

Summa of a Scotus Summa.

The following translations are taken from Jerome of Montefortino's selections and arrangement of Scotus' writings following the pattern of St. Thomas Aquinas' *Summa Theologica*. However, only the responses in the body of each article are translated here, or only enough of the responses to make the position of Scotus, or the Scotist tradition, reasonably clear. Adding the objections and replies that are in Montefortino's original (again following the Thomistic pattern) would not only greatly extend the size of the translation but would also make the whole less accessible to interested readers.

Montefortino's texts, which are from the old Wadding edition of Scotus' works (along, it seems, with connecting matter added by Montefortino), fairly represent Scotus as he was discussed and defended for many centuries after his death. This advantage is no mean one, although these texts combine elements from different writings of Scotus (as that the Oxford work, or Oxon. here, combines the *Ordinatio* with parts of the *Reportatio* and the *Additiones Magnae*), and even contain some writings now known not to have been by Scotus but by some of his early followers. The recent critical editions of Scotus' writings, while more accurate to what Scotus himself wrote and when (and so more valuable for scholarly purposes), is in some ways less accurate to Scotus as he was widely, if mistakenly, known in the past.

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Theological Prayer of Master Scotus to the Most High God [from his On the First Principle]

Lord our God, when your servant Moses was making presentation to the children of Israel about your name and was asking it of you the most true teacher, you knew what the intellect of mortals could conceive of you and, keeping back your own blessed name, you replied to him, *Exodus* ch.3, "I am who am." You are true being; you are the whole of being. For you are the first efficient and the last end of all things. You are supreme in perfection and transcend all things. You are altogether uncaused, therefore wholly incapable of not being, and therefore eternal, possessing all at once and most fully unendingness of duration, without any possibility of succession. You live with the most blessed life, because you have intelligence and will. You are blessed, nay blessedness itself, because you are the comprehension of yourself. You are clear vision and most sweet love of yourself; and although you are blessed in yourself alone and are supremely sufficient for yourself without anything else, yet you actually understand everything intelligible all at once. You are able all at once to will contingently and freely everything causable, and by willing to cause it; therefore you are most truly of infinite power. You are incomprehensible, infinite; for nothing that knows all things is finite; nothing of infinite power is finite; nothing supreme in beings and their ultimate end is finite; nothing existing of itself and altogether simple is finite. You are of infinite and supreme simplicity, having no parts really distinct. You alone are simply perfect, to whom is lacking nothing that can exist in another. It can altogether not happen that all being should be found in something in its formal and proper being, but it can be in something formally or eminently, in the way that you God preconceive, and you possess whatever is and can be of perfection in beings; therefore being established on the supreme and highest peak you alone are infinite, all other things being infinitely lacking in this excellence by the condition of its nature. You are good without limit, most freely bestowing the rays of your goodness, to whom as most lovable each thing in its own way hastens together as to the ultimate end of all things. You are intelligible in the most perfect intelligible way. You are present to your own intellect. You are alone are the first truth; since that which appears what it is not is false, and so the reason for its appearance is something other than it, because if its nature alone were the reason for its appearance it would appear to be what it is. But you have no reason of appearance; for all things would appear in your essence once you first appear; and so nothing later than you is a reason of appearance for you. In that essence, I say, everything intelligible, under the most perfect idea of intelligible, is present to your intellect. You therefore are intelligible, most clear truth, and infallible truth, and most certainly comprehending the truth of all intelligibles. Besides these things that are proved of you by the philosophers, Catholics often praise you as omnipotent, immense, everywhere present, true, just, and merciful, caring for all creatures and especially intelligible ones. Therefore Lord our God, you are naturally one, you are numerically one. Truly have you said, "Beside me there is no God." You are true God alone, God from whom are all things, in whom are all things, through whom are all

things. Aid me, Lord, in my inquiry, to as much knowledge as our reason can attain as I examine those things which you have deigned to reveal to us, and that we hold by most firm faith. For you have preached that you are first and last; teach your servant therefore to show by reason that you are sole, true, total being, and first efficient cause of all things and their ultimate end, and above all of those things for which you bear your chief care, namely the intellectual and rational creature. You are blessed for ages of ages. Amen.

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QUESTION SEVENTY FIVE: ON MAN'S SOUL IN ITSELF.
IN SEVEN ARTICLES.

Article One: Whether the soul is a body

Reply [*Oxon. & Report.* 4 d.43 q.2]: One must say that the rational soul is not a body. Since form becomes known to us through operation, as matter does through change, it is from the proper operation of the soul, which is understanding and which proceeds from the form and is received in the form, that one must try to make clear the form's lack of extension and its lack of any bodily property. Therefore I argue as follows. There is in us some immaterial knowledge; no sensitive knowledge is immaterial, for all sensitive knowledge receives an object as it exists here and now and as it is affected by the other material conditions; therefore the knowledge that abstracts from all these things is immaterial and is, as a result, necessarily received in an immaterial and incorporeal subject.

Proof of the assumption: for first of all we experience ourselves reflecting on the act of knowledge; but a quantum does not reflect on itself; therefore the proper operation of the soul is not something quantitative or corporeal. Next, we possess in ourselves a kind of knowledge of objects that cannot be sensitive and material knowledge; therefore it is altogether immaterial, inorganic, and incorporeal. Proof of the antecedent: For we experience that we actually know universals. Indeed we experience that we attain being, or the quality under its more common idea as it is the idea of the first sensible object, even in respect of the supreme sensitive power. We also experience that we understand the relations consequent to the natures of things, even of non sensible things, and equally that we distinguish the whole genus of sensible things from anything that is not of the same genus. We equally have experience that we understand the relations of reason, which are second intentions, as the relations of universal genus, of species, or opposition, and of other logical intentions; and further that by reflection we know the act by which we know these things, and that we know this for the reason that the reflex act by which we attain the direct act is in us, and that the principle of the power which is susceptible thereof is in us. We also discover by experience that we assent to propositions that cannot be contradicted or erroneous, of which sort are the first principles that are manifest to everyone from the simple apprehension of the terms. And finally we experience that we come to know the unknown from the known by discursive reasoning, so much so that we cannot reject the evidence of the reasoning nor the knowledge that is inferred from known principles. But each one of these is incapable of being known by any sensitive power.

There is proof of this from the individual acts that we discover by experience to exist in us. For the actual universal is known with so much indifference that it is known to be simultaneously predicable of all the singulars in which it is found; but the senses do not know in this way; for the senses are of what is existent as it is existent, but to be existent as existent is repugnant to the actual universal.

The point is more evident about second intentions. For no power can know a thing under a more universal idea than the idea of its proper object, just as sight does not know anything under an idea that is indifferent to color and sensation;

therefore a knowledge that is of something under an idea more common than the first object even of the highest sense cannot be any sort of sensation.

A third experience proves the same thing, for no sensation can distinguish its first sensible object (that is, its most common object) from that which is not of the same sort, because sensation is unable to be of both extremes. The same is true of relations that mutually hold between non-sensible things, or the relations between non-sensible and sensible things, as is plain also from the fact that the senses are incapable of dealing with them. And much more is this evident about relations of reason; for the senses are not moved to knowledge of anything that is not included in the sensible object insofar as it is sensible; but relations of reason are not included in anything as it is existent; now the senses are only of existent things as they are existent.

The other point about reflection on one's own act and power is proved by the fact that an extended quantity does not reflect on itself. Finally, the points touched on about propositions and assent to inferences demonstrated by evident reasoning are proved by what has just been said about relations of reason, since these inferences too do not happen without relations of reason.

But if someone should stubbornly deny that these acts exist in man, one should not dispute further with him but say to him that he should be numbered among the brutes; just as one should not dispute with someone who says he does not see colors, but one should say to him that he needs senses because he is blind. Thus it is by a certain sense, that is, an interior perception, that we experience these acts in ourselves, and therefore we should say to someone who denies them that he is not a man because he lacks the interior sense that others experience themselves having.

From the two propositions of the principal argument that have in this way been demonstrated the third proposition must be made clear, namely that the subject of such operations must be immaterial and incorporeal. For there must certainly be some subject properly receptive of these sorts of immaterial operations; for since they are sometimes present and sometimes absent, they cannot be referred to man's substance. Now the receptive subject cannot be anything extended, whether some organic part or the whole composite, because then the operations themselves would be extended; and they cannot be extended, because the aforesaid operations concern the objects enumerated above; so they must be in us according to something unextended that exists formally in us, and this can only be the intellectual soul; for any other form designated in man is extended; therefore the intellectual soul is unextended and incorporeal.

Or there is another proof as follows: any form lower than intellectual form, when it exercises its operation, is affected by conditions opposite to those in accord with which intellectual operations are carried out; therefore if we have operations about objects under ideas that intellectual operation is plainly affected by, then performing those operation will not exist in us according to any other form than an intellectual form; therefore not only is there formally in us an intellectual form (otherwise we could scarcely be said to act formally according to those sorts of operations), but this form is formally and intrinsically unextended, incorporeal, and immaterial.

Similarly one can argue from the other operation of man, which is the act of the appetitive power. For man is lord of his acts, so much so that it is in his power to determine himself to this or to the opposite. And this is not just held by faith but is also perceived in experience and demonstrated by natural reason. This indetermination and lordship cannot be placed in an organic and extended appetite, for any such appetite is determined to a definite kind of desirable thing fitting to it, so much so that when apprehended it cannot not be fitting to and be approved by the appetite; therefore the will, whereby we so will that the will can approve or want or refuse, or even not act at all about, anything shown to it, is the appetite of a form that is inorganic, unextended, and surpassing any such form, just as was shown above about the intellective power.

Article 2: Whether the human soul is something subsistent.

Reply [*Quodlibet* q.9]: Some think that the human soul does in fact exist per se, just as, on the contrary, no other per se form of matter should be said to subsist, because none of them is able to perform an operation in which their matter does not share, and because their being is not other than the being of the whole. To see how much must be made of these reasons, note that 'per se being' can be understood in three ways. In the first way a per se being is understood to be solitary being, the way this is taken in *Posterior Analytics* 1 text 3, in the third mode of per se; for which reason even an accident can be a per se being, when it is not in a subject. In a second way a per se being is said to be so in distinction from being in another, and in this way a per se being is the same as what does not inhere in another, whether actually or aptitudinally; and under this mode of per se being do all substances fall, not only composite ones but also matter and form. Finally the third sense of per se being is what has ultimate actuality such that it has no order simply to another act beyond the one with which it is endowed, which further act could be the act of it per se or primarily or by participation. What is called a per se being in this sense is commonly called a supposit and, in intellectual nature, a person.

From this it is at once apparent that the conclusion of the first reason is to be denied. For when taking 'subsistent' properly, that is in the third sense, the intellective soul is not referred to by this term. The intellective soul is not subsistent per se when united, that is, per se as solitary (the way the accident on the altar is said to be a per se being), for then it would not be informing the body when united to it; for it is not informing the body when it is separated, because when separated it is a per se being; so if, when united to the body, it were a per se being, then what informs and what does not inform the body would possess the same mode of being.

So, when the argument is made that the intellective soul has an operation per se in which the body does not share, I reply that an operation can belong per se to something in two ways: in one way as to what proximately receives the operation, and in another way as to what remotely does so. An example: a surface is said to be white because it proximately and immediately receives whiteness; but a man is said to be white because the same form is in itself in him by the intermediary of his surface. So too does the soul per se understand because it is the proximate recipient

of intellection; but it is not the first subject when it is united to the body, but rather reason then is the first subject, for it is because of reason that intellection belongs first to man, as belonging to the whole through the form. But a man is said to understand per se as the remote receptive subject, for man does not receive intellection save as his soul (which is his form) is more immediately the receptive subject. When therefore the major proposition, that 'what operates per se is subsistent', is taken, this proposition is true of that which so operates that it is not the reason why something else operates with the operation. But if what operates is not subsistent but an informing form, then it could only operate if the whole that it informs had, in addition, a principle of operating. But then the minor, that 'the soul understands per se', is clearly false; for this is only true to the extent that the operation belongs to a form as to the subject proximately susceptible of it. Therefore intellection is immaterial, not because it belongs to the soul as the soul is united to and informs the body, but because it belongs to the soul by itself as the soul is the proximate susceptible subject, and belongs to the composite [of body and soul] as to that which is remotely susceptible (and then only as to the formal part of the composite).

The second argument [sc. that the soul is subsistent] has problems with it. For what has altogether the same being does not seem to be simply imperfect from the fact that it is not communicating that being to something else. If therefore the soul had the same being as the whole has, why would the separated soul be called imperfect in being when nothing would then be taken away from it save that it was not communicating its being to something else? Why also would the soul, as possessing the same being, be imperfect in being while the whole, as possessing the same being, would be perfect in being? How finally does the being of the whole remain in the separated soul when the whole, in which there is the same being, has perished?

Wherefore we say that the being of the soul remains the same while the soul remains as a being with the being it has, that is, whether it is in the state of conjunction with or in the state of separation from the body; and likewise that the being of the whole only remains the same as long as it remains a whole in its being; for the actual being of nothing seems to continue the same unless the thing remains the same in retaining that being; therefore one must deny that the soul has the same being as the being of the whole, since the soul that has being is a part of a whole that has being; the relation then of being to being is the same.

And when the proof is given that the same being remains in the separated soul but this is not so in the case of other forms – this proves the opposite of what is intended. For the soul remains in its being because it is altogether incorruptible, both per se and per accidens; but it would very well seem to be corruptible if it were the same as the being of the composite, since the composite is truly corrupted; for just as generation terminates at the being of the thing generated, so the term of corruption is the being of the thing corrupted. But other material forms do not remain in their being when the whole is corrupted – and not because their being was not different from the being of the corrupted composite, but because they are corrupted per accidens. Now this happens either because the corrupting agent, through its active contrary principle, meets them as contraries, or at least because it

meets the composite by corrupting it and the forms are inseparable from the composite in being; neither of these is true of the intellectual soul.

In order to make clearer the force of the stated responses to the two above arguments, a distinction as to being can be drawn. For being is understood in one way as that by which something formally departs from not being, and is thereby established in existence outside the intellect and outside the power of its cause. In another way being is called ultimate act, namely act to which no other act is added that gives it being simply. For this reason a composite complete in its kind is said to be, and to be the thing alone; but a part of its being is called being only per accidens, or more properly said to be participative in the being of the whole. Hence the composite alone is a per se being; but the intellectual soul cannot be called subsistent save improperly and in a certain respect. For although it is a being and a per se being (understanding being in the former way), yet, because it is per se a part of the human composite, in no way can it or should it be called something per se subsistent. And these things are said by way of response to the first argument.

And the response to the second argument is plain through the same point. For if being is taken in the first sense, it is manifest that an altogether different being belongs to the form than belongs to what is constituted in its proper species by that form. In the second way both have the same being but diversely, for the whole has it primarily and the part has it by participation.

From this it is evident why the separated soul is imperfect in existing, not indeed essentially and primarily but by participation. In its own being, indeed, it is as perfect when separated as when conjoined; but when conjoined it participates additionally in the being of the whole, and this perfection is lacking to it when it is separated – which perfection to be sure can be called a lack of perfection simply, even though no proper perfection is in the meantime lacking to it. And so a form is not called imperfect merely because it is not communicating its perfection to another, just as neither is it imperfect because it is so communicating; but it is called imperfect because of its lack of the perfection of the being of the whole, which lack is concomitant to its not doing the communicating.

Having established that the intellectual soul cannot be said to be something per se subsistent, we must see how its operation must be called immaterial, or of a sort that the body has no influence with respect to it or does not communicate in it. In fact the term 'immaterial' is ambiguous. For, as concerns the present topic, it can be taken in three ways. In the first way it is taken such that an immaterial operation is understood to be also incorporeal, because it is not exercised by a bodily part or organ. In the second way an operation is immaterial because it is not in any way an extended magnitude, and then the thing is made plain in a broader way than by the term non-organic; for although every organic operation is extended because it is received in an extended subject, yet not merely so – because if it were received in a composite whole first, it would still be an extended operation, since the whole is extended. In a third way finally an operation is understood to be immaterial by comparison with the object that it deals with, namely because it has regard to an object in its immaterial conditions, to wit as the object abstracts from the here and now and the other conditions that surround matter (in the way that in the preceding article the immateriality of the soul and its immunity from the body were proved).

Now the immateriality of intellection is again made clear in the first sense of the term 'immaterial'. For all sensation is organic knowledge; but intellection is not organic knowledge; therefore it is immaterial. The major is given by Aristotle *On the Soul* 2 text 51, and he proves from it that every organ is determined to a particular class of sensibles, for every organ consists in the mean proportion between the extremes of that class; but we experience in ourselves a knowledge that does not belong to us through such an organ, for then it would be determined precisely to the sensibles of a determinate class, the opposite of which we experience. Since this sort of knowledge is transcendent to every kind of sensation, and since we know by this sort of act the difference of every kind of sensibles from anything that is not of that kind, therefore we know both extremes, as the Philosopher argues *On the Soul* 2, the chapter on the common sense. This knowledge, then, which is properly called intellection, is not exercised through any bodily organ, and so it is immaterial insofar as it is distinguished from all sensitive knowledge that has power for some determinate class of sensibles, according as the constitution and nature of the organ demands. But if it is immaterial then equally it must proceed from an immaterial principle, and in an immaterial principle it must equally be received, and not be received in anything else that is extended and material.

A response could be made to this deduction first as follows: although it may be proved that intellection is not exercised through a determinate organ, yet it has not been proved that it is unextended because it is in the whole primarily and is not done through any organ; also the whole is material and extended; therefore the operation is extended as well. Next it could be said that intellection is exercised in fact through an organ, namely through the imagination, which turns toward all sensibles; hence when imagination is damaged knowledge is impeded. The first objection was precluded by the argument when it was said that, through the act of understanding, we discern and discriminate the whole class of sensibles from anything that is outside that class. The second objection is not conclusive, for knowledge is impeded when imagination is damaged due to the subordination of the powers in their operating.

Article 3: Whether the souls of brute animals are subsistent.

Reply [*Oxon.* 2 d.3 q.8, d.9 q.2; 4 d.44 q.2, d.43 q.2; *De Rerum Principio* q.9¹]: I reply that one must say that, among forms perfecting matter, only the intellectual soul performs an operation that is without an organ and that transcends the whole genus of sensibles; but all the souls of brutes operate wholly through organs and so must in no way be said to be per se subsistent as the human soul is said to be per se. Explanation: for since the intellect covers the whole of being, distinguishing the class of sensibles from non-sensibles, and since also it reflects on its own acts and

¹ Nb. The *De Rerum Principio*, long attributed to Scotus, is now known to have been written in fact by Vital du Four. So this article and some others below, as selected by Montefortino, are not an entirely accurate reflection of Scotus' own thought but rather of Scotism as it was standardly known for many centuries.

does other things of the sort (as was explained in the preceding article 1), it necessarily cannot use any bodily organ in these acts. For such organs attain precisely a single class of sensibles and cannot extend themselves to others. Thus the hearing power perceives sounds but not colors and light, to which objects however the power of sight per se tends but does not reach sounds nor can grasp them. Therefore rightly does the Philosopher *On the Soul* 2 text 128 use the determinate number of organic powers to infer a determinate number of actions or objects. So the sensitive power can perform no operation save by tending to its proper object through a determinate organ.

To make this point clear, note that one must consider two things in the acts of understanding and of sensing, namely both what understands and senses and by what it understands and senses. What understands and senses is the whole man or the whole animal, as Aristotle says *On the Soul* 1 text 89. That by which it senses as by the remote principle is the substance itself of the sensitive soul. And that by which it senses as by the proximate principle is the same soul as being able to operate, or as it has the idea of power. Now the sensitive powers (as is said *On Sleep and Wakefulness*) do not sense per se, because sensing is done through the body; therefore the sensitive power as it flows from the soul, or as it is the soul itself in its power to operate, and further as it flows into the bodily organ thereby making it a unity with itself (like an artisan with a naturally conjoined instrument), is that by which the animal immediately senses; thus it is not indeed true that the sensitive power (on the part of the soul) sees but rather that the conjoined whole of the power and the organ is what the animal sees by, in accord with what Aristotle says *On the Soul* 2 text 9, 'If the eye were an animal sight would be its soul.'

Now as to what we understand by, this too is double: both what is remote, and this is the substance of the intellective soul, and what is proximate and immediate, and this is nothing other than the intellective power based in the essence of the soul and abiding in it, not as flowing into some bodily matter or organ. And hereby is at once evident the reason for the difference why the sensitive power, precisely as it is based in the essence of the soul, cannot be the immediate principle for eliciting the act of sensing until it flows into and is united with a bodily organ; but the intellective power, which is not of itself rooted in a bodily organ, either as flowing into or as united with matter, is the immediate principle of understanding. Hence it is that the soul is the act of the body through its substance differently from the way it is the act of the body through its power. For it is the act of the body by reason of its substance as the body is simply a substantial, mixed composite, in this or that degree of complexion. But the soul is the act of the body by its sensitive power as the body is something with organs and is a mean proportion between sensibles, as Aristotle lays out *On the Soul* text 9. But the soul is not by its intellective power the form of the body as the body is something with organs or is a complex. For the whole man elicits the act of understanding as he is moved by the object through the intellective power, according as this power proceeds from him and is based precisely in the essence of the soul and in its remote principle, without any influx into, or union with, any bodily material or organ. But the whole man elicits the act of sensing through the sensitive power, not only as this power is rooted in the soul but also as it flows into and is united with a bodily organ.

And since the operation and its object take their nature and measure from the principle by which the operation is immediately elicited, so it is that, just as the intellective power is not tied to any bodily organ, so its object is not contracted but universal, or particular, and is the whole of being without determination. But because the sensitive power, as it is the principle of operating, necessarily includes a bodily organ, therefore, since object and operation have to be proportioned to the proximate principle, its object must be at most a portion of being, and its operation must be a conjoint one, as was said.

Hereby is evident the truth of the difference between sense and intellect that Aristotle sets down *On the Soul* 3 text 7. For an excessive sensible object destroys or damages the sense, of which the sign is that afterwards the sense perceives sensible things less. But the intellect, by contrast, after it has understood things supremely intelligible, is found to be more suited and disposed for understanding lower things. Therefore it is very clear that the sensitive power is weakened whenever damage is suffered by the organ with whose extension it is itself extended, and it is weakened along with it.

Article 4: Whether the soul is man.

Reply [*De Rerum Principio* q.9 a.2;² *Oxon.* 4 d.43 q.2]: Plato supposed that man's nature and substance consisted in the soul alone, or a per se subsistent intellect, not in the body, so that the intellect does not have processes through the body, though it does use the body as a sailor uses a ship. He held, therefore, that only the rational soul is man, which would have a vegetative and sensitive and intellective power of its own nature, but that it yet communicates the acts of the sensitive powers with the body, whereby the powers would receive in the bodily organs the species of sensible things, while again the intellective power does not communicate with the body or any part of the body; nevertheless the intellect does abstract, through the non-communicated body, the intelligible species from the species that are certain phantasms in the sense organs; and by these intelligible species the intellective operation is perfected, which also, by reason of attaining the same perfection, is superior to the vegetative powers of the body or its organs. From all this Plato inferred that the intellect is precisely only united to the body as a mover is united to the movable.

But this opinion is rejected as false because, first, man belongs to the consideration of the natural philosopher, and so to treat of the intellective soul in the reference that it has to the body belongs to physics, as is said in *Physics* 2 com.21. Now the definition of a natural thing contains matter, as is said expressly in *On the Soul* 1 text 14; therefore body necessarily falls into the definition of man; but whatever falls into the definition of something belongs to its essence and to its integral totality; therefore one should not approve the view that man's soul alone constitutes his essence. Second, we experience that acts of sensing are in us and by us; for they cannot come from a separated intellect since they cannot be represented

² See footnote 1 above.

save through an organ, which it is clear the separated intellect lacks. I also show on the part of the body the falsity of Plato's opinion: because then the human body would be less noble than the body of an ass and other brutes, which bodies Plato does not deny are perfected by the sensitive soul as by their proper form. Lastly, since the intellective soul can be neither generated nor corrupted, then if man's essence were to be located only in that soul, man could be neither generated nor corrupted, which no one would concede.

One must say, therefore, that man is composed and consists essentially of rational soul and organic body united. For the rational soul is truly properly and per se the form of man; therefore man per se consists of matter and form; therefore he essentially includes soul as form and body as the per se matter of form. For if the soul is not essentially the form of man but is said to assist the body as the intelligences assist the heavenly bodies, then there is no science in man that could be called his habit; for there will be no acts of understanding in men as these acts are distinguished from acts of sensing; indeed there will be no acts of choice in man as these acts are distinguished from acts of the sensitive appetite, nor consequently are any virtues to be attributed to man. For the virtues are not generated save by choices elicited according to right reason. But since these things are wholly absurd and thoroughly contrary to men's common sense, we must make our opinion accord with the truth of philosophy and altogether confess that the intellective soul is the per se the form of man; and that consequently man's essence is not located in the rational soul alone but that in addition the organic body also has regard to his substance.

Article 5: Whether the soul is composed of matter and form.

Reply [*De Anima* q.15, *De Rerum Principio* q.7³]: in two articles of q.50 we made clear, even according to the principles of those who deny composition of matter and form in spiritual substances, that it seems from such principles that such substances are really composite. But next, abstracting from the opinions of others and looking at the question in itself, we said that this composition of matter and form must be admitted to exist in angels and in the rational soul. Therefore, in solving the present question consistently with what was there said, we think that the rational soul is composed of matter and form. For (as we also argued in the cited places), just as operation proves form, so material property proves matter; but the property of matter as to its being and as to its becoming is more truly found in the rational soul and in other spiritual substances than in sensible bodies; therefore we must set down in the rational soul a matter fitting and proportioned to it. Proof of the minor: the property of matter as to its being is that it cannot be generated or corrupted, but as to its becoming that it can only be produced by creation; these properties belong exactly to the rational soul and to other spiritual substances; for as souls have received being and do daily receive perfection, so are they free of generation and corruption. Similarly, it is a property of matter to be the underlying subject of

³ See footnote 1 above.

accidents; but just as the body is the underlying subject of sensible accidents, so the soul is the underlying subject of spiritual accidents; therefore matter is found in the soul. Proof of the major: this [sc. being a subject of accidents] is not a property of a composite save by reason of its principles; but the reason for this is not in the form, for it belongs to form to actuate, to constitute, and to distinguish; therefore being the underlying subject of accidents belongs to the composite by reason of matter. Next I argue as follows: in any genus in which there are principles that are most common, not just proper principles but principles that really differentiate, everything in that genus must be composite; such are the principles in the genus of substance. Proof: act and potency are the most common principles in any genus; but in the genus of substance act is form as potency is matter; therefore matter and form are the most common principles in the genus of substance; therefore every substance is composed of matter and form. Augustine is of this very opinion in *Confessions* 12.12 when he expounds the verse, 'In the beginning God created the heavens and the earth,' that is, 'In the coeternal word of his Son, God made the unformed matter of the spiritual creature and of the bodily creature;' and in *Literal Commentary on Genesis* 7.5 where he supposes that the soul has matter and is disputing whether the matter precedes the creation of the soul in time, he says, in speaking of the soul, 'Whether from something that was already spiritually made by him, while the soul did not yet exist, can rightly be asked.' Wherefore he says later in ch.6, 'If the soul were something unchangeable we should in no way have to ask about its quasi-matter. But in fact its changeableness sufficiently shows that it is sometimes deformed by vices and deceits, and sometimes formed by virtues and the teaching of truth.' And a little later he says, 'Thus perhaps could the soul have spiritual matter for its genus.'

Article 6: Whether the human soul is corruptible.

Reply [*Oxon.* 4 d.43 q.2, *Report. ibid.*]: Some think, persuaded by the reasons adduced for the affirmative side, that the immortality of the rational soul can be demonstrated and indeed proved by those very arguments. To us the arguments seem indeed to be probable but not demonstrative, nay not necessary either, as will be immediately evident to anyone when he has the solution.

As to the first argument [that the rational soul has no contrary to corrupt it and has being of itself], if the soul is understood to have the same per se being in the whole as outside it (as per se being is distinguished from the being-in of accidents), then in this way the form of fire, if it were without matter, would have per se being, and then one could conclude that it too was likewise incorruptible. But if per se being is understood to be what belongs to a composite in the category of substance, we deny that in this sense the soul has per se being outside the body, because if so its being would not be communicable to the body. Indeed even in divine reality such per se being would be incommunicable. So, in this understanding, this inference is void, 'the soul has being without the body, therefore it does not need the body,' because in this understanding the antecedent is false. In the first understanding the inference is not valid unless there is added to it that the soul has naturally, and

without miracles, per se being in the first way. But this addition is a matter of belief and is not known by natural reason.

As to the second argument [that the soul is not composite and cannot be separated from itself], not every corruption is the per se separation of one thing from another. For take the being of an angel; if it is posited, as it is by some, to be different from the angel's essence, then certainly it is not separable from itself, but yet it is destructible by the succession of not being to its being.

As to the third argument [that there is a natural desire for being which, in the case of intellectual things, is for being simply and always], the argument is either precisely about natural desire properly speaking, and this is not any elicited act but only the inclination of a nature to its perfection. And then it is evident that a natural desire for anything cannot be proved unless the possibility of nature's attaining it is proved first, and consequently there will be a begging of the question [sc. the argument is that the soul is immortal because it desires immortal existence, but if one must first prove that its desire is realizable, namely that immortal existence is possible for it, then one is proving immortality by assuming immortality].

If the argument is that that is naturally desired which, when apprehended, is at once desired by an elicited act (for this tendency cannot come from elsewhere than from natural inclination), then one can say that the apprehension must be according to right reason and not according to erring reason; otherwise, if everyone desires with an elicited act as soon as there is an erroneous apprehension, it does not follow that what is desired is in agreement with the inclination of nature, but rather the opposite follows. But it is not manifest by the natural light that, when reason shows man that something is desirable always, reason is not erroneous; because one must first show that man is capable of what is desired.

Therefore every middle term taken from natural desire seems not to work, because one must show either that there is in nature a natural power for it, or that the desire which follows the apprehension, and which is an elicited act, is right and not in error. But the first of these is the same as the conclusion that is inferred from natural desire, and the second is more difficult, or at least less known, than the conclusion is.

So when it is proved that man has a natural desire for immortality and hence that he naturally flees death, the response is that this argument would prove equally as much about any of the brutes, if brutes were allowed into the case. Wherefore the Philosopher in *On Generation* 2 text 55 says, 'Being is always better for everything than not being. But this continuously inseparable existence in all things, because of its great distance from the first principle, is therefore completed by God in another way, by making generation continuous.' And he means to say that, because natural desire is for eternal existence, then since, in the things where it is found, this is impossible for the thing itself or for any individual, the desire is for what is possible, namely for the perpetuity of the species in diverse individuals. And thus one must concede that this desire is found in man as to succession of individuals in the same species, just as it is found in other generable and corruptible things.

As to the point that what flees one opposite only does so by love of the other opposite – we admit that the following argument holds: this thing flees death for this moment now; therefore it does so by love of life for this moment now, and so on for

any definite moment now. But if the further conclusion is drawn, that therefore it does so always or for an infinite time, we say that the inference is void. And as to the Apostle's statement that we do not wish to be unclothed [2 *Corinthians* 5.4], this is not to the purpose; for indeed as inspired or assured by faith we do not wish to be unclothed, and in fact we naturally do not wish it, so much so that that 'not wishing' accords with natural inclination; but we do not know by natural reason that this 'not wishing' is truly elicited by us in accord with natural inclination, as was said.

As to the fourth argument [several quotations from philosophers], I reply first that it is very doubtful what Aristotle thought of the soul's immortality. Since he speaks differently in different places and establishes different principles, necessarily are the inferences drawn from them contrary to each other. Wherefore it is probable that he was always in two minds about the question, now inclining more to one part now to another, according as the matter he was dealing with seemed to him more in agreement now with one part and now with another. Some of the cited authorities argue that he stood for the immortality of the soul, but others that he thought the opposite, as *Metaphysics* 7 text 60 where he expressly determines that the only parts that can persist when separated from the whole are the elements, that is, the material parts; and besides he posits that there must be some form in the whole by which the whole is what it is, or which cannot remain separated from the material parts when the whole stops persisting; therefore if he conceded that the intellectual soul is the form of man, then this soul could not persist separated from the material part after the whole stopped persisting. Again it is a principle with him that what begins to be ceases to be. Hence in *On the Heavens* 1 he seems to hold, against Plato, that it is impossible for anything to begin to be and to be eternally incorruptible. And in *Physics* 3, the chapter about the infinite, he says that what has a beginning has an end. From all this it follows that, according to Aristotle, the soul is corruptible and mortal.

However, the following response is more real: not everything said by the philosophers, even assertorically, was known to them and perspicuous and proved by necessary deduction; on the contrary, they frequently had only certain probable reasons or only the common opinion of preceding philosophers. Hence in *On the Heavens* 2 text 69 Aristotle says (when speaking of two difficult questions) that, 'One must try to say what seems worthy, holding that promptness is more to be attributed to shame than to daring – should anyone love to make a stand because of philosophy and love little sufficiencies about things where we have the greatest doubts.' So whenever the philosophers could not reach anything greater, they were contented with a little sufficiency and with probable proofs, so as not to contradict the principles of philosophy. And Aristotle says in the same chapter, 'The Egyptians and Babylonians say things about the other stars, from whom we have many credulities about each one of the stars.' The philosophers then sometimes acquiesced in probable proofs; sometimes, for the sake of asserting their principles, going beyond necessary reasons. This response is enough for all the cited authorities, even the express ones; for although Aristotle affirmed them, yet they were not known to him by natural and necessary reason but only by probable proofs.

Fifth, as for what Aristotle says about the citizen exposing himself to death for the good of the republic (*Ethics* 3.11, 9.9) – [the argument being that no one would face death if he did not think the soul was immortal, since not-existing neither can nor should be desired] – one can say that a citizen facing the danger of death with great courage is giving himself the greatest good, which good he would deprive himself of, nay he would live viciously, if, by omitting the act, he were to save his own existence, however much this existence was prolonged. For the greatest good, even a momentary one, is simply better than some slight good of virtue or than a vicious life lasting a long time. From this then it is clearly proved that the common good according to right reason is more to be loved than one's private good; for a man should simply expose all his private good to destruction, even if he does not know that the soul is immortal, so that the common good may be safely preserved; and that is more loved simply for whose sake the safety of something else is despised or neglected.

As to the sixth argument [that no species can be wholly deprived of its end, and the end of human happiness cannot be had in this life, therefore it must be had in another life], I concede the major, and even that it is known by the natural light that man can obtain happiness in that degree in which we know that happiness is the end of man. And indeed this cannot happen in the present life, but this impossibility is matter only of belief and is not known by natural reason. Hence hardships, misfortunes, calamities etc. are indeed repugnant to the felicity that is known to belong to the intelligences, but not repugnant to the felicity that is known to be capable of belonging to man.

As to the confirmation [about the perfection of the universe requiring the perpetuity of species, and since man is not perpetual in body he must be in soul], one may say that the human species is going to be perpetuated in the universe by the continual succession of individuals, which the Philosopher posited will arise from the continual generation of the same things and not otherwise.

To the last argument [about the need for a judgment after death so that justice is finally done] I reply that it is not clear from natural reason that there stands over human affairs one who judges according to the laws of retributive and punitive justice, but we hold this by revelation. And even if one were to concede it, yet not for this reason would the immortality of the soul be necessarily entailed; for one could say that a reward of goods is made to each one who acts according to virtue, and that the reward is made present in the very act of virtue, while similarly evil doers are punished by the same sins into which they fall, as Augustine says *Confessions* 1.12, 'Thou hast commanded, O Lord, and so it is, that every sinner is a punishment to himself.' Thus sin itself is punishment for the first sin. So there is no need according to natural reason to lay down other punishments to punish sins, though we do hold by faith that there is another providence in the age to come. Hence it is clear how the saints, when arguing a posteriori about the present matter, do not intend to give other than probable proofs. Hence Gregory in *Moralia* 4 at the end, when he has given several arguments for this, says, 'He who refuses to believe for these reasons, let him believe because of the faith.'

So from what has hitherto been said, it is clear that the immortality of the soul cannot be proved by necessary and compelling reasons. But it is believed

through the Gospel when Christ says in *Matthew* 20, 'Do not fear those who kill the body, but those who can kill the soul.' And lastly it is plain how much thanks must be given back to the mercy of the Creator, who has made us by faith most certain about the things that pertain to our faith and to the eternal persistence which the most clever and most learned were able to attain hardly at all – according to what was cited from Augustine, 'What scarcely a few, endowed with great intelligence, free at leisure for investigating the immortality of soul alone, were able to attain.' But if faith be present, which is in those to whom Jesus has given it to become sons of God, there is no question left, because he himself has made his believers most certain about the matter.

Article 7: Whether soul and angels belong to one and the same species.

Reply [*Ordinatio* 2 d.1 q.6⁴]: The conclusion of this question is certain, namely that angel and soul differ in species – because forms of the same idea have the same idea of perfecting and not perfecting; but the soul is naturally perfective of an organic body as form of it, but an angel is not naturally perfective of any matter; therefore etc.

But what is the first reason for this distinction in species? Some say that the first reason is unitability with matter and non-unitability with matter. But, on the contrary, form is the end of matter, from *Physics* 2.8.199a30-32, and so the distinction of matter is for the distinction of form and not conversely (hence the bodily members of a deer are different from the bodily members of a lion, because soul differs from soul); so the first distinction of this thing and of that will not be through matter and non-matter, but will be prior in itself to those acts. There is a confirmation; for because this nature is such and that nature is not, so this nature is not that nature; therefore this idea of perfecting and of not perfecting [matter] will not be the first reason for distinction.

Others say that a greater or lesser degree in power of understanding, in angel and in soul, is what first distinguishes one from the other. There is confirmation through a likeness, because the sensitive soul does not seem to be distinguished in the brutes save because of diverse degrees of perceiving, and yet there is there a specific difference; therefore it can be like this here with diverse modes of understanding, namely a more perfect mode and a more imperfect one.

But what is this distinct mode of understanding? – What is posited is that an angel understands non-discursively and a soul understands discursively (speaking of the natural intellect); and these modes are distinct in species and are intellectualities of different species. On the contrary: The soul is not discursive as to principles and is discursive as to conclusions; therefore if knowing in this way and knowing in that way are different species, and if that is why they require intellectualities of different species, then there will be two intellectualities of different species in the soul, one insofar as it understands principles and another

⁴ The material here is taken directly from my translation of the relevant question in the *Ordinatio* and not from Montefortino's own text, which contains connecting phrases here ignored.

insofar as it understands conclusions. Besides, the soul of the blessed is not discursive about the beatific object, but it is discursive about an object known naturally; therefore there will be one intellectuality in species insofar as the soul understands God beatifically and another insofar as it understands something naturally. Again, third, as follows: if the intellectuality of angel and soul differ in species, then things that essentially depend on the one and on the other differ in species; but essentially dependent on these is the beatific vision of an angel and of a soul (for although an angel is not the total cause of his vision nor the soul of its, yet each vision essentially depends on the intellectuality of the nature it belongs to); therefore this beatific vision and that differ in species – but this is false, because all diverse species have a determinate order according to more perfect and more imperfect, such that any individual of the more perfect species exceeds any individual of the more imperfect species; and then it follows that any blessedness of any angel would exceed any blessedness of any soul, or conversely, both of which are false.

Again, fourth: what is meant by the statement ‘an angel does not understand discursively’? Either that an angel does not have a power by which he can know the conclusions when he knows the principles (supposing the conclusions were not known to him in act or habit before); and then this does not seem to be a mark of perfection in an intellect; rather it seems to be a mark of imperfection in a created intellect, because it is a perfection in our intellect – supplying an imperfection – that it can from known things that virtually include other things acquire knowledge of those other things. Or what is meant is that an angel can for this reason not know discursively, because all conclusions are actually known to him from the beginning (and so he cannot know them through the principles); but this is false, because he does not actually and distinctly know and understand everything from the beginning. Or for this reason, that everything is known to him habitually from the beginning (and therefore he cannot acquire an habitual knowledge of them from principles); and this does not posit an essential difference of intellectuality in soul and angel, because it might be thus in the case of my soul, that if all conclusions were known to it from the beginning (God impressing on it knowledge of the conclusions at the same time as knowledge of the principles), it could not know them discursively – not because of an inability of nature but because it would have knowledge of the conclusions beforehand and cannot acquire *de novo* what it would already have (in this way the soul of Christ was not discursive but knew habitually all the principles, and the conclusions in the principles, and yet his soul was not angelic in nature).

I say then to the question that whatever is able to act is some being possessed of first act; and by nature the idea there of first act in itself is prior to first act in comparison with second act, of which first act is the principle, such that, although that by which such a being is the principle of second act is not other than its own nature, yet its primary entity is not its nature as its nature is principle of such second act, but it is its nature as its nature is in itself a ‘this’; and so the first distinction of being is not through its nature as its nature is principle of such operation but through its nature as it is ‘this nature’, although it is by identity the principle of second act. So I say in the issue at hand that, although the angelic nature

is the principle of understanding and willing, and the soul likewise (such that these powers do not state anything added to the essence of the soul), yet what is first – in this case and that – is this nature and that nature, in relation to itself. And so the first distinction is that on which there follows the distinction of principles of operating, whether operating the same act or different ones; for it is because it is this nature that is the principle of such operation, and not contrariwise.

There is an example of this: the sun has the virtue of generating many mixed bodies inferior to it. And if you ask for the first reason for the distinction of sun from plant, the first reason for the distinction of one from the other is not through the power of generating a plant on the part of the sun, because, if that power were communicated to another, yet not for this reason would that other be the sun, nor would it be distinguished from a plant as the sun is distinguished. The first distinguishing reason then is that the form of the sun is such and such a form and the form of a plant is such and such a form, and on this follows the fact that this form can be the principle of such operations and the other cannot be. So I say in the issue at hand, that because an angel is such a nature in itself and because the soul is such a nature in itself, therefore are they first distinct in species; not indeed as two species but as species and part of a species, because the soul is not properly a species but a part of a species; and yet soul is the first reason for distinguishing its species – the species of which it is a part – from an angel, and so the first reason for specific distinction on the part of its species is itself.

One can also add (although it is not absolutely necessary for the solution of the question) that the intellectuality of an angel, qua intellectuality, does not differ in species from the intellectuality of the soul qua intellectuality^a – this is because, although this first act and that first act differ in species as these acts are considered absolutely in themselves, yet not as they are considered according to the perfection that they virtually contain, namely the perfection according to which they are principles of second acts; the point is seen from this, that these acts are about objects of the same idea and in relation to objects of the same idea (and a likeness of this is that, if the soul of ox and eagle differ in species, yet not for this reason do the powers of seeing of the one and of the other, insofar as they are this sort of perfection and that sort of perfection, differ in species). Now this is very possible, because some containing things differ in species and yet what they contain does not differ in species, as the properties of being are contained by identity in beings ever so distinct and yet these properties in them are not distinct in species; for the oneness of a stone (which is not really other than the stone) and the oneness of a man (which is really the same as the man) are not as formally distinct in species as man and stone are; rather, this oneness and that oneness seem to differ only in number.

This is also made clear through something else, that just as things, whose formal distinction is as it were one of species, can be by identity contained in the same thing (as in the same soul are included the intellective and sensitive perfections such that they are as formally distinct as if they were two things), so conversely something 'formally non-distinct' can be contained in distinct things. And if this is true, then it is plain that angel and soul are not in this way distinguished first in species, namely by such and such an intellectuality – rather, they are

distinguished in species neither first nor not-first because such and such an intellectuality exists in them. Or, if this not be true, but is left now as doubtful, then at least the first statement [sc. that angel and soul differ specifically on the part of their absolute natures] seems sufficiently clear, because their first distinction is not through distinct intellectualities.

QUESTION SEVENTY SIX: ON THE UNION OF SOUL AND BODY. IN EIGHT ARTICLES.

Article 1: Whether the Intellective Principle is united to the Body as the Form of it

Reply [*Oxon.* 4 d.43 q.2]: One must say that the rational soul, qua intellective, is most truly the form perfecting per se the human body. This truth is by some made clear as follows: 'To understand' is the proper operation of man; therefore it comes from his proper form; but it comes from the soul insofar as the soul is intellective; therefore the soul, as the principle of understanding, must be the proper form of man. But this reasoning is of rather little force in the teaching of those who use it, since they think that the intellect is disposed passively with respect to intellection; therefore the proposition 'proper operation comes from proper form' does not prove that the intellective soul is the proper form of man. For, given that the intellect does not have an active influence on the operation of thinking but the operation comes rather from the intelligible object or the phantasm, the argument is evidently defective and does not prove that the principle of the intellect is the formal perfection of man.

Therefore I form the argument differently in the following way: Man understands formally and properly; therefore the intellective soul is his proper form. The antecedent, that understanding is the proper operation of man, is manifest from the authority of the Philosopher *On the Soul* 3 text 2, 5, *Ethics* 2.9. But operating, as it is contradistinguished from making, exists within the one operating. Hence in *Ethics* 10.10 the Philosopher says that man's happiness is found in the understanding of abstract substances. And I make the antecedent no less clear by reason against anyone stubborn who denies it: by the term 'intellection' I mean to express an act of knowing that transcends the whole genus of sensitive knowing. For man knows by an act of knowing that is not the act of a bodily organ; therefore he understands properly, that is, the knowledge that transcends the whole genus of sensation comes from him, while all sensation is organic knowledge, from *On the Soul* 2 text 51. Proof of the antecedent here: Every organ is determined to a definite class of sensibles, from *On the Soul* 2, and this because it is located in a property that is a mean between the extremes of the class; but we have experience of a knowledge in us that does not belong to us in accord with any such organ, for then it would be determined precisely to the sensibles of a determinate class, the contrary of which we nevertheless experience. For we know that we understand and that by the act of understanding we grasp the difference between any class of sensibles and any other class that does not regard the former class; therefore we know the extremes of each class, as was proved at large in q.75 aa.1 and 2. Therefore, that from which such proper operation of man comes is of necessity man's per se form; but this operation

is an intellective operation, and by it and through it a man understands; therefore the soul, qua principle of intellection, is united to the body as the form of the body.

The point is also proved next from the fact that there is in us some immaterial knowing; but this knowing cannot come from the sensitive power, for the sensitive power is organic and material; therefore it must come from an immaterial and inorganic power; therefore this power will be as form in us, otherwise we would not be said formally to understand by it. But as to how an immaterial knowing can exist in man, although he is the while bodily and material, is made clear as follows: For the nobler the form the more it dominates the bodily matter; and the less conjoined it is with matter the more it exceeds matter by its own power; but our soul is the ultimate in nobility among immaterial [?material] forms; hence it so exceeds bodily matter by its power that it is capable of an operation that it in no way shares with bodily matter. This power and force is called intellect.

On the contrary [*Quodlibet* q.9 aa.8-9]: man is man by or through his soul only to the extent that the human soul informs matter; therefore man does not operate by his soul with an operation proper to man save as the soul informs matter. Therefore either man does not understand by his soul as by his form and by the principle of the operation or he at least understands through the soul as the soul informs matter. Again the soul informs matter as to the supreme degree of the soul's essential perfection; but 'to understand' cannot belong to the soul as to a degree more perfect than the supreme degree; therefore 'to understand' does not belong to the soul as the soul exceeds matter (meaning by 'exceeding' matter 'not informing' matter). The first proposition is plain, because otherwise man would not be supreme among bodily things and next in order to the angels in species, for he would not actually exist formally by that which is supreme in the intellective soul, namely the form that is the next to the angels.

For this reason, then, the intellective soul's supremacy over matter must not be so understood that the soul is not, in its rank of perfection (which is the principle of understanding), the form of the human body, because this way of understanding is false and impossible; for if the soul is per se the form of the human body, it will necessarily be the form of it according to all its powers. But the soul must be understood by reference to something extra, to something by which the soul is related to the intelligible whole and not just to the sensible matter of which it is the form (as was said in q.75 aa.1-2, where we made clear the soul's immateriality in its ordering to the object it can attain to). Therefore the intellective soul, in its substance and as to all its powers, is per se the form of the body; but, because it is the sort of form that is not determined to one class of intelligibles but rather is able per se to understand all of them, therefore the proper operations of this form are inorganic and incorporeal.

Second statement: the rational soul, qua intellective, is more truly and more perfectly united as form to the human body than any other form is united to its own matter; and therefore man, among all the works of nature, is more a unity than anything else among composite natures. Explanation: Form is in proportional correspondence to matter, *Physics* 2 text 26 and *On the Soul* 1 text 53; but the less perfect the form the fewer the dispositions it needs, as is evident from the degrees

of forms; therefore that form is supremely perfect in the genus of forms to which a matter with all modes of disposition is owed; but in the human body there is found every disposition of humors and every nobility of organs, as least by reason of its sensitive consubstantiality, as Avicenna says *Natural Philosophy* 6 p.4 ch.5 (as was also noted above), 'Since the human body is the most tempered body, so that contraries are equal in it and operate in it equally, it will cooperate with the perfection of rational life.' Therefore the intellective form is the most perfect in the genus of forms and able thereby to be most intimately united with its matter; in this way then will it actually be united with it and perfect it. But, as has been shown, being and one are consequent to each other; as a result, therefore, the soul makes a truer unity, a truer being, a more united composite, with the human body than does any other matter with its form. Confirmation: there is a greater unity in the term than in what is for the term, and in the end than in what is ordered to the end; man is the term and fruit of the whole of nature, in whom or in its fruit every possibility of nature is made clear and open to view.

Second, every form terminates and unites and gives being to its matter as it is present to it in substance; therefore the form that of its nature disposes of a greater aptitude for more truly and more perfectly being present to its matter is more truly and more perfectly united to it; but the whole thinkable idea of a form's presence to its matter is completed only in the rational form as in its term and in the most perfect of forms; therefore this form is united to the body with the same degree of perfection. Again, we see that two bodies can hardly be fused naturally with each other and so cannot have an intimate unity; and we see also that the more things recede from corporeality the more capable they are of being united (because they can penetrate each other more, as is plain in the case of light with respect to opaque bodies and transparency). Since therefore all forms besides the intellective form are, whether educed from matter or in their natural order, closer to materiality, then certainly no other form has the degree of spirituality and penetrability, and thereby of union, that the intellective soul has. And since man is man by the intellective soul, he is for that reason more a unity than any other natural composite. Further, form terminates the flux and potentiality of matter; therefore that form makes a truer unity with matter that more perfectly terminates this flux; but the intellective form, qua intellective, terminates in fact and in idea the whole flux of matter, since the intellective form is at the limit of things supreme, joining itself to the most supreme of lower things. Further, it belongs to the idea of form to draw its matter, and so the composite, to its own laws and actualities according to the greater and lesser actuality of the form; but the intellective form abstracts and draws matter to itself more than any form other than it can do. For although its matter is corruptible, yet by its acts of merit it ordains its matter to a firmer perpetuity in heaven, and unites it to a supernatural form (because the subject of perfect beatitude is the whole man, according to Augustine, who says that the separated soul with all its intention cannot reach the highest heaven perfectly without the body). Finally, one and being, according to Boethius *On Unity and One*, are convertible with and proportioned to each other; but all the idea of being that can be thought to belong to any natural composite is given by the intellective soul to its matter or composite. For although there are diverse forms in man giving him diverse existence, yet the intellective soul

does not just give intellectual being but perfects in addition the acts of the other forms; hence, when it departs, the matter begins to be corrupted as to the acts of the other forms; therefore this form, which gives to matter the sort of consummated and perfect being that can be communicated to it, is more perfect than any other form, and thus, by uniting itself to matter with a more united and tighter bond, it makes a unity more perfect than any other unity. For just as the whole consideration of form ends at intellectual form, so the whole idea of unity that can exist in any purely natural composite is fulfilled in man as in nature's ultimate limit. So there is in man a greater essential unity than in any brute or natural composite; and in him the whole idea of unity in its limit is found and fulfilled.

Article 2: Whether the Intellectual Principle is multiplied in number as the Bodies are multiplied in number

Reply [*Oxon.* 4 d.43 q.2]: Averroes, *On the Soul* 3 comm. 4-5, held that there was one intellectual principle for all men. But this worst of errors destroys all knowledge, because it removes from men all acts of understanding as these are distinct from acts of sensing; for how are these acts attributed to a man when they are from a form that is altogether separate from human nature? For neither Averroes himself nor any of his followers has been able to explain how the action of a separate substance join-able to us by means of phantasms can preserve the fact that man understands. Again, this opinion also destroys all acts of choice as these are distinct from acts of the sensitive appetite; and so it removes all the virtues, for these are only generated by making choices in accord with right reason. So someone who holds to such an error will have to be removed from the society of men and the natural reason of the living.

This error is however to be attributed to Averroes alone. For Aristotle, whether he taught the immortality of the soul or was in doubt on the question, posited that the soul was the form or act of an organic body, *On the Soul* 2 text 6, and consequently that it was multiplied in number with the multiplication of matter. For, as he says in *Metaphysics* 5 in the chapter on causes, and in *Physics* 2 text 38, causes and effects are proportionate to each other – genus to genus, number to number. Indeed [*Oxon.* 3 d.22] all philosophers commonly put 'rational' in the definition of man as the difference of it, meaning by rational the intellectual soul; nor, in short, is any noteworthy philosopher found who denies this, save, as was said, for the accursed Averroes.

[*Questions on the Soul* 15 aa.3-4] Some hold that although the intellectual soul, like an angel, does not have a matter from which it comes to be, yet it is, unlike an angel, the form of some matter, and so there are many souls in one species according to the division of matter, but there cannot be many angels in one species. On the contrary: every relative form presupposes something absolute prior to it in which it is founded; but inclination toward bodies is a relative form founded in the essence of the soul which is so inclined; therefore the essence of the soul is prior to the inclination; but a prior is not distinguished by a posterior, just as it is not constituted by a posterior either. Second, the inclination in question is not of the

essence of the soul because the soul is a form absolute in itself; therefore the soul can be understood in its essential idea without such inclination; consequently one soul is essentially distinct from another before any inclination to diverse bodies. So we say it is false that the principle of numerical multiplication arises from the matter that is the second part of a composite whole; rather it comes formally from a principle of individuation which is a certain reality identical with the essence, and the Philosopher calls it matter because it is outside the essential concept of the species, which is form.

Article 3: Whether besides the Intellective Soul there are in Man other Souls that differ in Essence

Reply [Oxon. 2 d.3 q.10; *De Rerum Principio* q.10 a.4⁵] Aristotle *On the Soul* 2 text 20 says, 'As a triangle is in a tetragon and a tetragon in a pentagon, so the vegetative is in the sensitive and the sensitive in the intellective.' But a tetragon does not contain a triangle nor does a pentagon contain a tetragon as if they were two figures forming a single figure, for if a pentagon was a tetragon by one figure and a pentagon by another the first form would be superfluous because it is contained in the pentagon. Therefore neither does the human soul that vivifies the body need a vegetative and sensitive soul as distinct forms, since it can by itself give the organic body all that the others would give it.

And this authority from Aristotle is founded in fact on natural reason. For whenever something can be as equally well done by fewer things as by more then the more is not to be admitted. The rational soul can do by itself alone whatever a distinct vegetative and sensitive soul would do if they were present; therefore one must suppose these to be otiose. The minor is made clear as follows: action follows degree of actuality and perfection; but in agents of the same genus, where one is contained under the other in substantial order, that which the lower can do the higher can do, and not by a double form but by the one form by which it is superior to the other. For whatever something can do in a first or second degree can do, it can do in a third degree, where the causality is simpler. And the same reasoning holds of first act, as is evident. Since, therefore, living thing is a single genus that embraces a threefold degree of life, all the acts of vegetative and sensitive life can be done in intellective life, because this last contains the other degrees virtually and not substantially or formally.

The solution can be made clear by another and more evident reason, namely one taken from the order of forms and the tying together of the parts of the universe, whereby the universe is single, according to Dionysius *Divine Names* ch.7. For the highest of the lower are joined to the lowest of the higher; and, to those who carefully consider this order of the universe, it is evident that the tying together in more imperfect things occurs in more things and by a nature more universally taken. For the mixed and tempered body is tied to the vegetative in all plants and trees; but the vegetative is tied to the sensitive in fewer things, namely in one genus

⁵ See footnote 1 above.

alone, which is the genus of animals; therefore the sensitive, which is the intrinsic goal of nature, is tied to the intellective, not in the whole genus, but in one species alone, which is the human species. Therefore the highest of the lower things are not tied to the lowest of the higher things in their whole extent; for the mixed is in more things than is the tempered, and the tempered in more than the vegetative, and the vegetative in more than the sensitive. So the perfection of the universe has a broad base and tapers to an apex, and finally terminates at the point of the union of the Word of God with human nature.

From all this we deduce that if the sensitive were in man from his generator as with brutes, where the sensitive is not tied to the intellective by a different sensitive soul (because the sensitive souls in other species do not form a pyramid so as to be close to the intellective, but they are all subject to corruption and educed from the potency of matter) – if it were thus in man, then the human sensitive part would not tie the inferior nature to the intellective; nor would it make a pyramid or a point if it were corruptible, as it would indeed be if it were said to be educed from matter. So we say that, however much the sensitive soul of man is educed by the generator, yet it is nobler than any other sensitive soul and hence makes, in ascending, a pyramid so that it can be united with the intellective soul. This nobility of the sensitive soul is, we say, not found in the acts (for some animals have sharper sight than man, as eagles, and so on). The reason for the supremacy whereby the human sensitive soul is tied to the intellective must be that it is a mean between the intellective on one side and the sensitive of the other animals on the other. This mean is a mean in being and in mode of passive production. So since the sensitive souls of other animals come about through the action of the generator and are corruptible and bound to bodily organs in substance and in power, while the intellective soul is from without (being united to matter in substance but not in nature of power), so the sensitive soul in man, in order to hold the mean and be a tie between the highest of the lower and the lowest of the higher, will necessarily come to be by creation from without, whereby it will exceed other sensitive souls (though it is also tied to matter by reason of its subject and of its power, wherein it is inferior to the intellective). So man's sensitive soul will be the mean and the tie, whereon rests the unity of the universe, only if it comes from an extrinsic agent.

Article 4: Whether there is in Man another Form besides the Intellective Soul

Reply [*Oxon.* 4 d.11 q.3, *Report. ibid.*] We say that, besides the intellective soul, one is altogether obliged to posit another substantial form, not only in man, but also in other living things, whereby the body is constituted as organic; and it can be called the form of corporeity or the form of mixture. Explanation: Contradiction is the immediate reason for distinguishing several things under the heading of being, and a contradiction is shown by the senses to hold as to the being of body and intellective soul. For, after the soul departs, the body remains as much as it was before when it was animated; therefore the body is not what it is by means of the intellective soul, otherwise, when the soul is gone, the body would not persist as it did before. Therefore, in the case universally of any animated thing, one must posit

that the form by which it is a body is different from the form by which it is animate. But note that we are not speaking about the form that is body, that is, an individual instance of the genus body. For any individual is by its form this sort of 'body', as body is a genus, and possesses corporeity; but we are speaking about body as it is the other part of a composite. For a thing is not an individual by body in this sense, nor is it a species in the genus of body or the genus of substance (which is the genus above it), save by reduction. So, for body in this sense, which is the other part of a composite, there is, while it remains in its own being without the soul, a proper form whereby it is such a body even without the soul; and therefore the form of the body is necessarily other than the soul, even though as a part it is not an individual in the genus of body, save by reduction; just as neither is the separated soul per se in the genus under substance, save only by reduction.

Add that those who posit a unity of form in man cannot explain how man is said to generate man; for his generating does not generate the rational soul, as the brutes generate the sensitive soul; nor does it generate prime matter, which is ingenerable; therefore unless a man generates the form of the mixed or tempered body, which truly belongs to man's totality, by drawing it out from the potency of matter, a man would not be generated by another man either simply or in a certain respect.

The same must hold of other animate things. For, as a general rule, the same effect cannot be produced by any agent whatever differing in any way whatever. But by whatever and in whatever way a living body is corrupted, provided it is not at once dissolved into its elements, the same corpse of the same nature is always produced. The thing is plain to the senses. But the same thing cannot be the proper term of this and that agent; therefore the action that destroys an animated thing does not produce something new but leaves something behind. And this is plain to undoubted experience: for if an ox or any other animal is killed by a knife or by drowning or in other ways, always the same corpse of the same nature is left behind, as is plain to sense. But different corrupting agents are not naturally able to introduce the same form, and to do so at once without any preceding alteration. Indeed, even if the same sort of form is to be introduced and by the same agent, there still seems need first for a uniform alteration to precede it. But the same end always follows on this form however different the alteration that precedes and however different the agents.

I agree that of one thing there is one existence, but that the one existence requires only one form must be denied if we take 'existence' in the same way in both cases. For just as a 'one thing' is divided into simple thing and composite thing, so are 'existence' and 'one existence' so divided. Therefore 'per se existence' does not precisely determine for itself simple existence, just as neither does anything with divisions precisely determine for itself precisely one of the divisions. So the whole composite has one existence and yet it includes many partial existences, just as a whole is one thing that includes nevertheless many partial entities. For I know of no fiction whereby the existence supervening on an essence is non-composite when the essence is composite. For this reason therefore the existence of the whole composite includes the existence of all the parts and the many partial existences of the many parts or forms, just as a whole of many forms includes the partial actualities.

But if there is any force at all in a word, we concede that the formal existence of the whole composite principally proceeds from one form, that that form is the form by which the whole composite is this thing, and that it is the last form that comes to all the preceding ones. In this way, then, the composite whole is divided into two essential parts, namely into its proper act, which is the ultimate form by which the whole is what it is, and the proper power of this act, which includes prime matter and all the preceding forms. So we concede that the total completive existence is given by one form, and that this form also gives to the whole the fact that it exists; but one must not conclude from this that there is only one form included in the whole, or that therefore several forms are not found in it – not as if the composite is constituted in its species from all those forms, but rather that they are included in the potentiality of the composite.

As to the giving of existence simply to something, one must distinguish what is meant by 'non-being simply'. For the 'simply' is either taken universally, and then non-being is simply a pure nothing, and to this non-being any being of the least entity is opposed. In another way 'being simply' is taken as distinguished from 'being in a certain respect', and in this sense substance is being simply and accident is being in a certain respect. So to the matter in hand: substantial form gives existence simply but not existence first, namely existence that immediately follows non existence simply; rather it gives existence simply as distinct from existence in a certain respect. For if an accident were to come first to matter then, although it would give to matter first formal existence, yet it would not give matter existence simply but existence in a certain respect, for an accident is only act in a certain respect; also no material substantial form gives existence simply to matter, but matter receives this from the creator. However, in the other sense, existence simply is given to matter by the substantial form, just as existence in a certain respect is given by accidental form. For in the way that being is divided into prior and posterior, and prior contains substance under it and posterior contains accident under it, in this way 'simply' is taken in the sense equivalent to 'what is naturally prior', and 'in a certain respect' is equivalent to 'what is naturally posterior'; and in this way every accident gives existence in a certain respect. Therefore the substantial form, whether it comes to something already having existence or not, gives existence simply, just as an accidental form gives existence, not simply, but in a certain respect.

Incidental Article: Whether in the Body of an Animal, or in any Mixed Body, the Elements actually remain in Substance

Reply [Oxon. 2 d.15, Report. *ibid.*]: One must say, first, that the elements do not remain in a mixed body nor are found in it in their substance, whether remiss (as Averroes thought) or non-remiss (as Avicenna opined). Proof: no plurality is to be admitted beyond necessity; but by no necessity are we compelled to admit that a plurality of elements or forms remain in a mixed body; therefore this is not to be admitted. Proof of the minor: for we would be compelled to concede that the forms are in the mixed body either by an operation or at least a change that most implies

form. Not the first because no operation of a mixed body is of the same species as any operation of the elements; therefore there is no operation in a mixed body from which we could infer that the elements are present in their own substance. Nor the second, for the form of an element and the form of a mixed body have sufficient reality for one of them to be the term of one generation and the other to be the term of another, or for one to be the term 'from which' of corruption and the other to be the term 'to which' of generation; therefore just as nothing can be simultaneously under the form of air and of fire, so nothing can be under these forms and under the form of a mixed body. Nor even does the quality of a mixed body, as the coldness of flesh, prove anything, because this is certainly not the coldness of water or earth.

Further, an elementary form is of a nature to constitute, along with matter, a *per se* subsisting supposit in the category of substance; therefore if a plurality of elementary forms is admitted in a mixed body, each of them would constitute a supposit; therefore in every mixed body there would be found many supposits for the many substantial forms, each of which is of a nature to subsist *per se*, which is unacceptable. But there is also another unacceptable result, that something subsistent has two specific forms one of which is not of a nature to be perfected by the other; and this result cannot be escaped if the elements are posited as existing in the mixed body in their own forms. Again, every bodily substance has consequent to it some quantity, which is the proper accident of bodily substance; but the form of an element, however remiss the form, constitutes, along with matter, a composite substance; therefore a proper quantity as its proper accident is consequent to it; but many subjects cannot have the same proper accident; so in one subject there will be many quantities, one the quantity of the mixed body and another the quantity of an element; so either two bodies will be together in the same place, or no part of the mixed body will in fact be mixed, and thus mixing would only be a certain juxtaposition, unless one admits the inter-penetration of bodies.

Lastly a mixed body is generated from an element or elements and is corrupted back into them; so there is the same impossibility between the form of a mixed body and an element as between the term of generation 'from which' and the term of generation 'to which'; so the form of a mixed body and the form of an element do not allow themselves to be in the same receiving subject at the same time. Therefore, just as it is impossible that, when water comes to be from fire, the matter should be perfected with the form of water and the form of fire at the same time, so it is impossible that the forms of the elements should remain in their proper substance in a mixed body.

One must say, second, that the elements are said to remain in the mixed body on account of natural agreement with it (as Aristotle seems to maintain, *On Generation* 1 text 84). Explanation: in every genus one can find a middle of the same nature as the extremes, from *Metaphysics* 10 text 23. The mean is said to be composed of the extremes as red is said to be composed of white and black. Now this composition is only a natural agreement of the mean with the extremes, and it is not an agreement of extreme with extreme, even though the mean quality is as simple as the extreme quality; that is, the mean does not include the parts of the extremes that it is said to consist of or be composed of, or that it is said to participate. Therefore, as the extreme qualities are said to remain or to have

existence in the mean (and it is not allowed that extreme exists in extreme), so we say the same about the form of a mixed body, namely that the substantial forms of the elements are admitted to exist in the mixed body according to the natural agreement that there is between the form of the mixed body and the elements, and this agreement is not of element with element.

For even Aristotle, *On Generation* 1 text 84, says that the form of a generated or mixed thing is more actual and more perfect than the form of an element, so much so that an elementary form is inferior and more potential; and elements are said to remain virtually in a mixed body as imperfect and inferior things remain in superior ones, which only remain in them virtually. Hence after the Philosopher said that the elements remain in the mixed body, he adds 'because their virtue is preserved.' From this one must conclude that elements are not found in a mixture in their substance; nor again in the qualities proper to them, just as neither are the extreme qualities formally in the mean; the elements then remain in the mixture as if one were to say that the sensitive and vegetative soul remain in the intellective.

One must say, third, that a mixed body is not generated by the action of elements mutually destroying each other, but by virtue of the universal agent. Explanation: for God made many mixed bodies from the one element of water, and indeed he produced living things from it when he said, *Genesis* 1.20, 'Let the waters produce the moving thing that hath life.' Also, when mixed things are generated by the coming together of many elements, then either the elements are all corrupted in the instant in which the mixed thing is generated or they remain. If the first, then, since in the instant in which the substantial form of the mixed body is introduced there is true action and production and generation, the mixture would be generated from non-being. If the elements remain then they do not destroy each other in the coming to be of the mixture; and it is not understood that the mixed body comes to be from the concourse of several elements but from that alone by whose corruption the mixed thing is generated; so the elements must act by virtue of the universal agent. Further, an equivocal cause is nobler than what it causes; but the elements are, in the instant in which they are corrupted and in any other instant, more imperfect than the mixed body; therefore they do not cause nor generate the mixed body by their own action but by the virtue and causality of the higher agent. And for this reason we said that the four elements remain virtually in a single mixed body, insofar as its substantial form contains in virtue the forms of the elements – not in substance as its parts but because of agreement with the elements and because of virtual containment, as the Philosopher too seems to have thought.

Article 5: Whether the Intellective Soul is fittingly united to this sort of Body

Reply [all from *De Rerum Principio* qq.9-13, and nothing from Scotus proper]: Man was willed by God so as to be the end of all sensible things, which fact also did not escape Aristotle, *Physics* 2 text 24, 'We are in a way the end of all things,' so that man might use sensible things for his own advantage and should thence rise to praise of the creator and admire his wisdom and goodness and love him more eagerly; therefore it was necessary for man to know sensible things in many ways, whereby

to see how he might turn useful things to his own use and avoid anything harmful.
[Hence he needs all the senses and organs of sense etc.]

Article 6: Whether the Intellective Soul is united to the Body by means of accidental Dispositions

Reply [*Oxon.* 4 d.1 q.1]: One must say that the soul is united to the human body as its form and so not by means of accidental dispositions. Explanation: for no substantial form is united to matter by an accident intermediate or preceding in the matter; therefore much less is the intellective soul so united, which is not educed from the power of matter but is created ex nihilo. For although the active quality of the generator precedes the substance of the generated, yet this quality is not in the genus of efficient cause causing the substance of the generated thing, but it only disposes the matter so that the matter is apt to receive the form. For just as substance in its whole category precedes quality in its category, namely in definition, knowledge, and time (that is, as far as it is concerned, in separability), so any substance of the same species precedes any quality whatever. Therefore, however much the qualities come together that dispose the body and make the matter suitable, before it is informed, for receiving the soul, yet they have no order or any influence obtaining on the part of matter in respect of the man who is generated by the informing soul.

[*Oxon.* 4 d.12 q.6] The same thing is made clear as to quantity. For no form that is determined to one receptive subject can in any way perfect another subject, just as whiteness cannot perfect an angel or wisdom a stone; but substantial form is determined to substantial matter as to its proper receptive subject; therefore in no way can it perfect dimension in the category of quantity, which indeed is not substantial matter. Again, a form in a prior category cannot perfect something receptive of a posterior category; therefore neither can substantial form perfect dimension. Proof of the antecedent: act presupposes potency in order of origin; but the act of a prior genus presupposes neither in origin nor in perfection anything of a posterior genus. Further, substantial form is the sort of act that naturally constitutes something per se one with its per se perfectible matter; but it cannot constitute anything per se one with anything in the genus of quantity; therefore nothing of this sort in the body precedes the soul so that the soul can, by its means, be per se united to the body.

Article 7: Whether the Soul is united to the Body of the Animal by means of a Body

Reply [*Oxon.* 2 d.16]: One must say that the soul is not united to the body by means of a body. If an organic body were informed by the soul through the medium of another body, then the soul would not be the perfection of it per se but per accidens. Proof of the consequence: a perfection is not proper to a thing if it is only received in that thing by being first received in something else really different from it. An example: color is not the proper perfection of a corporeal substance because color is

only received in corporeal substance through the medium of a surface really distinct from the substance; therefore the substance is colored per accidens; therefore, in the same way, an organic body would not per se be perfected by the soul if it received the soul by means of some other body. Further, every form perfects and terminates and unites its matter and gives being to it; therefore the form that, of its nature, has a greater aptitude and is more truly and perfectly present to its matter, is more truly and perfectly united to it without need of intervening means; but the whole conceivable reality of how a form is present to matter, is found in, and is most perfectly had by, the intellective form; therefore this form is in no need of a bodily medium in order to perfect the body.

[*Oxon.* 2 d.12] The more that things are formally distinct and diverse, the more are they disposed to form something per se one; for, in the constituting of something per se one, there is no need for likeness in nature but rather for fitting proportion, the sort of proportion indeed that is found between a perfectly organized body and the intellective soul.

Article 8: Whether the whole of the Soul is present in every Part of the Body

Reply [from *De Rerum Principio* q.12 a.3⁶]: One must say that indeed the intellective soul is whole in the whole body and whole equally in each of its parts... The soul is the form of a physical organic body. Such body states a certain integral whole of all organic parts. Therefore, since perfection is in that whose perfection it is understood to be, the soul must be in the whole body and in every part of it; for every part of the body has regard to the integrity of the whole. So if the soul is in any way in every part of the body, either the whole of it is there, or at least a part of it. If the first, the conclusion is gained. If the second, then the soul will be a divisible quantity that is extended with the extension of the body which it informs; but this impossible; therefore it is whole in every part of the body whose substantial perfection it is. This solution can be illustrated as follows: Whiteness is the form of a white thing; but of every part of a white thing it is true that it is white; so therefore whiteness is in every part of a white thing [and likewise in the case of fire, that a whole fire has the form of fire and that every part of the fire also has it]. But what has just been said of whiteness is found in fact in the intellective soul, which is naturally indivisible and unextended; therefore necessarily, just as the soul is whole in the whole body that it informs, so it is whole in every part of it.

[*Ord.* 1 d.28 q.3] What is first and per se perfected, that is, adequately perfected, by the intellective soul is the whole organic body; but because there is an order of origin in the parts of this whole body, either in themselves or in being ensouled – for the heart is first and then the other parts –, therefore the soul does not with equal immediacy or first perfect the whole, but it immediately perfects first the heart and then, by means of it, the other parts. For since the soul administers the body through animal spirits, and since these spirits come from the force of the heart, therefore this part of the body is more disposed to receiving the form of life (and

⁶ See footnote 1 above.

hence the soul has reference to it first in origin), even though the whole organic body is what is first perfected by the soul. Insofar, then, as the soul is the form of the body, it regards all the parts exactly as it regards the whole itself that is composed of them; but as the soul is the mover of the body through the operations of the organs and bestows life, then necessarily it follows the order in question [sc. heart first and then etc.].

QUESTION SEVENTY SEVEN: ON WHAT PERTAINS TO THE POWERS OF THE SOUL.
IN EIGHT ARTICLES.

Article 1: Whether the Essence of the Soul is the Power of the Soul

Reply [Ord. 2 d.16, *De Rerum Principio*, q.11⁷]: One must say that the powers of the soul are really different neither from the soul nor from each other. Explanation: that must be posited in nature which, if it is possible, is better, *On Generation* text 5, for nature always desires what is better; but fewness without manyness, if possible, is better in nature; therefore if diverse acts can come from the simple essence of the soul without any real distinction of powers, then thus must one must think things to be; but this fewness is possible. And it is evident that this fewness is a mark of nobility, otherwise it would not have to be attributed to the noblest of beings, whose property it is to do diverse things by a single most simple essence without any real distinction.

The powers then are not distinct from the soul, nor distinct from each other, as accidents are different from their subject and from each other... nor as parts of the soul nor as respects of it nor in idea... But they must not be thought to be distinct in no way at all; for they are, by the nature of the thing, distinct from each other and from the soul. They are one really but remain distinct formally, in that, from the nature of the thing, one of them is not formally another. Moreover one thing can be contained unitively in another in two ways. For sometimes the contained things belong to the essence of the containing thing as things higher than the containing thing, such as the genus being, color, whiteness, sensible, quality, which are higher than this particular whiteness and all enter for this reason into the essence of this whiteness. But other things are contained unitively in something else as posterior to it, such as the properties of the containing thing, and yet these properties are not other than the containing thing. It is in this way that being contains many properties which are not other than being itself and yet are, from the nature of the thing, distinct quidditatively from each other and from being; for the quiddity of one of them is not the formal and quidditative idea of another. In like manner are intellect and will unitively contained in the soul, not as essential parts or as genera by which the soul is constituted in being (as we said about this particular whiteness), but as properties through which the soul operates by way of nature and by way of freedom, which ways are simply opposed as excluding each other formally and

⁷ See footnote 1 above.

quidditative, and nevertheless they are identical with the essence of the soul. Just as all the divine attributes are really one with the essence of God, and yet, from the nature of the thing, the idea of wisdom is not the idea of goodness, so we can in the same way conceive and express the matter at hand: in the first instant of nature the essence of the soul is existent and in the second instant it is operative (or able to operate by this power or that); and the powers that are the principles of these operations are contained unitively in the essence.

In accord, then, with this way of speaking we can save all the authorities of those who say that the powers of the soul proceed from the essence, or that they are intermediate between substantial and accidental forms; for the powers are like properties of the soul and properties proceed or boil up, as they say, from the subject, but yet they are same as the essence of the soul (as has been stated). And these powers can also be called parts in that none of them contains or expresses the whole perfection of the containing essence but rather, as it were, the partial perfection of it. It is also easy in this way to conceive how one of the powers does not contain the perfections of all of them or the total perfection of the soul itself; because the powers are, from the nature of the thing, distinct from each other and from the soul; and so they cannot, as thus contained, mutually contain each other, although they do nevertheless coincide with each other, and with the container, in being the same thing.

Article 2: Whether the Soul has several Powers

Reply [Ord. 4 d.49 q.2]: it is altogether necessary that the soul is endowed with several powers. For there is a double perfection found in things; one is the first perfection by which each thing is perfected and subsists in its natural, proper, and specific being; the other is the secondary perfection, which does not enter into the quiddity of the thing and yet by it each thing is in a completely fine condition. Now finite beings do not possess this perfection in themselves, for this is proper to the sole first principle, whose total perfection consists in perfect possession of itself, needing nothing else so as to be first, most blessed, and most happy. Everything other than it, therefore, seeks perfection in something outside it, not as if it desires to pass over into that something's nature, but as it is united to it by operation. Nor is it surprising that a finite being is perfected in something outside itself, for by attaining something extrinsic, especially something more perfect than it, it obtains a fuller perfection than it can have in itself and for itself. Just as therefore each thing is inclined by its own nature to its proper perfection, so necessarily, if it can be perfected in what is supremely desirable, it will be equipped with an appetite by whose operation it will be united to the supremely desirable object. Since therefore the soul is supreme among forms, and is immaterial and incorruptible, and is formed to the likeness of God, it can have a capacity for this, that is, for being united through operation to what is supremely desirable; and, because of this union, it comes to be in good state, desiring nothing further not most fully found in it, and so it is most happily at rest. [Oxon. 3 d.17, *De Rerum Principio* q.11] There is therefore in man an intellective appetite; but there is no appetitive power which does not

have its own discerning and knowing power that shows what is to be desired; so there must necessarily be found in man a cognitive power proportioned to the appetitive power. The rational soul therefore has the powers by which it can perform acts of understanding and willing. And because the rational soul is united per se as form to an organic body, it must be endowed with powers whereby to use the many organs that the body consists of, and to proceed to acts that accord with the exigencies of these organs...

Article 3: Whether Powers are distinguished by their Acts and Objects

Reply [Ord. 2 d.16]: One must say that powers are not intrinsically distinguished by their acts and objects. Explanation: the soul is able by itself to be the immediate principle of operation, for this is admitted about forms far more imperfect than the intellective soul, and besides it is a mark of nobility in the soul, otherwise it would not belong to the most perfect of agents. Since therefore nothing extrinsic, or any order to something extrinsic, can belong to the intrinsic nature of the soul, the concept of the soul's essence is prior to any operative principle or any reference to acts; equally too whatever is the same thing as the soul's intrinsic nature will be intrinsic, nor will anything extrinsic be able to be an aspect of its essential nature. But acts and their ordering to an object are altogether extrinsic and essentially posterior to a productive principle, for it is because the productive principle has the intrinsic nature it has that it can perform the acts; therefore this intrinsic nature must be in existence and have power to act, and so it can in fact act, because the nature already has existence beforehand. For something absolute in the cause is followed by something absolute in the effect (and the relation of effect to cause, and of cause to effect, arises from this fact), provided the absolute in the cause is able to found an absolute in the effect. But a cause as cause is prior to its effect, nor does the cause pre-require any relation in the cause that may be the reason for producing the effect; therefore the operation follows from the productive or operative principle without any respect or ordering to operation being pre-understood in the principle, provided the conditions mentioned are present; therefore no principle is intrinsically constituted by respect to acts and objects.

[*Quodlibet* q.13] A thing gets its entitative reality from that from which it gets its unity and, as a result, its distinctiveness; therefore, just as a caused thing gets its entitative reality from whatever is its per se cause, so it gets its unity and distinctiveness from it, and the same for any dependent thing as to what it essentially depends on. And this is most of all true when the thing depends on something as on its proper cause, or on the proper term of its dependence. Now an act depends on its object as on the proper term of its dependence; so one must concede that acts are distinguished by the objects as by extrinsic things, that is, the objects on which they depend with essential dependence. But one should not thereby infer that the acts are distinguished formally by these objects as by terms of a relation included within the acts. For because an act is essentially posterior to the power, and because a posterior cannot be the per se reason for distinguishing a prior, then the distinction of powers by acts and objects is only a distinction by

certain extrinsic things that the acts depend on by essential and proper dependence (a dependence in no way common to another caused thing). The distinction of objects is clearer than the distinction of acts, and from the former, as from what is more manifest, the latter become known, and from these finally the powers. And Aristotle was speaking as to manifestation when he distinguished powers by acts and objects.

But this may not seem enough, for the Philosopher maintains that acts are prior in idea to powers, and objects prior in idea to acts; therefore this distinction in this way is through what is prior; it is not a distinction just in the way that efficient causes precede their effects, but also in the way that the end does – which is prior to the other causes – and powers are essentially ordered to their end (*On the Heavens* 2 text 7, ‘Each thing is for the sake of its operation’). We reply that if acts are prior in idea to powers because they introduce the idea of the end, this reference to an end is a being of reason only. For the end does not move the agent to act save metaphorically (*On Generation* 1 text 55), for to attribute any other causality to the end is to transfer it into the genus of efficient cause.

[*Ord.* 1 d.3 q.3] The philosopher does not say [*On the Soul* 2 text 33] that if the powers are diverse then the objects are too, but he means that one must know the object before the power, for we know that the soul has the power to do something because it does so act; not that the operation is what causes these powers to exist in the soul, either in themselves or in their distinctiveness, or that the object is what causes this. Rather operation and object are the cause of our coming to know the distinction of the powers. This inference then is correct: the primary objects are different, therefore the powers are different. But the converse inference is fallacious, for the powers can be distinguished by something else; indeed they are never distinguished causally by their objects. And if the distinction between certain things is proved by a sign of the distinction, yet the converse does not follow, for the things can, without the signs, be distinguished by something else.

Article 4: Whether there is an Order to the Powers of the Soul

Reply [*Ord.* 2 d.16]: One must say that the soul is in its own way the immediate principle of all its powers. The soul alone, existing as such essence in the first instant of nature, is operative in the second instant, or able to operate, according to this operation or that through the powers that are the principles of the operations; nor do powers of this sort, contained unitively in the soul, proceed in degrees as proper passions from the soul, as if one proceeded by means of another; but they proceed immediately from the same nature of the soul; and even if one of them presupposes the operation of another (so as then to flow immediately into its own act), yet no operation is received in the soul from a principle pre-requiring the act of another principle as intermediary, but the soul is the immediate recipient of both; so the soul is the origin of the principles equally. The case is like that of the properties of being in relation to being; for no property of being proceeds by medium of another, but all come immediately from being and none can be proved through another; on the contrary, if an order between them were set up and unity were said to be more

immediate to being, the propositions taken from it as it is posited to be prior to the rest would not be more evident than the conclusions, and so would not prove the conclusions inferred. The transcendentals of being therefore determine each other mutually, nor is one of them the per se reason for another, but being itself of itself is 'one' and 'true' and 'good'; not that being, from the nature of the thing, is not per se conceivable in its formal exclusion of the properties, but because all the properties flow from being immediately, and one of them is not intermediary to another. In this way too is the intellective soul of itself operative by way of nature and by way of freedom; not that the essence includes, from the nature of the thing, these modes of operating, but in that, just as it is of itself operative through intellect, so it is of itself operative through will; nor is one of these perfections of the soul the per se reason for the existence in it of the other perfection.

[*Oxon.* 1 d.3 q.3] Now the appetitive power does pre-require a proper cognitive power, and is also unable to be separated from it. Equally too, in our present state, the interior and exterior senses are ordered to the intellective power, since it cannot proceed to act without their cooperation. But yet one must deny that an act of understanding is the per se reason for the soul's receiving an act of the appetitive power, for the soul itself is immediately receptive of the acts of both powers, as it is also the equally immediate principle of both powers; nor did the soul get its capacity for eliciting an operation of the appetitive power by means of the power of understanding, even if the soul is so called [*sc.* intellective] primarily, and even if the perfection of understanding is supposed to have proceeded from the soul more immediately. Let it be, we say, that the soul is first operative as to intellect before it is operative as to will; yet, because it is just as immediately receptive of both operations, it receives both equally; for the soul contains these perfections or operative powers in the power of its essence, and so it is in the same way the immediate cause of producing both after their own fashion – not as a thing is produced but as subjects are said to produce their own properties.

Article 5: Whether all the Powers of the Soul are in the Soul as in a Subject

Reply [*Ord.* 4 d.44 q.2]: one must say that in no way are all the powers of the soul in the soul as in a subject but only the non-organic ones. Explanation: the seeing and hearing and the like power is not the perfection of the soul by which the soul is the principle of seeing and of performing the acts that proceed from the bodily organs, even though such power in the soul is not an accident really distinct from the soul but the same thing as it. For the proper seeing power is something that includes essentially both the perfection of the soul and in addition the perfection of a body properly complexioned for the common operation corresponding to it. And in the same way vision itself belongs primarily to the whole made of these two, so that vision's proximate subject, and the reason for its being received, is not the soul, or anything precisely referring to the soul, nor even the form of the mixture in the bodily organ. Rather it is the form of the whole composite, made of the bodily complex and the soul; and such perfection is the proximate reason for the reception of sensation. And therefore the whole form is the sensitive power, not one or other

part of the form, that is, not the form of the mixed body or the intellective soul. These organic and material powers, therefore, are in no way found in the soul as in their proper subject; and so the sensations of the sensitive soul are rightly removed from the soul. [*De Rerum Principio* q.9] Only the inorganic powers are found in the soul as in a subject, but not the other powers, whose proper subject is not the soul or any organic part, but the whole composite made up of both perfections.

Article 6: Whether the Powers of the Soul flow from its Essence

Reply [*Ord.* 2 d.16]: Some will say that the powers of the soul do in fact proceed from the essence, and they use the following argument. The powers of the soul are certain natural properties of it; but the subject is the cause of its proper accidents; hence too the subject is put into the definition of accidents, as is plain in *Metaphysics* 7 text ch.66; therefore the powers of the soul proceed from the essence as from their cause. But we, in a.1 above, went against those who think the powers of the soul are accidents really distinct from it. Indeed, if the intellect and the will are posited as differing really from the soul, then the soul would not be made blessed, except per accidens. Proof: That is not the proper perfection of something which is only received in it by something else first that is really distinct from it and in which it would even be received if it were to be separate from it. Hence color is not the proper perfection of bodily substance, because it is not received in bodily substance save by means of a surface really distinct from bodily substance, and it would be received in the surface if the surface were to remain when separated from the substance; and so a substance is rightly said to be colored per accidens. But the vision and enjoyment of God are only received in the soul because they are in the intellect and will, which are said to be accidents of the soul and really distinct from it and from each other; and intellect and will would receive these acts if they were to exist without the soul; therefore the soul would be blessed per accidens and blessedness would not be its proper perfection but rather the perfection of powers really different from it. Therefore, since it is a feature of forms far inferior to the soul that they flow immediately of themselves into their acts, as is plain of heat and other active qualities (otherwise there would be an infinite regress), we infer that this too will rightly have to be attributed to the soul; and one will have to say that the soul is the principle of understanding and of willing, not through accidents really distinct from it, but in its substantial being.

Therefore, just as the property of a thing proceeds or, as they say, springs up from the substance of the subject, and just as the properties of being flow from being, so too are intellect and will, which are the properties of the soul and that by which it is operative, understood to flow from the soul, not as accidents or parts of it, but as perfections united and contained by identity in it; and yet they are not included in the formal and essential nature of the soul nor, is one the essential nature of the other. The soul, therefore, in the first instant of nature is the sort of essence it is, and in the second instant it is operative according to this or that operation; and the principles of these operations are the powers flowing from the soul. And just as the acts of the operative powers by which the soul per se wills and

understands and is blessed are immediately received in the soul, so also do the principles of these operations advance immediately from the soul's essence.

Article 7: Whether one Power of the Soul arises from another

Reply [Ord. 2 d.16, *Reportatio ibid.*]: It must be said that one power of the soul does not arise from another but that all proceed from the one essence of the soul. Explanation: the soul's powers or principles of operation are as it were its properties issuing from its essence and contained in the unity of the essence; and they mutually exclude each other in their formal ideas, and so one is not the perfection of another nor contains the perfection of the soul, though the soul embraces the total perfection of all of them. But if the will were to arise from the intellect or by means of the intellect, the intellect should contain the perfection of the will. For the soul does not embrace the perfection of all the powers save because they issue from it as its properties; therefore if the intellect were to be per se the reason for the issuance of the will, the perfection of the will should be found in the intellect; but this does not seem to be possible. First, because these powers are the same thing as the soul. Second, because one property of a subject is not intrinsically more perfect than another save perhaps as to what they connote; for 'true' is not more perfect than 'good', or conversely, and so on as to the other properties of being. Third, finally, because these principles' ideas of operation, which are nature and will, cannot be reduced the one to the other in the way that the thing produced is reduced to that which is the principle of producing, because then one of them would, as to its whole class, be imperfect, which is false; for since being an operative principle belongs with equal perfection to both of them, neither is imperfect in being operative – for then it would not be found in God (just as is nothing is attributed to God that, of its formal idea, is contained in another as in a prior principle). And so the whole idea of being principle, not reduced to a prior principle, is found in God. Because therefore these two principles of operation [sc. nature and will] are of different ideas, one of them does not contain or embrace the perfection of the other, nor consequently is one of them the reason for the other's issuing from the soul. Rather, the soul itself, containing both unitively in itself, is the immediate emanating principle of its powers, even if it cannot issue in an act of willing unless the intellect first issue in an act of understanding. The matter is the same way here as it is with being, for being is not desirable before it is understood to be needing to be desired, and yet not for that reason is 'true' the reason or cause why 'good' is in it, or 'one' the reason why other properties are in it, but being itself is of itself true and good just as it is of itself one, although some order exists, or is understood, between these properties.

It must be denied that an act of will is caused by an act of intellect, or by the object, as by the total cause. On the contrary the sole or principal cause is the will itself, as Augustine teaches *City of God* 12.6, when he says that if two people are affected equally in their mind and are tempted by the same beauty, the fact that one yields to the temptation and the other not proceeds from their will. The same is said by Anselm *Conception of the Virgin* 8. And certainly if the acts that are voluntary in

us were caused by some cause acting naturally, the will should neither be praised nor blamed because of those acts, nay nor warned either, because acting otherwise would not be in its power; but this is plainly erroneous and most absurd. So although the will needs objects first to be shown to it, yet because it moves freely in pursuing or fleeing them, the first determination and production of the act comes from itself. One should rather infer, then, that the power of operating freely does not arise from the intellect but immediately from the soul, in which alone, because of its inborn nobility and preeminence, is the principle of freedom virtually contained; and it is not contained in the intellect, whose nature it is to act altogether determinately, and therefore the intellect cannot be the reason for producing the principle of freedom.

Article 8: Whether all the Powers remain in the separated Soul

Reply [Ord. 4 q.44 q.2, 1 d.3 q.9]: One must say that those powers at least accompany the soul departing the body that are in it as in a subject; the others, however, which issue in acts according as the power of the soul is united to a bodily organ, are corrupted equally along with the destroyed body, and they do not accompany the incorruptible subject. However, as expounded in article 5 supra, the power of the soul is not the sensitive power by which the body senses, or by which a man senses; nor again is the sensitive power the perfection of the bodily complex that corresponds to it for the common operation; but the sensitive power is the form of the whole that is composed of the bodily complex and the soul, and it is the proximate principle for both eliciting and receiving sensation; therefore this total form is the sensitive power, namely the proximate principle of sensing; for when either is taken away there can be no sensation. But the soul when separated from the body is no longer a form of the part by which man senses, although in it is found the same perfection that is complete of the sensitive power (for this perfection is not something really distinct from the essence itself of the soul); so there is in the separated soul no sensitive power save in part and as in the root of all sensations. Further, if the sensitive powers were to remain in the separated soul, the soul would be capable of the acts of those powers without the use of any organ; therefore it would be capable of the same acts of sensing that it was capable of when united to the body, and hence it would not need organs. For because the intellective power, as to acts of understanding, does not need an organ when separated, so neither does it need any organ when united; therefore, if the sensitive power does not need an organ when separated, then neither would it use an organ when united. Again, the intellective power is free, since it is unobligated in its operation, and it is not the form of bodily matter; and so the will acts as a lord and the intellect's object is being in the whole of its extent; therefore, if there were present in the separated soul the sensitive powers by which it also senses when it is united to a bodily organ, then sensible operations would be free and have regard to all being universally, particular and intelligible and bodily; and so God and angels would be apprehended by the senses and the intellect would be superfluous, which no one would say. Finally, a sensible thing is not perceived save through a sensible species as it is

sensible and is proportioned to the sensible; but such a sensible is only received in some extended quantum; therefore if the separated soul were endowed with sensitive powers it would be an extended quantum.

We do concede that all the powers of the soul are really one with it, just as properties are one with their subjects. But we say there is considerable difference between the powers of intellect and will and the powers of the sensitive soul. For because the former do not need an organ so as to operate, they are in the soul as in their proper subject; but the latter, since they are organic, are conflated from a power of the soul and an organ corresponding to it, and for this reason, when the organ is lacking, the soul does not have the wherewithal to issue in their acts. Nevertheless the force is present to the soul by which that power was formed along with the form appropriate to the bodily complex. [*Ord.* 4 d.45 q.3] And over and above the sensitive memory one must admit that there is an intellective memory in the soul, and it remains in the soul when separated; on this are impressed, like sensible phantasms, intelligible species. Through this intellective memory, then, souls deprived of bodies remember the things they did in the body.