

This translation of Book III Distinctions 1 to 17 of the *Ordinatio* (aka *Opus Oxoniense*) of Blessed John Duns Scotus is complete. These distinctions fill volume nine of the Vatican critical edition of the Latin text edited by the Scotus Commission in Rome and published by Quarrachi.

[Note that distinctions 18 to 25 are lacking in Scotus' *Ordinatio*. Their place is filled here in an appendix from Antonius Andreas, one of Scotus' more faithful followers.]

Scotus' Latin is tight and not seldom elliptical, exploiting to the full the grammatical resources of the language to make his meaning clear (especially the backward references of his pronouns). In English this ellipsis must, for the sake of intelligibility, often be translated with a fuller repetition of words and phrases than Scotus himself gives. The possibility of mistake thus arises if the wrong word or phrase is chosen for repetition. The only check to remove error is to ensure that the resulting English makes the sense intended by Scotus. Whether this sense has always been captured in the translation that follows must be judged by the reader. In addition there are passages where not only the argumentation but the grammar too is obscure, and I cannot vouch for the success of my attempts to penetrate the obscurity. So, for these and the like reasons, comments and notice of errors from readers are most welcome.

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April, 2018

THE ORDINATIO OF BLESSED JOHN DUNS SCOTUS

Book Three

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First Distinction
 First Part
 On the Possibility of the Incarnation
 Question One
Whether it was Possible for Human Nature to be United to the Word in Unity of Supposit

1. About the Incarnation I ask first about possibility, whether it was possible for human nature to be united to the Word in unity of supposit.^a

a. [Interpolation] “When therefore the fullness of time came etc.” *Galatians 4.4.* After the Master in Book I has made determinations about God as to the idea of his natural perfection, and in Book II about God as to the manifesting of his perfection in the works of creation, here in Book III he makes determinations about God as to the manifesting of his perfection in the works of restoration. And he raises five questions in the first distinction of this Book III: first, whether it was possible for human nature to be united to the Word in unity of supposit; second, whether the three persons could assume the same numerical nature; third, whether one person could assume several natures; fourth, whether one created supposit could be the hypostatic substance of another created nature; fifth, whether the formal idea of the term of the union is a relative property. About the first question.

2. It seems that it was not:

Because pure and infinite act is not combinable with anything, as was proved in Book I distinction 8 nn.16-19, in the question ‘Whether God is supremely simple’; the Word is such, namely pure and infinite act; therefore etc.

3. Further, between things capable of being united there is some proportion, – there is no proportion of the finite to the infinite; the Word is infinite, and human nature is finite; therefore they are not capable of being united.

4. Besides, contraries cannot exist together, on account of their repugnance; but created nature and uncreated nature are more repugnant to each other than contraries are (as is plain, because contraries are in the same genus, – created and uncreated nature are not so, as is plain); therefore etc. The first proposition is proved by the Philosopher *Metaphysics* 4.3.1005b19-30, where he argues that, if contraries existed together in the same thing, then contradictions would be true together.

5. Moreover, to incarnate is to act, therefore to be incarnated is to undergo an act; but the Divine Word does not undergo; therefore it is not incarnated. Proof of the consequence, because to every action there corresponds a proper undergoing. And if this be denied because of the objection ‘about to love and to be loved, therefore in the same way about to unite and to be united’ – the objection is not valid, because the act of loving is an immanent act to which there corresponds no undergoing in the object, but ‘to incarnate’ is an act that passes over to an object outside, therefore some undergoing will correspond to it.

6. Further, there are other reasons, proper and special to the case:

And first, on the part of the nature that is united: human nature is in the same way both a ‘this’ and a person with created personhood, – a nature that per se exists cannot be

assumed unless it is a *per se* existing ‘this’; therefore it cannot be assumed without its being a person with its proper personhood. But if it is thus a person, it cannot be assumed by an uncreated person, – therefore it is not assumable; therefore etc.

7. Proof of the first proposition: because ‘what *per se* exists in intellectual nature’ is a person. Proof of the second proposition: because it cannot be assumed unless it is actually existing, and this existence is proper to it; existence that is proper ‘to a nature that is a substance’ is *per se* existence.

8. Another proof of the same proposition: because just as created nature is related to singularity, so intellectual nature – or at any rate a singular intellectual nature – seems to be related to personhood; but created nature is singular such that it cannot remain the same without its singularity; therefore neither can a singular intellectual nature remain the same without its personhood

9. Secondly, there is argument on the part of that which assumes, because in the case of things that differ only in reason, one of them cannot be the reason for the union while the other is not; person and essence differ only in reason, otherwise there would seem to be composition in divine reality; therefore etc.

10. Further, every dependence relates to something independent and absolute, as it seems; a divine person – as such – is not absolute; therefore nature does not depend on a person as it is a person; but there is no uniting to a person save it be to a person as it is a person; therefore there is no uniting to the person unless there be a uniting to the nature, or the person will be absolute, – both of which seem unacceptable.

11. Third, there is argument on the part of the union, because every dependence of one thing on another is of a caused thing on a cause, or of a thing caused later on a thing caused earlier (this seems manifest in all dependent things); but human nature does not depend on the Word ‘as a thing caused later on a thing caused earlier’, because ‘in the beginning was the Word, through which all things were created’ [*John 1.1, Colossians 1.16*] – nor does it depend on it precisely as a caused thing on a cause, because the term of the dependence is common to the three persons; therefore etc.

12. To the opposite:

John 1.14: “The Word was made flesh;” ‘flesh’ is taken here for man, according to Augustine [*On Psalms 29, 2 n.1*]

I. To the Question

13. We assume the affirmative side as the principal article of faith among the articles that concern temporal things, – and to understand this possibility, three things need to be considered; first, what is to be understood by ‘personal union’; second how it is possible on the part of the person who assumes, that is, that no repugnance is found on this point; third how it is possible on the part of the nature assumed, such that no repugnance is found on this point.

A. What is to be Understood by ‘Personal Union’

14. About the first I say that union does not state anything absolute in a supposit, because when anything absolute is understood in one of the extremes no perfect idea of union is understood, because union is not understood in relation to itself. Therefore

whether union is concomitant to something in one extreme or in both, since it is not nothing, it does at least state a respect; but not a common respect, which would be of the same reason in each extreme (of the sort that likeness is), because the disposition in the assumed nature and the assuming person is not of the same reason. Now the assuming person has no real relation to the created assumed nature, from Book I distinction 30 nn.49-51; conversely, however, unless the assumed nature had some relation to the assuming person, nothing would be *per se* understood by the union.^a Nor is the relation in the assumed nature only a thing of reason, because then the union would not be real. This relation then is a real relation of inequality in one extreme, to which no relation in the other extreme corresponds at all, or at least no real relation. And so the relation is a relation of order in one related extreme; but it is not the relation of ‘caused thing to cause’, because that relation is common to the whole Trinity – nor is it a relation of ‘what is caused later to what is caused earlier’, because the Word is not anything caused; therefore it is a relation of order or of dependence that is of a reason different from all dependence in the order of caused to cause, because the relation is universally by reason of nature in one extreme.

a. [Interpolated note] For ‘union’ is a special relation of dependence and order that is not of the same reason in both extremes: a real relation and not a relation of reason in the united nature, and a relation of inequality.

15. And although it be difficult to see that some dependence is of this sort, yet it can in some way be made clear in the case of subject and accident. For an accident has a double relation to its subject or to substance; namely of in-forming to in-formed, – and this necessarily includes imperfection in the formed subject, namely by the fact that it has potentiality with respect to ‘act in a certain respect’ (because the act is an accidental one); the other relation it has is of the naturally posterior to the prior, on which it depends as on its subject and not as on some cause (because if it has the subject as a cause, it has it as material cause, and this insofar as it in-forms the subject). If then these two relations of accident to subject are distinguished from each other, the one is necessarily a relation to the subject under the idea of imperfection in the subject, namely the imperfection of potentiality – the other, however, does not necessarily posit any imperfection in it but only natural and instantiating priority with respect to the accident.

16. Very similar to this is the dependence of human nature on the divine person, which is without any dependence of the caused on the cause; also it does not have the [divine] nature for first term but the person as it is person, such that just as the entity of nature is of a different idea and of something different from the entity proper to the person as person, so dependence on this sort of being and on that is of a different idea and of a different thing.

B. How Personal Union is Possible on the Part of the Person Assuming

17. About the second point [n.13] I say that if it were repugnant to the divine person thus to assume or to be the term of dependence of human nature, this would be either insofar as it was a divine person or insofar as it was ‘this person’:

Not in the first way, because this dependence does not imply anything repugnant to the divine nature or person (because it implies neither composition, nor potentiality, nor limitation); for it is only necessary that ‘what is the term of this dependence’ be in itself something independent, having entity as is required for being the term of this dependence; nor does any composition or potentiality follow (as is plain), nor any dependence in the divine person, because it is not necessary for the person to be really related but only that it be the term of the dependence of the human nature assumed relatively to it.

Nor second is there any repugnance on the part of the divine person insofar as it is a ‘this’, namely that ‘this one person’ unites and not another, because although a respect consequent to nature by outward respect (as of triple causality) or ‘to be the term of such respect’ is common to the three, and therefore all causality with respect to the creature belongs to the three, yet it is not necessary that the respect in question here, which is not consequent to quidditative or personal entity, be common to the three (for any independent personal entity can be a sufficient term of this dependence; such is the entity proper to any person, even as it is distinguished from another person; therefore etc.).

18. But there is another proof of this [from William of Ware], that a divine person contains and includes in itself virtually the perfection of any created person; therefore it can with respect to created nature supply the place of uncreated nature and of created person so as to be the term of dependence of created nature.

19. This argument is deficient in three ways:

First in accord with those who argue like this, because they posit that personal reality in divinity is not a perfection simply; but that which is a reason for containing virtually many perfections and – as relates to itself – infinite perfections, must be a perfection simply; but a divine person, if it contained the realities of one created person, would by parity of reason also contain infinite realities, and so its personal entity would be a perfection simply, which they deny.

20. Further, as perfect a containing exists in the divine essence with respect to created nature as exists in a divine person with respect to a created person, nay even more so, because the divine essence is absolutely infinite, but not so the personal entity; but the essence cannot of its perfection be formally the essence of any created person so as to take the place formally of the created nature, however much it contains it virtually; therefore much more is the person not able to supply for the created person with respect to created personhood.

21. Hence it is not because of the perfection of personal entity that the person contains virtually any created personhood, but because the personal entity is independent, – and as independent, insofar as it is such, it can be the term of dependence on it of something else which is of a nature to have such a term; but this dependence is of a nature to have the person for term and not the nature; therefore an independent divine person can sufficiently be the term of such dependence on it of the created nature.

C. How Personal Union is Possible on the Part of the Assumed Nature

22. The third article is more difficult, because one must show the distinction of created nature from created personhood.

1. The Opinion of Others

23. The proposed conclusion is proved in this opinion [of William Ware] in three ways:

First, because singularity naturally precedes personhood; therefore God can influence for singularity as for what is naturally prior without influencing for personhood, and so he can – in the instant in which a singular nature should be per se in a person – prevent it from being a person in itself and to be so in another instead.

24. Second, because “that which is of one genus can have the mode of another genus” (as is plain of an accident existing per se in the Eucharist), – therefore just as an accident can have the mode of substance (as is plain there), so substance can have the mode of accident and conversely, namely of being dependent; but once this is posited on the part of human nature, which is a substance, the dependence and union stated [n.16] is preserved.

25. Third it is argued that the more things are diverse, the more they can be united with each other (this is plain by induction, because individuals of the same species are least capable of being united; things of diverse genera are more capable than things of the same genus, as is plain of subject and accident); therefore since the created and uncreated are maximally diverse, because they are not of one genus, it follows that they will be most capable of being united, because one is potential with respect to the other.

2. Rejection of the Opinion

26. These reasons do not establish the proposed conclusion.

The first does not because – if it were valid – it would prove that God could make the nature to exist and at the same time not be singular, or if he made it singular first with this singularity, he could make it, while it remained the same, singular with another singularity; for ‘nature as such’ naturally precedes itself as singular. But if it be denied that nature can be made to exist save as singular determinately with this singularity, and that it cannot remain save under the same singularity, much more does this follow about the singular nature and its personhood, because this is its ultimate actuality.

27. The second reason seems to be at fault because the mode that truly is proper to one genus does not belong to anything else of another genus; for just as it is not proper to it, so also it is incompossible with anything else.

28. Nor does what is adduced about a separated accident prove the proposed point, because it does not have the mode that is proper to substance; for substance exists naturally per se, that is, in its existence it is not inclined with natural aptitude to anything else – but it is not so in the case of the separated accident.^a

a. [*Interpolation*] Nor is the substance formally dependent on the divine person such that the accident is not inclined with natural aptitude to a subject or the nature to its proper personhood.

29. And if the remark of *Metaphysics* 5.14.1020a33-b13 be adduced that a difference in the case of substance has the mode of quality, I reply: the Philosopher does not understand this of the proper mode of quality as a genus, but intends there to posit a

distinction in this word ‘quality’, and that ‘one of its mode is that according to which a difference in the case of substance is called quality’. This mode of the word ‘quality’ does not belong to any species of the genus of quality as it is a genus, nor is the mode proper to the genus of quality, but is only a mode of what is ‘quality’ in general. Therefore in the issue at hand one must show that the distinction between created nature and created personhood is from something else than from this.

30. The third reason does not seem conclusive, because the reason of the major is that because of potentiality in one extreme and because of actuality in the other extreme they are not univocal in fact, since they are primarily diverse (as is plain of subject and accident, which are disposed to each other as potency and act); this reason is not conclusive about things maximally distant, namely the Word and created nature, because neither is the Word formally the act of the created nature nor conversely is created nature formally potential with respect to the Word, because then they would be of a nature to become naturally one thing.

3. Scotus' own Opinion

31. Therefore because of this third article it is necessary to see the manner of the disposition by which an intellectual nature is said to be a ‘person’, in comparison with the manner of it by which such a nature is singular and individual.

32. And it is plain that what it is individuated formally and ultimately by is not the same as ‘this created personhood’ by which it is a person, because – according to Damascene bk.3 ch.3 – God assumed our nature in an individual but not however a nature in a person.

a. Two Possible Ways of Solution

33. But as to what the property is by which the nature is a person there seem to be two possible ways: one, that it is a person by something positive in final nature (final as that by which it is a nature and an individual nature), and this whether the positive thing is absolute or relative; in another way, that it is a person by mere addition of negation.

34. The first could be posited in some way proportionally to what was said in Book II on individuation, in distinction 3 nn.168-188, that just as there is some proper reality by which a nature is a ‘this’ over and above that by which it is nature, and that the latter is not formally the former, so over and above each of these there would be some reality by which it is a person; and so neither of these would be formally the same as person.

35. The second denies that any positive reality is the person, and it posits the reality – by which it is a ‘this’ – to be the final positive entity, and that over and above this there is only some negation, by which it is said to be ‘subsistent in intellectual nature’ and a person.

b. Arguments against the First Way

36. Against the first way I give four arguments:

First, because then there would be some positive entity in human nature that was not capable of being assumed by the Word. – Proof of the consequence: for this final entity, which person adds over and above the singular, would be repugnant by contradiction to being communicated the way the nature is communicated to the supposit (as is plain, because “a person is incommunicable existence” [Richard of St. Victor *On the Trinity* IV chs.21-23]), and so being assumed would be repugnant by contradiction to it. The result seems unacceptable: both because, according to Damascene ch.50, “what cannot be assumed cannot be cured,” – and because every created positive entity is in obediential potentiality with respect to the divine person.

37. Second, because it would follow that the nature, which was already assumed by the Word, would lack this positive entity, which however is posited as the final and most actual and most determinate entity in such nature. And if it not seem unacceptable to concede that this person lacks it, I argue that this nature could not suffer diminishment in itself and not be given another reality than the one it has, namely personhood – or it would remain a non-person, because then it would not be a person without the reality, and in this case it does not have it; therefore it is necessary for the diminished nature to be given it again.

38. Further it follows, third, that the nature could not be diminished and be in a person, because such reality could not be a reality of nature (as was shown in the question, n.26) nor can it be contained by identity in any nature which is not the same as itself; but whatever does not contain some reality by identity while remaining the same cannot contain that reality by identity.

39. Fourth, because it would follow that intellectual nature could come to be and not be in any person; for what is prior could naturally come to be and not be under this reality (because of the fact it is not posited to be really and formally the same as it),^a and in the second instant of nature – in which it is assumed by the Word – it would not be necessary for the Word to assume it; therefore the Word would be able not to assume it and so it would be left to itself and then it would not be in a person by any personhood (either created or uncreated!).

a. [*Interpolation*] as actually existing, and it would not be in a person, because by the fact that this reality is not posited to be the same as the nature, and that the nature – as nature – is naturally prior to itself as it is under this reality, it could come to be and not be under this reality.

c. Arguments against the Second Way

40. Against the second way there seem to be many arguments:

First, because this negation could only be posited as non-dependence on an extrinsic person; but if this would suffice for proper personhood – that it does not thus depend on it – the separated soul would be a person, which is false according to Richard *On the Trinity* IV ch.23.

41. The same arguments seem to be against this as are against ‘ungenerated’ being a property constitutive of the Father, Book I distinction 28 nn.1-4, 21; for no negation can

of itself be incomunicable but only by affirmation; and so, since it is of the idea of a person to be incomunicable, no person can be formally a person by negation.

42. Likewise, as was argued there [*ibid.*], no negation can be proper first to any subject but only by some affirmation;^a therefore this negation by which a person is a person is not proper to this person unless some affirmation is posited proper to this person, and so it is a person by affirmation before it is by negation.

a. [Interpolated note] because an absolute and free negation is common to being and to non being.

43. Fourth, because, as was argued in the question ‘On Individuation’ [II d.3 nn.49-57], to be divided is a mark of imperfection, and therefore not everything, by which to be divided is repugnant to something, is a privation but is a positive entity, and from this the conclusion follows that the entity is positive by which nature is individual and undivided. Consequently I argue in the issue at hand: to depend on an extrinsic person is a mark of imperfection; therefore not being dependent or being repugnant to such dependence does not necessarily entail imperfection;^a but to be dependent on something else is not repugnant to anything save because of some positive entity.

a. [Interpolated note] because then the same would be entailed about a divine person.

d. What one should Think about the Two Ways

44. Without asserting, one can mediate between these two ways by denying – with the first way – that there is any positive entity in created intellectual nature which is repugnant by contradiction to being communicated by some communication repugnant to person, because there seems to be no positive entity in created nature that is not capable of being dependent on the Word, and so to be communicable in the same way in which nature is said to be communicated to the supposit, as is the nature by which the supposit is said to be a being in nature (namely, ‘by humanity’ a thing is called ‘man’ and ‘by this humanity’ called ‘this man’). And one should not concede with the second way that mere negation of dependence on an extrinsic person is what is formally compleutive in the idea of person, because – as was argued at the beginning against it [n.40] – the separated soul would then be a person.

45. But thus one should distinguish between actual, possible, and aptitudinal dependence; and I call the sort of dependence aptitudinal that would always – as far as concerns itself – be in act (in the way that ‘heavy’ is apt by nature to be in the center, where it would always be, as far as concerns itself, unless it were impeded); and ‘possible’ I call absolutely that dependence where there is no impossibility from repugnance or from impossibility of terms (and this possibility can be sometimes with respect to a supernatural active power, and not only a natural one).

46. Although therefore merely negation of ‘actual’ dependence does not suffice for the proposed conclusion, nor could negation of the third dependence [sc. possible dependence] on the Word be posited in created nature (for there is no created nature or entity to which dependence on the Word is repugnant by contradiction), yet negation of

'aptitudinal' dependence on the Word can be conceded in the created nature that is a person in itself, otherwise it would rest by violence in created nature (as a stone rests upwards by violence). And so this negation, not of actual but aptitudinal dependence, as such completes the idea of 'person' in intellectual nature and of 'supposit' in created nature.

47. Yet neither does this aptitudinal non-dependence posit repugnance to actual dependence, because although there is not an aptitude in such a nature for depending, there is yet an aptitude of obedience, because the nature is in perfect obedience for depending, by the action of a supernatural agent; and when such dependence is given to it, it is a person with the personhood on which it depends – but when it is not given, it is a person in itself by this negation formally, and not by any positive addition over and above the positive entity by which it is 'this nature'.

e. To the Arguments against the Second Way

48. From this to the arguments against the way of negation.

The answer to the first [n.40] is plain [n.44].

49. To the other one [n.41], when it is argued that 'negation of itself is not communicable', my response is as was stated in Book I d.23 n.16 or d.25 nn.6-7.

The incommunicable that pertains to the idea of person excludes a double communicability, namely communicable as 'what' and communicable as 'by what'; created nature is incommunicable in the first way, because it is singular by singularity in the first way (for a singular is not communicable as 'what' unless it is unlimited, as is the divine essence); but created nature is not incommunicable in the second way,^a understanding by 'incommunicable' a negation of communication simply, namely negation of actual and aptitudinal communication, but without understanding formal repugnance to either communication.

a. [Interpolation] unless the supposit is 'what has nature by itself' or is a being having quiddity. Person is incommunicable in both ways.

50. On the contrary: in that case it does not seem that 'person' exists univocally in divine reality and in creatures, because there is something in divine reality that is formally incommunicable (as that to which being communicated in either way is repugnant), here there is not – rather created nature does not seem to be a person because it does not have the definition of person.

I reply: this concept of 'incommunicable', because it denies actual and aptitudinal communication, is univocal to God and creatures, to divine and created person; for negation is univocal to many things, when the 'same affirmation' is denied of several things. But negation 'of a communicability that includes repugnance to being communicated' is not univocal, because it does not belong to creatures. Hence if 'incommunicable', as it pertains to the idea of perfect person, states not only the negation 'incommunicable' for actual or aptitudinal communication but also a negation along with repugnance for affirmation of communication, there will be no person perfectly a person save a divine person; for a divine person has absolutely something by which there is a repugnance for it to be in any way communicated.

And hereby is plain how this reason earlier proved the intended conclusion about ‘ungenerated’ [n.41] but does not do so here; for a divine person not only has negation of actual and aptitudinal communication but also has repugnance for communication both as ‘what’ and as ‘by what’; such repugnance can never exist save through a positive entity – and therefore it never follows that a divine person is without such entity. But a created person is not thus incommunicable; and therefore there is no need to attribute to it such personal entity.

This assertion can be easily seen if we see the difference between bare negation of act and negation of aptitude and negation that requires repugnance. The first is in the ‘heavy’ when it exists above in respect of the ‘where’ in the center; the second is in a black surface with respect to ‘white’, if it is in neither of the potencies for it; the third is in man with respect to ‘irrational’. And although negation has one idea in itself, yet it is distinguished by comparison with what its respect is in. – So here: negation of potency to depend belongs to no creature; negation of aptitude belongs to any nature capable in itself of being a person, even if it actually does depend, because the aptitude in nature is not concomitant to the supernatural act, since the nature is only in obediential potency to that act; the negation of act is in the separated soul. Nor is only the second negation or only the third sufficient for being made a person in itself, but both together are so without the first, which is something that cannot be had.

51. To the third argument [n.42] I say that negation cannot be called ‘proper’, because it is not communicable as ‘what’ to many things, – and so negation in creatures is proper through the positive entity by which the nature is a ‘this’, to which is repugnant its being communicated as ‘what’ to many things; or it can be understood to be proper as incommunicable to another as ‘by what’, and thus in creatures it is not proper by affirmation.

52. To the fourth [n.43] I concede that if to depend were repugnant to any created thing, it would necessarily be repugnant to it through something positive; but it cannot be repugnant to any creature, because every created entity not only depends on the uncreated as on its cause but can also depend ‘by this special dependence’.

4. A Doubt

53. But about this third article [nn.13, 22] there is another doubt: whether there is some entity that is absolute, new, and positive for the foundation of this new relation, namely of dependence on and union with the Word, such that, with this posited, the relation of it to the Word cannot not follow.

54. It seems that there is, because otherwise there would first be a change toward relation and from relation, because if the Word were to let go the absolute nature assumed, the relation of union would not exist and – for you [n.37] – nothing would be absolute; therefore the change would be first from the relation (in this way, if it were to assume a nature first made to be a person in Peter). If there were no need for some new absolute to come to be, so that it might be made a person by the Word, the first term of this change would be a new relation; but this consequent is contrary to the Philosopher *Physics* 5.2.225b11-13, because there is no motion, either of principle or of term, in the category of ‘relation to another’. There is a confirmation from reason too, that a relation does not seem to be new unless there is something new in one of the extremes; for if something is

disposed in altogether the same way in itself, then it is also so disposed to another; there is nothing new in the Word in itself nor in the nature assumed unless some new absolute is consequent to it; therefore such an absolute needs to be posited.

55. But the opposite seems more probable:

Because the ‘absolute’ would be necessarily united to the Word such that, just as it is impossible for the union to exist and not be to the Word as to its term, so it would be incompossible for that absolute – which is the necessary foundation of the union – to exist save in the person of the Word; there seems to be no such absolute entity in a creature; therefore etc.

56. Further, such an absolute entity, in order to be the foundation of union with the Word, would be either accidental or substantial. Not accidental, because substantial nature seems to be what is first capable of being a person in itself (speaking of intellectual nature), namely insofar as it is prior to any accident; therefore when it is a person in something, it seems to be a person prior to any accident – and so no accident is the proper reason for being a person, and consequently not for this union either. If it is substantial, it cannot be that it is something other than what can exist in created nature, because then some matter or form, or some composite substance, would exist in Christ according to his humanity for which there would be nothing of the same reason in another man – therefore it would be a substantial entity but the same as matter or form or composite substance; but whatever is the same as some substance remains while that substance remains; therefore the assumed nature could not be removed by the Word while that absolute entity remains.

57. To what was said from the Philosopher in the *Physics* [n.56], one can reply that a relation can be disposed to a foundation in three ways:

In one way, that the foundation cannot, without contradiction, be posited in the absence of the relation, because the foundation cannot without contradiction exist in the absence of the term of the relation; nor even in the absence of relation to the term, because such relation necessarily requires such a term for its own existence. Of this sort are the relations of creatures to God, insofar as they are creatures and he is creator. This sort of relation is the same really as the foundation, as is plain from 2 d.1 n.260.

58. In another way a foundation can exist in the absence of relation because it can exist in the absence of a term; however when it and the term are posited, the relation necessarily follows, such that the two – posited together – are the necessary cause of the relation, whether in one extreme or both. An example would be about likeness in one white thing and in another white thing.

59. In another way, a relation can non-necessarily follow a foundation, because the foundation does not necessarily co-require a term or a relation to a term; and also, when the foundation and term are posited, the relation does not necessarily follow on both extremes or on one, but is contingently said to happen to the extreme, even after any absolute in it and in the term have been posited in being. And in this way one should not posit any new absolute in one of the extremes, even given that the relation is new. Many relations are disposed in this way, as generally the unions of absolute to absolute; for if the form existed per se and the matter existed per se (as a separate organic body and a separate soul), or if the subject existed per se and the accident per se (as bread and quantity in the Eucharist), and if they are again united, then no new absolute exists in

either extreme, but the relation is disposed contingently, so that it could also exist or not exist when the extremes were posited.

60. Then, in response to the Philosopher [n.54], I concede that there is no motion or change toward a relation that is disposed in the first or second way [nn.57-58], and so in general not toward relation in the category of relation, as he himself says about the category of relation [*Physics* 5.1-2.225b5-11]. But it is different with relation said in the third way [n.59], for this is a respect coming extrinsically from outside; that is, it is not an intrinsic respect consequent necessarily (not with absolute necessity, but once the term to which the relation is a relation is posited) to the foundation, namely to quantity or quality or substance, which are present intrinsically. Other respects, which do not in this way necessarily follow the foundation intrinsically, even when the term is posited, are said to come extrinsically from outside; and some perhaps belong to the six principles, which are said to come extrinsically from outside.¹ So there is no change toward a new relation in the category of relation, because it only arises *de novo* because of a newness in the absolute in either extreme; for it is always a respect in the first or second way [nn.57-58].

61. However there can be a change toward a respect coming extrinsically from outside, without newness of any absolute in what it is in or in the terms; indeed there can be motion as well toward this sort of respect, because according to Aristotle *Physics* 5.2.226a18-26, when he says there is no motion in relation [n.54], he says that motion is *per se* to a ‘where’, and yet ‘where’^a does not state an absolute form but only a respect in a body contained in a containing place; and this respect belongs to the above stated mode [sc. the third].

a. [*Interpolation*] the ‘where’, of which he is speaking, since it only arises because of a newness of some absolute in either extreme, is also always in the first or second of the stated modes [nn.57-58]. But as to relation disposed in the third way – because it arises extrinsically, that is, does not necessarily point to an intrinsic foundation, namely to quantity or quality or substance, but follows contingently without newness of any absolute in that in which it is or in the term – there can be change toward this relation; and some such relations perhaps belong to the six classes or principles which are said to come extrinsically from outside. Hence, even according to Aristotle, there is motion toward a ‘where’.

II. To the Principal Arguments

A. To the Common Arguments

62. To the arguments.

To the first [n.2] I say that what is infinite is not combinable as a part, because the whole is more perfect than the part and nothing is more perfect than the infinite; the infinite can however be united to, that is, it is able to be the term of the dependence on it of something else.

¹ Vatican editors: The *Book of Six Principles* ch.1 n.14, divides Aristotle's ten categories into two groups: the first four (substance, quantity, quality, relation) it says are respects that come intrinsically from inside; the remaining six (action, passion, when, where, position, having) it says are respects that come extrinsically from outside; and the book deals only with these six; Scotus 4 d.13 q.1 n.9, *Quodlibet* q.11 n.13.

63. And when the addition is made there [not in the *Ordinatio*, but in the *Lectura* 3 d.1 n.3] that ‘the infinite cannot be added to, therefore neither can it be united to’, I reply that the infinite does not have in itself any entity formally, but virtually or eminently, and so human nature, the way the Word does not have human nature in himself, can be added to the Word, that is, such a nature may formally depend on the Word; but human nature as it is in the Word eminently or virtually does not in this way depend on the Word, because it does not in this way have dependent entity.

64. To the second [n.3], a proportion, that is, a determinate relation, is conceded, but not a quantitative one, the sort that is said to be of double to half or of one quantity to another; rather, the sort conceded is said to be generally of passive to active and, conversely, of active to passive or of act to potency; but human nature is able, with a special dependence, to be dependent in respect of a divine person, and this dependence is a sufficient proportion for such union.

65. To the third [n.4] I say that contraries are incompossible not because they are diverse – that is, agree in nothing – (for in this way things diverse in genus are more diverse than contraries), but because, even though they agree in many things, there is a repugnance in them; and this sort of repugnance is not between things that agree in nothing or in little; so divine and human nature, although they are more diverse than contraries, are nevertheless not more repugnant. An example: surface and whiteness are more diverse than white and black, and yet a surface can be white, though white cannot formally be black, or conversely, because of their formal repugnance.

66. To the fourth [n.5] I say that some undergoing corresponds to the incarnation act, whereby it is an act passing over to another; but this undergoing is not signified, properly speaking, by ‘to be incarnated’, but by ‘to be united’ or ‘to be assumed’ – for this action, as it passes over to an object, passes over to human nature, not to the Word; and so what, on the part of human nature, corresponds to the act is an undergoing. Although formally and grammatically, therefore, ‘to be incarnated’ seems to indicate the undergoing of the action ‘to incarnate’, yet ‘to be assumed’ signifies the undergoing really in the nature united, which undergoing is more properly signified by ‘to be united’ or ‘to be assumed’; and I concede that the nature assumed does undergo, and is in a state of potency

B. To the Special Arguments

1. To the Argument on the Part of the Nature that is United

67. To the special argument on the part of the nature assumed [n.6] I say that human nature per se existing is not made complete by the same thing as is person by created personhood, because in the third article [nn.36-39] it was said that person does not ultimately exist by anything positive; but the nature per se exists, speaking of the proper existence of nature, by created positive existence.

68. To the first proof of the assumption [n.7], when the assertion is made that ‘its existence is per se existence’, I concede it in the sense that ‘to exist per se’ is distinguished from ‘to exist in’ (which is proper to accidents). But when the assumption is made that ‘per se existence in intellectual nature is personhood’, I deny it when universally taking ‘per se’ in the above sense, namely as it is distinguished from to exist per se in another, because there is required for personality the ultimate in absence or

negation of actual and aptitudinal dependence on a person of another nature; but not everything that per se exists in the prior way (as it is distinguished from accident) need per se exist in this second way.

69. As to the second proof [n.8], it is plain that created nature is a ‘this’ by something positive, but not by something the same formally as the entity of nature, because repugnance to being divided does not belong to created nature save through some positive entity; but there is no need thus to posit, over and above that entity of singularity, some other positive entity of personhood.

2. To the Arguments on the Part of that which Assumes

70. [To the first] – As to the next argument [n.9], he who would say that person differs only in idea from essence would have this argument [n.9] against him; but there is some positive distinction between nature and personal property, as is plain from I d.2 nn.388-410. But if the first position is taken [sc. person and essence differ only in idea], one could still reply to the argument [n.9] on the ground of fallacy of amphiboly (see 1 d.26 nn.52, 73, 78-77, about ‘absolute persons’).

71. [To the second] – To the next argument [n.10], as to the part that ‘a respect does not terminate the dependence of an absolute nature’, the response is made [by William of Ware] that a divine person, insofar as he is relative, does terminate the dependence on him of a created nature – and that in two kinds of cause, namely efficient and formal cause:

The first is clear thus, that the Word assumes, that is, ‘takes to himself’, but the other persons do not do so; and further, because to be incarnated is to ‘descend on’ in a special way, and descending on pertains to efficient causality; and because the Word is the operative power of the Father, and so can have a proper operation beside that which is common to the whole Trinity.

72. The second is clear because the Word is the formal cause for the reason that he terminates formally; but he terminates insofar as he is a relative person, such that the relative property is the reason for the terminating; so he should not be understood to be the formal cause in this sense, that he is the other part of a composite, or that he is a formal cause supervening on a composition, or that he is the exemplar form (because this is common to the whole Trinity), but that he is the formal cause formally terminating – that is giving – the form specifically to the distance that is between the nature united and himself as term.

73. Against what is said about the proper efficiency of the Word [n.71], that it is not common to the whole Trinity, there are the authorities adduced by the Master in the text [3 d.1 ch.3 n.2], that the whole Trinity operated the incarnation equally.

74. And if you say [William of Ware] that there is some special mode of acting in the Word by which he is said to instantiate a nature in a different way from that in which the Father and Holy Spirit instantiate it – on the contrary:

In actions directed outwardly there is no distinction in the three persons in their acting, save that which follows the origin, namely that one person acts from himself, another not from himself but from another; but this distinction is not the reason that some person, as the Son, is said to assume human nature, or to be the person of the nature, and not another person, because if the Father were incarnated and the Trinity effected the

incarnation, this distinction would exist in their operating just as it does now, because the Father would act from himself and the Son not from himself.

75. Besides a personal respect cannot be the proper reason for acting outwardly (as is clear in 1 d.18 on Gift, and d.27 on the Word [the first is not in the *Ordinatio* but in the *Lectura*]).

76. Further, a created supposit does not act in respect of the nature it belongs to, because according to them [William of Ware and his followers], ‘nature naturally precedes the supposit, but not as actually acting’; therefore neither is that which supplies the place of the supposit, insofar as it does so, an agent with respect to such nature.

77. As to what is said second, about form [n.72], it seems to misuse the words ‘form’ or ‘formal cause’, because according to it the eternal Father – insofar as he is Father – would be the formal cause with respect to the Son, namely insofar as the Father terminates the relation of the Son to the Father.

78. As to what is also said there [n.72] about the supposit, that it has the idea of the whole and so has the idea of form (as the form is the whole, *Metaphysics* 5.26.1023b26-28) – the antecedent is false and the consequence null.

The first point is plain from what has been said, that person does not add any absolute entity over and above the singular nature, and therefore neither does the supposit in general do so, just as neither does person in intellectual nature [nn.55-56, 59, 69]; and consequently it is not the whole with respect to the singular nature.

79. Second, the proof has no validity [n.78]; for the whole is form for the reason that any part is as it were potential with respect to the perfection of the whole; in the issue at hand, however, the Word is not potential with respect to a quasi composite person. Also, if the Word ought to be this whole, the way Damascene² concedes the composite nature to be the Word, this is not true of ‘person taken absolutely according to personal entity’ when compared to the nature, but of ‘person in the nature’ when compared to the nature. The conclusion ought to be, then, that the Word was incarnate as form but not as formal cause; for if the entity of the supposit and of the nature with respect to the whole created entity are considered absolutely, the proper entity of the supposit is not formal with respect to the nature, but rather material.

80. But as to what is adduced for the statement ‘to assume is to take to oneself’ [n.71], I reply that ‘to take’, as it signifies action absolutely, belongs to the whole Trinity equally, without any distinction besides the one that follows origin; but ‘to oneself’, as it signifies the term of the action, signifies as it terminates the respect of the Word.

81. Likewise, as to what is said about ‘descend on’ [n.71] I reply that if that ‘descending’ is taken for some condition of the efficient or producing or conserving cause, the whole Trinity descends on the nature in the same way; but if it is taken for some other intimacy, of the sort that is of the supposit to the nature that depends on it, then in this way only the Word descends on, because he terminates the dependence of the nature. But this ‘descending on’ is not any efficiency but is a priority of an altogether different idea.

² *Orthodox Faith* ch.49: “We confess in Christ two natures, divine and human, agreeing with each other and united in hypostasis, but one perfect hypostasis composed of two natures; and we say that the two natures are also preserved after their union in one composite hypostasis, namely in one Christ, and that they truly exist.”

82. Also as to the addition that ‘the Word is the operative power of the Father’ [n.71], it is true that he acts otherwise than the Father as to the action that follows origin, namely the Father acts ‘from himself’ and the Son ‘not from himself but from another’, for which reason the Father creates through the Word and not conversely [2 d.1 n.33, 1 d.27 n.98]. But there is not, on account of this distinction, one person who as incarnate acts thus and another person who as non-incarnate does not act thus.

83. To the principal argument [n.10], therefore, I say that if a divine person is an absolute, the absolute terminates the dependence of the nature; but if it is a relative, although a relative as such cannot terminate a dependence that is of a caused thing to the cause, yet it can terminate a dependence that is of a different idea, namely the dependence that is on a supposit as supposit. So, in order to terminate the dependence, any entity is sufficient that can be the proper idea of a supposit, and such is this positive entity posited to be.

3. To the Argument on the Part of the Union

84. To the final argument [n.11] I say that the proposition is false, namely that ‘every dependence is of caused thing on cause or on prior caused thing’: for there is a dependence of a different idea from that, and it is not a dependence on something as that something has quiddity but as it is a subsistent being or a supposit; of such sort is the dependence here [cf. n.212 below].

Question Two

Whether the Three Persons can Assume Numerically the Same Nature

85. Second I ask whether the three persons can assume numerically the same nature.

86. That they can:

‘This nature’, before being assumed by some person, is assumable by any of them separately – so let them all act at the same instant for the assumption of it; therefore it is assumed either by all of them, and the conclusion is obtained, or by none of them, which is unacceptable if they are acting for the assumption of it as much as they can; or it is assumed by some single person, which is also unacceptable, for there is no more reason for it to be assumed by this person than by that, since each person is acting equally for the result.

87. Further, before the assumption of this nature by the Son, the nature was assumable by the Father; therefore it is assumable by him now.

88. Proof of the consequence:

For the nature was assumable initially because it was in obediential potency to the person of the Father, and this potency is not removed by the assumption of the nature to the person of the Son, because the personhood of the Son is not of the same idea as the personhood of the Father – or if it were of the same idea, there would not be the same obediential potency to the personhood of the Father as to that of the Son, just as neither are the persons to whom those potencies are referred the same; so the fact that one of the potencies is reduced to act does not reduce the other to act.

Besides, the nature existing in the Word has an inclination to its own supposit, because the inclination is natural to it – therefore it has an inclination to anything that is able to supply the place of its own supposit; the person of the Father is such; therefore, along with the nature's existing in the person of the Son, there remains its potentiality for existing in the person of the Father.

89. Further, the same accident can exist in two subjects; therefore the same nature can exist in two supposita. The proof of the consequence is that the relation of accident to subject is very similar to the relation of nature to supposit, as was said in the preceding question [nn.15-16]. – The proof of the antecedent is that a glorious and non-glorious body can exist together; therefore they have the same 'where', and this 'where' is an accident of the placed or located body. But the proof that it is the same 'where' is that it is the same place; the one place has one active circumscribing; therefore one passive circumscribed corresponds to it, which is the 'where'.

90. On the contrary:

Anselm *Incarnation of the Word* ch.9 and *Why God Man?* 2.9 says, "Several persons cannot assume the same man."

91. Further, if the created supposit is multiplied, so is the nature; therefore the like applies also to an uncreated supposit. The proof of the consequence is that the uncreated supposit supplies the place of the created supposit [n.18]; therefore it distinguishes the nature in the way the created supposit would.

92. Further, what belongs to something as it is distinct from another cannot belong to that other; the incarnation belongs to the Son as he is distinguished from the Father; therefore it cannot belong to the Father. The minor is plain, because the incarnation belongs to the Son according to that property of his [sc. Son-hood] by which he is distinguished from the Father.

- I. To the Question
- A. Opinion of Others
- 1. Exposition of the Opinion

93. Here the assertion is made [William of Ware] that the three persons can assume the same nature.

Because what is prior can exist without contradiction in the absence of the posterior, and consequently the prior can remain indistinct when a distinction is made in the posterior; but the idea of singularity or individuation in created nature is prior to the idea of person, as is plain, because the Word assumed an individual nature not yet existing in a person [n.32]; therefore it can remain the same individual nature although there are several personhoods extrinsic in respect of the nature.

94. Further, the distinction of relation is not a sufficient reason for distinguishing absolutes, as is plain from induction; therefore, since the distinction of divine persons is relational, there is, for this reason, no need for the absolute nature to be distinguished; but the [created] nature can be assumed by the three persons (as is plain); therefore it is possible for them to assume the nature without distinction in the nature.

95. Therefore is the assertion made that, just as the same soul can be in diverse parts of the body, and the same body can be miraculously in diverse places, so one nature

can exist at the same time in two supposit (when those supposit are extrinsic and not the same as the nature).

2. Weighing of the Opinion

96. Against this there is the following objection, that the divine essence is infinite from the fact it can be the same in three persons [1 d.2 nn.385-387], therefore this human nature would be infinite if it could be in several persons.

97. Proof of the consequence:

Because the reason it could be in two persons is an equal reason for it being also in infinite persons.

Also, if it could have at the same time several perfect uncreated personhoods, then it could have at the same time a created and an uncreated personhood, or several created personhoods, because there is no greater repugnance in a created and uncreated personhood existing together in one nature than in two uncreated personhoods existing together in it, each of which perfectly supplies the place of created personhood.

98. To the first of these reasons [n.97] the response is made that the divine essence is the same for the three persons, and its being infinite follows from this identity and not from the fact merely that it is at the same time in three persons; but the assumed human nature would not be the same for the three persons but extrinsic to them, although it would be in them at the same time.

A like response is made to the second reason [n.97]: the divine nature founds the three uncreated relations and personhoods, and from this follows its infinity; but the human nature extrinsic to them would not find them.

99. Against the first response the objection is that, just as a substantial form, which gives perfection of substance to several supposit, would be a substance actually unlimited, so an ensuing accident, which actually perfected the same supposit, would be an unlimited accident (an example: just as the soul is unlimited as to perfecting several substantial parts of the body, so its knowledge is an unlimited accident with respect to the parts of the body); therefore, just as the divine essence, because it is essentially the nature of three supposit, is the infinite quasi essential nature of them, so the human nature would be infinite, although it is a quasi extrinsic nature of several supposit.

100. There is a confirmation, that it seems as impossible for one accident to exist in two first subjects³ as it is for one substantial form to be in two matters; therefore, if infinity follow necessarily from the fact that one substantial form is in diverse matters, then infinity would follow necessarily from the fact that one accident is in many subjects. The antecedent is plain, because an accident is adequate to the first subject just as form is to matter – and more so, because the accident converts with the subject.

101. The second reason [n.98] is flawed: the point is clear about the will, which can found diverse relations, even relations of a different idea, and yet is finite; likewise, the same white thing can found many likenesses, and the same father many paternities, without infinity; the same nature too can found many created personhoods, even an infinity of them, because an infinity of them is no more repugnant to it than two are; and thus infinity follows.

³ Scotus *Metaphysics* 1 q.1 n.72, “That seems to be the first and proper subject to which the properties first belong that are per se considered in the science.”

B. Scotus' own Opinion

102. One can reply to the question by making a distinction, because the first term of this union can be either the person or the subsistent essence common to the three.

1. Whether the First Term of the Union is the Three Persons

103. It cannot be the case that the first term of this union is the three persons, because it does not seem that one nature could be assumed by three persons at the same time; for, in every essential dependence, one dependent thing precisely depends on only one thing that totally terminates its dependence; in this union the dependence is essential and belongs to one nature, and one person totally terminates it; therefore the same nature cannot depend in this way on several such persons.

104. The proof of the major, in the case of every dependence of a caused thing on the cause, is that it is impossible for the same caused thing to have, in the same genus of cause, several total causes on which it depends; for the result would be that then it would still exist when the cause on which it essentially depended did not exist. For if it has *a* as total efficient cause and likewise *b* along with it as total efficient cause, then it would be sufficiently caused by *a* when everything else was removed – otherwise *a* would not be its total cause; therefore the effect would come from *a* when *b* did not exist, and so it would not depend on *b*. Similarly contrariwise about *a*, if *b* is posited as total cause. Therefore if *a* is its total cause and *b* likewise, each and neither will be total cause. Thus does it seem to be in the case of all dependences, even those that are not of caused things on causes, for, since the dependence of anything will be totally terminated by a given thing, it cannot depend – with a dependence of the same nature – on something else [1 d.2 n.73].⁴ Confirmation comes from the case of accidents in relation to several first subjects.

105. The proof of the minor is that a created personhood would totally terminate the created nature, and – while that created personhood remained – the nature could not exist at the same time in another person (created or uncreated); because any personhood of a divine person would terminate the nature, and its dependence, no less than the nature would be terminated within itself [sc. by its created personhood]; therefore etc.

106. An objection against this is that it does not seem unacceptable for several relations of the same idea to exist in the same subject, as when the same white thing is similar to several white things; therefore likewise in the issue at hand it will not be unacceptable for the same absolute thing to depend on several persons by several

⁴ This argument, which Scotus presents more than once, seems unconvincing, for ‘total’ may be understood in two ways, as sufficient cause of an effect or as the cause without which the effect would not be. So let *a* and *b* each be sufficient for a certain effect and let both be present and active at once; then, if by total cause is meant sufficient cause, each is total cause even separately because each would cause the effect even in the absence of the other; if, on the other hand, by total cause is meant the cause without which the effect would not be, then only *a* and *b* together are total cause, because only when both are removed does the effect cease to be. But that *a* and *b* are only *together* total cause in the second sense does not mean that they cannot *separately* be total cause in the first sense. Scotus’ argument works only against total cause in the second sense, while his conclusion requires it to work against total cause in the first sense.

dependences of the same idea. But if the dependences are posited to be of a different idea, the conclusion will be got the more.

107. I reply that, just as not every relation, whereby it is a relation, is the same as the foundation (even if some relation is such, namely one that is first in foundation to the term and the foundation cannot in any way exist without this term, as was said in 2 d.1 nn.260-263, 266-267), so neither is there repugnance to relation whereby it is relation that several relations of the same idea should exist in the same thing; but there is a repugnance in the case of certain special relations, namely essential dependences; for these are such that, if one of them is dependent on a totally terminating term, the foundation does not leave it dependent with a like dependence on anything else, because then it would not be a terminated dependence.

2. Whether the First Term of the Union is the per se Existing Essence

108. If the union is understood in another way, namely that the first term of the union is the very nature per se subsistent in the three persons, then it seems possible that one [created] nature may be assumed by the three by the quasi-medium of the one essence existent in the three, just as one whiteness could be in three bodies if the one surface, on which the whiteness was, existed in three bodies.

109. Now it does seem that the per se existing essence itself could be the proximate term of the union, because the essence does not get being from the persons but it naturally is before it is in the persons and it gives being to the persons; for the nature is of itself a ‘this’ and per se existent, though not incomunicably; and it does seem that incomunicability may not necessarily be the proper reason for terminating the union but rather singular subsistence; but then such a [created] nature would only be a person with its own personhood mediately, because it would not be united to a person first.

II. To the Principal Arguments on Both Sides

110. To the principal arguments.

To the first [n.86] I say that, if all three persons were acting to the utmost of their power for the assumption of the nature, they could not act as terms of three assumptions but would act for the assumption of it by some one person who terminates it; so that, although the three are acting, nevertheless one terminates it. And when you ask, ‘by whom then would it be assumed?’, I say by the one to whom the three actively unite it.

And if you say that each person can act at the same time to unite it to himself, I deny it, both because it is incompossible for the nature to be united to two persons at the same time, and because it is impossible for the nature to depend totally with a dependence of the same idea on several persons, since it is of a nature to be terminated by one person; and the persons cannot perform incompossible things at the same time.

111. To the second [nn.87-88] I say that if there is one obediential potency in the created nature whereby it can be united to the three (that is, to any of the three disjunctively), this potency has been reduced to act by the Word’s instantiation of the nature. But if there are three potencies, I concede that one potency’s being reduced to act does not reduce another to act; and the other potency can be reduced to act, but not along with the act of another potency, because of the incompossibility of the acts (just as a

potency for whiteness cannot be reduced to act along with blackness). And so the nature that is now given personhood by the Word could, if it were let go by the Word, be assumed by the Father; but as long as actual assumption by the Word remains, then, although the nature is in potency to assumption by the Father, yet the potency cannot be reduced to act because of the incompossibility of this act with that one.

112. As to the third [n.89], I deny the assumption about accident and first subjects. In proof I say that there are two ‘wheres’ and yet both from one circumscribing place. And when it says that ‘one place has one active circumscribing’, I say that if place is something formally absolute, in which is founded, not action, but the relation that is signified by way of action (as circumscribing action), then two circumscribings for two circumscribed bodies can be founded in the same absolute thing, or there can be one absolute for the two passive circumscribings, which are called the ‘wheres’. But if place states formally a relation to the located and materially founded thing on which the relation is founded, then there is one material place – because of its unity – but two locations formally, and in each way are active and passive circumscription multiplied or co-multiplied.

113. To the first argument for the opposite [n.90] one can say that Anselm’s remark applies when the first term of the union is the person, and in this way the nature has already been assumed, for the three persons cannot so assume the same nature.

114. As to the other argument [n.91], it is conclusive when the uncreated supposit is the first and proximate term of the union, but not when it is the mediate term, because then the one assumed nature, because of the unity of that to which it is first united, can be in many suppositis; nor does it belong to the assumed nature to be of itself and immediately in the three, but only through the infinite nature to which it is first united.

And if the argument is brought against this, as it was against the first opinion [n.99], that an accident existing in many persons is unlimited, just as the substance existing in the several persons is an unlimited substance – one can say that this is true when an accident gives some formal act to the things of which it is the accident; but this assumed nature, if it is first united to the essence, does not give any act to the persons or to the essence, but only depends on the essence as on one first term, to which the existence in three persons is incidental (just as now all creatures depend – by dependence of caused on cause – on the three persons as they are one in nature; and the caused is not posited as unlimited because of this dependence of the caused on the three persons, but it is posited as an unlimited caused by reason of the one first term). The argument then about the unlimitedness of the accident [n.99] is not conclusive, unless of course the accident bestows act – and this argument is not at issue in the matter to hand; hence neither does the argument have much validity against the first opinion, but it has to be solved there the way it is here, although it is contrary to the response given there [n.98].

115. To the third [n.92] the response is that instantiating the [created] nature does not belong to the Son as he is distinguished from the Father but as he is ‘this existing God’.

III. To the Arguments for the Opinion of Others

116. To the arguments for the opinion:

Although [n.93] individuation can be prior to personhood, yet it does not follow that individuation can be one and the same as several personhoods; for then this same conclusion could be drawn about created persons, with respect to whom individuation is naturally prior; nor can just anything prior remain indistinct along with the distinction of just anything posterior, especially when the distinction of the posterior entails in the prior something repugnant to it if it remains the same.

117. To the next [n.94] I say that although a distinction in relation does not cause a distinction in the absolute that founds the relation, yet it can cause a distinction in the absolute that naturally follows the relation and depends on it, because a distinction in a prior is sufficient for causing distinction in a posterior; but this absolute [created] nature would not precede the relations but follow them, and so, according to them [William of Ware and his followers] the persons would be distinct.

118. The examples [n.95] about the soul in diverse parts of the body and about one body in diverse places are not to the purpose, because nothing incompossible (with the informing soul or with a located body) is contained in those examples as there is here in the issue at hand.

IV. Objection to Scotus' Opinion and its Solution

119. But there is an argument against the second part of the solution [nn.108-109]: for it is asked what unity the assumption would be made to in that part [Bonaventure].⁵ Not to the unity of the nature, because then the nature assumed would be the same as the nature assuming; nor to the unity of the person, because *ex hypothesi* the person is not the term of the union but the essence is [n.109]; therefore the assumption would not be made to any unity.

120. I reply and say that the assumption would be to a unity, not of identity or of composition, but of union of this nature with that; and thus the union would be a special dependence of nature on nature, like the one that now exists of nature on person. So when you say [n.119], ‘if the assumption were to the unity of the nature, then the nature assumed would be one with the nature assuming’, I say that one should not concede the assumption is to the unity of the nature, but that there is only there a union with the nature, and only an assumption to the unity of union of nature with nature; for when ‘unity of nature’ is spoken of, then the term ‘unity’ – by the force of the [grammatical] construction – is taken for ‘unity of identity’ or ‘unity of composition’, and neither of these is present there. But ‘unity’ is not taken in this way when something is said to be assumed ‘to the unity of person’, for – by the force of the construction in this case – ‘unity’ is taken for ‘unity of union’ [cf. 1 d.2 n.403].

⁵ *Sentences* 3 d.1 a.1 q.3, “If it be said that the three persons assume one and the same man, a contradiction is involved in every way, whether the assumption is understood to be to the unity of nature or to the unity of person. For if such assumption is made to the unity of nature, then one nature is constituted from the divine and the human nature; therefore there is no distinction between the assumer and the assumed and so no true assumption. But if the assumption is to the unity of person, then the several persons communicate together in one person; therefore the several persons are not several persons... Because of this implied contradiction, then, it is neither possible nor intelligible for several persons to assume one and the same nature.”

121. On the contrary [Bonaventure]:⁶ just as this inference holds, ‘the person is the first term of the union, therefore the nature is assumed into unity of person’, so does this inference seem to hold, ‘the nature is the first term of the union, therefore the thing assumed is united in unity of nature’.

122. I reply that, although the consequences ‘therefore it is united in unity of nature’ and ‘therefore it is united in unity of person’ do not equally follow (although indeed this latter consequence does follow, because the consequent, by force of the construction of ‘unity’ with ‘person’, signifies the same as the antecedent), yet the second consequence [sc. second in n.121] does not hold, because the antecedent signifies that ‘nature’ is the term of the union but the consequent signifies unity of ‘identity’ of nature with nature or of person with person, or it signifies ‘composition’ of nature with nature. Hence the tacit assumption in one of the enthymemes⁷ [n.121] is true, namely this one, ‘what is united to the person is united to the unity or into the unity of the person’; but the tacit assumption in the second consequence is false, namely this one, ‘what is united to the nature is united to the unity or into the unity of the nature’.

Nor is there a real difficulty here but only a grammatical one; for in reality the unity of person is not formally communicated to the assumed nature but only to it as a term of dependence, just as neither is the unity of nature – if nature were the term of the union – formally communicated to the assumed nature; nor even is some third composite thing made from the assuming person and the assumed nature, just as not from nature and nature either; but there is only a different mode of speaking when saying ‘unity of nature’ and ‘unity of person’, because in the first, from the mode of speaking, unity of identity or of composition is indicated, but in the second the locution only indicates union with the person as with the term.

Question Three *Whether One Person can Assume Several Natures*

123. Whether one person can assume several natures.

124. That he cannot:

Because then he would be either one man or several men. But not one, because there would not be one nature; nor several, because there are not several supposita. – The first consequence is proved by the fact that the three persons are one God. The second by the fact that a knower of several sciences is one knower, because of unity of suppositum.

⁶ *Sentences* 3 d.5 a.1 q.1, “When the action of assuming terminates at some unity, then the ‘assume’ stated of something signifies not only union but also that the union terminates at the unity of the assumer. And since the union does not terminate at the unity of nature but rather at the unity of person, therefore ‘to assume’ does not belong to the divine nature; for the divine nature did not assume the human nature into the unity of nature; and so in this way it is not conceded that the divine nature assumed it, that is, took it to itself or to its own unity. But if the term of the assuming has regard to the relation of union, then it is conceded that the divine nature assumed the human nature, that is, united it with itself; for it did unite human nature to itself, although not in the divine nature itself but in one person.”

⁷ Peter of Spain, *Tractatus* tr.5 n.3, “An enthymeme is an imperfect syllogism, that is, a speech in which, when not all the propositions have been set down beforehand, a conclusion is hurriedly inferred.”

125. Further, nature gets unity and numerability from the supposit, because a nature in abstraction from individuals is not enumerated; therefore if there is one supposit, there is one nature.

126. On the contrary:

Another nature could have been assumed if the one assumed was not assumed; therefore this other nature can be assumed now. The proof of the consequence is that the potency of the other nature is not reduced to act because the one assumed was assumed; nor does the relation on the part of the Word have this assumed nature as adequate to it in idea of terminated dependent thing on terminating independent thing, because as a universal rule, although one caused thing cannot depend totally on several total causes, yet one cause can well terminate totally the dependence of many caused things; therefore etc.

I. To the Question

127. I reply that, since another nature could have a dependence of this idea just as does the assumed nature, and can even have it at the same time – for there is no repugnance either on the part of the natures (for the dependence of one nature is not repugnant to the dependence of another nature) or on the part of the Word (because only relations of reason are hereby posited in him, or no relations of reason, but only the fact that he terminates several real relations at himself – and this is not impossible, just as the whole Trinity terminates all the relations of creatures [2 d.1 nn.44, 48]) – therefore there is no reason for the impossibility or incompossibility of the assumption of another nature, even when the assumed nature remains united.

II. To the Principal Arguments

128. To the first argument [n.124] the response is made [Richard of Middleton] that he would be neither one man nor several.

But on the contrary: ‘one’ and ‘many’ are opposites that divide being immediately; therefore one or other opposite is also immediately true of ‘this being which is man’, so that if it is a man it must be one man or several, otherwise it would not be a man. The like is proved by the terms ‘one’ and ‘not-one’, which are contradictories about any subject, and something ‘not-one’ in being is necessarily ‘many’.

129. Another response is made [Thomas Aquinas]⁸ that he would be ‘one man’ because of unity of supposit, just as ‘one knower’ is, though he knows many sciences.

But against this is that then a concrete thing of this sort should be multiplied because of the multiplication of supposita, and so the several divine persons would be several Gods.

130. Therefore I speak in a third way, as was done in 1 d.12 n.46, that Father and Son are ‘one inspiriter’ and yet not ‘one inspiriting’ but ‘two inspiriting’.⁹

⁸ ST IIIa q.3 a.7 ad.2, “A name imposed because of some form is never stated by us in the plural unless there is a plurality of supposita; for a man who is wearing two garments is not said to be two wearers but one wearer with two garments, and a man who has two qualities is said to be in the singular a man qualified by two qualities... And therefore if a divine person assumed two human natures he would, because of unity of supposit, be called one man having two human natures.”

131. On the contrary: to be a man is to be a person; therefore to be several men is to be several persons. The proof of the consequence is that, as singular entails singular, so plural entails plural [1 d.12 n.43].

See the response [1 d.12 n.47].¹⁰

132. To the other argument [n.125] I say that, just as singularity precedes the idea of supposit, so a plurality of natures can stand in the same supposit.

Henry of Ghent responds differently, and responds well.¹¹

Question Four

Whether a Created Supposit can Hypostatically Instantiate a Different Created Nature than the One that it Has

133. Whether a created supposit can hypostatically instantiate a different created nature than the one that it has.

That it can:

A created nature has a greater proportion to a created supposit than to an uncreated one, both because each in this case is finite while in the other case one is finite

⁹ Scotus' point would therefore seem to be that if one divine person assumed two human natures he would be one person being two men, or one person doing two 'man-izings'. At any rate in the cited n.46 he says, "Everything dependent depends on something altogether and simply independent (for never is the dependence of anything sufficiently terminated save at something altogether independent), and therefore when things are equally dependent, neither is of a nature to terminate the other, but both would depend on some third, independent thing; an adjective is dependent on a substantive. When, therefore, an adjective is added to a substantive, an independent thing is found, at any rate where its dependence is terminated, – but when two adjectives are added mutually to each other, neither depends on the other, because neither is terminated at the other but both depend on some third thing, which sufficiently terminates the dependence of both. Therefore when a numerical term is added to a substantive, as when it is said 'two inspiriters', at once the numerical adjectival term has a substantive terminating it, because the adjective is determining that which terminates its dependence; therefore the signification of its substantive is denoted as numbered. But when it is added to an adjective, as when it is said there are 'two inspiriting', both are dependent and therefore neither determines the other just as neither terminates the dependence of the other, but both depend on a third thing which terminates their dependence and is determined by them."

¹⁰ "n.47. Hence, as to this consequence 'there are two inspiriting, therefore there are two inspiriters', – I deny it. And when you prove it 'because as a singular implies a singular, so a plural implies a plural' [n.43], I say that it is not necessary – if on some antecedent some consequent follows – that on a distinction in the antecedent a distinction in the consequent follows, except when the consequent is distinguished in the antecedents as a genus is distinguished in its species. But in the proposed case the inspiriting suppositos are distinguished, and on 'inspiriting supposit' there follows 'inspiriter', but this consequent is not distinguished or numbered by the numbered antecedent; and therefore, by arguing 'inspiriting, therefore inspiriter, – therefore if there are two inspiriting, then there are two inspiriters' there is a fallacy of the consequent, arguing from a distinction in the antecedent to a distinction in the consequent."

¹¹ *Summa* a.29 q.7, "Although a simple form, as it is a certain essence, is divisible into several suppositos, yet, as it has singularity, it is altogether indivisible – just as 'this singular man', according to his singular form of 'this humanity', cannot be at all divided." a.25 q.3 arg.4, "A designated supposit, as it is a designated supposit..., is in no way multipliable – just as if Socrates were man by the very designation by which he is Socrates, then, just as what Socrates is in reality cannot be 'several Socrateses', so the nature by which he is a man cannot be 'several men'."

and the other infinite, and because this [created] person is absolute and so is like the person that is of a nature to belong to this [created] nature, while a divine person is relative; therefore, if a divine relative person can instantiate a nature other than his own, or can instantiate several created natures, then much more can a created absolute person do so.

134. Further, God can give a creature any limited perfection that is not repugnant to the creature; but ‘a supposit of one nature being able to instantiate another created nature’ does not posit infinity in the supposit; therefore it does not posit repugnance either. The proof of the minor is that the supposit and the nature are finite, and a finite added to a finite does not make an infinite.

135. Further, a superior contains the inferior in a limited nature; therefore the perfection of a superior nature contains the perfection of an inferior nature; therefore it can supply the place of the supposit of an inferior nature.¹²

136. On the contrary:

A created nature and a created supposit are equal proportionals; therefore neither exceeds the other; therefore, just as the nature cannot be the same for three suppositis, so not the other way round either.

II. To the Question

137. I reply:

‘To instantiate a nature’ can be taken in two ways: as efficient causality, and as formal causality or terminatively. In the first way the whole Trinity instantiates the human nature in Christ, that is, makes it to be instantiated; in the second way only the Word instantiates the union of the created nature with himself.

A. On the First Way of Instantiating, that is by Efficient Causality

138. In the first way I say that a created supposit cannot instantiate a nature other than its own, because the other nature is only in obediential potency to such a union with Christ, for otherwise it would exist by violence in its own supposit (as a heavy thing going upwards); obediential potency in creatures has regard to the efficiency of the first efficient cause and not to any other active power.

B. On the Second Way of Instantiating, namely Terminatively

139. In the second way it is said [William of Ware] that a created supposit cannot instantiate another nature because it is not an unlimited supposit, and so it does not contain in itself the perfection of another supposit; for to contain eminently the whole perfection of a created supposit belongs only to something infinite, for although one finite thing may be more eminent than another finite thing, yet the one does not contain the whole perfection of the other, because beings essentially ordered would seem to be

¹² Tr. The point seems to be that a human nature and supposit together, as in this particular man Socrates, are superior to a human nature simply without supposit; therefore this particular man Socrates can supply what is lacking to that nature; therefore he can supply the supposit to it.

distinguished only by negation, in that the inferior falls short of the superior; therefore etc.^a

a. [Text canceled by Scotus] Further, to terminate the dependence of caused on cause is a mark of greater perfection than is this perfection [sc. containing the whole perfection of a created supposit] which belongs to God; this greater perfection, without God's unlimitedness, can belong to a creature (as in the case of substance with respect to accident). [sc. so that if the greater perfection is limited in the creature, even more so must the lesser perfection be limited].

140. But this reason [n.139] does not seem conclusive, because the Word is not infinite as to the idea of his personhood, according to which he instantiates the assumed nature; therefore unlimitedness or infinity is not required in the supposit for it thus to instantiate an assumed nature. The assumed proposition here is plain, because then [sc. if the Son were infinite as to his personhood] some infinite perfection that is in the Son would be formally lacking to the Father.

141. Another reason is put forward [William of Ware], that only God can descend upon a creature by a general descending; therefore only he can descend by this special descending [sc. the descending of the incarnation].

142. But this reason is not conclusive, because the general descending includes in it the primacy of efficient cause within the descender [1 d.19 n.64]; but not so this instantiating of nature by supposit, as is plain in the example to which this instantiating is most similar, namely the instantiating of accident by subject, because although the subject instantiates its proper accident, yet it does not have the primacy of efficient causality with respect to it, nor does it have any causality insofar precisely as it instantiates it.

143. One can therefore say:

Either created natures are not unitable in the same supposit unless one is act and the other potency, and then neither nature remains in itself save as mixed with the other; but what belongs to this union [sc. a union of two human natures in one human supposit] is that the nature of the proper supposit of the assumer remains as unmixed in itself, though combined with the other, as if it did not exist in the extraneous nature.

144. Or the supposit, with which this union is made, must be simply independent, because the dependence [sc. of the nature] is not terminated at one supposit by means of another supposit; but there is no essential order in this dependence of the sort there is in the order of caused to cause.

145. Or it can be said in a third way that all created substantial natures are simply incompossible in the same supposit, so that if one of them were natural to the supposit and per se belonged to it, then another could neither per se nor per accidens exist in it. But two created natures are not thus incompossible when compared to a divine supposit, to which both are accidental and extrinsic, because neither belongs per se to a divine supposit.

146. Now the first of these [n.143], namely that all created natures, when united in a third thing, constitute a third thing, is difficult to prove.

147. The second [n.144], namely that what terminates this dependence ought thus to be independent, does not seem to be true, because there is some thing that terminates

another dependence – as a subject terminates the dependence of an accident – which yet is not altogether independent.

148. The third [n.145] does not seem probable, because if there is a formal repugnance among created natures in the same supposit, then they seem as incapable of belonging to the same supposit at the same time per accidens as belonging to it at the same time per se; for just as the same thing cannot be per se white and per se black, so neither can it be per accidens white and per accidens black.^a If therefore no reason for impossibility can be found that makes a created supposit unable to instantiate a nature extraneous to it, yet God causes this dependence in a nature thus united and instantiated and in a supposit of a different nature [sc. in the case of the incarnation], it does not seem one should posit this to be impossible [sc. in the case of a created supposit] without any reason.

a. [*Interpolation*] For just as no same color can be white and black at the same time, so no same body can be white and black at the same time, because things that are repugnant formally of themselves at the same time, will be repugnant as to existing in anything at the same time.

II. To the Principal Arguments when Holding to the Negative Side of the Question

149. To the first argument [n.133] I say that a proportion of agreement is not required for this union, but the proportion of dependent nature to independent supposit is, and this sort of proportion is perhaps not in a created nature to a created supposit but is in an uncreated supposit. And as to the confirmation about the absolute in created nature, I say that absoluteness does not make the instantiation but only the fact that the person is independent, not being of a nature to be act or potency with respect to another unitable thing – which would not be the way it is here.

150. To the next [n.134] I say that although both opposites are limited, yet they cannot both be in the same thing at the same time; even if this does not entail unlimitedness in them formally, nevertheless it does entail incompossibility; so if one nature – existing per se in a supposit – is repugnant to another nature which may be there per accidens, then these two cannot at the same time come to be because of their incompossibility, but not because of the fact that they are unlimited.

151. To the third [n.153] I say that not every superior contains the perfection of an inferior.

III. To the Argument for the Opposite when Holding to the Affirmative Side of the Question

152. If the other side is held, one can say to the argument for the opposite [n.136] that there is not so precisely a proportion there that a created supposit cannot terminate the dependence of another nature; however a nature cannot depend at the same time on several terminating supposita, because as a universal rule, in the case of dependences of cause and caused, although one cause can terminate the dependence of several caused things, yet several causes in the same genus and order of cause cannot terminate the

dependence of one caused thing, because a plurality of the prior argues a plurality of the posterior, but not conversely.

Second Part
On the Fact of the Incarnation
Single Question

Whether the Formal Reason of Being the Term for the Union of the Human Nature with the Word is the Word's Relative Property

153. Having looked at the possibility of the incarnation in general [supra q.1] and in particular [supra qq.2-4], I ask about the fact of it, namely about the formal term of the incarnation, and whether the formal reason of being the term for the union of the human nature with the Word is the Word's relative property.

154. That it is not I show in two ways:

First because not the personal property but the essence does the terminating, for terminating the union belongs to the Word for the reason that containing the perfection of the created supposit belongs to the Word, and for the reason that^a created nature is in perfect obedience and potency of obedience to the Word (for these reasons are the ones assigned on the part of the assumer and on the part of the nature assumed for the possibility of the incarnation); but these features belong to the Word through the essence and not through any idea of the person, which is not formally infinite, because the personal property does not contain formally the perfection of every supposit, nor is there in the creature a potency of obedience to the person, but this potency has regard to the omnipotence of the maker, and this is not a personal but an essential property.

a. [Interpolation] About the fifth question, which presupposes the possibility of the incarnation and asks about the fact of it – the formal term of the incarnation –, whether the formal reason of terminating the union of the human nature at the Word is the relative property of the word; and the argument is that it is not, because terminating the union belongs to the Word through that through which containing the perfection of the created supposit belongs to the Word and through that through which...

155. Further, the one assuming communicates existence to the assumed nature; but existence in divine reality is an essential property; therefore something essential, which is precisely the reason for existing, is the reason for communicating to the human nature its dependence on the Word.

156. Second, I show that the relative property of the Word does not do the terminating because the Word formally terminates the union by that by which the Word is formally ‘this person’ (if the person is the first term of the union); but he is not ‘this person’ by a relative property.^a

a. [Interpolation], because then this person would exist per accidens, for he would be constituted by something in a different category; therefore etc.

157. But that a relative property is not ‘this person’ nor terminates it I prove by the reasons that were adduced for this opinion in 1 d.26 nn.32-55, 60-64, 66.

158. On the contrary:

One person and not another does the assuming; therefore he assumes through that by which he is ‘this person’, distinct and determinate. But this property is only a relative one, according to Anselm *On the Procession of the Holy Spirit* ch.2,¹³ where, in maintaining that the Holy Spirit is from the Son, he argues by way of division: the Holy Spirit is either from the Father or from the essence; if the first is granted, the conclusion is obtained, because nothing is there obtained but the property of the supposit or the common essence; if the division is immediate and, by destroying one member of it the other is inferred, then – if the conclusion does not follow – a fallacy of the consequent is committed [cf. Scotus, *Lectura* 3 d.1 n.174].

159. If it be said that, just as by the phrase ‘from one God’ he [Anselm] understands something common to the three persons, namely inspiriting power, which was an absolute power for the whole time (as the doctors commonly expound Anselm), so by the phrase ‘from relation’ he understands something proper to the person of the Father (whether something relative or something absolute), and thus, if an absolute property is being posited, then he understands by the phrase ‘from the essence of the Father’ that the Holy Spirit is inspirited from some absolute proper to the Father (if there is one) as from some property of the Father – then on the contrary:

160. Augustine in *On the Trinity* 7.9 n.11 says that under ‘essence’ is contained whatever is a ‘for itself’, whether it is essential – common to the three – or personal. For he proves there that a person is called ‘person’ and ‘God’ by virtue of the same thing, even though ‘person’ is taken for first substance [cf. 1 d.26 nn.60-61]; but he is not God by that by which he is Father, according to Augustine, but he is God by one thing and Father by another. Therefore a personal property – if it is absolute – is not understood under relation of person but rather under something common that is a ‘for itself’.

161. Further, if the person of the Word is constituted by something absolute, then Arius’ argument will be a demonstrative proof; for when Arius argued that ‘to be unbegotten is one thing and to be begotten another, and both are said according to substance, therefore the first person is different in substance from the second person’ – this conclusion necessarily follows if person is posited as something absolute; for an absolute constitutes substance and not relation, and so that which is other as to this

¹³ “It is openly shown that the Holy Spirit proceeds from the Son when it is said that ‘he proceeds from God’, because the Son is God. For I ask whether the Holy Spirit is understood to be from the Father for the reason that he is from God, or understood to be from God for the reason that he is from the Father. For although either of these may in turn be proved by the other (for if the Holy Spirit is from the Father, then he is from God, and if he is from God, then he is from the Father, since none of the aforesaid relations prevents this), yet it is not the case that either is in turn the cause of the other... One must believe and confess that the Holy Spirit is for this reason from the Father that he is from God; now the Father is not God more than the Son is, but the one sole true God is Father and Son; therefore, if the Holy Spirit is from the Father because he is from God who is Father, then it cannot be denied that he is also from the Son since he is from the God who is Son.” William of Auxerre, *Summa* 1 tr.8 ch.7, “Anselm of Canterbury replies that the Holy Spirit does not proceed from the Father and the Son insofar as they are divided but insofar as they are one, because he proceeds from them insofar as they are God... We say with Anselm, therefore, that the Holy Spirit does not proceed from the Father and the Son as they are divided but as they are one able-to-inspirit God.”

property is other as to substance; but the unbegotten is other as to this property; therefore he is also other as to substance.

162. If it be said that Arius' argument commits the sophism of figure of speech in two ways:

First because it changes a 'relative to' into a 'what' by arguing that 'unbegotten is other than begotten, that is, it is other as unbegotten, therefore it is other in substance'; for it changes a 'relative to' [sc. 'unbegotten'] into a 'what' [sc. 'substance'] (as Augustine shows because 'unbegotten' formally states a 'relative to', although negatively);

Second because, if 'unbegotten' is not taken for the property itself which it signifies but for the absolute property that underlies it (if such a property is posited, let it be called *a*), and if the argument is: 'unbegotten is other than begotten in person, therefore it is other than it in substance', then there is a fallacy of figure of speech, by change of a 'some this' [sc. 'unbegotten'] into a 'what' [sc. 'substance']; for in the premise otherness in property of first substance is understood, and in the conclusion otherness as second substance or as quiddity is understood, for this is how Arius understood it (because he himself said that the Son of God is a pure creature and has a different substance and a different nature from the Father) – and in this way does Augustine confront him, *On the Trinity* 5.3 n.4, that if the three persons are a something in substance, then this is only understood of second substance, that is, of quiddity (and in this way do Augustine and the heretics he is speaking against take substance); and therefore to infer otherness in substance, as the Arians do, from otherness of supposit, which is first substance, is to change a 'some this' into a 'what'.

If response is made in either of the above two ways to Arius' argument, namely that it is sophistical – on the contrary: first substance is substance most of all; therefore, if person is constituted by something absolute, person will thereby be most of all substance – and thus, if a person is other in this respect, he will be most of all other in substance.

163. Further, there are other arguments for this conclusion, which were touched on in 1 d.26 nn.24-27, on behalf of the side that says 'relations constitute the persons'.

I. To the Question

164. In these question there are two articles: first, what is the property that constitutes a person; second, whether this property is the reason of terminating the union.

A. What the Property is that Constitutes a Person

1. Reasons and Responses of those who Think that the Persons are Constituted by Relations

165. [Special reasons] – This first point was touched on in 1 d.26 nn.15-31; but special reasons are put forward that the persons cannot be absolute properties.

The first is as follows: if this [absolute] property did constitute the persons, it would not exist merely potentially or virtually in God, because then he would not be more 'this person' than an ass (for God includes the perfection of an ass virtually in himself); therefore it must be in him actually; therefore it is in him as act (both as that

which gives being and as absolute act). So there would be three absolutes in divine reality, which is unacceptable.

166. Further second thus: let the absolute property be called *a*; therefore, if *a* makes a unity with the essence, the one is act and the other potency, and the one is the perfection of the other; essence does not perfect the personal property, because it does not presuppose it but vice versa; therefore the absolute personal property will be the perfection of the essence. And then two unacceptable results follow: one, that the essence is not in itself wholly perfect; the other, that one person is not wholly perfect, because he does not have the absolute property of another person (which property, from what was just said, is a perfection).

167. And if this second result may be confirmed, because according to Anselm, *Monologion* 15, everything else besides relations is either simply better it than not it, or this is not so but in something it is better not it than it; that which is disposed in the second way, according to Anselm, is not in God; therefore everything else in God, once relation is removed, is better it than not it, and is a perfection simply; – then, if so, from this it follows that no person will be simply perfect, because no person has the absolute property of another person; it follows also that two persons are something more perfect than one person, which is contrary to Augustine *On the Trinity* 8.1 n.2.

168. Further third as follows: when some absolute is multiplied, every other absolute circumstance of it is multiplied (an example: when quantity is multiplied, the whiteness of it is too, and vice versa); therefore, if there are distinct proper absolutes that circumstance the divine essence, they would distinguish the divine essence too.

169. And the major here is confirmed, because several things of the same species cannot exist in the same thing; these absolutes, if they are posited, will be of the same species – for if not, they will be of different species, and so there is need to inquire what makes either of them incommunicable: for just as it is posited that paternity (which differs in species from filiation) cannot be of itself incommunicable [1 d.26 n.46], so the consequence, as to the property *a* in the Father (if it is an absolute) and the property *b* in the Son – if they are different in species – , is that neither will be of itself incommunicable, and there will be need to make a stand at some properties of the same idea. This argument is at least confirmed by the fact that there are not several things of the same idea in the same perfect thing (just as there are not several Words or several Fathers in divine reality), because it seems a mark of imperfection that in some nature there can be several things altogether alike; therefore in the simply perfect divine nature there will not be several absolutes of the same nature, nor of a different nature, and so not in any way.

170. Fourth: if the absolute property *a* and likewise the absolute property *b* are expressed by the essence, and if what is expressed exists in the same supposit as that by which it is expressed (according to the way of expressing here set down), then *a* and *b* will be in one person, and so no person will be originated by another (because their properties will be in the same person); indeed it follows that there will be no distinction of persons.

171. Fifth: [if persons are absolutes] the consequence is that there is no origin in God, because the originated person receives being through the origin; but the person, if he is an absolute, precedes the relation of origin; therefore the second person would in essence precede passive origination itself, and so would not have being through it.

172. [Response to some reasons for the opposite opinion] – And so those who hold the conclusion of these reasons [nn.165-175, that the persons are not constituted by absolute properties but by relations] would make a response to the opposite reasons touched on for the opposite opinion [1 d.26 nn.32-55]:

To the quote from Augustine about person [1 d.26 n.54] the response is that Augustine is speaking there of the thing that is formally and not materially signified by ‘person’; but ‘person’ formally signifies something in intellectual nature that is non-distinct in itself and distinct from another; but that whereby (whether an absolute or a relation) there is such a distinction is accidental to the formally signified thing; and yet in the case of some nature the absolute necessarily involves a relation. So it is in the issue at hand.

173. To the statement that ‘the supposit of the divine nature is not a one per accidens, therefore it is not constituted by something of another genus in nature’ [1 d.26 n.52], the response is that relation constitutes as it passes over into the essence and not as of a different genus; nor because of this does it follow that the thing constituted is an absolute, because relation preserves what is proper to it – yet the concession is good that ‘what is left from relation’ is an absolute, because what is left is being.

174. To the other claim [1 d.26 nn.45-50], that ‘the property of the person is incommunicable primarily, but relation is not’, the response is that a subsistent relation, of the sort that a divine relation is, is incommunicable primarily, although by the absolute idea of such a relation it is communicable.

175. More or less the same is said to the claim [1 d.26 n.51] that ‘things that distinguish are primarily diverse, but not so paternity and filiation’; the minor is denied, because even if paternity and filiation in creatures communicate in something, yet the divine ones, or those in divine reality, do not.

176. To the claim [1 d.26 n.36] that ‘real relation requires really distinct extremes’ the response is that this is true of relation as accident, and divine relation is not of this sort, but it is substantial relation, constituting the supposit of a substance.

2. Rejection of the Aforesaid Reasons and Responses

177. With respect to this article [n.164] one must examine first the response and objections, and second the conclusion by itself.

a. About the Special Reasons and Responses

178. The argument on the first point is that the reasons are not conclusive and that the responses do not solve the problem.

179. [The special reasons are not conclusive] – I prove this in order:
For the first reason [n.165] rests on the proposition, ‘every absolute is act and consequently is something that gives being’.

180. The rejection of this is multiple:

First, because in the case of creatures, where the proposition most seems to be probable, not every act gives being, for then the human nature in Christ would give being, and it would not have the same being that it would have were it let go (which is against

Augustine, *On the Trinity* 13.17 n.22), because when let go it would have its own personhood, and personhood states incommunicable act.

181. Likewise, an act that gives being bestows operation, but the hypostatic property in creatures does not bestow operation. This is plain from Damascene *Orthodox Faith* 3.14, “We say that wills and operations are natural and not hypostatic; for if we were to grant they were hypostatic, those who will being one hypostasis and those who act another, we are compelled to say that the three hypostases of the Holy Trinity...”, where, from the fact the three divine persons do not have three operations, Damascene concludes that operation is not hypostatic, that is, does not come through a hypostatic property, and this he concludes of the property in general, whether it is absolute or relative.¹⁴

182. Besides, third: in everything that has being from something in some way, there is, besides what gives it being, something else, different from it in nature, which receives being (the thing is plain of a composite of matter and form, and of all other things composed of act and potency); therefore in the case of everything that has being through something that gives it being, there is something that is not an act giving being but a reason for receiving being – and so it seems to be in the supposit of nature, for, since the supposit has the being of nature and nature gives it being, the hypostatic property will be the reason for receiving being.

183. One can then say to the argument [nn.165] that, since there is a twofold idea of entity, namely quidditative and hypostatic, then, just as it belongs to quidditative entity to give being of itself, because it is of itself communicable, so it belongs to hypostatic entity not to be an act giving being, because, as ‘that in which’, it is of itself incommunicable. And although in creatures the individual property gives being, because it is a degree of some positive entity over and above the quidditative entity of nature, yet the property of a supposit does not state any entity over and above the entity of singularity, nay does not state anything positive (from the first question, nn.54-55); and even if it were to add some being, yet it would not be the reason for giving ‘being’ but only for giving ‘incommunicable being’, because ‘this existing nature’ – wherein is included nature and the entity of singularity – is the whole reason for giving being, and so anything understood to be additional to it, whether positively or privatively, whether something positive or a privation, whether absolute or relative, will not give being, because being is given totally by that which is already pre-understood. Therefore, although in divine reality the personal property is not merely negation but some positive property, yet, because the divine nature is of itself a ‘per se existing this’, it will contain the whole reason for giving being; and just as in creatures ‘this existing nature’ gives being totally, and not merely by the fact that the additional property is a negation (rather, if the additional property were positive, nothing would be taken away from ‘this per se existing nature’ to prevent it giving being totally), so neither in divine reality will anything be taken away from this nature – which is existent of itself – to prevent it giving being totally to the person, even if there is understood to be in ‘person’ a positive personal property.

184. In response to the argument [n.165] therefore, when the proof is given that ‘the personal property is act, since it is not there in potency, or is not in God virtually’, I say that it commits the fallacy of equivocation. For in one way ‘act’ is the difference

¹⁴ See Appendix A at the end of this distinction.

opposed to ‘potency’, and in this way act along with potency divides the whole of being (even matter as well). In another way act along with potency constitutes some whole, the way the Philosopher speaks of act and potency in *Metaphysics* 8.6.1045a7-29; and here potency is not opposed to act because it does not remain along with act the way ‘this matter’ remains in the composite along with form. So this personal property does not exist only virtually in the divine essence (the way ass does, which is merely in potency there before act), and consequently this property is actually there, in the way that act is opposed to such potency. But it does not follow that ‘therefore it is an act that gives being’ – for there is required for this that it be formal act: because in this way matter might give being, since in the composite it is in act, not in potency before act.

185. The second reason too [n.166] seems defective:

First because the absolute in question is not related to the essence as perfection to perfectible, as was made clear about the relative property of person extensively in 1 d.5 nn.113, 118, 129-138, where it was said that person is not composed of essence and relation or property as of something quasi potential and actual, but rather that essence has more the idea of act. So although the property be understood as in some way posterior to essence, yet not for this reason is it a perfection of essence; for the order of origin and of perfection is there the same, and what is prior in origin is prior in perfection, as was then made extensively clear [1 d.5 nn.130-138].

186. Second, given that the property would in some way be related to the essence as informing it, yet it is not a perfection simply, because according to Anselm *Monologion* ch.15 ‘a perfection simply in anything is better being it than not being it’, and this is impossible about a hypostatic property, because such a property is by its own nature repugnant to anything contradictorily other than what it belongs to, and thus it cannot in anything else be better being it than not it, for it is contradictorily repugnant to anything else.

187. Thus as to the reason [n.166], then, it is plain that something false is assumed if the supposition is made that the absolute perfects the essence. Nor is the proof made valid by the fact that the absolute ‘in some way follows and does not precede’, because in divine reality – insofar as precedence can be posited there – act and form are first. Second, even given that one did get the result that it informs the essence, the conclusion would not be that it is a perfection of it simply; nor do the conclusions follow that are further inferred, namely that ‘the divine essence is not simply perfect’ or that ‘one person is not simply perfect in himself’.

188. Moreover, the argument [n.166] would conclude better against relation [sc. than for it], because it seems more probable that a hypostatic absolute is not a perfection than that a relation is not a perfection, because being a perfection belongs to no hypostatic property (either in creatures or in anything else), but being a perfection does belong to some relation as to the relation’s proper idea: for one relation is more perfect than another and yet none is a perfection simply, according to Augustine *On the Quantity of the Soul* ch.9 n.15, “we rightly prefer equality to inequality, and there is not anyone at all endowed with human sense etc.” who would not prefer equality to inequality [cf. 1 d.19 n.25]. And this is not just because of the base of the [geometrical] figure, for inequality can be founded on more perfect bases than some equality is; it is even clear that, if it were just because of the base of the figure, Augustine would be begging the question; for he is intending to prove the nobility of one figure over another (as of a circle

over rectilinear figures), and he does so using equality and inequality; so if the excellence [of one figure over another] were only deduced from the base of the figure, or if the excellence of the figure were deduced from this, then he would be arguing in a circle.

189. If it be said that Augustine's statement is true by reason of proximate and not remote bases, and that the proximate foundation of equality is quantity – this reply is false and nothing to the purpose of the minor [n.188]. For I ask: when it is said that 'a quantity is equal or on a par with another quantity', does this mean the relation or something absolute? If it means an absolute, then something can be understood to be equal without being equal to anything; and similarly, how will the perfection of equality in respect of inequality be got in this way? – and then in a triangle there must be two quantities. Or you may imagine some other way in which equality can be an absolute, more perfect than inequality in some way and different from quantity. – But if it means the relation, as seems manifest, then a relation will be per se founded on a relation; nay, it seems to mean the same relation as the relation of equality: for a quantity is equal to and on a par with a quantity.¹⁵

190. As to the statement of Anselm in the *Monologion* [n.167], the response is that he is speaking of quiddities, not of hypostatic properties. This is proved first by his examples of wisdom and truth on the one side and gold and lead on the other side.¹⁶ Second it is proved by reason, because that alone is a perfection simply which can be infinite in something, just as that which is of itself finite is better 'not it' in a thing than 'it'; these features [sc. better not it than it, or better it than not it] belong to quiddity as to its 'being finite' or 'being infinite', but not to a hypostatic property, because a divine personal property – of whatever sort it is – is formally neither finite nor infinite; likewise, a hypostatic property is repugnant to everything else beside the one thing it belongs to; so for everything else it cannot be better than not it, rather not even for anything at all. Therefore Anselm is excluding relation according to quiddity from the whole range of quiddity, and then every absolute quiddity is either a perfection simply or limited; but the intended conclusion about hypostatic property [sc. it is a relation and not an absolute] does not follow from this.¹⁷

191. The third reason [n.168] has, in the case of all things essentially ordered and similarly in the case of all things not equally unlimited, a major that is false in form (although it may sometimes be true because of the matter); for in the case of no essential order does there have to be any multiplication because of the proper idea of prior and

¹⁵ The point seems to be that if one tries to avoid the argument in n.188 by saying that the relation of equality is not better than the relation of inequality qua relation, but rather what is better is the absolute on which the relation is founded, save that this absolute is not the figure [as was supposed in n.188] but the quantity of the figure, then the statement 'this quantity is equal to that', which is alleged to be what really justifies Augustine's saying that equality is better than inequality, will either state an absolute (namely the quantity itself), which has the problems Scotus notes here in n.189; or it will state a relation, and then the relation 'this quantity is equal to that' will be founded on this other relation (whatever it is); in fact, however, there is no such other relation, but only that very relation itself of equality between the quantities. So Augustine's argument stands.

¹⁶ *Monologion* ch.15, "By 'it' and 'not it' I understand here nothing other than 'true', 'not true', 'body', 'not body', and the like. There is something indeed that is altogether better it than not it, as wise than not wise...and just than not just...But not it is better than it in something's case, as not gold than gold, for it is better for a man not to be gold than to be gold, although perhaps for something (as for lead) gold would be better than not gold."

¹⁷ See Appendix B at the end of this distinction.

posterior, but multiplication of the posterior can stand without multiplication of the prior, although not conversely; similarly, when two things are compared to a third that is unlimited, the third does not have to be co-distinguished after the manner of the unlimitedness of the two things (an example: the intellective soul is compared with the parts of the body, because it is in some way unlimited with respect to them; the soul does not have to be distinct in distinct parts after the manner of the unlimitedness of the parts). The major then is, as to the issue at hand, false in two ways: first because the essence, in the way priority in person exists there, is in some way prior to the properties, but not conversely, according to them [cf. n.166] – therefore it is not necessary for the essence to be distinguished following the distinction of the properties; second because the essence is formally infinite, and the properties are not formally infinite – and therefore there is no need for what is formally infinite to be distinguished following the distinction of things that are not formally infinite.

192. Even if the major [n.168] were taken generally about any absolutes at all that circumstance the same thing, it still has a manifest instance against it in the soul and its power, because the powers of the soul are multiplied when the soul is not multiplied.

But if this instance could be got round by specifying that the major is about things that are of the same species (the way the first confirmation of the major takes it), not even then is the major universally true in the case of relations, as will be plain below in d.8 nn.21-29. Several things of the same idea existing in the same thing – even in the case of absolutes – is not a contradiction, if any of them is not an act adequate to what it is in.

193. When the major, then, is made clear through an induction [sc. the example in n.168], there is a fallacy of the consequent, because certain singulars are taken that are not similar to the issue at hand, namely singulars in which a distinction of the posterior does constitute a distinction of the prior, or in which there is a similar limitation on all sides and no unlimitedness of one in respect of the other; and from these singulars only a universal proposition that is false can be inferred, one where the conditions already stated [sc. the conditions required to make the inferred conclusion true, n.191] are lacking, just as they are lacking in the issue at hand.

194. But as for the final point added to confirm the major [n.169], that ‘there are not several things of the same idea in the same perfect thing’, it could be replied that, just as a thing perfect simply – being numerically the same – is communicable to several supposita of the same idea (such that this is not repugnant to it because of its perfection simply, but it does belong to it that it exist in several supposita of the same idea), so there belongs to it from the perfection of its nature that several things of the same idea can exist in it as supposita in a nature, and consequently that several hypostatic properties too of the same idea can exist in it; but this is not possible about the other things that are given in the example [n.169] (namely about the Father and the Word), because the perfection of what is simply perfect requires that any production have an adequate term, but does not in this way require that some hypostatic property be adequate to the nature in constituting a supposit.

195. The same point [n.194] can be made in reply to the first confirmation of the major [n.169], by applying this confirmation to the issue at hand, because there is a fallacy there of equivocation: for the major [sc. of the first confirmation, ‘several things of the same species cannot exist in the same thing’], if it were true, would have to be understood of things existing in something the way act exists in that which is informed by

it. But in this way the minor [sc. ‘these absolutes, if they are posited, will be of the same species’] is not true; for the [hypostatic] property does not exist in the essence as informing it but as constituting a supposit in it.

196. However to both confirmations [n.169] it can be said that these [hypostatic] properties are not of the same idea formally, just as the individual properties in creatures are diverse primarily and not of the same idea. And if from this is inferred that they are of a different species, or that each of them has the idea of a quasi different species, and that therefore each would have to be determined to incommunicability by something else – this does not follow, just as it does not follow in the case of individual properties in creatures, where these properties are the ultimate determinations of the nature: although, in the case of creatures, these properties are not of the same idea in anything, yet none is a common and quidditative entity, but each is of itself a ‘this’.

197. The fourth reason [n.170] proceeds from a false imagination, namely that these properties are expressed by the essence as through an origin – which is not what was said. But, just as some concede that relations burgeon in the essence [cf. Ord. 1 d.5 n.131, d.26 n.28] (if however this is properly said), so it could be said and conceded (against them [sc. Henry and his followers]) that these properties – if they are absolutes – burgeon in the essence; and although each of them is in the same essence from which it burgeons (because the essence is in the three persons), yet one or other is not in the same person as that from which it is got by origin. Nor is there any repugnance in one person with one property having true origination from a person having another property, even though all these properties burgeon from the essence, not as origins, but in some other way – just as the others [sc. those who say the persons are not absolutes] have to say about origination through relation, because the Son burgeons from the Father by origin and yet filiation burgeons in some way in the divine essence or from the divine essence.

198. The fifth reason [n.171] is defective, because it seems more difficult to sustain origination by positing that the extremes are only formally relatives than by positing that they are absolutes. For if they are only relatives then to say that ‘person originates person’ will be nothing other than to say that a relative has a correlative; but a relative, once posited, seems to have a correlative without any further action. But if absolutes are posited, there does not seem to be as much difficulty in the way one supposit is generated by another, since in creatures – according to everybody – the supposita are absolute, and yet origination of one from another is not there denied.

199. So when it is argued [n.171] that absolute precedes relative and consequently precedes origination [cf. Ord. 1 d.26 n.58], I reply: it was said that origination belongs to the genus of efficient cause [supra nn.172-176] – and just as in the case of creatures the term does not exist by origination formally but as it were by effect (nor from the fact that it exists formally by effect does it follow that it precedes it), so could it be said in the issue at hand; nor does there seem to be greater difficulty in the priority of an absolute than in the priority of a relative, nor in divine reality more than in creatures.

200. [The responses do not solve the problem, n.178] – That the responses assigned by them [nn.172-176] do not solve the problem I prove thus:

First from the reasoning of Augustine [n.172]. Either Augustine is understanding by the formal object signified by ‘person’ something non-distinct in itself and distinct from another in essence – and then he no more has to concede that there are three persons than that there are three essences (or three things distinct in essence), which seems

manifestly against his intention when he maintains that we use the word ‘substance’ in one way and the Greeks in another; the Greeks then are using ‘person’ or ‘substance’ for ‘first substance’, and they allow three substances in the way that we allow three persons [n.160]; therefore we are, according to Augustine, not properly conceding that there are three persons. Or he is understanding by ‘person’ something indistinct in itself according to incommunicable substance (and thus something distinct from another), and then that thing, according to what it formally signifies, is for itself, and the intended conclusion is gained [sc. ‘person’ is an absolute and not just a relative].

201. Against the next one [n.173]: I ask whether relation constitutes as it is formally the same as essence or not. If it does, two absurdities follow: first, that relation will not be relation, because, according to Augustine *On the Trinity* 7.5 n.9, ‘if substance is related to another it is no longer substance’, and so relation, if it is formally substance, is no longer related to another; second likewise, that whatever is constituted formally by something, as this something is an absolute, is itself formally absolute, and so the supposit constituted would be formally absolute. Or the supposit is constituted by relation insofar as relation passes over to the divine essence, or as it is the same, not formally but really, as the divine essence – and along with this goes that the supposit is constituted properly by relation as relation is relation, because relation cannot be considered in divine reality without its being the same really (whether it is a thing or a relation) as the essence. So if relation ‘in some way considered’ constituted the supposit per accidens, supposing it were so to constitute it, and if relation ‘when considered in every way’ is really (though not formally) the same as the essence, then from the fact that – as really the same as the essence – it constitutes the supposit, then the thing constituted is not prevented from being an entity per accidens; but relation cannot constitute as it is more than really the same as essence, because it cannot do so as formally the same.

202. Further, the statement [n.173] that ‘what relation leaves behind is an absolute’ seems to be repugnant to itself, because a form does not leave behind an existence other than itself (just as whiteness does not leave behind in the white thing any being other than itself by which the white thing is white); therefore the constituting property, if it preserves what is proper to itself, leaves behind what is proper to itself and nothing else. Likewise, how could an absolute be left from a relative property if the absolute precedes the relative property in the person?

203. Against what is replied next [n.174] about subsistent relation, that it is incommunicable, I ask: since one must first understand relation as a something before one understands it as subsistent, I ask how paternity is a ‘this’? It is not a ‘this’ of itself since it is not formally infinite, and so even more will it not be subsistent of itself; therefore it is not incommunicable of itself either. Against the other part, that ‘it is incommunicable insofar as it is divine’ [n.174], I argue as follows: when two things constitute per se some third thing, neither of the two gets from the other what accords with its own proper idea (as matter does not get from form the potentiality that belongs to it in causing the composite, and as form does not get from matter any of the actuality that belongs to it in composing the composite along with the matter; so too in the case of definition, genus does not get from the difference any determinable concept, nor does the difference get from the genus a specific act that is indivisible into things several in species); therefore if person is constituted from essence and incommunicable property, neither of these latter will have from the other what is proper to it; accordingly, therefore,

just as the essence does not get communicability from the property, because (when one prescinds in thought from the property) the essence is communicable of itself, so the property will not get incommunicability from the essence, but will of itself, once the essence is per impossibile removed, be incommunicable primarily.

204. Further, essence as it is purely essence does not give incommunicability to the Father, because essence is of itself communicable; therefore it gives incommunicability to the Father as it is understood to have paternity virtually in itself, and so the same thing ‘as it is in the essence virtually’ will be the reason for itself ‘as it is formally such’!

205. Against the next one [n.275], namely that divine relations are primarily diverse, the argument is as has frequently been made [cf. Ord. 1 d.26 n.51], and one of the middle terms can be repeated: that then someone who knows one origination in divine reality, and who does not know whether that origination is filiation or inspiriting, would have a concept only about the word used [cf. 1 d.23 n.9]. Therefore the problems would be empty that are raised about generation in general and that are solved through their own middle terms before the question about productions in particular is raised [cf. 1 d.23 nn.19-16].

206. Against the next [n.176], namely that to relation, as it is relation, there belongs its being to some other distinct thing, because otherwise, if it is not to some other distinct thing, one would be able to say that paternity could be a real relation without the Son, on the supposition that the extremes of the relation would not have to be in some way distinct (just as would be true of identity too [sc. that identity could be said to be a real relation in divine reality without a real and sufficient distinction between the persons, 1 d.31 n.18]). Therefore ‘this’ paternity is related either to something else distinct by filiation alone or to something else distinct by a distinction prior to the one that would be from the Son. If in the second way, the intended conclusion is got [sc. person is distinct by something absolute prior to relation]. If in the first way, then to argue ‘paternity is not related to some other distinct thing, therefore it is not real’ is to argue ‘to this relation no real relation is opposed, therefore it is not real’; but this seems to be a manifest begging of the question, because the antecedent seems no more manifest than the consequent. Therefore no argument in the case of many relations could be made to the effect that they are not real on the basis of the premise that these relations are not between extremes really distinct, but there would be a general begging of the question.

b. About the Conclusion in Itself

207. As to the other point, namely about the conclusion [n.177], the authorities of the saints seem to speak in favor of relations as doing the constituting rather than absolute properties.

108. I also adduce one reason for this, that if the first person is an absolute (let him be *a*), and if the second is an absolute (let him be *b*), then in the first moment of origin *a* is not the Father or a ‘this’ having a real relation, because he does not have a Son; in the second instant of nature he generates, and then there is a Son and a real relation in *a*; therefore the first person would acquire by the act of generation something formally existing in himself, just as does the second person – which seems unacceptable, because, just as whatever the Son has he has through generation, according to Hilary [cf. Ord. 1

d.28 n.13], so the Father has nothing by generation but has everything from himself without any beget-ability.

209. However this argument could be stated and solved by distinction of priority and posteriority of origin, so that in the first instant of origin *a* is posited as being the Father and in the second *b* is posited as being the Son, and yet *a* would be Father and *b* would be Son in nature simultaneously. And this distinction of priority and posteriority was touched on in 1 d 20 n.34.

210. Let the other reasons be examined into, those that prove this inference, ‘three persons are one God, of which persons one is from one by generation and one is from two by inspiriting; therefore the first things constituting and distinguishing these persons are relations’; if the conclusion be asserted it is something that is to be believed; for nothing that is not expressly an article of faith is to be held as simply to be believed unless it follows from something that is simply to be believed [cf. Ord. 4 d.11, Lectura 1 d.2 n.164]. Many of the reasons adduced [e.g. supra nn.165-176] to prove this inference are soluble, and many have already been solved [e.g. supra nn.178-206, Ord. 1 d.26 nn.73-94].

B. Whether a Personal Property is the Formal Reason of Terminating the Union of the Human Nature with the Word

211. As to the other principal article [n.164] of the question, namely the formal reason of terminating this union, those who would say that this union exists because of the assumer containing in himself the perfection of the reality of the created supposit [e.g. William of Ware, supra n.18] and because of the obediential potency in the assumed nature [an opinion Scotus favors, supra nn.46-47, 138], would have to say that the essence is the proper reason of terminating this union, as was argued in relation to this question in the first argument [n.154].

212. But this supposition seems false, because this dependence is of a different idea from the dependence of caused on cause; and the virtual containing that is in the term and the obediential potency that is in the dependent nature pertain to the dependence of caused on cause. Hence for these reasons I did not posit in the first question that the Word can terminate this dependence, but that it is because of independent subsistence [n.84].

213. I say therefore that the essence is not the formal reason of terminating this union; rather the personal property is.

214. I prove this as follows: in whatever supposit there exists the formal reason of terminating this union, that supposit terminates it; the Father, in whom is the divine essence, does not terminate it; therefore etc. – Proof of the major: a supposit only terminates because it has the formal reason of terminating, just as a supposit only creates because the formal reason of creating belongs to it; and for this reason any supposit that has in it the proximate formal reason of creating creates; hence the three persons necessarily create simultaneously.

215. The statement is made [by Giovanni de Mincio] that the property is the reason of terminating as the sine qua non.

216. Against this: whatever supposit has in it the formal reason of acting acts according to that reason, or at least can act according to that reason, and prior in nature to

the action being actually elicited or to the term being produced; and this is, for it, the reason and principle of acting,^a as was made clear frequently in Ord. 1 [d.2 nn.221, 226, 235, 237, 300, 302]; and, on this account, it is in this way that the Father and the Son inspirit the Holy Spirit, because they have inspiriting force, and both are prior in origin to the Holy Spirit's being inspirited [cf. Ord. 1 d.12 nn.36, 62]; and for this reason too the three persons create, so that the power of creating is also for each person the reason of creating and of being able to create, because each of them has it naturally before the creature is produced [cf. Ord. 2 d.1 nn.17-22]. – Therefore, by similarity: that which is the reason of terminating this union will be, for the one who has it, the reason of terminating before it does terminate, if this reason is naturally had before the union is terminated; but it is certain that this reason is not naturally had by the three persons before this union is brought about; therefore etc.

a. [*Interpolated note*] And it is understood that as the formal reason terminates so does the supposit terminate: if the former terminates actually, then the latter terminates actually, if the former aptitudinally, then the latter aptitudinally, if the former in potency, then the latter in potency. And thus is the conclusion understood. Therefore, by similarity, that it is prior in nature, because the term of one [extreme], especially in the case of [the relation] that is dependence, is not simultaneous, nor is it union, nor is it with the foundation.

[*Second interpolated note*] That is precisely: if [the formal reason] is got posteriorly, then [the supposit] does not act by it; similarly, not even if [the supposit] is got simultaneously in nature with the foundation; for then the Son would generate himself.

217. One can respond to the reason [n.214] in another way, that the three persons have the essence in different ways, and because of this different way of having the essence, one person can terminate the union such that the essence is for him the reason of terminating but is not so for the others.

218. Against this [n.217] one can argue in two ways:

First as follows: because since this union is real, it has a real term and has it under a real idea; therefore a relation of reason is not the formal reason of terminating the union (but this way of having the formal reason is only a relation of reason in the essence itself, for otherwise the essence would be really related to itself or to the person); therefore the essence, as so possessed, is not formally the reason for terminating the union, such that the essence, as so possessed, should be the proper reason for terminating the union.

219. Second: because the only distinction in way of possessing the essence is one that pertains to origin; but it is not because of this distinction that one person terminates the union and another person does not, because the distinction would be the same if the Father had been incarnated and not the Son, and yet the Son would not, in that case, have terminated the union as he does now; therefore, because of this distinction (which is necessary), the essence is not for one person the reason of terminating the union (which is contingent) and not for another.

C. Solution of the Question

220. The solution of the question, therefore, is plain from these two articles [n.164; nn.165-210, nn.215-219], namely that the property of the Word is the reason of terminating, and that, according to the authorities, it seems to be a relative or a relation of origin n.207], although the reasons adduced [nn.165-171] do not prove this [nn.179-199].¹⁸

II. To the Principal Arguments

221. To the arguments.

As to the first [n.154], it is plain that the major is false, and that the reasons are not reasons for proving the possibility of the incarnation.

222. To the next [n.155] I say that to communicate being is not the same as for the divine being to inform human nature formally, nor even to communicate it as efficient cause, namely as if the person assuming, by efficient causality, give some being to the assumed nature from the fact of assuming it – but this ‘to communicate’ is to terminate the dependence of existing of the assumed actual nature, and this not because the ‘real existence’ of the nature assuming is the reason of terminating but because the ‘subsistence’ is, that is, the ‘incommunicable existence’. I concede that it communicates being into the form, that is, that ‘its incommunicable existence as incommunicable existence’ does so, not that existence as existence is the reason of terminating the dependence of the assumed nature.

223. As to the next [n.156] I concede the major; and the minor, when one holds to the common opinion that the persons are relatives [nn.174, 203], is denied.

III. To the Reasons Adduced for the Opinion that Holds the Persons to be Constituted by Absolutes

224. To the reasons adduced for this opinion, some of which were let go, in book 1 [d.26 nn.33-55, 60-64; those let go, nn.93-94].

225. For the response to Augustine [supra nn.53-54] see Appendix B below [last few paragraphs].

226. To the other one [Ord. 1 d.26 n.52¹⁹], about supposit per accidens, I say that a metaphysician speaks about ‘per accidens’ in one way and a logician in another; for the metaphysician calls ‘an entity per accidens’ what includes in it things of diverse genera, as is plain from *Metaphysics* 5.7.1017a7-22 ‘about being’, and 6.1015b16-36 ‘about one’;

¹⁸ The Vatican editors say that Scotus’ answer here is more motivated by the authorities of the saints than by the arguments adduced (which he has just been criticizing). One might also add that Scotus himself, while allowing that the persons are in some sense relatives, seems nevertheless inclined to the view that their primary constituting factors are absolutes, nn.207, 210.

¹⁹ “Again, third: the first constitutive element of a supposit in any nature seems to make something that is *per se* one with that nature, because it does not seem that the *per accidens* could be ‘first simply’ in any genus, according to the Philosopher *Physics* 2.1.192b20-23; but just as in creatures relation is of a different kind from the absolute and so does not make something *per se* one with it, so in divine reality there does not seem to be one concept *per se* of the absolute and of relation; therefore if person includes these two things, namely essence and relation, essentially, then person does not seem to be a supposit *per se* and first of such a nature but is a supposit as it were *per accidens*, and so it seems that some prior thing could exist that is constitutive *per se* of the supposit in that nature.”

but the logician says that ‘a proposition is per accidens’ whose subject does not include the reason for inherence of the predicate, and if one concept is made from two such things – neither of which is per se determinative of the other – he says that the concept is ‘one per accidens’. There is no example in creatures of a logical concept ‘one per accidens’ save of a concept to which a ‘one per accidens metaphysically’ corresponds, because although this proposition is per accidens ‘the rational is animal’, yet, by joining one to the other, one of them is determinative of the other; therefore the whole concept is not a one per accidens, but only some concept that brings together the concepts of two genera.

To the issue at hand, then, I say that the proposition ‘paternity is deity’ can be conceded to be per accidens – logically speaking –, because the subject as it is subject does not include the reason for inherence of the predicate as it is predicate, because the subject is not the predicate formally. Also, by joining the concept of the subject to the concept of the predicate (by saying ‘God is Father’) one concept does not per se determine the other, because, according to Damascene (*Orthodox Faith* 3.6), the properties determine the hypostases, not the nature; therefore this concept is not in itself per se one, and so it does not state a concept per se one with respect to any supposit; for what is not per se one in itself in things is not the per se supposit of anything – and so it is in the case of concepts. Thus therefore, speaking logically, it could be conceded that the Father is not the per se supposit of God.

227. But I argue against this, because a primary identity cannot be per accidens, and as not in the case of things so not in the case of concepts either; but there seems to be a primary identity of a primary nature with its supposit; therefore this identity is not per accidens but per se.

228. I reply: primary identity in the case of predication is when anything is said of itself, as ‘man is man’ and ‘God is God’. But, when speaking of real things, according to the metaphysician, since here [sc. in the case of ‘God is Father’ or ‘Paternity is Deity’] there are no genera nor anything of any genus (from Ord. 1 d.8 nn.95-115), there will here be no being per accidens; nor does the inference hold, ‘the supposit is logically per accidens, therefore the supposit is metaphysically per accidens’, because ‘to be a supposit’ states the disposition of something as subject to something as predicate – and thus the supposit can be said to be ‘per accidens’ because of accidentality on the part of the inherence but not on the part of the extremes or the terms.

229. And if it be objected that ‘here things are conceded that are as it were of two genera, namely substance and relation’ [sc. therefore the extremes or the terms must be per accidens] – I reply: the proper idea of things, as to genera or quasi genera, does not make the whole to be a per accidens being, but rather the disposition of thing to thing does, namely non-identity simply; but as it is, although the proper and formal idea of relation – which remains here – does not include formally the idea of essence, yet in reality one of them is most truly the same as the other [sc. ‘relation’ and ‘essence’], and because of this identity there is no disposition of reality to reality of the sort required of things that constitute a per accidens being.

230. And if it be objected against the first part [n.228, ‘and thus the supposit can be said to be ‘per accidens’ because of accidentality on the part of the inherence’] that ‘since in creatures the supposit of a nature can be per se one, why not here [in divine reality] in the same way?’, one can reply that some imperfect absolute thing can be

incommunicable, and universally something that per se contracts in some genus can be incommunicable, just as it can be communicable – and thus that which in any created thing pertains to some genus can be something that belongs to the genus and that constitutes an incommunicable; but a simply perfect thing cannot be incommunicable nor can it be something of the same idea (and of this sort, according to this opinion, everything is that is absolute in divine reality), and so nothing ‘as it were of the same genus as the essence’ can constitute a person or a supposit there, but only something which is as it were of a different genus. An example: if anything in the genus of substance, up to the furthest point where it is constituted as ‘this substance’, were a perfection simply and so communicable, ‘this substance’ could not be further contracted by anything (because what is of itself a ‘this’ is not further determinable in itself), but only through something in the genus of quality or quantity could it constitute something incommunicable, because the quality or quantity would not be a perfection simply; then the thing constituted of substance and accident would be a being per accidens, and so it would exist per accidens if one of these realities was not perfectly the same as the other.

231. Thus is it set down in the issue at hand, that the essence is a perfection simply, and that whatever is of the same genus or idea is a for itself along with the essence; and therefore anything such is communicable and yet is of itself a ‘this’. And further: that which is of itself a ‘this’ cannot be contracted, but can – by the fact it is a ‘this’ – only be constituted as something incommunicable through something that is not a perfection simply, and that therefore is not of the same genus as the essence but is as it were of a different genus.

232. To the other one [Ord. 1 d.26 n.45²⁰] I say that ‘paternity’ is of itself formally incommunicable; not indeed the concept, which – according to what was said elsewhere [Ord. 1 d.8 nn.236-150] – cannot be abstracted from divine and created paternity as univocal, but the reality that exists in divinity (and that is not formally the essence itself) is formally incommunicable and not as it were through an extrinsic determination (namely the determination ‘because it is divine’). The reason for its incommunicability is as follows: that just as the essence is ultimate act, and therefore cannot be determined by anything with respect to which it is as it were potential, so whatever is in it is ultimate, with the ultimate actuality possible for it, such that in the instant of nature in which ‘wisdom’ burgeons in the essence, it burgeons according to the ultimate determination that it is able to have; hence too the reality that is wisdom formally is not determinable. Likewise, whatever can be incommunicable in the first instant of nature in which it burgeons in the nature is incommunicable and burgeons as

²⁰ “Whatever constitutes existence in something, and in the unity corresponding to such existence, is wholly first repugnant to a distinction opposite to that unity (example: if rational first constitutes man in his being and specific unity, rational is wholly first repugnant to a specific distinction such that, when removing if possible or *per impossibile* everything other than rational that is not part of the meaning of rational and keeping only the meaning of rational, a division into diverse specific natures will be repugnant to it). And the proof of this proposition is that if such a distinction is repugnant to the constituted whole, then it is repugnant to it by something; let that something be *a*; if it is wholly repugnant to the *a* itself then the intended conclusion is gained, – if not but it is repugnant to the *a* itself through *b*, there will be a process ad infinitum or, wherever a stand is made, that will be the ultimate constituent in such a unity and a distinction opposed to such unity will be wholly repugnant to it. Therefore if paternity constitutes the first supposit in its personal being under the idea of its being incommunicable, then communicability must of its own idea be first repugnant to paternity.”

incommunicable (and not first as communicable, because then it would be determinable through something by which it would be made incommunicable).

233. And if you say that ‘paternity’ is only incommunicable because it is in the divine essence (for this reality of [divine] paternity only has the fact that it is of itself ultimately determinate because it is in the divine essence) – I say that whatever is as it were originally and fundamentally intrinsic to divine reality is from the essence, because the essence of God, according to Damascene [*Orthodox Faith* 1.9], is a certain sea of infinite substance; but yet these other things possess formally their own ideas and are by themselves formally such primarily, so that ‘wisdom’, although it gets as it were originally and fundamentally from the essence that it is a perfection simply, is yet formally a perfection simply and is in itself formally infinite, such that in the same instant of nature in which wisdom is now actually in the essence it will, after the removal per impossibile of the essence itself, remain the understanding of wisdom simply and of infinite wisdom. Thus, in the ‘now’ of nature in which ‘paternity’ is understood to be in the essence, it is by itself formally incommunicable, with the essence then per impossibile removed.

Nor is it here a contradiction that something should as it were originally or causally have from another that which belongs to it formally, the way the hot is of itself formally contrary to cold although it is causally this from fire, to which it is not formally contrary. So it is in the case of other things, that the entity by which something is constituted in its specific being is of itself formally indivisible into several species, even given per impossibile that it is uncaused, although as it is it has this indivision causally from there from where it causally is.

234. And if you object, ‘why does some entity arise communicable in the essence and this one incommunicable?’ – I say that there is no formal reason for this save that this entity is ‘this’ and that entity is ‘that’, and that this entity, because it is ‘this’, is communicable and that that entity, because it is ‘that’, is incommunicable, so that it could not arise unless it arose formally incommunicable, and so that the other could not arise unless it arose formally communicable. But the extrinsic reason for this – as it were the original and fundamental reason – is that the essence is radically infinite, wherefrom can arise intrinsically not only communicable perfections simply but also incommunicable properties; but any one of these arises, when it arises, determinate with the highest determination possible for it.

235. From this [nn.232-234] is plain the response to all the proofs that show paternity is not of itself incommunicable [Ord. 1 d.26 nn.45-50].

For when you say ‘it is not of itself a this’ [*ibid.*, n.47], I say this is false, when one understands it formally of the reality that is ‘paternity’ and not of a concept common to this paternity and to that, because (as was expounded in 1 d.8 nn.136-150, d.23 n.9 [nothing in 2 d.23 referred to by Scotus]) there can be a common concept when there is no order of realities intrinsically of which one is contractive or determinative of the other. But this paternity or that is not of itself a ‘this’, that is, is not a ‘this’ fundamentally, but is so from the essence, and paternity is incommunicable from the same essence itself because it is not a ‘this’ before it is incommunicable; but there arises, without any order of singularity toward incommunicability in this reality, a reality supremely determinate in the first instant of nature in which it arises.

236. Nor is the proposition true [Ord. 1 d.26 n.46] that ‘every quiddity is communicable’, but only that quiddity is which is a perfection simply or is divisible (for the first is communicated in unity of nature without division of itself, and the second is communicated with division of itself); this quiddity [sc. paternity, n.235] is not a perfection simply nor is it divisible, because it exists in a nature perfect simply.

237. Nor is the proposition true [*ibid.*, d.26 nn.48-49] that ‘opposite relations are of themselves equally communicable’, but rather active inspiriting arises as communicable to two and can never become incommunicable by anything determining it; but passive inspiriting is of itself, in the same instant in which it arises in divine reality, formally incommunicable.

238. Also as to the statement [*ibid.*, d.26 n.50] that ‘with anything whatever posited – possible or impossible –, and while its idea stands, it remains incommunicable’, I concede it as to ‘while its idea stands’ and ‘with nothing posited that is repugnant to its idea’. But if what is posited is that its idea remains and that there is something repugnant to it, then from opposites in the antecedent follow opposites in the consequent, namely that it is incommunicable formally of itself and also that it can be communicated. So it is in the issue at hand: if inspiriting is posited as preceding active generation, then something is posited incompatible with the paternity of the Father and yet the idea of paternity remains – and thus from the first would follow that paternity is communicable and yet from the second that it is incommunicable; hence there is formally a contradiction in generation being the second production in divine reality.

The paternity, therefore, because it is divine, is incommunicable, such that the ‘because’ is the circumstance of original or fundamental principle and not of principle contracting or determining in the way that white is contracted when ‘white man’ or ‘human whiteness’ is said; for here this whiteness is understood beforehand as existing in itself and, as such, it would be indeterminate and determinable so as to belong to a man; and it is determined when ‘human whiteness’ is said, but not because whiteness arises from the nature of man and is, in the instant in which it arises, of itself indeterminate. So it is, oppositely, in the issue at hand, because, just as a cause would not give being to an effect unless it gave to it ‘an existence agreeing with the effect’, and just as it would not produce this effect unless it produced something that was of a nature to have such an effect (for instance, no cause would cause a triangle formally unless it produced something that was of a nature to have three angles equal to two right angles, and if it could produce something that did not necessarily have three such angles, it would not produce a triangle but something else; nor is there any reason for this save that the formal idea of a triangle is such that it be a triangle), so I say that deity would not be the formal idea of any intrinsic reality unless this reality arose such that – in the first instant in which it is – it be determinate with ultimate determination; therefore, if it produced something determinable by some reality that came to it as it were from outside after it was already produced, it would not produce something intrinsic in divine reality – also, if it produced something incommunicable, it would not produce a personal property but something in some way different from it.

239. To the other argument [Ord. 1 d.26 n.51] I say that, although some common concept could be got that is said quidditatively of divine paternity and divine inspiriting (rather perhaps some common concept that is said quidditatively of divine paternity and created paternity [*supra* n.232]), yet no reality can be distinct in the deity in any way on

the part of the thing (from which this concept said quidditatively may be taken), which reality would be determinable by another reality (in the way that a common concept in the intellect is determinable by another concept); and the possibility and reason for this was touched on above, 1 d.8 n.135-150.

240. I say therefore that paternity and filiation are not diverse primarily as to understanding such that it not be possible for the intellect to abstract some common concept from them [cf. Rep. IA d.26 n.105], but they are diverse primarily as to reality and reality, so that they include no single degree of reality that is quasi potential and determinable by proper differences (in the way that whiteness and blackness include some reality of the same idea determinable by their proper specific differences, from which their specific differences are taken). And then the major proposition, which is that ‘the first distinguishing factors are primarily diverse’ [Ord. 1 d.26 n.51] must only be understood of the realities themselves that primarily constitute them as to a non-agreement, which they formally include, in some single formal reality.

241. To the other argument [ibid., d.26 n.36] I say that every real relation is between extremes really distinct, but sometimes with a distinction that precedes the relations and sometimes not but only with a distinction formally caused by the relations; and this is not only true in divine reality but also in creatures and even in accidental relations. For the will moves itself and is moved by itself, and there is not only a real relation of the will to volition but also of will as active to itself as passive (just as father is not only said really to son but also to mother, and a heating thing is not only said really to the generated heat but also to that which it heats – and universally an effect dependent on an active and passive principle necessarily requires a real relation, of the sort that is ‘of passive to active’, and this either a single or a mutual relation so that there be a relation of one or other of the principles to the effect and conversely). And yet the will, which is the foundation of these opposed relations of ‘mover and moved’ and is denominated by both of them, is itself not distinguished by any distinction of these relations but only by a distinction made by them.

242. When the argument is made [Ord. 1 d.26 n.37] against this part, that then there will be no proof by a proof that this relation is real because the extremes are really distinct – I say that one must prove by inferring the conclusion on the ground that the extremes are distinct neither by a distinction preceding the relation nor by a distinction caused by the relations. And for proving the second part [sc. ‘nor by a distinction caused by the relations’] it is not enough to take the premise that these opposed relations are said of the same thing; so the inference does not follow, ‘they are said of the same thing, therefore they are not distinguished formally by a distinction pertaining to the genus of relation’, just as the inference does not follow, ‘they are said of the same thing, therefore they are not real’ – as in the issue at hand, where mover and moved are said of the same thing and yet they are real; but one must prove it because the distinction that they cause, if they do not presuppose any distinction, is only made by them from the nature of the thing along with an act of intellect. Hence one can well concede that the argument for destroying the reality of relations, on the ground of a lack of real distinction in the extremes, frequently begs the question, and it is difficult to prove everything that is needed for that argument to be conclusive. If however everything is proved, the consequence is good. But one must eventually end up at the point that the extremes do not make the distinction they make from the nature of the thing (as with identity and

identity) but rather along with an act of intellect; and one can at once argue from that middle term, passing over the middle term about the distinction of extremes; for the inference at once follows, ‘if the relation is not consequent to the nature of the thing, it is not real’. And on this way does the Philosopher rely in *Metaphysics* 5.9.1018a2-4 to show that identity is not a real relation, because the intellect uses the same thing twice, and not because the extremes are not distinct. But if this latter argument were accepted, one should expound the antecedent as saying that the extremes are not distinct by a distinction preceding the relation, nor by relations distinct by distinction of incompossibles, nor by a distinction of compossibles that are from the nature of the thing; and one must prove all these parts so that the enthymeme [sc. ‘the extremes are not real, therefore the relation is not real’] may prove the inferred conclusion.

243. Hence the argument about primary substance [Ord.1 d.26 nn.60-64], that it is not constituted by relation, coincides with the argument about per se supposit [ibid., d.26 n.43], and it can be similarly solved, because ‘this essence’ has this from the idea of primary substance, because it is ‘of itself a this’; yet anything that is for itself cannot have incommunicability, but rather any entity for itself is there a perfection simply; so one can find in what is posited in divine reality that it has the idea of substance in the ultimate coordination insofar as concerns its not being repugnant to perfection, namely insofar as it is a ‘this’, but not insofar as concerns incommunicality, which is something repugnant to perfection.

244. The other arguments for the opinion about constitutive absolutes were solved in 1 d.26 nn.84-92.

Appendix A

[Note by Duns Scotus] Again as follows: every relation is terminated at an absolute; but the first term of relation – in a person – is some person or some property, not the essence, but, just as essence is not related to anything, so it does not terminate a relation (for the term of a relation is distinguished as the thing related is); therefore a person, as he is distinct from another person and terminates the relation of that person to himself, is an absolute. The major is made clear in 1 d.30 nn.35-38, in the discussion about the relation of God to creatures.

Appendix B

[Note by Duns Scotus]²¹ To the third [see Appendix A above] one can well say that an absolute can terminate a relation, and an absolute always does terminate in the case of relations in the mode of measure [sc. the relation of measured to measure], and this principally, as is sufficiently maintained in 1 d.30 nn.30-34, because the relations of creatures are terminated at God insofar as he is absolute; but, speaking universally [cf. *ibid.* n.35], one should not concede that the term of a relation is an absolute save in unlike relations, about which the argument is there [*ibid.* nn.35-38], namely relations that are in the genus of quality (and divine relations are not of this sort), or about the formal term (namely by reason of which the first term terminates), but not about the first term; for just as the foundation in the relatum is absolute but not always that which is related (according to this

²¹ The Vatican editors say about this note, which seems out of place where it is added, that it was written by Scotus on pieces of paper some of which were lost. So what remains is partial.

opinion [sc. Scotus' own, about constitutive absolutes, 1 d.26 nn.57, 59, 72]), so too that which is the reason for terminating a relation is always absolute, and this is pre-required on the part of the relative term the way the foundation is required on the part of a created substance.²²

...

Using the same point²³ one can reply to the next confirmation, whereby it is inferred that ‘the identity of a created substance with its supposit would be truer than the identity of the divine nature with its supposit’ [cf. Rep. IA d.26 nn.45, 79-80]; this does not follow if it is understood on the part of the thing, because although individual entity in a creature per se determines the nature and makes something per se one with it, yet that something one is a composite with some composition, even real composition; but a relation, although it does not per se determine the divine nature, is yet so truly the same as it that no composition arises in it. And therefore, speaking really or metaphysically, the identity of the divine supposit is much truer, both in itself and with the nature, than the identity of a created supposit is in itself or with its nature; but speaking logically, one can well concede that a created substance is more formally predicated of its supposit (because it is predicated in the first mode of per se), but not so is ‘God’ predicated of the Father, because ‘Father’ does not have a concept in the intellect that is as per se one as ‘Socrates’ is. – If you infer, ‘therefore the latter predication is truer than the former’, the consequence can be denied, because some less formal predication, or one that is not as per se, can be truer than some more formal and per se predication; but there is a greater identity in reality in the case of extremes that have a lesser or less formal inclination or inherence conceptually.

As to the last confirmation, one can concede as a matter of logic that of neither quiddity is there a per se supposit; in reality, however, the supposit is supposit of the nature, not of the relation, because relation there is an incommunicable property while the nature is not [Rep. IA d.26 nn.48, 81-82]. Similarly, relation passes over into the essence and not conversely, because of the infinity of the essence.

To the fourth [Rep. IA d.26 n.60, the fourth after those in nn.45, 51, 52]. Primary substance in creatures does have something of perfection to it, namely final unity (and so it is indivisible), and this is consequent to final actuality, and because of this ‘per se existence’ belongs to it; two opposites come together in secondary substance, which is both divisible and does not have ‘per se existence’ save in primary substance. These conditions of primary substance the divine essence has of itself and not formally by relation; for the essence is of itself a ‘this’ and it per se subsists, or at least it is the whole reason for subsisting, according to Augustine *On the Trinity* 7.6 n.11, who says that the Father is not Father by that by which he is God. In addition to this, created primary substance – because it is limited – has incommunicability, because the numerically same

²² The Vatican editors say that there were probably before this, but now lost, three confirmations about some statement or argument, since Scotus next immediately responds to the two final confirmations. Most likely these confirmations were drawn from Rep. IA d.26 nn.45-58, 77-82.

²³ Namely the point made in response to a preceding confirmation, now lost.

limited thing is not communicable; and this property does not state perfection, and so this property of primary substance does not belong to the divine essence.

Hereby is plain the response to the first argument touched on there [Ord. 1 d.26 n.60], because I concede that primary substance in divine reality, as to its being ‘most of all substance and per se subsistent’, is not constituted formally by relation, but divinity or ‘this God’ is that by which it is most of all substance and subsists.

Likewise to the second [Ord. 1 d.26 n.60] I say that the proposition ‘primary substance does not include non-substance’ is true, because of the conditions of perfection that belong to it – and so, wherever these conditions are preserved, the thing will not exist through non-substance. But as to something where this condition cannot exist through substance, which is a condition of imperfection, namely incomunicability (unlike what is posited in God, where everything that is a ‘for himself’ is posited as a perfection simply and so as communicable), there primary substance – as concerns its having this condition [sc. incomunicability] – must include non-substance.

To the third argument there touched on [Ord. 1 d.26 n.62] my reply is that paternity and this incomunicable paternity – whatever may be true of them conceptually – are in reality altogether the same, so that there is no distinction, whether real or formal, between them; and therefore that reality, in the first instant it is or burgeons in the essence, exists there under the idea of the ultimate determination possible for it. So, because determination to incomunicability is not repugnant to relation, therefore it is not only quiddity and ‘this’ but also incomunicable, and it is not at all in reality a ‘this’ before it is incomunicable; but ‘this deity’ is communicable, so that, according to this opinion [sc. the one which says the persons are constituted by relations], it is repugnant for ‘this deity’ to be incomunicable through something of its genus as it were. Therefore I deny the inference, ‘in relation there is quiddity, and this is incomunicable insofar as it is relation, therefore these cannot be found in what is for itself’, because the last one [incomunicability] is repugnant to anything that is ‘for itself’; in God, according to this opinion, incomunicability is not repugnant to relation, and therefore relation immediately has it.

To the fourth there touched on [Ord. 1 d.26 n.63]: ‘per se existence’ is conceded to ‘this essence’ or to God ‘as he is God’, but not a ‘per se existence’ by which formally something is incomunicably per se; and this latter does belong to a created person on the grounds of his limitation, because of which he is incomunicable both as ‘what’ and as ‘in which’ (this double incomunicability was spoken about in 1 d.23 n.16). It is true, then, that created substance has ‘per se existence’ and not per accidens existence, and this belongs to the substance on the grounds of its perfection – but that a created substance cannot communicate this ‘per se existence’ to anything in which it is, this is a mark of limitation. I concede here, then, that [the divine] essence is determined of itself to ‘per se existence’ (whether as to ‘what’ or as to ‘in what’), but that, along with this, it is communicable to a relative person, as being that in which the relative person has the same ‘per se existence’.

To the arguments about the fourth way [Ord. 1 d.26 nn.53-55]

To the first, from Augustine [*ibid.* n.53], I reply that Augustine there (*On the Trinity* 7.4 n.7) is saying how ‘one essence’ is spoken about, and how ‘three substances’ is said by the Greeks and ‘three persons’ by the Latins;²⁴ and in the text from 7.4 n.9 there adduced [Ord. 1 d.26 n.54], he says that ‘substance exists for itself’,²⁵ and that ‘three substances are not properly spoken of, because substance (as is conceded in the case of divine reality) exists for itself’,²⁶ and he is taking essence and substance to be the same. Therefore he says, “one should not say ‘there are three substances’, so as not to say ‘three essences’.” Therefore he himself is not intending that substance as the Greeks take it (namely as person) exist for itself, but that he himself is not conceding that there are three substances properly, but he is only using the phrase because of necessity of speech;²⁷ hence he seems to prefer the Latin way of speaking, that there are ‘three persons’,²⁸ but this too he proves subsequently not to be proper, showing that ‘person’ is said simply ‘for itself’ as essence is.²⁹ Finally, then, he draws his conclusion from this material [7.6 n.11], “We want some single word to serve for signifying what is meant by the Trinity, so that we may not be altogether silent when asked ‘three what?’” And whether ‘three persons’ is said by the Latins or ‘three substances’ by the Greeks, Augustine would say that this is said improperly and only because of the necessity of speaking. – One cannot, therefore, get from his intention that some term, signifying ‘incommunicable subsistence’ in divine reality, is for itself, but only that the names (which some adapt for expressing such an incommunicable) are in themselves absolute names, indeed are purely absolute, so that they are essentials. But one ought to have got the first point from him [sc. just above, ‘that some term...is for itself’] in order to get the proposed conclusion for the third opinion [sc. about absolutes, Ord. 1 d.26 n.56] in this question (which posits that in reality ‘this incommunicable subsistent’ is for itself [*ibid.* nn.59, 62]), and not merely that it can be expressed by some essential name, accommodated to the purpose from usage or the need to speak.

Hereby is response made to everything adduced from Augustine for this opinion [*ibid.*, nn.54, 73-75].

To the third argument, from Richard and Boethius [*ibid.*, n.55] the response is that just as something quidditatively common can be abstracted from an absolute and a relative – speaking of them quidditatively – , so also is something common abstracted from such and such an incommunicable, and this

²⁴ “By our Greeks ‘one essence, three substances’ is said, but by the Latins ‘one essence or substance, three persons’, because...in our speech, that is in Latin, ‘essence’ is not usually understood differently from ‘substance’.”

²⁵ “But it is absurd for substance to be said relatively; for every thing subsists for itself. How much more God!”

²⁶ *On the Trinity* 7.5 n.10, “However, whether essence is said (which is what is properly said) or substance (which is abusively said), both are said ‘for itself’ and not relatively to anything. Hence for God to exist is for him to subsist; and therefore if the Trinity is one essence, it is also one substance.”

²⁷ *Ibid.*, 7.6 n.11, “The Greeks have preferred to say this (namely ‘three substances’), which is perhaps the more fitting expression in the custom of their speech.”

²⁸ *Ibid.*, 7.5 n.10, “Perhaps therefore ‘three persons’ is a more suitable expression than ‘three substances’.”

²⁹ *Ibid.*, 7.6 n.11, “For it is not one thing to be God and another to be person, but altogether the same thing... Indeed ‘person’ is said for itself...just as God is said for itself.”

common thing is of itself neither an incommunicable absolute nor an incommunicable relative; something like this is described by Richard and Boethius, with this addition, that it is in an intellectual nature, so that, just as the description of a higher should not include the proper idea of something lower, so too the description of person – which states an incommunicable in intellectual nature – should not include anything that properly pertains either to an incommunicable absolute or to an incommunicable relative, but should be indifferent to both; and in this way do both describe person. I concede therefore that neither in the definition of person assigned by Richard nor in that assigned by Boethius is anything relative posited; and so I concede that there is given to person – as it is defined – neither absolute being nor relative being but something indifferent to both, so that, just as in the case of some nature (as in that of a creature) the idea is only in particular found in an absolute or in the idea of an absolute, so in the case of the divine nature it is only found in a relative.

Second Distinction

Question One

Whether a Nature immediately United Hypostatically to the Word and not Having Joy Involves a Contradiction

1. About the second distinction I ask first whether a nature immediately united hypostatically to the Word and not having joy involves a contradiction.

a. [Interpolation] About this second distinction, where the Master deals with the manner of the assuming of the nature, three questions are asked: first whether the human nature's being hypostatically united to God and yet its not having joy involves a contradiction; second whether there was there some medium of congruity – and, so as to include each medium, namely intrinsic (as the soul) and extrinsic (as grace), I ask whether the Word assumed the nature primarily and immediately; third whether the incarnation preceded the organization and animation of the body. Argument on the first question:

2. That it does:

Because the nature is either of a nature to have joy or it is not.

3. In the first way it cannot not have joy. Proof:

First because this union is greater than is union through the habit of grace, for according to Augustine *On the Trinity* 13.19 n.24, “In things begun in time, the supreme grace is that man is joined to God in unity of person;” but it is a contradiction for a nature united through the habit of grace not to have joy; therefore much more so in the case of the former union. There is a confirmation from Augustine *ibid.* 13.9 n.12, where he argues through the argument *a minore* [cf. Peter of Spain, *Tract. 5n.32*]: if the natural Son of God was made son of man [by mercy], then it is more believable too that the natural son of man should be made son of God by grace; if this consequence is good, it holds *a minore* universally; therefore in the case of Christ, once the antecedent is posited

[sc. human nature united to God through habit of grace and not having joy is a contradiction], the consequent must necessarily be posited [sc. human nature united to God through unity of hypostasis and not having joy is a greater contradiction], and so Christ must necessarily have joy.

4. Second because, if such a nature was not necessarily in a state of joy, it could sin, and so God could be said to sin and as a result to be damned. There is a confirmation of this proof, because, according to Anselm *Why God Man?* 2.10, if the first man was capable of sin because he was not God, then by this second union, whereby [Christ] was God-man, he was incapable of sin; but he was not incapable of sin unless he was blessed; therefore etc.

5. The second member of the disjunction [n.2], namely that a nature that was not of a nature to have joy could be united to God hypostatically, involves a contradiction:

First because a nature incapable of being a person would be a person; for a nature that is united to a person in unity of supposit is a person; a nature ‘not of a nature to have joy’ is incapable of being a person.

6. And second because then there would be a sharing of characteristics, and God might be said to be stone or fire [sc. because stone and fire are things not of a nature to have joy]; indeed, the sharing then would seem more perfect than now, for since any part of a stone is stone, and any part too of God is God, it is not so in the case of man; therefore etc.

7. On the contrary:

During the three days of Easter the flesh was united with the Word, and yet it was not in a state of joy; and whatever the Word could preserve that was immediately united to himself, he could immediately assume to himself.

I. To the Question

8. In this question there are two articles: first, whether a nature naturally fit to be in a state of joy would be able not to be in a state of joy; and second, whether a nature not naturally fit to be in a state of joy could be assumed.

A. Opinion of Henry of Ghent

9. And a negative answer is given [by Henry of Ghent] to both articles.

1. An Assumed Nature Naturally Fit to have Joy cannot not have Joy a. Exposition of the Opinion

10. The reason posited for the first article is of the following sort: the completion of enjoyment is found in the enjoyable object’s being present to the intellect and moving the intellect to an act of seeing, and in its being thereby present to the will and attracting the will to enjoy necessarily the presence of the end; but the intellect is necessarily moved by this [hypostatic] union; therefore the enjoyment of the will too follows necessarily on the movement of the intellect.

11. Proof of the minor: if the eye could, on the presence of light in itself, see the light existing in itself, then necessarily the light would be present as moving the eye to an

act of seeing; but the intellect can see something present in itself; therefore since, by this [hypostatic] union, the uncreated light is present to the intellect, then necessarily it will be present to the intellect as moving it to an act of seeing. There is confirmation from Augustine, *On the Trinity* 13.9 n.12, where he argues *a minore* about the double union [n.3].³⁰

12. Further, powers are founded in the essence of the soul and not conversely; therefore the order whereby what is in the essence overflows into the powers is more essential than the reverse; but blessedness cannot be in the powers without necessarily overflowing into the essence, so it cannot be in the essence without overflowing into the powers; the essence of the soul, by this special falling into it [sc. of union with the person of the Word], is beatified as much as it can be beatified, because it is made one with God; therefore etc.

13. There is a confirmation in that blessedness is in the essence primarily before it is in the powers; for blessedness exists in what is supreme in a nature capable of blessedness, and the essence has more the idea of being supreme with respect to the powers than the reverse; but blessedness cannot be posited in the essence unless there is a certain falling of the enjoyable object into the essence; now the falling in that exists in [hypostatic] union is supreme, and by it is nature supremely elevated.

14. A way to make the first argument [n.10] clear is as follows, that sometimes an intellectual habit is necessary for the representation of the object (as in the case of angels), and that sometimes the habit only facilitates the power so that the object may work on it more easily (as in our own case); a habit of glory is not posited in the [hypostatic] union for the first reason, because God is not present to it as enjoyable object by anything that formally informs the nature, but he only represents himself voluntarily as enjoyable object to a power able immediately to enjoy him; therefore if the habit in question is required for the sake of easiness, or for the sake of some elevation of the power so that it can be moved easily by such object, then even without such a habit it can absolutely be moved by the object, because the power of an assumed nature is supremely inclined and elevated and proportioned to the enjoyable object; for because the power of an assumed nature is elevated by the [hypostatic] union to the being of supernatural nature, therefore is the power itself sufficiently elevated so as to be able to enjoy; so this union with the Word supplies, as far as enjoyment is concerned, whatever the habit of glory could do in the other cases.

b. Rejection of the Opinion

15. Against this opinion.

And first I argue against the conclusion in itself as follows:

A prior, by reason of being a prior, can exist in the absence of a posterior without contradiction (and this when there is no necessary connection between them), otherwise the priority of the one to the other would not be preserved (the point is plain from the definition of prior, *Metaphysics* 5.11.1019a2-4); but a nature capable of being a person can be a person naturally before it acts, and this when it is a person in itself, for operation

³⁰ "For if the Son of God by nature has been made son of man, how much more credible it is that the sons of man by nature should become sons of God by grace...; and it is a greater thing to be united to God in person than in grace."

belongs to a pre-existing supposit and, in the case of an intellectual nature, operation belongs to a person; therefore when it is a person in something else, it is a person in that something else naturally before it acts. – The proof of this last consequence is that in the same instant of nature in which a nature, if left to itself, it would be a person in itself, it would in that same instant of nature be a person in the person assuming it; therefore there is no contradiction in this nature's being a person in a divine person and yet not having the operation of enjoyment.

16. Further, I make the argument for the position in question [n.10] lead to the opposite side:

First because no nature necessarily enjoys an object unless it is necessarily affected by the object as present; but this [assumed] soul is not necessarily affected by the object, both because it is not so affected by it as to act of understanding, because the object necessarily affects no intellect but the divine intellect (for the object causes nothing outside itself save voluntarily and contingently), and because it is not so affected by it as to act of enjoyment, for the will in its pure natural condition does not necessarily enjoy the end (as was shown in 1 d.1 nn.143-146) – so this soul will not enjoy the end necessarily unless something is superadded to its nature whereby a necessity for enjoying may exist. But nothing superadded is here posited formally in the will by this [hypostatic] union, but all that is posited is a certain dependence on the Word; therefore etc.

17. Further, the denial here of the necessity for a habit [n.14] is refuted by the fact that, as was touched on in 1 d.17 nn.121, 129, 133-134, 144, 152-153, 160-164, the most powerful reason for positing [a habit of] created charity is for the act of loving God to be in the power of the will; for no agent has an act in its own power unless the whole of what is necessarily required on its part for such an act is in its power; but a created will does not have in its power, from purely natural resources, the act of meritoriously loving the uncreated good such that this act may be accepted by God; and so there is need for the created will to have the something else that is required for acting so that it can thereby meritoriously love God. Enjoyment exceeds the nature of the human will much more than a meritorious act does, because enjoyment is a supernatural act or form while a meritorious act is not; therefore enjoyment will only be in the power of the human will if the will has some supernatural form which it can use for eliciting this act. But the human will assumed by the Word is a will of a human nature univocally the same as ours; therefore it cannot enjoy without [a habit of] charity.

18. And if it be objected that 'whatever God can do by an intermediate efficient cause, he can do directly by himself; but this habit, which is posited in respect of enjoyment [n.17], is only an efficient cause, because it is not any other cause (as is plain by running through the causes [*Physics* 2.3.194b23-5a3, *Metaphysics* 5.2.1013a24-b16]); therefore God can cause enjoyment in the soul without any intermediate cause whatever', – I concede the conclusion, as will be stated in 3 d.13 n.91, namely that enjoyment can be caused in the soul immediately by God; but in that case the will does not have the idea of active cause with respect to enjoyment, because it does not have of itself whereby it may act, and so this soul would not be said to enjoy formally, or by an eliciting of enjoyment, the way other souls are said to enjoy – which seems unacceptable.

19. Similarly the conclusion just stated [n.18] would not save the necessity of the enjoyment; for if there were a necessity, then, since the will is only disposed passively with respect to the enjoyment, and this with a potential of contradiction toward it [sc. the

will is passive either to enjoying or to not enjoying], and no necessity is taken on the part of what is in a potential of contradiction to something [sc. that which can be or not be is not necessarily one or the other], the necessity of this enjoyment would have to be attributed to God; but God does not necessarily cause this enjoyment, just as he does not necessarily cause anything outside himself; therefore etc.

20. And if you say that, on the contrary, when an affect in the intellect is presupposed it necessarily causes enjoyment [in the will] as a concomitant – this was rejected in 1 d.2 n.139, for since intellection (or vision) and enjoyment are two absolutes, there is no contradiction in the prior being caused without the posterior.

21. Further, if it be conceded that the soul of Christ can be thus disposed toward enjoyment without a habit just as can some other soul without a habit, then it would seem altogether superfluous to posit infused virtues in Christ (and yet these virtues are posited by everyone, *infra* d.13 nn.3, 15-18, 53-54, 87, d.14 nn.30, 108, 110, 126) – which seems unacceptable.

22. Further, from the force of the [hypostatic] union the Word alone is present to the assumed soul, and this as to personal being; therefore if from such presence or union there is the same presence in the idea of the affecting object, the consequence is that from the force of the union the Word alone and not the whole Trinity affects the created intellect – which is false, because the works of the Trinity when operating externally are undivided.

23. And if you say that the idea of seeing three persons is the same as the idea of seeing one person, and that he who sees one necessarily sees them all – it was shown in 1 d.2 nn.31-33, 42-43 that he who enjoys one does not necessarily enjoy them all, and that he who sees one does not necessarily see them all.

2. A Nature not Naturally Fit for Enjoyment cannot be Assumed

a. Exposition of the Opinion

24. As to the second principal article [n.8] a negative answer is given for the following reason, that as God is disposed toward any creature in his general descent into it as regard the being and operation of it, so does he seem to be disposed toward this nature [assumed by the Word] in his special descent into it as to this operation of it and this being of it; but in the first way he cannot descend into anything as to its being unless he also descends into it as to its operation, according to the Philosopher *Meteorology* 4.12.390a10-13, because each thing is of the sort it is when it can act, and is not of the sort when it cannot act; therefore God cannot descend in the same way into this nature with a special descent as to its being unless he can also descend into it as to its special operation. Its special operation with respect to a supernatural object is the operation of seeing and enjoying, which in no way belongs to a nature not naturally fit to enjoy (as to an irrational nature); therefore etc.

b. Rejection of the Opinion

25. Against this opinion:

An intellectual nature is assumable because it does not have in itself a positive entity that is repugnant to this special dependence on the Word, or repugnant to its being

communicated to the Word in the way a nature is communicated to a supposit. But whatever is thus communicable is assumable, and what does not have that whereby such communication may be repugnant to it does not have that whereby depending on and being assumed by the Word may be repugnant to it; but a non-intellectual nature does not have a more perfect idea of supposit than an intellectual nature has; therefore neither does a non-intellectual nature have any positive entity whereby a depending with the aforesaid dependence may be repugnant to it; therefore too if on its own part it is assumable, the Word could, it seems, be the term of this dependence of it, because the Word is independent in idea of supposit and so the Word can be the term of the hypostatic dependence of it.

26. It might be said here that if the nature of stone could depend hypostatically, yet it could not depend on a person as on the term, because a person is only the term of the dependence of a nature that can be a person.

27. I first exclude this statement, because created natures are of different ideas, and so their dependences on a foundation, qua dependences, can be distinct and in some way of different ideas, and yet the term is the same and is the object of these dependences according to the same idea on its part. In like manner, if an angelic nature were assumed, it would be of a different idea from human nature, and thus the dependence of the former would be different from the dependence of the latter, and yet both could depend on the same term as on the person of the Word.

28. If it be said that it is because both of these natures are able to be persons that they have something common on which they can depend, and that it is because of this common something that they can be united to a person, but not so a nature unable to be a person – on the contrary: if the Word were an independent hypostasis and not a person, it could be the term of the dependence of another thing; therefore since nothing that per se makes for the idea of being the term of dependence of another thing is taken away from the Word by the fact that the Word is a person, the Word will still be able to be the term.

29. Nor yet does it follow that the assumed nature of a stone would be a person, because ‘to be a person’ states not only ‘to be united’ but ‘to be so united that the mode of the union has a relation to the foundation united’ (whether the manner is intrinsic to the union or is disposed toward it as matter). For a relation could well be posited that would from the foundation, though causally, have some intrinsic mode, because although the superadded mode would not be intrinsic to the relation by the fact of its being ‘capable of being a person’, yet this mode is necessarily connoted by the way union is signified by the term ‘being made a person’; now the mode is this, that the foundation would be of a nature to be a person in itself if it were not assumed by another. Although therefore human nature and the nature of a stone agree in idea of dependence on a hypostasis, yet because they do not agree in idea of the sort of mode of dependence, for this reason they cannot both be a person.

30. Some however say that this is because of a distinction of hypostasis and person in the Word, that something can be united to the Word in idea of hypostasis (as a stone) but not in idea of person.

31. On the contrary: as was said in 1 d.8 nn.107-108, 135, there is in God no order of any realities where one reality might contract another, because then he would not be perfectly simple (and this is the reason that God is not in a genus); therefore there is in him no reality by which he is a determinable hypostasis different from the reality by

which he is a person – rather, absolutely no reality is different according to a distinction on the part of the reality by which he might be hypostasis and person. But every real union is to a real term and in the respect in which it is real; there cannot therefore be a real union with the hypostasis and not with the person, since there is no real distinction there. And therefore I do not say that the irrational nature is not a person and our nature is a person because of any distinction of hypostasis and person in the term of the dependence; but I say it because of real distinction in the relations, whether formally through the modes that they have from their foundations or at least concomitantly through their foundations.

B. Scotus' own Opinion

32. To the question, therefore, as to its first article [n.8] I concede that a nature naturally fit to enjoy and being assumed and not enjoying [the Word] does not involve a contradiction, and this even if it be posited that the nature can be assumed without a created habit, as the rejected opinion [n.14] posited. But if it were posited that the nature – so that it might be assumed – must necessarily have in act the habit of glory, then, because of the reason posited against the aforesaid opinion [n.15], I do not see the necessity of it.

33. As to the second article too [n.8] I concede the reason leveled against the opinion [n.25], because a created nature can depend not only with the dependence of caused on cause but with the dependence of what can have a hypostasis on the hypostasis, because a created nature does not have in itself anything whereby such dependence might be repugnant to it; and the Word can terminate this dependence, because, although there not be in it a distinct idea of hypostasis and person, yet it has in itself whatever is required for person and hypostasis in the way person terminates as perfectly as if he were not a person.

II. To the Principal Arguments

34. To the principal arguments.

To the first [n.3], when – as to the first member of the division [n.2] – argument is made about the comparison of the two unions, I reply and say that the hypostatic union is greater as to first act, because by this union the being of the person assuming is communicated to the assumed nature; and in fact even now this union includes the other union, which is union with second act and operation; but if the unions were separated, as they could be, that union would be greater which is of the nature to the Word as to term in respect of first act, but not to it in respect of second act and of beatific existence, because blessedness exists in operation more than terms for operation do. Or, to speak more properly, one can say that neither union is greater than the other because they are of different ideas – and since neither includes the other, one of them can exist without the other.

35. To Augustine's authorities:

As to the first [n.3], I concede that supreme grace exists in this union, because the con-descending of the divine will, which was the principle of the assumption, was supremely gracious; but supreme habitual grace is not in the union by force of the union,

although in fact it does now accompany the union. Hence Augustine's authority can be expounded of the fact – because he is speaking of 'things begun in time' – , that the supreme grace of all exists in the union of our nature with the divine Word.

36. Reply can on the same grounds be made to the authority of Augustine *On the Trinity* 13.9 [n.3] when he gives the argument *a minore*: it is indeed true that for the Son of God to be really a son of man seems less possible than for a son of man to be able by grace to be a son of God; and therefore if the former is possible by grace, much more is the latter so. But, if a son of God is a son of man, there is no necessity that this same predicate 'son of man' should be said determinately of the same subject; indeed, one might perhaps deny the first proposition or combination, namely that a son of man is a son of God by grace; nor, further, is any concession made that Christ is a son of God by adoption; but what follows is that some man or other, or the same man, could be a son of God by grace, because the first combination was made with someone indeterminately [sc. 'the Son of God is a son of man'], and not to this or that man determinately [sc. 'the Son of God is *this* son of man'].

37. As to the argument [n.4] proving that 'Christ or any assumed nature is incapable of sin, otherwise God could be said to be capable of sin or of being damned or of being a devil etc.' (which seem horrendous), I reply: just as he who has the light of glory and consummate charity cannot sin, not because these are formally repugnant to sin (as neither is first act repugnant to the opposite of a contingently causable second act), but because God, by his ordained power, cannot not cooperate with the second acts of vision and enjoyment, which acts are repugnant to sin – so God, by his ordained power, cannot not give to a hypostatically united nature supreme charity and, further, supreme enjoyment, which exclude sin; and by this union the assumed nature is incapable of sin, not formally, but virtually by way of disposition, a disposition that, in respect of God as agent, is remote but necessary – as necessary as is it necessary that someone blessed does not sin.

38. As to the second proof, from Anselm [n.4], I say that the second man [Christ] – because he is God – was, by congruity, filled with supreme grace, whereby he was incapable of sin; and it was not appropriate for the first man [Adam] to be filled with as much grace, because he was not God. So it is not by force of this union that Anselm posits [in Christ] an inability to sin, but only by congruity, because fullness of grace was the accompaniment of the union.

39. When, against the second member [n.2], argument is made about a non-intellectual nature, the response to the first point [n.5], as to how a non-intellectual nature could be said to be united in hypostasis or substance and yet not be a person, is plain because of the difference between the dependence that is called union in hypostasis or in substance and the dependence that is called union in person [n.31].

40. As to the other point [n.6], which is about the sharing of characteristics, some deny the consequence; but since the idea of this sharing is that the supposit receives, in the concrete, the predication of the nature in which it subsists, then even if the supposit were to subsist in the nature of a stone, there seems no reason for stone not to be predicated of it, by saying 'God is a stone' just as now one says 'God is a man', and both these would be equally true. – But when the further inference is drawn that 'the sharing then is more perfect, namely because any part of a stone is stone etc.' [n.6], I say that although a part of a stone receives the predication of stone in general as being a

homogeneous or subjective part of the whole, yet it does not receive the predication of that of which it is an integral part, just as no integral whole is predicated of an integral part (as we do not say that a wall is a house); for in this case the Word would not be stone in general but ‘this particular whole stone’; and because no part of the stone would be ‘this stone’, so no part of the stone would be predicated of him.

III. To the Arguments of Henry of Ghent

A. As to the First Article

41. To the arguments for the opinion.

As to the first [n.10], it is plain that it fails in many ways, both because the object does not necessarily move the created intellect, and because – even if it did – the will would not necessarily enjoy, and especially if the will not necessarily have the supernatural habit wherewith to enjoy.

42. To the other argument [n.12], about essence and powers, I say that a creature cannot be beatified in itself, because it is not the infinite good; but it is beatified in the infinite good as in the object that is attained by the operations of its powers, and not in the way that such good is the perfecter of the creature’s essence as to first act; for the following reason, therefore, does the beatitude of the power redound to the essence, that beatitude, when it is in the power, is in the essence as it is of a nature to be in the essence, because the redounding is there mediately and not formally, as if there were there a beatitude different from the one in the powers. Therefore I say that the essence cannot be beatified as it is distinct from the powers, and consequently neither can its beatitude redound to the powers as it is distinct from the powers.

43. And when the reason is confirmed on the ground that beatitude is in the essence first [n.13], the opposite of this was proved in 2 d.26 nn.15-23. – And when you prove that beatitude is something supreme in the soul [n.13], I say that if it is altogether the same as the powers themselves then there is no order of supremacy in the thing; but if beatitude [in the soul] is in some way the foundation of the powers, then although it is supreme by reason of first act, yet it is not of a nature to have a supreme second act, nor consequently of a nature to attain a supreme extrinsic object save by mediation of the power, because the supreme object is only attained by operation of the power. Beatitude then, it is true, is in what is supreme as it is of a nature to be in it; but it is not of a nature to be in the essence save by mediation of the power.

44. And if you argue that beatitude falls into the essence and therefore into the powers, and so it is in the powers by mediation of the essence, I reply and say that this is true as to first act, as to giving being to the powers; for whatever is in the assumed human nature depends in some way on the being of the Word, but there is no need that, in order to give supernatural operation, [beatitude] fall into the power by mediation of the essence.

B. As to the Second Article

45. Hereby is clear the answer to the argument [n.24] adduced for the second article, that just as there is truly a special in-falling as to being, whereby namely the being of the Word is communicated to the created nature, so there is necessarily a special in-falling whereby namely the Word could operate as to the operations of that nature (in the

way that, as the Word could be said to be fire if he had assumed the nature of fire, so he could be said to heat with the heat of fire); but there is no need that there be an in-falling as to operations repugnant to that nature, as are the beatific operations, such as to understand and to will [sc. the beatific object], in the way that God, by a general in-falling, falls into any creature as to the being and operation fitting to that creature but not to any operation not fitting to it or exceeding it.

IV. Conclusion

46. From this question it is apparent that there is no intermediary necessary in the assumption of human nature by the Word; to wit, neither does a soul ‘of a nature to have joy’ intervene between the flesh and the Word (because, from the second article [n.25], a non-intellectual nature could be immediately assumed), nor does grace immediately intervene between the Word and a nature ‘of a nature to have joy’, because a nature could be assumed without its being the case that it would have the habit of grace.

Question Two

Whether the Word assumed the Whole of Human Nature First and Immediately

47. In another way I ask, as to the fact, whether there was any medium of congruity between the Word and the assumed nature – and, in order to include both, namely both an intrinsic medium (as the soul) and an extrinsic one (as grace), I ask whether the Word assumed the whole of human nature first and immediately.

48. That he did not:

Because “he assumed the flesh by means of the soul,” Damascene *Orthodox Faith* chs. 62, 50, Augustine *On the Christian Contest* ch.18 n.20, (and the quote is in Lombard’s text, 3.3, 2.2 n.3).

49. Again, the part is prior, by way of generation, to the whole (as the incomplete is to the complete), according to the Commentator on *Physics* com.28 [“the parts of a thing in accord with its definition precede the thing in being”]; therefore likewise in the case of assumption, because the parts [sc. body and soul] were assumed in the order they were assumable; therefore etc.

50. Further, “that is ‘prior’ where inference as to subsisting does not convert” [*Categories* 12.14a26-35]; but this inference holds, ‘he assumed the whole, therefore he assumed the parts’, but the converse does not hold.

51. Again, if he had assumed the whole first, then what he once assumed he would at some point have let go – as in death, because death was corruptive of the whole, for, if there was a true corruption, then the whole that was before did not exist. The consequence is manifest; the consequent seems false and contrary to Damascene *ibid.* ch.71 [“So although he died as man and his soul was divided from his uncontaminated flesh, yet his inseparable deity remained with both..., and neither was the one hypostasis in this way divided into two hypostases”].

52. Again, about the extrinsic medium, I argue as follows: human nature cannot be united to the Word by beatific union without the habit of grace, and this because both the union itself and the term of the union exceed the ability of created nature; therefore,

since the hypostatic union exceeds more, because it is ‘supreme grace’ according to Augustine *On the Trinity* 13.19 n.24, the consequence is that it could not happen without grace.

53. On the contrary:

If this union were done first part by part, then it is not single.

54. Again, in that case the Word would have been an animal before he was man.

55. Again, as to the second point [sc. an extrinsic medium], the argument is as follows: the general in-falling [sc. creation] is into each nature according to its first existence, not through any intermediate habit in the nature; therefore similarly here, the special in-falling [sc. the assuming of human nature by the Word] will be into this nature first without any intermediate habit.

I. To the Question

56. In this question it is plain there are two questions: one about the intrinsic medium, namely whether any part was intermediate between the Word and the parts, or whether a part (or parts) were intermediate between the Word and the whole, or conversely whether the Word was intermediate between the whole and the parts; the second article is about the extrinsic medium, namely whether grace was the medium between this united nature and the term of the union.

A. About the Intrinsic Medium

1. The Opinion of Others

57. [Exposition of the opinion] – As to the first article, what is said is that the Word assumed the body by the intermediary of the soul [Bonaventure, Aquinas, Richard of Middleton, Henry of Ghent].

58. And the point is expounded in the following way [Henry of Ghent], that the soul was first assumed by the Word, and in the second instant the soul was united with the body, and thereby the Word in the second instant unites the body to his person by the intermediary of the soul, which he united to himself first.

59. Likewise, as to the parts compared with the whole, what is said is that, in the order of execution, the parts were assumed first, but in the order of intention the Word first assumed the whole, just as the whole is by intention prior to the parts.

60. [Rejection of the opinion] – Against the first of these points [n.58], namely about the soul in respect of the body, I argue:

That it seems to follow that Christ is not a man first; for [Henry] argues, against the opinion of the Master of the *Sentences*, that Christ was not a man during the Triduum [the three days in the tomb], because ‘the assumer is not a man save because what is assumed is a man’ – which can, if it be well understood, be expounded as ‘because what is assumed is human nature’; therefore if what is first assumed is not human nature but a part of human nature, the assumer will not be first a man and, as he is disposed to the whole and the parts in the second instant of assumption, so is he disposed now as well [sc. the assumer is not first a man either before he assumes all the parts of human nature or after he has done so, for, by supposition, he is first a part of human nature and only secondly the whole of it]; therefore now too he is not first a man as Socrates is first a man

– but this seems unacceptable, since there seems to be no difference in idea on the part of the predicate in the one case [sc. Christ is a man] and in the other [sc. Socrates is a man], although there is a different mode of predication, as will be touched on below in d.7 nn.16-17. Indeed further, second, it seems to follow that Christ is not a man; the proof is that, if an accident were a composite of essential parts, of a potential *a* and an actual *b*, the subject would not be denominated by the accident, because it would be denominated by *b* alone – for if it were *a*, it would be a subject in respect of an accident composed of *a* and *b*, because *a* is denominated actually by *b*; therefore, by similarity, a human nature composed of soul and body is not asserted denominatively of the Word because of the mere union of the soul with the Word, which union is supposed to be the idea of such denomination, for only then [sc. when body is united with soul] could the body be called ‘man’.³¹

61. Again, incommunicability belongs to the idea of person, and this by reason of the ‘by what’ as has frequently been expounded [3 d.1 n.50, 1 d.2 nn.379-380, d.23 nn.15-16]; this [incommunicability] belongs more to matter than to form, because form is communicated to matter in the whole as giving being to matter; therefore, just as this incommunicability in a nature that is a person in itself is appropriated more to the body than to the soul, so, when a nature is a person in another, then it seems (if there is any order in this case) that the dependence of the body – in order for it to be thus subsistent in itself – is terminated before the dependence of the soul is.

62. Further third: a body is of a nature to subsist in itself; therefore this ‘subsisting in itself’ is not supplied in a body unless the body is assumed directly; for the body is capable of such assumption just as it is capable too of subsistence in itself; when therefore the union of the soul with the Word exists, then, since the body is not

³¹ This argument is stated rather elliptically, but its point seems to be as follows. Suppose that the accident ‘brown’ in ‘brown horse’ were a composite of the subject and the quality, and that the subject were actual and the quality potential with respect to the subject. This supposition is strictly false, for ‘brown’, as an accident said concretely, is actual and actually includes the subject, though obliquely and not directly. However, it creates a parallel with Henry’s supposition about the Word’s assumption of human nature. For, if the accident ‘brown’ is so understood then it is potentially brown before being united to horse and actually brown afterwards (as the body is potentially human before being united to the soul in the Word and actually so afterwards), so that ‘brown’ gets its meaning from ‘brown horse’. ‘Horse’, then, cannot properly be called ‘brown’ for, as subject, it is not the accident but the subject of the accident, and the subject, as such, does not include the accident in its idea. The same problem applies to Henry’s supposition. For since, according to Henry, the Word assumes the soul first and the body through the soul, the Word plus soul is the subject of body. But Henry also says that body in separation from soul (and soul in separation from body) is not human nature, because Christ was not properly a man when his body and soul were separated during the three days in the grave. The assumed body, then, in order to be human body, must include soul in its idea and must mean something like ‘bodied soul’. Thus the assumed body directly includes the subject in its idea, for its subject is the Word plus soul, and, just as the horse cannot properly be the subject of brown and be called brown if ‘brown’ means ‘brown horse’, so the Word plus soul cannot properly be the subject of man and be called man if ‘man’ means ‘bodied soul’. Henry’s supposition, then, must be false and, in order for the Word properly to be called man, the Word must be the subject of ‘bodied soul’ directly and not through the soul, which is to say that the Word must assume soul and body immediately and not the second through the first.

immediately assumed through that union, the potency in the body to be assumed by the Father still exists, and thus the same man may be assumed by two persons – which seems unacceptable because in this way no person will be the man. And yet from these parts, when united, the man exists; therefore he is a man and not a person unless he is a person in himself – which is unacceptable because then the parts will be hypostasized twice, namely intrinsically and extrinsically.

63. Further, there would have then been a new assumption in death, because then the body was united with the Word immediately and not united through the soul, because its order to the soul was in potency only.

64. Further, he was not a man because of these two unions, as was shown in the second reason [n.61], so a third union is required, which would first be the union of the whole, and because of this third union the Word would be a man; but this third union is sufficient by itself without the other two; therefore the other two are superfluous.

2. Scotus' own Opinion

65. As concerns this article [n.56], therefore, a distinction can be drawn about the medium; for just as – between an agent and its action or effect – something can be posited to be medium either as the ‘what’ (as the proximate agent between the remote agent and the effect) or as the ‘by what’ (as the form of the agent), so between the recipient and the received a double medium can be posited, a ‘what’ and a ‘by what’. For just as something can be the reason of acting for something, so can something be the reason of receiving for something; and the medium with respect to the reception of an accident can sometimes be the proper form of the receiver, just as a subject first receives its proper accident through its proper form (as through its proper reason of receiving).

66. As to the issue at hand it can be said that, in the passive assumption of human nature into the Word, there was no medium as ‘what’ between the Word and the whole human nature, but the whole human nature was assumed immediately.

67. The proof is as follows, that what, if left to itself, has first the capacity to be a person in itself, is first a person in another when it is assumed, because the divine personhood supplies the place of the thing’s own personhood; the whole human nature, if left to itself, and not a part or parts of it, is in this way first and immediately able to be a person; therefore etc.

68. The proof of the major is that the whole human nature is a person in another or by another in the same instant of nature in which, if left to itself, it would be a person in itself; for it is not of a nature to be assumed before that instant (because it was not a singular nature before that instant), and it is not assumed after that instant (because after that instant it would be person by itself).

69. The proof of the minor is that in the same instant of nature in which the matter or the form precedes the whole, neither the matter nor the form is of a nature to be a person; but when the whole nature exists from these united parts, then first is the thus united whole a person, if it is not impeded by the assumer.

70. Speaking of medium in the second way [n.65], namely as ‘by what’, one can concede that the soul is the medium in the assumption by the Word – and this with respect to the whole nature, because the soul is the formal idea of this nature, whereby the nature is capable of being united (just as the soul is the formal idea whereby a man, not

only as efficient principle but also as proximate subject, is formally capable of laughter); and just as the soul is the form of the subject, so it can be the form that constitutes the nature, and yet it is the proper reason for the whole nature of receiving this union, because it is the proper reason constituting the whole that is receptive of the union. Nor on this account need the soul be first assumed as the ‘what’, just as neither is the soul capable of laughter as the ‘what’, although it is the ‘by what’ a man is capable of laughter.

71. And by reason of this idea of being medium can the whole nature truly be said to be assumed through the soul, such that the ‘through’ states with respect to the predicate the circumstance of quasi material cause, although, with respect to what is determined through the soul, it states the formal cause –just as also in the statement, ‘man is capable of laughter through the rational soul’, the form of the soul is indicated to be quasi material with respect to the predicate. In this way too the soul can be conceded to be the medium between the flesh and the Word, because the soul is the total form of the nature assumed first and is, for this reason, the medium ‘by which’ the whole nature is what it is and is assumable and is assumed; and the soul is hereby itself assumed, because it is part of the nature assumed first. Thus too is the flesh in its own way assumable and assumed.

3. Three Doubts against Scotus’ Opinion

a. Statement of the Doubts

72. But there is, as to the first member of the distinction [n.65], a doubt here what the nature is that is said to be assumed first [nn.66-67], namely whether it is some being other than the parts. The Commentator, *Physics* 1 com.17, seems to say that, although a whole is other than the parts or other than each part separately, yet it is not other than all the parts together; and if this were so, since there is no real assumption save of a real thing, then the assuming of the whole would be nothing other than the assuming of all the parts. Also, if the whole is a being other than the parts, there is a doubt whether it is other by some absolute entity or by some relative one. And, third, there is a doubt whether there is any form of the whole other than the form that is a part.

b. Solution of the Doubts

73. [As to the first doubt] – As to the first doubt, I show that a whole is a being different from all of the parts jointly and separately.

First, because otherwise the difference between ‘whole’ and ‘one’ in *Metaphysics* 8.6.1045a7-33 would not be true, for it is said there that a single whole that is per se one is other than a single whole that is one by aggregation (as a pile or a heap), and this latter whole is merely its parts. The inferred consequent seems unacceptable, first from *Metaphysics ibid.* [where it is said that a heap has no cause of its being one but a whole does], and second because also a whole that is per accidens one is more one than a whole by aggregation and less one than a whole that is per se one – and yet a whole that is per accidens one is not merely its parts, for, according to the Philosopher *Metaphysics* 7.12.1037b14-18 ‘On the Unity of Definition’, a white man is a ‘one something’ by the fact that whiteness is in the man; he would not therefore be such a single whole if whiteness did not inform him.

74. Further, the per se ‘term to which’ of generation is something that has its proper entity, because generation proceeds to the being of its proper term; but the whole, not one or other part of it, is the ‘term to which’ of generation; indeed, if each part were to pre-exist and then first be united, the generation or production would no less be of the very composite – just as, in the case of resurrection, given that both the soul and the body as to their entity pre-existed, resuscitation would still be of the whole composite; but resuscitation would not be to the being of the body or of the soul, nor to both beings; therefore to some third thing different from them.

75. Third, one can argue similarly about corruption, following the argument of the Philosopher at the end of *Metaphysics* 7 (17.1041b11-17), because *a* and *b* remain and not *ab*, and the same thing cannot really remain and not really remain, so *ab* is something other really than *a* and *b*; therefore, since so it is in the case of all per se composites, namely that it is not repugnant to the idea of parts that they should remain and the whole not, therefore there will be some entity proper to the whole itself that is different from the entity of the parts.

76. Again fourth, because otherwise [sc. if what is asserted in the first paragraph of n.73 is not true] nothing would be per se caused by the intrinsic causes, namely by matter and form; for because these causes cause this composite, it is plain that these causes are parts of the thing caused; but these causes are not parts of the other part nor of both parts, because neither one nor both of them are caused, for they are themselves the first causes and the first principles of the thing; therefore etc.

77. Again, it would follow, fifth, that there was no being where the proper feature and operation or any proper accident would per se exist, because these exist in the species and not in the matter or form of the species, nor in both matter and form together save as matter and form are a unity in some per se whole.

78. [To the second doubt] – About the second doubt [n.72], I say that a whole is also a different being and with a different absolute entity, because a mere respect would not suffice for calling some whole being a per se one, for in the case of a single whole that is per accidens one there is a per se respect – and an essential respect – between part and part, as is plain of the dependence of an accident on a subject; likewise, the quiddities of all absolutes, as including matter and form and as being definable (for they are definable species as such) are not just relative entities formally, which, however, they would have to be if the proper entity of a whole were a respect.

79. This conclusion also follows from the reasons given for the first doubt [nn.73-77], for no generation is per se toward a respect as to the term to which [n.74]; nor either is corruption from a mere respect as from the term from which [n.75]; nor are absolute causes causes of something merely relational [n.76]; nor does a proper feature follow a whole precisely insofar as the whole is relational, nor either does a proper operation so follow nor any absolute accident [n.77]; nor finally does being able to assign a specific difference for all quiddities seem possible, because positing a difference merely of respects between united parts does not seem possible [n.73]. Also, as to the issue at hand, it does not seem possible for a respect to be the proper idea of founding a relation of union with the Word – which, however, should be possible when positing that the whole is assumed in the way before stated [nn.65-71], if the entity of the whole, as distinct from the parts, not be posited as being absolute.

80. [To the third doubt] – As to the third doubt I say that if in a whole there is understood to be, aside from the form of the part (of which sort in man is the intellective soul), another form supervening on it as it were that is also something of the whole itself and yet is called the form of the whole by distinguishing this form from the form of the part (because it more completely constitutes the whole than the other form does), then this understanding is false; for in that case there would be in man some form constituting man that is more perfect than the intellective soul, which is unacceptable. Likewise, if this third doubt rests on a reason taken from the perfection of the whole, namely that a one would not be made from the matter and form (each of which is a part) save through some form uniting these parts, which form would be the form of the whole, then this reason would entail a process to infinity; for I ask, as to this form, how it makes a one along with the matter and form of a part. If it does so of itself, then the same could be granted about the form of a part, that it is of itself of a nature to make a one along with the matter; if it does so through something else, there will be a process to infinity.

81. I say then that over and above the form that perfects the matter and is thereby said to be a form of a part (and understanding this to be the ultimate form, when positing several forms in the same thing), there is no need to posit some form perfecting as it were both the matter and form, because matter and form are in the whole not parts of the same idea or elements that are perfectible by some third act, but one [sc. matter] is the perfectible proper and the other [sc. form] is act; and this reason is why they make a per se one, from *Metaphysics* 8.6.1045a7-8, 23-25.³²

82. If however the form of the whole is understood not to be something constituting the whole but to be the whole nature, as the quiddity, then in this way it can well be conceded that the form of the whole is other than the form of a part and that the nature of quiddity can be called form (the point is plain from the Philosopher *Metaphysics* 5.2.1013a26-27, ‘On Cause’³³); but that there is some form other than the form of a part is plain from the first article here touched on [nn.73-75].

83. But in respect of what is it the form?

I reply by saying that it is the form in respect of the whole composite, not indeed the informing form but the form whereby the composite is a quidditative being; and in this way the whole being formally is the form of the whole (the way a white thing is said to be white by whiteness); not indeed that the form of the whole is as it were the cause of it, causing the whole as it were along with the matter and the partial form, but it is the whole itself precisely considered, in the way that Avicenna speaks of it in his *Metaphysics* 5 ch.1, “horseness is only horseness.”³⁴

³² Aristotle: “As to the doubt what the cause is of being a one..., if this is matter but that form, and this indeed is in potency but that in act, the question asked will seem no longer in doubt.” Scotus’ commentary *ad loc.*, sect.1 ch.6 n.37: “One must note that the strength of this solution stands in this fact...that man...is per se one insofar as he is composed of matter and form as of potency and act; nor is any cause to be sought why these make a one other than that the former is as potency while the latter is as act.”

³³ Aristotle, “But in another way cause is said to be the species [form] and exemplar; this then is the idea of the ‘what it was to be’ [the quiddity].” Scotus’ commentary *ad loc.*, sect.1 ch.2 n.17, “For form belongs most of all to the quiddity of a thing... One must note that the form of a thing is called the species, insofar as it is the principle of being and of specification.”

³⁴ Avicenna, “Although the universal itself would be man or horse, the intention in this case is different, additional to the intentionality that is humanity or horseness; for the definition of

84. And if you ask for the causes of this entity, I say that it is a third from its causes and comes from them causally and not from other causes; and as to why such and such causes cause and constitute a third entity, different from themselves, which is a per se one [sc. in the case of substance], and as to why other causes cause a third entity, different from themselves, which is not a per se one [sc. in the case of substance and accident], there is no reason other than that the former entities of causes are such as they are and that the latter are of a different idea. The Philosopher insinuates this in *Metaphysics* 8 [n.81] where, responding to a question about the unity of the composite, how from matter and form it becomes a per se one, he assigns as cause that ‘this is per se act, that is per se potency’; and just as this is act per se and that potency per se, so this whole is one per se; and just as this is act per accidens and that potency per accidens, so this constituted whole is one per accidens. But as to why this entity is act per se with respect to this thing and another entity is only per accidens with respect to something else has no reason other than that an entity of this sort is ‘this entity’; for, just as between the hot and heating there is no middle in genus of efficient cause, so neither between this form and thus informing [sc. informing a substance as opposed to a substance and accident] is there any middle in genus of formal cause; but just as the hot heats insofar as it is hot and not because of anything else, so the soul thus perfects and thus constitutes insofar as it is soul.

85. It is thus plain, therefore, with respect to this doubt [sc. the third, nn.72, 80], that there is a medium of congruity [nn. 46-47] of the union of human nature with the Word, namely that the medium is the whole nature constituted from the parts, which is a certain absolute third thing, different from each and both of the parts jointly and separately.

c. To the Authority of the Commentator Adduced in the First Doubt

86. And therefore the remark that was adduced from the Commentator on the *Physics* [n.72], namely that ‘the matter and form together’ are the same as ‘the whole’ and conversely, has no weight. For it fails in this case as in others by reason of the fact that no distinction is drawn between what is per se and what concurs as a necessary requisite; the ‘to be’ indeed of the whole is necessarily accompanied by the union of the parts and conversely, and yet the union is not the ‘to be’, because union is a respect and ‘to be’ is an absolute – just as the order of efficient causes, when there are many efficient causes that are ordered and in proximity to each other, is a necessary prerequisite for the causing of an effect, and yet the order or the proximity are not the ‘to be’ of the effect but the absolute ‘to be’ alone is. Nor is it unacceptable that some absolute depend on and pre-require – or at any rate in some way co-require – some respect; for universally any absolute that is caused by several causes necessarily pre-requires the union and proximity of those causes in their causing. And thus here, in the case of the hypostatic union, it can

horseness is other than the definition of universality, and universality is not included in the definition of horseness... Horseness, therefore, from the fact that many things come together in its definition, is common but, from the fact it is taken along with indicated properties and accidents, it is singular. Horseness then in itself is just horseness... For humanity itself, from the fact it is humanity, is something additional to any of the things mentioned [sc. the accidents and properties of this man], and in its definition nothing is taken but humanity alone.”

be the case that the whole entity of the whole is absolute even though it necessarily pre-require or co-require the union of the absolute parts.

B. About the Extrinsic Medium

87. [The opinion of others] – As to the second principal article [n.56], about the extrinsic medium, the position is taken [Aquinas, Bonaventure] that grace was the medium of congruity in this [hypostatic] union.

88. [Rejection of the opinion] – Against this position I argue first that in the instant of nature in which the nature would be a person in itself if it were not assumed, it would, in the same instant, be a person in another when it is assumed (this was made clear in the first article [n.56]); but it would naturally first be a person in itself before it had the habit of grace, because the habit is the principle of operating and consequently is the perfection of that to which operating belongs; but to operate belongs to a supposit; therefore the nature would first naturally have the idea of supposit in itself before it had any grace or habit, which alone is the principle of operating. Therefore when it is assumed too it is naturally united first before grace is given to it; therefore grace is not the medium.

89. There is also a confirmation, because what belongs in itself to another belongs to it before something else does if that something else belongs to it per accidens; nature, if left to itself, would be a person in itself and of itself; therefore that would belong to nature first before the accidental habit did.

90. Again, *John* 1.14, “We saw his glory as of the only begotten from the Father” – where John seems to say that ‘to be only begotten’ is the proximate reason for the congruence whereby he [the Lord] has the fullness of grace; therefore the nature was subsistent in the Word before so great a grace was conferred on it, because it would seem improper for so great a fullness of grace to be conferred on the nature in an instant in which the nature is understood not to be united with the Word.

91. Further, the grace would not formally unite [nature with the Word] (as is plain), so grace would be disposed in idea of a disposition in the other extreme; but this is false,^a because the nature itself, where grace is, is a person, and for that reason all its accidents are united to the person accidentally and mediately; therefore in the case of this union no accident could have been the medium (just as neither is whiteness the medium in the union of surface with body).

a. [Interpolation] because the real and actual existence of an accident presupposes, in the order of nature, the real existence of the subject; but grace is in the soul of Christ as an accident in a subject; therefore its real and actual existence presupposes the real existence of the soul. But the soul of Christ only had real existence in the Word; therefore the soul was assumed by the Word first in the order of nature before it was the subject of grace.

II. To the Principal Arguments

92. To the principal arguments.

To the first [n.48] the answer is plain, because the authorities are to be understood as speaking about the medium ‘by which’ and not the medium ‘which’.

93. To the second [n.49] I say that something can be prior in itself to another when not comparing them to a third thing, as the parts of my nature are prior to my whole nature in the order of generation or execution, but not when comparing them to being a person, because my parts are not a person before my whole nature is. So too is it in the case of being a person in an extraneous person; and the reason is that, in the instant of nature in which the whole is whole, it is able to be a person in itself or in another – and therefore, whatever precedes it does not precede in ability to be a person, because it is not, as prior, able to be a person.

94. To the next [n.50] I say that not everything that is prior in consequence is naturally prior, that is, causally prior (or prior as something is said to be prior in execution by priority of material cause, or said to be prior in intention by priority of formal cause). Likewise, according to the Philosopher in the *Categories* 12.14b11-22,³⁵ what is prior in causality can be simultaneous in consequence, “for being a man converts in consequence with true speech about man,” and yet the being of the thing is prior in causality, “for speech is true or false by the fact that the thing is or is not.” So here, priority in consequence can stand along with non-priority in causing, as is universally the case with an accident that is necessarily consequent to a number of things, as hot is to fire and air; that is why fire and air are consequent according to consequence and yet in causality the hot is posterior to both of them; so it is in the issue at hand, that although the being-assumed of the parts follows the being-assumed of the whole and not conversely, yet the second is not prior in causality. However, it could be said that, in the way in which the parts are assumed, the being-assumed of the parts and the being-assumed of the whole are convertible.

95. To the next [n.51] I say that if Christ truly died then, since the corruption of the body is not nothing, one can truly say that he had some entity in death that he did not have alive; but he did not, as far as concerns the essential parts of the nature, put aside the nature he assumed. And such is the understanding of Damascene (as is plain there in ch.71), and not something different; he means in ch.73³⁶ that the soul and body in death were never in their own hypostasis but in that of the Word.

96. But a doubt remains, because it seems that in death there was a new assumption of a part in itself that was not united before.

97. On this point see the solution in d.16 n.39 infra.

98. To the last argument [n.52] I say that, if ‘grace’ is taken for the gratuitous will of God, then God is said to do this from grace because he is said to do everything gratuitously that is included the less in a thing and exceeds the faculty of it the more; and, in this way, because ‘subsisting in the word’ exceeds the faculty of created nature, so God does this gratuitously and with supreme grace, that is, with his supreme condescending gratuitous will, because conferring on nature what nature can least attain

³⁵ Aristotle, “...there is another way of being prior; for, in the case of things that convert according to consequence of essence, that which is in some way cause of the other is rightly said to be prior in nature..., for being a man converts in consequence of substance with true speech about it...; but the thing seems to be in some way the cause that the speech is true, for speech is said to be true or false because the thing is or is not.”

³⁶ Damascene, “In death...neither soul nor body had their own hypostasis besides that of the Word, but there was always the one hypostasis of the Word and not two.”

of itself and what most exceeds it. But if ‘grace’ is understood as an informing created habit, then, although this is concomitant to the united nature, it is yet not necessary for the union. And so, when it is then argued [n.52], as by an argument *a minore*, that grace is necessary for the beatific union, I say that, as to the hypostatic union, the conclusion does not follow, because beatific union is through operation and second act, and for this union the soul has no power unless it have the form [sc. grace] – but this [hypostatic] union is to first existence, and for this no accident in the united nature is presupposed, just as also for first supernatural existence, which is had through the habit of grace, nothing further raising up the nature is required; for thus there would be a process to infinity, as always one natural thing would be disposing it for another. And just as what gives first act in this case could perfect nature immediately, so can the existence communicated by the Word be the immediate principle of the [hypostatic] union.

Question Three

Whether the Organization and Animation of the Body Preceded the Incarnation

99. Whether the organization and animation of the body preceded the incarnation.

100. That they did:

Because [William of Ware] the body of Christ was generated “from the most pure blood” of the blessed Virgin, according to Damascene [*Orthodox Faith* ch.46]; but the generated body is more dense than the blood from which it is generated, according to Damascene [*ibid.*, ch.50]; therefore the blood occupies less space and consequently the formation or conception or generation was necessarily accompanied by local motion; and that not in an instant, so not along with the incarnation either (which happened in an instant), nor after it; therefore before it.

101. Further, the organized body had a different figure from the blood it was generated from, and the body was differently formed, because the blood was uniform in its parts but not so the organized body; therefore it occupied a different place; therefore the formation required local motion; therefore it happened in time and beforehand.

102. Further, every generable and corruptible substance that is not created but produced is produced through alteration; all the matter assumed by the Word is generable and corruptible – and it was not immediately created because it came from blood; therefore it was produced through alteration and consequently a potential part of the whole was altered into the form of the same whole; therefore this potential part was first under the privation opposed to that form, and this prior in time because privative opposites cannot be in the same thing at the same time. Therefore the body was non-animated prior in time to being animated.

103. On the contrary:

There is the Master in the text [3 d.2 ch.3] and Damascene; and again, Damascene [*ibid.*, ch.46] says, “at the same time flesh, at the same time flesh of the Word of God, at the same time animated flesh.”

I. To the Question

104. I say that the question can be understood of priority in time or of priority in nature.

A. Of Priority in Time

105. The first way has two articles: namely about the order of animation in relation to incarnation, and second of the order of organization in relation to animation.

1. Of the Order of Animation in Relation to Incarnation

106. As to the first article I say that animation did not precede incarnation in time, because then the nature would at some point have been a person in itself (and not in the Word), namely as soon as there was animated flesh.

107. Proof of the consequence:

For the animated body, if it is at any time subsistent in itself, is a person. The consequent is false, because then the blessed Virgin would not have been the true Mother of God; for she would not have borne God but that pure man whose nature would afterwards have been united to God. This consequent is against Damascene [*ibid.*, ch.56], who determines, against Nestorius, that the blessed Virgin was true Mother of God and not of some pure man only. The consequence is plain, because the whole idea of the maternity of Mary was complete in the production of that nature.

2. Of the Order of Organization in Relation to Animation

108. As to the other point, about complete organization [n.105], I say that organization can be understood:

On the one hand either as the final induction of the form immediately disposing it [the body] to the soul – according to one opinion [Avicenna, William of Auvergne, et al.] – or as the induction of the intellective soul – according to another opinion that posits the organic body to exist formally by the soul [Aquinas et al.].³⁷

109. Or, on the other hand, organization can be understood as the change preceding the ultimate induction of the organic form, disposing it to intellective form; but two changes precede, namely the local motion whereby the matter is taken to the place proper for generation, and the alteration by which the matter in the due place is altered and disposed for the inducing of the form of the organic body.

110. And in this second way [n.109] – according to an opinion that posits the heterogeneous parts of the organic body to differ in species [infra d.4 n.38] – many generations and many changes can be posited; for just as the parts have different quidditative substantial forms, so there is a different generation for each of them and there is a proper alteration for each generation; and also, further, one can posit that not all these generations are simultaneous but that one precedes another in time, and thus one alteration disposing to one generation is naturally prior to another.

111. But however it may be with these matters, one can say that organization taken in the first way [n.108], namely the organization whereby the body is said to be

³⁷ This question about the unity or plurality of substantial forms is discussed extensively by Scotus in *Ordinatio* 4 d.11 q.3.

organized, does not precede animation in time, even in our own case, because then a father would in no way generate a man (as is plain from Augustine [rather, Fulgentius] *On the Faith to Peter* n.60, before the end, “Hold most firmly and in no way doubt that God the Word made flesh has one person of his divinity and his flesh, for God the Word deigned to unite full human nature truly to himself,” and Damascene ch.46 [n.103]); for the whole of a father’s action would be complete in duration first before the soul was complete; but he does not generate a man whose whole action is complete in time prior to and before a man is complete.

112. But if the discussion be about organization in the second way [n.109], one must hold that all inductions of partial substantial forms, even if there be many of them, yet take place in the same instant, and no part is prior in time to another, because no part assumed by the Word ever pre-existed in its own supposit – and this is what would have happened if any part had existed prior in time.

113. But as to the transference of matter to the place proper for generation, and as to the alteration preceding the generation of the whole or the generation of the parts [n.109], there is doubt whether these preceded the incarnation in time or existed in the same instant as it; for if they are posited as having existed together in time, then it seems more possible to save the fact that Mary cooperated in these motions (on this question see *infra d.4 n.41*) – and if the whole is posited as having happened in an instant, so that there was no local motion there nor any successive change, then the fact is more saved that in the ultimate instant of the Virgin’s express consent the Word-man existed in the Virgin’s womb, because before that instant there does not seem to have been any operation specific to the incarnation, and in that instant the whole incarnation seems to have been complete.

B. Of Priority in Nature

114. About priority in nature, it seems one should say that the foundation of the relation naturally precedes the relation, because – according to the Philosopher *Categories* 7.6a36-37 and to Augustine *On the Trinity* 7.1 n.2 – what is nothing in itself is nothing in relation to another [cf. 1 d.3 n.31], and the whole nature is the foundation of this relation (from the previous question, n.86); therefore the entity of the whole nature naturally precedes the incarnation and so animation naturally precedes it as well; but animation is naturally preceded by the organization of the whole, according to one opinion, or at least is simultaneous with it, according to the other opinion about forms [n.108].

II. To the Principal Arguments

115. To the first argument [n.100] I say that if it were conceded that the alteration precedes the incarnation in time, it could be said that, along with the alteration, there was occupation of a lesser place (as is universally the case with any condensing), and so there would be posited one per se local motion there, by which the matter was removed to a place appropriate for generation, and another per accidens local motion concomitant to the generation of the denser body, by which a lesser place would be occupied; and, in the ultimate instant of condensing, all the partial forms and the whole form of the organic

body would be induced and, in that instant, the whole would be assumed, though in a certain order of nature. – But if it be posited that the alteration did not precede, then it can be posited that the occupation of a lesser place was sudden, and this by divine power, provided however that created virtue could not cooperate with it (discussion of which is contained in d.4 n.46 infra).

116. The same point must be made in answer to the second argument, about figura[n] [n.101].

117. To the third [n.102] I say that alteration properly speaking is between privation and form, as is plain in *Physics* 5.1.225a7-18, and not between negation and form [cf. 4 d.10 p.1 q.2 n.19]; but privation is a negation in something naturally fit [sc. for the relevant form, *Categories* 10.12a29-31]; and therefore, when the form is produced simultaneously with what receives it, there is properly no alteration to that form,^a but only alteration to what is receptive of it. But since here [sc. the hypostatic union] the intellective soul is induced (even in our own case) simultaneously with the being of the organic body, there is properly no alteration to the soul but only to the being of the organic body; and the subject of this alteration is the matter that existed before under the form of blood. – And when in the major is taken [n.102] that ‘every generable and corruptible form, if it is not immediately created, receives being through alteration of the subject’, this proposition must be denied if it is understood to mean that being is received through an alteration of which the form is first the term, and if it is understood to be about alteration properly speaking; however the proposition can be conceded if, namely, it is about an alteration of a thing some part of which is the term, and it is about alteration commonly speaking. So here [sc. the hypostatic union] the term of the alteration properly speaking is the organic body, which is some part of the animated body.

a. [Interpolation] because what is receptive was not under privation before it was under form, nor was it naturally fit to have form before it had it.

Third Distinction

Question One

Whether the Blessed Virgin was Conceived in Original Sin

1. About the third distinction I ask whether the blessed Virgin was conceived in original sin.^a

a. [Interpolation] About this third distinction, where the Master deals with the quality of the nature assumed, two questions are asked: one about the Mother, and the other about the Offspring. The first is whether the blessed Virgin was conceived in original sin; the second is about the sanctification of the body of Christ, namely why and how it did not contract original sin. Argument is made about the first.

2. That she was:

“In Adam all sinned,” *Romans* 5.12, but only because all were in Adam as to seed-reasons; thus was the blessed Virgin in Adam; therefore etc.

3. Again, Damascene *Orthodox Faith* ch.48, “The Holy Spirit purified her;” there is no purifying save from sin; therefore she had sin; not actual sin; therefore etc.

4. Further Augustine [rather Fulgentius] *On the Faith to Peter* n.69, “Most firmly hold and do not at all doubt that every man who is conceived by the lying together of man and woman is born with original sin” (and the authority is in Lombard’s text 2 d.30 ch.7 n.4); but the blessed Virgin Mary was conceived by the lying together etc.; therefore etc.

5. Again Augustine [*On the Gospel of John* tr.4 n.10] on *John* 1.29, ‘Behold the lamb of God etc.’, says, “Only he is innocent who did not so come,” namely did not come by common propagation.

6. Again Pope Leo *On the Nativity of the Lord* [serm.1 ch.1], “Just as he found none free of guilt, so he came for the freeing of all;” therefore etc.

7. Again Jerome on *Psalm* 21.21, ‘And my only one from the hand of the dog’, seems to say the same thing [*Ps.-Jerome Breviary on the Psalms*, “The ‘dogs’, the Jews; ‘my only one’, that is the soul of Christ. It is called ‘the only one’ because that soul did not have sin, and other souls are cleansed by it”].

8. Again the decree ‘On Consecration’ at ‘Nativity’, and in the gloss [Gratian, *Decretum* p.3 d.3 ch.1, “Announcement must be made to the laity so that they may know the times for celebrating feast days during the year, namely: every Sunday... And to be celebrated during the year are these days: the Birthday of the Lord...., the Nativity of his holy Mother... But the other festivities during the year are neither compulsory for being celebrated nor forbidden.” Huguccio Pisanus *Glosses on Gratian* p.3 d.3 ch.1, “Nothing is said in the *Decretum* about the feast of the Conception [of the Virgin], for it is not to be celebrated the way it is done in many regions, and especially in England; and the reason is that she was conceived in sin as were also the other saints – the single exception being the person of Christ”].

9. Further, Bernard says about her conception that “she was conceived in original sin” [*Sermons, On the Assumption of blessed Mary*, serm.2 n.8, “She contracted the original stain from her parents..., for it is agreed by all that Mary was cleansed of original sin by grace alone”].

10. Again Anselm *Why God Man* 2.16 [“The Virgin herself, from whom Christ is assumed, was conceived in sin, and in sin did her mother conceive her and with original sin was she born, since she too sinned in Adam, in whom all have sinned”].

11. Again this same thing is maintained by Bernard in a certain epistle, and he proves that she was not sanctified before her conception (as is plain), nor in her conception, because lust was there [Bernard, *Epistle to the Canons of Lyons* n.7, “Whence then comes the sanctity of her conception? Is it said that this was by preventient sanctification...? But she was not able to be holy before she existed; indeed she did not exist before she was conceived. Or perhaps it is said...that she was sanctified and conceived at the same time? Neither, indeed, does reason admit this...; how was sin not there where lust was not lacking?... What is left is to believe that she received sanctification when already existing in the womb after conception”].

12. On the contrary:

Augustine *On Nature and Grace* ch.36 n.42 (and it is in Lombard’s text), “When sin is under discussion, I wish no question to be raised about Mary.”

13. And Anselm *On the Virginal Conception* ch.18, “It was fitting that the Virgin should shine with that purity than which no greater below God can be conceived;” but a pure innocence below God of the sort that was in Christ can be conceived; therefore etc.

I. To the Question
A. The Common Opinion
1. Exposition of the Opinion

14. The common statement is, yes [that Mary was conceived in original sin], because of the authorities taken up, and because of arguments from two middle terms:³⁸

One of these is the excellence of the Son himself;³⁹ for, as universal redeemer, he opened the door for everyone; but if blessed Mary had not contracted original sin she

³⁸ Vatican editors: Alexander of Hales, *ST* 3 n.75, “The blessed Virgin could not have been sanctified in her parents; on the contrary, it was necessary that she would contract sin from her parents in being generated;” n.76, “The blessed Virgin could not have been sanctified in her conception;” n.78, “The glorious Virgin was sanctified in her mother’s womb before her birth after infusion of soul in her body.” Albert the Great *Sentences* 3 d.3 a.4, “The blessed Virgin was not sanctified before animation; and to say the opposite is a heresy;” ad 1, “This statement is false: that the Holy Spirit preceded her soul in the body by sanctifying grace inhabiting the body;” a.5, “She was sanctified before birth from the womb..., more probably soon after animation.” Thomas Aquinas *Sentences* 3 d.3 a.1 a.1 q.2, “The sanctification of the blessed Virgin could not have fittingly been before the infusion of the soul, because she was not yet capable of grace; but nor even in the very instant of infusion, namely so that by the grace then infused in her she would have been preserved from incurring original guilt;” a.2 q.2 ad 3, “Christ’s Virgin Mother was indeed infected with original sin, but she was cleansed of it before she was born from the womb;” *Quodlibet* 6 q.5 a.1, “Now the blessed Virgin proceeded thus from Adam...and therefore she was conceived in original sin...The belief is... that she was sanctified quickly after conception and infusion of soul.” Bonaventure *Sentences* 3 d.3 p.1 a.1 q.2, “Now the position of others is that the sanctification of the Virgin was subsequent to the contraction of original sin...And this way of speaking is more common and more reasonable and more safe...Adhering to this position...let us hold...that the sanctification of the Virgin was after contraction of original sin.” Richard of Middleton *Sentences* 3 d.3 princ.1 q.1, “The soul...of the Virgin, from its union with the flesh, contracted original sin.” Giles of Rome *Sentences* 3 d.3 q.1 a.1, “We will say that she was conceived in original sin as are also other women, but it is piously believed that almost immediately after she was conceived in original sin she was cleansed of it and sanctified in the womb;” also *Quodlibet* 6 q.20. Many other authors too.

³⁹ Vatican editors: John de la Rochelle *Quaestiones Disputatae* q.1, “If the blessed Virgin...does not have the guilt of sin she does not need redemption...She was redeemed by Christ; therefore she was conceived in sin.” Bonaventure *Sentences* 3 d.3 p.1 a.1 q.2 arg.5 in opp., “If then the blessed Virgin lacked original sin, it seems that she does not belong to the redemption of Christ; but there is great glory for Christ from the saints whom he has redeemed; therefore, if he did not redeem the blessed Virgin, he is deprived of the noblest glory...; this is a profane and impious thing to say.” Thomas Aquinas *Sentences* 3 d.3 q.1 a.1 qc.2, “Christ singly has this among the human race, that he does not need redemption, because he is our head but it belongs to all to be redeemed through him; but this could not be if any soul were found which had never been infected with the original stain; and therefore this was conceded neither to the Virgin nor to anyone else besides Christ;” *Quodlibet* 6 q.5 a.1; *ST* IIIa q.27 a.2, “If the blessed Virgin had not incurred the stain of original guilt...she would not have needed the redemption and salvation that comes through Christ...; but this is unacceptable, that Christ was not the savior of all men.” Bonaventure *Sentences* 3 d.3 p.1 a.1 q.2 arg.6 in opp., “Again, if the blessed Virgin did not have original sin, and if to none the door is closed save as desert for original sin, then it seems that, if she had died before Christ, she would at once have flown to heaven; therefore it does not seem that the door was opened to all by Christ.”

would not have needed a redeemer and her Son would not have opened the door for her, because it would not have been closed to her (for it is only closed because of sin, and especially original sin).^a

a. [Interpolation] Again Augustine in book 1 on the baptism of infants [*On the Merits of Sinners* 1.29 n.57] says, “Only Christ was born without sin [whom the Virgin conceived without male embrace].” Again in book 2 [*ibid.*, 2.29 n.47] the same Augustine says that the barrier came through sin, and because of it men were excluded from the entrance of the heavenly fatherland, and the door was opened by the passion of Christ; therefore the blessed Virgin, if she had been without sin and had died before the passion of her Son, would have entered heaven, and so the door would not have been opened for all by Christ; consequently the blessed Virgin would not have needed the redemption of her Son.

15. The second middle term comes from what is evident in the blessed Virgin:⁴⁰

For she was propagated according to the common law and consequently her body was propagated by and formed from infected seed – and so the same idea of infection was in her body as is also in the body of anyone else propagated from the origin; and since the soul is infected by the infected body, the same idea of infection was in her soul as is also in the souls of others commonly propagated.

16. Likewise, she had the penalties common to human nature (as thirst, hunger, and the like), which are inflicted on us because of original sin;⁴¹ and these were not voluntarily taken up by her, because she was not our redeemer and repairer, for then her Son would not have been the general redeemer of all; therefore, they were inflicted on her by God – and not unjustly inflicted; therefore they were inflicted after sin, and thus she was not innocent.

2. Rejection of the Opinion

a. Against the First Reason

17. Against the first reason [n.14] the argument that she did not contract original sin is taken from the excellence of her Son – insofar as he was redeemer, reconciler, and mediator.

For the most perfect mediator has the most perfect act of mediating possible with respect to some person for whom he mediates; therefore Christ had the most perfect

⁴⁰ Vatican editors: Bonaventure *Sentences* 3 d.3 p.1 a.1 q.2, “Being precedes well being; therefore the soul was first united to the flesh before the grace of God was infused in it... So it is necessary to posit that the infection of original guilt was there before sanctification was.” Thomas Aquinas *Sentences* 3 d.3 q.3 a.1 qc.1 and ad 1; *Quodlibet* 6 q.5 a1, “Now the blessed Virgin proceeded thus from Adam, because she was born from the commingling of the sexes, as others also are; and therefore she was conceived with original sin and is included in the totality of them, about which totality the Apostle says in *Romans* 5, ‘in whom all have sinned,’ and from this totality Christ alone is excepted;” *ST IIIa* q.27 a.2 ad 4. Also references in Richard of Middleton, Henry of Ghent, Giles of Rome.

⁴¹ Vatican editors: Bonaventure *Sentences* 3 d.3 p.1 a.1 q.1, “Almost everyone holds that the blessed Virgin had original sin, since this is apparent from the manifold penalties in her, which one cannot say she suffered for the redemption of others, and which one cannot say she had by assuming them – but by contraction [of sin];” d.15 a.1 q.3 ad4. Thomas Aquinas *ST IIIa* 1.27 a.3 arg.1.

degree of mediating possible with respect to some person with respect to whom he was mediator; but with respect to no person did he have a more excellent degree than with respect to Mary; therefore etc.

18. But this would not be the case unless he had merited to preserve her from original sin. I prove it in three ways: first in comparison to God to whom he reconciles; second in comparison to the evil from which he liberates; third by comparison to the obligation of the person whom he reconciled.

19. [In comparison to God to whom he reconciles] – To see the first proof I set down an example in agreement with Anselm's example in *Why God Man* 2.16: someone, when offending a king, injures the king so much that the king is offended in all the person's natural sons and, being offended, disinherits him [and them] etc.; this offence is set down as not to be remitted unless someone innocent offers to the king some obedience that placates and pleases the king more than the sin was offensive to him; someone does offer an obedience thus pleasing, and reconciles the sons to the king so that they are not disinherited; yet the king is offended in each son, although he afterwards remits the offense because of the merits of the mediator. But if the mediator could supremely and most perfectly please the king, he would anticipate the king with respect to some son such that the king would not be offended in that son – for this would be greater than if the king remits now to the son an offense held against him; nor is this impossible, since the offense does not come from the son's own guilt but was contracted from another.

20. From this example the argument goes as follows: no one supremely or most perfectly placates someone for someone's contracting an offense unless he can prevent that someone from being offended in the other, for if he placates him so as to remit the offense when he is already offended, he does not most perfectly placate him; and indeed in the issue at hand God is not offended in the soul because of an interior motion in God himself, but only because of guilt in that very soul; therefore Christ does not most perfectly placate the Trinity for Adam's sons contracting guilt if he does not prevent the Trinity from being offended in someone and if the soul of some son of Adam does not have such guilt – and consequently some soul of some son of Adam does not have such guilt, or it is possible that he not have the guilt.

21. [In comparison to the evil from which he liberates] – In the second way the argument is twofold:

First, because the most perfect mediator merits the removal of all punishment from him whom he reconciles; but original guilt is a greater punishment than the lack itself of the divine vision, as was made clear in 2 d.36 nn.170-173, because sin is for an intellectual nature the greatest of all its punishments; therefore if Christ has most perfectly reconciled us to God, he merited to take away from someone this gravest of punishments – but not from anyone but his Mother, therefore etc. This is confirmed by the example, because if the greatest punishment for a son of Adam were that the king was offended in him, no one would most perfectly reconcile him unless he took away from him not only his being disinherited but also his being an enemy of the king's, etc.

22. In this same second way the argument proceeds secondly as follows: Christ seems more immediately to have been our repairer and reconciler from original sin than from actual sin, because the necessity for the incarnation and passion of Christ is commonly assigned to original sin [Alexander of Hales, Bonaventure, Aquinas, Richard

of Middleton]; but it is commonly supposed [Albert the Great, Bonaventure, Aquinas, Peter of Tarentaise (Innocent V), Richard of Middleton] that Christ was a very perfect mediator of some person, to wit Mary, because he preserved her from all actual sin; therefore, similarly, he preserved her from original sin.

23. [In comparison to the obligation of the person whom he reconciled] – In the third way I argue as follows: a reconciled person is not supremely obliged to a mediator unless he have from him the highest good that can be had from him; but the innocence in question, namely preservation from contracted sin or from contracting sin, can be had through the mediator; therefore no person will be supremely bound to Christ as mediator if Christ preserved no one from original sin.

24. And if you say that a person to whom sin is remitted is [not?] equally as much bound as a person who is preserved from sin, because of the saying of *Luke* 7.47, ‘He who is forgiven more loves more’ – look at the response there of Augustine,⁴² that all non-committed sins are dismissed as if they were committed sins; indeed, it is a more excellent kindness to preserve from evil than to allow to fall into evil and to liberate from it afterwards.

25. It seems too that, when Christ merited grace and glory for many souls, and when these souls are debtors to Christ for grace and glory as to their mediator, why will there be no soul a debtor to him for innocence? And why, although all the blessed angels are innocent, will no human soul in the fatherland be innocent save Christ’s soul alone?

b. Against the Second Reason

26. The second reason [n.15], which was taken from what is evident in Mary, does not seem conclusive:

For what is argued first, about infection of the flesh on account of begetting from seed, does not proceed according to Anselm’s way of original sin, as was touched on in 2. d.30 nn.30-32, 48-67 [Anselm holds that original sin is lack of owed original justice]. Or, given that commonly original sin is thus contracted [sc. from infection of flesh, as held by Lombard et al.], yet the infection of flesh – which remains after baptism – is not a necessary cause that original sin remain in the soul but, while the infection remains, original sin is destroyed because of the grace conferred on the soul; thus God could destroy the infection in the first instance of the Virgin’s conception by then giving her grace, so that there would be no necessary cause of infection in her soul but grace would take away the guilt in her soul.

27. The other point, about the sufferings of Mary [n.16], is not conclusive; for the mediator can so reconcile someone that penalties useless to him are taken away from him and he is left in penalties useful to him; original guilt would not have been useful to Mary; temporal penalties were useful to her, because in them she earned merit; therefore etc.

⁴² *Sermon* 99 ch.6: “But O you who say that you did not commit many sins. Wherefore? Ruled by whom?... This man committed many and was made debtor for many; that man, being governed by God, committed few. The former attributes to God that he dismissed them; the latter attributes to God that he did not commit them... Recognize then the grace of him to whom you also owe that you did not commit them.” *On Holy Virginity* ch.41 n.41, “Reckon for yourselves as altogether dismissed by God all evil whatever that was – under his rule – not committed by you.”

B. Scotus' own Response

28. As to the question I say that God could have acted so that Mary had never been in original sin; he could also have acted so that she was in sin only at one instant [Henry of Ghent, *infra n.30*]; he could also have acted so that she was in sin for some time and was purged in the last instant of that time [the common opinion, nn.14-16].

29. I clarify the first: since grace is equivalent to original justice as concerns divine acceptation, so that – because of it – original sin is not in a soul possessed of grace, God could in the first instant of the soul have poured into it as much grace as he poured into another soul at circumcision or baptism; therefore in its first instant the soul would not have had original sin, just as neither would it have had original sin afterwards when the person was baptized. And if the infection of the flesh was there in the first instant, it was not a necessary cause of infection in the soul, just as neither was it after baptism when – according to many [Lombard et al, see Scotus *Ord. 2 dd.30-34 nn.29, 33*] – it remains and the infection in the soul does not remain; or the flesh could have been cleansed before the infusion of the soul, so that in that instant the soul was not infected.

30. The second [n.28, Henry of Ghent⁴³] is plain, because a natural agent can begin to act in an instant such that in that instant it will have been at rest under one contrary and in the immediate time it is in a state of becoming under the contrary form; but whenever a natural agent can act, God can act; therefore he can cause grace in the time immediate to some instant. There is also confirmation of this because, when the soul is in sin, it can, by divine power, be in grace; but in the time when the Virgin was conceived she could have been in sin and, for you [Henry], she was; therefore likewise she could have been in grace.

31. Nor was it then necessary that she would have been in grace in the first instant of the time, just as neither was this necessary in the case of alteration and motion [n.30 footnote].

⁴³ *Quodlibet 15 q.13*, "Was it possible, according to nature, that the Virgin, in the instant in which she was conceived a human being from seed according to the body and in which the soul was united to the body, could truly have contracted original sin and remained in the sin only for that instant? And it seems to me that this is very well possible... When a fava bean is moved upwards with violent motion and meets something moved more forcefully, to wit a millstone falling naturally downwards, it is, by the sudden contact of the stone, altered in an instant into a space equal thereto by the natural motion of the stone pushing the fava bean downwards, so that it is not possible for the fava bean to rest in a space equal to itself in the way it would have rested if it were left to itself... And this example, as it seems to me, is valid...for our present purpose: for the corporeal human form has being...in the first moment of its generation from the seed..., and in the same instant the human body...has infected being...; and in the same instant the rational soul is created in the body...and thereby the soul contracts from the body the stain of original sin...; and in the whole preceding time the soul did not have that stain, because it did not have being; nor did [the stain] have being in the Virgin during the subsequent time, as I reckon becomes the dignity of the Virgin, in the way it is possible according to nature, so that only in passing and in an instant was she in original sin; that is to say, original sin had in that instant first and final being at once, but according to different indications of that instant, because as the instant was the term of past time, original sin had in it first being..., but as the instant was the beginning of subsequent time, original sin had in it final being by the subsequent impulse of the motion of grace, as by a superior expelling original sin in that subsequent time... Thus it seems to me that original sin could have been in the Virgin for the sole moment of an instant... But whether it so happened God knows – and I neither know it nor assert it, but it seems reasonable to me and possible that, in accord with the aforesaid, it did happen."

32. Further, if God had created grace in the first instant, the third member [n.30] could be there posited, and God could have conserved this grace in the immediate time.

33. The third [n.28] is manifest.

34. But as to which one happened among these three that have been shown to be possible, God knows; but if it not be repugnant to the authority of the Church or to the authority of Scripture, then to attribute to Mary the more excellent seems probable.

C. Objections and their Solution

35. Against the third of these members [n.32] there is a twofold objection:

First as follows: whatever God does immediately in respect of some creature he does in an instant, because (*Physics* 8.10.266b4-5) an infinite power acts in an instant, for a finite and an infinite power cannot act with equal measure; therefore God cannot, after the instant of guilt, justify the soul through grace in the immediate time.

36. Further, was the justification a motion or was it an alteration? Not an alteration because it would not happen in an instant. Not motion because there would be no succession according to parts of the movable thing, namely of the soul, because the soul is indivisible; nor according to parts of the form, namely of grace; nor according to means between extremes, for there is no mean between privative opposites in respect of a naturally fit subject, just as there is absolutely none between contradictories; nor is one of these opposites acquired or lost part by part; nor is the subject divisible.

37. To the first objection [n.35] I say that if God voluntarily, and not necessarily, acts in an instant of some time, he must wait for the ‘then’ so that he may act in a determinate instant of the time; but he can act in a time in whose first instant he did not act; it is therefore true that God can do in an instant what he does immediately, but it is not necessary for him to act in an instant.

38. To the second [n.36] I say that, when speaking strictly about motion and alteration in the way the Philosopher does [cf. d.2 n.117 supra], passive justification is neither motion nor alteration but has something of both: from alteration it has that it is in a subject as a simple and indivisible form; from time and motion it has that it is in no indivisible measure but is in time, and in this respect it fails of being alteration. But it fails of being motion because it is not a flow according to the parts of the form and of the movable thing, or according to means between extremes, for here there are no means, as was proved [n.36].

39. Here is an example of this: a movable thing passes from the form under which it was in the ultimate instant of rest in such a way that, after that instant, there is a continuous losing of the form according to its parts and a continuous acquiring of the opposite form. If the opposite form were present in the whole time then, since its parts would not be acquired successively, it would be like the issue at hand, because then the acquiring of the form would be neither motion nor alteration, just as the passage now from alteration to motion is neither alteration nor motion.

40. But why is an undergoing caused by a natural agent an alteration or a motion but this is not?

I reply that if a natural agent can introduce a form suddenly, it introduces it through alteration; and if it cannot, it must act in time and so through motion and so by moving. But God, although he can introduce a form in an instant, yet – if he were not to

introduce it in an instant – he can introduce the whole of it in time such that he does not introduce it part after part; for being able to act in time is not a mark of imperfection in an agent, although the necessity of acting in time is an imperfection.

II. Response to the Arguments while Holding that the Blessed Virgin was not Conceived in Original Sin

A. To the Principal Arguments

41. Now if the negative side of the question be maintained, the response to all the authorities for the contrary side [nn.2-11] is that any natural son of Adam is a debtor for original justice and, because of Adam's demerit, he lacks it; and therefore any such son has a source whence to contract original sin. But if someone is given grace in the first instant of creation of his soul, he would never lack original justice; and this, however, not of himself but from the merit of another if grace is conferred on him because of the merit of another; therefore anyone would have original sin, as far as concerns himself, unless another prevented it by mediation. And thus are the authorities to be expounded, because everyone naturally propagated from Adam is a sinner, that is, all have – from the way they possess nature from Adam – the source whence they would lack owed justice unless it was conferred on them from elsewhere. But just as grace could be conferred after the last instant, so it could be conferred in the first instant.

B. To the Arguments Given for the Common Opinion

42. The same point makes plain the response to the reasons given for the first opinion [nn.14-16], because Mary would most of all have needed Christ as redeemer; for she would have contracted original sin by reason of common propagation unless she had been prevented by the mediator's grace; and just as others needed Christ so that the sin already contracted might, through his merit, be remitted to them, so she had more need of a mediator preventing the sin ever needing to be contracted by her and preventing her contracting it.

43. And if it be argued against this that 'she was naturally a daughter of Adam before she had grace, because she was a person before she had grace,^a so in that prior stage she was, because she was a natural daughter of Adam, under obligation for original justice and lacked it, therefore in that prior stage she contracted original sin' – I reply by saying that, when opposites are compared to the same thing according to the order of nature, both of them are not present together but only one is, and the other – which is said to be prior in nature – is not present (because an opposite is not present at the same instant); but it is said to be 'prior in nature' because it would then be present as far as concerns the side of the subject unless something else (from the outside) were to prevent it.⁴⁴

a. [*Interpolated note*] How does this stand with the proposition, often alleged in d.2 [nn.68-69, 74, 88, 93, 106 supra], that 'the nature is perfect in the same

⁴⁴ Scotus, *Lectura 3 d.2 n.52*, "not both but one fails to be present, and that one is present which – as far as depends on the idea of the subject – the subject determines for itself, unless it is impeded."

instant in which it would be a person in itself? They stand because here the opposites are only understood through two instants.

44. Therefore if I compare the matter to the form and the privation, the matter without the form is naturally prior to the matter with the form: not that in the instant in which it has the form it does not really have it, because then contradictions would be true together, but that then the matter – as far as depends on itself – does not, when left to itself, have the form if another who has it were not to give it.^a Similarly, the subject is naturally prior to either opposite, because each thing is naturally ‘what it is in itself’ before it is, or is not, ‘what it is in another’ – and so the matter not only has the privation naturally before it has the form but it also is in itself naturally before it has the privation or the form; nor yet does it follow that it is at any time so in itself that it is neither under the privation nor under the form, because, considered in this way, there is only the fact that its proper and quidditative idea – which is said to be ‘prior’ – essentially includes neither of the other two.

a. [Interpolation] Yet the nature in itself is prior to each – both to the privation and to the form – and is neither, because its nature is neither privation nor form. And the Commentator proves this in *Physics* 1 com.79 (see *Ord.* 2 d.1 n.61 supra).

45. Thus, in the issue at hand, I say that the nature of the soul naturally precedes both original justice (or the equivalent grace) and the lack of owed justice, and further the lack – in that nature – of original justice naturally precedes the justice because, as far as depends on the subject (which is naturally prior to either opposite), the privation would be naturally present before the form; yet it is not necessary that the soul is at any time under neither of the opposed extremes, nor that it is under the privation before it is under the opposite.

46. So when it is argued that ‘she was naturally a daughter of Adam before she was justified’ [n.43], I concede that a consequence of her nature – as so conceived in the first instant of nature – was that she was a daughter of Adam and did not have grace in that instant of nature; but it does not follow that ‘therefore in that instant of nature she was deprived [of grace]’, speaking of the altogether first instant, because her nature, according to that firstness, preceded as naturally the privation of justice as the justice itself; but only this can be inferred, that to the idea of her nature belongs that it is naturally the foundation of filiation from Adam, and that in that nature – as such – there is included neither justice nor its lack, which I concede.

47. But if you object about the other mode of priority in nature, that she naturally lacks justice first before she has it, because the lack is in her by an intrinsic cause [sc. because she is a daughter of Adam], I say that this ‘first in nature’ is never naturally in her, but would only be present in her if an extrinsic cause did not impede it and posit the presence of its opposite, just as, if in the first instant of nature the matter had the form, the privation (which would otherwise naturally be in the matter) would never be in it.^a

a. [Interpolation] If you ask ‘how is that thing prior in nature which is not prior in being?’, I say that when the order of nature is between positives, as between subject and accident, matter and form, what is prior in nature can be prior in being;

but when it is only between opposites, priority ‘by comparison to a third’ means only that this one would be present if the other did not impede it; or it is priority in understanding, namely because this one, as ‘being deprived’, is understood first.

48. And if the argument is made, ‘she is not just in the first instant of nature, therefore in that instant she is non-just’ (from *De Interpretatione* 10.19b19-30), I say that the consequence is not valid in the case of composite predicates, as ‘it is not white wood, therefore it is non-white wood’; so here with ‘she is not just in the first instant, therefore she is non-just in the first instant’, because the sense of ‘she is not just in the first instant’ is that she is not just in the first instant of nature as far as concerns her idea; so to say, ‘she is non-just in the first instant from her idea’, does not follow, because neither of these inferences is essentially included.

49. And if you argue, ‘in the first instant of nature she is understood to be non-just’, I say no but ‘she is not understood to be just’, and “in things abstracted there is no falsehood” (*Physics* 2.2.193b35), because not everyone, when not understanding ‘this’, understands ‘not this’ [cf. d.14 n.31 infra].^a

a. [*Interpolation*] like someone who, not understanding ‘man being an animal’, understands it as ‘not being an animal’, because then abstraction, by the taking away from something what is essentially present in it, could not be without falsehood.

50. To the other point [n.14], about the opening of the door, it is plain that the door was opened to her through the merit of Christ’s passion foreseen and accepted specifically in its order to this person [sc. Mary], so that, because of that passion, sin would never be present in this person and so neither anything on account of which the door would be closed, although however there did belong to her, from her origin, the source whence the door would be closed to her, just as it was to others.

51. And if you say, ‘therefore if she had died before her Son’s passion she would have been blessed’, the response can be made that the holy fathers in limbo were purged from original sin and the door was closed to them up to the payment of the owed penalty. For God had so determined that, although he would accept the foreseen passion of Christ for the remitting of original guilt to every believer and believer-to-be in the passion, yet he was remitting the penalty due the sin – namely the lack of vision – not because of the passion as foreseen, but because of the passion as displayed in its presence; and therefore, just as the door was not opened to the fathers until the passion of Christ was displayed, so it is probable that it would not have been opened to the blessed Virgin either.

C. Specifically to the Arguments of Bernard

52. To Bernard’s argument [nn.9, 11] the reply can be made that in the instant of conception of the natures [sc. body and soul] there would have been sanctification, not from the guilt that was then present, but from the guilt that would have been present if grace had not then been infused in the soul.

53. And if it is argued that ‘there was lust there’, this is false of the conception of natures, although it could be conceded that there was lust in the conception and mixing of

the seeds. And given that in the conception of the seeds there would have been conception of the soul, there would not have been anything making it unacceptable that grace was then infused in the soul because of which grace the soul would not have contracted any infection from the flesh, or from the body, along with the lust sown; for just as infection of the body – contracted through propagation – has been able to remain along with grace in the cleansed soul after the first instant of baptism, so can this be the case in the first instant if God then created grace in Mary's soul.

Question Two

Wherefore and How Christ's Body did not Contract Original Sin as Other Bodies did

54. About the sanctification of Christ's body I ask wherefore and how that body did not, like other bodies, contract original sin.

I. On a First Way of Speaking

55. I say that, according to the Master [Lombard], there was some portion in Adam from which all his sons are created.

56. And some posit that something of this portion was not infected in Adam but was preserved pure in him up to the generation of Christ.

57. But against the first statement [n.55]⁴⁵: since a finite quantity, by a finite taking away from it repeated several times, can be consumed, and especially such a little quantity as would have had to be emitted by Adam in the procreation of his sons, that quantity will seem now to have been totally used up.

58. But if you say that it was multiplied in itself the way the Master says 2 d.30 ch.14 n.2 and Hugh of St. Victor *On the Sacraments* I p.6 ch.37 – this does not seem it could happen without a miracle (as with the loaves [e.g. *John* 6.9-11]); and thus it was not possible for the father to generate the amount that there is on the part of the body's form without a miracle, and this does not seem probable.

II. On a Second Way of Speaking

59. Those who do not hold here to the Master respond in different ways according to diversity in ways of understanding original sin.

A. First Way

60. Those who state that the sin is contracted because of infected flesh, which is sown in concupiscence [Bonaventure, Aquinas, Giles of Rome], say that the whole flesh of Mary was sanctified and thus what was assumed to form the body of Christ was sanctified before it was assumed, so that there was no infection there at the moment of the soul's infusion.

⁴⁵ Scotus says nothing in response to the second statement [n.56]; it was sufficiently rejected by many others before him.

61. But the argument against this is first that, if the blood of the blessed Virgin were what the body of Christ was formed from (according to Damascene ch.46), then consequently, since this blood was never animated with the soul of the whole body [sc. of the Virgin] or of any human being, it never contracted the stain from a sinful soul, and no reason for the stain can be assigned on the part of it nor can any sanctification be assigned for the body generated from it.

62. But if it be said that the active power that formed the body from the blood was infected in the parents, and so the generated body was infected – this does not seem true if the Holy Spirit immediately formed the body from that blood.

63. Further, it does not seem probable that there was corruption without generation of any kind; but if the sanctification and cleansing of the flesh were the corruption of the diseased quality and yet there was no generation of any other positive quality, then there was no generation of grace, because that flesh was not capable of sanctity.

B. Alternative Way

64. Alternatively, according to the way of Anselm, who says that original sin is the lack of owed justice (as was touched on in 2 dd.30-32 n.50 supra), it is plain why Christ did not contract original sin, because he was not a natural son of Adam and so was not debtor for original justice. For those alone received justice in Adam who were going to be descended from him according to seed-reasons, that is, with respect to whom Adam possessed the idea of natural father according to propagation; hence, just as he alone could have preserved the justice, so he alone could have lost it; and therefore, if Christ had been a pure man and not God, but miraculously born of a Virgin, he would not, according to Anselm, have contracted original sin.

65. This opinion is evident from him in *On the Virginal Conception* ch.11, and express in ch.18f., where he holds that a twofold reason can be set down for the innocence of Christ: the sanctification of the Virgin, and the formation of his body miraculously, not by common propagation; either would suffice for Christ being born innocent.

66. Hence is plain the reason for the tithing of Levi and not of Christ.⁴⁶

Fourth Distinction

Single Question

Whether the Blessed Virgin was truly Mother of God and man

1. About the fourth question I ask whether^a the blessed Virgin was Mother of God and man.

a. [Interpolation] About this fourth distinction, where the Master deals with the conception of Christ, the question – in comparison to the Virgin conceiving him – is namely whether:

⁴⁶ The reference is to St. Paul's remark *Hebrews* 7.9 that Levi paid tithes in Abraham, discussed extensively by Master Lombard in 3 d.3 ch.3 and by Scotus himself in *Lectura* 3 d.3 n.2.

2. That she was not:

Because contrary opposites cannot exist in the same thing, even by divine power, for then God could make contradictions simultaneously (the consequence is proved by the Philosopher *Metaphysics* 4.6.1011b15-18, where he proves that if contraries existed in the same thing, contradictions would be true together); but virginity and maternity are contrary opposites; therefore etc.

3. Further, Damascene ch.58, “We do not in any way call the blessed Virgin the bearer of Christ.”

4. Further, active and passive are mutual correlatives, from *Metaphysics* 5.15.1020b26-30; mother is related to father as passive to active, according to the Philosopher *Generation of Animals* 1.20.729a27-31; therefore father and mother are mutually correlative. But no one is father of Christ-man; therefore no one is mother of him.

5. Further, the mother is disposed in an active way in the generation of offspring, because if she were only passive [sc. only providing matter] Adam would be the mother of Eve and earth would be the mother of Adam; but the blessed Virgin was not disposed in an active way in this generation, because this generation happened in an instant [supra d.2 n.112]; created power does not work in an instant on what is of a nature to come to be in time.

6. Further, in the case of every generation some supposit is generated, *Metaphysics* 7.7.1032a15-19; such was not the case here, because here there was only an uncreated supposit, and it was not generated because it did not exist by act of generation in time.

7. But if you say that it was generated in a created nature – on the contrary: the first term of generation is a *per se* being; the Word-man is not a *per se* being, because neither is he a *per se* one; therefore etc.

8. And if you say that there is a unity of union there – on the contrary: a relation is not the formal idea of terminating generation; this union is a relation; therefore etc.

9. Further, if the Virgin generated the God-man, this was only by reason of the human nature terminating the generation, in which nature was the Word subsisting; but this it seems should not be posited, because then the supposit would here not be the first term but the quasi formal term, after the first term has been acquired, while in other cases it is the first term. Nor can the difference be posited that in other cases the nature is a person and here it is not, because this only holds in other cases because of a negation of double dependence; negation is not the reason for terminating generation.

10. On the contrary:

Luke 1.31-33, “Behold you will conceive in your womb and bear a son...”

11. And *Matthew* 1.18, “Now the generation of Christ was on this wise: when his mother Mary was espoused to Joseph, before they come together, she was found to be with child of the Holy Spirit...”

I. To the Question

12. In this question the conclusion is certain, as is plain from Damascene ch.58, “We preach that holy Mary is truly bearer of God. For just as God was truly borne of her,

so she is truly called bearer of God; for we say that she gave birth to God from herself, not as if the deity of the Word takes from her the principle of his being, but as the Word of God is incarnate and borne of her. For the holy Virgin did not bear a mere man, but true God – not mere but incarnate.” Here Damascene seems to say that she generated a supposit, as he himself determines later in ch.80 because “generation is of the hypostasis.”

13. But she bore that supposit not according to its divine nature but its human.

14. And against this [n.13] seem to be the two arguments [nn.6-9] made on the other side.

II. A Doubt

15. But there is a doubt about what someone is called ‘mother’ because of, and how this could be saved in the present case.

A. First Opinion

1. Exposition of the Opinion

16. There is an opinion [Aquinus, Albert the Great, Giles of Rome] that the father alone has the idea of what is active and the mother the idea of what is passive, so that she just ministers the matter for the offspring and in the seed of the father alone is there a force active and formative of the offspring.

17. This seems to be the opinion of the Philosopher *Generation of Animals* [1.21.730b8-24, 2.4.740b24-25, and n.4 supra], when he compares the virtue in the seed of the father to the artisan and the matter ministered by the mother to the wood from which the artisan makes a bench.

18. From this too appears that Augustine is for this proposal in *Literal Commentary on Genesis* 10.20 n.35, where he says Christ did not descend from parents according to seed-reasons; but if the blessed Virgin had been active with respect to the formation of her Son’s body, it would seem that that body was formed according to seed-reasons.

2. Rejection of the Opinion

19. But against this [n.16] there is first a fourfold argument about other mothers:

[i] Because forms of the same species are followed by natural powers of the same species; but male and female are of the same species, *Metaphysics* 10.9.1058a29-34, b21-24; so their forms are followed by a power of the same idea; therefore if the form of one is naturally followed by an active vegetative power, likewise too is the other’s. And this reason is confirmed, because otherwise the vegetative power of the latter and the former would differ as active and passive differ, and thus they would be powers of an altogether different idea.

20. [ii] Further, the father naturally loves his son more than the son the father, just as “each naturally more loves his work than conversely,” from *Ethics* 8.12.1161b24-26, 9.7.1167b34-35; and this argument holds because of the fact that the benefactor is more affected toward the benefitted than conversely; but the mother loves her son more than

the father does, as is plain from Aristotle in *Ethics* 8.14.1161b26-30, 9.7.1168a24-26; therefore it seems that her son is in some way her work.

21. [iii] Further, a son is sometimes more like his mother than like his father; so there is in the mother too some active power. The proof of the consequence is that “an agent aims to make the effect like itself” [*Generation and Corruption* 1.7.324a9-11], so that the effect is only made like something because of some action.

22. It is said [Aquinas] that the seed of the mother principally tends to make the offspring like the father and, secondly, that because of lack of obedience in the matter the seed of the mother fails of what it tends to do and does what it can – and thus, since alteration does not change to anything at all but to the opposite, the likeness is made to the opposite and so to the mother.

23. Against this: in that case a hot thing that is impeded and unable, because of the impediment, to make the effect perfectly like itself, will make it like the cold – and this seems impossible, because the impeded hot will only not make the effect like itself; therefore if the effect is made like the cold, this is from another agent, not merely from the impeded hot. So, in the issue at hand, from an impediment resisting the active power of the father there is only got this negation, that the offspring is not made like the father; however the offspring will only be made like another from some other active cause – and if this be thus granted in the issue at hand on the part of the mother, the intended conclusion is obtained.

24. Further, to say that ‘the mother is only a sort of vessel in which, as in a place suitable for generation, the offspring is generated, and generated from something of her as from matter’, does not seem to give more to the mother than to the earth in the generation of a mineral (if the mineral is generated from the earth and the earth itself – containing the something that is corrupted – is a fitting place for generation of such a body); nay rather, it does not seem to give to the mother more than is given to a human being in respect of the generation of a worm because the worm is generated from some moisture that has become putrid, and this in a place fitting for its generation; and then the human being would lack nothing in being the mother of the worm save that the worm is not of the same species. But this perhaps does not take away [the human being the mother] if a horse may be called the father of a mule and an ass the mother.

25. [iv] Further, this opinion [n.16] in the issue at hand about this Mother [sc. Mary] is rejected by the remark of Damascene ch.46, “The Holy Spirit came over her...giving her a susceptive power for the deity of the Word as well as a generative power at the same time;” but if Mary were only a passive principle there would seem no reason that the Holy Spirit should join to the susceptive power a generative power at the same time.

B. Second Opinion

1. Exposition of the Opinion

26. Now if another opinion be held [Galen⁴⁷], that that any mother is, along with the father, an active cause with respect to the formation of the offspring’s body, although

⁴⁷ Galen, *On the Use of the Parts of the Human Body* 14, “Nature has thought out a way to provide a double principle of generation for fetuses, that one of them indeed should be male and the other female;” “The woman herself has all the parts that the male has; but if she has some of them smaller

a less principal and a secondary cause and making with the father one total cause – then to save how Mary was mother seems more difficult than when positing the first opinion [n.16]; for it is plain that she ministered the matter, even the whole matter, for Christ's body, but it is not as plain how she could have cooperated with the Holy Spirit in the forming of the body.

27. Answer to this is made as follows [Bonaventure], that she ministered a matter that had an active force in it, but the force did not have any action because its action was anticipated by the Holy Spirit, who suddenly formed the body from the matter ministered to him; the Virgin then was mother (holding this opinion about a mother's action) because of the fact she provided the matter and – as far as concerns her part – she had wherewith to act but another stronger agent [sc. the Holy Spirit] prevented her power in the acting. An example is given: fertility was given to Aaron's rod [*Numbers* 17.6-8] by which it was able to have actively produced flowers and fruits successively, but it did not produce them because the fertility was prevented by the divine power suddenly producing them.

2. Rejection of the Opinion

28. On the contrary: if fire were most perfectly active and had a passive thing – as wood – near to it, yet was prevented by another stronger agent that heated the wood, in no way would the fire be the agent cause with respect to the heat; but if 'fire generating heat' is fire 'being father of heat', then in no way would the fire be father of the heat. So it is similarly in the issue at hand: if a mother is an agent cause, Mary would not be called mother because of her active power alone if she was prevented from acting.

29. This is confirmed by their example: for if a tree were called father or mother of the fruit it produces, yet Aaron's rod, although it would have been fertile in being able to produce fruit and did not produce it, would nevertheless not have been father or mother of the fruit. This is also proved in the issue at hand: for no man was father of this Son, although someone [sc. Joseph] had the active power by which he could have acted as father in the formation of this body, and he did not act, being prevented by the Holy Spirit.

C. Third Opinion

1. Statement of the Opinion

30. In another way [William of Ware] it is said that a supernatural power was conferred on Mary whereby she was able to cooperate with the Holy Spirit in an instant.

2. Rejection of the Opinion

and others larger, the art of nature is here too to be admired, that it did not – even in women – make anything less that ought to be more, nor again anything more that was fittingly less;" "It is sufficient enough to reckon that the male's seed provides the principle of motion and that the women's seed confers something on it for the generation of the animal." William of Ware *Sentences* 3 q.13, "Others say the opposite, and this is the opinion of Galen, that both the man and the woman cooperate in this formation, but the chief part of the action is on the part of the man and the less chief on the part of the woman."

31. On the contrary: this supernatural force would be an ‘accident in an accident’ [cf. *Metaphysics* 4.4.10007a31-b13] of Mary’s nature; but if she acted in the formation of Christ’s body only by this accident, then she did not thus per se and truly and naturally act in the formation of this body as other mothers do, who act of their own nature in the formation of their offspring’s bodies; for it does not as truly belong to a stone to diffuse sight⁴⁸ (which belongs to it through its whiteness, and this is an accident in an accident in it) as it belongs to a stone to go downwards (which belongs to it through its nature as a natural accident).

32. Similarly, where will the supernatural accident be? If in the intellect or will then it does not seem to be a reason for acting in the generation of her Son, which is an action that belongs principally to the vegetative power; but if it is placed in the vegetative power, then it seems a wonder how that force should be capable of a supernatural accident.

33. Further third, how will this force, from the fact it is created, be able to cooperate or be the idea of cooperating in an instant with the Holy Spirit, when it is, however, unable to be anything in Mary’s nature?

34. Further, how is an accident the formal idea of producing a substance, which is the term of generation?

35. But if it be said [William of Ware] that the supernatural power is as it were an intrinsic perfection conferred on the vegetative power in Mary, then it seems wonderful how this force would have been made more intense than it would be if she had generated naturally, because then she would be more than mother.

36. Likewise, how will this intense force be able to act in an instant and yet the non-intense force [sc. the natural power to generate] is not able then to act? For forms of the same idea, even if one is more perfect than another, seem to be similarly disposed for acting in an instant or in time, though one of them may produce something more perfectly than another (as is plain in the case of a more perfect and less perfect light, each of which illuminates equally instantaneously though one illuminates more perfectly than the other).

D. Scotus' own Opinion

37. One can say that, if acting belongs to the mother as to a less principal cause, then Mary was truly mother, because the whole of the action that is due to the mother belonged to her.

1. On the Action of the Mother in the Formation of Our Bodies

38. To understand this one needs to know that in the formation of our body there is first a local motion from the place of the body to be corrupted to a place fitted for the generation from it of an organic body. This local motion is followed by a shaping of that changed body, and the shaping is not without local motion. Third there follows a condensing of the body to be corrupted, and this is an alteration that precedes the generation of a denser body from the less dense body, and this alteration is not without change of place, by which is not acquired a new place but a smaller space is occupied. In

⁴⁸ On the diffusing and concentrating of sight by colors, Aristotle *Topics* 1.15.107b29-32, 3.5.119a27-31, 7.3.153a36-38, Scotus *Ord.* 1 d.4 n.12.

the last instant of this alteration the form is induced, by which the body is completely organized, whether the form is, according to some, the intellective soul or, according to others, some other form preceding it [cf. *infra* 4 d.11 q.3] – and this, according to both of them, whether the form is single for the whole organic body and the heterogeneous parts, or whether the form of the whole is different from those that are the proper and substantial forms of the heterogeneous parts, or whether still in a third way there is no form for the whole organic body different from the partial forms of the heterogeneous parts; and according to this third option, a body's being completely organized would be for all the partial forms to be completely induced. And although, according to this third option among these, one could posit that not all the partial forms are induced simultaneously but one is induced first, for which a shorter alteration would suffice, and another later, on which a longer alteration would follow further – yet, according to all three, there is something in the last instant which was not there before and without which the body is not completely organized.

2. On the Action of the Blessed Virgin in the Formation of Christ's Body

39. When applying this to the matter at hand, there seems to be doubt whether there corresponded to the three aforesaid motions [*n.38 init.*] three briefer motions in Mary, just as in us, and whether in these three motions Mary acted as second cause and the Holy Spirit as principal cause.

40. For if this be posited, then it will not be posited that anything later assumed by the Word existed at any prior time in a created supposit but only that it was corrupted into something assumed by the Word; nor would it be posited that anything in the changes, which elsewhere require a long succession, existed here without succession and suddenly, and that in them Mary cooperated in an instant with the Holy Spirit; for even if she cooperated with the Holy Spirit in the induction of the ultimate organic form that is the disposition for receiving the intellective soul, yet she would not have cooperated in those three previous motions; for what require succession in us are those three motions, and not the ultimate induction of the substantial form of the organic body.

41. But if the three motions are denied to have existed in this case, and it is said that the whole thing happened in an instant, namely that at some single time the blood was dispersed in the body of Mary and never moved during time into the womb, and was not thus shaped and condensed, but that there was in the ultimate instant of the time a shaped and dense body (just as is the case at the term of the three motions, if the three had preceded), I still say that the blessed Virgin could have cooperated with the Holy Spirit in the instantaneous action, both as to the substantial form of the term and as to the shape and density (even though they were suddenly induced).

42. My proof of this is that, if she had not been able to cooperate, this would have been for one of three causes: either because she did not have a less principal active causality with respect to the term induced or with respect to the terms induced; or because she was not able to use the active force for inducing the terms in this way; or in a third way because, although she was able, yet she was prevented by a greater force that did the whole thing and did it wholly.

43. The first is rejected because she did have the active power as do other women [*n.37*], and had it for the same terms for which other women also have it; but other

women have a less principal active force with respect to the ‘where’, the shape, the condensing too of the substantial form.

44. And if you say, according to one of the three options [sc. the second, n.38], that there are in the whole many specifically different substantial forms for the heterogeneous parts, for inducing which all at once no mother has sufficient active force but one form must be induced prior in time to another being induced, and that so it is here – on the contrary: an active power that does not have an adequate term can act at the same time with respect to another term (because the reason that it can only act on one term at the same time is that the term is adequate to its power; and it most of all has power for many non-adequate terms if those terms are included in the first single term that is adequate to it); but no partial form is the adequate term of this sort of power but the form of the whole organic body is, otherwise the power would not be sufficient for the form of the whole; therefore since all the partial forms are included in the whole, which is the adequate term, it has power for all of them all at once.

45. The rejection of the second [n.42] is that some means are necessarily means for a more imperfect power that are not necessarily means for a more perfect power; for a natural agent has to proceed through determinate means, because it is subject to that order (for the order is fixed beforehand by the superior agent) – but a supreme agent, which is not subject to this order in its acting (because it fixed it voluntarily beforehand), does not have to proceed through these means in its acting. – From this I argue that the Holy Spirit and Mary are a more perfect agent than would a created father and Mary herself have been; therefore the means through which the action of a natural father and Mary would have had to proceed, if Mary had conceived by a man, were not necessary in the action of the Holy Spirit and Mary.

46. But if you say [Richard of Middleton] that this non-necessity of means is only because of the infinity of the power of the Holy Spirit, but that the necessity for means always remains equal as regard a created power, so that it cannot act with respect to the term unless it proceeds through the means necessary for it – on the contrary: if the term had been reached through the means, the agent would not produce the term by reason of the means, because the means do not then exist; so it would precisely then produce the term because it has then a power active with respect to the term; therefore if any power brings it about that the result not come through means but that the agent is disposed to the term as it would be disposed in the term if it had proceeded through means, then the same agent, which did not pass through means, can act in the same way as if it had passed through them. But the Holy Spirit could bring it about that there was here no passage through means, as the argument stated before proves [n.45]; and along with this can stand the fact that the active power of Mary would have been the same as, through the means of such a passage, it would have been; therefore by that active power she can as equally act on the term, having omitted the means, as if she had passed through the means before acting on the term.

47. The rejection of the third [n.42] is that the Holy Spirit acts freely, and therefore does not necessarily act according to the utmost of his power; therefore he can extend himself to something along with the causality of a second cause cooperating with him, and so he can supply the power of a natural father, or even act more efficaciously than a natural father (if there was one). And Mary will be able to cooperate according to her causality, because nothing is taken away from her by the fact that the Holy Spirit has

his own causality, for he does not, by anticipation, take away her causality, although he does supply eminently the causality of the other cause with which she could be co-cause.

48. With these three positions rejected, the following argument can be formed: every active cause that has power with respect to some effect, and that is not prevented by another that totally causes the effect, can, in the instant in which the effect is produced, act for the producing of it; Mary was an active cause of this sort if other mothers are of such a sort, and this as a non principal active cause; therefore etc.

49. This is made clear by the authority of Damascene [n.25], that the Holy Spirit ‘gave her a susceptive power but also at the same time a generative power’; not that he gave her the fertility by which she cooperated, but she had it naturally, for she was not sterile, and she could, according to that fertility, have cooperated in the production of her Son if a natural father had generated him; but the active power of an inferior cause is remote when the superior cause is not acting, so that an inferior cause is only ever in proximate power for an effect when the superior cause acts, because the superior cause is determined first and, once it has been determined, the inferior cause cooperates necessarily if the inferior cause is a natural cause.

50. Now according to the common order, the active power of the mother is of a nature to be subordinate to the active power of the father, and so the proximate power for generation is of a nature to be conferred on the mother by the father, but not the remote power, which is her first act whereby she is said to be fertile.

51. This proximate power was not conferred on Mary by such a cause [sc. by the active power of a natural father] but only by the Holy Spirit, who is possessed of the force of the principal cause; and therefore the Holy Spirit gave her ‘generative force’, that is the proximate power of generating, according to the natural force whereby she was naturally fertile; but he gave her ‘susceptive force’ insofar as she was generative of the Word. For just as the nature – to which the generation was as to formal term – was only in obediential potency for being united with the Word, so the Mother only had obediential potency for being the Mother of the Word; for by this was she Mother of the Word, that the Word was subsisting in the nature united to him.

3. A Doubt about the Mother’s Action through Seed-Reason

52. But there is here a doubt, because if, according to what was said in the question on seed-reasons [*Lectura 2 d.18 nn.26-28, 36*], a seed-reason is not the principle of action in generation, for it does not then remain, just as neither does the substance it is consequent to, but it is only the reason for acting in the alteration that precedes generation (and here [in Christ’s case] no alteration preceded generation) – then the result is that there was here on the part of the Mother no action through seed-reason, and so neither through any active force in the matter provided.

53. This would have to be conceded according to what was there said [n.52]; but yet the Mother herself was able immediately to act in the instant of generation, because she was immediately present and had active generative force with respect to the term of the action.

54. And perhaps so it is in the case of other mothers, that they act not only through the active force in the matter provided but that also – after the active force in the

seed, just like the substance in which it is, has been corrupted in the instant of generation – they act immediately for producing the term of generation.

55. And this seems probable, because once the body – thus altered in that instant – has been put in place through a divine power outside the womb, generation would not happen, and yet there would be the same passive element there and the same proximate agents from the mother alone (as it seems). And then, if the seed of the father is posited to be corrupted in that instant, namely because it is part of the offspring, the mother would more truly be acting than the father, because she is acting immediately in the instant of generation and the father is not, but is so only in the preceding alteration through the active force that was in his seed; or if it be posited that the father's seed remains in the instant of generation and the active force remains in it, and the seed is not converted into the body of the offspring but, after the formation of the body, dissipates into something else, then still in the instant of generation the mother will be able to act and the father through the diminished force in the seed.

56. Nor does it seem particularly unacceptable to attribute so much action to the mother, because, once the father's seed has been emitted, the whole of the ensuing formation up to birth seems principally to follow the conditions of the mother (whether she have a warm and well disposed womb etc.).

III. Other Doubts on the Question

57. But must one concede that Mary was the natural Mother of Christ, or that she generated Christ miraculously?

58. Anselm responds *On the Virginal Conception* ch.11 that this generation was miraculous.

59. And this indeed is true as to the manner of the reducing to act of Mary's active natural potency, which is only naturally reduced to act by a determinate natural active cause (namely the active force of a natural father).

60. It was also miraculous as to the manner of procedure in this generating, because either it was altogether sudden, in the way that the natural procedure in the generation of a human being is not, or, if it was successive, the motions that preceded the generation took place in as brief a time, insofar as they did not happen naturally; but on the part of Mary's active power itself there was natural action, because the power by which she was naturally fertile was natural to her, and she could have conceived from a natural father and have acted naturally in the production of her offspring's body.

61. And because of this natural active power whereby she operated she can be called the natural mother of Christ, although as well, because of the non-natural manner of carrying out the double act of this power, she can be said to have generated not naturally but miraculously.

IV. To the Principal Arguments

62. To the arguments.

To the first [n.2] I say that 'virgin' and 'mother' are not opposed by any formal opposition, neither as privatives nor as contraries; for 'virginity' only takes away the action of a natural cause superior to the active cause of the mother; but 'maternity' does

not necessarily posit the action of that superior cause, but this action is only commonly a concomitant; but if another supply the action of the natural cause, maternity can exist according to its whole idea and nevertheless along with privation of the action of a superior cause and so along with virginity. And so it was here.

63. An example: a created object is of a nature to be, along with my intellect, a co-cause of intellection; so the intellect's conceiving knowledge commonly requires a created object moving the intellect; but it does not require this of its *per se* idea; for if God, by moving the intellect, supply the action of the object, the intellect can conceive the same knowledge as it would conceive with the object moving it; and so, if the intellect – with God moving the term of it – were not moved by the created object and were designated by the name of 'virginity' or 'incorruptibility' or 'non-subjected', there would in no way be any formal repugnance in the intellect conceiving and being a virgin. So it is here.

64. But if you object about the verb 'to give birth' that a woman with unbroken hymen cannot give birth, my reply is that there was a miracle there, because one body existed together with another body [sc. the body of the babe and the hymen both existed together in the same place during birth] – and perhaps it was a new miracle different from that by which the Virgin conceived without the action of a superior natural cause.

65. But it is sufficiently commonly conceded about the birth, as something not difficult, that Mary did there whatever other mothers do, just as she did by fostering and preserving and nourishing the fetus in her womb. And yet there could perhaps be a special difficulty there [sc. if a miracle is denied], because there was no active force in Mary able to move the body of her offspring locally so as to come out of her, and especially so as to exist together with another body, because no created virtue can move a body locally to some 'where' without expelling the other body; yet it is at all events true (not speaking of a glorious body).

66. To the second [n.3] I say that Damascene did not deny absolutely that Mary was Mother of Christ, but denied it only against Nestorius who wished to deny, under that title, that Mary was Mother of God by positing that she gave birth to a pure man.⁴⁹ Hence after the authority quoted he adds, "To destroy too the name of 'God-bearer', the wicked Nestorius, to the dishonor of the only God-bearer, the truly honored above every creature (although he himself is broken to pieces along with the impious Satan), made it [sc. the name 'Christ-bearer'] to be reprobate;"^a therefore I do not deny it [sc. that Damascene denied 'Mother of Christ'], but he refused to share the name with a heretic who was hiding his poison under that name.

a. [Interpolation] Damascene: "Since it was for the destruction of the name 'Theotokos', that is 'God-bearer', that the wicked and sinful and Jew-thinking Nestorius, who is also a vessel of dishonor, for the dishonor of the only Theotokos, that is God-bearer, truly honored above every creature, although he himself is cut off with his father the devil, made it up [sc. the name 'Mother of Christ']. For

⁴⁹ Nestorius, *Second Epistle to Cyril*, "So wherever the divine Scriptures make mention of the Lord's dispensation, his birth and his death are not attributed to the divine but to the human nature of Christ. Wherefore, if we consider the matter more carefully, the holy Virgin should be called, not 'God-bearer', but 'Christ-bearer'."

David too and those like him can be called Christ, and every man who carries God can in this respect be called Christ, but not called God by nature.”

67. To the next [n.4] I say that all active and passive terms in general are necessarily relative to each other, but this is not necessarily so of ‘this active’ or ‘this passive’, because some other active can supply the place of ‘this active’. So, in the matter at hand, ‘father’ states such a particular active, and his action was supplied here by another agent.

68. To the final one [n.5]⁵⁰, it is conceded that, if other mothers act, then Mary too acted in this generation. When argument is made about [the generation happening in] an instant [n.5], the response is plain from the solution of the question [supra nn.37, 48-51], because if she had cooperated in the whole of the preceding time, it may well be conceded that she was able in the last instant to cooperate for the form that was inducible in that instant; but she would not then have cooperated in an instant through operation in time, because the operation [in time] would not then have existed; therefore only through the active power that she would have had did she have the same operation, although she did not act on the intermediate stages that would be caused in time.

V. To the Arguments for the First Opinion

69. To the arguments for the first opinion.

As to the Philosopher [n.17], the exposition is that the mother is not the principal agent cause; for she ministers more principally the matter, because the body of the offspring is more formed from the matter ministered by the mother than from the matter ministered by the father. And if more is understood [sc. if Aristotle is interpreted as saying the mother is in no way agent cause, as e.g. Aquinas, Albert, Giles seem to, n.16], it is denied, because Galen thought the opposite, as Avicenna records [*On Animals* 9.1; see n.26 with footnotes supra], and in these matters one should believe the experts more.

70. As to Augustine on *Genesis* [n.18], I say that only that effect is produced according to seed-reasons in whose production a created active force comes together as total cause; it was not so in the issue at hand, because although Mary acted through natural force, yet the natural cause was not the total cause but the Holy Spirit was the more principal cause.

Fifth Distinction Question One

Whether the Divine Nature assumed the Human Nature or was Able to Assume it

1. About the fifth distinction I ask whether the divine nature assumed human nature or was able to assume it.^a

a. [Interpolation] About this fifth distinction, where the Master treats of the extremes of the assumption, two questions are asked: first whether divine nature

⁵⁰ The other arguments, nn.6-9 supra, Scotus does not reply to as they are not in the *Lectura*, which the *Ordinatio* is here following.

did assume or was able to assume; second whether a created person was assumed or was able to be assumed. Argument about the first.

2. That it did assume:

A divine person assumed human nature; therefore divine nature did too. Proof of the consequence: because they are the same in reality; therefore they are the same with respect to any real action, whether they are disposed to the real action as principle or as term, because a real action is both from a real principle as it is real and not as it is an intention only, and is to a real term.

3. Further, that it was able to assume:

Proof: because divine nature, since it is infinite, includes in itself the idea of every supposit; therefore it can supply the place of any created supposit, and so be the person of a created nature.

4. On the contrary:

If divine nature did assume human nature, then, since it is one and the same in the three persons, the result is that three persons would have assumed human nature.

5. Again, proof that the divine nature was not able to:

Because I ask what the unity was into which it did the assuming. Not unity of person because nature as nature is not a person; not unity of nature because then either this nature and that would be the same nature, or one nature would have come to be from both natures. Each is impossible; therefore divine nature was not able to assume into either unity.

Question Two

Whether a Created Person was Assumed or was Able to be Assumed

6. Second I ask whether a created person was assumed or was able to be assumed.

7. That it was:

The nature was assumed; therefore the person was too. – The consequence is proved through the same major as was set down for the preceding question [sc. divine nature and divine person are the same in reality, n.2] and through this minor: a created person is the same as the nature, because if it is different it would be either substance or accident; not accident because no accident is the reason that anything subsist in itself; if it is substance then either as matter or as form or as the composite – and whichever it is, the result is that there were several composite substances or several forms in a created person.

8. Again, everything pertaining to dignity in a creature is something positive; person states something pertaining to dignity; therefore it states something positive. But everything positive can be assumed; therefore etc.

9. Again, if the supposit were absolute, the divine nature would assume it, because nature differs from person only in idea; therefore it can assume now. – Response: the consequence is not valid, because now there is not a difference of reason only, then there was.

10. Again, [human] nature is united to [divine] nature, because [divine nature] is in the three persons; and, because a human nature is united first to a whole person, it is

also therefore per se united to anything of the person; so the person is assumed when the nature is assumed.

11. On the contrary:

If a created person was assumed, then two persons were or would be one person.

I. To the First Question

A. Solution

12. The answer to the first question is plain from the first and last question of the first distinction. For in the last question [d.1 nn.211-220] it is said that the essence is not the formal idea of terminating the union, although it is the idea of effecting it; it was however able to be the formal idea of terminating, as was said in question two of the first distinction [d.1 nn.108-109].

13. So therefore, if the discussion is about the idea of causing the assumption, it is plain that the divine nature is the idea of causing it; but it is not in fact the idea of terminating it, though it could be that idea.

14. But if the question is asked about the assumer as term, one can say that if it is of the idea of the assumer that it have incommunicable subsistence and the essence by itself does not have incommunicability, then the essence cannot be the assumer as term. But if in the assumer, that is, in what terminates the union, a singular per se existence without incommunicability is sufficient, then, since ‘being per se and a this’ belongs to the divine nature, the divine nature would be able to do the assuming.

B. To the Principal Arguments

15. To the Arguments.

To the first [n.2]: a reply seems difficult for those who say that the property or the person differ only by reason from the nature [see *Lectura 3 d.5 n.25* for how they should make reply].

16. It was said differently in 1 d.2 nn.388-390, that an entity incommunicable from the nature of the thing is not formally communicable; and so the Father communicates to the Son an entity that from the nature of the thing, before all operation of the intellect, is communicable and not incommunicable. And accordingly, whatever third thing they are compared to that belongs to one of them according to its formal idea, it should not belong to the other if it is not formally the same as the other; of this sort is the act of assuming according to one of the ways [*supra d.1 nn.93-94, 108*], because assuming belongs incommunicably to what is subsistent insofar as it is subsistent as to the term.

17. To the next [n.3] I say that infinity is not the idea of terminating this union but independent personhood is, from d.1 n.44 *supra*. But if you say that infinity can for something be the idea of terminating, because it supplies the place of any created supposit [cf. William of Ware, d.1 n.18 *supra*] – this can be denied if incommunicability is required in the term; for ‘infinite’ and ‘incommunicable’ are not formally the same, because everything infinite is formally communicable [sc. in God].

II. To the Second Question

A. Solution

18. The answer to the other question is plain according to what was said above, d.1 nn.44-47, that created personhood states negation of actual dependence on something else as on the supposit of the nature, and also negation of aptitudinal dependence, which – as far as concerns the thing having the aptitude – would always be actual (as the separated soul would always depend on the body as far as concerns the soul's natural aptitude); since therefore it is a contradiction for a nature to depend and not depend actually on an extrinsic person, and the nature's being assumed is its actually depending with this particular dependence, it is a contradiction for it to be assumed and to have at the same time its own created personhood.

19. But those who would posit that created personhood states some positive nature or entity over and above the singular nature, and that for this reason it is repugnant for created personhood to be assumed but not so repugnant for the singular nature – they would have to look for some other cause why a person cannot be assumed [cf. n.8].

20. But what is here supposed [n.19] was rejected in d.1 n.26; and against it well proceeds the reason touched on [n.7] about the division of substance and accident and threefold substance.

B. To the Principal Arguments

21. To the arguments of the second question.

To the first [n.7] I say that if what is positive in a person be taken, then, because ‘personhood’ adds nothing positive beyond ‘this nature’, a created person is the same as ‘this nature’. But if personhood be completely taken according as it imports incommunicability, then ‘person’ is not altogether the same as ‘this nature’; just as an entity that is indifferent to some affirmation and negation is not altogether the same as the negation, or the same as itself along with the negation, so it is here; and therefore ‘this nature’ has enough distinction from ‘this non-dependent person’ that this nature is able to depend but not that this non-dependent nature is able to depend (taken in the composite sense). – The proof adduced for identity [of created person and nature] only proves that created person does not add any positive entity over and above ‘this nature’ – which I concede.

22. To the second [n.8] I say that person in the case of creatures states a ‘dignity’ materially by reason of the intellectual nature that it connotes, but not formally by reason of the incommunicability that it further adds – unless it be said that some negation is a mark of dignity, as was said in 1 d.28 nn.27-28 about ‘unbegotten’ in divine reality.

Sixth Distinction Question One

Whether in Christ there is some Existing other than Uncreated Existing

1. About the sixth distinction I ask whether in Christ there is some existing other than uncreated existing.^a

a. [*Interpolation*] About this sixth distinction, where the Master treats of the incarnation considered as it is in fact, three questions are asked: first whether in Christ there is an existing of the Word different from the created existing; second whether Christ is some two things; third which of the three opinions reported by the Master should be held. Argument about the first.

2. That there is not:

Because existing constitutes a thing, and thus, if Christ had two existings, Christ would be two things – or, if he were one thing, he would only be per accidens one; but this is unacceptable according to blessed Bernard, writing to Pope Eugenius [*On Consideration* 5.8-9], “This unity [sc. the unity of Christ] is the greatest after the unity that is in the Trinity.”⁵¹ Per accidens unity cannot be greatest among created unities; therefore etc.

3. Further, human nature is not united to the Word as form to matter or as act to potency but rather vice versa, because the Word is act; therefore human nature is not united to the Word as giving existence to potency but rather as receiving existence; therefore etc.

4. Further, the infinite cannot receive existence from a creature; therefore it does not get any created existence from the assumed nature.

5. On the contrary:

Augustine *On the Trinity* 5.2 n.3, “Just as ‘wisdom’ [sapientia] is taken from ‘to be wise’ [sapere], so ‘essence’ [essentia] is taken from ‘to exist (existing/existence)’ [‘esse’];” but there cannot be many wisdoms unless there are many ‘to be wises (beings wise)’; therefore etc.

6. Again Anselm *Monologion* 6, “As the three of ‘light’ [lux], ‘lighting’ [lucens] and ‘to light’ [lucere] are related, so are ‘essence’ [essentia], ‘thing’ [ens], and ‘to exist (existing/existence)’ [‘esse’];” but there cannot be several lights in something if there are not several ‘to lights’, because when a prior is multiplied, its posterior is necessarily essentially multiplied; therefore etc.

I. To the Question

7. I respond.

In this question it is certain about the existing of essence that, if existing differs from essence only in mode of conceiving, there are as many existings in Christ as there are essences.

8. It is certain about the existing of subsistence too (namely that there is an existing of actual existence in itself that is not dependent, in its subsisting, on something else or on another supposit), because there is only one such existing in Christ, just as there is also only one supposit.

9. About the existence too or the ‘is’ that signifies the compounding by the intellect uniting predicate with subject, and that is syncategorematic ([sc. co-signifying

⁵¹ Bernard, “Among all the things that are rightly called ‘one’, the summit is held by the unity of the Trinity, whereby the three persons are one substance. Excelling in second place is the unity by which, conversely, three substances are one person in Christ... I mean that in Christ the Word, the soul, and the flesh are, without confusion of essences, one person.”

with another term, as in ‘...is white’] about which the Philosopher says *Metaphysics* 5.7.1017a31-32 that “‘is’ signifies true and ‘is not’ signifies false”), it is plain that there are as many ‘is’s as can be predicated of a subject.

10. But about the real existing of actual existence, as it is distinct from the existing of essence and the existing of subsistence, there is doubt whether there is any such existing different from uncreated existing.

A. Opinion of Others

1. Exposition of the Opinion

11. And answer is made that there is not [Aquinas, Godfrey of Fontaines], because if ‘this nature’ existed in its own supposit there would be the same existence for the nature as for the person; therefore now too, if ‘this person’ supplies the nature’s proper personhood as to the existing of the person, then it does so also as to the existing of the nature.

12. I reply that it does the supplying by terminating the dependence of the nature on the supposit, but it does not do so by positing that identity between them. Likewise, the existing of the nature and of the person, when the nature exists in its own supposit, are the same for the reason that person only states a double negation by reason of the nature [d.1 nn.44-47 supra]; therefore, however much person is taken away, the existing of nature is not taken away.

13. Again, if a part were to come newly to a whole that possesses perfect existence, the whole would not possess any of the whole’s existence from the part but would only have a new relation to the part, and the part would exist through the existence of the whole, as would be the case with a hand newly created for pre-existing Socrates. But human nature comes to Christ engrafted as it were into a pre-existing supposit; therefore it does not give the supposit any existence but only receives existence from it, and the supposit has only a new relation to it.

14. Further, an accident does not give any existence to the subject, because then there would be as many existences in Peter as accidents; human nature comes as it were accidentally to the Word because coming to what pre-exists in itself actually.

15. This position is made clear in another way, that just as quantity is compared to quality and to substance, and each of the latter is quantified by the same quantity (the subject formally because it receives it, and the quality as it were by accident because the quality is received in a quantified thing), so the Word and human nature exist with the same existence; and this existence is the same in supposit, and it gives as it were existence formally to the Word and per accidens to the nature united to the existing supposit, because the nature is received in the existence which the assumed nature participates; and so there is no need for there to be several existences there.

2. Rejection of the Opinion

16. [Against the conclusion in itself] – Against the conclusion of this opinion there are multiple arguments.

First as follows: the term of generation is the being of existence or something having such being, *Physics* 5.1.225a12-16; the Son of God was truly generated from

Mary in time, according to Damascene ch.51, and the term of this generation is something as it has the being of existence; but not uncreated existing (for that existing was not effected by temporal generation); therefore some other existing.

17. Further, *On the Soul* 2.4.415b13, “For living things to exist is to live;” in Christ there was a life other than uncreated life, otherwise he would not truly have died, because death is the privation of true life; uncreated life too he could not have been deprived of; and so there was in him another ‘living’, and consequently another ‘existing’.

18. Further, his soul was created; creation terminates at something actually existing; therefore there was some actual existence of his soul insofar as this existence terminated the action of creation; it was not uncreated existence, because nothing creates itself; therefore it was created existence.

19. Again, the whole Trinity under the idea of efficient cause produced and conserved the nature that the Word was the person of; the causality of the efficient and conserving cause terminated only at some ‘existing’, and so the nature had the being of existence; not uncreated existence, because nothing is efficient cause of itself; therefore etc.

20. Further, if this nature were to be let go by the Word, a new existence through generation or creation would not have to be acquired by it, because it was already in existence; for even if it were let go, yet it would not, by the fact of being let go, be annihilated or a being in potency (as is the soul of Antichrist before its creation); therefore it would have some actual existing; and not a new one because not by any positive change; therefore the same existing as it has now; therefore etc.

21 To the first, second, third, and fourth of these arguments [nn.16-19] it might be said [Aquinas] that uncreated essence is the term as it belongs to this nature.

22. On the contrary: the existing of uncreated essence states only a relation of reason as it belongs to this nature; therefore etc.⁵²

23. Further, the foundation of a relation naturally precedes the relation [d.2 n.114 supra], and precedes, in actual existing, the idea of actual relation; this union was an actual relation; therefore its foundation naturally preceded it in actual existing. The foundation was the total [human] nature itself; therefore etc.

24. There is a confirmation, because the soul naturally perfects the body first before the whole nature would be naturally fit to be assumed; in that prior stage the form was the act of the matter and was, as a consequence, giving it existence, and this existence was not corrupted by union [sc. with the Word].

25. [Against the reasons for the opinion] – Against the reasons for this opinion.

Against the first [n.13] I argue as follows:

If the Word only has a new relation to the nature, and if it will be a relation of reason (the point was plain above, n.13), then, since a subject is not said to be formally anything by a relation of reason, the Word – as he is man – will not be formally anything. The consequent is contrary to the Decretal *On Heretics* [1177 AD, Gregory IX, *Decretals* 5 tit.7 ch.7], “Since Christ is perfect God and perfect man, it is remarkable by what

⁵² Text cancelled by Scotus: “Further, the nature of an angel could be assumed by the Word, and it cannot remain the same, according to them [Aquinas], unless it remains with its own same existence; therefore neither could human nature now remain the same in Christ unless it remained with its own existence. The consequence is manifest, because its own existence is as intrinsic to one nature as to the other; therefore etc.”

temerity anyone dares to say that Christ is not anything according as he is man... As for the rest, no one is to dare to say that Christ is not anything according as he is man."

26. Further, a part that comes to a whole does not give existence to the whole but receives it, for the reason that it is perfected by the form of the whole; because if it remained distinct like before, it would not receive the existence of the whole but would have either its own existence or none; but human nature united to the Word does not receive the form of the Word but remains simply distinct; therefore either it has no existence or it has some existence of its own.

27. Against the next argument, about accident [n.14], I argue as follows:

An accident has its own being of actual existence, because it can per se exist and because it has its own essence; therefore etc.

28. Again, an accident is the term of generation in a certain respect [sc. alteration]; therefore etc.

29. Further, when bread becomes by transubstantiation the body of Christ, the quantity is actually existent there, and it acquires no existence through the transubstantiation of the subject, because not through any positive change (to wit generation or creation); therefore it had actual existence before in its subject, and had the same existence (as is plain); therefore etc.

30. Against the third piece of reasoning, about quantity [n.15] – if it were valid it would prove that the human nature was formally existent with an uncreated form; for if human nature in Socrates is formally a quantity by the same quantity that Socrates is a quantity by, and if human nature in the Word is formally a quantity by the same virtual quantity that the Word is a virtual quantity by, then the nature would be formally good and infinitely lovable by uncreated goodness (and so on about truth and the rest).

B. Scotus' own Opinion

31. I concede the conclusion of the above reasons [nn.16-24], that this nature, from the fact it does not exist only in the intellect nor in its cause but outside its cause, necessarily has its own actual existence just as it has its own quidditative being; but it does not have its own being of subsistence, because subsistence states – over and above existence – nothing other than negation of double dependence, as was said about personhood in d.1 nn.44-47 supra. Now this existence [sc. subsistence] is not dependent, just as neither is the nature it belongs to, but such existence is that of the Word; so there is here only one subsistence.

32. The reply is made [Aquinas] that a prior can be separated from a posterior without contradiction; existing is prior and absolute.

33. On the contrary: the question is not about a new miracle other than the assumption, but if the nature is not deficient, it does not lack its own existing; proof has been given that it does not lack it [n.31].

34. And proof is given in another way, that then depending would be repugnant to the act of the creature; for nothing depends save according to its existing.

35. Likewise, our nature would be formally less perfect in Christ than in Peter, because existing is posited as the ultimate perfection.

36. I say further too that there is an existence, different from uncreated existence, that is the existence properly and simply of this supposit [sc. the supposit has two existences even though it has one subsistence, n.31].

The first point [sc. ‘properly’] I make clear through the opposite: for the existence of my foot is not the existence of me, although it is in me, for the reason that I am not my foot, nor subsistent with respect to my foot the way my supposit is with respect to my nature; but the existence, contrariwise, of my foot is not different from the existence by which I exist, but is only some partial existence in the existence by which I exist. But the opposite is the case here: for the Word subsists in human nature as a supposit in that nature; and, because of this, the Word is properly called ‘man’, and so he is existent with the existence of that nature.

37. Second [sc. about ‘simply’] I also say that he exists simply with that existence; for although Socrates formally exist with the existence of white, because he is formally white, yet he only exists with that existence in a certain respect, because that existence is existence in a certain respect, and especially in regard to the existence of Socrates which in itself is existence simply. But in the issue at hand the existence of the human nature is in itself existence simply, insofar as being is divided into ‘simply’ and ‘in a certain respect’; and ‘being simply’ is substance, while ‘being in a certain respect’ is accident, according to the Commentator [Averroes] *Physics* 1 com.62 [cf. Aristotle *Physics* 1.7.190a32-33, Scotus *Ord.* 4 d.1 q.3 n.45].⁵³

38. And if you say [Godfrey of Fontaines] that it is true that the nature’s existence in itself is existence simply but not so in the Word – on the contrary: the sort that the existence is in itself is the sort that it gives to whatever exists through that existence; the Word exists with that existence, namely through human nature.

39. And this last point [n.38] was perhaps the motivating reason for others about this opinion [n.15], that this existence of the human nature was not the first existence of this supposit but comes to it when it already has perfect existing; therefore it seemed to be an existence of the supposit in a certain respect, so that, although one should concede that there are several existences *in Christ*, yet one should not concede that there are several existences *of Christ*, because only one of them, as being the first, would belong to him simply and the others would belong to him in a certain respect.

40. But this is not conclusive, because not every non-first existence of something belongs to it in a certain respect – but the existence that is of the sort that every substantial nature is, is not of a nature to give existence in a certain respect, however it be disposed to what it gives existence to.

41. But if dispute is made regardless that the ‘existing not first’ of a supposit and the ‘not existing simply’ of a supposit mean the same, then the contention is only in words, and the opinions, which seem to be opposed, are not in contradiction save verbally.⁵⁴ But “when the thing is agreed, one should use no force about the word,” Augustine *Retractions* 1 [rather *Against Cresconius* 2.2 n.3, “The discipline of

⁵³ Text cancelled by Scotus, “now the existence of human nature is the existence of substance; therefore, since the divine Word is a man simply by that existence, he exists simply by that existence.”

⁵⁴ Vatican editors: because everyone concedes that the first existing of Christ is the existing of the Word (Bonaventure, Aquinas, Richard of Middleton, Henry of Ghent, Godfrey of Fontaines).

disputation teaches...that when there is agreement about the thing, one should not labor over the word”].

42. This second opinion [sc. Scotus' own], as to what it maintains about double actual existence, is confirmed by Damascene ch.58, where he holds that in Christ there are two wills as well as two willings; but existing is more immediately related to essence than willing is to will; so there is a greater necessity for existing to be multiplied in accord with the plurality of natures.

II. To the Principal Arguments

43. To the arguments.

To the first [n.2] I say that although there are in Christ two willings, yet he is not two willers, because the concrete thing is not multiplied without multiplying the supposit – as is plain about someone possessing two sciences, who is not called two knowers; so it is in the issue at hand, that, if there are several existings each of which will be the existing simply of the supposit, it does not follow that the supposit is two things. And in the form of the reasoning, ‘existing constitutes a thing, therefore many existings, many things’, there is a fallacy of the consequent, from destruction of the antecedent and the consequent; for the dividing of the antecedent and consequent involves some negation about each of them.⁵⁵

44. And as to the confirmation of the reason [n.2], when it is said that then Christ would be a per accidens thing, I say that if ‘accident’ or ‘per accidens’ is taken there properly, as they join together two genera or things of two genera, there is no ‘per accidens thing’ there, because the divine nature is not in any genus; human nature too is not an accident of anything, since truly it is a substance. If however ‘per accidens one’ means improperly anything that includes a two, one of which comes to a second possessed of complete existence and is not a form per se informing the second and constituting a third thing, then it can be conceded, though in the issue at hand it does not sound well.

45. But then there is the argument against the meaning of the term [n.2], namely that this unity [sc. of Christ] is the greatest unity according to Bernard: I say that a unity can be called greatest from the privation of distinction or from the perfection of the things united in the unity. In the first way, the unity here is not the greatest, because the distinction of natures is here the greatest; in the second way it can be conceded that the unity is the greatest after the Trinity, because the united things are most perfect, for one is infinite and the other is a substance perfect in itself; and the latter, from its unity with the former, is most perfect in the sharing of characteristics, for it is ‘God’ [d.7 n.51 infra].

46. To the next [n.3], I concede that human nature is potential, as an effect is potential in respect of its cause but not as perfectible by the Word, for the Word cannot be the form of anything; conversely too the nature is not the form of the Word, and so it

⁵⁵ The conclusion ‘many existings, many things’ requires dividing up ‘existing’ and ‘thing’ so that each, by way of negation, becomes many (‘this existing or this thing is not that existing or that thing etc.’). The original premise, however, said nothing about how the multiplication of one term related to the multiplication of the other, so that to introduce multiplication into the conclusion is to destroy the premise, and thus the conclusion too that was depending on it.

does not give existence by informing but by union; for just as from this union the Word is man by this nature, so by this nature he is existent with the existence of this nature.

47. To the next [n.4] the answer is plain from the same point, that the infinite receives no perfection that may inform it; yet, just as this nature is united to the Word without passive reception of any of the perfection in the Word, so the Word is by this union existent with the existence of this nature.

III. To the Arguments for the Opinion of Others

48. To the arguments for the opinion, the answer is plain as to part [n.13], accident [n.14], and quantity [n.15], because these were rejected in the argument against the opinion; for this nature is not part of any whole [n.26], nor is it in itself an accident [nn.27-29], nor is it formally existent with uncreated existence [n.30].

IV. To the First and Second Reasonings in the Solution of the Question

49. The first and second reasons adduced to show the difference in the solution of the question [nn.36-37]: ‘[Christ] is different according to humanity and deity, therefore he is different’ – the antecedent is denied; nor does ‘he is of a different nature in humanity and deity’ follow therefrom.⁵⁶

Question Two *Whether Christ is a Two*

50. Second I ask whether Christ is a two.

51. That he is.

Because Christ, as he is man, is something (according to the Decretal *On Heretics* [n.25 supra]), and, as he is God, he is something; therefore, as he is man, he is not the same ‘something’ that is God, but another something – and likewise, as he is God, he is not the same something as is man, because then he would be God by humanity; therefore he is different somethings. Therefore he is two.

52. Further, Damascene ch.51, “the whole [*totus*] Christ is God, but he is not only God;”⁵⁷ from this follows, ‘if he is not only God, then he is God and something other than God’ – and so he is two. The consequence is plain from a likeness, that if a man runs and not only a man runs, then something other than a man runs; therefore the like holds on the part of the predicate [cf. n.62 infra].

53. Further, according to the Philosopher *Metaphysics* 5.6.1016b35-17a3 ‘On One’, difference in species entails difference in number, as difference in genus entails

⁵⁶ Scotus is not denying here what he said in nn.36-37, but denying that the difference he showed there of existences in Christ can be used to argue to a difference of subsistences in Christ, or to show that Christ is one supposit in one existence and another supposit in the other existence; for, on the contrary, he is not different even as to each existence but the same in both. Further, the difference cannot be used either to show that Christ is different in having two natures. Christ is, as it were, one supposit all the way through whatever the differences.

⁵⁷ Damascene, “the whole [*totus*] indeed who is Christ is perfect God, but the whole [*totum*] that is Christ is not God; for Christ is not only God but also man... For ‘the whole that’ represents totality of nature, but ‘the whole who’ totality of hypostasis.”

difference in species; but here there is a quasi-specific difference of natures; therefore a numerical difference – and so two.

54. Further, as the masculine gender [e.g. *totus*] belongs to the supposit, so the neuter gender [e.g. *totum*] belongs to the nature, and conversely, according to Damascene [n.52]; so, since there are two natures in Christ, he can be said to be ‘two’ in the neuter, just as, because of unity of supposit, he can be said to be ‘one’ in the masculine.

55. The reasoning is confirmed because, as the three divine persons are said to be ‘three’ in the masculine, so they are said to be ‘one’ in the neuter, because of unity of nature; therefore the opposite here [sc. Christ is ‘one’ in the masculine but ‘two’ in the neuter].

56. On the contrary:

Christ is nothing but God and man, and these are not two, because God is man;^a therefore Christ is not a two.

a. [Interpolation] and every predication is made in respect of some unity, whether per se or simply or per accidens; therefore no duality.

57. Further, Athanasius in his Creed [*Quicumque*], “Yet Christ is not two but one.”

58. Again Hilary *On the Trinity* 9 n.40 [“And I ask whether the Son of man and the Son of God are the same. And since the Son of man is not other and the Son of God is not other (‘For the Word was made flesh’, *John* 1.14), and since he who is Son of God is also Son of man, I require who is the God glorified in the Son of man who is also Son of God”].

59. And for other good authorities, pro and con, see Lombard *Sentences* 3 d.7 ch.1 nn.4-13.

I. To the Question

60. To the question I say that the conclusion is manifest, that Christ is not a ‘two’ in the masculine, because he is not two persons, for then there would be no union in person; nor is he a ‘two’ in the neuter, because he is not human nature, though he does have in himself a neuter ‘two’, that is, two natures; therefore he is not in any way a ‘two’.

II. To the Principal Arguments

61. To the first argument for the opposite conclusion [n.51], I say that although Christ is something insofar as he is God and something insofar as he is man, yet it does not follow that ‘therefore insofar as he is man he is the same something that is God’ nor that ‘he is a different something’, because by taking ‘insofar as’ properly, namely as it indicates that what follows is ‘the reason for inherence of the predicate’, there is a fallacy of the consequent, by using ‘insofar as’ in arguing from inherence of a higher predicate to inherence of a lower predicate; for there is no necessity that what is the reason for inherence of a higher predicate be the reason for inherence of a lower one. But as it is, ‘to be the same something that is man’ is lower than anything said of the Word, and likewise ‘to be the same something that is God’ is higher than anything said of man. And so,

although Christ is something insofar as he is man, yet it does not follow that ‘therefore insofar as he is man he is the same something that is God’; similarly on the other side, although he is something insofar as he is God yet he is not, insofar as he is God, the same something that is man.^a – If however the ‘insofar as’ were taken, not strictly as it states the inherence of a predicate, but only as it states the reason according to which the subject is taken in itself,⁵⁸ one could concede that Christ, insofar as he is man, is the same something that is God; but then the consequence does not hold that he would be God by humanity, because this consequence does not belong to this second way of understanding the ‘insofar as’ but to the first.

a. [Interpolation] And if you argue ‘therefore he is another something’, because ‘same’ and ‘diverse’ are first differences of being dividing the whole of being, *Metaphysics* 10.3.1054b18-19 – the consequence does not hold, because neither of the opposites needs to be present when using the ‘insofar as’; for deity is not the reason for being the same as man, because then the reason for being the same as man would be in the Father, nor is deity the reason for being other than man, because then what it is to be man would be repugnant to deity (which is false, because God is man). Likewise, humanity is not the reason for being the same as God, because then the reason for being the same as God would be in any man, and then every man would be God; nor is humanity the reason for being other than God, because then being the same as God would be repugnant to any man.

62. To the next [n.52] I say that although logic about exclusions added to a predicate [sc. ‘only’ as added to ‘runs’] is not generally passed on,⁵⁹ perhaps because on the part of the predicate it imports a negation that is, in comparison to the preceding, not determinative (and a syncategorematic term is of a nature to determine one extreme in comparison to the other extreme) – yet, because speech is subject to the thing and not vice versa, one can say that an exclusive phrase excludes in one way when added to the subject and excludes in another way when added to the predicate, because, when added to the subject, it excludes precisely everything with respect to the predicate that the subject is not truly said of either *per se* or *per accidens* (to wit, the excluding sentence ‘only a white man runs’ does not exclude ‘Socrates runs’ or ‘a musician runs’ but ‘a black man runs’, though ‘Socrates’ and ‘musician’ are said of ‘white man’ only *per accidens*); but,

⁵⁸ Scotus *Exposition on Aristotle's Metaphysics* 4 sect.1 ch.1 n.12, “One must note that the ‘insofar as’, and any reduplicative phrase, can be taken in two ways, namely either as reduplicative or as specifying. It is taken in the first way when that which immediately follows the reduplication is indicated to be the formal and precise cause of the inherence of the predicate in the subject. It is taken in the second way when that which immediately follows the reduplication is taken only in its formal idea, without precision of causality of the inherence of the predicate in the subject. An example of the first: ‘a triangle, insofar as it is a triangle, has three angles’... An example of the second: ‘A man, insofar as he is a man, is white’ – for here the ‘man’ that follows the ‘insofar as’ is not the formal cause of the inherence of the predicate in the subject...; for in this way the ‘insofar as’ only specifies the subject and does not reduplicate it” [sc. presumably, specifies it as an individual man and not as a species, or as a man and not as a horse, or as to his whole body and not as to his teeth or hair etc.; however, if one said ‘a man, insofar as he is a man, is rational’, one would have the first way of saying ‘insofar as’, namely by indicating the cause of the inherence of the predicate in the subject].

⁵⁹ It is treated of at length by Peter of Spain *Syncategoremata* tr.3, and William of Sherwood *Syncategoremata* pp.67-70.

when added on the part of the predicate, it excludes with respect to the subject whatever is not formally or essentially said of the predicate – and not conversely [sc. it does not exclude something formally or essentially said of the subject], and especially in the case of the same genus, as that ‘only this is white’ can be excluded because no quality inheres in this subject save whiteness [sc. ‘only a white man runs’ does not entail ‘only this man is white’, because ‘only’ added to the subject is exclusive with respect to the predicate, not the subject].

63. And in this way is it taken in divine reality when this proposition is denied, ‘Christ is man alone and God alone’ [sc. where the ‘alone’ is added to the predicate]; for this proposition is false, not because something is said of Christ that God is not said of [sc. as would be the case if the ‘only’ were added on the part of the subject], but because not everything said of Christ is formally or essentially God (because ‘man’ is said of Christ and yet is not formally God or formally said of God). So this proposition is commonly conceded, that ‘Christ is not only man and not only God’.

64. But from this proposition it does not follow that ‘therefore Christ is other than man or other than God’, but this is a fallacy of the consequent by argument from something with several cause of truth to one of these causes; for, in the issue at hand, the antecedent [sc. ‘Christ is not only man etc.’] holds true for this meaning, ‘Christ is not only that which is essentially or formally God’, or for this, ‘Christ is not one who has deity only’ – as if positing the exclusion of an abstract [sc. ‘deity’] understood in the concrete [sc. ‘God’], which is explained as ‘one who has such a form’, according to Damascene ch.57, “For God is one who has divine nature and man one who has human nature.”

65. And so this proposition can be denied, ‘God is only man’, either because the exclusion excludes from a predicate taken formally (because, namely, he is not only that which is formally man), or because it excludes by a form imported in the predicate and not by a supposit having the form (because, namely, he does not have humanity only). The inference made in the statement, ‘therefore he is other than God’, holds true for the second understanding, namely, ‘he is not one who has deity only but also humanity’.

66. And the reason for this diverse way of taking an exclusion in the predicate, not in the subject, could be assigned as that, although the subject supposits for the supposit, yet the predicate predicates a form that is imported in the subject, and not for the supposit.

67. To the statement of Damascene [n.52 footnote], when he says ‘Christ is not wholly God’, this can be expounded syncategorematically [sc. con-significatively] as follows, namely that not both natures are God, or are not the whole formally, namely that what is in Christ is not formally God by both natures.

68. To the next from the *Metaphysics* [n.53], I concede that in Christ there are numerically two natures; but it does not follow that Christ is numerically two, because Christ is not either of the two natures [sc. Christ is not identical to the species humanity and deity, which would make him a two; he is a supposit that has each species, which makes him a one].

69. To the last argument [n.54] the answer is plain from the same point, because two essences are said to be two in the neuter, but not for this reason is Christ said to be two in the neuter, because he is not the two natures [sc. not identical with them]. Hence if, in order to prove the predicate ‘is two’ of Christ, the natures are taken for the middle term,

then: either the major will be false when the natures are signified in the concrete, by taking them thus: ‘God and man are two, Christ is God and man, therefore Christ is two’ (the major here is false, because God is man), or the minor will be false when the natures are signified in the abstract, as if the argument were: ‘humanity and deity are two, Christ is humanity and deity, therefore Christ is two’ (the minor here is false). Or if the natures are taken in the abstract in the major and in the concrete in the minor, there will be four terms, as if the argument were: ‘humanity and deity are two, Christ is God and man, therefore Christ is two’ (here there are four terms: ‘humanity and deity’ and ‘man and God’⁶⁰), and so nothing will follow.

70. Hereby is plain the answer to the likeness [n.55]: for three persons are one thing because that one thing, which is the nature, is predicated of the three together and of each of them; but if they had something one that was not predicated of them, as if three men had one intellective soul, according to the fiction of Averroes [cf. *Ord. 2 d.3 n.164*], they would not be said to be something one but to have a one. So here, Christ is not said to be two, although he has in him a two (namely two natures, human and divine), just as neither is a *per se* composite said to be two, though it has in it a two, namely matter and form.

Question Three *Which of the Three Opinions that the Master Reports should be Held*

71. Lastly the question is asked, without arguments, which of the three opinions that the Master reports should be held.⁶¹

72. I reply.

The first one is not generally held to, because the assumer is not the thing assumed, but the Word *is* ‘this man’. Now whether ‘this man’ can stand for any singular of human nature and not precisely for the supposit of the Word (as white can stand for ‘this white’, which is a singular of white in the concrete – in the way that the proposition ‘every white is colored’ is true – and not stand for the subject or supposit subsisting in whiteness), will be touched on in d.11 n.69 below on ‘Whether this man began to be’.

73. The third opinion was not heretical in the time of the Master, but was condemned afterwards in the time of Alexander III, as is plain in the decretal *On Heretics* [n.25 supra].⁶² Also the authorities adduced on its behalf [by Lombard in the *Sentences*],

⁶⁰ Tr. That is, since there are two middle terms here, ‘humanity and deity’ and ‘man and God’, there will be four terms overall when the minor and major terms, ‘Christ’ and ‘two’, are added in; but a syllogism is only valid with three terms.

⁶¹ Tr. The three views from Lombard’s *Sentences* 3 d.6 are: first, that in the incarnation a man already constituted of soul and flesh became God and that God became that man; second, that the man Christ consists of three substances [God, soul and flesh] or two natures [divine and human] and that he is one composite person; third, that the union of soul and flesh with the Word did not constitute a single substance or person but God clothed himself with the human nature as with an external habit or covering.

⁶² The condemnation by Alexander III in 1177AD is included in the *Decretals* of Gregory IX, and reads more fully: “Since Christ is perfect God and perfect man, it is remarkable by what temerity anyone dares to say that Christ is not anything according as he is man. Now lest so great abuse or error arise or be introduced in the Church of God, we command Your Fraternity by apostolic writing that, having convoked the masters of Paris and Reims and of the other cities round about, you forbid by our authority under anathema that, for the rest, no one is to dare to say that Christ is not anything

which seem to mean that ‘Christ assumed human nature as a habit’ [cf. *Philippians* 2.7, “he emptied himself, taking on the form of a slave...and was found in habit as a man”⁶³] need expounding because there is a certain likeness of this nature to a habit; for just as he who has a habit does not change, but rather the haver, or the one with the habit, is hidden under the habit, so the divine person is not changed in this union but the human nature is, which has as it were hidden the person of the Word.

74. Therefore the second opinion should be held, that the person of the Word subsists in two natures: in one from which he has first existence, in the other (coming externally as it were) from which he has second existence, just as if, in a different way, Socrates were said to subsist in humanity and whiteness. But as to what the opinion says, ‘that the person of Christ is composite’, it is not commonly held when composition in the proper sense is spoken of, namely composition of act and potency (as of matter and form) or of two potentialities, of the sort that the Philosopher [*Metaphysics* 5.25-26.1023b19-34] calls elements integrating the total nature [cf. d.1 n.78 supra].

75. The authorities from Damascene,⁶⁴ then, which mean that the person is composite, need exposition: that both the divine and the human nature are there as truly as if they composed the person but are there so un-confusedly that there is from them no third thing, for they do not bring about any composition. And this same thing is said by Damascene himself ch.49, “If, according to the heretics, Christ exists in one composite nature, he is changed from a simple nature into a composite one,” and “he is called neither God nor man,” “in the way we say a man is composed of soul and body, or the body of four elements.”⁶⁵ So one should expound Damascene and say that the nature of Christ is composite because of the truth of the two natures in which he exists – but it is possible more truly to deny composition, because one of the natures does not perfect the other nor is some third nature made out of them. .

according as he is man, because, just as Christ is true God, so he is true man, subsistent of rational soul and human flesh.” John of Cornwall, in a eulogy to Alexander III, reports that, “Master Gilbert de la Porrée, as many relate, taught...that Christ is and became a person composed of two natures or three substances, and yet did not become a person or a substance or anything as he is man.”

⁶³ Augustine 83 *Questions* q.73 n.2 explains Paul’s verse in *Philippians* thus: “He emptied himself, not changing his form but ‘taking on the form of a slave’, and not changed and transmuted into a man with loss of his incommutable stability, but, by as it were taking on true man, he himself, who takes it on, ‘was made in the likeness of men...and was found in habit as a man’... By this name ‘habit’, then, the Apostle sufficiently indicated how he meant the phrase ‘made in the likeness of men’, because the Word was not made into man by transformation but by habit when he took on man, whom he associated with himself by in some way uniting man with, and conforming him to, immortality... And by this word [‘take on’] should be understood not that the Word was changed by taking on man, just as neither are our members changed when they put on clothing, although the taking on here conjoined the taken-on ineffably with the taker-on.”

⁶⁴ Three authorities from Damascene for the second opinion are quoted by Lombard, where the person of Christ is said to be composed of two natures.

⁶⁵ Damascene, “If therefore, according to the heretics, Christ exists through the union of one composite nature, he is changed from a simple nature into a composite one, and...will be called neither God nor man but only Christ... But our dogma is not that Christ is composed of one nature, nor is he another thing from other things, as man is from soul and body, or as body is from the four elements.”

Seventh Distinction
Question One
Whether this proposition is true, ‘God is man’

1. About the seventh distinction I ask whether this proposition is true, ‘God is man’.^a

a. [Interpolation] About this seventh distinction, where the Master explains three opinions posited above about the incarnation of Christ in its factual reality, three questions are asked: two about locutions that express the union, and one locution expressing the predestination of the union. The first is whether this proposition is true, ‘God is man’; the second is whether this proposition is true, ‘God became man’; the third is whether Christ was predestined to be the Son of God. Argument about the first.

2. That it is not:

Because in things that divide being, or in the divisions of being, the first that divide it are most diverse; but being is divided by the first division into finite and infinite; therefore finite and infinite are most diverse. Therefore if there are any other dividers of being that are so incompossible that one cannot be predicated of the other, this will be most of all the case in the issue at hand.

3. Again, the same thing is not predicated of the same thing both in the abstract and denominatively, because if this proposition, ‘man is white’, is denominatively true, yet it is not true in the abstract, ‘man is whiteness’, according to the Philosopher *Topics* 1.2.109a34-b12, where he destroys a problem about accident if what is assigned as accident is predicated of the whatness; but God was human-ed, according to Damascene ch.46 [“Therefore we do not say that man was deified but that God was human-ed”], and according to Cassiodorus on *Romans* 1.3, ‘made to him from the seed of David’ [Cassiodorus, *Exposition of the Psalter*, *psalm* 9.1, “What more marvelous than God unconfusedly human-ed for the salvation of the human race?” *psalm* 56, “For God – so to say – became human-ed, who also in the assumption of the flesh did not cease to be God”]; therefore he was not man.

4. Further, if God is man, then either ‘man’ predicates a relation or it predicates something relative to God; it does not predicate a relation because ‘man’ is not said relative to the other correlative (for God is not man *of* something); if it predicates something relative to God, then it is said of the three persons, according to Augustine *On the Trinity* 5.6 n.7 [“But whatever is said relative to substance is said according to substance; so the result is that the Son is in substance equal to the Father and to the Holy Spirit;” 8 n.9, “Whatever God is said to be relative to himself is also said thrice of the individual persons...and said...together of the very Trinity”]; therefore the three persons will be man, which is false.

5. Further, if God is man, I ask according to the idea of what predicate is ‘man’ predicated of God?⁶⁶ None seems capable of being assigned: not the predication of genus

⁶⁶ Porphyry in the *Book of Predicables* ch.1 lists the five predicables (into one or other of which all predications are supposed to fall) as follows: genus, species, difference, property, accident.

or of species or of difference (because God is not in a genus or a species, nor is he a predicate of the essence of a subject); nor the predication of the property (because then God would fall into the definition of man); nor the predication of the definition (for the same reason); nor the predication of an accident (because no such thing is said of God).

6. On the contrary:

John 1.14, “The Word was made flesh,” where, according to Augustine [*On the Trinity* 2.6 n.11], ‘flesh’ is put for man.

I. To the Question
A. Solution

7. About this question one must see what is the cause of truth for the proposition ‘God is man’ being true, because it is not true first; for any predicate that only belongs to a universal through some supposit does not belong to it first or truly save because it is said of some inferior term; and so there must be some cause making the proposition true that is other than the universal. ‘Is man’ is only said of God through some determinate supposit, as through the Word; therefore the proposition is true because this proposition ‘the Word is man’ is true.

8. Second one must see about the truth of this cause [sc. the truth of ‘the Word is man’].

Here one needs to know that this proposition cannot naturally be made plain or known to be true; for either we can have a proper and determinate concept of the Word, and then this proposition is a true contingent but an immediate one and not known from the terms, because then the terms would have to include the evident relationship between them, so that the idea of the terms would necessarily include the union of the terms that the proposition expresses; or we do not have a proper concept of the Word but only a confused one (as was said in 1 d.3 nn.56-57, 187-188, d.27 n.78), and then this proposition ‘the Word is man’, as to the concept we have of the terms, is a contingent mediate one. Now such a contingent mediate proposition is not of a nature to be known save from some contingent immediate proposition from which it may follow; but, as was just said, the above proposition, because it is contingent, cannot be known from the terms, nor can it in any way be known naturally to be true, because a contingent immediate proposition is not truly known save by intuitive cognition of the extremes and of their union, of the sort we cannot have of the extremes of the proposition immediately antecedent to this one.

9. Therefore the truth of this proposition is only an immediately believed one, or one that must be made plain from something believed. And accordingly it is shown to be true in this way: for a supposit ‘subsistent in some nature as supposit’ is truly called such formally according to the nature; but it is a thing believed that this union is such that by it the Word subsists in human nature as a supposit in the nature; therefore by it the Word is formally man.

10. The major of this syllogism is proved by Damascene ch.57, “‘God’ signifies a universal of nature, so that it has in any hypostasis the order of a denominative term, as does also the term ‘man’ – for God is he who has divine nature as man is he who has human nature.”

11. The minor is proved by Augustine *On the Trinity* 1.13 n.28, “This assumption was such that it made God man and man God.”

12. Third one must see how this predicate ‘man’ is taken.

13. And one statement [Ps.-Hugh of St. Victor] is that it is taken for the supposit, so that the predication is by identity, by pointing to the implicature: ‘the Word is the supposit that is man’.

14. Against this:

In that case there will be a process to infinity: for this implication is on the part of the predicate and it predicates ‘man’ of something that is introduced by the subject – and then I ask whether the predicate is taken formally⁶⁷ or for the supposit, when the statement is made that ‘the Word is the supposit that is man’? If the predicate is taken formally the intended conclusion is gained, that the predication is formal and not only by identity; but if the predicate is only taken for the implied supposit, there will be a process to infinity, because any implicative speaking includes a proposition within it and so a predication, because such a proposition is a double proposition; either then there will be process to infinity in implication or recourse must be made to another mode of predicating.⁶⁸

15. Further, the predication of a nature of a supposit is formal, not only by identity.

16. Fourth one must see what sort of predicate this predicate is with respect to the subject.

It seems that it could be posited to be the species [Henry of Ghent]: for ‘man’ is said univocally of Christ and Peter; the predicate is also said of something as to its ‘whatness’, and only said of several things that differ numerically; therefore etc. That the predicate is said as to whatness is plain from the Decretal *On Heretics* [d.6 nn.25, 73 supra].

17. I reply:

Just as it is one thing to predicate a univocal and another to predicate univocally, strictly speaking (for a univocal predicate is said to be a predicate whose *per se* concept is one; and in this way ‘white’ said of wood and a stone, or said denominatively⁶⁹ of anything, is a univocal predicate; predicated univocally is a predicate of which, as it is predicated, the idea is so one that this idea is included in the idea of the subject;⁷⁰ and in this way a denominative predicate is not predicated univocally, that is in the way the Philosopher speaks in *Categories* 5.3a33-b9) – so a predicate stating the ‘what is

⁶⁷ Scotus *Metaphysics* 7 q.4 n.23, “Formal predication is when the predicate is in the subject from the understanding of the subject.”

⁶⁸ This argument is given by Bonaventure *Sentences* 3 d.7 a.1 q.1. The point seems to be that ‘man’ in ‘the Word is the supposit that is man’ must, according to the view here being criticized, itself be short-hand for ‘supposit that is man’ (otherwise the predication will be formal after all), so that the proposition will become ‘the Word is the supposit that is the supposit that is man’, where again the ‘man’ must be replaced by ‘the supposit that is man’, and so on ad infinitum.

⁶⁹ Peter of Spain *Tractatus* tr.2 n.21, “Denominatives are said to be all terms that, differing from something only in case, get from that name their appellation... Hence ‘grammatical’, ‘strong’, ‘white’ and the like are predicated denominatively. And therefore an accident is said to be predicated denominatively.”

⁷⁰ *Ibid.* n.20, “But to be predicated univocally is to be predicated according to one name and one definition taken according to that name, as ‘man’ according to its name is predicated of Socrates and Plato..., and the definition of it according to that name is one, as ‘mortal rational animal’, and according to this definition is it predicated of its [logical] inferiors.”

'predicated' is one thing, and a predicate 'predicated of a thing as to whatness' is another (from *Topics* 1.5.102a31-34 [“Now genus is what is predicated in the ‘what it is’ of things that are many and differ in species; and the sort of things said to be predicated in the ‘what it is’ are whatever pertains to him who is asked to give in answer ‘what’ the thing proposed ‘is’”]), and yet not everything of any genus is predicated of anything ‘as to whatness’ but only what is predicated of its essential inferior, in whose definition it is included⁷¹ (as in the matter at issue).^a

a. [Interpolation] Thus it could therefore be said that, since no union is like this one – because of which the predication [sc. ‘God is man’] is said to be true – there is no predicate said of a subject that is related to it.

18. As far as concerns what is predicated, then, this is the species, because it is not of a nature to be genus or difference or property or accident. But as far as concerns the manner of the relation of the predicate in regard to the subject, the predicate does not belong to the idea of the subject, and it comes to a subject existing in complete act, and it can be absent from the subject – and to this extent, the predicate seems to have a relation in regard to the subject like the sort the predicate called ‘accident’ has.

19. And if it be objected [Godfrey of Fontaines, Richard of Middleton] that the relation of this universal [sc. ‘man’], because it is an ‘accident’, is founded in reality only in an accident – I reply that, as to the fact, it is true that this second intention ‘accident’, of which the logician speaks, is only founded in an accident that states a first intention, as the metaphysician speaks; yet it is not of the idea of this second intention that it only exist in the first intention, just as it is not of the idea of genus or species that it only be founded in the idea of substance (and perhaps already in the proposition ‘the white is wood’ the predicate is the second intention of accident, speaking logically; or if it is not so there, then at least if ‘to be wood’ could come to an actually existing white, such that it would not be predicated of the notion or essence of the subject nor would be convertible with the subject, ‘to be wood’ would seem perfectly an accident, speaking logically).

20. Fifth, what sort of predication, whether per se or per accidens, is this predication?

It seems not to be per se in the first mode, because the predicate does not fall into the definition of the subject; nor in the second mode, because the reverse does not hold (the subject does not fall into the definition of the predicate); nor generally is it in any mode of per se,⁷² because the relation [sc. the relation of ‘man’ to ‘God’ in ‘God is man’] does not seem necessary in any of them.

21. But this is not conclusive, because some contingent propositions can be per se, as with immediate predication in the second mode, if the proximate reason for the inherence of predicates is included in the subjects even though the inherence of the predicates is not necessary, as in the case of ‘the hot heats’ and ‘the will wills’.

22. But not even this mode of per se seems present in the issue at hand (the thing is plain in the second article [n.7]).

⁷¹ *Ibid.*, “Now that is said to be predicated of something as to whatness which is appropriately given as a response to a question asked by ‘what?’ – as when the question is asked, ‘what is man?’, an appropriate response is, ‘animal’; and for this reason ‘animal’ is predicated of man as to whatness.”

⁷² See Aristotle *Prior Analytics* 1.4.73a34-b18.

23. Response:

If the discussion about ‘per accidens’ is being done in the way the metaphysician speaks about it, namely that either one term is accidental to the other or both are accidental to a third (as is plain in *Metaphysics* 5.6.1015b16-34, 7.1017a19-22, ‘On Being and One’) – then this proposition [sc. ‘God is man’] is not per accidens, because “what exists in the true sense is not an accident of anything”, from *Physics* 1.3.186b4-5; hence this union is not conceded to be accidental either, because neither extreme is an accident. But this argument does not prove that the proposition is per se,⁷³ speaking logically of ‘per se’.^a But the subject ‘God’ here does not determinately include ‘Son’ more than ‘Father’ – so just as this proposition too, ‘the rational is animal’, is not per se, logically speaking. One could concede, then, that, logically speaking, the predicate is outside the per se notion of the subject and that, for this reason, the proposition is true not per se but per accidens, even though neither extreme is really present per accidens in the other.

a. [Interpolation] first because the predicate is not of the per se notion of the subject, even in the concreteness of the supposit; second because in per se predication the subject supposits determinately (for if it were to suppose only indeterminately then this proposition ‘animal is man’ would be per se, because it can be verified in Peter or in Paul); third because if ‘man’ [sc. in ‘God is man’] were predicated per se of whatever is contained under the subject, then both the Holy Spirit and the Father would be ‘man’.

24. Hence this union of the extremes [sc. ‘God is man’] is conceded to be neither essential nor accidental but substantial – Damascene ch.49, “For we say the union is substantial, that is, true and not in imagination;” and so, in accord with the diversity of this union from all others, one can posit a diversity of this sort of inherence from all others.

B. A Doubt

25. But about this proposition, ‘Christ is man’, there is a doubt that it is per se, because here the subject does include the predicate, for, according to Damascene ch. 49, “Now we say that ‘Christ’ is the name of the hypostasis, not stated in a uniform way, but an existence significative of two natures;” so Christ signifies ‘an existent in human nature’, and thus it includes the predicate ‘man’, as Peter does.

26. It is said [William of Ware] that this is per accidens on account of an implication in the subject, which implication is per accidens; for Christ implies about the Word that he is man, because Christ is the Word-man or ‘the Word who is man’, because

⁷³ Scotus *Lectura* 3 d.7 n.33, “Know that an accident, as the metaphysician takes it, is a thing dependent on a substance; but, as it is taken by the logician, it is an intention made by the soul and is nothing but the contingent inherence of a predicate in a subject. And although this intention of contingent inherence only exists in a real accident, yet there is no repugnance to its being found in something else.”

a ‘who is’ falls as a middle between the demanding and the demanded terms,⁷⁴ according to Priscian [*Grammatical Foundations*, 18.1 n.6, “When it is said ‘Achilles son of Peleus slew in fight many Trojans’, the participle of the substantive verb, ‘being’ [*ens*], is understood (which is not now in use among us [sc. ‘*ens*’ is now used as a noun and not as the participle of the verb ‘*esse*’]), and in its place [sc. in place of ‘Achilles, being son of Peleus,...’] we can say or understand ‘who is or who was the son of Peleus’. In like manner...‘a friend agreeable to me is coming’, that is, ‘a friend who is agreeable to me...’; the ‘who is’ is understood. And these constructions, indeed, which the nature of the words demands, vary in this way in their cases, to which we may join pronouns or participles in the same cases.”].

27. But this statement of Priscian is not the purpose, because a substantive does not demand its adjective to be at the same time through an intermediate implication, nor conversely, but substantive and adjective are together construed intransitively. And so, although an intermediate implication occurs in the phrase ‘the cappa of Socrates’ [sc. ‘the cappa that is of Socrates’], yet it does not occur in the phrase ‘white man’, otherwise determining any extreme by any accident or adjective added to it would be impossible, and there would be a process to infinity.⁷⁵ Therefore one may say that such an implication is not introduced by this name ‘Christ’, and that there is no need, because of it, to posit that the proposition [sc. ‘Christ is man’] is true per se; however, since, according to the Philosopher *Metaphysics* 5.29.1024b26-28 ‘an account false in itself is true of nothing’, then also, by similarity, a concept that is not in itself per se one is not asserted per se of anything one, nor is anything asserted per se of it. So this proposition ‘Christ is man’ can be conceded to be not altogether per accidens, for the subject includes the predicate, nor altogether per se, for the subject does not have a concept altogether per se one. And the like would be said of this proposition, ‘a white man is colored’.

II. To the Principal Arguments

28. To the arguments.

As to the first [n.2], I concede the greater diversity but not the greater repugnance; for those things are said to be more diverse than agree less in the same thing, but they are not for this reason more repugnant (just as white and black agree in more things than white and man do, and yet white and black are more repugnant than white and man); and in this way a greater diversity in the extremes is not a cause of their being false but the repugnance is, or the incompossibility of things that formally have any of the four oppositions [*Categories* 10.11b17-23; Peter of Spain *Tractate* 3 n.29, “Now one thing is said to be opposed to another in four ways: for some opposites are opposite by relation, as father and son, double and half, master and slave; others are opposite by privation, as privation and possession, or sight and blindness, or hearing and deafness; others are

⁷⁴ Peter Helias, *Commentary on Priscian* 18, “Where the grammarians say that diction regiments diction, there Priscian says that diction demands diction; and what others call ‘regimen’ he calls ‘demand’, using a more explicit locution.” Cf. Scotus 1 d.21 n.16.

⁷⁵ Tr. That is, if ‘white man’ should be construed as ‘a man who is white’ and if ‘white’ should be construed as ‘a white who is a man’, then ‘a white man’ becomes ‘a man who is a white who is a man’; and since ‘white’ appears here again and so must be construed in the same way as before, the sentence becomes ‘a man who is a white who is a man, who is a man’, and so on ad infinitum.

contraries, as white and black; others are opposite by contradiction, as affirmation and negation (as ‘sits’ and ‘does not sit’).”].

29. To the second [n.3] I say that ‘to be human-ed’ is the proper denominative not of this term ‘man’ but of the term ‘becoming man’ – and universally, this sort of denominative, which signifies a form in its becoming, is said of the same thing that the form itself is said of, and yet denominatively or with the like denomination; for ‘white’ and ‘becomes white’ are the same, and ‘man’ and ‘becomes man’ are the same; but the proper denominative of man is the term ‘human’ (and this term is not said of God). And this has to be understood in the way that from subjects denominating supposita further denominatives can be taken; and this is not because they in-form them, the way concrete accidents are denominated [sc. as man is called white because he has the form of whiteness], but because of possessing or being related to something else extrinsic to such a substance.

30. To the third [n.4] I say that Augustine is speaking only of those things relatively said that predicate an intrinsic extreme.

31. However alternatively it could also be said that this predicate [sc. ‘man’], although it does not predicate a relative, yet does imply a relation of union with the Word, for this predicate is truly predicated of God because of the union of the nature with the word – which union is a relation.

32. As to the other [n.5], it is plain that this predicate participates something of the idea of a species and something of the idea of an accident in relation to the subject, because this nature comes to the Word actually existing perfectly in himself.

Question Two *Whether God was Made Man*

33. Second I ask whether God was made man.

34. That he was not:

Because then God would be made. The consequent is false; therefore the antecedent is too. Proof of the consequence: this inference holds, ‘Socrates was made man, therefore he was made’, because ‘man’ does not destroy in the proposition the predicate ‘to be made’ (the way ‘dead’ does with respect to man when one says, ‘he is a dead man, therefore he is a man’); therefore the inference holds everywhere.

35. Further, if God was made man, then he was changed to humanity. The consequence is universally plain in everything: ‘he was made white, therefore he was changed to whiteness’, and so of other cases.

36. Further, if God was made man then God was made God. The proof of the consequence is that there is, because of the union of the natures, a sharing of characteristics, and so, just as he who kills the man kills God, so if God is made man he is made God.

37. On the contrary:

The *Nicene Creed* says, “He was made man.”

38. Again, in the *Gospel of John* 1.14, “The Word was made flesh;” ‘flesh’ is put there for man [n.6].

39. Again, Augustine *On the Trinity* 1.13 n.28, “The union was such that it made God man and man God.”

I. To the Question

40. There are distinctions to the proposition ‘God was made man’, because the making can be referred either to the composition or to one or other extreme, and this in two ways, namely either in itself or in order to one or other extreme. And these distinctions, whether in one sense or the other, are diffusively treated of [Bonaventure, Aquinas, Richard of Middleton, et al.].

41. But, avoiding such prolixity, one can say that the proposition is simply true.

42. The clarification is as follows: when the making is predicated by way of added second element, it states making simply; when it is predicated by way of added third element, it states making in a certain respect, namely the respect specified by the third term; the same is also true of ‘is’ when it is predicated as second or as third element.⁷⁶

43. So, just as ‘being made’ is truly stated of a subject in accord with the subject’s receiving existence simply after non-existence simply from some maker, so is ‘being made *a*’ truly said of it because it is *a* after it was not *a* through the action of some agent.

44. And this latter point is proved by the fact that passive making formally includes only a relation to the maker and an order of the thing made to a preceding non-existence (and these go together in the case of creatures); when these two do, then, come together, the idea of making is secured, whether making simply [sc. making to be] or making such and such [sc. making to be *a*], if such a supposit [sc. some supposit that is not *a*] naturally precedes the form; but God is man by the action of some maker, and he was not always man; therefore he was made man.

45. The proof of the minor [sc. ‘God is man...and he was not always man’] is that it is plain from the preceding question [supra n.9] that God is man and that he was not always man, because he was not always subsisting in human nature as a supposit in that nature. And the proof that he is man through the action of some maker is that, when certain things are necessarily concomitant to each other, then, if one of them is made by the action of another, so are the rest; ‘human nature being united in person to the Word’ and ‘the Word being man’ are necessarily concomitant to each other; but human nature was thus united to the Word, namely by the Trinity’s making, because the Trinity was the

⁷⁶ Tr. Scotus is following the analysis of propositions found in Aristotle *On Interpretation* 2-3 and 10.19b19-25 (also William of Sherwood *Syncategorematic Words*), where a proposition is analyzed either as consisting of two elements, noun and verb, or as three, two terms and a copula. In the case of ‘is’ an example of the first analysis would be ‘Socrates is (or exists)’, and an example of the second would be ‘Socrates is wise’. In the case of ‘made’ an example of the first analysis would be ‘Socrates was-made (or became)’, and an example of the second would be ‘Socrates was-made (or became) wise’. In this second analysis the ‘is’ or ‘was-made’ or ‘became’ is added as a third element and is specified by the third term, namely ‘wise’, which says what the subject is or was made to be. Of course one can, if one wishes, analyze ‘Socrates is (or exists)’ in the second way, namely as ‘Socrates is existent or is an existent’; one can also analyze ‘Socrates is wise’ in the first way, namely as ‘Socrates wise-izes’. Indeed disputes and developments in the history of logic turn on this interesting fact. Nevertheless, for Scotus’ present purposes, the point about the varying uses of ‘is’ or ‘made’ remains.

agent in respect of this union; and it is plain that the Trinity was the maker, because the Trinity caused the effect in the creature; therefore the Trinity made the Word to be man.

46. And if the objection is made [Bonaventure] that making requires change, and change of that in which it is and of that about which it is said, because change is not of the end term – I reply that a natural maker presupposes an affected passive thing that it changes, because a passive thing that is first in potency to a term is made actually to be that term by the action of the maker, and what passes from potency to act changes. But, in the case of this union, the supernatural agent does not presuppose that the Word is, as it were, potential for this term, nor did the supernatural agent introduce the term as an act or form of the Word through inherence, but united the term to the Word without inherence; so there was no passage there from potency to act. The idea of making, therefore, is preserved on both sides, because something on both sides is, by the action of the maker, such as it before was not and thus becomes such. So it is accidental that what becomes such undergoes change, save when what is said to be such is the form of that which becomes such, to which form it was before in potency; and thus does it commonly happen in passive makings, where natural agents are at work and make certain things to be of the sort actually which they potentially were before.

47. But if it is objected that ‘there was at least some passive undergoing here after there was active making, because to any making that is a process there corresponds a proper passive undergoing; therefore this undergoing was in something; but not in the human nature because, as it seems, human nature was the term of the passive making; therefore it was in the Word, which seems unacceptable’ – I reply that here there was one, active, real making by the whole Trinity, to which there corresponded a real passive making, namely that whereby God was made man and which was the passive union of human nature to the Word, and this passive uniting was in the human nature and the term of it was the Word; there was, as to manner of speaking, another passive making, concomitant with the active, real making, namely that whereby the Word was made man, and of this making human nature seems, as to manner of speaking, to have been the term; but there was not a different real term in this case and in that, because there was no other real passive making; for by the same making, as well active as passive, was the Word united thus to human nature. I say, therefore, that the passive undergoing correspondent to the acting was in the human nature united, and the human nature was the subject, not the term, of the passive making, even though it is signified as being the term in the proposition, ‘the Word was made man’.

48. And in this way might one reply to the preceding objection about change [n.46], namely that the change that there was here was in the human nature, not in the Word, so that there was not here a making without any change, nor yet was there need for change to have been in anything said to be made such, but only in that because of whose making or undergoing something is said to be made such – which here was the human nature alone.

49. From all this it is plain that the proposition ‘man was made God’ is simply true, because man, by the action of making, is God and before was not God.

50. And as for what some say [Bonaventure], that ‘to be made’ denotes a change in that of which it is said and a preceding of it with respect to the term of the making – it is plain from what was already said [nn.46-48] that the first [sc. ‘to be made’ denotes a change] is not necessary, nor the second [sc. ‘to be made’ denotes a preceding...],

because this would only be the case insofar as ‘to be made’ implies a beginning in some way. But this beginning, when an added third element is predicated [n.42], does not denote that the subject precedes the predicate; for it is true to say of a now created soul that this soul now begins to animate the body, and yet it did not exist before it was animating the body; so too, when the predication is made by way of added second element, it is true to say that it begins to be (and thus does it begin to be day, that is, ‘time begins to be day’ and nothing other than day, and yet the time did not exist first and afterwards begin to be day); so also neither is it necessary, in order for this proposition, ‘man was made God’, to be true, that man preceded – just as neither for the truth of the proposition, ‘human nature was united to the Word’, which implies the proposition, ‘human nature was made subsistent in the nature of the Word’, is it necessary that human nature was pre-existent in the Word before it was subsistent in the Word.

51. But if you ask which of these propositions is more proper, ‘man was made God’ or ‘God was made man’, and you argue that ‘man was made God’ is, because the truth of all these propositions is founded on the fact that ‘human nature was united to the Word’ (for the real undergoing that there was there was in the human nature, and the term was the Word), and because to this fact the proposition ‘man was made God’ seems closer because it more immediately expresses passive making – I reply that, in this matter, the proposition ‘human nature was united in person to the Word’ is first, but from this follows immediately that the Word is man. The reason for this is that the Word, by virtue of the union, is subsistent in human nature, and from this follows, by conversion, that man is God. And the same holds of ‘is made’. Therefore ‘God was made man’ is not truer than this one, ‘man was made God’, nor is it more remote from the previous one [sc. ‘human nature was united in person to the Word’], on account of which both of them are true – both are proper, however.⁷⁷

II. To the Principal Arguments

52. To the arguments.

To the first [n.34] I say the inference ‘Socrates was made man, therefore he was made’ does not hold of Socrates due to his form, just as it does not hold thus of the matter at hand either; but it holds of Socrates only due to his matter, because ‘Socrates is a man’ states the being first and simply of Socrates; in the matter at hand it is not so.

53. To the second [n.35] the answer is plain from the solution to the question [n.46], because the claim ‘everything that is made to be of a certain sort must be changed in order to be of that sort’ does not hold, but only happens to be the case about things that were in potency beforehand to that as to which, by receiving the form, they are being made to be – and the Word is not made man in this way but only by personal union. However if some change were wanted, it could be posited to be in the human nature – not that the human nature was existing before it was united, but the change is between opposite terms, one of which terms precedes the other in duration.

⁷⁷ Tr. Scotus here goes against the opinions of Bonaventure (*Sentences* 3 d.7 a.1 q.3) and Aquinas (*ST* IIIa q.16 a.6 ad 4), who think ‘man was made God’ is improper or false, though Scotus interestingly directs his remarks to the view that ‘man was made God’ is truer or more proper.

54. To the third [n.36] I say that things that express the union of the nature to the person are excepted from the rule about the sharing of characteristics.⁷⁸ And the reason is that the sharing of the aforesaid characteristics happens because of the union, and so it presupposes the union; the sharing does not happen then as regard things that express the union. And therefore God is not made, although he is made man.^a

a. [Interpolation] because these things express the union; and these things and the example given [n.36, he who kills the man kills God] are not alike.

Question Three

Whether Christ was Predestined to be Son of God

55. Third I ask whether Christ was predestined to be Son of God.

56. That he was not:

Because he was not predestined to be Son of God in respect of his being Son of God, since predestination did not precede the existence of the Son of God, for predestination states a preceding to that which is predestined; nor was he predestined in respect of his being man, because a thing predestined to be of some sort in some respect is of that sort in that respect – therefore if he was predestined to be Son of God in respect of his being man, then the Son of God is Son of God in respect of his being man, which is false.

57. On the contrary:

Romans 1.3-4, “He was made of the seed of David, who was predestined to be Son of God in power.”

I. To the Question

58. I reply.

Since ‘predestination’ is principally a pre-ordering of someone to glory and to other things in their order to glory, and because glory for this human nature in Christ, and the union of it with the Word in order to glory, were pre-ordered, since a glory as great as has now been conferred on it should not have been conferred on it if it were not united to the Word – therefore, just as the merits, without which someone would not be ordered fittingly to a glory as great as he would be ordered to with them, fall under predestination, so this union, which is ordered fittingly to so great a glory, though not by way of merit, fell under predestination; and thus, just as this nature’s being united to the Word was predestined, so the Word’s being man and this man’s being the Word were predestined. – The inferences are proved by way of likeness, as was said about passive making [nn.44-48].

⁷⁸ The rule is thus expressed by Damascene ch. 49, “The Word appropriates human things to himself (for to him belongs what belongs to his sacred flesh), and bestows on the flesh, by way of giving back, his own properties, because of the interpenetration of the parts with each other and because of union in hypostasis.” He excepts things expressing the union from this rule as do other doctors generally, Alexander of Hales, Bonaventure, Aquinas.

59. And if you say [Godfrey of Fontaines, Aquinas] that ‘predestination regards first the person, and so it is necessary to find first here some person to whom first God predestined glory and the union in its order to glory; but he did not predestine this union to any divine person (plainly not to the person of the Word as of the Word; and not to that person as human nature, because in this sense the union is included)’ – I reply: the proposition that ‘predestination regards the person alone’ can be denied; for just as God can love any good other than himself (not merely the supposit but the nature), so also can he pre-choose or pre-order for something other than himself a good fitting to that other, and thus he can pre-choose glory and a union in order to glory for the nature and not only for the person. However it is true that, in all other cases besides this one, predestination regards the person, because in no other case has God pre-ordered a good for the nature save by pre-ordering a good for the person, because a nature for which a good can thus be pre-ordered exists only in a created person. It is not so in the issue at hand.

II. Doubts and their Solution

A. First Doubt

60. But here there are two doubts. The first is whether this predestination [of Christ] necessarily requires a preceding fall of human nature, which the many authorities seem to mean that say the Son of God would never have been incarnate if man had not fallen.

61. It can, without prejudice, be said that, since the predestination of anyone to glory naturally precedes, on the part of the object, foreknowledge of the sin or damnation of anyone (according to the final opinion stated in 1 d.41 nn.40-42 [i.e. Scotus' own opinion]), much more is this true of the predestination of the soul that was predestined to the highest glory; for universally, he who wills in an ordered way seems to will what is closer to the end first, and so, just as God wills glory for someone before he wills grace, thus too, among the predestined (to whom he wills glory), he seems to will in an ordered way glory first for him whom he wills to be closest to the end, and so to will it first for this soul [of Christ].^a

a. [Interpolation] he first wills glory for this soul before he wills glory for any other soul, and he first wills grace and glory for any other soul before he foresees in it the opposites of these habits; therefore, from the beginning, he first wills glory for the soul of Christ before he foresees that Adam will fall.

62. All the authorities [n.60] can be expounded as follows, namely that Christ would not have come as redeemer if man had not fallen – nor perhaps have come as capable of suffering, because neither was there any necessity that that soul – glorious from the beginning, for which God pre-chose not only the highest glory but also a glory coeval with the soul – would have been united to a body capable of suffering; but neither would redemption have had to be made if man had not sinned.

63. But not for this redemption alone does God seem to have predestined this soul for so great glory, since the redemption or glory of a soul needing to be redeemed is not as great a good as the glory of the soul of Christ.

64. Nor is it likely that so supreme a good among beings was only occasioned because of a merely lesser good.

65. Nor is it likely that God preordained Adam to so great a good before he preordained Christ, which however would follow.

66. Indeed, what is more absurd, it would also follow further that God, when preordinating Adam to glory, would have foreseen that Adam would fall into sin before he would have predestined Christ to glory – supposing the predestination of Christ's soul was only for the redemption of others.^a

a. [Interpolation] because redemption would not have happened if the fall and fault had not preceded.

67. One can therefore say that God, prior to foreseeing anything about sinner or sin or punishment, pre-chose for his heavenly court all those whom he wished to have there – angels and men – in definite and determinate degrees; and no one was predestined merely because another was foreseen as going to fall, so that thus no one would have to rejoice in the fall of someone else.

B. Second Doubt

68. The second doubt concerns whether the union of this nature with the Word was foreseen first or whether its order to glory was.

69. One can say that since in the action of an artificer the process of execution of the work is opposite to the order of intention, and since God in the order of execution united human nature to himself first in nature before conferring on it supreme grace and glory, then the opposite can be posited in his intention, so that God first wills some non-supreme [sc. non-angelic] nature to have supreme glory, showing that he need not confer glory according to the order of natures, and then secondly, as it were, he willed that that nature exist in the person of the Word (so that the angel would thus not be placed beneath man).

III. To the Principal Argument

70. As to the argument [n.56] one can concede that, in respect of his being man, he was predestined to be Son of God to the extent the ‘in respect of’ states the formal idea according to which the extreme term is taken determinately in itself; for the man is formally God, and his predestination to be God preceded the man, that is, the person as existing in human nature; thus is the man made God. But if the ‘in respect of’ be taken properly as a mark of reduplication [cf. d.6 n.61 footnote], namely such that it states the cause of the inherence of the predicate in the subject, then in this way he is not God in respect of his being man, because he is not God by humanity.

71. One can, in another way, distinguish the major [n.56] when it says ‘he was predestined to be God in respect of his being God’, namely that the ‘in respect of’ can determine the act of predestination in the sense of ‘he is God in respect of the fact he was predestined’, or that it can determine the term of predestination thus, ‘he is God in respect of the fact he is God’. In the first way the major is false and the minor true [sc. that

predestination precedes what is predestined]; in the second way the major is true and the minor false.

72. One can, in a third way, say, and perhaps more really, that neither in respect of his being man nor in respect of his being God was he predestined to be Son of God, because the phrase ‘to be predestined to be Son of God’ includes two things, one of which requires in the term something temporal (namely the ‘to be predestined’), and the other of which requires the term to be eternal (namely the ‘to be Son of God’). But, as it is, there is no thing the same that is the reason for both of them in the term; for although in the term two things come together, one temporal (which can be the term of the predestination) and the other eternal (because of which ‘to be Son of God’ may belong to the term), yet no one nature is the reason for both of these belonging to the term. But if something else were allowed to be the ‘in respect of’ as to the whole predicate, then a cause in respect of both in the predicate would be being indicated; and therefore properly – logically speaking – neither in respect of his being man nor in respect of his being God or Son of God is he predestined to be God or Son of God.

Eighth Distinction

Single Question

Whether there are Two Real Filiations in Christ

1. About the eighth distinction I ask^a whether there are two real filiations in Christ.

a. [Interpolation] About this eighth distinction, where the Master treats of the incarnation as to the sharing of characteristics, the question is raised...

2. That there are not:

Because filiation implies a son, therefore two filiations imply two sons; Christ is not two sons, therefore there are not two real filiations in him either.

3. Further, according to Anselm *Incarnation of the Word* ch.10⁷⁹ and *Why God man* 2.⁹⁰ and Augustine [rather Gennadius of Marseilles] *On Ecclesiastical Dogmas* ch.2,⁸¹ the Son was incarnate, not another person, lest a confusion in properties arise; so

⁷⁹ “If the Holy Spirit were incarnate as the Son is incarnate, the Holy Spirit would be son of man; there would therefore be two sons in the Trinity of God, the Son of God and the son of man. Hence a certain confusion of doubt would arise when we spoke of God the Son; for both would be God and son, although one is Son of God and the other son of man... And if the Father had assumed man into the unity of his person, the plurality of sons would cause the same unacceptable results.”

⁸⁰ “If any other person is incarnate, there will be two sons in the Trinity, namely the Son of God who is Son also before the incarnation, and he who through incarnation will be son of the Virgin; and among the persons, who ought always to be equal, there will be an inequality in dignity of births, for he who is born of God will have a greater birth than he who is born of the Virgin. Again if the Father is incarnate, there will be two grandsons in the Trinity, because the Father will be grandson of the Virgin’s parents through the man assumed, and the Word, although he has nothing of man, will yet be grandson of the Virgin, because he will be son of her son. All these things are unacceptable and do not arise in the incarnation of the Son.”

⁸¹ “The Father did not assume flesh, nor the Holy Spirit, but the Son only, so that he who was in divinity Son of God the Father would become in man son of the human mother; and so that the name

now there is not the confusion that there would be if the Father were incarnate. Therefore now too the Son is not son by any other filiation than eternal filiation, otherwise there would be no less a confusion of properties because of the incarnation of the Son than because of the incarnation of the Father, for there would no more be a single filiation.

4. Further, there is only a real filiation with respect to the Mother because of the real relation Christ had to the Mother; he did not have this relation in his death, because then the union was dissolved; therefore Christ did not then have the filiation. Either therefore he had it in the resurrection – and this seems unacceptable because the resurrection was not a taking up of the being that generation was, therefore too the relation founded on the being which was taken up by the resurrection was not the same as the relation that was founded on the being which was taken up by generation; or he did not have it in the resurrection, and then he would not be son now more than he was in death.

5. Further, one should only posit in Christ a real relation to the Mother so as to save his being her true son; but this is saved without positing any real relation in him – just as God is really lord of creation and yet the relation of lordship is not a real relation in him, and likewise the relation of Creator is not a real relation in him and yet he is truly creator of creation [cf. 1 d.30 nn.44-45, 48-51].

6. Further, God produced creatures as artisan of them, that is, insofar as he has a relation of reason to them, because his science is art insofar as it causes ideas in itself by an act of reason; therefore ‘his being artisan and able to create’ states in him only a relation of reason. Therefore much more does ‘Christ being son of Mary’ state in him only a relation of reason, because there seems more necessity that ‘the relation that is presupposed to a thing’ be real than that the relation be which follows a thing.

7. Further, if there were a real relation of Christ to the Mother, then it would be really equal to the Mother in human nature; the consequent is false, therefore the antecedent is too. The proof of the falsity of the consequent is that the consequence is manifest, ‘for equality is founded on unity of union’ [Henry of Ghent],⁸² but there is no real unity there of union with the Mother, as is plain by running through all the real relations,⁸³ therefore etc.

of son should not pass to another who was not son by eternal birth. Therefore the Son of God was made son of man, born Son of God in truth of nature from God, and born son of man in truth of nature from man; so that the truth of the one begotten would have, by being born, the name of Son, not by adoption or in name, but in both births, and the one Son would be true God and true man. We confess, therefore, neither two Christs nor two sons, but one Son, God and man.”

⁸² *Summa* a.65 q.1, “I say that ‘one’ is said in two ways, and accordingly a common relation is caused by ‘one’ in two ways. For in one way something is called one by unity; in another way it is called one by union... Now ‘one’ called so by union, or by the property of union, is the cause of every relation of equality...in creatures..., which can for this reason be called a relation of union... But a relation of unity is double...; for something is one by unity of singularity...while another thing is one by unity of community;” q.3 ad 3, “Equality and likeness in divine reality...are caused by a ‘one’ called so by unity of singularity; but they are caused in creatures by a ‘one’ called so by union of many.”

⁸³ Gilbert de la Porrée, *Commentary on Boethius' Work of Seven Days*, “Now union is always of things that are diverse in number from each other; but this happens in diverse ways from diversity of ideas. For in one way are matter and form said to be united to each other, so that there is, by a certain rational habit, one subsistent thing; in another way part and part, as in civil matters where many persons are, by partnership in one tongue or rite or law or place or affection, said to be one nation, one people, one assembly, one heart, and the like.”

8. On the contrary:

If the Father had been incarnate, he would have been son; not son by eternal filiation, therefore by temporal; the eternal property of the Son abstracts from every creature as term just as does the property of the Father; therefore the Son now does not have, by eternal filiation, a relation to the Mother such that, on account of it, he may be called her son – therefore he has it by some other filiation.

9. Further, the Philosopher, in *Metaphysics* 5.15.1021a31-33 ‘On relation’, infers as something unacceptable that the same thing be said twice; but if it is unacceptable, this is especially so in the case of the same foundation and supposit and of the same relation; therefore Christ cannot be said relatively to the Father by the same relation as to the Mother.

I. To the Question

A. Opinion of Others

10. The statement is made here [Bonaventure, Aquinas, Henry of Ghent] that there are not two real filiations in Christ. And this for two reasons.

1. First Reason and Rejection of it

11. One is [Aquinas] that filiation is per se of the supposit, not of the nature, so nature is in no way called filiation; but here there is only one supposit; therefore there is here only one filiation.

12. Against this reason:

If filiation is only of the person, so that it cannot be multiplied even though the foundation is multiplied, then this belongs to filiation either from its being a relation absolutely or from its being the relation of this sort of origin. Not in the first way because then Christ, if he had been white, would not have been really like someone else white, nor would he have been really equal to someone having as much size as he had; also relations in created supposit could not, then, be multiplied on the basis of their foundations. If in the second way, then this is false, because the multiplying of a relation of origin in a supposit is not more repugnant than is the multiplication of the originating itself that precedes the relation of origin as the proximate reason of founding it; but origins are multiplied in the same supposit, according to Damascene ch.53, “We venerate two generations of Christ.”

13. Further, the eternal Father, although he is one supposit, has yet two relations of origin, one with respect to the Son and one with respect to the Holy Spirit, and thus two relations of active production are founded on the same supposit and the same foundation, that is, on the essence; therefore much more can two relations of passive origin be founded on two diverse foundations.

14. Again, according to Damascene ch.60, “Because we say that Christ has two natures, we say that he has two natural wills and natural operations;” ch.61, “But we say that there are two operations in our Lord Jesus Christ,” but relation regards the supposit no more than operation does, because operation belongs to the supposit (*Metaphysics*

1.1.981a12-17);⁸⁴ therefore etc. By this too one can argue to the proposed conclusion from operation, that just as Christ operated naturally with certain operations of human nature (such as eating and drinking), so, if he had generated two sons, he would have really had two paternities with respect to them, because of two active generations; therefore he has now two filiations because of two passive generations.

15. Again, what belongs to Christ according precisely to the idea of his eternal personhood is not said of him as he is man; for just as this proposition is false, ‘Christ, insofar as he is man, is an eternal person’, so too is this one false, ‘Christ, insofar as he is man, is Son’, if filiation were only said of him according to the idea of eternal personhood.

2. Second Reason and Rejection of it

16. Another reason is posited [Henry of Ghent, Aquinas] for this conclusion [n.10], namely that two dispositions the same in species cannot be located in the same thing; these two filiations, if they were in the same thing, would be the same in species; therefore etc.

17. The major is made clear by others [Godfrey of Fontaines] as follows:

First because potency is per se related to form and not per se to ‘this form’, because it is a ‘this’ through what it receives in the form; therefore, if it could be in act as regard one form and in potency as regard another, then the same thing in respect of the same thing (namely in respect of the form in which – as such – it happens to be this or that) would be in potency and in act first.

Second because every distinction is either by nature of division or by nature of opposition; a distinction in the same species by nature of opposition is impossible, and impossible by nature of division where the subject is the same, because accidents get numerical distinction, as they get entity, only from their subjects.

18. And the proof [Godfrey] is that there cannot be several properties in divine reality of the same idea, because they would not be distinguished either by opposition or by division unless the divine essence – in which they exist – were divided, which is unacceptable; therefore etc.

19. The inference [n.16] is made clear [Bonaventure, Henry of Ghent] by the fact that someone who generates by a first act of generation acquires paternity with respect to a first son, and acquires no new paternity by a second act of generating but is related to a second son by the same paternity; therefore, just as there cannot be several paternities in this case, because the forms are of the same species, so for the same reason there cannot be several filiations in Christ’s case.

20. Against this argument [n.16]: the major seems false and the minor likewise.

21. That the major is false my proof is that, in the case of every essential order, the unity of a prior can essentially stand with a plurality of posteriors that do not per se inhere in the prior and are not adequate to it; a subject is essentially prior to the

⁸⁴ Cf. Scotus 4 d.12 q.3 n.34, ‘I say that the proposition ‘to act belongs per se to the supposit’ is not got from the Philosopher in *Metaphysics* 1 (1.1.981a12-17), but what is had there is that action is about singulars... But whence comes the mode of arguing? ‘Action is about the singular as object, therefore it belongs to the supposit alone as agent.’”

disposition that is posited as inherent in it (for it does not per se or adequately inhere in it); therefore etc.

22. The antecedent here [n.21] is proved by a likeness with cause and effect, because there can be one cause for several effects; and although an effect here does not exist in the cause, yet there is no greater repugnance in posteriors that do inhere (provided however they do not inhere per se) than in other posteriors that exist in something per se, because then there is no intrinsic cause for unity to follow on unity (and especially if the unities are not adequate), such that one of them in its actuality determines the potentiality of the receiver; there is, then, no contradiction in even several absolutes of the same idea being per accidens present in the same thing to which one of them is adequate.

23. The antecedent [n.21] is also proved in the case of some things as to the fact, because several imaginative species exist in the same organ of imagination, otherwise when one species of one imaginable thing was destroyed, no one could perfectly imagine any imaginable; and it is plain that the imaginative species are of the same species, as are also the objects by which they are generated; and they are in the same part of the organ, because the organ could not be divided into all the many minimal parts that can per se be formed for all the many separately existing imaginables that can at once exist in the whole organ; therefore it is necessary that there not be in the organ distinct parts corresponding to the imaginables.

24. And if it be objected ‘why then can the same quantity not be altered by an operation of nature into possessing at once many qualities of the same idea?’ – I reply that, since there are in a subject many powers for many forms of numerically the same species, then, if some act is not introduced in it that contains all the acts that can be present in the perfectible subject, the total potentiality of the receiving subject does not reach its term, and so there is no contradiction in some other form existing in it at the same time; and yet in fact no other form is introduced by a natural agent, because a natural agent intends a pre-existing imperfect form, for it introduces some reality that is of a nature to be a part along with the pre-existing reality; and it unites it to the pre-existing reality as part to part, and so it does not introduce a form altogether other; there would however be no repugnance in a form being other provided the subject be not diversified because of it, because a subject having a potentiality for several forms of the same species is unlimited in some way with respect to them – and a thing unlimited with respect to certain things does not have to be multiplied along with them.

25. The aforesaid reason [n.21] proceeds about several absolutes in the same perfectible subject; but even if it not entail the intended conclusion, yet this conclusion is more easily proved about relations of the same species.

First because, as paternity is founded on ‘having generated’, so ‘this paternity’ is founded on ‘this having generated’, and ‘this filiation’ is founded on ‘this having been generated’; by this paternity then does the father regard this son first by this filiation.

26. Further, correlatives by nature go together, so that when one is destroyed the other is too – therefore, when this filiation in this son is destroyed, this paternity in this father is destroyed; therefore if paternity in relation to a second son remain when the first paternity to the first son is destroyed, it follows that the paternity to the second son was different from the paternity to the first son, for no new relation arises because of the fact the first son is removed, just as neither does a new generation come to a first son by positing that a second was generated while the first son is living.

27. Further, when something is of a certain sort ultimately by something else, the sort cannot remain in it unless what has the sort is of that sort by that something else (as whiteness cannot remain on a surface if the surface is not white, and especially if the surface is white ultimately by whiteness); but a relation is that by which what has the relation is ultimately related to another; therefore a relation cannot remain the same in something unless what it remains in is related to another by that relation, but it does not remain the same when the term is destroyed relative to which what has the relation is said to be formally such by the relation.^a

a. [Interpolation] therefore because of some other term.

28. Further, a father has in some way a respect different relative to this son and relative to that son; if the respect is different by a different relation, the intended conclusion is got; if by a different respect of the same idea, the intended conclusion is again got, for the respects will be of the same idea because of foundations that are the same in species; similarly this is false, because a respect is not always founded on a relation as being something other than the relation, for positing two such things is superfluous; but if the respects are the same in the relation on which they are founded, then to say the respect is multiplied is the same as to say the relation is; therefore the intended conclusion is got.

29. Further, distinction in a prior naturally entails distinction in a posterior; but a supposit that is related precedes not only the relation but also the foundation; therefore when the foundation is multiplied so is the relation – and so it is in the issue at hand, that since there are two foundations, there will be two relations.

30. Further the minor of the reason [n.16] is false, because eternal filiation and temporal filiation are not of the same idea – and this is especially true according to them [sc. Henry of Ghent and his followers], because they themselves say that nothing of the same idea can be asserted of the temporal and of the eternal.

B. Scotus' own Opinion

31. As to the question I say that the filiation in Christ relative to the Father is different from the filiation in him to his Mother, and both filiations are real.

32. [In Christ there are two filiations] – I prove the first by the fact that filiation is the condition of something naturally produced like the producer in intellectual nature. The particulars here are plain, because as paternity is ‘the condition of a producer’ so filiation is ‘the condition of a produced’; ‘naturally produced’ as well for, by reason of lacking this particular, the Holy Spirit is not son; and similarly as to ‘like the producer’, and for this reason a worm is not son of the sun; ‘in intellectual nature’, so fire is not son of fire nor plant of plant nor, properly, ox of ox.

33. But if you altogether insist that a brute animal is son of a brute animal (as that a calf is son of an ox), then filiation is ‘the condition of something naturally produced, and like the producer, and in non-intellectual or sensitive nature’.

34. Nothing in this description has regard per se and first to a supposit save by reason of passive production, because all the other things added regard the nature either in the producer or in the produced or in both; so by reason of nothing does filiation

determine for itself its belonging to a supposit more than passive generation does. But passive generation is multiplied by the multiplication of actually existing natures that are received through acts of generation, as is apparent from Damascene ch. 53, that there are ‘two generations of Christ’ [n.12]; therefore filiation too will be multiplied by the multiplication of the generations.

35. Again, what was argued on the basis of the foundations [n.29] is proved on the basis of the terms, because there cannot be the same relation to two terms, for then the same relation would be and not be at the same time.⁸⁵

36. Further, the proposed thesis – as to the first point [nn.31-32] – is shown more particularly as follows: that all divine personal properties equally lack a respect to anything created as to their term; therefore just as eternal paternity cannot be a relation whereby the Father would be called son in time, so neither can eternal filiation be a relation whereby the Son would be called son in time.

37. [These filiations are real] – Second, namely that each filiation is real [n.31]. The point is plain about eternal filiation, because the Son is really Son eternal.

38. The proof about temporal filiation is that that relation is real which, from the nature of the extremes when they are posited without act of intellect, is consequent to the extremes [cf. 1 d.31 n.6]; but when a generating Mother is posited and a supposit having through generation the generated nature, filiation from the nature of the extremes without act of intellect follows in the latter just as maternity follows in the former.

39. But if anyone imagines that here the intellect is operating to cause the relation – the disproof of this is that if Mary had borne a pure man, she would have been truly mother and he truly son by a real relation; but she acted no less now than she would have acted then, nor did Christ as man any less receive nature from her than if a pure man had received it; therefore he is as much a son now from the nature of the extremes as he would then have been, and the relation is as real now as it would then have been.

C. Doubt

40. But there is a doubt whether this real filiation is the same as the foundation, namely as the nature received through generation.

41. And it seems that it is, because the respect of the creature to God as to its efficient cause is the same as the foundation, from 2 d.1 n.260; therefore too a respect to the proximate efficient cause is the same as the effect. The proof of the consequence is that all ordered efficient causes have the idea of one total cause; one and the same relation is not consubstantial and non-consubstantial with the same thing; therefore etc.

42. I reply that this relation is not the same as the foundation, because just as it is a contradiction for something to remain in a thing when that which is really the same as it does not remain, so it is a contradiction for something to be the same really as something and be able to remain the same without that other remaining – therefore, just as the first relation of something to that without which it cannot be is the same as the related thing, so a relation to anything without

⁸⁵ Tr. A relation only has being as relation to something, so if a relation has two terms its being to one term is not its being to the other, and so its being simply (which for it is relative being) is not its being simply.

which the related thing can be is not the same as the related thing; but this nature [sc. Christ's human nature] could be the same in number without the relation to the Mother and without the Mother as term, because the same nature could have been created immediately by God;^a the same nature could also have been had through temporal generation from another mother, as was touched on in 2 d.16 [not in the *Ordinatio*; see *Lectura* 2 d.20 n.27], where it was said that the same person who is son of one father could have been son of another father; therefore etc.

- a. [*Interpolation*] because whatever a second cause can cause immediately, the first cause can cause immediately by itself.

43. If it be objected that 'although the nature could have been produced in being such that filiation was not founded in it, yet, from the fact that this filiation is founded, it does not seem that the nature can remain without this filiation; on the contrary, if it does so, there will be a contradiction, because to be haver of this nature and to be son is to be generated in this nature by this Mother; but he who is generated in this nature by this Mother cannot not be generated in this nature by this Mother (for that anything that happened in the past did not happen in the past involves a contradiction); therefore that the haver of this nature, received from this generator, is now not a son by this filiation involves a contradiction, which would not be the case if filiation was accidental to this nature';

44. I reply:

Either [sc. in a first way] filiation is precisely a relation founded on a passive generation insofar as it is past, so that – whether in reality or in the intellect – something is said to be son because it was at some time generated, and thus 'to be son' will not predicate something of a thing really present, although it does verbally, but only something of a thing past; just as the proposition 'Socrates is about to run', although it seem to be about the present, yet in fact posits something only for the future, because it is equivalent to this one, 'Socrates will run', so the proposition 'Socrates is generated' is equivalent to 'Socrates has been generated', and the former, in this understanding, is equivalent to 'Socrates is or was a son'. And in this way 'son' states a real relation, but not according to 'is' simply, namely not according to the 'is' of existence, but according to the 'is' of the past, which is an 'is' that is real in a certain respect, as is also the 'is' of the future – or rather, 'son' states a real relation in the way that potency before act in a potential nature states a real relation in a way, but according to a diminished entity of the thing.

45. And the objection [n.43] seems to proceed of this way, because according to this way 'whatever once was a son' cannot ever not be a son, just as 'what was' cannot not have been, in the way too that 'what at some time is possible' cannot not be possible when it is not actually present. In this way one would have to say that, if John was annihilated, he was still son of Zebedee [*Luke* 5.10] – nor could God destroy this relation however much the foundation were annihilated as to actual existence, nor would filiation state more of reality about an existing son than about a non-existing son.

46. It could, in another way, be said that filiation states the complete relation of a passive product as long as the actual existence – received through generation – continues without interruption; and in this way Christ would have been son of Mary up to his death and would not have been her son after the resurrection, because the actual existence of the human nature received through generation from Mary would have been interrupted by death, and the existence as it was received a second time after the resurrection was followed by a different relation to God who resuscitated it. In this way too no one would be son of anyone after the general resurrection – and this opinion seems absurd.

47. It seems then that one should, in a third way, take the mean between these two extremes [nn.44-46], namely that filiation states the relation of generated to generator as founded on the actual existence of the nature generated, or as founded on the actually existing generated nature itself – and this whether the nature was continuously preserved without interruption after being received, or was with interruption preserved the same after being received, such that both preservings are accidental to it.

48. And one can in this way reply to the argument [n.43] and say that although this nature, received through this generation, could not have the same numerical being that it received by not founding this numerically same relation, yet this relation itself is not consubstantial with the nature, because the numerically same existence was absolutely able to have been had without the relation and without the generation, if the existence had been received from a creator or from some generator immediately.

49. As to the argument touched on for this doubt [n.41], I reply that the relation of a nature to the first efficient cause is consubstantial with the nature, because the nature could not be the same if it did not really have for itself the same relation to the first efficient cause; but its relation to a second efficient cause is only an accidental relation, because the nature could remain the same without a relation to any second efficient cause. And as to this subject there was discussion at length in 2 d.1 nn.261-275, about how the relation of the creature to God as efficient cause is the same and not the same as the creature: the same truly and really, not the same formally; nor is the relation any the more the same in this way because it is the validity⁸⁶ or firmness of the foundation.

50. Nor are these claims contradictory; for although truth and goodness are really the same as absolute entity, and although this truth and this goodness are the same as this entity, yet they are not the same formally or quidditatively [cf. 1 d.8 nn.191-209], because truth and goodness are as it were properties of being, *Metaphysics* 4.2.1004b10-17 [cf. 1 d.3 n.134]. So it is in the case of the reality from which genus is taken and from which difference is taken, and likewise in the case of quiddity and individual entity and many other things that have been

⁸⁶ Vatican editors: The Latin is ‘ratitudo’ from ‘reor’, to think or validate or ratify, and signifies a thing as certain. Henry of Ghent, *Quodlibet* 5 q.2, “The first...most common concept, common to this concept and to that, is the concept whereby a thing ‘res’, as said from ‘reor’, is conceived, which ‘thing’ contains under it ‘imaginary thing’, which is a pure non-being... But if a thing has being in God according to exemplar idea, not only does one say that it is a thing or ‘res’ as taken from ‘reor’, but also that it is some nature and essence, and so it is called a validated thing, or ‘res’ as taken from ‘ratitudo’.”

touched on frequently as to this difference on the part of the thing, namely the difference whereby this reality is not formally that reality although it is identical with it [cf. 1 d.3 n.133, d.11 nn.51-52, 2 d.3 nn.176-179, 187 etc].

51. Nor, further – according to him who says⁸⁷ that the vestigial respect is the validity of the foundation [cf. 1 d.3 nn.302-309] – is there any contradiction in something's being the same as the foundation (which was conceded in 2 d.1 nn.261-271 ‘On the Relation of the Creature to God’), and yet not being the same as the validity of the foundation (which was denied in 1 d.3 nn.310-323, in the question ‘On the Vestige’), because he posits [sc. Richard of Conington, along with Henry; cf. 2 d.1 nn.241-242] that every relation of the creature to God is the same as the foundation, yet not that every validity of the foundation is the same as the foundation; but he distinguishes, on this point, the vestigial respect from the other respects [cf. 1 d.3 nn.302-304].

II. To the Principal Arguments

52. To the arguments.

To the first [n.2] I say that a son is son by filiation as a father is father by paternity; but not for this reason does the multiplication of sons follow the multiplication of filiations, because concrete particulars are not multiplied unless both form and supposit are multiplied; the multiplication of the form alone does not suffice, especially when several forms – whether of the same idea or expressed by the same name (as in the present case) – can exist in the same thing, in the way that, as Damascene says [supra d.6 n.42], Christ is not a plural willer though he has more than one will; hence in the form of the argument ‘a son exists by filiation, so if another filiation then another son’ there is a fallacy in the inference by destruction of the antecedent [cf. Peter of Spain *Tractatus* tr.7 n.159].

53. To the second argument [n.3] I say that if the Father were incarnate there would be confusion, because temporal filiation would be said of the same person that had eternal paternity, and so the person could be called confusedly now Father and now son; but as it is there is no such confusion because, precisely, the same person is called Son by both filiations. Therefore when now ‘Son’ simply is said, it is clearly understood of the same person whichever filiation is being talked about; but if, in the other case, the Father were incarnate, then, when the word ‘son’ were said, a single person would not clearly be understood but now one and now another would confusedly be according as this or that filiation was the one being talked about. – The argument made for the opposite [n.8] is similar because the confusion that there is now in the case of the Father would only arise because the Father would be called the mother’s son by some filiation and not by his eternal relation; therefore now too the Son is called son by a filiation other than his eternal filiation.

54. The answer to the third [n.4] is plain from what was said in the solution of the doubt [n.47], that Christ after the resurrection is the Mother’s son by the same filiation as before, because filiation is not founded on the existence of

⁸⁷ Vatican editors: Probably Richard of Conington, an Anglican Minorite, said by contemporaries to have been a follower or disciple of Henry of Ghent; his commentary on the *Sentences* is missing.

the nature as received by an uninterrupted generation, but founded on it absolutely; and so, whenever the existence is the same and related to the same extreme, the filiation is the same and is so by the same action as that by which the foundation returns the same and the relation returns the same. And when the argument is made that Christ received existence in his resurrection by a different production [n.4], I say that the production does not take away the filiation that was founded on the same being that was received by generation, but there are only two relations consequent to two passive productions, and these were productions to the same existence; and one production was interrupted, as was also the being of the foundation, and the other of them was first then new.

55. To the next [n.5] I say that Christ is not said to be really and truly his Mother's son only in the way that God is said to be really and truly Lord of creation, but that Christ received the really existing nature by a real passive generation; and for this reason it follows that he is son by a real filiation.

56. To the next argument too [n.6] I say that, although God is formally called creator by a relation of reason or by no relation but by a denomination that is reduced to the category of relation (namely insofar as he is the term of the relation in the creature, as was said in 1 d.30 nn.41-45), yet he does not create by a relation of reason – and I understand this not of what is formally implied by the term 'creative' but of the foundation (just as a thing is said to be 'heative' by heat as by the foundation of its heating power and not by a relation founded on heat). And the reason for this can be briefly stated, namely that no relation of reason can be the formal reason by which something can produce a real being, because a being of reason is not present in anything save only as it has being in the intellect as a known in a knower; and this being is a diminished being in comparison with the whole of real existence, and so a cause by this being of reason cannot be a cause of anything by that other being of real existence, because that other is more perfect being and is produced neither naturally nor artificially.

57. And when the proof is given [n.6] in the claim that God has power to create only as artisan, I reply that the knowledge of God, which is a certain absolute perfection in him, is in him from the nature of the thing, but it is only called 'art' by its relation to certain objects, or by the relation of certain objects to it; so although God produces creatures as artisan, this term 'artisan' is not founded on his knowledge as a relation of reason, and that this is the reason whereby he is able to produce, but is founded on it only as the absolute habit of knowledge, which is called 'art', exists in God himself; so there is a fallacy of the accident in the form of the argument 'God produces as artisan, he is artisan by relation of reason, therefore he produces by relation of reason'; for the major is true to the extent the middle term is not taken for the relation itself which 'artisan' implies, but for the foundation of the relation; and the minor is true only as it is taken for the relation formally. An example: 'the hot heats by its heating power, heating power is a relation, therefore heat heats by a relation'; the major is true as taken for what 'heating power' states and for the foundation of the relation, but not for the relation of powerfulness itself; and the minor is true of the powerfulness itself and of the relation in it that is implied by it, and not of the absolute reality on which it is founded. – But as to how God's knowledge is absolute and as to how,

as absolute, it can have adequately the full idea of art (to the extent that, as artisan, it is the term of the relations of all creatures), the answer was stated in the material about the ideas, 1 d.35 nn.38-52, d.36 nn.39-43 [cf. Rep. IA d.36 nn.132-138, 148-152, 112].

58. To the last one [n.7] I concede that the son is really equal to the mother in human nature, or is in this respect more excellent. And so when the argument about the union is made [n.7], I prove that the proposition taken, namely that ‘equality is founded on the unity of union’, is false, because union is a relation. For union cannot be understood as a relation of union to itself. I ask then what relation it is. Either the same as equality, and then the same thing will be founded on itself, because this union, according to them [sc. Henry of Ghent and his followers⁸⁸], is founded on equality and is the same as itself; so the same thing will be founded on itself. Or it is a different relation; and if it is, it will be founded on ‘one’, and I ask what the unity is. If it is founded on a unity and not the unity of union, the same can be said about equality; and if on the unity of union there will be an infinite regress.

59. And if you say that this union is not union of matter with form, nor of any of the many other manifest unions [n.7], but is the unity of likeness – then this seems to expound one term by another term of the same meaning; for equality and this unity of likeness are the same; so to deny that equality in divinity is real because there is no unity of equality there (in the way the understanding of the antecedent can probably be taken), is to deny the same thing because of the same thing (as that equality is not a real relation because it is not equality).

60. And as to what is added for the question [n.58 footnote], that equality of union must be taken twice but that it is not taken twice save as it has the unity of union – it is refuted by the fact that essence finds the relations of origin, and these are real and nevertheless not taken from the nature of the thing.

61. But if it is said that equality in generation is taken twice, in the producer and in the produced – on the contrary: I ask what from the nature of the thing is taken twice? Either that from the absolute nature of the thing the nature has things that are distinct in some way, and this is false in the matter at issue; or that from the nature of the thing it only has distinct relations, and then to say that from the nature of the thing the essence finds distinct relations of origin (because it is from the nature of the thing taken twice) is to say that it finds real relations of origin, because it finds two real relations – which is nothing.

⁸⁸ Henry of Ghent *Summa* a.55 q.6, “When it is said that in divine reality ‘the Father is equal to the Son’ the relation on both sides is according to reason... So when greatness is said to be the equality of the persons, it must, in its understanding, be taken twice: once as it is has being in one person and once as it has being in another, or taken thrice if equality of the three persons in greatness is taken;” a.65 q.1, “From ‘one’ understood from unity, or from the property of unity, every common relation in divine reality is caused... But from ‘one’ understood from union, or from the property of union, every relation of equality...in creatures is caused;” ad 1, “I say that the fact that on ‘one’ something follows, namely common relation, can be understood in two ways: in one way when ‘one’ is taken once and formally; in another when ‘one’ is taken several times and is multiplied materially as it were, either in reality or in reason...now when ‘one’ is taken in the second way, there follow on it all the common relations of equality, identity, and likeness.”

62. I say, therefore, to the argument [n.7] that the equality is founded on the unity of non-union, but that non-unity in creatures is non-unity of singular being and not non-unity of nature (this double unity was sufficiently dealt with in the question on individuation, 2 d.3 nn.76, 169-188); thus, in the matter at hand, the unity that founds equality is the unity not of person but of nature; nor does this unity need to be distinguished or taken twice in order for the relation to be real, but it is enough that – when the relation is the same – the extremes are really distinct, as they are also in the case of relations of origin. And then to the matter at hand I say that in the human nature in Christ there is some real unity less than numerical unity, and that likewise there is some numerical unity in Mary; and this unity and that unity are the foundation of the mutual equality of Christ and Mary, if they are posited as having been equal in human nature.

Ninth Distinction
Single Question

Whether Divine Worship or the Honor of Divine Worship is due to Christ only as to his Divine Nature

1. About the ninth distinction I ask^a whether divine worship or the honor of divine worship is due to Christ only as to his divine nature.

a. [Interpolation] About the ninth distinction, where the Master deals with and inquires whether Christ's flesh should be worshiped, the question asked...

2. That it is: 'Worship is cult due to the supreme Lord alone' [Master Lombard 3 d.9 ch.un. n.1], by reason of supreme lordship; but Christ is supreme Lord only in his divine nature; therefore etc.

3. Further, Christ adored [God] in his human nature, because 'he prayed'; therefore in his human nature he had a superior, and so the conclusion is gained.

4. Further, however much the human nature is united to the Word, it is in itself a creature and does not exceed the limits of a creature; therefore the cult due to Christ in that nature should not exceed the cult due to any creature; divine cult does exceed it; therefore etc.

5. Further on *Psalm 98.5* 'Adore his footstool' the Gloss says, 'Not with the adoration that is due to God alone.'

6. Further, only that is to be worshipped in this way which is to be loved above all things, because the same thing and in the same nature is supreme Lord and the ultimate end of all things; but Christ is to be supremely loved only in his divine nature, because only in his divine nature is he the supreme Good and the ultimate end; therefore etc.

7. To the contrary are the authorities adduced by the Master.

I. To the Question

8. Here three things must be considered: first how divine worship is taken; second how what is due is due; three to whom it is due, and to Christ in what nature it is due.

A. How Divine Worship is taken

9. On the first point. – Just as to revere someone in an inner act is to reckon one's own goods little in respect of the goods of the one revered and to reckon the revered person's goods great, and just as this is an act of virtue – so to go to the limit in one's heart in reckoning the goodness of another to be supreme with respect to one's own good, and for that other to be the one from whom he who magnifies him has the totality of his own good, is indeed a laudable act provided it have an object fitting the two features mentioned, namely that it be an object whose goodness exceeds the goodness of the one who reveres and that it be that from whom the reverer receives whatever goodness he has.

10. This reverence in interior act has regard only to God as to its fitting object – to God as being supreme good and supreme Lord.^a

a. [Interpolation] and so this reverence is to be shown to God alone.

11. To this interior act there correspond certain exterior acts that are signs of the interior act – namely, in the case of each Law [new and old], certain sacrifices or rites (as genuflections), which profess that this reverence is given to the supreme Lord, and that supreme Lordship exists in him to whom such acts are exhibited, and that subjection to him exists in the one who exhibits them.

12. From these frequently elicited interior and exterior acts there is generated a habit that inclines one to eliciting such acts easily and promptly; and just as such acts were good when possessed of their due circumstances, so the habit that comes from such acts when frequently elicited is itself good.

13. The name therefore of ‘divine worship’ can be taken in two ways: in one way for the worship or reverence shown to God in an interior act, by reason of God being supreme Lord or supreme Goodness, and for the reverence shown to God in an exterior act – or in another way for the habit that inclines one to such acts. And since this habit is consonant with reason it is a virtue – and not a theological virtue, because it does not have the uncreated Good for immediate object but rather the honor to be paid to the uncreated Good; it is therefore a moral virtue, and it is contained most of all under justice whereby that is rendered to a superior which is due to him, according to Augustine *City of God* 19.21.⁸⁹

14. The question here is not about the virtue of divine worship but about the act, because the offering or the debt does not belong to the virtue but to the act, the act that generates virtue or is elicited by virtue, because this act is immediately in our power.

⁸⁹ “Justice, further, is the virtue which bestows on each that which belongs to him. Is that then man’s justice which takes man himself from God and subjects him to unclean demons? Or is that man just who removes himself from God his master, by whom he was made, and serves malign spirits? So where man does not serve God, what of justice must there be thought to be in him?”

B. When and How Divine Worship is due

15. As to the second point [n.8], when and how this debt should be paid, I say that the command to do this act is an affirmative one; for it is reasonable that the intellectual creature be obligated to acknowledge his supreme Lord sometimes and to revere him, *City of God* 10.1; and this precept, like other affirmative precepts, is always binding but not binding at all times.

16. It can be supposed indeed that the obligation to perform this act belongs to the first precept of the first table [the Decalogue, *Exodus* 20.3, 5], ‘Thou shalt have no alien gods etc.’ This precept is not merely negative, prohibiting worship to be shown to anything it does not fit, but affirmative, that the true God should be held and worshiped as Lord. This is well expressed in *Deuteronomy* 6.13, and it is cited by the Savior, *Matthew* 4.10, ‘Thou shalt worship the Lord thy God and him only shalt thou serve.’ Here a positive precept about worship is set down, together also with exclusion of worship and service shown to another, just as also idolatry is forbidden in the first quotation, ‘Thou shalt not worship alien gods.’

17. Now it is impossible that this affirmative precept be always prevented from being carried out, as if an opportune time for doing what is commanded should never arise – as it might arise in the case of the precept ‘Honor thy father and mother;’ for it is possible that an opportune time necessary for honoring parents should never arise, and so this precept could always be kept without transgression even if no act of the precept should ever be done; for the obligation to do the act is only for when an opportune time arises. But nothing could permanently prevent an opportune time arising for worshiping God; and so every adult is simply bound at some time to perform an act of this affirmative precept.

18. At the time of the Mosaic law a determinate time for carrying out this precept seems to have been given in the third commandment, ‘Keep holy the Sabbath day.’ But it was also a precept of the natural law, namely that at some determinate time a man should refrain from servile works; and the observation of the precept did not consist in this negative refraining alone, but in a positive act, namely in an act of ‘keeping holy’, that is, in a greater magnifying of God.

19. Now in the time of the Gospel law this worship, which is to be shown to God in the keeping holy of the Sabbath, is determined as to be done on the Lord’s day – and determined also as to the act by which it must be done, namely in the oblation of the supreme sacrifice, that is, the Eucharist, which the priest must offer for himself and for the people. And the people too make offering in this oblation, namely in a spiritual way, since they are bound ‘to hear the whole mass on the Lord’s day,’ according to the decree ‘Masses’ [Gratian p.3 d.1 ch.64]. And if some necessity excuse one from performing the act that the Church has determined, then one must fulfill it in some equivalent act, namely that (as regards the divine worship specifically deputed) some act be done that is referred directly to God and to reverence of him.

20. But as to whether anyone is bound to carry out this precept, namely to do some act of worship, at any other time besides the time determined – first in

the law of nature and afterwards in the Mosaic law and now in the Gospel law on the Lord's day – it seems that it is so, as on the great feast days during the year, as in the decree 'Who on a solemn day,' and 'Of consecration' and 'One must pronounce' [Gratian p.3 d.1 ch.66]. But if this is doubtful, yet it is certain that some worship at least on those days does seem it should be performed.

C. Whether Divine Worship is due to Christ only as to his Divine Nature

1. Solution

21. As to the third article, where the question is asked whether divine worship is due to Christ only as to this divine nature, I say that the word 'only' can be taken in two ways, namely categorematically or syncategorematically.

I concede that in the first way the answer is yes, that a sufficient reason for Christ to be supremely adored only exists in him considered as to his divine nature.

22. But if the term is taken syncategorematically, then it marks, in respect of one extreme, an exclusion from the other extreme. I here draw a distinction, because the exclusion can be either from the term or object of the adoration or from the reason for adoring.

23. In the first way I say that Christ is not to be divinely adored only as to his divine nature, for the human nature should not so be excluded from the term of the adoration that, by this exclusion, the whole could not be adored. The point is made by Damascene (*Orthodox Faith* ch.54, or 3.8), "Christ, perfect God and perfect man, whom, with the Father and the Holy Spirit, we adore in a single adoration along with his uncontaminated flesh, a flesh that we deny is incapable of being adored; for what has come to exist in the single hypostasis of the Word is adored in that very hypostasis." And a little later, "The one person of the Word of God, to which his two natures are reduced." And he then gives an example, "I fear to touch the wood because of the fire present in it." In this authority from Damascene the 'with' [in the phrase 'with his uncontaminated flesh'] is taken associatively and not copulatively, so that the sense is, 'we adore the Word with the flesh, that is, the Word having flesh united to him,' and not, 'with the flesh, that is, we adore the flesh as well,' where the proposition is copulative and the flesh is considered as 'flesh' and not as 'united to the deity.' So 'flesh' should not be excluded from the object or term of adoration in this way, although flesh is not the reason for the adoration.

24. There is an example of this from a king and the king's purple garment, for though the king is to be adored because of himself and in himself, yet he is to be adored along with the purple he is wearing; and just as the purple is not the cause of the adoration, so the flesh is not adorable in the Word such that it is the reason in the Word for the adoration. Another example is taken from a whole and its parts: if I revere a man because of his wisdom and virtues, I revere the whole of him, namely his body and soul, and do not exclude the body from the person I revere; likewise, when I adore a whole man, I do not adore his head by itself to the exclusion from adoration of the other parts.

25. In the second way [n.22], namely where the ‘only’ excludes something from being the reason for adoring, one can say that Christ is to be adored only as to his divine nature, to the exclusion of some other nature as the reason for adoring; for no other nature is the reason for supreme lordship, and so no other nature is the reason for the adoration due to the supreme Lord, just as neither is the body the reason for adoring someone who is virtuous.

2. An Objection, and Rejection of it

26. But an objection to this [n.25] is that supreme lordship is not immediately consequent to the divine nature, because, according to Augustine *On the Trinity* 5.16 n.17, God was Lord only in time, just as the creature was servant in time; therefore supreme lordship exists by reason of the creation, whereby the creature received its whole being from God. But as great a reason for lordship seems to belong to God because of the gift of redemption as because of the gift of creation; therefore the cult of divine worship is due to the Redeemer as Redeemer, and by reason of the redemption, in the same way as it is owed to the Creator by reason of creation.

27. This supposition about the equality of lordship in Creator and Redeemer with respect to the created and redeemed is proved in several ways:

First from the Apostle in *Galatians* 6 [*I Corinthians* 6.20], ‘For you were bought at a great price; so glorify etc.’ Therefore I am a servant for the reason that I am redeemed.^a

a. [Interpolation] The question is whether adoration is due to God because of something intrinsic to God in himself or because of a benefit conferred on us or an intrinsic good qua communicated to us. If the second, the question is whether the adoration due by reason of redemption is equally as great as the adoration due by reason of creation.

28. There is also this confirmation from Gregory in the canticle of blessing the paschal candle, ‘Had it not benefited us to be redeemed, it did not benefit to us to be born;’ as great a good, then, is conferred by redemption as by creation.

29. There is another confirmation, too, in that by redemption is conferred the gift of grace and glory, but by creation only the good of nature; therefore etc.

30. Herefrom the conclusion is drawn that, since Christ was redeemer as to his human nature, then the same adoration that is owed also to the Creator is owed to Christ according to his human nature, that is, according to the reason for adoring (not absolutely, but as it was the reason for redemption).

31. I reply that, although no one can be bound to something greater than what is greatest, yet he can, for some reason, be bound to the same thing for a more reasons. An example from a religious who vows chastity and afterwards receives sacred orders: he is bound to the same thing and not to a greater thing, but he is bound to it for a greater reason. In this way one can concede that to be the principle of redemption, or to perfect that very redemption – provided that it confers as great a good on us as creation – does, as a result, demand as much

service from us by the work of redemption as by the work of creation. And then he who principally works redemption is, as to the reason itself for adoration, owed supreme adoration; but he is not owed a greater adoration than he is owed by reason of creation, because supreme adoration is owed to him by creation.

32. And this point is true: if some good conferred on a creature, and not the intrinsic good itself of the conferrer, is the reason for worshipping the conferrer as Lord (as, for example, if, *per impossibile*, there were several gods and one of them created us but not another, and if we were bound to adore the first and not the second) – then one could well say that, if as great a good is conferred on us by the working of redemption as by creation, then as much service is owed by reason of this redemption to the whole Trinity (which works the redemption) as is owed to the Trinity by reason of creation;^a and it is plain that these reasons for owing adoration to the Trinity are distinct.

a. [Interpolation] But if the intrinsic goodness of the conferrer is the only reason for such supreme adoration, then, since there is as much intrinsic goodness in one god as in the other, the first should be adored only as the other is.

33. But if the supreme intrinsic goodness of God is the reason for adoration then, since this goodness is not different according to the different goods conferred on creatures, there are not several reasons for adoring God – however many the benefits are that he confers on us.

34. So if this second position is maintained [n.33], then the argument applied to Christ as redeemer [n.30] does not hold, because the nature in which the work of redemption was carried out does not have infinite intrinsic goodness – however much it may be the reason or the principle of conferring on us a very great good.

35. But if the first position is maintained [n.32], namely that it is not just the intrinsic good or intrinsic goodness that is the reason for adoration, but rather this goodness as it communicates the greatest good to us (and this primarily and freely of itself and not because of some return of payment, according to *Psalm* 15.2, ‘Thou hast no need of my goods’) – then one can reply that, although Christ was Redeemer according to his human nature, yet he did not effect redemption principally according to that nature, but rather the whole Trinity did; and so Christ as man effected only by way of merit the salvation that has been conferred on us by redemption. But supreme reverence is not owed to one from whom we possess the supreme good, not principally, but secondarily.

II. A Doubt about the Adoration owed to Christ as he is a man

36. But there remains a doubt here: what adoration is owed to Christ as he is a man such that the nature, in which he performed the works of redemption as meritorious cause of our salvation, is the reason for the adoration?

A. The Opinion of Others

37. And if it be said that the adoration is hyperdulia (which is the highest reverence due to a creature), there are many arguments to the contrary:

38. First, that this reverence of hyperdulia is due absolutely to Christ as to the nature whereby, even had he not redeemed us, he was full of grace; so a greater reverence is due to him now when, as Mediator in that nature, he has redeemed us.

39. Again, Christ in that nature is head of the Church, according to Augustine, commentary on *John* 15.1, ‘I am the vine’ – therefore he has to infuse grace into the whole Church; therefore the whole Church is more especially beholden to him than if he were not head and did not have to infuse grace. But if he had only the amount of personal grace he does have, then, even though he would not be head, he would still be owed supreme hyperdulia; therefore a greater reverence now is due to him.

40. Further, a reason that some posit as to why man could not have been repaired by a pure creature is the following, that then man would not have been perfectly restored to the excellence that he had before, because he would be bound to serve that creature and not God alone as he is now; therefore the repairer had to be God. – This reasoning would not be conclusive if Christ was to be adored only with the adoration of hyperdulia; for man could very well have been restored to his former excellence so as to be held to adore God alone with the adoration of latria and to adore that other mediator with the adoration of hyperdulia; but man would not be held to adore that other mediator with adoration of hyperdulia if Christ now in his human nature is to be adored by reason of no other adoration than hyperdulia; therefore man should not now adore him only in this way.

41. Again Anselm, *Why God Man* 2.14, proves that the life of the man Christ was better than all the sins were evil, or could be evil, that were not sins against God or the person of God. But Anselm is speaking of the created life that Christ was deprived of by death, because he says that his killing is a graver sin than all other sins that are not committed immediately against God; for it was more detestable, according to Anselm, to deprive the man Christ of life than to commit any other sin; but in the case of any sin the will is turned away from the supreme Good; therefore it was more detestable to take away the life of the man Christ than to turn away, by any other sin, from the supreme Good (unless one turns immediately away from this Good). Therefore too Christ’s life was more to be loved than the supreme created good, and so it was to be adored as an infinite good.

42. Or one can argue from the words of Anselm in this other way, that if Christ’s life was as great a good as the privation of it was an evil, and if the privation of it was a greater evil than all the evils, even infinite evils, that there could be, then that evil was worse than all the other infinite evils; therefore the good opposed to it was the infinite Good; therefore Christ in his human nature is owed the adoration of latria that is owed to the infinite Good.

B. Scotus' own Response

43. As to this article then [n.36], it can be said that a reason for giving latria can be the intrinsic goodness of the one adored or this goodness as communicating itself to the one adoring (and its doing so first, freely and principally, and in accord with the greatest good of the one adoring). Likewise too a reason for the adoration of hyperdulia can be the intrinsic goodness of the one adored or this goodness as through it (as through a second cause) the greatest good is communicated to the one adoring.

44. If the first way is held then for neither cause is there due to Christ in his human nature an adoration because of his being redeemer greater than were he not redeemer; but, according to this opinion, neither is a greater latria, or a latria for an additional reason, due to God if he is Creator than would be due to him if he were not Creator.

45. But if the other opinion is held, then, it can be said of hyperdulia just as of latria in respect of God that a greater reverence is due to Christ because he is redeemer than would be due to him if he were not redeemer (and this if the reverence then due to him were not the greatest reverence) – or if the reverence were the greatest, the same reverence would be due to him now for an additional reason.

46. And this is what the arguments seem to prove [nn.38-42].

47. The fact is plain about the first argument [n.38] because it proceeds of Christ as he is mediator and meritorious cause of our salvation; and plain about the second one [n.39] because it proceeds of Christ as he is head of the Church.

48. The other two [nn.40-42] reasons, which proceed from authorities, need solving.

As to the third argument [n.40], about the perfect repair of man – it concludes by way of congruity that the person who redeemed and meritoriously saved was God, so that we owe the supreme hyperdulia that is owed by reason of meritorious redemption to the same person to whom we also owe, by reason of creation, the adoration of latria; but we would, for this reason, not have been less perfectly saved if we were obliged to show the reverence due a meritorious savior, as he is meritorious savior, to someone other than him to whom we owe latria; just as now we adore Mary with hyperdulia and all the other saints with dulia, and yet we are not lower down because of this adoration than if God alone were to be adored; we would however be very low down if we owed to someone else the adoration we owe to God, because then we would be wholly subject to that someone else, which would prove a great unhappiness and weakness for us. An example of this is that it is more fitting for my father to care for me than for someone else do so in such wise that I would owe him the same reverence that is owed to my father and carer; but if someone else were to be carer, I would owe one sort of reverence to my father and another sort to that someone else, and so I would in some way be subject to several persons, but not with an equal subjection.

49. To the other argument [n.41] I say that the created life of the man Christ was not an infinite good formally, nor was it something to be supremely loved – hence the Trinity wanted it not to die the death it wanted it to die; but, to turn away from God in one thing is graver than to turn away from him in some other thing, and the graver the more noble the turning toward him would be, other

things being equal. Now by loving this human nature in Christ, which was the best creature as to fullness of grace, there could be the supreme turning toward God that happens by act of using a creature, because this creature was closest to the end and most able to be referred to the end; therefore a turning away from God with respect to this usable object, namely by hating the created life in him whom God wished to hate it, was the worst turning away – and thus the killing of the man Christ was the gravest sin as far as depends on the object taken as such.

50. And if you say that it was the gravest of all other possible sins not immediately committed against God, one can say that since these other sins are distinct in their gravity, and one of them does not intensify the other, the gravity of this one sin was greatest as to its intensity, but in the others it was greatest as to extent. However the created life of Christ was so good that its being taken way would suffice to destroy infinite evils (there will be discussion of this below in the topic of the satisfaction of Christ for our sins [*Lectura 3 d.20 nn.24, 28*]).

III. To the Principal Arguments

51. To the first principal argument and to the second and third [nn.2-4] I say that they are conclusive when the ‘alone’ is taken syncategorematically [n.21] and excludes everything else from the divine nature as from the reason for adoration; and so it excludes the human nature, for if the human nature were a reason for the adoration of latria, it would, when separated from the Word, be a reason for the same adoration – which is false according to Augustine in the text; for if the nature were separated from the Word I would not serve this man with this sort of service.

52. This too is how the gloss on the Psalm should be expounded [n.5]; or it can be expounded of the flesh itself as total term of adoration, so that adorers stop there in considering and adoring it.

53. To the last argument [n.6], whoever says that the intrinsic goodness of what is supreme is the reason for adoration, he would concede the minor. And the minor can be distinguished just as the principal conclusion can [nn.22-25]; and the way that a positive response to the question can be conceded [nn.23-24], the minor is true and the conclusion likewise true; and the way that a negative response to the question is given [n.25], the minor is false. But anyone who held that the reason for adoration is supreme Goodness as supremely communicating itself to the adorer [n.35], although he would concede that what is to be supremely adored is to be supremely loved, would not however be held to this conclusion by the argument.

54. But how?

It does seem that Christ in his human nature, that is to say, this totality – not excluding the human nature – is to be supremely loved, just as the totality here is posited as supremely adored when the human is not excluded nature from the term of the adoration [nn.23-24]; for since the union is not to be supremely loved, for it is a created good, then neither is the totality to be supremely loved that has its totality through that union.

55. Or it could be said that the act of loving regards distinctly the lovable nature just as does the act of not-loving, and in this way the totality is not supremely loved although it is adored with supreme adoration, because the adoration refers to the whole confusedly but love regards the distinct nature that is in the term of the act of loving. Or if the act of loving can tend toward the object as confusedly as the adoration can, one can concede that Christ – who has the thus lovable human nature – is to be supremely loved, although the human nature in him is not the reason for his supreme lovability, nor even the union of the human nature with the Word of whatever sort it is. For since we adore the Trinity with one adoration and love the Trinity with one love, not excluding the personal properties from the essence although these properties are not formally infinite, so too it is safe in loving not to distinguish the created nature too much from the Word, but to love the Word who subsists in both natures. And in this way the Word as possessing human nature can be loved supremely even though that nature itself is not supremely loved, as also neither is the union with the Word, which is something created, supremely loved; for it does not seem that someone should want to sin mortally lest the union not exist, since one should not sin mortally to save the being of any created thing; nor too would that union, precisely considered, beatify intellectual nature even though the term of the union would beatify, because the term is the infinite good and so is to be loved above all things.

Tenth Distinction
Single Question
Whether Christ is Son of God by Adoption

1. About the tenth distinction I ask whether Christ is an adoptive son of God.^a

a. [Interpolation] About this tenth distinction where the Master deals with the sharing of properties respecting the person of the Son, one question is asked about the sharing of attributes pertaining to nobility, namely whether...

2. It seems that he is:

Christ is a predestined son of God (*Romans 1.4*); therefore he is an adopted Son. Proof of the consequence: for to predestine is to adopt as heir; therefore God, in predestining Christ to be son of God, adopts him as predestined to be heir, because he preordains him to be heir, and that by act of will; therefore etc.

3. Further, it is a mark of dignity in man to be an adoptive son, because this does not belong to any non-intellectual nature; therefore it belongs to Christ that he be a son of God.

4. Again, the properties of natures remain just as the natures do; therefore since ‘to be adopted’ is a property of a nature possessed of grace, it seems it can

be said of Christ in his human nature, just as it can also be said of him that, by reason of his divine nature, he is a natural Son.

5. Against this are the authorities adduced by the Master in the text.

6. Again, Christ would then be a son of the Trinity, because the whole Trinity adopts just as the whole Trinity does all extrinsic acts; and so Christ would be a son of himself.

I. To the Question

7. I reply.

Someone who said that filiation belongs precisely to the supposit and not to the nature could easily say that Christ is not an adoptive son, because this relation does not belong to the supposit in itself.

8. But by saying that filiation is founded on a nature naturally like the one who generates, then adoptive sonship will be founded on a nature that (as image of the creator) is similar to the creator by natural likeness, and also by likeness of grace, whereby the nature is able, as intellectual nature, to attain to the inheritance of adoption. For the term ‘adoption’ has been borrowed from the jurists, so that an adoptive son is said to be he who is not naturally generated by a certain person and does not have, by natural generation, the right of succeeding to the inheritance, but who is by grace preordained to have the right of succeeding. Thus three things come together here: foreignness to natural generation, the grace that is the gratuitous will of the one adopting, and the good to which the one adopted is ordained by grace, namely the inheritance that he has, from adoption, the right of succession to. But it is plain that these are not found together in Christ as to his divine nature, because he is by divine generation a natural heir to eternal life; neither are they found together in him as to his human nature, because he was not foreign as to his generation in that nature, since he was innocent.⁹⁰

9. On the contrary: if this ‘foreignness’ is understood to be found only in possession of sin, then Mary was not an adoptive daughter (if she never contracted original sin), which however is false.

10. If it be said that she would have contracted original sin insofar as she came to be by natural generation (that is, through the idea of seed), while Christ, as Christ, lacked the source in natural generation for contracting sin – then Adam, at any rate in the state of innocence, would not have been an adoptive son of God, because he did not contract sin and lacked a ground for then contracting it, since he was created or produced without the idea of seed; the angels too would not be adoptive sons, because they were always innocent.

11. Besides, it is plain that there is no need that, in the case of human adoption, the one adopted be foreign – that is an enemy – whether by his own act or by that of his parents, because someone who is an enemy in one or other of these ways is not typically adopted, but rather he is who is loved in one or other of these ways. So the foreignness is sufficient which comes from lack of right to the inheritance of the one adopting, and that because of lack of natural generation. Now Christ in his temporal generation did not have a right to eternal inheritance;

⁹⁰ Because, presumably, he would thus not be estranged by any sin from union with God.

therefore he had the foreignness necessary for being adopted; and it is plain that, as son of man, he possesses the right by grace, and so is adopted.

12. Someone who does not accept this reasoning [n.11] can say that, in the case of an adopted son, the sort of foreignness required is that at the moment of natural generation he not have the right of inheritance, so that he has natural being first and is foreign prior to adoption. Christ was never without grace, and so he was not adopted.

13. But this reasoning [n.12] does not seem sufficient, for then the angel, if he was created in grace, would not have been adopted nor be an adopted son of God; therefore priority of nature is sufficient, namely that an adopted person does not, in the first moment of nature when he is generated or created, have the right of inheritance from that generation or creation, but has it rather from grace in the second moment. So it is in the case at hand: for Christ's human nature naturally brought the process of generation to completion first, but it was, prior to habitual grace existing in it, united to the Word (III d.2 a.2 q.2, nn.88-91).

14. If this response is not agreed to, one could say finally that the foreignness required, whether in a prior instant of time or nature, is not of the sort that some right conferring inheritance need accompany the natural generation as a deserving disposition for it; but a deserving grace whereby Christ's soul had a right to the inheritance did here accompany temporal generation.

15. And if it be objected that the grace accompanied it, not in the first moment of nature but in the second, and so Christ was foreign and had foreignness in the first moment, for his soul lacked the right that was conferred in the second moment – see the response in III d.3 nn.46-49 about whether Mary was a natural daughter of Adam before she was justified.

II. To the Principal Arguments

16. To the first [n.2] I say that when a man adopts he does so through a new act of will, and so 'adopting' is 'opting into inheritance' by a new willing; but God does not adopt by a new willing; he does so by producing a new effect, namely grace. Therefore although divine predestining is a certain pre-ordinating to inheritance by act of will and a certain adopting into it, yet predestination is not properly called an adopting; only the conferring of grace (which corresponds to a new willing in someone adopted) is called adoption. So the inference 'God predestines, therefore God adopts' does not hold, but one must add that he confers grace on the one predestined (as on one who was sometime foreign).

17. To the second [n.3] I say that a lack of dignity is a mark of the supplying of dignity; because he who is foreign cannot receive a dignity unless he is adopted into an inheritance, and his being sometime foreign is a mark of his lack of dignity.

18. To the third [n.4] I concede that a property, when consequent to nature, is predicated of Christ, for he is natural son of Mary as well as just and pleasing to God. But 'being adopted' does not state a property of Christ's created nature, because Christ was never foreign in that nature to his paternal inheritance; it states rather a property of a damned and crooked nature.

19. To the contrary [n.18]: foreignness in Christ is only denied because of the habitual grace of Christ, for by it alone, and not because of personal union, does he have a right to his paternal inheritance; for if that union were to lack habitual grace, Christ could fail, in his human nature, to have a right to the inheritance.

20. But [contra n.19], if this habitual grace were conferred on Christ's human nature in the first moment of existence, then the supposit would truly be an adoptive son by paternal inheritance; therefore in this case too [n.19] he will not, by reason of not being foreign, be denied to be an adoptive son, because the lack that would then have existed of a right to the inheritance would now exist, though in the proper supposit.

Eleventh Distinction
Question One
Whether Christ is a Creature

1. About the eleventh distinction I ask whether Christ is a creature.^a

a. [Interpolation] About the eleventh distinction, where the Master deals with the sharing of attributes as regard the person of the Son and pertaining to the result, three questions are asked: first whether Christ is a creature; second whether Christ qua man is a creature; third whether Christ began to be. Argument about the first:

2. That he is:

In Christ there is a human nature as also a divine nature, and so the properties of each nature too, according to Damascene [*Orthodox Faith* 48]; therefore just as he will be called Creator on account of one nature, so he will be called creature on account of the other.

3. Further, the predication 'Christ is man' is an essential one, according to *Extrav. 'About Heretics'* [Gregory VII *Decretals* 5.7.7]. I ask what essential element the predicate 'man' predicates, is it something created or uncreated? If something uncreated, then the predicate 'man' predicates formally of Christ the same thing as the predicate 'God' does; this is false, because then it would be formally the same thing to say 'Christ is man' as to say 'Christ is God'. Therefore the predicate 'man' predicates something created.

4. Further, Christ is a man either created or uncreated (these are immediate opposites for any being); if he is an uncreated man then he is eternal; if he is a created man, then the conclusion is gained.

5. Further, what a lower predicate is stated of the higher predicate is also stated of, whether the higher is something essential in the same genus or something common to both genera – as that whatever fire and body are said of, creature is said of, and creature is higher in both genera.⁹¹ Therefore whatever

⁹¹ Fire is a genus under body and body a genus under creature, and creature is said of both fire and body.

man is said of, creature is said of, for it seems that creature is superior to everything other than God. But Christ is a man, therefore he is a creature.

6. Further, Christ was conceived by reason of his body; therefore he was created by reason of his created soul. The proof of the consequence is that a whole is not denominated less by what is proper to a more perfect part than by what is proper to a less perfect part.

7. To the contrary are the authorities in Lombard's text.

8. Again, every rational creature is a son of God by adoption, or can be; but Christ is not a son of God by adoption (from the preceding question, d.10 nn.12-14); therefore he cannot be a creature of this sort, and if not of this sort then not of any other sort.

9. Again, if Christ is a creature and Christ is Son of God, then the Son of God is a creature. This way of arguing is a good one because when the middle term is a definite something the extreme terms must be joined together in the conclusion; therefore etc.

10. Again, nothing created is said of Christ; the proof is that nothing in Christ is created save human nature; but human nature is not said of Christ [sc. Christ is not said to be human nature]; therefore etc.

I. To the Question

A. The Solution of Others

1. First Solution

11. One statement is [Bonaventure] that the proposition 'Christ is a creature' is to be denied because there is no sharing of attributes where the property of one nature is repugnant to the other nature [cf. III d.7 n.54], as is the case here, because 'creature' includes the idea of a beginning of existence and so it is repugnant to the eternity that is an attribute of the Son of God.

12. On the contrary:

It is no more repugnant to the person of the Son that he is or begins to be after not being than that he is not after being or that he ceases to be, for both are repugnant to eternity; but Christ is admitted to have died, even though 'to be dead' states a not-being after being because it states not being alive after being alive; for 'to be alive is what it is for living things to be' (Aristotle *On the Soul* 2.4.425b13); therefore etc.

13. Further, mortal and immortal are as opposed as created and uncreated, and yet both of the former are said of Christ; therefore etc.

14. Further, it is as formally repugnant to a created nature that it be creator or eternal as it is formally repugnant to something eternal that it begin to be; therefore Christ's being Creator will be as much denied because of repugnance to one nature as his being a creature will be denied because of repugnance to the other nature.

2. Second Solution

15. Another solution [Aquinas] is to say that there is no sharing of attributes in the case of negations, or in the case of things that state the respect of one nature to the other.

The first point is plain, for otherwise contradicaries would be said absolutely of Christ; for any negation belongs to one of the natures when the opposite affirmation naturally inheres in it by reason of the other nature, as with ‘the divine nature is eternal’ and ‘the human nature is non-eternal’. But if, for this reason, Christ were said to be non-eternal, then he would be said to be eternal and non-eternal. Negations, therefore, that inhere by reason of one of the natures (because they inhere in a certain respect, namely with a disjoining determination) do not denominate simply what they are said of.

Likewise the second point, about things stating the respect of one nature to the other, is clear: for it does not follow that if the human nature is assumed then the divine nature is assumed, because ‘creature’ not only includes negation, namely non-being before being, but also the respect of one nature to the other, namely to the one from which it receives being; therefore these will not be said of the whole.

16. On the contrary:

As ‘creature’ states the respect of one nature to the other, as of the human nature to the divine nature, so it seems that ‘Creator’ does so conversely, namely that it states a respect of the divine nature to the human; therefore if things that state a respect are not said of the whole, Christ will not be Creator. A negation too can be found that would be introduced by the name ‘Creator’, as ‘not to receive from another’, just as in the name ‘creature’ is introduced ‘receiving from another’ or ‘not existing of itself’; therefore, just as Christ is not called ‘creature’ because of the negation included, so he will, for the same reason, not be called ‘Creator’.

17. Further, ‘Christ is less than the Father’ is conceded absolutely and is stated in *John* 14.28 – yet it states a respect of one nature to the other, because Christ is not less than the Father save in his human nature.

2. Third Solution

18. Another solution [William de la Mare] is that the proposition is simply to be conceded provided it is properly understood; it was, however, commonly denied by the saints because of the heresies of those heretics who said that Christ was a pure creature, and the saints did not want to share with them in their words.

19. And that it can be conceded by virtue of the words is proved from Damascene [ch.48], who says that “Christ is created and uncreated, passible and impassible,” and again the same Damascene concedes [ch.91] that he can be called ‘creature’. There is proof also from Augustine *On the Sermon on the Mount* [Sermon 186], “he who was Creator wanted to be a creature;” and from Jerome *On Ephesians* 2.10, ‘We are his handiwork’, who says, “Many are fearful lest they be compelled to say Christ is a creature; we proclaim that there is no danger in saying Christ is a creature.”

B. Scotus' own Solution

1. First Reason

20. Those who do not like this opinion [n.18] would say that it is false for this reason, that ‘to be created’ states a certain ‘coming to be’ such that, over and above ‘coming to be’, it adds something both as regards respect to an efficient cause that ‘coming to be’ asserts, and as regards respect to the preceding opposite that it asserts. On the first point, ‘coming to be’ has a respect to efficient cause in general but ‘to be created’ has a respect properly to the first efficient cause as immediate producer (so that nothing is properly said to be created save what is directly brought into being by the first efficient cause alone). On the second point, ‘coming to be’ gives one to understand any preceding opposite whatever, whether positive or privative; but ‘to be created’, when properly taken, adds that the immediately preceding opposite is the contradictory (namely negation that is not in any subject, and so is neither privation nor even the contrary [Peter of Spain, *Tractatus 3.29*]).

21. Taken in this way, namely when ‘to be created’ is taken strictly, that thing is said strictly to be a creature which receives being immediately from the first efficient cause, and does so after complete non-being or after pure nothing. And in this way there is no doubt that Christ is not a creature, because even the human nature in Christ is not a creature in this way; for it was not immediately brought into being by the first efficient cause alone but also by his mother Mary, who had some causality with respect to it; nor was it brought into being after the contradictory opposite, which is complete non-being or pure nothing, but after the privative opposite, namely because the matter of the body was changed from the form of blood to the form of an animated organic body. For only angels and the intellective soul and grace and things of that kind, which are produced by the first efficient cause from nothing, are said to be created in this way.

22. ‘To be created’ is taken more generally in another way insofar as it states a relation to the first efficient cause but not to it as immediate producer (namely with exclusion of all second causes). And when ‘to be created’ is taken generally in this way ‘creature’ is asserted generally of everything other than God, with the exception of Christ; for everything other than the first efficient cause receives being and is said to be created – and although they are the effects of other causes, yet they are not said to be the creatures of other causes, for creature taken in the strict way does not state a relation to a second cause; also they receive their first being after non-being, whether the non-being is nothing or in some subject.

23. Now the first being of something can be understood in two ways:

First, that by which the whole is said to be first a being, that is adequately, as humanity is said to be the first being of an animated organic body – and this whole being, which arises from the union of the parts, is the adequate being of the whole.

24. Second, the first being of something can be said to be the being of some first part in the whole, as that, if the organic body preceded animation in time, the first being of a man in this way would be the being of the organic body.

25. Any creature, therefore, receives, in either of these two ways, its first being after the non-being, total or partial, of the first part; and therefore, if the organic body were inanimate from eternity and animated in time, the whole man would be called a creature even though he did not receive all his partial being after non-being but rather his total first being.

26. Now Christ in no way received his first being after non-being, because he did not thus receive his first total being, which would be the resultant of his divine and human nature – for nothing is such according to Damascene ch.49, since then those two natures would exist in confused state there but, just as the two natures are distinct, so the beings are two – nor did Christ thus receive his first partial being, namely the being of the Word (which is presupposed to the being of the human nature as subject to accident), for the being of the Word is eternal. So in Christ's case the relation that 'creature' necessarily states to a preceding opposite is lacking, namely the relation that being follows non-being – whether partial being, if there is no total being, or the total being of that which is created. Such is not the case in the matter at hand.

27. Against this reasoning [n.26] the following is objected:

Whatever is the term of some change can be the term of creation; the human nature in Christ, which was the term of his generation, can be the term of change taken generally, and so it can be the term of creation taken generally. Therefore Christ is a creature in the way that he has human nature, for creation does not seem to have regard to the firstness of his being as its term more than any other change has to its term, for creation can have for term whatever any other change can have for its term.

28. Besides, Christ was truly said to be dead, and 'being dead' truly states privation of being and privation of first being – and what the one opposite posits as first being is, it seems, not more than what the other opposite posits as privation of first being.

29. To the first objection [n.27] I concede that human nature can be –and was – the term of creation taken generally, and the nature is truly called a creature; but yet not for this reason is Christ called a creature, because the first being of this nature is not the first being of Christ; and so the first being of this nature follows the first partial being of Christ, for it follows the being of the Word, and Christ cannot have any other first being.

30. And when the objection says [n.27] that this change, namely creation, no more posits that the first being of the term was acquired than any other change does, I reply that this is false, because the specification 'creation' adds further the other changes that 'creation' states – for just as something would not be called a creature if it were only from a second cause (for 'being created' states a relation to the first efficient cause), although it would be called 'generated' with respect to that second cause, so in like manner, although something could be called 'generated' if some being simply (and not the first being of a generated thing) were acquired by it through generation, yet it is not said to be created unless its first being follows after non-being. And thus this inference does not hold: "Christ was generated in the sense that the predicate 'generated' belongs to him by reason of his human nature, so he is also created," just as it does not hold in other cases

as “fire is generated, therefore it is a creature generally speaking” – or it only holds by reason of matter, for the being of fire simply, which is the term of the generation of fire, is the first being of what is said to be generated.

31. To the second objection [n.29] I say that ‘dead’ does not deprive Christ of his first being but of his being simply, which is his being alive; for the generation of a substance is its acquisition of being simply but not necessarily its acquisition of its first being. Hence it is true to concede that Christ was dead just as it is true to concede that he was generated in time; but it is not true to concede that he was annihilated, for just as Christ is not said to be created so he is not said to be annihilated (for what the opposite of creation states is annihilation of first being).

2. Second Reason

Another argument posed to the question is of the following sort is: Just as a denomination that naturally denominates many things in general (as ‘whole’ and ‘part’, ‘accident’ and ‘substance’) does not denominate a whole through a part nor a subject through an accident (as the term ‘one’, which is naturally said of subject and accident, does not formally denominate the subject through the accident, for Socrates is not said to be ‘one’ by the unity of whiteness, so that if whiteness were one and Socrates were many, it would be simply true to say that Socrates was many and false to say that Socrates was one) – so, although ‘this thing that is a creature’ is naturally said in general both of the supposit and of the nature in beings, yet it will not denominate the supposit by reason of the nature unless it belongs to the supposit with a proper denomination. Now it does not in any way belong to the supposit of Christ that ‘creature’ could denominate him with a proper denomination, because the supposit of the Word is not a creature, for he is Creator; nor can it in any way denominate him save as it denominates the human nature, and it cannot denominate the supposit through the nature; therefore etc.

33. And hereby it is plain that Christ is said to be generated in time but not said to be a creature, because ‘generated’ there only naturally denominates the nature, and only according to the nature does it naturally denominate the supposit. But ‘creature’ naturally denominates, with proper denomination, both nature and supposit, and neither of these gives a reason for a denomination with respect to the other.⁹²

II. To the Arguments

34. To the arguments.

To the first [n.2] I say that that which naturally denominates a supposit by reason of nature can be said of that supposit, as ‘to live’ and ‘to understand’ and ‘to eat’ and other such things; but ‘creature’ is not such a denominative. An example: a man is said to be ‘curly’ as to his head, but he is not said to be ‘triangular’ or ‘round’ as to his head, for the first denominative naturally applies

⁹² Sc. neither does a created nature give a reason to denominate the supposit as created, nor does an uncreated supposit give a reason to denominate the nature as uncreated.

to the head it is found in, but not the second; so ‘to be Creator’ naturally denominates by reason of nature but ‘creature’ does not.

35. In another way it can be said, according to the reason posited for the question [n.2], that ‘creation’ does not state something repugnant to the nature or to this supposit as ‘creature’ does; for ‘to create’ is to give something being after non-being by way of first causality – and this is not repugnant to Christ; but ‘to be created’ is to receive first being after non-being from the first efficient cause, and this is repugnant to Christ.

36. To the next argument I concede that ‘man’ predicates something of Christ, and that that something is created and a creature, so that ‘creature’ is said of the nature; but that it is therefore said of Christ does not follow; for if the middle term in the major is taken in the abstract and is said of Christ in the minor in the concrete, there will be four terms in the syllogism.

37. To the next [n.4] I say that Christ is a created man in the sense that ‘created’ here is qualified by ‘man’ to say ‘created man’, and so the inference ‘therefore he is a creature’ does not hold, but there is a fallacy of simply and in a certain respect (as in the case of ‘Socrates is made white, therefore Socrates is made’).

38. In another way it can be said that the division [sc. into ‘being created’ and ‘being uncreated’] is insufficient, because, although anything ‘one’ is sufficiently divided in itself by both terms, yet something that involves two things in itself, namely nature and supposit, is not thus sufficiently divided, because one of the terms belongs to it by reason of nature and the other is repugnant to it by reason of supposit.

39. To the next argument [n.5] I say that any property in the abstract that belongs to any genus has ‘creature’ as a higher denomination, just as does also ‘to be an effect’; but not every concrete thing of any genus has ‘created’ as a higher nature, but only that concrete thing whose first being is the being of that denomination, that is, whose first being is created; but the first being of Christ (whether his first total being or his first partial being) is not created. The case is like ‘to be a creature’, which is not a superior denomination of ‘to be white’ such that, for this reason, Socrates should be called ‘creature’ because whiteness is a creature, but he is a creature for another prior reason; hence, although ‘creature’ is said of whiteness it is not said of white if white is not the first being of that of which it is said.

40. To the next [n.6], it is plain that Christ is called ‘generated’ and ‘conceived’ because these terms naturally denote the whole by reason of the nature, so that, in their case, nature is the ‘that by which’ with respect to the whole; but it is not so in the case of the predicate ‘to be a creature’, for this would need to be said of the supposit by a denomination proper to the supposit and other than the denomination by which it is said of the nature; or it would at least need to belong to the supposit by reason of the first being of the supposit.

Question Two

Whether Christ as he is man is a Creature

41. The second question is whether Christ as he is man is a creature.

42. That he is:

Because he is something as he is man [cf. d.6 n.25]; not something uncreated because then ‘man’ would predicate of Christ the same as ‘God’ does, which is false; therefore it predicates something created; therefore Christ [sc. as man] is a creature.

43. Further, Aristotle in *Physics* 5.1.225a23-26 says, ‘What belongs to a whole according to a part is said of the whole, as that man is healed because his thorax is healed’; therefore since ‘being a creature’ agrees with human nature it will be said of Christ, and especially when with a determination to the nature; so of Christ simply it will be said that he is ‘creature’ as he is ‘man’, just as it is true simply to say ‘the man is healed as to his thorax’.

44. To the contrary:

If Christ ‘as he is man’ is a creature then he is a creature as he is ‘this man’, for he is not another man than ‘this man’; but if he is a creature ‘as he is this man’ then ‘this man’ is a creature. Proof of the consequence: a predicate can be asserted absolutely of that which is consequent to a reduplication, as with ‘if a man as he is colored is seen, then a colored is seen’. Therefore, if Christ ‘as he is this man’ is a creature, then truly this man is a creature. The consequent is false for, according to Damascene ch.50, “This child created the stars;” therefore he is Creator and so not a creature.

45. Further, if Christ ‘as he is man’ is a creature, then he is simply a creature. The consequent is false (from the preceding question [nn.29-30, 36]). Proof of the consequence: that which is asserted of a supposit with reduplication of the species is asserted of the same supposit simply, as with ‘if Peter exists as he is man, then Peter exists simply’; and so it is in the case at hand; therefore etc.

I. To the Question

46. I reply:

When an affirmative proposition is false because of repugnance between the terms, then whatever reduplication or determination is added that does not take away the repugnance, it does not take away the falsity of the proposition. Now reduplication properly taken does not diminish either extreme, because it is the determination of one extreme to the other, and therefore it does not make true any false proposition that was false without the reduplication. However, if to one of the extremes, as to the predicate, there is added something that so qualifies or specifies it that the qualified extreme is not repugnant to the other extreme the way the unqualified extreme was repugnant to it before, then a proposition with such a qualifying determination – and not without it – can be true. So although ‘white’ is repugnant simply to an Ethiopian, and although therefore the proposition ‘an Ethiopian is white’ is false and ‘an Ethiopian as he is a man is white’ is false, yet when the addition of ‘as to his teeth’ is added to the predicate, whereby the predicate is qualified and its repugnance to the subject is removed, then the proposition is true that nevertheless was false without the addition.

47. As to the proposition in question: if ‘as he is man’ is taken in a properly reduplicative way, so that the qualification limits neither extreme, then the proposition ‘Christ as he is man is a creature’ is no more true than the proposition ‘Christ is a creature’; for in both cases the same reason for falsity remains, that the human nature in Christ is neither the first total being nor the first partial being of Christ, which however it would have to be if Christ were a creature in the broad sense of the term; nor is Christ’s human nature caused only by the first efficient cause and from totally nothing, taking ‘creature’ in the first way [n.21]. But if the determination ‘as he is man’ is added to one extreme, namely the predicate, so as to qualify the predicate in respect of the subject, then repugnance to the subject is removed from the now qualified predicate, which repugnance to the subject was present in the predicate taken simply.

48. So as to the proposition in question [n.41], when one takes the ‘as he is...’ as properly a mark of reduplication or of inherence of the predicate in the subject, the proposition is false; but when one takes it as it specifies or qualifies the predicate, then it indicates creation in a certain respect. And in this sense ‘Christ is a created man’ or ‘Christ is a creature as he is man’ can be thus conceded, but the phrase is improper and needs expounding by ‘Christ as to his humanity is a creature’. An example of this is plain in the example of an Ethiopian in relation to whiteness; for just as ‘an Ethiopian is white’ is false so also ‘an Ethiopian as he has teeth is white’ is false, if this second proposition is properly reduplicative. But the proposition ‘an Ethiopian is white as to his teeth’ is true, and is so according as he has teeth, provided the ‘according as’ qualifies the predicate. However in this way the expression is not proper, for syncategorematic expressions are not determinations of the predicate.

49. Further, there are two additional reasons to prove that Christ is not a creature.

The first is as follows. When some denominative is such that, by its formal idea, it denominates equally the whole as the part, then although sometimes, because of an extrinsic impediment, it might not denominate the whole supposit, yet it does not, by reason of denominating the part, thereby denominate the whole absolutely, for it would be denominating both (as far as concerns the *per se* idea of its form) even if there was some concurrent impediment on the part of the subject or matter. An example about whiteness with respect to a surface one of whose parts is actually black; for whiteness naturally denominates, as far as concerns itself, the whole surface, but it cannot denominate the black part, because black and white are mutually incompossible, even though the whiteness would have, on its own account, regard to every part; and so, while it denominates a part, the whole should not be called white. The denomination ‘creature’ is, as far as concerns itself, said equally of the supposit and of the nature, and said more of the supposit, it seems, because ‘nature’ is not created save because ‘this nature’ or ‘this supposit’ is created, for nature does not exist save in a supposit or an individual singular. So, in the proposition in question, in as much as the idea of creature is repugnant to the supposit of Christ, because the supposit is eternal, his human nature should not be taken as a reason to call that supposit a creature absolutely.

50. Besides, when a form is naturally said of a part and not of the whole uniformly, then, if it is said of the whole by reason of the part alone, it is said by way of synecdoche, or figuratively or improperly, because it would be simply false if the figure of speech did not excuse it. Now the human nature in Christ is a sort of part of Christ, not an integral or essential part, but a requisite part, for without it Christ would not be ‘Christ’ according to Damascene ch.49. And the term ‘creature’ denominates, as far as concerns itself, the nature and supposit equally, so it is never true to say ‘Christ is a creature (by virtue of the expression) because human nature is a creature’ but, if it is true, it is so by synecdoche – just as these others are true by synecdoche, ‘Christ descended to hell’ and ‘Christ lay in the tomb’, the first of which belonged to him only through his soul and the second through his body. “But an argument that proceeds from figurative locutions does not proceed correctly,” according to the Master in the text, for according to him “the proposition ‘Christ is a creature’, whether taken simply or with addition, is a figurative or tropical locution” [Sent. 3 d.11 ch.1 n.4].^a

a. [*Interpolated text*]: I say that ‘death’ can denominate the whole simply if it denominates the human nature, because neither death nor life naturally denominate both the supposit and the nature by a proper reason of denomination. For however much it is the whole that first lives and first dies, yet neither supposit nor nature is formally of a nature to live or die separately, but only the whole is through the formal part that makes the whole the whole that it is – just as the whole is said to act by reason of its form, so in this case for like reason. But it is not so with the denomination ‘creature’, as was said above [nn.49-50].

II. To the Principal Arguments

51. As to the first argument [n.42], I concede that Christ is something, and one can concede that he is ‘something created as he is man’, because then the predicate is qualified by the ‘as he is man’, like ‘an Ethiopian is white as to his teeth’ – and then the inference does not simply follow that ‘therefore Christ is a creature’, just as neither in the other case does it follow that ‘therefore an Ethiopian is white’; but then the further inference does not follow, that Christ is something ‘created’, but there is a fallacy of simply and in a certain respect, as with ‘Socrates is made white, therefore Socrates is made’.

52. Or it can be said that Christ is ‘something uncreated’ because the ‘something’ does not stand there for the nature alone but for what denominates the nature; and this ‘something’ can be said to be uncreated by reason of the supposit that is denominated by the nature; nor would it follow that ‘man’ would predicate of Christ the same as ‘God’ does, because ‘God’ would predicate uncreated being per se and essentially of Christ but ‘man’ would do so only denominatively.

53. To the next [n.43] I say that if opposites can be present in something according to its opposite parts, neither opposite denominates the whole by virtue of the expression, but both are false (as is plain of a shield one half of which is

white and the other black, because it is false to say of the shield that it is white simply or black simply). Nor was the Philosopher in *Physics* 5 concerned with logic but with reality, about how something is said to move in three ways. But when some predicate is naturally in a whole through a part of the whole, namely because the predicate is precisely in the part of the whole, then from the fact that the predicate denominates the part it follows that it denominates the whole, for it denominates the whole the way it is naturally fit to denominate it (just as sight is by nature in an animal precisely as to its eyes, and so if sight is present in the animal as to the eyes it is present in the animal simply). By force of the expression, then, if ‘to be healed’ is naturally fit to be present in a man precisely or principally as to his thorax (that is, as to his heart, understanding ‘heart’ by ‘thorax’), he can be said to be a healthy animal simply because his thorax is healthy. But if, as to another part, this predicate ‘healthy’ and its opposite are both naturally fit to be present in him, then, as to the denomination of this other part, the man is not said to be a healthy animal simply, because the two opposite predicates can then be asserted of the same man at the same time.

54. So I say to the point at issue that if ‘creature’ is not naturally asserted of the whole by reason of a part (unless perhaps it is asserted by reason of the part from which the whole has its first being, or by reason of the total being of the whole), and if humanity or human nature in Christ are not the first being in Christ nor the total being of Christ, then the term ‘creature’ cannot be asserted of him by reason of his created nature, whether simply so [sc. ‘Christ is a creature’] or with a reduplication [sc. ‘Christ as a man is a creature’].

55. And if it be objected that two opposites are admitted to be true of the same thing, as of Christ that he is ‘mortal and immortal, passible and impassible’ [n.19], so Christ is Creator and creature – I say that contradictories are never admitted to be true of Christ, as neither of anything else. For although by reason of Christ’s two natures opposite affirmative properties are said of the same subject (because an affirmative is enough for there to be some cause of truth whereby the affirmation can hold of the subject), yet the negations of the affirmatives cannot be simply present in the same thing at the same time; and in this way contradictories are never true together; rather, just as Christ is passible and impassible, so it is false that he is not passible and likewise false that he is not impassible.

Question Three *Whether Christ began to be*

56. The third question is whether Christ began to be.

57. That he did:

‘Christ’ names the supposit of the two natures, according to Damascene ch.49/47; but the supposit of the two natures began to be; therefore etc.

58. Further, what began to be according to existence of substance began to be simply, because the existence of substance is existence simply; Christ began to be according to human existence, which is the existence of substance; therefore etc.

59. Further, what is generated began to be simply because, according to Aristotle *Physics* 5.1.225a16-17, generation proceeds from non-being to being simply; the whole Christ was generated; therefore etc.

60. Further, the Word began to be man; therefore Christ began to be. Proof of the consequence: for when a ‘begin’ determined by some predicate is said of something, ‘begin’ is said of the whole of it, as in the case of ‘if Socrates began to be white, then white Socrates began to be’; so the like holds of the matter at hand.

61. On the contrary:

John 8.58, “Before Abraham was, I am” – so he is from eternity; therefore he did not begin to be.

62. Again, Damascene ch.50/48, “This man was without beginning,” beginning to be requires a beginning; therefore he did not begin to be.

I. To the Question

63. Here there are two things to consider, one on the part of the subject and the other on the part of the predicate.

64. On the part of the subject the question is whether a whole ‘per accidens’ being can stand with respect to the predicate by reason of the whole per accidens being, and [sc. if so] by reason of the whole or by reason of the formal part or by reason precisely of the principal part. For example, if ‘white man’ is said to begin to be, can the subject with respect to the predicate be taken for the whole per accidens being or only for the whiteness itself, so that ‘white man’ is said to begin to be because whiteness begins to be in the whole, or can it be taken for the subject itself of which whiteness is said?

65. And because this difficulty does not seem to be in the subject with respect to other predicates, the difficulty seems thus to be on the part of the predicate, namely whether the beginning asserted by such a predicate signifies the whole by reason of the whole’s totality or by reason of one or other part, and if by reason of a part, which part? Now it seems that, from the force of the expression, the subject cannot be more restricted with respect to this predicate than with respect to some other predicate, because what is put in one extreme does not determine for itself what is put in the other extreme. Now with respect to some other predicate it could be taken according to the idea of its totality or according to the idea of the formal or principal part. Thus, if whiteness were to make a per se one with man then this proposition ‘a white man is colored’ would be per se in the first mode – although the proposition ‘man is colored’ is not per se the way the proposition ‘a rational animal is capable of laughter’ is per se in the second mode, although ‘an animal is capable of laughter’ is not per se in any mode –, so if ‘Christ’ is a name used to signify the man-Word, according to Damascene ch.49/47, then something could be predicated of this subject either by reason of the whole or by reason of either part. Therefore, just as ‘Christ is dead when dead according to his humanity’, so if Christ begins to be according to his humanity then Christ is said to begin to be. If this predicate, then [sc. ‘begin to be’], can truly be asserted of this subject by reason of this part of the subject, then it seems it could be simply asserted of it.

66. So the result is that it is all on the part of the predicate whether ‘begins to be’ states a beginning according to the first being of that of which it is said, or according to some being simply of it; because if it does so in the first way the proposition ‘Christ began to be’ is false, just as the proposition ‘Christ is created’ is also false; if it does so in the second way, then since any being of substance is being simply and Christ began to be according to being human, which is the being of substance, then Christ began to be simply. The second seems, by virtue of the expression, to be more the case because, just as this second being [sc. being human] asserts being simply but does not assert, by virtue of the expression, the first being of that of which it is said (if the subject has several beings simply, as Christ does), so also ‘to begin’ – determined by the second being – seems to state a beginning in being simply, but not a beginning in the first being of the subject.

67. It can be simply conceded then that by the virtue of the expression Christ as to what the term ‘Word-man’ involves did begin to be; that is, he has some being simply that he did not have before, although this being is not Christ’s first being.

68. The ‘began to be’ could in this way also be conceded to hold of the subject term ‘this man’, which, though it indicates the supposit, does not indicate it as it is purely in divine nature. But in the case of the human nature it is true to say that the subject began to be, provided one not have to concede that ‘the Son of God began to be’ in the way Christ or this man began to be; for his temporal being is the being simply of Christ or of this man, but not of the Son of God or the Word, because although this being simply is said of the Word (for this being is the being of substance), yet it is not the being simply of the Word; with respect to the Word this being simply is as it were an adventitious being and a being of accident so to say with respect to its subject; it is not however adventitious with respect to Christ or to this man.

69. And if you say that ‘this man’ can only supposit for the supposit of divine nature – one can reply that although it can only supposit for a supposit of divine nature, yet it supposits for it as the supposit exists in human nature, just as ‘white Socrates’ supposits for a supposit of substance as it exists in whiteness.

70. The saints, however, refused to allow this proposition on account of the heretics who said that Christ began to be simply as to his first being, making him to be a pure creature; but ‘begin to be’ does not imply the same as ‘creature’ does.

II. To the Arguments

71. The arguments [nn.57-62] are plain, because they proceed as to the fact that the properties of each nature are said of Christ by reason of the two natures; and thus, by reason of nature divine and human, Christ was able to begin to be simply.

Whether the Human Nature in Christ was able to Sin

1. About the twelfth distinction I ask^{ab} whether the human nature in Christ was able to sin.

a. [Interpolation] About the twelfth distinction, where the Master deals with the conditions of the assumed nature, one question is asked, namely whether Christ was able to sin...

b. [Interpolation] Whether the human nature in Christ could have procreated – Godfrey [of Fontaines] *Quodlibet* 9 q.5, and an article here is possible.

2. That it was

John 8.55, “If I say that I do not know him, I will be like you, a liar.” Christ was able to say and did say all of this statement, therefore he was able to say a part of it; therefore he was able to say, “I do not know the Father,” and so to lie, and consequently to sin.

3. Further, Augustine *On Free Choice* 3.5 n.56, “A nature that can sin is better than a nature that cannot sin.” But Christ assumed the best human nature in the best part of himself; therefore he assumed it as able to sin; therefore in that nature he was able to sin.

4. Again, what someone can do if he wills, he can do simply (for, according to Augustine *On the Spirit and the Letter* 31.n.53, “That which a man does is in his power”), and this is taken up by Anselm *Why God man* 2.10; Christ was able to sin if he wanted, because ‘to want to sin’ is to sin; therefore he was able to do it simply; therefore etc.

5. On the contrary:

If he could sin he could be damned; the consequent is false, therefore the antecedent is too. The consequence is manifest, for anyone who is damned is damned because of sin.

6. Again, Christ was always blessed; therefore he could not sin or be damned. The consequence is manifest, for privative opposites are no more present in the same thing than contradictories are, for they are immediate opposites in a subject apt for them.

I. To the Question

7. There are two difficulties here: one, how the blessed are incapable of sin, and the other how Christ, who was a wayfarer and was able to merit, could have, along with the blessed, inability to sin. The first article belongs to 4 d.49, about which see there [q.6 nn.10-11].

8. To the second question I reply in brief that since Christ in the first moment of the [hypostatic] union was blessed with God, his blessedness took from him all the power of sinning that could be taken from him by blessedness, although along with it there stood, by dispensation, the power of meriting; for the

fullness of glory, whereby he was no less joined to the end (though he could merit) than any other blessed, as equally removed all power in him for turning away from the end as it does in others.

9. In agreement with this is that when matter is under a form equal to its whole appetite it cannot be under another form (the point is plain in the case of all the celestial bodies); of such sort is blessedness with respect to the soul, as is plain from the definition of blessedness in Augustine *On the Trinity* 13.5 n.8, “He is blessed who both has all that he wills and wills nothing badly;” therefore etc.

10. Those, however, who say [Henry of Ghent; cf. d.2 n.14 above] that Christ’s united nature enjoyed the end by force of the union have to say as a result that he was incapable of sin not only by his fullness of glory but by the force of the union.

11. This opinion was refuted above [d.2 nn.15-23].

II. To the Arguments

12. To the first argument [n.2]: he who says the whole statement says that part of it materially, but he does not say the part, that is, does not assert it. For between this part (which cannot be asserted by the blessed, and especially not by Christ), namely, “If I say that I do not know him,” and the other part, “I will be like you etc.” there is a necessary consequence; and so if he could have asserted the first, he could have lied. However, he can be making the statement in a manner of speaking, so that, as speaker, he speaks each categorical part [sc. ‘I do not know him’, and ‘I am like you, a liar’], but yet he does not assert it, nor can he assert it, unless his intellect is capable of being deceived or his will capable of being damned or depraved (for if he lets it seem that words willingly spoken are in conflict with what is meant, he sins); for neither of these capabilities is in the perfectly blessed, because both are cases of imperfection (one of moral imperfection and the other of intellectual imperfection).

13. To the second [n.3] I say that the nature Christ assumed was of itself capable of sin and able to sin, because it was not by force of the union in a state of bliss, and it had free choice, and thus it could be turned either way; but it was confirmed in blessedness from the first instant such that it was incapable of sin, just as the other blessed are incapable of sin.

14. To the last argument [n.4] I say that by virtue of the expression the major is false, because it indicates that a categorical proposition follows a conditional one, and the conditional is necessary but the categorical consequent to it is contingent, and a contingent proposition does not follow necessarily; the conditional antecedent in the whole conditional proposition is necessary, because the antecedent includes the consequent (for the ‘to will’ in respect of the ‘to sin’ includes ‘able to’, for ‘to will’ is not only being able to do but doing it) – but the consequent is contingent, for it belongs to some nature and not to others.

15. If however the major [n.4] should in some way be true, one must expound it so that the antecedent of the whole conditional possesses some determination without which the consequent does not follow from it. And the determination must be this: ‘what someone can do if he wills, and he can and

should will it, he can do simply'; for without this condition (namely, if he should not or cannot will it) the proposition will not be true save by supposing something impossible; and what is possible simply of itself but impossible by supposition is impossible simply.

16. Now the minor, 'Christ was able to sin', is false in this way, because as is not able to sin so neither is he able to want to sin.

17. It can in another way be said that a proposition that is conditional by an 'if', that is, by a condition, can determine a possible or an impossible result; if an impossible one, nothing follows, as in this case. See on this matter 'Whether God is one' in the argument 'everything that it would be better if it existed must be posited', 1 d.2 nn.189-190.

Thirteenth Distinction

Question One

Whether on Christ's Soul could have been Conferred the Highest Degree of Grace that could have been Conferred on a Creature

1. About the thirteenth distinction I ask^a whether there was conferred or could have been conferred on Christ's soul the supreme degree of grace that could have been conferred on a creature.

a. [Interpolation] About the thirteenth distinction, where the master determines about the progress of Christ as to his conversation and operation, four questions are asked: first, whether on Christ could have been conferred the supreme degree of grace that could have been conferred on a creature; second, whether there was in fact conferred on Christ the supreme degree of grace that can be conferred on a creature; third, whether it was possible for the will of Christ's soul to have the highest degree of enjoyment possible for a created nature; fourth, whether Christ's soul could have enjoyed God in the highest degree without the highest degree of grace. Arguments about the first question:

2. That it was not.

Christ's soul was not able to receive grace in the highest degree, because it was not the highest intellectual nature; so it was not able to receive the supreme degree of grace. Proof of the consequence: because a more excellent intellectual nature is capable of a greater and more excellent perfection, for capacity for perfection follows the rank of the perfectible nature.

3. On this point it is said [Godfrey of Fontaines, *Quodlibet* 9 q.8] that to Christ's soul was given a certain supernatural habit whereby that nature's capacity was increased so as to be able to receive greater grace.

4. Against this view [n.3]

A more excellent nature was capable of the same habit or of another more perfect habit and it would, through the latter, be capable of a greater grace; and

thus an always more excellent nature is, whether of itself or by habit, capable of more grace than this nature [of Christ's soul]; and therefore if the proportion for perfection is perfectible [sc. capable of being made more perfect], it can never have the greatest grace that is conferrable or that can be conferred on a creature.

5. Further, this habit should not be conferred on Christ's soul because grace can be conferred without the habit, and in equal quantity, for grace is a first supernatural act and therefore does not presuppose any other first supernatural act.

6. Further, to the main point: the grace that Christ's soul could have received would necessarily be finite in its completed state, that is, it would exist in a certain degree, because it exists in completed fact and not in a state of becoming. But a greater grace beyond that degree could be conferred; proof: for although one may suppose grace to exist in some greater degree, one does not thereby suppose it to be infinite, but finite; a finite degree is not repugnant to the perfection of a creature; therefore it is not a contradiction for something to be made more perfect than this creature [sc. Christ's soul], and this perfection would not be a form in it other than grace, because grace belongs to the highest species among supernatural perfections.

7. Further, if the grace of Christ's soul were so complete that there could not be a grace altogether greater than it, this would be because of the idea of the form of grace in itself, or because of something on the part of the efficient cause, or because of something on the part of the susceptive cause. Not in the first way because grace is a participation in infinite charity, and so it can grow infinitely before it reaches the limit of the charity it is participating in; not in the second way because the efficient cause is infinite; not in the third way because the form received always increases the capacity of the receiver, for grace enlarges.

8. Further, if Christ's soul could have creatable grace in its highest degree, then it could have a grace to which no other was equal. The proof of the consequence is that what is said by way of highest abundance belongs to only one thing (*Topics* 5); the consequent is false, because God could assume another equal human nature or assume an angelic nature and confer on it an equal grace [cf. supra d.1 n.127, d.2 n.27].

9. Argument to the opposite:

This nature [sc. Christ's soul] was capable of being assumed, as to its existence, into highest union with God; therefore it was thus capable as to its operation too. The highest union as to operation is by supreme habit of grace alone, which is the principle of operating; therefore etc.

10. Further, having the capacity for grace belongs to intellectual nature insofar as it is the image of God [Augustine *On the Trinity* 14.8 n.11]; but this nature [sc. intellectual nature in Christ] was the highest image of God; therefore it was in the highest degree capable of grace; therefore the highest grace was conferred on it.

Question Two

Whether on Christ's Soul was in fact Conferred the Highest Degree of Grace that could have been Conferred on a Creature

11. I ask second about the fact of the matter, whether on Christ's soul was in fact conferred the highest grace that could have been conferred on a creature.

12. That it was not:

Augustine *On the Trinity* 13.5 n8 says that 'he is blessed who has what he wills and wills nothing badly'; this remark is not understood only of actual willing, because then some holy wayfarer could be blessed for some instant, because he can have whatever he wills for that instant, and he is also then not actually willing badly. Therefore the remark is understood of possible willing, namely that the blessed has whatever he can rightly will. But [the Archangel] Michael can rightly will to have as much grace as his nature is capable of, because free will is always right when it conforms to a natural will or willing, which is always right; therefore Michael's natural will is for as much grace as his nature is capable of. But the nature of Christ's soul is not as excellent [sc. as Michael's nature], and so it is not capable of as much grace; therefore it does not in fact now have as much grace as Michael has (if Michael is blessed).

13. Further, the amount of grace to be posited in the soul of Christ should only be as great as is required for the blessedness of his soul; but it is perfectly blessed if its whole natural inclination is brought to completion. Now his soul can be perfectly completed even if it does not have the highest degree of creatable grace, for it does not have the highest inclination for it (since it does not have the highest nature [n.12]). An example: water would be blessed [i.e. its natural inclination would be realized] even if it was not in the center, because it does not have the highest degree of heaviness that earth has.

14. Further, the highest nature has not been made; therefore neither has the highest grace. Proof of the antecedent: whatever nature has been made, another can be made that is more excellent, because the former too could be finite. Proof of the consequence: the order of the universe consists more in species than in individuals, for species rather than individuals determine the perfection of the universe; therefore it seems that a thing is superior to other natures in species before the making of the highest grace (which would differ from other graces only numerically).

15. On the contrary:

Augustine *On the Trinity* 13.19 n.24, "In things that have arisen in time, the highest grace is that man was joined to God in unity of person."

16. Further, *John* 1.14, "We saw his glory, glory as of the only begotten Son of God, full of grace and truth," that is, of the sort that befits the only begotten; but this sort is the highest that it was possible to give; therefore etc.

17. Again, *John* 3.34, "God does not give the Spirit by measure," and this is understood of Christ, for "of his fullness have we all received etc." [*John* 1.16]. Grace that is not 'by measure' is the highest possible grace; also a fullness that can be shared in by another grace according to a certain measure, seems to be found only in the highest grace.

18. Again, the Master [Lombard] says in the text, "One must believe that God has conferred on Christ's soul as much grace as could have been conferred;" God has conferred as much as he could create, as will be proved [infra nn.45-48, 53]; therefore etc.

Question Three

*Whether it was Possible for Christ's Will to have the Highest Enjoyment Possible
for a Created Nature*

19. I ask third whether it was possible for Christ's soul to have the highest enjoyment possible for a created nature.

20. That it was not:

The will elicits an act of meriting, and therefore of enjoying too, because otherwise one would not merit and enjoy according to the power's same act; but the will of Christ's soul cannot possess the highest idea of activity in eliciting an act of meriting because it is not able to have the highest active virtue that is consequent to free intellectual nature [sc. angelic nature, *infra n.81*]; therefore it cannot have the highest enjoyment.

21. Further, if as much grace were given to an angel as was given to Christ's soul, then, since the will of an angel is more perfect, its active causality would be more perfect than the active causality of the will of Christ's soul; also the other partial cause [sc. grace] would be equal with his soul; therefore the whole, namely an angel's will along with a certain amount of grace, would have power for a greater act of enjoyment than the will of Christ's soul along with that amount of grace, because when one partial cause is equal and the remaining one is greater, a more perfect effect can follow.

22. On the contrary:

It is possible for Christ's soul to have the highest grace [nn.9-10]; therefore to have the highest enjoyment too. Proof of the consequence: an act naturally elicited by some form is equal in perfection to that form; the enjoyment in question is a supernatural act and consequently is elicited by the supernatural cause which is grace, and it is plain that it is elicited naturally for grace is not in its idea formally free; therefore the amount of enjoyment can accord with the amount of grace.

Question Four

Whether Christ's Soul was Able to Enjoy God supremely without the Highest Grace

23. I ask fourth whether Christ's soul was able to enjoy God supremely without the highest grace.

24. That it was not:

Grace is required for an act of merit when one is on the way to the fatherland; therefore it is required for the act of enjoyment when one is in the fatherland.

Proof of the consequence: When a form is required for some operation because of imperfection in another cause that is a partial cause of that operation, then the more excellent the operation the more that form is required; but grace along with the will is required for an act of merit it because of the excellence of that act; therefore grace is more required for the act of enjoyment, which is a more

excellent act. Further, otherwise [sc. if grace were not required] someone could be supremely blessed, without charity, because he could have the highest enjoyment without charity.

25. Further, just as natural existence is required for natural operation, so supernatural existence is required for supernatural operation; therefore the highest existence is required for the highest operation; the highest existence is had through the highest grace; therefore etc.

26. On the contrary:

Grace is not related to enjoyment in any class of cause save in that of efficient cause (the point is plain by running through the kinds of causes); but whatever God can do through an intermediate efficient cause he can do without it; therefore the highest enjoyment, which God can make through the medium of the highest grace, he can make without it; therefore etc.

I. To the First Question

27. To the first question I say that ‘highest’ can be taken in two ways: in one way positively, for exceeding everything else; in another way negatively, for not being exceeded by anything else. In the first way there can be only one thing that is said thus to exceed. In the second way there can be many such things (as the most general categories being of are because they do not have a genus above them).

28. When speaking in the first way, I say that God could not have conferred on Christ’s soul the highest possible grace to which he could not create an equal, for he was and is able to assume another nature equal to that one and to give it an equal grace; in the second way I say that he was able to give the highest creatable grace to Christ’s soul.

29. To show this I prove two things: first that the highest grace could in this way have been created at once in a single creation; second that it could be conferred on a creature.

A. The Highest Grace could have been Created

1. Scotus’ own Reason

30. I prove the first: taking some determinate grace, say *a*, I ask by way of progressive ascent: either there is a stand at some highest grace, and then the conclusion is gained; or there is no stand and an infinite process is possible. And then it follows, in the latter case, that the more some grace exceeds a certain grace *a* the more perfect it is; and so a grace that exceeds infinitely is more perfect infinitely and will thus in itself be intensively infinite; and since it would be seen by the divine intellect as a single creatable thing, it can be created in a single creation. And thus, setting aside what the inference shows to be impossible, namely that there does not exist such an infinite grace [sc. a grace to which there can be no equal, n.28], the conclusion is gained that the highest grace can be created by a single act of creation [cf. n.16], just as it is seen by the divine intellect to be a single creatable thing.

2. Others' Reasons

31. [First reason]. From this reasoning two other arguments get their evidence, one of which is taken from the Philosopher *Physics* 3.7.207b17-18, the chapter on the infinite, that “as much can be in act as can be in potency”, and so there is no process to infinity when advancing toward form; and for this reason it has been necessary to posit for any form however perfect a completion that is somehow possible

32. But an objection is raised against this position [n.31], that in the case of numbers it is possible to advance toward a potential infinite even though no number is actually infinite; so it is not true of numbers that as much can be in act as can be in potency.

33. I reply in accord with Averroes [*Physics* 3 com. 67] that addition in the case of numbers is by division of the continuous; but in the division of the continuous the advance is made materially [sc. by division in the matter]; consequently numbers increase by an advance that is in the matter; but the continuous grows and increases by an advance toward form; now in an advance toward form there must be a stand, and a stand that is as much in act as in potency; but there is no stand in an advance that is in matter; and so there is a stand in the quantity of continuous things but not in a multitude of numbers, just as neither is there a stand in the division of continuous things into lesser and lesser quantities.

34. But an argument against this is that if number is per se one and is not like a heap (*Metaphysics* 8.6.1045a7-10, b23 – the Commentator Averroes says the opposite in *Physics* 3 com.68), then any number has its own proper form. Therefore in advancing to a greater number there is a progress toward a form that is proper and includes the preceding forms virtually; so there is no progress to infinity in numbers.^a

a. [Interpolation] Note on this point Augustine *City of God* 12.19, and the Commentator on the chapter on the Infinite, *Physics* 3 com.33, who says that every number is divisible; so see *Metaphysics* 2.2.994a11-19 on the Infinite, and note that the Commentator says the opposite, *Physics* 3 com.68.

35. I say, then, that the Philosopher’s argument here [n.31] is only conclusive about quantity of bulk, and according to this sort of quantity ‘a thing can be in potency as much as it can be in act’ – in fact it is in act because, according to the Philosopher, a quantum cannot grow in this way unless the parts taken from one continuous thing (by way of removal or division) are added continuously to another that is growing; and so, although these parts could never exceed the divided whole nor the increased whole, yet the divided whole can go to excess by addition of these parts; for if the whole quantity, to which addition is being made, could be actually greater than the whole potentially divided thing is and can be growing accordingly, then it could be bigger than the heaven.

36. The provability of the Philosopher's statement is that a natural agent (without whose action he supposes nothing new can come to be) cannot make something bigger unless it takes parts from one quantity and adds them to another quantity. According to the theologians, indeed, this is not true when speaking of divine power, because there is some quantity potentially bigger than it actually is, for God can make it larger without adding to it parts that have been taken from another quantity [cf. *Ord.* 1 d.42 n.9].

37. In order, then, to apply the stated proposition of the Philosopher [n.31] to a virtual quantity, one needs to have a different proof from the Philosopher [sc. a philosophical and not theological proof], and in the place cited [n.31] the only proof is that, just as in the case of some permanent things something finite can be makeable by a single making, so too if one of the infinite things were makeable by a making, it would be makeable by a single making, and so something highest could be made, yet if there can be a process to infinity it would not be infinite.

38. From the fact, then, that charity or grace is something permanent, even as to any degree, the result is that if there is a process to infinity then any degree that has been made will be further perfectible; and so there can be at the same time as much in actuality as there can be in potency, for the possibility for such form is not a possibility for something that is only in a state of becoming but for something that is in a state of having become.

39. And this interpretation is touched on by the Commentator in *Physics* 3 com.69, that all powers that are in increase belong to one definite or demonstrated power; that is, that there is one power for a highest act in which are contained all the acts the many powers are capable of that are reduced to act one after another. But in the case of the division of the continuous, the many powers are not parts of one demonstrated or definite power, that is, there is not in their case some single act in which are contained all the acts completing the powers that are reducible to that act in turn; and so they are not parts of one demonstrated or definite power. This seems to mean only that in all ordered acts where there is, according to each degree, some act that is *per se* makeable, there is a highest in potency that can at the same time be in act, because it can be reduced to act by a single power; but in the case of acts that are only of a nature to exist in coming to be and where there are many ordered powers, there cannot be some single highest thing that can be in act as much as it is in potency but, beyond any potential coming to be, there can be something greater, although not something makeable by a single making.

40. [Second reason, n.31]. There is another reason posited for this conclusion [sc. that the highest grace can be created, n.29], namely that God can create as much charity as he can create (the subject of this major includes the predicate). Posit then that in fact 'he creates as much as he can create'; therefore he cannot make anything greater; therefore the conclusion is gained that a highest creatable degree can be created.

41. Here the response is that the first proposition [sc. he can create as much as he can create, n.40] can be a hypothetical conditional, or a categorical proposition about a conditional predicate [sc. when the statement is conditional only about the predicate; William of Sherwoode *Introductions to Logic* pp.33-34, *Synategorematum* pp.79-80].

42. In the first way the proposition is necessary because the antecedent includes the consequent: ‘if he can create so much, he can create so much’; and in this way one must suppose that it actually holds, so that both the antecedent and the consequent are posited as holding; because if the consequent is posited as holding and not the antecedent there is a fallacy of the consequence. For it need not be that what the antecedent follows on the consequent follows on, and this proposition about the holding of the antecedent [sc. ‘he can create as much as he can create’] is related to one about the possible holding of the consequent, and the inference ‘if man is an animal it is possible that he be white, therefore every animal is white’ is not valid. The first proposition therefore [sc. ‘he can create as much as he can create’] would have to be posited as holding in this way: ‘he creates as much as he creates’.

45. But if it is taken in the second way (when it is a categorical about a conditional predicate), the sense is, ‘he can create as much as he can create, that is, he can create a highest creatable’. And if a single power is indicated as modifying the whole proposition, it is, in its form, not true; and so the subject does not include the predicate, for the predicate is specified by a determination that is not *per se* known to be present in the subject, but it is true only by reason of the matter (for in the case of permanent things, however far one proceeds, the highest possible is as makeable by a single making as is anything else).

44. And these two reasons [nn.31, 40] get their evidence only from the first reason [n.30]

B. The Highest Grace can be Conferred on the Soul of Christ

45. Secondly, and more to the question, supposing that a highest grace can be created by a single action, I prove that it could be conferred on the soul of Christ.

First, because a subject fitted to receive an appropriate accident that comes in degrees (although not a subject that is of itself determined to any particular degree) can, considered in itself, receive that accident according to any degree; the soul is such a subject with respect to grace; therefore it can, considered in itself, receive any degree of grace.

46. The major here is clear from its opposite: for water is for this reason not able to receive any degree of heat, that heat is an accident unfitting to water in any degree, and there is a degree of it that could not exist in water while water remains with its nature as water, but the water would be destroyed;⁹³ air too, for which heat is an appropriate accident, cannot receive just any degree of heat for the reason it is determined by its nature to have a definite degree of heat; the same too of mixed bodies. But when there is an accident in a certain degree, and it is appropriate to a given subject and the subject is not determined to having any definite degree, there seems no reason for any degree to be unable to belong to the subject; for no greater contradiction at all between accident and subject is found

⁹³ Scotus is following here, and throughout this argument, the traditional Aristotelian analysis of the material elements, according to which earth is cold and dry, water cold and wet, air hot and wet, fire hot and dry.

in one degree of the accident than in any other, and the existence of what contains no contradiction is absolutely to be posited as possible.^a

a. [Interpolation] Or the argument [n.45] can be formulated in this way: Further, a subject able to receive a form that comes in degrees where no degree is repugnant to the subject, can receive any degree of it; the soul is disposed to grace in this way. Proof: if some degree of grace is repugnant to a subject that is as such receptive of it (the ‘as such’ excludes from the subject all accompanying idea of the subject’s being an active principle with respect to grace), then that degree of grace is also repugnant to any subject of the same nature, for anything capable of grace is capable of it under the same idea (from the second argument, n.47 infra). But no degree of grace is repugnant to whatever subjects are receptive of grace. So not to any particular one of them either.

I reply that a greater degree is repugnant to a subject that has a lesser capacity. Therefore the minor [sc. ‘no degree of grace is repugnant to whatever subjects are receptive of grace’] is denied. The consequence proving it is likewise denied. But the inference does indeed hold that ‘if a degree of grace is repugnant to any subject of such and such capacity, then it is repugnant to any subject of equal capacity’, but not that it is repugnant ‘to any subject of the same idea, but of unequal capacity’. An example: if surface contains body then any surface contains any body, but a greater surface contains a greater body; and a smaller surface is not able to contain as large a body, and yet a smaller surface is of the same idea as a larger one.

And then in reply to the third reason about first extremes in a proportion (n.48 infra, which would be against the above solution) I say: form and subject are adequate extremes when taken proportionally, and otherwise they are not (as a subject with a capacity for such an amount and a form with a degree of such an amount or a lesser amount).

If a proof from surface to color is given (or a proof from first matter to all material forms) I reply that there is an equality of capacity there, but it is not so in the case of angel and soul, nor yet does the difference exceed the difference [sc. ‘intellectual’ as to angels, ‘rational’ as to men], but the idea of the genus does that is common to the differences [sc. angel and soul are both spiritual beings as to genus, and spiritual is common to the differences of intellectual in an angel and rational in the human soul; but an angel’s spirituality has no relation to a body while the soul’s does]; and so their greater and lesser capacity are of the same idea, although the differences are of a different idea.

47. Further, angel and soul are related to grace according to the same idea of receptivity, because grace, as it is received, is a form of the same idea, and so the receivers – insofar as they do receive – are of the same idea. An example: just as white is of the same idea in stone and in wood, so stone and wood are not related to white as they belong to different natures; on the contrary it is accidental

to them that, as they receive a form of the same idea, they belong to different natures. Now grace in soul and angel is of the same species, otherwise one grace would determinately surpass the other and thus all grace in the soul would be greater than grace in an angel or conversely, and both of these are false. Therefore the two are not related to grace as subjects of different nature, but this difference is incidental to them insofar as they receive such accident; and thus the soul can receive as much as an angel can receive. But an angel can receive the highest creatable grace; therefore the soul can, and therefore also can the soul of Christ.

48. Further, when there is a proportion between common extremes, as between the first extremes of the proportion, it is between whatever is contained under either extreme. An example of this: what heats and what is heatable are the first extremes based on ‘having heat’, namely actually so and potentially so; thus, wherever the ideas of actually hot and potentially hot are found, there what heats and what is heatable can be found. But the first extremes of the proportion in question, namely ‘supernatural perfection and supernatural perfectibility’, are (in the present context) grace and intellectual nature; so the idea of this proportion is present in whatever is contained under either extreme; and therefore any grace whatever is the perfection simply of any intellectual nature whatever as that nature is perfectible by grace. An example of this: if color is related in first place to surface as perfection to perfectible, and if it is not determined by the nature of either extreme to some genus beneath it in order to be one extreme of the proportion, then any surface can be perfected by any color; but if the extremes are made determinate by something else, as that the surface, because it is the surface of a stone, is the determinate extreme of such and such a color, then that surface cannot receive any color whatever – but this is not because the surface is perfectible by color but because that whose surface it is determines a certain species or degree of color for itself; but if the surface were perfectible absolutely, and if the perfection were too, then anything with that surface could be perfected by any color in any degree.

C. A Doubt

49. There is a doubt here about the second member of the distinction, namely when ‘highest’ is expounded in the negative sense [sc. ‘highest’ as ‘what is not exceeded by anything else’, n.27]; the doubt is whether by God’s ordained power some other grace could be equal to this one [sc. the grace of Christ’s soul].

50. And it seems it could not:

For no other nature could be head of those who have grace, for there cannot be two heads, just as there cannot be two things that are highest in the same order.

51. Likewise, if the same amount of grace could be given to someone else, then this someone else could advance to the same extent in merit, which seems absurd.

52. Here one could say that although God could by his absolute power confer the same amount of grace on another nature, whether the nature was assumed or perhaps not assumed, yet he could not do so by ordained power

because (according to the laws already set down by divine Wisdom) there will be only one head in the Church, from whom graces will flow to the members.

II. To the Second Question

53. As to the second question, about the fact of the matter [n.11], it is probable, according to the Master [Lombard] that God conferred on Christ as much as he could [n.18]; but, from the preceding question [nn.30, 45-48], he was able to confer the highest creatable grace; therefore he did so confer it. I prefer, in commanding Christ, to go to excess in praising him than to fail to praise him as is his due – supposing that, because of ignorance, one must fall into one or other extreme.

54. This response is confirmed by Augustine's remark *On Free Choice* 3.5 n.45, "As regards whatever occurs to you by true reason to be better, know that God has done it rather than not done it." Now it seems, according to right reason, to be simply better that the highest grace has been conferred on someone than not conferred, for thereby is displayed the highest mercy of God in giving the highest good of grace without preceding merits; therefore it is probable to say that he did it, and not to any but the soul of Christ; therefore etc.

III. To the Principal Arguments of these Two Questions

55. To the arguments of these questions.

A. To the Arguments of the First Question

56. [To the first argument]. It is said [Aquinas, Bonaventure] to the first argument [n.2] that, although Christ's soul was not the highest thing capable of grace, yet it was united to the person of the Word, and by this union its capacity was so enlarged that it could receive the highest grace, which it would not have received had it not been assumed.

57. Against this:

Nothing absolutely new was put into the soul's nature by the union, because its being united to the Word states only a special dependence of it on the Word; so just as the nature remains the same as to all its absolute properties, so it remains the same as to having the same capacity, for its capacity is its nature.

58. Further, if an angel had been assumed, it would have had a greater capacity by force of the union than it now has, according to you, so that there would have been as much, or more, increase beyond the angel's natural capacity by assumption as there is by union now increase beyond its natural capacity on the part of Christ's soul; and accordingly the angel's nature could receive more grace than Christ's soul now has, and so grace would not be the highest in Christ, the opposite of which is here [n.56] maintained.

59. One can say briefly that anything capable of grace is in potential obedience to receiving any amount of grace, or to receiving any degree of any amount of grace; for with respect to this per accidens (yet fitting) accident nothing

whatever that is capable of grace has of itself a reason for being determined to a certain degree of it – nor is any such degree introduced according to any alteration caused in the patient by a natural agent, but only absolutely according as the subject is capable of grace and God is able to impress on it grace.

60. The proposition then that ‘there is a proportion between perfection and perfectible’ [n.2], if it is understood as to precise proportion (namely that a more perfect perfectible is capable of a greater perfection) is false; on the contrary, the whole of the perfectible in general and in particular regards the whole of perfection in general and in particular. But this proposition about proportion has some probability as to subjects and the natural accidents they cause, because the perfection of the effect follows the perfection of the total active cause. But it has no probability as to substantial forms in matter, because then a more perfect form is sometimes received in a more imperfect perfectible subject, because the form gives a simply greater and prior perfection. But there ought not to be any objection here about matter and substantial form, because here the discussion is about subject and accident, and an objection ought to be made here only because of the accidentality of such accident, for the accident has in itself no reason to limit the subject to such and such a degree.

61. [To the second argument]. To the second [n.6] I say that the meaning is either that beyond that finite degree there could be another degree of grace which was greater; or that there is some degree in the nature of a more perfect supernatural perfection that is greater, although it is beyond the species of grace; or that some degree is absolutely superior.

62. If in the first way, I say that this is impossible, or rather that it involves a contradiction, because the grace in question is completed. And when you say that ‘if a finite degree is understood to be added to it, it is not infinite’ [n.6], I say that there will be something imcompossible involved, for an intelligible finite perfection can be repugnant to another intelligible finite perfection (as when white is understood to be added to black), each of whose components is finite and yet no such thing can be made, because things that are understood to be composite are incompossible when the understanding of them includes contradictions [sc. as in the case of black and white]. Hence in such cases it is not valid to say ‘I can understand this because it is not an infinity, therefore it can come to be’; for this statement is only understood according to a concept that is false in itself and that includes a contradiction; and though it thus be understood not to be infinite, yet it has another incompossibility within it, because it has a repugnance within itself.

63. If the point is understood in the second way [n.61] then, on the supposition that grace is the highest perfection, it will be understood in the same way as it is when understanding some degree of grace to be higher than the highest grace in the genus of supernatural perfection, for this is to understand contradictions (just as it is contradictory to understand some color greater than the greatest white). If, however, charity is not the highest supernatural perfection but enjoyment is, then one can allow that (beyond the highest degree of charity) there can be a higher degree beyond it in kind, namely some degree of enjoying.

64. If the point is understood in the third way [n.61], it can be said that, beyond the whole genus of the most noble qualities (of which sort supernatural

perfections are), the lowest degree of a higher genus, as the lowest substance, can be supposed, because the whole genus of substance surpasses the whole genus of quality; nor is it unacceptable that the substance lowest in essential perfection should surpass any accident whatever, though some accident, as it exists in supernatural and accidental perfection (that is, in being joined to a supernatural object) surpasses substance; for such a perfection is not said to be perfect save by the fact it is joined immediately to the perfect object.

65. In these last two ways [nn.63-64] there is indeed something higher than the highest grace, but it is not to the purpose.

66. [To the third argument]. To the third [n.7] I say that the soul of Christ, in whatever way one considers it, has grace in its completed term such that it cannot have a greater grace. And from this third argument [n.7] three arguments to the opposite of what it says can be constructed:

67. The first is as follows: for because grace is a certain participation in God, it is for this reason necessary that it receive a part of infinite perfection according to some determinate degree, so that it necessarily includes, as it is itself a determinate participation, a determinate degree with respect to infinite charity; otherwise one could conclude that heat and any such form was infinite because any form is a participation in something infinite.⁹⁴

68. Similarly on the part of the efficient cause, that this cause makes a nature from nothing that is limited.

69. Third on the part of the capacity that, though it is a capacity with respect to any degree of the form, it is not a capacity of something finite for something infinite. And when the statement is made that it increases the capacity, it is clearly false, for when two causes come together to constitute a third thing, the later and second of them does not give the prior anything pertaining to the prior's proper causality; matter is in some way prior to form, at least as to origin, in constituting the composite, and prior in particular to an accidental form that only constitutes a per accidens being with the subject; therefore the form does not give the matter anything pertaining to the matter's proper causality, and so it does not increase in the matter any potentiality or capacity (which is matter's potentiality).

70. But if you say that charity in one degree increases capacity not in itself but relative to another degree – on the contrary: charity is a form of the same idea in anything whatever, and so the capacity for it is also of the same idea in anything whatever; therefore no capacity can be increased by any charity received, but the whole of it is naturally presupposed. For this reason I say that the highest and lowest capacity exist in the nature of a thing before the reception of any form; nor is the capacity increased or lessened whatever form is received, for ‘being able to have grace’ is, according to Augustine [*Predestination of the Saints* ch.5 n.10], present in man by nature, so that this potentiality is founded in the nature of the soul as something essential and eternal to it, so that it does not change it.

71. [To the fourth argument]. To the final argument [n.8], it is plain that its conclusion is about the highest taken in the positive sense [n.27].

⁹⁴ Sc. any form is a universal and can inform any number of individuals.

B. To the Arguments of the Second Question

72. To the arguments of the second question:

I say [to the first, n.12] that the blessed has, not by absolute power but by ordained power, whatever he can rightly will. Or if he has it by absolute power this must be understood in the sense of ‘whatever he can absolutely will rightly’, that is, what God wills him to will; but God does not will that any will wills freely to have a greater glory than he has conferred on it; and so it cannot rightly will a glory other than what it has.

73. And when you say in proof: ‘through a natural will, which is always right’, I say that the natural appetite of any will is for the highest glory such that the will could be naturally perfected by that much glory; however there is not there any natural inclination for the highest glory such that the opposite of that form, that is, non-highest glory, would be in it by force (in the way that a heavy object is naturally inclined to go downwards^a such that the opposite – namely being up, or not being down – cannot be in it save by force). For any soul is naturally inclined to have the highest grace, and yet it can be at rest in a smallest grace, because there is no intrinsic principle in it determining it equally to any determinate degree of grace.

a. [*Interpolation*] because that inclination [sc. natural appetite in the will] does not have an intrinsic principle necessitating it toward that for which it is the inclination.

74. But when you say [n.12] that a free will will be right if it accords with natural will, I say not always so but only when it accords with the superior will, namely the divine will (when it wills what God wills it to will); but sometimes God wills the will to will freely, because he wills natural will to exercise its appetite; but sometimes he does not, but he wills free will to be in accord with his own will and not in accord with natural appetite. And for this reason is blessedness rightly desired freely, because God wills natural appetite to desire this and free will to be in accord with him. But God on occasion does not will free will to love immortality, and yet he does will natural appetite to be for the opposite of death – and then he does not will free will to follow it but to follow his own will, which is a higher rule, because God by his own will, which is a higher and the highest law, has prefixed on any created will that it not will more than the divine will has conferred on it and wants it to will.

75. To the next argument [n.13] I say that although Christ’s soul has supreme inclination for the highest grace as far as concerns the foundation of the inclination (so that any other grace less than the highest grace would be in by force), yet it has supreme inclination for the highest grace whereby it can be joined in the highest way to the object; and so, although it could be at rest in any grace whatever (as any other soul also can), yet it would not be at rest in the highest way without the highest grace, nor would it be joined in the highest way to the object (wherein is perfect rest) if it did not have the highest grace.

76. To the next [n.14] – if the antecedent is conceded (which however seems doubtful and against the authority of Augustine *On Free Choice* 3 [n.54]), the consequence can be denied.

77. And when the cause is asked for as to why God made the highest grace but not the highest nature [n.14], I reply that the highest created nature, if it existed, would not have influence over all natures, just as now too a higher species in the universe does not necessarily have influence over a lower; but the highest grace has, according to the being of grace, influence over lower things; and so there seems to be a greater necessity to posit something supreme possessing grace than for some nature that is supreme. But if, just as God supplies the influence of a higher nature, if there is one, over a lower one (because God has influence directly over everything), then he could directly supply the influence of the highest grace, because he pours grace onto all.

78. But another reason could be given [sc. to the question posed in n.77], that, in any work of nature whatever, divine power and wisdom are manifested, because they have produced things from nothing; and divine power and wisdom belong to the whole universe, both as to the hierarchy of corporeal natures and as to natural existence. But mercy and justice, which belong to the hierarchy of intellectual natures as to moral existence, are not manifested supremely in every work of grace; on the contrary, it seems that the highest mercy is not manifested unless the highest grace and glory be given without merits.

IV. To the Third Question

79. To the third question [n.19] I say that the phrase ‘the soul being able to enjoy supremely’ can be understood in two ways: either formally or elicitively, that is, either that supreme enjoyment informs Christ’s will (by whatever cause), or that his will elicits this enjoyment and is the active cause with respect to it.

80. In the first way, it is possible for the highest creatable enjoyment to be conferred on Christ’s soul, because his soul is receptive of any accident that befits him whatever and in the highest degree (if his soul does not determine for itself a definite degree), just as was proved in the first question about grace [nn.45-48]; and enjoyment is a certain absolute accident, capable of being created by the first cause immediately without the action of the created will.

81. In the second way, it seems probable that as the human will cannot have as much active force as another created will can have (as an angel’s), it cannot elicit enjoyment as perfectly as some other will can; for although it could have the highest grace, which, as partial cause with respect to enjoyment, would equally cause enjoyment in itself and in an angel (if the angel had enjoyment), yet the other partial cause, namely the will, will be unequal; but when one of two causes is deficient, the effect is deficient, if the remaining partial cause is equal. But now in fact Christ’s soul is elicitive to the greatest extent, because although his will is not as perfectly active as an angel’s will, yet along with supreme grace – as the other active partial cause – it has power for a greater enjoyment than the will of an angel with less grace has, because the excellence of grace in it surpasses the efficacy of the will of an angel.

V. To the Fourth Question

82. To the fourth question [n.23] I say that God could confer the highest grace on Christ's soul without the highest grace (as the argument to the opposite says [n.26]); because grace has only the idea of a second efficient cause with respect to enjoyment, and so enjoyment is possible without it.

83. But whether Christ's will could, on its own part, act for the highest enjoyment as much without grace as with grace is dubious.

84. For suppose that the enjoyable object is present to the intellect, and that the will, without the object being present to any habit, could so elicit the act of enjoyment that grace was not required for eliciting any perfection of the enjoyment (as holds of any other partial cause that gives some perfection to the effect but does not give the will any causality proper to itself – rather the will has of itself its own causality as to proximate power, or at least as to the remaining cause). If so, then either a necessary connection of second causes is being posited, such that none could cause a determinate effect without a determinate second cause (in the way that a father, as father, cannot act for the generating of a son without the mother acting as second cause); or God is being posited as supplying the causality of any second cause whatever (so no causality of another cause is being posited), and then he could supply the causality of the mother and leave to the father his proper causality for being true father of his son (though no one would be the mother).

85. If the first of these [n.84] is held, then one must say that the will without grace cannot act for as much enjoyment as could be elicited by the will with the highest grace, although it could receive that enjoyment without grace.

86. But if the second [n.84] is held then one must say that God could supply the action of the highest grace, and the will without that grace could act for the highest enjoyment according to its own causality, while God supplies the action of grace as grace is a second cause.

87. However, by ordained power, Christ's will cannot have the highest enjoyment actively or elicitively without the highest grace, because the ordaining is that the first cause, which naturally gets some action from the second cause, does not have power for the highest effect of both causes without such action of the second cause [cf. *Ord.* 1 d.2 n.129, d.42 nn.9-15]. Likewise, the ordaining is that no will is perfected to the highest, even as recipient in highest second act, unless it has the highest first act – and so it is not possible by ordained power that it should have the highest enjoyment without the highest grace.

VI. To the Principal Arguments of the Third and Fourth Question

88. To the arguments of these two questions.

A. To the Arguments of Both Parts of the Third Question

89. The first two arguments [nn.20-21] show that the will of Christ's soul cannot elicitively have the highest enjoyment, and this insofar as the action is due to second causes, with God not supplying the action of any second cause.

90. The argument to the opposite [n.22] shows that Christ's will cannot have the highest enjoyment formally – which I concede. However the argument fails in that it seems to prove that enjoyment is from grace as from the total cause, which is false; hence although grace is disposed for enjoyment by nature, yet the will, which is the other partial cause, is not but is disposed freely; however in the fatherland the will always cooperates, according to the utmost of its power, with the action of grace according to the utmost of grace.

91. And if it be objected against the distinction set down for the third question [n.79] that then Christ's soul could, by its union, have enjoyment without grace (the opposite of which was stated in d.2 [nn.18-22]) – I say that God could cause enjoyment immediately in any soul, and thus the soul would have enjoyment formally without habitual grace; but no soul could be disposed to enjoyment actively according to the order of causes now in place [n.87], unless it had grace as the second cause for it to be able to use in its acting; therefore enjoyment could not, by force of the union, belong more to Christ's soul than to another soul, unless by force of the union enjoyment belonged to it elicitively according to the established order of second causes; but it could only do so if God supplied the action of grace, which would naturally be the will's second cause in producing the effect – and God could supply it in this way for some other will. The will could also have enjoyment formally if God caused enjoyment in it immediately; but this would not be by force of the union, because God could cause it as immediately in another will. So this does not contradict what was said there [d.2 nn.18-22]; and also the enjoyment would not be praiseworthy if it were only caused immediately by God in the will as in a subject, because it would not be in the power of the will of the enjoyer, for it is not in the power of a second cause to use a first cause but conversely.

92. And therefore both for the wayfarer and in the fatherland some created form is posited, so that the will can use that form in its operation, and so that the form is in the will's power and may thus be used in a praiseworthy way.

B. To the Arguments of the Fourth Question

93. To the arguments of the fourth question.

To the first [n.24] I say that grace is required for merit, because merit formally requires that the act be freely elicited by the will, and that it thus be in the will's power; and in this way too grace is required for enjoyment, so as to be elicited actively by the will; but to have formally from God the act that is called merit, or the act that is called enjoyment, grace is not necessarily required; because grace is not the reason for receiving the form but the will itself is (and I say this about God's absolute power).

94. To the second argument [n.25] I say that its conclusion concerns having enjoyment elicitively not formally, because in order to cause the highest effect (according to the now established order of causes [n.87]), both partial

causes must have the highest perfection; it is not so for passive reception of the highest form, which form can be immediately caused by God in a passive subject without the prior perfection of that passive subject, or without any partial second cause.

Fourteenth Distinction

Question One

Whether it was possible for the Intellect of Christ's Soul to be first and immediately Perfected by the Most Perfect Vision of the Word possible for a Creature

1. About the fourteenth distinction I ask^a whether it was possible for the intellect of Christ's soul to be first at once and directly perfected by the most perfect vision of the Word possible for a creature.

a. [Interpolation] About the fourteenth distinction, where the Master treats of the perfections [Christ] assumed with human nature in contrast to the perfection of the divine nature, four questions are asked: first whether it was possible for the intellect of Christ's soul to be first at once and directly perfected by the most perfect vision of the Word possible for a creature; second, whether it was possible for the intellect of Christ's soul to see in the Word everything that the Word himself sees; third, whether Christ's soul knew everything in its proper genus; fourth whether Christ's soul knew everything in its proper genus most perfectly. Argument about the first.

2. That it was not:

Augustine 83 *Questions* q.32 says, “It is not to be doubted that no one can understand the same thing more than another can.” His reason for this is that “anyone who understands a thing other than the thing is errs, – and everyone who errs does not understand that about which he errs; therefore, anyone who understands a thing other than it is does not understand it. Nothing then can be understood if it is not understood as it is.” From this the conclusion above stated follows. Therefore, the intellect of Christ's soul cannot see the Word more perfectly than any other soul can.

3. Further, if it could most perfectly see the Word, then it could see the Word under the idea of infinity, because for everything visible not taken under the idea of infinity there is something more perfect that can be seen. The consequent is false, because ‘the object specifies the act’ (cf. Aristotle *On the Soul* 2.4.415a18-21), and so a created vision of the object would be of it under the idea of infinity and an uncreated vision of the object is of it according to the same idea; therefore the two visions would belong to the same species; and then similarly the intellect of Christ's soul would comprehend the Word, for it would see the Word according to the whole idea of the Word's visibility – which is unacceptable.

4. Further every vision requires a light proportional to it naturally prior to the vision itself; therefore, just as natural vision requires a natural light other than vision and prior to it, so supernatural vision requires a supernatural light other than vision and prior to it – and thus supernatural vision cannot be the first perfection of the one who is seeing.

5. Further, a perfect natural act is elicited by a habit, because it is not as perfect when it precedes the habit as when it follows it, according to the Philosopher in *Ethics* 2.1.1103a26-b22; therefore, the most perfect supernatural act also presupposes the supernatural habit (the consequence is proved by way of similarity); and thus the most perfect supernatural act cannot be the first perfection of the intellect.

6. To the contrary is the Master in the text.

7. Besides, the highest enjoyment presupposes the highest vision; Christ's soul was able to enjoy the highest enjoyment possible for a creature (from d.13 nn.80-81); therefore etc.

8. And that it could have been immediately perfected by the vision of the Word is proved by the fact that any passive power can be immediately perfected by the act to which it is in immediate potency; therefore the intellect or the intellective power can be perfected immediately by the act of understanding, and thus without any necessary intermediary.

Question Two

Whether it was possible for the Intellect of Christ's Soul to See in the Word Everything that the Word Sees

9. Second I ask whether it was possible for the intellect of Christ's soul to see everything in the Word that the Word sees.

10. That it was not:

Because then it would be able to see infinites; the consequent is false, for 'it is not possible to traverse infinites' (*Metaphysics* 2.2.994b29-31).

11. Further, the illumining of the good angels happens in ordered fashion, as is plain from Dionysius (*Celestial Hierarchy* ch.7); therefore, just as a higher angel is illumined before a lower one, so a higher angel is illumined before the soul of Christ is, which is lowest [sc. with respect to the angels], and a higher angel can illumine this soul as someone blessed who is higher illumines someone blessed who is lower; therefore the soul of Christ can see something new in the Word just as the angel illuminating it can, because the one illumined does not see things in the Word before the one illuminating does.

12. A confirmation of the argument is that the soul of Christ possesses, as to its being illumined, a certain order among illumined spirits; but it does not illumine the angels, for it does not have an active power with respect to them, since it is of a lower nature; therefore, it is illumined by them – which is the conclusion intended.

13. Again, where there are two dimensions, what is adequate to one dimension can be said to be equal to it even though it is not adequate to the other,

otherwise a thing could not be at the same time both double and sub-double; therefore, if the soul of Christ knows all the knowable things that God does, it can be said to be simply equal to God; again, if it knows everything that God does, then it can do everything that God does!

14. To the contrary:

The Master in the text ch.2 says that the intellect of Christ's soul sees everything that the Word sees.

I. To the First Question

15. There are two articles in the first question: first whether the intellect of Christ's soul can be perfected with the most perfect vision of the Word; second whether it can be thus perfected first and immediately, without any form perfecting it beforehand.

A. It is Possible that Christ's Soul is able to be Perfected with the Most Perfect Vision of the Word

16. To the first article of the first question one can answer yes for the same reason that, in d.13 n.47, I gave for Christ's will being able to have the highest charity; and its having it in fact is just as likely.

17. There is a confirmation from Isidore *On the Highest Good or Opinions* 1, that "The Trinity is known to itself and to the man who was assumed," and this cannot be understood save of knowledge in the ultimate state, whether simply so or the ultimate possible for a creature.

B. The Intellect of Christ's Soul can be Perfected First and Immediately with the Most Perfect Vision of the Word

18. As to the second article, it can be said that insofar as the intellect has the idea of receptivity with respect to vision, no other form needs to be received beforehand in order for vision to be received in the intellect

19. Proof of the first proposition [n.18]:

If another form is posited, the object is not present unless, in absolute freedom, it represents itself, for the form cannot be a necessary reason for the object to be present as something seen, because "if he wishes he is seen; if he does not wish he is not seen" [Ambrose, on *Luke* 1 n.24]; also, when the form is not posited, the object can voluntarily impress itself on the intellect, and do so by actually causing vision in the intellect; therefore etc.

20. Further, if some form were necessarily in the intellect prior to vision, let it be called *a*: then *a* is related to vision either under the idea of efficient cause, or under the idea of material cause as that which properly receives vision (the way that the surface of a body is related to color, because surface is what properly receives color):

21. But if *a* is related in the first way [as efficient cause; Aquinas], then vision could be present in the intellect without *a*, for whatever God can do by an

intermediate efficient cause he can do immediately as well, and do so as to anything that is receptive of vision.

22. If *a* is related in the second way [as material cause; Bonaventure], then it cannot be posited as something necessary for what is being proposed:

First because then the intellect, as it is some part of the soul, would receive blessedness in *a*, for matter that is receptive of many forms is immediately brought to rest when it has the most perfect form of which it is capable; the case here is of this sort, for the intellect cannot of itself receive other forms save through this form (just as a substance would receive blessedness in its surface if it could not of itself receive *per se* another form); and so the intellect, as it is some part of the soul, would be naturally at rest before the vision of the Word was present in it – which is impossible.

23. Second because if something absolute, which is the idea of receiving some form, exists *per se*, it can receive *per se* (as a surface, if it *per se* exists, can *per se* receive color); therefore if *a* is a something absolute other than vision and is the reason for receiving vision, and if it existed *per se*, it could *per se* receive vision, and thus, as existing *per se*, it could be beatified by vision – and consequently even now it would be immediately beatified; the consequence would also follow that the intellect would not be beatified now save *per accidens* (just as substance, as regards its passive potency, would be at rest *per accidens* in a color able to exist in its surface).

24. If, however, it be said that the whole, namely the intellect informed by *a*, would be *per se* beatified by vision [Bonaventure] – on the contrary: of one *per se* act there is one *per se* power (*Metaphysics* 8.6.1045b17-19), so of this one act, namely *per se* vision, the potency is not a *per accidens* whole; therefore the second [sc. the *a* by itself] will precisely be the proper and immediate reason for receiving vision; and so, as proved by the first two reasons [nn.19, 20-23], the intended conclusion follows.

25. Therefore it can be said that the intellect of Christ's soul can passively receive the vision of the Word first and immediately [sc. without any preceding light or habit, nn.26-27]:

26. And such that it is not perfected first by some light as by an absolute form other than vision:

First because vision is perfect light; for, in the case of natural understanding, a light preceding vision is required due to the imperfection of the object, either because the intelligible thing is not actual of itself but through the agent intellect (which is the light whereby what is potentially intelligible becomes actually intelligible), or because, if it is actually intelligible, it is not sufficient of itself to move the intellect to second act. Neither of these is found in the present case because the divine essence is of itself supreme light and is intelligible in itself and is of itself most perfectly a mover of the intellect; therefore, no light to cooperate with it is required; for the more an object possesses the idea and perfection of a light able to cooperate with it, the less it needs it; therefore an object possessing altogether perfectly in itself a light of a nature to cooperate with it does not at all require light.

27. Similarly, no habit prior to vision itself is required for receiving vision, for a habit does not dispose a power to receive act but rather act is of a nature to be received first before the habit is. However, because an acquired habit in us has this perfection (because it is immanent in the soul as such when there is second transient act), the intellect, which cannot have the most perfection knowledge of several objects at once (for it is not in act), has a permanent knowledge of them at least in the way it is able to, and so it has this knowledge in habit; but if some act were of its nature as permanent in act as the habit with respect to it is, there would be no need to posit a habit, for such an act would have the perfection of both first and second act. But the beatific vision is of its nature a form as permanent in the intellect as is the habit that is posited as prior to it; for both always persist through the perpetual presence of the beatific object, and neither could persist otherwise.

28. And if an objection be raised against this, that then the intellect could see the Word by its purely natural powers, for it could do so without the light of glory and without a habit preceding vision – I respond according to your own statement, and say that this conclusion seems in some way to follow if one posits a light or habit preceding vision such that it is a necessary or sufficient reason for vision; for although a blind man may be given light miraculously, nevertheless he is not then seeing naturally, because he has a created form [sc. eyes] for the natural use of that operation. Thus, if some habit is supernaturally given to the intellect through which, when given, the intellect can, as through a sufficient form, see God, then, since this habit is something created and perfects the intellect naturally, the result would be that one could see God naturally through some created form. But this result would not follow if one denied such a disposition or preceding light (whether it is called a light or habit I care not), because in each instant naturally prior to the vision there is no cause naturally prior to it; for up to the instant of nature when the intellect sees, a created intellect does not have in itself power for that vision, but all that precedes is the intellect itself in itself, and the object – which object has the power to elicit the vision, and is not a moving power naturally proportioned to the created intellect, and is not of a nature to move it naturally.

29. Next to the form of the argument [n.28]: the conclusion does not follow save as to the fact that the intellect of Christ's soul could naturally see the Word; but it does not follow that the vision could be in that intellect by its natural powers or by some natural cause; for it can only be made present by the Word immediately causing it, and when the Word causes he causes supernaturally. And to say this is the same as to say that the intellect of Christ's soul could formally or receptively see the Word by its natural powers, but not that it could effect or elicit seeing the Word by its natural powers.

30. But if it be asked whether a created intellect without such a habit or light (let it be called *a*) could be disposed for such vision not only passively but also actively so as to elicit it, and to elicit it as perfectly as when it has *a*, I reply: Take the supposition that the intellect could be disposed actively with respect to the vision of the Word (which supposition was made above, n.21). Then, just as the intellect is actively disposed with respect to natural vision (namely insofar as the intellect is beatified in the same power, nn.26-27, and insofar as it is the

principle of natural intellection, and thus insofar as its way of operating with respect to both objects is the same), one can, on the basis of the above supposition, say what was said to the fourth question of the preceding question, namely that if there is a necessary connection of second causes [d.13 n.84] one must say about the intellect what was said there about the will [d.13 n.85]. But as to the receiving of the vision, which the question here is about, there seems to be no simple necessity to concede that *a* must perfect the intellect first before vision; but if the intellect can receive two perfections in order, namely *a* as first act and vision as second act, then it is fitting that intellect and vision should be perfected in the same order, even though either perfection could, absolutely, be present without the other.

C. To the Principal Arguments

31. To the first argument [n.2] I say that the statement of Augustine can be explained through the remark at *Physics* 2.2.193b35 that “there is no falsehood when people abstract,” for someone who abstracts does not understand the thing to be other than it is but understands the thing in a way other than the way it is; so that the otherness in abstraction determines his understanding or states the way he understands, but it does not determine the object or state the manner of the object. Thus, in the matter at hand Augustine’s first proposition, ‘anyone who understands a thing other than the thing is errs’, is not true unless the ‘other than’ determines the object, namely the implicit being of it, and the sense is ‘anyone who understands a *thing* other than the *thing* is errs’. Then Augustine’s conclusion follows, for the same object, taken according to altogether the same idea of it as object, is not understood more by one person than another, because the ‘more’ here determines the object; and this is enough for Augustine’s conclusion. For therefrom follows that understandings do not proceed to infinity but that there is some supreme understanding; because if the object, on its part, is infinite it cannot be understood in different ways, and some understanding can exist that is adequate to an intelligible according to its intelligibility; and so, by parity of reasoning, another understanding, under the first intelligible, can be adequate to it; therefore too there will be some supreme understanding.

32. To the second [n.3]: although some deny that an object under the idea of the infinite is seen by any created intellect, that is, seen absolutely, and although they also concede that the infinite is concomitantly seen non-formally, yet I concede (as was touched on in *Ord. I* d.2 nn.130, 136, 138) that only something taken under the idea of the infinite can formally give rest to the intellect. I mean that if it is not formally but concomitantly apprehended under the idea of the infinite, it would not give rest to the apprehending power more than some other finite concomitant intelligible would (for infinity, as concomitantly compared to the apprehending power, is accidental to that power). It is like a triangle which, if it is compared to the intellect only as triangle and the concomitant color is not apprehended *per se*, does not give rest to the intellect more when white than when black. So too the divine essence only gives rest to the intellect as it is seen, and as it is existent in three supposita; and this fact, namely

that the same numerical essence exists in three supposita, only belongs to the divine essence by reason of its infinity; therefore etc.

33. And then next to the two proofs to the contrary [n.3]:

To the first I say that although an object distinct in species proves a distinction in species of the act, it does not do so formally (for the object is not the form of any act) but causally, for a preceding cause that is an essentially necessary requisite establishes, insofar as it is distinct, a distinction in the thing caused. However, the specific unity of an object does not establish a unity in species of act, for the same object is the object of every blest intellect and also of every blest will, but volition is not of the same species as intellection. These acts then can be formally distinguished although they do not have objects that are formally distinct; and they can be distinguished formally otherwise than by their objects, because they can be distinguished by their power as well as by their essential causes; and so, given that they would not get distinction from an object that is not distinct in species, yet they are specifically distinguished by some other partial cause.

34. Nor does the Philosopher in *On the Soul* 2.4.415a18-21 say that acts get unity from the unity of the object but rather they get distinction unless some object is so adequately related to the act that it would neither exceed nor could exceed it (as perhaps is the case in respect of its own act); it is not so in the issue at hand. There is an example in the case of motion and its term, for a distinction in the term of motion proves a distinction in the motion, insofar as motion is a flowing form, provided that the flowing form is of the same idea as the form that terminates the motion; but it is not necessary that the unity of the term of the motion prove a unity of the motion, because the same ‘where’ can altogether be reached by motions diverse in species, as by circular and by straight motion, and these motions are not comparable according to the Philosopher *Physics* 7.4.248a10-15.

35. To the second proof [n.3] I say that Augustine in *City of God* 12.18/19 says that “whatever is comprehended by science reaches its end in the knowledge of the knower” – which remark is not to be understood as that it absolutely reaches its end (for then God would not comprehend himself endlessly), but that it reaches its end in the knower, because it is disposed in respect of the knower as if it reached its end. Briefly, however, the only intellect that comprehends an intelligible is one whose perfection in intellectuality and in understanding is as great as is the intelligible’s perfection or intelligibility in being able to be understood; which is why there is a commensuration and adequation between them. For this reason, indeed, neither of them exceeds the other, so each, as it were, reaches its end in the other; for they are simply adequate to each other. It is like the way that, because of the equality of the divine persons, each person could be said to reach his end in another person because not exceeding the other person, though each person is simply infinite. Therefore, because no created intellect is able to have as much intellectuality, whether in first act or in second act, as is the intelligibility of God (on the contrary, the created intellectuality that was supposed to be commensurate with this intelligible in its intelligibility would have

to go on being more perfect infinitely), so no created intellect can comprehend God, even though it see whatever, on the part of God, can be seen.

36. To the third argument [n.4] I say that light is required, but not a light different from the object when the object sufficiently supplies the place of light. For the fact that, in the case of natural understanding, the light is different from the object is because of the imperfection of the object; and so, in suchlike cases, no likeness can be drawn from plurality in things imperfect to a plurality in things perfect, for things dispersed in inferiors are sometimes united in superiors, and especially in a supreme that contains all things in one.

37. To the fourth argument [n.5] response can be made in the same way [n.36], because the likeness does not obtain between a natural and a supernatural act.

38. However one can reply in another way that the most perfect act of cognition can be elicited from a power without a preceding habit; for the intellect can most perfectly know the quiddities of the terms before any act of combining them and putting them together in a proposition, and of proving, from the ideas of these quiddities, the truth of the principle proposed in the proposition. For, as the Philosopher says in *Posterior Analytics* 1.3.72b24-25, “we know the principles insofar as we know the terms.” So assent is given to the principle and its terms before any generation of a habit. Although the habit follows such assent, the habit is also in some way necessary for the perfection of our nature, for knowledge of a principle could not in any way remain in us after the act ceased unless the habit of the principle remained – and thus would someone, after understanding the principle, be as much in essential potency to understanding as he was before.

39. The like can be said of the science of conclusions. For when the principles have been understood and from them has been inferred, by a perfect syllogism, a conclusion that is evident from the principles (according to the definition of perfect syllogism in *Prior Analytics* 1.1.24b22-24, that “nothing is needed for the necessity of it to be apparent,” that is, for it to be evidently necessary through knowledge of the principles and through the evidence of the inference), then the conclusion is necessarily assented to. Thus there is first an act of knowing about the conclusion and therefrom science about it follows, which is the habit of the conclusion – and so a habit is not presupposed to perfect act, but follows it and presupposes it [cf. *Ord. Prol.* n.9].

II. To the Second Question

A. First Opinion

1. Exposition of the Opinion

40. To the second question the response is made [Aquinas] that the intellect of Christ’s soul cannot see everything that the Word sees. The reason is that the more perfectly a cause is seen the greater is the number of effects seen in it and conversely, as is plain about principle and conclusion; for the more perfectly a principle is seen the greater is the number of conclusions seen in it; so he who can see all the effects in a cause can comprehend the cause. No created intellect can do the latter; therefore not the former either.

41. A distinction is therefore drawn in God's knowledge, one sort being that of simple apprehension, which concerns possibles, whether these are going to exist in some part of time or not thus going to exist, and another sort being that of vision, which is only of things having existence in some part of time. Everything that is known by the knowledge of vision is posited as known by the soul of Christ in the Word, but not everything that is known by the knowledge of simple apprehension.

2. Rejection of the Opinion

42. Against the reasoning of this position I argue as follows:

If b, c, d belong to a in a certain order such that b is the whole reason for c , then if he who understands b does not comprehend a , much less would he who does not understand c comprehend a . An example about subject, definition, and property: if he who understands the definition does not comprehend the subject, then he who does not understand the property would not understand the subject; or let a prior property be taken for the middle term, and let a more remote property be taken for the third term (which more remote property is present in the subject by reason of the prior property) – in this case the intended proposition is plain. But the properties of ‘being intensively infinite’ and of ‘being that to which infinite possibles are somehow reduced’ are related to God in an ordered way, such that it is because God is intensively infinite that infinite possibles are reflected in him and that he has power for infinite possibles, and not conversely. But someone who knows God under the idea of the intensively infinite does not for this reason comprehend God (from what was said in the preceding question, n.35); therefore, much less does someone who knows the infinites that are reflected in God, or who knows God’s infinite effects, comprehend God.

43. Besides, he who knows one effect in the Word does not comprehend the Word, nor does he comprehend the Word as cause of it; therefore, no matter how many effects he knows, he does not comprehend any of them, nor the Word as cause of any of them – and so, much less does he simply comprehend the Word even if he knows all the effects.

44. Further, the example about principle and conclusion [n.40] takes up something false: for a cause, qua cause, receives no perfection from the caused, for it is naturally prior to it; therefore knowledge of the principle, as it is cause of knowledge of the conclusion, is in no way perfected by knowledge of the conclusion.

45. Confirmation of the argument [n.44]: let some principle be taken as it is in some degree known; I ask whether some conclusion can be known through it such that precisely this knowledge [of the principle] stays in the intellect without increase or not without increase. If the first, then the proposition intended here is gained, that he who knows the conclusion does not know the principle more perfectly – and as this holds of one conclusion so it holds of any conclusion at all that is included in the principle. If the second, then this principle, as known in this degree, is not the principle, because it is [as thus known] not the principle of any

conclusion – which is false; again, there would be a circle of causality [in knowing] between principle and conclusion.

46. There is also confirmation from the Philosopher in *Posterior Analytics* 1.1.71a11-16, where he holds that one must know not only the ‘what it is’ of the subject but also the ‘why’ of the property and predicate. And his reason is that the whole idea of science is contained virtually in the whatness of the subject, and that in no way is knowledge of the ‘what it is’ of the subject acquired by the demonstration but is totally presupposed to it, and that what is acquired by the demonstration is only knowledge of the inherence of the properties in the subject; and so the upshot is that, as regard knowledge of the conclusion with respect to the principle, knowledge of the principle, the ‘what it is’, is altogether presupposed to the demonstration, and that it in no way becomes more perfect through the demonstration.

47. To the argument then [n.40] one can say that there is a fallacy of the consequent in the arguing; for although he who more perfectly knows the cause more perfectly knows the effect, and so can know more things when the cause more perfectly represents the things caused, yet it is not, conversely, the case that when he knows more effects he then more perfectly knows the cause; for knowledge of the principle can stand in itself without being increased by the greater number of conclusions elicited from it. And can one also say the same about a cause and the several effects known from it.

48. As to the distinction which is used to solve the question about the two kinds of knowledge, namely knowledge of vision and of simple apprehension [n.41], I argue against it because the soul of Christ can apprehend in the Word any never-to-be future possible; therefore his soul has precisely no term set down for its knowledge of what God knows by the knowledge of vision. The proof of the assumption is that it is also likely that other souls will see in the Word, and see distinctly, that he can create things he does not create; so much more will Christ’s soul be able to see in the Word any of the possibles.

49. Further, it can be that his soul sees in the Word some possible in a relation of one thing to another; so, in order to avoid infinity, it is necessary to fix a term other than by inclusion of actuals and exclusion of possibles.

B. Second Opinion

1. Exposition of the Opinion

50. Another response [Bonaventure] to the question is the distinction that the intellect of Christ’s soul is able to see everything in the Word habitually but not actually (and so about all souls).

51. Proof of the second part [the ‘not actually’]:

Infinite virtue does not have power for more than infinite objects; so if a finite virtue has power for infinite objects then a finite virtue would be equal with an infinite one, which is unacceptable; therefore etc.

52. Further, a finite virtue sees two things more distinctly than three things, and three things more distinctly than four and, thus continuing upwards, it sees a thousand things less distinctly than it sees a hundred; therefore, thus continuing

infinitely, it sees more things less distinctly than it sees fewer things; but to see finite things ad infinitum more distinctly than some infinite limit is not to see; therefore etc.

53. Further, third, an extensive infinity presupposes an intensive infinity, according to Averroes *On the Substance of the Globe* ch.3; Christ's soul cannot have an intensive infinity, since it is a creature and something finite; therefore it cannot have an extensive infinity for infinite objects.

2. Rejection of the Opinion

54. Against this opinion.

And first against the first part of the position, about habit [n.50]; if the sense is that a single habit is the reason for understanding infinite objects, this seems impossible (and this for the opinion's own reasons); for then it would follow that such a habit is intensively infinite, as was proved in 2 d.3 nn.367-377 about the habit that some posit in angels which, as to itself, is representative of infinite objects.

55. But if you say that there are founded on this habit infinite respects to infinite objects, and that this could be without infinity in the foundation – against this the argument is that then, accordingly, the second member contradicts the first [n.50]; for the habit is hereby posited as founding infinite respects without an infinity in the foundation itself following on; therefore, by similarity, there is nothing unacceptable in some act being actually of infinite things through infinite respects to infinite things, and yet the act not being in itself infinite.

56. The point about respects [n.55] also does not hold, because some respects can be founded on a same thing and others not; for if there were an infinite number of whitenesses, an infinite number of likenesses would be founded on the nature of whiteness, because the very unity of the nature of whiteness (which is the proximate idea for the foundation of the likeness) would be, as concerns itself, in infinite things; but relations to what is essentially posterior [sc. the habit] cannot be infinite in relation to what is essentially prior [sc. the objects], especially when the priority is one of perfection (namely the perfection of efficient or final causality), because the more that something can be such a cause of many things at the same time, the more perfect it is; and so, if it can be of infinites at the same time, it can at the same time be in infinites [sc. if the habit can be of infinite objects, the habit must be infinite]. Such is the relation of a habit to an object known in first act, for the object is the idea in which the habit first has being.

57. Further, I prove that the second member contradicts the first [n.50] because every single habit in a single intellect can have an act or acts adequate to the habit or to the intellect where the habit is, for every finite total cause can be understood to have an adequate effect or effects. This single adequate effect, if posited, will be single for all objects (or several effects will be if several are posited), for the habit is posited to be for all the effects in first act, and so the second act will also be for all effects. Thus, either the habit is infinite, which is what is proposed on one side, and then an actual infinity follows just as does an

habitual infinity. Or the single act, or several acts, which would be of infinite objects, would not be infinite, which is what is proposed on the other side, and then the finite habit would not be an infinity, for from a finite total cause an adequate infinite effect or effects cannot follow.

C. Scotus' own Opinion

1. The Soul of Christ sees Everything in the Word Actually

58. In a third way one can say that Christ's soul does see actually in the Word everything that the Word sees.

59. The explanation is that any intellect is receptive of knowledge of any object, because it is receptive of the whole of being, and consequently it has a natural desire for any intelligible whatever; and if it knows anything whatever, if is therein naturally perfected. And what I say of knowledge I say also of seeing things in the Word, because that vision is the most perfect knowledge of an object that can be had. Therefore any intellect is receptive of the vision of anything whatever in the Word, and I mean this divisively, or one by one. Therefore any intellect is also receptive conjunctively of many visions at once in the Word as to all objects.

60. Proof of the consequence [n.59]: anything can be in anything; for if two things, since they are not opposed, can be present together in something, then infinite such things can be together in the same thing, because the reason for the impossibility or incompossibility of infinite things is no different from the reason for that of two things; for any of them can be per se present and any of them can be present together in something, because they are not opposed; and as many as you like can be present together, because no new impossibility follows from the fact that the number of things that inhere is larger; and thus the conclusion follows. Such is how it is in the case of the proposed conclusion here, for just as the seeing of an object in the Word can exist in Christ's soul, so can the seeing of two objects at once, for these objects are not repugnant; otherwise Christ's soul could not see in the Word both its own blessedness and some other thing. And so, since his soul always sees its own blessedness in the Word, it could never see anything else. Therefore no number of objects posits either a new impossibility (as is plain) or a new opposition, because if there were an opposition it would be of one thing to another in respect of any intellect.

61. Nor is the infinity in question here incompossible with a created intellect. The proof is that something receptive, according to the strict idea of the receptive, is not more perfect in itself if it is in act with respect to its powers than if it is in potency with respect to its acts. The thing is clear because acts are outside the idea of the receptive (as is plain in the case of matter and form); therefore the intellect is not proved to be more perfect if it is in act according to all its passive powers than when it is in potency to the acts. But, as it is, the intellect is in potency to an infinite number of visions, for it is plain that it is, of its nature, in potency to any act and at the same time in potency to all of them; therefore if it were in act according to all those acts, a greater infinity would not follow then than now.

62. But if you say that it is not capable of all of them at once, then this is false, because it is in potency to all of them at once; therefore it can have all of them at once in act, for there is no opposition between the acts, and they do not require in the receptive thing anything repugnant to them.

63. Further, as will be said in the next question [nn.107-108], if Christ's soul knows all singulars in their proper genus, that is, through their proper species, then also through infinite species, for the singulars can be infinite. But an infinity of visions is not more repugnant to the intellect than an infinity of intelligible species, because although the visions are in some way more perfect than the species they yet do not require a different idea in what is receptive of them.

64. A confirmation of this opinion [n.58], that it is in fact so, comes from Augustine *On the Trinity* 15.16 n.26, that "perhaps there will be no thoughts still wanted there." For although this be doubtful about the blessed generally, yet about Christ's soul, as being the most blessed, it seems probable that it will not have such thoughts; therefore whatever it knows habitually it can know actually.

65. There is a confirmation from Damascene ch.67/65, who says that Christ's soul had foreknowledge of future contingents; this knowledge does not seem to be merely habitual, because future contingents, as it seems, are not of a nature to be known save intuitively, whether in themselves or in the Word.

66. Likewise, second act is more perfect than first act [sc. than habit], and so the first act would be more perfect if Christ's soul knew that it was seeing everything actually than if it knew habitually; therefore one must show the impossibility of Christ's soul seeing everything actually in order for this perfection to be lacking to it. So if the reasons adduced to prove this impossibility [nn.40-41, 51-53] can be solved, then it seems that the opposite of them should be held to be more probable.

67. Again, the act of glory does not seem to suffer interruption, and so it is not sometimes about one thing and sometimes about another; therefore it is about all them at once, and is so actually.

68. This opinion [nn.58, 67] could be stated in two ways:

In one way that Christ's soul would have a single vision of the Word as primary object and of all that shines out in the Word as second objects, to which second objects it would not have distinct relations; nor for this reason would there follow an infinity in the act founding those relations, because they would only exist in potency. And in this way no infinity is posited in the act, because the object does not have actual existence.

69. In another way that there would be a vision proper to any object, such that infinite visions would be received in the intellect at once from the Word as cause. And according to this second way one would have to posit that some infinites exist – which seems to contradict many authorities of Aristotle and the saints.

70. If the first way is taken [n.68], it would not follow for this reason that the vision is formally infinite (the way the divine vision is), for it would not comprehend the first object or the secondary objects, nor would there follow from its perfection that it was of the secondary objects, but, given that it was only of the first object, it could be the same act (it is otherwise in the case of the divine vision

with respect to itself and other things, for the divine vision is by its perfection necessarily of those other things).

2. A Doubt about Scotus' Opinion

71. But given that Christ's soul could receive a single vision with respect to infinites, or could receive infinite visions, there is a doubt whether as regards those infinite visions, if they exist, or as regards the single one, if it is in respect to infinites, a created intellect could have the idea of elicitive principle.

72. And it seems that it could, because the intellect elicits understanding as it is naturally prior to understanding; but by the fact that some understanding is elicited nothing is lost to the intellect of the perfection that belongs to it as it is naturally prior to understanding; therefore by the eliciting of one understanding its power of eliciting another is not taken away.

73. This reasoning [n.72] is confirmed, because it could elicit any of the infinite visions or understandings just as it could elicit some single one, even though it did not then elicit it; but even if it did elicit one, it remains in itself just as perfect insofar as it can elicit another; therefore it can elicit some single one.

74. But the contrary also appears to be the case, because any finite active virtue can have some effect intensively adequate to it, or several effects extensively adequate to it, and be unable to cause many at the same time; therefore no created intellect can elicit an infinite number of visions at the same time.

75. And then, in response to the first argument, about the priority of the elicitive principle to the effect [n.72], one should say that something prior can have several additional things posterior to it which it cannot elicit at the same time; and so, although nothing from it insofar as it is prior is taken from it by the fact that it causes one of the posteriors, yet it cannot at the same time cause any number at all of the posteriors.

D. How the Second Opinion could be Sustained

76. If this third way is not found pleasing, nor that Christ's soul sees infinites elicitively (whether by receiving infinite visions of infinites or by receiving one vision of infinites [n.71-75]), one can say that it sees everything habitually in the Word but not actually [n.50] by explaining the distinction in this way: It sees the Word by some act or habit, and through the act all things shine forth in the Word as present in first act, and so are known to it habitually; for, speaking generally, that is said to be known habitually for which the habit is a sufficiently ostensive first act. There is not therefore any single habit in Christ's soul which, by its single idea, displays infinite objects; rather that by which the soul sees the Word first is a first act by which shine forth for it all that shines in the Word – and this because the Word is an object manifest to it, and a willing mirror representing all things.

77. Let the second member [sc. 'not actually', nn.76, 50] be conceded – and what we find express in us declares in its favor, that attention directed to

many objects is less perfect; and so it seems impossible for a finite power to see infinite objects at the same time with perfect attention.

78. Likewise, if Christ's soul were to see infinites actually, the perfection of his soul would infinitely exceed the perfection of other souls, which seems unacceptable.

79. In favor of this can be adduced Avicenna's remark (*On the Soul* part 4 ch.2) that 'there is in the wisdom of the Creator no hiddenness save according to what can be received', for although the Word, as willingly showing everything, is willingly present to Christ's soul, yet that soul cannot receive everything at once but each singular one by one; and so Christ's soul can see one thing after another as regards any of the numerically infinite things it turns itself toward. The result then is that it does not know everything [sc. actually], because all the things successively received are infinite.

80. And if it is objected that any blessed can in this way see anything in the Word non-simultaneously, I reply that for any other blessed the Word is a mirror representing a determinate number of things beyond which such soul cannot want, in ordered way, to see other things. But for Christ's soul the Word is a mirror representing everything, and so this soul can want, in ordered way, to see as many of the infinite things as it has immediate power for seeing, just as if they were present to it through its own habit or through some known first act that could be called a habit.

E. To the Principal Arguments

81. To the principal arguments.

To the first [n.10], it is plain that Christ's soul can know infinites.

82. To the second [n.11], I say that although the illuminings happen in ordered fashion, yet not according to the order of natures but according to the order of graces; so the illuminings happen first to Christ's soul, and by this soul are the angels illumined.

83. And when, in confirmation of this reasoning, the argument is made that the soul does not have an active power etc. [n.12], I say that, as concerns the action whereby a creature is said to illumine a creature, a rational soul is said to illumine an angel and conversely, for in the fatherland the souls of the blessed will have the same way of speaking to others as the angels also have; and so if some truth in the Word is revealed first to some soul before to an angel, that soul will be able to reveal it to an angel, and accordingly can illumine the angel, just as an angel can illumine a soul if another truth were revealed to the angel first.

84. To the argument about the proportion of cause to effect, of principle to conclusions [nn.13, 40], the answer is plain in the disproof of that opinion [nn.43-47].

F. To the Arguments for the Second Opinion

85. To the arguments for the second opinion, which prove that Christ's soul cannot see infinites.

To the first [n.51], when it is said that an infinite virtue does not have more power than for seeing infinites, I say that this is not true; for although it does not have power extensively for more than infinite things, yet it has more power intensively and can see more perfectly than any finite virtue; for its act would be more intense according to the proportion and greater virtue of the power.

86. To the next [n.52], when it is said that what sees things ad infinitum would see finite things more distinctly, it can be said that ‘to see more indistinctly ad infinitum in respect of more things’ is not necessarily the case on the part of the intellect as it is receptive, because it could receive from the object visions as distinct of more things as of fewer things. But the indistinctness [of vision] does hold of the intellect as it is efficient cause, and so, if the argument were valid, it would only prove that the intellect has no elicitive power with respect to infinite visions seen distinctly.

87. But it can be said that the argument does not even prove this, for although in fact the intellect in us understands more things less distinctly than fewer things, yet this does not hold of it as it is prior to the elicited act but it follows from something concomitant, namely from its state [sc. the fallen state of human nature, n.123]; and this state need not be posited of Christ’s intellect.

88. To the third argument [n.53] I say that ‘an extensive infinity that extends to infinite things as to receiving their forms’ does not prove an infinity of entity in the receiver (as is plain of prime matter, if it is receptive of infinite forms); on the contrary it proves rather the lowness of the entity; but ‘an extensive infinity that extends to infinite things as to effects it can cause at once’ does prove an intensive infinity, in that the manyness here does prove a greater perfection in that which extends to more things (but it does not prove it of something that is receptive and not causative).

89. But if one posits that the intellect is elicitive of infinite things [n.72], I still say that this infinity too does not prove intensive infinity of the intellect but rather of the object, for the object is principal in respect of the visions and is the principal active cause, but the intellect is not.

Question Three *Whether Christ’s Soul knows Everything in its own Proper Genus*

90. Third I ask whether Christ’s soul knows everything in its own proper genus.

91. That it does not.

Luke 2.52, “Jesus advanced in age and wisdom before God and men.”

92. But if this verse [n.91] is expounded as meaning he advanced in appearance, then to the contrary is Ambrose *On the Incarnation* ch.7 n.52 (and it is found in the text for the preceding question), where he concludes that there was some sense other than divine in Christ because according to some sense Christ advanced; but this proof would have no validity if it had to be understood only of Christ advancing in appearance, because wisdom according to the divine intellect could display more things [sc. if Christ advanced in wisdom in appearance, a

divine sense would be enough to explain the appearance, and no further sense would be required, contrary to Ambrose's reasoning].

93. Further, *Hebrews* 5.8, "He learnt obedience through the things he suffered."

94. Again, Christ was not only blessed and possessed of comprehensive vision but also a wayfarer; so he had the knowledge that belongs to a wayfarer, namely a knowledge arising from repeated acts (according to what is determined by the Philosopher in *Metaphysics* 1.1980b29-81a3 and *Posterior Analytics* 2.19.100a3-8); therefore etc.

95. Further, Christ was rational; therefore he had power for acts belonging to a rational nature as this nature is rational, which is to proceed from things known to things unknown, and so to learn by progressing through a knowledge of such unknown things in a discursive way.

96. On the contrary:

Christ had, according to the Master, no kind of ignorance, for Christ's assuming this deficiency was of no expedience for us.

97. Further, the angels know everything in its proper genus; therefore much more does Christ's soul, which (as was said before [n.26]) was perfect with the highest supernatural perfection and so, by parity of reasoning, with the highest possible natural perfection.

I. To the Question

A. First Opinion

1. Exposition of the Opinion

98. A distinction is drawn here [Aquinas] between infused knowledge and acquired knowledge.

99. And the statement is made that as to infused knowledge Christ's soul knew everything through certain principles infused into it (namely through intelligible species infused by God), and that, to this extent, it could not advance; but it could advance as to acquired knowledge.

100. The proof is that Christ's soul had a possible and agent intellect just as we do, and the proper operation of these intellects is to abstract intelligible species and take them in; so these powers in Christ's soul had this ability; but an intelligible species is either knowledge of an object or a necessary principle of knowing.

2. Rejection of the Opinion

101. Argument against this conclusion [n.99] is drawn from the statements of him who thinks it, because according to him 'two accidents of the same species cannot exist in the same thing'; but infused and acquired knowledge of the same thing in its proper genus are of the same species.

102. If it be said that they can be distinct in species, as 'morning' and 'evening' knowledge are distinct in species – on the contrary: knowledges are not distinguished into species by the intellect (according to those who hold this view),

nor according to the proper idea of the object, that is, as the object is present in itself and in the Word. Therefore the two knowledges, acquired evening knowledge and infused evening knowledge, must have the same object, and their difference is only as to their efficient causes (as in the case of a man created and a man generated naturally) – but such a distinction of causes does not distinguish the form itself of knowledge,^a according to Augustine, *Letters to Deogratias* q.1 n.4, and Ambrose, *On the Incarnation* ch.9 nn.102-105: ‘difference of origin does not produce difference of nature’, as is plain in the case of Adam and ourselves.

- a. [Interpolated note] for the object is the same; but the distinction is in the diverse means and principles of knowing, which are efficient causes of the distinction.

103. Further, against the conclusion in itself [n.99] I argue as follows: even if two knowledges of the same species could be in the same thing at the same time, yet two perfect knowledges of the same species and in accord with the same idea could not be; for either the object, to the extent it is knowable, would be known perfectly by either of the knowledges and then the other would be superfluous, or it would not be perfectly known and then neither knowledge would be perfect.

104. There is argument too against the reasoning for the conclusion [n.100], because then someone blessed, since he has an agent and a possible intellect, would be able to acquire knowledge; and the power too of growth and the other powers, which in the blessed will be of the same nature as they are in us, will be able to perform their acts; and so someone blessed is now able to grow, just as Adam too in the state of innocence could have grown.

103. From these instances and others like them it is plain that the proposition is false that ‘powers are, wherever they are, perfectly able to perform their acts’; for this proposition is true only of something imperfect that is in potency to the term of the actions of the powers; but if some agent anticipates those powers and induces the terms which the actions of those powers had the ability to attain, then those powers will not be able to act to attain those terms – not because of any imperfection in themselves but because of the positing of the term by the anticipating agent; nor for this reason should those powers be denied to exist in the nature of the thing, for they are perfections of the nature simply, whether they have reached the terms of their perfection through that nature or in some other way.

B. Second Opinion

106. But if another opinion here be held [Henry of Ghent], namely that Christ’s soul knows everything in habit, the way that a single habit is posited in angels as sufficient reason for having habitual knowledge of everything – then this opinion about Christ’s soul is refuted in the same way as it was refuted about angels, in Ord. 2 d.3 nn.355-363, 366-367, 400-407.

C. Scotus' own Opinion

107. In response to the question, then, it can be said that knowledge is twofold, namely abstractive and intuitive (the distinction was proved in *Ord. 2 d.3 n.321*); and by each kind of knowledge can one know both nature as it is prior to singularity and nature as it is a ‘this’.

1. On Abstractive Knowledge

108. To speak, then, of abstractive knowledge, that is, knowledge which is of an object, whether singular or universal, one can say that Christ’s soul has, through infused species, habitual knowledge of all universals or quiddities. For since this sort of knowledge is a mark of perfection in a created intellect –because a created intellect is passive with respect to any intelligible object (a created intellect does not have the perfection of all intelligibles in itself, and the lack of a perfection possible to it in respect of some object makes the intellect to be in some way imperfect) – it seems reasonable to attribute to Christ’s intellect the sort of perfection with respect to every intelligible that is attributed to angels. For such perfection is not repugnant to a created intellect, nor is it an imperfection in it, nor even is it incompossible with the perfection of the knowing in the Word which is posited as belonging to Christ’s soul, because, according to Augustine *Literal Commentary on Genesis* 4 ch.30/47, “there, in the creature’s knowledge taken in itself, it is always day, always evening.” Therefore knowledge in the Word and knowledge in its proper genus can stand together.

109. But by knowledge in this way, namely abstractive and habitual, Christ’s soul, on the one hand, either does not know all singulars in their proper idea – if, that is, it has infused species only of quiddities, for these are not principles of knowing singulars in their proper idea; for just as the universal does not state the whole entity of singulars, nor consequently their whole knowability, so neither is the proper principle for knowing the universal the proper principle for distinctly and properly knowing the singular. Or, on the other hand, if Christ’s soul is posited as knowing singulars abstractively and habitually (to the extent singulars are knowable by a created intellect), then one must concede that there is in Christ’s intellect a proper species for each singular, and so several species for the same species of thing, and even an infinite number of species for the infinite number of possible singulars.

110. But if someone thinks one should not attribute to Christ’s soul a confused knowledge of singulars, nor a distinct infinite knowledge through infinite species [n.109], he can say that this soul knows some singulars habitually and abstractively through infused proper species, and does not habitually know other singulars, though it can know them habitually if they come to exist in reality (in the way that was stated in *Ord. 2 d.9 nn.52, 97, 103* about the ability of angels to acquire knowledge of some objects through the action of their intellect about those objects). However, it is not necessary to posit that Christ’s soul knows quiddities and singulars at the same time actually; for actual knowledge of things in their proper genus is through the natural virtue of the intellect in itself, and a

finite intellect cannot, by its natural virtue, turn itself to any number whatever of distinctly perceived objects at the same time.

2. On Intuitive Knowledge

111. But to speak of the other sort of knowledge, namely intuitive knowledge, which is about natures or singulars as regards actual existence, I say that this knowledge is either perfect (which is the kind that is about an object as it is now present and existent), or imperfect (which is the kind that opinion about the future is, or memory about the past).

112. In the first way Christ's soul does not know everything in its proper genus in the Word, even by habit, because an object taken in this way is only knowable as it is actually present in itself, or in something in which it possesses being more perfectly than in itself; but a thing known in this way is not in its proper genus; so 'Peter's sitting down' would not then be of a nature to be known unless Peter's sitting down were in itself now present. Thus, since many objects neither were nor could have been present, as to their actual existence, to Christ's intellect, it will not be able to have intuitive knowledge of them.

113. And if it be said that it could have had knowledge of all existing things for any period of time through infused species [Aquinas], this is false: first because infused species represent an object as it is abstracted from actual existence (for they represent the object regardless of whether it is existing or not, and so they are not principles for knowing the existent as existent); second because truths that are knowable by intuitive knowledge of existents as they are existent, namely contingent truths, cannot be known by any sort of innate species at all; for from knowledge of the terms of contingent things the truth of contingent propositions about those terms cannot be known (because the truth of those propositions is not included in the terms the way the necessary truth of scientific propositions is included in the intelligible species and in their terms). So, because of truths knowable by intuitive knowledge (which are contingent truths about existents as they are existent), and because of actually knowing these existents as they are in themselves, one has to have the objects present in themselves so that they may be intuitively known and seen in themselves; and this is only possible about things in their proper genus if the very things are in themselves present in their proper existence.

114. And this intuitive knowledge of things in their proper genus, actual or habitual, could be given to Christ's soul about everything. And to this extent one must say that it advanced as do other souls, and that it comes in some way to know other objects.

115. But as to imperfect intuitive knowledge, of which sort is opinion about the future and memory of the past [n.111], which is what remains from perfect intuitive knowledge – I say that because many experiences and memories of many such things, since these things were perfectly intuitively known, remain in the intellect, and by them the objects can (as regard the conditions of their existence) be known as they are present and not as they are past – and I say this because Christ's soul knows them in their proper genus in this way as well.

116. And if the objection be made that what is left from a present thing is only the intelligible species impressed on the intellect and the imaginative species impressed on the sensitive faculty (as it is imaginable virtually) – I say that this is false, because what is left from a present thing is not only the intelligible species in the intellect (whereby the thing is known without any reference to time), but also another species in the power of memory. And these powers know the object in different ways: one knows the object as it exists in its presence, the other knows it as apprehended in the past, such that the apprehension of the past is the immediate object of memory, and the immediate object of that past apprehension is the mediate object of recollection.

117. Thus also, when some sensible thing is present to the senses, a double knowledge can, by virtue of it, be caused in the intellect: one knowledge is abstractive, whereby the agent intellect abstracts the species of the quiddity, as it is a quiddity, from the species in imagination, and this species of the quiddity represents the object absolutely (and not as it exists at this time or that); the other knowledge can be intuitive knowledge in the intellect whereby the object as existing cooperates with the intellect, and from this knowledge there is left a habitual intuitive knowledge imported into intellective memory; and this knowledge is not of the quiddity absolutely (as the first abstractive knowledge was) but of the known thing as existent, namely in the way it was apprehended in the past.

118. In this way Christ is said to have learnt many things by experience, that is by instances of intuitive knowledge (intuitive knowledge of things known as to their existence) and by the memories left over from them.

II. To the Principal Arguments

119. To the arguments.

To the first [n.91] the answer is plain from this, that the text of the Gospel is not to be expounded of Christ's advance such that he advanced only in appearance, because according to Augustine, *83 Questions q.80 n.1.3* against the Apollinarists, the evangelists give historical accounts of what was done and is true; and therefore the words of the evangelist must be true as written – but this does not hold of other figurative passages of Sacred Scripture.

120. The same point is made by Ambrose [n.92] and by the Apostle in *Hebrews* [n.93], that some sense in Christ did truly advance: not that he acquired some habitual abstractive knowledge (at least not any infused such knowledge), but that he acquired intuitive knowledge, both habitual and actual.

121. To the passage from the Philosopher in the *Metaphysics* [n.94], I say that knowledge arising from many repeated acts is in some respect necessary in us and in some way not: as regard intuitive knowledge it is simply necessary, and to this extent it belonged to Christ, since he was a wayfarer along with us; as to abstractive knowledge such a process is not necessary in Christ, and he had knowledge as to abstractive knowledge through infused species; so to this extent such a process was not necessary in him as it is in us.

122. To the next [n.95] I say that discursive reasoning does not always make one acquire knowledge of an unknown conclusion to which the reasoning proceeds, but it either does this or it makes one use a knowledge already possessed. So I say about the issue at hand that Christ could have proceeded discursively from principles to conclusions that he had habitual abstractive knowledge of beforehand – or he could have learnt a scientific conclusion even though he did not have total quidditative knowledge of the terms (which is called ‘science’ by Aristotle, *Nicomachean Ethics* 6.4.1139b18-34, *Physics* 8.1.252a32-b5, *On the Soul* 2.2.413a16) – but it would not be a properly scientific habit of the conclusion.

III. An Objection against Abstractive Knowledge of Singulars

123. And if objection be made against the first part of the solution [n.108], namely about abstractive knowledge of singulars according to the proper ideas of all of them (the second way, n.109) or of some of them (the third way, n.110), that such knowledge could not have belonged to Christ, just as it does not belong to us either and we are of the same species as he and cannot know singulars – my reply is that this absence of knowledge of singulars is not in us because it is repugnant to our intellect (for we will know singulars in their proper ideas in the fatherland with the same intellect as we have now – such that we ‘know God as he is in himself and know ourselves’ – for otherwise we would not be blessed); but our intellect in this present state knows nothing save what can generate a phantasm, for our intellect is not moved save by a phantasm or by something of which there can be a phantasm. Now a singular entity is not the proper reason for generating a phantasm, but only the entity of nature is that precedes the singular entity; for the singular entity was not of a nature to move any cognitive power save the intellect, and the fact that it does not move our intellect is because of our intellect’s connection to imagination. But there will be no such connection in the fatherland, and so in the fatherland, when we will be blessed, a ‘this’ as it is a ‘this’ will be understood as it is in itself [cf. Ord. 1 d.3 n.187, 2 d.3 nn.288-290].

Question Four

Whether Christ knows Everything in its own Proper Genus Perfectly

124. Lastly I pose about this distinction, without arguments, the further question of whether Christ’s soul or Christ knew everything most perfectly in its own proper genus.

125. I reply: knowledge can be understood either as habitual or as actual.

126. I say that in the first way Christ knew everything most perfectly in its proper genus, because just as his soul was posited (in d.13 nn.28-30, 45-48) as being able to have the highest grace possible for a creature, so it is probable on this ground that he does thus have the most noble of intelligible species, whereby most perfectly and habitually he knows species or things with abstractive knowledge.

127. But if the question is about actual knowledge then a distinction must be made between abstractive actual knowledge and intuitive actual knowledge:

As to abstractive knowledge, Christ cannot know most perfectly when one takes the intellect as it is partial cause of understanding, for his intellect is not the most perfect created intellect, and the more this partial cause is imperfect the more its understanding is imperfect (for this knowledge, in the absence of special miracle, is elicited according to the power of the intellect and of the present object). But if an infused intelligible species of some object is posited in Christ's soul [n.110] which as much exceeds in perfection the species infused into any other intellect as the intellectuality of Christ's soul is exceeded by the intellectuality of the other intellect, then the whole totality, namely the intellect of Christ's soul along with its more perfect species, can equal the whole of the other intellect with its species. And if whole cause equals whole cause, even though the partial causes taken separately are unequal to each other, an equal effect can follow, or an unequal effect can follow if the species in Christ's soul exceeds in nobility the species of the angel much more than Christ's intellectuality is exceeded by the angel's. In another way too can an unequal effect follow, if one supposes that, in the first way, whole cause equals whole cause because of a nobler principal cause.

128. About intuitive knowledge too: if the object does not act as it is in the species but is, as being present in itself, the same object and works in the same way with any intellect, then the intellect that has a more imperfect actuality will have a more imperfect intuitive act.

129. But as to intuitive knowledge in the Word, Christ's intellect can be said to have as supreme a perfection of vision as it has also of the Word [nn.25-30].

Fifteenth Distinction

Single Question

Whether there was True Sorrow⁹⁵ in Christ's Soul as to its Higher Part

1. About the fifteenth distinction I ask whether^a there was true sorrow in Christ's soul as to its higher part.⁹⁶

a. [Interpolation] About the fifteenth distinction, where the Master treats of the defects Christ assumed along with his human nature, a single question is raised, namely whether...

2. That there was not:

⁹⁵ The Latin word is 'dolor', which also means 'pain' and is sometimes so translated in what follows.

⁹⁶ St. Augustine *On the Trinity* 12.3. n.3, "...the part of reason that is turned toward management of temporal things [=lower part], so that the image of God does not remain save in the part with which man's mind clings to gazing upon eternal reasons and considering them [=higher part]."

‘Contraries cannot exist in the same thing at the same time’ [*Metaphysics* 10.5.1055a37-38]; joy and sadness are contraries and Christ had supreme joy; therefore etc. The proof of the major is, first, that ‘the opposition of contradictories is greater than all other opposites and therefore its idea is included in all the others’ [*Metaphysics* 10.4.1055a33-b1], and consequently it follows all the others such that contradictories follow on any opposite; second, that the Philosopher gives this meaning in *Metaphysics* 4.3.1005b19-24, that if contradictories are posited to exist in the same thing then contradictories are true of the same thing.

3. And if it be said to the major that motion includes contraries because the term ‘from which’ is not totally removed at once nor the term ‘to which’ introduced at once; on the contrary what is moved is, while in motion, partly in the term ‘from which’ and partly in the term ‘to which’, from *Physics* 6.4.234b10-17, *Metaphysics* 9.9.1051a4-21. Against this is that the terms are not together at the same time in their supreme and complete existence because then they would be incompossible, and even when they are together in some way, the one diminishes the other; but in Christ’s case his joy was not diminished, because it was not fitting that the enjoyment of his soul be diminished on account of a meritorious act that was so acceptable to the Trinity it satisfied for the human race.

4. If it be said to the minor [n.2] that joy and sorrow are not contraries in the matter at hand because they are not in the same subject or about the same object – on the contrary: what contraries concern is the same subject but they need not have the same cause; for white and black if caused by contraries (as hot and cold) are as contrary and incompossible as they would be if able be caused by the same cause; but the object is related to joy and sorrow also as efficient cause; therefore etc.

5. Further, the impassibility of the body exists in the body because of God glorifying it, and nevertheless it does not experience any passion of the body because of any lower cause; therefore impassibility and passion – even when from diverse causes – are incompossible; so by parity of reason in the matter at hand.

6. Further and third thus: the impeccability of a soul is inferred principally from the fact that it is joined immediately to the ultimate end; and yet with this coheres that it not be capable of sin about any other object whatever, although there is as great a distinction of objects about which those opposites might be found as exists in the matter at hand.

7. Further, *Ethics* 7.15.1154b13-14 ‘A strong pleasure expels sadness, not only an opposite pleasure but any chance pleasure’; therefore, even if there were no contrariety, still an excelling joy about one thing would expel all sorrow.

8. Confirmation of this point is that, according to Avicenna *On the Soul* part 4 chapter 2, natural powers impede each other when their acts are intense (as is plain in the rapture of Paul, who did not know whether he saw the mysteries of God in the body or out of it, as he says in *2 Corinthians* 12.1-4); much more then does it seem that the same power, by the strength of its operation or passion about one object, would impede itself in an operation or passion about another.

9. The point is also confirmed by the proposition in *On Causes* 17, where it is said that ‘every power when united is greater than itself when dispersed’.

10. Further, joy is expansion of heart and sadness constriction of heart; the heart cannot at the same time be constricted and expanded; therefore etc.

11. Again Hilary (in the Master's text) seems expressly to reckon that sadness is true sorrow.

12. To the contrary:

Isaiah 53.4, 'He truly carried our sorrows'.

13. Again, *Lamentations* 1.12 says, in the person of Christ, 'see if there is any sorrow like unto my sorrow'; but there can be sorrow that is greater than any sorrow that does not reach the superior part of the soul, just as there can also be a joy in the higher part (as in the case of the blessed) that is greater than any joy in the lower part.

14. Further, Christ merited through suffering; merit is principally found in the higher part; therefore etc.

14. Further, Christ satisfied for the sin of Adam; Adam sinned in his higher part; therefore Christ made satisfaction in that part, for satisfaction should concern that which the sin concerned.

16. Further, Christ's death was a violent one; therefore it was involuntary and sad. The antecedent is plain, because he did not then die in a natural way, nor is his death altogether natural but is a penalty for fallen nature.

17. Further, Damascene *Orthodox Faith* 69 (3.23), 'Fear is natural when the soul is unwillingly separated from the body, because of the natural fellow feeling and association placed in it at the beginning by the Creator'; but an evil that is feared when imminent causes sadness when present; therefore, because of the natural law imposed by the Creator, Christ's soul was saddened by the passion – and consequently saddened as to its higher part, because to have regard to the law imposed by the Creator belongs to the higher part, for that part judges according to eternal laws.

18. Again Damascene in the same place, 'Now in no way did the deity assume suffering without a body that suffered, nor did the deity display trouble and sadness without a sad and troubled soul, nor is he afflicted without an afflicted understanding'; the word 'understanding' does at least mean something that exceeds everything sensitive.

19. Further on *Psalm* 87.4 'my soul is full of evils' Augustine says (*On Psalms* 87.3) 'not the evils of vice but of punishment'; therefore each part suffered and sorrowed.

I. Brief Reply of Others to the Question and Rejection of it

20. Here someone [Bonaventure] draws a distinction about the higher part: that as this part is a nature Christ did thus grieve, because this part is founded in the soul that was grieving; or, on the other hand, that as this part is the higher part, or is his reason, he did not thus grieve, because not with respect to the object that his reason had regard to.

21. An argument against this distinction is that no predicate is said to be present in anything because of something that is accidental to the reason for the inherence of the predicate/accident (just as a man is not said to build insofar as he

is musical, even if someone musical happens to be a builder); therefore Christ's soul will not be said to grieve according to the higher part if the sorrow is present in some accident that is accidentally joined to the higher part; such is the reason [or higher part] of Christ as it is nature and has to the soul the respect of foundation, as foundation of the sorrow.

22. In confirmation of this reasoning is that the soul could in this way be said to understand according to the will, that is, as the will is nature and not as it is will, for the soul itself, which is a will, does understand.

23. Again, it does not belong to the soul to grieve as it is distinguished from the power or powers, just as neither does it thus belong to the soul to have regard to the object about which it grieves; but the soul itself, taken by itself alone, is a unity in its lower and higher part not as it regards some object but as it is first act; therefore it cannot, as it is a unity in both these parts, be the reason that one or other of the parts should grieve; therefore it does not thus belong to the soul to grieve. Therefore the higher part will not be said to grieve because of the soul (which is the same soul as in the grieving lower part), for it is not the same as it.

24. Again, if the higher part did come to know grief for the soul, this would be most of all because of its separation from the body (and the soul as it is nature does properly perfect the body and does have a natural inclination to the body); but the consequent is false, because the higher part was made impassible in the separation of the soul from the flesh; so it was not then saddened.

II. Fuller Examination of the Question and Solution to it

25. For solution of this question the authority of Augustine in *City of God* 14.15 n.2 must be put forward first. He says there that "the pain of the flesh is only an offense to the soul coming from the flesh and a certain opposition of the soul to the passion of the body, just as sorrow of mind, which is called sadness, is the opposition of the mind to things that happen to us against our will." From these words is made plain the distinction between pain properly speaking, which is in the soul from the flesh and primarily as to sensation, and sadness properly speaking, which is in the soul in itself and in it primarily as to the intellective part.

26. For the solution, then, one needs first to see what pain and what sadness are when these terms are taken properly; second to see how there was true pain in Christ's soul and as to which power and about what object; and third to see about sadness, and here to see first whether it was present in the higher part, and second whether it was present in the lower part and about what objects.

A. What Pain and Sadness are

1. Pain

a. Opinion of Henry of Ghent

27. As to the first matter, one assertion is [Henry of Ghent, *Quodlibet* 11 q.8] that "the first root of pain is an alteration in a fitting natural disposition that offends and corrupts it; the second and proximate root of pain is apprehension of this alteration." The second root is not sufficient without the first, since otherwise

the blessed could feel pain after the resurrection; for if one of the blessed were in fire he would apprehend the supreme heat perfectly but would not be harmed by it, and so, if mere apprehension without an alteration first were sufficient, someone blessed could be in pain while in a fire that was afflicting him.

28. But a distinction is made about apprehension, that apprehension is one thing and perception another; for sense apprehension has the sensible thing itself for object (as the apprehension of sight has color for object and the apprehension of hearing has sound for object), but the perception annexed to apprehension has an agreeable or harmful sense condition for object. This perception of what is agreeable or harmful has the power to move us to the experiencing of it that the thing itself has, as is plain from *De Motu Animalium* 7.701b16-32, that “phantasms sometimes, like things, move us to being warmed and cooled, and a small change in the heart causes a big one in the body; for just as a small change in the ship’s wheel causes a big change in the prow, so these sense intentions, possessing the power of the object, can move us to passions in the soul, namely pain; and they also accompany the body’s changes in its natural undergoings of hot and cold.”

29. In this way, then, apprehension is said to be only a cause *sine qua non*, as being the second root of pain; but perception, as the first root, is cause as to why there is pain. Because there is in a sense-intention of something agreeable and harmful the idea of being able to be moved to some passion in the soul (as being the object that the intention concerns), so the idea of moving power exists also in perception as to causing in the body the real undergoing that the perception in the soul accompanies.

b. Rejection of the Opinion

30. Against these assertions.

First, it seems that the first root [n.27] is no root, because just as (according to him) “the first root of pain is an alteration in a fitting natural disposition that offends and corrupts it,” so the first root in pleasure is “an alteration in a fitting natural disposition that induces and preserves it.” But this alteration seems to be no alteration, for I ask what the term of the alteration is. Not the sensation itself because the alteration precedes the sensation as the first root precedes the second; nor much less can it be the sensation which follows the passion, because this sensation follows both roots; therefore the proper term is the disposition of both, which naturally precedes both every act of sense and every act of the delighting or sorrowing power. But nothing such seems necessary for pleasure, for nothing precedes the two of them save perhaps the species of the object; but if the species had thus pre-existed in the imaginative power, which conserves the species, there could no less be a new alteration, and every root necessary for pleasure should now be kept preserved. But if the sensation alone existed, there could no less be some pleasure, because there would no less be some perfect operation which, according to the Philosopher (*Ethics* 10.4.1174b18-23), is necessarily followed by pleasure.

31. Further, that the second root is sufficient without the first is proved by the fact that, although the organ of sense is a natural body (and so capable of undergoing a real passion), yet it is, as an organ of sense, so balanced that it is in proportion between the sense objects; in this way indeed is it of a nature to receive alterations in intention from the object as the object is a sense object; and in this way some object is agreeable to sense and another is disagreeable, and so is something that delights or pains. Therefore, even if every action prior to the intentional act were removed, still, provided the intentional act were of some thus disagreeable object in the organ (as it is a sense organ), or in the sense, pain would follow.

32. And this seems to be clear in the case of some of the senses, for although a disposition really preservative of an individual's nature be induced by certain sense objects, yet these sense objects cause the feeling of pain if they are disagreeable to the senses as they are sense organs (as in the case of bitter medicine that pains the sense of taste, although it is healthy for the sick person [*Ethics* 10.2.1173b20-28]). For only the sense of touch is so bestowed by nature on animals that what disagrees with this sense as a sense accompanies what disagrees with it as a nature. And that is why the two alterations in the other senses go together even though one is of a different idea from the other, and even though the one that is sensed in the sense organ could be without the other (and conversely), and so the disagreeableness in the one could be without the disagreeableness in the other – and so pain without the first root.

33. As to the objection about the blessed [n.27], it will be touched on in Ord.4 d.44 p.2 q.2 nn.2-9, about how the bodies of the damned are made by corporeal fire to suffer.

34. As to the point about the difference between apprehension and perception [n.28], it seems that one power has only one perfect act at the same time; therefore the senses should not be posited as having two acts about their object at the same time, even though the same act qua 'perfect' could be called perception and qua 'imperfect' be called apprehension. So it is called apprehension when, namely, the operation of the senses is imperfect because the one sensing is distracted, being busied in his intention about the action of the other powers. Also, if apprehension and perception should be distinguished, perception seems more removed from pain than apprehension, because the operation that perception expresses seems to be more pleasant than the passion that apprehension expresses.

35. Also, what Henry seems to say of objects of sensitive perception as to their relations [sc. that they involve the idea of the agreeable and disagreeable, n.28] is not correct, because no sense can perceive the relations but perceives only certain non-relational or absolute things that are the principles which move the senses; but relations are not principles of moving any sense to any act.

36. Likewise, if the relations are posited to be objects of an act other than apprehension, it seems one should posit two acts of sight and two acts of hearing (and so on of each sense), one of which would apprehend color or sound and the other of which would perceive the intentions that circumstance them, because powers get their distinctions from distinct first objects.

37. What is cited from *De Motu Animalium* [n.28] does not serve to show that the intentions of agreeable and disagreeable cause the first bodily passions in the heart that the animal passions follow, nor even that they cause those very animal passions – rather it serves to show that the very sense objects, which are displayed in imagination (and which Aristotle is there talking about), or the imaginations themselves by virtue of the objects, cause such passions; and so the text serves to show that one must posit as causing pain ideas that are objective and are different from relational ones.

c. Scotus' own Response

38. One can reply in another way as follows. Active and passive power are, in general, the same in absolute nature (namely, some hot thing is the same as the heating power and another hot thing the same as the heatable power), and on these absolute natures are founded certain relations such that ‘this passive thing’ is disposed to ‘this active thing’ so as to receive from it the form for which it is in passive potency; and when a power thus proportioned or disposed comes close to the active thing, there is then a relation of coming close together, a mutual relation, on which it follows that the passive thing receives a form from the active thing – not however that the relation of action in the active thing and of passion in the passive thing, or their tendencies prior to their coming together (or the relation of coming close in the active and passive thing), are causes of such a form; rather these relations will be causes ‘sine qua non’. So, in like manner, one can say as to the matter at hand that this absolute thing, e.g. sight, is disposed to some visible thing as to something perfective of it (e.g. to some perfect or beautiful white thing) and, conversely, to a contrary visible thing as to something corruptive of it (or it is not disposed to it but disposed from it), and then the relation that is the term of the relation of the disposing to the disposed is called ‘agreement’ and the contrary is called ‘disagreement’ (because there is no relation of equality in the sense objects but of inequality), insofar as the ‘agreeable’ is said to be that to which it is dispositionally inclined (that is, to something extrinsic which is perfective of it), and the ‘disagreeable’ that from which it is dispositionally disinclined as from something extrinsic that is corruptive and offensive to it. Nor is there any other reason that sight is disposed with such an inclination to something white save that sight is the sort of passive thing it is and white the sort of active thing it is; just as there is no other reason that matter is inclined to form as to an intrinsic perfection save that matter is the sort of absolute entity it is and form the sort of absolute entity it is. Now upon this relation, which is founded on these absolute terms, there follows a coming together, which coming together is greatest when the white thing in its very presence is seen or perceived by sight.

39. From this coming together it follows that the inclined thing receives (from the perfective thing to which it is inclined) some perfection; and this perfection is pleasure, which, because it only moves in the presence of the agent cause, is called a ‘passion’, though it is really a quality and not of the genus of ‘passion’ as passion is a category (as I said elsewhere [*On the Categories* qq. 30-36 nn.54-60]). For a like reason intellection is called an ‘action’, though it is

really a quality; also, just as intellection possesses something additional to this idea of action (namely that, like action, it has regard to an object), so this additional something has regard to an efficient cause by which it is produced as a passion is. And by these two facts one says ‘it [intellection] is an action’ and ‘it is a passion’.

40. The idea then of being cause of this pleasure is not the agreement that was the relation, nor either is it the presence of the object in perception, which is a different relation (a sort of coming together of agent and passive thing); rather the absolute form alone (on which the relation of being active object is founded) has the idea of causing also the absolute (which is the pleasure) in the absolute that is inclined to this absolute (the absolute form) as to an extrinsic cause of perfection.

41. So too from the opposite side about pain, that the absolute which is disposed against the corruptive object called ‘disagreeable’ (as the object is referred to the power) is followed by a coming together, and this is followed, third, by the impression of the passion which is the pain; and this pain is, as an intrinsic form, contrary to the disposition of the receiver of pain, just as the passive thing is, as extrinsic, contrary to the receiver’s disposition.

42. As to the commonly stated remark that ‘the agreeable pleases and the disagreeable saddens’, it must not be understood causally, as if the agreeableness or disagreeableness were the reasons for causing pleasure and pain in the power; but we abstract certain general reasons from the distinct absolute things (to which causing those effects belongs), and from those reasons (to which it belongs to be efficient cause of pleasure and pain) we abstract reasons of agreeable and disagreeable, as that we abstract the idea of disagreeable from that which is efficient cause of pain, and we take the idea of agreeable from that which is efficient cause of pleasure. It is as if we were to say that every active thing when close at hand acts on the passive thing; ‘active’ and ‘passive thing’ spoken of as relations are not the reasons for acting and undergoing, but rather the absolute things are that those relations refer to.

43. But if it be asked on what the form is impressed – as on what disposed perfectible thing the form called ‘pleasure’ is impressed and on what counter-disposed perfectible thing the form called ‘pain’ is impressed, whether on the sense power as apprehending things or as appetite – it seems more to be on the appetite, because we can distinguish the power by which the soul can apprehend something from the power by which the soul is inclined to some extrinsic thing that is perfective of it [n.38], and the inclination naturally has the preceding apprehension as term. And so, just as we attribute apprehension per se to sense, so it seems that the inclination (the inclination namely whose term follows on the apprehension) belongs to the sensitive appetite; for we posit a sensitive appetite only because of such a term and the pleasure that follows apprehension; and so, since the form that terminates the inclination belongs to the same thing that the being inclined belongs to, pleasure will be in the appetite that was inclined.

44. This is confirmed from Damascene *Orthodox Faith* ch.38 [2.22], “the term, that is, the definition, of the animal passions is this: ‘Passion is a movement of the sensible appetitive power in imagination of good and evil.’” ‘Sensible’ is put for ‘perceptible’ because a non-perceptible passion is not properly an animal

passion; ‘in imagination of good and evil’ is put there as cause, for ‘good’ and ‘evil’ are put there as something absolute; but ‘agreeable’ or ‘disagreeable’ is the cause of the passion, and ‘imagination’, that is sensation in general, is a sort of coming together of agent and passive thing.

45. Further, the moral virtues are located in appetite and not in the cognitive part as it is distinguished from appetite, and they are located thus most of all because of pleasure, for they concern pleasures and sadnesses [cf. Ord. 3 d.33]. So the passions seem to be in the same part and not in the sensitive [cognitive] part. Therefore does Avicenna say in his *Metaphysics* 8.7 that “pleasure is the conjunction of any power/virtue with what is agreeable to it.”

46. Alternatively, Avicenna takes ‘virtue’ there as it includes the cognitive part as well as its own appetitive part, for any proper cognitive part has its own appetitive part and cannot be conjoined perfectly with anything agreeable to it unless conjoined according to both parts. And because of this closeness they are taken to be one power; for they are more inseparably conjoined than operation and pleasure, which the Philosopher says, *Ethics* 10.5.1175a19-21, seem to be the same because they cannot be separated from each other. Now such predication are causal, so that the sense is “pleasure belongs to any power agreeing with its agreeable object, for it is caused by an object agreeable to sense.”

2. On Sadness

a. On the First Mode or Way of being Sad, that is, on Sadness as it Arises from an Object that is not Wanted

47. Further, the like things must to some extent be said about sadness and to some extent not. Sense appetite, indeed, has something absolute that is of its nature agreeable to it (as an extrinsic perfective thing) and something disagreeable to it (as an extrinsic corruptive thing); and in this respect the like holds true of the will. But in another respect there is a difference, because the sense appetite is drawn naturally to its object (hence, according to Damascene, ch. 38, 2.22, “[sense appetite] is led and does not lead”), whereas the same is not true of an object taken in relation to the will, which is free. Still, there is an object that is of its nature agreeable to the will, namely the ultimate end, since this end is in ultimate agreement with the will through an act of the will accepting it and being pleased with it. And such agreement occurs through wanting the object, or disagreement occurs through not wanting the object; and thus the relations of agreement and disagreement (which accompany the ideas of the willed and the unwanted object) are followed by coming close to this object, namely the apprehension that the thing wanted or not wanted really exists; and from this last fact there seems to follow in the will a passion caused by the object by its very presence, namely joy and sadness.

48. Now the fact that sadness properly taken is a passion of the will seems to be because sadness is not an action or operation of the will; for that it is not an act of willing is plain, and the proof that it is not a not wanting or a not willing is that God and the blessed can supremely not want and not will something, but they cannot be saddened, for that with respect to which they have a not wanting or a

not willing cannot come about; “but sadness is about things that happen to us against our will,” according to Augustine [n.25]. The point is clear from the fact that God, when he supremely does not want something, prohibits it from ever happening; but when such a not wanting something exists in a wayfarer and the thing happens, the wayfarer will be saddened, and he will be the more saddened the more his will is against it (from Augustine’s definition of sadness). There will then be something in the wayfarer that was not there before, because he was not saddened before. But there is no operation in the wayfarer, either simply so or to any degree that it was not present before. Nor again does the passion exist in the will as something brought about by the will, for then the will would have immediate power over it, just as it has power over willing and not willing. But the will does not have such power; for when something unwanted happens to someone who does not will it, he seems not to have the resulting sadness in his immediate power. Further, if the sadness were from the will as from an active power, it would be an operation of the will, just as ‘willing’ is, which is an operation from the will and in the will.

49. If it be objected that then the object is necessarily acting on the will by imposing passion on it (which seems to be against the will’s freedom), my response is that the will is not simply necessitated by the object, but rather that, between the things that are shown to it, there can be a necessity of consequence, as with ‘if I will, I will’. Thus, if there is a not wanting some object and that not wanted object comes about, then it necessarily follows, by the necessity of consequence, that there can be sadness in the will. An example is a free man who voluntarily holds land burdened by a duty of service. It is not immediately in this man’s power not to fulfill the service but on the contrary to fulfill it – or it is immediately in his power to give up holding the land and, thereby, not to be bound to service, or not to serve. So in the issue at hand, it is immediately in the will’s power not to will against the object and, thereby, not to be saddened by the object if it comes about, for then the object would not be something he does not want; but if there is something he does not want and that something comes about, then, as long as his not wanting it remains, sadness follows necessarily by the necessity of consequence.

50. And if it be asked ‘why then can the will not receive a passion from the object as it receives the volition itself from the willed object?’ – I reply that the will as will is free but as not wanting it is not free formally, because it then has a form determined to one particular thing, which form is that very not wanting. But although what is free does not, as free, immediately receive a passion from the object, yet as determined to one of the opposites (which determination is a natural form for it) it can be determinately disposed by that form to one of the objects and not be open to both, and so it can suffer.

b. On the Second Mode or Way of being Said, that is, on Sadness as it Arises from an Object naturally Disagreeable or from an Object Disagreeable to Sense Appetite

51. Apart from the first mode of being sad, namely when the object is disagreeable through the will's not wanting it [nn.47-50], there seems to be a doubt whether any other disagreeableness of an object is sufficient to cause sadness, namely when the object is disagreeable naturally (and is not something freely willed) – or alternatively whether, when the object is disagreeable to and saddens sense appetite, it is sufficiently disagreeable to the will (provided however it is shown to the will by the intellect) because of the connection of the will with the sensitive appetite.

52. As to the first alternative [n.50], one could say that a natural object's disagreeableness to the will (as the will is a natural power) suffices for causing sadness in the will, quite apart from the object's being not wanted because of an elicited act of will against it.

53. The point can be made clear from Augustine in his *Enchiridion* [ch.28 n.105, or ch.105 n.28] that “the will so wills happiness that it cannot will misery.” Now this willing of happiness is natural, as was said in *Ord.1 d.1 n.152*; therefore the natural willing of something suffices for not being able naturally to will the opposite of it, and consequently for not being able naturally to enjoy the opposite and to being necessarily saddened by it, just as the willing of natural happiness suffices for being saddened by natural misery.

54. And if it be objected against this that virtue and nature are distinguished against each other and nevertheless acting virtuously is without sadness, therefore, notwithstanding the natural disagreement of the object to the power, there can be an agreement more truly through the virtue and so the disagreement alone does not suffice [sc. for sadness] – I reply: natural inclination is double, and one is toward the advantageous and the other toward the just, each of which is a perfection of the free will; however the former inclination is said to be natural more than the latter, because the advantageous more immediately follows nature (as nature is distinguished from freedom) than the just does; and so there cannot be a natural inclination to the advantageous without this inclination being sufficient for not wanting the opposite and being saddened because of it, but there can be a natural inclination to the just that is not sufficient for a free not willing of the opposite and for accordingly being saddened because of it.

55. As to the second alternative [n.51], one can say that the connection of the will with sense appetite (provided however that a thing desirable to appetite be understood and be able to be presented by the intellect to the will) also suffices for the agreeable to sense appetite to be agreeable to the will and for the disagreeable to sense to be disagreeable and sad to the will; for it is in this way that a surreptitious pleasure is supposed to be in the will before any free act of the will.

56. And what happens in the case of surreptitious pleasures can also happen in the case of sadnesses or pains as regard sad things. Just as the intellect (when it is not distracted by something) is necessarily affected by the senses when these are strongly moved, so one could suppose that the will does not cooperate necessarily but rather is affected along with the affected sense appetite, and is so about the same object, provided the will is not impeded by the intellect's non-consideration of the affection or by some other impediment that overcomes it.

57. In this way is it said that a virgin who is forcefully violated does not sin, even if in her will she feels delight along with the delight of her sense appetite, because delight and the delightful can be against one's will as far as every elicited act of will is concerned. According to the other way [the first alternative, nn.52-53], one should say that although she delights as to her sense of touch yet she does not do so as to her will – unless, that is, she freely wills the delightful object.

b. On the Third Mode or Way of being Sad, that is, because of a Conditioned not-Wanting

58. Besides the two preceding ways of being sad (or three ways, if the second way is divided into two) [nn.47-57], there seems to be a third (or fourth) way of being sad that can be posited. This way is according to conditioned not-wanting, namely when someone would not want a thing as it would be in itself but does want it in a certain case. An example is that of a merchant in peril on the sea who would not want to throw his merchandise overboard if he could avoid it; but this not wanting is conditioned, namely in that he would not want to do it as it is in itself but yet he does simply want to do it, because he throws the merchandise overboard without being extrinsically forced to do so. For although he throws it overboard because of something he does not want, namely the peril, yet he is not coerced into doing it unwillingly. His absolute volition would be expressed by 'I will it', but the conditioned not wanting by 'I would not will it if I could do something else.' This sort of conditioned not wanting seems to suffice for being saddened by the unwanted event (the way the merchant is saddened when he throws the merchandise overboard); nor does the willing there of the opposite cause as much joy as the conditioned not wanting causes sadness.

59. Such willing and conditioned not wanting suffices for the sort of mortal sin that was in the angels perhaps, and those who were not deceived before they sinned, for they did not, as far as was in themselves, want to be equal to God, but their not wanting it was simply because they saw it to be impossible [sc. and not because they saw it to be unjust?]. The same willing and conditioned not wanting also suffices for the sort of merit that is in someone who pities his neighbor in his heart but is not able to aid him in deed; just as it also suffices for the passions that follow willing and not wanting, especially when the willing and not wanting, that is, the conditioned act of will, is intense. Therefore it suffices for being saddened.

d. Conclusion

60. Bringing together this point [the second member of the first article, nn.47, 26] in this way, then, it seems that being sad properly concerns a fourfold disagreeableness to the will: in one way [nn.47-48], the habit simply and the not wanted act that comes about; in a second way [nn.58-59], what is habitually not wanted and the conditioned act, even though this act against habitual inclination is wanted in an absolute sense; in a third way [nn.52-53], because of what is disagreeable to the will as it is a nature; in a fourth way [nn.55-56], because of

what is disagreeable to the sense appetite, with which disagreeable thing a ‘will not inclined to the [agreeable] opposite’ is conjoined more strongly than is its inclination to sense appetite.

B. In Christ there was True Sorrow

61. As to the second article [n.26], I say that in Christ there was true sorrow in his sensitive part because the object approximate to touch and sense appetite was disagreeable to that sense – and the sense had perfect perception, because a disposition of good excellence in touch follows the proportion of good disposition of the body (from *On the Soul* 2.9.421a19-23), and Christ’s body had the finest complexion, just as his body’s soul was most perfect.

62. Next, an exceeding sorrow in the sense part is of a nature to impede the use of reason. The proof is that a strong pain impedes the use of reason more than does a strong pleasure, for according to Augustine 83 *Questions* q.36 n.1, “there is no one who would not flee pain more than he would seek pleasure, since we see the most savage beasts terrified with pain and fear in desperate situations.” But there is a certain strong pleasure of sense that totally impedes the use of reason, as is proved by Augustine *City of God* 14.16, “there is no pleasure in the body greater than it; in the very moment when the extreme point of it is reached, almost the whole sharpness and, as it were, wakefulness of thought is overturned.” And the Philosopher in *Ethics* 7.8.1149b15-18 says “the delight of the Cyprus born [Aphrodite] steals the mind of the firmest of wise men.” Therefore, much more does a strong pain of sense have a nature, by common law, to impede the use of reason. From this it follows that if, in the case of martyrs when exposed to the greatest torments, their intellect had its use of reason, this was because of a special grace from the Creator.

63. And if it be objected that a firm upstanding politician does not use his virtue to expose himself to such exceeding passions, because he will not be able to use his virtue in them (due to their vehemence) and so is deprived of his use of virtue – I reply that ‘to suffer such pains’ is a good object worth choosing for a good end, and so a choice that has this suffering for object is good because of the due circumstances that surround it, even though the formally good act – which is the choice of the will – does not abide along with the torments and conjoined passions to which the good man chooses to expose himself. So too, someone who exposes himself to fornication, though he does not have the use of reason nor consequently of will in the moment of supreme pleasure, yet he sins mortally in exposing himself willingly to the sort of passion in which he will not be able to use reason; for the object of fornication cannot be a good that by its circumstances (such as the end and other factors) is worth choosing. Likewise, someone can also meritoriously, or un-meritoriously, expose himself to sleep because of a good end, though he will not be able to use reason while asleep.

64. I say third [n.62 was second] to this article [n.26] that if the intellect can exercise its act when the senses are having a vehement experience of something pleasant or sad, it seems natural that the intellect would vehemently cooperate with the lower powers and that the will would suffer delight or sadness

along with the sense appetite, according to the third mode touched on in the third way (in the first article, on the sadness of the will, n.55).

65. So, therefore, it can be said to the matter in hand that since Christ's reason remained wholly in use through the dispensation and special grace of the Creator, his will was not absorbed in the pain of sense appetite and his intellect did as a result intuitively apprehend the pain. The intellect showed the pain to the will, the will grieved along with it, because (in a first way, [n.67]) the will was naturally inclined to the opposite, and this inclination was sufficient for sadness (according to the second way stated in the first article [nn.52-57]).

66. The fact is clear because the affection for the advantageous (which is concupiscence) presupposes the affection for friendship and justice, because everyone who desires some good for someone wants well-being in itself first for that someone before he desires something else for him. Therefore, if in any inclination to a desired advantage there can be a necessary reason for being saddened by the opposite, much more can the inclination to love that for which the desired good is desired be a cause of sadness about the opposite of the good of the thing loved. But since the will is a person's principal appetite, it is supremely inclined naturally to an advantageous good and desires it. For when there are many parts to the same thing, the higher one is said to be principal among those that belong to the supposit in question (just as, since there are several cognitive powers in man, the supreme one is most of all said to be the cognitive power of man qua man, so too the supreme appetite in man will be said to be the appetite of man qua man). Therefore, the will supremely desires naturally the good of the person it belongs to as being what it loves with love of friendship, and on love of friendship is founded all love of concupiscence. And so the love of friendship is necessarily followed by sadness about the opposite, and thus the destruction of the person will necessarily be sad to his will.

67. In a second way [the will is grieved along with the sensible pain, n.65], because the will is necessarily tied to sense appetite (according to the opinion that was the third way in the first article [nn.58-59]); and this tie was most perfect in Christ, and the intellect apprehended the sad-making object (for it was not impeded), and thus does it follow that there was the suffering of sadness and pain in his will.

68. So there appear to be two ways in which Christ can be posited to have grieved in his will or in his rational appetite: first because of the will's natural inclination to the good of the person, second because of its tie to sense appetite.

69. If it be objected against the first way [n.68] that then Christ's soul was supremely saddened in death (for there was then supreme sadness in the sensitive part), one can say that, if his soul was impassible at that moment, it was not saddened at that moment but was sad beforehand, when it was still capable of sadness, because of foreseeing the sad event.

70. On the contrary: Christ's soul did not know this future contingent save by vision in the Word (from d.14 nn.145-152), so it was only saddened in will to the extent that the thing was shown to it in the Word; but the will taken in this way belongs to the higher part of the intellect.

71. I reply that the lower part of the intellect did indeed display the future suffering, and likewise (which is less apparent) the imagination could have imagined it as frightening and saddening, and so the appetite of the imaginative apprehensive power could have feared – and this appetite is called sense appetite when virtues and vices are discussed [Ord. 3 d.22].

C. Whether Christ was Saddened in the Higher and Lower part of the Intellect

1. Of the Objects and Ways as to which each Part is Saddened

72. As to the third principal article [n.26], namely about the sadness that concerns something not wanted by free will (and not only what arises from the flesh), one needs first to consider what Christ in his higher part was saddened by.

73. This part can be taken in two ways: in one way strictly, for the intellect and will as they regard eternal things alone, and in another way more broadly, for the intellect as it judges something according to eternal rules and for the will as it wills each thing by referring it to eternal things (Augustine speaks of this second way in *On the Trinity* 12 ch.2 n.2).

74. In the first way the higher part of the will cannot have a sadness that is disordered, because such a sadness would be consequent to not wanting God in himself or not wanting some perfection to be intrinsic to God. This sort of not wanting is so disordered in itself that it is perhaps the sin against the Holy Spirit, and scarcely do the damned thus sin, for though they do not want God to be just, yet it is not perhaps that they do not want this absolutely but that they do not want the effect of justice, namely the punishment that they feel; and this does not belong to the higher part taken strictly.

75. As to the higher part understood in the second way, there are three things that this part could be saddened by: namely, first, by lacking enjoyment of the eternal object; second by the sin of its own or another's will; third by other evils disagreeable to its own supposit or to other persons dear to it. The order is plain. For just as the higher part, taken broadly, wills first its own enjoyment of God, wills second any justice that is ordered to enjoyment (and this whether in itself or in another), and wills third intermediate and lesser goods, in accord with eternal rules, for itself and others in their ordering to the greatest goods – so the same higher part has a not-wanting with respect to the opposite of these things, and is saddened by the opposites if they happen.

76. As to the first of the three [lack of enjoyment of God, n.75], the soul of Christ did not have sadness about it, because no non-enjoyment or non-perfection that was unwanted happened to him in death; for it was not fitting that he should be joined less to the end by that through which he merited to join others to the end.

77. As to the second [n.75], Christ's soul was not saddened by his own sin because he had none; but he was saddened by others' sin, as about the unfaithfulness of the doubting disciples and the cruelty of the persecuting Jews. Hence Ambrose, *On Luke* [*On Faith* 2 ch.7 n.54] (and it is in the text), says, "You are grieved, Lord, not over your wounds but mine," that is, you are saddened by my sins that wound my nature, not by any of your own.

78. But there is a doubt here: since Christ merited for no one save because he paid back his passion for them by his act of will, and since he wanted his disciples' innocence more than the innocence of the others (otherwise he would not seem to have been saddened), how is it that he did not merit that his disciples be preserved from a fall that was not wanted? There is a confirmation: he merited that they should rise from their fall, so he could have preserved them from it etc.⁹⁷

79. As to the third [n.75], one must reply diversely according to the four ways set down in the first article about the disagreeable and the sorrowful [nn.47-60].

80. For by making a beginning here from what was last there, as being more manifest [nn.60, 55-56], it is plain that Christ's will was conjoined with his pained sense appetite, therefore his will was of a nature to be pained along with it.

81. Next, as to what was second to last there [nn.60, 52-53], it is plain that the will as it is a nature desires the good of the whole person, just as it is an appetite of the whole person; for just as the more universal and higher cognitive power in man is the cognitive power of man qua man, so the supreme appetite in man is most of all the appetite of man, and this appetite, as it is a nature, is inclined to the natural good of man; and the destruction of nature, or the separation of the parts of the whole nature, was against this inclination. Similarly, the will as it is a nature strongly desires the good of any lower power; therefore what is disagreeable to any power is as a result disagreeable to the will as it is a nature.

82. As to the third from last there [nn.60, 58-59], one can reply in accord with Augustine *On the Trinity* 13.7 n.10, when he proves that no one is blessed here [in this life] because no one has what he wants in wanting nothing bad, for although perhaps he is ready to bear with equanimity the adversities that befall him, yet he is not blessed because, as far as it is in him, he does not want them.

83. And as to the two first objects, namely enjoyment and justice [n.75], no distinction should be drawn here between the higher and lower parts, for just as the lower intellect can have enjoyment and justice for its object, so the lower will, like the higher, was not saddened in some respects, for the unwanted things did not come about, and saddened in other respects, as by the sins, for they were thus unwanted too. For since Christ's will was right, the sins of sinners neither pleased him nor were neutral to him but were presented to him as bad.

84. As to the third object, namely the passion of Christ [n.75], one must speak in different ways about the two parts [the higher and lower parts]; and one must do so according to the four ways set down in the first article about the disagreeable and saddening [nn.47-59]. One must consider if all of them can be posited to exist in each part.

85. In this regard there seems to be a double sadness: one that does not follow an actual not-wanting nor a habitual or conditioned not-wanting, but a natural one as it were, which concerns the will as it is a nature [nn.52-53]; and another which concerns the conjoining of the will to the sense appetite that is suffering [nn.55-56]. This double sadness, I say, seems to be appropriated to the two parts, such that the natural not-wanting, and so the being saddened, belongs to

⁹⁷ The editors put this doubt in brackets, noting that there is no response given to it later by Scotus.

the will only in its higher part, while the being saddened only by a suffering along with the sense appetite belongs precisely to the will in its lower part.

86. Proof of the first point [n.85]: the higher part broadly taken (as said before according to Augustine [n.73]) has regard to that which is regarded in its order to the eternal, and this both in the reason, as that from which reason takes its principle of knowing, and in the will, as that for which as ultimate end the will wills it. But the will naturally wills nothing first and for itself save the ultimate end, and so it wills everything else not first and in order to what is first; therefore etc. [sc. the will as it is a nature is the will of the higher part]. The minor is plain from the rightness of natural inclination, which would not be right if it were inclined most and ultimately to a lesser and non-ultimate good. But if someone were to say that the will as it is a nature is only inclined to its own proper good first, he would be in disagreement with what has been said in this argument. But let the contrary be supposed here, from the question dealt with elsewhere [*Reportatio IV A d.49 q.8-9 nn.4-5, 18*].

87. Proof of the second point [n.85]: the intellect insofar as it understands something because the sense (with which it is conjoined) senses it, is the lower part alone; therefore the same holds of the appetites. The antecedent is plain because, insofar as the intellect does thus know, it knows nothing through eternal rules, for it would know in the same way if it could not judge according to those rules.

88. Against these arguments: the second argument [n.87] seems to be in conflict with the first [n.86], for the will suffers along with sense appetite as the will is a nature, because it does not do so as it is free, for the sudden suffering it has because of the natural connection of the higher appetite with the lower is not in its power; therefore the will as it is a nature does not concur precisely with the higher part and does concur, as suffering along with the sense appetite, precisely with the lower part.

89. Response: will as nature is taken in two ways.

In one way as it tends naturally to objects proper to this power as it is this power, all other things being excluded and this power being understood only as it is perfectible by certain objects and these its own objects. It is in this way that the first argument [n.86] is being understood, because the will is in that way inclined to its objects (ordered according to the natural order of the objects) insofar as the objects are in some way perfective of it.

90. Will as it is a nature is spoken of in another way when any order of it to anything consequent to the will's nature is understood – this properly not as it is free but only as it is intellective appetite, or as it possesses the love of advantage and not of justice. And thus taken it has an order toward feeling along with the lower appetite not only in the order that the desired object has to the first object of the will as it is a will, but, setting aside this order, as the will thus feels along with the lower appetite about anything, and is as disposed toward this anything as if it could not be referred to what is eternal. But not like this is the natural inclination of the will (as the will is a power) that is precisely ordered to its own proper objects, because this inclination is not to any object at all save

insofar as it is a further inclination to the eternal (just as matter is not inclined to a preceding disposition save as further inclined to perfect form).

91. Briefly, then, the will as nature in the first way is the will as only naturally inclined to its own proper objects; in the second way it is the will inclined to the objects of the other appetite with which it is conjoined by means of that inclination. In the first way it is the higher part only; in the second the lower part only. Thus in general, the will as nature can be taken as it includes both, and thus does it belong to both parts.

92. About the other two sadnesses, which follow absolute actual volition or conditional (or habitual) volition [nn.58-59], it seems that since both parts are able in both ways not to want anything that happens, both will be able to be saddened in both ways.

93. Of the four ways, then, of being saddened set down in the first article, two are common to both parts and two are proper to the two, such that both parts can be saddened by an object that is in a triple way unwanted.

2. Of the Passion as it is the Object of Sadness in the Higher Part

94. Next, by still applying to the matter at hand the object of Christ's will that is the passion, one must look at which part could have been saddened by this object, and according to which of the three ways of being saddened possible for it.

95. And first, as to the higher part, it is plain of the will as it is a nature that it did will the good of the person of Christ and did so in its order to what is eternal; and in this way something unwanted did come about, and it was unwanted as being against the affection for advantage but not as being against the affection for justice. But something unwanted in this way, namely as against the affection for advantage, is a sufficient cause for being saddened (from the first article [n.54]); therefore the higher will as it is a nature was in this way saddened by the passion.

96. Nor is it an obstacle that the good to which Christ's death was ordered was greater than the preservation of his life for a time; for although in this regard the good was to be more freely willed according to the affection for justice, yet not so by the will according to the affection for advantage – unless it could have been shown that the salvation of man was then a greater advantage to the person of Christ than the preservation of his life, and shown to be a greater advantage naturally, and not just from its ordering as being more useful to a good end.

97. If it then be objected that the will as it is a nature is not in that case the higher part, because it does not regard everything in its order to the eternal, nor in its order to the eternal first, for something else (namely its own being) seems naturally more advantageous to this person than any other extrinsic thing – one must deny this last point, for the eternal is not only the supreme good that is to be loved with justice, but it is also the supreme advantage of every will as it is intellective appetite (when this appetite is taken in abstraction from freedom and justice). And therefore, in each natural ordering of objects the eternal is first.

98. But, second, one must consider the higher part of the will insofar as it is free, and consider the sadness in it consequent to the actual not wanting of what

was happening. It seems, on the basis of principles taken from the ultimate end, that one cannot conclude about his passion and its opposite (as they are referred to the end) that the passion was to be wanted; for as opposite things cannot be demonstrated, if one simply draws, by reference to the end, the conclusion that at that moment life was not to be wanted and death was to be wanted, then the divine will would not rightly have wanted the passion because it was against right reason; nor would Christ's will have rightly wanted it, nor would he have obtained merit in wanting it – which results are absurd. It seems then that, just as the higher reason could not, by reference to the ultimate end, judge that death was bad at that moment but rather was definitely good (either because the willingness to die was ordered immediately to the ultimate end on account of its truth, or was so ordered meditately, namely by way of the salvation of man, for the procuring of which death was willed) – so, in the same way, the higher will as free and ordered was not able not to want death at that moment but rather to want it determinately, and so not to be saddened by it with the sadness consequent to a free absolute not-wanting.

99. On the contrary: therefore the higher part does not then have joy in Christ's being alive, for there is no reason to conclude that his life is or should be simply wanted as referred to what is eternal, because the same reason would have concluded the same thing at the moment of the passion.

100. Reply: the conclusion of a practical demonstration concerns the act with its circumstances, and just as 'wanting to die' was simply good at that moment (for it was wanted by the Trinity at that moment, namely as to be undergone at that moment for confirming justice and procuring salvation), so life is good for the present moment now. But as to the point adverted to, that a demonstration always concludes the same thing [n.99], it is true that a demonstration has the same conclusion also in practical matters when it is circumstanced in the same way; but not so if one concludes 'I have drawn the conclusion for this moment as this moment states a circumstance, therefore I have drawn it for every moment', for the conclusion 'composition, therefore also division' is not the same when the 'for this moment' determines the inference or the thing inferred.

101. Third, one must consider the higher part as it is free and consider conditional or habitual not-wanting [nn.58-59] (and I mean by 'habitual' that whose act the will is inclined of itself to issue in, unless something stands in the way). On this point one must, it seems, say that the higher part did not want the passion, that is, it would not have wanted it as it would have been in itself if all the advantageous and just things that are desirable in themselves had been equally present without the passion.

102. The proof is by a twofold authority and a twofold reason:

One authority is from Augustine *On the Trinity* 13.7 n.10, "Although a just man is, though fortitude, ready to accept and bear with calm mind whatever adversity may happen, yet he prefers it not to happen, and if he can he does so; and he is ready for either event such that, as far as is in him, he chooses the one and avoids the other; and if he falls into what he is avoiding, he bears it willingly, because what he wanted could not be done" (understand: as far as is in him). Now

it is clear that Augustine means what his words say, because through them he proves that no one, however virtuous, can be blessed here, for he can suffer adversity here and so does not have what he wants; because, as was already said, ‘he chooses, as far as he can, one of the alternatives’, namely the advantageous one.

103. The other authority is from the Philosopher *Ethics* 3.12.1117b7-11, “Death and wounds are sad for the courageous man; but he endures them because it is good or not base to do so. And the more he has the whole of virtue and the happier he is, the greater will his sadness be in death;” which is only because, as far as is in him, he wants the opposite. And Aristotle’s authority manifests what was said in the first point [n.95], that such not wanting suffices for being saddened.

104. The reason with respect to this point is that an object of patience does not seem to be choiceworthy in itself, for then patience would not in that case be required, and the blessed choose no such things.

105. If it be said in response to the authorities [nn.102-103] that they are speaking of fortitude in the moral sense, which is a disposition of the lower and not the higher part – there is no impediment here, because the higher part seems to judge nothing to be eligible according to eternal rules, as far as concerns itself, without judging the opposite to be more eligible provided justice do not forbid; otherwise why do those who are bound tightly to the ultimate end, as the blessed, choose nothing contrary to it?

3. About the Passion as it is an Object of Sadness in the Lower Part

106. Finally one must consider the lower part with respect to the object which is the Passion. That this part, as it is a nature or is conjoined to sense appetite, did suffer by being saddened is clear.

107. But there is a doubt about the lower part as it is free, whether it suffered because of an absolute free not-wanting or of a conditioned not-wanting.

As to conditioned not-wanting, one should, it seems, say something similar to was said of the higher part [n.101]; and the authorities [nn.102-103] prove it as much, or more so.

108. All that is left, then, is whether the lower reason could conclude that the Passion was absolutely not to be wanted, and thus whether the lower will could, with due order, absolutely not want it and so be saddened.

a. First Possible Solution and the Weighing of it

109. With respect to this question it seems one should say no as to the lower reason, and consequently as to the lower will too.

110. The proof is multiple:

The first is that the same power cannot have opposite acts about the same object when one of these acts is exercised to its fullest, for one opposite, when at its fullest, is not compatible with the other. But the lower and higher part are one power (according to Augustine *On the Trinity* 12, and it was shown in *Lectura 2*

d.24 nn.7-12), and the higher part at its fullest in intellect prescribes the passion to be wanted, and at its fullest in will supremely wants it; therefore the lower part could not not-want it.

111. Again, from a principle and conclusion opposite results do not follow; the principle of lower practical reason is a conclusion of higher reason; therefore etc. Proof of the minor: practical first principles are taken from the ultimate end; directed to that end are other ends from which are taken the principles of the lower reason, so that the goodness of these other ends comes from that end; therefore the principles taken from the other ends are proved from those taken from that end.

112. Again: in whatever way the principles of the lower reason are disposed (namely whether they are conclusions, as the preceding argument assumed [n.111], or are immediate, though posterior to the immediate first principles taken from the ultimate end; for there can, as it seems, be an order of dignity between the practical and theoretical immediate principles), this at any rate is certain, that opposites cannot both be demonstrated but one of them would be the result of sophistical argument. Therefore, if the higher reason demonstrates that ‘this thing is to be willed’, then from no principles save sophistical ones can the lower reason argue that it is to be absolutely not willed. Now we are supposing that Christ’s right reason was not in error through sophisms, and that his will was in conformity with right reason and not sophistical reason.

113. Again, the reason which judges about the acts of the political virtues is lower reason; but it judges that ‘death is to be endured willingly’ for the common good; so Christ’s lower reason could not have concluded that death was not to be willed, but rather would have concluded the opposite.

114. If it be said that right reason judges that death is to be endured but not that it is not to be willed, so that its being not to be willed, and thus its being sad, is a conclusion drawn from something else (and even Aristotle seems to agree with this in the citation above [n.103] about the brave man, and Augustine too [n.102] and his reason, that an act of the virtue of patience is willingly chosen but the object the act concerns is not) — on the contrary: the conclusion that death is now to be endured is drawn by reason, and either the will does not will what is concluded now and then it is not right, or it does will and then it seems not absolutely not to will death; for an absolute and efficacious volition of *a* does not stand along with an absolute and efficacious not wanting of that without which *a* cannot be, for then it would flee and not flee the same thing at the same time. For an absolute and efficacious not-wanting is the cause of fleeing from what is not wanted, just as an absolute and efficacious wanting is the cause of pursuing what is wanted.

115. Again, there are authorities that seem to be for the principal conclusion [n.109]:

Augustine *On Psalms* ps.21, “Is the soldier who is to be crowned not afraid, namely Paul, and the Lord who is going to be crowned is afraid...?” meaning to say ‘not so’; fear is about something not wanted which is known or believed to be in future; therefore etc.

116. Again, the Master in the text (and he is quoting Jerome) maintains there is not passion in Christ but pro-passion; but if Christ did absolutely not want it then, since such not wanting follows the full apprehension of reason, the sadness following such not wanting would seem to possess the full idea of passion.

117. Anyone who would be pleased with the conclusion of these arguments and authorities could say that Christ's lower will, as it is free, did not absolutely not want death but was nevertheless saddened because he conditionally did not want it, namely as far as was in himself, provided God's good pleasure could be fulfilled in some other way.

118. Now some people say, that in this sort of case there is a combination of the voluntary and involuntary, and that what is willed simply is what someone wills as far as is in himself, and that what is not willed in a certain respect is what someone wills because of a present necessity (for example: what is voluntary simply for someone in danger at sea is not to cast his merchandise overboard; or alternatively, what is involuntary simply for someone in such danger is to cast his merchandise overboard, so his casting overboard causes him sadness, and is voluntary in a certain respect); and so these people would say that in the matter at hand Christ did absolutely not want death but that insofar as it concerned him and in a certain respect he did will it. As to this view I say it is false both generally and in the matter at hand.

119. First, generally, the point is shown by the case of the man in danger at sea; for since he is lord of his acts by his will, in whose power it is to use his motive force or to not use it to throw his goods overboard, and that this is as much in his power in danger as otherwise, therefore he then casts his goods overboard simply voluntarily, because he is not then coerced by anyone to use his motive force for the purpose. For it is plain that his will could love the merchandise so inordinately that it would not want to throw them overboard even to avoid danger.

120. Next, as to the matter in hand, Christ does not seem not to want death, save with a diminishing determination, namely 'if something else could be well done instead'; and this determination is a diminishing one because the condition in question does not exist.

121. Now, according to this way, a 'willing to die' without any diminishing condition is conceded; for if the addition is made that he willed to die 'for the honor of God' or 'for the sake of justice' or 'for the salvation of men', then the end of the action does not, in these cases, diminish the act; therefore what someone does or suffers in this way does not make the act to be simply unwilling but to be so in a certain respect, namely insofar as it is up to him.

122. But a motive perhaps for taking the opposite side is that such a determination is sad simply — just as 'throwing overboard' is sad for a man in danger on the sea and 'dying' sad for a brave man.

123. But this is not compelling (for the opposite side), because a conditioned not-wanting, when the condition is not wanted, is sufficient for being sad simply, and so the wanting consequent to some unwanted condition is not sufficient for being glad, as in the case of the merchant where a 'willing to throw overboard' follows on 'there will be a storm', which is something he does not want.

124. But then Christ's death does not seem sad, for it is not the case that it was unwanted because of some pre-supposed unwanted thing.

125. I reply: just as a brave citizen would not want his city to undergo a necessity of such sort that the city's being freed from it would require his own death (and so the necessity is here pre-supposed as something he does not want), so Christ did not want his hearers to be such that they could not have the truth preached to them without being scandalized into mortal hatred. Therefore, if he wanted to die for the truth of his teaching, something he did not want is pre-supposed on the part of his hearers. And if he wanted to die for the salvation of the human race, something else he did not want is pre-supposed, namely that men are in the sort of state that his death was needed to snatch them from it. And if he wanted to die because of the divine good pleasure, there too something Christ did not want seems to be pre-supposed, for the divine good pleasure had his death for object and for the sake, as it seems, of some end to which this object was ordained, and this end is either the preaching of the truth or the procuring of men's salvation.

126. So then, if these last arguments be sound [nn.119-125], one would have to say, in brief, that Christ did not, in his lower part, want death or the passion — and did not want it both by his will as it is a nature (that is, as it is conjoined with the suffering sense appetite [n.106]) and by his will as it is free, insofar as it thus only conditionally and not absolutely did not want it [n.117] — the way said before about the higher part, that this part as it is a nature did not want it [n.95-97], and that as free it only conditionally and not absolutely did not want it [nn.101, 98]. And so he was saddened in both parts in the same ways. Nor is it valid to say, 'he did not want it absolutely, therefore he was not saddened', since a conditional not-wanting suffices for being saddened simply; hence, one can only argue, 'he did not want it absolutely, therefore he was not saddened for this reason' — but compatible with this is that he was saddened simply for some other reason (a single reason or a double one).

127. Thus is the gloss fulfilled [Lombard, *Commentary on the Psalms*, psalm 87.4] ““My soul is filled with evils etc.,’ that is with sadnesses and pains,” because his whole soul was saddened in will as to both respects, both as will is nature and as it is free (with a conditional not-wanting, namely as far as it was up to him), and his whole soul as to its intellect in both its parts apprehended something naturally and conditionally disagreeable to will.

b. Second Possible Solution and the Weighing of it

128. However, if anyone wants to assign in the lower will a cause of sadness that was not in the higher will (by saying that the lower will did absolutely not want the pain, which was not the case for the higher will), he can posit that the lower part considers the Passion in abstraction from its order to the ultimate end, because to consider the Passion under the circumstance of the ultimate end belongs to the higher reason; but when that circumstance is removed, the Passion is not something wanted, for it was only to be wanted because of the ultimate end; therefore the lower reason does not say the Passion is to be willed, and so neither does the lower will want it.

129. Against this way of proceeding [n.128] one can argue as follows:

First that the reason on which it rests only shows the possibility of the lower will not wanting what the higher will absolutely wants, which is not the point at issue, for ‘not wanting it absolutely to be’ does not imply ‘absolutely wanting it not to be’, and the latter is what the other way of proceeding denies [n. 117].

130. Again, one can argue that the intended conclusion about ‘wanting it not to be’ cannot be inferred; for if a circumstance that the lower reason considers is enough for concluding that ‘this thing is not to be wanted’, then the circumstance in question is not determinable by the other circumstance [the circumstance of the ultimate end] whereby it is concluded that the Passion is to be willed; for something that is ‘per se not to be willed’ cannot be made ‘to be willed’ by anything else. The point is clear as follows: if the lower reason shows an object *a* without the circumstance of the ultimate end (because of which circumstance it is something to be willed), then it does not show the object is either to be willed or not to be willed but that it is as it were neutral; for an object that can be made by circumstances into something to be willed is not an object that is determinately not to be willed, for then nothing could make it into something to be willed.

131. Third, it also seems that the lower reason could display the Passion along with the circumstance that makes it to be wanted [the circumstance of the ultimate end]; for otherwise the practical lower reason could not be directed by principles taken from a nobler end (because ‘being directed by those principles’ means to consider the end from which they are taken); and so someone who is morally brave could not, insofar as he is prudent (for prudence belongs to the lower reason), direct himself in acts of courage by considering happiness. But if this result is unacceptable, then the lower reason, when, as far as it can, it shows the object completely and does not show a part of it (with the circumstance of the ultimate end removed), it will show it as something to be willed.

132. There is also a fourth argument — about the morally brave man, that an absolute not-willing seems to be a reason to avoid the thing not willed so as to prevent it happening, and the determination is not ‘so as to prevent it happening through himself’ but ‘so as to prevent it happening to himself’.

c. Scotus’ own Conclusion

133. As to this article and its treatment [nn.106-132], it does not seem one has to keep the idea that the inferior part absolutely did not want the Passion [n. 108], for even without this idea one can keep the fact that the lower part was saddened by the Passion both as this part is a nature and as it is free, for it was saddened because of conditional not-wanting, as was said above [nn.117, 123,126].

d. To the Arguments for the First Solution

134. As a solution to the arguments [nn.110-116], one can say that ‘moral good’ is a per accidens being, containing in itself an act of some sort together with many circumstances additional to the act, so that one can conclude, by reason of one of the circumstances, that the whole is worth choosing, and yet conclude that, with the circumstance removed, the remainder will, because of some other circumstance, not be worth choosing.

135. So by reliance on this point [n.134] for the first argument for the first way

[n.110], the major is granted about the same per se object, but here the object is only per accidens the same and not per se.

136. Using the same point [n.134] for the second argument [n.111], I say that the conclusions of the higher reason are principles for drawing further conclusions when taken per se and as inferred from the principles of the higher reason; and in this way opposite minor premises can well be assumed under a principle about a thing that is per accidens the same, one of which minors may be true by virtue of one part of the whole and the other by reason of another part.

137. The reply to the third argument [n.112] is clear again from the same point, that there would be a sophism if opposite conclusions were drawn, but when the whole is ‘per accidens the same’ a predicate is proved of it because of one circumstance that is opposite to a predicate proved of it because of another circumstance.

138. To the argument about a brave man enduring death [n.113], I say that it proceeds of circumstances that belong to the lower reason, and so the reply made above [n.131] can be applied directly to it.

139. To the argument to the contrary [n.114] one can say that ‘absolutely not wanting *a*’ and ‘absolutely willing to undergo *a*’ are mutually compatible provided one assumes some unwanted thing, namely the necessity of undergoing *a*. And when you say [n.114] that ‘an absolute not-wanting is cause of fleeing what is not wanted’, this is true in itself, not as inferred by someone other than the one by whom ‘do not want’ is inferred.

140. As to Augustine [n.115] I say that Christ did not have the same reason for fearing that we have, because he did not have sins to make him fear as ours do us. Thus can the words of Ambrose be understood, “You are grieved, Lord, not over your wounds but mine,” [n.77].

141. To the Master and Jerome [n.116]: if the will suffered not only because of a surreptitious movement preceding consent (and this sort of passion — which can be called ‘pro-passion’ — belongs to the will as it is a nature), but also because of a movement following a freely elicited not-wanting, then the pro-passion in question must be understood to be distinct from passion that overthrows reason, of which sort there was none in Christ.⁹⁸

Sixteenth Distinction

Question One

Whether Christ was under any Necessity to Die

1. About the sixteenth distinction I ask whether^a Christ was under any necessity to die.

a. [Interpolation] About the sixteenth question, where the Master deals with the way in which the Son of God assumed the defects of human nature, one question is asked, namely whether...

⁹⁸ No reply is given by Scotus to the principal arguments posed at the beginning, nn.2-19, but answers can perhaps be supplied, *mutatis mutandis*, from the parallel passage in the *Lectura 3 d.15 nn.108-121*

2. That he was not:

Romans 8.10, “The body is dead because of sin,” that is, it was under necessity to die; and *Genesis* 2.17, “In the day that you eat thereof, you will die.” But Christ did not have either actual or original sin; therefore Christ was not under any necessity to die.

3. Second as follows: Christ’s soul was omniscient (as said in d.14 nn.58-70); therefore it was omnipotent, and if so it was not under necessity to die because it could prevent any cause that would prevent life. The first consequence is plain, because omniscience is not a greater perfection than omnipotence, since the acts of both have regard to the same objects and include power for acts that tend to everything possible; therefore etc.

4. Third: Christ’s body was most balanced and with the best complexion, otherwise it would not have been proportionate to his soul, which was the most noble among forms that perfect matter; therefore his soul knew everything that could benefit or harm the body’s health, and he was obliged to preserve his life; therefore by accepting as food what was beneficial and avoiding what was harmful and guarding against anything corrupting he was able to go on living always – and he well knew how to do these things; therefore he was under no necessity to die.

5. And there is a confirmation like the previous argument [n.4], for his soul was most perfect among forms that perfect matter; therefore it did perfect the matter most perfectly, and therefore it removed all privation from the matter it perfected (for a more imperfect form, as the form of the heavens, can do this, namely take away all privation from matter; and so the heavens are naturally incorruptible [2 d.14 n.13]). Therefore Christ’s soul did the same with respect to his own matter.

6. On the contrary:

Everything composed of contraries necessarily suffers corruption (*On the Heavens* 2.3.286a33-34) – and the cause is that the contraries are in the same thing; since, therefore, Christ’s body was composed of contraries, it would at length naturally suffer corruption.

7. Second as follows: “Matter is that whereby a thing is able to be and not to be” (*Metaphysics* 7.7.1032a20-21), and this by reason of privation (*Physics* 1.9.192a3-16), because privation in deprived matter works harm, that is, the corruption of the composite it is found in; but the matter in Christ was of the same nature in him as in us, and in us it is a necessary cause of corruption; therefore also in Christ.

Question Two

Whether it was in the power of Christ’s Soul not to Die from the Violence of the Passion

8. Next to this, I ask whether it was in the power of Christ’s soul not to die from the violence of the passion.

9. That it was:

Because his soul perfectly dominated the sense appetite and all lower powers with its will, for there was no rebellion of those powers in him; therefore his soul had full dominion over the body so as to be able to prevent any bodily violence. The proof of the consequence is that his soul dominated his body with despotic rule (the way a master rules a slave), and dominated his sense appetite and the other lower powers with political rule (the way a king or prince dominates over citizens); therefore his soul dominated his body more than it dominated the other powers, because a slave has no power against his master but a citizen has power against the prince and sometimes contradicts him; therefore etc.

10. Secondly as follows: in *John* 10.17-18 Christ says, “I have power to lay down my soul,” and, “I lay down my soul from myself and no one takes it from me.” I ask, when he says “I lay down my soul from myself” how is he using the ‘lay down from myself’? Not from himself as the God-Word, for he never laid down his soul from himself as Word since his soul was never separated from the Word. Therefore he says this as he is man, because he was able to lay down his soul from himself by separating soul from body; therefore it was in the power of his soul to suffer separation from the body and not to suffer separation from the body.

11. Third, there follows a verse in the same chapter of John where Christ says, “This commandment have I received from my Father,” namely ‘to lay down my soul’; but he only received the commandment as he is man, for in his divinity he is equal with the Father; therefore he laid down his soul as man and as less than the Father. Therefore it was in his power as man to lay down and not to lay down his soul; it is plain when he says, “no one takes it from me but I lay it down of myself.”

12. Fourth, in several Gospels are contained the words that “with a loud cry he gave up his spirit;” but he could not have thus cried aloud unless he had freely forestalled the hour of death that was going to happen to him because of the violence of the passion; before that hour, therefore, he laid down his soul of his own power, and for the same reason he was able not to have laid it down both at that time and later; therefore it was in his power to die or not to die from the violence of the passion.

13. On the contrary:

Christ was in the same state as us as regards his body, and he was also a wayfarer; therefore violence could have been inflicted on him in his body whereby the harmony of the body would have been destroyed (as is very plain in ourselves), and so his body would have been deprived of life.

14. Second: if it was in Christ’s power to keep his body from all exterior violence, then, since he was bound, like everyone else, to guard himself from death, he would consequently have committed sin by dying; for he was bound by the law of charity to love his body next after love of God, of his soul, and of the souls of his neighbors. Thus, if he laid down his soul or permitted it to be laid down, then, since he could have preserved it instead, he would *qua* man have sinned; for he who does not prevent the dissolution of his body when he can sins.

I. To the First Question

A. Opinion of Others
 1. Exposition of the Opinion

15. To the first question many say that Christ was under a necessity to die, because the potency of matter was of the same nature in him as in other men; and because it was deprived of other forms; and because deprived matter is a necessary cause of corruption etc.

16. Second, because in Christ's body there were contrary qualities, for the qualities of the elements are not in altogether equal proportion in a mixed body that is proportioned to the soul (for one part is complexioned differently from another, and life consists principally in the hot and wet and in other things that are equally proportioned); therefore because there was thus a domination of one or other quality and contrariety, corruption would eventually and necessarily have followed their mutual action and passion.

17. Third, from the fact that the elements in the body desire their proper places when they are outside them, corruption and dissolution would also eventually have happened by nature; for natural desire is not in vain for ever, for 'nothing violent is perpetual' [*On the Heavens* 2.3286a17-18].

18. Fourth, the diverse parts of the organic soul are complexioned differently, and in addition one quality is dominant in the eye and another in other organs, and these qualities are contrary; so from the mutual action and passion of the parts would follow a necessity for corruption of the parts; but the corruption of the whole follows on the corruption of the parts; therefore etc.

19. Again, every generable and corruptible body has a definite period and measure or duration of existence, beyond which it cannot last; but Christ's body was generable and corruptible; therefore etc.

2. Rejection of the Opinion

20. These arguments are not conclusive because the conclusions of all of them – apart from the last – apply as much to the body of Christ as it is now after the resurrection (and to our bodies too after the last judgment) as to his body as it was before.

21. The first argument [n.15] is not conclusive because Christ's body has now the same potency of matter as before, and it is similarly deprived, for it has no other act now than before; therefore just as the act or form of his soul did not take away every privation before when it communicated itself to the body through the essence, so neither does it do so after the resurrection.

22. The second and third arguments are not conclusive [nn.16-17] because Christ's body in heaven is a mixed body, and there is contrariety in it there as before. The elements too by nature are in their proper places, although they are outside, and more outside, their places now than they were when in Christ's body before his death; and in the body in itself, and not as it is taken as to its sense organs, earth dominates the most; but earth is most outside its place when it is in heaven, and so it would, by desiring its proper place, do most to cause corruption.

23. The fourth argument [n.18] is not conclusive because the same result follows for the organic parts, for they will, after the resurrection, be of the same complexion as they were before; otherwise they would not be the same parts. So if they were cause of corruption before they will still be so afterwards; and so their complexion will be as necessarily corrupted afterwards as before if they were a necessary cause of corruption.

24. Now the fifth argument [n.19] assumes a false premise, namely that everything generable has a definite period etc.; for posit some stone in existence and take away everything external that is corruptive of it; if the divine maintaining power is also posited along with this general fact, the stone will never be corrupted; it is not then because of an extrinsic agent or because it has a definite limit of duration that it is corrupted. But if mixed bodies are necessarily corrupted, this is through an intrinsic cause, and especially in the case of animate things since in these a contrary quality dominates – as heat, which however is continually fostered in the wet and the wet continually tends toward corruption through the action of the heat. Thus at length, through the action of the heat, there is a corruption of the wet at the root, being a quicker corruption in some and slower in others according as the action of the heat is more or less strong. And so there is no need for a definite external corruptive cause. And thus the limit of generable and mixed corruptible things is longer or shorter because of an intrinsic cause; and something within is cause of the period of corruption rather than something outside. Likewise, the simple elements in mixed bodies are not corrupted in their totality but in part, and that because of the action of some other contrary on them. – But why is it that the contrary acts on it now and not earlier? Surely from the removal of the extrinsic cause that was conserving and producing it always the same. For fire here below is corrupted in winter by the action of the dominating cold, the cause of which is the sun being further away; while in the summer the fire part is generated and the cold near the fire is corrupted, the cause of which is the nearness of the sun. Remove these causes and a simple body is not corrupted because of any definite limit it has in itself, but the limit of the thing follows the cause of corruption, and it is longer or shorter for a cause other than the fact that the thing has a limit.

B. Scotus' own Response

25. To the question then I reply as follows: first by comparing the Word that assumes to the nature that is assumed; second by comparing the nature to its accompanying quality; and third by comparing the assumed nature with its qualities to glory and punishment.

26. Now as to the first point it can be taken in two ways:

Either by comparing the Word as going to assume to the glorious nature to be assumed, for the Word was able to assume a nature simply glorious – and a simply glorious body would in no way have had a necessary cause of corruption.

27. Or in another way, by comparing the Word to the assumption of an innocent nature which, because it is without sin and is a pure nature, has original justice and innocence, as far as concerns the nature in itself. And thus too there

was in the nature no cause deserving of death; and so, because of some gift, namely the gift of original justice, it was able not to die.

28. As to the next point [n.25], by comparing the Word to the assumption of a glorious body in such a way that, because of a miracle, the glory did not redound to the body; and thus, when the miracle was performed in the third instant, there necessarily followed in the fourth instant a cause of necessity for corruption of the body, that is, for the separation of soul from body. Consequently, by comparing the Word to the assumed glorious nature, and when in the third instant there was no redounding of the glory into the body, then I say that there was not only a necessity for the body to be mortal but there was a special miracle for the body to be mortal, because a new miracle impeded the redounding of the soul's glory into the body. And when this new miracle was performed, the body was under a necessity to die, both because glory did not redound into it and because it did not have (as to the body) original justice preserving it from corruption.

29. A confirmation that the body was under a necessity to die when this miracle was performed comes from Augustine, *On Baptism of Infants*, [*On Merits of Sins*, 2.29.n.48], who speaks thus expressly.

30. But where does this necessity of dying come from?

This was because the body, when left to itself (if one compares nature to its principles and to the qualities that naturally follow nature [n.25]), was, by privation of glory, an animal body and so was not under a full enough dominion of the soul to prevent passion in the body. Therefore too the body underwent depletion and restoration through consumption of food; but, if the soul did not have complete dominion over the body, the restoration was incapable of being so perfect that the body would remain immortal.

31. On the contrary: Christ knew how much had to be taken up for the restoration of so much that was lost, in order that as much as had been lost would be restored.

32. I reply that although he knew this yet there are two reasons that the conclusion does not follow, namely weakness in the nutritive power for converting food and impurity of the food that he took in.

33. As to impurity of food [n.32], I believe that if Adam had had our food he would have died of old age. So it is plain that, by reason of the food, 'not anything is able to be generated from anything' ('from anything' as from the term of generation) [*Physics* 1.5.188a33-34], but a determinate thing is generated from a determinate thing. And so, from a purer and better food better blood is generated, and from better and purer blood the body becomes more compact and permanent; hence from corrupt and impure food a very loose flesh is generated. The impurity, then, of Christ's food by comparison with Adam's would have been an extrinsic cause of corruption in Christ (as it is in us), for there would not have been, on the part of the food, as full a restoration as there was a loss.

34. But on the supposition that Christ would have had the 'tree of life', would his body have been incorruptible [n.32]? I say no but that he had an intrinsic cause of dying, for every finite natural power (left to itself and not preserved by some gift conferred on it) suffers and is weakened when acting on

anything material; and I say that, from the fact the power is finite, then the more it is able to act the more its power is weakened, because it cannot act sufficiently for the conservation of the individual (the point is plain from the nutritive power in us, for its power, by long action on and daily conversion of food, is weakened so much that it cannot convert more, and the man dies). The nutritive power in Christ, left to itself, was of this sort, and so it was at length weakened so much that it could no longer effect restoration.

35. The weakness, then, of his nutritive power and the impurity of the food from without would have been naturally a sufficient cause of Christ's death.

C. Doubts and their Solution

36. But there are some doubts about this:

For it seems that when Christ's body was united with the Word it would, without any other miracle, have been preserved from all corruption, for his assumption of the body was of the sort that what was assumed would never be dismissed (according to Damascene, 4.1); therefore it could not have been the case that, while the union of the body with the Word lasted, any part of the flesh would have flowed away and been corrupted, because then what was assumed would have been dismissed; indeed, if its parts did flow away then this seems to have been because of a miracle; therefore it was a miracle that Christ died rather than something natural.

37. Second, because if the parts did flow away then there was restoration of a new part, and that not without a new miracle, because the new part is not united by the old miracle just as the old part is not united by a new miracle; therefore by another miracle.

38. I say to these doubts [nn.36-37] that, after the miracle that the glory of Christ's soul did not redound to his body, there was necessity that the parts of the body should flow away through sweatings and other consumptions; for, when active and passive powers are naturally brought close to each other, consumption must happen if one of the powers dominates the other; but the nutritive power was not able to restore from the food what was lost by their mutual action; and so there was a necessity for a flowing away of parts and for corruption.

39. To the first argument [n.36], when it is said that 'what was once assumed was never dismissed', this is true of the principal parts of a man's body that come together for man's perfection (of this sort are the heterogeneous parts, as heart, head, and hands); but some other parts were dismissed, as suppose he cut his nails or shaved his hair, and so on about parts of flesh and other things; indeed the whole under the idea of 'whole' was dismissed, because the whole as integrated with its parts was not always united, as was plain above [d.2 n.95]; yet the principal parts were always united, and it is about them that Damascene speaks.

40. To the second [n.37], when it says that then another part was added and united by a new miracle, I say that it was not by a new miracle but by the old one. Here one must note that just as the generative power has to generate something distinct in being and place and separate, so the nutritive power has to

generate something the same and united, for nutrition is the generative addition of one thing to another through identity and unity with that other. And I say that the generation of a new part – united to the body – which the body used to have was something merely natural, and the fact that flesh newly generated would be part of the pre-existing body is something natural to both. But the fact that a part be united to the Word was a miracle but not a new one; rather it was done by the old one, because every part of the whole, and everything which is actually part of it, is united by the miracle whereby the whole body was first united to the Word. Nevertheless the natural power did something preparatory for the old miracle, because it brought it about that something was actually part of the body that before was not part of it; but once the old miracle has been performed, that part is united to the Word by the union of the whole, and it is caused by the Word and by the whole Trinity.

D. To the Principal Arguments

41. To the first principal argument [n.2] the answer is that the body is, because of sin, mortal by demerit; and from this it follows that there was no sin in Christ from the first instant in which he assumed innocent nature; and there was in him, from the first instant of nature, no cause of death by demerit. And this in response to the quotation from *Genesis*, that, after Adam had eaten, the first parents had by demerit a necessity to die – also the reasoning [about Adam] does not proceed in this way, but the cause is different, as was said toward the end of the question [n.30].

42. To the second [n.3], after conceding the antecedent, I deny the consequence, and the reason is that an omnipotence for producing anything possible cannot be conferred on a creature, or on anything, unless the thing has in itself one or several forms wherein is rooted a power for making everything possible first come to be; but this sort of form cannot be one or many accidental forms, for an accident does not and cannot have in itself (while it remains an accident) a power for producing all substances, or any substance (I mean producing ‘from itself’); therefore the omnipotence would have to be in the thing by some substantial form that contains virtually, and in perfection, every form or being that is able to come to be. But such a power cannot be conferred on Christ’s soul while it remains a soul, nor on an angel; therefore neither can an act of making cool be conferred on it; and so such a form virtually containing everything is repugnant to it while its nature remains. But to be able to know everything knowable, since to know is not to produce things in being, requires only an intellective power and a habit or the accidental species of which the soul is capable; and because knowing tends to knowable things not by causing them but by knowing them only, therefore the foundation for knowing simply does not require as much perfection as the foundation of a power requires for being able to cause everything possible.

43. To the third [n.4], when it is said that Christ knew equally well how to guard and to restore, I say that he knew if (for the state in which he was) he had had pure food and an unweakened nutritive power; but both of these were lacking;

so there was no conversion of food into blood and flesh as pure as before (so that he should remain always), nor was his power as intense in converting food.

43. To the fourth, when it is said that Christ's soul was most perfect and so it took away every privation (as the form of the heavens does), I say that just as the form of the heavens is not such as to contain all forms in itself perfectly and virtually and causally, so it cannot take away all privation and potentiality in its matter for some other form (if there is matter and potency in the heavens for other forms); and so if in the heavens there is matter of the same nature as here below, there is necessarily privation of matter and potentiality in it for other forms. And therefore, if the heavens are incorruptible, one must say that either its form is simple or that, if it has matter, it is of a different nature and is in potency only to the form that the heaven has of itself.

E. To the Form of the Arguments for the Opinion of Others

45. But as to a response to the form of the arguments for the first opinion above [nn.15-19] (about how those features [sc. the features that conflict with incorruptibility] exist in glorious bodies and yet are incorruptible), it belongs to *Ord. 4 d.49 q.13 nn.2-11*, and therefore is to be put off until then.

II. To the Second Question

A. Solution

46. To the question posed second above [n.8], whether it was in the power of Christ's soul not to die from the violence of the passion, I say that if Christ's soul had been left to itself absolutely then, from the fact it was glorious, its glory would have redounded to the body, and consequently it would have been in the power of the soul not to die from any passion.

47. But because, in the fourth instant, his body was, by a miracle, without the redounding into it of glory (as is plain from the preceding question [nn.28-30]), the body was in the fourth instant necessarily corruptible through passion.

48. Nor was it in the power of the soul to preserve the body from suffering. The reason is that, by the institution of nature, it was the case that, after the Fall, some of the active elements were of a nature to dominate over some of the passive ones – then the argument goes: all bodies capable of change and corruption can be corrupted by the approach to them of the dominating active element; Christ's body was of this sort from the first instant of union until death; therefore through the approach of such active element a disposition or quality could have been induced in the body that was incompossible with the passive animation of the body, and so the body could have been deprived in life or by death, because the soul perfects only a body disposed to it.

B. Objections

49. If you say that, just as the soul is created and united [sc. with the body] by God alone, so God alone can separate it, and thus nothing else (no cause of suffering) can separate the soul – nothing else, I mean, other than the first Uniter.

50. A second proof is that if keeping the body from suffering was not in the power of Christ's soul, then his passion and his soul's separation were not voluntary, and so not meritorious either.

51. Third, that if not-dying was not in the power of Christ's soul then his suffering was coerced; and if so, it was not meritorious.

C. Response to the Objections

52. To the first of these objections [n.49], when it says that only God can unite the soul to the body, there could be a doubt whether at the resurrection (when the body will be supremely disposed to the soul) the soul could reunite itself or whether, in generating man, it unites the intellective soul to the body, meaning by 'union' the organizing and fitting disposition of the body so it is ultimately perfectible by the intellective soul. Now as to the first point [sc. the union or reunion of soul to body] the place for discussing it is found in *Ord. 4* d.43 q.3 nn.21-22, q.4 n.15. But if one concedes the antecedent (that 'only God can unite the soul to the body'), I deny the consequence (that 'only God can cause separation' [of the soul from the body, n.49]), because while a natural or created agent can induce a quality in the body that is incompossible with passive animation of the body, it cannot cause any quality in the body on which would necessarily follow, by absolute necessity, the animation of the body; so the consequence is not valid, for no disposition caused in the body by a natural agent is cause simply of the passive animation of the body (an example: fire can by its action cause a quality suited for separating soul from body, but it cannot cause any necessity for uniting the intellective soul to the body –I mean fire cannot do so by itself alone).

53. On the contrary: it is commonly said [Richard of Middleton] that a natural agent does induce a disposition in the organic body, namely the perfect organization and due complexion of the elements, which is the simply necessitating disposition for inducing the soul.

54. I reply that no disposition induced in matter by a natural agent is a necessitating disposition for the infusion of the soul (but whatever the disposition is, since it exists on the part of the matter under matter's idea of being receptive of form and in potency to form, that disposition is in contradicitive potency to the intellective soul⁹⁹). For if it were such a necessitating disposition, then the disposition induced in matter by a natural agent would necessitate God's causing and creating the soul and animation of the body – which is false. The Philosopher, however, would have to say it, because he posited that God acts naturally and does whatever he does by necessity of nature [*Ord. 1* d.8 n.251-252]. And so, just as the Philosopher posits that, when air is supremely hot and supremely disposed for the form of fire, the necessary result is that fire acts on the air and corrupts its

⁹⁹ *Metaphysics* 9.8.1050b8-12: "Every power is a power at once for contradiction:...what is possible to be is able to be and not to be."

form as air, so he would posit that, when the organic body is disposed by the action of a natural agent, God necessarily creates the soul in the body by animating the body. But just as the Philosopher erred in that principle (positing that God creates everything by necessity of nature), so theologians, by rejecting the Philosopher as to that principle, must necessarily reject him as to the conclusion, because no natural agent can simply necessitate matter for passive animation. Rather any disposition caused in matter by a natural agent is in contradictive power to form and to animation by God, for God causes voluntarily and contingently whatever he causes that is outside himself.

55. To the second objection [n.50], when it is said that Christ's passion was then not meritorious, I say that the will can have a meritorious act about any object that is not in its power, or indeed that is necessarily unable to be otherwise, just as the will can love God with love of friendship by willing him good, namely by willing him to be just and wise and other things of the sort, and yet, whether the will wills or not, God is wise, just, etc. Thus too Christ's will could have had merit about Christ's passion, although it was not in his will's power to prevent it, namely by his consenting to the passion and accepting it because of the good following from it and because it was accepted by God.

56. To the third objection [n.51], when it is said that if it was not in the soul's power not to suffer then the passion was coerced and not meritorious, I say that coercion is in one way opposed to what is natural [*Physics* 2.1.192b13-36, 8.4.255a2-4] and in another way opposed to what is voluntary [*Ethics* 3.1.1110a1-3]. In the first way, since it is natural for a stone to go downwards, it is coerced and against natural inclination for it to go upwards – and 'going upwards' is coerced in this way because opposed to the natural inclination of the stone. And in this way of speaking about what is coerced (the way it is against the natural inclination of nature itself), death was coerced because against the natural inclination of the body, because the natural inclination of the body is to be perfected by the soul. In another way the coerced is opposed to the voluntary, and then, according to what was said above [d.15 n.95], as to the way the passion was not wanted and yet as not wanted happened, the passion was coerced and Christ did not thus merit by suffering it; in another way, as willed and as accepted by the will, it is meritorious and not coerced. These points are made plain in d.15 nn.98, 100, 126.

D. To the Principal Arguments

57. To the first principal argument [n.9], when it is said that Christ's soul dominated the body more than it did the appetite, therefore etc., I say that the soul does not dominate the body (as to every potency that belongs to the body) more than it dominates the sense appetite; indeed it dominates less, for as to the powers of the vegetative soul that belong to the body it does not dominate the body, but it does dominate as to the motive power, so that the soul can move the body hither and thither in place and to this work or to that work as it pleases. But it is not thus with the vegetative powers, because these are wholly irrational and not obedient to the soul in their acts; for although it is in the power of the soul to provide them

with the matter on which they act, yet once the matter is provided to them they are not subject to the dominion of the soul in their acts; and so from impure intake of food and weakening of power in converting it, the power would have been corruptible and death would have followed. Again, Christ's soul did not so dominate the sense appetite that his sense appetite could not suffer, but he was truly in pain; therefore he did not so dominate his body that, because of the domination of the soul, it could not suffer. And so the argument assumes something false, namely that 'his soul dominated his sense appetite so that it did not suffer, and thus it dominated his body more'.

58. To the second argument, from *John* [n.10], I say that the 'I' in the supposit or subject place ['I have power...'] and in apposition ['...from myself'] stand for the same person but not according to the same nature, as follows: 'I, the supposit of the Word according to divine nature, lay down my soul from myself according to human nature, because I lay down my soul from my body and not from the Word'; so that the 'power of laying down and separating' are attributed to the Word, but 'his soul suffering separation from the body' he did by reason of human nature, where the separation was made.

59. The answer to the third argument [n.11] is plain from the same point, that as 'man' he received the commandment of laying down his soul: he laid down his soul by consenting to it and suffering it, but not by effecting it, such that the effecting of it was in the soul's power. Such an exposition of the text is not a forced one, because the same authority can be expounded partly of the head and partly of the members, as in this case, 'he was able to sin and did not sin' [*Ecclesiasticus* 31.10], where 'being able to sin' is expounded of the members and 'not sinning' is expounded of the head; thus one and the same thing can in one respect be expounded of Christ as he is an eternal supposit, and by reason of his being a supposit in divine nature, and in another respect of the created nature in the supposit.

60. To the fourth argument [n.12], about the loud cry, I say that it was another miracle, namely that he cried aloud even in the hour of death, or it was by the power of the Word; and so his soul was miraculously separated from the body before the hour of separation due to the violence of the passion. But it was not a new miracle that he thus cried in the hour of death, but it came from the old miracle whereby his glory did not redound to his body – just as everything that he suffered was in some way miraculous, although natural, because what could not happen save by presupposing a miracle could, even though a miracle was presupposed, come about naturally – but this natural coming about was in a way a miracle in relation to the necessarily presupposed miracle. However, the fact that Christ suffered in body and sensitive soul, or in the lower part of reason or even in the higher part, was because of the miracle that the glory of his soul did not redound to the body, nor to the lower part. Therefore the whole of what he suffered was a miracle and yet happened naturally once the miracle was performed (just as the man born blind sees naturally when his eye has been miraculously illumined, and as the body lives naturally when the intellective soul is supernaturally added to it).

Seventeenth Distinction

Single Question

Whether there were Two Wills in Christ

1. About the seventeenth distinction the question is whether^a there were two wills in Christ.

a. [Interpolation] About the seventeenth question (where the Master deals with the things Christ did through his human nature), because the principle of human doing is the will, without which no work is either meritorious or praiseworthy, therefore the first question to ask is about the will, and in the next distinction [d.18] about merit. The question asked about the present distinction then is whether...

2. The evidence that there are not two wills in Christ is:

First, because every will is lord of its act; but if in Christ there were two wills, one would not be will because it would not be lord of its acts. The proof is that that power is not lord of its act which follows the movement of another power, because to follow in this way is not to be lord of one's act but to be subject to another with respect to one's act; but if there be a created will in Christ, it follows in its act the movement of the uncreated will of the Word, for the Word performed the operation of human nature; therefore etc.

3. Second, if in Christ there be two wills then the argument is that there are not two only, for since there is a free will there, following the created intellect, and besides this a natural will, then, since free will and natural will have an opposite manner of bearing and tending to their objects, the result is that there will be two created wills in Christ; and there is an uncreated will in him; therefore etc.

4. On the contrary:

He had only two intellects, namely an uncreated and a created intellect; therefore similarly he had only two wills.

I. To the Question

5. Damascene 58 [3.14] solves this question by saying that just as one must firmly hold by faith that in Christ there are two natures and a single hypostasis, so one must concede (as a consequent from it) that there are in him the natural properties and powers of each nature; but the most perfect powers of rational nature are intellect and will; so there are in him a created intellect and a created will.

6. In d.13 nn.53-54, 87 above it is maintained that there was supreme created grace in Christ and supreme created enjoyment, and in d.14 nn.58, 67-70

it is maintained that in him was all knowledge and supreme vision, by reason of the assumed nature.

7. The Church maintains the same in its Sixth Synod, when it determines that in Christ there are two wills and two operations [Canon ch.9, Gratian *Decretum* p.1 d.16 ch.16].

8. Since, therefore, knowledge [n.6] presupposes intellect and will, one must posit both powers in Christ in their best disposition; and so there is a created will in him.

9. But is the created will in Christ one only?

I reply that the will can be taken in its proper idea, or in its general idea and name, namely as appetite. If it is taken generally then there were at least three appetites in Christ, namely uncreated intellectual appetite, created rational appetite, and created irrational appetite (that is, sense appetite); but will properly speaking adds something to appetite, because it is “free appetite with reason” [*Rhetoric* 1.101369a24]. And so, strictly speaking, there were only two appetites in Christ.

10. But commonly speaking, and taking will in the sense of appetite, I think that in this way there were in Christ, as in us, as many appetites as there are in us distinct apprehending powers; and thus, just as there is a different apprehending of taste and sight and another of taste and smell, so there is a different appetite proper to this one and to that, and a different proper appetite consequent to this apprehending and to that.

11. However we commonly speak of the sense appetite as single, and it is the appetite that follows the imagining power, because just as the imagining power imagines the objects of each of the senses (in the presence and in the absence of those senses), so its appetite delights in them if they are agreeable, or is pained by them if they are disagreeable. But just as, notwithstanding the fact that the imagining power can thus imagine the objects of each of the senses (both in their presence and in their absence), we nevertheless posit certain particular senses that apprehend distinct particular objects – so, notwithstanding the fact that the appetite consequent to the imagining power can desire and rejoice in the agreeableness of every sensible particular and not desire or be pained by their disagreeableness, so by parity of reasoning one must posit distinct particular appetites that are consequent to particular apprehendings or to distinct apprehending powers; and there is the same necessity to power distinct appetites as there is to posit distinct apprehending powers.

12. But what of natural will and free will – are they two powers?

I say that natural appetite in any thing is taken as a general name for the natural inclination of a thing to its proper perfection – as a stone is inclined naturally to the center; and if in a stone that inclination is some absolute thing other than gravity (weight), then I believe as a result that in a like way the natural inclination of a man, as he is a man, to his proper perfection is something other than free will. But I believe the first point to be false, namely that the inclination of a stone to the center is some absolute thing other than gravity and is a different power, which different power has some operation toward the center, as some imagine; for then the operation would be miraculous, for there would be no

possibility of giving a term to it since it would be a transient action passing outside to something other. And as the center is agreeable to it, it does not perform an action corruptive of it or preservative of it, since one cannot posit what that operation would be or what is the term of it, save perhaps that of the preserving of its proper ‘where’; for perhaps its ‘where’ in the center is continually coming to be (like light in the medium); but then the action is not to the center, for the ‘where’ is in the thing placed not in the thing that places it, and the center is what places a body in it; therefore the inclination does not state thing over and above gravity (weight) but the relation of the inclination of it to the center as to its proper perfection. Then I say that so also is it about the will, that natural will is not a will, nor is a natural willing a willing, but the term ‘natural’ diminishes both and is nothing but a relation consequent to the power in respect of its proper perfection; hence the same power can be called ‘natural will’ with a necessary respect to perfection consequent to it, and it is called ‘free’ according to its proper and intrinsic idea, which is will in the specific sense.

14. In another way will can be called natural as it is distinguished from supernatural power or will; and will as thus existing in its pure natural state is distinguished from itself as it is informed with the freely given gifts [of the spirit].

15. There is yet a third way in which ‘natural will’ is taken, namely as it elicits an act in conformity with natural inclination, which inclination is always toward the advantageous; and in this way the will is free in eliciting a conformed act as it is free in eliciting an opposite act, for in its power is the eliciting or not eliciting of a conformed act (the supernatural will elicits only conformed acts).

II. To the Principal Arguments

16. As to the first principal argument [n.2], I concede the major, that ‘every will is lord of its act’. And when it is said in the minor that ‘the will that follows the movement of another power is subject in its act and not lord of its act’, I say – as elsewhere in d.1 nn.17, 80-81 – that the Word has no causality over the act of the created will in Christ that the whole Trinity does not have; and so the created will in the Word is no more deprived of lordship with respect to its acts because of its union with the Word than if it was not united to the Word.

17. But then further to the argument [n.2], according to the double opinion touched on in *Ord. 2 dd.34-37 nn.97-107, 113, 119-128, 142-154*:

If the will is the immediate and total cause of its act, so that it does not follow the movement of the Trinity that, along with the will, causes the act of the will – but the Trinity only places the will in its first existence and if the will moves itself in its acts, such that the Trinity does not operate in the operation of the will save because the Trinity works for the existence of the will (according to one opinion) – then the minor is false that ‘the will follows in its operation the movement of another power’; for although it follows the movement of another power in its existence as regard first act, yet it does not do so as regard operation (immediately, I mean).

But if the view be held that the will would immediately cause its operation and nevertheless God too immediately causes it along with the will, just as he

immediately causes the existence of the will, then because (as I said [n.16]) the Word has no special operation different from the whole Trinity, yet the Word and not the whole Trinity is denominated by the operation of the created will (because of the union that produces the sharing of characteristics) – then I say that the created will in Christ elicit its acts freely and is lord of its act just as my will does and is lord now, for God does not operate with his operation unless the created will freely acts and determines itself to operation, and then God operates along with it; but nevertheless the first freedom and lordship is not in the created will but in God's will, which does not have another cause operating along with it for its act but yet is as much in the creature as it can be in it.

18. As to the second argument [n.3], when it is said that free will and natural will are two wills, I say that natural will – as such and as it is natural – is not will as a power but imports only the inclination of the power to receiving its perfection, not to acting as such; and therefore it is imperfect, unless it is under the perfection to which the tendency inclines the power. Hence the natural power does not tend but is the tendency whereby the absolute will tends – and that passively – to receiving [its perfection]. But there is another tendency in the same power, so that it tends freely and actively in eliciting its act, so that there is one power and a double tendency (an active and a passive tendency). Then to the form of the argument [n.3], I say that natural will, according to what it formally imports, is not power or will but the inclination of the will and the tendency whereby it tends to passively receiving its perfection.

Appendix (from Antonius Andreas)

Eighteenth Distinction

Single Question

Whether Christ Merited in the First Instant of his Conception

Bonaventure, 3 *Sent.* d.18 q. 1, a.1

Scotus, 3 *Sent.* d.18 q.1

Thomas, *ST IIIa* q.9 a.4

Richard of St. Victor, 3 *Sent.* d.8 q.2

Durandus, 3 *Sent.* d.18 q.2

1. About the eighteenth distinction the question asked is whether Christ could have merited and, if so, whether he did so in the first instant of his conception.

2. That he could not have merited is proved thus: he was not able to sin, therefore not to merit either. The antecedent is plain because his will was perfectly united to the ultimate end by act of enjoyment. The proof of the consequence is that, if Christ could have merited, then the blessed could merit now. For an act is meritorious to the extent that a right act is freely elicited, although a non-right act could be elicited.

3. Again, a meritorious act is either the same as a beatific act of enjoyment or it is not. If it is the same then it is not meritorious, otherwise it would be meritorious now and in the blessed likewise. If it is not the same then, since a meritorious act has God for object, and just as a beatific act of enjoyment is adequate to the whole of the will, the result would be that the same power about the same object will have an adequate act and an additional act.

4. Again, that he did not merit in the instant of conception in particular is argued thus: a meritorious act is contingent and free; but in the first instant of conception the act would be necessary, because while a thing is coming to be it is necessarily coming to be, but it could not have had choice before then, as is plain.

5. Again, two changes where the term of one presupposes the term of the other cannot be simultaneous; but creation of the will and the acting or motion of the will are of this sort. For a meritorious act, which is the term of an acting or motion of the will, necessarily presupposes the being of the will, which is the term of the creation of the will; therefore etc.

6. On the contrary: that Christ could have merited is plain, because he was truly a wayfarer as we are; therefore etc.

7. That he merited in the first instant is plain, because sufficient for being able to merit are a free power, grace, a presented object, and the power being able to perform an act about that object through the mediation of grace. But all these were in Christ in the first instant of his conception. The first three of these are plain from what has been said. The fourth is proved from Augustine *On the Trinity* 6: if fire were eternal its splendor would be co-eternal, and yet the splendor is an effect of fire; therefore an effect can be coeternal with its cause.

To the Question

8. I reply that it is difficult to see that Christ merited, for since he was truly a blessed, then, if he could have merited, any of the blessed by parity of reasoning can merit, and so, since to merit there always corresponds a reward, the blessed would never have their ultimate reward.

9. The first thing then to see is what merit is; the second how Christ could have merited; the third how he could have done so in the first instant of conception.

10. About the first I say that merit is some act virtuous and praiseworthy in view of some further end, which corresponds to the act as a reward according to the acceptation of the rewarder. By the first part of this description all vicious and indifferent acts are excluded from the idea of merit. By the second part all acts that are beatific acts and contain beatific acts are excluded; for a beatific act, since it is the ultimate to be expected in the genus of acts, does not have the idea of merit since it cannot be ordered to another further act. Similarly acts that follow a beatific act cannot be ordered to another further act by which they obtain the ultimate. By the third part all acts are excluded from the idea of merit that are elicited by someone, or are in someone, who does not have charity from the ordination of God, so that charity alone is the reason for acceptation to the eternal reward.

11. About the second [n.9] it is said that Christ only merited according to his sensitive part because he could only suffer as to this part. But this is not sufficient, especially since he could also suffer as to his intellective part as concerns its lower part, as has been shown. For grief over sins cannot be in the sensitive part and he grieved over our sins, according to Ambrose, as was said there.

12. I say about this point, then, that Christ merited as to all the acts of his sense part as these were commanded by his will; for all such acts were right by will, since commanded by right will, and he could truly suffer and be wayfarer as to the sense part.

13. Again I say that he also merited as to all the acts of the intellective part as to its lower part, because he could suffer and so be a wayfarer also as to this part – and I say this as to the acts that regard what is for the end. For the acts of the intellective part that regard the ultimate end simply are acts of the higher part. For the higher and lower parts are not diverse powers but the same power is called the higher part as it regards the ultimate end simply, but it is called the lower part as it regards things that are for the end in respect of the ultimate itself, that is, that are according to eternal rules.

14. But against this seems to be that a power which is simply in its term cannot merit, since merit is ordered to the reward that responds to it as its term; but the inferior part in Christ was simply in the term, for it was joined to the higher part, which was simply blessed. Therefore etc.

15. I reply that Christ's lower part being in the term simply can be understood in two ways, namely either as to the affection for justice and to

impeccability, and in this way the statement is true; or as to the affection for advantage and impassibility, and in this way it is not true, as is plain in d.15; therefore etc. But this suffices for being able to merit; therefore etc.

16. I say further that every act too of the higher part in Christ could have been meritorious, and if it could have been it was; and although this be more difficult to prove because of the authority of some of the saints, yet I prove it as follows:

17. God can accept any praiseworthy act for some reward; but every act of Christ's higher part was a praiseworthy and beatific act; therefore etc. The minor is plain. The proof of the major is that even if to a beatific act there cannot correspond as reward another beatific act in the same thing, or an intensification of it (for then it would not be ultimate and most perfect), yet there can correspond to it as reward some good in something else; and in this way Christ merited for us. And so, according to the major of this reasoning, one must say that even now a created beatific act of someone blessed could, without contradiction, be accepted by God for some reward in another, though in fact it is not so. For it was so in Christ up to his death and resurrection because he was not entirely outside the state of this life; indeed in some aspect of himself he was truly a wayfarer, and this by way of dispensation, so that he might merit for us.

18. About the third main point [n.9] I say that Christ could have merited in the first instant of his conception, nor do I see the opposite. The reason is that it is possible to say that, for a meritorious act, there is only required an unimpeded power of will, the habit of grace, and an object presented in idea of object; but all these were present in Christ's soul in the first instant of his conception; therefore etc. The major is plain. The declaration of the minor is that Christ's will in the first instant in the soul was perfect as to first act, and grace was most perfect, as is plain from what has been said; and in the same instant there could have been presented to him the whole of what he was due to suffer for our salvation according to the will of God the Father. For he had in his intellect in the same instant most perfect knowledge, as is plain; therefore, in the same instant he could have voluntarily accepted what was shown to him, and consequently earn merit.

19. But you will say not so, because a meritorious act is an elicited act, and choice chooses to deliberate first; deliberation requires the practical syllogism, and so as a result requires discursive reasoning and some delay.

20. I reply by saying that this is true in the case of someone who is not perfectly habituated, but it is not true in the case of someone who is perfectly habituated. Hence it is said by the Philosopher that if a lyre player, when he has to play a chord, were to deliberate first, he would have imperfect knowledge of how to play the lyre; and this is certainly sufficiently plain. Hence if someone virtuous is once exercised in virtuous acts, he would immediately accept a choosable good, without any prior deliberation, as soon as it was presented to him; and it would be similar in its own way with anyone virtuous, as is plain; but no one was ever as completely habituated, whether in virtue or in knowledge, as Christ was habituated in virtue and knowledge in the first moment; therefore etc.

21. Next to the principal arguments to the contrary:

As to the first [n.2] I concede the antecedent but deny the consequence.

The proof is plain in the reply taken from what was said in the question about how Christ, although he was blessed as to his higher part, could yet have merited as to his lower part and sense part, insofar as he was able to suffer; and even according to his higher part he could have merited, as was said above. Nor does it follow from this that the blessed could merit, because they are outside the state of this life. But Christ was truly a wayfarer. Nor even is it necessary that a meritorious act be able to be elicited non-rightly; but it is sufficient that the act be right and free and possessed of charity – which is the idea of merit that is orderable to some end that would correspond to it as reward, whether in itself or in another; otherwise the blessed Virgin could not have merited, since she was confirmed [in good].

22. To the second [n.3] I say, as was said above, that there was a meritorious act in Christ, both the beatific act and other acts. And when it is said ‘if beatific then [not]meritorious’, I say that this does not follow, because now Christ and the blessed are always in the term both as to affection of justice and impeccability and as to affection of advantage and impassibility. But then [during his earthly life] Christ was in the term only as to the first affection, as was said before. And when an additional act etc. is mentioned, I say that a beatific act is adequate to the power intensively, such that the power cannot elicit a more intense and more perfect act. But it is not adequate extensively, since there can be along with it at the same time other more imperfect acts, though acts about other immediate objects; otherwise the blessed would never see things in the Word and even less in their proper genus. And when it is said that a meritorious act has God for object, I say not necessarily for immediate object but certainly for final object, as that every meritorious act is because of God as end. Hence in Christ the only meritorious act that had God for immediate object was the beatific act, but others of his meritorious acts had other things (or powers in the Word or in their proper genus) for immediate object, by referring them to God as to final end, as is plain.

23. To the objection [n.4], that he did not merit in the instant of conception, I concede the major but deny the minor. For as nothing is formally necessary save when it actually exists, so nothing is formally contingent save when it is actual. Hence I say that a cause need not precede a contingent effect in duration, but it is enough that it precede in nature. Hence even if the world were from eternity, it would yet be contingently produced, and God would from eternity have determined to produce the world in such and such a ‘now’, and he could then have determined the opposite. And when it is said that while a thing comes to be it must be coming to be, I say that this is true in the composite sense but false in the divided sense; hence the conclusion does not absolutely follow, that therefore it must come to be. So this proposition is true in the composite sense: ‘when Christ’s will is willing in the first instant it is necessarily willing’; but it does not follow, ‘therefore he necessarily wills in the first instant’ but rather he willed contingently, and he was able not to will the good things that were presented to

him, though he could not will against them. because he was already confirmed in good.

24. To the final objection [n.5], I say that, as to simultaneity of nature but not as to simultaneity of duration, it is true that when the sun shines the sun illumines. Note too that it is not necessary that every meritorious act be elicited by him for whom the act is meritorious, for it is possible for one person to merit for another, as Christ merited for us. But hence it is necessary that the meritorious act be voluntarily and freely elicited by him by whom it is elicited. Hence also someone could merit by an act caused in his will by God, and he would by that act be formally willing but not causally so.

Nineteenth Distinction

Single Question

*Whether Christ Merited Grace and Glory and Remission of Guilt and Punishment
for all Men*

Bonaventure, 3 *Sent.* d.18 q. 3, a.2

Scotus, 3 *Sent.* d.19 q.1

Thomas, *ST IIIa* q.48 a.1

Richard of St. Victor, 3 *Sent.* d.19 q.3

Durandus, 3 *Sent.* d.18 q.3

1. About the nineteenth distinction the question asked is whether Christ merited remission of guilt and punishment and conferring of grace and glory for all men, past, present, and future.

2. That he did not: merit is always ordered to reward, and reward always exceeds merit; but the rewards of all men do not exceed the merits of Christ, nor are they more noble; therefore etc.

3. Against this is Pope Leo in his sermon on the nativity: ‘as he found no one free of guilt, so he came to liberate all’.

To the Question

4. I reply that Christ did merit for all as regard sufficiency but not as regard efficacy.

5. The proof of the first is that the sins and punishments of all men cannot be formally infinite, but the merits of Christ had a certain infinity; for just as the life of Christ is said to be infinite because the life of Christ is the life of the Word, so the death of Christ is said to be infinite to the extent that the death of Christ is the death of the Word or of God; and the meritorious works of Christ are said to be certain infinites to the extent that they are the works of the Word.

6. The second [n.4] is also proved because the acts of active things are in the things that receive and are well disposed to them; but not all men disposed,

and dispose, themselves for remission of sins and of punishment and for grace and for glory.

7. Against the first proof [n.5]: the works of Christ were not uncreated and did not pertain to his divinity; therefore they were created and finite and pertain to his humanity; therefore they do not have true infinity but infinity is said hyperbolically. There is a confirmation too, that acts belong only to supposita as they are agents, but the agent does not give infinity to the effect; therefore the meritorious works of Christ, since they pertain to humanity, are not infinite, although they are elicited by the supposit of the Word; for the formal principle of such works is finite (namely humanity) and from the principle or the humanity they have finitude¹⁰⁰; therefore etc.

8. I reply then that just as everything that is from God is good because God wills it and not conversely, so what is good is meritorious because God accepts it and not conversely. Therefore, to the extent God can actively accept something, to that extent the good thing can passively receive the acceptance; therefore an equivalence between the good that is accepted and the accepting of it is not necessarily required, and this is plain from an example. For he who strikes the ball on the playing field wins the prize, not indeed that the act of striking the thing is by nature equivalent to the prize, but it is equivalent by the voluntary acceptance of the one who institutes the game, and so the prize is due also according to distributive justice.

9. I say then to the point at issue [n7] that the merit of Christ was in itself and formally finite because elicited by the medium of a finite principle, and the merits of Christ do not bestow infinity on themselves by their respect to the supposit or to the end, for all these respects are finite; and so Christ's merit in its formal idea and by the nature of the thing was only finitely acceptable; and yet God accepted it infinitely in extension, that is, for the deletion of infinite sins, whether the sins existed together or in succession, and so for liberation from infinite punishments and for the conferring of infinite graces and glories; and therefore the saints say that Christ's merit was sufficient for the redemption of infinite worlds, if infinite worlds existed. And this is true, because the whole Trinity voluntarily actively accepted Christ's merits. And the Trinity could thus accept by congruity the works of Christ more than of someone else because of the condition of the supposit of Christ who did them – even if not wholly because of the work worked, yet in itself and from the nature of the thing.

10. But what did Christ merit for us? I say that he merited the first grace wholly, without any assistance on our part, by means of the sacraments, as is plain of baptism where grace is conferred without any previous disposition in children (and this grace opposes original sin, which is the first sin). He also merited for us a second grace in penance, opposing actual mortal sin; but for this grace a disposition and contrition and the like are required on our part; and so in the case of the baptism of adults some contrition is required for actual sins. Christ also merited for us the opening of the gates of Paradise.

11. But there is a doubt here, that if Christ merited for all of us the first grace against original sin then, since the Fathers of the Old Testament had grace

¹⁰⁰ The text has 'infinity', which seems to be a typographical error.

destroying original sin (otherwise they would have been damned), it follows that the reward preceded the merit; and so by parity of reasoning the opinion of Master Lombard in Book 2 could be true, that grace preceded merit in the Angels such that they merited later in the guardianship they exercise toward us. And if it be said that the passion of Christ as foreseen by God and offered to him and accepted by him merited grace for everyone and that, as such, it preceded, then by parity of reasoning it can be said that the passion could from eternity have merited predestination for the predestinate (for it was thus foreseen and accepted from eternity), and so predestination will have a cause.

12. I say to the first point [about the Angels, n.11] that the reward that properly and principally corresponds in us to the merit of Christ is eternal glory, which was given to no one before Christ's passion took place in fact; however it came from his merits, because their future satisfaction for the human race was presented to God in advance of all the Fathers, indeed from eternity, and was also foreseen by God and accepted by him as being a satisfaction and as meriting grace and glory – but in different ways; for glory was not to be given before Christ's works were performed in fact; and thus it is plain that Christ's merit in some way preceded all grace and remission of guilt; and so it is plain that what the Master says about the Angels does not hold.

13. But a response remains to be made to the second objection, about predestination [n.11]. I say to this point that the consequence does not hold. For God predestined the elect in a moment of nature prior to his foreseeing Christ's passion; for this reason, note that the order in question was of the following sort from eternity. For God from eternity in the first moment of nature understood himself under the idea of supreme good. In the second moment he understood creatures in himself. In the third moment he foresaw that some of them must, of their own liberty, finally act well and some finally act badly; and also he saw the former whom he indeed predestined, and about the rest he had a negative act in not predestining them. In the fourth moment he saw that all of them, the former and the latter, would fall in Adam. In the fifth moment he preordained and foresaw a remedy, namely as to how all had to be redeemed through the merits of his Son's passion.

14. And to the principal argument [n.2] the response is plain from what has been said.

Twentieth Distinction

Single Question

Whether it was Necessary for the Human Race to be Repaired by the Passion of Christ

Bonaventure, 3 *Sent.* d.20 q. 1, a.1

Scotus, 3 *Sent.* d.20 q.1

Thomas, *ST IIIa* q.46 as.2-3

Richard of St. Victor, 3 *Sent.* d.20 q.2

Durandus, 3 *Sent.* d.11 q.1

Francis of Meyronnes, 3 *Sent.* d.17 q.2

1. About the twentieth distinction the question asked is whether it was fitting for the human race to be redeemed by the passion of Christ.

2. That it was not: a nobler nature, namely the Angelic nature, was not redeemed nor will be redeemed; therefore neither should human nature, which is more ignoble, have been redeemed.

3. On the contrary is Anselm in *Why God man?*

To the Question

4. I reply that this question is a purely theological one, and Anselm seems to have written his book, *Why God man*, because of it.

5. First it is necessary to see that it was necessary for man to be redeemed; second that man could not be redeemed without satisfaction; third that satisfaction had to be done by God-man; fourth that it was fitting that it be done through the passion of Christ.

6. I prove the first as follows: God and nature do nothing in vain; but man is ordered to eternal beatitude; therefore if man could not attain it he would be in vain; but he could not have attained it after the fall if he had not been redeemed; therefore etc. This is in Anselm's book *Why God man* 2.

7. I prove the second [n.5] as follows: someone is said to be unjust if he does not pay a man what he owes; therefore he is more unjust if he does not pay God what he owes; but no one who is unjust is admitted to eternal life; therefore etc. On this Anselm in *Why God man* 1. But you will say that man is not unjust because he is excused through inability. Again, because his offenses could have been forgiven through mercy without satisfaction. But Anselm meets these responses as follows:

8. To the first he says that though some inability excuses yet not an inability to which man voluntarily subjected himself; on the contrary, such inability is sin. But this is in fact the case because man received from God the power of rendering him honor, for he received original justice; but he voluntarily made himself incapable of this; therefore etc.

9. To the second [n.7] Anselm says that either God so remitted to man the debt, whereby he was obliged to render God honor, that man could in no way have this debt; and to attribute this sort of mercy to God would be ridiculous. Or God remitted it in this way, that he wanted to reward man without man's returning his debt to God; and so he will reward man without man's rendering God honor; therefore he will reward man for sin, which is absurd; therefore etc.

10. I prove the third [n. 5] as follows: satisfaction could not be made to the Creator unless more or as much was returned to him as was taken from him; but man by sin took away the honor due to God himself; but the honor due to God is greater than any creature; therefore it was necessary that something be returned and sacrificed to God that was greater than any creature; therefore God-man. Anselm on this in his book.

11. Next the minor [n.10] is proved thus: because man by sin took from God what God had disposed about man to do; but God had disposed about man to repair the fall of the Angels; but a creature was not able to do the repair since he could not justify; therefore etc.

12. The fourth [n.5] I prove as follows: because man sinned through the sweetness of taste; therefore he who satisfied had to satisfy through bitterness; but nothing is more bitter than death; therefore etc. Anselm in his book 2.

To the Argument

13. Next, in response to the argument to the contrary [n.2], some say that the case of Angels and men is not alike, because many of the Angels remained but none of the men did.

14. But this response is not valid, especially for those who make it, because they posit that each Angel constitutes a single species; therefore since many Angels fell, many species fell that were more noble than one more ignoble species; but men make one species; therefore etc.

15. Another response is that the case of Angels and men is not alike because man was tempted by another, while the Angel was not but sinned from pure malice.

16. But this response too does not seem to be valid, for it is likely that Satan tempted the other Angels to go along with him, and this is found in *Revelation* 3 when it is said that there was war in heaven between the Dragon and Michael, such that the Dragon, that is Lucifer, prevailed in tempting others and inducing them to his side; but Michael and his Angels did not thus side with the others; therefore etc.

17. I say otherwise, then, that because man was of a weaker and more imperfect nature therefore the temptation was more violent for him, and his fall was less imputed to him than the fall of the Angels was to the Angels, who were of a more perfect nature and had a clearer knowledge; and so the fall of the Angels was graver.

Twenty First Distinction

Single Question

Whether Christ's Body would have Putrefied if his Resurrection had not been Hastened

Bonaventure, 3 *Sent.* d.21 q. 2, a.1

Scotus, 3 *Sent.* d.21 q.1

Thomas, *ST* IIIa q.51 a.3

Richard of St. Victor, 3 *Sent.* d.21 q.2

Durandus, 3 *Sent.* d.21 q.2

1. About the twenty first distinction the question asked is whether Christ's body would have putrefied if his resurrection had not been hastened.

2. That it would have: nature does not begin a motion that it cannot bring to an end (from *Metaphysics* 2 and *Physics* 5); but the end of man's corruption is the reduction of the corpse to ashes; therefore since Christ was dead, his body would have been reduced to ashes. There is also a confirmation that, according to Damascene (3.19), Christ assumed man's penal defects and not the defects of guilt.

3. On the contrary: in *Psalm* 15 it is said: 'You will not suffer your holy one to see corruption'.

To the Question

4. I reply by saying that a future effect, which has sufficient, particular, natural causes that are not impeded, is simply and truly declared to come about; but if its particular causes are impeded by a simply higher cause, it will not come about, though it might come about in a certain respect. An example: King Hezekiah [*Isaiah* 38] was due to die from his sickness according to particular causes, and so Isaiah declared his death to him; but, because of his tears and prayers God impeded the particular causes for 15 years; therefore the effect of his death did not come about until the 15th year.

5. Next to the issue at hand: since Christ's body was mixed of the elements it had sufficient, natural, particular, intrinsic causes of corruption, as the four active and passive and extrinsic qualities by which it was able to suffer and be corrupted, as by hot and cold and other things of that sort. These causes, however, were impeded by a higher cause, namely by God, who suspended their action miraculously and supernaturally so that they had no power for such effect of corruption. This much is well said and I concede it.

6. Next it is said further that this suspension of the action of the causes was not done by a new miracle but by the old miracle, namely by the same miracle by which the body was united hypostatically with the Word; and so not by a new miracle, because the Word did not assume the body on the third day by a new miracle. This is proved from the example given above from *Isaiah* [n.4]. For God foresaw the tears of Hezekiah from eternity, and willed the result not by a new suspension of the causes but by an eternal one.

7. But against this I argue that the whole humanity was, like the body, united to the Word, and yet the humanity was truly corrupted in death; therefore the body was not preserved from being reduced to ashes by the union without another, new miracle.

8. I say, therefore, that just as the particular causes were impeded supernaturally after Christ's death and not before his death, for at that time the body was being preserved by the soul by which it was animated; so one must say that then (after death) the body was depending on God by a special dependence, as on a special conserving cause; and it was a real dependence; and so there was a new, real relation on the part of the body, but on the part of the divine will there

was a new relation of reason; and so there was a new miracle there; and I say the same about the case of Hezekiah in its own way, as is plain if one considers it.

To the Argument

9. To the principal argument to the contrary [n.2] I say that nature was not able to bring the motion to an end because it was supernaturally impeded.

10. To the confirmation [n.2] I say that there was need for Christ to assume only the penal, non-culpable, defects that were in some way necessary for us for salvation; but the corruption of the body was not one of them, but rather to the contrary, because corruption would have impeded faith in the resurrection, etc.

Twenty Second Distinction

Single Question

Whether Christ was a Man during the Triduum

Bonaventure, 3 *Sent.* d.22 q.1

Scotus, 3 *Sent.* d.22 q.1

Thomas, *ST IIIa* q.50 a.4

Richard of St. Victor, 3 *Sent.* d.22 q.1

Durandus, 3 *Sent.* d.22 q.1

1. About the twenty second distinction the question asked is whether Christ was a man during the Triduum.

2. That he was: Christ is a man; Christ was Christ during the Triduum; therefore Christ was a man during the Triduum. The major is plain, because the species is predicated of the individual. The minor is also plain, because the same thing is predicated of itself.

3. Again, Christ had his whole humanity during the Triduum; therefore he was a man. The consequence is plain. The antecedent is proved in two ways: first because the Word had the soul united to Him; but the soul is the form, and the form states the whole whatness according to the Philosopher and the Commentator (*Metaphysics* 7); therefore etc.

4. Second [n.3], because he had the soul and the body; the whole humanity is nothing but the soul and body really, and death is only their separation, according to Dionysius, *Celestial Hierarchy* 5, and Damascene 3.26.

5. Again a supposit subsisting in some nature can be denominated by that nature; but during the Triduum the Word subsisted in the nature it had assumed, and he was not called soul-ed, or a body, or bodily; therefore it remains that he could be called a ‘human-ed’ man.

6. On the contrary: a dead man is not a man; but Christ during the Triduum was a dead man; therefore etc.

To the Question

The Question Treated Theologically

7. I reply that this question must first be treated theologically, because theologians do not care about the concepts of the words but about the power of the reality. Secondly it must be treated logically [n.33ff.].

8. In the first way of treating it, the theological way, Hugh [of Saint Victor] says about the sacraments (in the first book and in the second part) that Christ was a man during the Triduum, because for this purpose it suffices that the whole humanity, which is the soul and body, be united to the supposit but not that soul and body be united with each other but only that they be in the supposit.

9. The Master of the *Sentences* agrees with this conclusion. Others agree in the conclusion but give a different proof of it. For they say that Christ was a man during the Triduum to the extent that he had the whole humanity simply united to him. Now they prove it as follows: the form states the whole quiddity of a thing, but Christ had the whole form of man, namely the soul, united to him in the Triduum. The major is proved in many ways, and first as follows: matter is that according to which a thing can be and not be (*Metaphysics* 7); but the quiddity cannot be and not be. Also, in the same place of the *Metaphysics*, matter does not belong to the idea of the quiddity but only the form does; therefore etc.

10. Again, whatever exists can be the principle for knowing a thing (*Metaphysics* 7); but matter is in itself unknown (*Physics* 1); therefore it is not part of the quiddity.

11. Again, in things separate from matter the quiddity and what has the quiddity are the same (*Metaphysics* 7.4), but in things that have matter they differ; therefore, from the fact that matter is the cause of the difference between the quiddity and what has the quiddity, it follows that matter is outside the idea of quiddity.

12. Again in *Metaphysics* 7.2 the Philosopher says that the matter is posterior to the quiddity; so it is outside the idea of the quiddity. Then, or further, they say that, insofar as the form states the whole quiddity, if the soul in the resurrection were united with a different body it would still be the same man numerically because it would be the same whole humanity numerically.

13. Against the first conclusion [n.8] is Augustine *City of God* 13, ‘The soul is not the whole man but the better part of man; and the body is not the whole man but the inferior part of man’. But that has the name of man which is both conjoined together. But this authority of Augustine is against the major of the above argument, which says that the soul is the whole man.

14. Again in the [Athanasian] Creed: ‘just as rational soul and flesh are one man, so God and man are one Christ’; but there is no Christ if the humanity is not united with the divinity; therefore neither is there a man if the soul is not united to flesh.

15. Again, Damascene 3.3 says that all men are composed of soul and body.

16 Further, contrary to the major of Damascene’s reason [n.15], against the heretics who say that Christ had a supremely excellent body, and that as such he passed through the body of the Blessed Virgin, in that he was a man univocally

with us; but the argument would be of no validity, as is plain, if the body did not belong to the idea of man.

17. Again, if the soul alone states the whole humanity, then man is totally and simply created and in no way generated, especially if only one form is posited in man.

18. Again, what has a quiddity complete in its kind does not make something per se one with anything else; for if something per se one is to come to be from two things, it is necessary that neither of the two be a chiefly per se complete being. If therefore the form alone states the whole complete quiddity, it never makes a per se one with matter; and so either all things are immaterial and simple, or something composed of matter and form is not one being per se but one by aggregation.

19. Again, what does not include in itself any quiddity of any genus, nor is included in any such quiddity, is in a genus neither per se nor by reduction; therefore either it is God or it is nothing; therefore etc.

20. Again, in *Metaphysics* 7 the Philosopher maintains that, just as from this matter and this form this individual comes to be, so from this common form in general the common quiddity results; and the reason is that from this matter and this form no per se one thing comes to be unless the former is in potency and the latter is in act; but matter is potency by reason of matter in general and form is act by reason of form in general; therefore etc.

21. Again natural science is about material and corruptible things and is a true science; but a true science is only about quiddities (*Metaphysics* 7 near the end); therefore the quiddity of a natural thing is corruptible; but everything corruptible includes matter according to your argument above [n.9]; therefore the quiddity of a natural thing includes matter.

22. I say to the question, then, that Christ was not a man during the Triduum because, as has been proved [nn.13-21], the soul alone does not state the whole humanity. Nor do soul and body principally state the whole humanity – neither when not united with each other nor even when united, because the formal idea of humanity does not consist in a relation of union, for then man would not be a being per se one but one by aggregation.

23. I say therefore that man has a certain unity and entity other than the parts taken together, as I have proved [nn.13-22] – not indeed a partial unity and an entity that would be related to the parts by addition to them (for then there would be a regress to infinity, as is plain). But it is a unity and entity constituted by and resulting from those parts, and by this unity and entity man is formally man; but this unity and entity were truly corrupted in death; therefore etc.

24. Next to the arguments [nn.9-12], and to the first proof for the major of the reasoning [nn.9]

25. As to this first proof, note that the Philosopher in *Metaphysics* 7 is speaking equivocally about three things, namely the species, the whole together, and the matter. For sometimes he takes for the form the species (which is one part of the composite), sometimes for the abstract ultimate, sometimes for the quiddity of the whole (which is the total resultant). Likewise, he takes the whole together for this existing individual in its being as existing, and sometimes for the total

concrete composite taken absolutely and not concretely. Likewise, he takes the matter sometimes for matter non-contracted but absolutely taken, and sometimes for matter in its ultimate contraction, namely as it is a part of this individual sensible thing.

26. Once these facts are seen the solution is plain. For matter taken in the first way [sc. absolutely] belongs to the essence and is part of the idea of the quiddity taken in the third way [sc. as the quiddity of the whole]; and matter taken in the second way belongs to the essence and is part of the idea of the quiddity taken in the third way. And similarly matter taken in the first way is part of the idea of the whole together taken in the second way [sc. the concrete composite taken absolutely]; and matter taken in the second way [as contracted] is part of the idea of the whole together taken in the first way [sc. the existing individual in its being as existing]. But matter is never part of the idea of the quiddity taken in the first way [sc. as species].

27. Next I say further that everything that has matter taken in the first way as part of itself is able to be and not to be only in remote potency and not in proximate potency, namely potency for that by which a thing can be corrupted; however only the proximate matter will ever be corrupted. Now a thing is corruptible in proximate matter when it has as part of itself matter taken in the second way. An example: fire is always in potency to heating things, but it is only ever in proximate potency and can only ever issue in act when it has something heatable proximate to it (although the relation of proximity is not the formal idea of being heatable, it is yet an idea that is necessarily required). So matter taken in the second way is in proximate potency, that is, what it is part of is able to be and not to be; but when taken in such a way it is not part of the quiddity taken in the second way, and so the quiddity as thus taken is said to be incorruptible, for it is not in proximate potency to corruption; nor can it be corrupted unless it is in proximate potency, and then it would have as part of itself matter taken in the second way, in which way matter does not belong to the idea of the quiddity (as Aristotle there takes quiddity).

28. To the second proof [n.10] I say that just as matter is more imperfect than form in existing so is it more imperfect in causing with respect to the composite; and since it is likewise more imperfect in causing knowledge of the composite it is also said to be unknown in itself, for it is not very powerful in causing knowledge; yet matter is very well known in the composite when the composite is known; otherwise the composite would never be known but all knowledge would be of simples.

29. One can say differently that matter taken in the second way is not known with scientific knowledge, and in this way it is not part of the quiddity, and scientific knowledge is of the quiddity.

30. To the third [n.11] I say that in things separate from matter there is no difference of really divided parts but there is such a difference in material things, and therefore the component parts are not the same, namely matter and form, so that what has the quiddity is taken there for matter and the quiddity is taken for form.

31. In another way it can be said that some things have a quiddity per se and first, as man; and then the quiddity and what has the quiddity are the same, such that man and his quiddity are the same, as the Philosopher expressly maintains in *Metaphysics* 7, so that the two together are said to be separate from matter, that is, from contracted matter, matter said in the second way. But other things have quiddity per se but not first, as this man, and in this case they are not the same first though they are the same per se; and the Philosopher means this in the place cited, such that he takes matter for the idea of the individual.

32. To the fourth [n.12] I say that the Philosopher is speaking there of contracted matter, matter taken in the second way.

The Question Treated Logically

33. Then, treating of the question logically [n.7], I say that this proposition is truly logical, ‘Caesar is a man’, even though Caesar is not now existent. However, this proposition is not true: Christ during the Triduum was a man even logically. The first point [about Caesar] is plain, for a logician considers the concepts of the terms, and speaks only in the way that the concept of the predicate term is included in the concept of the subject, and that the ‘is’ is added as a third part and not as part of the predicate, so that the proposition does not require the actual existence of the terms.

34. The second point [n.33] is proved as follows: when some predicate is attributed to some subject then, because the subject does not state one concept but several, if they are repugnant to each other the proposition is false. An example: when no white man exists then the proposition ‘a white man is a man’ is false, because on the basis of the hypothesis [sc. the subject states more than one concept] the concepts are repugnant, as is plain. If Christ states not one concept but two, because he is one supposit subsisting in two complete natures, according to Damascene 3.3, then this proposition is false, ‘Christ during the Triduum was a man’, because the subject of it ‘Christ during the Triduum’ includes in itself a repugnance of concepts, as is plain; for then one of the natures was not complete, namely the human nature, and the fact that the concepts of the predicate are included in only one concept of the subject does not suffice if the concepts of the subject are mutually repugnant. The point is plain, otherwise this would be true: “Something greater than God exists because ‘exists’ is included in the concept of God.”

To the Arguments

35. Then to the arguments for the opposite:

To the first [2] the response is plain from what has just been said, that the subject includes a repugnance of concepts.

36. To the second [3] the answer is plain from what was said in the question [nn.23, 34], that during the Triduum the whole of the humanity was not there.

37. But to the authorities proving that it was there [nn.3-4], because death is only the separation of parts, I say that death is the separation of parts together with corruption of the whole that resulted from their union or unity.

38. As to the point from the Philosopher [n.3] it was dealt with above [nn.25-27].

39. To the third [n.5] I say that body and soul are essential parts of man, and parts do not denominate the whole when they are actually outside the whole, for then they would not be parts. Therefore during the Triduum they did not denominate the Word, where they did not exist united because they were actually outside the whole that resulted from them, namely from humanity. So the Word could not be called body, or soul, or bodily, or animate, because such parts are not parts of a man during the Triduum; but he could be named with some other appropriate name (if no name were imposed), but not with the name of man, because humanity did not remain etc.

Twenty Third Distinction

Single Question

Whether Infused Faith must be posited for Matters Revealed to us for Belief

Bonaventure, 3 *Sent.* d.23 q. 2, a.1

Scotus, 3 *Sent.* d.23 q.1

Thomas, *ST IIaIIae* q.6 a.1

Richard of St. Victor, 3 *Sent.* d.23 q.2

Durandus, 3 *Sent.* d.23 q.2

1. About the twenty third distinction the question asked is whether infused faith is necessary for us.

2. That it is not:

We can attain by acquired faith every act of believing we have about revealed matters of belief; therefore infused faith is not necessary. The consequence is plain because habits are only put in place by acts. The proof of the antecedent is plain, because a heretic sometimes believes articles of faith that he is in error about as firmly as one of the faithful does, and would expose himself to death on their behalf; and yet he does not have infused faith, as is plain from the fact he is a heretic, and especially if he was born among heretics such that he was never one of the faithful nor baptized.

3. Again a habit, which we cannot acquire by our own proper power from purely natural resources (of which sort is every infused act, otherwise it would be vain to infuse it), is more perfect than any acquired habit; for a result of its perfection is that we cannot acquire it of ourselves. But to a more perfect habit corresponds a more perfect act, for habit comes through act; now we can naturally acquire the habit of principles, which is intellect, and of conclusions, which is science; therefore if we posit infused faith, the act of belief will be more perfect in

us than an act of science and an act of understanding a first principle, which is very absurd, since acts of believing are accompanied by darkness and obscurity.

4. On the contrary: the Apostle enumerates faith, like charity, among the theological virtues; therefore it is an infused virtue like charity; and that it is necessary for us is plain, because in *Hebrews* 11 it is said, ‘without faith it is impossible to please God’; therefore etc.

To the Question

5. I reply first about acquired faith, and second about infused faith. Third I speak to the question.

6. About the first point I say that it is manifest there is in us acquired faith about matters of belief that are necessary for us for salvation. The point is plain, because, if there is one of the faithful and he happens to begin to err about just one article of faith while the others he retains, it is certain that the whole of infused faith is corrupted by this one error, otherwise faith and heresy would stand together with each other; and then too it is not a disposition for acquired faith. Therefore, the faith that he still has about the articles where he does not err is not infused faith, because the whole of infused faith has been corrupted. So it follows that it is acquired faith, which he first acquired for himself by hearing. This too is plain that, if a Jewish child was brought up among Christians and was not baptized, he would as firmly believe everything when adult as a Christian does. The same is plain from the Apostle in *Romans* 10, ‘How will they believe him who they have not heard? How will they hear without a preacher?’ Hence according to Paul faith is from hearing and hearing is from preaching. But it is plain that the argument holds only of acquired faith. Now, the fact that some things not necessary for salvation are firmly believed only by faith acquired through hearing is plain. For I most certainly believe that England exists which, however, I have never seen; but I believe those who have seen it, and so on in other cases.

7. From the things just said a corollary follows, namely that, in order for the articles of faith to be firmly believed, the other things too that are necessary for salvation are to be believed, and so firmly as not precisely to be altogether believed without fear of the other side of the contradiction. For this reason, infused faith is necessary, because faith acquired from hearing alone would suffice, as is plain from what was said. For sometimes a heretic exposes himself to death, just like one of the faithful, for the sake of what he has believed.

8. About the second point [n.5] I say that infused faith is similar to acquired faith in someone, because just as acquired faith rests on the truth of the one who asserts what I believe (so that because of him I believe it, because I believe that he who asserts it is truthful), so does infused faith rest on the truth of God revealing, so that I believe it to the extent I believe that God who reveals it is truthful. It is because God reveals such things supernaturally that therefore infused faith is a supernatural habit; and this is plain because it is obscure, without getting evidence from the object believed but resting on the truth of the revealer. And accordingly it can be said that there is one faith for all matters of belief, for it

does not bear per se and ultimately on believed things under their proper ideas, but on the truth of the revealer, so that by the same habit by which one believes that God revealing is truthful, one believes that everything he reveals is also true.

9. But there is here considerable doubt. For I will say to you, ‘Why do you believe that God is truly three and one?’ You will say, ‘Because God who is truthful has revealed it. And God is truthful because God is God’, and there a stand is made. But I will say to you, ‘Why do you believe that God has revealed it, because he did not reveal it to you.’ If you say, ‘I believe because he has revealed that he is three and one, because he has revealed that he has revealed it,’ and so there is a regress to infinity, as is plain. If you were to say that you believe this by acquired faith, because the Church tells you that God has revealed himself to be three and one, then it follows that infused faith depends essentially on acquired faith, which is unacceptable. If you were to say, ‘I believe it for the reason that I find it thus written in the Gospel’, you do not escape, because I will then ask, ‘Why do you believe the Gospel?’ and so we will return to the same place.

10. And therefore one can speak differently about infused faith. I will say then as follows: The terms of the articles of faith in their proper essence are naturally unknown to us, and the combination of them in propositions is now naturally unknown to us. But because the terms, which are unknown to us in their proper essence, are naturally known to us under general and common concepts, so their combination, which is naturally unknown to us, is naturally neutral for us; and the denial of the combination is not naturally known to us, because then their falsity would be a known falsity for us.

11. I therefore next say that infused faith causes me to adhere firmly to the combination of the terms, which combination was however nothing naturally unknown. And so the above doubt will cease, because I do not say that infused faith makes me believe the articles that are revealed by God, whom I know or believe to be truthful; but I say that infused faith inclines me immediately to believe the combination of the terms which was naturally neutral for me. But as to the genus of cause that faith with respect to this act of believing is related to, I say that it is in the genus of partial efficient cause, and in this way the difference between acquired faith and infused faith is plain. If someone prefers the first way [n.10] let him solve the above stated doubt.

12. About the third point [n.5] I say that one must posit infused faith because of the authorities of the saints and of Scripture, but this cannot be demonstrated to one who refuses to believe but it is to be held by faith, so that just as I believe that God is three and one, so I believe that I have the infused habit of faith whereby I believe. But one can be led to this result as follows: for God is the most perfect physician so that whom he cures he cures perfectly. Thus he has repaired the whole idea of the image in us that was deformed by sin. So just as he has repaired the will through the infused habit of charity, so he has repaired the intellect through faith.

To the Arguments

13. To the first [n2] the response is plain from what was said. For even if we can have the whole act of belief through acquired faith, yet not as we can through infused and perfect faith. Hence I say that just as God can be loved by the will without infused charity, and just as a habit of understanding can be generated whereby the will is capable of every act of delight that it is capable of by charity, yet it is not capable of so intense and perfect an act. It is the same too on the part of the intellect and the habit of faith, for since a habit is a partial cause with respect to act, it contributes to the substance and intensity of the act; therefore if the habit is more perfect, the act too will be more perfect.

14. It follows too that just as delight without charity is not meritorious, so neither is the act of believing without infused faith.

15. To the second [n.3] I say that an act can be considered in two ways. In one way in itself according to its substance, and I concede that in this way an act elicited by a supernatural and more perfect habit is itself more perfect. In another way in comparison with its object, and then an act is said to be more perfect in two ways.

16. First because it is about a more perfect object, and in this way too the act of believing is more perfect than our act of knowing or of understanding principles, for the object is God. Second because it understands more perfectly the whole attainability of the object, and in this way the act of understanding the principle of knowing a conclusion is more perfect than an act of believing. But this does not happen because of imperfection in the habit of faith; it happens because of the excellence of the object.

17. An example: the eye of the eagle sees the sun and I see the single flame of a candle. I say that in itself and simply the sight of the eagle is a more perfect sight than mine, because elicited by a more perfect organ and about a more perfect object. However according to and in the second way stated [n.16], one sight is more perfect than another because it attains more the whole visibility of the object. In this respect too is valid what the Philosopher says in his book on *Animals*, that it is better to attain less of a noble object than more of another object.

Twenty Fourth Distinction

Single Question

Whether about Revealed Matters of Belief Someone can have Science and Faith at the same Time, speaking of Science as it is taken for all the Certain Knowledge Received from the Evidence of the Thing

Bonaventure, 3 *Sent.* d.24 q. 3, a.2

Scotus, 3 *Sent.* d.24 q.1

Thomas, *ST Ia* q.1 a.12

Bacconitanus, 3 *Sent.* d.24 q.1

1. About the twenty fourth distinction the question asked is whether about the same object it is possible to have at the same time faith and science, taking science for all the created science that has from the object the cause of the thing.

2. That it is:

Because as *John* 20 says, ‘You have seen me, Thomas, and have believed’, therefore about Christ’s resurrection Thomas had faith and intuitive vision at the same time. But intuitive vision is more certain than science. Therefore etc.

3. Again, science and opinion can be had about the same conclusion; therefore much more so faith and science. The consequence is plain, because opinion fails to be science more than faith does, since opinion is adhesion to one side of a contradiction with fear of the other side. The proof of the antecedent is that for the same question it is possible to have a demonstrative middle term, which causes science, and a dialectical middle term, which causes opinion.

4. To the contrary is the Apostle saying to the Corinthians (*I Corinthians* 12), ‘we walk by faith not by sight’. The gloss says, ‘As wayfarers we do not have science about matters of belief but faith’.

To the Question

5. I reply that a subalternating science, which is knowledge that gets its evidence from the object, does not resolve its principles to the terms of a higher science evident from the nature of the thing. Such science cannot stand together with faith about the same object, since faith is dark and obscure knowledge; and therefore the theology of the saints does not stand along with the faith of the blessed, because the latter have clear knowledge that states the why of things that are matters of belief for us. But our theology, which is subalternated to the science of the blessed, stands in us along with faith about the same things. Because a subalternated science does not resolve its principle to simple terms known to it from the nature of the thing but assumes its principles, for it takes them from the subalternating science above it, where the principles are conclusions. The principles then of a subalternated science do not have the evidence of the thing itself of the subalternating science, but it adheres firmly to them by supposing them to be proved in the subalternating science; and so it can stand along with faith, as is plain.

6. To the contrary, and first again him [Aquinas] who thinks that a subalternated science is a true science because our theology is a true science. But according to him in *ST* IIa IIae, where he expressly moves the question whether faith and science about the same object can stand together in the same person, they do not stand together, as he there says. Therefore neither the theology of the saints nor our theology will be able to stand together with faith about the same object.

7. Again, and against his statement that our theology is subalternated to the theology of the blessed: the same man who has the subalternated science can have the subalternating science, as is plain about optics [subalternated] and geometry [subalternating], and all the rest, because all are possessed by natural light. Therefore a wayfarer could have the theology of the blessed with the same

light of faith by which he has our theoretical science; and then he would be wayfarer and blessed at the same time.

8. Again, and against the conclusion in itself: a subalternating science can exist at the same time as the subalternated science in the same person. Hence the same man can be an optician and a geometer. But according to you [Aquinas] the subalternating science can exist at the same time along with faith about the same thing. Therefore faith and the subalternating science can exist together at the same time. Therefore faith would exist in the blessed at the same time along with their theology. The first proposition is plain, because the conclusions of the one science are the principles of the other, etc.

9. So an alternative statement is that there is a threefold light. Namely, first, the light of glory in which the blessed have intuitive vision about the things that are matters of belief for us, and they see those things in light that provides the reason why. Another light, second, is the light of faith which is in us. Another, third, is an intermediate light below the light of glory and the light of faith, whereby we have abstractive knowledge, namely theology about the same matters of belief; but this intermediate light of faith rests on the light of faith and presupposes it.

10. Then to the matter at issue: although the light of glory does not stand along with the light of faith, and consequently the intuitive vision of the blessed about things that are matters of belief for us does not stand along with faith; however the intermediate light does stand along with the light of faith, on which it rests; indeed it necessarily assumes that light, and so our theology stands along with faith about the same matters of belief. For the middle term and the extremes are less repugnant to each other than the extremes are to themselves. This is confirmed by a gloss of Augustine and by the interlinear gloss on the verse of *John 1*, ‘he was the true light’, etc. Here both mean that the greater in the church have the light of faith and another light; but the lesser have only the light of faith.

11. To the contrary: no speculative science depends essentially on the will; rather it is of itself naturally prior to every volition. Therefore if the light by which we get our theology, since it is an abstractive and speculative science, is different from the light of faith and is above it, as you say, then it does not depend essentially on the will. Therefore neither does it depend on what does essentially depend on the will. But the light of faith, since it is essentially the evidence of the object, depends on the will in causing assent, for it does not compel the intellect to assent to an article of faith unless the will compels the intellect. Therefore it is not possible to say that the intermediate light rests on the light of faith and necessarily presupposes it; instead I say that if the light were of this sort we could through it have theology without any faith, which however is impossible. Therefore I say differently that if science is taken properly the way the Philosopher takes it in *Posterior Analytics* 1, namely as it is clear knowledge caused in the intellect by an evident object, it would be impossible for it to stand together with faith about the same object, and especially as far as the act is concerned, whatever be the case about the habit. The reason is that the act of faith attains an object obscurely seen, so that the obscurity in the act is so connected to the act that, if it were removed, the act would not be an act of faith. Just as the

past is a relation so connected to memory that, if the relation is removed, there would not be an act of remembering, so sciences properly taken attain their object as something clearly seen, so that, if the clearness is removed from the act, it would in no way be an act of science. But it is impossible that the same power at the same time attains the same object clearly and obscurely, just as neither as present and also as past; therefore etc. And although the relations (obscurity, which is privation of clarity, clarity, the passing of the present, and others of the sort) are not formal objectual ideas, they are yet necessarily connected, as was said. In another way science is taken as it is distinguished from opinion, namely as it asserts a firm adhesion to one side of a contradiction without fear of the other; and thus is it taken by Augustine and by Aristotle in *Ethics* 6; and taken in this way not only can it stand along with faith but is rather the same as faith, as is plain.

12. But further, this must be noted about our habit of theology, where it must be noted that the habit of theology can be called that which would be caused in someone from frequent reading and meditation of scripture understood only superficially and literally as written; and such a habit would not be one of certain knowledge from the evidence of the thing, but rather something believed on the testimony of the scriptures, in which faith is had. It would however be a different habit from the habit of faith, because it would not be in everyone who has faith, as is plain. But there would be caused in the light of faith another more perfect habit, so that scripture would be known not only literally but rather would be known for exposition and clarification, and how the doubts and contrarieties that appear in it are to be resolved would be known; and that in two ways: by clarifying a more obscure place by another more obscure place, and then too the habit is purely one of belief, as is plain, because the premises are matters of belief just as are the conclusions; or by clarifying scripture through other sciences as the doctors do commonly now do by introducing philosophy; and then too I say it is a habit of belief, because always one of the premises is a matter of belief, though the other be necessary from the evidence. For a conclusion follows the nature of the premise that is less evident, as is plain in mixed arguments. For a syllogism, one of whose parts is necessary and the other contingent, never has a conclusion save a contingent one, so that the conclusion of such syllogism is always contingent. Such a habit is also, then, acquired in the light of faith and stands along with faith, though it is other than the habit of faith.

13. Another more perfect theological habit can be had even by a wayfarer by infusion from God, which is what the Prophets and the Apostles had and other saints; and such a habit is so perfect that, while the intellect so stands, it cannot not assent to the truth as if it had evidence about the thing from the object. That this is possible is plain, because what God can do in the genus of efficient cause through a second cause, he can do immediately. Therefore he can immediately cause in the intellect the habit of science that an evident object would cause; therefore etc. But note that if this habit made the object to be clearly seen, it would then be the habit of glory; therefore God does not so act.

14. Again, if he were to make it know an object in its proper idea in the way that science properly speaking does, then it would not stand along with the

act of faith; but if he only compels the intellect to assent to the truth the way that science properly speaking does and does not do more, then it will stand along with faith.

To the Arguments

15. Then to the arguments to the contrary [n.4]. To other opinions it is not necessary to reply, as is plain save to the Gloss adduced for the second opinion; to which Gloss I say that light there is taken for the habit, whether infused or acquired, of theology among the greater, which they have over and above the habit of faith.

16. To the first main argument [n.2], the response is according to Gregory in his homily on the Octave of Easter, where he says that Thomas believed something else, for he saw the man and believed him God.

17. To the second [n.3] I say that even if they saw the man suffer yet only by faith did they see God suffer. But the article in the creed is that the God man suffered, and although the blessed Virgin or another saint had some intuitive vision about another article of the creed, yet they did not then have faith about the same thing, at least as to the act, but they could have it about other articles. To the third point [n.3] I say that the antecedent is false, because if effects are incompossible in the same thing the causes in act are also incompossible, and if a demonstrative and a dialectical middle term is possessed for the same conclusion, it will do nothing; and if first there was generated opinion, it will be corrupted by the coming of the science.

Twenty Fifth Distinction

Single Question

Whether before Christ's Coming Faith about the Things we now Believe was Necessary

Bonaventure, 3 *Sent.* d.25 q. 2, a.1

Scotus, 3 *Sent.* d.25 q.1

Thomas, *ST* IIaIIae

Richard 3 *Sent.* d.25 q.1

Durandus, 3 *Sent.* d.25 q.1

1. About the twenty fifth distinction the question asked is whether, before Christ's coming, faith about the things we now believe was necessary for salvation.

2. That it was not:

They [men at that time] were not obliged to believe more than the Angels can understand; but the Angels did not understand Christ's incarnation until after the Church had preached it; therefore etc. The major is plain, because an Angel's

intellect is higher than ours. The minor is plain from Paul *Ephesians* 3, ‘the sacrament of the incarnation was hidden from the princes and heavenly powers’, and it was made known to them by the Church. *Isaiah* 63 speaks thus: ‘The Angels ask, who is this who comes from Edom, his vestments stained with crimson, from Bosra?’

3. On the contrary: men were obliged to love all things lovable by charity, because charity is necessary for salvation in every state; but everything that we love is lovable by charity; therefore men were obliged to believe everything that, unless it were believed, could not be loved.

To the Question

4. I reply that one must first consider the faith of the ancients as to its habit; second as to its act; third as to its believable objects.

5. About the first I say that just as infused charity was always necessary (whereby the will deformed by sin might be reproved), so informed faith was necessary (whereby the intellect might be reformed), namely so that the whole image [of God] might be reformed; and just as no one is accepted by God without charity, so neither without faith; and this I say for the state of the wayfarer. Not indeed that it is a contradiction for faith and charity to be separated, because in fact now they are separated for wayfarers, where faith without charity remains unformed, and in the fatherland charity remains without faith. But because God so instituted from eternity that no one without faith could be perfect in charity.

6. About the second [n.4] I say that no adult can be saved without some act of moral virtue, and much less so without some act of the theological virtues; and so adults are bound to have some explicit act of faith, not indeed always but sometimes, in due place and time, for this falls under positive precept.

7. About the third [n.4] I say that simple and ordinary men did not need to believe explicitly as much as Moses and others believed (to whom more matters of belief were revealed), but they did need to believe some things explicitly, as that God is one, Creator of heaven and earth, and that they had to be saved in the faith of the one who was to come; nor perhaps did Moses and the ancestors believe explicitly as many things as we do now, because perhaps not as many matters of belief were revealed to them.

8. But to explicit faith in the Trinity men were not then bound, save those alone to whom God revealed it, who were more capable; but science cannot determine what matters of belief and how many the ancestors explicitly believed, for they had no fixed term of matters of belief, save that God revealed more or fewer things to them, either directly, as to Moses and the prophets, or through another, as to the leaders of the people through Moses and Aaron.

9. About ourselves too one must note that we are not all bound to believe all the articles explicitly, but the more principal ones, as that God is one and three, Creator of all things, that the Uncreated Son suffered and was raised, and other things of the sort that belong to the work of redemption. Nor is it necessary to know them with their complications, but it suffices that they be absolutely believed the way the Church holds them. And if someone were so ignorant as not

to be able to understand the terms of ‘nature’ and ‘person’, then he need not explicitly believe the Trinity, for God does not bind anyone to anything impossible; but it is enough that he believe what he can grasp, with this addition, that he himself believes and wants to believe whatever the Church believes. Curates, however, need to know the articles explicitly, at least in general without their complications, so that they may know how to instruct the people entrusted to them in the rudiments of the faith. Bishops, however, since they are guarantors of the Church, are bound so to know the things that are of faith that they know how to defend them against those who wish to attack them; for to them does this belong, according to Augustine *On the Trinity* 14.1. What must be said about the rest, according to the diverse ranks they possess in the Church, can be made clear from what has been said.

To the Arguments

10. To the argument [n.2] I say that although by general law the Angels are illumined about things knowable before men are, yet God can do otherwise. It does not follow, therefore, that, if the mystery of the incarnation was hidden from the Angels, men were not bound to believe it; for men were bound to believe what was being done for their salvation, but Angels were not and so it was being hidden from them. But perhaps it was not hidden from all the Angels, for Gabriel announced the mystery of the incarnation to Mary.