

This translation of Book 2 Distinctions 1 to 3 of the *Ordinatio* (aka *Opus Oxoniense*) of Blessed John Duns Scotus is complete. These distinctions fill volume seven of the Vatican critical edition of the Latin text edited by the Scotus Commission in Rome and published by Quarrachi.

Scotus' Latin is tight and not seldom elliptical, exploiting to the full the grammatical resources of the language to make his meaning clear (especially the backward references of his pronouns). In English this ellipsis must, for the sake of intelligibility, often be translated with a fuller repetition of words and phrases than Scotus himself gives. The possibility of mistake thus arises if the wrong word or phrase is chosen for repetition. The only check to remove error is to ensure that the resulting English makes the sense intended by Scotus. Whether this sense has always been captured in the translation that follows must be judged by the reader. In addition there are passages where not only the argumentation but the grammar too is obscure, and I cannot vouch for the success of my attempts to penetrate the obscurity. So, for these and the like reasons, comments and notice of errors from readers are most welcome.

Peter L.P. Simpson  
September, 2014

# THE ORDINATIO OF BLESSED JOHN DUNS SCOTUS

## Book Two

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# THE ORDINATIO OF BLESSED JOHN DUNS SCOTUS

## Book Two

### First Distinction

#### Question One

*Whether Primary Causality with Respect to all Causables is of Necessity in the Three Persons*

1. About the second book, in which the Master treats of God as to his primary causality, and this specifically of the causality of the triple cause that he has in respect of creatures, I ask the following questions – and first about the first distinction: whether primary causality with respect to all causable things is of necessity in the three persons; and I understand ‘with respect to all causable things’ in any existence [sc. real and in a certain respect], and this of necessity, such that it cannot be save in the three persons.<sup>a</sup>

a. [*Interpolation*] After the Master has in the first book determined about God as the idea of his natural perfection, in this second book he determines about him insofar as his perfection shines out in the works of creation. And about the first determination, in which the emanation of creatures is determined in general, five questions are asked: the first is whether the first causality with respect to all creatable things, according to any existence of them, is of necessity in the three persons, such that it cannot be save in the three persons; the second is whether God can create anything; the third is whether it is possible for God to produce something other than himself; the fourth is whether the creation of an angel is the same as the angel; the fifth is whether the relation of the creature to God is the same as its foundation.

2. That it is not is argued as follows:

Richard [of St. Victor] in *On the Trinity* bk.3 ch.16: “If it were only in one person, there would still be in that person the fullness of wisdom and power.” Therefore that one person could produce everything producible.

3. Second as follows: action belongs to a supposit, therefore in the case of several supposits there are several actions; therefore there cannot be one action of three persons, –therefore not one power or one causality either, because “what the power belongs to, that the act also belongs to,” according to the Philosopher *On Sleep* 1.454a8.

4. The third as follows: ‘as the principle of operation is to the principle [sc. as the principle of operation of one power is related to the principle of operation of a second power], so the operation is to the operation’ (this proposition is plain in the sensitive, intellectual, and volitional powers and their acts); but the principle of causation of causable things is something essential (because it is common to the three), therefore it is in some way prior to what is notional and personal; therefore so is action prior to action.<sup>a</sup>

a. [Interpolation] On the contrary: the act of creating is related to the three persons as the act of inspiring belongs to the Father and Son, as is plain from Augustine *On the Trinity* 5.14 n.15; but the act of inspiring so belongs to the Father and Son that it belongs to them precisely, and to neither without the other; therefore the act of creating, which is the first act of causing, belongs to the three persons precisely. – Again, to be able to create belongs to no nature but the divine, nor can it belong to any supposit in divine reality besides the three persons, as is plain from Augustine *On the Trinity* bk.2 ch.10 n.18, “the works of the Trinity are undivided;” therefore etc.

[Note from the Vatican editors: the arguments to the contrary answered later in nn. 48-49 are actually other and come from the *Lectura*: On the contrary: as the goodness of God is to the

goodness of the creature, so is production to production; but the goodness of the creature does not exist unless the goodness of God precedes; therefore neither will the production of the creature exist unless production of God inwardly is presupposed. – Further, person more agrees with person in operating in divine reality than substance and virtue in the creature do in operating; but in the creature substance cannot operate without its proper virtue; therefore neither can one person in divine reality operate without another.]

## I. Opinion of Henry of Ghent

5. [Statement of the opinion] – There is here the opinion of Henry, *Quodlibet* VI q.2 – look at it there.<sup>a b</sup>

a. [*Interpolation* from Appendix A] [Henry’s opinion] that “the philosophers [sc. Avicenna] only posited in God an intellect of simple intelligence whereby he understands himself and all other things; and likewise they posited a simple will whereby all things are pleasing to him according to the fact they are good in their essence. Now such an intelligence, by the fact it is natural, is naturally disposed to producing the things it has understood and in one determinate way – and the like holds of the will concomitant to such simple apprehension; and therefore the philosophers had to posit that God produced creatures outside himself by necessity of nature and in accord with the best way of producing (namely by intellect and will as nature, not by will as dispositive and elective),” and in this they erred, because according to them no intrinsic personal emanation precedes the production of things externally.

But this point, in the way the opinion of the philosophers says it, is not valid, because in order for God to produce something outside himself, simple knowledge and simple love of being well pleased (which alone belong to speculative knowledge) are not enough, but there is required a declarative and dispositive knowledge of things to be done and a love inciting and aspiring to the

production of them; now this declarative and dispositive knowledge is the Word, and the aspiring love is the Holy Spirit; therefore the Word and Holy Spirit precede the production of things.

Now the manner of positing [sc. by Henry] is as follows, that “however much God by simple knowledge knows things to be done and however much the will loves them, unless the intellect make disposition about them and the will aspire to the production of them, never would God by his wisdom and will produce them in being outside himself, because” – as I said [sc. just above] – “simple wisdom and its ensuing love pertain to pure speculation, but a work is then first produced when it is disposed by wisdom and aspired to by will, for the wisdom and love for this pertain to praxis. Hence, just as a natural form is not a principle of action as it is the perfection of what it is in but only as it has regard to an effect, so wisdom and love in divine reality, as they are the forms of intellect and will (as such, absolutely), are not a principle of action, but only as they have a regard to an effect; but the wisdom that disposes and the love that aspires, which have regard to act, are nothing but the wisdom and love that proceed [sc. as Son and Holy Spirit].”

Hence he [Henry] says “just as a created artisan has in the wisdom of his art a double knowledge of the artifact, one of simple knowledge in universal art whereby he intuits things to be done purely speculatively, and another that disposes to a work whereby in his particular art, conceived from universal art, he intuits the order of his production (and this is practical knowledge, without which it is impossible for an artisan to proceed to a work) – so it is on the part of the will, because the artisan has a double love of the artifact, one simple whereby the form of the artifact pleases him (and this love does not order him to a work), and the other aspiring love whereby he desires the work to be made. Things are similar on the part of God, because by his simple knowledge he knows all things simply and absolutely, but in his practical knowledge he knows all things as in an art dispositive and declarative of them for a work – and one of these knowledges proceeds from the other; and likewise on the part of the will about simple and aspiring love.”

Then they say that “intrinsic emanation is necessarily presupposed causally to emanation extrinsically, not because creatures are produced by way of efficient cause by the whole Trinity and by the produced persons, but because ‘produced wisdom and love’ are reasons in essential intellect and will disposing to the production of creatures by way of formal cause... such that the

Word proceeding and Love proceeding are, with respect to the essence, the formal principle of the act of creating and as it were the proximate principle while the essence is the remote principle.

And the essence, or the Father as he is essence, has the word in himself, that is in his essential intellect, for the perfection of his essential intellect – and similarly the Son (who is the Word itself) and similarly the Holy Spirit; but the Father has the word from himself (because he has it by speaking it), while the Son and Holy Spirit have the word in the essential intellect – perfecting the essential intellect – from the Father alone.”

On behalf of this opinion, thus faithfully recited, one can argue as follows: Augustine *On the Trinity* 15.11 n.20 says that “just as there can be a word of ours which is not followed by a work, though there cannot be a work unless a word precedes, so the word of God can exist without any creature existing; but no creature can exist save through him ‘through whom all things were made’ [John 1.3];” therefore etc. – Again, there is an argument thus, that if creatures were produced only by simple knowledge and complaisance, then they would be produced of necessity, as the philosophers said; therefore they are produced by dispositive and deliberative knowledge and by elective and freely inclining will. Again, a natural form does not produce its effect immediately but introduces a certain respect; therefore the wisdom of artifice is similar. Third, speculative wisdom and the love corresponding to it are not the immediate principle of producing; but “wisdom as it is an essential in divine reality is speculative, possessing speculative ideas and reasons only for knowing, but wisdom that is personal is not only speculative but practical, possessing the idea of operating.”

Once these things are seen, it is sufficiently plain what he [Scotus] is arguing against in this question [d.1 nn.6-14].

b. [Interpolation from Appendix A] that although the whole knowledge that is in the Son is really in the Father (because the Son knows nothing that the Father does not know), and although the love too that is in the Holy Spirit is in the Father and the Son (because the Holy Spirit loves nothing that the Father and the Son do not love), yet the knowledge that is in the Son as it is in the Son has a certain special idea that it does not have as it is in the Father, which idea indeed is the

idea of dispositive knowledge; likewise, the love in the Holy Spirit has a certain special idea that it does not have as it is in the Father and the Son, which idea indeed is the idea of love making aspiration for a work and aspiring to production of a work. For knowledge in the Father has only the idea of simple knowledge, but in the Son the idea of dispositive knowledge; for the Son in divine reality is nothing other than art or knowledge manifestive or declarative of the things that the Father knows in simple intelligence, making disposition and order for the things that are to be produced and for the manner of working; love too in the Father and the Son has the idea of love of simple complaisance, but in the Holy Spirit it has the idea of love making aspiration for and impelling to a work.

Now this distinction of knowledge and love in divine reality can be taken according to a proportion to a double knowledge and love that are perceived in us. For an artisan first simply, and with simple intuition, intuits the form of the work, and second he orders and disposes for the making and for the manner of the making – and this is called dispositive knowledge, which is conceived from the prior knowledge. Likewise on the part of the will: when the form of the work is offered to the artisan he is first pleased in himself with it, and second he is moved by his complaisance with aspiration for the production of it – and this aspiration is called aspiring love, and it arises from the first love.

One must imagine things to be thus in divine reality, according to their opinion; namely that in the Father there is as it were simple knowledge, not dispositive as to producing the thing or to the manner of producing it, but in the Son there is knowledge having the idea of this dispositive knowledge; similarly there is in the Father and the Son the love of simple complaisance in understood things, but in the Holy Spirit there is the idea of love making aspiration and inclination to a work.

The second thing – which is said by this opinion – is that, for the producing of an effect, simple knowledge on the part of the intellect is not enough, but dispositive knowledge is required; nor even is the volition of simple complaisance on the part of the will enough, but there is required a love or volition making aspiration; from this a third thing follows, namely that the extrinsic production of creatures presupposes the persons in the divine essence as certain formal ideas of the

essence whereby creatures are immediately produced – and this extrinsic production presupposes the intrinsic productions as what these formal ideas are acquired by. Hence this is the conclusion of this opinion, that extrinsic production presupposes intrinsic production as the cause by which is got the immediate productive formal principle; for as the author of this opinion expressly maintains (in the afore noted question, n.5), the essential acts of knowledge and love in divine reality, without the produced persons in addition (namely without produced love and produced word), were not complete or perfect for producing, but they are perfected through the produced word and produced love; and so these terms ‘word’ and ‘love’, perfecting the essential acts of understanding and willing in the three persons, are the immediate formal ideas and immediate principles for producing creatures.

On behalf of this opinion the same doctor, in the same place [n.5], seems to gesture toward three reasons.

The first is as follows: that which is produced by the knowledge of simple knowledge and by the love of simple complaisance, as by the immediate principles of production, is produced necessarily by the necessity of a natural determination for producing and for the manner of producing. The point is plain, because such knowledge and such love are disposed in a natural manner to producing their effect, and are disposed only to one determinate manner, no less so than heat is disposed to heating; hence too the philosophers (who posited in God only such knowledge and such love) posited that the world proceeds from God by a natural determination for producing and for one manner of producing only, such that God was not able not to produce nor able not to produce in a way other than he did produce, as is plain from Avicenna *Metaphysics* 9. Therefore, in order for God not to have produced the world by necessity, it is necessary that he have produced it not through knowledge of simple knowledge and love of simple complaisance – as through immediate principles – , but through dispositive knowledge (dispositive about producing and manner of producing) and through elective love and love freely aspiring to a work, as through acts supervenient to the earlier produced acts; but such dispositive knowledge and such aspiring love are the Word and the Holy Spirit in the case of divine reality; therefore the world is produced by produced word and produced love as through the immediate principles of its production.

The second reason is as follows: as natural form is disposed to producing its effect naturally, so intellectual wisdom and the volition concomitant to it are disposed to producing their effect intellectually and by art; but “a natural form is not the immediate principle of operation as it is the perfection of that in which it is, but only insofar as it introduces a respect to the effect;” therefore in this way the wisdom and the volition of the artisan are not the immediate principle of a work save as they introduce a respect to the work. But this respect they do not introduce save as they are in the produced word and the produced love; therefore produced word and produced love are, in any artisan whatever, the immediate principle of doing a work by art. – Here one must note that, according to this doctor, intellectual wisdom as an essential is as it were the form of a natural agent as it is the perfection of what it is in, but wisdom itself, as it assumes the idea of word, is as it were the natural form itself as having a respect and order to the effect; hence, according to him, the word has, from its proper idea as word, a respect and order to making things, which essential wisdom, as such, does not have.

The third reason is thus: speculative wisdom and the volition or love corresponding to it are not the immediate principle of operating, but only practical wisdom or knowledge and the love corresponding to it are – as is plain in the rational artisan, because the universal knowledge, whereby he considers something doable in general and according to its common principles, is not for him the idea of operating, but a certain practical knowledge is, one conceived from or under the universal knowledge; but “wisdom in divine reality, as it is an essential perfection, is only speculative, having, as such, speculative ideas only as ideas of knowing, but personal wisdom – which is the word – is not only speculative for knowing but practical, containing in itself ideas as they are principles of operating;” therefore the produced word corresponding to it and love are the immediate principle of operating and producing in divine reality. – The reason is confirmed by the verse of the Apostle *I Corinthians* 1.23-24, “‘We preach Christ,’ he says, ‘the virtue of God and the wisdom of God;’ ‘virtue’ insofar as Christ possesses the idea of practical science (and this is proper to him), according to which also the word is called operative power – ‘wisdom’ insofar as he possesses the idea of speculative science etc.” (look there in Henry [n.5]).



6. [Rejection of the opinion] – Against this opinion there is a threefold argument:

For first it seems to follow [sc. from Henry saying that ‘the three are with respect to the essence one formal and, as it were, proximate principle of the act of creating, and the essence is the remote principle’] that the Father does not formally create. For nothing formally acts which is not in act according to the proximate reason for acting; the Father is not formally in act with the Word or with the Holy Spirit. But according to this position the Word and Holy Spirit are the proximate reason for acting and causing, as understanding and volition are the remote reasons for causing; therefor the Father does not formally and proximately create.

7. And if you say that they all create ‘because they all have one word in their intellect by which essential intellection is perfected (although that word is only from the Father who speaks in turn for all), and all have one love in the common will (although that love is inspirited by the Father and Son together in turn for all)’ – against this I argue thus: I ask how the Father has this generated knowledge. Not formally (according to Augustine *On the Trinity* bk.7 ch.2),<sup>a</sup> but he has it as a correlative, as the producer has the produced; but in this way the haver is not in act formally with what is had by him; therefore he does not formally act by the action with respect to which the had – or that which is had – is the formal reason for acting.

a. [Interpolation] because, according to him there, the Father is not wise with generated knowledge or wisdom.

8. It seems further to follow that the Son and Holy Spirit do not create, because generally the formal reason for acting does not act in the action with respect to which it is the formal reason for acting.<sup>a</sup>

a. [*Interpolation* from Appendix A] but the Son and Holy Spirit, according to this position, are the formal reason for creating; therefore etc.

9. And if it be said that the Son creates and the Holy Spirit creates – however, neither of the persons seems to create proximately, because neither is in act formally through the other, and ‘everything acting proximately through intellect and will’ is in act by both the knowledge and the volition necessary for such act.

10. Further, second: I ask what you understand by dispositive or disposing wisdom and by aspiring love. For these are either appropriated to the Word and Holy Spirit or they are proper. If appropriated then in truth they are common to the three, and thus two persons are not the proximate formal reasons for creating. If proper, and if they state a respect of reason to creatures (because according to him [Henry] disposition states a respect of reason to the disposed things), then some respect of reason is proper to some divine person, which was rejected earlier (1 d.27 n.95, *Lectura* 1 d.18 nn.6-16 [no d.18 in *Ordinatio*]).

11. Further, what he says about practical ideas, namely that they are not in the Father but in the Word (as if one Person were not sufficient for production), seems to be contrary to Augustine *On the Trinity* 15.14 n.23, “Therefore this Word is truly truth, because whatever is in the science from which he is generated is also in him – but what is not in the science is not in him either;” and a little later, “God the Father knows all things

in himself, and knows them in the Son;” and later, “All things that are in their science are fully seen by each of them.” From these words – and from others set down there – Augustine seems manifestly to maintain that nothing is in the Word more actually than it is in the intelligence of the Father, and consequently that nothing is more distinctly in the Word than it is in the intelligence of the Father.

12. Further, what he [Henry] says there, that ‘the word exists for perfecting essential intelligence’ seems to be false, because that which is the reason for acting with some non-immanent action is not perfected by that action (just as the hot, qua hot, is not perfected by the heating that is received in some passive thing); but according to him [v. 1 d.2 nn.277-79, 290-96] actual intellection is the reason for generating the Word, and the generating is not formally immanent in the Father himself, because the term of generating is not the form of the Father; therefore essential intellection – which is the reason for generating the Word according to him – is not perfected by the produced Word.

13. What he says about universal knowledge, that it is speculative, was rejected above (Prol. nn.360-61, ‘about divine theological science, whether it is speculative or practical’), because practical conclusions are resolved to practical principles and not to speculative ones, just as speculative conclusions are resolved to speculative principles and not to practical ones

14. Also, as to his statement that ‘the philosophers for this reason conceded that God necessarily produces what is other than himself, because they denied that in him proceeding dispositive or disposing wisdom and proceeding aspiring love are produced’, does not seem true, because essential volition – whether as it is in the three persons or as it is in the Son or as it is in the Father – is not necessarily of something other than itself

(as of a creature); for the divine will does not necessarily will anything other than itself, even if, *per impossibile*, it were not a principle productive internally – because then it would necessarily depend on a creature, which is unacceptable in the extreme.

## II. Scotus' own Solution

15. For the solution of the question, then, three things need to be looked at: first, that the first causality with respect to caused things is necessarily in the three persons, and this in respect of caused things as caused whether as to their true being or as to their being simply; second, because of what was added in the question, 'about causables according to their causable being' [n.1], one must look at causality with respect to all causables as to their being in a certain respect, as their being known or their being willed; third, because of what was also added in the question, 'such that it could not be otherwise than in the three' [n.1], one must look at whether – if *per impossibile* one absolute person were posited – there could be in that one person perfect causality with respect to all causables.

### A. The First and Perfect Causality is Necessarily in the Three Persons

16. As to the first point, I say that the perfect causality is necessarily in the three persons.

17. The proof is threefold:

First, because in the case of the principles of the two productions, namely the necessary and the contingent, the principle of necessary production is necessarily prior to the principle of contingent production (for a necessary effect cannot presuppose a contingent one); but something in divine reality is principle of intrinsic production, which production is necessary – and something in divine reality is principle of extrinsic production, which production is contingent; therefore necessarily something in God is principle of production that is necessary and intrinsic before something in him is principle of production that is contingent and extrinsic. In that prior stage then, when intrinsic production is complete, there is communicated to the three persons all the fecundity that is not repugnant to them, and consequently there is communicated to them that which is the productive principle of extrinsic communication; therefore in the instant in which there is in God a proximate principle for producing something contingent extrinsically, that principle is communicated to the three persons.

18. Again, the first object is naturally present to the power that has regard to such object as first before a secondary object is present to it, and this is especially true when only the first object is object of the power from the nature of the thing and of itself, and the secondary object is not of itself object of the power but comes to exist as such through the act of the power; now in this way the first object of the divine intellect and of its will is the divine essence alone, and all other things are only secondary objects and are produced in some way in their being by the divine intellect; therefore the divine essence is naturally present to its intellect as first object before anything else is. But the divine intellect, possessing the object present to itself, is not only an operative power about it, but also a productive power of knowledge adequate to the intellect as productive power;

therefore it is then productive of the infinite Word and consequently of the Word generated in the divine nature. Likewise the divine will, possessing the essence actually understood as object present to itself, is not only an operative power (by which, namely, what formally has the will loves the object), but is also a productive power of adequate infinite love and consequently of a person inspirited in divine nature. Therefore naturally before the divine intellect and divine will naturally have or regard some secondary object, the complete idea is possessed of the production of the intrinsic divine persons and consequently those persons are produced before any other object is presented, and consequently much more are they prior to the causing of any other object.

19. Further, third, as follows: the relation of nature to supposit is prior to its relation to second act, because acting presupposes being and the relation of nature to supposit pertains to being;<sup>a</sup> likewise the relation of nature to supposit is essential and is in the whatness, but the relation that is of nature to acting does not appear to be thus essential. Therefore divine nature has being in the persons before it is a principle of extrinsic production.<sup>b</sup>

a. [*Interpolation*] because nature must have being before acting; but it only has being in a supposit, just as the species only has being in an individual; therefore etc.

b. [*Note of Scotus*] The first reason [n.17], if it proves any priority, does not however prove that contingent production necessarily pre-requires necessary production, because this priority is not as to the dependence of contingent on necessary production but as to the principle ‘by which’, which is common to both productions. Likewise, the second reason [n.18] assumes that the intellect, having the divine essence present to it before it has the secondary object, is the idea of generating, and this is true in such way that ‘as it is the idea of generating’ it does not require the secondary

object; thus it may be said, contrariwise, that although the secondary object pre-requires that the first object be present to the power, yet it does not pre-require that, when the first object is present, the second person be generated, because the first object present in one person is sufficient for making the secondary object present. Likewise to the third argument [n.19]; action presupposes nature in some supposit but not necessarily in several – or not even in any supposit when the nature is agent. Thus these reasons [nn.17-19] are conclusive in the way explained in the third article [nn.41-43]; not because the order is by reason of these productions (so the extrinsic production is not properly said to presuppose or pre-require the intrinsic production), but the order is by the common foundation, in which the intrinsic production is more immediate and therefore prior.

20. Secondly, as to this article [n.16], one must look at what is the reason for this [sc. the priority of intrinsic production to extrinsic production].

And I say that the reason is not as the first position [sc. Henry's, n.5] gestures to, namely that the Word and Holy Spirit are the proximate formal reasons for causing, or that in some way they complete the causality of the Father [nn.6, 12] (rather the same and equally perfect causality is in the Father as in the three persons). Therefore this priority [sc. of intrinsic to extrinsic production] is of the same sort in the Father and Son with respect to the Holy Spirit as was stated in 1 d.12 nn.7, 38-40 – and the reason posited there for this is not that there is a more imperfect fecundity in one person than in two, but that fecundity is communicated to the Son before the Holy Spirit is inspirited; and then in the instant of origin in which the Father produces the Son, the fecundity by which the Holy Spirit is produced will be in the Father and the Son, and from this the consequence is that then the Spirit is produced by the two, and the fecundity in them is one.

21. And thus here: the divine nature is communicated first in nature to the three divine suppositis (according to the reasons set down above [nn.17-19]) before the creature can be immediately created; and therefore in the instant in which the creature is immediately producible, there is one causality in the three persons with respect to the creatures to be produced.

22. And this is the reason of Augustine *On the Trinity* 5.14 n.15, that ‘just as Father and Son are one principle for the Holy Spirit, so all three persons are one principle for the producing of creatures’.

#### B. On Causality in regard to all Causables as to their Being in a certain Respect

23. As to the second principal article [n.15], it seems that if in the intellect of the Father there are also practical ideas (as was argued against the first opinion [nn.17-19]), then the Word is generated from a creature as it is an idea in the intellect of the Father; and this is also confirmed by Augustine *On the Trinity* 5.14 n.15, “[The Word is] born from all things that are in the knowledge of God.”

24. But against this there is argument as follows:

In that case [sc. if the Word is generated from all things as they are ideas in the Father’s intellect] the Holy Spirit is inspirited not only as love of the divine essence but as love of every understood lovable thing, and thus by force of his production he would be love of creatures just as of the divine essence; either then God would necessarily love creatures or the Holy Spirit would not necessarily be produced – both of which are false.



25. Again, not only does the Father know creatures formally but he also knows the Son formally; therefore if the Word is generated from all things as known to the Father, then the Word would be generated from the Word as known to the Father, and thus the Word would be generated from himself.

26. Again, no real relation of any divine person seems to be to anything outside it (as to a creature), from what was said in 1 d.30 nn.49-51; but of the generated to that from which it is generated, if it is really distinct, there is a real relation; therefore the Word is not generated from a stone as it is known to the Father.<sup>a</sup>

a. [*Interpolation*] Again, the Word is generated by act of the paternal memory, not of the paternal intelligence – from 1 d.2 n.291. But in the paternal memory, as it precedes intelligence as it were, a stone does not have intelligible being; for it is not intelligible before it is actually being understood or has actually been understood, but the divine essence alone is first actually intelligible, and it as it were makes all other understood things; nor are these other things intelligible before they are understood, because then they would precede by some distinctness the act of understanding, which is false. Therefore they are only in the memory virtually, because the essence is there formally. – If it be said that they first shine forth as intelligibles before they are actually understood, this should be denied of ‘actual shining forth’; it is only true of ‘virtual shining forth’, because the divine essence actually shines forth.

Again, a stone in intelligible or understood being is not formally of itself necessary being, because then it would in that being not be a secondary object but the primary one; therefore when produced as such by God, it would not be formally necessary being. Again, the divine intellect would be cheapened if it were moved by a stone; therefore similarly if knowledge of a stone were generated in it by a stone.

27. As to this issue [n.23] therefore, I say as follows that two orders can be understood in divine reality, namely the order of nature and the order of origin (and these are of different ideas), and to each degree of one order the whole of the other order can be assigned.

28. An example first: in a creature, where there is order of origin, of nature, and of duration (which are of different order and of different idea), the whole of one order can be assigned to one degree of another order; for let one instant of duration be taken, and to that one instant all the things ordered according to origin and nature can be assigned – also let one instant of nature be taken, and to it can all the things ordered to origin be assigned.

29. Simply, however, the order of nature is first in divine reality, such that, by proceeding simply, the whole first order of origin should be assigned to the first instant of nature, and if to the second instant of nature the first order of origin is assigned, then it is not the first order of origin but the second. I understand this as follows: the order of nature is taken by comparing objects to the divine intellect and will, because when comparing God's essence to his intellect and will – which essence is the first object of his intellect and will – there is the first instant of nature, and when comparing other and secondary objects to the divine intellect and will, which objects are not of themselves objects but things produced in their being as objects by intellect and will, there is the second instant of nature.

30. In the first instant of nature, if one stops at it, there is a perfect person, possessing perfect memory of the divine essence (namely possessing an intellect to which the divine essence is present in idea of actually intelligible object), and this person, by

this memory of the divine essence, can formally operate and formally produce, as was said before (1 d.2 n.311); but this person is understood in some way first to operate by this memory than to produce by it, and in this prior stage this person is understood perfect in himself and is blessed in his act of intellect in understanding the divine essence as his object. Also, the same person, producing by this memory, produces knowledge adequate to this object, and this object, since it is infinite, produces a per se subsistent formally infinite person; and to this produced person is communicated will as first act, not yet having an adequately produced term. Now by this single will, the first and second persons operate about the divine essence as about the object, loving it infinitely, and at this point they are in themselves perfect and blessed in the divine essence; in addition to this, however, these two persons by this same will – being single in them – produce love adequate to this object, known under the idea of being lovable, and so produce infinite love and so inspirit a divine person, because nothing is formally infinite save what is God by identity.

31. Stopping therefore precisely in the first instant of nature, comparing the divine essence to intellect and will, there exists in it the whole first order of origin (namely because two perfect persons are originated); and the whole perfection of the divine persons intrinsically, in intellect and will, exists in the first instant of nature, because the whole perfection simply of any person in understanding and willing the divine essence is complete in that instant.<sup>a</sup> All this therefore as to the first instant of nature.

a. [*Interpolation*] because in understanding and willing it they are formally blessed.

32. The second instant of nature follows, when the divine intellect and will are compared to another object, a secondary one. And because in this instant the object is not intelligible of itself but becomes actually intelligible through the intellect and will [n.29] – therefore it does not have being in the divine memory as it is memory, but is produced into the being of object by an act of intelligence (just as second intentions are produced in us by intelligence and are not in memory as it is memory); and whether too these objects be posited as having being through the memory or as being produced in known being by the intelligence, at any rate both memory and intelligence exist in the three persons prior in nature to these objects having being in the memory or intelligence – and so, insofar as memory or intelligence is in the three persons, it is the reason for producing the objects in their being as objects. The Word, therefore, is not produced by first production from a stone as it is in the memory of the Father, because either a stone does not have being in the Father's memory as this memory is the principle of producing the Word, or, if a stone does have being in the memory, it does not have it naturally before memory is understood to be in the three persons.

And in this way can it be proved that causality with respect to causable creatures in known being is necessarily in the three persons, as was proved in the second reason for the first article [n.18], and this reason is equally valid for this second article.<sup>a</sup>

a. [*Interpolated note*] About the remark that 'it is produced by act of intelligence' [n.32] there is a doubt, because at least it does not exist as formally intelligible in an act of intelligence, although it is there produced by action of memory and not of intelligence. – An example about second intentions is perhaps not similar, because a comparison with an object made by the intellect seems only to be a comparison with the considering intellect as cause, and an absolute object that is

shown to the intellect by virtue of another object existing excellently in memory is not like this; a second intention is not made to be actually understood by virtue of the thing that shines forth in memory in the way this stone is made to be understood by virtue of the divine essence shining forth in God's memory; for take away the comparing act [sc. of the human intellect thinking a second intention] and posit only absolute acts in some way or other, and the stone will be known, but a second intention without a comparing act will never be. Likewise, a second intention is made in its true being and not in known being, therefore it exists before it is known because it is known by a reflex act; a stone is not made in its being save only in diminished way, and so it is known – and by a direct act – before it exists. See on this 1 d.10 n.41, because memory is a principle productive of knowledge of an object shining forth in memory not only formally but also virtually, and so the object exists formally first in produced knowledge, or more or less.

33. However, in the second instant of nature there can be assigned a certain order of origin, because the Father understands stone first in origin before the Son does, because the Father understands stone from himself while the Son not from himself but gets this from the Father, and the Holy Spirit from the Father and the Son; but this second order of origin is not origination simply, namely that by which the divine persons are produced in being of nature simply, but is as it were origination in a certain respect, consequent to the persons already produced.

34. An example of this in creatures: if there is an origin of Socrates from Plato per se in humanity, the order of origin in them in having humanity is the first order of origin simply, but the order of them in having the capacity to laugh is a different order of origin, in a certain respect as it were – because just as in the first instant of nature Socrates has humanity from Plato, so in the second instant he has the capacity to laugh from him; and if both naturally had humanity before the capacity to laugh was produced, both would

together cause the capacity, and yet one would have from another the fact that they caused it.

35. So I say in the issue at hand, that the Word's being infinite generated knowledge is his being infinite knowledge of infinite essence, and this is through his origin from the Father in the first instant of nature; but the Word's being knowledge of a stone [n.23] or having knowledge of a stone from the Father generating him, this is as it were to originate the Son in a certain respect or in a respect that is additional to 'Word simply'; for this is not his being generated simply under the idea of a divine person, because neither is it under the idea of knowledge simply infinite and of formally infinite essence as its per se object; for although this infinite knowledge, which is of infinite essence as per se object, is concomitantly knowledge of a stone, yet insofar as it is of a stone it does not have infinity formally.

36. And as has been said of what is produced in understood being [nn.32-35], so can it likewise be said of willed being [n.15].

37. And if it be objected against this [sc. against the causality of the three persons in respect of the creature in known being] that the Father produces a stone in known being prior in origin to the Son's producing it, therefore the Son does not produce it or the same thing may be produced twice or at any rate may be produced after it is understood to have been already produced (for it is already understood to have been produced by the Father in the prior instant of origin) – I reply that the Father does produce a stone prior in origin to the Son (that is, the Father from himself and the Son not from himself), and yet the Son produces the stone with the same production and in the same instant of nature, and yet to the same instant of nature can be assigned all the

degrees of origin [n.33]. So it does not follow that a stone is twice produced or is produced naturally beforehand, because then it would be produced by the Father in an instant prior in nature than by the Son, which is not true; for in the same instant of nature when the Father produces a stone in such being, the Son has the same nature and consequently all the productive fecundity (that is not repugnant to him), and so has the virtue of producing a stone – and before that instant, in order of nature, the stone is not understood to have been produced in known being.

38. And if you say ‘at any rate there is some order in which stone is understood to have been produced by the Father before by the Son, therefore it cannot be produced by the posterior in origin, therefore not by the Son either, for the Son cannot produce a son, because the generative force as it is in the Father prior in origin has a term adequate to it’ – I reply and say that in the case of origination in a certain respect things are not as they are in origination simply; for origination simply posits an originated in being simply, and therefore what in real being precedes origination simply precedes also the originated simply, and thus it cannot be from the originated – and hence it is that the Word cannot produce another word; but in the case of origination in a certain respect the thing originating does not produce an originated in any being simply, and so there can stand with this that its production precedes some originated in such a way that yet it does not simply precede that originated.

39. But this does not seem to suffice, because there seems to go on being a doubt how the Word can produce a stone in known being and how a stone can be produced by the Word when it is produced first in origin by the Father in such being, and the Word cannot produce a word, therefore likewise neither can he produce a stone in known being

– provided the reason that the Word cannot produce a word is this which is commonly posited, namely that ‘a term already adequate to the generative virtue or force as it is in the Father is pre-understood’ [n.38] – I reply that this proposition ‘every power having an adequate term prior in origin before it exists in something is not for that something a principle of producing’ is not true unless is added that ‘the haver of the communicated (or adequate) principle cannot be a different term’, or unless is added that ‘the term is not producible a second time by this haver’. So it is in production simply, because ‘the Word having the same memory as the Father’ cannot exist really before the Word is produced simply, and neither is another word producible by the Word having that memory; but it is not thus in the case of the production of creatures in intelligible being.

40. But this response destroys a certain position that is set down by many in 1 d.7,<sup>1</sup> which posits that the Son cannot generate; for the whole reason is not that ‘the memory as it is in the Father has an adequate term’, but one must add that ‘it has a term adequate to the principle, and a term not producible by that to which such a principle is communicated’; because if it were producible by that to which such a principle is communicated, the principle would be communicated to it also in idea of being a principle for producing, and so it could produce by that principle. Now when one asks further why ‘to the Word having the same memory as the Father’ the memory is not communicated in idea of productive principle, it seems one must prove it by something other than by a term adequate to the idea of this principle as it is in the Father.

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<sup>1</sup> Vatican Editors: Scotus did not deal with this question in 1 d.7 in the *Ordinatio* and he here corrects a position he had himself embraced in the *Reportatio*, IA d.7 n.58, “Although the Son has the essence that is the productive principle of the Son, yet he cannot produce by it, because it is already understood to have in the Father a term adequate to the production; and so the essence in the Son cannot be a principle of production of the same idea, because then the production would not have been adequate to the principle in the Father.”



a. [*Interpolated note*] Understand that ‘first in origin’ does not only mean ‘from itself’ (or ‘not from another’) but also ‘from which a second’. Although therefore the Father understands stone from himself, yet if, insofar as he understands stone, he is not ‘from whom is the Word’ (neither simply nor as understanding stone), the Father will not, insofar as he understands stone, be perfectly prior in origin to the Son; and this supposition seems true because the essence ‘as it is in the Son’ is not a less perfect idea of understanding all things than as it is in the Father; therefore since the Father knows all things by the essence alone, the like will hold of the Son.

Again, if the essence can be the reason for the Son of knowing all things, then it is in fact the reason – because although the science of stone in the Father could be the idea of the science of stone in the Son, yet the essence precedes stone understood by the Father, because it moves more efficaciously.

Again, stone formally known is only in the intelligence of the Father; the intelligence is not the idea of generating [sc. rather the memory is].

Again, the remark of Augustine *On the Trinity* 15.14 [n.23, “[The Word is] born from all things that are in the knowledge of God”] is expounded thus: “from all things...” supply ‘virtually’ because from the essence, which is virtually all things.

But does the Son have actual knowledge of stone by virtue of the essence as it is in the memory of the Father or as it is in the memory of the Son? It seems that, as it is in the memory of the Father, it precedes, giving to the Son everything that it can give.

I reply that the essence absolutely is the first object (not the essence ‘as in someone’), but along with the essence the intellect concurs, by which intellect each person operates as it is his and not as it is another’s. Therefore one should posit only one order of origin, because in the second instant of nature there is no origin; not simply so, as is plain – nor in a certain respect, because what is in the Son in the second instant is not in him through anything in the originating person as through a principle productive in the second instant, but what is in the Son in the second instant is in him only through what he received in the first instant.

And then the example about ‘capacity to laugh’ [n.34] seems apt, understanding it in this way, that there is origination simply as to humanity, but in the second instant – as to the property [sc. capacity to laugh] – there is not, because he who is generated by what he receives in the first instant is now capable of laughter in the second, and not because of some other beginning in the generator; thus did the Word receive intellect in the first instant (to which the essence is present in itself) and through this in the second instant he knows it.

But is there not some order to knowledge of a stone in the Father and the Son [n.38]? – I reply: not first but as it were concomitantly, because of that in each person which the knowledge is concomitant to in this person and in that, and in it they have per se an order of origin.

Yet the doubt seems to remain (touched on here [n.39]), how does the Son produce stone if the Father produces it first in origin? – I reply: the productive principle is in the Father first in origin before it is in the Son, but the Father does not produce stone in that priority of origin but only when the essence has been communicated to the three. One should not say, then, that the principle is communicated under act, as it were, and therefore the act is communicated, but that the principle is first communicated and as ‘already communicated’ it is under act.

On the contrary: therefore the Father does not, in the first now of origin, have the principle under act. – This can be conceded as he is the principle of origin simply; but in the second instant of nature there is a certain order of origin, not simply nor in a certain respect, but concomitantly as it were (as was said above, in this note), namely in having the principle under act ‘because in having the principle’ – and thus the Father in the first moment of origin has concomitantly the knowing of stone, but this knowing is not the idea of originating anything in the Son.

### C. Whether in an Absolute Person, if posited, there could be Perfect Causality with Respect to all Causables

41. As to seeing and understanding the third article [n.15], one needs to know that, in the case of creatures, if a cause is compared to two ordered effects, the comparison of it to each effect is more essential than the comparison of one effect to the other; for they depend in order on each other because of their dependence on the same cause, and do not, conversely, depend in order on the same cause because of the dependence of one on the other; therefore if in this case, *per impossibile*, the order of effects ordered among each other be destroyed, then not for this reason is the order and dependence of each on the cause to be denied, because a more impossible thing is not to be conceded because of a lesser impossible thing, nor is a more necessary thing to be denied because of a lesser necessary thing.

42. An example. If it be posited that fire has two ordered effects, namely to heat and to burn, and if fire is disposed to each effect more essentially than burning presupposes heating – then, if it is posited *per impossibile* that fire cannot heat, not for this reason must the denial be made that fire cannot burn, nor is he who binds himself to holding the first obliged to hold the second. For this consequence would only hold, ‘if fire could not heat therefore neither could it burn’, because of this understood affirmative proposition ‘what can burn can heat’ – which is destroyed by the supposition [sc. ‘if it be posited that fire cannot heat’], where the perfect idea of fire is posited as being able to stand with the opposite of what it is to heat [sc. not to heat]; and so that which is more immediate to fire (namely to burn) than heating is can stand with the opposite of what it is to heat (because it is posited as standing with ‘not to heat’), and so this position destroys the proposition by which such a consequence would hold.

43. So applying this to the proposition,<sup>a</sup> one can say that something in God is the principle of intrinsic production and something in him is principle of extrinsic production, so that these productions are ordered to the same principle, and in some way the order of each production to the cause is more necessary than the order of either production to the other. If then – *per impossibile* – it be posited that one of the principles is not a principle of a prior production (which is posited when one person is posited to be absolute and when intrinsic production is denied), yet not for this reason does it seem one should deny that the other principle is a principle of extrinsic production, because even on this supposition the whole idea of a principle of extrinsic production is still had and all that is denied is the order of production to production, which order does not stand but is destroyed by the supposition. And so if the argument is made ‘this person cannot produce inwardly, therefore he cannot produce outwardly’, the consequence should be denied by one who is bound to the antecedent; for the consequence only holds through the proposition ‘the power to produce something outwardly presupposes inward production’, which is destroyed by the hypothesis. And therefore it seems that a causality perfect in its idea – namely insofar as it states a comparison with an outward product or with extrinsic production – does not require a relation to intrinsic production, although the same foundation is necessarily the idea and cause of each production, intrinsic and extrinsic, and of intrinsic before of extrinsic. Now for this reason does it seem that the philosophers did not posit a relation between these productions; for although they saw a necessary relation to an efficient principle, yet they did not see a necessary relation of extrinsic causation or production to intrinsic production – and so, while they denied the intrinsic production, yet they conceded the extrinsic causation or production [n.14].

a. [*Interpolation* from Appendix A] This reason seems to stand on this claim: every cause productive of two ordered effects, one of which is necessary and the other contingent, if per impossibile the cause not produce the first of these effects it could still produce the second; but the eternal Father is productive principle of the Word necessarily and of creatures contingently; therefore if he does not produce the Word, he could still produce creatures.

An objection is that the soul produces understanding before willing, and yet it cannot produce and create willing without understanding.

#### D. Conclusion

44. To the principal question therefore [n.1] it is plain that perfect causality with respect to causables outwardly is of necessity in the three, and this with respect to all causables in any causable being (whether being in a certain respect or simply), so that it could not fail to be in the three [nn.21, 32]; yet if *per impossibile* there were one absolute person, it should as a consequence be said that in such an absolute person simply there would exist such ‘perfect causality’ [n.43]. And thus ‘perfect causality’ does not seem, from the idea of this term, to include necessarily that it exist in the three persons, just as neither does it include, from the idea of this term, the idea of inward production, even though in fact inward production is necessarily presupposed to it – just as neither does being able to burn, from the idea of it, necessarily include being able to heat, although in fact the latter is presupposed to the former [n.42].

### III. To the Principal Arguments

45. To the principal arguments.

First to Richard [n.2]: it is plain that he concludes to the third article of the position [nn.41-43].

46. To the second [n.3], it was stated in a like case, 1 d.12 n.49-52, how Father and Son are one principle of the Holy Spirit – and better, as to the issue in hand, in 1 d.4 nn.11-13, where there was discussion about the truth of the proposition, ‘God is Father and Son and Holy Spirit’; and it was also touched on 1 d.20 nn.24-27, about how power is the same in the three persons.

47. To the third [n.4] I say that although something essential is the principle of producing something externally, yet it is only a principle immediately applicable to work or to act as it is understood in the three persons, because – as was said in 1 d.12 nn.38-40 – what is a principle of ordered acts is only understood to be in proximate potency to remote act as it is under prior act (just as the soul is never understood to be in proximate power to an act of willing save as it is actually understanding, because when it is in proximate potency for willing something it does actually will it, and nothing is willed unless it is understood); and thus although any essential [sc. in God] – in respect of itself – precedes the notional [sc. in God] in some way, yet not every essential needs to be in every outward respect able to precede something notional.

48. To the first argument for the opposite [sc. the second argument from the *Lectura*, note to n.4 above] I say that the divine persons necessarily come together in every operation outwardly, and more so than substance and virtue – because the divine persons have one operation, by which they are one operator simply; and yet if *per*

*impossibile* the virtue were in one person, nothing of perfection would be lacking to him to prevent him being perfectly able to produce everything producible.

49. To the second argument [note to n.4] I say that it proceeds about the fact, that production presupposes production – not however as ‘formally cause’ or under the idea by which it is production, but as immediate principle as it were.

## Question Two

### *Whether God could create Something*

50. Secondly I ask whether God could create something.

51. It seems that he could not:

Because if something is produced which before was not produced, this is because something is disposed differently now than it was before; this cannot be posited as having happened in the issue at hand unless the cause of the change is the agent, because the passive thing did not exist before; therefore the agent must be disposed differently now than it was before and consequently must undergo change. But the first agent cannot change; therefore etc.

52. If it be said that the agent can produce a new effect without change of itself – on the contrary: ‘because the agent gives being, therefore does the passive or produced thing receive being’, and not conversely, ‘because the produced thing receives being, therefore does the producer give being’; therefore some new relation in the agent to the

produced thing must naturally precede and not conversely; therefore change in the agent must precede too, which is not to be posited in God – therefore not creation either.<sup>a</sup>

a. [*Interpolated note* from Appendix A] Creation is change, and every change precedes its term; therefore I ask in what thing the change was? And one must necessarily grant a subject of change. Therefore no change can be from nothing.

53. Secondly thus: a cause equally always determined to acting seems equally always to act and to produce the effect, because there does not seem any reason that it should produce now and not at other times, if it was at other times as determined to act as it is now; but if something is created now, the cause is otherwise disposed now than it was before and through a greater determination of it now to the effect than before; therefore the cause is sometimes more determined to producing the effect than at other times, and thus not equally so – and consequently it will have changed.

54. Third thus: according to the Philosopher *On Generation* 2.10.336a27-28, “the same thing while remaining the same is of a nature to do the same thing;” therefore there will never be variation in the effect if variation is not first naturally posited in the cause.

55. Fourth thus: if no change is posited on the part of the cause (so that it be said to be now ‘more approximate’ or ‘less approximate’ than at other times), and if there could not be any impediment on its part either – no reason appears for it to act now and not to have acted before.

56. And if you say, ‘because it acts voluntarily, therefore it can act when it wants to act’ – against this: there seems no reason for a voluntary agent to act sometimes and not at other times save because it expects a greater opportunity for acting now than at



other times; but this cannot be assigned to the first agent and first mover with respect to its effect; therefore neither ‘does it act when it wants because it acts voluntarily’.

57. To the opposite:

*Genesis* 1.1, “In the beginning God created heaven and earth.”

### I. To the Question

58. I reply:

To create is to produce something in fact from nothing. Now although the ‘from’ can be taken in many ways (as is plain from Anselm *Monologion* 8), namely as far as it denotes order etc. [1 d.5 n.53],<sup>2</sup> yet there is – in addition to this – still multiplicity when taking ‘from’ thus as it denotes order, because it can denote the order of nature or of duration.

#### A. About Creation from Nothing as ‘From’ denotes Order of Nature

59. In the first way [sc. when ‘from’ denotes order of nature] the philosophers concede that God can create and produce something from nothing, as is plain from Avicenna *Metaphysics* 6.2 (f. 92ra) (look there).<sup>3</sup>

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<sup>2</sup> The three ways are: negatively, when someone says he is speaking ‘of nothing’ because he is not speaking; or affirmatively when the ‘from’ marks the matter out of which something is made; or affirmatively when the ‘from’ marks origin or order, in the sense of ‘after nothing’.

<sup>3</sup> “Since something from among ‘things by essence’ was cause of the being of something else always, assuredly it will always be the cause of it as long as it has this being; and if the being of the cause always was, the being of the something else always will be; the reality of this cause then is more worthy in causality than all causes, by the fact it absolutely prevents a thing not to be. This then is the cause that gives a thing being in fact, and this is what for the wise is meant by ‘creation’, which is the giving of being to something after absolute not-being. For the caused thing, as far as concerns it in

60. I understand this point ‘about priority of nature’ as follows:

Something can be said to be ‘prior in nature’ positively because it is in something first, and is a prior entity to that which is said to be present in the thing posteriorly in nature – as is the case with animal and rational in man, and with substance and accident in some *per accidens* composite thing.

61. In another way one thing is said to be prior in nature to another privatively, as it were, or potentially, by the removal or exclusion of another, because it would belong to it when some other cause is excluded – namely because it is not present in what it is said to belong to first but would be in it unless it were prevented by something else; as if it were said that privation is naturally prior to form in matter, not indeed because the two are in matter together (such that privation would be present before form was), but privation can *pro tanto* be said to be prior by nature, and prior by nature to form in matter, because privation would always be present in matter unless it received form from some agent – such that for the having of privation matter alone suffices along with negation or privation of an extrinsic cause, but for having form an extrinsic cause is required; yet privation is not of the idea of matter, as neither is form, nor are both present together in matter.

62. So I understand it in the issue at hand, that a creature does not have of itself not-being, nor that being and not-being are together in it (as if being and not-being were simultaneous), nor that it somehow has not-being when it is; but that, as far as of itself, it would have not-being unless an extrinsic cause were to prevent its not-being by giving it being – because from its own idea alone it would not have being, when every extrinsic

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itself, is that it not be – but as far as concerns its cause, it is that it be; but what belongs to a thing from itself is, as to understanding, prior in essence, not in time, to what belongs to it from something other than itself; therefore everything created is being after not-being, by posteriority of essence.”

cause giving it being is excluded, because in no way would it have being unless it were produced in being by an extrinsic cause; such that one should more properly say that of itself formally a creature is not rather than that of itself formally a creature has not-being (because ‘of itself formally it has’ is an affirmation [sc. and not a negation]); neither does it of itself have being nor not-being.

63. On behalf of this position [n.59] as so understood [n.62], an argument is made as follows: a more perfect agent presupposes less in its acting than a more imperfect agent does – just as nature presupposes less than art, because nature presupposes only being in potency and art presupposes being in act; but God is a more perfect agent than nature or art; therefore he presupposes in his acting less than being in potency (which is something presupposed by nature), and so he presupposes nothing, and as a result he can create.

64. This reason is adduced by some for the second member, namely as ‘from’ denotes an order of duration. But there [n.62] it is altogether invalid, because although God does not, in producing, presuppose anything from which he may produce, yet the consequence does not thereby hold that he could produce something new, just as this does not follow (by force of the argument) about nature and art either, because the inference ‘nature does not presuppose in its action a being in act, therefore it can produce something altogether new as to existence in act’ does not follow.

65. But the argument [n.63] is not valid for the first member either, because, according to the philosophers, any intelligence is an agent superior to a natural agent, and yet they do not commonly concede (although Avicenna would concede it) that an intelligence could create or produce something from nothing.

66. Therefore I argue differently for this same first member, namely thus: God can immediately cause and effect something, therefore he can create and make something from nothing.

67. The antecedent is manifest, because God is the first efficient cause, from 1 d.2 nn.43-59; and if he makes nothing immediately then he cannot make anything mediately either (because he is the first efficient), and so he would produce no effect.

68. The consequence [n.66] I prove thus, because if he can effect something, that something does not have of itself necessary being formally, and so it has being from a cause; therefore it has being after non-being, according to the understanding of this member [sc. where ‘from’ states order of nature]. And he produces immediately, with nothing else presupposed – because if something is presupposed, then that something presupposed would be effected by him (as is plain from 1 d.8 nn.7-8), and so the thing that presupposes it would not be an immediate effect from him. We have, therefore, from the first antecedent [n.66] to this consequent, that he produces, in order of nature, something from not-being to being, and that with nothing presupposed; therefore according to this understanding he creates. This reason seems to be pointed to by Avicenna *Metaphysics* 6.2 [n.59, see the note there].

#### B. About Creation from Nothing as ‘From’ denotes Order of Duration

69. About the second member, as ‘from’ denotes order of duration [n.58, cf. Prol. n.18, 1 d.2 nn.83, 120, 149, d.8 nn.251, 255, d.42 nn.10, 13], creation is commonly denied by the philosophers, because they say that God *necessarily* produces something

immediately and with nothing presupposed – but what he mediately produces, he produces presupposing something from which he produces, because he then produces through second causes; and so he produces neither a mediate nor an immediate effect from nothing, taking ‘from’ here in the sense of order of duration.

70. But proof was given against this in 1 d.8 nn.275-277, 281-291 (and it was also touched on in 1 d.39 nn.35-37, 41, 91 [in the *Lectura*; there is no d.39 in the *Ordinatio*]), because God causes ‘everything that exists outwardly’ contingently and from himself; and from this it follows that he does not cause necessarily, and consequently that he does not necessarily cause something eternal (because Aristotle seems in *Metaphysics* 9.8.1050b6-8 to concede that everything eternal is necessary; he seems to indicate the same in *On the Heavens* 1.12.283b1-6 against Plato, who conceded that something is eternal and yet is able not to be, *Timaeus* 30-33).

71. But you will object against this reason [n.70] that it is not necessary that, where there is contingency in the effect, there possibility for newness may be inferred; for God wills *a* contingently (from 1 d.8 nn.275-277, 281, 291), and yet he cannot *de novo* not will *a*, because then he would be changeable.

72. I reply. In divine production there can be newness of product although there is no newness in the producer himself, because in the case of ‘first production’ there is change and newness on the part of the product, as will be plain when responding to the first principal argument [nn.85-86]. But in ‘willing’ there cannot be newness or change on the part of the thing willed unless there is some newness on the part of the act of willing, because the act of willing – being disposed the same and in the same way – cannot be of anything newly willed; for a willed thing does not have willed being save

through the act of willing, and so it is not new in the being of being willed save through a new act of willing.

73. So it seems in some way to follow, therefore, that if God can cause something contingently, he can also contingently cause something new, because there is no reason that he could not cause a non-eternal thing contingently just as he can cause something eternal contingently, on the grounds that he does not cause necessarily; for that a 'caused thing' had to be eternal seemed to follow from the necessity of causation or from the immutability of the causer himself, neither of which entails the eternity of the thing caused; therefore newness has the possibility of being inferred.

74. There is also another argument for this member [the second, n.69], because if something is new, I ask by what cause is it new? Let the cause be *a*. – I then argue: *a* produced this new thing either when disposed in the same way or when disposed in a different way. If in the same way then the intended conclusion is obtained, that from the same unchanged cause there can be some new effect. If when *a* is disposed in a different way, I ask by what mover *a* was disposed differently for producing this new effect; there is no process to infinity, therefore a stand will at length be made at something that will be new from a cause that is uniformly disposed.

The reason is confirmed too, because if from the first mover this part of new motion can be that never was before, why cannot some whole thing thus be new, nothing of which ever was before?

75. But this reason (along with its confirmation) is of little validity against the philosophers [n.69] and would easily be solved by them; however the conclusion is true, that from some unchanged agent there can be a product in some way thus new.

76. However, in this second member (namely when understanding ‘from’ as it states an order of duration), a distinction can be made about what is meant by ‘nothing’ [n.58], namely that it can be taken for nothing in every way [nn.83-84], or for nothing in being of existence, although it is in some way in being of essence [n.82].

77. And some people give an example, that although God could create from nothing in the second way, yet not from nothing in the first way [n.76], because nothing can be produced that is not on its own part possible, according to Avicenna *Metaphysics* 4; but nothing is not possible on its own part, because there is no reason that one nothing should be possible on its own part and another nothing not.

78. The reason is also confirmed, because in every creature there is composition of act and potency – and wherever these are, possibility or potentiality precedes in order of nature; therefore potentiality, in whatever created thing it is, naturally precedes and is prior in nature to actuality. And then this potentiality is not nothing but belongs to some entity according to some being; not according to being of existence, therefore according to quidditative being.

79. And this is posited according to the way recited in 1 d.43 n.5 [of the *Lectura*, not the *Ordinatio*]. For it is there posited that, by the active power of God relative to itself, things are first produced in passive possible being relative to themselves; and then further they can be produced in being of existence, but not unless they have first in nature been produced in quidditative being and in passive possible being.

80. Against this is the argument in the same place [1 d.43 nn.6-9], that ‘a thing is not produced in possible being by omnipotence but by intellect, whereby the thing is

produced in intelligible being'; and when it is in intelligible being, existence is not repugnant to it, nor is it of itself formally necessary; therefore it is possible.

81. Likewise there is another argument, in 1 d.36 n.17, against this being of essence, that 'if this being were true being, production in that being would be truly creation and it would be into some being simply from nothing'. Therefore this production is simply different; not in possible being (or not of a thing in possible being), because if a thing is not possible before it is in being of essence, and if it is produced in this being – then something is produced in some being, by some production, that is not possible on the part of itself.<sup>a</sup>

a. [*Interpolated note* from Appendix A] It was impossible or necessary; therefore from the impossible or the necessary it becomes possible – which is false; for what is impossible on its own part cannot be produced in being of essence or in being of existence.

82. As to this third article then [n.76], I say that God can create in being of existence from nothing (that is, not from anything), and consequently he can create from nothing (that is, not from anything) according to being of essence, because, as was proved in 1 d.36 nn.26-29, 48-49, 53, never is being of essence really separated from being of existence.

83. And yet a thing cannot be created, that is, produced in being simply, from nothing, that is, from what is in no way a being (whether simply or in a certain respect). For nothing is created that did not first have understood and willed being, and was in understood being formally possible, as was said in the first reason against the position in



question here [nn.80, 79]; and then it was as it were in proximate potency so as to be able to be an object of omnipotence and to be posited in being simply.

84. Something can be produced (although not created) from nothing simply, that is not from anything in being of essence or in being of existence or in any being in a certain respect – because a creature is produced in intelligible being not from any being, neither simply nor in a certain respect, nor from something possible in that being from its own side; but this ‘to be produced’ is not to be created, because there is not anything created in being simply, but it is produced in being in a certain respect.

## II. To the Principal Arguments

85. To the first principal argument [51] I say that the first cause can immediately produce some new effect without any newness in the cause itself. The thing is plain from an example: for if the sun be posited always to be in itself equally bright and if there is created some transparent medium near to it, the sun will *de novo* illuminate it, such that nothing new will be in the sun in order for there to be from it a new illumination; and if it could of itself posit a transparent medium and put it under the light, then, just as it causes light in it, so it could produce in being the whole thing – namely the illumined medium – without any newness in its own self.

86. And if you say ‘it could not do this if it were a natural agent and disposed uniformly (because then it would always produce uniformly), therefore the example is not valid for illustrating the issue at hand’ – I reply: it is true that this example was valid to this extent, that it is not necessary to posit newness in the cause because of newness of

effect; yet it was not valid as to there being a new effect from a cause naturally acting and complete, because such an agent would always uniformly act (if it were such) with respect to the effect. But a free agent can by the same previous will produce a new effect for the time when it wills that new effect to be; for it is not necessary that ‘if it eternally wills and cannot will *de novo*, therefore it wills for the eternal’, just as it is not necessary in me that if I now will something, that I will it for now; but I can will it for tomorrow, and with the same will in place (without any change on the part of my will) I can cause that new thing tomorrow, for which I will it.

87. And when argument is made against this by the reasoning ‘that it is naturally necessary for some new relation to the product to precede in the producer and not conversely’ [n.52] – I say (as was said in 1 d.35 nn.31-32, 47-50, and frequently elsewhere, d.3 n.326, d.30 nn.22-23, 30-45, 65-68, d.43 nn.11-12) that on an absolute in the cause there follows immediately an absolute in the effect – and in the effect there first follows a respect to the cause; and then, if there is some respect of the cause to the effect, the respect to the effect is last and as it were null.<sup>4</sup> As to what the argument says, therefore, that ‘because the cause gives being, therefore the effect receives being and not conversely’ [n.52], I say that if the argument intends by the ‘because’ a reduplication of relation in the cause to some new reality in the cause (whether relative or absolute), the proposition is false; but if it intends to reduplicate the first act of the cause, which cause naturally precedes the thing caused, in this way the proposition is true: for the absolute in the cause naturally precedes the thing caused.

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<sup>4</sup> There are four in order: absolute in the cause, absolute in the effect, respect or relation of effect to cause, respect or relation of cause to effect; see references in the text.

88. And if you say ‘it does not cause merely because it is absolute, for it is such – namely absolute – even when it is not causing’, I say that in the instant in which it causes, it still causes as naturally prior to the action itself – and as such only the absolute itself is understood, from which the caused is posited in being; and so nothing can be taken along with the ‘it causes’ save that it is prior, and not that it is so in respect of this instant or in respect of another one. But imagination deceives ‘because it always seems that the cause is indeterminate up to the instant when it causes, and then that some relation – determining the cause to the effect – is required first on the part of the cause’, which is false; for the same absolute, which in the cause preceded both in nature and in duration the effect produced or caused, is in the cause in that instant naturally before it causes – and according to the same absolute ‘according to which it was first causative’ it now is causing, and not according to anything added, whether absolute or relative.

89. To the second [n.53], when argument is made for determination – I say on the same basis [n.88] that a cause equally determined to producing some product (as far as concerns its part) can sometimes produce and sometimes not produce, because just as in natural things ‘a cause being determined on its own part’ is its having the form whereby to cause, so in a free thing ‘a cause being determined’ is its having there a volition with respect to something willable; and just as in the former case the form can be had before the effect is caused (but it is now prevented from the outside or by the absence of a passive thing), so also a volition can be had in the latter case before the willable thing is had, and before both in nature and in duration.

90. To the third, from the Philosopher in *On Generation* [n.54] – I say that the Philosopher’s understanding is about a natural agent, as is plain from him in that place.

91. To the fourth [n.55] I say – as was said in 1 d.8 n.299 – that ‘it is a mark of lack of education to seek demonstrations for everything’ (according to the Philosopher, *Metaphysics* 4.4.1006a5-8), ‘for there is no demonstration of principles’. And in the same way in contingent things; otherwise there would be a process to infinity in the case of contingents, because contingent things do not follow from necessary ones. And therefore this will of God – which wills this and for now – is immediate and first cause, for which no other cause must be sought; for just as there is no reason that he wanted human nature to be in this individual and to be possible and contingent, so there is no reason that he wanted it now and not then, but only that ‘because he wished this to be, therefore it was good that it be’; and to seek some reason for this proposition – although it is an immediate contingent one – is to seek a reason for what no reason should be sought.

92. And when the argument speaks about ‘expecting’ [n.56], I say that a will that has goodness from the willable itself, this will – if it is right – immediately wills the willed thing, unless there is some reason that it should will it rather to be at another time, and then it expects or waits for that more opportune time; but a will that has no reason for willing something now (just as neither does it absolutely have a reason for willing this thing) does not have to wait for some opportunity in the willed thing – neither does it have goodness from the willed thing, but conversely.

### III. To the Other Arguments

93. To the first argument for the third opinion ‘about being of essence’ [n.77; the first opinion, n.59; the second, n.69], the response is plain from what was said before

[nn.80-81, 82-84]. For I concede that everything creatable was first possible on its own part, but this possibility or potentiality is not founded in any being simply but in known being (such that potentiality for being simply is concomitant to known being), although formally known being is not possible being, because ‘known being’ is being in act in a certain respect – but possible being is to be in potency for being simply, and not to be in act. Nor yet is ‘being in potency’ being simply, but there is a fallacy of simply and in a certain respect; just as neither is ‘future being’ being simply, nor is ‘past being’ being simply; for just as ‘to have passed in being simply’ does not imply being simply, so neither does ‘future being’ imply being simply; therefore much more does ‘able to be simply’ not imply being simply, because ‘able to be’ seems to be more remote from being simply than ‘to be future’ does.

94. To the other reason, about composition of act and potency [n.78], the answer is plain from the same point [n.93]. For although it be conceded that objective potency precedes act, yet that potency is not in any act – and although what is conceded to be known is in some ‘known being’, yet it is not formally known being. However the reasoning in question [n.78] is not valid, because the composition is not of objective potency and terminating act, but this composition is in some other way, as was said in 1 d.8 nn.32-33.

### Question Three

*Whether it is possible for God to produce Something without a Beginning other than*

*Himself*

95. Thirdly I ask whether it is possible for God to produce something other than himself without a beginning.

96. That it is possible:

The Philosopher in *Physics* 1.9.192a27-31 proves that matter is ungenerated and incorruptible – otherwise there would be a process to infinity in matters. Therefore either matter was not produced, or it was produced without a beginning, which is the intended conclusion; or if not, at any rate some form was produced in it and without a beginning, because matter never was without form.

97. Secondly thus: time, according to the Philosopher *Physics* 8.1.251b10-28 and *Metaphysics* 12.6.1071b6-9, is without beginning, which he seems to prove from this: because if not, then time could have been before it was, or could be before it was; but ‘before’ is a difference of time; therefore before time there was time.

98. Thirdly thus: according to the Philosopher *On Generation* 1.3.318a23-25, the generation of one thing is the corruption of another. So there never was any first generation, and consequently some generable things were without a beginning.

99. Fourthly thus: a cause not acting by motion and being unable to be prevented can have an effect coeval with it, as is plain in creatures; therefore etc.

100. On the contrary:

Augustine *To Felicianus* [Ps.-Augustine ch.7] assigns a definition for creatures and says that ‘a creature is from the fact that – by the will of the omnipotent God – its substance is produced from not-being to being’. If therefore it is of the idea of a creature

to be produced from not-being, then it is impossible for it to be produced without a beginning.

101. Secondly thus: by the same reason that God could have produced one thing without a beginning, he could also have produced another – and so things infinite in multitude would have been produced in act; God could also have piled together all the magnitudes that there would have been afterwards and so have made an infinite mass. But an infinity both in mass and in number is rejected in *Physics* 3.5.204a17-b10.

### I. First Opinion

102. Here it is said that God could have produced something ‘other than himself’ without a beginning, because his not being able to have done this (namely to have produced something ‘other than himself’ without a beginning) cannot be demonstrated either by an intrinsic middle term or by an extrinsic one. Not by an extrinsic middle term because that term is the will of God, for which no reason can be known or had as to why it wills this thing to be with a beginning rather than without a beginning. Nor by an intrinsic middle term, namely by the ‘what it is’ of the makeable thing, because the ‘what it is’ abstracts from the here and now; so it is not a reason for demonstrating the here and now.

103. Again, that ‘anything else whatever’ is from God is an article of faith. Therefore it is not expedient for demonstrations to be made about it, neither because of the faithful nor because of infidels; nay, it seems dangerous: as to the faithful indeed, because thus the merit of faith would be made empty, as it seems; and as to infidels,

because then they could accuse us of believing these sorts of things for reasons and thus of being without faith – and also if such reasons should seem sophisms to them (just as they seem to certain of the faithful [e.g. Aquinas *Sentences* 2 d.1 q.1 a.5]), infidels could doubt the things we would believe because of such sophisms.

104. Besides thirdly, Augustine *On the Trinity* 6.1 n.1, “If fire were eternal the splendor caused by it would be eternal, and would be coeternal with it.”

105. And from this point an efficacious argument is made for this position [n.102], as it seems: for Augustine’s consequence is natural – otherwise it would not be valid against Arius to prove the coeternity of the Son with the Father; but it cannot hold save on the basis of the perfect idea of cause and caused; therefore just as in that case [sc. Augustine’s case of fire] necessary coeternity is inferred from a perfect cause acting naturally, so from a perfect cause acting voluntarily the possible coeternity can be inferred of a limited effect with an unlimited cause, because the only difference there seems to be between a natural agent and a free agent is in acting contingently and naturally (but there is no difference between them in being able to act and not to act, because whatever a natural agent can do a free agent can do as well, and the two differ only in mode of causing).

106. And this argument can be replicated in many ways:

Because no perfect condition, whatever the positive mark laid down (being a condition of perfection), is found in a second cause which is not in the first cause as cause; but it is a mark of perfection in some second cause to have an effect coeval with it – and from this, if the effect were eternal or coeternal with its cause, the perfection would be in the cause; therefore etc.



107. The deduction is also made in another way (and it is more or less the same): that the mode of causing does not vary formally the caused thing itself, according to Ambrose *Incarnation of the Word* 9 n.103; but if God caused naturally and necessarily, he could cause an effect coeval and coeternal with himself; therefore if he now causes voluntarily, although he not cause necessarily, yet he could cause an effect coeval with himself.

108. And if it be said that Augustine's understanding [n.104] is about the immanent splendor of light, which is not formally caused by it – against this is his text, which says 'the splendor generated and diffused by it'.

109. And he states the same opinion in homily 36 *On John*, about a stick and its image in water. But it is certain that such an image, if it existed, would be caused and generated by the stick.

110. Besides, fourthly: whatever is not repugnant to limitation is not repugnant to a creature, if it is an entity; but duration however long is not repugnant to the limitation of a creature, because what lasts for a day is not more imperfect than what lasts for ten years; therefore it seems that an infinite duration would not posit a greater perfection in a creature than a lesser duration, and consequently it posits no repugnance that a creature always was without a beginning.

111. Again, a creature tends to not-being, to the extent it is from itself, just as it is a not-being to the extent it is from itself and from nothing; therefore just as some creature can, without contradiction, always tend to not-being and yet always exist (as is plain of an angel and the soul), so it can without contradiction always have existed and yet – to the extent it is from itself – always have had not-being.

112. Again, Augustine *City of God* 10.31 says that “if a foot had been in sand from eternity, its footprint would always have been under it, and yet no one would doubt that the footprint was made by the treader; nor would either of them be without the other although one was made by the other.”

113. Again in the same place, “in a scarcely intelligible way” the philosophers said that the world was made and yet does not have a beginning of duration. Therefore this way, if it is scarcely intelligible, is intelligible, and so no contradiction is included in something’s having been always and without a beginning.

114. There is a confirmation too, that it does not seem probable that such brilliant philosophers, and such diligent inquirers into truth and such perspicuous conceivers of the reasons of terms, did not see the included contradiction if it had been included in the terms.

115. And there is also a confirmation (that there is no contradiction there) according to the philosophers, because not only does the natural philosopher consider the four causes but the metaphysician does so too, though under a prior and more common idea [sc. by abstracting from motion or change]; so the efficient cause is in more things than a mover (or even a changer) is, and consequently it can give being without motion. The first efficient cause, therefore, can give being without its having to give new being, because without its having to give being through motion or change.

116. Again, motion is an effect coeval and coeternal with the first mover; therefore there can be some product or effect from the first efficient cause that is coeternal and coeval with it.

## II. Second Opinion

117. Against this position [n.102] it is argued [from Henry of Ghent] that there is a contradiction involved in something ‘other than God’ having existed without a beginning; because it is at some time true – or will at some time be true – to say of any produced thing that it is produced, because even of the Son of God produced in eternity it can truly be said that he is produced in eternity. The creature then is either always being produced when it is, or it is produced at some time and not always; if in the second way, then in the instant in which it is produced it first obtains being, and the proposed conclusion is plain [sc. that the creature at some time began to be]; if in the first way, then the creature is in continual becoming – which seems unacceptable, because it would in that case be impermanent.

118. It also seems that in this case [sc. the first way in n.117] being created would not differ from being conserved, and this is disproved in two ways:

First because ‘to be created’ is to be produced from not-being to being, but ‘to be conserved’ belongs to the very being already possessed, and thus to be created is not to be conserved.

119. Second, because a particular agent generates and does not conserve; therefore when both come together in the same thing, the one is different from the other.

120. And added to this reason [n.117] is that a creature has acquired being and consequently it exists after not existing; because if not, it would have being without acquisition, as the Son of God does – although it would not have the same being with that from which it acquires being.<sup>a</sup>

a. [Interpolation from Appendix A]. Third, by the authority of Augustine *Immortality of the Soul* 8 n.14, “What is made by him, he guards; for what does not exist per se will be nothing if it is deserted by that through which it exists.” And *Genesis* 2.1, “God rested on the seventh day from the work of creation,” not from the work of conservation [Henry of Ghent].

121. A second argument is as follows: “Everything that is, when it is, necessarily is,” from *De Interpretatione* 9.19a23-24; therefore it can only not be because potency precedes its being, whereby it can be prevented from being. But if anything was from God from eternity, no potency preceded its ‘being from God’; therefore it was not able not to be from God.

122. An objection is raised to this that someone predestined can be saved and not saved; therefore likewise in the case of something made from eternity it is possible for it to have been and not to have been.

The response is that predestination regards ‘a thing outwardly’ for some definite now of time, namely a time for which the thing cannot not be and so cannot not be predestined, because predestination corresponds to the nature of the thing; but to give to something being from eternity regards power for infinite eternity, wherein there is no power for the opposite and so not in the act of giving either.

123. And there is confirmation for this, that “in perpetual things to be and to be possible are not different,” *Physics* 3.4.203b30; and in *Metaphysics* 9.8.1050b7-8, “Nothing eternal is in potency.”

124. Further, the same is argued thus in another way: any species is in equal potency for existing, when comparing it to God as to the giver of being; therefore just as the sun could have been from eternity, so also an ass, and this a perfect one being able to generate; and from this ass all the other asses that there have been could have been generated, up to this one generated now. And then I ask whether all the asses would in that case have been finite or infinite; if finite, then the whole time from then up to the present would have been finite; if infinite, then, once the extremes are posited, an actual infinity of middles between them could have existed, which is unacceptable.

125. Further, a fourth argument is as follows: a creature from eternity is able to be and able not to be,<sup>a</sup> etc. [sc., from Henry, but ability not to be precedes in nature and duration ability to be, just as not being precedes being in nature; therefore if the creature can have being from God from eternity, it would either have being after not being in duration (and so it would at some point begin to be), or it would have being and not being together, which is impossible; n.162, Quodlibet 8.9].

a. [*Interpolation* from Appendix A] if then it is posited in being, it has that being as acquired; therefore its not being preceded in duration its new and acquired being. Or...

126. Again an argument for this opinion [n.117] is made that, if the world could have been from eternity without a beginning, there have been an infinity of intellectual souls.

127. Further, it is against the idea of the infinite in quantity that it can be exceeded or can be taken in its totality (as is plain from its definition in *Physics* 3.6.206b33-7a2, 7-9, “the infinite is that of which nothing outside it can be taken,” and “that which, when

one takes its parts, there is always something further to take”); but if the world could have been from eternity and without a beginning, an infinite duration would have been taken.<sup>a</sup> Nor is the response valid which says that ‘an infinite duration would have been in potency and in always receiving being and not in having-received being’, because the intellect’s taking note does nothing to make the infinite to be actually taken, for that a future infinite has at some time been taken is impossible, even if there had been no intellect that would take note of the parts of the infinite time.

a. [*Interpolation* from Appendix A] an infinite could have been exceeded and taken in its totality, because infinite things have preceded to which addition is continually made, which additions are also now taken; therefore it is impossible for the world to have been from eternity.

128. Again, argument is made that the part would be greater than the whole – because let midday today be *a* and midday tomorrow be *b*; if time on either side of *a* could have been infinite, the same reasoning holds about the past and the future with respect to *b*; therefore by whatever amount the past up to *b* is greater, by that amount the future from *b* is greater [sc. so that the amounts of time on either side of *b* remain equal]. But the past up to *b* is greater than the past up to *a* as the whole than the part, therefore the past up to *b* is greater than the future from *a*; therefore the future from *b* – which is equal to the past up to *b* – would be greater than the future from *a*, and so the part would be greater than the whole.<sup>a</sup>

a. [*Interpolation*] Again, every permanent eternal thing is formally necessary; nothing other than God is formally necessary [1 d.30 n.56, d.36 n.19]; therefore. – Proof of the major: a permanent

thing has the whole of its being at once, such that if it remain perpetually it receives no new being [1 d.8 nn.257-58]; therefore it now has the being whereby it formally is; therefore it now has the being whereby it would be a repugnance for it sometimes not to be; therefore it is now a necessary being. Proof of the minor: what includes being in act is of itself a 'this'.

Again, when a determinate act necessarily follows a determinate act, if the necessity of the prior can be demonstrated, the necessity of the posterior can be demonstrated as well; the act of the divine will with respect to 'anything other than itself' necessarily follows the determinate act of the divine intellect about the same thing, and by a necessary reason can the determinate act of God's intellect about it be demonstrated; therefore it can be demonstrated of the determinate act of the will too; and also creation, which follows the determination of the will. – Proof of the first part of the minor: by a likeness about sense and the sensitive appetite. Proof in another way: the divine will presupposes an act of the divine intellect (about the same object) and a right act; the will cannot fail to be in concord with the intellect, because then it would not be right. – Proof of the second part of the minor: what follows on causes that cause necessarily can be inferred necessarily from them; the determinate act of the intellect follows on such causes, for only the intellect and the object are causes of the act (in no way the will, because then the will would have an act about a non-understood thing). Another proof of the second part: as the principle is in speculative things, so the end is in desirable and practical things; from the principles there is necessary speculative knowledge of all other things, therefore from the end there is necessary practical knowledge of things for the end.

Again, every essence other than God is finite and not pure act – therefore (according to Thomas [Aquinas]) it is in matter or in potency to being, and by parity of reasoning it is material; it is therefore in potency before it is in act (*Metaphysics* 5.11.1019a7-11), and the order of nature between impossibles has a similar order in the case of duration.

Again, the more necessarily and immediately a determinate relation to something follows on the essence, so much the more can such a relation be demonstrated through the essence as through the middle term; but a relation to the first efficient cause more necessarily and immediately follows an essence than does a relation to something posterior, because it depends

essentially on the former but not on the latter (some relation to something posterior is determinately and necessarily inferred through the essence as to its specific property); therefore this determinate relation is demonstrated more. Creation states such a determinate relation, because it states a determinate receiving of being from such a cause; therefore.

Again, through the essence is necessarily inferred that without which the essence cannot be; such is dependence on the first efficient cause; creation as it is common to everything other than God states this dependence and states no other respect, because then it would not signify a concept per se one.

Again, there is no less dependence in real being than in known being; but by a necessary reason the passive exemplification of anything exemplified is entailed, because God is an agent through knowledge, because he is the first orderer.

Again, how the divine will is disposed to quiddities is demonstrated necessarily, therefore also how it is disposed to existence. – Proof of the antecedent: God is well pleased by participation of his goodness. Proof of the consequence: existence has an equally perfect relation to the first object of the divine will as essence does.

129. Many other reasons can be adduced, but some are sophistical and many others are made frequently.

### III. To the Reasons for the First Opinion when holding the Second Opinion

130. Those who hold this conclusion [sc. that there is a contradiction involved in God having made something other than himself without a beginning], especially because they posit the same impossibility to exist on the part of any species (and in some species – as in successive ones – it seems that everything taken is finite, although the whole is



infinite by taking part after part [nn.124-28]), give response to the reasons of the first opinion [nn.102-116] thus:

To the first [n.102], that although it cannot naturally be known whether God's will exists in respect of this particular, yet it can naturally be known that his will is not of anything that is not of itself willable, and this because there is a contradiction – and consequently an impossibility – involved in the divine will's being of that of which there is no idea; but then it is necessary to place the 'non-willability', as also the impossibility, on the part of the object, from 1 d.43 nn.3, 6.

131. And so, when it is argued that 'the what it is' is not a middle term for demonstrating existence [n.102], the response is made that, although this is true, yet a creature can be a middle term for demonstrating the beginning of its existence.

132. Against this: that the middle term by which the beginning of existence will be demonstrated cannot be the 'what it is', according to them, therefore it must be existence.

133. And then it seems that the argument is doubly at fault: first, according to the fallacy of the consequent, because existence in the minor does not entail actual existence; second, because the premise in which existence is applied to a stone will be contingent, and thus the demonstration will not be a very probable reason but sophistical.

134. A response can, however, be made to the argument [n.102], that although the 'what it is' is contingently disposed to existence actual or non-actual (and therefore it is not a middle term for demonstrating absolute existence, or any absolute condition of existence [131]), yet some condition of existence can be repugnant to some 'what it is', and so can be a middle term for demonstrating that existence under such a condition does

not fit that to which the ‘what it is’ belongs; just as the quiddity of a stone, although in itself it does not include existence, does yet of itself have ‘uncreated being’ repugnant to it – and so from the idea of this quiddity can be inferred that it does not have uncreated being, and not eternal being either.

135. Therefore one should say as to the issue at hand (according to this position [sc. when holding the second opinion, n.130]), that eternal existence is repugnant to a stone, and therefore from the quiddity of a stone can be demonstrated that it does not have eternal existence; and from this further, not absolutely that it has new being, but that if it exists it has new being – which is the intended conclusion.

136. The reasoning [nn.102, 131] is also at fault – as it seems – according to the fallacy of the consequent; for this consequence does not hold, ‘the opposite of this cannot be demonstrated, therefore this is possible’, but there is a fallacy of the consequent, for ‘first impossibles’ are impossible from the terms, just as their opposites, the ‘first necessities’ are necessary from the terms; and although the first necessities cannot be demonstrated (because they are first truths), yet it does not follow that therefore they are possibles; but to the antecedent ‘the opposite cannot be demonstrated’ one should add that the opposite is not a first necessary or something known from the terms – and perhaps this would be denied by some in the case of the issue at hand, although the fact that the opposite is necessary from the terms is latent and not evident to any intellect that confusedly conceives the terms.

137. To the second [n.103] it can be said that if there are necessary reasons for things believed, yet it is not dangerous to adduce them, neither because of the faithful nor because of the infidels.

138. Not as to the faithful, for Catholic doctors, when examining by reasons the truth of things believed and striving to understand what they believed, did not intend by this to destroy the merit of faith – on the contrary, Augustine and Anselm believed they were laboring meritoriously to understand what they believed, according to *Isaiah* 7.9 (according to another translation [the LXX]), “unless you believe you will not understand;” for while believing they examined, so that they might understand through reasons what they believed. But whether demonstrations – if they can be had – make faith void or not, on this see book three on the incarnation [3 Suppl. d.24].

139. Nor is it dangerous as regards infidels if necessary reasons can be had;<sup>a</sup> even if necessary reasons cannot be had for proving the existence of a fact – namely an article of faith – yet if they may be had for proving the possibility of the fact, then to adduce them against an infidel would even be useful, because he would in some way be thereby persuaded not to resist such articles of belief as impossibilities. But to adduce sophisms for demonstrations against infidels would indeed be dangerous – because the faith would thereby be exposed to derision (and so it also is in every other matter, even an indifferent one, as in the case of geometers, to propose sophisms as demonstrations). For it is better for the ignorant to know he is ignorant than to think because of sophisms that he knows; but those who state the opposite view say that they are not adducing sophisms but necessary reasons and true demonstrations – and hence they are not doing anything prejudicial to the faith (neither in respect of the faithful nor of infidels), but are rather with reasons of this sort confirming it.

a. [Interpolation from Appendix A] because “demonstrative speech is of a nature to solve all questions that arise about a thing,” Averroes *Physics* 1 com.71.

140. As to the third [nn.104-105], although different people speak in many ways about it, yet I say that in the same consequence there can be many reasons because of which the inference is necessary, and therefore many places (namely taken from the many reasons of such consequence) in the antecedent itself; and wherever any of these reasons or any of these places can be found, a like inference can be found and drawn. An example: ‘a man runs, therefore an animal runs’ rightly follows from the place taken from species [sc. because man is a species of animal], and not only from this place but also from a more common one, namely from the place taken from subjective parts [sc. because animal is a subjective part of man, for man is a rational animal] – because not only is the consequence good wherever there is an inference from species to genus, but it is also good wherever there is an argument from a subjective part to the whole. And another example could be posited where many reasons for an inference come together, but this suffices for the present purpose.

141. So I say that this consequence holds, ‘there is fire in this moment now and it is not impeded, therefore there is light’; the place is from a cause naturally causing and not impeded; and not only this, but this consequence can also hold from a certain more common reason in the antecedent, namely from the reason of something naturally producing and not impeded. For not only does ‘a thing naturally causing and not impeded’ have a caused thing or an effect coeval with it (*Physics* 2.8.199a10-11), but also ‘a thing naturally producing’ has a product coeval with it, as is manifest from the second reason [here above]. So wherever there exists a like reason for inferring, there will

exist, not only according to the special reason [sc. a thing causing] but also according to the general one [sc. a thing producing], a necessary and natural consequence.

142. And so I say that the example [n.104] is very well to the purpose; because if ‘there is fire’ entails, by reason of a thing producing naturally, ‘splendor is diffused’, then even if the antecedent were impossible and impossible and the consequent likewise, yet the consequence is necessary and good. Therefore, wherever this reason for entailment exists [sc. a thing producing naturally], the consequence is necessary and good, however things may stand with the antecedent and consequent; but so it is here with the Father and the Son, because the Father is a natural producer with respect to the Son; therefore there will be here a like entailment, good and necessary.

143. And hereby is plain the response to the confirmation of the reason, ‘that no perfection that can be in a second cause is taken away from the first cause’ [n.106]. Now to have a simply necessary caused thing is not a mark of perfection in a second cause, nay it even fails to belong to any second cause (as was said in 1 d.8 n.306), although some second cause may have it in a certain respect; for to cause simply necessarily involves a contradiction, and so it belongs to no second cause.<sup>5</sup> Nor does Augustine (when inferring something on the part of fire) argue from this as from something impossible, but he argues it [sc. splendor is coeternal with fire] from a more common reason (namely from

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<sup>5</sup> 1 d.8 n.306: “I say that no natural connection of cause and caused is simply necessary in creatures, nor does any second cause cause simply naturally or simply necessarily but only in a certain respect. The first part is clear, because any second cause depends on the relation of the first cause to the caused; likewise, no second cause causes save by the first cause causing the caused along with it, and this naturally before the proximate cause causes; but the first cause only causes contingently, therefore the second cause causes simply contingently because it depends on the causation of the first, which causation is simply contingent. The second part, namely about necessity in a certain respect, is plain, because many natural causes, as far as concerns themselves, cannot not cause their effects, and so there is necessity in a certain respect – namely as far as concerns themselves – and not simply; just as fire, as far as concerns itself, cannot not heat, yet, with God cooperating, it can absolutely not heat, as is clear, and as was clear about the three boys in the furnace [*Daniel* 3.49-50].”

the reason of a thing producing), which does not involve a contradiction, and this suffices for his reasoning [n.104, cf. 1 d.9 n.10].

144. The same point makes plain the response to the other reason, ‘that a diverse mode of causing does not vary the caused thing formally’ [n.107]. This is true of ‘diverse modes of causing’ that can be causes in some causation, but if one mode in causing is possible and another impossible, then according to the possible mode the caused will be such [sc. possible] and according to the impossible mode the caused thing will be different [sc. impossible]; just as the impossible follows from the impossible, though by natural consequence – so I say that by natural consequence the inference holds that if something did cause naturally it would cause necessarily (and even coeternally), but this mode of causing involves a contradiction in the case of ‘causing freely’; however some other mode of causing – namely causing freely – is compossible with this cause, and therefore it does not remove compossibility in the antecedent and consequent [sc. in the inference ‘if it causes freely, then it causes contingently’].

145. As to the fourth [n.110] someone might say (on behalf of this way [n.117]) that ‘to be eternal’ includes a lack of limitation, because it includes being made equal to God in some respect (namely lack of limitation in duration), and this cannot be without lack of limitation [sc. in every respect], because a thing cannot be made equal to God in one respect and not in another.

146. But this is nothing, because what also coexists with God today is not for this reason made equal to eternity, with which it coexists today; and this eternity too, as it coexists with this day, is infinite and independent – and the creature, as coexisting with eternity today, is finite and dependent and so is not made coequal

with it. Therefore one should say that ‘to be eternal’ states some lack of limitation in a creature and hence is repugnant to it; but why there is this repugnance and lack of limitation, let each show through the fundamental reason that he would posit for it.

147. To the fifth [n.111] the response is by reducing it to the opposite, because ‘just as a creature could not actually tend to not-being and yet be always going to be, so it cannot actually have been after non-being and yet always have been’ (now it is of the idea of a creature, according to this position [n.117], that not only is it a having had in aptitude not-being before being, but also a having had in actuality not-being before being).

148. As to the authority [n.112], I say that the authority posited there from Augustine *City of God* is not according to Augustine’s own opinion, but he put it there according to the understanding of the philosophers; hence he prefaces there about the philosophers, “For they speak thus, ‘if a foot were in sand from eternity, etc.’” Hence, according to the truth, that a foot has always been thus and has caused a footprint in the sand involves a contradiction, because the footprint is caused by a pressing down of the foot in the sand through local motion; and so for some motion to have been such without a beginning, when the motion, of its very idea, is between opposites [sc. between a beginning and an end], is a contradiction.

149. To the point about ‘scarcely intelligible’ [n.113] I say that contradictories can be apprehended by the intellect, and can even be apprehended together (otherwise no intellect would say they were contradictories), as is generally plain from the argument of the Philosopher *On the Soul* 3.2.426b8-23, where he proves about the common sense and the other particular senses that no

sense compares extremes unless it apprehends both. But to be understood thus is to be 'scarcely understood' because it is not a being understood along with assent, in the way we say that we 'understand' what we believe to be true and 'do not understand' what we do not believe to be true, although yet we apprehend it.

150. Or it can be said in another way that, if the 'intelligible' is taken for what the intellect can assent to and if it be said that the manner of the philosophers was in this way scarcely intelligible, then the exposition can be that the manner was in its universal form intelligible but not in itself and in particular; for it was intelligible along with assent under the idea of producer and not under the idea of causer – and to understand 'causer' under the idea of producer is to understand 'causer' imperfectly, just as to understand man under the idea of animal is to understand man imperfectly.

151. Or it can in a third way be said (and perhaps in accord with Augustine's mind) that latent contradictories – as long as an evident contradiction in them is not perceived – can in some way be apprehended by the intellect, but not with certitude; and so this 'contradiction', if it exists, did yet escape the philosophers and could by them be 'scarcely understood'.

152. As to what is added about the philosophers, it can be said that they conceded many latent contradictions – as that they commonly denied that there was a first cause causing contingently, and yet they said that there is contingency in beings and that some things happen contingently; but there is a contradiction involved in 'some things happening contingently and the first cause causing necessarily', as was proved in 1 d.8 nn.275-277, 281-291, and 1 d.39 nn.35-37, 41,



91 [in the *Lectura*; there is no d.39 in the *Ordinatio*], and to some extent above at nn.69-70.

153. As to what is added about the four causes [n.115] (which are considered by the metaphysician), and that proves that the abstraction, in understanding, of the efficient cause is from the mover and changer – I say that not everything abstracted in understanding (or in the consideration of the intellect) needs to be able to be separated in being from that from which abstraction in the intellect is made; and so from this it does not follow that there is in fact some efficient cause which is not a mover or changer.

#### IV. To the Reasons for the Second Opinion when holding the First Opinion

154. Now as to those who hold the first opinion [sc. God can make something other than himself without a beginning, n.102], especially because no contradiction is found in the terms ‘other than God’ and ‘to exist eternally’ [n.114, Aquinas *On Power* q.3 a.14], and secondly because the reasons that seem to prove contradiction are special (and so, although they prove contradiction of something special, yet do not prove it of everything that is ‘other than God’ [Aquinas *ST Ia* q.46 a.2 ad 8]), and thirdly because some reasons seem to reject a like able to come to be about the future as about the past [n.127] (although however no one denies ‘the possibility of a future without end’ or the coming to be of the non-successive or the able to come to be of the successive) – those, as I say, who hold this first opinion have a reply to the reasons against this opinion that show contradiction [nn.117-28].

To the first [n.117], that some creature could have been always produced, as an angel, whose being is to be in eternity.

155. And if you say that that creature [sc. an angel] at some time comes to be [n.117] – they would concede that it comes to be in an instant of eternity and that it always comes to be and is produced when it is. And when the inference is drawn that ‘therefore it would be successive’ [n.117], this does not follow, because the Son of God too is always generated, and yet is not something successive but supremely permanent, because the instant in which he is generated always persists. And so they would say that the same ‘now’ persists, wherein the angel persists and receives being, and thus there is no succession; for successive things always receive one part in being after another.

156. To the other proof, about being conserved and created [n.118], the answer will be plain in the first question about eternity [2 d.2 nn.49-51, 63].

157. To the point added about acquired being [n.120] – they concede that a creature has an acquired being, because it does not have a being that is of itself formally necessary; yet it does not seem to have been acquired after not-being, but acquisition (like reception too) seems to stand sufficiently if the creature does not have of itself what it is said to acquire, whether what it acquires is new or old.

158. To the second reason, about the Philosopher in *De Interpretatione* (“Everything that is, when it is, necessarily is” [n.121]), the response is plain from earlier [1 d.39 nn.55, 58 of the *Lectura* and 1 d.39-40 nn.45, 49 of the *Reportatio*], where this objection is introduced to prove that a thing does not exist contingently in the instant for which it exists, since then the opposite could be present in it; and from this it is plain that the assumption is false – rather, in the instant and for the instant in which it is and for

which it is, it exists contingently, as was proved and determined there. And I say the same of the cause, because the cause does not cause insofar as it precedes the effect in duration, but it is cause insofar as it precedes the effect in nature; if therefore every cause – for the instant for which it causes – necessarily causes and not contingently, then every cause necessarily causes and none contingently.

159. As to the third reason [n.124], one could deny that there is in each species an equal possibility for eternity and everlastingness, because a contradiction does not appear on the part of each species equally [e.g. it does not appear on the part of angels but does on the part of souls, n.154 ref. to Aquinas]; and so not a like possibility. Or if it be conceded of an ass that it could have been produced from eternity, and could have generated, and that consequently from it all the asses could have been that have been generated up to now [n.124] – when you ask whether they were finite or infinite, let it be denied that they are infinite; rather let it be said that they were finite [editors: the position actually adopted by Thomas of Sutton, who supposed an infinite past time before the first generation by the first ass, but a finite time from the first generation to the present].

160. And when the inference is drawn [n.124] that ‘therefore the whole duration from the production of that ass up to this one would have been finite’, let the consequence be denied; for although the first ass was produced from eternity, yet it could not have been generated from eternity, because generation necessarily includes – in creatures – that there is a change between opposite terms (namely privation and form), and whatever is between opposites succeeding to each other cannot be eternal.

161. And if you say that the ass would in that case have had to be at rest from generating for an infinite time (although however it had been made perfect and capable of

generating), which seems unacceptable – I reply that the ass was not from eternity made more perfect for generating than God for causing, and yet for you [sc. someone who posits that creatures were produced at some time and not always, n.117] God must have been at rest from causing *a* for a quasi-imagined infinite duration, such that there would be a contradiction in his having caused anything without a quasi-imagined infinite past having gone by; and yet in the causing of it, namely in the giving of total existence to what has being in itself [sc. as to the first ass], it does not seem that newness was as necessarily included as it is in generation, which is from privation to form. It is not disagreeable, therefore, that, if an ass had to have generated, it was at rest for an imagined infinite time from an action [sc. generation] that necessarily involves its being new, when you posit that God was necessarily at rest from an action that you do not show formally includes newness.

a. [*Interpolation* from Appendix A] and so, as to anything else that would have been created from eternity, what is said is that it had rested for an imagined eternity.

162. To the fourth [n.125] I say that the whole deduction about those powers seems to be superfluous and to be at fault in many ways.<sup>6</sup> And yet when speaking of

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<sup>6</sup> Vatican Editors quote from Henry *Quodlibet* 8 a.9: "If the creature has from God actual being, then the creature is of itself a possible to be...; wherefore, since just as being simply is related to possible being simply, so too is being from eternity to possible being from eternity – therefore, if the creature has from God being from eternity, then the creature is of itself a possible to be from eternity...and a not haver of being from eternity. I ask therefore whether at the same time the creature has altogether from God being from eternity and from itself possible being and not-being from eternity, or whether it has being first from God before the reverse, or the other way around? Not in the first way because then contrary acts would be together in the same thing, namely being and not-being; nor in the second way, because what belongs to a thing from itself is prior to what belongs to it from another. So the third way is necessary, namely that the creature has from itself possible being and not-being before it has being from God... -- Being able to be in existence and being able not to be in existence, do they have being in the essence of the creature at the same time, or one first and then another? Not

power as he himself [sc. Henry] does in arguing at the end, one should conclude that ‘potency to not-being’ necessarily precedes potency to being, and thus his argument, namely about contrary potencies (which he takes from the Philosopher *On the Heavens* 1.12.281b9-18) should be understood of potencies impossible with their acts; and then if potency for not-being necessarily precedes potency for being, then being necessarily precedes not-being, because potency for not-being never exists, according to this understanding [sc. about potencies impossible with their acts], unless in the same thing being has preceded.

163. Here one needs to know that when speaking properly of potency, namely prior to act, the subject of the immediate opposites is never in opposite potencies at the same time, because then it would lack both acts, and so the opposites would not be immediate to the same subject; and in the case of these it is true that never is the potency for one without the act of the other; not because the act is receptive of the potency, rather

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together because contrary powers (according to the Philosopher *On the Heavens*) cannot be wholly together in the same thing, just as neither can contrary acts; for if (as they say) the powers were present together...then two contrary powers could at the same time issue in contrary acts, and from the positing of a possible in being there would follow a false impossible. – Can then in the essence of the creature possible being in existence precede possible not-being in existence, or the reverse, and this either in nature or in duration? Now possible being cannot precede in nature, because not-being precedes being in nature... Possible not-being then precedes possible being. There remains a doubt, therefore, which of these precedes in duration? For if one of them precedes in duration then of necessity either possible this precedes possible that, or the reverse, or either of them can indifferently precede the other. And the last of these is impossible because then the essence of the creature under indifference would be disposed to both of them, and thus to the possible and to the act of them; but as it is, the essence of the creature is not equally disposed to act of existing and act of not-existing, because it is not of a nature to have the act of existing save from another, while the act of not-existing it has from itself... But if possible to be precedes in duration, and this of necessity... then of necessity the existence of the creature would precede its not-being (thus the creature would not be of itself a non-being in nature before it would be a being from another by some duration; for nothing belongs prior in nature to something which is not of a nature to belong first in duration to the same); but this is impossible, because (as has been said) what belongs to something of itself by nature is prior to what belongs to it from another. The second member (what I called above ‘the reverse’) is therefore necessary, that of necessity possible not to be is prior in the being of the creature in duration; wherefore so too is its not-being prior not only in nature but also in duration... It remains therefore that the creature cannot have being from something other than itself prior in duration to its having not-being (which belongs to it of itself) – and thus in no way could it be posited that a created thing could be made from eternity but from time.”

the subject alone receives the potency, just as it also receives the act of it (for if act *a* is prior to potency for *b*, because it is the idea of being receptive – then it is also prior to *b* itself, because in the same thing potency is prior by nature to act; but *b* is by the same reason prior in potency to *a*, and thus the same thing is prior and posterior to the same thing) – but the potency for one is necessarily concomitant with the act of the other, because of the immediacy of the acts.

164. To the proposed conclusion [n.125] I say that the creature was not from eternity under potency to being but under potency to not being, but it was first under potency to being (according to truth) because it was under not being, and so it was not in potency to not being; but if it had existed from eternity, it would always have existed under potency to not being, and never under potency to being but under act [sc. of being]. But if you are not speaking of potency before act but of quasi subjective potency, and if you are assuming essence not to be in this way to being save as under not being, the assumption is false and was rejected above [n.162].

165. Passing over this point about potencies, then, the argument in brief seems to stand on this, that opposites which are in the same thing in order of nature cannot be in the same thing at the same time in order of duration, because what is first by nature in a thing is first by duration in it; therefore, being and not being, since they are present in a stone in order of nature, cannot be present in it at the same time in duration, nor can they precede each other indifferently, but necessarily not being precedes being in duration, and so the stone could not have existed for ever. Now there is proof as follows that not being is present by nature first before being is: because not being belongs to a stone from itself,

while being belongs to it not from itself but from another [from Henry: see footnote to n.162].

166. In response to this [n.165] I say that two opposites are not present in the same thing at the same time in order of nature when speaking quasi positively of order of nature (the way one must speak of animal and rational, of substance and accident), but they are thus present when speaking quasi privatively, namely that one of the two is present unless it is impeded – and this way was expounded in the preceding question [n.61], when expounding the opinion of Avicenna; and in this way I say that it is not necessary that what belongs to something first in nature should belong to it first in duration; for that which does not have any being from itself can be prevented by a positive cause that gives it something which it does not have of itself; and so it would, prior in duration to what it has from itself, have the opposite of this first.

167. This response [n.166] is plain in the case of other things. For the argument [sc. of Henry, footnote to n.162] would prove that God could not create matter under form, because matter is in nature first without form before it is with form, for it has privation of form from itself and it has possession of form from another; therefore form could not be in matter unless unformed matter had been prior in duration. But this argument is not conclusive, because matter is not of itself positively without form but only privatively without form, for from itself it does not yet have form but from another (as from its generator or creator), and it alone by itself, without any other positive cause, suffices for its being without form; it would therefore always be without form unless there were some positive cause impeding its continuing without form; and yet, because a positive cause can, from the beginning of essence itself, prevent matter's being deprived

by giving it being so that it is not always without form, therefore one should not necessarily deduce a priority of duration from such a priority of nature.

168. To the other point, about an infinity of souls [n.126] I reply that anything which cannot be made by God in one day ‘because it involves a contradiction’ cannot, for the same reason, be made by him in an infinite past time (if there had been an infinite past time). For in this one day there are infinite instants (nay, in one hour of this day), in each of which he could create a soul just as he could in one day of the whole of infinite time, if there were such infinite time (for it is not necessary that God rest from one day to the next in order to create one soul after another), and so if in the infinite instants of this day he cannot create infinite souls (because this cannot be done), neither could he have created infinite souls in the infinite days of the whole of past time.

169. And if you say ‘the instants of this day have not been actual in the way the infinite days of the past have been’, this is not enough, because just as the infinite instants of the infinite days – wherein God would have created – would have been in potency according to you [sc. you who say that the instants of this day have not been actual] (just as ‘the indivisible’ is in continuous coming to be and is not actual), because none of the instants would have been the end in actuality of the whole time, so too about the infinite instants of this day; therefore the instants of this day – or of this hour – seem to have an infinity equal to the infinite instants of the infinite days, and so the proposed conclusion seems to follow [n.168]. Yet some philosophers would concede that an infinity in accidentally ordered things is not impossible, as is plain from Avicenna *Metaphysics* 6.2 [f. 92ra], on causes.



170. As to the argument about the passing through of an infinite time [n.127], it seems to reject an eternity of successive things. But according to those who hold this opinion [sc. the first, n.102], there is not the same impossibility in successive things as in permanent ones, because although a permanence (of any kind) could be measured by time as to its motions, yet they posit that it is measured by eternity as to its substantial being; and so, to posit that a permanent thing is without beginning does not seem to mean positing that anything infinite has been taken.

171. This reasoning about ‘the successive infinite’ [n.170] is confirmed by the imagination about a converted line: that if some line were extended as it were to infinity, then, beginning from this point *a*, it would not be possible for it to be passed over; therefore it also seems that by imagining, to the converse, a line thus as it were taken into the past, it would not seem possible for it to be taken forward to this point *a*.

172. To the final argument [n.128] one can say that equal and greater and lesser only belong to a finite quantity of amount, because ‘quantity’ is divided first into finite and infinite before equal and unequal belong to it; for it is of the idea of a greater quantity to exceed and of a lesser quantity to be exceeded and of an equal quantity to be of the same measure – and all of these seem to involve finitude; and therefore an infinite should be denied to be equal to an infinite, because equal and unequal and greater and lesser are differences of finite quantity and not of infinite quantity [cf. Thomas of Sutton].

#### IV. To the Principal Arguments of Each Part

173. To the first principal argument [n.96] I concede that matter is ungenerated and incorruptible; but it does not follow from this that it is eternal, because although matter does not have a source whence it comes to be, it is yet itself a produced whole – and this production is not generation, because generation and corruption are of composites and not of simples.

174. To the second argument [n.97], about the eternity of time, I say that it is not valid, because it otherwise entails that ‘the mover cannot not move’<sup>7</sup> (this response was made to the argument in the preceding question [n.70]). And as to what is argued and added about ‘before’ [n.97], I say that it is not conclusive save about an imagined ‘before’, or in the way that eternity is ‘before’ – which is nothing; it is as when we say ‘outside the universe there is nothing’, where the ‘outside’ is denied, or only an imagined ‘outside’ is asserted.

175. To the third about *On Generation* [n.98]. Although the proposition is in some way probable that ‘the corruption of one thing is the generation of another’ (I say that it is to this extent true, that no natural agent intends per se to corrupt anything, but it per accidens corrupts that which is impossible with the generated thing that it per se intends), yet from this no perpetuity of generation follows, because the ultimate corruption can be concomitant with the ultimate generation, for example when all mixed things are resolved to the elements – and then there will be a stand both of generation and of corruption, although the ultimate corruption is not annihilation;<sup>a</sup> however the Philosopher supposes another proposition along with this one [sc. ‘the corruption of one

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<sup>7</sup> The mss. are obscure here. The Vatican editors note that the second ‘not’ is omitted by them, and they also print ‘be moved’ and not ‘move [something]’. But Scotus’ criticism seems to be that if time has to be eternal then God has to be always moving things, which he rejected in n.70 against the philosophers. Accordingly the alternative reading in the mss. of ‘move’ for ‘be moved’, together with the addition of ‘not’, is translated here.

thing is the generation of another’], namely that such a generable thing is again corruptible, and that its corruption is the generation of something else – and this is not true. But when arguing about past things one should take the proposition that ‘the generation of one thing is the corruption of another’ – and this is not as true from the per se intention of a natural agent as is the previous one; for it is accidental that the generator corrupts, because of the impossibility of the term to be corrupted with the term the generator intends, because the generator cannot produce the form it intends save in preexisting matter – and this preexisting matter is commonly under a form impossible with the form it intends, and so it must corrupt the preexisting composite in order to generate what it intends. And given that from this it would follow that there would be no generation in which the whole is produced, the eternity of the thing would not follow for this reason – because when the whole is produced it is not necessary that a part of it preexist under an impossible form, and such production of some being does not have to be the destruction of some other being, but only the destruction of nothing or of not being precisely; and then there is no need for another production to have preceded the first production, because the term ‘from which’ [sc. nothing] of this production was not the term ‘to which’ of some other production, because ‘nothing’ was produced by no production.

a. [*Interpolation*] because it is to matter, which is not nothing.

176. To the fourth [n.99] about succession because of motion (when it is said that ‘an agent not causing by motion and not able to be prevented can have an effect coeval with it’), one should say that where cause and effect can have an essence of one kind this

major is true; but where they cannot be of one kind but the priority of nature in the cause requires of necessity priority of duration in the cause with respect to the effect, here the major is false; and so it is in the case at hand.

177. To the first argument for the opposite [n.100] I say that either that is not the definition of creature but a certain description, conceded by Arius (against whom Augustine is arguing) because Arius said that ‘the Son of God at some time was not’ – and then it is enough for Augustine to take against Arius this definition or description as conceded by him, and, from denying this description (conceded by Arius) of the Son of God, to conclude against him that the Son is not a creature; or if it is the definition of creature (speaking properly of creature qua creature), yet it is not for this reason a definition of whatever is other than God (for example of an angel or a man) – because it would be said that this definition is accidental to that which it is ‘to be a creature’. But if something were posited to be the definition of ‘what begins’ and in fact everything other than God is a thing that begins – ‘therefore everything other than God is a creature’ does not follow but is a fallacy of the accident, because of the extraneousness of the middle term with respect to the third as it is compared to the first; for not everything that is repugnant to the accident is repugnant to the subject of which such accident is an accident.<sup>8</sup>

178. To the second, about the infinite in multitude and magnitude [n.101] – the response was made before, in the response about the actual infinity of souls [n.168].

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<sup>8</sup> Tr. The argument being criticized would run: ‘what begins is a creature, everything other than God begins, therefore everything other than God is a creature’. The middle term is ‘what begins’ which is extraneous both to ‘other than God’ and to ‘creature’, because ‘what begins’ is not part of what it is to be a creature or of what it is to be other than God, but is accidental to both. For those who hold the first opinion think a thing can be a creature and other than God and yet not have had a beginning (in time).

## Question Four

### *Whether the Creation of an Angel is the same as the Angel*

179. Fourth I ask whether the creation of an angel is the same as the angel.

180. That it is not:

Because according to Avicenna *Metaphysics* 5.1 (f. 86va), “horse-ness is just horse-ness, neither one thing nor many;”<sup>9</sup> therefore, by parity of reasoning, an angel is just an angel, and no respect is the same as it.

181. Second thus: there is creation of an angel only in the first instant of nature, when the angel receives being; but an angel persists after the first instant, and nothing persists without that which is really the same as it; therefore etc.

182. Third thus: because if creation were the same as the angel, God could not renew *de novo* one and the same – annihilated – angel in number; the consequent is false, therefore so is the antecedent. Proof of the consequence: God cannot renew the same creation in number (so it seems) because neither can he renew the same motion in number (according to some), for the interruption would prevent the motion from being the same in number.

183. Fourth thus: ‘generated fire’ is from some other fire that causally generates it (and consequently the generated fire has its nature from the other fire); and yet creation – in a causally generated fire – is not from a generating fire; therefore etc. The proof of the

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<sup>9</sup> “Hence horse-ness is not anything but horse-ness alone; for it is of itself neither many nor one, nor is it existent in these sensibles or in the soul; nor is it anything of these in potency or in fact, such that this be contained within the essence of horse-ness.”

minor is that then the generated fire would have from the generating fire the fact that it is a creature, because the fire is created by whatever agent creation in the fire is from – but this consequent seems false, because ‘being a creature’ states only a respect to the Creator.

184. Fifth thus: change differs from the term to which; creation is change; therefore etc.

185. Proof of the major [n.184]: both because change precedes the term, and because change is in the genus of undergoing (for motion is too), according to the Commentator, *Physics* 5 com.9; but the intrinsic term is of the same genus as the thing it is the term of (as point is of the same genus as line), but the form to which there is motion or change is not of the genus of undergoing (from *Physics* 5.2.226a23-25).

186. Proof of the minor: first, because a new relation does not come to a thing without change of some extreme; through creation there is a new relation of the creature to God, because something new is said of the Creator but only because of a new relation in that to which he is said [sc. to be Creator]. There is confirmation from Augustine *On the Trinity* 5.16 n.17: “Those things are relative to God that exist with a change in that of which they are said.” Second, because “in every genus there is some one thing that is the measure of all other things that there are in that genus” (Averroes, *Metaphysics* 10 com.2); but the first thing in the genus of changes does not seem it can be set down as generation, because generation is not the idea of change in all changeables, for not all changeable things are generated – likewise the opposition between the terms of generation, which are privation and form, is not the greatest; but there is a greater opposition between the terms

of creation, which are contradictories, as being and nothing; therefore creation is the first change.

187. To the opposite:

If the creation of an angel is other than the angel, then either it is the Creator – which is not the case because creation is new; or it is a mean between the Creator and the creature – which is not the case, because nothing is the mean; or it is posterior to the created thing – which is not the case because creation is as it were the way to the being of a creature. Therefore creation is the same as the angel.

## Question Five

*Whether the Relation of the Creature to God is the Same as its Foundation*

188. And because this question [question 4, n.179] depends on a certain other question, namely about ‘the identity of the relation with its foundation’, and this when speaking specifically of the relation which is of the creature to God – therefore I ask fifth whether the relation of the creature to God is the same as its foundation.

189. It seems that it is not:

First thus: everything ‘other than God’ has a relation to him, therefore everything other would be ‘relative to something’ not only accidentally but by identity; the consequent seems impossible, because the Philosopher infers it, *Metaphysics* 4.6.1011a19-20, from the statement of those who say ‘everything that appears is true’.

190. Second thus: the categories are primarily diverse – from *Metaphysics* 5.9.1018a12-13, 10.3.1054b28-30 – and are as beings simply diverse, because being is of itself divided into them (*Metaphysics* 5.7.1017a22-27); therefore nothing in one category is the same as something in another category. Therefore no relation is the same as something absolute.

191. The opposite:

Any created thing whatever does not less depend on God than any created thing whatever depends on another created thing, because dependence on the First thing seems most essential; but a whole has a relation to its parts the same as to itself, because it cannot be a whole and not be made of parts; therefore, by parity of reasoning, it will have a dependence on the first cause, albeit an extrinsic first cause, the same as to itself. For although an extrinsic cause does not constitute a thing the way the intrinsic cause does, yet it causes the thing more perfectly than an intrinsic cause does; for to constitute a thing involves imperfection, namely potentiality.

## I. To the Fifth Question

### A. On the Identity of Relation in General to its Foundation

#### 1. The Opinion of Henry of Ghent

192. [Exposition of the opinion] – Here it is said [sc. by Henry] that every relation is the same as its foundation – look at his *Quodlibet* 9 q.3 and 5 q.2 (which seem as it were to be contrary).

193. For this opinion multiple arguments are given:



First, that relation is transferred to God according to the proper idea of relation, and therefore there are said to be two categories properly in divine reality, namely relation and substance [1 d.8 n.130]; but if it were going to be of the idea of relation that it would be a different thing from its foundation, then in God there would be thing and thing, which is against divine simplicity.

194. And from this middle term, namely from simplicity, a general argument is made: for a ‘like white thing’ is not more composite than a white thing simply, and consequently the relation of likeness does not add anything different from the foundation; therefore neither is relation a different thing.

195. Secondly this point is argued by way of change, that if relation were a different thing from the foundation, then whatever foundation it would come to *de novo* would be changed – which seems to be denied by many authorities; first of the Philosopher *Physics* 5.1.225a34, who denies that there is motion or change in the category of relation; second of Boethius *On the Trinity* ch.5 (look at him there [not *expressis verbis* but implicitly]); third of Anselm *Monologion* ch.25.<sup>a</sup>

a. [Interpolation] from Boethius *On the Trinity*: negative and relative predicates make no composition (look at him there); third of Anselm, *Monologion*, “For it is clear that for a man after a year...”

196. Third an argument is made from this, that if relation were a thing different from its foundation then likeness would have its own presence in a subject different from the presence in it of whiteness; and this seems *prima facie* unacceptable, because a relation founded on a substance (if there is any) would be accidental because of its own

accidentality – which seems against Simplicius *On the Categories* (f. 95r, 40v-41r) where he says that the Philosopher treats of quantity and quality before relation because relation is founded immediately on these; and it is not founded on substance immediately (and this when speaking of accidental relation), because relation founded on substance does not have a proper accidentality of itself.

197. The same preceding inference [n.196] is also proved to be unacceptable because then the genus of relation would not be simple but as it were composed of ‘in’ and ‘to’ – which seems unacceptable because the first concept of any first genus should be altogether simple, as it seems; therefore etc.

198. Fourth it is argued that if relation were a thing other than the foundation, then there would be an infinite regress in relations; for if this relation is a thing other than the foundation, by parity of reasoning the otherness too (which is a certain relation) will be a thing other than the foundation, and this otherness a thing other than the foundation, and so on ad infinitum; but this is unacceptable, therefore etc.

199. Fifth thus: relation does not have a distinction in its species save by reason of the foundation (for lordship is not distinguished from paternity by the fact it is ‘in relation to’ but by reason of the foundation – nor are these disparate relations distinguished, nor are they the same as relations of equivalence, save by reason of unity and difference of form in the foundations [n.205]); but if relation were a thing other than the foundation, it would have of itself formally a distinction in its species; therefore etc.<sup>a</sup>

a. [Interpolation]: Again, if likeness in this thing [sc. one of two things alike in whiteness] is other than the whiteness in it, by parity of reasoning the likeness in the other term [sc. the other white thing the first white thing is like] is also other than the whiteness in it; therefore both foundations

can be together without this likeness or that, as things prior in nature can be without things posterior in nature; and so two white things can be together and not two like things – which seems impossible, because likeness is unity in quality.

200. [Rejection of the opinion] – Against this opinion I argue first as follows:  
nothing is the same really as anything that it can, without contradiction, really be without;  
but there are many relations that foundations can, without contradiction, be without;  
therefore there are many relations that are not the same really as their foundation.

201. Proof of the major: because that the ‘same being’ should really be and really not be seems to be opposed to the first principle [sc. the principle that the same thing cannot both be and not be at the same time etc.], from which first principle the diversity of things seems at once to be inferred; because if contradictories are said of certain things, these things seem not to be the same in the way that the contradictories are said of them, and so if the contradictories ‘to be’ and ‘not to be’ are said of them, they seem not to be the same in being or in reality, or not to be the same being.

202. There is confirmation of this, because if the major [n.200] is denied, there seems no way left for being able to prove the distinction of things; for it will be said by the impudent not only that the several natures in one supposit – as substance and accidents – are the same, but also that Socrates and Plato are the same, or that Socrates and stone or white do not really differ; and if it be argued against him that ‘Socrates can exist when a stone does not exist’ and if from this the distinction of one from the other is inferred, or if it be argued that ‘Socrates can exist and not be white’ and if from this the distinction of subject and accident is inferred – the consequence will be denied, because the impudent will deny the proposition [sc. the major, n.200] on which these

consequences rely, which proposition you also deny [sc. *ex hypothesi* from the beginning of this paragraph].

203. This proposition too, ‘those things, one of which can persist without the other, are really distinct’, will be denied by the impudent. But once it has been denied, the whole doctrine of the Philosopher perishes, *Topics* 7.8-9.154a23-55a38, whereby he teaches that a proposition or problem is easily destroyed by discovery of its contradictory but is with difficulty established; but if this proposition [sc. at the beginning of this paragraph] is denied, no proposition or problem seems able to be destroyed (because if it is not destroyed by a contradiction then not by any other opposition either), or at least it seems not able easily or very easily to be sustained – because no place [sc. of argument] according to or assigned by Aristotle seems efficacious for destroying anything if this place is destroyed.

204. On this way of the philosopher is also founded the way of motion or change for proving a distinction – the way that the philosopher uses when proving that matter is a thing other than form, because it remains the same under opposed forms; the Philosopher also uses it, in *Physics* 5.2.220a1-11,<sup>a</sup> to prove that place is other than the things placed in it, because the same place persists along with different things placed in it.

a. [Interpolation from Appendix A] Averroes com.3 and more manifestly in com.7 says, “If place is prior to any natural body (as Homer posits), then there could be place without body, and the place would not be corrupted on the corruption of the body.” See there.

205. The minor [n.200] is also plain in all relations whose foundations can exist without terms, as is the case with all relations of equivalence (as are similar, equal, and

the like); for if this white exists and that white does not, this white is without likeness – and if that white should come to be, there is likeness in this white; therefore this white can exist with it and without it. It is similar in the case of many relations of non-equivalence; for if this man exists and he is such that no one else is subject to his power, he will be without lordship – and again he can be a lord with the accession of slaves, as Boethius says [*On the Trinity* ch.5]; and so it is in many other cases, about none of which is there need to adduce examples.

206. This reason [n.200] is also confirmed as to the whole of itself (because the following confirmations are valid for both the major and the minor); for if a relation is not other than its foundation, which yet remains in the relation's absence, the incarnation seems to be denied, and the separation of accidents from the subject in the Eucharist; also every composition in things seems to be denied, and all the causality of second causes.

207. Proof of the first unacceptable result [sc. about the incarnation]: if the union of human nature with the Word is the same really as the human nature, then if the Word had never assumed that nature and made it, the same nature, absolute, then it would really have been united with the Word as it is now, because the whole reality of the assumption was assumed; also if the Word put aside the nature (while the nature itself remained in itself the same), the nature would remain really united with the Word and as really as it is united now, because the whole reality of the nature would then be preserved as it is now.

208. The proof also of the second unacceptable result [n.206], about the Eucharist: that if the same quantity of bread remains (the same as was before), and if the inherence of the Eucharist in the bread is nothing other than really that very quantity, then the Eucharist is really united to the bread (or informs it) now as before.

209. Proof of the third unacceptable result [n.206, composition in things]: because if  $a$  and  $b$  compose  $ab$ , and if the union of these parts with each other is nothing other than absolute  $a$  and  $b$ , then when  $a$  and  $b$  are really separate the whole reality remains that belongs to  $a$  and  $b$  united. And then  $a$  and  $b$  when separated remain really united and so the composite remains when the components are separated, and so the composite will not be composite – because when the composite remains while the component parts are separated, it is not composed of them; for then nothing would remain but a one by aggregation, as the Philosopher seems to conclude in *Metaphysics* 7.17.1041b11-19.

210. Proof too of the fourth unacceptable result [n.206, about the causality of second causes]: because whatever is caused by diverse second causes requires in them first a due proportion and coming together so that it may be caused by them; but if this coming together and proportion are only something absolute, then the causes are in this way really causative of this sort of effect when they do not come together just as when they do, and thus they can when together really cause nothing that they cannot cause even when not together; for when no other reality is posited, no thing can be caused that could not have been caused before. And thus could one have argued in the case of the third member, about the composite parts [n.209], because if  $a$  and  $b$  when separate do not compose  $ab$ , then neither do they do so when united, because just as the same thing – without any other reality – cannot cause something now which it could not cause before, so neither can the same things without any other reality compose now something that they could not compose before; therefore etc.

211. Second<sup>a</sup> principally I argue against the aforesaid position [n.192]: nothing finite contains, according to perfect or virtual containing, opposites formally (because

however much in God is conceded a most perfect containing of all perfections by identity that are in him, yet he cannot contain absolute opposites formally in himself, although he could have in himself such opposites virtually and such relatives formally – but from this is conceded an infinity of the foundation). But equality and inequality are opposites formally, and similarly likeness and unlikeness – at any rate relative to the same correlative term; but these can be perfectly founded on the same foundation successively. Therefore the foundation contains neither of them formally (or, more to the point, really and by perfect identity), because the reason for its not containing both is the same as the reason for its not containing either.

a. [*Interpolation* from Appendix A] This reason is doubly deficient: first because the major is false of divine relations, second because the first part of the minor is false, save when making comparison to the same thing; thus there are two false premises. However the major holds the difficulty by adding to the subject the ‘nothing finite’ etc. – The minor is true when comparing equality and inequality to the same thing, and thus both are in the same foundation, though successively.

212. Third thus: the same thing does not contain many things of the same idea the same in perfect identity with itself; but many relations of the same idea are in the same foundation, as there are many likenesses founded on the same whiteness; therefore etc. The major is plain inductively in the case of everything that contains many things by identity, because one containing thing contains one thing of the same idea.

213. Fourth thus: that which contains something by identity entails too, if it is more perfect, that what is contained in it is more perfect by identity (as a more perfect

soul has a more perfect intellect – and according to those who posit that the same form is intellective and sensitive, and of corporeity and of substance, the intellective form includes a more perfect sensitive form than is the sensitive form in brutes); but a more perfect foundation does not contain in itself a more perfect relation, because not every whiter thing is more alike, as is manifest to the senses; therefore etc.

214. Fifth thus: things contained in something by identity are not less different if the containers of them are more distinct; but relations founded on two genera are less different than two relations founded on a thing of the same genus (nay on the same most specific species), because equality, which is founded on quantity, and likeness, founded on quality, are less different than likeness and relation of active power, which can be founded on the same heat; therefore etc.

215. Sixth and last thus: a relation of reason is a thing of reason different from its foundation, therefore a real relation too will be a real thing different from its foundation. The proof of the consequence is that, just as a relation of reason is the mode of the object in the first act of the intellect, and yet it is in itself not nothing in the genus of intelligibles but is in itself something truly intelligible (although it is not as or equally first as that of which it is the mode, since it is only understood by a reflex act – and so it is not as perfectly understood as that of which it is the mode), so too a real relation, although it is a mode of its foundation (and not equally first with it, nor as equally perfect as it), yet in itself it is a thing, because what is in itself nothing is the real mode of nothing; for there is no more general name than being or thing (according to Avicenna *Metaphysics* 1.6, f. 72rb), and so that to which being or thing do not belong has no real being belonging to it.



216. Further, the conclusion – for which these reasons have been adduced [nn.200-215] – is proved by authorities:

And first from Augustine *On the Trinity* 5.5. n.6, “In the case of created things, what is not spoken of as substance is left to be spoken of as accident;” here he expressly maintains that relation is an accident in creatures. Although this does not have to be understood of the relation that is of the creature to God [cf. nn.253-54, 260-63, below], yet it is certain that it holds, both in truth and in his intention, of the relation that can be lost while the foundation remains.

217. Again, Ambrose *On the Trinity* 1.9 nn.59-60, “If God existed first and later the Father, he has changed by the accession of generation; may God ward off this madness.” Therefore by mere accession of real relation a change could be made in a divine person, according to Ambrose – and this would not be unless that relation was a thing other than the foundation, because the foundation was there beforehand.

218. Again, Hilary *On the Trinity* 12 n.30, “That what was is born is already not only to be born but to undergo change by being born,” and he is speaking of the nativity of the Son of God. Therefore ‘to be born’ states a new relation.

219. Again, the Philosopher in the *Categories* 7.6136-37 says, “Relatives are all things that are said of others or exist to others as to what it is they are,” – and by this reasoning are substances excluded, which, although they are ‘of others’, are yet not ‘to another’; therefore the ‘as to what it is they are’ is taken here, not for existence in the intellect, but for existence in reality. But if relations in reality are of others ‘as to what it is they are’, and a foundation is not of another ‘as to what it is’ – then the being of the latter is one thing and the being of the former another thing; therefore etc.

220. Again, Simplicius *On the Categories* 'Relation' (f. 43r) declares expressly that relation is to another.

221. Again, the Philosopher *Metaphysics* 12.4.1070a31-b4 maintains that as the categories are different so also are their principles – and he exemplifies it specifically of the distinction of relation from other categories and of the distinction of the principles of relation from the principles of other categories..

222. Again, Avicenna *Metaphysics* 3.10 (f. 83va) seems to maintain expressly that relation has its proper certitude; and at the beginning of the chapter he maintains that it has, according to its certitude, its own presence in things and its own accidentality.

## 2. Objections

223. And because stubbornness is possible about relations, by conceding that they are not the same really as their foundation but that they are not different realities, and by denying that they are certain things by saying that a relation exists only in the act of the comparing intellect [Henry of Ghent] – there are arguments against this view: first that it destroys the unity of the universe, second that it destroys all substantial and accidental composition in the universe, third that it destroys all causality of second causes, and fourth that it destroys the reality of all the mathematical sciences.

224. The first is easily proved, because, according to Aristotle *Metaphysics* 12.10.1075a11-15, the unity of the universe exists in the order of the parts to each other and to the first thing, as the unity of an army exists in the order of the parts of the army to each other and to the leader; and from this can be asserted, against those who deny that a

relation is a thing outside the act of the intellect, the word of the Philosopher, *Metaphysics* 12.10.1075b37-6a3, that the sort of people who speak thus “are disconnecting the substance of the universe.”

225. The proof of the second is that nothing is composite without the union of composable parts, such that, when the parts are separated, the composite does not remain; but nothing real depends on what is merely a matter of reason (and precisely of reason caused by an act of our intellect), or at any rate the sort of real that is not a product of art; therefore no ‘whole’ will be a natural real thing if for its being is necessarily required a relation and if this relation is nothing but a being of reason.

226. The proof of the third is that the causing of a real being does not require a being of reason in the cause, and because second causes cannot cause unless they are proportioned and nearby; therefore, if this being nearby is only a being of reason, causes under this being nearby will not be able to cause anything real. Because without this being nearby they cannot cause, and this being nearby (which is a relation) is no real thing, according to you [n.223, Henry] – therefore a second cause contributes nothing to a being able to cause.

227. The proof of the fourth is that all mathematical conclusions demonstrate relations of subjects. The point is clear first from the authority of the Philosopher, *Metaphysics* 13.3.1078a31-b2, who says, “Of the good the species most of all are order [common measure and the definite] etc... and these are shown most of all by the mathematician,” because a mathematician’s art lies in proportion and the measures of certain things with each other. Secondly, this same thing is plain from experience by running through mathematical conclusions, in all of which some relative property is

commonly predicated; as is plain beginning from the first conclusion of geometry, where the equality of the sides of a triangle is shown, or the predicate ‘able to be the base or side of an equilateral triangle’ is shown of a straight line; and so in all the rest, as that a triangle has three angles equal to two right angles (the property demonstrated of the three angles of a triangle is this, namely ‘equal to two right angles’), and so in other cases.

228. But if the stubbornness is still continued, that although relations are not formally beings of reason but something outside the intellect and not the same as the foundation, yet they are not a thing different from the foundation but are only proper modes of the thing – this objection seems to be a contention only about the term ‘mode of a thing’; for although the mode of a thing is not a thing other than the thing of which it is the mode, yet it is not no thing (just as neither is it no being), because then it would be nothing; and therefore relation falls under the division of being per se, according to the Philosopher *Metaphysics* 5.7.1017a24-27. Nor is everything into which ‘being per se’ is divided an equally perfect being; on the contrary, quality in respect of substance can be called a ‘mode’ and yet quality is in itself a true thing. Thus relation, although it is a mode (though one more imperfect still than quality), yet if it is outside the intellect (and not a mode intrinsic to the foundation, as infinity is in God and the infinity of all the essentials in God, as was said in 1 d.8 nn.192, 220-221 [d.3 n.58, d.10 n.30, d.19 n.15, d.31 n.19]) it follows that such a mode, being from the nature of the thing other than the thing, is a different thing from the foundation, taking ‘thing’ in its most general sense as divided into the ten categories.

229. And if it be said that the genus of relation is a thing, not because of the mode that is a disposition to something else, but because of the thing to which the being toward

another belongs – this is not true; because just as every ‘being for itself’, conceived under an absolute idea, can pertain essentially to some absolute genus provided it is per se one (for no mode of conceiving, along with which the concept ‘per se unity’ [or: the per se unity of a concept] can stand, and which concept is absolute, takes away from the thing thus conceived its belonging to an absolute concept, because what is thus conceived includes something absolute asserted of it in its whatness and something said of it in its what-sortness, whereby it is distinguished from other absolute concepts – as its genus and difference, outside the intellect), so every such respect, or disposition or relation (or however it is named, for these are synonyms), can be per se conceived as per se one, having some quidditative predicate asserted of it in its whatness (as it is outside the mind, as was proved [nn.224-227]), and distinct from that in which it is founded, as was proved in the first article [nn.200-222]; therefore a proper genus can be had of those respects as they are respects without including their foundations essentially – and so the reality of the things that are in this genus is not precisely such because of the foundations, formally speaking, because the foundation is outside the per se idea of them as they have the complete of idea of a being in a real genus.

### 3. Scotus’ own Conclusion

230. With the reality of relation thus made clear in the second article [nn.224-229], and its real distinction from the foundation made clear in the first article (and this as to the relations about which the reasons there adduced are conclusive[nn.200-222; the relations in question are those that the foundations can exist without]), the first opinion

[sc. of Henry, n.192] seems sufficiently refuted, whatever understanding it is posited as being understood by.

#### 4. To the Arguments for Henry's Opinion

231. To the first argument for the other opinion [n193] I say that nothing of any genus is said of God, as was said in 1 d.8 nn.95-115; and, just like absolutes, so relations too that are formally said of God are not of any category but are transcendentals and properties of 'being in general', because whatever belongs to being as it is not distinguished into finite and infinite belongs to it before it is divided into categories, and so is transcendent.

232. To the point [n.194] that a like white thing is not more composite than a white thing merely, although it could be easily expounded by stressing the force of the word, saying that 'com-position' is 'position together' [sc. 'like' and 'white' are positioned together in a like white thing but not in a merely white thing, and so a like white thing is more 'com-posite'], however – not caring about the word – one should say as a result that a like white thing is more composite than a white thing merely, because it has in itself act and potency really distinct [sc. its potentiality to be like is now actual, while in a white thing merely its potential to be like remains potential].

233. This should also be conceded by him [sc. Henry], on behalf of whose opinion the argument was made. For he himself concedes that there is never a difference of intention without composition, and that a relation differs from its foundation in creatures by a difference of intention. He concedes too that in divine reality person is a

quasi-composite and essence a quasi-potency and relation a quasi-act [1 d.5 n.52], but where there are quasi-act and quasi-potency there is quasi-composition – so there, where there is act and potency, there is truly composition (but not a composition of two absolute entities, because one entity [sc. ‘like’] is not an absolute entity).

234. To the second argument, about change [n.195], Simplicius *On the Categories* ‘Relation’ (f. 43r) replies: since just as relation is not in respect of itself but of another, so that to which relation applies does not change in respect of itself but of another; and if, in that case, only that is said ‘to be changed’ which is disposed to itself differently now than it was before, there is no change in the category of ‘relation’ – but if ‘to be changed’ is common to a thing’s being differently disposed both to itself and to another, then change is in the category of ‘relation’ (as Simplicius maintains), because in relation someone is differently disposed to another.

235. The Philosopher, however, because he posits that it is not possible for something to be differently disposed to another unless it is differently disposed to itself, says for this reason that there is no motion in the category of relation; hence he only shows what categories motion is first in and what it is not.

236. Again, the Philosopher shows there [*Physics* 5.2.225b10-11] that there is no motion in substance, and yet there is change in substance; so from the Philosopher’s intention one can only get that in the category of relation there is no motion, and with this stands however that there is change in it. And this response is confirmed by the authority of Ambrose adduced above [n.217], who concedes that relation is a thing different from the foundation.

237. To the third argument, about presence-in [a subject, n.196], I concede that relation has its own presence-in (as Avicenna says in his *Metaphysics* [n.222]), and yet a composition of the genus out of things essentially included does not follow, because even quality has its own presence-in (which is not of the idea of its genus formally) and yet it is not composed with a composition respecting the nature of the genus; but this is because a property is present in the thing it belongs to and is not of the per se understanding of that thing, which however seems to be more true of property than of relation.

238. When therefore it is argued that then relation founded on substance would have its own accidentality, because it would have its own presence-in [n.196] – I reply: if there is any such relation (about which the reasons adduced above, in the first article [nn.200, 211-215], are conclusive) I concede the conclusion; both parts of the antecedent [sc. relation founded on substance, and having its own accidentality] seem to be true of the specific identity of one individual with another in species, or of essential likeness in specific form.

239. To the fourth, about infinite regress [n.198], I say that it does not follow, because the relation itself is referred to the foundation; for it cannot be without a foundation, or in the absence of it, without contradiction. For when it exists, and the foundation at the same time, both are the extremes of the relation which is of the relation to the foundation; therefore it cannot be – without contradiction – in the absence of the relation of it to the foundation, and thus it cannot, without contradiction, be in the absence of its foundation – and so the relation by which it is referred to the foundation will be the same as itself (and this will be plainer in the next solution in the following question, nn.268-71).



240. To the fifth argument, about distinction [n.199], I say that relation has distinction into its species as any other genus has distinction into its species; and yet the distinction only becomes known through the foundations, because of the littleness of its entity, which it has in the foundations. So it is also in the case of other accidents, which have a greater identity and reality, that sometimes the distinction is made through extrinsic things and is known from extrinsic distinction; yet in them it is formal, intrinsic, but made known through extrinsic things.

## B. On the Identity with its Foundation of the Special Relation of ‘Creature to God’

### 1. First Opinion

241. [Exposition of the opinion] – The point about relations in general then has been seen. About the special relation of ‘creature to God’ there is one opinion [from William of Ware] that says this relation is the same as its foundation, and this in such a way that the foundation is nothing other than a certain relation to God; for just as a creature, although in itself it is a being, yet in respect of God is called a non-being, according to Anselm [*Monologion* ch.31],<sup>a</sup> – so too, although in itself it is an absolute being, yet in respect of God it is nothing other than a certain respect.

a. [*Interpolation*] which statement must be understood insofar as the comparison falls under negation (in this way: ‘a creature, not in comparison to God, is something’), because according to no comparison is a creature’s entity proportional to God. But the statement is false if the comparison is affirmed (in this way: ‘in comparison to God a creature is nothing’); for such speech is metaphorical, according to Anselm.

242. With this claim seems to agree the statement that relation is the ratifying of the foundation, which was rejected in 1 d.3 nn.302-329, about the vestige.

243. [Rejection of the opinion] – Against this opinion there is Augustine *On the Trinity* 7.1 n.2, “Everything said relatively is, after removal of the relative, still something;” and again, “What is not anything in respect to itself is not anything that is said in respect of another.”

244. The foundation of a relation, therefore, is some entity formally that does not include the relation itself formally – because if it included it formally, the relation would not formally be a relation to another but to itself, for its foundation is formally to itself and the relation is being posited as formally the same as the foundation. Nor could relation be the first foundation of relation, for there would still remain the question what that first relation would be located in. It is not the case, therefore, that a relation is precisely the foundation of a relation.<sup>a</sup>

a. [*Interpolation*] A reason as follows is formed: if relation is not founded in another it is not relation; so either there will be an infinite regress [sc. if relation is founded in relation] or relation will eventually be founded in the absolute. But the idea of the absolute is that it is to itself, while the formal idea of relation is disposition to another; but formal entity to itself is not the same as formal entity to another; therefore etc. – Again, that in whose quidditative idea there is a disposition to another is not to itself, nor is it absolute; therefore nothing created is an absolute entity.

245. This fact [sc. the foundation does not formally include the relation] is also plain in divine relations, where there is the greatest identity with the foundation; and yet

the foundation is not formally the relation, because then the foundation would not be formally infinite perfection [1 d.5 nn.114, 117].

246. Secondly there is argument against the aforesaid opinion [n.241] as follows: a definition indicates the total quiddity of a thing, provided it is perfect; but the definition of stone does not include, essentially or formally, respect to another, because then it would not be the definition of stone as stone is in an absolute genus, and so it would not be of a stone as stone is in the genus of substance or as it is a species of substance; therefore in the essence of stone, formally, no respect is included.

247. Third thus: according to this opinion [n.241] creatures are not more distinguished from God than the relations in divine reality are distinguished from each other, because all opposite relations are equally distinct and especially when they pertain to the same mode of relatives; but divine relations, which are relations of origin, pertain to the second mode of relatives, to which also seem to pertain the relations that are in God by reason of efficient causality to creatures [1 d.3 n.287]; therefore if the creature is only a relation, and if opposite relation in God – as filiation – is subsistent relation, opposed to relation of Father, there will be an equal distinction on this side as on that.

248. And there is confirmation, because then a created supposit would only be a subsistent relation, and thus it would be more difficult to conceive the mode of existing of a created person than of an uncreated person.

249. And if you say that creatures differ in absolute nature among themselves but [divine] persons not so – this seems to destroy the position [n.241], because then the creature will have an absolute essence that will not be merely a relation.

250. The further consequence also seems to follow [sc. from the view that a creature is only a relation] that a creature differs less from God than one divine person differs from another, because in divine persons the relation is real and mutual, but between creature and God there is no real mutual relation [1 d.30 nn.30-31, 40, 43]; therefore etc.

251. Fourth, to the opinion itself [n.241], as follows: things that are formally distinct are not formally and precisely the same (because then they would be formally distinct and not formally distinct, because they would be nothing but the same, formally indistinct); but the relation of creature to God is not formally or specifically distinct in diverse creatures; therefore either creatures do not differ in species or they will be precisely that relation. Proof of the minor: to all those relations – in creatures – there corresponds the same extreme on the part of God, but to relations of different idea there does not correspond a term of the same idea.

252. Fifth thus: in creatures there is a triple relation to God [1 d.3 n.287]; so a reason that the creature will be nothing but one relation is equally a reason that it will be nothing but another relation; therefore it cannot be precisely any one of the relations. Nor can it be all of them, because they are formally different among themselves – and then any one created essence would have a formal distinction from itself. Therefore etc.<sup>a</sup>

a. [*Interpolation*] Or thus: a nature one formally and specifically is not many specifically; but any nature has three relations specifically different with respect to God, as is plain – conversely in God to creatures there are three relations of reason; therefore etc.

## 2. Second Opinion

253. [Exposition of the opinion] – Another position [of Peter of Tarantsia and Romanus of Rome, based on sayings of Thomas Aquinas] is that this relation of an angel [and of any creature] to God differs really from the essence of the angel [and any creature].

254. There is confirmation of this from blessed Augustine *On the Trinity* 5.5 n.6, where he says that in the case of creatures “what is not spoken of as substance is left to be spoken of as accident;” and he argues that in this case of creatures relation is an accident.

255. He also expressly maintains this in the same place 5.16 n.17, “Those things are relative accidents that occur with some change in the things of which they are said,” and he means from this that the relation of creature to God is an accident, but that the relation said relatively of God to creature is not an accident in God.

256. And from this he says more expressly toward the end, “That God begins to be called in time what he was not called before is manifestly said relatively; however it is not said as an accident of God (because something happens to him), but plainly as an accident of that in reference to which God begins to be relatively called something.”

257. [Rejection of the opinion] – Against this:

Substance is said to be prior to accident in three ways (according to the Philosopher *Metaphysics* 7.1.1028a31-33), namely in knowledge, in definition, and in time; and what it is to be prior in time is so understood that there is no contradiction on the part of substance to prevent it being able to exist prior in duration to any accident; so there would be no contradiction in a stone’s being prior in duration to all dependence on

God, and as a result there would be no contradiction in a stone's not depending on God, which seems absurd.<sup>a</sup>

a. [*Interpolation*] Or thus: if the relation of creature to God is other than the creature, it is naturally posterior to the creature; but what is prior in nature can exist without what is naturally posterior – as far as it itself is concerned – without contradiction; therefore a stone can exist without a respect to God – therefore it can exist without a term for the respect, which includes a contradiction. The first proposition, the major, is plain, because a relation cannot be prior; for a relation, being founded on the absolute, cannot exist prior to it – nor can it exist simultaneously in nature with it, for the same reason; therefore it is posterior, because it is an accident of it. The second proposition, the minor, is plain, because the idea of 'naturally prior' is that – as far as concerns itself – it can be without the other, and in this way, according to the Philosopher, substance precedes accident.

258. Further, Augustine is either taking 'accident' generally there [nn.254-56] for anything changeable – and then any created substance is an accident, because it is changeable; or he is taking it there for what is changeable, that is, able to be lost (namely because it can be lost when something remains, and because it is posterior in nature or in duration to the something that remains); if in this second way, then the relation of creature to God is not an accident, because a creature cannot remain either in duration or in nature without that relation.

259. And it seems that Augustine is speaking in this way in 5.4 n.5, in the way some accidents are inseparable: "Just as the color of a raven's feather is black – but it loses the color, not indeed as long as it is a feather, but because it is not always a feather. Wherefore the material itself of the feather is changeable, and because it ceases to be a feather, so it loses the color also."<sup>a</sup> The loss of color however is not a change, because

thus indeed the loss of the feather would be a change; but the loss of color is a loss, because just as the feather is prior in nature to the blackness, so too it could be posterior in nature to the blackness, that is, not be at once corrupted together with the corruption of the blackness.

- a. [*Interpolation*] because while the raven remains it cannot lose the blackness, but it can lose feathers and certain other things.

### 3. Scotus' own Solution

260. As to this question then [question five, nn.188, 241], I say that the relation to God common to all creatures is the same really as the foundation; it is not however the same formally, nor is it the same precisely (or not the same with adequate identity), such that the foundation is only relation formally [cf. on real identity and formal non-identity, 1 dd.33-34, nn.1-3].

- a. The Relation of Creature to God is the same really as its Foundation

261. The first point is proved by two reasons:

Because what is said properly to be present in something, and in the absence of which the something cannot be without contradiction, is the same as the something really; but relation to God is properly present in a stone, and in the absence of this relation a stone cannot be without contradiction; therefore the relation is the same really as the stone.

262. Proof of the major: because just as a contradiction stated of certain things is a way of proving distinction, so an impossibility of receiving the predication of contradictories pertaining to being is a way of proving identity in being – and this when there is no essential dependence that requires a manifest distinction (which I make clear thus: because the impossibility that *a* [e.g. a creature] is without *b* [e.g. relation to the Creator] is either because of the identity of *a* with *b* or because of its priority or simultaneity in nature with *b*; therefore if *b* is not naturally prior to *a* nor necessarily simultaneous in nature with it, and if *a* cannot be without *b*, the result is that *a* is the same as *b*; for if *b* is other than *a* or posterior to it, it is not likely that *a* could not naturally be in the absence of *b* without contradiction); but what is present in something properly, as relation is present in the foundation (that is, what is so present in what it is present in that if it were other than what it is present in then it would be posterior to what it is present in), is not prior in nature nor simultaneous in nature with what it is present in; therefore if what is present in something is necessarily required for the being of what it is in, such that what it is in cannot be without it, necessarily it is the same really as what it is in. So it is as to the issue at hand.

263. The minor [n.261] is manifest, because just as it is impossible for a stone to be without God, so it is impossible for it to be without its dependence on God – for it could be without the term of the dependence in just the same way as it could be without the dependence; for being without the term is not impossible save because of the dependence itself – but something ‘not necessary simply’ is not the idea of what is simply necessary; therefore etc.



264. Against this reason [n.261] I raise the objection that then [sc. if relation to God were the same really as the creature] any relation that is present in the divine essence through act of the divine intellect would be the same as the essence (proof: it is impossible for the essence to be without it – for if such a relation could be new then the divine intellect could change, which is impossible); but to posit that such a relation is the same as the essence is unacceptable, because then it would be real (for whatever is the same as a thing is real); but the relation is not real (from 1 d.31 nn.6, 8-9, 16, 18); wherefore etc.<sup>a</sup>

a. [*Interpolated note*] Again, the relation of likeness is not the same as whiteness, and yet it is necessarily present when the term is in place; therefore if the term were necessary, the relation would simply necessarily be present – and yet it is not then more the same, because it is not more intrinsic to the term just because the term is incorruptible. Likewise there is this argument: if the term were corruptible the relation would not be the same as the foundation, therefore neither is it the same when the foundation is incorruptible. – This reason well shows that incorruptibility of the term does not make per se for this identity; but incorruptibility of the term in comparison with the foundation does well make for it, that is, if it is simply impossible for the term not to be unless the foundation is not – and further, if this is the first relation of dependence of the foundation on a term, because then by reason of the foundation there is simply this necessity of coexistence; because of the first of these points [‘if it is simply impossible for the term not to be etc.’] the relation, according to one opinion, of vision to the object would be that of identity – because of the second of them [‘and further, if this is the first etc.’] the dependence of our nature on the person of the Word in Christ would not be identical with our nature.

Again, a relation to something simultaneous in nature as to a term is posterior to the foundation (as likeness is posterior to whiteness); therefore also a relation to something prior in nature to the term can likewise be posterior. Nor does it therefore follow, from the fact that the

foundation's being without the term is a contradiction, that the foundation's being without the relation is a contradiction [nn.262-263].

These two reasons [sc. in the preceding two paragraphs] are probable reasons against the first reason about the contradiction of 'being without each other' [n.261]. Likewise, the foundation cannot generally be without a respect that is other than it (as body and figure); therefore the inference 'not without this, therefore the same as this', when the thing in question is a respect, does not follow.

Against the other reason, namely that a respect common to everything other than the term is not the accident of anything [n.266], has a logical instance against it, that creation is not created (a concrete is not asserted of an abstract). Again, more really: 'inherence accidentally' is itself present in a thing but whiteness is not; therefore a relation is itself related but the foundation is not. There is therefore not the same reason of standing in the first case and the second. *[Vatican editors: these interpolated objections are left without answer.]*

Note, in the year 1304 (almost at the end): 'the two extremes are the one total cause of relation'; later differently: 'because the foundation is the total cause of relation but the term is a sine qua non' (just as fire is the total active cause of heat but wood is a sine qua non), such that the foundation is prevented from causing as long as it does not have the term. *[Vatican editors remark that the first note in this paragraph is the regular teaching of Scotus; the second or later note is nowhere found in him.]*

265. I reply. The impossibility of a separation can be by reason of that from which something is inseparable, and it can be by something extrinsic. An example of the second: because, according to the Philosopher, for the heaven to be without motion would be a contradiction, not indeed from a cause intrinsic to the heaven (because the heaven is receptive of motion, indifferent to rest and to motion), but from an extrinsic moving cause; yet it does not follow that the heaven is [the same as] its own motion, although it cannot be without motion. Now I say that the impossibility of being a

stone without dependence of it on God is by reason of the stone precisely; and by this reason is also the reason for the impossibility of being a stone without a term for the dependence of it – and whatever is the reason for requiring a term of dependence is the reason for having the dependence. But in the objection adduced [n.264], there is no necessity for the inherence simply of such relation, nor any impossibility of the non-being of the object on the part of the divine essence itself (as if it were impossible for the essence to be unless it required a term ‘to which’ and this term was unable not to be), but there is only impossibility from an extrinsic cause, namely the divine intellect (a cause, I say, simply necessarily acting), and the impossibility is on the part of the intellect’s doing something new.

266. The second principal reason for the first member of the solution [nn.260-61] is as follows: what is uniformly said of everything other than the term [of a relation] is not accidental to anything that is said relative to that term; the relation of creature to God is of this sort [sc. said uniformly of everything other than the term]; therefore etc.<sup>a</sup> – and so it is the same as the foundation.

a. [*Interpolation*] but such a relation, common to every creature, is uniformly said ‘of everything other than God’ in relation to God himself; therefore it is not accidental to any creature.

267. Proof of the major: because if it were accidental to one it would, by parity of reason, be accidental to another; as, for example, if the relation of effect to cause were accidental to the stone (and would consequently be a thing other than the stone), then by parity of reason this relation would have the relation of effect to God – and then another relation of effect would be accidental to the first relation, and so on ad infinitum.

268. Against this reason [n.267] I raise the objection that there appears nothing unacceptable in relations proceeding to infinity; for it was said in 1 d.19 n.6 that relation is founded on relation, as proportionality on proportion. From this the argument goes as follows: if Socrates is the same as Plato then the sameness of Socrates is the same as the sameness of Plato, and by parity of reason the sameness is the same as sameness; and the first sameness [sc. of Socrates with Plato] is a thing other than the foundation, because the foundation could be without it; therefore by parity of reason any sameness will be a thing other than that which it belongs to, and so there will be infinite real relations. And so can it be argued about proportions and likenesses.

269. To this I reply that there is a stand in the second stage [of the infinite process]. To understand this, let the first foundations be taken, namely Socrates and Plato, between which there is mutual sameness, and let this sameness in Socrates be called *a* and that in Plato *b*; let the sameness of *a* with *b* be called *c*, and let the reverse sameness, of *b* with *a*, be called *d*. I say that *a* differs from Socrates because Socrates can be without *a* (because he can be without the term of *a*), and *a* cannot be without the term; however *a* does not differ from *c* but *c* is the same as it, because *a* cannot be without *b* (since they are by nature together); and consequently it is a contradiction for *a* to be unless both the foundation of that which is *c* and also the term of it are. But when the foundation and the term of *c* exist, *c* will necessarily exist – so it is a contradiction for *a* to be without *c*; and *c* is formally present in *a*, because *a* is said to be the same with the very sameness that is *c*; therefore *c* is the same as *a*, and consequently a stand will be made there.

270. And if you ask by what sameness  $c$  is the same as  $a$ , I say that it is so by  $a$  itself, because the sameness is only one of reason, for it is simply of what is the same as itself.

271. In the same way there is a stand in likenesses of proportionalities, because one proportionality is like another with essential likeness (but two individuals of the same species are said to be alike in specific form), and so just as there is a stand in specific sameness in the second stage [of the process to infinity] (and not in the first stage), so too in the case of likeness of proportionalities.

b. The Relation of Creature to God is not the same formally as the Foundation nor is it  
precisely the same

272. As to the second article, namely that a relation is not formally the same as its foundation [n.260], I suppose this to be manifest from the understanding of what it is to be ‘formally the same’, because the per se idea of a respect does not formally include the idea of an absolute, nor conversely does the idea of an absolute per se include the formal idea of a respect; likewise, as to what is there added [n.260], that the foundation is not precisely the relation itself, this was proved against the first opinion [nn.243-52].

273. And then I understand how there can be a true and non-precise identity in the following way:

When, in the case of creatures, something contains another thing by identity, or is unitively many things, this is not because of the perfection of what is contained but of the perfection of what contains – just as, if the intellectual soul (according to some) contains

the vegetative soul and the form of substance, this is not because of the perfection of the form of substance (because it does not contain all the others), but because of the perfection of the intellectual soul. Likewise, let it be that being contains any property at all of being (as truth, goodness, and unity), yet this containing is not from the perfection of what is contained but from the perfection of what contains – just as also in divine reality, the fact that relation is the same as the foundation is not from the perfection of the relation (as if it contains the essence by identity), but from the formal infinity of the essence, because of which the essence has in itself relation by identity.

274. In all these cases (and especially in the case of creatures) the container is not precisely the contained, but is an entity as perfect in itself as it would be if the contained were outside the container and added to it – nay, a more perfect entity, because by its perfection it contains every other entity; hence the intellectual soul is not merely substantial form (because then it would not be perfect), but is as perfectly the ultimate entity – which is there – as it would be if it presupposed entity other than itself.

275. So I say in the issue at hand, that the foundation is not only the relation (which it contains by identity), but is as absolute as it would be if the relation were added to it, or if it had altogether no relation; but this is not because of its own perfection [sc. as foundation], but it is because of perfection (either simply or in some way or other), because the foundation contains the relation by identity, so that the containing itself prevents the accidentality of the relation from being able to be an accident, because it is perfectly contained in the substance – which relation, however, if it were not thus contained, would of itself not perhaps have the fact that it is the substance by identity.

### C. To the Principal Arguments

276. To the principal arguments of this fifth question.

To the first, from *Metaphysics* 4 [n.189]. It is said that Aristotle infers that ‘everything is relative to something’, that is, ‘relative to opinion and sense’. – But on the contrary: the consequent should differ from the antecedent in a proposed conclusion [1 d.3 n.316].

Therefore I say that it is unacceptable to say that ‘all things are relative to something’ such that their being is formally to be relative to something else, as the opinion said which posits that all appearances are true [n.189] – which opinion also said that the being of a thing is formally appearance. And I do not in this way concede that ‘all things are relative to something’ such that their being is formally relative to something – rather their being is formally to themselves, although this being contains by identity the being of things that are relative to something else.

277. As to the second [n.190], although its conclusion could be denied of relatives or of things in diverse genera (and they would then be said to be primarily diverse as far, namely, as concerns their formal reasons, such that none of them formally includes another or anything of another, although by identity in existing one contains another), yet it can be said – in consequence of what has been said elsewhere [n.231] – that this sort of relation is transcendent, because what belongs to being before it descends to genera is transcendent; but what belongs to every being belongs to it before it descends to genera; therefore anything such is transcendent and does not belong to any genus. And so these

relations that follow being before it descends to beings of any genus will, since they are transcendent, not be of any determinate genus.<sup>a</sup>

a. [*Interpolated note* by Richard of Soley] against the first response [n.277]:

Then, for the same reason, the powers of the soul could be set down as qualities and yet be really the same as the substance of the soul, because the reason that something in one accidental category – for instance relation – is the same in reality with substance is also a reason that something in another accidental category should also be. Again, nothing finite includes by identity anything primarily diverse from it; therefore substance does not include a relation of the genus of relation.

Against the second response [n.277]:

That which is of a determinate genus cannot be the same as that which is of some other genus but is transcendent. Again, what is a substance to one thing is not an accident to anything (from the Philosopher and Commentator, *Physics* 1.3.186a32-b12). Again, then an absolute thing and a comparative thing would not be contraries nor the first differences dividing being, because – according to Aristotle – great and small are not contraries because they are present in the same thing [*Categories* 6.5b11-6a11]; the second point is plain, because the first differences divide more than the second ones (but the second differences dividing being, when one says ‘another substance, another quality, etc.’ are primarily diverse; therefore). Again Avicenna *Metaphysics* 3.10, f 83rb, “There is no relation which is not an accident;” again *On the Soul* 5.2, f 23va, “Substance is not of itself referred to anything in any way.”

#### D. To the Authority for the Second Opinion

278. As to the authority of Augustine for the last opinion [nn.254-56], I concede that ‘relations in creatures are accidents’ in the case of relations of creatures to what they



do not essentially depend on; but as to what something essentially depends on, its essential dependence on it is not an accident of it, that is, is not something really different from it.

279. And then to the first [n.254], which is adduced from ch.5, that “what is not spoken of as substance is left to be spoken of as accident,” one must expound ‘spoken of as accident’ in the sense that it is not predicated per se in the what of a thing, and along with this that it is also changeable, not while the foundation remains, but by change of the foundation; and the first condition here fails in the case of essential (or rather substantial) predicates said of creatures, and the second condition fails in the case of divine relations – but both when concurrent are sufficient [sc. for something to be spoken of as an accident].

280. And so can the last authority [n.255] from ch.19 be expounded, that “they are accidents”, ‘in the case of things to which God is said’ [n.256]; that is, they are simply changeable but not losable – and they are said ‘by way of accident’ [n.256], that is, are not said essentially of their subjects; and one condition fails in the case of divine relations.

## II. To the Fourth Question

### A. Solution

281. As to the fourth question, about creation [n.179], I say that creation seems to import not only relation to God in idea of efficient cause but also a respect to preceding not-being, and this in order of duration, as creation is properly taken. But this order can be understood to be either to immediately preceding not-being or to not-being taken

indistinctly; and in the first way a thing is said to be created only in the first instant – in the second way a thing can be said to have always been created, as long as it persists.

282. If we speak of the first relation (namely to the efficient cause), the solution is plain from the preceding question [the fifth question, n.260].

283. If we speak of the second relation [sc. order to preceding not-being], the relation seems not to be the same as the foundation – and this follows from the first way [n.281], insofar as the relation belongs to the thing in the first instant, provided the respect to not-being persists only in that instant; but what is absolute persists after that instant, and what does not persist is not the same really as what does persist.

284. If we speak of the order to not-being taken indistinctly, the same conclusion seems to hold [sc. that the relation is not the same as the foundation], unless proof can be given that it is contradiction for the essence to be without a respect to a preceding not-being in duration. But if there be proof (in the third question asked [n.95]) that it is a contradiction for a stone to be without a respect to a preceding not-being in duration, then it could be said as a consequence that the respect does not differ from the foundation save in that the respect is not a dependence on something on which what has the foundation essentially depends; and it was said generally in the preceding question [the fifth question, n.260], not that ‘every respect is the same really as its foundation’, but that ‘every respect of dependence on something, without which the dependent thing cannot be, is the same as the dependent thing’ [nn.261, 263, 265, 278]. But if it is not a contradiction for a stone to be without such respect and order to not-being, then it is plain that the order is not the same as the foundation.

285. Thus, therefore, creation is the same as the foundation either, according to one opinion, as to both respects that it states [nn.282, 284], or, according to the first opinion, at least as to the first respect (though not as to the second [n.282]).

### B. To the Principal Arguments

286. One can reply as to the first argument [n.180] that the authority is speaking precisely of things that are included per se in the quiddity of the thing as it is quiddity (as quiddity excludes one and many, act and potency, because nothing such is of the per se understanding of quiddity); and in this way I concede that no relation is formally the same as the foundation, even if it is sometimes really and by identity contained in it, as is the case with the issue at hand.

287. As to the second [n.181], it is plain that the respect to God in question remains not only in the first instant but always, as long as the thing remains – as will be said below in d.2 n.62.

288. As to the third [n.182]. Although the statement ‘God cannot renew the same motion’ is not true (there will be discussion of this in 4 d.43 q.1 n.8, q.3 n.7), yet, if this is conceded, it is conceded because of the interruption, which according to them prevents the sameness of a renewed motion with a motion that has been destroyed. But this does not happen with the issue at hand save in that the same creation cannot be renewed insofar as it states an immediate order to not-being, but not insofar as it states a respect to the cause; hence, the same respect can be renewed, because the same maternity was in the mother of Christ (in relation to Christ) after the resurrection as before [4 d.43 q.1 n.13].

289. To the fourth [n.183] one can concede that creation as undergone is in the fire from the generating fire (namely the creation by which everything other than God is said to be created, whether it is created or generated); but the consequence does not hold ‘if creation is in the fire from the generating fire, therefore the creation is related to the generating fire as to the term’ – for likeness is in this white thing and in that from what generates it, and yet the likeness does not have to be related to the generator as to the term.

290. As to the fifth, the argument about change [n.184] – there seems to be a difficulty there both about the major and about the minor. I say that in natural change there is matter and form and agent and composite of matter and form and many respects (to wit: the respect of the agent to the produced composite, and conversely a respect of the produced composite to the agent, a respect of the matter to the form and conversely, and a respect of both to the whole and conversely, and a respect of the composite and of the present form to the preceding opposite; and not only were these absolutes preceded – namely composite and form – by their opposites, but the respects of matter to form and conversely, and the respects of form to composite and conversely, these too were preceded by their opposites, and so there can be respects of all these respects to their opposites; nor is this all, but also all these respects are from the agent, and so there can be respects of all these respects to the agent) – such that about these many respects, taking those that relate to the issue at hand, matter has respect to form as the perfectible and that which is perfected to its perfection, and these are coeval with the existence of the composite; this respect too is from the agent, which effectively induces the form and perfects the matter with this formal perfection, such that there is founded on this respect,

which is ‘of matter to form as of receptive to perfection or of perfectible to perfection’, a respect of the passive thing to the agent; this respect too succeeds to its opposite, because the matter was previously unformed. These three respects seem to be what is meant by passive change, namely: the respect of matter to form as of perfective to perfection or of perfectible to perfection; the respect of passive or produced thing to the agent or producer; and the respect of a later thing to the preceding opposite. But two of these respects, namely the first and third, seem to concur in change absolutely (when not comparing change to the agent), and these are expressed by the idea of change whereby something is said to be changed ‘because it is disposed differently now than before’; if ‘disposed’ expresses the respect of matter to form or of the perfectible to the perfection which it is thus disposed to, this is what is actualized by that perfection; if ‘differently than before’ expresses it, here is another respect, founded on some respect of matter to form or of perfectible to perfection. And if one adds that change means that something is disposed differently now than before by some changer, here is a third respect.

291. As to the issue at hand, therefore, one can say that change, properly taken, is not the same as form (because then change would remain while the form remains), nor is it the same as the respect of matter to form or conversely (because then it would always remain while this sort of respect remains), nor is it the same as the respect of the whole to the opposite or conversely of the opposite to the whole (because then it would likewise remain while the composite remains) – but it is the order of matter to form as a new and immediate order to such form; and neither of these orders is an essential dependence on anything on which what has the order depends, and so neither is the same as the absolute thing. In this way then the major of the reason [nn.184-85] is conceded.

292. And to the minor [nn.184, 186] I say that creation is the producing into being of the whole created thing without presupposing any part of it – such that, although the created thing has two parts (one of which naturally precedes the other and receives it as its perfection), yet it is created as a whole. The first term of creation does not seem to be any part but total being, or at least it is so if we are speaking of a created angel, where nothing is a potential receiving something actual the opposite of which it was under previously.

293. And then if change is called ‘a new relation of the potential to the actual’, such that the potential pre-existed in itself and yet without the actuality, it is plain that no creation is change, because nothing potential pre-existed creation.

294. But if change is called ‘a new actualization of a potential’, such that the potential did not pre-exist under the act nor need it have pre-existed in itself – then in this way the creation of an angel is not change, because there is nothing potential in it. Yet it could in this way be said that creation of fire was change (if fire was created), because in fire there would be a potential and it would be actualized by form and it would be disposed differently now than before; not that it is ‘differently disposed than it was before’, but that it was ‘not disposed before as it is now’. And it seems that in the definition of change the ‘being disposed differently now than before’ should not be taken positively, because it is plain that the reference is not to a subject but to the term ‘from which’; but the term ‘from which’ of motion is properly not anything positive but is a privation, according to the Philosopher *Physics* 5.1.224b35-5a16.

295. I say then that either no creation is change, if change is that a potential always has to have pre-existed and be newly actualized by a received form (because the

potential of no created thing pre-existed), or at least no creation of a simple is change, if it is sufficient for change that a potential was not in the act it is in now and was thus newly in act through change. But, in whichever way it is taken, the immediate order to not-being [n.281], by reason of which it was conceded that change differs from form [n.291], is also the reason by which it was conceded that creation is not the same really as the foundation [n.283], for the order immediate to not-being is not the same if it only remains in the first instant, just as, on account of the same order, creation does not remain in the same instant as form.

## Question Six

### *Whether Angel and Soul differ in Species*

296. Sixth – and finally – about this distinction, where the Master [Lombard] deals with the purely spiritual creature and with the creature composed of the spiritual and corporeal, I ask whether angel and soul differ in species.<sup>a</sup>

a. [*Interpolation*] About this second distinction, where the Master deals specifically with the issue of the existence of creatures, and first of the purely spiritual creature – there are thirteen questions to ask (and they all pertain to the present discourse); the first is whether angel and rational soul (which are creations purely spiritual) differ in species; the second is whether in the actual existence of an angel there is some succession formally; the third is whether in an actually existing angel something should be posited that is the measure of the angel's existence, or of the duration of his existence, which is really other than his existence; the fourth is whether there is one eternity to all the eternities; the fifth is whether the operation of an angel is measured by an eternity; the

sixth is whether an angel is in a place; the seventh is whether an angel requires a determinate place such that he cannot be in a larger or a smaller space but precisely in so much space (and there is included in this seventh question whether an angel can be in a point of space and whether he can be in any space however small); the eighth is whether one angel can be in several places at the same time; the ninth is whether two angels can be in one place at the same time; the tenth is whether an angel can be moved from place to place by continuous motion; the eleventh is whether an angel can move himself; the twelfth is whether an angel can be moved in an instant; the thirteenth is whether an angel can be moved from extreme to extreme without passing through what is in between. About the first question the argument is... [d.1 n.296, d.2 nn.1, 84, 126, 143, 189, 197, 254, 273, 439, 486, 507].

297. Proof that they do not:

Because if the essences differ in species then the powers also do that are founded on them; and if the powers differ then so do the operations – and further, the objects then differ as well, from *On the Soul* 2.4.415a18-22. The consequent is false, because an angel's intellect and mine have the same object.

298. Secondly as follows: Augustine *On Free Choice of the Will* 3.11 n.32 says, "Angel and soul are equal in nature but unequal in office;" but an equality of nature does not exist in things differing in species; therefore etc.

299. Thirdly as follows, that if they are of different species, then one of them will, as to its totality, be nobler than the other, and consequently each individual of the nobler kind will be nobler than any individual of the less noble kind; and then either any angel at all will be more perfect than any soul at all, or conversely; and then further, since capacity follows nature, either the capacity of any angel at all will be greater than the capacity of any soul at all, or conversely; and since blessedness requires the whole



capacity of the soul to be satisfied, it follows that there is necessarily a greater perfection in any angel (so that it may be blessed) than in any soul, or conversely – each one of which is false, because angel and soul are disposed as exceeding and as exceeded in blessedness.

300. On the contrary:

The more noble a created form is, the more it is distinguished into degrees of nobility (as there are more forms of mixed things than there are elementary forms, and more forms of animate things than of inanimate ones, and perhaps more animals than plants); so there will be more differences in species in the case of intellective nature than of non-intellective nature, which cannot be if angel and soul do not differ in species; therefore etc.

## I. To the Question

### A. About the Conclusion in Itself

301. The conclusion of this question [n.296] is certain, namely that angel and soul differ in species – because forms of the same idea have the same idea of perfecting and not perfecting; but the soul is naturally perfective of an organic body as form of it, but an angel is not naturally perfective of any matter; therefore etc.

### B. On the first Reason for this Distinction

302. But what is the first reason for this distinction in species?

## 1. First Opinion

303. Some say [Alexander of Hales, Thomas Aquinas] that the first reason is unitability with matter and non-unitability with matter.

304. On the contrary: form is the end of matter, from *Physics* 2.8.199a30-32, and so the distinction of matter is for the distinction of form and not conversely (hence the bodily members of a deer are different from the bodily members of a lion, because soul differs from soul [1 d.2 n.332]); so the first distinction of this thing and of that will not be through matter and non-matter, but will be prior in itself to those acts.

305. There is a confirmation; for because this nature is such and that nature is not, so this nature is not that nature; therefore this idea of perfecting and of not perfecting [matter] will not be the first reason for distinction.

## 2. Second Opinion

306. In another way it is said [Thomas Aquinas] that a greater or lesser degree, in angel and in soul, is what first distinguishes one from the other.

307. There is a confirmation through a likeness, because the sensitive soul does not seem to be distinguished in the brutes save because of diverse degrees of perceiving, and yet there is there a specific difference; therefore it can be like this here with diverse modes of understanding, namely a more perfect mode and a more imperfect one.

308. But what is this distinct mode of understanding? – What is posited is that an angel understands non-discursively and a soul understands discursively (speaking of the natural intellect); and these modes are distinct in species and are intellectualities of different species.

309. On the contrary:

The soul is not discursive as to principles and is discursive as to conclusions; therefore if knowing in this way and knowing in that way are different species, and if that is why they require intellectualities of different species, then there will be two intellectualities of different species in the soul, one insofar as it understands principles and another insofar as it understands conclusions.

310. Besides, the soul of the blessed is not discursive about the beatific object, but it is discursive about an object known naturally; therefore there will be one intellectuality in species insofar as the soul understands God beatifically and another insofar as it understands something naturally.

311. Again, third as follows: if the intellectuality of angel and soul differ in species, then things that essentially depend on the one and on the other differ in species; but essentially dependent on these is the beatific vision of an angel and of a soul (for although an angel is not the total cause of his vision nor the soul of its, yet each vision essentially depends on the intellectuality of the nature it belongs to); therefore this beatific vision and that differ in species – but this is false, because all diverse species have a determinate order according to more perfect and more imperfect, such that any individual of the more perfect species exceeds any individual of the more imperfect

species; and then it follows that any blessedness of any angel would exceed any blessedness of any soul, or conversely, both of which are false.

312. Again, fourth: what is meant by the statement ‘an angel does not understand discursively’?

Either that an angel does not have a power by which he can know the conclusions when he knows the principles (supposing the conclusions were not known to him in act or habit before); and then this does not seem to be a mark of perfection in an intellect; rather it seems to be a mark of imperfection in a created intellect, because it is a perfection in our intellect – supplying an imperfection – that it can from known things that virtually include other things acquire knowledge of those other things.

313. Or what is meant is that an angel can for this reason not know discursively, because all conclusions are actually known to him from the beginning (and so he cannot know them through the principles); but this is false, because he does not actually and distinctly know and understand everything from the beginning.

314. Or for this reason, that everything is known to him habitually from the beginning (and therefore he cannot acquire an habitual knowledge of them from principles); and this does not posit an essential difference of intellectuality in soul and angel, because it might be thus in the case of my soul, that if all conclusions were known to it from the beginning (God impressing on it knowledge of the conclusions at the same time as knowledge of the principles), it could not know them discursively – not because of an inability of nature but because it would have knowledge of the conclusions beforehand and cannot acquire *de novo* what it would already have (in this way the soul

of Christ was not discursive but knew habitually all the principles, and the conclusions in the principles, and yet his soul was not angelic in nature).

### 3. Scotus' own Solution

315. I say then to the question [n.302] that whatever is able to act is some being possessed of first act; and by nature the idea there of first act in itself is prior to first act in comparison with second act, of which first act is the principle, such that, although that by which such a being is the principle of second act is not other than its own nature, yet its primary entity is not its nature as its nature is principle of such second act, but it is its nature as its nature is in itself a 'this'; and so the first distinction of being is not through its nature as its nature is principle of such operation but through its nature as it is 'this nature', although it is by identity the principle of second act.

316. So I say in the issue at hand that, although the angelic nature is the principle of understanding and willing, and the soul likewise (such that these powers do not state anything added to the essence of the soul), yet what is first – in this case and that – is this nature and that nature, in relation to itself. And so the first distinction is that on which there follows the distinction of principles of operating, whether operating the same act or different ones; for it is because it is this nature that is the principle of such operation, and not contrariwise.

317. There is an example of this: the sun has the virtue of generating many mixed bodies inferior to it. And if you ask for the first reason for the distinction of sun from plant, the first reason for the distinction of one from the other is not through the power of

generating a plant on the part of the sun, because, if that power were communicated to another, yet not for this reason would that other be the sun, nor would it be distinguished from a plant as the sun is distinguished. The first distinguishing reason then is that the form of the sun is such and such a form and the form of a plant is such and such a form, and on this follows the fact that this form can be the principle of such operations and the other cannot be.

318. So I say in the issue at hand, that because an angel is such a nature in itself and because the soul is such a nature in itself, therefore are they first distinct in species; not indeed as two species but as species and part of a species, because the soul is not properly a species but a part of a species; and yet soul is the first reason for distinguishing its species – the species of which it is a part – from an angel, and so the first reason for specific distinction on the part of its species is itself.

319. One can also add (although it is not absolutely necessary for the solution of the question) that the intellectuality of an angel, qua intellectuality, does not differ in species from the intellectuality of the soul qua intellectuality<sup>a</sup> – this is because, although this first act and that first act differ in species as these acts are considered absolutely in themselves, yet not as they are considered according to the perfection that they virtually contain, namely the perfection according to which they are principles of second acts; the point is seen from this, that these acts are about objects of the same idea and in relation to objects of the same idea (and a likeness of this is that, if the soul of ox and eagle differ in species, yet not for this reason do the powers of seeing of the one and of the other, insofar as they are this sort of perfection and that sort of perfection, differ in species).

a. [*Interpolated note* from Appendix A] Opinion of venerable Alexander of Hales. – Angel and soul can be considered:

Philosophically, and thus they differ essentially in being “separate in substance” and in being “unitable in substance.”

Logically, and thus ‘they differ by the essential powers that they add over and above the genus’, as is ‘to be intellectual with reason’ and ‘to be intellectual without reason’. “And I mean that ‘intellect with reason’ combines and divides and proceeds discursively through middles from an extreme, and the angelic intellect is not of this sort.”

Metaphysically, and thus “they differ essentially through an intellect with a possibility for species existing in phantasms and through an intellect abstracted from this possibility,” of which latter sort is the angelic intellect, because “an angel does not have a sensitive power.”

Theologically, and thus they differ because an angel “is changeable immutably and the soul is changeable mutably.”

320. Now this is very possible, because some containing things differ in species and yet what they contain does not differ in species, as the properties of being are contained by identity in beings ever so distinct and yet these properties in them are not distinct in species; for the oneness of a stone (which is not really other than the stone) and the oneness of a man (which is really the same as the man) are not as formally distinct in species as man and stone are; rather, this oneness and that oneness seem to differ only in number.

321. This is also made clear through something else, that just as things, whose formal distinction is as it were one of species, can be by identity contained in the same thing (as in the same soul are included the intellective and sensitive perfections such that they are as formally distinct as if they were two things), so conversely something ‘formally non-distinct’ can be contained in distinct things.

322. And if this is true [sc. that formally non-distinct things can be contained in formally distinct things, as an intellective power not distinct in species can be contained in specifically distinct angel and soul], then it is plain that angel and soul are not in this way distinguished first in species, namely by such and such an intellectuality – rather, neither first nor not-first are they distinguished in species ‘because such and such an intellectuality exists in them’. Or, if this not be true, but be left now as in doubt, at least the first statement [sc. that angel and soul differ specifically on the part of their absolute natures, nn.315-318] seems sufficiently clear, because their first distinction is not through this [sc. through distinct intellectualities].

## II. To the Principal Arguments

323. As to the first principal argument [n.297], one can concede that the essences of angel and soul can differ in species and that yet the powers do not, if the final statement in the solution of the question [nn.319-21] is true – and in that case the argument [n.297] does not proceed.

324. Yet one can say that powers, different in species on the part of the foundation (but not on the part of the object), can have acts different in species insofar as the acts depend on the foundation of the power, though the acts are of the same species insofar as they depend on the objects; and then it would be conceded that the intellection of angel and of man about the same intelligible thing is the same in species on the part of the object, but on the part of the foundation – insofar as the foundation is the power’s reason of acting – is different in species.



325. One should then also say that the operations simply differ in species – because the identity on the part of the object is not simply an identity in species but is a diversity simply and an identity in a certain respect (for any difference suffices for drawing a distinction between certain things but not any identity suffices for a perfect identity between them); and then the same unacceptable result seems to follow as was inferred against the second opinion, the one about beatific acts [n.311], unless perhaps it be said that the total cause of the beatific act is the object and that the powers are disposed there in respect of the act as merely receptive and passive – and receptive things do not distinguish received forms in species, as is plain about whiteness when received in a stone and in wood.

326. As to the second argument [n.298] (and all like authorities), the answer is plain from the authority of Augustine [*On 83 Diverse Questions* q.51 n.4] ‘the soul is formed by truth alone’; indeed for this reason nothing is superior to the soul – for this is true by reason of the object in which it rests; and to this extent the soul is equal to an angel, because no intellectual nature can be made to rest save in an infinite object. And thus must the authority be understood, and all like authorities.

327. As to the third [n.299] it can be conceded that any individual of one species exceeds any individual of the other – but what that means does not have to be explained before book 3, when comparing the soul of Christ with the angelic nature [2 d.13 qq.1-4 nn.2, 5-6, 9, 19]. And the whole argument should be conceded up to the phrase that ‘the whole capacity of nature is satisfied in blessedness’ [n.299]; for that proposition is not true when speaking of merely natural capacity; for this capacity is precisely satisfied in proportion to its merits (commonly speaking), and in this is deliberative appetite

sufficiently satisfied. But as to how blessedness from only such satisfaction can stand perfect even though there can be natural appetite for a further and added perfection – this can be dealt with elsewhere, in the subject matter of blessedness in book 4 (Suppl. d.50 p.2 qq.1-3 n.3).

## Second Distinction

### First Part

#### On the Measure of the Duration of the Existence of Angels

#### Question One

*Whether in the Actual Existence of an Angel there is any Succession Formally*

1. About the second distinction, where the Master deals with the place of creation of angels and the time when they were created, I ask two questions: first about the measure of existence of angels, and second about the place of angels.

2. As to the first question I ask firstly whether in the actual existence of an angel there is any succession formally.

3. That there is not:

First, because quantity cannot be received by what lacks extension, or is a non-quantum; therefore succession – which is a quantity – cannot be received by the existence of an angel, which is indivisible.

4. A confirmation of the reason is that a permanent quantity cannot be received by something indivisible; therefore not a successive quantity either.

5. Second, as follows: before and after, in idea of number, can bring together the idea of time [time is ‘the number of motion with respect to before and after’ according to Aristotle]; wherever there is succession, there is before and after, and there the idea of number and of measure can be found; therefore, if succession were formally in the actual existence of an angel, that existence would be measured by time.

6. Third, relevant to this is Augustine 83 *Questions* q.72, “Aeviternity<sup>10</sup> is stable but time is changeable.”

7. Fourth, the same is argued by Dionysius *Divine Names* ch. 10 (these things that, when they are looked at there, are said to be there [“The property of aeviternity is something ancient and invariable, and the whole of it is measured as a whole...”]).

8. On the contrary:

When God creates one angel it is not necessary for him to create another; so some angel can exist when another does not exist, and this other can be created such that it exists while the former is still now existing. So the former, which existed when the latter did not exist and exists with it when it does now exist, seems to be prior to the latter, and its existence as ‘not being along with the latter’ seems to precede its existence as ‘being along with the latter’.

9. Second as follows: an angel, when time has been excluded, can be annihilated. I ask then in what moment? Not in the ‘now’ of time because it does not exist; nor in the ‘now’ of eternity, formally; nor in the ‘now’ of aeviternity, because that ‘now’ remains

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<sup>10</sup> Scotus and Medieval theologians in general used the word ‘aevum’ for the eternal existence of angels and ‘aeternitas’ for the existence of God. Angels depend for existence on another (unlike God) but are immaterial and immortal (unlike men), and so exist, once they exist, without end (unless God un-creates or annihilates them). They are thus measured neither by God’s eternity nor by human or material time but by something in between, for which the Latin word ‘aevum’ was used. In English a term for the purpose has to be invented, and aeviternity is now by tradition that term. See the quotations from Henry of Ghent in the footnote to n.42 below.

one and the same. Therefore it will exist and will not exist in the same moment, which is contradictory.

10. Third as follows: an angel can exist now and afterwards be annihilated and again be restored; but his having been restored is not as one and the same with his having been created as it would have been had there been no interruption (otherwise something interrupted would be as one as something not-interrupted, which is false); therefore his having been restored will be in one ‘now’ and his having been created before in another ‘now’ – and if so, then, if he had persisted without interruption, he would have been then in a different ‘now’ than he is in at this moment. The proof of this consequence is that there is as much duration of him as at rest as there would be of him as moved; therefore, by similarity, there would have been as much duration of him as not-tending to not-being (although as able so to tend) as there is if he does actually so tend.

#### I. First Opinion as Reported and Held by Bonaventure

11. Here it is said that there is succession formally in the actual existence of an angel. See the opinion of Bonaventure and in his writings [Bonaventure, 2 d.2 p.1 a.1 q.3].

##### A. Arguments for the Opinion

12. And for this opinion there is argument in four ways:

First on the part of conservation. And the reason is founded on the authority of Augustine *Literal Commentary on Genesis* 8.12 n.26, where he maintains that “as air is

not a *having been* made to be bright, but a *continual being* made bright, in respect of the sun (otherwise the air would remain bright in the absence of the sun), so is the creature disposed in respect of God;” and again (*ibid.* 4.12 n.22), Augustine maintains that God is not disposed in respect of the creature the way the builder is disposed in respect of the house.

13. And from this an argument is made as follows: if the creature in respect of God is not a *having been* made in its being by God but is as it were formally in a state of *becoming*, then it is always formally being posited in being by God – and so its creation in being is as continuously from God as it is continuous in persisting.

14. The point is confirmed, because ‘to conserve’ is not merely not to destroy but is some positive action of God’s (otherwise one who does not close a window would be said to be conserving light; similarly, ‘to annihilate’ would then be a positive act, which is false, because ‘to annihilate’ is ‘to non-act’); therefore to conserve is to act.

15. This is also plain from the following, that no creature is independent in its existence, because neither is any creature pure act; therefore a creature depends for existence continually on its cause, and not just on a cause that has given it being and is not giving it now, because then ‘to conserve’ would be nothing other than to have acted before and not to be destroying now.

16. If all these things be conceded, that God in conserving does something positive as regards the creature, yet not by any continuous action (because there is no form in him according to which continuation of action could be assigned), nor even by different actions one after the other, but always by the same action – then, on the contrary: by this causation there is not had formally and ultimately that which, when this causation

is in place, can possibly not be had (my proof for this is that a cause causing by this causation is a cause that is ultimate and applied to producing an effect in existence; therefore if the non-existence of the effect can stand along with this cause, then existence does not seem to be had ultimately by this causation); but when this causation, by which an angel was produced in existence, is in place, the angel can possibly not have existence tomorrow; so he will not formally by this causation have existence tomorrow; and he does have existence; therefore by some other causation.

17. If you say that from the first causation he does not have existence along with coexistence in time tomorrow, but that for this there is required the ‘existence of the future’ (and so, when the future then exists, this ‘reason of the future’ is the reason of coexistence for the angel) – on the contrary: this is how it is in eternity, that eternity does not have coexistence with time insofar as coexistence is coexistence.<sup>a</sup> Likewise, not only can an angel, when ‘causation of the future is not in place’, not have existence with the future, but he can even not have the foundation of the coexistence, namely existence absolutely; therefore he does not have ‘existence absolutely’ from such coexistence.

a. [*Interpolation*] but only when time coexists with it; and so, if this were the cause, aeviternity and eternity would not differ.

18. Again, second: if an angel’s existence is simple, then just as God cannot make an angel not to *have been*, so neither can he make an angel not to be *going to be*.

19. There is a confirmation of the reason, that in eternity there are no true contradictories about the divine will, and neither is there divine volition in respect of contradictories as they are contradictories; but God could in eternity have willed to create

some angel and to annihilate him; therefore he willed him to be and willed him not to be. Therefore some conditions on the part of being and not being must be found here so that they are not contradictories. But there seems to be nothing capable of being assigned to take away the contradiction save diverse ‘nows’ (namely, that God willed the angel to be at now *a* and not to be at now *b*); so it was impossible for God to will to create an angel and to annihilate the same angel unless he willed the former and the latter to be at diverse ‘nows’; but God could have willed the former and the latter without any respect to time; therefore it must be possible to understand one now and another now on the part of the angel without any respect to time; this otherness can only be of the ‘nows’ of aeviternity; therefore etc.

20. The third way of argument is from infinity – because from the fact an angel will persist infinitely with the whole of future time, then, if he has now the whole duration that he will always have, he has now formally infinite duration.

21. There is confirmation of this in that the ‘now’ that is of itself such that it can coexist with the infinite is formally infinite – just as an angel, if he had in himself wherewith he was able to coexist with every place, would be infinite in place.

22. And if you say that this is not true unless the angel has of himself wherewith he can coexist – on the contrary: although he does not have of himself wherewith, as thus coexisting, he may possess infinity, yet, just as he formally has wherewith he does thus coexist, so he seems to be formally an infinite thing – just as if he had wherewith he might be present to every place (actual and potential), although he would have this from God effectively, yet he would be formally immense; and although his immensity would

not be equal to the divine immensity in intensity, yet it would be equal to it in extension, such that God could be nowhere in his immensity save where the angel could be.

23. There is a confirmation for this reason too, that the negation of a negation is the assertion of the affirmation – therefore the negations of infinite negations assert infinite affirmations, or one infinite affirmation formally; but an angel, being possessed of this simple coexistence, has from it the negations of infinite negations (‘he does not exist with the infinite moments of time’); so he has from it infinite affirmations, or one infinite affirmation formally.

24. The fourth way is from the order of the things that come to be in aeviternity; for an angel could have been created not a sinner but innocent, and could afterwards have sinned or not sinned, with all time abstracted away; so this angel was innocent before he was a sinner; therefore there is in his existence ‘before’ and ‘after’.

25. Likewise, an angel could have been first created and afterwards at once annihilated, and another angel later created; the first angel never existed when the second existed, and so was not in the same ‘now’ as the second was; therefore the first was before and the second was afterwards (because if they existed, and not together, then one after the other). So if some other angel had existed along with both of them, there would have been ‘before’ and ‘after’ in his existence, just as the existence of one of them was before the existence of the other of them.

26. Authorities for this position [n.11] are:

Augustine *Confessions* 11.14 n.17, “The now of time, if it always stood and did not flow, would not be time but eternity;” and he seems there to be speaking of the true



eternity of God, by expounding the verse of *Psalms* 101.28, “But you are yourself the same and your years, etc.”

27. Further, *Literal Commentary on Genesis* 4.12.n.23, “But as to his saying (*John* 5.17), ‘My Father works until now’, it signifies continuation of work;” and Augustine proves this by adding, “For he could be understood otherwise if he said ‘works now’ (where it would not be necessary for us to take it as continuation of work), but he compels us to understand it differently when he says ‘until now’, namely from then on – when he was making all things – he has been working.”

28. Further, Boethius *On the Trinity* ch.4 says that although, according to the philosophers, one could say of the heavenly bodies and spirits that they always are, yet there is a great difference; ‘being always’ in God is always present, not a running ultimately through eternity.

29. Further, Damascene *Orthodox Faith* ch.15, “The term ‘age [saeculum]’ means what is always being extended with eternal things, as space etc.”

30. Further, Gregory *Morals* 27.7 n.11 (on the remark in *Job* 36.26, ‘the number of his years is without reckoning’) says of the angels, “In them we discern a beginning when we turn our mind backwards etc.”

31. Further, Anselm *Proslogion* ch.20 speaking to God says, “You pass through all things, even eternal ones, because your eternity and theirs is all present to you, since they from their eternity do not have what is future as neither what is past.”

32. Further, Jerome *To Marcella* [rather Isidore *Etymologies* 7.1 n.12] , “Only God does not know ‘has been’ or ‘will be’.”

## B. Arguments against the Opinion

33. Against this position [n.11] the argument is made that it involves a contradiction, because where succession is, there before and after are – and these are not together, but when what is after arrives, what was before falls away, and consequently what was before grows old and what comes after is new.

34. And if the succession is supposed to exist in the measure without newness coming to be in the measured – an argument against this is that, according to the Philosopher *Physics* 4.11.219a10-29, ‘before’ and ‘after’ in time are because of ‘before’ and ‘after’ in motion, such that if there were no different stages in motion there would not be ‘before’ and ‘after’ in time; therefore, by similarity, if there is no new existence in what is aeviternal (nor any newness in it), there will be no distinction between ‘before’ and ‘after’ in the measure of it.

35. This is confirmed by the Philosopher in *Metaphysics* 10.1.1053a18-27, because a measure should be of the same genus as the measured, such that, if the measure is divisible, so too is the measured; this is also proved by the fact that the indivisible (insofar as it is indivisible) cannot be measured by the divisible.

36. Further, if the ‘now’ of aeviternity passes away and does not always remain the same, this cannot be because of a defect in the subject, because the subject for you remains the same; nor can this be posited because of some corrupting cause, because it does not seem that any corrupting cause can be assigned. Therefore the ‘now’ does not pass away. It is otherwise with the ‘now’ of time, because its proximate subject (or the proximate measured thing) passes, namely change.

37. Further, if there is here some newness and some remaining with respect to the same thing, then it properly changes, because it is disposed differently now than before; but the measure of change is the ‘now’ of time; therefore to the extent aeviternity is posited as being measured by the ‘now’ of aeviternity, it will be measured by the ‘now’ of time.

38. On behalf of this view are the authorities of Blessed Augustine *City of God* – look there.<sup>11</sup>

## II. Second Opinion

39. By holding to this negative conclusion, then [sc. that there is no succession in the existence of an angel], a twofold difference of aeviternity from time and eternity is posited.

### A. Thomas Aquinas’ Way of Positing it

40. In one way as follows – look for the opinion elsewhere.<sup>12</sup>

41. On the contrary – look for it.<sup>13</sup>

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<sup>11</sup> 11.31, “The holy angels have an eternity of persistence...”, 12.15 n.2, “...the immortality of the angels does not pass in time, nor has it gone by (as if now it were not) nor is it in the future (as if it not yet were)...”

<sup>12</sup> Scotus *Lectura* 2 d.2 n.34, “So others say [namely Thomas] that eternity is the measure of stable existence. To the extent, therefore, that something departs from stable existence, to that extent it departs from eternity; now there is something that is in flux as to its whole existence (as a temporal thing), and there is something that, though it is not in itself in flux, yet has existence along with that in which there is flux (and in this way ‘aeviternal’ things exist along with flux) – and, when understanding things in this way, the heaven and angels exist along with flux, but yet their existence is stable in itself and their whole duration exists at once in itself.”

### B. Henry of Ghent's Way of Positing it

42. In another way, [Henry] *Quodlibet* 5 q.13 – look for it.<sup>14</sup>

43. Against this way of positing it I argue thus:

For he seems to contradict himself,<sup>15</sup> because if in aeviternity “it is not the case that an angel should have in the following ‘now’ the being he has in the present ‘now’ ...

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<sup>13</sup> In Scotus' *Lectura* 2 d.2 nn.35-36, “On the contrary: an angel is some being in itself, and so he has in himself his proper duration; therefore some duration must be assigned in itself to him. So he is not measured because of the fact that something else, possessed of duration, runs along with him; the point is plain in the heaven, which exists along with its own motion that is measured by time, and yet the heaven in itself has its proper measure... Besides he [Thomas] says elsewhere [*ST* Ia q.14 a.13] that ‘God knows future contingents because all things are present to the ‘now’ of eternity, which contains in itself the whole of time’; therefore, if the ‘now’ of aeviternity contain the whole of time, the consequence is that an angel knows all future things.”

<sup>14</sup> Henry *ibid.*, “Now there is only a triple mode of existing in the universe of beings; for there is some being that exists in act altogether immutably, without any potency for change; and there is some being that exists in act altogether immutably, but is (as far as concerns itself) in potency for change if it were left to itself; and there is a third being existing altogether mutably in act and in potency. The measure of the quantity of existence (or of duration in existing) in the first way is called ‘eternity’ – and this, because of its ‘in every way immutable existence’, is necessarily a whole all at once, because as nothing is left to be acquired in its existence, so neither in its duration or eternity; and because of its lack of potency for change, it is of itself a fixed standing in the same way – for which reason the whole of eternity is nothing but a ‘now’ standing of itself immutably and indivisibly, not possessing parts..., and it has, as far as concerns itself and the idea of its measurement, no idea of continuity, but only as to the consideration of our intellect in respect of and comparison with the succession of time... The measure of the quantity of existence (or of duration in existing) in the second way is called ‘aeviternity’ – which, because of its actual immutability, is necessarily a whole all at once, because nothing in the existence of what is aeviternal remains to be received; but because of the potency for change in what is aeviternal...it is not of itself a fixed standing, but is so only from another; not because it could be in the flux of a continuum, having of itself parts (as the ‘now’ of time can be), but because it can fall into, and it has a necessity of falling into, non-being unless it is conserved in being by another...; because of this, the whole duration of what is aeviternal is only a ‘now’ that stands, because of another, immutably and indivisibly, not possessed of parts...save by the extension of the intellect in respect of and by comparison with the parts of time... Now the measure of quantity (or of duration in existing) in the third way is called ‘time’ – which, because of the actual changing of the temporal thing (of which ‘time’ is the per se measure) is not a whole all at once but in succession, because in the being of a temporal thing (of which sort motion is) there properly remains always something to be received; and, because of the potency always mixed in with its act, it is always in flux (never a fixed standing), having parts that succeed to each other and never remain, in respect of which common difference eternity and aeviternity differ from time.”

<sup>15</sup> Henry *ibid.*, “Anselm [n.31] only says this in respect of the extension of time, namely because it is not true in their case that they should have in the following ‘now’ the being that they have in the present ‘now’, nor do they have now of themselves the being that they had before; rather, the being

rather the being of an angel, as far as concerns itself, has to have a limit” (as Henry says expressly), and later he says that “aeviternity can, as far as concerns itself, fail at any instant” – then, if this ‘now’ of aeviternity have being formally along with the first ‘now’, whereby that being had to have a limit along with the first ‘now’ (according to Henry and his followers), then it must exist along with the second ‘now’ either by another being or by the same being posited again.

44. Further, as to his saying<sup>16</sup> that ‘there are impossible inferences which follow, and they do not follow from positing aeviternity as indivisible but from the denial of time, which denial is impossible with the positing of aeviternity, and it is because of this impossibility that the impossible conclusion about aeviternity follows’: this does not seem reasonable, because, according to him,<sup>17</sup> whatever is, as far as concerns itself, prior in nature can, as far as concerns itself, be prior in duration. So there is no repugnance for it in its being able without contradiction, as far as concerns itself, to be ‘prior in duration’ to the posterior (with respect to which it is said to be ‘prior in nature’) – and, when it is

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of a creature (as of an angel), as far as concerns itself, has to have a limit, but the being of God not at all. Hence the being of a creature is not had through continuous influx save by having a reference to the extension of time, as was said; also as concerns extension or process, eternity and aeviternity are differently disposed, because eternity is related to the whole of time as ‘not being at all able to fail’, but aeviternity can (as far as concerns itself) fail at any instant and be concluded under time – and thus, by reason of its potency for corruption, it has in some way the idea of what is temporal, which eternity has not at all.”

<sup>16</sup> Henry *ibid.*, “For eternity, as the exceeding measure, contains virtually in itself the whole course of time, just as a superior creature contains virtually and in a supereminent way whatever there is in an inferior creature; so that, by positing eternity or aeviternity to exist in reality, not only is it impossible to posit that time in itself cannot exist..., rather it is impossible to posit this once eternity or aeviternity have been posited to exist in reality... So the fact that from positing this impossibility, namely that time cannot be...(which is not only impossible in itself but impossible with positing that eternity exists in God and aeviternity in an angel), the impossible conclusions [about aeviternity] in the four ultimate modes of unacceptability follow, is not surprising. However, they cannot follow from the fact that the ‘now’ of aeviternity is posited to be simple and indivisible, since this ‘now’ possesses virtually in itself its being extended, by intellect or imagination, to time...; but they all follow from the aforesaid not only impossible but also impossible thing – by the opposite of which, once posited as necessary, namely ‘there is time’... the contraries of all those conclusions are very easily understood.”

<sup>17</sup> Henry *ibid.* 8 q.9, “For nothing belongs to anything prior in nature which is not of a nature to belong to the same thing – as far as concerns itself – prior in duration.”

posited and the posterior is not posited, there is no contradiction on the part of what is ‘naturally prior’, nor on the part of anything that pertains to it insofar as it is prior.<sup>a</sup>

Therefore, from such an hypothesis, there follows no impossibility on the part of what is aeviternal insofar as it is aeviternal.

a. [*Interpolation*] but the aeviternal and its proper measure are in every respect prior in nature to time, as foundation is prior to relation.

45. An example of this: that although the subject is necessarily followed by its special property, yet, because the subject is prior in nature, there is no contradiction on the part of the subject that it should exist prior even in duration to its special property; and if this supposition is made, no impossibility follows on the part of the subject in itself as to the way it is prior to its property. Therefore if any contradiction does follow, this is through some extrinsic fact, namely from the relation of the cause to the effect.

46. So, in this way, if there were some necessary comparison of aeviternity to time, as of what is prior in nature to what is posterior in nature, then no contradiction would follow, because of negation of the posterior and positing of the prior, on the part of the prior in itself, nor on the part of anything that belongs to the prior in itself; but those inferences [sc. of Henry], namely that an angel ‘cannot be prior to another angel’ or that ‘an angel cannot be after its non-being’, are impossible per se on the part of the aeviternal as it is aeviternal; therefore etc.

47. Also, as to his proof of the necessity of the concomitance of time with aeviternity on the basis of the order of the more perfect to the more imperfect, it does not seem to suffice. For the proof would not conclude this about a quasi-quantitative

containing but about a quidditative one, in the way a superior quiddity contains the inferior one; but with such containing there stands the fact that the superior can be without the inferior and the fact that the being proper to the superior may belong to it in the absence of the inferior, or at least need not belong to it in respect of the inferior. One must speak, therefore, in the same way about the issue at hand, that nothing proper to aeviternity belongs to it precisely in respect of time.

### III. In what Ways the First Opinion can be Sustained

#### A. The First Way, which is according to the Intention of Bonaventure

##### 1. As to the Opinion itself

48. He who wishes to hold the first opinion [n.11] (which seems probable and has probable reasons on its behalf) can say – according to the intention of him who poses it [sc. Bonaventure] – that aeviternity is properly a quantity and consequently has proper divisibility; but not a permanent divisibility, therefore a successive one; such is an indivisible succeeding to an indivisible, and a different indivisible to a different indivisible.

49. And so the ‘now’ of aeviternity, as far as concerns itself, passes instantaneously – and aeviternal being, as it is posited in being in the ‘now’, has, from the force of this position, being precisely in the ‘now’ and then immediately non-being (when the ‘now’ has gone by), unless the same cause, by another causation, were to posit the same being in another ‘now’. And so the cause conserves it by positively causing, not another being (as is true in the case of something successive), but the same being over

and over infinitely – such that the first causation is called ‘creation’, because it follows not-being immediately in the order of duration, but each following causation follows not-being mediately in the order of duration, and not-being immediately in the order of nature, namely because not-being would then be present unless the conserving cause were to bestow being. But the being posited secondly follows, in the order of duration, the being posited previously – and thus, in this way, there is conservation and continuation of the same being.

50. There is an example of this. If an angel has some virtual quantity by which he can be present at some place, then he is, by this virtual quantity, present at this place, because he cannot simultaneously be present at another place; and he can absolutely not be present at another place save by some change made with respect to the former place; either because the virtual quantity becomes formally greater, or because it is transferred from place to place, or because it is, by divine power, in another place without leaving the former place.

51. So it is in the issue at hand, that the being that the angel has by a single causation is limited to this ‘now’ – and, when nothing new is done with respect to the angel, he cannot, by force of this single causation, exist beyond this ‘now’; but God, by giving the angel perpetual, enduring quantity (and this by a single continuous causation or by infinite causations of the same being), gives it to him always uniformly, so that by it the angel is extended to the whole of time.



## 2. To the Arguments brought against the First Opinion

52. To the arguments against this position.

To the first [n.33], which proves that a contradiction follows from the position, I reply: in the duration or persistence of being which precisely is successive there is renewal (and one part of it goes away and another part succeeds, and in general one part succeeds to another), but there is not any renewal in the existence of that of which there is persistence; just as, if the same flesh were posited, not possessed of part after part in the same permanent quantity, there would be an otherness there of parts in the extension itself formally (which is a quantity), without any extension or diversity of parts in that to which such extension happens.

53. And when proof is given [n.34] that ‘there is no distinction in the measure (from the Philosopher *Physics* 4. 11.219a10-29) unless there was distinction in the measured’ – I say that the consequence is good that ‘if the parts of time are other, then the parts of motion are other’, as inference from effect to cause; but it is not necessary that in anything whatever the parts of duration are other, because there may be some ‘distinction of parts’ that are prior; the reason for this is that the distinction that is second to one thing can be first in another thing.

54. There is an example of this: fire heats and dries, because of distinct ordered accidents in fire, such that the distinction of actions there is second, presupposing another prior distinction, namely the distinction of active accidents [sc. of hot and dry in fire]; but it does not follow from this that, wherever there is a distinction of actions, this distinction is second – because if these distinct accidents of fire were virtually contained in the sun,

then the first distinction there would be of actions, which distinction was second with respect to fire. So must one say in the issue at hand.

55. To the other argument [n.36] I say that the ‘now’ can fail, because of itself it has only instantaneous being – although its subject remains the same, and no agent corrupts it. And as to the fact that ‘the now of time fails when its own proper subject fails’ [n.36], it is accidental to a ‘now’ that its proximate subject fails – because if the subject were to remain the same (as in the case of something at rest), then one could say that the same subject, acting through what is another ‘now’ succeeding to the prior ‘now’, does, by producing another ‘now’ impossible with the prior ‘now’, destroy the prior ‘now’, not first of itself but by way of consequence.

56. And if you ask what the prior ‘now’ fails in, whether in itself or in another (as Aristotle argues in *Physics* 4.10.218a8-21) – I say that ‘to fail’ (as also ‘to cease’) can be understood in two ways: in one way by positing a present and denying a future, and in another way by positing a past and denying a present. The first way must be understood in the case of indivisibles and things that have the ultimate of their being; for they do not have a first stage in their not-being, and they then cease to be when they are – and in this way the ‘now’ ceases to be in itself, because then it is and after this it will not be; and if you ask for the first stage in its not-being, there is none, as neither in the case of anything that has the ultimate of its being.<sup>18</sup>

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<sup>18</sup> Tr. The point here seems to be something as follows. The ‘now’ of time comes and goes with the process of change in temporal things, as these come to be and cease to be. Angels do not undergo change but simply are or are not without any process (they have, or do not have, the fullness of their being all at once). The ‘now’ of angels comes and goes, then, not because angels are subjects of change, but simply because of itself, because it is an indivisible that immediately is and immediately is not.

## B. Second Way, which is tangential to the Intention of Bonaventure

57. The conclusion [sc. that there is succession formally in the existence of an angel, n.1] can be sustained in another way (although not according to the intention of him who posits this principal position [n.11]), because the total existence of an angel persists according as it is absolute, but it has new respects, one after the other, to the cause – such that this total existence as it is under one respect to its causing cause succeeds to itself as it is under another respect to its conserving cause.<sup>19</sup>

And this way would perhaps be easier for maintaining succession than the previous one (which posits quantity [n.48]), although, on the other side, there would be much difficulty in sustaining how there would be there a succession precisely of respects without any distinction in what is absolute in any way, whether in the foundation or in the term.

## IV. Against the Conclusion of the First Opinion in itself

58. But against the conclusion of the said opinion in itself [n.11], whether it is sustained in the first way or the second, I argue as follows:

The ‘now’ of aeviternity – which is posited as one absolute after another according to the first way of sustaining the opinion [nn.48-51] – is either the same as

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<sup>19</sup> William of Ware *Sentences* 2 d.2 q.2, “The whole of aeviternity, taken under one real respect to an angel, succeeds to itself under another real respect to an angel, succeeding to itself; likewise the creature, as it now coexists with God, has a different respect from when, in another ‘now’, it coexists with itself, without any absolute newness. Hence the whole succeeds to itself in both measured and measure, as the measure succeeds to itself the way the measured whole, in every respect of proportion, succeeds to itself; nor can there be concluded from this any succession in parts succeeding to themselves. Hence the first succession of whole to whole exists in aeviternity without absolute newness, but not without respective newness, because it receives different real respects.”

actual existence or different from it. If the same, then it is plain that as actual existence remains the same so also does the ‘now’ of aeviternity. If different –to the contrary, for then, just as existence can be posited in being an infinite number of times, so it seems the same absolute ‘now’ of aeviternity (different from the being of existence) can be posited frequently in being, and so the same ‘now’ of aeviternity can be conserved just as the same existence can.

59. If it be said that ‘if it is posited frequently in being, then it is posited in diverse nows’ – on the contrary, if the absolute ‘now’, different from the being of existence, can be posited frequently in being and in different nows, there will still be the same reason for its being able to be conserved in each of those ‘nows’; and then there will be a process to infinity or a stand will be made in this, that just as existence is conserved the same, so any absolute in an angel will be able to be conserved the same.

60. Likewise, in the following question [nn.122-123] it will be proved that there is no other absolute in an angel besides his existence, and so there cannot be identity in existence and succession in some other absolute; and, whether it is this way or that, a new respect does not seem able to exist without newness in the foundation or the term, for a respect consequent to extremes – such that, when either is posited, the respect follows from the nature of the extremes – cannot be new (as it seems) without newness in one or other extreme; but, for you, there is nothing new in the foundation of this respect – nor in the term, as is plain.

61. Likewise, this respect is the same as the foundation, as is plain from the preceding distinction [2 d.1 n.260]; therefore this respect cannot be other while the foundation exists the same.

## V. Scotus' own Response to the Question

62. Therefore, one can say that there is no necessity of positing anything new or any succession in any angel (which, namely, would be formally 'new' in it); rather 'whatever is there' can remain the same (as the existence remains the same) and consequently so can any respect consequent to the absolute.

## VI. To the Arguments for the First Opinion

63. To the arguments for the first opinion [nn.12-25].

To the first [n.12] I say that both ways [nn.11, 33] save the saying of Augustine. For as the first way says that 'the creature always essentially depends equally on God', so that the conservation of a thing is as it were one continuous causation (or there are infinite causations), and thereby it always actually causes the thing in the way it caused it in the first instant (although the causation, as it is in the first instant, be called creation and in the other moments conservation) – so the second position [n.33], not seeing a reason for continuation in this causation (because not seeing any continued form), nor seeing so much reason for a distinction (because not seeing that distinction either in the causer or in the caused, as far as concerns the formal term) [n.16], says that one action 'persisting always in respect of the creature' is creation insofar as it is understood to coexist with the first 'now' of time, which 'now' of time was immediately preceded by the non-being of the caused thing; and that the same action persisting is called

‘conservation’ insofar as it coexists with the other parts of time, parts not immediately following not-being but following the pre-had being along with the parts of time – and so the action is a sort of continuation of what was pre-had, without comparing it to not-being (where there is no before and after), but comparing it to the parts of time with which it coexists.<sup>20</sup>

64. But, apart from the intention of Blessed Augustine, the reason there adduced [n.16] seems to have the difficulty that, namely, the thing has being by one causation with one ‘now’ and by another causation with another ‘now’, because ‘being is not had in its completion by any causation, the opposite of which seems to stand when such causation is posited’ [n.16].

I reply. This proposition [sc. ‘being is not had...such causation is posited’] is to be distinguished as to composition and division; and in the sense of composition it is true, because ‘it is not had in its completion by any causation the opposite of which stands when such causation stands, such that these are simultaneous’; but in the sense of division it is false, because even the conservation itself is able not to be, although the

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<sup>20</sup> Henry of Ghent *Quodlibet* 5 q.11, “But different are the things on which caused things depend not only as to their coming to be but also as to their being, as the creature universally depends on God and light in the air on a luminous body. In the case of such things the caused altogether does not persist in the absence of the truth of its cause; not because the agent by a different action in reality gives being and conserves it once given (as the opinion already stated maintains [sc. the opinion of Bonaventure]), but because the action does not have any co-agent for the coming to be of its being..., such that, as the acting virtue itself...remains the same in number, so its action about the caused thing is the same, remaining one and the same in number; and likewise, the caused thing itself...is first said ‘to be a caused thing coming to be’ and next there is conservation of it. Yet the agent has not done by the first causing of coming to be anything other than it is doing now by the causing of being conserved (nor conversely), such that, as on the part of the agent ‘to make’ and ‘to conserve’ are the same in reality, so on the part of the caused ‘to come to be’ and ‘to be conserved’ are the same in reality and different only in reason... Rather (as it seems) ‘coming to be’ and ‘making’ should not be spoken of save as regards the first instant, wherein the caused leaps into being at the presence of its cause – but afterwards, as regards the whole succession of time, ‘conservation’ of the persisting thing should be spoken of, without any making.” “And as to what Augustine said...about ‘always coming to be’, he did not understand the ‘coming to be’ of the thing itself considered in itself and absolutely, but according to a certain respect to time, where there is before and after.”

causation, by which the thing has its being to the ultimate, has been posited – and so, although the causation of an angel has been posited, yet the non-existence of the angel can stand with this causation (when it has been posited) in the sense of division, but not in the sense of composition.

65. And hereby is plain the response to the like argument, that ‘an angel’s being created and being annihilated cannot stand together, therefore being created and being conserved are not the same thing – because when an angel is being conserved it can be annihilated, but not when it is being created.’

I reply. Just as an angel’s being created and being annihilated do not stand together in the sense of composition, so neither does an angel’s being conserved and being annihilated stand together in the sense of composition; but in the sense of division it does stand that, as concerns an angel, creation or conservation at some point are and yet that they can at some point not be (and thus annihilation can be) – just as was said in the matter of God’s predestination and foreknowledge, that in the sense of division there is potency for one opposite when the other opposite persists, yet not that there is potency for the opposite when the other opposite persists at the same time [1 d.40 nn.4-7, or *Lectura* 1 d.40 nn.4-8 and d.39 nn.53-54 – there being no d.39 in the *Ordinatio*].

66. To the second argument [n.18] I say that, on the part of an angel, there is no difference between its being, its having been, and its going to be, yet these indicate a different relation of the angel to time – because, just as was said in 1 d.9 n.17 and d.40 n.9, about being generated and having been generated, that these co-signify the ‘now’ of

eternity insofar as it coexists with the diverse parts of time, so too they would state of the ‘now’ of aeviternity that the same ‘now’ can be and coexist with all the parts of time.<sup>21</sup>

67. And when in the argument it is said that ‘God cannot make an angel not to have been’ [n.18], this is denied as it is said of the *thing* signified by the ‘have been’ – because the thing signified by the ‘have been’ is the same being as what the angel has.

68. And if it be said that ‘the past cannot not have been’, the minor that would be co-assumed [sc. ‘an angel has been’] is denied, because it is not past in itself.

An example of this would be if the Son of God, along with his being generated in eternity, were to receive, *per impossibile*, another nature in accord with which he would depend on the Father – then the ‘being generated’ and the ‘having been generated’ would state the same in him, and this being of the Son could absolutely not be; and insofar as this being would as it were follow its not-being, it would be called ‘being generated’, and insofar as it would as it were mediately follow its not-being, as coexisting with the other parts of time, it would be called ‘having been generated’. And so conservation and production (or creation) differ only by the action of the intellect; and the ‘having been conserved’ is able not to be when this being is being conserved, and when it is being produced, in the sense of division.

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<sup>21</sup> Henry of Ghent *Quodlibet* 5 q.13, “Hence the fact that the [angelic] creature has, in the said way, its whole being at once does not in any respect derogate from the simplicity of the being of God. Hence it is false to say that the being of the creature yesterday and tomorrow is not the same and simultaneous; for it is simultaneous as far as concerns itself and on the part of aeviternity. But if it is understood not to be simultaneous, this is according to the mode of our understanding, extending aeviternity to the parts of time; for the intellect seems to exist with the continuous and with time in such a way that it cannot understand things, which are in themselves fixed according to the whole of time, without understanding their being to be extended according to the differences of time – and in this regard our intellect is altogether defective... In that which has being at once and from itself, there is no difference at all between ‘to be’ and ‘to have been’ and ‘to be going to be’ – but these differ in anything that has being at once but from another, so that, when it has been according to the extension of past time, it is thereafter impossible for it not to have been according to that past; simply however it is impossible for it not to be going to be, on the supposition that there was no extension made.”



69. And if it be thus argued that ‘the past is able not to have coexisted with it, therefore it is able not to have been’ – this seems to be the fallacy of figure of speech, by changing ‘when’ into ‘what’.<sup>22</sup>

70. As to the confirmation of this second reason, about contradictory things willed in eternity [n.19] – one can say that although God willed me to sit at moment *a* and not to sit at moment *b*, yet the objects willed by him are naturally prior to the things that measure the ‘now’, and one must look in the prior stage for the non-contradiction of the things willed; otherwise a contradiction of this sort does not seem it could be taken away by the adding on of those posterior ‘nows’. Although therefore God might will an angel to be for this ‘now’ and not to be for that ‘now’, one must look first for the possibility of how he might will an angel to be and not to be.

71. I say then that if the ‘now’ is posited in any even aeviternal thing as proper to it, God wills it to be in that ‘now’ positively – and he wills it not to be negatively by willing that ‘now’ not to be; and then if there is another aeviternal thing in whose ‘now’ both of the former come to be, this is accidental to those ‘nows’, for the ‘now’ of that aeviternal thing is not the proper measure of them – just as neither is eternity a measure, in which there can be contradictories that succeed to each other in the case of every measure.

72. Or if there is not posited in any aeviternal thing some ‘now’ different from the actual existence of the thing (as will be said in the following question [nn.122-123]), then

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<sup>22</sup> Tr. The sense seems to be that since an angel, or anything aeviternal, is (according to this opinion) only said ‘to have been’ relative to the parts of time, if there was no time, or no past time, then the angel would not have the ‘when’ of past time. Yet he would still have the ‘what’ of his existence. So the angel would still exist in the way he was said to have been, though there would no longer be a ‘when’ relative to which his ‘have been’ could be said. So there is a fallacy of figure of speech in inferring absence of the ‘what’ from the absence of the ‘when’.

God wills it to be along with eternity and wills it not to be along with eternity. He does not however will it to be along with the whole of eternity ‘according to all the being present of eternity’, nor not to be along with the whole of eternity in this way, because then there would be a contradiction; but there is no contradiction when comparing these to eternity ‘not in accord with the whole idea of eternity’s infinite present’.

73. To the third [n.20] I say that in order to be obliged to infer, from the coexistence of some virtual quantity with some quantity properly – namely some quantity of bulk –, to the infinity of the virtual quantity [n.21], the virtual quantity must necessarily coexist with all the parts of the other quantity. The proof is that ‘the other quantity’ [sc. the quantity of bulk] would not be infinite unless it had all the parts possible to it (just as time, if it were simultaneous, would not be actually infinite unless it had all the parts possible to it); therefore nothing is deduced to be infinite virtually from the coexistence of it with the whole of time unless it necessarily coexist with all the parts of time. But aeviternity is not such. I say then that although aeviternity has wherewith it can coexist with the infinite parts of time, there is no need – for this reason – that it be in itself infinite, because it does not have formally wherewith it necessarily thus coexists.

74. And as to the likeness about immensity [n.22], I say that there is no likeness – because, in the case of immensity, that which could be present to every place would exist in every place at once, and not through any conservation by an extrinsic cause. In the issue at hand, however, an aeviternal thing does not have wherewith it may coexist with all the parts of time save through conservation by an extrinsic cause; and it would have nothing through which it might coexist unless it were caused to be quasi-continuously the same by the extrinsic cause, although not by a different causation; so there would be

more a likeness of this [sc. aeviternity] with that [sc. immensity] if the coexistence of the latter with different places – if this were possible – were caused by the same causation. However, in order to coexist simultaneously, it would never have infinite presence to place, and so it would never be immense. So it is in the issue at hand.

75. On the contrary: a finite thing cannot coexist together with a total infinite thing, such that it have in itself wherewith it could coexist with it; therefore because it does coexist it is infinite. – I reply: the antecedent is denied of an infinite which is infinite by succession, and denied of a finite formally having what it has always by the same action, such that it does not have it without such action.

76. As to the fourth [nn.24-25], that one aeviternal thing succeeds to another is conceded, and that the existence of an aeviternal thing succeeds to its opposite (that is, one is after another) is conceded, but from this there is not deduced any succession in any single existence of some aeviternal thing.

77. And from this is plain the answer to all the arguments:

As to those two angels [n.25], about these a ‘before’ and ‘after’ are conceded (because one remains after the other); if however a third were to coexist with the two of them, there would be no ‘before’ and ‘after’ in the existence of that third – just as, though today and tomorrow coexist with eternity, not for this reason is there a ‘before’ and ‘after’ in eternity.

78. Likewise [n.24], it is conceded that the nature of an angel would be prior to his guilt, such that this existence (namely under innocence) would be with the opposite of that existence, and from the second existence would follow the opposite of the first; however the existence of the angel in its own nature would not have any succession,

neither as it is existent under innocence nor as it is existent under guilt – but there would only be a succession in accidents (that is, that the existence of one act would be after the existence of the other), without however a diversity in the other in itself.

79. The authorities adduced for this opinion [nn.26-32] I concede, because no creature is independent of the first cause, but is always dependent on the cause – not however with a continuous dependence, nor with difference dependences, but with the same dependence; and, because of this same dependence, any creature can have being with one part of time and not with another part, and to this extent it can as it were fall under time, that is, so as to coexist with one part and not coexist with another, and in this way it may be said ‘to have been’ and ‘not to be going to be’, and thus not something eternal.

## VII. To the Principal Arguments

80. To the principal arguments [nn.8-10].

As to the first [n.8], it is conceded that one angel is created before another, but it does not follow because of this that there is in the existence of the angel first created a ‘before’ and ‘after’.

81. As to the second [n.9], it can likewise be said that an angel can be annihilated, and in the same ‘now’ negatively (if it has a ‘now’), that is, that its ‘now’ should cease along with it; but if its ‘now’ does not differ from its existence, then it can be annihilated with eternity and can exist with eternity, but not with the whole nature of the present-ness of eternity [nn.71-72].

82. To the last one [n.10] I say that the being of the [angel] restored follows the not-being of the [angel] annihilated, and that the not-being of the annihilated was preceded by the being of the created, and that the being of the created was preceded by the not-being of the creatable – and so the ‘being’ follows the same being, with the interrupting not-being in between. Nor does there follow from this any continuation in the being itself ‘if it had not been annihilated’ [n.10], because there is not now any succession in some one thing, but succession of one opposite to another [sc. not-being to being to not-being to being].<sup>23</sup>

83. On the contrary: therefore in this way the interrupted existence is at one with itself restored, as if it was a non-interrupted existence.

I reply: if there was no succession there of opposite to opposite [sc. of being to not-being to being] (which opposite [not-being] mediates between this being [the being of the created] and itself [the being of the restored]), the consequence would be that there would be as much at-oneness as if the opposite did not intervene; but now the opposite mediates as it were between the created being and that very being repaired (and this ‘opposite’ is a mean, or has a certain relation to both extremes), and so these are not as at one as if not-being did not intervene. However, just as in this case the same repaired ‘now’ (or the same existence, if it requires no ‘now’ [n.72]) is the same, and there is ‘created existence and repaired existence’ in the same thing without any succession in it in itself (although, as posited in being, it succeeds itself as previously posited in being) – so it would have been in the same ‘now’ if it had not been interrupted, and without any succession, in either way.

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<sup>23</sup> Vatican Editors remark that Scotus means the identically same being is restored as was annihilated, not some other being, and that the not-being of annihilation was identically the same as the not-being prior to creation, not some other not-being.

## Question Two

*Whether in an Angel actually Existing there is Need to posit Something Measuring its  
Existence that is Other than that very Existence*

84. Secondly I ask whether in an angel actually existing there is need to posit something measuring its existence (or the duration of its existence [n.1]) that is other than that existence itself.

85. That there is:

Time differs from motion by the fact that it measures motion (as the Philosopher proves in *Physics* 4.10.218b13-18 by the fact that ‘time is neither quick nor slow but motion is said to be quick or slow’, and by other reasons); therefore, by likeness, there is something other than the existence of the aeviternal that measures it.

86. Secondly as follows: permanent quantity and successive quantity belong to the same genus – therefore each is something other than its subject, especially if the subject belongs to the genus of substance; therefore just as permanent quantity is other than that of which it is the measure, so also is successive quantity [cf. nn.1-2].

87. On the contrary:

About this ‘other’ I ask by what it endures in being. If by itself then, by parity of reasoning, existence itself will be able to endure by itself formally, because this ‘other’ is not more perfect than that very actual existence, since it is as it were the property of it.

But if it endures in being by an absolute other than itself, there will be an infinite regress in measures and things measured.

## I. To the Affirmative Side of the Question

### A. The Opinion of Others

88. My response.

The first opinion in the preceding question [n.11] should concede the affirmative side, because aeviternity [according to this opinion] truly posits the idea of measure and quantity in its proper sense [n.48] – and so aeviternity differs from the existence of an angel, which existence is not in itself formally an extension, a quantum, but is indivisible.

89. Likewise, in that existence one ‘now’ of aeviternity succeeds to another; therefore both ‘nows’ differ from the existence of an angel as something absolute (according to this position [nn.19, 49-51, 58]), because they are quasi-indivisibles of the genus of quantity.

90. Likewise some – holding the second opinion in the preceding question (about the indivisibility of aeviternity [nn.39, 42, 33]) – say that aeviternity itself belongs to the genus of quantity, not as a divisible but as an indivisible in that genus; such that from many indivisibles of the same species, measuring namely the existences of several aeviternal things of the same species, a discrete quantity can be composed, which is the number and measure in aeviternal things, just as number in corporeal things is composed of the discrete unities in those things (for this they adduce reasons – look for them).<sup>24</sup>

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<sup>24</sup> Henry of Ghent *Quodlibet* 12 a.8, “But someone might ask in what category the measure of angels is. And I say that it is in the category of quantity as the principle of it, in the way that unity and point

## B. Rejection of the Opinion

91. Against this [nn.88-90] there is, as was argued before in 2 d.1 n.262, an argument as follows:

That which, if it were distinct from something, would be naturally posterior to it, is necessarily the same as that something if it is impossible for it to be without it. Therefore, if it is impossible for an angel to be without some extrinsic thing (which thing would be the measure of his actual existence), then, since that extrinsic thing, if it were other, would be naturally posterior to the actual existence of the angel, the consequence is that it is not other than his existence; or if it is other, and consequently posterior, the angel's actual existence will, without contradiction, be able to be without it – and thus there is no necessity to posit it.

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and instant are in the category of quantity. For just as from diverse indivisibles measuring the diverse thoughts of any angel there is constituted one discrete measure, which is called time, because it is constituted from transient things measuring the being of a transient thing, so from the diverse indivisibles of aeviternities measuring the substance and 'the being as to substance' of several angels, differing in number in one species of angels, there is constituted one discrete measure, which does not deserve to be called time, because it is not constituted from transient things measuring the being of a transient thing as it is transient, but rather is constituted from permanent things of a permanent being as it is permanent; and so it is not a species of time but rather of number – and this number is from discrete unities in spiritual things, just as the number that the philosophers posit is from discrete units in corporeal things. But if it happen that there is only one angel in one species, yet because there can be several angels, as we made clear elsewhere (*ibid.* 9 q.1), this makes no difference as to positing that such a number is some species of quantity – just as if everything corporeal were one continuum, this would make no difference as to positing that natural number is a species of quantity, since the continuum can be divided (at least by the intellect) and from the continuum something discrete comes to be. So therefore the aeviternity in a species, containing in itself diverse aeviternities measuring the being of diverse angels of the same species, is a discrete quantity and divisible into indivisibles – which indivisibles are the aeviternities of individual angels and differ in number among themselves; and if from the aeviternities of diverse angels differing in species a mathematical abstraction could be made, just as it can be made from the numbers of diverse corporeal things differing in species – then perhaps, just as there is one number ten for ten men and for ten horses (although the tens are not the same), so there is the same aeviternity in species for all the angels diverse in species, although the aeviternals would not be the same in species."



92. There is a confirmation of this reason (and it is like the one that mention was made of above at d.1 n.262), that a distinction between things, one of which is properly present in the other, is not deduced save from an actual or potential distinction, or because the things are disposed to each other as those things are of which one is separable from the other.

93. I add this third point, that according to Aristotle, *Metaphysics* 7.11.1036b22-28 ‘On the parts of Definition’, many have been seduced from the truth by comparison of the younger Socrates who said that ‘if were no circles save bronze ones, bronze would not for this reason fall into the definition of circle’, and inferred by similitude that ‘flesh should not fall into the definition of man, even though there is no man without flesh’ – when it is given, I say, that a separation of these [man and flesh] from each other is impossible. However if these are disposed to each other as are things of which the separation is possible, then the conclusion is that they are separable; for example, if from the proper idea of circle and triangle, of flesh and wood, the conclusion is drawn that circle is disposed to wood as triangle is to flesh, and if separability is proved on the one side, then a distinction will be proved on the other side, and proved that inseparability on that other side is not from its proper idea but from something extrinsic.

94. I take, therefore, that nothing can be proved to be distinct from another thing save because of their actual or potential separation, or because of a proportion of them to some other things of which one is separable from the other. But in the issue at hand [sc. the measure of the existence of angels] none of this holds. For there is not here (for you [sc. those who hold the first or second opinions in the previous question]) any separation, whether actual or potential. Nor are these things [sc. an angel’s existence and the measure

of it] disposed to each other as distinct and separable things are, because nothing distinct really from another thing, without which it cannot be without contradiction, is prior to it, but either naturally posterior or simultaneous in nature with it; but this thing which is posited as ‘other’ [sc. the measure of an angel’s existence], if it existed, would be naturally posterior to the angel; therefore etc. [n.91].

### C. Instance against the Rejection of the Opinion

95. There is objected against this [sc. that there is no distinction between the existence of an angel and the measure of it], that ‘the now as to substance’ is disposed to the substance of a movable thing as that which is posited to be the measure of the duration of the existence of angels is disposed to that existence – because, just as the existence, measured by this indivisible measure, remains the same, so the like is posited on the side of the ‘now’ and the substance of a movable thing; and yet on this side is found a distinction between the substance of the very movable thing and the substance of the ‘now’; therefore here too.

96. Now that one should posit some such ‘now’ measuring the movable thing, the same as it in substance, seems to follow from the intention of the Philosopher in *Physics* 4.10.281a8-11; there he seems to solve as it were the question he is moving about the ‘now’, by saying that it is ‘one and the same as to substance, but different as to being’.

### D. Response to the Instance

97. I exclude this objection [n.95] as follows:

First I show that what it supposes about ‘the now as to substance’ is false and is against the Philosopher’s intention – because the Philosopher proves [*Physics* 4.11.219b22-25] that “‘the now’ follows what is being moved” by the fact that “we learn from what is being moved the ‘before’ and ‘after’ in motion,” and that from this ‘now’ we learn the ‘before’ and ‘after’ in time. But this is not true of the movable as to substance, but as it is under different changes, because, if the movable is taken as to substance absolutely, we do not from it learn the ‘before’ and ‘after’ in motion.<sup>a</sup>

a. [*Interpolation*] therefore neither do we from the same ‘now’ according to substance learn the ‘before’ and ‘after’ in time, but we do so from different ‘nows’.

98. Likewise, the Philosopher says [*Physics* 4.11.219b33-20a4], as to the second property about the ‘now’, that it is not without time nor vice versa, because motion is not without the movable nor vice versa; and as motion is to the movable, so the number of motion is to the number or unity of the movable. But that the movable cannot, as to its substance, be without motion is false, but it is true of the movable precisely as it exists under change; therefore if the latter is a movable in the whole motion, then so is the ‘now’ corresponding to it.

99. Further, how could the ‘indivisible now’ flow according to different existences (which would necessarily be indivisible), without its whole flow being a composite of indivisibles? For the Philosopher proves, from his intention in *Physics* 6.10.241a6-14, that the indivisible cannot move, because then its motion would be composed of indivisibles, because a lesser or equal part of it would pass by before a

greater did; therefore time would be a composite of indivisibles, which is against the Philosopher [*Physics* 6.9.239b8-9].

100. To prove this [sc. that an indivisible ‘now’ cannot flow according to different existences] there are two reasons from the Philosopher [*Physics* 4.10.218a21-30],<sup>a</sup> one of which is of this sort: ‘those things are said to be at once which are in the same indivisible instant etc.’<sup>b</sup>

a. [*Interpolated note*] In the *Reportatio*, “these reason are left unsolved, though they may apparently be solved.”

b. [*Interpolation*] therefore if the instant is the same in substance, all instances are equally present and at once, both those now and those a thousand years from now (Averroes *Physics* 4 comm.92).

101. The other reason is that ‘of any continuous thing there are two distinct terms etc.’ – which reason I clarify as follows:

Because to ask whether the substance itself of the ‘now as to substance’ is movable is only to dispute about words. But if the ‘now’ is other than the substance (namely, something indivisible in the genus of quantity), I ask of which continuous thing or of which discrete part it is the term – because everything indivisible that is per se in the genus of quantity is either a term of continuous quantity or a part of discrete quantity. If the now is part of discrete quantity then time is discrete, which the Philosopher did not concede [n.99]; if it is a term of continuous quantity, then it must be two (according as it is the term of this and of that part of the continuous), because it is impossible for ‘the

same thing as to substance' to be per se the end and the beginning of one and the same quantity.<sup>a</sup>

a. [*Interpolation*] Again, the Commentator makes the following argument at *Physics* 4 comm.91:  
an instant is end and term of something finite; but everything finite has two terms and two ends;  
therefore it also has two instants.

102. And if you say that it is the term 'according to diverse existences' – then since those existences are accidents of the 'now' the same in substance (because for you it remains the same under diverse existences [n.95], and consequently those existences are accidents of it), and since everything indivisible in the genus of quantity is the per se term of a quantity (or is a part of what is discrete), it follows that that 'now' is not an indivisible per se in the genus of quantity, since it is not per se a term.

103. Further, I ask to what genus those 'existences' belong. If they are indivisibles of the genus of quantity, then they are sufficient to be the terms of the continuous proper without the 'now as to substance', which is unacceptable (the proof of the consequence is that nothing indivisible is per se a term 'because there is a term of a second indivisible'). But if they belong to another genus, namely of quality – then a quality will be per se the idea of terminating the continuous in the genus of quantity.

104. And further, how would the 'now as to substance' not undergo change according to diverse existences? And then one would have to ask about the measure of it and of its changes, and so on ad infinitum.

105. Further, is the 'now as to substance' the same in any motion whatever or in a single one precisely?

106. To the Philosopher [n.96] I say that he does not intend the ‘now’ to remain the same in substance, but the opposite follows from what he said; but any ‘single now’, considered in itself, is the same, and this is said to be ‘the same in substance’ – but considered in order to past and future time, since it is the end of the past and the beginning of the future, it is said ‘to be distinguished in being’ [*Physics* 4.13.222a10-15].

107. And to make this clear, there is the likeness about the movable thing, that it remains the same [n.95]; not indeed the movable thing as it absolutely precedes change (for in that case, the ‘now’ is not the measure of it and it does not belong to time [nn.97-98]), but the movable thing as it is under a change is ‘the same as to substance’ – that is, according to the being of the change considered in itself –, and is ‘different as to being’ – that is, as under the change it is the term of the past and the beginning of the future, and in this respect it is said to be here and to be there. Not indeed actually so, but in one intermediate ‘where’ between the extremes (insofar as this intermediate ‘where’ ends the motion as to the prior ‘where’ and begins the motion as to the later ‘where’) – in this it is said to be here and there, because ‘to change’ is to have something of both extremes; hence the Philosopher in *Physics* 6.4.234b17-19 maintains that, although something may be in a single intermediate, yet it is ‘other’ according to each extreme.

108. But how will this solve the question of the Philosopher, which he moves in the *Physics* [n.96], ‘whether the same ‘now’ in substance remains in the whole time or not’?

I say that the Philosopher nowhere expressly solves this other question, about ‘whether time is’, but he does say a few things from which its solution can be collected [*Physics* 4.10.217b31-18a8] – and so it is in the case of this question: for if any movable

thing whatever has sameness precisely as to substance (that is, relative to itself) and difference as to being (that is, in its order to different parts of motion), then things are the same about an instant with respect to the parts of time; and there is not as much sameness to the instant in the whole of time as there is to one instant; therefore the instant in the whole of time is ‘different things’ as to substance.

109. I say then to the objection [n.95], that if any ‘now’ is similarly disposed to the substance of the movable thing as aeviternity is to the substance of an angel, then that ‘now’ is not other than that substance, nor is it an indivisible in the genus of quantity; and if some ‘now’ in the genus of quantity is imagined for measuring the movable thing as to substance, then there is no such thing in an angel actually existing, as was proved before [n.91].

110. But I argue against this [sc. the imagining of a now in the genus of quantity etc., n.109] as follows:

The movable thing can be considered in three ways: either as it exists under the end points of change, or as it exists under the in-between of change, or as it is prior to motion and change (though able to receive them). In the first way there correspond to it diverse ‘nows’ as to being, in the second way there corresponds to it the time between those ‘nows’ – so in the third way there will correspond to it some proper measure, but this measure is only the ‘now as to substance’; therefore etc.

111. I reply.

If time has to differ from motion, and consequently the instant has to differ from change, yet there is not a like reason for positing something different from the existence itself of a uniform angel in order to be measure of it.<sup>a</sup> For if time differs from motion, the

reason for this is that the parts of the same proportion of some motion are not necessarily equal in number and quantity to the parts of the same proportion of time; but no quantity is the same as another quantity unless the parts of the same proportion in it are equal to the parts of the same proportion in the other quantity, and that equal both in number and in magnitude (though, when speaking of the quantity that is in motion, it has this from the part of the magnitude or form by which it is motion). However, parts of a motion, to wit ten parts integrally forming a whole motion, can exist with ten parts of time, and yet they are not the same as the parts of time, because there could exist, along with the same parts of time, a greater number of parts of motion equal in magnitude to the prior parts of the motion, or as many again; for if a double force were to move the same movable thing, and consequently move it twice as quickly, there will be no part in the slower motion that does not exist in the quicker motion (speaking of the parts that the motion has in magnitude, according to the form according to which it is a magnitude), because what moves a movable thing with a quicker motion does not make any parts of the magnitude pass by simultaneously but makes them precisely pass by one after the other; therefore there are as many and as large parts in a quicker motion (speaking of this quantity) as there are in a slower motion. But the same time (possessing the same parts) cannot exist along with the former motion and also with the latter; therefore the parts of time will not be the same as the parts either of the former or of the latter, because the parts of time are not disposed to the whole in the same proportion as, and equal with, those other parts of the whole.

- a. [*Interpolation*] in the way that is posited on the other side about time and the instant with respect to motion and change as to their measures.



112. If this is true, the conclusion from it is that an indivisible of one quantity is not the indivisible of another quantity, but the conclusion from this conclusion is not that in anything ‘that remains always uniform in being’ one must posit something else different from it, because there the argument about the magnitudes and their parts does not hold. There is then a fallacy of the consequent involved in arguing affirmatively from the lesser thing: ‘if change and motion have measures other than themselves, then the substance too itself – which is prior to motion and change – has a measure other than itself’ [n.110]; for there seems to be less distinction (or lack of sameness) in a permanent thing than in a thing in flux (or in motion) and its measure.<sup>25</sup>

113. But if one is pleased to grant some measure to the movable thing insofar as it is in itself prior to motion and change, then that measure will be aeviternity, as will be plain in the question about the measure of the operations of an angel [nn.167, 171-76].

114. And if you look for another measure of it insofar as it is in itself and insofar as it is susceptible of motion and change, I say that it is not other, because the subject insofar as it is in itself is susceptible of its proper accident – and likewise, if there is any measure, it is the same; hence there is not another measure of a surface insofar as it is a surface and insofar as it is susceptible of whiteness and blackness. So I say that if the substance of the first movable (or of any other movable) is measured by aeviternity, there is no other measure of it insofar as it is naturally prior to motion and change and insofar as it is receptive of motion and change.

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<sup>25</sup> Tr. To argue from a distinction between change and its measure to an equal distinction between a permanent thing and its measure is to argue from a less permanent thing to a more permanent one, which is fallacious here because there is no reason to suppose that a more permanent thing should have the *same* distinctions as a less permanent one; rather it would seem intuitively to have *fewer* distinctions.

115. But if you say that insofar as it is at rest it will have a measure other than aeviternity, this is false as will be clear later [nn.167, 171-76].

## II. To the Negative Side of the Question

116. As to the second side of the question wherein is asked ‘whether there should be posited in an existing angel something measuring his existence’ [nn.84, 87], I say that ‘to measure’ is to make an unknown quantity certain through a more known quantity; but making certain can be done by a quantity existing in reality or in imagination.

117. In imagination as when a skilled artisan measures by a quantity that he has in his imagination some quantity that is presented to him.

118. But sometimes the measuring can be done by some real quantity, and that in three ways:

Either by an exceeding quantity, and then the intellect is made certain about a lesser quantity through its approach to or departure from a greater quantity. And in this way is a measure imposed on the quiddities of things, and the measure is more perfect than the measured and must be naturally more known than it – the way whiteness is imposed as the measure in the genus of colors and is called the first measure in everything that is in that genus [*Metaphysics* 10.2.1053b28-34, 54a9-13].

119. In another way the known quantity is lesser and part of the greater quantity (which is less known), and then the lesser quantity measures the larger whole by reduplication of itself. And in this way a lesser motion can, from the nature of the thing, be the measure of a greater motion.

120. In a third way an unknown quantity is measured by some known quantity that is equal to it, and this is done by applying or superimposing it; and because that which, from the nature of the thing, is the measure first should be naturally more known than the thing measured, so in this way one of the equals is not the measure of the other unless it were, from the nature of the thing, more known. And in this way time, if it is a quantity other than motion and more known than it, can be from the nature of the thing the measure of motion.

121. However, for some intellect what is not the measure by the nature of the thing can be a measure; for example, if the length of the arm is known to someone and the length of a piece of cloth unknown, the length of the arm (because it is known) can be for him the measure of the length of the cloth,<sup>a</sup> although neither length has, from the nature of the thing, greater certitude than the other.

a. [*Interpolation*] About the mensuration of one thing by another by a measure more known simply or more known to us, note Averroes *Physics* 4 comm.112-114 about time, where he shows how time measures motion by a number of it that is more known, and the whole motion by that part.

122. Applying this then to the issue at hand, I say that in the actual existence of an angel there is no need to look for some intrinsic measure different from the nature of the thing itself that is measured, because – as was already proved [n.91] – nothing is there really other than the nature of the measured thing; but a measure is, from the nature of the thing, other than the thing measured, and plainly, if some measure were posited in an angel, it would not be posited in him save in the third way (for it neither exceeds nor is

exceeded but is equal [nn.118-120]). And in addition, the existence of an angel does not seem able to be its own measure the way that in other things a quantity more distinctly known can be the measure of itself as to its own confusedly known parts; it is not so with an angel, since his existence is indivisible and cannot contain parts confusedly in itself, since it has no parts.

123. Likewise therefore, there is no need to posit in an existing angel anything to be the measure of actual existence other than his actual existence. And if plurality is not to be posited without necessity, and here there is no necessity, plurality does not seem it should here be posited; but not only is it not necessary to posit anything absolute as measure, it is also not necessary to posit any relation other than relation to the efficient or conserving cause – and that relation is not different from the foundation (from 2 d.1 q.5 nn.260-71).

### III. To the Principal Arguments

124. As to the first principal argument [n.85], it is plain that the consequence about time and motion is not valid when making comparison with the existence of an angel (and the reason was stated before, when replying to an argument [nn.110-112]), because an argument that would prove a difference between motion and time [n.111] does not here prove that there exists anything distinct and different from the actual existence of an angel; so neither that there is any measure distinct and different.

125. As to the second [n.86], it is plain that nothing is conceded to be in the actual existence of an angel that may properly be a quantity or an indivisible in the genus of

quantity – because his existence seems able to be known by itself without anything else added.

### Question Three

#### *Whether there is one Aeviternity for all Aeviternals*

126. Third I ask whether there is one aeviternity for all aeviternals.

127. That there is not:

First, because then aeviternity would be in a subject upon whose destruction or change all the other aeviternals would change, which seems unacceptable; and likewise, when the others were destroyed, aeviternity would seem to be changed, because an aeviternity with respect to others would not be there.

128. On the contrary:

There is one time for all temporal things (*Physics* 4.10.218b4-5), so there is one aeviternity for all aeviternal things.

#### I. To the Question

##### A. Opinion of Henry of Ghent

129. Here it is said [by Henry of Ghent] that there are as many aeviternities as there are aeviternal things, such that there is in any aeviternal thing some proper

indivisible pertaining to the genus of quantity, and from many such one number can be constituted, as was reported before [n.90].

### B. Rejection of the Opinion

130. But this opinion seems to posit plurality without necessity. Therefore it seems one should speak against it as was done in the preceding question [n.123]:

That either aeviternity is said to be the actual existence of the aeviternal angel, and in this way there are as many aeviternities as there are angels.

131. Or it is said to be a thing intrinsic to something actually existent and measuring that existence – and in this way it is nothing, as was proved in the preceding question [n.122].

132. Or aeviternity is said to be something extrinsic, different from the actual existence of the aeviternal thing, which extrinsic thing, from the nature of itself, is however of a nature to measure the actual existence of the very aeviternal thing – and then this can be posited in three ways:

Either that one can deny that any such thing is, from the nature of itself, of a nature to measure the existence of the very aeviternal thing, by positing that all aeviternal things have an existence equally invariable, because, although one existence is more perfect than another and, for this reason, can measure it by that sort of quidditative measuring (the way the Philosopher speaks in *Metaphysics* 10.2.1054a9-11), yet in the case of a measuring of duration – which is in some way reduced to the genus of quantity – no invariable existence seems to be more invariable than another, because a succession

of parts within itself is altogether repugnant to any of them; and then one should say that, since aeviternity is posited as the measure of something insofar as this something endures unvaried, and since the extrinsic measure should, from the nature of the thing, be more known in idea of invariability, and since there is no such difference [sc. in idea of invariability] among existences of aeviternal things, then nothing will be thus an aeviternity.

133. Or one can say in another way that any superior existence is simpler than any inferior existence, and is of a nature, from the nature of the thing, to give certainty about that inferior existence, and to this extent any existence of a superior could be called aeviternity in respect of an inferior; and then there will be as many aeviternities as there are aeviternal things, excepting that there is no aeviternity in the last aeviternal thing since its existence does not measure any other invariable existence; and likewise the existence of the highest angel is only an aeviternity with respect to the other inferior angels, because his invariable existence measures all the others and does not have himself any aeviternity in this way, because he has no other existence above him.

134. Or one can say in a third way that, if aeviternity is not said to be any existence simpler than another and to be of a nature to give certainty about it, but is said to be the simplest existence which, by its own formal idea and in itself, is most certain and is first known and of a nature to give certainty about the others – and in this way one can say that there is only one aeviternity, namely the existence of the first angel with respect to all the other aeviternals.

135. Now whichever of these ways [nn.130-34] is posited, there is not in any aeviternal its own aeviternity [n.129]; nor is there in the last aeviternal any aeviternity

[n.133] – nor is the one in which is the first aeviternity measured by any aeviternity [n.133], because it has nothing such in itself (from the preceding question [nn.122-23]) – nor is aeviternity in any other aeviternal from the nature of it, because any other [sc. being inferior to the first] is less certain.

### C. Instance

136. Against this [n.135]:

Because then it would follow – if this is so [sc. if the first angel is not measured by any aeviternity] – that the first motion will not be measured by time, just as the first aeviternal is not measured by aeviternity; for the comparison seems to be similar on this side as on that.

137. The consequent [sc. the first motion is not measured by time] is conceded for this reason, that – according to the rule in *Physics* 4.12.221a26-b5 – everything that is in time ‘is exceeded by time and is corrupted and wastes away in time’; and thus necessary and impossible things are not in time. Therefore the first motion (which is not corrupted in time nor exceeded by it) is not in time nor measured by time.

### D. Response to the Instance

138. But this reason is not valid, because ‘something’s being in time is like something’s being in number’ [*Physics* 4.4.12.221a17-18], but it is not of the idea of a being existing in number that it be exceeded by number – rather, if the first numbered



thing is taken (that is, the adequate one), it is equal to number itself; but it is of the idea of the first numbered thing that a part of it is exceeded by number, because the whole is greater than its part and the whole is equal to the number; therefore part of it is exceeded by number.

139. Therefore I say about an entity in time that, from the fact any such entity is of necessity variable according to its varying being, it must be that in accord with something of itself – namely in accord with some discreteness which it has on the part of time – it is exceeded by time, because it will be disposed differently in a different part of time; and for this reason it is that impossible and necessary things ‘are not in time’ [n.137], because there is no difference of disposition in them so that they could be exceeded by time or be differently disposed. But the first motion, although not in its totality exceeded by time, yet is exceeded by time as to some part of itself, and this suffices for it to be truly said to be measured by time; and it seems unacceptable that time, since it is a uniform measure, should not have some first uniform measured thing.

140. And then to the argument [n.136]:

I deny the consequence [sc. if the first angel is not measured by aeviternity, then the first motion is not measured by time], because the reason is not the same here as there. For if the first motion is measured by time, this is either because motion is posited to be something other than time (because of the reason set down above, from the *Physics*, n.85), or because, by positing time to be the same as motion, that motion can measure itself (not indeed first, but it measures the whole by the part of it that is known, as the Philosopher says in *Physics* 4.12.220b32-1a4, “Time measures motion itself by determining some motion that will afterwards measure the whole motion, as a cubit measures length by

determining some length that will measure the whole”); but neither reason is found in the issue at hand, because there is not anything in the first aeviternal thing other than its existence, nor is its own very existence an extension, or a quantum, that could measure itself by some known part of itself [n.122].

## II. To the Principal Arguments

141. To the first principal argument [n.127] I say that, on the destruction of the first aeviternal, it does not follow that the other ones are changed save as to a certain relation in them (namely that then they will not be measured by the first aeviternal as they were before), and it is not unacceptable to posit such a change in something that before had the relation. Likewise, as to the inference that ‘the first aeviternal will be changed when the others are destroyed’ [n.127], I say that this does not hold, because the first aeviternal before did not have a real relation to the others but only a relation of reason, because it is not a measure dependent on the measured thing but exceeding it; and so, upon the destruction of the others, it will not be changed absolutely or according to any real relation, because there was no real relation to them in it before.

142. As to the argument for the opposite [n.128], one can say that, when speaking of aeviternity as it states something extrinsic different from the measured existence of the angel [n.132], the first opinion alone denies an aeviternity in this way [sc. one aeviternity for all aeviternals], but the second and third concede that there is one aeviternity, although the second does not concede that there is only one [nn.132-34]. And then if you argue that ‘there is only one time for all temporals, therefore there should be only one

aeviternity for aeviternals' [n.128], the consequence is not valid, because not every superior motion has, from the nature of the thing, the idea of measure with respect to an inferior motion, nor does it, from the nature of the thing, have the conditions of a measure the way any superior existence, speaking of the invariable existences of angels, has with respect to an inferior one; and so the reason here and there is not alike, that just as only one time exists there for all temporals so one aeviternity should exist here for all aeviternals.

## Question Four

### *Whether the Operation of an Angel is Measured by Aeviternity*

143. Fourth and last as to this matter [n.1] I ask whether the operation of an angel is measured by aeviternity.

144. That it is not:

From the author of *On Causes* proposition 31, "Between a thing whose substance and action are measured by time and a thing whose substance and action are measured by eternity there is an intermediate thing whose substance is measured by eternity (or aeviternity) and whose action is measured by time;" now an angel is of this sort; therefore etc.

145. Secondly as follows: the Philosopher in *Physics* 8.7.261b22-24 says that "nothing is generated in order immediately not to be;" therefore every operation of an

angel endures for a time and consequently is not precisely in an instant. But if it is in aeviternity (since it is not eternal) it will be precisely in an instant; wherefore etc.

146. To the opposite:

The operation of an angel is not measured by time or by eternity, therefore by aeviternity. The proof of the consequence is that more than one measure is not posited in an interval of being. The antecedent as to eternity is plain; as to time the proof is that an angel could have an operation when the motion of the heaven does not exist; but when the motion of the heaven does not exist there would be no time; therefore etc.

### I. To the Question

#### A. The Opinion of Henry of Ghent

##### 1. Exposition of the Opinion

147. Here it is said [by Henry of Ghent] that the intrinsic operation of an angel is measured by discrete time. And it is posited in the following way:

The measure that is of the duration of a thing is a way in which the thing is measured, and it is proportioned to the thing measured (as the measure of a permanent thing is permanent and of a flowing thing is flowing); therefore such a proportion must be found between the thoughts or operations of an angel and the measures of them. Now these thoughts are transient, because an angel does not have always wholly one intellection that is possible for him but many, and these intellections flow and pass by in a certain order, so that one is after another; and yet this happens without connection, so that an angel does not have one thought after another or from another because he is not

discursive; it is also without succession, because none of these operations is in a process of being acquired or lost but is, while it is, whole at once and indivisible. So there will correspond to them a measure having indivisible, ordered, transient parts; but such is discrete time; therefore etc.

148. This reason is confirmed by Augustine *Literal Commentary on Genesis* 8.22 n.43, where he maintains that ‘God moves the spiritual creature in time’.

149. But if it be asked what this ‘discrete time’ is – the response is that it is a ‘true quantity’, distinct in species from number and speaking; for the parts of number indeed are permanent (so that if they are not permanent this is incidental), but a part of speaking is necessarily not permanent and yet is not continuous with another part. Therefore ‘discrete time’ agrees with speaking in that its parts are not permanent, but differs from speaking in that any part of vowelised speaking is continuous with vowelised speaking and of consonantal with consonantal (and this can be in our time truly and be measured by some part of time), although it is not continuous with another part of speaking; but no thought of an angel can in itself be measured by time (because it is indivisible), nor can it be continuous with another thought.

150. But if it be asked why this ‘discrete quantity’ is not put by Aristotle among the species of quantity, the response is that he posited the intelligences to be certain gods [*Metaphysics* 12.8.1073a14-b1, 1074a38-b13], and for this reason he did not posit any measure corresponding to such operation of them that was whole at once.

151. And if it be asked how this ‘discrete time’ relates to our time, the answer is that the ‘now’ of discrete time necessarily coexists with some part of our time and consequently with all the parts that exist along with that instant; for if an angel has some

thought first along with this instant of ours, he does not at once have another thought in a next instant but he has the previous one in the time following, and in the last instant of the time following he can have another thought in continuity with our time.

152. And in addition, this instant does not have any proportion to our instant, because the same ‘now’ of that discrete time can coexist with any amount of our time, whether a greater or a lesser, according as the angel can continue the same indivisible intellection with a greater or lesser part of our time, without any other new intellection.

## 2. Rejection of the Opinion

153. Against the conclusion of this position [n.147] I argue as follows:

Things that have a uniform mode of lasting have, while they last, a measure in their duration of the same idea, even though one lasts longer than another; but the thinking of an angel has, while it lasts, the same mode of lasting as the existence of an angel, although it does not have as long a duration as the angel’s existence has; therefore it has a measure of the same idea as the existence does, and so the angel’s thinking is measured by aeviternity and not by time.<sup>a</sup>

a. [*Interpolated note*] In the *Reportatio*, “The major is plain, both because the subject includes the predicate and because, if a single intellection of an angel were to remain sempiternally like his existence, it would have a measure uniformly; but sempiternal existence is not incidental to the measure, because, if one suppose that the angel will be annihilated tomorrow, his existence now would no less be measured by aeviternity.”

154. The proof of the minor is that to the formal idea of the existence of an angel – whether uniform or not – there corresponds, in their view [sc. the supporters of this opinion, n.147], a proper idea of measure, because they distinguish and speak of<sup>a</sup> three modes of measure for things; and in this way both major and minor are plain. Hence their view maintains that the middle measure corresponds to what has an indivisible duration and is yet defectible (such that of itself it can cease to be), and it posits the measure to be aeviternity. But, just as the existence of an angel is indivisible and yet defectible, so also now, in their view, is the angel's thinking.

a. [*Interpolated note*] In the *Reportatio* [IIA d.2 q.1], “This doctor [Henry of Ghent] elsewhere says that there are three existences and three measures; existence that is simply independent and invariable, and it is measured by eternity, variable and dependent existence measured by time, invariable and dependent existence measured by aeviternity.”

155. If it be said that an angel's thinking will not always be but that his existence will always be, and so things are not alike as to his existence and his thinking – this argument does not seem valid, because even if the angel is to be annihilated yet not for this reason would he, while he lasts, not be measured by aeviternity.

156. If it be said that it is in the angel's power to have or not have the thinking, but not in his power to have or not have his actual existence – this argument does not seem valid, because just as potentiality for being about not to be at some point does not vary the measure of an angel's existence while he lasts, so will the cause much more by which this potentiality can be reduced to act – namely a created or uncreated cause – not vary the formal idea of his existence or his duration in existing.

157. Further, second and principally, everyone concedes that the beatific act of an angel is measured by aeviternity, as is plain from Augustine [Fulgentius] *On the Faith to Peter* ch.3 n.20. But that act necessarily includes or presupposes a natural act, and this by positing the angel has some perfection in his beatific act, although he not have power in himself for the total perfection of the beatific act; but it is impossible for an aeviternal thing to include or presuppose something posterior to aeviternity, which would, namely, be measured by a measure posterior to aeviternity; therefore the natural act, which is included in the beatific act, cannot be temporal.

158. Against the way of positing this opinion [n.47]:

For it seems to concede a large quantity of times without necessity; for it has as consequence that any angel possesses his own discrete time, because one angel can continue his thinking along with our day and another continue his thinking along with half our day and a third do so along with an hour of our day – and so one angel will have twenty four instants while another will have a single instant; nay, the opinion has as consequence that in any angel there will be two discrete times, because any angel will be able to continue his thinking while not continuing his volition – and so he will have two instants of intellection and yet one instant of volition.

159. Further, according to this opinion the aeviternal durations in diverse aeviternities will, if the actual existences of aeviternal things are of a different idea, also be of different ideas – and in angels of diverse species the opinion posits aeviternal durations of diverse species; so likewise there will be ‘nows of discrete time’ of different species for intellections of different species.



160. From this I argue as follows: no single quantity is composed of several parts of altogether different ideas, because although sixes can be composed of twos and threes etc. (which however the Philosopher denies, *Metaphysics* 5.15.1020b7-8, because ‘six things are only once six’, and Avicenna also denies it, *Metaphysics* 3.5, f 80va), yet no quantity ‘composed however much of parts of distinct ideas’ can be the same quantity, because then six could come from tens and twos and from any number whatever; but during the length of a day of ours an angel could understand distinctly any natural intelligibles whatever, as stone, wood, iron, water, and understand anything else at all after anything else at all – and then his time would be composed of diverse instants and instants of diverse species, corresponding to the intelligibles of diverse species.<sup>a</sup> He would also be able not to think or understand these but instead to think or understand many more (or as many) other species, and consequently his time could then be composed of others parts, and parts positively disposed in determinate nature to time; therefore it seems etc. [sc. as above: that ‘his time would be composed of diverse instants and instants of diverse species, corresponding to the intelligibles of diverse species’].

a. [*Interpolated note*] In the *Reportatio* [IIA d.2 q.1], “For number is not composed of numbers but of unities, because ‘once six’ etc. Let it however be so, certainly no number can be composed of parts altogether of another idea, however much; but an angel’s intellection of one object and of another is of another idea in its proper genus, because intellection is specified by its object; therefore the times that do the measuring will be diverse and of a different idea.”

161. Further, positing that ‘one now of angelic time necessarily coexists with several instants of our time’ [n.151] seems to be a subterfuge, and to be posited in order

not to concede that our time is discrete; and if instants of the former time coexisted precisely with instants of our time, then it would follow that, as the former time is discrete, so our time would be discrete – and by avoiding this result the statement that one instant of the former time must coexist with many parts of our time seems to be posited without reason.

162. But that this is not necessary is proved as follows, because whatever intelligibles I can understand within a certain time (few intelligibles or many), an angel can understand distinctly in the same time, because in a created intellect – which cannot understand everything all at once – it seems a mark of perfection to be able to understand many things without interval, for this is something present more in those more talented; but the human intellect can have an intellection in some one instant and immediately afterwards have another intellection – and in this way it can have many intellections within some given time; therefore there is no necessity that the intellect of an angel should, if it understand *a* along with an instant of our time, abide in understanding the *a* for any time and any instants of our time in which my intellect could be having another intellection.

163. But if it be said that my intellect cannot after one instant immediately understand by another intellection but must remain for a time in that thought, otherwise one could not give a first instant for the subsequent thought – if it be posited that ‘the other intellection’ is indifferently measured by time and the instant, the argument would not be conclusive; for then, just as there is no intermediate between instant and time, so neither is there between an intellection of mine that is in an instant and that intellection which is in the immediately possessed time – and then one cannot give a first instant for

the second intellection. But if an angel's intellection is measured by aeviternity (as will be said later [n.167]), then some intellection too of his can be with one instant and some intellection can be with possessed time (and the second has a first instant of its being just as does the first, because the second has an indivisible measure just as also does the first), but yet nothing first in our time coexists with the second intellection; and the way it is with the intellects of an angel is that, if he understand anything along with our time, there is no need for that intellection to persist through a possessed time; but if he at once has another intellection, it coexists with 'possessed time' in the instant when the first intellection existed – and then there will be nothing of our time coexisting with the second intellection.

164. Further, it seems that he [Henry] should say as a consequence of his opinion [n.147] that our intellects are measured by discrete time, because our intellects seem to be whole all at once (according to the Philosopher in *Ethics* 10.6.1176a30-b6, 7.1177a12-8a8), since they are perfect and transient and disposed in a certain order.

166. And if you say (as Henry seems to say) that our intellects have connection because we understand discursively and an angel does not [n.147] – on the contrary, this does not make per se for continuity or non-continuity of intellection with intellection; for the cognition (or intellection) of a conclusion is not more acquired successively because part is acquired after part, and cognition of a conclusion acquired after cognition of the principle, than if knowledge of the conclusion were had precisely after knowledge of the principle and had without it. Likewise, we can have distinct intellects succeeding each other non-discursively; and if the intellects are whole all at once, then they will be

non-continuous and in a discrete time – which is against the Philosopher *On Memory and Recollection* 1.450a7-9, because we understand along with the continuous and with time.

166. Further, as to what is said about the difference of number and of speaking and of a time of this sort [n.149], that ‘the parts of number last and the parts of speaking can be continuous in themselves, but the parts of angelic time neither last nor are continuous in themselves, nor can they be,’ then all these differences seem to be material and not to give a formal distinction to discrete quantity insofar as it is discrete; for they are incidental to the idea of a thing having parts not conjoined to a common term, whether the parts last all at once or are in flux, whether any of them is in itself indivisible or not.<sup>a</sup>

a. [*Interpolated note*] In the *Reportatio* [IIA d.2 q.1], “To persist or not to persist makes nothing for discrete quantity or continuous quantity, but being conjoined to a common term or not does; and so for no reason in the world should one posit that time is composed of such discrete parts.”

### B. Scotus’ own Solution

167. I concede the conclusion of the first two reasons [nn.153, 157], namely that the intellections of an angel are measured by aeviternity – and, in short, so is any actual and invariable existence, that is, an existence to which it is repugnant that there should be in accord with it variation or flux or acquisition of part after part; nor does the lastingness of any of them or the corruption or annihilation or any of them vary the measure formally, provided the existence is of the same idea while it lasts.

### C. Instances against Scotus' own Solution

168. But there is against this that it then seems everything permanent would be measured by aeviternity; for nothing is permanent whose existence does not stay the same while it lasts, and this without succession properly speaking, which is acquisition or loss of part after part.

169. The consequent seems unacceptable, for two reasons:

First, because according to the Philosopher *Physics* 4.12.221b7-9 rest is measured by time; therefore things where motion is of a nature to be are, when not in motion, measured by time as if they were in motion.

170. Second, because the generation and corruption of all generable and corruptible things are measured by an instant of time; but that which has its first being measured by the 'now' of time has its possessed being measured by time; therefore the possessed being of all generable things is, after generation, measured by time.

### D. Response to the Instances

#### 1. To the First Instance

171. To the first of these [n.169] I say that the following five things are disposed in beings by a certain order:

Flux of form, form according to which there is actual flux, and form according to which there can be flux of parts; and fourth a permanent thing, in which a flux of parts is

not of a nature to be present, yet has a subsequent form in which flux is of a nature to be; fifth, that in which there cannot be flux, nor in anything that naturally follows on it.

172. The first is essentially measured by time, because permanence (or some part of the thing remaining the same) is against its formal idea, but its idea requires that a part of it succeeds to a part of it; the fifth remains invariably the same while it lasts and is therefore in no way measured by time (neither as to its totality nor as to a part of it nor even per accidens); the fourth is not measured by time per se, nor is there properly rest in it, because it is not of a nature to be moved (it rests however per accidens, because rest accords with some form necessarily following on it); the third and second are the same form but as taken according to diverse dispositions – and according as the form is taken in one way there is actually rest, and according as it is taken in another way there is actually motion.

173. About this form [sc. of the second and third in the list] one can say that although it does not have actually varied being (because then there would not be rest according to it), yet it does have variable being – and therefore it is never measured by aeviternity (even though it is not actually varied), because aeviternity requires in what it measures an invariable being that is repugnant to succession of part after part; but if it be said that ‘non-varied being’ is measured by aeviternity, then one can concede that this form – when there is no motion actually in accord with it – is measured by aeviternity.

174. However this last point seems less probable than the one before it, because when the form is actually existing it seems to have the ‘now’ (instant) of time for measure and not the ‘now’ of aeviternity – which however one should posit when

positing that, insofar as it is actually under motion, it is measured by the ‘now’ of time and that, insofar as it is actually in rest, it is measured by the ‘now’ of aeviternity.

175. So when the inference is drawn that ‘everything permanent is measured by the now of aeviternity or by aeviternity’ [n.168], this plainly does not follow (as to one way [sc. the first given in n.173]), but it follows only as to things that are truly permanent, namely invariable while they last.

176. And then the first rejection of the consequent, about rest [n.169], is not valid, because rest is not in accord with any such form but in accord precisely with a form in accord with which there is naturally motion.

177. But if someone wants to concede that heat, insofar as it has ‘non-varied being’ is measured by aeviternity [n.173], one can say that its resting is not measured by aeviternity and yet its permanent being is measured by aeviternity, because rest is only a privation of some succession of part after part, according to what the Philosopher maintains in *Physics* 5.6.229b24-25, where he treats of the opposition of motion and rest, that ‘rest is privation of motion’ – and elsewhere [*Physics* 5.2.226b15-16, 8.8.264a27-28]; but this privation presupposes the actual existence of the form in which the privation is, such that the privation is not the first reason for the actual existence. So although this privation is measured in this way by time, yet the inference does not, for this reason, hold, that the existence of such a form is measured by time, but rather that it is so by some prior measure.

178. And if you say ‘how can this privation, as it is distinguished from actual existence, be measured by time?’, I say that just as a vacuum, if it existed, would be measured by the same magnitude as the corresponding plenum would be measured by

(for if this house were a vacuum, there would be a greater distance from me to one wall than to another, just as there would by nature be a greater plenum between me and the one wall than between me and the other wall; for then the vacuum would be said to be as much as the body – were there no vacuum – would be that was cut off by the vacuum, and as much as the plenum would by nature be [n.218]), so in the issue at hand there is as much privation of succession in the parts of the form as there is naturally succession by motion in the same form; for this is the measuring of rest, not positively but privatively, by the motion that could then be present when the privation is present (just as in other things the privation is measured by its non-privation; for blindness is as great an evil in an eye naturally apt for seeing, at a determinate time, as vision is a good). In this way, although Aristotle say that rest is measured per accidens [n.169], it can be said (in this way) that it is measured per se, in the way, that is, in which privation is measured per se – because this belongs to privation per se, because it belongs to it as it is such a nature; but the fact that it is this much or that much belongs to it as it is of this or that much positively.

179. Although, then, it be conceded that heat in its being at rest (or the resting of heat) is measured by time, yet it need not be that ‘the actual existence’ of heat be measured by a time that naturally precedes this idea of rest; for the actual existence does not in itself have a relation to time (as time is time), whether an actual or an aptitudinal relation.

180. If however it be conceded – according to the other way [sc. the first, n.173] – that every such form, while it lasts, has variable existence, and that not only a varied but also a variable existence is measured by time – then one must well posit that some



permanence is not measured by aeviternity, namely the permanence according to the forms of things where there can be motion; yet one must well concede that generable and corruptible substances are per se measured by aeviternity, though they are per accidens – that is, according to some natural quality consequent to them – measured by time.

## 2. To the Second Instance

181. And then to the second instance [sc. the first, n.173], which is about things producible and corruptible:

Taking the change of these substance according as the Philosopher speaks of it [*Physics* 6.5.236a5-7], that is, as indivisible, change is either of such sort or is an indivisible necessarily concomitant to the indivisible that is the term of the motion – such that ‘to change’ is to be differently disposed now than before, and ‘to be differently disposed’ is taken for an indivisible but ‘before’ is taken for a divisible. The first being of the form, then, per se terminating the flux is per se measured by the first instant, and the change is properly toward it – but toward the first being of the form not per se terminating the flux there is not change properly and first but, as it were, secondarily, insofar as the first being is concomitant to change properly said.

182. I concede therefore that the first being of a generable substance, insofar as it is concomitant to change properly so called, is measured by an instant; but the further consequence does not hold that ‘therefore the being had after that instant is measured by time’ [n.170], because, in the first instant, the being is compared to a particular generating cause, and after that instant it does not have dependence on that particular

cause but only on the first conserving cause; and then it has a uniform relation to the conserving cause – just like the being of an angel, which is conserved in perfect sameness without variability.

183. And from this is plain the answer to a certain argument that could be made about succession in aeviternity: the argument is that ‘if there is succession then there is newness, and consequently change’ [nn.33, 37]; and further, ‘change is measured by an instant of time, therefore an aeviternal thing is temporal’ [n.37], because whatever is measured by time or an instant of time is temporal.

I reply that not every form according to which there is newness is measured by time, but only the form according to which the changeable thing had a different disposition successively to the disposition it would now indivisibly have – that is, there is presupposed to the term ‘to which’, possessed divisibly, the term ‘from which’, possessed indivisibly in the term, and this term is either the one according to which the motion was measured by time or the one which was necessarily concomitant to the motion measured by time.

184. Hereby it is also plain that God could create something without any time – given also that creation (or annihilation) was said to be change according as there is a succession in it of the form after negation of the form [d.1 n.294] – because there is no change in the way in which the Philosopher speaks of change [n.181], for there is nothing indivisible that is necessarily the term of the flux in its opposite, either as the opposite is what flows first or as it is necessarily concomitant to the motion measured by time.

## II. To the Principal Arguments

185. To the first principal argument [n.144] I say that the doctrine in *On Causes* accords with the erroneous doctrine of Avicenna [*Metaphysics* 8 chs.6-7, 9 chs.1-4 f99vb-105rb], as if the author of *On Causes* understood the intelligences to be gods and their operations to be measured by the ‘now’ of time; not indeed their intrinsic operation (because for this he posited neither potentiality nor succession), but their extrinsic operation – as to bodies – which operation he understood to exist truly in the moment of time. And therefore this authority [sc. of *On Causes*] is not to be held for an authority because it is delivered according to an error at its root [sc. that God cannot immediately cause anything save the first intelligence alone].

186. To the second [n.145] one can concede that the intellection of an angel is not instantaneous but endures along with some part of our time, and yet not for this reason does it follow that the intellection is in time; for what exists in aeviternity can endure along with our time. Or one can say that some intellection could be in an angel precisely with an instant of our time, and after that instant the angel can have another intellection immediately.

187. And when you say ‘nature produces nothing in order for it immediately not to be’ [n.145] – it is true that nature does not intend that what it produces ‘immediately not be’. Nor either does nature produce anything by generation without there being between generation and generation – which are in instants of continuous time – some intervening time; and therefore generation and corruption cannot be perpetually continuous with each other, according to Aristotle’s intention in that place [n.145]. However there is nothing unacceptable in something’s being in continuous time and

immediately not being, as is plain about change and an instant, which only have instantaneous being and at once are not.

### III. To the Authority of Augustine adduced for the Opinion of Henry

188. To the remark of Augustine (n.148, ‘God moves the spiritual creature in time’) adduced for the first opinion [sc. Henry’s], one can say that Augustine takes time there for everything that can have being after non-being (as the authorities above were expounded in the first question about aeviternity [n.79]), and in this way anything at all that is other than God is temporal. And so what has one thing succeeding to another (as being after non-being) can be said to be ‘moved in time’, even though what succeeds – or what it succeeds to – is not properly temporal, because ‘non-being’ or ‘nothing’ has no measure. So should one speak in the issue at hand.

## Second Part

### On the Place of Angels

#### Question One

##### *Whether an Angel is in Place*

189. As to the second part of this distinction, in which the Master [Lombard] treats of ‘where the angels were created’, what remains for inquiry is the place of an angel [n.1], and first whether an angel is in place.

190. It seems that he is not:

Boethius *On the Seven Days*, “It is the mind’s common conception that incorporeal things do not exist in place.”

191. Further, Augustine 83 *Questions* q.20 seems expressly to prove that God does not exist in place using this middle term, “because he is not a body;” but this premise is true of an angel; therefore the conclusion is true of an angel too.

192. Augustine also says about God in *Literal Commentary on Genesis* 8.26 n.48 that “he moves the corporeal creature through place and time but the spiritual creature through time only;” therefore he denies local motion of the spiritual creature, and so he denies that the spiritual creature exists in place.

193. Further, Aristotle *Physics* 4.4.212a20-21 says that “place is the ultimate limit of the containing body, etc.” [n.219]; but no body contains an angel, because the container is more actual than the contained and no body is more actual than an angel; therefore etc.

194. Further, everything that is in place has a location; but location only belongs to something extended, a quantum. The point is plain because ‘position’ is in one way a difference of quantity, and in this way it only belongs to quantity; in another way it is taken as a category, and in this way it is a property founded on quantity; therefore in neither way does it belong to an angel; therefore place does not belong to an angel either.

195. Against this there is:

The Master [Lombard] in the text, d.2 ch.4 n.14, and in d.37 chs.6-8 nn.345-49, and he adduces authorities as well.

196. Damascene chs.13, 16, 20; see him in those places [nn.199, 215].

## Question Two

### *Whether an Angel requires a Determinate Place*

197. Next I ask – without arguments – whether an angel requires a determinate place such that he can be neither in a greater nor a lesser space but precisely in a space of so much; and this question includes whether he can be at a spatial point, and whether he can be in a place ever so small or ever so large.

#### I. To the First Question

##### A. The Opinion of Others

198. [First way of speaking] – As to the first question [n.189], one assertion [from Thomas Aquinas] is that an angel is in place precisely through his operation.

199. For proof of this Damascene ch.13 is adduced, who says, “Incorporeal nature operates where it is; and it is not corporeally contained but spiritually;” and later in the same chapter, “it is said to be intelligibly circumscribed where it also operates;” and in ch.16, “they [sc. incorporeal things] are intellectually present and operate where at least they have been commanded to be.” Thus it seems that ‘an angel’s being in place’ is always conjoined with his ‘operating’ – as if being in place were for an angel the fact that ‘he operates in place’.

200. Against this [sc. an angel is in place by his operation] is that the opinion has been condemned as a certain condemned and excommunicated article by the bishop of Paris.<sup>26</sup>

201. But if it be said that ‘an excommunication does not pass beyond the sea or beyond the diocese’<sup>27</sup> – yet, if it was condemned as an heretical article, it seems to have been condemned as heretical not only by the authority of the diocese but also by the authority of the lord Pope [Gregory IX],<sup>28</sup> in his *Extra* ‘On Heretics’ ch. ‘In order to abolish’.<sup>a</sup> Or at least the opinion is suspect, because it has been solemnly condemned in a university.

a. [*Interpolation* from Appendix A] and in canon law, d.15 last chapter, in the paragraph ‘Montanus’ [Gratian, p.1 d.15 ch.3 n.81] where it is said that “all heresies that bishops and their disciples have taught or written down we confess to be not only things repudiated but also things eliminated by the whole Roman Church and to be, along with their authors and these authors’ followers, eternally condemned under bond of anathema.”

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<sup>26</sup> Vatican Editors: by Bishop Stephen Tempier on March 7, 1277. To the extent the articles condemned by Bishop Tempier touched on the teachings of St. Thomas Aquinas, the condemnation was revoked by Stephen de Bourret, Bishop of Paris, in 1325, so that Thomas’ doctrine could be left to free discussion in the schools.

<sup>27</sup> Vatican Editors: William of Ockham tells of a certain Dominican doctor who claimed there was no problem his holding an opinion condemned by Bishop Tempier because the condemnation did not pass beyond the seas.

<sup>28</sup> *Decretals* 5.7 ch.9, “In order to abolish the depravity of the diverse heresies that have begun to burgeon in many modern parts of the world, the vigor of the Church should be stirred up... Therefore do we rise up...against the heretics... by the general sanction of the present decree, and we condemn by apostolic authority every heresy (under whatever name it is held) one by one in this decree... And in general all those who have been judged heretics by the Roman Church, or by individual bishops in their dioceses, we bind with equal bond of perpetual anathema.”

202. [The second way of speaking] – Others [Henry of Ghent, Richard of Middleton], not wishing to use a suspect statement (namely that an angel is in place through operation) say that an angel is in place through an application of himself to place.

203. But these thinkers seem to hide the same opinion under different words. For ‘application’ does not seem it can be understood as anything other than first act [sc. act of essence] or second act [sc. act of power]. Not first act, as is plain. Nor second act, because if second act is understood, it is operation; and not an immanent operation (as understanding or volition), because the immanent operation of an angel abstracts from place just as does the essence of an angel; therefore ‘application’ is a transitive operation on a body, and so an angel will be in place through his operating on a body in place.

#### B. Against the Conclusion of the Opinion

204. Argument against the conclusion of this opinion [n.198]:

First thus: that he who posits this conclusion contradicts himself, because in the question ‘whether God is everywhere’ [Aquinas *SG* 3.68] he proves that God is everywhere through the fact that, according to the Philosopher *Physics* 7.2.243a3-4, ‘the mover is together with the moved’, and God is the first efficient cause and therefore able to move every movable; and from this he concludes that God is in everything and present to everything. I ask what he means hereby to conclude. Either that God is present, that is, is ‘mover’, and then there is a begging of the question because the premises and the conclusion are the same [sc. ‘because God moves everything, therefore he is present by motion to everything’]; and is nothing to the purpose, because he intends there to infer



the immensity of God from the presence of God to everything. Or he means to infer the presence that belongs to God insofar as he is immense, and in that case from God's presence anywhere is inferred – according to him – the presence that pertains to the divine immensity (which belongs to God insofar as he is God), such that God will as he is immense naturally be present before he is as operating present; and this is inferred from the fact that he is present by operation, the way the prior is inferred from the posterior [sc. as cause is inferred from effect, or 'God is somewhere by operation, therefore he is first there by essence']. Therefore by likeness as to the issue at hand, an angel will naturally be present in some place by essence before he is present there by his operation [sc. contrary to the opinion in question here, which says an angel is only present in place by operation and not first by essence].

205. A confirmation of this reason [n.204] is that it seems less true of God that he must by his essence be present in the place where he operates than of an angel, because what is of unlimited power seems able to act on a thing however distant it is, but what is of determinate and limited power requires a determinate nearness to what it acts on so that it may act on it; for there is no agent of limited and determinate power whose action cannot be impeded by too much distance from what is acted on, and so it seems more necessary to posit that an angel is present so as to act [sc. than that God is].

206. Another confirmation is that if there is any action from an angel on a body, how is this action disposed to the power from which it proceeds? Mediatly or immediately? If it is disposed immediately to the power from which it proceeds, then the angel is in such body or next to it immediately. If it is mediatly disposed, then it is from the power through some medium, and there will be the same question about this medium.

And then one will have to stop at the fact that what is first from such power is immediate to such power (and consequently to him whose power it is), and thus that it will be present in that place.

207. Further and second, there follows [sc. from this opinion, n.198] that an angel may sometimes (nay frequently) be nowhere; for an angel does nothing in the empyrean heaven (because it is neither changeable nor movable, [Aquinas *Sentences* 2 d.2 q.2 a.2]), so he is never in the empyrean heaven. But he is there most of all.

208. Again, if an angel passes from heaven to earth, he can act on the extreme places while doing nothing in any of the intervening places – because there can be an angel who is not the mover of any intermediate sphere; so he is then [sc. in his passing] neither in heaven, nor on earth, nor in between.

209. Further: for an angel is not there first where he first operates. For the whole of something is first proportioned to the power of an angel, such that he moves the whole of it first (and proportioned such that, according to the Philosopher *On the Heavens* 2.12.293a9-10 [or rather in the Arabic version], if one star were added, the angel would move it painfully and laboriously), and yet he is not first in the whole heaven; therefore etc. [sc. an angel's place is not just where he operates].

210. And if you say that he first moves some one part [Aquinas *ST* Ia q.52 a.2] and that part is where he is, and by the motion of that part he moves another part (as by pushing or pulling) – against this:

Although the Philosopher [Averroes *On the Heavens* 2 com.13] supposes the rustic he imagines to have his head and feet at the poles and his arms stretched or extended to East and West – yet in truth, if the first heaven is posited as movable and not

resting, no point in the heaven is more East than another but each point is East successively. Also no point there is in truth more capable of motion than another – and so there is no right or left in the heaven from the nature of the thing as there is in an animal (for the right part in an animal is more capable of the virtue of the soul than the left part). So in no part of the heaven can an angel be placed first from the fact that he first moves that part.

211. There is also a confirmation of this, in that if in some part there were an angel resting as it were but moved per accidens (like a sailor in a ship), such that he was always being carried around by the motion, it would seem unacceptable to attribute such motion to the angel moving the sphere. Nor even can this angel be posited as per se resting and that next to him there is part after part of the heaven as it were flowing by, and that he is always moving first the part of it more present to him; for it is impossible to assign where the angel is resting, since he is continually moving the part present to him – and to exist in something insofar as it is moved is not to be resting in it, as it seems.

212. Further, that which for an angel is the reason for his existing or being in a place is in him formally – otherwise an angel would never be formally in a place; but a transitive operation on a body is not formally in him; therefore etc.

213. Further, the action is commensurately in a place, per accidens; therefore if the angel were by this in a place (and in no other way), he would be there commensurately.

214. Further, Damascene – on whom they most of all rely [n.199] – is not in their favor:

Both because all the authorities quoted from him commonly always combine operating with being – and this would be superfluous unless ‘an angel’s being in place’ were formally different from ‘an angel’s operating in a place’ (for Damascene says in the first authority that ‘he operates where he is’, in the second he says that an angel ‘is said to be in a place because of his being intelligibly there and operating there’, and in the third that angels ‘are intellectually present and operate where they are at least commanded to be’ [n.199]).

215. Likewise, the same Damascene says in ch.20 that “the heaven is the container of the forms of visible and invisible creatures, and below it are included the intellectual virtues of angels.” In this way then (according to him), the angels are now in the heaven, because they are included ‘below the heaven’. But they would not be thus included at the beginning of their creation, because Damascene himself in ch.17 seems to agree with Gregory the Theologian that they were made before the corporeal creature was; so they were not then in place as they are now, because now they are contained in place but then they were not; and yet then they were able to understand creatures in place, according to Augustine *Literal Commentary on Genesis* 4.32 n.39, because they had morning knowledge before they had evening knowledge, and they were able to understand the object ‘on the part of the object’ under the same idea under which they now understand it. Therefore Damascene does not posit that they are present to the object by intellection alone.

### C. Scotus’ own Solution

#### 1. How Body is in a Place

216. To solve this question, then, we must first consider the place of body.

For any body, beside the ultimate one (which has nothing outside it containing it), possesses five features: to be in an actual place, to be in a determinate because equal place, to be in a place commensurately, to be determinately in this place or in that, and to be naturally or violently in a place.

217. The first four belong to body insofar as it is extended, a quantum, or a body; the last one belong to it insofar as it is a natural body. For although no extended thing exists unless it also has qualities, yet it is naturally an existent with extension before it is an existent with qualities – and in this regard it is an object of mathematics before it possesses quality, that is, it is first such as is considered per se and first by a mathematician.

218. This is what the Philosopher means in *Physics* 4.8.216a27-b8 ‘On the Vacuum’, because he maintains that “if a cube is put in air or water, even if it have no natural qualities, yet it causes as much displacement as an inserted body,” so that it causes a distance as great as the body; and this does not belong to it insofar as it is natural only, but insofar as it is precisely an extension, a quantum, and so a mathematical object.

#### a. On the First Article

219. Now I say, expounding each of these five points in turn [n.216], that every such body (other than the body of the first sphere) is first in place, that is, in that which precisely contains it and is immovable; for this is what is understood by the definition of

the Philosopher *Physics* 4 ‘On Place’ [n.193], namely that “place is the ultimate, immovable, first limit of the containing body.”

220. For the divisible, according to the dimension by which it is divisible, cannot be immediately applied to anything nor can immediately contain it; and that which precisely contains something is an indivisible in the genus of quantity and is per se and extrinsic (for nothing indivisible in the genus of quantity exists per se but exists in something divisible); and so the consequence is that what precisely contains something is the ultimate limit of some divisible container. But this ultimacy does not belong to the idea of place, just as it does not belong to the idea precisely of quantity either – because if an indivisible could per se exist and not be the ultimate limit of anything divisible, it could be what precisely contains a thing.

221. Now place, over and above having this ultimate containing, has immobility in addition (whereby it is distinguished from a vessel, according to Aristotle *Physics* 4.4.212a14-16), which immobility diverse people have in diverse ways tried to save by reference to the poles and to the center.

222. But briefly I say that if the subject does not remain the same, no relative accident stays the same, according to the Philosopher [*Categories* 5.2b4-6]. And therefore, since it is manifest that every substance that precisely contains this body precisely can be moved locally and not remain numerically the same, it is plain that any accident (absolute and relative) that is in what contains the body is able not to remain numerically the same; and so neither will place remain numerically the same, whether place is posited to be something absolute in such containing body or something relative.

223. And if it be said [Aquinas, Giles of Rome] that place is the ultimate limit of the whole universe and that, although it varies as it is the ultimate limit of the container, yet it does not vary as it is the ultimate limit of the whole universe – this too is not a solution, because place is only the ultimate limit of the whole universe because it is the ultimate limit of part of it; and therefore, if it is different for one part and for another, it is not the same for the whole universe. For although there are many parts in some whole, yet what belongs to the whole through one part first and precisely and afterwards through another part precisely – this is not numerically the same.

224. I say therefore that place has an immobility opposed altogether to local motion, and an incorruptibility by equivalence when compared to local motion.

225. The first point is plain because, if a place were in some way locally movable, however much this is taken to be per accidens [e.g. as a sailor at rest on a ship is moved per accidens], one could say that it is in a place and a different place can be assigned to it one after another; in the same way that a likeness, although it is moved per accidens quasi-accidentally, namely at four or five degrees removed (because first the body moves, and thereby the surface of the body, and thereby the whiteness of the surface, and thereby the likeness [sc. of this whiteness with another whiteness]), yet likeness and surface are truly in different places one after the other.

226. In like manner, then, something at rest could be moved locally; for, because it has one place after another successively, it is locally moved; but something fixed could have different places containing it if the place were moved per accidens.

227. I prove the second point [n.224] by the fact that, although a place is corrupted by the local motion of its subject, such that, when air is moved locally, the

same idea of place does not remain in it as before (as is plain from what has already been proved [n.222]), nor can the same idea of place remain in the water that succeeds to the air, because the same accident numerically cannot remain in two different subjects [n.222], yet the succeeding idea of place (which is different in idea from the preceding one) is truly the same as the preceding one by equivalence as to local motion, for that local motion should be from the preceding place to the succeeding one is as impossible as if the place were altogether the same numerically. But no local motion can be from one 'where' to another 'where' unless these two 'wheres' correspond to two places different in species – relative to the whole universe; hereby these respects, which are only different numerically, seem to be numerically one, because they are as non-distinct with respect to local motion as if they were only one respect.

228. An example of this is in some way plain in the case of significant names, because this word 'man', however often it is spoken, is called numerically one word, and it differs numerically from this word 'stone'; but since the same word numerically cannot be spoken twice (so that there are as many words distinct in number as there are speakings), and since this word 'man' and this word 'stone' are distinct not only numerically but also specifically – yet because with respect to expressing the goal of a word (namely the concept signified) the word 'man' and the word 'stone', however often each is spoken, are by equivalence numerically the same, therefore they are said to be numerically one word with respect to this goal.

229. So I say in the issue at hand that place is immovable locally per se and per accidens – yet it is corruptible when the subject is moved locally, because there does not then remain in it the same idea of place; and yet it is not corruptible in itself and by



equivalence, because necessarily there succeeds to the body, in which that idea of place was, some other body, in which there is an idea of place numerically different from the preceding one yet the same as the preceding one equivalently by comparison with the local motion.

230. But is it not the case that any body – different from the first body or sphere – is necessarily in a place because it is an extension, a quantum?

Aristotle would say so, because he would say there cannot be ‘a body different from the celestial body’ in the sphere of the active and passive elements [sc. the sublunary sphere where are the elements of earth, air, fire, and water] unless he said it was necessarily contained under something precisely containing it.

231. But the opposite seems to be true according to Catholics, because God could make a stone without any other body existing that was the place of it – or he could make a stone existing apart from every other body, because he could make it outside the universe; and in both ways it would not be in place and yet it would be the same [sc. as other stones] with respect to everything absolute in itself. By nothing absolute in another thing, therefore, must it necessarily be in place, but it has only a passive potency whereby it can be in place; and this would be when a place has been posited in actual existence and when the presence of the stone with respect to some other body as its place has been posited.

#### b. On the Other Articles

232. About the second article [n.216] I say that – on the supposition of the first article – an extended body is actually in a place, because it is in what actually precisely contains it; for it cannot be in place without the ultimate limit (which is what proximately contains it) making it actual, because it makes the sides of the containing body to be spatially distant. But it is otherwise about a part in the whole, which does not make a surface potentially in the containing body to be actual; and so a part is not in a whole as a placed thing is in a place (*Physics* 4.5.212b3-6).

233. About the third article [n.216] I say – because of sameness of quantity – that a body necessarily requires a place equal to it.

And for this reason a body is in place commensurately, such that a part of the contained surface corresponds to a part of the containing surface, and the whole of it to the whole.

234. The fifth article [n.216] belongs to a body from the determinate place that places it.

235. The sixth article belongs to a body insofar as it is a natural body, namely from the fact that – insofar as it has a determinate substantial form and determinate qualities – it is of a nature to be preserved and saved by some place that contains it and to be corrupted by another; and when it is contained by the ultimate surface of that which is of a nature to save it, it is said to be in its natural place, even though that naturalness is in many respects accidental to the idea of place; therefore it is to this extent in its natural place because it is in what naturally places it, that is, in the ultimate of the thing containing it which is of a nature to save what is contained in it.

### How an Angel is in Place

236. Applying these points to the issue at hand about the angel, I say that an angel is not necessarily in place, because an angel could much more be made without the creation of the corporeal creature or could, after the corporeal creature was made, also be made to be beyond every corporeal creature. And yet there is a passive potency in an angel by which he can be in a place; and this potency is founded either in his substance immediately, or in his substance as it is a limited nature actually existent, or in something extrinsic to the angel (whatever that is). And so there is no need to ask for any intrinsic reason for an angel's being necessarily in place, because there is none in him, but there is only in him a passive potentiality by which he can be in a place, because this is not repugnant to him.

237. So, on the supposition of this first point [n.236], there is no need for an angel to be in a place actually, because there is no need for him to be in some indivisible container actually existing; for he does not make the sides of the container to be spatially distant, and so he does not make the containing surface to be actual.

238. But about the third article [n.216] there is a doubt, and about this article the second question has been moved [n.197]. However, it can be conceded that an angel cannot be in a place ever so large, because this is proper to God. And from this it seems that he cannot be in a place ever so small, from Euclid 1.35, for Euclid maintains there – look at him there [“parallelograms on the same base and on the same parallel lines are equal to each other”].

239. From this I argue as follows: whatever can be in one of two equals can also be in the other, provided no shape by which one of the equals is distinguished from the other is repugnant to it; but in an angel no shape of the place which he is in is repugnant to him; therefore if he can be in one of the equals, he can be in the other – and consequently if he can be in a little square and there is no repugnance in his being in a quadrilateral ever so narrow (which is something one must say in saying there is no repugnance in his being in any size of place), it seems that there is no repugnance in his being in a place ever so long, because the quadrangle is equal to the little square in which he is able to be.

240. This fact is made clear by the opposite in natural bodies. For water, which can be in a square, can for this reason not be in a quadrangle ever so long, because it cannot be in a place ever so narrow; and so it cannot be extended ever so much in length; for it cannot be extended in length without being narrowed in width, and if it cannot be narrowed to infinity in width, it cannot be extended to infinity in length. The opposite holds in the issue at hand; for if an angel does not determine a place ever so small (because then he will be able to be in however narrow and narrower a place), then etc.

241. Further, if there is some quantity of virtue in an angel according to which he can be in some place in proportion to the utmost of his power (namely, this angel so much and that angel so much), yet if he could, in accord with the utmost of his power, make himself to be in a place ever so much smaller than this one, which is adequate to him (and this ‘could’ belongs to some active power in him, because it is in his power to be able to use it for an effect adequate to him or not) – then ability rather to have this [lesser] quantity is more perfectly in his power, because he has an active power that is

greater; and so he is able to use this active virtue *ad infinitum* so as to cause or be in a smaller and smaller place than is the place adequate to him; therefore he has an infinite power. The consequent is unacceptable, so the antecedent is too; just as, then, an infinity of power in him would be inferred if he could be in a larger and larger place *ad infinitum*, so an infinity of power in him is inferred if he could be always in a smaller and smaller place *ad infinitum*.

242. But as to whether he could be in a point or not [n.197] there seems no necessary reason for one side or the other; because although he is indivisible yet he does not have a limited indivisibility as a point does, and so he need not be in a point as in a place; nor perhaps is there any repugnance for him to be in a point as in a place, because nothing unacceptable seems to follow from this – because if from this is inferred that he could not be moved locally unless space were made of points, the inference does not hold (for he could immediately from a point in space put himself into a continuum, of which continuum the point is the term).

243. About this article [sc. the third, n.233] it seems one should concede that an angel has a determinate place, but indeterminately. In this way there is both some place which he cannot have a greater than, and some place which he cannot have a smaller than (speaking of continuous place), although perhaps he could be in a point.

244. Now whether an angel requires a determinate place and in a determinate way, such that an angel having so much power is, if he is present to a place, of necessity present to so much place, and it is not in his power to be present to a larger or smaller place (just as is true of bodies, because each body is necessarily in a place equal to it; the intellectual soul too is necessarily in the place of the whole animate body, such that it is

not in its power to be in a place larger or smaller than the whole body) – this is doubtful, because it does not seem one can easily prove necessarily either one side of the question or the other. For what is unacceptable if an angel's quantity of power (by which he can be present to some place) is the natural reason for his being in so much place in his own way, just as the quantity of a natural body is the reason for the body's being in a place in its own way – such that, although it is in my power to be in this place or in that, yet it is not in my power to be in this much place or in that much, because this effect is naturally consequent to a quantity that is not subject to my power, and just as the quantity in itself is not subject to my power so neither is it subject to my power as to its effect, namely to being in this much place or in that much? So nothing unacceptable seems to follow if this supposition is made about angels. Or if the supposition is made that the quantity of the power of angels has some place adequate to it, than which it cannot have a greater, although however this quantity may be subject to an angel's will so that he is able not to have this place always but sometimes a larger or a smaller one, nothing unacceptable follows.

245. About the fourth article [sc. being in a place commensurately, n.233], it is plain that an angel is not in place commensurately, because he does not have one part after another side by side with different parts of the place.

246. About the fifth article [sc. being determinately in this place or some other, n.234] I say that an angel is in this place or in that, because he is not everywhere. And the reason for this needs investigating.

I say that although something could in itself be in passive potency to some physical genus and not determinately in potency to some species of this genus, yet the

same thing reduces it to the act of the genus and of the species; just as a surface (qua surface), although it is of itself determined to a color and is not of itself determined to whiteness and blackness, yet is reduced by the same agent to the act of color and to the act of a color of this sort, because a surface is not colored save because it is colored thus – so I say here that although an angel is in potency to a ‘where’ in general and is not of himself determined to this ‘where’ or to that, yet he is reduced by the same agent to his actually being in a place and to his being in this place or in that in which first he is in place, when this agent produces him above the containing corporeal creature; but from then on he can reduce himself to the act of place, as will be plain in the question about the motion of an angel [n.444].

247. About the sixth article [sc. being in place naturally or violently, n.235], I say that an angel is not in any place naturally, because then he would be in some other place violently; then too some body would have a natural disposition to conserving him in a place, and some other body to corrupting him.

248. And there is a confirmation of this reason from Avicenna, *Metaphysics* 9.2 f.102va, when he maintains that the motion of the heaven is not natural (“because then it would reach an end in natural rest, and motion away from that rest would be violent” – and so would it be in the issue at hand), and this when taking naturalness properly, in the way that that is said to be moved naturally which is naturally inclined to motion.

249. And from this sixth article [n.247] it is plain that this passive potency (which is in an angel for being in place) is not natural or violent but neither – because what has this passive potency is not inclined naturally of itself to this form or to the opposite, but is

disposed in neither way toward them, just as a surface is indifferently disposed to whiteness and blackness.

#### D. To the Principal Arguments

250. To the arguments [nn.190-194].

All the authorities that deny an angel is in place [nn.190-192] one must expound to be stating the truth by saying that they mean an angel is not in place circumscriptively. Now circumscription involves being in place ‘actually’ and ‘in a place equal to it’ and ‘commensurately’ (namely, according to the second, third, and fourth conditions of place [nn.237, 243, 245]), and these do not belong to an angel.

251. To the quote from the Philosopher [n.193] one can concede that some surface of a body contains an angel, but from this does not follow that the surface acts or has influence on or contains the angel, because the containing of place is of a different idea from the containing of form or the containing of species. For the containing of place means nothing other than that what is contained in place is under the containing surface and that nothing is outside the surface – and this is true in the case of anything definitively contained in place, because nothing of it is outside the surrounding place.

252. As to the point about location or position [n.194], whether it is taken for a difference of quantity or for a category – if the category presupposes quantity then in neither way is the major [sc. ‘everything in place has a location’] true, because there is no need for ‘every being that is in place’ to have a location in one or other of the ways mentioned, unless it is in place circumscriptively.



## II. To the Second Question

253. As to the second question [n.197] the answer is plain from what was said in the case of the third article, namely about determinate place [nn.238-244].

### Question Three

#### *Whether an Angel can be in Two Places at Once*

254. Seventh [sc. seventh from the beginning of d.2, but third from the second part of d.2] I ask whether an angel could be in two places at once.

255. That he could not.

Because then he would be spatially separate from himself as place is spatially separate from place. The proof of the consequence is from the opposite of the consequent [sc. ‘if an angel was not thus spatially separate from himself, then place would not be spatially separate from place’], because things that exist together with some third thing exist together with each other.

256. Secondly as follows: an angel is a nature limited in every respect, therefore limited as to whatever can be present in him – therefore limited in place too; therefore he cannot be in several places at once.

257. Thirdly as follows: two ‘wheres’ are formally contraries, because there can be a distance of place between them, and because motion is between two contraries or

from a contrary to what is in between; and in the preceding question it was said that all distinct ‘wheres’ differ in species [n.227] – and things that differ in species within the same genus are contraries, and contraries cannot be present together in the same thing (because contraries are maximally distant from each other), just as neither can contradictories be; therefore etc.

258. Fourthly as follows: because if an angel is in two places at once, then he could be at rest and in motion at once, because he could be at rest as to one ‘where’ and in motion as to the other ‘where’; but to be at rest and to be in motion imply being at rest and not being at rest, which are contradictories and cannot be in the same thing at once; therefore etc.

259. Fifthly as follows: because then either he could be in motion toward those two ‘wheres’, or he could be moving from one ‘where’ to the other and yet be remaining in the first ‘where’ and acquiring the second along with it. But not in the first way, because two motions of the same species cannot be present in the same thing (*Physics* 3.3.202a34-36), and even less two contrary motions. Nor in the second way, because the terms of the motions are impossible together; and that is why a movable thing necessarily loses the term ‘from which’ when acquiring the term ‘to which’. Therefore etc.

260. To the contrary:

An angel can be in some whole place, for example the area of a foot; so let him put himself in the end points of this place without making himself present in the middle (because he is not there as a form is, nor in any way in which he would seem required to make himself present to the whole); therefore he will be in two non-continuous places.

261. Further: a body can be in two places at once, therefore a spirit can much more be so; the antecedent is made clear in 4 d.10 p.1 q.2 nn.11-24, in the material about the Eucharist; therefore etc.

### I. To the Question

262. On this question Damascene ch.13 says that in fact an angel is not in two places at once, because – in his view – “when they are in heaven, they are not on earth,” and conversely. And this as to the fact.

263. But as to the natural possibility of angels, it seems probable that one angel cannot be at once in two places each of which is adequate to him according to the utmost of his power; to wit, if he could, as to the utmost of his power, be in a place of one mile, he could not, by his own power, be in two such places, because then this place of one mile does not seem to be adequate to him according to his natural power.

264. But whether he could be in two discontinuous places, neither one nor the other of which is adequate to him, is a matter of doubt, and there seems no necessary reason either for it or against.

But that he could be in two places (whether adequate to him or not) by divine power I think to be certain, because this involves no contradiction, as will be said in 4 d.10 p.1 q.2 nn.11-24 in the matter about the Eucharist.

### II. To the Principal Arguments

265. And therefore to the arguments for the first part [nn.255-59], which seem to prove not only an impossibility as to the natural power of an angel but also an impossibility simply (because they seem to prove a contradiction), a reply must be made:

And first to the first argument [n.255], that it is a non sequitur; and the converse too is a non sequitur, when the third thing (to which the extremes are compared) is unlimited in the respect in which the extremes are compared to it – as is plain about the soul in the right hand and the left hand, which soul is not spatially separate from itself and yet hand is spatially separate from hand; thus God is not spatially separate from himself and yet the things that exist with him here and in Rome are spatially separate from each other. But whatever is posited as the same in two ‘wheres’, whatever the power be by which it exists in them, is in some way thus unlimited with respect to them, and so neither consequence is valid.

266. To the second [n.256] I say that an angel is of himself limited both in nature and in natural properties; but as to an accidental property or respect (of the sort that ‘where’ states, or at any rate ‘where’ is not without a respect), there is no need that an angel be limited altogether (such that it is impossible for him to have two such respects), although perhaps he is limited by natural power to one of them as to adequacy.

267. As to the third argument [n.257] see 4 d.10 p.1 q.2 n.25.

268. As to the fourth argument [n.258] I say that just as ‘to be moved’ means to be disposed differently now than before, so ‘to be at rest’ is to be disposed now as before; but it is not unacceptable that something is with respect to one ‘where’ disposed now as before and is with respect to a second disposed differently than before – and so it is not unacceptable that it could be at rest here and in motion there. And hereby I concede

absolutely that it is at once at rest and in motion – because affirmative predicates simply taken follow of themselves, being taken with a non-diminishing determination.

269. And when the inference is further drawn that ‘therefore it is at rest and not at rest’ [n.258], there is here a mistaking of the question and a fallacy of simply and in a certain respect; for ‘to be at rest’ does not entail ‘not to be in motion’ absolutely but entails only ‘not to be in motion’ with that determination with which ‘to be at rest’ was taken insofar as it preceded being at rest simply; and therefore all that follows is that the thing is in motion in this ‘where’ and is not in motion in that ‘where’, which are not contradictories.

Here is an example: this is double *a* and half *b*, therefore it is double and half. But the further inference ‘therefore it is double and not double’ does not follow; for this inference only follows from the first antecedents together with the determination that the thing is double *a* and not double *b* – and from these the further inference does not follow that ‘therefore it is double and not double’, but there is here a mistaking of the question. So, in all such cases where the predicates are taken with a qualification, affirmative conclusions are entailed in which the same predicates are included simply; but negative conclusions are not entailed in which the predicates are involved simply in belonging to the subjects, for the reasons stated.

270. To the final argument [n.259] I say that both ways are possible.

271. And when the first way is criticized, I say that there is no impossibility of motions unless there is an impossibility of the forms according to which they are motions; and therefore, if two ‘wheres’ are not formally impossible (either as to being in motion or as to being in flux), then neither will two motions at once to two ‘wheres’ be

impossible. Now the statement of the Philosopher in *Physics* 3 [n.259] is true of motions according to impossible forms, of which sort perhaps are absolute forms (but not of the same species), and of this matter elsewhere [4 d.10 p.1 q.2 nn.13-17, 19].

272. And when the second way is criticized, I say that just as generation and corruption are two distinct motions and have their own distinct terms, even though they frequently coincide (and then there are four terms, namely two terms ‘from which’ – one privation and one form – and two terms ‘to which’ – similarly one privation and one form), so there is in the case of motions a departure from the term ‘from which’ and an approaching to the term ‘to which’; and yet, just as generation can, without contradiction, be without corruption and conversely, because they are not the same change, so there can be motion or change insofar as there is an approaching to the term ‘to which’ without any motion which is a departure from a term ‘from which’. And then the statement ‘the terms of the motions are impossible’ [n.259] is true of the proximate terms of the same motion, but it is not true of terms that can be those of any different motions whatever.

## Question Four

### *Whether two Angels can be in the Same Place at Once*

273. Eighth I ask whether two angels can be in the same place at once.

274. That they cannot be:

Because [Aquinas] two total causes cannot be together in respect of the same effect; but an angel, when existing in a place, is a total cause with respect to an operation

in such place that he is said to be there by; so another angel, cannot, because of another operation exercised there, be there along with him.

275. Another reason is given by others: that things that have the same mode of existing 'in' cannot be together. The point is made clear about two glorious bodies, which cannot naturally be together in the same place, although a glorious body could be together with a non-glorious body. So about two Gods: if they were equal, neither could be with the other (according to Damascene ch.5), and yet God can be together with a creature because of their different way of being in a place. Since therefore angels have the same way of being in a place, they cannot be together in the same place.

## II. To the Question

276. In this question the truth is not as certain and clear as it is in the preceding one [n.262], because Richard of Saint Victor *On the Trinity* 4.25 seems to prove that demons do not have bodies by the fact that a legion of them was in the body of one possessed man (*Mark* 5.1-17); but a legion could not have been in someone if they had bodies. Therefore he seems to prove that, if they had bodies with them, their bodies would have been in the same place together; therefore now, when they do not have bodies, it seems one should say that they were together without bodies.

277. Also if one angel, who is moving the heaven, is in the south and another good angel, sent by God from heaven to earth, has to pass through that place, there seems no necessity for him not to pass through in a straight line, as it were, or for the other to yield to him.

278. Also, if all the angels had been created before the corporeal creation (as seems true according to Damascene ch.17 [n.215]), it does not seem easy to assign any way that they were then together – and if they were then not together, then not together now either.

279. Whatever be true of their natural power as to fact and possibility, yet as to possibility in respect of divine power there seems no impossibility in angels' being able by that power to be together.

## II. To the Principal Arguments

280. And so one must reply to the arguments, when they seem to prove the opposite.

To the first [n.274] I say that it presupposes something false, namely that an angel is in a place only by operation – which was rejected in the first question on this topic [nn.204-215]. Also, if that supposition be admitted, one angel could operate about the place with one operation and the other with another operation, and each could, in their view [sc. those holding this opinion], be put by its operation in the place where he was operating (namely the place of the one body) and thus both could be together, which is the opposite of the conclusion of the argument.

281. And if you say that they could not operate without moving bodily – neither does this help, because just as an angel moves freely, so he can move according to the utmost, or below the utmost, of his power; and if he moves something below the utmost of his power, another angel could move the movable thing along with him (as is clear



about a man, who while able, according to the utmost of his power, to carry ten stones, can, below the utmost of his power, carry five, so that his active power has an act only about five stones – and then he could have another man, cooperating with him, carrying the same), for an angel is a substance that acts freely.

282. To the second [n.275] I say that the major [sc. ‘things that have the same mode of existing ‘in’ cannot be together’], which is famous in many topics, is not reasonable. For ‘to exist in’ states no essential relation to that in which it is, but ‘to exist by (or from)’ does state an essential relation to that by which it is. What is the reasonableness, then, in saying that several things can be *by* the same and be so in the same way and that several things cannot be *in* the same and be so in the same way of being *in*? For why is an accidental respect more repugnant to the species of one idea than the dependence of an essential respect? Likewise, temporal things have the same respect to time as things in place have to place; so it hereby seems to follow that several temporal things cannot be in the same time, which is absurd.

283. Now as to what is said about two glorious bodies, and about two Gods, if they were together [n.275] – if this is true, it must be proved otherwise than by the term ‘being in a place in the same way of being in’, for no repugnance seems to arise from this for things that are together.

## Question Five

*Whether an Angel can be moved from Place to Place by Continuous Motion*

284. Ninth I ask whether an angel can be moved from place to place by continuous motion.

285. Proof that he cannot:

Because “motion is the act of a being in potency insofar as it is in potency,” from *Physics* 3.1.201a9-11; but a ‘where’ or place is not an act or perfection of an angel, because every perfection seems to be nobler in some way than the perfectible thing; but a ‘where’ is not such with respect to angelic nature.

286. Secondly, there is argument that an angel cannot move with continuous motion:

And first I prove it in general [the proof in particular at nn.301-308], that nothing successive is continuous, and this I do in two ways: I prove it first from the fact that everything successive is composed of indivisibles, and second because everything successive is composed of minima.

287. The first consequence [sc. everything successive is composed of indivisibles, therefore nothing successive is continuous] is proved from Aristotle *Physics* 6.1.231a24-28, because “an indivisible cannot be continuous with an indivisible since it does not have a last point.”

288. The antecedent here, namely that ‘everything successive is composed of indivisibles’, I prove in two ways:

First because the successive is divided into indivisibles; therefore it is composed of them. – Proof of this antecedent: it is possible for the successive to be divided into all the things it is divisible into (the subject of this proposition seems to include the predicate), and from this seems to follow further that it can exist divided into all the

things it can be divided into (this consequence is proved by the statement of *Physics* 6.6.237b19-20 that “what cannot come to be cannot have been made to be;” and Aristotle says the same in *Metaphysics* 3.4.999b11 and *On Generation* 2.11.337b14-25); further, let this possibility be posited as being actual, and the inference follows ‘therefore it exists actually divided into all the things that it can be divided into’, and from this follows that it exists divided into indivisibles (because if not, then it would not exist divided into everything it can be divided into, since it could be divided still further into the parts of the divisibles).

289. Second I prove the same [sc. the successive is composed of indivisibles] because nothing successive is actual save as indivisible – because if something of it were divisible it would at the same time be successive and not successive, or successive and permanent. When therefore it is not actually existing but passing by instantaneously, I ask what succeeds to it. If something indivisible in the continuous succeeds to it, the proposed conclusion is reached, namely that an indivisible is immediate to an indivisible, and thus the continuous will be composed of indivisibles. If there is no other indivisible succeeding to it, therefore it will then not be, for the indivisible of it is not; and as was argued, ‘it does not exist unless some indivisible of it exists’, therefore etc.

290. The second way [n.286] is that the successive is composed of minima; therefore it is not continuous.

291. The proof of the consequence is that what is simply smallest (namely what has nothing smaller than it) does not have any part from which it is composed, because then that part would be smaller than it; therefore it is altogether non-extended, a non-quantum, because everything extended has a part smaller than itself. But something non-

extended cannot be continuous with something extended; therefore the smallest thing, the minimum, cannot be continuous.

292. The antecedent [sc. the successive is composed of minima] is proved both by authorities and by reason:

First by the authority of the Philosopher *Physics* 1.4.187b35-188a2, where his reasonings seem meant – against Anaxagoras – to rest on this principle, that it is possible to take a smallest in nature, as a smallest part of flesh or a smallest part of fire; but according to the Philosopher *Physics* 6.1.231b18-29, “the fact motion and magnitude and time are composed or exist of indivisibles and the fact they are divided into indivisibles mean the same;” therefore it will be necessary to posit a smallest motion and a smallest time, just as also a smallest permanent thing.

293. The same appears from the Philosopher *On the Soul* 2.4.416a16-17, where he maintains that “for everything that exists by nature there is a determinate principle of magnitude and increase;” now not only permanent things but also successive ones are natural things; therefore they have a determinate smallness and magnitude.

294. The same is also plain from Aristotle *On Sense and Sensibles* 6.445b3-11 in his first puzzle, where he seems to maintain that ‘natural properties are not divisible infinitely’; and he seems to prove this from the fact that ‘then the sense would be intensified infinitely’, because, in order to perceive an indivisible minimum, a sense is required that is ad infinitum sharper.

295. A reason for proving this [n.292, that the successive is composed of minima] is from the fact that there can be a first part of motion; therefore also a smallest part of motion.

296. The consequence here is plain, because if anything whatever has a part smaller than itself, it would also have a part of itself prior to a part of itself and so on ad infinitum.

297. The antecedent about firstness (namely that ‘there can be a first part of motion’ [n.295]) is plain from two authorities from Aristotle, *Physics* 1.3.186a10-16, 8.3.253b23-26: “if what undergoes alteration is divisible ad infinitum, not for this reason is alteration divisible ad infinitum as well, but many times it is swift,” where the Commentator [Averroes, *Physics* 8 com.23] has “sudden” and gives this exposition, “that is, it happens in an instant and not in time.” And Averroes objects as it were against him [sc. Aristotle] that “this seems to conflict with what is said in *Physics* 6.6.236b32-7b22, that before any moving there is a having moved, and before any having moved a moving;” and he gives a solution in reply that “the latter statement is understood about motion insofar as it is continuous and divisible, but the former one is understood about motion insofar as it is generated or produced in act.”

298. On behalf of his intention there [sc. in *Physics* 8] Aristotle seems to have premised an example about drops of water, that “if many drops take away a part of a stone by penetrating the stone, it is not necessary that any drop at all should also take away something of it, but sometimes the whole part is taken away at once.” So when he says that “many drops take away from the stone a certain amount in a certain time, but a part of these many drops takes away that amount in no time” (and he gives an example, “just as many men pull a ship,” but none will per se pull the ship also in no time), he seems to indicate that eventually, after a number of drops, the whole part of the stone is

taken away. And so it is in the case of alteration, that not always does this happen part by part, but sometimes the whole alteration happens at once.

299. The point seems more express in the second puzzle of *On Sense and Sensibles* 6.446b28-7a6, where Aristotle maintains that “there is no need for things to be similar in the case of alteration and of transporting; for alteration of a thing happens at once as a whole and not first a part of it, as when water freezes at once as a whole – however, if there is lot of water that is getting hot or freezing, a part receives or becomes so from a part already so; but the first part must be changed and altered by the causer suddenly and all at once.”

300. Again, the point [n.297] is proved by reason – because between contradictories there is no middle; therefore between the non-being of the form that is to be introduced through motion and the being of it there is no middle (but its non-being was in the ultimate instant of the preceding form, therefore between that instant and the instant that measures the being of the succeeding form there is no middle). But if there is no first *between* the being of the form that is to be introduced through motion and the non-being of it, the ‘first’ [sc. of the being of the form] would be indivisible. And from this proved firstness there follows that the ‘first’ is a minimal part; for the ‘first’ cannot be indivisible, since the Philosopher in *Physics* 6.5.236a7-b18 shows that one cannot take a first change in motion [n.297].

301. Third principally [n.286] I argue as follows, that an angel cannot be moved [sc. with continuous local motion] because he is indivisible.

302. For Aristotle proves in *Physics* 6.4.234b10-20, 10.140b8-31, that nothing indivisible can be in moved (and this is intentional – the proof he gives in ch.4 he repeats

in ch.10), because everything that is moved is partly in the term ‘from which’ and partly in the term ‘to which’; for when it is totally in the term ‘from which’ it is not moving but at rest, and when it is totally in the term ‘to which’ then it has been totally moved.

Therefore when an indivisible [sc. an angel] is moved it cannot be partly in the term ‘from which’ and partly in the term ‘to which’, because it does not have part after part; therefore etc.

303. Aristotle’s second reason [in ch.10] is that everything that is moved passes first through a space equal to itself or less than itself before it passes through a space greater than itself; but an indivisible cannot pass first through a space less than itself; therefore it passes first through a space equal to itself before passing through one greater than itself. But it will, by passing always through a space equal to itself, pass through the whole continuous space over which it moves; therefore that space would be composed of indivisibles equal to the moved indivisible. The consequent seems false, therefore the antecedent too.

304. Aristotle’s third reason seems to be that every motion is in time (as he proved before in *Physics* 6.10.241a15-23); and for any time it is possible to take a lesser time, in which lesser time a lesser movable can be moved; so for any movable it is possible to take a lesser movable ad infinitum; and thus to take an indivisible movable.

305. Fourth, that an angel cannot be continuously moved through place because he has no resistance.

306. Because, as the Commentator [Averroes] says in *Physics* 4 com.71 about the vacuum, successiveness in motion comes from the resistance of the movable to the mover, or of the medium to the movable, or of the medium to the mover; but none of these

occasions of resistance exists in the issue at hand, for an angel does not resist the medium, nor himself as mover. And there is a confirmation of the reason, because according to him a heavy object would be moved in a vacuum in no time, because there would be no resistance there that could cause successiveness in the motion; but an angel does not resist himself or the medium more than a heavy object resists a vacuum (or than a vacuum resists a heavy object), if a vacuum be posited; therefore etc.

307. Again, from the reason of the Philosopher. For he argues there [*Physics* 4.8.215a24-b21] as follows: what the proportion of medium to medium is in rareness and density, so the proportion of motion to motion is in quickness and slowness; but there is no proportion of vacuum to plenum in rareness and density; therefore neither of motion to motion in quickness and slowness. But there can be a proportion in quickness of any possible motion to any possible motion; therefore no motion is possible in a vacuum, but a motion is possible in a plenum. – In the way that Aristotle argues on the part of the medium, so can one argue in the issue at hand; for (*ceteris paribus*) what the proportion of movable to movable is in quickness, so is the proportion of angel to body in rareness; but there is no proportion of angel to body in rareness; therefore etc. (as in the case of Aristotle's reason [sc. therefore no motion is possible for an angel but motion is possible for a body]).

308. There is another reason of Aristotle's there: because if motion were to happen in a vacuum, some other body could be taken that would be rarer than a rare plenum in as great a proportion as the time of motion in a vacuum would be quicker than the time of motion in a plenum; the motion through the medium of that rarer plenum will be in an equal time with the motion in a vacuum – which Aristotle holds to be impossible.



– So can one argue in the issue at hand on the part of movables; for if an angel is moved ever so much quicker than a body, then some other body may be taken that would be rarer than the given body in as great a proportion as the time of motion of an angel would be less than the time of motion of the given body – that body, being rarer in such proportion, will be moved in an equal time with the angel.

309. Damascene chs.13, 17 seems to be to the opposite side, when he maintains that angels are not at once in heaven and on earth [n.262]; and angels are frequently sent to earth, as is apparent from Scripture [nn.312-313].

### I. To the Question

310. To the question [n.284] I answer yes – because everything that is receptive of the forms of some genus, and that is not of itself determined to any one of them, nor is unlimited, can be moved or changed from one of these forms toward another (this proposition is plain of itself, because the subject includes the predicate); but an angel is receptive of some ‘where’ definitively and not circumscriptively (as is plain above, in the first question on the place of an angel [nn.245-246]), nor is he unlimited as to all of them, because he is not immense; therefore he can be moved continuously from one ‘where’ to another ‘where’. And that he can do so continuously is plain, because between two ‘wheres’ there are infinite intermediate ‘wheres’ (which is proved by the continuous movement of a body through all those ‘wheres’); now an angel can pass through all those ‘wheres’ such that he is not in any of them save indivisibly – and consequently he cannot pass through them all unless he is moved continuously.

311. There is also a confirmation of this, that the blessed soul will be equal to an angel, according to the promise of the Savior in *Matthew* 22.30; but the blessed soul – rather the most blessed soul – that is Christ’s was moved locally, because it descended into hell, as an article of faith says [sc. in the Creeds].

312. From the Scriptures too it is plain that angels are sometimes sent in an assumed body [*Genesis* 19.1-22, *Numbers* 22.22-35, *Judges* 6.11-22, 13.3-21, *Tobit* 5.5-12, 22, *Matthew* 18.2-7, *Luke* 1.11-20, 26-38, 2.9-15, *Acts* 12.7-10]; and if they were then moved along with the body, it seems that there was some passive motion in them different formally from the passive motion of the body itself, because they were not formally anything of the body itself.

313. Likewise it is credible that they are frequently sent without a body, as in the case of the angel sent to Joseph about the conception of the Blessed Virgin [*Matthew* 1.20-21, also 2.12-13, 19-20].

## II. To the Principal Arguments

### A. To the First Argument

314. To the arguments of the question [nn.285-308].

To the first [n.285] I say it is not unacceptable that every creature, however perfect it be (provided however it not have in essence all perfection), is capable of or has a potential with respect to some perfection, although the perfection is lesser than the creature’s nature – just as an angel has intellection, which is a perfection of his intellective power, and yet intellection is less noble simply than angelic nature; and so

can one concede about ‘where’ or corporeal presence with an angel [sc. that ‘where’ or corporeal presence is some perfection or act of an angel], just as the angelic nature is said to be an ‘act’ (though in a far different way) for the angel in whom it is.

## B. To the Second Argument

315. As to the second argument [n.286], I deny the assumption it makes, namely that ‘nothing successive is continuous’.

### 1. Rejection of the First Antecedent

316. The antecedent of the assumption (which antecedent is itself assumed for the proof of the assumption), namely that ‘the successive is composed of indivisibles’, I deny. And I prove the falsity of the antecedent from the Philosopher in *Physics* 6.2.233b19-32 about sesquialterate proportion [the proportion of one and a half to one] (which is more convincing for the adversary, although perhaps some of Aristotle’s reasons are taken more ‘from the cause’), because he supposes that a motion can be taken quicker than every given motion in any proportion whatever – and consequently, when some motion is given that is measured by three instants [sc. on the assumption that motion is composed of such indivisible instants], one will be able to take a motion twice as quick that will be measured by only an instant and a half [sc. which is impossible, because an instant is indivisible].

317. This point about the successive [sc. that it is not composed of indivisibles, n.316] I prove by the continuity of something persisting; because a persisting thing is continuous, so a successive thing is too.

318. The proof of the consequence is that if there are indivisibles in motion [= a successive thing] which are immediate to each other, I raise a question about the movable [= a persisting thing] and about the ‘wheres’ that the movable has in those immediate instants; if there is nothing in the middle between the ultimate of one ‘where’ and the ultimate of another, then the ultimate of one ‘where’ is immediate with the ultimate of the other ‘where’ [sc. and so the ‘wheres’ are continuous like the movable that persists through them]; but if there is some middle between these two ‘wheres’, I raise a question about the ultimate of the movable when it is in the middle (and not in the second indivisible instant); because when it is in the two indivisibles it is in the ‘wheres’ between which the middle was posited, so when it is in the middle it is in some middle between the two instants; therefore the two instants were not immediate [sc. and so the motion of the movable between these instants is no more made up of instants immediate to each other than the movable itself is]. – And this consequence is made clear by Aristotle in *Physics* 6 [n.292], namely that “the fact motion and magnitude and time are composed or exist of indivisibles and the fact they are divided into indivisibles mean the same.”

319. The antecedent [sc. ‘a persisting thing is continuous’, n.317] can be proved by Aristotle’s reasons, *Physics* 6.1.231a21-b18, more manifestly about permanent than successive things, because it is more evident and manifest that permanent indivisibles do not make something larger than that indivisibles succeeding each other do.

320. However the antecedent is more efficaciously proved by two geometrical reasons or propositions, of which the first is as follows:

‘About any center a circle can be drawn, occupying any space’, according to the second postulate of Euclid [*Elements* 1 postul.3]. So about a give center, which may be called  $a$ , let two circles be drawn: a smaller circle, which may be called  $D$ , and a larger  $B$ . If the circumference of the larger circle is composed of points, let two points immediate to each other be marked, and let them be marked as  $b$  and  $c$ ; and let a straight line be drawn from  $a$  to  $b$  and a straight line from  $a$  to  $c$ , according to the postulate of Euclid [*Elements* 1 postul.1], ‘from a point to a point a straight line may be drawn’.

321. These straight lines, so drawn, will pass straight through the circumference of the smaller circle. I ask then whether they will cut the circumference at the same point or at a different point.

If at a different point, then there are as many points in the smaller circle as in the larger; but it is impossible for two unequal things to be composed of parts equal in size and number; for a point does not exceed a point in size, and the points in the circumference of the smaller circle are as many as the points in the larger circle; so the smaller circumference is equal to the larger, and consequently a part is equal to the whole.

But if the two straight lines  $ab$  and  $ac$  cut the smaller circumference at the same point (let that point be  $d$ ), then on the line  $ab$  let a straight line be erected cutting it at the point  $d$ , and let this line be  $de$ , so that this line is also tangent to the smaller circle, from Euclid [*Elements* 3 prop.17, ‘from a given point draw a straight line tangent to a given circle’]. This line  $de$  forms with the line  $ab$  two right angles or angles equal to two right angles, from Euclid *Elements* 1 prop.13 [‘if a straight line erected on a straight line makes

angles, it will make two right angles or angles equal to two right angles’]; also from the same prop.13, the line  $de$  will make two right angles or angles equal to two right angles with the line  $ac$  (which is posited as a straight line); therefore the angle  $ade$  and the angle  $bde$  will equal two right angles; and by parity of reason, the angle  $ade$  and the angle  $cde$  will equal two right angles. But any two right angles are equal to any two right angles, from Euclid *Elements* 1 postul.3 [‘all right angles are equal to each other’]; so take away the common angle (namely  $ade$ ), and the remaining angles will be equal; so the angle  $bde$  will be equal to the angle  $cde$ , and so a part will equal the whole.<sup>29</sup>

322. But to this conclusion the adversary will say that the lines  $db$  and  $dc$  do not make an angle, because then on that angle a base could be subtended from point  $b$  to point  $c$ , which is contrary to what was laid down, that the points  $b$  and  $c$  are immediate. When therefore the supposition is taken that the angle  $cde$  is the whole with respect to the angle  $bde$ , the supposition is denied, because nothing is added to the angle  $bde$  from the angle  $cde$ , for between  $b$  and  $c$  in their coming together at point  $d$  there is no angle.

323. This response may seem at first absurd, because it denies an angle where two lines that cover a surface and are not coincident come together, and in this respect it contradicts the definition of an angle in Euclid *Elements* 1 [def.8, ‘A plane angle is the inclining of one line to another when two lines touch and do not lie in the same direction’] – and also because, by denying that a line can be drawn between  $b$  and  $c$ , it denies the first postulate of Euclid [n.320, ‘from a point to a point a straight line may be drawn’] –

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<sup>29</sup> Tr. Since points  $b$  and  $c$  are, by hypothesis, not the same, the lines from  $b$  to  $d$  and from  $c$  to  $d$  must form an angle when they meet at  $d$ . Hence, since  $b$  is, by hypothesis, to one side of  $c$ , the angle  $bde$  will be smaller than, or a partial amount of, the angle  $cde$ ; but by the argument from Euclid,  $bde$  must equal  $cde$ , so a part will equal the whole.

however because these results may not be reckoned unacceptable (because they follow the opponent's assumption [n.322]), I argue against the response in a different way:

The angle *cde* includes the whole angle *bde* and adds to it at least a point (although you perversely say it does not add an angle), and a point for you is a part; therefore the angle *cde* adds to angle *bde* some part; therefore the former is a whole in relation to the latter.

324. The assumption [sc. '*cde* adds to *bde* at least a point'] is plain because, if an angle is called the space between intercepting lines not including the lines, then the first point of the line *db* outside the smaller circumference will be nothing of the angle *bde* and will be something of the angle *cde* [sc. because the angle *bde* and the line *db* are, ex hypothesi, included within the angle *cde*]; but if an angle include, over and above the included space, also the including lines, then the first point of the line *dc* outside the smaller circumference will be nothing of the angle *bde* and will be something of the angle *cde* [sc. because the line *dc* is, ex hypothesi, not part of the line *db* but outside it]. And so in either way the angle *cde* adds a point to the angle *bde*.

325. Nor can one in any way oppose the principal demonstration [sc. that the lines begin to diverge at point *d* on the smaller circumference] by supposing the two lines do not begin to diverge from each other at the circumference of the smaller circle but somewhere else, closer to or further from the center, because wherever you put this I will describe there a smaller circumference [sc. than that of the larger circle, though a circumference larger than that of the original smaller circle].

326. This second part, namely that the smaller circumference is not cut at one point if it is cut by two lines, needs to be proved only because of the perversity of the

opponent, because it is sufficiently manifest that the same line, if it is continuously extended straight on, will never, from the same point, end at two points, and if this ‘manifest’ truth is conceded, the intended conclusion is plain from the deduction in the first part [n.325].

327. The second proof [n.320] is from Euclid *Elements* 10 prop.5, 9. For he says in prop.5 that “the proportion of all commensurable quantities with each other is as that of one number to another number,” and consequently, as he maintains in prop.9, “if certain lines are commensurable, the squares on them will be to each other as some square number is to some square number;” but the square on the diagonal is not related to the square on the side as some square number to some square number; therefore neither is the line, which was the diagonal of the square, commensurable with the side of the square.

328. The minor of this syllogism is plain from Euclid *Elements* 1 prop.47 [“the squares on straight lines commensurable in length have a proportion to each other that is a square number to a square number”], because the square on the diagonal is double the square on the side, because it is equal to the squares on two sides; but no square number is double some other square number, as is plain from running through all the squares, whatever the roots they are drawn from.

329. Hereby is the following conclusion plain, that the diagonal is asymmetrical, that is incommensurate, with the side. But if these lines were composed of points, they would not be incommensurable (for the points of one would be in some numerical proportion to the points of the other); and not only would it follow that they were commensurable lines, but also that they were equal lines, which is plainly nonsensical.



330. Proof of this consequence [sc. ‘if diagonal and side were composed of points they would be equal’].

Let two points in a side be taken that are immediate to each other, and let another two be taken opposite them in the other side, and let two straight lines, equidistant from the base, be drawn joining the opposite points. These lines will cut the diagonal.

I ask therefore whether they will cut it at immediate points or mediate points.

If at immediate points, then there are no more points in the diagonal than in the side; so the diagonal is not larger than the side.

If at mediate points, I take the point between the two mediate points on the diagonal (this in-between point falls on neither line, from the givens). From this point I draw a line equidistant from each line (from Euclid *Elements* I prop.31, “Through a given point draw a straight line parallel to a given straight line”); let this line be drawn straight on continuously (from the second part of Euclid *Elements* 1 postul.2, “A terminated straight line may be drawn straight on continuously”); it will cut the side, and at neither of its given points but between both (otherwise it would coincide with one of the other lines from which it was posited to be equidistant – and this is contrary to the definition of equidistance, which is the definition in *Elements* 1 def.23, “Parallel lines are those that, drawn in the same plane and produced to infinity in either direction, meet on neither side”). Therefore between the two points, which were posited as immediate in the side, there is an intermediate point; this follows from the fact that it was said [just above] there was a middle point between the points on the diagonal; so from the opposite of the consequent follows the opposite of the antecedent [sc. ‘if there is no intermediate point in the side, there is none in the diagonal; but there is an intermediate in the diagonal,

therefore there is one in the side’], therefore etc. [‘therefore since, ex hypothesi, there is no intermediate point in the side, there is none in the diagonal, and side and diagonal are equal’].

331. Nay, in general, the whole of Euclid *Elements* 10 destroys the composition of lines out of points, because then there would be altogether no irrational lines or surds, although however Euclid there treats principally of irrationals, as is plain about the many species of irrational lines there that he assigns.

## 2. Rejection of the Second Antecedent

332. From the same discussion [nn.316-331], the rejection of the second antecedent [about minima, nn.286, 290] is also apparent – for either the minimum could precisely end a simply indivisible line, or it could be taken between the ends of two lines.

If in the first way, a minimum is posited as simply an indivisible point; and then it is the same, in this way, as positing a minimum and a simply indivisible as a part.

If in the second way, let two lines then be drawn – extended from the center – to the end points of such a minimum in the larger circumference, such that the lines precisely enclose in the circumference such a minimum. I then ask: do they enclose some minimum in the smaller circumference, or do they precisely include nothing but have altogether the same connecting indivisible? If in the first way, then there are as many minima in the smaller circle as in the larger; so the two circles are equal. If in the second way, it follows that the smaller circumference will be cut at one point by two straight lines (proceeding from the same point), which was rejected in the first member [sc. when

arguing against the first antecedent, nn.316-331, esp. 321]. Rather, there follows something more absurd, namely: let these lines in the larger circumference enclose the minimum; and let a straight line be drawn from the end of one these lines to the end of the other, according to the first postulate in Euclid *Elements* 1 [‘From any point to any point a straight line may be drawn’]; and then this line will be the basis of a triangle of two equal sides, and consequently it will be able to be divided into two equal parts (from *Elements* 1 prop.10, ‘to divide a given terminated straight line into two equal parts’); and so what was given as a minimum will not be a minimum. Nay further: let some other line be drawn [within the triangle] parallel to the base of the triangle; it will be shorter than the base, and so there will be something less than the minimum.

333. Likewise, this position [sc. about minima] (provided a sort of thing be understood as does not have a part in a whole), involves, whether in one way or the other [n.332], the commensurability of the diagonal with the side (nay, its equality), as was proved before against the first opinion [sc. the first antecedent, n.330].

334. [Instance about minima as to form] – To these arguments [nn.332-333] a response is made that they do not conclude against a minimum as to form, and thus a minimum as to form is posited and not a minimum as to matter.

335. And this distinction is got from the Philosopher *On Generation* 1.5.321b22-24, ‘On Growth’, where he maintains that “any part as to kind increases but not as to matter.”

336. However this statement can be understood in three ways:

First that ‘a part as to kind’ is called a part as to form, but ‘a part as to matter’ is called a part of an extension insofar as it is an extension, a quantum, because quantity

follows matter. And then the statement returns to an old saying, namely that ‘extensions are divisible ad infinitum as they are extensions, but not as they are natural entities’.

337. Or, second, ‘a part as to kind’ can be understood to be what can per se be in act, while ‘a part as to matter’ is called a part as to potency, namely the way a part exists in a whole. And then the statement returns to another old saying, that ‘there exists a minimum that can per se exist, but there is in a whole no minimum than which there is not, existing in it potentially, a lesser’.

338. Or, in a third way (not in harmony with the two old sayings), ‘a part as to kind’ can be understood as what is in something as a minimal part of the form, or of the whole thing as it has the form, and is not any minimal part as to matter, or as to the whole thing in respect of matter. And then it seems manifestly false, because no part of matter in the whole is without form in act, or even without a form of the same nature in the case of homogeneous wholes; rather, just as in this case the whole is divided into homogeneous parts, so the matter and form are per accidens divided into their homogeneous parts – and there is a minimum of each part in the way that there is a minimum of the whole, and conversely.

339. [Response to the instance] – Dismissing, then, this third way of understanding [n.338], I show, by excluding the other two understandings [nn.336-337], that they do not stop the preceding proofs [nn.332-333].

So first I argue against the first way [n.336] using the authority of the Commentator *ad loc.* on *Physics* 3.6.206b27-29, on the remark “And we saw Plato etc.,” look there.<sup>30</sup>

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<sup>30</sup> Aristotle in the Arabic-Latin translation: “And we saw Plato for this reason posit two infinities, because he thought that a thing can pass through and proceed to infinity both by increase and by

340. Second using the authority of Aristotle *On Sense and Sensibles* 6.445b20-27, in the first puzzle when he alleges something to the contrary [n.294]. For although he solves the puzzle obscurely there, yet he does definitely say that ‘sensible qualities are determinate in species’ (which he proves by the fact that ‘when extremes are posited, the intermediates must be finite; but in every kind of sensible quality extremes are posited, because contraries are’). But as to whether any one individual quality is able to have a term in itself, he seems to say no, ‘because they exist along with continuity, and so they have something in act and something in potentiality’, as a continuous thing does; that is, as a continuous thing is one per se actually and many potentially (the many it is per se divisible into), so a sensible quality as it exists in a continuous thing is one actually and many potentially, although per accidens. And then, when the potentiality of the extension or of the quantum is per se reduced to act, the potentiality of the quality is per accidens reduced to act, such that the quantity [sc. of the quality] is by division never divided into mathematical extensions; because, just as he himself argued in response to the puzzle [sc. here above] that ‘a natural thing is not composed of mathematical parts but of natural parts’, so too it [sc. the sensible quality] is divided into such parts, namely natural ones.

But as to how the first way does not make for its intended conclusion, this will be plain from the response [n.344].

341. That for which the authorities of the Commentator and Aristotle have been adduced is also proved by reasons:

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decrease.” Averroes: “When Aristotle declared that an infinite is found in decrease simply and in addition non-simply (but in that which is converse to division), he began to accuse Plato because Plato equated infinity in one way with infinity in the other (namely both in addition and in decrease), and Aristotle said ‘And we saw Plato etc.’; that is, and Plato, because he thought an infinite proceeds to infinity both by increase and by decrease, posited two species of infinite, by addition and by decrease; and Aristotle introduced the term ‘increase’ in place of the term ‘addition’, so as to distinguish between a proposition of nature and one of geometry.”

Because when some property belongs to something precisely according to some idea, then whatever it belongs to equally according to that idea it belongs to simply equally (just as if ‘to see’ is of a nature to belong to an animal precisely according to its eyes and not according to its hands, then whatever it belongs to equally according to its eyes it will belong to equally simply, even though it does not belong to it according to its hands); but to be divided into such integral and extended parts of the same idea belongs formally to something only through quantity, and to a largest natural thing no more than to a smallest one; therefore since being divided belongs to the smallest according to the idea of quantity, so it will belong to the smallest simply, just as it does to the greatest.

342. But if it be said that the form of a minimum prevents it from coming together from a quantity (as far as concerns itself, on the part of quantity) – on the contrary: if certain consequents are per se impossible, then what those consequents follow on are also impossible; and, much more, if what are of the essential idea of certain things are impossible, then the things too are impossible; but divisibility into such parts either essentially follows quantity or belongs to the per se idea of it (the sort of idea that the Philosopher assigns to it, *Metaphysics* 5.13.1020a7-8); therefore, any natural form that divisibility is posited to be impossible with, quantity is impossible with too; and so it will not be simply divisible insofar as it is an extension, a quantum, because it is not simply an extension.

343. A proof also of this is that it is not intelligible for something to be an extension without its being made of parts, or for something to be made of parts without a part being less than the whole; and so it is not intelligible for something to be an indivisible extension such that there is not anything in it, less than it, present in it. Nor too

can any simply indivisible flesh be posited in a whole of flesh [n.292], because, just as a separate point would not make a separate extension, so neither would a separate point of flesh (if it existed) make any greater thing, either continuous or contiguous, along with another separate point of flesh; hence the reasons of the Philosopher in *Physics* 6 [n.319] refute the indivisibility of any natural thing just as they refute the indivisibility of any part of an extension insofar as it is an extension.

344. I say therefore that if the response [n.366] about a natural thing insofar as it is an extension and insofar as it is natural can possess any truth, this response should be understood by affirmation and denial of the formal idea of divisibility, such that the formal idea which says that a natural thing is divided insofar as it is an extension says that it is divided insofar as it is a natural extension, and that the formal idea which says that it is not divided insofar as it is natural denies that naturalness is the idea of this division – as if one were to say that an animal sees insofar as it has eyes and not insofar as it has hands; and this understanding is true. But from this it does not follow that that does not belong simply to a natural thing which belongs to it according to quantity; for the concurrent naturalness of the natural thing does not impede that which naturally belongs to quantity, just as neither do the concurrent hands in an animal take away that which simply belongs to the animal according to its eyes. So therefore, absolutely, every natural thing is divisible into divisibles ad infinitum, just as if the quantity, which exists along with the natural form, were to exist by itself, without any natural form. And so all the reasons that proceed of quantity absolutely (according to the idea of quantity) are conclusive about it as it exists in natural things, because divisibility is a natural property

of quantity – and so as a result the reasons are conclusive about the natural thing to which this property belongs.

345. The second response [n.337] does not seem to exclude the aforesaid reasons that a whole is not composed of indivisibles or of smallest parts within the whole [nn.332-333]. Nevertheless, it does seem possible to posit a minimum in motion because of the fact that a part of motion per se exists before it is part of something else, of some whole; and thus a part of a form, according to which there is motion, precedes all the parts of that form (not only in nature but also in duration), and so it seems to exist per se and not in the whole. If therefore there may be a minimum in natural things that could exist per se, then this seems to be the smallest part of a form that could be introduced by motion, and so to be a smallest motion [response in nn.350-352].

346. But against this response [nn.337, 345] I argue that just as it is essential to an extension that it can be divided into parts, so it is essential to it that each individual part of the parts it is divided into can be a ‘this something’; therefore existing per se is repugnant to none of them.

347. There is confirmation of this reason and of this consequence:

First because these parts are, as to both matter and form, of the same idea as the whole; therefore they can have per se existence just as the whole also can.

Second because if these parts existed per se, they would be individuals of the species of which the whole is also an individual; but it seems absurd that something has in itself the nature whereby it is, or could be, an individual of some species in such a way that its being able to be an individual of that species is not repugnant to it while yet its being able to exist simply is repugnant to it, and this at any rate as to things that are not



accidents (we are speaking now of homogeneous substances which are not essentially inherent in something).

Third too because parts are naturally prior to the whole; so their being able to exist naturally prior to that whole is not repugnant by contradiction to them, because their being prior in time to the whole itself is not naturally repugnant to them (in this way, that it is not repugnant by contradiction to them – on their part – to be prior in duration).

348. It seems, as far as this fact is concerned [nn.346-347], that one should say that, just as a natural form does not take away from a natural whole its being in this way a whole that is always quantitatively divisible, in the way a quantity would be if it existed by itself [n.344], so too it does not take away from it the possibility of any division of it existing per se (as far as concerns it on its own part), in the way that any quantitative part that an extension might be divided into could exist per se.

349. And if you say that it would at once be changed into what is containing it [sc. as water would be changed into air when divided, as per below], the response is that this does not seem to relate to the meaning of the question. For we are looking for a minimum able to exist per se by its intrinsic idea, that is, a minimum that, by nothing intrinsic to it, has any contradictory repugnance to the per se existence of something smaller than it; but, if the whole is corrupted, no intrinsic idea of this sort of impossibility is imputed. For let us set aside everything containing it or corruptive of it, and let us suppose that water alone exists in the universe; let any given amount of water be divided, because this is possible, as is proved above against the first response [nn.341-344]. The parts into which the division is made will not be nothings, because this is against the idea of division – nor will they, from the idea alone of division, be non-waters, because then water would be

composed of non-waters; nor is this smallness, which is now actual, repugnant to the form of water, because this ‘small’ water was there before (although within the whole); nor is the water corrupted through the division, because everything corruptive of it was set aside. So there seems to be no intrinsic reason that the possibility of something less of it *per se* existing should be repugnant to any *per se* existing natural thing, although perhaps an extrinsic reason preventive of such *per se* existence could be assigned in the opposition of some corrupting agent to it [nn.341-344].

350. I also argue against both responses together [nn.336-337], because neither saves a minimum in motion (although it was to reject this charge that the preceding deduction [n.345] was to some extent touched on); for although a medium for local motion cannot be ground for a movable thing unless the medium is natural, yet if *per impossibile* a mathematical medium could be ground for a mathematical movable, there would truly be succession in such motion, because of the divisibility of the medium; for the movable would pass through a prior part of the space before it passed through a later part. And even now, just as it is *per accidens* for a thing in place (on the part of the thing as it is in place) that it has natural qualities (as is plain from the Philosopher about a cube in *Physics* 4.8.216a27-b8 [n.218]), and just as it is *per accidens* for place (on the part of place as it is place) that it has a natural quality (from q.1 n.235 about place, because although naturalness belongs to what gives a thing place, yet it belongs *per accidens* to place) – so too it belongs, albeit necessarily in a way that is altogether *per accidens*, to motion in place or to motion as to ‘where’ (which is *per se* in a thing in place insofar as it *per se* regards place) that a natural quality is in the motion, or that it is in it according as it

is motion or is in a magnitude over which there is motion. Therefore quantity is per se the reason for succession, whether in a magnitude or in a movable thing or in both.

351. Hereby is the first response [n.336] destroyed, because it does not make for a minimum in motion; because from the fact that – according to this response – one cannot take a minimum in motion according as it is a quantum [n.336], and that succession is per se in local motion by reason of something insofar as it is a quantum, the result follows that in local motion there can in no way be a minimum. And so not in other motions either, because although this may not be as immediately conceded about alteration (if motion or succession be posited according to form), yet it follows by the argument ‘a maiore’ [a fortiori] negatively; for no motion is quicker than passage in place, and thus no motion can have indivisible parts if passage in place necessarily has divisible parts.

352. By the same fact is the second response [n.337] also destroyed, that it does not make for a minimum in motion [n.345]; because in a magnitude over which there is motion one cannot take a minimal part existing in it; therefore neither can one take a minimal passage over the magnitude, because in that minimal passage one should be able to pass through a minimal part of the magnitude.

353. In addition, the second response – as to a minimal motion – is also destroyed by other facts:

First because when a mover is present and is overcoming the movable, one cannot posit the extrinsic reason because of which such a minimum is denied to be capable of existing per se, namely the presence of something corruptive of it [n.349]—because the presence of the cause moving it and producing such a minimum is then overcoming every corruptive contrary.

Likewise [second], ‘for a minimum in successive things to be able to exist in flux is for a minimum there simply to exist in the whole’, because the part of something successive does not have any being in the whole other than that one part flows by before another, and these flowing by parts integrally make up the whole; so just as, in the case of a permanent whole, ‘for a part to be in the whole is for a permanent part to be in the whole’ so, in the case of successive things, ‘for a part to be in the whole is for a flowing by part to be continuous with another part’.

So therefore, now that the two antecedents [nn.286, 290] have been rejected, reply must be made to the proofs of them adduced on their behalf [nn.288-289, 292-300].

### 3. To the Proofs of the First Antecedent

#### a. To the First Proof

354. [On the division of the continuous at *every* mark in it] – To the first argument [n.288] the response is that ‘although it is possible for the continuous to be divided at every point, yet it is not possible for it to exist as so divided, because this division exists in potency and in becoming and can never be complete in a having come to be’. And then as to the proofs adduced for the opposite [n.288], they are conceded as to any single potency for a single making to be, but not as to infinite makings to be, since when one potency has been reduced to act there necessarily remains another not reduced to act; so it is in the issue at hand, that there are infinite potencies for being divided into infinites (since when one potency has been reduced to act, necessarily another remains

not reduced to act), and so, although a possibility for being divided is conceded, yet a possibility for having been divided is not.

355. This response is confirmed by the Commentator on *Physics* 3.7.207b15-18 where he gives the reason for the Philosopher's proposition that "an [extensive] magnitude happens to be in potency as much as it happens to be in actuality (it is not so in the case of numbers)," namely: "For the reason that all the potencies that there are for parts of a magnitude are potencies of the same potentiality and of the same nature – not so in the case of numbers."

356. Against this: it follows for you [from the concession made in n.354] that 'a continuum can be divided at  $a$ , therefore it can exist divided at  $a$ ' – and so on for  $b$  and  $c$  and for any individual point (whether determinate or indeterminate), because there cannot be any single division that cannot be carried out. Therefore all the individuals in the antecedent entail all the individuals in the consequent. The antecedent therefore entails the consequent: if a continuum can be divided to infinity, then it will be possible for this division to have been actually done to infinity.

357. But if you say that the singulars in the consequent are repugnant but not the singulars in the antecedent – on the contrary: from something possible no impossibles follow; but from the singulars of the antecedent the singulars of the consequent follow (as is plain by induction); therefore etc.

358. [On the division of the continuous according to *any* mark in it] – However, the proposition 'it is possible for the continuous to be divided at any point whatever' can be distinguished according to composition and division – so that the sense of composition would be that this proposition 'it is possible for the continuous to be divided etc.' is

possible, and the sense of division would be that in something continuous there is a potency for it to be at any point divided. The first sense is true and the second false.

259. Or the proposition can be distinguished like this, that it can distribute point divisively or collectively [sc. ‘it is possible for the continuous to be divided at any point singly’ and ‘it is possible for the continuous to be divided at any point together’].

360. It can also be distinguished according as ‘possible’ can precede point or follow it; and if it precedes then the proposition is false, because it would indicate that there is one potency for the attribution of the predicate; if it follows then it is true, because it would indicate that the potency is multiplied on the multiplication of the subject [sc. ‘the continuous is possible to be divided at any point’ and ‘the continuous at any point is possible to be divided’].

361. These responses do not seem very logical; not the third because the mode of putting the proposition together – namely possibility – does not seem it can be distributed to several possibilities (or one possibility to several possible instants), and it would not indicate that the predicate is united to the subject for some one instant; nor is the second response valid, because its distinction has place only when taking ‘any point’ in the plural, as in the proposition ‘all the apostles of God are twelve’; nor is the first response valid, because it still must be that, taking the extremes for the same time (or for a different time), possibility state the mode of composition uniting the extremes [sc. regardless of the distinction between ‘composition’ and ‘division’, ‘possible’ remains the mode by which the proposition combines subject and predicate; see n.362].

362. So passing over long and prolix evasions for these refutations [n.361], I say that this proposition [sc. ‘it is possible for the continuous to be divided at any point

whatever'] indicates the union, possibly, of predicate with subject for some one 'now' (although the 'now' be indeterminate), provided such ampliation of composition can be done by virtue of possibility; for no ampliation can be made for several 'nows' such that the possibility of composition for some one 'now' not be indicated, whether the extremes are taken for the same 'now' or for a different one (to wit, if 'sitting' is taken for one instant and 'standing' for another). In every sense 'possibility' must modify the composition uniting the extremes for some one 'now', however indeterminate.

363. So it is in the issue at hand, that the 'to be divided' is indicated as being joined to the continuous at a point and at any point of it you like – and this for some indeterminate now. But this is impossible, because whenever the predicate [sc. 'divided'] is united to it for some singular or singulars [sc. 'at point *a* or *b*'], this predicate is repugnant to it for other singulars; for it is necessary – as the first response says [n.354] – that along with the reduction of a potency (not only to having become but also to becoming) there stands another potency not reduced either to act of having become or even to becoming, because it is necessary that, when division exists 'in becoming or having become' at *a*, something continuous be terminated by *a* – and thus necessary that the potency which is in that part of the continuous is not reduced to act.

364. But if you argue that any singular is true, therefore the universal is too, one can say that the singulars are true but not compossible, and both are needed for the possibility of a universal.

365. On the contrary: this proposition is true at once 'a continuum can be divided at *a* and at *b* and at *c*', and so on about any other singular at once.

366. I reply. I say that singular propositions of possibility, taken absolutely, do not entail formally a universal proposition of possibility, but there is a fallacy of figure of speech ‘from many determinates to one determinate’. For singulars can, from the force of their signification, unite a predicate with a subject for some ‘now’, but a universal unites a predicate with a subject for any now of it universally; and so, by the form of signifying, there is a process ‘from many determinates to one determinate’.<sup>31</sup> This is the reason why there does not follow from a premise possible for some ‘now’ and a premise possible for another ‘now’ a conclusion about a universal possible as now, because the premises do not – from their form – signify that the extremes are combined with the middle term; and so the union of the extremes to each other does not follow, nor is it even possible for some one and the same now.<sup>32</sup>

367. And if you say that the singulars are compossible when taking the potency (but not the act terminating the potency) for the same now, to wit ‘it is at once possible for the continuous to be divided at *a* and at *b* etc.’ (but not ‘it is possible for the continuous to be divided at *a* and at *b* etc. at once’) – I argue that there is no need for possibility to be divided to the same now in order for the universal to be true, because singular propositions that absolutely assert the predicate of singular subjects, these subjects being sufficiently asserted, entail a universal that absolutely asserts the predicate; if such singular propositions are true, all of them, in themselves, absolutely – then the universal is true as well.

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<sup>31</sup> Vatican Editors quote from Peter of Spain *Logical Summaries* tr.7 n.37: “The third mode of fallacy of figure of speech comes from diverse mode of supposition, as ‘an animal is Socrates, an animal is Plato, and so on about each one; therefore an animal is every man’; for a process is made from many determinate suppositions to one determinate supposition... Hence since ‘animal’ supposits in each premise for one supposit and in the conclusion for diverse supposits, its supposition varies.”

<sup>32</sup> Tr. That this division is possible at this now and that division possible at that now does not entail that all divisions are possible now, because the particulars do not combine the same now with each division, nor can they.



368. And if you ask how singular propositions of possibility are to be taken as sufficiently asserted – I say that they must be taken with specific composition, for the same indeterminate now; to wit, ‘it is possible for the continuous to be divided at  $a$  for some now, and possible for it to be divided at  $c$  and at  $b$  for the same now’, and so on about each of them; and then the universal follows, but otherwise not.

369. And if you argue that these are singulars of a different universal, namely of this universal ‘it is possible for the continuous to be divided at any point whatever according to a single now’, and this universal differs formally from the other [sc. ‘it is possible for the continuous to be divided at any point whatever for the same indeterminate now’ nn.358, 362] – I reply that they differ in words, because that which the former expresses the other by the co-signification of the verb denotes, namely that the extremes are united.

370. And if you say that even in this way, by specification of the predicate to some determinate or indeterminate ‘now’, no singular proposition is repugnant to another, because, just as it is possible for the continuous to be divided at  $a$  for some ‘now’, so it is possible for it to be divided at  $b$  for the same ‘now’, and so on about  $c$  and about any other singular (because if any singular were repugnant, it would be one that took up a point either immediate [sc. to point  $a$ ] or a point mediate to it; but not one that takes a mediate point, because division at one point does not impede division at another point, even an immediate one; nor one that takes division at an immediate point, because no point is immediate [sc. to point  $a$ ]; therefore the singular propositions, as they introduce the universal, are true and compossible) – I reply and say that to no singular proposition taken or take-able is any singular proposition repugnant that is determinately taken or

take-able with indeterminate composition for the same now, nor are these repugnant among themselves; yet infinite indeterminate propositions are repugnant to any taken singular – and the reason for this repugnance was assigned before, a real one, namely from the impossibility of the reduction to act of all potentials at once [n.363].

371. An example similar to this in other cases is not easy to get. For one can well posit an example where any singular is possible and yet the universal is not possible, because any one singular is impossible with any one singular, in the way that the proposition ‘it is possible for every color to be in you’ is impossible, because any determinate singular is repugnant to another determinate singular, as ‘you are white’ is repugnant to ‘you are black’. However, let us posit an example of a man who cannot carry ten stones but only nine (and let the stones be equal), then this proposition ‘it is possible for every stone to be carried by him’ is false; and not because any singular is in itself false, nor because any determinate singular is impossible with any other determinate singular – but because with some determinate singulars some indeterminate singular is impossible; for any nine singulars are compossible and the indeterminate tenth is impossible with them.

372. And in this way must the response of the Commentator at *On Generation* 1 com.9 be understood where he says that “when a division has been made at one point, a division at another point is prevented from being made,”<sup>33</sup> namely not indeed at any indeterminate point (marked or mark-able), but at some determinate one.

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<sup>33</sup> Averroes: “And it would be possible for a magnitude to be divided at every point at once if the points were in contact with each other, which however is impossible... And so we see that when we divide a magnitude at some point, it is impossible for a division to be made at the point following on that point, although this was possible before the division was made at that point...; but when a division was made at the first point, the possibility of division at the second point was immediately destroyed. When therefore we have taken some point, at any place we wish, it will be possible for the magnitude to be divided at that point; but when the magnitude has been divided at a point and at

373. And then I reply to the argument made above against me, about mediate and immediate points [n.370], namely that it is against the objector. I say therefore that one should not allow a division to be made at some point immediate to another point, but at some mediate one; not however at a determinate mediate one (whether marked or markable), but at an indeterminate one – because let any determinate mediate point be taken, then a division at the initial point could still stand together with a division at this mediate point; yet to the division at the initial point there will be repugnant a division at another mediate point, namely at one that is not an indivisible any longer in the determinate continuum.

374. [On the division of the continuous at *any* and *every* mark in it] – If however you ask about this proposition, ‘it is possible for a continuum to be divided at any point whatever’ – this proposition can be conceded, because ‘any whatever’ is not only a distributive particle but also a partitive one, such that for the truth of the universal, whose subject is distributed through the term ‘any whatever’, there suffices a single attribution of the predicate to any singular whatever; so not to every singular at once, but to any singular whatever indifferently (there is no need for it to be attributed to others). But ‘all’ does not signify in this way, but signifies that the subject is taken at once for any respect of the predicate.

375. However about the term ‘any you like’ there is doubt whether it signifies the same as ‘all’ does or the same as ‘any whatever’ does; but whichever of these is posited, one should say the same about it as about what it is equivalent to; for when the meaning is clear, one should not use force about the word.

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some place, then it will be impossible for it to be divided at a second point in any place we wish, since it is impossible for it to be divided at a point following on the first point.”

### b. To the Second Proof

376. To the second proof of the antecedent [n.289] it is said that ‘the indivisible is nothing other than lack of the continuous, so that nothing save lack of continuous succession is formally an instant— and so a point is lack of length and states nothing positive’. And in that case the proposition that ‘the successive has precisely being because its indivisible exists’ [n.289] needs to be denied; rather it has precisely successive being because a part of it flows by, and never because an indivisible of it is something positive.

377. Many things seem to make for this opinion:

First, that, when the idea alone of the continuous is posited and everything absolute is removed, the continuous seems to have a term, provided it is not absolute; and it does not seem that God can separate finiteness from line nor – as a consequence – a point from it either, which does not seem likely were a point ‘an absolute essence’ different from line.

378. Likewise, if point and line were two absolute essences, it does not seem possible that some one thing would be made from them unless one of them were an accident of the other; for they are not one by perfect identity since they are posited as two absolute essences; nor possible that a single third thing would be made composed of them, because neither is act or potency with respect to the other. The indivisible then has being and not-being without generation and corruption, because if it is only in the middle of a continuous line it is only one point, but when the line is divided there are two points

actually; so there is there some point that was not there before, and there without generation, because it does not seem probable that a generator has generated there some absolute essence.

379. Likewise, it seems, from the author of *Six Principles* about the figure of an incision,<sup>34</sup> that this is not something said positively, and yet there is a surface there in actuality that was not in actuality before.

380. But against this [nn.376-379]:

Then the result is that the generation of a substance that is not per se the term of a continuum will be nothing (or at any rate in nothing), because there is no positive measure of it; and so it is in the case of illumination and all sudden changes that are not the per se terms of motion. And although this result could be avoided in the case of changes that are terms of motion and come to be in an instant (as nothing in the case of nothing or privation of continuity in the case of privation of continuity), yet it seems absurd about the former cases, for they are not the per se terms of the continuity of any continuous thing, because they are nothing of anything continuous, whether positively or privatively.

381. Further, according to the Philosopher *Posterior Analytics* 1.4.7334-37, the idea of line comes from points, that is, point falls into the essential idea of line and is said of line in the first mode of saying per se [sc. the mode of per se when the predicate falls into the definition of the subject]; but no privation pertains per se to the idea of something positive; therefore etc. [sc. point must state something positive, contra n.376].

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<sup>34</sup> *Book of Six Principles* 1.4, "In the case of certain things there is doubt whether their beginning is from nature or from act, as in the figure of an incision; for no addition is made but a certain separation of parts."

382. From the same [sc. statement of the Philosopher, n.381] the result also follows that, if a point is only a privation, line too will be only a privation, as well as surface and solid; for a termed thing is defined by what terminates it and something positive does not essentially include a privation.

383. Likewise the same result [n.382] follows (for another reason [sc. from what is said in n.376 and not from Aristotle's statement in n.381]) that, if a point is only a lack of length, a line will be only a lack of width and a surface only a lack of depth; and then there will only be a single dimension, which solid would be posited to be, although however the dimension which is called 'depth' could in another respect be called 'width' (for the three dimensions are distinguished by imagining three lines intersecting each other at the same point).

384. And from this further is inferred something unacceptable, that if a surface is only the privation of depth, how will a point be the privation of a privation? For nothing seems to deprive a privation unless it is something formally positive.

385. In addition, there are on a surface many corporeal or sensible qualities, as it seems; therefore a surface is not merely a privation.

The antecedent is proved about colors and figures, each of which is per se visible and consequently something positive. The figure too [sc. of a surface] seems most properly to follow the kind or species, and so seems to be an accident manifestive of the species; but it does not seem probable that there is no positive entity to something that is such as to follow a species naturally and to manifest it.

386. If it be said differently [sc. to the proof, nn.289, 376] that 'the indivisible by which the successive has being exists only in potency' – this is no help, because, when

the indivisible is gone, what succeeds to it in the way it has being in the whole? If another indivisible does, the argument [n.289] stands; if not, then the successive will not exist.

387. My response to the argument [n.289] is that, when the indivisible is gone, a continuous part flows by and not an indivisible; nor does anything succeed immediately, save as the continuous is immediate to the indivisible.

388. And if it be objected ‘therefore time does not always have being uniformly and equally (because, when the indivisible instant is posited, time exists, for its indivisible exists, but when the indivisible has gone, time immediately does not exist, because another indivisible of it does not exist)’ – I reply that, just as a line does not have being uniformly everywhere insofar as ‘everywhere’ distributes over the parts of a line and the indivisibles of a line (because a line has being in the former as it is in the parts and in the latter as it is in the ultimates), and yet a line exists everywhere uniformly to the extent that ‘everywhere’ distributes precisely over the latter or precisely over the former, so it is in the issue at hand of time; if the ‘always’ [at the beginning here, n.388] distributes precisely for the indivisibles or precisely for the parts, then time does have being uniformly; but if for both at once then it does not have being uniformly.

#### 4. To the Proofs of the Second Antecedent

389. To the proofs of the second antecedent, about minimal parts [nn.292-300], I reply:

To the first [n.292] that the Philosopher has enough against Anaxagoras if the whole is diminished by a taking away from the whole such that an equal amount cannot

go on being taken from it forever; for Anaxagoras had to say (as Aristotle imputed to him [Averroes *Physics* 1 com.37]) that, after separation of anything generable out of flesh has been made from the flesh, there would still remain as much flesh as could have anything generable further separated off from it; and this is impossible, because however much the flesh can be divided and diminished ad infinitum, not as much flesh at any rate would remain as could have anything generable generated from it, because anything generable requires a determinate quantity of that from which it is generated (especially if, as is imputed to Anaxagoras, generation is only separation or local motion, and the flesh is diminished, by continual separation of other parts from it, beyond the total quantity that generation might come from). So one is not required by Aristotle's intention there [n.292] to posit also a separate minimum in natural things which exists per se and not in the whole.

390. To the statement of the Philosopher *On Sense and Sensibles* [n.294] I say that properties are divisible as much as may be, so that a quantum cannot be divided without dividing the property; and yet the property is not divided ad infinitum as it is sensible (that is, insofar as it is perceptible by sense), just as Aristotle maintains there that 'a part, however minimal, can be sensible virtually although not in act'; that is, that such a part can cooperate along with other parts so as to affect the senses – and yet, although division could also be made in it as it is a per se existent, it would not however affect the senses.

And then the response to the argument of Aristotle adduced for the opposite [n.294 'the senses could be intensified infinitely'] is plain, that 'the senses grow ad infinitum in intensity if a property divisible ad infinitum is presented to them'; and this is



true if the sensible, insofar as it is actually perceptible by the senses, could be divided ad infinitum – but the same does not follow if the thing that is sensible can be divided ad infinitum.

391. As to the statement from *On the Soul* [n.293], it is plain that Aristotle is speaking of the quantity of something capable of increase and decrease; and this I concede, because the quantity that is a perfect quantity for any natural thing is determinate as to being greater or smaller, speaking of the quantity in which the natural thing is naturally produced; or at any rate it is determinate as to being smaller in the case of animate things, speaking of the quantity which diminution leads to. However, the Philosopher is only speaking there [sc. in the passage from *On the Soul*] of the limit of size and increase; and so he is precisely in this place understanding the perfect quantity of any natural thing to be determinate as to being greater – and from this he gets his conclusion, which he intended to prove, namely that ‘fire is not the principle of increase in any generation or in any species’; for the principal agent in any species must be determinate to the perfect quantity of that species, so that it may produce that quantity and not more than it; but fire is not determinate as to determinate quantity in any species, because – as far as concerns itself – it would go on producing a greater amount, for it grows ad infinitum if combustible material is added to it ad infinitum.

392. And when the antecedent about the minimum [n.290] is proved through the premise [n.295] that ‘it is possible to take a first part of motion’, the consequence can be denied [n.295, ‘therefore it is possible to take a smallest part of motion’], because those who asserted a first part in motion asserted that change is this first part of motion; however I deny a first in both ways (both a first motion and a first change), because the

Philosopher in *Physics* 6.6.236b32-7b22 of express intention shows the opposite, namely that every moving is preceded by a having moved ad infinitum, and conversely [n.297].

393. And he gives proof of this as follows: that if fire were to cause some first in motion, by parity of reason it would cause something equal to that first, simultaneous with it, and immediate. And so one would need to imagine that between the first simultaneous caused thing and the second one – equal to it – the agent would either have to be at rest, and so motion would be composed of motions and intermediate rests, or the agent would, after having introduced the first, need to introduce the attained successive whole, which seems thoroughly irrational, because, since the agent is of equal virtue for, and equally near to, the passive subject, then just as the agent can simultaneously introduce any (first) degree simultaneously caused, so it can, simultaneous with that introduced degree, introduce the whole thing, and so the whole motion would be caused immediately of immediate changes, or composed of changes – whether motions or rests – that are intermediate.

394. So here is the following process. Let there be a form subject to change needing to be corrupted by motion, for instance, in the case of an alteration, under a heat that is at rest. Of this motion, I say, it is possible to take a last, namely the terminating change, because a movable thing is now disposed indivisibly as previously it was disposed divisibly, and this ‘being affected’ – just like ‘being changed’ – is a being now indivisibly disposed otherwise than it was disposed divisibly before [n.181]. Now for this reason it is under the same form – under which it was at rest – in the instant of change, because then the agent that ought to be moving it did nothing before, and is not now doing anything in respect of it. From this instant the movable begins to move, and that

successively – either because of the parts of the movable, for no parts of the movable are equally close to the agent but one part is nearer ad infinitum than another (only a point of the movable is with all of itself immediate to the agent, and a point is not movable), or because of the parts of the form according to which there must be motion, each of which parts can be introduced before another by the present mover, since the extrinsic reason why a minimum cannot exist per se in natural things is the presence of a corrupter – but this is removed by the presence of the agent, which corrupts everything corruptive of its own effect [nn.349-353].

395. Therefore, from this instant of change, the heat that was present is continually diminished and coldness takes over. For it is not likely that there is only a movement of diminishing up to some instant and then first some coldness is introduced; for in that case either the heat to be diminished would have an ultimate of its being (which the Philosopher denies in *Physics* 8.8.263b20-26), or, if not, at least the coldness immediately following it would have a first of its being, and then there would be a first change of the motion of cooling, which is as unacceptable as that there is a first diminishing of the motion of the heat. It also seems unacceptable that an agent should diminish heat save by causing in it something according to some degree impossible with it, and, as it causes that impossible something in greater or lesser degree, it corrupts degree after degree of the existing heat; now Aristotle manifestly maintains this in *Physics* 6 [n.302], that everything moved has something of both extremes – and it seems manifest to sense that there is something of heat in water being successively heated, while the coldness still remains and is not yet wholly corrupted.

396. So, from the instant of change, the motion of remission of heat and the motion of intensifying of coldness run together – and of neither of these is anything first and in some instant in which, by a sudden change, some degree of coldness is introduced that is altogether impossible with the heat; in the first there is no heat and up to it there was heat – such that heat has no ultimate of its being but did have an ultimate in its being at rest; and coldness has no first simply of its being, although it have a first in being of rest (namely what it receives through the change, although this is not rest).

397. When therefore the proof is given by the Philosopher in *Physics* 8 [n.297], I say that the intention of the Philosopher is this, namely to prove that not everything is always in motion. And against those who say that ‘everything is always in motion’ he says that they are manifestly refuted if we consider the motions by which they were moved; for the motions – for their positing of this view – were taken from the increase and decrease of animate things, which they saw coming about in some great length of time (as in a year), and yet from this fact they concluded for no reason that these motions were coming about throughout the whole time but not perceptibly in any part of the time. To them Aristotle objects that such a movable can very well be at rest for a certain time and be moved in some small period of time, so that there is no need that it be always moving with that motion; and he proves this with an example about drops of water wearing away a stone, which drops fall in some certain number and take nothing away from the stone – eventually, however, one falling drop (let it be the hundredth) takes away, by virtue of all the drops, some part of the stone, and this part is taken away whole at once and not part before part.<sup>35</sup>

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<sup>35</sup> The Vatican Editors point out that, in his interpretation of Aristotle here, Scotus is in agreement with the like interpretation of Aquinas in his commentary, *ad loc.*, on the *Physics*.

398. Hereby the Philosopher does not intend that this taking away of a part of the stone happen in an instant and be in this way whole at once, for this taking away belongs to local motion (and so the motion is local), which cannot at all happen unless a part of the movable pass over the space before the whole movable does; but although this one part of the stone – which is taken away by the last drop in virtue of all the preceding drops – is taken away successively, yet the taking away of it is not successive corresponding to the whole succession of the falling of the drops; for it is not the case that there were as many parts of this taking away of a part from the stone as there were falling drops, but this whole small part is taken away by the last drop, albeit successively. The Philosopher, therefore, is denying a succession corresponding to this succession, namely to the whole falling of the succession of drops – and for this reason the moving of the stone was not always being moved, although when it was being moved by the last drop it was then being successively moved.

399. And, in accord with this intention, he subjoins afterwards about alteration that “there is no need, for this reason, that the whole alteration be infinite, for frequently it is swift” [n.297], where the translation of the Commentator has “sudden” for the “swift” in our translation; now the Commentator expounds ‘sudden’ thus, “that is, in an instant,” and infers “not in time.” But this exposition is contrary to Aristotle’s text, as is plain from our translation ‘frequently it is swift’, and from his own translation which has ‘suddenly’ – because in *Physics* 4.13.222b14-15, where our translation has “at once,” his translation has “suddenly,” and he has a note there, “that is said to happen suddenly which happens in an imperceptible time” – and thus does he himself there expound it. So to expound ‘swiftly’ or ‘suddenly’ as an instant is to expound time as an instant.

400. However, the intention of the Philosopher [sc. in *Physics* 8, nn.297, 399] is as follows: there is no need that, as the alterable is divisible ad infinitum, so a time ad infinitum should correspond to the alteration of the alterable – or that always, while the alterable exists, part after part of it should alter continuously, the way alteration could be a succession by reason of the parts of the alterable; but ‘frequently alteration is swift or sudden’, that is, when the alterable is at rest, and then the parts are not simultaneous (either according to the first change or according to the first part of motion) but in succession.

401. And this is what is immediately added by the reason that the Philosopher appends for the same conclusion, namely that when someone is healed the healing is in time “and not at the limit of time;” and yet the movable is not always in motion with this motion, because this motion is finite between two contraries. How then would Aristotle, for the purpose of proving that ‘not everything is in motion’, be taking in the preceding reason [n.400] that ‘alteration happens in an instant’ [sc. as Averroes interprets Aristotle, n.399], and in this second reason he is taking the opposite, namely that ‘healing is not at the limit of time but in time’, and still healing is, on this account, ‘not always’ because it is between contraries, and so, when the contrary is acquired, the motion ceases?

402. Therefore the Philosopher subjoins that “to say ‘everything is continually in motion’ is extravagant quibbling” (where ‘continually’ is taken for ‘always’, because he rejects, for all these reasons [nn.397, 399, 401, 402], the second member of the five

membered division<sup>36</sup>). And yet too a further exposition is there posited, because ‘stones remain hard’; so they do not undergo alteration.

403. Aristotle does not then deny his whole opinion in *Physics* 6 because of anything he says here, in *Physics* 8 [nn.297, 392]; and granted that here there were some term that seems expressly to carry this meaning (although there is not but only one taken from a false interpretation), yet it would seem to need being expounded according to what is said in *Physics* 6 rather than to retract somewhere else [sc. *Physics* 8] the whole of what is chief in *Physics* 6 because of certain things that somewhere else are not said as chiefly or of as express intention as in *Physics* 6.

404. To the passage from *On Sense and Sensibles* [n.299] response will be made in the last argument of this distinction [nn.519-520].

405. To the argument about contradictories [n.300] a response is made that statements are contradictories that are taken to hold for the same time (and according to the other required conditions), and statements are not contradictories that are not taken to hold for the same time – as is proved by the definition of contradiction set down in *Sophistical Refutations* 1.5.167a23-27 [‘A refutation is a contradiction of a same and single thing in the same respect and in relation to the same thing and in like manner and at the same time’]; and so the non-being of heat as it went before in the last instant of change, and the being of heat taken up in the completed time, are not contradictories with respect to heat.

406. On the contrary: the being and non-being of color, taken absolutely (not as they understood to be in the same instant), are impossible simply, so that because they

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<sup>36</sup> Aristotle gives in the passage at *Physics* 8 five arguments against the thesis that everything is always in motion: from increase and decrease, from the wearing away of a stone, from the freezing of water, from health, and from stones remaining hard.

are impossible simply they cannot be in the same instant – not conversely; and the reason for this impossibility ‘for the same instant’ is not other than that they are formally opposed with no other opposition formally than contradictory opposition.

407. This is confirmed by a likeness in other things, that a contrary succeeding to a contrary is truly contrary to it, although the two are not together in the same instant; likewise, a form as the term ‘to which’ of privation is truly opposed to it privatively – and this motion is formally between opposites. Hence the Philosopher in *Physics* 1.5.188a30-b26, 5.5.229a7-b22 maintains that every motion is between opposites that are contrary or privative or some intermediate of the two, and yet they are, as terms of change, never simultaneous.

408. It could also be argued that the terms of creation were not contraries, because the non-being that preceded the being of the created thing cannot be a contrary or a privative or an intermediate between them because it is not in any susceptible subject – and thus it would not be contradictory to being. Creation therefore would not be between contradictories or contraries, which seems absurd.

409. But as to what is adduced about the definition of a contradiction [n.405], there is an equivocation because contradiction exists in one way in propositions and in another way in terms. Propositions are not contradictory unless they are taken to be for the same instant, and for this instant both must assert the predicate of the subject; but terms absolutely taken, without determination to any being, are contradictories. About the first contradiction the Philosopher speaks in *On Interpretation* 6.17b16-26, and about the second in *Categories* 10.13b27-35.



410. I reply in another way to the argument [n.300], because ‘immediate’ can be taken in two ways: in one way that there is no middle between what is a whole in itself and something else, and in another way that what is a whole in itself is at once with something else or after something else. In the first way the continuous is immediate with its term, because nothing falls in the middle between the indivisible point that terminates and the divisible continuum that is terminated. In the second way there is nothing immediate to the indivisible point terminating a continuum; for nothing that is a whole in itself immediately follows the indivisible but a part of the whole does; and what is an immediate whole in the first way follows an indivisible according to a part before a part *ad infinitum*.

411. To the issue at hand therefore I say that as the measures are disposed to each other so are the things measured, namely that when one contradictory is measured by an indivisible the other is measured by an indivisible as well. And then the minor is false [sc. in n.300, ‘if there is no first *between* the being of the form that is to be introduced through motion and the non-being of it, the ‘first’ would be indivisible’]; for there is no middle between a contradictory ‘as it is in its whole measure’ and the other contradictory, just as neither between its whole measure and the measure of the other; a contradictory, however, that is measured by an indivisible is not immediate to anything, such that according to some of its being (namely as it is in its measure) it immediately follow the other contradictory. So I say as to the issue at hand that the non-being was in an indivisible, but the being of the form introduced by motion is in the whole completed time – and so nothing is intermediate between them; and yet what follows in time is not immediate – in the second way [n.410] – to what pre-exists in an instant.

### C. To the Third Argument

412. As to the third principal argument of the question, when the argument is made that ‘an angel cannot be moved [continuously] because he is indivisible’ [n.301] – although one could easily reply that an angel occupies a divisible place and so, in respect of place, he is disposed as if he were divisible – or that, if he occupies existing as a point a point-place, he cannot be moved continuously so as always to have point-existence – yet, because there seems no reason to deny that an indivisible is moved (even if it were a per se existing indivisible of quantity), then one can concede that an angel, occupying a ‘where’-point, can, as always existing in a point, be continuously moved.

413. And what is here assumed about an indivisible can be proved in many ways:

First that a sphere moved over a plane describes a line on the plane and yet only touches the plane at a point; therefore the point passes through the whole line, and yet not for this reason is the line that the point thus passes through composed of points. Therefore, by similarity, neither would this result follow if the point existed per se.

414. Multiple responses are made here:

That there is no spherical thing in nature but only in the intellect or imagination. – But this reply is nothing, because the heaven is simply spherical; and anyway, given that there were no simply spherical thing in nature, there would still be no contradiction on the part of sphere and plane that this thing move over that thing as a sphere over a plane (but there would be a contradiction if, from an indivisible moved over something, the result was that the thing moved over was indivisible).

415. A response in another way is that a natural sphere touches a plane at a line and not at a point. – But this seems impossible, because what is applied to a circular line (so as to touch the whole of it) is necessarily circular, because any circular part is circular in any part; but of a straight line no part is circular or curved.

416. Another response is that, because the point of the sphere [n.413] is moved per accidens, therefore there is no need that the space over which it moves be commensurate with it; but the sphere itself is moved per se, and it is divisible. – But against this is that, although a part in a whole is moved per accidens, yet it is always in a space equal to it, and it describes – in its passage – the whole space; indeed, if a whiteness (which is moved, when the extension is moved, more per accidens than any part or term of the extension) is compared to space according to the quantity it has per accidens, its accidental quantity would still be measured by space. Hence – as far as commensuration is concerned – it does not seem that ‘being moved per accidens’ takes away anything other than ‘being moved per se’.

417. Second [n.413], the line laid down by the sphere is not commensurate with the sphere (because then it would be a solid), and it is commensurate with something moved over it; therefore only with the point that is moved over it. If too the sphere is posited to be in a vacuum and only the line to be a plenum, and if per impossibile the sphere could be moved in a vacuum and the point could be moved over the line-plenum, the line-plenum would only be precisely described by the point. And so the conclusion intended follows from these considerations.

418. Further, take a solid cube and let it be moved. Its primary surface is always on something equal to it, and so always on a surface; or something corresponds to it in

the magnitude placed underneath [sc. the magnitude over which the cube is moving], to wit a line – and thus, by always passing over something of the magnitude before something else of it, the cube passes over the whole magnitude; therefore the whole magnitude underneath is composed of a line, if their reasoning be valid [sc. those who say an indivisible cannot be moved continuously, n.412].<sup>37</sup>

419. Further, let a first point be marked on a line over which another line is moving. This point on the line placed underneath describes the whole of the moved line, because just as any point of the moved line is always continuously at different points of the line underneath, so conversely any point of the line underneath is underneath different points of the moved line; and yet along with all of these points there stands a continuity of motion.

420. It can therefore be conceded (since the statement about motion per accidens [n.416] seems nothing but a subterfuge) that an indivisible could be per se moved if it existed per se, and still be moved continuously; nor from this does it follow that the magnitude passed over is composed of indivisibles.

421. However, because of what Aristotle means in the passages quoted [nn.302-304], one needs to understand that in local motion there is succession for two reasons, namely the divisibility of the movable and the divisibility of the space, and each of these causes, if it existed per se and precisely, would be a sufficient reason for succession; for any movable first passes over one part of the space before it passes over another, and so

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<sup>37</sup> The idea seems to be that if a cube is moved over a magnitude not continuously but indivisible by indivisible, then the surface of the cube in contact with the magnitude beneath will move over one line of the magnitude before another. So if we focus on just one line in the magnitude, we can consider the whole surface moving over that one line, which will thus be the magnitude the surface moves over. The magnitude moved over will then be composed of that one line. We can repeat this process for every subsequent line of the magnitude, and consequently the surface will always be moving over a magnitude composed of a line. Since this result is unacceptable, we must suppose that the cube moves continuously and not indivisible by indivisible.

there would be succession on the part of the space when comparing the movable to the diverse parts of space; further any same part of the space goes by a first part of the movable before a second, and so there would be succession on the part of the movable when comparing it to any same part of the space. In like way too can it be said of the motion of alteration and perhaps of the motion of increase.

422. The philosopher denies therefore, and well denies, that an indivisible ‘as far as concerns itself’ can be moved or can move such that a continuity of motion on its part can be taken such that it is a movable possessing in itself the complete idea of continuous movable, because being continuously moved is not something it has in itself; yet moving or being continuously moved is not repugnant to an indivisible when taking the continuity of motion from something else [n.421].

423. And such, and nothing more, is what Aristotle’s reasons prove, as is plain by running through all of them:

For when Aristotle takes the principle that ‘everything that is moved is partly in the term from which and partly in the term to which’ [n.302], this principle is true if the movable is of the sort that, from its own idea, there is succession of motion; for such a movable is in both terms according to different parts of itself. However things are not so here [sc. in the case of an indivisible], but an indivisible is partly in one term and partly in the other according to the same part of itself – that is, it is in some intermediate stage, not by being at rest, but insofar as this intermediate stage is something of both terms, that is, insofar as it is that through which the indivisible tends from one term to the other; this is to say that it is under change and under something lying under change, and in this way the parts of motion are continuous. – But when the principle is taken that ‘the indivisible

cannot be partly in one term and partly in the other because it does not have parts' [n.302], this principle is true of the first sense of partly (and so I conclude and concede that the indivisible is not thus a movable), but it is false of the second sense of partly [sc. first and second in this paragraph: the first is that of a movable from whose own idea there is succession, and the second is that of an indivisible].

424. To the other argument [n.303], when it is said that 'a movable passes through a space equal or less than itself before it passes through a greater space', I reply by saying that 'to pass through' can be understood of a divisible passage or of an indivisible passage.

If for an indivisible one, the proposition is false if the understanding is that before passing through any greater space the movable universally passes indivisibly through some equal space; for then one would have to concede that there would be a first change in local motion; and not even those perverters (and not expositors), who say that Aristotle retracts [in *Physics* 8] what he said in *Physics* 6 [n.297], can reasonably say that he contradicts himself within *Physics* 6 itself. There is no need, then, that any successive passage, which is greater than the movable, be preceded by an indivisible passage.

But if 'to pass through' be understood of a divisible passage, then it can be understood of the whole, not by reason of the whole, but by reason of the part; and this not by comparing the part to a 'where' equal to it and the whole to a 'where' equal to it, because the continuous is that 'whose motion is one and indivisible', *Metaphysics* 5.6.1016a5-6; and in this way the part passes through a space corresponding to it at the same time as the whole movable passes through a whole space corresponding to it. But when understanding 'to pass through' with respect to some definite and determinate point

in the space, the whole passes first through that point by reason of some part (and, in having passed through it, the whole has passed through something less than itself, speaking of a 'where' different from its own first total 'where'), before it thus passes through a space equal or greater than itself; and this it does per accidens, insofar as the movable can have a 'where' less than its total 'where'.

425. But if we speak of greater or lesser or equal 'wheres', according to which continuity of motion is immediately expected (and an infinite number of which 'wheres' are something in the first 'where'), then simply the whole passes through a space greater than itself before it passes through one equal to itself. As such is the response to the issue at hand, saving what belongs to the per se idea of continuous motion and not what does not belong to the per se idea of it.

426. And if you object that, however it may be with Aristotle's argument in itself [n.303], this point is always in a space equal to itself and so passes through the whole (so it is commensurate with the whole line underneath, and so this line underneath will be composed of points) – I say that it is 'always' in the sense that, in any indivisible, it is in a space equal to itself; but it is not 'always' in the sense of any part of time.

The same could be argued about the first surface of the cube solid [n.418], that although in any 'now' of time it is lying precisely on the line over which it is moved, yet in the intermediate time between two instants it is flowing over the continuous intermediate between the two extremes.

427. As to the last reason [n.304], I well concede that it is possible to take a time less than any given time, but from this does not follow that in that lesser time a lesser

movable can be moved, save when speaking of a continuous movable that was, on its own part, the cause of the continuity of the motion.

#### D. To the Fourth Argument

428. To the fourth principal argument [nn.305-306], about the cause of succession in motion, I say that, although there can be contention and dispute about Averroes' intention and about what he contradicts Avempace in (the way it appears in *Physics* 4 com.71, 'On the Vacuum'), yet I say briefly that the cause of succession in any motion is the resistance of the movable to the mover; not indeed such that the mover cannot overcome the movable (for then it would not move it), nor indeed such that the movable is inclined back toward the opposite (for then precisely it is in violent motion) – but resistance such that the movable is always under something to which the term intended by the mover cannot immediately succeed. And this resistance of the movable to the mover is because of a defect in the virtue of the mover and thereby because of the resistance of the medium to the mover and the movable, and by the 'medium' can be understood all that necessarily precedes the introduction of the term to be introduced. But such a medium is not necessarily a medium save to a limited virtue; for if there were an infinite virtue, it could put the movable at once in the term 'to which' – such that neither because of the opposed form in the term 'from which' (the form that the movable would already have), nor because of the mediums naturally ordered between the form that the movable has and the term 'to which', would there be a necessity that such a mover should move through such mediums before it introduced the term.



429. The possibility, then, of succession comes from the resistance of the movable to the mover, which is from the resistance of the medium to the movable and the mover, such that this is one resistance. For the movable, insofar as it has a form of the sort that between it and the term such mediums are of a nature to exist, can be continuously moved through the mediums to the term – and by these mediums, which resist the movable so that it cannot at once be in the term, can be understood the divisibility of the parts of the movable, or the divisibility of the parts of the form according to which there is motion, or both these two together. However the necessity of succession is never from this resistance, but is precisely by comparing this resistance to the agent, which the movable resists because of the resistance of the medium to the agent – such that, just as the possibility was from the resistance alone of the medium to the movable, so the limited virtue cannot take away this resistance; and therefore this resistance resists the agent so that it does not at once introduce the term.

430. Then to the arguments introduced for the opposite [n.306], namely that ‘there is no resistance of an angel to himself’ – I say that, as an angel does not act from the infinity of active virtue when he is in heaven, between which ‘where’ and his own ‘where’ on earth many mediums are of a nature to exist, which are also mediums for his own motive virtue – so neither can his own motive virtue make all those mediums and the term, nor even can he at once make the term save by first making those mediums; and for this reason there is here the whole resistance that is required for succession in motion.

431. And when argument is made about the saying of Averroes, about a heavy object, that ‘if it were put in a vacuum it would descend immediately because of a defect of resistance on the part of the medium’ [n.306] – I say that if a vacuum is posited then

the heavy object would not move (according to the Philosopher, *Physics* 4.8.214b12-215a24), because a vacuum cannot give way to a heavy object and because separate dimensions cannot be together. However, if it were posited that a vacuum could give way and that there was space in it, and not that the sides of the plenum were together (because then there would not be a vacuum) – I say then that there would be motion successively of the heavy object in the vacuum, because a prior part of the vacuum would be prior and also because the whole heavy object would pass through this part of space before that part; and, as was said before in the second argument [n.350], per se succession is only in local motion and in space insofar as space is a quantum.

432. To the arguments of Aristotle as far as they are adduced for the issue at hand [nn.307-308]:

I say that the proposition ‘what the proportion of medium to medium is in rareness and density, so the proportion of motion to motion is in quickness and slowness’ is true (*ceteris paribus*), and so it follows that there is no motion in a vacuum – or at least this is true against those [sc. the ancient atomists, Democritus and Leucippus] who posited the vacuum to be the whole cause of motion or of succession in motion; but as to the issue at hand, by arguing similarly here about movables as there about spaces, this proposition ‘what the proportion of movable to movable is in rareness, so the proportion of motion to motion is in quickness’ can be denied. And if you take the proposition ‘what the proportion is of this movable under the idea by which it is movable and of that movable under the idea by which it is movable’, I concede it but then the minor is false [sc. that ‘there is no proportion of angel to body in rareness’, n.307]; for an angel is capable of moving continuously insofar as he has a virtual quantity according to which he

can coexist in an extended place, just as a body can, according to its quantity, stand in an extended place.

433. Likewise, as to what the Philosopher infers from his second reason, that ‘motion is in an equal time through a vacuum and a plenum’ [n.308] – if something similar to this is inferred, namely that angel and body would be moved in an equal time, it is not impossible; but there is an impossibility there from the idea of mediums, according to which this sort of reason seems to proceed.

434. But although Aristotle’s reasons would not prove much to the purpose (because movables here are not disposed as spaces are there), yet his reasons are simply valid, such that his major is probative and the other argument leads to an impossibility [sc. the major of the reason in n.307 is probative and is allowed to be true in n.432, and the second reason in n.308 leads to an impossibility by reason of the mediums, n.433].

435. I reply, therefore, that if a vacuum could yield and motion were possible in it, then I say that from the divisibility of the space the motion would have divisibility and succession, just as now from the divisibility of the space of a plenum motion would have per se an essential succession; but over and above this succession can be superadded speed or slowness, by reason of the accidental condition of the medium itself (insofar as it promotes or impedes the motion), or by reason of its rareness (whereby it promotes or at least does not impede motion), or by reason of its opposed density. So in that case there would be motion in a vacuum, and proportionality to the motion in a plenum, and this when speaking of essential succession, but not of the superadded speed or slowness, because a movable in a vacuum would altogether have no superadded speed or slowness

(but it would have some in a plenum, but there is no proportion between ‘nothing’ and something).

436. Therefore Aristotle [n.307] has precisely from this fact [n.435] – against the adversary who says there is motion in a vacuum [n.432] – that there can in a vacuum be no motion having any speed or slowness superadded to essential succession. And this would not be unacceptable if one posited precisely that there was motion in a vacuum – but it would be unacceptable if along with this one were to posit a vacuum as a promotive medium in motion (or a necessary medium in motion), on whose part speed or slowness of motion could be taken.

437. In the same way, what is inferred in the second reason [n.308] is not impossible for an adversary who says precisely that there is motion in a vacuum, because a medium that is a plenum can be equated with a medium that is a vacuum insofar as there is reason or cause for essential succession in the motion; and if some plenum were taken in the sort of proportion to a given motion that Aristotle takes it in, it would be altogether neutral (bestowing no accidental quality), being neither a plenum medium nor a vacuum medium.

438. What then does the Philosopher get against the adversary from this reason [n.308]? – I say that he gets only that a vacuum has no accidental quality over and above essential succession; because if it did, some equal medium could be given and then through the plenum medium and the vacuum medium there would be a motion in as

much time as corresponds to the accidental condition of the motion, which is impossible – because if so the mediums would be proportional.

## Question Six

### *Whether an Angel can move himself*

439. Whether an angel can move himself [d.1 interpolation to n.296].

440. That he cannot:

Because nothing can be in act and in potency at the same time in the same respect; but the mover, insofar as it is mover, is in act, and, according as it is moved, it is in potency; therefore it does not move itself.

441. The reason is confirmed by the fact that some of the divisions of being – as quantity and substance – are impossible in some one and the same thing; therefore, by parity of reason, act and potency are impossible in any one thing.<sup>a</sup>

a. [*Interpolation* from Appendix A]. The consequence is plain, because if divisions of being more remote from being are impossible, much more are also the immediate divisions.

442. Again, everything that moves itself is divided into two parts, one of which is mover first and the other moved first, from *Physics* 8.5.257b12-13. There is also proof from the first conclusion in *Physics* 7.1.241b33-242a15, that ‘nothing moves itself first, because then it would rest on the resting of a part and would not rest on the resting of it’, which proof holds about a moved body; and from this there follows that in any self-

moving body such a distinction exists, and from this there seems to follow universally that in any self-mover such a distinction exists (for there seems to be the same impossibility in the same non-body moving itself first as in the same body moving itself first). But an angel is not divided into two parts, one of which is mover first and the other moved first; therefore etc.

443. On the contrary:

An angel can be moved locally (from the preceding question, n.310), and not by a body as efficient cause (as it seems), nor only miraculously by God; therefore he is moved by himself.

### I. To the Question

#### A. Scotus' own Response

444. I concede that an angel can be moved locally by himself, because in the case of anything that has a passive potency for acquiring or possessing something through motion, it is not a mark of imperfection but of perfection in it that it has an active potency whereby to acquire it. – The point is apparent from animate things, that they have been given an active power with respect to the perfect size that they are, when generated, in potency to; it is also plain in heavy and light things, which have an active potency for the 'where' of which they are naturally receptive; likewise, animals have an active potency with respect to the sensation to which they are in passive potency (however, as was made clear in 1 d.3 n.547, they cannot have it in its totality, because a power cannot have all the objects that, namely, are consubstantial with it). Therefore, since there is in an angel a

potency for a ‘where’ that he can acquire by motion, it is not a mark of imperfection in him that he have an active power with respect to the same ‘where’; rather it seems to be an imperfection in him if he not have such active power, because there is no repugnance in other less perfect beings having such an active power.

### B. Instance

445. And if it be said that this belongs to more imperfect things (as animals) only according to a part of them, because they can be divided into two (namely into mover and moved), but if it be said that what is assumed about heavy and light things [sc. that they have an active power, n.444] is false and against the Philosopher’s intention (as it seems) in *Physics* 8.4.255a4-18, where he seems to give four reasons specifically against it (first by the fact that a heavy thing is not an animal, second by the fact that it cannot stop itself, third that it cannot move itself with diverse motions, fourth that it is continuous, that is, of the same kind in a part and in the whole, and such a thing cannot move itself), and in solving the question he says that ‘natural things have only a principle of undergoing with respect to motion and not a principle of acting’ – I show the opposite, first from authorities and second through reasons.

### C. Rejection of the Instance

446. [From authorities] – The first authority is Aristotle *Physics* 8.4.255b19-31, where, in solving the doubt about heavy and light things, he says that ‘potency is said in

many ways, hence it is not evident what a heavy thing is moved by'. Now he distinguishes 'potency' into potency for first act and potency for second act (as is plain about potency for knowledge and potency for actual consideration of knowledge), and when applying it to the issue at hand he says that 'fire is in essential potency to becoming cold, namely insofar as water is generated from it – but when water has been generated, it is in accidental potency to making something cold, unless it be impeded'.

447. Thus too does he himself say about the heavy and light [*Physics* 8.4.255b8-12]: "For the light comes from the heavy, as water from air; but when it is already light it will at once operate, unless it is prohibited; now the act of a light thing is to be somewhere and to be upwards, but it is prevented when the contrary is present in it."

Here there is no validity to the exposition that, since it is actually light, it is actually light such that going upwards is the feature of light, because then to say that 'it is actually light' is the same as to say 'because it is actually light, it goes upwards', which is nothing other than a causal statement. For he says that 'it will at once operate, unless it is prohibited', which cannot be understood of the actually light in first act, because the act of a light thing in this way cannot be prohibited or prevented while it is actually such. Likewise, he says that 'it is prohibited when it is in the contrary place'; but a light thing is not non-light 'because it is in a contrary place'. Therefore he means this of second act, namely that 'its act is to be somewhere' – that is, that its act, which is upwardness, is its operation. Therefore, just as fire when it has heat as first act is truly and effectively disposed toward heating (which is second operation), so also fire actually existing light is effectively disposed to being upwards, or to the second operation whereby it exists upwards.



448. The same in *Physics* 4.9.217b16-18 about the vacuum, for he says that ‘two contraries accompany the dense and the rare, namely the heavy and light and the hard and soft’ – and when speaking of the contrariety of the heavy and light he says that “according to this contrariety they will be active in motion, but according to hard and soft they will be passive.” Therefore etc.

449. And if you say that that is not his intention (although the words sound that way), because when, in *On Generation* 2.2.329b18-22, he enumerates the active qualities, he excludes the heavy and light from qualities that are truly active and passive – I reply:

I say that by what he says in *On Generation* 2 he would contradict himself in *Physics* 8 [n.445] if he did not understand the matter there differently from here; for in *Physics* 8 he says, the way it is cited on their behalf, that ‘natural things have a principle not of acting but of undergoing’ – but in *On Generation* 2 he says that “heavy and light are neither active nor passive,” and his proof there is plain.

450. Therefore he is speaking in one way about action and passion in *Physics* 8 and where discussion about action and passion occurs, and in another way in *On Generation* 2 and where discussion about generation occurs; for just as in the *Physics* he is speaking in general and universally about motion while in *On Generation* he is speaking about motion toward form, so too in *Physics* 3 he is speaking of action and passion in general and universally – and thus what he says in *Physics* 8 is true, that ‘they have a principle of undergoing’, namely with respect to local motion; but in the book *On Generation* he is speaking of action toward form where agent and patient are contraries (which indeed is true of univocal action<sup>a</sup>), and these are equivocal at the beginning, and at the end are alike with univocal likeness (in equivocal action the agent is alike in form to

the produced thing with equivocal likeness, as he himself concedes in *On Generation* 1.7.324a34-b1, that some agent does not communicate with the thing that undergoes, as neither does medicine with the healed body).

- a. [*Interpolation*] wherein agent and patient are dissimilar and contrary at the beginning and similar at the end.

451. Now in this way [sc. by understanding action as motion toward form] he denies in *On Generation* 2 that heavy and light things are principles of acting or doing and also of undergoing – and this is what the wording of his reason expressly says, that they are ‘not principles of acting on other things nor of suffering from other things’; and therefore they are not principles of producing something according to some substantial form (and of this producing he is there speaking), nor are they principles of suffering from some agent correspondent to such action. But they are passive principles in some way with respect to local motion to a ‘where’, and in some way active principles with respect to the same – both of which he himself expressly says in *Physics* 8, that they are passive in that ‘natural things have in themselves a principle of undergoing’ [n.445], and that they are active in that he said the operation of a light thing is ‘to be somewhere’ [n.447], as the operation of a knower is to consider [n.446].

452. The authority of the Commentator, *On the Heaven* 3 Com.28, could also be adduced for this purpose: “In the case of simples,” he says, “mover and moved are the same in idea but different in manner; for a stone moves itself insofar as it is actually heavy, and it is moved insofar as it is potentially in a lower place; for it is found in one way to be actual and in another way to be potential – and the cause of this is that it is

composed of matter and form.” But he seems to speak of this variously, for in the same place he seems to mean that a stone ‘moves itself per accidens, by pushing the medium in which it is, as a sailor moves himself by moving the ship on which he is’ – and for this reason his authorities are not much to be relied on.

453. [From reasons] – There are reasons for this conclusion.

The first is of the following sort: every effect has, when it is actually caused, an actual cause (this is plain from Aristotle *Physics* 2.3.195b17-20 and *Metaphysics* 5.2.1014a21-23, the chapter on cause: ‘The efficient cause in act and the caused in act are and are not at the same time’; it is also plain – if there were no authority – from manifest reason, because what is not, when it is not, does not bring anything into being); therefore when the descent of a heavy thing is actual, then there is something actually causing it.

454. But this descent is not actual from something that removes an impediment. Nor consequently is it the heavy thing’s relation downwards, ‘because what impels it moves it per se downwards’, for in this respect the heavy thing is as it were the remover of an impediment – and such a mover, according to the Philosopher in *Physics* 8.4.255b24-27, is as it were a per accidens mover; and there must, in addition to a per accidens mover, be a per se efficient cause, because everything per accidens has to be reduced to something per se.

455. Nor can this per se cause be the center pulling it, because if *per impossibile* there were nothing heavy in the center but the whole earth were removed from it (and the center remained, as before, under the relation of being the center), the heavy thing would still tend naturally to the center. – What then is pulling it? Is it the ‘where’? Manifestly not because the ‘where’ is not an active form.

456. Nor too is it the influence of the heaven, because to have recourse to a universal cause seems a subterfuge – it is to deny particular effects and particular causes; also the influence of the heaven (as far as concerns itself) is uniform in the whole medium, so there is no reason for it to move one part upwards in the whole medium and another part downwards unless a particular determining agent is posited.

457. Nor can the ‘actual mover’ (when it is actually moving) be posited to be the actual moved heavy thing, because nothing univocally moves itself toward what it possesses – and for this reason motion is something extrinsic to the heavy thing; nor can what generates the heavy thing be the actual mover, because it can at that point not be.<sup>38</sup> Therefore it must be something intrinsic.<sup>a</sup>

a. [*Interpolation*] to the heavy thing, or it must be the heavy thing through something intrinsic to it.

458. It is said that the generator [of the heavy thing] remains virtually in the heavy thing, and that in this way it moves the heavy thing [cf. 1 d.17 n.89]. – On the contrary: it does not remain virtually save as a cause remains in its effect, and what remains thus does not remain in itself but only because it remains in its effect – and then its virtue in respect of the motion pertains to the genus of efficient causality. For if the generator is said to bring something about, and if it does not bring anything about save as it is in act, it must needs bring something about because it brings about what is virtually the efficient cause, and in this way the proposed conclusion still follows.<sup>a</sup>

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<sup>38</sup> Tr. The generator of a heavy thing need no longer exist when the heavy thing is actually in motion downwards, so that the generator cannot be the actual mover of it at that time.

a. [*Interpolation* from Appendix A] Again, if the generator remains virtually in the heavy thing, then either in its own virtue and or in that of its effect, because acting presupposes being. If it remains only by virtue of its effect, namely the heavy thing, and it is thereby cause of the motion of the heavy thing, then the heavy thing moves itself.

459. Besides, what does not move another save by being first naturally moved by something else [e.g. as a stick does not move a stone save by being first moved by the hand] gets from the same thing the fact that it moves and that it is moved; but a heavy thing that has a light thing tied to it (and whose lightness is not greater than the heavy thing's heaviness) moves that same light thing by drawing it with itself toward the center – and it only moves because it is moved; therefore it is moved naturally first before it moves. And it is moved by the same thing as that which is tied to it is moved by; but it moves what is tied to it by something else, namely by its heaviness; therefore it moves itself in the same way.

460. A confirmation can be given for this reasoning because, when something has active power with respect to some form, it can cause that form in any passive thing proportioned and proximate to it; but a heavy thing has active power with respect to a 'where' downward, just as it does with respect to what it pulls along with it, and it itself – when it is outside the place downward – is receptive of that form, which it lacks, and it is proportionate and proximate to itself; therefore it can cause that form in itself.

461. This can also be sufficiently plain if one considers that rest requires a cause actually causing it just as motion does; for then one should posit a cause naturally causing coevally with a heavy thing the rest of the heavy thing; but there is no such cause causing rest coevally with the heavy thing save the heavy thing, and so the heavy thing is causing

with efficient causality – and so it is causing the motion toward that rest, because these two [sc. motion and rest] are from the same cause.

462. Further, a heavy thing – when prevented from moving – removes what is preventing it if its heaviness is superior to the virtue of the impeding or resisting thing; to wit, if it is placed on something continuous [e.g. a wooden plank] and its heaviness is superior to the nature of the continuity, it breaks it and by thus getting rid of the continuity it gets rid of what impedes its going downward. Now this breaking, since it is a forced motion, must have some existing extrinsic cause for it, and to suppose there is any cause other than the heavy thing itself does not seem rational; but the heavy thing does not break the continuous object save because it aims to put itself in the center; therefore it has the putting of itself in the center from the same principle as that from which it has the removing of the impediment.

463. This could also be made clear in another way, because the heavier object moves more quickly, and yet the same generator could generate something heavier and something less heavy, and these two could be at the same distance from the center and under the same influence of the heaven; therefore the difference of motions in them is from something intrinsic to them.

464. Again “natural motion becomes more intense at the end,” according to the Philosopher *On the Heaven* 1.8.277b5-7, and it would be difficult to assign a cause for this if the efficient cause of this motion were precisely something extrinsic.

465 [Response to the statements of Aristotle] – I reply then to Aristotle, who is adduced for the contrary view [n.445], that he is in my favor (the way I have adduced him [nn.446-448]) – that the heavy thing does effectively move itself, as a knower moves

himself effectively to an act of thinking. And I understand this as follows: just as a thing that has a form, which is of a nature to be the principle of some univocal action, can act by that form on what is receptive of the form and proportioned and proximate to it, so too a thing that has a form, which is of a nature to be the principle of some equivocal action, can by it act on what undergoes and is proximate to it; and if the thing itself is receptive of the equivocal action or equivocal effect and lacks it, then it will, by the fact it is itself most proportioned and proximate to itself, not only be able to cause this effect in itself but will supremely cause it. So also is it in the case of the issue at hand, that a stone which is up above is in potency to a ‘where’ down below, but heaviness with respect to that ‘where’ is an active equivocal principle, just as there is only need universally with respect to a ‘where’ to posit an equivocal principle (for a mover moves a movable to a ‘where’ not because the mover is formally in act with respect to that ‘where’, but merely because it is virtually so). Therefore, because the heavy thing is itself receptive of the equivocal effect and lacks it, so it causes that effect in itself first, and causes it in no other thing save by causing it first in itself, such that its causing it is the operation of the heavy thing – as Aristotle says [*Physics* 8.5.257b9] – the way heating is the operation of a hot thing. But the fact that it causes the effect in itself is accidental to it insofar as it is active (because it is itself receptive with respect to this causing, or with respect to this causability); this could be understood if the heavy thing – while remaining up above – could propel itself, or something else, to the center; no one in that case would then doubt how a heavy object is the principle of descent in something else; and it is not less an active cause now of its own descent.

466. However, because of what the Philosopher says [n.445, that natural things have, in respect of motion, only a principle of receiving and not of acting], I add further that this motion is ‘natural in itself’ not by the fact that it has an active principle in itself, but only by the fact that the movable thing has an intrinsic passive principle naturally inclining it to motion. – This is plain from the definition of nature in *Physics* 2.1.192b20-23, that it is “a principle of motion in that in which it is per se and not per accidens” (for nothing is a principle of moving for anything save insofar as it is per se in that which is moved; but it is not per se and first in anything that is moved save insofar as it is passive; therefore it is not anything by nature nor a natural principle of anything save because it is a passive principle in the thing moved). This is plain because something is naturally moved for this reason, that it is moved as it is of a nature to be moved.

467. Thus it is in the case of the issue at hand, so that, although here (as in the case of many other things) an active principle is the principle of moving, yet not because of that active principle of moving is it moved naturally, but because of the passive principle because of which it is thus moved. And this is what the Philosopher subjoins (after he has said that “the act of a light thing is to be somewhere, upwards” [n.447]): “And yet,” he says [*Physics* 8.4.255b13-15], “the question is raised why they [sc. light and heavy things] are moved to their places.” And he says pointedly ‘to their places’, that is, that they are naturally moved to those places, “because they are of a nature to be there,” that is, they have a natural inclination to that ‘where’. And in this way he adds afterwards that “they have only a principle of undergoing and not of doing” [n.445], namely in respect of motion insofar as it is natural – and so, in this solution of this doubt



about the motion of heavy things, he says there by the by of the natural principle of this motion, and of the efficient principle of it, that it is only passive.

468. Now Aristotle's reasons [n.445] do not conclude against me, for the first three (which have the same force) show that the heavy object does not move itself the way what acts by thought moves itself; for an animal could not move itself short of the intended ultimate end – nor even could it direct itself or stop itself – unless it acted by knowledge. And from this is got the Philosopher's proposed conclusion, that these things [sc. heavy and light things] are not movers first [sc. do not move themselves] – for a first mover moves by knowledge (because “to guide is the mark of the wise man” [Metaphysics 1.2.982a17-18]), as was shown in the third distinction of the first book about the knowledge of God, and in the second distinction of the same book about the being of God [1 d.3 nn.261-268, d.2 nn.76-78].

469. Also, his fourth reason [n. 445] does not draw its conclusion about the continuous precisely as the continuous is some quantum. But it proves it relative to the continuous – namely because the continuous has the same disposition in every part of itself – that a heavy object does not move itself effectively, because there is not one part of it in act able to make another part of it to be in act according to the same quality, in the way he himself states in *On Sense and the Sensed Thing* [6.447a3-4; n.299 above]. And I concede that in this way an actually existing part of the heavy object does not cause motion to be in another part; but the whole heavy object is in act according to first act, and it causes in itself second act.

470. But if you object, ‘how will Aristotle, if he concede that a heavy object is thus moved effectively by itself (although not by knowledge, nor even because its

naturalness is from it insofar as it has an active principle) – how will he get his principal conclusion, that these things [heavy and light things] are necessarily moved by another – which is something he intends principally to prove [n.445]?’ – I say that he gets this conclusion sufficiently from a distinction of power [n.446]. For these things [sc. heavy and light things] do not reduce themselves from second potency [sc. accidental potency, n.446] to act unless they have first been reduced from first potency [sc. essential potency, n.446] to first act, or at least could be reduced to first act; and I assert this of all the elements, which are all – according to him – ungenerable and incorruptible, and yet, because they are of the same nature as their parts are, it is not repugnant for them to be reduced from first potency to first act in just the way their parts are reduced. So it follows that, although the heavy and light thing move themselves from second potency to second act, yet a movable thing is, or is moved, from first potency to first act by something else outside it; for it is not necessary that ‘if everything that is moved is moved by another’, that it is moved by another in the case of every motion – and the first point [sc. everything that is moved is moved by another] is enough for the Philosopher, because thereby deduction is made to something ‘other than all these things’, which something other cannot be moved by another either in one motion or in any motion but it is altogether ‘an unmovable mover’ [*Physics* 8.5.256a13-258b9].

471. It can also similarly be said that even if heavy and light things are – in the case of this motion – moved effectively by themselves, yet they are not moved as they are by first movers; from the fact too that they do not move by knowledge, the consequence follows that they presuppose something that does move thus by knowledge – and so,

although they do effectively move themselves yet they do not do so without being moved by another, although not as they are by a proximate cause.

## II. To the Principal Arguments

472. As to the first principal argument [n.440], it was stated in distinction 3 of the first book [1 d.3 nn.513-517] how something can act on itself, and response was made there to this first principal argument.

473. But as to what is added in confirmation, that ‘some of the divisions of being are not compossible in anything, so these divisions are not compossible either’ [n.441] – I concede the point about these divisions [sc. act and potency] as they are opposites. But they are opposites insofar as they state modes of any being, namely insofar as ‘one and the same thing’ is in potency before it is actually a being (or a being in act) when it already is; and in this way these divisions do not belong to any one and the same being, either formally or denominatively, namely that ‘one and the same thing’ should be said to be denominated by something in some act and at the same time by the same thing in potency. However, as act is taken for active principle and potency for passive principle, which principles fall under the essence of any definable or defined thing, then they are in this way neither opposites nor divisions of being nor repugnant to any one and the same thing.

474. As to the second argument [n.442], I say first to the authority from *Physics* 8, namely that everything ‘that moves by knowledge’ is divided into two, one of which is mover first and the other moved first – and the reason is of this sort, that the motive

power of such a mover is an organic power so that it requires not only a distinction between body and soul as between mover and moved, but requires perhaps in the body itself – where the organic power is – a moving part of the body distinct from the moved part. But it need not be like this in the case of something non-organically moving itself, because here the whole is uniform as to first act, and the whole is in potency as to second act.

475. But as to the proof of this proposition, which is taken from the beginning of *Physics* 7 [n.442], where is proved that ‘nothing moves itself first’ – I say that what ‘first’ means here can be understood in two ways:

In one way it is taken as it means the same as ‘according to the whole’ and is opposed to what ‘according to a part’ means. And Aristotle takes it this way in *Physics* 5.1.224a21-29, where he distinguishes what it is for a thing to be moved per accidens, or as a whole, and what it is for it to be moved as to a part; Aristotle also takes ‘to be moved first’ in this way in *Physics* 6.6.236b19-23, where he says that ‘whatever is moved first in some time is moved in any part of that time’ – and he says it frequently elsewhere.

476. In another way what I mean by ‘first’ means precise causality, in the way it is taken in *Posterior Analytics* 1.4.73b26-33 in the definition of the universal.

477. I say therefore that the reasoning of Aristotle at the beginning of *Physics* 7 [n.442] does well prove that no body is moved by itself first at the same time in this double firstness:

Because if it is moved by itself first, that is, according to the whole of itself, then the motion is present in any part of it. This consequence holds from the fact that a whole, insofar as it is a mover, is homogeneous, and that ‘to be moved’ is a homogeneous

passion; but a homogeneous passion is only present first in a whole by this firstness if it is present in any part of it. So the result is that if a whole is moved first in this way, then if a part of it is at rest then the whole of it is at rest.

478. But when taking the other firstness, the firstness of precise causality, if a whole is moved by itself first, then this predicate ‘to be moved’ is not removed from the whole because it is removed from something that is not the whole, nor is it removed from the whole because it is removed from something that is not any part of the whole; for if a triangle has three angles first by this firstness, not only is the predicate ‘having three angles’ not removed from it if it is removed from a quadrilateral, but it is also not removed from it because of its being removed from a part of the triangle, as from this or that angle. Therefore ‘to be moved’ is not removed from a whole in which it is first by this firstness, even if it be removed from a part of it, which part is not it; and therefore if a whole is moved first by this firstness, it does not rest on the resting of a part.

479. But the prior inference was that it is moved first by the other firstness [sc. the firstness of ‘according to the whole’, nn.477, 475]; so it is impossible for a whole to be moved first by both firstnesses at the same time [nn.477-478], because this involves a contradiction, in that a contradiction follows [sc. the contradiction that the whole would both rest and not rest on the resting of a part]. However, some whole can precisely by the one firstness [sc. the firstness of ‘according to the whole’ n.475] be moved by itself first.

480. Now in the issue at hand, I say that a heavy thing is moved by itself first in the prior way of ‘firstness’ [n.475], because it moves and is moved according to any part whatever, and moving and being moved belong to any part whatever – although not first but insofar as any part is in the whole.

481. But does it ever belong to a heavy thing ‘to be moved first downwards’ by the firstness stated in the second way [n.476]?

I say that we can in general speak of the heavy thing’s being moved downwards either as to the being moved that belongs to the whole heavy thing or as to a part of the being moved that belongs to a part of the heavy thing. And I say that just as the whole heavy thing and a part of the heavy thing are homogeneous in heaviness, so the total being moved (which is a total passion of the whole) and the partial being moved (which is a passion of a part) are ‘being moveds’ of the same nature; and just as being moved downwards is naturally – and in general – present first by the firstness of precise causality in a heavy thing generally, so the total being moved is present in the whole heavy thing by a like firstness, and the partial being moved (which is a part of the total being moved) is present in a part of the heavy thing by a like firstness.

482. Therefore the whole homogeneous heavy thing is not moved by itself first such that the ‘being moved’, as being moved is common to the whole and to any part of the whole, is present in it first according to this firstness [sc. the firstness of precise causality], because then being moved would not be removed from the whole even if it were removed from a part; however this is false because of the other firstness [sc. the firstness of ‘according to the whole’], which is necessarily going along with it, if this other firstness is posited in a homogeneous subject with respect to a homogeneous passion.

483. However, the heavy thing is also moved with this motion by the firstness of causality, namely of precise causality – and it is true that this total motion is not removed from the whole heavy thing because it is removed from anything that is not this whole

heavy thing; but it is true that a part of this whole heavy thing is not moved by this total motion, and yet not for this reason is this total motion removed from the whole heavy thing.

484. If you object that at least the total motion is removed from the whole heavy thing if partial motion is removed from a part of the heavy thing – so the total motion is not present in the whole by the firstness of precise causality (for if it were thus present, in no way would it be removed from the whole because of the removal of any other predicate from the whole that is not the whole) – I reply:

I say that the whole heavy thing, insofar as it is homogeneous, is made up of like parts (and these parts are prior in some way to the whole itself), so that when these are destroyed in idea of parts the whole does not remain; thus I say that it is not unacceptable for the parts to have their own partial properties and partial motions (and to have them somehow before the whole motion belongs to the whole itself), because even the whole motion is composed of the partial motions of the parts just as the whole heavy thing is composed of parts of the heavy thing. And then I deny the assumed proposition that ‘what belongs to something first (that is, according to precise causality) is not removed from it’ because something which is not the very predicate is removed from something which is not the very subject. For this assumed proposition is universally false when the subject has a prior subject and the property a prior property; for then on the removal of the prior property from the prior subject there follows the removal of the posterior property from the posterior subject.

485. The reasoning of Aristotle, therefore [nn.477, 442], proves precisely that the whole is not moved by itself first, that is, his reasoning proves that ‘to be moved’, which

is a homogeneous property, is not present in the homogeneous whole first (that is, first according to precise causality), insofar as the property is taken as homogeneous (that is, as of the same nature) in the whole quantity and in a part of the quantity – because thus it would not be removed from the whole although it were removed from a part; and this is false, because of the firstness of the whole that is entailed here by reason of precise causality. Yet Aristotle's reasoning does not prove that, speaking about that total motion whose parts are motions of parts and about the firstness of precise causality, the whole cannot be moved by itself first; and compatible with this stands that it is moved first by another firstness (namely the firstness of the whole), taking 'to be moved' generally (namely as it belongs to the whole and to any part of the whole), so that in some way one needs to assume a predicate that must be present in the whole with both the latter firstness and the former.

## Question Seven

### *Whether an Angel can Move in an Instant*

486. Eleventh I ask whether an angel can move in an instant.

487. That he cannot:

Because then a greater power could move in less than an instant. Proof of the consequence: for thus does the Philosopher argue in *Physics* 6.3.234a22-31, that if a greater power were to move something in time, the greatest power would move it in an instant.



488. On the contrary:

Some movings by some moving bodies exist in an instant, as the illumination of a medium; therefore too the much stronger moving of an angel can exist in an instant, because the power of the mover is greater and the resistance of the medium smaller.

## I. To the Question

### A. The Opinions of Thomas Aquinas and Henry of Ghent

489. Here the statement is made that an angel can move in an instant, not indeed of continuous time but of discrete time; for the proof see Thomas.<sup>39</sup>

490. Another doctor speaks about this time; see Henry.<sup>40</sup>

## II. Rejection of the Opinions

491. Against the first position [n.489] I argue thus:

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<sup>39</sup> *ST* Ia q.53 a.3 ad 3: "Now the time of motion of an angel can be non-continuous, and thus an angel can be in one place at one instant and in another place at another instant, without any time existing in between. But if the time of motion of angel is continuous, the angel goes through an infinity of places during the whole time preceding the ultimate 'now'." *Ibid.* in corp.: "And thus it is clear that to rest for a whole time in something, as in a whiteness, is to be in that something at any instant of the time; hence it is not possible for something to rest for the whole preceding time in one term and afterwards, in the last instant of the time, to be in another term... But in the local motion of an angel there is no term of any other continuous motion...; hence it is impossible to say that he is for the whole time in some place and is, in the ultimate 'now', in some other place, but one must assign an ultimate 'now' in which he was in the preceding place."

<sup>40</sup> *Quodlibet* 13 q.7: "And the time measuring these sudden changes of an angel is a discrete quantity..., but its parts have no permanence but exist only in passing through, and the individual parts coexist with the individual instants of our time; nor do these parts have any continuity among themselves, because between any two instants and the aforesaid changes [of the angel] one must posit a stopping of the angel at the moment at which the preceding change ends, where the angel does not change but rests through some interval and part of our time."

For he seems to contradict himself. For he seems to posit that an angel exists in place through operation; and if he is understanding the operation of an angel that passes over into a body, then that operation will exist in time or in an instant of common time; but if he is understanding an angel's immanent operation, namely intellection or volition, then (from what was said earlier in the discussion of aeviternity [nn.153-67]) that operation is neither in our common time nor in any other time but is, according to him, in aeviternity. Therefore etc.

492. Besides, his reasoning does not seem conclusive, because then it follows that, in the ultimate instant of pronouncing the words of consecration [sc. in the eucharist], the true form of bread would be there that was there before during the whole time of the pronouncing.

493. Likewise it follows that, when air has remained in darkness for the whole of a time, the air would be in darkness in the ultimate instant of the illumining of this dark air, and thus it follows that illumination does not take place in an instant.<sup>41</sup>

494. And if you say that this illumining is 'the term of a local motion' whereby the sun is made present to the medium – on the contrary:

Let the sun be posited as created *de novo* and the medium as pre-existing. Then too, although the illumining of the medium (done by the sun made present in this way) goes along with the 'where' terminating the local motion, yet the illumining is not per se

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<sup>41</sup> *ST* Ia q.53 a.3: "But sometimes the term 'to which' is immediate to the term 'from which', as in the case of those changes where the change is from privation to form..., as with illumination; and in these changes too there must be a time annexed to them, since it is clear...that the air is not illumined and in darkness at the same time. But not in such a way that the departure or passage from one extreme to the other takes place in time, but one of the extremes is conjoined to the local motion of the sun (as with illumination), and in the term of that motion there is also a term of the change... Hence all such instantaneous changes are terms of the same motion."

the term of the local motion but is some 'where' acquired by the sun itself; nor even can this happen without the air having remained in darkness up to that instant.

495. Further, if an angel – whatever time he is resting at – has to have moved in the ultimate moment of that time at the same 'where', then he never move, either in continuous time or in discrete time.

496. Proof of the consequence:

I take some part of the time at which the angel is at rest and at which, consequently, he changes in the ultimate moment of it.

Even if he should change in some instant of discrete time, I ask: is that instant immediate or mediate with our instant that terminates the time of his resting? If mediate then between our instant (at which the angel has moved) and that instant there is a time in between, at which too the angel would be resting; therefore in and at the ultimate instant of that time he will have changed, and so in that mediate instant (at which he was posited as changing) he does not change. But if the instant is immediate, I ask what within our time corresponds to it? If an instant, then an instant in our time is immediate to an instant [sc. of the angel's time] (so our time is discrete [sc. as the angel's time is posited to be discrete]); if time corresponds to it, then the angel does not in that instant instantaneously change, because – according to you – that instant coexists with a part of our time, in which or at which he can continuously change or be at rest.

497. It is because of this argument perhaps [sc. the last argument in the previous paragraph] that the second position [sc. of Henry, n.490] posits that between two instants of discrete time a quasi-intermediate rest of the angel occurs along with an intermediate part of our time.

498. But it was proved above [nn.161-62] against this second position that there is no need for the operation of an angel to have duration along with an instant of our time; so neither will that operation be the reason for the resting of the angel at the term of a sudden local motion. To say ‘therefore it will also be necessary to posit that the angel rests after the sudden local motion’ does not seem to be an argument but merely a subterfuge, to prevent our time being posited to be discrete from the fact that such local moving of an angel is posited to be a discrete time.

499. Further, as to what it [sc. the second position] posits that in such a ‘now’ an angel can locally move, so that he has several equal ‘wheres’ all at once between which there will only be an order of nature, or an order in imagination and not in duration – it seems to be impossible that an angel should, by his own power, have several equal ‘wheres’ “in one instant of his time and of ours”. And this is made clear by the example of the heavy object (which they [sc. Henry and his supporters] adduce for the opposite): for if a vacuum could give way to a body placed in it (and thus if there were motion in a vacuum), there would be no intelligibility in a heavy object’s being in several ‘wheres’ equal to it, but it would be first in one ‘where’ before it was in another ‘where’, and first in a prior ‘where’ before it was in a later ‘where’ [n.431]; and one part of the heavy object would be in a place first in duration before another part of it was.

500. And what he himself [sc. Henry] adduces about a body that passes through an infinity of ‘wheres’ in a finite time, because of the fact that it is only in those ‘wheres’ potentially – this does well prove that the time of an angel can be made of infinite parts of the same quantity and that yet in that time he can pass through an infinite space; but it does not prove that he can pass through so much space in a single instant; rather it proves

the opposite; for a body passes through a whole space thus in some period of time, because in different parts of the time it passes through different parts of the space.

### C. Scotus' own Response

501. I say therefore to the question [n.486] that a plurality is not to be posited without necessity,<sup>42</sup> and there is no necessity why one should posit a discrete time that measures the motion of an angel – for whatever is secured by that discrete time is also secured by continuous time in general; for just as they [sc. those who posit such a discrete time] must say that, if an angel passes through something in an instant, he cannot immediately have another instantaneous passing through, so one can, if an angel instantaneously passes through something in an instant of common time, posit that, although he can immediately have after that instant a continuous motion in actual time, yet he cannot immediately have an instantaneous passing through. There is nothing unacceptable, then, in positing that an angel, to the extent he participates in bodily condition (that is, a condition which is in some way of the same nature in himself as in a body), also participates in some way in the measure of body; but to the extent he moves locally, he participates in a 'where' (which is a bodily property that is in some way of the same nature in himself as in a body); therefore he can also be measured by the measure of the first moved body.

502. And if you object that an angel could move while the heaven is stationary, so there is no need for his motion to be in time – I reply:

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<sup>42</sup> A version of Ockham's famous razor, which at least in this form is not original to Ockham.

Peter after the resurrection will be able to walk about when the heaven is thus stationary, and yet this walking about is not imagined to be in any time other than our common continuous time, even though it takes place when there is no first motion of the heaven. The resting of the heaven itself, indeed, is (as was said before [n.178]) measured potentially by the time by which the first motion – if it existed – would be positively and actually measured; and by that potential time can another motion be measured which is then actually existing, such that there is no need for what is measured by the first heaven to depend in its essence (or in its being) on that motion (as was the case with the motion when the heaven was standing still in the time of Joshua [*Joshua* 10.12-14]), because this measuring of a quantity by quantity and quality is not by something on which the measured thing essentially depends (as is true in the case of quidditative measures), but it is sufficient only for that motion – when it exists – to be able to be distinctly known, according to its quantity, by a distinct knowledge of time, whether actual or potential time. And thus I say that, when this motion of the heaven does not exist, yet another motion will be able to be measured by the time of that motion of the first heaven, namely insofar as the other motion could take place simultaneously with some amount of the former motion, if the former motion existed, and takes place now with as great an amount of rest as there could be of the motion.

503. On this supposition then, that there is no need to posit for the motion of an angel a measure other than common time [n.501] – when it is asked ‘whether an angel could change or move in an instant’ [n.486], I say that change can be understood in two ways and can be said in two ways: one way includes the whole reality of motion, and the other includes the reality precisely of the term of motion.

An example. That this thing is changed from ‘where’ *a* to ‘where’ *b* can be understood in two ways: either that it possesses at once all the intermediate ‘wheres’ (in the way it would if it precisely moved successively), or that it would possess by that change exactly the ultimate ‘where’ (the way it would if the change were the ultimate term of motion).

504. In the first way – in contradiction to the second opinion [n.490] – I do not see in what way an angel could by natural power move or change in an instant, because it does not seem that he could by his natural power have several ‘wheres’ equal to himself [n.499]; in the second way [n.503] it does not seem he could not move in an instant, because the fact that the term of a motion is not immediately introduced comes from the imperfection of the power of the mover – and this imperfection is not to be attributed to an angel unless some necessity appears, because a nature should be granted as much worth as appearances allow.

## II. To the Principal Arguments

505. To the argument for the opposite [n.487] I say that the consequence of the Philosopher [sc. if a greater power moves in time, a greatest would move in an instant] holds from the fact that in the antecedent is included that the measure is divisible, because of what is posited in it [sc. time, for time is divisible]; but in whatever divisible measure some power can do something, a greater power can do it in a lesser measure. But in the antecedent ‘an angel changes in an instant’ is not included that the measure is divisible.

506. This consequence, then, that ‘it moves in an instant, therefore something can move in less than an instant’, does not so much hold from true propositions and the nature of the thing, but it holds from something false that is included in the antecedent [sc. the antecedent ‘it moves in an instant’]; for this premise, that ‘whatever some power causes in a divisible measure, a greater power can cause in a lesser measure’, is true from the nature of the thing, but the minor premise – which will have to be subsumed there under this true major [sc. the minor ‘an angel moves in an instant’] – is not true from the nature of the thing, but only by hypothesis, namely that ‘there is motion in an instant’. But if it be said that ‘an angel changes in an instant’, and if from this one is to infer that ‘some power should change him in less than an instant’ – then the minor thus to be assumed will not be true from the nature of the thing, nor by hypothesis, and so the consequence will not be valid. And from this it is plain that many enthymematic consequences [sc. consequences where one premise is left unexpressed] do not hold precisely by virtue of some understood truth, but sometimes by virtue of some understood falsehood, provided however a falsehood is included in the antecedent.

### Question Eight

*Whether an Angel could Move from Extreme to Extreme without Passing through the Middle*

507. Twelfth and finally I ask whether an angel could move from extreme to extreme without passing through the middle.



508. That he could:

Because either an angel is in place by his operation (according to some), and it seems plain that he can operate on an extreme without operating on the middle [Aquinas *Sent.* 1 d.37 q.3 a.1, q.4 a.2]; or he does at least move himself by command of will (although through some executive power), and he can wish to be in an extreme without wishing to be in the middle, just as he can understand an extreme without understanding the middle [Aquinas *Quodlibet* 1 q.3 a.2].

509. Second as follows: the body of Christ, being in the empyrean heaven, is now on the altar, and it does not pass through the middle; therefore an angel will be able to do this, since a body seems more to follow the laws of place than a spirit does [William of Ware, *Sent.* 2 d.2 q.11 arg.1].

510. On the contrary:

No part of time can pass from the future to the past save through the present; but the essential order between the parts of place seems to be just like that between the parts of time; therefore a transit from extreme to extreme will not be possible save through the middle [William of Ware, *Sent.* 2 q.11 arg.2 to the opposite].

### I. To the Question

511. It is said here by some that extremes can be understood either as two distant ‘wheres’ between which there is some middle that is not part of the extremes, or as two immediate ‘wheres’ between which there are middles yet any one of them is some part of the extremes.

512. Speaking of middles in the second way and of the continuous motion of an angel, I say that he cannot pass from extreme to extreme (speaking in this second way about extremes) save by passing through such a middle as is part of each extreme, because such a middle is the idea of continuity between the extremes passed through, as is plain from the definition of a middle in *Metaphysics* 10.5.1057a21-26.<sup>43</sup>

513. It seems to be similar when speaking of continuous motion and of a middle said in the other way [sc. the first, n.511], because, if an angel moves continuously, he is not completely in either extreme; therefore he is partly in one and partly in the other, or he is in the middle between both; for it cannot be said – as it seems – that he is in part of one extreme and in part of the other and yet that he is altogether not in such a middle between such extremes, because then he would be in two discontinuous places and in not in any way in the middle place, which does not seem to belong to him by natural power [nn.262-64].

514. But if we are speaking of indivisible motion, I say that in such a motion an angel can pass from extreme to immediate extreme without passing through a middle that is some part of either extreme; rather this must be the case, because if he were to pass through such a middle he would pass continuously and not instantaneously [n.512].

515. However as to distant extremes there is doubt. It is plain indeed from the preceding question [nn.503-504] that an angel cannot put himself in a distant extreme with a change that involves the whole reality of motion. – But can he really put himself in a distant extreme that involves precisely the reality of the term of motion, so that in some whole time he is in ‘where’ *a* and in part of that time he is precisely in ‘where’ *b* (such

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<sup>43</sup> “We call those middles into which that which changes must change first, as...in the case of colors where, if a thing goes from white to black, it will go to red and to grey before it goes to black.”

that ‘where’ *b* is distant from ‘where’ *a* by some middle, and the angel was never in this middle, whether in time or in an instant)? It seems probably that he cannot, because an order pre-established by a superior agent seems to be necessary for any inferior agent when the inferior agent does an action precisely about things in that order (an example: the order of natural forms that succeed each other in natural generation is determined by the institutor of nature, and so this order is necessary in respect of any natural agent, such that no natural agent can make vinegar immediately save from wine); therefore, since the order of the principal parts of the universe has been imposed by God on every created agent and created power, this order seems to be a necessary one when a natural agent moves itself through bodies to which such an order belongs. So when an angel moves himself through bodies to which such an order belongs, he cannot put himself in any ‘where’ whatever and follow no order about any ‘where’ whatever; for then no distance would seem to impede his action.

516. And if you object that this argument [n.515] is conclusive against the second member, ‘about middles that are part of the extremes’ [n.514], I deny it, because in that case, when an angel passes in an instant immediately from one ‘where’ to another ‘where’, he has all the ‘wheres’ in some order of nature (and between these ‘wheres’ there is, from the nature of the thing, a potential order), but he need not have them in an order of duration; and if he passes from a distant ‘where’ to a distant ‘where’ without any order in any way, then he would, without any order at all whether of nature or of duration, possess things to which a natural order belongs even though his acting about them necessarily presupposes the order of them.

## II. To the Principal Arguments

517. To the first argument [n.508] I say that a bad angel can will disorderedly; and a good angel, just because he only wills orderedly, need not will with his own power – and so, if a good angel wills to be at once in some ‘where’, still he does not will to be there by his own power, because this would be to will disorderedly. If however such power does not belong to the good angel but he wills to be there at once by the power of God, it is likely that God would accede to his will (if such it be), so as to put the angel in such ‘where’; but an angel can never by his own power be anywhere save in the way in which it belongs to his power.

518. To the second [n.509] I say that the body of Christ is by his infinite power made to be present on the altar, on which point see 4 d.10 p.1 q.3 n.5. But that infinite power can hold any middle between extremes to be no middle, and can hold order for no order, because he is above that order, being the one who prefixes it and not having it prefixed for him; but the limited power of an angel is not of this sort.

519. From this is apparent the response to the passage from *On Sense and Sensibles* 6.446b28-7a6 [n.404, 299], which was passed over in question 5 about the place of an angel. For it is not unacceptable that some alteration is complete all at once, namely when the agent has regard to the whole passive subject as an indivisible term and to the form in its ultimate degree (according to which degree it introduces the whole form as an indivisible); in that case a perfect form is introduced by an indivisible change in a divisible subject. But according to such form there is no motion, but only a single change – or perhaps several changes are had (in the order either of duration or of nature), as

Aristotle himself there says, that “if it was large, it undergoes one complete change after another” [n.299]; which can be understood in two ways: in one way that a later part is naturally perfected later by a prior part – the prior part naturally perfect before –, so that there is only an order of nature between the change of the prior and of the later part; in another way that there is an order of duration, namely that a later part is moved in succession by a prior part and yet the prior part was changed precisely by the extrinsic agent itself (this second way seems less probable, unless one posits that the prior part – already changed – is more imperfect than what changes it, and thus that it cannot change the later part at once in the way it was itself changed by the extrinsic agent).

520. So the Philosopher says there that “things in change of sound are not as they are in light,” because the multiplication in quantity of a sound, which takes place along with local motion, is necessarily successive – but not so the multiplication of light; and so simultaneity is not repugnant to the idea of alteration as it is to the idea of change of place, and this when making reference to natural power. Yet, however, there is never simultaneity in alterations that are a first change of motion, just as neither in changes of place, because where change is instantaneous, there the change is not a change initiating motion; nor even does simultaneity follow universally where motion follows, if there is a change that is the term of the preceding rest (but where rest, because of the perfection of the power of the agent, is followed immediately by a change, there no change terminating the preceding rest exists).

## Third Distinction

### First Part

### On the Principle of Individuation

### Question One

*Whether Material Substance is Individual or Singular of Itself or from its Nature*

1. As to the third distinction one must ask about the distinction of persons in angels. But to get a view of this distinction in angels one must first inquire about the distinction of individuals in material substances; and just as different people speak differently about this distinction, so they speak in like different ways about the plurality of individuals in the same species of angels. And in order to have a distinct view of the diverse opinions that are inquired into as to the distinction or lack of distinction in material substance, I inquire individually about the diverse ways of positing the distinction – and first about whether material substance is individual or singular of itself or from its own nature.

a. [*Interpolation*] “Behold, it has been shown where the angels were immediately they were created; the next thing now is to investigate of what sort they were made to be at the very beginning of their condition etc.” Lombard *Sent.* 2 d.3 c.1 n.17. As to this third distinction, where the Master deals with what the angels were created to be like as concerns their natural conditions, two things must principally be asked – first about distinction of persons in them, and second about natural knowledge in them [n.255]; but because we are led from distinction of persons in material substance to knowledge of distinction of persons in spiritual substance, so we must first get a view of distinction of individuals in material substance and lastly in spiritual substance. And because

there is a variety of opinions about distinction of individuals in material substance, so a variety of questions will be formed in accord with the variety of opinions. First then the question is raised whether material substance is individual or singular of itself or from its nature; second whether it is individual through some positive intrinsic thing; third whether it is individual through actual existence, or whether something else is the reason for individuation; fourth whether it is individual through quantity; fifth whether it is so through matter; sixth whether it is so through some positive entity determining the nature to singularity per se; seventh and lastly whether there can be several angels in the same species.

## 2. That it is:

The Philosopher proves in *Metaphysics* 7.13.1038b10-11 against Plato, that “the substance of any thing is proper to that in which it is, and is not present in something else;” therefore etc. So material substance of its own nature, with everything else removed, is proper to that in which it is, so that it cannot of its own nature be in something else; therefore it is individual of its own nature.

## 3. On the contrary:

Whatever is present in something from its idea per se, is present in it wherever it is; therefore if the nature of a stone were of itself a ‘this’, then wherever the nature of a stone was, that nature would be ‘this stone’. The consequent is unacceptable when speaking of determinate singularity, and the question is about this.

4. Further, that to which one opposite per se belongs, to it the other opposite is per se repugnant; therefore if a nature be of itself numerically one, numerical multitude is repugnant to it.

## I. To the Question

### A. The Opinion of Others

5. Here the statement is made that, just as nature is of itself formally nature, so it is of itself singular, such that to look for a cause of singularity beside the cause of nature (as if nature is nature first – first in time or in nature – before it is singular, and then is narrowed down by something additional so as to become singular) is not necessary.

6. This is proved by a likeness: that just as nature has of itself true existence outside the soul but does not have existence within the soul save from something else, that is, from the soul itself (and the reason is that true existence belongs to nature simply, but existence within the soul is its existence in a certain respect), so universality only belongs to a thing according to existence in a certain respect, namely existence in the soul, but singularity belongs to a thing according to true existence, and thus belongs to it of itself and simply. Therefore one must look for a cause as to why a nature is universal (and the intellect is to be given as the cause), but a cause other than the nature of the thing as to why a nature is singular – a cause mediating between the nature and its singularity – is not to be looked for, but the same causes that are causes of the unity of a thing are causes also of its singularity; therefore etc.<sup>44 a</sup>

a. [*Interpolation*] Against this there is argument as follows, and first on the part of the communicability of nature: if a nature is of itself a ‘this’, then communicability [to several] is repugnant to it, as is plain about the divine essence [sc. communicability by division] – and so it is also in the case of angels, if the nature of them were of itself a ‘this’. Another proof is that that to which one opposite of itself belongs, to it the other is repugnant; but communicability is not

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<sup>44</sup> Vatican Editors: Several other reasons for this opinion are given by Scotus in *Metaphysics* 7 q.13 n.16.



repugnant to material nature. Again, if a nature were, according to what it is in reality, of itself a 'this', then to understand it to be universal would be impossible unless one understood it under the opposite idea of understanding such an object [n.7]. Again, if singularity is included in the idea of a nature, then being a 'not-this' (and thus being a universal) is repugnant to it [n.48], because whatever is repugnant to what is included in a thing is also repugnant to the thing that includes it [Scotus *Rep* IIA d.12 q.5].

7. [Rejection of the Opinion] – Against this [n.5] there is argument as follows:

An object insofar as it is an object exists first actually by its own act, and in that prior act – according to you – the object is of itself singular, because this belongs to the nature when not taken in a certain respect or in accord with the being that it has in the soul; therefore, when the intellect understands the object under the idea of a universal, it understands it in an idea opposite to the object's own idea, because as the object precedes the act [sc. of the intellect] it is determined of itself to the opposite of that idea, namely the idea of a universal.

8. Further, whatever has a real, proper, and sufficient unity less than numerical unity is not of itself one with numerical unity (or is not of itself a 'this'); but the nature existing in this stone has a proper unity, real or sufficient, less than numerical unity; therefore etc.

9. The major premise here is plain of itself, because nothing is of itself one with a unity greater than the unity sufficient for it; for if its proper unity – the unity that is of itself due to it – is less than numerical unity, then numerical unity does not belong to it from its nature or according to itself (otherwise it would have precisely from its nature both a greater and a lesser unity, which are opposites about and according to the same

thing – because along with a lesser unity there can stand, without contradiction, a multitude opposed to a greater unity, and this multitude cannot stand along with a greater unity, since this is repugnant to it; therefore etc.).

10. Proof of the minor [n.8]; because if there is no real unity to nature less than singularity, and if all unity other than the unity of singularity and of specific nature is less than real unity, then there will be no real unity less than numerical unity; the consequent is false, as I will prove in five or six ways [in fact in seven ways, nn.11, 16, 18, 19, 20, 23 28]; therefore etc.

11. The first way is as follows:

According to the Philosopher *Metaphysics* 10.1.1052b19-24, “in every genus there is one first, which is the standard and measure of everything that belongs to that genus.”

12. This unity of the first measurer is real, because the Philosopher proves [*ibid.*] that the first idea of measure belongs to a ‘one’, and he explains by means of order how that to which the idea of measuring belongs in every genus is a ‘one’. Now this unity belongs to something insofar as it is first in the genus; it is therefore real, because things measured are real and really measured; but a real being cannot be really measured by a being of reason; therefore it [sc. the unity of the measurer] is real.

13. But this unity is not numerical, because there is no singular in a genus that is the measure of all the things that are in that genus – for according to the Philosopher *Metaphysics* 3.3.999a12-13 “in individuals of the same species it is not the case that this individual is prior and that one posterior.”

14. And although the Commentator [Averroes *Metaphysics* 3 com.11] expounds the ‘prior’ here of a prior that constitutes a posterior, yet this is of no consequence for the minor premise [n.13], because the Philosopher intends to assign there [*ibid.* 999a6-13] the reason for Plato’s positing that the nature of the species exists separately and not in a genus – because there is in a species an essential order, on account of which the posterior can be reduced to the prior (and so according to Plato there is no need to posit an idea of the genus, ‘through participation in which the species are what they are’, but only an idea of the species, to which all the others are reduced); but in individuals, according to Plato and according to the Philosopher reporting him, there is no such order, whether or not one of them constitutes another; therefore etc.

15. So the Philosopher’s intention there is to agree with Plato that in individuals of the same species there is no essential order. Therefore no individual is the per se measure of the things that are in the species of it – and so no numerical or individual unity is either.

16. Further, second, I prove that the same consequent [n.10, ‘there will be no real unity less than numerical unity’] is false:

Because according to the Philosopher *Physics* 7.4.249a3-8<sup>45</sup> comparison occurs within an undivided species, because there is one nature – but not within a genus, because a genus does not have such unity.

17. This difference [sc. between unity of species and unity of genus] is not one of unity in idea, because the concept of a genus is as one in number in the intellect as the

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<sup>45</sup> “If then comparable things must not only not be equivocal but must also have no difference..., then a thing is not comparable in this way, namely whether something colored is more white than black (for these are not compared as to some color but insofar as there is color), but in whiteness [sc. whether something white is more white].”

concept of a species is; otherwise no concept would be predicated in the whatness of many species (and so no concept would be a genus), but there would be as many concepts predicated of species as there are concepts of species, and then in individual predications the same thing would be predicated of itself [sc. the species would be predicated of the species]. Likewise, unity of concept or of non-concept is of no relevance to the Philosopher's intention there, namely for making comparison or not [n.16]. So the Philosopher intends there that a specific nature is one with the unity of specific nature; but he does not intend that it is one in this way with numerical unity, because in numerical unity no comparison is made. Therefore etc.

18. Further, third:

According to the Philosopher *Metaphysics* 5.15.1021a9-12, in the chapter on relation, the same, the like, and the equal are founded on 'one', so that although likeness has for foundation a thing of the genus of such and such a quality, yet relation is not real unless it has a real foundation and a real, proximate idea of founding; therefore the unity that is required in the foundation of a relation of likeness is real; but it is not a numerical unity, because nothing one and the same is like or equal to itself.

19. Further, fourth:

Of one real opposition there are two real extremes; but contrariety is a real opposition (as is plain, because one of the contraries corrupts or destroys the other in the absence of any work of the intellect, and just because they are contraries); therefore both first extremes of this opposition are real and 'one' with some real unity; but not with numerical unity, because then this white thing would be precisely the first contrary to this black thing (or that white thing would precisely be so), which is unacceptable, because

then there would be as many first contrarities as there are contrary individuals; therefore etc.

20. Further, fifth:

Of one act of a sense there is an object that is one according to some real unity; but not numerical unity; so there is some real unity other than numerical unity.

21. The proof of the minor is that a power which knows an object in this way (namely insofar as it is one 'with this unity') knows it insofar as it is distinct from anything that is not one with this unity – but a sense does not know an object insofar as it is distinct from anything which is one with numerical unity, as is plain because no sense distinguishes that this ray of the sun differs numerically from another ray, although however the rays are diverse because of the motion of the sun; if all common sensibles are removed (to wit, diversity of place or of position), and if two quantities were, by divine power, posited to be together at once, and they were also completely alike and equal in whiteness – sight would not distinguish that there were two white things there (yet if it knew either of them insofar as it is one with numerical unity, it would know it insofar as it is one distinct by numerical unity).

22. Next to this [n.20], one could also argue, as to the first object of a sense, that it is one in itself by some real unity, because just as the object 'of this power' – insofar as it is the object – precedes the intellect, so too it precedes, according to its real unity, every action of the intellect. But this argument does not conclude as the preceding one does; for one could posit that a first object – as it is adequate to the power – is something common, abstracted from all particular objects, and thus does not have a unity save the unity of commonness with the several particular objects; but the argument does not seem to deny,

as to one object of one act of sensing, that it necessarily has a unity that is real and less than numerical unity.

23. Further, sixth:

Because if every real unity is numerical, then every real diversity is numerical. But the consequent is false, because every numerical diversity, insofar as it is numerical, is equal – and so everything would be equally distinct; and then it follows that the intellect could no more abstract something common from Socrates and Plato than from Socrates and line, and every universal would be a pure figment of the intellect.

24. The first consequence is proved in two ways:

First, because one and many, same and diverse are opposites (from *Metaphysics* 10.3.1054a20-21, b22-23); but as often as one opposite is stated so also is the remaining one (from *Topics* 1.15.106b14-15); therefore to any unity there corresponds its own diversity.

25. The second proof is that each extreme of any diversity is in itself one – and the way it is one in itself it is in the same way diverse from the remaining extreme, so that the unity of one extreme seems to be the per se reason for the diversity of the other extreme.

26. There is also a confirmation of this in another way, that if there is only a numerical unity in this thing here, then whatever unity there is in that thing there is of itself one in number; therefore both this thing and that thing are, according to their whole entity, diverse first, because diverse things do not agree in anything ‘one’ in any way.

27. There is confirmation too from this, that numerical diversity means that this singular is not that singular, though with the assumption of the entity of both extremes.

But such unity belongs necessarily to one or other of them/[or alternative text:] is the negation of the other of them.

28. Further:

When no intellect exists, fire would generate fire and corrupt water, and there would be some real unity of generator to generated in form, according to which form there would be univocal generation. For the intellect when considering does not make generation to be univocal but knows it to be univocal.

#### B. Scotus' own Opinion

29. To the question then [n.1], I say, conceding the conclusion of the above arguments [nn.7-8], that material substance is not of itself from its own nature a 'this', because in that case, as the first argument proves [n.7], the intellect could not understand material substance under its opposite if it did not understand its own object under an idea of understanding repugnant to the idea of such an object.

30. Also as the second argument proves [n.8], along with all its own proofs [nn.9-28], there is, without any operation of the intellect, some real unity in things less than numerical unity or than the proper unity of a singular, which unity belongs to nature of itself; and nature, according to this proper unity of nature as it is nature, is indifferent to the unity of singulars; so nature is not thus one by that unity, namely the unity of singulars.

31. But how this should be understood can in some way be seen from the statement of Avicenna *Metaphysics* 5.1 f.86va,<sup>46</sup> where he maintains that ‘horseness is just horseness, and is not of itself one or many, or universal or particular’. I understand this to mean that horseness is not of itself one by numerical unity, nor many by the manyness opposed to that oneness; nor is it actually universal (namely in the way that something is universal as it is the object of the intellect), nor is it of itself particular.

32. For although it is really never without some of them, yet it is of itself none of them, but is naturally prior to all of them, and according to natural priority its ‘what it is’ is per se the object of the intellect and, as such, it is per se considered by the metaphysician and expressed in a definition; and propositions ‘true in the first mode’ are true by reason of the whatness thus taken, because nothing is said ‘per se in the first mode’ about a whatness save what is essentially included in the whatness, insofar as it is abstracted from all of the above things which are naturally posterior to it [1 d.3 n.164, d.5 n.18, d.2 nn.19, 25].

33. But not only is the nature of itself indifferent to existence in the intellect and in the particular, and thereby indifferent to universal and to particular (or singular) existence, but also, as it has existence in the intellect, it does not first of itself have universality. For although it is understood under universality as under the mode of understanding it, yet universality is not part of its first concept, because it is not part of a metaphysical but of a logical concept (for the logician considers second intentions

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<sup>46</sup> “For the definition of horseness is aside from the definition of universality, and universality is not contained in the definition of horseness; for horseness has a definition that does not contain universality but universality is accidental to it; hence horseness itself is not anything but horseness alone; for it is of itself neither many nor one, and is not existent in sensible things or in the soul; nor is it any of these potentially or in fact, such that they are contained in the essence of horseness; but it is, from what it is, horseness alone.”



applied to first intentions, according to Avicenna). Therefore the first understanding is of the nature without any mode being understood along with it, either the mode that belongs to it in the intellect or the mode that belongs to it outside the intellect; and although the mode in which that understanding is understood is universality yet it is not a mode of that understanding.

34. And just as, according to that existence [sc. existence in the intellect], the nature is not of itself universal, but universality is an accident of the nature according to its first idea, according to which idea the nature is object – so too in the thing outside [the intellect], where the nature exists along with singularity, the nature is not of itself determined to singularity but is naturally prior to the idea that contracts it down to that singularity; and insofar as it is naturally prior to what contracts it, there is no repugnance in its existing without what contracts it. And just as the object in the intellect did, according to the primacy and universality of it, have intelligible existence, so too the nature according to that entity has true real being outside the soul in the thing; and according to that entity it has the unity proportioned to it, which unity is indifferent to singularity, so that there is no repugnance in that unity's being of itself posited as existing with some unity of singularity (so this is how I understand 'nature has a real unity less than numerical unity'); and although it not have the unity of singularity of itself, so that such unity be internal to the idea of the nature (because 'horseness is just horseness', as Avicenna says in *Metaphysics* 5 [n.31]), yet that unity is a proper accident of the nature according to its first entity, and consequently the nature is not of itself a 'this', either intrinsically or according to the proper entity necessarily included in the nature according to its first entity.

35. But against this [n.34, about the indetermination and indifference of nature to singularity] there seem to be two objections:

One, that it seems to posit that the universal is something real in the thing (which is against the Commentator [Averroes] in *On the Soul* 1 comm.8,<sup>47</sup> when he says that ‘the intellect makes universality in things, so that universality does not exist save through the intellect’, and thus universality is just a being of reason) – for although the nature as it is a being in this stone is naturally prior to the singularity of the stone, yet, from what was said [n.34], it is indifferent to this singular and to that [sc. and such indifference is a mark of universality].

36. Further, Damascene *Orthodox Faith* ch.8 n.16 says, “It must be borne in mind that it is one thing to be considered in reality and another to be considered in reason and thought. So, and more particularly, the division of hypostases [supposits] in the case of any creature is considered in reality (for Peter is considered in reality as separate from Paul), but commonness and union are considered only in the intellect, reason, and thought (for we understand by the intellect that Peter and Paul belong to one nature and have one common nature); ...for neither do these hypostases exist in one another, but each is divided one by one, that is, separated in reality.” And later [ch.8 n.17], “However, in the holy and supersubstantial Trinity it is contrariwise; for there what is common is considered one in reality, ...but afterwards in thought it is considered divided.”

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<sup>47</sup> “It is shown by this that Aristotle does not think that definitions of genus and species are definitions of universal things existing outside the soul, but definitions of particular things outside the intellect; but the intellect – which acts – creates in them universality; and it is as if he said: and the being of definitions is not attributed to species and genus such that those universal things exist outside the intellect. For either the universal living thing or animal is altogether nothing, or, if some universal thing is a per se being, its being is posterior to the being of sensibles; and he said this because it appears here that definitions are of the sensible things existing outside the intellect, and then either there are no universal things existing per se, the way Plato used to say, or, if there are, their being is not necessary to the understanding of sensible things.”

37. As to the first [n.35], I say that a universal in act is that which has some indifferent unity, according to which the identically same universal is in proximate potency to being stated of any supposit whatever, because, according to the Philosopher *Posterior Analytics* 1.4.73b26-33, a ‘universal’ is what is a one in many and of many. For nothing in reality – according to any unity – is such that according to that precise unity it is in proximate potency for any supposit by a predication stating ‘this is this’; because, although there is no repugnance for something existing in reality to be in a singularity other than the one it is in [n.34], yet this something cannot truly be stated of any inferior beneath it, that ‘anything whatever is this’; for this is only possible of an object the same in number actually considered by the intellect – which object indeed ‘as understood’ has also the numerical unity of an object, according to which it is, as identically the same, predicable of every singular, by saying that ‘this is this’.

38. Hereby is evident the refutation of the statement that ‘the agent intellect creates universality in things’ [n.35, cf. Scotus *On the Soul* q.17 n.14] on the ground that one can say of any ‘what it is’ existing in a phantasm that it is such that being in something else is not repugnant to it, and on the ground that there is a denuding [Henry of Ghent, *Quodlibet* 8 q.12, 13 q.8] of the ‘what is’ existing in the phantasm – for whenever a ‘what is’ exists beforehand in the possible intellect, it has objective being, either in reality or in a phantasm, or it has a being that is definite or deduced through reason (and thus not through any [intelligible] light, but it is always of itself a nature of such sort that being in another is not repugnant to it); but it is not of such sort that being said of anything whatever belongs to it in proximate potency, but only in the possible intellect is it in [such] proximate potency.

There is then in reality a ‘common thing’ that is not of itself a ‘this’, and consequently ‘non-this’ is not repugnant to it of itself. But such a common thing is not a universal in act, because there is lacking to it the indifference by which a universal is a completed universal, namely the indifference by which the common thing, being identically the same by some identity, is predicable of any individual, such that any individual is it.

39. To the second objection – from Damascene [n.36] – I say that what is common in creatures is not really one in the way that what is common in divine reality is really one. For in divine reality what is common is singular and individual, because the very divine nature is of itself a ‘this’, and it is manifest that in this way no universal in creatures is really one; for to posit this would be to posit that some undivided created nature was predicated of many individuals by a predication stating that ‘this is this’, just as it is said that the Father is God and the Son is the same God. But in creatures there is some common thing one by a real unity less than numerical unity, and this ‘common thing’ is not so common that it is predicable of many, although it is so common that its being in something other than what it is in is not repugnant to it.

40. So it is plain in two ways how the authority [of Damascene] is not against me: first because he is speaking of the unity of singularity in divine reality, and in this way not only is the created universal not one but it is also not common in creatures [or: the common in creatures is not one]; second because he is speaking of a common predicable, not precisely of a common that is determinate in fact (even though being in another is not repugnant to it), and a common of this sort can be precisely posited really in creatures.

## II. To the Principal Argument

41. And from what has been said the answer to the principal argument [n.2] is plain, that the Philosopher is rejecting the invention that he imputes to Plato, namely because ‘this man’ existing per se – which is posited to be the Idea – cannot be per se universal to every man, because ‘every substance existing per se is proper to that in which it is’, that is: either it is of itself proper or it is made proper by something contracting it and, once this something contracting it is posited, it cannot be in anything else, even though being in something else is not repugnant to it of itself – and this gloss is certainly true when speaking of substance as it is taken for nature; and then it follows that the Idea will not be the substance of Socrates because it is not even the nature of Socrates – for the Idea is neither proper of itself nor made so proper to Socrates that it exists only in him, but it exists also, according to Plato, in someone else. But if substance is taken for first substance, then it is true that any substance is of itself proper to that to which it belongs, and then it much more follows that the Idea – which is posited as a ‘substance existing per se’ – cannot be in that way the substance of Socrates or of Plato; but the first member [sc. substance as taken for nature] suffices for the conclusion.

## III. To the Confirmation of the Opinion

42. As to the confirmation of the opinion [n.6], it is plain that commonness and singularity are not related to nature as existence in the intellect and true existence outside the soul are related, because commonness belongs to nature outside the intellect as

likewise does singularity – and commonness belongs of itself to nature while singularity belongs to nature through something in reality that contracts nature, but universality does not belong to reality of itself. And so I concede that one must look for a cause of universality, but one must not look for a cause of commonness other than nature itself; and once commonness is posited in nature according to its proper entity and unity, then one must necessarily look for a cause of singularity, a cause that super-adds something to the nature to which it belongs [sc. which cause is what is looked for in the following sections, nn.43-211].

## Question Two

*Whether Material Substance is of itself Individual through Some Positive Intrinsic thing*

43. I ask second whether material substance is of itself individual through some positive intrinsic thing.<sup>a</sup>

a. [*Interpolation*] Argument about the second, namely whether material substance is individual through some positive intrinsic thing.

44. That it is not:

Because ‘one’ states only privation of division in the thing itself and privation of its identity with something else; therefore, since singularity or individuation only states a double negation, there is no need to look for something positive as its cause but negation suffices.

45. The proof of the first proposition here is that if ‘one’ were to state a positive idea, it would not state the same idea as ‘being’ states (for then it would be otiose to say ‘being is one’); nor does it state an idea other than ‘being’, because then in any being there would be an entity added to an entity, which seems unacceptable.

46. On the contrary:

Primary substance is generated per se (from *Metaphysics* 7.6.1033a24-b19) and operates per se (*Metaphysics* 1.1.981a16-19), and in this respect it is distinguished from secondary substance, to which neither of these per se belongs; therefore they belong to primary substance through what primary substance adds above secondary substance. But they do not belong to anything formally through negation; therefore primary substance does not just add negation to secondary substance [n.53].

## I. To the Question

### A. The Opinion of Henry of Ghent

47. Here the statement is made that individuation in created things is done by double negation – see this opinion in [Henry] *Quodlibet* 5 q.8.<sup>48</sup>

48. But against this opinion:

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<sup>48</sup> “It is necessary then that the cause of individuation be something negative or positive-relative; but not positive-relative, because the relation would necessarily be founded on the thing itself as made and so as determinate in a supposit; so the cause must be some negative condition. One must therefore say that in specific created forms...the reason for individuation...is negation, whereby the form itself..., as it is the term of the making, is made altogether undivided in the supposit and individual and singular by privation of all divisibility (per se and per accidens), and divided from any other thing whatever... This negation, indeed, is not simple but double, because it is a remover of all multiplicability and diversity from within and of all identity from without... And this double negation altogether formally determines the idea of the form, by which determination an absolute supposit over and above the essence of the form is constituted... Thus, therefore, only by the determination of negation as to form...does the individuation and constitution of a supposit come, as by its formal idea, completely to be.”

First I expound the meaning of the questions moved about this matter [sc. the six listed in the interpolation to n.1, and dealt with at nn.1, 43, 59, 66, 129, 142]; for I am not asking by what a nature is singular or individual if these terms signify a second intention (for then a nature would exist by a second intention formally and exist effectively by the intellect causing that second intention, namely by its bringing ‘this nature’ to ‘nature’ as a subject-able to a predicable); and I am also not asking about the real numerical unity whereby a nature is one in this way (for a thing is formally one by numerical unity, whether the unity converts with being or is in the genus of quantity or states a privation or something positive); but, because there is in entities something incapable of division into subjective parts, that is, something ‘to which its being divided into several things, each of which things is it, is formally repugnant’, the question being asked is not whereby it is formally repugnant (because it is formally repugnant by repugnance), but by what, as by proximate and intrinsic foundation, this repugnance is in an entity. Therefore the meaning of the questions about this matter is ‘what is it in this stone by which, as by proximate foundation, its being divided into several things each of which is it is simply repugnant’ – which division is the sort proper to a whole universal into its subjective parts.

49. Understanding the questions in this way, then, I prove that there is not anything formally individual in the way this position [n.47] seems to posit.

First, because nothing is simply repugnant to any being through a mere privation in it but through something positive in it; therefore being divided into subjective parts is not repugnant to a stone – in that a stone is a certain thing – through any negations.



50. Proof of the antecedent: because however much negation may take away the proximate potency for acting and undergoing, so that thereby the being which the negation is in is not in proximate potency to anything – yet it does not posit in that being a formal repugnance to anything, for, when the negations are removed, possibly or impossibly (since they do not exist), such a being would stand along with the opposite of the negations, and so along with what it is said to be repugnant to, which is impossible.

An example of this: if a substance be understood to be a non-quantum, it is not divisible (that is, it is not able by proximate potency to be divided), yet being divided is not repugnant to it, because then receiving a quantity would be repugnant to it, a quantity by which it could be formally divided; therefore, while the nature of the same bodily substance stands, being divisible is not repugnant to it. Likewise: if ‘not having sight’ takes away the proximate potency for seeing, yet it does not create a repugnance to seeing, because the positive nature (where this negation was) can stand, and the opposite of the negation can, without repugnance on the part of the nature, be present in it.

51. So can it be argued in the issue at hand: although he [sc. Henry] posits nature to be ‘of itself one and individual’,<sup>49</sup> yet never will being formally divided be repugnant to nature through some negation posited in it, and so never will there be in things any positive being that will be completely individual.

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<sup>49</sup> *Quodlibet* 5 q.8, “Now there is another form which, as to thing and nature, is one and undivided in itself, and it is divided from a different form in the way that, with nothing formal being added to it, it subsists in supposits – the way it is the form of any most specific species, whose unity is only according to reason; ‘undivided’ I say, as far as concerns it of itself, in respect of subjective parts... But any specific form does not of itself and by its nature admit division into supposits but is simple, and it exists whole in whatever it exists in;” “An individual form (as humanity or ass-ness) is of itself and by its nature simple and indivisible, in that of itself and by its nature it does not have parts that differ in form, the way the form of a genus does – which differs in this respect from the form of a species, that the form of a genus...of itself and by its nature is divided through parts that differ in form, and it does not have a natural unity of itself but only according to reason and conception of the intellect; but the form of a species is of itself and by the nature of species individual in form, having of itself a unity terminated at the same time in the being of nature and in the intellect.”

52. And if an instance is in any way made against the first proposition of this argument [n.49], I will at least assume this proposition: ‘no imperfection is repugnant to anything formally save because of some perfection’, which perfection is some positive thing and a positive entity; but ‘to be divided’ is an imperfection (and for that reason it cannot belong to the divine nature); therefore etc.

53. Again, a thing is not by a negation formally constituted in a more perfect entity than is the entity presupposed by the negation (otherwise the negation would be formally some positive entity); but primary substance (according to the Philosopher in *Categories* 5.2a11-15) is most of all substance, and is also more substance than is secondary substance; therefore primary substance, insofar as it is distinguished from secondary substance, is not constituted formally in the entity of primary substance by negation [n.46].

54. Again, that of which a singular is the singular is predicated of the singular in the first per se mode of predication; but of some being taken under negation no entity is per se said by reason of the whole subject, because the whole is not per se one (if it is said by reason of a part, then a superior is not being predicated of an inferior but the same thing of itself).

55. Further, although this position [of Henry, n.47] seems to be false in itself because of the arguments already given [nn.49-54], yet, if the individual is understood to be constituted in the entity and unity of singularity through negation, the position seems altogether superfluous and not to respond to the question, because even when it is posited the same question remains:

For about the double negation that it posits I ask what the reason is that the negation belongs to the thing. If the position says that this double negation is the per se cause, no response is made to the question; for the question is what makes the opposites of these negations to be repugnant, and consequently what makes these negations to be present in the thing.

56. Likewise I ask where the negation comes from, since it is of the same idea in this thing and in that thing. For just as there is a double negation in Socrates, so there is a negation of a double idea in Plato; why then is Socrates singular by this singularity (a proper and determinate singularity) and not by the singularity of Plato? It is impossible to say unless one finds what this negation is a negation by, and this cannot be anything other than something positive.

#### B. Scotus' own Opinion

57. I concede then the conclusions of these arguments [nn.49-56], that the repugnance in this stone for being divided into subjective parts must be through something positive as through a proper reason; and this positive thing will be what is said to be the per se cause of individuation, because by individuation I understand the indivisibility, or the repugnance to divisibility.

#### II. To the Principal Argument

58. To the argument for the opposite [n.44]:

Although the assumption [sc. ‘that ‘one’ states only privation of division in the thing itself and privation of its identity with something else’] is perhaps false (about which elsewhere [not in the *Ordinatio*; see *Metaphysics* 4 q.2 nn.2, 4, 7, 9, 13; 7 q.3 n.17]), yet, if it were true that ‘one’ signified formally that double negation, it does not follow that the double negation does not have some positive cause whereby it is present in a thing – for specific unity would by parity of reason signify double negation, and yet no one would deny that there is a positive entity in the idea of a specific entity, from which positive entity the idea of the specific difference is taken. And this is a good argument for the solution of the question and for the opinion [sc. Scotus’ solution and opinion] because, since in any unity less than numerical unity there is a positive entity given (which is the per se reason for the unity and for its repugnance to the opposed manyness), a positive entity will be most of all – or equally – given in the most perfect unity, which is numerical unity.

### Question Three

*Whether Material Substance is Individual, or the Reason for Individuating Another, through Actual Existence*

59. I ask third, without arguments, whether material substance is individual, or the reason for individuating another, through actual existence.

#### I. The Opinion of Others

60. The statement is made that it is,<sup>a</sup> because, from *Metaphysics* 7.13.1039a3-7, ‘act determines and distinguishes’, so ultimate distinction is through ultimate act; but the ultimate act of individuals is according to the being of existence, because anything other than this is understood to be in potency to it.

a. [*Interpolation*] About the third, namely whether material substance is individual through actual existence or whether something else is the reason for individuating, without arguments; the statement is made that material substance is individual and singular through actual existence.

## II. Rejection of the Opinion

61. Against this:

First, because what is not distinct or determinate of itself cannot be the first distinguisher or determiner of something else; but the being of existence, in the way it is distinguished from the being of essence, is not distinct or determinate of itself (for the being of existence does not have its own differences besides the differences of the being of essence, because then one would have to posit a proper ordering for existences other than the ordering for essences), but the being of existence is determined precisely by the other’s determination; therefore it does not determine anything else.

62. On this basis one can argue in another way: because that which presupposes the determinateness and distinctness of something else is not the reason for distinguishing and determining itself; but existence, as it is determinate and distinct, presupposes the order and distinctness of essences; therefore etc.

63. And if it be said that existence presupposes every distinctness other than the one that is for individuals, but that it causes the distinctness that is as it were for an individual – on the contrary: in the ordering in a category there exist, when whatever is no part of the ordering is removed, all the things that per se pertain to the ordering, because, according to the Philosopher in *Posterior Analytics* 1.20.82a21-24, ‘in any category a stand is made upwards and downwards’. Therefore just as the highest in a genus is found precisely by considering it under the idea of essence, so the intermediate genera and species and differences are found in this way; the lowest, namely the singular, is also found there, with actual existence altogether removed – as is plainly evident, because ‘this man’ does not formally include actual existence any more than ‘man’ does.

64. Further, there is the same question about existence – by what and how it is contracted so as to be a ‘this’ – as there is about nature, for if the specific nature is the same in several individuals, it has an existence in them of the same idea: following the way the proof that specific nature is not a ‘this’ goes in the solution to the first question [nn.29-30], it can in the same way be asked what existence is a ‘this’ by (because it is not of itself a ‘this’), and so to give existence as what nature is a ‘this’ by is not sufficient.

### III. To the Argument for the Opinion

65. On this basis I say to the argument for the opinion [n.60] that act distinguishes in the way it is act, but accidental act distinguishes accidentally, just as essential act distinguishes essentially. Accordingly I say that the ultimate distinction in ordering in a category is individual distinction, and individual distinction is through an ultimate act

pertaining per se to the ordering in the category – and therefore I concede that this act distinguishes ultimately, but by a distinction that is outside the whole per se ordering in the category. This distinction is as it were somehow accidental; even though it is not truly accidental, yet it is subsequent to the whole of the ordering by quidditative being; in the way then that it is act it distinguishes, and in the way it is ultimate act it ultimately distinguishes.

### Question Four

*Whether Material Substance is Individual or Singular through Quantity*

66. I ask fourth whether material substance is individual or singular through quantity.<sup>a</sup>

a. [*Interpolation*] About the fourth, namely whether material substance is individual through quantity, argument is made:

67. That it is:

Boethius *On the Trinity* ch.1, “Variety of accidents makes a difference in number, for three men do not differ in their genus or species but in their accidents; for if we separate in our mind, for example, all the accidents, still the place for them all is diverse, and we can in no way imagine one place for two; for two bodies will not occupy one place, which is an accident, and therefore they [sc. the three men] are numerically many to the extent the accidents [sc. the places of the three men] are many.” And the first

among all accidents is quantity, which is even what ‘in place’ seems specifically to express (when we say that ‘we cannot imagine the same place’), and place belongs to bodies insofar as they have quantity.

68. Further, Damascene *Elementary Introduction to Dogmas* ch.4 (not counting the preface): “Everything in which a hypostasis differs from an hypostasis of the same species is said to be a difference from without and a characteristic property and a hypostatic quality; now this is an accident, in just the way that one man differs from another man because one is tall and the other short.”

69. Further, Avicenna *Metaphysics* 5.2 f.87va says, “A nature which lacks matter – to the being of this there come, from without, accidents and dispositions, by which accidents it is individuated.”

70. On the contrary:

Primary substance, as is argued for the second question [n.46], is per se generated and per se operates, and this insofar as it is distinguished from secondary substance, to which these features do not per se belong. But they do not belong to accidental being; as concerns ‘generated’ the point is plain from *Metaphysics* 6.2.1026b22-24; as concerns ‘operate’ the point is also plain, because one thing acting per se is one per se being, and this in one order of cause.

## I. To the Question

### A. The Opinion of Others

#### 1. Exposition of the Opinion



71. Here the answer to the question is said to be yes, namely that material substance is singular and individual through quantity.<sup>50</sup>

72. And for this the following sort of reason is put forward,<sup>51</sup> that what belongs first and per se to something belongs to any other thing whatever by reason of that something; but substance and quantity do not make a per se one but only a per accidens one; therefore, singularity will belong to that among these to which first and per se belongs divisibility into parts of the same idea; of this sort is quantity, because it has of itself the capacity to be divided infinitely (*Metaphysics* 5.13.1020a7-8); therefore what belongs to quantity first and per se does not belong to anything else save by reason of quantity. Such is the division of a species into its individuals, because these dividers [sc. individuals] are not formally of a different idea the way the species are that divide a genus. – But from this further [Godfrey]:<sup>52</sup> to be divisible into parts of the same idea

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<sup>50</sup> Thomas Aquinas, Giles of Rome, Godfrey of Fontaines. Aquinas *SG* IV ch.65: “Now wherever there is understood a diversity of parts of the same species, there individuation is necessarily understood; for things that are of one species are not multiplied save by individuality... And because dimensive quantity possesses of its idea that whereby a multiplication of individuals in the same species can take place, the first root for this sort of multiplication seems to come from dimension; because even in the genus of substance multiplication happens by division of matter, and this can only be understood according as matter is considered under dimensions; for, once quantity is removed, every substance is indivisible, as is plain from the Philosopher *Physics* 1.2.185a32-b5.”

<sup>51</sup> Godfrey of Fontaines *Quodlibet* 7 q.5: “For it belongs to quantity to be thus divided [into parts of the same idea, as a line into many parts of the same idea], and to be the reason of dividing for every substance in which it is; hence just as this per se belongs to quantity, so it belongs to matter insofar as matter is extended – and consequently to everything that thus in matter has existence through quantity it belongs also to have substantial parts of the same idea, insofar as through quantity the substance of matter is truly extended and truly divisible and is made to be divided. For it is clear that in two individuals there are two quantities essentially and formally differing from each other in the genus of quantity, though such that, for these two quantities thus to differ from each other, there is not presupposed anything else by which they thus have to be divided or extended save only a subject ‘in which’; but, for two substantial forms thus to differ formally from each other, there is something else presupposed whereby the matter (in which such extended and divisible forms exist) has extended and divisible being;” “composites of substance and accidents...are not one per se but per accidens.”

<sup>52</sup> *Ibid.*: “The aforesaid are plain from the description of quantity in *Metaphysics* 5, where it is said that ‘a quantum is what is divisible into the things that are in it, each one of which is of a nature to be each a single one-something and a this-something’. From which it is plain that neither quantity nor substance are per se divided but the composite which is a quantum; but yet this divisibility belongs

belongs to something by reason of quantity (from *Metaphysics* 5 above), and quantity is the principle of division in any nature and the principle of distinction between divided things; therefore it is by quantity that individuals are individually divided from each other. And from this the conclusion is drawn that division into individuals, individuals to which there belongs such a distinction, belongs to a thing through quantity; therefore an individual is an individual through quantity.

73. Further,<sup>53</sup> this fire does not differ from that fire save because form differs from form, and form does not differ from form save because it is received in different parts of matter, nor does one part of matter differ from another save because it is under a different part of quantity; therefore the whole distinction of this fire from that fire is reduced to quantity as to the first distinguishing thing.

74. There is confirmation of this argument<sup>54</sup> in that a generator does not generate another save because of distinctness of matter; but the matter of the thing generated is

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to the composite by reason of quantity, since what is formal in a quantum as it is a quantum (which is here being defined) is quantity. And the divisibility is into parts of the same idea, because the parts that are in some one quantum (as it is a quantum) are of the same idea, because they are of the same species and form; which parts, indeed, when they are actually divided, are diverse individuals in the same species – for, as Aristotle says, each one of such things ‘is of a nature to be each a single one-something and a this-something’; but primary substance, which is an individual in the genus of substance, is one something and a this-something.”

<sup>53</sup> Aquinas, *SG* 2 ch.49 arg.3: “The principle of the diversity of individuals of the same species is the division of matter according to quantity; for the form of this fire does not differ from the form of that fire save by the fact that it is in the diverse parts into which the matter is divided – and divided not otherwise than by division of quantity, without which a substance is indivisible; but what is received in a body is received in it according to division of quantity; therefore only form as individuated is received in a body.” *Ibid.*, chs.80-81 ad 2: “For it is clear that the essence of the form of this fire is different from the essence of the form of that fire, and yet there is not in species a different fire or a different form.”

<sup>54</sup> Godfrey, *Quodlibet* 7 q.5: “Hence it is said in *Metaphysics* 7, ‘There is a diverse species (that is, form) in the generator and generated because of matter’ (the Commentator, ‘the cause of a multitude of things able to be generated by one generator is the multiplication of the matters on which the agent acts’). But since matter in itself is one and indivisible, it seems that the causality of such division and distinction or individuation should not be attributed to the matter in itself, but must be attributed to it as it is understood under quantity, from which it has extension and divisibility into parts of the same idea etc.” *Ibid.*, 11 q.3: “Again, because matter is not susceptible of several forms in succession save through change, but because matter is not changeable save as it is presupposed to be

necessarily presupposed as a quantum and a quantum under distinct quantity; that it is presupposed as a quantum is plain, because a natural agent cannot act on a non-quantum; that it is presupposed as a quantum with a different quantity from the generator is also plain, because it cannot be a quantum with the quantity of the generator. But this quantity of the thing generated naturally precedes the being of the thing generated, therefore it precedes also the distinction of the generator and the generated; but it would not naturally precede this distinction if it were not naturally and per se required as the distinguisher of the thing generated; therefore etc.

## 2. Rejection of the Opinion

75. Against this conclusion [n.71] I argue in four ways: first from the identity of numerical idea or of individuation or singularity; second from the order of substance to accidents; third from the idea of ordering in a category – and these three ways will prove in common that no accident can per se be the reason whereby material substance is individuated; the fourth way will be specifically against quantity as concerns the conclusion of the opinion [n.71] and argument will, fifthly, be made specifically against the reasons for the opinion [n.72-73].

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extended and divisible in quantity (otherwise something indivisible could be changed and moved), and because too the generator generates something else because of a different matter and from a different matter, and because matter does not have this without quantity – therefore, just as matter must precede before the substantial form is introduced through generation, so also must quantity too be presupposed. And this quantity [according to Averroes *Substance of the Orb* ch.1] is called indeterminate...namely because of itself it does not determine for itself a form to be corrupted or even to generated, because, when the form to be corrupted is corrupted, the quantity itself does not seem to be corrupted, and, when the form to be generated is generated, the quantity does not seem to be generated; but just as the matter remains in substance under both terms, so too the same quantity seems in some way to remain... And for the same reason one should suppose an indeterminate quantity in matter, because just as a thing is not changed save because it is under a contrary, so it is not changed save because it is a quantum.”

a. The First Way: from the Identity of Individuation or Singularity

76. As concerns the first way I expound first what I understand by individuation or numerical unity or singularity. I do not indeed understand an indeterminate unity (by which anything whatever in a species is said to be one in number), but designated unity (as a 'this'), such that, just as it was said before [n.48] that it is impossible for an individual to be divided into subjective parts and that what is being asked for is the reason for this impossibility, so I say that it is impossible for an individual not to be a 'this' designated by this singularity, and that what is being asked for is not the cause of singularity in general but of 'this' singularity in particular, designated singularity, namely as it is determinately a 'this'.

77. Understanding singularity in this manner I give, in the first way, two arguments:

First as follows: an actually existing substance, not changed by any substantial change, cannot become a non-this from a this, because this singularity – according to what was just said [n.76] – cannot be different in the same substance while the substance remains the same and is not substantially changed; but an actually existing substance, when no substantial change has been made in it or altered, can, without contradiction, be under a different quantity and under any different absolute accident whatever; therefore by no such accident is it formally 'this substance' with this designated singularity.

78. The minor premise is plain, because there is no contradiction in a substance quantified by this quantity being conserved by God and informed with another quantity;

nor will this actually existing substance be, for this reason, changed by any substantial change, because there will be no change save from quantity to quantity. Likewise, if the substance is changed by any accident, it will not be changed with any substantial change; whether this is possible or impossible, it will not for this reason be formally not-this.

79. And if you say that this is a miracle and so is not conclusive against natural reason – on the contrary: there is no miracle in respect of contradictories, for which there is no potency. But it is a contradiction for the same abiding substance to be two substances without substantial change, and this both successively and at once – but this result however follows if a substance were formally ‘this substance’ by some accident; for then, when accident succeeds to accident, the same unchanged substance would be two substances in succession.

80. There is confirmation also for this through a likeness about specific unity, because it is impossible for one abiding substance – not substantially changed – to be at once or successively this species and not this species; therefore by likeness in the case of the issue at hand.

81. Second as follows: of two productions complete in substantial being there cannot be the same first term (the proof is that then each of the two would receive perfect substantial being from the fact the other of the two is complete, and so the same thing would be produced in completeness twice, – and also, if the two productions were not simultaneous, the same per se and actually existing substance would be produced when it already actually exists; so at least in the case of two successive productions the term cannot be the same). But ‘this bread’ was the first term of a generation of bread, and the transubstantiated bread exists with the same abiding quantity; so let another bread be

created and affected with the abiding quantity – the consequence is that the term of the creation will be ‘this bread’, the same as the bread that was the term of the generation, because the former bread will be ‘this’ with the numerically same singularity as the latter bread was ‘this’; the consequence also is that ‘this bread’ is the same when transubstantiated and when non-transubstantiated – indeed the consequence is that no bread is transubstantiated (because universal bread is not, and ‘this bread’, the singular, is not, because, *ex hypothesi* [n.71], this bread remains when the quantity, by which it was formally ‘this’, is unchanged); therefore nothing altogether is transubstantiated into the body of Christ, which is a heretical thing to say.

#### b. The Second Way: from the Order of Substance to Accidents

82. From the second way I argue as follows: substance is naturally prior to every accident, according to the Philosopher *Metaphysics* 7.1.1028a10-b2. And his intention concerns the substance that is one of the dividers of being [sc. into categories], so that to expound ‘substance’ there of God or the first substance is not relevant to his intention. For he proves that substance is first in the way he proves that substance is of the number of the dividers of being – that it is prior to every accident, namely such that, in order to determine everything that divides being, it suffices to determine substance as what is first, because the knowledge of accidents is had from the fact they are attributed to substance; but this is only to the purpose about substance in its whole ordering; for nothing posterior to this ordering can be the formal reason whereby something is in that ordering. Therefore, from the idea of the priority of substance universally, as it is something

common, sufficient determination is made about the ordering that is the ordering of primary substance, to which this natural priority to any accident belongs; so being a 'this' naturally prior to its determination by any accident belongs to primary substance in its idea.

83. And the consequence can be confirmed, because when something is prior to something else, the maximally first of that something is prior to the something else; but the maximally first in substance in general is primary substance; therefore primary substance is simply prior to every accident, and so it is first a 'this' before it is determined in any way by anything else.

84. Here it is said [by Godfrey of Fontaines] that although primary substance is prior to quantity in existing yet not in dividing – just as also secondary substance is prior in entity but not in divisibility.

85. On the contrary:

This response destroys itself, because if primary substance is naturally prior to quantity in existing, and if primary substance cannot be understood in its existence unless it be understood as it is a 'this', then it is not prior in existing unless it is prior as a 'this'; therefore it is not a 'this' by quantity.

86. Further, form is prior simply to the composite, according to the Philosopher's proof *Metaphysics* 7.2.1029a507. Therefore if quantity is the form of primary substance insofar as it is primary substance, then quantity will be simply prior in being to primary substance – because if quantity is not the form in being, then it is not the form in dividing either, or in the unity that belongs to primary substance insofar as primary substance is

such a being (for any entity is followed by its proper unity, which unity does not have any other proper cause of itself than the cause of entity).

87. Further, substance, in the way that it is the subject for every accident, is naturally prior to every accident. For, insofar as it is the subject, it is proved to be prior in definition to every accident, for it is by way of addition thus posited in the order of any definition; but as it is the subject it is ‘this substance’, because, according to the Philosopher *Physics* 2.3.195b25-26 and *Metaphysics* 1.1.981a16-19, singulars are causes of singulars (in any genus of cause), so a singular subject is cause of a singular accident. And there is an especial confirmation of this as to an accident in an accident, because that is present first in a singular, according to the Philosopher *Metaphysics* 5.9.1017b35-1018a3, ch. ‘On the Same’.

88. Further, everything that is prior in nature to something else is prior to it in duration, in the way that – as far as concerns it of itself – there is in it no repugnance of contradiction in its being able to be prior in duration to its posterior; for priority of nature universally includes in the prior thing the ability, without contradiction, to exist in the absence of its posterior, from *Metaphysics* 5.11.1019a2-4 ch. ‘On the Prior’. Therefore any substance (as far as concerns itself) can, without contradiction, exist prior in duration to any accident, and thus prior to quantity.

### c. The Third Way: from the Idea of Ordering within a Category

89. From the third way I argue thus: in any ordering in a category are all the things pertaining to that ordering, after removal of anything else whatever that is not



essentially part of the ordering (the proof of this is that two orderings are primarily diverse, and so nothing of one ordering is the sort it is through the ordering of the other); but to the ordering as it is complete both upwards and downwards (according to the Philosopher *Posterior Analytics* 1. 20.82a21-24 [n.63]), just as there belongs to it the first predicate of which nothing is predicated, so there belongs to it the lowest subject for which nothing is subject; therefore the singular or the individual exists in any ordering by nothing in any other ordering.

90. Further second: in any ordering, after removal of everything whatever of another ordering, there exists the idea of species – for no opinion imagines that a species is in some genus by reason of an accident, speaking of absolute things; but it is of the idea of a species that it is predicable of several things differing in number; therefore in any ordering there can be found something intrinsically, individual and singular, of which the species is predicated – or at any rate there can be found something ‘not predicable of many’ (otherwise, if nothing of this sort can be subject, then nothing in this ordering will be a most specific species, in whose idea is contained that it can be predicate).

91. Further third: the lowest that can be a subject and is a subject receives per se the predication of any predicable whatever, just as the first predicable is predicated per se of any predicate in the ordering whatever; but a per accidens being, insofar as it is per accidens, receives the predication per se of nothing; therefore the lowest thing that can be subject cannot be a per accidens being (a per accidens being is an aggregate of things of diverse genera, according to the Philosopher *Metaphysics* 5.6.1015b16-36, ch. ‘On One’).

92. Further fourth: when something is precisely of a nature to belong to something according to some idea, then, whatever it belongs to essentially according to that idea, it

belongs to simply and essentially according to that idea; but to be a universal in the ordering of the genus of substance belongs to something precisely insofar as it is part of that ordering, after removal of everything that is part of another ordering; therefore, what ‘commonness’ essentially belongs to insofar as it is part of the ordering, belongs to it simply and essentially. But however much it is contracted by something of another genus, nothing about it pertaining to its own ordering is taken away; for however much Socrates is determined by white or black (to which he was in potency), Socrates is not more determinately in the genus of substance than he was before, because he was before a ‘this’. Therefore, however much a nature in the genus of substance is posited to be contracted down to individuals by something of another genus, the nature will remain formally common (contracted just as when not contracted) – and therefore to posit that something common becomes an individual by what is of another genus is to posit that it is common and individual or singular at the same time.

93. So as to flee, perhaps, from the arguments of these two ways [nn.82, 89-92], the position about quantity is held in another manner [Giles of Rome, Godfrey of Fontaines]: namely in this manner, that just as the extension of the matter is different in nature from the nature of the quantity of the matter and adds nothing over and above the essence of matter, so the designation of the matter, which the matter has causally through quantity, is different from the designation of the quantity, being naturally prior to the designation that matter has through quantity; and this designation is different from the designation that belongs to quantity, but it is not different from substance – so that, just as matter does not have parts though the nature of quantity (because a part of matter is

matter), so designated substance is only substance (for 'designation' only states a mode of disposition of substance).

94. To the contrary. This position seems to include contradictories in two ways.

First, because it is impossible for anything dependent naturally on a posterior to be the same naturally as a prior, because it would be both prior and not prior; but substance, for them, is prior naturally to quantity; therefore anything pre-requiring, in whatever way, the nature of quantity cannot be the same as substance. So it is not the case that this designation is a designation of substance and yet is caused by quantity.

95. Proof of the major: where there is a true and real identity (even if it is not formal), there it is impossible for the one to be and the other not to be, because then the really same thing would both be and not be; but it is possible for the naturally prior to be without the naturally posterior; therefore, and as a result, much more so without that which remains from, or is caused by, the natural posterior.

96. Further, that which is necessarily a condition of the cause in its causing cannot be possessed by the thing caused, because then the cause – insofar as it is sufficient for causing – would be caused by the caused, and the caused would be the cause of itself and would, to this extent, be able to give to the cause its own causation; but singularity – or singular designation – is a necessary condition in a substance for causing a quantity, because (as argued [n.87]) a caused singular requires a singular cause; therefore it is impossible for the designation of a designated substance or of a singular to be from a singular quantity (or to be from the caused) and not from the substance insofar as the substance is singular.

97. Further, what is it for quantity to leave remaining, or to cause, such a mode of being in a substance? If it is nothing but what was present before in the quantity, then in no way is the designation through quantity, because the designation simply of substance would naturally precede quantity. – But if it is something else, I ask how it is caused by quantity and in what genus of cause? The only genus it seems possible to assign is that of efficient cause; but quantity is not an active form; therefore etc.

98. Further, why does quantity leave such a mode remaining in the substance, the same really as the substance, more than quality does, like whiteness? There seems to be no reason, because just as whiteness itself is a form in the surface and is so without the mediation of any other form that is left remaining, so it seems that quantity is a form in the substance whereby the substance is a quantum and never leaves any other form remaining.

#### d. The Fourth Way: on the Part of Quantity

99. From the fourth way I argue as follows: the quantity by which a substance is a ‘this’, so designated, is either a terminated quantity or a non-terminated quantity. It is not a terminated quantity because this follows the being of the form in the matter and, consequently, the singularity of the substance – because if substance is the cause of quantity as terminated, ‘this substance’ is the cause of the quantity as it is ‘this terminated quantity’. If non-terminated quantity is the cause of this substance being a ‘this’ – on the contrary, this quantity, namely non-terminated quantity, remains the same in a body when

generated and when corrupted; therefore it is not the cause of any designation of terminated quantity.

100. If you say that the consequence does not hold, because quantity is not posited as the cause of singularity save on the presupposition of specific unity, but a body when generated and corrupted is not of the same species – on the contrary: I posit that from water first fire is generated, and second from fire water is generated. There is the same quantity in the first water corrupted and in the second water generated – and not just non-terminated quantity but also terminated quantity, because it can have from the form the same term; or at any rate the same non-terminated quantity suffices, and that, for you, is the cause of singularity, on the presupposition of specific unity. Therefore the first water and the second water are numerically the same ‘this water’ – which seems impossible, because the numerically same individual is not made to return by natural action, from *Physics* 5.4.228a4-6 and *On Generation* 2.11.338b16-18.

101. Further, if quantity is what first individuates substance, then it itself – in itself – must be first ‘this quantity’ and numerically distinct of itself from ‘that quantity’, just as this substance is numerically distinct from that substance; but in that case your proposition is not true, namely that ‘every formal difference is specific difference’; for this quantity and that are forms, therefore they differ specifically.

102. And if you except from this fundamental proposition the quantity of a building going to ruin, how will formal difference be proved to be specific difference [nn.71-73 footnotes]?<sup>55</sup> For any quantity adduced from the form will equally fit the proposition, since a quantity is a form just as also are the other categories.

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<sup>55</sup> Tr. A building going to ruin does not differ from the unruined building in number (it is numerically the same building), but in quantity (its outline differs, for instance). So difference of quantity here

103. And if you say, ‘on the contrary, quantity has of itself a determinate position, and it is by this distinct of itself from that quantity’ – on the contrary: of which position are you speaking? Either of predicamental position (which is one of the categories), and this category is naturally posterior to quantity.<sup>56</sup> Or of position as it is a difference of quantity, insofar as a quantity is said to be made up of parts having position – and then the same question arises as before [n.101], namely why this position of this quantity differs from that position of that quantity; and this question is ‘how this quantity differs numerically from that’, and so it seems that you are assigning the idea to itself; for the fact that the permanent and continuous parts – within the very whole – are in themselves distinct from the permanent and continuous parts in the whole (and these two features, namely continuity and permanence, are included in position as position is a difference of quantity) – this fact is not more known than the fact that this quantity differs in itself from that quantity.

104. Further, all the arguments used against the opinion in the first question, to prove that flesh is not of itself a ‘this’ [nn.7-28], can be used the same to prove that quantity is not of itself a ‘this’; and it is manifest that the idea of line is of itself common to this line and to that, nor is there a greater contradiction in thinking of line under the idea of a universal than in thinking flesh so. And line even has some real unity less than numerical unity, just as flesh also has, on the ground of the same proofs as were set down in the second argument against the opinion of the first question [nn.8-28]. It is plain too

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cannot cause numerical difference, and so not specific difference either; but the quantity of something, however taken (its outline as in ruins or as unruined), is a form of the thing, namely an accidental form; therefore difference in form does not always cause difference in species. Aquinas and Godfrey [as quoted here and earlier by the Vatican editors] speak of two numerically differing lines as being two by difference of position, which is a difference of form.

<sup>56</sup> The ten categories follow in order of prior and posterior: substance, quantity, quality, relation, action, passion, position, having, where, when. Peter of Spain *Logical Summaries* tr.2 n.6.

that line and surface are of the same idea in this water and in that; why then is this water ‘this water’ and a singular? And I am not speaking of a vague and indeterminate singularity but of a designated and determinate one.

#### e. Against the Reasons for the Opinion

105. Against the reasons for the opinion [nn.72-73] I argue thus:

First against the first opinion [n.72], because quantity is not the reason for divisibility in individuals:

For whatever is the formal idea for any divisibility is formally in that which is divisible by this division; but quantity is not formally in a species as it is divisible into subjective parts; therefore it is not the formal idea for the divisibility of such a whole into such parts.

106. There is a confirmation for this argument, that a universal whole, which is divided into individuals and subjective parts, is predicated of any of those subjective parts (so that any subjective part is that universal [sc. as ‘animal’ is predicated of ‘horse’ and ‘man’ and of ‘this horse’ and ‘this man’]) – but quantitative parts, into which the division of a continuous whole is made, never receive the predication of the whole that is divided into them. And even if the division of a homogeneous whole into quantitative parts and the division of a species (or of a universal whole) go together, yet they are not divisions of the same divided whole, because a quantitative whole is divided by quantitative division and is not predicated of any of the parts dividing it, just as neither is a heterogeneous quantum predicated of the parts that divide it; for, universally, no

quantitative part is the whole of which it is the part; but there goes, along with this, also the fact that there are many individuals possessing the same common being, and this common being is divided into individuals by another division; and the common being was not the quantum that was divided by quantitative division. There is then a different whole that is divided by this division and by that; and it is divided per accidens into the same parts, but formally into parts of different ideas, in respect of this [universal] whole and of that [quantitative] whole – because with respect to the latter the parts are integral parts, and with respect to the former they are subjective parts.<sup>57</sup>

107. And as for what is taken from the Philosopher [n.72], one must say that the Philosopher does not say that a quantity is divided into parts of the same idea, but that “a quantity is divisible into the things present in it, an individual of which, or each of which, is of a nature to be a thing and this thing.” He says ‘into the things present in it’ as the things that compose the whole they are in, and so not into subjective parts, which are not in it in this way; ‘each of which’ (if the division is into two) or ‘an individual of which’ (if the division is into several) ‘is of a nature to be a thing’, namely per se existing in the way that the whole is (because to the extent a thing is a quantitative part dividing the whole, to that extent it can per se exist just like the whole does that is divided), and this against the division of a composite into matter and form; ‘and this thing’ – against the division of a genus into its species. And if a number were composed of diverse numbers, it would not be against the idea of number for it to be divided into numbers of different idea [sc. if 6 were composed of 2 and 4, which are of different idea]; and in the same way it would not be against the arm for it to be divided into parts of different idea if it were

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<sup>57</sup> Tr. Say, for example, that a line of 12 inches is divided into parts of 2 inches; each 2 inch part of the line is a line, or has the same universal whole (‘line’) predicated of it, but no part of the line is the whole quantity of the 12 inch line.



composed of two cubits or three cubits – and these are different in species; so too it would not be against a quantity for the division of its subject to be into parts of different idea.

108. I concede the fact universally, then, that although a whole does not require to be divided into parts of the same idea, yet it does not require the parts to be of a distinct idea, because, insofar as the parts are parts of a quantity, they are not of a different idea; for although head, heart, and hand are quantitative parts and of different ideas, yet they are not parts of a different idea insofar precisely as they are parts of a quantity.

109. In the way, then, that it is true that a quantity may be divided into parts of the same idea (although this cannot be got from the Philosopher [n.107]), this is altogether not to the purpose, because the division is not into parts which include the idea of the divided thing, but into parts which were present in the divided thing – and they do have one idea, not the idea of the divided thing, but of something common to it and to themselves [sc. the idea of 12 inches is not included in the idea of its 2 inch divisions, but only the idea of length is common to them all]; but a species is divided into parts of the same idea, namely because they include the idea of the divided thing [sc. as ‘this man’ and ‘that man’ both include ‘man’] and not something else that is of a different idea, common to the divided thing and the things that divide it.

110. Further, I argue against the second argument [n.73]: the generator qua generator (with everything else removed) is distinguished from the generated qua generated (with everything else removed from the generated), because it is unintelligible for the same thing to generate itself (even in divine reality a person does not generate himself); but the generator qua generator does not include quantity as it includes its

proper generative principle; nor does the generated qua generated include quantity as the per se or formal term of generation; therefore when both quantities are removed, namely the quantities of generator and generated, the latter substance is distinguished numerically from the former.

## B. Scotus' own Conclusion

111. Therefore, I concede the conclusions of all these arguments [nn.76-110], namely that it is impossible for substance to be individual through any accident, that is, impossible for substance to be divided into subjective parts [sc. into individuals] through something accidental to it and thereby have being 'non-this' repugnant to it.

## II. To the Arguments for the Opinion of Others

112. As to the first argument for the opinion [n.72], it is plain from the fifth article [nn.105-109] how badly the minor is taken [sc. 'to be divisible into parts of the same idea belongs to something by reason of quantity'], and that it cannot be got from the Philosopher [n.107]; and in the way in which the minor can be held to be true, it is not relevant to the division of a whole into quantitative parts [n.109].

113. When further too the premise is taken that 'by the same thing is something divisible and distinguished into the parts that divide it' [n.72: 'quantity is the principle of division in any nature and the principle of distinction between divided things'] – this is false, for a common nature is divisible of itself into individuals, and the divisions of it are

not distinguished by reason of the nature but by their own distinguishing differences; for thus does it appear in a genus, that a genus is divisible of itself into several genera and several species, and yet the genus is not the reason for the distinction of species but the differences are that constitute the species.

114. As to the second argument [n.73], it is plain how from it can be concluded that the same thing would generate itself [n.110]. But as to the form of the argument, I say that both premises are false: for although ‘a different form is in a different matter’ [n.73, ‘form does not differ from form save because it is received in different parts of matter’], yet it is not a different form because of difference of matter, but just as a form’s entity is prior so also is its difference; likewise the other premise – namely that ‘there is a different part of matter because there is a different part of quantity’ [n.73, ‘nor does one part of matter differ from another save because it is under a different part of quantity’] – is false, because, whether the distinction of parts of matter in themselves is quantitative or not, the distinction of parts of matter is prior to the distinction of quantity (for the subject of such an accident is a ‘this something’).

115. As for the proof, when it is said that ‘the generator does not generate save from a matter quantified by a different quantity’ [n.74, ‘a generator does not generate another save because of distinctness of matter etc.’] – whether this is so or not (about which elsewhere [n.208]), at any rate, in the case of parts of matter that are distinct in form of quantity, I say that unity is a metaphysical property [n.128], so that unity of matter naturally precedes any idea of quantity; for an idea of quantity does naturally precede such a natural generator, because the generator requires, externally, a matter of its own from which it generates, and it requires the quantity as a concomitant distinction

of matter from matter. And yet what needs to be proved is that the quantity was the proper idea of such unity, that is, of singularity in the substance, and what is proved is that it is the idea *sine qua non* in respect of the ultimate thing [sc. the thing generated]; hence there is no place for the consequence.<sup>58</sup>

116. If the objection be raised that at least from the confirmation [n.74] one will get the result that quantity naturally precedes the individuation of substance (which is contrary to the conclusion of the second way rejecting the opinion [nn.82-83]) – for if the generator first requires a quantified matter before it may generate, then the quantity of the matter is naturally presupposed to the individuation of the thing generated – I reply and say that the quantity of the thing corrupted and all the accidents of the thing corrupted are presupposed, in the order of duration, to the individuation of the thing generated, because the thing corrupted with all its parts pre-exists; but herefrom nothing follows as to the minor, that there be a natural priority of quantity to the individuation of the thing generated [n.74, ‘the quantity of the thing generated naturally precedes the being of the thing generated’], or follows as to the individuation of the substance in which the quantity is – for the accidents of the thing corrupted, which precede in time the thing generated, follow the substance in which they are (and follow it even as it is singular),

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<sup>58</sup> Tr. The contention seems to be that in the argument [in n.74]: ‘the generator does not generate save from a matter quantified by a different quantity; therefore quantity is the idea of distinction in the generator’ the conclusion does not follow. What follows rather is that a difference of quantity in the matter on which the generator works is required for the generator to be able to work on it. So all that follows is that such difference of quantity in the matter worked on is the *sine qua non* of the generator’s generating. It does not follow that the difference of the quantities in the matter of the thing worked on and in the matter of the generator working on it is what formally makes the generator’s own quantity to be ‘this quantity’. For it could still well be, as for as this argument goes, that ‘this quantity’ is a ‘this’ because it is the quantity of ‘this substance’. So the argument in n.74 does not prove, as it needs to, that the ‘this’ of ‘this substance’ is the result of the quantity’s being a ‘this’ and not, as Scotus contends, the cause of it.

and in the same way do the accidents of the thing generated follow the substance of the thing generated.

117. But the argument [n.74] is taken still further back [by Godfrey], that ‘quantity – as it is in the thing corrupted – not only precedes the thing generated, but naturally precedes in the thing generated the form of the thing generated’. The proof is that, otherwise, in the instant in which the generator introduces the form, it would introduce it not into a quantum, and this seems contrary to the proposition that ‘a particular agent does not reach the substance of the matter but reaches the matter precisely insofar as it is a quantum’ [n.74, ‘a natural agent cannot act on a non-quantum’]; it seems likewise contrary to Averroes in his treatise *On the Substance of the Globe* ch.1, where he seems to hold that the quantity remains the same in the thing generated and in the thing corrupted, otherwise the generator would generate body from non-body.

118. Against this I argue as follows:

And first indeed it seems that this argument [n.117] should not be adduced for this opinion [n.71], because he [Godfrey] who seems to be the founder of this position seems to hold what is here adduced against it [n.117]. For he holds [*Quodlibet* 11 q.3, 7 q.5, 6 q.5, 2 q.7] that, since quantity is not the first act of matter, no form of corporeity remains the same in the thing generated and in the thing corrupted (he says, when speaking of corporeity in the genus of substance, that no quantity remains the same in number in the former and in the latter); and also, since he posits that quantity perfects the composite substance (and not the matter) immediately as subject, he should posit that the different quantity of the thing generated is naturally posterior to the thing generated, just as he should also posit that the quantity of the thing corrupted is naturally posterior to the thing

corrupted – and thus the deduction about the priority of the quantity to the substance or the form of the thing generated (whatever may be true of Averroes) does not belong to the opinion of the one who posits that opinion [n.71]. This as to the man [Godfrey]. But as to the conclusion in itself, I say with him (as far as these matters are concerned) that if no form of corporeity remains the same formally in the fire and in the water, then altogether no accident – which requires a composite substance as subject – can remain the same in number, but each will be either in the thing corrupted as subject or in the thing generated as subject; and so quantity, and any other accident, will be naturally posterior to substance – and thus the quantity of the thing corrupted, and any other accident of it, was naturally posterior to the substance corrupted.

119. And then about that proposition [n.117, ‘a particular agent does not reach the substance of the matter but reaches the matter precisely insofar as it is a quantum’] I do not much care, because it seems impossible; for to be an agent that reaches the thing acted on in its idea as acted on seems to be nothing other than to introduce into it the act by which it is perfected; but the particular agent introduces a substantial form whereby the matter as matter is perfected – and not matter as a quantum, such that quantity is the ‘mediating idea’ between the agent and the thing acted on; therefore a natural agent reaches the matter in its bare essence as the acted on thing that is immediately changed by the agent.

120. As to Averroes [n.117], I say that a body could be generated from what was once a non-body, but perhaps a natural agent could not generate a body from a non-body as from a thing corrupted; but from what was a body up to the instant of generation, and this by the quantity inhering in it, a natural agent can in that instant generate something

else that is a quantum with a different quantity; because, just as it can generate a substance that was not present before, so it can produce all the accidents consequent to that substance.

121. And if you say that, although it does not produce a body from a non-body as from a thing corrupted, yet it will from matter as from a non-quantum produce another body that is a quantum – I say that a composite must come to be or be produced from a non-composite as from a part, or there will be a process to infinity; and so, from matter according to its substance absolutely as from a part, a body can be produced that is a composite substance, and the substance as quantum is a concomitant, because quantity is a property of the composite substance (this response denies that an indeterminate dimension numerically the same remains in the thing generated and in the thing corrupted, about which elsewhere if occasion arise [*Ord.* 4 d.11 p.1 princ.1 q.2 nn.6-7, princ.2 q.1 nn.18-21 and 50]; but it has been touched on now because of the arguments [nn.118-121]).

### III. To the Principal Arguments

122. To the first principal argument, from Boethius [n.67], I concede that variety of accidents makes a numerical difference in a substance in the way that the form is said to make a difference, because all distinct forms thus make some difference in the things they are in; but accidents cannot make a specific difference in the substance they are in (from *Metaphysics* 10.9.1058a29-b25); so they do make a difference in substances and that a numerical one; but they do not make the first difference (but there is another, prior,

numerical difference), nor do they alone make the numerical difference. And the authority [from Boethius] says neither of these two things, and unless one of them is got from it the conclusion intended is not got from it.

123. But what about Boethius' intention?

I say that Boethius intends to prove that there is no numerical difference in the divine persons. And although at the beginning of his little book *On the Trinity* such propositions could be got scattered about, yet he seems to argue as follows: 'a variety of accidents makes a difference in number; but in the divine persons there is no such variety of accidents, because a simple form cannot be a subject; therefore there is in them no numerical difference'.

124. The argument, it seems, unless Boethius meant that only accidents could make a numerical distinction, is not valid; for if a numerical distinction could exist through something else, then the negation of numerical distinction would not follow from the negation of accident. I say that a distinction of accidents is concomitant to every numerical distinction, and so there can be no numerical distinction where there can be no variety of accidents; and on this basis the argument of Boethius can hold up, because since there cannot be any accident in divine reality (nor any variety of accidents), there cannot be there a numerical distinction or difference – not as from the denial precisely of the cause there follows the denial of that of which it is the cause, but as from the denial of a necessary concomitant there follows the negation of that which it is necessarily concomitant to.

125. But how, relative to this intention, is it true that a variety of accidents makes a numerical difference?



I say that it makes some difference but not the first difference, and some difference that necessarily follows every difference; and thus does the statement ‘they make a numerical difference’ have to be understood. Nor does this gloss seem to be forced from the words, but the words themselves make it to be understood so, since they [sc. Godfrey and his followers who quote Boethius, n.67] must necessarily expound what he himself subjoins there about place. For place is not the first thing that distinguishes individuals from each other, either when speaking of place as it is the property of the containing thing or when speaking of place as it is the property of the thing contained (namely the ‘where’ that remains in the thing contained). So if they must expound ‘place’ as ‘quantity’ (according to their opinion [n.71]), what is wrong with expounding ‘make a difference’ as ‘make not the first difference but some difference and it is concomitant to the first’?

126. To the second argument, from Damascene [n.68], the response is plain from himself at the end of the chapter, where he expounds how he there understands ‘accident’. He speaks thus: “Whatever is a hypostasis in some of the things that are of one species, but in others of them is not, is an accident and added from without.” I concede therefore that whatever is outside the idea per se of a specific nature itself, and is not a per se consequent of that nature, is accidental to such nature; and in this way whatever is posited to be the individuating principle is an accident; but it is not properly an accident the way others understand this [n.128].

127. And indeed that Damascene himself does not understand accident properly is plain from what he says in *On the Orthodox Faith* ch.8: “For we mean that Peter and Paul are of the same idea.” Later, “Hypostases have in themselves several things that separate

them; they are divided in mind and in strength and in form (that is, in figure) and in habit and in complexion and in dignity and in invention and in all characteristic properties;” and he notably adds to ‘in all characteristic properties’, “to the extent that these do not exist in themselves in relation to each other but exist separately; hence they are called two men and three men and many men. And so on in every case.” – Note well: he says that, rather than by characteristic properties, all created hypostases whatever differ by ‘not existing in relation to each other but separately’; and this is said by way of an opposition in the same place, “the holy hypostases of the Trinity are in relation to each other”, the reason for which is unity of nature, personal distinction being presupposed (*Ord.* 1 d.2 nn.376-87). Division of nature, then, in created suppositis is the first and greatest reason for distinction.

128. To the third argument, from Avicenna [n.69], I say that he is most principally considering quiddity insofar as it includes nothing that does not pertain to its per se idea, and in this way horseness is ‘just horseness, and is neither one nor many’. To whatever extent its unity is not something else added but is a necessary consequent of the entity (just as every being, according to any entity whatever, has also its own unity consequent to it), that unity is nevertheless not within the formal idea of the quiddity (as the quiddity is quiddity), but is a sort of property consequent to quiddity [nn.31, 34] – and everything of this sort is called by Avicenna an ‘accident’. And in this way too the Philosopher (who named the ‘fallacy of the accident’) sometimes takes accident for everything that is outside the formal idea of another (for everything such, in comparison to the other, is extraneous to that other); and in this way does a fallacy of the accident come about, and in this way too is genus accidental to difference; and whatever is the individuating

principle is an accident of the specific nature, but not in the way they [Godfrey and others] understand accident. And so there is here an equivocation over the term ‘accident’.

## Question Five

### *Whether Material Substance is a This and Individual through Matter*

129. Fifth I ask whether material substance is a ‘this’ and individual through matter.

130. That it is:

Because according to the Philosopher *Metaphysics* 5.6.1016b32-33, ch. ‘On One’, “Things whose matter is one are in number one;” therefore etc.

131. On the contrary:

*Metaphysics* 5.4.1014b26-32 (in the ancient translation), “in the foundation of nature there is nothing distinct.” But what is not distinct or diverse in itself cannot be the first reason for the diversity or distinction in another; but matter is the altogether indistinct and indeterminate foundation of nature; therefore it cannot be the first reason for distinction or diversity in another.

## I. The Opinion of Others

132. [Exposition of the opinion] – Here an affirmative answer is given [Aquinas, Giles, Godfrey], and it is above all held because of the many authorities from Aristotle that seem to have this meaning.

One of these is *Metaphysics* 7.8.1034a4-8, that the generator generates another because of matter: “Callias and Socrates,” he says, “are diverse because of matter (for they are diverse), but the same in species, for they are individuals of a species.”

133. Again because of 7.11.1037a37-b5, ch. ‘On the Parts of Definition’: “The whatness and the individual are in some substances the same thing, but as to things that are in matter or taken along with matter they are not the same thing;” and 8.3.1043b2-4 seems the same, “For soul and being a soul are the same; man and being a man are not the same, unless being a soul is called man.” Therefore it seems that matter is outside the idea of quiddity and of whatever first has quiddity, and so, since matter is something in beings, it seems to be part of the individual, or the individuation of the whole; but whatever there is in an individual that is repugnant altogether to the idea of quiddity, this can be posited as the first reason for individuating; therefore etc.

134. Further 12.8.1074a31-38 proves that there cannot be several heavens: “For if,” he says, “there were several heavens as there are several men, the principle as concerns each would be one in species but many in number; but,” he says, “all things that are many in number have matter; now the whatness does not have matter first (for it is actuality); therefore the first, immovable mover is one in idea and in number.” This reasoning – whereby the unity of the heaven is proved from the unity of the mover, and the unity of the mover is not only unity in species but in number, because of the fact the

mover does not have matter – would not seem valid unless distinction in number were made by matter; therefore etc.

135. Further *On the Heaven* 1.9.278a10-15: “When I say ‘heaven’ I state the form; when I say ‘this heaven’ I state the matter.”

136. [Rejection of the opinion] – Against this [n.132], and first through authorities of the same Aristotle:

According to the Philosopher *Metaphysics* 7.11.1037a5-10, ch. ‘On the Parts of Definition’: “It is clear that soul is substance first and that body is matter; but man or animal – which are from both soul and matter – as universals, and Socrates and Coriscus (supply: from both soul and matter) as singulars; since soul is said in the two ways.” And afterwards he adds: “But if soul is a ‘this’ and body a ‘this’, then as universal and singular.”

137. And previously, in the same place on the parts of definition, 10.1035b27-31: “Man and horse and what thus exist in singulars are not substance universally,” that is, form, “but together a certain whole,” that is, the composite, “made from this matter and this nature” (where he means by the ‘this’ not uniform and singular matter but determinate matter, otherwise he would contradict himself; hence he adds in the same place, “universally”). And he adds later: “From ultimate matter there is now Socrates etc.”

138. The same is also plain from the same Philosopher in 12.5.1071a27-29 where he maintains that the principles are the same just as are the things that come from the principles: “And of those in the same species,” he says, “the principles are diverse, not diverse in species, but because they are principles of singulars; your matter and mover

and species are one thing and mine another, but yet the same in universal idea.” So in this way he admits a distinction of form as of matter in the particular, and in this way a unity of matter in general as of form; and therefore the question whereby matter is a ‘this’ must still be asked.

139. Further, as is proved from many places of *Metaphysics* 7 on the parts of definition: matter is of the essence of the composite substance, namely of man, and such a composite is not precisely the essence of the form. Therefore, just as the composite cannot be of itself a ‘this’ (from the first question, n.29), so neither will the matter – which is part of the composite – be of itself a ‘this’, because there cannot be a composite that is common and of the same idea in diverse things unless whatever is of the essence of the composite can be of the same idea in those diverse things.

140. Further, by reason: matter is the same in the thing generated as in the thing corrupted; therefore it has the same singularity in the thing generated and in the thing corrupted.

141. And if you reply that the matter is not of the same species in the thing generated and in the thing corrupted, I argue as before against non-terminated quantity [n.100], and thus generation will be circular: first of fire from water, second of water from fire; the water corrupted first and the water generated second have the same matter and are of the same species; therefore they are really ‘this water’; therefore the first naturally returns the same in number, which is against what they hold [sc. that matter is the principle of individuation, nn.132].

## Question Six

*Whether Material Substance is Individual through Some Entity per se Determining*

*Nature to Singularity*

142. Because the solution to the authorities from the Philosopher for the opposite [nn.130, 132-135] require a solution to the sixth question, namely through what a material substance is made completely individual, therefore I ask sixth whether material substance is individual through some entity per se determining nature to singularity.

143. That it is not:

Because then the determinant would be disposed to nature as act to potency; so there would truly and properly be a single composite from the specific nature and the determinant, which is unacceptable; for the determinant would be either matter or form or something composed of them, and whichever is taken the result would be unacceptable; for then there would be in the composite another matter beside the matter that is part of the nature, or another form beside the form posited as part of the nature, or another composite beside that which is composed of the nature.

144. Further, the singular composed of the nature and the per se determinant would then be per se one, and so per se intelligible; and this seems against the Philosopher, *On the Soul* 2.5.417b22-23 and *Metaphysics* 7.10.1035b33-6a8, where he seems openly to maintain that understanding is of the universal, and sense and sensation of the singular.

145. Further, if the singular were per se intelligible, there could be demonstration and science of it, and so there would be a science proper of singulars as they are singulars, which the Philosopher denies, *Metaphysics* 7.10.1035b33-6a8, 15.1039b26-40a5, ch. ‘On Parts of Definition’.

146. Again, if the singular included the specific nature and the per se determinant, it could be per se defined through those two (included per se in its idea), and so there would be one definition of the individual and another of the species – the former making addition to the definition of the species at least in the way the definition of the species makes addition to the definition of the genus.

147. For the opposite side:

Every [logical] inferior includes per se something that is not included in the understanding of the [logical] superior, otherwise the concept of the inferior would be as common as the concept of the superior, and then the per se inferior would not be per se inferior because it would not be under the common and superior; therefore something is per se included in the idea of the individual that is not included in the idea of the nature. But the included something is a positive entity, from the solution to the second question [n.57], and makes with the nature something per se one, from the solution to the fourth question [n.111]; therefore it is a per se determinant of the nature to singularity, or to the idea of the inferior.

#### A. To the Question

##### 1. The Opinion of Others

###### a. Exposition of the Opinion



148. Here it is maintained [by Godfrey of Fontaines] that the specific nature is of itself a ‘this’, and yet it can, through quantity, be the nature common to several singulars, or quantity can be the reason that several singulars can exist in the nature.<sup>59</sup>

149. The first point [sc. specific nature is of itself a ‘this’] is made clear thus: the most specific species is of itself an atomic unit; therefore it is indivisible.

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<sup>59</sup> Godfrey, *Quodlibet* 7 q.5: “For just as the universal that is genus cannot be divided into several things differing in species save by the addition of something pertaining to the idea of the species...so too it seems that the universal that is species cannot be divided into several individuals unless each individual adds something over and above the idea of the species, which idea of the species – as concerns itself – is one in all individuals... But it does not seem that something can be understood to be added that pertains to the essence and nature of the individual, because the species, which is the whole being of individuals, states the whole of that essence; therefore if something is added, it seems to be something pertaining to accidental nature... For in direct descent under a category, the division stops at the most specific species, in that this species includes the ultimate difference below which one cannot take a more determinate difference whereby the species could be made more determinate in the individual (the way this happens in a species in respect of a genus), unless there is to be a regress to infinity; and so, as Plato says [*Politicus Latinus* I 596], one must rest at singulars – namely in this way, that one is not to posit in singulars something formal pertaining to essence or quiddity beyond what is included in the idea and quiddity of the species. Therefore, if anything is added whereby a nature universal in itself is to be thus determined and contracted, it must be something pertaining to accidental nature [sc. to the nature of quantity], as was said.” *Ibid.*: “But since material substance is in itself not divided into several things of the same idea or species...therefore, just as it is a ‘how much’ that comes per accidens, so it is divided per accidens into several things of the same idea, namely divided through quantity. Now that seems to be properly called one ‘according to number’ which is one in number or one by number; but number is properly caused by division according to quantity; therefore that seems to be properly called ‘one in number’ which is undivided first in that nature by which it is distinguished first from another of the same species; but this nature is quantity, and so a ‘one in number’ seems properly to be something undivided in the nature of quantity. Therefore, quantity is the per se principle of a one according to number, just as form...is the principle of individuation; and thus, properly speaking, there is not the same principle for per se individuation in the genus of material substance and for a one according to number, because the principle of a one according to number is quantity, in that according to quantity it is undivided in itself and divided from another of the same idea...; but the principle of per se individuation is the form, by which substance is divided into several things of the same idea... And accordingly it seems one should say that the formal principle (or the formal idea) of this sort of distinction...is each individual’s substantial form undivided in itself and divided from another, and thus do they differ in substantial number... The principle...of ‘distinction according substance’ of several individuals is quantity, since it is the principle of division both of the matter and also of the form in divided matter; for if there were not pre-understood in matter a quantity that would make the matter divisible, the matter could not receive several forms... Hence, because of this, there are several entities according as there are quanta, or according to division of quantity...; for, by the fact that quantity makes the substance to be really extended, it happens that the substance...also has parts really and essentially differing from each other.”

150. And there is confirmation from the remark of Porphyry [*Book of Predicables* ch.2 2b14-16], “When we descend from the most general to the most specific, Plato [*Politicus Latinus* I 596] bids us come to a rest;” but if it were possible for there to be a further division of this nature, one should not rest at the nature; therefore etc.

151. Likewise Boethius in his book *Of Divisions*, when he is enumerating all the divisions not only per se but also per accidens, does not enumerate a division of the species into individuals; therefore the specific nature is not a ‘this’ through something else.

152. Again, if there were some reality in an individual beside the sole reality of the specific nature, the species would not state ‘the whole being of individuals’ – which is against Porphyry [*Predicables* ch.2 3a5-9].

153. The second point [n.148] is made clear by the fact that quantity, although it is not the formal idea of the division of anything into subjective parts, yet, when a quantitative whole is divided into quantitative parts, it is divided per se into things that are of the same idea; now the principle of a division into something is the same as the principle of distinction of the very dividers; therefore, just as quantity itself is the principle of the division, so it is the principle of the distinction of the dividers. But these dividers are the subjective parts of the common nature; therefore quantity is the principle of the distinction of such parts.

154. Now how these two points [n.148] can stand together can be made plain through an example, because, according to the Philosopher *Physics* 1.2.185a32-b5, ‘substance is of itself indivisible into parts’, speaking of parts of the same idea – and yet, when quantity is added, substance is divisible into such parts, indeed it then has such

parts. In this way, then, can a nature of a species be of itself a 'this' and yet, though a nature coming to it from without, be this here and this there.

#### b. Rejection of the Opinion

155. This position [n148] seems it can be understood in two ways:

One such way is that material substance, to the extent it is essentially distinguished from quantity, remains the same, wholly non-distinct by reason of its proper and essential entity, and yet receives many quantities and, when receiving them, constitutes along with them many wholes at the same time; that is to say, in plain words, that the same material substance, being in itself neither divided nor distinct, is informed with many quantities, and thereby are there many individuals in a species.

156. The position can be understood in another way, that the material substance, which of itself, with all quantity removed, would be a 'this', will, when a quantity informing it is posited, be this substance and that, such that it not only receives distinct quantities but also has distinctness in itself, in its proper substantial entity; so that the substance, which is subject of the quantity and is distinct from the quantity essentially, is not the substance which is subject of another quantity and distinct from this other quantity essentially, although however the fact that it is this substance and not that cannot be without quantity in this substance and in that.

157. The first way of understanding [n.155] seems impossible, because from it there follow things that are unacceptable in theology, metaphysics, and natural science.

158. In theology indeed this unacceptable thing follows, that to be ‘this’ is not a property of the infinite divine essence, namely that the divine essence, existing as single, indistinct in itself, can be in several distinct supposits – but this is commonly understood only of persons distinct just in relation; here, however, what is posited is that a single substantial nature, in no way distinct in itself, would have several supposits distinct with absolute reality.

159. Second, it follows that some substance of wine cannot be transubstantiated into the body and blood [of Christ] unless the whole substance of wine is transubstantiated, because the wine is only transubstantiated as to its substance, for its quantity remains the same, and for you [n.148, specific nature is of itself a ‘this’] the substance in this wine is the same as the substance in that wine; but the same thing is not both transubstantiated and not transubstantiated; therefore etc.

160. In metaphysics the unacceptable things that follow are:

First, that the Idea posited by Plato would be posited. For Plato posited that the Idea is a per se existing substance, a separate nature, without accidents (as is imputed to him by the Philosopher), in which would be the whole nature of the species, and this nature, according to what Aristotle imputed to Plato, would be said of any individual by a formal predication stating ‘this is this’ [n.41]; but this opinion has posited that ‘this substance’ is said of anything of this species by a predication stating ‘this is this’, and yet that it is under this accident and under that accident [n.143]. This opinion, therefore, posits as much commonness as Plato posited in the Ideas.

161. Second, because for them [Godfrey and his followers] two accidents of the same species cannot be in the same subject (provided they were absolute accidents [sc.

accidents of quantity or quality]), because a manifest contradiction according to them would follow, namely that the same thing would be in act and in potency in the same respect;<sup>60</sup> however the opposite hereby follows, that the same nature is in act in respect of many acts of the same species.

162. Accordingly one could infer another impossibility, a mathematical one (insofar as a quantum pertains to the consideration of a mathematician), namely that two dimensive quantities of the same idea would perfect the same subject at the same time, and this is contrary to the proper nature of dimensive quantities of the same idea, speaking according to the intention of a mathematician.

163. Third, in natural science there follow two unacceptable things:

First, that no material substance can be generated and corrupted. Not generated indeed, because if there is a ‘this stone’, all the substance will be in it that there can be in any stone; however, this substance of stone can acquire a quantity of this much and a quantity of that much, different in number; but the acquisition of a new quantity is not generation (as is plain from the terms of this generation); therefore etc. Likewise, while this stone remains, the specific nature of stone remains in it; but every nature of stone is ‘this nature’; therefore, while this nature remains, every nature remains; therefore a material substance cannot be corrupted while the stone remains, although the quality – or the quantity – is not the same.

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<sup>60</sup> Godfrey, *Quodlibet* 6 q.5, “One must say that, just as several accidents of the same species cannot be at the same time in the same subject, so also one accident cannot, by any agent, be at the same time in two subjects... For accidents that have in themselves no distinction do not acquire distinction, but unity, from being in the same subject; hence, just as two points cannot be at the same time in the same subject (but they become one point), nor two lines, so neither can two whitenesses... Therefore it is impossible for two accidents of the same idea and species to become one in a subject and to remain two and distinct.”

164. Second, it follows that, although one could, according to the invention of that cursed Averroes about the unity of the intellect in everyone, make a like invention about your body and mine as about this stone and that; nevertheless, holding that different intellective souls, according not only to the faith but also to philosophy, are necessary, it cannot be that human nature is of itself atomic or undivided and yet is made different by quantity, because in this man and in that man there is a different substantial form, different by a difference naturally preceding quantity. And therefore they do not try to respond to this objection – as being insoluble – but betake themselves to different things, ‘homogeneous’ ones, stone or water; and yet, if they had anything in their favor from the idea of atomic specific nature, they would conclude about man as they conclude about stone. They are therefore able to see that the principles from which they proceed, since manifest impossibilities follow from them, are no principles.

165. The second way of understanding the position [n.156] seems to destroy itself, because what is of itself a ‘this’, in the way that ‘something is of itself a this’ was expounded before (that is, something for which it is repugnant per se to be divided into several subjective parts and for which it is repugnant to be not-this [nn.48, 76]) – such a thing cannot be divided into several parts by something coming to it from outside, because if its being divided is repugnant to it of itself, then its receiving something by which it may become not-this is repugnant to it of itself. Therefore, to say that a nature is of itself a ‘this’ (according to the understanding expounded before about a nature that is of itself a ‘this’ [n.155-56]), and yet that it can be this or that through something coming to it from outside, is to state contradictories.

166. And this is plain from the example set down in the position [n.154], that, although a material substance is not of itself divided into parts of the same idea, yet it is of itself not indivisible into such parts – because if it were of itself indivisible (that is, if division were repugnant to it), it could not receive the quantity by which it is formally divided into such parts; the fact is clear, for a soul – or an angel (which is of itself indivisible in this way) – cannot receive quantity, just as it cannot receive parts.

167. There seems then to be a deception in this consequence, ‘it is not of itself such, therefore it is of itself not-such’ (fallacy of the consequent). For substance, according to one position, is not of itself a haver of parts of the same idea, and yet it is not of itself a non-haver of parts of the same idea, such that having parts is repugnant to it; because then it could not receive such parts formally through ‘something coming to it from outside’. And so the nature of a most specific species is not of itself a ‘this’, just as neither is anything of itself a ‘this’ that is in its nature divisible; but it is not of itself not-this, such that being divided into several parts is of itself repugnant to it, because then it could not receive anything by which such a division would formally belong to it.

## 2. Scotus’ own Opinion

168. I respond then affirmatively to the question [sc. the sixth question, n.142].

169. For which purpose I bring forward the following sort of reason: just as unity in general per se follows entity in general, so any unity per se follows some entity; therefore if unity simply (of which sort is the unity of the individual frequently described before [nn.48, 76, 165], namely that to which division into several subjective parts is

repugnant and to which not being this designated thing is repugnant) exists in things (as every opinion supposes), then it follows per se some per se entity; but it does not follow per se the entity of nature, because it has some unity proper to itself and per se, a real unity, as was proved in the solution to the first question [n.30]; therefore it follows some other entity and determines this entity, and it will make a one per se with the entity of nature, because the whole of which it is this unity is perfect of itself.

170. Any difference of differences is ultimately reduced to things that are primarily diverse (otherwise there would be no stop to differences); but individuals differ properly, because they are diverse 'identical thing beings' [1 d.3 n.132]; therefore their difference is reduced to what is primarily diverse. But what is primarily diverse is not the nature in this thing and in that thing, because that by which things formally agree is not the same as that by which they really differ, although the same thing can be distinct really and agree really; for to be distinct and to be that by which something is first distinct differ a great deal (so it will be like this in the case of unity). Therefore, beside the nature in this thing and in that, there are some primarily diverse things by which this thing and that thing differ (this in this thing and that in that thing); and these primarily diverse things cannot be negations, from the second question [n.57], nor accidents, from the fourth question [n.111]; therefore they will be some positive entities per se determining nature.

171. An objection against the first argument here [n.169] is that if there is some real unity less than numerical unity, it is the unity of something either in what is numerically the same or in something other. Not in what is numerically the same, because everything in what is numerically the same is one in number; nor in two things, because



nothing in them is really one, for that is proper to the divine supposito (the way the saying of Damascene was explained above, n.39).

172. I reply: just as in the solution to the first question (about this issue, nn.32, 34) it was said that nature is naturally prior to this nature, so too the proper unity consequent to nature as nature is naturally prior to the unity of it as this nature; and it is under this idea that nature is considered in metaphysics, that the definition of it is assigned, and that propositions about it are in the first mode per se [n.32]. There is, then, in the identical thing that is one in number some entity which unity less than numerical unity follows, and it is real; and that of which it is such unity is one of itself with numerical unity. I concede therefore that the real unity is not of something existing in two individuals but in one.

173. And when you object that ‘everything in what is numerically the same is one in number’ [n.171], I make my reply first in some other similar and more manifest case: everything that is in one species is one in species; the color therefore in whiteness is one in species; the conclusion ‘therefore it does not have a unity less than the unity of the species’ does not follow. For as was said elsewhere (namely 1 d.8 n.214 in the question about the attributes, before the solution of the principle argument about attributes, when solving the first doubt), that ‘something can be said to be animate either denominatively, as body, or per se in the first mode, as man’ (and thus a surface is said to be white denominatively, and a white surface is said to be white per se in the first mode because the subject includes the predicate) – so I say that a potential which is contracted by an actual is informed by that actual, and thereby it is informed by the unity consequent to that actuality or to that act; and so it is one by the unity proper to that actual, but it is thus

one denominatively (and it is not of itself thus one, neither in the first mode nor through any essential part).

174. The color in whiteness, therefore, is one in species, but it is not so of itself either per se or first but only denominatively; now the specific difference is first one, because being divided into things several in species is first repugnant to it; whiteness is one in species per se, but not first, because it is so through something intrinsic to it (as through the difference).

175. I concede therefore that everything in this stone is one in number, either first, or per se, or denominatively: 'first' perhaps as that by which such unity belongs to this composite; 'per se' this stone, of which that which is first one by this unity is per se part; 'denominatively' only the potential which is perfected by this actual, and which quasi-denominatively has regard to the actual's actuality.

176. I further clarify this solution [nn.168-170]: what the entity is by which that unity [sc. of the individual] is perfected can be made clear by a likeness to the entity from which the specific difference is taken. The specific difference indeed, or the entity from which the specific difference is taken, can be compared to what is below it, or to what is above it, or to what is next to it.

177. In the first way [sc. comparison with what is below], it is per se repugnant to the specific difference, and to the specific entity, to be divided into things several in essence, in species or nature, and thereby this is repugnant to the whole of that of which the entity is per se part; thus, in the issue at hand, it is repugnant first to this individual entity to be divided into any subjective parts whatever, and thereby such division is per se repugnant to the whole of that of which the individual entity is part. And the difference is

only in the fact that the unity of the specific nature is less than the former unity [sc. of the individual entity], and for that reason the specific nature does not exclude all division according to quantitative parts, but only excludes the division of essential parts; the former unity, however, excludes every division.

178. And the proposed solution is sufficiently confirmed from this, that, because any unity less than the former unity has a proper entity which it per se follows, it does not seem probable to deny to the former most perfect unity [sc. the numerical unity of the individual entity, cf. n.58] a proper entity which it follows.

179. Now, comparing the specific nature to what is above it [n.176], I say that the reality from which is taken the specific difference is actual with respect to the reality from which is taken the genus or the idea of the genus, such that this latter reality is not formally the former; otherwise there would be trifling in the definition, and the genus alone (or the difference) would be sufficient for the defining, because it would indicate the whole entity of the thing defined. However, sometimes what contracts the genus is other than the form from which the idea of the genus is taken (when the species adds some reality over and above the nature of the genus), and sometimes it is not another thing but only another formality or another formal concept of the same thing; and accordingly some specific difference has a concept that is not simply simple, namely a difference that is taken from the form, and some does have a concept simply simple, namely a difference that is taken from the ultimate abstraction of the form (this distinction of specific differences was stated in 1 d.3 nn.159-161, about how some specific differences include a being and some do not).

180. In this respect the reality of the individual is like the specific reality, because it is quasi act determining the quasi possible and potential reality of the species; but in this other respect it is not like it, because it is never taken from an added form but is taken precisely from the ultimate reality of the form.

181. It is also unlike it in another respect, that the specific reality constitutes the composite (of which it is part) in quidditative being, because it is a certain quidditative entity; but the reality of the individual is primarily diverse from every quidditative entity. The fact is proved from this, that when one understands any quidditative entity (speaking of limited quidditative entity), the entity is common to many, and its being said of many, each of which is it, is not repugnant to it; therefore this other entity [sc. of the individual], which is of itself a different entity from the quiddity or the quidditative entity, cannot constitute the whole (of which it is part) in quidditative being, but in being of another idea.

182. And because the quiddity is often called form by the Philosopher (as is plain from *Metaphysics* 5.2.1013a26-28 ch. 'On Causes' and in many other places; and from *Metaphysics* 7.11.1037a32-b5 ch. 'On Parts of Definition', that "in things where there is no matter the 'what it is' is the same as the 'of what it is';" Aristotle is speaking, as will be explained [nn.204-207], of matter and form), and because whatever has a contracted quiddity [nn.206-205] is often called by him a material thing (and Boethius in his book *On the Trinity* maintains that no form can be the subject of an accident, because form is predicated of the 'what' of some other thing; and if humanity is a subject, this yet does not belong to it as it is form; humanity indeed is not a form of another composite part, as of a composite of form and matter, but belongs to the whole composite that is possessed

of a contracted quiddity, or in which there is a contracted quiddity) – therefore every specific reality constitutes a thing in formal being (because it constitutes it in quidditative being), and the reality of the individual constitutes it precisely in material being (that is, in contracted being). And herefrom follows the logical point that ‘the former is essentially formal, the latter material’, because the latter precisely constitutes a thing in idea of what can be a subject and the former in idea of what can be a predicate; but a formal predicate has the idea of form, and what can be a subject has the idea of matter.

183. But, third, comparing specific difference to what is next to it, namely to another specific difference [n.176] – although sometimes it is possible for the specific difference not to be first diverse from another, as with the entity that is taken from form, yet the ultimate specific difference is first diverse from another, namely the one that has a concept simply simple [n.179]. And in this respect I say that the individual difference is likened to the specific difference universally taken, because every individual entity is first diverse from any other.

184. And from this the answer to the following objection appears: for it is objected that either this [individual] entity and that are of the same idea or they are not. If they are, then from them can be abstracted some entity, and this a specific one (and about it one must ask by what it is contracted to this entity and to that; if it is contracted of itself, then by parity of reasoning there could be a stand at the nature of stone; if by something else, then there will be a regress to infinity); if they are of a different idea, then the things constituted will also be of a different idea, and so they will not be individuals of the same species.

185. I reply. Ultimate specific differences are primarily diverse, and so from them nothing per se one can be abstracted; yet it does not thereby follow that the things constituted are primarily diverse and not of some one idea. For that certain things are equally distinct can be understood in two ways: either because they are equally impossible (namely because they cannot be in the same thing), or because they agree equally in nothing. And in the first way it is true that distinct things are as equally diverse as what distinguishes them (for what distinguishes them cannot be impossible without the distinct things also being impossible); in the second way it is universally impossible, because distinct things include not only what distinguishes them but also something else (which is quasi potential with respect to what distinguishes them), and yet the things that do the distinguishing in that something else do not agree.

186. About individual entities I reply in the same way as was replied about differences primarily diverse [n.185], that individual entities are primarily diverse (that is, they agree in nothing the same), and yet there is no need that distinct things be diverse simply; still, just as the entities are impossible so are also the individuals that have those entities.

187. And if you ask me what this individual entity is from which the individual difference is taken, whether it is matter or form or the composite, I reply:

Every quidditative entity – whether partial or total – of any genus is of itself indifferent, as quidditative entity, to this entity or to that, so that it is, as quidditative entity, naturally prior to this entity as it is this; and just as being a ‘this’ does not agree with it as it is naturally prior, so the opposite is not repugnant to it of its own idea; and just as the composite, as it is nature, does not include its own entity (by which it is

formally ‘this’), so neither does mater, as it is nature, include its own entity (by which it is ‘this matter’), nor either does form, as it is nature, include its own entity.

188. Therefore ‘this entity’ is not matter or form or the composite insofar as each of them is ‘nature’; but there is an ultimate reality of the being that is matter or that is form or that is the composite, such that whatever is common and yet determinable can, however much it is one thing, still be distinguished into several formally distinct realities, of which this reality is not formally that one; and this reality is formally an entity of singularity, and that is formally an entity of nature. Nor can these two realities be thing and thing in the way that the realities can from which genus is taken and from which difference is taken (from which the specific reality is taken); but always they are, in the same thing (whether in a part or the whole), realities, formally distinct, of the same thing.

#### B. To the Principal Arguments

189. And from this the response to the first principal argument [n.143] is clear. For when the conclusion is drawn that ‘every individual where the nature can be contracted is more composite than the nature itself’,<sup>61</sup> I say that composition can be understood properly, insofar as it is composition of an actual and of a potential thing; or less properly, as it is composition of a reality and of an actual and potential reality in the same thing. In the first way the individual is not a composite with respect to the specific nature, because it adds no reality (for it adds neither matter nor form nor composite in the way the argument proceeds [n.143]). In the second way the individual is necessarily composite, because the reality from which the specific difference is taken is potential

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<sup>61</sup> Not express in n.143 but implied. It is express however in *Lectura* 2 d.3 n.140.

with respect to the reality from which the individual difference is taken, as if they were thing and thing; for the specific reality does not of itself have that whereby it includes by identity the individual reality, but some third thing includes by identity those two.

190. And this composition is of such sort as cannot stand along with the divine simplicity. For the divine simplicity not only does not allow a composition with itself of thing and of actual and potential thing, but not a composition either of actual reality and potential reality; for, when comparing anything essential with anything whatever in divine reality, the essential is formally infinite, and therefore it has of itself that whereby it includes by identity whatever can exist along with it (as was often touched on in the first book, 1 d.8 nn.194, 209, 213, 215-217, 220-221, d.5 nn.117-118, 127, d.2 n.410), and the extremes [e.g. wisdom and goodness, deity and paternity] are not precisely the same perfectly, because some third thing includes them both perfectly. But in the issue at hand neither does the specific entity include by identity the individual entity nor the reverse, but some third thing – of which both are as it were per se parts – alone includes those two by identity, and therefore the most perfect composition which is of thing and thing is removed; not however every composition for, universally, any nature that is not of itself a ‘this’ but determinable to being a ‘this’ (either so as to be determined by some other thing, which is impossible in anything whatever, or so as to be determined by some other reality) is not simply simple.

191. To the second argument [n.144] I concede that the singular is per se intelligible, as concerns it on the part of itself (but whether it is not per se intelligible to some intellect, namely to ours – about this elsewhere [n.294]); at any rate any impossibility in its being able to be understood is not on its part, just as neither is the



impossibility of seeing or of vision in an owl on the part of the sun but on the part of the eye of the owl.

192. To the argument about definition [n.146] I say that if any account could express whatever comes together in the entity of an individual, yet that account will not be a perfect definition, because it does not express the ‘what it is to be’, and according to the Philosopher, in *Topics* 1.5.101b39, a definition is what expresses the whatness of a thing. And therefore I concede that the singular is not definable by a definition other than the definition of the species, and yet it is a per se being, adding some entity to the entity of the species; but the per se entity which it adds is not a quidditative entity.

193. From this is plain the answer to the other arguments about science and demonstration [n.145], because the definition of the subject is the middle term in the most powerful demonstration; but the singular does not have a proper definition but only a definition of the species, and so there is of it no demonstration proper but only a demonstration that is of the species (for it does not have its own particular property but only the property of the species).<sup>62</sup>

### C. To the Arguments for the Opinion of Others

194. To the arguments for the opinion.

First, when it is said that a species is an atomic unit [n.149], I say that it is such a unit, that is, it is not divisible into several species; it is however not purely atomic, that is,

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<sup>62</sup> Tr. The most powerful demonstration demonstrates a property of a subject through the definition of the subject, and an individual has neither property nor definition.

indivisible simply; for indivisibility into several species is compatible with divisibility into several things of the same species.

195. And when indivisibility is proved by the remark of Plato that Porphyry states [n.150], I say that division by art stops at the most specific species, because to proceed further is to proceed to infinites, which “must be set aside” by art according to Plato; for there is nothing on the part of individuals whereby their number should be definite, but they can be infinite, provided their nature is not repugnant to this [1 d.2 n.176].

196. But if division is taken strictly [nn.150-151], as it is in what requires parts determinate in multitude and magnitude, then a species is not in this way divided into individuals; but a genus does require a determinate multitude of species (because, according to Boethius *On Division*, the first divisible is into two); and a quantum requires a determinate magnitude, and they are, because two, presupposed in the whole that bounds the middle parts. And if division is taken strictly as it is into parts having a proportion to the whole, because they either constitute it or are contained under it in a determinate multitude or magnitude – then a species is not per se divided into individuals; and by this can both Plato and Porphyry be explained. But if division is taken commonly, as it is present in all things that share the nature of the divided thing (whether they have such a proportion to the whole in being the integral parts of it, or in being the subject of it, or not) – then a species is per se divided into individuals; and this latter division is reduced to genus in Boethius, because the conditions and properties that Boethius assigns in the division of a genus agree with the division that is of a species into individuals.

197. As to the other argument, that the species states the whole being of individuals [n.152], I say that ‘being’ is taken there for quidditative being, as Porphyry

says in his chapter ‘On Difference’ [*Predicables* 3.3a45-48], where he maintains that difference per se does not admit of a more and less; his proof is: “For the being of each thing is one and the same, receiving neither increase nor decrease” (he takes ‘being’ as quiddity, the way the Philosopher does in *Metaphysics* 8 [n.133], “soul and being a soul are the same”). And, because the entity that the singular adds to the species is not a quidditative entity, I say that the whole quidditative entity that is in the individual is the entity of the species, and for this reason the species states the whole being of individuals; but the genus does not in this way state the whole being of species, because species adds further quidditative entity.

198. To the argument for the other member, about quantity [n.153], I say that this proposition is false, ‘the principle of divisibility and of the distinction of the dividers is the same’; the concept indeed that is common to species is the reason for the divisibility into species, but it is not the reason for distinguishing the species from each other, but this species is distinguished from that by the difference. Now in a quantitative division, the whole quantity, as it contains confusedly all the parts, is the reason for divisibility in the whole quantum; but the reason for the distinction of the parts from each other is not thus but as this quantity distinctly in act is not that quantity in act, which is in the whole.

199. When the deduction too is further drawn that ‘when a whole homogeneous quantum is divided, the division is got through quantity’ [n.153] – let it be so. However that division is not the first division of individuals, but this substance and that substance – insofar as they are a ‘this’ and a ‘this’ – have a division and distinction from each other naturally prior to the distinction insofar as they were parts of distinct quantity per

accidens (for it is accidental to them to be parts); yet once a division according to quantitative parts is made, a division is made according to subjective parts per accidens.

[Continuation of Question Five]

## II. Scotus' own Solution to the Fifth Question

200. As to the preceding fifth question, about matter [n.129], the solution is plain from the arguments against the opinion [nn.132, 136-141]. For I concede that matter absolutely, as it is nature, is not the reason for distinction or individuation; for whatever is a nature, total or partial, in any genus is not of itself a 'this'; and therefore one has to ask by what it is a 'this'.

## III. To the Authorities from the Philosopher for the Opposite

201. To the authority from Aristotle *Metaphysics* 5 [n.130] ("in number one" etc.), I reply and say that Aristotle is there taking matter for the individual entity that it constitutes in material, and not in formal, being (as far as quiddity is said to be form), because that individual entity is not quidditative. And this exposition is plain from what he subjoins, "Those things are one in species whose idea is one, etc.," where indeed 'idea' is taken for quiddity, which is called form in respect of individual being.

202. Thereby is plain the answer to the remark in *On the Heaven* about heaven and this heaven [n.135] – and it confirms the conclusion proposed.

203. Thereby too is plain the answer to the remark in *Metaphysics* 12 [n.134]. For I concede that there cannot be several first movers because there is no matter in the first mover: that is, there is not in it anything that, as matter or as anything else, contracts it, but it is of itself a ‘this’ without anything else contracting it; for such contracting does not stand along with perfect simplicity; and therefore the quiddity of the first mover is of itself a ‘this’.

204. As to the remark in *Metaphysics* 7 [n.133], that ‘whatever there is of reality in things that are without matter is the same as what it is the reality of’, I say that the ‘what it is’ of a thing can be compared with what it belongs to per se and first and with what it belongs to per se and not first; and, universally, the way it belongs to something is the way it is the same as it, because, as the *Philosopher* argues in 7.6.1031a17-18, “The singular seems to be not other than its substance, and the ‘what it is’ is called the substance of the singular” (for if the ‘what it is’ is not being, it is nothing). But the ‘what’ is that which a thing first is, and so that to which the ‘what it is’ per se belongs is the same per se as the ‘what it is’, and that to which the ‘what it is’ per accidens belongs is the same per accidens as the ‘what it is’ and so is not simply the same as it (hence Aristotle too himself maintains there [6.1031a19-21] that, in the case of things said per accidens, the ‘what it is’ is not the same as what it belongs to – and no wonder, because he has earlier made it clear [4.1029b12-30a17] that nothing is the ‘what it is’ or definition of them).

205. Now that which has a ‘what it is’ can be understood either as the nature itself, which the ‘what it is’ first belongs to, or as the supposit of nature, which the ‘what it is’ per se but not first belongs to. The ‘what it is’ taken in the first way, in both material and

immaterial things, is the same as what it belongs to – even first belongs to, because what it belongs to has the ‘what it is’ first. Taken in the second way, what has a ‘what it is’, when it includes some entity outside the idea of its whatness, is not the same as the ‘what it is’; for then it is not the same first as the ‘what it is’, because the ‘what it is’ does not belong to it first, in that what has the ‘what it is’ includes some entity outside the idea of what is first the ‘what’.

206. To the intended conclusion of the Philosopher, therefore, I say that in things not conceived along with matter (that is, not conceived along with an individual entity contracting the quiddity), the ‘what it is’ is the same as what it belongs to, because such a ‘what it belongs to’ has no nature outside the nature of that which is the ‘what it is’; but in things conceived along with matter (that is, conceived with an individual entity contracting the quiddity), the ‘what it is’ is not the same first as what it belongs to, because a first thus conceived would not have the ‘what it is’ of itself but only through a part, namely through the nature which is contracted by the individual entity.

207. So from this one does not get that the matter which is the other part of a composite is outside the idea per se of the quiddity – rather, matter truly belongs to the quiddity, and the species (and what has the form universally) has the ‘what it is’ first and is the same as it first; and so it does not follow that the matter that is the other part of a composite is what individuates it, but this only follows about the matter that is the entity contracting the quiddity, and I have conceded that [n.206]. But whether a lack of the matter that is the other part entails, according to the Philosopher, the lack of this sort of individual entity will be discussed in the following question [nn.238-239].

208. To the remark of the Philosopher that ‘the generator generates another because of matter’ [n.132] I say that the intention of the Philosopher there is that [Platonic] ideas are not necessary for generation, because both the distinction of the generator from the generated and the assimilation of the generated to the generator (which two are required for univocal generation) can be got without ideas. For the particular agent has from its form wherewith to assimilate the passive thing to itself, and the generator has from its form wherewith so to assimilate the generated – and from matter the generator has that it is distinct from the generated: not principally, although however it may follow that it is distinguished by matter from the generated, because, through the form that terminates generation, it perfects another matter and not its own matter (for its own matter is already perfected by the form); and, because it assimilates through the form, it perfects another matter than its own, and so its own matter is other than the matter which is deprived of such form. But whatever has a different matter is, from the fact that matter is an essential part of a thing, other than it.

209. I say then that the principal reason for assimilation (or of likeness) is the form itself between the generator and the generated, and this not according to individual unity and identity insofar as the form is a ‘this’, but according to a lesser unity and identity insofar as it is a form, and the reason for generating accords with this; the form too is a more principal reason for distinction than matter is, because just as form is more principally that by which a composite is than matter, so it is more principally that by which a composite is one and so that by which the composite is not in itself distinct but is distinct from another.

210. However (distinguishing ‘what assimilates’ from ‘what distinguishes’), the form is appropriately assimilative in a way that the matter properly is not, because matter is not a substantial or an accidental quality; but matter is a distinguishing thing (speaking appropriately), because – from the fact it lacks form – it necessarily distinguishes from the matter which already has the form, and so it distinguishes composite from composite.

211. The composite can also in another way be understood to be ‘other because of matter’, as being other because of a pre-existing cause of otherness: for the form of the generated thing is a more principal cause of otherness in the composite than the matter is; however it is not the pre-existing cause of this otherness, but matter is – and that because it pre-existed as deprived matter; and therefore it cannot be the same as informed matter.

## Question Seven

### *Whether it is Possible for Several Angels to Exist in the Same Species*

212. Seventh and last about this subject matter I ask whether it is possible for several angels to exist in the same species.

213. That it is not:

Because the Philosopher in *Metaphysics* 7.11.1037a32-b5, ch. ‘On Parts of Definition’ at the end, says that “in things that are without matter the ‘what it is’ is the same as what it belongs to” [nn.133, 182, 204]; therefore since an angel is without matter, his ‘what it is’ is the same as the angel himself. Therefore it is impossible for an angel to be distinguished from an angel unless his ‘what it is’ is distinguished from the ‘what it is’



of the other angel; therefore there cannot be a distinction of individuals among angels under the same 'what it is'.

214. Further, Avicenna *Metaphysics* 9.4 f.104vb-105rb sets down an order of intelligences wherein he seems to maintain that a lower intelligence is produced by a superior intelligence as by the one creating it; but this causality is not in anything with respect to another of the same species.

215. I argue further by reason: every formal difference is a specific difference; angels, since they are several and are forms, differ by some formal difference; therefore they differ specifically.

216. The proof of the major is taken from *Metaphysics* 8.3.1043b32-44a11 where forms are compared to numbers, in which any addition or subtraction varies the species; therefore etc.

217. Again the major is proved in another way in *Metaphysics* 10.9.1058a29-34 and b21-23, "Masculine and feminine do not differ in species, because masculinity and femininity are only material differences of the form of humanity," insinuating by this that all formal differences make a distinction in species, and also that form and species are the same; therefore etc.

218. Further, every form separated from matter has in itself the whole perfection of the species; therefore if one such form is posited in the species (as the form of this angel) and another such form is posited, the former will be the latter and the latter will be the former, because each angel is a form separated from matter, and consequently any one of them has the perfection of the whole species.

219. Proof of the antecedent [n.218]: because the fact that a form does not have the whole essence of the species is because it partakes of it; but the form only has the essence of the form by partaking of it because it exists in matter; therefore etc.

220. Further, in the case of perfect beings there is nothing that is not intended by nature; but numerical plurality is not per se intended by nature because numerical difference – as far as concerns it of itself – can be increased infinitely; now infinity is not per se intended by any agent; therefore there is no numerical difference in perfect beings. But what is in angels belongs to them as to the most perfect beings in the universe; therefore there is no numerical difference in them but only a specific one, wherein the beauty of the universe principally exists.

221. There is a confirmation: the intention of nature stops per se at those beings that pertain to the order of the universe; but species and not individuals are of this sort; now there is nothing in angels that does not pertain to the order and beauty of the universe; therefore there is no numerical difference in them.

222. Further, the Philosopher in *On the Soul* 2.4.415a26-b7 seems to say that a multitude of individuals exists only for the sake of the preservation of the species; but in the case of incorruptible things nature is sufficiently preserved in one individual; therefore etc.

223. There is confirmation too from the Philosopher in *On the Heaven* 1.9.278a22-b8, that in the heavenly bodies there is only one individual of one species, as one sun and one moon; therefore etc.<sup>63</sup>

224. On the contrary:

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<sup>63</sup> Arguments like those in nn.222-223 are found in Aquinas and Henry of Ghent.

Damascene in his *Elements* or *On the Two Wills etc. in Christ* n.3 [“Wisely then did the author of natures (that is, of species) make much difference in them for the display of his riches and wisdom and virtue, so that he might, by being at least wondered at, be the more desired... For this reason he made different hypostases, not only for each order of angelic virtues, but also for each species, so that they might, by communicating with each other at least in nature, rejoice in each other and, by being joined together in natural condition, might care for each other and be amicably disposed toward each other.”]

## I. To the Question

### A. The Opinion of Others

225. Those who answer to the preceding questions about individuation that the principle of individuation is quantity or matter [nn.71, 132, 148, 153-154] accordingly in consequence give a negative answer to this question [Aquinas, Giles, Godfrey], namely that there cannot be several angels in the same species, because the principles of such an individual difference for a species cannot be found in angels; and they have to say that this is impossible not only by an intrinsic impossibility [sc. on the part of the angel] but also by an extrinsic one [sc. on the part of divine power], because it is simply impossible in such a way that an individual distinction cannot belong to angelic nature, because that which precisely can be the principle of such a distinction is repugnant to the nature – just as it would be impossible for there to be several species

under animal if the different actualities by which the species were distinguished were repugnant to animal.

226. However, the foundations for this opinion were rejected before in the preceding questions [nn.75-104, 136-141, 155-167, 200].

### B. Scotus' own Opinion

227. The simply opposite conclusion must therefore be held, namely that it simply is possible for several angels to exist in the same species.

The proof is as follows:

First, because every quiddity – as far as concerns it of itself – is communicable, even the divine quiddity; but no quiddity is communicable in numerical identity unless it is infinite; therefore any other quiddity is communicable, and this with numerical distinctness – and thus the intended conclusion. But that every quiddity is communicable is plain because this is not repugnant to it from perfection, since it belongs to the divine quiddity, nor from imperfection, since it belongs to things generable and corruptible; therefore etc.

228. Further, any quiddity of a creature can be understood, without contradiction, under the idea of a universal; but if it were of itself a 'this', it would be a contradiction to understand it under the idea of a universal (just as it is a contradiction to understand the divine essence under the idea of universality), because the idea of understanding the object is repugnant to the object understood, which means that the understanding is false; therefore etc.<sup>a</sup>

a. [*Interpolation*] Or as follows: no created quiddity is of itself a ‘this’, but it can be conceived as a universal, because in its idea is not included singularity (and therefore God cannot be a universal, because he is of himself a this, not possessing the genus and difference that belong to created quiddity); therefore, since any quiddity has principles that are not of themselves ‘this’, it can be understood under the idea of a universal. But it is of the idea of a universal that it is multipliable into many, because a universal arises from the fact that it is understood according to an indifference to this thing and to that, as being sayable of many things according to the same idea; and there is a confirmation from the idea of species [sc. because a species is of itself sayable of many].

229. Further, if God can annihilate this angel in this species, then, after the angel has been annihilated, he can produce this species anew in some other individual, because being does not become, by the annihilation of this singular, repugnant to the species; for otherwise it would be only a fictitious being, like a chimaera. God can, then, produce the same species in some individual, otherwise he could not make the same order of universe as he made at the beginning; but not in this angel [sc. the one annihilated], according to those who hold this opinion, ‘because a man could not rise again the same in number unless the intellective soul remained the same in number’.

230. Further, intellective souls are distinguished by number in the same species, and yet they are pure forms, albeit perfective of matter; there is, then, on the part of forms, no impossibility in their being distinguished by number in the same species; for whatever would entail, by reason of form, this impossibility in angels would entail it also in souls.

231. But if you say that souls have an inclination to diverse bodies and thus they have an aptitude for perfecting matter, and so they are distinguished by diverse relations<sup>64</sup> – on the contrary:

This inclination is not an absolute entity, because a thing cannot be inclined to itself; therefore it supposes some prior entity absolute and distinct, and so in that prior entity this soul is distinguished from that. Therefore souls are distinct without these sorts of relations (as without a formal reason for distinguishing).

232. There is confirmation, because this aptitude cannot be of the formal idea of the soul, for it is a relation; but a relation is not of the formal idea of anything absolute.

233. Again, it is because a soul is this soul that it therefore has this inclination and not conversely (because form is the end of matter and not conversely); therefore this inclination is not the idea of being this soul, but presupposes this idea.

234. This point [n.230] is also confirmed for some [e.g. Aquinas] who find it unacceptable that any species simply of intellectual nature should be damned in its totality; but, on the positing of this position [sc. that there is one angel per species], there would be many species of angels where none would be saved; therefore the position is not true.

235. And there is proof of the first proposition [n.234] from what Augustine says *Enchiridion* ch.29 n.9: “It has pleased the universal Lord that, since not the whole multitude of angels, by deserting God, had perished, the part which had perished should

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<sup>64</sup> Godfrey of Fontains, *Quodlibet* 7 q.16: “...just as also the separated rational soul is not thus a purely metaphysical being, the way the intelligences or angels are, on account of its natural relation and inclination to a natural body, which includes natural and material dispositions... Notwithstanding this, however, several souls differing in number are posited; but this is said to come from the fact they are forms of diverse bodies differing in number, and following along with these bodies there is an individuation or numerical distinction of this sort.”

remain in perpetual damnation, but that the part that had stood with God, while the other part was deserting him, should rejoice in their happiness most certainly known to be always going to be; however the rational nature that was in man, since it had all perished in sins and punishments, deserved to be in part repaired, whence it might be joined to the curtailed society of angels that the former ruin had diminished.” This totality and partialness in angels does not seem to be rational unless it be posited that no angelic species had totally perished as to all individuals, and so some from each species fell and some stood; therefore etc.

236. Further, if it be conceded that the quiddity of an angel is of itself communicable to many and so – as far as concerns it of itself – communicable to an infinite number (for there is no idea of impossibility on the part of a numerical multitude), then, if the fact the nature is produced in this individual means that the possibility of its being in more is taken away, the nature exists in this individual according to its whole communicability and so infinitely, because it is infinitely communicable according to its quiddity; therefore that single angel would be formally infinite. The consequent is unacceptable, therefore the antecedent is too.<sup>a</sup>

a. [*Interpolation*] Or the argument goes as follows: if the quiddity of an angel is in itself multipliable into many, then it is multipliable also into infinities; therefore it cannot, by its being received in some one angel, be made incommunicable to another angel unless it is in the former in its whole commonness; now this whole commonness does not belong to the former unless it is in him infinitely, because it is in itself infinitely communicable. But this reasoning of others supposes that the quiddity of an angel is of itself multipliable and that the whole of its commonness is received in this angel; and then the reasoning would proceed, but others would have to deny the antecedent.

237. I say therefore that every nature which is not itself pure act can – according to the reality according to which it is nature – be potential to the reality by which it is this nature, and consequently can be a ‘this’; and just as it does not of itself include any quasi singular entity, so such entities in whatever number are not repugnant to it, and so it can be found in any number of them. But in the case of what is of itself a necessary being, there is a determination in nature to being ‘this’, because whatever can be in the nature is in it – so that the determination cannot be through something extrinsic to singularity if there is in the nature of itself a possibility for infinity; things are otherwise in the case of any possible nature, where there can be multiplication.

## II. To the Principal Arguments

238. To the first argument [n.213] I say that although the Philosopher’s understanding there is per se about matter (that is, about the entity that per se contracts the quiddity [nn.182, 206-207]), yet it is by application of it to what has matter, which is the other part of a composite, and to what does not have matter – I concede that the Philosopher’s intention was that everything not possessed of matter as some component nature is the same first as its ‘what it is’, because every such ‘what it is’ per se posits a ‘this’; and the reason for this is that he posited that everything such as not to have matter as part of itself is formally necessary. Now whatever can be in a nature formally necessary is actually in it; therefore anything whatever that can have that quiddity does have it, because there is no potency there distant from act; hence every possibility for



supposits that he posited in such a nature he posited as being actual. Now if there were a possibility there for several individuals, there would be a possibility there for an infinity of individuals, and so the individuals would be actually infinite; therefore, since an infinity is impossible in any nature, so there is in this nature too (according to him) an impossibility for infinity. Therefore this nature is of itself a ‘this’, according to him.

239. But we disagree with him in the proposition that ‘everything such as not to have matter as part of itself is formally necessary’ [n.238], and so we disagree with him in the conclusion. For it is more rational for a theologian to disagree with a philosopher in the principle because of which the philosopher holds some conclusion, than to err with him in the conclusion and to disagree with him in the principle because of which he himself erred. For thus to agree with him is neither to philosophize nor to think theologically, because such a theologian does not have a reason that would be valid with the philosopher, because the philosopher would not be conceding the conclusion save because of that principle; nor even does such a theologian have a theological principle for his conclusion, because there is precisely a philosophical principle for it, which the theologian denies.

a. [*Interpolation*] The response [to the first argument, nn.238-239] stands on the fact that matter is taken in one way for the second (potential) part of a composite, in another way for the disposition that contracts a quiddity or for any entity that is outside the idea of the quiddity; and accordingly things that do not have matter can be understood in two ways. Likewise, a distinction must be made on the part of the predicate, for ‘whatever is the same as that which it belongs to’ can be understood in two ways: in one way about a real identity, and thus the ‘what it is’ is the same really as what it belongs to, whether it has matter or not (because as Aristotle argued in the beginning of the chapter ‘On Parts of Definition’ [n.213], “The singular does not seem to be other

than its own substance;” and the argument is not sophistical but demonstrative); in another way it can be understood about the most precise identity, and thus the ‘what it is’ is the same as that which it belongs to when what has the quiddity is only quiddity and not something else (which indeed the Philosopher would place among things that do not have matter as the second part of a composite, because he posits that on this follows that there is in them no matter in the second way but that there is only quiddity there and not any condition contracting the quiddity, for the reason above posited, that they are formally necessary [n.238]). – Thereby to the form of the argument [n.213] I say that in things having matter the ‘what it is’ is not the same as what it belongs to in either the first or the second way. But then the minor is false, when it is said that angels are of this sort [n.213]; for in them there is in truth matter in the second way (though not first), because none is of himself a ‘this’, although Aristotle posited this because of the principle that the theologian has to deny.

240. On the same basis I say as to Avicenna [n.214] that his intention was that there is one angel in one species, but the proposition on which this conclusion rests – namely that ‘a superior angel causes an inferior angel’ (because he posits that there can only be one thing from one thing disposed in the same way)– is conceded by no Catholic theologian; therefore neither should his conclusion be conceded by any theologian.

241. As to the first of the reasons [n.215], it was said elsewhere [1 d.17 n.255] that formal difference can be taken for a difference in form (and what is called ‘formal difference’ seems properly to signify this), or ‘formal difference’ can be taken for a difference of forms, although the difference is not in the form as in the reason for the difference.

242. In the first way the major [n.215, sc. ‘every formal difference is a specific difference’] can be conceded, and thus the minor [sc. ‘angels differ by some formal

difference'] is false. And the proof of the minor, namely that 'an angel differs from an angel because he is a form, therefore angels have a formal difference', involves the fallacy of the consequent; for the inference 'the forms differ, therefore they differ formally (or they differ in form)' does not follow, just as the inference 'many men differ, therefore they differ in humanity' does not follow; for it is one thing that 'something is distinct' and another that 'it is the first reason for the distinguishing (or the distinction)', because that the thing is the reason for the distinguishing entails that the thing is distinct, but that the thing is distinct does not entail that it is the reason for the distinguishing. And the logical reason is to this effect, that the negation included in the term 'difference' not only confounds the term of this relation [sc. the relation of difference] by confusing and distributing it, but also confounds the thing that specifies the difference (as that in which the difference is noted to be); the difference is indeed confounded (as to the negation included in the term 'difference'), because if Socrates differs from Plato in whiteness then he is not the same as him, neither in this whiteness nor in that.<sup>65</sup> – But if the major

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<sup>65</sup> Tr. The logical point in this paragraph seems to be as follows. The statement 'A is different from B' does not so much assert something of A as deny of it a relation with B (that A is not the same as B). So it distributes the term of the relation 'different', namely 'B' and everything about B in which something could differ from it; or, alternatively, it distributes the whole predicate 'same as B' (negative propositions logically distribute the predicate of the proposition). Accordingly it takes the predicate confusedly, that is, takes it to apply to everything that belongs to 'B', or to 'same as B', and leaves indeterminate what sort of sameness with B, if any, is being denied of A. Hence one cannot conclude from 'A is different from B' that A is not the same as B in humanity, say, or whiteness. One needs further premises for that purpose. Further, if the proposition does specify what the difference is in, as that A is not the same as B in humanity or whiteness, then the negation distributes and takes confusedly the specification as well. For the proposition 'A is not the same as B in whiteness', because it distributes and takes confusedly, or universally, the predicate 'same as B in whiteness', denies of A, if not further clarified, all likeness with B in all whiteness. But of course it could well be that A is not different from B in all whiteness but only in this or that shade of whiteness (A and B are both white, say, but A is a paler white). Thus the proposition 'A differs from B in whiteness' is, by itself, far too vague or confused to form the basis of any valid inference about what sort of difference in what sort of whiteness. And this error is committed by the argument 'an angel differs from an angel because he is a form, therefore angels have a formal difference'. For in fact, as far as the premise is concerned, an angel could differ from an angel in form or because of form in a whole host of ways. So to conclude that the angel differs in this way (namely in 'formal difference') is to infer something not warranted by the premise, and so to commit the fallacy of the consequent.

[n.215] is taken improperly, according to the second understanding [n.241], I deny the major.

243. As to the proof [sc. of the major, n.216] I say that the Philosopher in *Metaphysics* 8 is speaking of form as it indicates quiddity. This is apparent from his first comparison of forms with numbers; for he says [8.3.1043b32-36], “If substances are in some way numbers, they are so in this way – that definition is a sort of number, a divisible into indivisibles (for accounts are not infinite), and number is such.” That is: the resolution of definitions stops at an indivisible just as the resolution of numbers stops at an indivisible; and such a definition is of what he calls ‘substance’, that is ‘quiddity’, not form, which is a second part of quiddity.

244. I say that in this way [sc. as form indicates quiddity] nothing is added to form without varying the species, whether simply, that is, without making from one species another species (a contrary or disparate species), or in a certain respect, that is, without making another species from what is not such a species (for example, if a difference pertaining to quidditative being is added to a genus, then it makes a most specific species, and such a most specific species was not present before but only an intermediate species was present).

245. And I say that in this way nothing circumstantial to nature in inferior things adds anything to the form. Whether this something circumstantial is an individual property or is a more or less (or anything else that does not regard the nature as it exists in its quidditative being), it neither removes nor adds in this way anything to the substance. An example of this would be if a unity, as it is part of a triple, were a precise part as a numerical individual difference, and yet it could in itself be intensified or

relaxed – this difference would belong per se to the unity but per accidens to it as it is part of a triple; so there would not be a different triple when the unity was intensified or relaxed.

246. So when you say that ‘any distinction of forms is like a distinction of number’ [n.216], this is false save as it is about what accords with the formal being that pertains to the quiddity per se; and such is not the case here.

247. As to the statement from *Metaphysics* 10 [n.217] I say that a fallacy of the consequent is involved in inferring, from the text, that ‘all forms make a difference in species’. For the Philosopher is really maintaining there that ‘a non-formal difference is not specific’, and from this it does not follow that ‘a non-specific difference is not formal’ (which they themselves want to have), just as this does not follow in the case of the affirmative propositions that are equivalent to these, because a universal affirmative does not convert with the terms disposed in the same way.<sup>66</sup>

248. From the Philosopher then is got that ‘only a formal difference is specific’, not that ‘every difference in form is specific’, because although an exclusive proposition [sc. a proposition of the form ‘only A is B’] entails an affirmative proposition with the terms transposed [sc. ‘only A is B’ entails ‘every B is A’], it does not do so in the same way with terms not transposed [sc. ‘only A is B’ does not entail ‘every A is B’] – but

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<sup>66</sup> The objectors want to argue from ‘no non-formal difference is specific’ to ‘every formal difference is specific’, and in order to do so they have to go through a series of logical obversions and conversions. So: ‘no non-formal difference is specific’ is obverted to ‘every non-formal difference is non-specific’, which is converted to ‘every non-specific difference is non-formal’, which is obverted to ‘no non-specific difference is formal’, which is converted to ‘no formal difference is non-specific’, which is obverted to ‘every formal difference is specific’. But in this series of obversions and conversions an invalid conversion is made, namely from ‘every non-formal difference is non-specific’ to ‘every non-specific difference is non-formal’. For a universal affirmative does not convert to a universal affirmative but to a particular affirmative, that is, in this case, to ‘some non-specific difference is non-formal’, and from this latter one can no longer validly get, as the objectors wish, the proposition ‘every formal difference is specific’.

there is a fallacy of the consequent in converting an indefinite proposition into a universal affirmative [sc. 'only A is B' is equivalent to 'some A is B' and 'some A is B' does not convert to 'all A is B']. Indeed from that place [from Aristotle, n.217] it seems rather that one can take the opposite of the proposition 'every difference of forms is specific'; for the difference of a white man and a black horse is a difference of forms and in some way through forms, but it is not a specific difference (according to Aristotle there), because the forms are formal with respect to the natures in which they are [sc. white and black are formal with respect to this man and this horse], that is, they are consequent to the individuals, but they are not consequent per se or terminative per se of the quidditative being [sc. white and black are forms determining individuals, not species].

249. To the other argument [n.218] I say that if some individual – from the mere fact that it is without matter – had in itself the whole perfection of a species that of itself is of a nature to be in infinite individuals (as far as concerns itself), then it would seem to have infinite perfection from the mere lack of matter; but whatever can have an infinite perfection has it, and so there would be infinite perfection in any species, and consequently the perfection of a species would not be limited or determined by the determination or specification or limitation of the ultimate difference (which, by addition to the genus, constitutes the ultimate species), which is false and contrary to all the philosophers. So the assumed proposition is false that 'the individual which can be without matter has, from this privative cause alone (that it is without matter), the whole perfection of the species' [n.218], because if, along with this, one posits that nothing positive is done in respect of it (but there is just separation), nothing that was not there before is posited.

But if the proposition be set down as it has some probability, namely that ‘if a form were separated from matter, it would have the whole perfection of the species, because the species cannot be participated by matter’ [n.219], it is false and begs the question, unless it be understood in the sense that matter states the individual entity that contracts the form. By understanding in this way the equivocal meaning of the assumed proposition, then every form has the whole perfection of the species and is of itself a ‘this’; and then the minor – assumed thereunder, about an angel [sc. ‘an angel is a separate form not able to be participated by matter as by an individual entity contracting the form’] – is simply false, because although the essence that is the other part of a composite is not able to be participated by matter, yet it can be participated by several material things, that is, by several individuals having material entities, which entities are called ‘material’ – as has often been said – in respect of the contracted quiddity, to the extent quiddity is called form [nn.182, 201, 206-207, 238, 243].

250. To the next [n.220] I say that there is a fallacy of the consequent in the form of the arguing, ‘infinity is not intended, therefore plurality is not intended’; numerical plurality is not of itself infinite, but infinity can stand only if the plurality is not repugnant to it. So although no one per se intends infinity, yet someone can intend a numerical plurality that is not of itself infinite, and which, just as it admits of infinity, so it also admits of finitude.

251. And thus can their common saying be understood [sc. the order and beauty of the universe consists in species, nn.220-221], and truly:

Although order in the whole universe is principally found in the distinction of species, wherein there is the inequality pertaining to order, yet because, according to

Augustine *City of God* 19.13.n.1, “order is the fitting disposition of equal and unequal things, bestowing on each of them its own place,” the principal agent who intends the order of the universe (as the principal good internal to it) intends not only the inequality, which is one of the requisites for order (namely the inequality of species), but also the equality of individuals (namely in the same species), which is the other of the concurrent requisites for order. And individuals are intended simply by the First Cause insofar as he intends something ‘other than himself’, not as end, but as something other for the end; hence, for the sake of communicating his goodness, as for the sake of communicating his blessedness, he produced many individuals in the same species. But in the case of the most principal beings, God principally intended the individual.

252. And when the proposition ‘numerical difference is not intended’ [n.220] is taken in this way, it is false; and when it is proved in this way that ‘numerical difference can be infinite,’ the conclusion does not follow. The inference ‘numerical difference can be infinite, and the infinity is not intended, therefore the difference is not intended’ does not hold; for there can be some finite numerical difference, and there is; and it can be intended, and it is.

253. To the last [n.222] I say that although the Philosopher says that generation is perpetual ‘so as to preserve a divine existence’, and this in corruptible things where the species cannot remain for ever in one individual, yet he does not himself say that a multitude is precisely for the preservation of the species in corruptible individuals; hence such preservation is one cause of the multitude of individuals in the same species but it is not the precise cause; rather the one stated before is [sc. the goodness of God, n.251].



254. And as to what is adduced about the celestial bodies, that ‘in one species there is only one singular and one individual body’ [n.223], I reply: Aristotle’s reason was that such a singular body came from the whole matter of the species (and this not only actual matter but also potential matter, according to him), because there was, according to him, no possible matter in any such species that was not totally in the one individual of such species; for he posited that nothing new could be produced in immobile or eternal things as they are such, namely immobile and eternal [n.222]. And because theologians do not agree with him in this proposition ‘every eternal body is made of the whole matter, actual and potential, of the species’, therefore there should be no agreement with him in the conclusion.

## Second Part

### On the Knowledge of Angels

#### Question One

##### *Whether an Angel can Know Himself through his own Essence*

255. Concerning the knowledge of angels I ask<sup>a</sup> whether an angel can know himself through essence, such that his own essence is the reason for knowing himself without any representing thing that naturally precedes the act.

a. [*Interpolation*] About the second principal point, namely the knowledge of angels, four questions are asked: first, whether an angel can know himself through the essence, as by the reason for knowing, without any representing thing that naturally precedes the act; second, whether an angel has distinct natural knowledge of the divine essence; third whether, in order for an angel to know distinctly created quiddities other than himself, he necessarily needs to have proper and distinct ideas for knowing them; fourth, whether angels can make progress by receiving knowledge from things.

256. That he cannot:

Because this could only be because his essence is intelligible and present to the intellect itself; but our soul is actually intelligible and actually present to itself, according to Augustine in many places [*On the Trinity* 8.6 n.9, 9.3 n.3, 9.4 nn.4 & 7, 9.5 n.8, 9.6 n.9, 9.12 n.18, 10.3 n.5, 10.4 n.6, 10.7 n.10, 10.8-10 nn.11-16, 10.12 n.19, 14.4 nn.6-7]; therefore our soul would be the reason for understanding itself with respect to itself. But this is contrary to the Philosopher *On the Soul* [3.4.429b26-29, 429a21-24, 429b5-10], who maintains that ‘the soul understands itself the way it understands other things,’ and that ‘[the intellect] is none of the things that are before it understands’, and that ‘it cannot understand itself when other things are not understood’.

257. Further, the essence of an angel is singular; a singular is not per se intelligible, nor is it the per se reason for understanding; therefore etc.

258. Further, every cognitive power must, as to itself, be bare of that which is the reason for knowing; but an angel, insofar as he is cognitive, is not bare of his essence; therefore his essence is not for him his reason for knowing himself.

259. Proof of the minor: first from the Philosopher *On the Soul* 2 [7.418b26-28,], that every eye must be without all color so that it can see every color; second from *On the*

*Soul* 3 [4.429a18-20] where he maintains that the soul is unmixed and immaterial, so that it can understand everything.

260. Further, no thing the same is acted on by itself, because then the same thing would be in act and in potency; the essence of an angel is the same as himself; therefore the essence is not the object that immediately makes an impress on the intellect.<sup>a</sup>

a. [*Interpolation*] Or as follows: the active and passive thing are distinct in subject (from *Physics* 3.1.200b29-31, 3.3.202a25-27, 7.1.241b24, 8.1.251b1-4, 8.4.255b12-17); but the essence of an angel either is not distinguished really from his intellect, if the power does not differ from the essence, or at any rate is not distinct in subject; therefore the intellect of an angel is not acted on by his essence. But the intellect is acted on by the intelligible object, from *Metaphysics* 12.7.1072a30; therefore etc.

261. Further, if an angel could understand himself through his essence, then the intellection would be the same either as the object or as his essence. The consequent is false, because this is proper to God alone, that his intellection is the same as his essence; therefore the antecedent too is false. The proof of the consequence is that the middle between extremes agrees more with both extremes than either extreme agrees with the other; but 'to understand' is intermediate between the power and the object; therefore if the power and the object are the same, much more will the act be the same as the object (the confirmation is that intellection only gets distinctness from the object or from the power).

262. On the contrary:

Some material form is the reason for acting according to the material thing's essence (as heat is in fire, for the act of heating), or at any rate something in common is, else there will be an infinite regress in reasons for acting; therefore, since immaterial things are more active than material ones, an immaterial form will be, by its essence, the reason for performing the act that belongs to it; such is the idea of object to act of knowing.

## I. To the Question

### A. The Opinion of Others

263. Here the following is said<sup>a</sup> [Aquinas *ST* Ia q.56 a.1, *SG* II ch.98],<sup>67</sup> that although the object is separate from the agent in the case of an action that passes over to something extrinsic, yet in the case of an action that is immanent the object must be united to the operator, and, as united, it is the formal idea of such immanent operation, as the species of vision is in the eye; and from this it is further said that, since the essence of an angel is of itself united to his intellect, it can be the principle of the intellection, which is an immanent operation.

- a. [*Interpolation*, from Appendix A] Here there is the opinion of Henry of Ghent, *Quodlibet* 5 q.14, that an angel does not know himself through his essence but through a scientific habit, in which

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<sup>67</sup> *ST*: "In the case of an action that remains in the agent there is need for the object to be united to the agent in order for the action to proceed, just as there is need for the sensible to be united to the sense so that it may actually perceive. And the object united to the power is, for this sort of action [sc. intellection], disposed in the way that the form is that is the principle of action in the case of other agents; for just as heat is the formal principle of heating in fire, so the species of the seen thing is the formal principle of vision in the eye." *SG*: "Hence a separated substance, although it is per se intelligible in act, is not however understood according to itself save by the intellect with which it is one. And thus does a separated substance understand itself through its essence."

his essence is presented to his intellect just as are also the essences of other things, “such that if an angel per se, in his bare substance, is posited, *per impossibile*, to be without any scientific habit, he would be moved to an act of understanding by nothing at all, neither by his own essence nor by any other.”

Now the reason that is there relied on is the following: “The angelic intellect per se and first understands per se no particular essence, just as neither does ours,” because “essences are not represented to the intellect save as they are abstracted from all particular conditions, because science is only of things that are necessary and possess an unchangeability for their essence (according to Boethius *On Arithmetic* 1 ch.1), and of this sort are only essences as abstracted from singular conditions;” but the essence in itself, in actual existence, is not present to the intellect save as particular, while in the habit it is present and shines forth under the idea of a universal; therefore an angel first understands his essence as it shines forth in the habit, and the essence “as known universally by the angel is the means for knowing his own singular essence, just as any other species is also for him the reason of knowing any singular under it.”

I argue against this opinion:

It is unacceptable that a perfect created intellect, out of the whole order of natural causes, has no power for an act of understanding an intelligible object proportioned to it, because a more imperfect intellect – namely the human – has this power along with the order of natural causes, as with phantasms and the agent intellect; but this consequence follows if an angel can understand nothing save by the habit, because the habit is from God alone [Henry *Quodlibet* 5 q.14]; and thus all natural causes, active and passive, are unable to cause the habit.

Further, if an angel cannot understand his essence save as it shines forth in the habit, this is either because the object is not intelligible unless it shines forth in the habit, or because it is not intelligible to this intellect save as thus shining forth, or because it is not proportionally present to the intellect in the idea of being intelligible save as it shines forth in the habit. Not in the first way, because then God could not know the angel’s essence save in the habit, because he cannot know anything unless the thing is intelligible. Nor in the second way, because the angel’s essence is supremely proportioned to his intellect, for everything intelligible in itself is a proportionate

intelligible to some intellect, and this object is not more adequate and proportionate to any intellect than to its own. Nor in the third way, because presence through informing is not required for something intelligible to be present to an intellect, because then God would not know his own essence; hence it is sufficient that the essence be present under the idea by which an angel can return to it by a complete return; therefore it is proportionately present to his intellect otherwise than through a habit; therefore it is intelligible to him in some way other than by a habit.

Further, according to him who thus thinks [Henry], the idea of immateriality is the same as the idea of intelligibility; but the essence of an angel is immaterial in itself, therefore it is intelligible in itself; but each thing has as much of intellectivity as it has of intelligibility; therefore an angel in himself, without such habit, is intellective.

Further, if an angel cannot understand save through such a habit, the consequence is that he cannot know the existence of a thing. Proof: a knower that knows a thing through an idea indifferent to existence and non-existence cannot precisely know the existence of the thing; but such a habit, if it is posited, is disposed indifferently to representing the existence and the non-existence of the thing, because it naturally represents whatever it represents; therefore either it represents that *a* will be and will not be, and then it represents nothing because these are contradictories; or it represents only that *a* is, and so the intellect would not know it when *a* is not, and the same conversely; therefore etc.

There is a confirmation, because a thing cannot be representative secondarily of something unless the first object represented determines it to it; but the quiddity, which is first represented by the habit, is not determined to existence; therefore etc.

Further, against the statement [above] that the angel does not per se understand the particular save through the universal: because singularity does not prevent a thing from being understood (otherwise God could not understand himself), nor either does limitation (because thus the angelic quiddity would not be per se intelligible to him), nor is there materiality there or any impeding condition; therefore etc.

Further, the reasons that he makes against the species [Henry, *ibid.*] work equally against the habit, as is plain to anyone who looks at them.

Therefore something else is said:

264. And if it be objected that such a form should be in that in which there is such an operation (it is not in this way in the essence itself of the angel, where however the reason for acting is), the response seems to be [Aquinas *ST* Ia q.56 a.1] that the form existing in something else and inhering in something else is the principle of operating; and if the form existed per se, it would no less be per se the reason for acting – just as heat, if it were separate, would, as far as concerns itself, be the principle of heating. Therefore so it is with the essence of an angel, that, although it subsists per se, yet it can be the reason for operating with the above immanent operation.<sup>a</sup>

a. [*Interpolation*] The reason for the opinion is formed as follows: that which is for something the per se reason for acting can, if it is separate, be the principle of acting, as is plain of heat; but the object united to a thing active with an intrinsic or immanent action is the reason for acting; therefore, although it is separate, it will be the principle of that action; therefore although the essence of an angel is not united to the intellect of the angel by informing it, but by another reason for the uniting, it will be for the angel the reason for understanding himself.

265. And if it be again objected that the thing acted on should receive something from the agent (but here the intellect receives nothing from the essence itself, because no species preceding the act is posited), the response is [Aquinas *ibid.*] that some cognitive power is at times potentially knowing and at times actually knowing, but some other cognitive power is not so. Now, the fact that there is need for a cognitive power to receive something is not because it is a cognitive power, but only because it is sometimes in potency to act; in the issue at hand it is not so; therefore etc.

266. Against this:

This opinion posits, as it seems, that the intellect is in essential potency to operation and intellection (which it posits to be an immanent operation), and the whole reason for the operation is the object as it is united to the power, the way heat in wood is the whole reason for heating [nn.263-64].

From this I argue: nothing can have the principle of immanent action of any agent unless it is in act through that which is the principle of such action; but the intellect is not in act through its own essence in that which is per se subsistent, because the essence does not inform or impose any activity on the intellect itself; therefore the fact that such per se existing essence is present to an intellect itself cannot make the intellect have an operation where the essence (or its likeness) is, through the intellect, of a nature to be the reason for understanding.

267. His own example [about heat, n.264] confirms this against him; because although heat is what heats or is the reason for heating, yet it would not in the wood – from which it was separated – be the reason for heating, so that, if ‘to heat’ is called an immanent operation, it would be impossible for the wood to heat by the heat separated from the wood; therefore it is impossible for the wood to have this immanent operation, which is ‘to heat’. So it is in the issue at hand; therefore etc.<sup>a</sup>

a. [Interpolation] Hence that which is the per se reason for operation, if it exists per se, is the principle of the operation – but it is not the principle of the operation for anything susceptible of the reason; thus, if heat were separate, it would not be the principle of heating for fire. So it is impossible for anything to act through that which is separate from it; hence the Philosopher, *On the Soul* 2.1.412a27-b6, 414a12-13, proves that the soul is ‘first act of the body, etc.’ because it is



‘that by which we live and sense etc.’ Therefore nothing acts by any reason for acting unless that reason informs it; but the essence of the angel is posited as subsistent; therefore it cannot be for the angelic intellect the reason for understanding.

268. Further, second, against what he says, that ‘the power does not receive anything because it is not sometimes in potency and sometimes in act’ [n.265] – the object in respect of that which is in the intellect about it (namely in respect of intellection) is not only the cause in its coming to be (the way a builder is cause in respect of the house), but is cause both in its coming to be and in its being (otherwise, just as the house remains when the builder is corrupted, so when the object is at all absent or corrupted in idea of object that which is in the intellect about it as object would remain); but a cause of coming to be and of being is always equally causing, as is plain about the sun with respect to rays of sunlight [1 d.3 nn.602-603]; therefore the object that is posited as the principle of the operation of intellection [n.263] is always equally causing, and consequently the intellect is always equally receiving. The intellect then receives from the object not merely because it receives a new act which it is sometimes not receiving, but because the object is cause of being with respect to that which is always from it receiving.<sup>a</sup>

a. [*Interpolation*] Further, according to him who thus thinks, ‘an angel is so much the higher the more he understands through a species that is more universal’ [Aquinas *ST* Ia q.55 a.3], which is not true by universality of commonness but by universality of virtue and perfection. And they [sc. those who think like Aquinas] do not first have to posit that species with respect to accidents, because accidents are known through the species of the substances in which they are virtually included; nor even do they first have to posit it with respect to subalternate species, because all the

intermediate things can be known through the species of the most specific species. Therefore they have to posit this sort of intelligible species with respect to the most specific species, so that an angel is so much the higher the more he knows more things (as the inferior species) through the species of a superior species; therefore the highest angel knows inferior species through that by which he knows his own quiddity. So if he knows himself through his own essence, he would know all other created things through his own essence, which the author of this opinion himself denies [Aquinas *ST* Ia q.55 a.1].

### B. Scotus' own Opinion

269. To the question therefore I say that an angel can understand himself through his essence according to the sense expounded at the beginning of the question [sc. 'an angel's own essence is the reason for knowing himself without any representing thing that naturally precedes the act', n.255].

270. In proof I say:

First, because an object has some partial causality with respect to intellection (and this the object insofar as it is actually intelligible), and the intellect has its own partial causality with respect to the same act, according to which it concurs with the object for perfectly producing such act – so that these two, when they are in themselves perfect and united, are one integral cause with respect to intellection [1 d.3 nn.486-494].

From this I argue as follows: every partial cause that is in the perfect act proper to itself as it is such a cause can cause the effect with the causality corresponding to itself; and, when it is united to the second partial cause in its act, it can, along with it, cause perfectly; but the essence of an angel is of itself in first act corresponding to the object, because it is of itself actually intelligible, and it is of itself united to the intellect with a

conjunction of both partial causes; therefore it can, along with the other partial cause united to it, perfectly have a perfect act of intellection with respect to the essence.

271. Further, in the case of intelligible things possessed of intelligible species, the species, along with the intellect, cause an intellection by virtue of the objects; but the objects in the intelligible things have a diminished being; therefore, if they had in themselves an absolute such being and being simply (namely actually intelligible being), then they could more truly cause the same effect, because whatever can be caused by something diminishedly such in some being, can be simply caused by virtue of, and by, something simply such. But the essence of an angel as it is in itself is present to the angel's intellect, and this essence indeed is simply such (namely, actually intelligible in itself, and intelligible in a certain respect in the intelligible species); therefore etc.<sup>a</sup>

a. [*Interpolation*] Or let the argument be formed thus: if something having some sort of diminished being has power for some operation, then something that has a perfect such being has power for that operation; but the intelligible object, possessing diminished being in the species, is the reason for understanding it – for the object has being in the species in the intellect (as was said in 1 d.3 n.249); and it has there a diminished intelligible being because, where it is a being diminishedly, there it is diminishedly intelligible; therefore when the object has simply intelligible being in the intellect, it will be simply the reason for understanding it. But the essence of angel has such being with respect to its intellect; therefore etc.

Further, that thing can be the reason for understanding some object in which the object, 'as actually intelligible', is sufficiently present to the intellect, because it constitutes, along with the intellect, perfect memory, and this memory is sufficiently a generator; but the essence of an angel is actually intelligible, and is sufficiently present to the intellect in idea of object, because there is no requirement for it to be present in the intellect by informing it (for then God would

not understand his essence); therefore an angel can understand himself in and through the essence.

Further, an angel can have intuitive cognition of his essence, for our soul can also do this if it did not have an ordering toward phantasms; but this knowledge can only be done through the essence of the thing (or it cannot be perfectly done by some other thing), because whatever other reason is posited, this other reason can remain when the intuitive cognition does not remain, and it would be indifferent to representing the thing whether the thing exists or not; therefore etc.

### C. Instances against Scotus' own Opinion

272. It is objected against this view [n.271] that then a sensible thing could cause intellection immediately, without an intelligible species (which was denied in 1 d.3 nn.334, 382); because a sensible thing present to the senses is of such sort simply as it is in a certain respect in the intelligible species; therefore if in the intelligible species (where it is in a certain respect) it can cause intellection, much more can it do so as it is in itself according to its being simply and absolutely.

273. Further, it seems one can argue against this position [n.269] as was argued against the opinion [of Aquinas, n.266], that nothing is for anything the reason for its operating with an immanent operation unless it informs it; but although the essence of an angel is actually intelligible and present to the intellect, yet it does not inform the intellect; therefore the essence is not for the intellect the reason for its operating with an immanent operation.

274. Further, if these two agents always concur for the same common effect [n.270], then they have an order between them, since they are not of the same idea;

therefore one of the two is prior or superior, and the other posterior and inferior, and so one will be a moved mover and the other will, with respect to it, be an unmoved mover. But the object is not a moved mover with respect to the intellect but an unmoved mover; therefore the intellect is a moved mover with respect to the object [1 d.3 n.554].

275. Further, fourth: what is said about these partial causes concurring for one common effect [sc. that they are one integral cause of intellection, n.270] seems unacceptable, because two things distinct in genus cannot cause an effect of the same idea; but the spiritual and bodily, or the intelligible and sensible, differ in genus; therefore etc.

276. Proof of the major: because corresponding to these two ideas in the partial causes are two distinct somethings in the effect, and so the same effect would be bodily and spiritual, which is unacceptable. Second, because every agent is more excellent than its patient [1 d.3 n.507]; but the bodily or sensible is in no way more excellent than the spiritual; therefore it cannot be the agent in respect of the spiritual save in virtue of some more excellent agent, and so it will be a moved mover. Next third, because then one of the causes could be so intensified that the whole virtue of both could be in that one of the two, and then it alone could sufficiently cause the effect without the other [1 d.3 n.497], which is unacceptable in the case of two such agents.

277. Response to the first objection [n.272]. In 1 d.3 [nn.349-350, 382] an intelligible species different from the act was posited for this reason, that the object – whether as existing in itself or as existing in any species whatever outside the possible intellect – does not have the idea of an intelligible in act. And then I concede the fact that, wherever there is a thing existing as of some sort in a certain respect and something can

make it simply of that sort, there it could, if it were simply such in act, do the same thing simply. But the sensible object is in a certain respect in the intelligible species and is not actually intelligible outside the species; and so, although in the species (where it is in a certain respect such) it could cause a diminished intellection, yet it can never cause intellection outside the species, whether a diminished or a perfect intellection, because outside the species it is not actually (but only potentially) such a sort of being as the actualizer of it is. Now the essence of an angel is such a sort of being diminishedly, that is, a being of such sort in the species (if it has a species); but it is in itself simply a being and such a being is actually intelligible; therefore etc.

278. To the second [n.273] I say that on the opinion that does not posit the intellect to have any activity, different from the activity it has formally from the object or through the species of the object (just as neither does the wood have an action in heating different from the action which is that of the heat [1 d.3 nn.456-459]) – that on this opinion it necessarily follows that the intellect (not having anything formally) does not do anything formally; and so was it argued against the first opinion [of Aquinas, nn.266-267], which seems to think this same thing about the intellect. But, as was said in 1 d.3 [nn.486-489, 494, 498, 500], the intellect does have its own proper activity along with an object present to it (present in itself or in its species), but an object concurring with it to cause an effect common to them both, so that the union and coming together of these formal parts suffice; and yet there is no requirement that one of the parts inform the other, because neither gives to the other an act pertaining to its own partial causality.

279. To the third [n.274] I say that ‘moved mover’ can be understood in two ways: either because it receives from the unmoved mover some form as first act (whereby it

may move), or because the form, possessed as first act, receives from the unmoved mover some (further) form as second act, by which it may act.

280. Now the first way exists in certain ordered causes where a first gives virtue to a second; but this way is not in the issue at hand, because neither does the intellect, as acting by its own partial causality, give this act, whereby it operates for intellection, to the species of the object; and much less does the reverse happen, because the species of the object does not give to the intellect any activity pertaining to the causality of it.

281. The second way is seen in certain things moving locally, the way the hand moves the stick and the stick moves the ball; for the hand does not give to the stick the hardness by which it impels the body toward some place; rather it gives to the stick precisely a local motion whereby, namely, it is applied to this impelling because of the impossibility that one hard body against another hard body not yield to it.<sup>68</sup> This is the way it seems to be in things acting for some effect produced by generation or alteration, because although the ordered causes there have some reason for causing and the inferior does not cause save in virtue of the superior, yet this virtue or assistance or influence – whatever name one gives it – is not the impression of some form or of something or other inhering in the inferior or superior cause, but is only an order and actual conjunction of such active causes, from which, as thus conjoined and with their proper activities presupposed to the conjoining, an effect follows common to both causes [1 d.3 nn.495-496].

282. Therefore to the issue at hand [nn.274, 279] I say that not only are the causes in question not mover and moved in the first way but they are not even properly so in the second way (the way that the sun and a father are disposed in generation); rather they are

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<sup>68</sup> Tr. A possible reference to an early form of golf?

only two causes disposed as it were equally, in respect of the fact that neither per se totally moves and yet one of them has, in respect of the effect, a causality prior to the other.

283. For perhaps the inferior cause never acts in virtue of the superior cause (properly speaking), unless in its form, whereby it acts, it depends in some way on the superior cause, although it does not then – when it acts – receive that form from the superior cause but has it prior in duration or in nature. For neither does the object depend on the soul (at any rate as the soul is the possible intellect) with respect to the form by which it actually operates for the intellection, nor much less so the reverse dependence; and therefore the object is in no way an unmoved mover with respect to the soul as it operates for intellection.

284. However it can be a mover with respect to the soul insofar as the soul receives the intelligible species, but then it does not move the soul as to the causality that the soul has per se, but moves it per accidens to the form in respect of the partial cause, insofar as the soul operates on that form. And this is the way it was said in 1 d.3 [n.563] that ‘the agent intellect and the phantasm are one total cause of the [intelligible] species’, and further that ‘the intelligible species and something in the soul (whether the agent intellect or the possible intellect) are one total cause of intellection’ [nn.563-564]; so that in the first case there is an object (or a phantasm) moving the soul to intellection, and not to the first act that is the soul’s as it is soul but to the act that is from the rest of the partial cause previous it; but in the second case the object does not move the soul at all, neither to the first act of the soul nor as to any other concurrent cause, but it acts precisely for the common effect – and then the soul, by the act that it had [sc. through its first act],



displays in its own order its perfect acting [or: displays...its acting through the effect], so that there is no motion of the soul there for acting naturally prior to the effect produced. However the soul is not moved to the effect insofar as it is active but insofar as it is receptive of the effect, and so, although it is moved, yet it is not a moved mover, because it is not moved to actively moving but to receiving.

285. To the fourth [n.275] I say that the first proposition [sc. ‘two things distinct in genus cannot cause an effect of the same idea’] is false of partial causes ordered in some way or other to the same effect – that is, that there is an essential order to them and they are not altogether of the same idea. For such partial causes, which are of a different idea, are not only distinct in species (because causes of the same species do not go together in common as causes ordered to the same effect), nor are they only distinct in number (because then they are not of such idea [sc. ordered partial causes]) – therefore they are distinct in genus; and if you take it that they are not distinct ‘in this sort of genus’, a consequence drawn from the idea of distinction in genus cannot hold more of this genus than of that.

## II. To the Principal Arguments

286. To the principal arguments [nn.256-261]:

To the first [n.256] I concede that the soul is of itself actually intelligible and present to itself, and from this follows that it could understand itself if it were not impeded; for nothing is lacking to first act, neither on the part of one cause or both, nor on the part of their union; and thus the whole of first act is perfect of itself, and on this

first act should follow the second act that is intellection. For this reason, perhaps, Augustine frequently says that the soul ‘always knows itself’, because of this proximity to the act of knowing when there is no imperfection in first act.

287. Now the soul does not in this way always know a stone, because although it always has the perfect act of knowing a stone with respect to its own proper partial causality, yet it does not always have the other partial cause in act and present to it in act; and therefore the soul can be said to be ‘sometimes in essential potency’ to understanding a stone, namely when it lacks the form that is of a nature to be the other partial cause in act and of a nature to be united to it in act. And in this way does Augustine posit a trinity [*On the Trinity* 14.6 n.9, 7 n.10] and yet posits that it pertains to the memory alone, because the whole thing exists under the idea of being intelligible only in the presence of the object (and this pertains to the memory [1 d.2 nn.221, 291, 310, d.3 n.580]), but in it is the virtual intellection of the object, which intellection pertains to the intelligence; and in this way, when the will is present as first act, the first act is in some way, in the sufficient cause as in the will and in the *sine qua non* condition as in the intellection, perfected for having a second act with respect to itself as effect. But because nothing of this whole save what pertains to the memory is in act, therefore this whole trinity (namely, that which is of a nature to be a trinity) is in the memory alone as to its real actuality.

288. But why does this total first act not proceed to second act [n.286], since it is per se a sufficient principle for eliciting the second act? I reply: because there is an impediment which this cause cannot overcome, in just the way that a natural cause, however much it be posited to be perfect, could yet never act because of some impediment overcoming it.

289. But what is this impediment? I reply: our intellect, for this present state, is not of a nature immediately to move or be moved unless it is first moved by something imaginable or sensible from outside.

290. And why is this? Perhaps because of sin, as Augustine seems to say *On the Trinity* 15.27 [cf. 1 d.13 n.78], “Infirmity does this to you, and what is cause of infirmity but sin?” (The same is said by the commentator on *Ethics* 6 and by Lincoln on the same place and on *Posterior Analytics* likewise.)<sup>69</sup> Or perhaps this cause is natural, in that in this way was nature set up (as not absolutely natural), namely, if the order of powers (which was discussed largely in 1 d.3 nm.187, 392) necessarily required this, that a phantasm must, as regard whatever universal the intellect may understand, make actually appear a singular of the same universal; but this does not come from nature (nor is this cause absolutely natural), but from sin – and not only from sin but from the nature of the powers in this present state, whatever Augustine may be saying.

291. To the form, then, of the argument [n.256] I say that the cause that is on the part of the angel [sc. ‘because his essence is intelligible and present to the intellect itself’, n.256] is sufficient for the essence of the angel to be the sufficient reason for understanding itself; the essence is also such on the part of the soul, but in the soul it is impeded, and in the angel not impeded; for the intellect of an angel does not have the sort of order to imaginables that our intellect has in this present state.

292. And because of this impotency for immediately understanding intelligibles in act (which impotency does not come from an intrinsic but an extrinsic impossibility, which impossibility, and not just any impossibility, the Philosopher also experienced), the

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<sup>69</sup> Eustratius *Nicomachean Ethics* 6.4 f.106rb-va, as translated and annotated by Grosseteste, Bishop of Lincoln, *ibid.*, and on *Posterior Analytics* 1.14 f.14ra.

Philosopher himself said that ‘the intellect is not any of the intelligibles before it understands’ [n.256], that is, ‘it is not able to be understood by itself before the understanding of other things’; and this last proposition is multiple, according to composition and division (like the proposition in *Topics* 6.6.145b21-30, ‘this now is first immortal or incorruptible’), from the fact that the preposition ‘before’ along with its clause ‘the understanding of other things’ (which is equivalent to an adverbial determination) can be composed with the infinitive ‘to be understood’ signifying the term of the power (and the sense is that of composition) or with the composition itself signified by the indicative term of verb ‘is’ (and the sense is that of division); so that the first sense [sc. of composition] is this: ‘it is not possible for the intellect to be understood by itself before the understanding of other things’, and this sense is true according to the Philosopher; but the other sense [sc. of division] is that ‘before the understanding of other intelligibles it is not possible for the intellect to understand’, and it is false (just as the proposition ‘this is now first immortal’ is false about man in the state of innocence, *Topics* 6 above). And in this way does the Philosopher understand that ‘the soul understands itself as it does other things’ [n.256].<sup>70</sup>

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<sup>70</sup> In the *Topics* passage Aristotle discusses the sentence ‘this animal is incorruptible now’ and says it can be understood to mean ‘this animal is not corrupted now’ or ‘it is not possible for it to be corrupted now’, or ‘it is of the sort now as never to be corrupted’. He further remarks that when we say an animal is incorruptible now we do not mean that now the animal is such (sc. such as never to be corrupted) but that now it is as never corrupted (sc. though it can or will be corrupted sometime later, as was also true of man in the state of innocence before the fall, that he was immortal then but not such that, through sin, he could not die later). Hence the ‘now’ is either taken in divided sense where it is outside and governs ‘this animal is incorruptible’, so that the sense is that the animal is such as never to die, and this sense is false; or in composed sense where the ‘now’ is part of ‘this animal is incorruptible’, so that the sense is that the animal is at this time now incorruptible (though nothing is implied about whether it can or cannot be corrupted later), and this sense is true.

So the sentence discussed here by Scotus, ‘the intellect is not able to be understood by itself before the understanding of other things’, can be taken either in divided sense where the ‘not possible before it understands other things’ is outside and governs ‘the intellect understands itself’, so that the sense is that the combination of ‘the intellect understands itself’ and ‘before it understands other things’ is impossible, or that the intellect is such as never to understand itself

293. And, according to this mode of exposition, the intellect is moved by imaginable objects and, when these are known, it can know from them ideas common to immaterial and to material things and thus, by reflection, know itself under an idea common to itself and to imaginable things. But it cannot understand itself immediately without understanding something else [n.256], for it cannot be moved immediately by itself because of its necessary ordering, in this present state, to imaginable things [1 d.3 nn.541-542].

294. As to the second principal argument [n.257], one doctor says [Aquinas *ST* Ia q.56 a.1 ad2] that a singular can be per se understood although not a material singular, because it is not the singularity but the materiality that gets in the way (otherwise God would not be intelligible since he is singular, which is false); and then the response is plain, that the assumed proposition about the non-understood singular [‘a singular is not per se intelligible’, n.257] is only true of a material singular. Another doctor says [Henry of Ghent *Quodlibet* 5 q.15] that the intellect is not able to understand either itself or other things under the idea of a singular (material or immaterial) but under the idea of a universal, which is per se the object of the intellect and also shines forth in the intelligible habit; and according to this opinion too the response to the argument is plain. However I believe neither is true save when speaking of the material intellect, which is not able

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before understanding other things. This sense is false. Or the sentence can be taken in composed sense where the ‘not possible before it understands other things’ is part of ‘the intellect understands itself’, so that the combination of ‘the intellect understands itself’ and ‘before it understands other things’ is not impossible simply but only given the intellect’s current ability. This sense is true because it allows that the intellect might, in other conditions, be able to understand itself before it understands other things.

So, finally, when the Philosopher says ‘the soul understands itself as it understands other things’, he should not be taken as meaning that it is impossible simply for the soul to understand itself in any other way, but that this way is how it does in fact understand itself – without implication about what it may or may not be able to do in other circumstances.

perhaps, because of its imperfection, to understand every intelligible that an angelic intellect can understand.

295. To the third [n.258] I say that the reason for the major proposition [sc. ‘every cognitive power must, as to itself, be bare of that which is the reason for knowing’] is this – first in the case of the sensitive powers – ‘that every sensitive power requires a determinate organ’; hence from the possible determinate number of organs the Philosopher concludes, *On the Soul* 2.6.418a7-17, 3.1.424b22-27, 3.2.426b8-12, to a determinate number of actions or objects. But the organ has to be so disposed that it can receive the sensible thing without matter, and, in the case of bodily things, whatever is receptive of the form without the matter is not commonly receptive of every form (I said ‘commonly’ for this reason, that the discussion is not now of the organ of sense, about which there is a special difficulty [*Reportatio* ad loc.]). So the organ of sense must be not such, that is, it must lack the object in the object’s material and sensible being (not only actually but even potentially), because it is not receptive of the object in its material being (according to which being it is the object of sense). The point is very clear about color, where the thing that receives it in material being is the surface of a determinate body, but where the thing that receives it without matter is a transparent or indeterminate body [sc. the water or air etc. through which a colored object is seen]. And thus opposed dispositions are required in the organ of sense, because it must be receptive of the sensible without matter and in something which must receive the object in material being [sc. the eye, qua seeing, is transparent but qua determinate body has a colored surface]; so for this reason the organ, and consequently the sense that is in the organ, has to be bare of the form that it receives.

296. From this too follows what is put forward by the Philosopher in *On the Soul* 3.4.429a24-27, namely that the intellect is not the power of an organ and so is separated from the whole of matter, just as from any organ by which it operates. For if it required some organ, that organ would be of a determinate disposition (as is every bodily organ), and so from the fact it is receptive of things according to determinate material being (because of the determinate disposition of the body) it would not be receptive of all bodily forms according to immaterial being; and so the intellect could not receive the forms of all material things, as of its objects, if it were a material and organic power. However, when one has that it is a non-organic power, there is no need for it to be really not of the sort as that is of which it has to be intellectually receptive; for there is no need that there be an opposite disposition in what is receptive really and intellectually of something – on the supposition that the intellect is not an organic power, although this would be required if it were an organic power; for the same intellect can be itself really and be habitually in act really, and yet receptive intellectually both of itself and of its habit and of anything that really informs it; and the whole reason is that such things, when intellectually received, do not require in the receiver a determinate disposition opposite to intelligible real being [1 d.3 nn.383-390].

297. The proposition, then, which says that the knower must be not such, or bare of that which it knows or receives and of the reason for knowing [n.258], entails, if it is taken generally, that every intellect is nothing, because every intellect in itself belongs to the totality of beings, and so it will be none of the beings; and this understanding is false. But it is however not material or organic, so that it can be capable of all beings; because if it were material or organic it would be receptive only of some things without matter,

things the reception of which would not be repugnant to its material entity; but to its intellectual entity the intellectual reception of anything whatever is not repugnant.

298. To the fourth principal argument [n.260] the reply has been made frequently [1 d.3 nn.430, 513-520] that the same thing can move itself (not only with bodily but also with spiritual motion), and universally any virtual univocal action can stand with a power for a second formal act; and, next, it has been frequently said [2 d.2 nn.472-473, 1 d.2 n.231, 1 d.7 n.72] how the same thing is not in power and in act as these are opposite differences of being, whether per se or denominatively, and yet the same thing is in potency (that is, is a passive principle) and in act (that is, is an active principle of the same).

299. As to the final argument [n.261], although some [Averroes, *Metaphysics* 12 com.51] concede the conclusion there drawn [sc. ‘the intellection would be the same either as the object or as his essence’] – which seems impossible, because then it would follow that the intellection would be actually infinite (for any intellect can be of infinite intelligibles, and if it then had an intellection the same as itself, the intellection of anything whatever would, by parity of reason, be the same as itself, and thus it would have an intellection the same as itself which was or could be of infinite intelligibles) – however I deny the consequence [sc. ‘if an angel could...then...the object or as his essence’].

300. And as to the proof of the consequence [n.261] I say that the intellection, according to truth, is an extreme both with respect to the power and with respect to the object, because it is the effect of both; for just as when knowledge is produced by diverse things (knower and known) there is an effect common to them both (Augustine *On the*



*Trinity* IX.12 n.18), so too when an effect is produced by something the same that has the nature of both the power and the object, it is the effect of that one thing (which thing really has the double causality) and is not in between the same thing and itself in natural reality, the way that a middle is in between contraries; and about such a middle, as far as concerns the nature of the thing, the proposition is true that ‘the middle agrees more with the extremes than the extremes agree with themselves’ [n.261].

301. To the confirmation [n.261] I say that an intellection is distinguished from another intellection by the object, but it is distinguished from the object and the power by itself formally; but the fact it is distinguished from them causally it gets from the extrinsic causes (as from the power and the object), as the ray has causally from the sun that it is distinguished from it.

## Question Two

### *Whether an Angel has a Distinct Natural Knowledge of the Divine Essence*

302. Second I ask about an angel’s intellection with respect to things other than himself, and first whether an angel has a distinct natural knowledge of the divine essence.

303. That he does not:

Because this knowledge would come either through the divine essence or through a species of the essence. But not through the essence because then the angel would be naturally blessed, which is not something that can belong to a creature. Nor through a species because the divine essence is more intimate to the intellect than the species would

be; therefore it would be superfluous to posit a species there, because the essence by itself would be able more efficaciously to do what the species is posited for than would the species itself.

304. Further, the Philosopher *On the Soul* 3.8.431b29-432a1 seems only to posit that a species is necessary because the object is not by itself in the soul, “For the stone is not in the soul but the species of the stone is;” therefore etc.

305. On the contrary:

The angel would then either have no knowledge of the divine essence, and then in vain would the precept be given to him, ‘Thou shalt love the Lord thy God etc.’ (for in vain is a love prescribed of what is altogether unknown), or he would have a confused knowledge of that essence, and then his intellect seems to be potential like ours (which can proceed from the confused to the clear), and this seems unacceptable.

## I. The Response of Others to the Question

306. There are some here [Aquinas *ST* Ia q.12 a.4, q.56 a.3, Henry *Quodlibet* 3 q.1] who agree in the negative proposition that ‘angels do not naturally have a distinct knowledge of the divine essence’.

### A. First Opinion

307. If, when holding this negative proposition, you ask by what affirmative it is held, the response is that the angel does not know the divine essence naturally, through any species.<sup>71</sup>

308. The proof is:

Because every reason proper for understanding any object represents that object adequately; no created essence or species can represent adequately the divine or uncreated effigy, because anything of the former sort is finite but the object is infinite (there is no proportion of the finite to the infinite); therefore etc.

309. Again, the created species of one thing is more similar to another created thing than to God, because each of them is finite; therefore it more distinctly represents a creature than God. Therefore it is not a reason proper and distinct for understanding God.

310. Again, the formal reason according to which an object is apprehended is determinate (as is also the idea of the object), otherwise it would not represent this object more than that; God is most indeterminate and unlimited because he is infinite; therefore etc. Hence Augustine *On the Trinity* 8.3 n.4, “Take this good away and that good away, and look at the good itself, if you can, and you have indeed seen God, the good of every good, beyond every good;” therefore God cannot be known distinctly by such a species.

311. Again, if it is necessary to posit a species such that through it God is known distinctly, then as a result that species will be more an image of God than an angel or the soul in themselves are; but this is against Augustine (*ibid.*, 14.8 n.11), who says that “the more something is an image of God, the more it is able to have a capacity for him and to

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<sup>71</sup> Tr. This proposition too is negative but it depends on the prior affirmative proposition that what is known by creatures naturally is known through a species.

participate in him;” but an angel is able more to participate in God than a species; therefore etc.<sup>a</sup>

a. [*Interpolated note*] There are two arguments missing here, as is plain in the responses [nn.342, 345]. However, according to what can be elicited from the responses, the first can be formed enthymematically as follows: if an angel can have a distinct knowledge of the divine essence through some species distinctly representing it, then as a result he can naturally know the Trinity and the whole mystery of it. The second argument as follows: since a blessed angel can see the species in the intellect of another angel, as Michael for instance in the intellect of Gabriel, then as a result Michael, by virtue of the species seen in Gabriel’s intellect, will see everything supernatural.

## B. Second Opinion

312. Another way [Aquinas] is to say that an angel knows God through his own proper essence, that is, through the angel’s essence, for the essence of an angel is an image and likeness of God; but each thing is known through its likeness and image; therefore an angel can know God through his nature and essence insofar as this is an image of God. And this image is called a ‘mirror’ image; therefore etc.<sup>a</sup>

a. [*Interpolation*] Which is proved by Henry in the *Quodlibet* 5 q.9 [3 q.1, 4 q.7] and by Thomas in *ST* Ia q.56 a.3.

## C. Rejection of the Opinions

313. Against the first [Henry], who posits the above reasons for the negative conclusion [nn.307-311], the argument is as follows:

Because it can be proved from the same reasons that an angel does not naturally know the divine essence through any created representation; and, according to Henry, an angel does not know naturally through the divine essence, because no creature can naturally see that essence. And from this it seems to follow that an angel can have no natural knowledge of the divine essence; for nothing about this essence is seen distinctly and in particular, because this seems to be possible only through the essence, or through something distinctly representing it, both of which Henry denies; and it is not seen indistinctly, or in some more common concept (a concept not proper to the divine essence), because Henry denies every concept common and univocal to this essence and to another.

314. Further, the divine essence, according to him, is of a nature only to form a single concept in the divine intellect, so that no other concept is had about it save by an intellect busying itself about it [cf. Scotus 1 d.8 nn.55, 174-175, 188]; therefore the divine essence is of a nature only to make of itself one real concept about any intelligible whatever. Proof of the consequence: every concept that is of a nature to be had and to be caused by virtue of this essence in any intellect is of a nature to be, by virtue of it, had in an intellect comprehending it; such is the divine intellect. And further it follows that no real concept save one can be had about this essence; the proof of this consequence is that every real concept that any intellect can have about this essence can be caused by this essence (otherwise it would not be perfect in idea of object), because that which is most perfect in idea of object can cause every real, causable concept about itself. And the

further consequence is that either an angel's intellect will have that one concept (however it is caused), or it will have altogether no concept; but it cannot have the former (namely 'to know through the divine essence' or 'through a proper representing reason', nn.306-311); therefore it will have no concept.

315. Against the second [Aquinas], who posits that an angel understands the essence through himself insofar as he is the image of God [n.312], I argue:

Although the image that is only a reason for knowing, and is not as a known species (as is true of the visible species in the eye and the intelligible species in the intellect), represents the object immediately, or non-discursively, yet the image through which the object it is the image of is not known, save as through a known species, is not the reason for knowing the object save only discursively (the way the knower reaches discursively the thing known); but the essence of an angel can only be posited as an image in the second way and not in the first way; the angel then does not know the divine essence through the image save discursively. But this is unacceptable, because according to those who hold this opinion the angelic intellect is not discursive [Aquinas *ST* Ia 1.58 a.3]; therefore etc.

316. Further, all discursive thought presupposes simple knowledge of that which it discursively reaches; therefore, if through the known essence [sc. of the angel] discursive knowledge is had of the divine essence, a simple concept of the divine essence must be had first, and then another, prior reason must be sought after for knowing it.

317. There is a confirmation too in that no object causes a distinct knowledge of some other object unless it includes that other object virtually in itself, because 'each thing is disposed to being known as it is disposed to being' [cf. *Metaphysics* 2.1.993b30-

31]; an object then that does not include something virtually as to entity does not include it as to knowability. But the essence of an angel does not include virtually the divine essence under some distinct idea; therefore neither does the angel thus know the divine essence.

## II. Scotus' own Response to the Question

### A. On Distinction of Intellections

318. I respond differently, then, to the question [n.302]. First I draw a distinction between two intellections: for some knowledge of an object can be according as it abstracts from all actual existence, and some can be according as the object is existent and is present in some actual existence.

319. This distinction is proved by reason [nn.319-322] and by a likeness [nn.323]:

The first member [abstract knowledge] is plain from the fact we can have science of certain quiddities; but science is of an object as it abstracts from actual existence, otherwise science could sometimes be and sometimes not be, and so would not be permanent but the science of a thing would perish on the perishing of the thing, which is false [*Metaphysics* 7.15.1039b31-1040a4].

320. The second member [knowledge of actual existence] is proved by the fact that what is a matter of perfection in a lower power seems to exist more eminently in a higher power of the same genus; but in the senses – which are cognitive powers – it is a matter of perfection that the senses are cognitive of a thing according as it is in itself existent and is present in its existence; therefore this is possible in the intellect, which is a

supreme cognitive power. Therefore the intellect can have the sort of knowledge of a thing that is of it as present.

321. And, to speak briefly, I give to the first knowledge, which is of the quiddity as the quiddity abstracts from existence and non-existence, the name of abstractive. To the second, namely the one that is of the quiddity in its actual existence (or is of the thing as present in such existence), I give the name intuitive intellection; not as ‘intuitive’ is distinguished from ‘discursive’ (for some abstractive knowledge is in this way intuitive), but as simply intuitive, in the way we are said to intuit a thing as it is in itself.

322. The second member is also made clear by the fact that we are not waiting for a knowledge of God of the sort that can be had of him when – per impossibile – he is not existent or not present in his essence, but we are waiting for an intuitive knowledge that is called ‘face to face’ [*I Corinthians* 13.12], because just as sensitive knowledge is face to face with the thing as it is presently existent, so also is that knowledge we are waiting for.

323. This distinction [n.318] is made clear, second, by a likeness in the sensitive powers; for a particular sense knows an object in one way and imagination knows it in another way. For a particular sense is of the object as it is existent per se and in itself, while imagination knows the same object as it is present in a species, and this species could be of the object even if the object were not existent or present, so that imaginative knowledge is abstractive with respect to the particular sense, for things that are dispersed in inferior things are sometimes united in superior ones. Thus these two modes of sensing, which are dispersed in the sensitive powers because of the organ (because the organ that is well receptive of an object of a particular sense is not the same as the organ that is well



receptive of the object of imagination), are united in the intellect, to which, as to a single power, both acts can belong.

## B. Solution

324. Having premised this distinction, then, I reply to the question [n.302] that, although according to what is commonly said an angel cannot, on the basis of his natural powers, have an intuitive knowledge of God (on which see book 4 [not in the *Ordinatio* since d.49, where this matter would likely have been treated, is missing]), yet it does not seem one should deny he can naturally have an abstractive knowledge of him, understanding this as follows, that some species distinctly represents the divine essence although it does not represent the essence as it is presently existent; and then indeed an angel can have a distinct, though abstractive, intellection of God, for abstractive intellection is distinguished into confused and distinct, according to different reasons for knowing.

325. And to posit that an angel's intellect has been endowed from the beginning with such a species, representing the divine essence, does not seem unacceptable, so that, although this species is not natural to his intellect (in the sense that his intellect could not acquire it on the basis of its natural powers, and could not even get it from the action of any naturally acting object, for it cannot get it by the presence of any object moving it save only of the divine essence, and this essence naturally causes nothing by natural causation other than itself), nevertheless, just as the perfections given to an angel in his first creation (even if they did not necessarily follow his nature) might be called 'natural'

(by distinction from the ‘purely supernatural’ gifts of grace and glory), so too this perfection given to the angelic intellect – whereby the divine essence would be present to it distinctly, albeit abstractly – can be called ‘natural’ and be said to pertain to the natural knowledge of the angel; so that whatever an angel knows about God by virtue of this species, he would know in some way naturally and in some way not naturally: naturally insofar as this perfection is not the principle of a graced or a glorious act, supernaturally insofar as he could not attain to it on the basis of his natural powers nor of any natural action.

326. Now that such a species, representing the divine essence (albeit abstractly), should be posited is rendered persuasive as follows:

First because the natural blessedness of an angel exceeds the natural blessedness of man (even if both angel and man had been in the state of innocence for however long a time); therefore, since man in the state of fallen nature can have knowledge of the ultimate end in general, and since he could have had in the state of innocence a distinct knowledge of it in some way, and since volition of the supreme good follows knowledge of the ultimate end as such – it follows that an angel, in such knowing and willing the highest good distinctly, could have a greater blessedness than man.

327. This point is made persuasive, second, by the fact that someone in a state of rapture who has a transitory vision of the divine essence can, when the act of seeing ceases, have a memory of the object, and this under a distinct idea (under which idea the object of vision was), although not under an idea of its being actually present, because such presence does not, after the act, remain in its idea of being knowable; therefore, by some such idea perfecting the intellect, the object can in this way be objectively present,

and thus it is not against the idea of the divine essence that a species of it, distinctly representing it, may be in some intellect. Therefore neither does it seem that such an object is to be denied to the most perfect created intellect; for it seems that to the highest created intellect nothing should be denied that is not repugnant to any created intellect in its natural powers, because it is not a perfection that is too excelling. The assumption here can be made clear by the rapture of Paul who, when the rapture passed, remembered the things he saw, according to what he himself writes, *2 Corinthians* 12.2-4, “I know a man fourteen years ago, whether in the body or out of the body I know not, God knows etc., who heard secret words that it is not permitted for a man to speak.” Now it seems that after the rapture the species can remain distinctly, because this belongs to perfection in the intellect, that it can preserve the species of an object when the presence of the object ceases.

328. The proposed conclusion is made persuasive, third, by the fact that, according to Augustine *Literal Commentary on Genesis* 4.32 n.49, 26 n.43, ch.22 n.39, 18 n.32, the six days of creation were not days in succession of time but days in angelic knowledge of creatures possessed of a natural order, so that first the angel knew the creature in the Word and second in the proper genus and, not stopping there, he returned to praise the Word ‘because of his work’; and in the Word again he sees naturally the idea of the creature next following; so that, when God said ‘Let there be light’, the angel saw it in the eternal Word; and when was said ‘And there was light’ and evening came, he saw it in the proper genus; and when was said ‘And evening came and morning came one day’, he rose up from it to praise God, in whom he saw the second creature; so that his seeing was the end of the preceding day in that, from his knowledge of the first

creature in the Word, he rose to knowledge of the Word – indeed, there was a ‘resting’ of all creatures in the first maker and craftsman (thus does Augustine distinguish the individual days up to the seventh day, which had a ‘morning’ of the final creature in the Word and no ‘evening’ followed) – and his seeing was the beginning of the following day, in that the angel saw another creature in the proper genus.

329. And although Augustine himself posited that the knowledge of things in the Word was a beatific knowledge – as is plain there in ch.24 n.4, “Since the holy angels always see the face of God the Father in the Word, for they enjoy his Only Begotten as he is equal to the Father, they knew first in the very Word of God the universal creation of which they themselves were made the first;” the enjoyment therefore pertains to blessedness. Likewise *ibid.*, “Night then pertains to day, when the sublime and holy angels knew what the creature was in the creature, and they refer it to the love of him in whom they contemplate the eternal reasons by which the creature was created; and in that most concordant contemplation they are one day, with which the Church, when freed from this pilgrimage, will be joined, so that we too may exult and have joy in him etc.” – yet it can be proved from Augustine’s words that this knowledge (which is very commonly called ‘morning knowledge’) is natural and not precisely beatific, because – according to him – this order was in the angelic knowledge ‘of creature after creature’, and it naturally preceded the knowledge of creatures in the proper genus; but, when the creatures were made in the proper genus, at once the angel could have knowledge of them in the proper genus; therefore all those knowledges in the Word naturally preceded the knowledge of creatures in the proper genus; all of them then (according to Augustine) were produced at once. Therefore this ‘knowledge in the Word’ naturally preceded the

production of creatures in the proper genus; but the angels were then in the state of innocence and not blessed, because there was some little delay – as will be said below [2 dd.4-5 qq.1-2 nn.5-7] – between creation and its fall; there was, then, in the angels some morning knowledge (namely of creatures in the Word) while the angels existed in their natural condition (or at least while they were not blessed), and so it does not seem one should give distinct knowledge to an angel while he is standing in his natural condition or in grace, because otherwise he could not know the creatures in the precisely known cause itself before he knew them in the proper genus, since a reason for knowing a cause confusedly is not a reason for knowing it and its ordered effects distinctly.

330. And if an objection be raised as to how in the Word not intuitively but abstractly known an angel could know other things, I reply that the whole of our knowledge of properties now is by abstraction through the intellect, so that an object not only intuitively but also abstractly known is that in which, as known, the property is known.

331. Briefly then to the question [n.302]:

Because we do not have a rule about the angelic intellect (for we are able neither to attribute to it whatever is a matter of perfection in an intellect simply, nor to attribute to it as much imperfection as we experience in our own intellect), and because it is rational to attribute to it all the perfection that belongs to a created intellect and no repugnance stands in the way of why a created intellect had such a knowledge distinctly representing the divine essence (provided however it not represent it intuitively), the concession seems rational [sc. the concession that an angel can know the divine essence

abstractly through a species representing the divine essence], even if it be objected that God can cause intellection immediately without a species [nn.303, 347].<sup>a</sup>

a. [*Interpolation*] I reply: “God administers things thus,” *City of God* 7.30; for he could cause this act immediately, but then this act would not be in the power of the angel (see the end of the fourth distinction [in fact d.3 n.347]).

### III. To the Arguments for the First Opinion

332. To the arguments for the first opinion [nn.308-311], which reject this species.

To the first [n.308] I say that, when speaking of God, the word ‘effigy’ does not seem to be a proper one; for perhaps nothing is properly said to be ‘effig-ied’ save what is figured.

333. But if, using proper words, the proposition ‘every reason proper for understanding any object represents that object adequately’ is taken, I say that here ‘adequately’ can be understood simply of entity to entity, or it can be understood according to the proportion of thing representing to thing represented (as matter is said to be adequate to form according to proportion, although not according to entity because the entities of them are unequal; yet matter is as perfectible as form is perfective, which is that the matter represents the form as much as the form is representable), or, in a third way, ‘adequately’ can be understood according to a proportion, not absolutely, but by comparison to such act (to wit, that it represents an object as perfect and as perfectly as the power, through the sort of act it represents, apprehends the object).

334. Universally in the first way, no per se representing thing (because it is the reason for representing and is not a something known) is adequate to what it represents but falls short, as is plain of whiteness and the species of a white thing. In the second way some reason does represent adequately, as the most perfect species of white represents the white thing, and it is a reason for quasi comprehensively seeing the white thing. In the third way any species of white (even in an eye going blind), even if does not represent the white thing as perfectly as the white thing was representable, yet does perfectly represent it by comparison to the ensuing act [sc. of sight], because it represents it as perfectly as is required for having such a species about the object.

335. As to the issue in hand, then, I say that no species can adequately represent the divine essence in the second way (nor even in the first way), because that essence – which is comprehensible to its own intellect – cannot be comprehended save through the essence as through the reason for comprehending; but in the third way, by comparison with a created intellect, a species can in some way adequately represent the divine essence, that is, as perfectly as such an act attains it.

336. When the minor proposition is proved through the term ‘infinity’ [sc. ‘no created essence or species can represent adequately the divine or uncreated effigy, because anything of the former sort is finite but the object is infinite’, n.308], I say that, just as a finite act can have an infinite object under the idea of infinite and yet the act more immediately attains the object than the species does, so a finite species can represent an infinite object under the idea of infinite; the species is not however adequate in being, nor even in knowing simply, because it is not a principle for comprehending [1 d.3 n.65].

337. To the next proof [n.309], when argument is made about the species of one creature in respect of another, I say that a natural likeness in being is not a per se reason for representing one thing in respect of another thing, because this white thing, however much it is more like another white thing than the species is, is not the reason for representing it; but the species of this white thing, which is much less in natural entity, is more like the white thing in the agreement and likeness of the proportion that is of representing thing to represented thing [n.333].

338. To the third [n.310] I say that ‘determination in an object’ can be understood in two ways: in one way as determination to singularity, in opposition to the indetermination of a universal; in another way as determination to a definite participated degree, in opposition to the unlimitedness of what is participated. In the first way ‘determination in an object’ does not impede intellection of the supreme good, which is God; rather that is the supreme good which is of itself a certain singularity; in the second way ‘determination in an object’ does impede this intellection, because the supreme good is good not in some determinate degree but good absolutely, able to be participated in by all degrees.

339. And although Augustine says about this good and that good (perhaps about singular goods that occur to the soul) ‘Take this good away and that good away, and look at the good itself, if you can etc.’, yet he has this understanding only because particular goods include limitation; but, when limitation is taken away, there is a stand at the unlimitedness of the good in general, and in this good is God understood in general, as was said in 1 d.3 n.192; or, further, there is a stand at the good most universal in



perfection, and then, by taking away the limited degree of good, God is understood more in particular (and such good is neither this good nor that).

340. To the fourth [n.311] I say that ‘image’ is in one way taken for a likeness that depicts or represents precisely, which represents, not because it is known, but precisely because it is the reason for knowing; in another way ‘image’ is taken for a likeness that depicts what is something other than itself, and it represents because it is known; in the first way the species of white in the eye is an image; in the second way a statue of Hercules is an image of him.

341. In the first way the species of God in an angel is more an image than the angel is. In the second way is the angel an image, and to this image belongs a likeness in some way natural in existence, and it consists somehow in what Augustine proposed (in the fact that the soul in a way possesses a unity and trinity, just as the divine essence does), and this likeness is a concurring part in the idea of what is capable of blessedness. Although, therefore, the divine species represents the divine essence more distinctly than an angel does, yet an angel is more of an image to the extent an image is said to be something more alike in nature, possessing acts similar to the acts that are posited in the Trinity – and to this image, from the fact it has such acts, there belongs a capacity for that of which it is the image; and, through these means (namely natural likeness in acts) this capacity belongs to the image of God as Augustine is speaking of it, that ‘it is able to have a capacity for him and to participate in him’.

342. To the next argument [sc. the fifth, not posited above, n.311 interpolation a]<sup>72</sup> one could say that, although the species in the intellect of an angel is the reason for

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<sup>72</sup> This fifth argument reads as follows in *Lectura 2* d.3 n.275: “Further, the species that would represent the divine essence can also represent the Trinity, because the Trinity exists in the divine

distinctly knowing the divine essence, yet it is not a reason for distinctly knowing the mode of that essence in the supposits [persons], just as also some created quiddity in us can be distinctly known although what supposits it is in and how it is in them is not known.

343. And if it be objected against this that when the supposits are, from natural necessity, intrinsic to the nature, then that which is the reason for distinctly knowing the nature will be a reason for distinctly knowing the supposits in the nature, and in that case it seems that an angel could naturally know the divine essence in the three supposits (because he could naturally know that in the first supposit there is an infinite memory productive of a supposit, and that in two there is an infinite will productive of another supposit) – one could say that the knowledge would not be purely natural, because an angel could not naturally reach it on the basis of his natural powers, nor on the basis of the necessary causes of something acting naturally; so that, although an angel possessing a species of the divine essence could naturally use the species, yet the species itself is from a cause that is supernatural and acting supernaturally.

344. But against this is objected that an angel naturally knows all things other than God, although he receives the other species from God imprinting them supernaturally. One could say that the angel could have the other species from the objects in themselves, with no agents being required other than those objects; but in no way could an angel have the distinct species with respect to the divine essence save from God imprinting it, and imprinting not naturally but supernaturally.

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essence; therefore if an angel could naturally know the divine essence distinctly through a species, he will be able naturally to know the Trinity distinctly, which is false." Such an argument is also found in Henry of Ghent *Quodlibet* 4 q.7.

345. To the last argument [sc. the sixth, not posited above, n.311 interpolation a]<sup>73</sup> I say that if one holds that a blessed angel does not see supernatural things through that species, then neither will another angel, seeing the species in the first angel's intellect, see supernatural things through it. But if it is posited that the species is, for the intellect, the reason 'as that in which' for seeing the Trinity, one can concede that it is the reason also for another intellect that sees, because the other intellect too has in it a like species of seeing; but then one has to say that the seeing is natural in one way and not in another way, as was expounded in the preceding response [nn.343-344].

#### IV. To the Argument for the Second Opinion

346. To the argument for the second opinion [n.312], that an angel is an image, I say that the term 'image' is equivocal, because an angel is not an image of the sort that is precisely a reason for the knowing of something as known thing; but it is an image having in some way a natural likeness in existing [nn.337, 340-341], and in being a reason for knowing as itself something known; and, in addition to every such reason for knowing as is a reason insofar as it is known, one must posit – as presupposed to discursive knowing – a reason different from it [nn.315-316].

#### V. To the Principal Arguments

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<sup>73</sup> This sixth argument reads as follows in *Lectura* 2 d.3 n.276: "Again, if some species distinctly represented the divine essence and the Trinity of persons in the essence, then since one angel could see that species naturally in the intellect of another angel, he can naturally know what it represents; and thus an angel can by natural knowledge know more about matters of belief than the faithful know by faith, which is false." Such an argument is also found in Henry of Ghent *Quodlibet* 4 q.7.

347. As to the principal arguments [nn.303-304], it is plain how an angel can know the divine essence distinctly through a species [nn.324-325, 332-345]. And when it is objected [as by Henry of Ghent, *Quodlibet* 3 q.1] that the divine essence ‘is more intimate to the angel’s intellect than the species is’ [n.303], I say that although that intimacy could immediately cause the act that the species causes, yet the act would not be in the power of the angel, just as neither is the cause that causes it; and if the cause should sometimes cease from acting, the angel could not have the act again unless the essence is causing the act, and this would not be in the power of the angel himself. In order, then, that this act, an act not necessarily perpetual, may be in the power of the angel doing it, one must posit in the angel a species of the sort that he can perpetually through it know God distinctly.

348. Hereby is plain the answer to the second argument [n.304], namely that a species is necessary, not only so that the object be present to the soul, but also so that the act be in the power of the doer of the act.

### Question Three

*Whether an Angel is Required to have Distinct Reasons for Knowing Created Quiddities  
in Order to Know them Distinctly*

349. I ask third about the knowledge of an angel (and it is the second question with respect to things known other than himself [n.255, 302]), whether an angel is

required to have distinct reasons for knowing created quiddities in order to know them distinctly.

350. That he is not:

*Metaphysics* 8.3.1043b33-34, “Forms are disposed like numbers;” therefore the more perfect virtually includes the more imperfect, and consequently the more perfect will be a sufficient reason for knowing the more imperfect, just as a greater number is a reason for knowing a lesser number.

351. There is a confirmation from the Philosopher *On the Soul* 2.3.414b29-32, where he maintains that the sensitive power is in the intellective power as a triangle is in a quadrilateral, and such seems to be the order of ordered forms in the universe; but a quadrilateral can be a sufficient reason for knowing a triangle; therefore etc.

352. Again, a material thing is more perfect than its species, because the species has to the material thing the relation of measured to measure, but the measured is naturally posterior and more imperfect than its measure; but nothing more imperfect than a material thing seems to be a perfection of an immaterial thing; therefore no species of a material thing will be the proper reason of knowing for the intellect of an angel. But that which is for it the reason of understanding any intelligible is for it a natural perfection insofar as it is intelligible; therefore etc.

353. Again, an angel understands himself through his own essence (from the first question [nn.269-271]), therefore he understands other things through it as well. The consequence is plain, because his quiddity is intelligible in the same way as other created quiddities are intelligible; therefore if for any intellect its own essence is the immediate reason for knowing itself, by parity of reasoning the quiddity of another thing will be a

reason for its knowing itself, and so there will not be proper reasons with respect to proper quiddities different from those quiddities.<sup>a</sup>

a. [Interpolation] Again, in the first proposition of *On Causes*, “Every first cause has a greater influence on the thing caused than a second cause does;” if therefore an angel is a cause of an inferior thing, he will contain it perfectly.<sup>74</sup>

354. To the contrary:

The divine intellect (according to most people) understands many things distinctly through many distinct reasons (and on this account do some posit [Bonaventure, Aquinas, Henry of Ghent] a necessity for ideas in the divine intellect), and our intellect understands many things precisely through many reasons; therefore the fact of having many reasons with respect to many intelligibles comes neither from an imperfection of intellect (because it belongs to the supreme intellect) nor from a perfection of intellect (because it belongs to the lowest intellect); therefore it comes from an absolute perfection of intellect in itself.

## I. The Opinion of Others

### A. First Opinion, which is that of Henry of Ghent

355. Here Henry of Ghent says, *Quodlibet* 5 q.14, that an angel understands all quiddities through a single scientific habit. Now his way of positing it is this, that

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<sup>74</sup> Further words are added at the end of this interpolation that the Vatican editors have transposed to n.364 as its last sentence (“There is a confirmation of this...more things through one reason.”), where they think the words properly belong.

although the habit is in the intellect as a form in a subject (or by impression), yet the object that shines forth in the habit does so only objectively.

356. And if it be asked how an object could be present as shining forth through a habit, the answer is that “although scientific habits are qualities in the first species of quality, yet there is founded on this quality a respect essential for it (which cannot be removed from it) to the knowable object as to that on which it depends in its essence and its existence...so that the intellect cannot take hold of this quality without taking hold of the knowable object with respect to which it exists,” because of “the natural connection of correlation” that it has to it; and even if the quality is “divinely bestowed, it no less has the essential respect to the knowable object,” so that “the knowable object, from the nature of the scientific habit, always shines back on the intellect with that of which it is the object...and it as much more naturally shines forth than could happen through a species as the science depends more essentially on the knowable object than the species on the thing, from which thing the species does not get its being caused.”

357. And if it be asked how it is that through one habit many objects can be present, the response is that “a single habit of science contains virtually the many intelligibles that the science concerns, and contains them the more actually the more simple it is; so that, if there were infinite species of creatures, that one habit would suffice for understanding all of them one after another, even by an infinite process, and this by understanding each of them the more simply and clearly the more indeterminate the habit is and the less determinate in its nature and essence, according as the higher angels are reckoned to understand by more universal and simpler habits than the lower ones do.”

358. And if it is asked how this habit reduces the angel's intellect from potentially understanding to actually understanding, the answer stated is that "an angel's intellect is naturally inclined by the habit co-created with it to understanding the quiddities of simple things, in the way an unimpeded heavy object is at once made to tend downwards by its heaviness; and an angel's intellect is inclined so much the more naturally by the habit to understanding this thing rather than that thing the more essentially the habit is ordered to one thing rather than another (as to an intellection of itself or of a more abstract and more perfect creature that has more intelligibility). And then, when the intellect has been put into first act for first understanding, it runs discursively by a free choice of will to understanding particular things both propositional and simple (I mean by 'discursively' to know this thing after that thing, not to know this thing on the basis of that thing)...and according as it tends determinately to something by command of will, so the habit inclines determinately to that same thing;" for the habit "moves determinately to something according as it is impelled toward it by command of will."

359. Now, in support of this opinion, five reasons can be elicited from the statements of the author of it. The first of these is that the Philosopher *Ethics* 2.4.1105b19-21 says there are only three things in the soul: power, habit, and passion. But the reason of understanding in an angel cannot be only his power (because thus something natural would be a sufficient principle for representing all knowables), and it is certainly not his passion; therefore it is his habit.

360. The second is as follows: in an intellect that has no habit a habit can be generated by frequent elicited acts; therefore if a scientific habit for knowing were not co-created in an angel, he could generate in himself such a habit, and thus he would be in



essential potency, not only to second, but also to first act (the way our intellect is), which is unacceptable.

361. The third is that Dionysius *Divine Names* ch.7 says that ‘the connection of the universe consists in the fact that the highest of the lower is conjoined with the lowest of the higher’; but the highest in human knowledge is that he should be ready for knowing through a scientific habit; therefore this sort of knowledge must be posited in an angel.

362. The fourth is that if there were no other reason save that a species without a habit does not suffice for perfect knowledge while a perfect habit without a species does suffice, in vain is a species posited for an act of understanding.

363. The fifth is that several elements are not posited in the will as principles for willing diverse objects; therefore neither are diverse principles of understanding posited in the intellect, but a single habit in a perfect intellect will suffice for representing whatever is naturally knowable to it.

#### B. Second Opinion, which is that of Thomas Aquinas

364. Another opinion says [Aquinas *ST* Ia 1.55 a.3, *De Veritate* q.8 aa.10-11] that there is no need to posit proper reasons in an angel with respect to individual created quiddities, because although a lower angel knows many quiddities through many reasons for knowing, yet a higher angel can know them through some one reason, as is proved by Dionysius *Celestial Hierarchy* ch.12, “The superior angels have a more universal science than the inferior ones;” it is also proved by reason, because just as prior things are nearer

to the first thing in entity so are they too in intellectuality. Since therefore the first intellect understands everything through one reason, a higher intellect will understand through fewer reasons what a lower intellect understands through more. There is a confirmation of this, that a sharper human intellect understands more things in one reason for knowing than another less sharp one does; therefore it thus seems that the angelic intellect, because of the greater perfection of its intellectuality, can distinctly understand more things through one reason.<sup>75</sup>

365. There is another argument to the same effect, that the more some reason for knowing is in something more immaterial or in something more actual, the more universal is the reason for representing; this major premise is plain of the species in the senses and of the phantasm in the intellect; and the reason is that ‘a received thing is in the receiver in the mode of the receiver’ [n.412]; therefore the reason that is in a higher, more actual angel will be a reason in a superior for knowing more things than in an inferior.

### C. Rejection of Both Opinions in General

366. Now this opinion seems to coincide with the preceding one in this respect, that as the first posits that infinitely many quiddities could be known by the one habit (as far as concerns it of itself [n.357]), so this second one has to posit that in some one angel there was some one reason that would not be a reason for representing a definite number of quiddities without being a reason for representing more. For, by proceeding according to the number of quiddities in the universe and the number of intelligible species in

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<sup>75</sup> See footnote to interpolation after n.253 above.

angels, ‘of which there is always a smaller number in a higher angel’ [nn.364-365], one will eventually reach some single species in some single angel that could be the reason for knowing all inferior intelligibles – or at any rate one will reach some few species, and so all the inferior quiddities whatever that could come to be could be known by those few species; and thus, by attributing to one species some one definite multitude of knowable quiddities, one would not be able to find, on its part, why it was the reason for knowing so many and not more. And granted that the second opinion could in some way escape this conclusion, nevertheless, even were it not the first reason I pose against it, there will be another three against it, as also against the first opinion [nn.369, 371, 376].

367. I prove first, then, that a single created reason cannot be a principle for knowing an infinity of quiddities, or cannot be a principle for knowing a definite number of them without being a principle for knowing more, because where a numerical plurality requires a greater perfection, there an infinite plurality or a numerical infinity requires an infinite perfection (an example: if being able to carry more weights at once entails a greater power, then being able to carry an infinity of weights at once, or not being able to carry a definite number at once without being able to carry more, entails a power intensively infinite); but for something to be a reason for distinctly knowing several quiddities entails a greater perfection in it than does being a reason for knowing one quiddity alone; if therefore something could be a reason for knowing an infinity of things (or not a reason for knowing a definite number without being a reason for knowing more), it will be infinite – which is impossible.

368. The assumption [sc. the minor, ‘for something to be...knowing one quiddity alone’, n.367] I prove<sup>a</sup> by the fact that if the proper reason representative of this quiddity

is taken, then, insofar as it is the representative reason of this quiddity, it includes some perfection, and likewise the proper reason representative of another quiddity includes some perfection; and these perfections in their proper representative reasons are of different idea; the one reason, then, that distinctly represents both of them as objects includes virtually in itself several perfections of different idea, and so it is more perfect in itself than is either of them alone. This is also confirmed by what is said in 1 d.2 nn.125-127, where it is proved that God is infinite from the infinity of the things represented through his essence.

a. [*Interpolation*] Hereby not only is the minor proved but also the major.

369. Second I prove that no created reason can be a reason for knowing distinctly several quiddities:

First, because each one reason for knowing has one adequate object, and in this object are perfectly included all the things knowable through that reason, if several things are knowable through it.<sup>a</sup> The point is plain from a likeness about the divine essence as reason and as object; for the divine essence as reason is distinctly representative in regard to infinite objects because it is of one first object, which object perfectly includes all those infinite objects insofar as they are knowable. But the one reason here that is being posited does not have any first object virtually including, according to its total knowability, all other quiddities; for this reason is posited precisely as having for object all created things, and no creature thus includes all quiddities.

a. [*Interpolation*] Or alternatively let the major be this: whatever is the reason for knowing distinctly several things has one object in which those several things are perfectly contained.

370. There is also proof of the major [n.369] by reason, because the unity of the naturally posterior depends on the unity of the prior, for on a distinction in the naturally prior follows a distinction in the posterior; but every reason for knowing that exists in a created intellect (that is, which is not participated as the divine essence is) is disposed to the known thing as measured to measure, and so is as naturally posterior to prior; therefore its unity necessarily depends on the unity of the object measuring.<sup>a</sup>

a. [*Interpolation*] Therefore it is necessary that some one object is the measure of the reason for knowing. But the object that is the measure of it is adequate to it; therefore it is not a reason for knowing other things save in that these other things are virtually contained in the first object, which is the measure of the reason for knowing. – Second, the major is proved as follows: nothing is a reason for perfectly knowing another thing unless it either is the proper reason for it or contains the proper reason for knowing it; but not in the first way, since it is a reason for knowing distinctly several other things; therefore it must contain virtually the reasons for knowing many things, if it is a distinct reason for knowing them. The minor is evident, because the quiddity of the object will be a created one – and it cannot contain other quiddities distinctly in knowability, because there is some entity in an inferior that is not contained in a superior; therefore likewise there is in knowability some reason in an inferior that is not contained in a superior knowability; therefore etc.

371. Again second: each one reason for knowing can have some act of knowing adequate to it; but this reason, which is posited to be the reason with respect to knowing distinctly several quiddities, cannot have some one act of understanding adequate to it,

because – according to them – this intellect cannot know distinctly and at once the several quiddities of which it is the reason; therefore etc.

372. The proof of the major is that every perfect memory can have an intelligence adequate to itself as to the fact that, according to its first and total act, it can produce an effect adequate to itself; this is clear because even the infinite memory of the Father can be the principle for producing an actual infinite knowledge.<sup>a</sup>

a. [*Interpolation*] Proof of the minor: for it cannot have one act adequate to it intensively, because then the act would contain virtually acts of understanding all other quiddities, which it cannot do; nor can it have one such act extensively, because then it could at once actually and distinctly understand all those quiddities, and this is not true and not conceded by them either.

373. Against these two arguments [nn.369, 371] it is objected that a form productive of several things does not have to have one first object in which are contained virtually all other objects (as is clear about the form of the sun with respect to generable and corruptible forms); nor even does it have to be able to have one act adequate to itself, but several. So it is in the issue at hand.

374. I reply:

A productive power in some way unlimited in its effects is an equivocal power, and therefore simply superior and nobler than any effect; because of this its unity does not depend on the unity of the effect but the effect depends on this cause; and the effects can be many while this cause exists as single, because there can be a plurality in posterior things along with a unity in the naturally prior thing. But in operations that are not productions the object in that case does not have the idea of a naturally prior with respect

to that which is the proximate reason for operating (speaking of the case of creatures), and the unity of what is naturally posterior depends on the unity of the prior.

375. Likewise too, such a productive form does not naturally have to have a passive thing adequate to it (adequate both in intensity and in extension) so that it can act with an adequate action; but the memory insofar as it is an operative power has itself a natural intelligence (in the same nature) as the passive or quasi-passive thing adequate to it, namely because it can receive an action or a second act adequate in every way (namely both intensively and extensively) to the first act of memory itself; otherwise there would be in the memory some reason for knowing that would altogether exceed the power of generating of the memory as it is parent, and so ‘the parts of the image would not mutually take hold of themselves’, which is contrary to Augustine *On the Trinity* 10.11 n.18 (for that is why these parts are equal in comparison with the objects, because every object, in the way it can be in the memory, can be in the intelligence actually and in the will lovably or hatefully according to its act) – and the Master [Lombard] adduces in *Sentences* 1 d.3 ch.2 n.41 authorities from Augustine for the fact that ‘whatever I know I remember’.

376. I argue third as follows: the intellect that can without contradiction habitually know this and not know that does not know several things habitually in the same way formally (the proof is that it is a contradiction for the intellect to have and not have the same thing formally, and to have something by which it is and is not formally such; therefore if it can be non-knowing *a* habitually and knowing *b* habitually, it does not know *a* and *b* habitually in the same way); but every created intellect can know one

object and not another; therefore no such intellect knows several objects in the same way habitually.

377. The proof of the minor is that if a created intellect could not, without contradiction, habitually know *a* in the absence of knowing *b*, this would be either on the part of such an intellect – which is false, because it can now habitually know one thing and not another thing (otherwise it would be knowing several things at once); or on the part of a necessary binding together of objects – which is false, because one object can be known by our intellect while another is not known. If then this is not because of a necessary connection of objects, nor of a necessary connection of object to power, then not in any way.

#### D. Rejection of the First Opinion in Particular

378. Further, I argue specifically in four ways against the first opinion about habit: First against what it posits about essential respect [n.356]: it seems to contradict Augustine, *On the Trinity* 7.1 n.2, who maintains that “everything that is said relatively is a something after the relative is removed;” and in 2 d.1 nn.260, 272, 243-252, 260-261, 266, 278, 284 (the question on the relation of the creature to God) it was proved that no relation is formally or essentially the same as its foundation, although it is sometimes by identity the same thing. If then the habit in question is a certain quality and an absolute entity, it does not have a respect in such a way that it cannot be understood without it.

379. Further, if the respect is posited to be the same as something absolute, it



is so only as to what is naturally prior, as is plain from the question about the relation of a creature to God [*ibid.* nn.261, 263, 265]; but the respect of a habit in the angelic intellect to a stone is not to what is naturally prior, because a stone is not disposed in any genus of cause with respect to such a habit.

a. [*Interpolation*] Or in this way: a respect is not posited as being the same as something save in regard to that on which it essentially depends; but nothing can essentially depend on several things of the same order, because in that case, when one of the things terminates the dependence of it, another would not terminate it – and thus would it be even if that other on which it essentially depends did not exist, which is unacceptable. But if such a habit is posited, it will represent all quiddities under the same order, such that it will represent none of them by means of another but all of them immediately; therefore etc.

380. Second against the fact that an object is posited through the habit to be present under the idea of the intelligible [n.355]:

First by Henry's own reason: for he proves that an intelligible species cannot be the reason for the presence of the object because it perfects the intellect as a certain being, the way form perfects matter, and consequently it will not perfect the intellect as it is intellect [sc. as it is an intellective power], nor will the intelligible be present insofar as it is intelligible. Much more can this be proved of the habit, because the habit, as habit, is a perfection of a power.

381. Further second: the consequence would much more hold in our habit, which is caused by the object, that our scientific habit would be something by which the

intelligible object would be present, and so, when the scientific habit has been acquired, no turning toward phantasms would be required for actual intellection, which he denies.

382. The response is that our intellection depends on sensibles, not so the intellection of an angel. – On the contrary: if a necessary joining together (or an essential respect in the habit) is the reason because of which the object is sufficiently present through the habit [n.356], and if that respect is more essentially in our habit than in an angel's habit (because ours but not the angel's is caused by the object), then our habit, because of this essential respect, will be more the reason for such presence than the angelic habit will be.

383. Third, against what he says that every created intelligible object is present through this habit [n.355]: this seems unacceptable, because if an angel were created in its purely natural powers without any such habit (and this involves no contradiction, because this habit differs, as a quality does, from the angel's essence), then the angel would not be able to know, and the nature of angel would thus of itself be more imperfect in intellectuality than the nature of a man; because the nature of a man, however bare it is made to be, has the means to acquire intellectual knowledge of certain objects, but an angel could not acquire this habit nor be able, without it, to understand anything.

384. Further, the habit, according to him, does for this reason not represent the singular 'the way a species would represent it', because it is not of a nature to be generated immediately by the thing itself but only by an act of intellect comparing simples; but he himself argues against the species because, when something 'generated by its natural cause' is of a nature thus to represent a singular under the idea under which it is generated by it, it will, by whatever the singular is impressed on it, always thus

represent it; therefore, since the habit that was thus generated by its natural cause would naturally follow the apprehension of simples (by whatever the apprehension too is impressed on it), the consequence would be that it would presuppose that apprehension of simples; therefore it cannot be the proper reason for apprehending simples.

385. Further fourth: as to his saying that this habit is the principle for knowing any distinct objects whatever [n.357] – the first argument against the first opinion [n.367] seems to be against it, namely because it would be naturally infinite.

386. As to his also saying that the habit determinately inclines to what the will by commanding determines it [n.358] – this seems irrational, because this habit, ‘as it is a natural form’, has a determinate natural inclination, and if there are many inclinations to diverse things they are ordered inclinations, such that at least one of them is first; and consequently to use it for that to which it is not first inclined seems to be against its first natural inclination, and so it will not be inclined to it merely naturally. Nor does it seem rational to posit that one natural form – as concerns its natural inclination – is subject to a created will; for if a heavy thing, while remaining actually heavy, were moved upwards by God, although the heavy thing be perfectly in obediencial potency to the divine power, yet it does not seem, on its own part [2 d.2 nn.466-467], to be passively moved naturally; and however it may be in this case, it does not seem that any natural form – in its natural inclination – is altogether subject in its act to a created will, such that it be inclined naturally to that to which the created will wants it to be inclined

387. Further, in whatever way he may be able to say that the habit, by command of the will, determinately represents different things, much more could it be posited that what has many intelligible species can use now this species and now that; and a naturality

will exist in any species that represents and inclines to its own object, and a liberty in the user of this species or that.

## II. Scotus' own Opinion

388. As to the question then [n.349], I concede the conclusions of the first four arguments [nn.367, 369, 371, 376], which prove that an angel has distinct reasons of knowing for knowing distinct quiddities.

389. And if it be asked what these reasons of knowing are, I say that an angel has reasons of knowing, different from the known essences themselves, that represent those essences, which reasons are both properly and truly called intelligible species; and if they are called habits by some people [e.g. Henry], they are thereby actually expressed as being accidents of species, for the idea of habit is an accident of a species, insofar as a species in the intellect, from which it is not easily deleted, has the idea of habit (because it has the idea of permanent form), but 'species' is not stated of the whatness of this quality or habit, just as 'habit' is not stated of the whatness of a species (for the same absolute essence in the genus of quality can be a habit and a disposition).

390. Likewise, 'habit' is universally used for a fixed such intelligible species, because although every such firm species is a habit, yet not conversely – rather, neither is every intelligible habit of the same object of which there is an intelligible species the same as the species.

The fact is plain, first because the species of the first object which is not naturally present through the essence naturally precedes the act of knowing it; but the habit with

respect to that object naturally follows what it is generated from [n.384]; but the essentially same thing does not naturally follow and naturally precede, because there is no circle in essentially ordered things, neither in the case of causes nor in the case of caused things. Second because a habit can be more intense than something of which the species is less intense (and conversely), for he who has an imperfect intellect, in which an imperfect intelligible species is received, has a less intense intelligible species than someone else who has a sharper intellect (as is plain, because the natural causes in the former and the latter are unequal, namely the agent intellect and the phantasm, and natural causes act according to the ultimate of their power); therefore the intelligible species in the more imperfect intellect is less intense than in the more perfect intellect, and yet the slower intellect can more frequently consider the intelligible thing (of which it has the species), and thereby have a more intense habit with respect to this object, which habit is a quality facilitating the consideration of the object.

391. Thus this reason therefore (namely the species) is called per accidens and in general an 'intelligible habit', but per se and essentially such a reason is called an 'intelligible species', because in this way it is more properly expressed, more properly even than in the idea of a likeness.

392. But the proof that an angel, with respect to quiddities other than himself, has such a reason of knowing, different from his essence, is that he knows through something through which he would know those quiddities even if the quiddities were not in themselves existent; for this is a feature of perfection in our intellect, that we may have actual knowledge about a thing when it does not exist, so much more does this feature belong to the angelic intellect; but such knowledge of a thing, which can be had of it

when it does not exist in itself, could only be had through a species representing it; therefore etc.

393. And herefrom follows further that an angel has a reason of knowing even about his own quiddity, because no knowledge imperfect in its kind belongs to a higher angel without an inferior angel having about the same thing a knowledge more imperfect in kind; but a superior angel can have knowledge about an inferior angel through a species (from what was already proved [n.392]), and knowledge through a species is more imperfect in its kind than knowledge through the essence; therefore an angel can have knowledge of himself through a species.

394. And if it is objected that this contradicts what was said in the first question [nn.269, 353], because it is said there that an angel knows himself through his own essence, I say that an angel can know any quiddity at all (other than himself and even his own) through a species of it and through the essence of it; he can know it through the essence indeed when he knows it with intuitive knowledge (namely under the idea under which it is present in actual existence); he can also know it through a species when he knows it with abstractive knowledge, about which a little will be touched on in d.9 qq.1-2 nn.19, 30 [cf. supra nn.318-323], in the question about the speaking of angels.

### III. To the Principal Arguments

395. To the principal arguments [350-353].

To the first [n.350] I say that the Philosopher's intention in *Metaphysics* 8 concerns subaltern species; this is clear from the first property of a number, where

Aristotle maintains that just as a number stops at indivisible units so the resolution of definitions stops at indivisibles; therefore the quiddities are ordered in the universe the way numbers are ordered, as resolvable to unities. He is speaking therefore of subaltern species, and so it is not to the purpose when speaking of the most specific species in the universe.

Yet if this point is taken, not from authority but as something true in itself, to be about most specific species, I say that a higher angel has a more perfect entity than a lower one; however the higher angel does not include the whole entity of the lower, such that the lower only differs from him by negation, for species in the universe are not distinguished by negations but by their proper ideas. Nevertheless the divine essence, which is infinite, does include eminently all perfections, and for this reason no higher angel is a sufficient reason for knowing a lower but the divine essence alone is.

396. As for the quote from *On the Soul* 2 [n.351], I say that the Philosopher is speaking there specifically of the sensitive, vegetative, and intellective soul. Nor is there a likeness between the species of numbers (or figures) and the most specific species in the universe, because greater numbers (and figures) include lesser ones as parts and according to the whole entity of numbers, and therefore they are sufficient reasons for knowing the lesser ones; but the higher species in the universe do not thus include the lower species.

397. To the second argument [n.352] I reply by conceding that the species of a material thing is a perfection of an angel in intelligible being, but an accidental perfection (not a substantial or essential one), and such a perfection does not always simply exceed

what it perfects; rather, every accident is simply less a being than substance is (from *Metaphysics* 7.1.1028a13-20).

398. And if you ask how the species of a material thing can be an accidental perfection of a nature already perfect if that species is thus lower than the lowest nature (namely than corporeal substance), because that which is the reason for understanding whiteness in a perfect intellect (as in an angelic intellect) seems to be more perfect than whiteness – I say that the species is not altogether lower than the lowest nature, because it is not the effect of it as of the total cause but is the effect of it and of the intellect of the angel as of integral parts of one total cause. But the effect of some partial cause can exceed its partial cause, because it can have something of perfection from the other partial cause on account of which it can exceed the former partial cause; hence the species of whiteness in the intellect of the angel is a perfection of his intellect; indeed it is not a more imperfect entity than the entity that whiteness is but rather a more perfect one. And this does not belong to it insofar as it generated from whiteness but because it is generated as well from the intellect of the angel, as being a living perfection and in some way more perfect than whiteness itself (and yet it does in some way fail of entity simply, because it is an entity generated from whiteness); but this excess of perfection is only ‘in a certain respect’.

399. As to the final argument [n.353], it is plain that an angel’s understanding himself through a species stands together with his understanding himself through his essence, just as does his thus understanding anything other than himself [n.394] – and that naturally, the divine essence alone excepted [nn.324-325].



#### IV. To the Arguments for the First Opinion

400. To the arguments for the first opinion [nn.359-363].

To the first argument from *Ethics* 2 [n.359] I concede that, by proceeding through the division of things in the soul, species can truly be called habits, and habit can truly be predicated of the species as a universal and per accidens predicate; and if this has to be rightly expressed per se and in particular, such a thing is called an intelligible species. But the Philosopher does not mean that nothing is in the soul save what is a per accidens habit; on the contrary, that to which the idea of habit belongs is a sort of universal predicate.

401. To the second [n.360] I say that an angel cannot generate in himself any habit from his acts (I mean a habit that is a thing other than a species), because a habit is not generated in things inclined or determined naturally to one thing (as the reason for falling in a heavy thing is not generated by its falling however many times); nor in things moved violently is an inclination generated in conformity to the mover or to the operation of a habit (as is plain if a heavy thing is projected upwards however many times),<sup>a</sup> – but a habit is generated in powers that are in themselves indeterminate to an act frequently elicited. Now it is not a feature of imperfection that some created intellect is supremely habituated to intellection; but if there is any such intellect it will be the angelic, and so in it (as in what is supremely habituated to act) an aptitude that may be called a habit in the above way [sc. as a habit is ‘a thing other than the species’] will not be able to be generated from any action; or if it lacks such a habit (a habit that was an aptitude for

considering this intelligible thing) and the intellect is capable of it, then I say it is not unacceptable for it to be able to generate such a habit in itself.

a. [*Interpolation*] [nor in things moved violently] is there generated, by their being so moved however many times, any idea or habit facilitating and habituating them to such violent motion, as is plain of a stone moved upwards.

402. And when you say ‘therefore it is potential, as our intellect is, not only to second act but also to first’ [n.360], I deny the consequence; because the first act in an intellect is that which is presupposed to second act (which second act is intellection), but this habit (which is an aptitude for understanding and is distinguished from a species) does not naturally precede the act but follows it; therefore it is posterior to second act (and so it is not first act), and thereby the potency for it is not an essential potency (rather it is quasi posterior to accidental potency), because an essential potency is properly for a first act preceding second act; hence the science, for which the intellect, according to Aristotle, is said to be in essential potency, is not a scientific habit (which is generated from acts), but an intelligible species.

403. Hereby is plain the answer to the third argument, from Dionysius [n.361]. I say that ‘the highest in an inferior is lowest in a superior’ when what is placed as highest in an inferior is not repugnant to the superior. Here however it is repugnant, because in us the habit of science is a perfection supplying the imperfection of our intellect, inasmuch as our intellect is not of itself supremely habituated; even when a man has an active reason whereby the object is sufficiently present, such a supreme inclination as is required for the most perfect act is still lacking.

404. Although this perfection in us supplies an imperfection, yet it is repugnant to an angel, because there cannot be an imperfection in an angel that may be supplied by this perfection; so could it be said in many other cases, because if what is supreme in an element is to generate something like itself, there is no need that it be lowest in any mixed body proximate to it, for some mixed bodies do not generate something like themselves, because such a perfection supplying imperfection in an inferior is repugnant to them (so too can what is lowest in a superior be repugnant to an inferior, and then the converse is not valid, namely that the lowest of the superior are the highest of the inferior). Hence this argument [sc. taken from Dionysius, n.361] would entail many falsehoods; for it would follow that the sensitive soul (which is the supreme form in brutes) would be formally in the intellective soul.

405. To the fourth [n.362] I say that if there were no other reason save that the species, when it is perfect, suffices for perfect intellection without a habit (and in an angel the species perhaps necessarily suffices without a habit, if a habit as it is distinguished from a species is impossible in it; or if a habit is possible there, it does not suffice without a species) – this alone suffices for denying in an angel a habit other than the species as a necessary principle for the act of understanding.

406. To the fifth and last argument [n.363] I say that if the appetible object were present to the appetite by some proper presence different from that by which it is present to the cognitive power of the appetite, then proper reasons would be required in the appetite whereby diverse objects might be present to it; but this supposition is false, because an object present to some cognitive power is present by the same fact to the appetitive power that corresponds to the cognitive power.

407. And then if you argue that ‘the will does not require diverse reasons, so neither does the intellect’ [n.363], I say that the antecedent is false if it is understood of the reasons by which an object is present to the intellect (for the reasons by which objects are present to the intellect are reasons that are diverse); but if you mean that the reasons by which the objects may be present would not be required in the will, I say that this is not valid, because the appetitive power is not of a nature to have an object in itself in the way that an object is present to the cognitive power. Nor is it valid to raise an objection against this from ordered cognitive powers, for the order between themselves of things that are of the same genus is not like the order of the intellective and appetitive powers, which are of different genera; and therefore ordered cognitive powers that are diverse have diverse reasons (by which their objects may be present), just as the cognitive power has diverse reasons in relation to its appetitive powers.

#### V. To the Arguments for the Second Opinion

408. To the arguments for the second opinion [nn.364-365].

The answer to Dionysius [n.364] is plain from a different translation that is adduced (‘total’ etc.) – look at Lincoln [Grosseteste, translation and commentary on *Celestial Hierarchy* ch.12]; for, as Lincoln himself expounds, by ‘universality of species’ is understood ‘totality of species’. But this totality is totality of perfection (as of clearness or intensity), and not that a single reason is for something a reason of knowing more things than it is for another, because equal for every finite intellect is that all of them require, as regard knowing several things, proper reasons.

409. When, second, the argument is made that ‘the first are nearer the first’ [n.364], I concede the fact; but they do not have to be nearer in this sense, that they know through fewer principles, but because they can know more clearly; for the per se nearness of perfection lies in the latter and not, were it possible, in the former. For that intellect is simply more perfect which knows more clearly; but nothing is lost to it if it knows through different principles, provided however it knows more clearly; for if it were to know through one and the same principle and were not to know more clearly, it would not know more perfectly – which is false [sc. for, ex hypothesi, it does know more perfectly]. For per se nearness exists in this clearness, and not in the fewness of reasons for knowing, because – absolutely – it is not in the nature of any created reason that it be one for several.

410. And hereby is plain the answer to the argument that is made about the cleverer intellect, that it knows through fewer things etc. [n.364]; the argument is false, but the cleverer intellect has as many species of knowables as the slower intellect has; yet it thereby knows objects more clearly and uses them more quickly, combining this object with that and running discursively from one known thing to another. But from its greater clearness and speed one cannot deduce that it understands through fewer reasons; so it is in the issue at hand.<sup>a</sup>

a. [Interpolation] As to what was said there [interpolation to n.353], about the authority of the author of *On Causes*, there is no need to worry about it; hence one should say that the authority has to be understood about a cause simply first, not about any intermediate cause, because although a first cause can do more than a second cause (because it includes it), yet because it does not include it eminently in its whole entity (because only God includes everything in this way), so

neither does it include it in its whole active virtue, because it does not include it in the representative power by which it can represent the intelligible object that a body cannot represent.

411. To the final argument for this opinion [n.365] I say that there is not a single species in sense, imagination, and intellect, but different ones; nor does a species represent more universally merely on the ground that it is in a more immaterial subject, because if – per impossibile – the species that is in the sense were in the imagination (or if the one that is in the imagination were in the intellect), it would not represent more perfectly (neither as to quiddity nor as to intensity) because, namely, it was the proper reason for more things. So from the sole immateriality or greater actuality of the receiver cannot be deduced a greater actuality in representing of the species received, but this will be only from the nature of the species in itself.

412. However these conditions of received species are proportionate to the receptive things (according to the saying of Boethius [*Consolation of Philosophy* 5 prose 5] that ‘the received is in the receiver in the mode of the receiver etc.’) – but absolutely, just as no receiving essence is universal with respect to all essences (nor even does it perfectly contain every essence other than itself), so neither can anything received in it be the universal reason for perfectly representing everything else; but such universal representation can precisely belong (infinitely and eminently) to the divine essence, and to no other.<sup>76</sup>

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<sup>76</sup> The Vatican Editors point out that the interpolated fourth question here (see interpolation to n.255), about whether angels can progress in receiving knowledge from things (interpolated by another manuscript after d.12 q.1), is conflated from *Rep.* II B d.11 q.2 and *Additiones Magnae* 2 d.11 q.1 or d.10 q.1.