

This translation of Book IV dd.43-49 of the *Ordinatio* (aka *Opus Oxoniense*) of Blessed John Duns Scotus is complete. These distinctions fill volume fourteen of the Vatican critical edition of the Latin text edited by the Scotus Commission in Rome and published by Quarrachi.

Scotus' Latin is tight and not seldom elliptical, exploiting to the full the grammatical resources of the language to make his meaning clear (especially the backward references of his pronouns). In English this ellipsis must, for the sake of intelligibility, often be translated with a fuller repetition of words and phrases than Scotus himself gives. The possibility of mistake thus arises if the wrong word or phrase is chosen for repetition. The only check to remove error is to ensure that the resulting English makes the sense intended by Scotus. Whether this sense has always been captured in the translation that follows must be judged by the reader. In addition, there are passages where not only the argumentation but the grammar too is obscure, and I cannot vouch for the success of my attempts to penetrate the obscurity. So, for these and the like reasons, comments and notice of errors from readers are most welcome.

Note: this volume of the critical text seems to be less well edited than most earlier volumes, and has some infelicities of division and subtitle, as well as of punctuation and grammatical marking, that have had to be changed in the translation. Not all these changes seemed significant enough to need indicating in footnotes.

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THE ORDINATIO OF BLESSED JOHN DUNS SCOTUS

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Book Four

Forty Third Distinction

Question One

Whether there will be a General Resurrection of Men

1. “Lastly about the condition of the resurrection” [Master Lombard, *Sent.* IV d.48 ch.1 n.1]

2. About this forty third distinction I ask five questions, and first whether there will be a general resurrection of men.

3. That there will not:

Ecclesiastes 3.19, “There is one death for men and beasts;” but beasts do not rise again; therefore.

4. Again, *Job* 14.12, “When a man sleeps he will not rise; until the heavens are worn away, he will not awake;” but the heavens will never be worn away, since they are incorruptible.

5. Again the Philosopher *On Generation and Corruption* 2.338b13-20, “Things that are corrupted in substance do not return the same in number, but the same in species.” He maintains the same in *Physics* 5.4.228a3-6.

6. Again by reason: the whole requires the union of the parts, so the same whole requires the same union; but the same union will not return because it has been interrupted – and what is interrupted does not return the same, for if it returns there will be iteration, but iteration is repugnant to identity, because iteration posits number and identity takes number away.

7. To the opposite:

Job 19.25-26, “I know that on the last day I will rise from the earth etc.”

8. Likewise *I Corinthians* 15, “We shall indeed all rise.”

I. To the Question

9. Here two things need to be considered: first the possibility, second the fact.

A. About the Possibility of the Resurrection

1. First Opinion

a. Exposition of the Opinion

10. About the first, one view [Thomas Aquinas, *Sent.* IV d.44 q.1 a.1] is stated as follows, that if the sensitive soul in man were diverse from the rational soul and were consequently corruptible as it is in other animals, the conclusion would well be drawn that in the resurrection there would not be the same sensible soul, and so not the same animal either.

11. But if it be posited that the rational and sensible soul in man is the same in substance, we will suffer no difficulties in this respect, as he himself declares elsewhere [*ibid.* IV d.44 q.2 ad 1], when he shows, relative to the point at issue, the difference

between man and other corruptible things, that “the form of the other animals is not per se subsistent so as to be able to remain after the corruption of the composite, the way this holds of the rational soul, which retains after separation from the body the being it acquired in the body. And the body after the resurrection is drawn into participation with that being, so that there is not in man one being of the body and another of the soul; otherwise the union of soul and body in man would be accidental. And thus no interruption is caused in the substantial being of man to prevent the numerically same man being able to return after interruption of being, as does happen with other corrupted things whose being is altogether corrupted.”

12. This claim, then, rests on this, that although something that has been interrupted cannot return numerically the same, yet, because the being of the intellective soul is the same being as the being of the whole, the matter too remains the same; and so in nothing that pertains to man’s substance is any interruption caused in his being. Therefore, it is possible for a man to return numerically the same. It is not so in other corrupted things

b. Rejection of the Opinion

13. Against this is the authority of Augustine *City of God* 22.20 n.2, when he speaks of the flesh that is to return to man in the resurrection: “although,” he says, “a man had in all ways perished and none of his matter had remained in any hidden parts of his nature, the Almighty may bring it back whence he will and repair it.” Therefore, something totally destroyed and corrupted in the totality of its being can be restored the same.

14. Again by reason:

If a destroyed thing were annihilated, the nothing following the annihilation of it would be of the same idea as the nothing that was the term ‘from which’ of the creation of it, because these opposite changes have the same thing for term – one for the term ‘from which’ and the other for the term ‘to which’. But there is no repugnance in the nothing preceding creation to prevent what is opposed to that nothing from being capable of being created; therefore after annihilation it can be created the same. The reasoning is confirmed because it is plain that the same power on the thing’s part remains. Now a stone, though it be annihilated, has on its part as much possibility simply for existing after its annihilation as it had before its creation, because this possibility does not include contradiction more; nor does the nothing to which the stone departed take away the possibility more, because it would only take it away as being opposed to it; but it was opposed to the same thing, and equally so, before creation.

15. Again, there is some positive entity in man that is neither the material nor formal part or parts, as was proved in III d.2 nn.73-77. And, for the purpose in hand, it is sufficient to repeat one reason, that something is caused there by intrinsic causes; but neither the material cause nor the formal cause, nor both together, are caused by intrinsic causes; so there is some entity other than those causes taken separately or together; and it is destroyed. Otherwise a man would not be truly dead, because the whole entity of man would not be corrupted; and yet that entity will be repaired numerically the same, otherwise it would not be numerically the same man.

16. Again, if God conserved the 'to be' in instant *a* and in the whole intervening time up to *b* and in *b* too, one would concede that it was altogether numerically the same. Therefore if God conserve it in *a* and again in instant *b*, and not conserve it in the intermediate time, it will still be the same and yet will be interrupted in time; therefore a thing that has been interrupted can return numerically the same.

17. Proof of the consequence:

Because the identity of that 'to be' as it is in *b* in relation to itself as it is in *a* does not depend essentially on its conservation through the intermediate time, for it does not depend on it as formal cause or as any essential cause.

This is also proved in another way, that otherwise God would not be able to create the same 'to be' in some instant and not conserve it in another instant or particular time; because if he creates it in a prior instant and conserves it in the following time, and if the 'to be' (as it is conserved in that time) is essentially required for the identity of the 'to be' in instant *b*, then if it were not conserved at this time but were first created, it could not be created the same in *b*.

18. Again, the diversity of what is posterior does not prove diversity in what is essentially prior; but the above instants are essentially posterior to the persisting 'to be'; hence too the 'to be' remains the same in all succeeding instants whatever. Therefore, whether there is continuity between the instants or not, the 'to be' will no less be the same. Or put it thus: if the 'to be' were in *a* and in the subsequent time and in *b*, it would be the same in *a* as in *b*; therefore if it were destroyed after *a* (which is its enduring in the intermediate time), still no diversity of it between *a* and *b* would thereby necessarily follow.

19. Again, from the root principle of the argument, that a 'to be' simply destroyed or interrupted cannot return the same [n.11], unacceptable results follow.

First, that God could not resuscitate the numerically same brute, the opposite of which is sometimes read to have been miraculously done by the saints, as is plain of the bull that St. Silvester resuscitated according to the story about him [Jacob Voragine, *Golden Legends* ch.12]; and to deny that this is possible for God is a mark of great infidelity, and yet a brute's sensitive soul is interrupted and destroyed.

A further result is that none of the accidents that are corrupted in a man's corruption, or before a man's resurrection, could return numerically the same; and then the resuscitated man would not have numerically the same proper accident as before, because the proper accident did not remain after death, for it belonged to the whole as whole and not to the soul alone. The consequent is impossible, that it be the same thing in species and not have the same proper accident.

A further result, about the other accidents, is that the powers of the soul, which (according to him [Aquinas]) are accidents, cannot return numerically the same, for they are not accidents of the soul alone but of the whole composite (according to the Philosopher *On Sense* 1.436b6-11 and *On Sleep* 1.453b11-54a7); and so man in the resurrection would not have the same hearing and seeing power, and so on about the rest.

A result too is that he would not have the same quantity, because that does not remain either in the remaining matter alone or in the intellective soul.

20. Again the position seems to be at fault in another respect, that it posits that the whole of man's 'to be' remains uninterrupted. [n.12].

First because, as proved before [n.15], the total entity is interrupted.

Second because the ‘to be’ of the intellective soul is not the total ‘to be’ of man (as he supposes, nn.10, 12), because every being has some ‘to be’, and man as man is some being and is not the soul alone; therefore he has some ‘to be’ of his own and not only the ‘to be’ of the soul.

21. Again, he contradicts himself in this, that elsewhere he says the state of the soul in the body is more perfect than its state outside the body because the soul is part of a composite, and every part is material with respect to the whole.

22. Against this I argue: what has the same proper ‘to be’ totally is not more imperfect from the mere fact that it does not communicate that ‘to be’ to something else. But the soul for you [sc. Aquinas] has totally the same ‘to be’ when separated as when conjoined; indeed, it has the ‘to be’ which, when communicated to the body, is the total ‘to be’ of a man; therefore it is in no way more imperfect by the fact that it does not communicate that ‘to be’ to the body.

23. The major is plain, because perfection is naturally presupposed by what it is ‘to communicate perfection’; therefore, perfection is not greater or lesser by the fact that it communicates or does not communicate – and this is especially so if, by such communication, there is no other ‘to be’ of the whole than the ‘to be’ here in question.

24. Again, it was proved above, in the material about the Eucharist [*Ord.* IV d.11 nn.285-286] that in man the substantial form is different from the intellective soul, and consequently, since it belongs to any form to give ‘to be’, the intellective soul does not give the total ‘to be’ of the composite.

25. This same argument can be directed against his first argument [n.10], because the form is interrupted in its being and yet is brought back the same.

As to the proof he intimates to the contrary [n.11], that then the union of soul and body would be accidental, the consequence must be denied. For just as union is not nothing but is of something to something and is consequently of being to being, so it is of what has being to what has being (for I do not understand how there could be some being that exists outside its cause and yet does not have its own proper ‘to be’); therefore just as being can be compounded per se with being, so can what is per se receptive and has its proper being be compounded with what is per se received and has its proper being. Nor is the union accidental because the latter is per se perfectible and the former per se perfection, for if ‘having being’ took away the idea of ‘per se perfectible’, then nothing but non-being could be per se perfectible.

2. Second Opinion

a. Exposition of the Opinion

26. A different position [Giles of Rome, *Theorems about the body of Christ*] is that, because nature only acts by movement and change, it therefore cannot bring back the numerically same thing because motion or change cannot return numerically the same. But God does not act through motion and change, and therefore too, by contrast, he is able to bring back the numerically same thing. And for this view can be adduced something that this Master [Giles] touches on, that because God has regard to matter as it is a ‘what’ he can impress a form on it as in no way distinct; for matter is not distinct as it is a ‘what’, and so God can always impress the same form on it while the matter remains the same, and matter always remains the same. But a natural agent does not regard matter

as it is a 'what', and so a natural agent cannot bring any form indifferently to be in it however much it remains the same, and so a natural agent cannot bring to be in it the same form.

b. Rejection of the Opinion

27. Against this opinion: as to the issue at hand, it supposes something false, namely that God does not act by motion when he resuscitates. The proof is that matter first existed deprived of form and it comes to be under a form; therefore it transitions from privation to form through the action of the agent; but such transitioning is properly change, because the whole idea of change is preserved in it.

28. As to what Giles says on the other side about a natural agent, the conclusion seems doubtful, and it is touched on in question 3 below [nn.178-180]. However, the conclusion does not follow from the reasoning, because there is no necessity that, if a posterior cannot return the same, therefore a prior cannot either; and change is posterior to form itself.

A confirmation of this is that God, as a matter of fact, does not bring the numerically same change back when he resuscitates, because resuscitation is not the same change as generation; and yet the numerically same form will be brought back. Hence it is a fallacy of the consequent to infer a distinction of terms from a distinction of changes. For the converse does indeed follow, namely that if a different form is acquired there is a different change. But the same form can very well be acquired by diverse changes, just as a 'where' the same in species can be acquired by local motions diverse in species, as by motion in a straight line or in a circle, which are so much of different idea that they are not comparable, *Physics* 7.4.248a10-b6. Augustine too in *On the Trinity* 3 ch.9 nn.16-19 maintains that a thing the same in species can be generated equivocally and univocally, which however are changes of different idea.

29. There is a proof also for this, that the antecedent (namely that change cannot be brought back numerically the same [n.28]) does not hold, because although the unity of a whole composed of parts is the continuity of part with part, yet the unity or identity of a part with itself is not the continuity of it with another part; so although interruption posits the non-continuity of posterior with prior, the consequence does not hold that it takes away the identity of a part with itself.

3. Scotus' own Opinion

30. As to this first article, then [n.9], I say that there is possibility on the side of God, because of his omnipotence (whether some other cause has the possibility for this I do not deal with here, but it will be spoken about in question 3 [nn.221-222]); and on the side of the object there is possibility simply, because no contradiction is involved.

31. And this is proved against the first opinion by authority and by reason – and this whether the bringing back is through change or without change, for both are possible, as was argued against the second opinion [nn.27-29].

32. And what is touched on by the second opinion, about having regard to matter as it is a 'what' [n.26], was touched on in the material about the Eucharist in d.11 nn.148, 58. For if there were any good sense to the remark it would perhaps be this, that God does

not have regard to matter as it passes from form to form in a certain order, the way a natural agent necessarily has regard to it, because a natural agent cannot pass immediately from just anything to just anything.

33. But this difference does nothing for the possibility of bringing back the numerically same thing or not, because the order in question has regard to forms in their specific ideas and not in their identity or distinction. For the form of vinegar can succeed immediately to the form of wine, and the converse not immediately; but that the form of vinegar succeeds to this form of wine or to that is indifferent, just as water is indifferently generated from this fire or from that. Therefore when an agent has regard to the order of forms in a change, it can, just as if it were acting immediately without such order, have something preceding the form to be induced by it; and consequently, if it had the power absolutely to bring back the numerically same thing, it would not be prevented by its being determined to this or that order of forms in its acting.

B. About the Fact of the Resurrection

34. As to the second point, whether it can be shown by natural reason that there will be a resurrection, it will be discussed presently in the following question [nn.52-53].

35. But for now the conclusion is manifest from the truth of the faith.

36. For this truth is expressed as an article of faith both by the *Apostles' Creed* and by the *Nicene Creed*, "I look forward to the resurrection of the dead," and also in the *Athanasian Creed*, "All men have to rise along with their bodies, etc."

37. This is also contained very expressly in many places of Scripture, as *John* 11.23-26, *Matthew* 22.31-32, *I Corinthians* 15.20-22, *Job* 19.25-27, and *II Maccabees* 12.43-46, "Unless he hoped that those who had fallen would rise again etc."

II. To the Initial Arguments

38. As to the first argument, Solomon [n.3] was there the proclaimer, now arguing on the part of the foolish, now replying according to the opinion of the wise; and he made the remark in question [n.3] when proclaiming on behalf of the foolish. But he contradicts it later (*Ecclesiastes* 12.5, 13-14), "Man will go to the home of his own eternity," and later "Let us all equally hear the end of the speaking: fear God and observe his commandments, that is, let every man fear and observe. God will bring everything that happens under the sun into judgment etc."

39. As to the second [n.4]: although the heaven will never be worn away in substance, yet it will be as to its effect on things here below in its generating and corrupting them, for its influence will cease after the judgment. And thus far can the verse in *I Corinthians* 7.31 be understood, "The figure of this world is passing away." Or one could say that this verse is speaking of the heaven that St. Peter is speaking of in *2 Peter* 3.10, "The heavens will be consumed in heat," which is only understood of the elemental heaven [*Ord.* II d.14 nn.4-8].

40. As to the third argument [n.5], the Philosopher is there distinguishing circulation in celestial bodies from circulation in corruptible bodies, because in the former case the substance is not corrupted by the motion and so the substance returns the same – not meaning its 'to be' by this motion, but that it comes to be present to the same

part by returning motion. Now circular motion in things down here is according to corruption and return of substantial form, and so the numerically same thing does not return here as it does there. But as to whether Aristotle universally denies that the numerically same thing can return, see question three [nn.173-179].

41. To the final argument [n.6] one can say that a composite can return the same, though the same union of parts not return. For that union is not of the essence of the whole, nor is that union the total entity composed of the parts, nor is it the form of the entity. But because union is simply necessarily required for the total entity, and nothing seems to be numerically the same unless what is necessarily required for it is numerically the same, therefore it seems truer that the union will return the same – and this if union is taken for the relation of the parts united with each other but not for the uniting, which remains only for the instant of resurrection. For the uniting can be posited as different, just as the change in question [sc. the resurrection] is different from generation.

42. And when the argument is made that the union was interrupted [n.6], I say that an interrupted thing can return numerically the same, not only the thing absolutely but also its respects, if the terms of the thing return numerically the same. For I believe that Mary had the same relation to the Son after Christ's passion as she had to him before his passion, and yet it was interrupted in the death of the Son, because of the destruction of the term, and in the death of Mary,¹ because of the destruction of the foundation.

43. And if you say that this response seems to contradict itself, because it denies that the uniting returns the same, and yet this is necessary for the coming to be of the whole and, according to the above statement, nothing can return the same unless that return the same which is necessary for the thing's being – I reply: let it be that the uniting, as it is a passive receiving, is necessary for the coming to be of the whole, then it follows that there is not the same coming to be of the whole unless the uniting is the same, and this I concede. And then either it is the case that neither will be the same, which is probable, because the change in question, as was said [n.41], would not be the same as the generation of man; or both will be able to be the same, because there is no contradiction involved.

Question Two

Whether it can be Known by Natural Reason that there will be a General Resurrection of Men

44. Secondly I ask whether it can be known by natural reason that there will be a future general resurrection of men.

45. That it can be:

A natural desire cannot be in vain, according to the Commentator on *Metaphysics* 2 com.1; but man has a natural desire to exist always, and this desire can be known by natural reason; therefore etc. Proof of the minor: because nothing is naturally fled from save by virtue of a natural desire or of love in respect of it; but man naturally flees from death (this is plain from experience; plain too from the Apostle *II Corinthians* 5.4, "We do not wish to be unclothed, but clothed upon").

¹ The Church's teaching that Mary was assumed bodily into heaven does not by itself determine whether she died first or did not die first.

46. Again, it is naturally known that beatitude is naturally desired (this is plain from *Ethics* 1.5.1097b1 about beatitude in general, and 10.4.1174b18-75a1 about beatitude in particular); but it is known by natural reason that there can only be beatitude if it is eternal. Therefore it is known by natural reason that man is ordered to some eternal perfection. The proof of the minor: Augustine *On the Trinity* XIII 8.n.11 proves it thus by reason: “Life itself, even if blessed, abandons the dying man. It abandons him either as he is not willing or as he is willing or as he is neither. If he is not willing, how is a life blessed that is in his will in such a way that it is not in his power? But if he is willing, how will a life be blessed which he who has it wants to end? If you say he is neither, neither wanting nor not wanting – but neither is that life blessed which is such that it not be worthy of the love of him whom it makes blessed.”

47. Again, it is naturally known that the whole species does not so lack its end that this end is not realized in some individual; but it is naturally known that blessedness is the end of the human species; therefore it is naturally known too that man can attain it, at least in the case of some individual. But it cannot be realized in this life because of the many miseries that accompany this life, as changes in fortune, infirmity of body, imperfection of knowledge and virtue, and inconsistency and fatigue in exercising acts of perfection, so much so that no activity, however delightful in the beginning, can be delightful continually; on the contrary, desisting from it through disgust will be delightful. And it is known by natural reason that beatific activity does not disgust. Nor can it be had by the separated soul alone, because man would not attain his end thereby. Therefore it will be had in another life by the whole man joined together. And, consequently, natural reason seems at least to conclude what the things are wherein man may reach his end.

48. Again, it is known by natural reason that every species that belongs to the integrity of the universe is perpetual, because the integrated whole is perpetual; but man is the most perfect species, at least among things here below, “For we are in some way the end of all things,” *Physics* 2.2.194a34-35.

49. To the opposite:

Augustine *On the Trinity* XIII.8-9 n.12, when speaking of immortal and eternal life, says, “Whether human nature lacks this life is no small question; indeed, of those who try to find it by human arguments scarcely a few – endowed with great intelligence, in leisure unbusied, instructed in the most subtle doctrines – have been able to track down only the immortality of the soul.”

50. Again, in *Acts* 17.18 it is said of certain Athenians listening to Paul that they said “he seemed to be a preacher of new daimons, because he was preaching to them Jesus and the resurrection.” And yet those Athenians were philosophers, very able in natural reason (clear about Dionysius the Areopagite, who was one of them). Therefore this fact of the resurrection, which seemed to them to be so remote from the truth, did not seem to be well known through natural reason; hence all that Paul adduces there is only certain persuasive considerations, as is plain in the text.

51. Again in *Acts* 26.23-24, although Paul was saying “If Christ is capable of suffering, if he is first of the resurrection etc.,” Festus said with a loud voice, “You are mad, Paul.”

I. To the Question

52. Here it is manifest that if any reason prove the resurrection, it must be taken from something that is proper to man such that it not belong to other corruptible things. But this is not matter, even incorruptible matter; nor is it any destructible form, because although there be such form in man, and more excellent than any form of a brute, yet a sufficient reason cannot be taken from it to prove the resurrection of the whole. Therefore, a reason must be taken from the specific form of man, or from an operation belonging to man according to that form.

A. About the Three Propositions for Proving the Resurrection of Man

53. Proceeding in this way, one can prove the intended conclusion from three propositions; and if all these were known to natural reason, we would have that conclusion. Now the propositions are as follows:

That ‘the intellective soul is the specific form of man’; second that ‘the intellective soul is incorruptible’. From these two it follows that the specific form of man is incorruptible. The added third is that ‘the specific form of man will not remain perpetually outside, or without, its whole’. Therefore the consequence follows that the whole will at some point return the same. This repeated return is called ‘resurrection’ according to Damascene *Orthodox Faith* ch.100, “Resurrection is a second raising up of that which was dissolved.”

54. As to these three propositions let us see how they are known.

1. About the First Proposition, that ‘the Intellective Soul is the Form of Man’

a. The Opinion of Others and the Weighing and Putting Together of it

55. It is said of the first [by Aquinas] that it is known by natural reason.

56. This is shown in two ways: in one way by authorities from the Philosophers who asserted this, and only as something known to natural reason; in another way by adducing the natural reasons from which it follows.

α. Proof by Authorities from Philosophers

57. As to the first point [n.56]: Aristotle *On the Soul* 2.1.412a19-b6 defines the soul as ‘the act of an organic physical body’ etc. And at 3.4.429a10-11 he says, “About the part of the soul by which it knows and is wise,” where he seems to posit the intellective soul as at least a kind or species of soul previously defined in general terms.

58. Again, all philosophers have commonly put ‘rational’ in the definition of man as his proper difference, meaning by ‘rational’ that the intellective soul is an essential part of man.

59. Nor, in short, is any noteworthy philosopher found who denies this, although the accursed Averroes in his fiction in *On the Soul* III com. 5, 36 – a fiction that is nevertheless intelligible neither to him nor to anyone else – posits a certain separate intellective substance that is conjoined [to man] by the medium of phantasms. This conjunction neither he nor any of his followers has been able to explain, or to save by means of it, the fact that ‘man understands’. For, according to him, a man would formally

be only a sort of excelling irrational animal, though because of an irrational and sensitive soul more excellent than the other animals.

β. Proof by Natural Reasons

60. On the second point [n.56]. No a priori or a posteriori reason can easily be found for the intended conclusion save one taken from man's proper operation, since form is made known by proper operation as matter is made known by change. So, argument for the intended conclusion is taken from the operation of understanding as follows: understanding is the proper operation of man; therefore it comes from man's proper form; therefore the intellective soul is the proper form of man.

61. But this reason has an objection against it, that the intellect, according to them, is related only passively and not actively to the act of understanding. Therefore the proposition 'proper operation comes from proper form' does not prove that the intellective soul is the proper form of man, since this operation, according to them, does not come from the intellective soul but from the intelligible object or, according to others, from the phantasm.

62. Therefore I form the argument from that operation in another way as follows: man understands formally and properly; therefore, the intellective soul is the proper form of man.

63. The antecedent here seems sufficiently clear according to the authorities from Aristotle *On the Soul* 3.4.429a21-24 and *Ethics* 1.6.1098a3-4, 1.7: that 'to understand' is the proper operation of man; but operation, as it is distinct from action or making, exists formally in the one operating and does not proceed therefrom to something else. Likewise, *Ethics* 10.7.1177a12-b1, 8.1158b7-32, 9.1179a22-32, places man's happiness in an act of understanding, and it is manifest that happiness is in man formally; therefore the operation in which happiness consists is in man formally.

64. But it is necessary to prove the antecedent by reason (against him who impudently denies it), and this by taking in the antecedent 'understanding properly speaking', by which I mean 'an act of knowing that transcends the whole genus of sense knowledge'.

65. This antecedent, therefore, is proved in one way as follows: man understands by a non-organic act of knowing; therefore, he understands properly.

The consequence is plain from the reason already set down [n.63-64], that a proper act of understanding is knowing that transcends the whole genus of sensation; but all sensation is organic knowing, from *On the Soul* 2.1.412a21-b9, 2.11.423b31-42a7. The proof of the antecedent of this enthymeme² is that an organ is determined to a definite genus of sensibles, from *On the Soul* 3.4.426b8-23, and this for the reason that it consists in a proportion between the extremes of the genus. But we experience some knowledge in ourselves that does not belong to us according to such organ, because then it would be determined precisely to the sensibles of a determinate genus, the opposite of

² The antecedent is "man understands by a non-organic act of knowing" and the argument it is the antecedent of is an enthymeme because the premise that a non-organic act is an act of understanding properly is left unexpressed. This premise itself is proved by the statements that understanding properly is knowing that transcends the whole genus of sensation, and that sensation does not so transcend because it is the act of an organ and an organ is tied to a determinate class of sensibles. The inadequacy of this argument is shown in what follows.

which we experience; for we know by such act the difference between any genus of sensibles and something else that is not anything of the genus; therefore we know each extreme (the consequence is plain according to the Philosopher when he argues about the common sense in *On the Soul* 2.11.423b31-4a7).

66. But objection is made here:

First, that organic knowledge is that which is present according to a determinate part of the body; but the knowledge about which it is argued that we distinguish by it sensibles from non-sensibles is present first in the whole body, and so it does not come through any organ properly speaking. However, it does not transcend in perfection the whole genus of sensitive knowledge, because it is present first in the whole body, and consequently it is as material as that which is in the whole part by part; for thus is a property of the whole as material as that which is in the whole part by part.

67. Second, the assumption is denied, namely that the act is not present according to any organ; for it is present according to the organ of imagination. The proof of this is that when this organ is damaged knowledge is impeded. Nor is the proof sound [n.65] about the determination of the organ to a certain genus, because imagination extends itself to all sensibles.

68. However, the first objection [n.66] is excluded by something touched on there [n.65], because we discriminate by the act [sc. of understanding] between the whole genus of sensibles and something that is outside that whole genus.

69. Nor is the proof sound [n.67] that when the organ of imagination is damaged knowledge is impeded; for this happens because of the order of these powers in their operation, and not because understanding is exercised through the medium of this organ.

70. The principal antecedent [nn.65, 62], that there is some immaterial knowledge in us, is proved in another way: no sensitive knowledge can be immaterial, therefore etc.

71. This term 'immaterial' is frequently used by the Philosopher in the issue at hand, but it seems ambiguous. For it can be understood in three ways relative to the issue at hand:

Cognition is immaterial either because it is incorporeal in the following way, that it does not come through a bodily part and organ; and then it is the same as the proposition already set down about non-organic knowledge.

Or it is immaterial in another way, that it is in no way extended, and then it states more than 'non-organic' does; for although all organic cognition is extended because it is received in something extended, yet not only so; because if it were received in the whole composite first, then since the whole composite is extended the operation would still be extended.

In a third way its immateriality can be understood in relation to the object, namely that it regards the object under immaterial ideas, that is, to the extent it abstracts from the here and now and the like, which are said to be material conditions.

72. Now if immateriality in the second way were proved, the proposed conclusion would be obtained more than from a proof of it in the first way. But it does not seem it can thus be proved (save from the conditions of the object that the act regards), unless perhaps by reflection, because, as much as the act of this knowing is not reflexive on itself, we experience ourselves reflecting back on it. And therefore, it is from the object of the act that a proof of the antecedent is finally reached.

73. In this way: we have in ourselves some knowledge of the object under the idea under which there cannot be any sense knowledge of it; therefore etc.

74. The proof of the antecedent [n.73] is that we experience in ourselves that we know the universal actually.

75. And we experience that we know being or quantity under an idea more common than is the idea of the first sense object, even as regards the highest sense soul.

76. We also experience that we know the relations consequent to the natures of things, even non-sensible things.

77. We experience too that we distinguish the whole genus of sensible things from anything that is not of that genus.

78. We even experience that we know relations of reason (which are second intentions), namely the relation of universal, of genus and species, of opposition and other logical intentions.

79. We experience too that we know the act by which we know these intentions and know that by which the act is present in us, which is by an act that reflects back on the direct act and is receptive of it.

80. We experience too that we assent to certain propositions, as the first principles, without possibility of contradiction or error.

81. We experience too that we come to know the unknown from the known by a discursive process, such that we cannot dissent from the evidence of the discursive process or from the knowledge inferred.

82. Each of these 'knowings' is impossible for any sense power; therefore etc.

83. But if someone stubbornly deny that these acts are present in man, and deny that he experiences them in himself, one should not dispute with him further but should say to him that he is a brute thing. Just as one should not dispute with someone who says 'I do not see color there', but should say to him 'you need senses because you are blind'. So we we experience these acts in us by a certain sense, that is, by an interior perception. And therefore, if someone denies them, one must say that he is not a man because he does not have the vision that others experience.

84. The proof of the assumption, namely that 'none of these acts can be present according to any sense power' [nn.82, 73], is because the universal in act is known with as much indifference [to any particular] as the thing thus known can be asserted of every singular in which it is found to be preserved. Sense does not know in this way [n.74].

85. But this is more evident from the second point [n.76], because no power can know anything under an idea more universal than its proper object (as sight does not know anything under an idea that is indifferent as to color and sound); therefore the knowledge that is of something under an idea more common than any posited object, even of the highest sense, cannot be any sensation.

86. The third point [n.77] proves the same, because no sensation can distinguish its first sense object, that is, its most common object, from what is not of that sort, because neither can it distinguish both the extremes.

87. About relations consequent to things not mutually sensed by each other, or are non-sensible in relation to things sensible [n.78], the answer is plain from the same point [n.86], that the senses have no power for them. And this is much plainer about those relations that are called relations of reason, because a sense cannot be moved to know

something that is [not?]³ included in a sensible object as sensible. The relation of reason is not included in anything as it is existent; but sense is of the existent as it is existent. And hereby can also be proved the principle too about a universal act, because to be an existent as it is existent is repugnant to a universal in act.

88. The other point, about reflection back upon act and power [n.79], is proved by the fact that a quantum is not reflexive on itself.

89. The other two points, about composition and assent to composition, and about discursive reasoning and assenting to the evidence of discursive reasoning [nn.80-81], are proved from relation of reason, because they are not without relation of reason.

90. The consequence of the first enthymeme [n.65] is proved as follows: if such an act is in us formally (since it is not our substance because sometimes it is present and sometimes not present), then one must grant there something properly receptive of it; but not anything extended, whether it is an organic part or a whole composite, because then the operation would be extended, and it could not be such as it is said to be about objects such as they are said to be; therefore it must be present according to something non-extended and that is formally present in us; but that cannot be without the intellectual soul, because any other form is extended.

91. Or the consequence can be proved in another way, by going to the condition of the object of the act; because any form lower than the intellectual form, if it has an operation, has it precisely in respect of an object under ideas opposite to those that have been stated. Therefore, if we have an operation about an object under those ideas, it will not be in us according to any form other than an intellectual one; therefore it is in us according to an intellectual one. Therefore an intellectual form is in us formally, otherwise we would not be operative formally according to that operation.

92. The same thing can be proved from the second human operation, namely the will, because man is lord of his acts such that it is in his power to determine himself by his will to this thing or its opposite, as was said in *Lectura* II d.25 n.94. And this fact is known not only from the faith but also by natural reason. Now this indetermination cannot be in any sense appetite, either organic or extended, because any organic or material appetite is determined to a certain genus of desirables that is agreeable to it, such that when the genus is apprehended it cannot not be agreeable nor can the appetite not desire it. Therefore the will by which we thus indeterminately will is an appetite that is not of any such form, namely material form, and consequently it is an appetite of something that surpasses every such form. We set down the intellectual form as of this sort, and then, if that appetite is formally in us, because desiring is so as well, it follows that that form is our form.

2. About the Second Proposition, that 'The Intellectual Soul is Incorruptible or Immortal'

93. About the second main proposition, which is that 'the intellectual soul is immortal' [n.53] the procedure is the same as about the first one, by first bringing forward the authorities of the philosophers who held this opinion.

a. Proof through Authorities of Philosophers

³ There is no 'not' in the Latin but it seems to be necessary, unless 'sensible qua sensible' means 'sensible under the idea of sensible', for sense perceives the sensible thing and not the idea of what it is to be a sensible thing.

Aristotle, *On the Soul* 2.2.413b25-27, says that “the intellect is separated from other things as the perpetual from the corruptible.” If it be said that it is separated as to its operation, on the contrary: from this the proposed conclusion follows, that if it can be separated as to operation then as to being as well (according to Aristotle *On the Soul* 1.1.403a7-12).

94. Again, *On the Soul* 3.4.429a29-b5, a difference is set down between sense and intellect, that “a surpassing sensible object destroys the sense”, and so, after the sensation, the sense perceives a lesser sensible thing less. But it is not so with the intellect; rather after it has understood things supremely intelligible, it understands lesser things more; therefore the intellect is not weakened in its operation; and then it follows further that it is incorruptible in its being.

95. Again *Metaphysics* 12.3.1070a21-27, “Moving causes, just as they exist beforehand, are yet as the rational nature (that is as the form) simultaneous with the caused thing as a whole. For when a man is being healed, health exists then also. But whether anything remains afterwards needs to be examined. For nothing prevents this in some cases, as suppose the soul is such – not every soul, but the intellect etc.” The Philosopher means to say, then, that the intellect is a form that remains after the composite but not beforehand.

96. Again *Generation of Animals* 2.3.736b27-28, “It remains then that only the intellect comes from without.” Therefore, it does not receive its being through generation but from an extrinsic cause. And, consequently, it cannot receive non-being through corruption or through any other inferior corruptive cause, because its being is not subject to any such cause, for it is immediately from a superior cause.

97. Again, a number of reasons can be formed from the *Authorities of the Philosopher* [3.18, n.45].

There is one principle the Philosopher has that ‘natural desire cannot be vain’; but there is a natural desire now in the soul to exist always.

98. Again, in *Metaphysics* 7.15.1039b29-30 he maintains that ‘matter is that whereby a thing can be and not be’; therefore, according to him, what does not have matter does not have the possibility not to exist; the intellective soul, according to him, does not have matter, because it is a simple form.

99. Again, in *Ethics* 3.9.1115a32-b1 he maintains that a brave man should expose himself to death for the sake of the republic, and he maintains the same in *Ethics* 9.8.1169a18-20, and speaks according to the judgment of natural reason. Therefore, the immortality of the soul can be known according to natural reason. The proof of this consequence is that no one should or can desire his own complete non-existence for any good of virtue, whether a good in himself or in another or of the republic. For, according to Augustine *On Free Choice of the Will* 3.7-8 nn.68-84, non-existence cannot be desired; but now, if the soul were not immortal, someone would get, by dying, total non-existence.

b. Proof through Arguments of Doctors [of Theology]

100. Again, one doctor [Aquinas] gives, as if from the words of the Philosopher, the following argument: what is corrupted is either corrupted by its contrary or by a lack

of something necessarily required for its being; but the intellectual soul has no contrary, nor is the being of the body simply necessary for its being, because it has its own proper being per se and has it the same in the body and outside the body; nor is there any difference involved save that in the body it communicates it to be corrupted and outside the body does not communicate it. Again, what is simple cannot be separated from itself; the soul is simple; therefore it cannot be separated from itself, and consequently cannot be separated from its being, because it does not have being from a form other than itself. Things are otherwise in the case of a composite thing, which has being through a form and this form can be separated from matter, and so the being of the composite can be destroyed.

101. But the Philosopher seems to have thought the opposite, because at the end of *Metaphysics* 7.17.1041b11-33 he expressly maintains that all the parts that can remain when separated from the whole are elements, that is, material parts, as he there takes the term 'elements'. And one must, besides such elements, posit in the whole some form whereby the whole is what it is, and this form could not remain in separation from a material part when the whole does not remain. Therefore, if he conceded that the intellectual soul is the form of man, as is plain from the proof of the preceding proposition [nn.62-63], he does not posit that it remains separated from matter when the whole does not remain.

102. Again, it appears to be a principle with the Philosopher that 'what begins to be ceases to be'; hence in *On the Heavens* 1.10.279b17-21 he seems to hold, against Plato, that it is impossible for something to begin to be and yet to be perpetual and incorruptible; and in *Physics* 3.4.203b8-9, on the infinite, he says that what has a beginning has an end.

α. The Proofs of the Philosophers are not Demonstrative

103. It can be said that although the reasons for proving this second proposition [nn.53, 93] are probable, they are not however demonstrative, or indeed necessary.

104. And what is adduced for it in the first way, from the authority of philosophers, can be solved in a twofold manner:

In one way that it is unclear what the Philosopher thought about the matter, for he speaks variously in different places; and he held different principles, from some of which one of the opposed sides seems to follow and from others the other. Hence it is probable that he was in doubt about this conclusion, and seemed to incline now more to one side and now more to the other, as he treated of material consonant with the one side more than with the other.

105. There is also another response, a more real one, that not everything said assertively by the philosophers was something they had proof for through necessary natural reason, but that frequently they had only certain probable convictions, or the common opinion of preceding philosophers.

106. Hence the Philosopher says *On the Heavens* 2.12.291b25-28, "One must try to say what appears, considering it proper that eagerness be attributed rather to modesty than daring if, for the sake of philosophy, one prefers to make a stand and embraces slight indications as sufficient where the doubts we have are very great." Hence the

philosophers were content with slight indications when they were unable to reach anything greater, lest they go against the principles of philosophy.

107. And in the same chapter [n.106] he says, “accounts of the other stars are given by the Egyptians and Babylonians, from whom we get much of what we believe about individual stars.”

108. Hence the philosophers are content sometimes with probable arguments, sometimes with assertions of their principles beyond any necessity of reason. And this response might suffice for all the authorities, many though they be, because these authorities do not prove their conclusion.

109. However response can be made to them in order.

To the first [n.93], that Aristotle only understands this separation in the precise sense that the intellect does not use the body in its operation; and for this reason it is incorruptible in its operation –meaning by ‘corruption’ that by which an organic power is corrupted because of the corruption of the organ. And this is the only corruption that belongs to an organic power, according to the Philosopher *On the Soul* 1.4.408b21-22, “If an old man were to be given the eye of a young man, he would see just as a young man does.” Therefore, the seeing power is not weakened or corrupted as far as its operation is concerned, but only the organ is. Nor yet from this in-corruption in the intellect (namely that it does not have an organ by the corruption of which it could be corrupted in its operation) does it follow that it is simply incorruptible in operating (for then it would follow that it would be incorruptible in being, as is then [n.94] argued); but all that follows is that it is not corruptible in its operating the way an organic power is. Still, it would be posited to be simply corruptible, according to *On the Soul* 1.4.408b21-22, “The intellect is corrupted in us when something within is corrupted,” and this to the extent that it would be posited as the principle of operating its proper operation for the whole composite; but a composite is corruptible; therefore the operating principle of it is corruptible too. And that the principle of operating is for the whole, and that the operation of it is an operation of the whole, seem to be what Aristotle says in *On the Soul* above.

110. To the next argument [n.94] I say that a surpassing sensible object destroys the sense per accidens, because it corrupts the organ, for it disrupts the mean proportion in which the good disposition of an organ consists; and, by contrast, the intellect, because it does not have an organ, is not destroyed by a surpassing object; but from this does not follow that the intellect is incorruptible, unless it be proved not to depend in its being on the whole thing that is corruptible.

111. To the third [n.95], about *Metaphysics* 12.3.1070a21-27, the answer is that Aristotle made that statement in a state of doubt, for he says ‘perhaps’, but he does not say ‘perhaps’ as regard the fact that the intellect remains afterwards, that is, after the whole; but he says, “not every soul, but the intellect;” and then follows, “for it is perhaps impossible that every soul should etc.,” where he was in doubt whether it is possible for every soul to remain after the composite. But as to the intellect he does not doubt but that it does not depend in its being on the whole that is corrupted. If then he expressly asserts it, one can say that nevertheless it was not proved to him by necessary reasoning but that he was persuaded by probable reasons.

112. To the next [n.96], it is very doubtful what he thought about the beginning of the intellective soul. For if he did not posit that God does something afresh immediately

but only moves the heaven with an eternal motion, and does so as remote agent, by what separate agent would Aristotle posit that the intellective soul is freshly produced?

113. For if you say it is produced by some intelligence, there is a double unacceptability: first, because an intelligence cannot produce a substance (*Ord.* IV d.1 n.75); second, because an intelligence cannot more produce something new immediately than God can – according to the principles of the Philosopher about the immutability of the agent, and so about the agent's eternity in acting. Nor can Aristotle posit, according to his own principles, that the intellective soul is the term of a natural agent, because, as appears from *Metaphysics* 12.3.1070a25-27, he posits that it is incorruptible (and no form that is the term of a natural agent is simply incorruptible).

114. One can say he posits that it receives being, and new being, immediately from God, because the fact that it receives being follows sufficiently from Aristotle's principles, since he does not posit that it had perpetually preceded without a body nor that it existed beforehand in another body. And it is not provable by reason from whom it could receive such being (nothing else being presupposed) save from God.

115. But on the contrary: then Aristotle would be conceding creation.

I reply: this does not follow, because he did not posit a different production for the composite and for the intellective soul, as neither for fire and the form of fire; but he posited the animation of an organic body to be a production per accidens of the soul itself.

116. We, however, posit two productions: one from the non-being of the soul to its being, and this is creation; a second from non-animation of the body to animation of it, and this is production of an animate body and is through a change in the proper sense of change. Someone, then, who posited only the second production would posit no animation,⁴ and thus Aristotle did.

117. But although you may, according to him, avoid creation, how can the proposition be saved of an unchangeable agent producing something?

I reply: in no way except because of a newness in the passive receptive thing. For the fact that an effect, dependent totally and precisely on its active cause, should be new would be reduced, according to Aristotle [nn.94-99], to some variation in the efficient cause itself; but the fact that an effect that is dependent on the agent and on the receptive thing is new can be reduced to the newness of the passive thing itself, without newness in the agent.

118. And thus it would be said here that by natural necessity does God move an organic body to animation as soon as there is a body susceptible of this animation, and that by natural causes does this susceptible thing sometimes newly come to be. And for this reason is there then a new movement for animation from God himself.

119. But why must this newness be reduced to God as to the agent cause?

I say because it is like a first agent, and therefore, according to Aristotle, it is always acting with some action on the passive subject, being disposed always in the same way, so that, if some passive subject can be new and be receptive of some form, which form cannot be subject to the causality of a second cause, God is the immediate cause of it. And yet he is so newly, because one must posit to every passive power in an entity some corresponding active power; and so, if no created active power corresponds to a new passive power, the divine active power will immediately correspond to it.

⁴ That is, presumably, no making of a soul by creation.

120. To the next argument [n.97], about natural desire, response will be given in replying to the initial reasonings [nn.138-145], because the first initial reason and the second and third [nn.45-47] proceed on the basis of natural desire.

121. To the next [n.98] from *Metaphysics* 7 about matter, the description there of matter is true, not only when understanding ‘matter is that whereby the thing of which the matter is part can be and not be’ about the thing of which matter is part, but about the thing whether it is that of which matter is part or that which is received in matter; otherwise the form of fire would not be able not to be, because matter is not part of the form of fire.

122. To the next argument [n.99] about the brave man, there is considerable disagreement whether one should, according to right reason, expose oneself to death. Yet one can say, as the Philosopher replies in *Ethics* 9.8.1169a17-33, that the brave man gives himself the greatest good in performing that great act of virtue; and he would deprive himself of that good, indeed he would be living viciously, if, by omitting the act, he were then to save his being for however much being. But a simply greatest and momentary good is better than a diminished good of virtue, or than a vicious life, for a long time. Hence from this argument it is clearly proved that the common good, according to right reason, is more to be loved than one’s own proper good, because a man should expose to destruction simply all his own proper good, even if he not know his soul is immortal, so as to save the common good; and the good for whose preservation the being of something else is despised is more to be loved simply.

β. To the Arguments of the Doctors

123. To the arguments of the Doctors:

As to the first argument [n.100], if it take the soul to have the same per se being in the whole and outside the whole (insofar as ‘per se being’ is distinguished from the ‘being-in’ of an accident), the form of fire in this way, if it were without matter, would have per se being, and then one could admit that the form of fire would be incorruptible. But if the argument take ‘per se being’ as what belongs to a composite thing in the genus of substance, then it is false that the soul without the body has per se being, because then its being would not be communicable to another; for in divine reality too per se being in this way is taken to be incommunicable. Hence the argument, that because the soul has per se being without the body therefore it does not need the body, altogether fails. For in the second way of understanding ‘per se being’ the antecedent is false, and in the first way the consequence is invalid – unless you add to it that the soul naturally or without a miracle has per se being in the first way; but this proposition is something believed and is not known by natural reason.

124. To the other argument [n.102]: not every corruption is by separation of one thing from another; for if one takes the being of an angel – supposing this to be, according to some [Aquinas], different from the angel’s essence – it is not separable from itself, and yet it is destructible by the succession to its being of the opposite of being.

3. About the Third Proposition, that ‘The Specific Form of Man will not Perpetually Remain Outside its Whole’

125. About the third proposition it is said [Aquinas] that it can be proved from the fact that a part outside its whole is imperfect; but a form so noble will not remain imperfect perpetually; therefore not separate from the whole either.

126. Again, “nothing violent is perpetual” according to Aristotle *On the Heavens* 1.2.269a19-28. But the separation of the body from the soul is violent, because against the natural inclination of the soul, according to the Philosopher; for the soul is naturally inclined to perfecting the body.

127. Now as to this proposition [n.125], it seems that if the Philosopher had posited the soul to be immortal he would rather have posited it to remain perpetually without the body than in the body, because ‘everything composed of opposites is corruptible’.

128. Nor do the above reasons prove it:

Not the first [n.125] because the major premise, ‘a part outside its whole is imperfect’, is only true of a part that receives some perfection within the whole; now the soul does not receive perfection but communicates it. And thus an argument to the opposite can be formed, because it is not repugnant for something to remain equally perfect in itself though it not communicate its perfection to another. This is clear about the efficient cause, whose remaining however much without its effect is not repugnant to it. But the soul remains equally perfect in its proper being whether it is joined or separated, being different however in this, that when separated it does not communicate its being to another.

129. Hereby also to the next argument [n.126], because natural inclination is double: one is to first act and is the inclination of the imperfect to the perfect, and accompanies essential potency; and the other inclination is to second act, and is of the perfect to the communicating of perfection, and accompanies accidental potency.

About the first inclination it is true that its opposite is the violent and is not perpetual, because it posits perpetual imperfection, which the Philosopher considers unacceptable [*On the Heavens* 2.14.296a32-34], for he placed causes in the universe that at some time take away any imperfection. But the second inclination, even if it be perpetually suspended, is not properly called anything violent, because neither is it an imperfection; but as it is now the inclination of the soul for the body is only in the second way.

130. Or one can say, according to Avicenna [*On the Soul* 1.1, 3], that the appetite of the soul is satisfied by the fact that it once perfected a body, because its conjunction with the body is so that by means of the body the soul acquire its perfections through the senses, which it could not acquire without the senses, and so not without the body either. But when the soul has been once conjoined, it has acquired as much as it desires simply to acquire in that way.

B. Recapitulation of the Things Said about the Three Propositions

131. I say, then, about these three propositions [n.53], from which is formed a reasoning for the resurrection that is in some way a priori (because the propositions are taken from the form of man who is to be resuscitated), that the first of them is naturally known. And the error opposed to it, which is proper to Averroes and his alone [n.59], is worst, not only against the truth of theology but also against the truth of philosophy. For

it destroys science, because it destroys all acts of understanding as distinct from acts of sensing, and all acts of choice as distinct from acts of sensitive appetite, and so destroys all the virtues, which are not generated without choices made according to right reason. And consequently, someone who so errs would need to be exterminated from the community of men who use reason.

132. But the other two propositions are not sufficiently known by natural reason, although there are certain probable persuasions for them. For the second, indeed, the persuasions are more numerous and more probable, and hence the Philosopher seems to have more expressly perceived it; for the third proposition, however, they are fewer. And consequently, the conclusion that follows from them is not in this way [sc. a priori, n.131] sufficiently known by natural reason.

133. The second way to the conclusion is from arguments a posteriori, some probable ones among which were touched on in the initial arguments, as about the beatitude of man [nn.46-47].

134. Added to this is also the argument about the justice of God as exacting retribution, whereas now in this life the virtuous suffer greater pains than the vicious. And this argument the Apostle seems to touch on *I Corinthians* 15.19, “If in this life only we have hope in Christ, we are more miserable than all men etc.”

135. But these reasons a posteriori [nn.133-134] are less conclusive than those taken a priori from the proper form of man [n.131]; for it does not appear through natural reason that there is for all men a single Judge ruling according to the laws of retributive and punitive justice.

136. Let that also be true which might be said in this way, that for each man there is in his own good act a sufficient retribution, as Augustine says [*Confessions* 1.12 n.19], “You have commanded, O Lord, and so it is, that every sinner is a punishment to himself,” so that sin itself is the first punishment of sin. Hence it is plain that the Saints, when arguing for the intended conclusion a posteriori, only intend to give certain probable persuasions. As Gregory says, after he has set down certain persuasions for the purpose [*Moralia* 14.55 n.70], “He who will not believe for these reasons, let him believe because of the faith.” Likewise too is the teaching of St. Paul in *Acts* 17.4, 12, 34; 26.8, 19-20, and *I Corinthians* 15.12, 35-38, 42-51, through the example of a grain of wheat that falls [in the ground], and through the resurrection of Christ, that if Christ is risen the dead too will rise, and through just retribution – these are only probable persuasions, or taken only from premises of faith. The fact is plain by running through them one by one.

137. In brief, then, it can be maintained that neither a priori (namely by reason of the intrinsic principle in man), nor a posteriori (namely by reason of some operation or perfection befitting man), can the resurrection be proved necessarily by relying on natural reason. Hence the resurrection is only held as absolutely certain through faith. Indeed, neither is the second proposition taken in the first way [nn.93-102] held by reason, as Augustine says *On the Trinity* 13.9 n.12,⁵ but only through the Gospel, when Christ says [*Matthew* 10.28], “Fear not those who kill the body but cannot kill the soul.”

⁵ See above n.49. “Of those indeed who tried to find these things out by human argumentation scarcely a few, endowed with great genius...and educated in the most subtle doctrines, were able to attain to tracking down the immortality of the soul alone... But that the whole man, who consists of soul and body, will be immortal, and for this reason truly blessed, is promised by this Faith, not with human argumentation, but by divine authority.”

II. To the Initial Arguments

138. To the first argument [n.45]:

139. Either the argument is about natural desire properly speaking, and that is not any elicited act but only the inclination of nature toward something; and then it is plain that a natural desire for anything cannot be proved unless a possibility in nature for it is first proved; and so, by arguing in the reverse direction, there is a begging of the question.

Or the argument is about natural desire less properly speaking, namely that it is an elicited act but in accordance with natural desire; and then again it cannot be proved that some elicited desire is natural in this way unless it first be proved that there is a natural desire for it in the first way.

140. But if you argue that that is naturally desired which, as soon as it is apprehended, is desired by an elicited act, because this proneness seems to come only from a natural inclination – the first would in this one way be denied, that a vicious man is inclined at once to desire, in accord with his habit, what is offered to him; but because nature is not vicious immediately in itself or in everyone, and because anyone at all immediately desires what is apprehended, the upshot is that the desire is not vicious; therefore this response is not a general one.

141. Therefore it can be said that one must show the apprehension to be in accord with right reason and not vicious – otherwise if upon an erroneous apprehension everyone immediately desires it with an elicited act, what follows is not that the desire is consonant with the inclination of nature but rather that it is opposed to it. Now it is not manifest by natural reason that, when reason displays eternal existence as desirable for man, it is not an erroneous reason, for one would first have to show that this existence is capable of belonging to man.

142. Briefly then, every middle term taken from natural desire seems not to work, because for it to work one must show either a natural potency in nature for such existence, or show that the apprehension of it (upon which this desire immediately follows if it is an elicited act) is a correct and not erroneous apprehension. And of these alternatives the first is the same as the conclusion that is drawn from natural desire, and the second is more difficult or less known than this conclusion.

143. But as to the proof of the claim that ‘the natural desire of man is for immortality because he naturally flees death’ [n.45], one could say that this proof would prove the same equally of a brute. And if the remark of the Philosopher *On Generation* 2.10.336b27-29 is brought forward that “in everything to be is better than not to be,” it is to the opposite effect: first because it would be equally conclusive of a brute as of man, and second because Aristotle adds [*ibid.* 30-32], “but this continual existence is not possible in all things, because of their great distance from the Principle,” and therefore “God has completed nature in another way, making generation continual,” as if he were to say: since natural desire is for existence always, in things in which this existence is impossible in itself the desire is for it in the way possible, namely by continuing the species in diverse individuals. And thus might it be conceded about man as about other generable things, that he has a natural desire to exist always, not in a single individual but in this sort of succession.

144. But the drive seems always to remain, that in fleeing one opposite it only flees it because of love of the other opposite. One can concede that from this follows that, when it flees death for the moment now, it loves life for the moment now, and so on about any designated now; but it does not follow that therefore it flees it for an infinite [of nows].

145. To the remark of the Apostle [n.45] I reply: we who are inspired or confirmed by faith ‘do not wish’, and so ‘we do not wish naturally’, such that this ‘not wishing’ is according to natural inclination; but it is not known by natural reason that this ‘not wishing’ is according to natural inclination.

146. To the second argument [n.46] I concede that it is true, not only universally but even specifically, that beatitude is desired naturally by man, as will appear below in d.49 [Rep. IVA d.49 nn.6-8]. But it is not known by natural reason that beatitude in particular, namely which consists in what we believe it to consist, is naturally desired by man; for one would first need to know by natural reason that that act would be suitable for us as the end.

147. When therefore you prove [n.46] through the Philosopher that, from *Ethics* 1, beatitude not only in general but that also, from *Ethics* 10, beatitude in particular is naturally desired, I reply: the idea of beatitude that the Philosopher reckons particular, namely what consists in the most perfect speculation of the highest causes, is very universal. But, when descending to it in particular, the Philosopher does not seem to have gone beyond the speculation that is most perfect in this life. Hence, after he has inquired into man’s beatitude, he adds, “The body too must be healthy, and there must be food and servants; but the happy man must not be supposed to need much and great things” [*Ethics* 10.5-9.1175a3-78b35].

148. Therefore the specific happiness that we posit (for we posit a speculation possible for man far more perfect than any perfection possible for him in this life) is not naturally known to be our end, nor is it naturally known that it is naturally desired by us as the end.

149. When you prove through Augustine’s reason that beatitude cannot be but eternal [n.46], he who holds that human beatitude can be had in this life will grant this, that he loses it willingly, because, according to right reason, he ought to will the condition of his life; but right reason shows to him who does not have the faith that, as it seems to him, the condition of his nature is mortality of soul as well as of body; and therefore just as he ought to will the loss of life so also of blessed life.

150. And when you say ‘a life which was not loved by him who has it is not blessed’ [n.46], this is true if it were not loved for the time when it is possible and fitting the lover of it; but that ‘it is fitting thus forever’ is not known by natural reason.

151. As to the next argument [n.47], it is conceded that it is known to man that he can attain his end in some individual and, consequently, attain beatitude in that degree in which it is known that beatitude is the end of man.

152. And when you say that this is impossible in this life [n.47], I say that this impossibility is not known through natural reason.

153. When you appeal to misfortunes (infirmity of body, imperfection of virtue and of science) [n.47], the response will be that all these are repugnant to the sort of perfect happiness known to belong to the intelligence, but not to the sort known to be capable of belonging to man.

154. To the fourth argument [n.48] it might be said that the species will be perpetual in the universe by continual succession of individuals, which the Philosopher would posit through continuous generation; but it will not be continued in the life of any one or several within the species.

155. From these facts is apparent how great are the thanks that should be given to our Creator, who has made us by faith most certain in matters that pertain to our faith and to eternal continuance, which matters the most clever and most learned were not able, by natural reason, to attain to in almost any way at all, according to what was brought in from Augustine above about ‘scarcely a few’ [n.49]. But if faith is present, which is in those to whom Christ has given it to become sons of God, there is no question, because Christ himself has made his believers most certain of it.

Question Three

Whether Nature Could be the Active Cause of Resurrection

156. Thirdly I ask whether nature could be the active cause of resurrection.

157. That it could be:

Because in nature there is a passive and natural potency for resurrection; for the soul naturally inclines to the perfecting of matter, and matter, conversely, is naturally inclined to the soul, as to its perfection. But to every passive natural potency there corresponds an active natural potency, otherwise the passive natural potency would be vain. So there is some natural active potency with respect to resurrection.

158. Again, in nature there is a double process: one by way of compounding, the other by way of dissolving; and that from which one of these begins is that in which the other is terminated, and conversely. Therefore, each seems to be equally subject to natural action, because each is also the term of each. But nature can dissolve this composite into the components. Therefore, conversely, nature can produce this composite from the components.

159. Again, let fire be corrupted into air, then air into fire: this second fire seems to be the same as the first, because the matter is the same, and it is possible that it have the same efficient cause as the first fire. But now, from the Philosopher *Metaphysics* 8.4.1044a30-32, “if the matter and the efficient cause are the same, the effect too is the same;” if therefore nature can bring back the same fire, it can by equal reason also bring back [the same] man.

160. On the contrary:

Dionysius *Divine Names* ch.6 says about resurrection, “A thing seen by antiquity^a to be against nature is seen by me and the truth to be above nature.”

a. [Interpolation] “Hence the whole of all of us, souls, I say, and bodies conjoined, he promises to transpose to a life altogether perfect and to immortality: a thing seen perhaps by antiquity as against nature, but to me and you and the truth as also above nature – considered, I say, according to us, as not altogether the fortune of divine life. For this life, as being the life of nature of all things and especially of divine things, is not a life against nature or above nature.”

Here Dionysius intends to say that the resurrection of the dead was incredible to antiquity, namely to the ancient folly of the Gentiles, as being against nature and above nature in respect of any agent at all. And this is false, according to him, because although, as concerns us and our strength, it is above nature, yet in respect of God it is neither above nor against nature; for, as the Commentator of Lincoln says [Robert Grosseteste, bishop of Lincoln], what does not fall

under the ‘to will’ of divine life itself, falls immediately under the ‘to be able’ of it, that is, when it is maker of vessels [sc. creatures, *Romans* 9.19-21]. And therefore for that life it is neither against nature nor above nature nor against nature.

161. Again, a perfect animal is not produced equivocally [sc. by specifically different causes], as the Commentator [Averroes] argues against Avicenna, *Physics* 8 com.46. Man, therefore, since he is the most perfect animal, can only be produced by nature with univocal production [sc. production only by specifically the same causes]; but resurrection is not a univocal production, because it is not generation; therefore etc.

I. To the Question

162. Here one needs to know that since, according to Damascene ch.100, “resurrection is a second rising of that which fell and was dissolved,” and that the whole man fell in death, and also that, if one posits that the form of the mixed [body] there was different from the intellective soul (as I believe to be true), then the mixed body was dissolved in death or after death – since this is so, then there is needed for resurrection, in the order of nature, first indeed that the mixed body be restored the same, and second that the same intellective soul be united to the mixed body so that the same man may thus rise again [*Ord.* IV d.11 nn279-284].

163. First then one must see if nature could bring back the numerically same form of mixed body; second if to the dissolved mixed body an intellective soul could be reunited so that there be the same man. The first point contains two things: first whether nature can bring back something corruptible the same in number; second whether it can bring back this mixed body. Thus there are as it were three articles in particular.

A. Whether Nature can Universally Bring Back Some Corruptible Thing the Same in Number

1. First Opinion, which is that of the Philosophers

a. Exposition by Augustine of the Opinion

164. About the first article Augustine in *City of God* 12.14 reports the opinion of the ancient philosophers saying that the numerically same things return in a circuit of time. They posit that after the ‘great year’, that is, after a circuit of 36,000 years, everything will return numerically the same.

165. Their reasoning is that when the cause of things returns the same, the effect will be the same; and, as it is, all the celestial bodies will return to their position, because, on the supposition of Ptolemy in his *Almagest* 9.6 that the heaven of the fixed stars moves one degree in a hundred years contrary to the daily motion, the result is that the motion from East to West will be completed in 36,000 years.

b. Rejection of the Opinion

α. Through Scriptural Authorities

166. But this opinion is rejected there [n.164] by Augustine through the authority of Scripture:

Romans 6.9, “Christ being risen from the dead does not now die; death will no longer have dominion over him.” *I Thessalonians* 4.17, “We who are alive, who remain, will be taken up together...to meet Christ in the air, and thus we shall be always with the Lord.” *Psalms* 118-9, “Thou, O Lord, wilt preserve us and guard us from this generation forever;” – hence about those who hold the above opinion the Psalmist well adds, “the impious walk in a circuit.”

β. By Reason

167. And Augustine [*ibid.*] rejects it by reason, as regard beatitude, because according to the above circular process there would be no true beatitude, in that the blessed soul would be going to return to the miseries that it had before. And so, while it is blessed, it either believes it will never return, and then it is blessed with a false opinion, or believes it will return, and then it is afraid and consequently not blessed. And to the verse of *Ecclesiastes* 1.9-10, “There is nothing new under the sun...,” Augustine replies there [*ibid.*], “Far be it that we believe that those circuits are referred to in these words of Solomon; but the point must be taken either in a general sense, that the same things were before that will be, but not the same numerically, or, as some have understood, that the wise man [Solomon] wanted it to be understood that everything has already happened in the predestination of God, and that for this reason there is nothing new under the sun.”

168. The opinion can also be rejected as concerns the reason for it [nn.165, 167], because if some celestial motion be incommensurable with another (which can be proved if it be posited that, on the supposition of equal velocity on both sides, expanse is incommensurable with expanse over which the motion goes), then, I say, it follows that never will all the motions return to the same point. Nor is this feature of incommensurability in the motions opposed to the continuity of continuous motion, because if two movables were moved, one over the side of a square and the other over the diagonal of it, these motions would be incommensurable, and they would, if they lasted, perpetually fail to return to uniformity. But this question would require a long discussion of the individual motions that are congruent with the [Ptolemaic] epicycles and deferents, as to whether any motion incommensurable with another could be found in the whole heavens.

169. Again, the foundation adopted by Ptolemy [n.165] is rejected by Thebit,⁶ who proves that the sphere of the fixed stars is not thus moved from West to East, because, according to Thebit, the star that was otherwise at the starting point of Capricorn in the ninth heaven [sc. sphere] would be at the starting point of Cancer in the ninth heaven. And therefore Thebit posited for the eighth heaven or for the heaven of the fixed stars a motion in certain small circles described on the starting point of Aries and of Libra in the ninth heaven. And he posited that it is a certain motion of precession and recession, according as the starting point of Aries, movable in its circle, is ascending, and as, oppositely, the starting point of Libra, movable in its circle, is descending; and as elsewhere, conversely, the head of Libra is ascending while the head of Aries is descending. And thus do the stars in the eighth heaven move in longitude and latitude together. If then this motion be proved to be completable in a period of time in which not

⁶ Thabit ibn Qurra, died 901. His rejection of the position held by Ptolemy position is reported by Roger Bacon, *Communia Naturalium* 2 p.5 ch.19.

all the lower spheres would be able to return to the same place that they had at the beginning of the motion, the proposed conclusion would follow.

170. Again, the reasoning [n.165] is defective, because identity of effect depends not only on the efficient cause but also on the matter; but the matter can be altogether different, or possess a different place in comparison with the heavens, because bodies can be prevented by the action of free choice from being in the 'where' where they were before. By such action too a body can be divided, and so the matter of it dispersed.

171. Again, manifest unacceptable results in the case of the human species follow on this position:

For it follows first that learning is nothing but remembering, which the Philosopher touches on in *Posterior Analytics* 1.1.71a1-11; and this is unacceptable because, as he proves in *Posterior Analytics* 2.19.99b22-27, it is unacceptable that the noblest habits exist in us and escape our notice.

172. Another unacceptable result is that the acts of free choice are not necessarily subject to the causality of the heavens, and consequently the acts will not necessarily return the same, and consequently not those acts either which necessarily depend on them. And however this example is posited by Augustine (*ibid.* n.164) about the saying of the philosophers, "As in this age," he says, "Plato taught his students in the school called the Academy, so through innumerable ages backwards the same Plato and the same city and the same school and the same students are to be found." And he adds, "Far be it from us to believe these things," and he introduces the disproofs from Scripture previously brought forward [n.166].

2. Second Opinion

173. There is another opinion [Bonaventure, Albert the Great, Aquinas, Giles of Rome etc.], totally to the contrary, that it is impossible for anything to return numerically the same through a natural agent.

174. For this is adduced the authority of the Philosopher, *On Generation* 2.11.338b161-7, "Things whose substance has perished do not return the same in number."

175. And there is his authority in *Physics* 5.4.228a6-12, about health, that it does not return numerically the same.

176. And his authority in *Categories* 10.13b20-27, "a return from privation to possession is impossible," which is to be understood about the privation subsequent to form and about the preceding form. In agreement with this is what some allege from *Metaphysics* 8.5.1045a3-6, about wine and vinegar. And Aristotle denies that the return is immediate, even as to the species, because there must first be a resolution back into common matter.

177. There is also his authority in *Ethics* 6.3.1139b9-11 approving the saying of Solon [actually Agathon] that 'God is deprived of this alone, to make undone what has been done;' therefore it is impossible to bring back past things, because this would then make them not only not to be past things but also to be present things.

178. Again, by four arguments:

The first is this: in every case of corruption, the matter of a generated thing is divided up, so that the generated thing is not generated from the whole same matter that

was in the corrupted thing before, and thus further a greater and greater division of the matter is always being brought about. Therefore, in any circular process, if return is made to something of the same species as the thing first corrupted, it will not be from the same total matter, and consequently will not be the same, because identity of matter and of form is required for numerical identity— from the Philosopher *Metaphysics* 12.5.1071a17-29; and by reason, because identity of matter and form is the essential principle of the whole.

179. Again, a natural agent can only act through motion and change; but motion and change cannot return the same, because their unity is their continuity, and interruption or repetition is repugnant to continuity; repugnant therefore also to unity of motion and change. Therefore, the term of a natural agent cannot return the same.

This reason is confirmed as follows: as ‘this product’ is to product, so is ‘this production’ to production; therefore, by permutation, as product is to production, so is ‘this product’ to ‘this production’. But there cannot be product without production; therefore neither can there be ‘this product’ without ‘this production’. And ‘this production’ cannot return the same, because it is a change; therefore neither can ‘this product’ return the same.

180. Again, the same thing could not return unless there could be the same potency for it; but this is false, because either the same potency always remains or it is newly produced:

Not in the first way, because potency is corrupted in the arrival of form, and consequently, after the first reduction to act, the same potency does not remain. Nor in the second way, because just as a privation succeeds to the form different from the privation that preceded the form, so the form is resolved into a different potency – if it is resolved into any potency.

There is also a joint proof that neither way is possible, because there is no potency for the past; this form is past.

181. Why too is the same thing not brought back by nature immediately, if the potency for the same thing is in the receptive subject and if nature could be the active cause?

For since nature acts by impetus, there is no reason in this fact why nature may not as immediately bring back the same thing as not immediately do so when at least the sort of order of forms is in place by which it can bring back the same thing in species. But we clearly see that the same thing in number is not immediately brought back in the initial bringing back of the same thing in species – the fact is plain from the altogether different accidents that are consequent (at least as inseparable accidents) to the supposit itself.

And this question, posed by ‘why’, could be the fourth principal reason [n.178].

3. Third Opinion

182. The third opinion [Henry of Ghent, William of Ware] is an intermediate one, which posits that although not everything could return numerically the same by the action of nature, yet something can thus return numerically the same.

183. [First argument] – Argument for this opinion:

First by the remark of the Philosopher *Metaphysics* 8 [n.159], “If the agent is the same and the matter the same, the effect will be the same,” because he only assigns a possible diversity of effect because of a diversity of matter or efficient cause. But it is possible for the efficient cause and the matter to be, in their second relation to the thing produced, the same as they were in their first relation to the thing produced; therefore, it is possible for the thing produced second to be the same as the thing produced first.

184. The proof of the minor is that, although dispersion or division of matter frequently happen in corruption, yet the opposite is possible in many cases. For example, if a fire is contained within a urinal and is corrupted there into air and then from this air is generated fire by reflection of the rays of the sun or in some other way, the contained matter will be the same. Similarly, if something compact is generated from something compact precisely when the form of the thing generated can follow the form of the thing corrupted, the consequence is that the reason that the whole matter was in the form of the thing corrupted is equally reason that the same whole matter will be in the form of the thing to be generated.

185. Response: the remark of the Philosopher [n.183] must be understood with the addition of ‘at the same time’, because, according to him in *Physics* 5.4.227b21-24, not only is there an adding up of effects because of difference in species and subject, but also because of difference in time.

186. Another and better response is that Aristotle means that if the agent and matter are different the effect too will be different, but not that, by reversing the antecedent, if the agent and matter are the *same*, therefore the effect will be the *same*. Hence at the end [of the passage from the *Metaphysics* 8., n.159] he says in conclusion: “If then [nature] happens to make the same thing from the matter, it is plain that the principle that functions as mover is the same, for if the matter is different the mover and what is made are different,” supply: “since there the mover is different, what is made will also be different.”

187. Against the first response [n.185]: if the agent acts now in instant *a*, it will cause this (let this be *p*), and if it does not act now but stops until instant *b*, it will cause the same thing; therefore if it cause in *a*, and in the time intermediate between *a* and *b* the caused thing is destroyed, and the cause act again in instant *b*, it will cause the same thing. The consequence is plain from the fact that the continuity of the intermediate time does nothing for the identity of what persists through it, because what persists has the same being in the time as in the limits of the time.

188. If you deny the assumption, because in instant *b* a cause second from the universal cause (namely the heaven) cannot have the same influence as it had in instant *a*, and therefore it will not be able then to cause the same thing – to the contrary in two ways:

First because a like influence is sufficient for identity of effect; for if in instant *a* another agent were next to the passive thing, it would produce the same thing numerically as the original agent produced, and yet the influence would not be numerically the same as the influence of the latter, but only like it; now, however, there is in the other instant, namely *b*, an influence like what there was in instant *a*.

Again, this influence is not anything absolute received in the second cause, because then the second cause could, through what it received, act without the first cause whose influence it receives, because it now has the whole of that for which it needs the

action of the first cause – which is unacceptable; therefore the influence of the higher cause with respect to the lower one is not anything received in the lower cause. Hence there is only the order in causing of the lower cause to the superior cause, which superior cause is, as concerns itself, always causing; so there will not be a different influence, just as neither a different order of higher cause to lower cause.

189. [Second argument] – Again, either it is simply impossible for the same thing numerically to be differently produced, and then it follows that neither does God have power for this; or it is not simply impossible, and then it follows that it will also now be in the causality of the things which it was possible in before; but it was before in the causality of natural causes, therefore it will be in their causality now as well.

4. Scotus' own Judgment about these Opinions

190. As regards this article I reply that the third opinion seems more probable. For the first opinion, about the return of all things, is altogether improbable, because it is at least against the faith. Nor is the reason given for it effective, because the reason about the return of the heaven both presupposes a dubious antecedent and its inference is dubious.

191. The second opinion does not sufficiently prove the impossibility of the return by nature of anything at all.

192. And therefore the third opinion can be maintained, because it does not appear why nature could not bring something back that is numerically the same. For when there is continuous action by an agent natural in respect of what it produces, as there is in the sun in respect of its rays, if the sun be posited to produce a ray in a first instant and to conserve it in succeeding time, then in the last instant, for example *b*, there will be the same ray, since the identity of a ray in a second instant with itself in a first instant does not depend on its existence in the intermediate time, because the numerically same thing could have been produced in the same instant without the intermediate existence. It follows that, with the intermediate existence destroyed, the same thing could exist in both extremes; and although in the case of other agents, where the agent would not be said to act after the first instant, there might be evasion on this point in respect of the proximate agent, yet the argument remains the same with respect to the remote agent on which the effect continuously depends; and the intended conclusion follows about this effect dependent immediately on the proximate agent.

5. To the Arguments for the Second and Third Opinions

193. To the arguments that are for the second opinion and consequently against the third opinion:

194. [To the authorities of Aristotle] – To the first [n.174] response was made in the first question [n.19].

As to the second [n.175], the opposite could rather be drawn from the doubt in *Physics* 5, because if the health that continued for a day remains the same, why will the health that existed in the morning and was interrupted at noon and returned in the evening not in the same way be the same? Hence the negative response that is alleged is not expressly obtained there [in *Physics* 5].

195. To the other authority from *Categories* [n.176]: if privation, which is the term ‘from which’, cannot return the same, neither can the term ‘to which’ (and this when speaking of the precise term ‘from which’, and as regard a natural agent). But now the only cause why it does not return the same is that the positive state, with which the privation is conjoined, does not return the same; for if the form can return that, according to the order of generation, immediately precedes the other form in the matter, there appears no reason why the concomitant privation could not also return. This proposition, then, from the *Categories* is understood in the order of natural generation in descending process, because after the privation there the positive state does not return, for the form does not return that immediately preceded the positive state in the order of generation. Briefly it can be said that the proposition is understood of identity in species, not of identity in number, and then of immediate return; and consequently neither [of these authorities, nn.175, 176] is about mediate return.

196. To the one from *Ethics* 6 [n.177]: the Philosopher understands the phrase “to make undone what has been done” to mean that one cannot make them not to have been done; but it does not follow that therefore one cannot make them present, because it is not repugnant for them to have been done and to be, by another making, present now, even had they been destroyed between the first action and the second.

197. To the reasons for the opinion:

[To the first reason] – As to the first [n.178], it is plain that it should not move us:

First because some part of the matter remains the same notwithstanding the division of it; therefore in that part the same form as before would be brought back (if return of the same form is not impeded for any other reason than the difference of the matter); and then the new generated thing would in part be numerically the same as what was before, and in part diverse, because as regard the part of the matter that remains the generated thing would be the same as what was first corrupted; but as regard other parts of the matter (that have succeeded to those that were before in the corrupted thing and have been dispersed) the generated thing would be different from what was corrupted.

Second because God or an angel could collect all the parts of the matter of the corrupted thing and apply them in due proportion to a natural agent, and thus, according to this reason, the whole of the numerically same thing would return as before.

Similarly, the whole matter can be naturally preserved the same without division – for example if fire in the urinal be converted into air and all the air conversely be converted into fire, there is here no dispersion of the matter.

The response then is that it is not necessary for the matter of the previously corrupted thing to be divided and, granted it remained the same, it would not be the whole idea of the return of the same thing.

198. [To the second reason] – As to the next, about motion and change, response was made in the first question [n.27].

199. As to the confirmation, about the interchange of proportions [n.179], I say that an interchanged proportion is taken from *Euclid* 5 prop.16, “if quantities are proportional, they will also be quantities when proportioned” [Euclid: “If four quantities be proportional, they will be proportional when interchanged”].

200. And this point is carried over [sc. to the confirmation]. Also, to arguments of this sort the answer is plain from Aristotle *Prior Analytics* 2.22.68a3-16: “If *a* and *b* are converted, *c* and *d* are also converted; if *a* and *d* contradict, *b* and *c* contradict.” And thus

does the argument from interchanged proportion universally hold, provided the interchange happen as to contradiction and conversion. But if it happen as to contradiction and consequent and antecedent, it is not valid, but there is a fallacy of the consequent. Hence this inference is not valid: as man is to non-man, so animal is to non-animal; therefore, by interchange, as man is to animal as to consequence, so non-man is to non-animal as to consequence [cf. *Ord.* I d.36 nn.56-57].

201. As to the proposed conclusion, which is argued for to this effect, which is that ‘it cannot be without this’ [n.179: sc. ‘this product cannot be without this production’], the consequence is not valid when a common term determines for itself another common term [sc. ‘product’ and ‘production’], and an inferior under a common term [sc. ‘this product’ under ‘product’] does not determine for itself an inferior under the other common term [sc. ‘this product’ under ‘this production’]. But the following is quite possible that, from the fact that some common term determines for itself another common term, the only consequence is that an inferior determines for itself the same common term.

An example: ‘as surface is to this surface, so is color to this color’ and conversely; therefore, by permutation, ‘as surface cannot be without color, so neither can this surface be without this color’ – this does not follow, because although one common term determines for itself another common term, yet the singular term does not determine for itself a singular term. Similarly: ‘as body is to this body, so place is to this place’; therefore, by permutation, ‘as body is to place, so this body is to this place’; but body cannot be without place; therefore neither can this body be without this place – the consequence is not valid, because this body does not determine this place for itself in the same way that body determines place for itself. But this consequence holds: if that which is necessarily required for another cannot be without something, neither can that for which it is required be without that something. And so, since production is necessarily included in the idea of ‘this production’, if production cannot be without product, the consequence is that ‘this production’ will not be able to be without ‘this product’; but neither production in common nor product in common necessarily require ‘this’ production.

202. In brief: permutation only holds in accord with the same thing that the proportion accorded with before, or in accord with something where ‘to be a proportion’ is included in the first proposition – as in this case, which is that included in ‘a proportional is in accord with convertibility’ is ‘the proportionals are in accord with repugnance’ [sc. that ‘product’ and ‘this product’ agree in being repugnant to ‘without production’ and ‘without this production’ respectively]. But in the issue at hand it is not so, because in ‘being proportional as to higher and lower’ is not universally included ‘being proportional as to the same sort of inseparability in the lower as in the higher’.

203. [To the third reason] – To the next one [n.180] I say that the potency-principle always remains the same, and it suffices for the reception of form. Because if you seek beyond this principle for another potency, which is a potency of relation, it does nothing for the reception of form; but if it be required, it can be said to be now the same.

204. And when you ask, “either it remains the same or it returns the same” [n.180], each can be granted:

The first, to be sure, because, when speaking absolutely about the potency that states the order of the receiver to the received, the order remains the same whether before

the received thing is present or when it is present, because the order follows the nature of the receiver, which nature is naturally perfected by such form. And the proof that the potency remains is that if God were to bring back the same form (which is not denied to be possible for him), it would make with the matter something 'per se one' just as before; therefore the potency in the matter with respect to the form would be the same as before.

205. And then when the argument is made that 'potency is destroyed in the arrival of form' [n.180], one must say that this is not properly understood of the idea itself of potency, but of a certain respect concomitant with the potency that the potency has because of the fact that it precedes act, which preceding is a certain priority in duration to act; but this is not included per se in the idea of potency, because potency can exist at the same time along with this priority and along with immediacy to act.

206. One could also say that potency before act remains always the same, even along with act; and yet opposites are not together at the same time, because the potency before act is not a potency for form for the same 'now' as when act is present in it, because it has act for that 'now'. But the potency before act is not present in it for the same form, but for a form in the future.

207. Now that either one of these responses may be true is proved by this that, if something can have a potency for form, it already has the potency, because the impossible cannot become possible and, consequently, potency for some form cannot be had at some time without being had now, provided that what is susceptible of the form is possible now.

208. It might in another way be said that the same potency would return, just as it is also possible that the same act return. And then it would be said that, for the moment when the act is present, the potency opposite to act does not remain but that it does return when the act ceases.

209. In a final way it might be said that, from the beginning of creation, there are distinct potencies in the potency-principle, as many as are the receivable forms, not only distinct in species, but in number and not precisely so many but even that there are as many for the same form as there are times when the form can be induced, and that each of these potencies ceases to be when its proper act arrives and does not return; and yet the same form can return, because there is not only a single potency for it but different potencies according as the form was differently inducible into the same potency-principle.

When it is argued against the second member [n.180] that the same potency cannot return because neither can the privation – it was said above [n.195] that privation can return if the positive state can return with which the privation is conjoined; and about potency in the same way, if the form prior in the order of generation can return with which the potency for the second form is concomitant.

210. When it is argued, against each member [n.180], that there is no potency for the past, this is true of the past as it is past; hence there is properly no potency for the past to have been or not been, but there is potency for the thing that was past insofar, however, as it can be future.

Now this argument about potency [n.180] works not only against a natural agent but also against the return of the same material form through divine action, because divine action requires in matter a potency that it perfects. He who would say that these potencies are nothing, when speaking of any power besides that which states a respect of

the receiver to the form received, should free himself of all this bother, because how many nothings are posited does not matter. But the potency that is a real relation on the part of matter to form (just as, conversely, in-forming is a real relation of form to matter) – that potency, I say, returns the same if the form returns; or if it not return before the composite, it could return the same (the point was stated in the first question [n.41]).

211. [To the fourth argument] – To the final argument [n.181], as to why the same thing in number would not return at once with the initial return of the same thing in species, one can say that there are impediments on the part of the passive thing and the agent, because of which inseparable accidents cannot immediately be brought back; and without these inseparable accidents the same substance would not be brought back. It need not always be so that there are such impediments.

B. Whether it is Possible for Nature to Bring Back the Same Mixed Body

212. As to the second principal article [n.163], it is absolutely possible for nature to bring back the same mixed body on the supposition of the third opinion in the preceding article [n.182]; but it is not possible for nature to bring back the same thing in the way it will be brought back.

213. The proof of the first conclusion is that, if the third opinion in the preceding article be true, then whenever the whole of the same matter is, without impediments, in proximity to the same agent, the same thing can be brought back – in proximity not just to the same agent in number but to the same agent in species, because identity in species in an agent is equivalent to identity in number. The proof is that if in this instant this fire generates from this wood this fire, then if in the same instant that fire were proximate to the same wood it would generate the same fire. But it is possible for the whole matter (from which this body was otherwise generated in a natural generation) to be again under the form of sperm and menstrual fluid in another womb, as is proved by the statement of Gregory *Moralia* IV ch.31 n.62 (and it is set down in II d.20 nn.18-20, of the *Lectura*). Therefore the same mixed body would then be formed in another womb.

214. The second conclusion is for me more certain, because it depends on certain particulars, namely if the third stated opinion is true [nn.182-192]. My proof for this second conclusion is that the whole of active nature is tied to a certain order of forms in the changing of things, so that the whole of nature could not produce wine immediately after vinegar (only God is not limited to this order in his acting). And this order is especially necessary as regard a natural agent when process is being made to what is perfect, because something perfect cannot be produced in many ways but in fewer ways. Now, as it is, the mixed body is perfect among corruptible things, and therefore a considerable order in forms that are first according to natural order (as the order of seed, blood, flesh etc.) is determined for the mixed body. But such forms do not, as it is, precede this formation of the body in the way the body will then be restored [sc. at the resurrection], because it will be restored suddenly from ash or dust or other things, whatever it was before reduced to; therefore, the whole of nature will not be able to restore the same body in the way in which the body will then be restored.

C. Whether Nature Could Reunite the Intellective Soul to the Dissolved Mixed Body so that it be the Same Man

1. Opinion of Others and its Refutation

215. As to the third article [n.163]: once the body has been restored by something or other, it seems that the soul could be united to that body by nature, because this form [the soul] is the disposition that necessitates with respect to animation; so there is in nature a disposition necessary for animation, but that which it disposes for necessarily follows on such disposition.

216. But on the contrary

It is plain that the soul cannot be united to the body by any creature other than itself; but neither can it be united by itself as by the effecting principle of the union. Proof of both theses: an equivocal cause is simply nobler than the effect, and the proof is from Augustine 83 *Questions* q.2, “Everything that comes to be cannot be equal to that by which it comes to be, otherwise justice, which must render to each what is his own, would necessarily be taken away from things.” But Augustine means this about an equivocal cause, because justice in a univocal cause requires equality, while in an equivocal it requires eminence. Avicenna holds the same in his *Metaphysics* 6.3, and Augustine *Literal Commentary on Genesis* 12.16 n.33, holds the same, that “the agent is more outstanding than the passive thing.” This proposition, as stated elsewhere [*Ord.* I d.3 n.407], depends on this other, “the agent is simply more perfect than its formal effect;” but man is simply more perfect than his soul (as whole than part), and than any other bodily substance. It is plain, therefore, that neither the soul nor any other bodily substance (other than man) can be the effective cause of man.

217. Again, *Physics* 2, the form and efficient cause are not numerically the same; therefore the soul, which is the formal cause of man, cannot be the efficient cause of the same man.

218. Again, the first union [of body and soul], made in generation, is not less natural than this other, made in resurrection; but the soul could not have been the effective cause of this union; therefore only God was in creating and infusing the soul. – I concede the conclusion that if the first production of man is subject to active divine virtue alone, then to him alone will be subject the second production of man; but this production is in the animation of the organic body.

219. To the argument for the opposite [n.215] I say that in the whole of nature there is nothing in the receptive thing that is a disposition that necessitates for the form, because along with any such disposition there stands the potency for the contradictory opposite [sc. the disposition, qua disposition, can be with or without the form it is the disposition for]; the receptive thing, which is precisely receptive, necessarily goes along with this potency, for such potency is repugnant to necessity [sc. a potency qua potency is not necessitated to being actualized or to not being actualized].

220. But the customary phrase ‘the disposition that necessitates’ [n.215] must be understood in this way: not because the disposition belongs to the idea of necessity but because, when the disposition is posited, the agent necessarily induces the form for which the disposition is the mere disposition – the agent induces either with necessity simply, as when the agent is merely natural, or with necessity in a certain respect, as when the agent is voluntary and disposes itself so to act. And in this last way the form of corporeity is a disposition necessitating for the soul, not that the disposition is of itself or by virtue of

itself followed by animation, but because once the disposition is in place, the agent, by the conditioned necessity of its own disposition, induces the form that it is for.

II. To the Initial Arguments

221. As to the first initial argument [n.157], I say that there is not any created passive potency to which there does not correspond in nature an active potency, lest the passive potency be posited in vain. But this active potency in nature is differently posited by philosophers and theologians [cf. *Ord. prol. p.1 q.un. nn.5-89*], for [the latter posit it] by taking active nature strictly for created nature. Not that Aristotle posits that the intellect is immediately induced by God (as was touched on above, n.60), but, by taking nature for what acts by natural necessity, the Philosopher would in this way say that there is an active potency in nature, because he takes the first cause to be acting on the passive subject by natural necessity.

222. But the theologians deny that there is an active potency in nature even in this way, because they say that the first principle [sc. God] acts on the passive subject, not by natural necessity, but freely. And then, according to them, when it is said that ‘there is in nature some corresponding active potency’, ‘nature’ must be taken universally there for the totality of being. Nor do they posit something in being more vainly than the Philosopher does, because the passive potency can be as much reduced to act if it is not reduced by a created agent but by an uncreated one, and one that is not active naturally but freely – just like if the potency were posited as being reduced by the agent in different ways.

223. As to the next [n.158], the inference is not valid: ‘it is capable of the dissolving process, therefore also of the reverse process, which is by compounding’. An instance is plain, for I can divide up a solid object but I cannot join the divided parts together again.

224. As to the third [n.159]: in one way it is denied that the same matter in itself and in its parts can again be in proximity to some agent (because of the division of the matter’s parts that happens in corruption); in another way it is denied that the same potency or matter can remain or return. However, this argument touches on the general point dealt with in the first article of the solution [nn.190-192], and it is in favor of the third opinion, which is not simply rejected there.

Question Four

Whether the Resurrection is Natural

225. Fourth I ask whether the resurrection is natural.

226. That it is:

Damascene ch.58 “What is common to all (in the same species) is natural;” the resurrection is of this sort.

227. Again, a motion is natural that terminates in natural rest, because a movable is naturally moved to that in which it naturally rests; and, by equal reason, a change is natural that terminates in a form that naturally perfects the changeable thing; but the resurrection is of this sort, because the perfectible thing will be naturally perfected by the reuniting of the form.

228. On the contrary:

Dionysius, *Divine Names* ch.6 says of the resurrection, “seen by me and the truth to be above nature” [n.160]; therefore it is not natural.

229. Again, knowledge of natural effects can be reached by natural reason; the resurrection cannot be so reached, (from the second question of this distinction [n.137]).

230. Again, what is natural happens for the most part, not only in most individuals but also at most times [cf. *Ord.* I d.3 n.235], because it happens as often as its cause, which is natural, is not impeded, and its cause is impeded for the least part; but resurrection happens only once.

I. To the Question

A. About the Meaning of the Term ‘Natural’

231. Here one needs to understand that ‘natural’ is taken equivocally [cf. *Ord.* prol. nn.57-59] – which is plain from the fact it has diverse opposites.

232. And this is one teaching about knowing what is multiple, for in *Topics* 1.15.106a9-10 the natural in one way is opposed to the supernatural, in another way to the artificial (or to the free or voluntary), in a third way to the violent.

233. For naturality sometimes pertains to the active principle, and then are opposed to it the free in one way and the supernatural in another way – for a natural agent or an agent acting naturally (which is opposed to the free) is said to be that which acts of natural necessity, while the voluntary or the free is that which determines itself to acting. And in this way does the Philosopher speak in *Physics* 2.3.195a27-b6, 5.196b17-22, when he divides nature from what acts by design, and in *Metaphysics* 9.2.1046a22-b2, 5.1047b31-8a8, when he speaks about irrational active powers and rational or free active powers. In another way the natural, on the part of the active principle, is said to be what has a natural order of active to passive, and the supernatural what exceeds all such natural order; and in this way any created agent is said to be natural and only an uncreated agent is said to be supernatural.

234. On the part of the passive principle, the natural is spoken of in one way as it is opposed to the violent, insofar as it is said to be moved naturally because it is acted on according to its proper inclination as passive; the violent is what is acted on against its inclination as passive. From this follows that the natural and violent are not immediate contrary opposites; rather there is a mean between them, namely when the passive thing is disposed in neither way, and is not inclined to what it receives nor to what is opposite (as a surface is disposed to whiteness or to blackness or to something intermediate).

235. There follows too that the violent cannot exist in what is primarily passive, namely in prime matter, because prime matter is never inclined against anything that it is absolutely receptive of.

236. And the distinction between these opposites and the intermediate in the passive thing is taken as it is compared to form. But as the passive thing is compared to the agent from which it receives the form, it is said to be moved naturally when it is moved by an agent naturally corresponding to it; however, it is said to be moved supernaturally when it is moved by an agent proportioned to it naturally above the whole order of these sorts of agents.

237. Thus we have, therefore, in two ways the natural as it belongs to the active principle, because we have it as it is distinguished from the free and supernatural [n.233]; and we have in two ways the natural or naturally as it belongs to the passive thing, because we have it as it is distinguished from the neutrals and the violent [n.234].

B. Objection against What has been Said and its Solution

238. But argument is made against the distinction in the case of the two last items [n.236], for Aristotle in *Ethics* 3.1.1110b15-17 says that “the violent is that whose principle is extrinsic, with the passive thing not conferring any force;” therefore the moving principle is placed in the definition of the violent, and consequently the violent is not just taken essentially from the comparison of the violent with the passive subject [cf. *Ord.* IV d.29 n.22].

239. I reply (and to however many such instances) with this proposition: ‘that is per se cause on which when posited, and with anything else and any variation in it removed, the effect follows’; but now, although a form against which the receptive thing is inclined is only induced by an agent that per se inflicts violence on the passive subject, yet the per se idea of the ‘violent’ is taken from the relation of the passive subject to the form, because as long as the passive subject and the form remain in their idea (namely, that the form can be received, but against the inclination of the passive subject) then, whatever variation there is in the agent, the passive thing receives the form with violence.

240. This is plain, because not only in ‘the being induced’ but also in the ‘persisting’ is some form said to remain violently, and some form naturally, and for a long time, in the passive subject, so that, if one removes the agent (namely because it has no action after inducing the form), the naturality and the violence are there, if one compares the form precisely with the receptive subject [cf. *Ord.* prol. nn.58-59].

241. I concede, therefore, that in the description of the violent the agent is placed as something extrinsic, but not as per se completing or as per se constituting the idea of the violent, but this idea is completed only by “with the passive subject not conferring any force,” that is, contra-ferring.⁷ And the violent would remain after the whole action of the agent stops (just as if a stone could rest above without the continuous action of what detains it). However, in the description of the violent is added ‘principle’ [n.238], as being for the most part the extrinsic cause.

242. Similarly, although the passive subject receive some form that is in some way supernatural (and in this respect supernaturality could be called the manner of relation of the passive subject to the form), yet it is never called supernatural save because it receives the form from such an agent. The proof of this is that if it receive from such an agent a form naturally perfective of it, still it would receive it supernaturally – not indeed because of its relation to the form (because in this way it receives it naturally), but because of its relation to the agent from which it receives it.

C. Conclusion of What has been Said

⁷ I.e. the passive subject does not cooperate with the agent in bringing action *contra* or against itself as passive subject.

243. To the issue at hand: resurrection signifies a passive undergoing to which resuscitation corresponds as the action undergone; therefore in the question ‘whether resurrection is natural’ [n.225] naturality is only taken as it pertains to the passive undergoing; but in the question ‘whether active resurrection is natural’ natural is taken as it pertains to action and the active cause.

244. In the first way, then, I say that resurrection will be natural as natural is opposed to violent, but it will not be natural as natural is opposed to supernatural. And the reason for each point is plain from what was said in the first article: the reason for the first point is that the passive subject is naturally inclined to the form that it receives [nn.234-235]; the reason for the second is that it does not receive the form from an agent possessing a natural order to what needs to be done to the passive subject, but from an agent above the whole of this sort of order [n.236].

245. If however the question be about whether active resuscitation will be natural, one must reply that in neither way in which natural belongs to action will the action be natural, because it will be from an agent acting freely, not by natural necessity, and from an agent above the whole order of created causes that are said to have a natural order of acting on a passive subject.

III. To the Initial Arguments

246. As to the first of the initial arguments [n.226], the authority of Damascene about ‘all’ must be understood about what is common to all in the species from an intrinsic principle or a natural cause; it is not so here. And it is plain that such is Damascene’s understanding, because he applies the proposition so understood to the double operation in Christ that is present to all in the human species from an intrinsic or at least natural cause.

247. As to the second [n.227], it proves only that resurrection is natural as natural is opposed to violent. Yet what is touched on there about change contains a doubt, namely whether resurrection is a change – and this will be spoken of in the following question [nn.269-273].

Question Five

Whether the Future Resurrection will be Instantaneous

248. The question asked fifth is whether the resurrection is instantaneous.

249. That it is not:

I Thessalonians 4.16-17, “The dead who are in Christ will rise first, then we who are alive etc.,” therefore those who are found to be dead at the advent of Christ will rise first, then those caught up to meet him will die and afterwards rise; therefore the resurrection of the latter and the former will not be simultaneous; therefore not in an instant.

250. Again, Augustine in *City of God* 20 ch.20 n.3 says, “Then with ineffable speed the dust of the most ancient corpses returns to bodily members that will live without end.” And in the same chapter, “They will with marvelous speed pass to deathlessness through death;” the Apostle most openly says the same [n.249]. But fast and slow (from the Philosopher, *Physics* 4.5.218b15) “are determined by time.”

251. Again, in the resurrection something that existed before will be corrupted, because the matter that will receive the new form existed before under another form that is to be corrupted. That which is to be corrupted will have a finite being; but everything positive that is everywhere finite has at least two positive terms; therefore the being that precedes [the resurrection] will have two terms, and consequently one can grant there is an ultimate instant in the being of that preceding thing. Therefore, if the resurrection will be immediately after the being of that preceding thing and instantaneous, an instant will be immediate with an instant, which is against the Philosopher, *Physics* 5.3.227a27-32, 6.1.231a22-b10, 232a18-22, 3.234a22-31.

252. Again, the body that is now to be corrupted will have permanent being; but the permanent does not have being in time save because it has it in an instant; therefore if the being of what is to be corrupted immediately precedes the being of what is to be resuscitated, the result is that it will precede in an instant immediate with that resuscitated being, and then (as before [n.251]) it will not be possible for the thing to be resuscitated to have being immediate with an instant.

253. To the opposite:

I Corinthians 15.52, “In a moment, in the blink of an eye, at the last trump.” This authority is adduced by Augustine *City of God*, in the place cited before [n.250], as proof for the resurrection’s happening suddenly.

254. Again, generation is in an instant, therefore resurrection is too.

255. Likewise the Master [Lombard] says in the text that the resurrection will be in an instant.

I. To the Question

256. Here one needs to see that since resurrection, according to Damascene [n.162], “is a rising again of that which fell” – but the whole man fell through separation of the intellective soul from the body, and the mixed body secondarily fell through corruption into some other thing or things; and generation and corruption proceed in reverse order, and so the body must be repaired first, in the order of nature, before the soul is united, but this restoration of the body is preceded by collection of the parts of the matter that were dispersed by dissolution of the body into diverse elements (at once or after a delay) – one must see first about this preliminary to resurrection, which is the collection of the parts of the body, second about the induction of the form of the body into the matter, third about the union of the soul with the body.

A. About the Collection of the Parts of the Body

257. About the first point [n.256], I say that collection of the parts will be done by the ministry of angels, and therefore in time. The antecedent is plain from the saying of the Savior, *Matthew* 24.31, “The Son of Man, with a trumpet and a loud voice, will send forth his angels, and they will gather his elect from the four winds, from the tops of the heavens to the limits of them,” which is to say: whithersoever the parts of the matter of the body had been dispersed into the elements, whether into fire or earth (“from the tops of the heavens to the limits of them”), whether into any intermediate body (of water, or

air, or imperfectly mixed),⁸ from the four winds all the parts of matter will be collected again and reunited.

258. The consequence [sc. the collection will be in time, n.257] is plain from what was said in (*Rep.* IIA d.8 n.2), that an angel cannot move a body in an instant.

B. About the Inducing of the Form of the Body into the Matter

259. On the second point [n.256] I say that the formation of the body will be instantaneous, because it will be done immediately by divine virtue; for an angel will not be able to induce the material form into matter. Now divine virtue, although it can act successively and induce a form successively (just as created virtue can), and although a substantial form could be induced successively (which others deny [Aquinas, Henry of Ghent]), yet it is more fitting that divine virtue instantaneously induce a form that can be induced instantaneously, for succession is only necessary because of some deficiency in the agent. For all the causes touched on by the Commentator, *Physics* IV com.71, namely of the movable in relation to the mover, and of the movable to the medium, and of the medium to the mover, are ultimately reduced (as I have touched on elsewhere [*Ord.* II d.2 nn.428-429]) to the imperfection of the virtue of the agent; and because of this imperfection the movable can resist that virtue, not absolutely but as it regards the terms and the medium through which the movement from term to term needs to be made. But, as it is, the [divine] virtue can have no imperfection; and that this form can be induced instantaneously is plain, because that virtue can perfect it instantaneously.

260. But there is here a doubt, for then it follows that a local motion will be instantaneous. A proof is that the body will be more densely or more rarely formed from the dust that it will be formed from and, whether this way or that, it will occupy a greater or lesser place than that out of which it will be generated, and so there will be local motion not only of it but of the surrounding air.

261. [A proof] secondly is that the body will be of a different shape than the body from which it will be formed, therefore it will occupy a place proportionally corresponding to its shape – and so as before.

262. I concede the conclusion of these argument [nn.260-261], that by taking local motion generally, in that, when a generated thing succeeds to what is corrupted and occupies a greater or lesser place than the thing corrupted, some change of place is being spoken of – for there is occupation (though not by a body the same in act) of a greater or lesser place; so there is instantaneous change of place because there is occupation of a greater place. And not only so but the surrounding air is at once expelled if the body is greater or follows it if the body is lesser. And indeed I concede that in the first instant, namely when the air is expelled, it is expelled instantaneously, and is so immediately by divine virtue, because that virtue immediately positions a greater body where the lesser body was.

263. But now, what effectively moves one body in place, effectively expels the other body – and it is not the moved body that effectively expels the other body, just as

⁸ Scotus is proceeding on the assumption, common to the ancient and medieval world, that the elements of matter are the four of fire, air, water, earth (of which fire is naturally at the top and earth at the bottom and the other two in between), and that material bodies are mixtures more or less of these four.

heat too in wood does not effectively expel the cold from the wood, but the hot itself, which effectively causes heat in the wood, effectively expels cold from it.

264. However it is possible for divine virtue to position a greater body in a 'where' and to keep the body that was there before, and then two bodies will be together at the same time; but then there would be a new miracle over and above the sudden positioning here of the larger body. But if, simultaneously with this positioning of the body, this body expels that one, there is only one miracle.

265. Now when the generated body is less than the corrupted body, things are different: for then either God will immediately move the surrounding air so that it touches the surface of the lesser body, or he can refrain from moving it. For his moving it is not simply necessary in order for a lesser body to be here; because God can leave nature to itself, and since nature cannot move air instantaneously so as to apply it to the sides of the lesser body, there will for a time be a vacuum – namely until nature is able to make the surrounding air contiguous with the body.

266. From this is plain that, on the supposition that God suddenly makes a lesser body (which assuredly does not involve a contradiction) and leaves the surrounding air and nature's action to themselves, there will for a time be a vacuum. So there is no contradiction in a vacuum existing in the universe; on the contrary, if nature were instantaneously to make a lesser body from a greater, it would seem one could conclude that a vacuum, without any divine miracle, exists for a time.

C. About the Union of the Soul with the Body

267. On the third point [n.256] I say that animation not only is instantaneous (for the reason stated in the second article, namely that animation is immediately from God alone, whose active virtue nothing resists [n.259]), but must be instantaneous, because there can only be succession in reception of a form either because of the parts of the form to be induced, or because of the parts of the body one of which receives the form before another. But neither of these can be posited in animation. Not the first because this soul will be reunited in the unique degree in which it was created, so that although some part could be more perfect than another, yet this does nothing for the intended conclusion of a successive uniting of the soul. Nor can the second be granted, at least as regards that which is first ensoul-able; for there is something that is the first proportioned ensoul-able, such that nothing of it can be animated unless the whole of it is animated – although perhaps as to many parts of the body that are not simply necessary for animation (as are hands and feet and other exterior parts), one of them could be animated before another; but we are speaking of the first animation.

268. I say too, secondly, that the body is animated in the same instant in which it is formed, because from the fact that this form is a necessitating disposition for the soul (not absolutely, but from the necessity of the agent; not simply, but from its disposition), the soul is, from the necessity of the disposed matter, at once induced when the form of the body has been induced.

269. And if you ask whether the form of the body and the soul are induced by the same change, I say no, but rather that the inducing of the form of the body is by change, while the inducing of the soul is not by any change so as to be a change to the soul, or to animation, as to a term.

The first point is plain, because what is susceptible of the form of corporeity passes from privation to form. The second is plain from the same fact, because what is susceptible of the soul or of animation is not prime matter but the body; now the body will not have privation of the soul itself, so as to pass from this privation to form; nor will it have it at the same time as the soul, because then privation and form would be simultaneous; nor will it have it before it has the form, because it will not exist before; therefore, body and soul will exist simultaneously. But there is never change except when what is susceptible of the term ‘to which’ of some inducing precedes in time the term ‘to which’ and when it is then under privation of the term.

270. If you argue that therefore neither animation as action nor animation as passive undergoing will be there, because action is not without passive undergoing nor passive undergoing without change, and change is denied to be there; so both action and passive undergoing are denied to be there, which seems unacceptable – I reply that, as was said above in *Ord.* IV d.13 n.54, passive undergoing asserts of the passive thing a relation which comes to it from without, that is, which follows necessarily when the extreme is posited. Now such relation can exist even if the passive thing never precedes in time the form that it receives, for, however much it may at the same time have the potency in itself, yet it cannot receive this potency from another. And then, in brief, a passive undergoing in the inducing of a form coeval with the passive thing does very well exist without change.

271. An example of this, according to Augustine *Confessions* 12.3:⁹ matter is, by a certain mode of priority, created before form. And in that prior instant matter has only the respect toward God of produced to producer; and this respect comes from within, indeed is necessarily consequent to the foundation’s nature (from *Ord.* II d.1 nn.260-275). In the second instant matter receives form from God, and the respect here is not of it as produced to God as producer, but of it as what is unformed to God as in-forming and impressing form; and this second respect comes to matter from without, because matter could remain perpetually (God conserving it) without the respect of receiving something from God.

272. The form, then, is created together with matter simultaneously in time, but later indeed than it in nature is induced or impressed on the matter with a passive undergoing [of the matter] that is in the category of passion but without any change – because never does matter pass from privation of the form to form nor, in brief, is it differently disposed according to form, because different dispositions presuppose an entity [sc. which matter as such is not].

273. From this follows a corollary, that when one says action and passion are taken in abstraction from motion and change, one should not say that only the idea of relation remains in them; rather the idea of action and passion, without any idea of motion and change, truly remains.

D. Two Small Doubts

⁹ “Have you not taught me, O Lord, that before you were forming and distinguishing this unformed matter it was not anything, not color, not figure, not body, not spirit? But it was not altogether nothing; it was some unformed-ness without any appearance.”

274. Two small doubts remain: one is whether the resurrection of everyone will be at the same instant (the first argument touches on this [n.249]), and the other is at what instant – though not a determinate or specific one, yet what instant by comparison to the parts or hours of the natural day, as whether in an instant of the middle of the night, or some other instant that has a determinate relation to the parts of the natural day.

275. As to the first, Augustine in the whole of the cited chapter 20 [n.250, *City of God*] seems to determine of express intent that the resurrection of those who will be found dead at the coming of the Judge will precede in time the resurrection of those who will be found alive. But those who are alive, according to the words of the Apostle [n.249, *I Thessalonians* 4], “will be taken up to meet him etc.,” and there as is probable, according to Augustine, they will die and immediately afterwards rise; and so the resurrection of these latter will follow after the resurrection of the former.

276. Hence Augustine says [*ibid.*], “If we believe that the saints who will be found alive at Christ’s coming, and who will be taken up to meet him, will in that same taking up leave bodies mortal and return directly to the same bodies immortal, we will experience no difficulties in the words of the Apostle.” This also seems to be expressly indicated by the words of the Apostle, “the dead who are in Christ will rise first, then we etc.,” where, according to Augustine, the Apostle “exemplified in himself and in those who were alive with him the persons of those who will be found alive [sc. at Christ’s coming].”

277. As to the second doubt, it seems true *prima facie* that any instant at all has every relation to the parts of the natural day; for what in one part of the earth is an instant in the middle of the night is in another meridian an instant between midnight and midday, and in the meridian opposite the first an instant of midday, and so on about the individual instants that can be singled out in a natural day; therefore, comparing things in this way, the dead will rise in any and every hour of the natural day.

278. But since not without cause is a question raised about the hour of the resurrection, one must understand that those who ask it are asking about the hour in comparison to the region where the judgment of the resurrection will be, and to where those who are to rise will be transferred so as to be judged – transferred, I say, either after complete resurrection or before it through transfer of the collected dust. For both are possible to God, so that either they will be resuscitated in diverse places, perhaps where they were buried, or the dust will be collected from the individual places to the one place where all must come together after the resurrection to be judged; and in that place the resurrection of everyone will happen.

279. Now I mean by ‘dust’ any bodies whatever into which resolution is ultimately made, namely if into so much amount of fire and so much of water and so much of earth; and let an amount of fire be immediately next to the sphere of the moon above any point on the earth, and another amount directly in the diametrically opposite extreme in the sphere of fire, and let a third part be at the bottom of water or the middle or top of it, and the like.

280. All these parts, even a thousand thousands, are understood when ‘dust’ or ‘ash’ are spoken of. For when Christ says, “from the ends of the heavens” and “from the four winds” [*Matthew* 24.31], he himself does not mean that the dust we usually take in tombs has been dispersed to the furthest distance, but he means generally that ‘whatever bodies or parts dissolution may have been made into, those parts will be collected, and

from the collected parts, that is, from the matter in them which was previously the matter of the corrupted body, the same body will again be restored’.

281. Now the place of the general judgment is reckoned probably to be the land of promise [*Genesis* 13.14-17, 17.8] or the valley of Josaphat [*Joel* 3, 2.12], or another determinate part there, or as large a part as will suffice for the reprobate (if indeed the elect will not be on the earth but “will be caught up to meet Christ in the air” [n.249]); and, consequently, the hour [of general judgment] must be understood with respect to that part of the earth.

282. But as to what is then said to be “in the middle of the night” (it is taken from *Matthew* 25.6 and from the Apostle in *I Thessalonians* 5.2, “Now the day of the Lord will come as a thief”), it does not seem it must be understood literally, because, although the Lord could make himself manifest to each singly, yet it is more probable – for the confusion of the reprobate (who will be seen by each other and the good) and for the glory of the elect (who will be seen by each other and the bad) – that it will be in an illumined place, and so there will not then in the place of resurrection and judgment be the darkness of the middle of the night. Therefore, in the hour perhaps in which Christ rose, in that hour, I say, in reference to the place mentioned, the dead will be resuscitated; or in the hour in which he was condemned by Pilate; or in the hour in which he expired on the cross – since we do not have certainty about this from Scripture. And whichever of these times be posited, the words ‘in the middle of the night’ must be expounded as signifying uncertainty.

II. To the Initial Arguments

283. As to the first argument, from the Apostle [n.249], I concede that the instant of resurrection will not be the same for all, because in the first instant of the resurrection of the dead there will still be some alive, and that too with mortal life; and it is probable that they will pay the due of death as Christ and his Mother did, and then they will rise, and so after others who have already been resuscitated.

284. As to the next [n.250], what Augustine says about speed, I say that it can be referred to the collection of dust, not to the two other things that follow [sc. in Augustine, inducing and uniting the soul, nn.257, 259]; and it has been conceded that the collecting will take place in time, but the other two in an instant and in the same instant.

285. The third and fourth [nn.251-252] raise considerable difficulty among those who philosophize about the last instant of a thing permanent in being. But if it be said, as was said in *Ord.* II d.2 n.167, that ‘anything permanent in its being is measured by aeviternity’, there is no difficulty, because the same aevum measures the body that precedes [sc. the resurrection] as long as it remains, and when that body ceases to be its aevum ceases to be; and then one can, it is true, grant there is an ultimate in the being of a permanent thing [n.251], and the ultimate and the first are the same, and this same measures the whole, if one upholds the indivisibility of an aevum. So when it is argued about finite being that it will have two terms [n.251], one must deny it, because it is not something continuous but indivisible.

286. And if you say, “at least immediately before the being of what is to be resuscitated there is the being of what is to be corrupted” – I ask in what or with what limit of the time itself? Not with time because then the time would not be something

finite with proper limits; with an instant of time therefore, so an instant of time will not immediately succeed – I reply: the being immediately preceding the resurrection is itself in an instant of the aevum, which aevum indeed can coexist with time as also with the ‘now’.

287. And when you ask about what coexists with it in time as it immediately precedes resurrection [n.252], I say that what coexists with it is time and not an instant; and thus those who speak of permanent things as if they had being in time should say that they never have ultimate being, but have being in the whole time, and in the ultimate of the time they have non-being, because then the thing generated has being; however the finite time has its own limits, because the instant that measures the being of what is to be generated is the term of the time that measures the being of what is to be corrupted.

288. And if you say that that being is something finite, therefore it will have its own proper limits – the inference that it will have limits within which it may be preserved does not follow; for ‘having its own proper limits’ only corresponds to it by reason of the time that measures it, and its proper limits are two instants, whether they measure that being or another.

289. Thereby to the next argument [n.252]: when it is said that a permanent thing does not have being in time or with time save because it is in an instant – this is false when holding to the first way, about being measured by the aevum [n.285].

290. But if one holds the other way [sc. being measured by time, *Ord.* II d.2 n.146], one must say that it is with the whole time as it is immediate to an instant in the way something continuous is immediate to its term; and it does not have this immediacy save as it is in some instant; and then one must deny the statement that “the permanent does not have being in time save because it has it in an instant” [n.252]. True indeed it is that it can be in an instant, provided, however, it can have being in time, namely being with duration; and according to this being, and not instantaneous being, it is immediate to the following instantaneous being.

291. But the first response [n.290] seems easier and more reasonable, because a permanent thing, even if it persist with time, seems nevertheless to have a being in itself that is just as indivisible.

Forty Fourth Distinction

First Part

About the Resurrection of the Whole Man in the Truth of Human Nature

Single Question

Whether, in the Case of Every Man, the Whole that Belonged to the Truth of Human Nature in him will Rise Again

1. “Now some are accustomed etc.” [Master Lombard, *Sent.* IV d.44 ch.1 n.1].
2. About this forty fourth distinction I ask whether, in the case of every man, the whole that belonged to the truth of human nature in him will rise again.
3. That it will not:

Genesis 2.21-22, “God took one of Adam’s ribs and made it into the woman.” Therefore, either Eve will not [thus] rise again, because not that [will rise in her] which belonged to the truth of human nature in her from [Adam’s] rib, or Adam will not rise again with all that belonged to the truth of human nature in him, because not with his rib.

4. Again, the same thing will not rise again in diverse persons; but what belonged to the truth of the flesh in one can be nutriment for a second and belong to the truth of nature of the second, and so belong successively to the truth of nature in both. Therefore in one of the two there will not rise again whatever belonged to the truth of human nature in him.

5. Again, an argument from the same major by taking it under this minor: that ‘that which was semen in one can, through many changes, become semen in another’, and consequently in someone generated from the latter and in someone generated from the former the same thing will belong to the truth of nature in each.

6. Again, that whatever belonged to the truth of nature in anyone should rise again in him is only necessary so that the simply same numerical thing that fell should return. But, by parity of reasoning, it would be necessary to say the same of individual limbs or organic parts, and then that would have to rise in any part which belonged to the truth of any part – and this is against Augustine *Enchiridion* ch.23 n.89 (and it is in Lombard’s text): “it will not be so repaired that it must return to where the same parts of the body were, otherwise the hair too returns that much frequent shaving took away, etc.” And he adds, “It is as if a metal statue were melted down and the artisan wanted to restore it again from the same matter: it would make no difference as to the integrity of the statue which particles of matter returned to which limb of it, provided however the whole restored thing returned. Thus does God marvelously restore our flesh or all parts with marvelous speed out of the whole that our flesh consisted of. Nor will anything of its integrity be affected by whether hair returns to hair or is called back to other parts (the providence of the Artisan ensuring that nothing indecent happens).”

7. On the contrary:

The opposite is maintained by Augustine *ibid.*, that “the flesh will be restored from the whole that it consisted of.” And again *City of God* 22.15 and *Luke* 21.18, “Not a hair of your head will perish.”

I. To the Question

8. As to this question, one is required, from the fact that man is composed of body and soul and the soul always remains the same, to consider how the organic body will return the same. But because the body is composed of many organic parts (which distinction of parts is required for the multitude of operations that the soul, because of its perfection, is principle of), one must consider the identity of the organic parts. And because heterogeneous parts are composed of homogeneous parts, one must consider the identity of the homogeneous parts, and first how a homogeneous part (as the flesh) remains, along with continuous nutrition, the same and not the same, and second how the same flesh returns that existed previously in the mortal body.

A. About the Manner of Nutrition

1. First Opinion

a. Exposition of the Opinion

9. About the manner of nutrition there is an opinion [Lombard, *Sent.* II d.50 ch.15 n.2] that nothing of the food passes over to the truth of human nature, but that only what is contracted from parents belongs to the truth of human nature, and that this is multiplied in itself so that increase happens (an example is taken from the multiplication of loaves in the Gospel [*Matthew* 14.19-21, 35-38]). But what is generated from the food adheres like a warm fluid to the natural heat so that this heat is not extinguished (the way oil adheres to a wick). And in this way is food needed, though it is not converted into the truth of human nature.

b. Rejection of the Opinion

10. Against this:

First, that the vegetative power is no less perfect in man than in brutes; therefore, it is no less capable of the vegetative power's operation, which is to nourish in the way that to nourish means to convert the substance of food into the substance of the thing to be nourished (for so it is in the brute); therefore such conversion through the vegetative power can occur in man. And there is a confirmation. For a man is generated in perfection of quantity just as a brute is, and the continuous loss of parts happens in him just as in a brute. So there must be increase and restoration here of what is lost just as there is there. But there this is because the term of action is truly something of the substance of the thing to be nourished and increased. Confirmation: we could not posit increase to be possible in man in this way [n.9] save by a miracle (as is plain of the multiplication of loaves); why then would human nature be more deficient as to acquisition of perfect quantity after imperfect quantity than the nature of an ox?

11. Again, according to this way it follows that in man there would be some flesh that was simply incorruptible for the whole of his life, or that, if it were corrupted, it could never be restored; for it could only be restored through nutrition, which restoration is denied. Both alternatives are unacceptable: the first because the incorruptible part would be of a different species from the other corruptible parts of flesh; the second because then what belongs to the truth of human nature in man would become always less and less.

12. Again, the parts of flesh that are generated from food are truly animated with the intellectual soul; therefore they belong truly to the substance of that which lives with such [intellectual] life. The antecedent, though it seem manifest, can yet be proved, because any part of the flesh is animated with the sensitive soul, because some operation of sensation and touch can be exercised in any part of the flesh. And any part of the flesh is animated with the vegetative soul, because any part of its due quantity is able to have some action of the vegetative soul; but the sensitive and intellectual soul exist in man along with the intellectual soul, *Ord.* II d.1 n.321.

2. Second Opinion

a. Exposition of the Opinion

13. Another statement [Henry of Ghent, *Quodlibet* II q.10] is that the flesh formed first, handed on from parents, belongs to the truth of human nature, but the food later passes over into what belongs to the truth of human nature. However, it does so in this way, that it is converted into what pre-exists, not by receiving a new form either in whole or in part, but only by the fact that, when the form of food in it falls away, the pre-existing form of the flesh succeeds to it in the matter.

14. This is made clear by an example [Henry, *Quodlibet* IV q.36], because so it is with the intellective soul, that it newly perfects the matter that was under the form of food, and yet the intellective soul is not new in itself either in whole or in part.

15. It is also made clear by the authority of the Philosopher, *On Generation* 1.5.321b25-2a4, “The flesh grows in species not in matter, and the flesh remains in species while the flesh in matter flows and reflows.” But if a new form of flesh were introduced in nutrition, and if, by equal reason, a part of the form of flesh that was there before were to cease to be by being lost, then not only would the matter of flesh flow and reflow but the form of it also would, which seems to be against the Philosopher.

16. Third by reason [Henry, *ibid.*], because if in nutrition the matter of the food were to receive another form of flesh that was not there before, then this matter would only make with the pre-existing flesh a single thing by contiguity or continuity with it, and then nutrition would be a sort of juxtaposition of new flesh with pre-existing flesh, which the Philosopher denies in the aforementioned place [n.15]. There is also the consequence that no part of the nourished thing would be nourished or of the increased thing increased, because the part that the new flesh was put next to would not be.

b. Rejection of the Opinion

17. Against this opinion:

A form that has on its own part no other extension than it had before, which yet perfects a matter that has different extensions, is related indivisibly to that matter (this is because it does not perfect the parts of matter according as they are parts). But the form of flesh is not indivisibly related to matter in this way, because then it would be simple just as the intellective soul is simple, which is not something admitted. Therefore, since it perfects a matter that has different extensions (because the matter is much bigger than before), it must in itself have different extensions. And then, since its prior parts remain, another part of it must be new, otherwise the form would not have a greater extension now than it had before. The proof of the major is that a form which, as per accidens extended, is related to a matter that is extended, is related as itself having different extensions to a matter that has different extensions, because according to Aristotle, *Categories* 6.5b7-8), “the whiteness is as large as is the surface.” The fact is also plain by reason, because a part [of form] is in a part [of matter], and so a greater part in a greater part.

18. Again, it is admitted that there are, after nutrition, more parts of matter in the whole than there were before. Either then a new part of matter is in the whole without form (which is unacceptable), or it is there under a new form (and this is the intended conclusion), or it is there under a pre-existing part of form – and then either this pre-existing part of form will cease to perfect the part of matter that it perfected before, and then the same part of the material form will migrate from one part of matter to another

part (which is unacceptable), or the same prior part of form will at the same time perfect the prior part of matter and the new part of matter, and then, as a result, it will perfect two perfectible things, each of which equally exhausts it.

19. Again, flesh is of a nature to be in flux, because it is not incorruptible; but not only is the matter in flux but the form is as well, because this form cannot remain the same unless it remains informing the matter it did before (speaking of the same part of form), because it naturally depends on the perfectible thing it perfects. Therefore, the composite must be in flux, and consequently through nutrition a composite comes back.

3. Scotus' own Response

a. First Conclusion

20. As to this article, then, let this conclusion be the first that, by extending the term 'generation' to cover all introduction of substantial form after privation into matter, there is some generation in the case of nutrition, because (as was argued [n.18]) the matter of the food does not remain under the form of food, nor under any other form than under that of the thing nourished, and it receives that form after nutrition; therefore etc.

21. The exposition of this conclusion is that the generation is not called generation simply, because it is not generation of a per se being insofar as what is not part of something else is said to be per se. But it can be called 'generation-at', because it is generation of something that becomes, by generation, the same as something pre-existent at which it is generated; or it can be called 'generation-in', because it is generation of a part in a whole of which it was not part.

b. Second Conclusion

22. A second conclusion is that in such sort of generation the form of the flesh which is introduced into the matter of the nutriment is new, because (as was argued against the preceding opinion [n.17]) the pre-existing form could not newly perfect that matter, for this possibility belongs only to a form that is altogether un-extended (as was illustrated there [n.17] about the intellective soul). For any form that is per accidens extended has a different part in different parts of the matter, and so, if new matter is perfected by the form, the new matter is not perfected by any part of the form that perfected another part of matter before.

23. An illustration of this is through the flowing away of a part generated in nutrition, because when it flows away then, just as the matter of the part ceases to be something of the whole flesh, so too does the form (which perfects the matter) cease to be part of the whole flesh, because it cannot remain or migrate without the matter.

c. Third Conclusion

24. A third conclusion is that a part added by nutrition is in some way like and in some way unlike the pre-existing part that was there by generation: like in specific form, not only in intellective form but in the form of corporeity that is presupposed; unlike in this, that the strength of a natural agent is the more weakened in proportion as its action on a contrary is the more continued.

25. The proof is that every such natural agent suffers reaction in its acting [Aristotle *On Generation* 1.7.324b9-10], and so, if it acts on a contrary, it suffers some corruptive action back from the contrary. Therefore, the more the flesh that was possessed before in generation acts on nutriment as on a contrary the more in proportion is its strength weakened, and by this is the flesh said to be more impure. Therefore, after some time, during which it has acted thus continually on its contrary, it is more impure than it was at the beginning, and consequently, since what is generated cannot be more perfect than what generates, the result is that the later the flesh generated by later flesh is itself generated, the more impure in proportion as a rule will it be, because generated by what is more impure.

26. This conclusion is confirmed by an example from Aristotle, (*On Generation* 1.5.322a31-33), that the more wine acts on the water mixed with it the more impure in proportion it is, so much so that at length, because of the impurity, the whole will become water. This conclusion [n.25] proves another, that not only is the flesh generated later more impure than the prior flesh, but also the same flesh remaining later in the whole is more impure than before – and this is the reason for impurity in the part of flesh generated later. The conclusion here does not assert that the form of flesh is receptive of more and less (though if this were posited the impurity would be because of remission of the form); but the impurity can be posited precisely because of the imperfection of the natural qualities that are consequent to the form, which qualities are the principle of altering the food; because the more imperfect the food altered the more impure proportionally the flesh generated from it.

d. Fourth Conclusion

27. A fourth conclusion, about the distinction of flesh as to species and flesh as to matter, is plain from the third conclusion, because each part of flesh has a certain period of time within the whole, and it has a greater period the purer it is, and a lesser one the more impure it is. For flesh can keep its being in the whole as long as it is able, through its qualities, to resist what corrupts it. Now this period is greater in a part generated first than in one generated later, and each same part is more efficacious in acting in the prior part of a period than in the later part. And this difference must be understood to hold when other things are equal, that is: if a part of flesh was generated from the sort of food that was of a nature to be converted into flesh as equally pure as that from which the flesh was generated, then, provided a proportionate alteration of food is posited, purer flesh is of a nature to be generated from one food than from another.

28. From these points to the fourth conclusion: form bestows being and acting; therefore, a part according to form (a form-part) can be so spoken of as long as it has being according to form, or as long as it has acting according to form. And the second of these implies the first, and not conversely; for a thing more quickly loses action because of imperfection than being. In both respects, whether in this way or that, a form-part is not only a part of form, but includes matter as well as form.

29. Now in the first way [sc. as to being] any part, while it remains in the whole, is said to be a form-part, namely from the beginning to the end of its period, because, that is, it has being for that length of time.

30. In the second way [sc. as to action] it is not said to be a form-part for every part of the period, but for that part of the period for which it has power effective enough that action according to form can belong to it. I do not mean ‘belong to it’ only as it concurs with the action of the whole, nor as it is simply separate from the whole; but I mean that there is present to it in the whole a virtue for the action proper to it, which action it would be able to have as existent in the whole even though it not be considered precisely as it concurs with the action of the whole. And the efficacy of a virtue for action requires a determinate intensive and extensive virtue. For some slight part of virtue could not have its proper action in the whole in this way, but could only *concur* with the action of the whole, as Aristotle says [*On Sense* 6.445b31-6a1] about the action on the senses of a hundred thousandth part of a grain of millet.

31. Some determinate *extensive* quantity of virtue, therefore, is required for this efficacy of action in the whole.

32. Some *intensive* quantity of virtue is also required because, as was said [n.30], after active virtues decline to such an extent that they yield rather to their contraries than conquer them, the virtue cannot act with its proper action; therefore, in this second way, a species-part is of so much natural quantity and of so much active virtue that its proper action can belong to it, not indeed as it is a supposit outside the whole, but proper to it in such a way that it does merely concur with the action of the whole.

33. In the first way [as to *extensive* quantity, n.31], a part according to matter is not opposed to a species-part, save as a dead man is opposed to a living man; and thus is the same part said to be a species-part while it remains in the whole and a part according to matter when it is in flux, just as the same man is first said to be a living man and afterwards a dead man.

34. In the second way [as to *intensive* quantity, n.32], one part among the parts that remain in the whole is a species-part and another part is a part according to matter, because some slight part, to which no action can belong, even if it is at the beginning of its period, is a part according to matter; but a part of quantity sufficient for acting is a species-part – and that if it have virtue efficacious for an acting that requires a quantity of virtue. And contrariwise, a part according to matter is what does not have such efficacy of virtue, however much extensive quantity it may have.

4. To the Foundations of the Second Opinion

35. Hereby to the foundations or arguments of the preceding opinion [n.13]

[To the first] – The example of the intellectual soul [n.14] is to the opposite effect, because the intellectual soul is related to matter in a non-extensive way and non-extensively, and so it has no new part from the fact that it perfects a new part of matter. But the opposite follows about a form that is extensible in matter.

36. [To the second] – The authority of the Philosopher [n.15], about flesh according to species and flesh according to matter, is solved in the fourth conclusion [nn.27-34]. For the Philosopher does not understand that the part according to matter (that is, matter alone) flows and reflows and that the part according to form (that is, form according to its whole self) remains, but that both the part according to matter and the part according to form are an integral part of the whole and are truly a composite of matter and form; hence he says ‘flesh according to matter’ and ‘flesh according to

species' are composite of matter and form, but not 'the matter of flesh' and 'the species of flesh'. But which part, composed of the matter and form of flesh, is flesh according to species, and which part is flesh according to matter, was stated in the fourth conclusion [n.34]. And how flesh according to matter is in flux is plain from the first way of distinguishing flesh into flesh according to species and into flesh according to matter [n.33]. But according to the second way [n.34], a part according to matter is in flux, that is, is in proximate disposition to flowing – and this when speaking of a part according to matter because of its deficiency in quantity of virtue. But, when speaking of a part according to matter, this difference between flowing and not flowing is not to be understood because of the deficiency of it in quantity of mass; rather the part according to species grows while the part according to matter does not grow, because (as will be said directly [n.40]) it is not that the smallest part or some notably large part in the whole grows, but rather that some part of determinate quantity grows that is sufficient for a part according to species.

37. The part according to species, then, is not in flux – because, according to the first understanding [nn.34-35], it remains in the whole; and because, according to the second understanding, it has virtue for preserving itself in the whole; and because, according to the third understanding, it has sufficient quantity for some part to be generated at it [cf. n.21] for its own conservation. And, contrariwise, the part according to matter, understood in three ways, is in flux in three ways.

38. [To the third] – To the third [n.16] I say that in nutrition and growth there is a certain juxtaposition, and yet for the thing nourished or increased (and this whether the whole or part of it) juxtaposition is not only what happens.

There is need of understanding here: posit some part of such quantity and virtue that it not only act along with the whole but could, while existent in the whole, have its own action, and let this part be called *a*. It has small parts, and let there be ten of them (because perhaps more are required in one thing than in another, as that in a plant one suffices, in a brute two, in a man three or more – I care not). Each of these parts has an equal virtue intensively, and let them be called *b*, *c*, etc. Suppose food were drawn through depositings and purifyings in whatever number to the point that now it is in a form proximate to the form of the body to be nourished – whether this were done before or after the parts to be nourished have the food sent to their place by the regulative power of the whole body itself (and this through certain subtle paths that subserve this sending function, of which sort are the veins in the bodies of animals and other such things corresponding to them in plants). This food now, under a changed or glutinous form, is proximate to the part to be nourished and is received within certain pores left behind by the flowing away of certain of the parts according to matter (which parts were present there before and have now, through their own flowing off, left behind pores filled with some more subtle humors); and thus the whole food, lacking the density in its parts that is required for the body's wellbeing, is, while existing there, converted into the thing to be nourished. And, just as before the conversion it was juxtaposed by way of contiguity with the parts of the thing to be nourished, so is it after the conversion juxtaposed by way of continuity with some of the parts that remain.

39. So then: *a* is a part great enough that being nourished and increased befits it; in the pores within the body are everywhere received the parts of the food, and these parts, while existing there, are generated into [cf. n.21] parts *b* and *c*, and are juxtaposed

with other pre-existing parts. But not juxtaposed with the whole, because they are something within the whole, although no newly generated part is within another part of the nourished part, even if it be the smallest part which being nourished or growing may properly in such wise fit that each part of it be nourished and increased. And this is something necessary, to set down some smallest part, thus increased, of noticeable quantity; for if every part in the whole (however small the part) were properly to increase, it would be necessary that what increases always increase double, or at least increase to a noticeable amount greater than before – which is manifestly false.

40. Thus therefore is it plain, in response to this third argument [n.16], how there is juxtaposition of something and juxtaposition with what thing or things, namely with the smallest parts, which are properly not nourished. But there is no juxtaposition with that which is properly nourished (namely with that of which some part has flowed away and a new part afterwards restored), but there takes place in it a certain generation-in [cf. n.21], that is, an intrinsic generation of a new part in the place of the old part that has flowed away.

41. But from these points one does not yet have anything of the manner of growth, because the generation that happens in nutrition is momentary. But growth is not in an instant, since it is a motion. Generation can also come about without growth, as is plain from the Philosopher *On Generation* 1.5.322a31-33. Nor is there need here to add the manner of the growth, because we are asking about nutrition here only so as to grasp how homogeneous parts in nutrition remain the same or not the same.

B. How in the Resurrection the Flesh Returns the Same

1. First Conclusion

42. As to the second main point [n.8]: the supposition here is that to the truth of an individual man's nature pertain not only the essential parts, namely matter and form, but also the integral parts (not only the heterogeneous ones, but the homogeneous ones that the heterogeneous are composed of, and in brief whatever was truly animated by the intellectual soul, or is per se something of the individual animated body). On this supposition I state first this conclusion: that not everything that in Peter belonged to the truth of his nature for the whole of his life will rise again in him.

43. The proof is that because many of these sorts of parts flowed out during his life and many others came back in (from the preceding article [nn.19; 35-41]), then if they were all to return in him his body would either be of extreme density or of extreme size.

2. Second Conclusion

44. Second conclusion: what parts then will rise again so as to be of due density and due size? And that is: of as large a quantity as he would be of at the end of thirty years, had he lived, because whatever is to be re-formed in the resurrection is posited to be of such quantity – which I understand to mean: if he had suffered no deprivation that prevented him from reaching within thirty years the due quantity that would have occurred in his un-deprived nature.

45. Here there is a double way:

For this way is true: that as a rule a prior part of a man, that is, a part within the body of a living man, is purer (from the preceding article [nn.25-26]) – as a rule, I say, because by accidental impediment, whether on the part of what contains or on the part of something applied that is fitting or harmful, something else can come about.

46. Now the following is probable: that the body will be repaired from the purer parts that were at some point parts of this body; therefore it will have the whole of what was contracted from parents (because this was purest), and always the purer parts of whatever else is generated from food, up to a quantity sufficient for the whole body.

47. The second way is that nutrition is not per se necessary, save for the restoration of what is lost; but growth is per se necessary, so that the generated thing may reach the due quantity of its nature. Therefore, in all nutrition (up to the limit of growth) something is converted precisely because of nutrition, namely so that what flowed away might be restored, and something is converted because of increase, namely so that the due quantity may be acquired, even had nothing flowed away. And the first of these, indeed, does not belong to the principal intention of nature, for nature would simply rather conserve, for the being of the whole, the part that had flowed away (if nature could conserve it) than restore in its place another less perfect part. But the second does belong to the principal intention of a nature that wants to attain perfect quantity. So that the second is intended for the sake of acquiring perfection; the first is as it were occasioned for the sake of avoiding imperfection.

48. To this is added the probable conclusion that (up to due quantity) those parts will be in the body that is to be resuscitated which nature made more by intention to be parts of the body, up to the quantity sufficient for that body. But of this sort are the parts that arrived to give increase and not those that arrived to give restoration.

49. Therefore the body will rise again from that which was first taken from parents, and from the other parts generated from food for the sake of due increase of the body, up to the quantity sufficient for that body.

50. These two ways agree in this, that whatever was taken from parents will rise again, because, according to the first way [nn.45-46], it was purest of all the parts of the body and, according to the second way [n.47], it belonged most to nature's intention in this supposit. But they disagree as to the parts generated from food, because the first posits that to this are joined, as to parts, those that were purer in this body as to the whole flow of its life; the other posits that to this are joined the parts that belonged more by the intention of nature to the truth of this body. Now the parts are not the same that are purer in the whole flow of time and that belong more by the intention of nature to this body, because the parts generated first are always regularly purer, whether they are more or less intended; but always, whether first or later, those parts that were generated over and above the necessary restoration of what has been lost were more of the intention of nature.

51. If you ask in objection against each way 'how then will the man to be resuscitated have the same flesh which he had while alive here?' – I say that he will not have precisely the same that he had in some instant or in some time of his life. But neither will he have the whole that he had at some time beside what he contracted from parents. Yet he will have the whole, and have the other parts that he had successively, now this one now that one. And so the body resuscitated will be more the same as the body possessed in this life than if it were the same as the man had in any determinate

instant (or part) of his life, because although it would be the same as it for such an instant, it would be more different from the man's body at another instant.

II. To the Initial Arguments

52. To the arguments:

[To the first] – To the first [n.3] I say that the rib did not belong to the truth of nature in Adam, because he had enough ribs besides it (as to what commonly belongs to a man). But that rib was given to him as superfluous for his supposit, but necessary for the intention of nature – just the way semen is in a male, not as something of the nature of the supposit, but for the sake of generation of another supposit is it in him as in a vessel; hence it is not animated by his soul. So was it with that rib.

53. But if it be altogether imagined that the rib was simply necessary for Adam as an integral part, I reply: what follows is that he [God] made up the flesh for it, that is, in place of it he formed another rib.

54. I believe the first response to be truer, but if the second be granted then the transferred rib will not rise again in Adam but another one will.

55. As to the second [n.4]: I believe that there never was, nor will there be until the end of the world, anything that belongs equally to the truth of human nature in two supposits; and therefore it will rise again precisely in the single supposit where it more belonged to its truth – more, I say, because more pure in him or because a part of him is more of the intention of nature.

56. But if it be simply contended that it was simply and equally of the nature of both supposits, I say it will rise again in him in whom it was first animated. And Augustine says this (*Enchiridion* 23.88), and it is in Lombard's text (*Sent.* IV d.44 ch.1 n.1), "[Earthly matter] returns to the soul which initially animated it so a man might come to be." And this is reasonable, because it is after first animation that the flesh of an individual man is made, and consequently, although it be afterwards taken over by someone else, its first relation to this matter is not lost.

57. But if he in whom the flesh belonged secondarily to the truth of his nature – if he had other parts sufficient for his due quantity, parts that belonged to his body through nutrition in successive stages of his life, then from them will a body of due quantity be repaired, because the parts were animated by his soul and had a more essential order to his soul – setting aside what will rise again in someone else, because this had a more essential relation to the other soul than to his. But if, beside what will rise again in someone else, the nourishable parts (which it successively had) do not suffice for the due quantity of this body, the Omnipotent God will supply them whence he will.

58. [To the third] – As to the third [n.5], if it were possible for exactly the same semen to be in two persons, and consequently for the same semen to belong primarily to the truth of nature in two supposits (which however I believe never was in fact nor will be), it will rise again in the first one of them.

59. [To the fourth] – To the next [n.6] I say that there is not the same reasoning for whole and for part, because the restoration of the same whole is what is first intended in the resurrection, and not the restoration of the same part, especially the part that is not a principal one, one without whose identity the whole cannot be the same.

60. And if you argue about a principal part whose unity is required for the unity of the whole, I say the like about this part as I said about the whole, that homogeneous parts sufficient for its due quantity will rise again in an organic part – and in this way, that if the homogeneous parts belonged equally, both in purity and in the intention of nature, to the truth of another part, then those homogeneous parts will rise again in the organic part that belonged first to the truth of its nature (I mean first in time). But if, in the case of some other part, they belonged more principally to the truth of that part's nature in the second of the above ways [sc. in nature's intention], then they will rise again in that other part.

Second Part

About the Condition of Malignant Spirits and Damned Men in Respect of Infernal Fire

Question One

Whether Infernal Fire will Torment the Malignant Spirits

61. "But if it is asked" [Lombard, *Sent* IV d.44 ch.5]

62. About this part of the forty fourth distinction I ask whether infernal fire will torment the malignant spirits.

63. That it will not:

Augustine in *Literal Commentary on Genesis* 12.16 expressly argues as follows, "The agent is more excellent than the patient; but the body is not more excellent than spirit, but conversely." Therefore, no body acts on a spirit.

64. Again, according to Augustine in the same place [16.32], "Not bodily things but things like bodily things are what disembodied souls are affected by." Therefore, they are not affected with punishment by the body.

65. Again, Aristotle *On Generation* 1.6.322b22-24 says a body only acts by touch; but a body cannot touch a spirit, because [323a4-6] "only those things touch each other whose ultimate points are together." And this is confirmed from *Physics* 7.1.242b24-27, where Aristotle holds that agent and patient must be together and no medium exist between them. But a spirit cannot be together with a body, because it is, as it were, not in a place with respect to body.

66. Again, *On Generation* 1.7.324a9-11 Aristotle says "an agent aims to make the patient like itself;" but a body cannot make a spirit like itself, because then a spirit would be capable of a form in which it would be assimilated to body.

67. On the contrary:

Matthew 25.41, "Go, you cursed, into the eternal fire which is prepared for the devil and his angels."

68. Again, Gregory *Dialogues* 4.29, "If the devil and his angels, although they are incorporeal, are to be tormented by fire, what wonder if souls are able, before they receive their bodies, to feel bodily torments?"

69. Again, Augustine *City of God* 21.10, "Why may we not say that, in marvelous yet true ways, even incorporeal spirits can be afflicted by the pain of bodily fire?" And he

proves it there by this, that “the incorporeal spirits of men can be indissolubly tied by the chains of their bodies.”

I. To the Question

A. First Opinion and its Rejection

70. It is said here [Aquinas, *Sent.* IV d.44 q.3 a3, Giles of Rome, *Quodlibet* 2 q.9] that spirits are tormented by fire insofar as they apprehend fire under the idea of something disagreeable. And there is a confirmation from Gregory *Dialogues* 4.29, “A spirit suffers in the way in which it sees; and because it sees itself burning, it is burnt.”

71. And for the possibility of this there is Avicenna *Metaphysics* 9.7, where he gives the example of a dream, that someone is tormented more in a dream by such imaginative apprehension of something disagreeable than he would sometimes be afflicted by the presence of the same thing when awake.

72. Against this: either a spirit apprehends the fire as disagreeable to him with true apprehension or he apprehends it so with false apprehension.

If with true, one must posit the manner of the disagreeableness, which does not appear possible, because the fire can in no way be disagreeable as it is a corruptive contrary in reality [sc. because, ex hypothesi, the fire is disagreeable to the angel in the angel’s apprehension, not in its material reality], nor can it be so in idea of object because the object of a power as object is agreeable to it.

If with false apprehension, then it follows first that the spirit is tormented not by the fire but by his false judgment; second that if this false judgment is from God, God will be the immediate cause of the deception; and if it is from the angel himself this does not appear probable, because, as Dionysius says *Divine Names* ch.4, “the natural endowments in them are most splendid,” so spirits can naturally apprehend that fire is not disagreeable to them; again, Gregory *ibid.* [n.70] says, “The soul suffers from the fire not only in seeing it but also in feeling it.”

B. Second Opinion and its Rejection

73. In another way it is said [Henry of Ghent, *Quodlibet* 8 q.34] that, because of the demerit of sin, a supernatural habit is given to a spirit, and through this habit the spirit is subject to a bodily agent so it can be made to suffer by it.

74. Against this: the habit is either a bodily form or a spiritual form. If bodily, God can give the habit to inhere in an angel in just the way that an angel can be white or a stone wise, because there is an equal repugnance on both sides between the recipient and the received. If spiritual, then by it the passive subject is no more proportioned to a body as to an agent than it was before.

75. Again, a habit is not that whereby we are able simply but that whereby we are able in a certain way; therefore, that which has in it no potency for acting or being acted on simply has in it no potency for acting or being acted on thus; but in this [angelic] nature there does not sufficiently exist a potency for being acted on, nor can this habit give it the possibility, because the habit is not a potency.

76. Again the punishment would be received immediately in the habit as in what is proximately receptive of it; indeed not mediately either in the angel’s nature, if it is

repugnant to that nature. And if the first point be granted, it follows that this habit when separated from the angel could be punished with the same punishment; if the second be granted, it follows that the angel is not punished now either, but that only the habit is.

C. Scotus' own Response to the Question

77. To the question I say that, according to Augustine *City of God* 14.15 n.2, "pain of flesh is only a vexing of the soul arising from the flesh, and a certain dissent from its suffering – just as pain of soul, which is called a 'suffering', is sadness arising from things that happen to us against our will."

78. From this it is clear that pain is a passion consequent to sense apprehension and existing in sense appetite, while sadness is properly in the intellective appetite or will, and is consequent to the apprehension by the intellect of some unwanted object.

1. About Pain Properly Speaking

79. The first of these, namely pain properly speaking, must not be looked for in spirits or angels or separated souls, unless it be imagined that there is in a separate spirit sense appetite and (for like reason) senses, and that there can be in a spirit both passion in the sense appetite and passion as to sense, which is trifling, because according to Aristotle *On the Soul* 1.4.408b11-13, "to say the soul is sad or joyful is nothing other than to say it weaves or builds." This is indeed true insofar as they are properties of the soul, for they are properties of the composite [of body and soul]; just as sensing too, on which follow such sorts of property, belongs first to the whole composite (*On Sense and Sensible* 1.436a11-b8, *On Dreams* 1.453b11-14).

80. Nor yet do I deny that there is in the sensing soul the perfection which is complete in idea of the sensing power, for this is not different from the essence itself of the intellective soul – when one holds what I held in *Rep.* II.A d.16 n.17, that the principles of operation on the part of the soul are not accidents of the soul. But this perfection, which remains in the soul (rather is really the nature of the soul) is not the visual or auditory power save partially.

81. But the visual power is something that essentially includes this perfection of the soul as well as some perfection of the mixed body (corresponding to it) for their common operation. And in the same way sensation belongs first to the whole that is a conjunct of the two, so that the proximate receiver, and the reason for receiving, is not the soul, nor anything precisely in the soul, nor the form of the mixture in the organ, but the form of the whole that is composed of mixed body and soul; and such perfection is the proximate idea of the receiving of sensation. And therefore the total form is the sensitive power, and not one part of it (namely the form of the mixture) without the other part (namely the form of the intellective soul).

82. Therefore the cause of pain, as it is distinguished from sadness, should not be looked for either in a separate spirit or in a separate soul, because it cannot be in them.

2. About Sadness

83. But let us see about sadness.

I say that, since sadness is in the will arising from the apprehension of the existence of an object disagreeable to reason, either one must look for an object that is immediately shown by reason as disagreeable and yet as posited present or, if it cannot be immediately shown as disagreeable save by an erring reason (because it would not be disagreeable to [the Archangel] Michael, and it does not seem reasonable that this affliction follow erroneous reason), one must find there an object disagreeable to reason because not wanted and yet posited present to it.

84. Now I say that the infernal fire is an object thus disagreeable, and that in two ways: first as definitively detaining a spirit, and second as objectively affecting it.

a. About the Disagreeable Object or
About the Infernal Fire Definitively Detaining a Spirit

85. On the first point:

No place, as it is the place of something, is disagreeable to what is placed in it, save because some other body is disagreeable to it. Now since a spirit has no natural agreement with a body (for then that body would be naturally preservative of it), so does it have no natural disagreement with a body such that its being detained at it would be disagreeable to its nature. Hence if the Archangel Michael were, by divine command, joined definitively in place with a body, even perpetually so, and were to apprehend the fact, he would in no way apprehend it as disagreeable or as matter for sadness. Therefore, in order to get sadness from fire as a detention, let first a reason for not wanting it be found.

86. In this way does a bad angel have a 'not wanting to be detained perpetually by fire', and specifically under the idea that the fire, by divine sentence or will, effectively detains him there. And to this 'not wanting' he is inclined by the love of advantage, in that he wants free use of his power, in order that, as his nature is indifferent to any particular body, so he may be able to make himself present to any particular body. Now pride provokes him, for which reason he desires to use his proper power; envy consumes him, for which reason he wishes not to be determinately anywhere on account of divine sentence or action. Detention and apprehension of it precedes this 'not wanting'; but, once the 'not wanting', albeit disordered, is posited in his will, there follows a definite apprehension of the fact of the unwanted thing; and from this third (or fifth, if the two things that precede the 'not wanting' are counted in) there follows sadness.

87. If you ask whether the detaining fire is the effective cause of this sadness, I reply: the fire does not effect the detaining of a spirit, because what is not the effective locator of a thing, or does not prevent it being moved from this place, does not detain it in this place. This house, to be sure, is not effective in detaining me (as to the first point), because it is not effective in fixing my place; yet it does prevent me moving to another place [sc. unless I go out through the door]; and so it can be said in some way to be effective in detaining me as being what prohibits some other formal detention.

88. But in neither way can any bodily place detain an angel; so the bodily fire formally detains him only in this way, that there is no detaining by the fire in the genus of action but only an externally arising relation reducible to the category of 'where'. What does the effective detaining, whether in the first way (because it actively determines the spirit to that place) or the second way (because it prevents the spirit moving from that

place to another), is God directly, because at least detention against the will of an angel that has no angel superior to him could not thus be done save immediately by God.

89. But further, an angel not only hates his detention, active and passive, by God, but he hates his perpetual formal detention by the fire; and not only does he apprehend this active or passive detention as real in fact or as to be continued, but he also hates the formal detention, and consequently the formal detention causes him sadness.

90. Now the saddening object is properly cause of the sadness, because it is not immediately the will since then being sad or not being sad would be immediately in the will's power – which is not true once the not wanting, and the apprehension of what is not wanted, are posited. Therefore, because the formal detention, or the fire that is formally doing the detaining, is effective cause of sadness, and so further since to be saddened is formally to be tormented (in the way it is possible for a spirit to be tormented), it follows that the fire, as formally detaining the spirit, is effective in tormenting him.

91. And in this way is the assertion [nn.70-71] preserved about how fire is God's instrument in tormenting, because the evil spirit more principally hates the active detention of God and his own passive detention by God than he hates the formal detention by the fire, because he hates the second only in its order to the first; and thus, what in the second objectively afflicts him, afflicts him in virtue of the first, and does so instrumentally. Nor does this follow: 'the fire is not the effective but only the formal detainer, therefore it is not effective cause of affliction' – because the fire, as formal detainer, is an unwanted object and an object apprehended as present, and so it is effective in inflicting sadness.

92. If you say that this is not only because it is not wanted but also because the object is in itself disagreeable (because freedom and indifference to any bodily place belongs to a spirit) – the antecedent is false, as was said above about Michael [n.85], that if he were to apprehend himself as determined perpetually to a definite place by divine sentence he would not be sad, because although he has freedom and indifference as to places, yet he does not have this to them as a sort of natural perfection, because not even one place is thus. So neither does indifference to any number of places naturally perfect an angel; and therefore determination to one place is not against the natural inclination of an angel.

93. An example of this way of being sad is found in men who desire to die, for whom life is sad. In this way do they hate the soul's being in its body right up to the moment of natural death, because of something hateful that accompanies mortal life; and, second, they apprehend that what they do not want will be; and therefore follows, third, sadness about the detention of the soul in the body, or about the body as detaining the soul – not because the body is the effective detainer of the soul but as it is in some way receiver of the form of soul; and as it detains, so is it, as apprehended, an unwanted object.

94. And this can be got from Gregory *Dialogues* 4.29, "If the incorporeal spirit of a man when alive is bound in the body, why may not the incorporeal spirit after death be bound by bodily fire?" And Augustine *On the Trinity*, 21.10 n.11, "If the spirits of men, altogether incorporeal, can now be contained in bodily members, they will then too be able to be indissolubly bound in the chains of their bodies."

b. About the Disagreeable Object or
About the Infernal Fire Objectively Affecting a Spirit

95. About the second way, namely how fire as affecting object causes sadness, the like must, in some respect, be said:

First, the angel's intellect is determined perpetually to intense consideration of the fire in its idea as object of consideration. Second, the angel apprehends his being determinately fixed to this sort of consideration. Third, the angel hates it and, as before [n.86], this hate arises from affection for advantage, and from this affection the angel wants to consider any object, now this one and now that, insofar as it will have been delightful to him; he is also provoked by pride, whereby he wishes to use his intellective power according to the command of his own will; and he is consumed by envy, because of which he hates to be determined by God to some single consideration. Fourth follows awareness, not only bare awareness of this consideration, as in the second stage, but certain awareness of the factual reality of this intense and perpetual consideration. Fifth, from this follows sadness.

96. But in some respect there is unlikeness between this case and the preceding one [nn.85-94].

As to the first stage [n.95], the unlikeness is because the fire here has the idea of agent as effective detainer of the angel's intellect, and not by command of the angel's will, to intense consideration of the fire.

97. And if you ask how these facts can hold of fire, since a body could not move the intelligence of a spirit so effectively that the intelligence be no longer subject to the spirit's will for determining its act of consideration, namely to considering this or that [n.95] (as Augustine says that the will turns the intelligence away and towards now this and now that [cf. *Ord.* II d.38 n14]) – one must say that this does not belong to fire by its own virtue, because when the whole active virtue of fire is in place an angel left to himself could, by command of his own will, consider fire or some other body indifferently.

98. Therefore, one must say that this being detained in intense and perpetual considering of fire, and against the angel's will, is an effect from God principally, and if actively from the fire yet less principally so. And an example can be set down for this: just as the agent intellect and the phantasm are disposed to move the possible intellect in us, so God has, in the matter at hand, a mode similar to the agent intellect and to the phantasm of fire. And the mode would be altogether similar if in us the agent intellect had a will formally and the possible intellect likewise had a will formally, and if the agent intellect were by its own will to determine some definite phantasm for the effective moving of the possible intellect against the possible intellect's will.

99. Nor is it a difficulty that the principal agent [sc. God] and the instrument [sc. the angel's intellect] are not in the same supposit here as the agent intellect and phantasm are there, because the order of these agents does not require identity of supposit.

100. At the third stage too [n.95] there is a difference between here and the former case [nn.85-94], because an angel hates much more the perpetual detention of his intellect in intense consideration of fire than his formal detention definitively in place by fire; for his perfection consists much more, and is desired much more, in the opposite of the first,

namely in the free use of his intelligence by command of will about any object at all, than it consists in the free use of his power to move definitively as to any 'where'.

101. Now this detention in the most intense consideration of fire impedes the first liberty [n.100], because by it the angel's intellect is impeded from considering other things that he could consider. But his definitive detention [in 'where'] by fire only impedes the second one [n.100].

102. From this follows a difference at the fifth stage [n.95], that there will be much more sadness from this second cause than from the preceding one [nn.85-94, 100], because where there is a greater 'not-wanting', and an equally certain apprehension of the fact, a greater sadness follows.

103. There is also a difference between this case and the preceding one [nn.85-94], that in this case fire can in some way be more said to be effective in thus afflicting a spirit than in the preceding case, because in that preceding case the fire is effective in afflicting a spirit only in the way an unwanted apprehended object causes sadness, while in this case here it is effective in causing the primary apprehension that the intellect is determined to, which apprehension is not wanted. And therefore the fire has here as it were a double action on the preceding merely simple apprehension. But just as in the preceding case no disagreeableness in the fire was posited from the nature of the thing but only from the nature of it as not being wanted as detainer, so here the disagreeableness of the fire is not of it as an object considered [sc. the mere consideration of an object is not disagreeable, cf. n.72], but as the final one ever considered, because the object is not wanted as being so considered; yet there is a greater inclination to not wanting in this way than in the preceding way.

c. Objections Against Both Ways

104. There are objections against both ways:

Against the first [n.84], that the fire detains them all equally; therefore all of them will be tormented equally. The consequent is against Augustine *City of God* 21.16, "It must not at all be denied that the eternal fire will be lighter for some, heavier for others, whether the heat of the fire varies in proportion to the punishment deserved by each or whether it is equally hot but is not felt with equal distress." From this authority too seems to be got that the heat will torment them and not merely the detention.

105. Against the second [n.95], that if the fire makes such impression only in an intellectual way, delight follows, because the impression befits the intellective power. There is a proof too, because it would delight [the Archangel] Michael.

106. Against both together, that if a spirit does not will against, or hate, being thus detained or affected by the object, he will not be saddened; and thence, since it is in his power not to will against it, it will be in his power not to be tormented.

107. Again, against both together: spirits could be afflicted while in a stone or the sun or the empyreal heaven, if they were definitively detained in them and objectively affected by them. – Look for the answer to this last objection.¹⁰

¹⁰ No response by Scotus is given for this objection, and the Vatican editors provide no explanatory note. Perhaps the answer would be that it does not matter, as to the fact of punishment, where evil spirits are detained or afflicted, provided they are so; but it does matter as to the fittingness of this 'where' within the whole universe, namely that it should be a lower and debased place (so not the sun or empyreal heaven) with an active force (so not a stone).

d. Response to the Objections

108. As to the first [n.104], I concede that formal detention (which accords with the formal definition) is equal, but the not-wanting of it is not equal; rather it is more intense in those who sinned more; and so there is greater sadness in them.

109. To the second [n.105]: the first impression on the intellect, which is to understand fire, would be of itself delightful to the intellect; but in the fifth instant [n.102], after the act of not-wanting and the apprehension of the not-wanted event, sadness would be caused by the unwanted and apprehended impression.

110. And if you say that at least the impression as it exists in the first instant will cause delight, I reply that it cannot, because in the same instant the appetite has vehement sadness and that sadness excludes all joy, not only the contrary joy but any chance joy, from *Ethics* 7.15.1154b11-15.

111. If you say that the cause of delight is naturally prior to the cause of sadness, I reply that, in the case of things that have only a natural order and a real simultaneity, the more efficacious one excludes the less efficacious one though the more efficacious one be posterior in nature. And no wonder, because what impedes and prohibits is sometimes posterior in nature to the agent that is impeded by its restraint. (An example is found in what is generative of one thing and what is alterative of it into the contrary.)

112. To the third [nn.106] I say that not wanting it and not willing against it are not in their power, as will be touched on in discussion of the continuation in them of their evil act [d.46 n.101]. The reason for which is perhaps the continuous action of the superior cause acting to produce something uniform in them because of their preceding demerit; and on this uniform thing there follows a uniform affliction of them. And for this reason, no spirit can have a less strong not-wanting than he has now, because just as his act is not in his power so neither is the mode of his act; and just as the superior cause acts uniformly for the not-wanting (because of which the inferior cause cannot act differently from the superior cause), so does the superior cause act for the intensity of this not-wanting.

II. To the Initial Arguments

113. [To the first] – As to the first [n.63], the proposition of Augustine depends on this one, “an agent is more outstanding than the formal term of action,” and “the formal term is more outstanding than the receptive subject of it.”

114. Now the second of these two propositions is only true insofar as the first part is act and the second potency. And thus must one concede that the agent, insofar as it is in formal or virtual act, is more outstanding than the passive thing, insofar as the passive thing is in potency to it. But from this does not follow that it is more outstanding in its absolute nature than what is susceptible of it, just as neither does this follow about the formal term with respect to the same.

115. But because Augustine intends to conclude through this argument [n.63] that body does not act on spirit, one can say that his major is true of an equivocal and total or principal agent, and otherwise not; and thus is his conclusion true. And it is admitted that fire is not a principal agent acting on a spirit, whether as to the detention (because fire

does not act in this respect but is the definitive container formally of a spirit), or as to affecting a spirit (because fire only acts here as the instrument of God, the way a phantasm is disposed to the agent intellect [nn.88-91]).

116. Now, in causing sadness in this way or that, the fire is not the principal agent, but the will that does not want the object is. For the sadness follows rather from the fact the object is not wanted than from the idea of the object in itself, or from the very apprehension of the fact of the unwanted object; for the object causes sadness not just as unwanted but as something unwanted that is apprehended as being or going to be.

117. [To the second] – As to the next [n.64], Augustine’s remark can be expounded as being about what spirits are immediately affected by (that these are like corporeal things because they are passions in some way caused by bodies), and not about what spirits are mediately affected by (that these are corporeal things). Or, which amounts to the same, let it be expounded as being about what affects spirits formally, not effectively.

118. [To the third] – As to the next [n.65], this proposition is universally true, that “the agent must be present to the patient, at least according to active virtue.” From this follows that where an appropriate presence cannot be had save by contact, contact is required; but where a truer presence can be had, this suffices much more for action; but the presence of a spirit to body by coexistence can be much truer than presence by contact.

119. In another way it can be said that virtual contact is required and not mathematical [cf. *Ord.* II d.9 nn.59, 62]. Now virtual contact is that something in this thing could be the term of virtue in that thing, which is nothing other than that that thing has the active virtue of something in this thing. And in this way would God, were he not below the sphere of the moon, be present to the center of the earth, as was said in *Ord.* I d.37 n.9.

120. [To the fourth] – As to the next [n.66], one can say that an equivocal cause assimilates equivocally, that is, according to something that it has not formally but virtually in itself. And in this way an object that is not-wantable has sadness in itself and assimilates according to this sadness. In another way it can be said that the proposition [n.66 “an agent aims to make the patient like itself”] is true of the principal agent, not of the instrumental agent. Now God is here the principal agent and assimilates the passive thing to himself; for he understands and wills the affliction of the spirit, and according to what is thus understood and willed does he assimilate the suffering spirit to himself.

Question Two

Whether Damned Men will be Tormented by Infernal Fire after the Judgment

121. The second question asked is whether damned men will be tortured with infernal fire after the judgment.

122. That they will not be:

Topics 6.6.145a3-4, “Every passion when made more removes more from the substance;” therefore if the damned were continually tormented by the fire, their substance would be more and more wasted, and would consequently be at length altogether consumed. This is against *Job* 20.18, “He will pay for everything he has done,

and yet will not be consumed,” and against *Revelation* 9.6, “They will desire to die and death will flee from them.”

123. Again, the fire they suffer will affect them either really or only intentionally:

Not really for two reasons: first because when the first real motion ceases [sc. the motion of the heaven at the end of time] no other real motion seems possible, since the posterior depends on the prior; second because then the body would be really corrupted, because one contrary is really corruptive of the other.

If the effect of the fire will be only intentional, it will not really afflict them, because the senses of someone blessed present there would experience from the fire that intentional effect.

Therefore, they will suffer no passion.

124. On the contrary:

Matthew 25.41, the Judge will say to the men to be damned, “Go you cursed, into the eternal fire.”

I. To the Question

A. About the Action, Real and Intentional, of the Infernal Fire on the Damned

125. As to the question, it is plain that fire present to a corruptible body, animated with a sensitive soul, can have a double effect on it: real, which is univocal, and intentional, which is equivocal with respect to it, because the sensible species is not simply of the same species as the object itself.

126. To the matter at hand, therefore, I say that after the judgment, since man’s body is per se corruptible, fire present to it will be able to do both actions to it, because these actions are not repugnant [sc. to each other] and because there is a receptive subject and an active cause of both there – unless you say the real effect is impeded by the failing of the motion of the heaven, but about this see below d.48 n.69.

127. It is also possible for one effect then to be without the other, speaking of absolute possibility, because neither depends essentially on the other. Hence now too they are separable, if something were susceptible of the form really and not intentionally, and another thing the reverse. But it will not be possible then for one of them not to be present, save because of some impediment – and this either because God does not cooperate with the fire for that action, or because some created agent impedes one action and not the other.

B. About the Sufficiency of the Intentional Action for Causing Pain in the Damned

128. Second I say that intentional action alone suffices for causing pain, but that real action without intentional action would not suffice for this.

129. The second part is manifest when wood gets hot, because however excessively it heats up it yet does not suffer pain.

130. The proof of the first part is that an excelling sensible object, as it is an excelling sensible object, is of a nature to inflict pain because, insofar as it is such, it is disagreeable, and yet, insofar as it is an excelling sensible object, it only has an intentional effect. For although some real change is concomitant with it, whereby the

organ loses the mean proportion it consists in, yet if a disagreeable object were sensed without that action, pain would follow.

131. There is also this proof, that sometimes when there is a slight or no real change, there is a great pain because of the intentional change – as when a hand has been made excessively cold by contact with snow or ice and is at once brought close to a fire, it has vehement pain from the object affecting it and yet a slight or no real action on the hand comes from the heat because of this excelling state of the contrary (namely of cold in the passive object).

132. Now the manner is this: pain, like sense delight, is a passion caused in the sensitive appetite by an object apprehended by sense; therefore, just as an object, insofar as it is object (that is, an object that moves intentionally), is agreeable, so it causes, when there is sensation, delight in the sense appetite. Hence it is not easy to suppose in every delight (at least of sight and hearing) a real change for the preservation of the supposit. In the same way, although the intentional change of a disagreeable object is accompanied by some real change disagreeable to nature (which is perhaps not true in sight and hearing), yet from intentional change alone there follows pain caused by the sensed object in the sense appetite.

C. About the Sufficiency of Intentional Change Alone

133. Third I say that it seems more probable to posit that there is only an intentional effect after the judgment, for although both effects could then be posited (from the first article [nn.125-126]), yet the real effect would not cause any pain without the intentional effect; nor even would it do so along with the intentional effect, but only the intentional effect would cause pain. Since therefore “a plurality is not to be posited without necessity” [Aristotle, *Physics* 1.4.188a17-18], and since suffering by fire is only posited there because the damned are afflicted by fire, it suffices to posit the intentional effect alone, such that the positing of the other seems superfluous, for it would do nothing for the goal.

134. Again, it is fitting to posit in the damned as few miracles as possible, since it is not likely that God would want then to multiply miracles in them beyond what seems required for their just punishment. But it seems that by positing a real action and along with this (as necessary) an intentional one, one has to posit more miracles in them than by positing only an intentional action; therefore etc.

Proof of the minor: although any way at all requires one to posit that the damned are not then corrupted by an intrinsic cause – and this either by a miraculous divine conservation or by a non-miraculous but just conservation (because corresponding to the final state in which they now are) – yet, if a real action be posited, some extrinsic corruptive cause is present there, and it seems a miracle if it do not corrupt, since a cause that can induce something impossible with something else can corrupt that something else. But the fire can induce a heat altogether impossible with the quality, required for life, of a mixed body. If therefore the fire not induce heat to the upmost and yet it does act really, it is a miracle (as there was in the case of the furnace, where the fire did not have all the action that it could by its own nature have had [*Daniel* 3.49-50; *Ord.* I d.8 n.306]). If again it do induce heat to that degree, it is a miracle for that degree to stand compatible with life.

135. If you say that one must in the same way on the other side posit a miracle for the body not to be corrupted extrinsically, for the excessive intentional effect naturally causes excessive pain, and excessive pain kills (as is plain from Antiochus in 1 *Maccabees* 6.13); nay, even extreme fear, where the point seems less clear, is sometimes a cause of death – I reply that no pain is simply repugnant to a mixed quality that is simply required for life.

136. The point is sufficiently clear, because an intention causative of pain does seem more repugnant; yet it is not repugnant, as neither is one contrary in real being repugnant to another in intentional being.

137. The point is also plain from Augustine *City of God* 21.3 n.2, “The bodies will not be able to die just because they will be able to suffer;” and he adds, “Why are bodies able to inflict pain on souls but are not able to inflict death, unless it is the case that causing death is not a necessary consequence of causing pain? Pain, then, is not a necessary proof of future death.”

And his reason, stated a little later, rests on this: “It is a feature of soul to be in pain, not of body, even when the cause of the soul’s being in pain is from the body. If then an argument for death were taken from pain, to the soul, to which pain more belongs, would death more belong.” And further, before this, he points to another reason, of this sort as it were: “For what reason is causing pain a proof of death, since rather it is a sign of life? For it is certain that everything in pain is alive” – as if he were to argue: if being in pain necessarily implies life, it does not necessarily imply death.”

138. I say, however, that sometimes, indeed most of the time, death does follow extreme pain, because a disproportion in some natural quality requisite for life follows – and to set down how it follows would require making clear how the imaginative faculty and appetite can act on natural qualities. But however it may be, no formal repugnance exists there between any sensation or pain and any degree of natural quality necessary for life. Therefore, it is not so great a miracle that some pain exists without death as it is that a real quality simply contrary to the quality of a mixed body exists along with life. For there would in the latter case be a sort of formal repugnance between the quality induced by the contrary and the quality requisite for life; and if the second quality were not posited, it would be a miracle that life existed without that mixed quality.

139. But in the former case the only miracle required is one that suspends pain, for the most part, from having its effect, namely so that a disproportion in the mixture’s humor repugnant to life not follow on the pain. And for the pain to be suspended from having such effect there is no need to posit a new miracle, but only to reduce it to the same thing as the suspension of contraries within is reduced to so that they do not cause corruption – namely so that, because of the final state to which they have been reduced, God may, for the most part, suspend causes from their effects, which effects, if they followed, the composite would be destroyed.

140. Besides, third, Scripture seems to say that the same damned person suffers from contraries, according to the verse of *Job* 24.19, “From waters of snow will they pass to extremes of heat.” And although an alternating of these afflictions would be saved according to the surface reading of the text, no probable saving would be possible of why the damned would suffer contraries simultaneously at their peak and really. But that they suffer them at the same time and at their peak can be saved, because the [intentional] species of contraries, even at their peak, are not contrary.

141. Therefore this way [n.142], about intentional effect without real effect [cf. n.133], can save more things pertaining to the affliction of the damned than the other way can.

D. About the More Probable Possibility of Admitting Real Effect

142. Fourth, I say that there is no altogether certain reason to deny a real effect there, for from the fact that a real effect can be posited (as is contained in the first article [n.125]), though it not be necessary for pain (as is contained in the second article [n.128]), yet, if all that is argued for in the third article [n.133] be ascribed to miracles as cause, it cannot be refuted.

143. God too could act along with the fire to induce real heat in the body, but not what would be formally repugnant to the quantity of the mixture or complexion [of the body], and then a miracle could be posited in this, that God does not act with the fire for the total effect that fire can act for.

144. Also God could act along with fire to generate supreme impossible heat, and then the proportioned mixture [of the body] would be destroyed, and yet life would not be destroyed if God miraculously conserves it.

145. But if it be posited that heat is induced to the extreme limit and that yet the quality of the mixed body stands in the same heat, there seems to be a repugnance formally – just as there would be if the middle and the extreme were to come together in the same thing. And as to whether this is possible for God (not discussed here but elsewhere, [d.46 nn.103, 105]), yet it is not as known as either of the two aforesaid possibilities [nn.143-144].

146. So therefore I say that the damned will suffer a passion of affliction from the fire, and so necessarily suffer it with an intentional suffering but not necessarily reach an affliction with a real passion. But if real passion is concomitant as a natural cause proximate to the susceptible subject, the incorruption of the body from without must be saved in one of the aforesaid ways [nn.142-143].

E. Objections to the Third Article

147. Against the third article [nn.133-141] there is an objection from the fact that the senses of the blessed would sense every difference in sensible things. Therefore, if someone blessed were in the fire he would be changed intentionally by it the way the damned are, and yet he would not suffer an afflicting passion. Therefore, the afflicting passion does not come through the intentional passion alone.

148. Again, every operation is delightful to the operating power, because it is a perfection of it; therefore, any sensation that accompanies an intentional action will be delightful; therefore, none will be painful.

149. Again, the sense appetite only exists because of nature; therefore, nothing is disagreeable to it save because it is disagreeable to nature.

F. Response to the Objections

150. To the first [147]: either no sensible thing would be excessive for the senses of the blessed, or the senses will be so perfect that no sensible object will, because of its excess, be able to be disproportionate to them; and then it follows that they would be changed intentionally by the fire but not painfully, because not by anything disagreeable.

151. Or in another way, since pain is not caused in the senses but in the sense appetite (as was said [n.132]), and since the sense appetite in the blessed is totally at rest (or completely satisfied) in sense delight, and since excelling delight excludes all sadness whatever (*Ethics* 7 [n.110]), no pain could be caused in the sense appetite of the blessed.

One should therefore concede that, if the sensible object were excessive for the senses of the blessed, pain would be caused in his appetite save for the fact that there is in his appetite from a more efficacious cause something that excludes all pain.

152. To the second [n.148]: a disproportionate operation is not delightful; such is the sensation of an excessive object; and no wonder, because an operation is not delightful save because it is about a delightful object; but an excessive object is disagreeable, therefore it causes sadness or pain.

153. To the third [n.149]: it is true that nature makes a thing to be disagreeable to sense appetite because that thing, or what accompanies it, is commonly corruptive of nature. However, let it be that sometimes there is no such accompaniment; the initial disagreeableness remains. So in the issue at hand, although the heating up that accompanies the species of the excelling hot thing not be extreme, yet the disagreeableness of the hot thing, as it impresses the species on the sense appetite, remains.

II. To the Initial Arguments

154. To the first initial argument [n.122]: the authority from *Topics* VI seems to reject real action by the fire on the body but not intentional action, because the statement of the Philosopher is not taken to be about that. But if a real action is posited, one must say that the proposition is true on the part of a natural cause left to itself in its acting, because then, by the continuation of it, the removing of what is fitting from the substance to which it is fitting becomes greater and greater; but in the issue at hand the natural cause is not left to itself.

155. Or, in another way, [the proposition is true] the more the fire is disposed to remove from the substance that for which it has a disposition; but here it does not have a disposition to remove it in this way, because it has no power for the effect of the disposition, namely the disposition that would in itself be its disposition when natural causes are left to themselves.

156. To the second [n.123] it is plain which action, namely intentional or real, is necessarily to be posited there and which could be posited there – and to the objections to the contrary [nn.123-124], the answer is from the second and third articles [nn.128-132, 133-141, 146-153].

Forty Fifth Distinction

Question One

Whether the Separated Soul can Understand the Quiddities Habitually Known to it before Separation

1. "Further, one must know etc." [Lombard, *Sent.* IV d.45].
2. About this forty fifth distinction I ask four questions:
First whether the separated soul can understand quiddities habitually known to it before separation.
3. That it cannot:
On the Soul 3.7.431a14-17, 8.432a9-10, "Phantasms are to the intellect as sensible objects are to the senses" [cf. *Ord.* I d.3 n.343]; but the senses cannot have any sensation unless moved by a sensible object; therefore neither does the intellect have any intellection unless moved by a phantasm. But then [after separation] it will not be moved by a phantasm; therefore etc.
4. Further, *On the Soul* 1.4.408b24-25, "Understanding is corrupted when something internal is corrupted;" that 'internal something' can only be the organ of imagination; now it is corrupted in death; therefore understanding is too.
5. Again, only the possible intellect understands, because the agent intellect does not understand; but the possible intellect does not remain after death, because *On the Soul* 3.5.430a23-25, "the passive intellect is corrupted;" the possible intellect is the passive intellect; therefore etc.
6. On the contrary:
On the Soul 3.4.429a27-28, "The soul is the place of species [forms], not the whole soul but the intellect;" it is the function of place to keep what is placed in it; therefore the intellect keeps the species; therefore etc.
7. Further, Boethius *Consolation of Philosophy* 5 prose 4 n.25, "The thing received is in the receiver according to the mode of the receiver;" but the soul that receives the sensible species is incorruptible; therefore it receives them incorruptibly.
8. Further, Avicenna *On the Soul* p.5 ch.6, "The separated soul will see truth more clearly than the conjoined soul," and it agrees with *Wisdom* 9.15, "The body that is corrupted weighs down the soul."

I. To the Question

A. Opinions of Others

9. There is an opinion here [Aquinas] about understanding by the separated soul through species infused by God; but the treatment of it is proper to the following question [nn.39-44].
10. The opinion about non-infused species, or species acquired in the natural way, seems to be Avicenna's in *On the Soul* p.5 ch.6, that without the act of understanding the soul does not remain. For this is Augustine adduced *On the Trinity* 11.3 n.6, t These words imply that no intelligible species remains habitually in the intellect when the act ceases.
11. Another opinion [Henry of Ghent] is that there is no intelligible species in the intellect but only a phantasm in the imaginative faculty.

B. Scotus' own Response

12. A treatment of this question is contained at length in *Ord.* I d.3 nn.340-345, II d.3 nn.355-363.

Hence, from the things proved there [*ibid.* I d.3 nn.348-378, II d.3 nn.388-394], let there be supposed here: first that an intelligible species is to be posited; second that it remains in the intellect when all act of understanding ceases – nor does it remain only as suddenly passing away, but as possessed under some idea of permanence. But whether it is a habit was touched on there, that when speaking of habit in the sense of some quality inclining to ease of consideration a species is not a habit but precedes it; indeed, it precedes the act by which the habit properly speaking is generated [*ibid.* I. d.3 n.378, II d.3 nn.378-387].

13. Now how Augustine and Avicenna [n.10] are to be expounded is plain there, because Augustine speaks only of the sensitive faculty that he calls the 'faculty of cogitation' [*On the Trinity* 15.22 n.42], and which will not remain in the separated soul [*Ord.* I d.3 n.393]. But Avicenna seems to posit a double mode of understanding: by an inferior and by a superior, as is said there [cf. Scotus, *Rep.* IA d.3 nn.236-238], and knowledge by the inferior indeed abides but not knowledge by the superior.

14. From these suppositions we get this conclusion, that there remains in the intellect in itself, after the act of understanding, an intelligible species.

15. From this the argument goes: in the intellect, as it is subject of the intelligible species, there is not requisite, not even necessarily requisite, a union of it with the body; therefore, when not united with the body, it is not differently disposed as to receiving the intelligible species.

The consequence is plain, because a subject is not differently disposed to receiving something because of variation in what is not the reason for receiving it, nor in any way necessary for receiving it.

I prove the antecedent, because the species is a form simply immaterial or spiritual, at least in that it is not extended and not extendable. Hence the Commentator [Averroes] says [*On the Soul* III com.18] that the object is transferred from order to order when it is transferred by the agent intellect from the phantasm to the order of the possible intellect [cf. *Ord.* I d.3 n.359], which I understand only to mean from the order of the material and extendable to the order of the immaterial and non-extendable. But nothing simply immaterial is received in the intellect insofar as the intellect is simply united with the body, because if this were so, it would be received either in the whole first, or union with the body will be a reason for the receiving; whether in this way or that, the thing received will not be thus altogether immaterial.

16. From this I get that the intelligible species can inform the separated and united intellect in the same way. And then further: since the intelligible species, joined with the agent and possible intellects, constitutes in the same way the idea of perfect memory (in the way said elsewhere about intellective memory, that it contains intelligible object and generative intellect [*Ord.* I d.3 nn.375, 395]) – it follows that a memory of the same idea will be able to exist in the separated intellect as existed in the united intellect; and further, since an equally perfect memory is equally parent of a perfect act in the intelligence, it follows that this sort of generating will be equally able to be present in the separated intellect as in the united intellect. Therefore, the separated soul will be able, by a retained

intelligible species, to have actual intellection of anything that it was capable of having intellection of before.

17. With this agrees the intention of the Philosopher, who maintains, *On the Soul* 1.1.403a3-10, that if the soul cannot have an operation when it is separated, neither can it exist separated. He also puts knowledge properly in the intellect, *On the Soul* 3.8.431b21-23, saying that “just as the soul is made sensible through the senses, so is it made knowable through knowledge.” Now science is, on its own part, of a nature to abide incorruptibly, and consequently on the part of the subject too, since the subject is incorruptible. But what has science is in accidental potency to actual consideration, from *ibid.* 3.4.429b31-30a2, *Physics* 8.4.255a30-b5. Therefore, the separated soul is in accidental potency to understanding objects habitually known to it; therefore it can by itself proceed to act.

18. With this agrees also the statement of Jerome in his prologue to the Bible [*Epistle 53 to Paulinus* n.9], “Let us learn on earth things the knowledge of which will remain with us in heaven.” For it would be very unfitting to labor so much over science and truths if they ceased to exist in death, and very irrational that they should remain without being able to be actualized.

C. Doubts about Scotus’ Response

19. Against this view there seem to be some doubts.

First, that if many intelligible species be conserved in the intellect, either each of them will move the intellect to consider the object represented by it, or none of them will. The first is unacceptable because understanding many distinct things at once is unacceptable; therefore the second is left, that the intellect will turn out understanding nothing.

20. Besides, understanding without a phantasm is more perfect than understanding with a phantasm (the proof of which is that this agrees more with the understanding of God and angels, which is simply more perfect in the genus of understandings). Therefore, if the separated intellect could understand without a phantasm, it would have an understanding simply more perfect than when conjoined with the body, which is unacceptable.

21. Further, in a conjoined intellect the intelligible species without a phantasm is not sufficient for understanding, because the intellect needs to turn toward phantasms, *On the Soul* 3.8.432a8-9. But the intelligible species is as equally perfect in a conjoined intellect as in a separated one; therefore, the species by itself will not be sufficient in a separated intellect for understanding, nor will it be possible then for a phantasm to be had; therefore etc.

22. Further, an operation proper to the whole cannot be an operation proper to a part, because neither can the total being of the whole belong to a part, but understanding is the operation proper to man, *Ethics* 1.6.1098a3-4, 7. And there is proof from reason: because the proper operation of this species [man] is not other than this operation, therefore this operation cannot be an operation of the soul, which is only a part of the species.

D. Response to the Doubts

23. To the first [n.19]: this difficulty (about the understanding of many or no objects first) is a common one, yet in the issue at hand it has a special difficulty, because there is no possibility here of having recourse to particular senses perceiving sensible things, nor to phantasms more or less efficaciously moving the intellect, as is the case with the conjoined intellect.

I say, then, to this briefly here (and consequently about this lack of simultaneousness everywhere), that objects habitually present are either equal in moving the intellect or one of them is a more efficacious mover of it than another. If in the first way, and if there were posited with this an equal inclination of the intellect toward all of them, then the intellect would understand none of them before another – but the hypothesis is impossible. If, however, one of them were a more efficacious mover (after removal of greater inclination in the intellect to one object than to another), then the more efficacious mover will move the intellect first and be first understood. But if one posits an equal inclination toward this object and toward that, then which of them will be understood first appears after one has weighed the moving force and the inclination on each side.

24. To the second [n.20] I say that something can be called more perfect than something else either positively or permissively. An example: animal is more perfect than fly permissively, because the idea of animal permits ‘animal’ to be saved in man; but fly is more perfect positively, because any species posits a perfection over and above the genus.¹¹

To the issue at hand, ‘to understand without a phantasm is more perfect than to understand with a phantasm’ is true permissively but not positively, that is, it does not posit more perfection. The proof is that an agent able to use an instrument does not act positively more perfectly if it not use the instrument; yet it is possible that action without an instrument is more perfect than action with an instrument.¹² So it is here with a phantasm, which is a sort of instrument. I concede therefore that intellection without a phantasm has some condition of perfection which intellection with a phantasm does not have, because the former has a likeness with the simply perfect intellection of a separate substance. But it does not follow from this that any intellection of that sort [sc. intellection without a phantasm] is positively more perfect than any intellection of this sort [sc. intellection with a phantasm].¹³

25. To the third [n.21] I say that although the intelligible species in a conjoined intellect is not sufficient without a phantasm, yet not for this reason is a phantasm required there as a principle of the act of understanding; rather it is required there precisely as a principle of the operation of the imaginative power, and this operation is required for intellection because of the connection of the powers in acting (namely the superior and inferior powers), since the superior does not perfectly act about any object unless the inferior powers (those that have power to operate) operate about the same

¹¹ The term ‘animal’ is here being used broadly for any living thing that moves about, and therefore it includes flies and snakes, although we classify flies more properly as insects and snakes as reptiles.

¹² Punctuating the Latin as in the translation. The punctuation in the printed text seems misleading.

¹³ Intellection without a phantasm, while simply more perfect, is not more perfect in man’s case than intellection with a phantasm.

object. And this is the reason that distractions in the powers of the soul about diverse objects impede the operations of those powers.

26. There is however some perfection that a phantasm bestows on intellection, because it regularly intends the intelligible species in any intellection, as was made clear in d.1 nn.44-49 [cf. *Ord.* I d.3 nn.499-500]. But this perfection can be had without a phantasm, and therefore, to this extent, one must concede that separated intellection would be less perfect than conjoined intellection unless there were something else re-forming it that would suffice for restoring an equal perfection.

27. And from this is plain how necessary a conversion to phantasms is, not as to a principle of understanding, but as to that whereby an inferior power has to be used so that a superior power may have its operation; and this because of the order of the powers in acting, which powers must come together in acting about the same object for the acting to be perfect.

28. To the fourth [n.22]: in the case of any whole whose form is not of a nature to exist per se there can be an action proper to the whole that is not able to belong to the form. But contrariwise, in the case of a whole whose form, namely specific form, is of a nature to exist per se, there cannot be a perfect operation that could not belong to the form as the operator; because the most perfect operation cannot be present unless it be present in its most perfect form, and it cannot be present in a form able to exist per se unless it could be in it per se, because the form will be immediately receptive of it; and so, if the form exists per se, it can receive per se.

29. I concede therefore that intellection is the proper operation of the whole man, but according to the most perfect form in him as through the proper principle of operation; nor is this all but, because this form is separable, intellection is so in the form that it can belong to it, and therefore is so proper to the whole that it can belong to the part. I therefore deny the major in the proposed argument [n.22 *init.*].

30. To the proof about being [n.22 *ibid.*], although some may say [Aquinas, *Sent.* IV d.44 q.1 a.1] that the being of the whole is the being of the soul, yet this was disproved above in d.43 [nn.12-25]. Hence I concede that the being of the whole cannot be the being of the soul, nor conversely – speaking of total and precise being. And yet the most perfect operation belongs to this whole because it cannot be in it save according to the soul, and it cannot be in it according to the soul as the soul is proximate receiver unless it could belong to the soul when the soul per se exists. It follows that the operation of the whole can be the operation of the soul; hence I deny the consequence, that ‘the being of this [the whole] cannot be the being of that [the part], therefore neither can the operation of the former be the operation of the latter’.

As to the proof [n.22], that ‘operation presupposes being’: this is true, but not as the precise reason for receiving.¹⁴

II. To the Initial Arguments

31. To the initial arguments.

¹⁴ A thing cannot operate unless it exists, but the precise reason it has the operation need not be its existence. So the soul, which is not the existence of man but a part of that existence, can yet be the precise reason man has the relevant operation.

To the first [n.3]: the authority from *On the Soul* 3 must be understood as to the acquiring of intellection, and this the first acquisition firstly done. But it must not be understood of use; and the reason is that the intellect can use a form previously acquired, although those things are not had that were necessary before for acquiring the form. The senses, speaking of exterior sense, cannot thus use a form previously acquired, because the senses do not conserve for later operation a form or species previously received. In another way it could be said that this proposition [of the Philosopher] is understood as holding of this life, because the Philosopher knew by experience the intellection that fits us only for this life; for he had experience of no other.

32. To the second [n.4]: the intellect is corrupted, that is, impeded in its operation, and it is as if it is kept corrupt by something corrupted within, for without the operation of imagination it cannot proceed to its own act. But from this does not follow that it is corrupt or corruptible in itself, nor that something else is necessarily required for its act, but only that it is required according to the order of powers that is now found in human nature as to operation on the same object.

33. To the third [n.5] I say that the passive intellect is not there understood to be the possible intellect, but to be some sense power, which power some call the cogitative power. And it is true that every sense power is corrupted, and therefore that the passive intellect, taken in this way, is corrupted too. But the passive intellect is not corrupted in the sense in which we say the possible intellect is passive.

Question Two

Whether the Separated Soul can Acquire Knowledge of Something Previously Unknown

34. Second I ask whether the separated soul can acquire knowledge of something previously unknown.

35. That it cannot:

[Because if it could] it would then in vain be united to the body. Proof of the consequence: the soul is not united for the sake of the perfection of the body, because form is not for the sake of matter but conversely, *Physics* 2.8.199a30-32; therefore it is united for the sake of acquiring its own perfection, namely so that it may acquire knowledge through the use of the senses in the body; but this would be in vain if, when separated without use of the senses, it could acquire knowledge; therefore etc.

36. Again, passage from extreme to extreme is only possible through the middle; the thing outside exists altogether materially, in the intellect altogether immaterially; therefore, it must pass through the middle, wherein it exists in some way materially and in some way immaterially. But in the senses it thus exists in some way materially, because according to material conditions, and in some way immaterially, because, according to the Philosopher *On the Soul* 2.12.424a17-19, “sense is receptive of the species without matter” – without, I say, the sort of matter that a form really existing outside requires.

37. Again, if the soul could acquire knowledge of one unknown thing, then likewise too of any unknown thing, and so an object’s distance in place would not prevent knowledge of it – which seems against Augustine *On Care for the Dead* ch.15 n.18, where he maintains that separated souls do not know the things done here unless angels and souls coming to them express to them the things they know here.

38. On the contrary:

Nature is not without its proper specific operation – and this point is taken from *On the Heavens* 2.3.286a8-9 and from Damascene *Orthodox Faith* ch.59 [cf. *Ord.* I d.3 n.209]. Now the human soul is the most perfect form, and its proper operation according to the possible intellect is to understand, according to the agent intellect to abstract, according to the will to will. Therefore, no manner of being can belong to the soul according to its nature wherein it does not have power for these operations. But according to its nature the soul is such as to be able to have separate being, and this comes from the perfection of its nature (hence it does not belong to other, imperfect forms). Therefore it has, in that separate being, power for these operations. But it is possible for the soul not to have previously acquired any species of objects, as is plain of the soul of a deceased child; therefore it will be able to acquire them then.

I. To the Question

A. Opinion of Others

1. Exposition of the Opinion

39. Here the negative opinion is held, because of the second reason [n.36], virtually [cf. n.49].

40. For it argues [Aquinas, *Sent* IV d.50 q.1 a.1] that “there must be some agreement between receiver and received; now the species existent in the senses have agreement with the intellect insofar as they are without matter, and agreement with material things insofar as they exist with material conditions; and so it is agreeable that the senses receive from material things, and that the intellect receives from the senses – but not that the intellect receive immediately from material things,” because there is no such agreement in that case; and so, “in order for the intellect to understand after separation from the body, no forms received from things either then or before are required.”

41. How then will the intellect understand?

They say that it will understand “through influence from higher substances, namely from God or the angels” – and this when speaking of a natural influence and its natural knowledge.

42. The point is shown as follows:

“The intellect seems to be a mean between intellectual substances and corporeal things (hence the saying that ‘the soul is created on the horizon of eternity’ [*Book of Causes* prop.2 n.22]); and this for the reason that the soul attains intellectual substances through the intellect, but attains corporeal things insofar as it the act of a body; but the more any mean approaches one extreme the more it recedes from the other, and conversely.”

43. “Hence, since our soul comes closest to the body in this life, namely as being the act of the body, it does not have a relation to intellectual things, and therefore does not receive influence from higher substances so has to get knowledge, but it gets knowledge through species received from the senses. And so, even in this life, the more the soul is drawn away from the body so much the more does it receive the influx of knowledge from spiritual substances, and hence it is that it knows certain occult things when sleeping or in excess of mind. Wherefore, when it will be actually separated from

the body, it will be most ready to receive the influence of higher substances, namely of God and angels, and thus, in accordance with this sort of influence, it will have a greater or lesser knowledge according to the mode of its own capacity.”

44. “And this is how the Commentator [Averroes] speaks in *On the Soul* 3 com.5, because he posits that the possible intellect [cf. *Ord.* I d.3 n.548] is a separate substance; and although he errs in this yet he does speak rightly to this extent, that from the fact the possible intellect is posited as a separate substance it does have a respect to higher intellectual substances, so as to understand them. But according to the respect in which it is compared to our intellect by receiving species from phantasms, it is not conjoined with the higher substances.”

2. Rejection of the Opinion

a. Against the Opinion in Itself

45. There is reason against this position, even if no other reason save from the following principles: the first of which is that “a plurality is not to be posited without necessity” (*Physics* 1.4.188a17-18), the second of which is that one should not posit of any nature what derogates from its dignity, unless this be evident from something that agrees with such nature (this principle can be got from the Philosopher, *On Generation* 2.10.336b27-29, “we always say that nature desires what is better, and as in the whole universe, so also in each part, one must rather posit for it what is better, and provided it not evidently appear that it does not belong to it”). But now a plurality is being posited, because such species are infused by God or angels, and without necessity – because this nature has sufficiently in itself the resources to be able to reach its own perfection without such givens infused by God or angels. Hence it seems here that only because the perfection of this nature is not understood in itself is recourse being had to God or angels.

46. This opinion also cheapens the nature of the intellective soul. For just as a nature is cheaper simply that has power for no operation or only for a cheaper one, so proportionally is a nature that has no power for an operation that belongs to it cheaper than one that does have such power. Now the separated soul has for you [Aquinas] no power from its intrinsic resources (even when extrinsic factors are concurrent with it) for any operation that belongs to it unless God or an angel give it the sort of species in question – but a stone does have power from its intrinsic resources, without such a begged-for infusion, for an operation proportioned to it, because it can descend toward the center and remain there. Therefore, the soul is more cheapened by this position, in proportion to its nobility, than the nature of a stone is.

47. Again, he who has this opinion holds elsewhere [Aquinas, *On Metaphysics* 5 lect.12] that two accidents of the same species cannot exist together; but the infused species of a stone as object is of the same species as the intelligible species acquired by the soul here in the body; therefore either the infused species will not remain, or the one acquired here must not remain. But the second is false, because since the proper subject of this species is incorruptible, and since the species itself can of itself incorruptibly remain, it follows that it will in fact remain. Therefore, another species of the stone will not be given to it by God or an angel and, consequently, either it will never understand a stone, or it will be able to understand it through the species it previously received from things – which they [Aquinas and his followers] deny.

48. If you say that the species is not given to what possesses it already – this does not seem reasonable, that this soul [sc. the one that possesses it already] should lack the sort of perfect species given to another soul not possessed of it;¹⁵ and this response is at least maintained against the opinion [in question here], because there will then be an intellection through a species previously received from the thing.

49. If you say the infused and acquired species differ in kind the way acquired and infused virtue (which exist simultaneously) differ – this is assumed as axiomatic, and was dealt with in *Ord.* III d.26 n.11, 22, 24-26, 102-111. But suppose the axiom is conceded to them as to the virtues; the proposed conclusion does not follow here, because infused virtue will have its own different rule from the one that acquired virtue has, and from difference of rule a virtue different in species will be able to be posited, because a virtue (by the essential idea of a virtue) depends on the rule it is conformed to. But it will not be possible to imagine here a specific difference between an infused species and an acquired species, because there is no difference here save only that of effective principle or of mode of effecting, and such difference does not distinguish effects into species, Augustine, *On the Trinity* 3.9 n.20¹⁶ [cf. *Ord.* III d.27 n.11].

b. Against the Reasons for the Opinion

50. The reasons for the opinion do not prove it.

[To the first reason] – The first [n.40], for the negative side [n.39], will either have four terms, or will not prove the conclusion intended, or one proposition will be false.

For if you take for the major ‘there must be an agreement between receiver and received’ and for the minor ‘an external material thing does not have an agreement with the intellect’, what follows? That therefore ‘the intellect does not receive the external material thing’, nor conversely [sc. ‘the external thing does not receive the intellect’]. But if you conclude that ‘the intellect does not receive *from* an external material thing’, there will be four terms, because the predicate [sc. ‘does not receive from an external material thing’] was not in the major. Now if you take the following major (which however you do not put down in what was written but rather the first one), namely ‘there must be an agreement between receiver and what it receives from’, I say that it would be more proper to say ‘proportion’ than ‘agreement’, because the receiver has the idea of passive thing and that from which it receives has the idea of agent. Now agent and passive thing are proportional but not properly in agreement, save by extending ‘agreement’ to mean ‘proportion’; nay rather, proportion between them requires disagreement, because proportion requires that one be actually such and the other potentially such.

¹⁵ The translation given here rejects the punctuation and grammatical markings in the printed text, which are hard to decipher. The sense of the argument seems to be that if an infused species is only given to a separated soul that does not have the species already, then first: the separated soul that does not receive the infused species (because it already has the species acquired from things) will lack this perfect infused species, though other souls will have it, which seems unreasonable; and second: this separated soul, which does not receive the infused species (because it has the acquired one), will understand, if it understands, through the acquired species, and this is opposed to the opinion being defended here, that separated souls understand only through infused species.

¹⁶ “What is understood from each of two sources is perhaps single, but the things it is understood from are different, as that if the name of ‘the Lord’ be written in gold and in black ink, the first is more precious the second more cheap, but what is signified by each is the very same.”

51. So this new major, then, will either be false, if it is understood of agreement properly speaking; or if it extends agreement to mean proportion, let it be conceded. And then the minor ‘the external thing does not have agreement in this way [sc. by proportion] with the intellect’ is false; for it is at least virtually in act such as the intellect is formally in potency.

52. A first confirmation of this is that you concede a phantasm has such an agreement with the intellect, and yet a phantasm is of a condition opposite to what is received in the intellect, because it only represents the object as it is here and now, which object in its universal idea is understood abstracted from these conditions [of here and now]. Nor does the other agreement, namely that the phantasm is without extrinsic matter, make the phantasm to be something active. For the phantasm is truly in matter, that is, in an extended organ, and this would as much prevent action on the immaterial intellect from existing in this extended matter [sc. the extended organ] as from existing in that extended matter [sc. the external thing]. But a phantasm acts on the intellect only in this way, that it is representative of the object; so the thing itself can in itself equally be this, because it is equally representative of itself. And this I believe to be true, that although the intellect can abstract from a phantasm, which persists apart from the thing, yet it can take knowledge immediately from the external thing, as is contained in a comment [by Averroes] *On the Soul* 3 com.20.¹⁷

53. A second confirmation is that it follows that an angel could not receive knowledge from an external thing, which was something rejected in *Ord.* II d.3 n.383.

54. [To the second reason] – The second reason [n.42], which is for the affirmative conclusion about that influence, either fails by equivocation over the middle term, or one of its premises is false. For when you take in the major “the more any mean approaches one extreme the more it recedes from the other” – if you understand the mean to approach and recede as to the same form, I concede it; if as to different forms, it is false. So, for instance, if it is a medium in being and it recedes from this extreme in being, it approaches the other extreme in being; likewise, if it is a mean in operating and it recedes from this extreme in operating, it approaches that one in operating. But if it is a mean in operating or being, and it recedes from one extreme in being, it will not for this reason approach the other in operating.

55. Now the minor can be understood, first, of a middle in being – and this is true, because the soul (even when conjoined to the body) in some way holds the mean between separate substance and bodily existence. And conclude then: ‘therefore when the separated soul recedes from body in being, the more it approaches separate substance in mode of being’ (I concede this). But from this nothing follows as to the proposition “it approaches closer to receiving from separate substance an influx pertaining to operation.” And if the argument were adduced for this purpose, it manifestly does not prove it; for then the soul when separated would be more capable of such influx than when conjoined to a glorious body, because when conjoined to a glorious body it approaches closer to body in being than it does when separated, indeed it approaches closer, that is, approaches more perfectly, than when conjoined to a corruptible body.

¹⁷ “For one must suppose that when this intellect, which is in potency, is declared to be eternal and of a nature to be perfected by material forms, it is of greater dignity than to be naturally perfected by non-material forms that in themselves are understood.”

56. But if, second, you take in the minor that the separated soul recedes more from the body in operating than when it is conjoined, this is false as meaning that it recedes from the object about which it operates. For the soul can know body when separated just as it can when conjoined; and so the result does not follow that it approaches more to separate substance as to its knowable object, or as to that from which it receives its knowable object.

57. What they adduce for confirmation of this position (the one about dreams and ecstasy, the other about the statement of the Commentator *On the Soul* 3 [nn.43-44]) seem to be figments.

58. For it is not because the soul in its operating recedes from the body as from its object that certain truths are seen in dreams; for then the deeper the dream the more such things would be seen; but this is false, because dreams do not happen in very deep sleep but in light sleep; also epileptics would then regularly see truths coming from those spirits [God and angels].

59. Hence, this basis of argument seems to be taken from the fictions of Mahomet, who is said to have been an epileptic and, so as to give a deceitful covering to his wretchedness, he said he had to fall down when the angel was speaking to him. And, according to this fiction of Mahomet's, Avicenna, when speaking with reverence of Mahomet's law, imagines (in *Metaphysics* 9.7) there are such abstractions from sense so that there may be revelation from angels.

60. But we Christians do not say that anyone sees anything in sleep or ecstasy, unless there be some positive cause there, as that God acts then on the person's intellect. But the person then is disposed more fittingly by the removal of an impediment, namely because he is not distracted by other objects; and vehement occupation with another object impedes operating intensely about this one. Indeed, it seems more a miracle that truth is revealed in sleep than in being awake and in an intellect not too intent on sensible things, for it is natural for man to have use of reason when awake and not when asleep.

61. The second example, from Averroes [n.44], is plainly all made up for the purpose, that that separate substance receives from higher beings, and yet as conjoined with us it does not so receive. For it is a contradiction that a separate nature could be conjoined with us save by reason of efficient or moving cause. But something active, if in its being it receive something from a superior, receives it therefrom insofar as it is active [sc. insofar as it is active in moving the conjoined body].

B. Scotus' own Opinion

62. To the question, then, I say that the separated soul can acquire knowledge of an object previously unknown, and knowledge both abstractive and intuitive. The meanings of these terms were stated elsewhere [*Rep.* IVA d.45 q.2].

1. About Abstractive Knowledge

63. The proof of the first is that when a sufficient active and passive factor are sufficiently close, the effect can follow, and if the agent acts naturally, the effect does follow. But now, when the separated soul has present to it a stone or any object proportioned to it, there come together in the soul an active and a passive factor both

sufficient for abstractive knowledge – or for the intelligible species of such object by which abstractive knowledge is had; therefore etc.

64. The proof of the minor is that the agent intellect together with an object is a sufficient active cause of an intelligible species, and no less so when with an external object than with a phantasm (which point they concede); because, as was said in arguing against the opinion [n.52], there is nothing in a phantasm to make it sufficient to cause an intelligible species that does not more eminently belong in the thing of which the phantasm is the phantasm; and the possible intellect is a power sufficiently receptive [of intelligible species].

2. About Intuitive Knowledge

65. This argument proves the second point, namely about intuitive knowledge. For the sufficient causes of this knowledge are the object present in actual existence and the agent and possible intellects; all these can come to be together. And so is it proved, as it seems, that the thing must itself immediately suffice for intellectual knowledge to be had of itself, because the phantasm alone does not suffice for intuitive knowledge of an object, since a phantasm represents a thing existent or not existent, present or not present, and consequently through it knowledge of the thing as it exists in its proper present existence cannot be had. Now such knowledge, which is called intuitive, can be intellectual knowledge, otherwise the intellect would not be certain of any existence of any object. But this intuitive knowledge too cannot be had through the presence of the species, because the species represents the thing indifferently as existent and not existent, present and not present.

66. And from this follows that through species infused by God or angels neither intellection is possible for a separated intellect, because the second is not.¹⁸ If then the second is possible, because it is also possible now, it follows that it will be about the thing in itself and not by such infusing.

67. Now the excessive distance of the object impedes this intuitive intellection of the object, because according to Augustine *On Care for the Dead* 15 n.18, “those souls do not know what is done here unless they learn it from angels or from other newly arriving souls who can tell them what they knew here,” in the way that John the Baptist predicted to the holy souls in limbo that Christ would come down to them, according to Gregory’s exposition [*Ten Homilies on the Gospels*, 1.6 n.1]¹⁹ of John’s question in *Matthew* 11.31, “Are you he who is to come etc.?” But now, if they knew through infused species these conditions of the existence of things, such would not need to be announced to them by the saints, whether angels or souls, who know these matters.^a

a. [*Interpolated text*]. I specifically believe that it is impossible for any intelligible species to be equivalently in the soul through an influx from angels, because I do not believe that an angel can cause in these lower things any real form that I understand distinct in location, nor consequently cause in the soul an intelligible species (which is a form and a perfect one, though in respect of the

¹⁸ The second kind is intuitive intellection and the first kind is abstractive, and the first depends on the second.

¹⁹ “John says therefore, ‘Are you he who is to come or do we wait for another?’, as if he were to say openly, ‘As you deigned to be born for men, indicate whether you deign also to die for men, so that I who have arisen as precursor of your birth am also to be precursor of your death, and am to announce that you are to come in hell whom I have announced are already come in the world’.”

object it be said to be intrinsic). Because for the same reason that an angel could impress this form it could impress an intellection on the intellect, since an intellection too is a certain form of intention with respect to a real object; yet an intellection could in itself impress a volition – which [sc. an angel impressing a volition on the soul] no one concedes.

II. To the Initial Arguments

68. To the first initial argument [n.35] I say that it does not follow the soul is in vain united to the body. For let it be that this union come about for the perfection of the soul, namely so that the soul acquire its perfection from such union; it does not follow that, if it could acquire it in another way, it is united in vain. For if something is ordered to an end, it does not come to be in vain if the end could be acquired in another way; just as if health could be acquired by surgery and medicine, surgery does not become vain though health could be acquired by medicine. So, if knowledge could be acquired by the use of the senses and in another way by the soul when separated, the union does not become vain from the fact that it agrees with one of these ways of acquiring knowledge.

69. An answer in another way, and more to the point, is that the union of soul and body is not ultimately either for the perfection of the body or for the perfection alone of the soul, but for the perfection of the whole that consists of these parts. And therefore, though no perfection could accrue to this part or to that which could not be had without such a union, yet the union does not come to be in vain because the perfection of the whole, which is principally intended by nature, could only be had in this way.

70. To the second [n.36] I say that something is a necessary medium for one virtue that is not a medium for another virtue, speaking of necessary medium, as in transferring a body from place to place, where some medium is necessary for the natural moving power, so that the natural power cannot transfer it from a distant ‘where’ to another ‘where’ save²⁰ through a ‘where’ in the middle; and yet it is not a medium necessary for divine power, which can at once transfer it from any ‘where’ to any other ‘where’. So, in the issue at hand, a perfect abstractive virtue needs a medium, namely imaginative being, between the sensible object outside and the pure intelligible thing; but a more perfect abstractive virtue does not need this medium. Hence the argument [n.36] can be turned toward the opposite, that if the virtue of the separated intellect were more perfect than that of the conjoined intellect, it could transfer the object from extreme to extreme without such a medium.

71. Or it could in another way be said that under one of the two extremes falls imaginable being, because this is simply sensible being. But this extreme has under it diverse things and in diverse degrees, because the sensible thing outside is in some way in a more remote sensible degree from intelligible being than the sensible thing is as it is in imaginable being. But as it is, some virtue in some degree in the extreme is able to act and some lesser virtue is not able to act, but it can act from some degree closer. So here, although the abstractive power of our conjoined intellect cannot act by abstracting the intelligible thing from the sensible thing save from this lowest sensible degree, namely the imaginable, yet the higher or more efficacious virtue can abstract from a more distant degree, namely from the degree of the sensible thing outside.

²⁰ The word ‘save’ seems necessary for the sense though the printed text omits it, probably through a typographical error.

72. To the third [n.37]: conceded that knowledge can be acquired of anything *ceteris paribus*.

73. And when you say about distance in place that it is not a hindrance, I reply that this does not follow, because a determinate presence of the object to the power is required; but a disproportionate distance prevents this determinate presence. And no wonder, because at least an object that is in some way here active cannot act on a passive object however much in the distance it is; and consequently I concede that knowledge of an object however much in the distance it is cannot be caused in a separated intellect, as not in a conjoined one either.

74. If it is objected against this that, according to Boethius *Hebdom.* PL 64, 1311, “it is self-evident that incorporeal things are not in place” [cf, Aquinas, *ST* Ia q.2 a.1], therefore they do not require distance in place in their operation – I reply: the Philosopher seems to posit that a determinate distance is required for the operation even of separated substance; hence in *Physics* 8.1.267b6-9 he seems to posit that the intelligence moving a sphere is in some part of the sphere, from which part the motion begins, as if at least a definitive presence to place of the mover were doing something for the action of moving. Likewise in *Physics* 7.1.242b24-27, 2.243a3-6 [*On Generation* 1.6.323a22-31] he maintains of express intention that agent and patient are present together – which is understood either of presence together by contact, where it cannot be greater, as in bodies, according to him [sc. of two bodies in contact, one body is not more in contact with the other than the other is with it], or where presence can be greater, but the greater one, namely mutual presence, is the one meant [sc. one thing can be more present to another than the other is to it, as in affection, but the greater presence is mutual presence, when the affection is on both sides]. But a spirit can have a greater presence to body than by contact; therefore, by Aristotle’s express intention, presence together by contact will [for a spirit] be by mutual presence, and consequently too great a distance does impede action.

Question Three

Whether the Separated Soul can Remember Past Things it Knew when Conjoined

75. Third I ask whether the separated soul can remember past things that it knew when conjoined.

76. That it cannot:

The Philosopher *On Memory* 1.450a11-14 lays down memory as a sense power, and Damascene ch.34 does the same; but no sense power remains in the separated soul with the possibility of being active; therefore etc.

77. Again, the object of the intellect is the universal, *Physics* 1.5.189a5-8, *On the Soul* 2.5.417b20-22, but the universal abstracts from the here and now, the ‘has been’ and ‘will be’, and from these sorts of conditions that concern existence; but memory has regard to a determinate condition that concerns existence, namely the past; therefore memory is repugnant to the intellective part of the soul; therefore it does not remain in the separated soul.

78. Again, it then follows [sc. if separated souls did have memory of the past] that, for like reason, blessed souls would have recollection of everything past, and consequently the soul of a blessed would have recollection of sin committed. The

consequent is false, because *Isaiah* 65.16-17 says, “Behold I make a new heaven,” and there follows “former tribulations shall be handed over to oblivion;” and Gregory [*Moralia* 4.35 nn.71-72], when expounding this statement,^a says it is because the blessed will suffer no misery. But this memory [of sin committed] would be cause of great misery, because cause of great displeasure; for the blessed could not be pleased with any sin committed, nor be indifferently disposed, as though neither pleased nor displeased, because this would not stand with perfect charity; therefore the blessed would have displeasure about something irrevocable; therefore, sadness too.

a. [*Interpolated text*] which Gregory expounds thus [in fact Jerome, on *Isaiah* 18.65, nn.17-18, as cited by Lombard *Sent.* IV d.43 ch.5 n.3], saying, “Perhaps, in the future, memory of former behavior will be altogether destroyed, with every eternal good succeeding to it, so that there be nothing left to remember of the evils of former tribulation.”

79. On the contrary:

Luke 16.25, “Son, remember that you received good things in your life, and Lazarus bad things in like manner.”

80. Again, Augustine maintains this on *Psalms* 108.17 “Let his sons be orphans,” and in *Confessions* 9.10 nn.23-25, 4.4. n.8, where he says that the dead have memory of us.

81. Again, if [the dead] did not remember, then they would not have ground for giving thanks to God for his mercy; and this is the argument of Gregory *Moralia* 4.36 n.72 who, basing himself on *Psalms* 88.2 “I will sing the mercies of God forever,” says, “How does he sing mercies forever who does not remember his misery?”

I. To the Question

82. As to this question one must ask first whether memory properly speaking (namely, memory that has the job of remembering the past) is in the sensitive part of the soul; second whether it is in the intellective part.

A. Things Needing to be Noted Beforehand about Memory Properly Speaking

1. There Exists in us an Act of Knowing the Past as Past.

83. Now, presupposed to these two questions [n.82] is something certain common to both, namely that there is in us some act of knowing the past as past.

84. The fact is plain, because otherwise we would lack the first part of prudence, which according to Tully [*On Invention* 2 n.53] is memory of the past.

85. Second it would follow that the virtuous could not rightly know that they are to be justly rewarded, nor the vicious that they are to be justly punished, for reward and punishment are so carried out because of past good or bad; and, *ex hypothesi*, neither the former nor the latter have knowledge of the past within themselves; therefore justice neither in reward nor in punishment would be known. This conclusion destroys all political life [cf. *Ethics* 8.12.1160a31-36], because it destroys all agreement as to the just imposition of reward or punishment according to law.

86. Again, the past has more of truth than the future (the proof of which is that the truth of the future is contingent, of the past necessary – according to *Ethics* 6.2.1139b10-

11: “God is deprived of this alone: to make undone what has been done”). But we can have some knowledge of the future as future (as we experience), otherwise we could not have foresight for ourselves and procure what is suitable for our life and avoid what is unsuitable. Therefore, much more can we have some knowledge, and so memory, of the past as it is past.

87. Taking this supposition as certain (that there can exist in us an act of knowing the ‘past as past’ as object of knowing), I add that the act called ‘remembering’ is not directly of just any past, but only of an act that was present in the one supposed to be remembering and that was in him a human act (to exclude acts of the vegetative power and casual acts or acts generally imperceptible); for I only remember the fact that you sat down because I remember that I saw or knew that you sat down. Hence, although I know I was born or that the world was created, yet I do not remember the one or the other, because I do not know any act of mine in the past being about the one or the other.

88. From this meaning of the term, then, ‘memory’ is knowledge of some past act, and of it insofar as it is past, by the very one who remembers.

89. And certain things follow from the fact that memory is said to be of the past, and some follow from the fact that it is memory of this sort of past object [sc. a past object as past].

2. Four Certainties Consequent to Memory, or to Knowledge of a Past Act

90. Now from the fact that memory is of the past, four things follow that are certain.

The first of these is this, that the remembering power acts after passage of time, otherwise it would not be of the past as past, and this is what the Philosopher says in *On Memory* 1.449b27-28. The fact that memory acts after passage of time must be understood per se, so that the act of remembering per se follows the remembered thing; and the Philosopher’s words are: “all memory happens after passage of time.”

91. The second is that the remembering power perceives the flow of time between the instant or time when the object remembered existed and the instant of present perception.

92. The third is that the object of memory, when it is the object of memory, is not in itself present, because then there would be no memory of it as past.

93. The fourth is that since the object must in some way be present to the act of memory, and it cannot be present in itself, it must be present through its species, and then the remembering power will be a power of conserving the species, and this in the sense of the total power required for memory. For whether there are two powers, one of which conserves the species and the other remembers, or a single one that performs both acts, I care not; at least there is required for remembering the conserving of the species of the object that can be remembered.

3. Three Certainties Consequent to Knowledge of this Sort of Past Act

94. Now from the idea of ‘this special object’, namely the past act of the very one remembering, three things follow that are certain:

The first is that memory will be of a double object: one as remote or ultimate object, namely the thing about which the one remembering at some point performed a human act; and the next as proximate object, namely the human and past act tending toward that other object.

95. The second thing is that, since the act of remembering must possess the species [of the object] (and by this meaning the whole complete species required for remembering), the species could not be impressed by the object when the object does not exist or is not present; but the proximate object is the past human act; therefore, while this act existed the necessary species was being impressed. Therefore, since the species of the past human act could not be impressed on any power save the power of which this act was the object, it follows that the act of knowing the past is the object of the remembering power.

96. The third is that no one can have a memory save of his own act, and this a human act, because only through the act as proximate object known is its object as remote object known – and consequently there cannot be memory of an act in another of the same idea as the act there is memory of in oneself.

B. First Article: about the Memory of the Past in the Sense Part of the Soul

1. Whether the Remembering Power Knows the Act while it Exists

97. In this regard a doubt can be introduced, and it is whether the remembering power knows the act while it exists, of which act as past, as of immediate object, it is the memory. For it seems that if it does not then know it, neither will it remember it afterwards. But the proof is not necessary, because one sense does not seem to reflect on the act of another sense; and though it not perceive the act of another sense while it is present, there is no clear proof that it will not be able to perceive that act as past after it has passed. At any rate, let the conclusion of this article be examined on the supposition of the above certainties [nn.90-96].

98. It seems that memory cannot be set down as an act of the sense part.

First, from the condition that it perceives time; but “time is nothing but the number of motion according to before and after,” *Physics* 4.11.219b1-2, and this cannot be perceived without collating the after with the before; but the senses are not able to collate, because this is proper to the intellect.

99. Again, it was said in the fourth inference [n.93] that the remembering power must perceive the act while it is present. But the sense power cannot perceive the act of sensing while it is present (at least not universally), because the act of the supreme sense power cannot be perceived by any sense, neither by a lower nor a higher one (as is plain), nor by itself, because that power does not reflect back on itself or its act, and yet there can be memory of any sensation in us (as we experience); therefore this remembering does not generally belong to any sense power.

100. But since the argument here is from something that was earlier said to be doubtful [n.97], the argument therefore is taken from something else supposed certain as follows: not only does the sense power not perceive first anything but some sensible quality (hence the Philosopher *On the Soul* 2.425b17-20, in order to concede that vision is in some way perceived by sight, says that vision is in some way colored), but also it does not receive the proper species of anything other than some such quality. But the

sensation of which it is the remembering cannot in any way be set down as a sense quality, because any sensation (whether of color, or sound, or flavor) can equally be remembered; therefore the species required for remembering is not that of any sense as of the receptive power.

2. It Seems that No Sense Operation is to be Posited in the Sense Part that Cannot be Conceded to a Brute

101. Again, one should not posit in the sense part any sense operation that cannot be conceded to a brute (the proof of this is that there can be a sense part in some brute that excels as to all the sense acts that we experience); but this remembering cannot be proved to exist in a brute from a brute's acts.

102. Proof of the minor [n.101]:

There are all these acts of brutes we see from which the conclusion [sc. brutes have remembering] could the more be drawn, as those that seem to be acts of prudence or foresight, as is plain of ants gathering grain to the same place and at a definite time (as in summer).

103. Similarly, acts of revenge or exacting justice, as it were, such as yielding to benefactors and punishing those that offend, seem to belong to brutes insofar as they know the past as past.

104. Likewise, third, about acts pertaining to preservation of the species (as the nest-building of birds and feeding young and the like), which do not seem regularly to belong to them without knowledge of the past as past.

105. Fourth, because some brutes are teachable (as the Philosopher maintains *On Memory* 1.430a15-22 and *On Sense* 1.437a9-14), but teaching is not without memory of the past as past.

106. Now all these acts can be carried out without remembrance of the past as past; therefore, no act proves that this act of remembrance exists in brutes.

107. The minor of this argument [n.106] is proved by running through the acts in question.

For as to uniformity with respect to place and time (as appears in ants [n.102]), this can be saved by mere apprehension and retention of a species of what is delightful, without apprehension of the past as past. For if it was delightful to this ant to deposit grain here, and if the delightful species remains in imagination, it will move the sense appetite to seeking it as delightful, and so to coming again to this place. But as to why ants gather at one time and not at another, explanation must be given from the side of their [bodily] complexion, or why it is delightful for them to gather grain in this way and not in that. And whether this is attributed to natural industry or some other cause, at least this does not prove remembrance of time, for although an ant born this year has never experienced want in winter it gathers in summer just like an ant ten years old (if an ant could live so long); therefore it does not get this act for such time from the remembrance of the past. But if the frequenting of the same place shows it comes from the past, the response is that it comes from the delightful previously apprehended, without apprehension of the past as past.

108. Similarly to the second [n.103], about revenge or benefit from a wounded or placated animal for, in brief, the delightful image of what pleases, or the saddening image

of what offends, is formally impressed and always pushes the sense appetite to motion in conformity with the object (namely of avenging or benefiting), at least when any other delightful or saddening thing ceases that was moving more strongly. Therefore, if in the intermediate time this action is suspended by something present, at the end of the time the phantasm at once moves, and there follows in the sense appetite a motion proportioned to the object, which motion did not follow before because it was impeded by some object moving more strongly. There is here, then, no apprehension of the past as past but only of the thing that is past, whose persisting species moves to revenge or thanks when some other thing that was moving more strongly ceases.

109. Likewise about the third [n.104]: because [building nests and feeding young] is delightful to these brutes wherever they are from, it is necessary that at least some intrinsic cause (from a [bodily] complexion disposed or altered now in this way) must convince them to gather such and such twigs for making a nest and for constructing it in such and such way; and this is not delightful otherwise, when their complexion is disposed differently; and from this delight they operate, not from the apprehension of the past as past. The proof of this is that if there were a brute animal propagated in its first year, it would just as much provide for itself things necessary for building a nest as if it were however many years in age; therefore nest building is not from knowledge of the past as past.

110. Fourth, about learning [n.105], this is more easily solved, as it goes along with the second [nn.103, 108]. And it is solved by the fact that, from frequent sensing of things delightful and saddening conjoined, there is impressed on the animal a delightful and saddening phantasm, and in the following way, that when one of them moves it, the other from the conjunction at once moves it. Therefore, when present food moves the appetite to consume, at once the phantasm of a rod beating it moves it at the same time, and consequently moves it as something saddening to be fled from; and if from much frequency the phantasm of the latter is impressed on it as very saddening, the brute withdraws itself from the delightful thing more than the delightful thing attracts it.

3. The Contrary Position of Aristotle, which is more Probable

111. These arguments can be responded to by upholding the intention of the Philosopher in *On Memory* [n.76], that memory is in the sense part, and by turning the arguments to the opposite.

112. For first about the perception of time [n.107], the Philosopher concedes it there saying that by the first sense part by which we perceive magnitude we also perceive time. Nor is it an objection that time is successive, because motion is successive and yet motion is of itself sensible (from *On the Soul* 2.6.17-21); nor is it an objection that time is number, because number is of itself sensible (*ibid.*). Also, the Commentator maintains, *Physics* 4 com.98 'On Time', that if the motion alone of phantasms is perceived, time is perceived. But the exposition of this could be that such motion is perceived by the intellect, not by the power of imagination.

113. To the next [n.108] it will be possible to say that some sense can receive the species of the act of sensing and retain that species after the act passes away and, consequently, it can by that species have an act after passage of time and so remember.

114. And when you make objection about the act of the supreme sense power [nn.108, 99], one can concede that memory of its proper act does not belong to a sense, just as neither does it belong to any other sense to remember its proper act (as is taken from Augustine *Free Will* 2.3 n.9-10), but this belongs only to a superior sense with respect to the act of a lower sensitive part.

115. It can be said in another way, as the Philosopher seems to think (*On the Soul* 3.2.425b17-25), that sight in some way senses that it sees, because sight is in some way colored; and so it could be conceded that the sensing of the supreme sense part is in some way continued under the object of the supreme remembering part. And if you evidence the reflecting of that sense part on itself, this proves no more than Aristotle proves about sight perceiving vision.

116. To the final one [n.109], although the acts of brutes could probably be saved by positing, not memory properly in them, but only imaginative knowledge of the object that is past (though not as past), yet the things we see in their acts are more easily saved by positing memory in them.

C. Second Article: about Memory of the Past in the Intellective Part

1. About the Authorities of the Ancients

117. About the second principal article, Aristotle seems to say certain things in the book [*On Memory* 1.449b18-21] from which it follows that memory is in the intellective part. For he says that we remember certain intelligibilities, as that a triangle has three angles equal to two right angles etc. “because we have learnt and considered them.”

118. A response is given [Henry of Ghent, *Quodlibet* 6 q.8] according to Aristotle’s own remark, for later in the same place [*ibid.* 1.449a12-13] he says “memory of intelligibilities is not without a phantasm.”

119. On the contrary: not for this reason must memory be denied to be in the intellect, just as understanding is not denied to be in the intellect and yet, according to his opinion there, we do not understand without a phantasm.

120. Another response [Henry, *ibid.* q.8] is that we remember intelligibilities per accidens; hence Aristotle says there [*On Memory* 1.450a12-13], when speaking of intelligibilities, that intellection will be per accidens. And Damascene (as cited before, n.76), “we remember intelligibilities just as we learn them, but we do not have memory of the substance of them.”

121. On the contrary: any power that knows an act as the act is of an object, in some way knows the object; but this object ‘a triangle has three angles equal to two right angles’ as it is a demonstrated and known truth can only be known by the intellect, such that no sense is similarly able to know this act ‘I have considered the fact that a triangle has etc.’

122. Again the Philosopher concedes there [*On Memory* 1.450a16-18, 2.453a8-10] that recollection is present only in man (and Avicenna maintains this above [nn.8, 10; *On the Soul* p.4 ch.3;]), because there is a sort of syllogizing in it. From this there is a twofold argument. First, that the knowledge proper to man himself seems to belong to the intellect itself; second, more efficaciously, that knowledge through syllogistic discourse pertains to the intellect alone; of this sort is recollection, for recollection proceeds

discursively from certain known things to what has in some way fallen away, which it wants to recover the memory of. And although, because syllogism is always from premises to conclusion, there is no syllogism there (for recollection proceeds from contraries or similars, or from something that has, in its being sensed, an ordering toward what we are looking for), nevertheless neither can such conferring belong to the sense power, as it seems; rather the discursive process and the cognition that terminates it belong to the same power, and recollection terminates this discursive process; therefore etc.

123. An objection against this reasoning [Henry of Ghent, *Summa* a.4 q.4] is as follows:

The Philosopher [*On Memory* 1.449b6-8, 450b5-12; *Book of Six Principles* 4 nn.46-47] says that some are good at recollection and others bad, because of diversity in the organ; therefore he attributes recollection to the sense part.

124. Again [Henry, *ibid.* a.1 q.10] an argument that recollection is impossible is taken from Themistius [*On Posterior Analytics* 1 ch.1] about a fugitive slave, whereby it is proved that it is impossible to learn anything, because either it was something already known and so it is not learnt, or it was not and so, if it occurs to the intellect, the intellect does not know it to be what it is looking for.

125. This argument there indeed [n.124] lacks evidence, because whatever is necessarily inferred from necessary premises is known by this very fact; nor is it necessary for me to know [sc. first] what I [sc. later] acquired knowledge of, or not necessary for me to know it save in general, because I sought to know whatever I could infer from things I knew.

126. But in the issue at hand there is a difficulty. For the argument goes as follows: has he [the one recollecting] completely forgotten the thing that *a* is [sc. the thing he is looking for] or not? If he has then, if he could through recollection get back to the memory of it, he does not know it to be what he sought the memory of, and consequently he does not recollect it; because in recollecting he remembers it anew, as a thing having been remembered before and forgotten in the meantime. If he has not completely forgotten *a*, then he cannot recollect *a*.

127. The first member of this argument is confirmed by Avicenna from before [n.122]: the desire to remember in particular belongs to no brute, “for if brutes do not remember, neither do they desire to remember.” Likewise the Philosopher [*On Memory* 1.450a27-30] seems to posit that memory belongs to the imaginative part, “the habit of which,” he says, “we assert to be memory.”^a And Damascene, as above [n.76] says, “Memory is imagination left behind by actualized sense.”

a. [*Interpolation*] namely, it is manifest that memory is a part of the soul: when and of what there is imagination, of that there is also memory.

128. For the understanding of these authorities [n.127] I say (as was said before [n.94]) that the act of memory has a double object, namely proximate and remote. Now past-ness is sometimes required in each object as it is object, and sometimes in one of them only.

129. Because the senses do not know their object according to any condition save the one they have when they are sensing, according to *Metaphysics* 7.10.1036a6-7, “when sensible objects are away from the senses, it is not clear whether these objects are or are

not,” and so they cannot have memory of their past act as past without also having memory of the sensed object as past, because they have memory of it only in the way it was as sensed when the act of sensing remained.

130. Now the intellect does not require past-ness in each object but only in the proximate one. For because its act can be of something as that something is necessary, as considering ‘a triangle has three angles equal to two right angles’, so its act of remembering this act of considering can have a remote object, not as past, but as always being the same way.

131. As concerns the condition, then, of ‘regarding a past object as past’ [n.88], that is, both remote and proximate object, such that both are known precisely and necessarily as past – memory as concerns this condition belongs necessarily to the sense part and not necessarily to the intellective part, although it could belong to the intellective part, as will immediately be said in the solution [n.136ff.].

132. Another thing [sc. to understand, [n.128]] is that memory in the sense part is enough for operation without the intellect, as is plain in brutes; but, conversely, the intellective memory is not enough for operation without the sense memory, just as we cannot understand without a phantasm. And therefore Aristotle [*Metaphysics* 7.10.1036a6-7] would not say that a man is good or bad at remembering because his intellect is good or bad at conserving the species of something previously understood, but because his sense memory (which goes along also with the intellective memory for intellective remembering) is good or bad at retention. For perhaps any intellective memory always conserves the species, but it has not the power for act because the species has been destroyed from sense memory, without which the intellective memory is not enough for operation.

133. Proof of this:

First because what is received seems to be in the receiver according to the manner of the receiver, and consequently, since the intellect is an immaterial power and not changeable by these bodily undergoings [sc. of the senses], it does not seem that its species remains indelibly. For this reason, therefore, Aristotle [n.129] assigns a falling away of species in the sense memory only, because the sense organ is affected or moved in this way or that.

134. The same is proved secondly because, when someone remembers, he must have something remaining in himself through which he knows that thing to be what he first remembered and later forgot (in the way the argument about the fugitive slave proceeded [n.124]). But this something that remains cannot be placed in the sense part, because it has been destroyed, at least it does not remain perfectly or sufficiently for an act of remembering; therefore it is probable that it is the species remaining perfectly in the intellect. And thus when the species that somehow fell away has been recovered in the sense memory then, by collation of it with the intelligible species that remains, this ‘remembered object’ is known to be that which was known in memory before.

135. So therefore, as concerns primacy or radicality or sufficiency in itself for acting, memory is not in the intellective part but the sense part, even in our case.

2. Scotus’ own Explication

136. I say therefore as to this article [nn.117, 82] that memory and the act of remembering properly speaking are in the intellective part.

137. For given that the intellect not only knows universals (which indeed is true of abstractive intellection, about which the Philosopher is speaking, because this alone is scientific intellection), but also knows intuitively what the senses know (for a more perfect and higher cognitive power in the same thing knows what the lower power knows), and also knows sensations (and both these points are proved by the fact that the intellect knows contingently true propositions, and from them it forms syllogisms; but to form propositions and to syllogize is proper to the intellect; and the truth of these propositions is about objects as intuitively known, namely known under the idea of existence under which they are known by the senses) – given all this, it follows that in the intellect can be found all the conditions previously said to belong to remembering: for it can perceive time and has an act after passage of time, and so of the rest [nn.90-96].

138. And the intellect can, in brief, remember any object that sense memory can remember, because it can intuitively know the act (which is the proximate object) when it exists, and so can remember it after it has existed. It can also remember many proximate objects that the sense part cannot remember (as every past intellection and volition). For the proof that man remembers such things is that otherwise he could not repent of evil volitions, nor too could he collate a past intellection as past with a future one, nor consequently direct himself, from the fact that he has studied them, to study other things that follow from them; and in brief, if we do not remember past intellections and volitions, they are destroyed.

139. But no sense can remember these things, because they do not fall under the object of any sense; therefore this remembering is proper to the intellect, and this by reason of its proximate object. There is also another remembering proper to the intellect, not by reason only of proximate object but also of remote object, namely the remembering that tends to the necessary as necessary as to its remote object, of which sort is the remembering that has for remote object ‘a triangle has three angles equal to two right angles’; for the proximate object of remembrance, namely the act that tends to such [remote] object, can only be an act of the intellective part.

140. Thus therefore it is plain that some remembering is proper to the intellect by reason of both objects of its act, namely both the proximate and the remote object; also some remembering is, by reason of proximate object, so proper to the intellect that it could not belong to the senses, and some remembering belongs, by reason of proximate object, to the intellect, yet it can belong to the senses (as would be if the intellect has intuitively understood that I am seeing white, and the intellect afterwards understands or remembers that I saw white). Here indeed both the proximate and the remote object could be the object of intellective remembering (for also sometimes there occurs a discursive collating from such remembering to syllogistic conclusion of something else); however, the past sensation in some sense part, namely the supreme part, cannot be the proximate object save only of intellective remembering, as was touched on in the preceding article [n.98].

141. However, no remembering belongs to the intellect insofar as it understands precisely by abstraction; also no remembering requires, from the fact that it belongs to the intellect, a double past, namely a past in both objects; also no remembering belongs to the intellect as primarily and radically sufficient for an act of remembering.

142. And it is on account of these three conditions, or some of them, that all the authorities of Aristotle and others denying that memory is in the intellective part [nn.118, 123-124] must be understood and expounded.

143. When therefore objection is made against the second argument in this article (which proceeds from the act of remembering, [n.122]), by the fact that the Philosopher posits that there are rememberers and non-rememberers because of disposition of organ [n.123] – the answer is plain from what has been said [nn.125, 128-131], and especially from the third condition [n.116], and it was sufficiently explained above [nn.139-141].

144. As to the objection about the fugitive slave [n.124], it has been solved if it is true that the intelligible species always remains, and the sense species that has in some way been lost is perfectly recovered through a certain collating or use of other like species; for then the fact that this thing now remembered is that thing before remembered (and afterwards forgotten) is known through the species resting in the intellect. It is just as if some species of Peter as seen is resting in the imaginative power, though I never use it, and afterwards when Peter comes into sight I at once recognize it to be Peter by collation with this knowledge (as Augustine teaches *On the Trinity* 9.6 n.10, 8.6 n.9). But if nothing were set down as remaining in such forgetting, by collation with which it could be known that this is what through recollecting was being sought after, it does not seem that it could in the end be known that it is this, more than in the case of the unknown fugitive slave.

145. To the next objection that is set down [n.127], a habit of imagination at any rate is only got from it as to sense memory. For the fact that, besides sense memory, there is some firmness of intellect is plain later from *On Memory* 2.451b2-3, where Aristotle says, “science or sense, the habit of which we say is memory,” ‘science’ stands for the intellect, ‘sense’ for imagination, of which he said before that memory was the habit. However, this authority would require expounding if sense memory were posited to be a power distinct from imagination; but it is not to the purpose to discuss this here.

146. And as to what is adduced from Damascene [n.120] “we do not have memory of the substance of them” – it is true as of past objects, and in this way there is no remembering of them that requires a double pastness.²¹

D. Scotus’ own Conclusion

147. As to the question, then, it is plain that, since in the soul conjoined with the body there is an intellective memory, that memory remains in the separated soul, and consequently so does habitual knowledge of everything that remained in the soul up to separation. Consequently too, the separated soul can use what remains for acts of remembering, just as the conjoined soul could, because (as was said in the preceding question [n.16]) all the intelligible forms and consequent operations that could have been had by the conjoined soul will be able to be had by the separated soul. But the sense memory (speaking of the whole power of it) does not remain in the separated soul, just as no sense power remains either. I said ‘whole power’, however, because although the soul is that which is formal in the sense power, yet the sense power formally includes a certain form of the whole that is composed of this sort of mixed body and a soul that perfects it

²¹ That is, pastness of proximate and remote object. For we have memory of *learning* them (proximate object), but we have knowledge, not memory, of *them* (remote object), n.130.

proportionally for acts corresponding to such a whole; and consequently, since remembering belongs to the whole sense part, it cannot belong to the separate soul.

148. Briefly, then, the separate soul can remember all the things that the conjoined soul remembers, because there exists intellective memory of whatever there was sense memory of, on account of the intuitive knowledge that accompanies all sense perceived knowledge; but the separate soul cannot remember with every remembering that the conjoined soul could remember with.

149. If it is objected that the mere species in the intellective memory was not sufficient for remembering in the conjoined soul without another species in the sense memory (as was said in the second article [n.132]), so it is not sufficient now, because it is not more perfect now than before – the response is in the preceding question, in the like case [n.27], because neither can we now use the intelligible species without a phantasm, but then we will be able to, not because of a new perfection but because the order of powers in operating will not exist that exists now.

II. To the Initial Arguments

A. To the First

150. As to the first main argument [n.76], I concede that there is sense memory in man, but from this does not follow that there is no intellective memory in him; for what belongs to the perfection of a lower cognitive power should not be denied to a higher cognitive power. Hence if God could have an act after passage of time (and would not have an act stationary in eternity), he could remember; and thus does Scripture concede that he remembers, “Remember, Lord, what has happened to us” (*Lamentations* 5.1), namely insofar as the act that is not in him after passage of time is considered as coexistent with a prior time, and as coexistent now with this ‘now’ as if after passage of time. But the angels, because they do not have all their intellections permanently, can absolutely remember; for it is fatuous to say that Lucifer does not remember that he sinned, or that the good angels do not remember that they had such and such intelligible acts, or had also some exterior acts about a body.

B. To the Second

151. As to the second [n.77], that authority is speaking of the intellect as it has scientific intellection, of the sort that is abstractive only – and yet the precise cause does not thus come from the nature of the intellect, because the singular can also be understood by that abstractive knowledge, although not by us now (on which elsewhere, *Ord.* II d.9 n.122, d.3 nn.320-321).

152. If you object that a power that does not know the singular as singular does not remember, because a rememberer cognizes something as it is here and now, which is proper to a singular – I reply: actual existence belongs to nature first; hence ‘this nature’ is not formally existent because it is ‘this’, but because of nature; now nature, as existent, is what the intellect intuitively knows, and the knowledge of an existent as existent is sufficient for remembrance of it to be possible. When, therefore, you say that the remembering power knows this as this, I deny it. When you give as proof that it knows something as it is here and now, if by ‘now’ you mean ‘existent’ and by ‘here’ you mean

‘present in itself’, I concede that it knows something as existent in its presence in itself. If so, then there are proper singulars beyond the ‘here’ and ‘now’, so that they can be singulars of nature but not as of a singular – though they are not of anything save what is singular by intrinsic or adjunct singularity; however, they do not include, nor do they per se presuppose, singularity as the precise reason whereby they are present.

C. To the Third

153. To the third [n.78] it is said in one way [Richard of Middleton] that the blessed remember the sins they committed, and yet it is not a punishment for them but they rejoice in the mercy of God remitting sin and in their freedom from punishment. And this is proved by *Psalm* 88.2, “The mercies of God,” where Gregory says [*Moralia* 4.36 n.72], “How does he sing mercies forever who does not remember his misery?”

154. On the contrary: although the fact that God remitted Peter his sin includes the fact that Peter sinned, yet these are simply distinct intelligibilities, and the second does not include the first in being (the fact is plain about when Peter did the sin), nor consequently does it include it in being understood; therefore it is possible for Peter’s intellect to stop thus at his having sinned without considering that God has forgiven these sins. And though you may contend one act was never without the other in Peter, yet there are at least two objects and two distinct intellections, and also the intellection that Peter sinned is prior in nature.

155. I ask a question therefore about this remembering by which he remembers that he sinned: which act of will does it follow? Either the willing it or being pleased, or the not willing it and being displeased – or neither, not pleased nor displeased? If the first Peter is evil, because he is pleased with the sin he has committed; if the second, he is wretched, because his not wanting to have happened what he knows did happen causes sadness (from Augustine, *On the Trinity* 14.15 n.21, “Sadness comes from things that have happened against our will” [cf. *Ord.* IV d.14 n.48]). If neither the one nor the other, he is again bad; for if the wayfarer cannot remember with full remembrance the sin he committed without detesting it or being displeased at it (otherwise he sins at least by omission), how much more are the blessed held to do this! For the common reason binds the blessed more than the wayfarer, which reason is perfect love of God, and this love always impels one to hate what is contrary to God when it is actually thought on.

156. But as to what is added from the *Psalm*, and Gregory’s argument from this “How does he sing mercies forever who does not remember his misery?” [nn.153, 78, 81] – I reply: he remembers his misery in general terms, because he now knows he is blessed.

157. I say it is possible for God to destroy every sin totally from the memory of the blessed; nor in this is anything taken from the blessed; rather it would seem to belong to some accidental blessedness in them. For if the innocent will rejoice over their innocence with a special joy (as was touched on in *Ord.* IV d.1 n.356), though these others not be able to rejoice over innocence (because this would be a false joy), yet their guilt can be destroyed from their memory so that they not have any matter for sadness about it.

158. Also, God is able, while habitual memory of committed sin remains, to preserve the blessed from ever proceeding to actually considering they committed it; and this again would suffice to exclude the proximate occasion for sadness, though not the

remote one. Nor would privation of such habitual knowledge make one imperfect in anything because, according to the Philosopher [*Topics* 3.6.119b11-15], it is better to forget certain things, as base things, than to remember them, and this is especially true when speaking of something base one did, the memory of which is penal. Scripture too [*Isaiah* 43.25, *Jeremiah* 31.34, *Hebrews* 10.17, *Psalms* 31.1] says that God forgets sins and that they are covered up for God. And although one should give exposition of this, because of the infinity of the divine intellection which nothing positively or privatively knowable can escape, yet that they are really hidden or forgotten for those who committed them would not be at all unacceptable.

159. If this view does not satisfy, but it is held that there will always remain habitual memory of sins in them and that they will sometimes proceed to actual remembering, then, to avoid sadness, one must say that either God suspends the causality that memory would be of a nature to exercise with respect to sadness (and this is indeed possible, just as God suspended the natural action of fire with respect to the young men in the furnace [*Daniel* 3.49-50]), and then it is a miracle that they are not saddened as often as they remember. Or if a miracle is eschewed, one must say that a natural cause can be impeded by a contrary that excels it so that it not cause its effect, and especially when the contrary totally fills the capacity of the passive thing.

160. Thus, in the issue at hand, joy in the beatific object totally fills the capacity of the blessed, and therefore they are not capable of the sadness that is of a nature to follow this memory. For the beatific object in causing joy overcomes the power of the memory in causing sadness, according to the Philosopher *Ethics* 7.15.1154b13-14, “Strong delight expels every sadness, not only the contrary sadness but also any chance sadness.”

161. On the contrary: the blessed have a ‘not wanting’ with respect to the remembered thing, therefore they do not have what they want; therefore they are not blessed, from *On the Trinity* 13.5 n.8.

162. I reply: the blessed have whatever they want as regard the present or the future; but as regard the past they do not have whatever they want, that is their wanting it not to have been; and this does not argue misery, because it is impossible for the past not to have been.

Question Four

Whether the Blessed Know the Prayers we Offer to Them

163. Lastly I ask whether the blessed know the prayers that we offer to them.

164. That they do not:

Isaiah 63.16, “Abraham did not know us and Israel has ignored us.”^a And Jerome *On Isaiah* there (look in the original).²²

a. [*Interpolation*] There “Augustine says that the dead do not know, indeed the saints do not know, what the living do, even their sons” [*Gloss*, from Nicholas of Lyra].

²² “You, Lord, who have bestowed so much on your people...that you considered us worthy to be fellows also of your Spirit, now too hear from heaven and see our works, if yet they are worthy of you. Why do you turn your face from us?”

165. Again, God alone knows secrets; mental prayer, which is most acceptable to God, is of this sort; therefore etc.

166. Again, they do not need to know save for the purpose that they may pray for us; but the consequent is unacceptable, because they are not in state of merit; therefore they cannot pray, because in prayer, per se, consists merit.

167. On the contrary:

This is an error that Jerome touches on in his *Epistle to Vigilantius* chs.4-11.

I. To the Question

168. Here three things must be looked at:

First, whether the blessed know our prayers by natural cognition; second, whether by supernatural cognition; third, whether, as knowing them, they pray for us.

A. Whether the Blessed Know our Prayers by Natural Cognition

169. The first was touched on in the solution of the second question of this distinction [nn.62-67], about how the separate soul can acquire knowledge not only abstractive but also intuitive, not only of sensibles (as the conjoined soul can [n.50]) but also of any intelligibles that are proportioned and proportionately present. What is proportioned to the separate soul is any created intelligible; therefore prayer, whether vocal (which the conjoined soul too could know through the bodily senses) or also mental (which will then be proportioned to the separate soul), it will be able to know intuitively for that 'then', provided however that extreme distance not get in the way, which was touched on in the second question [n.67].

170. Nor is it valid to say that the intellect's own proper act is hidden from every creature, and its act of will hidden for equal reason, because these acts are intimate to the creature and consequently nothing can know them save what is intimate to the creature; such is God alone, who is immanent [in creatures]. This argument is not sound, because it is manifest that my intellect can know every act of my will; but another intellect, created more perfect, has power for the object that my intellect has power for, if a determinate order to other intelligibles, or defect of proportioned presence, does not get in the way.

171. Now the separate intellect is as equally perfect as the conjoined intellect, or more perfect, and it is not by any order determined to not knowing the operations of another intellect or will; nor is the requisite presence necessarily lacking, because this can exist without immanence; otherwise an angel could have no presence made demonstrable in respect of another than himself, since an angel is immanent to none, for this is repugnant to a creature.

172. As to your saying 'such operation is intimate' [n.170] – I reply: essence is more intimate to the intellect than operation, and yet another separate intellect can understand this essence. Nor is it valid to say 'this is intimate by inherence or, what is more, by being, therefore nothing knows it save what is intimate by immanence'. Indeed, the reasoning seems to proceed as if what is extrinsic to a thing more than what is intrinsic and spiritual could be known by a separate intellect, which is not true; indeed the intelligible essence of a thing or its intrinsic operation is an object more proportioned to

the separate intellect than any sense object, because to a pure intellect a pure intelligible is a more proportioned intelligible, provided however it is finite.

173. If you object that the conjoined and separate intellect have the same first object, but operation is not contained under the first object of the conjoined intellect, therefore not under the object of the separate intellect either – I reply: it was said elsewhere that the first object of the intellect as it is such a power is more general than the object that moves it in this present state; and²³ any created being is contained under the first object taken in the first way but not under the object taken in the second way. And the reason is that now it is determinately moved by sensibles, or by what is abstracted from them, because of its immediate order to the imaginative power, which will not exist then. Taking first object in the first way, then, the major [sc. ‘conjoined and separate intellect have the same first object’] is true and the minor [sc. ‘operation is not contained under the first object of the conjoined intellect’] is false; taking it in the second way, the minor is true and the major false.

B. Whether the Blessed Know our Prayers by Supernatural Cognition

174. About the second article [n.168] I say that it is not necessary by reason of beatitude that the blessed regularly or universally see our prayers: not in the Word (because seeing our prayers is not something that is as it were a necessary accompaniment of beatitude), nor that the prayers be revealed to the blessed (because neither does such revelation necessarily follow beatitude). For beatitude of intellect in created objects does not go beyond quiddities, or things whose seen essence is the necessary reason for seeing them.

175. However, because it is fitting for the blessed to be fellow helpers of God in procuring the salvation of the elect, or leading them to salvation, and to do so in the way that this can belong to them – and for this is required that our prayers be revealed to them, especially those that are offered to them, because these prayers specifically rely on the merits of the blessed as on one who is a mediator leading us to the salvation that is being requested; therefore it is probable that God reveal to the blessed the prayers offered to them or to God in their name.

C. Whether, Knowing our Prayers, the Blessed Pray for us

176. About the third article [n.168] I say it seems doubtful, because if it is revealed to them that such and such a person is seeking salvation through them, or anything pertaining to salvation, then either they see that God wills such a person to be saved or wills against it or non-wills;²⁴ if God wills it, then they know such a one will be saved, so they pray in vain; if God wills against it, they won’t pray for anything willed

²³ Punctuating the Latin as in the translation and not as in the printed text, whose sense is obscure.

²⁴ Latin has two ways of negating ‘to will’ or *velle*, namely *non velle* and *nolle*. Scotus uses the first to mean simple negation, or not having an act of will, and the second for positive negation, or having an act of will against something. The English ‘I do not want/will’ is ambiguous as between these two. To bring out the difference where it is relevant for Scotus’ meaning (for *nolle* can sometimes connote simple negation), the translation uses, perhaps a little awkwardly, ‘will against’ for *nolle* and ‘not want/will’ for *non velle*.

against by God; if God non-wills, they know it would not happen, so they would pray in vain.

I reply: the statement ‘the blessed pray for someone’ can be understood either of habitual prayer or of actual prayer (and we are speaking here only of mental prayer, which is desire offered to God with the intention that it be held as accepted by him). If of habitual prayer, this is perpetual and general for all the elect (but about this there is no difficulty); if of actual prayer, some saint has this prayer specifically when it is revealed to him that someone is invoking him, because it is reasonable that he should want his merits to avail the latter for salvation when he specifically invokes God to help this latter through his merits.

177. Now this prayer is not repugnant to beatitude, because someone who has attained supreme perfection can very well wish that, through his own merits whereby he has attained that perfection, another should attain it by his prayer, so that his merits should be proper not only to himself alone but should, by the benevolence of God’s acceptance, avail for another. Just like someone who has attained by his services the supreme degree in friendship of a king could want to pray for others, not so that through that prayer he may attain a greater degree of friendship [sc. for himself], but so that the merits by which he attains such degree may be of aid to others, who have recourse to those merits – and this, on the supposition of his liberality, namely the king’s, in accepting them, not only for him but (by the king’s liberality) for others, whereby for a lesser good he returns not only a greater good but also more goods, provided however that, by a new act of will, many apply this good to themselves and, as it were, make it their own.

178. When therefore you argue “the blessed see that God either wills or non-wills or wills against” [n.176], I reply: it is not necessary to grant any of these options – not, surely, as to the final salvation of him who prays, but not even as to the hearing of the prayer that he now prays. For this does not follow: God reveals to Peter that John is now asking for *a* through the merits of Peter, therefore it is revealed to Peter that John is to be saved or not to be saved; nor does this follow: therefore it is revealed that John is to be heard or not to be heard in this petition. However let it be that it were revealed to him that this person is to be heard or not heard in this petition; it does not follow that therefore he prays in vain, because just as God wants to save him, or hear him, so he wants to achieve this through determinate means (namely through the prayer of such a blessed). But if it be revealed to Peter determinately that God wills against hearing this prayer, Peter would not be a mediator for John in praying; but if it not be revealed to Peter that God wills nor revealed that he wills against, Peter prays expecting that a determinate revelation of his being heard would follow his prayer, or at least a determinate effect of his being heard as to his own asking.

II. To the Initial Arguments

179. To the first principal argument [n.164] I say that Abraham, at the time for which *Isaiah* 63.16 is meant, was in limbo, and consequently not blessed, and therefore he did not know his Jewish sons living in the land of Israel; for he did not know by intuitive knowledge (which was impeded by the extreme distance, as was said in that second question, nn.169, 67), nor by knowledge of special revelation, because he did not

have that vision in the Word which such revelation regularly accompanies. The argument, therefore, does not hold of the blessed, to whom are regularly revealed in the Word the things that concern them, whether as increasing their beatitude or as pertaining to their causality with respect to the beatitude of others.

180. To the second [n.165] I say that there is not anything in the mind, namely any operation of intellect or will and any property or real condition of either of them, without the whole of it lying open to an unimpeded angel proportionally present, or to an unimpeded soul proportionally present – just as a present whiteness is apparent to a conjoined soul through the senses.

The statement, then, that “God alone knows the hidden things of the heart” [n.165, *Psalms* 43.22] is true universally and by his proper perfection, such that it is impossible that they be hid from him by any impediment. He also knows them as universal Judge of all such hidden things, in this way knowing them as neither the good angels nor the bad angels nor separate souls know them. Indeed, as a matter of fact, the blessed do not know many such movements because of lack of due presence, and the bad angels do not know many such things, even those that are proportionally present, as God prevents them and, because of his prevention, they cannot do many things that yet could not be naturally prevented.

181. To the third [n.166] I say that our prayer now has a double effect: one because it is meritorious for him who prays, indeed is a natural meritorious work; the other because, from the fact it is directed specifically on behalf of another, it is meritorious for him for whom it is offered. And the blessed do not have prayer in the first way but in the second. Nor is it unacceptable for someone, who is now, as to himself, at his final goal, to merit for another by his prayer; just as we see in politics, where a king gives what he wants but he wants to give it through the intercession of another to someone who would not be worthy to be heard immediately; and he most wants to give it if someone intercedes who has most acceptance with him, which accepted person yet merits no greater degree of friendship with him.

182. It could be said in another way (and it returns as it were to the same) that just as someone blessed obtains things for others and not for himself, so he causes merit for others and not for himself; for his prayer is a disposition by way of congruity, so that through it God grants to him for whom he asks what he obtains; and so his merit is not for himself but for him to whom is rendered what, as if in place of an immediate reward, corresponds to this merit.

Forty Sixth Distinction

Overview of Questions

1. “But there is a question here about the very bad...” [Lombard, *Sent.* IV d.46 ch.1 n.1].

2. Since in this forty sixth distinction God’s justice and mercy are treated of as they come together in the punishment of the bad, four questions are therefore asked: first, whether there is justice in God; second, whether there is mercy in God; third, whether in

God justice is distinguished from mercy; fourth, whether in the punishment of the bad justice goes along with mercy on the part of God as punisher.

Question One

Whether in God there is Justice

3. As to the first question, argument is given that there is not [justice in God]:
Because in *Ethics* 5.10.1134b9-11 it is said that there is no justice from a lord to a servant because there is no equality between them; therefore much more is there none between God and creatures or conversely, because this Lord most of all could say to his servant what is said in *I Corinthians* 4.7, "What do you have that you did not receive" from me?
4. Again, *Ethics* 10.8.1178b8-27 says that it is unfitting to praise separate substances for works of virtue, as Aristotle argues there specifically about justice [cf. *Ethics* 5.3.1129b25-30a9]; and it is confirmed by a likeness, that there is not temperance in God, therefore similarly not justice either.
5. Again, justice inclines one to render what is owed, but God is debtor to no one.
6. On the contrary:
Psalms 47.11, "His right hand is full of justice."

I. To the Question

A. First Opinion about the Definition of Justice and its Distinctions

7. Here first about the definition of justice:
8. Its most general idea is posited by Anselm *On Truth* 12, that "justice is rectitude of will, kept for its own sake."
9. This idea is made specific by justice as Aristotle treats of it in *Ethics* 5.3.1129b30-30a9, who adds (in addition to the above idea) that it is 'toward another'.
10. And taken in both ways, it is clear that justice belongs to God.
For, in the first way, he has rectitude of will, indeed un-pervertible will, because the first rule is 'kept for its own sake' [n.8]. Now insofar as it is 'kept', it states a receiving or undergoing with respect to someone who does the keeping, but it is 'kept for its own sake', that is always spontaneously held for its own sake.
11. In the second way too the point is plain, because God can have rectitude toward another, and therefore in every act of his toward another there is rectitude.
12. This second rectitude is subdivided, because either it is as it were universal to another, namely as to legislator and law insofar as law is determined by the legislator (and this is called legal justice by some); or it is particular, namely in something determinate belonging to the law, that is, rectitude toward another.
13. And this second one is subdivided, because it can either be 'simply toward another' or 'toward one's self as other'. And this second member is plain from what is said in the material about penance [*Ord.* IV d.14 n.154, d.16 nn.18-24], that it is punitive justice not only with respect to another simply, but with respect to oneself as other, because punishment of oneself as guilty is conceded to oneself as minister of the judge.
14. The first of these, namely legal justice, could be posited in God if there were another law prior to the determination of his will, with which law (that is, with which

legislator as other) his will would rightly agree. And it is indeed this law: ‘God is to be loved’ – if however it is rightly called law, and not a practical principle of law. At least it is a practical truth, preceding every determination of the divine will.

15. Now particular justice, justice ‘to oneself as other’, exists in God, because his will is determined by rectitude toward willing what befits his goodness. And this is as it were the rendering of what is due to himself and to his goodness as other – if however it could be called particular, because it is in some way universal, namely virtually.

16. And these two members, namely legal justice and particular justice toward oneself as other [nn.14-15], are as it were identical in God, because they are rectitude of the divine will with respect to his goodness.

17. If we speak then of the remaining part of justice, which is justice simply to another, it is divided into commutative and distributive – and thus is justice in us distinguished, as is plain from *Ethics* 5.5.1130b10-31a9. In distributive justice equality of proportion is required, not equality of quantity; in commutative justice, according to some, equality of quantity is required not equality of proportion (these are expounded in Aristotle *ibid.*).

18. To the issue at hand:

Commutative justice properly concerns punishment and reward, namely so that rewards may be rendered for merits (as by mutual exchange) and punishment for sins.

19. Distributive justice has regard to superadded natures and perfections, as it were, namely so that the perfection proportioned to nature be distributed to them. Just as in the case of our distributive justice, persons according to their ranks in a republic have proportionally distributed to them the goods pertaining to those ranks, so in the hierarchy of the universe a nobler nature has distributed to it by the hierarchy, that is, by God as prince, nobler perfections or perfections agreeing with that sort of nature, and an inferior nature has distributed to it the perfections agreeing with it.

20. The first of these justices [sc. commutative justice] cannot simply be in God with respect to creatures, because equality simply cannot be in him; but it can in some way be in him according to proportion, as between master and slave. For it befits a generous master to give a greater good than the slave could merit, provided however there is the following sort of proportion: that as the slave does what is his, so the master gives what is his, and does the same by punishing less than deserved.

21. But the second justice [distributive justice, n.19] can exist simply in God, because he can simply give to natures the perfections due to or agreeing with them according to the degrees that perfect them.

22. Thus, therefore, the whole distinction of justice in its genus [nn.10-17], in the way it can belong to God, can be reduced to the two members, so that justice in the first way is called ‘rectitude of will in its order to what befits the divine will’; in the other way ‘rectitude of will in its order to the exigencies of what there is in the creature’. This distinction can be got from Anselm *Proslogion* 10 where, speaking to God, he says, “When you punish the bad, it is just, because it befits their merits.” As to the second member he adds at once, “when you spare the bad it is just, not because it is appropriate to their merits but to your goodness.”

23. And a distinction so great is put between these members because God cannot operate against the first justice nor operate tangentially to it, but he can act tangentially to the second, though not universally, because he cannot damn the just or the blessed.

24. If it is objected that this and that justice cannot be different in God, because then one justice would be rule (as the first justice) and the other would be ruled (as the second); but in the divine will there cannot be any ruled rectitude. – And there is proof of this in us: the same thing inclines to the end and to what is for the end as it is for the end; therefore if what inclines to the end were simply perfect, it would simply perfectly incline to what is for the end, as is plain of the charity of the blessed; but the first divine justice is simply perfect; therefore no other justice beside it is required in the divine will.

25. As to the remark that sometimes God is not able to act tangentially to the second justice [n.19], it does not seem probable, because he can simply do, and thus will, whatever does not involve a contradiction; but he cannot will anything that he could not will rightly, because his will is the first rule; therefore God can rightly will whatever does not include a contradiction. And so, since this justice determines to something whose opposite does not include a contradiction, God can will and rightly well and act tangentially to this second justice.

26. As to the first of these points [n.24], the objectors would perhaps concede that there is not a double justice in God but only a single one, having however as it were different effects, as ‘willing in accord with what fits his own goodness’ and ‘willing in accord with the exigency of the creator.’

27. But the second argument [n.25] seems clearly to prove that whatever the first justice inclines the divine will toward, the second justice will be able to incline it toward, since it inclines determinately and by way of nature. But it does not so incline without the divine will being able to will against it and tangentially to it; and so there will not be a distinction between these willings as to ‘being able to act tangentially to it’ and ‘not being able to act tangentially to it’.

B. Scotus’ own Response

28. Without rejecting the distinctions, I say in brief to the question that in God there is only one justice in being and in idea. However, beside this justice, there can, by extension of the term, be a justice, or rather something just, in the case of creatures.

1. About the Justice that is in God

29. The first is made clear in that, since justice properly is habituated rectitude of will, and since it inclines as it were naturally toward another or to oneself as other, and since the divine will does not have a rectitude inclining it determinately to anything save to its own goodness as other (for as to any different object whatever, it is merely contingently disposed, such that it has power equally for this and for its opposite) – since this is so, the consequence is that the divine will has no justice save to render to its goodness what befits its goodness.

30. Thus too it has one act in being and in idea, to which this justice, which is in reference to its will, determinately inclines; but this act has regard by consequence to many secondary objects (and this in the way stated in *Ord.1 d.35 nn.28-33*), because the divine intellect, besides having one first object and one first act, has regard to many secondary objects. But the difference between there and here is in this, that there the intellect has regard to secondary objects necessarily, while here the will has regard to

secondary objects contingently alone. And therefore, not only does the act here of will, as there of intellect, not depend on those secondary objects, but neither is it necessarily determined to them, as neither is the act of intellect necessarily determined to them.

31. Now if we want to distinguish the act one in being into many acts in idea, (just as there an intellection one in being is distinguished into many intellections in idea as it passes over many secondary objects) – I say that in respect of these acts there are no justices distinct as it were in idea; but neither is there one justice however distinct or indistinct, because a habit inclines to one thing by way of nature (and thus determinately), so that, by this fact, tending to the opposite is repugnant to a power habituated by the habit.

32. But to no secondary object is the divine will thus determined by anything in itself, so that it be repugnant to it to be justly inclined to the opposite of the secondary object; because as it can without contradiction will the opposite of the secondary object, so can it justly will the secondary object, otherwise it could will absolutely and not justly, which is unacceptable.

33. And this is what Anselm says *Proslogion* ch.11, “That alone is just which you want, and that not just which you do not want,” so that in this way, if there be posited in the divine intellect some habit intellective with respect to itself and other things, the divine intellect could be by reason distinguished so as to incline to many secondary objects more than [could the divine will] in the case at hand, because the intellect there is determinately inclined to many secondary objects, not so the will here.

34. However, it can be said that this single justice, which inclines determinately only to first act, regulates the secondary acts, although none of them necessarily, such that it not be able to regulate the opposite; and it does not, as it were, precede the will, inclining it by way of nature to some secondary act. Rather the will first determines itself to any secondary object, and thereby is this act regulated by first justice, because consonant with the will it is made adequate to – first justice inclining it, as it were, in favor of rectitude.

2. About Justice in Creatures

35. In a second way, ‘the just in creatures’ is called so from the correspondence of one created thing to another – the way it is just, on the part of the creature, that fire is hot and water cold, that fire goes up and water down, and the like, because the created nature requires this as something correspondent to it; and the way we could say in the case of polities that, though there were justice in the prince alone, yet there would be a just in some way in things to be ordered, namely so that these sorts of things may be disposed in this way and those sort in that way, because the things themselves, as they are of a nature to come into the use of citizens, demand this.

36. But the first intrinsic divine justice makes no determination for this just [in creatures], whether in respect of first act (in the way this act does not regard this object [the just in creatures]) or in respect of second act, because this divine justice inclines determinately as it regards this object (as was said [nn.31-33]).

C. Difficulties as to the Definition of Divine Justice, and the Solution of Them

37. Against these conclusions:

First, because this justice cannot be in any will unless this will be inclined agreeably to the dictate of prudence, and consequently to the conclusion of a practical syllogism; but the divine intellect does not syllogize since it does not proceed discursively.

38. Again, the divine intellect apprehends the doable first before the will wills it, and the will cannot disagree with the apprehending intellect; but the intellect apprehends this doable thing determinately, such that it does not apprehend this and that doable thing indifferently, because then it would have erred; therefore the will determinately wills this doable thing, such that it cannot will the opposite if it wills rightly.

39. Again, if it is just for Peter to be saved and God justly wills this, then it is unjust for Peter to be damned, and so, if God can will this, he can will something unjust.

40. To the first [n.37] I say that if in us there can be some moral virtue inclining us to agree with the conclusion of a practical syllogism, much more is there in us a practical habit of appetite that inclines us to agree with the first practical principle, because this principle is truer and consequently more right. But justice, which is in God single in reality and in idea (as was said [n.28]), inclines agreeably to the first practical principle, namely 'God is to be loved'.

41. But if you take this justice strictly, that it does not incline agreeably to the conclusion of a practical syllogism, therefore it is not any special virtue – I concede that the justice that is in God is only as it were a universal and radical virtue, from whose rectitude all the particular justices are of a nature to proceed, though not by necessity.

42. To the second [n.38] I say that the [divine] intellect apprehends the doable thing before the will wills it, but it does not determinately apprehend 'this is to be done', which apprehending is called commanding; rather it offers it as something neutral to the divine will, from which will as a result, when the will determines through its volition that 'this is to be done', the intellect apprehends 'this is to be done' as true, as was said in the material about future contingents, *Ord.* I d.39, *Lectura* I d.39.

43. However, on the supposition that the intellect were to apprehend a 'this is to be done' about something before the will were to will it, just as it apprehends it about this, 'God is to be loved', the inference does not by natural necessity follow that 'it apprehends this and the will cannot disagree, therefore the will by natural necessity wills this'. For the will cannot disagree as to the object (namely so that it will against or will for what the intellect shows to be willed), but in manner of tending toward that object it disagrees or, more properly, is distinguished, because the intellect tends toward the object in its way (that is, naturally) and the will in its way (that is, freely). And those powers always agree that always tend to the same object in their own ways of tending, as imagination and intellect do not disagree if the imagination tends to the object as a singular and the intellect to it as a universal.

44. To the third [n.39] I say it is like in politics, that the legislator has regard to the simply just in itself (which is the just of the public good), but does in a certain respect have regard to some partial justs, always to be sure in proportionate relation to the former just [of the public good] – and therefore in certain cases it is not just to keep just laws concerning these partial justs, namely when observation of them would tend to the detriment of the public just, namely the well-being of the republic. So God is determined simply toward the public good, not by commonness of aggregation, as in a city, but by

commonness of eminent containing, which is the just that befits his goodness. But everything else that is just is particular, and now this is just, now that is just, according as it is ordered toward or fits in with this just [of the common good].

45. I say, therefore, that God can will Peter to be damned and justly will it, because this particular just thing, ‘Peter is saved’, is not required for the public good necessarily so that its opposite could not be ordered to the same public good, namely to fitness with God’s own divine goodness; for that goodness is indeed an end which requires for the end no entity with determinate necessity.

II. To the Initial Arguments

46. To the first main argument [n.3] I say that there is no equality there simply save to oneself; so neither is there justice there simply save to oneself as other; but the sort of equality can be posited there that can belong to a greatly excelling lord to an exceeded servant.

47. To the second [n.4] I say that there are no virtues there according to what belongs to the imperfection that is in them, but after that which belongs to imperfection is taken away, as is plain in the example adduced about temperance; for the example requires that in a tempered nature there can be some immoderate delight, and this belongs to imperfection. And for this reason we can more properly posit justice there [sc. in God] than temperance, because justice does not require any excess in passion or any such imperfection as temperance requires. However, whether justice as it exists there is a virtue as regard this idea, that it be ‘distinct formally from the will and as it were the rule of it’, or is only ‘the will under the idea of the first rule determining itself’ [n.24], is a doubt; because if the second is posited the argument is solved more, since then justice is not there under the idea of moral virtue.

48. To the third [n.5] I say that God is not debtor simply save to his own goodness, to love it. But to creatures he is a debtor by his own liberality, to communicate to them what their nature demands, and this exigency in them is posited to be something just as a secondary object of his justice. However, in truth, nothing is determinately just, even outside God, save in a certain respect, namely with the modification: ‘as concerns the part of the creature’. But what is simply just is related only to the first justice, namely because it is actually willed by the divine will.

Question Two

Whether in God there is Mercy

49. Proceeding thus [n.2] to the second question: argument is made that there is not:

Because, according to Damascene ch.28, “mercy is compassion for another’s ill;” in God there is no compassion because there is no passion; therefore etc.

50. Again, mercy is prompt to take away another’s misery and to have compassion on him; but God is not thus prompt to take away misery, because since he could take it all away, he would take it all away.

51. On the contrary:

Psalms 102.8, “Patient and full of mercy.”

I. To the Question

52. I reply: mercy in us is a habit or, however it may be called, a form whereby we do not want the misery of another, such that it first inclines us to an act of not wanting misery in another, and this either misery in the future (and then it preserves the other from misery, if it can), or misery in the present (and then it relieves from misery, if it can); and, as a consequence, after this operation it disposes us to passion, namely displeasure at imminent or present misery.

53. As to the second, namely insofar as mercy inclines us to this passion, mercy is not in God. And the name of mercy seems principally to be imposed on the basis of this passion, going by etymological exposition of *miseri-cord* [Latin for 'mercy'], that is, having a heart [*cor*] for misery [*miseria*], because by sharing another's misery one has in this a heart for misery, that is, a heart communicating in misery.

54. But as to the operation 'not wanting misery' whether present or to come, mercy is properly in God.

55. Proof of this as to imminent misery:

For just as no good happens unless God wills it, so nothing is prevented from happening unless God wills against it; but many miseries capable of happening are prevented from happening; therefore God has an adverse will with respect to them.

Likewise about present misery:

For no misery is taken away unless God's will is opposed to the misery being present; but many miseries are often taken away; therefore etc.

56. A distinction can be made about this misery, as also about willing misery not to be present; because just as we distinguish in God an antecedent willing and a consequent willing, so could a double 'willing-against' be distinguished in him with respect to misery. And just as he always has an antecedent willing as regard the good of a creature, so he always as an antecedent willing-against as regard the bad of a creature, prohibiting it or taking it away, according to the statement of the Apostle *I Timothy 2.4*, "He wants all men to be saved." But just as he does not always have a consequent willing with respect to good, so neither a non-willing with respect to removing evil. The first [antecedent] non-willing does not belong to someone merciful, but the second [consequent] one does.

57. And it can be distinguished thus, that he has a non-willing in respect of an imminent evil either totally or partially. If in the first way, the mercy is said to be 'liberating' mercy, namely mercy that excludes all evil, whether imminent or already present; in the second way the mercy is called partial or mitigating mercy, namely mercy that does not exclude the whole evil but some part of the evil that is due to this or that man according to his merits. Now mercy in both ways exists in God, because he comes also to the aid of some by prohibiting all imminent evil or by relieving present evil or at least by diminishing the misery due.

II. To the Initial Arguments

58. As to the first argument [n.49] it is plain that that description of mercy holds as to the remote or ultimate effect of it, namely the ordered passion of suffering along

with, which follows from the ordered action of not-willing evil to one's neighbor. But it has been conceded that mercy is not in God as to that remote effect but only as to the proximate effect, which is not-willing misery to be present.

59. To the second [n.50]: mercy does not inflict misery save according to right reason; but now right reason sometimes commands that misery is to be inflicted on some people, so that (according to some) justice in the damnation of the reprobate may appear; and therefore God does not inflict punishment save in the way he has made determination, along with mercy or the command of right reason, that it be inflicted.

Question Three

Whether in God Justice is Distinguished from Mercy

60. Proceeding thus [n.2] to the third question; it seems that it is:

Cassiodorus *Exposition on Psalm 50.16*, "These two things are adjoined," and he is speaking of mercy and justice.

61. Again, if they were not distinct but were the same, then both would have the same effect. The consequence is plain, because the same formal principle has only the same effect; but the consequent is false, because the effect of mercy is to set free without merits, the effect of justice is to condemn where there are no merits or to save on behalf of merits.

62. On the contrary:

Augustine *City of God* 11 ch.10, "God is so far simple that he is whatever he has," and this holds of what is said in respect of himself; of this sort are mercy and justice; therefore, God is justice, God is mercy – therefore the one is the other.

I. To the Question

63. To the question:

When upholding the first opinion set down in the first question [nn.9-27] it is stated [Aquinas, Richard of Middleton] that mercy is a certain part of justice said in the first way, namely the justice that is fittingness with God's goodness [n.26], because it fits his goodness to have mercy.

64. However, when upholding the second approach [nn.28-36], it is plain that justice and mercy are not formally the same, because justice in relation to the first object has regard to divine goodness, but mercy has regard to something in the creature (after having also set aside the just that can be in the creature, namely exigency, because mercy is not in God in this respect, when there is thus something just in the creature). But this object [sc. object of mercy] and that [sc. object of justice] do not have a primary regard to this thing [sc. mercy] and that thing [sc. justice] unless in this thing [sc. mercy] and that [sc. justice] there is some distinction or formal non-identity in this thing [sc. object of mercy] and that [sc. object of justice].²⁵ However, along with this non-identity formally there stands an identity simply, as was said in *Ord.* I d.13 nn.40-43, d.8 n.209 [also d.2 nn.388-410, d.5 n.118].

²⁵ The square brackets here indicate my sense of what 'this' and 'that' in this passage must refer to. They do not represent anything in the Latin text.

65. But if a question is asked about the order of justice (taken in this way) in this thing and in that, justice is simply prior by comparison with the objects, in the way object is simply prior to object.

66. But on the side of them between themselves, as they are intrinsic to God, they only have an order in the way that other perfections (which are not formally the same) are posited to have an order – by the fact that one is said to be present really (if the distinction were a real distinction) prior to another, and consequently one is prior, according to this distinction they have, to the other. And with this possible priority is justice prior to mercy, according to the remark of Anselm *Proslogion* 11, “From justice mercy is born.”

II. To the Initial Arguments

67. [To the first] – As to the first argument [n.60]: Cassiodorus is using ‘two things’ in an extended sense for dualities in a certain respect, according to what was stated in the aforesaid [n.64] *Ord.* d.8 n.209. Nor is it necessary to expound ‘things’ as realities and formalities, because the distinction between thing and thing is like that between reality and reality, or formality and formality.

68. [To the second] – As to the second [n.61], it is said [Richard of Middleton, *Sent.* IV d.46 pr.2 qq.1, 3] that mercy connotes something other than justice, although the two are simply the same between themselves.

69. But to the contrary: the sort of distinction from it required by connotation is not from it as it is in itself but as it is taken and meant, because for this is connotation required. But the argument requires that there be some distinction between them in themselves as they are causes of distinct effects.

70. Nor is a difference of reason, as is said [by Richard of Middleton, *ibid.*], sufficient for this, because a relation of reason is that by which any effect is really effected. Rather, no real distinction in an effect depends on a relation of reason in the cause, as was proved in *Ord.* I d.13 n.39; but this distinction of effects essentially depends on a distinction in the cause; therefore, the distinction is not one of reason only.

71. I concede therefore, as to the argument, that just as intellect in God is not formally the will, nor conversely (though one is the same as the other by the most true identity of simplicity), so too is justice in God not formally the same as mercy, or conversely. And because of this formal non-identity, this [sc. justice] can be the proximate principle of some effect extrinsically [sc. mercy], the remainder of which effect is not a formal principle in the way in which it would be if this and that were two things; because ‘being a formal principle’ belongs to something as it is formally such.

72. Against this: the divine ‘to be’ is most actual, therefore it includes all divine perfections; but it would not include them all if there were such a formal distinction there, because whatever is distinct from it formally is there actually, and consequently it is, as distinct, act there, and so the [divine] essence, as it is distinct, does not include every act.

73. Again, if distinct real formalities are there, then distinct realities are there, and so distinct things. Proof of the first consequence: because every proper formality is distinct in reality.

74. As to the first point [n.72], the divine ‘to be’ contains unitively every actuality of the divine essence; things that are contained without any distinction are not contained

unitively, because unity is not without all distinction; nor are things that are simply really distinct contained unitively, because they are contained multiply or in dispersed fashion. This term ‘unitively’, then, includes some sort of distinction in the things contained that suffices for union, and yet for such union as is repugnant to all composition and aggregation of distinct things; this cannot be unless a formal non-identity is set down along with a real identity.

75. As to the argument [n.72], then, I concede that the essence contains every actuality, and consequently every formality, but not as they are formally the same, because then it would not contain them unitively.

76. And if you say that it contains as much as can be contained – this is true according to the ‘to be’ of one idea; but nothing of one idea can in a more perfect way than unitively contain many things that are not formally the same.

77. To the second [objection, n.73] one could say that there are as many formalities there as there are realities and things there, as was shown in *Ord.* I d.13 nn.34-35 [cited supra n.70]. In another way, the consequence ‘many real formalities, therefore many realities’ could be denied, just as ‘many divine persons, therefore many deities’ is denied; but the first response is more real.

78. [To the argument for the opposite] – As to the argument for the opposite [n.62], it proves the true identity in God of anything with anything (speaking of what is intrinsic to God himself); but from this does not follow ‘therefore anything whatever [in him] is formally the same as anything else [in him]’, because a true identity, nay the most true identity, that suffices for what is altogether simple, can stand along with formal non-identity, as was said in the cited distinction [n.64; *Ord.* I d.8 n.209].

Question Four

Whether, in the Punishment of the Bad, Mercy Goes Along with Justice on the Part of God as Punisher

79. Fourth [n.2], the question is asked whether in the punishment of the bad justice goes along with mercy on the part of God as punisher.

80. Argument that it does not:

Augustine 83 *Questions* q.3 says, “A man becomes worse when no wise man is in authority;” therefore much more when God is in authority, since God is greater than any sage, does man not become worse. But he who adds bad to bad makes the whole worse, just as he who adds good to good makes the whole better, *Topics* 3.5.119a23; therefore etc. [sc. therefore God does not add bad to bad; punishment adds bad to bad; therefore God does not punish, therefore *a fortiori* not justly and mercifully either].

81. Again, *Deuteronomy* 25.2: “according to the manner of the fault will the manner of the beatings be;” but the fault of any sinner at all is temporal and finite; therefore, according to justice, the punishment of anyone at all will be of such sort. So there is no justice in eternal punishment for a temporal and passing fault.

82. Again, just punishment is for correction of the one punished; but no one who is damned is corrected by his punishment. The first statement is proved by the Philosopher *Rhetoric* 1.10.1369b12-14 [cf. *Ord.* IV d.14 n.105].

83. Again, *James* 2.13, “Judgment without mercy will be done to him who did not show mercy;” and Augustine on *Psalms*, *Psalms* 118.151, “You are near, Lord,” in sermon

29, “When God does not pity, vengeance is given;” therefore, in the damned there is justice without mercy.

84. Again, *Revelation* 18.7, “Give to Babylon as much torment and grief as she gave glory to herself and was in delights;” so there is a strict correspondence of punishment with guilt without any remission and mercy.

85. On the contrary:

In *Psalms* 24.10, “All the ways of the Lord are mercy and truth;” where Cassiodorus [n.60] says, “These two things are always adjoined in the ways of the Lord.” And in Scripture enough is said about both, as *Psalms* 10.8, “The Lord is just and has loved justice etc.,” and *Psalms* 76.8-10, “God will not forget to be merciful.”

I. To the Question

A. The Common Response

1. Exposition of It

86. As to this question, the opinion is with probability held [Bonaventure, Richard of Middleton, Innocent V, Cassiodorus et al.] that in every divine work mercy is found along with justice, according to *Psalms* 24.10, “All the ways of the Lord are mercy and truth.”

87. The reason for this is that an artisan, when voluntarily producing an effect conformably to his own rule, is just, for ‘justice renders to each what is due’ [Cicero, *Nature of the Gods* 3.15, Justin *Institutes* I tit.1 ch.10]; what is most due to an artifact is that it agree with its rule; but God is such an artisan for every creature.

88. Likewise mercy exists in coming to the aid of present need to stop it, and of impending future need to prevent it; but God, when producing each creature thus and so, is coming to the aid of what is in need; therefore etc.

89. In favor of the presence of these two [justice and mercy] together, there is the following sort of congruity: The more that several virtues incline toward some one and the same work, the more is that work perfect, just as, by opposition, the more a work is blamable, the more is it against the inclination or rectitude of the several virtues. Every work of God, as it is his, is most perfect; therefore it comes from every virtue that can come together in the same work. But mercy and justice can come together in the same work, as is plain from the solution of questions 1-3 of this distinction [nn.29-36, 40-45, 56-57, 64-66].

2. Weighing of It

90. But the first reason [n.87], which proceeds from the idea of justice and mercy, takes the works of them very generally; for if justice consists properly in returning what is due, and if nothing is due to an artifact save according to the will of the artisan, it follows that in the production of the artifact there will be no justice strictly speaking; but God is such an artisan with respect to the creature. Therefore, what is taken in the phrase ‘it is due to an artifact to be conformed to its rule’ must be denied when ‘due’ is taken strictly, because God is not in debt to this artifact. But if the phrase is taken to mean that this is required in an artifact for it to be duly fashioned, from this no justice in the

producer follows, if he only give freely to the artifact that it be so conformed, without any previous exigency on the part of the artifact – as is the case here.

91. And the reason about mercy [n.88] overly extends mercy to the alleviation or exclusion of any defect whatever, although mercy is only properly for alleviating or supplying defects that belong to misery, and not everything defective is capable of misery.

92. The congruence too about the coming together of several virtues involves a doubt, because it is not certain that in the divine will there can be any idea of any virtue – not only of a virtue non-distinct in reality (this is certain), but of one not distinct formally either, for the will, because it is infinite, suffices for all rectitude of act more than any superadded virtue however distinct in reality or in idea. But if a virtue that is distinct formally from the will be granted there, as wisdom or some intellectual virtue in the intellect, it is not clear that the coming together of several virtues for the same work is required for the highest perfection of the work.

93. Let it be, too, that these reasonings [nn.87-89] prove the conclusion generally about God's positive works (because manifest rectitude is there, and even exclusion of need), yet, because some evil is inflicted in the punishment of the bad (such that the one punished becomes needier after punishment than before), it does not seem that these reasons equally prove the conclusion in this issue at hand.

B. Scotus' own Response

94. Therefore, as to the question, one must see first what the punishment of the bad is; second, whether it is from God; third, whether justice concurs with it; fourth whether mercy does.

1. What the Punishment of the Bad is

a. About the Essence of Punishment or about Sadness

95. About the first [n.94]:

Punishment is 'a perceivable lack of an agreeable good in an intellectual nature', or 'a perceivable presence of a disagreeable evil' in the same. Now the good of intellectual nature is double in kind: namely the good of advantage and the good of the honorable. The useful good, indeed, which is posited as a third, is reduced to either other of these, according as it is ordered toward it. And although sometimes the ideas of the advantageous and the honorable good come together in the same thing (as in the enjoyment of God in the fatherland), indeed although generally everything honorable is advantageous (but not conversely), yet the supreme advantage is beatitude and it would be advantageous even if, per impossibile, it were not honorable; also, the supreme good is charity and it would be honorable even if, per impossibile, it were not advantageous. Therefore in an intellectual nature there is a double punishment by privation of this double good: the first is called the bad of injustice or of guilt, and it can be called obstinacy in sin; the second is called the punishment of loss, or either loss or damnation.

96. The disagreeable bad in a nature merely intellectual cannot be any operation of that nature taken in itself, because any operation of it at all is agreeable. Indeed, every act of understanding, taken in itself, agrees with the intellect, and every act of willing

agrees with the will; and likewise every act of willing-against, taken in itself, agrees with the will, because the will has willing-against as freely as it has willing, and so even when comparing this power with the former [sc. understanding], the operation of one is not disagreeable to the other. So, nothing will be found there [sc. in an intellectual nature] that is disagreeable positively to such nature save a distinct suffering opposite to its operation, or a disagreeable operation – not disagreeable in itself but because it is unwanted; such a passion is sadness. An unwanted operation, and indeed any unwanted thing generally, is cause, when put into effect, of sadness. Such sort of unwanted operation is immoderate consideration of fire, as was said before in d.44 n.7, which is against the command of the will that wills freely to use its intelligence for application now to this object, now to that; but now the intelligence is, contrary to this willing, detained always in intense consideration of fire, whereby it is impeded from perfect consideration of other objects, as was said there [*ibid.*]

b. About the Four Forms of Sadness

α. About the Privation of the Honorable Good, or of Grace, by Guilt

97. Now the sadness is there [in an intellectual nature] in a fourfold way in genus: double sadness about privation of double good.

One sadness indeed is about privation of the honorable good, or of grace, through guilt. For there is sadness about its own obstinacy in sin, which is the first privation – or at least about the sin committed in life, wherein it is now without remission left abandoned. The sadness is not indeed about this or that sin in itself as the sin is the sort of thing it is, but because the sin is a demerit with respect to punishment of loss; that is, the sadness is not because God is offended, but because, thinking on the fact it was immoderate in appetite, it deprived itself by sinning. And this sadness can properly be called the ‘pain of the worm’, namely sadness arising from remorse about sin committed, not because it is sin but because it is a demeriting cause with respect to the pain of loss.

β. About the Privation of the Advantageous Good, namely Beatitude

98. Sadness about the lack of the advantageous good, namely beatitude – this either has no name but can be called all-absorbing sadness, because that of which the desire is most of all present in nature, and specifically in it along with restraint by the justice it abandoned – the perpetual lack of this object of desire, when perceived, saddens totally by way of absorption; or its name is ‘pain of loss’, taken so as to be transitive in construal, that is pain about loss; for to call the mere lack of what is advantageous the ‘pain of loss’ is an intransitive construal.

γ. About the Double Positive Disagreeable

99. And there is a double sadness about what is positively disagreeable: one about the perpetual detention of fire as definitively locating it [sc. intellectual nature] in a place; another about the detention of the intellect in intense consideration of fire as object. Which two positives, namely two detentions, are not wanted and are therefore disagreeable – not so as to destroy the nature of the power they are in, but in the way it is

disagreeable for the heavy to be above and in the way this would be sad for it if it were perceived by it. And these two sadnesses about double detention can be named as follows: the first as ‘penalty of incarceration’, the second as ‘penalty of blinding’ – read as transitive in construal, taking penalty for sadness and the term added in the genitive for the object that causes sadness.

100. In this way, therefore, we have two punishments in genus by privation of a double good, and a quadruple punishment by positing a quadruple sadness, with respect to which there are two positive causes (two unwanted detentions) and two privations (the unwanted and perceived privations).

2. Whether the Punishment of the Bad is from God, or about the Four Penalties

a. About the First and Second Penalty or Punishment

101. About the second article [n.94]:

The first penalty [n.97], namely the continuation of guilt without intermission, which continuation can be called ‘obstinacy’, does not have God for positive cause. For just as guilt, when committed, does not, as guilt, have any positive cause, so neither does it to the extent that guilt as guilt is continued; and, as guilt, it is the first penalty, according to the remark of Augustine *Confessions* 1.12 n.19, “You have commanded, Lord, and so it is, that every sinner should be a punishment to himself;” and there was discussion of this in *Ord.* II d.7 n.92. Now this guilt, as continued, is from God as negative cause, namely as not remitting it. He is not, however, the first cause, but the will itself voluntarily continuing it is the demeritorious cause that God does not remit it – or at least the will itself, when it committed it, demerited, though it not always continue it after the act of the sin.

102. The second penalty likewise, since it is a privation, has no positive cause, but does have God as negative cause, because having him as not conferring beatitude; but this ‘not causing’ of God’s has another cause, a cause of demerit, in the [one punished], namely guilt, whereby it was said [n.97] that this advantage is not conferred on him.

b. About the Third and Fourth Penalty or Punishment

103. But the two unwanted punishments, namely the two detentions [n.99], are from God, because they are positive realities and consequently good.

And the first detention is from God immediately, at least as it is perpetual, because although fire may detain a spirit as if formally, yet it does not effectively locate him in place, namely neither by effectively detaining him in this ‘where’ nor by prohibiting him from that ‘where’; nor does a spirit locate himself, at least not perpetually. Therefore God is immediately cause of this definitive, perpetual detention.

And of the other detention, namely of the intelligence in intense consideration of fire, the proximate but partial cause is the fire. Now God is the remaining and immediate cause, because according to the common order of causes, an object should, in acting on someone’s intelligence, have a causality subordinate with respect to his will; but here the object is not subordinate to the will of the spirit himself, rather it moves against his will, as if immediately subordinate to the divine will.

104. These four sadnesses, then, since they are positive effects, are from God, but all are so mediately, namely through the medium of apprehension of the unwanted object.

3. Whether Justice Goes Along with the Aforesaid Punishments or Penalties of the Bad

105. About the third article [n.94] I say that since justice is taken in two ways in God (as was said in this distinction, question 1 [n.22]), there is in this punishment not only the first justice, namely because it befits divine goodness to punish thus, but also the second, because this punishment is a certain exigency or just correspondence of penalty to guilt.

106. And this can become clear by running through the aforesaid punishments.

a. About God's Justice in the First Penalty

107. The first punishment [n.97] indeed is not inflicted, nor could it be inflicted justly, since it is guilt formally but a penalty left afterwards, as Augustine says *On Psalms*, *Psalms* 5 n.10, "When God punishes sinners, he does not inflict his evil on them but leaves the bad to their evils." I understand this of the first penalty, which is the guilt left afterwards, or not remitted, or the abandonment of the sinner in this sort of guilt; and this, in the way it was said to be from God in the preceding article [n.101], is thus justly from him. For he justly abandons or does not remit, whether because the will voluntarily continues to will badly, or because it remained in sin without penance to the end (which time, however, was precisely reckoned to it for penance), or, third, because in wayfaring it sinned, where it deserved by demerit to be thus left behind.

108. Just indeed it is that he who continues malice not be freed from malice by another – and not this case only but he who could have left malice behind and had time precisely reckoned for this and is not corrected in that time but perseveres in evil; for it is just that, when the time has elapsed, he be left to that evil. Third too (which is less evident), if someone by his guilt has thrown himself into an incapacity of escaping, not only of escaping by himself but also by anyone's help save his whom he then offends, he justly deserves to be abandoned in his incapacity – in the way that, if someone were to throw himself voluntarily into a pit from which he could not get out by himself, or in any way, save by the help of another whom he despises and offends by throwing himself therein, he can justly be left behind in it.

109. These three points are sufficiently clear as to the issue at hand, because someone damned is continually in some bad act of will (as seems probable), and persists impenitent up to the end of life, and offends as wayfarer by tottering into sin from which he cannot escape by himself save only by disposing himself with congruous merit, and that for this state of life, through the whole of which state he passed fruitlessly without such merit.

b. About God's Justice in the Second Penalty

α. Exposition

110. The second penalty too [n.98] is from God in this way, that is, negatively, because it is from him as not conferring beatitude. Justly is it from him, because as he

justly requires the honorable good in order that the advantageous good be given in return for it, so he justly requires a sin that takes away the honorable good in order that the privation of the advantageous good be given in return for it. And this just correspondence of the privation of the advantageous good with the privation of the honorable good puts that guilt in order, the way guilt can, while it remains, be put in order; for, absolutely, guilt is against order, and therefore it cannot remain in the whole along with the order that can exist in the whole, while the whole remains, unless something be added that the order of the whole requires to be added. An example: rottenness in a bodily member is simply against the good order of the body, because, if it is not taken away, the better order of body that is able to be had cannot stand while the rottenness stands, unless something is applied to it, namely something else that corresponds to the rotten member according to the natural order of the body, that is to say, unless something else is applied that would prevent the sort of communication between the rotten member and the other members that there would be if there were no rottenness.

111. In favor of this is Boethius *Consolation* 4 prose 4 n.21, “The base are more unhappy when given unjust impunity than when punished with just punishment.” And no wonder, because in the first place there is no good save the good of nature, which good however is vitiated by the evil of guilt; in the second place, beyond the good of nature there is a good which reforms guilt, that is, the just correspondence with it of the penalty.

β. Two Objections and Response to the First

112. On the contrary:

Between bad and bad there does not seem to be any relation in which goodness may exist.

113. Again, it would be better at any rate if the first bad were taken away than if it remained and another corresponding bad were added, as is apparent in the example about the rotten member [n.110], where expulsion of the rottenness were simply better for the body than were the prohibition of communication between that member and the other ones.

114. As to the first [n.112]: there is a necessary correspondence between false and false, so there is a just correspondence between the bad of the dishonorable and the bad of the disadvantageous.

γ. Response to the Second

115. [Others’ response] – As to the second it is said [Aquinas, *ST*, Ia q.22 a.2 ad 2, q.48 a.2 ad 3] that the universe’s being better requires that some evils be allowed in it; and this is taken from Augustine, *Enchiridion*, 8 n.27: “The Omnipotent One judged it better to allow evils to come to be, because he is able from those evils to elicit greater goods.”

116. Again *ibid.*, 3 n.11, “evils suitably placed do the more eminently commend goods.”

117. And this conclusion is drawn specifically in the issue at hand [Aquinas, *Sent.* IV d.46 q.2 a.1, q.1 a.2], because, by the allowance of faults and of punishment for them, the justice in divine effects is apparent, and it would not be apparent if no fault were

allowed. Augustine says this in *City of God* 21.12, “The human race is separated into parts, so that in some may be shown what merciful grace is capable of, in the rest what just vengeance is capable of; for neither would both be shown in all of them.”

118. Further, this commending of the good by the juxtaposition of evil is referred back to the glory of the saints [Aquinas, *ibid.* d.46 q.1 a.3], about whom *Isaiah* 66.24 says, “They will go out and will see the corpses of men, and it will be for the satiety of all flesh,” in accord with *Psalms* 57.11, “The just will be happy since he has seen vengeance.”

119. And Augustine treats of this in *City of God* 20.21.

120. It would therefore have to be denied [sc. by those, nn.115-119, who thus respond to the objection, n.113] that it would be better for the universe that the bad of guilt be taken away from the bad [n.113], because then the goodness would be taken away that there is in just punishment, and punishment cannot be just or good if all guilt were taken away.

121. Nor is the example about the rotten member valid [n.110], on the ground that, just as removal of rottenness would be better for the body than the withering of the member with its rottenness remaining, so it would be better for this person that his guilt and punishment be taken away than that the double privation along with such mutual correspondence remain in him, because each privation is bad in itself and bad for him, and worse than the correspondence of this to that would be good for him.

But that correspondence is better in the universe than no such correspondence being in the universe, because a plurality of degrees of goodness belongs to the perfection of the universe – just as it would be better for the moon to have the light of the sun [sc. as its own], if it could have it while its nature remained, but not better for the universe, because then there would not be all degrees of luminaries in the universe.

122. [Scotus’ Response] – Against this:

Neither has the highest nature possible been made in the universe nor will it be made, as is maintained with probability, nor will all possible degrees of beatitude in beatifiable nature be in the kingdom of heaven. If then God will not make, for the sake of the perfection of the universe, all the degrees of goodness that are not only good for the universe but good in themselves and good for those who have them, what necessity is there that, for the sake of the perfection of the universe, there be this lowest goodness, which is in itself bad and bad for him who has it? Indeed, it is worse than any goodness that is in itself good and good for him who has it. Surely it would be better that all such [lowest goods] are taken away and that in their place goods are given that would be good in themselves and good for those who have them, namely their blessedness?

123. This excludes the first reason [n.115]: for greater goods are not elicited from the bad, as it seems, than are the goods that are taken away by the bad. For this depriving punishment is not simply better than the charity or beatitude that is deprived.

124. As to the other point touched on, that ‘evil suitably ordered the more eminently commends the good’ [n.116], it seems that eminent commendation of the good does not require that what is also evil is suitably ordered, since all of it is evil because against order. Nor is there a likeness about diverse colors in pictures, because every color is something positive and moves sight in its own way; but if a painter could leave in one place a vacuum, not for this reason would the picture be more beautiful.

125. The next point, about the manifestation of divine justice [n.117], does not seem to prove the conclusion; for it is a more eminent act, even of justice, to reward him who deserves well than to punish him who deserves ill. Indeed, the lowest justice is vindictive justice, hence its act should never be purely elective, as in the case of reward or exchange, but as it were elective with a certain displeasure. And that act of will is less perfect, because in order for it to be good it should be less voluntary; for a robust choice for revenge is cruelty. Now this inference does not follow: ‘divine justice does not appear in the lowest act that can belong to justice, therefore it does not appear’; rather it more eminently appears in other more eminent acts of justice.

126. The fourth point, namely about the happiness of the blessed [n.118], does not seem it should move us; for just as, according to Gregory *Dialogues* 4, “God, because he is pious, does not feed on torment; because he is just, he is not assuaged by vengeance on the wicked,” so is it much more repugnant to the blessed to feed on torment, because this is attributed to God precisely because of justice, and justice sometimes compels the judge to avenge when another, not a judge, feels compassion for the one punished. But let it be that the blessed are now conformed to divine justice and therefore are happy about the punishment of Judas, surely they would be happier about his glorification if he were beatified? It is plain that they would be; for now Peter rejoices more in the beatitude of Linus [Bishop of Rome after Peter] than in the damnation of Judas; but if Judas were beatified, Peter would be happy about his beatitude just as he is now about the beatitude of Linus.

c. About God’s Justice in the Third Penalty

127. Excluding these views then [nn.115-121], and confirming the reasons taken from the words of Augustine [nn.115-118], it can be said that in the third penalty [n.99] the justice of exigency sufficiently appears; for, just as fitting the good is a ‘where’ in the noblest body (a ‘where’ circumscriptively for the bodies of the blessed and definitively for the good angels), but with liberty for another ‘where’ at will (because it is a feature of glory to be able to use one’s motive power for any ‘where’ that is not repugnant to glory), so is it just that the reprobate be placed in the most vile body, which is the earth, and to be limited to that ‘where’ in which they are deprived of motive power – which power they would use badly if they could, because of the malice of their will.

d. About God’s Justice in the Fourth Penalty

128. In the fourth penalty too [n.99] there is justice, because as the intellect of the blessed is determined toward seeing the noblest object, that is, the divine essence, and as concomitantly their will is determined toward enjoying that object (with liberty remaining, however, to consider and love other objects, the consideration and love of which do not impede that good), so is the intellect of the bad determined toward intensely considering an object that is disagreeable, because not wanted, and imperfect, because corporeal, and their will determined toward something placed in existence that is saddening, and the liberty to consider and will other things is taken away, by which, when considered and willed, this punishment could be lessened. And the reason both in the case of the good and in that of the bad is that they merited precisely through their

intellect and will. And these powers are the noblest of an intellectual nature, in whose perfection or imperfection, by consequence, consists precisely the perfection or imperfection of such nature.

e. About God's Justice in the Other Four Penalties

129. Now in the other four penalties, namely the sadnesses [n.100], justice sufficiently appears, because the consummation of the penalty requires sadness.²⁶ But if about damned men after the judgment there is put, in place of the second detention [sc. the devils' intense consideration of fire, nn.99, 103], burning in fire, and in place of the fourth sadness [sc. sadness about such intense consideration of fire, n.128] pain in sense appetite, then there is justice from the correspondence of this bitterness with the inordinate delight it had in sin.

4. Whether Mercy Goes Along with the Punishment of the Bad

130. As to the fourth article [n.94], as was said in d.46 q.2 [n.57], liberating mercy removes the whole of misery; mitigating but not liberating mercy removes part of what is due. The first is not relevant here, but the second.

a. Opinion of Thomas Aquinas

α. Exposition of the Opinion

131. For this the following reason is given [Aquinas, *Sent.* IV d.46 q.2 a.2]: "Agent and patient always correspond to each other proportionally, such that the agent is related to action as the patient to passion. Now things unequal among themselves do not have the same proportion to other things unless the other things are unequal among themselves – the way that six and four, because unequal, have the proportion of double to the similarly unequal three and two. Therefore, when the agent exceeds the patient, the action must exceed the passion."

132. And there is confirmation of this conclusion, because we see in all equivocal agents that the patient does not receive the whole of the effect.

133. From this conclusion to the issue at hand the inference is as follows [Aquinas, *ibid.*]: "The giver is disposed the way an agent is, and the receiver is disposed the way a patient is; therefore, when the giver exceeds beyond the receiver, it is fitting that the giving exceed the receiving that is proportionate to the receiver. Now 'less bad' and 'more good' are reckoned as the same, as is said in *Ethics* 5.7.1131b22-23; therefore as God always gives beyond desert, so he always inflicts bad less than desert."

β. Refutation of the Opinion

134. Against this position. First as follows:

If two things have the same proportion to two other things, then, to the extent that one term of the first pair exceeds the other term of that first pair, to that extent one term

²⁶ There are four penalties of sadness, corresponding respectively to the two penalties of privation and the two of detention [nn.97-99]).

of the second pair is exceeded by the other term of that second pair; and this holds when speaking of ‘so much’ and ‘as much’ according to proportion, not according to quantity. The point is plain in his example [n.131]: for just as six is one and half times four, so three is one and half times two. But never because the agent or giver in the issue at hand infinitely exceeds the sufferer or receiver does the agent exceed the patient, or the action exceed the passion, nor yet the act of giving go infinitely beyond desert.

135. If you say that, on the contrary, divine action and giving, as far as concerns God himself, is infinite because it is his act of willing – then the argument [n.131] is not to the purpose. For from this does not follow that the agent has some extrinsic causation greater than the passive thing is suited to receive, nor does it follow that something be extrinsically given that is greater than the receiver is fitted to receive; but it only follows that the agent’s action, as it remains in itself, is something more perfect than the reception of it; such would be the case if in the effect were given to the recipient nothing save the minimum that was proportioned to the recipient.

136. Again, his example is to the opposite purpose [n.131]: for if the passive object does not receive the total effect of an equivocal agent, then: either some other passive object does, and in that case an equivocal agent would always require several passive objects at once; or no passive object does, and in that case the agent will have, along with the effect in the passive object, another effect standing by itself – both of which results are manifestly unacceptable.²⁷

137. Hence, although the argument, when it speaks of the action, could be qualified by raising a difficulty in this way, that an action is taken that remains in God himself as agent, yet when it speaks of the effect (in the way the argument here says that the passive object does not receive the total effect of an equivocal agent [n.132]), it is manifestly false; and thus is it false also when it speaks of the action as it is in the passive object [n.133] (the way the Philosopher speaks in *Physics* [3.3.202b19-22]). 138. To the reasoning then [n.131]: either the major is false or the minor,²⁸ or it equivocates over ‘proportion’, and this when speaking of action as it is something in the passive object. For if [the minor] takes proportion properly, and thus takes it that there is a similar proportion between agent and action and between patient and passion, the proposition is false, as is this proposition ‘the patient exceeds the form received in it as much as the agent exceeds the form given by it’. Nor does this understanding of a like proportion between these four terms follow from the antecedent, that ‘the agent is proportioned to the patient’; for they are proportioned in this respect, that the one is such actually as the other is potentially, where the two are the extremes of one proportion. How can from this be inferred that these two terms have a like proportion to the other two terms, namely action and passion, save by supposing that action is such actually as the passion is potentially? – which is false. But if it takes ‘proportion’ in some way improperly, namely

²⁷ This argument assumes the premise of the example, namely that the proportion of the inequality is the same on the side of both cause and effect. For if so and if there is no such proportion between God’s action and creatures, then there is an overplus on the side of God’s action that remains to be accounted for, namely the overplus that creatures are unable to receive. This overplus would therefore have to be explained away either by saying that the cause must always have many more things to work on, or by saying that the cause has an effect that stands by itself and is not an effect produced in anything. Both these results seem absurd and ad hoc.

²⁸ The minor is: “Agent and patient always correspond to each other proportionally, such that the agent is related to action as the patient to passion.” The major is: “Now things unequal among themselves do not have the same proportion to other things unless the other things are unequal among themselves.”

not according to exceeding and exceeded, but in some other way, according to which the major could perhaps have an appearance in some way of truth, then thus is the second [sc. the major] not true, that ‘unequals have a similar proportion only to unequals’ [n.101].

b. Scotus’ own Opinion

139. I say therefore that for this conclusion, namely that there is mitigating mercy in punishment, a better foundation is obtained from *James* 2.13, “Mercy triumphs over justice,” because, as was said at the beginning of the solution [n.89], “the more that several virtues come together in some work, the more perfect is that work;” thus, if judgment is from justice and, along with this, from mercy, it is so much the more perfect. Such is the case if, when inflicting something that justice commands to be inflicted, something is remitted that mercy inclines toward remitting; and so mercy triumphs over divine judgment to the extent that divine judgment is more perfect coming from mercy than it would be coming from justice alone.

140. Against this: on the contrary, mercy seems to destroy just judgment, for as vengeance is to be exacted by justice, so must it be exacted in proportion to the fault; therefore, as it would be against justice not to avenge, so would it be against justice not to avenge totally.

141. I reply: to give an undue good is not against justice because it is an act of liberality, and the act of one virtue is not repugnant to another; but to take away a due good is against justice. Now as it is, ‘to give good’ and ‘not to inflict bad’ keep pace with each other as far as justice is concerned; therefore ‘to inflict bad beyond what is due’ is against justice because it is to subtract a due good; but ‘to inflict bad less than what is due’ is not against justice, as neither is ‘to give an undue good’ against justice.

142. On the contrary: the argument still stands, because then ‘to inflict no bad’ would not be against justice, nor would ‘to confer or give the maximum undue good’ be against justice.

143. There is a confirmation, that to this guilt with three degrees of intensity there corresponds, in strict justice, a penalty having three dimensions or parts, *a*, *b*, *c*. From what has been granted, it is consistent with justice that *c* not be inflicted. From this follows, first, that, by parity of reasoning, it would be consistent with justice that *b* not be inflicted (because *b* is not more necessarily commanded to be inflicted than *c* is), and so on about *a*. Secondly, it follows that if justice permits one degree in the sin to go unpunished with its own proper punishment, then by parity of reasoning justice can permit another degree to go unpunished, and so the whole to go unpunished.

144. Look for the response.^a

a. [Interpolation] One must say that justice has a latitude in its degrees beyond which, if God did not punish, he would not be using justice. Therefore, although he could dismiss one degree of the penalty or two, yet it does not follow that he could therefore dismiss any degree, because then he would pass beyond the latitude required for justice. And thus is the response to these two arguments plain [nn.142-43].

It could be said in another way that if he were to dismiss [any degree] he would not be acting against justice absolutely considered, because whatever he did he would justly do, since his will is justice itself, and his will would be acting according to justice, though not ordained justice.

The first solution [first paragraph in this interpolation] is taken from *Ord.* IV dd.18-19 nn.24-26; and the second solution [second paragraph in this interpolation] is taken from the present distinction [nn.29-34].

II. To the Initial Arguments

145. As to the first main argument [n.80], Augustine speaks of the evil of guilt, not of penalty, because God is indeed the judge of the bad, *Deuteronomy* 32.35, “Vengeance is mine; I will repay.”

146. On the contrary: the proof of Augustine does stand at least, that “A man becomes worse when no wise man is in authority;” therefore much more when God is not in authority, as Augustine himself argues; but a man becomes worse through punishment, because bad is added to bad.

147. I reply: when a first bad stands, the second added bad, though it be worse than it, yet is not worse simply, because not worse in comparison with the universe, whose order requires that the first bad, while it remains, be put in order by another bad. An example: it would have been better for the man born blind in *John* 9.1-41 to have had sight from the beginning, but not better in its ordering to the manifestation of the divine wisdom and goodness. When therefore the phrase “a man becomes worse when no wise man is in authority” is taken, either it must be expounded of the evil of guilt or, if it is about bad simply, one should say that this man does not become simply worse through the added penalty, though he have a more multiple evil, because the proportion of the second bad to the first in him is just.

148. As to the second [n.81], it is said [Aquinas, *Sent.* IV d.46 q.1 a.1] that if the bad man had lived perpetually he would have sinned perpetually, and therefore he is perpetually punished because in his will he has sinned perpetually. And this is the reasoning of Gregory, *Moralia* ch.19 n.36.

149. On the contrary: someone sins with the intention of repenting; therefore, neither implicitly nor explicitly does he sin with perpetual willingness.

Response: he exposes himself to the perpetuity of sin, as was said in the solution about someone throwing himself into a pit [n.108], and especially so when he remains without penance for the whole time of his life.

150. There is another way of speaking, which seems to be Augustine’s in *City of God* 21.11, where he seems to say that justice does not require a perpetual penalty to be inflicted in order for it to be sufficient for the guilt, but the penalty is perpetual for the reason that the person is perpetual and remains perpetually in guilt. For Augustine says, “What holds of the removal of men from this mortal city by the penalty of the first death, holds of the removal of men from that immortal city by the penalty of the second death.” And a little before, about certain penalties inflicted in this city, he says, “Surely penalties similar to eternal ones are seen to hold for the manner of this life? Indeed, that they cannot be eternal is for the reason that the life too itself that is punished by them does not stretch into eternity.” He means to say that there is a sort of guilt that does not merit total exclusion from the city, and that this is temporal even in respect of civic life; but some guilt is so great that it merits total exclusion from this civic life, and the intensity of it corresponds to the guilt – but the extension happens to be finite because the life is finite. So, in the issue at hand, mortal guilt deserves total exclusion from the supernal city, but for this reason precisely is it perpetual, that the life is perpetual along with the guilt.

151. The reason for this seems to be that it would be possible for God, according even to the strict rigor of justice, to reckon out a penalty so intense that it would sufficiently correspond to the guilt even if nature were to be at once annihilated; therefore, the fact that an eternal penalty is now inflicted is not because eternity belongs per se to the idea of the penalty insofar as a penalty is equally punitive [sc. gives punishment equal to the fault], but the penalty happens to be eternal because of the eternity of the person punished and of the persisting guilt. And this reason better preserves how “according to the manner of the fault will the manner of the beatings be” [n.81], speaking of the intensity that is per se required in a penalty – infinite extension is accidental to it, for the aforesaid reasons [nn.150-151].

152. To the next [n.82] I say that medicine is double: curative and preservative. Thus is punishment a double medicine: it is inflicted on the corrigible to cure him, and inflicted on the incorrigible to preserve, not him indeed, but others, if it is for the good of the community that some penalties be made determinate by the legislator, and that they be inflicted on the delinquent. And not only in the determination but also in the infliction are medicines preservative for those who are in a state of preservation. But that they are medicines in neither way for the one punished is not repugnant to justice; the point is plain in the civic penalties that are exterminating or determinate for great guilt.

153. To the next [n.83] I say that James’s meaning is about liberating mercy, and likewise Augustine’s.

154. To the next [n.84]: the ‘as much...as’ does not deny equality of quantity but equality of proportion;²⁹ that is: let him who has glorified himself more inordinately than another be punished more than another in like proportion. Thus, even if the reward exceed merit, he who has merited more than another is proportionately rewarded more – “which may He grant us who lives and reigns God for ever and ever.”

Forty Seventh Distinction

Question One

Whether there is a Future Universal Judgment

1. “A question also accustomed to be asked is how sentence of judgment will be given” [Lombard, *Sent.* IV d.47 ch.1 n.1].

2. About the forty seventh distinction I ask whether there is a future universal judgment.

3. That there is not:

John 12.31, “Now is the judgment of the world.”

4. Again, *Nahum* 1.9, “God will not inflict punishment on that very thing twice.”

5. Again, Augustine *Epist.* 99 to Hesychius ch.1 n.2, “The state in which a person’s last day will find him is the state in which the world’s last day will find him.”

From all these authorities, along with the addition that each one’s judgment is when he dies [cf. *Hebrews* 9.27, “It is appointed for man once to die, and after that the judgment”], it follows that no other judgment may be expected.

²⁹ An obscure point and argument.

6. The thing is proved by reason, because a sentence is only handed over to be carried out after the final judgment, for in vain would judgment follow the carrying out of the sentence; but the damned will be damned and the blessed will be blessed before the day of judgment; therefore, execution will happen before judgment of the sentence that is then to happen; so the judgment would happen then in vain.

7. Again, *Psalm* 1.5, “The impious will not rise up in judgment.”

8. Again, *Matthew* 19.28, Christ says to his Apostles, “You will sit on twelve thrones judging the twelve tribes of Israel;” therefore the Apostles will not be judged.

9. And in favor of this is Gregory, *Moralia* 26.27 on *Job* 36.6 (and it is in Lombard’s text here in d.47), that “in the judgment there will be four orders;” one of the orders is those who will judge and not be judged.

10. On the contrary:

Augustine *City of God* 20.21, speaking of the end of the book of the Prophet *Isaiah* [66.22-24] says, “The prophet himself promises the ends of the Church, which will be reached through the last judgment when distinction has been made between good and bad.” There he treats at length of the words, “All flesh will come to adore in Jerusalem in my sight, and they will go out and see the members of the men who sinned against me,” using the *Septuagint* translation that he commonly used. And at the end he adds, “In the good ‘flesh’ and in the bad ‘members’ or ‘corpses’ are spoken of; assuredly is it made clear that after the resurrection (faith in which is wholly confirmed by these words for the things) there is a future judgment when the good and bad will be separated in their confines.”

I. To the Question

A. About the Divisions of Judgment

11. I reply:

Judgement is taken in general for any certain knowledge, and in this way are the senses called a judgment when they distinctly apprehend an object or distinguish an object from an object (where perhaps a more distinct apprehension is required). Hence in *On the Soul* 3.2.426b12-15, the common sense is said to judge of the sensible objects of the diverse senses.

12. In another way is a judgment said to be a certain intellectual apprehension, even any apprehension at all; and in this way definitive knowledge of anything can be called a judgment about the quiddity of the thing, according to the remark in *Ethics* 1.1.1094b27-28 that “Each person judges well what he knows, and of these things is he a good judge.”

13. Judgement is said still more properly of any true proposition, for, according to Augustine, *On Free Choice* 2 ch.14 n.152, “no one judges about eternal rules but in accord with them judges other things;” therefore a judgment is a certain apprehension of something through something else. Now every true proposition is apprehended to be true through something else, because if it is an immediate proposition it is still judged true through the ideas of the terms, according to *Posterior Analytics* I.3.72b24-25, “We know the principles insofar as we know the terms.”

14. More properly still is judgment said of a proposition that is a conclusion, because judgment is passed on a conclusion not only through the terms but through a principle.

15. Judgment is said of a practical conclusion yet more specially than of a speculative one, because a judgment is a dictate of the practical intellect consonant with justice, and justice does not regard matters of speculation but of practice.

16. Again more specially: since a law not only determines things to be done and avoided, but determines the rewards to be given for good merits and the punishments to be given for bad merits (so that from love of rewards men may be drawn to acting well, and from fear of penalties or punishments drawn away from acting badly), judgement is more properly taken as a certain determination about rewards or punishments to be given than as a determination about other practical truths. Now although anyone could elicit these truths from practical principles and thus make judgment by a process of reasoning, as it were, yet still judgment is more strictly taken as it pertains to him who has authority to make determinations, according to the remark (Gregory, *Decretals* II tit.1 ch.4, Gratian, *Decretals* p.2 cause 11 q.1 ch.49, Justinian, *Code* 7 ch.48 nn.1, 4), “A sentence passed by one who is not judge of it is null.”

17. The most complete idea, then, of judgment rests in this, that it is ‘complete and authentic determination of rewarding someone according to his merits’. I say ‘complete’ as to firm determination of the intellect and effective determination of the will, that is, of a will that is able and intends to reward according to the determination of the intellect. And this is what is specified by the word ‘authentic’, because by this is understood that it belongs to him who, according to his effective volition, can bring into effect the determination of the intellect and the determination of the will.

18. From this is in general plain the division of judgment into that of approval and that of condemnation; because certain things can be manifest to a judge from which things it follows in particular that this man is to be rewarded (namely because he merited well) or to be punished (because he merited badly); and the first sentence is one of approval and the second one of condemnation.

19. Next to these, two other sentences sometimes follow in us: namely if worthy merits be asserted for someone and the judge find the things asserted not true, a sentence follows rejecting him from the reward; likewise if some things worthy of punishment are asserted against someone and they are found not to be true, a sentence follows of absolution or of absolving him (namely, ‘we pronounce such a one, accused before us, to be innocent’).

B. About the General Judgment

20. On the second point,³⁰ I say that when judgment is taken most properly [sc. as practical judgment about reward and punishment, n.17], and according to each member of the division [sc. approval and condemnation, nn.18-19], there will be a general judgment. No demonstrative proof can be had for this, because it is less known than the resurrection and yet, as was said above [n.18], the resurrection cannot be demonstrated.

³⁰ The three points [per n.26], which are not expressly explained by Scotus, seem to refer to the three parts of the topic: future, general (universal), judgment. So the first point is about what is meant here by judgment [nn.11-19]; the second is about its generality; the third [n.26] is about its future being, or about how it will be carried out.

21. But elements of congruity can be set down.

The first is of this sort, that it is congruous for all the bad to be finally separated from the good, for ‘the bad does not live with the good save either for the purpose that the bad be corrected or that the good be exercised by the bad’, according to the remark of Augustine [*On the Psalms*, ps. 54 n.4]. But now there will come a final determination, where neither the good are to be exercised nor the bad corrected, so it is congruous for a general sentence to be finally passed; therefore congruous too for there to be a general judgment so that this general separation may appear just.

22. The second congruity is that although there is justice in the secret judgments that are made about individual persons, yet it is not manifest to everyone; therefore, it is reasonable that God have some general judgment in which the sentence or justice may be manifest that he has used in particular judgments.

23. The third congruity is that just as things come from the first efficient cause, so are they led back to the first as to their end. But besides the special goings forth of things from God through the operation that Christ speaks of in *John* 5.17, “My Father works until now, and I work,” there was one universal going forth in the first creation of things. Therefore, by similarity, it is congruous that besides individual returns to their end, there is one final return to their end and, in consequence of this, one final sentence of separating out, because the bad are not made to return.

24. The fourth, and it is nobler, is that besides the fact that each one is ascribed for the kingdom or to jail, the whole multitude foreseen to be for the kingdom and the whole other multitude for the jail should at some point be determined for the possessing of it, so that there may thus be a separating of the two families or two cities, as Augustine treats of through the whole of *City of God*.

25. So although now this person and that are individually ascribed for the kingdom, now this one and now that one for the jail, yet it is congruous for there to be a general judgment by which the whole multitude foreseen for the kingdom be sent to possess that kingdom, and the whole other multitude be left behind for the gloomy jail.

C. About the Acts of Judgment to be Passed that Precede and Complete it

26. About the third:³¹ in this judgment there will be something preceding it, namely the making known of the merits and demerits because of which such and such a sentence will be passed; and something else that completes it, namely the bringing in of the sentence and execution of it (though the passing and execution could be distinct).

D. Doubts about the Universal Judgment

1. First Doubt

27. The first doubt is whether the judgment happen in time or in an instant and, if in time, whether brief or not brief.

It is possible, indeed, that all the merits of each individual are made known to everyone, so that, as regard the manifestation of them, it is a miracle. However, let each intellect be dismissed to its own natural mode of understanding – and then, in such

³¹ See previous note.

manifestation, a long time would be required for successive understanding of the merits first of this one, second of that one, and so on about each.

28. It is, secondly, possible that to each will be made manifest his own merits or demerits in particular, and the merits and demerits of others in general.

29. And this in two ways:

Either such that each does consider individuals, yet this one as just and to be rewarded because of merits conceived in general, and that one as unjust and to be punished because of demerits conceived in general.

30. Or, in another way: not by conceiving individual persons in particular and their merits in general but conceiving both persons and merits in general, namely by conceiving that all those left behind on earth are reprobate and justly to be condemned, but that all those caught up with Christ in the clouds are just and to be rewarded.

And of these two ways the first would require a long succession, because the consideration of all persons one by one (though without consideration of all the merits) could not be done at once by the created common intellect without a miracle.

31. In a third way in general, or fourth in particular,³² it would be possible that, by the divine power (not only as manifesting things but as causing an act or acts of knowing), distinct understandings of all merits (and this as to all persons) exist simultaneously in each intellect; for things that are not repugnant formally and that can be received by some intellect successively can, by divine power, be received simultaneously by the same intellect.

32. And if this last be posited [n.31], then the preliminary stage need only be in an instant, and next the following completion, namely the sentence passed, if pronounced vocally, must be in time. If passed only mentally, it will be possible for it to be in an instant, not only as to Christ pronouncing it but as to those for whom or against whom the sentence is pronounced; for Christ would be able to make them conceive in an instant such and such a sentence.

33. About this fourth way [n.31], if the verdict there will be vocal, or the pronouncement of sentence vocal, the thing will be in time; but if it will be in an instant, both must be merely mental. And the possibility of it was already stated [n.8], because it seems more in agreement with the Gospel [*Matthew* 25.28-46] that the verdict and the pronouncement of the sentence will be vocal – whether the verdict is made manifest to individuals suddenly, or in a short time or a long time.

2. Second Doubt

34. Now as to the place, some say [Richard of Middleton] that it will be in the valley of Josaphat, according to *Joel* 3.12.

35. But the Apostle *I Thessalonians* 4.17 plainly holds that “the good will be caught up to meet Christ in the air;” the bad will be left behind on the earth, and consequently the good will not be in the valley of Josaphat. Perhaps the bad will be there, or round about in as much space as will be able to contain them. For it is perhaps conjectured by someone [Richard of Middleton] that the Judge will not go lower down in

³² The first possibility, n.27, is particular only. The next two, nn.28-30, are both particular and general. Hence this next way, n.31, is fourth in particular and third in general, provided the distinct understandings in question are of merits shown either in particular or in general.

the air that he was at the Transfiguration or the place where he was transfigured before his apostles, in which transfiguration he displayed a sign of his future glory.

II. To the Initial Arguments

36. As to the first argument [n.3], there follows in that place, “Now will the prince of this world be cast out” – the prince, namely the devil, who up to the coming of Christ ruled as prince in the world, although tyrannically. Therefore, the judgment of the world, which Christ says is ‘now’, was for that casting out, because sentence was pronounced that the devil was to be cast out through Christ’s passion.

37. As to the second from *Nahum* [n.4], and likewise as to Augustine [n.5] and the argument that follows [n.6], I say that each individual, insofar as he is a private person, is judged, even finally, when he is at the end of the life pre-established for him. But insofar as he is a part of the family destined for the royal court, or of the family destined for prison, he will be judged along with others in the final judgment.

38. And hereby is plain the response to the statement of Gregory about the four orders in judgment [n.9]:

The perfect, indeed, as regard the verdict preceding the sentence, will not be judged; nor will they, or others, be judged in the judgment that pertains to them as private persons; but the sons of the Kingdom will, in the saying from *Matthew* [25.34], “Come, you blessed of my Father, inherit the Kingdom,” be judged in the general judgment as heirs of that kingdom.

Infidels likewise, will not be judged as to the preceding verdict, for they will not be judged in the general judgment; but in the saying [*Matthew* 25.41], “Depart, you cursed,” they and others, against whom the verdict is pronounced, will be judged in common as members of the prison. And then will joy accrue to each of the elect, beyond what he had in the particular judgment, because each one will rejoice in the integrity of his city; and some punishment will accrue to each of the damned, beyond the particular judgment assigned him, because the completeness or fullness of the prison will crowd each of the prisoners in.

39. As to the passage [n.7] from the psalm “The impious will not rise up in judgment,” it is true – they will not rise up “to life,” according to what was said to Antiochus in *II Maccabees* 7.14, “But for you there will be no resurrection to life.” And this is plain from what is added in the psalm, “nor will sinners rise up in the council of the just” – whether what is taken there is ‘of the just’, that is, ‘God’s counsel about the just is that they be perpetually beatified’, or whether what is taken is ‘council of the just wherein they take counsel’, the ‘council of the just’ is in all things to agree with the divine will, and in that council the impious will not rise.

Question Two

Whether the World is to be Purged by Fire

40. Secondly I ask whether the world is to be purged by fire.

41. That it is not:

Because then fire, the same fire, would be purged by fire, and so the same thing would purge itself, which is unacceptable.

42. On the contrary:

In *Psalms* 96.3, "Fire will go before him," (and it is adduced in Lombard's text).

I. To the Question

A. Needed Preliminaries

43. I reply:

This conflagration, or purgation by conflagration, which is predicted in many authorities and especially *II Peter* 3.11-12, is possible for God in many ways, because it is possible for him in every way that does not involve a contradiction.

44. But let inquiry be about what way is more consonant with the nature of the parts of the universe:

It can be that some fire be newly created and of great or small size; and it can be that it is at once in some total breadth and thickness about the earth, and only everywhere by motion round the earth.

45. And both of them can be: namely the first, that fire be generated, and the second, that it be generated in some determinate part above the earth and not everywhere save by motion round the earth. Let enquiry, then, be about these two points, namely production of the fire and the place of the production or conservation or continuation.

B. About the Production of Infernal Fire

46. About the first point: If the fire is posited as created, it is necessary to posit that an equal amount of some other corruptible body is annihilated; or that in the whole corporeal or incorporeal substance a compressing occurs that corresponds to the quantity of this created fire; or it is necessary to posit that this created fire is together with some other body. Also, if it is posited as created, and consequently created from some other thicker body (for fire is the most subtle body among corruptible bodies), it is necessary to say that some other corruptible body is as much compressed as the body from which it is generated is rarer, or that, conversely, a rarer body is converted into a denser one proportionate to this quantity.

47. Therefore, if it were generated from air, either air would have to be converted into water, or water into earth, in as great proportion as would cover the spreading of the generated fire.

48. The thing is plain in an example: For let it be that the whole sphere of air be divided into ten parts, from one of which the fire is generated; and the fire has ten parts each one of which is equal to that [one part of air] from which the whole fire is generated – where will the nine parts [of the remaining air] have their location? Either two bodies must be together, or they must be compressed (or other bodies standing around must be) until they do not fill up the place of nine parts [of air]. But if this happen by the conversion of these nine parts into water, a place for the converted fire will be obtained even though there be no compression of anything else; because those nine [parts of air] do not generate one part of water, but almost do,³³ which [one part of water], along with nine previously generated parts of fire (one of the parts is located in the place of the air

³³ If ten parts of air are assumed to produce, on conversion, one part of water, then nine parts of air will produce, on conversion, something less than one part of water.

corrupted into fire), fill the whole place of the ten parts of air. And then there would be a flood of water along with the flaming of the fire, though not in as great a quantity as is the flaming of the fire; for the water would exceed the preexisting water in a part that is a tenth of the generated new fire.³⁴

C. About the Place of Infernal Fire

48. On the second point [n.45]: Since fire only remains outside its sphere in continuous generation (according to the remark of the Philosopher, *On Youth and Old Age* [5.470a3-5], “it is always coming to be”), how would it persist in any complete sphere round the earth? How also would it purify things, since purification is only by the consuming of something impure, as of vapors or other such mixed bodies, in which there is impurity of air?

D. More Probable Solution

50. Briefly, then, as to the first article, it seems more probable that, just as fire can exist outside its sphere in foreign matter, namely in an ignited body, as burning coal or flame (not that the form of fire is truly in the solid parts, unless it be posited that disparate specific parts together perfect the same matter, which seems unacceptable), so can the vapors existing in the air be ignited by juxtaposition [sc. with the sphere of fire]. And this successive ignition, now of these vapors, now of those (at least for all the air placed above the habitable region of men), can be called the conflagration.

51. And by it is the air well purified, because ignited bodies are converted at once into true and pure air. Since the air is predominant in its region, and since the ignited body, because of mutual contrary qualities in it, namely fire and vapor, resists the air a little (for it also in a way acts for the destruction of itself, but non-ignited vapor was not thus at once convertible by fire into pure air), it is apparent how flame thus has power for purifying gross air. For by the preceding action of an ignited body, and a body having a fiery quality in its watery self and having substantially the quality of water, the gross air is disposed by the containing body so as to be at once converted into what contains it.

³⁴ Scotus follows the prevailing view, derived from philosophical tradition, that the elements of the physical world are the four of earth, water, air, and fire, with earth being the grossest and fire the subtlest, and with earth at the center and the others round it (in progressive order of subtlety) at different levels or spheres. His example is complex, nevertheless, in expression, but it seems to amount to the following. The whole of the existing air is divided into ten parts and one of these parts is converted into fire. The converted fire itself has ten parts and, being less dense than air, these ten parts together fill up the space of all ten parts of air even though only one part of air was used to generate the ten parts of fire. So, there are nine parts of air remaining that have no place left to exist in. Either then they occupy the same place as the generated fire (so that more than one body is in the same place), or the air is compressed, or other surrounding bodies are, until the nine parts of air no longer fill up the same place as before. If this compression happens by conversion of the nine parts of air into water, and this water fills the same place as one part of air or a bit less (and so the same as one part of fire or a bit less), there will be a flood of water that exceeds any pre-existing water by a part that is equivalent to a tenth part, or a bit less, of the generated fire.

The oddity here is that this new water will be in the same place as a tenth part, or almost, of the fire. For the fire converted from one part of air occupies the place of all ten parts of air, so that the nine parts of air not converted into fire and now assumed to be converted into one part or less of water (and so compressed into the equivalent of the place previously occupied by one part or less of air) must occupy the place occupied by one part or less of fire. The flood will indeed be a flood.

And thus is pure air generated, which was not able thus to convert into itself a larger amount of gross vapor.³⁵

II. To the Initial Arguments

52. To the argument [n.41] I say that fire always remains pure in itself with natural purity, because it is supremely active (such that it would at once convert into itself anything of an extraneous nature that would ascend to that region [of fire]), and because nothing rises by the action of heavenly bodies to the region of pure fire, so as thus to make fire impure. Now it is specifically this impurity from the smoke of sacrifices offered to idols and from infection from the sins of men that does not ascend to the sphere of fire, because neither that smoke nor any other infection from impure acts can ascend to the fire. But this purifying is posited because of the impurity of the air that is contracted from acts of human sin; therefore, it does not follow that the fire purifies itself.

Forty Eighth Distinction

Question One

Whether Christ will Judge in Human Form

1. “A question also accustomed to be asked is what form Christ will judge in” [Lombard, *Sent.* IV d.48 ch.1 n.1].

2. About this forty eighth distinction I ask whether Christ will judge in human form.

3. That he will not:

Judging belongs only to someone who has power and lordship over the one judged; Christ as to his human nature is our brother; therefore he is not lord.

4. Again, Augustine *On John's Gospel* tr.19 n.15 [or *Gloss ad loc.*, Nicholas of Lyra], commenting on *John* 5.21, “The Son makes alive those whom he will” (and it is in Lombard's text [*Sent.* IV d.48 ch.3 n.2]), says, “Not the Father but the Son raises bodies, according to the dispensation of his humanity, wherein he is less than the Father.” And he adds, “But according as he is God he makes souls alive.” But judging pertains more to the soul than the body; therefore, it does not belong to Christ save as he is God.

5. Again, if he will judge in human form, then either in glorious form or in non-glorious form.

If in glorious form, two unacceptable things follow: first that the glorious body could be seen by bodily eye, and that a non-glorious bodily eye, because the damned will see him, according to *John* 19.37, “They will see him whom they pierced;” second, that

³⁵ According to the traditional theory of the disposition of the four elements in their pure state, earth is naturally below water which is naturally below air which is naturally below fire. Impure air is impure by containing earthly elements, but when earthly elements (body) are burning, they take on the quality of water (dissipating and becoming fissile, even exuding water), and so rise from the earthly to the watery element, that is, to the element next to the element of air. The previously impure air is now without most of its grosser elements and also now next to the element of air, by contact with which it becomes at once pure air. Thus can fire purify air of its grosser elements so that it becomes pure air.

then the damned would delight in the vision of that glorious form (for what is delightful, present, and perceived by sense, causes delight); but the damned will have no delight in seeing the Judge, but grief and fear.

If the second [in non-glorious form], this seems contrary to *Luke* 21.27, that he will come “in great power and majesty.”

6. On the contrary:

John 5.27, “He has given him power to judge, because he is the Son of man.”

Therefore, the power of judging is given him as to his human nature.

7. Again, *Job* 36.17, “Your cause has been judged as that of someone wicked; therefore, may you undertake the judgment and the cause,” is said of Christ, and the first part is only true according to his human nature; therefore etc.

I. To the Question

A. Opinion of Thomas Aquinas

1. Exposition of the Opinion

8. Here it is said [Thomas Aquinas, *Sent.* IV d.48 q.1 a.1] that Christ will judge in the form of a servant.

9. The reason is of this sort, that: “judgment requires lordship in the one who judges, according to *Romans* 14.4, ‘Who are you, who judge the servant of another?’ Therefore, it belongs to Christ to judge in the respect in which he has lordship over men; but he is lord of men not only by reason of creation but also by reason of redemption. Hence *Romans* 14.9, ‘For Christ died and rose for this, that he might be lord of the living and the dead’. Therefore, power of judging belongs to him in the nature in which he is redeemer.”

10. Again: “The judgment is ordered toward this, that some may be admitted to the kingdom and some excluded. But the attaining of the Kingdom does not belong to man because of the goods of creation by themselves, for the impediment coming from the sin of the first parent has supervened on them, and if this impediment were not removed by the merit of the redemption, no one would be admitted to the Kingdom. Therefore, it is fitting that Christ, insofar as he is redeemer, should preside over that judgment in his human nature, just as that judgment, by the favor of the redemption displayed in that nature, introduces into the Kingdom.”

11. This is confirmed by *Acts* 10.42, “He has been constituted by God judge of the living and the dead.”

12. And from this is deduced further that: “since by the redemption of the human race in general the whole of human nature is made better, as is contained in *Colossians* 1.20, ‘Making peace by the blood of his cross, whether things in heaven or things that are on earth’, therefore has Christ through his cross merited lordship, and so judiciary power, not only over men but over every creature; hence *Matthew* 28.18, ‘All power has been given to me in heaven and on earth’.”

13. But it is added that he will not in his deity appear terrible to everyone in judgment, because he could not appear without joy, and the impious then will have no joy.

14. The proof of the first point [n.13, sc. he could not appear without joy] is that: “in something delightful can be considered the thing that is delightful and the reason for

its delightfulness. And just as, according to Boethius *De Hebdomadibus*, ‘that which is can have something over and above its ‘to be’, but the ‘to be’ has nothing admixed with it besides itself’, so can ‘the thing that is delightful’ have something admixed with it because of which it is not delightful; but that which is the reason for delightfulness can have nothing because of which it not be delightful. Therefore, the things that are delightful by participation in goodness, which is the reason for delightfulness, are able not to give delight when apprehended; but it is impossible that that which is goodness in its essence not give delight when apprehended.”

15. This [n.13, sc. the impious will then have no joy] can be confirmed through the *John* 17.3, “This is eternal life, to know thee;” therefore eternal life consists in that vision. But eternal life cannot be had without joy; therefore, in no way is conceded to the reprobate that which eternal life consists in.

2. Rejection of the Opinion in Itself

16. Against the first conclusion of this opinion [n.8]. It is one thing to say ‘Christ will judge *in* human form’ and another to say ‘Christ will judge *according to* human form’. For this proposition is true, that ‘Christ in human form creates souls’, but not this one, ‘Christ according to human form creates [souls]’. Rather, whatever he made (namely whatever the Word made from the time he assumed human nature, because he did not, in his act of making, set aside his human nature), he made in his human nature, unless you restrict the phrase ‘in his human nature’ to mean what is meant by ‘according to his human nature’, where is to be noted not only the concomitance of the human nature with the act, but the causality of the human nature with respect to the act.

17. If you understand the remark ‘Christ will judge in human nature’ in the first way, the question is not other than the same as this one, ‘whether, when he judges, he will set aside his human nature’.

18. Therefore, in order for there to be a question, another understanding must be obtained, which is more properly expressed thus, ‘Christ will judge according to his human nature’. But this is false when speaking of ‘to judge as principal judge’. Proof: principal judgment (as can be got from what was said above in the preceding distinction [d.47, n.17]) is the perfect and proper determination of what is to be rendered to someone according to his merits; but this perfect determination includes a perfect dictate of the intellect that this is to be so rendered, and a complete determination of the will through an efficacious willing that is sufficient of itself for the execution of what has been determined.

19. But Christ according to his human nature cannot have such a willing with respect to the reward to be rendered to a person judged, because he cannot have principal command efficacious for uniting any soul to the beatific object, for according to Augustine *On Seeing God* 6.18 [quoting Ambrose *On Luke*] “It is in God’s power to be seen; for if he wills, he is seen; if he does not will, he is not seen.”

3. Rejection of the Conclusions of the Opinion

20. As to the reasons for this conclusion [nn.9-15], they do not prove it as regard principal judgment [n.18], because Christ did not, through the act of redemption, merit principal lordship with respect to man [n.9].

21. Proof: for Christ as he is redeemer possessed the idea of a cause that is meritorious for us; but a cause that is only meritorious cannot be a principal cause; for it only causes because it is accepted by some more principal cause, which principal cause, because of what it has accepted, does the principal causing. Therefore, let it be that, because of the redemption, we are bound to the Trinity as to supreme Lord by some new right, beyond the right of lordship that the Trinity has from creation (which would be true if redemption, as accepted by the Trinity, were as great a good for us as creation) – still, it does not follow that it is by reason of the redemption that we are obliged to Christ as supreme Lord according to his human nature.

22. Likewise as to the second point [nn.10-12, 19], because, insofar as he is redeemer, he does not introduce as principal introducer but only as meritorious cause.

23. Against the second conclusion [n.13]: an absolute naturally prior to something else can without contradiction exist without that something else; the vision of the divine essence is something absolute, at least as to any relation to joy, and is naturally prior to that joy, for an object does not cause delight if it is not first apprehended. Therefore, the vision of the essence could, without contradiction, exist in someone without delight.

24. Nor would the Philosopher deny this save because he would posit a simply necessary conjunction of causes in the universe, such that (according to him) it is simply necessary for the first cause to act along with second causes, according as it can act along with them. But by acting along with an intellectual nature (to the extent it can act along with it), an intellectual nature that already sees the divine essence, delight follows, because by acting along with the proximate cause of that effect it is, as far as it itself is concerned, necessitated to that effect.

25. But theologians deny this proposition: ‘whatever a second cause, as far as concerns itself, is necessitated to, the first cause is necessitated to’; because they deny that the first necessarily acts, as far as it can, along with the second.

26. The reasoning [n.14] is not valid; for it only proves that the idea of delightfulness, which is goodness, cannot not be delightful. But the conclusion does not hold that ‘therefore it cannot not cause delight’, because ‘the delightful’ asserts something in itself, or if it states a respect, only an aptitudinal one, which necessarily follows the foundation; but ‘to cause delight’ states a contingently causable later effect, especially because of the divine will’s contingent determination for acting along with the delightful thing itself.

27. To the confirmation from John 17 [n.15], I reply (without the authority’s gloss [sc. Aquinas’ gloss there]), according to the Philosopher in *Metaphysics* 12.7.1072b26-27, “An act of intellect is life;” therefore an act of an eternal intellect is eternal life – if actually so, actually; if aptitudinally so, aptitudinally. But now the vision of the divine essence, if it were conceded to the damned, although it would not be eternal actually, yet it would be so aptitudinally (as far as concerns the side of the possible act or power), or it would be apt to be eternal, and therefore to be eternal life; but if you infer from this, ‘therefore it would be beatitude’, the conclusion does not follow.

28. Rather, if you say that Christ says that ‘in this is beatitude [sc. and not ‘eternal life’], that they know you etc.’, then you do not accept the text of the Gospel but a certain

gloss of a more particular understanding of the letter of it. So if you wish to weigh the word precisely without any gloss, the solution is that the word is ‘eternal life’; but if you wish to argue through certain glosses that it is speaking of beatitude, then it is permitted for me likewise to add a gloss that does not distract the text: ‘to know you’ by loving and enjoying.

B. Scotus’ own Response to the Question

29. To the question. Taking as supposition (from d.47 n.17) that judgment is a complete determination of that which is to be rendered to someone for his merits, and that this complete determination includes a perfect determination of the intellect about it and a perfect ‘willing’ of the will (efficacious willing [nn.18-19] not just any willing), it follows that ‘to judge as principal’ includes ‘to dictate as principal’ and ‘to have efficacious willing as principal’. But nothing is said to do something as principal that is subordinate, in its acting, to some second thing as principal; therefore, ‘to judge as principal’ only belongs to an intellectual nature whose intellect is not subordinate to some other in its dictating, and whose will is not subordinate to something in its efficacious willing – which efficacious willing can be said to consist in so commanding the willed thing that on the command the effect follow.

30. But as it is, the intellect of Christ’s soul is subordinate to divine truth in dictating, and especially about things about which there can only be a certain dictating if it follows from rules determined by a divine will contingently disposed with respect to them (of which sort are all things that regard the beatitude and misery of those to be judged). But the will of the soul of Christ is subordinate to the divine will in rightly willing; and to the extent it efficaciously wills something by commanding it efficaciously (such that by its command the thing come about), it is necessarily subordinate to the divine will, because the will of his soul is not omnipotent. Therefore, it is impossible for Christ according to his human nature to judge as principal. For, in brief, the whole of created nature together does not have efficacious command with respect to the fact that ‘this soul sees God’. I call ‘efficacious command’ a command on which, from the command itself in itself, and not from another cause, the effect follow. Nor would the will of Christ presume to command as principal that Peter will be blessed, but only to command in subjection to the true author, as that the command become efficacious from another as the superior, in virtue of whom the command is made.

31. In another way ‘to command’ can be taken, not as being such altogether principal commanding, but as a commanding by commission or in subjection to the true author, a command excelling with a singular excellence, namely an excellence by which there could not be by commission any authority that is higher.

32. And in this way I concede that Christ judges according to his soul, for although it could be committed to a pure creature that its intellect would rightly dictate about retribution, and that its will would rightly will, and that on its right willing would always follow the happening of the thing willed (although not causally from itself, but from the divine will always enforcing that efficacious willing) – yet it could not be committed to a pure creature that its every willing would be fulfilled by the same [created] person, because then a pure creature would be omnipotent. Therefore, the highest commission possible is that not only would everything that was determined by

the will infallibly come about, but that it would come about by the same person whose will it was, so that thus that person would have an efficacious command, whose created will determines in its own order as much as it can the coming about of something.

33. In this way does the will of Christ's soul make determination with subordinate authority and with this sort of subordinate commission, because although that will not command as principal, just as it is not lord as principal, however it does well give command (as having lordship with respect to what is commanded) but it commands as commissioned (because it commands as having lordship subordinate to the supreme lordship of God) – and yet it does so command that its command has, from that person, complete efficacy. And if someone attribute another authority of judging to the soul of Christ, it seems to be blasphemy, by attributing to created nature what is proper to the Creator.

34. Now this way, just as it does not concede omnipotence to the soul of Christ, so neither does it deny to it the highest excellence that can belong to a creature.

35. Nor should the authorities adduced for the opinion (*Romans*, “that he may be lord of living and dead,” and *Acts*, “judge of living and dead,” and *Matthew*, “all power has been given to me” [nn.9, 11, 12]) be understood of principal, but of subordinate, lordship and judiciary authority or power, yet of the most eminent kind that can exist under the principal.

II. To the Initial Arguments

36. To the first argument [n.3] I say that Christ as man has power the most eminent by commission, but not principal power; and so it does not belong to him as man to be principal judge.

37. As to the second [n.4], the remark of Augustine is stated by way of appropriation, as the Master expounds in the text [*Sent.* IV d.48 ch.3 n.3]; or one can say that the making alive of souls belongs to the deity alone, and this whether as to first life, which is justification, or as to perfect life, which is beatitude. But the resuscitating of bodies and judgement can belong to the man Christ as commanding, although with command subject to the true author, because he can have a less principal dominion with respect to bodies, at any rate when taking ‘resurrection’ for the preparatory stages that are carried out by the ministry of angels; for Christ has efficacious command with respect to the power of angels. Similarly, he will have himself, even according to his human nature, efficacious command for passing sentences.

38. To the next [n.5] I say that he will appear in glorious form, because from the fact of his having been once glorified, he will never be not glorified, just as after his resurrection he will never be not immortal (*Romans* 6.9, “Death will no longer have dominion over him”) – and so on about the other things that belong to the glory of the body. But if you take the ‘appear’ not for ‘what sort of body he will have in himself’, but for ‘what sort of body will be seen by those to be judged’, one can say that the glorious form will be seen by the blessed; for they will already in the judgment be blessed who were even in the body the elect.

38. But about the bad there is a difficulty. It can be said either that they will not see the glorious form, indeed not any form (and then it will be necessary to give some exposition for ‘they will see him whom they pierced’), or that they will see Christ in his

glorious body. Nor does any delight follow from this, because it is very possible for the vision of an agreeable object to be separated from delight, as was touched on against the other opinion [of Aquinas, n.26]; nor is it unacceptable for a non-glorious eye to see a glorious body (see on this the material about endowments in d.49 [Rep. IVA d.49 q.11, esp. nn.3-4]).

40. But against this: if the verse is brought forward from *Isaiah* 26.10, “Let the impious be taken away, lest he see the glory of God” – there is a sort of dialogue there between God and the prophet, which latter brings allegation against the impious ‘lest he see the glory of God’ [cf. Jerome *On Isaiah* VIII 26 nn.10-21]; and this remark from that place, “within the land of the saints let them see,” is the word of the prophet, according to those who read the text as falling under the same prophet.

41. In another way there is a better reading, such that there is an allegation by the prophet against the impious, “he has done iniquity in the land of the saints,” and then follows as a question a word of the Lord, “and they will not see the glory of the Lord?”, as if he is saying, “may they not see?” The prophet replies, “Lord, let your hand be exalted so that they do not see.” God replies, “Let them see, so that the zealous of the people be confounded.” And this last ‘let them see’ is referred to the eternal vision, not only to vision in the judgment; and then the ‘let them see, so that they be confounded’ does not belong to the same thing, but ‘let them see’, supply: ‘let the impious converted through mercy see’, and from this comes ‘let the zealous of the people be confounded’, because by a sort of zeal they do not want mercy to be shown to the impious.

42. But if the passage be taken only about vision during judgment, then the understanding can be that ‘the impious even then are not adjudged fit to see glory’, that is, the glorious form of Christ’s body, ‘and let them be confounded’, because the vision will rather cause confusion and sadness than delight. However, the sense of the text is more about vision in the form of deity than of humanity.

Question Two

Whether in or after the Judgment the Motion of the Heavenly Bodies will Cease

43. I ask second whether in or after the judgment the motion of the heavenly bodies will cease.

44. That it will not:

In *Genesis* 1.14 it is said: “Let there be lights etc., and let them be for signs and for times, and for days and years,” and they seem to have been made for this end; but this cannot be had without the motion of them.

45. Again in *Genesis* 8.22, “For all the days of the earth, summer and winter, night and day, will not rest.”

46. Again, *Metaphysics* 9.8.1050b22-24, “The sun always acts, and the stars and the whole heaven; and there is no need to fear lest they should at any point stop, which some fear about nature.” And he adds a double proof as it were:

47. The first is this [*ibid.* 24-30]: “Nor do things that always act always labor.” And he treats more of this reason in *On the Heavens* 2.1.284a14-18, which reason rests, as it were, on this: ‘No agent ceases to move unless it is wearied in doing so’.

48. Another reason he touches on there [*Metaphysics, ibid.*], “For motion is not in these corruptible things as to potency of contradiction [sc. motion is not in them as

something that could either be or not be], so that the continuing of the motion be laborious,” as if the minor were as follows: “These movements are not fatiguing, because there is no potency of contradiction in them”. And further he proves this supposition there [*ibid.* 27-28], “For matter, substance, and potency (and not potency in act) are cause of this, namely of contradiction.”

49. Again, the universe will not be more imperfect after the judgment than it is now; therefore, the principal bodies of the universe will not then lose any of their proper perfection; but motion is a proper perfection of the supra-heavenly bodies, or it is required for their perfection, because otherwise their motion would be vain.

50. Again, the motion of the heaven is either natural or violent; it is not violent, because “nothing violent is perpetual,” *On the Heavens* 1.2.269b7-9. Such motion, if it is natural, can be perpetual; therefore, the opposing rest is violent, and consequently it will not be perpetual.

51. On the contrary:

In the text [of Lombard, *Sent.* IV d.48 ch.4], “Then there will not be change of day and night;” and he proves it from *Zechariah* 14.7, “There will be one day that is known to the Lord; not day and not night.”

52. Again, Isidore [Ps.-Isidore, *On the Order of Creatures*, 5. nn.6-7] and it is in the text [of Lombard, *ibid.* ch.5 n.6]: “After the judgment the sun will receive the reward of his labor; and neither sun nor moon will set, but will stand in the order in which they were created, lest the impious in prison, placed beneath the earth, enjoy their light; hence *Habbakuk* 3.11, ‘Sun and moon have stopped in their habitation’.” So Isidore.

I. To the Question

53. In this question one must see first what the Philosopher thought, second what the theologians thought.

A. About the Opinion of Aristotle

54. About the first point the answer is sufficiently plain from his intention, in diverse places, that he thought the motion of the heaven would last perpetually. For this he posited one reason, in *Metaphysics* 12.8.1074a17-23, as follows: “If it is necessary to reckon that every impassible substance has been allotted the best end, there will be no other impassible substance besides these,” besides these that are active causes of local motion.

55. From this the argument goes: if the best end of a separate substance is in causing the local motion of a celestial body, and if any such substance cannot lack its end, then it cannot not move.

56. This reasoning is derided by some [Richard of Middleton] who do not understand it as the Philosopher posed it, because even according to the Philosopher, *Ethics* 10.8.1178b7-8, *Metaphysics* 11.7.1064a33-b5, the perfection of these separate substances consists in speculation of truth; so their end even according to him is not, the way he seems to take it here, to move a body

57. But the procedure in this objection begins from an equivocation:

For the end in one way is the end that perfects, and thus is beatitude in the intellect or the will posited as the internal end of a separate substance, and the object of that act is posited as the external end (and this is what Aristotle himself understood in the *Ethics*, *ibid.*); and this end is the end simply.

58. In another way the end is said to be the ultimate result of the perfection of a thing, although it not be perfective of the thing. And in this way the Philosopher would say that not only are those separate substances perfect in themselves, but that from the fullness of their perfection it is necessary that they communicate that perfection to others; and thus are they allotted not only a first end but a second. This second end cannot be had without the motion of some celestial body.

59. This reasoning [n.55], thus understood [nn.57-58], can be formulated as follows: the most perfect substance does not lack anything that belongs to substance from the perfection of substance, whether that is the intrinsic perfection of it or the communication of its perfection outwardly; but to substance from the perfection of substance belongs that it not only be perfected in itself but that it communicate its perfection to another – by producing it; therefore this belongs most of all to impassible substances.

60. But they cannot produce any substance save by moving the heaven. This Aristotle himself supposes as having been made clear, in *Metaphysics* 7.2.1028b18-21, against the ideas of Plato.

61. That this is the mind of Aristotle and of the philosophers is accepted by Avicenna in his *Metaphysics* 1 ch.3, where he maintains that, in one way, metaphysics is useful for the other sciences because it directs and rules them (in which way too it can be conceded that a lord is useful to a servant, according to Avicenna there). But conversely, when taking ‘utility’ properly, it only belongs to another thing in view of an end; and in this way are the other sciences useful to metaphysics, and the servant useful to the lord. Therefore in the same way it will be possible, since ‘utility’ is equivocal, for ‘end’ also to be equivocal, so that to utility said in the first way there correspond the end that is the term and not the end that consummates, and to utility said in the second way there correspond the end of perfection.

Hence no philosopher posits that a necessity of externally acting belongs to the separate substances as if the things produced were to perfect the producing substances in some way; but that it is from the fullness of the perfection of those substances that they necessarily diffuse themselves to other substances.

62. The second reason of the Philosopher is as follows: anything that is permanent and sempiternal in relation to anything else that is permanent and sempiternal always and necessarily is disposed in the same way (the proof of this is that a relation between certain things cannot vary save by variation in one or other extreme; the extremes are thus [invariable] extremes if the sempiternal things are invariable). But the Intelligence that moves [the heaven] is a certain permanent and sempiternal substance, and the heaven is likewise; therefore, the sempiternal thing here has the same disposition to the other thing, as mover to moved.

63. If you object, “so when will a different disposition of the sempiternal to anything else begin?” – I reply: according to Aristotle, the first difference is in the parts of the uniform sempiternal motion (or uniform as a whole according to him); for because the motion is uniform from the uniform relation of a movable to a mover, therefore it has

new different parts, and from this difference of parts another difference or variety can follow in the substances that are generated in this way. And thus from uniform causes, namely the Intelligence and the heaven and their being in uniform relation to each other, some uniform thing consisting of different parts, as motion, is first caused, and by means of that motion other things simply different are caused.

64. The third reason: whatever is in beings is either simply necessary in being or is for the most part or for the least part or open to either side. In the heavens nothing is open to either side nor for the least part, because both these would be marks of imperfection repugnant to such a body. Nor is anything there for the most part, because then sometimes the opposite would chance to be, albeit for the least part, which has never been seen (for never has the opposite of anything belonging to those regular motions come about³⁶); therefore, whatever is there is simply necessary.

B. About the Opinion of the Theologians

65. The theologians commonly maintain the opposite.

66. For this they adduce authorities and reasons:

One authority is *Isaiah* 60.19 (and it is in Lombard's text, *Sent.* IV d.48 ch.5 n.5), "For you there will be sun no more to give light through the day." But this authority, as Master Lombard replies adducing Jerome *On Isaiah* XVII.60 19, "does not say that sun and moon do not then shine (which however the words seem to indicate), but what is signified is that there is no use of light for those who will then be in eternal life and beatitude." Hence Jerome says, "The office of sun and moon will cease, and the Lord himself will be the light in perpetuity for his own." The like meaning has the authority from *Revelation* 21.23, "The city does not need light."

67. Another authority adduced is from *Revelation* 10.6-7, "The angel swore an oath that, after this, there will be no more time." But it could be given an exposition, that 'there will be no more time' for the fulfilment of prophecy, because now all will be fulfilled.

68. The reason is brought forward of this sort: the motion of the heavens is for generation and corruption as though for its end; therefore when generation ceases, such motion will be vain. And this is confirmed by *On Generation* 2.11.338b1-5, where the Philosopher maintains that the carrying round of the sun in an oblique circle by the daily motion is necessary so that the generation and corruption of things here below may be continuous; and by *Physics* 2.2.194a34-35, "For we are in a way the end of all things."

69. But the Philosopher would deride this reasoning. For never would he posit a more ignoble thing as the end of a more noble thing, when speaking of a perfecting end, but only of a consequent or terminating end in some way or other. And then from the failing of such end, which failing however he would deny, he would posit that there will be a future end of the more noble thing, because he posits perpetual generation just as

³⁶ The observation at any rate of irregularities among the regularities has led to the replacement of this philosophical and Aristotelian system of necessities with our modern quantum mechanical and Einsteinian relative system of necessities. There is still necessity and still system, but a different system. The possibility of thinking a different system, however, was provided, not so much by different observations, as by the theologians next discussed who thought that this system, however consistent with observations, was not inevitable but optional and could, by divine omnipotence, be otherwise.

also motion of the heaven. However, from this failing, if it were posited, the failing of the motion of the heaven would not follow, just as neither does the failing of the cause follow from the failing of the effect, especially if the failing of the effect is not because of the failing of this cause but of some other cause – the way a theologian must say that generation does not fail because of the failing of the heaven in its causality, but because of the divine will.

70. And when it is said the motion is vain [n.68], this has no plausibility, because a thing is not vain if it has its perfecting end, even though no further extrinsic end, which is not a perfecting end, come from it – just as neither was God vain from eternity though he had not created things externally, which things are in a way an end.

71. The authority from *Physics* 2 [n.68] can be given exposition: ‘end of all things’, supply ‘of all generable and corruptible things’, because man is noblest among those, and is in this respect in some way a perfecting end.

C. Scotus’ own Response

1. Neither Way or Conclusion is Proved Necessarily

72. To the question it can be said that the Philosopher fails to prove his conclusion necessarily and the theologians fail as well, not to say failing to do so by necessary reason, but even failing to do so by evident authority of Scripture.

73. And it is plain from what has been said how what is adduced for the second way [sc. that of the theologians] is solved. But the reasons for the Philosopher’s way will be solved later [nn.97-102].

74. What then? The first part [sc. that of the Philosopher] seems to be proved more than the second; although the second part [sc. that of the theologians] is not got expressly from Scripture, it does seem to agree more with the words of the saints and of Scripture.

So the *possibility* of each part can be proved.

2. A More Probable Proof of Both Ways

75. The first part [n.74] is proved easily, and that commonly according to both the theologians and the philosophers. For just as the moving second causes are sufficient to cause motion for all time from the beginning of the world to the judgment, so are they able to cause movement infinitely: for the virtue of the infinite mover [sc. God] is sufficient for causing motion of itself in its order as first cause, and the other virtues are, by virtue of the infinite mover, sufficient for causing motion sempiternally.

76. The possibility of the second part [sc. of the theologians, n.74] is proved, but not from what the philosophers concede but only from what the theologians concede, namely that the will of God is contingently disposed toward moving the heaven and not moving the heaven. When the first cause is contingently disposed to the effect, the effect is simply contingent, and the effect is able simply not to be from the fact that the [first] cause is simply able in its own order not to cause; and when it does not cause, nothing else will cause.

77. This [possibility of both parts] is proved in another way from the side of the movable itself, because the motion of the heaven is neither natural nor violent [sc. forced].

It is not natural, as Avicenna proves, *Metaphysics* 9 ch.2, first because, when it reached what it was naturally moved toward, it would naturally come to rest, because natural motion is toward natural rest in that toward which the motion is; and consequently motion away from that would be violent. And then further, since it is always the case that while there is approaching of one part [of the heaven] to some 'where', there is a receding of another part from that same 'where' (indeed, after any part has passed that 'where', it is, while it is approaching another 'where', receding from that [first] 'where' according to the diverse parts of the circle in which it is moved) – [since this is so] it follows that the same thing is moved naturally and violently at the same time.

78. Nor is the motion of the heaven violent, because then the receding from it would be natural, and then, as before, it would be natural and violent at the same time.

79. Therefore, on the part of the movable itself, there is no repugnance either to its motion being continued or to its motion coming to an end.

3. Objections against the Second Way

80. Against the second way, which is that of the theologians, objection is made as follows:

After the judgment there will be succession in the thoughts of the saints, or at least of the damned, and also in acts of the imaginative power; such succession cannot be without time, because according to Averroes, *Physics* 4 com.98, 100, 106, 'On Time', if anyone were not to perceive any change save only in an act of imagining, he would still perceive time; so if time will then be, and time will not be able to be without the motion of the heaven (because time is a property of the first motion, *Physics* 4.12.220b24-28), then etc.

81. Again, if the celestial bodies were to stop, they would have an excessive action on the bodies placed beneath them; because when the sun approaches, more is generated from the higher elements and more is corrupted from the inferior elements; conversely when it recedes. Therefore, when the sun is standing perpetually above some part of the hemisphere, excessively more of fire would be generated in that part and more of water and earth would be corrupted; and so, in the region placed beneath it, the distinct order of the elementary spheres would not stand. Nor similarly would this order stand in the opposite part either, because the opposite manner of generation and corruption would be there. Or, alternatively, two bodies would exist together, or there would be excessive compression.³⁷ The same result would hold of the mixed bodies – provided however that some mixed bodies were posited as then remaining; for the celestial bodies that are standing directly above that region would corrupt the mixed bodies, and at length corrupt them all (placed beneath the virtue of the celestial bodies) into things agreeing to the virtue of their elements.

82. Again, in any essential order, when the first is destroyed, everything after it is destroyed, *Metaphysics* 2.2.994a18-19; the celestial motion is the simply first motion

³⁷ Sc. if there were generation but no corruption, the increase in the amount of material bodies would mean either that several bodies were in the same place or that they were excessively compressed together.

(from *Physics* 8.9.265a13); therefore, when it is destroyed, it is impossible for any other motion to exist. But it will be possible for some other motion to exist, namely the local motion of blessed men, and also some other motion in these inferior parts; for if an active force come close to a passive object, as fire to anything combustible, there is no reason for it not to be able to act on it. And in favor of this is an article [of the magisterium]: the statement “when the heaven is at a standstill, if fire be applied to tallow, it will not be able to burn it” is an error.³⁸

83. Again, if the sun were to stand always on the opposite side of the earth, there would always be darkness, for since the earth is an opaque body, it is necessary that, when obstructing that luminary body [sc. the sun], it would create beyond itself a cone of shadow.

4. Rejection of the Aforesaid Objections

84. To the first [n.80] reply is stated as follows, that time is not in the motion of the heaven as one quantity in another quantity, because there is no need to posit two such quantities in the same permanent quantum, one of which is as it were the subject and the other as it were the property. Therefore, time adds over and above motion (as motion includes its own succession) only the idea formally of measure, and adds only those ideas that are fundamentally required for measurement, which ideas are uniformity or regularity and velocity; because measure is what is most certain as to the first idea, namely regularity or uniformity, and least as to the second idea, namely velocity. But there will not then [sc. at the judgment] remain any quickest motion, or at any rate not a uniform or regular one; and then in no motion will there be based the idea of a measure for all other motion. And therefore time will not exist in the way in which it is now posited to be a property of the first motion.

85. If you argue that a thing measured cannot be without a measure, I say that this is true of the measure of a thing in its quidditative essence. And the reason is that ‘this sort of measured thing depends on this sort of measure’ (*Metaphysics* 5.15.1020b30-31, on ‘relation’); for the measured thing is referred to the measure and not conversely, just as the knowable is the measure of knowledge because knowledge depends on the knowable. Now this assumption is true of an accidental measure, which measures a thing by application to it or by co-existence with it, the way an arm measures cloth; for it is plain that the amount of cloth does not depend on the size of the arm; and in this second way, the first motion, taken according to its own successive extension along with its relation of measurement to other motions, is the measure of them by application or co-existence, and not by being the term of dependence. In favor of this response, *Joshua* 10-12-13 is brought forward, because Joshua fought while sun and moon stood still, and consequently while the whole heaven stood still, so that, with sun and moon standing still and all the other bodies moving, there would not be too much irregularity in the motion of the other celestial bodies. For this view there is also Augustine, *Confessions* 11 ch.23 n.29, where he maintains that if the heaven stood still the potter’s wheel would still move. (Look for argument contrary to this.)

86. To the second [n.81]: this reasoning should not move us to posit, for the sake of avoiding such excessive action in the elements, that the heaven stands still; because

³⁸ One of the propositions condemned by Stephen Tempier, bishop of Paris, in 1277.

there will then too be the same idea for acting as there is now (though not equally uniformly); and there is now the same idea for not acting excessively on things below as there will also be then.

87. Proof of the first part [sc. there will then too be the same idea for acting as there is now]: because there is then an idea for acting on the part of a particular cause only because the particular cause has a sufficiently active form and a passive object close to it; or if you say ‘along with this I want another universal agent, namely the heaven’, not insofar as it is moved locally, because local motion is not the reason for its acting in its order (“for local motion does nothing,” according to the Philosopher *On Generation* 2.10.336a16-18, “save that it brings the generator forward,” that is, through local motion the agent, possessing its proper virtue, comes close to the passive object). But all these things, namely the particular agent (having its own active virtue), and nearness to the passive subject, and relation or aspect toward the celestial body (possessing the determinate virtue of the higher cause), can then be posited, because the celestial body at rest has the same virtue of the higher cause with respect to the lower cause placed beneath it as if it would have if it were moved; therefore the things required for action exist then as now.

88. Proof of the second part [n.86, “there is the same idea now for not acting excessively on things below as there will also be then”]: for the reason that there is not excessive action now is either on the part of the proximate causes mutually resisting it in their actions (even for the time now when each is sufficiently close to the passive object, as the sun from here and Saturn from there on a fistful of earth) – and this resistance could be found in both, whether at rest or in motion; or the non-destruction is on the part of the whole heaven, because such harmony exists in all the celestial bodies when related to any part of things active and passive that they do not permit an excessive consumption repugnant to the perfect existence of the elements in their spheres, and this cause will exist then as now; or if a cause of this prevention could not be found in the heaven itself, or in the elements themselves, it could be posited in the conserving divine will.

89. To the third [n.82]. The priority of celestial motion to the other motions is not the priority of cause, or of anything on which other things essentially depend, but only the priority of something more perfect in certain of the conditions of motion, which conditions are regularity and velocity. For it is plain that the action of the celestial body on something below does not depend on the motion of the body, because according to the Philosopher *On Generation* [n.87], “transfer in place does nothing for generation save by bringing the generator closer;” therefore if the generator were as equally close without that motion, it would act as equally.

90. To the fourth [n.83]. The point about the cone of shadow is not held to be unacceptable; and hence is derided the authority of Isidore [n.52] adduced for the claim that ‘the sun and moon will stand still so that the damned under the earth may not have any light’. For the damned are not under the earth in the way some imagine the antipodes to be, being as it were on the surface opposite our habitation; but they are under the earth, that is, in the center of the earth or within the concavity of the earth, and so they would no more have light if the sun were carried round than if the sun always stood still in one part. Likewise too the other part of the authority, that ‘sun and moon will stand in the order in which they were created’ [n.52], seems irrational enough. However, since from when they have once left that [original] place, they do not return again before the space

of 36,000 years [d.43 nn.164-165], therefore the judgment would have to be put off for that long after the creation of the world – which is not probable. Likewise, they were created in a place most fitting for the production of new things. And they will stand in a place most fitting for the conservation of things without new production. Therefore the latter place cannot be the former.

II. To the Initial Arguments

91. To the first main argument [n.44]: That they may be lights “for days and years etc.” is not the principal end but an end under that end, namely for the time of the mortal life of men, who need such distinction of times.

92. The answer to the second [n.45] is plain from the same point: “For all the days etc.,” that is, all the days for which seed-time and harvest is useful, which is only for mortal life. Or in another way: “for all the days of the earth,” that is, all the days of the earthly life of man.

93. As to the next [nn.46-47], it is plain the conclusion was the Philosopher’s intention, but the proof ‘because the agent is not wearied’ is bad; for an agent, although not wearied in acting, can voluntarily stop acting; hence this must be conceded, that ‘every agent that is wearied in acting at some time stops’. But if it is not wearied there is no necessity that it [not]³⁹ stop, because there is a reason for stopping or ceasing other than weariness.

As to the other proofs from *Metaphysics* 9, that there is no potency of contradiction there [n.48], and this because there is no matter there: if these proofs are adduced for proving indefatigability, I concede that the issue at hand [sc. the heaven does not cease moving] does not follow from indefatigability; but if they are adduced for proving the main conclusion [sc. there is no potency of contradiction there], they are not valid, because whether the matter that is a part of a substance is in the heaven or not, there is at any rate in the heaven a potency for ‘where’, namely a movable subject; and one would have to prove that this subject is not of itself in potency of contradiction to motion and non-motion. For the opposite seems more probable, since it does not have in itself any potency save the receptive potency of a movable thing for motion, and every potency precisely receptive seems to be a potency of contradiction.

94. To the next [n.49], I say that motion is only a perfection of the heaven in a certain respect, and the sort of stopping [in question here] is not unacceptable, especially since perpetual rest is a greater perfection for it.

95. And if you argue ‘then its moving now would be altogether vain’, and further ‘motion is related to rest as potency to privation’ – As to the first I say: the heaven is not moved because of some intrinsic perfection complete of it that would consist in motion or be acquired by motion; but while the non-imperfection of the heaven stands (because it is in a potency that is indifferent to moving and resting), nevertheless the perfection of the heaven for the present state of things requires rather that the heaven move, on account of the state of corruptible things. As to the second: when taking ‘rest’ as it states precisely lack of motion, then rest is thus more imperfect, because to the extent that what motion states is something positive rest would be more imperfect. However, the lack of motion,

³⁹ This extra ‘not’ is a variant noted by the Vatican editors in the apparatus criticus but not inserted in the text. The context of the argument, however, suggests it should be so inserted.

as *lack*, is not thus imperfect but there is something that is substrate in rest, namely uniformity or identity in being, and this is simply more perfect than the positive thing in motion, namely motion's being now this way and now that.

96. To the next [n.50] Avicenna replies [nn.77-78] that the motion of the heaven is neither natural nor violent but, on the part of the agent, voluntary, though with a will of the sort that (according to him and to Aristotle) it is determined necessarily to acting. But on the part of the passive subject the motion must be posited to be neither, in the way that it was said elsewhere [e.g. d.43 n.234] that surface is in neutral potency to whiteness. And universally, when a subject is determinately inclined to neither contrary, it receives neither of them naturally or violently. However, there is in the heaven a certain aptitude for circular motion because of the fact it is of spherical shape; but this aptitude does not suffice for naturalness, but only for non-violence.⁴⁰

III. To the Reasons for Aristotle's Opinion

97. To the reasons for the opinion of the Philosopher:

As to the first [nn.54-59], a theologian would perhaps refuse to the Intelligence all potency productive of substance, and then the difficulty would seem to be how this potency would not belong to the Intelligence and yet does belong to a more imperfect substance. And even if a substance would not in this [potency] be made perfect in itself, yet this does belong to substance because of perfection, as was argued [n.59].

98. If again it were said to the Philosopher that this substance is communicative of itself by producing substance, the consequent does not hold that therefore it produces necessarily or sempiternally, because actual production of another substance is not for the good of this [producing] substance but of the universe; and the good of the universe does not require such production infinitely. And here the theologian would have to take his stand if he wanted to argue for his side from matters of belief, or even from things in some way probable according to natural reason – by showing that the perfection of the universe requires rather, or is equally compatible with, the ceasing of generation than the continuing of generation.

99. And further, from this is still not got the proposed conclusion about motion, as was replied to the reason for the opinion of the theologians [nn.68-69], but it would be necessary to show that the perfection of the universe rather requires, or equally permits, the resting of some bodies.

100. As to the second [n.62], one must deny the major in the case of an agent acting voluntarily, because [such an agent] can, by its old and immovable will, act in different ways on a passive object that is in itself old and unchangeable. And then as to the proof of the major: the extremes of this new relation are not the absolute nature of the agent and the absolute nature of the passive object (which are uniform), but are the agent and passive object as having a new form caused by the agent; and this foundation is new and therefore it can found a new relation to the agent.

101. If you ask whether this new caused thing has any new relation of passive object to agent [n.63], I say that there is none, because just as the first newness in the

⁴⁰ A concession, however implicit on Scotus' part, that the motion of heavenly bodies, however circular these bodies are or appear to be, need not by nature, or at all, be circular (and in fact it is not).

passive object is in its having this form, so the first new relation of it to the agent is according to this new form.

102. As to the third [n.64], I say that a thing can be contingent to either side in such a way that there is no repugnance to this contingency on the part of the heaven itself, because the thing of itself is in potency of contradiction; but the completion of the contingency to either side comes from contingency on the part of a cause moving voluntarily, such that its will is not necessarily determined to moving or to not moving.

Forty Ninth Distinction

First Part

About the Natural Quality of Beatitude

Question One

Whether Beatitude Consists per se in Operation

1. "But after the resurrection," [Lombard, *Sent.* IV d.49 ch.1 n.1].
2. About this forty ninth distinction I ask whether beatitude consists per se in operation.
3. That it does not:
Augustine *On the Trinity* XIII.5.8 (after rejecting other definitions [*ibid.* 4.7-5.8]) infers this one: "Therefore the blessed is he who both has everything that he wants and wants nothing wrongly." Therefore, beatitude consists in having everything that is willed well; many things are willed well that are different from operation; therefore etc. This is confirmed from Boethius *Consolation* 3 prose 2 n.3, "Beatitude is a state perfect by aggregation of all goods;" then, as before, this does not consist in operation alone; therefore etc.
4. Again, beatitude consists in being conjoined with the beatific object; that conjoining is a relation; operation is something absolute; therefore etc. There is a confirmation: an absolute can remain, without contradiction, in the absence of a respect founded on it, because it is naturally prior to such respect; a respect to an object is founded on operation; therefore operation can remain without such respect to an object. But without it [such respect] there is no beatitude, otherwise there would be beatitude and not in a beatific object.
5. There is argument from the idea of beatitude: first from the definition; second from the object; third from permanence; it could, fourth, be argued from the subject, but this will be touched on in the next question [nn.61-65]. From operation the argument is: first from the agent cause; second from the proximate cause, which is a habit.
6. Again, according to the Philosopher *Ethics* 1.13.1102a5-6, it belongs to the idea of beatitude that it be present in a complete life (otherwise the happy man could become wretched, and otherwise too the blessed would not have the end of all his desires); because not only does anyone desire well-being but also to be in that good state permanently. Operation however is transient and in a state of becoming, and so it does not have in its idea that it is present in a complete life; therefore etc.

7. Again, no agent is more perfect from the fact that it produces something by its action; but he who operates is in some way a producing cause of his operation; therefore he is not more perfect simply through his operation. But the blessed is more perfect simply through his, namely, through beatitude; therefore etc. The proof of the first proposition is that the effect is not the perfection simply of the agent, since the agent is either equally perfect (namely if it is univocal with the effect) or more perfect than the effect (if it is equivocal with the effect). There is a confirmation, that if what is more perfect should thus come from what is more imperfect, then it is changed simply; but it is unacceptable for an agent, in the respect it is agent, to change, according to the Philosopher, *Physics* 3.1.201a27-b4, because then it would be in potency in the respect it would be in act. There is also a confirmation, that the blessed is not the effective cause of his beatitude, because then he would beatify himself; but he is the effective cause of his operation; therefore etc.

8. Again, a habit is a perfection simply more perfect than act; beatitude is the noblest perfection; therefore beatitude consists more in habit than in act. Proof of the first point: first because, according to the Philosopher *Topics* 3.1.116a13-14, “a more lasting good is better;” a habit is a good more lasting or permanent than act, because a habit is difficult to move, an act passes at once; and second because habit is a cause of act, otherwise he who has the habit would not act more easily or perfectly than he who does not have it. But it is only a cause as efficient cause (as is plain by running through the causes), and is not an univocal efficient cause (as is plain); therefore it is an equivocal efficient cause; so it is nobler.

9. To the opposite:

Ethics 1.9.1099a30-31, 5.1097a15-b6, “Happiness is the best operation etc.”

10. *Ethics* 10.8.1178b7-22 Aristotle makes this specific by the operation it consists in, when he deduces that the gods, whom we judge most happy, have operation because of the fact that “everyone supposes them to be alive (and not to be sleeping), therefore supposes them to operate; wherefore the operation of God will be excelling in speculative happiness.”

11. Likewise, *Metaphysics* 12.9.1074b17-18, when speaking about divine understanding, he says, “If God does not understand, what will be striking or worthy of veneration in him? But he is disposed as one sleeping.” *Ibid.* 7.1072b24, “and speculation is a thing most delightful and best.” And a little later [1072b26-28], “and life exists [for God], for the act of the intellect is life” and he adds, “the divine is the very act, and the act is the best life.”

12. Likewise *Metaphysics* 9.8.1049b4-50a3, “Act is prior simply to potency,” not only prior in time and definition, but also in substance, that is, in perfection; and this third member he proves [1050a4-b16] by the fact that potency is for the sake of act, as he shows by induction in both natural and artificial things; therefore act is ultimate, not for the sake of anything else, but especially when it is operation and not making. Hence he concludes “wherefore happiness too” (supply: consists in operation); and he proves it, “for [happiness] is a certain sort of life.”

13. Again *On the Heaven* 2.3.286a8-9, “Every substance that has an operation is for the sake of its operation.”

14. Likewise Augustine *On Christian Doctrine* 1.32 n35, “The supreme reward is that we enjoy him,” namely God; but the supreme reward is blessedness according to him, and to enjoy God is an operation.

Question Two

Whether Beatitude Perfects the Essence of the Blessed more Immediately than the Power

15. Following on from this I ask whether beatitude more immediately perfects the essence than the power of the blessed himself.

16. It seems that it more immediately perfects the essence:

To a nobler perfection corresponds a nobler perfectible as proper to it; beatitude is the noblest perfection; but essence is nobler than power if they differ in reality, or nobler at least in idea if they differ in idea; for the sort of order that distinct things have really is the sort of order that the same things have in idea, when they are distinct in idea.

As to the first proposition [sc. to a nobler perfection corresponds a nobler perfectible], although there is an objection to it in the case of perfections of different idea in genus, as with substantial and accidental perfection (since a substantial perfection, because it bestows being simply, has for perfectible a being in potency simply; but an accidental perfection, because it gives being in a certain respect, requires a perfectible that is simply being in act), yet, in the case of accidental perfections compared among themselves, it seems true when comparing them to the perfectibles that are receptive of accidents; because if something more imperfect is capable of some accident that most of all perfects it accidentally, something higher cannot be supremely perfected accidentally by that perfection, nor by any other perfection save a more excellent one.

17. Again, whatever is the most immediate receptive subject of some accident, if it could exist per se, could per se receive that accident; but no other subject could receive it save by the mediation of that one. Therefore, if the power of the soul could exist separate from the essence, it could receive beatitude and consequently be blessed, but the essence could not be blessed without the power; and so a nature that is not intellectual or alive could be blessed, because it is an accident [sc. of what is intellectual and alive] – and an intellectual nature, though it abides in itself, could not be blessed, because lacking the immediate subject of beatitude. This argument does at least seem to have a difficulty in positing power to be different from essence in reality; but the argument can be proportionally maintained about a distinction of reason, if such a distinction be posited there.

18. Again, third, an intellectual nature will not be blessed save per accidens, the way wood heats because it is hot; the consequent is unacceptable, because a perfection per accidens is not essentially the perfection of that to which it belongs per accidens. The proof of the consequence is that beatitude would be present per accidens in a beatifiable nature through some medium (according to one opinion about power [Henry of Ghent]), the way the action of heating is in hot wood by means of heat; or at any rate it would be present accidentally as it were (according to another opinion), because present through something distinct in idea, for if it were different in reality it would truly per accidens exist.

19. On the contrary:

Blessedness per se consists in operation (from the authorities brought forward for the opposite of the first question [nn.9-14]); but operation more immediately perfects power than essence, because operation does not belong to essence save through a power, from *On the Soul* 2.1.412a27-28, and *Metaphysics* 9.5.1047b31-48a24.

I. To the Second Question

A. Opinion of Henry of Ghent

1. Exposition of the Opinion

a. About the Opinion Itself and the Manner of Positing it

20. As to this second question the assertion is made [Henry of Ghent, *Quodlibet* 13 q.12] that beatitude perfects the essence more principally than the power.

21. The way of stating it is as follows: “Beatitude consists more principally in the object, which is uncreated beatitude, insofar as this is the good of the created will. Now the soul or the angelic nature is transformed by means of the will, so that, to the extent possible for it, it is converted into the object, and this by force of love, according to what Dionysius [*Divine Names* ch.4] says, that ‘love is a virtue that transforms and converts the lover into the beloved’; and Hugh of St. Victor says about ‘acute and super-fervent heat’ [*Commentary on Celestial Hierarchy* 6 ch.7] that ‘love wants to make you one with it’, namely the beloved; and later, ‘love inserts itself so that, if it could be done, the lover would be what the beloved is’, namely the one he loves, ‘and thus in a certain marvelous way it begins, by the force of love, to be expelled and go outside itself’.”

22. From this as follows: “That the nature which loves should go out of itself and begin to be what it loves can only come about by circumincession, a circumincession not of the soul and of a created nature that in-flows into deity, but rather the converse, so that in such created nature nothing should appear save divine dispositions, indeed, so that it should not appear to be anything other than God – just as iron glowing in fire shines and burns the way fire does, as if it not be, and not appear to be, other than fire.”

b. Reasons Adduced for the Opinion

23. From this way of understanding things an argument is made for the conclusion:

Since beatitude is by the in-flowing or circumincession of the beatific object in respect of the beatifiable subject, and since this in-flowing or circumincession is more in the essence than in the powers (for from the in-flowing into the essence there is a redounding or derivation into the powers, and not conversely, because derivation or redounding is from the prior to the posterior, not conversely, whether the order is one of being or of reason; for that is principally such by which something else is such, and not conversely) – therefore etc. The proposed conclusion thus follows.

24. Again, and it is as it were the same point: God, who is beatitude in its essence, is more principally possessed in his essence than in his powers; for he perfects essence in some way through essence, namely by in-flowing in the manner stated; but he only perfects the powers through operations terminating in the essence under the idea of the good and true. Now he perfects more principally what he perfects per se under his proper idea than what he perfects only terminatively under the idea of an attribute.

25. Again, grace is consummate glory; but grace is principally in the essence of the soul, and redounds, under the idea of habit and virtue, to the powers; therefore etc. [cf. *Ord.* II d.26 nn.11-23].

26. Again, distributive justice has regard to the worth of the receiver according to geometrical proportion, namely so that to the more worthy more good be distributed; but an intellectual nature is, in reality and in idea, more noble and more worthy than its power; therefore etc.

27. And this argument coincides with the first reason for this question [n.16]. But the addition is made that “perception of this perfection only belongs to the essence through the powers: through the intellect indeed in knowing the essence, through the will as tasting it, as Hugh says on the above cited chapter 7 [n.21], ‘Two there are: knowledge and love; knowledge illumines, love (as feeding) satisfies; in this does beatitude consist: to know and love the good’,” or it consists in knowledge and love of the good.

28. But as to the authorities of the philosophers for the opposite [nn.9-13], the response is made [Henry of Ghent, *Quodlibet* 13 q.12] that according to the intention of the philosophers “the beatitude of man or angel does not concern their essence but only their power, through the medium of its operation. And they said this because they did not see true beatitude, which true beatitude consists not only in act of will and intellect but principally in the object itself” – and this by in-flowing or circumincession in the way stated [n.23].

2. Rejection of the Opinion

a. Against the Opinion in Itself

29. Against these views:

First as follows: God is not disposed in himself differently now than before, nor does he in-flow into this soul or angel differently now than before (if one considers essence precisely on each side), because there is always uniformity as to the in-flowing of the divine essence into the creature’s essence while the essence of the creature remains; so, if there is some newness in the beatified soul, it must be through some effect caused by God in the soul’s essence. The effect is said to be the beatitude of the soul formally, and this effect cannot be principally in the essence as the essence is distinguished from the power, because then it would be first act; but by no first act, distinct from second act, can a creature immediately attain the beatific essence.

There is a confirmation: nothing is properly speaking changed unless something new formally inhere in it; someone blessed is disposed now so differently than someone non-blessed before that he changes from misery to beatitude; but the divine essence is not by any in-flowing the essence of the blessed; therefore, something else must be in the blessed whereby he is formally blessed.

30. Again, in-flowing is prior in nature to any operation, since it is according to some first act, as was argued [nn.23-24, 29]; therefore it could, without contradiction, exist without operation, and consequently someone who is not operating but disposed as someone asleep could be principally blessed – which Aristotle considers unacceptable, *Metaphysics* 12.9.1074b17-18 [n.11]

31. Again a creature is blessed in some way proportionally to the way that God is blessed; but God is not blessed precisely by the fact he is the same as himself, but by the

fact he understands and wills himself as object – otherwise, from the fact that he is blessed it could not be inferred that he is intelligent, because if he did not have an intellect he would still be the same as himself, just as a stone is the same as itself.

32. This point is argued briefly as follows: if divine beatitude does not consist, by way of its completion, in the identity of the beatifiable thing with the beatific object, then neither does the beatitude of the creature consist in any identity or internalizing of the beatific object through in-flowing; because if operation is required there [in God], over and above identity, much more is it required here [in the creature] over and above in-flowing; because whatever were posited here as beatitude, something corresponding to it eminently would be beatitude principally there; but to the in-flowing by which the soul is said to be deified, as it were, identity corresponds there far more eminently.

b. Against the Reasons Adduced for the Opinion

33. As to the reasons adduced for the opinion [nn.21-28], some are against the opinion, and those for it are not compelling.

α. About the First Reason

34. For first, the way of positing it [n.21] seems to concede that this in-flowing is first in the power, and thus that beatitude is principally in the power.

Proof of the antecedent: for this way of positing states that through love, which is a transformative force, the lover begins to go out of itself and to be what it loves, and that this can only come about by circumincession or in-flowing. From this it follows that, through love, a circumincession or in-flowing of the beloved into the lover comes to be. But it is plain that love or affection, which Hugh is speaking about [n.21], are per se powers of the will.

35. Also the phrase ‘to go out of itself’ is metaphorical, as is apparent from the Philosopher in *Politics* 2.4.1262b7-13, for a thing is no less what it was because it loves something else [cf. *Ord.* I d.1 n.179]. But the reality of this sort of metaphor, and of all metaphors like it is this: that by receiving or valuing the beloved and by resting in the beloved the lover is more truly the beloved than it is itself. And this meaning is plainly stated by Hugh in the cited passage [n.21]: “He who longs only for what he loves even despises himself in comparison with what the loves.”

And this is what Augustine says *City of God* 14.28, “The city of God was made by a love of God proceeding to contempt of self (namely of the lover).” To this extent, therefore, does the lover go out of himself, because he thinks little of his own being in comparison with the beloved, so that he would prefer his own being rather than that of the beloved to be destroyed. But from this does not follow any circumincession or in-flowing such as he argues for [Henry of Ghent, n.23].

36. The first reason [n.23] is not compelling, because it proceeds from the idea of this in-flowing [nn.34-35]. This in-flowing too, that in beatitude there be a certain special in-flowing – it is not an in-flowing of the divine essence into this [creaturely] essence as the divine essence is essence, but it is an in-flowing of the divine essence as beatific object into this [creaturely] essence as this essence attains the divine essence as object; but it attains the object more principally and immediately through the power.

37. What is argued there about redounding [n.23], that it takes place from the prior to the posterior and not conversely, is not compelling, because nothing prevents something being prior and posterior with respect to the same thing in different ways; and, in the way in which something is prior, it is possible for what is proper to this something to redound from it into something else which, in that sort of way, is posterior (just as, although ‘being’ redounds into heat from substance, yet conversely ‘to cause heat’ belongs to substance from heat). So, if there were a priority of the essence with respect to the power, and this by a redounding of a first act perfecting the essence (if there were any), the essence would come to be in the power; yet the second act, which belongs first to the power, will redound from it into the essence.

From this then the opposite can be argued as follows: that thing is more principal from which something redounds into another thing; but beatitude redounds into the essence as it is essence from beatitude as it is power, just as the attaining of the beatific object too belongs in this sort of order to the essence and the power.

β. About the Second Reason

38. The second reason [n.24] is not compelling. For, when speaking of ‘to perfect formally’, this proposition is false: ‘the divine essence more principally perfects the essence than it perfects the power’, because God does not, as in-flowing into the essence, perfect it formally but only as an extrinsic cause. But when in-flowing into the power he perfects it (as it is an extrinsic cause) the way an object does, and he perfects it formally by a created form, which created form is the operation that attains it [= the divine essence] as object. But if you speak of a ‘to perfect’ that perfects by in-forming in some way or other, and if you take it that the divine essence more truly perfects the soul than the power by in-flowing— if this were conceded, the proposed conclusion does not follow. For the ‘to perfect’ in question belongs to first act; it is not therefore the ‘to perfect’ that is the perfecting of the beatified person.

39. And if you say “it is enough for me that it be more truly a ‘to perfect’ than is any ‘to perfect’ of second act” (for from this follows that the essence will be more principally perfect with a nobler perfection than the power is, and therefore it will also be nobler, even more perfect, with beatitude, or with something, than beatitude is) – I reply: substance is more a being than any accident (*Metaphysics* 7.1.1028a33-b6); therefore the essence of an angel or a soul is more perfect simply than its inherent beatitude, which is an accident; therefore, it is not unacceptable that some perfection that is the first act of a soul or angel in substantial being be a truer perfection of it because more intimate. And let it also be a nobler perfection than beatitude or anything pertaining to second act; however, beatitude is the noblest second perfection, as was said in the preceding solution [nn.36-37, also nn.16, 21]; but some first perfection is simply nobler in creatures than any second perfection, where the first and second perfection are distinct in reality.

40. The proposition can also be denied that [n.24] ‘the deity by in-flowing more truly perfects the essence than the power [n.24]’, because the in-flowing into the essence as essence is in a way general to every creature, though in proportion to each according to its grade of being; but the in-flowing that is of the essence as object into the power is of a special most noble nature. There is therefore some in-flowing into the power nobler than

the in-flowing that is into the essence, though that which is into the essence as to existence is more principal to the essence than to the power, just as also the existence is.

41. If it is argued against this that the in-flowing of the [divine] essence as object presupposes the in-flowing of the [divine] essence as making itself intimate to [creaturely] essence, and that that is more perfect on which another depends than conversely – I reply: “not everything prior in generation is prior in perfection” (*Metaphysics* 9.8.1050a2-10); but the preceding of the in-flowing that is by intimacy [into the essence] to the in-flowing that is in idea of object [into the power] [n.40] is not proved to be prior save in generation; for it is not a necessary active cause of the later in-flowing, because it exists when the second cannot be had, as in the wayfarer.

42. Of these two responses to the second reason [nn.38, 40] the first seems truer, and it sufficiently solves the fact that some simply more perfect in-flowing is not beatific and that another simply less perfect in-flowing is beatific. An example: the most perfect in-flowing is into human nature as it is united in person to the Word, and yet this in-flowing is not formally beatific, as is plain in *Ord.* III d.2 nn.10-23, though this doctor [Henry] say the opposite, as was said there; but the in-flowing of the Triune God into Michael, which is simply less perfect, is simply beatific.

γ. About the Third Reason

43. The third reason [n.25] is taken to the opposite, because grace immediately perfects the power, not the essence, as was said in *Ord.* II d.26 n.24; for a form perfecting an active principle as that principle is unlimited and indifferent to several things perfects it indifferently in its order to those several things (just as that, if some form were to perfect the sun insofar as the sun is unlimited in action with respect to all things inferior to it, it would perfect it indifferently in its order to one action and another); but grace does not perfect the soul indifferently in its order to intellection and volition, but only in its order to volition; proof: for volition is graced primarily and nothing else is graced save by it.

44. If objection be made to the major [n.43] on account of the term ‘indifferently’, at least this proposition is true, that ‘a form perfecting an active principle as that principle is unlimited to several actions does not perfect it precisely in its order to one action’, because at once the opposite of the subject term follows, namely that the form perfects it as it is limited and determinate to one action; but grace perfects the soul precisely for intellection and volition such that an intellection preceding volition is not graced nor meritorious, and an intellection following volition is only graced because it is commanded by graced volition.

45. If objection be raised against the minor of the first reason [n.43], because ‘essence is not active but passive, with these powers being intermediaries’ – although this is false of the will at least, as was said in *Ord.* II d.25 nn.69-73, yet a similar minor can be taken about passive power, ‘no form perfects a receptive subject insofar as it is indifferent to several thing which perfects it precisely in its order to one of them’; grace is of this sort, as before [n.43]. Indeed, no habit seems to perfect essence save as essence has the idea of power.

46. Let there, at length, be a stand in this: ‘no form perfects something insofar as it is unlimited or indifferent to several things which would precisely perfect it if it were

determinate to one of them'; but if the soul were only the intellect, it could not be perfected by grace because, even if it had an act, it could not have a graced act; but if, *per impossibile*, the soul were only the will, it could be perfected by grace, because if, *per impossibile*, it had an act, it would have that act a graced one.

δ. About the Fourth Reason

47. The fourth reason [n.26] is taken to the opposite, because he to whom a greater good is due should have it rendered to him in the way in which it can more be a good for him; but beatitude can more be a good for the soul if it is in the power than if it were immediately in the essence. Just as it is a greater good for the soul to see God through the intellect than through the essence (as it is essence), because 'to see' is not of a nature to be good for the soul save through the intellect, just as 'to have the beatific object as beatific' is not of a nature to be the soul's good save through the power that, by operation, attains that object.

48. The point that is there added [n.27], that perception of beatitude principally belongs to the power, seems to prove the opposite of the proposed conclusion, because perception of the beatific object (by seeing and tasting it) is not accidental or adventitious to beatitude, as Hugh says in the authority that he brings forward, "In these," he says, "does beatitude consist: to love and know the good" [n.27].

49. There is also proof by reason, because misery essentially includes perception of a disagreeable object, speaking of the complete misery that is accompanied with penalty; for the principal penalty, which consists in sadness (as was said in d.44 nn.83-112), is *per se* consequent to the perception of a disagreeable object; therefore perception of an agreeable object does not follow beatitude [*sc.* as something not essentially included in it], because then beatitude would not delight as equally necessarily as misery torments.

50. As to what is added from the philosophers [n.28], it does not seem probable that it contradicts them as regard this first mark of beatitude, that it consist in operation or not; for though they did err, or rather did not attain what object beatitude is in, or rather what idea it is under, yet this first mark of it wherein it is the fundamental perfection of a rational creature – namely whether it is in the power or the essence (whose distinction we get from them), whether too it is in operation or in habit (which we similarly get from them) – does not seem likely to have escaped their notice.

B. Scotus' own Response

1. A Double Understanding of the Question is Possible

51. To the question, therefore, I say that there is a double understanding of the question:

One is: if the supposition is made that the perfection of essence is one thing and the perfection of power another, which of these is beatitude principally? And in this way does the aforesaid opinion [of Henry, nn.23-24] seem to say that the in-flowing that is in the essence as it is essence (which is prior in a way to the operation that is the perfection of power) is beatitude principally.

52. According to this understanding I say that beatitude does not consist principally in the essence, because nothing that perfects essence, as it is essence distinct in whatever way from power, can be other than first act, and perhaps not a habit. Now nothing such can be beatitude principally; indeed that 'beatitude exists without operation' includes a contradiction, but that 'first act is without any second act whatever' does not.

53. The other understanding of the question can be of this sort:

By positing that the perfection is the same and unique for the essence and power (wherein unique beatitude consists), does that unique beatitude perfect the essence more principally than the power?

54. And in the first understanding [nn.51-52] there is a comparison of two perfections perfecting the essence and the power – which of them is more principal?

55. In the second understanding [n.53] there is a comparison of the same perfection to two receptive subjects – which of them is more principally perfected by that perfection?

56. In this second understanding it would seem that diverse answers must be given according to diverse opinions about powers. Because if the powers be posited to be accidents, since that is 'more principal' by which something else is and not conversely, and since the 'by which' can be taken equivocally for prior and more remote cause or for posterior and more immediate cause – in the first way the essence is more principally perfected by any power whatever; in the second way not so, because the essence is the more remote cause with respect to anything of which the power is cause, but the power is the nearer cause.

2. What View Should be Held

57. Because, however, I do not believe this opinion [n.56] to be true (as was said [in *Rep.* IIA d.16 nn.11, 18-19]), neither also is it clear that it is the same thing to be more principal with respect to 'being' and with respect to any perfection consequent to 'being', since something can be cause of something in being and yet that other thing receives [perfections] through no other cause; rather, if it were uncaused, it would receive [them] – just as God is cause of a triangle in being, yet, if a triangle were uncaused, it would by itself have three angles equal to two right angles.

58. And this is most of all true where there is no process in the same order, as suppose if one thing be prior in order of active principle and after that the second thing is prior to a third in order of passive principle. Even in the same order this only holds if the priority is essential, understanding this as follows, that it be impossible for the second to be prior to the third unless the first be prior to the second and to the third (as is plain in efficient causes, where a posterior can cause without a prior that is not essentially or necessarily prior in this way).

59. But, in the issue at hand, there is in the idea of the receptive subject no such essential priority thus of essence to power in the receiving, because if the immediate receptive subject could exist per se without an intermediate, it could per se receive, with the intermediate receiving neither mediately nor immediately. But a hypothesis is necessary (on the supposition that this hypothesis is necessary for many things), that, in the case of things distinct in absolute being, either one of them can, without contradiction, exist without the other.

60. It seems, therefore, that if the opinion were probable [n.59], yet in no way would it have to be conceded that the essence received the operation more principally than the power.

61. Dismissing, therefore, these and other opinions about powers, and dismissing the equivocations about what is 'more principal', I say that that is simply more principal with respect to *a* which, when anything else whatever has been per possibile or per impossibile removed, would be disposed in the same way toward *a*, and that nothing else, with it removed, would be thus disposed toward *a*.

62. This reasoning is proved from the idea of firstness, that that is first with respect to something, which when taken away there is nothing that is of this sort with respect to that something; but, when anything else is taken away, it is disposed in the same way toward that something; and it simply is simply more principal. These clarifications are made on behalf of the major [n.61].

63. But now, whether a power is a perfection that is unitively contained in the essence, or whether it is an essential part of the essence, or whether it is disposed differently in this way and that (according to different opinions), the essence would not receive beatitude when the power is, per possibile or per impossibile, taken away; but when the essence is per possibile or per impossibile taken away, the power would receive beatitude. Therefore, in the way in which firstness is, in fact or in idea, possible there, the power receives beatitude more principally, and consequently beatitude perfects the power more principally.

64. The proof of the minor [n.63] is from the preceding solution [n.52], that beatitude, according to that solution, consists in operation; now operation would perfect the power if it existed alone without the essence, but would in no way perfect the essence if it existed alone without the power.

65. If to this proof of the minor an objection is drawn from the fact that no accident perfects another accident but perfects only a substance, yet one accident is prior to another – according to the Philosopher, *Metaphysics* 4.4.1007b2-4, 12-13, "For an accident is an accident of an accident only because both are accident to the same thing," and later, "for this is no more an accident of that than that is of this" [cf. *Ord.* IV d.12 n.108]. So, if the power is an accident of the essence, then in whatever way it were, per possibile or per impossibile, to exist without the essence, it could not receive an accident; but the essence could receive a mediated accident, whether it received it afterwards or before, because it is receptive of both accidents, and immediately so under the idea of being the subject.

66. The minor of this objection [sc. the power is an accident of the essence] I do not reckon to be true, as I said [n.63], but let it be. The major, however [sc. no accident perfects another accident], is false, as was said in [*Ord.* IV d.12 nn.146-151].

67. And the fact is plain from Avicenna, *Metaphysics* II ch.1, because fast and slow are accidents of motion, and curved and straight accidents of line.

68. And it is plain too by reason, because whatever belongs to something per se in the second mode [Aristotle, *Posterior Analytics* 1.4.73a34-b18] is an accident of it, for in that mode the subject is put in the definition of the predicate as something added on that does not belong [to a definition] with respect to an accident save as to the subject of it. But there are many accidents that are present per se in the second mode in accidents and

in no substance, as is plain of all the properties of the mathematical sciences, none of which is about any substance as about its first subject [*Ord.* IV d.12 n.143].

69. But what is adduced from the Philosopher [n.65] needs expounding, because if he means precisely that ‘because two accidents are accident of the same subject, therefore one is accident of the other’, it follows that surface is as accident of whiteness as whiteness is of surface.

70. The same follows from the second authority, that ‘this is no more accident of that than that is of this’ [n.65].

71. His understanding then is not about ordered accidents, one of which is the idea of receiving the other, but about the disparate accidents of which he gives examples, as ‘white’ and ‘musical’.

72. Now this suffices for his purpose there, as he wants it to be impossible for there to be an infinite regress in predications per accidens, as I have elsewhere expounded his intention [*Ord.* IV d.12 n.158].

C. To the Initial Arguments of the Second Question

1. Response to the Individual Arguments

73. As to the first argument [n.16]: the major could be conceded about perfectible things and perfections of the same order, but not when comparing something perfectible by a perfection of one order with something perfectible by a perfection of another order (and I mean here by ‘perfections of another order’ first act and second act). And when taking the inference in this way, all that follows is that the essence, if it have some perfection that is first act, will be more perfect than any perfection that is second act; now beatitude is not the noblest perfection simply, but the noblest among second acts.

74. Alternatively, and it reduces in a way to the same, the statement that ‘to a simply nobler perfectible thing there corresponds a nobler perfection’ is true in the order of perfections which have regard to that perfectible thing; now beatitude does not have regard to the essence, as essence, for first perfectible thing. But if you compare the order of perfections to the order of perfectible things, I concede that to a simply nobler perfectible thing there corresponds a simply nobler perfection, intrinsic or extrinsic; but there is no need to concede this determinately of something accidental or extrinsic if it is not capable, under the idea under which it is a nobler perfectible thing, of the accidental perfection. So it is in the issue at hand, even as to the accidental perfection that is a habit, which does not perfect the essence as it is essence – and much more so as to the accidental perfection that is operation.

75. As to the second argument [n.17], I concede that if the power could exist per se it could be perfected by operation, and the essence could not be perfected without the power. And therefore the argument does conclude well against those who say that the power is really other than the essence [nn.20-28]. But it is nothing to us who say that the same real thing is under one idea essence, and has the perfections that are first acts, and is under another idea power, and has the perfections that are second acts; nor do I say that these different ideas are caused only by an act of intellect, but they come from the nature of the thing, as was said in the question about the powers of the soul [*Rep.* IIA d.16 nn.11-13].

76. As to the third [n.18], I say that it is not unacceptable to concede that intellectual nature is beatified per accidens, that is, not first or not immediately, and this when speaking of priority or immediacy according to idea; though it would be unacceptable to say that it was beatified per accidens when speaking of an accident in some way real.

2. An Objection to these Responses and its Solution

77. Against these responses [nn.73-76]: the idea according to which God is blessed is no less noble than the idea according to which he beatifies. But he beatifies under the idea of essence; therefore under no less noble an idea is [anyone]⁴¹ beatified; the idea of power is less noble.

78. I reply: speaking of the fundamental idea under which [anyone] is beatified, it is true that the idea according to which [God] beatifies is not less noble in its fundamental and formal idea. Speaking of the proximate formal idea according to which [anyone] is beatified and of the formal idea according to which [God] beatifies (which, according to some [Richard of Middleton], is the idea of the true and good [n.24]), there is still no greater nobility on this side than on that. But by positing, in a third way, that [God] beatifies objectively according to the idea of essence, not only fundamentally but formally (and [anyone] would be beatified immediately according to idea of intellect and will), it is consistent to say that he beatifies immediately according to a nobler idea than [the idea according to which anyone] is immediately beatified. Nor is this unacceptable, that something receive a second perfection according to a less noble idea than it is perfect [by] with a first perfection.

II. To the First Question

79. To the first question: first as to the thing, second as to the name.

A. About the Thing of Beatitude

1. First Conclusion

80. Let this be the first conclusion as to the thing [of beatitude]: among all that is desirable to intellectual nature there is something essentially and simply supreme.

81. The proof of this is that there is an essential order in desirable things, and in such an order it is impossible to proceed to infinity (as was proved in *Ord.* I d.2 nn.52-53); therefore, the proposed conclusion [sc. something in the order is first or supreme, n.80] follows.

82. If there is not an essential order there, the proposed conclusion again follows, because whichever [member] is given it is essentially supreme, in the sense that nothing is essentially superior to it.

83. But this hypothesis is false because, as was shown there, *Ord.* I d.2 n.54, no process in things ordered accidentally can proceed to infinity, or can proceed through a

⁴¹ The Latin says simply 'he is beatified', where the 'he', in grammatical context, would refer to God. The text can be read in this way, since God as subject may be said to be beatified by himself as object. However, it seems it might be better read, in logical context, as about any creature who is beatified by God.

continuing diversity [of things], save in virtue of something essentially superior to the whole diversity.

84. Corollary: that thing [sc. the thing essentially superior to the whole diversity] is infinite, because whatever infinity is not repugnant to is not simply supreme unless it is formally infinite; infinity is not repugnant to the desirable or wantable, since this is either perfection simply, or it convertibly accompanies some perfection simply, because it belongs to the whole of being, and whatever so belongs is perfection simply. Now infinity is not repugnant to perfection simply, because [if it were], then in the case of something, that is, something simply infinite, not-it would be simply better than it, which is against the idea of perfection simply (as is plain from Anselm *Monologion* 14-15).

85. From this corollary too the first conclusion [n.80] can, conversely, be inferred, because if something desirable or wantable can be infinite, and the infinite cannot be exceeded, then something can be a simply supreme wantable; and if it can be then it is, because if it were not and could be, it could only be by something different in essence, and so it would not be simply supreme in some perfection simply.

2. Second Conclusion

86. Second conclusion: the supreme desirable or wantable, and only it, is to be wanted by any intellectual nature simply because of itself.

87. My exposition of ‘simply because of itself’ is, namely: that to which it is repugnant, by its nature, to be wanted because of something else. Hence if the sensitive appetite desires anything because of itself (so as not to will it because of something else), this holds ‘in a certain respect’, because it comes from an imperfection in the power, which is not able to desire it because of something else, and not from an imperfection in the object to which being desired because of something else is repugnant.

88. My exposition of the other part is: ‘to be wanted by any intellectual nature’ and ‘by any will’ are convertible relative to the issue at hand, because ‘to have will’ and ‘to be an intellectual nature’ are convertible.

89. For the proof then of this second conclusion I argue as follows: anything for which the supreme wantable thing is a wantable object is something for which that object is alone to be wanted simply because of itself; but for any will the supreme wantable thing is a wantable object; therefore etc.

90. The proof of the major is that among wantable things there is something that is to be wanted because of itself, for if everything is because of something else there will be an infinite regress and nothing will be supreme; for a thing that is to be wanted because of something else is to be wanted less than that because of which it is to be wanted (from *Posterior Analytics* 1.2.72a29-20). Therefore, if there is something that is a simply supreme to-be-wanted (from the first [conclusion, n.80]), it is to be wanted simply because of itself (speaking on the part of the objects). And from this follows that it is to be wanted because of itself by any [subject] for which it is a wantable object; for [it is to be wanted] either by none, or by all, or by one and not another. But not the first [‘by none’], from what has been proved [sc. n.90 *init.*, that the supremely wantable is to be supremely wanted by whatever has it as a wantable]; nor the third [sc. ‘by one and not another’], because there is no greater reason for it to be so by one rather than by another; [sc. therefore the second].

91. The same [major] is proved a priori, because although it be in the power of the will to will this or that, yet that which is to be wanted, and especially that which is to be supremely wanted, is not in the will's power (for this precedes every determination of any will); therefore whatever will it is compared to, it always remains something that is to be wanted because of itself, and hence it is that it is to be wanted also by this will, because it is wantable by this will.

92. And this is proved in brief by application [of the argument] to wills, as also about willing in itself; because for any will there is something that is to be willed, since any will could will something rightly, and only that which is for it something to be willed, and no will can will something that is to be willed by it because of another thing and another thing and so on infinitely.

93. It is also proved from precision [of terms], namely that it alone is to be willed because of itself, for it is not repugnant to anything else that it be desired because of another thing (since nothing else is a simply supreme desirable thing); and a lesser good could rightly be desired because of a greater good.

94. The proof of the minor is that any will regards as its object the wantable thing under its most common idea; for the will is an immaterial power and consequently a power that regards the whole of being, or something of equal extent as being. This can be called the ultimate end with respect to such will, because any other to-be-willed thing is willed because of that.

3. Third Conclusion

95. Third conclusion: no intellectual nature is ultimately and completely perfected save in possessing the supreme desirable thing, and possessing it perfectly according to the way it can possess it.

96. This is proved from the second conclusion [n.86], because an intellectual nature is of a nature to be ultimately and maximally perfected in that alone which is for it something to be willed for its own sake; therefore, it can only be ultimately perfected in that thing when possessed by it in the way it can be possessed by it.

97. The third conclusion is also proved by the fact that the nature remains ultimately imperfect when what is supremely to be wanted is not possessed.

98. The conclusion is proved, third, by a more universal middle term, that in things possessing any appetite (whether animal or natural) the ultimate perfection is not had unless that is had which is desired because of itself by such an appetite. Hence a heavy object has some imperfection when away from the center [of the earth], and so does a sense appetite when lacking the highest agreeable thing.

99. However, one must understand about this conclusion that there is in beings a first perfection, a second perfection, or as it were a second perfection. The first perfection is when nothing is lacking that belongs to the first being, namely the essential being, of the thing; the second perfection is when nothing is lacking that belongs to the thing's second being. Also, this second perfection is a certain intrinsic perfection and is not conjoint with the extrinsic perfective thing. But there is thus a certain second perfection, because it makes perfect by the fact that it is conjoint with the extrinsic perfective thing. Nor is it surprising that something be perfected in what is extrinsic, because by attaining

what is extrinsic (and especially if this be more perfect than itself), it has a further perfection than it could have in itself or for itself or from itself.

For in this way are more ignoble things perfected by nobler things – not by being these things really, nor by having them formally inherent, but by attaining them, and so by having them in the way possible for them to have them. Hence a thing whose appetite is in relation to something more ignoble than is its nature itself, is not perfected by something extrinsic save in a certain respect.

100. In the case of a nobler thing, too, although there be some perfection for a more ignoble appetite of it, yet this is not its supreme extrinsic perfection. But if some nature be perfected in something non-supreme nobler than itself, there must be some nature that is immediately perfected by the supreme perfective extrinsic thing; for there is no infinite regress in things perfect and perfectible. Therefore, at least the supreme perfectible thing is not perfected save in the supreme extrinsic perfective thing.

101. Now the whole of intellectual nature is supreme according to this idea, as is plain from the second conclusion.

102. Nor is it necessary, according to the order of natures, that there are extrinsic perfective things that perfect completely, but it is enough that second extrinsic perfections, joining with the extrinsic perfective, correspond the same with the degrees of first perfections. Now although the first perfection in substances is simply more perfect than any intrinsic second perfection yet it is not the ultimate perfection because, when it is obtained, there is still expected and desired a further perfection. The second perfection, even if it conjoin with the more perfect thing not formally in itself but as more immediate to it, is in a way a more desirable perfection than the first perfection, to the extent that it is more immediately conjoint with the extrinsic desirable thing, which is more desired than its proper intrinsic being.

103. This however is especially true of the will, for any other extrinsic appetite desires the extrinsic thing because of the nature of that of which it is the desire, and therefore it does not join with anything simply more desirable than is the being of the nature it belongs to. But the will loves something more desirable than itself, and more than the nature it belongs to, and therefore it conjoins with something more desirable, both in itself and for the will, than is the nature it belongs to.

104. This conclusion, therefore, at least as to the will, is not only true as to what is meant by ‘to be ultimately perfected’, but also as to what is meant by ‘to be perfected with the most desirable perfection, and even with the greatest perfection’ [nn.95-96] – speaking of the extrinsic perfective thing and, by participation, of the intrinsic perfective thing insofar as it conjoins with the extrinsic one. The way the perfect is distinguished is also how the good is distinguished; hence although any being is, in its own goodness, good with first goodness, yet not with second goodness. And on this does Boethius especially seem to touch in his book *De Hebdomadibus*, where he maintains that goodness is an accident, and that things are not good by the fact that they are.⁴²

⁴² “Hence, I observe that it is one thing in them that they are good, another thing that they are. For let one and the same substance be posited to be good, white, heavy, round. Then the substance itself would be one thing, its roundness another, its color another, its goodness another; for if these were individually the same as the substance itself, heaviness would be the same as color, color the same as good, and good the same as heavy, which nature does not allow to happen.”

105. Now these facts (second goodness) we thus significantly express: ‘things are going well for it’. Hence, according to the third conclusion, this is plain, that for no will do things ultimately and completely go well save when that is had which is to be wanted because of itself, and had perfectly, in the way in which it can be had.

B. About the Name of Beatitude

106. About the second point, that is, the name of beatitude [n.79], this is taken as something known among philosophers and those who speak about beatitude [e.g. Aristotle, *Ethics* 1.5-6.1097a15-8a20]: that beatitude is the sufficient good, namely excluding defect and need; it is the perfect or complete good, excluding imperfection or diminution; it is the ultimate good excluding tending or orderability to another more complete good; it is the good that, when completely possessed, things go well with the possessor. In this way complete misery is need that is fixed; it is also lack of second perfection, and in this regard the diminution of the second good; it is also the exclusion of that which one would love because of itself if it were possessed; finally, things go completely badly for the person in misery.

107. Now although sufficiency, perfection, completeness, and goodness could belong to the first or second being of the thing, they could also include the things that belong as well to first or to second being yet, because what is sufficient is sufficient for someone and thereby supposes that for which it is sufficient, completion too completes what has already preceded and would, without it, be as it were a full or half full vacuum [sc. an absurdity].

108. The perfect also excludes defect, which is lack of what is of a nature to be present. ‘Things going well’ also only belongs to something already existent through something superadded to it as it were.

109. Therefore all these things belong more to second perfection than to first.

110. Also that a thing is only ultimately and completely perfected in an extrinsic perfective thing, because it is of a nature to be thus perfected; so these belong more to second perfection to the extent it is conjoint with the extrinsic perfective thing.

111. On the basis of these things beatitude could be distinguished into beatitude simply and in a certain respect, so that that would be beatitude simply which is second perfection immediately conjoining to the noblest extrinsic perfective object; but beatitude in a certain respect would conjoin with a less noble perfective object, and if indeed to an object more noble than the nature that is conjoined it comes closer to the idea of beatitude simply, but if to a less noble object it departs further from it.

112. The name ‘beatitude’ could also be distinguished in another way, because it can be taken for the conjunction with the extrinsic perfective object or for the proximate foundation of that conjunction – for indeed many denominations can be made in a certain order from relations, and abstractions made from those denominations.

C. Response to the Question

113. To the question I say, therefore, that beatitude consists in operation: either essentially, if beatitude be taken for the perfection that is the idea of conjunction with the beatific object, or proximately fundamentally, if beatitude be taken for the conjunction

itself, so that, with the exception of the relation to the beatific object, the ultimate perfection intrinsic to the blessed and proximate to the beatific object is operation.

114. The proof of this: no intrinsic perfection is beatitude save insofar as it conjoins immediately to the extrinsic perfective object, which is the beatific object; but, with the exception of the relation, what immediately conjoins to the beatific object is operation; therefore etc.

115. The major is plain from the first article [nn.80-85; cf. nn.95-58, 104-105], because things cannot go completely and ultimately well for anything save when it possesses that which is for it supremely to be wanted; this is the extrinsic or quasi-extrinsic perfective thing, which is my statement for God, where the beatific object is the same as the Blessed One himself. But this supremely to-be-wanted thing is not possessed most perfectly unless it is conjoined immediately to the possessor. To be blessed is for things to go supremely well for oneself, from the second article [nn.86-94]; therefore no one's beatitude consists in anything save in that by which he is more perfectly and more immediately conjoined with the supremely to-be-wanted thing.

116. The proof of the minor [n.114] is that neither essence nor power is conjoined with the extrinsic perfective object save through operation, which is the intrinsic such perfection. However, this operation does not abide in itself or for itself, but tends per se and immediately to the object, to the exclusion of any intermediary absolute form [nn.95-99].

D. To the Initial Arguments of the First Question

1. To the First Argument

117. As to the first argument [n.3] I say that it is not a definition of the blessed but a description, and truer than the rejected others, because it is given through what is necessarily concomitant to the blessed, unlike the other descriptions that are rejected by Augustine. An abstract [formulation] then, cannot be inferred about an abstract, because such a consequence holds only when in the antecedent there is predication of a concrete about a concrete in the first mode per se [n.68].⁴³

118. It can be said in another way that 'everything that he wants' is not taken divisively there for the things formally wanted, but for some one thing in which exist unitively all things that are rightly wanted, so that the sense is: the blessed is he who has perfectly, in the way possible for him, some object willed because of itself, in which object he has unitively and eminently whatever he can rightly will. And from this understanding the proposed conclusion follows, because in this way he has through operation whatever he wants.

119. As to the authority from Boethius [n.3], one must give as exposition either (1) that the name of 'beatitude' is equivocal, either (1a) for final or completive perfection taken extensively or (1b) taken intensively; and the former description (1a) is of beatitude

⁴³ In the first mode per se the predicate falls into the definition of the subject (as in 'man is a rational animal'), and here the abstract formulation ('humanity is rational animality') does follow the concrete one. But not so in the case, say, of the description 'man is capable of laughter', which does not entail the abstract formulation 'humanity is capability of laughter'. So, just because the blessed has everything he wants and wants nothing badly [n.3], it does not follow that blessedness is the having everything that is willed or wanted well. Some things wanted well (e.g. a blessed body) are not part of the definition or essence of beatitude but do accompany the blessed in fact.

taken according to its extensive totality, or one must say, if it is taken for its intensive totality (1b), that it is a state perfect by aggregation of all goods within one good eminently and unitively containing them. Or (2) if there is no aggregation in it because of its simplicity, then (in a third way) ‘by aggregation’ must be understood as what precedes or is concomitant to the perfect state but is not part of the essence of it.

2. To the Second Argument

120. To the second [n.4] the answer is plain from the distinction set down in the second article [n.112], that the name of ‘beatitude’ can be taken for the relation of conjoining, or for the proximate foundation of that conjoining. And as to the confirmation [n.4], I concede that any second perfection in a creature (which perfection however is an absolute form), can, without contradiction, exist without a relation of conjunction to the beatific object.

121. If, however, that sort of idea of intrinsic beatitude be posited here, since it could not exist without conjunction to the beatific object, it follows that beatitude is either a relation or includes an absolute and a relation. For if ‘to be blessed quidditatively’ is to have the beatific object, then beatitude is such a having of the object; but such a having of the object either includes the absolute and relative together, or it essentially states the relative and necessarily connotes the absolute; for if it were essentially to state the absolute, it would not necessarily connote the relative, which is something posterior to the absolute.

3. To the Third and Fourth

122. Answer to the third [n.6] will be stated below [question 6, nn.310, 327, 329].

123. As to the fourth [n.7], I concede that beatitude does not consist in an action of the category of action, because it is not simply the perfection of the agent, as is proved [there, n.7]; now operation is not such action but is action taken equivocally, as said in *Ord.* I d.3 n.604.

124. As to the first confirmation [n.7], the answer is plain through the same point, that the change from non-blessed to blessed is not from non-agent to agent, but is from non-operating to operating.

125. As to the second confirmation [n.7], a certain person says [Aquinas, *Sent.* IV d.49 q.1 a.2] that “in an act are two things, namely the substance of the act and the form by which it has its perfection; according to substance the principle is the natural power, but according to form the principle of it is the habit. If therefore the habit is acquired, we will be totally cause of our act; if it is infused, the perfection will be from the exterior cause that causes the habit. Now our act is not posited to be beatitude save by reason of its perfection; therefore, we are not cause of our beatitude but God is.”

126. Against this: the essentially prior cannot depend on any cause that the essentially posterior does not depend on; an act is essentially prior to its form, otherwise the form would not necessarily require the act for its being;⁴⁴ therefore if we are the cause of the substance [of the act], the form will depend on us, and only in some class of cause,

⁴⁴ The act of a habit, or the form here, falls into the definition of the habit, since a habit is the habit of such and such an act. But what falls into the definition of a thing is essentially prior to it.

because nothing seems to depend essentially on what is not a cause of it, speaking of any first act.

127. Again, the form is only a condition of the act; now the power that elicits the act does not elicit it bare, but with such and such a condition or circumstance; therefore, it is cause not only of the substance of the act but also of the form of the act.

128. Again, that the habit be a cause distinct from the power and a cause of something distinct (namely distinct from the power) does not seem probable; first because it is only a second cause in respect of the power (now second and first cause do not have distinct acts proper to them, because then with respect to neither would the former be first cause and the latter second); second because the effect, proper to the habit, would necessarily be an absolute form, if relation is not per se the term of an agent or an action; and it is not probable that the action is formed in this way, because then the action that reaches the beatific object would have to include two absolutes.

129. There is, then, another response, that the blessed is the second active cause of his beatitude as far as concerns the absolute that is in beatitude, and this if the will is the active cause of its beatific volition (about which later [in *Rep.* IVA d.49 q.10 nn.7-9, q.11 nn.3-9]).

4. To the Fifth

130. To the fifth [n.8] I say that the act is simply more perfect than the habit, both in idea of final perfection, because it more immediately attains the final object, and in idea of formal perfection, because there could not belong to the habit at its peak as great a perfection as belongs to such act at its peak.

131. To the Philosopher in the *Topics* [n.8], therefore, I say, in one way, that the consideration in question must be understood ‘other things being equal’. Hence he himself maintains (at the beginning of the book [*Topics* 3.1.116a4-6]) that he is not considering it “in things far apart,” that is, “in things having many differences,” but in things that have only that difference for which his considerations hold universally. And then the minor is false ‘habit and act are distinct in this alone’, namely ‘according to being more permanent or lasting and less lasting’.

But there is another response in the issue at hand, that this act is as equally lasting as the habit – on the part of the power and on the part of the object and on the part of the nature of this one and of that.

132. As to the second proof [n.8 “second because habit is a cause of act”], the answer is plain elsewhere, *Ord.* I d.17 n.32 (on charity), that a habit is only a partial cause of an act; and it is not unacceptable for a partial equivocal cause to be less noble than its effect, and especially as concerns a partial secondary cause, though the total or partial principal equivocal cause is nobler than its effect.

133. Briefly as follows:

Things go simply perfectly well for the blessed; things do not go thus well for anyone save in the simply perfect good, perfectly possessed, in the way possible for him; things cannot, from that good, go well for anyone else in that good save in his immediately attaining it; but he cannot attain it save by operation. Therefore, in this immediate attaining of that good, or in immediate conjoining with that good, does beatitude in its completion consist, and in the operation as in the proximate foundation.

134. The first proposition [n.133] is plain, because beatitude is the second perfection of a thing. For it is not the first perfection, because a thing is more perfect according to its first perfection (and by that first perfection alone can it be more wretched than others); now second perfection is properly expressed by the fact that ‘things go well’, for ‘things going well’ presupposes the first perfection of anything for which things go well. Further, there is an order in second perfections as in first perfections, because there is a correspondence of the latter to the former. And again, in the second perfections of any same thing there is an order such that some perfection is ultimate, short of which the thing is imperfect by way of privation, because it is of a nature to receive a further perfection; but when its ultimate perfection is obtained, if it is not simply perfect, its ultimate perfection remains something imperfect negatively, because lacking a perfection, though not a perfection of a nature to be received by it. To exclude further second perfection of the same thing, ‘perfectly’ is added to ‘well’; but to exclude further second perfection simply, at least in its kind, to ‘perfectly’ is added ‘simply well’, such that beatitude states a second perfection that excludes imperfection (both of privation and of negation), as being a supreme second perfection, at least in its kind.

135. The second proposition [n.133] is plain, because things do not go perfectly well for what can have that good if it does not have it, but go imperfectly for it by way of privation; and if it cannot have it, then things do not go perfectly well for it but imperfectly, at least negatively.

136. The third proposition is proved by the three conclusions of the first article [nn.80, 86, 95], that the whole of intellectual nature is of a nature thus to have that good, and it is imperfect unless it thus have it; but non-intellectual nature, as being inferior, if it is not of a nature to have it, then it remains imperfect, but not privatively so but negatively, that is, from the imperfection of its nature.

137. The fourth proposition is proved because there is no second perfection by which the perfect good may be more immediately attained than by operation, which of itself seems to be not for its own sake but for the sake of the object; and first perfection does not attain it save through the mediation of second perfection.

Question Three

Whether Beatitude Consists per se in Several Operations Together

138. Whether beatitude consists per se in several operations together.

139. That it does:

Augustine *On the Trinity* 13.5 n.8, “The blessed is he who has whatever he wills etc.” [n.3]; but man wills rightly not only one operation but several, because if he rightly wills enjoyment, he rightly wills vision, without which there is no enjoyment. Also, if he rightly wills vision he rightly wills enjoyment, because according to Anselm *Why God Man?* 2.1, “intellectual nature has received intellect for this purpose, to discriminate good from bad so that by his will he may love good and hate bad” (Anselm’s opinion, not his own worlds).

140. Again, from the same authority [Augustine] as follows: if by one operation he can have whatever he wills, therefore either through an operation of the will, and then it follows that Augustine’s description is equivalent to this: ‘the blessed is he who wills whatever he wills’ (because ‘to have’ is ‘to will’, since every operation of the will is a ‘to

will’); but the wayfarer wills whatever he wills, therefore he has whatever he wills, therefore he is blessed. And if ‘to have’ is by act of intellect, then it follows that the blessed will understand whatever he wills, and then it follows, as before, that the wayfarer will be blessed, because he understands whatever he wills. One must say, therefore, that ‘to have this’ does not consist in one or other act alone, nor consequently in any single operation.

141. Again, beatitude consists in whatever the blessed is from the non-blessed per se distinguished by. But the blessed is distinguished by act of intellect, because the blessed sees, the non-blessed does not see, the beatific object. He is also distinguished by act of will, because if causes be distinct, acts are too; an act of intellect seems to be cause of an act of will, because when that cause is in place, the act is in place, and when that cause is removed, the act is removed.

142. On the contrary: in any essential order a stand is made at some one thing; therefore in the order of ends there will not only be one act for one extrinsic end, but also among intrinsic ends there will be thus some one supreme end; therefore, from the idea of intrinsic end, there are not two operations.

143. Response: to one simply first thing in one order there can be two things immediate to it, and consequently each is equally first – though not simply first but first in second place (example about efficient causes and effects).

144. On the contrary: *On Generation* 2.10.336a27-28, “The same thing, insofar as it is the same, is of a nature to do the same thing” [cf. *Ord.* II d.1 n.54]; therefore, to the same efficient cause only a single effect is of a nature to be proximate; therefore, by similarity, in the case of ends.

145. Response: unless an essential order of species prove that two species cannot be equally proximate to a first essence (and so unless the impossibility of a plurality be proved from the products themselves), it does not appear how this result could be produced from the unity of the producer, because it is not always necessary to assign two causes for two effects if every multitude is to be reduced to one thing as to the cause of the multitude.

146. An argument to the contrary in another way is that in things essentially prior in some order there is not a lesser unity essentially but rather a greater one; and, as it is, some simply extrinsic end under the end is attained through the single intrinsic end corresponding to it.

I. To the Question

A. Opinions of Others

1. Opinion of Richard of Middleton

147. Here is said [by Richard of Middleton, *Sent.* IV d.49 princ.1 q.6] that “beatitude consists in the act of intellect and will together.”

148. The reason for this is that “beatitude consists in the perfect union of the beatifiable person with God; now this includes union according to every power according to which the nature is able to be immediately one with God. Of this sort [of power] are both intellect and will, because just as God (under the idea of supreme truth) is the immediate object of the intellect, so is he (under the idea of supreme good) the immediate object of the will.”

149. Again, “the virtue through which anything is moved to its term is the same virtue by which it rests in its term; but intellectual nature is moved to God through both intellect and will; therefore it rests in him through both powers. But beatitude is perfect resting of intellectual nature in God.”

150. I add a third reason: when several things are required for the perfection of something in first act, several things, proportionable to those first ones, will also be required for the perfection of the same thing in second act; but intellect and will are required for the perfection of intellectual nature in first act, because intellectual nature would be perfect in first act when it lacks neither; therefore second acts corresponding to the first ones are required for the perfection of it in second act; beatitude, therefore, which is complete perfection of intellectual nature in second act, will include these two second acts.

151. The proof of the major is that nature cannot be perfectly at rest unless whatever belongs per se to its natural perfection be at rest; for grant that some such not be at rest, then nature, according to something or other intrinsic to it, is not at rest; therefore it is not perfectly at rest; therefore the resting perfection of the whole nature includes per se the resting of any first act belonging per se to that nature.

2. Opinion of Thomas Aquinas

152. Another opinion [Aquinas, *Sent.* IV d.49 q.1 a.1] is in the opposite extreme, that beatitude consists only in a single operation, because, from the definition of the Philosopher, *Ethics* [1.13.1102a5-6, 6.1098a16, 18-20, 10.1100a1-5], “happiness is the best operation according to the best virtue and in a perfect life;” and then it is impossible for there to be several operations of the same thing that are simply best, because neither are they of the same species, since one such perfect operation suffices in one thing.

153. It is plain too that the operations of intellect and will would not be of the same species, nor can there be several best operations of another species, because “species are disposed like numbers,” *Metaphysics* 8.5.1044a10-11. And especially is this true of the species proximate to the first, because this species is only one; for it is first in genus with respect to the others, just as the ‘simply first’ is first outside the genus.

154. Likewise it is not possible for there to be several best virtues of the same nature, whether ‘virtue’ is taken there for natural potency (because the supreme power of one nature is single), or whether virtue is taken there for an acquired or supernatural habit; for always, this way or that, the best is only one.

B. Scotus’ own Response

155. To the question it can in a way be said (by mediating between the opinions) that, by speaking of beatitude not as it states an aggregation of all goods belonging to beatitude [n.152, Aquinas *ibid.* a.5; Boethius, *Consolation* III pr.2 n.3; Richard of Middleton *ibid.* n.147], but as it states that by which the beatific object is immediately attained ultimately [n.148], a distinction can be drawn as to beatitude of intellectual nature and beatitude of power. Because although nature is only beatified through a power yet, as nature, it is a beatifiable power, whose beatitude is not simply beatitude of nature,

for things do not go simply perfectly well for the nature in that but in something else more noble than it, though things do, from this, go simply well for the power.

156. According to this, then, it can be said that the beatitude of intellectual nature consists in a single operation alone, because only in a single operation do things go simply perfectly well for it such that nothing is lacking to it – not as if this include everything belonging to the ‘going well’ of nature, but as it state in ‘going well’ the fulfilment of everything. The proof of this is that just as the beatific object, single in thing and idea, is that in which, as in the extrinsic perfecting cause, things go perfectly well for this nature and do so only insofar as the beatific object is attained by this nature simply immediately by operation – so such operation will be simply one.

157. In a second way [n.155], when saying that every power is beatifiable that can immediately attain the beatific object [n.155], one must draw a distinction in ‘immediately’; for either this excludes a medium of the same order (which, namely, would be for it a medium for attaining [the beatific object] in its own order, as operation is a medium for the power in attaining the object), or it excludes a medium of another order (because, namely, nothing would attain the object more immediately or perfectly than it, or be for it the reason for its attaining the object or not). An example of this distinction: a prior and posterior cause immediately attain the same passive subject, such that neither agent cause is a medium through which the other cause attains the common passive subject; yet the prior cause attains it more immediately, because more intimately and perfectly, for the whole attaining by the posterior cause is in the virtue of the prior cause.

158. In the first way [n.157, ‘excludes a medium of the same order’], one must concede that both intellect and will are beatified, because the term more immediately of the operation of each power is the object itself, such that neither is medium as regard the other in idea of object, nor in idea of attaining the object as it is attained by the act. And thus, the total extensive beatitude that is possible in an intellectual nature (because it is the beatitude of its two powers, each of which is beatifiable in its own way) – this, I say, consists in several operations.

159. And in this way, if there could be ten powers in intellectual nature, each of which would, through operation, attain God immediately, the total extensive beatitude would consist in ten operations. Nor is this a problem unless it be said that God is the beatific object under a single idea alone, and cannot be attained under that idea save by a single power and a single operation, and so a power attaining that idea according to another operation, though doing so immediately, is yet not beatified save in a certain respect.

160. And according to this, it would have to be said that beatitude, simply and as a whole according to its powers, consists, like beatitude simply, in a single operation of that very nature.

161. Speaking of immediacy in the second way [n.157, ‘excludes a medium of another order’], it is plain that beatitude consists only in a single operation, because only a single power in nature most perfectly attains the object. Speaking thus, then, about the beatitude of nature, namely the beatitude by which things go simply best for nature itself, at least on the part of the object and of the best object (and as the best that nature is conjoined to), beatitude is only in a single operation of a single power –

162. – likewise too when speaking of the beatitude of the power as it includes immediacy in both ways stated [n.157].

163. In no way, then, can beatitude be said to consist in two operations save by positing that, for the beatific operation, a single operation suffice without another,⁴⁵ which however is a doubtful matter.

C. To the Arguments for the Opinion of Richard

164. To the arguments for the first opinion:

To the first argument [n.148]: the minor is not true save of one immediacy without the other, and from this does not follow save that beatitude is only in one or other of them, to the extent beatitude includes each immediacy. Likewise, beatitude of nature only consists in that by which nature most immediately attains the object; but that is single, though some power of it may, through another operation, attain it most immediately with the immediacy possible for that power.

165. To the second argument [n.149] it can be said that ‘to tend to the end’ only belongs to appetite properly, and this as the ‘to tend’ is compared to motion; because although the intellect tend to an object present, here however, when taking the ‘to tend’ equivocally, it yet never tends to anything as to acquiring, namely through motion, a term of motion.

166. In another way, having conceded that there is a tending to the beatific object through both powers, namely by a certain imperfect operation that can be had about something absent, the point can be conceded: one tendency is that whereby nature tends to it principally, and thus does a single resting follow it, which is the resting of nature principally; but the other tendency is a less principal tendency of it, and in this way does the resting follow. Also, when comparing the powers with each other, these tendencies are not to the object with a double immediacy most immediately, but only one is, and so that one will be the immediate resting which follows. The beatitude then is the beatitude of nature, to the extent that beatitude includes a double immediacy of operation to object.

167. To the third [n.150] I say that the total resting of nature, speaking of extensive totality, requires that whatever is restable in nature be at rest; and in this way the beatitude of man is not without resumption of, and reunion of the soul with, the body, because some appetite is in the soul for the body as for its proper perfectible object, or at least because conversely there is some appetite in matter (as in what is properly perfectible) for form, namely for the soul. But among these restings there is one resting of the nature simply, which namely is the resting of what is simply noblest in that nature, insofar as it is restable.

168. I say therefore that, just as there are some many things pertaining to the first act of something, so there can be many restings of those many, and one total resting, with extensive totality, of the whole, which includes those many restings. But there is of them all a single resting, which is the ultimate rest in the object, which also is alone the simply total resting of nature, speaking of intensive resting.

D. To the Reason for the Opinion of Thomas

⁴⁵ That is, beatitude could consist in two operations if each of the two operations was individually sufficient for the beatific operation, so that, though in fact both go together, each would be enough by itself.

169. The reasoning for the other opinion [n.152] can be conceded when understanding the conclusion of the single beatific operation (as to each immediacy) simply; when speaking too of the completive beatific operation of the whole nature. But if it be understood of the beatitude of the whole with extensive totality, the reasoning is not compelling, because many operations, one of which is simply nobler than the other, can come together in the best in this way, namely extensively.

II. To the Initial Arguments for Each Part

170. To the first main argument [n.139] I say that the ‘whatever’ is not taken there for all desirable things separately, but for one desirable thing in which all are unitedly contained; and thus, in having the beatific object, by whatever act it be said to be had, ‘he has whatever he wants’, because he has it eminently in that act on account of which alone it is rightly to be wanted; and in this act he has every act rightly to be wanted. When, therefore, you take under the minor that this and that operation are rightly to be wanted in themselves, it is plain that it is not rightly taken under the major.

171. To the next [n.140] I say, as will be said in the following question [nn.271, 304], that ‘to have’ is taken there for an act of willing, not for any act of willing whatever, but for the perfect act of willing, which follows bare vision; and he who by such act has whatever he wants, that is, has the one thing that is eminently everything wantable, is blessed. But it does not follow that ‘therefore whoever wants whatever he wants is blessed’, because a definition or description proper to something can be given through a lower level predicate but not through a higher level one, because a higher level one belongs to more things; hence in the form [sc. of the argument] a consequent is drawn from a lower to a higher level along with distribution [sc. at that higher level – which is fallacious].

172. As to the third [n.141], I deny the major, because many aspects in something can be distinctive of it from something [else], nor yet is each of them of the essence of that something insofar as it is distinct, but only that which first and essentially distinguishes it – and if you take this to be the understanding from the fact that ‘per se’ is stated in the major, namely essentially and per se in the first mode [cf. footnote to n.117], I concede the major; and then the minor is false, because by act of will alone is the blessed distinguished in this per se mode from the non-blessed – about which more in the following question, ‘On Enjoyment’ [nn.297-299].

173. As to the argument for the opposite [nn.142-146], it can be conceded when one understands it about beatitude simply of the nature, and about any operation simply beatific, namely in each way of immediacy in immediately attaining the object. And this appears probable since, when people posit beatitude to be in each operation or in both, they say that one of them is per se ordered to the other [nn.155-163]; and consequently, neither are each nor both one ultimate perfection simply of the nature, since even a single one of them is simply the ultimate perfection of the power.

Question Four

Whether Beatitude Consists per se in an Act of Intellect or of Will

174. Whether beatitude consists per se in an act of intellect or of will.

175. Proof that it consists in an act of intellect:

John 17.3, “This is life eternal, to know you etc.”

176. Again, Augustine *On the Trinity* 1.9 n.18, “Vision is the whole reward.”

177. Again, the Philosopher, *Ethics* 10.8.1178b7-32, proves by express intention that the happiness of separate substances consists in contemplation, and from this he concludes that our happiness is in contemplation, because in this are we made more like them.

178. Again, *Ethics* 1.5.1097b14-16, “Beatitude is the sufficient good;” but of this sort is vision, according to the remark of Philip, *John* 14.8, “Lord, show us the Father, and it is sufficient for us.”

179. On the contrary:

Augustine, *On the Trinity* 1.10 n.20, “To be enlightened and have joy in that alone [sc. the intellect] will suffice.”

180. Again, *On the Trinity* 13.5 n.8, “The blessed is he who has whatever he wills” [cf. nn.3, 139]; therefore, beatitude consists most of all in willed action. The will more wills its own operation than the operation of the intellect, because it is its proper perfection, and each thing desires more its own perfection than the perfection that per se belongs to another, although it be in some way its own.

181. Again, Augustine *On Christian Doctrine* 1.32 n.35 “The supreme reward is that we enjoy him [sc. God];” but to enjoy is an act of the will, because it is to “inhere with love” [*ibid.* 1.4 n.4]; our supreme reward is beatitude; therefore, it should consist in the will.

I. To the Question

182. In this question all who hold that beatitude consists in operation agree in holding that it consists only in some operation of the intellective part [of the soul] as distinguished from the sensitive part, because only an immaterial power can by its operation attain the perfect good, in which alone (as in its object) is beatitude. But as to the operation of which of these powers alone it consist in (if it consists in a single one), or principally consist in (if it consists in both), opinions arise.

A. Opinion of Thomas Aquinas

1. Exposition of the Opinion

183. One opinion [Aquinas, *Sent.* IV d.49 q.1 a.1] posits that beatitude consists in an act of intellect principally and essentially, and in act of will as in a certain perfection extrinsic to and supervening on vision – in which vision is the substance of beatitude.

184. The reason for this is of the following sort: beatitude either is the ultimate extrinsic end, which a thing attains by its operation, or is the ultimate intrinsic end, and is that operation alone which conjoins first with the exterior end; an act of will is the ultimate end in neither way; therefore beatitude too does not consist, in this way or that, in the will as an act of it – though it is in the will as object, because the idea of good is the object of the will, and beatitude, as it is the ultimate end, has most of all the idea of good.

185. Proof of the minor [n.184]:

As to its first part [‘an act of will is not the ultimate extrinsic end’]: first because the object of the will is the end, so every willing is a certain being ordered to the end; second because willing cannot be the first thing willed (for it presupposes that something other than willing is willed first, because a reflected act presupposes a direct act that has its term in something other than an act of the power, otherwise there would be an infinite regress). Something like this appears in the intellect, because [an act of] understanding cannot be the first thing understood, but something other than the very [act of] understanding is the object first of a direct act of understanding.

186. Proof of the second part of the minor [n.184, ‘an act of will is not the ultimate intrinsic end’], because the operation that first conjoins with the exterior end is the operation by which the attainment of the exterior end first comes about; an act of will is not of such sort, because there is one act of will before attainment of the end, namely desire, which is a sort of motion toward something not possessed, and another act of will is a sort of resting in the end. It is plain that the will does not first attain the end through the first act, because it lacks the end when it has that act. Nor does it do so through the second act; the proof is that the second act follows attainment; for the will is only now at rest in the thing it was tending to before because it is disposed differently now to the thing than before, or conversely. Therefore, what makes the will to be thus disposed to the end, so as to be (in it or through it) at rest in that which before it was tending toward, is the ultimate attainment of the end; such is the act of vision, because through this a certain contact of God with the intellect comes about (for the thing known is in the knower). Through this contact the object is so disposed to the will that the will can now be at rest in what before it could not.

187. This is confirmed by an example in the sense appetite, that if the sensible object is the extrinsic end, sensation is the intrinsic end, because the sensible object is first possessed through the sensation in such a way that the sense appetite can be at rest in it.

188. This is plain too in another example, that if money is the extrinsic end, possession of money is the intrinsic end, which intrinsic end is followed by the resting of the will in the loved money.

2. Rejection of the Opinion

189. Against this:

The extrinsic end is simply best and supremely to be willed, therefore, among the things that are for it, what is more immediate to it is more to be willed; but willing is more immediate to it, because it immediately tends to it as to ultimate end, since the ultimate end, as such, is the proper object of the willing.

190. Proof of the major:

That is more to be willed by a free will which is naturally more to be desired by natural appetite; of this sort is what is closer to the ultimate, because it is simply more desired naturally.

191. Again, the will can will its own act just as the intellect can understand its own act; either then it wills its willing on account of understanding, or conversely, or it wills neither on account of the other (and I am speaking of ordered willing). Not the first because, according to Anselm *Why God Man* 2.1, it would be a perverse order to will to

love in order to understand;⁴⁶ nor the third, because, in the case of things ordered per se to the same end, there is some order among them as if to an end under the end; therefore the second – and this is what Anselm maintains in the above cited place.

192. Again, if extrinsic beatitude were simply supremely to be willed, then that most of all is intrinsic beatitude, which, among things intrinsic, is supremely to be willed; of this sort is some willing; for the will more desires its own perfection in the ultimate end than the perfection of the intellect (and this, when speaking of correct free appetite, it does rightly), just as it naturally more desires it by natural appetite.

193. To the reasoning [n.184-85], then, I concede the first part of the minor and the first part of the conclusion, namely that the act of will is not the ultimate end altogether.

194. But neither so is the act of the intellect (according to them [n.185]); however, the act of will does approach more to the simply ultimate end – just as the first reason [n.184] proves about attaining, through this act, the end as proper object, and the third [n.184] about the greater wantability of this act, and the second about the idea of end in this act in respect of the act of intellect [n.184].

195. Nor do the proofs for the first part [n.185] prove more than is given:

For the act of will is ordered or orderable thus to the end simply because it is more immediate to it in the order of the things that are for the end; but the act of intellect, if it is not ordered, is yet orderable and mediately so, and for this reason it participates less of the idea of end.

196. The second proof [n.185] shows that something is willed prior to the willing itself; and I concede this, because the object is extrinsic; but the object is not intellection, at least when speaking of what is willed first in perfection, whatever may be true of firstness in generation; for that firstness does not prove anything for the proposed conclusion, namely that what is first willed is more an end.

The second part of the minor [n.184] I deny.

As to the proof [n.186] I concede that through an act of desire, which is for something absent, there is no attainment of the end; but through another act, which namely is the love of the thing present, there is attainment of the end first, speaking of the firstness of perfection, though through an act of intellect there is some sort of prior attaining of the end by priority of generation. But now, according to the Philosopher, *Metaphysics* 9.8.1050a4-5, “things posterior in generation are prior in perfection,” which is true of the posterior that is simply more immediate to the ultimate, which ultimate is what is simply perfect. So it is here.

197. When the proposed conclusion is proved about second act, that it is a resting in the end and consequently posterior to the attaining of the end [n.186], I say that resting can be understood either for delight properly speaking (which is a perfection supervenient to operation, as beauty to youth), and thus do some [Richard of Middleton] understand this reasoning, as if this opinion [of Thomas, nn.183-188] posit that with respect to the present object the will have only a delight consequent to the vision of the intellect; and if resting be thus taken for delight, I concede that it follows the attainment of the end, and the attainment first not only in generation but in perfection, because it follows the act of

⁴⁶ Anselm, “For this purpose has man received the power of discriminating, so that he might hate and avoid the bad and love and choose the good... For otherwise in vain would God have given this power of discriminating, because man would discriminate in vain if...he did not love the good and hate the bad.”

loving or enjoying the end seen, which is truly an elicited act of the will. But it is false that the will not elicit any act but have only passive delight about the lovable object present. Therefore does Augustine say *On the Trinity* 9.12 n.18, “The appetite of the seeker becomes the love of the enjoyer.”

198. Now this appetite or desire is not passion only: first because “we are not praised or blamed for our passions,” *Ethics* 2.4.1105b31-32 (but the greatest part of the merit and laudability of the just wayfarer consists in holy desires), second because for an object presented in the same way the will elicits desire sometimes more intensely, sometimes more laxly, according as it elicits it with greater or lesser effort.

199. It is also reasonable that if the will in desiring elicit an act, as is said in *Lectura* II d.25 n.36 (for which there is the authority of Augustine, *City of God* 14.6, about two similarly affected people,⁴⁷ and of Anselm *Virginal Conception* 1⁴⁸), that it also elicit an act about the end present, because if by acting it move itself toward a thing not possessed, it is reasonable that by acting it give itself rest in the thing present.

200. If then ‘resting’ is taken in another way for the quietening act elicited by the will, which act namely conjoins immediately with the ultimate end, in the way ultimate rest is in it, I concede that the resting is a second act of the will [n.197]. But I deny that it follows the first attainment of the end, I mean first in firstness of perfection; rather, in this way is it the first attainment, though it does follow some attainment, that is, the presence of this enjoyable object, which presence is by act of intellect.

201. But when speaking of first attainment in this way, namely the first presence of the object so that the will might be able, through its own act, to rest itself in it, I deny that this operation is the ultimate intrinsic end, through which is the first attainment of the extrinsic end; because the operation that is in this way first in attaining does not conjoin with the extrinsic end immediately, to the exclusion of all mediation of anything else nearer to the end.

202. If against this be adduced the proof that the will can now, not before, be at rest, therefore ‘it is disposed differently now to the end than before, or conversely’ [n.186], I reply that the consequence does not hold, but it is enough that some power, prior to the will in operating, be differently disposed to the object, by the positing, namely, of whose different disposition the will has power for the act for which it did not have power before, not by alteration of itself but of what was previous to it in acting.

203. Briefly then: the first part of the deduction [n.185] is not against any opinion, because no one posits that the act of the created will is God; nor is the second part [n.186] about the first act of will, namely desire, doubtful to anyone. The force then [of the deduction] rests in this: whether any act of will, other than desire, could be first in reaching the ultimate end.

204. And the proof adduced there about resting [nn.197, 186] is a failure of equivocation. For if resting is taken for the delight consequent to perfect operation, I concede that perfect reaching of the end precedes that resting; but if resting is taken for

⁴⁷ “For if two people, equally affected in mind and body, see the beauty of a single body and, when it is seen, one of them is moved to illicit enjoyment, the other perseveres settled in chaste will, what do we think is the cause that a bad will come to be in the former and not in the latter?”

⁴⁸ “God has subjected us and what is in us to the will, so that on its command we not be able not to move and do what it wills. Indeed, it moves us as its instruments and does the deeds that we are seen to do. Nor are we able to resist it by ourselves, nor can the works that it does not come to be. The mistress, which God has given us, we neither should, nor can we, not obey.”

the act of resting in the end, I say that the act of loving, which naturally precedes delight, gives rest in this way, because an operative power only rests in an object through the perfect operation through which it attains the object. And then the proposition ‘the first, that is, the perfect, attainment of the object precedes resting in the object’ is false, though having an appearance of truth from comparison with the motion by which a movable thing attains the term and attains rest in that term, since movement to the term precedes rest in the term.

205. But this comparison with the proposed conclusion is not valid, because the same operation is here perfectly attaining, and perfectly giving, rest, because the resting is in the perfect attainment of the object. And universally, when applying such likenesses taken from motions to operations, one must give up what, because it is a mark of imperfection, is therefore proper to motion. But so is here its distinction from rest; and, by opposition to it, the following are in operation in a unitive way: attainment of the object (as if by motion, or rather by tendency toward it), and resting in the object (since indeed such tendency toward it gives rest in it).

206. But if every operation of the will about a present object be denied other than delight – this is irrational, because if the will is operative about an absent object, but an object known imperfectly because obscurely, much more perfectly will it be able to operate about an object present perfectly, because seen.

207. If it is argued that the will can be at rest in the object now, not before, therefore it is differently disposed to the object (or conversely) than before [n.186] – I reply: the consequence is not valid, but it is enough that some power, a different one prior in operating, be disposed differently to the object than before [cf. n.202, repetition]; nor is it a wonder that a power, which in operating requires another operating power, is not altogether in proximate potency to operating save when the other is operating.

208. If it is argued that at any rate through that new thing, through which as new the will can be at rest now, the will was not able to be so then, therefore the attaining of the end is through that and is prior to the resting of the will (as is plain), therefore the first attainment of the end will be in that other act – I reply: first by firstness of generation, not by firstness of perfection; but beatitude is first attainment by firstness of perfection.

209. But if you argue that altogether, before any resting of the power, the possession or attainment of the end precedes, namely because the power can operate now and was not able to before, because it is not without some change, which change is only to possessing of the object – it follows that in no operation, even of the intellect, could there be a first attainment of the object, and so not beatitude either. And then the reasoning goes to the other opinion, that beatitude is not in operation but in some possessing of the object preceding all operation, which was spoken about in the first question [n.121].

B. Scotus’ own Response to Each Part of the Question

210. As to this question, argument from a number of middle terms is made for each part.

1. Argumentation from the First Middle Term, namely from the Object, and the Weighing of it

211. One middle term is from the object.

On behalf of the understanding, as follows: the true is nearer to being than the good is.

212. On behalf of the will, as follows: the idea of good is nobler because it is good by its essence, the true is good by participation; likewise, the universal good is nobler than a particular good, the true is a particular good because the good is an object of the intellect.

213. This middle term seems efficacious for neither opinion, because the major in both cases seems false, for the true and good are not really distinct, and consequently neither is one really nobler than the other.

214. But if one of them is said to be nobler than the other in idea (understanding 'idea' for something caused by the intellect), this is a relation of reason arising from the intellect comparing these things to others – this nobility does not make for the proposed conclusion, because a relation of reason is not the formal idea of the first object of intellect or will.

215. Likewise, to what will the comparison be made? If to the divine persons (to the Son, namely, to whom true corresponds in being, and to the Holy Spirit, to whom good corresponds), the divine persons are not different in nobility. But if they [the true and good] be compared to things posterior to them, namely to the acts of which they are the objects, there is now a circle in the reasoning.

216. And if they are posited to differ in real idea, as was said of the attributes in *Ord.* I d.8 nn.192-193, then some nobility in one of them (according to the proper idea of it) with respect to the other can well be preserved, and this before an act of intellect; because just as there is a distinction between things of a different idea, so is there inequality between them, especially if the distinction is quidditative, not hypostatic, and between absolutes. But perhaps neither true nor good assert absolute ideas beyond being.

217. The minor, too, of each reason is dubious as to the part that says 'the good is the object of the will' and false as to the part that says 'the true is the object of the intellect', as was said in *Ord.* I d.3 nn.171-174.

218. Both the major, then, and the minor require a lengthier discussion than may concern the present question.

219. Giving weight, then, to this middle term [sc. 'from the object'] in favor of neither side, I respond to the reasons taken from this middle term:

As to the first [n.211] the inference is to the opposite effect, because just as being is potential with respect to any particular idea so what is more potential will be closer to it.

220. But against this: the idea of being precisely taken is nobler than any idea superadded to it precisely taken, just as the idea of the subject is nobler than the idea of the accident; therefore, what is closer to it as it is most perfect will be more perfect. Hence it is false that being is disposed to other things as matter is to form, but rather it is as it were an active potency (as subject to property).

221. In another way it is said that something can be closer in one order to what is most perfect and another thing closer in another order; just as quantity is more immediate to substance than quality in one order, and yet quality is a more perfect thing and consequently closer [to substance] in another order. But that is simply more perfect which

is in a nobler order, or according to a nobler condition, closer to what is most perfect, as good is closer to being in the order of communicating perfections or being the term and completing the perfection of another (because of which good is said, in one way, to be communicative, according to Augustine *Christian Doctrine* 1 ch.31-32, in another way to be the end, *Physics* 2.3. 24-25, *Metaphysics* 5.2.1013b25-27, *Ethics* 1.4.1097a33-34) – though true be nearer to being in its order to powers operative about the whole of being.

222. As to the reason to the contrary [n.212], a first objection is that one could argue similarly about the true. For the true is true by essence, but the good is true by participation; therefore, the true is truer, therefore also greater, because thus does Augustine negatively argue *On the Trinity* 8.1 n.2, “if not truer, not greater,” where the context is only about things convertible.

223. Therefore I reply that all these transcendentals [sc. good, true] denominate each other mutually, and for this reason ‘being essentially true’ is of equal perfection as ‘being essentially good’, unless it be proved that the idea of true is nobler than the idea of good, and conversely.

224. Another response is realer, because the ‘more’ [sc. in ‘nobler’, ‘closer’ etc.] can be referred to the inherence or to the predicate; inherence follows the identity of the extremes. Therefore, what is essentially present is more present to the extent it determines inherence or identity, but not to the extent it determines the inhering extreme (an example: a white animal is not a more white thing than a man who is white).⁴⁹

2. Argumentation from the Second Middle Term, namely from the Habit, and the Weighing of it

225. Argument is made, second, from habit, because an act is nobler than a nobler habit disposes to. Some habit of the intellect is nobler than any habit of the will because, according to the Philosopher *Metaphysics* 1.2.983a4-7, wisdom is the noblest habit and the same is expressly said in *Ethics* 6.7.1141a16-20 and 10.7.1177a22-25. But no habit [of the will] is nobler, in the Philosopher, than justice or at any rate than friendship, about which it is plain that they are, according to him, far below wisdom.

226. To the contrary, *I Corinthians* 13.13, “But the greater of these is love;” and Augustine *On the Trinity* 15.18 n.37, “Among the gifts of God no gift is greater than charity, nor equal to it” (plainly speaking about a gift of a different idea).

227. The response [Aquinas, *Sent.* IV d.49 q.1 a.1] made to the Apostle and Augustine is that their understanding holds for the state of this life, but for the state of the fatherland the light of glory is nobler. The proof is that that to which, because of its perfection, belonging to something imperfect is repugnant is more perfect than that to which this is not repugnant; the light of glory, because of its perfection, is repugnant to being present in a wayfarer but not to being present in charity.

A confirmation: what distinguishes the perfect from the imperfect is more perfect than what is common to both; the light of glory distinguishes the comprehender [in heaven] from the wayfarer; charity is common.

228. Argument against this response:

⁴⁹ The term ‘white’ in the phrase ‘a white animal’ inheres in the term ‘animal’ more than ‘white’ in the phrase ‘a man who is white’ inheres in the term ‘man’ (for in the first the noun is directly qualified and in the second only by apposition); but the white animal is not thereby said to be a whiter thing than the man.

First from the authority of Hugh [of St. Victor] *On the Celestial Hierarchy* 6.7 [supra n.21], about the “acute, super-fervent, hot,” says “love is supreme over knowledge;” hence the supreme order [of angels] is denominated from its ardor, the next to it from its knowledge.

229. Again, by reason:

The most perfect habit of will on the way [for the wayfarer] perfects the will according to the capacity that it has at that time; therefore, if it is nobler than any habit of intellect [as the response to the Apostle and Augustine conceded, nn.226-227], the capacity of the will on the way is greater (or for something greater) than the capacity of the intellect; therefore it is greater in the fatherland too, because either there is the same capacity here as there (speaking of remote capacity, which is according to the rank of the nature with the capacity), or the capacity there will correspond proportionally to the capacity here (speaking of proximate capacity); for the first capacity [capacity on the way] can only be totally satisfied by something proportionally perfecting it, so only by something more noble than it; but it is for something more noble [sc. than the intellect is for, as was conceded, nn.226-227].

230. This middle term [n.225] seems rather to conclude in favor of the will, especially when speaking of infused habits, which dispose to the true beatitude that the theologians speak of.

231. As to the authority of the Philosopher [n.225], it could be said that, although wisdom were a nobler acquired habit, it does not follow that it dispose to a nobler act, speaking of supernatural act, of which sort is beatitude.

232. But to the contrary [sc. to the concession, n.231, that wisdom is a nobler acquired habit]: the will is a power able to be habituated by an acquired habit just as the intellect is; therefore, the supreme acquired habit of the will can exceed wisdom just as its supreme infused habit exceeds the supreme habit infused in the intellect.

233. It could also be said that the Philosopher commonly did not distinguish intellect from will in idea of operative principle, or operative in extrinsic operation; hence he holds this principle, as it is distinct from nature, to be the same, now art or intellect, now intention [*Ord.* I d.2 n.351]. Likewise, neither does he distinguish the principle in its intrinsic operation in regard to the end; hence too he does not distinguish wisdom’s speculation from love, but rather its speculation includes love – or at any rate he does not assert that intellection suffices without volition, because, as intellection is distinguished from this other act (which act [of volition] is less manifest), he neither affirms nor denies it.

3. Argumentation from the Third Middle Term, namely from the Comparison of Act with Act, and the Weighing of it

234. The third middle term is from comparison of act with act.

First as follows: an equivocal efficient cause is nobler than the effect; an act of intellect in respect of an end is cause of an act in respect of the will, because when the former is posited the latter is, and when the former is removed the latter is – and it is plainly an equivocal cause.

235. To the contrary, from the same middle term [n.234]: the will gives commands to the intellect; therefore, an act of will is an equivocal efficient cause in respect of intellection.

It is confirmed by Anselm, *Virginal Conception* 4 [n.199].^a

a. [Interpolation] where he says that the will moves itself against the judgement of the other powers, and that it moves all other powers according to its own command; and Augustine *City of God* 19.14 [in fact 14.5-6, 28] says that the will uses all the other powers.

236. Similarly, *Metaphysics* 9.8.1050a4-5, “What is posterior in generation is prior in perfection;” volition is posterior in generation; nor is it this alone, but it has the idea of end with respect to intellection, according to Anselm *Why God Man* 2.1; and Augustine *City of God* 19.14, “The rational soul is present in man so that he may contemplate something in his mind and do something accordingly,” and later, “so that he may cognize something useful and manage his life and morals according to that knowledge.”

237. I reply: neither is an act of intellect total cause of an act of will, but a partial cause (if it is any cause), nor conversely is the will total cause of intellection.

238. The major [sc. “an equivocal efficient cause is nobler than the effect,” n.234] is true of a total equivocal efficient cause, but if it is about a partial cause this will be [true] about a cause of a higher order. And in this way is the will, in commanding the intellect, a superior cause of the intellect’s act; but the intellect, if it is a cause of volition, is a cause subservient to the will, as having an action first in the order of generation.

239. And so this middle term concludes probably on behalf of the will, but proves nothing on behalf of the intellect.

240. But that intellection is not the total cause of volition [n.237] is plain, because, since the first intellection is caused by a cause merely natural, intellection too is not free; further, it would cause with like necessity whatever it would cause, and thus, however many circularities may occur in acts of intellect and will, the whole process would merely be by natural necessity – which however is unacceptable. But, in order that freedom in man may be preserved, one must say that, after intellection has been posited, a total cause of volition is not obtained, but the will is more principal with respect to volition – and the will alone is free.

241. As to the proof that “when the former is posited the latter is, and when the former is removed the latter is” [n.234] – the antecedent was rejected in *Ord.* I d.1. nn.100-146.

242. An argument in another way is given [Thomas Aquinas, *Sent.* IV d.49 q.1 a.1; cf. Richard of Middleton, *Sent.* IV d.49 princ.1 q.7 arg.5]: that is better which, without anything else, would be more choice-worthy; but intellection alone is more choice-worthy than volition alone, because intellection alone would be a perfect act and an act proper to intellectual nature; volition alone would be only a certain inclination (as of a heavy thing to the center [of the earth]).

243. On the contrary, from the same consideration: that by which what has it is simply good is more choice-worthy than that by which what has it is not simply good; but Augustine, *On the Trinity* 11.28, “neither is a man rightly called good who knows what the good is, but he is who loves the good,” and from this he concludes there that “in the

case of men who are rightly loved, the love itself is more loved,” which is the conclusion here intended.

244. Again, in the case of goods that do not include each other, that good is more choice-worthy whose opposite is more to be hated. But prescinding from these things, namely how they do not include each other, the opposite of intellection cannot be as hateful as the opposite of love.

245. Proof of this:

First about the contrary opposite: because no ignorance of God, even the ignorance of infidelity, can be as hateful as hatred of God, if it could be present in the will.

Second about the contradictory opposite: because not to love God is blamable and a sin, when namely it can be had by the proximate power [sc. power of loving]; because he who actually understands God and in no way loves him sins, and he who actually thinks of sin, and does so without any displeasure, sins. But not to understand when, however, one is in proximate power to understanding, is not blamable or a sin.

246. This middle term [n.244] concludes probably in favor of the will.

247 To the argument in favor of the intellect [n.242], I reply: if love were alone it would not only be a natural inclination, as of the heavy to the center of the earth, but it would be an operation proper to intellectual nature; for the fact that it is now operation, and is this sort of operation, it does not have from the intellect formally but concomitantly.

248. An argument is given in another way [Thomas Aquinas, *ST* Ia q.82 a.3; Richard of Middleton, *Sent.* IV d.49 princ. 1 q.7]: that is more perfect which in its perfection is less dependent, because ‘to depend’ is a mark of imperfection; an act of intellect does not depend on the will, but conversely.

249. I reply: things posterior in generation depend on things prior, and yet they are more perfect, *Metaphysics* 9.8.1050a4-7 [n.236].

250. Similarly, the end depends in its being on that which is for the end and not conversely [n.236]; form also depends on matter and not conversely; bodily quality depends too on quantity insofar as, according to them, ‘being white without a surface’ is a contradiction; and still in all these cases the greater opposite is true, and universally in these generations, where there is dependence on something prior in order of generation. However, it is true that the simply most perfect thing is altogether independent, because as there is first in perfection so also in generation, *Metaphysics* 9 [nn.249, 236]. Act precedes in time every power, because if there be a circle in the priority of act to power and conversely, yet there is a stand at him who is always moving first; but where two priorities do not come together, the greater opposite is more commonly true.

251. Likewise it could be said that the intellect depends on volition as on a partial but superior cause; conversely volition depends on intellect as on a partial but subservient cause.

252. Another way of arguing is as follows [Thomas Aquinas, *ST* Ia q.82 a.3]: the act of intellect is purer because it contracts no impurity from the object, because ‘to understand evil’ is not evil; but an act of will contracts impurity, because ‘to will evil’ is evil.

253. Besides this, there is another impurity in the volition [Richard of Middleton, *Sent.* IV d.49 princ.1 q.7], because it is a movement of the soul to the thing in itself;

intellection is not so but is a movement of the thing to the soul or of the thing as it is in the soul, from *On the Soul* 1.4.408a34-b18 and *Metaphysics* 6.4.25-31, “True and false are in the soul, good and bad in things outside.”

254. To the contrary: from *Topics* 2.9.114b20-22, that is purer and better whose corruption is impurer and worse; but the corruption of the will is such, because ‘to will evil’ is evil for you [Thomas, n.252], not so ‘to understand’.

255. Similarly, the reasoning [n.252] is otherwise at fault in two ways:

In one way because it should compare understanding the corrupt thing, which is false [understanding], with willing the corrupt thing, which is evil [willing], and then the proposed conclusion follows through the reason already stated [n.252, sc. the intellect contracts impurity from the object, because it contracts falsity, therefore it is not purer than the will].

256. In another way because the will can have a good act about any object whatever [sc. including an evil object], just as can also the intellect; for the will can hate evil well, just as the intellect can understand well that evil is to be hated.

257. If, finally, this proposition be taken, ‘that act is impurer which is rendered impure by impurity of object’ – I reply: an act of the intellect is such, because it is necessarily false from the fact it is of a false object [a false object is not a thing but a proposition about a thing, and if the intellect has a false proposition for its object it is necessarily false]; but an act of will is not impure and evil because it is of an evil object, save concomitantly [sc. because an evil object is not evil as an object, but as willed in an evil way].

258. But if you say that an act of will is impure from its object, by impurity of malice, not so an act of intellect – the conclusion does not follow, because then an act of sense would be nobler than an act of will, because it is less impure [sc. therefore lack of impurity, as per n.252, is not a good way to prove nobility].

259. The second reason [n.253], namely about tendency to the thing in itself, concludes to the opposite:

First from their own statements [Thomas and Richard], because they concede that an act of will in respect of things superior to the will itself is nobler than an act of intellect. From this follows, ‘therefore this act in genus is nobler than that act in genus’, because, if the best is nobler than the best, the genus too is nobler than the genus and the species than the species, for a whole species together is superior to any other whole species.

260. Second: an act is not perfect unless it conjoins with a perfect object; but an act of will conjoins with the object in itself as it is in itself, and an act of intellect conjoins with it only as the object is in the knower. Now the beatific object is simply nobler in itself than as it is in the knower; therefore, an act of will conjoins with the beatific object simply under a nobler idea.

261. As to the authority of the Philosopher in *Metaphysics* [n.253], I say that both intuitive knowledge and the love that follows it tend to an object as it is existent in itself; but abstractive knowledge and the consequent love tend to an object that has known being; so in this respect there is no difference between intellect and will, because each power can tend to its object as it is in itself and to the object as it has diminished being in the intellect. However, the Philosopher was speaking in common of abstractive intellection and of will as it is desiderative, how it tends to a thing not now existing but

future (and this as to the term or effect of the act of desire). But to the same thing, as to its object, the will only tends as the thing has being in the intellect, because when it is desired the thing has no other being that it could be object by.

II. To the Initial Arguments

262. To the first main reason [n.175] I say, according to what was said in the preceding question [n.11], *Metaphysics* 12.9.1072b26-28, that “the act of the intellect is life, and eternal life if it is eternal.” If you take it that it is eternal *blessed* life, this is not in the Gospel [n.175] but is added. So I add “to know you *and to love you*,” and the second addition is no more against the text than the first.

263. To the next [n.176], which is from Augustine, I concede that vision is the whole reward, that is, the supreme reward, of the intellective power; but it is not the supreme reward of the whole man. And in this way can many authorities that are verbally for the intellect be glossed, that they are meant for the supreme power or about nature according to its power, but not simply about the supreme perfection of nature.

264. To the third [n.177], about habit, the answer is plain in the second way that proceeded from the middle term taken from habit [n.225].

265. To the next [n.178] I say that love is a good more sufficient than intellection, because when it is had the haver of it needs less.

266. For proof of the minor [n.265] I say that Philip’s statement [n.178] must be understood as it concerns instruction about the Trinity, for he had not then completely understood it. For he (namely Philip) had frequently heard talk about the Father, and so he conceived that when the Father was shown to him he, and others with him, would sufficiently grasp the truth of the faith about the Trinity. But he was not speaking of the beatific vision, as if that would suffice without love, as is plain from Christ’s response [*John* 14.9], “Am I so long with you etc. Philip, he who sees me...,” as if Christ is saying, “if you have already seen me in my deity, also with the perfect vision of faith, you have seen my Father too with similar vision.” But he did not mean that the Apostles had seen him in the beatific vision; for then he would be supposing them to have been blessed.

Question Five

Whether Beatitude Simply Consists in the Act of Will that is Enjoyment

267. Whether beatitude simply consists in the act of will that is enjoyment.

That it does not:

268. The act of enjoyment does not distinguish the blessed from the non-blessed because, by the definition of ‘to enjoy’ [n.181], the act belongs to the wayfarer.

269. But I say that the wayfarer has only desire, which is relative to what is not had, and therefore he does not enjoys.

270. On the contrary: the wayfarer no more wills God a good not present in him than the comprehender does; therefore he no more has an act of love of friendship with respect to a good not possessed by the beloved than the comprehender does; but ‘to enjoy’ is an act of friendship, not concupiscence.

271. Again, if someone who does not have charity see the divine essence bare (which does not involve a contradiction) he can enjoy it; and yet without charity he cannot be blessed, Augustine *On the Trinity* 15.18 n.32, “[Charity] alone is what makes division between the sons of the kingdom and the sons of perdition.”

272. Again, all things lower than intellectual nature are in their own way (that is, in a certain respect) made blessed in completing an act of concupiscence; therefore the will too [is made blessed] in a like act, though a more perfect one; but enjoyment is not any act of concupiscence.

273. Again, possessing succeeds to hope, therefore possessing is an act of will; therefore beatitude is in that act, because the will is of itself the power according to which intellectual nature is beatified; but possessing is not enjoyment.

274. To the contrary:^b

[That it does] because beatitude is not actively elicited by the will; first because the will would beatify itself; second because a reward is conferred on the rewarded by the rewarder; third because a gratuitous act of love is of itself meritorious (for it is of the same idea as what is meritorious, because it makes itself worthy with him whom it thus loves, though no one may merit because of his state); fourth because nothing that is or can be a merit as concerns what is from itself is essentially a reward; fifth because a more intense act of enjoyment is preserved if it is from God. Proof in general: because the passive capacity in creatures is for a greater perfection than is their active virtue; proof in particular, about the soul of Christ [sc. who received by incarnation, not by act of will, supreme beatitude].

b. [Text canceled by Scotus]: On the contrary, Augustine *Christian Doctrine* 1 [n.181], “The supreme reward is that we enjoy him.”

I. To the Question

A. Two Possible Conclusions

275. There are two conclusions for the question: first, that the beatitude simply of intellectual nature consists in the sole act that is enjoyment; second what enjoyment it consists in, because not in every enjoyment.

1. About the First Conclusion

276. The first conclusion is made clear by division thus: in genus there is only a twofold act of will: ‘to will’ and ‘to will-against’.⁵⁰ ‘To will’ too is double in genus: either because of the thing, or the good of the thing, willed; or because of the thing, or the good of the thing, that wills.

277. The first ‘to will’ is said to be the willing of the love of friendship, the second the willing of the love of concupiscence; and only the first is enjoyment, for to enjoy is to inhere with love [n.181] because of the thing itself, namely the thing loved.

⁵⁰ Or, more colloquially, ‘to will’ and ‘to refuse’. Not to will at all, or to be indifferent, which is possible, is not an act but an absence of act.

278. Against this second distinction an objection is made through Augustine, *On the Trinity* 9.12 n.18, “The appetite of the seeker becomes the love of the enjoyer” [n.197]; the appetite of the seeker belongs to the love of concupiscence; therefore etc.

279. I reply: the wayfarer, as to the willing of concupiscence, wills a good for himself and, as to the willing of friendship, he wills well-being for God. The first appetite, in respect of a good to be possessed [sc. the love of concupiscence, or ‘the appetite of the seeker’], becomes the love of satisfaction for him in the good possessed, and so it becomes ‘the love of the enjoyer’ – it does not, however, become the love by which he formally enjoys, but it becomes his love who, by the other love [sc. the love of friendship], enjoys the same object in itself that, by this love [sc. the love of concupiscence], he loves for himself. The second appetite [love of satisfaction], that is, imperfect love, becomes the perfect love of the enjoyer by which, namely, he enjoys.

280. Having set down the division [nn.276-277] I give proof of the principal conclusion, not including nor excluding the passions (about which there will be question later, nn.413, 426, 431-433), but only speaking here of these acts of will [n.277].

281. It is plain that beatitude cannot consist in any willing-against; first because willing-against has evil for per se object, which cannot be the beatific object; second because the beatific act is first and immediate in respect of the ultimate end, and so is not had by virtue of any prior act of will. But it is plain that willing-against is not first with respect to the ultimate end; indeed it is not simply first among acts of will, but is either not had or not commonly had save by virtue of some willing, according to Anselm *Fall of the Devil* 4, “No one deserts justice save by wanting something else that does not stand with justice,” as he exemplifies about a miser and coin and bread.⁵¹

282. Second, beatitude does not consist in an act of concupiscence:

First because although [such act] could be good when duly circumstanced, yet it is not good by reason of itself or by its object, even by God, because it can be immoderate. This is plain from Augustine 83 *Questions* q.30, “Perversity lies in using what is to be enjoyed” (just as above, in *Ord.* II d.6 nn.34-73, it was said that the angel first sinned by immoderate concupiscence of the beatific object for himself), as Anselm maintains in *Fall of the Devil* 6, where he maintains that the [fallen] angels desired what they would have had if they had stood; but they desired nothing before, or more than, beatitude, because to that does the affection of advantage first and supremely incline. Now an act of friendship in regard to God is good by reason of itself and of its object, at least because it cannot be immoderate by excess, though perhaps by deficiency.

283. Second, because an act of concupiscence is not and cannot be the first act of the will in regard to the end, for every act of concupiscence is in virtue of some act of friendship; for I desire a good for this [person] with concupiscence because I love him for whom I desire it.

284. Third, because an act of friendship is in the will according as it has an affection for justice; for if it had only affection for advantage, it could only supremely will things of advantage, according to Anselm [*ibid.* n.282, chs. 12, 14. But an act of concupiscence is present in the will according as the will has an affection for advantage, because it is necessarily present according to that affection, even were that affection alone present; but the affection of justice is nobler in idea than the affection of advantage,

⁵¹ “For a miser, when he wants to keep the coin and prefers bread, which he cannot have unless he gives the coin, first wants to give it, that is, to give up the coin, before he does not want to keep it.”

because the former is ruler and moderator of the latter, according to Anselm [*On Concord* q.3 n.11], and is proper to the will insofar as the will is free, because the affection of advantage would belong to the will even if the will were not free.

285. Then, fourth, because the act of friendship tends to the object as it is good in itself, but an act of concupiscence tends to it as it is good for me; but nobler is an object in itself than as had by something else – at least this relation of the object to the haver, which is in an object as desired by concupiscence its formal idea, diminishes the objective perfection that this good has as it is in itself.

2. About the Second Conclusion

286. The second main conclusion is plain, for a wayfarer can enjoy God since he can inhere in him by love because of himself [n.277].

287. If you say ‘not by love but by desire’ [n.269], this is false, because although God is not had by the [wayfaring] lover, and therefore could be desired as something to be had, yet not by desiring some good to be had by God that God does not have, but his infinite goodness only is pleasing to me, which, by accepting and being pleased with, I will every good to be present in that is present in it.

288. The proposed conclusion is also plain from Augustine *83 Questions* q.30 [n.282], that virtue consists in enjoying what is to be enjoyed.

B. A Difficulty

289. But there is a difficulty here as to how beatific enjoyment and non-beatific enjoyment are distinguished.

1. First Solution

290. Not in species it seems, because when per se sufficient causes are of the same species the effects are too. So it is in the issue at hand, because the same will, the same charity, the same enjoyable object, and under the same idea on the part of the object. In accord with this, then, it would be posited that they only differ as greater and lesser in the same species.

291. Against this is objected that then the wayfarer would be blessed, though less blessed than the comprehender.

292. I reply: the consequence is not valid, because ‘beatitude’ is not imposed to signify the nature as to its species the way the name enjoyment is. Hence it is well conceded that both [sc. wayfarer and comprehender] enjoy, but one more, the other less; however, the name ‘beatitude’ is imposed to signify enjoyment in a determinate degree, so as not to be below that degree. And this degree the wayfarer never has, neither as to more nor less.

293. But [sc. to the contrary], diverse comprehenders have it thus [sc. more and less], and so one of them is more blessed than another.

294. This⁵² is shown as follows, that if there are only there degrees of the same species, let the lowest degree of a blessed be taken and the highest degree of a wayfarer; if they are equal, then the wayfarer is blessed.

295. But this act [sc. of the wayfarer] does not fall short of that act [sc. of the blessed] to an infinite degree, as is plain. Posit then that it fails short to four degrees. It is possible for the enjoyment of the wayfarer to increase through four degrees, because knowledge also can. Since then too knowledge of the same species may have as many degrees as enjoyment also has, yet, once intensification of the knowledge is posited, the enjoyment of the knower can be intensified proportionately; therefore, it is still possible for the wayfarer to be blessed; therefore, it is also possible for a wayfarer to reach that degree [of enjoyment] and be blessed.

296. A similar argument can be made about a given degree of beatific enjoyment, from which the supreme degree of a wayfarer (suppose the blessed Mary) is distant by a certain number of degrees; yet if it is of the same species within the species of beatific enjoyment, let a descent be made to lower and lower degrees – a length there will be some beatific enjoyment equal to the non-beatific enjoyment, or less than it.

2. Another Solution

297. It can be said in another way, and more probably, that beatific and non-beatific enjoyment differ in species – formally indeed in themselves, but causally from their causes, or the disposition of their causes.

298. For if it be posited that the intellect is cause, though a partial cause, of volition, and the intellection of the wayfarer and the vision of the blessed differ in species, then the effects that necessarily require these diverse causes differ in species; for never does an individual of the same species necessarily require a cause of a different species from the cause that another individual requires.

299. But if intellection be said to be a cause *sine qua non*, it is at least essentially required, and then, as before, diverse things of the same species do not necessarily require in their causes any of a different species. So this opinion too [n.297] has to concede that volitions are distinguished in species by their objects, and yet the object, according to them [Henry of Ghent, *Quodlibet* I q.15], is a cause *sine qua non*. But then the distinction of enjoyments can be saved by distinction of visions, just as an effect varies by the differing closeness of the agent to the passive subject (for an agent that is opposite to the passive subject in a direct line acts differently from one that is opposite to it in a reflex or broken line), and cognition here is as it were the coming close of the object to the will.

3. Conclusion

300. Holding to this second way then [nn.297, 299] one need not concede that, by God's absolute power, can be caused in the soul of a wayfarer, at least of one not seeing God bare, any enjoyment equal to the lowest enjoyment possible for any blessed; because the supreme of the lowest species cannot be made equal to the lowest of the higher species, for the whole of the former is below the whole of the latter.

⁵² Paragraphs 294-296 are an added extra in Scotus' own ms.

301. But it is difficult according to the first way to prevent in the soul of the wayfarer (while his obscure knowledge persists intense to such and such a degree) the possibility of some enjoyment being there equal to some given beatific enjoyment.

II. To the Initial Arguments

302. The answer to the first main argument [n.268] is plain from the second article [nn.286-287].

303. To the second [n.271] it is said [Godfrey of Fontaines, Henry of Ghent] that if someone without charity see God, he would not have supernatural enjoyment because neither any first supernatural act, without which he is not able to be acted on nor to act, and consequently he would not have beatific enjoying either [cf. *Ord.* I d.1 n.88].

304. Another answer was stated in *Ord.* I d.1 nn.141-142, that a habit is not that whereby the haver can simply elicit the act; and so, after the presence as it were of the object is posited, the will can proceed to some act about the object, and the supernatural act [n.303] comes from the object and the presence of the object, but not from something that is in potency eliciting it. Nor yet is that enjoyment beatific, because it is not as great as is of a nature to be had by such a will about an object thus shown to it; for a greater enjoyment would be had if the charity were present by which the act is in some way intensified, as was said in *Ord.* I d.17 nn.202-205. But beatitude of will is not in any act save the highest that the will can have about an object represented to it in such a way.

305. To the third [n.272] I say that the will alone among all appetites can will a good for something because of the thing willed. And so there is no likeness here between other appetites and it, as neither is there generally when what the argument is about is the sole thing such. On the contrary, the argument is to the opposite when it is about something pertaining to the perfection of this sole thing; for it agrees with things more imperfect than itself in some respect and differs from them in some respect proper to itself: it is more perfect according to what is proper to it than according to what is common, because the common cannot be more perfect than any imperfect thing that includes it. And so, if excelling perfection, as beatitude, belongs to that sole thing, the conclusion that beatitude agrees with it not according to that in which it is like the inferiors is more drawn than the opposite conclusion is.

306. To the fourth [n.273], not everything that succeeds to the theological virtues in the wayfarer, or to their acts, is of the essence of beatitude, but only the most perfect unique act; therefore, let it be that possessing is the act of will that succeeds to hope, it does not follow that beatitude consist in it, but it suffices if it be concomitant to beatitude.

Question Six

Whether Perpetual Security of Possession Belongs to the Essence of Beatitude

307. Whether perpetual security of possession belongs to the essence of beatitude.

308. That it does:

Augustine, *On the Trinity* 13.4 n.7-7 n.10 adds after other things belonging to beatitude: "And because it is altogether most blessed, so will it be most certain that it will always be."

309. Again, it is of the essence of beatitude that it is the ultimate perfection; therefore, by its idea, it excludes from the subject all opposed privation; therefore, by its idea, it makes the subject incorruptible and unchangeable in respect of that perfection.

310. Again, Aristotle *Ethics* [1.13.1102a5-6, 6.1098a16-20, 10.1100a1-5], “the best activity in a complete life is happiness;” this, according to him, includes a certain perpetuity, otherwise a happy man could become wretched, which he considers unacceptable [*ibid.* 6.1098a19-20, 11.1100a27-29]; therefore etc.

311. Again, faith, hope, and charity come together essentially for the wayfarer’s first perfection, and actions according to them come together for his second perfection [n.39]. So, for the perfection of him who comprehends, the perfect acts corresponding to those acts come together essentially. The proof of the consequence is that the second perfection of the blessed in its degree does not require a lesser integrity of perfection than the second perfection of the wayfarer in its degree, otherwise the blessed, by that wherewith they are blessed, would not have all the perfection per se of which they would be capable. But, as it is, to the act of hope only possession succeeds; but possession seems to be nothing but security; therefore etc.

312. On the contrary:

Aristotle, *Ethics* 1.4.1096b3-5, “Nothing is more perfect from the fact that it is more lasting” (he gives an example of a white thing lasting one day and one year); and this point is altogether true of permanent perfection, because to such perfection time, or any greater or lesser duration, is an accident. Therefore, security of possession, which includes perpetuity of duration, does not per se belong to beatitude, which is total simultaneous perfection.

313. Again, this security of possession, if it is an act, is an act of intellect or of will; if an act of intellect it does not belong to beatitude save as being the way to it (from questions 3 and 4 of this distinction [nn.156, 194-202]); if an act of will, it is not enjoyment; rather it has enjoyment for object; but beatitude is in enjoyment alone (from the preceding question [nn.275-288]); therefore etc.

I. To the Question

314. Here two things need to be looked at: first the perpetuity of beatitude; second the security of the blessed.

A. About the Perpetuity of Beatitude

1. About the Reality of Such Perpetuity

315. About the first point [n.314] the thing is plain because it is so from Scripture, *Matthew* 25.46, “The just will go to eternal life;” and *id.* 22.30, “They will be like the angels of God;” and *Psalms* 83.5, “They will praise you for ages of ages;” and it is repeated elsewhere.

316. Similarly there are many sayings of the saints to the same effect. Let it be enough to adduce Augustine *On the Trinity* XIII ch.8 n.11, “There cannot be blessed life if it is not immortal.” He proves this by the fact that, if such life can be lost, then the blessed loses it willingly (and then he is not blessed because he does not have what he wants), or he loses it unwillingly, or neither willingly nor unwillingly. And on each of

these last two members it follows that he is not blessed; for he does not have beatitude, but rather: if he loses it willingly, he hates it; if he loses it neither willingly nor unwillingly then he does not value it; therefore it is not blessed life either. The like can be argued if beatitude is lost through loss of natural life; for if he loses life, he loses it either willingly or unwillingly or in neither way.

317. And this three-membered distinction of Augustine's must not be understood to hold for the moment at which blessedness is posited as being lost (because the result, namely that he is not then blessed, would not be unacceptable); but it must be understood for the 'now', or the time, for which he is blessed. For if he then does not want to lose blest life and yet does lose it, he does not have whatever he wants. Whether, then, he wants to lose it, or he does not care about it, he does not love that life for the future, even while he has it; therefore he is not blessed.

318. Nor is it reasonable to object that he may lose it but that he does not, while he is blessed, consider the fact, and so he is neutral as regard his will – not indeed by not caring about the apprehended good's being possessed forever, but by not understanding anything about that 'being possessed forever'. This, I say, is unreasonable, because how is it he would never consider the perpetuity of the life that he supremely loves if that life is blessed life? Or if he does consider it and believes the life to be perpetual, then he is deceived. But nothing is more unacceptable than that someone be blessed by a false opinion, according to Augustine *City of God* XI.4.

319. And with this also agrees the authority of the Philosopher *On Generation* 2.1033b27-29, "We say that in all things nature desires what is better; but it is better always to be than not to be," at least in the way in which it is possible 'to be always'; but it is possible for a perpetual nature to be ultimately perpetually perfect; therefore it naturally desires this. And so, in the case of beatitude, where natural desire is completed so as not to be vain, this condition will be obtained.

2. Doubts about Such Perpetuity

320. But what the cause is of this perpetuity is matter for doubt; likewise too what sort of thing is this perpetuity; and third how it is present in beatitude.

a. Three Positions or Opinions are Set Down About the First Doubt

321. About the First

Either [Henry of Ghent, *Quodlibet* VIII q.9] the position is that beatitude is essentially necessary of itself, and then beatitude cannot not be perpetual – of itself indeed formally, but causally by a causality other than extrinsic cause [cf. *Ord.* I d.8 nn.232-249].

322. Or, second [Aquinas *ST* IaIIae q.5 a.4], the position is that beatitude is perpetual from the fact that the will necessarily enjoys the object seen, for there is not any idea of evil or deficiency of good shown in the object. And this position differs from the first [n.321] in the way opinions about the heavens differ – the opinion that posits the heavens to be moved necessarily because of the uniform relation that the mover has to the movable [n.322], and the opinion that would posit the motion of the heavens to be formally necessary of itself [n.321]. The first opinion but not the second would be the one

posited by a philosopher, as is plain from Averroes *Metaphysics* 12 com.41 [cf. *Ord.* I d.8 nn.232-293].

323. Or, third [Aquinas *ST* Ia IIae q.2 a.8, q.3 a.8, q.10 a.3; Richard of Middleton, *Sent.* IV d.49 Princ.1 q.6], the position is that the power is determined to action and is so by a necessary habit, namely that the intellect is determined to seeing by the light of glory, and the will is determined to enjoyment by consummate charity.

α. Reasons for and against the First Opinion

324. Argument for the first of these positions [n.321] is as follows: some bodily form is simply incorruptible, not only some substantial bodily form (as the form of the heavens) but also some accidental one, provided it is the proper perfection of an incorruptible body (as perspicuity in the heavens and luminosity in the stars); therefore the supreme perfection of spiritual nature will be formally incorruptible.

325. Again, a form that takes away every privation from its matter constitutes an incorruptible composite (the point is clear about the heavens [below, n.417]); but beatitude takes away every privation from a nature capable of beatitude, because it takes away imperfection and potentiality, since beatitude is ultimate act in its own order more than is the form of the heaven in the order of substantial forms.

326. There is a confirmation of the reason in that, to the extent an extrinsic end includes eminently the perfection of every other end, it removes, as regards the extrinsic end, all privation or lack; for no extrinsic end is here lacking to him who perfectly has that end. Therefore similarly (or by way of causality) the ultimate intrinsic end, because it joins one to the ultimate extrinsic end, takes away all privation of a further intrinsic end, and so it will constitute a composite that is formally incorruptible intrinsically and in its conjunction with the extrinsic end.

327. Again, third, if beatitude were of itself a potential form, then it could be destroyed (and yet be so while nature remains, because the nature is incorruptible), and consequently someone blessed could become wretched, and thus someone blessed would not be blessed, because he would not have whatever he wants (for he wants never to become wretched [nn.3, 118]).

328. Against this [n.327]: created beatitude is an accident; therefore it is not less dependent than its subject is; but the subject depends on being conserved by God contingently conserving it, and consequently the subject does not have necessary existence formally; therefore much less does an accident have it.

329. I reply: although beatitude have an absolutely contingent being yet, from the fact of its once existing in a nature, it necessarily remains while the nature remains; and so it has necessary existence from its having been brought into being – and this as it is in its own order of being (although, as the argument proves [n.328], it is not absolutely necessary).

330. Against this [n.329]: God can conserve the essentially prior without the posterior; the nature, because it is the subject, is essentially prior to beatitude; indeed it is prior in time. There is a confirmation: a third has no greater necessity in relation to a first than a third has in relation to a second; but here the relation of the third to the second is a contingent relation only; (as is plain from the idea of the terms); therefore etc. [cf. *Ord.* I d.1 nn.139-140].

331. I concede, therefore, that, other than God, nothing has formally necessary existence, but simply contingent existence. Nevertheless, a created thing is said to have incorruptible being insofar as it does not have a contrary, or insofar as it cannot be destroyed by any created thing but can only be annihilated by God not conserving it. And in this way can it be conceded that beatitude is incorruptible. But what is thus incorruptible is only perpetual of itself in possibility; because just as it has its existence from God contingently conserving of it, so too does it have its perpetuity.

β. Reply to the Aforesaid Reasons

332. To the reasons for the first opinion:

To the first argument [n.324] the answer is plain from what has been said, that neither the heavens nor any accident of them is incorruptible save in the aforesaid way [n.331].

333. To the second [n.325] I say that no form can take away privation from a subject susceptible of it (namely a subject that is of a nature to receive another form) save to the extent the subject is of a nature to receive that other form, because, while the subject remains in some aptitude for receiving, a lack cannot be taken away unless that [sc. the subject being of a nature to receive] is posited, and it is not removed in another way save as that [sc. the subject being of a nature to receive] is removed.⁵³ Since the form of the heaven, therefore, does not include in itself the forms of inferior things simply (but neither does it include them eminently, the way that infinite being includes all other things), the result is that the form does not take away from its matter the privations of those forms (provided, however, its matter has the capacity for those forms⁵⁴). Hence this seems an irrational way of positing that the heaven is incorruptible, because corruptibility is not in this way removed as far as concerns the intrinsic principles it comes from – although the view is saved that the heavens could not be corrupted by a natural agent, for this form so contains others that it cannot be expelled by any natural agent.⁵⁵

⁵³ The Latin here is obscure. The sense seems to turn on what it means for a subject to have a privation, namely that a subject can only be deprived of something if it is of a nature to receive that something. A blind man, for instance, is deprived of sight because a man is of a nature to receive sight, but a stone is not deprived of sight because it is not of such a nature. So, if a form is to take away a privation from a subject, the subject must first be posited as being of a nature to receive that form. The only other way of removing a privation would be to remove from the subject its being of a nature to receive the relevant form, for then the absence of the form would no longer be a privation.

⁵⁴ There is a view, derived from Aristotle, that the matter of the heaven is matter only for the form of the heaven, in which case the heaven would be incorruptible because its matter would be incapable of receiving another form. But then the analogy between the form of the heaven and beatitude would cease to hold, since the argument says that beatitude, like the heaven, is incorruptible because it includes everything else one could want just as the form of the heaven is incorruptible because it includes all forms. But the heaven will not be incorruptible for this reason if its matter is incapable of other forms.

⁵⁵ The form of the heaven does not remove privations by supply of what is lacking, for it does not contain simply or eminently the inferior forms that the matter of the heaven is of a nature to receive. Neither does the form of the heaven remove privations by taking from the matter of the heaven its being of a nature to receive other forms (for the aptitude for other forms remains in the matter). So the heaven remains corruptible in principle, because it remains still of a nature to receive forms other than the form it has. The heaven is only incorruptible, then, in the sense that no natural agent could corrupt it (no natural agent could remove from the heaven its form), but not in the sense that the heaven is intrinsically incorruptible. For its matter still has a nature to receive other forms and so, in principle, to lose the form it has in favor of those other forms.

334. An example of this is plain: the intellective soul, which is a more perfect form than the form of the heaven, does not take away from matter the privation of other forms; indeed, it does not even constitute something incorruptible with respect to a natural agent, insofar as it requires some concomitant form [sc. bodily form] that a natural agent, by corrupting, can reach to. Only an infinite form, then, if it could perfect matter, could in this way (that is, by taking away privation), constitute an incorruptible composite. Yet there would still be a doubt whether the susceptible subject would be in potency to the forms in their proper ideas which, in that infinite form, it possesses eminently. Therefore, it is plain that the antecedent is false [sc. “a form that takes away every privation from its matter constitutes an incorruptible composite,” n.325], speaking of what is incorruptible, that is, indestructible; but if the discussion be about something not corruptible by a natural agent as by something contrary to it, I concede the antecedent, and thus concede the conclusion.

335. To the next [n.326] I say that, as regard the intrinsic end, the consequence does not hold that the intrinsic end removes every privation formally from a subject as the extrinsic end removes every defect of the extrinsic end. For the extrinsic end is formally infinite while the intrinsic end is finite, and so the latter cannot include intrinsic things the way the former includes extrinsic things.

336. On the contrary: another intrinsic end cannot succeed to this intrinsic end unless it join one to another extrinsic end; therefore if it joins one to an extrinsic end that excludes every defect, it will also intrinsically exclude every defect of the [intrinsic] end that does the joining.⁵⁶

337. I reply: this [intrinsic] end, while it remains, excludes defect (as whiteness, while it is present, excludes the defect of blackness); but it is not simply present necessarily, because it is not in itself necessary; but the extrinsic end is in itself necessary.

338. And when you say that ‘another intrinsic end can join one to another extrinsic end’ [n.336], I concede the fact; but then the extrinsic end is not the end for it,⁵⁷ nor an end supplying every defect of any extrinsic end whatever. The response to the confirmation [n.326] is plain from this, because then it [the ultimate intrinsic end] is not in conjunction with it [the ultimate extrinsic end].

339. To the third argument [n.327] I say that if the nature remain the same, the nature is always capable of beatitude and misery, and consequently it is not contradictory that, with the cessation of beatitude (which is a per accidens accident in that nature), misery should be present. And when you say that ‘then it did not have before whatever it wanted’, I reply that it did have whatever it wanted when the ‘whatever’ is taken unitively, not when taken distributively, in the way expounded above [n.334], that is, that it had God in whom it had eminently everything rightly want-able.

γ. What is to be Said about the Second Opinion

⁵⁶ An intrinsic end is the condition in the subject that joins it to the extrinsic end. This paragraph and the next ones are about arguments to show that an intrinsic end joining one to an extrinsic end that is without defect will itself be without defect. The arguments, their responses, and the Latin are obscure in their terseness.

⁵⁷ Sc. the extrinsic end is not the intrinsic end for the subject – nor is it an intrinsic end supplying all defects of any extrinsic end.

340. Against the second position [n.322] argument is given in *Ord.* 1 d.1 nn.139-140.

341. And I concede that although the intellect see, with natural necessity, a proportioned object present to it, yet the will does not, with natural necessity, enjoy this seen object, as was stated there [*ibid.*, n.340].

342. Nor too is the necessity of seeing a necessity simply but only a necessity if the object remain present – and this supposing the object is merely contingent, because the object moves any created intellect voluntarily and contingently. If too the will contingently enjoys the thing seen, it also contingently joins intelligence with memory, provided however the will there has its act.

343. As to the argument that in the object nothing of evil nor any defect of good is shown, response was given before [*ibid.* n.340].

δ. What is to be Said about the Third Opinion

344. Against the third position [n.323] it can be argued that the habit cannot be a cause of operation before the power is, but it is always second, because a power is that whereby we have the ability simply. Hence the habit does not use the power, but the power uses the habit as second cause and as instrument; now a prior cause is not determined to act, nor consequently is it necessitated, by a second cause, but the reverse holds.

345. Again, the Blessed Virgin had as wayfarer a greater charity than the charity of any of the blessed of lower degree, and yet her charity did not necessitate her to enjoyment, even when she was contemplating God.

346. Again, let it be that the light of glory necessitate the intellect to seeing the object present to it, yet if the will is the cause that commands the seeing, the will is able not to command it; for it contingently conjoins the intelligence to the memory of the object that it contingently loves. But it seems that it would there [sc. according to this position] have to conjoin it thus, because, from Augustine in many places of *On the Trinity* [9.8 nn.13-14; 15.10 n.19, 27 n.50], the will in the generation of a perfect word concurs in joining it thus; now the seeing is the perfect word, according to Augustine *ibid.* [15.12 n.22].

347. I concede, therefore, that no necessity or necessary perpetuity arises from the habits determining powers to their acts, but that from the habit of glory there is only a necessity in a certain respect, because the habit has its natural inclination from charity; and there is no such necessity in the will, because the will can freely use or not use charity.

ε. Scotus' own Opinion

348. I say, therefore, that the cause of this perpetuity is neither the form of beatitude (as if beatitude thereby be formally necessary), nor the nature of these powers (as if it necessarily operate perpetually about the object), nor the habit in the powers (as if it necessarily determines the powers to operating perpetually), but the cause is from the divine will alone, which just as it perfects such nature intensively so it conserves it in such perfection perpetually.

ζ. A Doubt and its Solution

349. But now occurs a doubt how Blessed Michael will be impeccable, because by nothing intrinsic to himself is he able to prevent his enjoyment from being contingent, and consequently he is able not to enjoy and so to sin. The consequent is false, since Augustine says in *Against Maximinus* 2.13 n.2, “To whatever nature is given that it not be able to sin – this comes not of nature proper but the grace of God” (and it is in Lombard I d.8 ch.2 n.3). The same Augustine in *Enchiridion* ch.28 n.105, “Just as our soul now has ‘not wanting unhappiness’, so will it always have ‘not wanting iniquity’.” But now our soul so has ‘not wanting unhappiness’ that it cannot want unhappiness; hence Augustine says *ibid.*, “not only do we not want to be miserable, but in no way can we want it.”

350. I reply: it is plain that Blessed Michael is impeccable in the sense of composition, that is, he cannot be blessed and at the same time sin. But in the sense of division, that while he remains blessed he not have power and possibility for sinning, this can be understood in two ways: either by something intrinsic to him that would remove such power, or by an extrinsic cause that would remove proximate power from him. For example: although someone possessed of sight have the intrinsic power to see any material body, yet through some extrinsic cause he can be made perpetually incapable of seeing with proximate power, as that if the power [sc. extrinsic cause] makes distance of sight from that body perpetual, as would be if there were a perpetual obstacle between the empyreal heaven and the eye of the damned. That eye would not be able to see the empyreal heaven, speaking of proximate power, and this by an extrinsic cause perpetually hindering the power; yet it could by remote and intrinsic power see it, so that there would be no intrinsic cause of impotency.

351. So I say that there is no intrinsic cause in the will of Michael, now blessed, by which the power otherwise to sin would, in the sense of division, be removed; there is no intrinsic cause altogether preventing the power from being altogether reduced to act. But by extrinsic power does the intrinsic power to sin lack possibility, namely by the will of God forestalling the will so that it always continue the act of enjoyment and so can never reduce to act its remote power of not enjoying, or of sinning – since indeed a second cause, hindered by a superior cause that is acting for one of a pair of opposites, can never, by its proximate power, issue in the other opposite.⁵⁸

352. I concede, therefore, the inference that, when one speaks of remote power, beatified Michael is, in the sense of division, capable of sin.

⁵⁸ It is easy enough to see how an extrinsic barrier can prevent the damned from seeing the heaven, though they have the intrinsic power to see it. It is less easy to see how God’s extrinsic power can put a barrier in the way of Michael exercising his intrinsic power to sin. Perhaps it is simply that God makes himself always so present to Michael that this presence is itself the barrier to Michael’s sinning. At all events Michael retains the power freely to sin but God ensures, extrinsically, that he never exercises it. There is some similarity here to so-called ‘Frankfurt cases’, where a person is free to choose between *a* and *b* but, if he is about to choose *b*, some outside agent intervenes to prevent it and ensure choice of *a*. In fact, however, the person chooses *a* without ever being about to choose *b*, and the agent does not have to intervene. The person, then, freely chooses *a* without in fact being able to do otherwise and choose *b*. Blessed Michael’s case, on Scotus’ view, seems similar: Michael actually chooses enjoyment, but remains free not to choose it and to sin, save that God would prevent that choice – not intrinsically by removing the power, but extrinsically by preventing its exercise. Or, as Scotus puts it [n.352], Michael remains able by remote power to do otherwise and sin, but not by proximate power [n.353].

η. To the Authorities from Augustine

353. To the authorities of Augustine:

To the first [n.349] I say Augustine means ‘that it not be able’ by proximate power ‘to sin’; ‘this comes not of nature but the grace of God’, that is, of God gratuitously forestalling and conserving the nature in right action.

354. As to the next [n.349], Augustine does not say that just as now the soul necessarily has ‘not wanting unhappiness’ so then does it necessarily have ‘not wanting iniquity’ – for neither is true when speaking of ‘not wanting’ as it is an elicited act; but just as now the soul perpetually has ‘not wanting unhappiness’ so then will it have ‘not wanting iniquity’.

355. And when you argue: “now our soul so has ‘not wanting’ that it cannot ‘want’,” I say that our soul is not able to want unhappiness, not⁵⁹ for the reason that it necessarily has ‘not wanting it’, but because unhappiness cannot be the object of an act of willing. On the other hand, it does not follow that thus our soul could never want iniquity, because iniquity – speaking of what is the substrate in sin – can be the object of a created will. Or one could say briefly that just as now the soul never wants unhappiness but always has ‘habitually not wanting’, so will it then never want [iniquity] – and thus the cases are alike *de facto* on this side and that.

356. And if you argue, “the soul now is not able to want unhappiness, therefore it will then not be able to want iniquity” – the consequence is not valid, because there can well be a likeness on this side and that as regard ‘is not’ although not as regard ‘cannot’.⁶⁰

357. Against this: the indifference of the will is taken away by its determination by a higher cause no less than by a lower cause; therefore if, by reason of its own causality, the will is indeterminate as to operation, it is as repugnant to its nature that this indifference be taken away by a superior cause as by an inferior cause; just as, therefore, it is against the nature of the will that a habit necessarily determine it, so is it against its nature that God determine it.

358. There is a confirmation, that a superior cause more determines an inferior cause than the reverse; therefore, a superior determining cause takes away the indifference in acting of an inferior cause more than if the inferior cause were to do the determining.

359. Again, it is not in the power of the will to act thus or not to act thus, because what a thing is determined to by a superior cause cannot be in the power of the determined thing, for the determined thing acts as it is moved by what determines it; therefore, its act will not be praiseworthy, nor properly voluntary.

360. I reply: the fact that the will in its order of causing causes this thing is proper to this cause [sc. the will]. I reply further that, since contingency on the part of the will is in every way contingency on the part of the effect, this requires the contingency of everything else that concurs in the effect. Now it is repugnant to the will’s nature (or to its freedom) that the contingency that exists necessarily on its part not simply posit the

⁵⁹ Removing the misleading punctuation ‘...non. Ideo non potest...’ in the printed text, and replacing it with ‘...non ideo non potest...’

⁶⁰ Sc. the likeness between the soul not wanting unhappiness now and not wanting iniquity then carries over only as regard the fact and not as regard the ability. The soul now both does not and cannot want unhappiness; the soul then does not but can want iniquity (in the way explained above in n.351).

contingency of the effect (as far as the side of all the lower concurring factors is concerned), because this takes away from it its being a cause in an order superior [to those lower factors]. But there is no repugnance to the will's nature that its own contingency not posit contingency simply in the effect as far as the side of a superior cause is concerned, because a superior cause is not determined by the will. Therefore, it is not simply against the will's nature that it be determined by a superior cause (that is, that doing the opposite not be against its nature⁶¹), as it would be against its nature to be determined by a habit or by an inferior nature.

361. To the form of the argument then: it is against the will's nature to be determined in its own order, and nothing else is primarily repugnant to it; but, as a result, it is against the will's nature to be determined by an inferior cause, because then it would itself not be the superior cause. Yet it is not against its nature to be determined by a superior cause, because there stands along with this that it is cause in its own order.

362. On the contrary: if the superior cause determines it, then the will is determined in its own order of causing; therefore, in its own order of causing it is not contingent.

363. I reply: by its nature, or because of its determination in its own order, the contingency is as equal as that of the effect which proceeds from it and from other causes. But that the will is not altogether contingent comes from its own contingency, that is, because some prior cause is determinate for that effect.

θ. Further Explanation of the Aforesaid, to Make it More Evident

364. Note [added by Scotus]: operative power does not prove that the possessor of it can operate, unless one understands 'can in a certain respect', namely as far as its own part is concerned. But 'can simply' requires that there be possibility on the part of all the other concurring factors, namely that these requisite factors can come together and put a stop to impediments. But, over and above this possibility, the proximate power, or rather possibility, requires that the appropriate things be present and that impediments cease. For just as nothing is in proximate passive potency save (*Metaphysics* 9.7.1049a8-14) "when nothing stands in the way, nor must anything be added or removed or changed" (understand anything other than the form to be induced), so an operative thing is not in proximate power to operating save when nothing extrinsic is lacking to its operating.

365. As to the matter at issue: a will that is blessed is the same power as it was when it was not beatified, and consequently he who has it is, as far as the part of the power is concerned, capable of the act he was capable of before. Further, it is simply possible for him to act, because nothing simply necessarily gets in the way or, being required, is lacking. But he is not able with proximate possibility to sin, because proximate possibility is impeded or prevented (not suspended) on account of the action of a superior cause preventing him and continually acting for the opposite, namely for the beatific act. And just as a superior cause is, with absolute power (yet not with ordained power), able not to act for the opposite, so it is simply possible for the impediment to cease and for the will to sin. But it is not possible for what is an impediment by ordained power to cease, nor even is it in the proximate power of the will to sin; for it is not in its

⁶¹ The meaning of this remark here is obscure.

power that the impediment cease, just as the action of a first cause is not in the power of a second cause.

366. It is contrary to the liberty of a cause that it so be necessarily determined that the opposite to willing well through the habit of charity not be in its power. For you, therefore, it is equally contrary to liberty that the will be thus determined by a superior cause.

367. I reply: to be absolutely determined to willing well, such that the opposite not be under the will's power, is simply not against its liberty (thus is the will determined now by the divine will, otherwise it could now simply proceed to act, just as it can while a wayfarer, though it never will exit into act – and let this be fixed by law, and so let it be against [divine] ordained power). But that it thus were determined to willing well through an inherent habit – this would not be against its liberty in this way. Because the will would not be the will unless it were a prior cause as regard its own habit, and so of a nature to use habit and to determine it to acting and not to be determined by it such that the opposite is not in its power; for then it would (as far as this is concerned) be totally under the habit. But it is not thus against the will's liberty or its nature, that it be impeded from one action and determined to another by a cause prior to itself, of which sort is the divine will.

368. But does it not have the power of sinning?

I reply: an abstract term indicating the principle of an act construed with the gerundive⁶² signifies the principle of an act as the act proceeds from the supposit; and if the power is with the gerundive it signifies the proximate power. Thus *Metaphysics* 9.5.1048a16-19: “there is no need to add ‘with no exterior thing standing in the way’. For it has power as it is a power of doing. Now this is not in all but in certain circumstances, where external impediments are excluded.” In other respects, ‘the visual (or seeing) power’ and ‘the power of seeing’ do not say the same thing, because the first states the principle for seeing and the second the possibility for seeing, and then distinctly the remote and the proximate power.⁶³

369. As to the second [n.359], the act is praiseworthy to the extent the will in its own order contingently determines itself.

370. In another way can it be said that the contingency of the will in its own order entails the contingency simply of its effect, because the contingency of any cause proves a contingent effect, and consequently it is simply contingent that the will does not sin, although this never happens, because the superior cause always preserves it.

371. If you say ‘it is at least in the power of the will that it happen’, one can say that the will is not for this reason less blessed if the happening of it be in the will's power, provided however it never do happen; but for this reason will it never happen, because the divine will always will prevent it.

b. About the Second Doubt

⁶² Such a case is ‘the power of sinning’ itself: ‘the power’ is here the abstract term (the concrete term would be the thing having the power), and ‘of sinning’ is the gerundive. A power without the gerundive would be, for example, ‘the seeing power’ or ‘the visual power’, as later in this paragraph.

⁶³ That is, ‘visual power’ states the remote power and ‘power of seeing’ the proximate power.

372. About the second doubt [n.320], namely what sort of thing this perpetuity is, whether one of aevum or of time: it is plain that it is not perpetuity of time, because time belongs to something successive.

373. The assertion is made [Aquinas, *Sent.* IV d.49 q.1 a.2 q.3] that it is not perpetuity of aevum, “because the aevum, as it is distinguished from eternity, belongs to immutable creatures; now beatitude exceeds the natural potency of a creature, since no creature can attain to it by its natural resources; hence the proper measure of beatitude is eternity; therefore beatitude is eternal life.”

374 Against this, first from this person’s statements: in the next question he says that “the principle of an act as to substance is the power, but as to form its principle is the habit; and if the habit is infused, the perfection of the act is from the exterior cause that causes the habit.”

375. From this the argument is:

It is impossible for an act, insofar as it has been formed (according to which idea, he says, the act is beatific), to be more, or more immutably, permanent than being according to substance, because it is impossible for that which something is in per accidens to be more immutable than that in which it is [as to substance]. Therefore, if an act is as to substance measured by the aevum, because its being (according to him) is measured by the aevum, the result [sc. according to him] is that the act insofar as it has been formed, or insofar as it is beatified, would have a greater immutability than the aevum [sc. which however, as just stated, is impossible].

376. Again, as to the thing [that beatitude is], it seems manifestly false, because ‘something created, as it is distinct from eternity, would be measured by the aevum’; for whether the aevum includes succession or possibility of failing, it seems to belong to any created thing whatever that is not properly temporal (for the eternal, as it is a whole in act at once, lacks thus the potency for not being).

377. His reasoning does not prove the conclusion, for this inference does not hold: ‘the intellectual creature has no power for beatitude from its natural resources; therefore, beatitude is in its nature something of greater permanence than is an intellectual creature’ [n.373]. For beatitude is an accident of the creature, and yet such accident – which does not follow the principles, nor is subject to the causality, of this subject – is nevertheless something less noble in itself and less permanent.

378. As to the addition [n.373], ‘beatitude is eternal life’ – ‘eternal’ is not there taken strictly as it is distinguished from ‘aeviternal’, but for the aeviternal that is perpetually permanent. Thus indeed is ‘eternal’ often taken in Scripture, as in *Matthew* 25.41, 46 there, “Go, you cursed, into eternal fire,” and immediately afterwards, “these will go into eternal punishment,” although it is not eternal with an eternity distinct from the aevum or perpetual time.

α. Scotus’ own Response

379. I say, therefore, that this perpetuity is not that of eternity nor of necessary existence; rather it is the eternity of an aevum able to be and not to be but yet perpetually conserved.

And if you ask what this perpetuity adds over and above the aevum itself, this requires another question first: whether the aevum include succession. For if it does,

perpetuity states a certain greater increase of quantity in the aevum itself, indeed a quasi-infinite increase, by acquisition always of one thing after another. But if the aevum is indivisible, then its perpetuity does not seem to state some positive new thing over and above that, but only negation of failing or of ceasing to be. And then one would have to say that God gives to Michael, whom he conserves blessed for eternity, nothing more positive or greater, by way of what is intrinsically greater, than he would if he were to annihilate him at once. On this see *Ord.* II d.2 p.1 [also *Lectura* II d.2 p.1].

c. About the Third Doubt

380. About the third doubt [n.320], namely how this perpetuity is related to beatitude, it seems one must say that it is included in the idea of beatitude:

First because [Aquinas, *Sent.* IV d.49 q.1 a.1] “beatitude includes the fact that it is the end of all desires” and consequently, when it is obtained, every other appetite ceases; therefore “it is necessary that beatitude thus include everything desirable, because nothing further remains to be desired; but anyone at all naturally desires to remain in good” and perpetually so, just as his nature is perpetual; therefore beatitude includes this permanence.

381. Second because [Aquinas, *ibid.* a.3] “eternity belongs to the idea of the punishment of damnation,” because “it must be infinite so as to correspond to the guilt, which is infinite in malice, for it turns away from the infinite Good; but it cannot be infinite in intensity; therefore included in the idea of punishment, insofar as punishment is proportioned in desert to guilt, is extensive infinity or eternity” [cf. *Ord.* IV d.46 nn.105, 150-151]; therefore similarly eternity is included in the idea of beatitude as reward.

α. Rejection of Thomas’ Reasons

382. About this, then, it is certain that, if blessedness be taken for some permanent perfection, however intense it is as permanent, perpetuity is not included in its idea; for a permanent perfection, and one that is however much the same and essential, can for an instant, or for some brief time, be what and how much it is for the whole time: “the whiteness of one day is as equally perfect as that of one year,” *Ethics* 1.4.1096b3-5.

383. Beatitude can, in another way, be taken for some permanent and intense perfection, not however by precisely stopping at the perfection of intensity but by including also the perfection of extension – and this either properly when positing the aevum to be successive, or eminently, namely by denying all cessation, when positing the aevum to be indivisible. And in this second way nothing is perfect by extension save because it endures as much as it can endure, whether the duration be extended really or virtually or imaginatively.

384. Now beatitude is plainly of a nature to abide perpetually; therefore, as taken for supreme perfection thus intensively and extensively, it includes perpetuity. But beatitude in this second way is not anything per se one, as neither is perfect operation and the whole aevum, if it is successive, or operation and negation of defect or of cessation of existence.

385. However, many seem to speak of beatitude in this second way [Aquinas, Godfrey of Fontaines, Richard of Middleton], because natural desire is not only for

intense perfection but also for having it as extensively as the desire also is; it is not only for natural 'good being' but for as 'always being' as can belong to nature.

386. Hereby to the first argument [n.380]: beatitude taken in the first way is 'the end of all desires' such that unitively, on the part of the object, 'it includes everything desirable' – as has often been said [nn.171, 180, 339], because in Augustine's definition [*On the Trinity* 13 ch.5 n.8] the 'whatever' in "whatever he wants" is not taken there distributively [sc. for everything] but for one thing unitively, containing everything rightly wantable.

387. Beatitude in the second way includes the end of desires not only intensively in this way but also extensively as to duration, understanding extension either real or virtual, that is, as not failing to be [n.383].

388. Briefly however, though the argument [n.380] belong to a certain doctor, it is at fault in form: 'beatitude is the end of all desires, therefore it includes all desired things' does not follow; but what follows is: 'therefore it includes or pre-demands whatever is necessarily requisite in order to the completing of desires'.

389. To the other argument [n.381], about reward, there is a doubt whether this extensive perfection, namely perpetuity or not failing in being, is included in the idea of beatitude in itself insofar as it is the reward for merits – namely doubt whether it falls per se under merit or is only something annexed to that which per se falls under merit.

390. And I say that, speaking of strict justice, God is debtor to none of us, for any merits at all, to return perfection so intensely, on account of the surpassing excess of that perfection beyond those merits – but let it be that, of his liberality, he had determined to confer so perfect an act as reward for merits, indeed with such justice, so supererogatory in reward, as befits him. Yet it does not necessarily follow from this that perennial perfection should, by that justice, be returned as reward; nay, return would be abundantly made with beatitude of a single moment. If therefore perennity pertains to reward as falling under merit, it must be that the correspondence is determined by justice and overflowing liberality.

Nor is it more unacceptable to say that God made disposition to reward man perpetually because man merited the end perpetually for his merit, and that by a liberal such justice, than to say that God made disposition in justice to render such intense perfection for merits, and that, over and above this, as if not from justice but from sheer liberality, he should add perpetuity.

391. The argument adduced, however, about the perpetuity of damnation [n.381], is not compelling, because perpetuity does not fall under merit as congruously there as it does here. For it is well congruous with the divine will that, by law, it determined to return for merits a perfection not only intense but also perennial; not so that it acted thus by returning for demerits a punishment not only severe but also perennial. On this matter there was discussion above, *Ord.* IV d.46 q.4 nn.105, 150-151.

B. On the Secure Possession of the Blessed

392. About the second principal question [n.314]:

To security is opposed fear; now fear is about inflicting evil or about the continuing of evil inflicted, with however apprehension of such evil; and it is not necessary that this apprehension be doubt. Hence doubt and fear are far distant, not only

because doubt pertains to intellect and fear to appetite, but because fear in the appetite does not necessarily pre-require doubtful apprehension of such evil. But whatever may be the case here, security is placed in the will as something opposed to fear, and certitude about conferring good, or continuing the good conferred, precedes it in the intellect.

393. Such certitude about beatitude is had by the blessed, not indeed because they see beatitude to be of itself perpetual (as was proved when arguing against the first position about the cause of perpetuity, in the preceding article [nn.328-331]). Nor even do the blessed have such certitude by natural reason only, because to no creature can that be known by natural reason which contingently depends on the divine will alone; the continuation of beatitude already conferred is of this sort (and this is plain from that article [nn.328-331]); therefore this certitude is only in the intellect of someone blessed by a revelation made to him by God.

Now whether certitude is made thus to the damned about the continuance of their damnation is not equally as certain.

394. From what has been said the solution of the question is plain, that security is not of the essence of beatitude.

395. First, because security presupposes certitude about the continuation of beatitude; but that certain apprehension follows, in the order of nature, the whole of beatitude, since it is an act not tending to the beatific object but is a reflecting on the act; and consequently the whole of beatitude will be essentially able to be without certitude – much more, therefore, without security.

Second because perpetuity, which this certitude is about that security follows, is not of the essence of beatitude, in the way stated in the preceding article in the solution of the third doubt [nn.382-385].

396. This reasoning, however, does not prove the conclusion when beatitude is taken in the second way stated there [n.383], because in this second way beatitude includes not only intensive but also extensive or never-failing perfection. Also, when taking beatitude in the first way [n.382], perpetuity is not anything added as an accident of the act. The first reason, then [n.395], is valid and this third reason here, that security is in the irascible power, as is also the fear opposed to it, if indeed opposites are in the same subject; but beatitude is in the concupiscible power, since it is the love of friendship.

1. Explication of Possession, Taken in Four Ways

397. Because of certain arguments and words that are asserted about possession [nn.273, 306, 311; *Ord.* III d.26 n.33], one must understand that ‘possession’ can be taken in four ways:

In one way properly memory possesses the object, and this either by impressed form (if the object is there in species) or by impressed habit, or at least by falling back on actual existence – at least memory possesses the object in the way the object comes together for idea of parent.

398. In another way intelligence can be said to possess the object in actual consideration, and to this can pertain the fact that the will is said to possess intelligence’s keen look turned back to memory [implicit references to Augustine *On the Trinity* 11.8 n.15].

399. In a third way possession pertains to the will as the will is concupiscible, and it is said to succeed to hope in the way that the will by hope desires the good to be had for itself, and that it loves by possession the good when added to it – and in this way possession is love of concupiscence of the present good [*ibid.* 10.11 n.17].

400. In a fourth way possession is said to be a certain act of keeping hold of, or a passion consequent to hope as a passion, and in this way it is in the irascible power.

401. In none of these ways does possession belong to the essence of beatitude.

In the first way it precedes beatitude, precedes indeed every second act; in the second way it is second act, pertaining to intelligence and preceding the beatitude that is in the will, or it is an act of will with respect to that preceding act; in the third way it is love of a present advantage, and plain it is from the preceding question [nn.282-284] that this love does not pertain to beatitude, but that the love of good in itself does; in the fourth way possession is in the irascible power, and in this way it approaches more to the security that succeeds to hope as a passion, not to hope as a virtue.

II. To the Initial Arguments

402. To the first argument [n.308] one can say that Augustine understands by it that what is ‘most blessed’, that is the greatest perfection of beatitude, “is what is most certain always to be thus,” – greatest, I say, in extension. And what follows is not taken for the act of certitude but for the object, as though Augustine were to say ‘perpetual continuation itself, about which certitude is had, is something greatest in beatitude, because it is quantity of extension superadded to quantity of intension; and it is called ‘greatest’ because it includes something and superadds something further. Thus this extension includes perfection of intension.

403. As to the next [n.309], the answer is plain from the first article of the solution [nn.325-326], because no finite form can exclude all privation from the susceptible subject. Yet beatitude, to the extent it is most perfect, does most of all exclude from its subject privation of perfection; and this suffices for it to be the intrinsic end (which is necessarily finite), but does not suffice for incorruptibility.

404. To the next [n.310], about the Philosopher, I say that his genius was never able to attain to the true felicity of human nature, whether by denying it or affirming it; not by denying it because what is false cannot be demonstrated; not by affirming it because things of sense do not sufficiently lead to it. Hence he seems, as if in doubt, now to think that what misery could succeed to would not be true happiness, and now that there cannot be another happiness for man; for he did not know about a life other than this one, and in this life happiness is not impossible of being lost. Therefore, one should not rely on his authority in this matter.

405. As to the next [n.311], I concede that to the three theological virtues in the wayfarer succeed three perfections in the blessed, whether virtues or acts I care not. But it is not necessary that this succeeding be of the essence of beatitude in the way we take beatitude for the supreme perfection of a beatifiable nature, joining it supremely to its most perfect object.

Notice from the Editors

The Quarrachi editors write that in the text at this point (between question 6 and the second part of distinction 49) a scribe noted the absence in the *Ordinatio* of a number of questions that Scotus nevertheless dealt with in his lectures. The text of these questions was supplied in the *Ordinatio* mss. from student reports of the lectures now preserved in the *Reportatio* [Rep. IV A]. Distinction 50 and its several questions, which are also missing in the *Ordinatio*, were again supplied from the *Reportatio*. For sake of completeness, the editors give the titles of these missing questions.

First, those that would have come between question 6 and the second part of d.49:

- Q.7: Whether Joy in the Beatific Object is of the Essence, or Pertains to the Essence, of Beatitude.
- Q.8: Whether Human Nature is the Lowest Nature Capable of Beatitude
- Q.9: Whether All Men of Necessity and Supremely Will Beatitude
- Q.10: Whether Everything that is Desired is Desired for the sake of Beatitude
- Q.11: Whether Man Could Attain Beatitude by his Purely Natural Resources
- Q.12: Whether Man could Attain Beatitude in this Mortal Life

Second, those that would have come in d.50:

- Q.1: Whether Anyone Could, by Right Reason, Desire not to Exist so as to Escape Misery
- Q.2: Whether the Damned Desire not to Exist for the sake of Escaping Misery
- Q.3: Whether the Blessed See the Punishments of the Damned
- Q.4: Whether the Punishment of the Damned is Equal
- Q.5: Whether the Beatitude of all the Blessed is Equal
- Q.6: Whether the Beatitude of the Bodies is Equal

Second Part

About the Qualities of Body of a Blessed Man

Single Question

Whether the Body of a Blessed Man will, after the Resurrection, be Impassible

406. As to the four endowments of the body,⁶⁴ I ask whether the body of a blessed man will, after the resurrection, be impassible.

407. That it will not be:

Gregory [*Homily 40 on John*] on *John* 20.27, “Put your finger here etc.,” says, “What is touched is necessarily corrupted.” The glorious body will be touchable, as the body of Christ was, as appears in *Luke* 24.39, “Touch and see etc.”

408. Again if the body be impassible, then the blessed cannot sense anything sensible; the consequent is false, for sensation, since it is a perfect operation of an animal, will not be lacking to a blessed man. The proof of the consequence: because everything sensitive can be corrupted by a surpassing sensible object [*Aristotle On the Soul* 2.1.424a28, 3.13.435b15-19]; but what is corrupted by an excelling corruptible is affected by a lower one, just as what is corrupted by something very hot is affected by what is less hot.

409. Again, nothing forced is perpetual [*Ord.* IV d.43 n.126], but that body [sc. of a blessed man], since it is a mixed body, has in itself four elements, each of which

⁶⁴ The four endowments are that the body will be impassible, agile, clear, and subtle.

(except one at least) is outside its proper region,⁶⁵ therefore it is violent; at some point it will return to its proper place; and thus the whole will be corrupted.

410. Again, *On the Heaven* 1.12.282a21-24, the Philosopher argues against Plato that the heaven cannot be corruptible and yet be perpetuated by something else; because a thing cannot be of itself possible and corruptible and yet be perpetuated by something other. And argument can be made in like manner about this body [here]. The Commentator also maintains this, Averroes, *Metaphysics* XI com.41, where he maintains that only motion can be a possible and yet be perpetuated by something else.

411. On the contrary *I Corinthians* 15.53, “This mortal will put on immortality,” and this corruptible incorruption. And in the same place [15.42-44], “It is sown in corruption, it will rise in incorruption...”

I. To the Question

412. I reply:

That it is so is plain from the preceding question,⁶⁶ because man cannot be blessed in this mortal life; but the whole man will be blessed because the whole merited; therefore the whole will be blessed in an immortal body.

413. For this too there is the fact that a blessed man will have the perfection that belongs to his nature; immortality is such, because it is not repugnant to an immortal soul to perfect perpetually its own perfectible [body]. Hence, just as the resurrection is inferred from the immortality of the soul, so is the immortality of the man, and consequently of the body, inferred with probability from the same fact – and so is impassibility inferred, speaking of real passion as opposed to intentional passion, which will be touched on in responding to the second argument [nn.408, 451-453].

A. A Doubt about the Cause of Impassibility, and its Rejection

414. But about the cause of impassibility there is a doubt. For it is not for this reason, that the qualities consequent to a mixed body do not remain then in the body, because in that case the body would not remain mixed nor would it be proportioned to the soul, just as now too the soul could not animate an element. Nor is it for this reason, that the qualities will not remain contraries; for since a form is contrary to a form in its own species, and the same qualities in species that are in the body now will remain in the body then, it follows that they will be contraries, just as they are now.

415. Nor is the reasoning [Bonaventure, *Sent.* IV d.49 p.2 sect.2 q.2 a.1] for proving they are not contraries valid – the reasoning that: contraries are of a nature to arise about the same thing, and consequently to succeed each other in the same thing; but

⁶⁵ The four traditional elements are earth, air, fire, and water, and only the earth in the human body is in its proper place, namely down level with the earth.

⁶⁶ This preceding question (number 12, about whether beatitude could be obtained in mortal life) is missing in the *Ordinatio* (see notice from the editors above). Its place was supplied by editors after Scotus' death from his oral treatment of it preserved in the *Reportatio*.

one quality will not succeed to another there, and so the reason for their contrariety will not be taken away.⁶⁷

The reasoning is first indeed not valid because it is circular in proving the premise from the conclusion.⁶⁸

Second that description of contraries [from *Categories* 5.3b24-4a21] is being badly understood, because it should not be understood of any contraries whatever taken numerically, nor of anything numerically the same, but of contraries taken specifically and of something the same in species; and if taken of a contrary numerically the same, not of all of them but some.

416. These facts are evident because this whiteness, which is now in this thing, and that whiteness, which is in that thing, never succeed to themselves; therefore not here either, for otherwise one of them would migrate [from one thing to the other]. But a different whiteness and a different blackness in this thing can succeed to themselves; but not in every subject, because then no subject would determine for itself one of the contraries. Nor, third, can it be posited that this susceptible subject not then be of a nature to receive contrary after contrary, because the susceptible subject remains the same as it is now, and consequently is susceptible of specifically the same thing.

417. If it be said that it remains then without privation, now with privation, on the contrary: this involves the contradiction, ‘the privation of form is taken away from the subject if the form is not present in it’. For the aptitude for receiving cannot be taken away while the nature of the susceptible subject remains; but the lack, which privation adds over and above aptitude, cannot be taken away unless that is posited of which there is a lack.⁶⁹

418. If you say that the higher form takes away the privation of lower forms, as the form of heaven takes away the privation of corruptible forms [n.325; *Ord.* II d.14 n.14, III d.16 n.5]; on the contrary – the lack is not taken away save as the habit is posited; and the superior does not include in itself the inferior in its proper idea but only virtually; therefore it does not take away the lack of it in its proper idea; therefore not the privation of it either, if it be of a nature to be present [sc. in a subject that naturally has the contrasting habit and suffers privation if it does not have it].

419. This is also plain specifically in the issue at hand, because the noblest form, which will then be in the whole, will be the intellectual soul; but it will then be the same as it also is now and equally perfect substantially; so it will also not take away privation then, just as it does not now either.

⁶⁷ Or, following other ms. readings, “...will be taken away.” In either event the point seems to be that contraries will not then function as contraries because, whether the reason for their being contraries remains or not, they will not then be in the same thing successively replacing each other.

⁶⁸ To argue that contraries will not then be (or function as) contraries, because they will not be in the same thing successively replacing each other, is to argue in a circle. For ‘being in the same thing successively replacing each other’ is how, in this argument, ‘contrary’ is being defined, so to say that contraries will not then be contraries because this definition will not apply to them is to say that they will not then be contraries because they will not then be contraries.

⁶⁹ If a subject lacks a property or form, as when water lacks warmth, it has the lack (or privation) of that property, as the lack of warmth. So if, conversely, one says of some water that it lacks the lack of warmth, one is saying that it has the lack of the lack of that property or form, or in short that it has the property and is warm. Accordingly, it is a contradiction to say of water that it lacks this lack of warmth and yet is not warm. But such is what one ends up saying if one says that the impassible body, unlike the passible body, does not receive warmth (or cold) because it lacks the lack of them.

1. Scotus' own Explanation of the Reasons about Impassibility

420. Whence then will this impassibility be?

421. I reply: no intrinsic cause of this impassibility can be found on the part of the susceptible subject; either then it is found from a defect of agent, or from an impediment of agent absolutely, namely both intrinsic and extrinsic agent.

422. A defect cannot be posited because "to every passive power there corresponds an active power" [*Metaphysics* 5.15.1021a14-16], either intrinsic or extrinsic; however perhaps a lack of power of the intrinsic agent could be posited by positing that these qualities in the body [sc. of the blessed] are reduced to such equality that one could not be the principle for one to act on another.

423. This is persuasive because, notwithstanding the contrariety of the elements, if they were taken in such equality of bulk and virtue that none of them could overcome any other (or any others), or be overcome by another (or by others), and if they were, thus proportioned, included perpetually in any body whatever – never would there be corruption of any of them there, because although there was contrariety, there was yet proportioned equality.

424. It seems to be similar now among the elements; for as to why fire does not burn up all the elements, though it is of greater activity, there does not seem to be a reason save from the proportion or adequacy of the other elements in resisting fire's power in acting, at least while the heaven concurs in cooperating with the others in resisting it.

425. But because this cause [n.422-425] perhaps supposes something false, for the qualities will not then be thus reduced to equality to such an extent that none could be the principle for acting on another, wherein some qualities must be overcome also in virtue – which appears to be the case, because the human body is more in flux as to its material parts than the body of any animate or inanimate inferior, and this is only from the dominance of some quality that requires such an animal.

426. Likewise, this cause could not posit impassibility with respect to an extrinsic corruptive cause; and therefore, if it were to exclude corruption from within, it would still be diminished; and so one must posit impassibility through something that impedes corruptive suffering. Either a positive or a privative such impediment can be posited; the positive is double (namely the soul or a gift in the body); the privative is double (cessation of heavenly motion, and God's non-cooperation with the corruptive second cause).

a. About the First Opinion of Others

427. Argument [Richard of Middleton] for the first is that the soul is constituted in the middle between God and corporeal creatures; therefore just as the soul will be then perfectly subject to God as to its superior, so will it then perfectly dominate over its body as inferior.

428. To the contrary:

The soul is not repugnant to these qualities [of the body], even insofar as the qualities are contraries and are not reduced to the mean wherein they are active. This is

plain because it supposes them thus to be in their susceptible subject, and nothing is repugnant to what it requires in its susceptible subject. Nor even is it repugnant to their effects, because although they act mutually, they only act by univocal action. At any rate their effects up to a considerable intensity are not repugnant to the soul, because they stand along with the soul now though they be intense to a considerable degree; therefore they will not be repugnant to it then as it is the 'informing form'.

429. So if the soul prohibits the actions of these qualities then, it is not because of its repugnance to the action of them, but because of command through act of its will, with full dominion, as it were, over the body. This does not seem probable, because the highest angel cannot, through sole command of his will, impede the action of any natural cause; for bodily causes do not, as to their action or alteration, obey angels' wish.

b. About the Second Opinion of Others

430. For the second opinion (namely a gift in the body [n.426], [Thomas Aquinas]) argument is given from the remark of Augustine *Letter 118 To Dioscorus* 3 n.14, "So powerful has God made the soul that from its full happiness there redounds to the body perpetual health and incorruptible vigor." The manner is as follows [Henry of Ghent]: as hardness is a certain impassibility [cf. *Ord.* IV d.1 n.319], namely one that prevents a certain suffering (as being easily cut), so is it possible for there to be a quality in the body that prevents all corruptive suffering.

431. Against this:

This quality is not a heavenly quality, first because it is not transparency nor light nor luminosity, second because, since the human body is a mixed body, it is not capable of a heavenly quality. Either then it will be a quality of an element or a quality proper to a mixed body; but whether this or that, it is not an impediment to all action or suffering. The thing is plain in their example, because although hardness prevents cutting, yet it does not prevent burning or some other destructive suffering.

432. There is also proof of it through reason, that all forms of the same proximate susceptible subject are of the same physical genus, from *Metaphysics* 5.28.1024a29-b9; but all such forms are contraries or intermediates, and all forms of this sort do not prevent mutual action; rather they are principles of mutual action as is said in *Metaphysics*, 10.7.1057a18-19, 30-31, b2-4. Therefore, this quality, whether it belongs to an element or a mixed body and consequently to the same susceptible subject, does not prevent all corruptive passion, but is rather a principle of acting or suffering.

433. Again, this quality is either repugnant to other qualities (and then it does not prevent all action, because it is of the same genus), or is not repugnant (and then it does not prevent an action of any of them on another, because those others are repugnant to each other and so principles of mutual action) – and thus is it not repugnant to any action of them.

c. About the Third Opinion of Others

434. For the third opinion argument is given as follows: when a first is taken away anything posterior is taken away; the heavenly motion is the first of motions [*Physics*,

8.9.265a13]; therefore, when it ceases there will be no other motion [cf. d.48 nn.82-83, 89].

435. Against this is the article [one of the 219 articles condemned in 1274 by the Bishop of Paris]: When the heaven stops and fire is next to flax [candle tow], to say that fire does not burn the flax is an error

436. Again by the argument of the Philosopher *On Generation* 2.10.336a16-18: “motion is to this extent cause of generation, that it brings forward the generator;” but it only acts for the presence or nearness of the generator as regard matter. Therefore if the same presence or nearness were had without motion, the form would act just as much. An example: if the sun suddenly by divine power came to be at midday the way it does so now by motion, it would illuminate and heat opposites in the same way as it heats them now; indeed it would then heat more strongly, because it would not cease to act until it had totally corrupted, if it could corrupt, what was in front of it or placed beneath it; but as it is, because it does not linger over the passive and supposed object, it acts on it less effectively.

B. Scotus’ own Response

437. I say, therefore, that the cause of impassibility is the divine will not acting along with the correlative second cause. And by this is it [the body] impassible: not by remote but proximate power, not by an intrinsic cause but an extrinsic impeding cause (as was said about impeccability in this distinction above, in the question about secure possession, nn.348-353). An example from the fire in the furnace [*Daniel* 3.19-24, 92], which did not act to consume the three boys – not indeed because of any impassibility intrinsic to the boys, nor from the lack of passive potency, nor from an impeding intrinsic contrary, but because God by his own will did not cooperate with the fire in its action.

1. Objections against Scotus’ own Response

438. Against this: impassibility would then not be a gift of the blessed body, for the gift is something intrinsic to him whose it is; but the fact that God wills to prevent second causes from causing corruption is not something intrinsic to the body; the consequent is false because it seems contrary to the authority of Augustine above [n.430].

439. Again, according to this position, the gift of impassibility will be as much in the elements as in the body of Peter; equally too in the bodies of the damned [n.381], because both the elements and the bodies of the damned will then be preserved from corruption.

440. Again, third, there then seems to be a miracle in the preservation, as there was in the guarding of the three boys from harm; but it does not seem that perpetual divine works are miraculous, according to Augustine’s remark, *City of God* 7.30, “God so administers the things he has established that he allows them to perform their own motions.”

2. Confutation of the Objections

a. To the First Objection

441. To the first of these [n.438]: it is very possible for a gift not to be present really in the person gifted. Just as there is not present in a bride what is given her by her spouse, which is wont to be called the gift of dowry, as is contained in *Genesis* 34.12, where Sichen says to Jacob and his sons, “Increase the dowry and demand gifts...”

442. Also, if the dowry-gift is said to be what is given by the father of the bride, it is indeed for the spouse, for his use, but it remains property of the bride. Just as it usually now is called a gift, plainly it is not really present either in the spouse or the bride; rather it is only something possessed in some way by reason of the marriage. And so in the resurrection, by reason of consummating the spiritual marriage, there will be given to each blessed for gift this divine assistance that preserves him from all corruptive forces, although this guarding not be in him really.

443. In another way it could be said that the one gifted has a right over what is assigned him as gift; so here the blessed by his merits has a right over the dispensing to him of this divine guarding; and this right of preservation of the body from every corruptive force by divine guarding is a gift in the blessed and as concerns his body, because it is for protection of the body.

b. To the Second Objection

444. To the next [n.439], it is plain from this that neither do the elements have a right to be preserved from corruption, nor do the bodies of the damned, but they are preserved for affliction because of their past demerits; but the bodies [of the blessed], because of their past merits, do have the right, and this for the advantage of these bodies.

445. And accordingly it can be said to the authority of Augustine [nn.430, 438] that this health and vigor flow from the soul to the body, because there is a certain ordering in the body whereby vigor and health are preserved for it by God. And this ordering belongs to the body for thereby preserving what is animated by this sort of soul, which soul was the principle for meriting that such health is preserved for its body by God – so that to say ‘this incorruptibility flows from the soul to the body’ is nothing else than to say ‘this reward, which is preservation of health, is a reward of the body by mediation of the soul’, and this soul, as it was more principal in meriting, so is it more principally in nature rewarded.

c. To the Third Objection

446. To the third [n.440] I say that [God’s] acting along with the body of the blessed for preserving it against any corrupting force is more natural than his acting along with the contrary in corrupting it, because a superior cause acts more perfectly with a more perfect second cause. And although this were now as to the body of someone just a thing miraculous, because now is the time of change and action, yet then it will be the time of rest and changelessness in bodies, and for the time then it will be natural and customary (according to the common course of things) that [God] act for rest, just as he now acts for motion

3. Scotus’ own Response to Others’ Reasons

447. To the reasons for these three positions [nn.427-436].

To the first [nn.427-429], about the lordship of the soul over the body, I reply that God will not then make the will of the soul omnipotent, and so not powerful either to do whatever it wish to do; but sufficient for it is that whatever it wish be done will be done; and thus its body will be perfectly subject to its will (that is, it will be as the will wishes it to be), just as it is perfectly subject to God. But this subjection of its body will be from the divine will effectively.

448. To the reason for the second [nn.430-433], it was said what Augustine's understanding [nn.430, 438] is about that gift: that it is a certain right possessed in the body, insofar as it is animated by this sort of soul, for such passive preservation from all corruption

449. To the third [nn.434-436]: the motion of the heaven has a certain priority relative to the others, namely of uniformity and velocity, but not a priority of causality, save insofar as it brings forward the generator [n.436], which is per accidens – the way the motion of fire to wood has a priority, namely of burning the wood, and without such prior there cannot be a posterior; [there can be] if⁷⁰ something supply the place of such prior.

II. To the Initial Arguments

450. To the first main argument [n.407]: [yes] if the authority of Gregory be conceded, which however does not seem necessary; for why could the heaven not be touched by a finger that existed there?⁷¹ – understanding touching in this way, that the body were sufficiently resistant to touch, though not through any sensible quality (neither as hard nor as soft, nor as hot nor as cold etc.). But as to what is touched according to some sensible quality, something corruptible is, by its affect on touch, very well left behind by it.⁷² And so not more follows than that the body, were it not preserved by God, would be corruptible by a corrupting passion.

451. To the second [n.408] it is said that all the senses of the blessed are within his act. The reason for this is that each sensation is a proper perfection of the sensitive power. However, I do not see the necessity that the senses pertaining to nutrition be among the blessed's acts, since nutrition is not necessary then, because the body will not be an animal one, that is, a body in need of food. Some senses, however, can well be posited among his acts – those senses whose acts do not require a concomitant imperfection, such as sight and hearing, which are more spiritual. About sight no one doubts, nor about hearing, if there is sound there and sound capable of being propagated and of affecting the hearing.

452. When it is argued that such affecting is not without a real corruptive affecting, I deny it, because sometimes there is a greater intentional affecting and a lesser real affecting, as was said elsewhere [supra d.44 nn.130-131].

⁷⁰ Instead of 'if' another ms. has 'unless', which is required if the '[there can be]' is not taken to be implied

⁷¹ The sphere of the heaven was understood to be physical, and so in principle touchable, but not corruptible.

⁷² That is, when something touches, or is touched, by something according to some sense quality, it leaves something of itself behind (some quanta of energy, we might now say), and so is progressively corrupted by such acts of touching.

453. As to the proof [n.408], that a surpassing sensible object can corrupt sense, I concede that these two affectings do now come together, because the active object is able to act with both actions [sc. real and intentional, n.452] and the passive subject (either the same or conjoined) is receptive of both actions. And for this reason is each action now conjoined together in the same passive subject (although sometimes one action is greater and the other less, according to the disposition of the passive subject to this action or that). But God will not then keep the organs of the senses away from one of the passions [sc. the intentional one], because it does not serve their perfection to be so kept away; but he will then keep the whole body away from the other action [sc. the real one], because this keeping away is for the well-being that the body has merited through the mediation of the soul, or the soul has merited for the body, or the whole has merited for the body principally through the soul.

454. To the third [n.409]: if it be denied that the elements are really in the mixed body, the response is plain [sc. because the problem ceases to arise]. But if this is not denied, I say that that is simply violent which is opposed to what is simply natural, and that that is more violent which is opposed to what is a more perfect natural, and that that is less violent which is opposed to what is less natural.

455. An example: that there is water above [e.g. in clouds] so that a plenum may be kept in the universe is not simply violent; rather what would then descend, with a vacuum left remaining above, would be violent, and natural in a certain respect, because the nature of the whole universe is more a principle of naturalness than is this particular nature, and more natural because it belongs to such a whole than what belongs properly to this part. Now the mixed body, and especially the human body, is more perfectly something natural than is any of the elements; and so, what is natural for that [mixed] body, this is simply more natural than what would be natural for any of the elements in itself. More natural, then, is that the body of man be conserved and the elements in it than that the body of man be violently dissolved and each element tend by its own naturalness to its own proper place.

456. The proposition too of the Philosopher, that nothing violent is perpetual [n.409], is not necessary for theologians, speaking of the violent that is against the particular nature of this body; because God can preserve some particular perpetually under the opposite of that to which it is naturally inclined. But with Aristotle the proposition was true [supra d.43 nn.157, 221-222; cf. Aquinas, *SG* III ch.45], because he posits that to every passive potency there corresponds, in the whole coordination of active causes, some cause that would sometimes necessarily reduce it to act. Therefore, this natural potency will sometime be reduced to act, and thus will its violent opposite be corrupted.

457. To the next [n.410] from *On the Heaven* [1.12.282a21-24], I say that when one act is repugnant to another, although the possibility for this act stand with that act (and more with the possibility for that act), yet the possibility for this act does not stand with the necessity of that act; because if this act is necessary, that act is impossible, because what is repugnant to the necessary is impossible. Therefore if Plato said that the heaven is in contingent disposition to being corrupted and to ceasing, and also is in contingent disposition to being perpetually conserved by God [supra d.43 n.102], the argument [n.410] is of no avail against him, because no impossibility follows when the possible is posited; because in such things, where each act is contingent separately

[sc. neither is necessary by itself though one or other must hold], from the positing of the possible no new impossibility arises [sc. if of two possibles contradictory to each other one is posited, the other cannot be posited; but the other does not thereby cease to be possible; it just ceases ever to be actual].

458. An example: let ‘I will run tomorrow, I am able not to run tomorrow’ be posited in existence; no new impossibility arises. And if [Plato] posited one of the two statements to be necessary, namely, that God necessarily conserve things, or it be proved that from the possibility [sc. of things ceasing] (which Plato concedes) a necessity follow because of matter [sc. that material things must necessarily cease to be at some point] – then, by positing the other possibility to be existent in fact, no new impossibility is got; but the impossibility that is now manifest between ‘the necessary is present’ and ‘the opposite is present’ was before between ‘the necessary is present’ and ‘the possible is present’.⁷³

459. In this way must the argument of Aristotle be expounded:

Namely either by accepting from Plato, if he granted it, that ‘the heaven will be necessarily perpetuated by God’, and then to posit in being that ‘it is possible for the heaven to be corrupted and cease’, and the impossible follows [sc. the heaven will last forever, and the heaven will cease] – not because of the positing of the ‘possible’, since by making comparison with the opposite ‘necessary’ there is no new impossibility.

Or if Plato did not grant it, it needs to be proved that there follows from what was granted that which is indeed true according to the Philosopher; and according to him, *Metaphysics* 9.8.1050b6-8, whatever is sempiternal is necessary; and so, if it can be sempiternal, it is necessarily sempiternal.

460. And thus does the Commentator seem to treat of this proof in *On the Heaven* I com.138, that nature would change if from being possible it became sempiternal, or two opposite natures would be together in the same thing (which was expounded above in *Ord.1 d.8 nn.236-258*).

461. In another way is proved to follow, from what is granted, that whatever God immediately does he necessarily does, according to the Philosopher; from this does he proceed at the beginning of *Physics* 8.1.251a8-b10, 252a3-22, 6.259b32-60a19. And this second proof proves a different necessity (because an inevitability) from the first (which proves an intrinsic necessity); in this latter way is the motion of the heaven necessary, not in the first way,⁷⁴ Averroes *Metaphysics* 11 com.30; Aristotle *Metaphysics* 12.6.1071b13-20.

462. In each way (by deducing the necessary from act or from the possible granted by Plato) the positing of the other possible in being shows the positing to be unacceptable, for it includes contradictories; because just as now there is a contradiction

⁷³ The point seems to be that Plato’s position (the heaven is in principle corruptible but God will prevent it ever being corrupted in fact) does not, contrary to the objection [n.410], involve a contradiction. For the two possibilities are not contradictory as they stand, and though one becomes impossible if the other is posited, this is not a new necessity in the things (*de re*) but only a necessity in the statements (*de dicto*). For both statements assert something possible in itself, but if one is asserted the other is necessarily denied.

⁷⁴ In the first way the necessity is about what God must do to the heaven extrinsically from without; in the second way the necessity is about what the heaven must undergo intrinsically from within. This intrinsic condition, however, can be prevented from every being realized extrinsically by God.

of act with necessity, so before it was of the possible with the same necessity, though a less manifest one.⁷⁵

463. The necessity of the other opposite, namely, to cease or be corrupted [n.459], can be proved thus; that to every passive power there corresponds in being some active power [n.455], (but if not, then our will sometimes will be necessarily reduced to act).⁷⁶ Similarly, ‘everything corruptible will necessarily be corrupted’, and then the remaining part must be posited in being, namely that it be perpetually conserved [sc. by God]; and there will be a manifest contradiction, which however before was because of the necessity of one of the opposites.⁷⁷ This second [sc. way of taking the contradiction] seems to agree less with the text [sc. of the objection, n.410].

⁷⁵ Before the contradiction was not in the things but in the statements, that while both were possible yet if one was true (or even necessary) the other could not be true. But once one of the statements is posited to hold in reality (being), the other is necessarily shown not to hold in reality.

⁷⁶ The will is a free power so must be reduced to act by a free cause. If there is no free cause, it will be reduced to act necessarily.

⁷⁷ Hitherto the contradiction has concerned the necessity of things being conserved by God and the possibility of things ceasing to be. This contradiction has arisen because of necessity in one of the opposites (namely that if God necessarily conserves things, the possibility of their ceasing to be is removed). The contradiction now is because of necessity in the other opposite as well, namely not only that God necessarily conserves things but also that corruptible things must at some time necessarily be corrupted. The contradiction in this case is more manifest because there is an opposed necessity on both sides, whereas the contradiction before was between necessity on one side and possibility on the other. Scotus is, however, not disturbed by either contradiction, because it is in the statements rather than the things – for if God conserves things, even necessarily, the possibility of things ceasing to be is only removed in fact and not in idea [n.458-459].