

This translation of Book 1 Distinctions 4 to 10 of the *Ordinatio* (aka *Opus Oxoniense*) of Blessed John Duns Scotus is complete. It is based on volume four of the Vatican critical edition of the text edited by the Scotus Commission in Rome and published by Quarrachi.

I decided not to translate volume three, containing distinction 3, because a translation of that volume has been completed by Professor John van den Bercken and published by Fordham University Press, 2015. However distinction 3 in the Commentary on the Sentences by Antonius Andreas, one of Scotus' most faithful students, is contained at the end in an appendix.

Scotus' Latin is tight and not seldom elliptical, exploiting to the full the grammatical resources of the language to make his meaning clear (especially the backward references of his pronouns). In English this ellipsis must, for the sake of intelligibility, often be translated with a fuller repetition of words and phrases than Scotus himself gives. The possibility of mistake thus arises if the wrong word or phrase is chosen for repetition. The only check to remove error is to ensure that the resulting English makes the sense intended by Scotus. Whether this sense has always been captured in the translation that follows must be judged by the reader. In addition there are passages where not only the argumentation but the grammar too is obscure, and I cannot vouch for the success of my attempts to penetrate the obscurity. So, for these and the like reasons, comments and notice of errors from readers are most welcome.

Peter L.P. Simpson
March, 2016

THE ORDINATIO OF BLESSED JOHN DUNS SCOTUS

Book One

[Third Distinction. See Appendix p.298]

Fourth Distinction

First Part

On the Predication of Otherness in Divine Generation

Single Question: *Whether this proposition is true*
'God generates another God'

Num. 1

Second Part

On the Predication of the Name of God in the Divine Persons

Single Question: *Whether this proposition is true*
'God is Father and Son and Holy Spirit'

Num. 7

I. To the Question

Num. 9

II. To the Principal Argument

Num. 14

Appendix

[From the *Cambridge Reportatio*] [Page 14]

Fifth Distinction

First Part

On the Generation of the Divine Essence

Single Question: <i>Whether the divine essence generates is or generated</i>	Num. 1
I. To the Question	
A. Opinion of Abbot Joachim against Peter Lombard	Num. 8
B. Against the Opinion of Abbott Joachim	Num. 10
C. For the Opinion of Peter Lombard	Num. 12
II. To the Principal Arguments	Num. 25

Second Part

On the Generation of the Son

Single Question: <i>Whether the Son is generated from the substance of the Father</i>	Num. 46
I. The Opinion of Others	Num. 52
II. Scotus' own Response to the Question	
A. The Son is not Generated from the Substance of the Father as from Matter or Quasi-matter	Num. 93
B. The Son is truly from the Substance of the Father	Num. 98
C. How Relation and Essence can exist in the Same Person	Num. 106
III. To the Arguments of the Opinion of Others	Num. 142
IV. To the Arguments	Num. 150

Sixth Distinction

Single Question: <i>Whether God the Father generated God the Son by Will</i>	Num. 1
I. To the Question	Num. 7
A. How the Father generates the Son willingly	Num. 8
B. How the Father does not Generate the Son by Will as by Productive Principle	Num. 16
II. To the Principal Arguments	Num. 30

Seventh Distinction

Question 1: <i>Whether the Power of Generating in the Father is something Absolute or a Property of the Father</i>	Num. 1
I. The Opinions of Others	
A. First Opinion	Num. 9
B. Second Opinion	Num. 18
II. To the Question	
A. On the Distinction of Powers	Num. 27
B. The Father's Power of Generating is Something Absolute	Num. 35
C. To the Form of the Question	Num. 65
III. To the Arguments	
A. To the Principal Arguments	Num. 66
B. To the Arguments against the First Opinion	Num. 74
Question 2: <i>Whether there can be several Sons in Divine Reality</i>	Num. 92
I. The Opinions of Others	Num. 93
II. To the Question	Num. 101

Eighth Distinction

First Part

On the Simplicity of God

Question 1: <i>Whether God is supremely Simple</i>	Num. 1
I. To the Question	Num. 5
A. Proof of the Simplicity of God through Particular Middle Terms	Num. 6
B. Proof of the Simplicity of God through Common Middle Terms	Num. 16
II. To the Principal Arguments	Num. 20
Question 2: <i>Whether any Creature is Simple</i>	Num. 27
I. To the Question	
A. The Opinion of Others	Num. 29
B. Scotus' own Opinion	Num. 32
II. To the Arguments	Num. 35
Question 3: <i>Whether along with the Divine Simplicity stands the fact that God, or anything formally said of God, is in a Genus</i>	Num. 39
I. First Opinion	
A. Exposition of the Opinion	Num. 44
B. Reasons against the Opinion	Num. 51
C. To the Arguments for the Opinion	Num. 80

II. Second Opinion	Num. 90
III. Scotus' own Opinion	Num. 95
A. Proof of the First Part of the Opinion	Num. 96
B. Proof of the Second Part of the Opinion	
I. By the Reasons of Augustine and Avicenna	Num. 97
2. By what is Proper to God	Num. 100
3. Statement and Refutation of Some People's Proof	Num. 116
IV. To the Arguments for the Second Opinion	Num. 128
V. To the Principal Arguments	Num. 136
Question 4: <i>Whether along with the Divine Simplicity can stand a Distinction of Essential Perfections preceding the Act of the Intellect</i>	Num. 157
I. The Opinions of Others	Num. 159
A. First Opinion	Num. 160
B. Second Opinion	Num. 174
II. To the Question	Num. 191
III. To the Principal Argument	Num. 218

Appendix

[From the *Cambridge Reportatio*] [Page 220]

Second Part

On the Immutability of God

Single Question: <i>Whether only God is Immutable</i>	Num. 223
I. God is Simply Immutable	Num. 226
II. Nothing else besides God has Immutability	Num. 230
A. Of the Intention of the Philosophers	
1. The Opinion of Henry of Ghent	Num. 232
2. Scotus' own Opinion	Num. 250
B. Reasons for and against the True Intention of the Philosophers	
1. Reasons on behalf of this Intention	Num. 259
2. Reasons against this Intention	Num. 263
C. Scotus' own Opinion	Num. 292
III. To the Principal Arguments	
A. To the Principal Argument	Num. 294
B. To the Reasons for the Intention of the Philosophers	Num. 302

Ninth Distinction

Single Question: *Whether the Generation of the Son in Divine Reality is Eternal*

I. Solution of the Question

II. To the Principal Arguments

Num. 1

Num. 6

Num. 12

Tenth Distinction

Single Question: *Whether the Holy Spirit is produced through the Act and Mode of the Will*

I. Solution of the Question

II. Doubts

A. Response of Henry to the Two first Doubts

B. Against the Response of Henry

C. Scotus' own Response

III. To the Principal Arguments

Num. 1

Num. 6

Num. 10

Num. 13

Num. 25

Num. 30

Num. 59

Appendix

[Scotus' extended annotation to n.41
and from the *Cambridge Reportatio*] [Page 285]

THE ORDINATIO OF BLESSED JOHN DUNS SCOTUS

Book One

Fourth Distinction

First Part

On the Predication of Otherness in Divine Generation

Single Question

Whether this proposition is true 'God generates another God'

1. There is another question, about 'other' [*Parisian Reportatio* IA d.4 n.1] – It is contained in the Cambridge question [*Reportatio* IC], but in this way [sc. as opposed to the way it is contained in *Reportatio* IA]: as it is in the case of all concrete terms, whether substantives or adjectives – wherefore they are not numbered the way something having a form is.¹ Another question, the common one, 'whether God generates God', of which the Cambridge question can be the article.²

2. For the arguments 'pro' and 'con' see the *Parisian* [*Reportatio* IA d.4 nn.2-5].

3. Solution. There is, corresponding to any entity, some thing or someone, as its 'in which'; deity is of itself a 'this', therefore God is of himself a 'this'; therefore non-

¹ *Reportatio* IC d.4 p.1 q. un: "...but in a thing which is a 'this' no otherness falls as such; therefore since one cannot there say 'another entity' or 'another deity', one could not there say 'another God', for 'God' in the manner of a concrete term responds adequately to deity... Hence when it is said 'Socrates is other than Plato in humanity', there is introduced a distinction between Socrates and Plato and an agreement of both in humanity, and the phrase introduces a distinction and a numbering of humanity in them. So since deity in divine reality is not numbered in the supposits, therefore this proposition is false 'the Father is other than the Son in deity'."

² See appendix point A. The Vatican editors opine that Scotus intended the lacunas in the *Ordinatio* to be supplied from materials in the two *Reportationes*. Hence they include the relevant sections of the Cambridge *Reportatio* in an appendix (the *Parisian Reportatio* is already in the process of being edited and published in separate volumes by the same Vatican editors).

identity is in itself repugnant to him; 'other' posits non-identity about him, because it is a determinable of him [IA d.4 n.6].

4. These three phrases are distinguished – other than God, other by deity, other in deity: the locution 'another God' does not posit the first two but the third. [IA d.4 nn.7-10].

5. On the contrary: 'other' connotes that the same extremes are in a determinable form. – Response: they are the same in one way in that form, different in another [IA d.4 n.10].

6. Another doubt, same God and other God: the term 'God', as it is compared to subject and determination, is understood in the same way in both cases, otherwise in one proposition the term would be understood under opposite modes of understanding; therefore if it has a personal and not a simple distinction with respect to the subject, it has the same distinction with respect to the term 'other' [IA d.4 n.13].

Fourth Distinction

Second Part

On the Predication of the Name of God in the Divine Persons

Single Question

Whether this proposition is true 'God is Father and Son and Holy Spirit'

7. About the second part of the fourth distinction I ask about the truth of this proposition 'God is Father and Son and Holy Spirit'.

It seems that it is not true, because its contradictory seems to be true 'no God is Father and Son and Holy Spirit', because each singular is true – because God is not Father and not Son and not Holy Spirit.

8. On the contrary:

Father and Son and Holy Spirit are one God – this proposition is true, therefore also its converse. The antecedent is plain from Augustine *On the Trinity*, in many places.

I. To the Question

9. I reply that the proposition is true, because the term puts first in the sentence what it first signifies, and if one or other extreme is the same as it, the affirmative proposition denoting such identity is true: but 'God' signifies the divine nature as it is

naturally predicated of a supposit, and the thing signified is the same for the three persons; therefore the proposition signifying this is true.³

10. But is it the case that it has the same truth as this one ‘deity is the Father and the Son and the Holy Spirit’?

I reply. Just as predication in divine reality is distinguished into formally true and true by identity,⁴ so this proposition ‘Father and Son and Holy Spirit are God’ is true formally, and this proposition is true by identity ‘Father and Son and Holy Spirit are deity’, but not formally; therefore this proposition too ‘God is Father’ etc. has some truth – speaking of formal predication – which this other one ‘deity is Father’ etc. does not have.

11. But for what does ‘God’ supposit, understanding that truth [‘God is Father and Son and Holy Spirit’] to be quasi-formal predication?

I reply. To each ‘in which’ there corresponds a proper ‘what’ or ‘who’, and therefore to deity as deity there responds a ‘what’ or a ‘who’. First ‘God’ by deity is a being as deity is, and just as deity is of itself a ‘this’, so God – who is God by deity – is of himself a ‘this’ [n.3], and in this concept there is not included incommunicability or idea of person, because deity is communicable, – and therefore God as ‘by deity God is’ does not include anything formally incommunicable. To this concept then as so understood, without conception of persons or of personal features, some real predicates can belong, namely those which do not belong to the nature as existing in idea of supposit, but to this nature as existing in this nature, insofar as it exists in it; in this way perhaps this

³ See appendix point B.

⁴ An interpolated text is worth noting here: “namely, that formal predication is when the predicate agrees formally with the subject, – predication by identity when, because of the divine simplicity, the predicate is the same as the subject though not formally.”

proposition is true ‘God creates’, and the like, understanding the subject to be ‘this God’ existing in divine nature, and not understanding any supposit, nor anything incommunicable in the nature, because incommunicability is not the idea of such acts; and thus one can posit that this proposition ‘God is Father and Son and Holy Spirit’ is true, insofar as ‘God’ stands for ‘this God’ – insofar as he is by deity a *per se* being – but not for any supposit properly said, in which the divine nature exists, because when there is truth in the things first signified by the terms, one should not look for truth in others in which those things first signified are included, – just as when the consequent has its own truth, one should not look for its truth precisely in any antecedent.

12. An example of this: ‘this’ color, an existing singular, does not determine for itself the idea of supposit (because the proper idea of supposit is not in accidents), and although it exists in a supposit of substance, yet insofar as it is understood without the substance in the supposit – as ‘this existing color’ – it can be the principle of a real operation, just as, if the same whiteness were in three surfaces, it would have one real act, namely the one idea of diffusing sight. And if, about the truth of this proposition ‘this color diffuses sight’, you ask me for what the term ‘color’ supposits, – I say that it supposits for its first signified thing, namely for ‘this existing color’, but not for any color inferior to this color, namely for ‘this color’ in this surface or in that, because the things that contract color are not the causes of the truth of this proposition, but it is true because of the first extreme terms.

13. Much more would this be true if this color as ‘this’ were a *per se* being. But deity is *per se* existence, and so God insofar as he is God by deity is a *per se* being, because *On the Trinity* VII ch.6 n.11: ‘the Father is by the same thing by which he is God,

although it is not that he is and that he is Father by the same thing'; and so to 'this God', without understanding any idea of supposit or person – nay, by understanding the idea of 'this God' – can be attributed 'Father and Son and Holy Spirit'.

II. To the Principal Argument

14. To the argument for the opposite [n.7] I say that that proposition is not the contradictory if the distribution be taken precisely for the persons, because then what is first affirmed in the affirmation is not denied [n.9]; but if it negate the predicate from the first thing of God signified, namely from this God [n.11], it is false. – And this is what is usually said, because 'such a universal negative does not contradict the term having simple supposition, although it do contradict the term having personal supposition'; but this [contradicting the term having simple supposition] seems probable if the maxim of the sophists is true – 'when two things are included in any well-formed phrase, one of them is not referred to anything that the other is not referred to';⁵ but in this quantifier 'no' there is included negation and distribution, therefore when the distribution has regard precisely to the supposits of such a nature, the negation too will have regard to the same, – and then the universal negation is true; but it would not be the contradictory of the first proposition, but this would be 'God is not Father and Son and Holy Spirit',

⁵ Peter of Spain *Logical Summaries* tr.12 n.32: "Hence the ancients say that the premises are double but the conclusion is not, because of a certain reason of this sort that they give: 'whenever negation and distribution are included in the same phrase or single term, to whatever one of them is referred the other is too.' Hence when a distribution, set down obliquely, does not reach the verb, neither does the negation, as in this case: 'no thing seen is something seen'." This sentence trades on a sophism, as if to see a no thing were like seeing a blue thing, so that to see nothing is really to see something. But 'no' is a negation and it is negating the word 'seen', not qualifying the word 'thing', so that 'no thing seen' means 'not seeing'. In any event the sentence is false.

where the same thing is denied as was first affirmed, – and this negation is false of the same thing, in the subject, of which the affirmation is true.⁶

⁶ See appendix point C.

Appendix

[*Reportatio* IC d.4 q.1]

Book One

Fourth Distinction

First Part. Single Question

[Point A]

2, 16 – About the fourth distinction I ask whether this proposition is true ‘God generates another God’.

It seems that it is:

God generates God; either himself God or another God; not himself, Augustine *On the Trinity* I ch.1 n.1; therefore another God.

Second thus: the one generating is distinguished from the one generated; but God generates God; therefore God generated is distinguished from God generating, and consequently God generates another one.

Third thus: God generates another; either then another God, and thus the proposition is obtained, – or another non-God, which is false, because thus the one generated would not be God.

Fourth thus: God generates another possessing deity, therefore he generates another God. The consequence is plain from Damascene *On the Orthodox Faith* ch.55: “‘God’ means one having divine nature, ‘man’ human nature.

On the contrary:

“There is no other God” [*Tobit* 13.4.]

“Hear, O Israel, the Lord thy God is one” [*Deuteronomy* 6.4]

One must say that this proposition is not true. The reason for which is that there adequately responds to any entity some thing or someone; but divine essence is a singular entity and in no way multipliable, as is plain from what is said below [IC d.4 q.2]; therefore there determinately responds to it some thing or someone. But in a thing which is a ‘this’ no otherness falls as such; therefore since one cannot there say ‘another entity’ or ‘another deity’, one could not there say ‘another God’, for ‘God’ in the manner of a concrete term responds adequately to deity.

One must understand, then, that just as in creatures there is a difference between ‘Socrates is other than humanity’, and ‘he is other by humanity’, or ‘he is other in humanity’, so also, with respect to deity or God, ‘other’ implies negation of identity. Hence ‘other’ means non-same.

When therefore ‘other’ is placed first, negation is posited universally with respect to the predicate, which is understood to be universally negated from the subject; and so this proposition is false ‘Socrates is a thing other than man’, but this is true ‘Brownie (or a donkey) is a thing other than man’. And therefore this proposition is simply false of the person of the Father ‘the Father is other than God’ or ‘he is another God’. I say the same of the other divine persons. – But when in the second way there is taken ‘Socrates is other by humanity’, there is likewise universal denial with respect to anything not participating humanity, and it constitutes a true proposition: as ‘Socrates is other than a stone by humanity’, likewise ‘God the Father is other than a stone by deity’; but it makes a false proposition with respect to those things that do participate it; hence this proposition is

false ‘Socrates is other than Plato by humanity’, and likewise ‘the Father is other than the Son by deity’. But in the third way, when it is said ‘Socrates is other in humanity’, one must understand that in this manner of locution ‘other’ implies two things, namely distinction between the things that are compared together and community of that in which they are compared, along with distinction and enumeration of it in them; hence when it is said ‘Socrates is other than Plato in humanity’, there is introduced a distinction between Socrates and Plato and an agreement of both in humanity, and the phrase introduces a distinction and a numbering of humanity in them. So since deity in divine reality is not numbered in the supposits, therefore this proposition is false ‘the Father is other than the Son in deity’.”

To the first argument one must say that this proposition is true ‘God generates God’; for terms taken concretely supposit for supposits. And when it is said ‘either himself God, or another God’ [n.2], I grant neither, but I say that neither himself, nor another. But if you argue ‘either he generates the same God or another God’ (for, according to the Philosopher *Metaphysics* 10.3.1054b17-23, ‘same’ and ‘diverse’ are said of everything, and are reduced to contradictories), one must say that he generates the same God, – not however himself, because it is the fallacy of figure of speech, by change of ‘qualified what’ to ‘this something’; for when I say ‘he generates the same God’, there is no reciprocation, which however there is when ‘himself God’ is said.

To the second one must say that in that argument and like ones – where the relation of the middle term varies – there is the fallacy of accident. For when it is said ‘the one generating is distinguished from the one generated’, the otherness is taken with

respect to the supposit, along with opposite relation, but when it is said ‘God becomes other than God’, it is taken absolutely, not along with relation.

To the third one must say that God generates ‘another’. But one must not concede the other proposition, that ‘another God, or another non-God’; for ‘other God’ and ‘other non-God’ are not contradictories, but these are ‘other God’ and ‘non-other God’; – and so one must grant this proposition ‘he generates a non-other God’.

But if you say ‘on a negative about the finite predicate – with constancy of subject – there follows an affirmative about the infinite predicate, and so if he generates a non-other God, therefore he generates another non-God’, one must say that this rule does not whole of complex predicates, as the Philosopher says in *Prior Analytics* 1.46.52a18-21; hence those two propositions about a stone are false ‘a stone is white wood’ and ‘a stone is non-white wood’, just as also these two ‘God generates another God’ and ‘God generates another non-God’.

To the fourth one must say that when it is said ‘God generates another possessing deity’ only in the supposit is otherness implied, but not in deity, – and so when otherness is included in deity, more is concluded than was in the premises, and so there is the fallacy of the consequent. For the conclusion can only be thus: ‘what possesses deity is God, God generates another possessing deity, therefore God generates another who is God’, not ‘another God’. Or one could say that there is there the fallacy of figure of speech, by change of ‘this something’ to ‘qualified what’.

Second Part. Single Question

[Point B]

4, 13 – Hence God, in subject position, indicates the divine nature in agreement with the supposit, – Father and Son and Holy Spirit, on the part of the predicate, indicate the same nature by indifference and they state supposits; from which it follows that the proposition is true. However it is true that in its converse there is rather formal predication, because there the superior or common thing is understood to be predicated of its *per se* supposits; but predication is always more formal when the common thing is predicated of the less or quasi-common than conversely.

[Point C]

8, 6 – To make evident the second argument, one must know that, as was said in the preceding question, to any unique nature there adequately corresponds one singular, because the singular is either incommunicable, as it is in creatures, – or it is communicable, as it is in God. But the divine nature is altogether unique, un-multipliable and un-numerable, therefore to it there adequately corresponds one singular, which is expressed by the name of God, because this is understood by natural intelligence before any property of persons is. And that singular is considered to be some being for itself, with which agree all the properties, essential and perfective, before any property of persons; but that indeed which is a being for itself and of itself is in no way multipliable or numerable, although it is communicable to several supposits, which communication is understood through the notional properties. And just as this proposition is true ‘God is

Father and Son and Holy Spirit', so is this one 'this God is Father' etc. An example of this has been touched on, that if there were one color in three surfaces, that color – suppose it whiteness – would diffuse sight and would have all the perfections belonging to whiteness, but not as it is first in this surface or that, but by itself, although it have them as a universal existing in those surfaces, yet not first. Now it is the same way here.

Book One

Fifth Distinction

First Part

On the Generation of the Divine Essence

Single Question

Whether the divine essence generates is or generated

1. About the fifth distinction I ask first whether the divine essence generates or is generated.

That it does:

From Augustine *On the Trinity* VII ch.2 n.3: “Let us accept that when the Word is spoken of, it is just as if ‘Wisdom born’ were spoken of, so that in one of these, namely ‘born’, both Word and Son are taken, and so that in all these words there is not shown the divine essence, which is said in reference to itself, – but so that in the other term, namely ‘Wisdom’, the essence is shown, and in this respect it is said in reference to itself.”

Therefore he expressly intends that Wisdom, as it is Wisdom and said in reference to itself, is called born as ‘born’ is proper to the Son.

2. Again, Richard [of St. Victor] *On the Trinity* VI ch.22 seems expressly to speak against the Master of the *Sentences* [I d.5 ch.1]. “Many,” he says, “have arisen in our times who do not dare to speak of generated substance, but always rather (which is more dangerous and against the authorities of the saints) dare to deny and in every way to disprove that substance generates substance. They stubbornly deny what all the saints

affirm. For that which they themselves affirm they can find no authority, – for that which we say, even they themselves adduce many authorities, in the manner of Goliath [*1 Kings [Samuel]* 17.45-51]” etc. And because the Master expounds the authorities which he adduces against himself [those of Augustine and Hilary, *I d.5 ch.1 nn.57-64*], Richard subjoins about him: “They say [sc. the Master and his followers], ‘The Fathers do well say that substance generates substance; our exposition contends that we believe substance does not generate substance’: – a faithful ‘exposition’, and worthy of all praise, because that which the Fathers proclaim they contend to be false, and what none of the saints asserts they contend to be true.” Thus Richard. – He seems to mock the Master in expounding as it were against the intention of the Fathers the authorities which he adduces against himself, and asserts – as it seems – the opposite of what the Master holds to be true and to be of the intention of the Fathers.

3. Again, by reason: essence is communicated, therefore it is produced. The antecedent is plain from Augustine *On the Trinity* XV ch.26 n.47: “generation without beginning bestows essence on the Son.” The proof of the consequence is both that to communicate and to be communicated are relational opposites, and only state a relation of origin (for they do not assert common relations, as is plain; therefore they assert opposite relations of origin; therefore they are the same as to produce and to be produced), and also that if there are two correlations, and if one extreme of one of them is the same as one extreme of the other, then the remaining extreme is the same as the remaining extreme. Example: if *a* and *b* were correlative and *c* and *d* correlative, then if *a* and *c* are the same, then *b* and *d* are the same, – the proof is that otherwise the same thing would be said with reference to several correlatives, as *a*, which is the same as *c*, would be said

correlatively to *b* and *d*, which for you are diverse; and here is one combination of relatives of this sort, ‘producing’ and ‘produced’, and another ‘communicating’ and ‘communicated’; but ‘producing’ and ‘communicating’ are the same, therefore the extremes corresponding to them are also the same.

4. Again, by logical arguments:

When a predicate is predicated *per se* of a subject, it can supposit for it, – the thing is plain in superiors and inferiors; essence is predicated *per se* of the Father, ‘the Father is essence’; therefore etc. – Proof of the minor, because it is not *per accidens*, because one is not an accident of the other, nor both of a third; and these are the two modes of unity *per accidens* that are posited in *Metaphysics* 5.6.1015b16-36, the chapter on ‘one’.

5. Again, essence is father of the Son, therefore the essence generates. Proof of the antecedent, by conversion: father of the Son is essence; therefore essence is father of the Son. Proof of the consequence: essence is father of the Son, therefore the Son is son of essence; proof of this consequence, because in relatives the consequence is mutual: *a* is father of *b*, therefore *b* is son of *a*; therefore if essence is father of someone, this someone is son of essence.

6. Again, the generated insofar as it is generated is something, because it is not nothing, and between nothing and something there is no middle; but nothing in divine reality is something unless it is essence, therefore the Son insofar as he is generated is essence; therefore essence is generated.

7. To the contrary is the Master in the text.

I. To the Question

A. Opinion of Abbot Joachim against Peter Lombard

8. On this question Abbott Joachim was in error, whose argument is reported in the *Decretals of Gregory IX* bk.1 tit.1 ch.2, ‘On the Supreme Trinity and the Catholic Faith’, “We condemn” etc. For he said that Master Peter [Lombard] was a heretic, because he said there was a thing in divine reality that neither produces nor is produced [I d.5 ch.1 n.54]. For Joachim made his inference from this, insinuating that Peter posited a quaternity in divine reality; for he posited three things in divine reality, a generating thing and a thing generated and a thing inspirited, – and he posited a thing neither generating nor generated nor inspirited [*ibid.* n.58]; therefore he posited four things.

9. Joachim, avoiding this discordant result that seemed to follow, posited that no one thing is Father and Son and Holy Spirit, but he only said that the persons were one thing in the way that many faithful are said to be ‘one Church’, because of one faith and one charity; and this he proved by the saying of the Savior (*John* 10.30) when praying for his faithful: “that they might be one,” he says, “as we are one.” Joachim therefore inferred: since the faithful are not one by unity of nature, therefore neither is the Son one thing with the Father.

B. Against the Opinion of Abbott Joachim

10. This second thing in the opinion of Joachim is heretical, namely that Father and Son and Holy Spirit are not some one thing, because as is argued in the afore cited

chapter [of the *Decretals*, n.8], ‘The Father by generating gave his essence to the Son’ (for he could give nothing else by which the Son would be God), and for a like reason both gave their essence to the Holy Spirit; ‘for the communication was not of part of the essence, because the essence is simple and indivisible, – therefore of the whole essence; therefore the whole same essence, which is in the Father, is in the Son and in the Holy Spirit, and, because of the divine simplicity, each person is that thing, and all three persons are that thing’.

11. Now as to what Joachim argued from the Gospel [n.9], it is there solved, for ‘the Savior understands in his prayer that his faithful are one in a unity proportional to themselves, just as the Father and Son are one in a unity proportional to themselves, – that is, just as the Father and Son are one in the unity of charity which is their nature, so the faithful are one in participated charity’. And this exposition is there proved by the like saying of the Savior (*Matthew* 5.48) saying to his disciples: “Be ye perfect even as your heavenly Father is perfect,” namely with essential goodness; where he did not admonish that we be perfect of ourselves naturally, as the heavenly Father is perfect of himself naturally, with a perfection essentially belonging to himself, but that we be perfect with the perfection belonging to us, namely of grace and the virtues.

C. For the Opinion of Peter Lombard

12. [As to the reality of the question] – However as to the first article [n.9], in which Joachim said that Master Peter was heretical, the Pope contradicts him [Innocent III, 4th Lateran Council, 1215AD]: “But we, with the approval of the sacred Council,

believe and confess with Peter [Lombard], namely that one supreme thing is essence or divine nature, which neither generates nor is generated; yet it does not follow that there is a quaternity, because those three things – Father and Son and Holy Spirit – are that one thing.” But there cannot be a quaternity unless there is a fourth, really distinct from the first three.

13. For this opinion, then, thus solemnly approved, there is adduced this sort of reason: a generating thing generates something, and generates a really distinct thing, because “nothing generates itself so as to exist,” *On the Trinity* I ch.1 n.1; but essence in divine reality is altogether indistinct; therefore it is neither generating nor generated, because there is a generating by the same reason that there is a generated.

14. To this are reduced the reasons of the Master in the text, that essence ‘would be referred to itself’ and ‘would be distinguished from itself’ [I d.5 ch.1 n.55]; but a third reason is that the Father would exist formally by that by which he generates, because he is formally the very essence that is in the Son, because of the lack of distinction of the essence, – and if he were to generate it, he would not formally be it, because it would be distinct from him and posterior in origin.

15. There is added too another reason, that in creatures form does not generate nor is generated, but the composite is; now deity is disposed as form in a person; therefore it neither generates nor is generated.

This reason has less evidence here than in creatures, because in creatures form is not something *per se* existing so that it could be operator; but here deity, without co-understanding the personal properties, is of itself a being in act [d.4 n.11].

16. The reason is however confirmed, because operation, which belongs necessarily to a distinct operator, cannot belong to that which here exists as form, because form is *per se* indistinct in the three; but such operation is personal, as to generate is.

Let this be said as to the reality of this question.

17. [As to the logic of the question] – But speaking of the logic, why cannot this proposition ‘essence generates’ be true as essence supposits there for a person, just as this proposition is true ‘God generates’ because God supposits for the Father, – and yet God is not distinguished from himself, nor is God formally he who is generated although God does generate God?

18. I reply and give the following reason for the intended proposition: whenever a subject is abstracted with ultimate abstraction⁷ and the predicate of its idea cannot be predicated save formally, the proposition cannot be true of such terms save *per se* in the first mode; the subject here, namely deity or the divine essence, is abstracted with ultimate abstraction, and the predicate of its idea, namely generating, cannot be predicated save formally; therefore the proposition could not be true save *per se* in the first mode; but in this way it is not true, because the predicate is not *per se* in the understanding of the subject – “for everything that is said in relation to something is something beside the relation” (*On the Trinity* VII ch.1 n.2), such that the relation is not within the concept of the absolute thing.

19. The major of this syllogism I declare in this way:

⁷ The following interpolated note [*Reportatio* IA d.5 nn.19, 21] may be helpful here: “Note, ultimate abstraction is when the formal idea of something is considered according to itself, apart from anything not included *per se* in it; if the idea of something is taken most precisely, nothing formally agrees with it save what is *per se* included in that idea.”

In the case of substances, although there can be in the same one really – even if it is simple – many substantial perfections formally distinct, and although there one formal idea could be abstracted from another, while the concretion of each formality with their own proper supposits still remains (for example, although this proposition is true ‘the intellective substance is volitional’ – where there is a concretive predication of the perfection of one substantial feature about another – yet this proposition is denied ‘the intellect is will’, because these terms signify the perfections as abstract from each other, and that according to their proper formalities; however these thus abstract terms still concern the proper supposits, because here ‘intellect’ is an intellect), yet, by taking the substance, whether simple or composite, precisely according to one formal quidditative idea, there is only abstraction from the supposit of the proper nature in common, because the substances do not naturally concern anything of another nature; therefore this first abstraction [n.20 for the second abstraction] is the greatest. For by abstracting human nature from the supposits that truly are of that nature – as humanity is abstracted when it is conceived – there does not remain any further abstraction; and this thing as thus conceived is precisely its very self, because extraneous to anything else, – as Avicenna says *Metaphysics* 5 ch.1 that ‘equinity is only equinity’ and nothing else.

20. But in the case of accidents, as many abstractions can be made as there can be many things they concern. Accidents indeed concern supposits of another nature, and although they are abstracted from them, yet they concern individuals of the proper nature, – just as white concerns wood, and although whiteness is abstracted from this, yet it still concerns this whiteness and that, which are its individuals. – But further, there is abstraction of quiddity from the supposit, which is the sort of abstraction said to happen

in the case of substances [n.19], and we have a circumlocution for this by the fact we speak of the quiddity of whiteness⁸ – and this does not concern any subject whether of the same or different nature.

21. In relations too, that concern many things, there can still be many abstractions; for a relation concerns its proper individual, both foundation and subject, – and although it is abstracted from the latter yet it is not abstracted from the former.

An example. This concrete term which is ‘cause’ is said of fire, which generates heat in wood. – But, abstracting from the subject, there still remains concretion with a foundation, to wit if one say ‘the power of causing’; for heat is a power of causing heat, yet fire is not a power of causing it. – There can be still a further abstraction to the proper genus, to wit if one say ‘causality’, and then neither fire nor heat receives the predication of it; yet this causality is ‘causality which is the ultimate abstraction of the sort that is in substances’ [n.19] through the fact that we speak of ‘quiddity of causality’, and this is predicated of nothing else.

22. And, from the things thus shown or narrated, it is apparent what ultimate abstraction is, that it is ‘of the most absolute quiddity, taken from everything that is in any way outside the idea of the quiddity’,⁹ – and from this is apparent the first term of the major.

⁸ The term for the quiddity of whiteness would be something like ‘whiteness-eity’, which is as barbarous as Scotus’ *albedineitas*, but it serves its purpose.

⁹ Note of Scotus: “This point ‘about multiple abstraction’ what is its validity? ‘This humanity’ is humanity, and ‘this whiteness-eity’ is whiteness-eity, – and universally, there can be no abstraction, however ultimate (provided, however, that the concept be common, as it always should be), without the abstracted thing being said of its singular ‘*per se*’; but this singular is not the supposit when the quiddity is abstracted from what has the quiddity; thus in the case of accidents the abstracted thing never has a supposit for singular.

Therefore in the case of accidents a multiple abstraction is posited, from a more remote and from a nearer subject [n.20], – as relation from its supposit (or subject) and from its foundation [n.21] – in the case of substance a single abstraction, from its supposit, but not from the singular

23. About the other term of the major, namely that the predicate ‘is of necessity formally predicated about whatever it is predicated,’ [n.18], one must note that substantives can be doubly predicated in divine reality, sometimes formally and sometimes by identity; but adjectives, if they are predicated, are of necessity formally predicated, and this because they are adjectives, – for, from the fact they are adjectives, they signify form by way of what informs; and so they are said denominatively of the subject, and consequently by way of what informs the subject, and thus they are said formally of it; of such sort are not only adjectival nouns but all participles and verbs.

24. With these things understood, the assumed major is plain, that ‘when something is abstracted with ultimate abstraction – such that it is abstracted from everything which is outside its idea – and the predicate is not predicated of it save formally, there is no true union of such extremes unless it be formal and *per se* in the first mode’. Because this predicate is precisely of a nature to be predicated formally, therefore truth cannot be saved by identity alone, – and because the subject is abstracted with the highest abstraction, it cannot stand for anything in any way that is other than itself but precisely for itself formally, and so it would be necessary [for truth to be saved] that its idea were precisely formally the same as the predicate, which could not be unless the idea precisely included the predicate. – The minor too [n.18] is plain, because the extreme terms ‘essence generates’ or ‘deity generates’ [n.17] are not of such a sort, because

[n.19]; nor is it thus posited that in some abstraction ‘the abstracted thing’ is not predicated of something nor something of it, because this is impossible [as stated in the previous paragraph of this note], but it is enough for the intended proposition here [n.18] that the ultimately abstracted thing – that is abstracted from everything of a different nature and from the proper supposit, but not from the singular [n.22] – that about it nothing is formally predicated unless it is predicated ‘*per se* in the first mode’.

So is it the case then that ‘humanity’ is animality? – No. Humanity is not the singular of animality but this animality is; but man is as it were the supposit of animal.”

‘deity’ is something abstracted with highest abstraction; but ‘generates’ is a verb, therefore it cannot be predicated save formally.¹⁰

II. To the Principal Arguments

25. To the arguments for the opposite. – To the first authority of Augustine [n.1] – *Sentences* I d.21 ch.2 ‘the words of the authority occur...’ – the Master [Peter Lombard] responds in d.28 ch.6, that Wisdom stands for the hypostasis; “‘the essence is shown’ [n.1], namely it is shown that the Son is essence,” because the essential name stands for the person. The reason for this is stated: although wisdom is abstracted from the wise man, because he is the one operating, yet it still signifies the operative power or the operative principle, and therefore it is not abstracted with highest abstraction, because the operative power in some way concerns something; and, because of such sort of concretion, it is some way conceded that Wisdom is born, but not in any way that the essence is born. But as to Augustine sometimes saying that the Son is essence of essence, this is expounded in the following question ‘because this does not prove that the essence is generated or generating, but that it is something from which the Son is generated’ [nn.98, 101].

26. To the statement of Richard [n.2]. If he intends to blame the Master there, as appears from his words, – since the doctrine of the Master, and this one especially, is

¹⁰ An interpolated text is usefully noted here: “This name ‘God’ is not thus abstracted with ultimate abstraction, and therefore it can supposit for a person, as when it is said ‘God creates’, ‘God generates’ [d.4 n.11].”

confirmed by a General Council in the chapter cited above [n.12], I deny Richard¹¹ by holding to the Master. And as to his saying that the Master adduces many authorities against himself, the Master well expounds them, as will be plain in the following question [n.100]; not, however, that he has no authority for himself, but he does have the authority of the Universal Church, which is the greatest, because Augustine says *Letter against Fundamentus* ch.5 n.6: “I would not believe the Gospel if I did not believe the Church,” – which Church, just as it has decreed which books are to be held as authentic in the canon of the *Bible*, so too it has decreed which books are to be held as authentic in the books of the doctors, as is plain in the canon, and after the authority of the canon there is not found in the *Corpus Iuris* any writing as authentic as that of Master Peter in the chapter cited before.

27. To the reason about ‘communicating’ [n.3] I say that production has the thing produced for its first term, and I say that this ‘first term’ is the adequate term; and in this way the Philosopher says *Metaphysics* 7.8.1033b16-18 that the composite is first generated, because it is what first has being through production, that is, adequate being.

28. However, in the composite the form is the formal term of generation, but it is not the term *per accidens*, – as is plain from the Philosopher *Physics* 2.1.193b12-18, where he proves that form is nature by the fact that ‘generation is natural because it is the way to nature, but it is the way to form, therefore etc.’, – which reason would be nothing if form were only the term *per accidens* of generation. And in the same way he intends that form and end coincide in the same thing, which is not true of the end of the thing

¹¹ Note by Scotus: “The assertion [Richard *On the Trinity* VI ch.22] ‘In himself the person of the Father is nothing other than ungenerated substance, and the Son nothing than generated substance’ could be expounded the way the Greeks take it [sc. understanding substance as hypostasis].”

generated, but is true of the end of generation. Therefore form is truly the end of generation.

29. The thing, then, that generates has one relation to the first term – which term is called the thing produced or generated – and it has another relation to the formal term. And in creatures each relation is real, because each relation has terms really distinct, and there is a real dependence of each produced thing on what produces it. But in the proposed case [sc. of God] the producer has to the thing first produced a real relation, because it has a real distinction and a real origin, but to the formal term in the thing produced it does not have a real relation, because it does not have a real distinction, without which distinction there is no real relation. ‘To produce’ then in divine reality states a real relation, but ‘to communicate’ states a relation of origin, and as it were of idea, concomitant with that real relation; there is an example of this about the principle ‘in which’; in creatures this principle is really referred to the product, just as the ‘what’ principle is (for the art and the builder are referred to the same genus of cause, *Metaphysics* 5.2.1013b30-33), but here [sc. the case of God] the ‘in which’, because it is not distinct, does not have a real relation to the thing produced (I d.7 n.13), – so not conversely either, the formal term not having a real relation to the producer.

30. When it is said, therefore, that these relations are opposite, namely to communicate and to be communicated [n.3], – I say that they are relations of reason, opposite according to their proper ideas, although they are necessarily concomitant with some real opposed relations, namely to produce and to be produced; but yet the latter and the former relations are not formally of the same relative things.

31. By this same fact is given an answer to the second [n.3], that no extreme of one correlation is formally the same as some extreme of another. For the communicator and the producer, although they come together in the same supposit (because the nature is said properly to be communicating itself just as it is said to be properly communicated¹²), yet the communicating does not state formally the same relation as producing qua producing does, – for to be communicated and to be produced do not state the same either, nor do they first denominate the same.

32. To the logical arguments [nn.4-6].

When it is first argued about predication '*per se*' [n.4], I say that essence is not predicated 'in the first mode *per se*' of the Father, nor is it predicated formally. – When you prove it 'because not *per accidens*' [n.4], I say that, as in creatures, not every predication is either '*per se*' or '*per accidens*', taking accident properly, as when an accident is predicated of a subject; for the genus is not predicated *per se* of the difference, nor is it predicated *per accidens*, – because neither of them is accident of the other of them, but the difference is there a middle that is extraneous or inferior to the genus, and contracts it, which inferior can be called 'accidental' to the superior, that is, extraneous, but it is not properly an 'accident'; but in divine reality not everything is '*per se*' the same, that is, formally,¹³ nor yet is anything of another '*per accidens*' properly,¹⁴ but something is the same as something by absolute identity, without formal identity, – and thus it is in the intended proposition.

¹² Note by Scotus: "Whether essence is communicating or communicated? – That it is not: then the things produced are [n.3]; it is proved in two ways, as above [n.3]. – On the contrary: *On the Trinity* XV ch.26 and *John* 10.29, "My Father who gave them to me." – Solution: about the double term, first and formal [nn.27-29]; likewise about the double term, first and formal. – To the arguments..."

¹³ Note by Scotus: "'Predications *per se*' are formal, Aristotle did not hand it down in 'on identicals' [*Posterior Analytics* 1.4.73a21-73b26]."

¹⁴ Note by Scotus: "*On the Trinity* V ch.5 n.6: in God there is a middle between 'according to substance' and 'according to accident' [to wit: 'according to relative']."

33. To the other I say that this proposition ‘father is essence’¹⁵ can be distinguished, because ‘father’ can be taken adjectivally or substantively. In the second way it signifies the person to whom belongs paternity, and I concede that the proposition is true by identity, because a substantive can be predicated of anything by identity. In the first way it signifies the very property denominatively, and in this way the Master expounds [I d.27 ch.1 n.237] that to be father is the same as to have generated;¹⁶ in this way this proposition ‘essence is father’ is false, because it signifies that father is formally predicated of the subject.

34. When therefore you argue about subject and property, I say that when the property can be predicated by a predication of the same idea as that by which the subject is predicated, the property can be inferred from the subject when it has the same mode of predicating [n.24], – but when not, not. Here the subject – if it is subject – can be predicated by identity, the property – if it is property – cannot be, but only formally, because it is an adjective [n.23].

35. To the other, ‘essence is father of the Son’ [n.5]:

A certain doctor [Henry of Ghent] repeats the opinions of others, the first of Master Alexander [of Hales, *ST* Ia d.20 ad 5], who distinguished this proposition ‘essence is father of the Son’ in the way the preceding one, namely ‘essence is father’, was already distinguished [n.33], – because ‘father’ can be taken adjectivally and substantively, and in the first way he says it is false and the consequence [‘therefore father of the Son is essence’] not valid, – in the second way he says it is true. Another opinion he repeats from Master Praepositinus, who says that it is simply true, for which Praepositinus has

¹⁵ Note by Scotus: “father generates; father is essence; therefore [essence generates; IA d.5 n.36]. – Response: the predication varies.”

¹⁶ Note by Scotus: “The master in I d.27 ch.2 takes father only substantively.”

two reasons, – one by conversion (because if the converting proposition is true, the converted proposition will be simply true): “this proposition is true ‘father of the Son is essence’, therefore essence is father of the Son;” the other reason is that “this proposition is simply true ‘essence is father’: either then it is father of someone or of no one; if of no one, then there is altogether no father, – if of someone, and if of none but the Son, then essence is father of the Son.”

36. Against Master Alexander – nay against both masters – he argues thus and proves “the term ‘father’ is only held adjectivally, since names that are imposed from an active and passive power (as are master and disciple, father and son, builder, etc.) are only significative adjectivally, and this from the respect that they have to something else, which is what the power from which they are imposed has regard to. But whenever something has the idea of adjective, or of adjacent, from a respect to something else, the more determinate its respect the more it has the idea of adjacent or of adjective, and the less it has this idea the more indeterminate it is, – as is plain about the respect of the infinitive mode, which grammarians say has or says an infinite inclination to the supposit and can supposit more than other modes can [Priscian, *Institutiones Grammaticae* VIII ch.12 n.63, ch.13 n.69], because the others also have a finite inclination to the supposit, but the former has an infinite one; but an infinitive and an adjective in the neuter gender are more substantive than in the masculine or feminine. Therefore since ‘father of the Son’ has a finite and express relation – but it is not so when the term ‘father’ is posited *per se* – therefore, although it could be held substantively when saying ‘essence is father’,

yet it is only held adjectively when saying ‘essence is father of the Son’, and thus this proposition ‘essence is father of the Son’ is simply false.”¹⁷

37. “It is also plain that the first argument of Praepositinus is not valid, ‘father of the Son is essence, therefore essence is father of the Son’, by conversion [n.35], because it should be converted in this way: ‘therefore something that is essence is father of the Son’; just as this proposition ‘an individual is man’ is not converted in this way ‘therefore man is an individual’, but it in this other way ‘therefore something that is a man is an individual’. – Likewise the second reason [n.35] is not valid. When it is argued ‘essence is father, therefore father either of someone or no one’, – one must say that it does not follow, because of the fallacy of figure of speech (because as soon as ‘of someone or of no one’ is added the combination is otherwise than was first being supposed), and one must say that it is father of no one, that is, it is not father of anyone; and it does not follow from this that it is not father, because of the fallacy of figure of speech, but there only follows ‘therefore the property of paternity does not belong to it’.”

38. So he responds in a third way, that this proposition ‘essence is father of the Son’ is simply false, because of the aforesaid reason [n.36], because the term ‘father’ here is only held adjectively.¹⁸

39. Against his way of speaking [n.38] I argue thus:

¹⁷ Text cancelled by Scotus [quoting Henry]: “And if it is objected ‘essence is father, but it is not father except of the Son, therefore it is father of the Son or it is altogether not father’,” – response: “it is plain that there is a fallacy of figure of speech, because in the first proposition the term ‘father’ *per se* supposits for the whole person; but in the second proposition, when it is said that it is ‘father of the Son’, it combines only a property with the subject.”

¹⁸ There are thus three ways of dealing with the proposition ‘essence is father of the Son’. First Alexander’s: true substantively, false adjectively [n.35]; second Praepositini’s: simply true, because substantive only [n.35]; third Henry’s: simply false, because adjectival only [n.38]. Scotus also cancelled here a less full repetition of Henry’s remarks quoted in n.36.

What is included essentially in the concept of something as a part of the concept cannot be excluded from it under whatever mode it is conceived, because if it is conceived under some mode and that part is not included, then the mode is repugnant to the idea of the concept which is conceived. When, therefore, in the concept of a relative [sc. father], from the fact that the concept is relative – not as conceived relatively – its correlative is necessarily included as its term (because it can neither be nor be understood without it, just as not without the term either), then in whatever way it is conceived, whether adjectivally or substantively, the correlative is always included as term, and so in no way can it be understood as absolute; the point is confirmed about filiation [sc. filiation is correlative in the same way].

40. Again, then [sc. if Henry's position is correct] this proposition 'father of the Son is essence' would be incongruous, and a non-substantive adjective does not supposit incongruously. Indeed in this case in the subject ['father of the Son'] father is determined by the Son, to whom it has a determinate respect [n.36].

41. Therefore I hold the opinion of Alexander, distinguishing as he does, that the substantive is true and the adjectival is false.

42. To the reasons of Praepositinus: I say that the converse ['essence is father of the Son'; n.35] is true substantively, – adjectivally it is incongruous, because the masculine [sc. 'father' in the converting proposition] cannot be made substantive; to his second reason [n.35] I say that essence is father, and of someone, – and I concede too that it is father of the Son.

43. But when it is argued in the principal reason 'if essence is father of the Son, therefore the Son is son of essence' [n.5], I deny the consequence.

When it is proved through that ‘mutual consequence’ in relatives, I say that the mutual consequence holds in those relatives that are first relatives [father-son]; it holds also of those that are referred through relations [paternity-filiation] – if they are said formally as relations of them, – just as if formally Socrates is father of Plato, then conversely, formally Plato is son of Socrates. But in those relatives that are not referred first nor are denominated formally from those relations, but the relation is predicated of one of them by identity, that [mutual] consequence is not valid, because in that case more is indicated in the consequent than in the antecedent; for in the antecedent is noted the identity of the relation with that of which it is said, but in the consequent is indicated that the other thing is formally referred to it: for since it is said ‘the Son is son of essence’, from the force of the construction there is indicated that the essence is the proper correlative of that which is the Son, and so the Son is formally son of essence; but the antecedent does not indicate that the relation of paternity agrees with the essence formally, but only by identity.

44. To the final one [n.6] I say: when you take ‘the generated insofar as it is generated is something’, I deny it. And when you say ‘it is not nothing’, I say (as has often been said before, I d.1 n.58, d.2 nn.422-423, 431, d.3 n.326), that between contradictories there is a middle with ‘insofar as’, such that neither is present with ‘insofar as’, just as man ‘insofar as he is man’ is neither white nor ‘insofar as he is man’ is he non-white; but these two contradictory propositions are false together; for the true contradictory is ‘man not insofar as he is man is white’; so here ‘the generated not insofar as it is generated is something’, because the idea of being generated is not the formal idea

of the inherence of the predicate, although the generated – taken formally in itself – is essence by identity.

45. What then should be said of ‘generated insofar as generated’? – One can concede that ‘generated insofar as generated’ is the person, or subsisting, but it does not further follow ‘therefore insofar as generated it is something’, taking something for essence, – because of the formal non-identity of the idea of person with essence, etc. [I d.2 nn.388-410].

Fifth Distinction

Second Part

On the Generation of the Son

Single Question

Whether the Son is generated from the substance of the Father

46. Second a question is raised about the second part of the fifth distinction, whether the Son is generated from the substance of the Father.

That he is not:

Because *On the Trinity* VII ch.6 n.11: “We do not say three persons out of the same substance;” but substance seems to be disposed uniformly to any of the persons; therefore no person is from the substance.

47. Again, the construal of something with the genitive does not indicate a greater distinction of construable parts than does a preposition with its own case when it is added to the same construable; therefore no greater distinction is indicated in ‘the Son is of the essence of the Father’ than in ‘the Son is from the essence of the Father’; but it is not conceded that ‘the Son is of the essence of the Father’ [n.43], because then the essence of the Father would generate the Son.

48. Again, when the Son is said to be from the substance of the Father, either the ‘from’ indicates a distinction or it does not; if it does the proposition is false, because essence is not really distinguished from the Son; if it does not, then this proposition is true ‘the Father is from the essence of the Son or from the essence of the Father’, which is not conceded.

49. To the opposite:

Augustine *On the Trinity* XV ch.19 n.37 treating the saying in *Colossians* 1.13 ‘he has translated us to the kingdom of the Son of his charity’ says: “what is called ‘Son of his charity’ is nothing other than Son of his substance;” therefore the Son is from the substance of the Father.

50. Further, there is for this the authority of Augustine *Against Maximinus II* ch.14 n.2, and it is in the text: “In no way are you thinking of the true Son of God if you deny that he is from the substance of the Father.”

51. Again, a son in creatures is only he who is generated from the substance of the father; for that is why there is in inanimate things no paternity and no filiation, because they generate from foreign matter, – just as fire generates fire from the matter of air; therefore there is no true filiation save where the substance of the father, or something of the substance of the father, is the matter with respect to the son.

I. The Opinion of Others¹⁹

52. On this question it is said that, just as in created generable substance there is something potential, presupposed to generation, as matter, – and something introduced by generation, as form, – and something from these the product, which is generated, so proportionally in divine reality there correspond as it were three similar things; the person to be sure is the quasi-composite, and relation the quasi-form, and essence the quasi-matter. Therefore the Son is generated from the substance of the Father as from quasi-matter.

¹⁹ Henry of Ghent.

53. This is proved by the reason of Augustine *Against Maximinus*, which is placed in the text [of Lombard I d.5 ch.1 n.63: “but it is none of these; therefore it is born either from nothing or from some substance”]. For the Son is in no way from nothing, whether negatively, as when someone says he is speaking ‘of nothing’ when he is not speaking, or whether by affirming the ‘from’ so as to make it a mark of materiality or quasi-materiality, because nothing cannot be the matter of anything, or whether by affirming the ‘from’ by way of origin or order, that is in the sense of after nothing. Which three ways of understanding ‘something is from nothing’ are put down by Anselm *Monologion* ch.8. If the Son is in no way from nothing, therefore from something; therefore since not from anything other than the substance of the Father, then plainly he is from the substance of the Father.

54. And if one respond as the Master seems to respond in the text, that he is from the substance of the Father, that is, from the Father, who is substance, – the argument is that this response is not sufficient, because it only expounds the ‘from’ as it indicates the idea of originating or efficient principle; and once posited that he is in this way from the Father, the question still remains whether he is from something or from nothing as from matter or quasi-matter, and since he is not from nothing (because in this way the creature is from nothing), therefore from something, and the argument [n.53] stands.

55. For this [n.52] there is also adduced the authority of Augustine *On the Trinity* VII ch.2 n.3, that the Son is ‘born Wisdom’.

56. If one argue against this opinion [n.52] that ‘pure act cannot be quasi-matter in respect of generation, because it is in no way in potency’, and further, by the reason of the Master, ‘since there is one essence of three persons, the Son is generated from the

essence of the three’, – the response to the first is by saying that²⁰ “something is in potency to something which is absolute, and it differs from it in reality or in intention, and it goes from potency to act by a change and transmutation of the thing or the idea; in another way something is in potency to something which is a respect only, and it differs from it only in idea, never going through any transmutation from potency to act, and always naturally conjoined with act. In the first way, in creatures, matter is in potency to form as to something differing really from it, and it passes from potency to act by a real transmutation in the matter, – and likewise, the form of the genus is in potency to the form of the difference as to something different in intention from it, and it passes from potency to act by change of idea; in no such way [the first] is the divine essence in potency to anything, and it is about potency in this sense that the middle term in the argument is true, because this potency is repugnant to pure act. Things are not like this of potency in the second way, because it is from the nature of the divine form insofar as it is pure act; it is also the case that – in the second way – it is in potency to several respects.”

57. “Divine production, therefore, differs supremely from natural production, because in the latter there is a going through transmutation to perfection and the potency stands apart from act, but in the former not at all so. But the former differs specifically from the natural production which is generation, because the latter is from what is imperfect in substance, but the former is from perfect substance, wherein there is more agreement with the production that is alteration, because in this the subject – which is in potency ‘in a certain respect’ – is something existing in act; but it differs in this respect that the subject in the case of alteration is in potency to something absolute, really

²⁰ Scotus here proceeds to quote Henry of Ghent, *Summa* a.54 q.3 arg.7 of the third principle and response to arg.3.

differing from it, but in divine production not at all so, – and in this regard divine production agrees more with the production of the species from the genus (but it differs), because in the case of this production the genus is as the subject and matter and it is in potency to something absolute, as to the difference, which however differs from it only in intention; but in divine production the subject is in potency to something respective, which differs from it only in idea; and so, although the production of the species from the genus is more like divine production than any other one is, yet it differs in many respects, because the production of the species from the genus proceeds from incomplete being to complete being, taking up the determination of the complement through the difference, so that according to this and that really different thing it descend to this and that different species and is in idea only one common thing. But in divine production the subject is not something incomplete, determined by the assumption of a property, but one and the same singular being has being totally – through production – in diverse relative properties, which is something common not in idea but in communication.”

58. To the second [n.56] it is said that the Son is not from the substance insofar as it is the substance of the three, but as it is the substance of the Father.

59. To this opinion [n.52] there is added by others [following Henry] that the divine essence is said to be generated subjectively. For what is subjected to generation can be said to be subjectively generated, from the Philosopher *Physics* 5.1.225a25-27, where he argues that generation is not motion through this argument: ‘what is moved is; what is generated is not; therefore what is generated is not moved’. He takes ‘what is moved’ for the subject of motion, not for the term, because while it is motion it is not the term. But if he were to take ‘what is generated’ for the term of generation, not for the

subject, the argument would not be valid, because the term is not motion; therefore he must be taking ‘what is generated’ there for that which is subject to generation. This is also proved by the Commentator, at the same place, com.8-9.

60. For this opinion these sort of reasons are adduced:

That is said to be truly subjectively generated, or to be the subject of generation, which remains the same under each term of the generation; but the divine essence remains the same in the Father and the Son; therefore it will truly be the subject of generation.

61. A confirmation of the reason is that transmutation and the term are in the same thing as the disposition and the form to which the disposition disposes; therefore since in the essence there is relation, which is the quasi-term of generation, there will be in it generation itself.

62. Further, to every active power there corresponds some passive power; therefore to the fecundity of the quasi-active Father there will correspond some quasi-passive power, from which it can produce.

63. Finally there is an argument like this: if fire were to generate fire from its own substance, the substance of the fire generating would still thus be in potency to the form of the fire to be generated, just as now there is foreign matter from which it generates. So it is in the proposed case, the essence of the Father – from which the Father generates – will be the quasi-matter with respect to generation.

64. [Rejection of the opinion] – I argue against this opinion [n.52].

First in this way: essence is the formal term of the production and of the generation of the Son, therefore it is not quasi-matter.

Proof of the antecedent:

65. *John* 10.29: “What the Father gave me is greater than all things;” something ‘greater than all things’ is only something infinite; this is only essence, – so he gave essence.

66. This is also the intention of Augustine *On the Trinity* XV ch.26 n.47: “Just as generation bestows nature on the Son without beginning, so procession from both also bestows essence on the Holy Spirit without beginning.” But it is not conceded that any form was given or communicated by production or bestowed by generation unless the communicated form is the formal term of the production.

67. The antecedent is also proved in another way [n.64]:

First, because no formally univocal entity, being simply more perfect than the formal term, is attained through production; the essence is formally infinite, the relation is not; therefore if the relation were the formal term of production, the person would not have the essence by production.

68. Second, because in creatures nature is the formal term of production, but the individual or hypostatic property is not, – as is plain in *Physics* 2.1.193b12-13, where it is held that generation is natural, or is called nature, because it is “the way to nature”

[n.28].²¹

69. Similarly: otherwise [sc. if essence were not the formal term] this production would not be generation, but rather it would be a change to relation, because production is put in a genus or species from its formal term, as is plain from the Philosopher *Physics*

²¹ Text cancelled by Scotus: “The antecedent is also proved because otherwise this generation would not be univocal, because the formal idea of its term would not be the idea of the agreement of the generator with the generated; the consequent is discordant, as will be touched on in distinction 7 [I d.7 n.43].”

5.1.224b6-8, – as alteration is put in the genus of quality, because quality is there the form which is the formal term of alteration; therefore if the formal term of this sort of production were relation, this production would be put in the genus of relation, and it would not be generation.

70. Proof of the consequence of the first enthymeme [n.64]:

First, because that which is matter in generation is in potency to the formal term, – and what is quasi-matter is quasi in potency; essence is neither truly nor quasi in potency to itself; therefore etc.

71. Likewise, the same consequence is proved because one person has essence in only one mode of having, or at any rate does not have it in these two modes – as formal term of production and, along with this, as quasi-matter and subject of generation. The proof of this is that, if by force of production, it had essence as formal term, it would have it when everything else is removed; therefore it would not have it as quasi-matter subject to generation; for it does not have essence in any way such that, with that way removed, it would have it perfectly and would be true God. The consequence also seems to be that it would have essence twice, and it would naturally have it before it has it, if the idea of quasi-matter in some way precedes the formal idea of the term of generation.

72. Again, second to the principal [n.52]:²² to the essence, as from it the Son is generated, some being must be assigned, because to be principle of some true being – in whatever genus of principle – does not belong to anything save to a real being.

73. I ask therefore what being belongs to the essence as it is that from which the Son by impression is generated; either it is precisely being for itself, which is of essence

²² Text cancelled by Scotus: “Let the reason that is put fifth below be the second, and let the third be third, and let what is here second be the fourth, and let what is fourth be fifth.” Hence the paragraphs would have had to be renumbered thus: 64(71), 80(82), 76(79), 83(85), 72(75).

as essence, – and then the Son is from the essence as essence, and essence in this way is of the three persons; or being in some subsistence belongs to it. And then I ask, in which? Either in ungenerated subsistence, – and if so, since in the understanding of that which is ‘being from which something is produced’ there is included that which is ‘being that in which form is introduced’, and in the understanding of that which is ‘being in which’ is included ‘having that which is in it’ and consequently ‘being formally through it’, – therefore if the essence as it is in the Father is that from which the Son is generated (and by impression, according to them) it follows that essence as it is in the Father will be that in which generated knowledge is imprinted, and so essence as it is in the Father will be formally the Word or generated knowledge knowing, which is discordant [sc. for the Word would not then be of the Father; I d.2 nn.273-280]; but if essence, as it is a subsistence other than the Father, is that from which the Son is generated and in some way precedes, ‘insofar as it is that from which’, the term of generation, then before the term of generation there are two subsistences, which is discordant.

74. If essence ‘insofar as it is that from which the Son is generated’ has no existence in a person, just as matter too ‘insofar as it is that from which the generated is generated’ does not have being in any supposit but only has being in potency in the supposit to be generated, – this is worthless, because, as was said, to what is really principle of some being, in whatever genus of principle, there must be attributed some real being [n.72]; and so to matter as it is principle of the composite, although there does not belong to it the being of the composite that exists by participating it, yet there does belong to it its own proper being, which naturally is before it is part of the composite. So here, then, there must be given to the essence ‘insofar as it is that from which the Son is

generated' either being in a supposit or the being of essence in itself, and the argument stands [n.73].

75 If it be said in another way that 'insofar as it is of the Father' it is that from which the Son is generated, and yet by generation, namely insofar as generated knowledge is actually formed, it is actually of another supposit, – this has been rejected in the argument, because in the understanding of that which is 'to be from which' by impression there is included 'to be in which', and so to be formally such according to the thing impressed; likewise, in that case the communication of essence to another supposit would, in understanding, precede the production, such that the communication would not happen by production but would as it were happen before the term of production, – just as that which is the quasi-matter of generation is pre-understood in some way to its term; likewise, although something which is from itself not of some supposit in act may come by generation to be actually of some supposit, – just as matter which is not of some supposit may come to be of some supposit, – yet that that which is of one supposit should come to be of another supposit precisely by that which is matter seems impossible without any action which is directed to the matter.

76. Further, third: when the active and passive element come together in the production of an effect, the respect of the active to the passive is naturally prior to the respect of either to the product.

77. Proof, because diverse causes of the same thing must be naturally brought into proximity with each other before they produce the effect, – and it is plain from the example of heating fire and heatable wood and generated heat.

78. Again, these respects, namely of the active to the passive and of the active to the product, do not belong altogether equally to the active element, – and the respect to the product is not prior; therefore it is posterior. The antecedent of this enthymeme, as to each part, is proved thus, – because the active acts on the passive by itself alone by reason of cause; and if you altogether deny the priority of respect to respect, you cannot deny that necessarily the respect of the active to the passive is not posterior to the respect of each to the product.

79. Therefore if in the Father there is active fecundity and some quasi-matter that come together for the product, the respect of the Father as productive for that quasi-matter is prior to the respect of each of them to the Son, or at any rate it will be necessarily concomitant; and from this further: since the thing does not naturally pre-require – nor does it necessarily require at the same time – that which is precisely a being of reason, it follows that the naturally pre-required relation of the quasi-active element to the passive be real, and so in the Father there will be a real relation to something in himself, prior to his relation to the Son, or at least different from it, which seems discordant.

80. Again, fourth: the first power that is effectively causative causes by itself alone, excluding every other cause – both of the same genus and of a different genus – in idea of material cause.

81. And the reason is that material causality does not state perfection simply; and therefore, although a reduction be made to something first in that genus, yet that something is not simply first, but the whole genus is reduced to something first in another genus, which something does not include imperfection, – to wit to something first in the

genus of efficient cause. This antecedent [n.80] is also plain by the fact that creative power *per se*, without any material principle as the ‘in which’, produces the product.

82. From this is inferred by similarity that the first productive power produces by itself alone, and without any other productive principle concurring, and without any quasi-matter; for the reason seems similar about the productive and causative principle, that if some quasi-material principle were posited, it would not be – insofar as it is such – of supreme perfection, and so it would seem to be needing to be reduced, in idea of principle, to an actively productive principle.

83. Again, fifth, Augustine *Against Maximinus* II ch.14 says: “the Holy Spirit is not from any matter, nor from nothing, but he is thence whence he proceeds;” so Augustine concedes, therefore, that the Holy Spirit is not from nothing but from the substance of the Father and the Son, just as he concedes that the Son is from the substance of the Father.

84. And this is proved by reason, that in a similar way the relation of the Holy Spirit is in deity as is the relation of the Son; but the essence is not disposed in respect of the Holy Spirit as matter receptive of him according to that opinion – as it seems –, because it posits that the Word is generated by impression on that from which it is generated, but that the Holy Spirit is produced as by expression, or exhalation of itself, from the formed will from which it is produced. But what is produced by expulsion or expression from some ‘from which’ does not have that ‘from which’ as the matter in its production, because all matter – of the production and of the product – is that in which the form of the product is received, which is not by expulsion from it. The Holy Spirit therefore is not from nothing, nor yet from the quasi-matter of its production.

85. Therefore, because of the fact that the Son is not from nothing, or that his relation is founded in the essence, – the essence as ‘that from which the Son is generated’ should not be matter with respect to the generation of the Son [nn.52-53].

86. Again, to the same [i.e. the principal issue, Henry’s opinion, n.52]:

That the Son is from the substance of the Father is necessarily required for this generation, as to the real existence of generation; but for that existence it is not necessarily required that the substance of the Father be quasi-matter; therefore etc.

87. The major is plain from Augustine *Against Maximinus* [*ibid.*]: “In no way are you thinking of the true Son of God if you deny that he is from the substance of the Father [n.50].” The minor is plain, – no being of reason is precisely, necessarily required for this generation as it is existent [n.79]; that the substance of the Father is matter states precisely a being of reason about the substance, otherwise, with the activity of our intellect removed, he will be of himself quasi-matter, or matter really, or a real likeness to matter.

88. Again, to the [divine] essence belongs nothing in which matter is distinguished from form, but whatever belongs to it is either proper to the form or common [sc. to both matter and form]; therefore it is in no respect quasi-matter in the way it is quasi-form.

89. The antecedent is plain, because to be the same thing in generator and generated is not proper to matter; nay rather the soul [sc. which is form of the body] is the same in the heart generating as in a part generated [n.135], – matter never, in the case of the creature, because it is sufficiently actuated by the single form; in propagation, the matter of the generated was something, but it was not the matter under the form of the

propagator; there is a deception here in the remark [from Henry] ‘because there is the same matter of the thing corrupted and the thing generated’ – as if therefore it was the same in the generator and the generated.

90. Again, things simply impossible cannot be the act of something simply the same; however the ‘same’ can well be the act of impossibles, as the soul is of the organic parts [n.133].

91. Again, the composite is constituted by the fact that the potential is actuated and determined by the act of the composite; therefore the essence will be referred and determined [sc. to and by something else]. There is a confirmation: just as quality is not act save as the thing actuated is qualified, so the relation of anything is not actuated save as it is referred [to something]. Essence is not referred [to something].

92. Again, another reason – which is in the third doubt at the end [n.137] – that the supposit would be said to be a related thing according to its foundation. – An instance [of Henry against this]: ‘the Father is like the Son in deity’. However, this relation is not the act of the foundation as the relation is formally distinct from the foundation, according to you [sc. Henry].

II. Scotus’ own Response to the Question

A. The Son is not Generated from the Substance of the Father as from Matter or Quasi-matter

93. Therefore by holding with the ancient doctors – because they all from the time of Augustine up to the present did not dare to speak of matter or quasi-matter in divine

reality, although all said in agreement with Augustine that the Son is generated from the substance of the Father – I say that the Son is not generated from the substance of the Father as from matter or quasi-matter.

94. And this can be made clear as follows:

Generation in the creature states two things, change and production; the formal ideas of these are different and separable from each other without contradiction.

95. For production is formally of the product itself, and it is accidental to it that it is done with change of some composite part, as is plain in creation [sc. where there is production but not change]; change is formally the act of ‘the changeable’, which passes from privation. But change accompanies production in creatures because of the imperfection of the productive power, which cannot give total being to the term of the production, but something of it that is presupposed is changed to another part of it and thus it produces the composite. Therefore they can without contradiction be separated, and they really are separated in comparison to a perfect productive power.

96. This is also plain in creation, where, because of the perfection of the productive power setting it first in total being, there is truly the idea of production, insofar as through it the produced term receives being, – but there is not there the idea of change, insofar as change states that some substrate ‘is otherwise disposed than it was before’, *Physics* 6.3-4.234b5-7, 10-13. For in creation there is no substrate.

97. To the proposed case. Since in divine reality nothing of imperfection is to be posited but the whole of perfection, and since change in its idea states imperfection, because it states potentiality, and that in a changeable thing, – and concomitantly too it states imperfection of the active power in the changer, because such a changer necessarily

requires a cause causing along with it so that it may produce (but no imperfection happens in divine reality, neither of the sort that is in the passive power nor any imperfection either of the active power, but supreme perfection), – in no way would generation be posited there under the idea of change or of quasi-change, but in divine reality would be posited only generation as it is production, namely insofar as something by it gets being. And therefore generation as it is in divine reality is without matter, – and therefore to generation as it is in divine reality there is not assigned matter or quasi-matter, but only the term; and this either total as first term, that is the adequate term – namely which is first produced in being [n.27] – or formal term, according to which the first term formally receives being [n.28].

B. The Son is truly from the Substance of the Father

98. Second I say [n.93] that when all materiality and quasi-materiality have been denied, the Son is yet truly ‘from the substance of the Father’, as the authorities [Augustine, Hilary] adduced in the text [of Lombard] say.

99. Here by the ‘from’ is not indicated only efficient causality or origination [n.54], because if it were efficient causality alone then creatures would be from the substance of God, – nor is indicated by the ‘from’ only consubstantiality, because then the Father would be from the substance of the Son, – but there is indicated origination and consubstantiality at the same time; namely so that in the [ablative] case, governed by the preposition ‘from’, consubstantiality is indicated, so that the Son has the same substance and quasi-form together with the Father, from whom he is by way of origin, –

and by what is construed in the genitive case [‘of the Father’] with this prepositional clause the originating principle is indicated; so that the total understanding of this phrase ‘the Son is from the substance of the Father’ is this: the Son is originated by the Father as consubstantial with him.

100. And in this way the Master [Lombard] expounds the authorities adduced in the text, – not precisely by consubstantiality, nor precisely by origination, but by both, as is generally apparent. “From the substance of the Father, that is, from the Father, who is the same substance [n.54]” – by the first point origination is held to, by the second consubstantiality.

101. And that this is the intention of Augustine in his authorities *Against Maximinus* [n.53] that are put in the text, is apparent from the point of the authorities, – for in one authority Augustine sets down: “If you do not find another substance, recognize the substance of the Father, and confess the Son is *homoousion* (Greek: ‘of the same substance’) with the Father;” from this then he understood by ‘the Son is from the substance of the Father’ that the Son is so from the Father that he is *homoousion* with the Father. Again, in the other authority he says: “But if he is from the substance of the Father, then there is the same substance of Father and Son.”

102. But to understand this affirmative proposition by which it is said that ‘the Son is from the substance of the Father’ [n.98], according to the aforesaid understanding [n.101], I say that that understanding truly saves the fact that the Son is not from nothing, – it also truly saves the fact that the Son is ‘from’ in the way required for filiation.

103. I clarify the first point, because a ‘generated creature’ is not from nothing, because something of it pre-existed as matter. Therefore since the form is something of

the composite, and something of it more perfect than matter, if the form of something pre-existed and matter came to it *de novo* and was informed by the already pre-existing form, the product itself would not be from nothing, because something of it would have pre-existed, nay something of it more perfect than the matter which commonly pre-exists. Therefore if the Son would not be said to be from nothing ‘because his essence according to order of origin pre-existed in the Father’, and this too if the essence were the quasi-matter of the generation of the Son, much more will the Son not be from nothing if the essence ‘existing in the Father first by origin’ is the quasi-form communicated to the Son.

104. I clarify the second point [n.102] in this way, namely that the ‘from’ suffices for the idea of filiation, because in animate things, where paternity and filiation exist, we may see what the act is by which the generator is said to be formally ‘father’. It is namely the act of depositing semen, and if it were a perfect agent, so that now, when it deposits semen, it could immediately deposit the offspring, it would be truly father and much more perfectly than is now the case when so many intermediate changes are required; but now, in the act of depositing semen, that which was the substance of it, or in some way something of it, is not matter, but is as it were the formal term, communicated or produced through the act, just as the offspring would be if it were immediately deposited by the father; therefore because something of the substance of the generator is the term of its act, by which it is father, this truly saves the fact that a product alike in nature ‘is from the substance of it’, so that the ‘from’ truly suffices for the idea of father and son, – and as to the thing ‘deposited as term’ being the matter of subsequent changes, this happens to the ‘from’ as it belongs to father and son.

105. Therefore the eternal Father, not depositing some part of himself but communicating his whole essence, and this as formal term of the production, most truly produces the Son from himself, in the way in which ‘from’ pertains to father and son; and although the essence be there the ‘from which’ as from quasi-matter, the ‘from’ would not do anything for the idea of father, – just as neither in creatures, if the generator had its semen both for the formal term and for the matter of its action, the father would not be ‘father’ insofar as his semen was the matter subject to his action, but insofar as it was the term of the action, in the way too that, if the created father deposited a son from himself, he would be truly father, because that which would be from him would be the term of the action, but in no way the matter.

C. How Relation and Essence can exist in the Same Person

106. Third principally, to the solution of the difficulty of this question, one must see how relation and essence can exist in the same person without the essence being material with respect to the relation, since no relation is material with respect to it.

107. And there are four difficulties.

[Difficulty 1] – First, in what way the divine person is one without the former [relation] being act and the latter [essence] potency.

108. To this I say as follows:

First, created quiddity is that in which something is a being quidditatively, and this is not a mark of imperfection; for it belongs to quiddity from the idea of quiddity.

109. Created quiddity, however, for example humanity, because it is of imperfect actuality, is therefore divisible by that which contracts it to an individual, namely by the individual property – whatever it be, let it be *a* – and it receives from *a* some actuality (whether also unity or also individuality), which it has in the individual and does not have from itself, so that the contracting thing (as *a*) is in Socrates not only that ‘by which Socrates is formally Socrates’, but is formal in some way with respect to the nature, and the nature is in some way potency with respect to it; hence, secondly, the nature is contracted and determined by that very *a*.

110. And third; but humanity in Socrates is some act, and precisely by taking humanity and by distinguishing *a* from it, humanity is a more perfect act than is *a* itself, although *a* is a more proper act and in some way the act of nature insofar as it determines nature.

111. When applying these three things [nn.108-110] to divine reality, let that be left behind which belongs to imperfection.

112. As to the first point [n.108]. Deity is of itself that by which God is God, and also that by which the subsistent thing ‘whose property is *a*’ is formally God, because to be ‘by this’ in this way is not a feature of imperfection in the creature, but belongs to quiddity whence it is quiddity.

113. As to the second point [n.109]. There is a dissimilarity, because deity itself is not determined or contracted by the personal property, nor in any way actuated by it, because this was a feature of imperfection and of potentiality in created nature; likewise, deity is of itself a ‘this’, and thus, just as it has ultimate unity of itself, so it has actuality

too. The personal property therefore is the proper act of the person such that it is yet not an act of the divine nature itself in any way perfecting or informing it.

114. As to the third point [n.110]. There is in some way a similarity, because although relation is the proper act of the person, and essence is not the proper act but an act of the person, yet the essence is formally infinite act; but the relation is not of its formal idea infinite act.

115. But how can these two acts come together to constitute one thing, if neither is the act of the other? For one must be in the other, because if not then each is *per se* subsistent, and thus they will not be in the same *per se* subsistent thing; likewise, the unity of things distinct in any way at all does not seem, according to Aristotle [*Metaphysics* 8.6.1045a7-10, 23-25], to exist except by reason of act and potency.

116. I reply. The unity of the composite is necessarily by reason of act and potency, as is assigned by the Philosopher, *ibid.* and 7.13.1039a4-5. But the person in divine reality is not composite, nor quasi-composite, but simple, – and as truly simple as the essence itself considered in itself, having no composition nor quasi-composition in reality; and yet the formal idea of the divine essence is not the formal idea of relation, nor conversely, as was said above [I d.2 nn.388-395, 403-406].

117. But how it stands that the idea of relation in the thing is not formally the same as the idea of the essence and yet, when they come together in the same thing, they do not constitute a composite, – the reason for this is that the former idea is perfectly the same as the latter; for because of the infinity of the one idea [sc. of the essence, nn.67, 114, 127], whatever can exist along with it is perfectly the same as it. Therefore the perfection of identity excludes all composition and quasi-composition, which identity

exists because of the infinity, – and yet infinity does not take away from the formal ideas that the one is not formally the other.

118. So there is no quasi-composite made from them. And therefore nothing from them is as composite of act and potency, but there is from them one most simple thing, because one idea is perfectly – nay most perfectly – the same as the other, and yet is not formally the same; for this does not follow ‘they are perfectly the same even by identity of simplicity, therefore they are formally the same’, as was touched on about identity in the pre-cited question [in n.116], and as will be touched on below in distinction 8 [nn.209, 217]. And the same perfect identity excludes all aggregation, because the same thing is not aggregated with itself.²³

119. And as to what is added that ‘one must be in the other’ [n.115], I concede that the relation is in the foundation or the root, but this is not as act is in potency but as identically contained in the infinite sea [sc. the divine essence, n.131].

120. In another way [sc. to the issue in n.119] it can be said that all these propositions are true, ‘deity is in the Father, paternity is in the Father’, ‘the Father is in deity or in the divine nature, paternity is in deity’, and yet no ‘in’ there is as act in potency.

121. For the first proposition is true as nature is in the supposit, having quidditative ‘being’ by it (because this belongs to quiddity whence it is quiddity [n.112]),

²³ Text cancelled by Scotus: “The conclusion [nn.116-118] of the first difficulty [n.107] here [sc. in the *Ordinatio*] is argued against in the *Oxford Collations* question 1 and question 14, where is contained the first part of it [the conclusion], afterwards this part [here nn.117-118], – and there [question 14] the idea of act and potency is treated of; however the major can be denied, – it suffices that there be respect and foundation, – and it is precisely false about respect, because it is of itself related to the foundation. When there [in the *Collations*] the minor is denied, – on the contrary: ‘the person is *per se* one formally’ etc.”

but not for this reason is it a form informing the supposit, even in the case of creatures [nn.132, 138].

122. The second [n.120] is true as the hypostatic form is in the hypostasis, – but it does not inform it; for as well the quiddity as the hypostatic form, even in the case of creatures, although it is the form of the supposit, yet is not an informing form, but is there [in creatures] as a part [sc. as Socrateity-humanity is in Socrates], while here it is as one formal idea concurring with another [sc. as paternity-deity], formally, to the same simple thing that yet has in it several formal ideas.

123. The third [n.120] is true as the supposit in the nature, – plainly not as informing it [n.147].

124. The fourth [n.120] is true in the same way of ‘in’ [sc. the same as in in.123], because in the way a whole is first in something, in the same way the part is *per se* but not first in the same thing, – it is plain about being in place; therefore if the Father is first in nature, as the supposit of nature, paternity ‘will be *per se* in the same nature’ in the same way of being ‘in’, although not first.

125. In addition to this, the prior response [n.119] gives the manner of ‘in’ – which is that of relation in the foundation – which is not reduced to the being of form in matter save where the foundation is limited, in that it does not have the relation perfectly identically in itself.

126. [Difficulty 2] – The second difficulty is how relation can distinguish the person and not distinguish the essence without the relation having the idea of act, – because it belongs to act to distinguish, *Metaphysics* 7.13.1039a7.

127. I reply. I concede that relation is a personal act, not a quidditative act, – because it distinguishes personally and not quidditatively. But the essence is quidditative act and distinguishes quidditatively; but the quidditative act is simply perfect, because infinite, – but the personal act is not thus of itself formally infinite.

128. And if you say that ‘the distinguishing act is an act of what does not distinguish’, it is false, unless what does not distinguish is distinguished by a distinguishing act, as it is in creatures; humanity is distinguished in Socrates and Plato by *a* and *b*, and therefore the distinguishing act there – even distinguishing individually – is an act of what does not distinguish, because the distinguishing act distinguishes the nature itself, which does not distinguish. It is not so here [sc. in divine reality], because the personal property does not distinguish the essence, nor does it contract or determine it.

129. [Difficulty 3] – The third difficulty is how a relation can exist without requiring the proper idea of foundation. For the foundation seems to be prior to the relation and is as it were perfectible by it, and not conversely; for a relation does not seem to be perfected by its foundation, because then it would be presupposed to its foundation. Therefore since the essence is the foundation of these relations, it seems to be quasi-matter.

130. I reply. In the case of creatures the order of generation and the order of perfection are contraries, as is clear from *Metaphysics* 9.8.1050a4-5, because “things that are prior in generation are posterior in perfection;” and the reason is that creatures proceed from potency to act, and so from the imperfect to the perfect, – and therefore by way of generation the imperfect is reached before the perfect is. But, when going to what is simply first, it must be the case that the ‘same thing’ is simply first both in origin and

in perfection (even according to the Philosopher, *ibid.*), because the whole order of generation is reduced to some first thing of perfection, as to the first thing of the whole origin. In divine reality, therefore, the order of generation and the order of perfection must be understood together.

131. Just as in creatures, then, if those two orders were always uniformly to come together, we would not seek first for the matter which underlies the form and then, second, for the form, but we would seek first for the form which would be of a nature to give act to the matter, and second we would seek for the matter which would be of a nature to receive being through that form, or the supposit which is of a nature to subsist through that form, – so it is in divine reality. Beginning from the first moment of nature, altogether first arises divine nature as it is being through itself and from itself, which does not belong to any created nature, because no created nature has being naturally before it is in a supposit. But this essence – according to Augustine *On the Trinity* VII ch.6 n.11 – is that by which the Father is and that by which the Son is, although it is not that by which the Father is Father and the Son is Son. To this essence, then, considered in the most abstract way, as prior to all the personal features, there belongs being through itself, and in this first moment it arises not as something receptive of some perfection, but as infinite perfection, able indeed in the second moment of nature to be communicated to another; not communicated to matter as an informing form, but to supposit as quiddity, as to what exists formally through it. And thus do the relations – as some say – ‘sprout up’ from it and the persons ‘sprout up’ in it; not as certain quasi-forms, giving being to it, or as certain quasi-supposits, in which it receives the being which simply belongs to it, but as supposits to which it gives ‘being’ as that by which they are formally supposits, and by

which they are God; and so the sprouting relation – if it is *per se* subsistent – sprouts up, not as form of the essence, but as naturally being God by the very deity formally, although not by deity as informing, but as existing the same with it, in the most perfect identity; but, conversely, in no way is the relation of the essence as being that by which essence is formally determined or contracted or in any way actuated by it, because all these things are repugnant to the infinity of essence as it first occurs under the idea of infinite act.

132. I concede then that essence is the foundation of these relations [n.129], but not a foundation quasi-potential receiving them, but foundation as by way of form, in which those forms are born and are to subsist, – not indeed by informing, as likeness does in whiteness, – but as the subsistent is said to exist in the nature, as Socrates is said to subsist in humanity, because ‘Socrates is a man by humanity’. You will not then have from the idea of foundation the idea of potency or quasi-potentiality in the divine essence, but you will have precisely the idea of form – as that by which the relation founded in it simply is God.

133. An example of this can be taken in the case of creatures by positing there a certain ‘*per impossibile*’. Increase happens now by the fact that food coming to the body is corrupted, and its matter receives the form of flesh, and is thus informed by the soul. Let it be posited that, while the same matter remains, it is of a nature to receive some part of the form [sc. of flesh] (as is posited in the case of rarefaction); the matter remains one, which was formed before and now is formed with a new form, – it itself however is formally truly changed, because it passes from privation to form. – Let us posit, on the other side, that the same soul would perfect first one part of the body (as the heart), but

after another part of the organic body arrives, perfectible by the soul, the soul would perfect the part that *de novo* arrives, – and the soul itself would yet not be changed, because there would not be in it first privation and later form. For privation is a lack in that which is naturally apt to receive [what is lacked]; but the soul, first non-informing and later informing, is not of a nature to receive anything but to give something.

134. In each of these extremes there is truly production of some product, but in the first there is change and not in the second.

135. The example will seem more apt if we posit that the matter of the animated heart is able to be communicated the same to diverse forms – as of the hand and foot – and this by the active virtue of the animated heart producing those composites from its own communicated matter and from those forms; this would truly be production of all the things having the same matter, and it would go along with change of that matter; but if, on the other side, we posit that the soul – because of its lack of limitation in idea of act and form – can be communicated to many things and, by virtue of the soul in the heart, is communicated to hand and foot, produced by the animated heart, this would truly be production of many things consubstantial in form, without change of that form.

136. In each example [nn.133, 135] let the products be posited to be *per se* subsistents, not parts of the same thing, because to be a part belongs to imperfection. With this posited, the second mode in each example, which is about the communication of form to the product, perfectly represents production in God, but not the first, which is about the communication of matter, – and this while still adding to the position that the soul in the heart and hand and foot is not the informing form, because being composable involves imperfection, but is the total form by which they are subsistent and are animated;

so that deity is not understood to be communicated to quasi-matter; rather, to subsistent relations – if the persons are posited relatively – deity is communicated by way of form, not informing form, but form by which the relation or the subsisting relative is God.

137. And the essence does not therefore inform the relation, nor conversely, but there is perfect identity. – But essence has the mode of form with respect to relation, just like nature with respect to the supposit, insofar as it is that by which the subsisting relation is God. Conversely, however, in no way is the relation an act of the essence, because just as relation (says Damascene *On the Orthodox Faith* ch.50) ‘does not determine the nature but the hypostasis’, so it is not an act of nature but of the hypostasis; likewise, when relation informs the foundation, the supposit is said to be related *per se* in the second mode according to that foundation, just as Socrates is alike in whiteness or by whiteness; but the Father is not Father by deity, according to Augustine *On the Trinity* VII ch.4 n.9, – therefore there is not here such a mode of relation to the foundation as there is in other things, because here the foundation is not actuated through the relation, but the relation is only the act of the supposit or is the supposit.

138. I say briefly that relation and essence are in the person such that neither of them is form informing the other, but they are perfectly the same, although not formally. But as they are not formally the same, the relation in no way perfects the essence, nor is it the formal term received in the essence, but the essence in this way is the form of the relation, because it is that by which the relation is and is likewise God, – and also, the essence is the formal term of generation [n.64], just as in creatures nature is the formal term of generation but not an individual act.

139. [Difficulty 4] – Against this it is objected that ‘the formal term of generation is communicated, therefore it presupposes that to which it is communicated; but the essence does not presuppose relation but conversely, therefore essence is not communicated to relation [from Henry]’, – and it can be the fourth difficulty; because something is communicated there, and it will be the formal term, and it will presuppose that to which it is communicated; but essence cannot presuppose the relation to which it is communicated but conversely, – therefore conversely, – and so relation is communicated to essence, and then relation will be the formal term of production and essence the quasi-matter.

140. I respond. Because production is of some first term – that is of an adequate term – which includes in it something in the idea of formal term of the very production and something in idea of subsistence in such term [nn.27-28, 97], therefore it is a contradiction for these to be separated in respect of production, namely the formal term and the idea of subsistence, namely insofar as they have being by production, although absolutely there would be a priority of one to the other (even to the ‘separated without contradiction’), considering them absolutely, not insofar as they have being through production, – although there would there too be a priority of perfection, because one would be more perfect than the other, – because nature is more perfect by reason of subsistence (even in creatures), and from this it follows that nature is the formal term of production, because no simple entity more perfect than the formal term of production has being through production [n.67].

141. Then to the form of the argument I say that the thing communicated ‘insofar as it is communicated by production’ does not presuppose that to which it is

communicated, nor conversely, because the communication is not to something already existing, as it is in the case of alteration, – but it is to something so that it simply exist; therefore neither is nature communicated before the production of the supposit (because then it would be communicated also to something non-produced), nor conversely, although absolutely it is communicated first in the proper idea of supposit – in priority of perfection and in priority of being without each other – in the case of creatures; to the first priority in the case of creatures there corresponds here in God that the essence is formally infinite, the relation however is not.

III. To the Arguments of the Opinion of Others

142. To the arguments for the opinion. To the first, from Augustine *Against Maximinus* [n.53]: it is plain how the Son is in no way from nothing, but is truly from the substance of the Father [nn.98-103].

143. But if you ask, once origination and consubstantiality have been posited, there is still the question: is it as from matter or from quasi-matter that the Son is from? – I reply that there is no matter or quasi-matter there, and so let him not be from anything.

And you ask further – therefore from nothing? – It does not follow; but what follows is that therefore he is not from any matter.

But you will say, then he is a creature. – I say it is false, because a creature exists after nothing, that is, after the non-being of itself and of whatever is in it; not so the Son, – not only because his being is eternal, but also because, as he is the second person, so his formal being is prior in origin in the first person.

144. To the other, from Augustine *On the Trinity* [n.55]: it is of no value for the proposed position [n.46], as was expounded in the preceding question [n.25].

145. As for the argument of others that ‘essence is subjectively generated’ [n.59], from the false is inferred the false.²⁴

146. To the arguments they give [n.145]:

To the first [n.60] I say that here there are not any terms corresponding to generation as it is change, because there is nothing here that is as it were in any way first under privation and later under form. But the terms of generation as generation is change are privation and form, but generation as production has as term the product itself [n.95]; now generation does not thus have a term ‘from which’ except by speaking of the productive principle, and thus the terms of generation are producer and product; and from this it does not follow that something is a quasi-subject, but there follows from it – if generation is univocal – that something is common to the generating and the generated, and this I concede, but it is not common as matter but as form or act, in both of them.

147. When the argument is next put ‘about generation and term’ [n.61], the response is plain, that relation is not in substance as form in matter, but if the person there is relative, then relation is in essence as the property of the supposit is in nature [sc. as Socrateity is in Socrates, nn.109, 113, 124];²⁵ but to be in something as a supposit or idea

²⁴ From Henry’s [false] opinion that the Son is generated from the substance of the Father as from quasi-matter [n.52] is inferred the [false] conclusion that essence is subjectively generated.

²⁵ Note of Scotus: “But it is objected: in the way in which generation precedes the Son – according to way of understanding – in what is it? Not in essence as essence is in the Father, because as it is in him it is not had by generation, – nor as it is in the Son, because it precedes him; and it is in something because it is not *per se* subsistent (because then it would be a person; not the first person, – therefore the second person would precede the Son) [sc. so it must be in ‘essence after the Father’ and so essence will be the subject of generation].

Response: in what is generation-passion? – it is the same question, nay a more difficult one because here can be given what is ‘in essence’ in a double way, both as in a foundation and as property of a person in the nature – in which the person is – and both without potentiality of essence;

of supposit in nature entails nothing about being ‘in’ as form is in matter, although, when nature is imperfect, the individual property in some way informs nature, as was said in the third article of the solution, in the first difficulty [n.109].

148. When it is argued third that ‘to every active potency there corresponds a passive potency’ etc. [n.62], I reply: to the first active power there does not correspond any passive power, as is plain about the power of creating, – and this speaking properly of passive power as that in which, or from which, something is produced; however to the active power there corresponds some passive power which they [followers of Henry] call ‘objective power’, – which is producible power, – and in this way I concede that if the Father is actively fecund, that the Son is producible, but from this does not follow some power of quasi-matter, just as it does not follow in the case of creation.

149. When finally it is argued ‘about fire’ [n.62], I say that if fire were to generate from itself, it would communicate to the thing generated its form as formal term of the generation; but its substance would not be in potency to the form of generating, if fire itself were perfectly something productive, – for then there would not be required another co-causing cause. So it is in the proposed case: the first principle – and not another principle (in the same not another genus of principle) – does not require something else concurring with it to be principle.

nor is the second way [sc. as property of a person in the nature] more difficult than about relation, because passive generation is the same property as filiation – only conceived in a different way.”

IV. To the Arguments

150. [To the Principal Arguments] – When it is argued to the principal from Augustine *On the Trinity* [n.46] I reply: Augustine subjoins in the same place: “as if one thing there were substance and another were person.”

Likewise, I concede that a person is not properly said to be from the essence absolutely, but when adding along with the substance some originating person it is well said that some originated person is of the substance of that person, such that this proposition ‘the Son is from the divine essence’ is not to be conceded in the way that this proposition is ‘the Son is from the substance of the Father’, because by the second is expressed consubstantiality and origination, on account of the genitive [‘of the Father’] construed with the causal case of the preposition [‘from the substance’], – but by the first nothing originating is indicated.

151. To the other [n.47] one must say that although Augustine says the Son is ‘Son of the substance of the Father’ (*On the Trinity* XV ch.19 n.37, n.49), and a certain doctor [Henry] says this proposition is a proper one, – yet it seems more probable that whenever a relative [‘Son’] is construed with something [‘substance’] in that sort of causal relationship [‘of’] in which something naturally terminates the relative as its correlative, then it is construed with it [‘Son of the substance’] precisely as with its correlative [‘Son of the Father’]. – An example. ‘Father’ is construed with the relative in the genitive case [‘of the father’], ‘similar’ in the dative case [‘similar to...’], ‘greater’ in the ablative case [‘greater than...’]. According to common speech, it seems that with whatever ‘such a [determinate] relative’ is construed in ‘such a causal [genitive] case’, it

is indicated to be the correlative of the relative [sc. ‘son of the father/of man/of substance’]; for we do not say ‘this dog is the son of a man’ because it is a son and is of a man as of the dog’s master, such that ‘of a man’ is construed with ‘dog’ by force of possession or possessor, but ‘of a man’ seems to indicate that it is construed with ‘dog’ in the idea of relation, as with ‘of the father’.²⁶

152. Thus therefore in the phrase ‘the Son of the essence’, it seems that essence is taken as the correlative of the relative with which it is construed. – And then the authority of Augustine [n.151] ought to be expounded as he himself expounds it [sc. and not as Henry does, n.49]: “‘of the Son of his charity,’ – that is ‘of the Son of his delight’.”

153. And then to this argument [n.151]: when it is argued that on the phrase ‘from the essence’ follows the phrase that he is ‘of the essence’, – I deny the consequence, because the consequent indicates that the relation between the Son and the essence is like that of a correlative; and this the antecedent does not indicate, but it only indicates consubstantiality in the essence, along with origination, indicated in the thing that is construed with essence.

154. To the final one [n.48] I say that ‘from’ [as in ‘the Son is from the substance of the Father’] does not indicate only identity, but it indicates identity of the noun it governs [‘substance’] (and this in the idea of form) and distinction of that which is added to that noun [‘of the Father’] as originating principle, in the way said before [n.99].

155. [To the arguments for the opposite] – To the arguments for the opposite:

To that from *On the Trinity* XV [n.49] the response has been given [n.152].

²⁶ In other words [to quote the note of the editors of the Vatican edition], although we can say that a dog is a son [of some dog] and is of a man [as of its master], common speech does not allow us to go on to say ‘the dog is a son of a man’ because here ‘of a man’ indicates paternity and not, as it did originally, mastership.

156. To the one from *Against Maximinus* [n.50] the response is plain too from what has been said [nn.98-101].

157. To the final one [n.51], about ‘son’ in the case of creatures, – the response is plain from what was said in the solution of the question, because the ‘from’, which pertains to the idea of filiation, does not state the idea of material cause [n.104], but rather it is enough if that from which the son is be a form common to father and son and be, not the subject of generation, but the formal term of it [n.105].

Book One

Sixth Distinction

Single Question

Whether God the Father generated God the Son by Will

1. Concerning the sixth distinction I ask whether God the Father generated God the Son by will.

That he did:

Richard [of St. Victor] *On the Trinity* VI ch.17, after the other treatments of the production of the persons, says: “Do you wish to hear a brief word about what he have said? The fact that the ungenerated wishes to have from himself someone who is of the same form and dignity seems to me to be the same as that he generates a Son; and the fact that both generated and ungenerated wish to have someone of the same love seems to be the same as that they produce the Holy Spirit.” Thus, that the Father wants to have someone of the same form is to generate; therefore just as he wants by will to have someone of the same form, so he generated by will.

2. From the same authority there is the following argument: in the same manner Richard concedes that ‘willing as it is of the Father’ is related to generating in the way that ‘willing as it is of the Father and Son’ is related to inspiring; but now the Holy Spirit is inspirited formally by the will ‘as it is of the Father and Son’; therefore etc.

3. Again, Augustine *Against Maximinus* II ch.7 (and the quote is placed in [Lombard’s] *Sentences* I d.20 ch.3 n.189) says: “If the Father did not generate the Son equal to himself, either he did not want to or he was not able to; if he did not want to,

then he was envious.” – From this as follows: for envy only pertains to those things that are taken away by will and can be communicated by will, just as I am not envious if I do not make you wise because I cannot make science to be in your soul; therefore the Father generated an equal Son by will, because according to the aforesaid authority he would be envious if he did not generate an equal Son.

4. Again, *Metaphysics* 5.5.1015a26-30: “Everything involuntary is painful;” there is nothing painful in divine reality, therefore there is nothing involuntary there; therefore the son is generated by will.

5. Again, the Word is love, as is plain, – and it is produced, because according to Hilary *On the Trinity* IV ch.10: “the Son has nothing save what is born;” the principle of produced love is the will; therefore etc.

If it be said that it is love concomitantly, because first it is produced knowledge; – there is the same principle with respect to the first formal term as to anything concomitant with that term.

6. To the contrary:

Damascene *On the Orthodox Faith* ch.8: “Generation is a work of nature;” and the Master [Lombard] in the text [I d.6 ch. un. n.69], and it is a quote from Augustine [Ps.-Augustine *Dialogue on 65 Questions* q.7]: “The will cannot precede knowledge.”

I. To the Question

7. In this question there seem to be two difficulties: one, in what way the Father generates the Son willingly, – the other how the fact may be saved that the Father does not generate the Son by the will as by productive principle.

A. How the Father generates the Son willingly

8. [The opinion of others] – As to the first article [n.7] the argument is given [from Godfrey of Fontaines] that the Father does not generate the Son ‘willingly’ but only by natural necessity (the way fire heats), although once the act of generating has been as it were posited the will of the Father is as it were much pleased.

9. The argument is as follows: the intellection of the Father precedes the will in some way; but the intellection of the Father as it is of the Father seems to be the generation of the Word as it is of the Son; therefore the generation of the Son as it is of the Son precedes any volition of the Father.

The first proposition [the major] is evident from Augustine *On the Trinity* XV ch.27 n.50. – I prove the second [the minor], because there are not two acts of the same power, for powers are distinguished by acts, *On the Soul* 2.4.415a18-20; but to generate the Son or to speak the Word – which is the same thing in God – belongs to the intellectual power, and so similarly does to understand; therefore to speak is formally to understand something, and it only belongs to the Father as to the Father generating; therefore etc.

10. [Against the opinion] – This reasoning rests on a false minor, namely on the identity of to understand and to speak, – and from it there follows a false conclusion, namely that the Father does not properly speak willingly. First then [nn.11-12] I show the falsity of the minor, second [n.13] that the ‘false consequent [conclusion]’ follows, third [n.14] I reply to the proof of the false minor, fourth [n.15] I show how the false consequent should be avoided and the opposite held, which is the principal point in this article [n.7].

11. On the first point [the falsity of the minor, n.10], I argue against the identity of these two, to understand and to speak, as follows:

First: to understand is a perfection simply; to speak is not; therefore they are not formally the same. Proof of the first proposition [the major]: the Father, as to intellect, is formally blessed by intellection, – and, as to will, by volition; but he is only blessed by perfection simply; therefore, etc. – Proof of the second proposition [the minor]: in that case [sc. if to speak were a perfection simply] the Son and the Holy Spirit would not be simply perfect, because they do not speak – taking to speak in this way – because they do not express word.

12. Second thus: because just as in creatures the idea of action and of making are formally distinguished (because action is ultimate term, – but of making the term is other, the thing produced by the making), so in divine reality the operation by which the Father formally operates seems to be distinguished from the production by which he formally produces; and this seems so because operation has an object as it were presupposed, but production has a term that is produced by it. Therefore to understand – which is the

operation of the Father – is not formally to speak, which is the production of the Son by the Father.²⁷

13. To the second point [that the false consequent follows, n.10], which is also a confirmation of the first point, I argue thus:²⁸ just as in the case of our intellect, when it naturally has its first intellection – which is not in our power –, the will is able to be much pleased in the intellection already posited, but properly speaking we do not elicit the act willingly but we will it to be, when it has been elicited, thus it would follow that, if to understand were formally to speak, the Father would not formally generate willingly, although the generating would later in some way much please the Father.

14. About the third point [the proof of the false minor, n.10], to the proposition ‘powers are distinguished by acts’, – I respond thus, that action in creatures is taken in one way for action in the genus of action, in another way for second act, which is an absolute quality, as was expounded before [I d.3 nn.601-604]. Of one power, then, there is only one act when speaking of the latter act only or of the former act only – but of one power there can very well be a double act, one of which acts is an action and the other is in the genus of quality; just as our intellect, which is of the sort that ‘to generate a word’ is action in the genus of action, yet it has another act in the genus of quality, namely the generated knowledge. So in the proposed case: the divine intellect has one act corresponding to our intellection, which is a quality, namely the act by which the intellect of the Father formally understands, – it also has an act corresponding to act in the genus of action, by which it expresses the Word. – A certain doctor [Henry of Ghent] says

²⁷ Text cancelled by Scotus: “This conclusion I concede.”

²⁸ Text cancelled by Scotus: “because otherwise [sc. if to understand and to speak were formally the same], how it is that the Father generates the Son willingly would not be saved well, as was argued in the first argument [nn.11-12] – unless because he naturally generates so as later to will the generation already posited.”

otherwise, that the intellect as it is intellect has the act which is to understand, – but that it also has the act which is to speak, according to the fact it has already been made to be in act by understanding; but this was rejected in distinction 2 [I d.2 nn.273-280, 290-296], where it was argued that the first act – which is to understand – is not the formal idea of generating the Word.

15. I say then about the fourth point [avoiding the false consequent, n.10] that the Father does in this way willingly generate, – because in the first moment of origin the Father understands formally, and then also he can have the act of willing²⁹ formally; in the second moment of origin he generates the Son; and he does not will the generating by a volition that follows the generating, but by a volition possessed in the first moment of origin, by which the Father formally wills, presupposing already in some way the intellection by which the Father understands, but not presupposing already the generating of the Word.

B. How the Father does not Generate the Son by Will as by Productive Principle

16. As to the second article [n.7], it seems that the Father does not produce the Son by will as by productive principle, because a productive principle of one idea in divine reality cannot have two productions; for there is no production of one idea there save a single production, because it is an adequate production; since therefore the Holy

²⁹ Note by Scotus: “‘of willing’: – true, as to whatever is then known; the generating of the Son is not pre-known to its existence in itself. – Response: the essence is known, it can be willed not only in itself but as to be communicated; therefore, willing the essence to be communicated, he generates the Son, and thus he is willing, not to generate as it is to generate, but as it is a sort of to communicate.”

Spirit is produced by way of will as of productive principle, the Son will not be thus produced.

17. But in this article there is a difficulty, on account of the word of Augustine, because he seems to attribute generation to will in us as to productive principle, *On the Trinity* IX ch.7 n.13: “the word is conceived in us by love;” and by the same, ch.11 n.16, ch.3 n.6: “The will itself, in the way it was moving the sense to be formed by the object and, when it was formed, uniting it, so in this way it was converting the mental vision of the remembering soul to memory;” and in the same, ch.4 n.7: “The will, which brings hither and thither and brings back the mental vision that is to be formed and conjoins it when it is formed.” There are also many similar passages. – Therefore he intends that will have the idea of turning back mental vision before generation, and of retaining it in act.

18. Thus then it seems that in the Trinity – whose image is in the soul – the will has there some idea of principle with respect to production and generating, or has the idea of some superior applying a proximate principle to its act, just as it does in us.

The consequence is confirmed, because thus to conjoin belongs to the will from its perfection, insofar namely as it is first in the kingdom of the soul; therefore it belongs most of all to the most noble will.

19. The fact is also argued for in us, because if our generating were merely natural, it would in no way be in the power of the will, – and so we would always have the same word, about the same object, which is more strongly moving the intellect.

20. As to this article, although some [Henry] make a distinction that the ‘by will’ can be held adverbially, so that the sense is ‘he generated by will’, that is ‘he generated willingly’, – or it can be held ablatively, and then it indicates the cause and elicitive

principle with respect to generating, and then the proposition is false, – but however it may be with this distinction, it does not seem that one should concede that the Father has produced the Son by will such that the will is the proximate or remote principle. That it is not the proximate principle has been proved [n.16], because a principle of one idea is only principle of one production; but that it is also not the remote principle is plain, because just as the will, as it is the operative principle in some way, operates posteriorly to the intellect, – so, as it is in some way the productive principle, it produces posteriorly to the intellect, and thus it will be a superior or prior cause in a production that belongs properly to the intellect.

21. However, because of the authorities of Augustine [n.17], one must understand that in us there is not only a single act of understanding (taking ‘act’ in the genus of quality), nor only a single act of generating (taking ‘act’ for action in the genus of action), because if there were only the single latter act and only the single former act, and the latter and the former act were the same, – our will would have no causality, either with respect to the act of understanding which is of the genus of quality, or with respect to the act of generating which is of the genus of action. In divine reality, therefore, since there is in the Father only a single act of understanding, with respect to that act the will of the Father will not have any idea of principle or cause, – since too there is only one act of speaking, the will with respect to it will not have the idea of principle, because the will – being principle in the way it is operator – in some way follows the intellect; therefore the act of speaking precedes every way of the will’s being a principle. But the will can have, as being well pleased – not as being principle –, an act with respect to the generating,

from the fact that the will, as operating in the Father, does not presuppose the generating but only the intellection by which the Father formally understands.

22. But in us the authorities of Augustine are true, because the will moves mental vision to the act of knowing and holds it in knowing [n.17], – because once our first act has been posited, whether of the genus of quality or of the genus of action, we can have other later acts from the command of the will; but in the Father the will does not move the intelligence of the Father as needing to be formed by the memory of the Father, because there is in the Father only a single intellection formally, which precedes in some way the production of the Word, – nor does it move the memory with the object itself, so that the Word may be generated.

23. Against this [nn.21-22] there is an argument that Augustine understands it not only in us but also in God, because Augustine never seems to assign an act to the will as it is the third part of the image [of God], save that which is conjoining the parent with the offspring, and in this way it has some causality with respect to the generating of the offspring; therefore this part, as it is part of the image, will represent nothing in the prototype unless the divine will in some way has to conjoin in this way.

24. I reply. Although he frequently assigns that act to the will – as it is part of the image – yet sometimes he assigns another one to it, namely ‘love of the same object’ (which is the ‘object’ of the memory and intelligence), as is apparent in *On the Trinity* XV ch.20 n.39: “Hence it is possible,” he says, “for eternal and immutable nature to be recollected, considered, and desired” (which authority is set down at distinction 3 of the last question, I d.3 n.591); for there he expressly posits a trinity “in memory, intelligence, and will” as they have an act about the same object, namely uncreated truth. Likewise in

XIV ch.8 n.11 he posits a trinity in the mind insofar as “it remembers itself, understands itself, and loves itself.” He also touches on both acts in XV ch.3 n.5: “The mind and the knowledge, by which it knows itself, – and the love by which it loves itself and its knowledge.”

25. And these two acts come well together in our will, because in loving the object the will also loves the knowledge of the same object, and from love of the object it moves the intelligence to understanding it, uniting it to memory (from which it is formed), and holding it in such uniting, and by this in actual understanding of one object.

26. Now of these two acts of the will, the more principal one in us is that which is ‘love of the object’, because it is sometimes cause of love, – but the other act, namely ‘love of the act’, is more universal, because even in respect of a bad object we love the act of knowing, although not the object, as Augustine says IX ch.10 n.15: “I define intemperance, and this is the word for it; I enjoy defining, although I do not enjoy incontinence.”

27. The will then in us, as it is part of the image, represents will in God, not as to the act of uniting, which belongs to our will, but as to the other act, namely insofar as our will is the principle of producing an act about the same object as belonged to our memory and intelligence; for will in divine reality is a principle of producing love adequate to the divine essence, which is the first object of the divine memory and intelligence and will, – and the love produced is the Holy Spirit, to whom corresponds in us the love produced, and this love is frequently called will by Augustine; but will properly in us – which is a power – does not correspond to the Holy Spirit but to the force of the inspiring power in the Father and the Son, and this according to the act by which the will in us has to

produce love of the object understood, though not primarily, to the extent it has to produce love of generated knowledge, and in no way, moreover, to the extent it is a superior cause of generated knowledge; if indeed the inspiriting force is the principle of producing the Holy Spirit in divine reality, who is love of the divine essence and also love of generated knowledge, – although perhaps according to a certain order, – yet the inspiriting force is in no way the productive principle of generated knowledge, because although the Father in the first moment of origin is willing and in the second moment generates, yet the will of the Father does not have the idea of principle with respect to the generating of the Word. – Thus then is it plain how the Father willingly generates and yet not by will as formal elicitive principle of generation.

28. However, as to Augustine’s intention ‘about the intention of uniting the parent with the offspring’ [n.23], a certain doctor [Henry] says that the uniting intention – speaking in respect of the act of sensing – is ‘inclination’, made in the power by the sensible species. Hence the five things that that doctor posits (namely sensible object, species, and made intention, and power of sensing, and act of sensing), he proves by one authority of Augustine *On the Trinity* XI ch.2 n.2, – and when Augustine enumerates ‘intention’, saying that “‘the intention of the spirit’ detains the sense of the eyes;” “behold the third,” says that doctor [Henry], “for what ‘detains’ the sense is not other than the excitation by the said inclination; but Augustine calls it” (according to him) “intention of the spirit causally, because by it the sense of the spirit becomes intent on perceiving the object.”

29. But this is not to the intention of Augustine there, because in the same place – distinguishing these things from each other – he says of intention that “it is the third of

the soul alone;” therefore, according to him, the intention which was ‘the third’ is not the excitation or inclination through the species; likewise, the ‘third’ is attributed to the will of which he says later that “the will carries the mental vision hither and thither” etc., – which is not true of inclination but only of will and the power of the soul.

II. To the Principal Arguments

30. To the principal arguments. – To the first, when Richard says “this seems to me” etc. [n.1], – this does not ‘seem’ to Augustine, that the to will of the Father is formally to generate, because he says *On the Trinity* V ch.14 n.15 that the Holy Spirit proceeds “in some way given, not in some way born,” – that is, by way of will, freely, and not by way of nature; and therefore one should expound Richard to mean ‘concomitantly’.

31. To the second [n.3] I say that ‘envy’ exists in taking away not only goods that can be communicated by an act of will, immediately, but also anything that ‘willing’ can communicate; but the Father willing generates, as was said [n.15], and therefore the argument of Augustine about ‘envy’ holds.

32. To the third [n.4] I say that nothing is involuntary there, and therefore the generation of the Son is not involuntary (which I concede), – but it does not follow further ‘therefore it is by will as by elicitive principle’: for we make many things – whether with will preceding or with it being concomitant – of which the immediate principle is not will, but nature is in the case of some, necessity in the case of others, and others things of the sort in the case of others, etc.

Book One

Seventh Distinction

Question 1

Whether the Power of Generating in the Father is something Absolute or a Property of the Father

1. Concerning the seventh distinction I ask whether the power of generating in the Father is something absolute or a property of the Father.

That it is a property of the Father, – proof:

Augustine *On the Trinity* V ch.5 n.6: “He is Father by the fact he has a Son,” therefore he is Father by the fact he generates; the proof of the consequence is that he has a Son by generation. But he is Father by paternity; therefore he generates by paternity.

2. Or thus: ‘he is Father by paternity, therefore he generates by paternity’; or thus: ‘he generates by deity, therefore he is Father by deity’. – Response: neither consequence is valid, because the ablative when along with a verb [‘he generates by paternity/deity’] signifies the principle of acting, when along with an adjectival or concrete name [‘he is Father by paternity/deity’] signifies the formal concerning principal [e.g. as a white thing is white by whiteness]. But as it is, to be ‘that by which he is formally such’ should not be the same as to be ‘that by which he elicitively acts’, although to be such and to act are convertible with respect to the acting supposit; nor is the added phrase the same, because the ablative cannot be construed uniformly with the latter and the former statements, but there is a figure of speech in the first mode [‘similar termination’, Peter of Spain *Logical Summaries* tr.7 n.35, Aristotle *Sophistical Refutations* 1.4.166b10-14], because ‘similar

termination' indicates identity of concept – with the latter and with the former – although the concept is different.³⁰

3. Again, by reason:

The act proper is from the proper form of the agent; but to generate is the act proper of the Father; therefore etc. – Proof of the minor: both because the proper form gives being, therefore it also gives acting, – and also because, if the form is common, the effect is common too, because cause and effect correspond to each other, universal to universal and particular to particular, *Physics* 2.3.195b25-27 and *Metaphysics* 5.2.1014a10-13.

4. Again, the middle term belongs to the same genus as the extremes; but the supposita, which are the extremes, are relatives; therefore that by which the supposit acts – which is the middle between them – is a relative.

5. Again, potency belongs to the same genus as act, nay in divine reality they are the same thing; but the act of generating is a relation; therefore the principle too will be a relation, or a relative.

6. To the contrary:

Damascene *On the Orthodox Faith* ch.8 says: “Generation is the work of nature” [I d.6 n.6]; but it is not of the nature as of the one generating, because the nature does not generate; therefore it is the work of the nature as of the principle of generating.

7. Again, Hilary *On the Trinity* V ch.37: “From the virtue of the nature the Son by nativity subsists in the same nature.”

³⁰ The point seems to be that though ‘by paternity/deity’ are the same in verbal form (having in Latin a similar ablative termination) as to each statement, ‘he is Father by paternity/deity’ and ‘he generates by paternity/deity’, yet they are different in concept, because in the first statement they indicate the formal principle and in the second the acting principle.

8. Again, the Master [Lombard] in the text: “the Father is not powerful save by nature,” – and he is speaking of the power of generating; therefore etc.

I. The Opinions of Others

A. First Opinion

9. There is here an opinion [Aquinas *ST Ia q.41 a.5*] of this sort, that that by which the Father generates is essence, – for the following reason, that the one generating assimilates to himself the thing generated in the form by which he acts; but the Son is assimilated to the Father in essence, not in property; therefore etc.

10. And there is a clarification of the reason, that just as in creatures the individual property is not the idea of the acting but the nature is, in which the individuals agree, so in divine reality the personal property – which corresponds to the individual property in creatures – will not be the idea of the acting or generating.

11. Against this [n.9] there are multiple arguments. – First thus: every form sufficiently elicitive of some action, if it exists *per se*, acts *per se* with that action (example: if heat is a sufficiently heating power, separated heat heats); therefore if deity is the generative power, and it is agreed that it is sufficient, – it follows that if deity exists *per se* then it will *per se* generate. But deity exists in itself – in some way – before it is understood to exist in a person, because deity as deity is *per se* being, such that the three persons exist *per se* by deity itself and not conversely (Augustine *On the Trinity* VII ch.4 n.9, ch.5 n.10: “God subsists for himself;” and later: “for God to exist is this, to subsist”);

therefore in the first moment of nature in which deity is understood, before it is understood in a person, it will generate, – and thus deity considered as such is distinguished from the generated.

12. If it be said that deity does not have ‘*per se* being’ save in a person, and therefore it does not *per se* act but the person *per se* acts, – on the contrary: the argument proves the opposite, that if heat, having *per se* participated being, were, by a miracle, to exist *per se*, it could *per se* operate with the operation of which it is the principle; therefore the essence itself, which is ‘*per se* being’ of itself (it does not, however, participate ‘*per se* being’), will be able *per se* to be an agent with the action of which it is the elicitive principle in the supposit, and so the argument [n.11] stands.

13. Second thus: the producer and the form by which it produces have the same relation to the product. This is taken from the Philosopher *Physics* 2.3.195b21-25, *Metaphysics* 5.2.1013b30-33, where he means that art and the builder pertain to the same genus of cause. Therefore the producer and that by which the producer produces pertain to the same genus of principle, and so, if the essence is that by which the Father generates, the essence will have a real relation to the one generated; this is false, therefore etc.

14. Again, third: the form, insofar as it is that in which the generator and the generated are assimilated, only has the unity of idea, therefore it only has the being of idea; therefore, according to this, it is not the elicitive principle of real action.

15. Again, fourth: the form is only the principle of acting insofar as the agent is in act by it, but the agent is not in act by it save insofar as it is in the agent; but as it is in the agent it is a ‘this’; therefore it is principle as a ‘this’.

16. Again, production distinguishes before it assimilates – as is plain (for every production distinguishes but not every production assimilates) – therefore the form which is the principle of production is first a principle of it insofar as form distinguishes before it is a principle of it insofar as form assimilates; the form distinguishes insofar as it is a ‘this’, and it assimilates insofar as it is a ‘form’; therefore it is a productive principle insofar as it is a ‘this’ before it is so insofar as it is a ‘form’.

17. Again, there is an instance against the proof of the argument for the position [n.9]: both because when a brute generates a brute it is assimilated to it in species, and yet the specific form of the brute is not the principle of generating, but the vegetative power is, – therefore the major [‘the one generating assimilates to himself the thing generated in the form by which he acts’, n.9] seems to be false; and also because in the increase of flesh heat is the active principle (according to the Philosopher *On the Soul* 2.4.416a13-14), and yet animated flesh is generated, being similar to the generator in form of vegetative [soul].

B. Second Opinion

18. In another way it is said [by Henry of Ghent] that for generation in divine reality one must give some positive principle, because action is positive; but the only positive principles in the divine persons are essence and relation, – but relation cannot be a principle of the production, because relation is not a principle or a term of motion, *Physics* 5.2.225v11-13; therefore essence is. But essence, considered in itself, is indeterminate to several persons and to the actions of several persons, therefore, in order

for it to be principle of determinate action, it must be determined; but it is determined by relation, – and therefore relation is posited as a principle, not an elicitive principle but a determinative one.

19. To this there is adduced a confirmation from creatures, where the same form gives the first and the second act [sc. being and action, n.3]; but it is determined to the former and the latter by diverse respects, because to the first it is determined by respect to the subject, and to the second by respect to the object.

20. To the contrary. Of indetermination one sort is of a ‘passive power’ and another is of an ‘active power’ unlimited to several effects (an example: as the sun is indeterminate to producing many generable things, not because it receives some form so as to act, but because it has an unlimited productive virtue). What is indeterminate by ‘indetermination of matter’ [sc. the first sort of indetermination] must receive a form so that it may act, because it is not in act sufficient for acting, but what is indeterminate ‘by indetermination of active power’ is of itself sufficiently determinate for producing any of the effects; and it is so if the passive disposed thing, when something passive is required, is close by, or of itself when something passive is not required; proof: if such an active thing was of itself determinate to one effect, it could of itself sufficiently produce it, – but if it is indeterminate to this and to that, the perfection of its causality with respect to such an effect is not taken away by such lack of limitation, but there is only added causality with respect to one or other of them; it can then produce it just as if it were of it alone, and so there is not required anything to determine it.

21. To the intended proposition [n.18]. The divine essence is not a principle that is indeterminate by ‘indetermination of matter’; therefore if it is indeterminate by the

indetermination of something else as an active principle, it will be simply determined by the determination that is required for acting, and thus nothing else is required. A confirmation is that such indetermination of an active principle, although it is to disparate things, is yet not to contradictories, but it is determinately to one or other part of the contradiction with respect to any of the disparate things; but no indetermination prevents a thing acting determinately of itself save an indetermination that is in some way to contradictories, as to acting and not-acting; therefore etc.

22. Again second thus: when some active principle is indeterminate to two effects, not equally so but according to a natural order, – it is sufficiently of itself determined to the first of them, and, once the first is in place, to the second;³¹ but the divine essence is not indeterminate equally to those two productions [sc. generation and inspiriting], but is related first to generation; therefore it is of itself sufficiently determined to both, because it is of itself determined first to the first – in order of origin – and, with that in place, it is determined to the second, – and so in no moment of origin is it indeterminate to each as each is then to be elicited.

23. Again third: relation is the idea of the acting supposit. Therefore if the relation is determinative of the principle ‘in which’, it will have a double idea of principle with respect to generation: one insofar as it is the idea of the agent, and another insofar as it is the determinative idea of the acting principle, – and so it will mediate between itself and the action.

³¹ Note by Scotus: “Note here that the indeterminate thing is determined by itself, – otherwise there would be a process to infinity, because it would be determined to those effects because it was determined to others, and to those others because it was determined by yet others. – On the contrary: what is determined of itself to one opposite is impossible with the other; again [what is determined of itself to one opposite] is therefore determined to it in anything at all. – Response: this holds of contradictories; to the second, – in anything at all it has been determined, etc. [sc. determined first to the first effect, second to the second etc.]”

24. Fourth thus: nature as nature is posited as the elicitive principle of the action. But nature ‘as nature’ is not determinable, according to Damascene *On the Orthodox Faith* ch.50: “The properties determine the hypostases, not the nature” ‘as nature’. Therefore nothing is determinative of the principle ‘in which’ as it is the principle ‘in which’, but only of the acting principle.

25. Again, relation according to you differs only in idea from the foundation; therefore it cannot be a determinative principle, in some way distinct from the essence, for a real act, because only something real concurs with the idea of some principle in respect of a real action.

26. Again, what is said of determinative relation in creatures [n.19] seems to be false, because heat of itself – not by some intermediate respect – is the foundation with respect to this heating power; also, it is not necessary that the determination to the first and the second act be done through respects, because the same absolute form gives a first absolute and not respective act, and the principle of acting too is absolute and not respective.

II. To the Question

A. On the Distinction of Powers

27. I respond to the question, then, by first making a distinction about ‘power’.

For in one way there is said to be ‘logical power [possibility]’, which states the mode of composition made by the intellect, – and this indicates the non-repugnance of the terms; about which the Philosopher says *Metaphysics* 5.12.1019b30-32: “That is

possible whose contrary is not by necessity true.” – And if in this way one asks about ‘power’ in divine reality I say that it exists by comparing generation to any act non-repugnant to generation; and then power, or possibility, is of the Father or of God to the predicate that is ‘to generate’, because these terms are not repugnant; but there is an impossibility that the Son or Holy Spirit generate, because these terms are repugnant. And if one ask what is the power of generating in divine reality, there is in this way [sc. of logical possibility] no need to give some principle by which someone is able to generate, – for the sole non-repugnance of the terms suffices; just as if, before the creation of the world, the world not only was not but, *per impossibile*, God was not but began of himself to be, and then was able to create the world, – if there had been an intellect before the world combining the proposition ‘the world will exist’, this proposition would have been possible because the terms were not repugnant, not however because of any principle in possible reality, or any active principle, corresponding to it; nor even so was this proposition ‘the world will be’ possible – formally speaking – by the power of God, but by the possibility that was the non-repugnance of the terms, because the terms would be non-repugnant, although the non-repugnance would be concomitant with the power that is active in respect of this possibility.

28. In another way there is said to be ‘power as divided against act’ [*Metaphysics* 9.8.1050a15-16], – and this power is not in God.

29. So there is left ‘real power’ – which is said to be ‘principle of doing or suffering’ [*ibid.* 5.12.1019a15-20; I d.2 n.262] – as the proximate foundation of relations, because this noun ‘power’ is not abstract with ultimate abstraction, but is concrete with concretion in a foundation (although not with concretion in a subject), – which multiple

abstraction in relatives was spoken of above in distinction 5 [I d.5 n.21]. Here however the question is only about the power of acting.

30. And then I draw a distinction, because this noun ‘power’ can be taken for that which it *per se* signifies, or for that which it denominates – which is ‘proximate foundation of such relation’.

31. Power taken in the first way [n.30] I say signifies relation, just as does potentiality or being a principle, – and in this way the question has no difficulty, because ‘the power of generating in divine reality’ essentially states a relation.

32. In the second way [n.30] the question does have a difficulty when one inquires what that ‘absolute’ is which is the proximate foundation of this relation. And then (speaking always precisely of active or productive power, which is what the discussion is now about [n.29]) I draw a further distinction that ‘power denominatively taken’ is sometimes taken for the foundation precisely, but sometimes for the foundation along with all the other things that come together so that it can elicit the act, namely the things that are required for the idea of proximate power – of which sort in creatures are the coming near of the passive thing and the removal of an impediment.

33. This last distinction of power, of power taken for the foundation precisely or for the foundation along with the other concurring things, is taken from the Philosopher *Metaphysics* 5.12.1019a15-16 and 9.1.1046a10-11. For the definition of power that he there sets down is of power taken in the first way. But power taken in the second way he himself manifestly expresses in *Metaphysics* 9.5.1047b35-8a2, 5-7, 16-21: “Since,” he says, “the possible is something possible, and when, and how, and anything else that must be present in the definition;” and he subjoins: “in the case of such powers” (namely the

irrational powers) “it must be that, when they approach each other so that they can be active and passive, the former must act and the latter must undergo.” And if it be objected against Aristotle that these irrational powers can be impeded, he says excluding this: “When no outside thing impedes, there is no need to add anything further, – for it has power as it is a power of making; now it is not present absolutely but in things that are disposed in some way, where what hinders from outside is excluded; for these – some of the things placed in the definition – remove it” (he means to say that ‘some of the things’ pertaining to the definition of active and possible power exclude impediment, but ‘active power’ here – according to him – is taken ‘along with all the things that come together for proximate possibility of acting’).

34. Again, third, ‘power of generating’ signifies the principle of eliciting the act by the supposit that has the principle. Therefore it connotes a double relation, one the relation of principle to act, and another the relation of act to supposit, – which is to say: it notes the relation of the principle ‘in which’ to the act and it connotes the relation of the act to the principle ‘which’; and perhaps, third, it connotes the relation of the principle ‘in which’ to the principle ‘which’. Whether there are two relations or three, they are only relations of reason, because of the lack of distinction of the extremes (the first [sc. the relation of principle to act] belongs to paternity as to proximate foundation). – What Boethius³² says, then, that the idea of original principle is directed ‘within’, is true in respect of the person originated, but not in respect of the origin or act of originating, save according to reason only.

³² What text of Boethius is here referred to is unclear. The name ‘Boethius’ may possibly be an error and perhaps a reference to an ‘argument’ is meant, as to that in n.22 [Vatican editors].

B. The Father's Power of Generating is Something Absolute

35. Speaking then of power, that is, of the proximate foundation precisely taken of this relation, – I say the Father's power of generating is not a relation but something absolute.

36. [Proof] – The negative part I prove:

First, because every relation seems to regard equally naturally its proper correlative, therefore the relation of inspiriting will equally naturally regard its correlative just as the relation of generating will regards its own; but in divine reality productions are not distinguished by way of nature and will, except because the principle 'by which the producer produces' is disposed differently to the production and to the product, because it is of this one naturally and of that one freely; therefore they would not then be two productions formally distinct by way of nature and of will.

37. Second, because then [sc. if the Father's power were a relation] the same relation would be the principle of itself, because there is in the Father only a single relation to the Son, and it is the principle 'by which' with respect to generation, – which is the same relation, although differently named; therefore etc.

38. Third, because then paternity would be simply more perfect than filiation. Proof of the consequence, in two ways. First, because that by which the producer produces, if it is not of the same idea as the form of the product, contains the form virtually and is more perfect than it; therefore if paternity is that by which the Father acts, and it is not of the same idea as filiation, it contains filiation virtually

and is more perfect than it. Second, because filiation does not give to the Son what it does; therefore if the Father acts by paternity formally, paternity will be something more perfect than filiation.

39. The affirmative part of the solution [that the Father's power is something absolute, n.35] I prove thus:

What is of perfection in the productive principle does not take the idea of productive principle away from anything; but to communicate itself in numerical identity, and with a communication adequate to itself, posits a perfection in the productive principle; therefore this does not take the idea of productive principle away from anything. But if God, *per impossibile*, were to generate another God, and that other a third, deity would be posited as the productive principle of the other [sc. the third] and not as a relation of it; and then deity would not communicate itself in numerical identity, nor would it communicate itself with a communication adequate to itself in idea of productive principle, because deity would be able to be the principle of another communication, namely the one done – *per impossibile* – by the second god. Therefore since, as things are now, deity is communicated in numerical identity and with a communication adequate to itself, such that by deity there cannot be a numerically further communication of the same idea as the first, – it follows that the productive principle should now much more be posited as absolute than it would then be posited as being.

40. In brief: if a form were communicated that was not the same in number, nor communicated adequately, it would be posited as the principle of communicating; therefore if now it is more perfectly communicated, it – or

something more perfect – will be the principle of communicating in this more perfect way.

41. An example of this is if heat in fire were to communicate itself the same in number to a piece of wood, and with an adequate communication, such that the heat could not be the principle of another heating, one would not deny that the heat of the fire was the productive principle of heat in the wood, since now in fact the heat is posited as the principle of it, and this with a double imperfection, opposed to the double perfection here supposed (because now there is here a diversity of communicated heat and the communication is not adequate, but then there would be an identity of communicated heat and the communication would be adequate); and yet – on the basis of this hypothesis – the wood would not be able to heat by heat; for it would not be able to heat itself, because it receives heat from the heating which comes from the heat in question, and so it would have heat before it had heat, – nor would it be able to heat something else, because the heating of the wood is posited as adequate, in idea of active principle, to the heat. – Thus must one understand things in the intended proposal, because that which would be posited as the principle of another heating, if the communication were made with numerical diversity and not adequately, this same thing should now be posited as the principle when a communication is made of the same thing and a communication adequate to the productive principle.

42. Second I prove the same: something absolute is the formal term of generation, therefore something absolute is the formal idea by which the agent acts.
– The antecedent was proved in distinction 5 question 2, in the first reason against

the first opinion [I d.5 nn.64-69]. – I prove the consequence by the fact that it is impossible for an ‘agent’ to communicate the formal term of production unless it act, if it acts univocally, by an equally perfect form, – or, if it acts equivocally, by a more perfect form; but in divine reality nothing is more perfect than the absolute, because the ‘absolute’ is formally infinite, but the relation is not; therefore etc.

43. [Instance] – Against this reason [n.42] it is instanced that the consequence is only valid in univocal generation. But this generation [sc. the one in divine reality] is proved to be equivocal, first on the part of the persons, second from the productions, and third from the idea of specific difference.

44. The first way is as follows: paternity and filiation differ in species, therefore the persons constituted by them differ in species. – The proof of the antecedent is that they differ in their quiddities, and such difference is specific; and also that they are pure acts, but the difference of act and form is specific. – The proof of the consequence is, first, that there is no greater distinction in the principles than in the things they are principles of; second, the difference is the same for that in accord with which certain things are precisely different as it is for the differing things themselves; third, that the relations are the same for the divine essence as for the person, – therefore a specific difference will not by this be denied for the persons just as it is not denied for the relations either; fourth, that there is the same difference for the formal constituents as for the things constituted.

45. In the second way (about productions) the argument is: in divine reality the productions differ in genus, therefore so do the products. – The antecedent is plain, because in divine reality there is no production of a single idea save a single

one. –The proof of the consequence is, first, that otherwise there would not be a proportion of the productions to the products; also, second, that productions are of the same idea as the products; and, third, that powers of a different idea require objects of a different idea, – therefore, if they were to produce their own products, they would produce products of a different idea; therefore, just as will and intellect presuppose that ‘good’ and ‘true’ are formally distinct, so they will produce formally distinct termini, or they will be that by which such distinct termini are produced.

46. In the third way (about specific difference) the argument is as follows: specific difference seems to be more perfect than numerical difference, – the proof of which is that the distinction of species belongs to the *per se* perfection of the universe, but the distinction of individuals does not; therefore specific difference, in the way it is more perfect, seems it should be posited in divine reality.

47. [Against the instance] – To these arguments I reply that, whether generation is set down as equivocal or univocal, the argument is not affected, because in equivocal generation the productive principle must be more perfect than the terminating form; but nothing is more perfect than the absolute, and specifically no relation is more perfect; for it seems most absurd to say that relation virtually contains the divine essence.

48. The conclusion, however, to which these reasonings [n.43] lead, namely about equivocal generation, seems to be false, because since in the first term of generation – namely in the product itself – two things come together, namely nature and the relation proper of the product itself by which it is a ‘this’, –generation is called equivocal or univocal either by some formal term of generation, or by some

formal term proper to the produced supposit itself. If in the first way, since nature – which is the formal term of this production – is the same in producer and produced, univocity follows, because the likeness is most perfect. If in the second way, then no generation is univocal, because nothing generated is assimilated in its own individual form to the one generating. – That is, and it is to argue in another and almost the same way, that generation both assimilates and distinguishes, – as is plain, because thus is generation from the form under the idea of form and not under the idea by which it is a ‘this’, and the idea of form is more perfect in the supposit than this individual difference is. If in the case of generation its being assimilative is more perfect, then it will according to this be called univocal or equivocal. For if it were said to be of the former or latter sort insofar as it distinguishes, any generation at all would be called equivocal, because any generation at all distinguishes, – and this idea of distinguishing is in generation more imperfect, because it belongs to the most imperfect generation. Therefore not by this is univocal generation distinguished from equivocal.

49. Therefore to the intended proposal. Since generation assimilates insofar as the same nature is communicated, and distinguishes insofar as it is of a generated thing distinct from a generator that is distinct, it follows that univocity is located in the nature of the thing coming to be and come to be, and not in the distinction of generator and generated.

50. Second, one applies this to the intended proposal, that if the individual differences – which are diverse first – constitute products not diverse first but between which there is univocal generation (because of their likeness in nature), if

these individual differences were species of a different genus, they would still not constitute things distinct with as much distinction as they would have in their own genus, because then the individual differences would constitute things diverse first. But that the things ‘constituted’ now are not diverse first is because of the nature, in which nature the individuals agree; so they would also then agree in the same nature, although the constituting differences would be species of a different genus. Therefore the constituted things would then be of the same species, as they now are.

51. So to the arguments for the opposite [sc. for the opposite conclusion, that the generation is equivocal, nn.43-46]:

To the first [n.44] one must say that there is properly neither genus nor species there, nor specific difference. But I do well concede that paternity and filiation are relations of a different species and of a different idea, because they are opposites and are not founded on unity – even immediately – as are likeness and equality; there is also a greater distinction between paternity and filiation than between paternity and paternity. But when you infer that ‘therefore the things constituted too are of a different idea quasi-specifically’, I deny the consequence.

52. And, on account of the proof of the consequence, one must understand that some things are sometimes said to be more distinguished because of a greater repugnance or impossibility between them, as contraries are said to be more distinguished, like white and black, than disparate things are, like man and white, – and in this way it is not said properly that ‘some things are more distinguished’; for those things are more ‘properly distinguished’ which agree less in some respect; and thus things distinct in the

most general genus are more distinguished than contraries which are of the same species, even though contraries are more repugnant.

53. Hence universally: the distinction of distinct things is as great as is the distinction, that is, the repugnance, of what constitutes or formally distinguishes them, because if white and black are impossible, the things constituted by them are also impossible. And so it is in the intended proposal: the impossibility of Father and Son, such that the Father is not the Son, is as great as is the impossibility of paternity and filiation – because of which paternity is not filiation.

54. But in the second way of taking it [sc. ‘more distinguished’, n.52], never do the distinguishing things agree as much as do the things distinguished by them, as is plain by running through all the things that distinguish. For specific differences do not include the genus in which they agree, but the species distinguished by them do include the genus in which they agree; and the reason is that the distinguishing things presuppose something in the distinct things that the distinguishing things do not include in their understanding, but the things distinguished by them do include it; therefore the distinguished things agree in it, but the distinguishing things do not agree in it.

55. From this [n.54] the response is plain to the arguments and the proofs [n.44]. – When you speak of ‘the principles and the things they are principles of’, I say that there can be a greater distinction – that is, a greater non-agreement (that is, an agreement in fewer things) – between principles than between the things they are principles of, just as specific differences, which are the principles of species, do not agree in the genus in which the species themselves agree; and so is it also in the case of individual differences and individuals in respect of the specific nature.

56. From this [n.54] the answer is plain to what is said about ‘formal constitutives and things precisely distinct’ [n.44]; for, in the case of all of them, it is false that the difference of the things constituted is as great as the distinction or difference of the formal constituents.

57. But I consider the argument further: because these relations – those in the intended proposal – are subsistent, therefore they have as much difference insofar as they are subsistent as they have in their proper ideas; but the subsistent relations are persons, therefore the persons have as much difference as the relations have. – And in addition to this: the persons differ by some formal difference, and by none save by the difference that the relations have, because they have no other; but the difference the relations have is specific, – therefore the difference of the persons will be in species or in nothing.

58. To these arguments I reply. – To the first [n.57], that although the relations are subsistent, yet the persons do not only include the relations but also the very nature in which they subsist, – but the relations do not formally include the nature. The persons then formally agree in something in which the relations formally do not agree, and so there is not as great a distinction in the former as in the latter.

59. To the second [n.57] I say that this consequence does not follow: ‘by these relations precisely are they distinguished, and the relations are distinguished in species, therefore the persons are distinguished in species’, – just as neither does it follow about individual differences with respect to individuals. And when you say ‘then there will be no difference between the distinct things, since what belongs to the distinguishing things does not belong to the distinct things, nor anything else that comes through them’ [n.57], I say that through them there can be some distinction of the distinct things, different from

the distinction of the distinguishing things, – and a lesser one, just as by the individual differences there is some distinction between individuals, different from the distinction of those individual differences, because the differences are diverse first; but the ‘distinct things’ are not diverse first, but they are only distinct in number within the same species. So here, in the intended proposal, by relations distinct in species, or in quasi-genus (to which, however, insofar as they are distinct, distinction in species is an accident), some things can be distinguished only in person within the same species or within the same nature.

60. As to the second way, about productions [n.45], I deny the consequence, because in divine reality there can, from the perfection of the divine nature, be some principles of a different idea yet communicative of the essence itself, – which does not happen in any imperfect nature. And because of the distinction of these formal principles, there can be productions of a different idea and yet products of the same idea, because of the unity of the formal term, namely of the nature which is communicated.

61. When the consequence is proved first, through proportion [n.45], – I say that the proportion ‘of the production to the formal term’ is that by it the formal term is communicated. But such proportion is not required for the production to be of one idea, provided the formal term is of one idea, because productions can be distinguished by their ideas otherwise than they are by the formal terms, as they are here [sc. in divine reality], by their formal principles. An example of this is whenever the same form can be acquired by changes of a different idea, just as the same ‘where’ can be acquired by straight or circular local motion over an extended magnitude, which motions are so of different idea that they are not comparable, according to the Philosopher *Physics*

7.4.248a10-b6, 5.4.228b19-21; so would it be if the same health could be induced immediately by art and immediately by nature.

62. When this consequence is proved, second, by the fact that ‘productions are of the same idea as their products’ [n.45], – I say that to this extent are they of the same idea, that just as productions are relations so products are relatives; but because the products are subsistent in the same nature, and the productions are not formally supposits subsistent in that nature, therefore the products can have some unity formally in the nature – communicated to them by the productions – which the productions do not formally have.

63. When it is argued, third, about the distinction of powers and distinct objects, that the distinction of the objects is similar to that of the powers [n.45], – the response was plain from distincton 2 question 4, ‘Whether there are in divine reality only two productions’ [I d.2 nn.342-344].

64. About the third way, namely ‘about the perfection of the specific difference’ [n.46], – I say that specific difference is not more perfect than is specific identity in divine reality. But in creatures it is a mark of perfection. – For once limitation in creatures is posited, there cannot be a total perfection in creatures without specific distinction, but if in some one nature there were an infinite perfection, specific distinction would not be there required for perfection simply. Therefore in creatures specific difference is a perfection supplying for an imperfection, but in divine reality – where nature is simply perfect – there is no need to posit such ‘a perfection supplying for an imperfection’, because there is no imperfection there for which it might supply. An example: generation in creatures is ‘a perfection supplying for an imperfection’ in

corruptible things, which without generation could not be conserved either the same numerically or of the same species, – but in divine reality there is no need to posit such ‘a perfection supplying for some imperfection’ which may exist there, or exist in any eternal thing.

C. To the Form of the Question

65. Now as to the form of the question, by which the question asked about the power of generating is ‘whether it is something absolute’ [n.1], – I reply that the gerundive construction [in Latin] with ‘power’ [sc. ‘power of acting’] indicates the act as coming from the same supposit as the power is attributed to. The like is true of science and will when these are construed with the gerundive; for then they indicate the act as coming from the supposit that the science or will is attributed to. For which reason one does not allow the proposition ‘the Son has the science or the will of generating’ in the way one allows that ‘the Son knows the generation of the Father and wills it’. – Nay, the first one seems it should be denied, just as also these, ‘he knows how to generate’ and ‘he wills to generate’, – because ‘to will to act’ seems to be the same thing as ‘to have the will of acting’; but ‘to will action’ does not seem to be the same as these, because it does not include willing the action as action belongs to the one willing, which the other [‘to will to act’] does seem to map out.

III. To the Arguments

A. To the Principal Arguments

66. To the arguments. First to the principal ones [nn.1-5]. – First, as to Augustine [n.1], I say that he understands the ‘by the fact that’ formally, not foundationally or causally; an example: we say that Socrates is similar by similarity formally, but he is said to be similar by whiteness foundationally or causally. So in the proposal, the Father generates by generation formally, but we are not asking in this way by what he generates, but we are asking by what the generation is elicited as by formal elicitive principle, namely what is the proximate foundation of this relation. Therefore Augustine intends that ‘he is Father by the fact he has a Son’, that is, by that notion, – this is to say that the Father is not called Father in relation to himself but in relation to the Son; but Augustine does not there understand that by which the Father is Father – or that by which he generates – as the elicitive principle of generation, as is plain there from his text.

67. To the second [n.3] I say that from a form common in the first mode³³ there is a common operation, because if some form taken universally is followed by some operation taken universally, any singular form under it will be followed by a singular operation of the same idea, unless some singular form is imperfect. But if we are speaking of the second kind of community, which is of the form with respect to what

³³ An interpolated text is here worth quoting: “community of form can be understood in a double way: one is the universal, which is by identity to many particulars under it, each of which is ‘it’ (in the way a universal is communicated to singulars), the other is by relation to many things each of which is ‘by it’ (in the way a form is communicated to matter) but is not ‘it’, – as was said above [I d.2 nn.379-380].” See also below, n.71, where it is pointed out that the second mode does not exist in creatures without the first mode.

participates it, I say that it is not necessary that the common form be the principle of a common operation, and especially when it is possessed by many supposits in order, such that it is communicated to one by another, and this by adequate communication, as was made clear in the example adduced in the first reason to the affirmative part of the solution [n.41].

68. To the proposal I say that the major ‘the operation proper is from the proper form’ [n.3] is false, when speaking of appropriation in the second mode [n.67], which is the sort of appropriation – or at least no other one – that can be understood in the proposal.

69. And when the first proposition is proved, first because “it is the proper form, therefore, because it gives being, it gives acting” [n.3], – I deny the consequence; for there are many forms giving being which yet are not active and which in no way give second act; the such is paternity, just as also filiation.

70. But what is the reason for some forms being active and others not?

It is difficult to assign a common reason, because some substantial forms are active, and some qualities are active, but some substantial forms and some qualities are not active, – and yet qualities and qualities agree more in some common concept than do qualities and substances. Likewise, some of the more imperfect substantial forms are active, such as the elementary ones, and some of the more perfect ones are not active, as the forms of mixed things, as of stone and other inanimate objects, – some forms too of the mixed and perfect things are active, as the forms of animate things; however some of the more perfect forms are not communicative of themselves, as the forms of celestial bodies and angelic forms. There does not then seem to be a reason why some forms in

general are active and some not – just as, in a specific case, there does not seem to be any reason why heat heats save that heat is heat; and thus it seems that this proposition is immediate ‘heat is effective of heat’. Thus too it seems that all forms of the genus of quantity, and all relations (about which the discussion now is), are not active, and about such it is not valid that ‘if they give first act therefore they give second act’.

71. When the second consequence is proved through the Philosopher in the *Physics* and *Metaphysics* [n.3], – I say that he is speaking of universal and particular speaking in the first mode of ‘common’, but not taking it in the second mode, namely insofar as the same form in number is common to the things that participate it; for this commonness is not in creatures, nor a ‘universal’ commonness to the things that participate without a ‘universal’ commonness said in the first way [n.67].

72. When the argument is given, third, about potency and act [n.5], I say that there is an equivocation about potency. For the major is true as potency is a difference of being, dividing it jointly against act, because thus not only is being in general divided into act and potency, but also thus divided is any genus of being and any species and any individual, because thus is the same whiteness first in potency and later in act, – and in this way act and potency belong to the same genus; and in this way, properly speaking, there is no potency of generating in divine reality, namely a potency which may be opposed to act, because that generation is simply necessary and in act, and therefore it is not in potency as potency is repugnant to act. But here the discussion is about potency or power as it is a principle, and in this way the proposition is false which says that ‘power is of the same genus as act’; for a substantial form can be a principle of action in the genus of action and of action in the genus of quality – as was touched on above in

distinction 3 question on ‘generated knowledge’ [I d.3 n.518], and this subject [sc. substantial form] is the *per se* cause of its proper passion.

73. When the argument is made ‘about the middle and the extremes’ [n.4], I say that there is a thing which is a middle by participation in each extreme, as grey is a middle between white and black, which middle is from the nature of the thing, and of such a middle it is true that it is in the same genus as the extremes, as the Philosopher proves *Metaphysics* 10.7.1057a18-26. Another middle is in a way taken accidentally, as is operation between the operator and the term; this middle need not be of the same genus as the extremes because, when the soul understands itself, its understanding is a quality, and yet the operator and the object are substances; such a middle is what is taken – namely in the intended proposition – as the ‘by which’ between the generating supposit and the generated supposit. Or one can in another way say that the ‘by which’ is not properly a middle but keeps itself to the side of one of the extremes, namely of the generator; but the proper middle, if it be granted, can be said to be generation, and about this it is true that is of the same idea as the extremes, because it is a relation, just as the extremes are relatives.

B. To the Arguments against the First Opinion

74. Now because some of the arguments ‘against the first opinion’ are against me, I respond to them.

To the first [n.11] I reply that the major proposition has a greater probability in divine reality than in creatures, because the form in question is *per se* such that there

corresponds to it its proper 'what', and this has the power to act, – to wit 'this God', who in some way precedes the relations and so acts; the thing is plain because he thus first understands and wills; therefore it seems he would have power for every action of which his 'in what' is the proper formal principle, and so 'this God' generates first.

75. But about the elicitive principle the major is false, since the elicitive principle – if it exists *per se* – cannot be the proper power for operation. An example: the visible species – if one posits an elicitive principle for the operation of seeing in the eye – could not, if it *per se* existed, be the principle of that operation, and the reason would be that it could not be in proximate potency to acting because it could not have the thing that undergoes the act near to it, for coming near to – as was said before [n.32] – is required for the idea of proximate power. But just as there is required in creatures a coming near and a removal of impediments, so has it been said that in the intended proposition there is required a supposit suited to acting [n.32]. Therefore the form, which would be the principle of action in a distinct supposit, if it was *per se* existent, would not be a supposit or a distinct principle, nor would it be in a distinct supposit suited to generation, and, from the fact that that supposit is required for proximate potency to act, such a form could not act *per se*. But something 'essential', if it were to exist *per se* in some instant of nature before it was understood to exist in a supposit or a person, it is not in that prior instant an acting supposit in proximate potency to acting; for the act requires a distinction of certain things in the nature, which distinction can only be of supposits. Therefore a supposit suited to this action is a distinct supposit, existing in this nature; in no such thing does nature exist insofar as nature is understood to be *per se*, although it would in some

way be *per se* before it was in a person – and therefore it will not be able ‘to act *per se*’ by this action.

76. Note that ‘a form existing *per se*’ can be understood in three ways: in one way such that ‘*per se*’ excludes ‘the being in of a form’ in matter, whether the being in is of an accidental or a substantial form; in another way ‘the being in of a quiddity or a nature’ in the supposit itself, and this actually so; in a third way ‘aptitudinal’ or ‘potential’ – each a case of being in.

77. The third way sets down what is to be thus *per se* a complete supposit, and therefore to take it like this in the major [nn.74-75] is to take contradictories, because the form, which is, for the thing that has the form, the principle by which it acts, cannot thus be *per se*. Therefore *per se* in the major is understood in the first two ways, – and thus do I prove the major, because there is only required for ‘acting’ actuality and ‘*per se* existence’; the first is possessed equally in an inherent form and in a *per se* being, the second is possessed sufficiently if it is *per se* in the first two ways (otherwise the separated soul would not be an agent).

78. There is also a confirmation, because if the nature assumed by the Word were let go without any positive action concerning it, it would not be *per se* in the third way (because then it would be un-assumable, as such), and yet ‘this man’ could do every act which the Word now possesses by means of this nature, – nay if, according to the article of the first distinction in book 3 (III d.1 q.1 nn.6,9], nothing positive constitutes the created supposit, it is certain that the idea of the supposit gives nothing positive to anything for acting; but neither does it give order in relation to other passive things, as

Averroes imagines in *Metaphysics* VII com.31, that a [Platonic] idea cannot move a body or matter because of lack of order.

79. Against this [sc. what Averroes says, n.78], that it is accidental that the order of agent to patient insofar as it is consequent to ‘this existent’ exists ‘incommunicably’.

Therefore one can reply in another way, that the major [nn.74-75] is true, because the form is active with respect to a term distinct of itself (but not when it is with respect to a term not distinct, because then, although it could be that by which the supposit produces, it cannot however be the producer, because it is not distinct from the term, which is required for it to be producer; but this is not required for it to be that ‘by which’).

80. More plainly said, the major is true of immanent acting and making, and universally of the production of a term distinct from the productive form. Here the term is not distinct from the form by which it produces [sc. therefore the major is not true here].

81. On the contrary. If deity or ‘this God’ creates, therefore it acts by the action that necessarily precedes creating;³⁴ of this sort is generating.

Proof of the first consequence: what is simply first does not require any ‘acting later’ for it to have power for an action proper to itself; ‘this God’ is in some way prior to the relative person; therefore etc.

82. This argument requires one to posit an order by which ‘this God’ is in the persons before there can be a power proximate for creating; not because of impotence in ‘this God’ for creating (even if, as the gentiles imagine, he did not exist in persons), but because of a greater closeness of the persons than of creation to the essence, according to that ancient rule: ‘about any two things, compared according to an order to some same first thing, the power is not proximate to the second unless the first has already been

³⁴ Note by Scotus: “Note this for the order of production inwardly and outwardly.”

posited' [Aristotle *Metaphysics* 5.11.1018b9-12, 22-23; Averroes *ad loc.*; also n.22 above].

83. Therefore 'this God' understands too not precisely as he is in the persons, because essential action is as it were prior to relation, and so is more immediate, – nay altogether first; second, 'this God' is *per se* unlimited existence, and in the [second] moment of nature [n.82] is first in the three persons (that moment does however have the signs of origin); in the third moment of nature 'this God' has power proximate for action outwardly.

84. Therefore let the minor [n.81] be denied, because deity never exists *per se* in such a way that it is not in a supposit, except in the intellect.

85. On the contrary. What belongs to something first of itself formally is in some way prior outside the intellect to that which does not belong to it from itself formally; (a) deity is altogether first, because it is a 'sea' [I d.8 n.200], and (b) to it belongs of itself formally *per se* existence; (c) but it is not of itself formally in this relative supposit, therefore it is first *per se* before it is in this supposit.

The proof of (b) is that the same thing is the *per se* existence of the three persons, – *On the Trinity* VII ch.4 nn.7-8; there is also the proof that otherwise it would have that relation in anything, because it has everywhere what belongs to it from its own formal idea.

86. To the other, about 'what' and 'by which' [n.13], I say that the saying of the Philosopher is true of the cause and the thing caused, because there is a real distinction there of the cause, and of the principle by which it causes, from the thing caused; there is also essential dependence there of the caused thing on the causative thing just as also on

the cause, and the reason there is that the causative principle is only single, in one supposit. In the proposed case, however, things are the opposite, because the producing supposit is distinct, but that by which it produces is not distinct, – and so the product is not referred really to the principle ‘by which’ as it is referred to the principle ‘which’ produces, and therefore in the proposed case there is no real relation of the productive principle to the product; but of the producer there is a real relation, while of the productive principle a relation of reason, as was said before about the communicated and the communicating in distinction 5 question 1 [I d.5 n.29].

87. To the third [n.14] I say that the form ‘according to its being that in which the generator is assimilated to the generated’ is not only a being of reason but also has some unity preceding every act of intellect, because in no existing act of intellect would fire generate fire and corrupt water, and this on account of the natural likeness here [sc. in the intellect] and the contrariety there [sc. in reality]. This will be plainer in the question about individuation [II d.3 q.1 nn.3-7]. – To Damascene [n.14] I say that he understands commonness of something one in nature and in number (just as divine essence is common to the three persons), but there is now no such commonness in the creature. There is however a commonness of something one by a unity less than numerical unity [II d.3 q.1 nn.8-9].

88. To the remark ‘the form is the principle of acting insofar as it is a this’ [n.15] – the conclusion is on my side, because the absolute thing that is the Father’s power of generating is not a power of generating for the Son.

89. And when it is argued that generation distinguishes before it assimilates, and that, from this, the form is elicitive first as a ‘this’ prior to being so as form [n.16], – I

respond that ‘prior’ in consequence is not always ‘prior’ in causality. An example: this conclusion follows, ‘fire, therefore hot’, and not conversely; therefore hot is prior in consequence and yet fire is prior in causality to the heat. And thus I concede that to distinguish is prior to assimilate, that is, it is more common, because many things distinguish that do not assimilate, – but to distinguish is not more perfect in generation than to assimilate, because to distinguish belongs to generation (even the most imperfect) insofar as it is from a form as a ‘this’, and to assimilate belongs to it insofar as it is from a form absolutely, and the idea of form is more perfect than the idea of singularity.

90. I concede the argument ‘against the opinion positing only a distinction of reason’, because it does not conclude against me, as will be clear in distinction 8 [I d.8 n.169, 185].³⁵

91. The instance ‘about heat and the vegetative soul’ [n.17] is not valid, because there each form is communicated – both the principal active form [sc. the vegetative soul] and the immediate form [sc. heat]; for the generated flesh is animated, and it has some natural generated heat; also each form is a principle of generation, although one is mediate and the other immediate. But the other instance ‘about the generation of the

³⁵ [From the Vatican editors:] The text of n.90 is a response to an argument that is lacking in this question of the *Ordinatio*, but it is found in the *Lectura* I d.7 n.21: “Further, against the one who has this opinion [cf. *Ordinatio* I d.7 nn.9-10], there is the following argument from his own words: for he himself posits that nature and will and everything essential in divine reality are only distinguished by reason, through an operation of intellect. If therefore – according to him – the principle of the generation of the Son is essential and, for the same reason, the principle of the inspiriting of the Holy Spirit is essential, then the principle of each production in divine reality will be essential, and consequently – according to him – the principles of each production are distinguished by reason. But that two real productions ‘of different reason’ are from the same principle simply – differing only in reason –, when the thing from the principle is adequate to the principle, is altogether impossible; therefore it is impossible that the essence be the formal production of the Son or of the Holy Spirit. It will not then be the case that the essence alone is the principle of producing.” The remark ‘from his own words’ points to Aquinas *Sentences* I d.13 q.1 a.2 and d.2 q.1 aa.2-3.

brute' seems more difficult, if the sensitive soul does not there have any operation but only the vegetative soul.³⁶

Question 2

Whether there can be several Sons in Divine Reality

92. Whether there can be several Sons in divine reality.

Arguments.³⁷

I. The Opinions of Others

93. It is posited [by Henry of Ghent] that there cannot be, because all the fecundity is used up in one act; therefore there is no fecundity for another one.

On the contrary. To be used up signifies in bodily things that the source does not there remain which was used up; it cannot be thus understood here, but that the source does not remain for another act. Therefore the premise is improper, – and in the way it is true it is the same as the conclusion.

94. Therefore it is said in another way – more properly – that a 'single generation' is an act adequate to the generative power and always stays in place, and that the single

³⁶ Text cancelled by Scotus: "and about this in book 2 [II d.18 q. un n.10 – although this reference corresponds not to the words here in n.91 but to the text of the *Lectura* I d.7 n.95], where there will be a discussion about seminal reasons, 'how there can be univocal generation in animals'."

³⁷ For the arguments pro and con Scotus refers, by a symbol, to the Parisian *Reportatio*, IA d.2 nn.183-184.

Son is a term adequate to the power and is always being produced; therefore there cannot be another one.

95. On the contrary. Is the adequacy understood as intensive or extensive? If in the second way there is a begging of the question. If in the first way, the proposed conclusion does not follow from the adequacy of the act, because fire generating a fire as equally perfect as itself – and so adequate – can still generate another fire elsewhere; therefore the consequent is inferred ‘that the adequate act always stays in place’, and consequently the power is not of itself determined to this act but absolutely it would have power for another act, – just as if the sun were always staying in place and so were with a single adequate illumination to illuminate the medium present to it, it would not have power for another illumination, because that single illumination always stays in place; but from this it follows that of itself it would have power for another – and suppose that the first one does not stay in place, it will proceed to another.

96. Thus therefore the generative power of the Father can absolutely be the principle of another generation; therefore another is absolutely possible, therefore another one actually is – and so the staying in place of this ‘adequate’ act will not here prevent another act from being, because whatever is here possible from the nature of the thing necessarily is; it is not thus in the case of the sun, where the medium is in potency to an illumination other than the adequate one that stays in place, but if that other illumination is possible it does not follow that it is necessary.

97. Again another argument. – ‘A principle produces insofar as it is prior’ [I d.2 n.308-309]; therefore the staying in place of the posited effect takes nothing away from the principle as it is a principle; therefore if, when the effect is not posited or not staying

in place, the principle would have power for another, it will also have power for another when the effect is staying in place. – But although the argument [n.95] appears sound, it would conclude against the sun having an adequate illumination.³⁸ Hence one should solve the argument by asking whence it is that the actual positing of the adequate effect limits the virtue of the cause to the ‘then’ (although absolutely it extends to other occasions), and to the ‘then’ in the sense of division and to the ‘at another time’ in the sense of composition.

98. I concede, however, that adequacy, whether absolute or with a staying in place, does not sufficiently entail the unity of divine generation, because it does not entail that to be the principle of another generation is repugnant to the generative power absolutely of itself, nor consequently does it entail the absolute impossibility of another generation, – nay it entails the absolute possibility, if this [sc. the adequacy of the one generation] were the precise reason for the impossibility – because where there is an impossibility for this reason, there is there an absolute possibility (the result is plain from induction).

99. One must then look for another reason so as to show that the generative power is determined of itself to this generation, such that if *per impossibile* it would not proceed to this generation, or if this generation were not adequate or were not always staying in place, it would altogether have power for no other, just as sight cannot hear, – in the way that, if the Father did not here exist in the divine nature, altogether no person could there be what the Father was; because if for this reason precisely there could not be another Father, namely because in the essence – although indifferent to several ungenerated

³⁸ Presumably because, if the sun can have another illumination, the one it has cannot be adequate after all.

persons – this person would as it were subsist by itself and adequately to the essence, then absolutely there could be another Father, and if there could be there would be.

100. Not only does this argument [n.99] refute the reason ‘about adequacy’ [n.94], but also, if this Father or this generation were not by itself, but the essence were as it were indifferent to several Fathers and the generative power were indifferent to several generations, one would not be able to give more a reason for this generation existing in divine reality than for that one, because that one too would be adequate, and so for the case where this one prevents that one, which is altogether impossible; nay for what reason the one is posited, any at all might be posited, and for what reason the other is not posited, any other might not be posited.

II. To the Question

101. I say therefore.³⁹

³⁹ Scotus gives no solution to this question here in the *Ordinatio*. One must presumably look in the *Reportatio* instead.

Book One

Eighth Distinction

First Part

On the Simplicity of God

Question One

Whether God is supremely Simple

1. Concerning the eighth distinction I ask whether God is supremely simple, and perfectly so.

That he is not:

Because simplicity is not a mark of perfection simply, therefore it should not be posited in God as an essential. – Proof of the antecedent: if it were a mark of perfection simply then anything having it simply would be more perfect than anything not having it, and so prime matter would be more perfect than man, which is false, – nay, generally, in corruptible or generable creatures the more composite things are more perfect.

2. Again, it is a mark perfection in a form to be able to give being, although it is a mark of imperfection to depend on matter; therefore if the first idea were separated from the second, because there does not seem to be a contradiction in such a separation, deity can be a form giving being, although it does not depend on that to which it gives being, and so it can be posited without imperfection to be a composition of matter and form, or a combinability at least of matter and of deity as form.

3. Again, what is a non-substance for one thing is not a substance for anything, from *Physics* 1.3.186b4-5; but wisdom in us is an accident; therefore in nothing is it a substance or a non-accident. But wisdom is in God according to the same idea as it is in us; so there is an accident in God and thus a composition of subject and accident.

4. On the contrary:

On the Trinity VI ch.7 n.8: 'God is truly and supremely simple'.⁴⁰

I. To the Question

5. I reply to the question, and first I prove the divine simplicity through certain particular middle terms, and second from common middle terms, namely infinity and necessity of existence.

A. Proof of the Simplicity of God through Particular Middle Terms

6. Proceeding in the first way, I show that [divine] simplicity is opposed to composition from essential parts, second that it is opposed to composition from quantitative parts, and third opposed to composition from subject and accident.

7. [God is not from essential parts] – The first thus: the causality of matter and form is not simply first, but necessarily presupposes a prior efficient causality, – therefore if the First thing were composed of matter and form it would presuppose the causality of an efficient cause; but not the causality of this First thing, because it does not, by joining

⁴⁰ These words are in fact not Augustine's but a prefatory comment by Lombard [*Sentences* I d.8 ch.4 n.85].

its matter with a form, cause itself – therefore of a different efficient cause, a prior one; therefore God would not be the first efficient cause, the opposite of which was proved in distinction 2 question 1 [I d.2 nn.43-59]. Proof of the first proposition: the causality of matter and form involves imperfection, but the causality of the efficient and the final cause do not involve imperfection but perfection; every imperfect thing is reduced to a perfect one as to what is essentially prior to it; therefore etc.

8. I prove the same thus: matter is of itself in potency to form, and this in a potency that is passive and open to contradictories, as far as concerns itself, – therefore it is not under a form of itself but through some other cause, reducing the matter to the act of the form; but this cause reducing it cannot be called form only as it is form, because thus it does not reduce matter save by formally actualizing the matter itself; therefore one must posit something effectively reducing the matter to that actuality. Therefore if the First thing were composed of matter and form, there would be some efficient cause through whose effecting act its matter would be under the form, and so it would not be the first efficient cause, as before [n.7].

9. Third in this way: every single caused entity has some one cause from which comes its unity, because there cannot be unity in the caused without unity in the cause. The unity therefore of a composite, since it is caused, requires some one cause from which comes this caused entity. The causality in question is not of matter or form, because each of these is a diminished entity in respect of the composite entity; therefore besides these two causalities, namely of matter and form, some other one must be posited – it will be the efficient cause, and so the same result returns as before [n.8].

10. [God is not from quantitative parts] – The second, namely the lack of quantitative composition, seems to be proved by the Philosopher in *Physics* 8.10.226a24-b6 and *Metaphysics* 12.7.1073a3-11, because the First thing is of infinite power; but infinite power cannot exist in a magnitude; and the proof of this is that in a greater magnitude there is a greater power, and so an infinite power cannot exist in a finite magnitude; but no magnitude is infinite; therefore neither does any infinite power exist in a magnitude.

11. But this argument seems deficient, because one who would posit that an infinite power exists in a finite magnitude would say that the power is of the same nature in a part of the magnitude as in the whole magnitude, and so of the same nature in a greater as in a lesser magnitude; just as the intellective soul is whole in the whole of the body and whole in any part of it, and is not greater in a greater body, nor greater in the whole body than in a part; and if an infinite power of understanding were consequent on this soul, this infinite power would exist in a finite magnitude, and in a part just as in the whole and in a little part just as in a big one. So should it be said in the proposed case, because an infinite power in a magnitude would be of the same nature in the whole as in the part.

12. Making clear, then, the reasoning of Aristotle [n.10], I say that his conclusion is this, that an infinite power, extended *per accidens* to the extension of the magnitude, ‘does not exist in a finite magnitude’. His reasoning proves this in the following way: any power that is extended *per accidens* is, *ceteris paribus*, greater – that is more efficacious – in a greater magnitude, and it is not greater as follows, namely that it is more intense formally, because a small fire can have more heat than a big one if the big

one is very diffuse and the small one concentrated (and therefore one must add the ‘*ceteris paribus*’ clause in the major); the example too is about heat in the same fire, which although it is of equal intensity in the part as in the whole, yet a greater fire is ‘of a greater power’, that is, more efficacious.

13. And from this it follows that every such power ‘extended *per accidens*’, as long as it exists in a finite magnitude, can be understood to grow in efficacy by increase of magnitude – but as long as it is understood to be able to grow in efficacy it is not infinite in efficacy; and from this it follows that every such power ‘extended *per accidens*’, as long as it exists in a finite magnitude, is finite, because an intensive infinity cannot exist without infinity in efficacy; and from this it follows that a power infinite in efficacy cannot exist in a finite magnitude, – nor therefore can a power infinite in intensity so exist; and then further: since there is no infinite magnitude, it is plain that there is no such infinite power in a magnitude.

14. But how does this result, that every such power would not exist in a magnitude, relate to the intended proposition [nn.5-6],?

I reply. By joining with this result the conclusion proved earlier by the Philosopher [*Metaphysics* 12.6.1071b19-22], – that such a ‘potent thing’ is without matter – the intended proposition follows. For, because it is by extension that a thing is extended, or, if extension were to be *per se* existent, there would be something that was the form informing the extension, and the form would be extended *per accidens*, – therefore if the infinite power were to be posited in a magnitude, I ask what thing is this extension of magnitude? Not the infinite power itself, as was proved [n.13], – nor does the infinite power perfect the magnitude as form does matter, because the power is not in

matter, from the conclusion shown before [sc. by the Philosopher *ibid.*]; therefore one would have to posit that the matter is what is extended with this magnitude, which matter would be perfected by infinite power, just as our matter or our body is extended in magnitude and is perfected by a non-extended intellectual soul; but there is no matter in a possessor of such [infinite] power, from the conclusion shown before by the Philosopher [*ibid.*]. From this immateriality then – shown before by the Philosopher and just shown in this conclusion [n.13] – the reasoning in question [that God is not a quantity, n.10] gets its efficacy.

15. [God is not from subject and accident] – The third conclusion is proved specifically from these [first two conclusions, nn.7, 10]: for because God is not material or a quantity, therefore he is not capable of any material accident fitting a material thing in the way a quality fits a material thing; therefore he is only capable of those accidents that fit spirits – to wit intellection and will and the corresponding habits – but such things cannot be accidents of such a nature, as was proved in distinction 2 [I d.2 nn.89-110], because its understanding and its willing, and its habit and power etc., are its substance.

B. Proof of the Simplicity of God through Common Middle Terms

16. Second I prove the intended proposition [n.5] generally.

[From necessary existence] – First from the idea of necessary existence, – because if the First thing is composite, let the components be *a* and *b*; I ask about *a*, whether it is of itself formally necessary existence, or is not but is possible existence (one of these two must be given in each thing, or in the whole nature, from which something is composed).

But if it is of itself possible existence, then necessary existence of itself is composed of possible existence, and so it will not be necessary existence; if *a* is of itself necessary existence, then it is of itself in ultimate actuality, and so with nothing can it make itself to be *per se* one thing. Likewise, if the composite is of itself necessary existence, it will be necessary existence through *a*, and by parity of reasoning it will be necessary existence through *b*, and so it will be twice necessary existence; it will also be a composite necessary existence through something which, when taken away, will leave it to be no less necessary existence⁴¹, which is impossible.

17. [From infinity] – Second I show the intended proposition from the idea of infinity, – and first that God is not combinable; for this reason, that everything combinable can be part of some composite whole which is combinable from itself and from something else; but every part can be exceeded; but to be able to be exceeded is contrary to the idea of infinity; therefore etc.

18. And there is a confirmation of the reason, and it is almost the same, – because everything combinable lacks the perfection of that with which it is combined, such that the combinable does not have in itself complete identity, and identity in every way, with that with which it is combined, because then it could not be combined with it; nothing infinite lacks that with which it can in some way be the same, nay everything such has all that in itself according to perfect identity; because otherwise it could be understood to be more perfect, for example if it had all that in itself as a ‘composite’ has it and if the

⁴¹ I.e., if it is necessary existence through *a* and through *b*, then, if *b* is taken away, it will still be necessary existence through *a*; therefore it will not really be necessary existence through *b*, and so it will not be a necessary existence composed of *a* and *b*.

‘infinite’ does not have it;⁴² but it is contrary to the idea of infinity simply that it could be understood to be more perfect, or that something could be understood to be more perfect than it.

19. From this follows further that it is altogether incomposite, – because if it is composite, then composed either of finite things or of infinite things; if of infinite things, nothing such is combinable, from what has been proved [nn.17-18]; if of finite things, then it will not be infinite, because finite things do not render anything infinite in the perfection that we are now speaking of.

II. To the Principal Arguments

20. To the first argument [n.1] I say that simplicity is simply a mark of perfection according as it excludes combinability and composition of act and potency or of perfection and imperfection, as will be said in the following question [nn.32-34].

21. Nor, however, does it follow that every simple creature is a more perfect creature than a non-simple one [n.1], because something that is simply a mark of perfection can be repugnant to any limited nature, and so it would not simply be such a nature if it had that which is repugnant to it; so a dog would not be a simply perfect dog if it were wise, because wisdom is repugnant to it. Likewise, to any limited nature one perfection simply can be repugnant and another one not be, – and then it does not follow that that nature is more perfect to which such a perfection as is repugnant to it belongs, especially when there belongs to that to which this perfection is repugnant another

⁴² Sc. suppose the infinite combined with something, then by itself, or uncombined, it does not have it; therefore, when combined with it, it is more perfect.

perfection simply, which latter perfection is perhaps simply more perfect than the former, the repugnant one. An example: ‘actuality’ is a perfection simply and ‘simplicity’ is a perfection simply; but to a composite there belongs greater actuality though not greater simplicity, – while to matter, although there belongs simplicity, there does not however belong as much actuality as belongs to the composite; simply, however, actuality is more perfect than simplicity, – and so, simply, that to which actuality without simplicity belongs can be more perfect than that to which simplicity without actuality belongs.

22. But there seem to be doubts here: one, how a perfection simply is something that is not a perfection everywhere, although it is of the idea simply of perfection that ‘it be simply better, in each thing, than not-it’, according to Anselm *Monologion* ch.15; the second doubt is how one perfection simply is more perfect than another absolutely.

23. To the first I say that this description [from Anselm’s *Monologion*] ought to be thus understood, that perfection simply is not only better than its contradictory (for thus anything positive is better and more perfect simply than its negation, nay no negation is a perfection formally), but this is how is understood the remark ‘it is better than not-it’ – that is, than ‘anything impossible with it’ – and then should the remark which is ‘in anything it is better’ be understood by considering the ‘anything’ precisely insofar as it is a supposit, without determining in what nature the supposit subsists [cf. I d.2 n.384]. For, by considering something insofar as it subsists in a nature, some perfection simply is able to be not better for it, because it is impossible with it as it is in such nature, because it is repugnant to such nature; yet it is not repugnant to it insofar precisely as it is subsistent, but it will be a simply more perfect being if it is in this way

considered to have it than if it had whatever [sc. perfection simply] is impossible with it.

24. To the second doubt [n.22] I say that clarification is required of ‘what is the order of perfections simply’. And now, briefly, let it be supposed that there is some order of perfection among them such that one is of its idea more perfect than another precisely taken, although when any of them exists in supreme degree then all are equally perfect, because infinite – and then any of them is infinite. About this elsewhere.⁴³

25. To the second principal argument [n.2] I say that ‘to give something being formally’ necessarily posits a limitation, because what thus gives being does not include by identity that to which it gives being; nor can imperfection be separated from thus giving being, because neither can limitation, or even every sort of dependence, be separated from it; for although dependence on matter be separated from it, yet there always remains dependence on the efficient cause by virtue of which the form informs the matter. And if an instance be made about the Word, that it gives being to human nature, – this is not to give being formally, as will be clear in book 3 distinction 1 [III d.1 qq.1-5]

26. To the third [n.3] I say that wisdom, according to the idea by which it is a species of quality and an accident in us, is not of the same idea in God, as will be clear in this distinction better at the question ‘Whether God is in a genus’ [nn.112-113].

⁴³ No such ‘elsewhere’ is to be found in the *Ordinatio*.

Question Two

Whether any Creature is Simple

27. Following on from this I ask whether any creature is simple.

And I argue yes as follows: the composite is composed from parts, and these not from other parts, therefore these other parts are in themselves simple.

28. The opposite of this is in *On the Trinity* VI ch.6 n.8, where Augustine says that no creature is in itself simple.

I. To the Question

A. The Opinion of Others⁴⁴

29. There is said here that ‘any creature at all is composed of act and potency’; that no creature is pure potency, because then it would not exist, – nor is any creature pure act, because then it would God.

30. Further, that ‘any creature at all is a being through participation’, – therefore it is composed of participant and participated.

31. Against this conclusion I argue that if in anything at all there is composition of thing and thing, I take the thing that does the composing and I ask if it is simple or composite; if it is simple, the proposition is gained [sc. that some creature is simple], – if it is composite, there will be a process in ‘things’ to infinity.

⁴⁴ Aquinas *Contra Gentes* II chs.53-54, I ch.22; *ST* Ia q.50 a.2 ad 3.

B. Scotus' own Opinion

32. I concede then that some creature is simple, that is, not composed from things. However no creature is perfectly simple, because it is in some way composite and combinable.

How it is composite I clarify thus, that it has entity along with privation of some grade of entity. For no creature has entity according to the total perfection that is of a nature to belong to entity in itself, and therefore it lacks some perfection which is of a nature to belong to entity in itself, and so it is 'deprived', – just as a mole is said to be blind 'because it is of a nature to have sight according to the idea of animal, but not according to the idea of mole' according to the Philosopher at *Metaphysics* 5.22.1022b24-27. Therefore any creature is composed, not from positive thing and thing, but from positive thing and privation, namely from some entity, which it has, and from lack of some grade of perfection of entity – of which perfection it is itself not capable, though being itself is capable of it; just as a mole is, according to itself, not of a nature to see but is, according to that which is animal, of a nature to see. Nor yet is this composition 'from positive and privative' in the essence of the thing, because privation is not of the essence of anything positive.

33. On this composition there also follows composition of potency and act objectively; for anything that is a being and that lacks some perfection of being is simply possible and is the term of potency simply, whose term cannot be infinite being, which being is necessary existence.

34. It is also the case that any creature at all is combinable:

This is plain about accident, which is combinable with a subject. In the case of substance too it is plain, about form as well matter. Also plain about substance *per se* generable and corruptible, because it is receptive of accident; no substance then would be non-receptive of accident save on account of its perfection. – But the most perfect intelligence [sc. creaturely intelligence] is receptive of accident, because it is capable of its own intellection and volition, which are not its substance; first, because then it would be formally blessed in itself, the opposite of which was proved in distinction 1 [I d.1 n.175]. Second, because any intelligence can understand infinite things, because these are all intelligible; therefore, if its own intellection were its essence, it could have an infinite essence, because it would have one intellection of infinite things. Third, because its own intellection would not depend on any object save that on which its own ‘existence’ would depend, and so it could understand nothing inferior to itself – not even itself – in its proper genus, but only in the superior object moving it; nay no intelligence could understand anything save in God, because its own existence is not caused by any other intelligence – therefore not its intellection either. Fourth, because the word of an angel would be personally distinct from it and essentially the same as it, as was proved in distinction 2 about the divine Word [I. d.2 n.355].

II. To the Arguments

35. [To the principal argument] – To the principal argument of Augustine [n.28] I concede that no creature is truly simple, because it is composite – in the aforesaid way – from positivity and privation [n.32], act and potency objectively [n.33], and combinable with some other creature [n.34].

36. [To the argument of the opinion of others] – And from this is plain the response to the argument about the first opinion [n.29]; for no act is pure that lacks a grade of actuality, just as no light is pure that lacks a grade of light, even if there is not mixed with that impure light any positive entity but only a lack of a more perfect grade of light.

37. To the second [n.30] I say that ‘to participate’ is in some way the same as ‘to take part in’, so that it involves a double relation – both of part to whole and of taker to taken.

The first relation is real. Nor yet is part understood to be that which is something of the thing, but it is taken extensively, insofar as every less is said to be part of a more; but everything that is a ‘finite such’ is simply a ‘less such’, if anything such is of a nature to be infinite; but any perfection simply is of a nature to be infinite – therefore wherever there is a finite perfection it is less than some similar perfection, and so it is a part extensively.

38. But the second relation – namely of taker to taken – is a relation of reason, as in the case of creatures between the giver and the given. However a thing is taken in three ways; either such that the ‘whole’ taken is part of the taker, as the species participates the genus (as far as the essential parts of the genus are

concerned, not the subjective ones),⁴⁵ or ‘part’ of the taken is part of the taker, or – in the third way – ‘part’ of the taken is the whole taker itself. In the first two ways the relation of taker and taken can be conceded to be real, but not in the third way; this third way is the one in the intended proposition, because every limited perfection (which perfection is of itself, however, not determined to limitation, and it is the part taken) is the limited whole itself,⁴⁶ except that a distinction can be made here between the supposit taking and the nature taken – but there is not thus a real distinction.

Question Three

Whether along with the Divine Simplicity stands the fact that God, or anything formally said of God, is in a Genus

39. Third I ask whether along with the divine simplicity stands the fact that God, or anything formally said of God, is in a Genus.

That it does:

Because God is formally being, but being states a concept said of God in the ‘what’ – and this concept is not proper to God but is common to him and creatures, as was said in distinction 3 [I d.3 nn.26-45]; therefore, in order that this might become

⁴⁵ The essential parts of something are what define it; the subjective parts are the kinds it divides into. So ‘animal’, which is by definition ‘animate sensing body’, is taken wholly by the species ‘man’ (for man is a rational animate sensing body), but the subjective parts of animal are all the kinds of animals (horses, dogs, giraffes), and of course none of these is taken into the definition of man.

⁴⁶ I.e. no perfection is of itself limited, but in creatures every perfection is limited, being a partaking of the perfection that is of itself unlimited [n.37]. Thus a limited perfection is a part of unlimited perfection, but in creatures this limited perfection is the whole creaturely perfection itself.

proper, it must be determined by some determining concept; that ‘determining’ concept is related to the concept of being as the concept of ‘what sort’ to the concept of ‘what’, and consequently as the concept of difference to the concept of genus.

40. Further, Avicenna *Metaphysics* II ch.1 (74vb): between ‘a being in a subject’ and ‘a being not in a subject’ there is no middle – and he seems to be speaking according to the fact that ‘a being not in a subject’ is the idea of substance and ‘a being in a subject’ is the idea of accident. Therefore God, since he is being formally and is not ‘a being in a subject’, therefore he is ‘a being in a non-subject’ – therefore he is substance; but substance as substance is a genus.

41. Further, where there is species there is genus – according to Porphyry [*Book of Predicables* ch.3] – because these are relatives; the divine nature is a species with respect to the persons, according to Damascene *On the Orthodox Faith* ch.48; therefore etc.

42. Again, wisdom is formally said of God, and this according to the same idea by which it is said of us, because the reasons that were set down in distinction 3 question 1 [I d.3 nn.27, 35, 39] about the univocity of being conclude the same about the univocity of wisdom; therefore wisdom, according to the idea in which it is said of God, is a species of a genus [n.153]; and this is proved by the saying of the ancient doctors [Alexander of Hales, Bonaventure, Aquinas], who say that species is transferred to divine reality, because it states a perfection, although not the genus, because it states an imperfection – as ‘science’ is transferred but not ‘quality’.

43. To the contrary is the Master [Lombard] in the text, and he adduces Augustine [*On the Trinity* V ch.1 n.2] – and shows through him that ‘from God are removed the categories of the art of dialectic.’

I. First Opinion

A. Exposition of the Opinion

44. Here there are two opinions, at either extreme. – One [Henry of Ghent] is negative, which says that with the divine simplicity does not stand the fact that there is some concept common to God and creatures, and it was touched on above in distinction 3 question 1 [I d.3 n.20].

45. For proof of this certain reasons are set down which were not touched on before [sc. not touched on by Scotus in I d.3 qq.1-3].

The first is this: there is for things that are totally and immediately under the extremes of a contradiction no common univocal term; God and creatures are totally and immediately under the extremes of a contradiction – to depend and not to depend, caused and not caused, to be from another and not to be from another; therefore there is for them no common univocal term.

46. Again second thus, and it is a confirmation of the previous reason: every common concept is neutral with respect to the things to which it is common; no concept is neutral with respect to contradictories, because it is one or other of them; therefore etc.

47. Again third thus: things primarily diverse agree in nothing; God is primarily diverse from any creature, otherwise he would have that in which he would agree and that in which he would differ, and so he would not be simply simple; therefore God agrees in nothing with the creature, and so neither in any common concept.

48. Again, where there is only the unity of attribution there cannot be the unity of univocity; but it is necessary to posit unity of attribution of the creature with respect to God in the idea of being; therefore there is in this no univocity.

49. For this opinion [n.44] is adduced the intention of Dionysius [*On the Divine Names* ch.7 sect.3, ch.2 sect.7], who posits three grades of knowing God – by eminence, causality, and negation – and he posits that the knowledge by negation is the ultimate, when from God are removed all the things that are common to creatures; therefore he himself does not understand that any concept abstracted from creatures remains in God according to the respect in which it was common to creatures.

50 For this opinion there is also Augustine *On the Trinity* VIII ch.3 n.5 (in the middle of the chapter): “When you hear of this good and of that good (which could elsewhere also be said to be not good), if you could without the things that are good by participation perceive the good itself, by participation in which they are good (for you also at the same time understand the good itself when you hear of this good and that good), but if you could, with these things taken away, perceive the good in itself, you would perceive God, and if you cleaved to him with love, you will at once be blessed.” Therefore he intends that, by understanding this good and that good, I understand the good by participation in which they are good, and this is ‘the infinite good’; therefore I

do not have there only a concept of God in general [I d.3 n.192], but also a concept of the good through its essence.

B. Reasons against the Opinion

51. Against this position [n.44] there are two reasons,⁴⁷ which were touched on above in distinction 3 in the aforesaid question [I d.3 n.35, 27].

[First reason] – One reason is ‘that this concept proper to God could not naturally be caused in our intellect’; for whatever is naturally a mover of our intellect for the present state, whether the agent intellect or a phantasm or an intelligible species of the thing, has for adequate effect causing in us a concept of the quiddity and of what is contained essentially or virtually in such quiddity; but that proper concept is contained in neither way in the quiddity, neither essentially nor virtually (that it is not essentially is plain, because it denies univocity, – that not virtually because the more perfect is never contained in the less perfect); therefore etc.⁴⁸

52. The response of some people⁴⁹ is that the being which is thought on causes knowledge of itself insofar as it is a being which is thought on (that is, insofar as it is a being related to the first being), and so to conceive it under that idea is not to conceive it

⁴⁷ Note by Scotus: “For the commonness of being, besides the two argument of distinction 3 and their confirmations [I d.3 nn.27, 30, 35], there are these: comparison in being [n.83] (a); number of any beings whatever, and that the determinable of that which is ‘other’ is common to both the others [n.84] (b); Aristotle *Metaphysics* 2.1.993b23-29 [n.79] (c); Augustine *On the Trinity* XV ch.4 n.6 [n.71] (d); the confirmation that God is not called a stone [n.74] (e); Anselm *On Free Choice* ch.1 [n.72] (f); Dionysius *On the Divine Names* ch.7 sect.3, ch.2 sect.7 [n.73] (g); the masters [n.72] (k); against the one holding this opinion [sc. Henry of Ghent, nn.44, 53-54] (h).”

⁴⁸ That is, since we could never naturally get this concept proper to God, we do not now have it, and so we do not now have a concept of God that is proper to God and not univocal with creatures; therefore any concept of God we do now have cannot be proper but must be univocal with creatures.

⁴⁹ Probably Richard of Conington, according to the Vatican Editors, who give references to Robert of Walsingham, John Baconthorp, Giles of Nottingham, and Giles of Alnwick.

under an absolute idea, but under an idea related to the first being; but the relation has to cause in the intellect a correlative concept, or a concept of the corresponding relation – and although the corresponding relation is not conceived of ‘as subsisting in itself’, yet it will be conceived in some way by virtue of the foundation of that relation.⁵⁰

53. Against this argument [n.51] the fact seems to stand that, if there is anything adequate to the object, the one naturally knowable and intelligible to us (whatever way it is present to our intellect), it can cause a concept of itself and of the things that it essentially or virtually includes, and, according to what was already said [n.51], it in no way includes the absolute that is the foundation of the relation in God, as I will prove [nn.54-55]; therefore it follows that in no way is a concept of that absolute caused in us, and so we will not naturally be able to have any concept of anything absolute about God.

54. Proof of the assumption [n.53], – because although the said response [n.52] supposes that a relation in creatures is naturally first conceived before the relation corresponding to it, or before the foundation of the corresponding relation (which I believe to be dubious, because the term of a relation is naturally pre-understood to the relation, just as the foundation is too), – although it supposes too that a created thought-on thing is not understood by us save insofar as it is related (which was refuted in distinction 3 in the question ‘On the Footprint’ [I d.3 nn.310-323] and seems to be against Augustine *On the Trinity* VII ch.4 n.9: “Each thing subsists to itself, – how much more God?” – and Augustine is speaking about subsistence as about that by which a created thing naturally is not, and which naturally subsists in itself, otherwise the remark, ‘if each

⁵⁰ The relation corresponding to the relation of the thought-on being to the first being will, of course, be the relation of the first being to the thought-on being. Hence (or so goes the theory) to think this correlative relation is to think the first being as in some way the foundation of the relation, and so to have a non-univocal concept of this first being.

thing subsists to itself, how much more God', would, if the same thing were taken in the premises as in the conclusion, not be an argument), – omitting these things, I say, which perhaps would be denied by the adversary, I argue as follows: although relation in a creature is able, by its virtue, to cause a concept of the relation corresponding to itself, yet that corresponding relation does not include in itself some absolute concept on which it is founded, because the relation of a creature – conversely – to God, which is only one of reason, does not include the divine essence or any perfection absolute in God (which perfection it naturally is), which essence, however, or perfection must be set down as the foundation of the relation of God to creatures; and so there could not, by these relations, be caused in us any concept of absolute perfection unless another relation possessed in itself virtually that absolute which is the proper perfection of God, and that is impossible.

55. This point [sc. that nothing absolute is included in the concept we have of God] is also proved by the fact that, according to them [sc. those holding the opinion in n.53], the divine essence is of a nature only to cause, about itself, a single concept in the intellect, – therefore only a single real concept about it is of a nature to be possessed. The proof of this consequence is that the divine nature itself is of a nature to cause in the intellect every real concept that is, as to its simple understanding, of a nature to be possessed about it (and more imperfect objects are not capable of this). I infer further: therefore any object that is of a nature to cause, about itself, some real concept, is of a nature to cause that single concept which is itself of a nature to be possessed about it – and, if it does not cause that concept, then it causes no concept about it; but no creature can cause that single concept, because then the concept could, under the idea in which it is a singular essence, be understood from creatures; therefore through no creature –

according to this position [n.53] – can any singular concept be possessed about the divine essence.

56. [Second reason] – The second reason, touched on in the aforesaid question [I d.3 n.35, 27], was about one certain concept and two doubtful ones, where the certain concept is common to them.⁵¹

57. To this there is a threefold response.⁵² – First, that there is some concept one and the same that is ‘certain’ and ‘doubtful’; as the concept of Socrates and Plato is doubtful while the concept of some man is certain, – and yet both this and that concept are the same.

58. This is nothing, because although the same concept might be diversified in grammatical and logical modes (grammatical ones as in any modes of signifying; logical ones as in any diverse modes of conceiving, as universal and singular, or explicitly or implicitly: explicitly, as definition expresses it – implicitly as the defined thing expresses it), and not only could one posit certitude and incertitude by these differences, but also truth and falsehood, congruity and incongruity, – yet the fact that the same concept, conceived or taken in the same way, may be certain and doubtful according to, or as to, the modes mentioned, is altogether the same as to affirm and deny. Therefore if the concept of being is certain and the concept of created and uncreated being is doubtful (and this is not because of grammatical modes of signifying, nor is it in logical modes of

⁵¹ A reference to an argument from I d.3 n.27: “Every intellect which is certain about one concept, and doubtful about diverse ones, has a concept about what it is certain of that is different from the concepts about what it is doubtful of; the subject includes the predicate. But the intellect of the wayfarer can be certain about God that he is a being, while doubting about finite or infinite being, created or uncreated being; therefore the concept of the being of God is different from this concept and from that; and so neither term [finite or infinite, created or uncreated] is, in itself and in each of those concepts, included in it [sc. included in the concept of the being of God]; therefore [the concept of the being of God] is univocal [sc. of the same meaning whether it is a concept of something finite or something infinite, of something created or something uncreated].”

⁵² Presumably from Richard of Conington et al.; see footnote to n.52 above.

conceiving), then either the concepts will be simply other, which is the intended proposition – or there will be a concept diversified in mode of conceiving universal and particular, which is also the intended proposition.

59. In a second way it is said [by Henry of Ghent] that they are two concepts close to each other, but that also, because of their closeness, they seem to be one concept – and the concept about the ‘one’ seems to be certain, that is, about these two concepts when doubtfully conceived, while doubtful about the two concepts when distinctly conceived.

60. On the contrary. When there are concepts that cannot be conceived under any unity unless they are at the same time, or beforehand, conceived under a distinction proper to them, which distinction is presupposed to the unity, the intellect cannot be certain about them insofar as they have that unity and doubtful about them insofar as they are distinct; or thus: the intellect cannot be certain about the unity of them and doubtful about their distinction; or thus: the intellect cannot be certain about them under the idea of the unity and doubtful about them under the idea of some proper distinction. But the intellect conceiving the being that is said of God and creatures – if they be two concepts, it cannot have those concepts according to any unity unless it naturally have them first, or at the same time, under their idea as distinct; therefore it cannot be certain about them under the idea of them as one and doubtful about them under the idea of them as many.

61. Proof of the major [n.60], that if there was certitude about any concept (or about all concepts whatever) while there was a doubting about *a* and *b* (or along with doubt about *a* and *b*), then this one concept or these two concepts [sc. which seem to be

one] are conceived first naturally – under the idea under which there is certitude about it or about them – before *a* and *b* are conceived [sc. but this is false].⁵³

62. However it is conceded that concepts that have a relation are pre-conceived. – On the contrary. Either conceived as altogether disparate, – therefore they do not ‘seem’ one; or conceived as having some unity, or any unity, of order or distinction among themselves, – and then comes the proof of the minor [n.60]: being in God and being in creatures, if they are two concepts having attribution, cannot be conceived insofar as they have unity of attribution unless this concept and that are first – or at least at the same time – naturally conceived insofar as they are distinct, to wit this concept under its own proper idea and that one under its own proper idea, because these concepts under their own proper ideas are the foundations of the unity of ‘order’ or of ‘attribution’.

63. This is confirmed by an argument of the Philosopher *On the Soul* 2.2.426b8-15 about the common sense, which sense he concludes is common through its knowledge of the difference between white and black, from the knowledge of which difference he concludes that it knows the extremes. For if it could know them under the idea of this respect which is ‘difference’, without knowing them under their proper idea, then his argument would not be valid. Therefore likewise in the intended proposition, *a* and *b* cannot be known at the same time under the idea of this relation – namely of the unity of order – unless *a* is known under its own proper idea and *b* under its own proper idea (since for you there is nothing common between them), and so any intellect that conceives these two under the unity of order conceives them as in themselves distinct.

⁵³ The point seems to be that one cannot be certain about a given concept and doubtful about whether it does or does not include some other concepts unless one first conceives those other concepts (for otherwise what is one doubting about?).

64. A better argument is as follows, against the claim ‘they seem to be one concept’ [n.59]:

Two simply simple concepts are not in the intellect unless each is there distinctly, because such a simply simple concept is either altogether unknown or totally attained (*Metaphysics* 9.10.1051b17-26); therefore no intellect is certain about it in some respect and doubtful or deceived about it in another. Form, then, a reasoning as follows: an intellect has two concepts; therefore, if ‘they seem’ to be one, something is plain to the intellect about each concept, and something else is not plain –clearly – otherwise they would always seem ‘one’; therefore neither concept is simply simple, therefore they are not first diverse or most abstract.

65. Again, an intellect in possession of a distinct concept can distinguish by it ‘a known object’ from the concept which it has; here [n.59] it cannot distinguish because it does not have a distinct concept, – therefore neither does it have a proper concept, because a proper concept is a concept that is repugnant to another one; therefore the intellect conceiving this proper concept conceives a something that is repugnant to another concept; for example, sight does not see something repugnant to black without thereby distinguishing it from black. I call concepts formal objects. – For because two objects under their proper ideas (one of which is diverse first from the other) are understood by me, and yet I cannot distinguish what this one is, then I do not understand their proper ideas; therefore I understand nothing or I understand something common.

66. Again, when it is known ‘if a thing exists’, the question ‘what it is’ remains, *Posterior Analytics* 2.1.89b34.⁵⁴

⁵⁴ Therefore, presumably, while one can know that something is, one does not know what it is, or does not have a concept of it (as opposed to a name for referring to it), until one asks what it is, and

67. Again there is a more brief argument thus: when the intellect is certain, either it is certain about a concept simply one, or it is not but about a concept one ‘by unity of analogy’. If in the first way, and the intellect is not certain about this concept or about that one (because it is in doubt about each in particular), then it is certain about some third concept that is simply one, which is the intended proposition. If in the second way, it is true, insofar as it is thus one concept, – but about that which is thus one I argue: the intellect cannot be certain about something one ‘by unity of analogy’ unless it is certain about the two as they are two; therefore those two do not seem to the intellect to be ‘one’, because they are at once conceived as distinct concepts.

68. The response in the third way [nn.57, 59] is that there is not certitude about some one concept and doubt about two, but certitude about two concepts and doubt about one or other of them; as for example, ‘I am certain that this is a being, that is, that it is a substance or an accident, but I doubt whether it is determinately this being, as substance, or that being, which is accident.’

69. On the contrary. The certitude precedes all apprehension of anything whatever that divides being itself, therefore it precedes certitude ‘about the whole disjunct’. – The proof of the antecedent is that in the first apprehension by which ‘this’ is known to be something, or a being, there is no need to apprehend it from itself or from another, in itself or in another, and so on about other disjuncts.

70. [Third reason, nn.51, 56] – Against this opinion [n.44] there is also a confirmation for the fourth argument stated above [point (d) in footnote to n.51], which was about the inquiry of the intellect, which inquiry we make by natural investigation

asking what it is will force one to come to a concept which, if not entirely adequate to the object, will be sufficiently adequate to itself that it is known to be the concept that it is and not, say, two concepts seeming to be one [cf. n.69].

about God [I d.3 n.39]; here the ideas of creatures that state imperfection of themselves are separated by us from the imperfection with which they exist in creatures, and we consider them, taken in themselves, as indifferent, and we attribute to them supreme perfection; and, when thus taken as supreme, we attribute them to the Creator as proper to him.

71. Thus does Augustine argue *On the Trinity* XV ch.4 n.6: “Since we put the Creator without any doubt before created things, he must both supremely live, and perceive and understand all things.” This he himself proves from the fact that “we judge that living things are to be preferred to non-living ones, things endowed with sense to non-sentient ones, intelligent things to non-intelligent ones, immortal things to mortal ones,” – which argument does not seem valid if such things, as they are displayed in creatures, were not of the same idea as those which, when such in supreme degree, we attribute to God.

72. The like arguments [sc. taking creaturely imperfection away and attributing supreme perfection to God, n.71] are frequently made or held by the doctors and saints.

For thus are intellect and will posited formally in God, and not only absolutely but along with infinity, – thus too power and wisdom; thus is free choice posited in him; and Anselm *On Free Choice* ch.1 blames the definition that says free choice ‘is the power of sinning’, because according to him free choice would then – according to this definition – not exist in God, which is false; and this refutation would be no refutation if free choice were said of God and creatures according to a wholly different idea.

73. This is also the way of Dionysius [*On the Divine Names* ch.7 sect.3, ch.2 sect.7], because when by the third way, or on the third level, he has come to the

‘knowledge by remotion’ [n.49], I ask whether the negation is understood there precisely, – and then God is not more known than a chimaera is, because the negation is common to being and non-being; or whether something positive is known there to which the negation is attributed, – and then about that positive thing I ask how the concept of it is possessed in the intellect; if no concept by way of causality and eminence is possessed, previously caused in the intellect, nothing positive at all will be known to which the negation may be attributed.

74. There is a conformation for this reason [n.70], that we do not say that God is formally a stone but we do say that he is formally wise; and yet if the attribution of concept to concept is precisely considered, stone could be formally attributed to something in God – as to his idea – just like wisdom is.

75. The response is that God is not called wise because the idea of wisdom is in him, but because such a perfection simply is in him, although of a different idea from created wisdom.

On the contrary:

76. Our wisdom is a certain participation in the ‘wisdom in God’, and likewise also in the idea; but only some single same perfection participates essentially.

77. Again, the relation of what participates the idea to the idea is the relation of measured to measure; but a single measured is referred only to a single measure, – the idea is its measure; therefore since the wisdom by which God is wise is the measure of the same, it is not distinguished from the idea (response: the idea is the proper measure and the proper participated, or rather, is the relation of measure and participated, – wisdom is not thus but is the foundation of the relation of measure and participated, and

is common, not proper, because one creature participates the perfection in just the way another does).

78. And similarly, if you say that we conclude something about God by reason of effects, where proportion alone and not likeness is sufficient – this does not reply to, but confirms, the argument [n.70], because, by considering God under the idea of cause, he is from creatures known proportionally well enough, but in this way there is not known about God any perfect thing's perfection that is in creatures formally, but only causally, namely that God is cause of such perfection. But attributes are perfections stated simply of God formally – therefore such attributes are known about God not only by way of proportion but also by way of likeness, such that it is necessary to posit some concept in such attributes common to God and creatures, and the common concept in the first way, knowing God by way of causality, is not of this sort.

79. For this argument [n.70] there is the authority of the Philosopher *Metaphysics* 2.1.993b23-29, who, when arguing that 'the principles of eternal things are most true', proves it through this major, that 'that thing is in each case maximally such whereby univocity is predicated in other things', and he exemplifies it about fire; and from this he concludes that 'the principles of eternal things must be most true'. This consequence is not valid save in virtue of the following minor, that the eternal principles 'are the univocal cause of truth in other things'. For if in the minor the proposition is taken that the principles are equivocal or analogical, there will be four terms in the Philosopher's syllogism, which is not likely.

C. To the Arguments for the Opinion

80. To the arguments for the opposite opinion [n.44].

To the first [n.45]. Either one understands in the minor the ‘they are totally under the extremes of a contradiction’, that is, that they are precisely under the extremes of a contradiction, – and thus the minor is false; for God is not precisely the extreme ‘not from another’, because this negation is said of a chimaera, nor is a creature precisely the negation ‘not a necessary being’, because this belongs to a chimaera, – but both God and a creature are something to which one or other side of a contradiction belongs. Take the major then to mean that whatever things are of the sort that the extremes of a contradiction belong to them, that ‘these things are not univocally spoken of in anything’; this major is false, for all things that per se divide something common are of the sort that the extremes of a contradiction are said of them, and yet they are univocally spoken of in that division. So in the intended proposition: these things can all receive, according to themselves, the predication of a contradiction, and yet they can have something abstract – or some substrate of the extremes of the contradiction – which is common to both [sc. extremes].

81. As to the confirmation about the ‘neutral’ [n.46], I say that even a concept common to two things is neutral formally, and so I concede the conclusion that the concept of being is not formally the concept of something created or of something uncreated [I d.3 n.27]; but if the understanding be that this concept is neutral such that neither of the contradictories is said of it, it is false. For thus it is about rational and irrational, that the concept animal is formally neutral with respect to them, and yet that

which is conceived is not neutral but is truly one or other of them. For one or other of the contradictories is said of any animal whatever, and yet it is not necessary that any concept whatever is formally one or other of the contradictories.

82. As to the third [n.47] the answer will be plain in the third article ‘that God and creatures are not diverse first in their concepts’ [nn.95-127]; they are, however, diverse first in reality, because they agree in no reality – and how there can be a common concept without agreement in thing or in reality will be said in what follows [nn.137-150].

83. To the next one, about attribution [n.48], I say that attribution by itself does not posit unity, because the unity of attribution is less than the unity of univocity, and the lesser does not include the greater; yet a lesser unity can stand along with a greater unity, just as things that are one in genus are one in species, although the unity of a genus is less than the unity of a species. So here, I concede that the unity of attribution does not posit unity of univocity, and yet this unity of attribution stands along with unity of univocity, although this unity is not formally that unity, example: the species of the same genus have an essential attribution to the first thing of that genus (*Metaphysics* 10.1.1052b18), and yet there stands along with this the unity of univocity of idea in those species. Thus – and much more so – must it be in the proposed case, that the attributes may have in idea of being, in which there is unity of attribution, a unity of univocity, because never are things compared as measured to measure, or as exceeded to exceeding, unless they agree in some one thing. But just as comparison simply is in the univocal simply (*Physics* 7.4.248b6-7), so any comparison is in what is somehow or other univocal. For when it is said ‘this is more perfect than that’, if it is asked ‘a more perfect what?’, one must assign something common to both, so that the determinable of every comparative is common to

each extreme of the comparison; for a man is not a more perfect man than an ass, but is a more perfect animal. And so, if certain things are compared in being, where there is attribution of one to the other ('this is more perfect than that; a more perfect what? – a more perfect being'), there must be a unity in some way common to each extreme.

84. Thus may it also be argued about number or about distinction, because all distinct or numbered things have something common, as Augustine means in *On the Trinity* VII ch.4 n.7: "If three persons are spoken of, common to them is what a person is," – so that the determinable of a numerable term is always something common (according to Augustine) to all the numbered things. – And if it be instanced that there is properly no number of God and creatures, I argue about the diverse or the distinct or the other, thus: God and a creature are diverse or distinct, or God is something, or someone, other than a creature. In all these cases the determinable of the distinction, or of the stated singularity or plurality, must be common to each extreme – the point is plain in all examples, because a man is not 'another man than an ass' but 'another animal'. This is proved by reason, because in relations of equal comparison the extremes are of the same idea; otherness is such a relation; therefore in all things 'other' there is an otherness of the same idea, and consequently the determinable of otherness will be of one idea. Do not rely on this, because it would conclude that the foundation is of the same idea, hence the minor ['otherness is such a relation'] is contrary to the article about 'other'.⁵⁵

85. As for the argument from Dionysius [n.49], it is clear rather in the third argument [n.73] that the intention of Dionysius is to the opposite, because at the third

⁵⁵ An article that Scotus apparently intended to put together from the Cambridge and Parisian *Reportationes*: "otherness connotes some agreement of the extremes in their determinable, and also notes some non-identity corresponding to the same" [Rep. IA d.4 q.1 n.9], which non-identity would here be lacking [n.54].

level a stand is not made at negation alone, but at some concept taken from creatures, to which that negation is attributed.

86. To Augustine [n.50] I reply that ‘the good by participation in which other things are good’ (which good is understood by understanding this good and that) can either be posited as a universal to all goods, and then ‘the other goods’ are by participation in it (the way a species participates the genus, or as any inferior participates the superior), or it can be understood as the good in essence, by participation in which, as in their cause, the other goods are, and then it is true that, by understanding this good and that good, I understand the good in essence, but in the case of the universal I understand good the way that, when understanding this being, I understand being as part of its concept, and that in being I understand any being whatever universally. And when Augustine adds ‘if you can know it in itself’ [n.50], I say that if the ‘in itself’ is referred, not to the act of knowing, but to the object [sc. if ‘in itself’ goes with ‘it’ not with ‘know’], – to wit, that I know the good, which I know universally, with the determination ‘in itself’, namely that I conceive the good with the sort of determination that it is a non-dependent good and good in essence – then I understand God not only in a common concept but in a proper concept, and then, by the phrase ‘in itself’, the good that was common is contracted and becomes proper to God; and beatitude lies in cleaving to this good by enjoyment (speaking of the beatitude of the way [sc. as opposed to the beatitude of the heavenly fatherland]), because this concept is the most perfect we can have in conceiving God naturally.

87. And this appears to be the intention of Augustine in *On Free Choice of the Will* II chs.8-14 nn.23-28 – or elsewhere in the same book [*On the Trinity* VIII, n.50],

where he says: “do not look for what truth is, because at once phantasms will present themselves, etc.,” which would not be true if there was a concept of being or of good in God altogether different from the concept of them in creatures. For then one well ought to look for ‘what truth is’, because then a truth would be looked for that is proper to God, nor would phantasms there present themselves to disturb the concept of truth as it is proper to God, because this concept does not have concepts corresponding to it. But they do disturb the concept of truth as it belongs to God when speaking of truth universally, as has been expounded elsewhere [I d.3 n.193].

But there are some who shamelessly insist that there is one concept of being and yet none that is univocal to this thing and that, – this is not to the intention of this question, because, whatever it is that is conceived according to attribution or order in diverse things, yet if there is a concept of itself one, such that it does not have a different idea according as it is said of this and of that, that concept is univocal.

89. Also if anyone in any way shamelessly insists that a denominative concept is not univocal, because the idea of the subject is not of the idea of the predicate, – this instance seems puerile, because in one way a denominative predicate is a middle between a univocal and an equivocal predicate, in another an equivocal and a univocal predicate are, in logic, immediate [extremes]. The first is true when taking a univocal predicate which is univocally predicated, that is because, namely, its idea is the idea of the subject, and in this way a denominative predicate is not univocal. The second is true when understanding it of the unity of the idea which is predicated; thus a univocal concept is that whose idea is in itself one, or the idea is the idea of the subject, whether it denominates the subject or is said *per accidens* of the subject, but an equivocal concept is

that whose idea is different, however that idea is disposed to the subject. An example: animal is univocal, not only as said of its species but also as determined by its differences, because it has one concept determinable by them, and yet it is not said univocally of the differences, such that it is predicated in their ‘what’ – such that its idea is the idea of the differences, the way it is said of the species. Also, this dispute is nothing to the purpose, because if being is said about God and creatures according to a single concept of itself, one must say that the idea of being is the idea of the subject; for it will be said of both in the ‘what’, and so it will be univocal in both ways.

II. Second Opinion

90. The other opinion is affirmative, at the other extreme [n.44], which posits that God is in a genus – and they [sc. those who hold this opinion]⁵⁶ have also on their behalf the authority of Damascene *Elementary Instruction on Dogmas* ch.7: “Incorporeal substance etc.”⁵⁷

91. Again Boethius in his little book *On the Trinity* ch.4, where he seems to say that two genera⁵⁸ remain in divine reality. This cannot be understood only according to some similar mode of predicating, because Augustine *On the Trinity* XV ch.5 n.8 speaks thus: “If God be called good, just, spirit” etc., “only the last one I mentioned seems to signify substance, and the rest qualities;” and *On the Trinity* V ch.8 n.9 he seems to say that action most properly agrees with God. Therefore it is not merely the modes of

⁵⁶ Who these people are is unknown, but their arguments given here [nn.90-93] are reported by Thomas of Sutton.

⁵⁷ Damascene *ibid.*: “Incorporeal substance embraces God, angel, soul, demon,” cf. also: “The most general genus is substance, for it has no genus above it.”

⁵⁸ The two genera are substance and relation, n.130.

predicating similar to those genera that remain, and in this way does it seem one should understand Boethius ‘about those two genera’ that in themselves remain.

92. Third for this opinion seems to be the authority of Averroes *Metaphysics X* com.7 (and the text begins “And being is said”),⁵⁹ where the Philosopher says that “there is some one first substance,” which is the measure of the others [*Metaphysics* 10.2.1054a8-9, 11-13]. The Commentator wants this first substance to be the prime mover. Therefore, just as in the case of other genera the ‘first’ is something of that genus, so the first mover is something of the genus of substance.

93. A first reason set down for this opinion is of the following sort, that created substance can be conceived from uncreated substance, and that neither concept is simply simple. Therefore, by resolution, the idea of substance will remain, indifferent to each contracting instance – and the idea of genus seems to be thus indifferently taken.⁶⁰

94. A second reason is that many simple entities are placed in a genus, such as angels, according to those who posit them to be immaterial – accidents too, according to those who posit them to be simple. Therefore the simplicity of God does not exclude from him the idea of genus.

III. Scotus’ own Opinion

95. I hold a middle opinion, that along with the simplicity of God stands the fact that some concept is common to him and to creatures – not however some common

⁵⁹ Cf. Scotus’ *Lectura I* d.8 n.92.

⁶⁰ The Vatican editors refer this argument to David of Dinant and Albert the Great.

concept as of a genus, because the concept is not said of God in the ‘what’, nor is it, by whatever formal predication said of him, *per se* in any genus.

A. Proof of the First Part of the Opinion

96. The first part was proved when arguing against the first opinion [nn.44, 51-79].

B. Proof of the Second Part of the Opinion

I. By the Reasons of Augustine and Avicenna

97. The second part I prove by Augustine *On the Trinity* VII ch.5 n.10: “It is manifest that God is improperly called a ‘substance’.” – His reason there is that substance is said to be that which stands under the accidents; but it is absurd to say that God stands under any accident; therefore etc. This reason holds in this way: Augustine does not understand that the idea of substance is ‘to stand under accidents as substance is a genus’, because he has given there as premise that “it is absurd that substance be said relatively.” But substance, as it is a genus, is limited, as will be immediately proved next [nn.101-107]; but every limited substance is able to receive an accident; therefore any substance that is in a genus can stand under some accident, – God does not so stand, therefore etc.

98. Again, Avicenna *Metaphysics* VIII ch.4 (99rb) argues that God is not in a genus, because a genus is a ‘part’; but God is simple, not possessing part and part; therefore God is not in a genus.

99. These two reasons [nn.97-98] are true by authority and reason together.

2. By what is Proper to God

100. I now show the intended proposition [n.95] by two middle terms (and they are made clear from things proper to God): first from the idea of infinity, – second from the idea of necessary existence.

101. [From the idea of infinity] – From the first I argue in two ways.

First as follows: a concept having an indifference to certain things to which the concept of a genus cannot be indifferent cannot be the concept of a genus; but something commonly said of God and creatures is indifferent to the finite and infinite, speaking of essential features, – or at any rate indifferent to the finite and non-finite, speaking of any feature whatever, because divine relation is not finite; no genus can be indifferent to the finite and infinite, therefore etc.⁶¹

102. The first part of the minor is plain, because whatever is an essential perfection in God is formally infinite, – in creatures it is finite.

103. I prove the second part of the minor by the fact that a genus is taken from some reality which, in itself, is potential to the reality from which the difference is taken; nothing infinite is potential to anything, as is plain from what was said in the preceding question.⁶² This proof stands on the composition of species and the potentiality of genus, but both these are removed from God, because of infinity.

⁶¹ This paragraph is marked as 'p' by Scotus. See footnote below to n.112.

⁶² The Vatican editors refer to nn.7-19, but the reference might be as well or better to nn.36-38.

104. This assumption [n.103] is plain from the authority of Aristotle *Metaphysics* 8.3.1043b25-26: “The term” (that is, the definition) “must be an extended proposition,” “because of the fact that it signifies something of something, so that the latter is matter and the former is form.”⁶³

105. The same assumption is also apparent by reason, because if the reality from which the genus is taken were truly the whole quiddity of the thing, the genus alone would completely define it, – also genus and difference would not define it, because the account composed of them would not indicate what is first the same as the thing defined; for each thing is itself once, and therefore an account that would express it twice would not indicate what is first the same as the quiddity of the thing.

106. Treating further in some way of this reasoning [n.105], I understand it thus, that genus and difference are, in the case of some creatures, taken from one and another reality (as, by positing there to be several forms in man, animal is taken from the sensitive form and rational from the intellective form), and then the thing from which the genus is taken is truly potential and perfectible by the thing from which the difference is taken. Sometimes, when there is not there thing and thing (as in the case of accidents), at any rate there is in the one thing some reality from which the genus is taken and another reality from which the difference is taken; let the first be called *a* and the second *b*; *a* is in itself potential to *b*, so that, by understanding *a* precisely and *b* precisely, in the way *a* is understood in the first instant of nature – the instant in which it is precisely itself – it is perfectible by *b* (as if it were another thing), but the fact that it is not perfected really by *b* is because of the identity of *a* and *b* with some whole with which they are first really the same, and this whole is indeed what is first produced and in this very whole both those

⁶³ See Appendix to this question point D.

realities are produced; but if either of them were produced without the other, it would be truly potential to it and truly imperfect without it.

107. This composition of realities – of potential and actual – is the least that is sufficient for the idea of genus and difference, and it does not stand along with the fact that some reality is infinite in something; for if the reality were of itself infinite, however much it is precisely taken, it would not be in potency to any reality; therefore since in God any essential reality is formally infinite, there is none from which the idea of genus can formally be taken.

108. [Again from the idea of infinity] – Second, from the same middle [n.100], I argue as follows: the concept of a species is not only the concept of a reality and of a mode intrinsic to the same reality, because then whiteness would be a genus and the degrees of intrinsic whiteness could be the specific differences;⁶⁴ but those things by which something common is contracted to God and creatures are the finite and infinite, which state intrinsic degrees of it;⁶⁵ therefore the contracting things cannot be the differences, nor do they constitute with the contracted thing a composite composed in the way the concept of a species should be composed, nay the concept from such a contracted and contracting thing is simpler than the concept of a species could be.⁶⁶

109. From these middles about infinity, the reasoning of Augustine stated above about ‘standing under the accidents’ [n.97] gets its evidence. Thence too does Avicenna’s

⁶⁴ Note by Scotus: “‘An intrinsic mode is not a difference, in any degree of form at all’; therefore there is no difference involved in this case. – On the contrary, ‘about infinite line’ [below n.117].”

⁶⁵ Note by Scotus: “‘but those things...’, – response: not those only, just as neither does color descend to whiteness only through the primacy and perfection of whiteness to the other colors, but also through the specific difference. – To the contrary. Nothing else contracts anything indifferent to God save the infinite, – because if something other than the infinite contracts it, what is the order of that other thing to infinity? Either the intrinsic mode will be posterior ‘to the quasi-extrinsic contracting mode’ just as the difference is, or the infinite understood as ‘infinite’ will be further contractible and potential.”

⁶⁶ This paragraph is marked as ‘q’ by Scotus. See footnote below to n.112

reasoning get its evidence, in *Metaphysics* VIII ‘about the partial nature of genus’ touched on above [n.98], because a genus is never without some partial reality in the species, which reality cannot be in something really simple.

110. [From the idea of necessary existence] – I argue, third, from the second middle, namely from the idea of necessary existence [n.100], – and it is the argument of Avicenna *Metaphysics* VIII ch.4 (99rb): if necessary existence has a genus, then the intention of the genus will either be from necessary existence or not. If in the first way, “then it will only cease at the difference;” I understand this as follows: the genus will in that case include the difference, because without it the genus is not in ultimate act and ‘necessary existence of itself’ is in ultimate act (but if the genus includes the difference, then it is not the genus). If the second way be granted, then it follows that “necessary existence will be constituted by that which is not necessary existence.”⁶⁷

111. But this reasoning [n.110] proves that necessary existence has nothing common with anything, because the common intention is ‘non-necessary existence’; hence I respond: the intention as understood includes neither necessity nor possibility, but is indifferent; but as to that in the thing which corresponds to the intention, it is in ‘this thing’ necessary existence, and in ‘that thing’ it is possible existence (this is rejected if to the intention of the genus a proper reality corresponds, and if it does not thus correspond to the common intention, – as is said [later, n.139].

112. [As to ‘whatever is said formally of God’] – As to that which is added in the question ‘about whatever is formally said of God’ [n.39], I say nothing such is in a

⁶⁷ This paragraph is marked as ‘s’ by Scotus. See footnote below to n.112.

genus,⁶⁸ for the same reason [nn.95-111], that nothing which is limited is said formally of God; whatever is of some genus, in whatever way it is of that genus, is necessarily limited.

113. But then there is a doubt, as to what sort the predicates are which are said of God, such as wise, good, etc.

I reply. Being is divided first into finite and infinite before it is divided into the ten categories, because one of them, namely 'finite', is common to these ten genera; therefore anything that agrees with being as indifferent to the finite and infinite, or as proper to infinite being, agrees with being, not as it is determined to a genus, but as prior, and consequently as it is transcendent and outside every genus. Anything that is common to God and creatures is such as to agree with being as indifferent to the finite and infinite; for as it agrees with God it is infinite, – as it agrees with creatures, it is finite; therefore it agrees with being before being is divided into the ten genera, and consequently whatever is such is transcendent.

114. But then there is another doubt, as to how 'wisdom' is set down as transcendent although it is not common to all beings.

I reply. Just as the idea of 'most general' is not the having of several species under it but the not having any genus above it (just as this category 'when' – because it does not have a genus above it – is most general, although it has few or no species), so

⁶⁸ Note of Scotus: "The negative [side of the question] – 'nothing said of God is in a genus': for this there are three reasons, two of which, p [n.101] and q [n.108], are from infinity (the instance r against them, through infinite line [n.117], and there two things: the intention of Aristotle and what is true in the thing); the third reason s [n.110] is about necessary existence – the fourth t from others [nn.118-119] (it will be refuted).

The affirmative [side of the question] – 'anything said of God is transcendent': where the first argument is v, about transcendentals "But then there is a doubt" [n.113]; next x 'to the contrary', the one about the four predicates [n.120], – and y the other 'to the contrary', about the reality corresponding to the common concept [n.137] (a difficulty is at o [see footnote to n.136]), – the solution to them [sc. x and y, nn.212-127, 138-150]."

the transcendent is whatever has no genus under which it is contained. Hence it is of the idea of the transcendent to have no predicate above it save being; but the fact it is common to many inferiors is accidental to it.

115. This is plain from another fact, that being not only has simple properties convertible with it, – as one, true, good – but also it has some properties where there are opposites distinguished against each other, as necessary existence or possible existence, act or potency, and the like. But just as the convertible properties are transcendent, because they follow being insofar as it is not determined to any genus, so the disjunct properties are transcendent, and each member of the disjunct is transcendent because neither determines its determinable to a definite genus; and yet one member of the disjunct is formally specific, agreeing with only one being, – as necessary existence in this division ‘necessary existence or possible existence’, and as infinite in this division ‘finite or infinite’, and so on in other cases. Thus too can wisdom be transcendent, and anything else that is common to God and creatures, although some such be said of God only, and some other such be said of God and a creature. But it is not necessary that a transcendent, as transcendent, be said only of whatever being is convertible with the first transcendent, namely with being.⁶⁹

3. Statement and Refutation of Some People’s Proof

⁶⁹ This paragraph is marked as ‘v’ by Scotus. See footnote above to n.112

116. [Some people's proof] – Some people⁷⁰ prove it in a fourth way [nn.101, 108, 110], that God is not a genus because “he contains in himself the perfections of all genera.”⁷¹

[Refutation of the proof] – But this argument is not valid, because what contains something contains it in its own way. Substance too, which is now the most general genus, contains, as it is taken for all inferior species, all the accidents virtually; so that, if God were to cause only the individuals of substances, they would have in themselves the wherewithal to cause all accidents, and yet created substances would not be denied, because of this, to be in a genus, because they contain accidents virtually in their own way and not in the way of accidents. So, therefore, from the fact alone that God contains the perfections of all genera, it does not follow that he is not in a genus, because containing them in this way does not exclude finitude (for this ‘to contain virtually’ is not ‘to be infinite’), but from God’s absolute infinity this does follow, as was deduced before [nn.101-109].

117. [Instances from infinite line] – But against this [sc. the last clause of n.118] an instance is made that infinity simply does not prove the intended proposition [sc. that God is not in a genus], because the Philosopher *Topics* 6.11.148b23-32 takes exception to the definition of straight line (namely this definition, ‘a straight line is that whose middle does not extend outside the extremes’), for this reason, that if there were an infinite line it could be straight, – but then it would not have a middle, nor extremes or ends; but a definition is not to be taken exception to because it does not agree with that to which

⁷⁰ Aquinas *On Power* q.7 a.3.

⁷¹ This paragraph is marked as ‘t’ by Scotus. See footnote above to n.112.

being in a genus is impossible; therefore it is not impossible for an infinite line to be in a genus, and consequently infinity does not necessarily prohibit being in a genus.⁷²

118. I reply, first to the intention of the authority [sc. of Aristotle, n.117], – because a straight line is a whole *per accidens*, and, if this whole be defined, it will be assigned one definition corresponding to line and another corresponding to straight. That which corresponds to ‘straight’ in the place in the definition does not formally contradict the infinite (because straight does not formally contradict the infinite), and what a definition is formally repugnant to, the thing defined will also be repugnant to; but that there is assigned in the definition, which the Philosopher takes exception to, a definition as it were of straight (that is, to have a mean within the extremes), this is formally repugnant to the infinite; therefore, if this definition were good, it has to be that straight would be formally repugnant to the infinite, – but this is false, although straight is, as to its subject, formally repugnant to the infinite. The Philosopher, then, does not intend to say that an infinite line can be in a genus, but that infinity is not formally repugnant to the idea of straight, – and therefore the definition to which infinity is formally repugnant is not a definition ‘of straight insofar as it is straight’; for he would not have taken exception to this definition ‘a straight line is length without breadth, whose extremes are two points equally extended’, because here something would be repugnant to infinity, but it would be assigned as the idea of line, not as the idea of straight, – and then it would be well assigned because infinity is repugnant to that line.

119. But there is another doubt, concerning the thing, whether an infinite straight line could be in the genus of quantity, – and if it could, then the two reasons taken from infinity [nn.101, 108] do not seem to be valid.

⁷² This paragraph is marked as ‘r’ by Scotus. See footnote above to n.112. See also appendix point E.

I reply. Never does the supreme in a superior follow on the supreme in an inferior unless the inferior is the most noble thing contained under the superior, just as ‘the most perfect ass, therefore the most perfect animal’ does not follow, but ‘the most perfect man, therefore the most perfect animal’ does, thanks to the matter, follow, because man is the most perfect of animals; therefore the best or most perfect being does not follow on the most perfect of the things that are contained under being unless it is the simply most perfect thing contained under being; but quantity is not such, nor anything in that genus – because anything in it is limited – nay, nothing is such save what is perfection simply, which can of itself be infinite; and so ‘the most perfect quantity, therefore the most perfect being’ does not follow, nor does it thus follow about anything in any genus, but only this follows, ‘the most perfect truth or goodness, therefore the most perfect being’. So it is, then, with the infinite, that because it does not assert only supreme perfection but also a perfection that cannot be exceeded, infinite being does not follow save on such an infinite as is the most perfect thing in which there is the idea of being, namely which asserts perfection simply. And therefore, although there were a quantity infinite in idea of quantity, yet, since quantity is not a perfection simply, it would not follow that it was an infinite being, because it would not follow that it was a being which could not be exceeded in perfection. There might, then, be an infinite line in the genus of quantity, because it would be a simply limited being and exceeded simply by a simply more perfect being, but ‘an infinite being simply’ cannot exist in a genus; and the reason is that the first infinite [sc. that of a line] does not take away all the potentiality that the idea of genus requires, but it only posits an infinity in a certain respect of some imperfect entity (in which, as it is that thing, there can well be composition, in whatever degree it be put –

as long as it is that thing), but the second infinity necessarily takes away [that potentiality], as was made clear before [nn.106-107, 103].

120. [Instance from the insufficiency of the categories of Aristotle] – Against this [n.119] it is opposed that then contradictories would be posited, by conceding a common concept said in the ‘what’ about God and creatures and denying that God is in a genus; for every concept said in the ‘what’, if it is a common concept, is either the concept of a genus or the concept of a definition, otherwise there will be more predicates than Aristotle taught in *Topics* 1.4.101b15-28.⁷³

121. To this I say that they are not contradictories. The thing is plain from the authorities of Augustine given above [n.97], – where he denies that God is a substance and concedes that properly and even truly he is essence. But if there were a different, an equivocal, concept for essence as essence belongs to God and creatures, then there could thus be an equivocal concept of substance, – and so God could then be called substance just as he is called essence.

122. Likewise Avicenna in *Metaphysics* VIII ch.4 (99rb), where he denies that God is in a genus, concedes there that he is substance and being not in another. And that he is taking ‘being’ non-equivocally from the concept according to which it is said of creatures appears from himself in *Metaphysics* I ch.2 (71ra), where he says that “being in itself does not have principles, which is why science does not look for the principles of being absolutely, but of some being.” But if being had a different concept in God and in creatures, there could well be a principle in itself of being, because of being according to one concept being itself according to another concept would be the principle.

⁷³ This paragraph is marked as ‘x’ by Scotus. See footnote above to n.112.

123. When you argue ‘it is said in the ‘what’, then it is genus or definition’ [n.120], – I reply: Aristotle *Metaphysics* 8.3.1043b23-32 teaches what sort of ‘predicate said in the what’ is a definition. For he introduces there, against the ‘ideas’ of Plato the sayings of the followers of Antisthenes, – whom to this extent he approves when they say, “a long account is a term.” And afterwards he adds that “it is a feature of substance that of it there can be a term (to wit of composite substance, whether sensible or intelligible), but of the first elements from which these are, there is not” (supply, a definition), – and he adds the reason: “since a definition signifies something of something” (this needs to be understood virtually, not formally, – as was said elsewhere [I d.3 n.147]); and he adds: “this indeed must be as matter, but that as form.” From which he seems there to be arguing that the [Platonic] ‘idea’, if it were posited, would not be definable, and so if, because of the simplicity of the ‘idea’, his own reasoning has validity in any way, he himself would much more deny a definition of God, whose simplicity is supreme. Therefore it follows from his authority that nothing is said of God in the ‘what’ as a definition.

124. From the same it follows that nothing is said in the ‘what’ of God as a genus. For whatever has a genus can have a difference and a definition, because (*Metaphysics* 7.12.1038a5-6) genus ‘either is nothing besides the species, or if it is, it is so indeed as matter’, and then that of which there is a genus should be set down as being able to have a difference as form. If, therefore, something is said of God in the ‘what’, it follows, arguing constructively from Aristotle’s authority not destructively, that that something is not a genus or definition; but when you infer ‘it is a genus or definition, because Aristotle did not say that there were other predicates asserted in the ‘what’, therefore there are no

other predicates' [n.120] – you are arguing from the authority destructively, and there is a fallacy of the consequent.⁷⁴

125. But you will say: then Aristotle did not sufficiently hand on all the predicates said in the 'what'.

I reply. The Philosopher in the *Topics* [n.120] distinguished predicates because of the distinction of problems, because diverse problems have, from the diversity of predicates, a diverse way of terminating. So he does not there number all the predicates, because he does not number specific difference (although he did include general difference under genus); and yet specific difference has the proper idea of a predicate; now species too has the proper idea of a predicate, different from definition, otherwise Porphyry [*Book of Predicables* ch.1] would have been wrong to posit five universals. For that reason, therefore, Aristotle did sufficiently there distinguish the predicates, because he distinguished all those about which puzzling problems require a special way of terminating, which is what he was there intending to hand on. – But the transcendent ones are not such predicates, because there are no special problems about them; for a problem supposes something certain and inquires into what is doubtful (*Metaphysics* 7.17.1041b4-11), but being and thing “are impressed on the soul in first impression” (Avicenna *Metaphysics* I ch.6 (72rb)), and therefore about these most common concepts there are no

⁷⁴ Those whom Scotus is criticizing are arguing that if a genus or definition is predicated in the 'what', then something predicated of God in the 'what' must be a genus or definition, and they are arguing thus on Aristotle's authority. But, first, this argument is the fallacy of the consequent (for even if genus and definition are predicated only in the 'what' it does not follow that anything predicated in the 'what' is only a genus or definition, for perhaps something else might be so predicated), and, second, they are arguing destructively from Aristotle and saying that if Aristotle spoke of nothing else as predicated in the 'what' then he denied that anything else could be predicated in the 'what'. Scotus is arguing constructively, that since Aristotle denied definition of simples he would admit that anything predicated of a simple in the 'what', as in the case of God, could not be a definition or a genus.

per se terminable problems. It was not necessary, then, to number them among the predicates of problems.

126. But is it really the case that Aristotle never taught those general predicates [sc. the transcendent ones]?

I reply. In *Metaphysics* 8 [n.123] he taught that nothing was said of God as genus (from the afore-mentioned authority [n.123]), and yet he did teach that ‘truth’ is said univocally of God and creatures in *Metaphysics* 2.1.993b30-31, as was mentioned above (where he says that ‘the principles of eternal things are most true’ [n.79]); and by this he taught that entity is said univocally of God and creatures, because he adds there (sc. *Metaphysics* 2, *ibid.*) that “as each thing is related to being, so is it related to truth;” it is also plain – according to him⁷⁵ – that if being is said of God, it will be said in the ‘what’. Therefore in these passages he implicitly taught that some transcendent predicate is said in the ‘what’, and that it is not genus or definition, – and that other transcendent predicates are said in the ‘what sort’ (like true), and yet that they are not properties or accidents in accord with the fact that these universals (sc. property and accident) belong to the species of some of the genera, because nothing which is a species of some genus belongs to God in any way.

127. He also in some way taught the same in *Topics* 4.6.128a38-39: “If something,” – he says – “always follows and does not convert, it is difficult to separate it from being a genus.” And he afterwards adds: “To use it as a genus by the fact that it always follows, although it does not convert,” – as if he were saying that this is expedient for the opponent; and he adds: “when the other grants one of the two sides, one should

⁷⁵ Because (Vatican editors) he posited that God was substance (first, eternal, and immutable), and that being is said of substance in the first mode of saying *per se*, etc.

not obey him in everything,”⁷⁶ – as if he were to say that this is expedient to the respondent, not to concede that every non-convertible consequent is a predicate as a genus; and, if he were not speaking of a predicate said in the ‘what’, there would be no plausibility to what he teaches, that the opponent is using such as a genus. Therefore he insinuates there that something is a common predicate said in a ‘what’ which is not a genus. – And that he is speaking of predication in the ‘what’ is seen from his examples, ‘tranquility is quiet’. For predication in abstract things is not predication in the ‘what sort’ or a denominative predication.

IV. To the Arguments for the Second Opinion

128. To the arguments for the second opinion [nn.90-94]. I respond to Damascene [n.90]. Although he says many words, in diverse places, which seem to say that God is in a genus, yet one word – which he says in *Elementary Instruction on Dogmas* ch.8 – solves everything. For there he says that “Substance, which contains the uncreated deity super-substantially, but the whole creation cognitively and content-fully, is the most general genus.” Therefore he does not say that the substance which is the most general genus contains the deity as it contains the creature, but contains it ‘super-substantially’, that is, by taking that which is a matter of perfection in substance, as it is a genus, and leaving out that which is a matter of imperfection – in the way Avicenna says in *Metaphysics* VIII ch.4 [n.122] that God is ‘being in itself’.

⁷⁶ But (Vatican editors) one should in some things respond with an instance, that is, by using that objection, *Topics* 4.6.128b6-9: “Non-being follows everything that comes to be (for what comes to be is not), but it does not convert (for not everything which is not comes to be); but non-being is not the genus of what comes to be; for, simply, there are no species of non-being.”

129. As to Boethius [n.91] I say that nowhere in that little book is he found to say that ‘two genera remain in divine reality’. In brief, neither genera, nor modes or genera, nor their ideas remain there, – because, just as genera and the things in them are limited, so also are their modes and ideas (speaking of ideas of first intention, which are founded on these), because nothing can be founded on a limited thing save a limited thing.

130. Yet Boethius does – in his little book *On the Trinity* chs.4, 6 – say, after enumerating the categories, that “if anyone turns these toward divine predication, all that can be changed are changed; but a something is not at all predicated as ‘a relation to something’,” – and later, “essence contains the unity, relation multiplies the trinity;” and from these is taken the thought that he indicates substance and relation remain in divine reality. But he expressly says there that neither substance, which is a genus, nor anything of it, remains there; for he says “When we speak of God, we seem to signify substance, but a substance that is beyond substance,” in the way Damascene spoke of substance ‘super-substantially’ [n.128]. Boethius intends, then, that there are two modes of predicating in divine reality, namely of relative predicate and essential predicate, which modes Augustine expresses rather as ‘to itself’ and ‘to another’ – *On the Trinity* V ch.8 n.9 – , and all the predicates said formally of God are contained under one or other of these two members; but under the first member [sc. ‘to itself’] are contained many predicates that have a mode of predicating like quality and quantity (and not only those that have a mode of predicating similar to the ones which are of the category of substance), and under the second member [sc. ‘to another’] are contained all that have a mode of predicating similar to relatives, whether they are properly relatives or not.

131. And as to why all essential predicates are said to be predicated according to substance, and why against them are distinguished the predicates said ‘in relation to something’, although however the predicates said ‘in relation to something’ pass over, by identity, into substance, just as the other predicates also do, – the reason for this will be assigned in the following question ‘About attributes’, in the second doubt against the principal solution [nn.215-216, 222].

132. As to Averroes [n.92] I say that he does not seem to have the intention of the master, because Aristotle, in *Metaphysics* 10.1.1052b18-1053b3, 2.1053b9-1054a19, asks whether in substances there is something one that is the measure of the others, and whether this is the one itself. And he proves – from his intention against Plato – that it is not the one itself, but something to which one itself belongs, just as with all other genera when speaking of one and of the other common things measured in the genera. And he concludes at the end: “Wherefore indeed, in properties and qualities and quantities one itself is something one but not the substance of it; and in substances things must be similarly disposed – for things are similar in everything” (about which text the Commentator set down the words afore mentioned [n.92]). But if the first mover is posited as the measure of the genus itself of substance, this one thing would itself be posited as the measure, because the first mover – on account of its simplicity – would much more truly be this one thing itself than the idea of Plato.

133. What then is the first measure of the genus?

I reply: some substance in that genus, to which unity belongs, is first. – But the first mover is not the intrinsic measure of that genus, just as not of the other genera either. Yet insofar as it is, in some way, the extrinsic measure of everything, it is more

immediately the measure of substances, which are more perfect beings, than of accidents, which are more remote from it. It is, however, the intrinsic measure of no genus.

134. To the first reason [n.93] I say that if you contract substance with the difference of created and uncreated, then substance is not taken there as it is the concept of the most general genus (for uncreated is repugnant to substance in this way, because substance in this way involves limitation), but substance is taken there for ‘being in itself’ and not ‘being in another’, whose concept is prior and more common than the concept of substance as it is a genus, – as was plain from Avicenna above [n.122].

135. To the other reason [n.94] I concede that the composition of thing and thing is not required for a being ‘in a genus’, but there is required composition of reality and reality, one of which – precisely taken in the first moment of nature – is in potency to the other and perfectible by the other; but such composition cannot be of infinite reality to infinite reality; but all reality in God is infinite formally, as was made clear above [n.107], – therefore etc.

V. To the Principal Arguments

136. [To the first] – To the first principal argument [n.39] I concede that this concept said of God and creatures in the ‘what’ is contracted by some contracting concepts that assert a ‘what sort’, but it is not the case either that this concept said in the ‘what’ is the concept of a genus, or that those concepts asserting a ‘what sort’ are concepts of differences, because this ‘quidditative’ concept is common to the finite and infinite, which community cannot be in the concept of a genus, – and those contracting

concepts assert an intrinsic mode of the contracted thing itself, and not some reality perfecting it; but differences do not assert an intrinsic mode of reality of some genus, because, in whatever grade animality is understood, rationality or irrationality is not on this account an intrinsic mode of animality, but animality is in that grade still understood as perfectible by rationality or irrationality.⁷⁷

137. But there is a doubt how a concept common to God and creatures can be taken as ‘real’ save from some reality of the same genus, – and then it seems that it is potential to the reality from which the distinguishing concept is taken, as was argued before ‘about the concept of genus and difference’ [n.39], and then the argument made above for the first opinion stands, that, if there were some reality in the thing that distinguishes and another reality in it that is distinguished, it seems that the thing is composite, because it has something by which it agrees and something by which it differs [n.47].⁷⁸

138. I reply that when some reality is understood along with its intrinsic mode, the concept is not so simply simple that the reality cannot be conceived without the mode, but it is then an imperfect concept of the thing; the concept can also be conceived under that mode, and it is then a perfect concept of the thing. An example: if there were a whiteness in the tenth grade of perfection, however much it was in every way simple in the thing, it could yet be conceived under the idea of such an amount of whiteness, and then it would be perfectly conceived with a concept adequate to the thing itself, – or it could be conceived precisely under the idea of whiteness, and then it would be conceived

⁷⁷ Note by Scotus: “Note how some intention is first about *a* and *b* indifferently, and nothing of one idea corresponds to it in reality, but the formal objects first diverse are understood, in one first intention, although both imperfectly.” This note is marked as ‘o’ by Scotus, see above footnote to n.112.

⁷⁸ This paragraph is marked as ‘y’ by Scotus, see above footnote to n.112.

with an imperfect concept and one that failed of the perfection of the thing; but an imperfect concept could be common to the whiteness and to some other one, and a perfect concept could be proper.

139. A distinction, then, is required between that from which a common concept is taken and that from which a proper concept is taken, not as a distinction of reality and reality but as a distinction of reality and proper and intrinsic mode of the same, – which distinction suffices for having a perfect or imperfect concept of the same thing, of which concepts the imperfect is common and the perfect is proper. But the concepts of genus and difference require a difference of realities, not just of the same reality perfectly and imperfectly conceived.

140. This point [n.139] can be clarified. If we posit that some intellect is perfectly moved by color to understand the reality of the color and the reality of the difference, however much the intellect may have a perfect concept adequate to the concept of the first reality, it does not have in this concept a concept of the reality from which the difference is taken, nor conversely, – but it has there two formal objects which are of a nature to terminate distinct proper concepts. But if the distinction in the thing were only as of reality and its intrinsic mode, the intellect could not both have a proper concept of the reality and not have a concept of the intrinsic mode of the thing (at any rate as of the mode under which it would be conceived, although this mode itself would not be conceived, just as is elsewhere said ‘about conceived singularity and the mode under which it is conceived’ [I d.2 n.183]), but in the perfect concept it would have one object adequate to it, namely the thing under the mode.⁷⁹

⁷⁹ This and the previous two paragraphs [nn.138-140] are marked by Scotus with a reference back to n.111.

141. And if you say ‘at any rate the common concept is indeterminate and potential with respect to the special concept, therefore the reality too is indeterminate and potential with respect to the reality, or at any rate the concept will not be infinite, because nothing infinite is potential with respect to anything’, – I concede that the concept common to God and creatures is finite, that is, it is not of itself infinite, because, if it were infinite, it would not of itself be common to the finite and infinite; nor is it of itself positively finite, such that it of itself include finitude, because then it would not belong to the infinite, – but it is of itself indifferent to the finite and the infinite; and so it is finite negatively, that is, it does not posit infinity, and in such negative finitude it is determinable through some concept.

142. But if you argue ‘therefore the reality from which it [sc. the above concept] is taken is finite’, – it does not follow; for it is not taken from any reality as a concept adequate to that reality, or as a perfect concept adequate to that reality, but it is diminished and imperfect, to such an extent even that if the reality from which it is taken were to be seen perfectly and intuitively, he who intuites it would not there have distinct formal objects, namely the reality and the mode, but one and the same formal object [n.140], – yet he who understands it with abstractive intellection can, because of the imperfection of the intellection, have it for formal object although he not have the other one.

143. As to the ‘I concede...’ [n.141 near the middle]: the concept is not the finite act [sc. whereby we conceive] but is the formal object [n.65]. If it is determinable [n.141], then it is formally finite and potential, and then not common to an infinite thing.

The final consequence [sc. the clause immediately preceding] is to be denied, because the infinite thing is in the formal finite object understood imperfectly to the extent that the infinite object would be of a nature to cause in the intellect such a formal object if it were to be moving it in diminished fashion [n.142], just as also a created object moving in diminished fashion is of a nature to do the same; and therefore it is common to both, as a sort of common and imperfect likeness.

144. To the contrary: an infinite thing is not anything finite; God is the object in question, if the object is predicated of God in the ‘what’, in the way ‘man is an animal’ – similarly, God is not anything potential.

Response. Although there is in the intellect a composition of concepts, yet the conception is on behalf of the external thing. Just as signs are taken for the things signified, and just as several concepts can be the signs of the same thing (although one is common, another proper), so the composition of the concepts is a sign of the identity of the things signified by those concepts. Because, therefore, the thing signified by the finite concept, as by the common sign, is the very thing which is signified by the concept of God, therefore, by compounding the finite concept in the intellect with the concept of God, this proposition is true ‘God is a being’; but the composition is not on behalf of the finite thus signified, but on behalf of the infinite signified in common.

145. Then to the proposition ‘God is the object in question, a being’ [n.144, *init.*], I reply: God is that which in reality is signified by being as by a common sign, and therefore in the intellect this composition is true ‘God is a being’, which composition is a sign of that identity.

146. When you say ‘God is not anything finite’ [n.144, *init.*], the statement is true, when speaking of identity in the thing, namely the identity which is signified and belongs to the signified things; but, when speaking of being as it is a composition in the intellect, the statement that nothing which in the intellect is a finite sign can be predicated of God in a composition is false. An example of this: ‘a man is an animal’, – in the intellect ‘animal’, as it is there the formal object, is a diminished being. But no diminished being is true of [the man] Socrates existing in reality.

147. So this is false, then, ‘Socrates existing is an animal’? – I reply: a composition is always made of concepts, and it is a sign and of things signified; but it is on behalf of material objects, which are signified by the concepts, and of identity, which is signified by the composition, such that if there is an identity of the things signified, namely of the material objects, the composition of the concepts, which are the formal objects, is true.

148. The point [n.139, 140] can also be further clarified. If there is posited for any universal a proper individual (to wit in reality, a proper individual for substance, a proper individual for animal, a proper individual for man, etc.), then not only is the concept of genus potential to the concept of difference, but the proper individual of the genus is potential to the proper individual of the difference. But if we take the proper individual of this concept ‘being’ which is individual in God, and if we take the proper individual of this which is ‘infinite’, it is the same individual, and it is not potential to itself.

149. But you ask at any rate: why does entity not have a proper individual in reality, which individual would be in potency to the individual of the determining feature, so that ‘this’ being is first understood before ‘infinite’ being is?

I reply, because when something is existent of itself, and is not merely capable of very existence, it has of itself whatever condition is necessarily required for existence; but being as it belongs to God – namely being through essence – is infinite existence itself and not something to which existence itself merely belongs (God is of himself ‘this’ and of himself ‘infinite’), so that infinity is in some way as it were first understood to be a mode of being through essence before it is understood to be ‘this’; and therefore one should not ask why ‘this’ being is infinite, as if singularity first belonged to it before infinity. And so is it universally in the case of things that can be beings through essence. Nothing such by participation is first of itself determined so as to be such by essence, both so as to be an infinite such and so as be of itself ‘this’.

150. And if you argue that individual includes individual, therefore common includes common, therefore if ‘this’ being includes ‘this’ infinity, and if being in common includes infinity in common, – I reply that the consequence is not valid, because individual includes some perfection which common does not include, and on account of this perfection it can formally include the infinite, and yet the common – by reason of the common concept – does not include it as an included concept, but is in some way determinable by it.

151. [To the second] – As to Avicenna *Metaphysics* II [n.40], the answer is plain from himself in *Metaphysics* VIII, as was said [n.122].

152. [To the third] – As to Damascene [n.41], the answer is plain from the Master [Lombard] in distinction 19 [*Sentences* I d.19 ch.9 n.182], because he puts species there ‘for some likeness of species to individuals’; there is however a greater unlikeness, according to Augustine, and therefore Augustine *On the Trinity* VII ch.6 n.11 denies

species there as he also denies genus. Hence the definition of Porphyry [*Book of Predicables* ch.3] ‘species is said to be that which is predicated of many things in the what’ should be understood as meaning that the species in those many is multiplied as to its nature, but in the divine persons the divine nature is not multiplied; the species too has in itself a reality corresponding to it, potential to the proper reality of the individual, but the divine essence is in no way potential to the relation, as was said in distinction 5 question 2 [I d.5 nn.70, 113, 118-119, 132, 138].

153. [To the fourth] – To the final one, about wisdom [n.42], I say that wisdom is not a species of a genus as it is transferred to divine reality, nor is it transferred according to that idea, but according to the idea of wisdom as it is transcendent. But how such a thing can be transcendent was said in the principal solution, the third article [nn.114-115].

154. There is, however, a doubt about the wisdom which is in us, whether it is an individual of transcendent wisdom and of quality, or whether only of something else.

And it seems not to be an individual of either.

Because nothing contains the same thing under diverse predicates which are said in the ‘what’ about the same thing and are not subalternate; but transcendent wisdom and quality are not subalternate; therefore etc.

155. Again, transcendent wisdom is a property of being, – therefore being is not said of it in the ‘what’, nor conversely, from distinction 3 [I d.3 nn.131, 134-136]; therefore neither does anything in which transcendent wisdom is included include a being in ‘what’, because then it would be a being *per accidens*; for it would essentially include the idea of subject and property, and these do not make anything one *per se* but only *per accidens*.

156. If these arguments [nn.154-155] are valid, and the wisdom in us is only an individual of transcendent wisdom or only an individual of the genus of quality – the second of these does not seem it should be granted, because then wisdom would not be in us a perfection simply, which seems to be contrary to Augustine *On the Trinity* XV ch.4 n.6: ‘Every creature around us cries out’ etc. [n.71]; if the first of them is granted, then not every habit is formally in the genus of quality, but all that indicate perfection simply are transcendent.⁸⁰

Question Four

*Whether along with the Divine Simplicity can stand a Distinction of Essential Perfections
preceding the Act of the Intellect*

157. I ask whether along with the divine simplicity there can in any way stand a distinction of essential perfections preceding every act of the intellect.

I argue that there cannot:

Augustine *On the Trinity* XV ch.5 n.7: “Wisdom and justice are not two qualities in God as they are in creatures, but that which is justice is itself also goodness.” From this I argue: predication in the case of something abstract is only true if it is ‘*per se* in the first mode’; therefore this proposition ‘wisdom is truth’ is *per se* in the first mode, and so

⁸⁰ The Vatican editors remark that nn.154-156 have the nature of notes (not of finished discussion).

there is in no way a distinction between the subject and the predicate, but the subject *per se* includes the predicate, because this is what belongs to *per se* in the first mode [*Posterior Analytics* 1.4.73a34-37]; therefore etc.

158. On the contrary:

Damascene *On the Orthodox Faith* I ch.4: “If you say just or good or anything of the like, – you are not stating the nature of God but something in respect of the nature.” But you are stating something that precedes the act of the intellect; therefore, before every work and act of the intellect, there is something in God which is not the nature formally.

I. The Opinions of Others

159. On this question there are many opinions, all of which I do not intend to recite. But there are two holding to the negative conclusion that nevertheless contradict each other; each posits that along with the simplicity of God no distinction of attributes stands save only a distinction of reason, but the first [from Thomas of Sutton] posits that it cannot be had save through an act of the intellect ‘understanding God himself in an outward respect’, – the second [from Henry of Ghent] posits that this distinction of reason can be had ‘without any outward respect’.

A. First Opinion

160. [Exposition of the opinion] – The first rests on this reasoning:⁸¹ “whenever there is in one extreme a difference of reason to which a real difference corresponds in the other extreme, the distinction or difference of reason is taken by comparison with things really distinct (an example of a distinction according to reason is of the right and left side of a column, which is taken by respect to the real distinction of these in an animal, – likewise, an example of a distinction of reason is in a point as it is the beginning and end, which distinction is taken by respect to lines really diverse); but the divine attributes have in creatures certain things really distinct corresponding to them, as goodness to goodness and wisdom to wisdom, and other things that are really called attributes (by which are excluded certain divine properties, as everlastingness and eternity, which are not properly attributes); therefore etc.”

161. “The adherents of this reasoning say that the attributes are distinguished with respect to our intellect in that, once the corresponding attributes have been removed, only a single and simple concept can be formed about the divine essence (which would be expressed in a single name for, if other names were imposed, either they would be

⁸¹ Scotus seems to be following, somewhat freely, Henry’s report of this opinion (with which opinion Henry himself did not agree), and the Vatican editors suggest that Henry’s report is not fully accurate to, e.g., Sutton’s own view. They quote the following from Sutton [*Quodlibet* II q.2]: “Therefore the divine intellect, insofar as it is the same, never distinguishes several reasons in its essence. But, once all respect to creatures is removed, the divine intellect is, in knowing its essence, only disposed in one and the same way alone; therefore it does not distinguish several reasons of attributes without respect to creatures, but it has one reason of the essence, by which it perfectly knows the essence... The divine intellect knows distinct attributes through respect to the human intellect distinguishing the attributes.” Again: “For because our intellect – on account of its imperfection – cannot know in one conception the perfection of the divine essence, therefore it has need to understand it in diverse conceptions, which are diverse reasons that it receives from creatures and attributes to God.” Again: “For because the created intellect cannot know the one divine perfection, in the way it is, according to its own single reason, therefore it has need, because of its imperfection, to know it under many distinct reasons.” They also quote the following from Bernard of Auvergne criticizing Henry [*Quodlibet* V q.1]: “But as to his [Henry’s] imposing on this position that ‘only one concept can be formed of the divine essence’, it is false, because the position says that ‘one complete concept is formed of the divine essence and that concept God forms, who conceives himself completely; but the created intellect can form many concepts of the divine essence, because it cannot capture the whole perfection all at once’; hence that position is true.”

synonymous names, because the same thing in reality and in reason would correspond to them – or they would be empty, because nothing would correspond to them).”

162. “Their mode, then, of positing attributes is of the following sort: to all the ideas of the attributes (namely those that state a perfection in God and in creatures) there corresponds in God the unity of essence, not according to the being which he has absolutely” – as was said – “but according to the respect which he has to creatures; not in the genus of efficient cause (for no attribute is thus taken, as wisdom because he causes wisdom), nor even to remove something from God – which two modes seem to be the ones asserted by Avicenna [*Metaphysics* VIII chs.4 and 7 (99ra, 101rb)] and Rabbi Moses [Maimonides, *Guide of the Perplexed* p.1 chs. 53, 55-60] – but insofar as the divine essence is compared to creatures according to the idea of formal cause, containing in itself the completeness of every perfection which is dispersed and imperfect in creatures, and in this respect the divine essence can in diverse ways be imitated by everything. – Further: the plurality of attribution-al perfections, as it exists in the divine essence, is as it were in potency, but as it is in a concept of the intellect it is as it were in act (example about the universal in the thing and in the intellect). But this plurality has a diverse existence in diverse intellects; in the divine intellect, indeed, and in a creature made blessed by the fullness of the perfection of the simple essence, it is conceived according to diverse ideas, and from this comes the multitude of conceptions in act in the intelligence, but by an intellect understanding with natural light they are conceived *a posteriori*, insofar as this intellect forms, from perfections really diverse in creatures, corresponding conceptions and perfections proportional in God; yet no intellect actually understands them without respect to those they are proportional to – whether it

understand them from those they are proportional to, as does the third intellect [an intellect understanding with natural light], – or not, but from the essence, as does the first and the second intellect [sc. the divine intellect and the intellect of a blessed creature]. – Limited perfections insofar as they are actually in the intelligence are called reasons, and reason here is said to be the conception of a determinate perfection, from its respect to the determinate perfection corresponding to it in creatures.”

163. [Godfrey of Fontaine’s clarification for the opinion] – Others clarify this position in the following way, that “the divine intellect, apprehending its own essence according to one simple reality, yet a reality virtually containing, without limitation and defect, the simple and absolute perfections of all things, insofar as it is more eminently perfect than the same perfections because of the eminence of its own perfection, understands that essence as one in reality, perfect with a multiple perfection that differs according to reason; and if it did not apprehend that the creature was perfected with diverse perfections really different insofar as the creature is good and wise, or because those perfections introduce diversities in the creature, it would not apprehend itself as perfect in wisdom under one reason and perfect in goodness under another reason, nor would it apprehend the difference in reason between its own wisdom and its own goodness unless it apprehended the difference in reality of wisdom and goodness in the creature, – otherwise unity and plurality would be taken from one thing disposed in the same way in reality and in concept. Since, therefore, the divine essence, as considered in itself, is something wholly without distinction – altogether simple – in reality and in reason, it cannot be said that, without a comparison between it and other things in which is found a diversity of reality and reason, such a distinction could exist, because, when

that is apprehended which is altogether simple and single under the reason that belongs to it in itself without any relation to anything else in which there is some distinction, then, just as the apprehended is only one in reality, so it cannot be apprehended save as one simple reason.”

164. “Nor can it – namely the intelligible and the intelligent – apprehend in its essence certain things as differing in their comparison with each other or as having a mutual relation with each other, unless these things are supposed already to exist in their own difference, or to be introducing a certain difference. For things which are apprehended as certain different things having a mutual relation to each other, and which are also, by the operation of the intellect, compared as differing from each other, these are also supposed to exist in their own difference; but things that, by the operation of reason or intellect, do not possess what makes them to be beings according to reason, and to differ by reason from each other, these cannot be said to be constituted in their own such being and to have this difference according to reason through comparison of them with each other by the operation of reason or the intellect; nay this second operation necessarily presupposes the first, such that, first, they are by one operation of reason constituted in such distinct being, and, second, by another operation of the intellect they are compared as thus distinct from each other; for just as things of absolute nature, when they are compared with each other, are supposed to have a distinct being in reality, so too beings of reason, when these are compared with each other, are supposed to have a distinct being according to reason. Therefore, if the divine intellect apprehends its own essence as different in reason from the attributes, and if it also apprehends the attributes as different in reason, and if the attributes are compared with each other under this very

difference, they are of themselves in it actually as so differing, and under their own actual distinction – which they thus have of themselves – they move the divine intellect so that it conceive them as so distinct and compare them with each other. But this does not seem to be concordant.”

165. This reasoning is confirmed as follows: “For all things that differ, or have a difference, formally in themselves or from themselves through what they are in themselves, without comparison to other differing things, all such things differ in reality. But there are other things that have plurality or difference from comparison with other things that really differ, and these things differ by reason; and this is plain in creatures, for once unity of specific form in reality is presupposed, the intellect distinguishes in it the idea of genus and difference – which are said not to be diverse things – but this diversity could not be taken in any single and simple thing unless it were compared by the intellect to some things really different and, according to some order, agreeing with that single thing; one and the same thing would not have diverse reasons of true and good unless to understand and to will the ‘one and the same thing’ were, for some subject, acts really diverse and ordered with respect to each other. This is plain also in God, because, when every kind of comparison to the diverse essences of creatures introducing a real diversity has been stripped away, the divine essence would not be apprehended by the divine intellect under the reason of diverse ideas (or of forms), differing by reason alone, but under one simple altogether indistinct reason.”

166. “And this is the intention of the Commentator in *Metaphysics* XII com.39 where, speaking of this matter, he says that life, wisdom, etc. are said properly of God, because God is properly and truly said to be alive and to be wise etc. But such and the

like things, which are signified by way of disposition and thing disposed, ‘are reduced’ in material things ‘to one thing in being and to two things in consideration; for the intellect is of a nature to divide things united in being, but in composite things – when it disposes the composite, or what has a form, through the form – it understands both the things that are united in some way and different in another way; but when the disposed thing and the disposition have been considered in immaterial things, then they are reduced to altogether one intention, and there will be no mode by which the predicate is distinguished from the subject outside the intellect, namely in the being of the thing. But the intellect understands no difference between them in being, save according to way of taking them, namely because the same thing receives the disposed thing and the disposition as two, the proportion of which to each other is as the proportion of predicate to subject; for the intellect can, in the case of composite things, understand the same thing according to likeness to a categorical proposition, just as it understands many things according to likeness’.”

167. [Rejection of the opinion] – Against this position I argue first thus.⁸²

“whatever is a mark of perfection simply in a creature is more principally and of itself in God, and not with respect to another;” an attribute is a mark of perfection simply in a creature, such that ‘it rather than not it’ is simply ‘better’ [n.22]; therefore etc.

Proof of the major: “the perfect is always independent of the imperfect, just as the imperfect is dependent on the perfect;” an attributal perfection is in God perfectly, in creatures imperfectly. – Likewise it would not be of infinite perfection simply unless it contained all perfection simply without respect to anything external.

⁸² Scotus’ arguments here [nn.167-173] are, according to the Vatican editors, freely based on statements by Henry of Ghent (indicated by the quotation marks).

The minor is made clear thus: for because any created thing, and any perfection of it essential to it, is limited in quidditative existence, therefore from nothing of this sort is an attribute taken (for by parity of reason an attribute might be taken from any created essence), but an attribute is taken from that which is an accidental perfection in a creature – or in its existing well – and which states a perfection simply in the subject substance, – because, although as a certain nature it has a limited rank, yet as perfecting another in its existing well it indicates no limitation, and thus it is an attribute. Thus too in God it does not indicate a proper perfection but as it were an accidental one, in his existing well, – *On the Trinity* XV ch.5 n.8: “If we say wise, powerful, beautiful, spirit, what I put last seems to signify substance, but the rest qualities of this substance.”

168. Again, those things are not distinguished by respect externally of which any one contains essence according to every ideal reason; but “any attribute contains essence according to every reason of ideal perfection;” therefore etc.

The proof of the minor is that the ideal reason corresponds to the perfection of the creature insofar as it is perfected in quidditative existence and, consequently, under the idea by which the essence is limited (hence also creatures are distinguished according to diverse degrees of limitation), but not insofar as the essence is perfect simply, because thus one attribute in God, as good or perfect, corresponds to all of them; from this the proof of the minor is apparent: for because any attribute is a perfection simply (from the clarification of the minor of the first proof [n.167]), it follows that any one of them is imitable by every limited grade.

The proof of the major is that what contains every idea seems to regard equally everything patterned after the idea, and so in regard to none of them can it be

distinguished from another, because it similarly regards any one at all; hence the attribute wisdom does not more regard wisdom patterned after the idea than color patterned after it, because both are equally limited, nor is the attribute taken more from one than from the other.

169. Again, “the distinction of attributes is the foundation of the distinction of the personal emanations, because the Son proceeds by being born as the word in the intellect, the Holy Spirit by being inspirited as love in the will, and not as the word, – which could not be unless there were some distinction of intellect and will internally,” such that the production of the persons is compared necessarily to nothing external; therefore etc.

170. Again, “he [God] understands his essence insofar as it is true, not insofar as it is good, – and he wills it insofar as it is good, not insofar as it is true;” “also from eternity he understood that he understands his essence and wills it simply, not in respect of something external,” because this act follows natural immateriality. Therefore, without such respect, it includes in its essence the idea of true and good, and similarly the idea of understanding and understood, of willing and willed, as formally distinct; therefore etc.

171. Again, “divine beatitude consists in its perfect acts, of intellect and will, but all the divine attributes mutually regard each other in perfecting those acts,” as will be plain [n.175]; but the beatitude of God depends on no extrinsic respect; therefore etc.

172. Against the reasons for the opinion [n.160].

The major is false. First because the divine essence is distinguished by reason from the attribute, just as one attribute is from another; can it therefore follow that ‘essence as essence is only there by outward respect’? – Second because true and good in creatures are distinguished by a distinction of reason; from which really distinct things,

then, is this distinction taken? From none but from true and good in God, which differ in reason. – Next, third because where there is “a mere distinction of reason, no outward respect is required” (just as is the case with definition and defined); and such is the distinction in the case of attributes, “which are objects of the divine intelligence, different in reason, although they are one act of understanding in God.” For when an outward respect is required, then the distinction is partly from the intellect and partly from elsewhere; and this either from diverse circumstances extrinsic in diverse ways, as is plain in the examples adduced of the column and the point [n.160], – or from the same thing diversely circumstanced, as is plain in the second instance [above, n.172] against the major.

173. Again, against the minor of the reason [n.160] there is this argument: “since all the attributes pertain to the intellect and the will – which are the principles of the emanations – the distinction of attributes can be really reduced to distinct persons, such that those which pertain to the intellect have respect to generation, – those which pertain to the will have respect to inspiring; so that, just as the natural intellect does not distinguish these and those save by respect to things in creatures to which it turns back all its understanding, so the blessed intellect distinguishes them about the persons, to which it directs all its understanding.”

B. Second Opinion

174. [Exposition of the opinion] – There is another position [Henry of Ghent’s],⁸³ which says that “the divine essence absolutely considered, insofar as it is a nature or essence, has no distinction of reasons save as it were in potency, – for the Commentator says *Metaphysics* XII com.39 that ‘the multiplicity of reasons in God is only in the intellect alone, not in reality’; but the divine essence considered, not in itself, but insofar as it is truth – insofar namely as it has existence in the intellect – can be taken in two ways, either insofar as it moves the intellect as by simple intelligence, and thus it is still conceived by reason of its simplicity and does not have any plurality save as it were in potency, – or insofar as the intelligence, after this apprehension, busies itself about the very plurality of the attributes, as if reducing them from potency to act. In the first way [sc. the divine essence absolutely considered] the natural intellect does not attain it but then only perceives it from attributes conceived from creatures,” according to this opinion; “in the second way [sc. the first way of taking the divine essence considered as it is truth] the blessed intellect grasps it as if in the first action of understanding; in the third way [sc. the second way of taking the divine essence considered as it is truth] the same intellect [sc. the blessed intellect] combining as it were and dividing, and the divine intellect in a single, simple intuition, distinguish the reasons contained in the essence, which essence contains, of its supreme perfection, all the perfections simply that are, by the sole operation of the intellect, to be distinguished.”

175. “These reasons of the attributes, which the intellect forms from the simple essence through diverse conceptions, are only respects founded in the essence (because simplicity prevents the concept of several attributes within it), and they are several concepts, lest the concepts be synonymous, and lest they be empty in the essence, but

⁸³ Scotus again quotes, somewhat freely, from Henry.

they are not outward respects” (as was proved [nn.167-171]), “but inward ones. Thus all the divine attributes pertain to the intellect or will, and they mutually regard each other inwardly insofar as they all – these and those – fall, by congruence, under the apprehension of the intellect; this intellect firstly conceives, in a simple intelligence, the essence as it is essence, and then, busying itself about it, conceives it as understood and as understanding and as the reason of understanding, – such that the essence, insofar as it is essence, has a respect to the other things as they are founded in it; but the essence as conceived, and as moving the intellect to understand, is called truth, whose proper reason is that it have a respect to the essence, insofar as it is essence, as being that of which it is clarificatory, and to the intellect as that to which it has to clarify it, and to the act of understanding as that by which it has to clarify it, and to wisdom as the habit in which the intellect is fit to have a clarification made to it. But the essence itself, as it is conceptive of itself by an act of understanding, is the intellect, and it has a respect to truth as that through which the essence which is conceived is made manifest,” – and likewise of the act, etc. – Thus too about the attributes pertaining to the will.

176. “From the supreme unity of the essence, in ordered manner, according to the mode of conceiving, the diverse reasons of the attributes are first conceived (and among these attributes there is still order, according as they are more immediately or more mediately ordered to the emanations), next the emanations are conceived, and there an inward stand is made, and finally there follow all the outward respects, which are *per accidens*; but just as the distinction of real relations is to what corresponds to them, so too is the distinction of relations of reason to what corresponds to them, and wholly inwardly,

according to the argument that was made for this part [sc. that the relations of reason are inward only].”

177. [Rejection of the opinion] – Against this opinion there is argument through the reasons I adduced against the first opinion [nn.167-176], – first, by the third reason, because it is against them [sc. the followers of Henry, n.169]: the distinction of the attributal perfections is the foundation with respect to the distinction of the emanations, – but the distinction of the emanations is real, as is clear; but no real distinction necessarily pre-requires a distinction which is only one of reason, just as neither does anything that is truly real pre-require something else that is merely a being of reason; therefore the distinction of attributes is not one of reason only but is in some way from the nature of the thing. – The assumption is plain, because a real being, which is distinguished against a being of reason, is that which has existence of itself, setting aside all work of the intellect as it is intellect; but whatever depends on a being of reason, or pre-requires it, cannot have existence when all work of the intellect has been set aside; therefore nothing that pre-requires a being of reason is a truly real being.

178. A confirmation of this reason is that what is naturally posterior cannot be more perfect than a being that is naturally prior; but real being is more perfect than a being which is a being of reason only [sc. therefore a real being cannot be posterior to a being of reason].

Although this reason is sufficient against one who holds the opinion, yet it is necessary to confirm it for the conclusion in itself [nn.180-181; the conclusion is that attributes are distinguished in the nature of the thing,].

179. Let it be said to it that the attributes are not the foundations of the distinct emanations,⁸⁴ nay the essence alone along with the relations is the principle of the diverse emanations; yet the intellect can afterwards consider the essence itself as it is, along with the relations, principle of this and that emanation, and then can consider the idea of nature and of will, and yet these will not there be prior from the nature of the thing.

180. On the contrary: in the instant of origin in which the Son is generated, I ask whether his productive principle is related to him in a way other than the productive principle of the Holy Spirit is related to him, or not in another way. If not in another way, then the Son is not more son or image of the Father by force of his production than the Holy Spirit is, – if in another way, then in those moments of origin, before all act of the intellect, some distinction and formal non-identity is obtained.

181. Nor is it valid to attribute this distinction to the relations, because every relation has a respect naturally to its correlatives; therefore the essence, as it is under the idea of inspiriting, equally has a respect to the inspirited, just as under the idea of generative it has a respect to the generated or the begotten. The different modes, then, of producing – naturally and freely – cannot there be saved by the relations, but only if the absolute, by which the producer produces, is of a different idea.

182. This point [that the attributes are distinguished in the nature of the thing] is also argued against this position by yet another of their reasons, about the objects of true and good [n.170] – because if ‘from eternity God, of his immateriality, understands himself and wills himself’, and this under the idea of true and good, then there is there a

⁸⁴ Note by Scotus: “This response is rejected in distinction 13, by argument against the third opinion [I d.13 q. un n.5].”

distinction of true and good by reason of formalities in the objects, before every act about such objects.

183. This is also confirmed by their argument about beatitude [nn.174-176], which belongs to God from the nature of the thing before every act of busying intellect, because the act of being busy about something is not formally beatific; but that beatitude (as is said) requires the proper idea of object and of power and of the one operating; therefore etc.

184. However the position [of Henry's] is expounded in this way, that we can speak about the relation that the object makes in the intellect of itself, or about that which the intellect can make by busying itself about the object;⁸⁵ if we speak of the first, it is

⁸⁵ Note by Scotus: "[Henry of] Harkleley [argues] otherwise – first proposition: a thing one in reality can be many in the intellect (Commentator *Metaphysics* XII com.39 [n.166], 'the intellect is of a nature to divide what is united in reality'); the reason is that one cause can have many equivocal effects, because none is adequate to the virtue of the cause; conception or intellection is an equivocal effect with respect to the object. Second proposition: yet two intellections have two formal objects (namely in cognized being), although they have the same material object in reality, – or they have the same object under this idea and that, and then there is a difference of reason only, and not of formal objects.

From these propositions the argument is as follows: on the supposition from distinction 3 [I d.3 n.35] that the creature can cause in our intellect some absolute concept 'proper to God' – either it will be a single concept differing only in reason (for whether it is a composition of the intellect according to logical reasons, or a composition outwardly, there are no differences in conception about an absolute concept save only relations of reason), or there will be many concepts having several formal objects, which may by diminution be the same object in cognized being, because they are reasons of it as it exceeds [the intellect].

In the first way it is easy to save the distinction of attributes in any intellect, even the divine one, because any intellect can understand the same absolute object under one or another relation of reason; as to relations outwardly the thing is plain, – and no less plain as to relations inwardly, to the persons; since indeed the essence is understood by God 'to differ in reason from the person'. But then in knowing all the attributes of God there is no real science, because the same formal object about him is not known, but the first proposition [above] holds; but as it is under an idea, if it has the idea of 'knowable of itself', it only exists on account of the reason under which it is understood, which in some way distinguishes it from itself as absolutely understood, or it is under another idea. – In the second way, several absolute concepts can be posited.

But it seems difficult to distinguish these [sc. several absolute concepts] in a blessed intellect, because there is only one concept as existent, intuited by that intellect; again, one 'object in itself' has, in the intellect to which it is present in itself, one concept, adequate to itself according to the virtue of that intellect, otherwise it cannot show itself to it as it is intelligible. – On the contrary, it can cause every concept that can be had about it, and if something else – to wit its effect – can cause imperfectly, yet it itself can cause perfectly; again, otherwise something would now be known of God

single, as it is also single in reality, – and this the opinion in itself said, that it has, as it is in the intelligence by an act of simple knowledge, the idea altogether of something indistinct [n.174]; if in the second way, thus the intellect can form about that one idea of the object many distinct ideas, comparing this to that, – and this likewise the opinion said, that the object, as it is in the intellect busying itself, has distinct ideas, quasi-formed about it [nn.174-175]. Yet this exposition adds – which the opinion in itself does not seem to say – that the one idea in itself is formally truth and goodness, and any perfection simply, and that the one idea, which is made in the intellect by virtue of the object, is also the idea of goodness formally and of truth, etc. The opinion in itself, however, seems to say that they state diverse respects founded in the essence.

185. Because, therefore, the said opinion [nn.174-176] can be understood in diverse ways, besides the arguments already made, I append other reasons, – and first I show that truth and goodness are formally in the thing, as well as any perfection simply, before all work of the intellect; because any perfection simply is formally in a simply perfect being from the nature of the thing; truth is formally a perfection simply, and goodness likewise; therefore etc.

which would not be seen in the fatherland; again, theology will be a science for no intellect, not for ours, because of faith, not for a blessed intellect, because of the singleness of concept.

Theology is knowledge of God (of the things that are present in him, known naturally to the divine intellect alone), therefore it is knowledge of the things that are in this science ‘as it is this’ (of which sort are the properties of the persons and the notional acts, the attributes), under the ideas by which they are these. If however a distinction of reason is held to or of formal objects and, third, some aptitudinal respects to creatures (such as the creative, the resuscitative, the remissive of sins, the retributive), – first against [the last]: nothing is in that case present ‘*per se*’, as it seems, because it is then common to all three [persons]; second against [the second]: how does the metaphysician know them [sc. if the ideas of formal objects are not there from the nature of the thing]? – third against [the first]: ‘respects of reason’ are in potency. Against the first proof for all of them [sc. the preceding paragraph]: an angel naturally knows it [sc. the divine essence] as ‘this’, although it does not see this ‘as this’, – therefore it could have theology; again, any concept about it [sc. the divine essence] is proper to it, because not common, – wherefore it is about it ‘as it is this’.”

The major is plain, first because otherwise there would not be a simply perfect thing, because there would not be 'that than which a greater cannot be thought' [I d.2 n.137] (for a greater than it would be thought if it were perfect thus and so), second because otherwise perfection simply would exist perfectly in nothing (for there is no perfection perfectly in a creature, because it exists there finitely, nor is there any perfection perfectly in God if it is not in him as existing but only as known, because 'to be known' is to exist in diminished fashion in contradistinction to something existent), then third because perfection simply in something would exist formally by participation and would not exist formally in that from which it would be participated (nay, such perfection in the participant would not be by participation of the perfection in its cause, because there is nothing on which participation in something existent depends save something existent), all which – namely all these inferred results – seem absurd. – The minor is plain, because otherwise Anselm would not posit such things in God, because according to him, *Monologion* ch. 15, nothing such should be posited in God which is not 'better existing than not existing', and hence a perfection simply. The same minor is also plain because anything such can be formally infinite; infinity is repugnant to anything that is not a perfection simply; therefore etc.⁸⁶

⁸⁶ Note by Scotus: "[Henry] of Harkeley proceeds in his discussion this way: the intellect according to its own proper and formal reason, namely according to its distinction from the will, is a perfection simply, – and the same about any attribute; the second proposition, the intellect according to its proper formal reason is in God from the nature of the thing as it is existent; third proposition, the intellect does not include *per se* any relation.

The proof of the first proposition, as the minor, is the following: first, because according to Anselm 'anything that is better it than not it' is to posited there (and he and the doctors treat of many cases [nn.195-197]). There would be only one single perfection simply (namely deity) unless the intellect were formally such, because if it were such only materially – insofar as it includes deity – it is a single perfection understood simply or compared in many ways. – The second proof (and it is a

186. Further, I prove that such perfections in the nature of the thing do not, before the work of the intellect, have formal identity; because the intellect can by its own act only cause a relation of reason, from the fact, namely, that it is a collative virtue, able to confer this thing as known to that. I ask then whether truth states precisely the perfection which is in the thing formally, or precisely the relation made by the intellect, or both? If precisely the relation of reason, then truth is not a perfection simply, because no relation of reason can be infinite; for if a real relation – as paternity – is not formally infinite, how much less so the relation of reason. If

confirmation of the first proof) is that the idea gives the understanding of the perfection which is the essence, although the formal reason of it is not simply perfection – so neither the formal reason of an attribute, according to you; nor is it valid about this and the other genus of cause, because the idea in a foundation which is perfection simply indicates eminence with respect to the thing patterned after the idea. – Third, because otherwise no perfection simply would be possible for an attribute; because it would not be second perfection (perfection in well being [n.167]); because nothing is a perfection simply save the first perfection in God. – Fourth, by that which is said here [n.185, end]; and prove it by the two reasons that are made for this purpose in distinction 13, against the seventh opinion in the second response [I d.13 q. un n.15]. – Fifth, because a perfection simply is in accord with a reason common to God and creatures; it is contained here, at the beginning of the solution [nn.192-193].

The proof of the second proposition: in three ways, as the major here is proved [n.185]. – Again, fourth: as here [Scotus marks here the reference back to the passage in the previous footnote, see*], by intuitive cognition of anything as intuited object in the first object. – Again, fifth: ‘he is blessed by nature’, as in distinction 13 [*ibid.*]. – Again, sixth, because it is the principle of a real production; and it requires the rejection of the seventh and sixth opinion in distinction 13 [*ibid.* nn.11, 7], hence let it be supposed for the present, unless it was proved in distinction 2 in the question ‘about the number of the intrinsic productions’ [not found in d.2 now, but presumably something Scotus intended to add]. – Again, seventh, that if the intellect is not there from the nature of the thing, it will never be there by an act of the uncreated intellect without a process to infinity; this reason is touched on here [n.189, at sign Z], and in distinction 13 [*ibid.* n.13]. – Again, eighth: science of these things would not be real, because the relation of some other reason to God (or conversely) would not be known of him, otherwise these things would not denominate; a confirmation: if they denominate through eminence, then God is in this way a stone. – Ninth Augustine *On the Trinity* XV as in distinction 13 [*ibid.* n.14].

Proof of the third proposition: from the first proposition, because no relation is a perfection simply (it is plain about divine relation), therefore it is not included in perfection simply. The proof of this consequence is, first, because perfection simply includes nothing to which the reason of perfection simply is repugnant (because then ‘it’ would in anything be better, and something ‘included in it’ would not in anything be better), and second because perfection simply is *per se* one, but relation does not make a *per se* one with the absolute [n.186]. – Again it is proved, third, from the second proposition, for from the second it follows that no relation of reason can be included in perfection simply, because then it would not be in the thing ‘from the nature of the thing’; but no real relation is posited as common to the three persons.

From these propositions it follows that an attribute, as it is distinct from another attribute, is in God as he is existent and for himself; and for this inferred conclusion some reasons are added to the three others that are made plain here [nn.177-178, 182, 183].”

both, since they are not one save *per accidens* – because a relation of reason never makes with a real being something one *per se* (as is plain, because it makes one thing much less with a real being than a property does with the subject; for a property follows the subject from the idea of the subject, but no being of reason follows a real being from the idea of it) – then separate those two things apart that come together in this being *per accidens*, and it then follows that truth always states precisely that perfection in the thing, and goodness likewise; and then further, since there is no distinction in the thing, whether according to the opinion or according to the exposition of the opinion [nn.174-176, 184], it follows that goodness and truth are formally synonymous (which they themselves deny [n.175]), because they would state the same perfection as it is a perfection in the thing, as was proved [just above at “then separate...”], and without any distinction of thing or of reason.

187. Further, the intuitive intellect has no distinction in the object save according to what is existent, because just as it does not know any object save as existent, so it does not know any things formally distinct in the object save as it is existent. Since, therefore, the divine intellect does not know its own essence save by intuitive intellection, whatever distinction is posited there in the object – whether of distinct formal objects or as of reasons caused by an act of intellect [sc. the two ways of taking Henry’s opinion, his and the expositor’s] – it follows that this distinction will be in the object as it is actually existent; and so, if this distinction is of distinct formal objects in the object, those distinct objects will be formally distinct (and then the intended proposition follows, that such distinction of formal objects precedes the act of the intellect), but if it is of reasons caused by an act of understanding, then

the divine intellect will cause some intellection in the essence 'as a relation of reason', as it is existent, which seems absurd.

188. Again, there is an argument against the exposition [n.184], – that if only one real concept is of a nature to be had about any object, nothing causes a real concept of the object unless it causes that one concept; but about the divine essence, according to them, only one real concept is of a nature to be had, because the divine essence is only of a nature to make one real concept (but it is of a nature to make any real concept that can be had of it, otherwise it would be a more imperfect intelligible than is any created intelligible, which created intelligible indeed is causative of every real concept that can be had of it); therefore nothing will cause in the intellect any concept of God unless it make that single concept, and so since the creature cannot cause that concept in the intellect – because the concept is of the divine essence as the essence is a 'this', in itself, under its proper idea – it follows that by no action of a creature can any natural concept be had of God in this life [n.55].

189. Further, against the opinion in itself, because if these things [the attributes] are distinguished in some way or other by reason, they are not distinguished by the nature of the thing, but by an act of intellect or will. From this I argue: a distinction preceding the idea of the first distinguishing thing is not made by such a distinguishing thing; but a distinction between nature and intellection, or between will and intellection, precedes intellection, which is the distinguishing principle of things which are distinguished by reason; therefore the distinction between nature and intellection, or between intellection and will, will not be made

by intellection.⁸⁷ – The assumption is plain. For if no distinction of them were to precede, these [attributes] would not be distinguished more by intellection than by nature or will; but whatever is distinguished by intellection, as it is altogether indistinct from nature, is also distinguished by nature; for whatever belongs to *a* as it is in every way indistinct from *b*, belongs to *b* itself, – the opposite seems to involve a contradiction.

190. And if it be said, as if despising this argument [189] (perhaps by precaution, because of the defect of the reply), that if there were, *per impossibile*, intellection alone, by itself, it would do the distinguishing, not nature or will, – this response is not sufficient, because however much certain things are *per impossibile* separated, if, when they are separated, something belongs to one and not to another, this cannot be except because of some formal distinction of the reason of this one from the reason of that one. Therefore if, *per impossibile*, with these things separated, a distinction would belong to intellection and not to nature, there is some distinction ‘between this reason and that’ even when they are not separated; for, after white and white are *per impossibile* separated, you will not be able to have it that white is the cause of something without white being the cause of the same thing, because there is no distinction between white and white; hence, there would never be a fallacy of accident here, ‘these attributes are distinguished by intellection, intellection is nature, therefore they are distinguished by nature’, unless the idea of intellection were extraneous to the idea of nature, insofar as they are compared to a third thing; therefore that extraneity precedes ‘any distinction’ of this idea from

⁸⁷ The passage ‘From this I argue...’ to the end of the paragraph is marked as Z by Scotus. See the third paragraph of the long note to n.185 above.

that, insofar as they are compared to a third, and it [sc. the idea of intellection or of nature] precedes the distinction of the ideas between themselves.

II. To the Question

191. [Solution of the question] – To the question [n.157] I reply that between the essential perfections there is only a difference of reason,⁸⁸ that is, of diverse modes of conceiving the same formal object (for there is such a distinction between wise and wisdom, and a greater one at any rate between wisdom and truth), and there is not there only a distinction of formal objects in the intellect, because, as argued before, that distinction is nowhere in intuitive cognition unless it is in the object intuitively known [n.187]. These two members are also proved by the reasons made against the preceding opinion [sc. of Henry, nn.177-178, 182-183, 185-190].

192. So there is there a distinction preceding the intellect in every way, and it is this, that wisdom is in the thing from the nature of the thing, and goodness is in the thing from the nature of the thing – but wisdom in the thing is not formally goodness in the thing.

The proof of this is that, if infinite wisdom were formally infinite goodness, wisdom in general would be formally goodness in general. For infinity does not destroy the formal idea of that to which it is added, because in whatever grade some perfection is understood to be (which ‘grade’ however is a grade of that perfection), the formal idea of that perfection is not taken away because of that grade, and so if it as it is general does

⁸⁸ Note by Scotus: “Every other opinion on this question, besides the one here, seems to evacuate as it were all the difficulties of the first book about the productions and the persons, as is touched on in distinction 13 [I d.13 q. un n.8].”

not include it formally as it is in general, neither does it as infinite include it formally as it is infinite.

193. I make this clear by the fact that ‘to include formally’ is to include something in its essential idea, such that, if a definition of the including thing be assigned, the included thing would be the definition or a part of the definition; but just as the definition of goodness in general does not include wisdom in itself, so neither does infinite goodness include infinite wisdom; there is then some formal non-identity between wisdom and goodness, insofar as there would be distinct definitions of them, if they were definable. But a definition does not indicate only the idea caused by the intellect, but also the quiddity of the thing; there is then a formal non-identity on the part of the thing, and I understand it thus, that the intellect, when combining this proposition ‘wisdom is not formally goodness’, does not, by its collative act, cause the truth of this proposition, but it finds the extremes in the object, from the combining of which the act is made true.

194. And this argument ‘about non formal identity’ the old doctors [e.g. Bonaventure] stated by positing in divine reality that there was some predication true by identity that yet was not formal; thus I concede that by identity goodness is truth in the thing, but truth is not formally goodness.

195. The rule of Anselm, *Monologion* ch.15: “It is necessary that it be whatever is altogether better it than not it;” no relation of reason is of this sort [sc. a perfection simply, n.185], and nothing is unless, when relations of reason have been removed, it is altogether the same in the thing and in reason; therefore Anselm’s rule is nothing other than ‘God is God’.

196. On the contrary. In [*Monologion*] ch.16: “If it be asked what that nature is, what better response than that it is justice?” Therefore anything at all is said of it in the ‘what’. The perfect quidditative concept is only one, or at any rate there is no formal distinction between ‘what’ and ‘what’. – Again, ch.17: “The nature itself in one way and in one consideration is whatever it is essentially.”

197. Response. ‘What’ by identity, not formally; proof of this gloss: ch.17 says: “justice signifies the same as the other things, whether all together or singly.” It is not understood here that they signify the same ‘formally and first’, because then they would be synonyms; therefore they connote the same, or signify the same really, not formally. Again, Damascene [n.198]. To the second [quote from Anselm, n.196]: he adds an example about man, who “is not in one way or in one consideration said to be these three: body, rational, man.” As to why, he posits two reasons: “in one respect man is body, in another rational;” second reason: “each of these is not the whole thing that is man.” It was in opposition to these two reasons that the remark ‘in one way and in one consideration’ was made.⁸⁹

198. This opinion [of Scotus, nn.193-194] is confirmed by the authority of Damascene *On the Orthodox Faith* ch.4 cited previously [n.158], and ch.9, where he himself means that, among all the names said of God, the most proper is ‘Who is’, because he says God is ‘a certain sea of infinite substance’; but the other names – as he said in ch.4 – state things that ‘circumstance the nature’. This would not seem true unless there were some distinction on the part of the thing; for God is not ‘a sea of infinite

⁸⁹ The Vatican editors note : “It was by opposition to ‘body’ and ‘rational’ (because they are not in man in one way or one consideration) that Anselm said on God’s behalf ‘in one way and one consideration’, and not that it really is so.”

substance' because of the fact that many relations of reason can be caused in respect of him – for thus can they be caused by an act of intellect in respect of anything.

199. Note on behalf of the saying of Damascene, that 'sea of perfections' can be understood in one way for an act containing, both formally and in itself, all perfections under their proper formal reasons; thus nothing formally one is a 'sea', because it is a contradiction for one formal reason actually to contain so many reasons. In this way, then, nothing is a 'sea' unless it is identically one, that is: "God, wise, good, blessed", and all the rest of this sort. Damascene is not taking 'sea' in this way.

200. In another can be understood [sc. by 'sea of perfections'] something formally one, containing all perfections in the most eminent way in which it is possible for them all to be contained in one; but this way is that they are not only contained identically, because of the formal infinity of the container (for thus any [perfection] contains them all), but that further they are contained virtually, as in their cause, – and further still, in something as first cause containing them of itself, and as most universal cause, because containing them all. In this way 'this' essence is a 'sea', because in the case of any multitude one must come to a stand at something altogether first; in this [divine multitude] there is nothing altogether first save 'this' essence, therefore it is not only formally infinite, but it virtually contains the others; nor only some of them (as perhaps the intellect contains wisdom and understanding, and the will love and loving), but all of them, nor containing them by some other virtue of something else, but by itself. Therefore it has infinity formally and primarily, namely as well from itself as in respect of everything, an infinity universally causal and virtually containing, – and thus it is a 'sea', thus containing all of them as they can be contained eminently in some formally

one thing. “All the rivers flow into the sea; whence they come thither do they return” (*Ecclesiastes* 1.7).

201. Therefore this proposition ‘God is wise’ is more *per se* than this other ‘the wise is good’. The other [sc. perfections other than the essence] have formal infinity, and if they have causal or virtual infinity (which needs to be preserved because of their nearer or remoter order to the essence), yet they do not have causal infinity with respect to all, nor do they have it with respect to any from themselves, but from the essence. – All these points [nn.199-201] are plain in the example of being and its properties (if they be posited to be the same, as is necessary [sc. for the purpose of the example]), if infinity is avoided.

202. On the contrary: the truest unity is to be posited in God; formal unity is truer than mere identical unity.

Response: formal unity is posited, but not of anything whatever in respect of anything whatever. If the major be taken in this way it is false of person and person, and the gloss would be: ‘[the unity] which is possible is true’; but, as it is, formal identity of anything whatever with anything whatever is not possible, but only real identity. From this middle the argument is made to the opposite, that every unity simply of perfection is to be posited there [sc. in God]; such unity there is identical unity, without formal unity, because it is simple and unlimited, but formal unity does not posit un-limitation.

203. The opinion [n.198] is confirmed by Augustine *On the Trinity* VIII ch.1 n.2, where he proves that in divine reality ‘two persons are not something greater than one, because they are not something truer’. What consequence would that be? If it were only a distinction of reason between truth and wisdom and greatness, the argument would not

seem to be different from an argument that proved ‘wisdom, therefore wise’, or conversely [n.191].

204. To what purpose, too, do the doctors who hold the opposite opinion [to that of Scotus] fill up so many pages demonstrating one attribute from another if there were between them only a difference of relations of reason? For God would seem thus to be perfectly known – as to every real concept – as he is known under one attribute just as if he were known under the idea of all the attributes, because the knowledge of several relations of reason does not make a more perfect knowledge, nor does it do anything for having a more perfect real knowledge of anything.

205. Likewise, third, in line with the aforesaid authority of Damascene [n.198], to what purpose do they [sc. those who hold the opposite opinion to Scotus] assign an order to the attributes, as if the essence were the foundation and certain attributes were closer to the essence and certain closer to the emanations? If they are only relations of reason, what is the order in comparison to the emanations?

206. Likewise, Augustine *Against Maximinus* II ch.10 n.3: “If you can concede God the Father to be simple and yet to be wise, good, etc.” (and he enumerates there many perfections), “how much more can one God be simple and yet a Trinity, so that the three persons are not parts of one God.” – He argues there that if in the same thing without composition or division into parts there can be many perfections simply, therefore much more can there be in the deity three persons without composition and division into parts. What argument would that be if the attributes only stated relations of reason and the persons were distinguished really? For this inference does not follow:

‘relations of reason do not cause composition in anything, therefore neither do real relations’.

207. Also the same Augustine *On the Trinity* XV ch.3 n.5 says that all those predicates [the ones listed in n.206] are equal. But nothing is equal to its own self. For what does it mean to say that something under one relation of reason is equal to itself under another relation of reason?

208. Hilary too in *On the Trinity* XII n.52, addressing God the Father, speaks thus: “Of Perfect God, who is both your Word and wisdom and truth, there is absolute generation, who in these names of eternal properties is born.” He says then that these properties are eternal, and that in this the Son is born of the Father, that is: the Father, possessing them first, communicates them to the Son. But if they were only distinct in reason, they would not seem to be first in origin in the Father before the Son was produced. For whatever is produced there in being of reason by an act of intellect seems to be produced by the whole Trinity (and so is not in the Father as he precedes the Son in origin), as if necessarily preceding the origin.

209. But this formal non-identity stands along with the simplicity of God, because there must be this difference between the essence and the property, as was shown above in distinction 2, the last question [I d.2 nn.388-410] – and yet for this reason no composition is posited in the person. Likewise, this formal distinction is posited between two properties in the Father (as between not-being-born and father), which, according to Augustine *On the Trinity* V ch.6 n.7, are not the same property, because it is not the case that ‘he is Father by the fact he is ungenerated’. If then there can in one person be two properties without composition, much more, or at least equally, can there be several

essential perfections in God ‘not formally the same’ without composition, because the properties in the Father are not formally infinite, but the essential perfections are formally infinite, – therefore any of them is the same as any of them.

210. [Doubts] – Against this solution [nn.191-209] there are three doubts.

For first it seems that the divine simplicity is not saved, because from the fact the essence is posited as the foundation and the attributes as circumstances of the essence [n.198] it seems that the attributes are disposed as acts and forms with respect to the divine essence.

211. The second doubt is that when Augustine (*On the Trinity* VII ch.4 n.9 ‘On Great Things’ and ch.2 n.3 ‘On Little Things’) denies the identity of paternity and deity – for he says he is ‘not Father by the fact he is ungenerated’ just as neither ‘is he the Word by the fact he is wisdom’ – he there concedes the identity of greatness and goodness, and of the essential perfections, because he says ‘he is great by the fact he is God’ etc. Therefore, just as he there denies identity, so he concedes it here; but he only denies formal identity there, so he concedes it here.

212. The third doubt is that, just as goodness would not be really infinite unless it was really the same as wisdom, so it seems that the idea of goodness is not formally infinite unless it is formally the same as the idea of wisdom. Therefore, for the same reason as you posit true identity between the former, you should posit the formal identity of reason with reason.

213. To these doubts. – To the first [n.210] I reply that form in creatures has something of imperfection in a double way, namely because it is a form informing something and because it is part of a composite, – and it has something which is not of

imperfection, but is consequent to it according to its own essential reason, namely that it is that by which something is the sort of thing it is. Example: wisdom in us is an accident, and this is a matter of imperfection – but that it is that by which something is wise, this is not a matter of imperfection but of the essential idea of wisdom. Now in divine reality nothing is a form according to that double idea of imperfection, because it neither informs nor is it a part; yet there is wisdom there insofar as it is that by which it – what wisdom is in – is wise, and this not by any composition of wisdom with anything as a subject, nor as the wisdom is a part of some composite, but by true identity, by which wisdom, because of its perfect infinity, is perfectly the same as anything with which it naturally exists.

But you will object: how is something formally wise by wisdom if wisdom is not the form of it?

214. I reply. The body is ensouled as it were denominatively, because the soul is the form of it – man is called ensouled not as it were denominatively but essentially, because the soul is something of it as a part; there is no requirement, then, that, for something to be the form informing something, it be itself of such a sort in itself, because the form is not a form informing the whole, although the whole is formally said to be such through it. If therefore some form were the same as something by a truer identity than is its identity with the thing informed, or with the whole of which it is a part, that true identity would be enough for the thing to be of such a sort by such a form; so it is in the intended proposition. – And then if you ask whether by first act there could be some abstraction of the form, – I say that there is not there abstraction of the form insofar as by

it something is of such a sort taken precisely, without consideration of its identity with that which is of such a sort in itself.

215. To the second, which seems to possess difficulty from the words of Augustine [n.211], I say that in five ways is God wise and great by the same thing, and yet he is not God and Father by the same thing; in one way because wisdom and greatness are perfections of the same idea, that is, of quidditative idea, because whatever is perfected by those perfections is perfected not as by reasons of the supposit but as quidditative perfections, – but paternity and deity are not thus of the same idea; wisdom and goodness are also in another way of the same idea, because they are perfections simply, – not thus paternity and deity; in the third way, because greatness is the same as deity anywhere, – paternity is not but only in one supposit; in the fourth way, because goodness and wisdom and the rest of this sort are the same as it were by mutual identity, because each is formally infinite, because of which infinity each is the same as the other, – but paternity and deity are not thus mutually the same, because one of them is not formally infinite, but only deity is formally infinite, and because of this infinity paternity is the same as it; and, from this, fifth, he is good and wise by the same thing, ‘by the same thing’ – I say – by identity adequate in perfection, because each is infinite; paternity does not thus have adequate identity with deity, because it is not infinite.

216. To the form [of the argument, n.211] I concede that he is good and wise by the same thing in the way that he is not God and Father by the same thing, because by the same thing he is good and wise, namely by the same thing anywhere and by the same thing as by mutual identity; but paternity and deity are not the same anywhere. Likewise, by the same thing – that is by perfection of the same idea – he is good and wise, because

he is quidditatively good and wise; he is not God and Father in this way by the same thing, because each ‘by which’, there, is not the essential perfection of that of which it is, because although the quiddity of paternity remains there, yet the quiddity is not the quidditative idea simply of any supposit, but the personal idea of the same is.

217. To the third [n.212] I concede that the idea of wisdom is infinite, and the idea of goodness similarly, and therefore this idea is that by identity, because an opposite does not stand with the infinity of the other extreme. Yet this idea is not formally that one; for this does not follow ‘it is truly the same as the other, therefore it is formally the same as the other’; for there is a true identity of *a* and *b*, without *a* formally including the idea of *b*.

III. To the Principal Argument

218. To the principal argument that is taken from the authority of Augustine *On the Trinity* XV [n.212], I respond that in the creature there is no predication through identity which is not so formally,⁹⁰ and therefore never has a logic of true predication formally and by identity in creatures been handed down; but in divine reality there is true predication by identity, in the abstract, and yet it is not formal.

219. The reason for this difference is this – as I think – that, when conceiving something abstract with ultimate abstraction, a quiddity is conceived without relation to anything that is outside the proper idea of the quiddity; therefore, by thus conceiving the extremes, there is no truth in the uniting of them unless precisely the quiddity of one

⁹⁰ Note by Scotus: “On the contrary: entity is unity or truth; if they are properties of being, they are also the same as themselves.”

extreme is the same precisely as the quiddity of the other extreme. But this does not happen in creatures, because there, when abstracting the relations that are in the same thing (to wit, the reality of genus and difference) and considering them very precisely, each is finite and neither is perfectly the same as the other; for they are not in any way the same among themselves save because of a third thing with which they are the same, and therefore, if they are abstracted from that third thing, there does not remain a cause of identity for them, and therefore not a cause either for the truth of the proposition uniting the extremes. This proposition, then, is false ‘animality is rationality’, and conversely, and this in any predication whatever, because the extremes are not only not formally the same but they are not truly the same either; for this quiddity precisely is potential to that quiddity, and is not the same as it save because of identity to the third thing from which they are abstracted; therefore the abstraction takes away the cause of the truth of the affirmative proposition uniting them.

220. The opposite is the case in God, because by abstracting wisdom from whatever is outside the idea of wisdom, and abstracting goodness similarly from whatever is outside its reason formally, each quiddity remains, precisely taken, formally infinite, and from the fact that infinity is the idea of their identity – in such very precise abstraction – the idea of identity of the extremes remains. For they were not the same precisely because of their identity to a third thing from which they are abstracted, but because of the formal infinity of each.

221. And a sign that this is the idea of predication through identity is from the fact that this proposition is not conceded ‘paternity is not-being-born’ (nor this proposition ‘paternity in divine reality is active inspiriting’), whether as true formally or as true by

identity; but this proposition is conceded ‘paternity is deity’, and conversely. The reason seems to be that, by abstracting paternity and not-being-born from the essence or the supposit, neither is formally infinite and therefore neither includes in its thus abstracted idea the idea of its identity to the other, and so neither, as so abstracted, is truly predicated of the other; but by abstracting deity and paternity to whatever extent, one of the extremes still remains formally infinite, which infinity is a sufficient reason for the identity of the extremes, and therefore the idea of identity remains, and consequently the idea of the truth of the composition of the affirmative proposition. But in this proposition ‘deity is goodness’ there remains infinity not only in one extreme but in both, and therefore there would be truth here because of the identity included virtually in each extreme.

222. From this, and from the response to the saying of Augustine adduced before in the second doubt [nn.215-216], what was supposed before in the question ‘about genus’ is clear, namely how there remain only two modes of predicating in divine reality [nn.130-131], – because although by identity the relations pass into the essence, yet not in the way the essential predicates do, because all essential predicates state rather quidditative perfections, but the personal idea does not state a quidditative perfection; and therefore all the essential predicates are reduced to one mode of predicating among themselves more than the personal predicates are reduced to one mode of predicating along with them, so that, according to this, it can be said that two modes of predicating remain in divine reality, not only because of the modes of conceiving the predicates, but also in some way because of the reality of the things that are predicated.

Appendix

[*Reportatio* IC d.8 p.1 q.3]

Book One

Eighth Distinction

First Part. Question Three

[Point D. See n.104]

Again, the Philosopher says this in *Metaphysics* 7.101034b21-22, for “just as the nature – that is the definition – is to the thing, so are the parts of the definition or of the nature to the parts of the thing;” therefore, just like in a definition, there are several real parts, which should not always be set down as matter and form, but as other realities, one of which is the necessary in potency to another.

Again, by reason: the intellect, when conceiving a genus, has a concept about something which is in the thing from the nature of the thing, otherwise it would not conceive anything that might be said of man in the ‘what’; and I am not speaking here of the second intention of genus, but of that which is objectively conceived. Likewise, when conceiving the difference, I conceive something which is in the thing objectively. If therefore the genus or the difference were to state the whole reality of the defined thing, then – by joining the genus to do the defining – the same thing would be said totally twice, which is one discordancy, and the other discordancy is that the definition would not be first the same as the defined, which is false, because the quiddity of anything is the same as itself.

On the contrary: if everything finite is in a genus, since the personal properties in divine reality are not infinite, because they are not perfections simply, – therefore they are finite, because between the finite and the infinite there is no middle, – therefore they are in a genus.

I reply: they are formally neither finite nor infinite. Not infinite because then one person would have some perfection which another would not have; nor are they formally finite, because then they would not be the same really as the divine essence, which is formally infinite. Hence, just as the finite and infinite, properly speaking, are congruent in quantity of amount and in nothing else (*Physics* 1.2.185a33-b3), so these transumptively said things only agree with something possessing a virtual quiddity of which there are entities said quidditatively, and of these entities the intrinsic grades are the finite and infinite, and not the personal or individual hypostatic idea.

[Point E. See n.117]

Note here for the intention of the Philosopher that something can be formally repugnant to the subject which is not repugnant to the property, although it is virtually repugnant to it. An example: it is formally repugnant to man to be in the genus of accident, but it is not formally repugnant to risible, which is a property of man; but infinity thus belongs *per se* to it [sc. some supposed line]; therefore although it is repugnant to line, it is however not repugnant to straight as it is straight. And therefore, as to the idea of straight, a straight line is not well defined when it is said to be “that whose middle does not extend outside the extremes” (*Topics* 6.11.148b23-32), because straight, whence it is straight, does not essentially include either middle or extremes, because, if a

straight line were infinite, the idea of straight would remain and yet it would have neither middle nor extremes. – This as to the intention of the Philosopher, why he takes exception to this definition of straight line.

Eighth Distinction

Second Part

On the Immutability of God

Single Question

Whether only God is Immutable

223. On the immutability of God, that the Master treats of in the second part of distinction 8 (which, however, seems it could be concluded from the simplicity of God, about which the question has already been raised [nn.1-26]), I ask whether God alone is immutable.

That he is not

Because if he is immutable then he is disposed immutably to that to which he is immediately disposed; therefore that other thing is immutable.

Proof of the first consequence: an immutable thing, which is of itself the first agent, cannot be diversely disposed to its effect, because if it sometimes acts and sometimes does not, this seems to be from a change in itself; for this change cannot be posited as because of a new proximity of the passive thing or because of the removal of impediments, because the action of the first agent does not require these. – Proof of the second consequence: to whatever a necessary thing is necessarily disposed, that is itself necessary.

224. To the opposite:

Augustine *On the Trinity* VI ch.6 n.8: “Every creature is changeable,” “only God is immutable.”

225. And Paul, *I Timothy* 6.16: “Only he has immortality;” which Augustine expounds in *On the Trinity* I ch.1 n.2 when he says that “true ‘immortality’ is immutability.”

I. God is Simply Immutable

226. The affirmative part of this question [the negative part begins n.230] is proved by the Philosopher *Physics* 7.1.242a13-20, 242b18-10, through the fact that “everything that is moved is moved by another;” the proof of which is that “when the part rests, the whole rests,” and it is not possible to proceed to infinity in things moved by another, because then an infinite movable could be made from them which would be moved in a finite time (which is rejected in *Physics* 8.10.266a25-b6, and before in distinction 2 [I d.2 n.152]); therefore one must make a stand at some mover which is not moved by another, and which consequently is altogether unmoved.

227. The same conclusion is also proved by him in *Physics* 8.4.255b31-5.256a21 through a division of movers and things moved naturally or violently, and because one must ultimately make a stand at some mover which is not moved of itself ‘*per se* and first’, and must also ultimately make a stand at something simply unmovable.

228. But these processes (which are the principal ones in two books, namely books 7 and 8 of the *Physics*) need a greater exposition so as to show that the reasonings are valid, and if perhaps they are valid, yet they have a diminished conclusion, as will be shown elsewhere [II d.2 p.2 q.6 nn.10-15]; perhaps they entail no more than that the First

thing is not moved as a body, or as a virtue in a body, in the way the soul is moved *per accidens* in the moved body.

229. Therefore, without pausing now to make these reasonings clear, I show briefly the affirmative part from the simplicity of God: for because God is perfectly simple (as was proved from his infinity [nn.17-19]), therefore he cannot be changed to any form that is received in himself; also because he is necessary existence (as was proved from the primacy of his efficient causality in distinction 2 [I d.2 n.70]), therefore he cannot be changed from being to not-being or from not-being to being, which change is called ‘turning’ by Damascene *On the Orthodox Faith* ch.3. Therefore God is said to be simply immutable in respect of any change, whether substantial or accidental.

II. Nothing else besides God has Immutability

230. But the negative part of this question, namely that nothing else besides God has immutability, poses a greater difficulty; for on this point the theologians differ from the philosophers, and vice versa.

231. In order to consider this, one must first see what the intention of the philosophers was and what motives there are in their favor and what reasons there are against them.

A. Of the Intention of the Philosophers

I. The Opinion of Henry of Ghent

232. As to the first point, specifically about the intention of Aristotle and Avicenna.

It is posited [by Henry] that in ten ways can something be disposed to existence, but for my purpose [n.230] let three modes be sufficient. For something other than God – to wit an intelligence other than the first – can be posited in being, or be immutable and necessary, in three ways:⁹¹ in one way, that it is of itself formally necessary existence but is from another causally; in a second way, that it is of itself formally necessary existence and is dependent on another, such that, because of essential order, it would be a contradiction for the second to be without the first but not vice versa, and likewise for the third to be without the second but not vice versa, – and this order is between the more perfect and the less perfect [*supply*: as with figures and numbers [n.245]], but not between cause and caused; in the third way, that something have formally of itself possible existence and have from another also necessary existence, namely because this other causes necessarily.

233. Of these three ways the first way involves a contradiction, as they say [sc. Henry and his followers], and therefore the Philosopher did not posit it, because it does not seem likely that he posited contradictories; that it involves a contradiction is plain, because what is caused by another is of itself a non-being and is of itself a possible being (otherwise it would be impossible for it to be caused), but what is a necessary existent is in no way a possible existent; therefore it is discordant to say that Aristotle posited this way about the separate substances, because of the contradiction involved.

234. That he also denied the third way is proved by the fact it too involves a

⁹¹ Note by Scotus: “Here Henry’s opinion, Quodlibet VIII question 9, is badly held.” The Vatican editors are puzzled as to what Scotus means here, since Henry’s opinion, they say, does not seem to be in any way a distortion.

contradiction.

235. There is a confirmation also of this, because the Commentator in *Metaphysics* XII com.41 (in the question of John the Grammarian) means that since motion is of itself possible it can be made perpetual by another, because it has being from another – but a possible substance cannot be made perpetual; therefore a perpetual substance cannot be from another.

236. Again, as the Commentator says in *On the Heavens* I com.138, about Aristotle's remark 'It is impossible that the non-generable fall under corruption'; expounding this, the Commentator says that "if some eternal generable thing were found to exist, it would be possible that something possible, or some possible nature, should be changed into something necessary."

237. Further, it is imputed [by Henry] to the Philosopher that he wished there (*On the Heavens*, *ibid.*) that any substance have its existence from its nature – this one always, that one sometime – so that this one necessarily always is, that one necessarily sometime is not; nor could it be otherwise unless one nature were to change into another, or two contrary natures be at the same time in the same thing – as in the same book of *On the Heavens* both Aristotle and the Commentator conclude.

238. Again, from these places – namely *On the Heavens* I and *Metaphysics* XII [235-236] – [Henry] shows that [Aristotle] denied the first way above [n.232], because to every necessary substance is attributed the being of its intrinsic nature, and thus that he posited no perpetual caused thing save what is moved in the heavens (and, by its mediation, individuals which are not necessary, although their species are necessary), but that generable and corruptible things come to be; and from the fact that he posited some

order among them, it is concluded [by Henry] that this is in accord with the second way [n.232]. But the species in incorruptible things he said were necessarily in one individual, while the species in corruptible things he said were necessarily in several and diverse individuals, so that the species are of themselves necessary, although corruptible *per accidens*, just as he posited that the elements were in their totality incorruptible but in their parts corruptible.

239. Against this opinion, which imputes these things to Aristotle, an argument is given first [by Scotus himself] that he did not deny the first way.

This is seen from his intention in *Metaphysics* 2.1.993b28-31: “Of eternal things the principles must be the truest,” because they are the cause of truth for the other things, – “but each thing is disposed to existence as it is to truth;” now it is clear, according to him, that everything eternal is necessary, from *On the Heavens* 1.12.283b1-6 and *Metaphysics* 9.8.1050b6-8. Again, *Metaphysics* 5.4.1015b6-11, nothing prevents there being other causes for certain necessary things [e.g. premises causing the conclusions of syllogisms]. If, however, a possibility repugnant to necessity were of the idea of a caused thing (as the said opinion [of Henry] argues [nn.233, 235-236]), it would be a contradiction for any necessary thing to have a cause.

240. Again, *Metaphysics* 12.10.1075a11-23, he deduces the oneness of the universe from the oneness of the end, – therefore everything other than the end is for it as for the end; but of whatever there is a final cause, there is also an efficient cause; therefore etc.

Proof of the final consequence: an end is not a cause save insofar as it moves the efficient cause to act and to give being. It moves, he says, as loved and desired (this is

plain from the idea of end *Metaphysics* 5.2.1013b25-27), for which end the agent acts, for which end – namely the end loved – the agent gives being to another thing that is ordered to itself.

241. Again, the Commentator *Metaphysics* XII com.37 concedes that there is there [in the heavens] cause and caused ‘as the intellect is the cause of intellection’, and Aristotle says that [the first mover] moves as loved and desired. ‘Bath’ as it is in the mind moves as efficient cause, according to the Commentator; at any rate the object moves, as efficient cause, to an act of understanding; therefore also to existence, because [Henry] imputes to the philosopher that he posited each of those substances to be its own act of understanding.

242. Again, Avicenna [*Metaphysics* IX ch.4 (104vb)] expressly posits that the necessary ‘is from another causally’. Therefore if in this he saw no contradiction, why should it be denied of Aristotle, because of the contradiction that you [Henry] posit there [n.233]?

243. Again, the Commentator in *On the Substance of the Globe* ch.2 says: “The celestial body does not only need a virtue moving it in place, but also a virtue bestowing on it and on its substance eternal permanence, etc.,” and later: “of the opinion of Aristotle some said that he does not assert a cause activating the whole, but only a moving cause, and that was very absurd.”

244. To these points they [Henry and his followers] reply that “those who posit a false foundation on the basis of probable reasons, end up after a while contradicting themselves on the basis of true reasons.”

On the contrary: you [Henry] have shown [n.233] that Aristotle denies the first

way ‘because it seems to involve a contradiction’, and now you concede that he himself contradicts himself;⁹² but it seems more reasonable not to impute contradictories to him, but to say that he speaks consistent to a false antecedent when he concedes the consequent.

245. Again, that Aristotle did not posit the second way, which you impute to him [n.238], is seen from the irrationality of this way; proof: for nothing depends for its existence on another thing from which it does not get being, and so neither does it depend for its permanence on another thing from which it does not get permanence, because it gets being and permanence from the same thing. – Nor is the case of figures and numbers similar [n.232], because although there the prior is not the efficient cause of the posterior, it is yet the material cause, as a part is – by potency – in the whole; but in the proposed case no causality can be posited but that of the efficient and final cause, according to Aristotle [n.240].

246. Also, what is imputed to Aristotle about the necessity of the species in corruptible things ‘in diverse individuals’ [n.238] is not true unless he understood it of the necessity of the motion of the heaven, and so of the production of individuals when there is such and such closeness or proportion of the agent to the patient; but necessity is a condition of existence; it does not then belong to species save in individuals. Nor is the case of the element ‘as a whole and in its parts’ similar [n.238], for the element as a whole is a singular, existent of itself, and a principal part of the universe.⁹³

⁹² That is, Aristotle does not merely, on probable grounds, assert a first thing from which a contradiction then follows [n.233], but directly contradicts that first thing, by later, on true grounds [n.244], asserting the opposite of it.

⁹³ Text cancelled by Scotus: “That it is also imputed to Aristotle that no substance is from another seems manifestly false in the case of generable things. For generation is into substance; therefore by very generation a thing which before was not receives being, and generation is the efficient cause of what is produced; but nothing produces itself into existence.”

247. Again, if what is ‘corruptible’ from its intrinsic cause sometime necessarily is not, as is imputed to him [by Henry to Aristotle, n.237], then it will be corrupted by itself without an external thing corrupting it.

248. The third way [n.232] is also imputed to Avicenna, and a proof is taken from *Metaphysics* VI ch.2 (92ra), where he says that “a caused thing, as to itself, is that it not be, but, as to its cause, that it be; but what is of itself – as it is in the intellect – is prior [sc. in nature], not in duration, to what is of another,” and this “among the wise is called ‘creation’, to give existence to a thing after absolute non-existence.”

249. Against him it is argued [by Henry] that that way [n.248] involves a contradiction, because if the possible is posited not to be, it follows that it is not only false but also impossible – according to the Philosopher – namely that the cause does not necessarily cause and give being [the opposite of which is posited by Avicenna, nn.248, 242].

2. Scotus’ own Opinion

250. On the intention of these philosophers, Aristotle and Avicenna. – I do not wish to impute to them things more absurd than they themselves say or than follows necessarily from what they say, and I wish to take from their sayings the more reasonable understanding that I can take.

251. I respond then that Aristotle posited, and Avicenna likewise, that God is necessarily disposed to other things outside himself, and from this it follows that some other thing is necessarily disposed to God (which is as it were immediately compared to

him), or disposed not by an intermediate motion, because from a uniformity in the movable whole they posited a lack of uniformity in the parts of the movable, and that by intermediate motion generable and corruptible things were non-uniformly compared to God.

252. By holding this false foundation, Aristotle does not seem, in positing that God is a necessary cause, to contradict himself by positing a necessary caused thing (as he intends in the *Metaphysics* 5, that of certain necessary things there is some other cause, and in *Metaphysics* 2 that “of eternal things the principles must be the truest,” as was argued [n.239]), and so he posited not only the third way but also the first [n.232].⁹⁴

253. Also Avicenna seems immediately to contradict himself when positing the [caused thing] to be a possible [n.248], because then a necessary thing is not necessarily compared to it.

But there is an argument on Avicenna’s behalf: if it is from another, then in the quiddity of it is not included its being of itself; therefore it is of itself a possible being and a non-being, just as humanity is not a being of itself, whether one or several. This way of

⁹⁴ Note cancelled by Scotus: “Again, there is the following argument: he [Aristotle] set down the first mover to be of infinite power; infinite power cannot immediately move the globe, because it moves neither in time nor in the ‘now’; therefore he posited that it precisely moves mediately. But this can be understood in three ways, but none of these three ways [see footnote to n.290] is possible unless it produces into being the proximate mover, because the other two modes are there [*ibid.*] rejected; therefore he intends to posit such a production.”

Another note cancelled by Scotus: “This also proves [sc. the previous paragraph in this footnote] that Aristotle posited that all the intelligences are immediately produced by the first intelligence (against Avicenna *Metaphysics* IX ch.4 (104vb-105ra)), because a cause of infinite power causes every infinite motion, and this mediately (but no other cause besides the first is of infinite power, because any cause is conjoined to some sphere; therefore it is finite); therefore any motion whatever is from the first cause by an intermediate mover and from its proper mover immediately moving it; therefore the first cause produced that proximate mover. Thus too the intellect is produced from outside (*On the Generation of Animals* 2.3.736b27-29), because, although he did not posit that the first thing acted without second causes, together with a matter disposed to the effect of the first thing, the first thing, according to him, necessarily informs the matter, so that this informing is the only change (not two changes, as in positing creation and informing). Thus too in *On Good Fortune* [*Eudemian Ethics* 7.15.1248a22-b7] he says that a separate cause moves immediately a man so disposed to what is of advantage to him, etc.”

possibility is conceded, namely the possibility which is just that, in the order of nature, this thing is capable of that, but it is not that quidditatively.

254. From this the response is plain to the first argument made against Avicenna [n.249], as though he were contradicting himself, because [from ‘possible not to be’] there does not follow ‘it is possible that it is not’, nor [from ‘it is possible’] does there follow ‘it can be posited [that it is not]’ – just as neither ‘a being that is not one’ – and thus Aristotle would concede something necessary from another to be a possible, but that ‘it is possible for potency to be prior to act’ he rejects in *On the Heavens* [n.249].

255. Therefore Aristotle and Avicenna agree in the things that follow from one false principle – in which principle they agree – namely that God is necessarily disposed to something that is outside himself, to which immediately, or by mediation of something immutable, he is compared.⁹⁵

256. To the things first adduced, to prove that Aristotle denied the first way [nn.233, 235-238].

To the first, that he tries to prove a contradiction [n.233], perhaps Aristotle would say that ‘possible objectively’ is not repugnant to the necessary if the producer necessarily produces; for it is not required that the possible could really not be such [sc. existent], but that ‘in the order of nature’ be implicitly understood when understanding it not to be such [sc. it is possible in its nature, but, because of its cause, it is necessary].

This is proved by the confirmation to the argument adduced by Henry [n.233], which is

⁹⁵ Note by Scotus: “And do they both say the first way [sc. immediately]? – Avicenna in *Metaphysics* [footnote to n.252]. But whether Aristotle thought so about one produced intelligence only [sc. whether Aristotle like Avicenna thought God was compared immediately to one intelligence only or to all] is doubtful; however he posited nothing else immediately from the first thing save intelligence, which, if it did not produce it, would altogether not move it, because not according to any of the three ways contained here [footnote to n.290].”

that from quasi-subjective potency – according to him – the Son is generated in divine reality; for it is certain that that quasi-subjective possibility does not prevent necessity; nor does the quasi-objective potency of the Son, because the generator necessarily generates.

257. To what is adduced from *On the Heavens* – “unless one nature were to change into another” – it can be said that the substance has permanent existence, and so there is not given to it always a new and a new existence. Therefore from the causer, causing necessarily according to Aristotle, there is given to it a necessary nature formally, and thus if it were able not to be it would change its nature.

258. Through the same point an answer is plain to the passage from the *Metaphysics* about motion [nn.235, 238], because, since it is of itself possible, not only can it be perpetual for the reason that it is from another, but also that, along with this, it always has a new existence, and so it never has a form which is necessary; but it necessarily always comes to be, because the whole movable is necessarily disposed uniformly to what gives it uniform existence necessarily, according to them [Aristotle and Averroes] (and this necessarily uniform disposition of the movable to the mover is the cause that motion necessarily comes to be, although the motion never has necessary existence formally, – there is also here a necessity of inevitability in the motion without a necessity of immutability in the motion, but from a necessity of immutability in the causes of the motion), such that both authorities are hereby solved. But a permanent thing, if it is necessary, has at the same time to be what is formally necessary, and thus, if it is corruptible, there will be a contradiction, – motion is not like this. Or the argument of Aristotle against Plato (*On the Heavens* n.237) proceeds on the supposition of a necessary

agent, and then I conclude in this way: if the heaven could be perpetual, and from a necessary agent, then it will necessarily be perpetual; but to this ‘necessarily’ is repugnant the act ‘to corrupt’, therefore also the potency for this act, because anything to which the act is ‘necessarily’ repugnant, to that same thing the potency to such act is repugnant, although not to anything contingent; therefore potency to corruption only stands if potency to opposites at the same time stands. And by this the position keeps itself in place, for, from the positing of what is possible to be, no impossibility follows – nor a new impossibility – on anything necessary.

B. Reasons for and against the True Intention of the Philosophers

1. Reasons on behalf of this Intention

259. As to the second principal point [n.231].

For this conclusion, which has been said to be the intention of both, namely of both Aristotle and Avicenna [nn.251-255], I argue as follows: in every difference of being necessity is a more perfect condition than contingency; the proof is that necessity is more perfect in being in itself, therefore in every difference too of being; therefore also in this difference of being, which is ‘cause’, necessity is more perfect than the most perfect contingency; therefore the cause necessarily causes.

260. The response is that necessity is a more perfect condition where it is possible; but necessity is impossible with the idea of cause as cause, because thus are we speaking and not of the thing that is the cause. Against this: in many divisions of

being one of the dividers is perfect, the other imperfect, and the extremes that are perfect in the diverse divisions are either necessary concomitants of each other or are compatible with each other. An example: if being is divided into finite and infinite, into necessary and possible, into potency and act, – act, necessity, and infinity are either necessary concomitants of each other or are compatible with each other. Therefore since, in the division of being into cause and caused, cause is the more perfect extreme, concomitant with it, or able to stand with it, will be any more perfect divider whatever of being, – and consequently necessity will be so.

261. Further, if the first causer were to cause naturally and were to cause necessarily, then it would give necessity to its caused; but no perfection is taken away from the caused because of an equally perfect mode of causing in the causer itself; but to cause voluntarily is not a mode of causing less perfect than to cause naturally, and thus no perfection is, because of there being this ‘to cause voluntarily’, necessarily taken away from the effect; therefore a cause, causing voluntarily, can give necessity to the effect. – A confirmation for the reason is that, if a cause were to cause naturally, it could produce several differences of being, to wit the possible and the necessary; therefore if a cause causing voluntarily can only cause contingent being, it would seem to be an imperfect cause, because then its causality would not extend itself to as many effects as it would extend itself to if it were to cause naturally.

262. Further, some cause necessarily causes its effect, therefore the first cause necessarily causes its caused. – The antecedent seems manifest because of the many natural causes that necessarily cause their effects. I prove the consequence by the fact that in things essentially ordered the ‘posterior’ cannot have necessity unless the ‘prior’ has

necessary being; the connections of caused things to their causes are essentially ordered; therefore no such connection is necessary unless the connection of the first caused thing to its cause is necessary.

2. Reasons against this Intention

263. [Reasons of Henry of Ghent] – Against this conclusion, in which the philosophers commonly agree – that the first cause necessarily and naturally causes the first caused – there is the following argument:⁹⁶ the first agent is in no way perfected by anything other than itself; a natural agent is in some way perfected by its production or its product; therefore etc. – The minor is shown by the fact that a natural agent acts for an end, *Physics* 2.5.196b21-22; but nothing seems to act for an end by which it is in no way perfected.

264. But to this there is a response according to the intention of Avicenna *Metaphysics* VI ch.5 (95ra), where he means that a perfect agent acts from liberality, that is, not expecting perfection from the product – as the intention of liberality was expounded in distinction 2 in the question ‘On Productions’ (I d.2 n.234). One should deny, then, the assumption made, namely that ‘a natural agent is perfected by that which it produces’ [n.263], because this is only true in the case of imperfect natural agents. And as to what is added about ‘acting first for an end’, it is not necessary according to the philosophers that a natural agent act for an end other than itself, but for itself as for an end – nor is it necessary that it be perfected by that end, but that it is naturally that end.

⁹⁶ Note by Scotus: “ Henry *Quodlibet* V question 4 makes two arguments, which are here:...”

265. Another response too is got from Avicenna, that just as water is of itself cold, and a consequent of this is that it makes cold something other than itself, so the first agent (if it is posited as a natural agent, according to them) will be perfect of itself, but consequent to its perfection would be ‘to produce perfection in another’, such that, however, the production of perfection in another is not its end, just as neither is it the end of water to make things cold.

266. This reason is turned back [by Henry] against these responses [nn.264-265], that if water could not remain in its coldness without its making something else cold, it would not be supremely perfect in coldness, because it would in its coldness depend in some way on another; the same here, then, as to the first cause in its own entity with respect to the entity of the first caused thing.

267. But this turning back of the argument is not very cogent, because, if water could produce a coldness standing by itself, Avicenna would say that however much it could not be cold in itself without its making something else cold, there would not for this reason be a dependence in its coldness but a complete perfection of coldness, from which perfection it would necessarily produce either cold in another or a cold standing by itself; and he would posit the same of the first being with respect to production in the case of other things.

268. Finally, it seems that this reason [of Henry’s, n.263] could be made clear in this way: every natural agent is perfected by its own action either in itself, or in something similar to it, or in the whole, or, by its production, its nature receives being in another.

For this appears by induction in all cases:

For the intellect, acting naturally, is perfected by its own action. Fire, acting naturally, is perfected in something similar to it and its nature has being in another thing in which that nature could exist even when the generating fire has ceased to be (and in this way there seems to be a necessity of generation in corruptible things, according to the remark in *On the Soul* 2.4.415b7 ‘generation is perpetual so that it may be kept being divine’). The sun generates a worm, and the sun, although it is not perfected in itself, nor does its nature receive being in another, yet it is perfected in the whole (insofar as the sun is part of the universe, some part of which universe is being produced), and the perfection of the whole seems in some way to be the perfection of the part. Although God the Father, in naturally producing the Son, is not perfected in himself nor in the whole (of which he may be a part, because he is part of nothing), yet his nature receives being in another supposit, or another supposit receives natural being.

This divided major [first paragraph of n.268] is plain, then, by induction, although it is difficult to assign the ‘why’ for this major; but if God were to produce creatures naturally, none of the following things would happen: for he would not be perfected in himself by such production, nor in something similar, nor in the whole, nor would his nature receive being in the product; therefore it is not the case that creatures are naturally produced.

269. A second reason posed against the philosophers [n.263] is that a power that has a respect to some object *per se* and essentially does not necessarily have a respect to the things that do not have an essential order – but an accidental one – to the first thing,⁹⁷

⁹⁷ Note by Scotus: “Anything else other than God has an essential order to him (although not conversely), hence it seems that the major should be taken in this way: ‘a power that necessarily has a respect to some first object is related necessarily to no other thing unless the object is the idea of necessarily tending to that other thing’; then the minor goes in this way: ‘the divine goodness is not

because he who wills the end does not, for this reason, necessarily will another thing to be whose being is not necessary for attaining or retaining the end in itself; but the divine will has first a respect to the divine goodness, to which creatures have an accidental order, because neither are they necessary for attaining that goodness nor do they increase it; therefore the divine will does not necessarily have a respect to those creatures.

270. Although this reason [n.269] seems in itself in some way evident, yet it seems to contradict certain things said by the arguer [sc. Henry], because he posits that ‘the divine will, as it has a respect to things in their quidditative being, wills necessarily whatever it wills’, and yet things in quidditative being no more have an order to the divine goodness than things in the being of existence.

271. The reason also seems to have an instance against it that, just as the divine will has its own essence for first object, so also does the divine intellect; therefore the divine intellect too would accidentally have a respect to anything that it has a respect to for its object other than the divine essence, and so there would seem to follow that God would not necessarily know any intelligible other than himself, just as he does not will any willable other than himself.

272. The first instance [n.270], because it is not against the truth but against the one holding the opinion [Henry], I concede.

273. By excluding the second [n.271], I confirm the intended proposition [sc. against the philosophers] and the reason [n.269], because the will which is determined to

the idea for the will of necessarily tending with efficacious volition to any other object, because neither is anything else necessary for attaining that goodness nor either does it increase it or along with it give more quiet to the will; therefore etc.

But the ‘because’ [the one following the note in the text] is a proof about the volition of being well pleased, as about volition that is efficacious, – the confirmation about the practical syllogism, on which you rely [n.273], proves a similar conclusion; therefore either deny the necessity of each volition of the creature, or seek another special middle term.”

the end is not determined to anything of what is for the end save insofar as, by a practical syllogism, the necessity of that thing for the end is deduced from the end, namely either its necessity in 'being' or in 'being had' for the purpose of having or attaining the end, – or its necessity in 'being loved', the way the end is loved or possessed. We see this in the case of all wills – which are of the end itself – because they would not, because of the end, need to be determined with respect to any entity for the end if such entity was not, by a practical syllogism, deduced to be necessary for the end in any of these ways [sc. those just mentioned]. Therefore, since the divine intellect does not know anything necessary for the ultimate end other than itself, there is no need that God's will, from the fact that it is necessarily of the end, be in some way or other necessarily of something other than the end.

274. As for the instance about the intellect [n.271], it is not similar, because the fact that the intellect is necessarily in respect of some object does not make that object to be in its real being something other than the first object, because 'to be known by the divine intellect' does not make the known thing to exist in itself but to be present to the intellect or to be in the intellect as present; it is not so in the case of being willed, nay being willed makes then (or subsequently) the willed thing to have a being other than the will, and this when speaking of efficacious will, because something thus willed by God is at some time in actual effect. The divine intellect, therefore, is not related to intelligibles other than itself in the way the will is related to other willables, because the intellect can be necessarily of other intelligibles – nay of all intelligibles – without them having a being other than divine being (insofar as they are present to it), nor by this is there posited that anything other than God is formally necessary in real existence; but the will could

not be necessarily of other willable things unless these other things were at sometime necessary in some real existence other than divine existence.⁹⁸

275. [Scotus' own reasons] – To these reasons of a certain doctor [Henry], in some way thus strengthened [nn.268, 273], I add other reasons.

And I first argue thus: an absolute being, supremely necessary – as much as anything can be thought to be necessary – cannot not exist, whatever else other than himself does not exist; God is supremely necessary, according to the understanding just accepted [sc. 'as much as anything can be thought to be necessary']; therefore, when whatever else other than him does not exist, it does not for this reason follow that he does not exist. But if he had a necessary relation to the first caused thing, then, when that caused thing does not exist, he would not exist; therefore he does not have to it a necessary relation.

276. I prove the major by the fact that the more impossible does not follow from the less impossible, just as neither does the more false follow from the less false; and I prove this because, if the more false has a double reason for its falsity and the less false has only one, we would isolate out by the more false the reason for falsity in which it exceeds the less false; with this other reason standing in place, the more false will be

⁹⁸ Note by Scotus: "Therefore can [the divine will] be necessarily well pleased in something displayed to it without wanting it to exist, as the intellect necessarily understands it without however understanding it to exist? I concede that it is similar on both sides, – and then when the minor is proved, namely that 'it is not required for attaining the end nor for increasing it' [n.269], the conclusion would hold equally against the willing of being well pleased as against efficacious willing; therefore the instance against him [sc. Henry] seems to be good, because it concedes that the divine will necessarily wills a thing in its quidditative being [n.270], since its proof 'from accidental order' is equally there [n.269] conclusive.

Let then the reasoning be formed as before [see footnote to n.269], and the minor [*ibid.*] is proved by the remark about the practical syllogism; which proof is conclusive about efficacious willing (as is plain), but not about the willing of being well pleased; the proof is that it concludes that the will, perfectly loving the first goodness, is well pleased in anything shown to it that participates that goodness, just as in the intellect the first object is the reason for necessarily tending to the second, because it manifests that it is in some way a participation of it."

false, and the less false will not be false, because the reason for the falsity of the less false has been isolated out; therefore, on this supposition, the false will be the more false and the true will be the less false, and then from the true will follow the false;⁹⁹ and also from this it is then plain that from the less impossible does not follow the more impossible. But such a necessary thing as has been described [n.275] is more necessary than any necessary thing other than it, even according to all the opinions of the philosophers; therefore from the non-existence of any other thing – which non-existence is less impossible – the non-existence of that which is more impossible does not follow.

277. I prove the other assumption, namely that ‘if he had a necessary relation, etc.’ [n.275], because what has a necessary relation to something does not exist when that relation does not exist, – but when the other extreme does not exist, the relation does not exist; therefore when the extreme of the relation does not exist, the foundation of the relation does not exist.

278. Against this reason there is an instance, that ‘the principle is destroyed when the conclusion is destroyed’ (*Physics* 2.9.200a20-22), and yet the principle seems to be formally of itself necessary; but the conclusion is not necessary save from the principle; therefore etc.

279. This instance is nothing, because the proof of the major remains, that from the less impossible does not follow the more impossible [n.276]. But neither is it similar in relation to the intended proposition, because the conclusion is only a certain partial

⁹⁹ The argument as contained in the text does not seem to make sense, or to make a sense opposite to that required (although how the text is to be construed is dubious). The point, however, seems clear: if we posit that the less false is true, we are not thereby compelled to posit that the more false is true (for if the more false has lost the reason for falsity it shares with the less false, it has not lost the reason for falsity it has by itself). So likewise, if we posit the less impossible we are not thereby compelled to posit the more impossible.

truth of the principle (which principle has a total truth), just as a singular is as it were a certain partial truth in respect of the universal. But in beings ‘a caused being’ is not a certain ‘quasi-partial’ entity of a cause, but is altogether another thing, dependent on the entity of the cause. So although the principle is destroyed when the conclusion is destroyed, it will not be so with the entity in the cause and in the caused.

280. But, to make this point ‘about the principle and the conclusion’ better understood, some examples can be given. First a conclusion of geometry, that the fact the sides of a triangle constructed in such and such a way are equal seems to be only a certain particular instance of this universal ‘all the lines drawn from the center to the circumference are equal’, – and so in many other cases, the conclusion seems only a particular or a less universal, or one of many things from which it is at the same time inferred, just as if we were to join to the universal mentioned this universal ‘things equal to the same thing are equal to each other’; and although the predicate belongs first, that is, adequately, to the subject of the universal, yet it does not belong first, with such primacy, to the less universal subject. Nor is it the case that, because of primacy in the principle and non-primacy in the conclusion, such causality in the principle with respect to the conclusion is, in the case of beings, the sort of causality of one being with respect to another, such that ‘causality in the principle’ posits in the conclusion a truth formally different from the truth of the principle in the same way as in beings the entity of the cause is formally different from the entity of the thing caused. Now the primacy of the predication is because of the primacy of the terms, and although special terms are not adequate to the predicates, yet the attribution of the predicate to the special terms taken

particularly is included in the attribution of the same predicate to the common terms taken universally; included, I say, as some part of that truth.¹⁰⁰

281. Second, I argue thus: something happens contingently in beings, therefore the first cause causes contingently.¹⁰¹

282. The antecedent is conceded by the philosophers.¹⁰² The consequence I prove in this way: if the first cause is necessarily related to the cause next to it, let the next cause be *b*, – therefore *b* is necessarily moved by the first cause; but in the same way that *b* is moved by the first cause, it moves the cause next to it, – therefore *b* causes necessarily when moving *c*, and *c* when moving *d*, and, by thus proceeding with all causes, nothing will exist contingently if the first cause causes necessarily. – This reasoning was handled in distinction 2 question 1 ‘On the Infinity of God’, in the argument proving that God is formally intelligent [I d.2 n.149], and so there is no need to dwell on it further.

283. Further, and it comes back to the same: something evil happens in the universe, therefore God does not cause necessarily.

284. The antecedent is conceded by the philosophers. And the consequence I prove by the fact that a cause acting necessarily produces its effect necessarily in what

¹⁰⁰ Note of Scotus: “On the contrary: therefore there is no necessary propositional truth other than the truths of the first principles, which seems discordant; again it is against you, who above adduce, against them on Aristotle’s behalf, the statement that ‘the conclusion has a caused necessary truth’ [nn.239, 252].”

¹⁰¹ Note by Scotus: “This reason and the two following [nn.283, 286] are not valid against the philosophers, but they are valid for us later in the matter of ‘future contingents’ [d.39, which however is lacking in the *Ordinatio* and so the equivalent discussions in the *Reportatio* and *Lectura* must be looked at instead]; for if the first cause is omnipotent, then it does not will necessarily any possible; the consequence is proved by these three reasons.”

¹⁰² Note by Scotus: “Response: the antecedent is true precisely of what depends on our will in order to come about; for there is nothing else they can say happens contingently. – About our acts there is the same difficulty for them as for you, namely whether our will moves moved by the First thing – except that you can save contingency in its motion from the First, but they cannot, as is here argued” [nn.285, 287].

receives the effect insofar as the effect can in it be produced; the effect of the First thing is goodness and perfection; therefore, if it acts necessarily, it necessarily produces in anything at all as much goodness as that receptive thing can receive. But what has as much goodness as it is capable of has no malice; therefore etc.

285. Although there could be a way out of this argument about evil in nature – as was touched on in the aforementioned question of distinction 2 [n.282] – yet a way out of it about evil done contingently, namely the evil that is blameworthy, does not seem possible, but rather, if any such evil as is blameworthy happens, and if from this it follows that it happens contingently, then the first cause does not necessarily cause, as this deduction shows.¹⁰³

286. Again, an agent acting necessarily acts according to the utmost of its power, for, just as acting and not acting is not in its power, so neither is acting intensely or lightly in its power; therefore if the first cause necessarily causes, it causes whatever it can cause; but it can cause of itself everything causable, as I will prove [n.288] – therefore it causes everything causable; therefore no second cause causes anything.¹⁰⁴

287. I prove this second consequence because a prior cause naturally has a respect to the caused before a later cause does, from the first position in the book *On Causes* [of ps.-Aristotle = from Proclus' *Elements of Theology*]; therefore in the case of the prior cause, if it causes totally, it causes the whole of what in the second moment should be caused by the second cause, and so in the second moment, in which the second cause

¹⁰³ Vatican editors: "if evil happens contingently and is blameworthy, it is possible for it not to be done when it is done, because if it is necessary then it will not be blameworthy" [*Lectura* I d.8 n.258].

¹⁰⁴ Note by Scotus: "This reason and the following one 'about what moves in no time' [n.290] are solved later [footnote to n.290], where the intention of Aristotle is proved that [God] can only be the proximate cause of intelligence and that he is called the 'remote' cause of motion and of other things, insofar as he gives being to the first mover [sc. the first mover after God]; each reason then [nn.286, 290] proceeds badly against the Philosopher, as if God could immediately move anything besides the intelligence, one or all, that he causes" [footnote to n. 255].

should cause, no action will be possible for the second cause, because the total effect caused by the first cause is already presupposed.

288. The assumption in this argument, namely that ‘it causes everything causable’ [n.286], I prove from this, that it has the power of any second cause whatever, even the total power that exists in the second cause, as far as whatever perfection of causality there is in any second cause,¹⁰⁵ as was deduced in the aforementioned question ‘On Infinity’ [n.282], in the first way, taken from effectiveness [I d.2 n.120]; now there is not required along with the efficient cause any imperfection but only perfection, because to cause effectively is a matter of perfection simply;¹⁰⁶ therefore the First thing, possessing in itself all the causality of the second cause, as regards anything of perfection, can immediately cause of itself everything causable just as it also can along with the second cause.

289. And if the final consequence, namely that second causes are deprived of their actions, is not held to be discordant, I reduce it to a greater discordance, that [the first cause] will cause both everything and only one thing, such that everything will be only one thing, – because just as it will cause all causables, on account of its causing everything that it can cause, so also in any causation it will cause as much as it can cause,

¹⁰⁵ Note by Scotus: “I concede this, but of the way of eminence. The power of the second cause is also required as proximate, because the first cause itself is of a nature to be, as it were eminently, in a remote cause. – When the statement ‘now there is not required along with the efficient cause, etc.’ [sc. the next statement in the text] is taken, I say that some formal perfection that is more imperfect is required eminently, such that the same perfection when eminently possessed cannot be the proximate idea of producing. Nor yet is the imperfection in the proximate cause *per se* the idea of acting, but such perfection (which yet is an imperfection) is the idea of thus acting, namely for the proximate thing, – which proximate thing is to act imperfectly; the other perfection, the more eminent one, is the idea of acting remotely, – which is to act more perfectly.”

¹⁰⁶ Note by Scotus: “It is not true of ‘to cause immediately’, but this is a mark of some sort of perfection along with imperfection; but to cause first, and as a result mediately, is a mark of perfection.”

and so something most perfect, and thus all the causables will be that single caused thing, and in that case everything will be one.

290. Also through the same middle term ‘from the necessity of causing and with the utmost of causation’ it follows that it will move in non-time, or at any rate it will change the heavens in non-time, so that the heavens will be moved in non-time.¹⁰⁷

¹⁰⁷ Note by Scotus: “In a second way: it can be said to the discordance ‘that the First thing will move the heavens in an instant’ that this does not follow, because the body is not susceptible of motion in the ‘now’; therefore no power at all is able to do this. The point is clear precisely about motion in a circle, because, if it go round in a ‘now’, any part of the moved thing is in the same place as it was before, otherwise, if some part do not return wholly to the same place and reach it afterwards – when the circular motion is complete –, then the circular motion was in time. So it follows that, if it go round in the ‘now’, in that ‘now’ any part is in the same place it was before, from which it follows that it is altogether not moved, because it remains altogether in the same ‘where’ and place, both as to the whole and as to the parts. Therefore to go round in a ‘now’ is not to go round, and altogether not to change.

This second reason well proves that, by not positing a conjoined mover, the First thing (even if it has infinite power) cannot move the sphere round in a ‘now’, – but not in time either, because of Aristotle’s proof, that then a finite virtue or power would move it ‘in an equal time’ [*Physics* 8.10.266a24-b6]; from which points it follows that an infinite power cannot immediately move the sphere round, and yet we see the sphere moving round. So this seems to be Averroes’ necessity [*Metaphysics* XII com.41] for positing a conjoined mover (that is an immediate and finite mover), without which the First thing would move nothing in spherical motion, for it can only act mediately, on account of its perfection and the effect’s imperfection, between which a mediating proximate cause is required.

Against this. I ask what is it for the First thing to move mediately? Either because it has produced a proximate moving cause, to which it has, by giving being, given a finite moving power, – Or if the second thing exists of itself, the First thing gives it virtue or some influence by which it causes motion, – Or, third, the First and the second thing cause the same effect in a certain order without the second cause receiving anything from the first cause. If the third, it follows that a finite power without another second cause will move in a time equal to the infinite power moving along with a second cause; if the second, it follows that the ‘influx’ is different from the nature of the second cause; therefore if it be denied, against the third answer, that the First thing has motion ‘for proximate effect’, and, against the second, that in no intelligence is the ‘influx’ an accident, the first answer must be said to be of the mind of Aristotle, and is what Avicenna expounds [*Metaphysics* XI ch.4 (104vb-105ra)] ‘on the order of the intelligences’. [Cf. *Lectura* I d.8 n.236: “Therefore Avicenna’s exposition of the Philosopher is most beautiful and better than all the rest, as to how many things can be produced without change in the First thing, by positing that only one thing is produced by the First, and so on.”] And then the infinity of the motion is reduced to the First thing, because the infinity of duration of the second cause is from the first cause always moving it, just as the Son is always generated, – but the First is of itself of infinite duration; but the succession is reduced to the finite virtue of the proximate mover, such that for no other reason is the first mover there save for giving being to the mover. Thus are well saved the first efficient and the final end (because the final end is loved by the mover for its own sake), but the first mover is saved only as a remote mover, that is by giving being to the mover.”

291. Nor is the response valid that was touched on above, in the aforementioned question ‘On Infinity’ [nn.282, 288], because infinite virtue has all the perfection of the efficient cause in itself that it has along with the second and proximate cause, and so the consequence is that it can immediately cause *per se* in the heavens the whole effect that it can cause along with the intelligence;¹⁰⁸ therefore it also causes, if it acts necessarily, whatever it is capable of, – and further, if it causes immediately, then it also causes change in non-time, because an infinite power, acting according to the utmost of its power, cannot act in time; and if so, then there is no generation and corruption in the things down here, which is contrary to the philosophers; therefore, the premises from which these conclusions follow are false according to the Philosophers.

C. Scotus’ Own Opinion

292. To the question, as to the exposition of the negative part of it [sc. that nothing other than God is immutable, n.230], I reply: I concede the conclusions of those arguments [nn.275-291, 273, 268], although perhaps some of them would not so convince the philosophers that they could not reply, yet they are more probable than those adduced on behalf of the philosophers [nn.259-262], and some perhaps are necessary.

293. I say however, as to this part, that nothing else is immutable when speaking of the change that is called ‘turning’ [n.229], because nothing else is formally necessary.

¹⁰⁸ Note by Scotus: “Again, the second cause does not take away the first’s proper mode of causing. – Response: its proper mode of causing is to cause through the medium of the second cause, and not immediately; again, the primacy of adequacy includes the whole order of the many things to which the cause extends itself (it is here just as you say it is elsewhere [I d.28 q.3 n.11] about the primacy of the three persons to the essence, and about the other immediacy of the first person to the essence), and then the first cause, when it is posited, is in proximate potency to the second, and then it acts as much as it can act.”

For anything else whatever is mutable subjectively, save because of negative imperfection; for example, a final accident, which is capable of no perfection because of its own imperfection (as suppose it is a relation), is not mutable subjectively, because it cannot be the subject of anything, namely because it is imperfect negatively, that is, not capable of any perfection. But nothing other than God is, because of its own perfection, immutable, because if anything were such it would most of all be the first intelligence. But that intelligence is mutable from intellection to intellection; proof: for it can have intellection of any intelligible, because our intellect can have this, – but not one intellection of everything (from I d.2 nn.101, 125-129), nor an infinite number of intellections of all intelligibles, because then an intellect possessing all of them at once in act distinctly would seem to be infinite; therefore it can have intellection of one intelligible after another intelligible and after the intellection of another intelligible; therefore it is mutable.

III. To the Arguments

A. To the Principal Argument

294. To the arguments set down on behalf of the opinion of the philosophers [sc. that something else besides God is immutable, n.223].

As to what they argue about an ancient change in the First thing if the First thing is not necessarily related to what is next to it [n.223], I reply that a new effect could come about from an ancient will without any change of will. Just as I, by that same continued

will of mine by which I wish something to be done, will then do it at the ‘when’ at which I will to do it, so God in his eternity wished something other than himself to be at some time and then created it at the ‘when’ at which he willed it to be.

295. And if you object, according to Averroes *Physics* VIII com.4, that he will at least be waiting for time, if he does not at once put the effect into being when he wishes it to be; –

296. – and in addition to this, according to Averroes elsewhere, a thing indeterminate by contingency posits such indeterminacy as to either eventuality, because what is thus indeterminate cannot of itself, as it seems, proceed to act; therefore if there is in God such contingency as to causing, he does not seem able of himself to be determined to causing.

297. To the first [n.295] I reply. Something existing and willing in time either wills with most efficacious volition, not having regard to the time for which it wills, – or it wills the thing to be for some definite time. If in the first way, it would at once put the willed thing into being if its will is perfectly powerful. If in the second way, to posit that its will were simply powerful would yet not put the thing at once into being but only at the time when it wanted the thing to be; it would wait then for time, because the thing is in time. – But when we apply this to God we must remove the imperfections. For neither is his will impotent nor does it have being in time so that it should wait for the time at which to produce the thing willed; which thing it does not will to be necessarily then when it wills, but it wills it for a determinate time; but it does not wait for the time, because the operation of his will is not in time.

298. And when Averroes speaks second ‘about the indeterminacy of a cause causing contingently’ [n.296], there was discussion elsewhere [I d.7 nn.20-21] about double indeterminacy, namely of passive power and of active unlimited power. For God was not indeterminate as to causing with the first indeterminacy but with the second, and this not to several disparate things (to each of which he is naturally determined) in the way the sun is related to the many effects it is capable of, but he is indeterminate to contradictories, to each of which he could be of his liberty determined. So too our will is indeterminate in this way, virtually, with indetermination of active power as to either contradictory, and it can of itself be determined to this or that.

299. And if you ask why the divine will, then, will be more determined to one contradictory than to the other, I reply: ‘it is a mark of lack of education to seek causes and demonstration for everything’ (according to the Philosopher *Metaphysics* 4.4.1006a5-8, 6.1011a8-13), ‘for there is not demonstration of a principle of demonstration’. But it is a thing immediate that the will wills this thing, such that there is no cause intermediate between these terms, just as it is a thing immediate that heat heats (but here it is a matter of nature, there of freedom), and so of this ‘why the will wills’ there is no cause save that the will is the will, just as of this ‘why heat heats’ there is no cause other than that heat is heat, because there is no prior cause.

300. And if you say ‘how can there be immediacy here, since there is contingency to either result?’, there was discussion elsewhere in the question ‘On the subject of theology’ [*Prol.* n.169], that in contingent things there is some first thing which is immediate and yet contingent, because no stand is made at something necessary (for the contingent does not follow from the necessary), and so it is necessary here to make a

stand at this proposition ‘the will of God wills this’, which is contingent and yet immediate, because no other cause is prior to the reason of the will as to why it is of this and not of something else. – By this is apparent the answer to what Averroes adduces, that ‘his own action is in him by his essence’ and is not in him accidentally; it is true that his willing is his essence, yet his willing contingently passes to this object and to that, as will be said later ‘about future contingents’ [I d.39, see footnote to n.281].

301. By this the answer to the principal argument [n.223] is plain, that with the necessity of God stands the fact that what he is immediately related to is mutable, because ‘immediately from the immutable’ is mutable without change of the immutable, because the relation of the immutable to what is next to it is mutable; and therefore the extreme of that relation is contingent and mutable, although the foundation is immutable.

B. To the Reasons for the Intention of the Philosophers

302. To the arguments posited for the philosophers [sc. that the first cause necessarily causes, nn.259-262].

To the first, about ‘the things that divide being’ [n.259], I say that ‘necessary’ is a more perfect condition (than ‘possible’) in any being for which the condition of necessity is possible; but it is not more perfect in that being with which it is not compossible, because a contradiction does not posit any perfection, and this is not from its own nature but from the nature of the being with which it is repugnant. And so I say that necessity is repugnant in every respect to what is posterior, because, from the fact that every posterior is non-necessary, the first thing cannot have a necessary relation to any of them.

303. And when you say that ‘all of the more perfect dividers of being are concomitant with each other’ [n.260], I say that this is true of the dividers that state a perfection simply and in themselves (as are act, infinity, and the like), but not of those that state a respect to something posterior, because to have a necessary relation to something of that sort is not a mark of perfection, because it does not stand with the perfect necessity of that which is said to have such a relation; the confirmation of this is that such a relation is not formally infinite, although however infinity is the more noble extreme in the division of being.

304. To the other remark, when it is said ‘if it causes naturally, it would necessarily cause and would then give necessity to the product etc.’ [n.261], I say that it does then follow that it would cause necessarily, just as from an antecedent that includes impossibles follows a consequent that includes impossibles; for in the antecedent that mode ‘naturally’ is repugnant to ‘what it is to cause’, because ‘to cause’ states the production of something diverse in essence, and so of something contingent, but ‘naturally’ states a necessary mode of causing and thus a mode of causing in respect of something necessary; and therefore the consequent follows which includes two opposites at the same time, by reason of the causation and of the mode of causing. It is in this way that the first proposition is true. – And when you add ‘no perfection is taken from the caused because of the more perfect mode of causing of the cause itself’, I concede it; nor does the mode of causing ‘voluntarily’ take from the causable any perfection that is possible for it, but it takes necessity from the causable (which is in itself a perfection, but one impossible with the causable), and it gives the caused the perfection compossible with it, just as ‘voluntarily’ in creation states a mode compossible with causation.

305. By this is apparent the response to the confirmation about the many producible differences of being [n.261]; I say that causable being cannot have those several differences, necessary and possible, but every causable being is only possible; and therefore it is not a mark of perfection in the cause to be able to cause those several differences, because there is no power for what is impossible, – likewise, if it were *per impossibile* to cause necessarily, it would also therefore necessarily not cause several differences of being, because it would produce only necessary things and not contingent ones.

306. To the final one [n.262] I say that no natural connection of cause and caused is simply necessary in creatures, nor does any second cause cause simply naturally or simply necessarily but only in a certain respect. The first part is clear, because any second cause depends on the relation of the first cause to the caused; likewise, no second cause causes save by the first cause causing the caused along with it, and this naturally before the proximate cause causes; but the first cause only causes contingently, therefore the second cause causes simply contingently because it depends on the causation of the first, which causation is simply contingent. The second part, namely about necessity in a certain respect, is plain, because many natural causes, as far as concerns themselves, cannot not cause their effects, and so there is necessity in a certain respect – namely as far as concerns themselves – and not simply; just as fire, as far as concerns itself, cannot not heat, yet, with God cooperating, it can absolutely not heat, as is clear, and as was clear about the three boys in the furnace [*Daniel* 3.49-50].

Book One

Ninth Distinction

Single Question

Whether the Generation of the Son in Divine Reality is Eternal

1. About the ninth distinction I ask whether the generation of the Son in divine reality is eternal.

Argument that it is not:

Because where being and duration are the same thing, if anything is principle of the being it is also principle of the duration; but the Father is principle of the being of the Son, because he is principle “of the whole deity” according to Augustine *On the Trinity* IV ch.20 n.29; therefore he is principle of the duration of the Son.

2. Further, Augustine *On the Trinity* XV ch.15 n.25: “it is a mark of imperfection in our word that it is formable before it is formed,” therefore it seems a mark of imperfection in a word that it is in a state of ‘being formed’; therefore this does not belong to the divine Word.

3. Further, if the generation of the Son is always, or eternal, then the Son is always being generated; therefore he has never been generated, and so he is never Son. – These consequences are proved through Augustine *On 83 Diverse Questions* q.37: “What is always being born has never been born,” – further, “what has never been born is never son;” therefore if the Son is always being born, he is never Son.

4. To the opposite:

Ambrose *On the Faith* I ch.9 nn.59-60, and it is in the text [of Lombard's *Sentences*]: "If God first existed and afterwards generated, he was, by the accession of generation, changed; may God avert this madness." Therefore he always had the Son.

5. Likewise the authority of Hilary [*On the Trinity* XII n.21] in the text: "between being generated and having been generated there is no intermediate," namely of duration. If therefore it is proper to the Father to have always generated, it is proper to the Son that he has always been generated.

I. Solution of the Question

6. To the question I say yes, because generation is there not under the idea of change (as was said above in distinction 5 question 2 [d.5 n.87]), and therefore it does not have terms corresponding to the terms of generation-change, namely existence after non-existence (that is, being differently disposed now than before, and, because of these terms, eternity is repugnant to generation-change, because they cannot be at the same time; so there is one thing after another, and so no eternity); but there is there only generation-production in the being of substance by way of nature.

7. From this I show that it is eternal, because a sufficient agent (that is, dependent on nothing), and one producing by way of nature, has a production coeval with it – and also a perfect product – if it does not act by motion; the Father generating is such an agent; therefore he has a production coeval with him, and also a thing generated.

8. The major is plain, because that a producer should precede its production is – as it seems – not possible except because either the acting and not acting is in its power,

or because, although it is of itself determined to act, yet it can be impeded through lack of something on which it would depend in its acting. All these conditions exclude what was posited in the major, namely being a sufficient agent and producing naturally; also if, with these conditions not posited, the producer should precede its product, this would be because the product is produced through motion; therefore, with these conditions and motion removed, not only is the production coeval with it (namely with the producer), but the product too.

9. The minor is clear as to all the conditions, because the Father generating generates naturally, and he is altogether the first producer, – therefore dependent on nothing in producing; and he in no way communicates his nature through motion, because there can be no motion in that nature.

10. On this reason [n.7] stands the example of Augustine *On the Trinity* VI ch.1 n.1, about fire and brightness, that ‘if fire were eternal, it would have a brightness coeval and coeternal with it’.

I make this example clear as follows: when the natures of the more common and the less common come together in something, whatever in it follows *per se* the nature of the more common also follows when it is found without the nature of the less common (this is clear about all common things that have their own properties, and about all that is inferior to them); therefore, if the nature of what causes naturally and the nature of what produces naturally come together in a creature, whatever follows the creature by nature of the more common, which is the ‘to produce naturally’, follows it also when it is found without the causing naturally. But that fire have a brightness coeval with it does not follow it precisely for the fact that it causes naturally but for the fact that it produces

naturally, because if, *per impossibile*, it did not cause but did produce, such that there would, along with the fire, be a brightness of the same nature, the brightness would be no less coeval. Therefore, where there is truly the nature of what produces naturally without the nature of what causes naturally, as is the case in divine reality, there it truly follows that the producer has a product naturally coeval with it.

11. There is also a confirmation of this solution [nn.6-10], if one takes whatever of perfection is, or is found, scattered about in the generations of diverse creatures, and if one leaves out what there is of imperfection; in the generations of successive things it is a matter of perfection that when they are coming to be they are, and a matter of imperfection that they do not abide but have only an existence in the flow of one part after another; in the generation of permanent things, it is matter of perfection that they abide, and of imperfection that they are not when they are coming to be (because this posits imperfection in the maker, that it is not a maker of what is perfect, – likewise in the thing made, that it necessarily has existence after non-existence); in the indivisible parts of successive things it is a matter of perfection that when they are coming to be they are, and that they are all at the same time, but of imperfection that they rapidly pass away. Adding together the perfections, one will have ‘a generated’ that at the same time ‘will be generated’ and ‘will be’ and ‘will permanently be’, that is: the generated is generated and exists perfectly in a perfect stationary ‘now’ (which is the ‘now’ of eternity), and this is the intended proposition.

II. To the Principal Arguments

12. To the first argument [n.1] I say that ‘principle’ is said in many ways (as is clear in *Metaphysics* 5.1.1012b34-1013a23), and, if it be taken in the same way, one can well concede that, if it is the principle of anything, it is the principle of what is the same as it. But ‘principle’ is not wont to be construed with the ‘of duration’ in the sense of a principle of origin, but only in the sense of a principle that is as it were the term of the ‘from which’ of the duration, just as an instant is said to be the principle of time; and, whether this comes from the use or from the power of the words, one should not concede this proposition ‘the Father is the principle of the duration of the Son’ without further determination – but one could well concede this proposition ‘the Father is the originaive principle of the eternity of the Son’.

13. When, therefore, you argue on the basis of the identity of being and duration, because ‘whatever is principle of the one is principle of the other’ [n.1], – I concede it if ‘principle’ is taken uniformly with respect to being and duration. But ‘principle’ is not construed with the ‘of duration’ under the idea of such a principle as that under the idea of which principle is construed with ‘being’, because in respect of being it is an originaive principle, and so the consequence does not follow, but there is a fallacy of equivocation or of amphiboly;¹⁰⁹ but in order for the consequence to hold, one must determine principle in the consequent by the terms ‘originating’ and ‘original’, – in this way: ‘the Father is the original principle of the duration of the Son’, which I concede, as has been said [n.12].

¹⁰⁹ I.e. in the proposition ‘whatever is principle of being is principle of duration’, which seems to be a particular case of the general proposition ‘whatever is principle of the one is principle of the other’, there is in fact an equivocation in the term ‘principle’ or in the phrase ‘principle of’, so that the particular proposition is not in fact a case of the universal proposition, but is instead a fallacy.

14. To the second [n.2] I say that our word is in a state of becoming in two ways; in one way it is in the becoming which is the proper generation of the word itself, in another way it is in the becoming which is the investigation preceding the generation (which investigation Augustine calls ‘flowing cogitation’). But that our word is in a state of becoming in this second way is a matter of imperfection both on the part of the word, because it posits novelty, and on the part of our intellect, because it posits imperfect causality, – and in this way the divine Word is not in a state of becoming; and therefore Augustine concedes that our word is formed by cogitation, so that it is, in the preceding investigation, formable before it is formed. But that our word is in a state of becoming as to generation is not a matter of imperfection in it; nay this is necessary for the *per se* idea of a word (and it will also exist in the fatherland), and so it is not a matter of imperfection in the eternal Word that it is always in a state of becoming, that is, of being begotten without investigation preceding.

15. To the third [n.3] I say that Augustine seems to deny that the Son is always being born (in the aforementioned question [n.3]), although however Origen says the opposite (as the Master [Lombard] says in the text) on the verse of *Jeremiah* 11.9-10: “There is found...” [Origen *Homilies on Jeremiah* IX n.4], and also Gregory *Moralia* XXIX ch.19 n.36 on the verse of *Job* 38.21: “Did you know when you would be born...?” – Can it be that they are contradicting themselves? – I reply. Gregory in the *Moralia* passage seems to be saying things with which what has been said can be made to agree: “We cannot,” he says, “assert that he is always being born, lest he seem to be something imperfect.” He says ‘lest he seem to be something imperfect’; he did not say ‘it is an imperfection if he is said to be always being born’, but he said ‘imperfection

seems to be signified', – that is, this way of speaking does not signify that the generation is as perfect as is signified by this statement 'he is always born'; for this 'he is always born' is more expressive of the truth than is 'he is always being born', although both are true.

16. To understand this one must know that verbs of any tense are said truly of God, whether they signify personal or essential acts. The fact is plain from Augustine [*On the Gospel of John* tr.99 nn.4-5] on *John* 16.13: "For he will not speak of himself but whatever he will hear that will he speak." Augustine says about the Spirit 'whatever he will hear', because indeed the Spirit has heard and hears, because the hearing of the Holy Spirit is his proceeding from the Father and the Son; and, consequently, that 'he will hear', has heard, and hears, just as he knows and has known and will know. Therefore Augustine himself wants the verbs of all tenses to be truly said of God, and the thing is clear from what the Master [Lombard] adduces [I d.8 ch.1 n.80].

17. But what do these verbs of diverse tenses signify when they are said of God? – I reply. They can more properly be said to co-signify the 'now' of eternity than differences of time; and yet they do not signify the 'now' absolutely, because then there would be no variation of diverse modes of signifying time, but they signify it insofar as it coexists with the parts of time, as when one says, 'God has generated', the 'now' of eternity is co-signified, so that the sense is that God has an act of generation in the 'now' of eternity insofar as that 'now' was co-existent with the past, – when one says, 'God generates', this means he has an act of generation in the 'now' of eternity insofar as it coexists with the present. From this is plain that, since the 'now' truly coexists with any difference of time, we assert truly of God the differences of all the tenses.

More expressly however – according to blessed Gregory – is the truth of divine generation signified by this statement ‘he is always born’ than by the statement ‘he is always being born’; because by the ‘is born’ is the nativity signified as perfect, by the ‘always’ is it signified as perfect with every difference or part of time, and thus it is not only signified to coexist with every part of time (as is signified by this statement ‘he is always being generated’), but it is also signified to coexist with every part of time under the idea of being perfect, and in this way does the truth of this procession seem to be most truly signified.

Book One

Tenth Distinction

Single Question

Whether the Holy Spirit is produced through the Act and Mode of the Will

1. About the tenth distinction I ask whether the Holy Spirit is produced through the act and mode of the will.

That he is not:

Because nature is “a force implanted in things, procreating similars from similars” [John the German, *Gloss on the Decretum* p.1 d.1 ch.7], according to the common description of nature; the Holy Spirit is like what produces him; therefore he is produced by nature, not by will.

2. Again, Averroes *Physics* VIII com.46 means there to be for one nature only one mode of communicating; therefore if the divine nature is communicated by act of nature, it will not be communicated by act of will.

3. Further, the will is a power of acting in creatures, so it is not a power of making; therefore similarly in God: if the will is an operative power it does not seem to be a productive power. – The proof of the consequence is that as the acting and making powers are disposed in creatures, so the operative and productive powers are disposed in God. For just as the acting power has an immanent act and presupposes its object, and just as the making power has a produced object and an act that passes beyond the maker, so in divine reality the act of operative power is immanent, and the act of the productive power is not immanent, – but the operative power presupposes its object, while the productive power does not presuppose its term.

4. Again, nothing is produced by an act of will unless it is first known, from Augustine *On the Trinity* XV ch.27 n.50. Therefore if the Holy Spirit is produced in this way, he will be known before he is produced, and then he would be known by the Father and the Son in a non-intuitive cognition, because the knowledge had of him insofar as he is known before he is produced does not seem to be intuitive, because intuitive knowledge is only of a thing as it is present in itself and existent; therefore it is discordant for the Holy Spirit to be known non-intuitively by the Father and the Son.

5. On the contrary:

Augustine *On the Trinity* V ch.14 n.15: the Holy Spirit exited from the Father and the Son “not as in some way born but as in some way given;” to exit by way of given and gift belongs to the producer by act of will, whose property it is to give, or donate, of its liberality.

I. Solution of the Question

6. I say yes to the question.

The proof is that there is will in God, – as was evident from question 1 of distinction 2, and also from the question about attributes in distinction 8 [I d.2 nn.75-88, d.8 nn.177-217].

7. For it is plain from this that God is blessed from his nature; but beatitude is not without the will, or without an act of will.

8. Also the will exists in him under the idea of productive principle, because productive principles, from the fact that they do not of themselves state an imperfection,

are reduced to some single perfect thing, or to as small a number of perfect things as they can be reduced to; but they cannot all be reduced to a single principle – whether productive or active – because that single thing would have the determinate mode of acting of one or other of them, namely of nature or of will, because between these modes of producing there is no intermediate mode; therefore these principles cannot be reduced to a fewer number than two, namely of principles productive by way of nature and by way of will. And since the things at which, as at things perfect, this whole reduction of principles stops are simply perfect, both of these principles are posited in their proper idea in God as he is a producing principle [I d.2 nn.305-309].

9. And from these further. In whatever there is some principle which, of its idea, is a productive principle, in that thing the principle, if it is in it without imperfection and is not understood to have already some product simply adequate to it, will be a productive principle; in God, as has been proved [d.8 nn.177-217], there is will formally from the nature of the thing, and this under the idea of a productive principle free in respect of love, and it is plain it is there without imperfection; therefore in God there will be a principle of producing love, and this in proportion to his perfection, such that, just as a created will is as great a principle of producing love as is the love it can love the object with (which is called adequate love), so this [divine] will is as great a principle of producing love as it is of a nature to love an infinite object; but it is of a nature to love an infinite object with infinite love, therefore it is of a nature to be a principle of producing infinite love, – but nothing is infinite save the divine essence itself, therefore that love is the divine essence. Now the love produced is not of a nature to be an inherent form, because there is nothing such in divine reality; therefore it is *per se* subsistent, – and not the same subsistent thing

as the producer, because nothing produces itself, Augustine *On the Trinity* I ch.1 n.1; therefore it is distinct in person; this person I call ‘the Holy Spirit’, because the Son (as is plain from d.6 nn.16, 20, 27) is not produced in this way but by act of nature or of intellect, – therefore etc.¹¹⁰

II. Doubts

10. Here, however, there are three doubts.

The first about how the will can be this principle of communicating nature, since it is not so in creatures.

11. The second about how the will might be a principle also of producing necessarily, and what necessity is necessarily required in this production.

¹¹⁰ Note by Scotus: “Every perfect productive principle, when some supposit possesses it perfectly, can be a principle of producing (or thus: for every perfect productive principle some supposit, perfectly possessing it, can produce) a term that is adequate in comparison with the presented object; a perfect will, having a perfect or first object actually presented to it, is a perfect productive principle of as much love as such an object should, by such a will, be loved by; therefore etc. But such a will exists in a divine person, therefore some divine person can produce a love adequate to that will. – This is sufficient here; hence here there is nothing about ‘prior’, but in distinction 11 – because ‘the Son inspirits’ – the point about ‘prior’ is required [sc. there is no need to add here ‘prior to the term being produced’, as there is later in I d.11 q.1 n.2]. This minor of the first syllogism does not assert, nor does it deny, anything about a second object [sc. a secondary or finite object], but it asserts what is certain, namely about the first object. Thus are here solved all the doubts [nn.10-12], for from the minor is inferred that an infinite will, having an infinite object present to it, is a productive principle of infinite love, because with that much love should an infinite object be loved (this is certain, whatever may hold of a secondary object, because it loves it with all its effort, if it is a correct will), or in another way, because it can love with that much love, – this is what the minor says; therefore the will loves. This follows from what is maintained later [n.48] ‘about the necessity of the act with respect to the object’, because, in the case of a necessary thing, what can be is. And thus is the first doubt [n.10] solved, about how it is a principle of communicating nature. – The second doubt [n.11] is solved by adding to the minor ‘an infinite perfect will, with respect to a present object that must necessarily be loved by it, is a necessary principle of producing as much love as such an object should by it be loved by’; therefore the will, with respect to a present infinite object is a principle necessarily productive of infinite love. Once it has been proved that that object must necessarily be loved by the will, and with that much love, this one minor proposition contains everything, both ‘necessary’ and ‘infinite’, – both in the ‘communication of nature’ and in the ‘inspiring of a divine person’.”

12. Third about how, if the production is necessary, it is not by way of nature but is distinct from nature and free.

A. Response of Henry [of Ghent] to the Two First Doubts

13. [To the first doubt] – As to the first doubt [n.10] it is said [by Henry] that “nature in divine reality is said in four ways:

In one way nature is called the divine essence itself, in which the three persons consist, – and in this way nature is said purely essentially.

14. In a second way nature is called the active natural principle, – and in this way nature is the productive force ‘of similar from similar’; and thus the power in the Father of generating actively is nature, and thus it is an essential feature contracted to a notional one, because it is the divine essence itself as said in the first way; for nature, which is the divine essence itself as it exists under the property of the Father determined to an act of generation, is the active power of generating, existing in the Father alone. – And these two modes of nature are touched on by Hilary *On the Trinity* V n.37 when he says of the Son ‘from the virtue of nature into the same nature, by nativity, does he subsist.’

15. In a third way nature is said to be any force naturally existing in nature said in the first way, which yet, although the force is free, can in this way be called nature, – and thus the will in God is nature, namely because it is a natural power existing naturally in the divine nature.

16. In a fourth way nature is said to be unchangeable necessity about some act.”

17. As to the intended proposition, it is said that nature in the third way is called the principle of inspiriting, because the will is the elicitive force of inspiriting “as it is free and freely acting.” In the fourth way it concurs with the will, in the first way it concurs “not elicitive but only subjectively,” in the second way it does not concur at all.

18. From these it is, as to the intended proposition, said that “neither the intellect nor the will, in the idea in which they are simply intellect and will, are elicitive principles of notional acts (by which is produced a thing similar in natural form to the very producer), because then, in whatever they would exist, they would be elicitive principles of acts by which would be produced a similar thing in natural form to the very producer, and this is false in the case of creatures. For in divine reality they are only elicitive principles of natural acts as these exist in the divine nature, and, as such, they have in themselves a certain naturality for notional productions.

19. It was according to this, then, that we [sc. Henry] said in a certain question ‘About emanations in general’ that the intellect and will, as they are simply intellect and will – namely as acting in an intellectual and voluntary way – are only elicitive principles of essential acts (which are those of to understand and to will), although this is passively on the part of the intellect and actively on the part of the will; but as they are nature and active principles naturally elicitive of acts, they are elicitive principles of notional acts (which are those of to generate and to inspirit), and this ‘by the necessity of naturality, whereby it is impossible for God, by the principles that are nature in him, not to elicit these sorts of acts.’

20. To make this clear, one must know that the principles have this naturality from the divine nature (in which intellect and will are), but in different ways, – since the

divine intellect has naturality by being coincident with divine nature in idea of nature, which is the principal elicitive idea of the notional act (and this according to the aforesaid mode of nature), so that this naturality is altogether first, and the idea of intellect is concomitant, or quasi-concomitant; for which reason it elicits its notional act only by way of nature and natural impulse, so that the Father is more properly said to generate by intellectual nature than by natural intellect, so that the intellect is understood to quasi-determine nature rather than conversely; and, in this respect, the idea by which the Son is produced by the eliciting nature is first, and the idea by which he is called the Word is, in respect of it, as it were second.

21. But the will has its naturality, not by being coincident in idea of nature as said in the second way, but by having annexed to it a certain force of nature as said in the first way, from the fact that it is founded in that nature, so that this naturality in the will in no way precedes its liberty (nor does the elicitive idea of the notional act precede, in the sense of according to nature, – for this would be altogether contrary to liberty itself), but rather so that it is consecutive to and annexed to liberty; and this not as something by which the will elicits, by way of principle, its notional act, but as something by which, with the assistance of the will, the will itself – from the force which it has from the fact it is will and free – can elicit its notional act, which, without that assistance, it could in no way elicit.”

22. [To the second doubt] – To the second doubt [n.11] it is said [by Henry] that “there is a triple action of the will:

The first is that which is elicited by the will as it is simply will without any naturality or necessity, as it is that which proceeds from a choice of freedom (whether in

God or in an intellectual creature), and as it tends in us only to a loved good which is below the supreme good.

23. The second is that which is elicited by the will as it is simply will along with the sole naturalness of immutable necessity, annexed to that action, as it is what proceeds from a choice of freedom, and as it tends to the supreme good loved and openly seen.

24. The third is that which is elicited by the will not as it is simply will but as it is nature, with naturalness said in the second way [n.21] annexed to it, as it is that which proceeds from freedom of will or from choice of will in God alone, and as it tends not only to the supreme good loved and seen but also to that good proceeding into love itself (by which it is incentively loved), although it tends in different ways to each, and this according to different necessities of immutability annexed to the action; for insofar as an action is ordered to the supreme loved thing, there proceeds from the will alone itself – by the idea by which it is free – an immutability of necessity in its second action and in its third action; but insofar as an action is ordered to the produced love that tends to the terminal loved thing, there thus proceeds from the naturalness annexed to the will a necessity of immutability about the sole notional act elicited by the will, or rather by the liberty itself of the will as to it such naturalness is annexed.”

B. Against the Response of Henry

25. Against these remarks.

First: as to what he posits about the assistance of nature for the will, so that the will, by force of that assistance, can communicate nature [n.21], I ask what is that

assistance? It seems that it is not necessary for the communication, because, once there is in place a perfect agent supposit and one that is appropriate to the action, and a perfect ‘by which’ principle for the acting, it does not seem that anything else is necessary for acting; but for you the will alone is the ‘by which’ principle in respect of the notional act, and it is clear that the supposit is perfect and appropriate to the action; therefore the assistance does not seem necessary for such production.¹¹¹

26. Further, that a single necessity is posited in the will and a double one in the inspiring [n.24] seems to be against both him and the truth, because he himself posits that the notional acts are founded on the essential ones, and everyone commonly concedes that the essential acts in some way precede the notional ones. But it does not seem that in something founded there can be any necessity formally greater than the necessity in that on which it is founded, or it does not seem that a double necessity will exist in the thing founded and a single one in the foundation; the proof is that then, when, *per impossibile* or *per impossibile*, one necessity is separated from the other (namely the necessity which the founded thing had from the foundation), the founded thing will remain necessary, because only one of the necessities it had will, in the foundation, be removed; therefore – once this position [of a double necessity] is supposed – necessity could exist in the founded thing and not in that on which it is founded. This to the proposal, because if the act of inspiring has necessity from the freedom of the will and – besides this – from the necessity of naturality annexed to the will, and if the act of simple love has only the one first necessity, then, with the first necessity removed, all the necessity will be removed that there was in the foundation, and yet there will still remain the other necessity in the production, namely that which is from the naturality.

¹¹¹ See Appendix Point F.

27. Further, it seems that the whole of the naturality is not consequent to the act of will, because – for him [Henry] – it belongs to the will from the fact that it is founded in the divine essence [n.21]; therefore, since the idea of the divine essence is prior to the idea of the will, whatever is consequent to the idea of the essence, or to the will by reason of the essence, will be consequent to the essence before that which is consequent to the will, as it is will, will be; and so it seems that the naturality in some way precedes the liberty, and as a result it will impede the liberty.

28. Further, against the opinion.

What would that argument be which he himself makes, ‘if the intellect and the will were principles of communicating the nature whereby they are such principles, then such powers in creatures would be principles of communicating nature’ [n.18], if there were an altogether different formal idea of intellect and will in God and in creatures?

29. Further, what necessity is there for distinguishing between the will, which he posits as the principle of eliciting the act, and the nature, which he posits as co-assistant of the eliciting will [n.21], if there is between them only a distinction of reason, as he seems elsewhere to think about the distinction of attributes in divine reality?

C. Scotus’ own Response

30. [To the first doubt] [n.10] – I say in another way that the will can be a principle of communicating nature, – and not the will as commonly taken for created and uncreated will, but will whereby it is infinite; for infinity is the proper mode of the divine will, just as it is of any other essential perfection.

31. This is plain from the reason posited above, to the solution of the question [n.9], that the will is a principle of a love adequate to itself, that is, of as much love as the will is of a nature to love the object with; but it is of a nature to love an infinite object with infinite love, therefore it is also productive of infinite love; anything that is infinite formally is the divine essence, – therefore the will itself is a principle of communicating the divine essence to the produced love.

32. And if you ask me about the co-assistance in any way of nature, I say that for the will, as it is a principle of communicating nature, there is no need to posit that nature co-assists it in some special mode of assistance (supposing nature could be the principle of communicating nature), unless some lesser perfection were posited for the will than for nature; but there is no such imperfection, because an infinite will is simply as perfect as an infinite nature.

33. There is a threefold argument against this answer [n.30].

First as follows: infinity is, of itself, of the same idea in the intellect and in the will; therefore there is no formal idea of distinct products, but they have to be distinguished by the formal principles.

34. Again, I argue thus: what does not belong to something – or what is repugnant to something – in its absolute idea, does not belong to it if it is infinite either; for infinity does not give to an active virtue the idea of another active virtue, but gives it intensity, both in itself and in its action; to this add this minor: but to the action of the will, as it is such an active principle, there does not belong – but there is repugnant to it – the communicating of nature; therefore etc.

35. Further, whence does the will get infinity? If from itself, then it is infinite everywhere, – if from the essence, then the will is infinite as having the assistance of nature or of essence, which is what the other opinion says [Henry's opinion, n.21].

36. To the first [n.33] I say that the two things in the act, namely liberty and infinity (which is a mode intrinsic to a thing), have two things corresponding to them in the principle 'by which', namely liberty and infinity, as the mode of that principle (look in the final Parisian collation);¹¹² whence I do not say that infinity is the formal idea of inspiring, but that infinite will is, – nor do I say in this respect that there are two formal principles, because 'infinite' is a mode intrinsic to both principles, namely the free and the non-free. – In another way it can be said that the will, whereby it is will, is altogether simple (that is, not combinable with the nature of which it is the power, nor with its act); for from this it follows that it is productive of an act, because this belongs to it as it is will, – and further, the act is the same as the nature, and this because it is altogether simple; therefore it is communicative of nature.

37. To the other [n.34]. If 'repugnance' is taken for the middle term, the major is true and the minor is false, for the transcendent idea of the will (which idea abstracts from finite and infinite) is not a reason for repugnance, but the limitation supervening on it. But if 'does not belong' is taken for the middle term, I say that to an active infinite principle there only belongs an infinite action, of the transcendent sort that belongs to something transcendent; but now, just as a 'to will' belongs transcendentally to a transcendent will, so also belongs to it the producing of a 'to will'; therefore to an infinite will there belongs the producing of an infinite 'to will', not so much *per se* but

¹¹² Collat.20: "Whether everything intrinsic to God is altogether the same as the divine essence, after all consideration of the intellect has been removed."

concomitantly (the deity is an infinite ‘to will’, but the finite ‘to will’ of an angel is not the essence of the angel). – Then to the minor I say that to communicate nature is not the transcendent action of the will generally, but that the producing of a ‘to will’ is that is proportionate to itself and to the object, – and therefore an infinite will produces something infinite, and consequently it produces nature.

38. To the third [n.35] the answer is plain in distinction 8 [I d.8 nn.209-222], that it gets it from what it is fundamentally – because it gets it from the essence, from which it formally is; I concede that the essence is required as foundation and as really the same, but it is in its own moment of nature – in which it is formally infinite – a precise ‘by which’ principle (along with the object) of thus producing as it is also of operating.

39. [To the second doubt] – To the second doubt ‘about necessity’ [n.11], the answer is plain through the same fact [through the will whereby it is infinite, n.30], that a perfect productive principle can give to a perfect product all the perfection which is not repugnant to itself; and an infinite will is a perfect productive principle, therefore it can give to its perfect product the perfection that is fitting to itself; but necessity is not repugnant to it (nay necessity necessarily belongs to it, because no infinite can be a possible, a non-necessary, thing), therefore that principle, which is infinite will, will be a sufficient principle of giving necessity to this product. If it is a principle by which necessity can be given to the product, then necessity is given, because to nothing which is not necessary can necessity of itself be given, – and further, if it is a principle by which necessity is given to the product, therefore also to the production; for the product gets

being by the production, – nothing can get necessary existence through a non-necessary production.¹¹³

40. This as it were *a posteriori* argument [n.39] seems to deduce the necessity of the production from the necessity of the product. If an *a priori* reason, or a reason from the cause, is sought, what it is by which the will gives necessity to the production, I reply that neither does a will infinite of itself alone give necessity to the produced love, comparing it to any object whatever, nor does the loved object alone – which is the end –, compared to any will whatever, give necessity to the act of willing or to the production of love.

41. I prove the first point [n.40] by the fact that the will is not a necessary principle of producing love of any object unless it is a necessary principle of loving that object; but an infinite will is not a necessary principle of loving an object save an infinite one, because then God would necessarily love any creature at all, nay also any lovable thing at all; therefore it is not a necessary principle of producing its love, comparing it to any object whatever.¹¹⁴

42. The second point [n.40] was proved in distinction 1 ‘On enjoying’, that the will, by reason of will in general, does not tend necessarily to the end [I d.1 nn.91-133, 136-140].

¹¹³ Note by Scotus: “On the contrary: love for the creature is infinite in the divine will and yet contingent (and this is contained here immediately after ‘I prove the first etc.’ [n.41]). Response (as there ‘It does not seem’ [see footnote to n.49] and here [see footnote to n.41]): the love is necessary, but it does not necessarily pass to the secondary object, on which it does not depend, but it does necessarily pass to the first object, on which it quasi-depends; it is also really infinite, from the will and from the first object. – On the contrary: at least as it passes to the second object it is contingent; therefore it will not in this way be infinite. Response: it is not necessarily of this object, nor is it infinitely of this object, – in the way the mode of the relation is noted on both sides as the mode of the act founding the opposed relation. – On the contrary: ‘as it passes to...it is contingent’ is denied, because contingency is present in the act under no mode or relation, although the relation is contingent. If this is understood in the antecedent, let it be said in the consequent.”

¹¹⁴ An extended note is added here by Scotus. See appendix.

43. And if you reply that the will can be considered as will or as nature [nn.19, 22-24], or as by comparing it to the end or to what is for the end; but as it is compared to the end it is nature, and thus there is merely necessity, – this is refuted by both authority and reason.

44. The reason is that there are not opposite modes of acting of the same active power, and especially not these modes ‘naturally’ and ‘freely’, which first distinguish active power; because if the will is compared to the end by way of nature and to ‘things for the end’ by way of freedom, it will not be one active power with respect to them, and then there will be no power that chooses ‘a thing for the end’ for the sake of the end; for no power chooses this because of that save by willing both extremes, just as no cognitive power knows a conclusion because of the principles unless it knows in the same cognition both the principles and the conclusion, as the Philosopher argued about the common sense in *On the Soul* 3.2.426b15-29.

45. The authority is from Augustine, *Handbook of the Faith* ch.105 n.28 (and it is placed by Master Lombard in II d.25 ch.4 n.218): “Nor must it not be called will – nor said not to be free – because we so wish ourselves to be blessed that not only do we not wish to be miserable but we altogether cannot wish to be miserable;” therefore he intends to say that the will whereby we wish for beatitude is free; the will has a respect for no end more necessarily than for beatitude in general, therefore it has a respect for no end necessarily.

46. Again, this response [n.43] would posit that the Holy Spirit is not inspirited freely but by way of nature, because his principle would be will not as free but as nature.

47. Therefore I say [n.40] that the necessity of this production of adequate love – just as also the necessity of the love by which what possesses the will formally loves – is from the infinity of the will and from the infinity of the goodness of the object, because neither suffices for necessity without the other.

48. Now these two [n.47] suffice in this way, that an infinite will cannot not be right; nor can it not be in act, because then it would be potential; therefore necessarily it is in right act. But not every ‘to will’ is right precisely because it is from that will only, as if nothing is to be willed of itself but only because it is willed by that will; for the divine essence, which is the first object of that will, is to be willed of itself; therefore that will is of necessity in right act of willing the object which is of itself to be rightly willed, and just as it is of necessity a principle of willing, so it is of necessity a principle of producing love of that object.

49. And then I say that neither precisely the infinite will alone (not determining the object it has), nor the infinite good alone (not determining which will it has, as object, a respect to), is the total cause of necessarily loving, nor even of necessarily producing adequate love; but the infinite will – having such an object, which is of itself to be rightly loved, perfectly present to it – is the necessary reason both for loving that good and for inspiring love of that good;¹¹⁵ and such a will, having such an object present to it, is a

¹¹⁵ Note by Scotus: “It does not seem that the will’s being right is to be assumed together with its being infinite, as if this other is on an equal footing, because an infinite will is not then a sufficient ‘by which’ for communicating nature – even a will having the object present – but an infinite right will; again, if this rectitude is conformity to right reason, therefore reason is the principle of the production of the Holy Spirit, at any rate as the rule, the way a rule is rule of an act of will. – So in this way: an infinite will (adding altogether nothing about the presence of the object) is necessarily in act of willing, so that to no act of willing is it in potency to contradictories, because then it would be combinable; and it has for adequate object an infinite willable thing; therefore it wills it by a necessary act, – and this holds of further production just as it does of necessary operation. The second proposition [it has for adequate object an infinite willable thing] is proved from the idea of a power that can have an object adequate to its capacity; therefore it has an infinite object, and not as

principle of communicating divine nature, because it is a principle of producing a produced infinite love; for such a produced love is proportionate both to the power and to the object, – it is not thus when an infinite will has a respect to a finite lovable good, because although there the act is infinite as concerns the part of the divine will, yet it is not infinite as concerns the part of the object.

50. But whether the will is a principle not only of loving an infinite but also a finite good, and of producing love of such a good, – and this either with the same production in fact, though different in idea, by which the Holy Spirit is produced, or with an altogether different one, or with none, – of this matter elsewhere [I dd.18, 27], because it has a similar difficulty to the production of the Word, whether the divine intellect is the principle of producing a Word of the same essence or a word of any other intelligible thing, and then either by a production the same in fact, though different in idea, as the production of the divine Word, or by one different both in fact and in idea.

51. [To the third doubt] – There remains the third doubt [n.12].

Here the statement is made in this way, that nature acts through impression (as does the intellect), not the will. – See Henry.

52. On the contrary. This is false, and was rejected in distinctions 2 and 5 [I d.2 nn.283-289; d.5 nn.52-92]; again, it is not to the purpose, because it is asking about a distinction of the active principle in its mode of acting (or of eliciting an action), whether it acts on something or not.

contained under the first object, because then it would depend on something finite in its operating and so would be cheapened. It is proved secondly from the idea of act, because an infinite volition does not depend on a finite volition; therefore a finite thing is not its first object. Any volition that there is possible is infinite, because..." The note is left incomplete.

53. Another response [to the same doubt, n.12]. The word is formally of the knowledge of memory; the will, when eliciting, gives to the object the first gift (because it gives love and, in this, gives itself), nor is it gift for this reason, – hence neither is it something similar to the object presented; therefore love is not generated, nor is the Holy Spirit an image as the Son is.

54. This [n.53] indeed is true, and well said about the image, but the point about how these principles can elicit is not saved, although some distinction is posited in the terms, compared to the principles in act of assimilation.

55. Third way [to solve the doubt, n.12]. That if there exists some necessity as the act tends to the object, yet not as it is elicited by the power; or in another way: if, as it is in an act already as it were elicited, it is confirmed, yet it does not as quasi-prior in act elicit that object.

56. In another way. On the part of the principle, as it quasi-precedes the act, there is a necessity to elicit, nor is will repugnant to the necessary, because a perfect will can have the condition of a perfect elicitive principle.

57. Again, conversely, necessity does not take away liberty (because of what has just been said [n.56]).

58. Again, to act necessarily is a condition of a way of acting, therefore it is not repugnant to one of the things that divide active principle, just as neither is the mode repugnant to that whose mode of positing it is; just as there is a double principle – nor is there any other reason for distinction than that this is this [sc. that the will is will, the intellect is intellect] – so there is a double fitting necessity, because this and this [sc. this is the necessity of nature, this the necessity of will]; not every necessity, then, is natural

necessity. – Taking ‘natural’ strictly, how is will nature? Another difficulty: whether this is what ‘freely’ is, because of an identity between producer and the product?

III. To the Principal Arguments

59. To the arguments. To the first [n.1] I say that that definition of nature proves that the Holy Spirit is not produced as a ‘similar’ by the first rule and by the force of his production,¹¹⁶ and it is true that he is not the image of the Father as the Son is, who by force of his production proceeds as a similar to the Father.

60. To the second [n.2] a response has been made diffusely elsewhere, in distinction 2 question 4, and in the question where the question is asked ‘whether there can be several productions in divine reality’ [I d.2 nn.327-344].

61. To the third [n.3] one should say – as was said in distinction 2 in the question ‘On productions’ [*ibid.*] – that the accidental differences of power, namely active and passive, are not differences of productive power. For. generally, what is produced by such a principle is that of which such a principle is productive, whether in that in which it is (if it is of a nature to receive it), or in another, or in nothing. If in nothing, because nothing is of a nature to receive it, then it is produced as *per se* subsistent, if the productive power is perfect with respect to something *per se* subsistent; so it is in the intended proposition: the will by which the producer produces neither acts by producing

¹¹⁶ Note by Scotus: “The opinion of Godfrey [of Fontaines] (as it is contained here in distinction 13 [I d.13 q. un n.5]) says that [the Holy Spirit is produced] by way of will ‘because he is produced on the supposition of another production’, but he is altogether uniform in reality with the Son, because [Godfrey] posits no distinction between intellect and will save by comparison to what is outward [d.8 nn.163-166], and so what is there in these two ‘words’ that solves [the difficulty] of the first book [sc. how the processions of Son and Holy Spirit differ]? Surely Thomas [Aquinas, *Sentences* I d.2 q1 a.3], surely Henry [solve the difficulty of] the whole book with a distinction by means of the divine intellect inwardly? What more is needed for productions?”

in the supposit in which it is, nor does it by producing make something in another, but it produces a term that stands in itself, as a person, which is not received in anything subjectively. – But there is a response in another way in distinction 6 [I d.6 nn.10-15], where it is said that production is not formally intellect, and where it is said how the intellect can be a principle not only of understanding but even of saying as well.

62. To the final argument [n.4] I say that for an act of loving – or for an act of love – the loved thing must be pre-known (this is said by blessed Augustine *On the Trinity* [n.4]), but it is not necessary that the love itself be pre-known, – to wit, if some honorable good is offered to me, it is not necessary that before I am able to have the act, namely the act of loving that good, I should, to be sure, pre-know the act; so in the intended proposition: the divine essence – the love of which is inspirited – must be pre-known to the Father and to the Son so that they might inspirit, but there is no need to concede that, in the instant of origin, the Holy Spirit – who is inspirited love – should be pre-known to the Father and to the Son, although in the instant of eternity the whole Trinity is always known to any person in the Trinity, because, in distinguishing between instants of origin, one is not distinguishing between duration and duration, but only distinguishing what origin which person is from. It could in another way be said that, in the prior moment of origin, before the Holy Spirit is understood to be inspirited, the Father and the Son know the Holy Spirit, and do so intuitively, although not as existing in himself, because they know the divine essence, which is the reason for knowing intuitively any intelligible object whatever, – just as the Trinity knows the creature, and intuitively, before it is produced, because the Trinity's own essence, which the Trinity

intuits, is the reason for most perfectly knowing everything else, and, as a result, it is the reason for knowing intuitively anything knowable, even if none were in itself existent.¹¹⁷

¹¹⁷ See appendix point G.

Appendix

Scotus' extended annotation to n.41

On the contrary. The same thing is principle of 'producing' and of 'producing necessarily'; therefore if there is infinity of will – or rather, an infinite will – it is not of itself a principle of producing necessarily, therefore not of producing absolutely, nor of communicating nature, because the nature cannot be communicated except necessarily; therefore in the solution of the question [n.9], and in the solution of the first doubt [n.31], one ought to speak about the object as here in the second doubt [sc. that the object does not give necessity to the act of willing, n.40]; there is confirmation because even an infinite will is not a principle of producing love of a finite object, – otherwise there will either be many Holy Spirits, or there will be one love produced for every creature (which you deny, n.41), because then they would be necessarily loved. I concede, then, that the reason for the solution here [n.9], and likewise about the Word as concerns the intellect, and the whole reason set down above in distinction 2 question 6 [I d.2 nn.221, 226], only conclude by taking, along with the will here [about the Holy Spirit] and along with the intellect there [about the Word], the productive principle, namely the object, without which it does not produce, just as it does not operate either.

In another way and better (immediately after 'It does not seem' footnote to n.49), because, by absolutely adding nothing to the idea of infinite will, the conclusion follows that it has a first object infinite and always present, nay always actually willed, and nothing else is necessarily required for its act; and therefore it has no contingent act, although it contingently passes to some object on which its act does not depend (about this in distinctions 38 and 39).

If it be said to the ‘I concede that the reason, etc.’ [above, in the first paragraph of this annotation] that the will is not the principle of producing unless it has the object present to it (which object is the co-principle of producing), and that it cannot be the ‘principle’ when it has any object whatever but precisely when it has the first object present to it and along with that one (and this either because, before the presence of the secondary object, it has an adequate production, because it has it with the first object, but it has no power for another production beyond the adequate one; or, secondly, because an infinite principle does not require any finite principle producing along with it, but the secondary object is finite; or, thirdly, because a necessarily productive principle does not have as co-productive principle that to which it has no necessary relation, but the divine will does not necessarily have a respect to a secondary object; or, fourthly, because in these cases the general supposition is true, namely that the will is a principle of producing that necessarily requires the object as co-productive, just as does also the intellect [this is valid in d.7 n.42]), – hence it was said in distinction 2 that perfect memory, which is the complete principle of the speaking, is the intellect possessing the actually intelligible object present to itself [I d.1 n.221]; so perfect will is a will possessing the lovable object actually presented to it through intelligence [I d.1 n.226].

But as to what is added [in the previous paragraph] about the difference between the first object (that it is co-productive) and the second (that is not co-productive), this is doubtful both in the case of the intellect and in the case of the will – nor do any of the causes assigned [in the previous paragraph] seem sufficient; not the first, because either it is understood of production adequate in extension, and then the question is begged, or adequate in intension, and then the ‘but...beyond the adequate one’ is false (as is plain in

the case of operation, because it has, beyond a thus adequate operation about the first object, power for operation about a second object). Nor the second reason, because I want the second object not to be co-productive but the first object to be co-productive, not only of knowledge of itself – which is present formally – but of knowledge of the second object, which is present in it virtually; so that, just as the divine memory precisely contains the first object formally and the second object is only in the memory virtually (because it is in the first object), and yet the memory is the reason for understanding the operation about both objects, so also is it the idea for producing declarative knowledge of both objects – not indeed a knowledge proceeding from both objects but from the infinite one only, yet making both objects clear through the object which is first formally and has the second in itself virtually (so also about inspiriting); again, [the second seems insufficient because] the will in its first production does not require a co-productive principle save an infinite one; whence, then, is its imperfection proved if in the second production it were to require a finite co-productive principle? (response: although sometimes it co-acts with the creature, yet it never necessarily requires it, – for its being as principle would be imperfect; but the first instance stands, that ‘only the first object is co-productive of double word and love’ [sc. word and love of God and of creature]). The third reason is not probative, because just as will operates about an object to which it is related contingently – yet in respect of that operation the quasi-principle is only the first object which has a respect contingently to the second – why cannot it be so about production? Again, it is not conclusive about the word; again, the being well-pleased is necessary.

Note: in anything in which there is a perfect productive principle, unpreventable and not dependent on anything else, the principle can produce a term in that thing unless it is repugnant to the term to be produced by it, – and likewise it cannot produce a term in it if it is repugnant to that term to be produced by it; for each of these the major seems immediate. Or thus: in anything in which there is a perfect principle before the term is produced, it is not repugnant to the term to be produced by it,¹¹⁸ – and likewise, it cannot be produced by it if it is not in it before the term is produced; each minor seems immediate. First conclusion: anything in which there is a productive perfect principle before the term is produced can by such a principle produce the term; second conclusion: anything in which there is no principle before the term is produced cannot produce the term.¹¹⁹

Further in this way. Let the first conclusion be the major and let the minor be thus: ‘perfect memory is a perfect productive principle of a knowledge declarative of the object, a knowledge reducing it both formally in the memory and virtually in the object’; therefore what has a perfect memory can produce knowledge of this or of that, if it has it before knowledge of another is produced. Make a similar syllogism about perfect will and love.

Let the third syllogism (because the two first are counted as one and the two second as one) be as follows: let the last conclusion be the major; let the minor be this:

¹¹⁸ Note by Scotus: “‘before in duration’ is plain in the first minor, ‘before in nature’ is doubtful, and it is directed to the intended proposition; ‘before in origin’ causes no difficulty for the intended proposition, because the minor of the third syllogism [see in a later paragraph in the text] is only about ‘before in nature’, as is plain, – but by taking the first minor about prior in origin, there seems to be a begging of the question and the minor is the same as the conclusion. – The remark about ‘before’ is not cogent here [sc. in d.10], as is plain here [footnote to n.9], but it is valid in distinction 11 [I d.11 q.1 n.2] ‘About the Son’.”

¹¹⁹ Note by Scotus: “[not] at the same time, therefore the Word does not speak itself, – nor posteriorly, therefore the Holy Spirit does not generate.”

‘the whole Trinity has perfect memory before declarative knowledge of the creature is produced’, from the first question of the second book [II d.1 q.1 nn.14-15], because in the first instant of nature there is completed the whole origin simply of the persons, and the knowledge of the creature is in the second moment of nature; therefore the whole Trinity produces declarative knowledge of the secondary object. Similarly about will and love.

The consequent seems false, because either the Trinity produces it [declarative knowledge of the creature] in any person at all, and then in the Father there will be something produced, – or in determinate, produced persons, with whose productions these productions are consonant (to wit, knowledge of the creature in the Son and love and of the creature in the Holy Spirit), and it follows that there is in the Son something from the Holy Spirit, and also that the Son will produce something in himself and the Holy Spirit something in himself. Therefore, by avoiding the inferred conclusion, one or other of the three minors must be denied. If the first is denied, the denial is about the ‘before in nature’, because that stands in the same degree of origin (where however there is no production), or a gloss is made to the effect that it is true if, ‘before the first producible term is produced’, the productive principle exists in it, not if it is before the second is produced, and the reason is that the second term is in the same degree of origin as the first; both responses seem to be the same (at least it is conceded that the Word is declarative knowledge of the creature and the Holy Spirit is love of the creature, although not produced by the Trinity; the contrary is in distinction 18 ‘About gift’ and 27 ‘About the Word’ [I d.27 qq.1-3 n.24; d.18 was left blank in the *Ordinatio*]). If the second minor about the secondary object is denied, the difficulty here treated of returns – above at ‘If it be said to the ‘I concede that the reason,’ etc.’ – and then one must speak differently

about will than about memory ‘because to the will the secondary object is actually presented through intelligence’ (response: the second object does not have of itself, as does the first object, a reason for being lovable). The third minor only has force about the ‘before’ (just as does the first minor): for it is plain that it is not true of the ‘before’ in origin; about ‘nature’ it is doubtful if there is only a difference of reason between the production of the Word declaring the first object and of the Word declaring the second object, because a difference of reason is not sufficient for the order of nature.

One should note for the three syllogisms posited above that, although the minor of the first syllogism is denied of ‘before in a way other than in origin’ in the case of divine reality, and by this, *a*, seems to be excluded all force of arguing ‘whom about what’ (because ‘before in origin’ is the same as the conclusion), yet there still remains the difficulty about the productive principle, which was touched on here above, at the beginning – namely about the secondary object – because either the major (on which you altogether rely in the question about productions) will be false or it will be difficult for it not to be extended to the secondary object; but once, *b*, it is conceded that it is extended to it, then there is lost, *c*, the point in the first distinction of the second book ‘about the creature in intelligible being, that it is from the whole Trinity’ [II d.1 q.1 nn.14-15] (because from that which knowledge of the creature productively is, from that the creature as understood is produced), there is lost, *d*, the point ‘about the relation of the secondary object to God’s knowing’ in the question about ideas [I d.35 q. un n.10], there is lost, *e*, the point ‘about the relation of the Word and the Holy Spirit to creatures’ in distinctions 18 and 27 of the first book [same reference as before], there is lost, *f*, the fact that ‘the Holy Spirit is not necessarily love of the creature’ [I d.32 qq.1-2 n.14] (and it

will be necessary to say that it is necessarily love of being well-pleased, although not love of existing), and then there will be lost, *g*, the point in distinction 8 ‘against the philosophers, about the non-necessity of the creature’ [I d.8 n.274], – and then returns, *h*, the point there ‘about being well-pleased’ [*ibid.*], and the first argument in the first question of the second book stands [that if there were only one person, it could produce everything possible, II d.1 q.1 n.1], the point about the respect of the first object is not valid [*ibid.* n.9], and the Holy Spirit will not as freely love the creature as the Father does (because love is from production), nor will the Word understand by virtue of memory as it is in himself but as it is in the Father.

To these remarks. First to *a*: the principle which of its idea is of a nature to exit first in act of really producing, in real subsistence, proves that its productive principle is before in origin, that is ‘without which there is no other’, and from this is proved that from him there is another (so about the Holy Spirit, because he is from the Father and the Son, distinction 11 of the first book); likewise, the product, which is of a nature to be produced in real subsistence before in another, is that ‘without which there is no other product’, – therefore ‘from which there is another product’ (thus the three persons, in relation to creatures in outward existence). I concede therefore that the person taken in real subsistence (as he has everything, whatever order they possess in him) is really productive of the second person (likewise taken in the way that everything is in him), yet in each there is a distinction between what is first in him – namely that by which he is a divine person – and what is as it were adventitious to the person as already quasi-constituted, of which sort is everything in comparison with the second object.

I concede *b* and likewise *c*, save that (according to what was said before in *a*) the three persons, in existence simply of divine person, precede in order of nature the understanding of the creature, and precede, as a result, the creature in its intelligible existence; this antecedent indeed is true (there, in the first distinction of the second book [same reference as before]), but the consequent is denied, ‘therefore creatures are produced by the Trinity in understood existence’; the reason for the denial is this, that, just as operation about the second object is really different (however it is so, whether essentially or subsistently) from the operation about the first object, not so production about the latter from production about the former; therefore it cannot be of another that is really producing in this way and in that; therefore only the Father speaks the word of the creature, just as only he speaks the Word of his essence. A confirmation is that, just as this operative principle has one operation adequate to itself not only intensively but also extensively, that is, about everything that is virtually in it, so it has, insofar as it is productive, one production adequate in both ways, because neither is repugnant to one product. Another confirmation is that the knowledge, whether as operation or as product, can only be of the same first term, – not of others, save as they are secondary; therefore no knowledge can be produced which is immediately of another object as term (about this in distinction 36 [I d.36 q. un n.9]).

In another way. I concede *b* and *c* is not lost, because the production of the second object in known existence is not real production, just as neither does the term receive real existence, – therefore it is a diminished production, just as the product is a diminished being; such production can exist, because it is not production but quasi-production; of this sort is knowledge. Therefore the Father in himself, through the knowledge in which

the second object is virtually, quasi-produces in himself that object while he actually knows it and, when communicating the knowledge, communicates it as quasi-producing the same object, because it is posterior to the person to whom it is communicated; therefore the Trinity quasi-produces the object, and so produces it in known existence (because to be produced in that is to be quasi-produced), although only the Father really produces in the Son, by force of generation, and the Father and Son in the Holy Spirit communicate knowledge of this sort of object, – which knowledge (communicated in all of them) is a quasi-production, and so a diminished production. – In another way, more plainly: to be knowledge of the second object is to produce it in known being, just as to be knowledge of the first object is to be of it as of quasi-producing knowledge, because the first object is quasi-presupposed and the second is quasi-produced by it – in act – because it is knowledge of it; therefore, as really communicating knowledge as of the second object, it really communicates it as producing the secondary object, by the production which there is possible, which is only a diminished production.

Whether the Father or the Trinity produces the second object in known existence, *d* is not lost, because the idea is a second object, whether produced in this way or in that, or it is not produced but quasi-produced. – And if someone says that the idea is not thus really referred to God's knowing, because thus the idea is nothing, – by parity of reasoning neither conversely does knowing have any relation of reason to the second object, because the second object is altogether nothing, just as it neither founds nor terminates any relation.

Nor is *e* lost, because from whatever source the second object is produced (or quasi-produced), the divine person has perfect existence, comparing the intellect and will

to the first object; however I do concede that the Word, from the quasi-secondary production, is really produced knowledge of the creature, just as the Father is quasi-secondarily unproduced knowledge of it, and so necessarily the Son, like the Father, is knowledge of it – but this relation neither with non-generation constitutes the Father, nor with generation the Son.

From this *f* [is not lost – i.e. repeat of the Holy Spirit what has just been said of the Son]; – or it can be asserted of being well-pleased; insofar as the ‘shown thing’ is shown to have goodness participated from the First thing; or in another way; just as the person of the Father necessarily has the operation of the will, which operation is of some object necessarily and of another contingently, – so he produces a subsistent quasi-operation, which operation, necessarily produced, is of some object necessarily and of another contingently; and just as this does not follow ‘the volition of the creature is the same as the person of the Father, therefore the Father necessarily has volition of the creature’ (but only this follows ‘therefore he necessarily has a volition that is of the creature’), so this does not follow ‘the Father necessarily inspirits volition of the creature’ (in the composite sense), although he necessarily inspirits a ‘voition’ which is of the creature.

Note that above, when it is said [at the beginning of this annotation]: ‘On the contrary. The same thing is principle’, contradictory responses are seen; one, that together with infinite will one must take the fact that it has a present infinite object, – the other, afterwards, that one should add nothing to the object, but from infinite will is deduced an infinite object always actually present, necessarily (and how it is deduced is contained here [footnote to n.49]).

But this contradiction is thus removed: from the idea of power is deduced the condition of the first object and of its presence, not by a ‘proof-why’ but by a ‘proof-that’; for the idea of power requires an object that is a quasi-co-principle with respect to the operation, and so, in order to have a complete ‘proof-why’ of necessary love, one must take it thus, ‘infinite will possessing an infinite object actually presented to it through the intellect’, –and the first response is understood in this way; but of this whole ‘proof-why’, including the two co-principles (necessarily being co-principles of the act) the one part proves the other part by a ‘proof-that’, – and the second response is understood in this way.

Nor does the proof ‘So in this way’ [footnote to n.49] conclude more: for the subject of the first proposition does not state the whole ‘proof-why’ with respect to the predicate, but the other principle does – from whose idea, however, is deduced that the remaining co-principle concurs not as to ‘proof-why’, but nature thus requires that to such a will there correspond a proportionate co-principle, therefore an infinite one, and in a proportionate way, therefore always present; for example, according to Aristotle ‘some cause simply necessary moves the heavens’ [I d.8 n.251]; here in the subject there is a partial ‘proof-why’ of the predicate, but nature requires that to it there correspond a proportionate co-principle and in a proportionate way, – as a necessary heavens and necessarily present and movable; therefore the total ‘proof-why’ of this effect – namely of the necessary motion – includes the active cause and the movable thing, but from the proper idea of one of these there is concluded, by a ‘proof-that’, that the other concurs, and so the effect is proved, but by a diminished ‘proof-that’.

[From the *Cambridge Reportatio*]

Point F. [See n.25]

Further, when things are so disposed that they join together as ‘prior’ and ‘posterior’ for some action, the one that is ‘prior’ joins in more principally for the action; but the essence, which is the nature (insofar as they [Henry and his followers] take ‘nature’ in the first mode [n.13]), in which the three divine persons consist, is prior to the will; therefore if nature joins in for the action in this way, as assisting the will, it will necessarily be more principal in this production; therefore a contradiction is involved in its joining in as assistant, concomitant to the will, and not, as they themselves say, preceding it.

Point G. [See n.62]

Concerning the tenth distinction, where the Master [Lombard] determines what one must see if the divine will is the principle of inspiriting the Holy Spirit, – and because there are three things that cause difficulty, namely the consubstantiality of the product, the necessity of the production, the apparent impossibility of liberty and necessity, therefore I ask three brief questions about these three points; the first is whether the divine will can be *per se* a principle of communicating the divine nature; second, whether it can be *per se* a principle of producing necessarily; third, whether necessity and liberty are compatible with each other in the very same respect of the same production. Fourth – the principal question – whether the divine will is *per se* the principle of inspiriting the Holy Spirit.

To the first question it is argued no: Averroes *Physics* 8 com.46, ‘Whether each thing’ [I d.2 nn.212-214].

Again, the common description of nature is convertible with it.

Again, the image is the principle in artificial things.

On the contrary: the will is not less perfect than the memory.

As to the second question it is argued no: Aristotle *Metaphysics* 9.2.1046b4-11, a rational power is to opposites.

Again, the ways of being a principle are opposed.

On the contrary: that which is perfect in production is not repugnant to the production of a perfective productive principle.

As to the third question it is argued no in this way: the necessity of a principle naturally determines necessarily; therefore the principle is from its nature necessarily determined; therefore by natural necessity.

Again, necessary dominion does not dominate [sc. cannot determine itself to this or that], otherwise anything natural would be called free.

On the contrary: perfection in productive principle is not repugnant to a perfect productive principle.

To the fourth question it is argued no: as doing and making are, so are operation and production.

Again, it would be precognitive.

On the contrary: the Master [Lombard] *Sentences* I d.10 ch.2 n.102, through Jerome *On Psalm 14* [=Abelard, *Christian Theology* IV: "Hence there is this from Jerome on psalm XVII: 'The Holy Spirit is not the Father nor the Son but the love which the Father has in the Son and the Son in the Father'."], and Augustine *On the Trinity* VI ch.5 n.7, and Richard [of St. Victor] *On the Trinity* VI ch.17.

Appendix. Distinction 3 from the Commentary on the

Sentences by Antonius Andreas

Question One: *Whether God can be naturally known by the intellect of the wayfarer*

Question Two: *Whether God is the first thing naturally known by the wayfarer*

Response to Questions One and Two

To Question One

To Question Two

Question Three: *Whether God is the sufficient object of our intellect*

Question Four: *Whether some sound and certain truth can be known by the intellect of the wayfarer without special illumination from the uncreated light*

Question Five: *Whether a trace or footprint of the Trinity is found in all creatures*

Question Six: *Whether in intellectual nature taken properly there is memory properly, that is, an intellect possessing an intelligible species naturally prior to the act of understanding*

Question Seven: *Whether the intellective part of the soul taken properly, or some part of it, is the whole cause, or the whole principle of generating, which generates actual knowledge*

Question Eight: *Whether the more principal cause of generated knowledge is the object in itself or present in the species, or the intellective part of the soul*

Question Nine: *Whether the image of the Trinity exists in the mind distinctly*

Third Distinction

Question One

Whether God can be naturally known by the intellect of the wayfarer

Bonaventure, *Sent.* 1 d.3 q.1 a.1

Alexander of Hales, *Summa* p.1 q.2 sect.1 a.1

Scotus, *Sent.* 1 d.3 q.1

Thomas, *ST Ia* q.12 a.12

Richard of St. Victor, *Sent.* 1 d.3 q.1 a.1

Durandus, *Sent.* 1 d.3 q.1
 Francis of Meyronne, *Sent.* 1 d.3 q.1
 John Baconitanus, *Sent.* 1 d.3 q.1

1. About the third distinction I ask first whether God can be known naturally by the intellect of the wayfarer.

2. That he is not. From Aristotle as follows. *On the Soul* 3: We understand nothing without phantasms, for just as sensibles are to the senses so intelligibles are to the intellect; but God is not a phantasm because he is not sensible; therefore etc.

3. Again, *Metaphysics* 2: Our intellect is related to what is most manifest in nature as the eye of the owl to the sun; but there is impossibility here; therefore etc.

4. Again, *Physics* 1: The infinite qua infinite is unknowable; but God qua God is infinite; therefore etc.

5. Again, Gregory on *Ezekiel*: However much my mind has advanced in contemplation of God, I have reached not to what he is but to what is beneath him, etc.

6. On the contrary. *Metaphysics* 6: Science or theology is about God; but the science of metaphysics is naturally attainable; therefore.

Question Two

Whether God is the first thing naturally known by the wayfarer

Scotus, *Sent.* 1 d.3 q.2
 Francis of Meyronne, *Sent.* 1 d.3 q.2
 John Baconitanus, *Sent.* 1 d.3 q.1

1. The question next asked along with the first is whether God is the first thing naturally known by the wayfarer.
2. That he is, from *Metaphysics* 2: As things are to existence so are they to being known; but God is the first being; therefore he is the first known.
3. On the contrary: All natural knowledge arises from the senses, *Metaphysics* 1, *Posterior Analytics* 2; but God is furthest removed from the senses; therefore he is not naturally first known.

Response to Questions One and Two

To Question One

1. The first question is not asking about whether God exists, because this question was discussed above [d.2 qq.1-2]. Rather it is asking whether the intellect of the wayfarer can have some simple concept in which God is in some way known as to what he is.
2. To this question some say (Thomas, *Summa* Ia q.12 a.12) that God is known by the wayfarer only negatively. But this does not hold, because negations are known only through affirmations, *Metaphysics* 4, *De Interpretatione* 2. For the reason that something is removed from something is because something else, with which the thing removed was impossible, is affirmatively attributed to it. So we remove composition from God because we attribute simplicity to him.
3. An alternative answer is that God is not known in himself by the wayfarer but in creatures, wherein he shines forth. But this too does not hold. For let purely a creature be

known: and then God is not known, or God himself, who is in the creature, is known, and then he is known in himself through creatures.

4. Or in this way: God is known by discursive reason; if there is this discursive reasoning, then, either it is discursive to God, and so the conclusion is obtained; or it is discursive to the creature, and so the beginning and end of the reasoning is the same and consequently nothing is known – or God is at least thus known in the creature.

5. Another way is to say that God is known by creatures not per se but as it were per accidens, because he is not conceived in the proper idea of deity but in some attributal idea, which is a quasi accidental according to Damascene bk.1, where he says that attributes do not state the nature of God but something about the nature; and in knowing that God is wise and the like, creatures know him as it were per accidens, because through some quasi accidental idea.

6. On the contrary. When creatures know that God is wise, they know that wisdom is in him, in a quasi second mode of statement per se [sc. a statement when the subject enters into the definition of the predicate]; and so they know the underlying quiddity to which they adequately attribute in the second mode the quasi accidental perfection.

7. Accordingly I state five articles in solution of this first question [q.1]. First I say that the wayfarer can naturally have of God some quidditative concept in which God himself will be known in some way, albeit imperfectly. For the wayfarer can naturally know that God is wise; therefore he attributes wisdom to the divine nature; therefore he in some way knows the divine nature quidditatively.

8. I say second that the wayfarer cannot naturally have a concept of this divine essence as it is this essence, the reason for which is that the essence is in this way not a

natural object of our intellect, only of the divine intellect; but of other intellects the essence is in this way the moving and beatific object.

9. I say third that the wayfarer can attain knowledge of many concepts proper to God, of which sort are all concepts in their supreme degree, as when he conceives God to be supremely wise, supremely good, and other things of this sort. However, the more perfect among these concepts is the concept of infinity, for infinity is not as it were an attribute but a degree intrinsic to the divine essence, just as intense whiteness is not something quasi accidentally added to whiteness but is an intrinsic degree of it, etc. Note that 'supreme' taken in relation to another states a respect but taken absolutely it states, for me, something purely simple; and in this way is the infinite made more explicit.

10. I say fourth that all the naturally possible knowledge that can be had by a wayfarer is because of the hopes creatures have and is as it were by way of argument; and it proceeds in this way: I possess the species of wisdom and the species of act and the species of a supreme stone; I then put these three species together and form one concept, which is supreme actual wisdom; and I then argue that such is the wisdom of God and so on as to other attributes; and this can be done by an argument *a minori*. For the imaginative faculty does this when it imagines a golden mountain, by putting together at the same time the species of gold and the species of mountain. Hereby is it plain that the natural knowledge that can be had of God is not knowledge of this essence under its proper idea of essence; etc.

11. I say fifth that, because the knowledge that can naturally be had of God comes through species of creatures, it must necessarily be the case that a concept common to God and creatures is univocal. And I mean by a univocal concept a concept that is single

with as much oneness as suffices for the extremes of contradiction and for a middle term, without fallacy of equivocation, in a syllogism.

12. Now I prove this in three ways. First as follows: Knowledge is not natural unless it is naturally caused; knowledge is not naturally caused unless it is caused by what naturally moves the possible intellect; the possible intellect is not naturally moved save by an object that is translucent in a phantasm along with the agent intellect; but every such object is something sensible; therefore God cannot be naturally known save through species of sensible things; but a sensible species cannot lead to knowledge of God and of spiritual things save in the way stated; but a sensible species, as of a stone, causes knowledge of the stone and of all its higher genera, as body, substance, and being; and it causes the concept of being, which is got through the species of the stone, by attributing concepts to being, or by putting being together with other concepts, as was said in the fourth article [n.10]. For I say that God is like this, and so I have of God a concept of being; but this could not be done unless, as is plain, the concept of being were univocal to God and stone, for otherwise I could not attribute to God the concept of being that the species of stone causes in me; etc.

13. Secondly thus: The intellect, when conceiving created wisdom, conceives it as it states imperfection; and then, by removing the imperfection (namely limitation and the like) and preserving the formal idea of wisdom, the intellect attributes it to God; but this could not be done unless the concept of wisdom were univocal to created and uncreated wisdom; instead the whole of it would have to be taken away, and so nothing we received from creatures could we attribute to God.

14. Thirdly thus: The concept that the philosophers had of God, or of the first principle, which concept was being, was a created concept; but such a concept did not give certainty as to whether being was created or uncreated; therefore the concept of being was neutral as to both such concepts; and consequently it was univocal to them.

To the Arguments

15. To the arguments. To the first [q.1 n.2] the answer is plain from what was said in the fourth and fifth articles [nn.10, 11 supra].

16. To the second [q.1 n.3] I say that, according to the Commentator [Averroes, *Metaphysics* 2 com.1], there is no impossibility but a difficulty, the reason for which is that nature would have uselessly made separate substances if they could not be understood by any intellect. But this does not hold, because being understood by us is not the goal of separate substances. Hence, if they are not understood by us, they would not for this reason have been made uselessly; etc.

17. Further, that they cannot be understood by us does not entail that they cannot be understood by themselves.

18. One must therefore say that the eye of an owl only has intuitive vision, as is plain, and I then say that, just as it is impossible for the eye of an owl to see the sun, so it is impossible for God to be intuitively seen by the wayfarer naturally.

19. It can also be said in another way that the eye of an owl does see the sun at twilight, and just as its eye then sees the sun imperfectly so do we understand separate substances imperfectly.

20. To the third [n.4] I say that Aristotle is speaking there of an infinite in possibility, and such a thing, as far as it is infinite, is unknown; but God is an infinite in act; therefore etc.

21. To Gregory [n.5] I say that however much the mind of the wayfarer may advance in contemplation of God, yet it will not be able to reach distinct knowledge, but it can well reach some natural knowledge of God – not however of his essence as it is this essence, but to a knowledge of God, or of his essence, under the idea of being. This sort of knowledge is called inferior, however, because it is not a perfect and distinct knowledge as of the essence as it is this essence; wherefore etc.

To Question Two

22. Now in answer to the second question I say that there is a triple order to intelligible things: the first order is that of origin or generation; the next is the order of perfection; the third is the order of adequacy or of causality in the precise sense.

23. Of the first two priorities the Philosopher speaks in *Metaphysics* 9.15; of the third he speaks in *Posterior Analytics* 1.11, about the definition of the universal, because it states precision and adequacy first.

24. To being with, then, we must look at habitual cognition. As concerns this I say that concepts are twofold: one is simply simple, namely that which is not resolvable into other prior concepts, of which sort is the concept of being and its ultimate differences; the other is a simple concept but not simply simple, namely that which is resolvable into other

prior concepts, of which sort is the concept of a thing defined (which is resolvable into the concepts of the parts of the definition), and so of other like terms.

25. Secondly I say that the second concept here [n.24] is knowledge, one being actual knowledge and another habitual knowledge; etc.

26. Third I say that actual knowledge is double: one is distinct, whereby a whole thing is actually known and actually in its totality; the other is confused, whereby a thing is not known actually in its totality because not all the things that are knowable about it are actually known. An example: it would be a contradiction to understand man actually without understanding all the things that are included in him essentially; yet it is not necessary for all these things to be understood actually, but only habitually. Accordingly, when all of them were understood actually, the thing would then be said to be known distinctly, because the whole of it would be known actually and totally; but when the things included in it are understood not actually but habitually, then the thing is said to be known confusedly.

27. Fourth I say that to know confusedly and distinctly are one thing and that to know a confused thing and a distinct thing are another; for in the former the confusion and distinctness are on the part of the knowledge and in the latter on the part of the thing, as is plain.

28. On the basis of these premises I say that when speaking of actual knowledge, which is here at issue, the first naturally known thing, naturally confused with confused knowledge, is the most specific species; but the first thing naturally known with distinct knowledge is being. But there is clarification of this as follows:

29. The first thing by which the possible intellect is naturally moved is the representative object in a phantasm together with the agent intellect, and, according to the common opinion, it does not immediately and directly represent the particular but the universal, namely the specific nature; therefore the specific nature is naturally first known; and because many things are included in it, of which included things the first is being, which is supreme, therefore, if the nature is to be distinctly known, there is need to start from being, and from the fact that being has a concept simply simple so that it includes nothing else. Therefore being can be only known distinctly, and thus it is plain that the first distinctly known thing is being, and the first confusedly known thing is the most specific species. But because the more universal things are the more confused things, therefore is it said in *Physics* 1 that the more confused things are known first by us. But this 'known first' must be understood of distinct knowledge, because we are now beginning from it, as was said [just above]; and what in such knowledge is more distinct is what is last known, as is plain; etc.

30. One must note here, however, that, as Scotus seems to think, no particular is, in our present state, known in its proper idea either by the intellect or by the senses. The reason is that, if the particular could be known in its proper idea, it could be distinguished from everything that is not it, and yet it cannot be. For suppose that there is here a single whiteness and it is present as an object to your senses, and suppose that God by his own power were to annihilate it and immediately replace it with a whiteness that was not numerically the same but very similar to it, you will think it is the same and yet it will not be the same; but if you knew the first whiteness in its own proper and singular nature, you would immediately notice that it was not the same. This would also be clear of many

other cases that, whether by the senses or in any other way, you cannot distinguish between, and yet they are really distinct. The particular and singular, therefore, are, in our present state, not known by the intellect or the senses in their proper idea of singularity, but they are known by aggregation of many accidents, namely size, shape, color, and many such things.

To the Arguments

31. To the first argument for the opposite [q.2 n.2] I say that the proposition is in all cases true only in respect of the divine intellect, which knows things according to the degrees of their entity; and so what is first and most being is first and most known by it. But because our knowledge begins from the senses, therefore are sensible things first known to us, yet they do not have existence first. So it is true that the first being is of itself the first knowable, but it is the first known only to the most perfect intellect, which also knows things in all their degrees, etc.

Question Three

Whether God is the sufficient object of our intellect

Scotus, *Sent.* 1 d.3 q.3

Thomas, *ST* Ia q.85 a.1

Francis of Meyronne, *Sent.* 1 d.3 q.2

John Baconitanus, *Sent.* 1 d.3 q.1

1. The second question¹²⁰ is whether God is the first sufficient object of a wayfarer's intellect.

2. That he is. Just as there is no participated being unless there is being by essence, so participated being is not known unless unparticipated being is first known; therefore God, who is being by essence, is the first sufficient object of any intellect whatever, etc.

3. Also, the first thing in any genus is the cause of everything in that genus, from *Metaphysics* 2 text.4; but God is the first and most perfect of all knowables; therefore etc.

4. Further, things are related to being known as they are related to being; but God is the first being; therefore etc.

5. On the contrary. The first object of a power, by the primacy of its sufficiency, is predicated of everything that can be known by that power, as visible is said of everything that the eye can see; but God is not predicated of everything that the wayfarer's intellect understands; therefore etc.

6. Further, no power can apprehend or understand any object under an idea more common than the idea of its first object; but the intellect understands things under an idea more common than God; therefore God is not the first object of the intellect.

To the Question

7. I reply by saying that Thomas [*ST* Ia q.12 a.4, q.85 a.1] posits that – just as powers are threefold: one altogether separate from matter in its being and in its operating,

¹²⁰ 'Second' because questions one and two above were really parts of one question, or because this question begins the second part of distinction 3 (see footnote 10, to q.5 n.1 below).

another altogether material in its being and in its operating, a third separate from matter in its operating but not in its being (the first is a separate intellect, the second is a material organic power, the third is a conjoined intellect which perfects matter in existing but does not use a material organ in operating) – so there are three objects proportionally corresponding to them. For immaterial quiddity corresponds to the first power as its first object; the material particular corresponds thus to the second power; the quiddity of a material thing corresponds thus to the third power, which quiddity, despite being in matter, is yet not known in the material singular, for it is purified by the irradiating of the agent intellect.

8. On the contrary. While a power remains the same power it cannot, by any habit added to it, exercise its act about an object that is not conceived under the formal idea of the first sufficient object of that power; but an intellect when blessed and when not blessed is numerically the same intellect; therefore, however much the habit of glory is added to the intellect when blessed yet, since such habit does not make the intellect not to be the same power as it was before, the intellect will when blessed not exercise its act about separate substances, which is absurd. The proof of the minor is that the first object of a habit either is contained under the first object of the power or at least does not go beyond it; otherwise it would not be a habit of the power.

9. Now Henry of Ghent says [*Quodlibet* 15 q.9 and 13 q.9] that the naturally first object of the intellect and of the will is God, the reason for which is that, just as the first object is naturally first simply, so it naturally first moves the intellect and the will, and whatever else moves them moves them by virtue of it, etc.

10. Against this is the argument brought against the first argument at the beginning [n.5]. On the supposition, therefore, of the univocity of being (which was proved supra, d.3 response to q.1 nn.11-14), I say that the first sufficient natural object of the intellect and of the will is being. However I will first state what the univocity of being extends to and what it does not extend to. Second I will demonstrate the proposed conclusion.

11. About the first point I say that being is not said univocally and quidditatively of the ultimate differences or properties of being. I first give a twofold proof. The first proof is that if being is thus univocally said, then two ultimate differences, labeled *a* and *b*, will not be in their totality primarily *diverse* but will be *different*,¹²¹ because they will be ‘some other being’, that is, they will be one in being by the fact that they include ‘some other being’, namely the concept of being. And then I will take precisely the reasons by which they [*a* and *b*] differ, and so either there will be an infinite regress or some ultimate differences will be found that will then be so diverse in their totality that they include nothing common; and consequently, since being states a single concept (as was proved, q.3 response to q.1 nn.11-14), these ultimate differences do not quidditatively include it.

12. The second proof is as follows: Just as a composite thing is composed of act and potency, so a composite concept is composed of an actual and formal concept; and just as act does not include potency, so an actual concept does not include a potential one; and just as the concept of being, which is potential, is simply simple, so an ultimate simple complex (at which ultimate resolution stops) is simply simple; and thus being, which states something potential, will not be predicated of difference, which states something actual.

¹²¹ Things are said to be ‘diverse’ if they are in another genus but ‘different’ if they are other in the same genus. So white and red are different but white and square are diverse.

13. Second [second of the twofold proof, n.11] I prove it following the Philosopher in *Metaphysics* 4 text 5 as follows: Being qua being has properties, and (following the Philosopher in *Posterior Analytics* 1 text 9) properties are predicated of the subject in the second and not the first mode of statement per se. Therefore, just as a property does not include the subject quidditatively, so the properties of being do not include being quidditatively.

14. I say that although being is not contained quidditatively in everything intelligible (for it is not thus contained in the properties and ultimate differences of being, as was said), and although, as a result, being is not common, with the commonness of quidditative predication, to all intelligibles, yet it is in some way common to everything as to virtual containment. And this virtual containment suffices for being to be called the natural first and adequate object of the intellect and of the will, and common to all intelligibles. And although it follows from this that the reason adduced against the first argument at the beginning [n.5] and against Henry's opinion [n.10] is not in itself a good argument, yet it is valid against Henry, because God is not predicated quidditatively of everything intelligible, nor is he contained in everything the way intelligible is so contained, as is plain.

15. But against what was said in the first article [n.11], and against the univocity of being that it posited, argument is made in another way from the Philosopher in *Metaphysics* 3 text 10, where he says that being is not a genus, for then its difference would not be a per se being. And if you say that it would be, the result is that being is a genus, because it is, according to you, univocally predicated of its logical inferiors, and,

according to you, something can be outside the idea [of being], and then this something will be able to be a true difference.

16. Again against the univocity of being: The Philosopher says in *Metaphysics* 4 that being is said of all beings the way health is said of all healthy things, and so not logically [sc. but analogically].

17. Again in the same place he says that everything metaphysics is about is not a one but related to a one; therefore being, which is the subject there, is not univocal but analogical, etc.

18. Again in *Metaphysics* 7 text 14 & 15, accidents are not beings but *of* beings, etc.

19. Again Porphyry says [*Predicables*, on species] that if anyone speaks of all beings he will call them beings equivocally and non-univocally, etc.

20. These arguments notwithstanding, I bring forward yet another sort of reason in favor of univocity:

21. Whatever things are properly matched together in respect of some third thing are named with one name univocally in respect to it; but substance and accident, created being and uncreated being, are properly matched in respect of being; therefore etc. The major is plain from *Physics* 7 text 26. It is also plain in an example, for this proposition is not true: whiteness is more a color than sound is; the reason for this is that color has no unity in respect of whiteness and sound, but only in respect of whiteness. The minor is plain because substance is properly more a being than accident is, and uncreated being than created being; and the point is plain from the Philosopher in *Metaphysics* 7 text 5, where he says that substance excels more than accident; but his meaning cannot be that

substance is more substance than accident is, because then accident will be a substance; nor can his meaning be that accident is less accident; etc.

22. In reply to the objections that were brought forward [nn.15-19], I say to the first part of the first objection [n.15] that, in the case of many differences, being is said quidditatively; but only in the case of the ultimate differences and properties of being is it not predicated quidditatively; the point has been explained [nn.11-13]. However, the idea of genus requires that all differences, both immediate and remote, be outside the idea of the genus, etc.

23. And for this reason does Aristotle say there [n.15] that if being were a genus all the differences would be per se non-being, which is unacceptable; but it is not unacceptable, rather it is necessary, as to the ultimate differences and properties, as has been shown.

24. Hereby is plain the solution to the second part of the first objection [n.15], that, because not all differences exclude being quidditatively, being cannot be a genus.

25. To the second, third, and fourth objections, and to all the authorities taken from the Philosopher that could be adduced for the purpose [nn.16-18], I say that, speaking naturally and metaphysically, it is true that being is analogical insofar it does not state any real unity outside the intellect and as to the same things it is said of. But nevertheless, logically speaking, it is univocal, because the concept of being is truly abstracted from them and is truly one concept, as has been said and made clear.

26. I confirm the fact, for the Philosopher says, *Physics* 7, that equivocations are latent in a genus; and he means it to the extent that not every genus has a real unity in respect of its species; indeed sometimes the idea of a genus is taken, in reality, from some

other form, a form from which the difference is taken, as is plain according to those who posit a plurality of forms; and yet, despite this fact, the genus is a true logical genus, because one concept can be naturally abstracted from things really diverse; therefore it is plain that, notwithstanding the fact an accident is a being by way of attribution to substance, that also a concept of being abstracted from other things is logically a univocal concept, and it has a certain unity, as was made clear above. For it was not to be imagined that being as said of God and creatures would have a real unity outside the intellect, because then such being would naturally precede God himself, and so God will not be the first principle.

27. To Porphyry [n.19] I say that Aristotle, whom he cites there, does not say in his *Logic* that being is equivocal; but if he says it in his *Physics* or *Metaphysics*, the thing has just been expounded, etc.

28. I come now to the second article [n.10], which is about the principal matter at issue; and I say that the adequate natural first object of the intellect and the will is being.

29. I prove this about the intellect in two ways, and first as follows: The object of a habit does not exceed the object of the power of the habit, because then it would not be the object of the power; but the object of the habit that is metaphysics is being, as is plain in *Metaphysics* 6 text 1; and that habit is an intellectual one; therefore nothing inferior to being can be set down as the adequate object of the intellect; and nothing is superior to being; therefore being is the object.

30. Second as follows: The adequate first object of a power ought to contain under it quidditatively or virtually everything to which the power extends, otherwise it would not be the adequate object; but there is nothing that may contain everything intelligible save

being, for being (as explained above) contains everything by quidditative or virtual containment (according to what was expounded above). I prove that truth, or the true, is not the object in question, because although the true is transcendent as being is, it cannot be posited as the adequate first object because it does not contain all intelligibles. For the true, as a property of being, does not contain being, nor the things that are per se being, whether quidditatively or virtually; but on the other hand the subject does contain the property virtually, albeit not quidditatively, etc.

31. Now, that being is the adequate first object of the will is plain from this, that whatever the intellect can understand the will, since it is free, can will, provided however the thing understood has the idea of being; for the intellect is of itself proportioned to the will. Many however do not concede that the will can will whatever the intellect can understand, etc.

32. Against this article [n.28] there is argument as follows: distinct powers have formally distinct objects, from *On the Soul* 2 text 33; but will and intellect are formally distinct powers, and sense and intellect are formally distinct powers, and yet the sensible is not formally distinct from being; on the contrary it formally includes being as its superior.

33. Again: Because then the intellect will naturally be able to understand separate substances per se, since they are contained per se under being.

34. To the first of these [n.32] I say that disparate powers of the sort that sight and hearing have also formally distinct objects, just as they are formally distinct powers; but subordinate powers in the same genus, of which sort are the sensitive cognitive power and the intellective power that is also cognitive, need to have subordinate objects, just as

they themselves are subordinate; and just as is plain about the particular sense and the common sense, so the sensible does not have to be distinct from the intellect but may be contained under it. Powers, however, that have an order between them but are not of the same genus, of which sort the intellect and will are, do not need to possess formally distinct objects because of the fact they have an order, for everything willed is known first, etc.

35. To the second [n.33] I say that, just as was said above, the intellect in this present state only naturally understands what it is naturally moved by; but it is only naturally moved by the object that shines forth in a phantasm along with the agent intellect; and everything such is sensible. And therefore the quiddity of sensible things is the first natural mover of the intellect in this present state; but nevertheless, that which the intellect is capable of should be assigned to it as its adequate first object. Hence the intellect, and the like, is the whole of being. For the conjoined and non-conjoined intellect are numerically the same intellect; indeed every blessed conjoined intellect has power for every intelligible and every being. But the fact that in this present state the intellect cannot be moved naturally save by sensible things is a result either of the natural connection of the powers of inferiors, or of superiors, or because of the sin of our first Parent, as Augustine seems to mean in *On the Trinity* 15 last chapter; and Augustine's view is perhaps more likely, because the blessed intellect would be conjoined with the same body after glorification, and consequently the connection would be the same; and yet the blessed intellect would understand sensible substances.

To the Arguments

36. As to the first argument, then, at the beginning [n.2], namely that there is no participated being unless there is being by essence and so participated being is not known unless it is a being through being by essence. However, the following inference does not hold, namely that just as being is from unparticipated being, so being is not known unless unparticipated being is known and unless being is known through the idea of being by essence. An example: A stone is not a being unless there is being by essence. Let there be being by essence. Yet the inference does not hold: the stone is not formally white or hard unless being by essence is white or hard.

32. Hereby is plain the solution to Henry's argument [n.9]. For although God is simply the first being and is of himself the first knowable, yet he is not naturally for us the first known or the first knowable. Such he is for his own true intellect, which is a purely simple intellect.¹²²

Question Four

Whether some sound and certain truth can be known by the intellect of the wayfarer without special illumination from the uncreated light

Scotus, *Sent.* 1 d.3 q.4

Thomas, *ST* Ia q.44 a.3

¹²² This response to Henry will serve also as a response to the remaining two arguments at the beginning, nn.3, 4 (which are not expressly addressed); for they both turn on the same idea, namely that since God is first therefore he is first known.

1. The fourth question is whether the wayfarer can possess some sound and certain truth without special illumination from the uncreated light.

2. And it seems that he cannot. For Augustine *On the Trinity* 9.8 says that we gaze on inviolable truth, and by state by means of it what sort of mind should belong with reasons to eternal man.

3. And in the same place, in the truth by which all temporal things are made we behold the form; therefrom do we get, as a word within ourselves, the conception of true knowledge.

4. And in *Confessions* 12 chs.2 & 3 Augustine says that if both of us see the truth, you do not see it in me or I in you, but we both see it with a changeless truth as far as possible above the intellect.

5. On the contrary, in *Romans* 1 it is said that the invisible things of God from the creation of the world are understood by the mind through the things that are made. These, the invisible things of God, are eternal ideas. Therefore they are known from creatures, and so, before they are seen, a sure knowledge of creatures is attained.

To the Question

Henry of Ghent's Answer

6. The question here is about the knowledge of truth, which is known by the intellect as it combines and divides; the question is not about the first truth or being, but about the idea, etc.

7. The opinion of Henry [of Ghent] about this question is in the negative. Here one must note that, just as there is a twofold exemplar, namely created and uncreated (the uncreated the idea, and the created the impressed intelligible species), so there is a twofold conformity corresponding to them. But Henry says that through the created exemplar, or the acquired one within us, there cannot be had an altogether sound and certain truth; in fact it is fallible, which he proves as follows:

8. The object from which the created exemplar (that is the true species posited above) is abstracted is changeable; therefore it cannot be the cause of anything unchangeable, but the sound and certain knowledge of any truth about anything is had about it under the idea of changeability; therefore it is not had from such an eternal exemplar. Hence Augustine in 83 *Questions* q.9 says that sound truth is not to be expected from sensible things, because they are changeable, etc.

9. Further, the soul is not ruled or perfected by anything more changeable than itself; but the sort of created exemplar posited above is more changeable than the soul; therefore etc. The major is from Augustine *On True Religion*, etc.

10. Further, he who has such eternal truth should have wherewith to discern the true from the untrue or from the seeming true, which the wayfarer does not have (for the created exemplar or species cannot do it). And the proof is that this species either represents itself as it is, and then it is a true understanding, or represents itself as the object, and then it is a false understanding; therefore it can err, as is plain in dreams. From these premises the conclusion is drawn that sure knowledge cannot be had by looking at the created exemplar.

11. His way of putting this is as follows: for he says that God does not have the idea of exemplar as a known thing by which, when looked at, sound truth is known; so God is known in some general attribute. But he is the reason for knowing as naked exemplar and as proper idea of uncreated essence. Hence Henry says that the uncreated light illumines the intellect of an angel by direct vision, as it were, and this light, as seen, is the reason for an angel's seeing in himself other things. But the uncreated light illumines our intellect as by reflected vision in this present state, and therefore it is the reason of seeing for our intellect and is not seen.

12. I argue against this opinion, and first by turning Henry's reasons in the opposite direction. For if the object too in the containing mind changes [n.8], no certitude can be had about it under an unchangeable idea; indeed in no light at all can certitude about it be had, because there is no certitude when the object can be known in a way other than how the subject is. There is no certitude then in knowing the changeable as unchangeable. It is plain too that the antecedent of this reasoning is false, for it imposes the view of Heraclitus, that sensibles are continually changing, *Metaphysics* 4 text 23. It also follows that if, because of the changeability of the exemplar in our soul, there can be no certitude (since anything posited subjectively in the soul is changeable, including the act of understanding itself), then it follows that by nothing in the soul will the soul be set right so as not to err.

13. Likewise, according to this opinion [n.9], the created species is inherent with this species alone^a apart from the being;¹²³ but when something is known that is repugnant to certitude, no certitude can be had; for, just as from one contingent premise joined to another contingent premise a contingent conclusion follows [*Prior Analytics* ch.21], so

¹²³ The text prints 'absente' but, to make sense, it should be 'abs ente'.

from an uncertain thing and a certain thing (when they come together for some piece of knowledge) no certain conclusion follows, etc.

14. Again, the same is plain about the third reason [n.10], for if the species abstracted from the thing is concurrent with all knowledge and if it is not possible to judge when the species represents itself as itself and when it represents itself as the object, then, however much something else is concurrent with it, no certitude can be had whereby to discriminate the true from the seeming true etc.

15. Now, that this opinion is not, as some mean to say, the opinion of Augustine, is plain from Augustine when he says [*Soliloquies* 2] that for no reason does anyone concede that the speculations of the sciences to be the truest. And Boethius says [*De Hebdomadibus*] that the common conceptions of the soul are those that, when heard, everyone approves. The Philosopher too in *Metaphysics* 2 com.1 says that the first principles are certain and known to everyone, like the doors in a house.

16. From these three authorities the argument goes as follows: Whatever agrees with everything of some species is consequent to the specific nature; therefore since everyone has sure knowledge of the first principles, and since knowledge of the conclusions depends on knowledge of the principles, it follows that sure knowledge of the conclusion can be known by anyone. And elsewhere Augustine says *On the Trinity* 15.13, “Far be it that we should doubt to be true and certain the things we have learnt through the senses of the body.”

17. I now solve Henry’s arguments etc. As to the first [n.8], about the changeability of the object, I say that the antecedent is false. Nor is it the opinion of Augustine but of Heraclitus [rather Cratylus], who did not want to speak but to move his finger, as is said

in *Metaphysics* 4. And given that the antecedent were true, sure knowledge could still, according to Aristotle, be had about the fact that everything is moved contingently; and from the fact that everything is moveable contingently, sure and sound and unchangeable knowledge is had that everything changeable was changeable. For the following consequence does not hold: the object is changeable; therefore whatever is generated by it does not represent anything under the idea of being unchangeable. For the changeability of the object is not the reason for knowledge, but rather the nature of the changeable object is; what is generated by it, then, represents the nature per se; therefore if the nature has some unchangeable relation to something else, this something else is represented by its exemplar as being unchangeably united to it and thus through two exemplars.

18. To the second [n.9] I say that a double changeability can be understood in the soul: one is from affirmation to negation and conversely, namely from non-intellection to intellection and conversely; the other is as it were from contraries to contrary, namely from correctness to error and conversely. The soul is changeable in the first way as to any object whatever, and such changeableness is not removed from it by anything existing formally in the soul. But the soul is not changeable in the second way until it reaches propositions that are not evident from the terms. But about propositions that are evident from the terms the soul cannot change in this second way of being changeable, because the apprehended terms are a necessary cause of the conformity of the composition with the terms. Therefore if the soul is capable of absolute changeability from rightness to error, then there is nothing by which it can set itself right; at least it cannot set itself right as to the objects that the intellect, once the terms are grasped, cannot be in error about.

19. To the third [n.10] I say that, when the intelligible species or the exemplar is said not to represent itself as the object in dreams, then it is a phantasm and not an intelligible species; therefore if the intellect is using only a phantasm in which the object is present to it and is not using another intelligible species, then it does not seem able to discern the true from the seeming true by anything that the object is manifest in; but positing an impressed species in the intellect is not valid reasoning, because the intellect cannot use that species itself for the object, because in fact it does not use it in sleep.

20. And if answer be made that because a phantasm can represent an object the intellect can at least err and can even be impeded from operating correctly, as is plain of the mad and people asleep – I say that the intellect does not then err because it does not then act.

21. And so the response to Henry's arguments is plain, etc.

22. What remains now is to argue against the conclusion of Henry's opinion. Hence I ask what he means by sound truth. For either he means certain and infallible truth, without any doubt or deception, and this can be had by purely natural power. Or he means by truth a property of being; but since being can be naturally known, so too can its property, namely the true; consequently, by abstraction, truth can be known, for any form that can be understood in something can also be understood in itself by abstraction. Or he means by sound truth conformity with the exemplar, and then I ask whether the conformity is with the created exemplar (and then the proposed conclusion is gained) or with the uncreated exemplar; and if with the uncreated exemplar then, since conformity cannot be known unless what the conformity is with is known, it follows that the

uncreated exemplar is known in the created exemplar, which is contrary to how he posits things.

23. Further, when the intellect understands something confusedly it can grasp it definitively by investigating its definition through a process of division. This knowledge is the most perfect kind and belongs to simple understanding, and from this most perfect kind of knowledge of terms the intellect can understand principles, and from principles conclusions, and in this way its knowledge becomes complete, etc.

Andreas' own Answer

24. To the question I say that, because of Augustine's words [nn.2-4],¹²⁴ one must concede the fact that infallible truths are seen in eternal patterns. But here the 'in' can be taken as meaning the object and in four ways: as in the proximate object, or as in what contains the proximate object, or as in that by virtue of which the proximate object moves, or as in the remote object.

25. To understand the first of these I say that all intelligibles have intelligible being by act of the divine intellect, and all truths about these intelligibles are visible in them; and the intellect, understanding them as intellect and the necessary truths about them by virtue of them, sees the necessary truths in them as in its objects. Now these are truths insofar as they are secondary objects of the divine intellect, because they are conformed to their exemplar, namely to the divine intellect; they are also light because they make things manifest and are unchangeable and necessary; they are also eternal, but in a certain

¹²⁴ Note that because Andreas accepts the arguments at the beginning he has no need to give an answer to them; so no section responding to such arguments is found in this question.

respect, because eternity is a condition of what exists in a certain respect, and these things only have existence in a certain respect. Thus we can in a first way say that the intellect sees things in the eternal light, that is, in a secondary object of the divine intellect, which, in the way just expounded, is the truth or the eternal light.

26. The second way is plain from the fact that the divine intellect contains the truths as a sort of book, after the manner stated by Augustine [*On the Trinity* chs.14-15], that the eternal patterns are written in the book of eternal light, that is, in the divine intellect insofar as it contains these truths. And although the book is not something seen, yet the things written in it are seen to be the quiddities of things; and the intellect could be said to see truths in the light, that is, in the book as it contains the object (and this is the second way), or to see them also in the truths that are in a certain respect eternal light, as we see truths in objects (and this according to the first way). The latter of these ways seems to be of Augustine's mind, because the idea of square body remains incorruptible and unchangeable but the body itself does not remain so, save as it is a secondary object of the divine intellect, etc.

27. But there is a doubt here; for if we do not see the truths as they are in the divine intellect (for we do not see that intellect), then we will be said to see them in the uncreated light, and that because what we see in such eternal light (eternal in a certain respect) are things that have being in the uncreated light as in the intellect that knows them. Here the second way replies that things as they are the secondary object of the divine intellect have being only in a certain respect. But real operation does not belong to any being by that being's power as it precisely is a being in a certain respect; but if operation does in any way belong to it then it must do so by the power of another thing

that has being simply. These objects, then are, according to Aristotle, only able strictly speaking to move the intellect by virtue of the being of the divine intellect, which is being simply and through which the objects have being in a certain respect. Thus it is, then, that we see things in the eternal light (eternal in a certain respect eternal) as in the proximate object; but we see them in the uncreated light as in the proximate cause, by virtue of which the proximate object moves the intellect, etc.

28. Alongside this can be said that, as to the third way [n.24], we see things in the eternal light as in the proximate cause of the object in itself. For the divine intellect produces things by its own indwelling intelligible act, and by this act it gives to each object, to this object and to that, this or that sort of being; consequently to each is given the idea of the kind of thing it is, and through these ideas do things first move the intellect to sure knowledge. But the fact that one can indeed say the understanding of the matter is to see things in the eternal light (because the light is the cause of the object) is apparent from a likeness: for we are properly said to understand in the light of the agent intellect – although however this light is but the active cause, either as being what makes the object actual, or as that by virtue of which the object moves, or as both. So this double causality of the divine intellect (namely that it is the true uncreated light which produces secondary objects in intelligible being and is that by virtue of which produced secondary objects also actually move the intellect) can as it were integrally include the third member (the one about the cause [n.24], because of which we are said to see truly in the eternal light).

29. But if you object against these two ways (which integrally include the third one about the cause) that then it seems rather to be the case that we are said to see in God's will, or in God as will, than in God as he is light, because the divine will is the immediate

principle of any extrinsic act of God etc. – I reply that the divine intellect produces objects in intelligible being insofar as it is in some way prior to the divine will, and so it seems to be a merely natural power with respect to them, because God is only a free cause with respect to something if the supposition is first made that some willing or act of will in some way precedes it; and so the intellect, as prior to the act of will, produces intelligible objects such that a prior cause seems to cooperate naturally with the intelligibles for their effect, namely in the way terms, when apprehended and joined together, cause apprehension of the conformity [of the proposition] to themselves. There seems, then, to be a contradiction in the intellect forming some such composition of terms and the composition not being in conformity in the terms – though it is possible that the terms not be conceived; for although God voluntarily acts along with the intellect in putting or not putting terms together, nevertheless, when the intellect has put them together, the conformity of the composition with the terms seems to follow necessarily the intelligible nature of the terms, which nature they have from the intellect of God as this intellect naturally brings the terms about in intelligible being.

30. Thus it is apparent how no special illumination is necessary for seeing things in the eternal patterns. For Augustine posits those truths alone to be seen in them that are, by the force of the terms, necessary extremes, and in such cases there is the maximum of necessity, that is, in both the proximate and the remote causes with respect to the effect, namely, in both the divine intellect with respect to the objects that move the intellect, and in the objects in relation to the truth of the proposition about them. But if it is posited that God cooperates as to the effect with a general influence but not with natural necessity, I

say that, whether there is a general influence here or a natural necessity, plainly no special illumination is necessarily required.

31. The assumption from Augustine [n.30] is plain from *On the Trinity* 4.15 when he speaks about these matters: “Some are able to raise the sharpness of their mind above every creature to attain in some way or other to the light of incommunicable truth, which they mockingly say Christians who live by faith alone are not yet able to do.” Therefore he maintains that Christians do not see the things of faith in the eternal patterns. But philosophers see many necessary things in those patterns according to Augustine when he says [*On the Trinity* 9.6] “the mind must not be of the sort it is in just any man,” as if he were to say, “contingent things are not seen there but necessary ones;” therefore he means the necessary ones are seen through eternal patterns, because contingent things, which are only known through the senses are or believed from histories, are not known; and yet a special illumination is more required in the case of believing contingent things than in knowing necessary ones, where a special illumination is furthest removed and the general illumination is alone sufficient.

32. On the contrary: Why then does Augustine say [*On the Trinity* 12.14] that few are able by sharpness of mind to attain to the intelligible ideas, and that only pure souls reach them?

33. I reply that the purity in question here should not be understood as purity from vices, because Augustine maintains [83 *Questions* q.46, *On the Trinity* 14.15] that an unjust man may see in the eternal patterns what in them one should think. But the purity must be understood as an elevating of the intellect to understanding truths as they are manifest in themselves, and not only as they are manifest in phantasms. Here one needs

to note that a sensible thing causes a single confused phantasm representing in the imaginative power something per accidens one, namely the thing in its size, shape, color, and other sensible accidents. And just as the phantasm represents the thing only confusedly and per accidens, so many people perceive only a per accidens thing. But pure truths are precisely what they are through the proper nature of the terms, to the extent the terms are abstracted from everything joined per accidens with them. For the proposition, ‘every whole is greater than its part’, is true not only as it is a whole of stone or wood, but as it is a whole abstracted from everything to which it is per accidens conjoined. Therefore when the intellect understands a whole as it is in wood or stone, it does not have sound truth about it; and in this way Augustine says that few are able thus to understand, for few have so subtle a sort of mind; and he who understands with a confused and per accidens sort of concept is in the valley and surrounded by fog. But he who understands truths purely, and understands them as, from the idea of their terms, they precisely are, is on a broad mountain, having the valley and fog below.¹²⁵

33. One can, then, in this way concede that sound truths are known in uncreated light as in a remote known object [n.24]; for the uncreated light is the first principle of theoretical matters and the ultimate end of practical ones, and the principles of theory and practice are taken up in this way. Therefore knowledge of beings through such principles is nobler, and such knowledge belongs to theologians. Yet, notwithstanding, Augustine says that sound truth can be had without special illumination, etc.

¹²⁵ The printed text has ‘sincerum’ or ‘sound’ which makes no sense in the context. It may be a misprint for ‘inferius’ or ‘sub pedem’ or the like, which is what is translated here.

Question Five

Whether a trace or footprint of the Trinity is found in all creatures

Scotus, *Sent.* 1 d.3 q.5

Thomas, *ST Ia* q.45 a.7

Richard of St. Victor, *Sent.* 1 d.3 q.1 a.1

Durandus, *Sent.* 1 d.3 q.4

Francis of Meyronnes, *Sent.* 1 d.3 q.3

1. The question asked in the third place¹²⁶ is whether there is a trace or footprint of the Trinity in creatures.
2. That there is not, because a footprint leads to knowledge of what imprinted it, and so we could know the Trinity, which is false.
3. Again, in intellectual nature there is an image of the Trinity, so there is no footprint; for image and footprint have opposite ways of representing something.
4. Again, intellectual nature, because it is nobler, has a higher way of representing than lower substances do, namely by way of image; but there are many natures in intellectual nature that have a less perfect rank, just as animate things rank above inanimate things and, after that, above simple things; so these natures will have different

¹²⁶ 'Third' because it looks to be the third part of the distinction, although the fifth question overall. The first two or three questions are the first part (about the knowability of God), the fourth question (or the third and fourth question together) is the second part (about creaturely knowledge in general in its dependence on God), the fifth question is the third part (about the trace or footprint of the Trinity – although the printed text calls it the second part), the sixth to ninth questions are the fourth part (about the image of the Trinity – although the printed text calls it the third part).

ways of representing, because the idea of trace or footprint will not be common to them all, etc.

5. To the contrary is Augustine, *On the Trinity* 6 last chapter, who says that we should be able, by looking at the creator through the things that are made, to understand the Trinity, whose footprint, as has been said, is posited to exist in creatures.

To the Question

6. I reply that, according to the Philosopher *Topics* 6.2, all transferred senses are transferred according to some likeness.

7. First, then, one must note what in creatures a trace or footprint is, and second in what consists that whereby the footprint is transferred to divine realities, and third whether the footprint is found in any creature whatever.

8. As to the first point, a trace or footprint is said to be an impression left by the foot of an animal as it passes by, if there is something that yields to the foot. Footprints do not represent what they belong to perfectly but by way of inference, and not as to the proper form of the individual (the way an image does) but rather as to the form of the nature. An example: If I see the footprint of a horse in the ground, I argue that a horse has been there; not however that this or that particular horse has but absolutely that some horse has; and even this could be wrong, because the foot could have been cut off from the whole horse, etc.

9. As to the second point [n.7], any creature at all is said to be referred back to God in three respects: as an example back to its exemplar cause, as a product back to the

producing cause, and as a thing ordered back to its final cause; and all three respects are parts of a footprint. However, it seems one should speak in another way in accord with Augustine *On the Trinity* 6 last chapter [n.5] last chapter; for he maintains that the parts of the footprint are units, species, and order, the first two of which are absolutes, as is plain.

10. On the third point [n.7], any creature at all is said to have its proper unity whereby it is distinguished from everything that is not of the same sort; and it has its own species, whereby it imitates its own proper idea; and it has its proper order, whereby it has a certain rank among beings; and so there is a divine footprint in every creature whatever.

To the Arguments

11. To the first argument for the contrary [n.2] I say that from the fact a footprint leads by way of argument and imperfectly to a knowledge of that of which it is the footprint, it does not follow that a Trinity of distinct persons can be known by such created footprint, etc.

12. To the second argument [n.3] I say that, although a created essence, insofar as it is such an exemplar, is created according to some determinate exemplar (so any creature represents God under the idea of footprint), yet, insofar as intellectual nature has in it one essence and several operations possessing an order of origin between them, it represents the Trinity by reason of all the operations found in such nature; to this extent an intellectual nature is not a footprint and an image in the same way, as will be plain below, etc.

13. To the last argument [n.4] I say that there are different ways of representing in creaturely essences, that is, different ways of being a footprint; but because there is a material subject in which many things representing unity and trinity come together, therefore such a nature has the idea of image, as intellectual nature does. But such coming together is not found in any nature lower than intellectual nature; and for this reason all other natures have precisely just the idea of footprint, etc.

Question Six

Whether in intellectual nature taken properly there is memory properly, that is an intellect possessing an intelligible species naturally prior to the act of understanding

Scotus, *Sent.* 1 d.3 q.6

Thomas, *ST* Ia q.79 a.6

1. The question asked in fourth place¹²⁷ is whether some species impressed on the possible intellect necessarily precedes all intellection by nature.
2. That it does not. A species is only posited because of the presence of the object; but the object present to the intellect is prior in nature to the impressed species; therefore positing a species is otiose. The proof of the major is that a species is only caused or impressed when the object is present; and here is confirmation, because the object that is

¹²⁷ 'Fourth' because the fourth part of distinction 3, but the particular question is number 6 overall (see footnote 10 to q.5 n.1 above).

in the phantasm, together with the agent intellect, can cause and impress a species on the possible intellect (according to you); thus the natural phantasm can cause simple intellection,¹²⁸ so the species would be impressed to no purpose.

3. Again, because it would then follow that the possible intellect would not be moved immediately to understanding by the intelligible object but would first suffer from it some real effect, namely by receiving in impression the real species; so the impression would be impressed to no purpose.

4. On the contrary. The possible intellect is sometimes in essential potency for understanding and sometimes in actual potency etc. But it only moves from essential potency to accidental potency by some real change in it, as is plain of all like cases. Now such real change is nothing but the impression of the species; therefore etc.

To the Question

5. Reply. Henry of Ghent denies, for the reasons just given, there is any impressed species in the possible intellect, and he posits only an impressed species such that the object evident in the phantasm when illumined by the agent intellect is by impression in the imaginative power, and such that in the possible intellect there is by expression only act and habit of understanding.

6. On the contrary. The same thing cannot represent diverse things in diverse ways; but the phantasm, qua phantasm, represents the singular; therefore it does not represent

¹²⁸ The printed text has no nouns qualified by the adjectives 'natural' and 'simple', so what look to be the appropriate nouns are added in the translation (rightly or wrongly) from the context.

the universal; therefore the universal cannot be understood unless one posits an intelligible species that is impressed on the possible intellect; etc.

7. I reply. The same thing can represent diverse things under different lights. So the phantasm represents the particular in the light of imagination and the universal in the light of the agent intellect. There is a confirmation, because, according to you, the separated soul understands the universal and the singular and everything else through the same species and in the same and not different light. So this objection does not seem cogent against Henry.

8. I therefore argue against Henry in a different way, and first as follows: The agent intellect is active and not receptive; but its action is real; therefore the term of its action is real; but such term cannot be intellection, because the object, as object, precedes intellection by natural order; now the object, as object, is a universal and it is only made a universal by the agent intellect; therefore the first and immediate term of the action of the agent intellect is the universal or universality; and universality is not intellection but a condition of the object on the part of the object; but this real term of the action of the agent intellect is not in the agent intellect itself (because the agent intellect is not receptive, as was said), nor is it in the imagination, because, first, it is not posited as being there, second because the agent intellect impresses nothing positive on the phantasm, and third because an agent does not extend to more things actively than the passive or possible thing extends to passively, and every active action received from an agent is received passively. Therefore it is impossible for the universal, which is the first term of the action of the agent intellect, to be received by impression in the possible intellect in advance of all intellection [sc. in advance of the agent intellect making the

universal]; and this is nothing other than that the intelligible species impressed on the possible intellect representatively is first and per se the universal, etc.

9. There is a confirmation because, in everyone's view, the first operation of the agent intellect is to make actually intelligible what is potentially intelligible – and this is everyone's view as was said; the term of this action is only in the possible intellect, for as the agent intellect is that which makes everything so the possible intellect is that which becomes everything; but being actually intelligible is on the part the object and not on that of the act; therefore etc.

10. Again, the possible intellect, qua distinct from the sensitive part of the soul, is said to possess the object present to it under its idea as object; but the possible intellect will not have this if there be impressed on it no intelligible species that is representative of the object; therefore etc.

11. I say, therefore, that because of these reasons (one on the part of the agent intellect [nn.8-9] and the other on the part of the possible intellect [n.10]) there is an intelligible species impressed on the possible intellect prior in order of nature to all intellection; and indeed the object, as present in the species of the object, is made manifest in this species and receives in it its being known, etc.

To the Arguments

12. To the first argument at the beginning [n.2] I say that, as is plain from what has been said, the natural order requires that the first and immediate term of the action of the

agent intellect is not intellection but the species that is naturally representative and that does represent the object as actually intelligible etc.

14. And hereby is plain the answer to the second argument [n.3]. For the natural order requires that the possible intellect be moved to an impression of the intelligible species before it is moved to intellection; it is of course, however, moved to understanding immediately by the intellect representing the species, but it is moved first to an impression of the species, as was said.

Question Seven

Whether the intellective part of the soul taken properly, or some part of it, is the whole cause, or the whole principle of generating, which generates actual knowledge

Scotus, *Sent.* 1 d.3 q.7

Thomas, *ST* Ia q.85 a.2

1. The question asked fifth¹²⁹ is whether the possible intellect is purely passive with respect to generated knowledge.
2. That it is, from Aristotle *On the Soul* 3 text 18, who says that the agent intellect is what makes everything and the possible intellect what becomes everything; therefore, just

¹²⁹ 'Fifth' perhaps because, although this question belongs to the general discussion of image (the fourth part of d.3), it here takes a diversion through the details of how the created mind knows, and then the question of image proper is returned to in question nine below.

as the agent intellect is purely active with respect to intellection, so the possible intellect is purely passive, etc.

3. On the contrary: Sometimes the possible intellect is in essential potency to understanding, and sometimes in accidental potency; but this distinction cannot be taken properly in something purely passive; therefore etc.

To the Question

4. Some say that, because the possible intellect is purely active, therefore understanding is an act merely of life; so it comes from a principle of life, and consequently it is not from an object but from the power, etc.

5. Again, the more perfect a form is the more actual it is; since therefore the intellect is a perfect form among other lower forms it is purely active.

6. Again, from *On the Soul* 3, intellection is an immanent action, so it is not the effect of an object, because then there would be an influence from outside the agent, for the act of understanding is in the possible intellect as in its subject.

7. Again, intellection is an action, and action is distinguished from passion; but action of this sort is in an agent and is its perfection (*Physics* 3, *Ethics* 2, *Metaphysics* 9); therefore, since the possible intellect is perfected by itself, the perfection comes actively from itself; this is said to be Augustine's meaning *On the Trinity* 4.5, *On Genesis* 28 etc.

8. On the contrary, from *On the Trinity* 9 last chapter, where Augustine says that knowledge is from both, that is, both knower and known; and *ibid.* 2.2 & 5 where he says

that vision is generated by seeing; and *ibid.* 15.10 & 24 where he says that the word comes from the thing we know; therefore the object contributes some activity, etc.

9. Again by argument thus: the efficient and material causes are sufficient for the effect when they are disposed and proximate to each other and not impeded – necessarily so if the efficient cause is a natural one, or, if it is a voluntary one, the effect can follow; for the effect essentially depends on the efficient and material causes; but the possible intellect is a sufficient continuing matter for intellection; therefore, if it is sufficient matter in respect of some same intellection and is purely active, then intellection follows even when everything else is removed; and so there will be intellection without an object, which is impossible, etc.

10. Others assert the opposite extreme [Averroes *On the Soul* com.17 & 18, Godfrey of Fontaines *Quodlibet* 7 q.7], namely that the possible intellect is purely passive. The reason is that it is susceptible of intellection as being the matter of it; so, if it were able to effect intellection, then material and efficient cause would coincide in numerically the same thing, which is contrary to Aristotle *Physics* 2 text 70 where he says they do not coincide.

11. Again, it would then follow that the same thing was active and passive with respect to the same thing, which is against the first principle [sc. the principle: ‘the same thing cannot both be and not be’], etc.

12. Again, it would follow that the extreme terms of a real completion, namely of producer and produced, would be in the same foundation, which seems impossible.

13. Hence these others say [n.10] that, since the agent intellect is the same really as the possible intellect, it does not do or cause anything in the possible intellect but only

makes the object that is manifest in the phantasm to be actually intelligible and actually able to move the possible intellect to understand. But intellection and volition are, they say, caused precisely by the intellective object; namely intellection by the object manifest in the phantasm (when this is actually imagined and illumined by the agent intellect), and volition by the object made actually intellective, etc.

14. On the contrary: The sensitive soul is the same really as the intellective soul, so the reason they give for the agent intellect's being unable to cause or do anything in the possible intellect is a reason for its being unable to be in the sensitive soul. Therefore either the agent intellect causes something positively in the phantasm (which is contrary to what they say); or it removes something from it, namely the material conditions and that sort of thing, and then the same problem arises, that by acting it removes something or it does nothing, and then the phantasm alone will cause intellection – which is false, however, because the effect would be nobler than its cause, and because a less noble thing would act on what is more noble, etc.

15. Again, acts of discursion and composing and denying could not be in the sensitive soul, as is plain, and likewise neither reflexive acts or relations of reason or logical intentions, and yet all these are intellections.

16. Again mental acts could not be in the sensitive soul etc.

17. Henry of Ghent [*Quodlibet* 5 q.14] holds a different view, that the possible intellect is not active or passive with respect to the impression of the species because, as he says, there is no impressed species. But with respect to simple knowledge the possible intellect, because there is no impressed species, is purely passive, for it is instead caused by the object manifest in the phantasm, and the same is expressive in the intellect. But

with respect to the further knowledge, which is the word, the possible intellect is active by means of the simple knowledge that it is informed by first.

18. On the contrary: Although this opinion, which does not posit an impressed species, was argued against in another question above [d.3 q.4], yet to the extent it has regard to the present matter it is argued against here again as follows:

19. The first knowledge, which is called simple, is confused and imperfect with respect to second knowledge, according to Henry, and can be of the same species as the first, because it can be about the same object; but the formal principle of causing an effective object cannot be more imperfect than the effect that it causes of the same species; therefore an intellect informed by simple knowledge cannot be made active by it for causing a second effect if, in the person, it was purely passive, etc.

20. The Thomists and Giles of Rome say in a different way that the object in the memory (if it is per se there primarily), or the species of the object in the memory, causes another intellective species, and this second species is generated knowledge while the first is not (and here they differ from the second power that Henry posits), because nothing is impressed on the intellect absolutely before knowledge is; and here they agree with Henry. But he posits that, in respect of all knowledge, both first and second knowledge, the intellect is purely passive, and all knowledge is caused by the object; and here they differ from Henry. They posit instead that the intellect is indeed purely passive in respect of all knowledge but, when the object is not present per se, the first impression of the species in the memory is not intellect but second intelligence.

21. To the contrary: I say about discursive, vital, reflex acts, and the like what I said against the second opinion [nn.14-16], that intellection does not come precisely from the

object or the species of the object, both because of the arguments made against this sort of opinion, and also because then the idea of image is not preserved in the mind when it is mind, for nothing of the mind would have the idea of parent by way of intellection.

22. I also say that intellection is not entirely from the power, both for the reasons made against the first opinion [nn.8-12] and for two other reasons:

23. First that intellection would not be a likeness of the object but of the power, because it would not be caused by the object save by the power; but this is unacceptable because understanding is about the object not about the power, for the object is what is understood.

24. Second because the power would have to have non-successively an active and infinite power – it can understand an infinity of intelligible things differing in species; but the intellect does not gain for itself any power from the fact it actually understands, but must have the power first so that it can understand; therefore it must pre-possess as much power as can understand infinities, though it understands this specifically diverse intelligible species through one power and that specifically diverse intelligible species through another power, but it can understand several things of the same species through the same power; therefore since two powers are more than one, powers infinite extensively would be infinite intensively. And if you say that fire can successively burn an infinity of combustible things and yet does not have infinite power, I say that the case is not the same, because all the combustibles are of the same species in idea of combusting, and therefore the fire burns all of them by the same power. But intelligibles are not so, because the intellect understands one intelligible as it is specifically distinct from another.

25. I say therefore that both the power and the object, or the species, are each per se partial causes, and both together integrally constitute one total cause. This is confirmed by Augustine *On the Trinity* 9 last chapter, as cited above [n.8].

26. But note that when several causes in the genus of efficient cause come together for causing the same effect, sometimes they come together as several men for dragging a weight, sometimes as subordinate but such that a lower receives power from a higher (as the cause in a creature receives power from the uncreated cause), sometimes as essentially ordered but such that one does not receive power from the other (though one is more excellent than the other, as in the case of father and mother in generating offspring, according to those who posit that a mother has active power in generating). The causes above listed [n.25] do not come together in the first way, because just as a stronger person could come along there who would by himself drag as much as two persons were dragging, so there could be a single more powerful intellect here which would cause intellection by itself without the object, which however is impossible. Nor do the causes above listed [n.25] come together in the second way [as is evident].

27. I raise the question about the comparison of the two partial causes [n.25] that cause generated knowledge.

Question Eight

Whether the more principal cause of generated knowledge is the object in itself or present in the species or the intellective part of the soul

Scotus, *Sent.* 1 d.3 q.8

1. But then the question arises as to which of these two causes [q.7 n.25] is more principal.
2. It seems, to begin with, that the object itself moves without being moved (*On the Soul* 3 text 54); while the intellect does not move to intellection unless moved, first because it is moved by the species impressed by the object, and second because its effect, namely intellection, is more like the object than like the power.
3. On the contrary. The cause that is more actual with respect to the same effect is more principal than the cause that is less actual; but the intellective power is more of this sort, especially when the object has a diminished being.
4. Again the object works along with the power and not conversely, because we can understand when we wish (from Aristotle), which would not be the case if the object was the principal cause.
5. Again, the object is determined to this intellection alone, that is, only to an intellection about itself; but the power is determined to intellection as such and so is a cause more universal and more indeterminate with a universality and indetermination that state perfection (as is plain); and so it follows that the power is more principal.
6. So for these three reasons, especially the last, I concede this conclusion, etc.

To the Arguments

7. As to the solutions of the arguments: To the first argument of the first opinion [q.7 n.4] I say that although a non-living thing cannot be the total cause of a living effect, it can yet be a partial cause, as is plain of the sun in the generation of man, etc.

8. As to the second [q.7 n.5] I say that, because the infinite is perfect, its not being totally active is not repugnant to it, but that it have some activity is sufficient for it, etc.

9. To the third [q.7 n.6] I say that, for an action to be immanent, it is enough that it not pass beyond the supposit of the agent, or beyond its own total cause, and that, even if it pass beyond a less principal partial cause, it yet remain within its principal partial cause – which is sufficient for action properly speaking. And hereby is plain the answer to the fourth argument [q.7 n.7].

10. As for the quote from Augustine [q.7 n.8] I say that his intention was not this [sc. that the object contributes some activity] but what has been said [sc. that the intellect is the principal cause], as is plain from the places there cited.

11. As to the first argument of the second question [rather second opinion, q.7 n.10] I say that it is true about matter properly speaking that it is pure potency, but this is not true of the subject of an accidental form, which is matter in a certain respect; for such a subject states in itself an act, and so there is no repugnance to its being an efficient cause, etc.

12. To the second argument [q.7 n.11] I say that the same thing cannot be active and passive with respect to the same thing in the same way, namely that it be formally such both in act and in potency; but it can be virtually such in act and formally such in potency, and this when it is an equivocal agent. In fact all change toward a non-active form is from an equivocal agent, because the formal principle of acting is always an active form

(otherwise it would not be the principle of acting); therefore change that is to a non-active form is change to a form dissimilar to the principle of acting and so dissimilar to the equivocal active cause. I then say that that this can sometimes fail to hold, though not always, in the case of equivocal agents, just as change can also be from an equivocal agent and yet to an active form; but what is sufficient for the idea of an equivocal cause is that the formal term of the change be of a different idea from the formal principle of the acting. There is an example of this from those who posit that a substance is actively causing in itself its proper accident at the prior moment when the substance precedes its proper accident: the subject in this case is, with respect to the same thing, virtually such in act and formally such in potency.

13. To the third [q.7 n.12] I say that some relations cannot go together in the same nature and the same supposit, as the relations of cause to caused. The reason is that then the same thing would depend essentially on itself, for the caused depends essentially on the cause. Some relations cannot go together in the same supposit but can in the same nature, when the nature is communicable without division to several supposits, of which sort is the divine nature; and these are relations of motion to moved. The reason is that, as the divine nature is of itself unlimited to the extremes of this relation, so a supposit or nature can in some way be unlimited as to the extremes of the relation; thus it is in the issue at hand, that the intellect and will are of themselves unlimited as to their power and understanding and willing being virtually informed by such acts, etc.

14. To the first principal argument [q.7 n.2] I say that the soul, by reason of the agent intellect, can activate any intellection, and, by reason of the possible intellect, can receive any intellection; and you may understand this of the intellection that is about an object

naturally moving the power, otherwise the agent intellect would not be able to activate it; however I say that the activity of the agent intellect is not immediately directed to understanding but to illumining, and this illumination is necessarily prior to natural intellection; and therefore the activity of intellection must be immediately from both the object and the power, as was said above etc.

15. Nevertheless, the soul's intellection of itself might well be totally from itself, because it would be both thing understanding and thing understood; however, according to Scotus, it cannot be had by the wayfarer save only by inference through the species of different sensible things; the reason is that only the species of sensible things are in the phantasm and illumined by the agent intellect.

16. Next, to the first argument of the first question [q.8 n.2] I say that a moved mover is a less principal cause than an unmoved mover, unless the moved becomes mover in such a way that it receives the power of moving from the motion by which it is itself moved; but so it is here, because the intellect receives no power of understanding into itself from the impression of the species, but the species must be impressed in such a way that it and the intellect are simultaneous, as being two partial causes integrally forming one total cause. Hence I say that the agent intellect with respect to the impression of the species, and the phantasm with which the intellect integrally forms one total cause, and the possible intellect with respect to intellection are all a more principal cause than the object or the species etc.

17. To the second [sc. the second reason given in q.8 n.2 and/or n.3] I say that the cause that makes the effect more like what it should be like is more principal, and not necessarily the cause that the effect itself is more like. An example: a like effect caused

by God and by a second cause is more like the second cause, and yet God is the more principal cause. Hence a less principal cause does not actively make the effects more like itself, though it is indeed more like the effects. But such likeness is more brought about actively by the more principal cause. For it is certain that the intelligible species is more like the phantasm than like the agent intellect, and yet the agent intellect is the more principal cause; otherwise a less noble thing would, as if principal agent, act on a more noble thing, etc.

Question Nine

Whether the image of the Trinity exists in the mind distinctly

Bonaventure, *Sent.* 1 d.3 q.3

Alexander of Hales, *Summa* 1a q.61 p.3 a.1

Scotus, *Sent.* 1 d.3 q.9

Thomas, *ST* 1a q.93 aa.5-6

Richard of St. Victor, *Sent.* 1 d.3 q.1 a.2

Durandus, *Sent.* 1 d.3 q.4

Francis of Meyronnes, *Sent.* 1 d.3 q.4

John Baconitanus, *Sent.* 1 d.3 q.3

1. The final question in this distinction is whether there is in the soul distinctly an image of the Trinity.

2. That there is not: Because then we could naturally come to a distinct knowledge of the Trinity through it. The proof of the consequence is as follows: an image is per se reflective of that of which it is the image, etc.

3. Further, the mind represents one [divine] person in the mind no more than it represents another, as is plain from Augustine *On the Trinity* 15.7, 14 when he says that the Father is intellectual memory – will as also memory – and the Son likewise; therefore the memory represents the Father no more distinctly than it represents the Son, and conversely.

4. Further, in the Trinity there are two produced persons in image, namely Son and the Holy Spirit; but no person is produced in memory, and consequently memory does not represent any production, and so neither is it the Trinity. The proof that no person is produced in the memory is that the acts themselves are the things exemplified in the soul, and not the second acts [see n.8 infra]; for there is no action of action since there would then be an infinite regress in the action, etc.

5. On the contrary: Augustine in *On the Trinity* 14 says that an image of the Trinity must be looked for, and it must be found where our nature possesses nothing better in itself, etc.

To the Question

6. The first thing that needs to be stated is what in creatures the idea of image is taken from. About this I say that an image represents the whole per se (just as I say that a trace or footprint represents a part per se [e.g. a horse's foot] and represents the whole

inferentially [e.g. a horse] as to the idea of the species of the whole [e.g. some horse or other and not this particular horse]); and I say that an image is naturally fit to imitate and to express that of which it is the image. Therefore, although a thing may be altogether like another thing, yet, because it does not imitate that other thing, it should not be called an image of it. Hence the impression of a foot in the ground is an image truly of the foot but it is a trace or footprint of the whole animal, etc.

7. The second thing that must be stated is in respect of what in God the idea of image in us is taken. About this I say that it is in respect of the three persons and of the one essence and of the procession of the persons. Here one must note that the concept of one person is a concept that is partial in respect of the whole Trinity. As to creatures, which lead us by way of image to a knowledge of the whole Trinity, they will represent the whole Trinity as to the total concept that our intellect can have of it; so they will represent the distinction of the persons, the unity of the essence, and the order of origin; for the real distinction that exists in divine reality by relations of origin will have an essential imitation in respect of the Trinity that creatures represent.

8. I reply that what needs to be stated is where in us the image is. Here one must note that in the mind there are first acts, namely intellect and will, and second acts, namely intellection and volition;¹³⁰ and the principles of these second acts are principles distinct in respect of their formal ideas, which formal ideas are act and will in the presence of their objects. Because of this the acts are of diverse ideas, for the cognitive act and the other volitional act will have distinct principles, etc.

¹³⁰ First act is the existence in the soul of the powers of intellect and will; second act is the exercising of these powers in acts of understanding and willing.

9. Now one must note that the image does not consist only in acts of paternity, first because there are only two such acts (and so the image would be only of a duality and not also of a trinity); and second because between these acts there is no real distinction of thing and thing, nor is there an order of origin either (though there is consubstantiality because a unity, albeit an essential unity, is communicated to the soul); and third because one of these acts is not produced by the other – not even in the case of individual acts, first because the acts are not essentially the same, and second because of the other two reasons just stated, namely that there are only two acts and that one does not originate from the other, etc.

10. I then say that the image consists in first and second acts in the following way, that the soul, qua having in itself the perfection of understanding and willing in idea of second act (namely in respect of knowledge generated along with the object present to it in idea of object), has the idea of memory and of parent (as of a father). However, to the extent that the soul has in itself the perfection of being able to receive generated knowledge in itself, it has the idea of a word; and to the extent the soul has in itself the perfection of being able to receive produced love, it thus has the idea of something spirated. And in this way the soul will be a trinity, of which the first part will be the parent, the second the thing generated, and the third the thing spirated, etc.

11. However there are here two doubts. The first is that there seems here to be a quarternity, because knowledge is produced from one memory and love is produced from another memory, etc.

12. On this point note that the first act in respect of volition, as namely the will, does not go together in the image with any of the three [n.10]: not with the third part because

the same thing is not the principle of itself; and not with the second part because actual intelligence is not will; and not with the first part because memory is said properly to be the productive principle of generated knowledge; therefore the will is a fourth with them, etc.

13. The second doubt is that generated knowledge does not go together with the production of love the way that, in divine reality, the first person by nature originates the second person, and the first and second person originate the third. It is not like this in the image, because neither is the first the cause of the second nor are the first and second the cause of the third, etc.

14. I reply by saying that Augustine assigns or gives two ideas of image. The first is in *On the Trinity* 9, and it is mind, knowledge, and love. The other he gives in *On the Trinity* 10 as follows: memory, intelligence, and will. When dealing with these two in *On the Trinity* 15 he says that what is said in the case of the fourth in the listing [sc. memory] is more evident to the extent that memory expresses the idea of parent more than mind does.

15. To make clear the first part of the image [sc. mind and memory], note that mind can be taken in two ways: either we can understand by mind a first and perfect act with respect to both second acts (namely fecundity in generating a son and fecundity in spirating a holy spirit). In this way mind possesses the perfect idea of parent, because it includes both fecundities. And between these acts, namely knowledge and love, there are two objects produced in a certain order, and so there will not be a quaternity, because in a parent that has the idea of parent perfectly there occurs a double first act. And this is the way it is in divine reality, because there is in the Father a fecundity for generating and

also for spirating, and the Father has this fecundity from himself and not as derived from something else, namely from the production of the Son (as some say). The proof of this is that it would then follow that the Father never had the fecundity in question; for the Father does not in any way have from production of the Son any reality whether absolute or relative, and so he will never have any reality that he does not have in the first moment of origin (namely insofar as he is pre-understood in order of origin to the Son); therefore he does not have this sort of fecundity of generating and spirating from production of the Son.

16. In another way mind can be taken precisely for first act alone, namely as it has only a fecundity for generating or a fecundity in respect of generated knowledge (which is the same thing). And in this way the idea of image is imperfectly assigned to it, and in this way too mind does not have perfectly the idea of parent.

17. Thus, about the way image is assigned when memory is posited, I say, neither more nor less, that if memory is taken precisely as first act in respect of generated knowledge, or in respect of being generator, then in this way the idea of image is imperfectly assigned. But if memory is taken as it states first act as first act is perfect with respect to both second acts (namely fecundity for generating and for spirating), then memory has perfectly the idea of parent. And thus is the idea of image assigned perfectly by Augustine, etc.

18. I then say that mind or memory should be taken as it has the perfect idea of parent; but it is not perfectly parent save as it is taken in respect of knowledge and love – as is plain, because the Father in divine reality has in himself fecundity for both. Therefore, in the case of the mind in the first way of assigning image, or in the case of

memory in the second way (or for the first part of the image) [n.14], the soul must be taken as it means the idea of the first act of the intellect, along with its object present to it in idea of object, and the idea of the first act of the will, along with its object present to it in idea of object, etc.

19. In the case of the second part of the image, generated knowledge, or the word, is taken for it; and in the case of the third part produced love is taken for it; and so it is plain that there is no quaternity there, because a double relation of fecundity is combined in the parent, if it is perfectly parent.

20. To the second doubt [n.13] I say that, because generated knowledge is an accident in the case of the soul and because an accident cannot have the idea of a producer, therefore, when memory generates knowledge, it does not communicate to it a fecundity of spirating the way this happens in divine reality (where generated knowledge is subsistent and has the same communicated nature as in the generator); and so, to this extent, and also as to real identity in absolute thingness according to distinction of relation, there is not a total similarity between the image and the Trinity, as is plain; yet the second and third part of the image have, even if not an order of origin, yet some natural order properly, because volition naturally and necessarily presupposes intellection, and an origin can in some way be assigned to them, because intellection goes together with the idea of parent of love. For the object of the will is necessarily actually known, just as the object of the intellect is formally actually in the phantasm; and thereby one can see how the agent intellect belongs to the image, etc.

21. To the first principal argument [n.2] I say that the assigning of an image of the Trinity in the soul only avails for someone who believes the Trinity, to enable him to investigate it in some way; but it does not do so for the sake of the Trinity becoming naturally known, first because the soul is not created by God as he is a Trinity, and second because the things mentioned [sc. in the image] are all primary together, as is plain.

22. To the second [n.3] I say that the major premise would be effective if the Father were posited as generating insofar as he understands (as some say) – and badly posited, as was proved above, because the Father does not generate in this way; rather, as I said, the Father has the divine essence by a second distinction present to himself under the idea of being actually intelligible (which belongs to the Father as he is memory) and in this way does he generate; but, as was made clear above, he does not generate insofar as he understands. And therefore I say that the antecedent is false, because the memory does not represent the Father more than the Son by the fact that memory alone exists in the Father, or that intelligence alone exists in the Son, but by the fact that the Father generates the Son insofar as he has the idea of memory and not as he has the idea of intelligence or will, etc.

23. To the third [n.4] I say that second acts are produced. The argument is *pro se*. Hence when it is said then there is no action of action, or action is not the term of action, and this [sc. some production] truly terminates action, as Augustine says *On the Trinity* 9 last chapter that knowledge is generated, and in *On the Trinity* 15.27 that volition

proceeds – then these are not actions in the genus of action but are absolute forms in the genus of quality.

24. When you prove [n.4] that they are properly actions because they are second acts, I say that there are certain forms which have a fixed and permanent being not dependent on their cause (as heat in wood), and that there are certain forms which have a communicated dependence on their cause, as light in the medium depends on the sun; and about this Augustine says, *Literal Commentary on Genesis* 8.9, that the air has not been made bright but is being made bright; thus the first forms, because they are independent of their cause in existing, are not actions and are not called actions; but the second forms, because of their independence,¹³¹ seem to have their existence rather in becoming than in being, which is why they seem to be actions; and yet in truth they are not actions, because they have their parts together all at once, which is something repugnant to action, and they are not in a passive thing either, because they have existence at once in the whole and part is not acquired after part; and intellection and volition are forms of this sort, for they have a continuing dependence on the presence of their cause, etc.

25. Intellection and volition pass over into something other as to their term. It is unintelligible that volition and intellection exist and are not *of* something (I care not what that something is). It seems that they are called second acts because of this continuing dependence and because they pass over to a term; but in fact they are immanent forms, being whole all at once and not as things acquired part after part, etc.

¹³¹ The printed text says 'independence', but it may be a misprint for 'dependence'.