

Summa of a Scotus Summa.

The following translations from Jerome of Montefortino's selections and arrangement of Scotus' writings are meant to make more readily and readably accessible the philosophical theology of the Subtle and Marian Doctor.

Montefortino's arrangement of his selections follows the pattern of St. Thomas Aquinas' *Summa Theologica*. However, only the responses in the body of each article are translated here. Adding the objections and replies that are in Montefortino's original (again following the Thomistic pattern) would not only greatly extend the size of the translation but would also make the whole less accessible to interested readers. It would again put Scotus' positions back into the larger dialectical context, whereas the desideratum here is to present those positions as simply and as straightforwardly as possible. One does, admittedly, in this way lose the completeness as well as some of the rigor and flavor of Scotus' own writing, but if one really wants Scotus as Scotus pure, one should not bother with Montefortino in the first place but go directly to the recently completed critical texts of Scotus' own writings. The present 'Summa of a Summa' (title borrowed, with appreciation, from Peter Kreeft) has a different purpose and a different utility.

Montefortino's texts, which are from the old Wadding edition of Scotus' works, fairly represent Scotus as he was discussed and defended for many centuries after his death. This advantage is no mean one, although these texts combine elements from different writings of Scotus (as that the Oxford work, or Oxon. here, combines the *Ordinatio* with parts of the *Reportatio* and the *Additiones Magnae*), and even contain some writings now known not to have been by Scotus but by some of his early followers. The recent critical editions of Scotus' writings, while more accurate to what Scotus himself wrote and when (and so more valuable for scholarly purposes), are less accurate to Scotus as he was widely known (and so less valuable for understanding historical Scotism).

Montefortino's Latin text of Scotus for Ia IIae can be downloaded from Google Books at:

http://books.google.com/books?id=-EEtAAAAYAAJ&printsec=frontcover&source=gbs_ge_summary_r&cad=0#v=onepage&q&f=false

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Sum of Scotus' Theology

Part One of Part Two. Ia IIae.

QUESTION ONE: ON MAN'S ULTIMATE END. IN EIGHT ARTICLES.

Article One: Whether it belongs to Man to act for an End.

Response: [Oxon. 4 d.6 q.5 n.2] one must say that in truth it belongs to man to act for an end. Declaration: for intention is required in any man doing something that is not fortuitous or carrying out any human act, when speaking properly of human acts, namely those caused by man through intellect and will. As often then as a man does something not as it happens by chance or fortuitously, then he acts from foreknowledge of the end, and does it for that end itself. – Next [Metaphysics q.1 n.2] every per se agent, of the sort that is not chance or fortune, acts for an end, according to the Philosopher Physics 2 text com.49 when he divides agents for an end into agents by nature and agents by intellect. Thus chance concurs in the effect of a natural cause but fortune is in what acts for a purpose, as is said in the same place that nature acts for an end and intellect likewise. From which I argue thus: every agent, in whose action error can happen, acts for an end; but every per se agent is of this sort; now that action is said to be in vain which is not able to attain the intended end; if then no end is intended, no agent would act in vain; so it is necessary to posit an intended end. But if the end is intended then the end is a cause, so that the agent may act, and it is the motive principle for the agent; an efficient cause already made to be a cause in act, or already moved by the end, proceeds to act for the sake of the end. – However, it belongs to a man, as he is a per see agent for a purpose, to act for an end foreknown by him, and to do the actions of which he is in control and are within his power. Also [Quodlibet q.18 n.9, and cf. Ia q.83 on free choice], although will and intellect concur for integrating this power, yet the indifference whereby what is done need not be done cannot be completely reduced save to the will itself; because any other active power is naturally active and thus is determinate to one part of a contradiction; but the will alone has an indifference capable of contradictions, and it determines itself to one side. That a man, then [Oxon. 2 d.38 n.2], intends and acts for an end in his acts is for him to elicit an act of this power that consists indeed of intellect and will; but the act however is by reason of the will alone, and to the will belongs the intending and acting for an end. A human act, therefore [Quodlibet ib.], according to its proper acceptation, implies two respects; one respect to the power or control of the agent to which belongs the act; but the other is to something corresponding to the act or to what acts according to justice, and that because of the act itself; and the second follows on the first. All these things will be more broadly explained in the following.

Article Two: Whether to act for an End is proper to Rational Nature

Response: one must say [Metaphysics 5 q.1 n.8] that it belongs to every per se agent to act for an end, and therefore it is not proper or unique to rational nature.

Declaration: the end, according to Avicenna *Metaphysics* 6 ch.5, is the first of causes, preceding in its own causality, which it exercises in the soul, the agent and receptive causes, although it does act about the other causes, when they are in effect, so that the final cause itself may be in effect. So says Avicenna in his final chapter. If, he says, there were a science about each of the causes, the science about the final cause would be the more known among them, and it would be wisdom. And in fact, among the extrinsic causes the end causes first; for it moves the efficient cause in idea of being loved, and for that reason and not otherwise does the agent cause; therefore all per se causes necessarily act for an end, since all depend in their causality upon it. Otherwise, unless in acting they intended a definite end, found within the sphere of their activity and attainable by force of the causes, they would exercise their proper causality randomly and vaguely, and per se causes would only attain their effect fortuitously; but this seems to overturn the idea of per se causes; therefore they come together in a certain and definite scope; from which it happens that in their acts error does not happen regularly; although straying from the purposed end does sometimes happen through the coincidence of contrary causes, which either impede the primary effect or at least bring it about that the effect is not produced free of all numbers. If then error can befall causes per se in their causing, then assuredly, since these causes attain for the most part the effect they are fitted to produce, they act for an end, which end is not other than the effect caused on the part of the thing; for this was what, as first desired, was moving the efficient cause to act.

However one must understand [Metaphysics 1 q.2 n.5, q.9 n.15, Prol. n.4, Oxon. 4 d.49 q.2 n.25, 2 d.25] that foreknowledge of the end does not exist in all things that desire an end and tend to acquiring it; rather the whole class of causes per se, contradistinguished from the class of purposive agents, does indeed desire an end (otherwise error would not happen there; for either a per se cause would be cause of any event at all or it would be a cause of nothing of the sort), and there is truly desire of an end in this class even though it is not endowed with knowledge of the end. To this end, therefore, it tends and is inclined by its proper nature, as to that by which it can be perfected with a secondary perfection; for the primary perfection of anything is its proper form, but the secondary perfection is the operation of desiring or the tendency of nature by which it is joined to the extrinsic desirable thing. Hence a heavy object is subject to some imperfection to the extent it is kept by violence from the center. To this specific perfection, then, each thing is naturally inclined, not as if the inclination is some elicited act, but rather it is the very same nature itself tending to its proper perfection; and the nature of anything, as it exists prior to all knowledge, is endowed with this tendency. Therefore such an inclination is given by that which bestows form, without which it would not desire well-being or exercise foresight for its own conservation. The whole genus of natural cause is therefore determined to its proper end, for which it also acts, by the first Intelligence which has willed this order, because the proper end is intended by each being, whereby it may be completely perfected in its being. So nature acts for an end, not foreknown by itself but by something else; and because for the most part

nature does not err in its operations, rightly is the work of nature said to be a work of intelligence. And although the brutes foreknow what is useful for them, and flee and avoid what is harmful, yet they are said to be of their own nature moved and drawn by objects shown to them, and they do not deal with these objects by a power of lordship over them so as to be able to embrace or to resist them. For this reason, only purposive agents are dominated by intellective appetite so as to act or not act for a foreknown end as it pleases them. Therefore any *per se* cause acts for an end, but natural causes are determined to their proper ends by their forms, as they are bidden to be inclined or to desire by the Maker of forms. But causes that act through intellect and will, although they are not able to refuse the end or the good in itself, are able nevertheless not to will it, and even to hate other things that are ordered to the *per se* good. It is not therefore proper or unique to rational nature to act for an end; which is what was to be made clear.

Article Three: Whether Acts of Man receive their Species from the End

Response: [Oxon. 2 d.41 n.2ff., 4 d.6 q.5 n.2, Quodlibet q.19 n.9] one must say that acts of man do receive their species from the end. Declaration: by the term 'acts of man' we do not understand any acts at all of man, or acts coming somehow or other from man; for by this term are not expressed fortuitous acts of men, or acts that happen from imagination alone, as to stroke one's beard, or pick up a straw form the ground, and the like; but we intend by this term to signify only acts that proceed from the impulsion of free choice and that are caused by a man through his intellect's knowing, and his will's intending, the end for the sake of which and because of which he proceeds to action or produces those acts. So a human act essentially involves respect to an agent who has it under his commanding power and indifference to be able to do the act or its contrary or even to do neither. But a man when acting by free choice not only foreknows the end but also intends the end by which he is moved; therefore this end is what bestows on the act its proper species. Indeed, when such an end is removed, there can, to be sure, be an act of a man but in no way a human act; for when the end is removed, the act will either be caused by imagination or be fortuitous; it is from the end, then, that an act precisely has it that it is elicited by the knowing intellect and by the appetitive power proceeding to act from love of the end; most truly, then, do these acts of man receive their specific idea from the end. – For a fuller understanding of this matter [Oxon. Prol. q.4 n.13, 2 d.7 n.11, d.40, Quodliber q.18 n.8], one needs to know that, over and above the natural goodness with which any positive thing is endowed according to its greater or lesser degree of being, the first moral goodness or malice that can be present in human acts is insofar as the will, by its act, focuses on an appropriate or inappropriate object either according to the dictate of right reason so as to be good or against right reason so as to be called inappropriate and evil (and not merely because the object is naturally appropriate to such an act, as light is to vision). This then is the first moral goodness or malice, which is therefore said to be so in genus; not because the goodness or malice is generic, since in fact it is specific with ultimate specificity, but rather because it is as it were material with respect to any further goodness in the genus of morals, which goodness or malice depends on

other special circumstances that do not concern the work or the act of the one acting, but arise rather from the extrinsic ordering of the one acting. The end, therefore, which gives species to the act, is not the end intended by the one acting that is extrinsic to the action, but rather the end that is so far intrinsic to the freely elicited act that it altogether coincides with the act's object, and this object, or end, if it is appropriate to the agent, will be good but if not bad.

Article Four: Whether there is some Ultimate End of Human Life

Response: [Oxon. 4 d.49 q.2 n.19; cf. Ia q.2] one must reply that it is altogether impossible to proceed to infinity in ends, and that, therefore, among all the things desirable to rational and intellectual nature, there is one essentially and simply supreme desirable thing, and the same is the ultimate end of such nature.

Declaration: for either an essential order in desirable things is laid down or let this order be denied. For to someone who concedes this essential order it is evident that a stand must be made at some supreme desirable thing. But if an essential order is denied, the intended conclusion is still attained; because any given thing is essentially supreme. But this hypothesis is impossible and foreign to all truth, because no process in accidentally ordered things can go on to infinity save in virtue of something essentially superior to that whole set of diverse things. Now, that this supreme desirable thing, where we say that a stand has necessarily to be made in the order of desirable things, must be intensively infinite, embracing every possible degree of goodness and desirability, is proved from this: anything which infinity is not repugnant to is not simply supreme unless it is formally infinite; infinity is not repugnant to the desirable or will-able, since it [sc. being desirable] is either perfection simply or convertibly accompanies some perfection simply; for this idea [sc. desirability] belongs to the whole of being, and anything such is perfection simply; but infinity is not repugnant to perfection simply. – From this result I again infer the conclusion as follows: if something desirable or will-able can be infinite, and the infinite cannot be exceeded, then something will-able can be simply supreme; and if can exist, it does in fact exist; for if it did not actually exist and it can exist, it could not exist save from something else diverse in essence, and so it would not be supreme in some perfection simply; on the contrary this excellence would have to be attributed to, and would indeed be found in, that other thing from which it received existence.

To give a fuller and more exact understanding of what has been said, and a richer clarification of the solution, we say [Oxon. 4 ib. n.20] that that thing alone and precisely is supremely desirable and will-able which is to be willed simply for its own sake by any intellectual nature that is endowed with will alone. Further, we understand that to be willed simply for its own sake whose nature involves a repugnance to being desired for the sake of something else. From this the result is that the sensitive appetite, when desiring something for its own sake, that is, not for the sake of something else, is not drawn to it for its own sake simply but only in a certain respect; for the sensitive appetite does not rest in the object because of the object's perfection (to which perfection being desired for the sake of something else is repugnant), but it proceeds from the imperfection of its own power, that the

object, as its nature requires, not be desired for the sake of something else. – Next is proved what we assumed as needing to be demonstrated: whatever has a supreme will-able thing for will-able object, has that supreme will-able thing alone as what is to be willed simply for its own sake; but any will has a supreme will-able thing for will-able object; therefore this alone is to be willed by it simply for its own sake. Proof of the major: something among will-able things is to be willed for its own sake; otherwise if each was to be willed for the sake of another, there would be an infinite regress; also none of them would be supreme, because what is to be willed for the sake of another is less to be willed than that other for the sake of which it is to be willed, from *Posterior Analytics* 1 text 3; so if there is some simply supreme thing to be willed (from what was said above), then that thing assuredly is to be willed simply for its own sake, speaking as to the side of the objects. – But that this is precisely true of the supreme desirable thing, namely its being simply to be willed for its own sake, is proved thus [ib. n.21]: for to nothing else is being desired for something other repugnant, just as to nothing else is the idea of supreme desirability fitting; yet a lesser good can rightly be desired for a greater good. A thing, then, that is to be willed precisely for its own sake is the ultimate end for the intellectual and rational creature, because any other thing to be desired is desired because of it. Proof of the minor: any will regards as its object the will-able thing under the most common idea, total being or something equal in ambit to being; as then all other goods besides the first and supremely desirable good are the goods they are and are something desirable through that good, so most rightly are they to be willed because of the supremely desirable good; so in none of these other goods can the ultimate end of man be placed, but precisely in that which, when willed, all the rest are to be willed. For to anything [Oxon. ib. n.20] that has intellective appetite the supremely desirable thing is to be desired for itself, since it is the will-able object in anything, and the same idea holds about one and all the rest. – Next, although it is in the power of one who wills to will this or that, yet that which is to be willed, and especially that which is supremely to be willed, is not in his power; for this precedes the determination of any will; therefore, whatever the will is compared to, there remains always that which is to be willed for its own sake; and hence it is that it is to be willed by the will because it is will-able for the will. – Lastly, for any will there is something that should be willed, since any will can will something rightly and will that which should be willed, as its proper perfection, for itself and not for another; for although any will is ordered to the same ultimate end, yet it is not perfected, as by its proper perfection, by the fact that another will attains the ultimate end; therefore the supremely desirable thing is desired by each will as that which it should will. But no will can will for the sake of something else that which should be willed by it and that something else again for the sake of something else, and so on infinitely. What is supremely desirable and is alone to be willed for its own sake among all desirable things, that very thing is the ultimate end of human life. This point will be discoursed of at length in what follows.

Article Five: Whether One Man can have Several Ultimate Ends

Response: one must say that it cannot at all happen that the will of one man should be disposed to diverse things as to ultimate ends. Declaration: [Oxon. 4 d.49 q.2 n.22] no intellectual nature is ultimately and completely perfected unless it possesses what is supremely desirable, and indeed possesses it in the perfection in which it can possess it. Intellectual nature (from what was said in the previous article) is of a nature to be ultimately and maximally perfected, and to be so by that alone which is to be willed by it for its own sake; therefore it cannot be ultimately perfected unless it possesses that object in the way the object can be possessed by it. This object supremely desirable, to be desired for itself, is altogether single; for in it a stand in desirables is reached; for all other things are to be desired for its sake; so the end for any man, and indeed for intellectual nature as a whole, is utterly single. – Next, when the supreme desirable thing has not been attained as it can be attained by intellectual nature, the desiring power remains altogether imperfect; for it is perfectible precisely in that which is simply to be willed for its own sake, and in nothing else; therefore nothing else is its ultimate end; and even if the will were to will all the other things at the same time, and were to possess them most fully, they will not be ultimate ends for it; but that precisely is ultimate end which is simply to be willed for its own sake. – Third, finally, I prove the same thing from a more universal middle term: for in things having any appetite, whether animal or natural, their perfection is not understood to be ultimate until that is possessed which is to be desired for its own sake by such appetite. Wherefore a heavy thing not at the center carries with it some imperfection, and the sensitive appetite which lacks what is supremely agreeable to it is imperfect; therefore, whatever good the human will is carried to, and however great a goodness is shown to it by the intellect, and however much it embrace it with all its effort and has pleasure in it when possessed, it will always be imperfect and never at rest unless it enjoy what is to be desired for its own sake in the way agreeable and possible for it. So whether the will establish the ultimate end for itself in other goods, or reason errs in presenting them as such to it, it will never be altogether, ultimately, and maximally perfect, in the way its nobility demands, unless it possesses that which is simply and precisely to be desired for its own sake; and so it cannot have several ultimate ends.

To give a more exact declaration of what has been said, one must understand [Oxon. ibid.] that there is in beings a perfection that is first and a perfection that is second, or quasi-second. The first perfection is when nothing is lacking of what belongs to the first being of a thing, and this is also rightly called essential perfection. The second perfection is when nothing is wanted of that which is integral to second being. Of second perfections some are intrinsic and do not combine what they perfect with anything that is extrinsically perfective, as are the powers of the soul with respect to their first act and the other passions that go along with the same thing as the essence. But some second perfections have regard to what is extrinsically perfective, even though they too themselves are intrinsic, and they cause perfection by conjoining with what is extrinsically perfective. Such perfection indeed is every operation perfective of its proper power, and above all beatitude, which is the most perfect of all. Nor is it surprising that a thing is perfected in what is extrinsic, because by attaining something extrinsic, and especially if this something is more perfect than itself, it receives a further perfection than it could

have in itself and in relation to itself. And for this reason the more ignoble things are perfected in the more noble things, not that these really pass over into the former or inhere in them formally, but insofar as the former attain them through their own operations, such that they possess them in the way they can have and possess them.

– Wherefore [ibid. n.23] that whose appetite has regard to something more ignoble than its nature itself is assuredly not perfected in what is extrinsic save in a certain respect. In a nobler thing too, although it has some perfection for the more ignoble thing desiring it, yet not supreme perfection. But if some nature is perfected in some non-supreme thing nobler than itself, there must be some nature which is immediately perfected only in some supreme thing perfective extrinsically, because there is no process to infinity in perfectibles and perfections; so at least the supreme perfectible nature is not perfected save in a supreme thing perfective extrinsically. But the whole of intellectual nature is supreme in this regard; therefore there is for it a single, extrinsic, and supreme perfectible thing, which is also its single ultimate end.

Article Six: Whether Man desires everything he Wills for the sake of the Ultimate End

Response: some maintain the following opinion [cf. Ia q.60 a.2], that everything a man desires he must desire for the ultimate end; for, to begin with, whatever a man wills he desires under the idea of good; but such good, if it is not desired as the perfect good, which is the ultimate end, must be desired as tending to the perfect good; for always the inclination of something is ordered to the consummation of it. – Next, although one does not always think of the ultimate end whenever one desires or does anything, nevertheless the virtue of the first intention, which is in respect of the ultimate end, remains in any appetite for anything, even if the ultimate end is not actually thought on, just as there is no need, as one walks along a road, to think of the end at every step.

By way of solution let the first statement be as follows: [Oxon. 4 d.49 q.10 n.2] there is a double appetite in the will; one, namely, is natural, and the other is deliberative or free. Now the first does not carry with it anything superadded to it over and above the power itself of the will; but the latter states an elicited act of it. Clarification: as the natural appetite of the intellect is related to its act, so is the natural appetite of the will related to its own act; now the natural appetite of the intellect is not an act elicited by the intellect, but only the natural inclination of it to its perfection; therefore we should think the same too about the will. – Next, [ibid. n.3] we experience no such act [sc. of the will] in us; but it is odd, according to the Philosopher *Posterior Analytics* 2 at the end, for the most noble habits to exist in us and sometimes to escape our notice; so the same will be more true, or at least as true, of operations. – Next, on the hypothesis of the contrary opinion, opposite acts will frequently be found at the same time in the same thing; for everyone flees death by natural appetite and yet can choose death by a freely elicited act, like the martyrs and other perfect men who embrace death without hesitation when sent by God. – It is preferable then to suppose that natural appetite is nothing other than a certain inclination of nature, in him whose nature it is, to his proper perfection, and not to introduce an elicited act in the will anymore than in a stone.

Second statement: [Oxon. ib.] if the discussion is about the natural appetite of man, he desires for the sake of the ultimate end whatever it is he wills; but as far as concerns deliberative appetite, he can will some things not for the ultimate end, both negatively and oppositely. Clarification of the first part: for, as belonging to such natural appetite, the will necessarily and perpetually and supremely desires its own perfection, which is placed precisely in the clearly seen ultimate end; whatever then the will naturally desires, to that it tends so as to be maximally perfected as much as can be and as is possible for it; so it desires each and all things for the ultimate end, since these are by their own nature ordered to it and from it get their desirability. – However [ib. n.4ff.] that the will by deliberative appetite desires for the ultimate end everything it desires is not necessary *negatively*, that is, in the sense that it need not will it for the sake of true felicity. The proof is that the will is able negatively not to will what is ordered to the ultimate end. For the intellect can understand and think of anything you like other than the ultimate end, and the will can will it as such; so in that case the will does not will it because of the ultimate end. – Next, the intellect can think of or know the idea of a good, not as it is ordered to the end, but as it is in itself some good or other; so appetite can desire it under that same idea and not in order to the ultimate end. – Someone can also will in this way oppositely; for one of the faithful, when apprehending the end, certainly holds that his beatitude is located in God three and one. But he likewise apprehends fornication as incapable of being ordered to that end; but while the intellect is dictating that fornication cannot be ordered to the end, which is beatitude, nay that it is contrary to the end, the will chooses fornication by its own liberty; therefore it can will some things not for the sake of the ultimate end, both oppositely and negatively.

Article Seven: Whether there is One Ultimate End for all Men

Response: [Oxon. 1 d.1 q.1 n.5] one must say that, when one understands the question as about the true ultimate end wherein the ultimate completion and consummate perfection of human nature is placed, there is altogether one ultimate end for all men; but several ultimate ends of the sort occur to those who follow an erring reason; and the will can also set up several ends for itself when it does not follow a rightly dictating reason. The first part is shown by what was said in articles 4 and 5 above. And indeed [Oxon. 4 d.49 q.n2 nn.25, 31] all men are proved to tend toward and to want the ultimate end from the fact they desire their own happiness and ultimate perfection, which they certainly know to be placed in the attainment of the ultimate end. But to attain these is not possible save in the most noble extrinsic perfective thing, which is the ultimate end desirable for its own sake and not orderable to anything else. There is therefore one ultimate end for all men. – Next, [Oxon. 1 d.1 q.2 n.1] in every essential order there is only one first thing; therefore in the essential order of ends too there is only one end. – Again, to the first efficient cause there corresponds an ultimate end; but there is only one first efficient cause and that under one idea; therefore there is only one end. – Lastly, just as there is one majesty in God, so there is also one goodness; but because of his one majesty there is due to him only one adoration, according to Damascene bk.1 ch.9, so much so that

it is not fitting to adore one person without adoring the others, on account of their single and essential goodness, which is the ultimate end of all men and of the whole of intellectual nature.

However [Oxon 4 loc. cit.] when an erring reason foreshows to the will that there are, before what is supremely desirable, other things desirable for their own sake, as empires or pleasures or other things of the sort, the will, acquiescing in these goods foreshown by erroneous reason and pursuing them with love, has ultimate ends other than the one that is to be willed for its own sake. And even if right reason dictates that empires and pleasures are not the ultimate ends, yet the will, by its own liberty, can attribute the idea of ultimate end to them and thus will them. For, as it is in the will's power to will or not to will, so also is in its power the mode of willing whereby it can will some things for their own sake which were simply to be willed for the sake simply of something else. There is, however, this difference, that a will that is tending to the ultimate end, which is the true end and the end to be willed for its own sake, is simply happy in the possession of it. But when it happens to get hold of ends other than that end, it is only happy and perfect in a certain respect. And indeed if what it loves is more noble in its nature, then the will in possessing it comes close to the idea of happiness, and departs as much from the idea of its consummate perfection as the extrinsic perfective thing is less noble. Simply, however, it cannot have well being save in possessing the supreme and most noble desirable thing, which alone is the ultimate end of all men.

Article Eight: Whether all Creatures come together in the Ultimate End

Response: [Oxon. 4 d.49 q.8 n.6, Reportatio 4 d.49 q.7 n.7] one must say that creatures other than man cannot come together in the end such as simply to rest in it, although in a certain respect those with sensitive operations can attain an end that gives them rest. Indeed we have just touched on the reason for the first statement here; for no creature is able to posses the ultimate end of man in the respect in which the end can be possessed unless that creature is able to attain an immaterial object and to be busy about the supreme good; but the most noble creature below man is able only to attain a material good; therefore it is impossible that its end be that wherein man is simply blessed.

However [Oxon. ib., Report. ib.] such a creature could in a certain respect rest in its own end, as is made clear thus: for every nature that can by its own operation be immediately joined to its end, and can for that reason attain what is its best, should be said to rest in its end in the way possible for it; but all natures possessed of proper operations, and indeed of immanent ones, as are those natures endowed with sensitive powers, can be joined to what is their best; therefore they can in this way be and be said to be blessed, although only in a certain respect. – Next, what is not joined to what is better than it cannot be made simply blessed; no creature inferior to man is joined to its best as to something better than itself. For any operative power belongs to an animate thing as it is animate; but material objects, as the sensitive qualities are in themselves, are not more perfect than an animated thing insofar as it is animated; therefore the powers themselves are far better than their objects; hence too they are very far from the ultimate end of man.

From this it follows [Oxon. ib., Report. ib.] that creatures which lack operative powers will not be capable of blessedness even in a certain respect. For since they are destitute of the operations by which they can be joined to what is most fittingly proper to them, they fall away from any idea of even the most imperfect blessedness, or of any complete inherence to an end that bestows rest. Of this sort are all forms below the sensitive ones; these are indeed forms that make but not forms that operate, nor do they have any power for operations immanent to them. – And if an objection be made about a heavy object that moves itself to the center and rests there, the objection is nothing; for a heavy thing is said by a metaphor to rest in the center. It does to be sure have an action, which is the motion of a heavy thing, but in no way does it dispose of any operation about the center whereby it may be joined to the center. Yet, granted it does rest in the center, that resting will be nothing other than the causing of some natural ‘where’ and not of the absolute form of the sort that blessedness is. Therefore the ultimate end of man, the possession of which is promised to him in the sacred Letters, as *I Corinthians 13.1, John 3, Revelation 22, Matthew 22*, and frequently elsewhere, is so proper to him that it is simply impossible for any other creature more imperfect than man himself.

QUESTION TWO: ON THE THINGS IN WHICH MAN'S BLESSEDNESS CONSISTS. IN EIGHT ARTICLES.

Article One: Whether Man's Blessedness consists in Riches

Response: one must say that it is altogether impossible for man to be able to be blessed in multitude of riches. Declaration: [Oxon. 3 d.30 n.5] riches are counted among indifferent goods, for a man can use them well or badly. For one can expend one's resources for the poor or again abuse them to oppress the republic. One can therefore want riches for oneself in an ordered way either by despising them or, if one is despoiled of them through violence, by bearing the inflicted loss with equanimity. But these things cannot at all be said of blessedness, nor can they in any way agree with it; for blessedness [Oxon. 4 d.40 q.2 n.25] is not an indifferent good for man but is rather his proper and ultimate perfection, insofar as he is by his own operation joined to the most noble and most perfect desirable thing without which his condition is completely bad, namely to be deprived of the greatest perfection that his nature by its natural desire and most intensely strives and longs for. Further [Oxon. ib. q.10 n.16] he cannot despise blessedness in an ordered way; on the contrary, as he is drawn to it by a correct instinct of nature, so does he by an elicited act most rightly desire it; in this sense Augustine writes *On the Trinity* 13.8, “All wish to be blessed, as truth proclaims.” So riches, however great and of whatever sort they are, have nothing in common with the object wherein man's blessedness is placed. – Next, the object in which human nature perfectly rests is so his ultimate end that, from the nature of the thing, all will-able things are for the sake of it; but to it is repugnant that it be desired for the sake of something else that might be the supremely desirable thing where a stand is made. Now riches [Oxon. 4 d.15 q.2 n.19,

3 d.34 n.15] are in the service of man and are for his several uses in accord with the republic's precepts; since therefore they are far inferior to man and are understood to have as much goodness and utility as he is able to use them for, wrongly and irrationally is the idea attributed to them of the end that man simply desires for its own sake. – Lastly, [Oxon. 4 d.15 q.2 n.19, 3 d.34 n.15] those things have a truer and nearer regard to man that he needs for nourishing the body and prolonging his life, as are food and other necessary supplies; and yet no one would place the happiness of man in the use of food. For [Oxon. Prol. q.2 n.8] this is the happiness that Mohammed promises his followers, which however is despised and mocked by Avicenna *Metaphysics* 9.7 although he was of that sect; therefore much less do riches and the other resources that are called the goods of fortune have regard to man's happiness such that he who abounds in many riches should be happy; nay, since riches are accompanied by much solicitude of mind and are possessed in greater anxiety through fear that they be lost through some misfortune or violence, it is evident that riches cannot render their possessors happy.

Article Two: Whether Man's Blessedness consists in Honors

Article Three: Whether Man's Blessedness consists in Fame or Glory

Article Four: Whether Man's Blessedness consists in Power

Article Five: Whether Man's Blessedness consists in any Good of the Body

Response: to solve these questions one must establish what comes to be understood by the name of blessedness. So the philosophers [Oxon. 4 d.49 q.2 n.25ff., cf. Augustine *City of God* 5.13ff.], when making their discourses about happiness, suppose as a thing known that blessedness is the sufficient good, thereby keeping off deficiency or need. They also say it is the perfect or complete good, thereby excluding imperfection or loss; again that it is the ultimate good, removing all tendency or order to any more complete good. Finally that it is the good which, when attained, is most fully good for the possessor. But, from the opposite side, we can conceive complete misery to be the need so fixed by decree of divine wisdom that it is never repaired nor undergoes any diminution; that also it is the lack of second perfection and the perpetual exclusion from that which, if it were possessed, would be loved for its own sake; and lastly by this misery we conceive that he who is wretched is in a completely evil state.

Now although [Oxon. ib. n.22] sufficiency, perfection, completeness, and goodness can belong to first or to second being, nevertheless, because what is sufficient is sufficient for another, we presuppose that for which it is sufficient; completeness also completes that which has already preceded, or which, without it, would be as it were empty or not full; so too what is perfect excludes any defect, which defect is lack of that which is of a nature to be present; well-being likewise does not belong to anything save to what already exists, through something as it were superadded to it. Therefore all these terms rather concern second than first perfection. But since a thing is not ultimately or completely perfected save in

something extrinsically perfective of it, because it is of a nature to be thus perfected, hence these terms do indeed import second perfection but only insofar as they join the thing to what is extrinsically perfective. Nor is it surprising for something to be perfected in what is extrinsic; because by attaining what is extrinsic, and especially if what is extrinsic is more perfect than itself, it acquires a perfection which it could not possess in itself or for itself. Wherefore these second perfections, insofar as they join the more imperfect to what is more perfect, are more desirable than the first perfections; for they are immediately related to the extrinsic desirable thing, which is more desired than is the proper being intrinsic to the nature that desires it; and this is especially true of the will. For any other appetite is carried to an extrinsic desirable thing because of the nature of that whose appetite it is, and therefore it does not join it to anything simply more desirable than is the being of the nature whose it is. But the will loves something more noble than itself, and loves it more than the nature to which the intellective appetite belongs, and so it joins it to something more desirable both in itself and for it than is the nature whose it is.

From the rules [Oxon. ib.] which the philosophers, when speaking of man's happiness, suppose as known by the natural light and as indubitable, it is manifest that man cannot be blessed even if he is piled high with all the honors that men can bestow on those endowed even with the most excellent virtue, nor can he blessed in any fame or glory, even the fullest, nor in the great power that follows earthly empires, nor lastly in any good of the body. For to none of these, even when taken collectively, do the mind's common conceptions belong that we have about human happiness. For none of these excludes the need of the soul thirsting to possess what is supremely desirable. For, if one possesses all these together, one would still be very far from that perfection which is of a nature to be acquired through union with the supremely desirable thing, wherein are all things united, such that, when it is possessed, all things are possessed. For none of the things the questions are about is the ultimate good that excludes any ordering to some other more complete good of the sort that, by it, he who has it is in the most cumulatively good state; indeed, all the goods of the body are ordered to the soul. The power given to princes should serve the good of the subjects and of the republic; if kings and worldly powers establish another end for themselves, they are proved not to be exercising a just dominion but rather are to be said to be running riot against their subjects through tyranny. – As for what concerns glory or fame, those should be judged most vain who lay down the ultimate end for themselves in this vanity. Each should judge highly of good fame and good repute among men with a view to the edification of one's neighbors, as we are commanded by the sacred Letters, *Ecclesiasticus* 41, *Proverbs* 22, and elsewhere; but however much men think highly of others, celebrate them, and extol them with great praise, this is not the ultimate end, in which alone they can be happy, but is the testimony only of approved virtue and excellence; but the virtues do not render the men endowed with them blessed and happy; rather the reward that should be paid to them is happiness. – The honors, finally, of which some are reckoned worthy because of their virtues, are not goods proper to the ones who are worthy of them but are in the power of those who bestow the honor; therefore blessedness cannot consist in honors, the blessedness, indeed, that is the proper and ultimate good of man. One must confess [Oxon. 3 d.34]

n.15] that honors are to be counted among the first objects of concupiscence, but when conferred they should be rejected or moderated by humility. For the humble man considers himself worthy of little honors, because he reckons himself little in his own eyes. So far, then, is human happiness to be placed in these things that rather there is need for a man endowed with virtues to use moderately the honors conferred on him, with his virtues as defense, lest, while he covets external honors for the sake of attaining happiness, he falls from virtue and at once becomes wretched.

Article Six: Whether Man's Blessedness consists in Pleasure

Response: [Oxon. 4 d.49 q.7 n.4] one must say that enjoyment does not consist in pleasure, nor does pleasure enter into the essence of enjoyment. And indeed, from the supposition that pleasure is a passion, the first part of the solution is evident. For blessedness and enjoyment are located in operation, by means of which the power and the essence it belongs to are united to the extrinsic perfective thing. Let this hypothesis, then, which must be made clear more at large below in question 31, be now briefly explained; for an object said, according to its absolute idea, to be agreeable, when it is applied by knowledge to appetite, whether rational or animal, causes, since it is compared to appetite as active to passive, pleasure in the appetite, or it causes sadness if it is disagreeable. For although these passions suppose the operation of the will, that is, the willing or not willing because of which the object becomes proximately agreeable or disagreeable, yet the passion follows on the object thus willed, or not willed, as on its cause, so that, as a result, this passion is not about the object but derived from the object to the appetite. Further, the operations are required in the will first – as far as the will is distinguished from the sensitive appetite to which the object, from the nature of the thing, apart from any operation, is agreeable or disagreeable. On the other hand, however, the objects become proximately agreeable or disagreeable to the intellective will by means of its operations; from which it happens that those operations proximately dispose the will to receiving the passions from the objects; in the same way, then, that what proximately disposes a subject so as to fit it to receive the form is said to be in some manner cause of the form, so a perfect operation is causally delight. Therefore the will can be considered in two ways: in one way as it is an operative power, in another way as it is a receptive power. Considered in the first way the will is perfected simply by the operation that joins it simply to what is ultimately best; in which event blessedness consists essentially in the operation itself. But insofar as the will is considered as receptive, then it is perfectible, not by operation, but by supernatural passions, because it is ultimately receptive of such passions, and thus is it by delight and joy perfected.

Now [Oxon. 4 ib. n.3] as to delight not at all entering into the essence of blessedness, the declaration is as follows: for no passion is blessedness essentially; delight is essentially a passion; therefore delight does not have regard to the essence of blessedness. Proof of the major: blessedness, because of the fact it conjoins simply to what is best, is ultimate perfection. I prove this as follows: because if anything were of itself blessedness, it would most of all be the noblest thing; but the nature of

one who is blest is something in itself nobler than any proper accident; therefore the nature would most of all be blessedness; but all the perfections of nature are accidents; so they are less beings than the nature itself is; now no passion conjoins to the beatific object, but that is performed by operations only, for passion is derivative from the object to the power; since therefore delight is a certain passion, it is assuredly not something that has regard to the essence of blessedness. – Next, that which belongs to the essence of blessedness should have regard to the beatific object not only under the idea of efficient cause but also under the idea of the object to which it conjoins and with which it deals. But passion does not regard the beatific object save as the object is efficient cause, for delight arises about it or from it and reaches to the power, which is thus suffused with joy; therefore it is something outside the essence of blessedness. – Lastly, the wayfarer is moved by, conjoined to, and rests in the beatific object through something of the same nature as it (though in a very imperfect fashion while wayfarer); so similarly in the fatherland he is ultimately and perfectly conjoined to and rests in the beatific object through something of the same nature as it; but no one while in the state of being a wayfarer is conjoined to that object by a passion, but rather by means of the operation that is love; therefore it is not otherwise in the fatherland. Since therefore blessedness is what ultimately conjoins, it will assuredly not be a passion; but delight is essentially a passion; so it cannot have regard to the essence of blessedness. And this indeed seems to be the intention of the Philosopher, *Ethics* 10.3, where his meaning is that we would desire many things even if we were to get no delight from them, of which sort are knowing, remembering, and the virtues; and from this he in the same place concludes that operation is not for the sake of delight but rather the reverse; for we do not work so that we may rest, but rather we rest so that we may work.

Article Seven: Whether Man's Blessedness consists in some Good of the Soul

Response: [Theoremata 18, Oxon. 4 d.49 q.2 n.19] one must say that a distinction about the end should be drawn. For one end of man is outside him and another is within him, and the latter is man's very operation or also its form. So if the discussion is about the end of man that is outside him, then it is impossible that the idea of this be placed in the soul or in anything having regard to the soul. For the end is that supreme thing among what is desirable wherein, as in what is essentially supreme, there is a stand in the order of desirable things; so it must also be formally infinite; for that which infinity is not repugnant to is not simply supreme unless it is formally infinite [cf. q.1 aa.4-5]. – The end is also and precisely to be willed simply for its own sake by the will, since to nothing else is being desired for the sake of something else repugnant; for a lesser good can rightly be desired for the sake of a greater good. – Finally, in an end of this sort, which is supremely desirable, intellectual nature is ultimately and completely perfected, for by attaining it, even though it is something outside it, it acquires a perfection beyond what it is able to have in itself and in relation to itself. For the more ignoble things are, for this reason, perfected in the more noble ones, not indeed by really passing over into them, nor by having them formally inherent in themselves, but by attaining them through their own operation; for they are not able to be united to them in any other way. – It is

evident that all these things, which we say belong to the end of man wherein is placed that ultimate and complete perfection of his which we mean by the name of blessedness, are repugnant to the soul and to whatever belongs to it; and so it is evident that neither the soul nor any good of the same can have the idea of man's blessedness. – However, if we are speaking of the intrinsic end, which is the operation of the soul by whose means it attains the extrinsic end, this end must indeed be said to consist in some good of the soul; for operation is an intrinsic perfection of what operates; but no intrinsic perfection of the blessed is blessedness save insofar as it immediately conjoins them to the extrinsic perfective thing by the fact it is the attainment of the extrinsic end. For neither essence nor power is conjoined to that extrinsic perfective thing save by an operation that is an intrinsic perfection of the blessed. But this operation does not rest in itself or in relation to itself but tends per se to the object, even by immediately excluding every mediate absolute form.

Article Eight: Whether Man's Blessedness consists in any Created Good

Response: [Oxon. 1 d.1 q.1 n.3] concerning the present question Avicenna, *Metaphysics* 9.4, seems to be of the opinion that the blessedness of intellectual nature is placed in some created good. For he wants the superior intelligence to produce by its own act of understanding an inferior intelligence. And this produced intellect is completely perfect when it attains its productive principle, according to proposition 15 of Proclus, "each thing is of a nature to return to that from which it proceeds." Now in such a return there seems to be a complete circle, and thus perfection. Since therefore the produced intelligence is perfectly at rest in the intelligence that produces it, it is beatified in it. – However this erroneous opinion is convicted by the Philosopher of falsity. For a power is not at rest save where its object exists most perfectly and at its highest; the object of the enjoying power is being in general, according to Avicenna *Metaphysics* 1.5; therefore the enjoying power is not at rest save where being is most perfect; but being is and can be nowhere such save in what is supremely desirable. – Next, a power that is per se inclined to many objects is not perfectly at rest in any single one of them unless that one includes all the per se objects to the extent these can be included in one thing; but the enjoying power is inclined to all being as to its per se objects; therefore it is not at rest in any one being unless that one being include all beings to the extent they can all be included in some one thing; now they can only be most perfectly included and contained in one infinite thing; therefore it is precisely there that the enjoying power can be most perfectly at rest. – Again, when an inferior intelligence sees a superior one, either it sees it to be finite or sees it to be infinite, or certainly it neither intuits it as being finite nor as being infinite. If it sees the superior as endowed with infinity, then since the superior is in fact finite, it is not beatified in it, "because nothing more stupid can be said than that the soul is blessed in a false opinion," according to Augustine *City of God* 11.4. But if it does not know whether the superior is finite or infinite, then to be sure it does not see it perfectly and is not blessed in such vision. If, however, it intuits the superior's finitude, then it understands that the superior can be exceeded by another in perfection, and thus it

can desire and love what thus exceeds, as we experience in ourselves. Therefore it does not rest in the intelligence from which (as Avicenna falsely imagined) other things proceed. – Lastly, Avicenna's reason works to the opposite. For on his hypothesis, namely that the second intelligence produces a third intelligence, the second certainly does not produce the third in virtue of itself but rather in virtue of the first intelligence on which it depends; therefore neither does it finish the third by its own virtue but by another's; but what finishes another thing in virtue of some further end as the ultimate end does not bring that other thing perfectly to rest; therefore it is altogether repugnant for intellectual and rational nature to be perfectly at rest in some created good, such that that rest can be said to be its blessedness.

One must say, therefore, [Oxon. ib. n.5] that it is utterly impossible for man's blessedness to consist in any created good, as the just alleged reasons clearly show; and I explain this solution further as follows: just as one must assent through the intellect to the first truth because of that truth itself, so one must adhere through the will precisely to the first good because of that good itself; and so man's ultimate happiness and blessedness should not and cannot stand in any created good as in its object, but only in the ultimate end, which is the supremely desirable thing.

QUESTION THREE: WHAT BLESSEDNESS IS. IN EIGHT ARTICLES.

Article One: Whether Blessedness is something Uncreated

Response: [Oxon. 4 d.49 q.2 n.17ff.] according to what was said in q.2 a.7 above, the extrinsic end of man is one thing, the intrinsic end another, namely his own operation, by means of which the power and nature of him whose operation it is are united to the extrinsic perfective object. If we speak then about blessedness as it is the beatifying end and object, it is evident that it is uncreated, and that it can be located in the ultimate end alone that is goodness by essence; for when everything other than it is established in man's full possession, the intellective appetite can still not be perfectly at rest while desire for possessing the highest good urges it most deeply within; but when that highest good is most perfectly and ultimately acquired the intellective appetite does rest, because now it has obtained a state that is perfected with the accumulation of all goods in the one good that eminently and unitively contains all other goods other than it. But if the discussion is about the blessedness that is the operation of the blessed, whereby they are united to the extrinsic perfective object, and that is formally the possessing or holding (so to speak) of the uncreated good, then this blessedness is created, finite, and newly produced by the inflowing of perfection to a finite power, such as are the powers of intellect and will of man, which God makes partaker of his own blessedness.

Article Two: Whether Blessedness is an Operation

Response: [Oxon. 4 d.49 q.2 n.27] one must say that the blessedness of man and of intellectual nature is the best and perfect operation, or at least that it consists in operation. Declaration: for from what was said in q.1 aa.4 & 5, there is in desirable things an essential order such that a stand must be made in one supreme and infinite desirable thing, which alone is to be willed for its own sake by the rational creature; for all other things are ordered to it, and thus no nature that is capable of it, unless united to it, is in the state of its perfection ultimately; because the supreme desirable is alone to be willed for its own sake; so nature is not ultimately at rest in the possession of anything other than it. But this supreme desirable thing can be united in no other way to a nature capable of beatification than by that nature's operation; for neither essence nor power is conjoined to the extrinsic perfective thing save by means of an operation, which, although it is a perfection intrinsic to the operator, yet does not stop in it or in relation to it but tends rather by its natural condition toward the object, even when any intermediate form of the absolute kind is removed. This last point is added because, although blessedness, if taken as the perfection that is the idea of conjunction with the beatific object, essentially consists in operation, yet the conjunction itself is formally the relation of the attainment and union of the power with the object present to it in its natural existence; so, this relation excepted, the ultimate perfection intrinsic to the blessed and proximate to the beatific object is operation. – Next, [Quodlibet q.13 n.3] blessedness is essentially the possession of the supreme good; for thereby a nature capable of blessedness is in a completely good state. This possession does not formally consist in any relation although it necessarily involves relation; therefore it must be placed in operation. Proof of the minor: the ultimate perfection of a living substance is not a relation merely; operation is the ultimate perfection of a living substance that is of a nature to operate, as is a living thing's sensitive or intellective soul; therefore operation is not a relation merely. Proof of the major: mere relation is not supremely desired by the natural and elective appetite of a nature that desires most perfectly; but the ultimate perfection of a living nature is supremely desired by such a nature with natural desire; for we all want to be blessed, whether we are actually thinking about blessedness or not; blessedness is also desired with the supreme elective desire of a well disposed will; therefore the ultimate perfection of a living substance is not relation merely. – However the operation that is the ultimate perfection of the operator's nature has this relation necessarily annexed to it; and it is a real relation, because it is between real extremes; and a creature cannot have a greater unity with the object than the unity of the relation; but divine blessedness, by contrast, although it equally consists in operation, yet it is one with the object, not however by relation, not even a relation of reason, but by perfect real identity. Nevertheless the real relation of union and of attainment with the beatific object, which relation is necessarily what is meant by a power seeing and enjoying the deity, does not import primarily per se the ultimate perfection of the operating power but only concomitantly and by connotation; for it connotes the operation which is ultimate and simply perfection and which is more outstanding than anything concomitant, although not by way of excluding the relation itself we are now talking about. For if the beatific object could stand without the added relation,

the soul would still remain blessed; but it would not be blessed if the relation were posited without the operation.

Article Two Again: Whether Blessedness is an Operation

Response: [Oxon. 4 d.49 q.2 n.3] here there are some who think [Henry of Ghent et al] that blessedness does not consist more principally in operation, but rather should be placed in the descent of deity into the essence of the soul and to be thence derived to the soul's powers, in which powers therefore, when they attain through their operations the beatific object, blessedness exists less principally and as it were secondarily. They make this point clear as follows: blessedness more principally consists in the object, which is uncreated blessedness; but a nature capable of blessedness is, by the medium of the will, transformed, and strives to be converted into it by the force of love, as Dionysius says *Angelic Hierarchy* 7: "Love is a power transformative and converte of the lover into the beloved." Here Hugo [of St. Victor] says, "he who loves presses himself forward so that, if possible, he himself should be him whom he loves; and a union is made in some way by the force of love, so that the lover begins to be removed outward and to leave himself and begins to be what he loves." But for the lover to leave himself and to begin to be what he loves can only happen by *circumcession*, namely not of the created nature descending into Divinity but the reverse. So when God descends into a nature capable of blessedness, the nature takes on divine form, as iron when hot glows and burns like fire so that it is and appears to be nothing but fire. – Then the conclusion is argued for as follows: that should be more principally made blessed which is more principally perfected by the object that blessedness essentially is; but the essence of the soul is more principally perfected by the perfective object, because it is perfected by the essence of the Deity descending into it; therefore the essence is more principally beatified than the power. Blessedness then consists most of all in some first act that has regard to the Deity's descent; but it is found in the powers by way of term, insofar as the powers reach their term through their proper operations, and so blessedness is in them less principally. Again [ibid. n.4] God, who is blessedness by essence, is more principally possessed in the essence than in the powers; for he perfects an essence in some way by his own essence, namely by descending, as described above; but he perfects the powers only through operations that have their term in the divine essence under the idea of true and good; but he perfects more principally that which he perfects per se in his own idea than that which he perfects only by way of term under an attributive idea. – Next, blessedness perfects in the way and order in which the disposition ordered to blessedness perfects; a disposition of this sort is grace; since therefore grace principally perfects the essence and redounds from it to the power, blessedness itself also should more principally be in the essence. – Lastly, distributive justice has regard to the worth of the recipient according to geometrical proportion, namely that more good should be bestowed on the more worthy; but intellectual nature is more noble and more worthy in fact or in idea than its power is; therefore the essence itself should more principally be perfected by blessedness, while the powers are less principally perfected. – However these proponents do confess that the essence only perceives

this perfection of itself through its powers; for by the intellect it knows, while by the will it as it were tastes, the perfection of blessedness; therefore it is by the redounding of the blessedness of the essence to the powers that the powers themselves also are beatified.

Against this opinion I argue first: [Oxon. ibid. n.5] God is not in himself disposed differently now than earlier nor does he descend into this soul or Angel otherwise now than before, when we consider his essence precisely here and there; for there is, according to the descent of the divine essence into the essence of a creature, always uniformity while the essence of the creature remains; so if there is some newness in a blessed soul, it must be by some new effect caused by God in the essence; the effect is said to be its blessedness formally or essentially. And the effect cannot principally be in the essence as the essence is distinct from the power, because then it would be first act; but by no first act distinct from second act can a creature immediately attain the divine essence. – Confirmation: nothing is properly altered unless something new formally inheres in it; the blessed are disposed differently now than before when they were not blessed; but the divine essence is not the form of the blessed by any descent; therefore something else must be present in them whereby they are formally blessed. – Next, [ibid. n.6] the descent is prior in nature to any operation, since it is [according to this opinion] in the presence of first act; therefore it can, without contradiction, be without any operation; consequently someone not operating but disposed as one asleep could be blessed principally, which Aristotle considers absurd, *Metaphysics* 12 text com.51. – Finally, the creature is blessed, by some proportion, in the way that God is blessed; but God is not blessed precisely by the fact that he is the same as himself, but insofar as he understands and wills himself as object; otherwise one could not infer from the fact he is blessed that he understands; for if he had no power of intellect he would still be the same as himself, just as a stone is the same as itself. If then the divine blessedness does not consist completely in the identity of what is capable of blessedness with the beatific object, then neither should the blessedness of the creature be placed in some reality or within-ness of the beatific object through a descent into it; because if the creature requires an operation over and above identity, much more is operation necessary here over and above the descent; for whatever blessedness is posited as being principally in a creature, to which something more eminent would correspond in God, that would be blessedness principally; but to the descent, by which the soul is said to be deified, the identity of God far eminently corresponds, and yet by this identity God is not principally and completely blessed but rather by the operations of intellect and will.

On behalf of a solution let the first statement be as follows: [Oxon. ibid. n.13] on the hypothesis that the perfection of essence is one thing and the perfection of power another, blessedness cannot principally be in the essence. For what perfects essence, as essence is in some way distinct from its powers, can be nothing save first act, and perhaps no habit can provide it; but no first act, or no act having regard to the order of first act, is principally blessedness; rather a contradiction is involved in blessedness being without operation and first act standing thus without any second act.

Second statement: [Oxon. ibid.] if we adhere to the opinion explained in Ia q.77 a.1, namely that the powers are not really distinct from the essence of the soul, blessedness absolutely exists more principally in the power. Proof: for the essence would not receive blessedness if the power was, per possibile or per impossible, removed; but the power, if the essence were per possibile or per impossible removed, would receive that perfection; therefore, in the way in which principality in fact or in idea is possible there, the power receives more principally, and consequently blessedness perfects it first; for blessedness consists in operation, as was said in the preceding article. – Further, that is truly and properly said to be more principle with respect to A which, when everything else is per possibile or per impossible removed, is disposed in the same way to A, but, when it is removed, nothing else is disposed in the same way to A. This reasoning is proved from the idea of first-ness; because that is first with respect to some other thing which, when removed, means nothing else is first with respect to that other, but which, when something else is removed, it would be disposed to that other in the same way; and the simply first is the simply more principal.

Article Three: Whether Blessedness is an Operation of the Sensitive Part or only of the Intellective Part

Response: [Oxon. 4 d.49 q.4 n.2, q.3 n.5] blessedness can be considered either according to its essential idea or according to what is concomitantly added to it. In the first sense, no operation of the sensitive part enters into its formal idea. For only an immaterial power is able by its own operation to attain the perfect good in which alone, as in the object, blessedness per se exists. So although the senses, as they are united with their agreeable objects, attain and possess certain goods, yet those objects do not bestow perfect happiness and blessedness. – Next [Oxon. ibid. q.8 n.6] what cannot be conjoined to what is better than itself cannot be beatified, nor is it beatified simply; no sensitive power is by its own operation conjoined to an object as to something better than itself; therefore blessedness cannot consist in any operation of the sensitive part. Proof of the major: any operative power belongs to the animated thing as it is animated; but material objects, as they are sensible qualities in themselves, are not more perfect than the animated thing as it is animated; therefore the powers themselves are better than the objects; it is therefore impossible that these operations, by which such objects are attained, can belong to the essential idea of blessedness. – Lastly [Oxon. ibid. q.2 n.24] any sensitive appetite desires the extrinsic object for the sake of the nature whose appetite it is; for any extrinsic sensible object is more ignoble than the sensitive appetite, and therefore the sensitive appetite does not conjoin to anything more desirable than is the being of the nature whose the appetite is. But the will loves something more noble than itself, and more than the nature of that of which it is the will; and so it conjoins to something more desirable both in itself and for it than is the nature whose it is; so only in the intellective part as it is distinguished from the sensitive part is blessedness to be placed according to its essential idea.

However [Oxon. ibid. q.12 n.8] because in the resurrection the body is united to the blessed soul, then, although blessedness properly said, which consists in an

act of intellect and will, is repugnant to the body, yet the body is, from its union with the soul, capable of blessedness in a certain respect, when the glory of which it is capable redounds to it, as Augustine says in his *Epistle to Dioscorus*; thus there is here a certain order, so that the blessedness of the soul would not be completely perfect unless it saw its body united to it adorned with glory; not that the body is simply blessed, because such is what the person is who enjoys and understands. So the blessedness of the body consists in its primary existence, as it is perfectible by a blessed soul, and that either because of the greater perfection of the soul in operating or because of the greater perfection of the body received from the soul, because matter is for the sake of form and not the reverse. Although therefore the body is not such as to be blessed simply on account of the sensitive powers, yet the redounding of glory into it regards the state of blessedness concomitantly, when the sensitive part shares in blessedness in a certain respect, namely in all the beatitude that it is capable of sharing in.

Article Four: Whether, if Blessedness belongs to the Intellective Part, it is an Operation of the Intellect or of the Will

Response: [Oxon. 4 d.49 q.4 n.2] there is here the following sort of opinion: blessedness per se and essentially consists in an act of intellect but in an act of will as in some extrinsic perfection supervening on vision. Proof: blessedness is either the external ultimate end that is attained by operation, or it is the internal ultimate end which is only the operation that conjoins to the extrinsic end; but an act of will is the ultimate end in neither way; therefore blessedness whether in that way or this does not consist in an act of will, as it is an act of will, although blessedness is in the will as object; for the idea of good is the object of will, and blessedness as it is the ultimate end most of all has the idea of good. – Proof of the minor as to its first part: the object of will is the end; therefore all willing is something ordered to an end. – Next, willing cannot be the first thing willed, for it presupposes that something other than willing has first been willed, because a reflex act presupposes a direct act terminating in something other than the act of the power, otherwise there would be an infinite regress; and the same must be said of acts of the intellect. – The second part of the minor is proved thus: [ibid. n.3] an operation per se conjoining to the exterior end is that by which the first attainment of the exterior end occurs; an act of will is not of such a sort, for there is an act of will, namely desire, before the attaining of the end; but this act of will is a certain motion to what is not possessed, and another act of it is a certain resting in the end. And indeed the end is not first attained by the first act, because while desire of the end is in place what is desired is lacked. Nor is the end attained by the second act; the proof is that that act follows attainment of the end; for the will does not rest in a different way in the thing it was first tending toward unless it is disposed in another way to the thing now than it was before, or conversely. That then which makes the will be thus disposed to the end so as to rest in it, is ultimate attainment of the end; such is an act of vision, because by it a certain contact of God with the intellect is made, and it is through this contact that the object is so disposed to the will that it can rest in it in a way it could not before. An example is added about the sensitive appetite; for if the

sensible thing is an extrinsic end, sensation is an intrinsic end, because by it the sensible object is first possessed in such a way that the sensitive appetite can be at rest in it. The thing is clear also from another example; for if money is an extrinsic end, possession of money is an intrinsic end, which is followed by the resting of the will in the longed for money.

We say [Oxon. ibid. n.4] that blessedness essentially and formally consists in an act of will whereby simply and solely the best good is attained, and in the enjoyment of this good a nature capable of blessedness is perfectly blest. Proof: the extrinsic end is simply best and supremely to be willed; therefore among the things that are related to this end, the one that is more immediate to it is more to be willed. But willing is more immediate to it, because it immediately tends to it as to the ultimate end, since the ultimate end as such is the proper object of willing. Proof of the major: that is more to be willed by free will which is naturally more to be desired by natural appetite; of this sort is what is closer to the best, for the best is most of all naturally desired. – Next, the will can will its own act as the intellect can understand its own act; either then it wills its own willing for the sake of understanding or the reverse or neither for the sake of either, and I am speaking of ordered willing. Not the first because according to Anselm *Why God Man* 2, “it would be a perverse order to will to love so that you might understand.” Not the third, because in things ordered per se to the same end there is also some order among them as to an end under the end. Therefore the second must be granted, as Anselm elegantly discourses. – Finally, if extrinsic blessedness is simply supremely to be willed, then that is most of all intrinsic blessedness which, among intrinsic things, is supremely to be willed; of this sort is some willing; for the will wants its own perfection in the ultimate end more than the perfection of the intellect, and does so altogether rightly speaking of free desire, just as it naturally desires more with natural appetite.

As to the reason on which the contrary opinion rests, I reply [Oxon. ibid. n.5] by conceding the first part of the minor and the first part of the conclusion, namely that an act of will is not the altogether ultimate or extrinsic end, just as neither is an act of the intellect; yet we say that this ultimate end comes closer to an act of will, as is shown by the reasons introduced above. Nor do the proofs for the first part conclude to anything more, granted that they do conclude. For an act of will is so to be ordered or able to be ordered to the end simply that it is most immediate above all other acts to the end; an act of intellect is not so able to be ordered but only mediately, and therefore it is less a participant in the idea of the end. The second proof shows that there is something first willed by the will itself, which is true, because it first wills the extrinsic object; but that is not intellection; and although vision may be said to be first in order of generation, this is not to the present purpose; for we are speaking of what is first willed in the order of perfection, in which order volition is first willed, both on the part of the first end moving first to things that are closer, and on the part of the power and its inclination, which inclination is carried to the end and to things more conjoint with the end.

The second part of the minor is to be denied. [Oxon. ibid.] As to the proof I concede that one does not attain the end by an act of desire, for desire is of something absent, but one does attain it by another act, which is the love of the

thing when present; for this beatific object is attained first, speaking of the primacy of perfection, although there is, by an act of intellect, some sort of prior attaining of it in priority of generation; but things posterior in generation are prior in perfection, from the Philosopher *Metaphysics* 9 text 15, and this is true in the case of a prior that is simply more immediate to the end, which end is the simply perfect ultimate. – As to the proof [ibid. n.6] of the proposition about second act, that it is the resting in the end and so is posterior to the attaining of the end, I reply that resting can be understood in one way as delight properly speaking, which is a perfection supervening on operation, as beauty supervenes on the body; in this sense, indeed, delight follows the attaining of the end, not only in primacy of generation but also in primacy of perfection; for it follows the act of loving the seen end, which is truly an elicited act of the will. Further, it is altogether false that the will does not elicit any act about the lovable object present to it but only receives delight and passion. For Augustine says *On the Trinity* 9 last chapter, that “the appetite of him who longs becomes the love of him who enjoys.” But this appetite or desire is not passion merely; both because, *Ethics* 2.5, “we do not merit by passions, nor are we praised or blamed for them,” although however it is clear that the greatest part of the merit and praiseworthiness of wayfaring just men consists in holy desires; and also because, when the same object has been presented, sometimes the will elicits a more intense desire, sometimes a less intense one, for no other reason than that it elicits it with greater or lesser effort. If therefore the will elicits an act when desiring, reasonably does it equally elicit an act also about the end when the end is present; for if it moves itself to something not possessed when it recognizes it, then, when it sees the object present through its own act, it rests in that present object. – Therefore [ibid. n.7] if rest is taken for the act elicited by the will when the will is immediately conjoined with the ultimate end, in the way ultimate rest is through this act, then I concede that that rest arises from a second act of the will; but I deny that it follows a first attaining of the end; I mean first by primacy of perfection, since rather by this very same operation attainment in the order of the primacy of perfection is possessed; however rest does follow some attainment, that is, the presence of the enjoyable object itself, which presence is through an act of intellect. However this act of intellect, through which the beatific object is present to the will, is not the ultimate intrinsic end through which the extrinsic end is first attained; for this operation, first in the order of generation, does not conjoin immediately with the extrinsic end, to the exclusion of all mediation of another thing closer to that end.

The first part of the deduction therefore [Oxon. ibid. n.8] is not contrary to any opinion, because no one posits that an act of created will is God; nor is the second part about the first act of the will, which is desire, doubtful to anyone. There remains then some force in the latter, if some act of the will other than desire could be the first attainment of the ultimate end. This is indeed denied by those who hold the above opinion; but their proof about rest commits the fallacy of equivocation. For (as was said) if rest is taken for the delight consequent to perfect operation, then indeed this rest is preceded by perfect attainment of the end; but if rest is taken for the act resting in the end, we say that the act of loving, which is prior in nature to delight, does for this reason give perfect rest to the lover, for the operative power is

not at rest in the object save by the perfect operation whereby it is conjoined with that very object. And surely, if the will is operative about an absent object imperfectly known, much more can it operate about an object present and perfectly seen. – Wherefore the proposition, ‘the first attainment of the object precedes rest in the object’, that is, the first perfect attainment, is false yet having an appearance of truth from the comparison with the motion whereby a movable thing attains the end and reaches rest in the end. But this comparison is nothing when applied to operations, because the same operation in this case is both perfectly attaining and perfectly resting, since rest consists in perfect attainment of the object. And, as a general fact, likenesses taken from motions fail when applied to operations; for one must leave out of the comparison whatever there is of imperfection in the motion, and the imperfection of this sort is motion’s being distinguished from rest; for in operation there are found together both the attainment of the object through motion as it were, or rather by reaching out to it, and the resting in the object; for such tending to the object is perfect rest in it.

But there was the argument [Oxon. ibid. n.9] that the will can now be at rest in the object when before it could not be; therefore it is related differently now to the willable object than it was before. Response: the consequence is not valid; for it is enough if some other power in the operating is differently disposed to the object than it was before. Nor is it surprising that a power, which requires in operating another operating power, is not altogether in proximate potency to operating unless that other power is operating. – On the contrary, at least by that new thing the will can now be at rest and could not be at rest previously; but for no other reason than that there is attainment of the end, and indeed an attainment prior to the resting itself of the will; therefore in such a prior act there is attainment of the end. I respond from what has been said: one must concede the inference as to priority of generation but not as to priority of perfection; but blessedness is the first attainment of the end by primacy of perfection. And if you argue that attainment of the end altogether precedes any resting of the power, namely because the power can operate now but could not before, which does not happen without any change and this change is only toward possession of the object, then the consequence is that the first attainment of the object cannot be placed in any operation, not even of the intellect, and so neither can blessedness be so placed; and now the reasoning ends up in the opinion that denies blessedness is to be placed in operation but rather in the descent of God into a nature capable of blessedness, and this opinion was disproved at large in the preceding article.

Article Five: Whether Blessedness is an Operation of the Speculative or of the Practical Intellect

Response: [Oxon. Prol. q.4 n.3ff, n.6ff, n.31ff] according to what was said in Ia q.1 a.4 about praxis and practical knowledge, one should be of the opinion that the blessedness of a created intellect pertains to the practical and not the speculative intellect. Declaration: for an elicited act of will is most truly praxis, even if no commanded will accompanies it; but the extension of practical knowledge to praxis consists in its aptitudinal conformity and priority to praxis, otherwise a carpenter

who is not actually operating would not have practical knowledge; that knowledge is practical, then, which is aptitudinally conform to right volition and is itself naturally prior; now the vision in the blessed's intellect of the divine essence and of the things necessarily present therein is conform by this reason to the blessed's act of will and prior to the same act; therefore such knowledge or vision is most truly practical. Proof of the minor: the first subject of theology is virtually conform to right volition, if indeed from the idea of this subject the first principles of rectitude in volition are taken; this subject also determines a created intellect to knowledge of the determinate rectitude of praxis as to all theological matters that are naturally necessary before any created will wills; therefore from the first subject, which is equally the object of blessedness, there proceeds both conformity and priority of vision to volition, and thus extension to praxis, and it is from this extension that knowledge is to be called practical. Confirmation: the first object of blessedness is equally the ultimate end, by which every intellectual nature is ultimately perfected; but the principles taken from the ultimate end are practical in a created intellect; therefore all knowledge and vision of that object should be practical, since only practical inferences are contained in practical principles. So the vision of the divine essence in the created intellect is truly practical.

Article Six: Whether Blessedness consists in the Consideration of the Speculative Sciences

Response: [Oxon. 4 d.49 q.2 n.25] either this discussion is about blessedness simply, which is second perfection conjoining immediately to the most noble extrinsic perfective object, which object is also supremely desirable, or we are talking about blessedness in a certain respect, by which name we mean second perfection that conjoins to an object less noble than what is supremely desirable, or we are speaking of the nature itself that is perfected. Now if it chance that the extrinsic perfective object is more noble than the perfectible nature itself, then such perfection comes closer to the idea of blessedness simply, but things are otherwise if it is supposed to be less noble.

When blessedness is taken in the first sense, it cannot consist in the consideration of the speculative sciences. For the most perfective and supremely desirable object is the most practicable object, that is, most attainable by act of love and lovable for its own sake; hence [Oxon. Prol. q.4 n.3] it is written: "Love is the end of the law," and "On these two precepts (which are love of God and neighbor) hang the whole law and the prophets," *Romans 13* and *Matthew 22*. For just as God made all things for his own sake, so he most rightly commanded that that because of which all things were clearly made be loved for its own sake and most of all. What therefore blessedness simply consists in is outside the whole genus of the speculative sciences. – Nor does it matter [ibid. n.25] that some speculative sciences, as metaphysics, show that there exists a first Principle, and indeed a supreme good, and therefore a supreme desirable thing. For although such knowledge may be extended to love, as showing the object of it, yet it would not at all give direction in act as act exists in such and such circumstances and insofar as it is of this object in particular; for this exceeds every faculty of a created intellect; and yet knowledge is

simply necessary if praxis is to be rightly elicited, and if the first desirable object is to be desired and sought after as it should. Since therefore none of the speculative sciences is able to teach this, it is evident that the ultimate perfection of a nature capable of blessedness cannot consist in the speculative sciences. – Then, [Metaphysics 6 q.1] every speculative science able to be acquired by man through the natural virtue and light of the intellect proceeds and rests on principles known by way of the senses; for our knowledge arises from the senses, *Posterior Analytics* 1.1. All speculative knowledge, therefore, by which the intellect is perfected and its ignorance warded off, is virtually contained in sensible things, and cannot extend itself beyond those first objects. [Cf. Ia q.1 a.7 intervening article] For every first object contains the immediate propositions, because the subject of these propositions embraces the predicate and thus the evidence of the whole proposition. But immediate propositions contain the conclusions; therefore the subject of the immediate propositions contains all the truths of the habit of the science. So an intellect endowed with the speculative sciences is understood to have indeed acquired the perfection that wards off ignorance of the things that are contained under the objects of those sciences; but in no way can it thence be simply happy and blessed. For these sorts of objects of the sciences are not simply perfective extrinsic objects; rather they are absolutely more imperfect than the most noble extrinsic object simply. Nor lastly do they pertain to the perfection of the human soul and of a nature capable of blessedness, since they are essentially and virtually included in sensible things. So although a nature capable of blessedness may find in the speculative sciences some perfection of itself, yet it cannot be made simply blessed in them.

Article Seven: Whether Blessedness consists in Knowledge of the Separate Substances, namely of the Angels

[Montefortino: Since we have dealt at length with this present question in the last article of the preceding question, where we showed, against Avicenna, that it cannot be that an inferior intelligence be blessed in another intelligence more perfect than or superior to itself but only in the first intelligence of all (even in the case of his false hypothesis that a second intelligence produces a third intelligence and so on), we judge that nothing more needs to be added here.]

Article Eight: Whether Man's Blessedness consists in the Vision of the Divine Essence

Response: [Oxon. 4 d.49 q.3 n.3] there are here two opinions from the side of the opposite; one indeed says that blessedness simply should be posited in an act of intellect and of will at the same time; the other, however, contends that it consists in only one operation, but what sort of operation, whether of intellect or of will, was discussed at large above in a.4. Further, the reasons on which the first opinion rests are, first, that blessedness should be placed in the perfect union of a nature capable of blessedness with God; now this involves the union of every power by which that nature is able to be united immediately with the beatific object; such powers indeed are intellect and will. – Next, the power through which something is moved to its term is the same power as that through which it rests in the term. Now an

intellectual nature is moved to God through intellect and will; therefore it rests in him through both powers. – I add also a third reason; for both intellect and reason have regard to the perfection of an intellectual nature in first act; so for the perfection of the same in second act there are required second acts corresponding respectively to these first acts. Blessedness, therefore, which is complete perfection of intellectual nature, includes simply in second act those second acts.

The other opinion [Oxon. ibid. n.4] is principally founded on the fact that, according to the Philosopher *Ethics* 1, “happiness is the best operation according to the best virtue, and in a complete life;” but it is impossible for the same thing to have several simply best operations. For they cannot be of the same species, because one operation thus perfect is sufficient for one thing. Nor can they be of a different species, since species are related as numbers, *Metaphysics* 8. So a repugnance is involved in several species being equal. Likewise it is impossible for there to be several best virtues of the same nature, whether virtue is taken for natural power (there is one supreme power for one nature), or whether by the name of virtue is understood acquired or infused virtue; so in both ways there is precisely a single best.

For the solution [Oxon. ibid. n.5] one must suppose that our discussion here is about blessedness insofar as blessedness means that by which the beatific object is immediately attained, and not as it states things preparatory for, or concomitant with, or even consequent upon, blessedness. On this supposition, I say, a distinction can be drawn between the blessedness of intellectual nature and the blessedness of intellectual power. For although nature is not beatified save through the power, yet there is in nature some power capable of blessedness, and the blessedness of it is not simply the blessedness of nature, just as there is a difference between the natural appetite of both for this supreme perfection; because the nature is in a perfectly good state not for the reason that the power is united to the beatific object, but it is so in some other thing more noble than it, although from such union the power is in a simply good state.

Then [Oxon. ibid.] let the first statement be as follows: when blessedness is taken intensively and for the ultimate and perfect attainment of the beatific object, blessedness consists in a single operation. Proof: for in one operation alone intellectual nature is in a simply perfectly good state, so much so that, once the operation is posited, nothing is lacking to the nature. Not as if it includes everything pertaining to the well being of nature, but because there stands in it precisely the complement of everything that exists in well being; also, in the way that the beatific object is in fact and in idea single, wherein, as in the extrinsic perfective object, this nature has perfect well being to the extent that well being is immediately attained through operation by this nature, so this sort of operation too will be simply single.

The second statement [Oxon. ibid. n.6] is that, if blessedness is taken extensively for the immediate attaining of the beatific object by whichever power, then it must be placed in the operation of both the intellect and the will. Indeed nothing else is proved by the reasons adduced for the first opinion. But for the evidence of the matter one must draw a distinction about immediacy. For either immediacy excludes an intermediate of the same nature, namely one that would be intermediate to it for an attainment in the same order (as operation is intermediate

for the power in the attaining of the object); or it excludes an intermediate of a different order, such that nothing attains more immediately or more perfectly than it does. An example: a prior and posterior cause immediately reach the same passive object, such that neither acts by the medium of the other, and yet the prior cause more immediately reaches it, because reaching it more intimately and more perfectly.

As far as concerns the first kind of immediacy [Oxon. ibid.], one must concede absolutely that both the intellect and the will immediately attain the beatific object; because neither is intermediate with respect to the other, whether in idea of object or in idea of attaining the object; rather the more immediate term of the operation of each power is the beatific object itself as it is attained by the operations of both. And so the total extensive beatitude possible in an intellectual nature consists in several operations, according to the plurality of the powers that can all in their own way be beatified. For which reason, if an intellectual nature were endowed with ten powers, each of which would by its own operation immediately attain the beatific object, total extensive blessedness would have to be placed in ten operations. – But when speaking of the second immediacy [Oxon. ibid. n.7], it is evident that blessedness is situated precisely in a single operation; because only one power in intellectual nature most perfectly attains the object; so the blessedness of nature, namely the blessedness by which the nature is in the simply best state, at any rate on the part of the best object as it is best, exists only in a single operation of one more excelling power. – The like holds when speaking of the blessedness of the power, as far as it includes immediacy said in both ways. Therefore in no way can blessedness be placed in two operations, unless one asserts that a single operation without the other is not sufficient for beatific operation, which however is doubtful.

QUESTION FOUR: ABOUT THE THINGS REQUIRED FOR BLESSEDNESS. IN EIGHT ARTICLES.

Article One: Whether Pleasure is required for Blessedness

Response: [Oxon. 4 d.49 q.7 nn.2-4] one must say that pleasure is not required for blessedness as something that regards the essence of blessedness; yet it makes for the extensive integrity of it, insofar as blessedness is a state perfected by the aggregation of all goods. And in fact the first part of the solution was shown above in q.2 a.6. For blessedness is so far the greatest perfection of intellectual nature that it states the conjoining of intellectual nature with the most noble object extrinsic to it. Now the passions, of which sort is pleasure, do not conjoin with the extrinsic perfective object but rather suppose the conjunction and flow from it. – Next, passion does not have regard to the beatific object in its idea as object, but in its idea as cause; blessedness, however, has regard to the beatific object as such, by which nature is made blessed because through operation it is conjoined with it.

But [Oxon. ibid.] joy and ineffable pleasure are nevertheless included in very blessedness, to the extent blessedness is described by Boethius as ‘the state perfected by the aggregation of all goods’, and thus pleasure is required for

extensive blessedness, as can be collected from the fact that the will is both effective of its own operation and is receptive, not only of its own acts, but also of spiritual passions; about these passions Augustine speaks in *On the Morals of the Church* 1.15, where he reduces all the passions of the will to love. Will therefore is perfected to the ultimate under both aspects. For as it is active it is perfected to the ultimate with the most perfect operation, and thereby it is conjoined with the most noble object; but as it is receptive, it is equally perfected to the ultimate with the ultimate passion, which is pleasure and joy. Pleasure then brings will to ultimate rest as will is receptive of passions, just as will is perfected with ultimate fruition as it is susceptive of operations. – With respect to intensive blessedness therefore [Oxon. ibid. q.3 n.5], as by this name is meant that by which the object is immediately attained and as by it a nature capable of blessedness is perfected to the ultimate, pleasure is not required for it; but to the extent blessedness states an aggregation of all goods pertaining to what is capable of blessedness, we say that pleasure and joy are necessarily required. Otherwise, as was said, the will, as receptive of passions, would neither be nor be understood to be at rest to the ultimate it could be made to be.

Article Two: Whether in Blessedness Vision is more Principal than Pleasure

Response: [Oxon. 4 d.49 qq.4, 7] one must say that in blessedness operation is most predominant as it is compared to the consequent joy or pleasure. This solution is plain from what was said both in the preceding article and in q.3 a.4. For what unites a nature capable of blessedness to the extrinsic most noble perfective object is its best operation, and through this operation the nature rests to the ultimate in the object present to it, which unites it for its own sake. In such love is its well being simply. For if nature tends to the object when absent by act of desire, then certainly it should tend to and inhere in the object when present by act of love for the sake of the object of infinite goodness itself, when this object is clearly shown to it by the intellect; in that act of love then it rests to the ultimate, desiring nothing further, having now attained in one thing that most eminently contains all things the accumulation of all desirable goods. In this fact it experiences an indescribable pleasure, yet this pleasure supervenes on operation as beauty supervenes on youth. But, in addition, pleasure elicits nature's operation about the object, and through this operation the object is united to the nature in the most perfect way, and the nature is essentially blessed; pleasure therefore is something less principal in blessedness, and the nature does not through pleasure tend to God as to the object, but rather pleasure has regard to the object as efficient cause and as impressing on the will, as the will is receptive, the quality by which the will rests in the object which it had already got possession of; so necessarily pleasure is something less principal in blessedness, and the will does not inhere by love in the supreme good because of pleasure, but rather because the supreme good is thus lovable for its own sake, although from it when thus loved pleasure redounds into the loving will.

Article Three: Whether Comprehension is required for Blessedness

Response: [Oxon. 4 d.49 q.6 n.22] some people have here the following opinion: sometimes the loved thing is present to the lover, and then certainly it is not sought after; and sometimes the loved thing is not present but it is impossible to attain it, and then equally it is not sought after; sometimes finally the loved thing is not present but it can happen that someone may in some way obtain it; and this last is the disposition of the hoper to the thing hoped for, and this disposition alone moves to investigation of the end. Therefore in the case of blessedness, perfect knowledge of the end answers to the imperfect knowledge of the wayfarer; the presence of that very end answers to the disposition of actual sight; but pleasure in its presence follows on love. So these three things must come together for blessedness, namely vision, or perfect knowledge of the intelligible end; comprehension, which involves presence of the end; pleasure or enjoyment, which involves the resting of the lover in the thing loved.

We say [Oxon. ibid. n.23, Reportatio 4 d.49 q.5 n.16] that comprehension or holding onto does not belong to the essence of blessedness, although we do not deny that, insofar as it goes along with security or has security as consequent, it concerns extensive blessedness (on which see the following article 4). To grasp this note that 'holding onto' or 'comprehension' can be taken in a fourfold way: first indeed properly, insofar as memory has the object and does so through an impressed form, if the object is there in actual sight, or through an impressed habit, or at least through descent, or existence within; at any rate memory truly holds the object in the way that an object is included in the idea of being apparent. Second, intelligence can be said to hold onto the object in actual consideration; and this understanding is favored by the fact that the will is said to hold onto intelligence's vision when this vision is converted to memory. Third, holding onto as it is desired by concupiscence pertains to the will, and this holding is said to succeed to sight in the way that the will by hope desires for itself possession of the good and by holding onto loves the good possessed; this holding onto then is love of concupiscence of a present good. Fourth, finally, holding onto is said to be a sort of act of obtaining, or a passion following the passion hope; but, as thus considered, holding onto resides in the affection of the irascible power.

Under none of these considerations [Oxon. ibid.] does holding onto enter into the essence of blessedness. For, taken in the first way, it precedes blessedness, nay precedes every second act, as is evident. In the second way of understanding, it is a second act pertaining to the intellective power and is on the way to blessedness, which we set up in the will, or in an act of will supposing an act of intellect by which the beatific object, as being present in its very existence, is attained. In the third way it is love of a present advantageous good; but this love does not pertain to blessedness, but only love of the honorable good does so, or love of the good in itself, as will be explained below in q.11 a.3. In the fourth way the holding onto resides in the irascible power; for it is a security opposed to fear, or something on the way to that security; but since opposites are in the same thing, and since fear belongs to the love of the irascible power, so holding onto must equally be in the

same subject as well; blessedness absolutely is in the concupiscent power; so holding onto does not in any way pertain to blessedness itself.

Article Four: Whether Rectitude of Will is required for Blessedness

Response: [Oxon 4 d.49 q.6, Reportatio ibid. q.5] some people have here the following sort of opinion: rectitude of the will is required for blessedness both antecedently and concomitantly. Antecedently, then, because rectitude of will exists for the sake of due order to the ultimate end; so when that is taken away, no one can reach blessedness. Concomitantly, however, because blessedness consists in the vision of the divine essence, which is the very essence of goodness; and so the will of one who sees the essence of God of necessity loves whatever it loves in its order to God, just as the will of one who does not see the essence of God of necessity loves under the common idea of good, which idea he knows.

We say [Oxon. 1 d.1 q.1 n.2] that the first member must be conceded, according to Augustine *83 Questions* q.30: "Supreme perversity lies in enjoying what should be used." Therefore true enjoyment cannot anywhere exist unless it is ordered, namely so as to be ordered according to the due circumstances; therefore the will that is going to possess blessedness must enjoy that which is the highest and supreme desirable thing and must use other things in order to it, in the way and manner that has been declared they must be willed.

But we do not admit the second member, either as to the hypothesis or as to the reason. And indeed [Oxon. 1 d.1 q.4] we disputed about it at large in q.3 a.4, showing that blessedness must be placed in an act of will, not of intellect, although the latter attains the beatific object first in order of generation. But that the will is by that fact concomitantly right, because it of necessity wills whatever it wills in its order to God, we think to be false. But this question must be explained below in q.10 a.1. For since it is the same power that busies itself about the end and about things ordered to the end, it must have regard to both under the same idea and manner of tendency; but it is clear that it tends altogether freely to that which is ordered to the end; so it would equally freely love the end when clearly seen. But from the fact that the end is goodness by essence, and that the things ordered to the end are not of such sort, nothing else can properly be inferred other than that the will is not able to refuse the end or to hate it; besides, if the acts of the inferior powers are in the power of the will such that it can suspend them from their proper acts – for not only can the will bring about and command that the eye see this or that other object but also to command that it simply not see –, much more will it be able to do or present the same thing in its own acts, by willing this thing or its contrary, or by willing altogether nothing; so although the reason proves that the will is not able to refuse the good by essence, yet it does not show that the will is not able not to will it.

We say therefore [Oxon. 4 d.49 q.5] that the reason why rectitude of will is required in blessedness is because blessedness itself or enjoyment is nothing other than love of friendship, but not love of concupiscence. When the will, therefore, moves to act according to an affection for justice, it is necessarily right, because, just as it loves the highest good for its own sake, so it should love all other things in order to the highest good. So, properly speaking, rectitude of will is not required in

blessedness, but rather blessedness is itself the most correct will of those who intuit God.

How then is it [Oxon. ibid. q.6 n.10] that the blessed are incapable of sin? For if they freely and contingently love the thing by essence good and thereupon the other things that are ordered to it, then they will be able to stop enjoying, or at any rate to will the things ordered to it in a way other than they should be willed, the contrary of which is eloquently conveyed by Augustine *Against Maximinus* 3.13 who says: "when provision is given to any nature that it not be able to sin, this is not by nature proper but by the grace of God;" so the blessed are incapable of sin by something intrinsically inherent in them. – Again, in *Enchridion* 86 or 73 Augustine says, "Just as our soul is able to refuse unhappiness, so will it always be able to refuse iniquity." But as a matter of fact, it is able to refuse unhappiness because it cannot will it; hence Augustine says in the same place, "Not only do we not will to be miserable, but we are in no way able to will it."

I reply [Oxon. ibid. n.11] that the inability of the blessed to sin insofar as they are blessed, that is, their inability at the same time to be blessed and to sin, is certain. But that by which, in the divided sense, the power to sin is excluded, can be understood in two ways, namely either through something intrinsic to the power, or through an extrinsic cause removing from the blessed the proximate power of sinning. An example: a well disposed eye is endowed with the power of seeing any body whatever; however an extrinsic cause can bring it about that some particular visible thing is never seen by it, since the cause perpetually acts to remove the body endlessly from the eye; and in this way, while the remote power of seeing is preserved, the proximate power of seeing will always be impeded; and in this way the damned will be perpetually prevented from seeing the empyrean heaven, which, if they were permitted to come near to, they would see as one among the visible things. – With this distinction as preface, we say that the blessed are incapable of sin, not by something intrinsic to the will, whereby the power for sinning, in the divided sense, is removed; for there is, as I say, no intrinsic cause preventing that power altogether from being reduced to act; but there is an extrinsic cause preventing the power from proceeding to an act of sinning. Now this cause is the will of God anticipating the will of the blessed so that their will always continues the act of enjoyment, and thus their will is never able to reduce to act its remote power of sinning or of not enjoying. For it cannot happen that, when a second cause is anticipated by a superior cause that is acting for one opposite, the proximate power should proceed to the other opposite. The blessed therefore could, in the sense of division, sin by remote power, as the natural and proper liberty remains in place that their will is possessed of; but yet this power will never be reduced to act, as the extrinsic cause determines it always to the opposite of sin, as has been said. – And this is the point of the first authority from Augustine; for he means that the fact of the blessed not being able to sin by proximate power is not to be attributed to their own nature but to the grace of God gratuitously anticipating and conserving the wills of the blessed in the most right act, of which sort is the enjoyment of the highest good.

As to Augustine's other authority [Oxon. ibid.], he does not say that, just as now the soul has a necessity of refusing unhappiness, so then it will have a necessity

of refusing iniquity (for neither is true when speaking of refusal as it is an elicited act), but that, just as now it has perpetually a habit of refusing unhappiness, so then it will have a habit of refusing iniquity. – And when you argue: it now has refusal in a way that it is not able to have willing acceptance, I say: for this reason it is not able to will unhappiness, not because it necessarily has the refusing of it, but because unhappiness cannot be the object of an act of willing. On the other side, the same reason does not have the consequence that there cannot be a willing of iniquity; because iniquity, when speaking of the substrate of sin, can be the object of a created will. Or one can say briefly: in the way that a created will now never wills unhappiness but always has the habit of refusing it, so then it will never will it, and so there is a likeness in fact on both sides. – And if you argue: now it cannot will unhappiness, therefore it will then not be able to will iniquity, the consequence is null; for there can very well be a likeness as to the *does not* from this side to that, but not as to the *is not able*.

Article Five: Whether the Body is required for Man's Blessedness

Response: [Oxon. 4 d.43 q.2 n.32, d.49 q.8 n.2] the discussion is either about man's imperfect blessedness or about his perfect blessedness, which we learn about from revelation alone. Further, imperfect blessedness is that which a man can acquire in this present life, insofar as even the philosophers, proceeding by way of natural knowledge, established that it was placed in the speculation of the highest causes, as is plain from the Philosopher *Ethics* 1.17, when he speaks of blessedness in general, and in *Ethics* 10.10 when he speaks of objective blessedness in particular. But for attaining this speculation man needs the corporeal senses; for we speculate about whatever is found in phantasms, on which man necessarily depends according to the condition of the present state, which state is all that the Philosopher recognized, knowing nothing of the nobility from the principle of established nature. Wherefore man cannot attain to this blessedness knowable by natural reason without the body, and hence Aristotle writes, *Ethics* 10.10, "There is need also of a healthy body and food and services; and yet the happy man must not be thought to need many and great things."

As to what concerns perfect blessedness [Oxon. 4 d.49 q.8 nn.5-9], which consists in the union of a nature capable of blessedness with the supreme desirable thing, the soul does not need the body in order to be fit for this blessedness. Declaration: for that we in fact experience the contrary, the intellect being unable to attain anything in universal form without imagination busying itself about a singular instance of it – this does not come from the nature of the intellect but is in punishment for the sin of the first man, as we explained at length in Ia q.84 a.7. Hence the first man was, before he sinned, able to understand without turning to phantasms. When the intellect, then, is separated from the body of which it is the form, no impediment holds it back from being borne to objects proportionate to it. If therefore the beatific object is shown to it, it will be able to see it and to inhere to it as with present love for its own sake; therefore the soul will then be perfectly blessed. Add that, although in fact the intellect may be moved by sensible objects, yet since it understands so many things in addition which are not sensible, it cannot

attain them through phantasms but through intelligible species, which it produces with incredible speed and preserves in itself, while phantasms provide an accompanying path to them in the form of exemplar cause; so when the connection with the body is broken off, the intellect can through its species have perfect operations by way of abstraction and can also intuit the objects present to it. Hence Avicenna says, *Naturalia* 6 ch.6, "the separated soul will see the truth more clearly than the unseparated soul does." But see the above cited Ia q.87 a.7.

If then the soul can be perfectly blessed without the body, what benefit will the soul gain from the body being repaired and being again united to it? I reply: although the essential blessedness of the soul consists in a single operation, which is love of the highest good seen in its very presence, yet its extensive blessedness also embraces the operation of the intellect; so there also has regard to this extension of blessedness that the soul be reunited to the body and that the body be made to share in its own way the same glory. For whatever in a nature capable of blessedness is able to be at rest would be perfectly then at rest when the powers of the soul reach through their own operations the highest good and when the body has through redounding of glory been adorned with its own dowry; thus therefore the soul is most perfectly blessed, both intensively and extensively, because nothing at all in such a nature capable of rest is without the rest that it is able to perceive. Just as, then, many things come together for the first act of a nature capable of blessedness, so there are proper rests corresponding to each of these things individually, and a single rest corresponding to the nature itself, and to its whole extensive totality, conflated from those many rests, in which many each of the first acts seeks in its own way and order to be at rest.

Article Six: Whether some Perfection of Body is required for Blessedness

Response: [Oxon. Prol. q.1, 4 d.49 q.8] imperfect blessedness, possible for man in this present life, is one thing; perfect blessedness, which we expect in the future age, is another. About the first the Philosopher speaks in *Ethics* 1 in general and in *Ethics* 10 in particular, as was also noted in the preceding article, where this blessedness was located in the speculation of the highest causes, and especially of the first cause. But man cannot, according to his principles, know this first cause save from a concept taken from sensible things, and this concept indeed cannot be of the substance in itself of the first cause but the knowledge of it is a sort of abstractive and obscure one. But since the happiness of man that comes from such speculation, as the Philosopher says in *Ethics* 1.8, is "the best operation in a complete life," assuredly this perfect life of man, whereby he is more apt for performing this best operation, requires the best constitution of the body proceeding from a precise temperament; for it is clear that a body broken by disease and weakened in health very much impedes the perfect operations of man; hence the Philosopher writes in *Ethics* 10.10 that "there is need of a healthy body." This imperfect happiness of man, therefore, of which the Philosophers spoke, requires perfect health of body.

However, [Oxon. 4 d.49 q.12 n.8] as to the blessedness revealed to us and promised to those who keep the law of God, the body is not simply necessary; for the soul separated from the body can be perfectly blessed. – Nevertheless, for the

soul's resting in every way there is required also a body perfect in every way. Declaration: for the soul cannot be perfectly blessed, that is, at rest in every respect in which it can be at rest, when joined to a body that is mortal by common law; thereby it desires to be made perfectly blessed; so it desires to be united to an immortal body, because then whatever can be at rest in it is most perfectly at rest, and it desires nothing further to be added to it. Not, however, that the body will be likewise simply blessed, but rather what enjoys and understands it will be, the way Augustine speaks to *Dioscorus* about blessedness of nature and blessedness in a certain respect, which latter consists in act; but the body, as it is distinct from the soul, has no second act. So this perfection of the body consists in its primary being, as it is perfectible by the blessed soul, through which it becomes fittingly perfectible by such form, namely that as the soul is immortal and blessed so also the body is immortal and in its way blessed; and then it is the instrument and organ of the soul in operating, for which reason it is endowed with agility, clarity, subtlety, impassibility; hence also Augustine writes, *On Genesis* 12.35, "So since the soul has received this now not animal but spiritual body, being made equal to the angels, it will have the perfect mode of its nature, obedient and commanding, vivified and vivifying, with such ineffable facility that what was for it a burden is now for it glory."

Article Seven: Whether any exterior Goods are required for Blessedness

Response: [Oxon. 4 d.43 q.2, d.49 qq.2 & 8, Metaphysics 12 q.3 n.7] imperfect blessedness, which the philosophers thought was attainable in this present life, requires many exterior goods; but none of these goods is required for the blessedness that the divine Scriptures promise us. And to be sure those who place blessedness in the speculation of the first cause and of the intelligences clearly suppose that man needs good health to have this perfect operation, as was said in the preceding article; for if a less advantageous health is made use of, there will be distraction from this perfect operation. – Next, for the subsistence and duration of animal life man needs many exterior things in order to persist in the contemplative life, and even more in order to exercise himself in the active life and to be useful to the republic. However, the Philosopher did not in *Ethics* 10 posit that man was happy in this operation; hence after he says, "there is need of a healthy body, of food, and of service," he adds, "however the happy man must not be supposed to need many and great things." – But that perfect blessedness does not need this sort of goods, even after the body is again united to the blessed soul, is plain from this, that we need those exterior goods because we bear a mortal and animal body; and a body subject to contraries in its natural constitution would quickly fail if what is continually lost is not restored through exterior helps, and so we have need of food to introduce restoration of strength and production of life. But the body after the resurrection [Oxon. 4 d.49 q.13 n.1] will be, not animal, but spiritual, on the evidence of the Apostle *I Corinthians* 15; not as if it will pass over into spirit, but because it will be immortal and impassible, endowed with ineffable clarity, and most agile, so much so that it will no longer be a burden to the soul but lead rather to an increase of its glory; the blessed, therefore, will have no need of external goods.

Article Eight: Whether the Company of Friends is required for Blessedness

Response: [Oxon. 4 d.49 q.2 n.22] the company of friends does not relate to the idea of true blessedness. For just as we say, when we conceive it, that it is to be placed in the ultimate and supreme perfection of a nature capable of blessedness, so that perfection can never be present in a man unless he is, by means of his own operations, united to the supremely desirable thing, wherein he may ultimately rest desiring nothing further, having attained the fullness of all desires through clear vision and enjoyment of the highest desirable thing, which is also the infinite good, embracing unitively and eminently all goods. Therefore while this union of a nature capable of blessedness with the supremely perfective object stands, even with no supplementing association of friends, it will be most perfectly blessed, because it will have the most perfect well being; so this company of friends is not required for blessedness. – However, because the supreme City abounds most fully with every possible happiness, the society and association of friends, who love the highest good together and love each other mutually with sincere and perfect charity, does make for the accidental joy and pleasure of the citizens; and while each rejoices about his own glory and happiness, he is at same time made happy by the blessedness of others.

QUESTION FIVE: ABOUT THE ATTAINMENT OF BLESSEDNESS. IN EIGHT ARTICLES.

Article One: Whether Man is able to Secure Blessedness

Response: [Oxon. 4 d.49 q.8, Reportatio ibid. q.7] that human nature is capable of blessedness is a dogma of the faith, expressed frequently in Scripture and notably in *I Corinthians* 13 where the Apostle says, “We see now through a glass darkly, but then face to face. Now I know in part; but then I shall know as also I am known.” And *I John* 3, “Now we are the sons of God, and it has not yet appeared what we shall be. For we know that when he appears, we will be like him, since we will see him as he is.” *Revelation* 22, “They will see his face.” *Matthew* 22, “They will be like the Angels of God in heaven,” and elsewhere.

But [Oxon. ibid.] whether this most certain truth can be made clear and proved by reason through the natural light of the intellect is denied by Aristotle. For when he speaks of human happiness, *Ethics* 10.10, he places it in speculation of the first substance, which speculation, although it can be attained by the human intellect through the sensible things presented to it, yet will remain always abstract and obscure and in no way clear and intuitive; wherefore he thought that a clear vision of God was altogether impossible for man.¹

¹ On this point Montefortino adds [from Oxon. ibid. and n.3, Prol. q.1 n.11] the following in one of the replies to objections: “Aristotle’s argument is conclusive according to his own principles; for in fact, in the imperfection of our present state, no reason is to hand whereby to prove that we can attain to a clear vision of God, but we can know this only by revelation; and for this reason there was added in

To us, nevertheless, it seems [Oxon. ibid. n.2] that a proof by natural reason can be given that human nature is capable of the blessedness promised to us, provided, however, the imperfection of the present state as to mode of cognition is taken away. The first proof on the part of the object is as follows: every power that has an adequate first object has per se power for whatever is contained under the object; but the first object of the human intellect is being; therefore too whatever the idea of being is preserved in is the per se object of it. But it is impossible for the intellect to be at rest in anything save in the peak of the whole analogy of being immediately, such as sight too is not at rest save in the most beautiful visible thing. But this, namely perfect and ultimate rest, cannot come through knowledge of the most perfect being in general, for this is not knowledge of it as it is in itself; therefore it will be knowledge of it as it is in itself in particular. And what sees the First Being clearly and distinctly is blessed, insofar as blessedness has been revealed to us; therefore the intellect not subject to the imperfection of the present state is able to show by the natural light that human nature is capable of blessedness. – The second proof [Oxon. ibid. n.5] I take from the side of act; for what belongs to perfection simply in any genus, if it belongs to an inferior in that genus, belongs also to the superior; but the senses are endowed with intuitive knowledge; therefore much more has the intellect been furnished with that virtue, so that it can attain the things included under its adequate object as these are present to it in their own existence, and so it can know all things intuitively; so not only can it thus know material quiddities but also immaterial ones, in the ultimate one of which consists its perfection and blessedness. – Lastly, if we did not have intuitive knowledge of something, we would not know with certainty about our own acts whether they are present in us or not; but this is plainly false; so, for the reason that we should concede that one thing among beings can be intuitively known, we should for the same reason also concede that any of them can be.

the conclusion [sc. in the immediately following paragraph of the reply] ‘provided, however, the imperfection of the present state as to mode of cognition is taken away’; for in the state of nature as first created, and when the soul was absolved from the necessity of turning itself to phantasms, it would, by virtue of assumed middle terms, assent to the inferred conclusion, and would see that there was no repugnance in its coming to a clear vision and enjoyment of God.

And although one may object to the Philosopher that there is in man a natural desire to know the first substance as it exists in itself, and therefore this substance will at some time thus be intuited (otherwise the natural desire would be present in vain, which no one would say), yet this objection is not conclusive; for, when speaking of a desire merely natural, one has to prove that such an appetite exists in man; but if by the term ‘natural desire’ is meant an elicited act of the will in accord with right reason, then Aristotle did not see this, nor could he according to natural reason have known of another state in which he would see more clearly, nor did he desire more, because he did not know that more was to be desired in accord with right reason than the condition of the present life dictates. Hence, although he could know that the first substance was capable of being seen in itself, he did not for that reason know that it was thus visible to man, or that man had a desire for intuiting it clearly. An example: man knows that the sun is more visible in itself than can be seen by himself, and that he is surpassed in the vision of it by an eagle; yet from this the conclusion does not follow that men desire to intuit the sun itself as far as it is visible or to the extent an eagle can see it; for the human eye has no ability to see the sun save insofar as it does in fact see it.”

Intervening Article: Whether Human Nature is the lowest of the Natures capable of Blessedness

Response: [Oxon. 4 d.49 q.8, Reportatio ibid. q.7] one must say, first, that it is simply repugnant to any nature inferior to human nature to be made blessed, as the reason just adduced shows.² – Next I argue also as follows: what is not conjoined with a better than itself cannot be made blessed, nor is it simply blessed; but no nature inferior to man is conjoined with a best as something better than itself; therefore it is simply repugnant for it to be made blessed. Proof of the minor: any operative power belongs to the animate thing as it is animate; but material objects, as they are sensible qualities, are not in themselves more perfect than the animate thing as it is animate; therefore the powers are themselves far better than their objects. – One must say second that some nature inferior to man is capable of blessedness in a certain respect. For every nature that can, by its own operation, be conjoined immediately to its end and so possess its best object, although this object be not best simply, is in its own order at ultimate rest; but natures endowed with a virtue of operating immanently, as that of the senses, can be conjoined with their best object; therefore they can be made blessed, although not simply so.

From this the conclusion follows [Oxon. ibid.] that natures destitute of operative powers can neither simply nor in a certain respect be made blessed; for they must hereby lack operations conjoining them with their best object; but blessedness consists in operation; therefore blessedness can in no way be attributed to them. Further, all things that only make and do not operate, as are all forms below sensitive things, cannot participate in any blessedness; for they lack any operation immanent to them and conjoining them with an extrinsic perfective object. – Nor is what is commonly said about heavy objects of any validity, namely that a heavy thing moves itself to the center and rests there; for, to begin with, this is said by way of metaphor; for while there is action in a heavy thing, which is the motion of it, yet the heavy thing performs no operation about the center; and so neither does it conjoin itself to the center; however, on the hypothesis that it did so, then certainly this is only the causing of some natural ‘where’ and not of any absolute form; therefore it is not blessedness, which is an absolute form.

Article Two: Whether one Man can be more Blessed than Another

[Montefortino remarks here: Since the present question was expounded in Ia q.12 a.6 [Oxon. 4 d.50 q.5], we have judged that the reader should be referred to what was said there. And although Cajetan in his Commentary says that the vision of God in his essence and the blessedness of the intellectual creature coincide indeed in the thing, yet, because they are formally distinct, it became the Angelic Doctor to complete formally question Ia q.12, nevertheless Valentia Ia IIae q.5 frankly confesses that the Saintly

² This reason was given by Montefortino in the *On the Contrary*. It runs: “Every nature inferior to man performs all its operations through an organ; therefore it does not busy itself about an immaterial object; but objective blessedness exists precisely in an immaterial object, which is not attained by operation of an organ; therefore every nature inferior to man is, by its natural condition, unable to attain to blessedness.”

*Doctor could have omitted several articles in this question. And Vazquez thought the same about the present article, and refers back to what he said in *Ia disput. 47.*]³*

Article Three: Whether Anyone can be Blessed in this Life

Response: [Oxon. 4 d.49 q.12, Reportatio ibid. q.11] some have here the following opinion, that although a certain imperfect participation in blessedness can be had in this life, nevertheless it is impossible for any mortal to possess perfect blessedness; for this blessedness excludes all evil and all misery; but mortal life is subject and liable to miseries in many ways. – Next, man naturally desires the permanence of a possessed good; but mortal life is passing, which however we desire to abide perpetually, as we fear death by its very nature; therefore it cannot happen that blessedness should be obtained in this life. – They also prove this finally from the fact that man cannot see God in this life; therefore neither can he be blessed; for blessedness consists in the vision of God.

We say [Oxon. ibid. n.3] that by the absolute power of God blessedness can be communicated to a mortal man. Proof: for an impossibility preventing something being received in a pre-existing subject arises either on the part of the agent or on the part of the subject, whether because it is simply repugnant to the subject, as it is repugnant for a stone to be wise, or repugnant in a certain respect; but on the part of these three there is no repugnance in blessedness being communicated to a mortal man; therefore this is simply possible, having regard to God's absolute power. Proof of the minor: for God can then give blessedness to a man the way he bestows it after death, whether immediately or by a mediating light, if this is required in the next life. There is no impossibility therefore on the part of the agent. On the part, however, of the passive subject [ibid. n.4], it is evident that no intrinsic impediment is present, otherwise it would be perpetually repugnant for man to be blessed. Therefore all repugnance must be expected by reason of some passive adjunct with which blessedness does not cohere; and if there is something such, it cannot be anything other than mortality; but this sort of repugnance cannot be formal; otherwise blessedness and mortality would not have been present in Christ, which is erroneous and altogether foreign to the truth. This repugnance therefore is only virtual, insofar as passibility, which follows as an effect from a natural cause, and the corruption adjunct to mortality are repugnant to the supreme joy that follows on blessedness. But God can, by his absolute power, prevent a natural effect from following on its cause, and by this there is no repugnance or impediment left to stop a man in the state of mortality from being blessed, with God conferring the blessedness. For since it is incompossible with blessedness that there be in the intellective appetite any wrong motion that is of a nature to conduct itself in conformity with a sensitive appetite supremely inclined toward some delightful thing agreeable to it, so, in a case where a mortal man were made blessed, these

³ The editors of Montefortino add a footnote: "That in glory one person is more blessed than another is a dogma of the faith defined at the Council of Florence under Eugene IV, according to *John 14*, 'In my Father's house are many mansions'. The heretic Jovinian held the opposite opinion according to the philosophy of the Stoics about the parity of the virtues and vices. Against this error Jerome inveighed most strongly in his second book against the said heretic."

causes would be prevented from eventuating in their effects, effects which are naturally consequent to them; therefore blessedness is not repugnant to mortality save in that the effect of one is not compatible with the effect of the other. Hence the delight of blessedness would ward off all sadness in the sensitive appetite, not only what is opposite but even what is contingent; for which reason, because the sensitive appetite would be prevented from delighting itself in some agreeable sensible object, it would not thereby be saddened, nor the intellective appetite either.

Further [Oxon. ibid. n.5], repugnance can be assigned on another head; for although the body is not capable of blessedness properly, which is located in acts of intellect and will, yet it is capable of blessedness in a certain respect, to the extent the blessedness of the soul redounds upon it; so much so that the resting of the soul in the beatific object is not altogether perfect without that of the body. Since therefore the blessedness of the body cannot stand together with mortal life, it is repugnant for perfect blessedness to be conferred during mortal life. Only by the absolute power of God, then, and according to the order of another providence can a man be blessed in this present life. And not only would a man's being blessed in this state have thus to be attributed to a miracle, but also on the ground that a natural cause would be prevented from issuing in the effect naturally consequent to it even though no cause of the natural order would be able to do the preventing.

On the basis of these points [Oxon. ibid. n.6] can be solved and rightly understood all the authorities of the saints who deny that the wayfarer can see God in himself and become blessed; for they are speaking according to existing providence and ordinary power, by which God has established that no mortal is to be admitted to the clear vision of himself. Hence it would, as was said, be a miracle if God were to give blessedness to any mortal, and moreover only a miracle could bring it about that a cause not produce its natural effect; and therefore is it said that by common law and according to the present state such cannot happen.⁴

Article Four: Whether Blessedness once Had can be Lost

Response: [Oxon. 4 d.49 q.6, Reportatio ibid. q.5] it is most certain that blessedness will be perpetual and eternal. For this is a truth of faith, expressed in *Matthew* ch.25, "The just will go to eternal life." And ch.22, "They will be like the Angels of God." And in *Psalm* 83, "They will praise you for ages of ages." And often elsewhere. Likewise the same thing is borne witness to by many sayings of the Saints, but let it be enough to have adduced Augustine *On the Trinity* 13.8 when he writes, "life cannot be blessed unless it is immortal." He also proves it from this, that if it can be lost, then either the blessed person loses it unwillingly and then he will not be blessed, since everything he wants is not supplied to him; or it is taken from him willingly; or at least he loses it neither willingly nor unwillingly but is indifferent; and from the last two it follows at once that he is not blessed because he does not love blessedness;

⁴ Hence Montefortino, in one of the responses to objections he inserts, quotes Scotus to the effect that Christ's being blessed and mortal at the same time was miraculous and a result of God's absolute power.

rather, if he loses it willingly, he hates it, and if he is indifferent to either result, he does not value it as much as it should be valued; he is not then a man enjoying blessed life. This triple distinction of Augustine is to be understood not for the moment at which blessedness would be posited as lost, because this result, namely that he would not then be blessed, would not be logically unacceptable, but is rather to be taken for the first 'then' or for the time at which he is blessed. The same point can be urged if it be said that a blessed person can fall from possession of blessedness by loss of temporal life. For either he loses life willingly or he loses it unwillingly or in neither way. And it is not rational to reply that he loses life but this is not foreseen or considered by the blessed while he is in possession of blessed life, and so he is disposed indifferently as far as his will is concerned, not as if he does not put a high value on possessing perpetually the good he has apprehended, but because he does not consider its perpetuity. This, I say, is irrational. For how would he never think of the eternal duration of that life which he loves supremely if it is blessed? But if he is posited as apprehending and believing that his life is to be perpetual, which however is not going to be the case, then he is deceived, and yet nothing more illogical can be said than that someone with a false opinion is blessed, according to Augustine *City of God* 11.4.

For fuller understanding [Oxon. ibid. n.3] of this most certain truth, one must consider first what the cause is of the perpetuity; next how it has regard to blessedness; and lastly about the security of the blessed and that they will never lose blessedness.

The cause, then [Oxon. ibid. n.4], of the perpetuity of blessedness is assigned by some with the assertion that blessedness cannot cease because it is of itself formally necessary, although it is so from an extrinsic causing cause as principle. – But others say that a power is necessarily determined to grow by habit, as the intellect to seeing by the light of glory and the will to enjoying by consummate charity. This cause then they posit as giving perpetuity to blessedness.

We think that neither opinion is to be approved. And [Oxon. ibid. n.6] a point indeed against the first is that created blessedness is an accident; therefore it is dependent no less than its subject is; but the subject depends on the conservation of God contingently conserving it, and consequently it does not have necessary existence formally; so an accident much more does not have it. – Response: although blessedness absolutely has contingent existence, yet, from its once being present in a nature, it is necessarily present in it while the nature lasts, and so it has necessary existence from the fact that it has been produced into existence. On the contrary: God can conserve an essentially first thing without a later thing; the nature is essentially prior to blessedness, nay even prior in time; therefore, while the subject remains, blessedness can cease to be. Confirmation: there is never greater necessity of a third to a first than of a third to a second; yet in the case of the third to the second blessedness is only contingent.

Wherefore [Oxon. ibid.] we say that other than God nothing has necessary existence formally but simply contingent existence. However something created is said to possess incorruptible existence insofar as it does not have a contrary, or because it cannot be destroyed by anything created but can only be annihilated by God not conserving it; and for this reason blessedness should be called

incorruptible, but this sort of incorruptible is not of itself perpetual save by possibility; for just as blessedness receives its existence from God contingently conserving it, thus too can it receive perpetuity.

A point against the second position [Oxon. ibid. n.9] is first that a habit is not, with respect to operation, a cause prior to the power but always second to it; for a power is that by which we simply have ability; and hence it is that the habit does not use the power but the power uses the habit, as a second cause and instrument. But a prior cause is not determined to acting, nor consequently is it necessitated to act, but conversely. – Next, the Blessed Virgin as wayfarer was endowed with charity as was given to any of the blessed of an inferior degree, and yet she was not compelled to enjoyment, even when she was abiding in the contemplation of God. – Lastly, although the light of glory imposes a necessity on the intellect of seeing the object present to it, yet if will is the cause commanding the vision, it is able not to command; for it unites intelligence contingently to the memory of the object, whereby it loves contingently. And further it appears it should so unite it, because Augustine in *On the Trinity* frequently says that in the generation of the perfect Word there is concurrence of the will thus uniting it; but the vision is the Word according to him, *On the Trinity* 15. – There is then [ibid. n.10] a necessity, or a necessary perpetuity, from habits determining powers to their acts; but from the habit of glory there is only a necessity in a certain respect, because a habit inclines naturally; nor is there from charity such a necessity in the will, for the will can freely use or not use charity. So the eternal happiness of the blessed is from the divine will alone, which, just as it perfects intensively a nature capable of blessedness, so it conserves the nature perpetually in this sort of perfection bestowed by itself.

However [Oxon. ibid.] from this arises a doubt: for if blessedness does not of its nature require that it be perpetual, and if nothing intrinsic to the blessed makes for the perpetuity of blessedness, then, from the point of view of the nature of created will, which can turn to good or bad, the blessed could sin, which is unacceptable. – Response: we expounded this doubt at large in the preceding article 4. It was said there, then, that the blessed can sin by remote power, not by proximate power, since God perpetually preserves the act of enjoyment and denies any coming together for sinful act.

But [Oxon. ibid. nn.16-18] as to how this perpetuity relates to blessedness, some think that it is included in the formal idea of blessedness, and they are moved by these reasons: for blessedness is the end of all desires; for once it is attained all appetite ceases; therefore it should so include all desirable things that nothing is left to desire. But everyone desires to remain in the good, and to do so perpetually. – Next, punishment is perpetual in the damned; therefore the happiness of the blessed is also essentially perpetual.

We say first [Oxon. ibid. n.19], that if blessedness is taken for permanent perfection as permanent, then, however intense it is, perpetuity does not have regard to its formal idea. For any perfection that is permanent, and any that is the same and equal, can for an instant, or for any brief time, stay being what and as much as it can be in the whole of time; for a whiteness of one day is as equally perfect as a whiteness of one year, *Ethics* 1.6. – Second we say that if blessedness is taken not only intensively but also extensively, then perpetuity does pertain to its

idea. For, according to this understanding of it, nothing is in every way extensively perfect save what lasts as long as it can last; but blessedness is of a nature to abide perpetually; therefore when taken for supreme perfection intensively and extensively, it includes perpetuity. And indeed there is in nature not only a desire for having intense perfection but also for thus having it extensively, just as desire is not only for the essential good but also for its always existing, to the extent the nature is capable of receiving it; and many seem to speak of blessedness according to this latter acceptation of it; although as thus taken it is not something one, for it includes both intensive blessedness and the other concomitants that have regard to the substance of blessedness.

Hereby [Oxon. ibid. n.20] there is a response to the first point [*sc. in the previous paragraph*], that intensive blessedness is the end of all desires as far as this holds on the part of the object unitively and eminently including everything rightly desirable, as has often been said about how the ‘whatever he wants’ is to be understood in Augustine’s definition, namely that he possesses everything desirable unitively in one thing. But blessedness in the second way is not only the end of desires unitively, but also extends itself to perpetual duration, as was said. Wherefore the argument introduced, if we admit the assumed proposition, is erroneous in its form; because the fact that it is the end of all desires does not entail the conclusion that it includes in itself everything that is desired; for it is enough that it either include or suppose or even accompany whatever is necessarily required in the order of the fulfilling of desires. – To the second point about reward, it is doubtful whether the perpetuity of blessedness falls per se under merit or is only something annexed to what does fall per se under merit. And one must say that God is not indebted to any of us by any merits whatever for rendering us a perfection so excellent; but let it be that he has determined of his own liberality to confer on our merits an act as perfect as the reward; however this is recompense by supererogatory justice, of the sort namely that befits him; but from this it does not follow necessarily that from such justice perpetual glory is to be given as a reward; rather the recompense would be abundant if the conferred blessedness lasted for an instant [Oxon. 4 d.46 q.4 n.20]. If then perpetuity pertains to reward as falling under merit, the correspondence must be in relation to justice and overflowing liberality. Nor is it unacceptable to assert that God from supererogatory justice determines to give a reward, even as something perpetual, in return for merits. – Therefore we say to the argument that the equality taken from the punishment of the damned is to be rejected, because although it becomes divine goodness to bestow reward, even a lasting one, in return for merits that are his own gifts, yet it does not fit with his justice to inflict, from the law of revenging demerits, a punishment that goes beyond the measure and the demerit of the crimes.

As to what concerns the security of the blessed [Oxon. ibid. n.33], security seems opposed to fear. But fear is either of an impending evil or of the continuation of one that has been inflicted, with however preceding awareness of the evil. Further this security is in the will as something opposed to fear, and it is preceded by certitude in the intellect about a good being conferred or about the duration of one already conferred. Therefore the blessed have this certitude, not because they see blessedness to be perpetual in its idea, as was said, nor even because they draw

that conclusion through natural reasoning; for since the continuation of blessedness depends on the one divine will contingently continuing the blessedness, it cannot be inferred by natural reason. The blessed therefore are most certain about the eternal duration of their happiness from divine revelation. – However [Oxon. ibid. n.23] this security is not of the essence of blessedness as this is taken intensively; for security presupposes certitude about the continuing of blessedness; but that apprehension follows, in the order of nature, the whole of blessedness; for it is not an act tending to the beatific object but is a reflection on the act, and consequently the whole of blessedness could be essentially in place without certitude; therefore also much more so without security. – Next, the perpetuity, about which the certitude is and on which security follows, is not of the essence of blessedness. Yet it is enclosed within the idea of it as it is taken intensively and extensively, as was said before; and so the security expelling all fear of sometime losing the happiness they are possessed of also equally has regard to blessedness. And just as fear is in the irascible power, so also is the security opposed to it; for opposites are in the same thing; but blessedness intensively is in the concupiscent power, since it is the love of friendship.⁵

Article Five: Whether Man can acquire Blessedness by his Natural Powers

[Montefortino: Since this question was disputed of in Ia q.12 a.4 [Oxon. 4 d.49 q.11, Reportatio ibid. q.10], we refer the reader to what was said in that place.]

Article Six: Whether Man obtains Blessedness through the Action of some Superior Creature

Response: [Quodlibet q.14 n.10ff, Oxon. 1 d.3 q.2 n.16] one must say that through the action of no creature, of whatsoever excellence it be, does man obtain blessedness, but both he and angels receive it immediately from God voluntarily showing himself to them in intuitive knowledge, and equally freely causing a representation of himself in abstractive knowledge. Declaration: [Oxon. 2 d.3 q.9, cf. Ia q.12 a.4] for whether we speak of the perfect blessedness that consists in the clear vision of God present in his own existence, or of the imperfect blessedness of the sort we think the angels had when they were wayfarers (for on them was conferred a representation of the deity as it is such an essence), both knowledges are immediately from God; therefore by the action of no creature can another creature be made blessed, whether in the first way or in the second. Proof of the minor: God

⁵ In response to an objection from Aristotle on happiness, Montefortino adds the following from Oxon. ibid. n.24: "The Philosopher was never able, by virtue of the natural light of the intellect, to reach the true happiness of human nature, either by denying it or affirming it. Not by denying it because a falsehood cannot be demonstrated; nor by affirming it because sensible things do not sufficiently lead to it; hence, being as it were in doubt, he seemed sometimes to think that a happiness to which misery could succeed was not true happiness, and sometimes that no other happiness of man was to be sought for than that which was a matter of experience (for the happiness promised to us was altogether hidden to him); but this latter is not perpetual nor incapable of being lost; so one should not accept his authority on this matter, since it is clear that he erred."

under the proper idea of divinity is not present to any created intellect unless he himself has wished to be made present, as Ambrose writes when discussing *Luke*, "it is in his power to be seen, it is his nature not to be seen; if he wishes he is seen, if he does not wish he is not seen." Well does Ambrose say that it is not God's nature to be seen, namely by the creature, because God's nature is not naturally the active cause of this seeing. And neither is any created nature, which is naturally active with respect to the created intellect, able to cause this intuitive vision of God, or bring it about that such object be perfectly present to another; for a creature cannot contain that essence perfectly in itself according to that essence's own being, and so not according to its intelligibility either. – [Quodlibet q.14 n.24ff.] And the same reason shows that nothing created can be the cause of the presence of the object in the intellect even abstractively. For it cannot cause anything that would be a proper and *per se* representation of divinity under divinity's own proper idea of knowability; for such a representation cannot be caused save either by the knowable thing itself or by something that perfectly contains that thing under its idea of knowability. So although God can be distinctly known and attained by abstractive knowledge through some representation of him, yet the representation cannot be caused save immediately by God himself voluntarily causing it. – And, put more briefly, this argument can be formalized thus: God, as this essence in itself, under which idea he is the beatific object, is not known naturally by any created intellect, because as so knowable he is a voluntary object and not, save only in respect of God's own intellect, a natural one; nor does any essence that is naturally knowable by us sufficiently reveal this essence as it is this; nor is it revealed by a univocal likeness, which univocity is only according to general ideas, nor by an imitative likeness, because such likeness is deficient and an imperfect likeness; for creatures imitate the divine essence imperfectly. Therefore it is utterly impossible for man to attain his blessedness, or a clear vision of God intuitively or abstractively, by means of the action of another creature, whatever excellence creatures may be said to be endowed with.

Article Seven: Whether any Good Works are required for Man to get Blessedness from God

Response: one must say [Quodlibet q.14 n.14] that good works are required for man to be made by God a sharer in blessedness. Declaration: the beatific object, which is the essence of God, only naturally moves the divine intellect, and that object, clearly seen and thoroughly understood, is necessarily loved by the will, by which vision and love God is most fully blessed. God then possesses blessedness of his own nature. But the other intellectual natures are not naturally moved by that object but only if it is freely and voluntarily shown to them; because, however, they are capable of blessedness, as bearing the image of him who is naturally blessed and so thereby endowed with liberty, it became the wisdom and goodness and justice of their Creator to propose blessedness to them as a recompense and reward; now the ordering of it we gather from the Scriptures and the sayings of the Saints. For in these it is eloquently maintained [Oxon. 1 d.17 q.2] that sinners are unworthy of eternal life, but the just worthy. For since they could by their own nature turn to the

worse, they needed to be ruled by command and frightened by destruction. Whether angels or men, therefore [Oxon. 2 d.9 q.2, d.6 q.2], precepts were to be given to them, and, if they obeyed, a reward from supererogatory liberality was to be paid them, but if they did not, irremediable punishments according to the quality of their crimes were to await them. So during man's state of life and mortality he must dispose himself through obedience to the commands given him by God, so that he may obtain a reward for his labors and a prize of victory. For [Oxon. 4 d.2 q.1 n.3] his spiritual life is a sort of way ordaining that by living well in it he may pass without impediment to the other life, for which he is being prepared; and this is done through the right use of the things that God has prepared as helps for men.⁶

Article Eight: Whether every Man desires Blessedness

[Montefortino: The matter of this present question you have express in Ia q.82 a.1, so it should be brought forward from there. Cajetan too refers himself back to what is said in that place. Master Hiquaeus should be looked at in his commentary. Scotus is followed by Valentia, Ia IIae point 1 of the present question, and by others.]

QUESTION SIX: ABOUT THE VOLUNTARY AND INVOLUNTARY. IN EIGHT ARTICLES.

Article One: Whether the Voluntary is found in Human Acts

Response: [Quodlibet q.18, Oxon. 2 d.32 q.4, d.14 q.1] one must say that the voluntary must altogether be laid down in human acts. And in fact the voluntary can be understood in many ways; for just as the involuntary is that against which the will simply murmurs back, so too the voluntary is that against which it does not murmur back but undertakes of its own accord. Therefore [Oxon. 2 d.32 n.14, Quodlibet q.18 n.21] the voluntary is in one way understood as that which is subjectively in the will. But because there can be found in the will something that is not accepted by it, therefore to be thus in the will does not completely constitute the idea of the voluntary. Secondly, the voluntary is that which is willed by the will; but this is said to be voluntary by participation, insofar as the acceptation of it as of an object is voluntary; besides it should rather be called willed than voluntary. So properly that is voluntary which is contained in the power of the will as it is an active force. Wherefore not only an act immediately elicited by the will is first and per se voluntary, but also an exterior act commanded by it, and as far as it is conjoined with it, is equally voluntary and thereby imputable to the agent. – Again [Oxon 1 d.1 q.5 n.4, 4 d.49 q.6, d.43 q.4 n.2, Quodlibet q.16], although everything free is voluntary, yet not everything voluntary is similarly free. For the blessed

⁶ In a response to an objection based on *Romans* 9, about what is of grace not being also of merit, Montefortino adds the following from Scotus [Oxon. 4 d.2 q.1 n.11]: "The meaning of the Apostle is that grace does not have a *condign* cause in him on whom grace is conferred; it can however have a *congruous* cause in him and a meritorious *condign* cause that is extrinsic, namely the merits of the passion of Christ, in view of which merits God confers grace on those who dispose themselves *congruously* for it, through which grace they thence observe the divine precepts for salvation."

voluntarily and by choice enjoy the beatific object, but not freely in such a way that they can suspend the operation of inhering in the supreme good for its own sake or can sin, since God does not provide concurring assistance for every act that a created will of itself has power for. Likewise God voluntarily loves his own goodness, but not freely to the extent that by the name of freedom is meant a power for acting and not acting and insofar as this power is accompanied by a contingency opposed to the necessity of operating. Therefore God freely and necessarily loves himself and produces the Holy Spirit, because he does so, not by way of nature, but by a way proper to the will. Wherefore the term 'natural' is not only opposed to supernatural but also to voluntary. And so the natural is as it were what is of itself determined to acting, as a heavy object to a place downwards, and fire to burning; but the voluntary is not determined to act by something else, nay it has a principle determinative of itself for acting, however necessarily it operates. Nor is there any other reason for this than that it is the will, which of its own nature determines itself to operating. Wherefore [Oxon. 4 d.6 q.5 n.2], since a human act is one that is by intellect and will caused in a man intending the end of the act, as was said in q.1 a.1, so by this necessity is the voluntary found in these acts, to the extent the will does flow into them; but the will concurs in such a way that, if its action is not understood, no human act would remain.⁷

Article Two: Whether the Voluntary is found in the Brute Animals

Response: some have here the following opinion: the voluntary in its perfect idea belongs only to the rational creature; but the voluntary in imperfect idea can also be found in brutes. For there is a double knowledge of the end, one perfect and the second imperfect. The first is when not only the end itself is known but the idea of end is also known, together with its proportion to what is ordered to the end. But the end is imperfectly known when a stand is made in the end itself, and the idea of end and the proportion of the act to the end are not known. Since brutes therefore

⁷ The following is added by Montefortino in one of the replies to objections [from Oxon. 2 d.25, Quodlibet q.16 nn.14-15]: "An external desirable object concurs with volition metaphorically; hence the adequate principle of volition is within man, which principle, because it determines itself to acting, does therefore freely, spontaneously, and voluntarily act. Even given that some principle could concur together with the will for action, as the object according to some or the intellect according to others' opinion, and given that this co-cause is naturally active, yet the will is never a natural active principle; for to act naturally and to act freely are first differences of active principle. So, when the will is operating freely and the intellect acting naturally, the totality is said to be produced freely and on purpose, because purpose is the principal and immediate principle of the production. Things are similar in the case of acts commanded by the will. For although the inferior powers are natural causes of their acts, yet because the whole process is subject to the will, we are rightly said to use them freely and to act freely by the principal agent. – In confirmation I say as follows [Oxon. 2 d.25 n.24]: there is one form in potency for contradictories that is not able to determine itself to one of them, because it is diminished and imperfect, as science is. But there is another power that is indeterminate but perfect, possessing virtue for determining itself to the object presented to it, and of this sort is the will, which is able to determine itself and the other powers to act, once one of the previously shown objects is first chosen and the other omitted. This matter was dealt with at large in Ia q.83 on free choice."

apprehend the end imperfectly, while the rational nature does so perfectly, therefore only in human acts is the idea of the voluntary perfectly found, but in brutes imperfectly.

We say [Oxon. 1 d.1 q.5 n.2ff.] that the idea of end is only abusively or imperfectly attributed to the sensitive appetite of brutes. Because unless this idea is perfect in its order, it does not exist in any place where an intrinsic principle of voluntary acts needs to be found, a principle which is not determined by another but only by itself (from the preceding article). This idea is absent from the whole genus of brutes, whose sensitive appetite is effectively determined by the external desirable thing and is by it drawn and acted on in its acts, such that it does not dominate its acts; on the contrary [Oxon 2 d.25 n.21, 3 d.27 and elsewhere], if there is a sensible object that is agreeable to it, at once the sensitive appetite desires it, but if the object is not agreeable, it turns from it and flees it, as Damascene rightly says, *On the Orthodox Faith* 2.23; therefore the idea of the voluntary is altogether repugnant to sensitive appetite and is only to be found in intellective appetite, which is not led but leads by its dominating power over its acts, and it also dominates over the acts of the inferior powers. – But the reason [Oxon. 4 d.43 q.2 n.12] that lordship over its acts is intrinsically repugnant to sensitive appetite is because any organic or material appetite is determined to a certain class agreeable to it of desirable things, such that when the class is apprehended it cannot not be agreeable, nor can the appetite not approve it; therefore in the sensitive appetite the indetermination altogether necessary for any idea of the voluntary cannot be set up; rather, there is as much repugnance to the idea of the voluntary, whether perfect or imperfect, in the sensitive appetite as there is of necessity in that appetite for its total determination in respect of desirable things; but this necessity proceeds from the condition of its nature, which nature is organic and material, as the soul also is material to which the organic powers belong. – However [Oxon. 2 d.42 q.4 n.19, 1 d.1 q.4 n.9] the sensitive appetite in us, in respect of which we are one with the brutes, is free and rational by participation, not indeed by its own act, but by the act of another power, which is the intellective appetite that it is subject to; and for this reason it can be turned to the good and turned from the good; but in brutes such appetite cannot be partaker of reason, because there is in them no such reason as there is in us.

Article Three: Whether the Voluntary can exist without any Act, or whether there can be a Pure Omission

Response: one must say first [Oxon. 2 d.7 n.23, 1 d.1 q.4, 4 d.49 q.10 n.10, Quodlibet q.18 n.9] that there is no repugnance, physical or metaphysical, in something's being voluntary without any act which might be the cause of the free omission of it, or the occasion for it, direct or indirect. Proof: according to Augustine, *Retractions* 1.22, "Nothing is so in the power of the will as the will itself," namely as to operating, for its being does not fall under its power; but the will is able to suspend the inferior powers from all action; therefore much more can it suspend itself from all action. And such suspension or omission is voluntary for it; therefore the voluntary is possible without any act. Proof of the assumption: the will can not only will and

refuse but also not will and not refuse; therefore in the way it conducts itself freely when it exercises acts, so does it when, in proportion to its exercise of dominating power, it omits them. – Again, this dominating power of the will has regard to willing and refusing such that it does not first require other acts for the exercise and use of them, otherwise, if it has regard to those acts through the mediation of others, the same question arises about those mediating acts, and so on ad infinitum; thus it has immediate regard to the positive extreme; therefore to the negative extreme as well. Just as then for its willing some object it has no need of another act, so also for its omitting the same or another object it does not require any act that might be the cause or occasion of this sort of free omission; and in this the free dominion of the will over its acts shines out, that they so fall under its whole power that it can elicit them and can altogether omit them.

One must say second [Oxon. 2 d.25] that in respect of the good as it is opposed to virtue, or about the good in general, a pure omission is scarcely possible in fact. Declaration: for although it is a natural power of the will, that about any object whatever it can exercise its dominion of willing or refusing, or can suspend itself from both and altogether omit those acts, nevertheless in fact, as conjoined to sensitive appetite, it is of a nature to delight in itself, as the intellect conjoined to the senses is of a nature to understand sensible things; therefore in wanting to withdraw appetite from its object of delight by which it is drawn, both does the appetite itself suffer difficulty when carried off against natural inclination and the will cannot carry this out without an effort. But the will does not strive against the sensitive part erring, or trying to err, from what is right, save by an act willing what is right and refusing that after which the sensitive appetite pants; so, in this present state, the will can scarcely exercise a pure omission whenever a good opposed to virtue, or a good that is good in general, is presented to it.

Article Four: Whether Violence can be done to the Will

Response: one must say [Oxon. 4 d.29 n.6] that there is altogether a contradiction involved in the will being compelled to elicit its acts. Declaration: according to Aristotle Ethics 3.2, "The violent is that whose principle is external, where the thing undergoing it contributes none of the force," that is, contributes none of the violence – and not only by negation but also by contrariety, by its being against the inclination of the passive thing, as when a stone is thrown upwards and other things of the sort. And for this reason the violent is wholly from an extrinsic principle, because the passive thing is not inclined to the form which is induced by the extrinsic agent, but rather, as far as concerns itself, resists it because of a natural inclination to a form contrary to that which it is violently receiving from the agent. But acts of willing and refusing cannot thus be present in the will, because then the will would be either willing when refusing or refusing when willing; thus, for violence to be inflicted on the will implies a contradiction, because then it would act in a way opposite to its own nature, which is to act freely. – And from this it is plain that it is in like manner impossible for the will to be compelled with respect to acts commanded by itself in the inferior powers, which acts are human acts; because it would then in the same way be refusing when willing or willing when refusing; for

these acts are human to the extent they fall under the command of the will intending a pre-known end; since therefore the will cannot be simply compelled to elicit its own acts, although it could be annihilated, so equally it cannot be driven by violence to elicit commanded acts. Therefore it is precisely impossible in fact that, when anyone has will, he should have force inflicted on him in respect of undergoing a passion, as when one is unwillingly detained somewhere, or in respect of order to some instrumental act, which however will not be his act, as when someone strikes a blow using another's hand; for he could just as well strike the blow with a hand made of bronze. The will therefore cannot be forced into an action or operation, which would be a truly human act, elicited or commanded by itself, save in a certain respect, as we will explain in a.6 below.

Article Five: Whether Violence is cause of the Involuntary

Response: one must say that violence, in the way it inflicts violence on what possesses will, causes the involuntary. Wherefore the solution is plain from what was said in the preceding article. For although a contradiction is involved in the will suffering violence in the acts that are with deliberation immediately elicited or commanded by it, yet violence can be inflicted on what has free choice so that it is compelled to suffer many things unwillingly, such that the will does not have power to proceed to the contrary acts that are of a nature to be done by locomotive power; so that thing is involuntary to it which it is compelled to undergo against its desire, for it would desire to use its locomotive power at will, and yet an extrinsic impediment does not allow it.

But [Reportatio 4 d.43 q.4] one must understand that the term natural is equivocal; for it has several opposites, which is a rule for recognizing what is multiple, according to Aristotle's teaching in *Topics* 1.12. So the natural is in one way opposed to the free, and these terms are the first differences of active principle, from Aristotle *Physics* 2 text 49, and they have an opposite way of being a principle; for a natural active principle is necessarily determined to one thing, such that it has no power for the opposite; but a free active principle, even then when it is acting, has power for the opposite of what it is doing. Further, passive principle does not fall under this latter division, because everything passive, as such, undergoes naturally and not freely, and therefore natural principle embraces also passive principle. – Next, natural is opposed to violent, and active principle or agent is not embraced by this acceptation; for no agent acts under violence, since anything acts according to its natural form and the inclination of the same form. But the violent, as to what it is in, is always against the inclination of the form suffering the violence, moving it or impeding it or even preventing its natural perfection. So if violence does not work on the active principle, violence remains to be asserted of the passive principle only. And the passive thing is understood then to suffer violence when it is naturally inclined to the opposite of what it is affected by, just as it is naturally suffering through the opposite when it is not naturally thereto inclined; violence then is not a condition of the agent but of the passive thing. For although someone might seize my hand and strike another whom I do not want to hit, yet I am not for that reason said to be acting violently but rather to be suffering violence, because,

with respect to the hitting, I am no more acting than a stone is [sc. if someone is hitting another with a stone]. For the principle of doing any action is intrinsic to the agent, but in this case the principle is wholly extrinsic. Violence therefore is a condition of the passive thing, or of the passive principle, as was said.

Article Six: Whether Fear causes the Involuntary simply

Response: [Oxon. 4 d.29, Reportatio ibid.] some have the following opinion: things done through fear are mixed of the voluntary and involuntary, according to the teaching of the Philosopher *Ethics* 3.1. (Nevertheless, when one considers the matter rightly, such things appear rather to be voluntary than involuntary; for they are voluntary simply and involuntary in a certain respect.)⁸ For each thing is said to be simply to the extent it is in act; but to the extent it is in apprehension only it is not simply but in a certain respect. An example: to someone in peril on the sea, throwing the merchandise overboard is simply involuntary; for, as far he is concerned, he does not in fact want to throw it overboard; but throwing it overboard is voluntary in a certain respect, because of the danger which is apprehended as imminent. – On the contrary [Oxon. 3 d.15 n.29], the will does not seem to will in a certain respect anything that it wants because of a present necessity, but rather, if it wants because of such necessity, it wants simply and absolutely, as the adduced example shows; for since he who is in danger is lord of his acts, as being one who has power to use his force for throwing the merchandise overboard, so he also has power not to use it, and that both when in danger and when beyond any danger; therefore he is willing simply when he throws the merchandise away, because he uses his motive power without being compelled by anyone. For it is evident that his will can so inordinately love the merchandise that he refuses to throw it overboard even to avoid the impending peril of death. Wherefore [ibid. n.17, d.26 n.20] a merchant in peril on the sea would refuse to throw the merchandise overboard if he could in any way overcome the danger of death. Such refusing then is conditioned, because as far as he is concerned he would refuse simply; yet he wants to lighten the ship of the merchandise, for he does not throw it overboard by coercion. For although he throws it overboard because of something he does not want, namely the danger of death, yet he is not compelled unwillingly to cast it away. This volition would be stated by the term 'I will', but the conditioned refusal by the term 'I would refuse if I could do otherwise'; and so it is the condition, because of which he wills to throw the merchandise overboard, that is not willed simply. One should not therefore approve what the aforesaid opinion asserts, namely that throwing the merchandise overboard is voluntary in a certain respect and involuntary simply, but rather the opposite is true.

Nevertheless, replying to the question asked, we say that fear of an imminent evil causes the involuntary in a certain respect, provided the impending evil is greater than the act which the coerced will performs. For although the will cannot be compelled to any elicited or commanded act, which are properly human acts, yet

⁸ [Translator's note: these remarks are put in parentheses because they seem to represent Scotus' opinion, as at the end of the paragraph, rather than the opinion he wants to criticize.]

a man endowed with virtue could have some evil put before his eyes which he must certainly undergo unless he does this or that thing, unless he gives assent or dissent to the thing he is being compelled to give assent or dissent to. For in such a case, a prudent man, when considering that the evil certainly to be inflicted on him, given sufficient certitude in human acts, is more disagreeable to him than to elicit the displeasing act, performs the act under coercion and involuntarily; the act therefore is involuntary for him, not simply, but in a certain respect. An example: if death is presented to someone unless he sells a farm, or if prison is, or captivity, severe mutilation of his bodily members, rape, and such like evils, he judges by right reason rather to let the farm go than to fall into the evils certainly threatening him; this fear therefore is cause of the involuntary in a certain respect. For since he is lord of his will, he is not compelled simply; yet he can will something which otherwise he would refuse, and he can command an act which simply he would refuse, rather than fall into imminent evils, and do so indeed by right reason. Hence this fear is said to be able to befall a man of constant virtue. However, no fear can induce anyone into mortal sin according to the judgment of right reason; for no greater evil than mortal sin can be proposed, because no punishment is worse than the guilt of mortal sin.

Article Seven: Whether Concupiscence causes the Involuntary

Response: [Oxon. 4 d.14 q.1 n.11] one must say that concupiscence does not cause the involuntary. Declaration: the involuntary simply is that against which the will simply protests; and so, for contrary reason, the voluntary can be understood in a threefold way: first, that against which the will does not altogether protest but patiently endures; and in this way the torments they patiently endured were voluntary for the holy martyrs. Next [Oxon. 2 d.37 n.7] that too is voluntary for the will which it accepts of its own accord and gladly. Lastly, that is equally voluntary for it which it voluntarily causes. But concupiscence is a certain proneness in the rational appetite for desiring pleasant things immoderately; for this appetite is of a nature to delight together with the sensitive appetite with which it is conjoined; concupiscence therefore does not effect the involuntary but rather causes the voluntary, as often as the will, according to its innate proneness, delights together with the sensitive appetite in immoderate pursuit of pleasant things.

Article Eight: Whether Ignorance causes the Involuntary

Response: one must say that ignorance does cause the involuntary. But [Oxon. 4 d.15 q.1 n.8, d.30 q.1 n.2, d.22 n.2] one needs to understand that ignorance is related in a threefold way to a human act; for either ignorance is cause of the act such that, if the ignorant person knew, either he would not do the act or at least he would do the contrary act; or it is concomitant to a human act, and thus is someone said to be ignorant while sinning; or finally ignorance follows on sin, as the punishment for it. Again ignorance can be of the fact itself in itself, or as to some circumstances of it, or as to something consequent to it.

Ignorance, therefore, and especially ignorance of the condition that is required for an act of will, does cause the involuntary, according to the Philosopher, *Ethics* 3.3, and Augustine *On the Trinity* 8.4, "Nothing is loved or willed unless it is known first." – However, when ignorance is voluntary and imputable to guilt, as when someone is under obligation to know and yet despises to understand, it never causes the involuntary, because the person is ignorant willingly; nor does it do so when it follows a wrong act as the punishment of it; nor even when it is concomitant does it cause the involuntary, because concomitant ignorance does not impede the act to which it is connected; for even if he knew what for the moment he does not, the ignorant person would still elicit the act. So ignorance is only a cause then of the involuntary when a person does something from an ignorance, which is not voluntary to him, of the fact, or of its circumstances, or of the condition that is required for an act of will, and he would not do what he does if he had clear knowledge of the fact in itself or of its circumstances. An example: [Oxon. 4 d.15 ibid.] if someone who has an abundance of the goods of fortune feigns himself a pauper so as to get alms from dispensers of funds, the other who bestows alms on him does so involuntarily, thinking he is coming to the aid of the needy. Or if he were to give to someone as being near in relation to him who however is not near to him, he would give involuntarily, because he is deceived about the circumstance on the basis of which he gives; and so with the other conditions, as was said in the matter of the matrimonial contract in the additions to IIIa q.51 a.1.

QUESTION SEVEN: ABOUT THE CIRCUMSTANCES OF HUMAN ACTS. IN FOUR ARTICLES.

Article One: Whether Circumstance is Accident of a Human Act

Response: one must say that circumstance is an accident of a human act. To see this one needs to know [Oxon. 2 d.7 n.11, Quaest. Miscell. q.5, Quodlibet q.18] that, over and above volition's natural goodness, which belongs to it insofar as it is a positive thing, volition can have a triple moral goodness inhering in it in a certain order. The first is called goodness in genus. The second is virtuous goodness, or goodness from circumstance. Finally the third is gratuitous goodness, or goodness from divine acceptation. The first belongs to volition insofar as it concerns an object fitting such an act according to the dictate of right reason, and not merely because it is naturally agreeable to the act, as the sun is to sight. And this is the first moral goodness, which is for this reason called goodness in genus because it is as it were material with respect to ensuing goodnesses [sc. as a genus is material for ensuing differences]. The second goodness belongs to volition from the fact the volition is elicited by the will along with all the circumstances dictated by right reason. The third goodness, finally, belongs to an act from the fact that, on the supposition of the twin goodness just stated, the volition is elicited in conformity with the principle of merit, which is grace or charity. Since therefore the same act as substrate to these goodnesses can have those degrees of goodness or can lack them, as when it is elicited against the

dictate of right reason, then circumstances are evidently accidents of human acts, because acts can be elicited according to them or contrary to them.

Article Two: Whether Theologians should pay Attention to the Circumstances of Human Acts

Response: one must say that it does belong to the theologian to consider the circumstances of human acts. For [Oxon. and Quodlibet in previous article] it belongs to a theologian to consider human acts as they are imputable to the will for praise and reward or for blame and punishment; but acts borrow these from the circumstances such that, if the circumstances are present, the act will be completely morally good and imputable to the will for praise and reward, and conversely imputable for punishment if the circumstances are not present, or if the act is deprived of agreement to the rule according to which it should be elicited. The theologian needs therefore to inquire into and scrutinize the circumstances by which acts are good or bad and worthy of reward or punishment, especially since ignorance of the circumstances may introduce involuntariness, as we said above in q.6 a.8. For in that case the act is not imputed for punishment, provided the ignorance is not willed. – Again, human acts can be elicited according to the inclination of the habit of charity and thus be accepted by God as worthy of eternal life; but it concerns the theologian to deal with things that, by divine law, are ordained to the attainment of eternal salvation; the circumstances of human acts are therefore to be considered by the theologian.

Article Three: Whether the Circumstances are suitably Enumerated in Ethics 3

Response: the circumstances about which the question is being asked are: who, by what means, what, where, why, how, when. So [Oxon. 2 d.40 n.3ff., Quodlibet q.18 n.4ff.] one must say that when, these circumstances are present, a human act is completely morally good, and that therefore the circumstances by which an act is made morally good are sufficiently enumerated. For the goodness of a moral act comes from the aggregation of all the things that belong to the act, not absolutely from the nature of the act, but belonging to it according to right reason; so because right reason dictates for an act a fitting object and a determinate mode and other circumstances, one can immediately conclude which object is fitting to such an act. An example: right reason dictates that an act of eating should be exercised on food restorative of what has been lost and not be focused on what is not of a nature to be nourishment. This determination of the object is the first determination that has regard to the genus of morals, not as a difference determining it to something in that genus but as a potential capable of being further morally specified; for when an act has an object agreeing to the agent and the action, it is then capable of being further determined by ordered circumstances; and hence it is that an act is said to have goodness in genus from its object, because as a genus is potential with respect to differences, thus the goodness from the object is the first in the genus of morals, presupposing only the goodness of nature and being capable of all specific goodness in the genus of morals.

Further, in the specific goodness that is goodness from circumstances, there is the following sort of procession: the first such goodness seems to be the circumstance of the end; for from the nature of the agent and action and object the conclusion is immediately drawn that such and such act should not belong to such and such agent save in order to such and such end, and should be chosen and desired for the sake of such and such end. But this circumstance does not belong to the act itself as it is precisely done or not done in fact, but rather to the act as willed and related by the will to such and such end; indeed, a choice that is done for the due end is no less good if the end of the choice is not attained by the externally elicited act than if it is attained. – After the circumstance of the end there seems to follow the circumstance of the mode of acting or of the form; for certainly the act should be done in a due way, as is proved by all that has been said or by some of it. – Next can be shown the circumstance of time, because such and such an act for such and such an end, even one having such and such a mode, does not have to agree with such and such an agent at any time but only at the time at which the act can be ordered to the intended end, or at which it can attain the end. – The last circumstance of all seems to be the circumstance of place; but there are many acts whose moral goodness, even complete moral goodness, does not determine a place.

Article Four: Whether the Principal Circumstances are the End for the sake of which and those in which there is Operation

Response: it was explained in the preceding article that the first and chief of all the circumstances is the end; next the one that provides the form; and the rest are posterior to these.

QUESTION EIGHT: ABOUT THE THINGS THE WILL IS OF AS WILLED. IN THREE ARTICLES.

Article One: Whether the Will is of the Good only

Response: [Oxon. 4 d.49 q.10 n.8ff.] one must say that for the will to desire the bad as such involves a contradiction. Declaration: it is impossible for any power to elicit an act about any object which cannot be an object of that act. For the power of vision cannot elicit an act about sound, for it is altogether repugnant for sound to be the terminative object of such act. For sight is the sort of entity that is of a nature to terminate only at color. Now evil cannot be the determinative object of an act of willing; therefore evil cannot be desired by the will. Proof of the minor: the object of volition is good alone, whether real or apparent; for hereby it is that the will is drawn or enticed to pursuit of an object, by loving it with the love either of friendship or of concupiscence; so when the idea of goodness is taken from the object and in its place wickedness is substituted, the will cannot be borne along to it by love but rather by hatred and aversion. For [Oxon. 3 d.17] will is essentially free appetite along with reason. Appetite is not borne along by desiring and willing save to its perfection, or to the object from which it expects its perfection; no goodness

can redound to the will from evil insofar as it is evil; therefore the intellective will does not have regard to evil save insofar as it detests, abhors, repels it, and save insofar as some idea of good is apprehended in it. Hence the Philosopher writes *Ethics* 1.1, "Well have they said that the good is what all things desire."

Intervening Article: Whether every Act of Will is of the End or of what is for the End

Response: [Oxon. 1 d.1 q.3] one must admit that there is an act in intellective appetite which is not of the end nor of what is for the end. Declaration: although from the nature of the thing there is no being that is not an end or ordered to an end, nevertheless there can be shown to the will a good object apprehended absolutely under the idea neither of what is good for its own sake nor of what is for the sake of some other good. Now about such a good thus shown the will can have an act of willing it absolutely, abstracting from relation to another and from the idea of what is good for itself; but this act is neither of an end, which is something to be loved for its own sake, nor of means to an end, which the will desires for the sake of the end; the act is therefore neither. For it lies in the capability of a free power to act in this way and in that way, relating it or not relating it, and therefore the will can tend toward any willable good either according to the former act or according to the latter.

Article Two: Whether the Will is of the End only or also of what is for the End

Response: [Oxon. 1 d.1 q.3, Quodlibet q.16 n.6] one must say that it is the same power of willing that intends the end and wills what is for the end. Declaration: means or useful goods are endowed with their own and intrinsic goodness in the genus of being, independently of the end to which they are by nature ordered; when therefore they are in fact ordered to the end and are desired for the sake of it, then there is an order there in goodness or desirability between the end and what is for the end, insofar as what is for the end has a participated goodness with respect to the end; however the participated goodness is not a pure, extrinsic denomination received from the end and derived to the means, but is a goodness proper and intrinsic to the means, and for the sake of this goodness they can be ordered to the pursuit of the end; it is like the way there is a per se order of truth between principle and conclusions; for the principle is true of itself, namely from the connection of the terms that make it up; but the conclusion borrows truth from the principle; however it receives this truth in such a way that the truth is proper and intrinsic to it, and is not merely an extrinsic denomination; the result is that for an intellect apprehending its terms the truth is plain in its own degree of evidence, even independently of the principle, although when taken along with the principle on which it depends it is far more evident. Likewise means and useful goods possess, independently of the end, their own proper goodness, by which they can be desired in order to the end; but when they are thus loved, then the utility of them is clear. Since therefore included in them is the formal idea of the object of the will, it is evident that the will is not only of the end but also of what is ordered to the end.

Article Three: Whether the Will is moved to the End and to what is for the End by the same Act

Response: [Oxon. 1 d.41, 3 d.7 q.3, 3 d.34] an act of the will can be considered as dealing immediately with the means and terminating at the end, or, contrariwise, as being elicited for the sake of the end and terminating at the means. Again too, the act can either be effective or be ineffective or conditioned. One should then say that, whenever the will pursues the means for the sake of attaining the end, it must necessarily be moved to both extremes by one and the same act. For the means are certain goods useful for pursuing the end; unless therefore the act terminates at the intended end, the means to the end are not then being desired, but are either not being desired or the will is at least not willing and desiring them as they are means but rather as they have got hold of some other goodness in the genus of being. For by the very fact that a sick man wishes to make use of a medicine suitable for expelling a disease, thereby is he willing the intended state of health. – But when the will terminates at the end, it first wills the end and then the means to the end, and not only first in nature but even possibly first in time. Hence an invalid who wants to be restored to health, which is the end, consults about means at a later point of time and applies the means that are more suitable for attaining the loved end. But this [Oxon. 4 d.49 q.10 n.2, 2 d.6 q.1] must be understood of efficacious volition. For if the will wills the end ineffectually and conditionally, recognizing the impossibility of it, it does not busy itself about the pursuit of it; for where no hope appears of attaining some end, either the end is not in any way desired, or is so very slightly; hence Aristotle rightly says that choice is not about impossibilities; and it is in this way that the damned desire blessedness as a good advantageous for them; but as they see that they are striving for what is impossible they do not consult about means for getting it.

QUESTION NINE: ABOUT WHAT MOVES THE WILL. IN SIX ARTICLES.

Article One: Whether the Will is moved by the Intellect

Response: [Oxon. 2 d.25, Reportatio ibid.] it is said here in the opinion that, since the will is in potency to several options, it needs to be reduced to act by something that is in act, and this is to move it. The will then needs a mover in two respects, namely as to the exercise or use of its act and as to the determination of its act. The first indeed is on the part of the subject, sometimes acting and sometimes not acting; but the other is on the part of the object, in accord with which the act is specified; the will then is moved by the intellect proposing an object for the specification of the act; but, on the other hand, the will moves the intellect and the rest of the inferior powers to the exercise of their acts. – In response to the question we say first that it cannot be that volition comes from the known object in the way that sensation comes from the sensible object. Proof: [Oxon. ibid. n.6] a natural agent cannot be a per se cause of contraries about the same thing; but in the power of our will lies the having of an act of refusal and of an act of willing, which are contraries about the

same object; therefore these acts cannot proceed from the object, since the object is a natural agent. Even if, then, the object may be called a cause of volition, some other principle must be laid down for refusal. But that principle other than the will can only be a bad object; but the bad, since it is something privative, cannot be the cause of a positive act of the sort that refusal is; so refusal must be effectively from the will and not from the known object. – Next, passion is not in the power of the one undergoing it, especially when it is from a natural agent; but if volition were from the known object and from the will, it would proceed from a naturally acting cause; the volition itself, therefore, will not be in the power of the will, nor further will any act commanded by the will be in its power, and so it will neither merit nor demerit through its volition, which no one would say. – Lastly [ibid. nn.7, 22] there are in reality contingent events, and I call a contingent event an event that happens avoidably; otherwise if everything happened with unavoidable necessity there would be no need to deliberate or be busy about things, as Aristotle concludes *De Interpretatione* 1 final chapter. I ask therefore whence or by what cause that which contingently happens does happen. Not from a determined cause because at the moment at which it is thus determined the effect cannot happen contingently; therefore from a cause indeterminate to each of the opposites. Either then the cause can determine itself contingently to one of them, since it cannot do both at once, as Aristotle says *Metaphysics* 9 text 10 about rational power; or it cannot determine itself but needs something else to determine it to one of the opposites. If it can determine itself to one of them contingently, or non-inevitably, then the proposed conclusion is gained. If it is determined by something else to one of the opposites, then either necessarily or contingently. If necessarily then the effect happens unavoidably. If the determining cause determines avoidably to one result, such that it could also determine to the other, the cause effecting this determination cannot be anything other than the will. For any other natural active cause is determined altogether to one effect, or at any rate, if a natural cause is said to be indeterminate, it cannot determine either itself or anything else.

We say second that the will moves the intellect to the exercise of its acts. Declaration: for, when the intellect has one perfect understanding, there can be in it in addition several other confused and imperfect understandings (unless perhaps the understanding were to be so perfect and actual that it excluded all others), in the way that the seeing power, when it is on a pyramid and focuses below the base on one point in the cone distinctly, sees at the same time many points imperfectly and indistinctly; therefore when these imperfect and confused understandings exist in the intellect, the will can, by its innate liberty, be pleased with any one of them, even if that understanding were not known actually as the object. Now when the will approves and is pleased with some understanding, that understanding itself is confirmed and intensified; but when, on the contrary, the will disapproves or refuses, the understanding in question is weakened and lessened; for if an agent that has diverse operations and actions is active about one and the same thing, it acts more strongly and perfectly than it would if it were active about diverse things according to diverse powers. The understanding, therefore, which was weak and imperfect, becomes, through the influx of the will willing it eagerly, perfect and intense; so in this way we very well understand that the will can command a

thought and turn the intellect toward it. But when the will refuses another understanding, or is pleased with a first, this other is weakened and ceases to be; and thus we perceive the will turning the intellect away from the understanding of some object.

Article Two: Whether the Will is moved by the Sensitive Appetite

Response: one must say that the will is in fact moved by the sensitive appetite. In order to see this [Oxon. 2 d.32 n.7] one needs to know how, by the disobedience of the first man, we lost original justice. The intellective appetite, like a ship with its rudder lost by force of a storm, and like a horse with its reins broken (to use Anselm's example, *On the Conception of the Virgin* 5) left unbridled to itself, is by its very nature prone to delight in the sensitive appetite to which it is joined, and all its effort tends to what is agreeable to itself; for that by which it was being restrained, so as not to delight immoderately in the things that the sensitive appetite is drawn to, is no longer ready to help it; so thereby it comes about that it is said to be moved by the sensitive appetite. For [ibid. d.29 n.5], just as the intellect joined to the senses is of a nature to understand sensible things, so the will joined to the sensitive appetite is of a nature to delight in that appetite, so much so that, when it is striving to hold the appetite back from being inordinately drawn to what it delights in, it is acting against its own inclination; for therein it too itself experiences difficulty and the sensitive appetite is affected by sadness, since force is being applied to it. Yet not for this reason however is the will thus moved directly by the sensitive appetite (because on the contrary it compels that appetite to obey it), but rather it is moved indirectly, in that, when the things that the sensitive appetite delights in and tries to pursue and possess, are presented beforehand to the will, the will itself takes delight in the pursuit of these objects, and thereby the whole man is understood to be delighted. So, by reason of the objects shown to the will by the sensitive appetite, the will is said to be moved by the appetite; in truth, however, it is moved and enticed by the objects that are agreeable to the appetite themselves, and hence both the appetite itself and the will and finally the whole man are delighted.

[Hence [Oxon. 1 d.3 q.3 n.24, in reply to an objection] the objects desired by the sensitive appetite do not efficaciously influence the will but serve the will as occasions or conditions for willing of its own accord what will bring pleasure to the sensitive appetite... Although [Oxon. 3 d.33 n.4] the will naturally tends to what pleases it in the things that are agreeable and delightful to sensitive appetite, nevertheless, when it actually takes pleasure in them, it suffers no coercion nor suffers any movement impressed on it as it were by a material power, but it itself is determinative of itself to willing so. Wherefore, although the will commands the sensitive appetite and although the sensitive appetite obeys its command, yet the will is not said conversely to obey the sensitive appetite; for a free thing is persuadable by reason but does not properly obey it, nor consequently is it moved by reason; and much less is it moved by the sensitive appetite.]

Article Three: Whether the Will moves Itself

Response: [Oxon. 2 d.25, Reportatio ibid., Metaphysics 9 qq.14-15] some who have been persuaded by arguments to the negative side have thought that the will does not move itself but needs some other mover, a subject distinct from it at least, by which it may be reduced to an act of willing or refusing; and they said that the other mover is a phantasm illumined by the light of the agent intellect, whereby intellection is immediately caused and volition too, by immediacy of cause but not by immediacy of effect, because intellection first proceeds from the phantasm as thus irradiated by the light, and then volition does.

As far as intellection is concerned, the question has been expounded in Ia q.79 a.2. Therefore [Oxon. ibid. n.7], that the cause of volition cannot be a phantasm irradiated by the light of the agent intellect, there is, besides the things said in a.1 (which directly and equally conclude that a known object and a phantasm cannot be the adequate cause of volition), the following argument: the first action caused in the will by a phantasm is altogether natural; therefore it is not in the power of the will; for it is not in our power not to be affected by what we see, as Augustine says, *On Free Choice* 3. Since therefore after such an act we are able to move the intellect to consider this or that, I ask by what act we do so. Not indeed by the medium of the first act; for that is not in our power; and again that act is not about considering or not considering but is caused merely naturally; therefore it must be done by another act. I ask about that other act where it comes from. Either it will proceed from the will determining itself, or it will at least proceed from the phantasm. If from the will, the intended conclusion is attained, for such volition is in its power and proceeds efficaciously from it. If from the phantasm, then the act will be natural and consequently not more in the will's power for commanding the intellect to consider this or that than the first act was. – Response [Oxon. ibid. n.8] when the intellect is considering an object there can arise an impediment to it; for with the first phantasm that moves it another is conjoined, and one that is as it were neighbor to the first, and therefore it moves the intellect, or can move it, more strongly to the consideration of itself, and can consequently incline the will to an act of volition, so much so that the phantasm moving first need not cause a volition. For if I think of something delightful that moves my appetite, there is no need that I be moved to desire it; for another object can through the consideration of the intellect arise that moves the will more, so much so that the will ceases from its first volition. Against this: even if it is true that an impediment can arise by chance, that however will not be in the power of the will, nor fall under its command. And it is the same in the case of the sensitive appetite; for when an ox sees grass, its appetite is moved, and from that appetite it is progressively moved to eat the grass; and if in such movement there occur to the beast a more delightful object, one that thereby more strongly moves its appetite, then indeed it stops from its first movement and yet not freely, because it is necessarily drawn by something more desirable that occurs to it, although this something occur by chance. – There is also another response to the argument as follows: when two delightful things come together in a phantasm, it is in the power of the will to make the intellect stand at the base one, the other reason being set aside, whence it happens that an evil choice follows. On the contrary, are these two reasons of equal efficacy as regard moving the will or not? If they move equally, then they will cause a willing and a refusing at the same time in the will

with respect to the same object, which is impossible. If they move unequally, then one moves the will more efficaciously and necessarily, and consequently that volition will not be in the power of the will but the volition will also necessarily move the intellect in accord with it; so it will not be able to make the intellect stand at consideration of the other reason.

The second reason against those who think thus: [Oxon. ibid. n.9] if the phantasm is a thoroughgoing and equivocal cause of volition and intellection by immediacy of cause, then it is simply more perfect than intellection and volition; then fantasizing is nobler than the happiness of the Philosophers, which they posited as consisting in intellection and volition. For the teacher [sc. of this view] cannot lay down some other agent, as the agent intellect, because the agent and patient are necessarily distinct in subject according to his opinion. – Lastly, an angel and a separated soul can operate by willing; but a phantasm effecting volition cannot be posited in them; therefore one will have to say that God immediately caused an evil willing in the will of the angels who revolted from him, which is false. Or if some other agent is posited, as the heavens or any other object whatever, then he [sc. the above teacher] will be compelled to deny his principle, namely that a total equivocal cause is nobler than its effect. Wherefore it is altogether impossible for an angel and a separated soul to be in no way able to move themselves but to stand immovably in whatever place they may be put, just as if they were in a prison.

For this reason we say [Metaphysics 9 q.15 n.8ff.] that the will is not an active principle determined of itself, but a principle with power determinative of itself to either alternative; and so it moves itself to operating when objects occur that provide it occasion. For a created active principle, beyond all contradiction, is capable of the perfection which we attribute to the will, namely not to be determined to one effect or act, since it has many operations, even contrary ones, in its power, nor even to be determined to some one of those that it virtually contains; for it can hold itself back from any operation, even when any object you like occurs to it. Further, the more perfect an active principle is, the less dependent, determined, and limited it is with respect to act or effect. Hence is rightly understood the most excellent nobility of the first glorious Principle, causing everything through infinite independence and supreme liberty, which perfection (namely being itself), the Philosophers took away, thinking falsely that it was a necessary cause. But if an active cause unlimited as to producing many effects, though with a natural determination to some one of them, is more perfect than a cause which is not thus unlimited, how much more so is it if, along with this unlimitedness and indetermination, there is also understood an indetermination excluding natural determination to some one of the effects to which its active power can extend itself? Such is the will, and it alone, among active principles, is such, having a mode of acting distinct from the whole class of active principles that are not the will; for the will's mode of acting is opposite to the mode of all the principles other than it. If then this perfection, which we attribute to the will, is not repugnant to a created active principle, and the supreme such principle is the will, then this perfection is rationally to be attributed to it. – Lastly, if the intellect through the same knowledge is in some way of opposites, namely as showing them, then an active power more indeterminate can be of opposites in a more excellent way,

namely that it itself, being single, is able to determine itself to either of the opposites shown; otherwise the first power for opposites would seem to have been given in vain, since without the second it would have power for neither of them.

[In response to the objection that the same thing cannot move itself because then it would be active and passive at the same time, Montefortino includes, among other things, the following from Oxon. ibid. n.12: An equivocal agent [as the sun with respect to causing the generation of worms in rotting flesh] is in act with respect to its effect, not as formally having the same act, since otherwise it would not be an equivocal agent, but as being universally endowed with the virtue of attaining the effect, because it is formally endowed with a more eminent virtue. It is therefore in potency as to the term of the movement, but in act according to the equivocal active principle in respect of the term. So may it be supposed in respect of the will and its moving itself to this act rather than that.]

Article Four: Whether the Will is moved by an Exterior Principle

Response: [Quodlibet q.21] Some think, because of arguments adduced for the affirmative side, that one must altogether set down that the will proceeds to its first act by the instigation of some exterior mover, as Aristotle concludes *Eudemian Ethics* 7.18.

For the solution of the question we say first [Quodlibet q.21 n.12, Oxon. 2 d.42 q.4 n.5] that the first intellection is not from reason but in some way from chance. Declaration: he who understands does not understand by first understanding; therefore the first intellection is not from reason showing an object first; therefore it is in some way from chance, according to Augustine *On Free Choice* 3.15 when he writes, "It is not in our power not to be affected by what we see;" therefore it is fortuitous and by chance. However, when the first intellection and volition are in place, one can reason about what is to be done; and consequently, although the first intellection is thus by chance, the things that nevertheless follow deliberation are not fortuitous but from deliberate reason. – And it is significant that the 'in some way' is added, because the first intellects are not to be called simply fortuitous. For they are from objects moving more strongly, according to phantasms that, when impediments cease, are impressed more, and thereby there is in us a naturally motive cause of the first intellection; but since it is not from deliberating reason, it is not imputable to man save by interpretation, namely insofar as it was in man's power to make the object move more strongly by considering it frequently, on account of which consideration the phantasm is more strongly impressed on the memory; hence the phantasm would move more strongly and first move, when impediment ceases.

We say second that the fact someone first determines himself to willing or to not willing is from the will and not from the intellect. For the will alone is endowed with a power of virtue for determining itself to either option and also of refraining from all determination. Declaration: the intellect is moved naturally by the object; if therefore the will were moved naturally by the naturally moved intellect, then it itself would equally be moved by natural necessity; and so man would be a brute, whose appetite is drawn and led and does not lead. The will therefore does not

move by natural necessity as regards any of its acts, but once the first intellection is had, it is in the power of the will to move the intellect to consider this or that, and in its power to will or refuse this or that; and thus the first volition is altogether from us, and is not by chance in the way the first intellection is.

[*From response to objections:* It was expounded in a.1 how the will is moved by the object. For, to begin with, it is impossible for it to be moved by any object as by a total effective cause of volition; and although it is not improbable that it is moved by a partial less principal cause, we however think that understood objects, at least of the natural order, provide only the occasion for the will to pursue these objects with love or to flee them through refusal... We concede that the will becomes willing from not willing by occasion taken from an object first presented to it by the intellect... For there is required for an act of will only the will and the intellect showing an object... An angel, while having an intellect showing it an object and a will prior in nature to volition, yet had willing at the same time, not through some other volition, but by a first act containing, by way of power, that operation in its own active virtue.]

Article Five: Whether the Will is moved by Celestial Body

Response: [Oxon. 2 d.14 q.3 n.4, Reportatio ibid. n.5, Quodlibet q.21 n.14, De Anima q.11] since the present question was extensively expounded in Ia q.115 a.4, we will now explain it briefly by saying that the celestial bodies are not at all able directly to move the will or the intellect, but only indirectly and on occasion of directly acting on the sensitive appetite. The reason is that what is purely bodily cannot directly act on the spiritual, for an agent is a more noble thing than the patient; now the will and the intellect are powers altogether spiritual; so the extremes here are wholly out of proportion for the latter to receive the influence of the former or to be moved on the action of them.

Because, however, the celestial bodies are able to act directly on the sense organs, which are mixed bodies, these latter can thence be altered and changed to some state that agrees or disagrees with them insofar as they are sense organs, and consequently they can in some way have some activity as regard an act of the intellect and of the will; for if the senses are disordered in their own act, the intellect too will err in following that act, as is plain in the mad and lunatic whose imagination is confused, and that this indisposition of theirs is directly influenced by the stars cannot be doubted. But when there is disorder in the intellect, disorder in the will also follows. – Further, the higher bodies can, when directly influencing the sensitive appetite, introduce that change in the will, so that it inclines more to these objects than to those, because in truth the rational will of the wayfarer is inclined to pursue what is efficaciously desired by the sensitive appetite; and hence it is that the stars are said to incline the will as well, not because they have a direct influence on it, but for the reason just stated. However in nothing is the will absolutely necessitated; rather it can, of its own freedom, stand in the way of any inclination of the sensitive appetite. Nevertheless, because of this proneness of the will to follow the sensitive appetite in its inclinations against the right dictates of reason, astrologers do make true conjectures about men's morals, although absolutely

things could happen otherwise if men were to be persuaded they should follow the dictate of reason rather than the proneness of the sensitive appetite. Simply then and absolutely there is in man something to which no influence whatever of the celestial bodies can extend itself (and the will is of this sort), save on occasion by, as was said, moving the sensitive appetite, toward whose inclination the will is apt to be inclined. But still these influences of the stars are not able either to reach the will or even to join together the causes necessary for its activity. But the afore cited Ia q.115 should be looked at.

Article Six: Whether the Will is moved only by God as by an Exterior Principle

Response: [Quodlibet q.16 n.15] Here there is an opinion that says the motion of the will is from what is intrinsic, just as is also natural motion. Now although a natural thing can be moved by something that is not the cause of the nature of the moved thing, yet that something cannot cause a natural motion unless it is in some way cause of the nature. For a stone is moved upwards by a man, who does not cause the nature of the stone; but this motion is not natural to the stone, but its natural motion is only caused by what causes its nature. In the first way, then, a man possessed of will can be moved by someone who is not his cause; but that his voluntary motion should be from some extrinsic principle which is not the cause of the will is impossible; but the cause of the will can be nothing other than God.

We say that we have declared in a.4 above how the will determines itself to willing and not willing; but how a created will is moved by God we explained in Ia q.105 a.4. For the present, however, it seems one should not approve the statement above that, just as natural motion is caused by that which is cause of the nature, so voluntary motion is by that from whose active virtue the will proceeds. For although a heavy object is determined to a place downwards, nevertheless its going downwards is not from what causes its heaviness but is from the intrinsic heaviness itself, and no second extrinsic cause is here to be mixed in with it, over and above a general influence. A natural principle is therefore supremely determined because it directly excludes an indetermination to either side, and indeed what causes such a principle gives the thus determined form, as that fire is hot or the heaven round, because the cause that gives being to fire and being to the heaven gives heat and roundness at the same time. Nevertheless fire and the heaven do not necessarily receive their second acts from the maker of their natures, but they receive only principles naturally determined to heating and to spherical motion. Now even if the will, which receives being through creation, be said necessarily to will something, yet it is not by its cause as determined to that willing as a heavy thing is to going downwards and as fire is to burning, but it has received precisely from its cause a principle determinative of itself to this willing. – The reason for all these things is that, although some principle can concur with the will, namely the object, according to some, or the intellect, in the opinion of others, and although the concurring principle is of itself naturally active, yet the will per se speaking never is or can be a natural active principle; for being naturally active and being freely active are first differences of active principle, and the will as such is a freely active principle. So the will can no more be naturally active than can nature, as it is a principle distinct from

will, be freely active. – Nor should anyone be moved by the fact that the first movement of the will seems to be necessary and must therefore be thought to be natural. For every natural agent is either altogether first or, if it is posterior, it will be naturally determined to act by something prior. Now the created will must in no way be said to be an agent altogether first. But neither can it be naturally determined by any superior agent; for it is itself an active principle of such a sort that it determines itself in acting. On the hypothesis therefore that the will necessarily wills something, nevertheless the willing is not at all caused naturally by what causes the will, even if this cause gave the will being naturally; but once the first act is in place whereby the will is will, then, if it is left to itself and if it can contingently have or not have this willing, it would still determine itself to this willing.

QUESTION TEN: ABOUT HOW THE WILL MOVES. IN FOUR ARTICLES.

Article One: Whether the Will is moved naturally to Anything

Response: [Quodlibet q.16 n.13ff.] ‘nature’ can be take extensively and properly. In the first way it embraces every being; hence we do not hesitate to declare this or that to be the ‘nature’ of negation, of second intentions, and of other things of the sort. Thus too, speaking extensively, necessity in any being can be called ‘natural necessity’; from this fact, since at least the divine will of its own liberty has necessarily some willing, this necessity of perfect liberty can be called natural necessity. However, when we thus extend this locution we are speaking improperly. The proper acceptation of nature, then, is that which the Philosopher gives in *Physics* 2 text.49, when he divides active principle into nature and purpose, as into two differences dividing a common genus or quasi genus. “Of those among them,” he says, “that happen for the sake of something,” that is, for the sake of an end, of which sort are all things that come to be from a *per se* cause, “some are according to purpose but others are not according to purpose.” And a little later, “Things for the sake of something are those that are done by intellect and those that are done by nature,” and to these two *per se* causes he thereafter reduces *per accidens* causes, which are chance and fortune. He gives the same division of active principle in *Metaphysics* 9 text.10 when he assigns the way in which rational and irrational active powers proceed in diverse ways to their acts. Augustine speaks about this same distinction in *City of God* 5.9. “There is,” he says, “fortuitous cause, natural cause, and voluntary cause,” and he makes clear what each of them is.

Having noted these points by way of preface, we say [Quodlibet ibid.] that the will does not will anything at all naturally, taking ‘nature’ in its proper signification. For each of the active principles, namely the natural and the free, has, taken *per se*, its own proper mode of being principle; the intellect, indeed, does so by way of nature, and hence, when compared to its proper act, it is a nature. However the will has a proper mode of causing freely on account of the power of virtue it has for determining itself; and for this reason, when it concurs with the intellect, as in the production of artificial objects, the whole result is said to be produced freely and on

purpose, because purpose is the principal and immediate principle of its production. And even when an immediate principle concurs by way of nature, as when we use the lower powers for our act, then, since what is done is subject to the will freely using such instruments, the action is free and we are said truly, from the principal agent, to have acted freely. However much it may be, then, that the intellect understands naturally, this in fact being required by the mode peculiar to it, yet the will does not will naturally, although it conform itself to the intellect in the thing willed; rather, to will naturally is intrinsically repugnant to it, just as is incompatible with it the other of the two differences, the one that contracts active principle to intellect, and conversely. The will then can no more be active naturally than nature (as nature is a principle distinct from will) can be active freely.

[*From replies to objections:* we say [Quodlibet q.21 n.14] that the will does indeed follow the act of the intellect, insofar as through the intellect are presented to it the objects that it would otherwise not be able to pursue or to hate... But whatever be the objects presented to the will, the will is able, by its innate power of virtue, to love or hate them or indeed not to have any act about them... [Oxon. 4 d.49 q.10, Quodlibet q.17] From the fact that the intellect necessarily and naturally knows the connection of the terms of a first principle and assents to it without delay, it does not thereby follow that the will is carried by the same necessity to the ultimate end, when speaking of the will of the wayfarer; rather, the will is able to withhold itself from any act at all about the ultimate end; otherwise it would, by its dominating power, always keep the intellect detained in considering that end and would not allow it to focus on understanding other objects. Given, however, that the will is necessarily carried to some object first presented to it, nevertheless this act should not at all be called a natural one. There is indeed in the will a natural appetite for good, and especially for the highest good; but since this appetite is not an elicited act in it but is only the propensity of nature to its perfection, it does not belong to the concern of the present question. An elicited act of the will conform to this appetite, however, can for this reason be indeed called natural, but the denomination will be merely extrinsic; for essentially the act is freely and not naturally elicited.]

Article Two: Whether the Will is moved of Necessity by its Object

Response: [Oxon. 1 d.1 q.4, 4 d.49 q.10, Reportatio ibid. q.2, Quodlibet q.16 a.1, Collationes 14, 16-17] [Oxon. 1 ibid. n.2, 4 ibid. n.5] for the solution let the first statement be: the will in respect of the exercise of its acts is not necessitated by its object, which is the good, whether the good is understood as such and in general or in particular, wherein is placed the ultimate happiness of an intellectual and rational nature. The proof, also concluded elsewhere, is that any unimpeded agent, provided it be posited as necessitated to act, removes of necessity, if it can, everything impeding its act; therefore if the unimpeded will is compelled of its nature to will the ultimate end, apprehended in general or in particular, it necessarily removes everything prohibiting that volition, if it can remove it. But the non-consideration of the object prohibits this volition; therefore the will, by willing this object, will necessarily make the intellect stay put in the consideration of it. The major is plain, because what is of itself necessitated to act is never prohibited save by something

repugnant that overcomes its active power; but we experience the opposite; therefore the will undergoes no necessity from its object however presented to it by the intellect. – Next, necessity in a higher cause cannot come from the necessity of a lower cause; for an inferior cause cannot determine the mode of acting of a superior cause, because it cannot determine the superior cause to act; therefore the superior cause, if it acts necessarily, has that necessity through something intrinsic to its own form, or from its own nature; if therefore the will has a necessity to will something, such necessity will be in it from its own nature and not from an inferior cause. – Then I argue further as before: a superior cause, if it acts necessarily, moves inferior causes with the same necessity to the doing of the actions that are necessary for its own action; since therefore the apprehension of the intellect is required for the act of the will, then, from the hypothesis that the will is compelled by its object to pursue the object, it follows that the will necessarily determines the intellect to the perpetual consideration of the object, which is false. Therefore [Oxon. 4 ibid. n.6] the will contingently wills the end, both in general and in particular, although for the most part it wills them both, provided the intellect is not in doubt as to what its happiness in particular is located in – as with the faithful believing that their ultimate happiness reposes in the enjoyment of the Trinity, although for the most part they neglect the necessary means for attaining that end, and so they think little of living virtuously because they do not efficaciously will the ultimate end.

The second statement [Oxon. 4 ibid. n.9] is that the will as to the specification of its act is necessitated by its object, so much so that it cannot hate the good or pursue and love the bad as such, or misery. For although the will, by its dominating power, is able not to pursue its object pre-known to it by the intellect, and thereby to withhold itself from any act and thus be immune from any necessity in exercising its act, yet, on the supposition that it does determine itself to issue in acts, it necessarily turns away from misery and on the contrary wills and loves the good or blessedness in whatever way this is pre-known to it. For neither can blessedness be an object of refusal nor is misery suited for terminating volition. Just as an act of seeing is by diffusion excluded from vision in respect of black, because black is not suited to be the object of such a diffused act, so in this case the will is not capable of such an act in order to such an object. In this way, then, the will is determined to willing blessedness and fleeing misery, namely that if it must issue in some act about those objects, it necessarily and determinately elicits an act of willing blessedness and of refusing misery.

[*From reply to objections* [Oxon. 4 ibid. n.8]: from the fact that someone does not wish blessedness the conclusion cannot rightly be inferred that he refuses such an object, because ‘to refuse’ is a positive act of the refuser, as is also ‘to will’, and so the one act is free just as is also the other; for we elicit neither of them necessarily about any object whatever, and so we are able not to elicit refusal about the bad, as also to abstain from volition about the good. Yet just as we cannot have about some evil shown to us an act of will save that of refusing it as such, so about some good offered to us we cannot elicit an act of will save that of willing it; and so one should argue: we cannot will to be miserable; therefore I am not able to hate blessedness; but from this does not follow: therefore I necessarily will blessedness, because no ‘to will’ is necessarily elicited from the will.]

Article Three: Whether the Will is moved of Necessity by the Lower Appetite

Response: [Oxon. 2 d.42, 3 d.15 n.18] the appetite, being subjected to passions of the irascible and concupiscent part, to pain and delight, in surpassing degree, either so moves the superior powers of the soul that man falls from the use of reason, or, while the inferior appetite is liable to such passions, man is in command of himself and is not deprived of the use of reason. If, because of the vehement action of the sensitive appetite, the use of reason is impeded, as in the case of the greatest torments and of great delight, according to Augustine *City of God* 14.16, then it is evident that thereby the will is necessarily dragged off by the inferior appetite; [Oxon. 2 d.25] not because the root of the will's freedom is the use and indifference of reason, but because, since the will cannot will anything save what is first shown it by the intellect, then, once the intellect is not abiding in its right use, the result is that the will too issues wrongly in its acts, namely in the way the objects are pre-shown it by an erring intellect. But if, while the passions in surpassing degree are present in the inferior appetite, reason is not absorbed in them, as in the case of the holy martyrs despite their being afflicted by atrocious torments, then the will is not at all moved necessarily by the inferior appetite; rather it is in the will's power to suffer and be sad along with the inferior appetite suffering such things or, if the inferior appetite is amid pleasures, to find pleasure along with it in such object, or to oppose it.

And [Oxon. 3 ibid. n.14] although some surreptitious delight, or some sadness with respect to sad objects, might be posited as preceding in the will every free act of it (for [Oxon. 2 d.42. q.1 n.1] "it is not in our power not to be affected by what we see"), however not for that reason [ibid. q.4 n.15] must the will be said to cooperate with the inferior appetite so necessarily that it is led by it in such way that to contradict, to oppose, and to issue in the opposite act is not in its power. The intellect does indeed cooperate with strongly moved senses unless it is distracted about other objects; and so too the will commonly suffers along with a suffering sensitive appetite, and delights with it in joy about the same object, provided it is not impeded by the non-consideration of the intellect or by some other overpowering impediment. But yet, if reason remains in charge of itself, the will is not in this way carried off necessarily by a change in the appetite such that the delight and sadness following elicited acts of will are not in the will's dominating power. And for this reason it would be said that a woman being violently raped does not sin. For although the delight of the sensitive appetite might reach to her will, yet because she does not will the delight or the delightful thing, her delight is surreptitious and the pleasure is not consequent to a free act of the will. It could also be said that, in the case of a woman suffering rape, she has delight in her sense of touch but not in her will, unless the object be freely willed.

Article Four: Whether the Will is moved of Necessity by the Extrinsic Mover, which is God

Response: [Quodlibet q.21, Oxon. 2 d.37 q.2 n.15] since in the whole of Ia q.85 we explained in many ways that man, even after sin, is possessed of free liberty of choice, so much so that he is very truly left in the hands of his own counsel, able to turn himself in any direction, as is written in *Ecclesiastes* 15, we now briefly say that he is not moved of necessity by the extrinsic mover, which is God. For the Creator himself of all things "so administers the things he has made that he allows them to perform their own motions," as Augustine says *City of God* 7.30. In the way then that he so moves a nature determined to one thing that it issues in its proper effects and is truly the natural and determined cause of them, in this way too he so moves a free principle that it can freely and contingently operate; otherwise, if he were to turn it of necessity to one side, it would no longer act according to the proper nature of that principle but rather against the energy of its power, and it would not be allowed to have the operations proper to its created essence. See Ia q.19 a.8.

QUESTION ELEVEN: ABOUT ENJOYMENT, WHICH IS AN ACT OF WILL. IN FOUR ARTICLES.

Article One: Whether Enjoyment is an Act of the Appetitive Power

Response: [Oxon. 1 d.1 q.3 n.2] one must say that enjoyment is an act of the appetitive power. To make this clear one needs to know that, just as there are in the intellect two acts of assenting to propositional truths, one by which we assent to a true proposition because of itself, the way we assent to a principle, and one by which we assent to a proposition because of something else, the way we assent to a conclusion because of a principle, so there are found in the will two acts of pursuing or of adhering to a good, one of doing so to a good because of itself, and one of doing so to a good because of some other good, to which good the first is referred and by which it is the sort of good it is. However there is to begin with this difference, that the assents of the intellect are distinguished by the nature of the propositions, some of which get their evidence from the nature of the terms and not as borrowed from elsewhere, while other propositions are evident and assented to by the intellect because of the principles from which they are shown to have been deduced. But the will, pursuing and adhering in a different way to the goodnesses in things, does not come to the distinction between its acts from the nature of the objects, but this arises precisely from a distinct act of a free power that takes its object in this way or in that. For to act thus or thus, referring or not referring one good to another, is in the power of the will itself. And for this reason there are no distinct proper objects corresponding to the will's acts; rather any will-able object whatever can be had by the will either in this act or in that. Next, there is this other difference, that the two assents of the intellect give a sufficient division of intellectual assent in general, such that they exclude any assent in between, for no evidence on the part of the object can be found in between that could be the source for a truth other than the truth of principles or of inferences from principles. On the other hand, however, since there can be shown to the will some object that is good absolutely, not under the idea of a good to be pursued for its own sake nor a good ordered to another good, and since

the will can have about such an object an act that need not be disordered, hence the will can issue in an act about that object absolutely, no account being taken of whether it is to be loved for its own sake or for the sake of something else (although the will can thence apply the intellect to inquiry about how the object should to be willed). – From all this four things manifestly emerge, which are: an imperfect act of willing a good for the sake of something else, which is called *use*; a perfect act of willing a good for its own sake, which is rightly called *enjoyment*; a third act which is *neutral* between these; and finally *delight* which is consequent to an act.

By the name then [Oxon. ibid. n.3] of *enjoyment*, which of these four is properly being referred to? The response, it is evident, is that the name cannot be attributed to a *neutral* act, nor again to an imperfect act, which is *use* or the pursuit of one thing in order to another. The controversy then reduces to whether by the term is expressed a *perfect* act, or the *delight* consequent to a perfect act, or *both*. Above in q.2 a.4 we made clear that pleasure or delight, since it is a passion, does not have regard to the idea of blessedness; but that enjoyment imports both act and delight seems to be signified by Augustine *On the Trinity* 10.10 when he says, “For we enjoy things known, wherein, being delighted for their own sake, the will rests.” For when he says, “we enjoy things known,” this pertains to the act, because presupposed to the act of the will is an act of the intellect toward the thing known; but when he adds, “wherein...the will...,” he insinuates that to the essence of enjoyment delight too equally belongs. Similarly in *83 Questions* q.30 he says, “We are said to enjoy the thing from which we take pleasure.”

So [Oxon. ibid. n.5] what really is the proper signification of this term is not easy to see; nevertheless it can be conjectured from the use of the term; for the verb ‘to enjoy, to take joy in’ is constructed with a transitive object, and this sort of construction belongs to words that signify an act that passes over into the object; the verb is not constructed with an instrumental object of cause, which sort of construction is due to undergoings signified by purely passive verbs (as in ‘to be hit by’). For to say ‘I am joyed by God’ is an error, just as ‘I am delighted by God’ or ‘God delights me’ is correct; rather I am said ‘to enjoy God, to take joy in God’ transitively, the way I am said ‘to love God, to have love for God’; so this is what seems to be the more proper signification of the term.⁹

However [Oxon. ibid.], one should not contend overmuch about the signification of terms when it is clear what the thing signified is, as Augustine advises *On the Trinity* 5.7 when he says, “Wherefore one should not consider in things how the usage of our speech allows or does not allow them to be said, but what is the understanding of things themselves that shines forth.” But it shines forth that the will has power for a perfect act, which is *enjoyment*, for an imperfect act, which is called *use*, and also for another act, which is not the former or the latter;

⁹ [Tr. Thus ‘to enjoy’, as a transitive verb focused on the object of the act and not as a passive verb focused on the subject of the act, must signify a perfect act rather than the subjective delight following that act. The issue of grammar Scotus raises here relates to peculiarities of Latin, not English, because the Latin for ‘to enjoy’ is ‘fruor’, and ‘fruor’ is an active verb in grammatically passive form which takes a direct object in grammatically indirect or instrumental form. Hence the need to explain that one should not let one’s understanding of the word’s meaning be confused by the surface grammar.]

and also that the will is the subject of the *delight* that follows an act. It is also clear that the signification of the term *enjoyment* does not in any way fit a neutral act or an imperfect act; but some seem to use the term for either of the other two, or for both together. From this it follows that 'to enjoy' has to be an equivocal term; or if it is univocal, then the authorities brought in from Augustine signifying that 'to enjoy' imports act and delight are in need of explanation, and one must say that the authorities are true to the extent that the object of enjoyment is the cause of delight, or at least that delight accompanies enjoyment, but not that delight is included in the formal idea of enjoyment.

Article Two: Whether Enjoyment befits only the Rational Creature or also Brute Animals

Response: [Oxon. 1 d.1 q.5 n.3, Reportatio ibid. q.4] one must say that enjoyment belongs to no creature inferior to man. Declaration: for by the name of enjoyment we mean to express the act of inhering in an object for that object's sake, and this act has the resting of delight as concomitant, or it is the resting itself, that is, the act which is the ultimate term of the power, insofar as the power has its term and its rest in its own act; so much so that it does not seem to be of the idea of enjoyment that it must give rest to the power on the part of the object, but rather on the part of the power inhering in the object for the object's own sake. – From this it follows [Oxon. ibid. n.3ff.] that, over and above the divine will, which simply and necessarily and *per se* enjoys first the infinite good, there is also the will of blessed minds enjoying the Deity simply and perpetually and *per se*, but not first; additionally the will of the just wayfarer enjoys the Deity simply and *per se* but not immovably nor first; the will of the one mortally sinning enjoys simply, as far as concerns the part of the will giving itself rest, for the will rests in the object which it *per se* loves, but the will does not simply rest as far as concerns the part of the object; nor does enjoyment require this, but because the object does not give rest of itself, so that the power may in its act be at rest in it, for that reason such enjoyment is disordered. Nevertheless the one gravely sinning does commonly take joy in himself. For he pursues the object of his act with the love of concupiscence; so he must love something else with the love of friendship; for a love of friendship precedes any love of concupiscence. That something else, then, is himself, for whose sake, as for the thing loved with love of friendship, he has concupiscent desire of the object that he inheres in with his act. He does not, then, enjoy the object of his act, nor consequently does he enjoy the act, which should not be the first thing he is turned back to; rather he enjoys himself, as was said.

However [Oxon. ibid. 5] none of this can in any way fit the sensitive appetite. For although the sensitive appetite inheres in some way in agreeable things for their own sake, that is, negatively not for the sake of another (because it does not have the wherewithal to refer them to something else), yet not contrarily so, because it does not value the object as not referable to something else; therefore it is said improperly and abusively to enjoy, because what it adheres to it does not refer to something else; but, as we said, it does not have the wherewithal to refer or not to refer one thing to another. – Next, neither does it inhere with love, because 'to love'

does not properly belong to it. – Lastly, neither does it properly inhere, because it does not apply itself to the object, but is as it were fixed by the force of the object that it is led by and drawn. – Wherefore much less should all the other beings, which are destitute of sensitive appetite and of the knowledge necessary for desiring, be said, because of their natural appetite, to enjoy anything, even abusively. For if, in the act of enjoying, a proper cognitive power, which agrees more with the will, where enjoyment is proper, and which corresponds to it, the way the intellect pre-shows to the will any object whatever – if this cognitive power does not fit the sensitive appetite, then in no way can the idea of enjoyment be attributed to natural appetite, even in the improper sense in which it does fit the sensitive appetite.

[*From reply to objections* [Oxon. ibid. n.7]: although natural appetite inheres in something for that thing's sake negatively, yet, for the most part, not contrarily; and if sometimes it does inhere contrarily, it does not inhere with love; however it does not even properly inhere, but is fixed as it were on the object by what gives it its nature, and not by an elicited act that is other than the nature (such as happens even in the case of sensitive appetite), but only by the habitual inclination of nature. Hence, as was said before, enjoyment belongs less to natural appetite than to sensitive appetite, which does by an elicited act inhere as it were in an already known object, although it does not do so freely. But natural appetite has its perpetual inclination without any knowledge.]

Article Three: Whether Enjoyment is only of the Ultimate End.

Response: [Oxon. 4 d.49 q.5 n.2, *Reportatio* ibid. q.4] let the first statement for the solution be: the blessedness of intellectual nature consists simply in that act alone which is enjoyment. Declaration: there is a double act in kind of the will, namely willing and refusing. The act of willing is also itself double in kind, either for the sake of the thing (or the good of the thing) willed, or for the sake of the one (or the good of the one) who wills. The first willing is said to be the love of friendship; the second the love of concupiscence; and only the first willing is enjoyment, which is ‘to inhere with love in another thing for the sake of that other thing itself’. – With this distinction as premise, I prove the conclusion: for blessedness cannot be placed in any refusing, both because the object of refusing is the bad, which cannot be the beatific object, and because the beatific act is first and immediate with respect to the ultimate end, and so is not had by virtue of any prior act of will; but refusing is not first with respect to the ultimate end; rather it is not even simply first among acts of the will, for the will does not commonly issue in the refusal of anything save because it first wants something else, according to Anselm *On the Fall of the Devil* 3, where he writes: “No one deserts justice save by wanting something that does not stand along with justice,” and he gives an example about a miser, money, and bread.

The second statement [Oxon. ibid. n.3] is that blessedness does not consist in an act of love of concupiscence. Proof: for even though that act could be good, if it has the right circumstances, yet it is not good by reason of itself or its object, even when not excluding the supreme good. For it can be immoderate, as appears from Augustine 83 *Questions* q.30, “Perversity,” he says, “is in using what should be enjoyed.” Likewise in Ia q.63 a.3 it was made clear that the angel first sinned by

immoderately coveting for itself the beatific object, as Anselm maintains *On the Fall of the Devil* 6, when he says that some of the angels had appetite for what they would have obtained if they had stood. But these angels desired nothing first or more than blessedness; for the affection for advantage is inclined to that first and supremely. On the other hand, however, the act of friendship in respect of God is good by reason of itself and its object; at least it cannot be immoderate by excess, though perhaps it can by deficiency. – Next, an act of concupiscence neither is nor can be the first act of the will with respect to the end; for every act of concupiscence is in virtue of some act of friendship; because it is for this reason that I covet a good for this man, because I love this man for whom I covet and wish well being. – Again, an act of love of friendship is in the will according to the will's having been endowed with the affection of justice; for if it had only affection for advantage, plainly it would only be able to will supreme advantage for itself, according to Anselm *On the Fall of the Devil* 14. But an act of concupiscence is in the will insofar as it has affection for advantage, because concupiscence according to this affection is necessarily present in the will, even if it were alone there. But nobler in the reason is the affection of justice than the affection of advantage, because it is ruler and moderator of the latter, according to Anselm, and is proper to the will insofar as the will is free, since the affection of advantage would be present in the will even if the will were not free. An act then elicited according to the affection of justice is more excellent than an act from the will according to the affection of advantage. – Lastly, an act of friendship tends to the object as the object is good in itself; but an act of concupiscence tends to it as it is good for me. But the object is nobler in itself than as it is possessed by someone; at any rate the having or possessing of the object in relation to the possessor, which is the formal idea in the object as thus compared, takes away from the objective perfection that the good has as it is in itself; so blessedness cannot consist in an act of love of concupiscence; and this is what was to be shown.

Article Four: Whether Enjoyment is only of the End Possessed.

Response: [Oxon. 4 d.49 q.5 n.4] one must say that enjoyment is not only in respect of the end had or possessed, but also in order to it when it is not there in its presence. For from what was said in aa.1-2, provided the will inheres with love in something for its own sake, it is truly said to enjoy that thing. Hence too those who mortally sin are said to enjoy on the part of their depraved will which rests itself in the object that it loves for the sake of itself. Since therefore the wayfarer, not possessing the ultimate end, is able to inhere in it with love for its own sake, and to love with the love of friendship what he has present only in his thought, truly he enjoys it; for this alone is required by enjoyment; and if this act tends to the object as shown to him with intuitive vision by the intellect, he will be perfectly blessed; but he is not such in respect of an end that is not there in that real presence of it by which it is intuitively seen by the blessed.

Intervening Article: Whether the Enjoyment of the Way and of the Fatherland differ in Species

Response: [Oxon. 4 d.49 q.5 n.5, Reportatio ibid. q.4] it seems more probable that these two enjoyments differ in species, formally indeed in themselves but effectively from their causes or the disposition of their causes. For if intellection is posited as a *partial cause* of volition, then, since the wayfarer's intellection and the beatific vision differ in species, the effects too that necessarily pre-require those specifically diverse causes equally differ in species. For an individual of the same species never necessarily requires a cause of a different species from that which another individual of the same species requires. But if intellection is called a *sine qua non* cause, it is at least in its essence required. And then as before: diverse individuals of the same species do not necessarily require among their causes any cause of a different species; according to this opinion, then, the enjoyable object is a *sine qua non* cause. And then on the part of the object there can be preserved a distinction of enjoyments arising from a distinction of unions, just as from the diverse proximity of the agent to the passive thing there is a variation of effects; for an agent that is opposite to and approaches the passive thing along a straight line acts differently from one that does so along a reflex or broken line; but knowledge here is as it were the proximity of the object to the will; for the wayfarer, certainly, the object approaches the will through knowledge darkly, but in the fatherland it is seen face to face and in its real presence. – By holding this second way [sc. intellection as a *sine qua non* cause], there is no need to concede that, by the absolute power of God, there can be caused in the soul of a wayfarer, who does not see God nakedly, any enjoyment equal to the lowest enjoyment possible to any of the blessed. Because the supreme of the lowest species cannot equal the lowest of a higher species, for the whole of the former is below the whole of the latter. But, according to the first way [sc. intellection as a *partial cause*], it is difficult to prevent the possibility of there being in the soul of the wayfarer, while he knows darkly, as much or as intense an enjoyment as is equal to some given beatific enjoyment.

QUESTION TWELVE: ABOUT INTENTION. IN FIVE ARTICLES.

Article One: Whether Intention is an Act of the Intellect or the Will

Response: [Oxon. 2 d.38 n.2, Reportatio ibid. n.2] one needs first to look at the signification of this term 'to intend', and then to respond to the question asked. 'To intend' then (according to the etymology of the word) is the same as 'to tend to another'. But this can be taken first in a certain general signification, namely either to have from something else that one tends to another, or to be moved to it by oneself. Also it is possible to tend to something as a present object or to a term distant or absent. In this acceptation it is clear that 'to tend to another' belongs to any power in respect of its object. But more properly 'to tend' is taken for that which so tends to another that it is not led or drawn to it but rather moves and leads itself to it; and this signification excludes all natural powers, for it belongs only to a free power to tend in this way to another. For the sensitive appetite is led and drawn by objects agreeable to it, and much more so are all the natural powers.

One must therefore say [Oxon. ibid., Reportatio ibid.] that intention belongs formally and principally to the will alone, although it pre-requires an act of the intellect. And indeed when one derives ‘intention’ from ‘to intend’, not as taken in its general and extended sense, but as it is taken properly, intention cannot be an act of a power other than the will. But because freely willing belongs to the whole of free decision, including intellect and will, intention will belong to this whole power, and to another power not in respect of its object but in respect of its end. For since, according to Anselm, there is in every volition a ‘what’ and a ‘why’, intending does not have regard to the ‘what’ but to the ‘why’, namely insofar as it tends to something as a distant thing to be attained through some intermediary; intention therefore will be an act of free decision by reason of will. For someone who wants medicine for the sake of health is not said to intend the medicine, even if this object is freely willed; rather he in fact intends the absent health but as to be acquired through the medicine. The act that has regard to the end is intention; but the act with respect to the means is not called intention but choice or use. And if the act of willing is the same, the use or choice of means and the intention will be the same; but if it is different, *intention* formally imports the act by which the will tends to the end, and materially it imports that the act whereby means are referred to that end is *intended*.

Article Two: Whether Intention is of the Ultimate End only

Response: [Reportatio 2 d.38 n.2] one must say that intention can deal even with a non-ultimate end. Indeed ‘ultimate’ can be taken in two ways; for either it is the ultimate simply, to which is altogether repugnant that it be ordered and referred to something else; or it is the ultimate negatively and for the present moment, namely insofar as it is not actually ordered to anything else although it could in fact be so ordered. As to ultimate understood in the first way, there is no need that every intention deal with such an ultimate immediately. But, as regard the second meaning, one should say that intention in this sense is precisely in respect of the ultimate end then actually being thought about. An example: bestowing alms on a pauper so that he may eat; this end, which the giver of alms intends, is not an ultimate end which cannot be referred to another end; but if in addition he intends God, who prescribes that one aid the poor with alms, then his intention is about the ultimate end, which intention can never be the choice or use of means to the end.

Article Three: Whether Anyone can intend two things Simultaneously

Response: since in Ia q.85 a.4 it was shown in many ways that we can at the same time understand several things, however disparate these are and however much they exclude unity with respect to the apprehending intellect (even though the more that several things are understood at the same time, the less perfection and intensity the acts have that reach the individual items), we say accordingly as a result, in response to the question asked, that the will can equally intend several things at once; for it is clear that several, even disparate ends can occur to the mind at the same time, and that the will can intend them and be moved to the pursuit of them, at

least to the extent opportunity permits. Because these two points therefore are connected with each other, and because the question as to the intellect has been expounded at large, we have thought that nothing further should be added here. But see the cited article.

Article Four: Whether Will of the End is the same act as Will of what is for the End

Response: [Oxon. 2 d.38, Reportatio ibid.] consequent to what was said above in q.8 a.3, this act can be single and also double, one terminating at the end and the other having regard to what is for the end. For the unifying act is one and yet it has two objects or terms, otherwise a conclusion true because of the principles could not by any act be understood, nor could what is for the end be intended because of the end. Intention therefore can be one act unifying two; it can also equally be a twofold distinct act intending, with a different intensity in each case, that in itself which is for the end in itself. And perhaps, when it is a unifying act, the two other acts are distinct in themselves; because unless, when it is a unifying act, it is at the same time of this act in itself and of that act in itself, no judgment would rightly be passed on the agreement or difference of these acts in themselves. Nor do I see how these acts, distinct in themselves, may be destroyed when the unifying act supervenes. For just as sight has a distinct act in itself of whiteness and another distinct in itself of blackness when it is actually judging their diversity, so the intellect that has an act unifying two acts attains each of these extremes in itself in distinct acts, and the will too when comparing and tending to the end by means of what is for the end.

Article Five: Whether Intention belongs to Brute Animals

Response: [Oxon. 2 d.38, 1 d.1 q.5, Reportatio ibid.] the solution of the present question you have expressly in a.1 above. For there it was said that 'to intend' in its proper signification pertains precisely to a free power, and that it belongs properly to free decision to intend an end by reason of the will. So although, to the extent that 'intend', according to the comparison of the word, means 'to tend to another', in which acceptation it belongs to any power altogether to intend, and thus 'intention' in this derivation exists also in brute animals, nevertheless, in the proper signification of the term, 'intention' cannot belong to them, since a free power is thoroughly repugnant to them. Hence in q.11 a.2 above it was said that brutes cannot be said to *enjoy* agreeable objects, because they do not love them with the love of friendship but for the sake of their own advantage, driven by a natural instinct, by which instinct they are drawn and led by the objects in which they sense their well being. Hence, in the way they are only abusively said to enjoy, so in the same way and mode does intending an end belong to them.

QUESTION THIRTEEN: ABOUT CHOICE, WHICH IS AN ACT OF WILL IN RESPECT OF THINGS FOR THE END. IN SIX ARTICLES.

Article One: Whether Choice is an Act of the Will or of Reason

Response: [Oxon. 2 d.38, Reportatio ibid.] one must say that choice is an act of free decision by reason of the will, as was said in q.12 a.1 above about intention in its proper signification. For to the same appetitive power belongs willing, or intending, the end and picking out by deliberation and discussion of means those of them that reason dictates are more efficacious and suitable for attaining the end (cf. Ia q.83 intervening a.3, Oxon. Prol. q.4 n.20]; although sometimes in the efficacious intention itself of the end the means too are willed, when there is no need for deliberation and debate as to the choice of them. For then at once "choice is the principle of the act" (as the Philosopher says *Ethics* 6.2), not the principle 'for the sake of which' but that which is 'origin of motion', that is, not the final cause, but the effecting cause of the things the will chooses so as to possess the willed end. But this [Oxon. 2 d.6 q.1 n.4] happens whenever in the efficacious volition of the end the means too that are necessary for attaining it have been searched out. For the most part, however, choice is an act of will consequent to a conclusion of the practical syllogism; and this choice proceeds from an efficacious volition of the object, which volition, as long as it is in place, happens thereon to command the investigation of means by which, as deduced through the practical syllogism, the will chooses those that right reason concludes are more opportune for attaining the end; choice then is this result of a conclusion of the practical syllogism.

But whether [Collationes 3] the dictate of the intellect is in every way an active principle, or is so at least on the part of the choice that follows it, or whether it is an occasion and a *sine qua non* cause is doubtful. Above q.9 a.1 we showed that the known object cannot be in every way the cause of volition; but although the same evidence does not make it as equally clear that partial causality is repugnant to the object, yet no necessity for constructing a partial causality of it appears, since the will itself can be the adequate cause of its acts, once a displaying of the object has preceded; for this agrees more with the will's dominating power and befits its independent excellence. Such a thing we cannot affirm of the intellect, since the act of understanding is a formal likeness of the object.

On the hypothesis, however, that the dictate of the intellect is posited as having an active influence on choice as a partial cause of it, this hypothesis would not be excluded by the objection that the causality and influx of the intellect on an act of will is natural. For whenever two causes come per se together for acting, if the principal cause is free, however less principal the necessary one may be, the action proceeds therefrom freely. An example: in an act of seeing there come together both the power of seeing, which is a natural cause, and the will applying the eye to seeing this or that object; but because the latter is the more principal cause, we are said to look about freely, since it is in the power of the will to turn sight away from or toward these or those objects. And in this way, since the dictate of the intellect is not the principal cause of choice, but rather the will freely and willingly chooses these means setting aside other ones shown it by the intellect, choice is said to be free, even though the dictate of reason is said to concur in part along with it.

[From reply to objections: right choice does indeed require a right dictate of the intellect first, although the will is able without any effort to try for things against right reason, and to will what reason declares is not to be willed, and conversely;

hence, when the will chooses means according to right reason, the consequence is not that the dictate of the intellect has an active influence on such a choice, since on the contrary the will can issue in an act against or at a tangent to the dictate, or even refrain from any act. So the specification of acts that comes from the dictates of the intellect does not seem to be present in the acts because of the active influx on volition or choice of the dictating intellect; otherwise, when the intellect gives a dictate about means that are uniquely necessary for attaining the end, but the will by its innate liberty opposes the dictate and chooses the contrary part, whence comes the specification of the act? For evil or perversity, since it is something privative, cannot be the cause of a positive act; therefore [Oxon. 2 d.25] when an act is right as far as right reason shows, then this act, which brings rectitude down with it because of its conformity to the right rule of reason, is wholly from the will. It seems then that the dictate of the intellect is a sort of occasion or *sine qua non* cause of choice.]

Article Two: Whether Choice belongs to Brute Animals

Response: one must say [Metaphysics 1 q.3 n.2] that it does not belong to brute animals to act from choice of means to an end. For since brute animals are set in motion by natural instinct conferred on them by the Author of nature, what they do necessarily follows the whole species, such that they cannot act both thus and otherwise. In this way a lamb follows its mother and flees a wolf, ants gather seeds, on which they feed in winter, swallows build nests, in which they hatch their young; but these and the like things are not done by them from some memory of the past, because ants and birds and other brutes just born are led as equally to do the like things as are those that have lived for several years; so there is no deliberation in brutes, or prudence, which is a deliberative habit about what is for the end and concerns, not necessary things, but contingent ones, which can only happen and be done otherwise by those who operate from deliberation and the discussion of means, choosing these ones and not those; so it is manifest that brutes do not act from choice, because they are led necessarily by natural instinct, and to embrace this means or that is not in their power but they follow only the things that have been most wisely ordained for them by divine Wisdom; for [Metaphysics 12 q.4, Oxon. 1 d.3 q.5] nature is a sort of divine art, enfolding in itself the measures of all things, their number and weight, which are seen unfolded in nature; "for measure" (says Augustine *On Genesis* 4.5) "fixes for all things their manner; number provides them with their species; and weight draws them to rest and stability." Therefore it is impossible for anything that is moved and drawn by natural instinct to act differently from what has been by divine art prescribed to it; and for this reason only metaphorically are there in brutes prudence and foresight and choice, which properly can have place in free causes.

Article Three: Whether Choice is only of what is for the End or also sometimes of the End itself

Response: [Oxon. 2 d.38 n.2, 4 d.49 q.10 n.7, 3 d.18 n.11, 3 d.36 n.15] one must say that choice is only of what is for the end; however the end does sometimes fall under choice, when it is ordered to a further end. For the will's job is to intend the end, not to choose it, and when the end is efficaciously willed, the will commands the intellect to inquire and deliberate about the means that lead to its acquisition; and after the means are shown to the will, the will thereon chooses these ones among them and leaves the rest. Choice is therefore of what is for the end and is properly an act of will following a conclusion that is deduced by deliberation from a practical syllogism.

But [Oxon. 3 d.32 n.5, d36 n.18] although the will intends the end and chooses means in order to obtain it, yet the end which it intends is not always the ultimate end, but an end that, from the nature of the thing, is ordered to another end; and for this reason the will can use this end, because it was in an inferior order, as a means to another and further end. An example: man is himself the end of the sensible world, but he is of his nature ordered to the ultimate end for the sake of which he was made. The virtues too are the ends of particulars and of the choices corresponding to them, but yet the virtues are themselves means for the attaining of blessedness, which is not ordered to another end.

Article Four: Whether Choice is only of Things that are Done by Us

Response: there is here this opinion: just as intention is of the end, so choice is of what is for the end; now the end is either an action or a thing; and when the end is a thing, some human action must intervene whereby a man may make the thing which is the end, as the doctor makes health which he intends as end, or at least whereby a man may possess or use the thing which is the end, just as for a miser the end is money or the possession of it; and similarly as to what is for the end; for what is for the end is either a human action or a thing that is to be possessed or used in some human action; it is evident, therefore, that choice is always of things that are done by us.

This opinion is not to be rejected [Oxon. Prol. q.4 n.21, 3 d.15 n.17], unless perhaps its understanding is that choice must always flow out into commanded acts that are to be performed by the exterior powers, or is that what one has been pleased to choose must be entrusted to execution. For if there is a choice on its own, without order to a commanded act, namely because of a lack of matter for the exterior act, there is a true choice of things that are for the end, and yet we cannot bring it about that these things for the end are ordered, that is, placed in existence. The assumption is made plain thus: for someone who lacks money but who has money placed in front of his intellect, if, before his choice is the effective principle of any act or is ordered to the commanding of something, so that it may be entrusted to execution – if this someone chooses to distribute money generously, should he possess any, no further pursuit is required as far as the act and habit of virtue is concerned; because once an object about which there can be an act of liberality has been presented, there is complete possession of the choice from which the virtue of generosity is generated or which is elicited by generosity, and no exterior pursuit or order to exterior acts is any further required, given the hypothesis that money for

generous bestowal is not to hand. – Next, this order of choice to a commanded act can only be the order of a cause with respect to producing the effect. But that the cause should in itself, as it precedes the effect, not be of this sort but should have it as something received from the effect insofar as it is ordered to the production of that effect, seems unacceptable, since the cause gets nothing from the effect nor from its order to it. So when all ordering of choice to commanded acts to be performed by us is removed, the choice still stands complete. – Therefore one should admit the affirmative side, namely that choice is of things that are done by us, yet it is not precisely there that choice is found, since right choice stands in place without such order to external acts, as has been explained.

Article Five: Whether Choice is only of Possibles

Response: there are some who think that nothing at all falls under choice that is impossible for the chooser or is thought to be so. – We, who think the opposite of this is truer, say that even impossibles can happen to fall under choice. For evidence of this [Oxon. 2 d.6 q.1 n.3, 4 d.49 q.10 n.13], one needs to know that the will has power for two acts; by one of these acts the will absolutely and simply wills or the reverse; but by the other it is borne to this or that thing only under a condition. Or in other words: one is efficacious volition, the other is volition of complacency. An example: someone sick who hopes that health will be restored to him wills the desired end with efficacious and absolute volition; so much so that he chooses and embraces means suitable for recovering health. But an invalid who despairs of gaining health does indeed want health, but with a will ineffectual, conditioned, and complacent; because health does in truth please him, but since he thinks it impossible, he tends to it with ineffectual effort and neglects all consultation with doctors, nor does he choose anything since he thinks everything is uselessly applied for attaining the end. This ineffective will, therefore, which we also rightly call conditioned and complacent, can exist with respect to impossibles; for the will can be complacent with respect to impossibles and can tend to them with ineffectual effort, and for that reason it does not issue in choice nor does it command the investigation of means, since it thinks all are thoroughly useless for attaining the end. – Now volition of this sort, although ineffective and conditioned, is enough for merit and demerit. For a will that follows the full apprehension of an intellect not subject to passions disrupting reason, and that adheres to the object presented to it with firm consent, can, even if the effect is impossible for it, merit or demerit. An example: [Oxon. Prol. q.4 n.20] if a pauper, for whom the getting of treasure is impossible, chooses, when thinking of riches, to distribute them liberally whenever they might be present, then he is matter for merit, and he would likewise be demerit if he wanted to use the riches to avenge injuries; for although treasure is *ex hypothesi* impossible for the pauper, and so, because of the impossibility of the end, he does not seek means useful for attaining it, yet, because he adheres to the riches with full consent and is pleased in them, he is deliberate in his willing in such a way that he can merit or demerit.

[*From reply to objection:* [Oxon. 2 ibid. n.4] choice is equivocal: in one way it is taken for an act of will consequent to a full apprehension of the intellect, and in

this way is someone rightly said to sin from choice, for there is no passion disturbing the intellect and no ignorance either. In another way it is taken for an act of will consequent to the conclusion of a practical syllogism; choice in this sense indeed is nothing other than an efficacious volition of the object, which volition thereon commands investigation into the means by which the object efficaciously willed may be attained. – In the first sense choice is of impossible things, as the Philosopher says *Ethics* 3.2 when he writes that will is of impossible things, and not only an erring will, but also a will that follows the full apprehension in judging of an intellect that is not erring. But in the second sense choice cannot be of impossible things, for no one puts practical syllogisms together about impossibles; because a practical syllogism concludes from the end to what is for the end as far as through what is for the end possession of the end may be reached. But this discursive reasoning and syllogizing do not rightly deduce when the end, either in itself or as compared to the act in which there is will of the end, is impossible.]

Article Six: Whether Man chooses of Necessity or Freely

Response: [Metaphysics 9 q.15 n.8ff.] one must say that the will does altogether freely, and without any necessity compelling it, choose these or those means from the several offered to it, and despise the one or the other; again, neither when only one means arises for the attainment of an end does it necessarily embrace that means, save perhaps by conditioned necessity, namely on the hypothesis of free volition of the end. For the will itself, especially in the wayfarer, is not moved or drawn necessarily by the goodness of any object, but rather, when the goodness of an object is first shown it, the will freely determines itself to pursuing it in such a way that it can determine itself to the opposite or even suspend itself from any act at all; therefore, when it intends the end efficaciously, and thereon intends it through a deliberation about the means after several occur to it, it is able to despise means more useful and choose means less suitable for being led to obtain the end; therefore all choice is by free will. For if any necessity were to appear, to which the will was subject in choosing, then it would most of all appear when the goodness of the more excelling and more useful means is set in contrast with respect to a less suitable and less efficacious one. However, in this is the will most of all distinguished from the sensitive appetite, that the latter is so affected by advantageous and agreeable objects that it is not able not to follow them and embrace them wholly, while the former, by its innate nobility and dominating power, is determinative of itself, and is able to pursue the things that agree with it or not pursue them if it prefer; therefore it is not more affected or drawn by the more excellent means than by the less useful and less good one. – But when there is a single means sufficient for a will efficaciously intending the end, not even here does there occur any necessity whereby the will may deservedly be said to have embraced that means necessarily. For [Quodlibet q.16 n.8] just as the will is altogether freely borne to the end, so is it also to what is for the end. But if, when pursuing a single means, it cannot be said to have chosen this means in preference to others, that is an accidental consequence of the condition of the end. Nor is there any necessity involved save what is consequent to the will's liberty, namely that it has itself brought the necessity on

itself, and it could have been altogether immune from that necessity if it had preferred another end in place of the one it did intend.

QUESTION FOURTEEN: ABOUT DELIBERATION, WHICH PRECEDES CHOICE. IN SIX ARTICLES.

Article One: Whether Deliberation is Inquiry

Article Two: Whether Deliberation is of the End or only of what is for the End

Article three: Whether Deliberation is only of Things done by us

Article Four: Whether Deliberation is about all Things done by us

Article Five: Whether Deliberation proceeds by Resolving to Principles

Article Six: Whether Deliberation goes on to Infinity

[Montefortino writes: the present question has, according to the accustomed method, no source in Master Scotus for its treatment and exposition, save that [Oxon. 2 d.25 n.22] he teaches that deliberation is to be altogether admitted in human affairs, since our acts, and what follows from them, happen contingently such that they cannot happen or be done otherwise, since if they could, he says, there would be no need to deliberate or busy oneself about them, as Aristotle reports De Interpretatione 1 last chapter. The same point is contained in Oxon. 1 d.39 q.5 n.11 and more expressively in Oxon. 3 d.18, where it is said that in us indeed choice supposes discursive thinking and inquiry about means until the final decision is reached, which decision is a conclusion deduced through practical reason; in Christ however, because all things were clear to him from the beginning, there was no need for this sort of discursive act and inquiry. Wherefore deliberation must suppose inquiry into things on and about which one must reflect, which was the first question [article 1].]

But as to whether deliberation must be taken about the end or about what is for the end, which was the question asked in second place [article 2] – because the will or intention deals with the end, as the Doctor says [Oxon. 2 d.38], while choice is about things ordered to the end, it is evident that the end does not fall under deliberation, but that only what is ordered for the end does; and he discourses of this at large in Oxon. 3 d.36 n.15.

About the third and fourth questions [articles 3 and 4], one must say, from Oxon. 2 d.25 and 38, that deliberation deals first with things that are to be done by us, that is, things that, after consultation and investigation and mature conferring, are to be chosen as more opportune for attaining the end, and second that deliberation can also have an influence on things that are to be done in similar way by others.

Now as to whether deliberation proceeds by resolution to principles, which is the fifth question [article 5], one must say, from Oxon. 2 d.28, that it does do so, for choice presupposes and follows deliberation; now choice embraces the means about which reflection for the sake of the end was made and to which end the reflection is resolved; therefore deliberation is so resolved as well.

To the final question [article 6] one must, from the Doctor Oxon. 2 d.3 q.7 n.10, reply in the negative. For no one intends infinity per se, which is most of all true in the case where reflection is made about what can conduce to the attainment of the end. It would assuredly be stupid to deliberate about things that proceed to infinity, because such deliberation would never come to an end, nor could any efficacious choice of means follow upon it.]

QUESTION FIFTEEN: ABOUT CONSENT, WHICH IS AN ACT OF THE WILL IN RELATION TO WHAT IS FOR THE END. IN FOUR ARTICLES.

Article One: Whether Consent is an Act of Appetitive or of Apprehending Virtue

Response: here there is an opinion as follows: to consent indicates the application of the sense to something. Now it is proper to sense to be cognitive of things present; for the imaginative power apprehends corporeal likenesses even in the absence of the things, and the intellect apprehends universal ideas, which it can apprehend indifferently [sc. indifferently to the presence or absence of the things]. And because an act of the appetitive power is a certain inclination to the thing itself according to some likeness, hence it is that the application of the appetitive power to the thing, according to which application it inheres in it, receives the name of sense, as if it took a certain experiential knowledge from the thing it inheres in, to the extent it is pleased to inhere in it. – Those who say this seem to distinguish between choice and consent, so that the latter is a certain complacency in the means which the final judgment, following disquisition, dictates should be preferred to others; but the former is an efficacious affection for the same means.

We say that these acts are being multiplied without any necessity. For consent, use, and dissent belong only to the appetitive power; for it concerns only the will to give assent to or to resist what is shown to it by the intellect. For [Oxon. 2 d.6 q.2 n.3, 4 d.4 q.4 n.2, d.27 q.2 n.2, d.29] there is in general a double act of the will: namely to will and to refuse. And refusal is indeed a positive act of the will, whereby the will flees what is disagreeable or recoils from a disagreeable object; but willing is an act whereby the will holds the object as something it accepts or as agreeable to him whose appetite the will is; with this act as intermediary, the appetitive power applies itself to what is shown it by the intellect, whether this has been proposed to it through deliberation and practical disquisition, or has been shown to it by an intellect not liable to disturbances of passion and to ignorance; as when right reason dictates that the ultimate end is to be loved, that health of the body is to be willed. Now once it has followed this application, the appetitive power gets a certain, as it were, experiential knowledge from that in which by willing it inheres. So over and above this volition of what has been obtained, in vain is any other act laid down through which the will might be said to consent. – Again [Oxon. 4 d.49 q.10 nn.12-13] the act of volition is double: one is efficacious willing, and this is in respect of obtaining an end through means ordered to that end; the other is conditional, respecting the end indeed but not the obtaining of it through means; the end is however desired, for the sake of which desire it would tend to the getting of the end if it could and if the object were contained and fell under the power of its activity.

In accord with each volition the will must be said to consent and give consent, in the aforesaid way, to what it pursues with efficacious or inefficacious volition. Indeed, as often as it is efficaciously carried to the end, to that extent it assents to the embracing of the means, that is, it wants the means as far as it has previously given assent to the end, and it descends, by virtue of that consent, to choosing the means and, after discussion of them, it puts these or those ends before others. Similarly, when it wills something under a condition, it does simply will it, as an invalid, who knows it is impossible he will be restored to health, does simply desire health, and he would embrace the means of recovering it too if he apprehended it as possible. This conditioned will is indeed such that it is enough for merit and demerit, as when someone wishes to fornicate although it is impossible for him to get an opportunity for fornicating; so assent is simply present in volition

of such an end; and thus too a merchant in danger on the sea wants simply to throw the merchandise overboard, lest he suffer shipwreck, just as he does in fact plunge them into the sea; but in a certain respect he does not want this, because he unwillingly deprives himself of riches; the damned too simply will blessedness, and perhaps more intensely than we wayfarers do, although since they apprehend it as impossible for them they despise all the means. So just as there is in an absolute and efficacious volition consent simply to that which the will wills, so too in the volition which we call inefficacious and conditioned there is consent, that is, a consent whereby someone consents and inheres in the object which he simply wills, although no choice of means then follows nor any deliberation about them. For the will, then, to consent is nothing other than that it wants whatever it simply wants, and so it does not will with one act and give with another act consent to what it wills; otherwise, without such an act of consent, there would be no merit or demerit, but these circumstances do absolutely follow acts of willing and refusing. For [Oxon. 4 d.6 q.1] whenever someone simply wills something, but not in the way it should be willed, he sins; and so the bad angels sinned by desiring blessedness in a disordered way; for in that act of theirs of this sort there was, when it was first elicited, no disturbing passion in them or ignorance; so in their case willing and assenting or consenting to the affection of advantage were the same thing, and in accordance therewith they were inclined to wanting blessedness at once and not according to the rules previously laid down by the wisdom of God.

Now it can happen [Oxon. I d.1 q.3 n.2] that some good object is shown to the will absolutely, namely when apprehended neither under the idea of the good for its own sake nor as a good for the sake of something else. But the will can elicit about an object thus shown some act of willing it absolutely, not referring it to anything else nor inhering in it with love for its own sake, and thence the will can give command to the intellect to inquire of what sort the good is and how it is to be willed; once this point has been established, the will pursues it as the ultimate judgment of reason dictates it should do so. In such a case indeed we do not deny that the will does not give consent to an object presented absolutely to it by the intellect (but its consent first requires the ultimate judgment of the intellect); however, it does not then merit or demerit, because neither does it will the object in the way the object should be pursued nor does it do the opposite. Whenever, then, the will's operation is worthy of reward or punishment, or of praise or blame, the willing and the consenting come together in one and the same act.

Article Two: Whether Consent belongs to Brute Animals

Response: one must say that it is not a feature of beasts to give assent or to dissent. For [Oxon. 1 d.1 q.5 n.5] these acts belong to a will freely assenting or dissenting, or even suspending both acts. When therefore this power assents, it is carried to the object by its own freedom, by willing or loving it. But the brutes [Oxon. 2 d.25 n.8] do not properly love, nor do they have love for the things that agree with them, but rather they are drawn by them such that they cannot prevent themselves, unless perhaps an object moving them more strongly intervenes and thence more efficaciously draws them and turns them away from something else that is leading

them less efficaciously. They do not therefore assent to what they see nor do they properly give consent to them, but are carried to possession of what agrees with them and flee from what harms them, their natural instinct thus dictating according to the rules previously laid down by the workman, the divine wisdom.

Article Three: Whether Consent is about the End or what is for the End

Response: [from the same sources as article one] here there is an opinion that consent deals only with what is for the end. For according to Damascene 2.22, consent or judgment is when a man disposes and loves what has been judged by deliberation. But deliberation is only about what is for the end, and so consent is not about the end but rather regards and attains what is for the end.

We adhere to what was said in article one and do not see any necessity to multiply and invent other acts of the will besides willing and refusing, and thus we judge that consent and dissent must be placed there, since these are sufficient for merit and demerit, nor can any reward or punishment be without consent and dissent paid to human operations, and since everything that is said about consent may be very well understood through willing itself. So we say that consent can work and deal both with the end and with what is for the end. It is indeed true [Oxon. 3 d.18 n.11] that sometimes, when the will is about to issue in an act of choosing means for obtaining the end, it commands the intellect to engage in practical syllogizing, and to set up disquisition about the means, until a judgment and ultimate decision about what to choose is reached, and then finally it consents to the choice of those means that were by the judgment of reason preferred to others. But yet it consents for this reason to means for the end, that it has first given assent to the end itself, willing it efficaciously, from which consent and efficacious volition it happens to consent to the means, embracing them, so that through them the loved end may be possessed. For if it had not given assent to the end, it would not try to investigate the means for arriving at the possession of it, nor would it choose them; so it consents to the means because it has given assent to the end itself, and indeed with an efficacious effort of the sort it does not exercise when it neglects the means, either because they are not to hand or because it is distracted to willing other things, and it prefers to devote itself to possessing these other things even if it could with equal facility reach the former ones.

Article Four: Whether Consent to an Act belongs only to the Superior Part of the Soul

Response: [Oxon. 2 d.24 n.3, d.42 q.4 n.13, 4 d.48 q.1 n.7] according to Augustine, *On the Trinity* 12.4, 7, the superior part of the soul intends the contemplation of eternal and superior rules, while the inferior part intends the doing of temporal things according to eternal rules. Wherefore the superior part intends the first end, from which it receives the rules for doing things. On the supposition of this most true teaching, then, one must say that consent to an act belongs to the superior part of the soul alone. Indeed, from what was said in article 3 above, for the soul to consent to an act is for it to follow the ultimate judgment of reason, which has been commanded to determine about the means for obtaining the end. But the will cannot

follow the dictate of reason without looking to the eternal rules; for thence it knows and has learnt whether the act is right or wrong; so only to the superior part of the soul does it belong to consent to or dissent from an act, since the soul knows that so it must do from the eternal rules and from the end, whence the canons of what is to be done proceed. – Next, to entrust the ultimate judgment to execution belongs principally to the agent and to what has efficacious willing with respect to what is to be done; but nothing that, in acting, is a cause subordinate to some other cause more principal than it, is said to will something principally; since therefore the inferior part of the soul is subordinate to the superior part, because it receives from it the rules for doing things, it will not be its job to affect the act through consent but rather the superior part's job, which commands the act to be entrusted or not to execution. But the superior part performs the command by its efficacious willing; for this is what it is for it to consent to an act, as far as the superior mover commands the inferior powers to issue respectively in their acts.

QUESTION SIXTEEN: ABOUT USE, WHICH IS (ALSO) AN ACT OF THE WILL IN RELATION TO WHAT IS FOR THE END. IN FOUR ARTICLES.

Article One: Whether Use is an Act of the Will

Response: [Oxon. 1 d.1 qq.3, 5] the Master [of the Sentences, Peter Lombard] in 1 d.1 refers to Augustine, *On Christian Doctrine* 1.3, “To enjoy is to inhere with love in something for its own sake. But to use is for that which has come into use to be referred to the getting of what one should enjoy, otherwise it is to abuse or not to use, for illicit use should be called abuse or abusing.” Just as then there are in the intellect two acts of assenting to some true proposition, one by which assent is given to a true proposition for its own sake, as to a principle, and the other by which assent is given to a proposition because of the principle itself, from which it receives the evidence that extracts the assent of the intellect, so in the will there is one act of loving the good for its own sake and another of loving the good because of some other good. So just as the act in which the intellect gives assent to a conclusion is more imperfect in respect of an act by which it assents to a principle for the principle's sake, so the act of the will by which it loves the good for the sake of another good has to be more imperfect than the act by which it inheres in some thing for that thing's sake. Now the former is properly use, according to Augustine's teaching. So to use is an act of will that supposes an act of reason first showing it that these things are to be willed and loved for the sake of another good, which is to be loved for its own sake. – For the will itself, just like the intellect, is a reflexive power, because of its immateriality, and so it collates one with another. So, as referring things by way of judgment belongs to the intellect alone, so it pertains to the will to refer one lovable thing to another, and thus to order and to use one good for the obtaining of another, and consequently right and wrong use of things is to be attributed to the will alone. In this sense Augustine writes, *83 Questions* q.30, “Therefore all human perversion, which is also called vice, is to will to use what should be enjoyed, and to enjoy what should be used.”

Article Two: Whether Use belongs to Brute Animals

Response: [Oxon. 2 d.38, 3 d.33 n.9] one must say that use is not to be attributed to brutes, just as neither does enjoyment belong to them, save abusively. For according to Augustine *On the Trinity* 10.11, to use “is to take up something into the faculty of the will.” Now although brutes do happen to use what they have been provided with by nature, as a lion its claws and its mouth, birds their wings for flying, and other things of the sort, yet it is plain that these are not taken up by them into the faculty of the will, but brutes are led to apply them by an altogether natural instinct; they are not then said to use, just as neither to enjoy when they adhere to agreeable objects; for they are not carried along by love but rather are fixed on the objects, not for the objects’ sake, but for the sake of their own advantage. – Next, use or the taking up of one thing in order to another comes from the intention of the end; sometimes use coincides with the intention itself, although more frequently the intention is one thing, the use another. However, from what was said above in q.13 a.2, it does not belong to brutes to act from choice, that is, to select, by intuition of the end which is desired, these and those things for obtaining the same end; therefore neither can use belong to brute animals.

Article Three: Whether Use can also be of the Ultimate End

Response: [Quodlibet q.17 n.3, Oxon. 1.d.1 qq.1, 5] since, from the opinion of Augustine, *On Christian Doctrine* 1.3, to use “is for that which has come into use to be referred to the getting of what one should enjoy,” it is manifest that use is of things ordered to the end, for the attaining of which end useful and opportune means are approved of. But we can understand and speak of the ultimate end in two ways: for either the ultimate end is simply such, that is, what gives ultimate rest to the created will and can, by its own nature, not be referred to another good, because it is the supreme good to which all others are ordered; or it is the ultimate end in a certain respect, that is, not ultimate of itself but nevertheless reckoned to be so by a will that rests itself in it exactly as if it were, from the nature of the thing, going to be the ultimate end; in the same way the will of someone mortally sinning enjoys an end which he prefixes for himself in such act and rests himself in it as far as concerns the part of the act, although he does not rest on the part of the object. Because therefore someone mortally sinning loves the object of his act with the love of concupiscence, he has to be loving something else with the love of friendship. But that something else is himself, for whom, as loved with the love of friendship, he desires the object in which he inheres by his sinning; this end, therefore, the one sinning uses for the sake of what which he loves with the love of friendship. And this is what Augustine says, *City of God* 14.28, “Two loves have made two cities; the love of oneself up to contempt of God has made the city of the devil; the love of God up to contempt of oneself has made the city of God.” As therefore someone sinning enjoys himself, so he uses the end set before him. On this matter more was said above q.11 a.2.

Article Four: Whether Use precedes Choice

Response: [Oxon. Prol. q.4 n.21ff., 2 d.38] according to what was said in q.13 a.4, the complete and absolute idea of choice can subsist without a direct order to commanded acts, which acts indeed are by use performed through the executive power in the faculty of the will, once the powers have been taken up by it whence the acts in accord with choice are to issue. For indeed if a pauper, when money is set before him, chooses to distribute it should it come under his power, then, as far as the act and habit of virtue is concerned, no further prosecution of the act is required; therefore, before any use and order to it, this choice stands, and indeed is right, as it would be wrong if he were, though not having the opportunity, to choose to fornicate. So this sort of choice altogether precedes use, the way it must also precede when someone, from intention of the end, descends to investigating opportune means for obtaining it. For before a sick man applies himself to means useful for recovering health, the choice of those means precedes in him the use of the same. – But [Oxon. 3 d.18 n.11] when an ultimate judgment can be had without preceding discussion, as in him who, in a single instant and view, knows the end and what is ordered to the end, choice and use are not two things, but rather the use coincides with the choice; for at once it happens by the choice that whatever was first chosen is entrusted to execution. – But because “the will is an instrument that moves itself”, from the witness of Anselm *On the Conception of the Virgin* 4 and *On Original Sin* 4, when he introduces the powers subject to the will speaking to God in this fashion: “You have given us a lord whom we cannot obey;” therefore reason is being used when someone who is intending the end commands the intellect to investigate the means by which he may reach the attainment of it. In this way of considering things, use altogether precedes choice; for the choice is following the deliberation and discussion of the means.

QUESTION SEVENTEEN: ABOUT THE ACTS COMMANDED BY THE WILL. IN NINE ARTICLES

Article One: Whether Command is an Act of the Will or of the Reason.

Response: [Oxon. 3 d.36; 4 d.14 q.2, d.49 q.4] I answer that, some suppose that to command does in fact belong essentially to reason, on the presupposition, however, of an act of will. Nevertheless, for the greater evidence of the thing, they think it needs to be added that reason’s intimating and pronouncing that something is to be done can happen in two ways: in one way absolutely, when the intimation is expressed by a verb in the indicative mood, as if someone were to say to another ‘you ought to do this’. But sometimes reason intimates something to someone by admonishing him to do it, and such intimation is expressed by a verb in the imperative mood, as when it is said to someone ‘do this’. But the first mover to the exercise of an act in the powers of the soul is the will; since therefore the second mover does not move except by virtue of the first mover, it follows that reason’s moving by commanding is present in it by virtue of the will. To command is therefore an act of reason, indeed, but presupposing an act of will, in virtue of which

reason moves, through commanding, to the exercise of an act.

But we do not approve of this opinion; for those who think that it belongs essentially to the will to command (the presentation of the object being presupposed), seem, as in all other cases, to hold the more probable opinion. For the will commands the intellect; therefore to it, and not to the reason, is commanding essentially to be attributed. The assumption is clear from Anselm (*On the Conception of the Virgin* 4), where he teaches that the will moves itself against the judgment of the other powers, which submit even unwillingly to its command; therefore, when the intellect intimates anything and presents it to the will, whatever the verb be by which the intimation is made or the insinuation expressed, it must obey as the will prescribes – not as the powers of the soul that are deprived of effective dominance think or dictate is to be done, but as it seems to the will and as the will prefers to choose, even against the inclination and express judgment of reason. If therefore the will uses the other powers of the soul as it pleases, commanding certainly belongs essentially to the will. – Next, when the will intends and effectually wills the end, it orders the intellect to seek out and find means of getting to the attainment of that end, and it keeps the intellect employed in investigating these means until, by a practical syllogism, the deduction is reached that these are to be chosen and those passed over, as Augustine says (*On the Trinity* 3, “The will unites the parent to the offspring”); moreover, the will gives commands to itself. For neither is it the case that any sensitive power can command the intellect and the will and combine those powers in its acts, nor is it the case that the intellect can command itself and the will, since, no matter what dictate of reason is in place, the will freely chooses. Therefore the will alone commands itself and the intellect; so it belongs to the will alone to command the intellect and not the reverse, since, even when the ultimate sentence of practical deduction is in place, the will is able, by its dominating power over itself, to ignore that dictate and embrace worse counsels, or at least to suspend itself and refrain from any action. – Lastly, the intellect or intellectual virtue says that a thing is true or not true, whether in matters to be thought or in matters to be done: but the commanding will, or the will to command, says that the act which has been commanded as needing to be immediately done is to be carried into execution; therefore the act of commanding does not belong to reason dictating that this ought to be done, but to the appetitive power ordering that what was intended be done.

[*From reply to objections*: [Oxon. 3 d.33 n.4] when the Philosopher says that appetite obeys reason, he must be understood about the sensitive appetite; but in the sensitive part of man there does not belong to him qua man any operation whereby he commands himself, and others subject to him, and excels the other animals. That then in man which excels the whole sensitive part is divided by the Philosopher, *Ethics* 1.9, into what understands and what is well persuadable by reason; and by ‘persuadable by reason’ he understands the will. And for this reason he calls obedient to reason sometimes the sensitive appetite and sometimes the will, as at the end of *Ethics* 1. And just as ‘obedient to reason’ is taken in two ways, so also is ‘rational’; in one way ‘rational’ is taken strictly and primarily, and thus it belongs to the intellect alone; in another way not strictly nor primarily, but simply, and in this way the will itself too is rational. But in a third way, namely as to the sensitive appetite, it does not belong save by transference. Therefore the one in the middle,

the will, is sometimes called rational from one extreme, and sometimes obedient to reason from the other extreme. However, when taking ‘reason’ strictly, the will is indeed persuadable by reason but in no way obedient to reason; while the sensitive appetite is not persuadable by reason but obedient to reason; for a free thing can indeed be persuaded by reason but not be compelled to obey. Wherefore one does not get from this authority of Aristotle that command belongs to reason...

Some conclude that command is not an act of reason absolutely but along with a certain motion of the will. But, to the contrary, if on an act of reason intimating and announcing that this or that is to be done the doing of the act, unless the will moves, does not follow, then command is to be attributed to the will and not to the reason, save as to a condition, which condition, however, does not flow formally into the act of commanding.]

Article Two: Whether Command belongs to Brute Animals

Response: [Oxon. 1 d.1 q.5, 2 d.15, Metaphysics 12 q.4 n.6] command is not a feature of brute animals. For if the brutes were to command themselves or others, this would certainly be in them from sensitive appetite, the way it belongs to intellectual nature to command through the intellective appetite. But the sensitive appetite is not endowed with any dominating power by which it could exercise command over others; for it does not move itself but is moved by the objects to the pursuit of them or flight from them, as they are agreeable or disagreeable; for it is impelled by natural instinct, so that brutes are not able to do otherwise nor to resist the impulse of nature. Command, then, or acting by command is very far from sensitive appetite, since this must altogether obey as being led and drawn according to what the nature of this or that brute has, by divine wisdom, been commanded to perform or carry out. Hence nature itself is a sort of divine art in which there shines forth and is unfolded what has been established by the artificer wisdom.

Article Three: Whether Use precedes Command

Response: there is here the following sort of opinion: use of what is for the end, according as the use is in reason referring it to the end, precedes choice; hence much more does it precede command; but use of what is for the end, according as the use is put under the executive power, follows command, by the fact that the use of the user is conjoined with the act of what he is using. But command is not together with the act of him who is commanded, but command is prior in nature to the command’s being obeyed, and is sometimes prior in time. Hence it is manifest that it is prior to use. – Those who hold this view also add that not every act of the will precedes the act of reason that is command, but some act precedes, namely choice, and some follows, namely use, because after the determination of deliberation, which is a judgment of reason, the will chooses, and after the choice reason commands the will what the thing chosen is to be done through, and then finally someone’s will begins an act of use by carrying out the command of reason; sometimes indeed this will is

the will of another, when someone is commanding another, and sometimes it is the will of the commander himself, when he is commanding himself.

But it seems to us [Oxon. 4 d.14 q.2, 2 d.38] that these acts are being multiplied without necessity. And just as we said above, q.15 a.1, that consent does not differ from efficacious intention of the end, nor from choice of means for the end, from q.15 a.4, and just as we said, q.16 a.4, that it can happen that use coincides with choice, so we now say that command is not an act diverse from choice. For when the will chooses means for reaching an end efficaciously intended, at once the powers subject to it give themselves to the execution and embrace the means that have been preferred to others, without the concurrence of any other imperative willing from above; therefore it is the same thing for the will to choose the means and for it to command the subject powers to execute what has been chosen. Hence a sinner intending efficaciously to be converted to the heart and recover the grace of God from which he fell by guilt, there and then detests the sin as the means necessary for satisfying divine displeasure; the imperative willing in him, therefore, was what the choice was, the choice of means for reaching the end intended, not intended in any way but with efficacious volition. So, just as no other act, besides simply willing and refusing, needs to be laid down by which the will may be said to consent or dissent, because by willing it consents and by refusing it completely resists the things it is said to dissent from, so by commanding it chooses and by choosing it commands whatever it sees there is in fact need of. Therefore we think that the acts of the powers of the soul must be arranged in the following order: first, there is apprehension of the end; from this there is intention of it as end, which intention we rightly also call consent; for by this act of willing the will applies itself to the object and receives from it a certain experience as it were. Third, there is the showing of means ordered to the end; and this showing is followed by choice, and with this choice, as was said above q.15 aa.1 and 3, consent too coincides. But this, to be sure, must be understood as a general rule. For it can happen that in the very intention itself the end and the means ordered to the end are fully seen, and then the same act of the appetitive power will be intention and use, or volition of what is desired in its order to some other willed thing. Lastly, there is the execution of the acts to be performed by powers other than the will, by mediation of the locomotive power. Over and above these acts no others seem to us in need of being thought up.

But as to whether use precedes command, or the reverse, the opinion cited above clarifies the present question with two statements: the first is that if the discussion is about the use by which the will applies the intellect to consulting about the means, this use is prior to command. For this use precedes choice; but choice precedes command in their opinion; therefore the use too is prior to command. The second statement is that the use by which the will applies the other powers to the execution of the means, that to this use command is prior.

We say [Oxon. 2 d.42 q.4] that imperative willing necessarily precedes every use of the powers of the soul, and much more the execution to be performed by the inferior powers. The will indeed is an instrument moving itself; for it commands itself and also moves the other powers of the soul, such that they cannot not obey it, as Anselm says *On Original Sin* 4. Since therefore the will uses the intellect to consider this or that, turning it away from the consideration of one object and

turning it toward another, it does this by means of its imperative willing; so this use proceeds from command as from its proper cause. And although such use is prior to choice, which choice follows deliberation and discussion of means, it is yet posterior to command, because it is the effect of command. Neither, again, is this choice of means to be distinguished from command, as has been noted, because, when the will efficaciously chooses means, it at once orders and commands the inferior powers to embrace the means that have been preferred to others. But if some execution over and above command seems needed, that is only because either the choice was inefficacious or extrinsic impediments fell in the way. About the second part of the solution there will be discussion in what follows.

Article Four: Whether Command and Commanded Act are One Act or Diverse Acts

Response: [Quodlibet q.18] some think that command and the commanded act carry with them one and the same morality, even though the acts are entitatively diverse, just as a single man is composed of rational soul and body, which parts, however, are several and diverse in substantial entity. – We do not approve of this opinion (as will appear at large in q.20 below). For [Quodlibet ibid. n.12] Augustine in *On the Trinity* 13.5 eloquently teaches the opposite when he says, “Willing what is not decent is itself a most wretched thing. Nor is it as wretched not to get what you want as to want to get what you ought not.” And a little later, “Who would call a man blessed because he is living as he wants, when really he is, even in being such, as wretched as you please but would be less so if he had been able to get none of the things that he wrongly wanted? For everyone is made wretched by an evil will all by itself, but is made more wretched by the power whereby he fulfills the desire of his evil will.” Now it is evident that these remarks cannot be understood of the wretchedness of loss, because he who desires and cannot get what he wants is affected with a greater loss than he whose desires are fulfilled. Augustine therefore is speaking of the wretchedness of guilt present in the interior act, and he says that this guilt is further extended and increased if to the interior act is added an exterior act elicited by command. The exterior commanded act, therefore, is other than the commanding act as regard both imputations, whether of guilt or of merit. – Next, moral goodness (on which see the next question, q.18) is the completeness of those things that, according to the right reason of the operator, are said should belong to the act itself; but there is one completeness of what, according to the dictate of right reason, should belong to the interior act, and another of what should belong to the exterior act; therefore the moral goodness or badness of each act is different. The minor is plain: for right reason dictates that what belongs to the exterior act cannot fit the interior one, and conversely, as we will make more fully plain below in q.20.

[From reply to objections: [Oxon. 2 d.42 q.4 n.1, cf. q.20 a.3 below] command and commanded act are a single thing by unity of order, insofar as the commanded act is of a nature to have, by means of the act of commanding, conformity with right dictate; nevertheless, the conformity of the act of commanding to the same dictate is one thing, and the conformity to it of the commanded act is another; there are therefore two conformities and two human acts, having a different morality, even though they are ordered to each other and are one by reason of that order.

Wherefore, although this morality and imputability for reward or punishment are found first and principally in the act of the will commanding, yet they exist secondarily in the commanded acts as well. For just as the will has to have rectitude in its own act, so it has to have it in the exterior acts with which it cooperates as mover; for precepts have been given not only about interior acts but also about exterior ones [as in the commandments, "thou shalt not covet thy neighbor's wife," and, "thou shalt not commit adultery"]. But if, because of this subordination of the exterior act to command, the exterior act is said to be related to command as matter to form, one should not care much about the words here since the thing is nevertheless clear as to the fact, with respect to which everyone rightly admits that commanded acts and external operations are formally sins whenever they are performed against the dictates of law natural or positive.]

Article Five: Whether an Act of Will may be Commanded

Response: [Oxon. 1 d.1 q.4, 2 d.42 q.4 n.1, Quodlibet q.16 n.3, q.18 n.9] one must say that an act of will is commanded, that is, elicited by the will willing or refusing by its dominating power, whereby and because of which it commands itself and the other powers so that in the kingdom of the soul it may be truly queen, whose commands cannot be resisted, as Anselm says *On the Conception of the Virgin* 4. This was the express opinion of Augustine *Retractions* 1.9, 22, "Nothing is so in the power of the will as the will itself." And since this remark cannot be understood of the *being* of the will itself, he is surely speaking of its act. Also in the power of the will is that at its command another power should issue in act, as the eye to seeing, the feet to walking, the intellect to considering, or at any rate that they should do nothing; therefore this act falls much more under its power, the act by which it commands and orders the other powers to act or not to act, or even to cease from any act. So, on the command of the will, the will issues in an act of willing or refusing the intellect's thinking about such object; therefore the acts of the will proceed from its own command, and the nature of this command is possessed completely even if the commanded acts do not follow on it. – Next [Oxon. 4 d.14 q.2], the will can, according to its diverse habits, use itself circularly, as it were, in this way: from the love of God in himself, which is an act of charity, it can command an act of vindication against sin; and conversely, from an act commanding vindication against sin, it can command an act of loving God in himself, on which follows a refusing or displeasure in a committed sin. The will therefore can use the act of penance and also the act of any virtue existing in the will or the intellect.

Article Six: Whether an Act of Reason may be Commanded

Response: [Oxon. 2 d.42 q.4 n.5, 4 d.49 q.4, Prol. q.4 a.1, Reportatio ibid.] one must say that the act of the intellect does altogether fall under the command and power of the will, whereby the will is able to turn the intellect away from one intelligible thing and turn it toward another. Declaration: if matters are not said to be thus disposed, then the intellect would remain standing perpetually in consideration of the most perfect object habitually known to it. For a more perfect agent acts more strongly on

the same passive thing and prevents it from doing something less perfect, as is plain of fire overcoming water in its operation on the same passive object. But intelligible objects are, in respect of intellection, natural active causes, and the intellect is likewise; therefore, when a more perfect intelligible thing is present and is moving the intellect, a less perfect intelligible would never move the intellect to consider it, nor would the intellect be turned away from the more perfect and most efficacious intelligible; so it is altogether necessary that intellection be thus contained under the power of the will, so that consideration can be turned away from one intelligible and be turned toward another intelligible. – But because the first thought of the intellect precedes every act of the will, as Augustine says, *On Free Choice* 3.15, “It is not in our power not to be affected by what we see,” it is manifest that this first thought does not fall under the command of the will. The following thoughts, then, are in our power, insofar as, when the intellect remains standing in the consideration of one intelligible and meanwhile objects other than it are appearing to it imperfectly, the will is able to turn the intellect from the object perfectly known to it and to turn it to those that are not as clearly seen by it, and command that, by considering them more attentively, it pursue a perfect knowledge of them.

[*From reply to objections*: [Oxon. ibid. n.12] the will first requires a knowledge that is prior in nature; but in order for it to turn the intellect to some object, it is enough that this object be in some way, however imperfect, presented to the will; for therefrom the will can take pleasure in it and prescribe to the intellect that it attend more exactly to the consideration of it.]

Article Seven: Whether an Act of the Sensitive Appetite may be Commanded

Response: [Oxon. 2 d.29, d.6 q.2, d.42 q.4 n.18] one must say that acts of the sensitive appetite do fall under the command of the will, which dominates them politically, but not despotically the way it commands the locomotive power. Declaration: the will when conjoined with the sensitive appetite is of a nature to delight itself in it, the way the intellect when united to the senses is of a nature to understand sensible things. So when the will itself does not follow the rule of right reason but rather the inclination of the sensitive appetite, it desires and delights in objects agreeable to the sensitive appetite; from this it comes about that among men the dominance of their sensitive appetites accords with the diversity of their bodily compositions, and the will is especially inclined through this dominance to the act of it; and for this reason some people, when they follow their first inclination without the rule of justice, incline first to luxury, others incline first to pride, and so on with the rest. The sensitive appetite, therefore, is not subject to the command and power of a will giving commands despotically; for the nature of the sensitive appetite always abides, tending to what is agreeable and delightful to it however much the will strives to the contrary. And if the will happens to conquer the natural inclination, it will not be without difficulty, nor without sadness in the inferior power when it is, as by force, taken from its proper delight and from what agrees with the constitution of its composition.

However, the acts of the sensitive appetite are subject to the command of the will politically; for as a prince rules the subjects whom he is justly lord of, so the will

in the kingdom of the soul bears rule, like a queen, over the acts of the sensitive appetite, moderating them and directing them to the due end. And indeed, that the rational appetite moderates the passions can be understood in two ways; for it gives attention to the moderation of passions either that now are or that will be. The first can also happen in two ways: in one way by lessening the passion that is of a nature to be generated from the object in itself, so that this passion is not immoderate in the way the object would be of a nature to delight the sensitive power left to itself; or in another way by referring the delight to an end agreeable to right reason, to which end it is not referred by the absolute idea of the object of the sensitive appetite. A future passion can also be moderated in two ways, either by shunning of the object that introduces the passion, or by the intending only of those objects that are of a nature to give delight moderately; in which case the future passion is not lessened in itself but precaution is taken to prevent it being immoderate when present. From this is clearly apparent that the sensitive appetite is subject to the power of the will, not in a despotic manner such that it cannot resist, but insofar as the will's act is able to reduce it to a just measure, or even to bring it about that the passions are not present in it; and this is to exercise political command over it. And such is what the Philosopher means, *Ethics* 1.13, when he says that the sensitive appetite is not persuadable by reason but can be obedient to reason. For something free is very well persuadable, but is not properly obedient; the sensitive appetite, however, because it is not free, is not persuadable but can be obedient to the will's command.

Further, there is also despotic domination by the will's command over the acts of the sensitive powers, not to be sure immediately and directly, but insofar as they depend on the locomotive power, which power is directly subject to the will's command such that it cannot not obey. Wherefore the will can command the eye to see some object or to withhold itself from such sight; for that depends on the motion of the eyelids; and therefore by means of that motion vision falls under the command of the will. Lastly in another way too can these powers be understood to be subject to the command of the will, to the extent namely that they have more perfect power over their acts by the fact the will tends by an act of pursuit to the same object; for then the operation is done more intensely and perfectly. The thing is plain in the case of sight, for when the disposition of the object and the eye stay the same, sight can be commanded by the will to look at some point in the same pyramid and below the same base more perfectly than before because of the joining in of the will.

Article Eight: Whether an Act of the Vegetable Soul may be Commanded

Response: [Oxon. 2 d.42 q.4] there is here an opinion that says acts of the vegetable soul are not commanded. The opinion is made clear in the following way: some acts proceed from natural appetite, some from animal or intellectual appetite; for every agent in some way desires the end; but the natural appetite is not consequent to any apprehension such as animal and intellectual appetite follow. Now reason commands by way of the apprehensive power, and therefore the acts that proceed

from intellective or animal appetite can be commanded by the will, but not those that proceed from natural appetite, of which sort are acts of the vegetable soul.

We say [Oxon. 4 d.49 q.10 n.2ff., 3 d.27 a.3, 4 d.14 q.2] that this explanation rests on rather dubious principles. For in the first place we think it false that any acts at all proceed from natural appetite; on the contrary it has been expounded elsewhere that this appetite can be the principle of no acts at all. For this appetite is nothing other than the natural inclination of any nature to its perfection. And such an appetite does indeed follow no intrinsic apprehension, but is led by the Intelligence that directs to their proper ends causes that have no knowledge of ends. Now that reason itself commands by way of the apprehensive power we think is not to be admitted, according to what was said in article one: reason does indeed show what is to be done and does direct in the work, but that it commands it to be done cannot be its concern. Wherefore none of the acts that proceed from the intellective or animal appetite are subject to the command of reason but fall under the power of the will. Lastly, if the reason for the solution were to stand, it would only prove that acts of the vegetable soul are not commanded in the case of things that are destitute of animal and intellective appetite, but not when these acts proceed from a vegetative soul that is not present formally but rather is enfolded within the intellective soul, as a tetragon is in a pentagon. For then they proceed from and follow apprehension just as do the animal and intellective appetite.

Wherefore we say that acts of the vegetable soul fall under the command of the will indirectly, insofar as these acts depend on the motive power. In man to be sure this power is in a state of servile obedience with respect to the will, and the command corresponding to this power is called despotic by Aristotle, *Politics* 1.3. And in this way the motive power obeys the will such that it cannot resist; for there is no bodily member suitable for motion, unless it is shriveled up, which does not immediately obey the will commanding it to move to this or that position. So since acts of the vegetable soul depend on the motive power (for the powers of nutrition and growth need the setting by of food and provisions, and in general the coming together of active to passive, as in the act of generation), thus these acts are contained under a man's power, and they are imputable to him for praise or blame, according to the way he prefers to conduct himself with respect to them.

However [Oxon. 3 d.16 q.2 n.9], because the subjection of these acts to the will is only by means of the motive power, as has been said, they are not directly subject to the will's command but only indirectly. For the vegetative powers are wholly without reason, not obedient to the soul in their acts; for although it is in a man's power to provide them with the matter on which they act, yet, once the matter has been provided, they are not subject to the lordship of the soul in their acts; for whatever the will may command, they go on acting on the matter set by them.

Article Nine: Whether the Acts of the Exterior Members are Commanded

Response: [Oxon. 2 d.42 q.4 n.16ff., 3 d.16 q.2 n.9ff.] from what was said in the preceding article, it is evident that the soul dominates the body, because the body is subject to the soul with servile subjection as far as the locomotive power is

concerned. Hence all the bodily members, unless they are shriveled up, move at the soul's command and obey without delay. Hence nothing further needs to be added.

QUESTION EIGHTEEN: ON THE GOODNESS AND BADNESS OF HUMAN ACTS IN GENERAL. IN ELEVEN ARTICLES.

Article One: Whether every Human Act is Good or Some are Bad

Response: