This translation of Book III Distinctions 26 to 40 of the *Ordinatio* (aka *Opus Oxoniense*) of Blessed John Duns Scotus is complete. These distinctions fill volume ten of the Vatican critical edition of the Latin text edited by the Scotus Commission in Rome and published by Quarrachi.

Scotus' Latin is tight and not seldom elliptical, exploiting to the full the grammatical resources of the language to make his meaning clear (especially the backward references of his pronouns). In English this ellipsis must, for the sake of intelligibility, often be translated with a fuller repetition of words and phrases than Scotus himself gives. The possibility of mistake thus arises if the wrong word or phrase is chosen for repetition. The only check to remove error is to ensure that the resulting English makes the sense intended by Scotus. Whether this sense has always been captured in the translation that follows must be judged by the reader. In addition there are passages where not only the argumentation but the grammar too is obscure, and I cannot vouch for the success of my attempts to penetrate the obscurity. So, for these and the like reasons, comments and notice of errors from readers are most welcome.

Peter L.P. Simpson
October, 2018

THE ORDINATIO OF BLESSED JOHN DUNS SCOTUS

Book Three

Twenty Sixth Distinction (page 8)

Twenty Seventh Distinction (page 29)

Twenty Eighth Distinction (page 41)

Twenty Ninth Distinction (page 45)

Thirtieth Distinction (page 47)

Thirty First Distinction (page 54)

Thirty Second Distinction (page 59)

Thirty Third Distinction (page 64)

Thirty Fourth Distinction (page 77)

Thirty Fifth Distinction (page 93)

Thirty Sixth Distinction (page 93)

Thirty Seventh Distinction (page 113)

Thirty Eighth Distinction (page 121)

Thirty Ninth Distinction (page 131)

Fortieth Distinction (page 138)

Twenty Sixth Distinction

Single Question

Whether Hope is a Theological Virtue distinct from Faith and Charity

1. About the twenty sixth distinction I ask[a] whether hope is a theological virtue distinct from faith and charity.

a. [*Interpolation*] About the twenty sixth distinction, where the Master deals with hope, one question is asked, namely whether…

2. That it is not:

Because no passion is a virtue (*Ethics* 2.4.1105b28-29); but hope is a passion; therefore etc.

3. Again, no theological virtue determines a mean between two vices; but hope determines such a mean; therefore it is not a theological virtue. The proof of the major is that, wherever there is a mean between two vices, excess and defect can exist there; but there can be no excess in tending toward God, as is plain in the other theological virtues; for a man cannot believe God too much nor love him too much. The proof of the minor is that hope determines a mean between presumption and despair as between two vices; therefore etc.

4. Again, a theological virtue is in us only from God infusing it into us; but it is possible, without such infusion, to have hope with respect to the things for which the virtue is commonly posited; the proof is that it is possible, through acquired hope, to hope in the promise of a truthful man; therefore much more is it possible, through acquired hope, to hope in the promise of God, who is most truthful.

5. Further, two things that are perfectible with respect to numerically one object are sufficiently perfected by two perfections; but in the soul there are only two powers perfectible with respect to the uncreated object, namely intellect and will; therefore etc. Just as therefore the intellect is sufficiently perfected by one habit, which is faith in respect of this object, so the will is sufficiently perfected with respect to this object by a single habit, which is charity; and so there will be only two theological habits.

6. But if it be said that there are three parts to the image [of God], and that therefore three perfective habits are needed with respect to these three parts – the objection against this is that two parts of the image belong to the intellect and only one to the will; therefore if three habits, according to this distinction, were required, two theological habits would be posited in the intellect and one in the will; but this is manifestly false, because hope is by some not set down as being an intellectual virtue or habit.

7. To the opposite:

I Corinthians 13.13, "Now remain faith, hope, charity; these three etc." therefore hope is a habit distinct from faith and charity.

I. Various Possible Solutions
A. First Way
1. Exposition of it

8. The foundation for this is the authority of the Apostle above cited [n.7], on which the saints rely when treating of this matter.

9. However if one were to contemn the authority [of the Apostle] and rest on the support of natural reason alone, then, since 'a plurality is to be avoided where there is no necessity to posit it' [*Physics* 1.4.188a17-18, 8.6.259a8-9], and since in the matter at issue there seems no necessity to posit a third theological virtue distinct from faith and charity, one would deny that hope is a distinct virtue.

10. The proof of the minor of this reasoning (according to supporters of it):

The same will that is disposed to willing in ordered way is disposed to refusing or non-willing in ordered way. And the proof is that one cannot refuse something in ordered way unless there is a willing of the opposite of that something in ordered way. This is also confirmed by *On the Soul* 1.5.411a4-6, 'The straight is judge of itself and of the curved.' Also the same thing that is sufficiently disposed to loving a good when present is disposed to desiring a good when absent. And the proof comes from both reason and authority. By reason, because the same thing tends to a term that is not possessed by the same power as rests in it when it is possessed, as is plain of a heavy body. The authority is from Augustine *On the Trinity* 9.12 n.18, 'the desire for something when one longs for it becomes love of the thing when one enjoys it'. Therefore if there is some habit whereby the will is disposed sufficiently for an ordered enjoying or willing of a present good, the same habit will suffice for every ordered willing, which will include ordered desiring and ordered not-willing of an absent good; but charity alone sufficiently disposes the will supernaturally to loving every present enjoyable object.

11. A second proof of the minor is that acquired friendship suffices for every ordered willing as to the loved thing – and this both as to the willing of desire and as to the willing that is love of the good when present, and also as to non-willing or refusing the opposite of what is loved; but infused friendship is no less sufficient for a multitude of objects than is acquired friendship, since the will extends itself widely to everything that can be loved by charity; therefore etc.[a]

> a. [*Interpolation*] Second, on the part of the intellect, because if hope were a habit it could not be placed in the intellect, because the act of the intellect in general is to understand; so all habits in the intellect will concern some act of understanding; but understanding with respect to a supernatural object is nothing but belief or faith. Therefore etc.

2. What should be Said about this Sort of Way.

12. If one holds this conclusion [n.9], one could say that hope in some way combines in itself two virtues, namely faith and charity; for the act of hope which is expectation [Lombard: 'hope is the certain expectation of future blessedness'], includes certainty, and this certainty belongs to faith in the intellect, and it

includes desire, which pertains to the will; and if so, meritorious desire pertains to charity, which perfects the will. Just as, then, perfect and meritorious expectation includes the certainty of the intellect and the desire of an ordered will, so hope, as a perfect virtue, would be said to include, by a certain combination, both faith and charity; and accordingly hope would not be posited as a third virtue simply but only formally, because it combines two virtualities in itself each of which is a perfect virtue, while hope is not, save formally by the formality of combination.

13. However the desire for what is not possessed can be present in the will without charity; also the whole act of hope, and even hope itself in itself, can be unformed, and so it agrees more with faith than with charity. Therefore it seems better to posit that hope, to the extent it is not a different virtue, agrees with faith, because a habit does not have a different form for universal and particular, as is clear in the case of all the intellectual habits; but faith regards the universal, because by faith I hold that 'every finally just man is to be saved', and hope regards the particular, because by hope I hold that 'I as finally just am to be saved'; therefore the habit is not formally different in the two cases.

14. There is a confirmation, that someone who despairs is not said to hate but to be deceived; and therefore persuasion makes him love and desire, because he would very well desire it if he believed it was attainable by him.

15. Accordingly one would say that faith in all the revealed articles, to whomever the articles pertain and at whatever hour, is true and universal faith.[1]

16. Further too faith is rather in a way particular faith, because it is about revelations pertaining to him who has faith, and only about things pertaining to the future. Nor does this specification vary the habit, just as neither does it do so with other intellectual habits, but the habit is the same, and possesses a certain specification on the part of the object.

17. So no third habit or virtue is posited, but faith as to certain things, namely future things belonging to the believing person, is called hope, although faith does extend itself to the person believing and to other things.

18. But if it be said that futurity in the object varies and so distinguishes faith from the other virtues, there is objection against this:

20. First that the same habit is universal and particular, as is plain in all intellectual habits; so just as there is faith about 'everyone finally just will be saved', so there will be faith about 'I, if I am finally just, will be saved'.

20. Second, that if futurity were the formal idea of an object, then hope would not be a theological virtue, for it would not concern something eternal as object but something temporal, for temporality would be the formal idea of the object.

21. Third, if futurity requires its own object, by parity of reasoning so would pastness, and so there will not be the same habit of faith about the past and the future.

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[1] This remark is perhaps to be understood of the parable of the workers in the vineyard, some of whom work the whole day, some lesser parts of the day according as they began at different hours. So true faith is to believe all the articles revealed at the time and in the condition anyone then finds himself in; and so some can have true faith if they believe fewer articles and others only if they believe more.

22. Anyone who holds this way [of understanding hope] could say that, just as there are in the soul two powers, namely intellect and will, of a nature to attain God under the idea of object (and that by acts proper to those powers), so each power is sufficiently perfected by a single habit in respect of that object; and thus, just as the intellect is sufficiently perfected in respect of that object by the habit of faith, so the will likewise is sufficiently disposed in respect of the same object by the habit of charity, and the following statements about hope will be preserved: either that it is a third habit, including the other two by combination; or (which is more probable) that it is a certain particular faith respecting future goods to be attained by the person, and that to this extent it is distinguished from faith absolutely taken, which has regard to all persons generally and all articles of faith at any time whatever.

23. This way is not satisfactory, because it seems to oppose the authorities of the saints, which rely on the words of St. Paul (*I Corinthians* 13, nn.7-8).

B. Second Way and Consideration of it

24. It could be said in another way that, since it is possible to have excessive hope for a future good (as is plain in the presumptuous), and to have diminished hope (as is plain in the despairing), the passion that is hope for a future good needs moderating; and consequently the moderating habit, since it regards an eternal object that he who hopes is pursuing, it can be a theological habit and be called hope, because thereby is understood a habit that moderates the passion by which someone tends toward obtaining a future good; for anyone morally perfect needs habits with respect to the passions that are of a nature to exist in him too much or too little.

25. Against this there are objections:

First, that then hope would be an acquired moral virtue, not a theological and infused virtue, for a habit that moderates passions is a moral one.

26. Second, because then there would be an infused fear, but it would not be a theological virtue, for it does not regard the uncreated good object but only something bad, while a theological virtue regards the uncreated good.

C. Third Way, which is that of Henry of Ghent

1. Exposition of it

27. So in another way it is said that the distinction of hope from charity, though they perfect the same power, namely the will, is that hope is in the irascible part and charity in the concupiscible part, and that these parts are distinct not only in the sensitive appetite but also in the will.

28. The proof is fourfold:

First proof through the objects, as follows: the object of the concupiscible power is the good as pleasing, and the object of the irascible the good as hard: the pleasing good is what is desired by him who desires it because of its agreeability; the good as hard is something valuable or desirable for the sake of which the will desires to overcome all that is contrary. These two conditions, which do not

belong to the same object under the same idea, belong to the good not only as it is conditioned here and now but belong to it simply; so they belong to the good not only as the good is an object of sense appetite (which is the good as it is here and now) but also as it is an object of will. Hence these two accidental conditions distinguish the irascible from the concupiscible not only in the sense appetite but also in the will.

29. Secondly, the same point is plain from acts, because 'to be irate' is an act of the irascible power alone; but it is possible to be irate not only through the passion that is in the sense appetite, but also through the passion that is in the will (*Psalm* 4.5, 'Be angry and sin not'); therefore this act regards the will, and so it will be an irascible act.

30. The same point is proved, third, from comparison of diverse acts with each other; for when the concupiscible is resting in contemplation of something, the will sometimes also rises up to fight against the vices that impede contemplation, and this fighting impedes the contemplation. But no one and the same power has a per se act impeding itself in its own principal act; therefore the concupiscible power, which seeks to be delighted, does not oppose with an act of fighting what impedes it from its own delight; therefore it is another power.

31. The fourth is made clear through the diverse acts that belong to the irascible power in sense appetite, all which acts seem to be equally necessary in the will; therefore the same reason for positing the irascible power in the sense part is a reason for positing it in the will.

32. Added too is that "the concupiscible power is the principal power and the irascible is a certain force or energy in it." "Just as all the passions of the irascible arise in the sense part from the passions of the concupiscible and terminate in them, so is it also in the will, since there too the irascible fights on behalf of the concupiscible."

2. Rejection of it

33. Argument against this opinion.

And first against the first reasoning, which proceeds on the basis of the objects [n.28]. Since the point about 'the difficult good' can be understood well or badly, I ask what you mean by 'difficult good': whether an absent good, or not only absent but exceeding the faculty of the power for which it is said to be hard, or thirdly a valuable, that is desirable, good as it exceeds everything else that is contrary to it? If the first way then there will be no irascible power in the fatherland and consequently possession will not succeed to hope, for it would be necessary for possession to be in the same power as hope is if it is to succeed to it, and so it would have for object a difficult good that is absent, if this is how the word 'difficult' is to be understood – but this is false, for in the fatherland no desirable good will be absent. If in the second way then there would be no irascible power in God, for there is no object that is excessive for him; the consequent is false because if, in those who have hope, hope is a habit of the irascible part, then possession regards the same part; but it does not seem that God is to be denied possession with respect to himself. If in the third way, the object of

hope is not rightly posited as ‘difficult’ in distinction from the object of charity, for charity most of all the virtues regards God under the idea of the valuable, because it regards him under the idea of the infinite good (*On the Trinity* 15.18).

34. Further, being valuable is understood of the object either actually or aptitudinally. If aptitudinally, because it is naturally apt to be thus valued, then this seems chiefly to belong to the object of charity, for – as was said [n.33] – charity most of all regards its object under the idea of infinite Good in itself. If actually, that is because the will does in fact thus value it, this valuing is badly assigned as the idea of the object of a power, for this actual valuing is because the will values the object in its act; so only this passive actual valuing is what is consequent in the act, but the formal idea of the object of any power necessarily naturally precedes the act of the power; but valuing cannot naturally be the idea of the object of a power or force.

35. Further, the act adequate to the irascible power is ‘to be irate’, just as the act adequate to the intellect is ‘to understand’; but being irate cannot have the difficult good for object, and cannot have it in any of the ways stated [n.33]. For according to the Philosopher in his *Rhetoric* 2.2.1378a31, ‘to be irate is to desire revenge or punishment’. This ‘desire’ takes for object either the punishment itself, or the one to be punished; neither is valuable; therefore the irascible power does not take the difficult good for object. – This argument disproves the second reason for the above position [n.29], for if ‘to be irate’ is an act of the irascible power [n.29], it follows that it is not distinguished from the concupiscible power by reason of a difficult good distinct from the pleasing good.

36. Against the third reason [n.30] the argument is that although what is of a nature to impede, through a positive act, the delight of any power must be subdued by some act that makes the power to enjoy in peace, yet what is not of a nature to impede save by way of privation does not need to be subdued positively but only privatively, namely by flight; now a vicious act does not positively attack the ordered delight of the concupiscible power, for the act that quasi-impedes the ordered act of the concupiscible power does not arise at the same time; therefore there is no need to subdue it save privatively, namely by fleeing it or preventing it happening. But fleeing the dishonorable belongs to that to which desiring the honorable belongs; therefore the concupiscible power is what subdues. – Besides, the concupiscible is posited as not fighting back or fighting for, because fighting back impedes delight [n.30], and yet later in the account it is said that the concupiscible power is defended by the irascible so that it is not perturbed in its delight; these two things seem to be opposites, namely that the power that does the fighting for impedes the concupiscible power and that it does not impede it but preserves it in its delight.

37. From this fact the fourth reason is refuted, which assigns these diverse acts to the irascible force [n.31]. It could also be argued that some of these acts do not belong to the irascible, at any rate in the sense part, which has no act about the future as future.

38. What is added in the first reason [n.28] – that the concupiscible power wants some good desired by the one desiring as advantageous for him – seems improbable, because the concupiscible is not denied existence in God as neither is

the most perfect delight, and yet God does not desire anything as advantageous to him, because no other things are advantageous to him.

39. To this extent therefore, the doubt can be dismissed as to whether the irascible and concupiscible exist in the will (up to distinction 34, nn.48-50); and if they should be posited in the will, they seem to be posited because of the distinction between the moral virtues that perfect the will [d.34 n.51], and not because of the distinction between the theological virtues (namely hope and charity) as this opinion supposes [supra n.27].

40. Further, just as force presupposes power so object presupposes object; therefore the act of the force presupposes the act of the power about its object along with something added [infra nn. 90-99]; but such an addition is universally more noble (the point is evident in all acts that mutually add to each other); therefore if the irascible is the force and the concupiscible the power, the act of hope would be simply more noble than the act of charity, which is false.

3. What should be Said about the Rejection of the Third Way[2]

41. The first argument against Henry, about the arduous [nn.33-34], has a confirmation: if the excelling is a condition of the object of any supernatural virtue, then it specifies nothing; if the valuable is such a condition then it is so actually or habitually, so that the second argument is part of the first.

42. Again, the second argument of Henry, about being irate [n.29], is valid for a distinction of force, and it is not solved by saying that 'to be irate is a certain not-wanting with respect to what impedes' [n.35], and if the not-wanting is supreme (namely when it is known that what impedes cannot be removed), the sadness is supreme, and yet there is no anger.

43. I reply that just as wanting a thing for an end is not efficacious unless it follows knowledge about the possibility of attaining the end, so not-wanting an impediment is a sort of wanting the privation of a being relative to the end – nor is this not-wanting efficacious unless it follows knowledge of the possibility of attaining it; yet efficacious and non-efficacious wanting do not vary in species but only formally (as to the intention, perhaps, or as to the first knowledge of the possibility of attaining or not attaining).

44. On the contrary: he who is irate does not merely want (with an efficacious willing) the impediment to be removed but also wants the impediment to be punished, so that he does not rest in the ceasing of the impediment until the impediment is punished. The point is plain in the brutes: if what first impedes the delight of *a* withdraws, *a* does not rest until it exacts punishment; but if what impeded *a* was angry against some impediment, *a* was not angry, and then – when it withdraws – *a* does not pursue vengeance (namely crow with crow, crow with some third thing). As to what is supposed about 'adequation' [n.25], it seems false, because fear and hope are passions in the irascible; therefore not every passion in it is anger.

45. I reply that the first four passions [sadness, joy, hope, fear] can be about the delightful desirable and about an offense that needs to be avenged; these

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[2] This section is an extensive and somewhat fractured addition by Scotus to the basic text.

first four are in the concupiscible power and all others [love, desire, hatred, flight] in the irascible [Aquinas *De Veritate* q.26 a.5]. And just as the first four are about an object, namely the delightful, that is adequate to the concupiscible power, yet 'to be apprehended in diverse ways' is lacking in the present in the case of the future, so the four others are about an offense to be avenged that is apprehended as being now or as after having been avenged, but not as something to be angry against. So what is intended there [n.25] by the object is true.

46. However the premises given there for the adequate object [n.35] are not true. For although 'to hope' belongs in a way to anger, because it is a sort of efficacious will to avenge, yet 'to fear failure to avenge' is not a sort of anger, because it draws one away from avenging.

47. I reply that 'to fear failure to avenge' is a sort of 'not-wanting not to avenge', just as 'to hope' is a sort of 'wanting to avenge' and a certain pain in not getting it. Say that to be pained at this or that in the present is not formally to be irate but is a different passion, though consequent to anger, just as fear and excitement in the concupiscible are not formally to desire but they are different passions arising from the concupiscible. Therefore both forces or energies – both of the irascible and the concupiscible – do not get their names from an adequate passion but from the most principal passion. The point is plain about fear because when something hurtful is apprehended as future the concupiscible fears it, and from this pain [of fear] anger arises against what is bringing the harm, and command is given to subdue it; and in this way anger prevents the pain of a present harm and preserves one from it. But if the irascible is afraid to subdue it, supposing its fear is great, it does not subdue it, and pain arises because the harmful thing happens.

48. Similarly the first hope can exist without the second hope, if nothing is apprehended as impeding the object of the first hope.

49. Note: hope in the irascible lessens fear and pain in the concupiscible; but perfect fear in the irascible, or the pain of it, increases pain in the concupiscible. Hence there is supreme pain in the appetite when it is suffering a supreme present harm and despairs of being able to repel the harm.

50. Note to this [n.49]: the first part is perhaps true, the second false; for although an animal or the appetite feels perhaps more pain when it is pained in both forces, yet one diminishes the other since they are compossible.

51. The second arises from the first; an effect does not diminish the cause; therefore neither part is false when speaking properly as to the intensity of the forces – and both are true of the appetite as to extension.

52. Henry's third reason is not well argued against above [n.36], because just as we fight in order to have peace, so the will fights against inordinate motions then arising in order that afterwards it may more agreeably and peaceably be at leisure for contemplation; therefore, at the time when the irascible is fighting, it impedes delight in the concupiscible, but the quiet that will follow is intensified. So Henry does not contradict himself when he says that it impedes the concupiscible from delight and that it fights in order to enjoy quietly (supply: afterwards, when victory is gained).

53. What the opinion of Henry says about power and force [n.31] is not well refuted [n.40] because it may be expounded thus: the concupiscible is more principle and the irascible less principle, because the latter is always about a being relative to the end in respect of the concupiscible; therefore the power gets its name (supply: of concupiscible rather than irascible) because of the principal part, though both belong to the same power.

54. On the contrary: then the power, as it is a power, cannot issue in an act immediately but only through one of its forces.

55. Again, not everything that has the concupiscible can do an act of the irascible but conversely; therefore the irascible is nobler according to the final argument [n.40] that rejects the opinion, because object adds to object as act adds to act.

56. My response here: where the irascible exists it does so because of the nobility of the concupiscible, whose being at rest nature was principally aiming at; where the irascible does not exist, nature does not care for it. The same about the resting of the concupiscible; that is why the argument [n.40] denied the irascible.

57. An argument for the opinion: hope is a passion in the irascible of the sense part; therefore hope is a virtue in the irascible of the will.

58. I reply: the consequence does not hold, because hope is passion as a sort of beginning of fortitude, which is in the irascible. Hope the virtue is for the act for which there is an efficacious desire of advantage, consequent to the apprehension of it, under the idea of reward for merit from someone, because ‘to desire’ means ‘to expect’; therefore it is in the concupiscible of the will. But that whereby the will subdues something is not hope, for it would not then have God for object, but the subduable; but the habit that corresponds to the second passion of hope is the virtue of fortitude.

59. On the contrary: every idea in the object, because of which the concupiscible is of a nature to draw back from what is desired, requires a perfection in the irascible fortifying the concupiscible so that it not draw back; of this sort is the excellence of the desired object and not just an impeding object; therefore perfection of the irascible is required because of the excellence of the object and not only because of something that offends.

60. The major is denied, because the adequate object of the irascible is what is to be avenged; therefore it is not the excellence of it.

61. To the contrary: the irascible is what per se strengthens the concupiscible; therefore it strengthens it in everything in which the concupiscible can fail and draw back.

62. I reply: the irascible is what per se strengthens as concerns the things that agree with fortitude (namely to confront and to withstand), but it does not fortify as to intrinsic degree; and therefore as to the defect that comes from drawing back from an excelling object, it comes from this; for because it is not raised higher, the object is excelling; therefore it is raised higher by an intrinsic habit so that it may be proportioned.

63. On the contrary: the concupiscible draws back from the hurtful because of its own imperfection, for if it were more perfect it would rise up; therefore the irascible is not required in it.

64. I reply: the concupiscible – however perfect it is – can withdraw from the hurtful, and it would not rise up against but only flee the hurtful; to flee is not to repel; therefore etc. But it would not have an excelling object above it in this respect, while the idea of the concupiscible stands in the object. And also it can desire in actual fact and, however much the act varies as to greater and lesser object, no other force is required but only perfection in the concupiscible. So it is in the case of the arduous, because the arduous, as arduous, is something to be desired; but a power, in order to be proportioned to the arduous so as to desire it perfectly (which is 'to hope'), and so as to become proportioned by an intrinsic habit for overcoming impediments, embraces the whole objective idea in question as well as the acts that are operative about an impeding object. So by reason of this something else there is another force there.

65. Another response to the argument [n.59]: the major is true properly speaking about 'draw back', but it is never in fact so unless the reason for drawing back is something non-desirable; but the arduous is not such; rather the arduous has a special idea of being lovable; that which offends is something non-lovable.

66. The minor is false, although this proposition is true 'a power tends of itself non-perfectly to the excelling'; for it is one thing to be disposed to tending perfectly toward it and another to drawing back; indeed drawing back presupposes an elevated power (as the cognitive power draws back from an ugly thing seen, and so hates it).

67. Again, it does not draw back by conditioned volition but by efficacious volition; but efficacious volition belongs to the same thing as conditioned willing does. Likewise no difference as to display of the possible and of the not possible is there required.

68. Again, if the irascible regards the arduous, since nothing is arduous for God, there is no irascible in him – which is false because he desires to avenge and does avenge.

69. Again if the irascible strengthens the concupiscible so that it not fear, then since it belongs to the same thing to be afraid and to be confident, the irascible makes the concupiscible confident. The consequent is false, both because confidence belongs only to the irascible and because a passion is not caused in the irascible by the concupiscible but conversely.

70. I reply that the concupiscible never fears because 'to fear' regards the arduous.

71. To the contrary: 'to fear to lose' is one thing, and 'to fear to avenge offenses' is another, because the first fear can be without the second. Example: let grace be apprehended as capable of being lost by the wayfarer; he fears to lose it; he does not then fear the devil taking it away, against whom he may be angry or fear to vanquish.

72. Again, from what passion of the concupiscible does anger against a future offense arise, namely against one about to take away the desirable? Surely from the fear of losing it?

73. Besides, some passion follows the apprehension of a future evil in the concupiscible, as pain follows the apprehension of a present evil. What is the passion that regards the future?

74. Again, pain and joy are in the irascible and, according to you [n.45], hope and fear. Why then cannot all the passions that concern the delightful be just like those that concern the arduous or offensive?

75. I reply: flight.

76. To the contrary: flight follows pain and the passion.

77. Nor is it a passion, because it does not come from the object.

78. If the irascible alone fears, then the concupiscible, if it were alone, would never draw back, because it does not draw back from the delightful as delightful; rather the delightful would thus not inhere as arduous, because it does not thus have any act about the arduous, because it is not its object; therefore the irascible is not required for strengthening the concupiscible.

79. I reply: the concupiscible draws back though it does not fear, because the arduous is proportioned to it in this way. And when it is said that it has no act about the arduous [n.78], I concede that it has none by way of tending toward it but does by way of drawing back from it.

80. Again, that the love of advantage and the love of justice are as it were two powers (and likewise about the irascible and concupiscible) is proved thus: that is not formally a power for any action with which, when possessed, an impossibility for that action can stand without repugnance, and this impossibility is an intrinsic one ('intrinsic' is added because of objections about impediments, [n.36]); but when the power or force for willing advantage is possessed, there can stand with it such an impossibility for willing what is just (likewise about desiring and being irate); therefore etc.

81. Proof of the minor [n.80]: the intellective appetite is, as such, a power for advantage; but along with it, as such, non-freedom stands without repugnance, for a prior can stand with the opposite of a posterior. These two things, 'being an appetite' and 'being an appetite of such sort of cognitive power', by nature precede the idea of freedom; and further, an impossibility for willing what is just stands along with what non-liberty stands along with. A confirmation: freedom is not the idea under which the intellective appetite per se desires known advantages, both because it would desire them even if it were without freedom, and because the will is naturally most prone to desire the greatest advantages; but freedom moderates this proneness so that we do not will immoderately; therefore freedom is not the idea in the will by which it desires advantage – on the contrary freedom is rather sometimes a sort of restraint.

82. All this is confirmed by Anselm *De Casu Diaboli* 12-16 about the will informed with love of advantage, if it were immoderately to desire advantageous things to be just it could not sin. If this separation of justice from the will were to involve a contradiction, Anselm's position would be null not only in fact but also in understanding; nor could Anselm show what would belong to a will without freedom, because of the contradiction involved.

83. The minor about concupiscence and anger [n.80] is similarly proved, for whence does the appetite have its force of desiring? Not from the irascible unless it is posterior to the irascible; therefore the prior stands with the opposite of the posterior [n.81].

84. This argument [nn.80-83] could be common to many things. Therefore I reply to the major, 'that is not formally a power for any action with which, when possessed, etc. [n.80]'; I concede it is not really a power, that is, the thing or nature is not a power. Then the minor [n.80] is false; and what is proved is only that a single idea is sufficient in itself for this and not for that, and so the idea can stand in the intellect with the opposite of the thing; but both are necessary in the one thing.

85. Note that second hope [nn.47-49] is a sort of beginning of fortitude, because things 'naturally fitted for the mean' are well adapted for regulating the passion and so for fortitude; second fear is a sort of beginning of the timidity of vice, hence someone naturally fitted for hope is naturally fitted for fear; for he who is naturally fitted for hope is disposed to audacity, and yet another to timidity. Second hope and fear are set down as concerned with avenging, which are passions of the irascible concerned with bearing up, since patience is a sort of fortitude and is in the irascible.

86. I reply: patience is constancy, and there is inconstancy.

87. If you say that no bearing up is disagreeable to the sense appetite save by command of reason –

88. On the contrary: a brute puts up with a moderate grief so as not to lose a great enjoyment.

II. Scotus' own Response to the Question

89. To the question then one must say that hope is a single theological virtue, distinct from faith and charity.

90. The fact is made convincing thus: we experience in ourselves the act 'to desire that the infinite Good be good for us, and that by God conferring it on us freely – not indeed first but because of something ordered to it that is accepted by him, namely because of merits'; this act is good when with its due conditions; therefore there can be a virtue for it.

91. The assumption is plain from running through the circumstances:

The object indeed of the act is the infinite Good; the first circumstance is included in the word 'desire', which is an absolute willing, not of anything, but of something absent; God under the idea of an object perfectly to be possessed is absent from the wayfarer; therefore a willing that tends to him under this idea has, on this point, its due circumstance.

92. Also the addition 'to be good for us' is a circumstance due to you, because the good is fitting for the one for whom it is desired as good; but no good sufficiently quietens the desirer save an infinite one.

93. The addition 'by God conferring etc.' notes the due circumstance on the part of him from whom; for the good in question cannot be communicated save by God freely conferring it.

94. The addition 'not first etc.' notes fitting disposition on the part of that by which the good is reached, because it notes a disposition that is fitting according to the way God orders the pursuing of the good; for divine wisdom has

made disposition not to communicate itself perfectly to anyone save to one who is accepted beforehand for virtue.

95. Therefore it is plain that the act is right, because it has its due circumstances; and so there can be a virtue inclining one to it, and this an appetitive virtue, because the act is an express act of appetite and the circumstances are the circumstances of an act of appetite.

96. This virtue is also a theological virtue. The proof is that it regards God as immediate object; for the idea of object as it is object is not taken away by any of the things that are added to the object [n.90]; for that I desire a thing for myself as being qualified by such or such does not take away the fact that I desire it as object – but what the act of desire is about is infinite, therefore it is also eternal; therefore it is a theological virtue.

97. But if it be said that desire involves absence of the thing desired, and so a condition of time in the object – it seems improbable, because hope and tending regard the object according to the same formal idea of it as object [n.19], just as there is the same formal idea of object insofar as there is a tending to it and a resting in it. But the difference is that the object is approached in diverse ways, because an absent thing that is imperfectly approached is desired but a present thing or thing that is perfectly approached is loved. Just as fire in the natural world causes, when approached, intense heat, but a distant fire or one approached less causes a cooler heat; but not for this reason is there less of the idea of being active in a distant fire than in a close one; just as the sun too, being more and less distant, causes direct and reflex rays.

98. From this one can argue in the issue at hand that, just as in the case of effective things what does not belong per se to the idea of being effective does not vary the idea of being effective, so in the case of ends what does not vary the idea of being an end does not vary the idea of end; such is how it is with being present or absent in the way said above [n.97]; therefore presence and absence do not vary the formality of the object.

99. There is also confirmation of this, that such absence or presence exists only as mediated through an act of intellect; for what is intuitively seen is present to the will as lovable, and what is seen as in a mirror is present to it as desirable; but the diverse way of an object's being present to some power does not vary the formal idea of the object; therefore etc.

100. If too it is said that 'to desire the good for me' varies the formal idea of the object, because it changes the honorable good into the useful good – this is false, for the condition or circumstance 'for whom' is not a per se condition of the object; rather such a condition can be added to the object while the formal idea of the object remains the same, as is plain in the case of faith: for in believing that God the Savior is the beatifier of all the good, I do not have an object formally other than God about whom I believe that he is three and one and all the other articles, but by the former I only compare the eternal to something temporal, and the comparison only states a respect of reason; and the same with 'desire for me', which only states a respect of the will, and on this respect I am now touching. Indeed every comparing power can compare its object to something else, and can cause a respect of reason in what is thus compared that is not present in it by the

nature of the thing in itself but from the act of the comparing power; and so, just as reason, by comparing its object, can cause a respect of reason in it, so the will can, by comparing its object, cause some respect in it that can be called 'a respect of appetite'. But such a respect is caused in a usable object by an act of use, when the will uses something; and such a respect can be said to be caused in God by an act of will, when I will the good 'infinite in him' to be good for me, because the appetite compares that good to another – namely to itself – by a certain comparison that is not in it from the nature of the thing.

101. But if it be objected that 'therefore the will is evil when it hopes, because it uses what should be enjoyed, by referring it to something else' – I reply that not every comparison of one object to another object made by the will is a comparison that is use, but only when the object is compared to another as to a lesser good ordered to something else as to a greater good to be attained through it; but it is not so in the issue at hand, but the will compares the greater good as abundant to a lesser good as what is to be perfected in it; and this is the comparison of liberality of which Avicenna speaks in his *Metaphysics* 6.5.

102. But if it be objected against this that to have the uncreated Good for object does not suffice for having a theological virtue, because then acquired faith and acquired charity would be theological virtues (for they have the same object as the faith and charity that are infused virtues, and have it under the same idea of object) – I reply that there are three conditions that are set down as belonging to a true theological virtue or to the first Truth. The first of these conditions is that it regard God as first object; second that it have for rule, that is, for first rule of its human acts, the first rule of truths or the first Truth, and not an acquired rule; third that it be immediately infused by God as by efficient cause. These three are distinct in that one is the idea of the object, the next the idea of the rule, the last the idea of the efficient cause. If all three are required for something's being a theological virtue, it is plain that acquired faith and acquired charity are not theological virtues because they are defective in the third condition; by parity of reasoning neither is acquired hope a theological virtue, if the first condition alone is sufficient for it or the first along with the second. In that case acquired hope can be set down as a theological virtue from the fact it is immediately about God as object, by desiring this object for him who hopes; for even if he not hope that it will exist in him, yet he hopes for it (that is, he desires it) and not for something else for himself. But if the second condition for it to be a theological virtue is there as well, then he who has acquired hope relies immediately on the first Truth as the first rule of human acts or of our acts; for he does not desire it because acquired prudence tells him it is to be desired but because the first Truth supernaturally known shows him it is to be desired – and that is the first rule of our acts.

103. And if it be objected that, with respect to acquired hope, acquired faith is the rule and not the first Truth supernaturally known, one can reply that acquired faith is not the first rule in itself; and if it is not the first rule in itself nevertheless it regards the first rule. And so every virtue having it for first rule does not have natural prudence for rule but the first Truth – and if it does not have it in the idea of habit yet it has it in idea of the object that regulates the habit.

104. And if these two conditions do not suffice, one must say as a result that theology itself is not a theological habit; for it can be theology and not be immediately infused by God but acquired, and this both as to actual and habitual assent (which is acquired faith), and as to the apprehension that comes from teaching; and then one must tightly narrow down theological habit.

105. But if the first two conditions (about the object and the rule) do not suffice without the third (which is about the efficient cause), then one must concede that hope, although it require the first two conditions in order to be a theological habit (and to this extent a part of the proposed conclusion is obtained, in that it has the first two conditions), yet it gets completely to be a theological virtue from the third condition, namely from the fact that it is of a nature to be infused immediately by God. But if it is not infused, it is not had as perfectly as it is of a nature to be had by infusion; for the supreme part of reason, since it is subject immediately to God, is not most perfectly perfected by any created agent but immediately by God perfecting it. Now a habit that is of a nature to concern God immediately as object and to rely on him immediately as first rule is of a nature to perfect the first and supreme part of reason; therefore, although some habit could be had, yet not the most perfect one. And so, as was said above about faith [*Lectura* 3 d.23 nn.48-51], that although there is also an acquired faith, yet along with it another infused faith is necessarily posited (though the necessity of this infused faith cannot be proved by natural reason [*Lectura* ibid. nn.56-57]), one must speak in the same way about the matter in hand. And just as theological faith is preserved there because of the object and rule and aptitude to be infused (which are consequent to the superior part of reason), so is it argued here in the matter at hand as well, although some hope could be acquired as also could some faith.

106. The first conclusion, then, of the solution to the question is that, with respect to the act of hoping, there can be a theological virtue. To this I add that it cannot be faith or charity; therefore it is a third, distinct from them.

107. Proof of the minor [n.106]:

As to the part about faith, because every act of faith is a believing and no desiring is a believing.

108. As to the other part about charity, the proof is that charity is supreme affective virtue and consequently is supreme habitual love; but love of friendship is more perfect simply than love of concupiscence; therefore charity simply inclines one to loving with love of friendship. But ‘to desire the infinite Good to be my good’ is not an act of friendship, nor is it the most noble act, because that object (the infinite Good) has a nobler being in itself than is the comparison of it to anything other than itself; therefore to desire something else, which is the first conclusion, is not the noblest theological act; therefore etc.

109. This point about charity and desire is also proved because without such desire the act of charity can be most intense and can be weak and can be in the middle. The weak act is plain, for I can will that God in himself be good without desiring him for myself. The like is plain about the middle act. Proof of the supreme act is that God loves himself supremely, for he is supremely blessed in himself, and yet there is not included in this that God will himself to be good to

another who loves him, nor need a freely acting power act necessarily as much as it can. These points are also proved by this, that it is not necessary for the will to have two acts in itself; but the act of loving God in himself and of desiring him for oneself as loving him are two acts; therefore one act can be without the other.

110. The point [that hope cannot be charity] can also be proved by the fact that in the will, according to Anselm, there are two affections, namely the affection of justice and the affection of advantage (he deals with them in *Fall of the Devil* 12, 14 and *On Concord* q.3.11). The affection of justice is nobler than the affection of advantage, understanding not only acquired and infused affection but also innate affection, which is congenital freedom, according to which the will can will some good that is not ordered to itself. But according to the affection of advantage it can will nothing save in order to itself – and it would have this if it was precisely intellective appetite following cognition without liberty, as sense appetite follows sense cognition. From this I wish to get only the following: since 'to love something in itself' is a freer act and more communicative than 'to desire it for oneself', and since the former act agrees more with the will insofar as it has at least the innate affection of justice, while the latter agrees with the will insofar as it has the affection of advantage, the consequence is that just as these affections are distinct in the will, so the habits inclining toward them will be distinct in the will. I say therefore that charity perfects the will insofar as it is affected by the affection of justice, and that hope perfects it insofar as it is affected by the affection of advantage; and so there will be two distinct virtues, not only because of the acts, which are 'to love' and 'to desire', but also because of what is susceptive of them, which is the will insofar as it has the affection of justice and of advantage.

111. The virtues will not be distinguished by the objects, which are the arduous and the delightful, as the preceding opinion said [n.28]; rather there is here altogether the same formal idea of object, although some things are added in one case and not in the other. Indeed 'to be excelling' states the condition that is 'to be by whom', but 'to be absent' states the removal of the object, which is a concomitant condition both in the efficient cause and in the end, and is not the formal idea of the object; 'to want for me' states the condition that is 'for whom', but 'to will on the basis of merits' states the condition how, as was expounded before [nn.90-95].

III. Objections

112. Against this way, which makes 'to desire' the act of hope [nn.89-90], there are multiple arguments.

The first is as follows: someone who despairs desires beatitude (and the proof is that he is saddened by the loss of beatitude); but no one is saddened save by the loss of something either loved or desired; he who despairs desires then, and does not hope; therefore etc.

113. Besides, I can love someone in himself with love of friendship and can desire the good for him; but I love no one in himself unless I wish good for him; therefore if any good intelligible in itself is loved with charity, a good is

desired for him with charity; therefore in the same person a good present and absent is desired, from the authority of Augustine *On the Trinity* 11.12 n.18; therefore 'to desire' is not 'to hope'.

114. Besides beatitude is naturally desired, as is plain from Augustine *ibid*. 13.5 n.8; so no supernatural virtue is needed for this.

115. Further, if hope is a virtue inclining one to desire, then 'to desire', which is the act of it, can be meritorious in the precise sense, since it is a theological virtue; but no act is meritorious unless elicited or commanded by charity; therefore 'to desire' will be elicited and commanded by charity. If it is elicited I have the conclusion intended, that hope will then be charity; if it is commanded, then charity commands as soon as hope elicits, and both are acts of the will for you [n.110]; therefore the will will have two acts at the same time about the same object, which seems unacceptable.

IV. Reply to the Objections

116. To the first [n.112] I say, as was said in 3 d.15 n.58, that conditioned willing suffices for sadness if the thing willed does not happen or if what is conditioned does not happen; but someone who despairs wills beatitude conditionally, that is he desires to attain it (if he could); and because his erring intellect shows it to him as impossible of attainment he is saddened. An example of this (touched on in the same place) is about him who, by absolute will, throws merchandise overboard into the sea during a storm; for if he absolutely did not will it, he would not throw it overboard since he is not compelled; yet because his will there not to throw overboard is conditioned (for he wills not to throw overboard if he could), therefore is he saddened when he throws overboard (for the condition because of which he wills to throw overboard is something simply not willed). So in the matter at issue, the man desires beatitude and wills it to be possible for him, but the condition (under which he wills it if he could) is shown to him in his intellect to be impossible; and so he is saddened by the opposite of the refused condition, and also by what is consequent to it.

117. So, to the form of the argument [n.112], I say that someone who despairs desires beatitude with conditioned desire, because he would will it if he could; but he does not desire absolutely because presupposed to 'desiring absolutely' is a conception of the intellect showing the desired thing as being possible for the desirer; for whatever is shown to the will as impossible is either not willed at all by the will or is weakly willed (according to Augustine *On the Trinity*). In this way what was said in 2 d.6 nn.9-13, 16 is perhaps true, that the angel wanted equality with God not absolutely (for he apprehended it as impossible for himself) but with a conditioned will, and in conditioned willing there is sufficiently found an idea of demerit or of sin as also of merit, and also – as is now being touched on – an idea of joy and sadness.

118. So some faith, acquired or infused, precedes an act of hope, to the extent that that only can be desired absolutely which is shown to be possible; and the possibility of obtaining the good is shown by faith applied to the delightful or desirable good. But the apprehension of the good as possible is not absolute

desiring but only conditioned desiring, namely to the extent desire is in him; if however this desiring were without such apprehension and were conditioned, it would not be hope.

119. To the second [n.113] one must say that, just as charity has for first object God as he is in himself (for charity is the principle of tending to God as he is in himself), so too as regard any reflexive acts it is in a way a principle of tending to that object; for the principle of a direct act is the principle of all the reflexive acts tending to the ultimate end under the idea of ultimate end. Therefore, just as I love God in himself by charity so, by reflexivity, I love by charity that I love God in himself. So, however much reflexivity there is, I never have an object that is good as being advantageous for me but only what is supernaturally and finally good as being good in itself; but I will for myself that I love God as good in himself, and this act is perfectly meritorious in desiring beatitude, not as by desiring beatitude for myself but by desiring it as it is a perfect loving of God as God is in himself good.

120. I concede then that in the same way as I love some good, I desire good to what is loved – but not just any good, rather the advantageous good, which terminates principally in the good that I love in itself by charity; that is, that I desire for anyone loved that he love God because of God himself, that is, love him insofar as he is good in himself, and not insofar as he is good for this or that person.

121. To the third [n.114] I say that beatitude taken universally is desired by natural power with the affection for advantage, because – according to Anselm *On Concord* 3.12-13 – we cannot not will what is of advantage; but beatitude in particular is not sufficiently desired by natural power but by natural power and by acquired hope. Yet not even so is it most perfectly and sufficiently loved without infused hope and charity (in the way that was said of faith, that nothing is most perfectly assented to by acquired faith but by infused faith [*Lectura* 3 d23 nn.48-51]).

122. To the fourth [n.115] I concede that a meritoriously desiring will has two acts: an act of hoping elicited properly by hope and commanded by charity, and another elicited by charity. Nor is it unacceptable that, in the case of subordinate acts, there be several in the same thing at the same time; indeed it is perhaps necessary that he who knows a conclusion of science – when he is actually contemplating it – scientifically understand the principle; and necessary that he who loves in ordered way what is for the end use what is for the end and at the same time be enjoying the end.[a]

a. [*Interpolation*, in reply to the objection in n.115] That ‘to hope’ is ‘to desire’ rather than ‘to believe’ is clear, because ‘to be sad’ is rather ‘to desire’ than it is ‘to believe’.

Again, there is one faith of the Good in itself and of the good in us, so things are the same in the will. This can be argued as follows: if every ‘to believe’ comes from a single habit, why is not every ‘to will’ likewise from one habit?

Further, what is loved presupposes love of that for whom it is loved; therefore hope presupposes charity.

V. To the Arguments for the First Way

123. To the arguments for the first way, which seem to follow natural reason [n.9], it can be replied that here a plurality is necessary.

124. To the first proof [n.10] it is plain from what was said [n.100] that to desire for this while standing on that cannot be formally an act belonging to the same virtue as the act of willing what is ordered in itself belongs to; although to desire this thing for that person, so that the latter tend to the former as it is good in itself, is an act of the same virtue.

125. As to what is added about acquired friendship [n.11], it could be said that acquired friendship has different habits.

126. As to what is added about the certitude of hope and the certitude of the one who hopes [n.12] my reply is that they precede the act of hope and despair. For no one effectively and absolutely hopes for or desires anything save what can be attained by him. And one who despairs does not desire absolutely; and the reason is that he does not believe it is possible for him to attain it, and so persuasion is given to make him believe and not to make him love, because the first root of this error is not in the will (for when the will does not efficaciously desire something, it is because the intellect does not efficaciously show the thing as something to be desired).

127. The same point makes plain the argument about universal and particular [n.19], that to believe 'I as just am to be finally saved' is only faith applied to some particular; but to desire it is an act of hope.

128. But then the objection is made: therefore 'to desire a good of the same idea for one's neighbor' will be an act of hope; indeed (what is more) 'to will a present good of the same idea to blessed Peter' will be an act of hope – which is absurd.

129. Seek an answer.[a]

a. [*Interpolation*] Note that this reply, which Scotus does not solve, is solved by the definition of the act of hope, that it is said to be 'to desire'; by which is solved the second reply, for the understanding is that it is not present but absent; and so it is not called hope if it is about the present.

It was also posited that 'to desire the infinite Good' is in me from God [nn.91-92]. And by the 'in me', which is the circumstance 'for whom' [n.100], is solved the first reply and the whole argument, because hope is not in desiring a good for another, which is rather charity or acquired love. But see Scotus' intention expressly below, d.31 nn.19-20.

VI. To the Principal Arguments

130. To the first principal argument [n.2] I say that names are conventional. Hence 'hope' can be and was imposed to signify a certain passion impressed on the sense appetite by some delightful thing that is present not in itself but in imagination (for if it were present in itself it would be of a nature to impress delight, just as, on the other side, an evil present in imagination is of a nature to impress fear, and an evil present in itself impresses pain). And I concede that in this way hope is not a virtue, either moral or theological; yet the same name can signify the aforesaid habit [n.90], whose property it is to tend to the sort

of object that is ‘desire that the infinite Good be good for me from God freely conferring it because of the merits that I have or that I hope for myself.’

131. To the second [n.3], although it be said that the mean does not participate the extremes but unites them, yet one can concede that a theological virtue is properly a mean, not on the part of the object, but on the part of the excess that can exist in the act. A moral virtue, by contrast, has excess and defect not only by reason of the mode of the action but also by reason of the act as it tends to the object. A theological virtue is not so because the object to which it tends is infinite; yet an immoderate act (here greater, there lesser) can tend toward it, and the virtue moderates it so that it tends toward it in a middle way. And one can in this way concede that faith is a certain mean or middle between levity, whereby someone assents too easily to what is not to be believed (according to the saying ‘who believes too quickly is shallow of heart’, *Ecclesiasticus* 19.4), and stubbornness, whereby someone resists what is to be believed, refusing to assent to anything unless it be made evident by natural reason. Thus also can one tend with too much and with too little love to some lovable object, but one cannot, when tending to God, tend to an object that is too good or too true. Now moral temperance requires the mean in both ways, because it can tend to an excessive or a deficient object and with a deficient or excessive act; the second way is common to moral and theological virtue, and the first is not.

132. The answer to the third argument [n.4] is plain from what was said in the question on faith [*Lectura* 3 d.23 nn.48, 56-57], and also from what was said in this question [n.105]; because it cannot be proved by natural reason that there is some infused virtue, for the acts that we experience in ourselves can perhaps be equally perfectly present and be equally perfectly of the same idea even on the supposition that there is no infused virtue; but, believing that there is some infused virtue, the acts are not bound to be as perfect as in the infused virtue; therefore although by acquired faith one could hope for the things promised by God (just as one can believe by acquired faith), yet there is another hope of a nature to be an infused virtue, which perfects the higher part of the will in its desiring the infinite good for itself; and once this infused virtue is possessed, the will desires the good more perfectly than without it, just as it is held that there is some virtue infused by God perfecting the higher part of the will [sc. charity], whereby someone more perfectly tends to the good than without it.

133. To the fourth [n.5] I say that the will has two affections [n.110], according to each of which it is possible to reach God immediately – namely according to the elicited affection of justice, tending to God immediately as he is good in himself, and according to the affection of advantage or concupiscence attaining God as he is good for me; and both acts can be ordered and possess a habit inclining to God, and a theological habit because regarding God immediately as object. It is not so on the part of the intellect; for there is only one power there, of a nature to have a second act attaining God (as intelligence); and this power is sufficiently perfected by one habit, which tends to the truth one assents to because of revelation.

134. And from this is plain the answer to the objection about the parts of the image [n.6], because although there are two parts to the image on the part of

the intellect and one only on the part of the will, this is not because the intellect attains the object of the will by a double elicited act; for memory, although it have an action of the category of action, yet does not have an action of the category of quality whereby it attains the object; but intelligence alone has an action of the category of quality whereby it attains the object, and this action is an operation about that object. And, to this extent, there is in the intellect the idea of parent, to which belongs action of the category of action, and the idea of product (these two in divine reality represent the Father and the Son); but in the will there is no such idea of originating naturally but only of originating freely – and to the extent the will has the idea of originator, it can be posited as concurring with memory, as was said in 1 d.2 nn.300-303. Briefly then I say that these habits do not correspond to the parts of the image but are only two principles to which belong attaining God immediately by elicited acts; such are the acts of the intellect, which – as it is indistinct – by a single elicited act attains God immediately by believing; but the will, having the ideas of the affection of justice and of advantage, attains God immediately by loving and hoping.

VII. To the Arguments for the Third Way

135. As to the arguments for the opinion [n.27] that posits charity in the concupiscible and hope in the irascible – these arguments are posited to prove a distinction between irascible and concupiscible in the will [nn.28-31] (where perhaps a distinction between them in the will, corresponding to the distinction of the moral virtues perfecting the will [n.39], should be conceded); but the distinction is not needed for the issue at hand.

136. But which of these two virtues are in the will as in the concupiscible?

The way the question is posed it will rather be hope, taking 'desire' strictly for 'desire the advantageous for the desirer' [nn.40, 58]. Absolutely however both these appetitive theological virtues are in the concupiscible, because the irascible is not of a nature to have God for immediate object, as is touched on by one of the arguments (against this opinion) about being irate [n.38], and it will be touched on below in the material on the moral virtues [d.34 nn.38, 48, 51].[a]

a.[*Interpolation: a synthesis of the whole question*] The opinion that 'hope is not a virtue distinct from faith or charity' but either it is them, when it is perfect, or is a kind of faith, is not rejected. The opinion of Henry has four arguments and an addition about force. Proof of Henry's first argument, as here above etc.

Solution: to desire God to be my good, from him as bestowing it on me for my merits, is a good act; therefore there can be a virtue for it, and a theological one, because taken from the object, which is the first condition. The proof is that it is possible to have thed three conditions theologically, namely to have God as measure and efficient cause, although some virtue could be acquired. This act is not one of faith because it is not a believing; nor is it one of love, for three reasons – that it is for me, that it belongs to the affection for advantage, that it is separable.

On the contrary: I desire naturally; someone in despair desires. There are two simultaneous acts: I desire from charity. And this is reduced by a likeness to faith, because I believe in him and for myself. Nor is it solved and reduced, because I desire for another.

About absence, whether it is of the idea of the object and is obscure in respect of faith? For these are always so emptied that the habits are essentially imperfect, or imperfection is concomitant to them; and the like is objected about objects imperfectly.

Twenty Seventh Distinction

Single Question

Whether there is a Theological Virtue Inclining One to Love God above all Things

1. About the twenty seventh distinction I ask[a] whether there is some theological virtue inclining one to love of God above all things.

a. [*Interpolation*] "Since Christ did not have faith and hope" [Lombard]. About the twenty seventh distinction, where the Master deals with the charity whereby we love God, one question is asked, namely whether…

2. That there is not:

Because if there were such a virtue it would be a sort of friendship, as is plain from its act, for its act would be 'to love'; but according to the Philosopher, *Ethics* 8.7.1158b27-28, there is no friendship with God, because God disproportionately surpasses us; such excess prohibits friendship, according to the Philosopher, because friendship is in some way between equals.

3. Again no virtue moves the possessor of it to an act that is impossible for him; but it is impossible for us to love God above all things.

4. The proof of this is twofold:

First because, from *Ethics* 9.4.1166a1-2, "the features of friendship with another are measured by those relative to oneself;" but the thing measured does not exceed the measure in the case of perfect measures; therefore friendship with oneself exceeds friendship with another.

5. Second [n.4], because friendship is founded on unity; it is impossible that anything be for a lover equally one with him.

6. Again, third, to the principal point: someone without virtue can love God above all things; therefore no theological virtue is needed for this purpose.

7. Proof of the antecedent:

First because if it is possible to love from habit it is possible to love without a habit, for a habit does not bestow the simple possibility since then it would be the power.

8. Second [n.7] because it is possible by natural power to enjoy a thing and not necessarily in an inordinate way; but there is no ordered enjoyment about anything save God; therefore etc.

9. Further, from frequent acts of loving God above all things a habit can be acquired like the one by which we meritoriously love God above all things [1 d.17

nn.129-142]) – a habit that inclines to love of God above all things; therefore charity cannot be in someone who has such a habit, because if so two habits of the same species would exist in the same person, which seems unacceptable.

10. The antecedent is plain because if (from the preceding argument [nn.6-8]) it is possible to love God above all things by one's natural powers, then it is possible to love frequently thus; loving God above all things generates this sort of habit; therefore etc.

11. Nor can it be said that these two habits are compatible with each other on the ground they are of different species because of their efficient causes; for an efficient cause alone does not distinguish effects into species, as is plain from Augustine *On the Trinity* 3.9 n.20 and Ambrose *On the Incarnation* 9 n.105, who say that difference of origin does not diversify the species (it is plain there about man as produced by creation and generation, for Adam was of the same species as I am); therefore etc.

12. The contrary is said by the Master in the text (3 d.27.2 nn.1-2) and by Augustine *On Christian Doctrine* 1.26 n.27.

I. To the Question

13. In this question three things must be looked at: first, because habits are manifested by acts, one must look at the act 'loving God above all things', as to whether it is a right act such that there could be a virtue for it; second, about the formal idea of the object of this act and of the habit that inclines one to first act; third, whether nature without an infused habit is capable of this act.

A. Loving God above All Things is a Right Act

14. About the first article [n.13] I say that the love God above all things is an act conform to right reason which bids what is best to be supremely loved, and so it is an act that is of itself right; indeed its rectitude is self-evident (as the rectitude of the first principle in matters of action); for something is to be supremely loved and nothing other than the supreme Good, just as nothing other than the supreme truth is to be most held true in the intellect. There is a confirmation too, that moral precepts belong to the law of nature, and consequently 'Love the Lord your God etc.' belongs to the law of nature, and so it is known that this act is right.

15. From this follow that there can be a virtue naturally inclining one to this act – and that a theological virtue, for it is about a theological object, namely God, immediately. Nor is this all, but it also rests immediately on the first rule of human acts, and it has to be infused by God; for this rule is of a nature to perfect the higher part of the soul, which is not perfected most perfectly save immediately by God.

16. This virtue is distinct from faith, because its act is not understanding or believing. It is also distinct from hope for its act is not to desire a good for the lover insofar as it is of advantage to the lover, but it tends to the object in itself, even if the advantage for the lover were, per impossibile, to be removed.

17. This virtue, then, which perfects the will insofar as it has the affection of justice, I call charity.

B. On the Formal Object of this Act

1. Three Ways or Opinions, from Others

18. About the second article [n.13], it seems that one of the following ways must be held: that the formal object of this sort of habit is God in himself according to his absolute idea [n.20], or that it is God insofar as he is agreeable to the lover [n.19], or third insofar as it includes both, namely as it is a certain infinite good in itself of which the lover is a sort of participation, in the way that the finite is a certain participation in the infinite good.

19. The second way [Aquinas] would thus posit that God, although insofar he is the good of the creature, as giving the creature its being, he is to be loved with natural love, yet insofar as he gives beatific being he is to be loved with charity, and so the object of charity would be God insofar as he is the beatific object of the lover.

20. The first way [n.18] would be posited because of what has just been touched upon [n.19], for it is not enough for someone's being supremely loved that he be alone in himself the supreme good (as the infinite Good), but there is need in addition that he be the good of this lover insofar as he is participated by the lover.

2. Rejection of the Opinion

21. Argument against the first way [n.18] is that then, if there were, per impossibile, another God, he should be loved above all things with charity – which seems unacceptable of itself. It also seems unacceptable by reason, because there cannot be two things that are lovable above all things, because each would be loved above the other, and then one and the same thing would be loved above itself.

22. Second, because if the idea of 'the simply good' is the idea of the good lovable above all things, then the idea of a greater good is the idea of a greater lovable – and thus everyone would be obliged to love more than himself a neighbor better than himself, which does not seem probable.

23. The second way [n.19] does not seem probable because the act of charity – if it is perfect – has regard to God under the most perfect idea of lovability; but the most perfect idea of lovability in God is not the comparison of him to any creature but is some idea of lovability in itself; for an 'in itself' is absolutely better than any relation to another could be.

24. Further, if the supreme good, insofar as it is beatific, is the principal object of charity, I ask what is the beatific thing: is it an aptitudinal respect whereby it is of a nature to beatify, or is it an actual respect whereby, namely, it does actually beatify?

If in the first way, and the aptitude is not the reason for terminating a perfect act perfectly save by reason of the nature that such an aptitude belongs to

(just as neither is any aptitude in itself universally a perfection but does necessarily carry with it the nature that it is present in) – then to say that God is thus the beatific object of charity is to say that he is, as far as he is of such a nature, the object of charity.

The second way does not seem probable, because the relation that is in the object insofar as it actually beatifies follows the act; for there is in the object no difference between the actual and aptitudinal respect, save because the act is elicited about the object; therefore to say this would be to posit that – insofar as it terminates the act elicited by charity – it would have the formal idea of the object of the act. Likewise 'to desire the good for this person' belongs to the affection for advantage, and according to this affection the will is not perfected by charity.

25. Besides both actual and aptitudinal beatitude, if it states anything in God, states precisely a relation of reason, actual or aptitudinal; no respect of reason can be the formal idea terminating the act of charity.

26. And the arguments touched in 1 *Prol*. nn.164-166 can be adduced for this point; therefore etc.

27. Against the third way [n.18] the argument is that there does not seem to be a double objective formal idea to the same act; one of them is put as formal with respect to charity and not both together. And from this the argument further is that the one that is the formal idea when joined with the other would, if it existed per se, be the per se formal object, as is plain in the case of other formal ideas (for example, if conjoined heat is the formal idea of heating, it would, if it existed by itself, still be the formal idea of heating); the one of the two, then, that is now the per se objective idea would, if it existed per se, be the per se term of the act, and consequently the other would not be and is not now the term.

28. Further, if some intellectual creature existed a se and was not an effect from another and was infinite of itself (as is the supposition attributed to the Philosopher about the intelligences other than the first [Scotus, *Quodl*. Q.7 n.37]), such a creature could love God above all things and love, in accord with right reason, nothing other than the first, and yet it would not be a participation, speaking of effectuality, in the first.

3. Scotus' own Response

29. As to this article [n.18] I say that the objective idea of the act or habit of charity can be understood in three ways; either, first, that (taken in itself) it is of a nature to be the idea of the term per se; or, second, that it is an idea preceding an act, because of which the act is of a nature to be elicited about the object; or, third, that it accompanies the act, or is rather a sort of consequence of the elicited act.

30. The first idea is the proper objective idea, and nothing else is properly and strictly speaking; and this objective idea is the idea of God in himself. But the precise idea of 'this essence' is the formal idea that terminates every theological act and habit, and it is so in the case of any intellectual nature (as was touched on in 1 *Prol*. n.206). The proof in brief is that a power that regards a common object adequate to it either in idea of mover or in idea of term cannot be most perfectly

at rest save in that alone in which is found the most perfect idea of adequate object; every intellectual and volitional power regards as adequate first object in term and in motive the totality of being; therefore in no being, created or uncreated, can it be perfectly at rest save in that in which is found the most perfect idea of being. But such alone is the first being, and not under any relative idea but under the idea by which it is 'this being'.

31. The second idea [n.29] can in some way be called an idea objective with respect precisely to loving, for it is in some way of a nature to draw things to love it; and such in the question at issue is the idea of this nature relative to the lover, which idea is the good as communicative of itself. For just as in us a thing is loved first because of the good as noble, secondly because it is known to love back, so that this loving back is a special idea of lovability in it, drawing one to love something, an idea which is different from the idea in it of the noble – so in God not only does the infinite goodness, or this nature as this, draw to love of it, but precisely because this goodness will love me by communicating itself to me I then, for this reason, elicit an act of love about it. And in this second degree of lovability can be placed everything that the idea of lovability can show itself in – whether by creating or repairing or disposing for beatification – so that there is no distinction between these, nor does charity regard more the last or second idea than the first, but all of them together as certain ideas not only of the good as noble but of the good that communicates and loves – and because it loves therefore is it worthy of being loved back, according to the words of *I John* 4.19, 'We love God because he first loved us.'

32. The third idea [n.29], which is the object completing the act, is not properly the objective formal idea, because it follows naturally the elicited act; and yet, to the extent it always accompanies the act it could be posited to be some idea of the object. And in this way God is loved insofar as he is the beatifying good object of lovability (just as he would be said to be loved to the extent he is supremely loved) – and this not through idea of object but through the idea in the object that accompanies the act.

33. An example of this threefold distinction [n.29]: suppose there were one most beautiful visible object that was so from the nature of the thing; second posit that it gives the power of vision when seen; third suppose that that which is the idea of the term of sighted love, if sight could primarily love such an object, were concomitant to the thing seen, insofar as the thing seen is got by the eye in the act of seeing. – The first point is the idea itself of such a nature, to the extent that in such a nature is perfectly found the idea of the object adequate to such power (as far as the idea can exist in anything). The second is a certain idea drawing to an act of love to the extent it has communicated itself by giving the power of seeing. The third is the idea that is concomitant to the act, in which sight is perfectly at rest. Absolutely, then, the first idea of the seeing, or of love in sight (if sight could love), would be the idea of 'this nature' – least and most improperly would it be the idea of what is attained by the act.

34. From this is seen to follow that those speak most improperly who say that God as he is the beatific object is the object of charity [n.19], if they mean by 'beatific' an actual respect (insofar as it is the term with respect to the act of

beatifying [n.24]) – but if they mean aptitudinal respect, then (as was argued [n.24]) this is only the idea of being the term because the nature is the idea of being the term.

C. Whether an Infused Habit is Necessary

1. Opinion of Henry of Ghent

35. As to the third article [n.13], what is set down is that nature does not suffice for this act without an infused habit.

First, because nature is determined to one thing; but it is determined to desiring its own being (*On Generation* 2.10.336b27-29); therefore it cannot desire its own non-being, and that in whatever way the point is put (unless it be said that nature is determined only to desiring its conditioned being, which does not seem probable). Therefore every intellectual nature is more determined to desiring its own existence than to desiring God's existence, if both could not stand together; for nature is determined to the desire of its own existence as to one natural object, to whose opposite it cannot be inclined whatever condition one supposes to hold of it; for then it would not seem to desire its own existence save under a condition.

36. Besides natural appetite seems only to regard what is agreeable to the desirer, and consequently it primarily regards that for which the agreeable thing is desired; but that is the lover himself (if it is first in regard o itself); therefore it cannot regard something else more.

2. Arguments of Others against Henry's Opinion

37. Argument against this opinion:

First, that a part desires the being of the whole more than the being of itself, which is clear in both the macrocosm and the microcosm.

In the macrocosm because water ascends so that there not be a vacuum in the universe (as is plain in many experiments [Roger Bacon, *Questions on Aristotle's Physics*; e.g. capillary action]), which however is against the particular natural inclination of water since water is naturally heavy and so tends downwards; but the universal inclination of nature dominates; for the good of the whole universe is hereby preserved, namely the continuity and contiguity of its parts, to which good it strives. In this way water is more inclined to the universal good of the universe than to a particular good.

38. The same also appears in the microcosm, for the hand exposes itself to save the head as naturally desiring more the saving of the head than other parts, and in this regard desiring the saving of the head more than itself, because the saving of the head is, as to life's operations and vital influences, the saving of all the members.

39. From this further: since each creature is a certain participation in the divine goodness, a creature desires more the being of the divine good than the being of the good of itself; and consequently the rational creature will be able by its natural powers to love the divine good more than any other good, even than itself.

40. Besides, rational nature loves beatitude supremely, as is gathered from Augustine *On the Trinity* 13.5 n.8; but it loves the beatific object more than beatitude, therefore it loves that object above all things; therefore above itself. A confirmation is that someone who despairs and kills himself hates his being and yet does not hate beatitude, because he desires it could he have it; therefore he loves beatitude more than himself and so the beatific object more than himself.

3. Consideration of the Aforesaid Reasons

41. These reasons are not compelling:

Not the first [nn.37-39] because the examples do not prove the matter at issue [n.39]; for they prove only that the whole loves the good of itself (or loves the more principal parts of the whole) more than it loves the good of a less principal part.

42. The point is plain from the first experiment, about water [n.37]; for it is impossible for water to move itself upward because of some good of the universe; for from the fact it has a natural form, which is determined to one action, that form (remaining numerically the same) can never be the formal idea of acting with the opposite action; water itself, then, does not move itself upwards but is only thus moved upwards by some externally moving agent to which alone it belongs (as far as concerns its own nature) to be upwards; and so water is moved violently when one compares the mover with the proper nature of water. This part then is not loving the good of the whole, nor is it saving the whole by love; rather the whole (or the virtue regulative in the whole), to which are attributed the virtues of the universe, moves each and every part of the universe as befits the wellbeing of the whole. From this then is got that the whole universe loves the wellbeing of the whole more than the wellbeing proper to this or that part.

43. The same conclusion is got from the other example [n.38]; for the hand does not of its own desire expose itself for the whole, but the man, possessing these parts (one of which is more principal and another less principal), exposes the less principal part, which it can lose without danger to the whole, so as to save the whole and the other part which cannot be lost without loss of the whole totality.

44. And thus can you take it in the matter at issue, that God loves the wellbeing of the universe, or even its being, more than the wellbeing of one part, and loves the wellbeing of a principal part than the wellbeing of a less principal part. But you cannot get that some creature loves the being of God or the being of the universe more than its own proper being – just as in the examples given a part left to itself (considered according to its own inclination) never exposes itself to non-existence for the sake of another.

45. The likeness fails in another respect too, for if what is supposed about these parts be true, that is that they are something really of the whole and that, by saving the whole, they save themselves insofar as they have their being in the whole, yet no creature is thus a participated part of God although it is something of God as an effect or participation of him.

46. The second reason too, about beatitude [n.40], is not conclusive because it proceeds only about the affection of advantage [d.26 n.110]; among things indeed that are desired by the lover beatitude is desired most of all, but it is not loved most of all; rather that for which beatitude is desired more is loved more (as the end is loved more than what is for the end). Likewise the assumption about beatitude [n.41] is only true when speaking of it in general and not when determining it to that wherein it consists. So one does not get the conclusion that someone loves something other than himself more than he loves himself, for it has not been determined that 'what beatitude exists in' is other than the lover.

4. Scotus' own Reasons against Henry

47. Without relying on these arguments then [nn.37-40], I lay down two other arguments for the principal conclusion [nn.38, 52].

The first is: natural reason shows something to the intellectual creature that is to be loved supremely, because in all objects and acts (and that in essentially ordered ones) there is something supreme, and so some supreme love – and thus some object too that is supremely lovable. But right natural reason does not show anything to be supremely lovable other than the infinite Good, because, if it did, charity would incline to the opposite of what right reason dictates and so would not be a virtue; therefore it dictates that only the infinite Good is to be supremely loved. And consequently the will has from natural resources the power for this love; for the intellect cannot rightly dictate anything which, as dictated, the will has naturally no power to aim and tend toward; or, if so, the will would be naturally bad, or at any rate it would be non-free as to tending toward anything according to the idea of good in accord with which the thing is shown to it by the intellect. And this is what was said specifically about the Angels [2 dd.4-5 n.37], that in the state of innocence they were not non-right, for they were unable then to have a non-right act; and they could not have had some non-right elicited act – but one must suppose they had some act, therefore a right one; and no act could be right save by loving God above all things; therefore etc.

48. The second reason is as follows: the Philosopher in *Ethics* 9.9.1169a18-20 holds that a brave citizen should expose himself to death for the good and utility of the republic. Now the Philosopher would not posit that such a citizen will have any reward after this life, as is plain from the many places where he doubts whether the soul is mortal or immortal, and he seems rather to incline to the negative side [cf. *Ord*. 4 d.43 q.2 nn.13-15] – at any rate if anyone, following natural reason, is in doubt about a future life, he should not, for the sake of a life he doubts, expose himself to risk where the loss of political good and virtue is certain. Therefore, with all future reward is set aside, it is consonant with right reason that every brave citizen wish himself not to live so that the good of the republic not perish. But according to right reason the divine and political good is more to be loved than the good of any particular thing; therefore according to right reason everyone should wish himself not to live because of the divine good.

49. Here a statement is made [Godfrey of Fontaines] that the brave man, in exposing himself to death because of the good of virtue, experiences virtue's

greatest good and greatest pleasure; and for the sake of these very great goods, though brief, he should more choose and love such an act than a life of ignominy; for one intense act is better, as is said in *Ethics* 9.9.1169a22-25, than any number of non-intense ones; so in this regard the brave man does not choose his own non-existence but his best existence according to act of virtue – and this best existence is, according to right reason, more to be chosen than many other advantages along with lack of virtue.

50. Against this: he for preserving whose safety and for whom, lest evil happen, I wish something else not to be is simply to be loved more than that other thing that I do not wish for his sake not to be; but such a brave citizen, lest evil befall the republic, wishes himself and his act of virtue not to be; therefore he simply loves more the public good (which he wishes to be preserved) than himself or his act of virtue, for whose preservation he does not expose himself but for the salvation of the republic. And thus does the argument stand [n.48].

51. A third reason is added (and it is a sort of theological one), that if anyone can have, by natural power, a perfect act of virtue of loving God above all things, then he who found himself inclined to such an act could know that he was in charity, because without charity there would be no such inclination to love God above all things.

52. The consequent is false [n.51], therefore the antecedent is too.

5. Scotus' own Opinion

53. As to this article [n.35], because of these two reasons, about the conformity of right reason and will and about the brave citizen [nn.47-48], I concede the conclusion that, at least in the state of innocence, it is possible for some will by its natural power to love God above all things.

54. To make this clear I first expound how 'above all things' is to be understood; second how the rational creature is obligated to this; and third why, nevertheless, a habit of charity is necessary.

a. How 'above all Things' is to be understood

55. As to the first point I say that 'above all things' can be understood extensively or intensively; namely extensively in that one love God more than all other things, because, that is, one more quickly wishes by some affection that all other things not be than that God not be; intensively in that one wishes with greater affection well-being to God than to anything else.

56. As to extension, it is commonly conceded that no single thing besides God, and not even everything together, is as valuable as God.

57. As to intension the following sort of distinction is set down, that love exceeds love either because it is more fervent or tender or because it is stronger or firmer; and these loves are said to exceed each other, as that a mother is said to love her child more fervently and tenderly while the father loves his child more strongly and firmly (because he would expose himself to a greater danger for love of his child). In this way it would be said that the love of God should be 'above all

things' as to firmness so that nothing else could turn one away from him; but it is not necessary that it be 'above all things' as to tenderness and fervor and sweetness, because sometimes someone finds himself loving creatures more fervently than he otherwise loves God (as is plain in zealous types). And there is a confirmation, that if someone could, for the present state, love God supremely above all things in both ways, then he could fulfill the precept of *Deuteronomy* 6.5, 'Thou shalt love the Lord thy God etc.'; but the opposite is held by the Master in the text and by Augustine, who maintain that this precept is not something we should fulfill but something we should tend toward.

58. An argument against this distinction [n.55] is that that alone is more loved which is more firmly loved; for I love that more which I less will that evil happen to, and for the preservation of whose good I expose myself out of love, for 'to expose' follows 'to love' – meaning this of the love that is an act of will and not of the other love that is a passion of the sense appetite. Although therefore some are sometimes said to love more fervently and tenderly who do not love more firmly, there is not for this reason any excess of any intellective love in them but perhaps of some passion, namely of some sense love; just as others, who are said to be devoted, sometimes feel some greater sweetness than others much more solid and firm in love of God who would a hundred times more promptly undergo martyrdom for him than others would – nor is such sweetness an act elicited by the will, but a certain passion acquired by the act of it, whereby God attracts and nourishes the little ones 'lest they faint in the way' [*Luke* 10.21, *Matthew* 15.32].

59. I say therefore that 'above all things' must be understood in both ways, extensively and intensively. For as I am held to love God above all things extensively so also am I held to love him intensively too with greater affection than simply anything else; I say 'greater', because it more opposes the opposite effect [sc. hate], in opposing which it could more easily be inclined to the opposite of any other love than to the opposite of the love of God.

60. As to what is added about the precept [n.57] – by the same reasoning it would have been necessary to give a precept about the vision of God, not that it be fulfilled but that we know whither we should tend – the opposite of which is sufficiently plain.

61. I say therefore that the precept as to extension and as to intension can, according to the present way [n.53], be fulfilled by the wayfarer – but not as to all the conditions that are expressed by the additions 'with your whole heart and your whole mind etc.' For a wayfarer cannot have as great a recollecting of his powers, with all impediments removed, that his will should be able to be carried forward with as great an effort as it could be if his powers were united and recollected and all impediments removed. And Augustine's and the Master's statement, that the precept is not fulfilled by the wayfarer [n.57], must be understood as to the same sort of intension, when all impediments are expelled and the powers recollected; for the proneness of the lower powers in this present state holds back the higher ones from the perfection of their acts.

b. How the Rational Creature is bound to love God above All Things

62. As to this point I say that the affirmative precept of *Deuteronomy* 6 and *Matthew* 22 'You shall love the Lord your God etc.' is not only always obligatory against the opposite, namely that there be no act of hate, but is also obligatory for sometimes eliciting an act of love, because this act concerns the end from whose goodness comes all the moral goodness in acts that are for the end. If then a man is obliged to have some virtuous act sometimes, he is obliged to have this precept's act sometimes, about loving the end freely. But when this should perhaps be is determined by the other divine precept, 'Keep holy the Sabbath' and 'let each remain with himself' (*Exodus* 20.18, 16.29-30), recollecting himself and rising up to his God; and the Church has specified it as to hearing mass on the Lord's day (Gratian, *Decrees* 3 d.1 ch.64 [*Ord*. 3 d.9 nn.18-20]). The like does not hold of the precept to love one's neighbor, as will appear in d.28 nn.17-20.

c. What the Habit of Charity is Necessary for

63. As to the third statement of this article, namely the habit of charity [n.54], I reply as was said elsewhere, in 1 d.17 nn.64, 69-70, namely that this habit gives to the act (as far as concerns the substance of the act) some intensity beyond what the power alone itself and by equal effort could give to the act. And however much more perfect the created power might be, it would to the same extent be imperfect if it does not have a created charity proportionally corresponding to it (I mean in arithmetical proportion, which is equality in geometrical proportion); for a lesser will, if it does not have a charity proportional to it, fails as much as a geometrically greater will seems to fail if it does not have a charity proportional to it.

64. But as to the circumstance of the act that is its 'being accepted by God', it was said in 1 d.17 nn.129, 152 that this act is principally in an act of charity and less principally in an act from the will.

65. I therefore say briefly what was said there about the necessity of habits because of acts, and principally the necessity of charity, as regards something that belongs to the circumstances of acts; but as to the substance of acts I say what was said there [nn.53, 65, 92-97].

66. Also as to the condition of the habit, namely that it is infused, I say what was said about faith and hope, that no one can prove such infused habits by natural reason, but it is held only by faith; and good congruity is apparent, because as to acts about God immediately elicited it does not seem probable that the higher part could be most supremely perfected save immediately by God.

II. To the Arguments for the Question

67. To the arguments for this question.

A. To the Principal Arguments

68. As to the first [n.2] I concede that charity can be properly called friendship; but when not taking 'friendship' altogether strictly the way the

Philosopher spoke of it, but by way of a certain extension to God (as by an intensifying of it), charity is something more excellent than friendship; for the excellence of an object does not take away what belongs to perfection in it but rather what belongs to imperfection in it. And therefore the argument from the excellence of God is not valid in the matter at issue, since nobility in the lovable and loving back in the beloved are per se conditions in something lovable, but equality in them is a concomitant condition and not a matter of perfection; on the contrary excellence would not be more perfect if it were loved back; but God has loving back and nobility or lovability in a more excellent way; and there can be a friendship with him such that it may be called 'super-friendship'.

69. And if it be argued that equality belongs to the idea of friendship – this is true on the supposition of nobility, which is the primary idea of the lovable; equality is the idea of friendship taken strictly, but excellence is rather the idea of a like or more perfect habit than friendship is; such is what in the present context I call 'charity'.

70. To the second argument [n.3] I say that God can be loved above all things not only by charity but also by natural power (at least in the original state of nature).

71. And as to the Philosopher's principle in *Ethics* 9 [n.4] I say that his assertion must be understood as to the making known of friendship (for friendship with another is known when I desire for another the same sort of things as I desire for myself); but not as concerns the per se idea of friendship – as if there were no friendship other than when speaking strictly of the friendship that is between equals; equality indeed is a measure of the beloved and not conversely.

72. As to the argument there about unity [n.5] I say that there are two ideas that come together in a lovable object, namely goodness and unity, and although sometimes unity surpasses goodness yet goodness makes compensation on the other side.

73. To the third [n.6] I concede the conclusion – yet charity is not superfluous, as was said [nn.63-66].

74. To the fourth [n.9] I say that no habit of the same species as charity can be acquired by acts (even though there is a friendship that tends to God under the same objective idea and also through like acts, for such a friendship can, through loving God above all things, be acquired through acts). The reason is that any nature that cannot be caused by an efficient cause of the same species as another cause is not of the same species as a nature that can be caused by another efficient cause of the same species (for effects of the same species can be caused by causes similar in species); and so charity, which can only be infused, cannot be of the same species as any friendship that can be acquired by acts.

B. To the Two Arguments adduced in the Second Article

75. Reply to the two arguments for the other member, in the article on the formal object of charity:

To the first [n.21] I say that the positing of two Gods destroys the nature of charity; for any habit tends of itself to one thing, and to posit that it tends to

several things is to posit that the habit is not the habit – just as, if there is some habit proper simply to a first principle, then to posit some other habit of the first principle is to posit that it is not proper to it; I say then that positing several Gods involves positing that both and neither should be loved with charity.

76. To the other [n.22] I say that the more and less in any order are not like the most in that order as to extrinsic operation about what belongs to that order. For the operation of a thing can, so as to be perfect, necessarily require what is supreme in that order. Yet it need not have an order to other ordered things in that order (an example in colors; vision can only be most perfect if it is of the most perfect visible color; yet vision of the color nearest to it need not be the vision nearest to it in perfection). And the reason is that what, on the part of an act, is its reason for coming to rest is the most perfect idea of its total object, while in other cases the object is present in diminished fashion. And although one act may in some way surpass another, yet in these acts there need be no idea involved of being brought to rest, though the power is naturally free. Therefore, although the sole and infinite good quietens the will, and does so insofar as it is the infinite good, yet it need not be the case that any good lower in its own degree of goodness than the infinite good would quieten the will proportionally more and less, because these lower degrees are accidental as regard extrinsic quietening.

Twenty Eighth Distinction

Single Question

Whether Our Neighbor is to be Loved with the same Habit as that with which God is Loved

1. About the twenty eighth distinction I ask[a] whether our neighbor is to be loved with the same habit as that with which God is loved.

> a. [*Interpolation*] About the twenty eighth distinction, where the Master deals with what is to be loved with love of charity, one question is asked, namely whether…

2. That he is not:

For to one habit there is one object; the idea of formal object of goodness in God and in neighbor are different; therefore etc.

3. Again, the habit whereby God is loved is a theological habit; therefore it only has God for object and not anything created.

4. In response [to n.3] it is said that this is true as to principal object, but the habit does regard other things insofar only as they are referred to God.

5. To the contrary: if attribution be enough, then there could be one intellectual habit for all intelligibles, and even one appetitive habit for all appetibles; for all intelligibles are attributed to one thing, and all moral virtues are attributed to one thing, for they are all attributed to happiness as to what is per se appetible.

6. Further, on the principal point, there is the argument that the habit of premises and the habit of conclusions are different, so in like manner in the case of appetibles the habit of the end and the habit of what is for the end are different; charity is the end; therefore etc.

7. To the opposite is the first letter of John (1 *John* 4.21: 'And this is the commandment we have from God, that he who loves God should love his brother also').

I. To the Question

8. Three things need to be noted about this question: the first is how the habit by which God is loved may have our neighbor for object of love; the second concerns possession of the habit as regard our neighbor; and the third is who our neighbor is.

A. About the Habit of Charity for God and Neighbor

9. About the first [n.8] I say, as was remarked in *Ord*. I d.17 n.129, that charity is called the habit whereby God is held dear.

10. Now he can be held dear with a private love, whereby the lover refuses to have a fellow lover, as is apparent in zealous types who have excessive love for their wives. But this habit would not be ordered or perfect.

Not ordered, I say, because God, who is the common good, does not want to be the proper and private good of some one person, nor should anyone, according to right reason, appropriate to himself a common good. And so this love, since it inclines to the common good as to a proper good that is not to be loved or had by anyone else, would be a disordered love.

11. It would also not be perfect because he who loves perfectly wants the beloved to be loved by others, as is plain from Richard [of St. Victor], *On the Trinity* 3.11.

Therefore God, who infuses the love whereby everything tends to him perfectly and in order, gives a habit whereby he may be held dear both as the common good and as a good to be jointly loved by others. In this way the habit that regards God in himself inclines one also to want him to be held dear and loved by others, at least by those whose friendship is welcome to God, or is not displeasing at the time when it is welcome. So just as the habit inclines one to love God in himself perfectly and orderly, so also it inclines one to want him to be loved by any others whose friendship is welcome to him.

12. Hereby becomes apparent how the habit of charity is single. For it does not primarily concern several objects but has for first object God alone as he is good in himself and the first good. Secondarily one's love of God, if it is perfect, has as ordered object the wanting him to be loved by everyone else, and the wanting him to be possessed as he is in himself by everyone else. And it is in this way that I love myself and my neighbor out of charity, by wanting myself and my neighbor to love God in himself, which is something simply good and an act of justice. Thus, God in himself is alone the first object of charity; all other

objects are certain intermediate objects, as it were, of reflex acts, by means of which I tend toward the infinite good that God is. The habit that is the principle for the direct and reflex acts is the same.

13. An objection made against this solution is that I do not with the same habit understand God and understand that another understands God; therefore, by similarity, I do not by the same habit wish God well-being and wish that another wish God well-being.

14. My reply: an act that is reflected on can be meant as a noun, and then it signifies the act in its quiddity; or it can be meant as a verb, and then it signifies the act as it exists in the supposit or as it concerns the supposit. In the first way, the act of reflecting on an act can universally be done by the same habit as the act reflected on is itself done or elicited, both in matters of appetite and in matters of understanding. For I understand something by the same habit by which I understand the understanding of it, whether the act of understanding is in another or in me. In the second way, the act of reflecting is expressed by an infinitive verb and in the infinitive mode (as 'to know', 'to will', 'to understand', and the like). And if one in this way takes the act in its relation to the infinitive 'to will', it need not be taken in the present tense; for I can will you 'to run' but at some other time and not now. If however the act is taken in its relation to the infinitive 'to know', then because knowledge is only of what is true and 'to know' is not 'to act' (unless the 'to act' is now present in the supposit), the 'to know' only reflects back on the act of knowing thus signified when it is present in the supposit where it is signified to be. And because knowledge and the reflex act itself can exist together in me, and yet it is not necessary that the act exist in someone other than me, then I do not have a reflex act about the act itself as the act is signified by a verb and as asserted of some other supposit.

15. It is plain therefore that although I do not by the same habit know God and know that you know God, yet I do by the same habit will God and will that you will God. And to this extent I love you with charity, for I hereby will that you will that an act, an act also of justice, exist in you. In this respect the term 'neighbor' is not signified as a sort of secondary object of charity but as a sort of object wholly accidental to the object of charity (namely something able to love the Beloved along with me in perfect and ordered fashion). And I love my neighbor in this, that he love [God] along with me. So in this respect I love him accidentally as it were, not because of himself but because of the object that I want to be loved by him. And by wanting this object to be loved by him, I want what is simply good for him, because I want an act of justice for him.

B. About the Habit one must have for one's Neighbor

16. About the second point [n.8] I say that just as the denial of a conclusion that does not necessarily follow from the premise can stand along with assertion of the premise (for not every error about a conclusion destroys the truth or assertion of the premise), therefore, since love of a finite good does not necessarily follow from love of the infinite Good, the loss of love of God does not, from the nature of the case in acts of love, necessarily follow from loss of love of

neighbor, and this too whether the loss of love be understood by way of contrariety or of contradiction. Even less would the contradiction that is love of God and not love of neighbor follow from the nature of the habit.

17. This act of love, therefore, is about something other [than God] insofar as a command has been given about loving something other. And for this act there is required the use of the habit, or at any rate not acting against the habit; otherwise the act and the habit as to God would be destroyed, not by the nature of the contradiction, but by the nature of the demerit. For transgression of a precept does not destroy the act, or even the habit, of loving God in a positive way, but deserves by demerit that God withdraw himself so that neither the habit nor the act can remain.

18. The fact as to the habit is plain also from this, that the habit, which of its nature is not private but common, is naturally inclined toward not loving God in a private way; and so a private act of loving, namely one that destroys loving one's neighbor, cannot in any way belong to the habit. And herein is apparent the great perfection of this habit, that although acquired zeal could be greater than a small amount of infused charity as regard intensity of eliciting the act here and there, yet the habit of charity, because it is an ordered and perfect habit in the genus of appetitive habits, can only be of God as of a common Good to be loved by others. And so the habit cannot be the principle of any act in which God would be loved along with the opposite of love for one's neighbor.

19. It is plain from this, then, how the act is necessary from the nature of the habit – at least by understanding that it cannot be elicited as a private act or as contrary to an act toward one's neighbor.

20. From the nature too of the precept added to the habit, an act toward one's neighbor must be positively elicited, or at least a contrary one must not be elicited, lest one deserve by demerit the corruption of the habit which concerns God.

C. Who the Neighbor is who is to be Loved by Charity

21. As to the third point [n.8] I say that one's neighbor is anyone whose friendship is welcome to the Beloved so as to be loved by him; for I ought not rationally to want what is loved supremely by me to be loved by another along with me if the Beloved does not wish to be loved by the other, or if love of the other is not welcome to him.

22. Since then it is certain that the love of good people is welcome to him, I ought to want him to be loved by them; and since this is doubtful about any definite wayfarer, I ought to want God to be loved by this or that wayfarer under a condition, namely if it please God to be loved by this wayfarer either now or at the time when it so pleases him.

23. But as to wayfarers in general, since one must always suppose that some are good and that their love is welcome or not displeasing to God, one can have about them an act of willing that God be absolutely loved by them along with me.

24. As to the damned or demons, or also men who are displeasing to God without limit, I ought not to want them to love him.

II. To the Principal Arguments

25. As to the first principal argument [n.2], it is plain how there is here [in the command to love] only one object. And when the proof is given that there is a different idea of goodness proper to God and to one's neighbor, I say that the idea of goodness proper to one's neighbor is not the determining idea of the act of love as object of the act, but only the idea of the divine goodness is; for although there is a tending to the good of one's neighbor, this is only in the reflex act, and this reflex act always further tends to the object of the direct act, as was said before [n.15].

26. The second argument [n.3] is answered in the same way, because the virtue of charity has God for its per se quietening object; however, it can have something created for its proximate object in the reflex act (thus perhaps the act of vision in the fatherland could have some elicited act about something created, though not however by resting there; rather by tending further to God).

27. To the third argument [n.6] I say that through the habit of the premise one tends to the premise according to the truth proper to the premise that it has from the terms; through the habit of the conclusion one tends to the conclusion through the truth proper to it that it has different from the truth of the premise. It is not so in the case of the matter at hand, but there is only one goodness, which is the reason for tending to God in himself and to one's neighbor as he tends to God; for the goodness of my neighbor does not move me more than if a clod of earth could love God; but if I love God perfectly I want him to be loved by everything capable of loving him in ordered way, and whose love is pleasing to him. What holds of objects of the intellect and of ostensive objects is not generally like what holds of objects of the will and of attracting objects.

Twenty Ninth Distinction

Single Question

Whether Everyone is Bound to Love himself most after God

1. About the twenty ninth distinction I ask[a] whether everyone is bound to love himself most after God.

a. [*Interpolation*] About the twenty ninth distinction, where the Master deals with the order of love of charity, one question is asked, namely whether…

2. That he is not:

In *Ethics* 9.8.1168a29-30 the self-lover is blamed, and much is said there on the matter.

3. Further, Gregory in *Homily 40* on *Luke* 10 ("he sent them out two by two") says, "No one is said properly to have charity for himself, but in order that his love may properly be called 'charity' he tends by love toward another."

4. On the contrary:

The measure is more perfect than the measured; but love of oneself is the measure of love of one's neighbor, according to *Matthew* 20.39, "Love your neighbor as yourself."

I. To the Question

5. From what was said in the previous question, namely about how charity has regard to one's neighbor [d.28 nn.11-15], the solution of this question is plain. For charity, because it is a principle of tending immediately to God by a direct act, is a principle of reflecting on the acts by which one tends to God – and in this too, as was said there [n.11], it is a principle of wanting all to love God who are able to love, when their love is welcome to God and not displeasing; and thereby it is a principle of loving one's neighbor. Now among all the acts of the same idea, the principle of tending to God is a principle of very immediately reflecting on the act that it elicits; this act is the act whereby he who has charity loves God; therefore, immediately after God, he wills from charity that he love that whereby he tends to God, or whereby he wills himself to love God. In willing himself to love God he loves himself from charity, because he loves the good of justice for himself; therefore, after love of God he immediately loves himself from charity.

6. There is also a confirmation, that when one weighs, after the infinite Good (in which is the most perfect idea of goodness), all the ideas of goodness and unity that are ideas of what is lovable, there arises within oneself another very great idea, namely the idea of unity that is perfect identity. For anyone is naturally inclined to love himself after the infinite Good; a natural inclination is always correct; therefore etc.

II. To the Principal Arguments

7. To the first argument [n.2] I say that the Philosopher there explains himself, about how blamable excessive love of self is but not moderate love of self.

8. To the second argument [n.3] I say that everyone who loves from charity loves himself in a way ordered to the infinite Good, because he loves for himself the act or habit whereby he tends to that Good; and in this way does his love tend to another, in that he tends to God as to the principal object of his act and yet he has charity toward himself, but not as final object, as proximate object, ordered to the ultimate and first object that is distinct from it.

Thirtieth Distinction

Single Question

Whether One must Love one's Enemy out of Charity

1. About the thirtieth distinction I ask[a] whether one must love one's enemy out of charity.

> a. [*Interpolation*] About the thirtieth distinction, where the Master deals with love of charity as to perfection of merit, one question is asked, namely whether…

2. That one does not have to:

In *Luke* 1029-37, in response to the Pharisee's question 'who is my neighbor?' Jesus says 'A certain man went down to Jericho…' [the Good Samaritan story]; and afterwards he approves the Pharisee's reply that he was neighbor to the wounded man who showed pity to him. Therefore Jesus seems to have laid down that he alone is to be considered a neighbor who shows pity. An enemy does not show pity; therefore etc.

3. Further, at 3 *Kings* 7.23, on the verse 'Hiram did…' the gloss says, "God has expressed in the 10 commandments in the Law everything that we ought to do." But there is in the law no commandment about loving one's enemy; therefore etc.

4. Further, on *Luke* 6.35, "Love your enemies" the gloss says, "This belongs to those who are perfect." But not everyone is obligated to do the works of perfection; therefore etc.

5. Augustine too is cited in the gloss, on *Psalm* 118.18, "Open my eyes and I will consider the marvels of your law." [Augustine: "Nothing is more marvelous in the commandments than to love one's enemies…"]

6. Further, *Matthew* 5.33, 43, "You have heard that it was said by the ancients, hate your enemies…"; but the moral precepts are the same in the New Law [the Gospel] as in the Old Law, therefore the command [to hate your enemies] remains in the New Law.

7. Again, Aristotle in *Topics* 2.8.113b27-30, "Contrary consequences hold of contraries." Therefore if a friend is to be loved then an enemy is to be hated; these are contraries said of contraries; therefore etc.

8. On the contrary:

Matthew 5.44-45, "But I say to you, 'Love your enemies' etc;" and he proves there [5.46-48] that this is good and necessary, "because if you love those who love you what more do you do than publicans…?"

9. Again, *Matthew* 6.12, 14-15, "Forgive us our trespasses…," "for if you forgive others' trespasses…"

10. Further, *Matthew* 18.32-33, what the Lord says to the servant who demanded back a debt of a hundred denarii, "You wicked servant…", and Jesus adds, "So will your Father do to you if you do not forgive from your hearts…"

I. To the Question

11. To this question I say that an ‘enemy’ can be considered either per se insofar as he is an enemy or per accidens insofar as he is this man.

A. On an Enemy per se

12. Speaking in the first way, I say that an enemy is not only evil by of way privation of good but also by way of positive habit, just as not only is he called unjust who lacks the habit of justice but also he who has the habit of injustice (contrary to the habit of justice) caused by his acts (as in Boethius on the category of quality in his *Categories of Aristotle* 3). In this way, since friendship regards the good of virtue in the friend loved, a good agreeing with the act of virtue in the friend loving, so enmity regards the evil of vice in the enemy, a vice disagreeing with the good. An enemy as such, then, is both evil and vicious, and consequently in no way to be loved. And the question here is taken in this way, for it is in this way that enemies were hated by him who said, “Let sinners and the unjust perish from the land, so that they be no more etc.” [*Psalm* 103.35], and not like others among the unjust [who were converted], “Turn the wicked and they will not be [unjust]” [*Proverbs* 12.17].

B. On an Enemy per Accidens

13. But speaking of the enemy per accidens, namely this particular man who happens to be an enemy, the question is difficult. In fact we can in this way speak of love either positively and by way of eliciting acts, or prohibitively as it were, by way of warding off contrary acts; but the latter is more necessary because affirmative precepts are more obligatory, so that, for example, the opposite of them happens less.[a]

> a. [*Interpolation*] … than that acts of affirmative precepts are positively elicited, because we are bound to negative precepts always and at all times, but not so to positive ones, to which we are bound only at certain times.

1. On Warding off Acts Contrary to Love

14. About this sense of ‘love’, that is, the sense of ‘not hating’, I draw a distinction, because there is a double good for an enemy per accidens that I am able ‘not to hate’: namely the spiritual good by which he attains, or is naturally fit to attain, God; or some other good, an indifferent good, which can be ordered to the spiritual good or also ordered to the opposite. Examples of the first: loving God with love of friendship as he is the noble good, to desire God for oneself as he is the advantageous good; to listen to preaching, rebuke, and instruction whereby one is converted to love of God. Examples of the second: living one’s bodily life, being healthy, being rich, being brave etc.

a. As concerns Spiritual Goods

15. As regard the first goods [n.14], it does not seem that I can hate or not want them for an enemy per accidens, because perfect love of God is not compatible with not wanting God to be loved by others whose friendship is not known to be displeasing to him (and this friendship can exist both by reason of the noble good, namely for God's own sake, and by reason of the enemy's own advantageous good). Similarly, not wanting for others the goods by which they are induced to love God is also incompatible with perfect love of God.

b. As concerns Indifferent Goods

16. But as for the other goods, the indifferent ones, it seems I could hate them for my neighbor, both because I can rightly hate or not want them for myself, and because he can rightly not want them for himself. And whatever he can rightly not want for himself he can rightly not want for another, for whatever I can rightly not want for myself if I were as he is, I can rightly not want for myself.

17. The assumption just made is plain, for I can want myself not to have riches or health or things universally necessary for bodily life, and I can rightly do this in two ways: either first by despising them (for example, if I were to become a pauper voluntarily), or second by wanting God to inflict the loss of them on me because of my sins or, if I am to have them inflicted, to accept them willingly and to rejoice while they are being inflicted.

18. So likewise I can in as many ways will these things, namely voluntary poverty and thus loss of riches, for someone else. I can even want certain evils, I mean temporal evils, to be inflicted by God on someone for his emendation and correction. And if the evils have already been inflicted I can still want them for him by approving the divine judgment and being glad about them. And not only in these ways can I want for him such extrinsic disadvantages, but also, if I believe that, because of temporal advantages, he will always be adding to his sins, I can want for him the evils opposite to these advantages. And this holds in like manner of the goods of fortune and of the goods of the body.

c. A Doubt about Bodily Life

19. But as to bodily life there is a doubt whether I could hate or not want it for an enemy.

20. And it seems that I could:

First because a judge in a criminal case can justly pronounce sentence against him; the prosecution too can, in the same case, rightly act against him; both therefore can want for him the fact of the sentence, namely the killing of him as the guilty party.[a]

a. [*Interpolation*] On this point see Gratian *Decrees* part 2, case 23, q.5, 'On those who are to be killed'. Also on the same point Boniface VIII's *Decretals* bk.6 tit.4 ch.2 'On Homicide', and bk.3 tit.24 ch.3, 'Clerics and monks should not be involved in secular affairs' and 'A bishop or anyone who…'

21. Likewise, second, if anyone is a hindrance to the Church and attacks it, then since, as far as in him lies, he is hindering the common good (because he is hindering the peace of the Church), and since the common good is more to be loved than the private good of any one person, and since consequently, if both goods cannot be had together, the private good is to be refused so that the common good may be preserved[a] – since all this is so, it seems that here one could properly will bodily death for such a persecutor, on account of the good he is hindering, namely the peace of the Church.

a. [*Interpolation*] On this see *Extra* 'On Rules of Right' Boniface VIII *Decretals* bk.6 tit. 12, 'The crime of a person ought not to be to the detriment of the Church'; and Gratian *Decrees* p.1 d.9 ch.1, d.10 ch.1 on both distinctions; and the Commentator [Michael of Ephesus] on *Ethics* 9.9.

22. On this article one can say that one cannot absolutely will bodily death, and reject life, for one's neighbor, because there is after death no way for repentance to be bestowed nor any conversion to the love of God as there is after the loss of riches or of courage or the like – on the contrary, the loss of these things can be an occasion for repentance while the loss of bodily life can never be. Now it does not seem that I could properly will for my neighbor what simply excludes him from the possibility of loving God, as death is such an exclusion.

23. However someone can properly will bodily death for another under a condition, for example if he believes the other will persist to the end in evil. And then he can choose death for him so as either to give space for the saints whom he is hindering or to prevent him adding sin to sin for which he will be more harshly punished after death. And these two reasons are taken from the legend of Saint Anastasia which she wrote to Chrysogonus [*Letter 1*, in *Martyrdom of St. Anastasia*, Simon Metaphrastes] about her husband Publius, that, as to the first one, "if God were to foresee that he would persist to the end in infidelity, God would bid him make way for the saints," and that, as to the second one, "it is better for him to breathe forth his life than to blaspheme the Son of God."

24. But neither in this case [n.23] nor in the two preceding, namely about the judge [n.20] and the tyrant [n.21], can anyone absolutely want death for his neighbor; on the contrary, rather, he should, as far as he can, not want it.

25. Here one must note, as was touched on in 3 d.15 n.58 and often elsewhere [3 d.16 n.56, d.26 n.116, *Lectura* 3 d.17 nn.22-23, 26], that when someone, because of the positing of a condition that is simply unwilled, wants something, then simply speaking he does not want it but rejects it. The fact is plain from someone throwing merchandise overboard, who voluntarily throws his merchandise overboard because a storm has sprung up (a storm that he simply speaking does not want). This voluntary act is not solely voluntary, because it is only willed on the supposition of something not-willed; but what is possible only on the basis of a supposition or presupposition of something impossible, is not possible simply.

26. In all these cases, therefore, the reason for death being in some way willed for one's neighbor is itself not simply willed; for the prosecutor in a court case and the judge of it are bound not to want the defendant to be guilty of the

supposed crime.[a] Someone who suffers tyrannical persecution is also bound not to want the tyrant to be a tyrant against the Church. In the third case too one is held, as far as in one lies, not to want him to be simply reprobate. And so, if what one does not want does come about [sc. the enemy commits a crime] then, on the supposition of what is now wanted instead [sc. punishment for crime], one can want death for him, though with a certain sadness. And this is the same as not to want it simply, for it has often been said above [n.25] that to will something under a condition is sufficient to cause sadness if the condition is realized.[b]

> a. [*Interpolation*] and not to want to punish him, as far as one can, for if he commits his crime out of lust or hatred or willingly, he sins mortally. Examine this whole matter in Gratian *Decrees* p.2 cause 11 q.3 ch. 65, and in Augustine (cited in Master Lombard 3 d.37 ch.5 n.5).
>
> b. [*Interpolation*] But is one bound to release an enemy from making amends as one is bound to release him from one's anger? It seems not, first from Richard of Middleton *Sent*. 3 d.30 q.2 ["If an enemy seeks pardon are we bound to release him not only from our anger but also from his making amends? I reply that when an enemy seeks pardon a man is bound to release him from his anger…and also when he does not seek pardon; but one is not bound to remit satisfaction or the making of amends for injury caused"]; and from Boniface VIII *Decretals* 2 tit.14 ch.1.

27. To the first argument, therefore, about the judge and prosecutor [n.20], the answer is plain from what has already been said [nn.25-26].

28. One could make the like reply to the second argument, about a tyrant [n.21]. However, one can reply differently, namely that a tyrant can only cause external persecution (according to our Savior's remark in *Matthew* 10.28, "Fear not those who kill the body but cannot kill the soul"). For after killing the body a tyrant has nothing more he can do. And such external persecution frequently gives the elect the opportunity to advance in virtue, and especially in patience, which according to *James* 1.4 "has its perfect work." For every church in its beginning made progress in this way [cf. Tertullian *Apol*. ch.50, 'the blood of the martyrs is the seed of the Church']. And so, in this case, it does not seem one may licitly desire even temporal death for a tyrant, unless perhaps there were someone who might justly inflict such death on him for his sins (if, say, one were to desire from God that justice be done by some such judge – yet with sadness, because one should always wish that the tyrant were not such as to deserve punishment of death).

2. On Positive Acts of Love

29. If we speak about the other way of taking the precept, namely positive acts of loving an enemy [n.13]: It could be said that eliciting at some time an act of love of a neighbor is not binding on anyone, for one is not bound even to think about him – for example if one were so occupied in contemplation of God that one never thought with full deliberation about one's neighbor. But if one should think about a neighbor, it is not necessary to elicit an act of love of him, for even without this one can perform acts properly ordered to the end and to what is

necessary to attain the end. Accordingly, one is much less bound to elicit an act of love of an enemy, because one is not bound even to think of him.

30. However one can, by moderating this reply, say that if some need of one's neighbor or an enemy is evident to anyone, for example that without our help he could not have what was necessary for attaining love of God (suppose he is an infidel and that without our teaching him he could not be converted to the truth; or suppose he is wicked and that without o correction he cannot be converted to the good – which may perhaps, however, never happen), then one is bound to want not only the final good for one's neighbor but also the goods necessary for him to attain the final good. And one is bound to want it not only by exterior volition but also by pursuing it with effective action, if one has the power.

31. But as to riches or health, the opposite of which one can will for him, as was said before [n.17], one is not bound positively to want them for him in some particular case.

32. As for spiritual goods, one is bound to want them for him not only with interior will but also with effective exterior action, in particular in the respect that one is bound to adore and pray to God on his behalf and on behalf of the whole Church. In this prayer one is bound to want the Church to be powerful as to spiritual good for everyone, good and bad. For just as a stomach would be bad that did not want its support to be strong enough to sustain the hand, so would he not be a good a member in the Church who did not want his good acts (if he has any) to prevail for every member of the Church, insofar as God accepts them and insofar as one is able to sustain himself and others (for one is never bound to want simply that which one can will the opposite of).

33. But as to bodily life, one is perhaps bound to want it with exterior as well as interior acts – especially if one can save a life and there is no one else nearby at the time able to help. For example, if someone were about to die of famine or drown in a river and only oneself were present to relieve his hunger or snatch him from the river, one would be bound then not only to want life for him but also, in order to assure it, to labor for it with all one's strength.

34. How to prove this, however, does not seem very clear either from Scripture or from reason. For if the person in need were in danger of death then, supposing he were good, he would [by dying] attain to perfect love of God in the fatherland, whereas if his bodily life was saved he might perhaps fall afterwards into sin and end in final evil. But it is pious to think piously about saving the life of a neighbor, because one must make the supposition that, if he is good, he could become better and his goodness will be valuable for himself and others; or if he is evil one must make the supposition that he will be corrected. For to judge piously is this, to interpret things always for the better when the opposite is not manifest.

II. To the Principal Arguments

35. To the first argument [n.2] I say that Christ's response to the question asking 'who is my neighbor' must be understood as follows. 'Neighbor' asserts a relation of equivalence, like 'friend' or 'brother'. Therefore, if he who shows mercy is a 'neighbor' (as is got from the Pharisee's reply), then it follows that he

to whom mercy was shown was held by him to be his neighbor; for he was not part of his family nor tied to him by sameness of nation but (as shown by the parable) was a foreigner. Therefore, anyone whom I can serve in a case of necessity, however much he is a foreigner, is to be held to be my neighbor. And this is what the Savior adds, "Go and do thou likewise" [*Luke* 10.37], that is, hold as neighbor anyone whom you can benefit, even if he is a foreigner to you. So not only is a benefactor a neighbor, but so is everyone who can be benefited by us – and benefited either by a good external feeling or by a good interior and passive love (which is an interior motion). And in this way even the blessed, whom we cannot benefit, can be loved and be our neighbors. But God, although he can be loved, can yet not have any other good added to him by anyone's love. And so God is not included among our neighbors.

36. To the second [n.2] I say that all the precepts of the second table [of the Ten Commandments] are explications of the command 'Love thy neighbor', for they specify that wherein we must not hate our enemy. For 'do not kill' includes not unjustly hating our enemy's bodily life; 'do not steal' and 'do not commit adultery' include not hating the good of our enemy's fortune or family, and so on as regard the others.[3]

37. To the authority from Augustine [n.5] – look for it.[4]

38. As to the verse from *Matthew* 5, "You have heard that it was said to the ancients…", it is significant that our Savior speaks of 'what was said' and not of 'what is written'. For although 'love your friend' was written, 'hate your enemy' was not written, but the Jews, perverting Scripture, proved it by arguing from the opposite, and it was thus that they kept it as a law. But that they were understanding the Scripture badly is proved there by our Savior, because he says [*Matthew* 5.46], "if you love only your friends who love you, what reward will you have?" The Pharisees had in this way a bad understanding of other precepts, as is plain about the command 'Honor your father and mother' [*Exodus* 20.12], and the Savior gives an argument against them [*Matthew* 15.4-9, *Mark* 7.9-13]. For their interpretation was that if anyone offered his goods to the temple, and did not give them to a needy parent, he would be keeping the commandment, because God is our 'spiritual father'. But Christ refutes this by saying, "You make void the commandment of God because of your tradition" [*Matthew* 15.6].

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[3] No reply to the third argument [n.4] is given by Scotus, but it is in effect responded to in the quotation from Bonaventure in the next footnote.

[4] The Vatican Editors refer to Bonaventure *Sent.* 3 d.30 a.1 q.4 ad 3. "To the objection that loving one's enemies is something marvelous, one must say that 'marvelous' means something that is above the power of nature. But this can be taken in two ways, as to the operations of nature simply or as to the operations of rational nature. Now to do marvels beyond the power of nature simply…is not given to everyone, while to do marvels beyond the power of rational nature comes [to everyone] through sanctifying grace, namely through faith and charity. For by faith we believe many things that we could not believe without faith and that seem to infidels to be extremely incredible; and by charity we love things that seem hateful to those who lack charity. And these marvels are contained in the divine law, and to do them is given to everyone who wants to receive sanctifying grace. And so one cannot argue that we are not bound to love our enemies; for this belongs to a different kind of marvel than what Augustine is talking about."

39. Hence appears the answer to the quotation from the *Topics* [n.7], because that rule holds only of precise causes [cf. I d.43 n.13, II dd. 34-37 n.94], that is, where the contraries on one side do not both fall under one extreme of the other contrary. For if color had a contrary, for instance *a*, the inference would not follow 'white is colored, therefore black is colored, namely is *a*'. Now so it is in the matter at issue, because under the idea of 'loving' is contained both friend and enemy per accidens. The thing is plain about enemy, because the same reason to love is found in both enemy and friend, namely the possibility of loving the primary object of charity, which they both have insofar as they are the image of God.

Thirty First Distinction

Single Question

Whether Charity Remains in the Fatherland such as not to be Extinguished

1. About the thirty first distinction I ask[a] whether charity remains in the fatherland such that it is not extinguished.

a. [*Interpolation*] About the thirty first distinction, where the Master deals with charity as to its duration, the question asked is whether…

2. That it does not remain:

The Apostle's reason in *1 Corinthians* 13.8-10 that the other gifts are extinguished is that they are partial, "For we know in part etc." But charity now is partial because it is imperfect; otherwise, since beatitude consists in it, one would now be blessed.

3. But if it be said that beatitude does not consist in the habit of charity but in its act, then on the contrary: An act can be elicited in proportion to the perfection of the habit, and so, if the habit is now equal to what will be had in the fatherland, then the act will be equal likewise, and enjoyment now will be as intense and as perfect as it will be then.

4. Further, faith is extinguished because it is about a hidden object; but charity is about the same object; therefore etc.

5. Further, Augustine in *83 Questions* 48 says, "Some matters of faith are never known to be the case." If faith is now had of these things by wayfarers, some grasp can be had of them in the fatherland – and this grasp can only be faith because these things can only be believed. Therefore faith as to these things at least is not extinguished.

6. Further, the habit with which I grasp a thing is the same habit as I rest in when I possess it [cf. d.26 n.10], for according to Augustine *On the Trinity* 9.12 n.18, "the desire of the yearner becomes the love of the enjoyer," and this is much plainer about the habit. It is also proved by similarity with natural things, because the same form is the principle for a things' moving to the term and for its resting in it. Therefore, since hope is the habit of desiring the infinite good, the same

habit will be the reason for resting in it when had, and so it will not be extinguished.

7. On the contrary:

The Apostle in *1 Corinthians* 13.8 seems to be for the opposite.

I. To the Question

A. On Faith and Hope

8. No habit to be posited in the fatherland is to remain there in vain; but a habit whose inclination would then be impossible is in vain. Now faith in its idea inclines only to a non-apparent and hidden good, according to *Hebrews* 11.1, "Faith is the substance of things to be hoped for, the evidence of things not seen." And hope inclines only to a good advantageous for desiring, according to *Romans* 8.24, "Hope which is seen is not hope," taking hope for the thing hoped for and for its object. Now these inclinations will not be able to be had in the fatherland, where the Good will be evident and possessed. Therefore these habits will not remain or be there, because they would be superfluous.

9. But there is a doubt here, namely will these virtues be extinguished because things incompossible with them will succeed to them?

10. I reply that there is no need that other habits succeed to them, speaking of habit properly as act differs from habit, for, as was said above in the material about the soul of Christ [d.14 nn.25-30], it is not necessary to posit in Christ's soul a distinct and created habit, different, that is, from charity, which would be the principle of his seeing and tending to the object. For habits are only posited in a power to habituate and facilitate it [d.33 n.25, I d.17 nn.7, 48-51], and not for eliciting the act – or at least not posited in the intellect so that the object be present to the intellect and so that the intellect be able to operate about it quickly and easily, which it would not be able to do if there were in any act a new object or an object to be newly acquired. For the object will always be present in the fatherland and always acting actually on the power, and the power will be supremely inclined and facilitated.

11. But if some acts follow on in the fatherland that are repugnant to acts had now (if, that is, 'to see' and 'to hold' are repugnant to the acts 'to believe' and 'to hope'), these following acts do not properly have a suitability to succeed to faith and hope. The proof is that Paul when in rapture [*2 Corinthians* 12.2-4] had at least the act of vision and yet the habit of faith was not extinguished in him; therefore, the habit of the one is not repugnant to the habit of the other. So faith and hope are not extinguished because something incompossible succeeds to them, but because they would be superfluous.[a]

a. [*Interpolation*] because the acts to which they incline are repugnant to the acts in the fatherland.

12. But there remains still another doubt about the object of these virtues, whether this object is God as he is hidden or is absent (so that hiddenness or absence is the formal idea of the object), or whether the object's only formal idea is God as God (as was said in d.26 nn.89-105 about the object of faith and hope,

and in *Prol*. nn.151-157, 167, 170 about the first object of hope and the object of theology). If the latter be the case, it does not seem that the habits would lack the formal idea of their object, and so they will be able to remain in the fatherland and to incline us to their proper object. And argument can be made in the same way about acts, namely that the same thing under its proper idea is the object of the habit and of the acts proper to the habit.

13. Besides as was argued at least about hope [d.26 n.97], it seems that hope could incline us to loving what is present and to desiring what is absent.

14. I say that, with respect to the same object and under the same formal idea of object, there can be many acts differing as to being perfect and imperfect (and not only acts of diverse powers ordered to each other but even acts of the same power). But perfect and imperfect are not disposed to each other as greater and lesser in the same species, but as diverse species in the same genus (namely as intermediates and extremes). Thus I say that with respect to God in himself there are not only acts of willing and understanding that are subordinate acts of diverse powers, but there are also acts of loving him in this way or in that, and these acts are different, as it were, not only according to more and less in the same species but as intermediates and extremes in the same genus.

15. This can be applied to the matter at issue because, since the perfection of an act comes from two things, namely from the power and from the object, when the proper idea of one of them varies in itself or also in conjunction with the other cause, or even when close to the other cause (for partial causes act less perfectly with respect to their effects when they are not adequately close to or conjoined with each other), then the perfection of the action will vary. And so it is in the matter at issue.

16. Now, with respect to the act of possession the object of the will is present in itself to it; but with respect to the act of desire it is absent, and it is absent by reason of the formal idea of the act of desire – for the object is not really conjoined in itself with the power. This act of desire, then, is imperfect with respect to the power and is in a different species, and the imperfection belongs to some species intermediate to the extreme – not because of any idea in the object but because of the closeness of the object to the other partial cause, and this closeness is sufficient for making a difference of species in the effects of the two causes. It is like when some action would follow the sun insofar as it is precisely and only present according to a reflected or indirect ray, and some action would follow it only and precisely as it is present in a direct ray; these effects would be distinct in species not by the distinction of the passive thing or of the agent (as to the formal idea of agent), but by the varying closeness of the same agent to the passive thing.

17. When, therefore, the argument is made that the object is formally the same [n.12], I concede this about the object of the virtues in the fatherland. And it does not follow from this that the acts are the same in species, not even the acts that belong to the same power. On the contrary, the acts can be diverse and also have the same force if they are per se about an object diversely present to the power. And from this assertion about the distinction of the acts it seems that a similar distinction can be asserted of the distinction of habits that incline to

several such acts; for corresponding to every act of any species in the same rational nature that can be frequently elicited in this way and in that, there can be some habit inclining by regular rule to such acts.

18. Further, as to what was said touching hope [n.13], one can say to it that just as any act distinct from some other act in species can have its own habit in the will and the intellect inclining them to that act, so also there can be one general habit inclining to an act single in genus and many in species – in the way that justice, if it be posited to be a virtue one in genus but not in species, has an act similarly one in genus. In like manner there could be some habit that per se regards God for object insofar as he agrees with rational nature, and thus it could indistinctly incline toward him. And if to these sorts of acts there were a habit inclining to God thus indistinctly, that is, not under the proper idea according to which it is proximate to the power that tends toward God, this habit would not vary whether the power was tending to the object by desiring it or by holding it. This habit is not posited as hope but as a habit precisely inclining to the imperfect act itself that desire is. I concede therefore that there could be a single habit tending to God as he is the advantageous good, and this habit would not have to be extinguished. But hope is posited to be perfectly inclining to an imperfect act, and by an imperfection of a different idea, namely an imperfection coming from the absence of the object in respect of the power tending toward it.

B. On Charity

19. Having seen how faith and hope are extinguished, we must see how charity remains the same in the fatherland and on the way to it. For, suppose that this is the idea of charity, namely that it is friendship with God as he is good in himself. This habit does not incline distinctly to a perfect act of loving God the way he is loved when he is present in himself and perfectly. Nor does it distinctly incline to an imperfect act the way God is loved when he is present imperfectly and in a mirror. Rather it indistinctly inclines to both this act and that.[a]

> a. [*Interpolation*] But the inclination to love God in himself will remain in the fatherland; therefore the charity that inclines to such love of him will remain.

20. And that such a habit can be something one has is plain from what was just said of hope [n.18]. For what was said there is more reasonable about a habit tending to God as he is good in himself than of a habit tending to him as he is good for me [the advantageous good]. For the act that tends to God as he is good in himself does not vary according to the perfect or imperfect presence of God the way that the act varies that tends to God as he is an advantageous good. For the first variation [according to the perfect or imperfect presence of God] is either not in species or, if it is, not in a species as remote as the second variation [according to advantageous good]. From the fact then that the inclination to love God in himself will remain in the fatherland, so will remain the inclination to the act posited to belong to charity the way it is posited to be the act of charity; and so the habit will be able to remain.

21. If you say in objection that the presence or variation of such and such an object can vary the act in its species, and so there can be two habits distinct in species, one of which is a principle for loving God in himself as he is present through faith (and this one will be extinguished in the fatherland), and the other of which is a principle for loving God as he is present through vision, and this habit follows on vision – I concede that two such habits can exist together in the will. But here the idea of charity is being posited, not because it would precisely be the principle of an imperfect act about a hidden object, but because it would be indistinctly the principle of an act tending to God as he is good in himself.

C. Conclusion

22. Briefly then about the two appetitive virtues of hope and charity (whatever may hold of faith), it can be conceded that there could be one appetitive habit with respect to the advantageous good that remains in the fatherland (like charity), and that there could be two appetitive habits with respect to God as he is the noble good and as he is the advantageous good, one of which would be extinguished (the way faith is now posited to be extinguished).

23. But we, from the sayings of the saints, are supposing a distinction in these habits of hope and charity, namely that hope does not incline to an act of tending absolutely to the advantageous good but to an imperfect act that comes from the absence of the object; so that the imperfection is not accidental to the act insofar as it belongs to the habit but is essential to it as it is elicited by the habit. But charity, as it is a habit, is a principle of tending to God as he is good in himself, so that perfection and imperfection as coming from the presence and absence of the object are accidental to the act as the act belongs to the habit. But charity inclines to an imperfect act from the absence of the object and to a perfect act from the presence of the object.

II. To the Principal Arguments

24. To the first argument [n.2] I say that the other virtues are ‘in part’ because they essentially include in their acts something that necessarily determines for themselves an imperfection that will in that [future] state be then extinguished. But charity does not necessarily determine its act to anything on which imperfection may follow, but the act, insofar as it belongs to charity, is indifferent, so that the sort of imperfection or perfection posited is accidental to it.

25. As to what is argued against the response given there [n.3] – this response is good insofar as it denies that beatitude can be had here; for although someone might have here a charity equal to what is had in the fatherland, yet not because of this would he be blessed here; for although he might have equal charity, yet he could not now have an equal act as he then will, and beatitude consists in that act. But in answer to the objection itself [n.3] I reply that as perfect an act cannot be had even though the habit be as perfect. For the generating cause of an act of love is not only the one partial cause that is the will, nor even the one partial cause that is charity [cf. I d.17 n.40], but the third cause

that is the object present in actual inclination, as was said in *Lectura* II d.25 nn.69-80; and this third cause is of a determinate perfection according as it is determinately present – if more, more; if less, less. There cannot, by common law, be an object present to a wayfarer the way it is in the fatherland, not even by the presence of the species of it. And therefore it is probable that not only can an equal act not be had but also not an act of the same species. Nor does it follow from this that the habit cannot be equal, because the habit is not the total principle of the act but a partial one. And the habit always gives an act equal to the way it is a principle. For always, as much as is in itself, it gives to its act that the act be a loving of God as God is the supreme good in himself; and the habit does not give to it that it be of God as God is present or absent; nor does it give absolutely the perfection that it has from the object's being present in this way or that.

26. As to the second argument [n.4], it is plain that although absence is not the formal idea in the object of faith or hope, yet the act of faith is per se such in its species that the imperfection from the determination of its habit necessarily follows it. And therefore faith determinately inclines to an act of a species of the sort for which there cannot be a determination in the fatherland. But charity, although it now concerns what is hidden and consequently something imperfect, does yet not incline to an act thus imperfect but to an act to which imperfection is accidental.

27. To the third [n.5] one can say that things believable have a threefold difference:

For there are some the vision of which per se belongs to beatitude (as is the vision of the Trinity), and these sort are things knowable (using 'know' in an extended sense), that is, visible; and they will be seen. And about these believables the statement that 'vision succeeds to faith' is to be per se understood [n.11].

There are others the vision of which in some way pertains to beatitude but not essentially; these are also not knowables because they are certain temporal facts, as are things believable about the Incarnation. And about such believables vision does concomitantly succeed to faith, but not indeed vision of the thing in itself (for Christ on the cross or in the womb of the Virgin will not be seen in the fatherland), but in vision in the Word.

Third are believables that are never knowables, because they belong entirely to time and never pertain to beatitude (either principally or concomitantly), of which sort are some other truths pertaining to human acts. And if some wayfarer has faith about such things, one can concede that in him, even in the beatific act, faith can remain.

28. To the final argument about hope [n.6] the answer is plain from what was said in the body of the question [nn.18, 23].

Thirty Second Distinction

Single Question

Whether God loves Everything out of Charity Equally

1. About the thirty second distinction I ask[a] whether God loves everything out of charity equally.

a. [*Interpolation*] About the thirty first distinction, where the Master deals with the charity by which God loves the creature, the question asked is whether…

2. That he does not:

Charity is a habit and consequently it formally perfects a power; it supposes therefore that the power is imperfect; God's will is in itself most perfect; therefore etc.

3. Further, not everything can be loved out of charity, because inanimate and irrational things cannot; therefore etc.

4. Further, God does not choose everyone; he even has anger against some; therefore the non-elect and those whom he has anger against he does not love equally with the elect. Besides, he does not give equal gifts to everyone, but in everyone his will of being well-pleased is fulfilled; therefore he does not will goods to everyone equally.

5. To the opposite:

God understands everything equally, because he understands them through one formal idea; therefore likewise about his loving them out of charity.

I. To the Question

6. Here three things must be looked at: first that God loves everything; second that this act is not proper to any one divine person; third that it is one act – and here will be stated how it is one, and how equal or not equal, or how it is disposed equally or unequally as regard everything.

A. God loves Everything

7. The proof of the first is that (as shown in I d.2 nn.75-88) God of himself naturally understands and wills, and is consequently capable of blessedness [cf. 2 d.1 nn.30-31, 4 d.49 p.1 q.1-2 n.27]. But in him power does not precede act, for then he would be imperfect; so he is blessed in actuality, and just by willing and understanding himself, for no other object can beatify the rational creature (from I d.1 n.15). Therefore, he actually understands and loves himself.

8. But the proof that he also loves other things is that, just as every intellect has power for anything intelligible, so every will has power for anything willable. Therefore the divine will can love all lovables, and not as doing so potentially before doing so actually. Therefore he loves all other lovables in addition to himself.

9. An objection here is that, if so, God would love contraries at the same time, because both contraries have the idea of being lovable.

10. This conclusion must necessarily be conceded of those natures that are in themselves contrary. But God does not love them so that they be present at the

same time in the same subject, for this is not something lovable. Certain things he also loves by willing them, and willing them by effective will, namely those that he at some point produces in being. Certain things he loves by a will of simple well-pleasingness, not by effective will; but these things he never produces in being, though they are shown by his intellect capable of having as much goodness as the things he does love with effective will.

11. A reason also put forward in support of this conclusion too (which is a presupposition in the proof in I d.2 n.74, nZ that God is formally willing) is that 'to be willing' is a pure perfection [a perfection simply]. For in all things that divide being the more noble divisor is a pure perfection. But if being is divided into willing and non-willing, the willing is simply more perfect; therefore it is a pure perfection.

B. This Sort of Love is not Proper to Any One Divine Person

12. From the above conclusion [n.10] there follows a second, that no pure perfection is proper to any one Divine Person [n.6].

13. For the point [in n.11] may be proved in another way, that if willing were proper to one Person it would be proper to the Holy Spirit, and so either the Holy Spirit would not necessarily proceed [sc. from the other Persons] or the Father would necessarily love something other than himself. By parity of reasoning the same holds of the Son, that he does not state any respect proper to something other than God. For to both the Spirit and the Son there is one common idea, namely that their relation cannot be a necessary prerequisite for the extremes because the relation itself requires both extremes. But nothing in any being whatever other than God is of itself necessary. So no relation to anything other than God in any being whatever can be in itself simply necessary, and so no such relation can be intrinsic to any Divine Person insofar as the Divine Person has the divine nature in the determinate way the Person has it.

14. There is an argument also about the Word, that if the Word were to state its own proper relation to a creature as being declarative of the creature, this would be insofar as the creature has being in the Father's memory and thus expresses the 'word' of the Father,[a] and from this conclusion there seems to follow a manifold falsehood:

> a. [*Interpolation*] or insofar as [the Word] manifests everything and makes it to exist in intelligible being.

First because no creature has being properly in the divine memory as it is memory (as was touched on II d.1 n.32); for it first becomes intelligible by act of the divine intelligence.

Second because then the creature would be the idea of moving the infinite intellect to a word insofar as this word is the intellect's word, and so a finite thing would move the infinite intellect and thus the infinite intellect would be cheapened. At any rate if, per impossibile, there were a single stone in the divine memory (as there is sometimes one intelligible thing in our memory), it would then be the reason in the memory for the expressing of its own 'word'; and then

the intended conclusion would follow, namely that a finite thing would be a reason for moving the infinite intellect.[a]

a. [*Interpolation*] and would be the reason for producing infinite knowledge. This seems false.

Again too, since a creature is not formally infinite in the divine memory or even the divine intellect, how it might found opposite relations of origin does not seem easy to prove.

This consequence also seems to hold, that there would be as many 'words' as there are intelligibles in the Father's memory; and they would be simply distinct. For if they were in the memory and were thus to be expressive in the memory, they would only be so as each is thus intelligible.

15. But if there is another understanding of what was stated [n.14], namely that the Word declares other things as they have, with respect to the act of declaring, the idea of term in some intelligible being, then this does not seem proper to the Word, because the whole Trinity produces them in intelligible being (as was said in II d.1 nn.32-33). For each Person holds each thing in its memory.

16. Now as to how the Father is admitted to speak properly by the Word, this was expounded in I d.32 nn.24-25, namely that there 'to speak' imports a double respect: a real respect of origin (which is of the expressed thing to the expresser of it), and a relation of reason (which is of the thing declared to the declarer of it), so that the Word is that by which he is called both what is expressed by the one speaking and called what declares what is spoken. Now the relation of 'to declare' is appropriated to the Word alone, for it proceeds by way of generated knowledge and is thus declarative. Now it is common to the three Persons if one takes 'to declare' formally. But when it is taken by way of principal it can be proper to the Father, for the Father declares as a principal insofar as he expresses generated knowledge.

17. And this double way of taking 'to declare', namely formally and by way of principal, is seen in other relative terms, as in 'to assimilate' and 'to adequate' [I d.31 nn.23-29]; for the form whereby something is similar is what formally assimilates it to another, but the agent that gives it its form is what makes it similar.

18. The Father can, in the same way, be admitted to love by the Holy Spirit, as was expounded in I d.32 nn.32-33; and this is appropriated to the Holy Spirit but is not proper to him. And a double relation is connoted there, namely one real, that is, the relation of spiration, and another a relation of reason, namely in what is spirated to what is loved by it – this relation of reason is appropriated to the Holy Spirit yet it belongs to the three Persons.

C. How there is Equality and Inequality in the One act of God's Love

19. The third point [n.6] is plain, because the will by which God loves is one power and its first object is one; and it has a single infinite act equal to itself. Nor is it necessary that this one act include everything, as if everything were required for the perfection of the act. All that follows from the perfection of the

act is that the act tend perfectly to the first term, and also tend to everything of which the first term is the total reason for acting. But in the case of both the divine intellect and the divine will the divine essence alone is able to be the first reason for acting; because if something else could be the first reason the power would be cheapened.

20. From this it is plain that, when we compare the act with the agent, there is no inequality in God in his love of everything.

21. But if we compare the act to what it connotes, or to the things it ranges over, there is inequality – not only because the things willed are unequal or because unequal goods are willed, but also because the act ranges over them according to a certain order. For everyone who wills rationally wills first the end, and immediately second what attains the end, and third the other things that are more remotely ordained for attaining the end. Thus does God also most reasonably will them, although not in diverse acts but in a single one, insofar as he tends to ordered objects in diverse ways: First, he wills the end, and herein his act is perfect and his intellect perfect and his will blessed. Second, he wills things that are immediately ordered to himself, namely by predestining the elect (who attain to him immediately), and this as by a sort of reflection, when he wills others to love the same object as himself (as was said earlier about charity, 3 d.28 nn.14-15). For, first, he loves himself in ordered way (and so not in disordered way by being jealous or envious). Second, he wants to have others as his joint lovers, and this is his willing others to have his own love in them – and this is to predestine them, if we supposw he wants them to have this sort of good finally and eternally. And, third, he wants the things that are necessary for attaining this end, namely the goods of grace. Fourth, because of these goods, he wants other goods that are more removed, namely this sensible world in which others may serve him, so that in this way what is said in *Physics* 2.2.194a34-35might be true, namely that "man is in some way the end of all things," of all sensible things that is, for it is because of the world willed by God in the second moment, as it were, that all sensible things are willed in the fourth moment, as it were. Also, that which is closer to the ultimate end is accustomed to be called the end of those that are more remote [I d.41 n.41]. Man, then, will be the end of the sensible world, either because God wills the sensible world in view of predestined man, or because he more immediately wills man to love him than he wills the sensible world to exist.

22. And thus is it plain that the inequality of the things he wills (as far as concerns the willed things) is not a matter of the volition of him who wills but because his volition ranges over the objects in the way stated. But this inequality in the act is because of the goodness that is presupposed in all objects other than God, which goodness is as it were the reason that they are to be willed in this way or in that. But this reason is in the divine will alone. For it is because the divine will accepts certain things to such or such a degree that they are good in such or such a degree, and not conversely. Or if it be granted that there is in them, as things shown [to the will] by the intellect, some degree of essential goodness according to which they ought rationally to please the will in ordered way, then at any rate this is certain, that the fact they are well pleasing to God, as to their

actual existence, is simply from the divine will without any determining reason on their part.

II. To the Principal Arguments of Both Parts

23. To the first argument [n.2] I say that a habit possesses something of perfection, and to this extent it is posited in God. But to the extent it requires imperfection (because it requires a power that is perfectible in act), it is not in God. For he is identically the same as his power, and the same as his act, since whatever is in him is of itself formally infinite.

24. To the second [n.3] I say that though inanimate things properly are not lovable out of charity (for charity is a friendship and no friendship is properly to be had with them), yet I can have for them out of charity some 'willing' of the sort that should be had for them out of charity. For I can out of charity want a tree to be and want a tree to serve me for such and such an act, insofar as such an act aids me to love God in himself. And in this way it can be admitted that God loves all things out of charity, not by a will of friendship but by the sort of will that should be had with respect to them.

25. The third argument [n.4] proves inequality as to the goods willed for those who are loved. For God does not will as great goods for the non-predestined as he wills for the predestined, and he does not will for those with whom he is said to be angry (at the time when he is said to be angry) as much good as he wills for those with whom he is not said to be angry. And this inequality of love, that is, the effect of love, must be admitted to hold not only as to degrees of nature but also within individuals of the same species. Nor is the reason for this the nature in this thing or that, but the divine will alone [cf. I d.41 n.53].

26. The argument to the opposite about 'understanding' [n.5] only proves equality of the act as it is the act of the one understanding, and not as it ranges over its objects.

Thirty Third Distinction

Single Question

Whether the Moral Virtues are in the Will as in their Subject

1. About the thirty third distinction I ask[a] whether the moral virtues are in the will as in their subject.

> a. [*Interpolation*] About the thirty third distinction, where the Master deals with the moral or cardinal virtues, the question asked is whether…

2. That they are not:

In *Ethics* 1.13.1103a3-5 the Philosopher says that the virtues are in the irrational part of the soul, and the exposition of the Commentator [Eustratius, *In*

Eth. ad Nic. 1 chs.18-19] is that they are in what is intermediate between the vegetative and rational part; such a part is not the will but the sensitive appetite.

3. Further, in *Ethics* 3.13.1117b23-49 the Philosopher puts courage and temperance in the sensitive appetite.

4. Further the Commentator [Eustratius 6 ch.6] puts prudence in the opiniative part of the rational part.

5. Further in *Politics* 1.5.1254b4-9 the Philosopher says, "Reason rules the inferior appetite with despotic rule, but the superior appetite with political rule, such that appetite is able to have a movement against it." Therefore, in order for this part to be moved with delight by right reason, there will be need to posit certain virtues in it.

6. Further, courage and temperance are said to be in the irascible and concupiscible powers, and these powers are not distinct powers in the will but only in the sensitive appetite. For the conditions in the object that they have regard to, namely the arduous and the delightful good [cf. d.26 n.28], do not vary the per se object of the will, but only the sensible good that is the object of the sensitive appetite.

7. To the contrary:

"Virtue is a habit of choice" from the definition in *Ethics* 2.6.1106b36-07a1; but choice is an act of the will or of reason, according to the Philosopher in *Ethics* 6.2.1139a22-23, "for choice is either deliberative appetite or…" These features belong to the will, which operates on what is presupposed in reason's knowledge. A habit belongs to the power to which that operation itself per se belongs; therefore moral habit belongs per se to the will.

8. Further, virtue has the honorable good for its per se object; the honorable good is the per se object of the will.

9. Further, virtue is the principle of praiseworthy acts, from *Ethics* 2.5.1106a15-17; but to no one is praise due save because he is acting voluntarily; therefore the virtue whereby he performs praiseworthy acts belongs to that to which acting freely per se belongs, which is the will.

I. To the Question

A. Opinion of Aquinas

10. An opinion stated here[5] is that the Philosopher took the negative side of the question [sc. the moral virtues do not belong to the will], or that elsewhere he spoke incompletely about the moral virtues. For whenever he speaks about them he seems to admit that they are in the sensitive part, and never that they are in the intellective part, save for justice, in *Ethics* 5.1.1229a6-9.

11. The reasons given for this are as follows:

The first is of this sort. The will is of itself determined to the good simply, because its proper object is contrasted with the good in the present moment (which is the object of the sensitive appetite). Or if the will can tend to the good in

[5] Scotus takes Aquinas' opinion from numerous of Aquinas' writings (and also from summaries by Henry of Ghent), including Aquinas' *Commentary on the Sentences*, the *Summa Theologica*, and *Commentary on the Ethics*.

the present moment, it can be sufficiently determined to tend or not to tend to it by what reason displays to the will (for the apprehended object, as it is apprehended, seems to be what moves the will); so there is no need to posit a habit in the will, but it is enough if the intellect is sufficiently perfect in showing it what is right.

12. Further, a second argument is given from the freedom of the will. For the will, which is free, can sufficiently determine itself, and so it needs nothing else to determine it. The same point is argued in another way, that if the will acts freely of itself then 'a determinate willing' inclining it to act is repugnant to it. But virtue gives inclination by way of nature, and so is repugnant to the mode of action of the will; and so there is no virtue in the will.

13. A third argument is "wherever there are extremes there is a mean between them" [*Eudemian Ethics* 3.4.1231b34-35]. So wherever there are extreme passions, there will be virtue, which is moderator of the passions. The passions are in the sensitive appetite and not in the will [*Ethics* 3.13.1117b23-24].

14. A fourth argument is that if there could be in the will a virtue arising from the will's right acts (which are other than the acts of the sensitive appetite), then an angel could acquire virtues from morally virtuous correct willing. This result seems unacceptable and is manifestly against the Philosopher *Ethics* 10.8.1178b8-18, where he denies moral virtues of them [sc. of god or spiritual beings].

B. The Opposite Opinion of Henry of Ghent which Rejects the Opinion of Aquinas

1. Henry's Opinion in Itself

15. This opinion [of Aquinas] is refuted in ways like those used to support it:

First is the authority of Aristotle, for he himself says in *Politics* 1.131102b30-31, "it is necessary for the ruler to have virtue so that he may rule rightly, and this in a greater way than in a slave so that he may be ruled rightly." And Aristotle applies this analogy to the superior and inferior parts in the soul.

16. Further this view concedes that justice is in the will [n.10]; so the general reasons about the will and moral virtue [nn.11-15] are not conclusive. Nor even should the authority of the Philosopher in *Ethics* 1.13.1102b30-31 about 'being obedient to reason' be understood of the sensitive appetite alone; for if he means only the sensitive appetite by the term 'obedient to reason' then he is incomplete in his division of the soul as to its capacity for moral virtue. And so, to the extent he intends to treat of the soul, he is incompletely dividing it. For he treats of it as it is susceptive of moral virtue, for instance justice, so at any rate the soul is susceptive of virtue as to justice, which is neither in the reason nor in what is obedient to reason, the way this opinion understands these two divisions.

17. Further, in *Ethics* 1.6.1097b34-98a5, before the definition of virtue, when Aristotle is intending to investigate the idea of happiness,[a] he speaks as follows, "We must separate off the nutritive part. Next is the sensitive part, and

this seems common to all animals. What is left is a certain practical part, and the part of it persuadable by reason, and this insofar as it has reason and understands." From this text it is plain that the Philosopher first excludes the sensitive part, because there is in it no activity of man as he is man. The sort of activity of man as man accords with the moral virtues, and consequently these virtues will not be placed principally in the sensitive part. Therefore, what is left, namely activity of the part that has reason, is per se a part of the soul, surpassing the whole sensitive part – and this part the Philosopher himself divides into the understanding part and the part that is persuadable by reason. So by 'persuadable by reason' he means there the will, because it is plain that by 'the understanding part' he means the intellect. Therefore, it seems that what can be got expressly from his words is that he sometimes calls the will 'able to obey reason' and sometimes he calls the sensitive appetite 'able to obey reason', as at the end of the *Ethics* [n.16]. And so 'able to obey reason' is taken in two ways, and 'rational' is taken in two ways: in one way strictly and primarily and thus it belongs only to the intellect; in another way not strictly or primarily, though simply such, and thus it belongs to the will; to the third part, namely the sensitive appetite, it belongs not properly but by way of transference. The intermediate part, then, the will, is sometimes called 'rational' by reference to one extreme and sometimes 'obedient to reason' by reference to the other extreme. For when taking 'rational' strictly, the will is able to obey reason; but when taking 'rational' broadly (not however improperly, but only for that which belongs to the mind) the will is rational.[b] The sensitive appetite is not only persuadable by reason but also obedient to it; and these words can very well be proved, for what is free is persuadable, but not properly 'persuadable but obedient'. The sensitive appetite, however, which is not free, is not properly persuadable but is obedient, for it can be subjected to the command of the will.

a. [*Interpolation*] which is in the work of man as he is man.

b. [*Interpolation*] and only persuadable by reason and not obedient; and this belongs not to reason but to the will alone.

18. Further, there are many authorities to this effect:

Augustine in *Morals of the Church* 1.15, where he holds that the four moral virtues are only ordered love or loves.

19. Augustine *City of God* 14.5-6, at length.

20. Avicenna *Metaphysics* 9.7.[a]

a. [*Interpolation*] Look for other authorities in Bonaventure *Sentences* III d.33 un. q.3 note 1.

2. Against the Reasons for Aquinas' Opinion

21. Further, the reasons adduced for the opinion are adduced for the opposite:

22. [Against the first reason] – The first [n.11] is as follows: the will is indeterminate to opposites, not only to opposite objects but to opposite modes of action, namely rightly and not rightly; therefore, it needs something determinative inclining it to right action, and this will be virtue. The consequence is plain: for the only necessity to posit virtues in a power is so that powers able of themselves to act rightly and not rightly may be regulated. The proof of the antecedent is that the will can choose anything shown it in which is shown the idea of its first object; but in eliciting such choices it can act not rightly.

23. Now if you say, 'it suffices that reason show things rightly, therefore a virtue is not required in the will but in the reason' – this is false, because then it would be necessary for reason first to err in its showing before the will chooses badly; and so, before the first sin of the will there would be error in the intellect – which is irrational, for then punishment would precede guilt.

24. Further, given that the will could be sufficiently determined by the intellect for right action, it does not follow that no habit will be generated in the intellect whereby it is more determined to right judgment, for insofar as the intellect has an action prior to an act of will it acts merely naturally; and yet there is no denying that in the intellect a habit for right judgment (namely prudence) is generated by repeated acts. Since therefore the will is not of itself a power more determined to one thing than the intellect is, then from acts repeatedly elicited by the will a certain right disposition can be generated in it for similar acts, and that I call a virtue.

25. Further, habits are not only posited so that powers may act rightly through them, but so that they may act with pleasure and promptly [*Ethics* 2.5.1106a15-17, 1.9.1099a14; Scotus *Ord*. I d.17 n7]. Now though the will could be determined by reason to choose rightly, yet not to choose with pleasure and promptly without the proper habit. The proof is that if someone first vicious begins newly to be recalled to the opposite, and reason tells him that something opposite to his vice is to be chosen, then although he choose it yet he would not do so with pleasure; for the whole vicious habit is not at once corrupted in the first act, but rather it is then corrupted not at all or only very slightly. Experience makes this plain, because someone newly converted chooses the good with difficulty, and it would be pleasant for him to choose according to his preceding bad custom. Therefore, in order for the will to do with pleasure what is told it by reason, a habit is required in it for eliciting an act conformable to that habit.

26. To the first argument then [n.11] I reply that it proceeds by equivocation over the phrase 'the good simply'. For this can be understood either as the good simply is contrasted with the apparent good, or as it is contrasted with the good taken in a singular case. If in the first way 'the good simply' is not the adequate object of the will, because then the will could not act on the apparent good, for no power can act on that in which is not preserved the idea of its first object – and thus any will of a wayfarer would, by its object, be confirmed or be preserved from being able to sin. In the second way one can admit that the good under the idea of good is the object desired by the will and is the object of its proper cognitive power. But the senses, according to what is commonly said, know the singular and the intellect the universal. Therefore, the sense appetite has

for object ‘the good in the now’, as it is a singular good with its individuating conditions. But the will has for object the good as shown to it by the intellect, which is the universal good and is the good simply.

27. As to what the argument adds, that it is enough for reason to show things rightly [n.11], then against this is: ‘that the will cannot do the opposete in the case of the universal and particular: error’ [Articles condemned by Archbishop Tempier in 1277, article 219].[a]

a. [*Interpolation*] Extra ‘On Heretics’ in Gregory *Decretals* 5 tit.7 ch.9, and in Gratian *Decrees* p.1 d.15 ch.3 ‘Montanus’.

28. [Against the second reason] – The second reason [n.12] leads to the opposite conclusion: for the will needs a disposition more in respect of what it has the doing of in its power than in respect of something else. For if it did not have the action in its power, then when and how it does it would not be imputed to it for praise or blame. But because the will has it in its power, it acts in a way deserving of praise or blame; and therefore it needs a principle by which it can act in a way deserving of praise; such a principle is virtue.

29. It also seems surprising that that because of which a man is praised in his acts should exist in him precisely as to that which is common to him and the brutes.

30. Nor is it valid to argue here that ‘a natural agent is determined to its action, so the will is as well, since it is a certain naturally active power’, for everyone removes habits from purely natural agents because these agents are inclined supremely of themselves. But the intellect, which acts more naturally than the will, is not denied to have a habit, for of itself it is not supremely inclined. Nor does the indetermination come from the imperfection of the active power, but from its lack of limitation, which lack is a perfection of the active power. For the other merely natural things are limited to one thing, so that they do not have power for contrary, or at least contradictory, opposites – the will is not thus limited, as was stated in II d.25 nn.37, 93. 93.

31. Also the other argument there adduced [n.12] that ‘virtue inclines by way of nature’ is not valid, because it would prove also against them that charity and hope are not in the will – which is against all the theologians.

32. In answer then to these two proofs [n.12]:

To the first: although the will can of its own freedom determine itself in its action, yet it is receptive of some disposition left behind from the action, a disposition inclining it to similar actions. For the single determination of it does not come through a natural form (of the sort found in fire for fire’s operation), but is from the free action that proceeds from an indeterminate power, and so the power is determinable through a habit.

33. To the second proof [n.12] the answer is plain from what was said in I d.17 nn.32, 40, 69-70 and II d.25 nn.69-74, about how a second cause naturally acting can go along with a prior cause freely acting, and about how an effect is said to be free because of the freedom of the principal cause; but a habit, if it is cause of the substance of an act, is a second cause in respect of the will.

34. [Against the third reason] – The third reason [n.13], about the moderation of the passions, leads to the opposite:

First because there are passions in the will, according to Augustine *City of God* 14.5-6; and for this reason, if a virtue is to be posited in a power where there is passion and action because of that action and passion, then it follows that, since there are passions in the supreme part of the soul, virtues may be posited there.

35. Second because the moderation of a passion can be understood in two ways: the moderation either of an existing passion or of a future one.

An existing passion can be moderated in two ways: Either by lessening the passion that is naturally introduced by the object in itself, so that the passion is not immoderate in the way the object, left to itself, would naturally cause when delighting the sensitive power. Or by referring the delight to an end agreeable to right reason, to which end it would not be referred by the mere idea of the object of the sensitive appetite.

The moderating too of a future passion can be understood either as a flight from the object that naturally gives immoderate delight, or as a taking up only of objects that naturally give moderate delight; and then the future passion is not in itself moderated, but precaution is taken against the presence of immoderate passion.

36. In whichever of these two ways the moderation of passion be understood, it can belong more to the will than to the sensitive appetite, whether the passion is present, or will be present, in the sensitive appetite.

For as to an existent passion, provided it can be lessened, the will, which acts freely, is able to lessen it more than the sensitive appetite can, which appetite is affected by the object or acts along with it as much as it can. The will can also refer the passion to an end consonant with right reason more than the sensitive appetite can, because the will is the proper appetitive force of the reason, and so it properly directs things to the end that reason shows. For 'to use', which is to direct things to the due end, is not an act of the sensitive appetite but of the will, since so to direct things is not admitted properly to belong to the sensitive power the way that the will, the intellect, and reason so direct things.

If passion be understood as what should be guarded against if immoderate, and accepted if moderate, it seems sufficiently plain that the will can have a right act about the future more than the sensitive appetite can, because the cognitive power of the will, which is reason, can deliberate about the future but not so the senses.[6]

37. [Conclusion] – It is plain from these reasons, then, which were adduced for the opposite opinion [nn.10-13], how the opposite conclusion can be drawn. First because the will is made right with respect to its proper operation and is not right of itself. Second because it is indeterminate, and is no less determinable than is the intellect, of which habits are not denied. Third because it is of a nature to be properly delighted in its own operation, and so to have a habit by which it may operate delightfully. Fourth because the lead in performing human actions belongs to it, for it is free, and praiseworthy human actions require

[6] The fourth reason [n.14] is not brought round to the opposite here, but it is dealt with at large below in nn.46-47, 49-56.

virtue in the leading agent, for praise is of virtue. Fifth because the will is able to moderate the passions in due manner by a habit more than the sensitive appetite is (if it were to have the passions).

3. Against the Conclusion of Aquinas' Opinion

38. One can, in addition to these arguments [nn.15-37], argue against the holder of this opinion as follows: If, according to him, 'in the state of innocence there would not be in the sensitive appetite any passion repugnant to right reason' [Aquinas *ST* Ia q.95 a.2], there would be no need to posit virtue in the sensitive appetite; and yet the virtues did then exist, because man was then perfect in accord with them – from the Master in the text.

39. There is also the authority Augustine in *Letter* 35 or 36 [*Letter* 155 to Macedonius 3.12: "There will be one virtue there, and it will be both virtue and the reward of virtue. It will be prudence…and courage…and temperance…and justice"].

40. Also in his *Soliloquies* I. 6.13, "Perfect reason is the soul reaching its end."

41. Again in his *City of God* 11.15 [14.6: "Love itself is to be loved, whereby that is loved well which should be loved, so that the virtue by which we live well may be in us"].

42. Again the Master lists the acts that can remain in the fatherland, and they are not acts of the sensitive appetite.

C. Scotus' own Opinion

43. As to the question, one can say that although the will without a habit is able to do right and morally good acts, and not only this but also that the intellect can make right judgments without any intellectual habit (indeed the first right act of the intellect and the first right action of the will precede the habit, even as to any degree of habit, because from these right acts is generated whatever of a habit is first present) – yet, just as the habit of prudence is generated in the intellect either by the first elicited act or by several elicited acts, so too right virtue is generated in the will, inclining it to right choosing, either through the first right act of choice consonant with the dictate of right reason, or by many right choices.

44. The proof is that the will naturally chooses first before it or reason command anything to sensitive appetite. For reason does not seem to reach sensitive appetite save through the intermediary of the will, which is properly rational appetite. The will too first wants something in itself before it commands an act about it to the inferior appetite. For not because it commands the inferior appetite does the will therefore want it, but conversely. In that prior stage, therefore, the will can generate in itself from its right choices (for it is as indeterminate and determinable as the intellect) a habit inclining it to right choice. And here the habit will most properly be a virtue, for most properly does a habit of choice incline one to act in accord with the right choices that generated it.

45. However one can admit that if the will, in willing, is able to command the sensitive appetite either by moderating its passion or by commanding pursuit or flight, then, if there are acts of the sensitive appetite, the will can, from its right commands, leave behind some habit in the sensitive appetite, a habit inclining the sensitive appetite to be moved with pleasure to similar things by command of the will. And this habit left behind, although it is not properly virtue, for it is not a habit of choice nor does it incline to choice, can yet be admitted to be in some way a virtue, because it inclines to what is consonant with right reason.

D. Objections against Scotus' own Solution

46. Against the first part [nn.43-44] an objection is raised that then, on this account, there could be moral virtues in an angel [cf. n.14]. The proof is that an angel can have a right act of will about things that sensitive appetite is naturally excited to have a passion about, and so from many such right acts of will a virtue would be generated in the angel. There is a confirmation, that it is possible not only to have right choice about passions present in the sensitive part but also about passions shown by the intellect, even though they will never be and never were there present, as was touched on in the question on practical knowledge in *Prol*. n.288. Therefore, from such choices a virtue is generated in the will and there is no concomitant virtue in the sensitive appetite.

47. Further, if moral virtue were in the will, then it would be nobler than prudence, because the perfection of a nobler perfectible power is itself nobler [cf. *Prol*. n.353]. The consequent is against the Philosopher in *Ethics* 6.11.1143a8-9; so the antecedent is too.

48. An argument against the second part [n.45] is that if, by the sole fact that the sensitive appetite is moved by command of the will, a quality can be generated in that appetite inclining it to similar acts, and if that quality is a virtue, then by parity of reason a moral habit can be generated in the part of the body that is moved frequently by command of the will; and not only so, but also in the inanimate and irrational things that the will uses.

E. Response to the Objections

49. [To the first objection] – As to the first objection [n.46] one can allow that if an angel were created with purely natural powers and did not have moral virtues in his will, these virtues could be generated therein from right choices done many times – not indeed about passions in the sensitive appetite existing in the angel (which neither were present in him nor will be nor could be), but only about the sort of passions shown to him in universal terms by the intellect. And by positing this intellectual showing, and by commanding what thus in the passions should be chosen by one who can have them, a will consonant with such command can possess, from many choices, a right moral habit.

50. And there is a proof of this:

First because every will that does not necessarily lack the perfection which befits the will has belonging to it every perfection of the will; but to will the good

about what is doable not only for oneself but also for another (and this not only in its order to the divine good but also insofar as it is a certain proper good) is a perfection of the will; and the will of an angel is not necessarily imperfect. Therefore a habit can belong to this will whereby it wills for me the good of temperance insofar as temperance is a good fitting for me. This habit cannot be called charity because (as was just said) this habit is not only a good for loving God but a good under the proper idea of the goodness of temperance; nor is this habit other than temperance, because the formal idea of a habit does not vary according to 'for me' and 'for you'. Therefore just as by the habit of temperance I formally choose this good for myself, so by a habit of the same idea anyone else wills this good for me. And so in an angel there will be a temperance whereby he wills this good for me.

51. In this way too can, as a consequence, the idea of moral virtues be posited to exist in God, just as charity is allowed to exist in him without its being an accident in him [Lombard, *Sent*. III d.32 ch.2 n.1].

52. And so from this reasoning about angels that was brought against the proposed solution [n.46] an argument can be taken in favor of that solution. For the will of an angel can will me the good that is the proper habit of temperance insofar as this proper habit is 'this sort of good'; therefore, an angel can will it for me from the habit of temperance (as was argued [n.50]), and so there will be temperance in him – and not in the sensitive part, so in the other part [sc. the will].

53. But if the objection is made that this is against the Philosopher, who in *Ethics* 10.8.178b8-18 [n.14] denies moral virtues of the gods, my reply is that the Philosopher is perhaps thus denying of them all accidental habits, if, as some say, he posited that the gods were good naturally.

54. Alternatively, if one is not pleased to posit moral virtues in the gods, one can deny the consequence of the reason that is brought against the proposed solution [n.46], and that in one or other of the following ways:

Either because virtue does not concern just any good but the difficult good. Now this sort of good, which is posited to be the sort of object of the will, is only difficult for someone who has a sensitive appetite that is of a nature to be carried to the opposite of this good, at least as to some circumstance of this good. And from the fact that the sensitive appetite is so inclined, the will in him who has sensitive appetite is of a nature to be thus delighted along with it. And therefore is it difficult for the will to tend to the good that has its due circumstances. So as to an angel, who does not have a sensitive appetite – his will is not of a nature to delight along with any such habit or appetite, and therefore it tends without difficulty to the moral good, that is the good which is rightly circumstanced.

55. Or in another way one can say that volition is twofold. One is simple and is a certain taking pleasure in the object; the other is effective, namely that by which the one willing pursues the willed thing so as to have it in himself, unless he is impeded. Only the second is properly speaking choice, the way the Philosopher speaks of it in *Ethics* 3.4.1111b20-23, "will is of impossibles, choice is not," for no one chooses the impossible, that is, effectively wills it with a will by which he pursues it, although someone could with simple taking of pleasure want impossible things (in which way perhaps the first angel sinned, or could

have sinned, by willing the impossible, namely equality with God [cf. *Ord*. II d.6 n.11]).

56. One can say, therefore, that in those who have sensitive appetite the will can be the principle of many choices with respect to the moral good, and choice is the above effective volition, which alone is of a nature to generate a habit; and although it is prior to every habit in the sensitive appetite, it is yet of a nature to be a principle of commanding such appetite. In an angel, however, there can be simple volition but not of a nature to command.

57. [To the second objection] – As to the second objection [n.47], although one can say that not every perfection of a nobler perfectible thing need be itself nobler, yet, if there is indeed in a nobler thing some perfection less noble than a perfection in a less noble thing, the supreme perfection of a nobler thing must surpass the supreme perfection of a less noble thing; now moral virtue is not the supreme perfection of the will, nor is prudence the supreme perfection of the intellect, but charity is of the will and faith of the intellect; and charity seems to exceed faith.

58. This response, however, does not seem sufficient, because the nobler power seems to have a nobler act with respect to the same object when each is acting according to the utmost of itself, because then there is no excess on the part of the object (for it is the same in both cases), but only on the part of the powers, and to that extent the nobler exceeds. Therefore, when there is an act of the practical intellect and of the will about the moral good, which is the same object, then if both powers are acting perfectly (the intellect in dictating and the will in choosing) right choice will be simply nobler than right dictating; and consequently the habit generated by choices will be simply more perfect than the habit generated by nobler acts – which I concede.

59. And as to the Philosopher when he prefers prudence [n.47] I reply: prudence is in some way the rule of the other virtues, to the extent that it or its act precedes in generation the habit and the act of moral virtue; and in this priority moral acts and habits conform to prudence as to what is prior, and not the other way around. This priority seems in the Philosopher to prove the idea and thereby the dignity of [prudence as] the rule and measure – but not simply.

60. [To the third objection] – As to the third [n.48], it is agreed that there can be virtue and habit in a part of the body, as is plain in the case of the hand of the writer and the painter; for my unexercised hand is unsuited to that ability, or in its facility for playing the lyre; but an exercised hand is suited, and this comes only from the facility inhering in the hand. This suitability is posited and conceded to be a certain virtue, because it is a certain suitability suiting something for the work of moral virtue. The same is also further conceded of irrational things, as of a horse, which is suited for certain acts to which it has become accustomed. But such suitability is not found in merely inanimate things; for a stone is not thrown upwards more easily by custom.

II. To the Principal Arguments

61. To the principal arguments:

As to all the authorities [nn.2-5] I concede what they assume, that in the sensitive appetite there is some quality that can be called a virtue; however, this quality has the idea of virtue less perfectly than the quality in the will that inclines to choice.

62. To the last argument [n.6], about the irascible and concupiscible powers, I say that these are not only in the sensitive appetite but also in the will. And when you make objection about the objects of the arduous and the delightful [n.6] – whether these are the objects or not will be dealt with in the next question [d.34 nn.38-49]; a distinction can be found of this sort on the part of the objects in relation to the will just as on the part of the sensitive appetite.

63. To the next one,[7] when it is argued that the will is made sufficiently perfect by theological virtue, I reply that this is true in respect of the divine good but not in respect of any other good save in its order to 'loving God', so that no act is elicited by charity save one whose object (at which it stops) is God himself – though this is done through other intermediate objects. Now not only can I rightly will a good for myself by willing rightly that 'I will God', but I can also will 'this particular good' insofar as it has the sort of goodness agreeable to me according to its proper idea; and thus to will 'this particular good' belongs to the will from a different habit.

64. And if you object that 'the habit will not be the idea of referring things to God, so it will not be a right habit, because its act seems to be an enjoying of created goods' – I reply that an inferior habit does not of itself possess the act of a higher habit; but charity, which is a higher habit, does have this habit of 'referring things immediately to God'. No other habit, therefore, properly possesses of itself this referring of things, but only has of itself its own proper act of loving this particular good, which particular good has to be carried beyond by charity. Nor does it follow from this that the inferior habit is bad, nor that it is a principle of loving a created good, because although it does not, by enjoying created goods, fail to refer them, yet neither does it oppose the referring, namely by repudiating it. But 'to enjoy' includes not only 'not to refer' but also what is opposed to referring, namely 'to use contrariwise', as was said in *Ord*. I d.1 nn.16. 66, 68, 180, 186 on 'enjoying' [cf. also II d.41 nn.10-11].

65. To the argument from the *Politics* [n.5] about despotic rule, a response is that the Philosopher thought the condition of corrupted human nature was also the condition of nature as first instituted.

66. However, something different was said on this in II d.29 nn.8-18 – about how the inferior appetite was then of a nature to possess delight and how it could be moved concordantly with the will, but in such a way that some virtue could have existed in both appetites. Or how this could have been so unless perhaps original justice caused in the will a more perfect dominion over the sensitive appetite and could at once use it as a slave. But even so one would not, as it seems, preserve the fact that the sensitive appetite would (however much the will dominated over it) still have delight, unless there was in the sensitive appetite some habit inclining it to such motion – in the way that if, in wanting you to

[7] This argument is not found in the *Ordinatio* but in the *Lectura* d.33 n.6 (a peculiarity found elsewhere in the *Ordinatio*).

choose rightly in the case of some passion, I could generate from this some moral virtue in myself.

67. By holding to this way of understanding things [n.66], one can draw a distinction between will as nature, will as free, and will as deliberative.

68. In the first way virtue is denied of the will, because in this way the will naturally tends to the end, and to every good shown to it such that the end shines out in it. On account of this natural determination a virtue is not required in the will as such.

69. Nor too is there virtue in the will as it is free, because virtue inclines by way of nature and the will, as free, is not of a nature to be moved naturally. For if it could be inclined naturally then it could, as free, be necessitated.

70. In the third way, then, namely as the will is deliberative with respect to what is for the end (and not with respect to the end), moral virtue will exist in it.

71. Add that virtue moves by way of nature, because it moves suddenly. Hence, according to the Philosopher in *Ethics* 3.9.1115a32-34, "if in sudden perils one is fearless, one most of all appears brave."

72. Against this [nn.67-71]

First because the will as 'nature' [n.68] does not elicit any act, as was said in III d.15 nn.48-50. Therefore, it does not as nature tend to any object, whether to the end or to something else (as to an elicited act); rather it tends only by way of natural inclination, as a heavy object is said to be tending downwards even though it is stationary above.

73. Against the other two members [n.67]: the one seems to include the other, for the will is 'free' as it is 'deliberative'. For it is called deliberative either insofar as it prescribes deliberation, or insofar as it chooses with preceding deliberation. Both of these belong to the will insofar as it is free, because the will freely commands choice. And therefrom it follows that to deny there is virtue in the will as the will is free, and to concede there is virtue in it as it is deliberative, is contradictory.

74. Also the proof [n.69] that virtue is not in the will as it is free because then it could be necessitated, is not conclusive, because a superior agent (in whose virtue is the action of an inferior agent) cannot be necessitated by the inferior agent; but virtue, if it is in any way an agent for an act, is an inferior agent, as was said in I d.17 nn.53, 66-67 (about habit). And it was said there too [*ibid*. nn.28-30] how a habit is not repugnant to free acting, and yet that a habit acts in the will with respect to the same effect by way of nature.

75. In a like manner too can one reject the argument [n.71] that there is no virtue in the will as deliberative if it is true that virtue acts suddenly, preceding deliberation (for the will as deliberative does not seem to act suddenly and to forestall deliberation).

76. But one should not rely on this, for the word 'suddenly' needs to be explained, since absolutely speaking no one acts virtuously save from deliberation. For just as one does not act humanly if one does not act understandingly, so (as regard what is for the end) one does not act well humanly if one does not understand what one is acting for the sake of; and this 'understanding' is a

'deliberating'. So hence a virtuous man does not act suddenly and without deliberation the way nature does (Aquinas *Physics* II lect. 14 n.8).

77. The statement of the Philosopher then [n.71] must be understood as follows, that just as a virtuous man, when shown an object, is inclined to choose rightly from having a right habit, so also is he directed by prudence to at once giving a right command about choosing it; and he deliberates imperceptibly, as it were, because of his promptness for practical syllogizing. But someone else, who is imperfect, does practical syllogizing with difficulty and delay, because he does not have habits in practice perfectly. And if he does at last choose rightly, he is not said to act suddenly, but slowly; while someone else who is perfect is said, in respect of the former, to act suddenly, because he acts as it were in imperceptible time.

Thirty Fourth Distinction

Single Question

Whether Virtues, Gifts, Beatitudes, and Fruits are the Same Habit as Each Other

1. About the thirty fourth distinction I ask[a] whether the virtues, gifts, beatitudes, and fruits are the same habit as each other.

a. [*Interpolation*] About the thirty fourth distinction, where the Master deals with the seven gifts, the question asked is whether…

2. That they are:

Because of what Gregory [*Moralia* 1 ch.27 n.38] says about *Job* 1.2, "Seven sons and three daughters were born to him." ["Through conception of good thoughts, seven virtues of the Holy Spirit arise in us…"].

3. Further, if they were different from each other, none on one side would be the same as another on the other side. The consequent is false, for fortitude is a gift and fortitude is a virtue.

4. And if it be said that the latter and former fortitude are of different idea, on the contrary: they have acts of the same idea.

5. To the opposite:

There is not the same number of gifts and beatitudes; also, the things numbered do not agree, as is plain, for something is a beatitude which is not a gift, something is a gift which is not a virtue, and so on of others.

I. To the Question

A. Opinion of Henry of Ghent

1. Exposition of the Opinion

6. In answer to the question Henry says in *Quodlibet* 4 q.23 that, just as one can be disposed to intense pleasures in three ways, namely in a human way,

in a superhuman way, and in an un-human way, so can one be disposed thus to inordinate sadnesses.

7. In the human way when one endures terrible things along with their due circumstances; and for this there is a moral virtue, acquired or infused, which however does not enable one to endure without sadness, according to Aristotle *Ethics* 3.10.1115b10-13 and Augustine *On the Trinity* 13.7 n.10 [cf. III d.15 nn.102-103].

8. In a superhuman way when one endures terrible things with joy, as was true of certain martyrs.

9. In an un-human but quasi-divine way when one not only endures death with joy but joyfully desires it, as Paul desired "to depart and be with Christ" [*Phil.* 1.3]. This is proved by Augustine in *Homily 1 on John* tr.1 n.4, treating of *1 Corinthians* 1.10, "Why are there schisms among you? Is it not because you are men?", where Augustine says "God wanted them to be gods," as stated in the *Psalm*, "I said, you are gods."

10. In this third way the virtue is heroic, and the Philosopher brings it together in opposition to bestiality, which is un-human as to vicious delights, *Ethics* 7.1.1145a22-23.

11. Henry says, therefore, that the virtues perfect man in a human way, the gifts in a superhuman way, and the beatitudes in an un-human way.

2. Rejection of the Opinion

12. But there are multiple objections to this opinion.

First because charity is the most excellent of the gifts of God, according to Augustine *On the Trinity* 15.19 n.37, and, what is more, according to the Apostle *I Corinthians* 13.2-3, "If I have fortitude and hand my body over to be burned" (which seems to be in the un-human way, because it is to ask to be burned for God), "but have not charity, it profits me nothing." Therefore, it does not seem that any good perfects more excellently than charity does, which however is a virtue and of the first degree [n.7], if we are speaking of the moral and theological virtues.

13. Further, as to things terrible, the case is that the human will holds rightly to the mean through the habit of fortitude; therefore it will hold to the mean more rightly [sc. the second degree] and most rightly [sc. the third degree] as far as is possible for human nature, if it is possible. Either it is possible, then, from the same habit of fortitude of the same species to tend to the mean according to degrees that do not vary the species, and so a habit the same in species disposes one to endure something terrible in the supreme perfect way as in the lowest way. Or if not from the same habit but a different one, then the habit that disposes one to endure in the lowest degree is of necessity imperfect as to its act and object, because it cannot have perfection about enduring terrible things; but, in order to be perfectly disposed with respect to them, one needs to have a habit different in species. But a plurality of species should not, it seems, be posited without manifest necessity, unless one virtue does not suffice (which does not appear in this case).[a]

a. [*Interpolation*] This can be got expressly from the Philosopher, *Ethics* 7.1.1145a15-35, and from Macrobius, *Dream of Scipio* I ch.8 nn.5-11, and from Henry [n.6], that all the virtues, if they are perfect, have one degree. Therefore…

14. Further, Christ was saddened during his passion (as said in d.15 n.65), and generally every martyr, left to himself if no miracle with respect to him is performed, endures whatever he voluntarily endures with some sadness [cf. d.15 n.62], as is plain from the passage of Augustine *On the Trinity* 13.7 n.10 [also *City of God* 14.10], where he argues against the philosophers who say they are blessed because they had whatever they wanted (for if prosperity befell them, they wanted it, and if adversity befell them, they wanted it, because they endured it patiently). He argues against them that in adversity they did not have what they wanted, because (as far as concerned themselves) they did not want adversity to happen to them; but if adversity did happen, they wanted to endure it patiently lest, by losing patience, they should be more miserable. And this seems persuasive, because patience is not possible about something desirable in itself. The martyrs in this life, therefore, when they endured adversity, had something that they did not in every way want, because the object of their patience was not in its absolute idea something desirable and wantable, but they endured it patiently because of God.

15. Further, it is impossible for the same person to do the same act humanly, superhumanly, and un-humanly at the same time. Therefore, when one has the gift of the Holy Spirit, the virtue acquired previously or infused in baptism is extinguished; or if it remains, it will not be able to issue in act, or it will not be needed, for one will have power for one's act from the more perfect gift. The beatitudes will in the same way remove the necessity for the virtues and the gifts, which seems unacceptable, especially if the discussion is about the theological virtues, for charity is not extinguished in the fatherland, nor faith and hope in the wayfarer.

16. Further, the words 'superhuman' and 'un-human' are metaphorical, for every action of a man, properly speaking, is human. For just as a right action must conform to the object, to the end, and to the other circumstances, so also must it conform to the doer himself (for it does not befit me to do what befits a king, and much more does it not befit me to do what befits an angel). So, in order for a man's action to be right, he must do it in a human way. Therefore, whatever habit disposes a man simply to do something in a human way, disposes him absolutely to doing it.

17. Further, if someone were always to be praying and the gift of understanding were to be given him and he did not exercise himself about things of faith, he would not be acting in a human way about these things, because he would not possess acquired faith – without which infused faith does not do its job [cf. *Lectura* III d.23 nn.48-50, d.25 n.35]. Yet he could act in a superhuman way because he would, according to you, have the gift of understanding. Therefore, he could act about things of faith more excellently than someone else who was skilled in Sacred Scripture – which we do not experience; on the contrary, anyone

else (including this sort of person) would perhaps more easily err about things of faith than another who was well skilled in Scripture.

18. Again, whatever one can be well ordered and active about in a human way, one can be so in a superhuman and un-human way; therefore, there will be as many virtues as there are gifts and beatitudes [which is false].

19. Further, true beatitude would be found in the acts of one of the beatitudes as the supreme habit [d.36 n.26; *Prol*. n.287].

B. Opinion of Bonaventure

20. [Statement of the opinion] – Another opinion says it is the case that the virtues make one to act rightly, the gifts to act perfectly, and the beatitudes to act expeditiously.

21. [Rejection of the opinion] – Against this view: by one and the same virtue I act rightly (because virtue is the rightness of power [*Ethics* 2.6.1106b36-07a2, 6.13.1144b27]), and act expeditiously (because virtue is a habit that makes one act expeditiously and easily [I d.17 n.7, 48-51]), and act perfectly (because virtue is both the perfection of him who possesses it in himself and the perfection by which his work is rendered perfect [*Ethics* 2.5.1106a15-17]).

C. Opinion of Aquinas

22. [Statement of the opinion] – Another statement is that there is something that must dispose the will to be movable by right reason, and such is what virtue is; and something that must dispose the will to be movable by the Holy Spirit, and such is what a gift is. And these two things are posited as movers of the will.

23. [Rejection of the opinion] – Against this opinion. First, what it supposes is false, namely that reason moves the will such that the virtue is only a disposition of movability in the will. Second, the beatitudes are not in this way posited as distinct from the gifts and the virtues. Third, from the fact that God has given a habit to the will, he is always assisting the will and the habit to do the acts that befit them (as that after he miraculously gave sight to the blind man [*John* 9.1-38], he was always assisting the now sighted man to be able to be moved by the power of sight). Therefore, a thing is proportioned to the second and the first mover by something that is the same. Therefore, if a power is proportioned to itself by a habit, it is sufficiently proportioned to the Holy Spirit by the same habit and to any other mover. Therefore, it is not for this reason that other habits must necessarily be posited in the will.

D. Scotus' own Opinion

1. Beside the Theological and Cardinal Virtues there is no Need for any Other Habit in this Life.

24. One can say to this question (without however making assertion) that in this life only the habits that are the intellectual, moral, and theological virtues are necessary.

a. Proof of the Opinion

25. The point is shown as follows:

For the need of an intellectual habit perfecting the intellect about things to be thought, and of a habit perfecting the intellect about things to be done, is proved by natural reason; and thus are got a speculative and a practical intellectual habit.

26. In like manner is proved by natural reason the need of a habit perfecting the appetite about desirable things in their order to oneself, and further about desirable things in their order to another; and thus is got the first distinction in appetitive virtue, namely in ordering these habits to oneself and to another.

27. As to what is in addition to these habits – although natural reason perhaps proves that man is not sufficiently perfected by these habits (which is something the solution of *Prol*. nn.62-65 rests on to show the necessity of another knowledge besides acquired knowledge), yet natural reason does not sufficiently prove with distinctness what intellective habit and what appetitive habit is different from the former ones. Still it is rationally held (according to the persuasive arguments set down in *Prol*. nn.13-18, 40-41) that, besides the former, there is need of the habits of the cognitive power and of the appetitive power that the Catholic Church teaches are necessary. And by faith we hold that three theological virtues are necessary, which are perfective of the soul in respect of the uncreated object [cf. *Lectura* d.23 n.48].

28. From these points I argue as follows: only those habits need to be posited in a wayfarer that he is (as to any object) perfected by to the extent that he can be perfected in this life. Of this sort are the seven virtues in general (ignoring the acquired speculative sciences). Therefore, besides the acquired speculative sciences, there will be no need to posit in the wayfarer any virtue simply other than the standard seven [sc. the three theological virtues and the four cardinal virtues].

29. Proof of the minor: the object about which the wayfarer can be perfected cannot be other than God and creatures.

As to God, the wayfarer is sufficiently perfected, and to supreme degree, by the three theological virtues (most perfectly so, as far as he can be, if those three habits are themselves most perfect).

As to creatures, ignoring the speculative virtues of the intellect, the wayfarer is sufficiently perfected by prudence – provided the prudence is most perfect, for then it is about everything doable as to every condition of the doable that is also most perfectly known. So, as regard appetite, the wayfarer is most perfectly perfected by the three moral virtues [justice, temperance, fortitude], if they are themselves most perfect, because then he is perfected both as regard others and what is desirable for others and as regard himself and what is desirable for himself (and this either primarily and directly, or secondarily because of the

primary ones). And I understand by these four cardinal virtues not some numerically single habit in someone that would be at the same time universal temperance or justice (that is a temperance or justice about everything), but that the individual species of justice are present along with their proper individual singulars.[8]

30. Therefore a man who is perfected by the three theological virtues and by the speculative and practical virtues and by the moral virtues (which order him in respect of himself and others) – he is perfected as much as a wayfarer can be fitted to be. There does not seem, then, to be any necessity to posit any other habits than those that are the theological, the intellectual, and the moral virtues.

b. About the Connection of the Intellectual, Irascible, and Concupiscible Habits with these Seven Virtues

31. To be noted further is that, just as a habit in the category of quality is a certain intermediate genus, so it has under it many intermediate genera, until we come to the most specific species. For habit is either first divided into intellectual and appetitive (as seems probable), and the intellectual is further divided into acquired and infused, the appetitive likewise being divided into acquired and infused; or habit is first divided into acquired and infused, and then each member is divided into intellectual and appetitive – at any rate acquired intellectual habit is further divided into speculative and practical, and acquired appetitive habit divided into ordered to oneself or ordered to another. Now acquired speculative habit is divided into real and notional [of reason], because it is either about real being or being of reason. Now the acquired speculative habit about real being is divided according to the division set down in *Metaphysics* 6.1.1026a18-19, which is into physical, mathematical, and divine. And each of these is perhaps further divided into many divisions, before we come to the most specific species. But acquired practical habit is divided into that which concerns doable things and that which concerns makeable things, and the one about makeable things has several divisions, until we come to the most specific species (of which sort is, for instance,

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[8] According to the Vatican editors, some mss. contain these further remarks canceled by Scotus in an appended note. "...the three theological virtues, the wayfarer is sufficiently perfected [by them] immediately with respect to God. For concerning God as he is to be understood in this life, faith sufficiently perfects the wayfarer, because only the knowledge of faith can be had about God in this life (as was said in *Lectura* III d.23 n.19); concerning God as he is lovable in himself, charity sufficiently perfects the wayfarer, and concerning God as he is desirable and advantageous for me, hope sufficiently perfects the wayfarer (as is clear from the articles above about hope and charity, d.26 nn.89-96, d.27 nn.29-32). But it is not possible for the wayfarer to have any other ordered acts about God save understanding and loving him as he is in himself, and desiring him for myself as he is my good; therefore etc.

Likewise, about every good (as about an object) other than God, the wayfarer is sufficiently perfected when he is perfected about them by the intellectual and the appetitive habits. But these intellectual habits, which sufficiently perfect the intellect, are the intellectual virtues, for the intellectual virtues do sufficiently perfect the wayfarer, as far as possible, for considering things and for practical syllogizing. The appetitive habits too are the appetitive virtues, which appetitive virtues sufficiently perfect the wayfarer for desiring or loving everything lovable, whether in its order to himself or in its order to another."

the one about this doable thing here). Finally, the building habit and the like, which is also practical about some doable thing, is divisible into many divisions (as will be plain in the question about the connection of the virtues, [d.36 nn.96-97]). For whether it is a practical science or a practical prudence, it is not single as to all doable things (as will be touched on in d.36 nn.98-99).

32. Of this whole division of intellective habits none is included in the number of virtues save the single infused virtue, which is faith, and a certain genus intermediate to many acquired practical virtues, which intermediate genus is called prudence. But even if, by numbering the species, including the sufficiently common ones, there could be got three divisions, namely faith and speculative science and prudence, yet, because speculative science does not perfect a man for operating well morally, for this reason it is not numbered among the virtues. For speculative science is less necessary for a man to live well humanly than prudence is, and less necessary also than faith for living well in the polity of the Church [cf. d.37 n.27].

33. Now, in the genus of appetitive habit, two acquired habits and two infused ones can be set down, if one stops at the first species under infused appetitive habit and the first under acquired appetitive habit. Under the infused indeed are first hope and charity; and under the acquired the virtues disposing appetite in relation to oneself and in relation to another. As to the second of these, it is called by the one common name of justice, but that in relation to oneself has no common name. And perhaps this is the reason that there is no stand made in the enumerating of the cardinal virtues, but further descent is made under the enumeration, because descent is made to proximate others under it [cf. Bonaventure *Sent*. III d.33 a. un. q.4; Aquinas *Commentary on the Ethics* 2.8].

34. Of things appetible for oneself, some are appetible of themselves, namely because they are of a nature to be at once agreeable; and some are to be first avoided, namely because they are of a nature to be disagreeable at once. Others are not appetible first nor avoidable first, but secondarily so, and are, because of the former, to be first desired or avoided. The virtue in general that disposes one with respect to appetible things is called temperance; the one with respect to avoidable things is called fortitude, since indeed things appetible belong first to the concupiscible power, and avoidable things first to the irascible power.

35. In order to see the distinction between these two powers, one must note that the concupiscible power has regard to that which is of a nature to be of itself agreeable or disagreeable; so that when nothing else is posited with respect to them save only that they are apprehended, then an act of being delighted or sad, of fleeing or pursuing, is of a nature, as far as concerns itself, to follow on necessarily.

36. Such agreeable things do not regard the irascible power as objects of it, for the act of the irascible power is to be angry; and to be angry, according to the Philosopher in *Rhetoric* 2.2.1378a31-33, is "to desire revenge according to an apparent end, because of an apparent slight." The object therefore of the irascible power is revenge. Or more truly, if this is the 'avengeable' object of its act, which could be called the 'angrifying' object or let it be called, to speak in a more accustomed way, the 'offending' object, this offending object is not said to be

what is immediately disagreeable to the concupiscible power, but to be what impedes what is first agreeable to it (for instance, if food is first agreeable to the taste appetite of a bird and is for this reason desired, what prohibits or removes this food offends the animal desiring it). This offending object is the object of the irascible power, about which the irascible power has a certain non-willing, not indeed the non-willing of what properly runs away (as the non-willing concupiscible runs away), but rather the non-willing of what repudiates or repels, because the irascible willingly repels it, and does not merely want what impedes it to be removed, but wants actively to remove it and to punish it further (see above d.26 nn.38-39).

37. Because, however, its act is to want to take revenge or not to want the object, and the unwilled object is still present, for this reason 'to be angry' is always with sadness (not only with sadness of the concupiscible power but also with sadness of the irascible power). But only at the time or instant when the irascible power perfectly has its act. This happens not by its refusing, as it were, what is desired (such as is the case when it does not avenge but wants to avenge). Rather it is when it is actually avenging that its act is perfect, similar to enjoyment on the part of the concupiscible power. And at that moment the anger of the irascible power is without sadness; indeed it is with its own great delight, according to Aristotle *Rhetoric* 2.2.1378b5-7 "the anger of a man is as honey."

38. Therefore, just as the concupiscible power needs to be set in order as to things that are of a nature to be desired first (so that it does not desire them inordinately but according to the moderation of right reason), so too does the irascible power need to be moderated by a habit. This is so that it does not want immoderately to repel the things to be repelled by committing offense itself and taking immoderate revenge, but rather so that it want moderately to repel the things to be repelled and not to repel the things not to be repelled. The habit by which it is disposed to repel the things to be repelled has no name, though it can be called bellicosity or something similar. The habit by which it is of a nature not to repel things not to be repelled but to endure them is called patience. And because not to repel what offends is more difficult than to repel it, for this reason is patience fortitude of the noblest kind, according to the poetic saying "Patience is a noble class of victory; he who suffers patiently wins" [from an anonymous thirteenth century poet]. Therefore, the irascible power does not have for object the arduous or valuable [as Henry thinks] (which is what the concupiscible power has for object). Rather it has offense for object, so that its proper act is 'to want to avenge' or 'not to want the offense'. This not-wanting is indeed, as it were, imperfect when the irascible power is angry but is not yet repelling or enduring, and this is for it what desire is like for the concupiscible power. Perfect not-wanting, when it moderately repels or endures what is not wanted, is for it what enjoyment is for the concupiscible power

39. The not-wanting that is 'repelling the intruder in the future' goes along with fear in the concupiscible power (unless the fear is too strong, so as to overcome the force of the irascible power). The not-wanting that is 'repelling the present force impeding and offending the concupiscible power' is, as it were, to desire to repel and is accompanied with sadness. The not-wanting that is 'actually

offending what, being an impediment before, was up to then offensive' is the perfect not-wanting of the irascible power, which brings the power its own delight, and from then on it rests. Thus every act of the irascible power is 'to want to repel', and it does not stop there but seeks revenge (for an angry bird pursues a fleeing bird to punish it). Therefore this desiring, since the object does not absolutely have in it any idea of the appetible, does not occur about what exists for the end.

40. Hence there is a greater distinction between anger and concupiscible desire than between enjoying and using. For the irascible power is always sad when it does not have its revenge, as the concupiscible is sad about the absence of what it desires (but then the irascible is not sad about the presence of what it does not want, while the concupiscible is sad about this).

41. A sophism. If the irascible power desires revenge, then it desires the object to be present. One can concede that someone perfectly in anger does not want the offending thing not to be save by his taking revenge on it. Hence it is sad for the concupiscible power that the irascible does not have the object disagreeable to it [sc. so as to take revenge on it].

42. I reply that it is per accidens [sc. that the irascible power does not have that object]. Yet neither is this sad for the irascible power, but only [its not having] the pleasure of revenge, or the victory of the offender over the irascible power.

43. On the contrary: therefore the irascible power does not have a bodily organ [Henry of Ghent, *Quodlibet* 8 q.15, held that sensible passions belong to diverse sense organs of the body], because some determinate quality would be agreeable and some determinate quality disagreeable to that organ. So not just any impediment is disagreeable to the organ, for to be an offender is just a relation of the agent.

44. The offender does not possess a sensible quality by which he is disagreeable, the way he has something that is sad for the concupiscible power. But the offender, when he offends, offends by asserting or preventing, even if whatever sensible quality he has were displeasing or repugnant to the concupiscible power. So there is no particular organ that is changed by the sensible quality.

45. And if you say 'not wanting one of the opposites belongs to him to whom belongs wanting the other opposite, therefore etc.' I reply that when the irascible power has its act, there are always two unwanted things in it: one of them unwanted by the concupiscible power and the other by the irascible. The example given earlier [n.36] makes the fact plain: the thing not wanted by the concupiscible power is 'lacking food', and from this not-wanting there follows sadness in the concupiscible power, by which sadness it as it were flees the unwanted thing and does not expel it. For there is another unwanted thing, namely what takes the food away, and it is unwanted by the irascible power – not by an act of fleeing but by an act of expelling or repelling. And while the irascible power is not actually repelling, it suffers its own sadness.

46. Now it appears that these pains of the irascible and concupiscible powers are not the same pain, because for if the offending object is presented under the idea of being impossible to repel, there is greater sadness in the

concupiscible power but there will not properly be anger in the irascible power. For no one greatly afraid is angry, according to the Philosopher *Rhetoric* 2.3.1380a31-33, and yet the more afraid someone afraid is, the more does he have the pain of the concupiscible power in flight from what is feared. And though the irascible power sometimes grieves about not being able to take revenge, namely when it has no power to do so, yet the concupiscible power grieves about something else, namely the lack of the desired object.

47. The pain too of the concupiscible power takes place with a change in the organ of the sensitive part different from the pain of the irascible power (cf. Aristotle *De Motu Animalium* 7.701b1-32): the pain of the concupiscible constricts just as its opposed delight dilates; and the pain of the irascible heats up, and is the boiling of blood about the heart. And from this it follows that, in the sensitive part, the concupiscible and irascible powers have diverse organs, because the same thing cannot be moved at the same time by contrary motions.

48. Now in the rational part there can be a similar distinction of objects as in the sensitive part.

For something is delightful first to the will, namely the good or what is agreeable to the will in itself, or even what is agreeable to it in the sensitive appetite (since the will is of a nature to experience pleasure along with the sensitive appetite, which it is connected with in the same supposit).

The will too can have an object offending it, both according to right reason and against right reason, and it can look at it as offensive in act, refusing it as offensive by a repelling and commanding act.

There is not, however, as great a distinction between these in the will as there is in the sensitive appetite, because the will is not organic [does not have a bodily organ]. Nor should one say that one of these is rather a force and the other a power, or conversely. But, like reason, it is distinguished into a superior and inferior part by comparison to diverse objects, though it is simply the same power.

49. About the term ‘force’ [n.48] I don’t know what one should say, for it is a superfluous word. The reason for operating about the distinct higher and lower objects is simply the same thing, as was said in II d.24 n.29.

50. In the same way one can say about the first and second classes of delightful and sad things [n.34] that the principle of handling them is altogether the same power and the same force, for a power is that whereby an able man is able and whereby an able man is brave. In spiritual things it is the same thing to be able and to be brave, and therefore this distinction will only be on the part of objects toward which an able man tends. It is as if we were to say that the intellect is distinguished into principles and conclusions, because it tends to the conclusions through the principles. But no one distinguishes the intellect into powers and forces because of such a distinction between principles and conclusions.

51. On the basis of these suppositions about the irascible and concupiscible powers [nn.35-50], I return to the virtues and say that the proper habit of the concupiscible power is called temperance, and the proper habit of the irascible power perfecting it in general is called fortitude, and this holds when speaking of acquired and infused habits. But both these infused habits perfect the

concupiscible power, because God, whom these habits have for object, is not in any way not-wantable. Now although both these kinds in general, namely both fortitude and temperance, could be further divided, yet in the enumeration of the cardinal virtues they remain undivided.

c. The Seven Virtues Perfect the Wayfarer Simply

52. Accordingly, then, in the enumeration of the virtues there are three theological ones and four cardinal ones. Discussion of the theological ones is got from the Apostle in *I Corinthians* 13. About the cardinal ones there is *Wisdom* 8.7, "She teaches sobriety, and justice, and prudence, and virtue, than which nothing is more useful in life."

53. This sevenfold number of virtues perfects the wayfarer simply, so that he is perfect according to the rank of these in their species. For according as these are more or less intense, not in themselves but in their capacity, he himself is more or less perfect. And if they are the most intense they can be in this life, man is simply perfect as far as he can be in this life (not paying attention for the present to the perfection that is had through the acquired speculative virtues, which were set aside above [n.28]). Through these seven virtues, to be sure, taking both them and their necessary species (which will be spoken of later [n.81]), provided they are in themselves most perfect, a man is simply most perfect both as regard God in himself and as regard everything else other than God, according as they are intelligible by practical reason and desirable for oneself and others. All this too in ordered relation to oneself, as far as the appetitive virtues are able in themselves or are so in order to the ultimate end – the end that the acquired virtues, combined with charity, are capable of.

2. About the Moral Virtues, the Beatitudes, the Gifts, and the Fruits, which are Reducible to the Aforesaid Seven Virtues

a. About the Three Moral Virtues

54. To understand further the said virtues, beatitudes, gifts, and fruits [n.1], one must note that the three acquired moral virtues, namely justice, fortitude, and temperance, are intermediate genera.

55. For there seem to be two desirable things that are first, namely honor and delight strictly taken, or everything that is a primary good, that is, agreeable, namely either honorable or delightful. For the useful cannot be a first motive for desiring something, since it is not desired save in its order to something else. The authority too in *I John* 2.16, "Everything that is in the world is the desire of the flesh and the desire of the eyes and the pride of life," shows the same thing. For 'desire of the eyes', which clearly relates to wealth, cannot be first when speaking of wealth as it is a useful and non-delightful good; but if we speak of wealth as it is beautiful, that is, as it is a delightful good, in this way it can be desired first (like any other visible beauty). Therefore, the first things desirable by rational nature are, as was said, honor and delight strictly taken. So the first species of temperance, which give moderation as to what is desirable for oneself, will be two;

for what moderates in the case of honors is called humility, what in the case of pleasures retains the name of the genus. And there are as many species of the temperance that moderates pleasures (for instance one about taste, another about touch) as there can be distinct pleasures to which the will is inclined. Nor is this true only of the pleasures of the senses which the will, which is joined to them, delights in; but it is true also of pleasures proper to the will itself as it is will – and it is in this way that the will of an angel, though it has no separate sensitive appetite, can desire the delightful good.

56. And the proof that these temperances are distinct is that there can be supreme delight in one of them and not in another. For someone can be temperate simply about sex, wanting only to use it with his own wife or simply not to use it, and intemperate about taste, wanting to eat what he should not eat or not wanting to eat what he should eat. Someone too can be temperate about things of sense and intemperate about things of speculation. For instance, if his will is supremely delighted by the fact that his intellect is thinking supremely about intelligible things, and this thinking is not as useful in itself as some other one, this delight is in itself immoderate and needs moderating, since it is in itself disordered.

57. The species of fortitude do not need to be thus explained for the present purpose, because only fortitude in itself and patience are, among others, here touched on. Patience, as was said before [n.38] is the noblest fortitude because it does not repel what is to be repelled, so that 'to be patient' is a sort of 'to permit'. And just as one would say about permission that it is a positive act of willing or not-willing, or perhaps of 'not willing to prevent', so one would say the same about the sort of act that is the will's being patient about terrible things.

58. Now justice needs to be subdivided according to what follows.

Here one must note that, in one's ordering to another, one can be disposed rightly first by sharing oneself with another as much as one can, or by sharing with him something else or one's own possessions.

59. The virtue that inclines to the first is friendship, whereby one gives oneself to one's neighbor as far as one can give oneself, and as far as one's neighbor can receive. And this is the most perfect moral virtue, because the whole of justice is more perfect than the virtues that relate to oneself, and this friendship is most perfectly justice.

60. But if one shares something else with one's neighbor, this is either extrinsic goods or intrinsic goods. To share intrinsic goods, insofar as these belong to the support of individual human life, from the extrinsic goods that men need is called 'commutative justice'; and it is the one that people more frequently call justice, to the extent something equivalent is exchanged. But if one shares with one's neighbor something necessary for life in community, either this is rule, which belongs to the presiding magistrate, and this species of justice lacks a name but it can be called presiding justice or lordly justice. Or one shares with one's neighbor the justice of subjection, and this species of justice is called obedience.

b. About the Beatitudes

61. On the basis of the above understandings, I say that the beatitudes which our Savior lays out in *Matthew* 5.3-10 are the same habit as the habits of the virtues. However sometimes more specific species of virtues are numbered than are included in the sevenfold number of virtues previously assigned [n.28]

62. Two species indeed of temperance are numbered by our Savior among the beatitudes. One is humility, which gives moderation about the first object of delight, honor, and he expresses it there as "Blessed are the poor in spirit…" Augustine says [*Sermon on the Mount* I ch.1 n.3], "The poor in spirit are rightly understood here as the just and God-fearers, that is, those who do not have a puffed up spirit." Another species of virtue, which moderates the pleasures in general, is expressed by the words, "Blessed are the pure of heart…" For purity of heart is immunity of the will from every disordered delight, both by reason of the will itself and by reason of the sensitive appetites with which it is conjoined.

63. Fortitude is expressed there in its most perfect species in the words, "Blessed are those who suffer persecution…"

64. Three species of justice are expressed:

One to be sure, which exists in sharing oneself through friendship, is expressed when he says, "Blessed are the meek…", for although friendship is more than benevolence (according to the Philosopher *Ethics* 8.2.1155b33-34), and benevolence is more than meekness, because the meek are those who do not offend or resist in evil, nevertheless through this minimum [sc. meekness], which is as it were least in friendship, is expressed the species of justice by which someone shares himself with his neighbor.

65. Another species, namely the one that is divided into justice of rule and obedience, is expressed by the words," Blessed are the peacemakers…" Peace is kept by the fact that the ruler rightly rules and the subject rightly obeys.

66. A third species of justice, which concerns exterior things, is expressed by "Blessed are the merciful…" For in no other way can anyone be more perfectly disposed to sharing external goods with his neighbor than is the merciful man, who shares them not to have them back nor to be benefited first in turn by him with whom he shares. A generous man indeed, although he shares things with his friend, yet his generosity can be a lower one than is mercy, and so generosity is a more imperfect species of justice than mercy. The justice, then, that concerns temporal matters, is expressed by the Lord in its most specific species, in *Luke* 14.13-14, "When you make a feast…"

67. And thus we have the three moral virtues expressly in themselves or in their species.

68. As to the theological virtues our Savior expresses two of them: charity where he says, "Blessed are those who hunger and thirst for justice". Hunger indeed is not without distress, but the habit by which it is elicited is charity. For most properly is the charity of the wayfarer a habit by which we hunger for justice and love God in himself, who is true justice. The second theological virtue, namely hope, is expressed by the beatitude, "Happy are those who weep…"; for mourning is the habit of desiring the object of hope.

69. So, therefore, in the eight beatitudes are expressed two infused appetitive virtues and three moral virtues: fortitude in itself, temperance in two

species, justice in three species. Now the two intellectual virtues, one acquired (as prudence), the other infused (as faith), are not expressed in themselves nor in their species, and are sufficiently given to be understood through the appetitive virtues, for the will is not best disposed without the corresponding virtue in the intellect.

c. About the Gifts

70. About the gifts I say that in that passage [*Isaiah* 11.2-3] the four cardinal virtues are numbered: Prudence through 'the spirit of counsel', for prudence is properly a habit of counsel, for it is properly a habit of right practical syllogizing, and thus to syllogize is to counsel. Hence the habit whereby one is good at counseling is the habit of prudence. Fortitude is expressed among the gifts by its own name. Fear is a species of temperance, for fear is altogether the same habit as humility, although named by a different name, as is plain from Augustine on *Matthew* 5.3, "Blessed are the poor in spirit" [*On the Sermon on the Mount* I ch.4 n.11], and for this reason does Scripture frequently commend fear, "The fear of the Lord is the beginning of wisdom" etc. [*Psalm* 110.10, *Proverbs* 1.7, 9.10]. Nothing other than humility is the beginning of the virtues – there being something corresponding to it in the intellect. And, in the issue at hand, what is called 'blessed' must always be understood as to species or merit, as it is often elsewhere in Scripture, "Blessed is he who understands the needy and poor" and "Blessed is he who suffers temptation" and the like others [*Psalm* 40.1 *James* 1.12, *Psalm* 1.1, 33.9, 39.5, *Ecclesiastes* 14.1, *Matthew* 24.46, *Revelation* 1.3]. These passages do not mean to say that one is happy because one has a habit, which habit is blessedness, but because through the habit one merits blessedness. When piety is placed among the gifts, this is what our Savior calls 'mercy', and thus it is a species of justice [n.66].

71. Therefore express among the gifts are the four cardinal virtues and two of the infused virtues, which are named by their proper names:

For prudence is also called counsel [n.66], and fortitude is called by its own name, and the two others are not named under the idea of their intermediate species (which are numbered in the sevenfold list [nn.52-53]), but under certain of their species, namely temperance is named under fear and justice under charity.

72. The two infused virtues numbered there are charity, under the 'Spirit of wisdom' – for generally when wisdom is commended in Scripture (as in "Blessed the man who dwells in wisdom" [*Ecclesiastes* 14.22] and the like), wisdom is taken there for charity and is there charity. For wisdom [*sapientia*] is the habit whereby the object that is in itself 'flavorful' [*sapidum*] 'tastes' [*sapit*] to him who has it; that is, by which the good in itself pleases me, and is what in itself I want for myself. Through the other two gifts, namely intellect and science, is expressed infused faith, not that these two are ways of stating two habits (as wisdom states charity and fear states humility), but they are ways of stating one habit, as it is perfect or imperfect. And each can be given separately, or the first to be sure without the second though not conversely. Intellect can be taken for imperfect faith, which is knowledge of the first principles, and science for perfect faith, which is explicit knowledge of the articles – just as in the case of natural

knowables intellect is said to be knowledge of principles and science of explicit conclusions. Hope is not listed here but is given to be understood by charity [which is expressed by wisdom], and wisdom is that whereby God in himself tastes for me, and by which the good tastes for me (for he who tastes both approves the taste in itself and desires it for himself).

d. About the Fruits

73. About the fruits [*Galatians* 5.22-23] I say that some of them are virtues (in the idea according to which they are numbered in the sevenfold list [n.53]); some are species of virtues (numbered in the same list); some are neither one nor the other but are delights consequent to acts.

74. For example, charity is there under its proper name, and faith likewise; but hope is included in what is called long-suffering (hence it is said of the patriarchs that they were long-suffering in hope, as if expecting with patience for a long time).

75. The moral virtues are also expressed there.

Fortitude in what is called patience.

76. Justice in its species, which is called mercy [n.66], and in what is called goodness, as he is commonly called good who shares himself with his neighbor. In another species of justice, namely in friendship [n.64], is expressed there benignity, which is as it were benevolence and good warmth. In a second species, which belongs to rule or subjection, is there mildness. Or obedience is specifically named there, for the mild man is he who carries out everything without murmuring.

77. Temperance is expressed in two of its species, namely continence and chastity, if it please to refer continence to other pleasures and chastity to sexual ones. Or they can be understood to be one species, as continence and chastity are said to be one species about all delightful things, the way the Philosopher in *Ethics* 7.8.1150a9-15 makes chastity to be a certain degree in any virtue.

78. Prudence is expressed there by modesty, for a modest man is he who holds to the due and right measure in acting, and it is the work of prudence to find and fix and determine the due measure in action.

79. Thus do we have in the list the three theological virtues in themselves. And we have fortitude under patience, justice in three of its species, temperance in one species or two species, prudence in one species. And thus we have all the [moral] virtues, both intellectual [sc. prudence] and moral [sc. the others].

80. Other things are numbered there, which are delights concomitant with or consequent to acts [n.73], namely joy and peace. For joy is properly delight within the will, and peace is the security of having the object in the same power without challenge.

3. Conclusion

81. Thus is it plain, therefore, how, by maintaining that the seven virtues (in themselves or in their species) sufficiently perfect man in this life, there will

not be other habits necessary that are neither them nor species of them; and how neither in the beatitudes nor in the fruits nor in the gifts are other habits listed. And although there is a different explicit number of the beatitudes than of the gifts, this is because different species of the seven virtues are expressed in different places in different ways, and not because there are other habits that are not species of those virtues.

82. Also if the Scripture about the distinction of these virtues – because it sets down eight in one place, in another seven – were so much pondered on that it was necessary to distinguish them, why then are the distinct habits not also set down that the Apostles makes mention of in *I Corinthians* 12.7-10, where nine is the number set down? Why therefare are those habits not distinguished from others that are enumerated in *II Peter* 1.5-7, "Minister virtue in your faith…"? Scripture frequently, then, while really expressing the same things, expresses them under different terms, now omitting some and elsewhere expressly stating those thus omitted.

II. To the Principal Argument for the Opposite

83. As to the argument, then, for the opposite [n.5], it is plain that although the numbering is not the same, this numbering is not of habits distinct from habits but of species intermediate to another habit; or they are the most specific species contained under those habits; or some of them are omitted; also the things numbered are the same in one case as in the other, as has been explained [nn.81-82].

III. To the Argument on behalf of the Philosopher in the First Opinion

84. To the other argument adduced on behalf of the Philosopher from the first opinion, about heroic virtue [n.10], I say that he assigns four degrees in every goodness or virtue that belong to the same specific habit, namely: perseverance, continence, temperance, and heroic virtue. The most perfect degree then, though remaining within the same species, is heroic virtue; and it perfects, as others metaphorically say [Henry of Ghent, n.9], in an un-human way, for it is not commonly a feature of man to attain to that degree of the same species.

85. And as to what is added to the opposite about bestiality [n.10], one could say similarly that it is an excess in the same species of vice; but it can be better said that it is of another species, because about another object. But from this the proposed conclusion does not follow, because it is possible to err and act viciously about many things, but only about one thing, in its perfect conditions, is it possible to act rightly [cf. I d.48 nn.3-5, II d.40 n.8-11].

86. So although bestiality is a different habit from common human vice, because it is about another object, yet it does not follow that heroic virtue is of a different species from human virtue, for heroic virtue orders man about the same object, though more excellently; nor is it manifest that this excellence cannot be realized in another degree of the same species.

Thirty Fifth Distinction

Single Question

Whether Wisdom, Science, Intellect, and Counsel are Intellectual Habits

1. About the thirty fifth distinction I ask[a] whether wisdom, science, intellect, and counsel are intellectual habits.

a. [*Interpolation*] About the thirty fourth distinction, where the Master deals with the gifts by comparing one to another, the question asked is whether…

2. Arguments for and against – look for them [*Lectura* III d.35 nn.2-5]

3. The solution is plain from what was said above [d.34 n.72]: wisdom of course is an appetitive habit, namely charity, although it includes something as prior to it, namely faith, just as an act of will includes an act of intellect prior to it [d.34 n.32]. Now science and intellect are ways of speaking about perfect and imperfect habit of faith, as was said before [d.34 n.72]. Counsel, though, taken as a habit is the habit of prudence [d.34 n.70].

4. And if you object that intellect and science are not one habit, because in acquired cognition there is one habit of the principles, which is intellect, and another of the conclusions, which is science, so by similarity there is in infused knowledge one habit of knowing the articles [sc. of faith] and another habit of knowing the consequences of the articles – I reply that the consequence is not valid. For in acquired knowledge assent is made to a true proposition on account of the evidence it has from the terms. For a principle has properly one kind of evidence from its terms and the conclusion has another kind of evidence from its terms, and there is a different evidence for the two different ideas, namely mediate or immediate, caused or uncaused. And although one of the evidences is caused by the other, and so there can be different habits with respect to each of them (which habits would regard the formal idea of truth in either case respectively), yet it is not so in matters of faith. For assent is not given to something believed because of the evidence of what is believed, but because of the truthfulness of the one who reveals what is assented to [*Lectura* III d.23 nn.22-23]. And this veracity is the same as regard the first articles and as regard the other articles explained by them. And so there is not a different habit for one and the other, or for these and those, because there is the same object for both under the same formal idea.

Thirty Sixth Distinction

Single Question

Whether the Moral Virtues are Connected

1. About the thirty sixth distinction I ask[a] whether the moral virtues are connected.

a. [*Interpolation*] About the thirty fourth distinction, where the Master deals with the connection of the virtues, the question asked is whether…

2. That they are not:

Someone can be naturally inclined to the acts of one virtue and not to the acts of another, according to how he is put together or made up [viz. connection or complexion], just like someone who is made up one way for easily getting angry by nature but is not as inclined by nature to acts of concupiscence [cf. *Ethics* 6.13.1144b34-35]. So such a person can exercise himself more easily about the former acts than about the latter. Indeed he can absolutely exercise himself about the acts toward which he is inclined and not about those toward which he is not inclined; and thus he will have virtue as to the former and not as to those he is not inclined to.

3. Secondly, as follows: in whatever way someone is inclined, he can have matter for exercising himself in the acts of one virtue and not in the acts of another (for instance, a religious can have opportunity for restraining the passions but not for facing or enduring the terrors of war). Therefore he will generate in himself temperance without fortitude.

4. Further, third, as follows: when reason is in error, the will can choose against its judgment and yet choose rightly. Therefore, from frequent such choices a moral habit can be generated in the will and yet in the intellect prudence is not generated, because the intellect does not give right commands. And so there can be moral virtue without prudence.

5. Fourth thus: when, conversely, the intellect is giving right commands, the will is able not to choose what is commanded but to choose the opposite; and so prudence will be generated from the frequent commanding of the intellect, and yet moral virtue will not then be generated in the will, but rather vice will be; wherefore etc.

6. Further, fifth: an act of despising all things for the sake of God is hard, and consonant with right reason.[a] So there can be a virtue inclining to that act. A pauper, therefore, who thus despises things, seems to have the virtue whereby he is thus inclined. But such a person cannot have generosity, as it appears, because he does not have matter for that virtue. For he has nothing that he could give away. Similarly, many have other virtues who are not poor.

a. [*Interpolation*] as an act of wanting death for the sake of God.

7. Further, sixth as follows: conjugal continence seems to be a virtue because it is a kind of chastity, and yet it exists without virginity, and virginity seems to be a virtue.

8. Further, seventh thus: magnanimity is a virtue and it seems repugnant to humility, for a magnanimous man thinks himself worthy of great honors and the humble man thinks himself worthy of small honors, because he reckons himself of little worth in his own eyes.

9. To the opposite:

Ethics 6.13.1145a1-2 "All the virtues will be present together in a single existing prudence." Augustine *On the Trinity* 6.4 n.6, "The virtues that exist in the human spirit, though they are understood to be single, yet are in no way separated from each other. Hence, whoever are equal, for example, in fortitude are equal in prudence and justice and temperance."

I. To the Question

10. There are many articles to this question: First, about the connection of the moral virtues with each other, and this either in their genus or in the species of their genus. Second, about the connection of any moral virtue with prudence. Third, about the connection of the moral virtues with the theological. Fourth, about the connection of the theological virtues with each other.

A. About the Connection of the Moral Virtues with Each Other

1. Opinion of Henry of Ghent

a. Exposition of the Opinion

11. As to the first, the following is said [Henry of Ghent, *Quodlibet* 5 q.16]. The Philosopher in *Ethics* 7.1-2.1145a15-b20 says that in every genus of goodness and badness it is possible to distinguish four grades. The first in the genus (that is, its beginning stage) is what by the Philosopher is called perseverance, the second grade is continence, the third temperance, and in the fourth is what is called heroic virtue. In the first two grades, to be sure, there is no virtue but only a certain imperfect disposition, on which perfect virtue naturally follows. In the third grade there is virtue commonly so called. But in the fourth grade the virtue is excellently so called, and exists in surpassing degree.

12. It is admitted, then, that in the first two grades there is not virtue, because in the habits of the virtues someone can be exercised in the acts of one virtue and not in those of another, and thus acquire perseverance as well as temperance, and one and not the other.

13. In the third grade a distinction is drawn, because virtue in that grade can be inchoate or average or perfect.

14. And so in the first two degrees [sc. of the third grade, the inchoate and average] there does not have to be a connection, for the same reason as before [n.12], because one can be exercised in the acts of one virtue according to these degrees and not in those of another.

15. But in the third degree of the third grade [n.13], and much more in the fourth grade [n.11], there is a connection.

16. The proof is multiple:

First as follows [Henry of Ghent *Quodlibet* 5 q.17]: "That is not perfect and true virtue which can fall away to the contrary of its end and fail, according to what Augustine says in a sermon about the works of mercy [Paulinus of Aquila, *On Salutary Doctrines* ch. 7, mistakenly included in the works of Augustine], 'A charity that can be abandoned was never true'." But if a moral virtue existed alone

without the others, it could fall away from its end; therefore it was not true virtue. The proof of the minor is that one virtue does not strengthen the will as regard other desirable things that it does not concern. Therefore, if the will only has this virtue, it can fall away as regard other desirable things that are presented to it. But by falling away as to these other things it can fall away as to the object of this virtue too; therefore etc.

17. This is plain in an example: for he who has fortitude and not temperance is not firm in resisting delightful things. Similarly, he who has temperance and not fortitude is not firm in enduring terrible things. Therefore, if terrible and delightful things are presented to him at the same time, as that he commit fornication or undergo death, he can fall away as to the terrible things and so about the things of fortitude (and not about the things of temperance). For such a person would choose not to undergo death than not to fornicate, because he is not firm as to the terrible suffering.

18. A second argument to the same effect is as follows: it is a feature of virtue to work delightfully (from *Ethics* 2.5.1106a15-17); but one virtue without another is not a principle of delightful activity. The point is plain in the aforesaid example [n.17]. For if, when tempted as to intemperance, he does not have fortitude, he will, without delight, flee the things that belong to temperance, and so he is perfectly temperate only if he also has fortitude. An example can be put forward in the same way about avarice, that if someone is greedy he will choose to keep his money rather than his temperance.

19. Further, third as follows: perfect virtue leads to the end of virtue, because leading to the end is what perfection is in morals. But no virtue without the others leads one to the end, not oneself by oneself nor man in political community. Therefore etc.

20. There is a confirmation of this position in Gregory *Moralia* 22.1 n.2, "Whoever is held to be strong in virtue is then truly strong if he is not subject to vices on the other side." And again 21.3 n.6, "One virtue without another is not perfect virtue, or rather is not virtue at all." The commentator too on the beginning of *Ethics* 6 [Eustratius, *On the Ethics* 6 ch.6], "When temperance does not exist, how will there be justice?" – as if he were to say, "in no way will there be justice." Again, the same commentator on the *Ethics* [*ibid*.], "We call temperance by this name [sc. sô-phrosunê in Greek] as being 'what saves prudence' [sôzein phronêsin];" and "The virtues are sisters to each other etc."

21. The same is proved by the gloss on *Revelation* 21, "The city lies four square" [in Nicholas of Lyra 6 folio 272v "The four sides are the four principal virtues"].

b. Rejection of the Opinion

22. Against this there are many arguments.

[First argument] – First as follows: for you [sc. Henry] the two grades (perseverance and continence) turn out not to be connected, and likewise the first two degrees of the third grade (namely when virtue is imperfect or average) [nn.12-14]. I argue in the same way about virtue in the third grade of virtue,

namely that someone who has virtue in the two first degrees of the third grade can be exercised in the third degree of one virtue and not in the third degree of another. For someone who has a habit of acting as regard the latter objects is not less disposed than someone else who has no such habit. So, if someone could exercise himself from the beginning about the objects of one virtue and not of another, then he will, when he has the habit of one virtue up to the first two degrees of the third grade, be much more able to exercise himself about the object of one virtue and not of the other, and so be able to acquire one perfect virtue for himself and not another. There is a confirmation, because opportunity to act on the matter of the other virtue (so as to be inclined toward it as he is inclined to what he has the habit of) may not be presented to him.

23. If it be said that, although the matter of the other virtue may not be presented to him externally, yet it is presented to him in imagination and he will have to make right choices about that, else the virtue acquired in any degree will not be preserved; – on the contrary: it is possible for the intellect not to consider the other things, but only those to which the habit of virtue inclines, for the intellect cannot understand two things distinctly at the same time, according to the common way of speaking [*Ord*. IV d.1 q.1 nn.22-23]. Or if other things do occur to it that belong to the other virtue, the will cannot make choices good or bad about them, but prescribes non-consideration of these other things and consideration of the things that belong to the virtue it does have. And so the proposed conclusion [n.22] will stand.

24. Alternatively it is said, and better, that a habit, however perfect it be in its natural genus, can be acquired from acts frequently elicited about the object of one virtue without the acquisition of another virtue; but the habit, however intense it is, will not be a virtue because it does not have the idea of virtue unless it is conformed to the other virtues already acquired in the same person, for the agreement of habit with habit is necessary in any habit for it to have the idea of virtue.

25. This statement [n.24] could be easily rejected if moral virtue were a per se being or per se one thing in the genus of quality.

26. But because I do not believe this to be true, as will be touched on below [nn.27-30], I therefore argue differently as follows: a virtue, when it has everything that belongs per se to the idea of virtue, is generated by acts conformed to right reason, so that the idea of a virtuous habit or act requires, over and above the nature of act and habit, only conformity to right reason. The proof is in *Ethics* 2.6.1106b36-07a2: "Virtue is a habit of choice as determined by reason." But such conformity of habit and act with the right reason by which a person chooses can exist without the agreement of the other virtues present together in the same agent. The assumption here is plain, for one only rightly chooses in the matter of temperance if reason that is right and gives commands about such choices precedes. But it is possible for right command about one virtue to precede without there being any right command about the matter of some other virtue. Therefore etc.

27. [Second argument] – Further second: it follows from what was said [n.22] that any virtue will be the reason for the existence of another virtue; the

consequent is false, therefore the antecedent is too. Proof of the consequence: for if the habit is not the virtue of temperance save because another virtue, say fortitude, is concomitant with it, then the virtue of fortitude, insofar as it is concomitant, will be the reason for that habit's being the virtue of temperance. And by parity of reasoning temperance, as concomitant, will conversely be the reason for fortitude's being a virtue; and any virtue generally will be the reason for another habit's being a virtue. The consequent is false because it follows that some virtue will be a virtue before it is a virtue, and so there will be no first virtue.

28. Proof of all this.

Let us take that habit in the genus of quality which temperance must be. If this habit cannot be a virtue unless the virtue that is fortitude is concomitant with it, then fortitude will be a virtue before temperance is a virtue. And fortitude cannot be a virtue unless the virtue of temperance is concomitant with it, ex hypothesi [n.27]. Therefore, fortitude will be a virtue before it is a virtue.

29. The same point proves that there will be no first virtue [n.27]. For temperance is not the first virtue because it cannot be a virtue without the concomitance of all the other virtues possessing the idea of virtue (ex hypothesi). Nor will any other be first, because no other virtue can be a virtue without the concomitance of temperance as a virtue.

30. If it be said to this, and with probability, that a virtue can be a virtue when it has all the virtues concomitant with it, and although, in the idea by which it is one habit, it precede another, yet not in the idea by which it is a virtue; but all the habits, whether generated earlier or later, have the idea of virtue from their own nature and from mutual concomitance. – Against this: Then it follows that one act will generate all the moral virtues in their being as virtue, which seems unacceptable. Proof of this consequence: For suppose that the habit which is temperance has been generated, and consequently that the habit which is fortitude has been generated, and to like degree; eventually none of these habits will be a virtue until each habit is in the degree in which it is a virtue. Either then each habit exists before another or it does not. If it does then the conclusion is gained, namely that one habit can exist without another, and so there is no connection of the virtues. If each habit does not exist before another, then the habits will come to be at once through one act that has the being of virtue, which seems unacceptable, because that act seems to be an act of a virtue [sc. so some virtue would have to exist already in order for the act to be an act of that virtue]. And just as it would be an act of a virtue if the virtue had been generated, so it would be generative of a virtue [sc. if the virtue were not yet generated]; therefore it would be generative of them all [sc. for all are virtues together, by mutual concomitance].

31. [Third argument] – Further, third: it seems more reasonable that the species of the same genus in the moral virtues are connected than that two genera are. For one is more inclined to have an ordered disposition about connected matter (from the virtue one has) than about remote matter. Now the matters of the species of the same genus are more connected than the matters of diverse ones. But the species of the same genus of virtue are not connected (as virginity and conjugal chastity); therefore the virtues of all the species are not connected.

2. Scotus' own Opinion

32. As to this first article [nn.10-11] I concede that neither in their genera commonly assigned (as justice, fortitude, and temperance) nor in the more general ones that I assigned earlier [d.34 n.33], which is virtue as disposing affection to oneself and to another, are the moral virtues necessarily connected.

33. The evidence for this is as follows: Virtue is some perfection of man, and not total perfection because then one moral virtue would suffice. But when there are several partial perfections of something, that thing can be perfect simply according to one perfection and imperfect simply according to another – as is clear in man, whose property it is to have many organic perfections. Man can have one perfection at its highest, having nothing of another (as that he is supremely disposed to sight or touch but has nothing of hearing). One can therefore have perfection at its highest with respect to the matter of temperance, while having nothing of the perfection that would be required with respect to the matter of another perfection; and consequently one can be simply temperate, even as to any act of temperance, but not simply be moral without all the virtues (just as one is not simply a sensing thing without all the senses). Yet one is not less perfectly temperate, although one is less morally perfect (just as one is not less perfectly sighted nor less perfectly a hearer, although one is less perfectly sentient).

3. To the Arguments for Henry's Opinion

34. Hereby is plain the answer to certain things touched on for the first opinion, that is, for the possibility of virtue's falling away [n.16]. This is false of virtue, for virtue does not fall away, but he who has virtue can, through deficiency in another virtue, fall away as regard the matter of that other virtue. But the virtue is not for this reason imperfect, because it is not virtue's job to direct man about everything but about its own proper objects (just as he who cannot see does not fall away more in hearing than if he could see, but rather he falls away in sensing).

35. If it be argued against this that thus a virtue is easy to lose and so is not a virtue, I deny the antecedent; on the contrary although falling away happen contrary to a virtue's inclination, the good disposition is not corrupted save by many sins or vices, or by a few intense ones.

36. And the same point makes plain the response to what was said about delightful activity [n.18], for one does act delightfully as to the matter of the relevant virtue taken precisely [n.17]. It is pleasant, I mean, for him to abstain from the works of intemperance, but it is not pleasant for him to undergo terrible things, because he is not in an orderly state with respect to them. Therefore, in sadness he commits an act of intemperance because it is against his habit; but because it would be sadder for him to endure terrible things, he flees what is sadder and in a way chooses involuntarily the less sad so as not to fall into the more sad. I concede therefore that such a person is imperfect and acts sadly; but he is not imperfect, nor does he act sadly about the matter of his virtue [sc. of

temperance], save only per accidens, because it is accompanied by another matter [sc. enduring terrible things], about which he is not virtuously disposed so as to act virtuously and delightfully with respect to it.

37. The same makes plain the answer to the point about the end of the moral virtues [n.19], because a single virtue does not lead one perfectly to the end of the virtues, just as neither does a single sensitive power lead man perfectly to the perfect act of sensing. But each virtue leads one as far as is it can, and all are required for leading one perfectly to act virtuously or delightfully. I concede therefore that one virtue does not lead one sufficiently to the end but – as far as in it lies – leads one sufficiently to the end, namely it suffices for the perfection of such virtue.

38. To the first argument that is added there from Blessed Augustine [n.16], I say that the Philosopher does not say in the *Categories* that a habit cannot be lost, but that it can with difficulty be lost. Although therefore a virtue could be lost and so he who has it could fall away, the virtue itself indeed does not fall away, but he who has it draws back from the peak of virtue. However it does not follow that his virtue was not virtue, even perfect virtue, according to the idea of habit, because it was not incapable of being lost but capable with difficulty of being lost. What therefore Augustine [Paulinus] says about charity needs to be understood as that someone was truly in charity who yet afterwards sinned mortally; but the charity was not the charity which truly joins to the end, that is, to blessedness.

39. To the authorities cited there:

About Gregory [n.20] one can say that he is speaking there about the virtues as they are the principle of gaining merit; and in this way it is true that one moral virtue without another is not virtue, because merit is not gained through one virtue if the others do not accompany it. For he who has moral temperance does not gain merit if humility does not accompany him, or at least if the opposite vice is present in him.

40. The same can be said to the gloss on *Revelation* [n.21].

41. The same again to the Commentator on *Ethics* 6, about virtues being sisters to each other [n.20]. I concede that although sisters mutually aid each other for common life, yet one sister is not another, nor does one sister essentially perfect another; the virtues do thus each well help each other mutually, each in saving the other. And in this can be understood the saying of some people that one of them is not complete without another, because one is not thus well preserved without another. For to a man exposed to many temptations in diverse matters, imperfection in one matter can be an occasion for acting imperfectly in another, and a perfect disposition in one matter aids toward right action in another matter; therefore the virtues help each other as sisters. But no virtue is essentially required for the perfection of another, just as one sister is born first without another, and so on, if they cannot be generated together. But two perfect acts cannot always be had together so that through them two virtues might be generated, because one perfect act of one power would impede the act of another power; they could then be generated together?

B. About the Connection of the Moral Virtues with Prudence

42. The second article about the connection of the moral virtues with prudence [n.10] has two doubts: the first about the connection of any virtue with its own prudence; the second about the connection of all the virtues with a single prudence.

1. About the Connection of any Virtue with its own Prudence

a. Opinion of Henry of Ghent

α. Exposition of the Opinion

43. As to the first doubt [n.42], it seems that the connection is necessary, from the Philosopher *Ethics* 7.10.1151a10-14, where his opinion is, "If the will chooses badly, the intellect commands badly."

44. The same Philosopher in the same place says something else for the same opinion [sc. to the vicious man things contrary to the final end seem good].

45. He says in *Ethics* 6.5.1140b19-20, 13.1144a33-36 that "malice makes one lie and err about practical principles," and so it destroys prudence.

46. Again [1144a36-b1], "It is impossible for a prudent man to be not-good," and conversely.

47. Again 1144b30-32, 45a1-6 ["It is impossible to be good without prudence, or prudent without moral virtue." "All the virtues will be present in the one prudence; there will be no right choice without prudence and moral virtue."].

48. Again 7.5.1147a25-b5 ["One proposition is universal, the other about singulars…; when a single idea from them arises, the conclusion must follow and at once action…"].

49. Again, I suppose two things: one that the intellect cannot understand several different things at once [n.23]; second that the will can will nothing under the idea of evil. I then argue: when there is only a judgment about fleeing some evil, the will either will flee it or will not. If it does flee, then the will along with right judgment cannot be bad (with abiding malice); if it can will evil [by not fleeing it], then it can pursue evil under the idea of evil, or pursue something unknown.

50. I reply that the first supposition [n.49] is false as concerns two altogether disparate things opposed to each other. The fact is plain from particulars. For a relative cannot exist or be understood without its correlative, nor an accident without a substance, nor much less can privation without its fitting natural subject, which privation necessarily presupposes a subject and an aptitude in the subject for the form that it lacks. So the intellect cannot understand privation on its own, as the argument [n.49] supposes, but only in a subject and in something ultimately naturally apt for it; just as neither can it understand one relative without its correlative, nor an accident without a substance. When the intellect, then, understands that evil is to be fled from and presents this to the will, the will can elicit an act that is material substrate for malice and that is even necessarily accompanied by malice in some way. Although therefore the intellect could understand a subject without privation, it cannot understand privation

without a subject, for privations are immediate opposites in a subject naturally apt for them [III d.3 n.36].

51. Again in *Movement of Animals* 7.701a11-23, if the major premise is proposed by the practical intellect and the minor is assumed by the senses or imagination, the conclusion will be an action, so that action in accordance with it must follow, unless impeded. So never, according to Aristotle, is action altogether contrary to the command of reason.

52. And this is confirmed by Augustine on *Psalm* 2.5 "He will speak to them in his anger," when he says *Enarrationes in Psalmos* 2 n.4, "The turning aside and blinding of the mind follows those who transgress the law of God."

53. To the same effect is the statement of Dionysius *Divine Names* ch.4, "No one does anything looking to what is bad." And that in *Ethics* 3.2.1110b28-30, "Everyone evil is ignorant what he should do," with which *Wisdom* 2.21 agrees "Their malice has blinded them."

54. The manner posited by Henry, *Quodlibet* 5 q.17.

55. If objection is made to these points on the base of the article condemned [by Archbishop Tempier in 1277], which says that "when there is universal and particular knowledge about anything, the will cannot will the opposite – error," Henry replies in *Quodlibet* 10 q.10 that this proposition "when there is…knowledge… the will cannot will the opposite" is to be distinguished as to composition and division. In the sense of division it is false, for it signifies that the will never has power to will the opposite (which is false). But in the sense of composition it must again be distinguished because the ablative absolute [sc. the clause "when there is…'] can be explained by 'if' or 'because' or 'while'.

56. If it is explained by 'because' or 'if' it is false, and it is true that this is an error; for it signifies that rightness in knowledge or the intellect is cause of rightness in the will.

57. But if it is expounded by 'because' or 'while', so that it indicates consequence or concomitance and not causality, then (according to him) the said proposition can possess truth, and is not an error and not condemned, but this in such a way that error of the intellect not be understood to be prior in nature to error of the will. For both are simultaneously concomitant with each other in time.

58. Still, the error of the will is by nature prior, so that if one considers the intellect as to its priority in nature to the act of will the intellect is right; but when the will freely errs, the intellect is blinded, and simultaneously in time but later in nature.

59. For this position the argument is as follows: If the first choice does not blind the intellect, then neither does any other, because the first can be as bad as any other. And if it does not blind when it is bad, it never blinds. And so, whatever actual malice there is in the will would never blind the intellect, and so someone could be as bad as you wish without any error of the intellect, which seems to be against many authorities.

β. Rejection of the Opinion

60. Argument against this is first from authorities.

One is from Augustine on *Psalm* 123.3, "Perhaps they would have drowned us…" where he says *On the Psalm* 123 n.5, "Thus are the living, he says, absorbed, who know evil and consent to it, or perhaps they die."

61. The same on *Psalm* 68.23, "Let their table be a trap before them [sc. persecutors who would have taken us alive]," where he says *On the Psalms* 68 sermon 2 n.7, "What is it for them to be alive, that is, to be consenting, unless they know they should not consent to vice? Behold they know the trap and put their foot in it."

62. Again he says on *Psalm* 118.20, "My soul has desired your justifications at all times," where he says, 118 sermon 8 n.4, "The intellect went before, affection followed late or not at all."

63. In support of this seem also to be the reasoning and authority of the Philosopher, *Ethics* 2.3.1105b2-3, where he says that "to know (or reason) is worth little or nothing for virtue." But if rightness of the intellect in its consideration had right volition as concomitant, then since knowledge does much for consideration, it would consequently do much for right volition. Indeed something else follows, that it would not be necessary for anyone to be persuaded not to be vicious but only to consider according to the habit of virtue, for (according to you) by rightly considering according to the habit of knowledge the will cannot at the same time not be right; and so there is no need to persuade anyone about right willing but only about right consideration.

64. Again by reason:

When the intellect is commanding rightly, it is possible for the will not to choose, just as it is possible for it not to choose what is commanded by the intellect, for reason is not moved at the same time by this understanding and by that. Now when the will does no choosing, virtue is not generated in it; but from right command prudence is generated, according to you; therefore prudence without any moral virtue will be generated.

65. Again, that bad choice cannot blind the intellect so that it err about things to be done I prove as follows: the terms are the total cause of the knowledge of a first principle in practical matters as in speculative ones [cf. *Ord*. II d.7 n.88], from *Posterior Analytics* 1.3.72b24-25, and the syllogistic form is evident of itself to any intellect (as is plain from the definition of a perfect syllogism, *Prior Analytics* 1.1.24b22-24 [*Ord*. III d.14 nn.38-39]). Therefore when the terms are apprehended and put together and the syllogistic deduction is made, the intellect must rest in the conclusion, the knowledge of which depends precisely on the knowledge of the terms of the principles and the knowledge of syllogistic deduction. Therefore, when the intellect is considering the principles through syllogistic deduction, it is impossible for the will to make it err about the conclusion, and much less to make it err about the principles. And so, in no way will the intellect blind the intellect so that it err.

66. If you concede the conclusion and say that therefore the will blinds the intellect, because it turns the intellect away from right consideration – on the contrary:

67. Thus to turn away is not to blind, for one could thus turn away while prudence still remains; for it is possible for a prudent man not to consider what belongs to prudence, but sometimes voluntarily to consider other things.

68. Again, the will has its wanting to turn the intellect away either while right command remains or while it does not.

If while it does remain, the will therefore wants to turn the intellect away when the will is not then sinning, according to you (because right command remains), and so the turning away of the intellect is not a blinding consequent upon sin, because there is not yet sin.

If while it does not remain, then the will has its wanting to turn away while some other act remains. Whence, I ask, does this other act come? Either from chance, and then the chance act is not a making blind consequent upon sin. Or it is necessary to posit, through an act of will (at a tangent to right command), another act of intellect, prior to the wanting to turn away; and then there is a process to infinity where, after the act of the intellect is in place, another 'willing' was present just as before. For it will always be necessary that the will turn first to this before it turn to that; and thus, if this willing was a sin, it was a willing that was bad while right command remained; or if this willing was not a sin but there was always some not-right command preceding the 'turning away', then some command precedes every sin of the will, and so the proposed conclusion is gained.[a]

a. [*Text cancelled by Scotus*]. Again, 'to will to turn away' requires some act of understanding that is simultaneous in time or nature.

This command is either an abiding command of right reason, from which the will wants to turn away, and then it follows that 'to want to turn away' is not for you a sin, because it stands along with right command.

Or the act previous to the wanting to turn away is different from right command; and if that previous act is right, the same follows as before, namely that the wanting to turn away is not a sin, and so no making blind follows upon it. But if the act previous to the 'wanting' is not right, there will not be a blinding of the intellect following the wanting to turn away because the blinding precedes that wanting.

69. Again, either the will chooses badly while right command remains, and so the intended conclusion is gained; or, if it chooses badly, and therefore, while right command does not remain, it chooses on the basis of some act of intellect that is not right, therefore, because for you it would not then sin, this other and non-right act will be previous to the bad 'wanting'; therefore there will not be a non-right act through another bad 'wanting'. And so the intended conclusion is gained, for there is no circle on account of some process to infinity in causes and caused involved. Consequently, the will is not a cause of blinding for the bad command which, according to you, follows upon the bad 'wanting'.

70. Again, no wayfarer is entirely incorrigible; therefore no one can err entirely about the practical first principles. Proof of the consequence: he who errs about the practical first principles has nothing through which he could be called back to the good; for whatever premises one tries to persuade him through, he will deny what is assumed, for nothing can be more known than a practical first principle.

71. Again, the damned do not rest in this proposition as something true 'God is to be hated', because then they would not have the worm of which *Isaiah* speaks 66.24, "Their worm will not die," for they would simply delightfully hate God without remorse; therefore etc.

b. Scotus' own Opinion

72. As to this article [nn.10, 42] one can say that right command can stand simply in the intellect without the will rightly choosing what is commanded. And so, since one right act of commanding may generate prudence, prudence will be generated there without any habit of moral virtue in the will.

73. And if so, it is then asked: how does malice, according to the above authorities [nn.52-53], blind the intellect?

74. It can be said to blind in two ways: in one way by privation and in another way positively.

By privation: because it turns one away from right consideration. For the will, when choosing the opposite of something rightly commanded, does not allow the intellect to abide in that right command, but turns it away to consider reasons for the opposite (if any sophistical or probable reasons can be found for the opposite); or at any rate the will turns the intellect away to consider something else that is unrelated, so as to stop the actual displeasure that lingers in remorse, the remorse that comes from choosing the opposite of what was commanded.

75. Positively it blinds in the following way: for just as the will, when rightly choosing the end, bids the intellect consider what is necessary for the end, and the intellect (by thus investigating the means ordered to that right end) generates a habit of prudence in itself, so the will, when it chooses a bad end for itself (it can indeed set up a bad end for itself, as said in *Ord*. I d.1 nn.16, 67), orders the intellect to consider the means necessary for attaining that bad end. Augustine well speaks of this in *City of God* 14 ch.28 ["Two loves have made two cities"], that the will has virtues in the way there dealt with; that is, the will by its virtue [or power] sets up a bad end for itself and bids the intellect find or bring forward the means necessary for attaining pleasurable things and for fleeing the opposed terrible things. And just as the habit of inquiring into the means for a well-chosen end (which habit is generated by order of the will eliciting it in an intellect giving commands) is prudence so, in the case of a badly choosing will, the habit acquired by command about things directed to the evil end is error, and is a habit directly opposed to the habit of prudence and can be called imprudence or folly. And this folly is not only a privation but also a positive contrariety, because just as a prudent man has a habit whereby he chooses things ordered to the due end, so the foolish man has a habit for rightly and promptly choosing means ordered to the end set up by an evil will. And because such a habit is generated by command of a badly choosing will, so to this extent it is true that a bad will blinds – not indeed by causing an error about some proposition, but by making the intellect have an act or habit of considering other means, means to a bad end. And this whole error is in things to be done, albeit it is not an error deceptive as to matters of speculation.

76. There could be another doubt here: If the right habit of the intellect and the good habit of appetite are not necessarily generated together (because it is possible to command well about something while not acting well about it), then is the intellectual habit generated without moral virtue prudence, or conversely is the habit generated in the appetite without the intellect moral virtue?

77. As to the first option about prudence, one can say that, strictly speaking, prudence is not without moral virtue, because it is 'right reason about things doable in accord with right appetite' from *Ethics* 6.2.1139a22-31, and appetite is not right without moral virtue. And if this be true, then the first commands about the principles of things doable would be right, and yet they would not be prudence but certain seeds of prudence. Still there would also be some rightly commanding habit about the means necessary for the end set up by the will, and yet it would not be prudence.

78. One could then posit a double intellectual habit about things doable, a neutral one and a right one, prudence. The one, indeed, which would precede right choice of the particular end, would not be prudence, because prudence is about the means ordered to the end, for it is a deliberative habit [*Ethics* 6.5.1140a30-31]: "deliberation is not about the end but about what is for the end" [*Ethics* 3.5.1112b11-12]. Prudence is also discursive (because deliberative), and so is about what one runs through in thought. But when the good end has been chosen, not only in general but also in particular, as that 'one should live chastely', there could be some deliberative habit of the intellect, giving commands about things for the end but not having right choice concomitant with it. And, as far as concerns the object, it would be prudence, for it would be right choice about things for the end. But the other condition would be lacking to it, namely that it be in agreement with and conformed to right appetite about the same objects [n.77].

79. In this way [nn.77-78] one should say that any habit generated in the intellect, though it be practical and right (whether about a particular or universal end, or whether about the means necessary for pursuing the chosen particular end), is not prudence if it is not accompanied by right choice of the will about the same things.

80. And if it be argued against this [n.79], as was argued against the previous article about the connection of the moral virtues [nn.26-30], that "in this agreement it would follow that prudence constitutes moral virtue and conversely, and so both habits (namely prudence and moral virtue) would ultimately be generated through one act, and that one act could not be of the intellect and will but only of one or the other, so it could not generate both" – to this one could say that the conformity of one moral virtue with another is not necessary, because no virtue is the rule for another virtue. But conformity with prudence is necessary for any virtue, because included within the definition of virtue is that it be 'a habit of choice according to right reason'. And so for this reason there could, by way of concomitance, be constitution of a habit in moral being by prudence, and conversely; but there could not be constitution of the moral virtues among each other in this way.

81. Then it would be conceded that some habit in the nature of prudence was generated at the same time as another habit in the nature of moral virtue was

generated; and they would be generated by the single habit and act that ultimately generates either moral virtue or prudence. For it is unacceptable in morals that one act ultimately generate two moral virtues.

82. But it is not unacceptable in the case of prudence and temperance, for the act that generates prudence in the nature of regulative principle also generates temperance in the nature of regulated principle. But this act only has the nature of virtue from the idea of being regulated, and for this reason it generates temperance in the nature of virtue. This cannot be said of temperance in relation to fortitude, because fortitude is not the rule of temperance.

83. One should say, therefore, that the two do not establish themselves in the being of virtue by any priority, as if one of them is a virtue before it makes the other to be a virtue; rather the intellectual habit of prudence and the moral virtue corresponding to it are simultaneous in nature.

84. And if one asks through what these two habits are generated in perfect being, I admit that it is through a single act, whether the act is a right choice (for without right choice of the end the intellectual habit is not in agreement with right reason and so is not prudence either), or whether the act is one of the intellect (for without right command of the intellect choice is not in agreement with right reason, and so is not virtuous nor can it generate moral virtue). Both the act of the intellect, therefore, and the act of will are able, by generating something per se in the being of nature, to generate it in relative being concomitantly and further to generate its correlative concomitantly; and so one act would generate both moral virtue and its prudence in nature simultaneously.

85. Accordingly, one could say that each habit, preceding right choice, would indeed be a habit of moral science or a certain moral science. For just as in things to be made the artisan differs from the man of experience, for the artisan knows the 'why' and the man of experience only the 'that', *Metaphysics* 1.1.981a28-30, and the artisan is not ready in acting but the man of experience is, as is said *ibid*., so in the same way in morals, he who has the right habit of the principle of things doable or of the conclusion but is not skilled in acting or directing himself about things doable, though he may have a remote directive habit (which habit can be called intellect or moral science), yet he does not have a proximate directive habit of the sort that prudence is, and of the sort that the habit of the experienced man is in things makeable.

86. Although these remarks seem probable applied to the distinction between practical science and prudence, yet prudence is not only about the means ordained to gaining the ultimate end but also gives commands about the ultimate end, at least in the particular case (as in the case of chastity).

87. The first proof is as follows: for moral virtue always follows prudence in a certain order of nature. Now from the choice of a particular end (as chastity) moral virtue is generated, so some prudence precedes the choice. Therefore it does not seem that prudence must properly be restricted to being only a habit about determinate and commanded means that are ordered to a chosen particular end, but also to being per se and properly about the end.

88. A second proof is that then there would not be one prudence corresponding to one moral virtue, for a moral virtue is one from the unity of the

end to the choosing of which it principally inclines. But if there were no prudence giving commands about that end but only about the means to the end, there would be no object which would give unity to commanding prudence, but there would be many prudences about many means commanded for the end, although however there would, from the unity of the end, be one moral virtue.

89. So both because of the priority of natural prudence to moral virtue [n.87], and because of the unity of prudence as regard one moral virtue [n.88], it seems one must admit that the practical act which gives right commands about a particular end is properly prudence.

90. Nor is it a problem that prudence is said to be a deliberative habit and so is for the end and discursive [n.78]. For it gives commands about the proper ends of the moral virtues by proceeding from the practical principle (which is taken from a universal, particular, political end); and this discursive process is the first deliberation, though it is more commonly called deliberation about the means of the virtues.

91. As to the other point added there [n.78], that prudence is agreement with right appetite, it does not impress, for what is 'naturally prior' does not seem to have anything of its nature dependent on what is posterior; but prudence as prudence seems to be naturally prior to moral virtue, because it defines it. So what is there called 'agreement', as was touched on in the first question about practical and speculative theology [*Prol*. nn.236-237, 265-269], should be understood as the agreement that conforms right action to it, that is, that knowledge ought to be such that, as concerns itself, right action should be conformed to it; but such is knowledge, whether right choice follows in the one giving command or not.

92. One can say differently then that the habit generated from commands, whether about the ends (at any rate certain particular ones, which are properly the ends of the moral virtues), or whether about the means ordered to those ends (about which means there are perhaps no habits other than those about the ends), is properly prudence, even though right choice not follow in the one commanding. And thus altogether there will be no necessary connection of any moral virtue with the prudence that gives commands about its material. Yet, conversely, no choice can be morally right unless it is in agreement with its rule and its measure, which is right command. But right command is of a nature to generate also a single prudence; therefore conversely the connection can be conceded, that moral virtue cannot be without prudence about its matter.

93. To the arguments and authorities brought from Augustine [nn43-59], see the responses in Henry of Ghent *Quodlibet* 9 q.5.

2. About the Connection of all the Virtues in a Single Prudence

94. On the other part of this article [n.42], namely about the connection of all the virtues in a single prudence, the Philosopher seems to say that there is such a connection, *Ethics* 6.13.1145a1-2, "Prudence exists as one and all the virtues will be present in it." See the Commentator there [Eustratius *On Ethics* 6.18].

a. Opinion of Henry of Ghent

95. Now how there is one prudence for all morality can be posited in the same way as for the habit of science – see the opinion [of Henry] and its rejection *Commentary on the Metaphysics* 6 q.1, *Lectura* III d.36 nn.87-89, 91-101.

b. Scotus' own Opinion

96. To this question, therefore, one can say that just as art concerns makeable things so prudence does doable things, and there is no greater connection of doable things as they regard one habit than of makeable things. So just as diverse makeable things require their own diverse arts, so diverse doable things require their own diverse prudences. And just as someone can be morally well disposed as to some doable things and badly as to others, so can one in giving commands be habituated to giving them rightly in these matters but not in those – and yet the former are not principles for giving commands about the latter nor conclusions following from the latter.

97. Now the way that all prudences are one habit, and all habits of geometry belong to one universal science, was stated in the *Commentary on Metaphysics* 6 q.1 nn.17-27, 40, 42. For a single formal unity is not to be understood there but a virtual one. For just as the habit about a first subject is formally one because of it and is virtually, but not formally, about everything contained in the first subject, so the habit that is formally about some end in doable things is virtually of everything of which the practical knowledge is included virtually in that end. But it is not formally of all those things, and so the one prudence formally is of all virtues virtually, if we extend the name 'prudence' to the habit that is the understanding of the practical first principle.

98. Accordingly one can expound the authority of the Philosopher in *Ethics* 6 [n.94] such that either he is speaking of one prudence formally, and then one must understand that all the virtues will be in one existing and perfect prudence, not only as to intension but also as to extension. Indeed, prudence is never as perfect in extension as it can be unless it is perfect about all the things that it can be extended to, and these are all the objects that belong to all the virtues.

99. Aristotle's authority can be expounded in another way, not about unity formally but about unity of genus. For just as temperance is said by the Philosopher to be one virtue and formally different from fortitude, and yet each of these is a certain intermediate genus possessing many species under it (as was said before d.34 nn.31-33), so in the case of the numbering of intermediate genera one can say (because of the unity of the intermediate genus) that, although it contains under it many species, yet it can be one in unity of genus.

100. And by understanding the unity of prudence in this way, all the moral virtues are connected in one genus of prudence insofar as any virtue is connected to it according to some species or other under it. And this was stated earlier, on the supposition of the preceding article about the connection, mutual or not [nn.77-83], of any virtue with its own prudence [n.99].

C. On the Connection of the Moral Virtues with the Theological

101. On the third article [n.10], Augustine seems to say, *Against Julian* 4.3 n.17, that true and perfect virtues are not without charity. And his proof is that someone without charity does not glory perfectly in God.

102. Against this is Augustine in a sermon on *Patience* 26 n.23 (and it is contained in Gratian): "If a heretic or schismatic die in order not to deny Christ, are we to commend his patience?" So such a person has patience but not faith or charity; therefore patience can be without charity.

103. Again, when certain things are ordered essentially, as a disposition and the acquired form for which it is the disposition, the disposition can be without the form though not conversely. The moral virtues seem to be certain dispositions for charity, as natural happiness is a disposition for supernatural happiness, [so they can be without charity].

104. Further, third, the definition of moral virtue [n.80] can be perfectly realized in someone without theological virtue.

105. One can say that no virtues incline one to the ultimate end save through the mediation of the virtue whose per se function it is to regard the ultimate end. And so, if only charity immediately regards the ultimate end, the other virtues do not direct one to the ultimate end save through the mediation of charity. But, insofar as the virtues are certain instruments for perfecting man, they should be instruments for directing him to the ultimate end wherein is supreme perfection, and therefore the virtues are imperfect without charity, and they cannot without it be directed to perfection. Yet because this imperfection does not belong to them in their species (for to none in their species does it belong to direct one immediately to the end); therefore each of them can in their species be perfect without charity. To the extent therefore that they are said to be unformed without charity and to be formed through charity [Scotus *Quodlibet* q.17 n.8], to that extent charity directs them and their ends to the ultimate end, in which direction lies their supreme and true extrinsic perfection.

106. Hereby is plain the answer to the authority of Augustine [n.101], for the virtues are not true without charity because they do not lead to blessedness without it.

104. But, on the other hand, there is a doubt whether the theological virtues presuppose the moral virtues.

108. As to acts the answer is manifestly that they do not. For if someone who was previously vicious is newly converted, he has all the theological virtues from the beginning, yet he does not have the moral virtues, at least not the acquired ones. For he does not do with delight all the things to which his [sc. infused] virtuous habit inclines him; on the contrary it is delightful for him to act according to the old vicious habit previously acquired, and to be saddened by the opposite.

109. But if it be said 'this man has at the beginning all the infused moral virtues' (and the like, as about a child in baptism), and that thus is a connection preserved, for if he does not have them as innate he does yet have them as infused (the proof is that he will have them in the fatherland, according to Augustine [*On the Trinity* 13.9 n.11], who is adduced in the text by Master Lombard; and it is not

probable that he would have them in the fatherland according to Augustine unless he had them as a wayfarer, and he will not acquire them as a wayfarer immediately at death). Although many things may be said about the infused moral virtues, namely that they seem to be necessary because of manner or means or end [Henry *Quodlibet* 6 q.12], yet because the whole end, which they cannot have from their species, is sufficiently determined by the inclination of charity, while the mode or means is sufficiently determined by infused faith, for this reason there seems no necessity to posit (infused) moral virtues other than the acquired ones in the case of those who have acquired them or can acquire them. But then there is no necessity to posit them in others either, because there is no greater reason why they should be infused in the latter than in the former.

110. And then to the point about children [n.109] one can say either, first, that it is not necessary to posit they have moral virtues in the fatherland, but it suffices that they be well disposed by charity about desirable things (charity, to be sure, disposes one about all wantable things under one idea of wantable) – just as it is not necessary they have science of everything in its proper genera, but it suffices that they know them in the Word, which is perfect knowledge.

111. Or, second, one can say that if they will have moral virtues in the fatherland, these virtues will be infused into them at the moment of blessedness. For it is not more necessary that what belongs to the wayfarer (if ever one is to be a wayfarer in the future) should be given in baptism than that what belongs to the state of a blessed comprehender be given at the moment of blessedness; rather the former is less rational than the latter.

112. Or one can say, third, that if the moral virtues belong to some perfection in the comprehender and it they were not given at the moment of glorification, then it will be possible to acquire them through acts performed in the fatherland. For just as no reason appears why comprehenders cannot learn some knowable things in their proper genus that they did not know before, so no reason appears that, by good choices about other things desirable for the end (and this not only to the extent these things are to be willed for the sake of God in himself, but also to the extent they are to be willed as advantageous for oneself), they will be able to acquire a moral habit inclining them to choice of such desirable things under the proper idea of these things, and so to acquire moral virtue.

113. As to this article then [n.101], I say as was said before [n.105] that the moral virtues do not require the theological virtues in order for these moral virtues to be perfect in their kind, although they would, without the theological virtues, not be perfect with a perfection beyond what they could have otherwise. Thus too it is not necessary conversely that the theological virtues, whether in the wayfarer or in the fatherland, should necessarily require the moral ones.

D. About the Connection of the Theological Virtues with Each Other

114. As to the fourth article, about the connection of the theological virtues with each other [n.10], I say that they are not connected, as is plain of the fatherland, where the habit and act of charity will remain without the habit and act

of faith or hope [*I Corinthians* 13.8-13]. It is plain in the wayfarer, where faith and hope remain without charity in the sinner. There is then, from the idea of the habits in their existence, no necessary connection between them.

115. But what of their coming to be or infusion – are they such that one cannot be infused without another?

116. I reply: All things that can be separated in their being, such that one can exist without the other, can be separated one from another by God in their coming to be or their infusion. And so, as to infusion, they are not necessarily connected of themselves, but they are connected by divine liberality, because God perfects the whole man, according to Augustine *On True and False Penance* ch.9 n.23: "It is impious to separate off half a favor from God, namely because as he cured no one in body save perfectly, so too he cures no man spiritually unless he cure him perfectly." But perfect health is when one have faith as to the intellect, and charity and hope as to the will, as is plain in Gratian *Decrees*, p.2 cause 33 q.3, *On Penance*.

117. But if it be asked whether faith and hope without charity would be virtues, one can say (as was said above about the virtues [n.105]) that they can be perfect in their species, that is, insofar as they are the principles of their own acts in respect of their own objects. But the ultimate perfection that they have in attaining the end, to which they are ordered by charity, they cannot have without charity. And this indeed is perfection both in morals and in theological virtue, although it is commonly said that it is perfection in attaining the end through some elicited act, or because of some order of these or those acts to the end. However, it can be said that the aforesaid perfection is precisely in the fact of their being accepted by God, through his ordering them to blessedness [*Ord*. 1 d.17 n.129]. Thus, to be sure, no moral virtue, nor infused virtue, nor moral act even, is accepted without charity, which "alone divides the sons of the kingdom from the sons of perdition" [Augustine, *On the Trinity* 15.18 n.32; *Ord*. 2 d.27 n.8].

118. But as to the intellectual habits, it is not necessary to delay over them. For it is plain that there is no necessary connection between them, unless some perhaps are subordinate habits, of which sort are the understanding of principles and the science of conclusions; and in these sorts of cases the prior is without the posterior though not conversely.

II. To the Principal Arguments

119. To the principal arguments.

The first two [nn.2-3] I concede, because they include what was said in the first article [n.33].

120. To the third [n.4] I reply that although a certain quality is generated from 'frequently acting in a certain way', a quality that is of a nature to be a moral habit (because it is of a nature to be in agreement with right reason), and that it would be a virtue if it had right reason in the agent, yet because there is no right command in him, the rule of right action is lacking. And so his choice, which is of a nature to be right, is not right because not regulated by rule; and consequently,

though it generate a certain quality, it yet does not generate a habit of right choice, and so it is not a virtue.

121. The fourth argument [n.5] I concede, because it concludes to what was said in the second article [n.72] about the connection of the moral virtues with prudence.

122. To the other following arguments about incompossible virtues [nn.7-8], I concede that although one could reply that no virtues, even in species, are incompossible yet, insofar as one relates them to the issue at hand, they include the fact that diverse species of the same genus, or diverse genera, of moral virtue are not necessarily connected; and this was conceded in the first article of this question [n.32].

Thirty Seventh Distinction

Single Question

Whether All the Commandments of the Decalogue Belong to the Law of Nature

1. About the thirty seventh distinction I ask[a] whether all the commandments of the decalogue belong to the law of nature.

a. [*Interpolation*] About the thirty seventh distinction, where the Master deals with the commandments, the question asked is whether…

2. That they do not:

It does not seem that God can give dispensation in things that belong to the law of nature. But he did give dispensation in some things that seem to be against the commandments of the decalogue. Therefore etc.

3. Proof of the major: things that belong to the law of nature are either practical principles known from their terms, or are conclusions necessarily following from such principles. In either way their truth is necessary. Therefore God cannot make them to be false. Therefore he cannot but make that good which they signify to be good, and that bad which they indicate is to be avoided. And so he cannot make the non-licit to be licit.

4. Proof of the minor: to kill, to steal, and to commit adultery are against the commandments of the decalogue, as is plain from *Exodus* 20.13-15, "Thou shalt not kill…" God seems to have given dispensation in these things. *Genesis* 22.1-2 is plain about murder, in the case of Abraham and the sacrifice of his son. *Exodus* 11.2-3 and 12.35-36 are plain about theft by the children of Israel, whom God commanded to despoil the Egyptians, and despoiling is "a taking of another's goods against the will of the owner" [Justinian *Inst*. 4 ch.1 n.1], which is the definition of theft. As to adultery, there is *Hosea* 1.2, "Make yourself sons of fornication."

5. Further, in *Romans* 7.7 the Apostle says, "I would not know concupiscence if the law did not say, 'do not covet'." But things known by the law of nature are known as things to be done or not done even had they not been

written down, just as things naturally known in matters of speculation would be naturally known even if they were not revealed; etc.

6. The law of nature is obligatory in any state of mankind, for such nature makes it known that such and such is to be done or not done. But the decalogue was not obligatory in every state of mankind, as not in the state of innocence; for then no law had been given, and there seems to be no obligation until the law was given.

7. On the contrary:

At the beginning of Gratian's *Decrees* I d.6 ch.3, "Natural law remains natural law, whatever is found in the Law or the Gospel." And in *1 John* 2.7, "Beloved, I write no new commandment to you but an old commandment, which you had from the beginning; the old commandment is the word that you have heard."

I. To the Question
A. Opinions of Others that Converge in the same Conclusion
1. Exposition of the Opinion

8. An answer given here is that yes, [the whole decalogue does belong to the natural law – Aquinas, Richard of Middleton].

9. The manner posited is as follows: the law of nature is a law that derives from the primary known principles in matters doable. Such principles are practical first principles, known from the terms, and are themselves the first seeds of truth. To the truth of them the intellect is, from the terms, naturally inclined, and to assent to their command the will is naturally inclined. Everything in the decalogue follows from these principles, whether mediately or immediately. For all things there prescribed have a formal goodness by which they are in themselves ordered to the ultimate end, so that through them man might be turned toward that end. All things too that are prohibited there have a formal malice turning away from the ultimate end. Consequently, the things prescribed there are not good only because they are prescribed, but conversely, they are prescribed because they are good; and the things prohibited there are not bad only because they are prohibited, but they are prohibited because they are bad.

10. And then it would, as a consequence, seem necessary to say to the first argument [n.2] that God cannot simply dispense in such matters. For what is illicit of itself does not seem it could become licit by any will. For example: if killing, on the grounds that it is an act that concerns such and such a matter (as one's neighbor), is a bad act, then, while the same grounds hold, it will always be a bad act. Thus no act of willing that goes against the idea of those terms [sc. killing, neighbor] can make the act good.

11. But then the authorities that seem to say that God did dispense in these matters [n.6] need special interpretation.

One way of interpreting them is as follows, that although a dispensation could be given for the act in the category of act, yet not for it insofar as it is, in being prohibited, against the intention of the lawgiver, and so there is no dispensation for it against the prohibition.

12. Another way would be to say that an act cannot be made ordered while it remains disordered; but an act is disordered to the extent it is against the prohibition. Therefore, God cannot give dispensation for it insofar as it is against the prohibition.

2. Rejection of the Opinion

13. But these interpretations [nn.9-12] (which seem perhaps to reduce to the same) do not seem to save the stated position.

For 'to dispense' is not the doing of what it is permitted to do against the precept while the precept still stands, but 'to dispense' is revoking the precept or declaring how it is to be understood: "for there is a double dispensation, namely revocation of the law and clarification of the law" [Bonaventure, *Sent*. IV d.38 a.2 q.3]. Therefore I ask whether, when all the circumstances in the act 'to kill a man' remain the same, and only the circumstance 'prohibited or not prohibited' is made to vary, could God bring it about that an act, which with its other circumstances remaining the same is sometimes prohibited and illicit, should otherwise be non-prohibited but licit?

If so then God could dispense simply, as he did when he changed the Old Law and gave the New Law (and this as to the ceremonial laws). He did not indeed make it the case that the ceremonial laws were not to be kept while the command to keep them remained, but he did make it the case that, though the act remained the same, one was not bound to keep the ceremonial laws as one was before. For it is thus that a legislator dispenses simply, namely when he revokes the precept of right that he has laid down, making it the case that, while the prohibited or prescribed act remains the same in itself, the idea of its being prohibited or illicit is removed from it, and it is made licit. Yet God cannot make it that this act, which with such and such circumstances was prohibited, should not be prohibited while all the circumstances prior to the prohibition remain. Therefore, God cannot make it that 'to kill' not be prohibited – the opposite of which appears plainly in the case of Abraham and many others.

14. Things true from the terms, whether they are necessary from the terms or follow from what is thus necessary, precede in their truth every act of will, or at least they hold their truth when every 'to will' is per impossibile or possibile removed. Therefore if the precepts of the decalogue, or the practical propositions that can be formed from them, had such necessity (namely if the following propositions were necessary, 'one's neighbor is not to be killed or hated', 'stealing is not to be done', and the like), it would follow that, when every 'to will' is removed from the apprehending intellect, such propositions would be necessary; and so, when the divine intellect apprehends them, it would necessarily apprehend them as true of themselves. And then the divine will would necessarily agree with what it apprehended, or the will would not be right. And so the idea of practical science would have to be posited in God, which was denied in *Ord*. *Prol*. nn.330-331. It would also be necessary to posit that God's will was simply necessarily determined as to willable things outside himself, the opposite of which

was stated in *Ord*. I d.2 nn.79-81, where the fact was touched on that his will tends to things other than himself only contingently.

15. But if it be said that a created will must necessarily conform to the above propositions [n.14] in order to be right, yet the divine will does not have to will in conformity with these truths but that they are true because he wills in conformity with them – this responds to the above conclusion [the divine will wills things other than itself contingently, n.14] that reason proves the opposite. For the divine intellect apprehends the terms and can apprehend from them the truth of the proposition they form (which truth the proposition otherwise has from the terms) prior in nature to his will having any act about the terms. Therefore, in the second moment of nature, when the will does have some act about them, it must necessarily will in conformity with that command and cannot will the opposite [cf. *Ord*. *Prol*. nn.325, 328, I d.38 nn.7-10].

B. Scotus' own Opinion

1. Double Way of Understanding how Certain Things Belong to the Law of Nature

16. I say, then, to the question that things can be said to belong to the law of nature in two ways:

In one way [cf. n.25] as practical principles known from the terms, or as conclusions necessarily following from them. And these things are said to belong to the law of nature strictly.

17. And the reasons against the first opinion [nn.13-14] prove that in such things there cannot be dispensation (and these are contained in Gratian *Decrees* p.1 d.5, where it is said that "natural right begins from the beginning of the rational creature, nor does it change in time but remains immutable") – this point I concede.

18. This is not so when speaking as a whole of the all the commandments of the second table of the decalogue, because it is of the idea of what is prescribed or prohibited there that the commandments are not simply necessary practical principles nor simply necessary conclusions. For there is in what is prescribed there no goodness necessary for the goodness of the ultimate end. Nor in what is prohibited there is there any malice necessarily turning away from the ultimate end such that, were the good not prescribed, the ultimate end could not be attained and loved. And if the evil in question were not prohibited, the acquisition of the ultimate end would remain consistent with it.

19. But it is otherwise with the commandments of the first table of the decalogue, for these regard God immediately as object.

20. The two first, indeed, if they are understood merely as negative (namely the first, "thou shalt not have strange gods," and the second, "thou shalt not take the name of the Lord thy God in vain," that is, you will not be irreverent to God) – these belong to the law of nature in the strict way of taking the law of nature, because it necessarily follows that 'if God is, he alone must be loved', and likewise it follows that 'nothing else is to be worshipped as God, nor should irreverence be shown to God'. Consequently God cannot give dispensation in

these commands, so that one might be able to do the opposite of this or that prohibition. For this conclusion see the two authorities [from Augustine] in Richard of Middleton *Sent*. III d.37 princ. 1 q.5].[9]

21. The third commandment of the first table, which is about keeping the sabbath, is affirmative as to giving some worship to God at a determinate time. But as to the determination of this or that time, this does not strictly speaking belong to the law of nature. Likewise neither does the other and negative part there included (whereby servile acts are prohibited) strictly belong, as to determinate acts, to the law of nature, excluding them from the worship to be then given to God. For such acts are not prohibited save because they impede the worship prescribed or withdraw one from it.

22. But whether the commandment about keeping the sabbath belongs strictly to the law of nature as to giving God worship at a determinate time, this is doubtful. For if it does not so belong then God could absolutely dispense man from ever having a good movement toward him for the entire time of his life, and this does not appear probable. For without some good willing of the ultimate end one cannot have any simply good willing of things that are for the end. Thus one would never be bound to any good willing simply, because the reason by which it would not follow from the law of nature, strictly speaking, that worship should be given to God at this time now, would be equally a reason for it not to follow either for that time then, and equally a reason for it not to follow for any determinate time. Therefore, strictly speaking, it does not seem how one could conclude that anyone is bound to give worship to God at any particular time; and by equal reason how he is bound to do so at some indistinct time or other. For one is not bound to any act for some indeterminate time which one is not bound to for some time marked out by some occurrent circumstances.

23. But if the commandment about keeping the sabbath does belong strictly to the law of nature, so that the command 'God is not to be hated' necessarily follows, or so that, from some other fact, 'therefore God is to be loved' necessarily follows (and that he is to be sometimes loved thus by an elicited act directed to him), then the argument 'from singulars to the universal' does not hold, but is a figure of speech, as in other cases is the move 'from many indeterminate causes to some determinate one'.

24. However, if this third commandment does not strictly belong to the law of nature, then one must, to this extent, judge about it as about the commandments of the second table of the decalogue.

25. In another way [n.16] things can be said to belong to the law of nature because they are very consonant with it, though they do not necessarily follow from the practical first principles known from their terms and known necessarily by any intellect.

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[9] Augustine *Against Faustus* 22 ch.27, "Eternal law is divine reason or the will of God bidding one to keep the natural order and forbidding one to disturb it." *83 Questions* q.53 n.2, "From this ineffable and sublime administration of things, which is done through divine providence, a natural law is as it were written in the rational soul."

26. And in this way it is certain that all the commandments, even of the second table, belong to the law of nature, because their rightness is strongly consonant with the practical first principles that are known necessarily.[a]

> a. [*Interpolation*] In this way must the decree of Gratian *Decrees* be understood, p.1 d.6 ch.3, where it is said that "the moral precepts belong to natural right, and therefore show that they admit of no mutability." Note the gloss that says "the law permits no change as to moral matters but it does as to ceremonial [and sacramental] matters."

27. This distinction [nn.16, 25] can be made clear by an example. For on the supposition of this principle of positive right 'one should live peaceably in a community or polity', it does not necessarily follow therefrom that everyone should have distinctness of property, or possessions distinct from those of another; for peace could abide in a community or in people living together even if everything were common to them. Nor even on the supposition of weakness in those who live together is that consequence necessary. And yet the fact that there are distinct possessions for weak people is very consonant with peaceful living together. For the weak care more about goods proper to themselves than about common goods, and wish that common goods be appropriated to them rather than that they be shared with the community and with the guardians of good community; and so there would be strife and contention among them [sc. without distinct possessions].

28. And perhaps thus it is in the case of all positive rights, that though there be some single principle that is the foundation for laying down all laws or rights, yet positive laws do not follow necessarily from that principle, but rather they make it clear or explain it as to certain particulars, and these explanations are very consonant with the universal first principle.

2. Summary of Theses Stated

29. So collecting things together, then: First it has been denied that all the commandments of the second table belong strictly to the law of nature [n.18]. Second it has been admitted that the first two commandments of the first table belong strictly to the law of nature [n.20]. Third a doubt was raised about the third commandment of the first table [nn.21-24]. And fourth it was admitted that all the commandments belong to the law of nature, speaking broadly [nn.25-26].

3. Objection to the First Thesis

30. Against the first of these theses [n.29] I argue that, according to the Apostle to the *Romans* 13.9, "Thou shalt not kill, thou shalt not commit adultery, and if there be any other commandment, it is summed up in this, you shall love your neighbor as yourself." Therefore in this precept 'you shall love etc.' are necessarily included the commandments of the second table, for the Apostle seems to prove this expressly there and in the end he seems to conclude, "He who loves his neighbor has fulfilled the law" [*Romans* 12.9-13]. And this is proved on the authority of our Savior, which is a greater authority, in *Matthew* 22.37-40,

"On this depend all the law and the prophets." But love of neighbor follows necessarily from this principle, 'God is to be loved'. Therefore etc. So, from first to last, all the commandments of the second table follow from what is the first commandment of the first table. And if the commandments of the first table belong simply to the law of nature (because they are included in the first principle or the first commandment, which belongs simply to the law of nature), then it follows that the commandments of the second table will also strictly belong to the law of nature, even though they are conclusions of the same first principle.

31. The proof of the assumption is clear from what was said in d.28 nn.10-11, where it is proved in two ways that the perfect and ordered love of God cannot be zealous, properly speaking, because the love of the common good as a good to be appropriated to oneself alone is disordered. The love too of someone who does not want the beloved to be loved jointly by others is disordered and imperfect. Therefore it follows that if God is to be loved perfectly and in ordered way, that he who loves God should want his neighbor to love God. But in wanting this for his neighbor he loves his neighbor, for only in this way is one's neighbor loved from charity, as is said in the gloss [Lombard *On Romans* 13.7-10]. Therefore etc.

4. Response to the Objection

32. To this objection one can reply in three ways.

In one way as follows: that the commandment, "Thou shalt love the Lord thy God etc." does not simply belong to the law of nature as it is affirmative, but as it is negative, prohibiting the opposite. For 'not to hate' belongs simply to the law of nature, but whether one is 'to love at some time' was doubted above in the third article [n.23]. Now from the negative command it does not follow that one must want love of God for one's neighbor; but it would follow from the affirmative command, about which it is not certain that it belongs, strictly speaking, to the law of nature [n.22].

33. One can reply in a second way that from the commandment 'Thou shalt love the Lord they God' it does not follow that I would want my neighbor to love God.

34. And when it is proved that zealous love cannot be ordered and perfect love [n.31], I reply: I ought not to want the common good to be the good of another and then not to be loved by that other. But there is no need for me to want that good to belong to another – namely because it is not pleasing to that good that it belong to another, in the way that God, in predestinating one and not another, wants to be the good of one predestined person and not of someone else.

35. And the same point makes plain the answer to the claim that 'he who loves perfectly wants the beloved to be loved jointly by another' [n.31]. It can be said that this is true of everyone whose love is pleasing to the beloved. But from the law of nature it is not certain about anyone that his love is accepted by God as beloved or as loving.

36. In a third way it can be replied that, although it belongs strictly to the law of nature that one's neighbor should be loved, as was expounded before [n.31], that is, that 'one must simply will for one's neighbor that he love God,

because this is to love one's neighbor' – yet from this it does not follow that the commandments of the second table belong to the law of nature. I mean these: that 'one must not want to kill one's neighbor, as concerns the good of his person', and that 'one must not want to commit adultery, as concerns the good of the person joined to him', and that 'one must not want to steal, as concerns the goods of fortune that he uses', that 'reverence is to be shown one's parents in honors and in help and in support', and so on about the other commandments of the second table. For it is possible for me to want my neighbor to love God and yet to refuse him, or not want for him, bodily life or the preservation of his wife's fidelity and so on about the rest. And consequently it is possible for the following two things to cohere together: a) that it would be a certain necessary truth, drawn as a conclusion from practical principles, that 'I should want my neighbor to love God in himself just as I ought to want myself to love God'; and yet b) this other would not be a necessary truth, 'I should want for my neighbor this or that good of the sort expressed in a commandment of the second table'.

37. And then as to the authorities of Paul and of Christ [n.30], one could say that now God has in fact explained love of neighbor beyond what it includes as following from the principles of the law of nature. Thus, although as to what follows from the principles of the law of nature it only contain 'to will to love one's neighbor in himself', yet as now explained it includes 'one should will those goods [n.36] for one's neighbor', or at least 'one should not will the opposite evils for one's neighbor' (as that one should not want him unjustly to have bodily life, fidelity of spouse, temporal goods and the like).

38. It is therefore true that he who loves his neighbor has fulfilled the law [n.30], in the way that the law has been explained as needing to be kept [nn.32-36], though not in the way in which love of neighbor follows from the first principles of the law of nature [n.36].

39. And similarly, the whole law (as to the second table) and the prophets depend on this commandment, 'You shall love your neighbor as yourself', when the understanding of that commandment is not however of it as it follows from the practical first principle of the law of nature, but as the legislator intends that that commandment among those belonging to the second table should be kept (as explained [n.37]).

II. To the Principal Arguments of Both Parts

40. To the principal arguments.

The first [n.2] is in my favor, because it proves that a precept of the second table does not belong to the law of nature strictly speaking.

41. To the second [n.5] I say that although 'God exists' could be deduced by natural reason from principles per se known, yet this fact was not known to that rude people, unexercised in intellectual matters, save from the law given to them. Hence the Apostle says in *Hebrews* 11.6, "He who comes to God must believe", meaning, that is, if he have and is unable to have any other knowledge of God. And so, if some concupiscence could be proved to be against the law of nature, yet that this concupiscence was against the law of nature was not known to

corrupt men. Therefore it was necessary to explain it through the law given to them. Or in another way, concupiscences are prohibited through the commandments of the second table, and about these it is admitted that they were not known per se [n.36].

42. To the next [n.6] I say that these commandments were kept and should be kept in every state of man. In the state of blessedness, to be sure, there will be supreme observance of the affirmative and negative commandments, save perhaps only of the commandment 'honor your parents' – not but that there will then be the will to honor them, but that there will be no necessity to devote attention to the act, at least as far as the honor extends to the support of necessities, for no one there will need assistance. In the state of innocence too everyone was bound to keep those commandments, which were interiorly prescribed in each one's heart. Or perhaps they descended through some exterior teaching given by God from fathers to sons, though they were not then written in a book; nor was this necessary, because people were able to retain them easily in their memory, and the people of that time had a longer life and a better disposition in natural powers than the people of a later time, when the infirmity of the people required the law to given and written down.

43. As to what was touched on in the first argument, however, about the children of Israel despoiling the Egyptians [n.4], one can say that God did not there make dispensation against the law or the commandment 'Thou shalt not steal', because they did not take what was simply another's. First because God was the superior lord and could transfer lordship to them, even against the will of lesser lords (and in this way Christ did not sin in allowing the demons to enter the pigs, which at once threw themselves into the sea [*Mark* 5.12-13]; for he did not unjustly deprive the lord of his own pigs). Second because the children of Israel, in serving the Egyptians, deserved to receive so great spoils as their wages (though the Egyptians, being unjust, refused to pay them, yet they could be compelled to do so by a higher judge), and so, because they took what was theirs by license of a higher judge, they took it licitly and justly.

44. As to the argument for the opposite from Gratian [n.7], it must be understood of the law of nature speaking broadly, and this as concerns the commandments of the second table.

Thirty Eighth Distinction

Single Question

Whether Every Lie is a Sin

1. About the thirty eighth distinction I ask[a] whether every lie is a sin.

a. [*Interpolation*] About the thirty eighth distinction, where the Master deals with certain sins belonging to the explanation of the fifth commandment, as about lies and perjury, which are prohibited in that commandment, the question asked is whether…

2. That it is not:

Genesis 22.5, "I and the boy will go thither and after we have given worship we will return to you." But Abraham intended to kill the boy because that was commanded of him. Therefore he intended that the boy would not return with him; so he said the opposite of what he had in mind. Therefore he was lying. Nor is it likely that he then sinned in carrying out the command, namely the command for which he was so much commended by God.

3. Further, the same is proved through many other examples:

As is plain in *Genesis* 27.32 about Jacob, who said he was Esau, the first born, which he knew to be false.

4. Again, in *Genesis* 42.16, 44.5, 15 Joseph said to his brothers, "By the health of Pharaoh, you are spies," and yet he knew the opposite to be true. Again the same Joseph also frightened his brothers about the cup found in Benjamin's sack, and said he used the cup in divination, although he was not a diviner, because divination was not permitted to those who kept the law of God [cf. *Leviticus* 19.26].

5. Further, Rahab lied about the spies (*Joshua* 2.2-21), and Judith likewise (*Judith* 10.11-13, 11.4-17), and Rachel when she spread garments on the camel to cover the gods of her father, said that it was happening to her after the manner of women (*Genesis* 31.19, 31-35). The midwives also lied saying that the Hebrew women had the midwife's art (*Exodus* 1.15-21); and it does not seem nor is it said that they sinned in this, because "God did well by them and built up their houses," and God does not give good for evil. Therefore etc.

6. Further, dissimulation in words is not a greater sin than dissimulation in deeds, because just as deeds are more evident signs than words so, if there is falsity on both sides, the falsity in deeds seems more blamable than falsity in words, for the falsity of a deed provides more cover for something other than what is in one's soul than the falsity of a word does. But a lie or dissimulation in deed is not always set down as a sin, as is plain of what David did when he pretended in the presence of King Achis to be mad when he was not [*I Kings* 21.20-15]. And Jehu too pretended to worship Baal, although however he wanted to destroy the worshippers of Baal. Nor is he blamed in that pretense but rather is praised, because he seemed to have zeal for God against Baal [*IV Kings* 10.-18-30].

7. To the opposite is Augustine frequently in his book 'On Lying', and his authorities are cited by Lombard in the text.

8. Further, here is proof that every lie is a mortal sin:

Because it is against the commandment and against the law of nature, "You shall not do to another what you do not wish done to yourself" [*Matthew* 7.12], for no one wishes to be deceived by his neighbor when his neighbor is bound to tell him what he thinks; therefore no one ought to treat anyone else differently.

9. Further, whatever is against some virtue or against the act of some necessary virtue is a mortal sin; a lie is of this sort because it is against veracity, which is a virtue contained under justice. For a truthful man shares with his neighbor what is to be shared, namely the thought in his heart according to the

way it is. Now a liar does not share but takes way what he should share in speaking, for he speaks so as to express his thought and by lying he does not express it but the opposite.

10. Further, lying is an abuse of speaking. For, as Plato says in the *Timaeus* 216b, spoken sounds are instituted and imposed to stand in as signs of one's will; but liars do not use spoken sounds as signs of their will but of the opposite; therefore etc.

11. Further, certain authorities in the aforesaid books of Augustine seem to say this, and they are cited in Lombard's text.

I. To the Question
A. A Lie is a Sin

12. In this question the conclusion that a lie is a sin is commonly held by everyone.

13. They are persuaded by Augustine's reasoning in his book *Against Lying*, "It is stupid to believe him who is permitted to lie." But there are many people we must believe, otherwise a joint human life sharing thoughts and affections of mind would be abolished. Therefore, we must believe people, and it is not permitted to lie.

14. But the reason for this is set down in different ways by different people.

For some say [William of Auxerre] that for this reason a lie is necessarily a sin because it necessarily turns one away from God, who is truth, and a lie is against truth.

15. But against this is that a lie does not immediately oppose the first truth but the truth of some thing that the speaker is lying about. Therefore, just as malice opposed to some created good does not necessarily turn one away from the first uncreated good, so neither does a falsity opposed to any truth not pertaining to[10] the first truth turn one away from the first truth.

16. In another way it is said [Aquinas] that an act is called good or bad from its object in the genus of morals, and a genus is taken from something potential, and therefore is it potential with respect to its differences. But the first thing through which an act is constituted in the genus of morals (so that it can then be further determined through its circumstances as through differences) is the object. For over and above the goodness of nature, which an act has from its quiddity, the first thing that determines it so that it is quasi-potentially and materially moral, is the object. So as to the issue at hand, it is said that an act bad in its genus can never be good, for no additional circumstance can take away the malice that it has per se from the object, for every other circumstance presupposes the object. But lying is an act bad in its genus, because it concerns matter disagreeing with the act. For the matter agreeing with an act of speaking should be true or believed, and 'being true' is opposite matter in the case of a lie.

17. Against this:

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[10] Adopting the reading from Q 'impertinenti' and not the 'in particulari' of the Vatican editors.

The matter for speaking when one believes everything one says is false is not more undue or illicit than 'a man innocent and useful to the republic' is illicit matter for killing. But when these latter conditions are in place on the part of such illicit matter (namely a man), killing such a man can become licit, namely if God revokes the commandment 'Thou shalt not kill' (as was said in d.37 n.13). And not only licit but meritorious, namely if God commands one to kill, as Abraham was commanded to kill Isaac. Therefore, by similarity or by the argument 'a minori', speaking words one believes to be false can become licit if the commandment is revoked that seems to be about not deceiving one's neighbor. For the commandment about not lying is not more binding than the commandment about not killing; for it is a lesser evil to take a true opinion away from one's neighbor, or occasionally to generate in him a false opinion, than to take from him his bodily life; indeed, there is hardly any comparison between the two.

18. There is a confirmation, that if lying necessarily got its malice from the fact that it concerns the sort of matter it does, then lying is not prohibited by a commandment of the second table, because in the second table only things bad to one's neighbors are prohibited. But, according to you in this opinion, lying is not only bad because it harms one's neighbor, for then (as argued [n.17]) it would be a lesser evil than killing, and it would be possible, or more possible, for it, like killing, not to have the idea of evil. So it would be against a commandment of the first table. But this does not seem probable, because lying does not immediately turn one away from God, just as neither does the opposite act [sc. telling the truth] immediately have God for object (when speaking of some indifferent truth).

19. Further, if someone who says 'he is running' were deceived and believed it to be true, his act of speaking concerns the same matter as it would if he were not deceived and believes it to be false. But when he is deceived and believes what he says to be true he does not sin. So there is no malice there from the object that the act concerns.[11]

20. In a third way it is said [Bonaventure] that 'lying' in its very idea states a bad intention, because it states an intention to deceive. So although some acts, which do not include an evil intention, could sometimes be good from some good circumstance, yet an act that includes in itself an evil intention can never be good because it formally includes an evil 'willing'. So it is in the issue at hand.

21. This view can be expounded as follows. Although a positive act and malice are not something per se one, either in fact or in concept, yet a name can be imposed on it that does not signify only the act or only the deformity of the act but the whole thing at once. It is like the name 'adultery' which is imposed to signify not only the natural act of intercourse but the deformity of its being with another's wife. And the name 'theft' is not only imposed to signify the receiving of something but also to signify the taking of what belongs to another against the will of the owner, and of any superior owner there may be. Such totalities, which are introduced by such names, do not seem able to be good, but what the substrate

[11] This criticism does not apply to Aquinas' way of understanding the object of an act of lying, since for him the object includes the intention to say other than what one thinks. Scotus seems to hold, nn.20-21, that this way of understanding the object of an act conflates two different things.

is of them can be without the relevant deformity (namely an act of intercourse or of receiving something). So it is in the issue at hand. Although the speaking of such and such words, whatever they signify or do not signify, could be without sin, yet the speaking of them with knowledge of the opposite, and consequently with the intention of deceiving, cannot be without sin, for this includes the substrate act along with the circumstances necessarily accompanying or deforming the act. The assumption is plain, because the words 'I do not know him' and 'I will be a liar like you' were spoken by Christ [*John* 8.55] but not assertively. Besides any Latin words whatever and however false can be pronounced by a Greek without sin.

B. What Sort of Sin a Lie is
1. About the Three Kinds of Lies

22. Second we must note what sort of sin a lie is.

And although lies are distinguished in many ways, yet for the present purpose a triple distinction suffices, namely into pernicious, useful, and jocose lies.

23. A pernicious lie is one that harms or is harmful of itself to the one I lie to or lie about. And if it harms him as to the Christian religion, namely as to faith or morals etc., then it is a mortal sin. But if it harms him as to his bodily life, or not preserving his conjugal fidelity, or taking away his children or persons in any way connected with him, or as to other temporal goods, then as the lie causes him more or less harm (which is to be weighed by the good it takes away), then it is counted as more or less serious. And generally every such lie, whereby one deliberately asserts what one does not know or what one knows the opposite of, is a mortal sin. For this is simply prohibited by the commandment, "Thou shalt not bear false witness against your neighbor" [*Exodus* 20.16]. And 'witness' is not precisely what is given in court, but is when anyone deliberately asserts something he does not know or whose opposite he does know. Whoever therefore has the intention to deceive someone to whom he is speaking or about whom he is speaking and says the opposite of what he knows to be true, and by thus speaking harms him to whom or about whom he is speaking, then he gives false testimony against his neighbor. But whether not doing so deliberately counts as an excuse will be touched in d.39 nn.13-21.

24. A useful lie is when it is useful for someone and harmful to no one.

25. A jocose lie is to tell stories about what everyone who hears knows is not true and not told as true. For the hearers are not deceived and the speaker does not intend to deceive, nor is his speech of itself deceptive because it is not such as to be naturally believed by the hearers. Rather it is known to be said without making any opinion as to its truth. The like holds if a jocose lie is when someone does intend to deceive by joking, so that the one deceived really is deceived, but not in anything that inflicts any great harm on him, and those too are joking who know he is deceived. And lastly he can be himself joking in the way that Augustine says of Joseph's lie, who did truly want to deceive his brothers in the words 'you are spies etc.' [n.4], and yet he himself, who knew the truth, could be joking about their deception and about the fear that the deceived were running

into. And the others, if any knew, could themselves also at last be joking when they perceived that the thing was not seriously said.

2. Opinions of Others

26. About the last two, namely the useful and jocose lie [nn.24-25], it is commonly admitted that neither of them is a mortal sin in the case of imperfect men, because neither is per se against charity, nor even against anything that is of itself necessarily required for the state of those persons.

27. But in the case of perfect men both lies are said by some to be mortal sins, because the authority of these men is taken away so that they are not believed, and in this they make their state to be cheapened and even harm their hearers because of the scandal.

28. An argument against this [n.27] is that no circumstance makes what in one person is a venial sin to be in another a mortal sin unless one of the persons is necessarily obligated to what the other is not obligated to. But a perfect man does not obligate himself to keeping truth in his words, either by a vow or an oath, more than any other Christian does. Therefore the circumstance of the person (because the person is not specially obligated) does not change a venial sin into a mortal sin.

3. Scotus' own Opinion

29. Here one can reply by drawing a distinction, that some perfect persons are in the state of exercising perfection (as prelates), others are in the state of acquiring perfection (as religious).

a. About Persons in the State of Exercising Perfection

30. One can concede about the first that, when they are performing acts that belong to them by reason of such state of perfection (as teaching, judging, preaching), both sorts of lies [sc. useful and jocose] would be a mortal sin in their case, for they take away the authority and usefulness of the doctrine being preached, according to the remark of Augustine, based on three letters to Jerome [*Letters* 26 ch.3 nn.3-4, 40 ch.3 n.3, 82 ch.2 n.21], "If lies, however jocose, had been introduced in the Sacred Scriptures, nothing of solidity would remain in them." For instance, if a prelate while preaching introduced a jocose lie, nothing of solidity remains in his teaching. For anyone can be in doubt about anything said by him as he can be in doubt about anyone else. Or the reason the hearer would not assent to the jocose lie would be a like reason not to assent to anything else that was said. And thus the authority of the teachers of the Church in their teaching will perish, and also their utility for the people listening. The same for solemn judgment or solemn teaching. And I mean this, that the lie is not perceived as said apart from the act of judging or teaching. For while someone is sitting in judgment it is possible to mix some scam in it, which from the manner of speaking is known not to belong to the judgment.

31. It seems, however, that a single jocose or useful lie does not impede the authority of a judge or teacher, but such a lie often repeated or the custom of thus lying does. But then, since according to the laws [Gregory IX *Decrees* I tit.6 ch.34] 'a twice repeated act introduces a custom', it follows that the second act is a mortal sin and not the first, although however the second is altogether like the first (as it seems) in all its circumstances.

32. Whatever may be true of one or several such lies in teaching and judging, at least in other acts it would not be a mortal sin, once the idea of scandal is removed.

b. About Persons in a State of Acquiring Perfection

33. If we speak of him who has the state of acquiring perfection, not of exercising it, something else seems it needs to be said. Such a person does not seem to be obligated more than others to anything that belongs to perfection, but only to what he has vowed. For he has not taken up the state of pastoral care, and so not an act pertaining to his person. Such a one, therefore, if he is not exercising a work of perfection (of which sort are teaching, preaching, and the like) does not seem to sin mortally in telling a useful or jocose lie more than any other Christian, save perhaps because of scandal. For the imperfect can be scandalized more by a lie from such a person than from a common person.

34. But deeds cannot be judged as to what they are from a scandal that does or does not accompany them

For generally, according to the evangelical law, all scandals whatever of the weak are to be avoided, according to *Matthew* 18.7, "Woe to the man through whom scandals come." But the scandals taken by the Pharisees, not given to them, are not to be avoided, according to the words of the Savior in *Matthew* 15.12-14: when the disciples said that the Pharisees were scandalized when they heard Christ's word, Christ replied, "Let them alone, for they are blind and leaders of the blind." Whether then it is a question of deeds indifferent in themselves, of which sort is eating meat (about which the Apostle says *I Corinthians* 8.13, "If my brother is scandalized, I will not eat meat for ever"), or of deeds that have some malice, namely venial malice, yet naturally give occasion or cause of scandal to the weak who are present, these are to be avoided because of the scandal. But we cannot thereby judge what sort of sin it is from the nature of the deed in itself.

35. But as to what belongs to the nature of a jocose or useful lie in deeds said in the second way [sc. without accompanying scandal, n.34], it does not seem that someone in the state of acquiring perfection [nn.29, 33] is obligated by his profession to avoid them for any reason or severity of the precept more than any other Christian. However if right reason dictate that a single act of his or a frequent act is a scandal to the hearers, although a like act in another would not be a scandal, he is bound by charity or the salvation of his neighbor to avoid the scandal; just as in a moment of flight during time of suffering a pastor is bound sometimes not to flee, according to *John* 10.12-13, "A hireling, who is not the shepherd, sees the wolf coming and flees etc." Augustine treats the matter well in

Epistle 228 to Honoratus (see Henry of Ghent, Quodlibet 15 q.16). But someone else, who is in the state of acquiring perfection and is not a pastor, is not bound of necessity not to flee if he can do otherwise. But he is bound not to scandalize his neighbor by fleeing, and sometimes his flight would be scandalous when the flight of the weak would not be scandalous. For neighbors would judge, from his flight, that because such a person, who has chosen so strict a life, does not expose his life to defend the faith, life should not be exposed even for this cause, and that such a one does not think well of the faith.

II. To the Principal Arguments

36. To the arguments of this question.

To the first [n.2] I say that Abraham did not speak against what he had in mind, for (as Josephus relates in his book *Antiquities* I.13 n.3) while he was walking alone with his son, having left the servants behind, he informed his son how he had been miraculously conceived and how, if he were sacrificed, God would raise him miraculously from the dead. And he is believed to have firmly expected this, because he did not doubt the promise of God that "in Isaac shall your seed be called" [*Genesis* 21.12]. So although he intended to sacrifice Isaac yet he intended that he was to be miraculously resurrected by God and would return with him to the servants. Hence his saying 'we will return to you' was said according to what he sensed in his heart. Nor was a lie to be easily imposed on Abraham whose life was so exemplary.

37. As to what is argued about Jacob [n.3], although some strive much to save him and other fathers of the Old Testament from having lied, however since they allow that they had an imperfect law and a little grace, while we conversely have a perfect law and abundant grace, and they do not deny about us that sometimes we lie or have lied – it does not seem very reasonable to deny that they sometimes lied or could lie. And if it is so, although we praise their good deeds and take them as example, yet we do not take their bad deeds as example nor do we stubbornly defend or excuse them. Yet it is said that these words of theirs can be understood figuratively or with other meanings than the words primarily express – but there is no need to delay over such meanings.

38. To the one about Joseph [n.4], who was himself a perfect keeper of the divine law [*Genesis* 39.2-23], one can say that his lie against his brothers was only a jocose one – as appears from the event. For at the end he opened to them the truth [*Genesis* 45.1-4], and while in the meantime he made them afraid he punished them as they deserved to be punished [*Genesis* 42.9-44]. For their betrayal, whereby they sold their brother into Egypt, well deserved to be punished not only with such fear but with an even greater punishment.

39. To the other arguments:

About Rahab and the midwives and Rachel [n.5] there is no need to give excuse, nor is their deed commended in Scripture as to the lie; but the providence of Rahab, whereby she provided for herself and her own and procured their safety, is praised.

40. As to what is argued about the midwives, that ‘God built them houses’ [n.5], there are opinions about this, as the Master of the *Histories* [*Scholastic History*, Petrus Comestor, on *Exodus* 3] relates on the passage. And perhaps that opinion is more probable which says they had a good movement of piety, and because of it God rewarded them temporally, because the sin annexed to it did not deserve an eternal reward. Or one can more probably say that the lie was a useful one, because it was useful for saving young Jewish boys and was harmful to no one. And therefore God rewarded them for the good motion of their wills, and yet did not deny them eternal life for a sin that in them was venial.

41. However there would there be a doubt: might such a lie or venial sin, along with a great movement of piety, be sometimes more worth choosing, or are both together to be avoided? A proof of the latter seems to be that a venial sin is in no way to be chosen. A proof of the former seems to be that a venial sin will be destroyed in time and will not remain to eternity, either in this life or after this life. A great movement of piety, which has great merit, merits a great reward because it merits an eternal reward, or at any rate it merits some degree of reward that will be eternal. It does not seem that, because of any evil whatever which is not of itself eternal but temporal, something has to be omitted that is of itself cause in some way of an eternal good. – I dismiss this question.

42. However, about the midwives one can hold (relative to the issue at hand) that they only sinned venially, because their lie was altogether useful. And their movement of piety, even if other things would have been required for merit, would have been of great merit, so that the midwives would have merited eternal life and also temporal good, because at that time God rewarded his worshippers with temporal good.

43. To the one about Judith [n.5] it is said that she lied in nothing, because the exaggerated words she spoke to Holofernes she did not intend to direct to Holofernes but to God. And she was not necessarily bound to speak outwardly according to the intention of the recipient, but she could speak according to her own intention as a speaker. However, when speaking to a superior, to whom one is bound to reply in good faith, it is said that a speaker must reply to the intention of the questioner, so that by responding in that case through words that would have been false if directed to the intention or authority but true if directed to God, the speaker does not speak truly, for in that case it is not licit to address God.

44. But on this supposition [sc. that Judith spoke to her own intention not that of Holofernes] there seems nothing certain in human conversation, nor does anyone seem to have certainty about the conversation of his neighbor; at any rate no one seems to be lying whatever he says in the second person provided it could be made true by directing it to God. But if you are bound to speak truth to your superior (not to someone extraneous), by not saying the truth to him you could be disobedient; but when not saying it to someone extraneous you will not be disobedient. But it does not seem how this could be, if you are not lying or are a liar more to yourself than to him.

45. If those words [sc. of Judith] then, which are said there and seem to be excessive, cannot be saved in any other way, it does not seem a great inconvenience to concede that Judith told a lie useful to her race but pernicious to

him whose death she intended. However the utility is preferred to the perniciousness because the good of the republic (which greatly worshipped God) is preferable to the temporal good of a private person (especially an infidel) – unless it be obvious to the latter that in fighting against anyone faith must be kept, so that the infidelity or lie of any Christian (in war even against the infidel) is condemned, though it is possible to use certain precautions of war that are not per se repugnant to truth nor include lies.

46. Also if Judith adorned herself with the intention that Holofernes be captivated by the sight of her, and this when wanting him to sin mortally with her, and 'to want another to sin mortally' is to sin mortally – it does not seem altogether certain that she guarded herself from every mortal sin. And so her deed is narrated in Scripture and recited in the Church as praiseworthy in regard to certain matters that there belonged to religion, although other things connected with them are not praised and not licit.

47. To the last one about pretense [n.6], I say that someone can pretend through some probable arguments, by assigning some good to be present in himself which is not present (as by genuflections and acts of adorations to pretend one has a devotion that one does not have), and such pretense is hypocrisy and a mortal sin.

48. But someone can pretend that evils are not present, either by showing signs opposite to those evils or by not showing signs that are accustomed commonly to follow those evils. And the first of these seems to pertain to hypocrisy, namely if some lascivious person, hearing talk about women, spits curses in sign of chastity, though he has the opposite in his heart. The second is not any reprehensible evil; rather to the extent it can be an evil it is praiseworthy, because it is blamable to preach in the way some are said to have done, "they preached their sin as Sodom and were not silent" [*Isaiah* 3.9]. For although there is evil inside in the heart, yet to add an evil sign outwardly is to add evil to evil.

49. But in indifferent matters one can do certain things that of their nature are signs of something. Someone else also can do things that are not of their nature signs, but he knows that they are conceived to be signs by those present. For instance, by the nature of the thing to sweat is a sign of fatigue or some bodily exhaustion; but to spit, so that saliva run down the beard, is not of its nature a sign of insanity of mind (for someone sound of mind can emit saliva so that it flows down the beard). Yet from the circumstances one can know that this is to be judged a sign of fury or madness (as that these are signs of madness in that country).

50. Generally, therefore, about the first and second pretenses [nn.47-48] I say that they are sins and that they are frequently mortal sins, because they are hypocrisy. The third pretense [n.48], provided another evil is not committed with it, is praiseworthy, so that a man not show one evil because of another evil. In indifferent matters the first pretense [n.49], if it existed in anyone, would perhaps be evil, but not by reason of the matter, that is, if someone could make himself sweat although he had not labored (in the way some comedians use their bodies for certain motions, signifying some dispositions that are not in them nor were

there before). But the other pretense, which is the second one in indifferent matters [n.49], is no sin.

51. And such was the pretense of David [n.6]. The pretense of Jehu should not be excused, for beside the pretense, which perhaps could be excused, he added a lie, "My great sacrifice is for Baal" [*IV Kings* 10.19]. This lie, although by his intention it was in a way useful because destructive of the cult of Baal, yet it was of its nature pernicious: not only of its nature pernicious because it procured the death of others but also because, as concerned itself, it procured the cult of Baal. And although Jehu is commended for the destruction and persecution of the cult of Baal, yet he is blamed because he did not refrain from [worshipping] the calves of Jeroboam, nor was he a true worshipper of the God of Israel [*ibid.* 10.28-31].

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Thirty Ninth Distinction

Single Question

Whether all Perjury is a Mortal Sin

1. About the thirty ninth distinction I ask[a] whether all perjury is a mortal sin.

a. [*Interpolation*] About the thirty ninth distinction, where the Master deals with perjury, the question asked is whether…

2. That it is not:

Because sometimes one swears what it is illicit to fulfill. Gratian *Decrees* p.2 cause 22 q.4 ch.5, "In evil promises end faith in it, in a base vow change the decision, do not do what you have rashly vowed; a promise is impious that is fulfilled by crime." But what is of itself illicit does not become licit by an oath, therefore it remains illicit after the oath. And so, fulfilling what was sworn is to sin mortally. Therefore by not fulfilling it one does not sin mortally. For no one is in perplexity in the Christian law, namely so as to sin mortally whether he does a thing or does not do it (which seems to be perplexity). And yet by not fulfilling what he swore he perjures himself. Therefore perjury is not a mortal sin.

3. Again, it is a graver matter to swear by God than by the Gospel [Gratian, p.2 cause 22 q.1 ch.11], just as it is a graver matter to swear by the temple than by the gold (for the temple that sanctifies the gold is greater than the gold that is sanctified by the temple [*Matthew* 23.17]). And this as to reverence. Therefore if it is a mortal sin to perjure oneself, it is a very great sin to perjure oneself swearing by God. Therefore common persons as a result sin mortally the whole day, because they have to swear by God for nothing, even asserting something false or doubtful (something not certain), which seems harsh.

4. Again, not every oath of a promise obligates necessarily, Gratian p.2 cause 22 q.4 ch.1, "It is better not to fulfill the vow of a stupid promise than to commit a crime." Therefore neither is perjury there a mortal sin.

5. Proof of the antecedent:

About a coerced oath, see Gregory IX *Decretals* II tit.24 ch.8 "Clerics who have been coerced to abjure the ministry of the Church have deserved the benefit of absolution from their oath, and are permitted to serve in the same Church."

6. About a deceitful oath it is plain that the swearer does not intend to obligate himself, for no one is obligated unless he intends to obligate himself [*ibid*. ch.31, Innocent's gloss], where it is said that "if anyone swears five times not to oppose someone else, he can in a cause of the Church or the community oppose him the sixth time, notwithstanding that it is against his oath."

7. About a rash oath there is proof that if the swearer fulfills it he verges on a worse fate [Gratian, p.2 cause 22 q.4 ch.19]. Therefore it is a worse evil to fulfill the oath.

8. And about these two oaths, namely the deceitful and the coerced, there is proof by similarity with marriage, for a coerced or deceitful (that is pretended) consent does not obligate a man to marriage [Gregory, *ibid*. I tit. 40 ch.2, IV tit.1 ch.14].

9. On the contrary:

Exodus 20.7, "You shall not commit perjury, but you will fulfill your vows to the Lord your God." And *Psalm* 75.12, "Vow, and fulfill it to the Lord your God."

I. To the Question

10. In this question one must first consider the nature or idea of an oath; and second, on this basis, that perjury is a mortal sin; third one must consider the distinction of oaths, and how specific oaths are sins.

A. About the Idea of an Oath

11. As to the first point I say that an oath is the assertion that a human statement is true, and this ultimately according to *Hebrews* 6.16, "the end of every controversy is the swearing of an oath." For man, knowing that man is mendacious and ignorant and can consequently deceive and be deceived, cannot give sure faith to his statements. And so a way was found of asserting statements by bringing in another witness, a true and knowing witness, who can neither deceive nor be deceived; and this is done by swearing an oath. For God is there brought in, who knows the truth and cannot lie, as being a witness of my assertion.

B. Perjury is a Mortal Sin

1. Solution

12. Hence follows the proposed conclusion about perjury, because to bring in God as witness of what is false is to do irreverence to God: – either by bringing him in as a witness ignorant of the truth and so not omniscient, or bringing him in as willing to testify to what is false and so not completely truthful. In either way irreverence is done immediately to God, against the commandment of the first

table, “Thou shalt not take the name of the Lord thy God in vain” [*Exodus* 20.7]. And so, in either way, if done deliberately, it is a mortal sin.

2. Two Doubts Against the Aforesaid

13. But here there are two doubts. The first is whether perjury’s not being deliberate excuses it from being a mortal sin. Second whether one sins mortally by bringing in God as witness in the aforesaid way for anything that one believes to be true though it is not true, or for something about which one has some opinion but assents rather to the opposite.

a. About the First Doubt

14. As to the first of these doubts it is commonly conceded that a single slight perjury is not a mortal sin.

15. However, to be a perjurer habitually is a mortal sin. And this it seems can be proved, because a habit generated by many acts inclines one to a graver act than are the preceding ones.

16. But against this: if the first act of perjury is not a mortal sin, then neither is any other, even from whatever habit it comes to be, because an inclining habit cannot make an act graver. For if someone acquired a great habit from acts of incontinence and quickly repent, then if after repentance he have some movement of incontinence, although his great habit incline him to it, yet it is not a mortal sin in him; indeed neither is it notably graver than it would be in someone else who has no habit.

17. A confirmation is that a habit cannot be graver, if it has any gravity. Since however gravity has no culpability, properly speaking, save from acts, then since the acts from which the habit is generated are venial, the habit will not produce any mortal gravity in acts elicited by the habit.

18. It seems then possible to say that a habit or custom does nothing for the proposed conclusion. But perjury, with full consent, is against the commandment of the first table and consequently turns one aside immediately from the ultimate end, and so nothing of the idea of mortal sin is lacking to it.

19. But if a perjury is not done deliberately, however often it is done, then since a meritorious act requires that it be fully human and so fully deliberate, an act of demerit would require altogether the same (for God is not more prone to punish than to condone) – if so, one can say that a non-deliberate perjury, even repeated ever so often, is not a mortal sin.

20. However, as was said before in the material about the virtues [d.33 n.77], a virtuous man has quick deliberation (which does not seem to be deliberation because of its quickness), because he has great prudence wherewith he is prompt to deliberating as it were in imperceptible time. So too someone could, from a habit opposite to prudence, acquire for himself a facility in deliberating promptly about the opposite, as if in imperceptible time, and this deliberation, following the habit, would be sufficient for the idea of sin; just as the like deliberation in a good man would be sufficient for the idea of merit.

21. Therefore, as concerns the idea of mortal sin, I do not distinguish so much between the rarity or frequency of perjury as between its deliberation or lack of deliberation, so that when deliberation is concurrent it makes mortal sin (and that whether the act is single or customary), and lack of deliberation excuses, whether once or as many times as you like.

b. About the Second Doubt

22. As to the second doubt [n.13] I say that he to whom one swears either accepts (from positive law or common custom) that the oath is as it were simply assertive of what is sworn, or that it is not as it were simply assertive but induces to probable belief of the thing sworn.

23. In the first way I say that one who swears something that is in any way doubtful (that is, something not simply certain and true and deliberate) sins mortally, because he is bringing in God as witness to confirm that what he asserts is simply certain and true when it is not simply certain.

24. And in this way must be understood all oaths of those who swear in court, where the sort of sentence accustomed to be passed there should not be passed unless what is asserted is simply certain. For example, a sentence of death should not be passed save for a crime that is certain. Therefore, he who swears that the accused is guilty of the crime when he is not certain, however much he may nevertheless conjecture that the accused is guilty and swears this in such a forum (where, by positive law or custom, a condemnation to death follows), he sins mortally. The like holds of any forum where (from the fact someone is convicted through sworn oaths) the accused is condemned as simply guilty or as infamous with the infamy of law. For in this case not only is irreverence done to the name of God against the commandment of the first table, but there is a pernicious lie because harmful to one's neighbor [cf. d.38 n.23].

25. And if you say 'it is useful for the republic; otherwise evil people will be too much multiplied', God replies "You will execute what is just justly" [*Deuteronomy* 16.20]. For there are certain evils that are not to be punished by men but are to be left to divine vengeance – for instance all things where man, as man, cannot even sufficiently teach the truth in the way it ought to be taught for the purpose of justly passing a due sentence of punishment. Nor are the witnesses alone guilty in these cases but the judge too. And if a judge knows that by custom witnesses only swear under oath what they believe, then he should not pass such sentence as should be passed if guilt were simply proved before him. For he knows from custom that guilt is not proved before him sufficiently for the infliction of such a punishment.

26. But if by positive law or custom it is held that a sworn witness is not bound to depose what he is certain of but only what he believes, then the swearer does not sin, provided he make conjecture for this side rather than another from probable signs. The point is contained in Gregory IX *Decretals* I tit. 12, about making examination for holdy orders, where Pope Innocent replies, "as far as human fragility allows us to know, [the Church] both knows and testifies that this man is worthy of the burden of this sort of office." Hence Pope Innocent says that

"in making such response we do not believe that anyone sins, provided he not speak against his conscience; for he does not assert simply that the candidate is worthy but asserts it as far as human fragility allows one to know, since one should judge him worthy whom one does not know to be unworthy."

27. Therefore, in such promotions either to any dignity of office by election or to holy orders, or also in other colleges (as to mastership in universities, to prelacy in religions, or to other acts of the sort), if there is an approved custom that the responses of the respondents (under proffered oath, or under pledge of faith, or under promised obedience) should be understood only of belief 'as far as human fragility permits us to know', and that the presider does not know of any indignity in the candidate, then all such responses should be understood according to the common custom and the respondents do not sin in anything (though it would be safer to speak there with some qualification, as in the aforesaid Decretal, that one speaks not simply but as far as human fragility allows). And in such cases a judge who promotes such a candidate does not sin, because the custom is that giving such testimony of one's belief is enough.

28. Here then 'favor is enlarged and hatred is restricted' according to the maxim of the law [Boniface VIII *Decretals* 6.V tit.12], because in matters of hate a sworn witness should speak the truth strictly, and a truth that is certain, for otherwise it is not a reason that the sentence of condemnation afterwards passed should be passed. In favorable matters it is sufficient for the person sworn to say what he believes to be true, above all where the custom or positive law in the college is of the sort that one speak one's belief. For because of the truth as to belief thus testified, the presider can promote the candidate to such and such a rank.

29. Now universally, whether in favorable or hateful things, he who swears something the opposite of which he more believes than anything else, swearing even to that about which he is simply doubtful and where he does not assent in his heart more to one side than the other – such a person sins mortally in swearing, because he brings in God as witness for something he is in no way certain about which he ought to be certain about.

2. Third Doubt against the Aforesaid

30. If objection is raised against the statement that perjury is against a commandment of the first table, for it seems that according to Master Lombard [III d.39 ch.3 nn.1-2] perjury is a sort of lie and so against the commandment of the second table, "Thou shalt not speak false witness against your neighbor" [*Exodus* 20.16] – one can reply that in perjury there is a double sin: namely a lie or lying as material, and the taking of the Lord's name in vain, that is, taking it not only uselessly but irreverently and against reverence. The first sin belongs to the second table but the second belongs formally to the first table, because of the irreverence prohibited there.

31. Perjury is also possible without lying, for example, where he who simply doubts swears to the part he doubts – which would not be a lie if he asserted it, for he does not have the opposite in his mind. At any rate, in a case

where the swearer is bound to be certain, he commits perjury if he is not certain, and yet if he asserted it without an oath he would not lie because he does believe it more than the opposite.

32. It is dangerous therefore to have an oath frequently on one's lips, because, in the case of many statements, there would be no sin without an oath, but there is sin when an oath is added, and grave sin if done deliberately [n.21]. Therefore useful is the counsel of our Savior, *Matthew* 5.37, "Let your speech be yea yea, nay nay."

C. On the Distinction of Oaths and How Specific Oaths are Sins

33. As to the third article [n.10] I say that a human statement is either about the present and the past, where the truth is determinate, or about the future, where the truth is uncertain and indeterminate. And a statement, indeed, about the first is said to be assertive, in the sense in which 'assertion' is extended to cover affirmative or negative assertions. But about the future, when something is in the power of the promiser or swearer, it is called promissory. And accordingly, since an oath is the assertion of either of these kinds of statement, an oath is assertoric or promissory. Both, to be sure, impose an obligation: the assertoric because it obligates the swearer to tell the truth, whereby it leads the witness to assertion of what he says; the promissory because it obligates the swearer to confess 'this is true'. And because the assertoric obligates one only for the time for which one swears, and a promissory oath is called an obligation as it regards the future, therefore a promissory oath is rightly called obligatory, because it obligates one to the future doing of what is sworn.

34. And these two kinds of oath are assimilated to two kinds of obligation in sophisms, namely position and petition. Position obligates one to upholding as true what is laid down, and petition to carrying out in fact what was asked for [*Topics* 8.155b-164b].

35. But here there is a doubt whether in a promissory oath the quality of its being an oath is presupposed, and by the weight of it a witness is brought forward who is suitable for confirming what is said. Or whether the veracity of the witness is presupposed, so that the quality of his speaking it under oath is considered secondarily. For if the first were true it would seem sufficient for a swearer about the future to have the intention, when he swears, to do what he swears to do in the future, even if afterwards he change his intention. The second seems more consonant with common opinion, because in an oath one is said to remain always obligated until one fulfills it.

36. As to assertive perjury, therefore, there is no need in particular to touch on more than was touched on I the article about perjury in general [nn.12, 18-21].

37. As to promissory or obligative perjury, I say that it can be deceitful or rash or coerced, or it can lack all these undue conditions.

38. A deceitful oath is when he who swears he will do something intends, even in the act itself of swearing, to do the opposite, and does not intend to obligate himself to what he swears. Such a person sins mortally in the very act of

swearing, because he brings in God as witness of his proposal to fulfill what he swears though he is proposing the opposite. However, after the oath he remains without obligation, because no one is obligated in the case of private obligations when he does not intend to obligate himself. Nor does it follow that he gains advantage from his deceit (because had he not sworn deceitfully he would have been obligated), for it is no advantage to gain mortal sin, and if he had not sworn deceitfully he would not have sinned mortally. Yet he who does not swear deceitfully would be bound to his oath and the other not. And the intention of the former is not as damaging as the loss that the latter incurs in his very deceitful oath, because the latter sins mortally.

39. A rash oath can be said in two ways:

Either because it concerns matter that is altogether illicit (for example, someone swears he will do the opposite of some commandment, as if he swears to kill someone or commit adultery with someone). And such an oath does not obligate the swearer to fulfill the oath, such that after the oath he should fulfill the act. However, after he has sworn, if he had no such intention, he has sinned mortally, because he has brought God in as testimony to what is false. Also, if he had such intention, he has sinned mortally, because to want to sin mortally is to sin mortally. Therefore, in every way, such a one sins mortally in the very act of swearing. But after having done so he should not fulfill the oath, because he ought not to add sin to sin. For something that was illicit does not become licit for him because he has illicitly sworn something; for mortal sin does not make his condition freer.

An oath is rash in another way because it concerns some matter that would be of itself licit but is not licit for the swearer; for instance, someone abjures the works of perfection and thereby interposes an obstacle to the movement of the Holy Spirit. To observe such an oath verges toward a worse outcome [n.7]. Nor should one keep what has been sworn after the oath has been made. For although it is licit absolutely not to do the works of perfection, it is however not licit to have a fixed 'willing' never to do the works of perfection, for this is to have a fixed 'willing' against the movement of the Holy Spirit.

In these two oaths, then, namely the deceitful [n.38] and the rash (in the two aforesaid ways [n.39]), it is plain that one does not, after the oath, stay obligated to fulfill what has been sworn, but one sins mortally in the very act of swearing.

40. Another rash oath could be posited when someone swears he will do what however he cannot do. And if, when he swears, he thinks he can, judgement must be made about him the way said in the article about oaths in general [n.28]. But if he could do it in the future, he is bound by the oath. If however he cannot, yet when he swore he believed he could, he is excused in the case of favorable matters.

41. About coerced oaths (with the coercion that can afflict a man of constancy), there are opinions – see *Ord*. IV d.29.

42. A promissory oath, which lacks the three conditions (deception, incaution, coercion [n.37]), obligates the swearer never to have a will opposite to what he swears. But if he defer fulfilling it for certain circumstances that seem to

require its deferral, he does not sin. He only becomes a perjurer when he has a will of not fulfilling what he swore, because only then does he want to God to have been a witness of what is false.

II. To the Arguments

43. As to the first argument [n.2] plainly, 'in a base vow, change the decision'. However, in making the vow one sins mortally.

44. To the next [n.3] I say that, other things equal, the greatest vow is to swear 'by God', because by nothing else is it to licit to swear save insofar as God is there in a special way (for instance, 'by the Gospel', because God is specially luminous in the Gospel; 'by heaven' because God dwells there in a special way; 'by the Church', because God is worshipped there in a special way). However, the custom is also reasonable that establishes that certain oaths are made with greater solemnity than others; and about those made with solemnity it is presumed that they are never done without deliberation. Other light oaths can be made without deliberation. Therefore God and the Church have established, for purposes of fear, that these sort of oaths [sc. 'by the Gospel', 'by heaven' etc. *Matthew* 5.33-37] only be sworn solemnly, and consequently with deliberation and where the truth is to be simply asserted. But oaths 'by God' are sworn commonly and lightly, and frequently without deliberation.

45. I say then that, other things being equal, it is a very grave thing to swear 'by God'. But if there is no deliberation on this side and there is full deliberation on another side, as is the case when an oath is sworn 'by the Gospel', there can be mortal sin in the latter case and not in the former – not because of the reverence of him by whom one swears, but because of deliberation in one case and not in the other.

46. And if you object 'why then does someone who swears by the Gospel become infamous, but not someone who swears by God?' – I reply that infamy does not always follow the quality of the guilt but the public character of the crime; but it has been established [Gratian *Decree*, p.2 cause 3, q.9 ch. 20] that an oath be sworn on the Gospel, or be done with deliberation, and that it be public and done publicly. And therefore a transgressor of the oath is presumed to be a violator of the faith, and is reasonably held to be infamous. The same is not presumed about someone else who lightly swears by God falsely.

47. As to the final argument [n.4] it is plain that a promissory oath obligates, but not to fulfilling the act sworn to.

Fortieth Distinction

Single Question

Whether the New Law is Heavier than the Old Law

1. About the fortieth distinction I ask[a] whether the New Law is heavier than the Old Law.

a. [*Interpolation*] About the fortieth distinction, where the Master deals with the two last commandments of the second table and about the usefulness of each Law, the question asked is whether…

2. That it is:

The New Law adds many things to the Old Law, as is plain from *Matthew* 5.21-28, "It was said by those of old, 'thou shalt not kill'. But I say to you, 'he who is angry with his brother etc.' and so on about other precepts. And in addition, the New Law contains the whole of the Old, *Matthew* 5.17-18, "I have not come to destroy the Law but to fulfill it." Therefore the New Law contains all the weight of the Old Law and adds something further, and so it is heavier.

3. Further, the state of grace is more perfect and virtuous than the state of Law; therefore it is more difficult. The consequence is plain from *Ethics* 2.2.1105a9, "virtue is about the hard and difficult good."

4. On the contrary:

Matthew 11.28-30, "Come to me all you who are labor and are heavy laden, and I will give you rest etc."

I. To the Question

5. Here one must consider two things, because the weight of the Old Law in relation to the New Law depends on two things, namely on the burden imposed and on the defect of the remedy for supporting the burden imposed.

A. About the Burdens Imposed

6. The burdens imposed under the Old Law were the moral, the ceremonial, and the judicial commands, to all of which everyone was then necessarily bound.

About the moral this is plain.

7. About the ceremonial it must be understood as follows, that although Jews could, without mortal sin, transgress the warning that belonged to the ceremonial laws (for example, they could without mortal sin touch a dead body and incur many impurities of this sort), yet if they did not do the things contained in the Law (and they were bound to be purified with respect to them), they sinned mortally, as is explained there [*Exodus* 30.38, *Leviticus* 7.20-21 etc.], "The soul that did so and so will die the death, or will perish from among the people…" For by these words is understood the threat of eternal damnation.

8. The Jews were bound also to all the judicial laws, either per se, or when law was determined by their judges [*Deuteronomy* 16.18-22, 17.1-7] or especially by the priests of the Levitical class, if ever there was a doubtful case among the inferior judges, according to *Deuteronomy* 17.8-13, "Every soul that despise the judgment of the priest will die the death."

9. Now in the New Law there are the same moral commandments as there were under the Old Law but made more explicit. The ceremonial laws (those imposed by Christ) are much fewer and lighter. No judicial laws were imposed by

Christ, but rather a law of mildness and humility [*Matthew* 11.29], wherein there ought not to be judicial actions, according to *I Corinthians* 5.1, "It is altogether a fault in you that you have suits at law. Why do you not rather suffer to be defrauded?" For Christ taught this, *Matthew* 5.43, "If someone strikes you on one cheek, offer him also the other; and if someone wants to take your cloak, give him your tunic also."

10. If one compares the moral commandments in each law, it is doubtful whether there was equal weight on both sides, because it is doubtful whether people under the Old Law were bound to all the commandments, and to commandments explained in the same way as they bind us now. Because if they were not bound to those commandments save as the Jews interpreted them, then it was licit for them to love their friends and to hate their enemies [*Matthew* 5.43], and to give a bill of divorcement to their wives [*Matthew* 19.7]. For thus did the Pharisees teach the simple among the people. But this is not licit today for Christians (and the like perhaps about certain other interpretations of some of the oral precepts, as is plain in *Matthew* 5). But if it is not licit for Christians, then our Law is heavier as to the moral commandments, although this heaviness is not equal with that of the ceremonial commandments to be discussed.

11. As to the ceremonial commandments I say that the Old Law was much heavier both as to their multitude and the difficulty of observing them, so Augustine *To the Inquisitions of Januarius* II ch.19 n.33 (and this is touched on in Gratian *Decrees* p.1 d.12 ch.12). And Rabbi Moses Maimonides (*Guide of the Perplexed* p.3 ch.26) has numbered more than 600 legal commandments, to all of which the Jews were bound, and some of these were very difficult. For instance, that three times a year every male be present in Jerusalem however far distant [*Deuteronomy* 16.16], and to worship in the seventh year, because of which they had to refrain from collecting the harvest in two years [*Leviticus* 25.3-7]; and many other things about not touching a corpse, or eating or not drinking after touching a corpse without washing [*Leviticus* 11.23-46, *Numbers* 19.11-13, 16-22]. Hence Peter in *Acts* 15.10 says, "Why do you wish to impose on the disciples a heavy burden that neither we nor our fathers were able to bear?"

12. The New Law, according to Augustine [*Inquisition of Januarius* I.1.n1], is content with few and evident sacramental rites. For the New Law has only seven sacraments, which are not necessary for all Christians (for not everyone contracts marriage, nor do all received holy orders), but baptism is necessary and confession (after falling away and lapsing into mortal sin). Hence what seems more difficult in our Law and the Church is confession, for it seems difficult to reveal to a man private sins that are known only to God and oneself. But there are so many remedies applied to confession that one does not need to be confounded after revealing things in confession. For the hearer is obligated to the greatest seal of secrecy. Other sacraments besides baptism and confession are perhaps not necessary, or if necessary are easy (as confirmation, eucharist, extreme unction).

13. As to the ceremonial commands, therefore, the New Law (as given by Christ) is far easier than the Old Law. And this is simply a lightness that far

outweighs the heaviness in the Old Law, even if there is a greater heaviness in the case of morals.

14. As to the judicial commands, it is plain that the New Law is lighter, because Christ imposed no judicial commands.

15. However if we speak of the New Law not only as it was handed on by Christ but also as it was declared by others, and as other things were added to it by others, and even as to ceremonial commandments, one can say what Augustine says in *Inquisitions of Januarius*.[12]

16. As to the judicial commandments, it is licit for judges to establish laws for the sake of preserving common peace, whether those that were in the Law of Moses (whether all or some) or others, and if others, of whatever kind and however many. And those subject to the judges are bound to keep these laws provided the laws are not repugnant to the Divine Law. See Gratian *Decrees* p.1 d.9 ch.1. And to this extent one can suppose that the Christian Law is heavier, for under the Old Law it was not permitted either to priests or judges to establish any new laws in the way that it is now permitted to Christian princes.

17. So, therefore, in brief: the burdens of the Christian Law are fewer as they were handed on by Christ, but perhaps more as addition of others was made by those who have rule over the Christian people. And to all such new statutes of the Church we are obligated, Gratian *Decrees* I d.19 ch.2, 5.[13]

B. About the Remedies and Helps Conferred on Us

18. As to the second article [n.5] I say that the passion of Christ, now shown and realized, merits more grace for those who believe it has now been realized than his passion as to be realized merited for those who believed it as to be realized. And therefore our sacraments, which have their efficacy in virtue of Christ's passion now realized, confers more grace than the sacraments of the Old Law did.

19. In addition, we have several helps of grace as well, because we have more sacraments than they had in the Old Law. For besides matrimony (if it was a sacrament for them, which will be touched on in IV d.26 nn.12-13), they had no sacrament other than circumcision, and this as remedy of original sin (a matter to be discussed in IV d.1 q.3 n.8, q.6 nn.2, 9, 11-2, d.2 q.2 n.9). After lapse into sin, if they could merit some grace by their own movements, well and good, but they had then no sacrament instituted among them for perceiving grace, for they did not have the sacrament of confession nor the other sacraments [cf. IV d.1 q.6 n.10]. Therefore we have more helps for obtaining grace than they had.

20. Third, besides the greater efficacy and number of the sacraments, we have a more explicit doctrine than they had. We also have more numerous and

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[12] Augustine speaks of local variations as approved by particular churches which may be freely observed provided they are not against faith or morals, or are not obstinately insisted on or opposed.

[13] Gratian's *Decrees* have been replaced by the Church's *Code of Canon Law*, which incorporates some of those decrees and adapts and replaces them relative to the needs of the time. Scotus is here essentially supporting and endorsing the Church's power and authority to regulate the life of the faithful according to the needs of faith and morals.

more effective examples of saints to imitate. And lastly we have more merits of the saints, who perhaps merited not for themselves but also for us; and we also merit by invoking their help and intercession with God.

21. Simply speaking, then, the helps in the New Law are more numerous and more efficacious than in the Old Law, and so on this side too the Christian law is lighter.

22. There is also a good and notable help that eternal life is explicitly promised to us for our observation of the Christian law [*Luke* 18.18-30]. But to them rarely or never were certain things explicitly given, save temporal goods and the support of our prayers implored for them, which alone were promised to them [*II Maccabees* 12.43-46]. But never does any temporal good as much attract man's spirit to observing the law as does an eternal good.

II. To the Principal Arguments

23. As to the first argument [n.2] I concede that although the New Law contains all the moral commandments as the Old Law and adds some more, or at least adds an explanation for some of them (to which perhaps those under the Old Law were not bound), yet these additions are not as heavy as were, on the other side, the multitude and weight of the ceremonial and judicial commandments [of the Old Law]. Also, on the part of the New Law, the multitude and efficacy of the helps greatly eases things, so that the greater weight, if there is any in morals, does not outweigh the others in heaviness (if one considers the helps on both sides).

24. To the second [n.3] I say that the difficulty in virtuous action is not, of itself, on the part of the actor but on the part of the thing done. For it is more difficult for a greedy man to give away one denarius than for a generous man to give away four, and yet a greedy man is not as virtuous as a generous man. And not just any difficulty on the part of the thing done proves a greater virtue, but the difficulty that per se includes the excellence of the object attained per se by the action. Yet the difficulty goes along with a greater ease, for it is easier to reach by love a very excellent object than a less excellent object. And such deeds of excellence have God immediately for object, and more are expounded in the New Law. For many acts of love are at once given more explanation to Christians than was given to Jews. And no wonder, because the Old Law is called a law of fear, and the New Law a law of love. But love and the end especially, if it is sought in all things, makes all burdens light, so that what the Savior said is true, *Matthew* 11.30, "For my yoke is easy and my burden light."

To whom be honor and glory for infinite ages of ages. Amen.