The Singular Voice of Being

John Duns Scotus and Ultimate Difference

ANDREW LAZELLA

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FORDHAM UNIVERSITY PRESS

New York 2019

Visit us online at www.fordhampress.com.

Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data

Names: LaZella, Andrew, author.
Title: The singular voice of being : John Duns Scotus and ultimate difference / Andrew LaZella.
Description: First edition. | New York, NY : Fordham University Press, 2019. | Series: Medieval philosophy: texts and studies | Includes bibliographical references and index.
Identifiers: LCCN 2018059016 | ISBN 9780823284573 (cloth : alk. paper)
Subjects: LCSH: Duns Scotus, John, approximately 1266–1308.
Classification: LCC B765.D74 L39 2019 | DDC 189/.4—dc23
LC record available at https://lccn.loc.gov/2018059016

Printed in the United States of America

21 20 19 5 4 3 2 1

First edition

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ABBREVIATIONS

WORKS BY JOHN DUNS SCOTUS

DPP	*De primo principio*
In librum Porphyrii	*Quaestiones in librum Porphyrii Isagoge*
In Metaph.	*Quaestiones super libros Metaphysicorum Aristotelis*
Lect.	*Lectura*
Ord.	*Ordinatio*
Q. de an.	*Quaestiones super secundum et tertium De anima*
Quod.	*Quaestiones Quodlibetales*
Rep.	*Reportatio*
Super Praed.	*Quaestiones super Praedicamenta Aristotelis*

References to standard internal divisions will be made with the following abbreviations: d. = distinction; a. = article; p. = part; q. = question; and n. = paragraph number. For example, *Ordinatio* I, d. 3, p. 1, q. 3, n. 133.

WORKS BY OTHER AUTHORS

Thomas Aquinas

De ente	*De ente et essentia*
Super De Trin.	*Expositio super librum Boethii De Trinitate*
In Sent.	*Scriptum super libros Sententiarum magistri Petri Lombardi*
Metaphysicorum Aristotelis	*In duodecim libros Metaphysicorum Aristotelis expositio*
SCG	*Summa contra Gentiles*
ST	*Summae theologiae*; followed by I for First Part; I–II for First Part of the Second Part; and II–II for Second Part of the Second Part

Aristotle

Cat.	*Categories*
De anima	*On the Soul*

Metaph.	*Metaphysics*
De Int.	*On Interpretation*
Post. Ana.	*Posterior Analytics*
Top.	*Topics*

Henry of Ghent

Quod.	*Quodlibeta*
Summa	*Summa (Quaestiones ordinariae)*

Peter John Olivi

In II Sent.	*Quaestiones in secundum librum Sententiarum*
QDDC	*Quaestiones de Deo cognoscendo*

Thomas of Sutton

Tract. de esse	*Tractatus de esse et essentia*
QO	*Quaestiones ordinariae*

All other abbreviations will be explained in context.

THE SINGULAR VOICE OF BEING

INTRODUCTION: SOLOMON'S DIFFICULTY

PROLOGUE

In his relatively late *Quodlibetal Questions* (dated to Advent 1306 or Lent 1307), John Duns Scotus begins by citing a passage from *Ecclesiastes* 1:8. "'All things are difficulty,' says Solomon in *Ecclesiastes* 1 and he explains why he thinks they are difficult." Scotus and Solomon proceed to gloss the passage: "'Human language is inadequate to explain them.' Therefore, the distinction of things can help in classification surrounding these difficult questions."[1] Scotus goes on to tell us that the first division is that of thing (*res*) or being (*ens*) into finite/infinite, possible/necessary, and so on.[2] Getting our distinctions straight can alleviate the difficulties humans face in explaining things (*res*). Equipped with inadequate linguistic and conceptual capacities, humans must undertake great labors in order to classify the world and make distinctions.

This work will investigate how Scotus envisions us wayfarers undertaking this labor of proper division. Such division, it will be shown, requires cutting the univocal concept of being at its joints. Such proper carving must locate what Scotus calls "ultimate differences," which are nonthings yet are not nothing. A study of such ultimate differences—an area of Scotus's thought that has been underexplored—will reveal the importance of a nonreified conception of difference for proper division, as well as shedding new light on Scotus's much-misunderstood doctrines of univocity and theory of individuation.

I.1. TO CUT BEING AT ITS JOINTS

Properly distinguishing and classifying beings stands as a perennial task of philosophy, one by no means unique to Scotus. Amid a career of making such divisions, Plato famously remarks in the *Phaedrus*: "Division must cut being at its joints."[3] Ordinary language and thought play fast and loose with its demarcations, which dialectic serves to refine. These everyday distinctions from which dialectic begins, although not necessarily incorrect, are imprecise. Meno's "definition" of virtue, for example, as a man's managing of public affairs, a woman's home management, a slave's submissiveness, and so on would not offend Greek ears, but what these examples fail to provide is a definition. Meno cannot say what makes virtue distinct from other human qualities; like Potter Stewart defining pornography, he simply knows it when he sees it.[4] But can he find the joints?

The question of division takes center stage in the *Sophist*, beginning with the question of how we can distinguish between the statesman, the sophist, and the philosopher. To get things started, the Eleatic Stranger and Theaetetus (the dialogue's primary interlocutors) construct a network of divisions to define an

angler. The angler provides a simple definitional model that can be used for the sophist. Such a network of division casts a net to identify a target. A well-constructed network of divisions, like a well-constructed net, should capture its prey without letting it escape between its nodes. This definition serves "to cut being at its joints."

The angler, we learn, is an expert, whose expertise acquires (as opposed to producing) its object by means of actions (not through exchange), who secretly hunts (not openly combats) a living (not lifeless) water (not land) animal and so on.[5] In each case of division, we tread clearly down one side of the binary paths, which ultimately lead us to our target: the angler.

The sophist, however, proves a wilier target. Like the philosopher, one might say, the sophist is also a cleanser of souls. So what distinguishes the sophist from the philosopher?[6] As the Stranger and Theaetetus progress in their attempt to capture the sophist, things go from bad to worse. If definitions are meant to pin a being down to a manageable category and contain it within a node, then the process has failed. The interlocutors show that the sophist eludes a single definition, instead falling under six distinct and, at times, contradictory definitions.[7] The sophist is, first, a hired hunter of rich young men; second, a wholesaler of learning about the soul; third, a retailer of the same things; fourth, a seller of his own learning; fifth, an athlete in verbal combat with distinction in the expertise of debating; sixth, a soul-cleanser with respect to beliefs interfering with learning. A sophist is a complex beast who can't be captured with one hand.[8] In casting the net of division to capture one of them, we confront a moving target. The sophist has transcategorial being, not remaining within a single node of the net cast upon him or her.

The goal of division is to pin down the sophist so as to distinguish the true philosopher from this rival imitator. This seems to carry on the lessons of the *Apology* such that impressionable young minds and uncultivated old ones alike cannot adequately discern between these rival types. To the untrained eye—or ones thoroughly saturated by certain works of comedy—the philosopher and the sophist are the same. Successful division thus should lead us to real definitions that divide essential kinds from one another. The success of dichotomous division, however, remains something of an open question at the end of the dialogue.[9] To fully appreciate the role of division not only in the *Sophist* but in the whole Western philosophical tradition, the specter haunting the dialogue must be introduced: Parmenides of Elea.

One might imagine Parmenides as a *muta persona* in the dialogue. His presence prompts the interlocutors to ask themselves about this manner of division. Yes, we might turn to various *technai* to understand philosophical division. But, as Theaetetus asks the Stranger, what's the point of discussing filtering, and winnowing, and carding, and spinning, and weaving, when we're on the track of a sophist? Why engage in a discussion of these household arts? Can we compare the division of being to these simpler objects that yield to dichotomous divi-

sion? If the sophist proves difficult to track down by means of division, being will be even more elusive.

Parmenides's lasting question thus returns. This manner of division is possible because one being divides another; the weaver's loom divides the wool into two threads, the potter's hand, the clay into parts. But what, outside of being, divides being into such parts? How can the atomic unity of being be cut? Parmenides—perhaps more than any other figure in the history of philosophy—challenges us to question the inadequacy of our ordinary linguistic and conceptual divisions. With Parmenides, however, the goal is not to achieve more accurate divisions in language and thought but to overcome the illusion of division altogether.

As he sings in his poem *On Nature*:

> There is still left a single story
> of a way, that it is. On this way there are signs
> exceedingly many—that being ungenerated it is also
> imperishable,
> whole and of a single kind and unshaken and complete.
> Nor was it ever nor will it be, since it is now, all together,
> one continuous.[10]

The manifold signs on the single path ultimately must coalesce around a single story (*logos*). This *logos* overcomes the disparate multiplicity of ordinary chatter and representation. In it, there is a complete isomorphism between language, thought, and reality.

Against the illusory divisions and multiplications of ordinary experience and talk, *logos* reveals an underlying oneness to being. There is the path of being, which is, and the path of nonbeing, which is not; there is no third path. So goes the familiar argument of *On Nature,* which introduces the lasting specter of Parmenidean monism. Whether deserved or not, his legacy to the tradition of metaphysics has been the specter of a monolithic being: being is but one, continuous, and everywhere the same.

It is not simply the oneness of being that resonates throughout the tradition of metaphysics but rather the lack of division and differentiation. As Parmenides goes on to sing: "Nor is it [i.e., being] divided, since it all is alike. [. . .] Remaining the same in the same and by itself it lies and so stays there fixed."[11] Difference, according to Parmenides, becomes a mere appearance. By prioritizing unity and oneness over difference, he can eliminate it altogether from his universe. If being is all there is, and nothing is not, then what's left for difference? The burden of metaphysics thus becomes how to reintroduce difference and division into monolithic being.

Parmenides's problem resonates even more for medieval metaphysics. Not only would the multiplicity of beings appearing before us turn out to be an illusion of untrained speech and thought, but also, if being admits of no division,

then a unique and transcendent God also would be an illusion. As Thomas Aquinas says in his commentary on the *Sentences*: "The error of the ancient philosophers was that God is the essence of all things. They prove that everything is one simply, and does not differ, except perhaps according to sense or estimation, just as Parmenides said."[12] Since everything is one, there can be no distinction between creatures and God.[13] Being is one, continuous, and everywhere the same. Thus, it seems, there can be no real difference between God and anything else.

In light of this background, the task of distinguishing, dividing, and differentiating between beings suddenly becomes more complex. It is in this light that we can cast Scotus's claim mentioned above that there must be a division between finite and infinite being. The claim, however, is not as innocent as it seems. Although by this point in his career Scotus has argued for this division at great length and in great depth, it is nothing if not controversial.[14] It is controversial for at least two reasons: first, it presupposes that being is something that requires division in the first place; and second, it assumes that, since being needs division, something could divide it.

Let's call the first issue "the problem of univocity" and the second "the problem of differentiation." What follows will argue that according to Scotus, humans can alleviate Solomon's Difficulty to the extent that we can secure a univocal concept of being. Although Scotus envisions Solomon's Difficulty in theological terms, it is not a simply a cautionary tale of human fallenness or sinfulness. Instead, it reflects the perennial philosophical task of matching our linguistic and conceptual distinctions to reality, of getting at the real joints. (For an updated equivalent of such a tale, see Jerry Fodor's "How Things Were Back in the Garden.")[15]

Scotus is even more wary of bridging these gaps than his medieval peers. This because, as has been thoroughly documented in the literature, he attends more critically to the failure of either formal isomorphism or causal processes in securing the bridge between thought and things.[16] As this Introduction will discuss, both formal isomorphism and causal externalism break down as models for explaining the relation of thought to the world. Thus, a univocal concept of being opens up an objective foundation for thought, which will be outlined further in Section I.2. To avoid the Parmenidean consequences of such a concept, however, such being must be divisible. The proper division of being cannot be represented in terms of forms or any *thing* for that matter, as will be shown in Section I.3. Instead, being can be divided only in terms of what Scotus calls nonreified ultimate difference.

I.2. THE INADEQUACY OF THOUGHT AND LANGUAGE

I look around me and observe a vast and manifold field of different and distinct things: chairs, and cats, and bottles, and colors, some awkward spatial alloca-

tions, and deadlines to be met, and so on. Things appear manifold. Parmenides argues that they are one. Such sensory diversity turns out to be an illusion. Heraclitus, on the other hand, maintains that things are even more diverse than they appear. They are so diverse and fluid that our language cannot latch onto them from moment to moment. Naming makes things *stand still*. However, the Heraclitean flux cannot stand still: to even call them "things" or "beings" seems too static. As Socrates states in the *Cratylus*: "But if it is always passing away, can we correctly say of it first that it is *this,* and then that it is *such and such?* Or, at the very instant we are speaking, isn't it inevitably and immediately becoming a different thing and altering and no longer being as it was?"[17] Fluctuating reality cannot be pinned down. In this sense, language is deceptive. It is deceptive, not because it makes the many out of the one as it does for Parmenides, but because it makes the one out of many (or the fewer out of the more).

Plato and Aristotle seek a compromise position between these two extremes. Plato settles for a manifold participating in a unified field of Forms; Aristotle famously asserts that being is said in many ways. Where does this leave us? Things are difficult, Scotus tells us. Our language is inadequately equipped to explain them. Proper division, however, might help to alleviate this burden. But do we follow Parmenides and banish division altogether? Or do we follow Heraclitus and divide being even further to the point that it flows into becoming? Or should we accept the compromises of Plato or Aristotle and find a way to bring them together? The problem is finding the correct match between our language, thought, and reality.

If language struggles to explain things, according to Scotus, matters are even worse for cognition. He argues that language can signify things more distinctly than thought can cognitively grasp them.[18] He defects from the more standard position that we can signify only as distinctly as we cognize, citing cases where language (both baptism of terms and everyday use) latches on to things that cognition understands confusedly (or not at all). For example, he maintains, citing the false etymology of Isidore of Seville, that whoever first named a stone (*lapis, lapidem*) did so on account of its accidental property of hurting their foot (*laedere pedem*)! The name giver, however, successfully manages to designate whatever it is that underlies such foot-hurting accidents, which she inadequately conceives.

Or, with respect to the question of whether God can be named by the pilgrim, Scotus states: "I say that just as I intend to express distinctly that essence of God in itself through that name, so he intends to conceive it through that name, although neither I who use it, nor he to whom I address it, could understand distinctly that essence that I intend to express distinctly in this manner, with him [subsequently intending] to use the name thus expressed in this way."[19] Scotus thus disagrees with Henry of Ghent and others, who hold that a name assigned by the blessed would do the pilgrim as little good as the name "whiteness" would to one born blind. For Scotus, we pilgrims are like the one

born blind insofar as we can name things more distinctly than we understand them. The names given to us, by which we name and designate God, natural kinds, and individuals turn out to be quite needed given our even greater cognitive difficulties.

Like the one born blind, the pilgrim possesses only a vocal habit (*habitus vocalis*) whereby she or he reasons about the real essence of substances and natural kinds.[20] What is apprehended through naming need not be equally comprehended through understanding. As has been seen, often in naming we name substances under the aspect of how they first present themselves to us.[21] This is a problem, however, because what presents itself are sensible accidents and, to some extent, their bundled unity registered by common sense. We are, however, not immediately acquainted with the real essences or factors of individuation beyond their mediation by sensible accidents.[22]

The first object confusedly conceived by the intellect is the *species specialissima* of whatever accident moves the senses (e.g., the tactile pain-inducing quality of "rocks").[23] Cognition is rooted in sensible accidents and is unable, Scotus argues, to gain direct access to the real essences of substances themselves. Giorgio Pini explains: "Scotus held that there is a gap between the structure of the world, constituted by real essences, and the way we grasp those real essences. We do not get to know real essences by way of simple acts of cognition that latch onto them with precision. We can merely describe essences by way of complex descriptions that are never *de re,* as they may, at least in principle, pertain to more than one essence. Scotus maintained that this cognitive limitation is probably a consequence of the Fall."[24] Something of a gap thus opens between the structure of reality itself and our representation of that structure. The link between our cognition and real essences—not to mention singulars—is contingent. Let us consider this problem in more detail.

Unlike many of his Aristotelian peers, Scotus does not adopt wholesale an explanation of cognition in terms of the sameness of the real and intentional form.[25] That is, for Scotus our cognitive grasp on the external world is not secured by one and the same form being both in the extramental object and also in the intellect. For reasons I can but indicate here, Scotus understands the mental content of our thoughts to be irreducible to their vehicles, intelligible species.[26] He breaks with the tradition of explaining intentionality in terms of formal assimilation. Rather, for Scotus, a concept is an object intentionally "shining forth" (*relucente*) through an intelligible species, but not the species itself.[27] A breakdown of formal isomorphism occurs insofar as thoughts are about objects, not on account of formal identity, but in some other way.[28]

Before turning to this relation, I should mention that in addition to rejecting formal isomorphism, Scotus also rejects causal externalism as a means of linking the mind to the world. Externalism holds that my thought is about an object insofar as that object is the one causing it. Scotus, however, offers several thought experiments to show that different causal processes can generate

identical thoughts and vice versa. The Eucharist is a key case, which will play a central role in what follows. Or, to take another example, Scotus argues that God can bypass the normal causal processes and generate the form of a horse in our intellect. Although God is the real cause of the intelligible species, the thought is about horses.[29] To raise the stakes even more, Scotus argues that God can make me think about horses even without any representational form infused into my intellect.[30] In sum, our cognitive processes fail to track the causal or formal processes which give rise to them.

Given this situation, where does Scotus land with respect to the aforementioned question? Are things more fluid than thought/language depicts them to be, or more static and unified? Do they fall somewhere in between, as suggested by Plato and Aristotle? Scotus provides a clue in the opening passage of the *Quodlibet*. Solomon's Difficulty affects cognition even more than language. Without a univocal concept of being, human cognition would flounder upon the shores of confused impressions. The science of metaphysics thus must take as its object being qua being and its division in terms of ultimate difference. But we must be careful not to think of this as a mimetically isomorphic map.

As this work will show, metaphysics studies a level of unity irreducible either to physical things on the one hand or logical concepts on the other.[31] As Ludger Honnefelder argues, Scotus, more than his peers, isolates metaphysics as the *scientia transcendens* that studies being.[32] Honnefelder concludes: "Scotus saw more distinctly than Thomas Aquinas and other authors of the thirteenth century that the question-worthiness of knowledge of the first being, as a special being in its possibility, can be secured only by appealing to those reasons (*rationes*) through which knowledge itself of any being, especially the absolutely first ground (*ratio*), constitutes the concept of 'being' in general."[33] Metaphysics becomes the transcendental science of being qua being, whose concepts secure an objective foundation, not through formal isomorphism or causal relationality but through a nonmimetic conceptual cartography.

The initial confused input from intuitive sensory and abstractive cognition provides the raw material upon which conceptual analysis must work. Through structuration in a fully resolved conceptual description, the intentional object can most clearly "shine forth." To use the terminology of later scholasticism, our formal concept signifies an objective concept. The objective concept is the expressed "informational contents of the formal concepts."[34] Scotus does not balk at such a "weird unity"—as Gyula Klima calls it—awarded to the objective correlates of our concepts.[35]

Although not providing us with a representationally mimetic picture, proper division can provide us with a more adequate grasp of reality.[36] When it comes to simple or immaterial things, Scotus asks how distinct terms in a *habitudo rationis,* or disposition of reason, can accurately reflect such a simple reality. For example, even the tautology "God is God" involves a minimal degree of composition. If our thought and language needed to mimetically track the real,

we could not truthfully propose "God is God."[37] Scotus compares the conformity or adequation of thoughts or concepts (*habitudo rationis*) to things to the famed "barrel hoop" of medieval semiotics.[38] When tavern keepers received a shipment of wine, they would hang the hoop of the barrel outside the tavern to signify to the patrons that wine was available inside. Scotus invokes this example to show that like the signifier (barrel hoop) and the signified (the wine in the tavern) of this true sign, so too the *habitudo rationis* captures something virtually contained in the thing. What is conceptually expressed (i.e., the objective concept), however, does not need to be structurally similar to the thing, just as the hoop is not similar to the wine (*circulus non est similis vino*).[39] One and the same simple thing can be conceived according to a multiplicity of real *rationes*. (For the time being, we can think of these real *rationes* as extramental distinctions not quite as robust as real distinctions.) Although Scotus recognizes where this parallel between conventional language and mental language breaks down, the central insight stands: our complex concepts, or conceptual maps, are grounded in reality without mimetically corresponding to it.[40]

Given our need to form complex descriptions based on a univocal concept of being, we might label Scotus's position as a form of "descriptivism."[41] Allan Wolter was one of the first commentators, but by no means the only one, to cast this issue in terms of Bertrand Russell's knowledge by acquaintance and knowledge by description: for Scotus, we know individuals, substances, and God only by complex descriptions; we are acquainted with accidents, and only common and confused ones at that.[42] However, when our conceptual maps are composed of fully resolved elements or simply-simple concepts constellated into complex descriptions tethered to a univocal concept of being, then they are capable of achieving real traction. In this sense, they "carve reality at its joints." The real concept of being qua being remains determinable, and metaphysics tracks its determination to the point of being *a this*. (This-ness, as we shall see, marks the borders of metaphysics.)[43]

I.3. VAIN REPETITION AND THE DIVISION OF BEING

If being turns out to be univocal, as it does for Scotus, then we face the added problem of how univocal being divides. We see this Parmenidean logic haunting Scotus's reasoning on the question of whether everything can be called being in a univocal sense. In addressing the role of being qua being as the subject of the transcendental science of metaphysics, Scotus states:

> Everything one in itself, if it is distinguished into diverse things, is distinguished by something added to it. The concept of being of itself is one in all categories (*generibus*). Then, I inquire about the added feature, call it A. [1] Either it is a being, and thus being will pertain to its concept, namely A. For "being" predicates the substance of every being, according to Bk. IV of

> this book. Substance, therefore, will be a being, and thus there will be a vain repetition. [2] Or it is not a being, and then every most general genus or category is formally not a being, because its formal element is not a being, and each species is formally not a being.[44]

Although Scotus does not mention Parmenides here by name, the latter's influence is clear.[45] The oneness or unity of being requires that something divide it into the multiplicity of beings we encounter in the world around us. First, we must divide being into the most general genera; then into the distinct species falling under such categories, and so on. Otherwise being remains one, continuous, and everywhere the same.

Such division, however, requires a divisor. If the divisor is itself a being, a vain repetition (*nugatio*) of the concept of being ensues: being must divide itself. The only alternative left by Parmenides is nonbeing. Remember, there are but two paths. If nonbeing divides being, then each of the most general genera (or categories) and every species falling under them are formally nonbeings. Its differentially constitutive element is not. Thus, that which follows from the addition of nothing to being (i.e., the genus or species) is not, at least is not anything more than being itself. And Parmenides's point stands.[46]

Here we find what is, it will be argued, one of Scotus's most unique and underappreciated contributions to metaphysics: division through nonreified difference. Scotus refers to this as "ultimate differentiation." Although he borrows this term from Aristotle, he profoundly transforms it in ways I will discuss below. The problem Scotus recognizes can be summarized as follows: Once the univocity of being has been established, which Chapters 1 and 2 will accomplish, then being must be divided. The divisions that carve being at its joints cannot be represented in terms of forms at all. This is because neither forms (either in the Platonic or the Aristotelian sense of the term) nor any *thing* else can explain differentiation. Forms are *too big* to explain difference. Two-footed is a thing, itself in need of differentiation. So too with anything of which being can be predicated in a quidditative sense: atoms, elements, accidents, or any*thing* else. Thus something else must divide being.

This is where Scotus introduces nonreified ultimate difference. To explain differentiation, he turns to the conceptually molecular level. Proper division requires nonreified differentiation. Being divides not in terms of beings or things, but in terms of perfecting differences. The key to understanding Scotus's thought is to appreciate the perfective role of differentiation. Differentiation is not a fall from unity or a defection from the purity of being itself, as it has often been construed.[47] It is not a dissolution of self-actualized unity into wayward multiplicity. Rather, differentiation is the culmination and perfection of being.

This is seen in the case of God. According to Scotus, God is most himself, not as being itself, but *as this.* The singularity of his difference—conceived by us as *ens infinitum*—makes him fully perfect. Being can be divided because, as

will be seen, it has latitude. Univocal being means only an indifference open to diverse manners of differentiation. This will allow Scotus to argue that difference is intrinsic to each being, which is formally ratified *per se.* So-called "lesser beings" are not constituted as being in relation to another. Their being, like the being of God himself, is constituted by inherent and positive difference.

Proper division requires that human cognition, which tends toward representing the rich diversity of reality as things, must resist reification. We cannot call upon beings to divide being; rather, a deeper principle of differentiation must be found. This is what he means by attending to proper division, whereby we can attend to Solomon's Difficulty as best we can as embodied mortal creatures. One of Scotus's most insightful, yet least appreciated, contributions to the history of metaphysics is his account of difference. As will be shown throughout this work, Scotus's positive account of difference underlies both of his better-known theories of univocity and *haecceitas,* runs through his robust essentialism, and even draws inspiration from (or inspires) his Franciscan voluntarism.

Thus, against Etienne Gilson, Jean-Luc Marion, and the chorus of others who have charged Scotistic univocity with "conceptual imperialism," the flattening of analogy to univocity in "a growing empire of being," or even "idolatry," Scotus is not a latter-day Parmenides or a harbinger of Spinoza.[48] Univocity correctly construed recognizes the conditions under which cognition operates and must operate in this state (*in via*). This single voice of being does not reduce all things to this indifferent monolith.[49] Instead, I will argue, it provides a necessary correction to theories that presuppose the division of being, such that they call upon already unified or self-identical entities (e.g., Platonic Forms, Aristotelian beings, atoms, etc.). Such theories fail to explain the division of being insofar as they presuppose already divided beings. The remedy is proper division by means of nonreified differentiation. Misunderstanding univocity has been due to a failure to appreciate the role of ultimate differences in Scotus's thought.

I.4. ON WHAT FOLLOWS

The argument that follows can be condensed into the following claim and subsequent observation: Due to his commitment to the univocity of the concept of being, which is needed for human cognition to make any contact with the real, Duns Scotus appropriates the Aristotelian notion of ultimate difference, but both deepens and broadens it. The buttressing work of ultimate difference for Scotistic univocity has been underappreciated and underexplored by the voluminous commentaries on Scotistic univocity. Let me explain this claim.

Scotus *deepens* Aristotelian ultimate difference in the sense that he equates it with extracategorial primary diversity that cannot be assimilated to opposition, privation, contradiction, etc. It is pure, positive difference. Furthermore, it is irreducible to form or to any already differentiated *thing.* He *broadens* it in the sense that he applies it not only to the final differentiation of genera into species

but also to the differentiation of being into God and each of the ten categories by means of intrinsic modes and *species specialissima* into individuals by means of *haecceitates*.

To this end, the following work consists of six chapters organized into two parts. The first part (Chapters 1–3) begins by providing a definition of univocity of being in addition to arguments both for and against such a position (Chapter 1). Chapter 2 shows what it means for Scotus to treat being as a real concept and how, once being is understood as a transcendental *quid*, the main opposition to univocity subsides. As will be argued in Chapter 3, Scotus's widened and deepened account of ultimate difference plays a key role in buttressing this doctrine. The second part (Chapters 4–6) systematically defines and defends his *ad hoc* account of ultimate difference. A chapter is dedicated to each of the three "groupings": intrinsic modes of being (Chapter 4); certain ultimate specific differences (Chapter 5); and ultimate individual differences (Chapter 6). The Conclusion addresses problems with respect to the cognition of ultimate difference, in particular ultimate individual differences.

The tendency to reify that which we cognize can be overcome, but only with great conceptual labor. Getting our distinctions straight, however, is necessary in order to properly conceive things and to alleviate Solomon's Difficulty. Ultimate differences constitute the fabric of the categories but are themselves subcategorial. Despite our incapacity for *de re* intellectual states, the Conclusion explores the possibility for *de re* volitional ones according to Scotus. Scotus thinks that we need to form beliefs about and establish affective attitudes toward individuals, and not merely something resembling them. The Conclusion explores this question with respect to love and asks whether we can love an individual, as opposed to merely someone with such and such characteristics. In establishing a positive answer to this question, a return is made to Solomon's Difficulty. This difficulty, it is argued, should be understood not so much as a burden inflicted upon us in the wayfarer state due to our embodiment or sinful fallenness but rather as an example of a more general Franciscan celebration of creatures in their irreducible singularity.

The unique deployment of ultimate difference with respect to Scotus's larger theory of univocity, however, has been underappreciated. The role of ultimate difference receives only mention at best in most discussions of his theory of univocity. In his seminal study of the transcendentals in Scotus's metaphysics, for example, Allan Wolter dedicates a portion of a chapter to their treatment.[50] Wolter does as much as anyone to define them and to attempt a systematic account of what falls under this heading. Chapter 3 will defend his overall breakdown of ultimate difference, while setting up the much-needed justification and sustained explanation of each grouping in Part II.

More recently, Peter King has offered the clearest articulation of the role of ultimate difference in the thought of Scotus. King treats the topics across multiple articles and in reference to other primary topics, such as Scotus's concept

of individuation.[51] Like Wolter, King does not offer a sustained or systematic treatment of them. Michael Sylwanowicz's *Contingent Causality and the Foundation of Duns Scotus' Metaphysics* introduces a brief but promising discussion of them at the end of this study.[52] Sylwanowicz does not, however, pursue these insights any further.

Next to Wolter's classic study, Ludger Honnefelder's *Ens inquantum ens: Der Begriff des Seienden als solchen als Gegenstand der Metaphysik nach der Lehre des Johannes Duns Scotus* stands as one of the key studies of univocity and the transcendentals.[53] Honnefelder observes, "What counts in particular as 'ultimate differences,' Scotus does not explain any further in the *Ordinatio* and the *Lectura*."[54] As with Wolter, ultimate difference does not emerge as a systematic topic in its own right or receive the prominence of place it deserves in this otherwise epic study of being.

Unlike Wolter, however, Honnefelder introduces several unnecessary complications with respect to the study of ultimate difference. For example, following the *Collationes*, Honnefelder separates the ultimate differences as that by which species are contracted into individuals from what he and the *Collationes* call "first differences," or the intrinsic modes of being such as infinite and finite: "Under the concept of 'last difference,' certainly the individual-determining difference should be counted according to Scotus, which contracts the natural kind to a nonexchangeable individual and which is understood by Scotus as 'the ultimate reality of being' or the 'ultimate reality of form.' It grounds the individual distinction as the 'last differentiation' in the order of essential determination."[55] He introduces what he calls "first differences" and "intermediary differences," which have the same characteristics I ascribe to "ultimate differences." Thus, it seems, his position—to the extent that he develops it—differs from mine mostly with respect to terminology rather than doctrine. As Chapter 4 will show, the intrinsic modes of being must be considered as "ultimate differences." According to the systematic account provided by Chapter 3, apart from a mere semantic quibble, the point remains: the intrinsic modes of being are "ultimate differences."

Another consideration of ultimate difference in reference to the larger topic of univocity is Cyril Shircel's *The Univocity of the Concept of Being in the Philosophy of John Duns Scotus*. While Shircel grasps the main elements of ultimate difference with respect to univocity, he misunderstands their *functional* similarities, thereby driving too great a wedge between the ultimate specific difference and the intrinsic modes dividing the concept of being itself. Likewise, he neglects to include individuation as part of ultimate differentiation. Finally, any discussion of ultimate difference is notably missing from Richard Cross's recent manuscript *Duns Scotus's Theory of Cognition*. Despite the thoroughness of this study, Cross bypasses any treatment of ultimate difference. As will be discussed below, this leads to a misunderstanding of Scotus's thought at several crucial junctures.

To summarize, most accounts of Scotistic ultimate difference—if they treat the topic of ultimate difference at all—fail to emphasize its centrality with respect to the univocity of being. Whereas they spend much time trying to "solve" the problems endemic to univocity—such as whether it risks collapsing divine transcendence to the mundane order of creatures and whether it treats being as a most general genus—they ignore Scotus's own solution. Granted, the Subtle Doctor did not announce this with any fanfare or provide a sustained and systematic treatment of his own. Although we are left to scavenge his opus for an account amid the isolated statements here and there, a systematic account can be reconstructed. And such an account, it will be argued, sheds light on his doctrine of the univocity of being. The present work seeks to remedy such a general oversight.

1.5. ON WHY IT MATTERS

A full and systematic treatment of ultimate difference helps to alleviate the aforementioned burden that has been placed on Scotistic univocity. Ultimate difference buttresses Scotistic univocity. Beyond merely tying up the loose ends of a historical figure—and a scholastic one at that—this treatment offers an important perspective on the perennial questions of being and difference. As has been shown, this question extends back to Parmenides and Heraclitus and continues to resonate in contemporary metaphysics, philosophy of mind, and philosophy of language. Let me mention but one example, which covers the analytic, continental, and historical traditions within philosophy.

In his 2014–2015 presidential address to the Aristotelian Society entitled "Being, Univocity and Logical Syntax," Adrian Moore bravely treats figures as diverse as Aristotle, Duns Scotus, Gilles Deleuze, and the early Wittgenstein. He also enlists W. V. O. Quine and Martin Heidegger along the way, just in case the others already listed were too cozy of bedfellows. Moore does not seek to offer a full-scale defense of the univocity of being but, rather, to show "what it takes to think the doctrine." Before looking at his answer, a skeptical response might be preempted.

Why should such a diverse crowd agree to this rapprochement? For example, one might wonder what the contemporary tradition of analytic philosophy would gain from this dialogue with Scotus or Deleuze. Is being as discussed by Aristotle, Quine, and Heidegger even in the same metaphysical orbit? Moore's answer cannot be rehearsed here. It might be noted, however, that he convincingly shows that the various traditions already have deep investments in these perennial questions. These include the fundamental questions of being and difference. These have been the questions of Parmenides and Heraclitus, Aristotle and Plato, and the list goes on. The virtue of Moore's address is to show a shared set of metaphysical concerns underlying diverse metaphysical traditions. Likewise, the virtue of the following work hopefully will be an exploration venturing

to great scholastic depths of subtlety and nuance, while managing to keep in view these same sets of perennial questions, lest we become dunces. Moreover, those questions still relevant to both contemporary analytical and continental philosophy will not be lost.

Moore's concern, which this work shares, is with how univocity of being can be thought. Moore correctly recognizes that being cannot simply be identified with an entity in its own right.[56] As hinted at above and will be argued in what follows, being cannot be identified with one single, or one kind of, entity any more than any other. Moore asks whether it is possible to think this term "being" in so broad a sense that it could encompass everything that is: "The word 'being' is to be understood in such a way that, whenever there are things that differ from one another, even if they differ so much that there is no single logico-syntactic way of making reference to all of them, this word can be truly applied to them, in a single sense, and therefore with a single logico-syntactic use."[57] What is required to think and to say being in a single sense? The doctrine of univocity requires, in our words, to think difference in a nonreified manner. Moore states: "The affirmation of difference is what enables being, univocal being, to be seen in the differences between things. It is a making sense of difference, as the face of univocal being, where this is as much difference's making sense as it is difference's being made sense of."[58] He recognizes that the inexpressible or ineffable character of difference as a nonbeing that is not nothing, clumsily formulated by such "self-stultifying statements" as "differing is not an entity," may test the patience of contemporary analytic philosophers. His goal is to open a dialogue because the question of difference strikes at the core of both analytic and continental philosophy.

The goal of this work will be to systematically articulate Scotus's defense of univocity as buttressed by an affirmation of difference in the guise of ultimate difference. I will argue that "to think this doctrine" of univocity it is necessary to find some way to conceive of nonreified difference in order to divide being. As embodied, mortal, and fallible beings, this is the best we can do to attenuate Solomon's difficulties according to Scotus.

PART ONE

BEING AND ULTIMATE DIFFERENCE

CHAPTER ONE
BEING IS SAID IN MANY WAYS

Long known for his defense of the univocity of being (*ens*) with respect to God and creatures as well as to substance and accidents, Scotus developed this position over the course of time. The entire trajectory of this development from the early logical writings through the *Questions on the "Metaphysics" of Aristotle* to the later commentaries on the *Sentences* will not be charted here.[1] Suffice it to note that Scotus embraces the univocity of being only once he can adequately respond to several problems it invites. As will be argued, one of the main reasons why Scotus shifts his view stems from a recognition that the form being the same both *in mente* and *in re* does not suffice to secure the link between mind and world. Substantial essences, individuals (including individual accidents), and God do not immediately move the senses, and thus they make no direct impression upon our intellect.[2] To overcome Solomon's Difficulty, the intellect must abstract a univocal concept of being around which to form complex descriptions of these otherwise unknowable things (i.e., substantial essences, individuals, and God).

Section 1.1 explains what Scotus means by the terms *univocity*, *equivocity*, and *analogy*. Section 1.2 looks at how they apply to being in particular, and various problems that result if being is treated as a univocal concept. These include Parmenides's challenge as to how to divide being, and the introduction of real complexity into God's simple essence. Section 1.3 reviews Thomas Aquinas's and Henry of Ghent's respective accounts of analogy. Section 1.4 explores Scotus's reasons for defending univocity, in particular, our inability to cognize substances or God without it. Section 1.5 concludes with a discussion of how we can be certain of something as a being, and yet lack cognition of its determination or differentiation.

1.1. UNIVOCITY, EQUIVOCITY, ANALOGY

In his early *Quaestiones super Praedicamenta Aristotelis,* Scotus explains that things are univocally, or homologically, named when they share not only the same term (*vox*) or name (*nomen*), but also the same account (*ratio*).[3] Things are equivocally, or homonymously, named when the name alone is the same, but their accounts differ. Analogical names require that the name signify multiple *rationes*, which are unified according to some order or relation.[4] This section will explore each term in more depth in order to prepare for a discussion of the univocity of being in the following section.

1.1.1. Univocity

The defining feature of univocity is sameness of account. Aristotle calls this commonality λόγος τῆς οὐσίας, which Boethius translates into Latin as *ratio substantiae*.[5] In question 5 of *Super Praedicamenta*, Scotus explains that the *ratio substantiae* is an essential understanding (*essentialis intellectus*).[6] As this gloss does not clarify much, several issues need to be unpacked. First, a distinction must be made between concepts of the first intention as opposed to concepts of the second intention. Second, an explanation of what Scotus means by the term *ratio* is required, since he departs from the more standard practice of the time. And third, the use of the term *substantiae* must be clarified.

To begin, question 1 of Scotus's commentary addresses the subject matter of Aristotle's *Categories.* This takes up a long-standing debate about whether the categories are divisions found merely in language or are divisions also found in reality. Scotus responds that the object studied by the *Categories* is neither words as such nor things themselves. Instead, it studies the concept *per se.* There is, Scotus tells us, something between the sciences of real things (e.g., metaphysics, physics, biology, etc.), which study things themselves, and the sciences of language, or *scientia sermocinalis* (e.g., grammar, rhetoric, etc.), which study how terms signify and also study the attributes of *terms qua terms*.[7] This intermediary science of logic studies the *concept qua concept* (*scientia esse de conceptu per se*). Scotus says that logic is a *scientia rationalis*, insofar as it studies the formation of concepts from an act of reasoning (*de conceptibus formatis ab actu rationis*).

Logic studies the concepts formed from acts of reasoning rather than the reality conceptualized by such acts.[8] To use the more familiar distinction, logic concerns second intentions as opposed to the primary intentions that are the objects of real sciences such as physics or metaphysics. Briefly put, a first intention conceptualizes a thing, whereas a second intention conceptualizes a concept. Thus, logic studies the properties and attributes belonging to concepts themselves and not the things they conceive.

Although logic studies the categories as second intentions, Scotus concedes that it is not the only science which treats the categories.[9] Following Aristotle's claims in the *Metaphysics* that the categories indicate ways of being, Scotus reminds us that metaphysics also treats of the reality signified by the categorial concepts.[10] However, whereas metaphysics considers the categories as first intentions, or concepts about the way things are, logic considers the attributes of such categorial concepts themselves which inhere in meaningful terms. Logic is not about the terms themselves; rather, it is about the significance of the utterance, or what makes the terms meaningful: "A concept, which is what logic is about, is immediately signified through an utterance; and because the attributes (passiones) of a concept exist in a signifying utterance—<for example> non-complex, complex, to signify true or false—as in a sign according to the

nature of the significate."[11] What makes terms meaningful are (at least in part) concepts.

Already in this early work, Scotus argues that the conditions governing things conceived are not identical to the conditions governing the concepts themselves. In question 3, he states that diversity in things of the first intention does not impede a more unified conception in the intellect.[12] Specifically, identical intentions can be attributed to diverse things conceived by the intellect. That is, univocally speaking, the categories are conceived as the ten highest genera, a conceptual unity forming the basis of the science of logic.[13] The way things *are* need not be identically reflected by the way things *are conceived.* Scotus explains: "I say that a thing is not the total cause of an intention, but is only an occasion, namely insofar as it moves the intellect so that it considers in act, and the intellect is the principal cause."[14] The thing is not a complete cause of the intention, but only an occasion for the work of the intellect. The operations of the intellect *principally* cause such second intentions, not the actual state of things. This point will prove vital when treating Scotus's later defense of the univocity of being.

In terms of the second point from above, *ratio* in this context means the concept formed about something's essence. But, as Pini shows with respect to the historical context, this definition emerges from a deeper debate: Do univocals having the same *ratio substantiae* or *essentialis intellectus* necessarily have the same essence? Pini explains:

> The interpretation of the expression "*ratio substantiae*" raises some problems. Scotus interprets such an expression as meaning "essential intellect," namely the concept that our intellect forms about the essence of something. If two things can be understood by the same concept, which is in turn signified by the same name, such things are univocated under such a term, whether or not they have essences of the same kind. Scotus thinks that the expression "*ratio substantiae*" signifies the concept under which an essence is understood, and not the essence or the definition that corresponds to that essence. There is a great difference between these two interpretations, for if *ratio substantiae* is identified with the essence, it follows that all univocal things have the same essence and that consequently they belong to the same category.[15]

Scotus's answer to the question of whether having the same *ratio substantiae* entails having the same essence is no. But this was not the majority view. For Scotus, the *ratio substantiae* is the concept under which an essence is conceived, not that essence itself. The *ratio substantiae*, he maintains, is only the concept formed by our intellect of the essence. Scotus's fellow Franciscan Peter John Olivi had already criticized the identity between *rationes* and essences as found in the works of Avicenna or Aquinas. Olivi holds that there can be a multiplicity of real *rationes* (*plures rationes reales*) without a multitude of real essences.[16]

Although these issues will play a more prominent role below, here in the *Super Praedicamenta,* Scotus seems concerned with addressing the requirements for logical univocity. In particular, he seeks to show how logical univocity requires only the same *ratio substantiae,* not the same essence. For example, the genus animal is univocally predicated of both human and ass, even though they do not have the same essence. They seem to share the same essence generically, but they are the same essentially, Scotus argues, only when multiple things have the same proper and complete *ratio*.[17]

In question 6, Scotus explains: "I say that those of which the proper and complete account of the substance is the same are themselves the same; but of <things> univocated, there is not the same proper account, although the account of the thing univocating is the same to them, since that is proper to no univocate."[18] An incomplete *ratio substantiae* does not correspond to the essence in the strict sense (i.e., a complete and proper *ratio*). Such an incomplete *ratio* does suffice, however, for logical univocity. The term *animal* is the same with respect to a human and an ass on account of their shared *ratio substantiae*. Logical univocity does not require the same essence, only the same *ratio substantiae.*

Natural philosophers hold a stricter notion of univocity than do logicians. For natural philosophers, not only must two or more things share the same *ratio,* but also they must share the same ultimate form. On this point, Scotus states: "According to the logician every univocal expresses that which arrives at the intellect through one account, according to that which it is said of many; according to the natural <philosopher>, every <term> is not such, but only what is one according to the ultimate, perfecting form."[19] Real univocity of the type studied by natural philosophers requires not only the same *ratio substantiae* but also the same completing ultimate form. This means that the term *cat* is univocal with respect to Albert and Felix because both cats have the same ultimate completing form. That is, both individuals have specifically the same type of substantial form, namely, cat.

On account of this substantial form, both of these individuals fall under the species *cat.* This substantial form provides each individual with what Aristotle calls the "ultimate difference of form," or that final difference providing something with its most specific species.[20] Insofar as this ultimate difference contains all the higher, less specific ones—lest the definition correspond to a real multiplicity—there is a greater univocity at the level of the specific categorical essence. The substantial form actualizes all previous potentialities of matter. Thus, the concept *animal* is less univocal than *cat.* The genus *living thing* is even less univocal than *animal* and so on until we reach the highest genera that admit of no univocal predicates (only, as we have seen, "most general" as univocally predicated of these diverse categories). Only with the most concrete "completing" substantial form, on account of which there is ultimate (read: final) differentiation, do we find true univocity.

The location of ultimate differences in this schema will play an important role in what follows. Let us begin by asking: Are they categorial items? To speak of difference as a quality—as Aristotle does in the *Metaphysics*—would undermine the entire categorial schema.[21] How could something in one category—not to mention an accidental one!—differentiate something in the category of substance? Without rehearsing the full historical scope of this claim here, Scotus's early response should be noted.[22] He recognizes the oddity of calling upon an accident to differentiate other categories, concluding:

> One can say that a differentia in the genus of substance is a substance, since it is essentially (*per se*) the same as that which is essentially (*per se*) a substance. Nevertheless, it is not a species or an individual in the genus of substance, nor is it essentially a substance. Nevertheless, such a predication as "rational is a substance" is truer than this <predication>, "how much as (*quantum*) is a substance," although each one is necessary and each one is accidental (*per accidens*). For the first is accidental (*per accidens*), not since something is a substance to which rational happens <to be accidental> (*cui accidit rationale*), but in which rational essentially (*per se*) inheres (*cui per se inest rationale*).[23]

Because the difference in the genus of substance is the same as that which is *per se* a substance, it too must fall under the genus of substance. For example, the ultimate difference and perfecting form of human (i.e., rational) must be treated as falling under the category of substance. Scotus recognizes the odd placement of such a determining factor in this category. As subsequent chapters will show, Scotus later will rethink this Aristotelian account of ultimate difference and its identification with the substantial form or any categorial item.

The third issue from above concerns the term *substantia*. Although the focus so far has been on substantial forms, the discussion of *ratio substantiae* pertains to all ten categories. As E. J. Ashworth has noted, following Simplicius, οὐσίας/*substantia* in this context means more than substance in the mere categorial sense of the term.[24] Instead, this phrase more broadly includes other modes of being as well. This is important to note, for accidental categories also have a *ratio substantiae*. Thus, we might speak of the univocity of the term *green* as applied to the leaves outside my window and the hue of paint on my walls on account of their shared *ratio substantiae*.

To sum up, by distinguishing the *ratio substantiae* from the essence, Scotus already has made an important move toward his later doctrine of univocity. At this stage of his career, however, he does not yet call upon this distinction in the service of defending the univocity of being.[25] This seems due in part to the fact that he has not yet recognized its full import. Despite clues found in the writings of Olivi, Scotus does not yet know how to think *real concepts* as not mimetically corresponding to real things. That is, he closely (and mimetically) aligns first-intentional, or "real," concepts with the actual structure of external

objects themselves. What Olivi referred to above as *plures rationes reales* that are nonidentical to *plures essentias* will open for Scotus a realm of distinct thought for metaphysics between logical processes of reasoning on the one hand and physical (or metaphysical) actuality on the other.

1.1.2. Equivocity and Analogy

Before turning to a more extended discussion of univocity with respect to being, a word is in order regarding equivocity and analogy. Recall that equivocity is the same name with multiple accounts. Examples of equivocity include calling both a writing utensil and a fenced-in area for animals a *pen*. One and the same term *pen* signifies distinct *rationes,* which have nothing to do with one another. The concept associated with such ambiguous names is a sort of cluster concept insofar as it unites *rationes* that are altogether unrelated, or at best united according to an analogical order. The name obscures what is in reality a clustered diversity of concepts.

This introduces the third type of names, namely, analogical ones.[26] Unlike either univocal or equivocal names, analogical names signify multiple *rationes*, which are unified according to some order or relation. In his early logical writings, Scotus holds that being is analogous only as a real (i.e., physical and metaphysical) concept, but not as a rational (i.e., logical) one.[27] In terms of logic, the concept of being is equivocal insofar as the concept's logical standing does not reflect the signified object's real conditions. Instead, a concept's logical univocity or equivocity reflects the mode of imposition of its associated linguistic term. According to Scotus, analogy pertains only to the real condition of objects (e.g., dependence, likeness, etc.), not to logical imposition.

Analogy provides unity to an otherwise disparate field of *rationes*, which will be important for Aristotle with respect to the science of metaphysics, as will be discussed below. The classic example of analogy is the term *healthy*.[28] "Healthy" signifies bodily well-being, exercise, and lab results, but according to different *rationes.* Unlike in the case of the term *pen*, which signifies the distinct *rationes* simply by chance, the distinct *rationes* of "healthy" are unified around the focal meaning of bodily well-being. That is, exercise is called "healthy" because it *causes* bodily well-being, and MRIs because they *represent* or *report* the same. This order gives meaning and unity to the distinct *rationes*, without which such secondary *rationes* would be ambiguously conceived.

Ambiguity, or obscurity, results from identifying a cluster of concepts by the same name. For example, my writing utensil and a fenced-in area for pigs are called by the name *pen*. Proper names can be ambiguous in this sense. Ambiguity should not be conflated with confusion, which will be discussed below. As Chapter 2 will examine in greater detail, confusion occurs through conceiving a complex concept (i.e., one with multiple notes) as unanalyzed into distinct notes or elements. For example, I might have a confused conception of a horse insofar as I have not analyzed this concept into its distinct elements. A zoolo-

gist, however, could tell us that it is an animal, falling under such and such genus, with such and such differentiating features, thereby resolving the confused concept into its more basic elements, or distinguishing the confusion. Ambiguous concepts, however, must be clarified (not resolved).

An ambiguous concept obscures proper distinctions between multiple *rationes* and thus improperly conceives a multitude of such *rationes* under a single concept. The proper concepts themselves are either analogically related—and thus unified only according to some proportion—or altogether equivocal. In either case, multiple concepts clustered together appear under the grouping of a single name as a single concept. Thus, the addition of proper distinctions (e.g., "bodily" to health or "writing" to pen) does not determine the original concept but, rather, clarifies its ambiguity and separates the cluster into either an organized unity (i.e., the name is used analogically) or altogether distinct *rationes* (i.e., the name is used equivocally). At this stage in Scotus's career, being functions with a certain degree of clustered ambiguity and is a proper concept improperly conceived. It properly applies to one thing more than to another. This will be a crucial distinction to keep in mind, since the later Scotus always treats being as a simply-simple concept incapable of ambiguity, a matter to which I will return below.

1.2. UNIVOCITY OF BEING

Where does Scotus stand with respect to being? Is it univocal, equivocal, or analogical? In his *Questions on the "Categories,"* and in certain versions of the *Questions on the "Metaphysics,"* he rejects the univocity of being.[29] In the former text, he concludes that, logically speaking, being is simply equivocal. He rejects analogical predication with respect to logic (i.e., concepts of the second intention) because concepts are either univocal or equivocal.

For the logician, there is no mediation between univocity and equivocity: a term (*vox*) either refers to a single meaning (*ratio*) and is thus univocal or refers to multiple meanings (*rationes*) and is thereby equivocal.[30] "Being" is an equivocal term in the first mode of equivocation outlined by Aristotle's *Sophistical Refutations*.[31] According to this mode of equivocation, one uses the same name with multiple meanings (e.g., "dog"). The term "dog" means multiple things. A shared attribution to a single meaning does not shine through on the logical level. So too, this is the case with being. An accident's *real dependence* upon inherence in a substance does not directly translate to the *conceptual* inherence of a notion in a subject.

Such logical equivocity, however, does not preclude that *ontologically* or *physically* there is an analogical relation of priority and posteriority between beings: accidental being is dependent upon and posterior with respect to substantial being. When it comes to such concepts of the first intention, analogical unity can be found.[32] That is, just as the zoologist discovers that dogs are more

animals than are sea sponges, and thereby the term *animal* applies to them with a greater priority, so too the metaphysician discovers how substances are more of beings than are positions, thereby deserving analogical priority when it comes to the nomination *being*.

Further examination of Scotus's arguments can be bypassed here. Rather, the central issue to consider is his claim for the lack of isomorphism between logical and real concepts. Although he does not abandon this claim, his transcendental metaphysics at least will revise it in a significant way. The revision is such that certain concepts of the first intention (i.e., simply-simple ones) also operate without reflecting reality as their total cause. As indicated in the Introduction, first-intentional metaphysical concepts are real, but their mark of reality is not won by a secure causal link to external reality (e.g., transmission of form). Instead, the process of abstraction and division is required to produce a real conceptual matrix or grid through which the real object shines forth, albeit nonmimetically.

When Scotus returns to the question of univocity in the *Ordinatio,* the scope and the stakes of the question now expand beyond the categories. He here asks how both God and creatures can fall under a single concept, even one as seemingly broad as that of being. To the quasi-unity of analogy, Scotus contrasts the unity of a univocal concept: "And to avoid disagreement over the word *univocation*, I call a concept univocal if it is one in such a way that its unity is sufficient for a contradiction to arise when it is affirmed and denied of the same thing. Its unity is also sufficient for its use as a middle term in a syllogism so that we may conclude without committing a fallacy of equivocation that when the extremes are united in the middle term having that unity, they are also united among themselves."[33] Whereas one and the same thing can be affirmed and denied of an analogical concept, the unity of univocal concepts prohibits this activity. For example, if the concept of being were analogical, one might say that being, *qua being,* is both inherent and noninherent. That is, it is inherent with respect to accidents and noninherent with respect to substance.

The caveat "qua being" must be added because to immediately divide being, Scotus introduces disjunctive attributes such as finite/infinite, contingent/necessary, and so forth. These disjunctive attributes of being do not violate this principle, for each disjunct remains primarily diverse from the univocal concept of being qua being; that is, they do not clarify an otherwise ambiguous concept of being. The concept of being is necessarily improper.

Before turning to a further explanation of this point, it is important to note that a univocal concept of being must have the same *ratio*—not merely a similar one—when applied to both God and creatures and to each of the ten categories. This entails that God is not *a being* in a more proper or primary sense than is, for example, a being in the category of Position. If this were not the case, the move from the secondary to the primary members of the analogical order would commit the fallacy of equivocation, for then the meaning of the

term would shift between applications. Both beings have the same *ratio* of being; even though this *ratio* does not conceive real essences, it is a real, and not merely a rational, concept.

As will be shown below, Scotus argues that we could not reach knowledge of God or substance based on an analogical concept of being alone. This is due to our incapacity to form concepts of such unknown beings. Before turning to Scotus's argument for the univocity of being, the problems faced by embracing a univocal concept of being must be addressed.

1.2.1. Who's Afraid of Parmenides?

Scotus's early arguments against the univocity of being reveal a deep-seated Aristotelian concern that a single *ratio* over and above the categories would itself function as a "most general genus." For this reason, Aristotle begins *Metaphysics* IV.2 with the oft-circulated line, "Being is said in many ways."[34] Such a response denies the central Parmenidean premise that being is fundamentally one, undivided, and everywhere the same.

Aristotle enumerates the following different (or diverse) ways of beings: some things are beings because they are primary beings; others because they modify primary beings; still others because of generation and corruption; and some because of privation (*steresis*).[35] Such a multivocity of being begins with an assumption of difference (or, more technically, "diversity"): there just are different types of being. From this initial assumption, Aristotle then works to show in what sense these different types of being can be brought together and studied by the single science of metaphysics.

As Aristotle goes on to state: "Now, 'being' has several meanings; but they all have a central reference to some one nature and are not entirely different things that happen to have the same name."[36] Even though we use the name *being* to signify a wild multiplicity of beings (or types of beings), Aristotle hopes that this multiplicity does not relapse into ambiguity or equivocation. What saves their unity and the science of metaphysics, he argues, is this reference to one nature.

The phrase "types of beings," however, risks the suggestion that being itself is a higher genus above these different types, a position that Aristotle is careful to avoid. This would put the question of being back in the realm of Parmenidean monism whereby difference becomes relegated to nonbeing. Instead, Aristotle maintains that the unity of the multiplicity of beings, a unity studied by the science of metaphysics, derives from their rootedness in a reference to a common source (*arche*). Such analogical unity thus brings together multiplicity without collapsing it into undifferentiated ontological identity. Early in his career, Scotus follows Aristotle in arguing that if being were univocal with respect to the ten categories, it would be their genus and they would not be the ten first genera but, rather, would be species falling under one most general genus.[37] His early arguments against univocity are worth noting in light of his later defense of it.

First, Scotus argues that every univocal said about many is said about them under some universal *ratio*: "Every univocal <term that is> said of many, is said of them under the aspect [*ratio*] of some universal; otherwise, these five universals would not sufficiently divide <that which is> 'predicable of many.'"[38] Under such a universal *ratio,* the univocal predicate would need to be one of Porphyry's five predicables: genus, species, difference, property, or accident. Suffice it to say that Scotus rules out the final four, leaving only genus.[39]

Treating being as a highest genus introduces the unwelcome consequence of demoting the categories to species of this higher genus. This would violate the teachings of *Metaphysics* IV.2. Recall that this is the chapter which begins "Being is said in many ways" and then quickly moves to defend the unity of the science of metaphysics. Aristotle argues for the unity on the grounds that, like health, these multiple ways of saying being must have a single point of reference (*pros hen*). That is, the multiplicity of meanings of being all grow out of a single root or source (*arche*), which provides them with their underlying unity. Aristotle (and Scotus following him) thus can maintain an ordered unity to the field of being without capitulating to Parmenidean monism, which Scotus's next two arguments keep clearly in view.

Scotus's second argument follows Aristotle's *Metaphysics* III.3 and V.16 (the latter of which Scotus lists as Book IV). He states:

> Similarly, if these ten <categories> have something univocal that is predicated of them, it is manifest that they are not distinguished through that <thing>; therefore, each one differs from the other through something added. Whatever that may be, it follows that they are different and not in themselves diverse, since "they are the same being in some respect," which is contrary to Aristotle in Bk. IV of the *Metaphysics.*[40]

In *Metaphysics* III.3*,* Aristotle argues that being is predicated of everything, but a genus is not predicated of its differences. Insofar as genera are not understood of differences, but a difference adds something in addition to the genus, being as the highest genus cannot be understood of its differences. They would fall outside the genus of being. For these reasons, Scotus agrees with Aristotle. Being and unity are both understood of differences. If this were not the case, differences would *not be*—an argument to which Scotus will return.

To say that differences *are* and are *one* reflects a deep engagement with Parmenidean monism. Parmenides identified difference with that which is not, or nonbeing. To speak of difference is to speak of nonbeing, thus falling into a realm of oblivion and nonsense. Plato responded to this move by identifying difference with a type of relative being (i.e., not-being-x), which he then enshrines as the Form of the Different.[41] In *Metaphysics* III, when discussing how to overcome difficulties surrounding first principles (*archai*), Aristotle too argues that differences are.[42] Unlike Plato, for whom difference is a hypostatic *eidos*, Aristotle locates difference as something's ultimate, completing form.

Difference is that which provides the individual with its ultimate actuality on account of which it falls under a species. As Aristotle will later explain, this ultimate difference must unite within itself all preceding differences lest the individual be subject to the same complexity as its definition. Instead, as a substantial form, the ultimate difference provides unity for the concrete substance. And so too, as a form, such a difference *is.*[43]

Scotus's third argument holds that if something were predicated univocally of the ten categories, they would not be distinct. This is because, as univocal, they would all share the univocal attribute in common.[44] Thus, if they are to remain distinct, they must differ from one another on account of something additional (*per aliquid superadditum*), something other than being. Scotus notes the problem that such a univocal predicate would entail, namely, that the categories would be *different,* but not *diverse.* That is, their status as highest genera would be subject to an even higher genus, the genus of being. The categories would become species, composed of a common *ratio substantiae* and some formal addition, the addition being that through which they are *properly* definable.

This argument resonates with the long-standing challenge of Parmenides: If being is and nonbeing is not, and besides them there is no third path, then what divides being? If being were common to the categories, they would not differ in terms of being.[45] Thus something else must divide them, that is, something other than being. But what? Whatever determines being—making a *per se* unity with that which is determined—is understood outside an understanding of what it determines (*esse extra intellectum*) and vice versa.[46] Determination augments the determinable. This entails that both the determiner and the determined converge around a *per se* unity and not a mere collection. Determination is outside an understanding (*extra intellectum*) of that which it determines, but not outside the *per se* unity of the thing. Despite this unity, such factors must be logically distinguishable. Otherwise, as Aristotle states in *Metaphysics* VII, the determination would be nugatory because it merely would repeat the genus. For this reason, being cannot divide being because the same thing would be repeated in both the genus and differentia of each category.

On the other hand, nonbeing cannot divide being for two reasons.[47] First, each category would be formally a nonbeing, and everything included under a category would be a nonbeing. That is, unless being is formally included in that which divides the categories, the categories and everything falling under them will be nonbeings. But, we have already seen that being cannot be divided by being. Being is not formally included in its differences, and therefore the differences must be nonbeings. This leads to the second reason disqualifying nonbeing as a divider. That is, we would be led to a contradiction, since a category would be "a nonbeing being." This is a quandary, then, if being is univocally common to the categories. Matters get even worse when this applies to God.

1.2.2. God and Creatures

If being were a univocal concept of the first intention, then it seems that it would conceive or pick out a common element shared between God and creatures and between all ten categories. The univocal concept of animal, for example, corresponds to the common element of animality shared between diverse species on account of which they are unified into a genus.[48] If the concept of being likewise picked out a real element of being-ness shared between God and creatures—and also between the ten categories—a number of negative consequences would result.

First, just as animality corresponds to the determinable element of a species, determined by its specific difference, so too being would be a determinable element *in potency* to some actualizing factor whereby God *differed* from other beings. Second, as different, God's radical transcendence would be undermined. God would be just one more being in a real community of beings. Finally, divine simplicity would be ruptured.

Scotus recognizes that community seems incompatible with singularity, in particular with the radical singularity of God.[49] Were we to really conceive God in common with creatures, then, it seems, God would really share some common feature with them. Such an objection against divine simplicity states: "If the divine essence, which through itself is a this, can have a concept common to it and a creature, that concept not only would be caused by the operation of the intellect, because then it would be only a rational concept. Thus, something else must concur as an object. Therefore, that common concept is real, which entails that God has something real in which he agrees with a creature and in which he differs, which does not accord with divine simplicity."[50] A real common concept of being seems to entail a real something in God shared with creatures. Such a real something (i.e., common element) complicates divine simplicity's radical, singular, otherness. Furthermore, we would need to find differentiating elements on account of which God differs from other beings. This brings us to the second problem from above.

The second problem again concerns the differentiating factor of being. This problem of what divides being has been called "Parmenides's quandary." That is, are such differences themselves beings or are they nothing? The logic of Parmenidean monism allows for no third path. Plato and Aristotle struggled to find one, albeit unsuccessfully, insofar as they did not respond directly to Parmenides but went around him. On the one hand, if such differences fall under the concept of being, then on account of what do they differ? An infinite regress ensues. On the other hand, however, if the differentiating factors are not beings, then are they nothing? And how can nothing, which *is not*, divide being? It is nothing. Again, one sees why Aristotle and others opt for the thesis that "being is said in many ways," whereby they begin with the diversity of being and subsequently seek to explain its unity.

By beginning with a unified concept of being, Scotus faces the reverse problem: Given divine simplicity, how can our concepts be about God and yet contain a common element shared with creatures? To what reality in God can such a concept correspond if there is just God? Furthermore, given such a common concept of being, what can divide this concept that does not already fall under it? To resolve these issues, Chapter 2 will investigate how concepts in general function according to Scotus, as well as how the concept of being in particular functions.

1.3. AQUINAS AND HENRY ON ANALOGY

Before turning to Scotus's arguments for univocity, a brief word must be offered on the analogical theories of Thomas Aquinas and Henry of Ghent. While this review is by no means comprehensive, it is necessary to help frame Scotus's account of univocity and to highlight his arguments against analogy. While more directly targeting Henry's account, Scotus's arguments are equally applicable to Aquinas's position. The early Thomist Thomas of Sutton will also be considered in order to highlight the important connection between analogy and participation.

1.3.1. Aquinas

Of the copious literature written about the doctrines of Aquinas, his theory of analogy figures prominently.[51] Thus, what follows will be but a brief overview for the purposes of setting up a dialogue with Scotus. To begin, a point of contention can be settled. Besides a seemingly isolated occasion of defending analogy of proportionality in *De veritate* (ca. 1256), Aquinas advocated for analogy of attribution or proportion. Analogy of proportionality can be summarized as follows: *a* is to *b* as *c* is to *d*. For example, vision is to physical sight as understanding is to intellectual sight.[52] The advantage of such a form of analogy is that it draws no direct comparison between the related terms. Rather, the relation is between the two proportions.

The reasons why Aquinas might have changed his mind cannot be considered here: instead, the focus must remain on his analogy of attribution.[53] As he often explains in his discussions of analogy of attribution, two things are said to be *analogous* in one of two ways: either as they both relate to a common third (i.e., many to one) or as one of them relates to the other and receives its *ratio* from the first (i.e., one to another).[54] An example of the first kind of analogous predication is predicating "*ens*" of both quality and quantity in reference to substance, as accidents are said "to be" only in relation to substance; or, to mention another example, as medicine and urine are both called "healthy" in relation to the end of health in the body.[55] This type of predication of two things to a third cannot hold for creatures and God, although it can be what holds between creatures themselves in reference to God. Otherwise this bond

of analogy would be *prior* to both God and creatures, and this common third would constitute the *ratio* of both finite *and* infinite being. Thus, the analogy between God and creatures must be of the latter sort, insofar as the being of creatures references God's being, but the reverse does not hold. This means that only one side constitutes the *ratio* under which a multiplicity is linked, but the multiplicity in no way coconstitutes the *ratio.*

In his *Metaphysics* commentary, Aquinas further explains how metaphysics treats such a subject that is said in many ways.[56] Although this science considers a multiplicity of beings (privation, accidents, etc.), its unity derives from ordering a diversity to some one thing.[57] Unlike univocity, which predicates a term according to entirely the same account or *ratio* (e.g., "animal" of a horse and an ox) or equivocity, which predicates the same term according to entirely different meanings (e.g., "dog" of the animal and the star), analogy predicates the same term according to accounts partly diverse, but partly not diverse (*rationes quae partim sunt diversae et partim non diversae*).[58]

Analogical accounts are partly diverse insofar as they imply diverse relationships. On the other hand, they are the same insofar as these diverse relationships refer to one and the same thing (*ad unum aliquid et idem*). Diversity becomes analogous or proportional to this single point of reference as introduced by Aristotle in *Metaphysics* IV.2. A multiplicity thus can be measured and ordered in reference to a unifying source. As Aquinas states: "That one to which diverse relations refer in analogy, is one in number, and not only one in account (*ratio*), which is oneness designed by the name univocal. But still [Aristotle] says that even if being is said in many ways, it is not said equivocally, but with respect to one. This is not one that is only one in account, but also one in a definite nature."[59] The measure must be a unified being (*unum numero*), and not simply a unified account (*unum ratione*). This is where Scotus differs from Aquinas in their respective discussions of unity.[60]

For Aquinas, the measure must be a unified being, and not merely a unified account, because it serves to actually (i.e., ontologically and physically) bring together these various senses of being. That is, Aquinas tells us, the manifold of being unites around substance as its subject. The various senses of being are so called on account of their relationship to substance. For example, generation is a being due to termination in a substance, or an accident because it inheres in a substance. In addition, on the vertical axis, all created being (*esse commune*) unites in common reference to *esse ipsum subsistens*.

The role of participation along this vertical axis is brought to light by an early Thomist and critic of Scotistic univocity, Thomas of Sutton.[61] With Sutton, what becomes apparent is this link between analogy and participation, which sometimes gets lost in readings of Aquinas on analogy.[62] Sutton, however, argues that being analogically applies to creatures because their mode of being is delimited by their various modes of participation. He draws on Aquinas's favorite image of light (*lumen*) in air versus light (*lux*) in its source; whereas the latter is bright

by participation, the former is bright by its essence.[63] In a comparable manner, since being is not rooted in the essence of creatures, they possess it in a limited mode, and it applies to them only in an analogical sense.

Of central importance is the role of difference in determining the being of creatures. As Sutton explains: "Essence does not participate in being [*esse*] such that it would have being that is limited through *a difference contracting* [my emphasis] being for constituting an essence. Being would be included in an understanding of the essence such that it would be said to participate in being (i.e., to take a part of it) because being is of its essence, which is limited, just as a species participates in a genus."[64] We ought not to think of creaturely essences as "being + difference," because this would entail that such essences would include being in an understanding of them. (Sutton worries here about making essences eternal.) Rather, being is limited by the essence in which it is received, just as light (*lux*) is diffused by being received in transparent bodies.

Following Aquinas's argument in *De ente,* Sutton maintains that what characterizes the being of creatures is its derivative (i.e., *secundum quid*) manner, just as the illumination of bodies (*lumen*) is not light simply speaking (*lux*).[65] This is because transparent bodies do not have light from their root but must receive it from another. Both created beings and transparent bodies must participate in that which they receive from another. The givers, in this case God and the sun, possess being and light essentially, and not in a univocal manner with the recipients. Thus, Aquinas and Sutton maintain that rather than sharing some common core that must then be differentiated, the being of creatures simply differs from that of God and yet retains a trace of the divine. The metaphysics of participation underwrites a real difference between things that somehow remain related. I will return to this issue in Chapter 3 when considering the metaphysical ground of diversity according to Aquinas.

1.3.2. Henry of Ghent

Even more than Aquinas, Henry of Ghent was a central target of Scotus's critique of analogy. As Section 1.4 will discuss, Scotus rejected Henry's attempt to bridge *ens infinitum* and *ens finitum* by means of an analogical concept or *ratio.* Though his reconstruction of Henry's argument is at times wanting, Scotus mounts a significant challenge to the "quasi-oneness" of the latter's common analogical notions.[66] That is, while Henry eschews the robust oneness of univocity, his move between conceptual orders nevertheless needs to establish some kind of unity in order to avoid equivocation.

Henry argues that being does not signify one intention (*intentio*) common to substance and accident but, rather, signifies each of the ten categories separately. Because creature and creator agree even less in their *rationes essendi,* being (*esse*) is not something real which they share. Being (*ens*) is not predicated univocally, nor equivocally by chance, but rather in the middle way of analogy. So far, everything seems familiar. But what Henry argues next is unique to his

view of analogy. He maintains that there is no concept of *ens simpliciter* apart from proper concepts of being applying either to God or to creatures. (The same argument applies to good, which is his favored term.) The fact that we seem to possess a common conception of being results from our indeterminate conception.[67] But indetermination masks two distinct senses of being. As Henry explains, "It must, nonetheless, be understood that this indetermination with respect to the being of God is other than it is with respect to the being of creatures, because indetermination is twofold: one that is negative, but the other by way of privation."[68] *Ens indeterminatum negative* is proper to God, whereas *ens indeterminatum privative* is proper to creatures.

"Privative indeterminateness" means that being is indeterminate insofar as it is determinable; that is, it is lacking in determination. Negative indeterminateness, however, is indeterminate insofar as it is indeterminable on account of its perfection. The two senses of indeterminateness do not share any common meaning, for then being would be a univocal concept. *Ens indeterminatum negative* applies exclusively to God and is thus a proper concept. It is also a simple concept insofar as it not composed of multiple conceptual notes.[69] Nothing added could further determine it.

But if it is not only a simple concept but also a proper one, how then do we acquire such a concept if not from creatures? Following Augustine, Henry answers: "You understand this good and that good. Understand good without qualification, and you will have understood God. Similarly, if you understand this being and that being and if you understand being without qualification, you understand God, and you do this by conceiving being without qualification and indeterminately by the indetermination of negation, as it is said."[70] The idea here seems to be that the mind has a concept of indeterminate being apart from this or that being (or this or that good).[71] Further, although this concept applies to creatures in a proper sense (i.e., able to be determined, and therefore indeterminate by privation), in another sense, such indetermination applies properly to God. The concept of being (or good) is analogous because it contains these two distinct senses. There is a sense of being proper to God and a sense of being proper to creatures. While these two concepts represent two diverse sorts of being, our cognition confusedly clusters or bundles them together. They are, Henry tells us, very close (*proximi sunt*) to each other.[72] But why does Henry think that the intellect can "run through" from privative indeterminateness to maximal negative indeterminateness?[73]

Various commentators have noted that Scotus misreads Henry's warning at this point as an invitation.[74] That is, Henry notes that our intellect conceives of the two different and distinct concepts *in a confused way as one.* Such a confused unification, however, would make analogy into a type of crypto-univocity. Henry is not advocating for such a confused unification, however, but rather is warning against it. This clustered ambiguity was discussed above when equivocity and analogy were first introduced. Being simply, or good simply, is not a

common concept shared between the being of God and the being of a creature; rather, such a concept operates disjunctively: either a concept of a thing that is God or a concept of a thing that is a creature, but not something common to both.[75] Be that as it may, in what sense are the two concepts proximate to one another by attribution?

Henry speaks of an agreement of imitation on account of which the being of creatures is like the being of God.[76] That is, all created being bears an imitative trace of its higher source.[77] Insofar as they exist, creatures are likenesses (*effigies*) of God, whose forms (like all good copies) clamor (*clamant*) that they have been made by God, but that they are not God.[78] Because creatures do not share a form with God, they do not have an intelligible content (*ratio*) in common.[79] The two concepts, while remaining distinct in their intelligible content, nevertheless maintain such proximity. For this reason, they are analogical and not merely equivocal. On these grounds, Henry holds that an analogical relation is preserved. And yet, one might wonder with Scotus whether such imitative unity can avoid crypto-univocity. Moreover, without a disjunctive attribute of a single univocal concept (i.e., being is *either* finite *or* infinite), doesn't Henry's disjunction (i.e., either finite being or infinite being) collapse into equivocity? With these questions in mind, we now turn to Scotus.

1.4. WHY UNIVOCITY?

The various forms of analogy considered above share the commitment that there is enough variation in intelligible content between the concept of being as applied to God and the concepts of being applied to creatures to warrant multiple concepts. If these are in fact distinct concepts, however, some accounting is in order. That is, how do we "evacuate" (*suffodere*) a concept applicable to God from content derived from creatures or of substance from accidents?[80] If only accidents immediately move our intellect, how do we produce concepts that share nothing in common with the source material? Our intellect would need to produce a concept or intelligible content of a completely different sort (*alterius rationis)* than that with which it began. The formation of analogical concepts, it seems, engages in a sort of concept laundering whereby the intellect derives content from this side of creation, but through a process of purification it produces a concept applicable exclusively to God (or substance).

This section will examine how Scotus argues against analogy by showing how it leads to the unknowability of God and substance. As will be shown, both Aquinas's and Henry's accounts, despite important differences, engage in an unwarranted process of "concept laundering." "Concept laundering" means transitioning from one *ratio* to another without a unity sufficient to warrant such a move. That is, the content is derived from a certain source (i.e., creatures); then, through an illegitimate laundering process, its origins are obscured in order to circulate the purportedly new content in another realm (i.e.,

the divine or substance). Conceptual content borrowed from creatures (or accidents) is maximized or intensified and passed off as applying exclusively to God (or substance). Such a transition, however, requires the mediation of a univocal concept of being.

1.4.1. No Cognition of Substance

According to Scotus, when it comes to the move from accidents to substance, or from creatures to God, only univocal conceptual unity suffices for such a move. Analogy commits an act of concept laundering. This can be seen in the case of needing to infer substantial essences from their manifest accidental forms.[81] But without a univocal concept of being to mediate such inference, Scotus asks, how could we reason to substances?

Substances do not immediately move the senses and so leave no distinct impression on the intellect.[82] We know this, Scotus tells us, because neither our senses nor our intellect registers when a substantial change has occurred. Scotus provides several arguments to show that we immediately cognize and are acquainted with sensory accidents, not the real essences or individuating features of the substances underlying such accidents.

Consider the Eucharist. We humans sense the accidents of bread and yet fail to perceive the no-longer-present intention of whatever substance underlies them.[83] When bread has been transubstantiated into the body of Christ, our accompanying cognition remains unaltered.[84] This shows that the substance itself makes no direct impression on the senses or the intellect. So too, Scotus speculates, if God were to show us the human essence unmediated by its accidental qualities, we would fail to recognize it.[85] This is because we normally recognize such substances based on a description of their accidental profile.

Scotus considers the objection that we do not reason from accident to substance, but rather substance is simultaneously cointended along with accidents.[86] He asks whether such an insight into substances themselves cannot be chalked up to intentions (*intentiones*) not immediately sensed, but perceived by our estimative faculty. Such a faculty, which we share with animals, would grasp a substantial intention subtending the immediately impressed profile of accidents. But Scotus discounts this possibility. He uses a thought experiment of a lamb whose mother's sensible accidents were miraculously transfigured into that of a predatory wolf. Would the little lamb flee its now-transfigured mother? Scotus asserts that it would, which shows that the lamb does not estimatively intend substance apart from accidents. We too are like the little lambs who would flee from their mothers if their mothers took on the accidental profile of a predator.[87]

Instead, we need to discursively reason from the accident to substance (or from creatures to God) by mediation of a univocal concept of being. That is, we know substantial essences based on complex descriptions, whose only quidditative term is *being*: "But we conceive nothing as a 'what' or 'quid' except

being."[88] Beyond the concept of being, nothing more special is known about the quiddity of substances, either separate or material ones.[89] To the concept of being, we attach what we hope to be a definite description. Scotus states: "But to 'being' itself we conjoin positive or privative accidents that we know from the sense, and we make from being and many such accidents a single description, the whole of which is never found except in such a species."[90] The one description made from the concept of being plus "many accidents" is a complex concept. For example, a stone is a being with such and such sensible accidental qualities.

This unique profile of accidents serves as a kind of definite description, which we use as a sign of the underlying difference. Scotus tells us: "Hence, where there is *some difference* in the underlying nature, there accidents are varied and joined in *diverse ways,* and thus also the underlying substrate of color or whiteness is different depending on whether they are in the wood or stone."[91] Both wood and stone can share many of the same accidents; however, they support different conjunctions of accidents. As Scotus explains, whiteness when conjoined with such and such other accidents takes on a unique profile. Of that which underlies such a profile of accidents, at most we can say, "It is a being." As Peter King notes with respect to substances, without a univocal concept of being, we could not even cognize a "something I know not what."[92] The univocal concept of being is necessary to form such a proper description of substances.

1.4.2. No Direct Cognition of God

A similar predicament applies to our knowledge of God. Scotus states:

> If we are speaking of a concept that is simply-simple and cannot be split up into diverse concepts, we cannot have a proper concept of God without every concept of this sort abstracted from a creature being univocally common to himself and the creature. But since we cannot distinguish him from what is not him if we remain with such a concept, we must be able to distinguish him through a concept that is proper, but this takes place only after another concept—or other concepts that are unqualifiedly simple and common to him and creatures—first qualifies such a simply simple common concept and thus it becomes proper to God, so that it is not common to any creature, although such concepts are all abstracted from creatures.[93]

Chapter 2 will return to the issue of simple-simplicity. For now, the issue to be noted is that the abstraction and simplification of our concepts does not lead to their elevation (i.e., making them proper to God). Without a univocal concept of being, the wayfarer could not know God. But one and the same concept of being applies both to creatures and to God. There is no change in its meaning.

Scotus shows this through a *reductio ad absurdum,* which follows as a consequence entailed by such an attempt for natural knowledge of God through analogy:

> But if you say that the formal notion of things that apply to God is different [from that of things as they are in creatures], the unacceptable consequence is that it is impossible to conclude something about God on the basis of a notion proper to these things as far as they are in creatures because [in that case] the formal notions of what applies to God and of what is in creatures are completely different, and from the notion of wisdom that we grasp from creatures we will no more conclude that God is formally wise than that God is formally a stone. Indeed, it is possible to form a concept other than that of a created stone [namely, the concept that is an idea in God] and to that concept of a stone, as it is an idea in God, this [created] stone is related by attribution. And according to this analogous concept we could formally say "God is a stone," just as we say "God is wise" according to the relevant analogous concept.[94]

Every inquiry regarding God presupposes the intellect's having a univocal concept taken from creatures. Without it, how could we say that God is a being? Being would mean something different in each case. One could conclude with the same amount of justification "God is most stone."

Scotus gives the example of divine wisdom and human wisdom: when we say "Solomon is wise" and "God is wise," the intelligible content in each case would differ. Human wisdom and divine wisdom (*per analogiam*) do not share the same *ratio.* But if we begin with the former concept (i.e., human wisdom), which cannot be broken up into a univocal and a differential concept—the pure perfection wisdom and its modification human—how does removing all finite measures give us the latter (i.e., divine wisdom), *which is of a different sort* (i.e., *ratio*)? Analogy leads to the destruction of theology according to Scotus.[95] We no more have an elevated concept of "divine being" (or "divine wisdom") with its own *ratio* than we have of "divine rockness" because neither can be derived from the *ratio* of human wisdom if the latter is treated nonunivocally.

The concept of wisdom—or of being—taken from finite creatures once purified by remotion does not leave behind a *ratio* of a different sort. Instead, either it provides a concept attributable to God univocally, or nothing at all is left besides an equivocal *trace*. If God leaves behind but a trace, then we may as well say he is most stone as he is most being. Scotus clearly opts for the first prong. Being qua being stands as the primary object of the transcendental science of metaphysics.[96] It is that concept without which we could not reach cognition of God or substance.

For Aquinas, being (*ens*) is the first object of the intellect by way of origin.[97] And yet, it is something of an ambiguous concept. If the concept of being from which we begin, however, is proper only to creatures (i.e., *ens commune*, and only to their sensible accidents at that), and this concept does not univocally extend to God (and substance), then there can be no separation of the concept from itself: *being* and *finite being* are synonymous. An *intensification* of the lat-

ter in order to remove finite "impurities" would destroy the concept itself. The explanatory gap between the two *rationes* cannot be bridged by analogy.

The difference, however, between Scotus's view and Aquinas's is not the taking of the concept from creatures but, rather, in the latter's subsequent attempt to elevate the abstracted concept.[98] That is, in abstracting a concept of being from creatures (or more specifically, from sensible accidents), proponents of analogy then attempt to distinguish the concept of being as it applies to God from the concept of being as it applies to everything else, its original source. Analogy absconds with being once it has reached the measure proper to God and enshrines it in its purified form as the *primary analogatum* of all beings. This, however, is an act of concept laundering.

Concept laundering means that the origin of intelligible content is hidden or obscured in order to make it appear proper to these so-called *primary analogata*. The formation of proper concepts without a univocal component, however, presents a problem. A created essence cannot contain a conceptual note proper only to God in the absence of God's direct causal influence. Scotus argues that concepts can only give rise to that which they contain essentially or virtually.[99] Essential containment means one conceptual note presupposes another, even if the latter is not explicit. For example, a species essentially contains its genus; or, more importantly for our purposes, all concepts contain being. Virtual containment means having the power (*virtus*) to produce something else, as an essence produces an attribute, or as premises produce a conclusion and thereby virtually contain it.

But neither of these modes of containment yields a concept proper to God. Despite Henry's clever tactics for moving between the two orders, a *ratio* proper to God cannot form an essential part of creaturely *rationes*. If the *ratio* is proper to God, this means it can't be shared or communicated to another. Likewise, if our various concepts of *ens finitum* derived from creatures virtually contained *ens infinitum,* this would mean that one *ratio* gives rise to a completely different *ratio* unless, of course, we presuppose some univocal component. Thus, what "shines forth" (*relucens*) in a phantasm or an intelligible species cannot cause an analogical concept proper to God.[100] A concept, even stretched to its furthest potential, only represents that with which it shares a common element, even if only transcendentally.[101] For this reason, it cannot represent something with an altogether diverse *ratio*.

Given the failure to procure a simple concept proper to God by means of the content derived from creatures, Scotus sees the only other option as discursive reasoning. But discursive reasoning does not help those who would defend analogy. As Scotus spells out in the *Ordinatio*: "For if God is known in that way through creatures, one must pre-have [*praehabere*—translation modified] some concept of God first toward which discursive reasoning can advance, since discursive reasoning presupposes some concept of the final term toward which it is heading [*termino ad quem*]."[102] All discursive reasoning, he

maintains, presupposes a simple apprehension (*notitiam*) of that to which we discursively reason.[103] As a process "leading to this from this," discursive reasoning must presuppose terms between which it moves.[104] It does not, however, itself yield such simple notions.

Through our abstraction from the sensible data, the discovery of simple (and simply-simple) terms occurs prior to discursive reasoning. If this were not the case, reasoning would leap to an unknown conclusion without the mediation of the known. Discursive reasoning then concludes something about the presupposed simples according to a new composition; it is not itself a discovery platform for unknown elements.[105] We discursively conclude, for example, that "some being is infinite (or first)."[106]

No finite intellect can reason from itself to cognition of God without something to mediate the two orders. All discursion presupposes simple notions of that to which it discursively reasons.[107] A pre-possessed simple note representing God, however, must be either shared in common with creatures or proper to God alone. Any conceptual note shared in common between God and creatures would be a univocal concept, which both Aquinas and Henry deny.

Scotus's theory of univocity can bypass these cognitive dead ends by maintaining the following: True, a proper concept of God requires discursion, leading to "hoc ex hoc."[108] Such is the nature of wayfarer *scientia,* which uses common transcendental concepts to form proper, yet complex, conceptions of God. Our intellect leads us from this one to that one on account of common content: we presuppose cognition of the *terminus ad quem* (i.e., God) in the form of common univocal simples abstracted from sensible accidents (e.g., the concept of being). From such simply-simples, we then reason to proper, yet complex, concepts of God (e.g., *ens infinitum*).

In short, the problem is not borrowing content from creatures to form a concept applicable to God or substance; the problem instead is in the elevation of the concept without a common concept to bridge the finite and infinite. For Scotus, being provides such a concept. To achieve cognition of any of these things, we must be able to procure a univocal concept of being from that with which we are acquainted, namely, sensory accidents. If God or substance were beings in an analogically different sense than those accidental beings capable of moving our senses, then God and substance would remain unknown to us. To obtain a proper concept of them, the human mind would need extrasensory illumination, which Scotus denies.[109] Theology and natural science would perish if there were not a single, univocal intention of being.[110] Without a shared, univocal *ratio,* the application of a term derived from creatures to God, or a term derived from accidents to substance, would be guilty of concept laundering.

1.5. THALES'S MISTAKE

In addition to the arguments from the unknowability of substance and of God considered above, Scotus leverages another argument for the univocity of be-

ing. He argues that being is the adequate object of the intellect, the first object of distinct cognition.[111] As Chapter 2 will discuss, the concept of being is present already in sensation.[112] As a potency, like sight or hearing, our intellect inclines toward being as its first natural object.[113] If our intellect were restricted to having material quiddity as its object, as Aquinas and others argue, either the blessed in heaven also have such as their adequate object or their intellect is not the same potency as ours.[114] Either consequence is unacceptable according to Scotus: the former, insofar as this would limit the beatific vision to knowledge of material essences, and the latter, insofar as it would require the introduction of a completely new power.

Although being is the first adequate object of the intellect, insofar as only natural (as opposed to supernatural) causes operate, the natural object *within reach* of our intellect is only finite being.[115] This is why our intellect will push on further until it reaches something fully satisfying to it: *ens infinitum* as present and existing.[116] The science of metaphysics, however, studies being qua being as the first and adequate object of the intellect without busying itself with these other matters.[117]

Being emerges as the first adequate object of the intellect insofar as one can know being before one knows anything else about the thing in question.[118] To demystify what may sound like an obscure piece of metaphysical insight, Scotus means simply that prior to and without knowing the proper determination of anything, we can know that *it is a being* (*ens*). This is one of his central arguments for the univocity of being: one can be certain that something is a being, and yet be mistaken as to its declension as a being.

We know that being is univocal insofar as one can be certain that something is a being, and yet not know its further determinations. Each of the early "pre-Socratic" philosophers was certain that his first principle was *a being*: water, air, number, etc. None of them erred in this respect, according to Scotus. And yet such conceptions—in being false—lacked certitude about whether such beings were *first* or secondary beings, and likewise whether they were created or uncreated (beings). Thus, the fact that Thales believed water to be the first, uncreated principle of everything else in no way undermined his certitude that water was a being.[119] Despite our ignorance of something's determination (e.g., whether a given being is primary or secondary), we still retain an equally applicable conception of it *as a being*: thus, if it turns out as one rather than the other (e.g., primary as opposed to not primary), we still retain the *same conception* of it as a being, but add the proper *determination*. We divide the world in a more perfect fashion.

If the concept of being that Thales et al. applied to their respective first principles were not univocal, then they would have been wrong regarding such principles' status as beings. Thales clearly recognized water as a being, erring only in failing to recognize this being's correct determination. If such a concept of being were not univocal, then the recognition of water as a secondary being (or first only in the sense of material primacy) would introduce a *completely*

new concept. But he was not mistaken to think that water was *a being,* but only in thinking that it was *primary.* To further understand this point, an exploration of the role of being as a real concept is in order.

CONCLUSION

This chapter has examined what Scotus means by univocity, equivocity, and analogy, and in particular what he means by the univocity of being. Central to this examination was encountering the numerous problems faced by the would-be defender of univocity. Thus, as shown through the exploration of the doctrines of Thomas Aquinas and Henry of Ghent, analogy offered a more agreeable position. Scotus, however, provided several key arguments to show the flawed basis of analogy; namely, that without univocal concepts—being, in particular—our intellect remains unable to form concepts about God or substance. Furthermore, even when one is mistaken regarding the declension of a being (e.g., when Thales took water to be primary), nevertheless they are certain that the being in question is a being. On this basis, Chapter 2 will explore how Scotus defends univocity of being given this multitude of challenges. Of particular importance will be defending the claim for univocity as both real and as a concept.

CHAPTER TWO
THE REAL CONCEPT OF BEING

The previous chapter established the differences between univocity, equivocity, and analogy, in particular with respect to the concept of being. Despite Scotus's arguments against being as an analogical concept, how he avoids the pitfalls surrounding univocity remains to be seen. The primary goal moving forward will be to show how Scotus understands being as a *real* univocal concept without inviting such unwanted consequences outlined above. To this end, Philotheus Boehner provides us with an initial clue: "For the concept of being is not a logical one—for then it would be a second intention—but a *conceptus realis,* that is, a concept of reality. But, and this matters, it is a concept and not reality."[1] The emphasis here should be placed on being as a common and univocal *concept* and not itself a real thing or component of things. It is a *real* concept, however, and not merely a logical one. Being is an improper, yet distinct, concept underlying (yet implied by) the confused input of sensory data and our initial confused conceptions. This chapter will show that being is the ultimate transcendental *quid* from which we form complex conceptual descriptions of God, of natural kinds, and of individuals falling beyond the scope of our immediate accidental acquaintance.

Section 2.1 explains what Scotus means by a real concept along with other key terms related to concepts. These include their confusion/distinctness, simplicity/complexity, and simple-simplicity/non-simple simplicity, as well as the process of abstraction and division. Here it will be seen how the concept of being emerges as the first simply-simple distinct concept. This sets up the pivotal discussion in Section 2.2 of being as transcendental *quid* and ultimate difference as transcendental *quale*, which forms the foundation for all that follows. Section 2.3 explores this further by examining the double primacy of being. This is followed in Section 2.4 by a return to the charges against univocity of being and Scotus's response to them. Section 2.5 shows how previous metaphysicians inadequately attempted to divide being in terms of beings. Overall, this chapter seeks to establish the functional role of the concept of being as a foundational *quid* for the *quale* of an ultimate difference.

2.1. REAL CONCEPTS

This investigation will begin *in medias res*, bypassing the acts of sensation, memory, and imagination, and picking up when the possible intellect first confusedly apprehends its object.[2] Any discussion of the distinction between abstractive and intuitive cognition also will be bypassed here; note only that

the discussion begins with abstractive cognition.[3] We begin with the confused apprehension or understanding by means of an intelligible species.

The first act of confused understanding, or confused conception, results from the conjunction of the agent intellect and a phantasm. Scotus states: "The causes causing the first act of confused understanding are natural. They are phantasms and the agent intellect."[4] That is, the agent intellect works with a phantasm to imprint an intelligible species upon the possible intellect. There is a confused cognition of the most specific species (*speciei specialissimae*), which the agent intellect and phantasm coproduce. Scotus provides the example of arriving at a confused and indistinct cognition of whiteness. Even at this stage of confused cognition—a phrase to be defined below—a real concept of being is present.[5] What does it mean to call something a real concept?

2.1.1. Being as a Real Concept

In claiming that being is a real concept, Scotus reminds us of this difference between a real concept and a rational one: "It should be said that the concept of being common to God and to a creature is a real concept, because every concept that is imprinted in the possible intellect from the agent intellect and phantasm *or included in a concept imprinted by them* [my emphasis] is real. That concept caused by the comparing of one concept with another made by the intellect is rational."[6] The caveat "or included in it" must be highlighted because the concept of being is not primary by way of origin (i.e., genetically). That is, the first simple concept imprinted in the intellect does not yet *distinctly* include being. When the farmer recognizes different shades of green, or when the geometer contemplates a line, they are not yet conceiving being; and yet, even these initial concepts include being.[7] The genetically subsequent distillation of being as a simply-simple concept cannot be considered mere intellectual fashioning or production (*facta per intellectum*). Were this the case, being would be merely a rational concept produced by the intellect comparing concepts with one another (*causatur a collatione* [. . .] *unius conceptus alteri*). Instead, being is a real concept.

The concept of being is included in the first concepts by way of origin but must be abstracted from the sensory accidents with which we are acquainted in simple apprehension. As discussed in the Introduction, what secures the connection between the mind and the world is not an identical form *in mente* and *in re*. Instead, the intellect must draw inferences on the basis of such confused cognition. This means that around the nucleus of being, we build a complex description from which we infer the existence of an underlying substances or God.[8] Unlike Aristotelian *nous,* simple apprehension does not yield an epistemic foundation but, rather, marks confused cognition in need of conceptual resolution (i.e., abstraction and division).

Fully resolved concepts can reflect reality, not because of a one-to-one mimetic correspondence of formal exchange. Instead, the process operates

for Scotus along the lines of articulating confused terms into distinct ones (abstraction) and then combining these distinct terms into complex matrices (division). Together, the complex conceptual web enables the intentional object to "shine-through." Thoughts can be measured by their objects without being identical to them, as seen in terms of the Aristotelian mechanism of formal exchange. As will be seen, each distinct conceptual note does not need to correspond to a distinction or division within reality in order for the total concept to adequately grasp the reality conceived. Before turning to this process below, a further word is in order about simple apprehension.

In their primacy of generation, the first concepts that emerge in our intellect are of the *most specific species*. From out of our lived-experiences of colored objects, for example, the concepts of white, black, red, etc. emerge as recognizable, yet confused, color concepts. These are usually generated from the sensations that most forcefully strike our senses and command our attention.[9] Scotus uses the example of the tactile feeling of pain associated with a foot-hurting rock. Even the farmer (*rusticus*), Scotus maintains, recognizes that "all whitenesses are similar" and that "white and black are not the same."[10] Such an individual can achieve such recognition without cognizing that all such colors agree generically (i.e., the subgenus of color qualities) or being able to give a definition of this or any given color. These generically primary concepts of the most specific species are simple concepts—but not simply-simple ones.

The farmer can successfully use names to distinguish between various animals, plants, and soils, even though he or she might not be able to define these objects.[11] The farmer—and most people for that matter—has an "I know it when I see it" acquaintance with such objects. Scotus tells us that such simple apprehension functions like a name: it picks out the thing without articulating its distinguishing characteristics. Through a process of abstraction, however, one can begin to distinguish even more conceptual elements contained therein: gray, for example, is a color of such and such a range, and so on. This is the mark of what Scotus dubs "non-simple simplicity."

2.1.2. Simple and Complex, Simply-Simple, and Non-Simply Simple

A simple concept, Scotus states, is one conceived with a single understanding or act of understanding.[12] He contrasts conceptual simplicity with non-simplicity or complexity, which he defines as those concepts conceived by multiple acts of the intellect.[13] Complex concepts require multiple acts of the intellect to conceive them. Scotus gives "pale human" as one such example: the intellect grasps paleness with one act and humanness with another and composes them into the complex concept of "pale human." As will be shown, all proper concepts of God, of natural kinds, or of individuals require a complex act of cognition.

Simple concepts can be either simply-simple or non-simply simple. Simple-simplicity entails an elemental or atomic status for the concept such that it cannot be further resolved or broken down. Non-simple simplicity, such as that

of whiteness or greenness described above, allows for reduction into simpler and ultimately simply-simple conceptual elements. Scotus explains: "A simply-simple concept is one that is not reduced to a prior or simpler one, and not resolved into many concepts. *Such are the concept of being and the concept of ultimate difference*."[14] This final sentence will form the core of what follows.

Our first concepts by way of origin (i.e., genetic primacy) are simple, but not simply-simple. That is, the individuals or singulars of the most specific species move the senses, whether visually, audibly, or tangibly.[15] Whatever individual most strongly moves our senses, its species is first in the order of confused cognition. When the agent intellect imprints the concept of the individual's species upon the passive intellect, the passive intellect grasps this concept according to a single act of the intellect. And yet, this species concept can be broken down into conceptual elements or notes, including its genus (*color* in this case) and specific difference (whatever the specific difference of white might be).[16] Our initial grasp of the most specific species of accidents, and even more of substances, leaves much to be desired in the way of clarification. This is what Scotus calls "confused cognition," which he distinguishes from "distinct cognition."[17]

2.1.3. Distinct and Confused Cognition

Something is distinctly cognized if it cannot be broken down into prior conceptual elements. Confused cognition or understanding (*confuse intelligere*), on the other hand, can be resolved into prior and simpler conceptual elements.[18] We recognize something such as a sea sponge as a distinct species, though we are confused as to any number of factors: Is it plant or animal? Is it a herbivore or a carnivore? And so on. Scotus provides the example of the geometer who might recognize the line as line but not yet know or be concerned with its category. Is it a quality or a substance?[19] One can successfully recognize a line without being able to answer such a question. Such generically primary concepts of the most specialized species (e.g., green, hot, human, tree, etc.) enable us, like children, to recognize things according to their common natures. As Scotus states: "Something is said to be conceived confusedly when it is conceived in the way that it is expressed by its name. Something is said to be conceived distinctly when it is conceived in the way that it is expressed by a definition."[20] Just as a child can correctly signify a type of object by a name (e.g., "doggie"), we also can correctly identify, by means of a confused concept, something as a type of object without explicating its distinguishing characteristics.

It must be emphasized that the intelligible species impressed upon the possible intellect, which results in a simple confused concept, is not an immediate insight into the essence of a substance without its mediating accidents. That is, when we possess a simple, yet confused, concept of a substantial essence (e.g., human, cat, tree, etc.), we do not immediately and distinctly grasp the essence itself. Scotus enlists the example of God showing to us the essence human unmediated by accidents; he surmises that we would fail to recognize it.[21]

This consideration is important for at least two reasons: first, it allows Scotus to challenge Aquinas's claim that the quiddities of material substances are the adequate and primary object of our intellect; second, he leverages it to show the necessity of a univocal concept of being derived from the accidents by which we reach knowledge of substances. We must reason to substances using complex descriptions. With this caveat in place, such an initial confused conception can be contrasted with subsequent distinct conception.

A distinct concept requires that the confused concept be broken down into its conceptual elements (i.e., simply-simple concepts) and expressed by a definition. Scotus outlines the process of reaching distinct cognition as follows:

> I say that the confused is of two kinds: the universal whole and the essential whole; accordingly, each is first in its own order. But absolutely first is what is first in the order of cognizing confusedly, for the natural progression from the imperfect to the perfect is through what is intermediate. Cognizing confusedly is a kind of intermediate between not-cognizing and cognizing distinctly. Therefore, cognizing in a confused way comes before any distinct cognition. As for the remark on the cognition of children, I grant that the species is known before the singular (I have said that the species is what is first intelligible [in nn. 73–78]). But the argument is not conclusive with respect to genus and species. For in the order of cognizing confusedly whiteness is actually conceived before color because color as such is known only on the basis of an abstraction that is broader than the abstraction of whiteness from this whiteness. And this broader abstraction is more difficult because it starts from less similar things.[22]

Distinct cognition emerges from out of ignorance with confused cognition as its medium. This occurs through a process of abstraction.

2.1.4. Abstraction and Division

According to Scotus's account of the process of cognition, we move from phantasms representing similar and dissimilar *things* to the ultimate ground of such similarity and dissimilarity in the simply-simple terms of being and ultimate difference: "So being is the first concept that can be conceived distinctly. From this it follows that what is nearer to being is prior [in the case of distinct knowledge] because cognizing distinctly comes about through a definition, which we investigate by a process of division starting from being and leading up to the concept of what is defined. But in division what is first conceived is attained first, like the concepts of genus and difference, in which the more common concept is conceived distinctly."[23] Abstraction is the process of reaching fully resolved simply-simple concepts from out of confused cognition; division is the process of contracting quidditative concepts by means of qualitative ones.[24]

The way of division occurs by the addition of differences to form less common concepts of species. Division allows us to form definitions using fully

resolved, distinct concepts. By using such concepts, we return to a distinct cognition of species, which were originally conceived but only indistinctly.[25] Scotus states: "But when the universal is distinctly cognized, then through division and contraction (i.e., through the addition of differences) there is a return to distinctly cognizing species."[26] Division, as the addition of a differentiator, yields distinct cognition of those objects confusedly cognized in our simple apprehension of the world.

The farmer does not see or cognize *color* or *animal*; he sees the concrete greenness of his crops in full bloom or some goat falling behind the others in the pack. He recognizes, for example, this color as similar to the ones of previous years of good harvest. Human cognition thus begins with the richest and most concrete non-simply simple concepts of the most specialized species. Our intellect cognizes the species indistinctly and confusedly as knowing what is meant by a name. To reach distinct cognition, it must abstract. On this key point, Scotus disagrees with Aquinas's more standard analysis: abstraction leads not to confusion, but to distinction.[27]

This accounts for the difficulty of abstraction.[28] The farmer does not conceive color in general from which he can thus distinguish this or that species of color. Instead, he recognizes *similar* species of color from which he might *abstract* more distinct, and less similar, concepts of color (and even more distinct, and even less similar concepts of its category and categorial mode). The point here is that our most distinct concepts will be most abstract and lacking much (if any) aspect of similarity and dissimilarity. Scotus recognizes that the process of abstraction is difficult because it moves away from similarity and dissimilarity to seek their underlying conceptual foundation. The concepts of being and ultimate difference cannot be represented as subsisting things (or parts of subsisting things) because they are what allow us to cognize the always already differentiated beings of our experience. Insofar as the process of abstraction moves away from (the representational modes of) similarity and dissimilarity, the most abstract terms (i.e., simply-simple concepts) cannot be represented because they underlie representation itself.

Division need not always be into two, as the case of individuation will show.[29] The work of division is to find concordance and to avoid dissonance between conceptual terms. It is to properly and distinctly represent the world of singulars using improper conceptual elements. In his *Duns Scotus's Theory of Cognition,* Richard Cross does well to outline this process, but he does not go far enough.[30] That is, he stops at the point of identifying contrary specific differences instead of highlighting their underlying primarily diverse ultimate specific differences. Contrariety, as we will see in the Chapter 3, is underwritten by primary diversity. That is, two differences are contraries *within* a genus (e.g., white and black) *because* each of their respective ultimate specific differences is primarily diverse. To insist on this point is necessary lest we remain at the level of representable contraries instead of digging deeper to think (although

not represent) ultimate principles of differentiation. The need to insist on the foundational primary diversity of simply-simple concepts will become clear in the following chapters, as will the consequences of Cross's stopping short.

To recap, by abstraction, Scotus means this process of resolving the non-simply simple concepts of confused cognitions into their simply-simple conceptual elements, the first of which is being.[31] Division subsequently "finds its joints," so to speak, in univocal being, which it does using the other simply-simple concepts at its disposal: ultimate differences.[32] Division contracts the most common concepts through the addition of differences. This is the process of "proper division" discussed at the outset of the *Quodlibet* in reference to Solomon's Difficulty.

Our confused cognition of the most specific species is of the richest and most concrete object that strikes the senses. We do not descend from indistinct, generic cognition to distinct cognition of the lowest species but, instead, ascend through the productive work of our agent intellect from confused cognition of a species to distinct cognition of its conceptual terms. Greater distinction, not confusion, comes with abstraction. Although the intellect does not produce the concept of being alone by comparing other concepts, whereby it would be a second-intention concept, it does draw distinctions that are not, strictly speaking, already there in the thing. For this reason, concepts, and in particular simply-simple concepts, are not snapshot replicas of reality. The parts of the map are not iconic depictions of the parts of the thing; only the harmony of the map's structure as a whole indicates an aptitude for existence. To the extent that we might compare this to a mental language, we might say that simply-simple concepts form the deep grammatical structure of our mental language.[33]

2.2. TRANSCENDENTAL *QUID* AND *QUALE*

In order to explain the compositional elements of concepts, Scotus draws a comparison with the act-potency structure of composite things: "Just as a real composite being (*ens compositum*) is composed of act and potentiality, so a composite concept that is *per se* one is composed of a potential concept and an actual concept or of a determinable concept and a determining one."[34] Note that this comparison does not map the act-potency structure of concepts onto the act-potency structure of hylomorphic reality. Instead, it borrows this familiar division to explain something less familiar. Scotus will leverage this distinction to explain the more foundational transcendental act-potency structure of concepts: being as determinable, and ultimate difference as determining. Even hylomorphic parts, as will be seen, must be conceptually resolved in this manner.

Based on this comparison, Scotus argues that just as the unity of composite beings emerges from the actualization of some potency, so too the unity of the aforementioned non-simply simple concepts emerges from the actualization or determination of a determinable concept. The non-simply simple

concepts contain within them more atomic concepts. Composite concepts resolve into more elemental ones, marked by their act-potency structure. The non-simply simple concept greenness, for example, can be resolved into the concept of color, a concept determinable by some determining concept. Often, as in the case of the concept color, our concepts can be even further resolved and ultimately revolved into simply-simple concepts. Simply-simple concepts ultimately stand as the foundation of conceptual unity.[35] Distinct and adequate cognition requires a resolution of concepts into their atomic elements, whereby their functional relation to each other as determining and determined becomes articulated.

Scotus explains the simple-simplicity of concepts as follows:

> Therefore, just as the resolution of composite beings ultimately arrives at simple-simplicity, that is to an ultimate act and an ultimate potency, which are primarily diverse such that nothing of the one includes something of the other. Otherwise, this would not be primarily actuality and that would not be primarily potentiality (that which includes something of potentiality is not primarily actuality). So too every concept that is a non-simply simple concept, but however, is *per se* one, can be resolved into a determinable concept and a determining one. The resolution terminates in simply-simple concepts, that is, in an only determinable concept, which includes nothing determining, and in an only determining concept, which includes no determinable concept.[36]

Like the components that constitute things, the components of non-simply simple concepts relate according to act and potency, or determining and determined. Note that Scotus says there is both a determining concept and a determinable one. They are not elements of a single concept.[37] There must be a simply-simple concept of both being and a simply-simple concept of each ultimate difference together which form a complex concept and form the foundation for distinct cognition. Each simply-simple concept has an irreducible functional role in forming a total conceptual matrix or complex concept. Only when all the elements or notes of this matrix are fully resolved can the intentional object clearly shine forth.

A simply-simple concept is atomic in the sense that it cannot be resolved into anything more elemental.[38] It is functionally basic: either purely determinable or purely determining. The former concept can be considered a purely *quidditative* concept and the latter a purely *qualitative* one, insofar as Scotus expands the more orthodox Aristotelian understanding of these terms. He identifies these simply-simple concepts as being and ultimate difference: "That concept 'only determinable' is the concept of being, and 'only determining' is the concept of ultimate differences. Therefore, they are primarily diverse, that is because one does not include the other."[39] Whereas non-simply simple concepts cannot be conceived without at least implicating other concepts (e.g., the

concept of greenness implicates the concept of color), simply-simple ones are such in virtue of their primary diversity. Before further explaining primary diversity, it is necessary to explain this pair quidditative/qualitative or *in quid* and *in quale.* As will be seen, Scotus greatly expands the scope of these well-known terms.

In quid predication captures the *quiddity* of its subject, whether generically or specifically: "Socrates is a human" or "Socrates is an animal," with "human" or "animal" being predicated *in quid* and according to the mode of subsisting. *In quale* predication, on the other hand, grasps some qualification of the subject.[40] *In quale* predication is denominative insofar as it refers to a modification of something, instead of treating the mode of "something subsisting."[41] Thus, *rational* modifies something, whereas *rationality* notes some subject. As will be seen, being can be predicated of ultimate differences *in quale,* but not *in quid*, insofar as they express purely differential qualification or modifications of being.

Regarding all non-simply simple and complex concepts, in both the *Lectura* and the *Ordinatio*, Scotus distinguishes an essential component, which formally contains being and of which being can be predicated *in quid*, and a differential element or set of elements of which being can be predicated *in quale*.[42] Note that, of the once elusive "differentiator of being," being is included, but only in a certain way. Such differentiators of being fall outside the formal concept of being, and yet are not the nonbeings of which Parmenides warned. This is because these qualitative modifiers express the unmitigated differences of being and yet themselves formally are not and have being predicated of them *in quale*, not *in quid*. They are primarily diverse.

Primary diversity, to which Section 3.4 will devote an extended treatment below, occurs when two items (e.g., things, species, concepts, etc.) share no common or mediating factor between them.[43] They differ without a common identity. This means that neither one can be reduced to the other, nor can they both be reduced to a common third. Two things, for example, are primarily diverse when they share nothing in common. Whereas this square and that circle share the genus of shape in common, and thereby only *differ,* squares and being-to-the-left-of-my-table differ without any common element (at least not immediately) and thereby are diverse. Scotus lists the examples of each one of the ten categories being diverse from the others, as well as God being diverse from all creatures.[44] Simply-simple concepts are primarily diverse insofar as they have an irreducible and functional role in larger conceptual matrices, but they share nothing in common with each other.

Scotus argues that primary diversity is a necessary condition for the parts of anything *per se* one.[45] When parts consist of nothing the same, they are more disposed to constitute something beyond either of the mere parts alone. He does not tell us why, but we can speculate. The addition of identical objects—whether subjectively, specifically, or generically identical—results in more of

the same. For example, the addition of water to water gives us more water. One river flowing into another expands the source but does not emerge as a fundamentally new unity. Whenever two or more things share a common identity, they are not parts of an emergent *per se* unity but, instead, add to their already-existing common identity. Scotus confronts the *aporia* of how multiple units can be added together to constitute a new unity. In a particularly lucid moment, he states: "The question of 'how come?' is perhaps difficult for Plato, but not for those of us who posit some difference and not just the proper attribute [of unity]."[46] That is, to the question, "How come unities added to unities sometimes constitute new unities?," Scotus responds, "Difference." Plato and others err by beginning with already constituted and already differentiated unities (e.g., Forms) without providing an account of their differentiation.[47]

Not to obscure this black box of composition even further, for now the following explanation can be accepted as a placeholder: primarily diverse, simply-simple elements are characterized by either pure determinability or pure determination.[48] Their commingling cannot be mediated by a common identity or unit of measurement. Given their lack of common currency, simply-simple items as either determinable or determining added together emerge as a *tertium quid*.[49] Most notably, Scotus lists form and matter as primarily diverse.[50] Sharing nothing in common, together they constitute a hylomorphic composite, a new *per se* unity. Were matter already just form-in-waiting, it would not be an explanatory principle.[51] Its explanatory force would be as tautologically silly as Molière lampooning the sleep-inducing qualities of opium as due to its *virtus dormitiva*.

Form and matter can be considered as primarily diverse, but only as physical components. That is, they share no mediating term by which this one determines (form) and that one is determinable (matter). Metaphysically speaking, however, they are not primarily diverse. Both form and matter are conceived as beings and thus require some further factor of differentiation.[52] For this reason, form cannot be called upon to serve as a principle of ultimate specific differentiation. Nor can matter be called upon as a principle of ultimate individual differentiation. *As beings,* form and matter have something in common. Thus, neither one *per se* can explain ultimate differentiation. They remain on the level of confused conception, or non-simply simple concepts. Scotus digs even deeper in their conceptual substrata to resolve the principles underlying our conception of them. His model of conception affords him the tools.

2.3. THE DOUBLE PRIMACY OF BEING

We are now in a better position to appreciate Scotus's claim regarding the double primacy of being as the first object of our intellect. The double primacy of being entails that being has both a primacy of commonness and a primacy of virtuality.[53] As Scotus explains: "A double primacy happens in being: naturally

a primacy of commonality in *quid* for all non-simply simple concepts, and a primacy of virtuality (either in itself or in its inferiors) for all simply-simple concepts."[54] Being can serve as the primary object of the intellect insofar as it can be predicated of anything that *is*. Some things are called "beings" insofar as they are subjects (i.e., a being), and being can be predicated of them according to this transcendental commonality. Others are called "beings" not on account of their being subjects, but because they in some sense modify being.

The intellect's production of a univocal concept of being indifferent to all determination thus extends to everything that is, even to ultimate difference. Even those ultimate differences differentiating the univocal concept of being (i.e., intrinsic modes) contain being, albeit not in a quidditative manner. Regarding the predication of being, Scotus states: "Being is univocal in everything, but in non-simply simple concept it is predicated univocally *in quid* of them. For simply-simple ones, it is univocal, but as determinable or denominable—not, however, as it is said of them *in quid,* because this would include a contradiction."[55] For everything falling under a category—genera within a category, species, individuals, and the essential parts of genera—and also for the uncreated and infinite being (i.e., God), being is predicated *in quid.* As non-simply simple concepts, they include being quidditatively. One might say, for example, "A sea sponge is *a being*" or "God is *a being*" and mean the same thing by "being" in each case.

In terms of the primacy of commonality, Scotus lists the following as *beings* quidditatively speaking: genera; species; individuals; the essential parts of individuals; certain specific differences; and the uncreated being. Only certain specific differences have being predicated of them quidditatively, namely, those corresponding to reified components of the thing itself (e.g., the rational soul of humans).[56] Like the other members on the list, their concepts can be further resolved into a quidditative component of being and a differential one. Primacy of commonality means that the concept of being is common to such things and therefore they must differ on account of something else. As shown by the long-standing Parmenidean quandary of what divides being, the differentiator cannot have being as a common conceptual element.

In terms of anything expressed by a simply-simple concept, being is not predicated of it *in quid,* but only *in quale.* For this reason, it is not common to such ultimate differences, proper attributes, or pure perfections.[57] They are pure determinations, *qualia* without a quidditative subject. With respect to such simply-simple concepts, being enjoys a primacy of virtuality. Although such determinations cannot be derived or deduced from the simply-simple concept of being itself, they can be found in quidditative beings, or those things for which being has a primacy of commonness. And thus being has a primacy of virtuality. Remember the barrel hoop: within one and the same unified object, the intellect can find ground for distinguishing a multiplicity of factors.

It is important to stress, following Allan Wolter, that the concept of being

does not contain within itself such determination. He explains: "Though these ultimate differences and attributes lie outside the concept of being as the ultimate *quid* (for they are *simpliciter simplicia* and *primo diversa*), they do not lie outside the physical being or thing (*res*) but are unitively contained in it."[58] They are what account for its unity. That is, anything of which being can be predicated *in quid*—included on the list above—is conceived as a unified thing through the conjunction of being with primarily diverse ultimate differences.

Simple-simplicity requires that the concept of being contain nothing other than its own *ratio*—indeterminate, yet distinct as it is—and thus neither the ultimate differences nor the attributes can be deduced from it. That is, we conceive something distinctly as a being, and indistinctly or confusedly as this being. This entails that the quidditative concept of being itself cannot give rise to ultimate differences. How could a finite being produce a concept of that which is infinite? Instead, the univocal concept of being does not itself harbor ultimate differences, but *beings* (i.e., fully actualized entities of which being can be predicated *in quid*) provide such resources for forming qualitative concepts. The concepts of ultimate differences *extend* to the same things as does the quidditative concept of being. But to conceive of anything as more than *a being,* something must differentiate it. This something cannot itself be *a being* quidditatively speaking; otherwise we enter the regress of which Parmenides warned.

Simply-simple concepts other than being itself, however, express being only qualitatively. They are the pure determinations or qualifications of the determinable subject being but are not themselves subjects or things. Being cannot be predicated of them *quidditatively* insofar as they have no *quid*. An ultimate difference, the topic of discussion for the following chapter, has being predicated of it only *in quale*. If they shared even being in common, they would need something else on account of which they differ, thus leading to a contradiction.

The contradiction runs as follows: if ultimate differences contained a common quidditative element, *even being*, they would need to differ on account of something else and thereby would not be ultimate. Differing on account of something else merely bucks the question of ultimacy. For there to be an account of differentiation, some factor must differ on account of itself. Scotus calls this "ultimate difference." This is why, as Chapter 3 will discuss, categorial accidents are not ultimate differences. Rather, something that is not *a being,* but yet is not nothing, must differentiate the concept of being. Such ultimate differences have being predicated of them—they are not nothing—but only in a qualitative manner. They are not *a being,* but being rendered and conceived as pure determination.[59] To this extent, they mark a third path unsung by Parmenides.

The ultimate differences cannot be deduced from being, nor can one difference be derived from another. This is because both are *simply-simple.* Instead, just as being is ultimate and irreducible as transcendental potency, so too ultimate differences are ultimate in terms of transcendental actuality.[60] They are

primarily diverse from, yet determine, the concept of being, which is only determinable, yet itself indeterminate. Scotus stays true to univocity and allows these simply-simple elements to remain primarily diverse. As we will see, he does not analogically order or arrange such primarily diverse ultimate differences under a first *analogatum,* some most-being being such as substance or God. Ultimate differences determine the determinable concept of being without becoming absolved within it or ordered to one another or to some third.

Scotus's thought is novel in the sense that he completely dissociates the principles of differentiation from already different things such as form, matter, accidents, atoms, and so on. Human cognition arrives at a simply-simple concept of ultimate differences through a hard-fought victory. It must wrestle such conceptual elements from the confused mixture of everyday objects. They are part of thought's deep grammar. (How we deduce such transcendental ultimate differences will be treated below.)

2.4. HOW DOES SCOTUS SOLVE THE PROBLEMS OF UNIVOCITY?

As discussed in the previous chapter, univocity is riddled with several problems. These include whether being can be treated as a *quid* term given its lack of discussion by Porphyry; whether a concept of being common to God and creatures introduces real complexity and real commonality into God's simple and unique essence; and, finally, Parmenides's quandary of how to divide being if the only thing that falls outside its scope is nonbeing. The problem of predication already has been solved through the double primacy of being. If Scotus is to defend univocity, how does he respond to these other, seemingly insurmountable pitfalls?

2.4.1. A New Transcendental Problem

Recall that one of the reasons for rejecting univocity was that being did not fit one of Porphyry's five universals. Playing the role of the would-be objector, Scotus in the *Lectura* recognizes the strange and non-Aristotelian account he has given of the concept of being: being is univocal, but it is not a genus; it is predicated *in quid,* but it is not a definition.[61] This seems to suggest that Aristotle missed something when he enumerated the various topical problems and forms of *in quid* predication; being does not appear in his discussion. Although Scotus doesn't say as much due to his medieval hermeneutics of generosity, he clearly exceeds the scope of Aristotelian metaphysics in elevating the concept of being to the ultimate *quid*, predicated univocally of everything that is. A few words are in order regarding topical problems and *in quid* predication in order to substantiate this point.

A *topos*, according to Boethius, is an argument source. "A Topic is the seat of an argument," Boethius states, "or that from which one draws an argument appropriate to the question under consideration."[62] *Topoi* might find arguments

from sources such as from a genus, from a whole, from a material cause, from cases, from the greater, and so on.[63] One example Boethius gives is someone arguing that "the Moors do not have weapons; he will say they do not use weapons because they lack iron."[64] The argument source, or *topos*, in question here is *from efficient cause*. The argument presupposes that "where matter is lacking, what is made from matter is lacking."[65]

Being does not emerge as a topical problem according to Scotus, but not because Aristotle, Boethius, and others overlooked it. Instead, Scotus explains: "Being cannot terminate some [topical] problem; for no one asks whether a human or stone is a being, because every question asks something and presupposes something else; and no one doubts this."[66] Being is presupposed by any topical problem insofar as in asking, "What is it?" or "How is it?" we must assume *it is something.* As will be shown, without being as a transcendental *quid,* we could not understand anything else (including those sensory accidents with which we are acquainted) in the mode of subsisting; we could not cognize anything according to what it is.

Although unmentioned by Aristotle, being is nevertheless predicated *in quid* according to Scotus. In fact, it is the ultimate transcendental *quid*, just as ultimate differences are the ultimate transcendental *qualia*. One of our central problems will be how to adequately conceive of ultimate differences in their functional role as transcendental *qualia*. The problem stems from the reifying tendencies of our cognition, which tends to represent for itself ready-made "things" (*res*) and only with great difficulty can think their underlying principles or terms. Ultimate differences cannot be things insofar as *thing* is transcendentally coextensive with being. Ultimate differences explain the differing of things as beings. Such differences are not beings, but the differentiator of beings.

To explain the univocal predication of being, Scotus must show two things: first, that *in quid* predication is not limited to the types discussed by Aristotle and the Aristotelian tradition; and second, that being is predicable of everything that is, albeit only of some things *in quid,* of others *in qualia.* With regard to the first, Scotus recognizes that being cannot be predicated in the manner of a genus or definition, the obvious candidates for *in quid* predication.[67] Scotus maintains that in this context (i.e. the *Topics*) Aristotle is only concerned with solving topical problems and therefore excludes being from consideration.[68]

To the objection that if being were common to God and a creature, God would be composed of a *quid* and a *quale,* Scotus responds:

> I say that *quid* is more common than *able to be in a genus,* and *quale* than [able to be a] difference. This is because not every *quale* is a *quale* actualizing and informing a potential. But that *quale* names an intrinsic mode of divine perfection in itself, not because infinity is the quasi-perfection of a perfection or an essence, because it is not a distinct attribute, as has been said.[69]

A number of factors should be noted regarding this passage. First, Scotus expands the Aristotelian understanding of the *quid*/*quale* pair to include the transcendental concepts being and ultimate difference. They are not limited to genus, especially the most general genera (i.e., the categories), and specific difference. Being serves as the most common quidditative concept. It is not a genus, however, because its differentiation envelops the entirety of the concept instead of adding determination to something determinable. This brings us to the second point.

Second, not all *qualia* actualize or inform some real (i.e., physical) potential. The model of specific differences, which actualize and inform genera, can be misleading in this respect. The transcendental *qualia* under discussion in this passage do not determine being as a real potency in things. Were such transcendental *qualia* perfecting qualities, then being would be that perfectible component in all beings together with an additional perfection. As has been noted, ultimate differences must not be reified. Transcendental *qualia* are not something in addition to being; they are being itself according to its real modes of entitativeness. This raises a third point.

2.4.2. No Real Complexity in God

Recall the concern that univocity would introduce a real common element into the divine essence. A real univocal concept of being would fracture divine simplicity insofar as it would introduce a shared common element. Scotus responds to the objection: if God, whose essence is of itself this (*quae de se est haec*), were to have a real common concept with creatures, he would share something in common with them. Scotus responds by outlining three manners of differentiation, which he introduces in order to show that conceptual complexity does not mimetically trace distinctions between real parts in things.[70] Instead, as we have seen, a fully resolved concept takes as its intentional object not actual things nor other concepts but, rather, what we might call *rationes reales,* or objective concepts. These, and not actual things, are the correlates of our concepts.

The first manner of distinction is the distinction in composite substances between the reality from which the genus is derived and that from which the difference is derived (e.g., animal and rational in human beings). The second distinction is between real formalities in simple things. For example, in a color such as green, the concept of color stems from one formality and the concept of its difference from another. Section 5.1 will treat further these first two distinctions; the concern at the present is with the third distinction.

The third distinction is between a single perfection or formality and its intrinsic mode of intensity. Here Scotus argues that on account of its infinity, infinite being is individuated.[71] It is *this singularity* (*haec singularitas*) and, as fully individuated, not further determinable. Even our most adequate and simplest concepts of God, however, are not simply-simple.[72] They fail to grasp this—or any—singular reality with a simple intuitive gaze.[73] As Wolter explains,

our intellect must make divisions to what a more perfect intellect would grasp in a single intuitive gaze, divisions that do not necessarily correspond to divisions in things.[74] Our intellect requires a complex conceptual description. These divisions, however, have an objective foundation and are real (not merely rational).

Scotus distinguishes what he calls "intrinsic modes" from other attributes, determining qualities, or perfections. Taking a color such as white according to a certain degree of intensity (e.g., the tenth degree of whiteness) does not add some additional perfection or determination to the concept of whiteness qua whiteness. Whiteness just is all those real degrees, yet it can be conceived independently of this real condition. Likewise, intrinsic modes do not add to being because they are being according to its real condition. For example, infinite or finite marks the magnitude, or virtual quantity (*quantitas virtualis*), of any being. Any being is only according to such a degree of perfection, whether infinite or finite. The intrinsic mode infinite thus does not actualize and inform some potential (e.g., the divine essence or being). Infinity envelops the entirety of God's being, leaving nothing besides this to share in common with creatures.

Here we see the novelty of Scotus's thought: insofar as he elevates being to a univocal transcendental concept, so too he must treat difference transcendentally. He cannot rely on the plurality of being ("Being is said in many ways"), which marks the starting point for the Aristotelian tradition in its response to Parmenidean monism. Difference thereby becomes a topical problem for Scotus. Although claiming to work faithfully in the tradition of Aristotelian metaphysics, Scotus has made a clear departure.

Neither being nor ultimate difference were topical problems for Aristotelianism. This was not, however, for the reasons Scotus cites. Instead, for Aristotle, being is always already said in many ways. We discover a primary diversity of beings, which subsequently we analogically order to some *most being* (e.g., substance or God). Any common concept of being, or one equally distributed to all beings, is not a matter of distinct cognition, but of confusion. This is because the unity appropriate to the concept of being qua being requires such prior diversity, not the indifferent neutrality of univocity.[75] This too had been Scotus's own position in his early logical writings.

By stating that *quid* is not limited to "able to be in a genus" but is more common, Scotus makes room for being as a transcendental and univocal concept.[76] This concept thus stands as the quidditative nucleus of all concepts, itself *neutral* with respect to all difference or determination.[77] It provides an objective foundation for thought. In unpacking *what* anything is, ultimately we can know and say: it is *a being,* and not nothing. Such conceptual resolution, however, distorts our cognition of reality. Nothing is simply *a being.* This is because simply-simple concepts need not conceive real parts in the things conceived by the total conceptual matrix. Such conceptual distinctness thus loses the richness of *how* anything is a being, that is, according to an intrinsic mode of entitativeness.

As will be shown in the following chapter, the determination of the concept of being according to ultimate differences does not add something completely beyond being itself. Ultimate differences are beings, albeit conceived according to nonsubsisting *qualia*.[78] Such *qualia* are modally or formally distinct realities centered around the nucleus of the concept of being. This raises the ever-so-vexing question of how to divide univocal being.

2.4.3. Vain Repetition

How can we divide being? Is not any of its divisors itself a being? This question will require a more extended treatment in the following chapters. Suffice it to say for now that, of these ultimate differences, being can only be predicated *in quale,* not *in quid*. The determinations of being through which being divides are the so-called "ultimate differences," themselves primarily diverse from each other and from being itself.[79] This entails both that the concept of being can be known independently of either determination and that each determination can be cognized independently of the other. This second point will be vital to show below that the lesser determinations (finite, contingent, etc.) are not mere imitations of their higher archetypes, but provide their own primarily diverse manner of determination or differentiation. As Chapter 3 will show, they can divide being without themselves altogether falling outside its scope.

Although being is the most general of concepts in its scope, it is not a genus. The numerous problems with treating being as the highest genus have been reviewed, problems clearly recognized by Scotus from early in his career. Instead, being is a transcendental concept: "Being first divides into finite and infinite being before it divides into the ten categories, because the division of finite being is into the ten categories. [. . .] But everything which follows being as common to God and creatures follows being according to its indifference and therefore follows before it is determined to the categories. Things of this kind which thus follow from being are transcendentals, and therefore they do not fall under the categories."[80] The concept of being transcends the division into the ten categories and the prior division into infinite and finite. The generality of this transcendental concept stems from its pure determinability as a concept. It is a real concept grounded in the fact that we can know of anything that *it is a being*. Such a conception lacks all determination whatsoever.

2.5. PUTTING THE WORLD BACK TOGETHER TOO SOON

Being is a concept of pure determinability. As simply-simple, it includes no determination whatsoever (*conceptum determinabilem tantum, ita quod nihil determinans includat*). To cite Honnefelder, being is the "foundational reifier of conceptuality" (*grundlegende Bedingung der conceptibilitas*).[81] This foundational reifier provides a nucleus around which dereified ultimate differences divide being and form complex concepts. The concept of being is no more

proper to any one being or type of being than to another. The mistake of many metaphysicians has been their failure to distinguish the concept of being from its determination as this or that being or kind of being. Here's why.

As has been discussed, each of the early philosophers was *certain* that their first principle was a being (e.g., fire, water, love, or number). Thales believed that water was the first being. Anaximenes thought it was air, Democritus atoms, Pythagoras number, and so on. They were correct in recognizing such things as beings. If being were not a univocal concept, then the recognition that water (or atoms) were not primary would yield an altogether new concept. Their mistake was in not abstracting a concept of being to the point where it strikes a simply-simple note primarily diverse from any determination.

As discussed in Section 1.5, Scotus uses the example of Thales to show that the modification (e.g., primary, secondary, etc.) is primarily diverse from the concept of being. Because water turns out not to be primary, then Thales was either altogether mistaken or partially correct in his insight. Scotus opts for the latter. The concept of being is present even in our most confused initial cognition. Thales and others could make this mistake because their concepts were not fully resolved. In not abstracting far enough, they put back the world too soon!

The firstness or primacy of water or whichever of the elements or material you prefer—atoms, *hyle,* quarks, dark matter, strings, etc.—is a material primacy. Regardless of what stuff emerges as primary in this sense, it does not answer the deeper question of what divides being. Whether conceived of as water, atoms, quarks, or what have you, matter is a being. But the transcendental science of metaphysics asks: What differentiates it as this kind of being, not that? As matter, not form? Thales, like others, remained at a level of material similarity and did not fully resolve his concepts and abstract from matter all of the conceptual elements it contains. In attempting to explain the world using these partially resolved, partially representational concepts, Thales engaged in an erroneous division of the world. He attempted to use beings to divide beings, thus putting the world back together too soon.

Thales is not alone. Most other metaphysicians share his failure to move beyond the representation of beings to the conceptual terms of such beings. The mistake is not in picking out the wrong being or type of being (water as opposed to God or substance). Rather, the mistake of so many metaphysicians was to select a being (e.g., water, atoms, Form, substance, God, etc.) and then identify it with being in the proper sense of the term. This is a mistake because being in the proper sense of the term is improper: it is a metaphysical conceptual term of determinability correlated with ultimate difference as the term of its determination. Neither being nor ultimate difference is itself a thing (*res*), but that on account of which we conceive unified things (e.g., categories, natural kinds, essences, and individuals). Scotus is careful to distinguish such a physical account of a substance and its parts from a metaphysical one of an essence and its parts.[82] Being and ultimate difference operate on the latter plane.

Water, God, substance, and quark fall under the concept of being, whatever else they might be. One can know, for example, that a line is a being, and yet not know (or ignore) its categorization as a quality or substance. Simply-simple concepts provide distinct cognition insofar as they are grasped in their entirety or not at all.[83] One cannot be certain of one aspect, while doubtful of another insofar as they have but a single element; they strike a single note. This is what makes them *simply-simple*. By not going far enough in abstraction to reach pure conceptual elements with no correspondence to things, being remained attached to a particular being or type of being. So too, our conception of difference suffers.

Unable to divide being, Parmenides reduced all of being to *a being,* one continuous everywhere the same. The pre-Socratics made the same mistake: they identified being with one being or type of being. That is, they identified being qua being with *X* (e.g., air or number), thus rendering everything not-*X* as nonbeing or mere appearance. Being becomes one, continuous, undivided. Everything is water, and there is no real difference. This was the mistake of Aquinas and others as well, who also held that being is one, continuous, and undivided; but unlike Parmenides, they instead identified being with a primary instant (e.g., God) and everything else as lesser similitudes of this one, true, being. Whether eliminated altogether (as with Parmenides) or assimilated to identity (as with Aquinas), difference is then rendered derivative. Difference becomes a fall or defection from being in this most perfect sense.

As the following chapter will show, Scotus thinks difference not in terms of a defection from being in the proper sense of the term (e.g., water, number, Form, substance, God), but as a determination of being. Ultimate differences serve to buttress Scotus's doctrine of univocity by serving as pure *qualia* without *quid* correlative to being. Like form and matter on the physical level, simply-simple concepts, as the atoms of all further concepts, constitute the *per se* unity of all composite concepts. As pure determinability, the concept of being shares nothing in common with the concepts of ultimate difference, which are concepts of pure determination. They are primarily diverse in their functional roles. The *per se* unity of composite concepts requires this lack of identity. Given such primary diversity between the concepts of being and ultimate difference, neither one contains elements of the other, and they can be conceived independently of each other. They are not beings, but nor are they nothing.

CONCLUSION

This chapter continued Chapter 1's investigation of the univocity of being. In particular, Chapter 2 explored how Scotus defends univocity as a real concept with an emphasis on both aspects: *real* and *concept.* Central to this investigation was establishing what Scotus means by real versus rational concepts, simple versus non-simple simplicity, distinct versus confused cognition, and finally

abstraction and division. This discussion prepared the way for understanding how he can defend univocity given the challenges outlined in the previous chapter. That is, in order to circumvent Parmenideanism, Scotus needs to show how univocal being does not undermine the diversity of everything that it covers—God and creatures, substance and accidents. The establishment of the concept of being as a transcendental *quid* provides such leverage. The question remains as to how being can be divided: if not by itself and not by nothing, then what divides being? As the following chapter will show, the univocal real concept of being can be divided by ultimate differences, which are not being, and yet are not nothing.

CHAPTER THREE
ULTIMATE DIFFERENCE

Chapter 2 established being as a real, simply-simple, quidditative concept—and the only one at that. As Scotus states: "That concept 'only determinable' is the concept of being, and 'only determining' is the concept of ultimate differences. Therefore, they are primarily diverse, that is because one does not include the other."[1] Being is the concept of *only determinable*; ultimate difference is *only determining*. To complete this explanation, an account of ultimate difference must now be given. This chapter will show how Scotus borrows a familiar Aristotelian concept but both broadens and deepens it to buttress his account of univocity. He broadens it by including not only the final determination by means of a substantial form but also other differences that terminate the quidditative terms of which being can be univocally predicated. Along these lines, the following three functional groupings will be identified as ultimate difference: transcendental differences; certain, but not all, specific differences; and *haecceitas*, or the individuating difference.[2] Scotus deepens ultimate differences by dereifying ultimate difference. That is, ultimate difference cannot be identified with form or any other thing or part of a thing. Instead, as transcendental terms of cognition, it falls beneath (or between) the categories. Rather than thinking of difference as secondary to unity and identity, Scotus conceives of differentiation as the intrinsic and positive perfection of univocal being. This perfection culminates in individual differentiation, which constitutes singular, indivisible degrees of being.

Section 3.1 begins with Scotus's account of ultimate difference, in particular in relation to the simply-simple concept of being. Section 3.2 shows why ultimate differences must be subcategorial. Section 3.3 shows how our simply-simple concepts of ultimate difference have a real and objective basis in things without mimetically corresponding to things themselves or their physical parts. Based on the previous considerations, Section 3.4 establishes a proper account of the primary diversity of ultimate differences against potential misunderstandings of it. In particular, this section will show how, for Scotus, primary diversity remains irreducible to privation, opposition, or any other form of relation (as it does when thought in terms of analogy). Section 3.5 initiates a deduction of the various groupings of ultimate difference and why these are included, which Part II of this book will examine in greater depth. This section also shows why the transcendental attributes of being (one, true, and good) must be distinguished from ultimate differences, despite structural similarities between the two.

3.1. ULTIMATE DIFFERENCES

To understand the role of ultimate difference, a distinction must be made between diversity and difference according to Aristotelian terminology.[3] Difference occurs whenever two (or more) things share something in common and yet in some way are not the same. Plato and Socrates are different humans. White and black are different colors. Plants and animals are different types of livings things. Two things are diverse, however, when they share nothing in common. The category of substance is diverse from that of position insofar as the two share nothing in common. Being, for example, is not a genus over and above them. It is not shared in common between them as most general genera. Recall that one of the arguments against univocity was that it would render the categories merely different, not diverse, manners of being. How Scotus manages to keep them diverse will be a central issue in what follows.

Insofar as two things merely differ, something else must explain their difference. For example, while humans and donkeys share animality in common, something else must explain this difference. In this case, such a differing factor would be their specific differences (i.e., rationality and irrationality). Of such differing factors, one must ask whether they too share anything in common, in which case they must differ on account of something else. Or, as Aquinas states, are they simply "not the same" (i.e., diverse)?[4] To avoid such an infinite regress of explanatory factors of difference, we must reach some factors that are primarily diverse. That is, they are diverse by themselves.[5] These are what Scotus calls "ultimate differences": "An 'ultimate difference' is so called because it has no difference, because it does not resolve into a quidditative and qualitative concept, determinable and determining, but there is only a qualitative concept of it, just as the ultimate genus only has a quidditative concept."[6] Whereas, as has been seen, being provides the simply-simple concept "only determined," an ultimate difference introduces the simply-simple concept "only determining." It has no common element. Ultimate differences "have no difference" because they are pure differences, positive differential elements differing on account of themselves and nothing else. Such differences cannot be resolved or reduced to any prior identity, not even being. If they could, they would require an account of their difference and thus would not be ultimate. They would differ in virtue of something else, of which we would ask, "Does it differ in virtue of itself?" and so on ad infinitum.

Scotus illustrates the purely differential nature of such differences as follows:

> Take two differences. I ask about them whether being is predicated *in quid* or not. If it is, therefore they essentially agree in being, and they are diverse, but not in being, but by other differences. Let's call those *c* and *d*. I ask about them (i.e., *c* and *d*) as before, whether being is predicated *in quid* or not. If it is, then the same thing will follow as above, and this process will run to

> infinity. Otherwise, we ultimately reach some differences, which do not have being predicated of them *in quid*.[7]

The test of any nonultimate difference is whether being can be predicated of it *in quid*. That is, at the very least, it has being in common with other things. Once we reach ultimate differences, this is not the case. They are transcendental *qualia* without *quid*.

Although Scotus borrows the concepts of ultimate difference and diversity from the Aristotelian tradition, it would be a mistake to assume that he puts them to standard Aristotelian use. Instead, Scotus both *broadens* and *deepens* the Aristotelian concept of ultimate difference: he broadens it by applying it not only to specific differences but also to the intrinsic modes of being (e.g., finite and infinite) and individuating differences; and he deepens it by placing it outside the categories and raising it to a transcendental level. Both claims will be defended in what follows.

3.1.1. The Standard Account

Scotus's need to retrofit this Aristotelian concept stems from the need to divide a univocal concept of being. Aristotle did not face the problem of whether or in what sense ultimate differences were beings because being is said in many ways. He did not need to differentiate a unified concept of being because being is already diverse. Given the univocal unity of the concept of being, however, Scotus confronts the difficulty forewarned by Parmenides: a univocal concept of being, everywhere the same, seems too monolithic to allow for differential variations. Whereas Aristotle can assume that primary diversity just is and there is no further explanation for the fact that being is said in many ways (a claim complicated for the creationist metaphysics of Aquinas), Scotus must confront Parmenides's challenge head-on.[8]

By starting with primary diversity, Aristotle could separate the answer to this question of difference (i.e., being is said in many ways) from the more restricted issue of ultimate differences. Ultimate differences could be considered categorial because the categories themselves already were diversified. Differences, even ultimate differences, could fall under a category. Chapter 1 discussed this with respect to Scotus's own early treatment of the issue.

Aristotle did not confront the problem addressed above by Scotus about whether two differences share being in common because being is not something univocally held in common in the first place. Ultimate differentiation only arises for Aristotle in answer to the question of definitional unity. As he states in *Metaphysics* VII: "If, therefore, a differentia of a differentia be taken, then one, the last [read "ultimate"], will be the form, that is, the primary being."[9] Several factors must be noted here.

First, consider the problem. Aristotle's concern is what accounts for the unity rather than the multiplicity of a definition. That is, he asks, why is there not real

complexity in the thing corresponding to the definitional complexity between the genus and specific difference? Why will human be a two-footed land animal (or a rational animal) rather than two-footed and animal?[10] Aristotle needs to provide a reason why this account forms a genuine unity rather than a mere heap such as in the case of a musical carpenter or *The Iliad*. A musical carpenter is a heap, many things rather than one. The fact that both factors reside in the same thing is merely incidental. This fact lacks true explanation.

Next, consider ultimate difference as a solution. Aristotle tells us that the genus and difference must relate in such a way that the difference divides the genus into a species. Proper division operates by selecting a difference (and ultimately, an ultimate difference) that contains the entire reality of the genus it divides. Winged cannot divide the genus of irrational animal because it does not speak to the previous difference (i.e., the difference of the difference must be taken). Or, to cite an example from Aquinas, almsgiving cannot divide the genus of theft.[11] The difference cannot contain the reality of its genus because the virtuous act of almsgiving finds itself under a different genus than the vicious act of theft. Not even Robin Hood can meld these two into a unified action!

Aristotle employs ultimate difference as the difference that differentiates the reality of the higher differences and genus into a most specific species. A properly selected *ultimate* difference must be one that contains the higher-level reality in it, this last difference. For example, two-footed does not need to repeat footed, or terrestrial, or corporeal. These are implied by the last, or ultimate, difference. But Aristotle still faces the problem of selecting ultimate differences that divide the genus into (most specific) species. Certain differences (e.g., odd/even, male/female) might imply their respective genera, but not specify them.[12] Odd implies a number (i.e., only numbers can be odd), but it does not specify it. So how do we know if the differences have carved the genus properly?

This brings us to the final point and what seems to be Aristotle's solution.[13] How can we be sure that the difference not only divides the genus but also constitutes a species? Definitions must express real essences and not merely nominal ones.[14] These joints of being are natural kinds. To address this question, we must return to a link Aristotle draws in the passage cited above from *Metaphysics* VII.12 between ultimate difference and substance (*ousia*). He looks to substantial form as primary *ousia* to explain ultimate differentiation. Again in *Metaphysics* VIII.6, he returns to this issue:

> What, then, is it that gives a human its unity, and why is it not a mere aggregate of things, such as an animal plus a biped; as though, according to certain theories, there were an animal as a thing by itself and a biped by itself? Why are these two together a human, so that a human would be, not by itself, but by participation in more than one being, in the two, animal and biped? [. . .] It is evident, therefore, that if people proceed in this way, as they are accustomed to do in the definition and discourse, the difficulty

> is insoluble. But if, as we say, there is a material and a form, and the material is a potency, whereas the form is act, the explanation sought avoids this difficulty.[15]

This solution requires some unpacking. It can be immediately noted, however, that Aristotle turns to the unity of substance to underwrite definitional unity. The act-potency structure of substantial unity can provide a solution to the problem of definitional unity. But how?

To better understand Aristotle's argument, we might consult Aquinas, who states: "Aristotle says that if the differences taken in the definition are such as has been said (i.e., so that they are always taken *per se* and not *per accidens*), it is clear that ultimate difference will be the whole substance of the thing and its entire definition. This is because it includes in itself all the preceding parts."[16] Whether one understands substance as substantial form alone (as do Aristotle, Averroes, and others) or the hylomorphic compound (as do Avicenna, Aquinas, and others), the unity of substance provides a foundation for the unity of the definition.[17] This does not mean that the substance is isomorphic with respect to the essence: the parts of the substance are not the same as the parts of the essence. Matter cannot be mapped onto genus, nor can form be mapped onto difference. Both unities must be considered separately.

The unity of substance, however, guarantees the unity of the essence insofar as form relates to matter as actuality to potentiality and the definition refers to this unity.[18] Because the essences and its essential parts are *taken from* the unity of the substance, a properly selected ultimate difference can divide a genus into species.[19] Although not isomorphic with respect to the definition, substantial unity serves as a guarantor of essential unity. Further discussion of this argument, and what it means for a difference to be taken from form and for the definition to refer to the unity of substance, must be postponed until Chapter 5.

The more immediate issue to note is that here we find one of Scotus's main revisions (or rejections) of Aristotelian ultimate difference.[20] If an ultimate difference is taken from a thing (e.g., substantial form), Scotus argues, differentiation remains inadequately explained. This is because any categorial item itself needs differentiation.[21] Ultimate difference cannot be identified with any categorial item, whether substance, quality, or the Boethian hybrid of both.[22] Scotus will show that ultimate differences cannot be taken from any thing (or part of things) falling under a category. This is because such categorial items require differentiation; they do not explain it.

3.1.2. Scotus's Innovation

Keeping this standard treatment of ultimate difference in view, the passage cited above (i.e., *Ordinatio* I, d. 3, p. 1, q. 3, n. 131) now can be examined. Here Scotus makes at least two unheralded moves: first, he weds ultimate difference with primary diversity. All ultimate differences are primarily diverse. Ultimate

differences differ on account of themselves. Second, he divorces ultimate differentiation from form or any other categorial item. A substantial form (or an accidental one) cannot account for ultimate differentiation because such forms are beings. For this reason, they do not explain difference. Some other factor must explain how such a form differs from another form, both of which share being (not to mention substantiality) in common.

A picture begins to emerge regarding how Scotus appropriates this concept of ultimate difference for purposes far afield from its Aristotelian origins. Before further unpacking the characteristics of ultimate differences according to Scotus, a clarification must be made. His comparison above to ultimate genera as "only quidditative" seems a bit odd. That is, if the highest genera, the categories, were only quidditative, they would be simply-simple concepts. As conceptually elemental, each category would not include a univocal concept of being.[23]

S. Y. Watson corroborates this suspicion that the ultimate genera cannot be purely quidditative in terms of their concepts: "We wonder if the development of his thought would not have led the Subtle Doctor to reject the view that the ultimate genera have purely quidditative concepts. If, as Scotus later came to hold, these genera have composite concepts made up of being and some sort of mode, it would seem that this latter would have to be predicated *in quale.* The genera, therefore, would have partially qualitative concepts, which would leave being as the one purely quidditative concept."[24] This is because nothing other than being itself can be only quidditative. When Scotus lists everything of which being can be predicated *in quid,* he includes genera on this list.[25] If the most general genera (i.e., the categories) were themselves purely quidditative but also had being predicated univocally of them *in quid*, then they would not include any determining element.

We are now in a position to discuss Scotus's novel use of the concept of ultimate difference. What features does he ascribe to ultimate difference? At least three features immediately can be recognized: (1) they differ on account of themselves, and nothing else; (2) they are conceived by a simply-simple concept; and (3) their simply-simple concept is purely qualitative and determining without any quidditative element. These three features follow from our previous discussions. If there were no ultimate difference, the process of differentiation would run ad infinitum and difference would not be explained, but merely deferred. If ultimate differences were not conceived by simply-simple concepts, then their concepts could be further resolved into a determining and determined element. Ultimate differences would not be ultimate since they would be differential only on account of their determining element. This would explain their differentiation. Thus, ultimate differences must be pure differences, expressed by a simply-simple qualitative concept.

Three other characteristics must be added: (4) such items are extracategorial, that is they are transcendental differences; (5) they exhibit an irreducible feature of primary diversity; and (6) they terminate quidditative orders (i.e.,

they divide being). Given their importance, a section will be devoted to each claim. Together these sections will explore the novelty of Scotus's conception of difference given his commitment to univocity.

3.2. EXTRACATEGORIAL DIFFERENCE

As the previous chapter discussed, Scotus does not limit *quid* to the genera or *quale* to specific difference. Being is transcendental *quid*, and ultimate difference—as now will be discussed—is transcendental *quale*. This move, however, entails that what divides the concept of being cannot be found in the categories.[26] As alluded to above, categorical items are themselves beings. Something deeper and which is not itself a being thus must divide being. But what? Although not a what, ultimate differences is an extracategorial (i.e., transcendental) ground of differentiation.

Recall that Scotus states, "I say that 'quid' is more common than *able to be in a genus,* and 'quale' than [able to be a] difference."[27] He here refers to genus and difference in the sense of the predicables, not the predicamentals (i.e., the categories). Traditionally, however, the ten categories served as what was predicable *in quid*. Thus, in speaking of transcendental concepts, intrinsic modes, and coextensive attributes applicable to God, Scotus recognizes that he is testing the limits of both the Aristotelian categories and the Porphyrian predicables. To this end, he asks himself, "Also, this seems to destroy the logic of Aristotle, who seems to posit only ten categories predicated as the quiddity (*in quid*) about all, and none of these that you [Scotus] posit, pertain to being before it descends into the ten categories."[28] Scotus responds to this would-be objection by pointing out that Aristotle's concern was limited to what falls under the categories and did not extend to these *transcendental categories* (*transcendentibus praedicamentis*).[29] Scotus here broadens the scope of *quid* and *qualia* to line up with being and ultimate differences. Whether or not this is an accurate reading of Aristotle, which it seems not to be, must be left aside. That being said, attention must be paid to the more pressing matter at hand: why must ultimate difference fall outside the categories?

Let's imagine for a moment that something in the category of Quality (call it *d*) were to divide a substantial genus (e.g., animal) into species. *D*, however, itself falls under a category (i.e., Quality) and thus has being univocally predicated of it. This means that *D* has an element in common with that genus it must divide, namely the common element of being. Thus, we must ask: if qualities (or other accidents) are called upon to divide and differentiate beings in the category of substance, but they themselves are not ultimately differential insofar as they contain the common element of being, then what accounts for their differential status? One sees quickly the problem that results: either we enter into an explanatory circle, where one category "grounds" the differentiation of another, but no category is an ultimately differential ground; or differentiation has no ground. Earlier in his career, Scotus recognized this and placed ultimate

difference of substances in the category of Substance despite recognizing its odd placement there.

But now Scotus provides a third option: an ultimate difference is a difference in itself. It is fundamental without any further explanatory ground. This entails, however, that ultimate differences cannot be conceived in any quidditative manner (otherwise they would be beings). Ultimate differences are pure qualifications, falling outside the categories. They divide being insofar as the concept of being conceives everything that is in terms of its whatness (broadly conceived). We might call this its conceptual manner of subsistence. Having the same extension as the concept of being, ultimate differences grasp beings in terms of their differential qualifications. Following suit, we might dub this its conceptual manner of denomination, or better yet, of modification.[30] Thus, just as the concept of being was a transcendental *quid*, ultimate differences are *transcendental qualia*. With respect to the ultimate individual difference, for example, Scotus argues against Aquinas that it is *not* the whole substance. Rather it is that *from which* the whole substance is completed and can be there.[31]

As Giorgio Pini makes clear, many thirteenth-century interpreters prior to Scotus recognized the problem of treating ultimate (specific) difference as a categorial quality, or as falling under any category for that matter.[32] Given his commitment to the univocity of being, Scotus faces an ever more unique set of problems. Whereas others might call upon cross-categorial differentiation, or look to an essential part of the substance itself, to ultimately differentiate substance, univocity rules out either option. The problem with the former (e.g., the category of Relation determines the category of Substance) is not simply that an accident determines a substance, although this is clearly an issue.[33]

For Scotus, the problem runs deeper: *a being* must determine and differentiate *a being,* and to the extent they have at least the quidditative concept of being in common, something more ultimate must differentiate both of them. Whether we fill in the first slot with "something in the category of Relation" or "an essential part of the substance itself," the problem persists. Only something that is not a being, quidditatively speaking, can determine and divide the univocal concept of being.

Scotus thus must take steps to *dereify* ultimate differences. This means that no thing (*res*), insofar as it has being predicated of it *in quid*, can explain difference. Scotus rules out some obvious candidates such as anything falling under a category or the essential parts of a substance (e.g., form or matter). Such a dereification of difference has the effect of exposing the complex structure of actual beings. Ultimate differences are identical to the beings they determine, and yet such beings consist of a multiplicity of distinct formal realities or perfections. Such distinctness rests upon grasping such differences as primarily diverse from a quidditative concept of being. An objective basis for our concepts can be found here. Recall that this analysis operates at a transcendental or metaphysical level, not a physical one. Essential unities do not equal those elements that

occasion them (or at least our conception of them). The distinctions we draw conceptually are grounded in reality, but they are not snapshots of reality.

With ultimate difference, Scotus adopts a familiar Aristotelian problem, but retrofits it to deal with the univocity of being. Whereas Aristotle only introduces ultimate difference to unite the categories (in particular substance) into the lowest species, Scotus, as will be seen, needs to extend this question beyond the confines of categorial differentiation to include both intrinsic transcendental modes of being and individual differences. Neither of these manners of differentiation can be adequately explained in terms of the thingly entities of the categories.

3.3. THE REAL BASIS OF ULTIMATELY DIFFERENTIAL CONCEPTS

If the concept of being abstractly conceives the quidditative structure of any being, as Chapter 2 argued, then what are concepts of ultimate differences about? Like being, they too are *real concepts,* or concepts of things and not of other concepts. For example, presupposing for the moment that *finite* is one such concept, one might ask: To what in reality does it correspond? Likewise, what does our concept of the *haecceitas* of this stone as opposed to that one conceive, or the ultimate specific difference of a nonrational animal or the human will?

As Scotus explains, we derive our simply-simple ultimate differential concepts from purely qualitative ultimate realities or perfections of a being. In explaining what distinguishes an ultimate from a nonultimate specific difference, he states: "But the ultimate reality or 'real perfection' of such a nature, from which ultimate reality an ultimate difference is derived, is simply-simple. That reality does not include being (*ens*) quidditatively, but it has a simply-simple concept."[34] From this passage, a number of factors must be noted.

First, such differential realities are real without being actual. What does this mean? According to Scotus, an actual being (or thing) contains a multiplicity of perfecting *realities,* the final of which is its *haecceitas,* or thisness. Actuality, we might say, marks the condition of being a fully determined thing. Reality, on the other hand, marks a perfecting determination. It is a simply-simple constituting factor of the actual thing itself.

Second, any difference that is *a being* contains multiple realities. For example, as Chapter 5 will discuss, the specific difference "rational" corresponds to the rational soul, which is a being. Such a difference can be further resolved into more ultimate differences, the most ultimate of which cannot contain being quidditatively. They are, and are conceived, as pure determinations, differential realities perfecting the being. The obvious question seems to be: Are such differences independent of the mind and the way we conceive reality? As we have already discussed, our manner of conceiving beings complicates what is in itself a singularity able to be grasped by a simple intuitive gaze. Thus, Scotus's answer to this question must be both yes and no.

Third, the distinction between such ultimate differences and the quidditative concepts they determine is less than real, but more than rational. They are either modally distinct, in the case of being and its intrinsic modes (e.g., finite or infinite, contingent or necessary, etc.), or formally distinct, in the case of the reality contracting a genus to a species or a species to an individual (i.e., ultimate specific difference and *haecceitas* respectively). There will be occasion to discuss both distinctions in more depth below.[35] Suffice it to say for now, that if we could grasp each thing in its singularity with a simple intuitive gaze, we would not need to fragment our concepts in the way that we do.[36] We instead can only capture *beings* by conceiving them according to ultimately differential concepts attached to a quidditative concept of being.

Ultimately differential concepts are about beings as determined, to the point of being completely determined *as this*. Singularity marks the final indivisible degrees of being in the division of being. Whatever unified individuals might be in themselves, we must conceive such determinations in a nonsubsisting manner. Just as a denominative term such as "finite" or "irrational" signifies qualities and not subjects, ultimate differences grasp the pure determination, the *quale* without the *quid*. It is a mistake, however, to assume that they are mere abbreviations for substantive things. As will be seen, they function a bit like snubs!

From early on, Ockham made the mistake of reifying ultimate differences.[37] He sought to translate the purely determining *quale* into a determining or qualifying *thing*. Thus, a qualification or modifier becomes "*that* which qualifies" or "*that* which modifies." Once ultimate differences are rendered substantive, then being can be predicated of them *in quid,* thereby undermining the entire structure of Scotus's argument.

To avoid such an outcome, it must be insisted that ultimate differences are not themselves things, but concepts; and what they conceive are not thingly in character, but purely differential realities. They conceive the determination of beings, but are themselves neither about the beings as beings nor about something with a thingly character of which being could be predicated *in quid*. Simply-simple ultimate differential concepts conceive either a being according to its real transcendental magnitude or according the distinct realities or formalities that constitute its perfection as an actual being. In either case, the being is conceived not *as a being,* but according to its determination in one manner or another.

3.4. THE GROUND OF PRIMARY DIVERSITY

The fifth, and perhaps most important, characteristic ascribed to ultimate difference is primary diversity. Recall from above that primary diversity is a relation between two things having nothing in common. That is, they share no principle of identity. As simply-simple, ultimate differences are primarily diverse from

one another and from the concept of being they determine.[38] For example, the *haecceitas* of this individual is primarily diverse from the *haecceitas* of that individual and from the common nature it determines to this.[39] As is by now a common refrain, if ultimate differences were not primarily diverse, they would share some common identity and thus differ on account of something else.

Scotus describes primary diversity as follows: "I say that those [factors] that are primarily diverse cannot constitute something the same [*idem*], but the more diverse they are, the more they are disposed to constitute a *per se* unity. Those things from which a *per se* unity comes to be require a non-identity of parts."[40] Scotus here is responding to objections regarding his claim that matter has some positive entity distinct from form. That is, the objectors wonder, how could two primarily diverse entities (i.e., matter and form) constitute a *per se* unity? Would they not, instead, form an incidental union, such as "pale human" or "musical carpenter"?

Scotus must respond to the question of how primarily diverse factors constitute something one *per se*. The factors themselves, he tells us, cannot constitute something the same. The same as what? They cannot constitute something the same as either one of them. Insofar as they share nothing in common, there is no common ground on account of which they can communicate. Factors that are in some manner the same (e.g., specifically or generically) can be added together to produce more of the same. Even contraries, such a black and white, at least share color in common. Their addition produces some shade of gray. Primarily diverse factors consist of nothing the same. They are foundational.

Primarily diverse factors, however, have no common ground in which to communicate. Their "addition," a matter discussed further below, instead yields a new *per se* unity. Matter and form together produce a hylomorphic composite, which is not the same as either one or the other. But, metaphysically speaking, matter and form at least have being in common.[41] Remember, being is univocally predicated of the essential parts of substance. The primary diversity of ultimate differences runs even deeper. The *per se* unities constituted by their addition to a quidditative concept from which they are primarily diverse produces a new unity that is not the same as either one or the other. This will be a further characteristic of ultimate differences: they terminate a quidditative order and constitute *per se* unities. What does this mean?

Insofar as ultimate differences are primarily diverse from that which they differentiate and share nothing in common with each other, their "combination" produces a new unity. That is, they contact the commonality or unity concomitant to the concept of being itself to a more determinate and less common unity, which is not the same as either of the contributing factors.[42] They move toward singularization, while principiating a new unity.[43] Differentiation is perfection.

Such a new unity is neither the same as the unity of its constituting principle; otherwise, it would need to share some common ground with its determining

factor and be a continuation of the same. Nor can it be the same as the ultimate difference insofar as they are pure differences. That is, they lack any unity or commonality whatsoever. Thus, following from their primary diversity, ultimate differences terminate a quidditative order: they contract the unity of being qua being to the singular divine essence or the further determinable creaturely categories through intrinsic modes, especially infinite and finite; they contract the categories to common essences through ultimate specific differences; and they contact common essences to singular individuals through *haecceitates*. Each of these terminations will occupy a subsequent chapter. For the moment, the following point must be emphasized: ultimate differences principiate new unities, but themselves lack any unitive commonality.

To say that *x* and *y* are primarily diverse and share nothing in common belies a deeper metaphysical question of what accounts for diversity in the first place. Why isn't everything simply one, continuous, and everywhere the same? According to Aristotle, the cause of multiplicity is divisibility.[44] There can be many things (substances, forms, elements, etc.) and not just a Parmenidean monolith because there is a principle of division between them. Such division seems to be something of a brute fact for Aristotle, not open to further analysis. In the medieval tradition, this issue becomes even more pronounced. If we begin with the pure identity of God, then what grounds diversity, multiplicity, unlikeness, inequality, and so forth? Where can we find room in a selfsame deity to introduce otherness? In short, we confront the ancient problem of the one and the many.

By beginning with a review of Aquinas's notable position, two tasks can be accomplished. First, a model of a metaphysics of imitation, and its attempt to explain primary diversity, can be set up. Second, it can be shown, contra Richard Cross, that Scotus's theory of univocal being is not founded upon a metaphysics of analogy or imitation. Before turning to Aquinas's account, several key Aristotelian distinctions must be reviewed.

3.4.1. Difference, Diversity, and Opposition

Recall from our earlier terminological clarification that difference for Aristotle is always mediated by some higher identity. That is, two things differ insofar as they are in some sense the same. I am different from my parents because, although we are not numerically identical individuals, we share the same human essence. Things can be said to differ more or less; for example, "I am more different from my grandparents than from my parents." Contrariety is complete difference. It marks the extremes between opposites sharing a common factor. For example, white and black share the genus of color, and courage and cowardice share the mediating genus of virtue.[45] The extremes of difference can communicate in a common identity, such that whiteness can become blackness, and vice versa. Change transpires between the extremes of difference because of this shared mediating factor.

The link between contrariety and privation forms a central consideration for what follows. As Aquinas clarifies in his commentary on the *Metaphysics*, privation is the basis for the opposition of contraries.[46] One of the contraries is always a privation, he explains, although not a pure privation. If it were, the two contraries would not share the same genus. Each member possesses a shared "matter" to some extent, although one contrary possesses it deficiently; what is primary in a class, such as whiteness in the genus of color, enjoys the full reality of the shared perfection. (See the *Fourth Way* for the full execution of this claim.) The primary member constitutes the unity of the kind, of which its contrary marks the extreme opposition. But the contrary is not something excluded from the class, because it still possesses the shared perfection, albeit deficiently.

Of contrariety and all forms of opposition, a common "matter" (broadly speaking) forms their basis of comparison or point of reference.[47] Opposition brings unity to difference on the basis of a mediating identity. Even in the case of contradiction, *not-being x* requires the negation of *being x* to form the basis of opposition. And all forms of opposition, Aquinas argues, include contradiction.[48] Contrariety, however, is the greatest and most perfect difference.[49] This is because it brings the furthest extremes under a common unity (e.g., whiteness and blackness, virtue and vice, etc.). Whereas contradiction unifies less extreme differences (e.g., gray as one form of not-being white), contrariety reaches to the extremes of difference to find common ground. In the case of species with contrary differences, "reciprocal processes of generation" can arise from these extremes.[50] For example, whiteness marks the extreme contrary of blackness beyond which there is no greater degree of difference. Passage between them can occur.

Generic difference, however, already admits of too great a difference for comparison. Thus, when two things no longer share a common matter and can no longer be generated out of each other, they reach a point of diversity. Aquinas explains: "Because those things which do not communicate in matter cannot be generated from one another, it follows that they are of diverse genera of which there is not mutual generation."[51] A line, for example, cannot be produced from whiteness.

Unlike difference and opposition, diversity involves what Aristotle describes as an indefinite otherness.[52] That is, two things are simply other without differing from one another with respect to a common mediating factor (i.e., identity). Although the distance between differential extremes is greatest, diversity lacks any such point of reference. Alongside sameness (*to auto/idem*), diversity or otherness (*heterotes/diversitas*) characterizes everything that is.

Attempting to sort out the problems endemic to Plato's Form of the Different (*to heteron*) from the *Sophist*, Aristotle proclaims: "For a thing and its 'other' need not be other in a definite respect, since everything that has definite being is either other or the same."[53] Everything thus can be said to be either the

same or diverse from anything else. Unlike difference, diversity requires only an indefinite otherness without a common identifying principle with respect to which two things are other. For this reason, diversity exhibits what can be called a "vague alterity."

Although Aristotle and Aquinas presuppose the diversity of the ten categories and (in the case of Aquinas) the diversity of creatures and God, which altogether lack a definite factor of identification, analogy provides a quasi-unity capable of uniting diversity on the basis of identity. Even the indefinite otherness of primary diversity, initially contrasted with mere difference, can be subsumed under a higher principle of identity. When coupled with analogy, diversity falls under the logic of opposition.[54] Here's why.

In discussing what sorts of things differ, instead of are simply other, Aristotle sometimes speaks as if things can differ in genus without being categorially diverse.[55] For example, animal and plants differ in genus, but fall under the same category (Substance) and at least under one genus (body). Such generically different things differ in a definite respect, namely, with reference to a common identifying factor. But we reach a point with the categories after which this can no longer be true. One would not say, for example, that "being to the left of the refrigerator" is different from "being a hippopotamus" or "being divisible by 109." If they were, they would need to be the same and identical in some respect. But if their respective genera constitute distinct categories (i.e., Position, Substance, and Quantity), the three manners of being seem to be diverse, and not merely different. And insofar as being is not their identifying factor, for all of the reasons previously discussed, Aristotle must either bite the bullet of diversity and allow it to linger as an irreducible feature of reality, or unify the diverse categories of being in some other manner.

Aristotle chooses the latter option. This can be seen, for example, in *Metaphysics* IV.1. He unifies the diverse categories of being in terms of their analogical attribution to the category of Substance. That is, multiple beings *differ* from each other insofar as they can be measured in reference to this common point of identity: being in its most proper sense, that is, as substance. The nine diverse categories of accidents are beings insofar as they inhere in a substance. The identity is not of a genus to a species (as was the case with mere differences), but of being in its primary *ratio* to being in lesser *rationes.* Analogy tames the wild alterity of diversity by means of a unifying measure.

For Aquinas, not only substance provides such a unifying principle of analogy, but so too does God. This procedure can be clearly observed, for example, in *De ente et essentia,* where Aquinas begins with being in its most disparate and manifold sense but resolves it to being as substance, then even further to being as first, simple substance (i.e., *ipsum esse subsistens*). A unifying analogue can be found both on the predicamental and the transcendental levels.[56] Beings thus retain something of the diversity at their highest levels (i.e., predicamen-

tal and transcendental) and in this sense, they do not merely differ. But given analogical unity, diversity can be grounded in reference to being measured by a prior identity, thus taming its otherwise vague alterity.

Although transcendental or predicamental passage between such diverse beings is not possible, as in the unity of contraries, analogy affords asymmetrical communication on account of the opposition between being and nonbeing at the core of creatures. As Aquinas states in his *Sentences* commentary: "The Creator and creatures are reduced into one, communicating not univocally, but analogically."[57] Such a privation of what God possesses in its fullness is not a pure privation because creatures participate in being (*esse commune*), albeit to a limited degree. As in the case of differential contraries, the deprived term shares in the common matter. Here, however, the perfection is shared analogically, not univocally. As the primary analogue, God thus convenes a community of beings measured in terms of their reference to this principle. In the end, primary diversity is explained in terms of falling short of being in its fullest measure.

As the following subsection shows, Aquinas holds that diversity presupposes multiplicity, but multiplicity presupposes the opposition between being and nonbeing. The nonbeing of creatures opposes the fullness of being possessed by God alone, not as the pure privation of nothingness but rather as a definite manner of falling short. Insofar as contrariety requires a shared genus as a factor of identification, but creatures and God share nothing in common and are primarily diverse, analogy picks up the slack at this point. God and creatures are not measured in reference to a shared genus of being. Rather, creatures are measured in reference to God and possess a degree of relative nonbeing on account of their essences. The nonbeing of creatures is not a pure privation but, rather, a deficiency of possessing being. Diversity can be subsumed under the unity of analogy, with God himself as *ipsum esse subsistens* providing the identifying factor. Such an identifying factor is not shared in the manner of a genus, but in the manner of imitation. A metaphysics of imitation thus reduces primary diversity to a metaphysics of identity.

Once Aquinas's account has been unpacked, Subsection 3.4.3 will show how Scotus's account of primary diversity and ultimate difference runs deeper than mere imitation. This is because, for Aquinas, multiplicity requires a composition within creatures between being and nonbeing, whereby they *imitate* God, but *are not* God. Composition explains multiplicity because creatures fall short of the selfsame and simple God on this account. Scotus, on the other hand, emphasizes finitude, not composition. The multiplicity of beings arises from primarily diverse degrees of finitude, a primary diversity that he does not ground in a prior imitation and composition. They remain diverse from God on account of an inherent and nonmimetic finitude, which is a positive differential degree of being culminating in each one's *haecceitas*.

3.4.2. Aquinas on the Opposition between Being and Nonbeing

As has been shown by both David Winiewicz and John F. Wippel, the locus classicus of Aquinas's discussion of primary diversity is question 4, article 1 in his commentary on Boethius's *De Trinitate*.[58] Here Aquinas asks whether otherness (*alteritas*) is the cause of plurality. He responds that the cause of plurality is divisibility, but what divides composite things cannot be the same as what divides simple things.[59] This is because, Aquinas explains, the division of composite things presupposes the diversity (*diversitas*) found in prior, simpler things. For example, a human and a donkey (composite things) are divided and thereby multiple on account of their diverse constitutive differences (e.g., rationality and irrationality).[60]

But then, we must ask, what causes the multiplicity of such prior diversities? It is clear that for humans and donkeys to differ, they must have diverse differentiating factors. Why, however, are such factors simply diverse from one another as plurality of factors instead of being one? What accounts for the division and thereby the multiplicity of rationality and irrationality? To avoid an infinite regress, there must be factors that are primarily diverse, differing on account of themselves and nothing else.[61]

Both Winiewicz and Wippel have noted how Parmenidean monism casts a specter over Aquinas's account at this point.[62] Insofar as being cannot be divided from being (i.e., cannot divide itself), what accounts for a plurality of diversifying factors? Why isn't everything simply included under this one monolithic being, "one, continuous, everywhere the same," as sung by Parmenides? Thus, to ground the multiplicity of prior and simple diverse factors, there must be a division within such prior and simple factors themselves.

Note that division, not diversity, grounds the multiplicity of simple and prior factors. This must be stressed because diversity, as we have seen, is a vague alterity between beings. The plurality of such beings must be explained. The division within a simple and prior factor cannot be simply in terms of its being, for we have seen that "being cannot be divided from being." The division instead stands between being and nonbeing. Aquinas states: "Immediately following the division of being and nonbeing, the plurality of simple priors is discovered. The account of diversity follows this plurality, according to which there remains in it the power of its cause, namely, the opposition of being and nonbeing."[63] An original opposition between being and nonbeing explains plurality and plurality explains diversity.

Wippel summarizes the matter as follows: "Diversity rests upon and follows from this plurality [of prior and simple factors], continues Thomas, insofar as there remains within this plurality the power of its cause. (Again, therefore, we find Thomas stressing this original opposition or division between being and nonbeing as the ultimate explanation for the plurality of created things which are primary and simple. This plurality in turn accounts for the diversity of the

same, that is, of created things which are primary and simple)."[64] Division or opposition is presupposed for the plurality of prior things; diversity is not. But why does such an opposition or division within beings lead to a plurality?

Aquinas explains that although each of the multiple factors is a being (otherwise it would be sheer nothingness), nevertheless, it has a degree of nonbeing relative to its nature. As Winiewicz states in an existential fashion, each thing's diversity lies in its unique power of existing, which negates all other manners of being, including God's.[65] In each effect, beginning with such primary, simple factors, the power of the first cause to divide being and nonbeing remains (*secundum quod manet in ea suae causae virtus, scilicet oppositionis entis et non entis*). The crystallization of this opposition in each being entails that this is not that, and most importantly that any given creature is not God.[66]

Bearing a trace of this opposition explains two crucial factors for Aquinas: creaturely imitation of the first being, and their composition. The two are intricately related, for each creature uniquely imitates God insofar as one creature is like God in a way that another falls short. And the one falls shorts in a way that another likens itself to God.[67] Wippel argues that nonbeing is not absolute nothingness but, rather, nonbeing in a relative sense: the negation of *esse.*[68] Insofar as God is *esse tantum* and *ipsum esse subsistens,* the composition of *esse* and essence in creatures amounts to such relative nonbeing.[69]

That the opposition stands between being and relative nonbeing must be stressed. Nonbeing here does not mean pure nothingness, but nonbeing insofar as it looks toward and negates being in its most fecund sense: *esse tantum.* Aristotle left the nonidentity between being and nonbeing or nothingness outside even the vague alterity of diversity. Whereas for Aristotle, being and nonbeing were simply "not the same," Aquinas elevates this division to a mimetic referencing: something is not God in a definitive respect and with respect to a standard of being. God as the fullness of being becomes the standard of imitation and the ground of contradiction: each being *is not God* in a definitive respect. Not being God, however, cannot be on account of diversity because diversity is within being itself. This division or opposition *imitates* the standard of being according to an asymmetrical relation insofar as each effect retains the power of its cause.

A creature can be called a being only insofar as it imitates the first being.[70] Unlike mere similarity, imitation requires an asymmetrical relationship whereby the image likens itself or is likened to an exemplar.[71] Two eggs are similar, Augustine argues, but one is not the image of the other. One does not imitate the other, since neither one serves as the exemplar and measure of the other.[72] Thus we say that the portrait is *like* a person, but not vice versa.[73] As the reproduction or communication of a given perfection or form in imperfect images, however, imitation necessarily requires a nonidentity between the likeness and the exemplar.[74]

A good image, as Plato shows in the *Sophist,* reproduces its model according to proper proportions, while embracing its secondary status as an imitation.[75]

He contrasts this to the bad images of the sophist, whose *simulacra* intentionally distort the original in order to appear real. The proper proportions of creaturely imitation, like the good image of Plato, reproduce their divine exemplar. Each one does so in its own definitive respect, or on account of its essence. Without this asymmetrical reference, however, creatures would have no claim to the moniker of being (either *esse* or *ens*), according to Aquinas.

Let us summarize: Aquinas makes mimetic negation the foundation of multiplicity and diversity. Creatures imitate God insofar as each one uniquely *is not God* and *is not another.* Aquinas can ground diversity according to such a model of negation because being in its purest state is identifiable with God. The negation or nonbeing of creatures is *not being* God who is *ipsum esse subsistens* and *esse tantum*. Only as a confused concept does being apply equally to creatures. Their proper concepts of being instead emerge in reference to the standard of subsisting being itself in terms of how they imitate, yet fall short of, their exemplar. This opposition between being and nonbeing grounds multiplicity which in turn grounds diversity.

As Oliva Blanchette states:

> If difference and diversity are real, as we have seen Saint Thomas insist that they be, then what is common in the analogy of being can only be the order that binds them together. "Being" is not an abstraction but a concrete order in creation. Analogy thus brings out the idea that reality in creation is not just a flat, lowest common denominator of widely diverse things in the concrete, but rather a diversity of things interrelated in their original and originating integrity, the first perfection of the world, and in their interaction as they move toward their second and final perfection.[76]

Analogy binds together the vague alterity of diversity under the unity of a common analogue. Creatures deficiently imitate the fullness of subsisting being itself, which serves as the measure of their relative nonbeing.

3.4.3. Scotus and the Vague Alterity of Primary Diversity

It was indicated above that Scotus does not reduce diversity to anything more fundamental. The primary diversity of ultimate differences instead are pure determinations of the concept of being. They do not negate a primary instance of being, as pure and subsisting being itself. Insofar as the concept of being is univocal, to negate being would leave creatures as nothing. Scotus vehemently rejects the claim that finitude is a negation of the infinite, and thereby defined only according to such relational determination. The finitude (or being finite) of creatures instead is primarily diverse from the infinite, such that the two do not share a common unit of measure of identity.[77] Each one exhibits a primarily diverse degree of being, and for this reason, as we will see, each remains foundational. To say that primary diversity retains a vague alterity means that division is not primarily oppositional.[78]

But are Aquinas and Scotus talking past each other on this point? Aquinas, it seems, questions the ontological foundation of the analogy of being, whereas Scotus limits himself to the cognitive order in discussing the univocity of the *concept* of being. Are they simply pursuing different questions, the one ontological, the other conceptual; or do the two converge at some point?

In terms of Scotus's theory of univocity and ultimate differences, it would be a mistake to move too quickly from the conceptual to the real. This has been the error of proponents of Radical Orthodoxy, who assume Scotus collapses the distance between creatures and God by subsuming them both under a univocal concept of being.[79] As the previous chapter argued, the concept of being is not about any property of beingness shared by creatures and God. But does this mean that Scotus's doctrine of univocity offers no ontology?

In response to the overzealous reading of Scotus by Radical Orthodoxy and others, some scholars such as Richard Cross have defended a "pure semantics" position.[80] He argues that univocity is a semantic doctrine (i.e., a doctrine about the meaning of concepts) whose ontological import must be considered separately. The ontological foundation of Scotus's theory, he argues, is quite similar to Aquinas's. Cross is warranted in curbing the seamless transition from the conceptual to the real. As indicated in the previous chapter, however, Cross does not go far enough in abstraction to reach ultimate differences. As discussed, concepts do not naively mirror reality, according to Scotus. Despite this fact, Cross's argument errs on two accounts: first, the univocity of the concept of being is not grounded in a metaphysics of imitation; second, our concepts of ultimate difference have a real and objective foundation in the irreducible primary diversity of degrees of transcendental magnitude or real formalities. Before responding, a brief review of Cross's argument is in order.

Against the charge of Radical Orthodoxy and others that Scotus's theory of univocity is a metaphysical doctrine, Cross holds that Scotus offers only a semantic theory.[81] That is, it is a cognitive theory making semantic assumptions.[82] The meaning of "being" should be understood as the meaning of the concept of being, which is, he argues, but a "vicious abstraction." By this oft-repeated phrase, Cross means that there is no real commonality underlying this concept of being. The intellect produces the concept of being in response to real things, but it does so by abstracting as much as possible. Hence, the "vicious abstraction."

At this point, Cross correctly asks: But what explains such similarity between beings falling under a real concept if not real commonality? Is it simply an irreducible similarity without a real foundation? Such a symmetrical relationship of similarity, insofar as it is symmetrical, must be mind-imposed. That is, God cannot be really related to any creature, which is what symmetry would require. He argues that the real foundation for such a relation, however, is an asymmetrical relation of imitation. According to such a relation, creatures imitate the divine essence insofar as a creature is measured by God as its exemplary

cause. Most importantly, a creature can be called or conceived as a being insofar as it imitates the exemplar of being itself, *ens infinitum*. The theory of univocity presupposes imitation; yet, as a semantic theory, Scotus develops it independently of such an ontological foundation.

A full-fledged theory of imitation has been modeled in the guise of Aquinas's doctrine. Scotus's theory of univocity, however, does not presuppose a metaphysics of imitation for the following reason: whether or not creatures in fact imitate God as images is not the question. And Scotus clearly rejects such a position: "While it may be true that both angel and soul are able to know themselves naturally for the absolute things they are, they cannot know themselves naturally to the extent that they are images of God. In other words, they are not aware that they are images of God. This is because the relation is not able to be naturally cognized, unless both extremes of the relation are able to be naturally cognized."[83] This is because a being is a being formally of itself.

Creatures are beings *because of* being finite in themselves, independent of any further relation. As primarily diverse, being finite bears no constitutive relation to being infinite. Each one enjoys a finite entitativeness formally through itself, despite being totally caused by God (in the case of all creatures) or inhering in another (in the case of accidents). Relationality to a measure does not formally constitute them as beings.[84] For this reason, being finite is neither a negation of the concept of being itself nor a negation of infinite being. This point requires careful explanation lest the subtlety of Scotus's point be obscured.

Scotus holds that each finite degree of being is formally a being through itself.[85] Even if (*per impossibile*) God did not exist or if there were no substances, creatures and accidents respectively would retain such possible entitativeness, although they would not actually exist. This is because, Scotus explains, a creature can be a being formally of itself and yet be totally caused by God.[86] So too, an accident can be a being formally of itself and totally dependent upon substance for its inherence. Although without God a creature would not have even the diminished being of *esse cognitum,* nevertheless being conceived in the divine intellect does not explain why it is a possibility in the first place. The possibility of possibles is reduced to God, but only as an extrinsic principle of their being. From themselves, that is, just being what they are (or what they could be), they are formally possible and thus distinct from impossibilities.[87] A chimera has formal repugnance on account of itself, whereas prior to creation, a rose has possible being even apart from God as the "principiative ground."[88]

The point here is that due to an inherent finitude, each creature *is a being*. Scotus considers the argument that something is not a being formally of itself, what he calls an *ens ratum*, except to the degree it participates in *ipsum esse*.[89] That is, some might argue, because only God is identical to his being, everything else must participate in being in order to "ratify" it. Insofar as it is a being, so the argument goes, to that extent it participates in being. But Scotus flat-out rejects this argument. Against this claim he responds:

> As for the proof in the other pro-syllogism ("a being that has being," etc.), I say that the major premise of the pro-syllogism is false, if "insofar as" is meant to reduplicate something [that is said of or belongs to the *ens ratum*] *per se* in the first mode or if "by participating" in the major premise is taken as a gerund. And to the extent that it [i.e., "insofar as"] is interpreted as "because," if the causality is understood as pertaining to [the *ens ratum*] *per se* in the first mode, then the major is likewise false, since "participation *per se* in the first mode" itself is not that by which something is formally a ratified being. But if one understands by "insofar as" a causality that pertains to [the *ens ratum*] *per se* in the second mode (as is the case in a subject with respect to its proper attributes), I grant that "such a being insofar as it is such a being" (for example, a stone insofar as it is a stone) participates in being (*esse*). Yet the proposition is not true conversely: "insofar as it participates it is a being."[90]

Scotus takes issue with the phrase "insofar as" (*in quantum*). He argues that if by this reduplication one means *per se* in the first mode, then the claim must be rejected. Participation is not that by which a being is formally a being. That is, participation does not cause or "ratify" something as a possible being (*ens ratum formaliter*) as opposed to a mere fiction. A being is formally a being of itself in spite of the fact that it participates in its being.

One might say, Scotus grants, that the reduplication can be read as *per se* in the second mode. In other words, participation can be predicated of creatures as if a proper attribute of them. He continues: "So, my interpretation is as follows: in the first moment of nature there is a being (*ens*) that is being itself (*ipsum esse*)—namely, God. In the second moment of nature there is the stone as a ratified being, taken absolutely, in the sense that it is not understood as participating or not. In the third moment there is participation itself, a relation, following the stone itself."[91] A stone qua stone participates in its *esse* only according to the second mode. It is a stone and formally a being simply on account of what it is.

As we saw, Scotus outlines three logical moments in this process. In the first moment of nature, there is a being that is its own being (*ens quod est ipsum esse*). Then, in the second, there is a being (e.g., a stone) that is an *ens ratum* absolutely and not understood according to its participation or nonparticipation relative to anything else. Finally, in the third moment, there is participation, which leads to the entity itself. In terms of this ever so important second moment, the formal ground of possibility is immanent to that being itself and nothing else.

One cannot say that because "insofar as something participates, it is a being" is true, therefore "insofar as something is a being, it participates" is also true. Such conversion holds only in the case of *per se* predication in the first mode. Scotus exemplifies this point with the false claim "Insofar as a human is risible, it is a human" (although the converse holds, the conversion does not).

Just as something is not human *because* it is risible, so too a being is not a being *because* it participates in being. Thus in keeping with the refrain of this section, Scotus does not deny that creatures participate in being or imitate God. Instead, he denies that *qua* such imitation or participation they are beings or are understood as such. As he illustrates in the passage above with the "second instant," each being *per se* enjoys a magnitude of transcendental perfection on account of which it is a being and is intelligible.[92]

Scotus rejects the claim that something is a being *insofar as* it participates in being itself or imitates another that serves as the standard of being.[93] Such relations only could be predicated of a finite or accidental being according to the manner of an attribute and the second mode of *per se* predication. Instead, he holds that a possible being has the formal ground of its possibility immanent within itself. This means that prior to any relation it might have to another, even to God, a possible being contains an aptitude for existence. The fact of whether it comes to actually exist remains a separate question, but such a possibility distinguishes itself from sheer impossibility without measuring itself in opposition to an extrinsic standard of being. The various degrees of finitude thus are not constituted vis-à-vis an oppositional relation to the infinite, at least not primarily.

What makes a finite being possible is that it is *this kind* of being. A chimera is nothing on account of a "formal repugnance to positive being."[94] The formal constitution of a chimera makes it impossible and unactualizable, whereas human or stone prior to creation were not formally repugnant to existence, but simply lacked it.[95] As has been seen, Scotus argues that *the possible* possesses a supposed being (*ens ratum*) formally from itself.[96] This means that horseness qua horseness (*equinitas tantum*), for example, expresses a complete concept. There is, one might say, a harmony or concord of its internal constitution on account of its conceptual elements or notes. Its formal ground of possibility is irreducible either to that which gives it *esse cognitum* (i.e., the divine intellect); or to that which gives it actual being (i.e., the divine will); or even to the causal conditions of the world upon which it depends (e.g., the physical processes of DNA or hylomorphism).[97] Essences are thinkable on account of their pure consistence of internal terms apart from how they may or may not be instantiated at a given moment in the actual world. This is what allows us to think such essences, even counterfactually.

3.4.4. Univocity without Imitation or Analogy

What has been discussed above can be drawn together to show, contra Cross, why a metaphysics of imitation does not underlie Scotus's theory of univocity. Imitation requires copying some exemplar.[98] According to Scotus, an image represents a whole perfectly and by means of imitation. In this sense, it differs from a mere vestige. Perfect representation means that the image captures its object according to a complete *ratio.* A vestige captures a whole imperfectly and

the part perfectly. Scotus states that "what is a vestige of the whole is an image of the part."[99] He offers the example of a foot in the sand: this vestige (i.e., the footprint) represents some fugitive animal, but only imperfectly. Unlike an image, which produced immediate cognition of the imaged, the vestigial footprint does not lead to an immediate cognition of the whole.[100] Such a trace warrants us to reason or otherwise infer (*sed tantum arguitive*) something about the whole, but it does not lead to the immediate cognition of it.

Whereas a vestige captures operates by means of similarity, an image requires imitation. Imitation likens the image to the imaged such that the one is the exemplar and measure of the other. Thus, the image inherently references the imaged without which it cannot be. Scotus often references Augustine's claim that two eggs are similar to one another, but they do not imitate each other. There is no order of hierarchy and priority between them.[101] There is an asymmetrical relation at work between an exemplar and the exemplified. Imitation or mimesis requires some model after which the imitations are copied; otherwise it is mere similarity. Although this relation is asymmetrical, the copy shares something in common with the model. Whereas the model possesses the common feature according to its essence, the copy participates in that feature.[102] Nevertheless the two can be unified on the basis of this trait shared in common, as we have seen. Granted, this is an analogical unification, but unification to be sure.[103]

A relation of dependence is built into the very fabric of this mimetic relationship. Scotus does not deny that creatures imitate God as their first exemplar and that God knows them insofar as he knows his essence as imitable.[104] What can be denied, however, is that finite beings either are or are knowable simply *qua imitating.* Scotus maintains that imitation is perfectly known when both the imitating entity and the imitated are known.[105] The converse need not be true. We can know the terms of the relation without knowing their relation; this is a vital point for Scotus in showing how we arrive at the concept of infinite being (and the simply-simple concept of infinite).[106]

Analogical differences share something in common, namely, asymmetrical relation to a measure. But primarily diverse factors as understood by Scotus share nothing in common. This is what makes them primarily diverse. For example, as Chapter 4 will argue, *finite* does not asymmetrically relate to, participate in, or oppose *infinite* as its measure. *Finite* is a positive degree of being of an *ens ratum* (or more appropriately *are* positive degrees of being or *entia rata*). Something cannot be both primarily diverse and the same as something else, such that it might be primarily diverse in one respect and the same in another. Remember, primarily diverse ultimate differences are simply-simple; they contain but a single irresolvable conceptual note. If they were to contain something in common with something else, then they would not be simply-simple. They could be further resolved until we reach a purely differential element both

simply-simple and primarily diverse. For these reasons, if ultimate differences could be cast in terms of a mimetic relation, they would lose this ever-so-important characteristic of primary diversity. And this is necessary for Scotus to buttress univocity, insofar as univocity does not identify being *qua being* with a primary being.

As a point of contrast, Aquinas can ground diversity in the oppositional structure of being and nonbeing because being means first and foremost *ipsum esse subsistens*. In their very being, creatures possess a relative degree of nothingness whereby we might say they oppose being itself (i.e., *ipsum esse subsistens*). Being a creature is *not-being God.* The nonbeing of creatures entails a falling short of being according to its full measure of perfection. God is already set apart from creation as a model (or the model of the model) from which creatures derive their similitude.[107] Thus, the vague alterity of diversity can be assimilated to unity, such that Fabro might profess: "Thus analogy of attribution accomplishes the ultimate 'resolution' of metaphysical discourse by relating the many to the One, the diverse to the Identical, and the composed to the Simple. It is at the same time the answer to the problem of the Parmenidean One within the creationist theory."[108] Diversity does not fall into dereliction for Aquinas because the identification of being with a simple subsistence of being demands the relative nonbeing of any other being. Given the simplicity and purity of the source, anything derived from it already must both be composite and participate in its being.[109] Diversity becomes a diminished unity of participation and composition.

Scotus's neutralized concept of univocal being, however, requires that the primary diversity of ultimate difference not be grounded in anything more fundamental. As we gleaned from Scotus's definition of ultimate difference, they differ in terms of themselves and nothing else. If such a difference were to reference something else as *that which it is not,* two consequences would follow. First, its nonidentity would be to being itself. And it would be nothing. It would not be a *relative* nonbeing à la Aquinas; that is, it is a nonbeing because lacking the fullness of being as relative to a standard of being in a primary analogue.[110] It would be absolutely nothing, altogether deprived of being. This is because it opposes being itself, and not merely a first, pure analogue of being.

Second, the difference would share something in common with that which it references, even if in a proportional fashion. Imitation reproduces a common form amid multiple instances. And on the basis of this common form, a multitude is (at least) analogically unified.[111] Imitation tames diversity, however, because it is founded on a distinct relation of measuring up to (or falling short of) some exemplar. As soon as the diversity between x and y (e.g., two ultimate differences) can be related either to one another or to a common third, they *oppose* each other in some definitive respect. For example, they are opposed in terms of not-being their exemplar—which they achieve in unique ways—instead of just differing in terms of themselves (i.e., immediately). In an analogical commu-

nity, each one with the exception of the first differs by a definitive and relative nonbeing. For Scotus, God is not most himself qua being, but qua this. Differentiation is the perfection of being qua being, according to Scotus.

The mistake here is to think of difference as the mere negation of identity. For Scotus, ultimate differentiation instead provides an irreducibly positive principle. It accomplishes the task of making unique, or making irreducibly other with respect to no common measure. Vague alterity means that ultimate differences differ on account of nothing besides themselves. That is, such differences produce unity as principles terminating respective quidditative orders without themselves possessing unity.[112] Each difference affirms a being's being *in quale* without primarily defining itself as the lack of something else. *This is not that,* not because this lacks what that possesses; and not because they differ with respect to something else (not even being, because, remember, ultimate differences are beings qualitatively speaking).

To retain their diversity, ultimate differences must remain unmediated with respect to one another. That is, they must be simply other without reference to the mediation of a common measure such as "not being infinite" as their constituting principle qua difference. They are first and foremost positive differences, and only secondarily and externally relatable to each other and to any measure.[113] To call them "positive differences" is to say that they just are differences and nothing else: not relations, not privations, and not imitations. Ultimate differences cannot agree or communicate in anything, not even in variously imitating a shared exemplar of being.

Due to the condition of our intellect, we conceive them only in the manner of nonsubsisting modes attached to a quidditative nucleus. We lack the simple intuitive gaze of angels or God. This is why we face Solomon's Difficulty. If we could grasp each thing, including God, in its singularity, we would (or will) intuit its seamless unity in diversity. In our current condition, however, to avoid Solomon's Difficulty, we must attempt to think difference in a nonreified fashion. Showing how this is the case will be the task of subsequent chapters.

In summation, Scotus vehemently denies that finitude can be reduced to such a relational foundation. Although creatures imitate God, they are not beings, nor are they finite on account of this imitation.[114] Both of these factors are instead explained by the fact that a creature is formally a being of itself irrespective of being caused or inhering in another. Primary diversity remains an irreducible factor of vague alterity on account of which ultimate differences differ in terms of themselves and not in reference to anything further. They are pure differences, irreducible even to an analogical unity of opposition. As will now be discussed, such pure differentiation is needed to explain the unity of various quidditative orders, despite such ultimate differences themselves possessing a subunitive character. The theory must answer the question of how to terminate (i.e., determine) purely quidditative orders. Its unequivocal answer is ultimate difference.

3.5. TERMINATION OF QUIDDITATIVE ORDERS

This final section will show, first, that there are three distinct functional "groups" of ultimate differences and, second, that while resembling ultimate difference in many ways, the coextensive transcendental attributes of being (*passiones entis simpliciter convertibiles*) must be distinguished from them. In terms of the first point, the term *group* will be used with the utmost care so as to not mistake an ultimate difference for a categorial thing. As primarily diverse from one another, no common terms can be abstracted from such ultimate differences.[115] It would be wise to invoke Adrian Moore's statement: "In the differing of entities from one another, differing itself is ever different."[116]

Although a common term cannot be extracted from such differences, their functional roles insofar as they terminate a quidditative order can be noted.[117] By looking at the unities they coconstitute, we can formulate simply-simple qualitative concepts of such differences. Constitution means that they unite in a nonreductive fashion a higher-lever essentiality to a lower-level subject such that "S is p."[118] And yet they add determination to the quidditative reality they determine, thereby resulting in the constitution of a new quidditative unity (hence the "nonreductive" part). Scotus thus elevates ultimate difference to this coconstitutive role in the *scientia transcendens* of metaphysics: As the determinations of an undetermined concept of being, ultimate differences are themselves indeterminable; they are pure differences.

3.5.1. Derivation of Ultimate Differences

Before arguing for a threefold quasi-taxonomy of such ultimate differences below, it will be wise to restate some criteria for ultimate differences: their concepts must be simply simple; there must be only a qualitative (but no quidditative) concept of them, which means they must determine the concept of being without themselves being determined; they must be primarily diverse from one another and from being; they must differ in terms of themselves and not on account of something else; they must be extracategorial/transcendental; and, we can now add, they must terminate a quidditative order. This is what "division of being" means. The following three chapters will be dedicated to justifying and exploring each functional group of ultimate differences, so only a brief sketch will be provided here. Following Allan Wolter, Part II will include the following three groups: intrinsic transcendental modes, certain specific differences, and individual differences.[119]

Why these? Each grouping explains or terminates a quidditative order: the transcendental order of being itself into God and creatures; the categorial genera into the less than numerical unity of essences; and communal essences into individuals. From the rich variation of concrete entities, such differences explain the different regions of unity we experience and conceive. That is, they explain the constitution of new levels of unity or terms: God and the categories, species and natural kinds, and individuals.

Each group should be considered an ultimate difference insofar as it terminates or determines its respective quidditative order and explains the emergence of new types of unity. Perhaps the most controversial member on the list are the intrinsic modes of being. This is because Scotus must avoid introducing real composition into the divine essence: God is *a being* that is *infinite*. As something of a promissory note in preparation for our more extended discussion of this matter in Chapter 4, we might consider two points. First, Scotus tells us that we can admit such distinction into our complex concept of God, even while admitting the simplicity of the divine essence itself.[120] That is, we conceive of God as *ens infinitum*—Scotus's preferred description of God—which provides us with a proper concept, yet a complex one. Whatever God, or anything else for that matter, is like in itself, we cannot know; for us, our concepts are grounded in the transcendental univocity of the concept of being. God is not most his own *as being,* but *as this;* his thisness is secured by us on account of his infinite modality.

Second, *infinite* (like *finite*) signifies an intrinsic mode or transcendental magnitude of a being. For this reason, this mode is more intimate (*intranee*) to God's being than any other added determination.[121] Scotus maintains that we can abstract all proper attributes from God and yet the intrinsic mode of being infinite would remain.[122] Attributes are formally distinct, whereas the more intimate modes are only modally distinct. Being is the ultimate determinable, lacking determination. Ultimate difference is the indeterminable determination. This does not mean, however, that as *ens infinitum* God himself is in potency.[123] All of this is to say—in advance of our arguments in the following chapter—that intrinsic modes function as ultimate differences.

Next, Scotus tells us that certain, but not all, specific differences are *ultimate*.[124] This is (in part) the least controversial application of the idea of ultimate difference. Others such as Aristotle and Aquinas seem to have such differences in mind when they use the term.[125] But Scotus reserves the category of ultimate only for certain specific differences: those specific differences that are not derived from quidditative things. Remember, the essential parts of individuals were included in the list of quidditative beings: specific form and matter. Thus any specific difference derived from a reified part (e.g., rationality from the rational soul) is not ultimate; instead, it too comprises being and an ultimate difference.

Finally, Scotus's principle of individuation—*haecceitas,* or "thisness"—will be defended as an ultimate difference. An individual ultimate difference is a pure positive difference, primarily diverse from the individual ultimate difference of another individual. As coupled with the less-than-numerical unity of a common essence, the individual ultimate difference accounts for the determination to a new type of unity, numerical unity. Plato is like Socrates insofar as they are both humans and are both individuals. But the *haecceitas* of Plato is not like the *haecceitas* of Socrates. The two ultimate differences share nothing in common. The results can be compared, but the principles of differentiation

cannot: ultimate differences are simply other than one another. Only an unmitigated account of primary diversity captures the subunitive positivity of difference according to Scotus.

Insofar as being qua being marks an open topical question, something outside of the concept of being itself must provide an answer. The determination or resolution of this question can be found in ultimate difference. In the words of Michael Sylwanowicz, ultimate difference "puts an end to" the indeterminacy of being qua being.[126] It does so by constituting quidditative, yet complex, terms. Whereas in the case of creatures, their transcendental magnitudes of being finite keep them open to further determination, individuation puts an end it this process. It is, again in the words of Sylwanowicz, the "hard actuality" that perfects being's intrinsic determinability.[127]

Ultimate differences cannot be directly represented insofar as they lack any thingly character. That is, to explain certain real concepts (conceptual phenomena), we must posit these purely qualitative conceptual elements. They terminate quidditative orders, which means they explain and constitute a nonreductive identity between the two (e.g., Socrates *is* a human). Three different functions can be found for ultimate differences: forming categorial terms, forming kind terms, and forming individual proper names. Although some functionally comparable aspects pertain to each conception of ultimate differences, each region or grouping requires its own special treatment lest we make too common that which fundamentally differs. Why should the coextensive attributes not also be included on this list?

3.5.2. The Coextensive Attributes of Being

Scotus identifies the classic list of transcendental concepts—one, true, and good—as proper attributes of being.[128] In discussing the double primacy of being, Scotus distinguishes the qualifying concepts of ultimate differences from proper attributes.[129] As he states: "Those accounts which do not include a univocal being predicated *in quid* are [its] ultimate differences and the attributes."[130] Based on this textual evidence, we have reason to conclude that Scotus does not include the coextensive attributes under the same heading as the ultimate differences, although the two grouping share many similar features. But what reason can he give for this distinction?

Like any proper attribute or property, the *passiones entis* follow from their subject and are convertible with it.[131] And also like any proper attribute, they do not simply repeat their subject. They instead are predicated *per se* in the second mode of their subject, being. And third, they coextend with being to everything that is, and yet are not identical to it. Thus, just as according to *per se* predication of the second mode one cannot say, "Risible is human" (but only "A human is risible"), so too we say, "A being is one," but not, "One is a being." Remember, being cannot be predicated of them quidditatively.

Oneness flows from a being qua being as a proper attribute. But like being itself (i.e., the transcendental concept), *unum* requires differentiation. The dif-

ferent kinds of unity (i.e., divine/categorial, generic and specific, and individual) follow from the differentiation of being. The resulting quidditative terms provide clues for understanding the process of differentiation. Insofar as it is coextensive with being, where we can isolate *different* regions of unities (i.e., different quidditative terms), we can infer ultimate differentiation. But *unum* cannot itself be an ultimate difference. The proper attributes remain *common,* retaining the commonality of being.[132] Ultimate differences, on the other hand, account for contraction. One is a determination that remains communal; the other moves toward singularity. Unity is a result of ultimate differentiation; it is not identical to it. Ultimate difference must be treated as subunitive: this means it lacks the oneness or unity of beings or things, but it is not many merely in the sense of being many ones.

Ultimately differential concepts, however, work between such levels of unity and oneness. For example, intrinsic modes contract the unity something has simply as *a being* to the singular unity of the divine essence as this (through the infinite mode) or to the not-yet-singular unity of the categories (through finite modes); then in terms of the latter, ultimate specific differences contract the generic unity of the categories to the unity of more specific common natures; and finally, *haecceitates* contract the less-than-numerical unity of common natures to the numerical unity of an individual.

Note the distinction between how the ultimate differences function in each case versus the proper attribute of unity. Although neither contains being quidditatively and both qualify being in some manner, they do so in different ways and for different reasons: whereas attributes accompany their subject, albeit in the nonidentical manner, and share its extension, ultimate differences have the function of terminating or contracting a quidditative order. Since each quidditative order has a concomitant unity, ultimate differences also determine the respective unity, ultimately to numerical unity, or singularity. And although being is not predicated *in quid* of its transcendental attributes, but only *in quale,* its transcendental attributes are contained in it.[133] Thus, since transcendental unity follows as an attribute from being qua being, to the extent they possess unity, they are beings quidditatively.[134] What accounts for such unities (namely, ultimate difference) is not the same as the resulting unities. To represent ultimate differences as having unity would undermine the ground of differentiation.

In terms of the other coextensive attributes (namely, true and good), the same standard can be applied for eliminating them from the list of ultimate differences. Insofar as "a being is true" (in the sense of being intelligible) and "a being is good" (in the sense of being perfect to a degree), they are coextensive with being.[135] Like their counterpart *one,* they too are indifferent to the division of being into distinct quidditative orders. For this reason, a more sustained discussion of them can be bypassed. I will mention only few key factors regarding *verum*.[136]

True as a coextensive attribute of being means that a being qua being is true. As Wolter has shown, Scotus reduces transcendental truth to *verum in re* as opposed to truth as an instantiation of exemplary ideas in the divine mind.[137]

Even if there were no intellects to conceive them, beings would retain their *verum in re.* Scotus explains that "verum in re" means a being insofar as it appears or manifests itself (*ens illud quod apparet*).[138] The truth in things is not their relation to a mind able to conceive them, whether human or divine. It is instead their *esse manifestivum,* their being manifest. *Esse manifestivum* means that each being, qua being, enjoys an inherent grade of being (*gradum suae entitatis*).[139] To the extent that a being has a certain degree of being, to that extent it manifests itself. It must be noted that *esse manifestivum sui,* which follows as a proper attribute of the being qua being, differs on account of each being. That is, the inherent degree of being requires a *differentiator,* which is none other than its ultimate difference (or a series of ultimate differences). For this reason, God alone can be conceived as *verum infinitum*; his intrinsic mode or transcendental magnitude of *infinite* runs through all other attributes like a current. *Verum,* like *ens*, is univocal. Ultimate difference is not.

CONCLUSION

Chapters 2 and 3 together show how our intellect resolves the rich, yet confused, data of sensation into simply-simple concepts, which are the most abstract concepts and yet also the most distinct. These are the quidditative concept of being, on the one hand, and ultimate differences on the other. Examining the latter, Chapter 3 showed how Scotus borrows, and yet radically transforms, this Aristotelian concept from its traditional meaning in terms of the last difference. In Scotus's expanded and deepened sense of the term, ultimate difference serves to buttress univocity by dividing being. The characteristics of ultimate difference were determined as the following: (1) their concept must be simply-simple; (2) there must be only a qualitative (but no quidditative) concept of them, which means they must determine the concept of being without themselves being determined; (3) they must be primarily diverse from one another and from being; (4) they must differ in terms of themselves and not on account of something else; (5) they must be extracategorial/transcendental; and finally (6) they must terminate a quidditative order (i.e., they must divide being). Particular emphasis was placed on the issue of primary diversity and how Scotus, unlike Aristotle or Aquinas, does not reduce it to anything more fundamental. Rather, he allows this vague alterity to remain fundamental.

Having shown the positive and irreducible role of ultimate differences, Part II will offer a more in-depth discussion of each grouping: Chapter 4 will cover the intrinsic modes of being; Chapter 5, ultimate specific differences; and Chapter 6, ultimate individual differences. Each grouping of ultimate difference divides being insofar as it terminates a quidditative order.

PART TWO

REGIONS OF ULTIMATE DIFFERENCE

CHAPTER FOUR
THE FIRST CUT—THE INTRINSIC MODES OF BEING

Based on the definition of ultimate differences from above, this chapter will show how the so-called intrinsic modes of being, in particular infinite and finite, are ultimate differences. Although they are not differences in the limited (i.e., Aristotelian-Porphyrian) sense of the term, they must be considered differences in Scotus's deepened transcendental sense. Like all ultimate differences, they must be understood in terms of their functional role and thus can be detected only indirectly. That is, these ultimate differences contract and divide the concept of univocal being, giving rise to new quidditative unities: God on the one hand as *ens infinitum*, and the categories as various degrees of *ens finitum* on the other. Recall that in response to Solomon's Difficulty, Scotus listed the division of being as the first proper division. This chapter will show how, given its latitude, univocal being is able to be divided through the perfecting differentiation of intrinsic modes.

Section 4.1 begins with an account of what Scotus means by an intrinsic mode and the modal distinction, followed by an account of finite and infinite as the intrinsic modes of being in Section 4.2. Section 4.3 links the modes of finite and infinite to what Scotus, following Augustine and others, calls "a transcendental magnitude." Section 4.4 explains how Scotus understands the categories as finite transcendental magnitudes and *infinitum* as the transcendental magnitude of the divine essence. Section 4.5 shows the connection between transcendental magnitudes and intensity and argues for a uniquely "nonadditive" account of intensity. The task of this chapter will be to show the diversity of differential degrees of being, which can nevertheless be measured on a scale of intensity reaching to, but never touching, the infinite degree.

4.1. INTRINSIC MODES AND THE MODAL DISTINCTION

An intrinsic mode, Scotus tells us, is a degree without which certain realities do not exist *in re*. We can conceive the reality without the mode, only imperfectly: "I respond that when some reality is understood with its intrinsic mode, that concept is not simply-simple so that the reality could not be conceived without the mode except as an imperfect concept of the thing. It also can be conceived with its [proper] mode, and then there is a perfect concept of the thing."[1] For certain things, we can only conceive them perfectly when they are conceived together with their proper mode. Such a concept, however, is non-simply simple insofar as both the unmodified reality and its modification can

be conceived separately. As will be discussed, such simply-simple concepts of the reality and its mode correspond to the quidditative and qualitative conceptions of a single reality, which can only be conceived properly by us according to such a complex concept.

Before diving into the metaphysical depths of such a distinction, however, it might be useful to illustrate what Scotus means here with some mundane examples. Such things as color, emotions, or other sensations, for example, do not exist without being of *x* or *y* degree. One cannot feel pain that is just *simply pain,* but one always feels pain according to a certain degree or intensity. One feels "more or less" pain according to a range of degrees. Likewise, something can be a brighter or darker shade of green, but nothing is just green. Modes are not realities added to other realties (as are formalities), but distinct grades or degrees of a single reality. This is because they do not add an additional *ratio* to our concept of the reality, but express the range in which such a reality can be actualized.

Between a reality and its intrinsic mode, Scotus explains, there stands a *modal distinction*: "There needs to be a distinction between that from which the common concept is taken and that from which the proper concept is taken. This is not a distinction of reality and reality, but a distinction of a reality and its proper, intrinsic mode. This distinction grounds a perfect or imperfect concept of [one and the same reality]: imperfect insofar as it is common, perfect insofar as it is proper."[2] Once again, the modal distinction distinguishes between a reality and its intrinsic and proper mode, not between a reality and another reality. As Section 5.1 will show with respect to the formal distinction, one and the same thing can be conceived according to a multiplicity of formally distinct realities. The modal distinction is a "less real" distinction than a formal or real distinction because it distinguishes between a single reality as an unmodified commonality and the same reality as it can be properly modified. The reality itself cannot subsist *in re* without modification, nor could God create such an unmodified reality. For these reasons, the modal distinction is less than a real distinction.[3]

The relationship between a common concept and its intrinsic modes is *simpler than* the relationship between a genus and a specific difference. Species contain a distinguishable determinable or material part (the genus) and a determining or formal part (the difference), thus giving rise to a distinction between potentiality and actuality.[4] There can be no common reality corresponding to the concept of being because such a real community would involve potentiality. As a transcendental *quid*, being has only quasi-determinability.[5] Unlike specific differences that divide a genus into species, intrinsic modes do not add an additional reality over and above the reality they modify.[6] Intrinsic modes differentiate the reality in question by delineating its range, instead of adding to it.

The common concept of the nature as conceived without the intrinsic and proper mode is understood imperfectly, while that proper (*proprius*) concept including the mode is understood more perfectly. Scotus calls such modes

"proper" in the sense that they do not merely accidentally adhere to the reality: "Any entity whatsoever has its own intrinsic grade of perfection, in which it is finite, if it is finite, and in which it is infinite, if it can be infinite. This is not something accidental to it."[7]

In preparing for a discussion of how he applies this distinction to the transcendental concept of being and its intrinsic modes, it must be emphasized that modes do not add an additional element to some reality; they are that very reality as differentiated by its various modalities. This means that although we can conceive something simply as *a being,* such a conception remains imperfect because nothing is simply a being. Beginning with the intrinsic modes that terminate the quidditative transcendental order, ultimate differences make all the difference in the world. The following section will show how the intrinsic modes dividing being, in particular the transcendental magnitudes infinite and finite, are ultimate differences.

4.2. THE INTRINSIC MODES OF BEING

Just as the transcendentals (*ens*, *unum, verum, bonum*, etc.) transcend the ten categories, or highest genera, Scotus holds that certain transcendental differences divide being before it descends into the categories.[8] As discussed in Chapter 2, the univocal concept of being divides on account of intrinsic modes prior to its division into the ten categories.[9] Scotus here lists finite and infinite as one pair of such modes, which—although not the only one—is his privileged pair. Section 4.4 will discuss exactly how finite being divides into the categories.

As has been seen, the question of how to divide being became something of a Gordian knot needing to be solved by proponents of univocity. How can being be differentiated without either dividing itself or being divided by nothing? In confronting Parmenidean monism, Scotus argues that those differences dividing being are modes outside the concept of being (*praeter conceptum entis*).[10] Otherwise, they could not differentiate this common concept. But this does not entail that the differential modes are thereby nonbeing. *Praeter* suggests outside a quidditative concept, but not a qualitative one. The differential modes of being are *not being in quid*, otherwise being would divide itself. There would be "a vain repetition." They, instead, qualify or modify the concept of being as distinct determinations.

As discussed above, Scotus's answer to Parmenides is the introduction of ultimate differences of which being can be predicated *in quale*. As has been stated, such ultimate differences are simply-simple; they do not formally include being. Otherwise, they would share being in common and would not differ *ultimately.* But—and there is a significant departure from *Super Praedicamenta*—neither are they nonbeing.[11] As ultimate differences, *transcendental intrinsic modes* divide being prior to its descent into the categories and terminate the quidditative order of being.

Unmodified being—or being qua being—does not exist without its transcendental modes. There is nothing that is *simply being* without its proper modification. Not even God is pure being! Being is an abstraction, as has been shown above. Whereas being can be conceived improperly without its proper transcendental modes, the modes themselves signify being according to its real state: as ultimately differential and without a common measure between its incommensurable degrees. Thus, any proper concept of God or creatures consists of at least two simply-simple concepts: the quidditative concept of being, and an ultimately differential mode. A concept understood with its intrinsic mode cannot be a simply-simple concept.[12] The human intellect lacks a proper *simply-simple* concept of God or creatures in this life and instead must forge a complex one based on its univocal concept of being and qualitative concepts of ultimate differences.

With respect to the unmodified concept of being qua being, what divides this quidditative concept are the intrinsic modes of being such as infinite and finite. Although Scotus lists other disjunctive modes (e.g., necessary/contingent, independent/ dependent, etc.), he considers the finite/infinite pair the most important. This is because being infinite is most unique to God, whereas the other modes (e.g., necessary, actual, causing, etc.) can in some sense be said of creatures.[13] For example, we often speak of necessity with respect to creatures. Although not an absolute necessity, nevertheless the concept can be used univocally with respect to God and creatures. As will be discussed below, although we can image possible extensive infinites, only God is actually infinite. For this reason, *ens infinitum* is the complex concept by which the wayfarer most properly conceives God.[14]

Whether it be finite and infinite, contingent and necessary, potential and actual, and so on, the intrinsic modes of being divide the univocal concept given their ultimately differential character. Recall the above-stated criteria for ultimate differences: (1) expressed by a simply-simple concept, (2) which is purely qualitative (but not quidditative); (3) primarily diverse from one another and from the concept of being; (4) difference in terms of themselves and not on account of something else; (5) extracategorial status; and, finally, (6) termination of a quidditative order. Consider how this applies to the intrinsic modes of being.

Infinite and finite must be conceived according to a simply-simple concept. If they were not, they could be further resolved until we reached something more elemental. Likewise, their concepts are qualitative in the sense that they modify something quidditative but themselves have no *quid* (i.e., a *finite* being); finite taken in itself quidditatively (finitude) is a reifying abstraction. We must avoid such a reduction of ultimate differences to things lest we make Ockham's mistake. Recall that Ockham translated Scotus's ultimate differences into abbreviated modifications of the form "a thing that is x."[15] To appreciate the full scope of Scotus's account, this and other reifying attempts must be resisted. Finite does not signify a finite thing or finitude (i.e., a reified abstraction).

In terms of their primary diversity, as shown in the previous chapter, neither finite beings nor accidental beings fundamentally imitate an exemplar to be what they are. This is not to say that creatures do not depend on God or that accidents do not inhere in substances. It is instead to say that *qua being* both creatures in general and accidents in particular have their *ratitudo* formally of themselves. They are neither beings nor are they finite (or accidental) *because of* such relations of dependence. Such relations are instead attributes following from this primary *ratitudo.* This means that finite being is not merely constituted by an opposition to infinite being as its measure. It differs in terms of itself, and not due to a falling short of this primary identity in some definitive respect. For this reason, the finite and infinite modes of being are primarily diverse.

The question of how intrinsic modes differ in terms of themselves and nothing else has also been answered. If they differed through something else, they would have both this differentiating factor and a common quidditative component of which being could be predicated. This would entail, however, that intrinsic modes themselves do not divide being, but this something more elemental, on account of which they themselves differ from one another and from being, divides being. For this reason, they cannot fall under any category or even (quidditatively) under the concept of being. This would require an additional differentiating factor, thus only deferring the question of what is ultimate in terms of difference.

Finally, an intrinsic mode terminates the quidditative order of being qua being, in addition to any concept coextensive with it (e.g., good). And, though not themselves a unity, such modes produce new conceptual unities in conjunction with the concept of being. The new unities that result are *ens infinitum* on the one hand and *ens finitum* on the other, the latter of which immediately divides into ten primarily diverse manners of *entia finita* (i.e., the categories).[16] As has been noted, the addition of the modification *infinitum* to *ens* secures a singularization of its conceived object (i.e., the divine essence as this) incapable of further division. In the case of *finitum*, however, the resultant unities are capable of further determination by ultimate differences: first through the addition of ultimate specific differences to produce the new (less-than-numerical) unities of specific essences; and then through the addition of ultimate individuating differences to produce the numerical unity of individuals. As pure transcendental *qualia,* the intrinsic modes thus divide the univocal concept of being. Remember, Scotus uses difference in a broader and more fundamental sense than a Porphyrian difference. Scotistic differences divide insofar as they produce new unities.

An intrinsic mode of being is not a difference in the sense of actualizing a preexisting potency, for reasons discussed. It is, however, an ultimate difference in Scotus's expanded sense of *in quid/in quale*. Allan Wolter is correct to note: "It is true that Scotus refers to infinite-finite and necessary-contingent as intrinsic

modes and denies that they are strict *differentiae.* By this, however, he does not wish to deny that such concepts are differential in character or that the reality signified by such concepts is *simpliciter simplex*."[17] When "added to" being, such modes divide being. And yet, unlike species, which preserve the identity of their genus within themselves alongside the addition of *differentiae*, intrinsic modes cannot add to being while leaving its self-identity untouched.[18]

They already are being, albeit qualitatively, not quidditatively, speaking. They divide being insofar as they terminate the quidditative concept of being qua being and give rise to the unity of new quidditative terms. The terms to which they give rise are concepts of being with their proper transcendental magnitude: *ens infinitum,* on the one hand, and the ten diverse categorial modes of being *ens finitum* on the other. To more deeply appreciate this point, Scotus's use of the term "transcendental magnitude" must be considered.

4.3. TRANSCENDENTAL MAGNITUDE

As has been shown, a creature is not a being nor is it finite because it imitates God or participates in its being. As Scotus states regarding a finite being such as a stone: "A stone is a ratified being absolutely because it can be understood neither as participating nor as unparticipated."[19] A creature's grounding as an *ens ratum* derives from the simply-simple elements or notes comprising its formal constitution.[20]

Scotus does not deny that a creature does in fact participate in its being and imitate God as its exemplar. He does deny, however, that a creature must be understood in terms of such relations or that they constitute its *ratitudo*. The simply-simple concept of finite thus must qualitatively capture primarily diverse degrees of being and not a mere opposition to the primary identity of *ens infinitum.* Finite can be grasped independently of, and prior to, its possible relation to such a measure. This is because formally of itself, each being has an intrinsic degree of being, or what Scotus refers to as a being's *transcendental magnitude* or *virtual quantity*.[21]

Transcendental magnitude answers the question, "How great is this being qua being?" The application of magnitude on the transcendental level corresponds to what we might call a being's "grade of perfection" (*gradus perfectionis*).[22] Whether finite or infinite, transcendental magnitude characterizes how much perfection a given being has. As Scotus states: "Infinity in entity expresses totality of entity, whereas finitude in its way expresses only partial entity, for every finite being as such is less than the infinite as such."[23] Each of the ten categories is a finite being because it exhibits a partial degree of perfection, that is, it can be exceeded and is open to further determinability until reaching a complete degree of being (i.e., singularity). "Totality" and "partiality" express a being's *magnitude* of perfection.[24]

As will be shown below, each categorial finite mode of being is diverse from the others and from *ens infinitum.* Each one is a differential degree of being

ratified through itself and not on account of its relation of dependence upon or inherence in another. The category of Relation, for example, exhibits its own diverse manner of being finite that is irreducible to that of Quality or Substance. Insofar as transcendental magnitude measures the amount of perfection of any being, Scotus uses "virtual quantity" as a synonym.[25]

Much like the Aristotelian category of Quantity, which, for example, pertains to equality and inequality of mass, the transcendental magnitudes finite and infinite have a transferred sense of quantity.[26] That is, they treat the "amount" of something's perfection or reality. Virtual quantity, it must be emphasized, does not fall under the category of Quantity. Virtual quantity transcends the categories and pertains to something's essence extramentally prior to this categorial division.[27] On this account, such quantity and magnitude are transcendental.

Transcendental magnitude and virtual quantity characterize an inherent *and differential* degree of being on the part of both God and creatures. Scotus states: "For [the divine essence] has its own intrinsic degree just as something finite has its own finitude. Man, for instance, even if one abstracts from all his properties, still retains his essential finitude in the hierarchical classification of beings."[28] Each thing has an inherent degree of being, which both ratifies it as the thing that it is and as differentiated from all else. If these degrees were not differential—and ultimately differential at that—such intrinsic modes could not divide the univocal concept of being. Nothing else could differentiate such degrees lest they be susceptible to a common element (once again deferring the question of differentiation). Thus any being's transcendental magnitude is its differential degree of being.

The fusion between a being and its transcendental magnitude can admit of only a modal distinction. No being is simply a being, and thus to properly conceive it we must grasp its magnitude. This is because, as Scotus explains: "Even in creatures magnitude is so fused with its perfection that it does not represent something really other than that of which it is the degree, yet it retains its own character as magnitude *insofar as this is the proper ground for equality or inequality*."[29] Transcendental magnitude modifies the concept of being qua being by adding the differential element of greatness. It answers the topical problem of "How great is it qua being?" The differential element by itself, however, is not really other than the being itself. The two are fused together such that nothing, not even God, is simply a being or being itself. As will be shown, God is most himself as this, and not as being.

Transcendental magnitude is thus unlike other intrinsic modes, which ask the qualitative question of how or what kind something is (e.g., necessary or contingent, independent or dependent). Virtual quantities are *intensive*, unlike their categorial extensive counterparts. This means that "the amount" of their perfection is not constituted by the addition of some base, homogeneous unit. If this were the case—that is, if each differential degree equaled its amount of the selfsame unit of being—Scotus's theory would falter in at least the following ways.

First, intrinsic modes would no longer be primarily diverse ultimate differences. They would share a unit of being in common. Thus they could not achieve their necessary task of dividing being. Second, God would be composed of "the same stuff" as creatures, just more of it. If Scotus is to admit that God differs from creatures by an infinite degree, a crucial qualification must be added: an infinite degree of being is not merely composed of the same stuff, but more of it, than a finite degree. The grades in question—whether finite or infinite—are not compositions of selfsame homogeneous units as are extensive magnitudes. Even though every degree is the same qua being, each degree of intensity is an *ultimately differential* degree.[30] As Section 4.5 will show, this can be the case only if Scotus conceives of degrees of being as nonadditive intensities.

Before turning to an explanation of what we mean by this phrase, a third and final consequence must be noted. To say that God is "infinite-times greater" than something else seems to place God on the scale of measurement, even if in an indeterminate or indefinite sense. This is, however, a misguided view. Along such lines, many contemporary readers mistakenly have faulted Scotus for making God into one more being *inter alia* without the necessary transcendence to diversify the divine from the mundane.[31] Infinite being, they imagine, is simply the same mundane unit of being taken to its greatest intensity and added up an unlimited number of times. It is the highest consummation of *that which creatures have* (i.e., being), but in a more rarefied state. God becomes something of a *primus inter pares* on the flattened plane of being, *differing* from creatures only as a matter of additive degree. And such, some would suggest, is the outcome of univocity.

In order to avoid this view, Scotus must treat the intrinsic modes of being as nonadditive intensities. This will require showing the following: first, each degree of being is ultimately differential and does not share some common element with the other degrees; second, despite being primarily diverse from one another, such degrees can be measured as degrees on a single scale of being; finally, God as *ens infinitum* transcends the scale of being as *that which cannot be exceeded.* Before turning to this argument, we must begin by showing how being divides into *ens infinitum,* on the one hand, and ten diverse modes of *ens finitum* on the other.

4.4. INFINITE AND FINITE MAGNITUDES

As discussed in the previous chapter, the ultimate differentiation of both God and creatures is a positive and intrinsic feature of their being, irrespective of any relationality. A creature is not a being nor is it finite because it imitates God or participates in its being. We are now in a position to understand how their respective intensities are positive differences. As will be shown, creatures are finite in virtue of themselves, and no less than God is infinite in virtue of himself. Differentiation is perfection; it is not a fall from selfsame unity.[32]

Understanding this point requires showing how Scotus flatly rejects such a negative model of difference. God is not infinite because he is *unlimited,* nor are creatures finite because they are limited by matter, *esse,* causation, or something else. The latter may be true, but being finite derives from a more immanent and positive feature of their being.[33] In the case of both God and creatures, their intensities of being are ultimately differential, brute and irreducible matters of transcendental facticity without which we could not explain difference.

To highlight the positive way in which Scotus understands difference, he draws a contrast to a view such as Aquinas's. As Aquinas states in the *Summa theologiae*: "Something is called infinite to the extent that it is not finite. In one way, matter is finitized through form, and (in another) form through matter. [. . .] Therefore, since divine being (*esse divinum*) is not received in something, but [God himself] is subsisting being itself (*suum esse subsistens*), as was shown above, it is clear that God himself is infinite and perfect."[34] God is infinite on account of *not being received* in another. As Aquinas continually argues throughout his career, everything else is in some way received and therefore limited (i.e., finitized). The separate soul and intelligences, which are forms not received into matter, however, must receive their *esse*.[35] They are not identical to their acts of being (*esse*), and this explains their finitude.

God is infinite because he does not receive his *esse* according to his essence but is identical with his very *esse.* Aquinas explains that something whose essence is only being (*esse tantum*) must be subsisting being itself (*ipsum esse subsistens*), just as something, if its essence were heat alone (were there such a thing), would be subsisting heat. What explains divine infinity is its not-being-received in another. According to such a view, a creature's reason for being finite is that it is caused and its essence must receive its being from another. In the case of hylomorphic composites, their form is also received in matter, which makes them finite in a twofold manner. The fact that divinity is not received in anything but is itself a subsistence of being, entails that God is infinite and perfect.

Scotus responds to Aquinas's view as follows:

> Although it is true that everything caused is finite, nevertheless the reason for its being finite does not lie in this respect or relationship to its cause but rather in something intrinsic to itself considered as such, just as the per se and formal reason why something is infinite is not its relationship to its effect. Rather it is something intrinsic to its essence, a measure of being it would possess even if it never had an effect. Therefore, the formal reason for finitude of an angel does not consist in a relationship to the cause that gives it shared existence.[36]

The reason for a creature's being finite is not equivalent to its being caused. This is not to deny, of course, that a creature is caused or that God is its cause. The modality of being finite instead resides in something as a positive and intrinsic

feature at the core of its being. Being caused does not explain the fact of being finite.

As finite in itself (*in se*), every created essence is finite prior to any relation to anything else. This is why Scotus can begin his proof for the existence of God not with the actual fact of some effect, but with the premise that *some being is effectible*.[37] Having such *ratitudo* formally of itself does not entail that a creature could actually exist or even enjoy the diminished *esse cognitum* without a relationship to God. It means that a being is possible on account of the internal coherence the conceptual *notae* comprising its essence. Such an essence does not contain mutually contradictory parts.[38] As discussed above, our intellect tests for such coherence through the process of division, which follows upon the heels of abstraction.

Here, the inherently positive character of such intensive modes must be stressed. Scotus maintains: "I say there is one principle to keep in mind. Each absolute essence that is finite in itself is thought of as finite prior to any relation it may have to any other essence and is first finite in itself before it is finite in relationship to anything else."[39] *Being finite,* which describes all things that can fall under a category, is not simply "limited by" its relation to something else (e.g., matter or *esse*). Aquinas and others who maintain this conclusion, Scotus states, "sin against logic."[40]

Being finite—like being infinite—marks a degree of perfection intrinsic to an entity itself.[41] Something is not finitized on account of its reception of being (*esse*), which, Scotus holds, would remain accidental to it. Something's act of being, or *esse,* turns out to be little more than an indicator of the final determination of its essence. A finite essence does not require an advening *actus essendi* in addition to its essential determination in order to limit and finitize it.[42] As an intrinsic degree, finitude instead is self-binding or self-limiting. It is divided from others on account of an intrinsic differentiation. Being finite according to such and such degree is just what it is. For creatures, this degree is constituted by a threefold process of differentiation: first, categorization; second, essentialization; and finally, individuation. As will be discussed below, from its initial diversification, each category has its own complete determination right down to individuation without overlapping with any other category.[43]

As Scotus stated in the passage above, each being has a *measure of being* from itself.[44] It has this differential degree of being independent of and prior to any relation of opposition or negation to an external measure (e.g., God or substance). A finite being's very finitude, or just how far it can go before it is exceeded, stems from intrinsic and positive differentiation: it is intrinsic insofar as not accruing to the being from the outside, not even in the fecund sense of attributes; and it is positive insofar as the difference is not constituted in opposition to *that which it is not* (not even a model of *ens infinitum*). Here we see exactly why such intrinsic modes of being must be characterized as ultimate differences.

As positive intensities, both infinite and finite degrees of being are what is

most fundamental to each and every being. They are ultimate differences on the transcendental order insofar as they divide the concept of being through pure *qualia* without *quid,* as expressed by simply-simple concepts. The modes of finite and of infinite are primarily diverse from each other insofar as they share nothing in common, not even being, which can only be predicated of them *in quale.* In the same way that the intensive infinite is unsurpassably excessive on account of itself and nothing else, the intensive finite is positively and intrinsically self-binding. It sets its own limits, not by opposing itself to the identity of another, which would externally limit it, but by virtually containing intensive parts, by which it self-measures its limits and boundaries. Finite being thus is not merely constituted on account of its mimetic opposition to and falling short of a pure standard. (How exactly they occupy the same scale will be treated in Section 4.5.) Whether finite or infinite, such an intensive modality is a difference in itself: nothing else accounts for the difference.

Granted, in the case of finite beings, they have not yet reached full differentiation as singularized individuals. In this sense, the process of differentiation between finite beings and an infinite one is dissimilar. But finitization constitutes the first step toward this end insofar as it terminates a quidditative order (i.e., being) and produces a new unity (i.e., the ten categories). A brief account of the categories will be offered. The main focus, however, will be on how the transcendental magnitude of infinite resounds amid each of the divine persons. This will put us in a position to understand how, despite the diversity between differential modes of being, they can be put on a scale of intensity.

4.4.1. The Categories

As discussed in Chapter 2, univocal being first divides into finite and infinite before the former descends into the categories.[45] Scotus refers to this as a transcendental division of being. This does not mean that *ens finitum* (or *ens* for that matter) is a genus higher than the categories but rather that each category is marked by a transcendental magnitude of *being able to be exceeded.* Their transcendental magnitudes are as intimately fused with them as *infinite* is with the divine essence.[46] Scotus refers to this as a transcendental division of being insofar as it operates on a metaphysical level independent of the logical analysis of second intentions, on the one hand, and of the physical analysis of hylomorphic things on the other.[47]

A full account of the novelty of Scotus's approach to the categories, which Giorgio Pini calls "radical and unprecedented,"[48] need not be provided here. Rather, the following should be noted: first, how the categories are real essences according to Scotus and not, for example, diverse modes of predication or hylomorphic things; second, how being immediately divides into ten diverse categories without falling under any higher genus (e.g., *ens finitum*); and third, how Scotus must discover each category independently and establish its real distinctness from the others, as opposed to deducing this list of ten.

A category, according to Scotus, is a thing or a being in the general sense of the term.[49] He contrasts this general sense, on the one hand, with the broad sense of "thing" as anything that is a noncontradiction and, on the other, the narrow or restricted sense of *per se* being or thing (i.e., substance). Each category is a thing in the sense that it has reality outside the soul. Relation, for example, has a degree of reality irreducible to that of its terms or foundation.[50] Socrates's being paler than Plato is a real thing other than the substances Plato and Socrates and their respective qualities of paleness. This does not mean that such a relative being could exist without them but, rather, that its degree of reality cannot be reduced to them and that there is a real distinction between them. This point must be stressed: the essential reality of each category is irreducible to the composition of physical things on the one hand and the operations of the intellect on the other.

A category cannot be derived from any more fundamental division. Representing a more standard approach, Aquinas, for example, deduces the distinct categories from diverse modes of predication.[51] That is, he reads off an initial categorial distinction between *per se* and *in alio* (i.e., substance and accident) from the distinction between *per se* and *per accidens* predication. He then deduces the other nine accidents from this initial division. Even dating back to his early pre-univocal logical writings, Scotus rejected such a move to derive the categories from modes of predication.[52] His argument against such a deduction throughout his career is that real unity and order cannot be isomorphically read off of logical unity and order. There is a gap between the real unity and diversity of things and the rational unity and order of concepts. The order of the real only *occasions* the order of the rational. The categories cannot be distinguished in terms of their second intentional content alone; Substance and Quality are indistinguishable as "most general genera." (So too, we might add, an ultimate difference dividing something in the category of Substance cannot be distinguished from an ultimate difference dividing something in the category of Quality. As second intentions, they exhibit the same function.) As real essences, the categories instead must be discovered from the essence of things themselves.[53]

But there is another distinction that becomes more pronounced with the rise of univocity: Scotus distinguishes between the metaphysical condition of real essences and the *physical* (e.g., hylomorphic) condition of actual things.[54] With respect to the categories as the highest of real essences, he now drives a wedge between the metaphysical status of categories and their actual instantiations. Whereas a physical substance or accident might be complex, the categories, like God, are simple essences. In this sense, our complex conception of them parallels our complex conception of God. Although individual substance or accidents falling under a category might be composed of form and matter, the categorial *essence* itself is not. The transcendental magnitude of each category can be modally distinguished from its quidditative term as a being without

introducing real complexity into the simple essence itself. Essential parts are not isomorphic with physical parts.[55] This is true not only with the categories as real essences but also (as will be discussed) with all essences. Against those who would argue that accidents are compounds (e.g., Albert the Great), Scotus defends their status as simple essences.[56] They are simple essences; not even *ens finitum* serves as an intermediary division uniting these ten diverse essences.[57] But, just as with the simple essence *ens infinitum*, they admit of a modal distinction. They are diverse intensities of being.

Unable to deduce the categories from any intermediary divisions or any intrinsic order between them, Scotus must discover each category in its essence as really distinct and separable from any other categorial essence.[58] There are no prior two-membered or three-membered divisions to prove the subsequent division of the categories into ten.[59] As Scotus notes in a later addition to his questions on the *Metaphysics*, division does not always require opposite differences (e.g., rational and irrational).[60] Here his expansion from the more limited Porphyrian understanding of difference as that which divides a genus to the broader sense of difference as transcendental *quale* is clear. That is, difference divides a quidditative term into a multiplicity because of its vague alterity. Difference is not derived from opposition or privation.

The diverse categorial magnitudes immediately divide the concept of being insofar as they ground a vague alterity between one finite mode of being and any other such mode. A new model of division, one based upon differentiation as perfection, is at work. As a real essence, each category has an *ens ratum* apart from either its physical or its logical relation of inherence. Each category of being, substance and accidents alike, is formally a being of itself. Scotus states:

> Neither then does the causality substance has with respect to the whole of accident, nor its greater perfection of entity, nor does the essential order of entity that obtains [between substance and accident] give any grounds for concluding that accident is not formally a being. It is not such through substance or through the relationship it has to substance, because being is included *per se* in the very notion of an accident and given that notion, even if—to assume the impossible—all the aforesaid conditions were taken away.[61]

To repeat a constant refrain, an accident is not a being because it inheres in a substance. Each category of accident instead possesses its own mode of being, each of which must be discovered in its own right and which cannot be derived from some higher mode (e.g., inherence in another).

To deny that an accident is a being because it inheres in a substance, or that a creature is a being because it has been caused by God, is not to deny that such relations exist. As Scotus makes clear: "A creature formally is a being (*ens*), although it is totally [caused] from God."[62] Instead, he insists that the formal reason of its being a being is not dependence. Finite beings are not finite

because they are deprived of the fullness of being (although this may be true); they are finite because of what they are.[63] So too, each category of accident is not a being in a lesser sense than or in relation to the category of substance.

The categories are divided from each other and from infinite being on account of a differential degree of being each one has formally of itself: its transcendental magnitude. Each categorial hierarchy forms as an ordered set. Scotus states: "In every such precise coordination [i.e., category] all that pertains to that concatenation can be found there apart from any other ordered arrangement. Furthermore, each item of one ordered set is different from those of the other ordered set."[64] This means that everything required to descend from the category Substance through animals and horses to Brunellus is intrinsic to the category itself. No category can find differentiation from any other category. Each category must have its own line of descent to its ultimate actualization in individuals.[65]

Even individuation cannot rely on cross-categorial differentiation. Scotus rejects the view that only quantity is individuated *per se* and the rest of the accidents are individuated through quantity, explaining: "No accident is formally singular through something of another genus [. . .] therefore, quality, even when it is in quantity, is not 'this' formally through quantity; therefore, if it is a cause of the singularity of quality, even proximate but extrinsic, quality can be singular without that extrinsic cause."[66] Although it may be true that a quality (e.g., this red) never exists without quantity, quantity does not explain the quality's being a this.

Each category forms its own topical problem. Such topical problems are in this sense primitive. A substance thing cannot answer a quantity question. For example: Question: "How big is it?" Answer: "A body." Categorial transgression results not merely in falsity and foolishness, but in a lack of unified meaning. The result is nonsense, recognized by our *gustus spiritualis*—a notion that will reemerge in Subsection 5.5.2.

What explains the unity of one category over and against another is each one's ultimate modal difference (i.e., its transcendental magnitude), as intimately *fused* with its essence just as God's infinite magnitude is fused with his essence.[67] For each category and every creature, magnitude is fused with their being, not as a "thing" added to another thing, but as an ultimate (modal) difference.[68] Scotus states: "No matter how immaterial they may be, one species of being is equal or unequal to another immaterial species. Therefore, the magnitude of their perfection remains in them as the basis for this equality, and still is fused into an identity with the essence."[69] In simple essences—whether the categories as simple essences or immaterial substances—a ground of equality and inequality is retained once everything else is stripped away. This ground is the ultimately differential degree of being, or transcendental magnitude. Without this, we could not distinguish such simple essences from God. They are all equal *qua being.* Rather, unlike physical or logical studies of the categories, metaphys-

ics studies (and discovers) the categories as diverse transcendental magnitudes. Having shown how Scotus understands the diverse transcendental magnitudes of finite beings, his account of infinite being now must be discussed.

4.4.2. An Infinite Magnitude

The first thing to note is that, for Scotus, infinite is not vague or indeterminate boundlessness, but a determinate wholeness of perfection that cannot be exceeded. It marks the limit of an intensity taken to its extreme, which lesser degrees can approach, but never reach. The intensive infinite *is* perfect qua unexceedable. Nothing can be added to it to make it any greater. In other words, it could not be actualized any further. The divine essence is thus "most singular" (*singularissima*).[70] Even the so-called "addition" of relations on account of which it is communicated to the supposits of the divine persons does not further actualize or determine this singularity.[71]

To defend this position, Scotus holds the view that paternity qua paternity (i.e., as a relation of origin) is not formally infinite.[72] This does not mean that paternity is not the same (extensionally) as something infinite. True, this relation of origin is the same as the divine essence and the divine essence is formally infinite.[73] But paternity or any other relation is not the same as the divine essence according to formal predication.

Paternity, filiation, and spiration belong together with the divine essence according to predication by identity. "This is this" is true to the extent that each one shares a common essence. Thus each one is deity, and deity is each one. Any one of these considered as a pure relation, however, is not identical to the others. Paternity is not spiration. Scotus explains that in abstraction from their respective supposit (e.g., God the Father in the case of paternity), the relation does not retain its ground of identity. This is because the so-called "truth-maker" of the claim "Deity is paternity" is its *note of infinity*.[74] Taken in abstraction from its supposit, the relation loses this ground of identity.

Anne Ashley Davenport dubs this "Scotus's Rule" based on this passage from *Quodlibet* question 5. "Every case of predicating the abstract of the abstract will be true if the ground of the identity is not destroyed in the abstraction," she states.[75] Although she does not recognize it as such, this ground of identity is ultimate difference. Anything with the note of infinity, as will be seen, is identical to the singularity of the divine essence. Likewise, each degree of finite magnitude accounts for identity in creatures. Ultimate differences constitute varying levels of identity, whether it be categorial, essential, or individual.

The ground of identity and equality for the distinct supposits, or *persons,* of the divine essence is none other than intensive infinity. The father *is* the son *is* the spirit (or father = son = spirit), and all three *are* (or =) God, *because* they share the same singularizing transcendental magnitude. From this claim, the following must be recognized immediately: something can be singular and yet communicable. Singularity as such does not preclude communicability. This is

because communicability does not entail divisibility. A nature is divisible, Scotus argues, if it does not have real existence apart from supposits.[76] Something else must be added to it on account of which it exists in supposits. Chapter 6 will discuss what this amounts to for creatures. For now, the main point to note is that indivisibility, not incommunicability, marks a fullness of being.

The divine essence thus can be communicated to multiple supposits (i.e., the divine persons), yet it is not divided among three distinct substances. It has real and perfect (read *infinite*) being in terms of itself. "In terms of itself" must be clarified. As has been seen, the ground of identity cannot be simply collapsed into identical things. What grounds their identity at the most fundamental level instead is a common singularity.[77] The statement "this is this" remains most true when the two terms belong together even amid abstraction. Such an identification is possible on account of their ground of identity, which is the ultimate transcendental difference of an intensively infinite magnitude.

Abstraction, Scotus tells us, considers one thing without considering another (although both coexist), unlike circumscription, which considers it without the other.[78] We thus might consider the divine essence *as this* without considering its relations (although not considering them *not to exist*). To the extent that each one is this, to that extent the divine essence, as this, can be formally predicated of the others. Thus we might say, "Deity is paternity" on account of deity, which even in abstraction from any supposit, retains its note of infinity.[79] So long as abstraction retains this note of infinity, the ultimately differential ground of identity whereby predication is possible remains.

It must be stressed that the ground of the abstract identity "This is this," is not being qua being, but the common singularity of each. As Scotus explains: "[The divine essence] is most actual on account of having in itself and of itself ultimate actuality, because it is repugnant to it, as to infinite act, to be perfected further. Moreover, it is of itself a 'this,' and is most singular, and therefore it has ultimate unity, and a greater unity is repugnant to it because it could not be determined by some further determination over and above [that by which] it is determined of itself."[80] The ultimate difference of *infinite* determines the concept of being to an ultimate actuality of which no further determination is possible. As in the determination of being to the categories, the ultimate difference serves to terminate a new quidditative unity. Unlike the categories, which are terminated as finite modes of being and which can be further perfected and actualized until they reach singular individuals, nothing further perfects the divine essence as *this being* (i.e., *ens infinitum*).

Relations cannot perfect the divine essence, which as *most singular* already possesses the greatest unity. What such relations add will be bypassed here. Instead, emphasis must be placed on the ground of identity and equality of the distinct supposits in terms of their shared singularity, in this case, their infinite intensity. The abstract ground of identity does not amount to the simplicity of pure being "itself by itself," as it might for Aquinas and others. That is, it is not

qua being that God is most himself. It is instead the singularity of the divine essence *as this* being. God does not find the ground of his identity in a purity of being only being (or as being itself by itself), but through the differentiation as *ens infinitum* on account of its indivisible singularity, a singularity (we might add) that remains communicable. God is most himself as this, not as being. Remember, differentiation is perfection.

If two beings have the same magnitude, they are *equipollent* (*aequiparantia*).[81] Scotus borrows this geometrical term to explain how the Son as an image of the Father has a twofold relation: one of equipollence and one of inequality. That is, the Father communicates his potency to the Son but does not do so as a productive principle. By producing the Son as an image, the Father communicates all pure perfections, which serves as a basis for perfect assimilation of the image to the imaged.[82] The Son, however, has a relation of quasi-passive potency to the Father, and in this sense the two (i.e., active versus quasi-passive potency) are not mutually equal. Yet the unequal relations are leveled or equalized (*coaequantur*) on account of their infinite transcendental magnitude.

The name for this geometrical relation *aequiparantia* is derived from an equality of preparedness or resolve. As the English translation helps to illuminate, there is an equality of strength (*pollens*). Strength here should be understood in a transcendental sense as a being's ontological capacities for self-differentiation in virtue of its *ratitudo.* Ultimate difference, it can be said, provides the ontological strength of self-ratification. From this Trinitarian example, a broader lesson regarding created essences can be gleaned. Intensity of being is not an attribute extrinsically accrued but rather an immanent characteristic. Such a degree is positive insofar as it is not constituted merely by its relation to another, but instead the reason for its finitude or infinitude arises through itself.

Whereas the divine essence is fully actualized and singularized by its intensive infinity, and its communication to supposits does not determine it further, created essences qua finite can be further determined. Their singularization requires differentiation both at the essential and individual levels before they reach full actuality. Even when they have been fully actualized, what constitutes their finitude, as we shall see, is their intensive finitude. Such intensive degrees of being, or virtual magnitudes, must be understood in a nonadditive sense for reasons the next section will discuss.

4.5. NONADDITIVE INTENSITY

The physics surrounding virtual magnitudes offers a rich chapter in the history of medieval thought.[83] Given their hybrid nature—resembling both quantities and qualities—the intensification and remission of such forms posed a problem: How could anything be added to or subtracted from forms? Augmentation is a strictly quantitative notion insofar as it could be explained by the

addition or subtraction of spatially distinct parts. A body becomes greater or lesser through such addition and subtraction of parts. Qualities, on the other hand, are those forms on account of which a subject is called "such and such."[84] For example, one is called "just" on account of the (inseparable) form of justice or "triangular" on account of its form of triangularity. Insofar as qualities lack spatial parts, they cannot be augmented through addition and subtraction. The subject instead undergoes an *alteration* with respect to the given quality: from unjust to just and so on.

Aristotle recognized, however, that certain qualities have a latitude of form.[85] They stretch along a certain range without passing over into their opposite. A light becomes brighter, a pain becomes sharper, or a tone becomes deeper, all within what Jean-Luc Solère dubs "a zone of indetermination."[86] This zone of indetermination marks the intensity of the given form. As the following subsection will show, although Scotus clearly sides with the proponents of an "additive-view" for explaining intensity in physical and theological matters, his account of a being's intensity of perfection does not follow suit. He does not, however, simply adopt a nonadditive account; rather, he utilizes a hybrid view better equipped for solving his problems with regard to the univocity of being.

4.5.1. Intensity

Mundane examples of intensity include degrees of colors. For example, the degrees of redness or blueness can be considered as more or less intense shades of each color. Further, we might add the brightness of light as more or less intense. A contemporary example of intensity includes the hardness of certain minerals, which are measured on a "scale of intensity."[87] That is, a mineral is considered more intense to the extent that it cannot be cut by something lower down on the scale. Diamonds, for example, are more intense than flint. Likewise, with the degrees of temperature, a 90-degree day exhibits a more intense heat than does a 60-degree one.

Each of these physical properties can be considered as more or less intense. But we also might include as intensities the sharpness of a pain, which can be more or less intense. The range of an emotion such as love also can be felt according to a greater or lesser intensity. And finally, we might consider the intensity of a virtue such as charity. Insofar as intensities increase and decrease, they have a magnitude (i.e., they are more or less), thus resembling quantity. These are examples of what Augustine calls *quantitates virtutis* and not mere *quantitates molis*.[88]

The historical stages through which this question of the latitude of forms was transmitted in the Middle Ages will not be traced here.[89] Suffice it to note the following two points: first, following Augustine, such intensive qualities were understood to possess a virtual quantity, as opposed to a quantity of mass.[90] This issue most often appeared in scholastic discussions regarding the possible

augmentation and diminution of the theological virtue of charity (*caritas*). Second, Aristotle bequeathed one problem in particular to his scholastic inheritors, namely whether intensification occurs in the form itself or in the subject.[91] That is, do the terms of quantification (i.e., "more" and "less") describe the form itself or the subject possessing the form as a quality? Having addressed the first issue above, the second can be addressed.

In response to this second question, some argued for what has been called an "additive" theory. According to this view, virtual magnitudes undergo intensification through adding more units, and remission through subtraction. For example, something becomes greener by adding more units of greenness to an already existing base. Others rejecting this view held that the forms themselves do not increase or diminish, but the subjects qualified by such forms.[92] This view can be called a "nonadditive theory."

Following the general Franciscan trend, Scotus supports the additive view.[93] For example, in applying this physical model to the theological virtue of charity, Scotus holds that charity can be increased or diminished like the addition of water drops.[94] The addition of independent units increase some preexisting base, like water drops falling into a rain barrel. He even describes God's magnitude along such lines, as "having every degree of unqualified perfection as an infinite sea (*pelagus infinitum*)."[95] As such an image seems to suggest, an infinite intensity is one to which an unlimited number of units can be added.

Despite this unequivocal support for an additive view of the intension and remission of forms, Scotus's theory of the transcendental magnitudes of being must be nonadditive. This does not mean that he simply embraces the opposing nonadditive view as it stands. To serve his purposes of explaining God's infinite being, however, he puts forward a somewhat conflicted picture of such intensities. On the one hand, he relies on similar explanatory devices as in his physics and theological ethics. On the other hand, he recognizes that there can be no base-units of being that can be simply added together. This is because if infinite were merely the highest point on an additive scale of degrees, like a sea (*pelagus*) without limits (*fines*), then Scotus would be guilty of collapsing the distance between God and creatures. Thus, even in spite of himself, he understands how an intensity can be divided and yet not contain real additive parts. Before showing Scotus's own treatment of this issue, it is important to establish the standard nonadditive view in order to show what aspects he would find disagreeable, perhaps leading him to reject the theory overall. To this end, Aquinas's excellent account will be considered.[96]

Aquinas argues that the form itself does not intend and remit, but the subject possessing it can increase and diminish its possession. In the case of charity (*caritas*), he explains, something is not added to something in the sense of preexisting parts. Instead, the partaking subject increases her or his possession of the given quality. This happens because, as Aquinas argues, the subject can

participate in the form to a greater or lesser degree as having been in potency to such an act. The form is *more in* the subject; one form is not added to another to yield a greater quantity.[97]

Jean-Luc Solère has shown how Aquinas's solution combines elements of both Aristotelian and Neoplatonic metaphysics.[98] On the one hand, Aquinas speaks in terms of the subject being in potency to the qualitative act. On the other, Solère argues, he couples this with the Neoplatonic maxim that everything received is received according to the mode of the subject. The reception in a subject thus limits the otherwise unlimited form. Were a form to subsist, it would be unlimited, a Form in the true Platonic sense of the term.

One advantage of Aquinas's view is to leave the quality qua form intact. The form as form is not divided into parts or units that can be added to each other, but it remains an undivided self-identity.[99] There are not distinct parcels of charity, for example, but one charity in which subjects participate to greater or lesser degrees. Charity itself is unchanging. Aquinas explains how an increase in charity transpires through God allowing it to have a greater hold on one's soul.[100]

One of the central tenets of this standard nonadditive view that Scotus rejects was noted above: namely, the explanation of finitization or limitation by means of reception in a subject. Recall that according to the position rejected by Scotus, what accounts for the intensity of the perfection is not intrinsic to the degree itself, but in how it is received. The form in and of itself remains unlimited (at least formally, even if not existentially).[101] It becomes finitized as *more or less* through the various manners by which the subject participates in it. If Scotus were to adopt this standard nonadditive view, he would need to forfeit his central claim addressed above that each degree is positively differentiated.

Where does this leave us in terms of understanding Scotus's account? When it comes to explaining transcendental magnitude, neither the standard physico-theological additive nor the nonadditive model suffices for Scotus's purposes. As he reveals in describing the nonmathematical measure by which we measure and rank beings, they do not share in some standard base unit of measurement (B = units of being-ness), but remain primarily diverse.[102] God's intensive infinity entails that he *cannot be exceeded,* whereas everything else (i.e., the finite) can be exceeded. This gives rise to a measure or proportion between it and other finite beings. It is a perfection to which nothing can be added. But, as we shall consider, thinking of degrees of being additively, whether they are finite or infinite, is a mistake.

Calling a virtual quantity "intensive" means that although it may be composed of "parts," no part can be added or taken away without a fundamental change to the very nature of the quantity. Unlike with a quantity of mass, to which and from which parts can be added and taken away without altering its nature, virtual quantities can be intensified (or deintensified), but change their nature in the process. They are differential degrees of a single scale. For

this reason, although our intellect reaches the concept of *ens infinitum* through imaginatively adding together degrees of finite without limit or end, God's intensive infinity is not composed merely of "the same ontological stuff"—units of being or being-ness, for example—as creatures. Both intensive infinite being and intensive finite being mark uniquely differential degrees of being.

Thus, as will be argued in what follows, any being's intensity, or virtual quantity of being, is its differential degree or transcendental magnitude. Unlike a quantity of mass, a differential degree cannot be divided without changing the very nature of its *virtual quantity*. In this sense, it is intensive, not extensive. To make this case, we must consider three closely intertwined points: first, infinite for Scotus does not equal indeterminate (the "bad infinite" of Hegel), but a deepening elevation of being; second, each degree whether infinite or finite is constituted as a positive, nonrelational, difference; third, as intensive, virtual quantities are nonadditive.

4.5.2. The Depth and Distance of the Intensive Infinite

As discussed above, the *simplification* of the concept of being to reach "just being" does not yield a concept proper to God (as it does for Aquinas). That is, simplification does not also elevate the concept insofar as the concept of being is univocal. To elevate the concept, we also must intensify it as that which cannot be exceeded. Being as intensely infinite means more than the indeterminate or unlimited addition of some selfsame unit. Instead, the intensive infinite possesses a virtual quantity of such a singular excess that it opens an abysmal distance and depth between it and even the noblest of creatures.

To characterize what Scotus means by the intensive infinite, consider his description from the *Reportatio*: "God is infinite not only in duration but also intensively. Therefore, we must set forth the meaning of the word. Now what I call 'infinite' here is what exceeds any actual or possible finite being to a degree beyond any determinate measure you take or could take."[103] Two points need to be noted from this passage. First, the intensive infinite is more than a mere infinite duration, which many medievals ascribed to even angels. That is, intensive infinity means something else beyond timelessness or eternity of duration.

The second point to note is that an intensive infinite is one exceeding all measure. Here we find a virtual quantification of a given perfection, whether it be being, goodness, or intelligence. Intensity marks the range or degrees along which the perfection can be stretched, so to speak. This is its zone of indetermination. An infinite degree is one beyond which nothing else can be added. We must observe the way in which Scotus treats the infinite. It is not merely undetermined quantity, the so-called "bad infinite" described by Hegel as an endless or unimaginable adding up of innumerable units. This is how the infinite has most often been thought: as a boundless abyss of chaos and anarchy. The *infinite* for Scotus is instead a determinate amount or degree of a virtual quantity. Its amount or degree is one of perfect excess: perfect because nothing

else can be added; an excess because it transcends all others on account of such a perfect distance. Whereas creatures can always *go further,* and therefore are finite, intensive infinity means that God can go no further or be exceeded.[104]

The novelty of Scotus's position can be appreciated in terms of how he understands the distance between something infinite and something finite. Whereas Aquinas attributes an infinite power to God on account of his unique ability to make something from nothing, and thereby to traverse an infinite distance, Scotus rejects this understanding of an infinite distance.[105] He agrees that there is no intervening distance between the contradictories being and nothingness. Here, however, infinite distance suggests only an indeterminate or imprecise distance. This is because nothingness, the term *a quo,* marks only a state of privation. Creation from nothing offers no resistance to be overcome; Scotus, like Olivi before him, is unimpressed by calling something infinite merely on account of such a parlor trick.[106]

The infinite distance between God and creatures follows not because of the lack of some intermediary, as with contradictories, but due to God's own positive infinite intensity.[107] As Davenport states (following Vignaux): "'This carefully-constructed concept of infinite being possesses a 'density and depth' that far outstrips the vulgar notion of ontotheology, where the divine is encompassed as a vague 'supreme being.'"[108] Scotus's concept of *ens infinitum,* forged from the simply-simple concepts of univocal being and the ultimately differential intrinsic mode of infinite distances God from all else due to the "density and depth" of this complex construct.

It is necessary now to show how Scotus can have it both ways: retain the irreducible primary diversity (or vague alterity) between God and creatures and between the categories and yet admit of some ranking of them in terms of their respective reality or perfection. Such a comparison, this work has insisted, is not one of analogical proportion. Whatever work analogy might do for Scotus, it falls outside the scope of transcendental metaphysics. One being is unequal to another because of its transcendental magnitude. But transcendental magnitudes (i.e., ultimate modal differences) have but a vague alterity with respect to one another sharing nothing in common, not even being. So how can they be compared?

4.5.3. Scale of Intensity

To explain how we rank various finite beings, Scotus gives the example of whiteness being excelled by knowledge, the intellective soul, and the highest of angels. He states that a being infinite in entity

> can also be described in terms of how it exceeds any other finite being in this fashion. An infinite being is that which exceeds any finite being whatsoever not in some limited degree but in a measure beyond what is either defined or can be defined. Consider whiteness, for instance. It is exceeded triply by

> another entity, knowledge, or ten times by the intellective soul, or a hundredfold by the most perfect angel. No matter how high you go among beings, there will always be some finite measure according to which the highest exceeds the lowest.[109]

To say something's intensity is finite means that it can be exceeded, that it can go further. As stated above, no matter how high you go with such beings, a finite measure holds between them.

But this can occur in a variety of diverse ways: knowledge exceeds whiteness, and an angel exceeds them both. Knowledge exceeds whiteness *triply*, the intellective soul exceeds it *tenfold,* and the highest angel *one hundred times*. Given the diversity between degrees of different categories, how is such cross-categorial measurement possible, for example between a habit such as knowledge, a quality such as whiteness, and substances such as souls and angels? What are we to make of such numbers?

Scotus tells us that the measure on account of which one finite being exceeds another and both can be ranked is not a mathematical proportion.[110] Our passage from above continues: "Not that there is any proportion or relative measure, properly speaking, as mathematicians use it, because the angel, being simpler, is not constituted by some lesser entity to which something has been added. It must rather be understood of the relative measure of perfection or power in the way that one species is superior to another. In this fashion, by contrast, the infinite exceeds the finite in entity beyond any relative measure or proportion that could be assigned."[111] As seen here, Scotus rejects one of key elements of the additive theory, namely, that intensive degrees can be conceived as adding to an already established base. An angel cannot be conceived as the hundredth degree of being in the sense of adding together other degrees. True, the angel in some sense contains these other degrees, but not in an additive sense.

Scotus maintains that the similarity between numbers and beings goes only so far: "Hence the dependence of a larger number upon a smaller number is like that of a whole upon its parts. The very opposite is true of being, whether they are essentially or accidentally ordered, for the less perfect being is not part of the more perfect being nor does the more perfect represent a whole that is the aggregate of the less perfect. It is rather the sort of whole that contains virtually and essentially the perfections of all less perfect beings, prepossessing them in a more excellent way."[112] The way in which one mass contains another mass is not the same as the way in which one degree contains a lesser degree and is "divisible" into such degrees. The divisibility of an intensity must be considered unlike either the indivisibility of a quality or the spatial divisibility of a quantity. Intensities can intensify and diminish, but not in the same way as quantities. An intensity can be divided, but only into virtual parts. And for this reason, one intensity can contain another, but not without transforming it.

The differential degree integral to each thing's being does not admit of a

mathematical proportion or measure with respect to the independent units of which it is composed. That is, the differential intensity of being an angel does not amount to the addition of *X-many* units (e.g., of whiteness, intelligence, etc.). It is simply its own qualitatively differential degree. The adding together of transcendental magnitudes is like the adding together of temperatures.[113] The division of such an intensity yields not lesser homogeneous units of the same, but a new differential degree. On this account, virtual quantities fundamentally differ from quantities of mass.

Divisibility does not mean that a degree contains independent units or parts whose addition composes a whole. Such parts are not simply lesser units of the same stuff as the whole, but each its own degree of determinateness.[114] The whole contains independent parts only virtually. Once the parts become added to or subtracted from the whole, a new differential degree is produced. In this intensive sense, and only in this sense, can transcendental magnitude be considered divisible or the result of addition. With their addition and subtraction, no base remains.

Recall the discussion from Chapter 2 regarding the need for diversity in order to achieve new unities rather than more of the same.[115] Two units can be added together to get more of the same units; but to constitute a genuinely new unity, primarily diverse elements are required. This is the case on the physical level with form and matter, and on the metaphysical with quidditative terms of being and ultimate differences. The "addition" or "subtraction" of one differential degree from another does not constitute more of the same, but something new entirely. There is no base or a core that remains.

Following Felix Alluntis and Allan Wolter, this might be compared to the measurement of nonadditive physical intensities.[116] Just as in the scale of hardness, diamond does not possess more of something called "hardness" than does talc, so too a being higher on the scale of perfection and power does not contain *more* of something called being.[117] Infinite being does not equal all degrees of finite being taken together additively, nor does any finite degree equal the preceding degree plus some added unit. To say that one hundred degrees "contains" ninety-nine degrees conjures up a potentially misleading image. One imagines physical parts external to one another united together in a single container. Such an image misses, however, the fundamental diversity between different degrees.

As one hundred times greater than the color white, an angel's "degree of difference" does not simply contain the same units of whiteness taken one hundred times.[118] There is no base unit to which something is merely added according to fixed ratios. An angel, Scotus states, "is not constituted by some lesser entity to which something has been added."[119] This means that exact mathematical proportions or ratios cannot be assigned to degrees of difference. And yet we still can rank and measure them as we do degrees of hardness or temperatures.

To think difference not in an oppositional or relational manner but, rather, as a positive determination and perfection of a being entails the aforemen-

tioned shift from thinking difference as a defection from the perfection of selfsame unity. Being has latitude; thus, it is divisible. It is divisible because being qua being is not a perfect unity; it is not identical to God or anything else. It is an abstraction in need of determination and perfection. The latitude of being means that it is open to determination and perfection by means of ultimate differences. The combination or subtraction of one degree to or from another does not yield more of the same, but a new differential degree. In this sense, intensive degrees of being are like temperatures.

As John Murdoch and Edith Sylla show, by the thirteenth century, having a latitude was the opposite of being indivisible:

> According to this [addition] theory, put into circulation by Duns Scotus early in the fourteenth century, a quality is made more intense by the addition of a new part of form which combines with the old form to produce a higher degree. Perhaps contrary to expectations, this theory did not assume that the previous form survived as such, but that, within the new higher degree, there was a part equal to the old lower degree. Thus, degrees, like latitudes, came to be imagined as lines, rather than points, and higher degrees contain lower degrees, just as longer lines contain shorter ones.[120]

It must be emphasized that "the previous form does not survive as such." When one degree is added to another, they constitute a new unity without either of the previous degrees surviving in their former shape.

Rather than a metaphysics based on isolated units (e.g., the selfsame substances of Aristotle and Aquinas), Scotus offers a metaphysics of intensive transcendental latitudes. The central question is not "What is it? What form does it have?" but "How intense is its quantum of being? How far can it go?" As in the image of the line, we can imagine one being encompassing or overtaking another on the scale of intensity. And yet, in such surpassing (i.e., becoming more intense), a new differential degree arises.

4.5.4. Measurement of Intensities

How then might we measure the difference of perfection between primarily diverse categories of being? How can Scotus say that an angel is more perfect than knowledge or than whiteness, or that quality in general is more perfect than time (in general)? Here we might turn to how mineralogists gauge diamond as being harder than talc. It's not because of some unit called "hardness." Instead, there's a transitive asymmetry between diamond and talc such that diamond can scratch talc. It contains as a quasi-unit talc's ability to scratch, albeit according to its own differential degree. So too, there are no independent units of being. Instead, each being's transcendental magnitude serves as the basis of equality and inequality insofar as it contains the other eminently or virtually. One degree contains another in the sense that a longer line contains a shorter, *but* completely transforms the original quantity in a new degree.

In this sense, the higher contains the lower, albeit not as a base unit to which something more is added. Being is not an independent unit of measurement by which we measure Relations and Qualities in terms of B-units. So too, Scotus does not elect some *most being* (e.g., God or substance) by which to analogically measure the others. With respect to being as a real conceptual *quid*, all beings are equal. They are radically unequal according to their diverse transcendental magnitudes (i.e., vague alterity). We can rank and compare them, however, in terms of how one being might contain the reality of another virtually or eminently.

Ranking beings in terms of their differential degrees entails that any analogical unity features as a secondary property of their being. The *inherence* of quantity in substance does not tell us what it is for Quantity to be Quantity. Wherever analogy may fall in Scotus's system and whatever work it may do, it falls outside a pure transcendental analysis of beings both qua being and qua their transcendental differentiation. Scotus can engage in a full-fledged transcendental analysis of being without making reference to such secondary and external qualities relating to analogical reference, imitation, or participation. This is because differentiation is an intrinsic and positive aspect of any being in terms of itself, whatever may be its actual causal standing.

In summation, Scotus clearly defends the additive view of the latitude of forms in terms of explaining physical qualities such as heat or theological virtues such as charity. With respect to charity, however, he recognizes that the additive view is less subtle and grosser than its alternative, yet it falls more in line with Bonaventure.[121] For reasons already noted, however, he seems to find equal, if not greater, problems with the standard nonadditive view. When it comes to explaining transcendental magnitudes and protecting divine transcendence from collapse into the mundane, he opts for an explanation that rejects key elements of the additive view, namely that units are added to a base unit. He does this, however, without accepting Aquinas's position that something is limited and rendered finite by its reception in a subject.

Scotus recognizes, even if he doesn't articulate it, a fundamental problem shared by both the standard views: they attempt to explain the difference between degrees in terms of already-established units of identity. That is, they presuppose what they attempt to explain: differential degrees. The additive view explains intensity in terms of units, whereas the nonadditive view explains it in terms of participation in a Form. Both attempt to explain phenomena of intensity using a principle of identity alone. But in both cases, difference itself remains unexplained. Although this may not be a problem for physics (i.e., measuring temperatures or color variations), it presents a fundamental problem for metaphysics.

The intrinsic modes of being are ultimate differences on account of which univocal being can be divided. They are not themselves beings or any*thing* lest we suffer the regress warned of by Parmenides. For this reason, they must not

be subjected to the principle of identity. In the case of God, his mode of infinite immediately singularizes the divine essence. In the case of creatures, their finite modes remain open to further determination both on the essential level by means of ultimate specific differences and finally to the individual level by means of ultimate individual differences. The following two chapters will be dedicated to these considerations.

CONCLUSION

This chapter defended the classification of the intrinsic modes of being, in particular finite and infinite, as ultimate differences. Although such modes of being are not differences in the restricted, Porphyrian sense of the term, they are differences in Scotus's deepened sense. As modally distinct from being, such transcendental differences divide being into God, on the one hand (*ens infinitum*), and creatures (*ens finitum*), on the other. Scotus's preferred modes of being, which together constitute the disjunctive attribute "finite or infinite," mark intensive degrees of being. Each degree is not composed of a shared, common, unit of being but, rather, indicates a relative position on a scale of being reaching to infinite. Beginning with the division of being according to transcendental modes, Scotus thinks of differentiation in terms of positivity and perfection rather than as a fall from perfective unity. God is not thought of as being itself (e.g., *ens maxime* or *ipsum esse subsistens*) but, rather, as most singular qua the differentiating mode of *infinitum*. For creatures, as the next two chapters will show, their differentiation as finite continues along the lines of both specific differentiation and finally individual differentiation.

CHAPTER FIVE
ULTIMATE SPECIFIC DIFFERENCES

The previous chapter showed how the intrinsic modes of infinite and finite divide the univocal concept of being. As ultimate differences, they terminate the quidditative transcendental order and produce the singular unity of the divine essence on the one hand, and the diverse modes of finite being, or the categories, on the other. This chapter will argue that the ten categories as the most general genera are contracted through *ultimate specific differences*, giving rise to specific essences and ultimately reaching the *species specialissima* beyond which there are only individuals.

Here an old question emerges: What explains why a given being (*ens*) is the sort of being that it is? Why is it this kind of being and not that? Why is it a human, not a horse? As this chapter will argue, such differentiation cannot be accounted for by already differentiated things, whether form, matter, or so on.[1] This is fine for natural science, but not for transcendental metaphysics. Thus, something else, something more ultimate, must account for the different sorts of beings and forms that we experience in the world around us. Scotus's answer will be that it is "the ultimate abstraction of form," or an ultimate specific difference, on account of which this sort of thing and that sort of thing differ. And like all ultimate differences, ultimate specific differences are primarily diverse, pure *qualia* without *quid*.

Since an ultimate specific difference is formally distinct from the genus concept it determines, Section 5.1 will begin with a discussion of the formal distinction. Section 5.2 will show how Scotus deepens the standard Aristotelian account of them. As will be explained, an ultimate specific difference conceives an irresolvable formality or reality as distinct from other formalities or realities within one and the same thing. Section 5.3 compares Scotus's account of ultimate difference to its more standard Aristotelian treatment. Section 5.4 discusses Scotus's technical understanding of the reality of essences and their modality of community apart from either individuation *in re* or universalization *in intellectu*. Here Scotus's robust essentialism will be displayed. Section 5.5 responds to the challenge that Scotus's metaphysics dissolves unity into a disordered heap without any organizing principle. This will lead to the following chapter on individuation and ultimate individual differences.

5.1. THE FORMAL DISTINCTION

The so-called "formal distinction" falls on a spectrum between the real distinction, on the one extreme, and the rational distinction, on the other.[2] Whereas

the modal distinction discussed above corresponds to a reality and its intrinsic modifications, the formal distinction admits of an even greater, or more real, distinction between two *realities* or *formalities* within one and the same thing. Positing distinctions somewhere between the real and the rational was standard practice for Scotus's peers. Above, Olivi's account of *rationes reales* was discussed.[3] Or, as Henry of Ghent states: "The differences according to intention differ from those which differ according to reality and likewise from those which differ only according to concept (*ratio*). These are founded in the same simple thing."[4] Henry recognizes that not all conceptual complexity (*rationes*) need be rooted in physical distinctions.

Scotus perhaps goes even further in defending the objectivity of concepts whose divisions do not mimetically map onto real distinctions between things and their parts.[5] The realities are not themselves subsistent or capable of independent existence. They do, however, enjoy a mind-independence, which means that our concepts correspond to distinct perfections in the thing itself prior to our act of carving up the entity.[6] We latch onto real divisions, which fall below the level of things. As we have discussed, however, such isomorphism cannot be thought representationally or mimetically. Instead, the formal distinction, like the modal distinction before it, must chart the course of differential divisions, which are more like processes than stable things. Wolter compares such conceptualization to shining a spotlight over a fluid territory rather than isolating ontological bricks: "For one thing, I think it would be a mistake to believe that [Scotus], like some later formalists, regarded realities or formalities as some kind of 'ontological bricks' characterized by fixed dimensions." He continues: "His account of the [formal] distinction is perfectly consistent with the admission that there is something fluid about the way we think of things, and hence about the way we draw the lines that separate one intelligible aspect from another."[7] Our fully resolved concepts latch onto these distinct intelligible aspects, which express formally nonidentical "points of inflection" (if I may introduce my own image) within one and the same thing. Our conceptions are not mere whims of fancy but get at real divisions underlying the structure of the unified objects of experience.

One of the central factors motiving Scotus's adoption of the formal distinction is his understanding of God and divine attributes. Not only are the divine attributes formally distinct from one another and from the divine essence, but each person of the Trinity is formally distinct from the others. For example, God the Father is formally distinct from God the Son. Otherwise, the passibility of the Son would also apply to the Father. Unlike his more parsimonious, razor-wielding Franciscan brother, however, Scotus by no means limits his use of this distinction to such theological concerns.[8] One example for which Scotus uses the formal distinction is the distinction between the soul and its faculties, and between the faculties themselves.[9] For example, our rational soul is formally distinct from the will and from the intellect; and the will and the intellect

are formally distinct from one another. Scotus also cites the distinction between genus and specific difference as another example of the formal distinction.[10] That is, to use the oft-cited example of the species *human*, there exists a formal distinction between the genus *animal* and the specific difference *rational.*

This specific example will prove to be problematic, however, due to Scotus's "plurality of forms" position.[11] Both concepts correspond to things (*res*) (i.e., the animated body and the rational soul) and not just formalities. Of them, being can be predicated *in quid*; and thus they can be resolved into even more elemental concepts. We need instead an example of distinct formalities or realities lacking the thingly character of *reified* beings, which we will provide below. For now, the focus must remain on the formal distinction as such.

As noted above, the formal distinction has an extramental foundation in the things themselves.[12] This means that our distinct concepts correspond to positive realities in the thing prior to the activity of the intellect.[13] Distinct formalities, nonidentical and primarily diverse from one another, converge around a unified thing. The mark of a distinct formality is that it adds a perfection whose *ratio* cannot be reduced to the *ratio* of another perfection. Whereas an intrinsic mode intensifies or remits one and the same perfection (e.g., degrees of lust), a formality introduces perfection of a different order. That is, it supplements the being in terms of manner of perfection, not just the intensity.[14]

Recall, from Chapter 2, Scotus's three types of differences.[15] Discussion of the first and second distinctions was postponed in order to focus on the third. They were: (1) the distinction in composite substances between the reality from which the genus is derived and that from which the difference is derived (e.g., animal and rational in human beings); and (2) the distinction in simple things between real formalities (e.g., in greenness, the concept of color stems from one formality and the concept of its difference from another). Scotus distinguishes type 1 from type 2 in terms of the simplicity versus complexity of the thing generating the formality. That is, not only can physically distinct things give rise to formally distinct realities of one and the same essence, but also things that are simple can generate distinguishable formalities. Of the latter, Scotus states: "Prior to those concepts are those realities, of which one does not formally include the other, even though the concept is able to be determined through the other. But still because there a determinative and a determinable there, there is a composition."[16] Even with simple *things*, their concepts must be resolvable into ones that are simply-simple. This was why it was said that despite the physical primary diversity of form and matter, metaphysically they shared being in common and are not primarily diverse. Conceptually speaking, something even more fundamental must differentiate such things into the distinct beings that they are. This is none other than an ultimate specific difference.

The formal distinction will be central to explaining both how an ultimate specific difference realizes a genus in terms of a unified species and how an ulti-

mate individual difference actualizes a species in terms of unified individuals.[17] Due to their work of explaining differentiation broadly construed (i.e., realization and actualization), such formalities cannot be beings or things, not even in Scotus's expanded sense of the term.

A word must be said here on what Scotus means by "reality" and how realities constitute things. A "reality" is not a *thing,* but, as the Latin neologism *realitas* suggests, a *thinglet.*[18] So too, we might add, a *formalitas* is not a form, but a *formlet*. Such realities cannot and must not be equated with the things of experience, the actually existing individuals encountered in the world around us or their parts. Ultimately differential formalities include not only that formality of individuation, or *haecceitas*, but also those pre-individual realities whose network comprises the essence of a thing. Reification of such formalities must be resisted lest Scotus's argument be undermined. They are the objective correlates of our concepts.

As *more real* than these other distinctions, the formal distinction explains how our most elemental simply-simple concepts pick out diverse realities within one and the same thing. These concepts do not correspond to the real things or their real parts (either of which can have being predicated *in quid* of it), but to those realities on account of which unified things are formed. Scotus does not balk at the prospect of *thinking the thing* less in terms of the integration of inherent forms, and more as a network of communicable realities (ultimately realized by an incommunicable singularizing principle of individuation).[19] As will be seen, Scotus rejects the Aristotelian view that the ultimate specific difference integrates all of the preceding generic and specific realities in its capacity as substantial form. It does not absorb these into a seamless identity of a substance, but retains ridges or strata of its differential constitution.

These simply-simple qualitative concepts are a bit like Aristotle's *snub.* They add an additional reality to that which they determine, but in order to pinpoint their added reality, we confront an *aporia.* That is, we need to both reference their determined subject but also to divide them from it. A snub is more than just a nose in the sense that snub and nose are not coextensive. Only noses can be snubs; there are not snub potatoes or snub clouds (besides in a metaphorical sense). But, Aristotle states, snub-ness is not a mere accident like big or pale; it is rather a "*pathos* of the nose."[20]

Two points must be kept in mind moving forward: First, formalities constitute *per se* unities, to which they are really identical; and yet, these constituting principles should not be treated as mirror images of the things they constitute. Second, to every difference there corresponds at least a proper formality, if not a form.[21] Whenever a difference corresponds to an actual form, however, it can be further differentiated until we reach primarily diverse differences corresponding to formally distinct formalities in the thing. This leads to the discussion of Section 5.2.

5.2. ULTIMATE VERSUS NONULTIMATE SPECIFIC DIFFERENCES

The second of the three ultimate differences discussed above are ultimate specific differences. To understand them, we must contextualize them with respect to their more standard cousins. This section will show how Scotus deepens the Aristotelian account and uproots the standard Porphyrian Tree. The focus shifts from oppositional dividends (e.g., rational versus irrational) to the vague alterity of ultimate specific difference. A new model of division is at work, one that relies on a nonoppositional, positively differential, system of division.

Specific differences, according to Porphyrian taxonomy, are those differences through which genera descend into species.[22] Specific differences are considered both divisive and constitutive; that is, they both *divide* the genus and *constitute* a species. For example, the specific differences "good" and "bad" divide the genus habit to constitute the species of virtue on the one hand and vice on the other.[23] This process can be traced farther up the tree, resolving the genus habit into its genus and constitutive difference, all of which falls under the category (or most general genus) of Quality.

Note that according to Scotus only some, but not all, specific differences can be considered ultimate: "Sometimes one specific difference might not be primarily diverse from another one—for instance, as happens when the entity is taken from the form—nevertheless the ultimate specific difference, the one that has a simply-simple concept, is primarily diverse from any other."[24] Three points must be highlighted from the passage above: first, only when two specific differences are primarily diverse and share nothing in common (including being) can they be considered ultimate; second, nonultimate specific differences have a common element (at the very least, being) due to their *reified* character (i.e., as derived from forms, they are things/beings); and third, such ultimate differences terminate the quidditative order of genera, producing the unity of real, yet nonactual, essences. Unfortunately, Scotus does not reveal which specific differences are ultimate. He does, however, rule out certain ones as nonultimate.

The defining characteristics of an ultimate difference should be recalled. They are: (1) their concept must be simply-simple; (2) there must be only a qualitative (but no quidditative) concept of them, which means that they must determine the concept of being without themselves being determined; (3) they must be primarily diverse from one another and from being; (4) they must differ in terms of themselves and not on account of something else; (5) they must be extracategorial/transcendental; and finally, (6) they must terminate a quidditative order (i.e., they must divide being). For a specific difference to be considered ultimate, it must meet all of these criteria.

Like all ultimate differences, ultimate specific differences are pure differences, differing only in terms of themselves and nothing else, and are conceived by a simply-simple concept.[25] Furthermore, an ultimate specific difference is

not *a being,* or *a thing*. Recall that anything that can have being predicated *in quid* cannot divide the univocal concept (or in this case, a quidditative term such as a genus). As a pure qualitative determination, an ultimate specific difference instead must have being predicated of it *in quale.* Ultimate specific differentiation is a perfective process of *realization* on account of distinct ultimately differential formalities, followed by their *actualization* on account of an individuating ultimately differential *haecceitas*.

Chapter 2 catalogued those *things* of which being can be predicated *in quid.* These include everything falling under a category—genera, species, individuals, and the essential parts of genera (e.g., form and matter)—and also the uncreated and infinite being (i.e., God). Insofar as certain specific differences are derived from essential parts, these differences cannot be ultimate. Scotus explains:

> Then just as being (*ens*) is predicated *in quid* of an essential part, from which such specific difference is derived, in this manner it is predicated *in quid* of such a difference in abstraction. Just as "the rational soul is a being" is predicated *in quid*, taking the same concept of being according to which is it is predicated of a human or of whiteness; so "rationality is a being" is predicated *in quid* if rationality is such a difference. But no such difference is ultimate, because in it multiple realities are contained (*continentur realitates plures*), which in some manner are distinct. (In the first question of the second distinction, I said such distinction or nonidentity is between an essence and a personal property, or an even greater distinction, as will be explained elsewhere.) And then such a nature can be conceived according to some reality or perfection, while some other reality is ignored. Hence the concept of such a nature cannot be simply-simple.[26]

For example, whenever a specific difference such as rationality corresponds to the rational soul in human beings, which according to Scotus is a form, such a difference is not ultimate. A form is a being and a thing. It must contain multiple realities, which account for its differentiation.

Why does Scotus think this is the case? If such a difference were itself ultimate, and thereby not differentiated by something more ultimate, being would divide itself. That is, a being would be differentiated on account of something that is *quidditatively* a being. But, regarding such a differential being, something other than its status qua being would need to account for its differentiation. As we have seen, this would only kick the question of differentiation further down the line. Forms are too big to explain difference. Scotus instead opts for the view that the differentiation of being is fundamental.

In terms of ultimate specific differences, this entails that anything that divides *a being* such as a genus must be ultimately differential. Calling upon a specific difference such as rationality to do this work only defers the question: What differentiates a being, such as the rational soul, from other such beings? This *thing* itself contains multiple formalities or realities.

The passage above continues:

> But the ultimate reality or "real perfection" of such a nature, from which ultimate reality an ultimate difference derives, is simply-simple. This reality does not include being (*ens*) quidditatively, but has a simply-simple concept. Hence there is some reality *a*, such that "*a* is being" is not *in quid*, but is *per accidens*. This is so whether *a* refers to that reality or abstractly to the difference taken from that reality. I said earlier that no ultimate difference includes being quidditatively because it is simply-simple. But certain differences, derived from an essential part (i.e., a part of the thing's nature or the nature from which the genus is derived), are not simply simple and include being *in quid*.[27]

As Scotus here explains, that reality, "let's call it *a*," does not include being quidditatively. Thus, "*a* is not a being," at least not quidditatively speaking. Being can only be predicated *in quale* of *a*, that is, insofar as it expresses a pure determination or qualification without *quid*. It is difference itself. Ultimate specific differences thus underlie the thingly character of nonultimate specific differences and ground their differential status.

Scotus adds an important caveat to this discussion. In comparison to individual differences, which are always taken from an ultimate difference, sometimes a specific difference is taken from a form. When an ultimate difference is taken from an essential part and is not based on an ultimate reality, the predication must be understood denominatively according to the form "a being is being-ish (*entale*)."[28] Otherwise, saying "an animal is rational" would amount to saying "a being is a being." Although such *entale* predications avoid redundancy, they mask further division. That is, functionally one may use such an essential part to divide the genus into a species. Full division, however, requires reducing beings—including those that are being-ish—into their differential formalities.

It must be noted that such differential formalities or realities constitute unified things, and yet themselves lack unity.[29] This means that they principiate unities insofar as they terminate a quidditative order (i.e., a category), but their primary diversity prohibits the ascription of any unity to them. Scotus states: "Ultimate specific differences are primarily diverse, and therefore nothing *per se* one can be abstracted from them."[30] Unity follows as a proper attribute from the terms they constitute, but they themselves are subunitive. If unity could be predicated of them, two unacceptable results would follow: first, ultimate specific difference would be cointensive with being, which also would be predicated of them *in quid*; and second, they would fail to explain the division of being. This means, to cite the earlier example, if good and bad are ultimate specific differences, then they must share nothing in common with each other.

5.2.1. An Example

To cite another example, Scotus asks in the *Quodlibet* whether natural necessity can ever coexist with freedom. He responds that the will *per se* never acts as a principle of natural necessity.[31] His explanation is what interests us. "Naturally active" and "freely active," he tells us, represent a primary and immediate division of active power.[32] This means that "natural" and "free" are the specific differences dividing the genus of active power and constituting their respective species. But are they *ultimate* differences?

If so, then *free* marks a pure determination added to the reality of the genus active power, by which the latter contracts into a new quidditative term: will.[33] This determination means that the will as a nonevident power for opposites is not determined to one contrary over another.[34] Free is primarily diverse from natural as powers in the sense that they share no common element. There is instead some ultimately differential reality—not itself a power, an accident, a form, or even a being—on account of which some powers are free. Division occurs through the vague alterity of ultimate difference and not opposition or contrariety. There is no comparison or common exchange between the ultimate specific differences free and natural; only their results can be compared.

Scotus tells us that no reason can be given for the division of powers into nature and will.[35] If someone asks, "Why is nature directed to one action whereas will is open to alternatives?," all that can be answered is, "That's what will is." No further reason can be rendered. What this means, more broadly speaking, is that difference cannot be explained in terms of anything more fundamental than itself. The *realitas* making a power free as opposed to natural stems from what Scotus dubs the "the superabundant sufficiency of indetermination" to opposites.[36] This can be abbreviated as *superabundantly sufficient* active power. Such a difference (i.e., superabundant sufficiency) is not a thing added to another thing, but a determination of one term (i.e., active power) that is constitutive of another term (i.e., will).[37] It is a line of differentiation perfecting the genus of active power.

Due to their primary diversity, ultimate specific differences cannot depend on each other or be mutually definitional (i.e., as oppositions). It is in this sense that Scotus deepens the traditional understanding of the Porphyrian Tree, which divides a genus based on oppositional difference. One side of the dividend (e.g., irrational) is not defined as lacking the fullness of its opposite (rational). Each difference remains primarily diverse from the other.

5.2.2. Constitutive Difference

When it comes time to explain the role of ultimate individuating differences constituting individuals, Scotus draws an analogy to ultimate specific differences: just as the latter constitute species from the higher-level essentiality of genera, so too the former constitute individuals from specific natures.[38]

Whether this is an apt comparison will need to wait until Chapter 6. For now, the threefold comparison Scotus draws between them will be addressed: with respect to the higher, the lower, and "the lateral."[39] That is, he illustrates the way in which a specific difference determines the reality of the genus; constitutes unity for the species; and stands primarily diverse from other ultimate specific differences on par with them.

First, when one compares an ultimate difference to that which is above it—that is, a genus with respect to a specific difference and a most specific species with respect to an individual difference—the concept of the difference not only determines the concept "above it," so to speak. It is also the case that the difference determines or contracts the corresponding reality.[40] That is, such formal realities, which Scotus calls here both "formal entities" and "formal perfections," serve as the objective correlate of our distinct concepts. Distinct formal perfections constitute, for example, the reality of the species whiteness: one the generic commonality of its color-ness, the other the determining differentiation of its ultimate specific difference. It adds a reality completely irreducible to that of the genus. The two share nothing in common, not even being. Because Scotus does not name this ultimate specific difference, the example of the will from above can be used: *superabundant sufficiency* adds an irreducible differential reality to the genus active power. This difference shares nothing in common with the genus, not even being.

Next, he compares the differences in terms of what is "below" them, species and individuals respectively.[41] It is important to note that "falling under" means more than simply exemplification or instantiation. Instead, the difference constitutes the unity falling under it and provides an ultimate reason why it is this unity and not that one. Differentiation means making this unity—whether that of the species or the individual—*be different* as the unity that it is. A difference is the ultimate reason or ground of unity (*differentia specifica est ratio ultima unitatis suae*), despite its own lack of unity. The difference leads to rendering the nature atomic (*natura constituitur atoma*) such that it becomes indivisible with respect to any further specific realization. This drive toward perfection, or specific differentiation, terminates in the most specialized specific terms under which there are only individuals. (A parallel process of actualization occurs with respect to the individual difference rendering the individual indivisible.)

Finally, he makes a lateral comparison.[42] This comparison is between differences on par with each other (*iuxta se*), either specific differences capable of determining the same genus or individual differences the same species. He reintroduces here the two types of specific differences, namely those that are nonultimate and those that are ultimate. The former, he reminds us, can have something common predicated *in quid* of them, at the very least being (*ens*). The latter are ultimate perfections in the thing and can have nothing quidditative predicated of them. Once again, the former must be resolved into ultimate specific differences in order to fully account for and explain difference. Once

we reach the level of ultimate specific differences, and analogously, ultimate individual differences, two such lateral differences can share nothing in common with each other or anything else for that matter. The ultimate specific difference of whiteness and that of blackness have nothing in common. They are pure differences. And between such differences there is, as discussed above, only a "vague alterity."

Scotus considers the objection that insofar as ultimate differences (specific or individual) are primarily diverse and nothing one (*unum*) can be abstracted from them, therefore the terms constituted through them (species or individuals) are also primarily diverse. Before considering Scotus's response, note that this reading would entail that distinct species agree in nothing and, even more radically, individuals agree in nothing. That is, between two species of the same "genus" (not to mention two individuals of the same "species"), no common unity could be abstracted. This and that (or this kind and that kind) share nothing over and above themselves on account of which they really (or even formally) agree. Thus, insofar as the constituted has a primarily diverse ultimate difference as a constituting factor or principle, it too (i.e., the constituted) seems devoid of any common identity.

Scotus replies to the objection:

> To the first of these, the response must be that, if the meaning is this: "Where the differences are primarily diverse, what is constituted thereby is also primarily diverse, i.e., they are incompossibles"—then this is true. For the differences of whiteness and blackness are primarily diverse, and thus whiteness and blackness are primarily incompossible. On the other hand, if the meaning is this: "If the constitutive differences are primarily diverse, then the things constituted thereby are [so] primarily diverse they agree in nothing," then this is false. For the things so constituted also have a nature, in which nature they primarily agree. But this is not the case with their differences, as is clear from the case where species are constituted by ultimate specific differences, which agree in nothing.[43]

Here the full effects of Scotus's deepened and expanded account of ultimate difference are on display.

An ultimate difference is not itself a unity (e.g., substantial form) that secures the identity of the essence at various stages of abstraction. Instead, the ultimate difference *constitutes* a new unity (e.g., a species or individual) by means of determination. It provides the ultimate reason why the new unity is different.[44] The new unity is different because it has been constituted (or principiated) by a primarily diverse ultimate difference. The ultimate difference makes the constituted (unity) be different. Compossibility and incompossibility are explained by such *ultimate* differences in their vague alterity (and not vice versa).

What Scotus means by "constitution" is that the difference really adds something to a more generic formal perfection or entity. This something added is

an irreducible formality or reality distinct from the more generic base. And such an added reality does not merely implicate or absorb the other formalities/realities, but they remain irreducibly diverse. For example, the reality of the ultimate difference constituting blackness does not include anything in common with the reality of the genus color.[45] Color or any higher-level difference is not included in the ultimate difference of blackness. The two remain diverse and formally distinct perfections or entities in one and the same constituted unity. For this reason, as we will discuss, such constituted unities can agree in something (i.e., their genus). It is important to remember that a metaphysical, and not a physical analysis, is at work here.

Whiteness and blackness agree in color although their ultimate specific differences agree in nothing. (So too with will and nature.) If the ultimate specific differences agreed in anything, we could not explain difference. Scouts uproots the standard Porphyrian Tree, which reduces such pure difference to what they also call "ultimate difference." According to the standard definition, as we have seen, ultimate difference is then identified with form. Scotus, however, pushes this further. Vague alterity underlies both contrariety and contradiction, according to Scotus. The repugnance of the statements "The will is nature" or "The will is nonwill" (like "White is black" or "White is nonwhite") is founded on the vague alterity of ultimate specific difference. There is no further account, Scotus tells us. The one is not a mere defection or lack of the other. Instead, each difference is itself primarily diverse from the other.

Primarily diverse ultimate differences constitute different, or incompossible, things. He explains that whiteness and blackness are incompossible because their differences are primarily diverse.[46] This does not mean that the constituted terms agree in nothing. Whiteness and blackness share color in common, just as humans and donkeys share animality. Scotus here argues that "the constituted" (i.e., species such as whiteness and blackness) are differing unities. The ultimate explanation or reason (*ratio ultima*) for their difference, however, is the diversity of their respective ultimate differences. Whatever it is that constitutes whiteness as whiteness and whatever it is that constitutes blackness as blackness are themselves primarily diverse ultimate differences. Ultimate specific difference principiates the being different of such species and coconstitutes them as new unities.[47]

It must be remembered, as Scotus reaffirms here, that although white and black oppose each other and are contrary colors, opposition and contrariety occur with respect to contrary species of color. Their ultimate specific difference explains their opposition, not vice versa. An ultimate specific difference is not primarily defined in opposition to another, from which it thus derives its difference. Instead, each ultimate specific difference is fundamental. As such, however, there is but a vague alterity between ultimate differences. This means that the ultimate specific difference of this one (species) does not derive its dif-

ferential character in opposition to that one. Blackness's ultimate specific difference is not an oppositional falling short of the fullness of whiteness.

Nor are the ultimate specific differences of nonrational animals opposed to the ultimate specific difference of humans as *irrational* to *rational*. Scotus states that nonrational signifies the ultimate differences of both a horse and an ass, whatever they may be.[48] The agreement of their respective ultimate differences in this negation, however, does not indicate something common and univocally shared by the ultimate differences themselves. For example, the fact that they both have a sensitive soul does not explain their specific differences. Nonrational serves as a placeholder of this fact. To properly divide these species, we must understand their ultimate specific differences. From these primarily diverse factors, Scotus reminds us, nothing common can be abstracted.

Scotus's claim here is that two species can be primarily diverse on account of their specific difference and yet still agree in something (i.e., a common generic reality or perfection). And given his use of the formal distinction here, such a something is a robust perfection. It is the reality of a generic essence. Only in terms of such a higher unity can we consider them oppositional or contrary to each other. The primarily diverse species constituted by primarily diverse ultimate differences have a common generic nature, which they share in common. Such a nature is grounded in a formally distinct reality or perfection. Specific difference adds an ultimate reason why they differ as different specific unities.

5.3. SCOTUS'S INNOVATION

To fully appreciate the novelty of Scotus's deepened account of ultimate specific differences, this section will return to the traditional account.[49] First of all, the context in which such a discussion arises must be noted. In both *Posterior Analytics* (book II, chapters 3–10) and again in the *Metaphysics* (book VII, chapter 12), Aristotle confronts the *aporia* why a definable thing constitutes a unity instead of a multiplicity.[50] The definition signifies the essence of something, but itself contains a multiplicity of elements.[51] The definition contains both a genus term and a difference term, which together signify the essence. Thus Aristotle asks: why, for example, is the thing *human* a unity, rather than the multiplicity represented by its definition (i.e., bipedal animal)? In other words, what distinguishes the unity of a human substance as bipedal animal from a mere incidental conjunction, for example, musical human?

5.3.1. The Standard Account

Aristotle tells us that essential division occurs when a difference of the other differences, or an *ultimate difference*, completes the process of differentiation. By containing the previous differences, the ultimate difference unifies the various elements distinctly expressed by the definition. This ultimate difference,

which brings differentiation to completion and unifies the other differences, is the form of the thing. Book VII, recall, considers various candidates for the substantiality (*ousia*) of things. Aristotle reduces the question "What is being?" to "What is substance?" The answer, it turns out, is form.[52] Ultimate difference *is* form, and form is the primary *ousia* of the thing, according to Aristotle.[53]

Without immersing ourselves in the depths of this murky argument, we must emphasize that the essential unity brought by form suffices as essential so long as the lower absorbs the reality of the higher without remainder. If rational turns out to be the ultimate difference of humans, it must contain the difference of animal and so on up the Porphyrian Tree. As Scotus explains, Aristotelian differentiation must capture that which precedes it if it is to be proper differentiation. "It is said that the superior is included in the inferior," Scotus states, "because the Philosopher says that the ultimate difference is the substance of the thing, but this is only so because it includes the others that preceded it." He continues: "Likewise the Philosopher says that it is not necessary to mention the other differences, but only the last, because if the others were posited along with the first, there would be a useless repetition. For it is not necessary to state that a bipedal animal has feet, because this is a useless repetition transposing terms, for after stating it is footed, it is superfluous to add it has feet."[54] Differentiation that does not incorporate previous differences fails to properly differentiate. For example, musical/not musical improperly differentiates the class of tall humans because musicality does not speak to the preceding difference (i.e., tall). It might also fall under its opposing differentia (i.e., short). There is no essential linkage between body size and musical talent.

A genuine ultimate difference for Aristotle must be one that incorporates all of the preceding differences within it, leaving behind no differential remainder.[55] But stating the same thing more than once in the definition is redundant. Aristotle explains that once one has stated the ultimate difference "bipedal," also stating "footed" becomes superfluous.[56] This is because the ultimate difference is taken from the primary being (*ousia*) of the object.[57] As Aristotle argues: "If, therefore, a differentia of a differentia be taken, then one, the last, will be the form, that is, the primary being."[58] Species, according to Aristotle, are differentiated according to their form.

Three factors must be highlighted here: first, Aristotle (and many medieval Aristotelians following him) reduce ultimate differentiation to the thingly character of the form.[59] As we see, for example, in chapter 2 of Aquinas's *De ente*, both the genus and the specific difference signify the whole essence of the species, albeit in different ways.[60] The genus concept signifies it indeterminately, whereas the difference concept signifies the whole determinately.[61] Difference is not identical to form, Aquinas argues, but instead to the "form signifying the whole." The genus signifies the form indeterminately (i.e., not this or that one), which the differentia signifies determinately. The fact that the differentia really corresponds to the thingly character of the form, as should be clear, clearly

distinguishes Aristotle's (or Aquinas's) position from Scotus's. For Aquinas, the important point to emphasize is that the essence has no reality or unity apart from its individuation in particulars.[62]

Second, and closely related to the first, an ultimate difference (e.g., rational, as opposed to an irrational, animate body) *is* really identical to its higher-level essentiality.[63] To speak, for example, of the formal perfection of animality as distinct from its incorporation in rational human animals or irrational nonhuman ones is to equivocate. The more generic or abstract the term becomes, the less unity it has. There is no reality distinct from either incorporation. Differentiation swallows up previous perfections. The form brings such ultimate specific actuality/essentiality to the thing, uniting within itself all preceding determinations.[64] In distinguishing how the genus signifies the whole indeterminately, whereas the differentia signifies the whole determinately, such abstraction does not constitute a formal distinction. The abstracted genus has no reality apart from its differentiation into species, just as species are really identical to individuals. The essence is abstracted without precision, thereby retaining and only virtually distinguishing the essence considered at various levels.[65] This identity allows genera to be predicated of the species falling under them, as well as species to be predicated of individuals.[66] *Rational* contains *animate* for Aquinas; only analogically can we say that two species of animals have the generic reality of animality in common.

The third point from above to consider is that the ultimate differentiation of accidental forms seems to be, at best, analogous to the ultimate differentiation of the forms of substances.[67] The unity for an accident, such as the color green, results from the unity of an accidental form. But just as accidents are only beings in a lesser, analogical, sense, so too they are unities in a lesser, analogical, sense. Aristotle, and Aquinas following him, is here concerned with substantial unity. That is, he wants to know "What makes this substance be one as opposed to many?" Being is said in many ways, but *ousia* holds a privileged place amongst them.

In short—and in answer to Aristotle's original question—the unity of a definable thing corresponds to the unity of its form, which *we* compose and divide according to the operations of our intellect. Each ultimate difference can be a thing and a being according to Aristotle because the ultimate difference stems from the unity of the form. He can reify difference in this way insofar as the *ousia* of one thing is merely analogous to the *ousia* of another (e.g., a human and a horse). Animality is not a thing or even a formality that must be differentiated, but a generic abstraction from the *ousiai* of distinct subsisting units.

Differentiation merely reflects various ways of parsing out the unified reality of a unified being, or thing. In achieving a concept of the essence in terms of *only the species* (without individual designation) or *only the genus* (without specific differentiation), the concept remains confused insofar as the residual determinations remains within it.[68] Individual designation or specific differentiation

has not been excluded, only occluded from conceptual focus. This means identity is preserved: Socrates *is* human *is* animal *is* . . . so on.[69]

The Porphyrian Tree thus *represents* those specific differences necessary to contract the genus into species and in turn to preserve its generic identity. But, as we have seen, the contracting factor is an essential part of the thing. This means that the Porphyrian specific difference masks other, more fundamental differences. This was not a problem so long as being was considered analogical. Differing species of the same genus do not share some real identity in need of differentiation. The basic currency of Aristotle's metaphysics is the essential unit, whose differentiation from other units becomes both external and oppositional; that is, this thing is not that thing. Differentiation is but the comparison we make to selfsame essences, which we compare and contrast as species of the same genus. By pointing to their specific difference as that on account of which they differ, we do not isolate any reality over and above the whole essence.

For Aquinas, a generic concept such as *animal* lacks any real unity or identity over and above the various species of animals.[70] It is but a mental abstraction, and a non-simply simple one at that. Insofar as the ultimate difference qua form incorporates all previous determinations, animal (or animality) is not a distinct reality (in the technical sense of the term) over and above specific animal (an analogical, if not equivocal, term) essences. Humans do not share any unified common reality or formality with other animal species. There is, in other words, no real community of animals: between rational *animals* and irrational *animals* there is but the generic unity of analogy. Vague, confused abstraction is based on the representation of likenesses and similarities. It is comparable to the process whereby an object becomes more and more like others the further it moves away from us: a human, then an animal, then a body, then simply something. (Remember that abstraction for Scotus, on the contrary, leads not to such confusion, but to distinction.)

5.3.2. An Example from Accidents

Returning to the third point from above, we can consider ultimate differentiation in various categories of accidents. Take the following example concerning moral action: Aquinas asks whether the species derived from the end is contained under the species derived from the object.[71] Here he considers whether the end of the will should be subordinated to the object of the external act or vice versa. (He concludes that it's the latter: the object is the species; the end is the genus.) His reference to ultimate specific differentiation is what interests us.

As was Aristotle's concern in *Metaphysics* VII, chapter 12, Aquinas seeks the unity of an action amid a multiplicity of factors.[72] For example, he argues, certain actions are not properly ordered into a single act, such as when a Robin Hood type steals from another for the sake of almsgiving. Here "stealing" cannot properly divide almsgiving (nor vice versa) just as winged and nonwinged

fail to divide irrational animal. Rather, there are multiple actions instead of one, unified, action. For the difference and the genus to constitute a single essence, the former must be essentially determined to the latter.

In explaining such essential determination, Aquinas concludes that the moral object gives the action its species, and in this sense functions as a specific difference with respect to the end as the genus. He outlines this relationship in three steps: first, the more particular the form from which the difference is taken, the more specific the difference; second, the more universal the agent, the more universal a form it causes; and third, the more remote an end, the more universal the agent which must cause it. For example, a king, as a more universal agent than a count, causes a more universal form of government. His end is more remote than the count's. A moral object can only be deemed as suitable in terms of some end desired by the will. For this reason, the former functions to specify the latter. Proper division of the genus into a species requires that the type of object chosen be naturally fitted to the end of the will. But what does Aquinas mean by "object"?

The object is an exterior act selected by the will according to reason's proposal.[73] Reason tells the will that such and such is a suitable object based on the will's desires. Reason must appraise the external act's natural teleology (*finis operis*) as being suitable for the act as a whole. It is important to recognize that the moral object is not some thing strictly speaking (e.g., person, behavior, money, or food). Rather, one and the same thing might serve as different moral objects depending on its *ratio*, or the aspect under which it is formally considered. Distinct *rationes* are not arbitrarily selected by us but, rather, are constituted insofar as the object relates to reason.[74] For example, the distinct moral objects adultery and marriage can take one and the same person as their respective "matter." The modes of according or conflicting with right reason constitute distinct moral objects: for person X, desiring after person Y is a case of adultery due to Y's marriage to Z.

Furthermore, sometimes reason must take circumstances into consideration in this process of differentiation. This occurs when circumstances are principal conditions of the object. In such cases, they can alter the form of the object and change its specification. For example, *who* is murdered matters if it is one's parent or the king; *where* one performs an act of theft matters if it is in the church; *when* one eats matters if it is a time of fasting, and so on. Reason must survey these factors to find an object suitable to the will.

For Aquinas, a suitable object gives the moral act its species, just as the substantial form gives the substance its species.[75] And, just as a substance can be naturally deformed, so too a moral act can be naturally deformed by an unsuitable object. Some acts are simply deformed, and thus are intrinsically evil. Likewise, he argues, what is suitable/unsuitable for a man will differ from what is suitable/unsuitable for a woman (e.g., with respect to lust).[76] And just as a substance needs an ultimate form, whereby it is *ultimately* differentiated into

a species, so too the act needs to an ultimate form whereby it is ultimately differentiated into a species.[77]

The object of the act suffices as an ultimate difference for Aquinas because it unifies the agent's purposes (*finis operantis*) with a suitable end of its action (*finis operis*). But even if the will has good intentions (e.g., almsgiving), if it selects a naturally ill-suited means of achieving such an end (e.g., theft), the act as a whole suffers. As Steven Long correctly explains: "Acts that are generically incompatible with the normative teleology of the good life are not transubstantiated by the further purposes of the agent, for goodness is from integral causes. [. . .] The unitary form or essence of the whole act, known as the object of the act, *never* excludes the external act and its natural teleology."[78] An ultimate difference cannot transubstantiate or transform the genus to which it is added. Reason must function properly to identify an object whose form is well-suited for the will's desired ends.

Whatever Aquinas means by "form" when speaking of the species of moral acts (e.g., "*ita species moralium actuum constituuntur ex formis prout sunt a ratione conceptae*"), he certainly sees a parallel between the differentiation of substances and the differentiation of human acts.[79] The role of form in both cases is to unify a multitude of distinguishable elements into a single, specific reality. The last difference implicates its higher-level generic reality. It must be noted, however, that the last difference is not ultimate in the sense of being a simply-simple reality from which nothing one can be abstracted.[80] Rather, the whole point of the last difference, for Aquinas, is to bring about the seamless unity of the action. The form of an action as a last difference merely defers, but does not answer, the question of ultimate differentiation in Scotus's sense of the term.

5.3.3. Other Examples

Peter John Olivi, Scotus's fellow Franciscan and outspoken critic of Aristotle, holds a position similar to the Subtle Doctor's. Olivi questions how we can discover diverse *rationes reales* in something that is one simple essence.[81] Are these really distinct parts or mere intellectual distinctions? He refers to these *rationes reales* as the simplest differences (*simplicissimae differentiae*), a phrase that foreshadows Scotus's own account of ultimate difference. Olivi is seeking to show how multiple parts as distinct as intellectual and sensory powers can constitute a unified entity. His concern is to avoid reducing our rational and free powers to the form of the body.[82]

In the end, however, Olivi parses ultimate difference in terms of some *thing*. Explaining his claim that although the powers of the soul are parts of it, the total substance of the soul is nominated by them as its most noble and actual part, he states: "Thus it is constituted because the name of the whole form or (*seu*) whole being is taken from *the ultimate difference or formal nature*, because one of the things is the whole form and the other a part or instrument of it" (my emphasis).[83] The *seu* should be read here in the strong sense of "or." The name

of the total form is derived from the ultimate difference, in other words, the formal nature.

According to Olivi's account, the unity amid a multiplicity of parts can be understood in terms of the doctrine of spiritual matter.[84] As parts of the soul, the potencies are identical with the whole as informing parts of a single underlying matter.[85] They are thus forms, but not of the body; instead, they are forms of the spiritual matter of the soul. Insofar as the rational part of us informs the spiritual matter of the soul, and not the body, Olivi can conclude that our rational workings are independent of the body. Such a form is the *altitudo actualitatis,* more intimate to us than anything else.[86] Thus, the human soul as spiritual matter is differentiated on account of a form, which is some *thing*. Olivi's account thus has not quite reached an understanding of ultimate difference in terms of nonreified "difference in itself."

Consider another point of comparison with Scotus's student Henry of Harclay (ca. 1270–1317). In a rather illustrative example regarding "monsters" from India, he considers the following objection:

> I can know very well that some specific difference is a being, and yet be quite ignorant whether it is rational or irrational. There is an obvious example in the eighth chapter of Augustine's sixteenth book *On the City <of God>*. It is unclear whether the monstrous beasts found in India (such as those with feet in both directions, satyrs, fauns, Brahmins, and pygmies) are rational or irrational animals, but there is no doubt that their specific difference is a being. According to the argument I used above, then, there is something univocally common to rational and irrational, although they are most distinct things [*ultima distinctiva*] <i.e. specific differences>.[87]

Regarding the specific differences of such monsters, the intrepid biologist may be uncertain or ignorant. What she does know, however, is that such specific differences are beings.

In response to this objection, Harclay consults Avicenna's argument from "On Difference" (*Metaphysics* V.6).[88] Avicenna argues that all differences have an intelligible form of difference in common (*intentio differentiae communis*). This does not lead to an infinite regress, Harclay reports, because several things can agree in an accompanying thing and not agree in any part of their definition. Thus, he concludes, differences are completely different under a more common intelligible form, which is a difference.

This line of reasoning problematically treats ultimate differences as things, with a quidditative component. As has been stressed, however, Scotistic ultimate differences are pure *qualia* without a *quid*. I say "problematically" because it exposes Scotus's account to the type of attack lodged by Ockham. That is, Ockham argues, because ultimate differences are real somethings outside the soul, they are either in a genus or essential components of something in a genus.[89] In either case, being is predicated *in quid* of them. Scotus can halt this

line of reasoning, however, simply by denying that ultimate differences are real somethings. Rather, as has been shown, he insists on their extracategorial status. They are pure *qualia* without a *quid*. If, however, one were to cede ground in the manner of Harclay, Scotus's position becomes open to such an attack. Moving forward, the fundamentally qualitative character of ultimate differences must be maintained.

5.3.4. Scotus's View

Even in his early discussions of ultimate differences in his *Questions on the "Metaphysics,"* Scotus recognizes that lower (i.e., more specific) differences do not absorb and contain the reality of the higher. The question in play here is whether the dividing difference of a genus includes the difference of what is first divided.[90] In other words, does the lower specific difference contain the higher generic one? Against Aquinas's view outlined above, Scotus argues that an ultimate specific difference adds something to the reality of the proximate genus without vainly repeating either its intelligible content or its reality. Even the proximate genus (e.g., animal) itself contains multiple realities or formalities. For example, it too can be broken down at least into *animate substance* or *animate substantial being*. These too are ultimate in the sense that they contain no higher difference. Forms as physical entities do not explain differentiation; they presuppose this metaphysical process.

Here in the *Questions,* Scotus already holds that some difference must not include prior differences.[91] These, he explains, are ultimate differences. They are ultimate not merely in the sense of being lowest on the Porphyrian Tree as there must be ultimate differences of the genus as well. For example, *animate* would be an ultimate difference of the genus *animal* (= animate body), ultimate because it shares no element in common with *inanimate*). Instead, such differences are ultimate in terms of having no element (including being) quidditatively and commonly predicated of them.

The first thing to note here is that Scotus disassociates ultimate difference from the substance itself or any of its parts (form, matter, etc.). Ultimate difference is not itself the substance of the thing. Instead, from that difference (*ab illa differentia*) there is the complete and total substance.[92] A substance *is* only on account of its principle(s) of differentiation. The ultimate difference is not, as Aquinas had claimed, identical to the total substance of the thing and its definition is not due to the former's inclusion of what precedes it.[93] Whereas Aquinas maintained that difference must be taken from and be identical to the substance of the thing, lest we attempt to define its unity on the basis of accidents, ultimate differences become something of a *sui generis* according to Scotus. That is, they must fall outside of the categories in order to explain these very categories and their essential order.

There can be, Scotus argues, many ordered differences in the definition without useless repetition. Scotus does not deny that ultimate differences constitute

different unities. What he denies is that they are identical to these unities. Thus Scotus states: "I say that if one posits in the definition many ordered differences, it does not follow that there is any useless repetition."[94] Unlike what was seen above with Aquinas, the last ultimate difference does not swallow up the preceding ones such that the animality of humans and the animality of frogs are merely analogical concepts. There can be real generic community (i.e., strange unity).[95] The definition can include multiple differences insofar as they are ordered to one another. How then does Scotus bypass Aristotle's dreaded *aporia* regarding the unity of the thing over and against the complexity of its definition?

Before answering this question, Section 5.4 will show how given Scotus's commitment to univocity, ultimate specific differentiation (and individuation) adds a distinct reality whereby a new unity is produced (i.e., differentiation terminates a quidditative order). But a distinguishable reality or formality, irreducible to either higher-level generic essentiality or lower-level individuation, remains.

5.4. REAL COMMUNITY PRIOR TO THE ONE AND MANY

To this point, it has been emphasized that the ultimate specific difference of an essence cannot correspond to any *thing* comprising the substance itself. And Scotus defines "thing" quite broadly to include the following parts of the composite. In the case of a living substance this includes: prime matter, bodily form, local forms of bodily parts (i.e., organs), and the substantial form of the soul.[96] Each of these *things* is a being in its own right.[97] Together they comprise a unified essence, which is really distinct from any one of them or the mere aggregate. There is a lack of isomorphism between physical parts and wholes and metaphysical parts and wholes. The predicate taken from form does not contract the predicate taken from matter in the same way that the difference contracts the genus; both form and matter are equally common.[98] Essential differences cannot be taken from the world of physical things: they are metaphysical.

If, in defining the essence, a difference corresponding to one of its reified parts (e.g., *rational* corresponding to the rational soul) were selected, then our definition would fall short. The rational soul is a being in its own right with its own essence, so (we must ask) what distinguishes it from the essence of a full-fledged human being?[99] *Rational* would differentiate both the rational soul and an embodied human being with a rational soul, but it would not provide the ultimate difference for either essence. In the case of the former, it would not tell us what about this thing makes it ultimately different from any other thing (or any other soul, for that matter). In the case of the latter, it would place the burden of what differentiates the essence of one type of thing (i.e., humans) onto the shoulders of another type of thing (rational souls). In both cases, we must seek out what *ultimately differentiates* each of their essences. Metaphysical differences cannot be explained by physical things.

Given the plurality of forms for a composite substance, there isn't only one Porphyrian Tree for a composite substance. The composite can fall under the category of Substance on account of a multiplicity of forms, including the really distinct form of the whole or essence.[100] For example, a composite living substance can be categorized as substance at the very least on account of both its bodily form and its form of life (i.e., animating soul), in addition to its form of the whole. Its form of the whole, however, is distinct from either of these partial forms.[101] The total essence is an assemblage of realities emerging from, yet irreducible to, the physical thing and its parts. Thus we must seek the essential difference on its own terms.

5.4.1. BA

Scotus compares the emergence of the essence from physical parts to the emergence of the syllable BA, which is constituted from the elements B and A.[102] Like the syllable, so too the essence emerges as something distinct from any of its constitutive parts: substantial forms, prime matter, forms of the organs, or the thingly relations between them. Each of these has its own essence, with its own ultimate specific difference, which is not the essence of the emergent whole.[103]

He characterizes the differences between the whole essence and its parts as follows:

> I say that with respect to whole composite, its form is not an informing form, but a form by which the composite is a quidditative being. In this manner, the whole being is formally the form of the whole (just as white is said to be white on account of whiteness). This does not entail that the form of the whole would be a quasi-cause of itself, causing a quasi-whole together with matter and partial form. [The form of the whole] instead is the whole considered precisely, according to the manner discussed by Avicenna in *Metaphysics* V: "Equinity is just equinity."[104]

A number of points must be noted: first, the partial form is the substantial form; second, while the substantial form can be an informing form, the form of the whole is not an informing form; third, "the whole form considered precisely" requires the abstraction with precision, with which Aquinas contrasted abstraction without precision; fourth, the form of the whole remains irreducible to the aggregate of its parts (i.e., forms and prime matter);[105] and last, given the reified character of each form, its ultimate differentiation must be sought in addition to the ultimate differentiation of the whole essence. Although this final point is the most important one for our purposes, a word must be said about the other points as well.

Why does Scotus emphasize this distinction of the form of the whole from the other forms? Whereas the various substantial forms of the composite are responsible for organizing the matter and the various material parts, and the highest substantial form for fully organizing these other forms, the form of

the whole, or the essence, makes the thing be the kind of thing it is: horse not human.[106] This ontological feature is irreducible to any of these other features. And whereas these other forms can inform matter (although they need not, as Scotus elsewhere points out),[107] the form of the whole cannot. Its job is to make the thing be *what* it is.

In looking for an ultimate specific difference, one must not take a mere inventory of physical parts but, rather, look to the distinction of the form of the whole. *Rational* is an inadequate specific difference because it only tells us about a natural part: the rational soul (B). It does not tell us what differentiates BA, or even this part B. A real definition, which incorporates the ultimate specific difference of the *essence,* helps us to pick out a specific or generic essence, regardless of natural parts. *Living,* for example, helps us to pick out animals and plants regardless of their substantial form or DNA.[108] If we were to encounter non-carbon-based "life" forms, it might turn out that they have the same generic essence as us. The fact that this physical sequence gives rise to the essence life is *metaphysically* secondary for Scotus. He drives a wedge between physics, which studies hylomorphic natures, and metaphysics, which studies being qua being and its division by means of ultimate difference.

As Scotus describes in the above passage, the essence enjoys an independence of its own distinct from that of its composite parts.[109] Peter King has described the essence as an "emergent feature" of the composite, irreducible to any single part or the total aggregate of parts.[110] Existence is not something added to the essence as its fullest actualization but is instead the essence as completely determined. (Scotus also holds that the forms have their own existences separate from the existence of form of the whole; there is not only one existence for the entire composite.) Individuation actualizes the essence, as will be discussed in Chapter 6, but not qua existence.[111] Even when we abstract the essence with precision (e.g., equinity), we do not set aside existence (*esse*), but only principles of individuation or universalization. This is because the essence, for example, *equinitas tantum,* has a reality *per se* independent of either condition of actualization. Scotus calls this its *less-than-numerical unity* prior to actualization in individuals or universalization in the intellect. Ultimate specific differences give rise to such "weird unities," as Gyula Klima calls them, which serve as the objective correlate of our concepts.[112]

5.4.2. Modal Community

Scotus's clearest expression of the reality of essences qua essences appears in his treatment of the question "whether a material substance is of its nature a this," which he answers in the negative, since the nature requires a separate principle of individuation.[113] Scotus argues for an ontological status for essences irreducible to either universality in the intellect on the one hand or individuation in the world on the other. For the sake of simplicity, this (modal) condition, which is neither one nor many, can be called *community.*

The ontological modality of community belongs to the essence *per se*, whereas singularity requires contraction through an additional principle; so too does universality.[114] Scotus stresses that the ontological condition of community is neither identical to, nor does it entail, the logical condition of universality.[115] Universalization requires a cause, which is the activity of the intellect. So too does individuation. Essential community, however, is real insofar as it does not require an act of intellect. Our concepts of such essential community correspond to something in the thing itself, albeit an abstraction. There is no cause of community, Scotus tells us, other than the nature itself.

The essence of equinity itself, for example, entails certain necessary features. Community follows as one such essential attribute of this essence, whether there happens to be individual horses or not. Or were such an essence to emerge as the result of a completely different divine or evolutionary course, certain essential attributes would remain true of the essence. In short, the actual condition of the essence does not affect its essential constitution. This is what we mean by calling it "real" and stating that community is its proper condition. What does not follow from it, however, is either universality or singularity. Each of these requires an extrinsic cause.

Despite initial appearances of similarity, this view differs from Aquinas's in *De ente,* where he argues that the essence absolutely considered has its *esse* bracketed.[116] That is, its condition of existing either in the intellect or in reality can be ignored. But the essence qua essence does not enjoy any being or any unity of its own. According to Aquinas, essences do not exist or subsist without either individuation or universalization. The essence qua essence lacks both being and unity. Remember, this abstraction without precision allowed him to maintain the identity of the essence at various levels.

Scotus, however, holds a more ontologically robust view of essences. Following Avicenna, he adopts the view that such *essential community* cannot be simply identified with either the condition of universalization or individuation.[117] He fondly cites the former's claim that "Equinity is just equinity," by which both Scotus and Avicenna mean the nature according to its own reality (*per se*) causes community; it remains indifferent, yet open to, its individuation or universalization.[118] Although actualizable under either condition, the common nature must remain really distinct from both the universal as the unity of totality but also the individual as the unity of particularity. If it did not, that is, if it were identifiable with one condition or the other, the representational adequacy between the two would be shattered.

The common nature *would be* the individual or it *would be* the universal and thus could not be common to both conditions. Scotus explains this point as follows: "It should be said that the unity of singularity does not follow upon a stone according to its nature. Otherwise, it could not be understood according to an account of university except understanding it according to an account opposed to its proper account [i.e., as singular], as the first argument shows."[119]

The basic argument put forward here is that singularity and universality are opposing conditions. One and the same thing cannot be both singular and universal. Thus, if an essence, such as that of a stone, is to be both universal insofar as it is conceived in the intellect and singular insofar as it exists outside the intellect, the stone qua stone can be neither singular nor universal. Neither condition forms part of its conceptual content. Its condition instead must be one of commonality open to either mode of actualization. An essence qua essence possesses reality *a se* apart from its "actuality" in individuals or in the intellect. Abstraction does not dematerialize or derealize the essence, but—to use a term from Efrem Bettoni—remodalizes it.[120]

The common essence thus exists apart from those particular things in a given world that instantiate it. Insofar as the essence as the form of the whole is not an inherent or informing form, its primary role is not to inform many subsisting instances. The essence instead makes a thing *be* what it is beyond whatever physical processes lead to the emergence of the essence. Thought and reality communicate not in terms of shared forms, but in terms of real *rationes,* illuminated by means of conceptual clarification.

5.4.3. More Than Vain Repetition

As discussed, ultimate differentiation traditionally was called upon to secure the identity of predication. In *De ente,* Aquinas traces the abstraction of the essence from its unified oneness in substance up through its various forms of abstract multiplicity, all the while maintaining its identity. For Aquinas, "Socrates *is* human *is* animal *is* substance" because each level of abstraction merely occludes something about the whole essence. This is the manner of confused abstraction discussed above. Unity occurs, however, on the basis of form. Scotus complicates this identity when he parses ultimate differences in terms of pure differential *qualia* irreducible to any reified being. The identity between a higher and lower unities on the basis of which "s is P" predications are possible requires mediation by ultimate difference.[121]

What does it mean to say that ultimate difference grounds or constitutes the identification of such unities? It means, for example, that Socrates is not the same as his essence, and the common nature of horseness is not the same as animality. Such formally distinct realities, however, become identifiable by means of their respective specific difference: Socrates individuates the common essence human on account of his ultimate individual difference; horseness realizes animality on account of its ultimate specific difference, which is not a form, but an irreducible *realitas*.

To state that the higher unity is *not the same as* the lower unity means more than that we consider one and the same unified thing at various levels of abstractness. It means instead that the identification of the two unities is possible only on account of a third term, which is itself not a unity, but a subunitive ultimate difference. Difference "adds" to unity purely qualitative declensions.

And for this reason, it cannot be considered a unity, a thing, or a being. It is *sui generis*.

This point emerges more clearly in relation to transcendental differentiation. Recall when Section 4.3 discussed the role of transcendental magnitude in the differentiation of a univocal concept of being. As we saw, Scotus argued that certain of the divine relations could not be predicated of each other (e.g., Paternity is not Filiation) because they were taken in abstraction from the ground of identity in the divine nature. Such a ground is the transcendental magnitude of being intensively infinite. Scotus referred to this as an *abstract* ground of identity because it subtends predications such as "Deity is paternity." Such a principle is not itself a unity. Abstraction by itself does not remove the reason for identity.[122]

Just as God's proper identity is not grounded in a purity of being himself by himself, but in an abstract ultimate difference, so too, Scotus tells us, generic essences are specified on account of the "ultimate abstraction from form," or an ultimate specific difference: "Sometimes that contracting factor is other than the form from which the account of the genus is taken (when the species adds some reality beyond the nature of the genus). Sometimes, however, it is not another thing, but only another formality or another formal concept of the same thing. Certain kinds of specific differences have a non simply-simple concept (i.e. those derived from a form). Others have a simply-simple concept (i.e., those taken from the ultimate abstraction from form)."[123] Scotus refers back to the earlier discussion of reified versus nonreified specific differences.[124] The main point to recall is that whenever the specific difference is derived from a form or any *thing,* its concept can be resolved into more fundamental, and ultimately, simply-simple concepts. Ultimate specific differences, however, are further abstractions from form. What Scotus means by "the ultimate abstraction from form" must be explained.

Although ultimate specific differentiation requires an abstraction from all reified forms, this does not make it a merely rational concept. Rational concepts are not more abstract; they instead change the focus by reflecting upon concepts themselves. Such a simply-simple concept, however, corresponds to *reality*, albeit not in its thingly state.[125] Such a concept instead conceives a distinct formality subtending a unified thing. The ultimate abstraction of such formalities means we have reached the most fundamental level of abstractness, beyond which our concepts cannot be broken down any further. For example, *superabundant sufficient* cannot be broken down into more atomic, constitutive, concepts; it is itself simply-simple.

As has been seen, conceptual distinctness requires distortion of our everyday picture of the world in terms of unified entities. That is, the simply-simple qualitative concepts corresponding to ultimate specific differences conceive realities, but not ones that subsist apart from unified things.[126] Insofar as one and the same form can itself contain multiple realities (as discussed above),

the ultimate difference must be taken from the *ultimate abstraction from form*: that is, from nonreified formalities or realities (i.e., pure differences). Within the essence of a thing, there remain other real potencies, or realities, those from which the genus concept can be derived.

But how do these formally distinct realities come together to form an essence? Furthermore, how does our intellect test for the division of a genus term into a new quidditative species term, as opposed to a mere aggregate? This question goes beyond that of the plurality of forms thesis. We are not asking (merely) how multiple forms come together to constitute a unified thing as opposed to a mere heap. Such a plurality of forms operates at the level of things.[127] This is a question for physics. Instead, it must be asked: without form to secure the unity of the essence as it had for Aquinas and others, how does an ultimate specific difference—together with the generic quidditative reality—constitute the unity of a specific essence?

5.5. A DUST CLOUD OF DIFFERENCES?

The Porphyrian Tree served to maintain identity *from the trunk up through its branches*. Ultimate specific difference could operate as the arbiter of identity between the various levels insofar as it corresponds to the self-identical form or substance of the thing. The lower includes the higher, and the higher is but an abstraction of the lower, because they both depend on the oneness of the form. The form brings unity to the substance and absorbs the preceding differences. Although we might *express* its definition as a multiplicity, such an expressed multiplicity corresponds to a unified substance. The oneness of the rational soul unites within itself preceding determinations, leaving behind no remainder. As Aquinas maintains, the form wins a victory over the matter and brings unity to the composite.[128] The nobler the form, the greater the victory that must be won; the rational soul, for example, must unite higher- and lower-level functions within the unity of the whole.

But once ultimate difference no longer absorbs preceding differences within its own self-identity of substantial form, does the Tree turn in to a "dust cloud of differences," as Umberto Eco characterizes it?[129] In other words, what explains the constitution of new quidditative terms (i.e., the unity of genera and species) as opposed to mere heapish aggregates (e.g., a musical carpenter)?[130] To use Scotus's example, why does the addition of *superabundant sufficient* to the genus *active power* constitute the unified term *will,* whereas the addition of *meritorious* to *love* (to be considered below) fails to produce a new term?

5.5.1. Quanta of Perfection; or Virtual Multiplicities

To begin formulating an answer, it will help to think of essences less in terms of static physical unities, and more in terms of transcendental *quanta of perfection or power* (*quantitas perfectionis sive virtutis*). That is, inspired by his

understanding of the Trinity, Scotus moves to thinking of things in terms of a matrix of formalities and modalities rather than as stable hylomorphic compounds with accidents.[131] To understand this, a phrase that Scotus employs in a slightly different context might be employed: "virtual multiplicity" (*virtute multae*).[132]

Multiplicity captures the way in which Scotus thinks that one formality or reality can determine another, without swallowing it up or canceling it. Instead, they compose something of a structured whole irreducible to either one alone.[133] The reality from which the genus term is derived, for example, is determined by the addition of a difference, but the two remain formally distinct. To cite Scotus's example, within the structure of a line, a half line should not be considered merely as itself a "potential line." Rather, the half line has its own *realitas*. This reality contributes to the structure of the whole without being identifiable with it. *Virtual* here suggests a transcendental strength (*virtus*) or power (*pollens*) of being. A virtual part does not have independent existence as does a physical part. It does, however, contribute to constituting the whole as a certain transcendental *quantum of perfection.*

A virtual multiplicity lacks the seamless unity of a tree, but it does not dissolve into the dust cloud of differences warned of by Eco. An essence can be considered a complex system with the ultimate specific difference as its bifurcation.[134] Within the complex system, such a factor is responsible for regulating change. That is, the system can undergo a variety of modifications and engage in various relations without undergoing an essential change. The ultimate specific difference regulates normal points of change versus points of bifurcation within the complex system. An ultimate specific difference marks a threshold after which the system passes into a different state.

Consider how Scotus responds to the question concerning the difference between the human soul and angels. Despite both engaging in acts of understanding, he argues that they differ in terms of their species.[135] After considering and rejecting the views that it is the unitability to matter of the human form or that the two differ merely as grades of more and less, he concludes that they differ on account of their natures as this and that: "Although the angelic nature is a principle of understanding and willing, and similarly the soul (such that those powers, they say, are nothing added to the essence of the soul), first however—in the former case and the latter—there is this nature and that nature according to themselves."[136] The essence of the human soul—whether embodied or not—differs from that of an angel, not on account of its operations but, rather, on account of being *this* nature and not that one.

The use of *haec* here is an illustrative choice given the role of *haecceitas* as the principle of individuation. Here it refers to the factor of differentiation of a nature into a specific unity. *Haec* in reference to the human essence cannot indicate the rational soul.[137] Otherwise, how the rational soul differs from an angel in kind remains unexplained. Both are beings and are substances, so how

do they differ? The "That's just how forms come" response defers the question instead of solving it. Rather, *haec* indicates that factor of ultimate specific differentiation of the total essence.[138] Interestingly, Scotus goes on to argue that this does not mean that intellectuality (*intellectualitas*) of the soul differs from that of an angel; that is, their secondary operations need not differ in kind.[139]

Even if it is granted that essences as virtual multiplicities do not dissolve into a dust cloud of differences, the question that still must be answered is: why do some formalities communicate in such multiplicities to form an essence, whereas others do not?[140] If the structure of essences cannot be modeled on the structure of the things from which they emerge, which determinations can communicate such that they form new systems? To return to the early example, why does *superabundantly sufficient active power* form a new quantum of perfection (i.e., the will) whereas *meritorious love* does not?

5.5.2. Meritorious Love?

To answer this question, it must first be assumed that both difference terms are fully resolved and do not fall under any category. As has been shown, something in one category (or even at another level of the same category) cannot differentiate something in another category. If *bipedal,* for example, is an accidental quality, it cannot serve as an ultimate differentiator. It would be a form and a being. Thus, for the sake of argument, let's assume that *meritorious* is a pure difference, and not already something constituted as an accidental being falling under a category.

Asking whether the addition of one reality to another constitutes a new quidditative term or is merely incidental (*per accidens*) opens a debate regarding the classification of meritorious versus natural love.[141] Despite arguments to the contrary, Scotus concludes that *meritorious* and *love* remain incidentally bound such that "This love is meritorious" does not terminate a new quidditative order. It is not a real essence. True, Scotus argues, one might distinguish such acts of natural love versus meritorious love; the former functions according to a species of moral virtue, whereas the latter functions supernaturally.[142] Although the noncategorial relation of *meritorious* might add something to the genus of love, it need not form a new quidditative term. To avoid the heresy of Arianism—whereby the addition of relations to the divine essence yields a difference in kind (i.e., three new essences)—Scotus must insist that not all relations constitute new essences.[143] The case of the Trinity shows how relations might add to the reality of the base without determining a new essence. It does not divide being into a new degree.

In the case of the addition of *meritorious* and *natural* to love, these are clearly important differences.[144] In the end, however, Scotus justifies the nonessential termination of love by means of such determination as follows: "We could say that the meritorious is not a specifying and completing factor in the moral order, because it does not indicate some intrinsic goodness or rectitude in the

agent but it only presupposes it and bespeaks in addition a relationship to the accepting will."[145] Meritorious involves only a twofold extrinsic relation: first, to the accepting will; and second, to the reward.[146] Each relation is, however, merely rational (i.e., nonreal). Although *meritorious* enters into a potent assemblage with the genus of love, it does not constitute a new specific term. That is, the two realities *moral order* and *meritorious* do not communicate in such a way that a new *quantum of perfection* emerges. There is no bifurcation.

How do we know that the division made by adding such a determination does not yield a *per se* difference in the essential concept? This is a crucial question, for as Scotus states: "Nothing is known through itself (*per se notum*) about a non-simply simple concept unless the parts of that concepts are known through themselves to be united."[147] That is, topically speaking, have we identified the correct divisor? It seems that this occurs through a process of discovery, where in each case the intellect must test the terms for harmony. Just as when the intellect tests whether *ens infinitum* is concordant or discordant, so too our *gustus spiritualis* must test for conceptual harmony of its non-simply simple concepts.[148]

In the case at hand, the result of the division is not nonsense, as meritorious love clearly conceives of something. But—as Scotus argues against a series of objections—it does not constitute a complete species. At best, one might consider it a type of nominal essence, but not a real one.[149] The terms do not cohere as a new, essential unity. The natural act of love is properly potential to the meritorious one. Therefore, the two do not differ specifically; the same ultimate specific difference accounts for both of them. Or, to put it in other terms, the complex system can be modified according to either relation without changing its essential structure. Such an act might require certain factors in order to give rise to it or certain circumstances to be in place to carry it out, for example, charity or circumstances *X*, *Y*, and *Z*. Charity, however, Scotus argues, is not the total principle of the will's act nor its disparate principle; rather, it is a subordinate principle, since the will *uses* charity. For this reason, he maintains, there is no essential difference to the act such that it would warrant classification into a new species.

It is not simply that human forms make human things, horse forms make horse things, or that acts elicited by specifically different principles generate specifically different acts.[150] Instead, as Scotus argues with respect to the latter, once a variety of factors converge, classification is not so simple. The dividing line between the essences that emerge from the commingling of things is murkier and more fluid. Where to delineate a new essential term becomes a matter of some debate. For this reason, the Franciscans might maintain that the customs of ownership and royal jurisdiction are real, but they do not constitute a really diverse essence.[151] That is, there is no essential term "property," at least not with respect to human appropriation. Property is not a real, essential kind. But this issue must wait for another discussion.

CONCLUSION

This chapter continued the investigation of ultimate difference in terms of those differences that divide genera into species. As was shown, not all specific differences are ultimate, but only those differences whose concepts have been fully resolved. Any specific difference corresponding to some *thing* or part of a thing, such as rational corresponding to the rational soul, cannot be considered as ultimate. Rather, it contains a multiplicity of distinct notes, which must be further resolved into more atomic ones. Unfortunately, Scotus does not provide many examples of which differences should be considered ultimate. On a more helpful note, he drew a comparison between ultimate specific differences and ultimate individual ones in terms of that which is above, below, and beside them. Although there is a deep similarity between these two sets of differences, the following chapter will examine what more ultimate individual differentiation adds to the process of differentiation of finite being.

CHAPTER SIX
HAECCEITAS, OR NAKED SINGULARITY

Besides "univocity," perhaps no single term is more associated with Scotus's name than *haecceitas.* This neologism, meaning "this-ness," is considered to be the Subtle Doctor's main contribution to medieval theories of individuation. Yet, as will be seen, this was not Scotus's preferred term to describe the factor of individuation. Instead, he used a range of other terms or phrases to describe that nonreified factor by which species are individuated, including the one most pertinent to our purposes: "ultimate individual difference." Despite problems with invoking this neologism, which will be addressed below, *haecceitas* will be used to abbreviate the lesser-known formulas and terms he uses to denote the ultimate individual difference of a given individual.

Continuing the trajectory of the previous two chapters, this chapter will show how ultimate individual differences satisfy the conditions for ultimate differences established by Scotus. As will be seen, the main failure of traditional accounts of individuation is that they look to some *thing,* whether it be form, matter, accident, or so on, to explain individuation. Things, remember, are too big to explain difference. Instead, as Scotus argues, individuation must be more than mere particularization. It is a process of differentiation inasmuch as it constitutes a unique and indivisible degree of being. Like God, whose intrinsic mode of *infinite* individuates him, creatures reach a condition of being qua this on account of an ultimate individual difference. As with the other ultimate differences, Scotus will characterize such a factor functionally insofar as it constitutes a new term or unity: the individual. Its singularity marks the ultimate division of being, that stage at which it is rendered indivisible.

Section 6.1 begins by outlining what any adequate principle of individuation must explain. This section also will show how Scotus links such a principle with ultimate difference. Section 6.2 evaluates one of the main contenders defended by Aquinas and others: matter, or to be more precise, designate matter. Section 6.3 continues this investigation by evaluating other traditional candidates for the principle of individuation. As with matter, we will show why Scotus rejects each of them on account of its failure to explain differentiation. Section 6.4 provides a positive account of Scotus's principle of individuation: *haecceitas*. As we will see, we must access such a principle indirectly. To further account for this principle, Section 6.5 returns to the threefold comparison between ultimate individual and ultimate specific difference. Here we see functional similarities between the two groupings of difference, despite key dissimilarities. Section 6.6 contrasts what will be called "naked singularity" with "bare particularity." To this end, let us begin with the principle of individuation.

6.1. WHAT MUST INDIVIDUATION EXPLAIN?

What must a principle of individuation explain? As we have seen, the world can be divided into general kinds: humans and horses; greenness and 150 lbs.; northwesterly position and courageousness. But we also can demarcate individual humans and horses (e.g., Benjamin Franklin and Brunellus), this shade of greenness outside my window, that act of courage, and so on. In other words, what accounts for distinct and multiple instances of a common phenomenon? What gives rises to those ontological units known as individuals?

Individuation was traditionally thought to explain at least the following characteristics with varying degrees of importance and emphasis depending on the thinker.[1] For the sake of convenience, let's use the example of Socrates. The first is impredicability. Unlike a common type, why can't Socrates be said of anything else? True, Socrates can have parts, but the whole is not predicable of the parts (e.g., Socrates's arm is not Socrates). The second is identity. Why is Socrates the same as himself now? That is, beyond the various accidents we might ascribe to him, Socrates is Socrates; he is not just some one, but he is *this* one. Furthermore, why can we reidentify Socrates over the course of time as the same individual? Individuation thus should explain both synchronic and diachronic identity. The third is distinction. This follows alongside identity: Why is Socrates Socrates and not Plato? The fourth is divisiveness. Individuals divide species into multiple individuals. Fifth, and finally, there is indivisibility or noninstantiability. Indivisibility is the repugnance of division into subjective parts.[2] This technical term requires further elaboration.

A subjective part is one instantiating the whole. For example, the species human can be divided into subjective parts (i.e., human beings). Socrates's leg, on the other hand, is not Socrates; thus it is not a subjective part. Indivisibility plays a central role here, perhaps more so than any of the other features.[3] We already can see how it explains impredicability. That is, if something cannot be divided into such parts, we cannot *say of* these parts that they are subjects of the whole in the sense that a genus is said of its species. Likewise, though we can conceive of a fully individuated essence as communicable to multiple supposits, we *cannot* think of it as being divided into subjective parts. Such supposits would be particular exemplifications of this one, singular, essence, but they would not instantiate it as multiple determinations.

To see why this is the case, first it must be asked what this principle of individuation is according to Scotus. His answer to this question begins by ruling out the traditional candidates (e.g., matter, accidents, and quantity) and some not so traditional ones (e.g., double negation). The complexity of argumentation against each of these candidates, which will be reviewed presently, can be boiled down to a single point: none of these things explains difference. Individuation is a process of differentiation, and as such must explain the *being different* of something as an individual. It is a matter of perfection and not a fall

from perfect unity. As I will show, the division of univocal being ends here for Scotus in these perfective degrees of singularity. They mark indivisible degrees of being.

All of these other principles of individuation are in some sense beings and therefore cannot provide an ultimate account of differentiation. Insofar as they presuppose differentiation without explaining it, they get at the *particularity* of individuals, but not at their *singularity*. The distinction between particularity and singularity will play a crucial role in what follows. Although they might both refer to one and the same individual thing, they do so under diverse aspects. A particular is, for lack of a better definition, a designated instance of a universal. That is, the particular—whatever its other qualities or constitution—instantiates a general type. We might think of particular horses such as Brunellus; particular humans such as Benjamin Franklin; or a particular greenness such as that of the leaves outside.[4] What makes each of these particular (or what makes them particular examples of particularity) is their subsumption under a universal. Their reality is equivalent to that of which they are instantiations.

A singular or singularity is not covered by the concept it determines but, rather, adds determination. Although singularities are not *per se* unintelligible according to Scotus, our way of generalizing cognition cannot subsume them under its concepts. As we will see, this is why traditional models and principles of individuation fail to account for singularity. Each one presupposes the differentiation of singularity without attempting to explain it. That is, they all call upon something already differentiated as *this* without providing an account of what makes it *this,* that is, what makes it be singular.

One final terminological point to note is the relation of the term *individual* to these others. An individual is both particular and singular. It is a particular instance of a universal, but—at least according to Scotus—it is more than that. For this reason, an individual is not singular *per se* but requires a principle of individuation/singularization. What follows will maintain that Scotus's principle prevails for a number of reasons, not the least of which is that it moves beyond an explanation of mere particularity to naked singularity, or singularity irreducible to generalizable, repeatable concepts. In light of this terminological choice, Section 6.6 will consider whether Scotus's notion of *haecceitas* can be squared with what contemporary metaphysicians refer to as a "bare particular."

To appreciate this distinction between mere particularity and singularity, and the neglect of the latter in the Aristotelian tradition, we need only consider Aquinas's account of individuation through designate matter. Here we see how due to the imperfection of matter qua being (i.e., matter is a near nonbeing), the multiplication of an essence into individuals through matter does not perfect and culminate the essence.[5] That is, the individual is but an instance or example of a universal type, one that can be designated.

6.2. MATTER AS THE PRINCIPLE OF INDIVIDUATION

In his *De ente,* Aquinas argues that matter serves as the principle of individuation.[6] Socrates and Plato both have the same form *human*, but they are not one and the same human. The reason why they are distinct humans is because they do not share the same matter: the same form thus informs different matters. The image is an appealing one and one borrowed from the world of production (*techne, ars*). On a representational level, we might imagine a sculptor forming multiple statues with a single shape (e.g., the shape of Hercules), an architect building multiple temples using a single blueprint, or a brewer brewing multiple batches of beer from a single recipe. What differs in each case is the individual stuff: this or that clay; thet or thot marble; these or those hops, barley, and malt, and so on.

But this poses a problem, as Aquinas immediately recognizes. He had previously stated that the essence signifies the form-matter composition, and not just the form alone.[7] In this sense, the definition is more than a mere mathematical formula. Does this not entail, however, that the essence (and therefore the definition) would be of the individual because it contains matter?[8] And that which contains matter—only the particular individual, and not the universal—would be defined?[9] Such an outcome would run afoul of *scientia* as echoed by that Aristotelian axiom: there is no *scientia* (*episteme*) of the individual.

6.2.1. Designate Matter

Aquinas solves this quandary by distinguishing between "designate" and "nondesignate" matter (*materia signata et non signata*): "It should be recognized that matter as such is not the principle of individuation, but only designate matter. And I call matter designate, which is considered under determinate dimensions."[10] Designate matter considers the determinate dimensions of matter: not just "flesh and bones," but *these* flesh and bones with this weight, these dimensions, in this area of space, and so on. A definition, he argues, includes only nondesignate matter, and therefore must be distinguished from the designate matter, which is the principle of individuation.

All matter has spatial dimensions and location. According to such designate dimensions, we can partition off that cross section of matter (bones, blood, etc.) belonging to just Socrates. In expressing the definition of Socrates, however, the specific dimensions that separate Socrates's matter from Plato's become irrelevant. Having flesh and bones makes it possible that he is human, but having *this* flesh and *these* bones is not necessary for his being human, only for his being Socrates. Thus, all matter *in re* is designate, even though in forming definitions the mind abstracts from such determinate dimensions and considers only nondesignate matter.[11]

The essence abstracted from individuals thus leaves the bond of identity unbroken. As already implicated in the essence, designate matter does not add any

additional content. Matter according to determinate dimensions instead concretizes our consideration of one and the same essence by making it designate. As Joseph Owens states: "Socrates is 'rational animal,' not just 'rational animal' in general, but this particular rational animal that you point out with your finger. By so doing you are adding nothing to what was already contained in the essence 'rational animal.' You are merely pointing out in a particular instance."[12] Two points should be highlighted from this passage. First, nothing is added to what is already contained in the essence rational animal. The individual, or its principle of individuation, is not formally or really distinct from the essence itself. They differ according to levels of abstractness.

Second, individuation for Aquinas is a matter of particularization, not singularization. That is, an individual such as Socrates is a particular instance of an essence. Here we begin to see the difference between genuine *individuation* and mere individual designation. Individuation, as Scotus argues, requires a positive differential principle irreducible either to the reality of the essence or the actuality of the resultant individual. It moves between such unities, but (as an ultimate difference) is itself without any such unity.

Insofar as matter (or more properly designate matter) individuates, and matter is a near nonbeing teetering on the verge of nothingness, it does not perfect the essence.[13] Instead, matter is the cause of corruption and imperfection for those species that must be realized through a multiplicity of individuals instantiated in matter. As individuals, beings do not find their highest perfection, according to Aquinas; instead, this occurs through their actual existence (*esse*) or act of being (*actus essendi*).[14] To say that matter is Aquinas's or anyone's principle of individuation is somewhat misleading. That is, it is not matter alone that individuates, but matter according to determinate dimensions. Before turning to Scotus's rejection of quantity as a principle of individuation, we must review his arguments against matter as a principle of individuation.

6.2.2. The Inadequacy of Matter

A basic motivation for considering matter as the principle of individuation stems from the need to distinguish between the generator and the generated in causation. That is, if the generator or producer makes its effect *be the same* as itself (formally or virtually, as fire makes wood be fire, or a builder makes wood be a house), then what distinguishes the generated from the generator? In *Metaphysics* VII, chapter 8, for example, Aristotle enlists matter as the source of such distinction. The agent causes neither the form nor the matter, but causes the matter to be informed in this way. Fire does not cause the form of fire (otherwise, it would be self-caused); nor does it cause there to be a wooden substrate; rather, it causes the wood to become fire. Given an already distinct patient and substrate upon which the agent acts, the two (agent and patient) can be the same formally and distinct on account of their matter. Matter thus multiplies a species.

Scotus responds to this argument as follows. He argues that the same matter that is numerically under the form of one individual can be under the form of another individual.[15] Imagine a Theseus's Ship scenario, in which over time the matter of one individual is replaced by the matter of another individual: each night we replace bits and pieces of Socrates's matter with that of Plato. Yesterday, we swapped their hearts, tonight their lungs, tomorrow their kidneys, and so on. Even if such a material transfer were to occur, Scotus maintains that this would remain this and that would remain that. Without anything to differentiate it, matter by itself cannot be distinguished between this, that, thet, and thot. It needs some other explanatory factor to account for the difference between these. Beginning with already differentiated matter merely presupposes differentiation rather than explaining it.

Matter cannot cause individuation because anything indifferent to a multiplicity of the same kind cannot account for its distinctness.[16] That is, being matter is indifferent to being this or that matter. The matter itself requires a cause of its individuation and singularity. We see here the return of a familiar argument: matter is a being and a thing and thus needs something else to account for its differentiation. What designates it as this clump of matter as opposed to that clump of matter presupposes individuation but does not itself explain it.

Aquinas gestures toward this fact when he appeals to the designate status of matter as the principle of individuation. That is, in terms of the *tode ti*—or this something which I can point out with my finger—matter's designation as this clump, not that one, accounts for the individuation of the composite particular. I say "gestures toward" because Aquinas does not investigate this any further. He, like many others, stops at the point of particularity without thinking it through to the positive actuality brought by singularity. But, it might asked, what allows us to designate it as *this one* in the first place? This question goes unthematized for Aquinas. Full realization has occurred when we reach the level of the most specific essence. Individuation adds nothing distinct, but merely the ability to designate one and the same essence across a multiplicity of instantiations.

To the extent that matter plays a role in individuation, it must itself be individuated. Otherwise, there is no difference between the matter of this thing and the matter of that thing. In a thing, there is both matter and this matter, just as there is form and this form.[17] Both form and matter are sources of similarity.[18] Some other principle must account for their individual difference. What distinguishes the composite individual, composed of both this matter and this form, however, is more the thisness of the form than the thisness of the matter. Scotus explains: "As for the distinction, however, this is due more to 'this' form than to 'this' matter, just as a thing is more (producing or being produced) because of 'this' form than 'this' matter."[19] Scotus here responds to the claim that it must be matter that causes individuation, since otherwise we could not explain the distinction between the producer and the produced. Insofar as this generating

fire and that generated fire share the same form (i.e., fire) matter, it seemed according to a reading of Aristotle, must distinguish and individuate them.

Scotus rejects this reading of Aristotle. The producer and the produced, he argues, are distinguished on account of this being this and that being that, which has more to do with the thisness of form than the thisness of the matter, although neither one by itself accounts for the thisness of the composite. Part of his motivation here seems to be the need to preserve the individuation of certain material substances (i.e., humans) even in an immaterial state. I might remain not only the same kind of thing but also the same individual, apart from my body. This is made possible by a principle of individuation for *my* rational soul.[20]

Separating the conditions of individuation from materiality and its individuation has a further cause (or consequence).[21] Individuals are not unintelligible, according to Scotus. They may be unintelligible for us in this state, but they are not unintelligible *per se.* What the individual adds to the species is nothing other than singularity.[22] This final, individual differentiation marks the culmination of being, and therefore of intelligibility.

Scotus argues that the individual difference is neither the matter, nor the form, nor the composite of matter and form. Each one of these is a quidditative being:

> If you ask me what this individual entity is that the individual difference is taken from—is it matter or form or the composite?—I reply: Every quidditative entity (whether partial or total) in some genus is of itself indifferent as a quidditative entity to this individual entity and that one, in such a way that as a quidditative entity it is naturally prior to this individual insofar as it is "this." As naturally prior, just as it does not belong to it to be a "this," so the opposite of being a "this" is not incompatible with it from its very notion. And just as a composite does not insofar as it is a nature include its individual entity by which it is formally a "this," so neither does matter insofar as it is a nature includes its individual entity by which it is "this matter," nor does form insofar as it is a nature include its individual entity by which it is "this form."[23]

Matter, form, and the composite whole as partial or whole quidditative being fall under a genus (i.e., substance) and, more importantly, they have being predicated of them *in quid.* Each one of them is indifferent to and naturally prior to the *being this* of an entity. Neither the composite, the form, nor the matter includes *being this* as part of its quidditative entity. Instead, each one must be individuated as *this* matter, *this* form, or *this* composite.[24]

For this reason, the individual entity from which the individual difference derives cannot be reduced to either the matter, the form, or the composite. As Scotus further explains:

> Therefore, this individual entity is not matter or form or the composite, inasmuch as each of these is a nature. Rather it is the ultimate reality of the being

> that is matter or that is form or that is the composite. Thus whatever is common and yet determinable can still be distinguished (no matter how much it is one thing) into several formally distinct realities of which this one is not formally that one. This one is formally the entity of singularity and that one is formally the entity of the nature. These two realities cannot be distinguished as "thing" and "thing," as can the reality the genus is taken from and the reality the difference is taken from. (The specific reality is taken from these.) Rather, when in the same thing, whether in a part or in the whole, they are always formally distinct realities of the same thing.[25]

When he refers to the realities of the genus and specific difference as "*res* and *res*," he means *those cases* in which we derive both from things as opposed to the deeper formalities underlying such things. They are able (*possunt*) to be taken from thing and thing, although, as we have seen, this is not always the case. And when it is, such things themselves must be further differentiated.[26] He then contrasts this with the case of the essence and its individuating difference, which are "always" (*sed semper*) formally distinct realities of one and the same thing.

Section 6.4 will further elaborate the relationship between the individual entity and the individual difference below when we discuss *haecceitas*. For now, how this discussion pertains to matter as a principle of individuation must be highlighted. To this end, note the following: first, matter itself requires a principle of individuation on account of which it is *this* matter; and second, if such a principle contributes to the individuation of the composite, its role is at best secondary in comparison to the role of the *thisness* of form. Even with the more robust ontological status Scotus assigns to matter, it fails to adequately serve as a principle of individuation. It too needs to be individuated and, even in its individuated state, an individual such as Benjamin Franklin is not primarily made to be *this* one on account of his matter.

6.3. WHAT ELSE IS (NOT) THE PRINCIPLE OF INDIVIDUATION?

Besides matter (or more precisely designate matter), what else might count as a principle of individuation? Historically, at least the following five candidates were considered as viable contenders: accidents, quantity, actual existence, double negation, and nothing. By "nothing," I do not mean some mysterious force of negation, but simply the nominalist view discussed above, according to which there is no need to explain individuation.[27] Individuals are all that exist; that's just the way things come and thus we do not need an account or principle regarding how they are individuated. As the previous chapter treated Scotus's rejection of this view and defense of the commonality of essences, further consideration of it can be bypassed here.

But what about these other candidates? How do they fare? As this section will show one by one, they all suffer from a set of common problems: that is, they presuppose individuation without explaining it and are not positively

differential. By positively differential Scotus means that insofar as they contain a quidditative element, they do not explain difference. What follows will not offer a full-scale account of Scotus's arguments against such theories of individuation. Instead, the focus will be on those arguments pertinent to our overall discussion regarding ultimate differentiation.

6.3.1. Collection of Accidents

Next to matter, accidents were traditionally seen to be the most likely source of individuation.[28] This was the view held by Porphyry, Boethius, Godfrey of Fontaines, and others. As with matter, there's an intuitive appeal to this view. If we begin with a common essence or form such as *human* or *horse*, and then ask what distinguishes individual humans or horses, it seems that accidental features do the trick. Plato differs from Socrates as an individual according to any number of accidents: Plato is tall, Socrates is short (quality); Plato weights 190 lbs., Socrates 175 (quantity); Plato is in the agora, Socrates is in the prison (place); Socrates lived between 470 and 399 BCE, Plato between 428 and 348 (time); and so on in terms of the other categories of accidents. The unique collection, or bundle, of accidental properties individuates these two instances. That is, if we could enumerate every single accidental modification of Plato, his unique profile of accidental traits would be apparent, and so too with Socrates. Beyond these accidental modifications, what they share, however, is what makes them be the sort of thing that they are.

Scotus recognizes several problems with this view. The most basic problem is that individuation according to Scotus marks the highest perfection of a thing. To be *this,* that is to be a singular, is to be a being in the truest sense of the term. Recall that God is most truly a being, not insofar as being applies most of all to him, but insofar as he is this singular being. If it is accidents that individuate a given material being, then the ontological priority of substance to accident has been reversed. Although Scotus maintains the equality of substance and accidents qua being, he nevertheless recognizes that accidents must inhere in an already individuated individual. For reasons that his other arguments make clear, something other than accidents must individuate the common nature prior to that thing's accidental modification (both logically and temporally).[29]

Furthermore, this view begs the question of what individuates the accidents.[30] If paleness, broad shoulders, intelligence, and so on individuate Plato, what makes a given accident individual and not common? For example, what makes it *this* individual paleness as opposed to paleness in general, or *that* intelligence? One might assume that they just are already individuated, but then we have not explained individuation so much as we have presupposed it. And, as has been shown, accidents require their own principle of individuation.

This follows from the more general problem of ultimate differentiation across or within categories.[31] As shown above, an ultimate difference must be extracategorial if it is to explain (and not simply presuppose) difference. In the

case at hand, if something in the category of Quality, or multiple accidental categories bundled together, are what explain the individuation of the common substances (e.g., humans, horses, stones), their differentiation as individual accidents either would be presupposed or would be explained in terms of something else.[32]

The former is problematic because it does not provide an account of individuation so much as a description: accidents just are the sorts of thing that come pre-individuated. The latter risks explanation ad infinitum. What else could explain accidental individuation besides other categories of accidents? Let's say accidents in the category of Quantity and Time individuate accidents in the category of Quality. But then we must ask after their individuation, and so on. For this reason, an extracategorial ultimate individuating difference must account for differentiation. *Haecceitas*, as an ultimate difference, will be such a principle.

Consider another counterargument: An individual, Scotus tells us, is a being *per se*.[33] Beings *per se* are beings in the truest sense of the term. They result from *per se* generation, operate in a *per se* sense, and are the subject of *per se* predication. An individual such as Plato or Brunellus results from the process of generation and operates as an agent. It is Plato who is born or teaches philosophy, and only incidentally is this individual human who is broad-shouldered or younger than Socrates. Likewise, we say, "Brunellus is a horse." Only incidentally is "the brown one a horse." That is, the accident of color does not account for real substantial unity. The aggregate of substance and accident(s) represents only a being *per accidens*: *Socrates who is musical and reclined in the prison* constitutes a single being or a unity only in an incidental sense. For this reason, such incidental aggregation cannot explain the numerical unity of an individual whether in the category of substance *or* in the accidental categories. As a coordinated set, each category must be individuated separately from the others.[34] Something more essential must fill this explanatory role.

A final argument against this manner of individuation engages in a type of thought experiment.[35] Imagine the complete synchronic and diachronic set of common accidents that might individuate Plato or Benjamin Franklin. That is, Benjamin Franklin equals "the common human nature plus {A, B, . . . Z}." This set of common accidents is unique as a set. This means that even if any one of these given accidents can be shared with another individual (i.e., they are common), the set as a whole constitutes a unique profile. (Scotus already has rejected his latter clause, but he assumes it here to show yet another fault with this position.)

This set of common accidents does not individuate Benjamin Franklin as Benjamin Franklin, Scotus would argue, because it does not account for this individual. That is, in Kripkean fashion we can imagine a world in which Benjamin Franklin is Benjamin Franklin, but in which his set of common accidents belongs to another individual (say, Voltaire). It is thus Voltaire who discovered

electricity, founded the U.S. Postal Service, invented the Franklin Stove (now called the Voltaire Stove), is buried in Philadelphia, and so on. There is nothing formally contradictory, Scotus tells us, in this set of accidents existing in some other individual.[36]

As odd as this may sound, Scotus's point is the following: what makes Benjamin Franklin be Benjamin Franklin across all possible worlds (if we wish to invoke this language) is not the fact that he has this profile of common accidents.[37] The set is not a rigid designator of individual substances, only of accidental profiles. Instead, it is simply his *being this individual.* What makes him be this individual (Ben Franklin) and also makes him not be that one (Voltaire) must be a positive principle of individuation. Before Ben Franklin or anyone can have this set of accidents or that set, they must be an individual. That is, the common nature human must be individuated as *this* one, which as *this* one then can possess a profile of such and such accidents.

6.3.2. Quantity

To a certain extent, individuation by quantity already has been treated when considering Aquinas's view. That is, he held that matter qua designate (i.e., according to determinate dimensions) accounted for individuation as opposed to matter as such. Given this previous treatment, only a few key points from Scotus's argument against individuation by means of quantity need to be added.

Quantity presents itself as a viable candidate for individuation on account of the individual being a numerical unity.[38] That is, quantity adds a certain divisibility, whereby an essence can be multiplied amid numerous individual instantiations. In this respect, a material essence is unlike that of a simple substance. Given Aristotle's definition of a "quantum" as that which is divisible into parts of the same sort, the accident of quantity added to a selfsame essence seems to account for its divisibility into subjective parts.[39]

Besides his more global rejection of individuation by means of any category of accident, Scotus shows how quantity also falls short of this task in several ways. First, he maintains that the cause of individuation is not equivalent to being one in number: "We are not looking for the cause of individuality as something indefinite, in the sense that 'one in number' can be abstracted from this or that unity by reason of each one's numerical unity, something they have in common. What we are looking for is the reason why a material substance is singular by this determinate or unique singularity that is the reason why a stone is just *this* stone and could not be any other stone."[40] Quantity only accounts for individuation as vague or indefinite individuation (*individuationis vagae*). By this Scotus means that from the properly singularized individual, oneness or unity can be abstracted. That is, we can say it is something one. But this unity by itself does not explain individuation. Instead it remains vague and incapable of accounting for the thisness of this one. It tells us the individual is some one, but not this one.

Following from the argument against accidents above, Scotus holds that a material substance can become a not-this (*non-haec*) and lose its singularity only through substantial corruption. Benjamin Franklin becomes not-this as a corpse once he has died. If, however, an accident were the cause of singularity, it would be possible (at least for God) to destroy something's singularity through an accidental change alone.[41] Even if God were to destroy his quantity, Ben Franklin would remain *this* one.

With respect to the earlier argument against accidents due to categorial coordination, Scotus considers a possible objection. Perhaps the coordination of substance is prior to accident in terms of its being (*in essendo*), but not in terms of its division.[42] Quantity is prior to substance's being divided into subjective parts, although not its overall being. Scotus rejects this counterargument on the grounds that substance is prior to accident in terms of its *whole* coordination, which terminates in individuation. Furthermore, *to be* is *to be in actuality.* Something is a being insofar as it is demarcated or designated (*signati*) as a this. The individual is thus designatable on account of some singularizing factor prior to having a designatable quantity (for the reasons discussed above regarding accidents). The vague oneness of quantity does not account for why an individual is not divisible into subjective parts. At best, it provides a means for designating a particular example of a kind.

A final argument offered by Giles of Rome holds that quantity is not the formal principle by which substance is singular, but that quantity leaves a modification (*derelinquit quemdam modum*) in the substance.[43] This modification is not really other than the substance, and the remaining mode *is* the subject's singularity. Insofar as such a modification leaves behind such a remainder, even if the substance were separated from its quantity, the substance would have a proper particularity by reason of this remaining affection (*habet particularitatem propriam ex illa affectione derelicta*).

Scotus rejects this view on the grounds that it would entail that the substance has something really the same as it on account of an accident.[44] That is, that which is prior (the substance) would be what it is on account of something posterior (an accidental affection). This is even more absurd, Scotus tells us, than the view that substance has *being* from itself, but *being indivisible* from an accident.

The absurdity of this view would be that it requires that the accidental affection both be and not be a necessary condition for this substance. Moreover Scotus asks, What exactly is this remainder (*derelictio*)?[45] Is it an effect caused by quantity? Or does it result from some other form in the thing? The former view can be rejected insofar as quantity is not an active form. Likewise, the latter would leave quantity altogether redundant in explaining something's individuation. Thus, Giles's revised view seems unable to account for individuation by means of quantity.

Although Scotus does not consider this possibility, the notion of a designating

remainder might solve one of the central problems with matter as a principle of individuation: How is the rational soul individuated *post-mortem*?[46] That is, attachment to this designate matter adds a type of signature to the substantial form. Such a unique signature individuates the form. Even in its separation from the body, which the rational soul unlike other embodied forms possesses *per se,* the rational soul is individuated on account of its having been attached to this body. Thus, the designation of this matter causes the designation of this soul.

Even if we were to accept individuation by matter, which Scotus rejected above, the principle of matter's individuation would still need to be explained. That is, what causes the individuating signature is not matter *per se,* but whatever designates matter as *this* matter. If we turn to quantity for such designation, however, then we confront the set of problems just discussed. For this reason, Scotus seeks to go to the ground of individuation itself and seeks singularity.

6.3.3. Actual Existence

A further candidate for individuation considered by Scotus is actual existence (*exsistentia actualis*).[47] The basic argument for this view is that the ultimate determination of a thing derives from its ultimate actuality. This is because, according to *Metaphysics* VII.13, the function of act is to distinguish. The ultimate actuality is existential being (*esse exsistentiae*) because all preceding essential determinations were in potency with respect to this final, existentializing, act. Such an act thus also must account for ultimate determination, that is, determination and division of a species into multiple supposits or individuals. To the extent that existential being determines an essence to *actually existing*, to that extent it determines it to be *this*.

Scotus identifies a number of problems with this theory of individuation. Actual existence, he tells us, does not have any *per se* differences.[48] That is, actual existence itself does not differentiate between the actual existence of this and that, or even between this kind and that kind. Instead, Scotus tells us, this and that differ on account of something else. Actual existence is incapable of accounting for what differentiates this from that, or this kind from that kind.

The complete categorial coordination of substance (or any of the accidents) can be considered before and without considering its actual existence (*non intellecto esse exsistentiae*).[49] Complete determination of a category terminates in individuation. For this reason, individuals falling under species of that category can be understood prior to and without considering their actual existence. That is, a category can be completely determined to *this* without considering its existential status. Existence or existential being according to Scotus is but a mode of a completely determined essence.[50] Ultimate actuality is brought about by determination to *thisness*. Through complete determination and categorial coordination we reach the ultimate determination of something as *this being*, not as an existing being. Something's complete determination and differentiation

results in its being this being. Actual existence is but a modal indicator of the fact that this being exists, which in the case of creatures, indicates their extrinsic relation to a cause.[51]

Existence does not add anything to conceptual intensity or clarity, even in the case of God. Instead, it indicates that concept's extension. We must abstract from existence in our consideration of the essence, Scotus tells us, because this enables us to define something according to its necessary features.[52] Whereas such necessary features reflect the intrinsic determinations of the thing, existence pertains to the merely contingent. No definition and no *scientia* can be developed from such contingency. For this reason, Scotus begins his demonstrations of the existence of God not with an existential fact (e.g., that some thing is an effect), but with an essential possibility (e.g., that some thing is *effectible*).[53]

Actual existence does not pertain to categorial coordination *per se.* That is, the determination of a category to its ultimate or singular point results in an individual. To be a being is ultimately to be *this being.*[54] It provides us with a new and irreducible quidditative term: a singular. Whether or not this being actually exists is (with the exception of God) a contingent fact. Even in the case of God, existence or existential being does not intensify a concept of the divine essence *as this*, but merely posits it *in re.*[55] Scotus concedes that actual existence is a type of ultimate act, but one that is posterior to categorial determination and, more importantly for the question at hand, individuation.[56]

6.3.4. Double Negation

Before turning to Scotus's own account, a final and unique account of individuation in terms of "double negation" must be considered.[57] Double negation is the view of individuation espoused by Henry of Ghent. Henry holds that a substance is individual and a this not through any positive feature of its being, but insofar as it is both indivisible (i.e., *not*-dividable into subjective parts) and laterally diverse (i.e., this is *not*-that). Here we see the double negation on account of which a substance is a this: Benjamin Franklin's hand *is not* Benjamin Franklin (nor is any part of him him); and Benjamin Franklin *is not* Voltaire (or Socrates or Plato . . .). Such double negation thereby accounts for his being indivisible and being diverse.

Being repugnant to something's entity, Scotus tells us, follows from the positive determinations of that thing.[58] As we saw above in our discussion of essences, whiteness and blackness are mutually repugnant on account of their respective positive determinations to *this kind* of color. Or freedom and nature are mutually repugnant on account of their respective positive determinations (i.e., superabundantly sufficient versus determined to one) to *this kind* of active power. Such determination resulted from an ultimate specific difference. Likewise, it is repugnant for an individual to be divided into subjective parts. The reason for this repugnance must follow from something positive in that being's entity.

Why does Scotus think this is so? He argues that a proximate potency can be removed by a negation. For example, the lack of a visible object removes the potency for vision, or lack of quantity removes the potency for division. The reason of formal repugnance, however, requires something positive. In the case at hand, something positive must ground an individual's being subjectively indivisible, not (as Henry claims) the lack of division. We might imagine the removal of all negations and yet still require a positive principle to account for an individual's indivisibility.

Although Scotus does not offer much more by way of explanation on this point, an explanation can be lodged on his behalf. Difference, as has been argued, is not merely an external state of opposition between two self-identical things or units. One should not, as is often the case, *first* imagine the existence of self-same units *a* and *b* , and *then* understand difference as the relation of opposition between them. Instead, difference must be understood positively and in terms of vague alterity. Difference stands at the core of what it is for a being to be a being (*ens inquantum ens*), which is ultimately to be *this* being. Just as the transcendental magnitude of *infinite* made God be this radically diverse singularity, so too ultimate specific differences made creatures be *this kind* of being, and ultimate individuating difference must make them be *this singular* being.

Scotus's thought experiment here asks us to imagine a case in which there would be no negation or opposition. That is, *a* could not be constituted vis-à-vis any external opposition. Even in such an imaginary situation, some *positive cause of repugnance* (i.e., to division) must be posited. That is, in order to individuate some individual *a* as *this*, some positive principle of differentiation must be found.

Two conclusions must be drawn from this: First, *a* is not first a self-identical unit before any differentiation; instead, *a* is constituted *as* a self-identical unit (i.e., an individual) *because of* its principle of individuation/differentiation. Such a principle of individuation, as we will see, is the ultimate individual difference of *haecceitas.* And like all ultimate differences, *haecceitas* constitutes self-identical unities without itself being a unity or a being. It is a purely differential principle without identity.[59]

Second, difference is positive, not negative. That is, even if there were nothing other against which *a* could be opposed, it still would differ. This can be seen most clearly in the case of God. If there were no *entia finita,* and even if such beings were not conceivable in terms of their formal grounds of possibility, God still would be *this being,* that is, *ens infinitum.* His positive principle of differentiation (i.e., his transcendental magnitude of infinite) would account for his differentiation independently of any and all negation and opposition. Even in the absence of any other real or imaginable being, God would not be simply identical to being itself, but would be *this being.* What makes God be God, or *this,* is such a positive principle of differentiation. So too with the will. Even if

there were no natural active powers, the will, on account of its *superabundant sufficiency,* would still be what it is.

Scotus's additional arguments against this position all strike a similar theme: individuation positively perfects the nature.[60] Scotus rejects Henry's claim that God needs only an idea about the most specific species and does not require a separate idea regarding individuals.[61] It is now clear why Henry would hold this view. If individuation were not the ultimate perfection of a nature, but merely a necessary imperfection of material substances, then knowledge of the individual would not add anything over and above knowledge of the specific nature. Much as designate matter provided only a particular instantiation of the essence without adding any positive determinations, even more double negation fails to perfect or actualize the essence in any meaningful manner.

Double negation, Scotus argues, treats the individual as a somewhat ephemeral particular, lacking in any deep and abiding reality. If, however, the common nature is predicated of the individual (i.e., "Ben Franklin is human"), there must be something positive of which it is predicated other than itself.[62] That is, to avoid the tautological "A human is human," the subject term must contain something more determinate than the predicate term. It must constitute a new, yet nonreductively identical, term. With respect to double negation, however, this is not the case. Singularity does not add positive features beyond what is already contained in the predicate term.

6.4. *HAECCEITAS* AS ULTIMATE INDIVIDUAL DIFFERENCE

After rejecting alternate accounts of individuation, in which accidents, matter, quantity, negation, actual existence, and the essence itself were all considered and rejected for this role, Scotus offers his own account: "I reply then to this [sixth] question that a material substance is determined to being this singularity by something positive and to other diverse singularities by diverse positives."[63] Diverse positive factors (*diversa positiva*) of individuation determine an essence to diverse singularities. As noted above, we will call this something positive that determines the essence to this singularity *haecceitas*.

Haecceitas is a neologism like *quiddita*s derived from the demonstrative pronoun *haec*, and translatable as "thisness." *Haecceitas* was not a term that Scotus used frequently to describe his principle of individuation. Instead, it seems to be a moniker of latter-day Scotists to describe their Master's principle of individuation.[64] Scotus himself uses such terms as *realitas positiva, entitas positiva, ultima realitas formae, ultimus gradus formae, diversa positiva*, and *ultima differentia individualis* to describe this principle.[65] Beyond the minimal textual support for the term *haecceitas*, there is a deeper problem. As discussed by Peter King, *haecceitas* is an infelicitous term due to its reifying tendency.[66] The individual difference is not a thing, even an abstract thing nominalized by as *x*-ness. It is an –izer. Not Socrates-ness, but the Socrat-izer. However, despite

these problems with the term, *haecceitas* will be used with caution in what follows. Keep in mind, however, that *haecceitas* is not a thing or a being, but an ultimate difference.

To this point, however, Scotus only has named this positive factor but has not yet offered an account of it. To refer to the "this-izer" of a given individual does not quite explain what accounts for its this-izer as opposed to its that-izer (or thot-izer). Part of the problem with accounting for the nature of *haecceitas* is that despite its role in the positive determination of the individual, we lack direct access to it. We encounter already constituted individuals, and even then, we cognize them only by means of their outward accidents. Like the other ultimate differences constituting unities, individuating differences do not appear to us except through the unities themselves, in this case, individuals. For this reason, Scotus's approach to *haecceitas* operates by way of factoring out what it is not in order to discover an ineliminable remainder.[67]

We can begin: *haecceitas* is not matter, nor is it a form. Both of these things, as discussed, require their own account of individuation. Thus they cannot themselves explain this process. A *haecceitas* is not an accident. Accidents, recall, require some *this* of which they can be the modification. Accidents also must themselves be individuated. This does not mean, however, that *haecceitas* is a substance. *Haecceitas* explains (in part) what makes a substance be a substance. Instead, like all ultimate differences, *haecceitas* is extracategorial. It is not a negativity, and thus Scotus refers to *haecceitas* as a positive factor of determination. It is not a being, or anything of which being can be quidditatively predicated. A *haecceitas* is not some thing, but it is also not nothing.

We reach this nonthing that is *haecceitas* once we remove the quidditative features of an individual thing. It is a remainder concept that cannot be defined, but must be present to account for the diversity of subjects sharing an essence in common. *Haecceitas* operates in the space between quidditative unities (i.e., individuals and their essences) and explains their identity without itself being reducible to such unity or identity.

The first functional feature we can attribute to *haecceitas* is ultimate differentiation of essences. Two individuals can agree in terms of their common nature and yet differ as individuals. What explains their difference? Obviously, it cannot be their shared essence. They agree in terms of this. Thus it must be something positive added to this essence, something that is an ultimate difference. Scotus explains this in now familiar terms: "Again, every difference among the differing is reduced ultimately to some items that are diverse primarily. Otherwise there would be no end to what differ. But individuals [in the same species] differ, properly speaking, because they are diverse beings that are yet something the same [diversa aliquid-idem entia]. Therefore, their difference is reduced to some items that are diverse primarily."[68] We see here how whatever determines the common nature to this, that, thot, and so forth must itself be a primarily diverse factor.

Individuals of the same nature, he argues, both agree with one another in something (i.e., that they are of the same nature), but also differ. That by which they differ must be reduced to some item that is *primarily diverse.* This means that even though this individual and that individual formally agree in their nature, their *this-izer* and *that-izer* by which they differ cannot be reduced to a common ground (that is, they are primarily diverse).[69] This lateral move between this and that cannot be bridged by a difference reducible to a common third but must remain incommunicably "diverse."[70] In other words, there is a vague alterity between the two principles of differentiation.

As discussed at length with other ultimate differences, such diversity must be more than mere difference lest the process of accounting for difference continue ad infinitum. Without such primary diversity, "every difference among the differing" would fall back into some identity or commonality, and thus be unable to explain difference. Thus, Scotus states: "Therefore, besides the nature [that is the same] in this individual and in that one, there are some primarily diverse items by which this and that individual differ, this one in this respect and that one in that. They are not negations, from the second question. Neither are they accidents, from the fourth question. Therefore, there are certain positive entities that *per se* determine the nature."[71] Having already shown that neither negations nor accidents can account for individual diversity, Scotus now can conclude that the principle of individuation must be positive (i.e., because individuation is not through a negation), *per se* (i.e., because it is not through accidents), and determinative of the nature, but not identical to the nature itself.

The distinction between an individual with numerical unity and that on account of which an individual has such numerical unity must be kept in mind. The latter, or *haecceitas,* is a pure difference. That is, it shares no common element with any other *haecceitas.* As we have seen, two ultimate individual differences are primarily diverse. Wolter mistakenly treats the *haecceitas* of a given individual as possessing the same features as the individual it constitutes.[72] That is, he ascribes numerical oneness or unity to the principle of individuation. But this is problematic: individuals are beings, they are things.

Quidditatively speaking, Ben Franklin and the weight of my pen are beings. They are beings in the fullest sense of the term. But that on account of which each one is *this* being and not *that* being—that is, each one's ultimate individual difference—cannot itself be a being. If it were, something else would be required to account for its differentiation qua being. If ultimate individual difference were a being, either differentiation would be deferred or it would not be a difference at all. To avoid this infinite regress, we must posit some ultimate difference on account of which this is this and that is that. Such a pure difference accounts for the determination to *this being,* but is not itself a being or a thing.

6.5. THE THREEFOLD COMPARISON TO ULTIMATE SPECIFIC DIFFERENCES

In explaining ultimate specific difference above, Section 5.2 discussed the threefold comparison Scotus draws between this difference and *haecceitas*. Each difference, he argues, can be compared to what is below it, what is above it, and what is alongside it.[73] The principle of individuation thus plays a role comparable to that of an ultimate specific difference. Just as an ultimate specific difference is the proximate cause of specific unity, so too an individual difference is the proximate cause of numerical unity.[74] As Scotus explains: "These are the ultimate reasons for unity, whereby they are thus indivisibles, as the specific difference in the species is the cause of indivisibility into species."[75] Ultimate specific differences cause the less-than-numerical unity of species, whereas *haecceitas* causes the numerical unity whereby an individual cannot be divided into subjective parts. Both of these unities caused by differentiation are real unities. In each case, the ultimate difference causes and perfects the quidditative reality determinable by it. Note that individuation, for Scotus, is the ultimate perfection of the thing.[76] This was highlighted above by distinguishing singularity from mere particularity. Unlike God, whose transcendental magnitude immediately individuates the divine essence as this, the being finite of creatures entailed multiple levels of determination (i.e., categorial, essential individual) culminating in their being a this.

What makes a this this and not that? In asking this question, Scotus tells us, we seek the proximate cause of unity.[77] Just as the ultimate specific difference was the proximate cause of specific unity, so too the ultimate individual difference is the proximate cause of numerical unity. The distinction, however, between these two regions of ultimate difference is that the less-than-numerical unity of an essence remains open to further differentiation by means of primarily diverse *haecceitates*.[78] (Note that the essence of which being can be predicated *in quid* is determined by this ultimate individuating difference. The ultimate specific difference is not itself determined.) Each difference terminates a distinct quidditative order. Each one terminates a quidditative order and gives rise to a new quidditative term (i.e., a new region of unity). Whereas ultimate specific differences constituted the various levels of essential terms, ultimate individual difference constitutes individual terms.

Two points must be noted: First, we must keep in mind that the cause of unity (i.e., the ultimate difference) is not itself a unity; the Socratizer of Socrates is not a thing identical to Socrates or any part of Socrates. Second, the answer to the question "What makes a this this?" must explain more than the "vague and general unity" of the individual (i.e., its particularity). Scotus explains: "[We are asking] by what is nature one, [i.e., we are seeking] the proximate cause of unity, in the way that the specific difference in the species is the proximate cause of the specific unity; nor are we inquiring about numerical unity in a

vague or general way but [we are asking] what makes this this and not that, i.e., why a nature is this [singular and] incommunicable to another."[79] Such a factor must explain its singularity: why is it *this* one and not just some one?[80] In other words, what makes the individual nonfungible?

Scotus here glosses "being this" in terms of incommunicability to another. This, however, turns out to be a secondary feature of individuation. That is, the fact that *this* can't be communicated to multiple supposits is not the main explanatory work of the principle of individuation. The following subsection will explain why Scotus thinks this is so. But even in this passage, "incommunicable" does not seem to mean "incommunicable to multiple supposits," at least not primarily. Instead, he apposes "incommunicable" to the factor that "makes this this and not that." In other words, the principle of individuation must explain the *nonidentity* or *distinction* between two individuals of the same species, for example, Ben Franklin and Socrates. Such explanatory work will be accomplished insofar as the principle of individuation is an ultimate difference and thereby primarily diverse from all else.

While it is true that individuation is not particular instantiation according to Scotus, it is nevertheless a form of ultimate differentiation. The principle of individuation is an ultimate difference, which Scotus calls an "individual or singular difference" (*istud proprie vocatur differentia individualis vel singularis*).[81] Both the common nature and the individuating difference converge in the unity of the individual.[82] Although the nature in itself (*in se*) can be distinguished from its individuating grade, the nature in existence (*in esse*) always has such an individuating grade.[83]

6.5.1. Indivisible/Incommunicable

We are now in a position to return to our earlier consideration of what falls below the ultimate individual difference (i.e., the individual). Does *haecceitas* account for indivisibility, incommunicability, unrepeatability, or all of the above? Furthermore, are these identical conditions? Although these conditions are often lumped together and treated somewhat synonymously, they must be clearly distinguished.[84] In particular, that on account of which an individual is made *indivisible*, and that on account of which an individual is made *incommunicable*, must be distinguished. (I will treat "unrepeatable" as synonymous with "incommunicable.") Although once individuated on account of its *haecceitas* a material individual is both indivisible into subjective parts and incommunicable to multiple supposits, *haecceitas* does not ground both of these conditions. Instead, whereas the former condition results as the positive determination of a nature to this, the latter follows as a *de facto* result without a positive account.

Why is this distinction so important? And why doesn't Scotus just call on *haecceitas* to account for incommunicability as well as indivisibility? I surmise that the answer stems from his understanding of the divine essence. Scotus understands the divine essence as something of an *immanent universal,* which

Richard Cross has argued was a not widely held perspective within the post-Augustinian Latin West.[85] Insofar as the divine essence can be understood as a universal, Scotus, following Gregory of Nyssa, John of Damascus, and others in the Eastern Orthodox tradition, must dissociate universality from divisibility. Something can be both indivisible and yet communicable: the divine essence is indivisible into subjective parts, yet communicable to the distinct persons of the Trinity. Care must be taken to separate these two conditions.

Thus, when it comes to accounting for a material individual, a separate account of its incommunicability and indivisibility must be offered. One account cannot cover both. As Cross argues, indivisibility for Scotus is not necessarily incommunicability.[86] The failure to separate the two in material individuals would present problems for considering the communicability of the divine nature. Cross summarizes that communicability is exemplifiability, whereas divisibility is instantiability. Thus when Scotus justifies the indivisibility of a material individual into subjective parts, he does so on the basis of division as imperfection.[87] That is, he compares the indivisibility of a material individual to the indivisibility of the divine nature.[88] Such a comparison would not hold in terms of incommunicability.[89] The perfective individuation of a material individual on account of its ultimate individual difference can be compared to God's individuation on account of his transcendental magnitude because each one produces an indivisible individual.

Scotus maintains that the reason for indivisibility into instances is not the same as the reason for incommunicability into supposits: "We can say that the formal reason our nature is invested with a created personality is not something positive; for in addition to singularity we find no positive entity that renders the singular nature incommunicable. All that is added to singularity is the negation of dependence or incommunicability, the denial that it is given over to someone."[90] Whereas *haecceitas* perfects a nature by determining it to this, the fact that it cannot be exemplified in multiple supposits results from mere negation. Being incommunicable stands as something of a shallow fact. A uniqueness of noninstantiability brought by *haecceitas* must be distinguished from a mere uniqueness of nonexemplifiability.

Haecceitas makes an individual be unique in the sense that to divide it would be to change its very intensity. That is, even if only as an imagined theoretical exercise or possibility, a singular material individual could have multiple exemplifications, but it would be impossible for it to have multiple instantiations.[91] Likewise, an individual human essence not yet supposited is conceivable. Recall individual accidents are singular *per se* insofar as they mark indivisible degrees of being and yet they are clearly not supposits. (Scotus even considers the radical possibility that all things might depend on the Godhead, rather than having their own supposits.)[92]

Instantiation requires division, and division must determine the divided into something different. Each *haecceitas* determines a being to its differential

degree, whose division into subjective parts would require further differentiation. Such division/determination would constitute an altogether new degree of being. Individual differentiation thus brings about an indivisible degree of being, making an individual singular. *Being this* is perfective because once the individual has reached such determination, it cannot be divided without causing a qualitative change. To divide it would be to create a new intensity. Each individual is an intensive magnitude of transcendental perfection, a unique degree that is indivisible but not necessarily incommunicable. Division or divisibility into subjective parts would be an imperfection. This is because something divisible in this way would not be a single differential degree of being. To be so divided, it would need an additional difference added to it, which would constitute a change in its degree. (Division requires addition.) The ultimate individual difference thus perfects the common nature by determining it as an indivisible this. A perfection, even the ultimate perfection of *haecceitas*, is in principle communicable or repeatable, just not divisible.

In the case of the divine nature, it can be both a common essence *and* a singularity on account of the perfection of indivisibility. Scotus contrasts the unity of indivisibility with what he calls a "unity of solitude."[93] Something with the unity of solitude is incommunicable to another, or in the language from above, it is not "given over" to another. He argues that solitude does not add perfection beyond the ultimate perfection of singularity.[94] Instead, it merely marks the negation of dependence of the supposit. Being incommunicable thus is something of an imperfection.[95] Being indivisible as this, on the other hand, marks the final division within univocal being.

The distinction between a uniqueness of noninstantiability and one of nonexemplifiability now can be appreciated. Whereas the former requires the indivisibly of a uniquely differential degree, the latter requires only a type of solitude. The uniqueness of noninstantiability marks the nonexchangeable or nonfungible character of a singularity itself. To be nonexchangeable or nonfungible requires the primary diversity of ultimate individual difference. On account of such difference, the nature is determined to this one and no other. The singular has no equivalent. There is no other one with which it can be exchanged. Such uniqueness, however, is not a state of solitude as a bare particular must be, as we will discuss below. Instead, it is a perfection of being qua singularity.

As a process of perfective determination, differentiation divides being until singularity is reached. Difference causes indivisibility in its respective quidditative order.[96] Thus, just as the ultimate individual difference causes the numerical indivisibility of the individual, so too the ultimate specific difference causes a type of indivisibility of species.[97] Once again, the point here has not been to deny the incommunicability of the material individual. Instead, it has been to emphasize that its *reason for being indivisible* is not identical to its *reason for being incommunicable*. Only the former is explained by ultimate individual differentiation.

6.5.2. The Comparison

This subsection returns to the discussion of the other two comparisons drawn between the individuating difference and the specific difference. In terms of what is on par with each difference, an explanation has been given for why parallel ultimate differences must be primarily diverse from one another. Note that Scotus here reminds us that sometimes we take a specific difference from form, in which case it is not an ultimate difference.[98] Such a difference must be resolved into some difference that is itself an ultimate specific difference.

In terms of the comparison with an individuating difference, Scotus concludes that in each case there can be a commonality between the constituted unities, but not their constituting differences.[99] That is, the different species of human and sea sponge share animality in common and are identical on this basis. So too, the different individuals Benjamin Franklin and Voltaire share humanity in common. That on account of which they ultimately differ, however, cannot share anything in common. Each ultimate difference, recall, is primarily diverse.

The takeaway from this discussion is that despite the diversity of the constituting element, the constituted can share in real commonality with others on par with it. This is true either in the case of constituted individuals or constituted species whose constituting element can partake of no such commonality. That is, either an ultimate specific difference or a *haecceitas* must be a pure difference without commonality. The vague alterity of ultimate difference underlies division.

Finally, Scotus considers each difference in terms of what it differentiates (i.e., what is above it). With respect to a specific difference, its reality is formally distinct from the reality of the genus. Recall that the ultimate difference does not merely swallow up the previous determinations, according to Scotus. Instead, the reality of the ultimate specific difference adds a reality that is irreducible to that which it determines but is identical with it in the thing (i.e., the constituted essence). This is what we mean by terminating a quidditative order.

In terms of the comparison between an ultimate specific difference and an individuating difference, he states: "So too the reality of an individual is like a specific reality in this respect: It is so to speak an act determining the reality of the species, which is as it were possible and potential. But it is unlike it in this respect: It is never taken from an added form, but rather precisely from the last reality of the form."[100] Two matters from this discussion must be noted: first, in what sense *haecceitas* determines the reality of the species; and second, the distinction he draws between the two types of differences. This latter point will lead to a discussion in the next section of whether *haecceitas* is a formality, a modality, or something else altogether.

In terms of the first question, recall Scotus's broadened understanding of the *quid*/*qualia* structure. Insofar as he elevates being to the most extensive

transcendental *quid* predicable of everything that is, he must balance its weight with an explanation of how beings differ, if they are to differ at all. He finds this in terms of ultimate difference, which plays the role of transcendental *quale* determining being. A transcendental *quale* answers not what something is, but how or in what manner. In this sense, it is not a being, but an inflection or declension of being. It terminates a quidditative order.

In light of this earlier discussion, it can now be seen how *haecceitas* is an act determining the reality of the species, which itself is a *quasi*-potentiality. He calls it a "quasi-potentiality" or a "quasi-possibility," apparently to indicate its distinction from more mundane forms of hylomorphic determination. Remember, essential determination does not map on to physical structure. Essential differentiation is not between two things (*res*) such as matter and form. Instead, the differentiation occurs between a thingly quasi-potentiality, that is, the reality of the species, which is itself a being, and a subthingly reality of *haecceitas.* Unlike those cases of specific differentiation in which we derive the difference from a thing, which require further resolution of this thing to explain its difference, Scotus argues that the factor of individuation is never a thing. That is, the transcendental actuality of this ultimate individual difference contracts the transcendental potentiality of something that is *a being* to being *this* being. But *haecceitas* cannot itself be a being, but the ultimate inflection or declension of a being to this.

Without such a purely differential factor, we could not explain how beings differ. It might seem as if Scotus has not offered any explanation of what *haecceitas* is. Part of the problem is that *haecceitas* has no *what*; instead it is a pure determination—a *quale* without *quid,* to echo an earlier phrase. We thus must return to the second question from above, namely how Scotus explains the distinction between a specific difference and *haecceitas.*

Scotus notes an important dissimilarity between the two types of differences. Whereas *sometimes* the specific difference is taken from a form, in which case it is not ultimate and must be resolved into more simply-simple ultimate concepts, an individuating difference is *never* taken from a form. Instead, it is the ultimate reality of the form. This means that whereas a form has a reified character as *a being,* this ultimate reality by which the essence is determined to this being cannot be a being. Instead, it is a pure difference. Does this make *haecceitas* a real formality that is formally distinct from the essence it determines?

6.5.3. *Haecceitas* as Real Formality

Recall from above that there is a formal distinction between two formalities or realities within one and the same object. Essences are comprised of such distinct formalities, which together constitute networks of genera and species. Given the comparison that Scotus draws between the function of ultimate individual differences and ultimate specific differences, it would be safe to assume that the former are also formalities distinct from the common essences they

actualize. Peter King, however, casts doubt on this claim and for good reason. Despite King's arguments, and despite the crucial dissimilarities between these two groupings of ultimate difference, I maintain that an ultimate individual difference functions as a formality.

To begin, consider the textual evidence. Scotus describes the added singularity as a distinct formality: "Thus whatever is common and yet determinable can still be distinguished (no matter how much it is one thing) into several formally distinct realities of which this one is not formally that one. This one is formally the entity of singularity and that one is formally the entity of the nature."[101] The two cannot be distinguished as *thing* and *thing* as the genus and specific difference sometimes can be. Instead, in one and the same thing, there are "formally distinct realities of a single thing." One is the reality or the entity of the nature, the other the reality or entity of the singularity. The two are always formally distinct. As Scotus further explains: "Rather, when in the same thing, whether in a part or in the whole, they are always formally distinct *realitates* of the same thing."[102] In the single thing that is an individual, the common nature and *haecceitas* stand as formally distinct realities. So why does King think that there is only a modal distinction between the nature and its individuating difference, making the latter but a mode of the former?[103]

King argues that Scotus's analogy between how a specific difference contracts a genus to a species and how a *haecceitas* contracts a species to an individual is misleading. It is misleading, he argues, in the suggestion that contraction is differentiation.[104] Despite Scotus's use of the term "individual difference" to refer to *haecceitas,* contraction, King argues, is not differentiation. Thinking of individuation in terms of differentiation mistakes the individual difference for an added form. King points to those passages where Scotus argues that the individual reality is never taken from an added form.[105] Instead, King argues, individuality "flows from" actuality (King's term), and actuality is not a form. If it were a form, the individual would be its own species. King's general insights are correct, but he seems to be mistaken on three points.

First, the formality added to the common essence is not a reified form, but an ultimately differential formality. In this sense, Scotus's statement that the principle of individuation is never taken from a form can be explained. A paragraph such as the following regarding ultimate individual difference might further support King's point: "It is unlike [the specific difference] in another respect too, because the specific reality constitutes the composite it is a part of in its quidditative being. For the specific reality is itself a certain quidditative entity. On the other hand, this reality of an individual is primarily diverse from every quidditative entity."[106] King argues not incorrectly that an individual difference can never be a form, but is always an ultimate abstraction from the form. As primarily diverse from the quidditative reality, he argues, the individual difference *modalizes* the essence without adding additional formal content. True, the individual reality is primarily diverse from any quidditative entitativeness,

whereas the specific reality is part of such quidditative entitativeness. Further contextualization illuminates, however, what Scotus is after here.

In the following paragraph, Scotus explains that the specific reality constitutes something in formal being (i.e., quidditative being), whereas the individual reality constitutes it in material being (i.e., contracted being).[107] He explains that such correlative terms as "formal-material" refer to the order of predication:

> For Aristotle, a quiddity is often called a "form." For example, it is clear in *Metaphysics* V, the chapter on cause, and in many other passages, and in *Metaphysics* VII, the chapter on the parts of a definition, that in whatever does not have matter the what-something-is is the same as what it belongs to. (As will be explained, he is talking about matter and form.) For him, whatever has a contracted quiddity is called "matter." Boethius too in his little book *On the Trinity* says no form can be the subject of an accident, because form is said *in quid* of everything else. If humanity is a subject, therefore, nevertheless that fact does not pertain to it insofar as it is a form. Humanity is not the form of one part of the composite, of the form or of the matter, but of the whole composite that has a contracted quiddity—that is, in which there is a contracted quiddity. Therefore, every specific reality constitutes something in formal being, because it constitutes it in quidditative being. But the reality of an individual constitutes something precisely in material being—that is, in contracted being. From this there follows the logical claim that the former reality is essentially formal, and the latter reality material. For the latter constitutes something in the aspect of precisely what is predicable. But a formal predicate has the aspect of a form, whereas what can be a subject has the aspect of matter.[108]

What Scotus is trying to show here is how the individual difference constitutes a "maximal subject of predication." An ultimate specific difference constitutes something that can be a predicate, and so is in this sense "quidditative" or "formal." Such predicates are also able to be subjects, and thus such specific differences are material as well. This issue of materiality and the constitution of subjectivities will be considered in Section 6.6.

For now, note that the specific reality coconstituted the quidditative reality of the species. And in this sense, it too is quidditative. In this context, Scotus means only that it is formal as opposed to material; it can be a subject but also a predicate. This does not violate its status as an *ultimate difference*. Like ultimate individual difference, it too can terminate a quidditative term (i.e., a genus).[109]

Second, King argues that individuation is not differentiation of the essence, but contraction of it. This is correct, but only in a limited sense. As has been shown, Scotus expands the scope of differentiation to include not only specific differentiation of genera but also transcendental differentiation. Thus it is true that individuation is not differentiation narrowly construed. Transcendental

differentiation is perfection, that process whereby a quidditative order is terminated. This includes the termination of species into individuals. A principle of individuation is thus a difference in the broad sense of that principle that makes a being *be different*, a principle that is itself not a being or a thing.

Third, King resorts to the process of modalization to describe individuation. According to King, the textual evidence supporting a formal distinction "does not tell us much."[110] In particular, it does not tell us how the two factors come together to constitute a single unity (i.e., the individual). King thinks this is a modal distinction insofar as the reality of the individual contains the whole of the reality of the species. He argues that it provides a better theoretical account for how two factors come together, unlike the rather vague formal-distinction. He states: "Socrates's individual difference, the Socratizer, modalizes human nature in an individual way, namely as Socrates—or, more exactly, as Socrates's human nature."[111] King and I agree that individuation does something else rather than further realize the essence qua essence. Individuation culminates in something radically new.

Individuation is not a mere continuation of essential realization. Instead, individuation marks a singular point in the division of being and a threshold between quidditative orders. A new type of unity emerges. Without quibbling with vocabulary, we can call this process "actualization" as opposed to the realization that occurs on the level of common essences. (Section 6.6 will discuss this actualization in terms of "materialization.")

Individuation is the process of rendering being indivisible and nonfungible. Actualization does not simply mean "making exist": as we have seen, existence is but a mode of a fully determined essence. Actualization is a type of materialization or concretion of the common essence in an ultimate subject term, which itself cannot be subject to anything further. It perfects something according to its indivisible degree of being. It reaches a final indivisible degree of being most similar to the individual degree of divine being as this.

Scotus argues that while the individual is defined by us according to the definition of its common nature, it has its own *ratio.* Although one might suspect any additional formality should expand the definition, this need not be the case. The formal distinction had been defined in terms of generating distinct *rationes* in one and the same thing.[112] But not every *ratio* is a definition. Thisness offers a different account than whatness, although it remains indefinable, at least to us.[113] Scotus states: "There is an intermediate unity and distinction in one and the same thing which has diverse perfections and diverse formal entities but in such a way that one formal reality does not include the other; neither is it of itself formally the other [i.e., by identity as in the deity] and therefore one formal reality is perfectible and determinable by another."[114] Although King is correct to direct us to the key dissimilarities between the realization of essences and the actualization of individuals, the formal distinction seems most appropriate to capture this distinction.

6.6. BARE PARTICULARITY VERSUS NAKED SINGULARITY

In constituting the individual essence in its difference, *haecceitas* constitutes an ultimate and maximal subject of predication or quidditative term, just as an ultimate specific difference constitutes an ultimate subject in its quidditative order. As indivisible, such a singular term has reached the furthest degree of perfection. Before showing what Scotus means by calling individual difference a "principle of subjectivization," his account of *haecceitas* must be distinguished from the bare particular of contemporary metaphysics.[115] To avoid any confusion, one might call *haecceitas* a "naked singularity."

6.6.1. Bare Particularity

A bare particular is a particular, or a this, without any properties or qualities.[116] Such a particular is contrasted with a covered, or qualified, particular. A particular is covered insofar as it instantiates some universal. When we say "This is a tree" or "This tree is green," both tree and green are particular instantiations of the universals treeness and greenness. Once we peel off the various attributes or qualifications of a given particular, what remains is an unqualified nucleus underlying these various properties. As Gustav Bergmann notes: "Should [bare particulars] turn out to be dialectically indispensable, an argument could be made for 'postulating' their existence."[117] Whether there is such a nucleus is a matter of dispute. But even as theoretical postulates, bare particulars serve as substrata underlying these various properties, but themselves lack any determination. Such an ontological unit is often referred to simply as "the bare X."

An ultimate individual difference (*haecceitas*), however, must be separated from a bare particular or bare particularity in at least the following ways.[118] First, *haecceitas* is not a substratum or an ultimate nucleus of predication, but that on account of which there is such an individual. Whether Scotus admits some ultimate substrate apart from any of its determinations remains an open question.[119] Second, both substances *and* accidents require ultimate individual differentiation. Not only that, each order requires *its own* principle of individuation. Remember, there is no cross-categorial pollination. The role of *haecceitas* is not to subtend or support qualities, but to contract them to an indivisible degree of being in each distinct category. Third, *haecceitas* accounts for diachronic identity. A bare particular accounts for only synchronic identity.[120]

At the risk of immodesty, it might said that *haecceitas* is not a bare particularity, but a naked singularity (to rebrand a term from astrophysics): naked insofar as it cannot be mediated by any essential or accidental traits, and a singularity insofar as it contains no divisible or instantiable degree. This is more than mere semantic quibbling. Instead, this phrase distinguishes Scotus's account of individuation from the more contemporary variety on both fronts. Although the two might appear similar or even equivalent at first sight, at least two reasons show that this is not the case, thus warranting this terminological choice.

First, we must expand upon the aforementioned distinction between singularity and particularity. Particularity has been defined as a type of exemplification or instantiation of some universal. What makes a particular particular is simply its ability to be designated as an instance of such and such. Particularity merely tells us, "Here's one, here's another one." Singularity, however, adds additional content to the nature in order to make it be this. It is a process of making a common nature *be different* in terms of individuation. Although particularity might presuppose individuation as *this one*, it abstracts from any consideration of such singularity. That is, particularity as such does not account for the uniqueness of this one (i.e., the uniqueness of noninstantiation). One might object, however, that we have missed the entire point of a *bare* particular. A bare, unlike a covered, particular is what it is on account of not being determined by a universal. In this sense, it can't be an exemplification at all. It's what remains once we have stripped the individual of its various determinations.

Whether or not there is adequate justification for positing such a remainder is not my concern here. That being said, the point still stands. Even a bare particular is an abstract exemplification of general placeholder *X*. In this sense, both bare and covered particulars are particulars. Calling each one a particular, as noted above, simply sets them apart as designatable: in the one case, we designate an instance of some universal; in the other, we designate the substratum of such qualities. Both forms of particularity differ from singularity, however, insofar as their function is not to account for the "difference of this one."

Second, a distinction must be drawn between the way in which a bare particular is bare and a naked singularity is naked. A bare particular is bare because it is the subject underlying all determination. It is the substratum upon which we pile determinations. If it exists, it bundles together such determinations as the undetermined nucleus. A singularity is naked, however, not because it subtends all other determinations. It is neither substrate, nor substance, nor supposit. Nor is it even an individual essence. Rather, it is naked because, unlike individuals and individual essences, *haecceitas* has no other principle outside itself. It is self-differentiating.[121]

6.6.2. Material Differentiation

Having distinguished *haecceitas* from bare particularity, let us return to the former's role in linking individuals to their common essences, in the manner of subject to predicates. An ultimate individual difference mediates the predication of some predicate (e.g., horse) of some subject (e.g., Brunellus) by maintaining their unity/identity through differentiation. As pure difference, *haecceitas* makes the essence *be different* as a this without losing the commonality between thises. (Recall, *haecceitates* are diverse, individuals are different.) For this reason, Scotus calls the ultimate individual difference a "principle of subjectivization": "This individual difference, because it is not a principle of constituting anything as predicable, but only as subjectable and this by a maximal

subjectability, and the subject is material with respect to the predicate, thus it can be called a 'material difference,' and therefore it is not a principle of definition, which properly speaking represents a predicate and is a means of demonstration. So also the specific difference could be called 'material' in some sense, because it is principle of subjectability as regards a genus."[122] Individual difference constitutes the "maximal subjectable," whereas other ultimate differences constitute subjects that also might be predicable. *Haecceitas* is, as Scotus states here, a principle of constituting something as subjectable. This means that it constitutes the subject as subject while binding it to the predicate. It explains the unity amid difference of subject and predicate conceptual terms, and it explains this in terms of the primary diversity of ultimate difference.

The phrase "being subjectable" here should be understood in terms of Aristotle's distinction from the *Categories* between "said of another" and "not said of another." That is, certain terms are both said of another and something is said of them, whereas other terms have something said of them, but they are not said of another. The latter are "maximal subjects" in the sense that they constitute an irreducible degree of being, or a "subject term." Individual difference is responsible for constituting something in the order of subjectivity, or that which can be determined by a predicate. Unlike other differences, it constitutes a *maximal subject* such that it cannot be predicated of anything else. Being, recall, provides the ultimate *quid* predicable of all that is. It constitutes subjects of which being is predicable *in quid* without being subject or predicate. But difference falls somewhere in between.

Recall Scotus's expanded use of the *quid*/*quale* distinction. It is that by which we move between and ultimately unite various quidditative orders of beings. In its capacity of constituting a subject, Scotus refers to *haecceitas* as "material difference." Both *haecceitas* and the specific difference, he tells us, are material.[123] This is not the materiality of *hyle,* which already has been rejected as a candidate for individuation and differentiation. Instead, it is a materiality of *concretion*.[124] It is that by which the predicate is *concreted* in a subject and the subject is subjectivated.

The phrase "maximal subject" might lead to yet another source of confusion. The term subject tends to be associated with things falling under the category of Substance. Accidents are excluded from this consideration. Scotus's concern here, however, is not to locate full-fledged subjects:[125] this is not a discussion of supposits, or even of substances.[126] Rather, he concerns himself with the individual difference as the cause of maximal unity. In this sense, it is the cause of subject terms, by which he means irreducible degrees of being in each of the categories.

Scotus describes the contracted being of the individual as having a materiality.[127] That is, the ultimate individual difference is a material difference. The type of "concretive" materiality discussed here functions on a metaphysical, and not a natural, level. That is, the ultimate individual difference materializes

the essence by making it an ultimate and individual subject. As a principle of subjectability, difference materializes a higher-order essentiality with respect to a lower. The materiality that runs between unities and identifies them is not itself something identical.[128] *Nota bene*: by grounding this bond of identity, difference remains different. Such a materiality is its extracategorial ground of identity. In short, ultimate individual difference materializes the essence in the sense of rendering an individual degree of being, a singularity if you will.

CONCLUSION

Chapter 6 completed the discussion of ultimate difference. Unlike God, whose being infinite entails an indivisible singularity, finite being requires further differentiation culminating in individuation by means of an ultimate individual difference (or *haecceitas*, to use a more familiar, but somewhat problematic term). As was shown in Sections 6.2 and 6.3, Scotus rejects other, more traditional, accounts of individuation because they fail to explain difference, and most of them appeal to something already differentiated. The result is that we reach a particular individual; what must be explained, however, is the individual in its singularity. Singularity makes each individual into an indivisible degree of being and thereby completes the division of being. The conclusion will investigate the strange fact that although singularity marks the culmination of being, ultimate individual difference remains unintelligible to us in our present condition.

CONCLUSION: I WOULDN'T KNOW HIM FROM ADAM

We're no angels. If this work has taught us nothing else, this fact should be clear. Solomon's Difficulty reveals that things are difficult: language is poorly equipped to grasp reality, and cognition even more so. Unlike God or angels, we do not capture things themselves in a unified, unruptured gaze. Ours is a confused cognition mediated by the impressions of sensory accidents. Proper division, as we saw at the outset, was the remedy to such difficulty. This begins with the abstraction of a univocal concept of being. Proper division then proceeds through categorial and essential divisions by means of ultimate differences, until the final and most perfect division of univocal being into singular degrees by means of ultimate individual differences. Individuation is that beyond which creation divides no further and beings become nonfungible.

Part I showed how Scotus retrofits the Aristotelian concept of ultimate difference to buttress his account of univocal being. In Scotus's hand, this concept was both broadened and deepened. Chapters 1 and 2 established how, despite the avoidance of a univocal being by many of his peers, Scotus argues for a univocal *concept* of being. Properly understood, such a univocal concept—emphasis once again on "concept"—does not risk Parmenideanism. Chapter 3 then examined the role of ultimate difference as that which divides such a univocal concept. Recall that ultimate differences were characterized as follows: (1) their concept must be simply-simple; (2) there must be only a qualitative (but no quidditative) concept of them, which means they must determine the concept of being without themselves being determined; (3) they must be primarily diverse from one another and from being; (4) they must differ in terms of themselves and not on account of something else; (5) they must be extracategorial/transcendental; and finally, (6) they must terminate a quidditative order (i.e., they must divide being).

Part II investigated the various regions of ultimate differentiation: ultimate transcendental differences; ultimate specific differences; and ultimate individual differences (or *haecceitates*). Chapter 4 examined the intrinsic modes of being, emphasizing the finite-infinite disjunction. Chapter 5 looked at Scotus's deepened account of ultimate specific differences, deepened insofar as he departs from the original Aristotelian usage. And finally, chapter 6 explored the oft-misunderstood terrain of *haecceitas*, recasting it more properly as "ultimate individual difference." Individuation was the process by which indivisible, or singular degrees of being were reached.

Despite functional parallels with the cognition of other regions of ultimate

differences, the actuality, or facticity, of individual differentiation adds another layer of difficulty.[1] To maintain the objectivity of our concepts, Scotus drives a wedge between the reality grasped by concepts and the actuality of individuals in the world. Insofar as not even sensory cognition gives us immediate access to the latter, the path to individuals becomes even more remote and laborious than it had been for his more orthodox-Aristotelian predecessors. Allan Wolter notes: "Scotus is perfectly willing to accept this conclusion as a small price to pay for what seemed even more important to him, the fact that our generalizations about the real world and the individuals in it have an objective foundation."[2]

As will be argued in what follows, generalizations about objective formalities are not more important to Scotus. Rather, he sees that there's a price paid, but there's also a benefit reaped. Although an individual's ultimate individual difference remains unknown to us *in via*, he holds open the possibility for *de re* volitional or affective states.[3]

C.1. THE INTELLIGIBILITY OF SINGULARS

Aristotelian orthodoxy held that *senses sense individuals, the intellect understands universals.*[4] Despite various problems surrounding this formula (e.g., how does the separate soul understand God?), it rang true for most medieval readers of Aristotle. The formula followed a careful economy of distinct powers having their respective objects: the senses grasp material individuals, the intellect abstracts quiddities. Scotus, however, rejects both parts of this equation. Not only are singulars fully intelligible, even if not to us, but also the senses do not sense singulars.

Scotus maintains that nothing about individuals as such prevents them from being intelligible. If matter is not the principle of individuation, which he argues it is not, then what restricts the intelligibility of individuals?[5] The answer, Scotus argues, is nothing. Individuals are fully intelligible *per se,* just not *to us* and not *in this state.*[6] The assumption that singulars are unintelligible seems to stem from the ontological view that individuation is nothing more than particularization. According to such a view, the individual adds no further determination to the determination of the species, at least nothing essential.

For Scotus, the ultimate individual difference adds a real *ratio* over and above the quiddity: "When an individual difference is added to a quiddity and specific nature, something outside the account (*ratio*) of the quiddity is added. This is because the essence of itself does not become a this unless through something that is outside its account."[7] Given that individuation is the culmination and perfection of being, singular cognition should be the culmination and perfection of intelligibility. As goes being, so goes intelligibility.

If the singular is intelligible *per se,* then why is it not intelligible *to us*? And why assume that we don't cognize singulars, especially when it comes to sensation? Let's start with the second question: Why does Scotus think we don't in

fact cognize singulars? He explains: "[I say] that the individual difference is not known to anyone in this life, generally speaking. Proof of this is that then its difference from any other would also be known, and thus one could not err about any other shown to one intellectually without judging it [correctly] to be other. But this is false in the case of any other that is completely similar to this [i.e., an identical twin]."[8] If we knew (*notare*) something's individual difference, we would know how it differs from any other thing like it. To cognize an individual, we must be able to distinguish it from all others like it. But as the case of identical twins shows, we often err in recognizing similar things.

Many a comedy has been built around episodes of mistaken identity. It is a common, if not hackneyed, trope. Shakespeare's *Comedy of Errors* expands the folly even further. The bard imagines two sets of twins, masters and servants, separated at birth: Antipholus and Dromio of Syracuse and the same-named pair from Ephesus. Antipholus of Syracuse and his servant Dromio arrive in Ephesus, the place of residence for their twins (i.e., Antipholus and Dromio of Ephesus). Even Antipholus of Syracuse's own servant may mistake him for his twin Antipholus of Ephesus. And from there, folly ensues.

Scotus likewise speculates that if Adam were shown to him in a flash of intellectual intuition without his surrounding accidents, he would not recognize him as Adam: "In this way when I think of Adam, I do not understand the singular, because if he were shown to me intellectually, I would not know that it was he himself, but I would have a concept composed of 'man' and 'singular.'"[9] As with any individual, we might discursively reason that some ultimate individual difference makes it this one and not that one. For example, this human is Adam and not Moses; or this cat is Albert and not Felix. But, in each case, we fail to recognize and identify the Adam-izer or the Albert-izer.[10] And for this reason, we are unable to distinguish between individuals.

The best we can do is recognize individuals by their accidents. For example, Albert is the cat with orange and white fur, who roamed outside my parents' house last summer, and so on. But this method is fallible. As Chapter 6 showed, God could swap an individual's total profile of accidents, and they would remain the same individual. Voltaire could take on all of Franklin's accidents, and yet remain Voltaire. If such cognitive error is possible in case of misrecognizing humans, matters get even worse when it comes to distinguishing between rocks, plants, animals, or chairs.

Furthermore, another problem arises: even accidents are not cognized as singulars. Our failure to grasp individual accidents is not due to our failure to cognize the substances in which they inhere. Rather, as discussed above, each category requires its own coordination to the point of individuation. (Accidents could be "swapped" between individual substances.) Even as the immediate object of our senses, accidents do not move our sensory powers qua this. Scotus argues that not only do we not cognize singular substances, but also we do not cognize singular accidents. That is, the senses do not register the this-izers of

thises, but rather repeatable commonalities. I do not see *this* red or hear *that* F-sharp and so on.

Scotus shows cases where the senses fail to discern two distinct accidents: "This whiteness may be put in the same place as that whiteness, and this remains this and that remains that, because this is not this by the fact that it is in this place. Does the sense discern that in the same place there are two whitenesses, if they are equally intense? It does not. Also, how does vision discern the difference between the rays of the sun, which however some assume are continually varied?"[11] Because our cognitive powers are unable to distinguish or discriminate between one singular and others like it, both in the case of substance and in the case of accidents, singulars remain unintelligible to us.[12]

Returning now to the first question from above, What accounts for the unintelligibility of singulars to us? Unlike angelic intellects, which can be immediately moved by the action of the singular qua singular, ours is a state of mediacy begotten through accidents.[13] Even though actual singulars move our intellect, they do not do so under the condition (*ratio*) of actuality.[14] There is an impediment to cognition, which no cause either natural or supernatural can overcome (*vincere non potest*).[15] Scotus explains: "But what is this impediment? I respond: our intellect in this state is not apt to move or be moved immediately, unless it is first moved by some imaginable or external sensible."[16] There are at least two noteworthy features in this claim: First, unlike those who maintain that the senses are of the singular because they share materiality in common, Scotus rejects such a view.[17] Second, he speculates on possible reasons for this condition (e.g., sin or some natural cause) but in the end arrives at nothing conclusive.[18]

Regarding the first point, Scotus explains how something can move a power without that power taking on the mover's mode of being:

> Now it is the case that the cognitive power, when it actually cognizes something, becomes similar to it. [. . .] But to conclude from this fact that the intellect itself naturally and in itself has a mode of being that is similar to that of the object or the other way around is to commit the fallacy of the consequent and of figure of speech just as the following inference is invalid: The bronze becomes similar to Caesar because it is made similar through the form that it gets. Therefore, the bronze has in itself a mode of being that is similar to Caesar's mode of being.[19]

Although bronze is assimilated to Caesar through the shape introduced into the bronze, the bronze does not share Caesar's mode of being.[20] So too, singular objects may move our cognitive powers, but our cognitive powers do not reflect this mode of being. To conflate the two would be to commit the fallacy of the consequent.

Scotus draws an important distinction between that which moves a cognitive power and the object of that cognitive power. The two are nonidentical. He dubs the former the *ratio agentis* and the latter the *ratio agendi*: "It is well said

that singularity is a reason or condition of an agent (*ratio vel condicio agentis*), but not a reason of acting (*ratio agendi*). Rather, the latter is the formal nature which is similar in diverse things. And this is the account (*ratio*) which the generated species represents, not however the condition of the agent."[21] Scotus proceeds to explain why our powers do not grasp the *ratio agentis*:

> The cause of this is the principle of acting-assimilation (*principium agendi-assimilandi*), because an agent intends to assimilate a patient to it, and this is especially true for cognition which comes to be through assimilation. But the principle of assimilation is not the singular as singular. Rather, the singular is more the principle of distinguishing (because singulars differ in their singularity). It is more the common nature that is the principle of assimilation in which singulars agree. Therefore, the singular as singular is not the principle of acting either in the senses or in the intellect.[22]

The singular resists assimilation insofar as assimilation is the process of likening in terms of a common element.

Two points should be noted. First, abstraction of any ultimate difference (i.e., individual or otherwise) cannot operate on the assimilation model. This is because ultimate differences qua primarily diverse cannot be abstracted as *quids*. They have no common element of exchange. Rather, to the extent that we can cognize them, such differences require another type of abstraction (more on this below). Second, ultimate individual differences are even more difficult to cognize than their counterparts. When coupled with the quidditative term they determine, they do not generate recognizable properties by which to distinguish one individual from another.[23] Through the addition of an ultimate transcendental difference to being or an ultimate specific difference to a genus, certain recognizable properties emerge from which we can identify the category or the species. (For example, homogeneous divisibility is a property of the category of Quantity[24] or braying a property of donkeys.) No such properties emerge with individuals. Or, if there is some property that results from an individual's positive grade of being, Scotus tells us that it is too molecular for us to recognize.

Returning to the first point, abstraction in the traditional sense fails to capture any ultimate difference. Such abstraction, Scotus tells us, abstracts some *quid* predicable of a subject. In this traditional sense, nothing can be abstracted from ultimate differences. He explains: "From individual differences, just as from specifics, nothing can be abstracted in the first way, because these are real 'reasons' [i.e., formalities] that are completely simple and primarily diverse; otherwise there would be an infinite regress."[25] Ultimate differences, both individual and specific, are real reasons whose simple-simplicity and primary diversity admit of no common element. Thus, we cannot abstract any *quid* from them. Abstraction leaves no remainder behind; there is no *thing* left after abstraction.

But there's another way. Scotus explains: "But in the second way there can be many things abstracted and not only of second intentions, as said above, but also first intentions, such as 'individual,' 'one in number,' 'per se existing,' 'incommunicable,' which perhaps are first intentions. In this way I understand the composite of the universal nature and some such thing [i.e., the individuating *haecceity*] [to be extramental or] on the part of the object, and not to stem simply from some conceptual [construct of] the object (*ratione obiecti*)."[26] From individual difference, *just as from specific ones*, we can abstract a pure, qualitative, difference.

Scotus recognizes the care he must give to abstracting from primarily diverse, simply-simple individual differences.[27] If abstraction were to yield any quidditative term, they would be completely miscognized. The abstraction at work here must not reify such primarily diverse ultimate differences. The failure of abstraction traditionally conceived is in making a quid out of that which is fundamentally nonquidditative: transcendental *quale*.[28] Individual ultimate differences are instead "real reasons, altogether simple and primarily diverse from each other." They must be abstracted with great care. It's a bit like removing the snub from the nose!

Consider now the second point from above. As was shown in Chapter 6, some positive principle on account of which a this is this can be detected. But as to the "this-izer of this" (e.g., the Albert-izer of Albert), we face (to use Peter King's terms) "a theoretical black box."[29] For us, at least *in via,* when faced with the utter singularity of actuality and in order not to recoil in the face of such seemingly *ineffability*, the conceptual production of *haecceitas* as "that which remains once all of the common features have been accounted for" is necessary. It serves as a necessary placeholder.

Scotus cannot claim singular thought of individuals by saying, "*the one* causing such and such profile," a description in terms of the *ratio agentis.* Our thought is not indexed to the world in this way. As Peter King explains: "To be sure, the cat occasioning Socrates's thought may be Felix. But even in that case Socrates's thought is only contingently a thought of Felix, not a *de re* thought of him, which would necessarily be about Felix no matter the identity of the cat (or the apparent cat-façade) before Socrates."[30] The fact that Felix, and not Albert, satisfies this description is merely contingent. *De re* singular cognition would require not only cognizing Albert as some individual, but as being this and not that. The fact that *this* individual happens to cause my cognition does not translate to the cognition itself. Without a grasp of Felix's ultimate individual difference, cognition of the singular individual remains beyond our scope.

In addition, intuitive cognition does not swoop in to solve this problem. Scotus states:

> Actual existence pertains primarily to the nature. Consequently, this nature is not existing because it is formally a "this," but by reason of its being a nature. The intellect, however, intuitively knows that nature qua existing, and

> this cognition of an existent as existing suffices to make remembrance of it possible. I deny your statement, then, that a potency in remembering knows this as *this*, since you only prove it knows something here and now. If by "now" you mean existing and by "here" you mean "present in itself," I admit that it knows something as presently existing in itself. If so, I go further. "Here" and "now" are singular properties which can pertain to a nature [qua nature], not qua singular, although it is true that these properties can only pertain to something that is singular, either because it is intrinsically such [like the "haecceity"] or is joined to such. Nevertheless, they do not formally include, or essentially presuppose, singularity as the precise reason why they are there.[31]

Intuitive cognition merely registers the common nature as existing now and present here. But here and now do not pertain to singularity as such.

The question from above returns: if singularity is the depth of perfection, being in its fullest articulation, why is our intellect so ill-equipped to grasp individual difference? Why do we fail to cognize individuals? Perhaps this is the wrong way of framing the question. Rather, let us refocus this issue and inquire how the will can be moved by the singular as it exists in itself.[32] Given the fact that the core of our theology concerns contingent truths regarding individuals, this point cannot be understated.[33]

C.2. SINGULAR VOLITIONS

Scotus punctuates the flow of his argument against singular cognition to add this caveat. In an interpolated text to the *Questions on the "Metaphysics,"* he states: "To the contrary are the articles of faith which are about singulars; also the act of the will which deals with a particular thing concerning which there are divine precepts and sins."[34] Scotus suggests that a believer can (and must) have a *de re* singular attitude about Jesus of Nazareth or Mary. The beliefs are about Jesus or Mary, these distinct individuals, and not just someone who might be like them in every replicable quality.[35] This, it seems, is a necessary condition for faith or for any other affective state on account of which we can relate to singulars *de re*.

How could one's belief in the Articles of the Faith be about singulars such as Jesus of Nazareth or his mother, Mary? This claim raises the following type of question: In loving, does one merely love someone, anyone, who can fulfill *X*, *Y*, and *Z* needs? Does a believer merely believe in some power to satisfy their search for meaning or for whatever else reason they believe? Or rather, does one love just this one and no other? That is, can we achieve such volitional states even while our cognition of the this-izer remains out of reach?

A full account of these questions would require a phenomenology of such affective states. Despite Scotus's own terse statement, I hope to offer an argument consistent with his basic view. The will tends toward its object according

to how it exists in itself (i.e., *ratio agentis*), not according to how it can be represented in the intellect.[36] Turning to Olivi, who expands upon this point more fully, will help to shed light on Scotus's limited statement before returning to Scotus's own account of love.

Olivi introduces what he calls the seven pairs of *affects*, which he argues are indicators of our free will (*ista [affectus] clament liberum arbitrium esse*). The affects are: zeal and mercy, shame and glory, friendship and hostility, gratitude and ingratitude, subjugation and domination, hope and distrust, and carefulness and heedlessness.[37] If we did not have free will, he speculates, we would not experience such affective states as we do. One would not, for example, feel the righteous anger over a misdeed unless one assumes the perpetrator had the freedom to act otherwise. We do not feel such righteous indignation over the acts of animals.

Most pertinent to our discussion is what he says about friendship: "The affect of friendship and hostility proclaim this. For a human cannot be carried to another as to a friend unless by regarding and receiving him or her as consisting as being a *per se* singularly and personally in her- or himself."[38] To gloss this passage, Olivi holds that the *de re* mental act of regarding this one as this one is a necessary condition for friendship.[39] Friendship requires that we regard another as a singular being (*ens singulariter*) and not simply *someone* who can satisfy this or that need. Without such a *de re* affective state, friendship would not be possible.

Olivi's affects indicate our freedom. If, for example, we were not free to relate to the other in their singularity, such an affect of friendship would stall. Whether these texts directly influenced Scotus is unclear. What can be said, however, is that both Franciscans share in the view that certain mental acts require *de re* cognitive attitudes. What explains the distinction between such *de re* singular attitudes and the merely *de dicto* ones mentioned above is that in the former case, such individuals are significant to the subject. There is in the former, but not in the latter, what I will call "an index of care." By this, I mean the ongoing process by which we can relate to individuals in their singularity.

Care latches onto a singular individual even without knowing their individual differentiator. This must be distinguished from amorous solipsism, which is a *de dicto* affective state of "whosoever fulfills such-and-such profile of experiential traits?"[40] For example, I want someone, anyone, to serve me at a restaurant. I want a chair, any chair, upon which to sit. With respect to a nonsolipsistic love, Scotus states: "To love something in itself [or for its own sake] is more an act of giving or sharing and is a freer act than is desiring that object for oneself."[41] Such acts require not only latching on to a designate individual in a manner irreducible to a definite description. Overcoming the solipsism of love, whereby I make the other reducible to my lived experience of her/him/it, means relating to the individual as nonfungible.

Certain cases seem to yield singular mental names, whereas others seem to

stall. Robin Jeshion explains this point well: "What distinguishes those instances in which mental names are introduced and those in which their production is stalled? The answer concerns not the individual-to-be-named's epistemic relation, but rather that individual's *significance* to the subject. A mental name can be initiated only if the individual-to-be-named is in the relevant way significant to the thinker."[42] What stalls the production of singular thought is not acquaintance versus nonacquaintance. Scotus can seemingly entertain a singular thought about Adam. Furthermore, I lack cognition of the ultimate individual difference even of those individuals with whom and with which I am acquainted. Cognition of such ultimate difference remains deferred, at least for us *in via*.

Insofar as singularity for Scotus marks a condition of being nonfungible, our cognition of this condition requires that the individual be made nonfungible to me. That is, it marks the threshold at which merely someone becomes this one with respect to a given subject. This occurs insofar as the individual in question affects me such that (to use contemporary lingo) "I open a mental file on *this* one." Such a threshold is not one of selfish appropriation to the cognizing subject, but the cognizing subject's ability to recognize the individual's nonfungibility. This individual matters to me. But this is not a solipsistic narcissism.

With respect to the necessary condition of an individual being significant to me in order for me to entertain a singular thought, Jeshion postulates what she calls a Significance Condition: "Significance Condition: a mental file is initiated on an individual only if that individual is significant to the agent with respect to her plans, projects, affective states, and motivations."[43] We open mental files on those individuals about whom we care. In this respect, it requires more than an index by fiat. This can occur in a variety of affective cognitive states: e.g., *the one I envy; the one I love; the one he hates; the one we as a nation fear*. For lack of a better term by which to group such significant affective states, I will dub them "indices of care." By "care," I mean "significance to the subject." I prefer the term "care," however, both because it captures the affective sense of the state but also because it avoids the ambiguity of "significance," thought in a purely semantic register. Care is not something I merely intend by fiat, but something that affects me.[44] Although the individual qua its individual difference does not cognitively move me, it can do so in some other affective manner. Consider some examples.

Jeshion provides two seemingly similar examples to illustrate this point. First, you are running along the ocean and seeing a set of footprints. You think to yourself, "Wow, he has big feet." Second, you are camping in the woods with your family. You see prints of a full-grown male bear in the mud banks along the stream. You say to yourself, "We need to get off of his turf." Jeshion argues, and I think correctly, that the first case does not involve singular thought, whereas the second case does. In the case of the "big-footed runner," you have no real interest in discovering who he or she is. Whosoever made these prints does not

matter to you, at least not with respect to this construal of the story. With the bear's prints, on the other hand, I create a mental name for *that bear.* Such a name is indexed to an individual insofar as he has significance to me in terms of my deliberations, plans, and actions.[45] I do not merely fear "some bear," I fear "this bear," that is, the one whose turf I must vacate. I have a singular thought in this case insofar as I form a mental name indexed to a feared individual.

As an impatient customer at a restaurant, I might want *someone to serve me.* Likewise, having had a car break down, I might need *a new car.* I want someone to satisfy this need of bringing me my food and I don't care how I get it. I need something to get me to work. And so on. But such cases seem to differ from the ones where we develop a volitional or affective state with respect to just this one.[46]

For example, Scotus notes the lamentable fact that "I have never been to Rome." How is it that the Subtle Doctor can refer to the Eternal City? He explains that this distinct reference to Rome by means of the proper name "Rome" is accompanied in his case only by a complex matrix of common conceptions. He admits: "I even use this name 'Rome' to signify distinctly that city which I have never seen [i.e., never known], either in itself or in its accidents, except those that are most common knowledge."[47] If one were to ask Scotus, "What do you conceptually mean by 'Rome'?" his answer would be something like the following: "In my mind, I form a conception of a city, located on the Italian peninsula, which was once the seat of the pope, etc." To this mental image, he affixes the label "Rome." But—and this is crucial to note—Scotus's ability to entertain a singular thought about Rome neither depends on his mental checklist of definite descriptors; nor could it depend upon an external causal relation (e.g., acquaintance). Instead, with respect to Rome or Adam, he sustains a singular thought through a mental name formed by *an index of care*.

Despite the vagueness or limitations of Scotus's definite description of his "mental checklist for 'Rome,'" he succeeds in his *intention to mean* for the following reason: he can *affectively* index his beliefs to the actual world, contingency and all. Rome is not just some city, but a city of great significance and importance to him. That is, even though Scotus, and all humans, lack cognition of the individual differentiator of a given individual, they still retain the ability to distinctly pick out and identify individuals as individuals. With respect to Adam or Rome, we can create mental names for them because they matter to us. Such mental names allow us to sustain singular thoughts. They are affectively significant. With respect to Scotus's belief or lament, "I have never been to Rome," he is not simply thinking about *some* city, but about *that* city (i.e., the one in Italy which was once the seat of the popes . . . etc.). What matters here for forming a mental name is not how accurate his descriptors of Rome are or the mental image he fashions in his imagination. Instead, the total significance *of* Rome *to* him accounts for the indexing. He cares about Rome in a way that he does not about some random city. So too with Adam.

The individual in its singularity cannot be made present to us—either immediately in intuitive cognition or through intelligible species in abstractive cognition—because the condition for such singularity is ultimate individual difference. I can love this individual as this, although cognition of its this-izer is deferred. That is, no definite description satisfies the question, "Why is this one loveable?" Although we might open a mental file on account of various accidental qualities or even a definite description, this does not exhaust their *de re* lovability. They simply become nonfungible. Acts of the will reach not just any individual whatsoever, but this one whatever it may be.

POSTSCRIPT

"All things are difficult." As the somber Solomon tells us: "Humans cannot explain them by word. The eye is not filled with seeing, neither is the ear filled with hearing. What is it that hath been? The same thing that shall be. What is it that hath been done? The same that shall be done. Nothing under the sun is new, neither is anyone able to say: Behold this is new: for it hath already gone before in the ages that were before us."[48] The eyes, ears, and (we might add) the intellect remain unfulfilled. That which they seek—being in its highest, infinite expression—remains out of reach.[49] As Scotus reports: "Infinity then is a *per se* condition of any object that is fully satisfying and therefore beatific. Proof of the major: Since a power is naturally inclined to its first object, it is not satisfied with anything short of the fullest expression of that object and *will indeed push on farther* to where that realization can be found."[50] Even their fellow creatures in their singular condition as this remain deferred.

But perhaps, not all is lost. Proper division ultimately helps to alleviate this difficulty. Although the intellect is unsatisfied, it pushes on further. The intellect charts a cartographical course using a univocal concept of being.[51] Scotus explains:

> Therefore the intellect of the pilgrim who cannot conceive of these in the united way that they exist in themselves is moved to form distinct concepts of these perfections that are proportional to the concepts of those perfections as they exist in creatures. But by means of these concepts, form in various ways and imperfectly, [the intellect of the pilgrim] conceives that "perfect one" and the perfections united in Him. And in this fashion the intellect of the pilgrim can have about God some concept expresses just what he is.[52]

To properly divide this indifferent, extensive terrain, the intellect must turn to ultimate differences, which generate being's complete determination to this. Such division terminates in the *terra incognita* of actuality, populated by singulars whose ultimate individual differences remain unintelligible to us. Despite this seeming limitation, the intellect opens up the possibility for the will to love being as it ought to be loved: *as this*.

ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

This project took form in June 2015, although several pieces had emerged earlier. I received a grant from the *Journal of the History of Philosophy* for early career scholars (which I was at the time) to attend a master class at the University of Toronto. The topic was "The History of the Will in the Middle Ages," and it was led by Dr. Peter King. As participants, we both read texts from several medieval authors and presented our own current research. I presented "Duns Scotus and Ultimate Difference," a first systematic and public attempt to unite several, separate ideas into a single vision. From that "work in progress," this book grew. I am thus grateful to Peter King for convening that seminar and providing a platform for us to discuss our research, in addition to offering subsequent suggestions to me on how to proceed with the project. Likewise, I extend gratitude to the other seminar participants for their feedback. These include Thomas Ward, Daniel Shields, Adam Wood, Josh Blander, Garrett Smith, and Simona Vucu.

Audiences at various conferences, both before and after, also have provided much-appreciated feedback. These were "Ancient and Medieval Interpretations of Aristotle's *Categories*" at Franciscan University of Steubenville; "A Metaphysics of the Logos: Self-Knowledge and Self-Manifestation in Medieval Hermeneutics" at the University of Navarra; and "Unum, Verum, Bonum: An International Colloquium on Medieval Philosophy" at the University of Lisbon. Various articles followed, including "The Simplicity of Being in Duns Scotus' *Quaestiones Super Praedicamenta Aristotelis* and Later Works," *Quaestiones Disputatae* 4, no. 2 (April 2014): 191–210; and "Remainders and Reminders of the Divine: Duns Scotus's Critique of Images of God," *Anuario Filosófico* 49, no. 3 (2016): 517–37. Both journals have graciously permitted me to republish material from these articles, which appears here in altered form. Two Faculty Development Research Grants from the University of Scranton made research on this project possible. In addition, I thank the Pontifical Institute of Medieval Studies (PIMS) for permission to use their library.

If the best way for a student to repay their debt to their teacher is through the student's accomplishments, then I hope this work starts to settle my tab with Richard A. Lee Jr., without whose guidance and inspiration this would not have been possible. Also, my friends and colleagues Matthew Meyer and Crina Gschwandtner have offered invaluable advice throughout this process. From the very start of my working with Fordham University Press, Gyula Klima, the editor of the Medieval Philosophy: Texts and Studies series, has offered tremendous support. Likewise, I wish to thank Will Cerbone and the external reviewers, whose feedback has served to strengthen this work. Thanks go to Ian

Drummond for meticulously editing and offering corrections. Also, I am grateful to Matthew Eckel for offering to read a draft and provide suggestions.

Most important is the love and support received from my wife, Melissa, and my parents, Bonnie and Dave LaZella, during this process. Regrettably, I can no longer call myself "an early career scholar," but I hope this project bears the mark of such youthful enthusiasm.

A. T. LaZella
Scranton, Pennsylvania
January 2019

NOTES

INTRODUCTION: SOLOMON'S DIFFICULTY

1. *Quod.*, Prol. "'Cunctae res difficiles,' ait Salomon, *Eccles.* 1. et cur intelligat eas esse difficiles, subdit. '*Non potest eas homo explicare sermone.*' Secundum igitur distinctionem rerum potest accipi distinctio difficilium questionum." For a translation and dating of this text, see the introduction to John Duns Scotus, *God and Creatures: The Quodlibetal Questions*, trans. Felix Alluntis and Allan B. Wolter (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1975). My claim does not hinge on the correctness of this dating. Wolter also notes the tradition of Franciscan masters to open with a line from scripture (see ibid., xxviii). In what follows, I will use standard translations whenever possible, noting the translation source at each first use; all other translations will be my own.

2. *Quod.,* Prol.

3. Plato, *Phaedrus* 265e, trans. Alexander Nehamas and Paul Woodruff, in Plato, *Complete Works,* ed. John M. Cooper (Indianapolis: Hackett, 1997); slightly modified. All references to Plato's works are to Plato, *Complete Works.*

4. Supreme Court Justice Potter Stewart, Concurring Opinion in *Jacobellis v.* Ohio 378 U.S. 184 (1964).

5. Plato, *Sophist* 219a–221c.

6. Ibid., 231a.

7. Ibid., 231d–e.

8. Ibid., 226a.

9. Mary Louise Gill notes that "dichotomous division yields a good definition of a target kind only in the simplest and most uncontroversial cases. [. . .] We have trouble catching the sophist, because we find him, not at the end of a single branch, but at many different termini, allowing multiple definitions" (Gill, "Division and Definition in Plato's *Sophist* and *Statesman*," in *Definitions in Greek Philosophy,* ed. David Charles [Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2010], 173).

10. Parmenides, *On Nature,* Frag. B 8.1–4, trans. R. D. McKirahan Jr., in *Readings in Ancient Greek Philosophy: From Thales to Aristotle*, ed. S. Mark Cohen, Patricia Curd, and C. D. C. Reeve (Indianapolis: Hackett, 1995), 38.

11. Ibid., 39.

12. "Philosophorum error fuit, quod Deus esset de essentia omnium rerum: ponebant enim omnia esse unum simpliciter, et non differre, nisi forte secundum sensum vel aestimationem, ut Parmenides dixit" (Aquinas, *In Sent.* II, d. 17, q. 1, a. 1 resp.).

13. Parmenides treats being as a genus, thereby affording it with oneness of account (*ratio*) and nature (see Aquinas, *Metaphysicorum Aristotelis* I, lec. 9, n. 6).

14. For a more in-depth discussion of this issue, see Chapter 4.

15. Jerry Fodor, *Concepts: Where Cognitive Science Went Wrong* (Oxford: Clarendon, 1998), 150–53.

16. Most recently, see Richard Cross, *Duns Scotus's Theory of Cognition* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2014). See also Giorgio Pini, "Can God Create My Thoughts? Scotus's Case against the Causal Account of Intentionality," *Journal of the History of Philosophy* 49, no. 1 (2010): 39–63.

17. Plato, *Cratylus* 439d.

18. *Rep.* I-A d. 22, q. un. See also *Ord.* I, d. 22, q. un.

19. "Dico quod sicut ego intendo exprimere per illud nomen essentiam Dei in se distincte, sic ille intendit illam concipere per illud nomen, quamvis nec ego utens nec ille cui utor posset distincte intelligere illam essentiam, quam sic distincte intendo exprimere (et ille ita uti nomine sic expresso)" (*Rep.* I–A, d. 22, q. un., n. 31). Translations will be from *The Examined Report of the Paris Lecture Reportatio I–A: Latin Text and English Translation,* ed. and trans. Allan B. Wolter and Oleg V. Bychkov, 2 vols. (St. Bonaventure, N.Y.: Franciscan Institute, 2004–2008).

20. *In Metaph.* II, qq. 2–3, n. 119. Elsewhere, he states: "Moreover, perhaps even this word XPC is this sort of a name, which cannot be written [in full], but is first sounded at God's instruction by an angel, and afterwards by the apostles and then through teaching by other saints, until finally it was given to us by the orthodox Fathers in the form of an express teaching about it—[a name, I say,] whose written form XPC has absolutely no correspondence to the way it is pronounced, because the sounds [of which it consists when pronounced] are neither X nor P nor C, which are [nevertheless] used for the written form of this word" (*Rep.* I-A, d. 22, q. un., n. 30). I bypass here any further discussion of how this relates to externalism (e.g., Hilary Putnam's "The Meaning of 'Meaning'" or Saul Kripke's *Naming and Necessity*). I refer the reader to Giorgio Pini, "Scotus on Knowing and Naming Natural Kinds," *History of Philosophy Quarterly* 26 (2009): 255–72.

21. *Rep.* I-A, d. 22, q. un., n. 23.

22. *In Metaph.* VII, q. 15, nn. 22 and 26.

23. *Ord.* I, d. 3, q. 1, p. 3, nn. 379–80.

24. Pini, "Scotus on Knowing and Naming Natural Kinds," 263.

25. See, for example, *Quod.*, q. 13, a. 2, nn. 39–40 [§§12–13] and 46 [§15]. (Alluntis and Wolter's paragraph numbers are provided followed by the Wadding numbers in brackets.) For further discussion of the issues raised in this section, see Cross, *Duns Scotus's Theory of Cognition,* chap. 8.

26. "An intentional term—as a universal object according to the represented being it has in the species—accompanies this real form" (*Rep.* I-A, d. 3, q. 4, n. 105). Peter King goes so far as to attribute the invention of mental content to Scotus (see King, "Scotus on Mental Content," in *Duns Scot à Paris, 1302–2002*; *Actes du colloque de Paris, 2–4 septembre 2002,* Textes et Études du Moyen Âge 26, ed. O. Boulnois, E. Karger, J-L Solère, and G. Sondag [Turnhout: Brepols, 2004], 65–88). For a broader discussion of this issue and comparisons to contemporary debates surrounding concepts and mental content (e.g., Jerry Fodor), see also Stephen Read, "Concepts and Meaning in Medieval Philosophy," in *Intentionality, Cognition, and Mental Representation in Medieval Philosophy,* ed. Gyula Klima (New York: Fordham University Press, 2015), 9–28.

27. *Rep.* I-A, d. 3, q. 4, nn. 116 and 119.

28. *Quod.,* q. 13, a. 2, n. 39 [§12]. Scotus here refers to this as a measuring relation. For a full discussion of this point, see Cross, *Duns Scotus's Theory of Cognition,* 153–63.

29. "Si Deus imprimeret speciem intellectui vel oculo, eodem modo ferretur in obiectum, sicut modo, et obiectum ita esset obiectum. Sed Deus non esset obiectum, quia in ipsum non tendit potentia, et tamen ipse imprimit" (*In Metaph.* VII, q. 14, n. 29).

30. *Lect.* I, d. 3, pars 3, qq. 2–3, n. 392.

31. Science need not operate with the same level of conceptual resolution as does metaphysics. The geometer need not achieve the same conceptual resolution as the metaphysician in terms of abstracting her geometrical concepts to the point of complete resolution (what we'll call *simple-simplicity*). She need not know to what category lines belong. For further discussion, see, for example, Peter C. Vier, *Evidence and Its Function According to John Duns Scotus* (St. Bonaventure, N.Y.: Franciscan Institute, 1951), 78.

32. Ludger Honnefelder, *Scientia transcendens: Die formale Bestimmung von Seiendheit und Realität in der Metaphysik des Mittelalters und der Neuzeit (Duns Scotus—Suárez—Wolff—Kant—Peirce*) (Hamburg: Felix Meiner Verlag, 1990), 430ff. See also Ludger Honnefelder, *Ens inquantum ens: Der Begriff des Seienden als solchen als Gegenstand der Metaphysik nach der Lehre des Johannes Duns Scotus,* Beiträge zur Geschichte der Philosophie und Theologie des Mittelalters, NF 16 (Münster: Aschendorff, 1979).

33. "Schärfer als Thomas von Aquin und die anderen Autoren des. 13. Jahrhunderts sieht Scotus, daβ das fraglich gewordene Wissen vom ersten Seienden als einem besonderen Seienden in seiner Möglichkeit nur durch den Rekurs auf jene Gründe (rationes) gesichert werden kann, durch die sich Wissen von jedwedem Seienden konstituiert, vor allem jenen schlechthin ersten Grund (ratio), den Begriff von 'Seienden' überhaupt" (Honnefelder, *Scientia transcendens,* 403).

34. Gyula Klima, "Mental Representations and Concepts in Medieval Philosophy," in *Intentionality, Cognitions, and Mental Representation in Medieval Philosophy,* ed. Klima (New York: Fordham University Press, 2015), 327.

35. Ibid., 328.

36. *In Metaph.* VI, q. 3, n. 66.

37. Ibid.

38. See, for example, Roger Bacon, *De signis,* 4.2.

39. *In Metaph.* VI, q. 3, n. 66.

40. Claude Panaccio, *Le discours intérieur: De Platon à Guillaume d'Ockham* (Paris: Seuil, 1999), chap. 7.

41. See, for example, Francois Recanti, *Mental Files* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2014), 3–14.

42. Allan B. Wolter, "Intuition, Memory, and Knowledge of Individuals," in *The Philosophical Theology of John Duns Scotus,* ed. Marilyn McCord Adams (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1990), 111. To say that our acquaintance with accidents is confused means that our concept of them can be resolved into simply-simple elements. Scotus can be a rigid internalist and hold that cognition is acquainted with sensible accidents. See Cross's argument against Pini (Cross, *Duns Scotus's Theory of Cognition,* 158–59). As Cross recognizes, the content of our thought is not fixed by the actual state of the world at the time of our thinking; instead, the measurability of thoughts is an intrinsic property such that our thinking about essences does not depend upon their actual instantiation.

43. To secure this objective foundation, however, questions regarding *what actually happens to be* necessarily withdraw from such consideration (Wolter, "Scotus' Individuation Theory," in *The Philosophical Theology of John Duns Scotus,* ed. Marilyn McCord Adams [Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1990], 95). I return to this passage in the

Conclusion, in addition to showing how this leads to a consideration of our volitional relation to actuality. In contemporary terms, we might say that Scotus is willing to accept haecceitism in order to avoid quidditism (see Armstrong, *A Combinatorial Theory of Possibility* [Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1989]; and David Lewis, *On the Plurality of Worlds* [Oxford: Blackwell, 1986]).

44. "Omne unum in se, si distinguitur in diversis, distinguitur per aliqua addita sibi. Conceptus entis est unus de se in omnibus generibus. Quaero igitur de addito *a:* aut est ens, et sic ens erit de intellectu eius, scilicet *a,* quia ens praedicat substantiam cuiuslibet entis, IV huius; ergo substantia est ens, et sic nugatio. Si sit non-ens, tunc omne genus generalissimum est formaliter non-ens, quia illud formale est non-ens, et omnis species formaliter non-ens" (*In Metaph.* IV, q. 1, n. 57). This and all subsequent translations of *In Metaph.* are from John Duns Scotus, *Questions on the Metaphysics of Aristotle by John Duns Scotus,* 2 vols., trans. Girard J. Etzkorn and Allan B. Wolter (St. Bonaventure, N.Y.: Franciscan Institute Publications, 1997–1998).

45. For a similar statement, see, for example, Aquinas, *Metaphysicorum Aristotelis* I, lec. 9, n. 5.

46. *Super Praed.*, q. 4, nn. 20–22.

47. For a further exploration of this point, see also Michael Sylwanowicz, *Contingent Causality and the Foundation of Duns Scotus' Metaphysics* (Leiden: Brill, 1996), 168–71.

48. Gilson, in a not uncharacteristic statement, writes: "The first and most necessary condition for things to become objects of scientific knowledge is to be purified of the slightest trace of existence. A perfect case of conceptual imperialism, if there ever was one! And all this owing to Avicenna, who begot Scotus, who begot Suarez, who begot Kleutgen; and the list still remains open" (Gilson, *Being and Some Philosophers*, 2nd ed. [Toronto: Pontifical Institute of Mediaeval Studies, 1952], 106). Marion, in language reminiscent of Gilson, states: "The analogy of being—about which it makes sense to emphasize once again that Thomas Aquinas scarcely uses the term *analogia entis*—has no other function than to dig the chasm that separates the two understandings of *esse* (and not to bridge it). It is even more necessary to underline that, coming from Duns Scotus unto Suarez by means of Cajetan, the inflation of this doctrine has had no other aim than to submit it to the growing empire of the univocal and intelligible concept of *ens*" (Jean-Luc Marion, "Thomas Aquinas and Onto-Theo-Logy," trans. B. Gendreau, R. Rethy, and M. Sweeney, in *Mystics: Presence and Aporia,* ed. Michael Kessler and Christian Sheppard [Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2003], 48–49). The proponents of Radical Orthodoxy (e.g., John Milbank, Catherine Pickstock) go even further. They charge Scotistic univocity with flattening being in such a way as to lead to the nihilism of modernity. For a sample of the Radical Orthodoxy position, see, for example, John Milbank, *Theology and Social Theory*, 2nd ed. (Oxford: Blackwell, 2006); and Catherine Pickstock, "Duns Scotus: His Historical and Contemporary Significance," *Modern Theology* 21, no. 4 (October 2005): 543–74.

49. See Richard Cross, "Where Angels Fear to Tread," *Antonianum* 76, no. 1 (January 2001): 7–41; Thomas Williams, "The Doctrine of Univocity Is True and Salutary," *Modern Theology* 21, no. 4 (October 2005): 575–85; and, more recently, Daniel P. Horan, *Postmodernity and Univocity: A Critical Account of Radical Orthodoxy and John Duns Scotus* (Minneapolis: Fortress, 2014). Each author responds to the aforementioned attacks with a particular emphasis on those lodged by Radical Orthodoxy.

50. Wolter, *The Transcendentals and Their Function in the Metaphysics of Duns Scotus.* (St. Bonaventure, N.Y.: Franciscan Institute, 1946), 82–87. Gilson also briefly discusses ultimate difference in *Jean Duns Scot: Introduction a ses positions fondamentales* (Paris: Vrin, 1952), 95–97, 105.

51. See, for example, Peter King, "Scotus on Metaphysics," in *The Cambridge Companion to Duns Scotus,* ed. Thomas Williams (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003), 19–21; and Peter King, "Duns Scotus on the Common Nature and the Individual Differentia," *Philosophical Topics* 20, no. 2 (Fall 1992): 50–76.

52. Sylwanowicz, *Contingent Causality,* 168–71.

53. Honnefelder, *Ens inquantum ens,* 317–21.

54. "Was zu den '*letzten Differenzen*' im einzelnen zu zählen ist, führt Scotus in Ordinatio und Lectura nicht näher aus" (ibid., 318).

55. "Unter den Begriff der 'letzten Differenz' dürfte nach Scotus wohl mit Sicherheit die individualitätsbestimmende Differenz zu rechnen sein, die die Artnatur zum unverwechselbaren Individuum kontrahiert und die von Scotus als 'ultima realitas entis' oder 'ultima realitas formae' verstanden wird; sie begründet in der Ordnung der Wesensdetermination als 'letzte Unterscheidung' die individuelle Vershiedenheit" (ibid., 318–19).

56. Adrian Moore, "Being, Univocity and Logical Syntax," *Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society* 115, no. 1 (2015): 18.

57. Ibid.

58. Ibid., 18–19.

1. BEING IS SAID IN MANY WAYS

1. For a more extensive account of this development, see Steven P. Marrone, "The Notion of Univocity in Duns Scotus's Early Work," *Franciscan Studies* 43 (1983): 347–95. See also Andrew LaZella, "The Simplicity of Being in Duns Scotus' *Quaestiones Super Praedicamenta Aristotelis* and Later Works," *Quaestiones Disputatae* 4, no. 2 (April 2014): 191–210.

2. For Scotus's claim that the individual qua individual (or singular) is not the object of our cognitive powers, see the Conclusion to this volume; see also Giorgio Pini, "Scotus on the Objects of Cognitive Acts," *Franciscan Studies* 66 (2008): 281–315. For a discussion of the term "object," see Lawrence Dewan, "'Obiectum': Notes on the Invention of a Word," in *Wisdom, Law, and Virtue: Essays on Thomistic Ethics,* 403–43 (New York: Fordham University Press, 2008).

3. *Super Praed.*, q. 6. See also Aristotle, *Cat.*, c. 1.

4. For the more extensive treatment of analogy as a relation between things and/or as a relation between words, see Joshua P. Hochschild, *The Semantics of Analogy: Rereading Cajetan's "De nominum analogia"* (Notre Dame: University of Notre Dame Press, 2010), 1–13. Hochschild traces how these discussions begin as separate issues in Aristotle but become entangled and intertwined as they reach the thirteenth century (without ever being completely conflated). As he makes clear, and as his title indicates, Cajetan operates in a Scotistic paradigm of the *semantics* of univocity/analogy (broadly considered). That is, while aware of purely logical as well as purely metaphysical/theological concerns, Scotus (as I will show) engages with the unity or diversity of conceptual meaning. Cajetan responds to the Scotistic argument that analogy is

semantically impossible by introducing nonunivocal conceptual unity (i.e., analogy of proportion) (see, in particular, ibid., 44 and 65).

5. E. J. Ashworth, "Suarez on the Analogy of Being: Some Historical Background," *Vivarium* 33, no. 1 (May 1995): 52

6. *Super Praed*., q. 5, n. 11.

7. Ibid., q. 1, n. 18.

8. The subject matter of logic properly speaking is not second intentions, but the syllogism. For a historical discussion of this issue, see Giorgio Pini, *Categories and Logic in Duns Scotus: An Interpretation of Aristotle's* Categories *in the Late Thirteenth Century,* Studien und Texte zur Geistesgeschichte des Mittelalters 77 (Leiden: Brill, 2002), 32–36.

9. *Super Praed*., q. 2, nn. 3 and 30.

10. Scotus here refers to Aristotle, *Metaph.* V.14 and VII.1–2.

11. "Conceptus est immediatum significatum per vocem, de quo conceptu est logica; et quia passiones conceptus insunt voci significativae—sicut incomplexio, complexio, significare verum falsum—, ut signo per naturam significati" (*Super Praed.,* q. 1, n. 19). All translations of *Super Praed.* are from John Duns Scotus, *Questions on Aristotle's* Categories, trans. Lloyd A. Newton (Washington, D.C.: Catholic University of America Press, 2014). The angle brackets in quotations from *Super Praedicamenta* appear in the source and enclose an addition by the translator.

12. *Super Praed.*, q. 3, n. 8. See also Pini, *Categories and Logic,* 142–44.

13. *Super Praed*., q. 3, n. 5.

14. "Ad tertium dico quod res non est tota causa intentionis, sed tantum occasio, scilicet in quantum movet intellectum ut actu consideret, et intellectus est principalis causa" (*Super Praed*., q. 3, n. 13). For an extended discussion of this issue, see Pini, *Categories and Logic,* 110–13.

15. Pini, *Categories and Logic,* 173. For further discussion of this debate, see ibid., 173–14.

16. Peter John Olivi, *In II Sent.* q. 7, ed. Bernhard Jansen (Quaracchi: Collegium S. Bonaventurae, 1922–1926) 1:145–46. For this work, I provide the volume number followed by the page number(s).

17. Cyril L. Shircel discusses how things can be equivocal for the logician and univocal for the natural philosopher and metaphysician, and vice versa (see Shircel, *The Univocity of the Concept of Being in the Philosophy of John Duns Scotus* [Washington, D.C.: Catholic University of America Press, 1942], 21–22).

18. "Dico quod quorum est ratio substantiae propria et completa eadem, ipsa sunt eadem; sed univocatorum non est ratio eadem propria, licet ratio univocantis sit eadem eis, quia illa nulli univocato est propria" (*Super Praed*., q. 6, n. 15).

19. "Univocum apud logicum dicitur omne illud quod per unum rationem devenit ad intellectum, secundum quam dicitur de multis; apud naturalem non est omne tale, sed tantum quod est unum secundum ultimam formam completivam" (ibid., q. 7, n. 11). For an extended discussion, see Pini, *Categories and Logic*, 174.

20. See Chapter 3.

21. See Aristotle, *Metaphysics* V.14.

22. See Pini, *Categories and Logic*, 191–94.

23. "Potest dici quod differentia in genere substantiae est substantia, quia est idem

per se ei quod est per substantia. Non tamen est species vel individuum in genere substantiae, nec per se substantia. Verior tamen est talis praedicatio 'rationale est substantia' quam ista 'quantum est substantia,' quamvis utraque necessaria et utraque per accidens. Prima enim est per accidens, non quia aliquid est substantia cui accidit rationale, sed cui per se inest rationale" (*Super Praed.*, q. 14, n. 10).

24. E. J. Ashworth, "Analogical Concepts: The Fourteenth-Century Background to Cajetan," *Dialogue: Canadian Philosophical Review / Revue canadienne de philosophie* 31, no. 3 (June 1992): 400

25. Marrone, "The Notion of Univocity." See also Pini, *Categories and Logic*, 174.

26. Whether analogy falls under equivocity or is its own category is a matter of some dispute. Whereas Aristotle seems to opt for the former, Aquinas advocates the latter (cf. Roger Bacon, *De signis,* 3.5–4.1). Bacon distinguishes univocity, equivocity, and analogy not in terms of the number of *rationes,* but by the number of impositions and reimpositions for a term. For Bacon, analogy is a form of equivocation.

27. *Super Praed.,* q. 4, nn. 27–36.

28. See Aristotle, *Metaphysics* IV.2.

29. For a discussion of the latter text, see Giorgio Pini, "Univocity in Scotus's *Quaestiones super Metaphysicam*: The Solution to a Riddle," *Medioevo* 30 (2005): 69–110.

30. *Super Praed.,* q. 4, n. 38.

31. Scotus refers to *Sophistical Refutations*, I.5.

32. *Super Praed.,* q. 4, nn. 27–36. For a discussion of these two texts, see Ashworth, "Analogical Concepts," 405. With respect to Scotus's discussion of analogy, Shircel notes how Scotus has a different understanding of analogy of attribution than does Aquinas (see Shircel, *The Univocity of the Concept of Being*, 16–17).

33. "Et ne fiat contentio de nomine univocationis, univocum conceptum dico, qui ita est unus quod eius unitas sufficit ad contradictionem, affirmando et negando ipsum de eodem; sufficit etiam pro medio syllogistico, ut extrema unita in medio sic uno sine fallacia aequivocationis concludantur inter se uniri" (*Ord.* I, d. 3, p. 1, qq. 1–2, n. 26). This and subsequent translations of *Ord.* I.3 are from *On Being and Cognition: Ordinatio 1.3,* ed. and trans. John van den Bercken (New York: Fordham University Press, 2016).

34. Aristotle puts forward Parmenides's argument in *Metaph.* III.3 and offers his response in IV.2.

35. See Aristotle, *Metaph.* IV.2.

36. Ibid., 1003a. All translations of the *Metaphysics* are from Aristotle, *Metaphysics,* trans. Richard Hope (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1960).

37. *Super Praed.*, q. 4, n. 18.

38. "[O]mne univocum dictum de multis, dicitur de illis sub ratione alicuius universalis; aliter illa quinque universalia non sufficienter dividerent 'praedicabile de multis'" (ibid.).

39. Marrone argues that univocity is limited to the five universals at this stage in Scotus's career and not yet extended to the transcendentals (see Marrone, "The Notion of Univocity," 350–51).

40. "Similiter, si haec decem habent aliquod univocum, praedicatum de eis, per illud non distinguunter, manifestum est; igitur per aliquid superadditum unumquodque differt ab alio. Quidquid sit illud, sequitur haec esse differentia et non secundum se

diversa, quia 'sunt aliquid-idem entia' quod est contra Aristotelem IV *Metaphysicae*" (*Super Praed.,* q. 4, n. 19).

41. See Plato's argument in the *Sophist,* in particular 255d.

42. Aristotle, *Metaph.* III.3.

43. See Section 5.2.

44. *Super Praed.*, q. 4, n. 20.

45. Ibid.

46. Ibid., n. 21.

47. Ibid., q. 4, n. 22.

48. Here he loosens his earlier view in terms of the univocity of genus-level concepts.

49. "Quando arguitur 'illa natura est singularitas quadam, scilicet natura divina, igitur non habet aliquid commune sibi et creaturae," - dico quod consequentia non valet, nam Socrates est quoddam singulare et hoc, et tamen ab ipso et ab aliis singularibus potest aliquid abstrahi" (*Lect.* I, d. 3, p. 1, qq. 1–2, n. 124).

50. "Si essentia divina, quae de se est haec, potest habere conceptum communem sibi et creaturae, ille conceptus non tantum causabitur per operationem intellectus, quia tunc esset rationis tantum; unde oportet quod concurrat aliquid aliud ut obiectum; igitur est conceptus ille communis realis, igitur Deus habet aliquid reale in quo convenit cum creatura et in quo differt, quod non stat cum simplicitate eius" (ibid., n. 125).

51. For a by no means exhaustive or representative list, see Hampus Lyttkens, *The Analogy between God and the World: An Investigation of Its Background and Interpretation of Its Use by Thomas of Aquino* (Uppsala: Almquist and Wiksells, 1952); George P. Klubertanz, *St. Thomas Aquinas on Analogy: A Textual Analysis and Systematic Synthesis* (Chicago: Loyola University Press, 1960); John Wippel, *The Metaphysical Thought of Thomas Aquinas: From Finite Being to Uncreated Being* (Washington, D.C.: Catholic University of America Press, 2000), esp. 550–55; Bernard Montagnes, *The Doctrine of the Analogy of Being According to Thomas Aquinas,* trans. E. M. Macierowski (Milwaukee: Marquette University Press, 2004)*;* James F. Anderson, *The Bond of Being: An Essay on Analogy and Existence* (St. Louis: B. Herder, 1949); Ralph McInerny, *Aquinas and Analogy* (Washington, D.C.: Catholic University of America Press, 1996); and Steven A. Long, *Analogia Entis: On the Analogy of Being, Metaphysics, and the Act of Faith* (Notre Dame: University of Notre Dame Press, 2011). In a chapter entitled "Where Cajetan Went Wrong," McInerny argues that Cajetan's threefold division of analogy (i.e., of inequality, of attribution, and of proportionality) not only is based on a misreading of Thomas but also ultimately denies an analogical nature for the first or second division (i.e., inequality and attribution), leaving only his ill-defined analogy of "proper" proportionality (see McInerny, *Aquinas and Analogy*, 3–29).

52. "Quandoque vero dicitur aliquid analogice secundo modo convenientiae; sicut nomen visus dicitur de visu corporali et intellectu, eo quod sicut visus est in oculo, ita intellectus in mente" (*De veritate,* q. 2, a. 11, resp.). Representing what seems to be the majority view, Klubertanz explains: "For a period of some months around the year 1256, St. Thomas either held or considered holding proper proportionality as *the* intrinsic analogy explaining the ontological similarity between God and creatures. This position he had not held previously and would never develop again in subsequent

writings. Proper proportionality is therefore a Thomistic analogy in the sense that it is a doctrine taught by St. Thomas for a brief period early in his career" (Klubertanz, *St. Thomas Aquinas on Analogy,* 94; cf. Anderson, *The Bond of Being*, 284).

53. See, for example, the following: "sciendum est quod tripliciter aliquid praedicatur de pluribus: univoce, aequivoce et analogice. Univoce praedicatur quod praedicatur secundum idem nomen et secundum rationem eamdem, id est definitionem, sicut animal praedicatur de homine et de asino: utrumque enim dicitur animal, et utrumque est substantia animata sensibilis, quod est diffinitio animalis. Equivoce praedicatur, quod praedicatur de aliquibus secundum idem nomen, et secundum diversam rationem, sicut canis dicitur de latrabili et de caelesti, que conveniunt solum in nomine, et non in diffinitione sive significatione; id enim quod significatur per nomen, est diffinitio, sicut dicitur in IV Metaphisice. Analogice dicitur praedicari quod praedicatur de pluribus quorum rationes diversae sunt sed attribuuntur uni alicui eidem, sicut sanum dicitur de corpore animalis et de urina et de potione, sed non ex toto idem significat in omnibus" (Aquinas, *De principiis naturae,* c. 6).

54. *In Sent.* I, Prolog., q. 1, a. 2, ad. 2. This passage is cited and discussed in Section 3.5 below.

55. See, for example, *SCG* I, c. 34; and *De potentia Dei* (*On the Power of God*), in S. Thomae Aquinatis, *Quaestiones disputatae, t. 2: Quaestiones disputatae de potentia,* ed. P. M. Pession, 8th ed. (Taurini-Romae: Marietti, 1949), q. 7, a. 7, resp.

56. Aquinas, *Metaphysicorum Aristotelis,* IV, lec. 1.

57. "Quandoque vero secundum rationes quae partim sunt diversae et partim non diversae: diversae quidem secundum quod diversas habitudines important, unae autem secundum quod ad unum aliquid et idem istae diversae habitudines referuntur; et illud dicitur analogice praedicari, id est proportionaliter, prout unumquodque secundum suam habitudinem ad illud unum refertur" (ibid., n. 7).

58. How Aquinas explains this initial ground of diversity will be considered in Subsection 3.4.2 below.

59. "Illud unum ad quod diversae habitudines referuntur in analogicis, est unum numero, et non solum unum ratione, sicut est unum illud quod per nomen univocum designatur. Et ideo dicit quod ens et si dicatur multipliciter, non tamen dicitur aequivoce, sed per respectum ad unum; non quidem ad unum quod sit solum ratione unum, sed quod est unum sicut una quaedam natura" (Aquinas, *Metaphysicorum Aristotelis,* IV, lec. 1, n. 8).

60. Hochschild shows how Aristotle treated cases of associated meaning based on a focal meaning (i.e., reference to one) apart from things having likenesses or similar relations (see Hochschild, *The Semantics of Analogy,* 4–5). In the passage from Aquinas above, one can see how he blends the two together. For an account of how Aquinas interweaves metaphysical, theological, epistemological, and semantic considerations, see ibid., 9–10.

61. Thomas of Sutton, *QO,* qq. 26 and 32. For further discussion of this issue, see Gyula Klima, "Thomas of Sutton and Henry of Ghent on the Analogy of Being," in *Categories and What is Beyond*, ed. Klima and Alexander W. Hall, Proceedings of the Society for Medieval Logic and Metaphysics 2 (Newcastle upon Tyne: Cambridge Scholars Publishing, 2011), 49–64.

62. Thomas of Sutton, *QO*, q. 26, 729.

63. See Aquinas, *De ente,* c. 4. See also Thomas of Sutton, *Tract. de esse,* c. 3, 244. For further discussion of this issue, see Klima, "Thomas of Sutton and Henry of Ghent on the Analogy of Being," 57–62.

64. "Essentia non sic participat esse, quod habeat esse limitatum *per differentiam contrahentem* [my emphasis] esse ad constituendum essentiam, de cuius intellectu sit esse, ut ideo dicatur participare esse, id est partem eius capere, quia est de essentia eius quae est limitata, sicut species participat genus" (Thomas of Sutton, *QO,* q. 26, 730).

65. See Klima, "Thomas Sutton and Henry of Ghent on the Analogy of Being," 579. See also Andrew LaZella, "As Light Belongs to Air: Thomas Aquinas and Meister Eckhart on the Existential Rootlessness of Creatures," *American Catholic Philosophical Quarterly* 87, no. 4 (2013): 567–91.

66. For Scotus's argument, see *Lect.* I, d. 3, p. 1, qq. 1–2, n. 11. For Henry's use of this term, see, for example, Henry, *Summa,* a. 21, q. 3. Citations and translations of *Summa,* aa. 21–24 are from Henry of Ghent, *Summa: The Questions on God's Existence and Essence (Articles 21–24),* trans. Jos Decorte and Roland J. Teske (Paris: Peeters, 2005). I indicate both the page number and include folio numbers of Badius edition. See Tobias Hoffmann, "Influence on John Duns Scotus's Metaphysics," in *A Companion to Henry of Ghent,* ed. Gordon A. Wilson (Leiden: Brill, 2011), 343–47.

67. Henry of Ghent, *Summa,* a 21, q. 2, 56–57 [124v–125r]. Although Henry and Thomas of Sutton share many points in common with respect to analogy, Klima articulates a key dividing line in terms of the essence/existence distinction (see Klima, "Thomas Sutton and Henry of Ghent on the Analogy of Being," 62–63).

68. "Intelligendum tamen quod illa indeterminatio alia est respectu esse Dei, et alia respectu esse creaturae, quia duplex est est indeterminatio, una negativa, altera vero privative dicta" (Henry of Ghent, *Summa,* a. 21, q. 2, 56–57 [124v]).

69. Allan B. Wolter, *The Transcendentals and Their Function in the Metaphysics of Duns Scotus* (St. Bonaventure, N.Y.: Franciscan Institute, 1946), 38.

70. "Intelligis bonum hoc, bonum illud; intellige bonum simpliciter et Deum intellexeris. Similiter, si intelligis hoc ens et illud ens, si intelligis ens simpliciter, Deum intelligis. Et hoc concipiendo esse simpliciter et indeterminatum indeterminatione negationis, ut dictum est" (Henry of Ghent, *Summa,* a. 21, q. 2, 56–59 [125r]).

71. As he elsewhere argues, the mind naturally grasps the indeterminate before the determinate (Henry, *Summa,* a. 24, q. 7, 246–49 [144r–144v]). For the multiple senses of being proper to creatures, see ibid., 58–59 [125r].

72. Ibid., q. 6, 234–35 [142v–143r].

73. As Martin Pickavé explains: "Before our intellect forms a determinate understanding of this or that (particular) good thing, it has to have an understanding of good characterized by indeterminateness, or more precisely, by a privative indeterminateness. But since there exists an indeterminateness that is even greater than privative indeterminateness, the intellect first 'runs through' that maximal (negative) indeterminateness and so cognizes something divine" (Pickavé, "Henry of Ghent on Metaphysics," in *A Companion to Henry of Ghent,* ed. Gordon A. Wilson [Leiden: Brill, 2011], 161).

74. Henry of Ghent, *Summa,* a. 24, q. 6, 232–35 [142v–143r]. Both Pickavé ("Henry of Ghent on Metaphysics," 164–66) and Hoffmann ("Influence on John Duns Scotus's Metaphysics," 346) note that this is not an invitation but a warning.

75. Henry of Ghent, *Summa,* a. 21, q. 2.

76. Ibid., pages 48–51 [124r].

77. For Scotus's rejection of Henry's argument on this point using angels as a test case of *imago Dei*, see *Lect.* II, d. 3, p. 2, q. 2, nn. 270–77 and 280–82. For analysis of this argument, see Andrew LaZella, "Remainders and Reminders of the Divine: Duns Scotus's Critique of Images of God," *Anuario Filosófico* 49, no. 3 (2016): 517–37.

78. Henry of Ghent, *Summa,* a. 24, q. 6, 242–43 [143v]; and a. 21, q. 2, 48–53 [124r–124v]. Steven P. Marrone states: "At last one can see fully how Henry could have justified his notion of a confused primary knowledge of being that originated solely in the mind's contact with the created world but leads to both God and creatures. Given his theory of being and essence, the analogical unity of the most general notion of being presented no particular obstacle to the formation of an idea of God. For according to Henry God was known in all essence—or to put it another way, in knowing essence the mind knows something of the divine" (Marrone, "Henry of Ghent and Duns Scotus on the Knowledge of Being," *Speculum* 63, no. 1 [1988]: 39).

79. Henry of Ghent, *Summa,* a. 21, q. 2, 48–51 [124r–124v].

80. *Lect.* I, d. 3, p. 1, q. 2, n. 13.

81. Aquinas seems to recognize this problem (see *ST* I, q. 77, a. 1, ad. 7).

82. See, for example, *In Metaph.* II, qq. 2–3, nn. 76 and 83.

83. *Ord.* I, d. 3, p. 1, q. 3, nn. 139–40. See also *In Metaph.* II, qq. 2–3, n. 18.

84. See, for example, *Rep.* I-A, d. 22, q. unica, n. 23; and *In Metaph.* II, qq. 2–3, n. 81.

85. *Lect.* I, d. 3, p. 1, qq. 1–2, n. 111.

86. Ibid., n. 55.

87. Ibid. The example of a lamb recognizing its mother seems to have originated with Avicenna. He used it show that a *vis aestimativa* (or a *vis cogitativa* in humans) was necessary to "see beyond the senses" and attribute various intentions (*mana, intentiones*) to an object. For further discussion in Scotus, see Richard Cross, *Duns Scotus's Theory of Cognition* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2014), 138–39. Using a similar example, Albert the Great held that unless the wolf cognized its offspring as an individual, it would not feel compassion for it. "Nec unquam lupus miseretur nato suo, nisi habeat cognitionem et hujus individui, et quod hoc individum est natus ejus" (see Albert the Great, *De anima* III, t. 1, c. 2, 317). For a similar discussion, see Aquinas, *ST* I, q. 78, a. 4, resp.

88. "Nihil tamen concipimus 'quid' nisi ens" (*In Metaph.* II, qq. 2–3, n. 115).

89. Ibid.

90. "Sed ipsi enti coniungimus accidentia positiva vel privativa, quae cognoscimus ex sensu, et facimus ex ente et multis talibus unam descriptionem, quae tota numquam invenitur nisi tali specie. Et conceptus talis descriptionis est perfectior conceptus quem habemus de tali specie substantiae" (ibid).

91. "Ubi ergo est alia differentia in natura substrata, ibi diversimode variantur accidentia et diversimode coniunguntur, et sic etiam aliud et aliud est substratum colori vel albedini ut est in ligno et ut est in lapide" (*Rep.* I-A, d. 22, q. un., n. 25; my emphasis).

92. King, "Scotus on Metaphysics," 18.

93. "Responsio: dico quod loquendo de conceptu simpliciter simplici non resolubili in diversos conceptus non possumus habere de eo conceptum proprium, quin omnis talis a creatura abstractus sit sibi et creaturae univoce communis. Sed quia

stando in tali conceptu non possumus distinguere ipsum a non ipso, per proprium conceptum possemus eum sic distinguere, sed talem conceptum simpliciter simplicem et communem contingit per alium conceptum—vel per alios conceptus simpliciter simplices communes sibi et creaturis—priorem determinare et sic fiet sibi proprius, ita quod nulli creaturae communis, licet a creaturis abstrahantur conceptus huiusmodi" (*Rep.* I-A, d. 3, q. 1, a. 3, n. 45; translation modified).

94. "Quod si dicas, alia est formalis ratio eorum qua conveniunt Deo, ex hoc sequitur inconveniens, quod ex nulla ratione propria eorum prout sunt in creaturis, possunt concludi de Deo, quia omnino alia et alia ratio illorum est et istorum; immo non magis concludetur quod Deus est sapiens formaliter, ex ratione sapientiae quam apprehendimus ex creaturis, quod Deus est formaliter lapis: potest enim conceptus aliquis, alius a conceptu lapidis creati, formari, ad quem conceptum lapids ut est idea in Deo habet iste lapis attributionem, et ita formaliter diceretur 'Deus est lapis' secundum istum conceptum analogum, sicut 'sapiens' secundum illum conceptum analogum" (*Ord.* I, d. 3, p. 1, qq. 1–2, n. 40).

95. *Lect.* I, d. 3, p. 1, qq. 1–2, n. 113.

96. See, for example, ibid., nn. 75–77; *In Metaph.* II, qq. 2–3, nn. 93–94; and *Rep.* I-A, Prol., q. 1, n. 19.

97. See, for example, Aquinas, *De ente,* Prol.

98. For the role of divine illumination in Henry's thought, see Marrone, "Henry of Ghent and Duns Scotus on the Knowledge of Being," 28ff.

99. "Et confirmatur ratio, quia 'obiectum': praeter conceptum suum proprium adaequatum, et inclusum in ipso altero duorum modorum praedictorum, nihil potest cognosci ex isto obiecto nisi per discursum; sed discursus praesupponit cognitionem istius simplicis ad quod discurritur. Formetur igitur ratio sic, quia nullum obiectum facit conceptum simplicem proprium, in isto intellectu, conceptum simplicem proprium alterius obiecti, nisi contineat illud aliud obiectum essentialiter vel virtualiter; obiectum autem creatum non continet increatum essentialiter vel virtualiter, et hoc sub ea ratione sub qua sibi attribuitur, ut 'posterius essentialiter' attribuitur 'priori essentialiter,'—quia contra rationem 'posterioris essentialiter' est includere virtualiter suum prius, et patet quod obiectum creatum non essentialiter continet increatum secundum aliquid omnino sibi proprium et non commune; ergo non facit conceptum simplicem et proprium enti increato." (*Ord.* I, d. 3, p. 1, q. 2, n. 35). See also *Ord.* II, d. 3, p. 2, q. 2, n. 317.

100. See, for example, *Lect.* I, d. 3, p. 1, qq. 1–2, nn. 26–27.

101. Ibid.

102. "Si enim ita cognoscitur Deus per creaturam, oportet aliquem conceptum praehabere de Deo, ad quem discurritur, quia discursus praesupponit aliquem conceptum de termino ad quem est" (*Ord.* I, d. 3, p. 1, qq. 1–2, n. 106).

103. *Ord.* II, d. 3, p. 2, q. 2, n. 316.

104. *Lect.* II, d. 3, p. 2, q. 2, n. 284.

105. See Wolter, *The Transcendentals*, 40–48.

106. For how we can form a simply-simple concept of the ultimate difference *infinitum* based on cognitive access to finite accidents, see *Quod.*, q. 5, a. 1, nn. 5–9 [§§2–4].

107. *Ord.* II, d. 3, p. 2, q. 2, n. 316. See also *Lect.* I, d. 3, p. 1, qq. 1–2, n. 27.

108. *Lect.* I, d. 3, p. 1, qq. 1–2, n. 27.

109. *Ord.* I, d. 3, p. 1, qq. 1–2, n. 45.

110. *Lect.* I, d. 3, p. 1, qq. 1–2, n. 113.

111. Ibid., nn. 66 and 88–104.

112. *In Metaph.* I, q. 4, n. 44.

113. *Quod.,* q. 14, a. 2, nn. 39–43 [§§11–12]. See also *Rep.* I-A, d. 3, q. 1.

114. This too had been Scotus's own position. He states: "Dico quod primum obiectum intellectus est substantia. Quia, ut dicit Aristoteles in principio VII *Metaphysicae,* 'substantia est primum omnium entium cognitione,' quod non intelligitur de prioritae temporis sed naturae, scilicet quod cognitio eius est perfectissima" (*Super Praed.*, q. 4, n. 53).

115. *Quod.*, q. 14, a. 2, n. 39 [§11].

116. *Rep.* I-A, d. 3, q. 1, a. 2, nn. 20–22.

117. *Quod.,* q. 3, a. 1, n. 9 [§2].

118. *Lect.* I, d. 3, pars 1, qq. 1–2, nn. 88–104.

119. See *Ord.* I, d. 3, p. 1, q. 1-2. See also *Lect.* I, d. 3, p. 1, q. 1–2.

2. THE REAL CONCEPT OF BEING

1. Philotheus Boehner, "Scotus' Teaching According to Ockham: I. On the Univocity of Being," *Franciscan Studies* 6, no. 1 (1946): 101.

2. For a full account of this activity, see, for example, Efrem Bettoni, *Duns Scotus: The Basic Principles of His Philosophy*, trans. Bernadine Bonansea (Washington, D.C.: Catholic University of America Press, 1961), 93–117; and, more recently, Richard Cross, *Duns Scotus's Theory of Cognition* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2014), chaps. 2–4.

3. Intuitive cognition can be defined roughly as cognition of the object as existing and present. Abstractive cognition is cognition indifferent to the object's existence and presence (*Ord.* I, d. 3, p. 1, q. 3, nn. 139–44).

4. "Causae igitur causantes primum actum confusum intellectus sunt naturales, ut phantasmata et intellectus agens" (*Lect.* I, d. 3, p. 1, qq. 1–2, n. 71). See also *Quod.*, q. 15, a. 1, n. 33 [§10].

5. Being is already present in sensation (see *In Metaph.* I, q. 4, n. 44).

6. "Ad illud dicendum quod conceptus entis communis Deo et creaturae sit conceptus realis, quia omnis conceptus qui imprimitur in intellectu possibili ab intellectu agente et phantasmate, vel qui includitur in conceptu qui imprimitur ab eis, est realis; sed ille conceptus qui causatur a collatione facta per intellectum unius conceptus alteri, est rationis" (*Lect.* I, d. 3, p. 1, qq. 1–2, n. 126).

7. Peter Vier discusses the use of confused cognition in the sciences (e.g., geometry). See Vier, *Evidence and Its Function According to John Duns Scotus* (Bonaventure, N.Y.: Franciscan Institute, 1951), 78–83.

8. *In Metaph.* II, qq. 2–3, n. 114. See also Giorgio Pini, "Scotus on Knowing and Naming Natural Kinds," *History of Philosophy Quarterly* 26 (2009): 258.

9. *Lect.* I, d. 3, p. 1, qq. 1–3, n. 70. See also Allan B. Wolter, *The Transcendentals and Their Function in the Metaphysics of Duns Scotus* (St. Bonaventure, NY: Franciscan Institute, 1946), 60–62.

10. *Lect.* I, d. 3, p. 1, q. 1–2, n. 78.

11. *Rep.* I-A, d. 22, q. un., n. 23.

12. *Lect.* I, d. 3, p. 1, q. 1–2, n. 68. See also *Ord.* I, d. 3, p. 1, q. 2, n. 71.

13. "Unde ille conceptus dicitur non simplex qui pluribus actibus concipitur, sicut ens per accidens, ut 'homo albus', et etiam alia complexa" (*Lect.* I, d. 3, p. 1, q. 1–2, n. 68).

14. "Ille est conceptus simpliciter simplex qui non reducitur in priorem aut simpliciorem, nec omnino in plures conceptus resolvitur, sicut est conceptus entis et conceptus ultimae differentiae" (ibid., d. 2, p. 1, q. 2, n. 24; my emphasis). See also *Ord.* I. d. 3, p. 1, q. 2, n. 71.

15. *Lect.* I, d. 3, p. 1, qq. 1–2, n. 70.

16. Ibid., d. 2, p. 1, q. 2, n. 68.

17. Ibid., d. 3, p. 1, qq. 1–2, n. 70; *Ord.* I, d. 3, p. 1, qq. 1–2, n. 72.

18. *Ord.* I, d. 3, p. 1, qq. 1–2, n. 72. Scotus here contrasts *confusum intelligere* and *confuse intelligere*. The former pertains to objects, the latter to our manner of understanding or conceptualizing them. An example of the former would be a universal as a confused or indistinct object insofar as it is indifferent to its subjective parts or an essential whole undistinguished into essential parts. Our focus in what follows will be the latter (i.e., confused understanding).

19. *Lect.* I, d. 3, p. 1, qq. 1–2, n. 72.

20. "Sed confuse aliquid dicitur concipi quando concipitur sicut exprimitur per nomen,-distincte, quando concipitur sicut exprimitur per definitionem" (*Ord.* I, d. 3, p. 1, qq. 1–2, n. 72).

21. See *Lect.* I, d. 3, p. 1, qq. 1–2, n. 111.

22. "Dico quod sicut est duplex confusum, scilicet 'totum universale' et 'totum essentiale,' ita utrumque in suo ordine est primum. Sed 'simpliciter primum' est illud quod est primum in ordine confuse cognoscendi, quia processus naturalis ab imperfecto ad perfectum est per medium. Confuse autem cognoscere est quasi medium inter ignorare et distincte cognoscere, et ideo confuse cognoscere est ante quodcumque distincte cognoscere.—Quod autem dicit de puero, concedo quod species praeintelligitur ante (dixi quod species est primum intelligibile), sed ratio non concludit de genere et specie: prius enim actualiter concipitur albedo quam color, in ordine cognitionis confusae, quia color sub ratione coloris non cognoscitur nis sub ratione maioris abstractionis quam sit abstractio ab hac albedine,—et ista abstractio maior est difficilior, quia est minus similibus" (*Ord.* I, d. 3, p. 1, qq. 1–2, n. 86).

23. "Ergo ens est primus conceptus distincte conceptibilis.—Ex hoc sequitur quod ea quae sunt sibi propinquiora, sunt priora, quia cognoscere 'distincte' habetur per definitionem, quae inquiritur per viam divisionis, incipiendo ab ente usque ad conceptum definiti. In divisione autem prius occurrunt concepta priora, ut genus et differentia in quibus concipitur distincte conceptus communior" (ibid., n. 80).

24. Ibid.

25. *Q. de an.,* q. 16, n. 19.

26. "Sed cognito universali distincte, tunc per eius divisionem et contractionem—per additionem differentiae—fit reditus ad cognoscendum speciem distincte" (ibid.). Cross cites this passage without highlighting the role of ultimate differentiation (see Cross, *Duns Scotus's Theory of Cognition,* 74).

27. Cross, *Duns Scotus's Theory of Cognition,* 74.

28. *Ord.* I, d. 3, p. 1, qq. 1–2, n. 86.

29. Scotus notes that division need not always be into two (see *In Metaph.* V, qq. 5–6, n. 79). See also Introduction, note 9, for a similar statement from Gill.

30. Cross, *Duns Scotus's Theory of Cognition*, 73. He states, for example, "This two-fold analysis [of abstraction and division] is distinctive to Scotus" (ibid., 70).

31. See also ibid., 70–74. Cross does not discuss the role of ultimate difference in this process.

32. *Ord.* I, d. 3, p. 3, qq. 1–2, n. 80.

33. For more on this claim, see Claude Panaccio, *Le discours intérieur: De Platon à Guillaume d'Ockham* (Paris: Seuil, 1999), chap. 7; and Cross, *Duns Scotus's Theory of Cognition,* chap. 9.

34. "Sicut ens compositum componitur ex actu et potentia in re, ita conceptus compositus per se unus componitur ex conceptu potentiali et actuali, sive ex conceptu determinabili et determinante" (*Ord.* I, d. 3, p. 1, q. 3, n. 133).

35. *Lect.* I, d. 3, p. 1, qq. 1–2, n. 101.

36. "Sicut ergo resolutio entium compositorum stat ultimo ad simpliciter simplicia, scilicet ad actum ultimum et ad potentiam ultimam, quae sunt primo diverso, ita quod nihil unius includit aliquid alterius—alioquin non hoc primo esset actus, nec illud primo esset potentia (quod enim includit aliquid potentialitatis, non est primo actus)—ita oportet in conceptibus omnem conceptum non-simpliciter simplicem, et tamen per se unum, resolvi in conceptum determinabilem et determinantem, ita quo resolutio stet ad conceptus simpliciter simplices, videlicet ad conceptum determinabilem tantum, ita quod nihil determinans includat, et ad conceptum determinantem tantum, qui non includat aliquem conceptum determinabilem" (*Ord.* I, d. 3, p. 1, q. 3, n. 133; my translation).

37. Cf. Peter King, "Scotus on Metaphysics," in *The Cambridge Companion to Duns Scotus,* ed. Thomas Williams, 15–68 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003), 19–20.

38. "Ille est conceptus simpliciter simplex qui non reducitur in priorem aut simpliciorem, nec omnino in plures conceptus resolvitur, sicut est conceptus entis et conceptus ultimae differentiae" (*Lect.* I, d. 2, p. 1, q. 2, n. 24).

39. "Ille conceptus 'tantum determinabilis' est conceptus entis, et 'determinans tantum' est conceptus ultimae differentiae. Ergo isti erunt primo diversi, ita quod unum nihil includet alterius" (*Ord.* I, d. 3, p. 1, q. 3, n. 133; my translation).

40. *In librum Porphyrii*, q. 12, nn. 15–16; Wolter, *The Transcendentals*, 79–80.

41. *Lect.* I, d. 3, p. 1, qq. 1–2, n. 123. See also *In librum Porphyrii*, q. 12, n. 16 and q. 28, n. 5.

42. *Lect.* I, d. 3, p. 1, qq. 1–2, n. 131.

43. Ibid., d. 8, p. 1, q. 3, n. 56.

44. For his account of the primary diversity of the ten categories, see *Lect.* II, d. 1, q. 5, n. 165. For his account of the primary diversity between God and creatures, see ibid., d. 8, p. 1, q. 3, n. 56.

45. "Dico quod illa quae sunt primo diversa, non possunt constituere aliquod 'idem,' sed quanto magis sunt diversa, tanto magis sunt disposita ad constituendum unum per se; ad hoc enim quod ex aliquibus fiat unum per se, requiritur non-identitas partium" (ibid., d. 12, q. un., n. 51).

46. "Et quaestio 'quomodo' difficilis est forte Platoni, non nobis qui ponimus aliquam differentiam, non per passionem" (*In Metaph.* V, q. 9, n. 55).

47. In the *Sophist* (a dialogue likely unknown to Scotus), Plato examines difference most carefully. He still explains differentiation in terms of the reified Form of

Difference, one of the great kinds (*megista gene*) (see Plato, *Sophist* 254b–257a). As a Form, however, such a thing is already constituted as a unity; furthermore, how Difference itself by itself could possess self-sameness (as is the characteristic of Forms) remains something of an *aporia.*

48. For a more extended treatment of this topic, see Chapter 3.

49. I will address this in Chapter 4 as a "new intensity of being."

50. *Lect.* I, d. 7, q. un., n. 114.

51. This seems to be one of the reasons Scotus awards matter with some degree of reality apart from form.

52. For Scotus, matter has being in itself, even when it is not joined to form (see, for example, *Quod.*, q. 9, a. 2, n. 7 [§3]). For a more in-depth discussion of this issue, see Thomas M. Ward, *John Duns Scotus on Parts, Wholes, and Hylomorphism* (Leiden: Brill, 2014), chap. 2.

53. See, for example, *Lect.* I, d. 3, p. 1, qq. 1–2, n. 99; and *Ord.* I, d. 3, p. 1, q. 3, n. 137 and n. 151.

54. "In ente concurrat duplex primitas, videlicet primitas communitatis in 'quid' ad omnes conceptus non-simpliciter simplices, et primitas virtualitatis—in se vel in suis inferioribus—ad omnes conceptus simpliciter simplices" (*Ord.* I, d. 3, pars 1, q. 3, n. 151; my translation).

55. "Ens est univocum in omnibus, sed conceptibus non-simpliciter simplicibus est univocus in 'quid' dictus de eis; simpliciter simplicibus est univocus, sed ut determinabilis vel ut denominabilis,-non autem ut dictum de eis in 'quid,' quia hoc includit contradictionem" (ibid., p. 1, q. 3, n. 150; my translation).

56. This topic will be discussed in more depth in Chapter 5.

57. "Istae rationes non includunt univocationem entis dicti in 'quid' ad differentias ultimas et passiones" (*Ord.* I, d. 3, p. 1, q. 3, n. 147).

58. Wolter, *Transcendentals,* 94; see also ibid., 92–93.

59. *Ord.* I, d. 3, p. 1 q. 3, n. 133. To maintain the character of ultimate differences as pure *qualia,* I will need test the limits of grammar at certain points. For example, where the reader sees "infinite" and might expect "infinity," they should note that this is not a mistake.

60. Ibid.

61. *Lect.* I, d. 8, p. 1, q. 3, n. 119.

62. Boethius, *De topicis differentiis,* book 1, 1173d, lines 32–34.

63. Eleonore Stump, "Dialectic in Ancient and Medieval Logic: Commentary on Boethius's *De topicis differentiis*" (Ithaca. N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1978), 196.

64. Boethius, *De topicis differentiis,* book 2, 1189b, lines 21–28.

65. Ibid.

66. *Lect.* I, d. 8, p. 1, q. 3, n. 121.

67. Ibid., n. 120.

68. Ibid., n. 122.

69. "Dico quod 'quid' est communius quam quod possit esse genus, et 'quale' quam differentia, quia non omne 'quale' est 'quale' actuans et informans potentiale. Sed illud 'quale' dicit modum intrinsecum perfectionis divinae in se, non quod infinitas sit quasi perfectio alicuius perfectionis aut essentiae, quia non distinctum attributum ut alias dictum est" (ibid., n. 123).

70. *Lect.* I, d. 3, p. 1, qq. 1–2, n. 127.

71. "Essentia divina est ens infinitum et haec singularitas [. . .]" (ibid.).

72. *Rep.* I-A, d. 3, q. 1, n. 45.

73. Due to the imperfection of our intellect, we conceive a single simple reality through a complex concept (*Lect.* I, d. 8, p. 1, q. 3, n. 125).

74. Wolter, *The Transcendentals,* 30.

75. See, for example, Aquinas's *De ente* for the move from confused to distinct cognition of being qua being.

76. Honnefelder expresses a similar sentiment as follows: "Gemeint ist also nicht das pure Sosein, sondern das Seiendsein, das sich darin (in seinem Minimalmoment) zeigt, dass etwas als ein *subjecthaftes Was* und insofern als >Seiendes< bezeichnet werden kann. Wäre >Seiendes< die essentia pura, so wäre zu fragen, warum Scotus von >ens< und nicht von >essentia< spricht." Honnefelder, *Ens inquantum ens,* 428. The angle brackets are present in the source.

77. *Lect.* I, d. 8, p. 1, q. 3, n. 124.

78. Ibid., d. 3, p. 1, qq. 1–2, nn. 122–23.

79. *Ord.* I, d. 3, p. 1, qq. 1–2, nn. 23–24.

80. "Unde sciendum est quod ens per prius dividitur in ens finitum et infinitum quam dividatur in decem genera, quia divisio entis finiti est in decem genera; et sicut ens sic primo dividitur, ita illa quae consequuntur ens absolute per prius convenient sibi quam dividatur in decem genera. Sed omnia quae consequuntur ens ut commune est Deo et creaturae, consequuntur ens secundum suam indifferentiam, et ideo consequuntur ens per prius quam determinetur ad genera. Huiusmodi autem quae sic consequuntur ens, sunt transcendentia, et ideo non erunt in genere" (*Lect.* I, d. 8, p. 1, q. 3, n. 107).

81. Honnefelder uses variations of this phrase throughout *Ens inquantum ens* (e.g., 413).

82. On this point, Scotus is quite close to Henry (see Henry of Ghent, *Quod.* IV, q. 4, in *Opera Omnia,* ed. G. A. Wilson and Girard Etzkorn, vol. 8. Ancient and Medieval Philosophy, De Wulf-Mansion Centre, series 2 (Leuven: Leuven University Press; Leiden: Brill, 2011), 13.

83. *Ord.* I, d. 3, p. 1, q. 3, n. 147.

3. ULTIMATE DIFFERENCE

1. *Ord.* I, d. 3, p. 1, q. 3, n. 133.

2. Allan B. Wolter, *The Transcendentals and Their Function in the Metaphysics of Duns Scotus* (St. Bonaventure, N.Y.: Franciscan Institute, 1946), 82–87. More recently, Peter King lists only the latter two groups (see King, "Scotus on Metaphysics," in *The Cambridge Companion to Duns Scotus,* ed. Thomas Williams, 15–68 [Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003], 59n19).

3. Aristotle, *Metaph.* V.9–10.

4. Aquinas, *SCG* I, c. 17.

5. Ibid.

6. " 'Differentia ultima' dicitur quia non habet differentiam, quia non resolvitur in conceptum quiditativum et qualitativum, determinabilem et determinantem, sed est tantum conceptus eius qualitativus, sicut ultimum genus tantum quiditativum habet conceptum" (*Ord.* I, d. 3, p. 1, q. 3, n. 131; my translation).

7. "Accipiantur duae differentiae. Quaero an de eis dicitur ens in 'quid', aut non? Si

sic, igitur conveniunt essentialiter in ente, et sunt diversa et non in ente, igitur aliis differentiis; sint illae *c* et *d.* Quaero sicut prius, aut dicitur ens de eis in 'quid', aut non. Si sic, arguitur sicut prius; et sic vel erit processus in infinitum, vel ultimo devenitur ad aliquas differentias de quibus non praedicatur ens in 'quid'" (*Lect.* I, d. 3, p. 1, qq. 1–2, n. 100).

8. This will be further clarified when I investigate the ground of primary diversity in Section 3.4.

9. Aristotle, *Metaph.* VII.12, 1038a20. This is by no means Aristotle's only answer (cf. ibid., VIII.6). For a discussion of these issues, see David Charles, *Aristotle on Meaning and Essence* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2010), 276–300; Marguerite Deslauriers, *Aristotle on Definition* (Leiden: Brill, 2007); and Edward C. Halper, *One and Many in Aristotle's* Metaphysics: *The Central Books* (Columbus: Ohio State University Press, 1989), 179–95. See also Joseph Owens, *The Doctrine of Being in the Aristotelian "Metaphysics,"* 2nd ed. (Toronto: Pontifical Institute of Mediaeval Studies, 1963), 224.

10. For an excellent discussion of this issue, see Deslauriers, *Aristotle on Definition* (Leiden: Brill, 2007), c. 4.

11. *ST* I–II, q. 18, a. 7.

12. Deslauriers, *Aristotle on Definition,* 135.

13. Michael J. Loux explains: "That last differentia is not just another item in the definition, just another 'part' of the form; it is the form itself" (Loux, *Primary Ousia: An Essay on Aristotle's* Metaphysics *Z and H* [Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1991], 175). Loux, however, arrives at a different reading of the argument than the one I present. He argues: Z12 is concerned with definition of form, not definition of species; this is really a pseudo-problem of unity; and it does not directly correlate with H.2's discussion of the unity of definitions of species (see ibid., 168–83).

14. Aristotle, *Post. Ana.* II.7.

15. Aristotle, *Metaph.* VIII.6; translation modified.

16. "Dicit ergo primo, quod si sic se habent differentiae acceptae in definitione sicut dictum est, scilicet quod semper sumantur per se differentiae et non per accidens, palam est quod ultima differentia erit tota substantia rei, et tota definitio. Includit enim in se omnes praecedentes particularas" (Aquinas, *Metaphysicorum Aristotelis*, VII, L12, n. 19).

17. Ibid., L9, n. 8. Aquinas here, as elsewhere, believes that Aristotle agrees with him rather than with Averroes.

18. I bypass the question of whether the unity is that of substantial form alone or the compound.

19. Ibid., n. 4. See also *De ente,* cc. 2–4. I will return to this argument in Chapter 5.

20. *Ord.* I, d. 3.

21. For a discussion of ultimate difference as the final determination of a thing, see Owens, *The Doctrine of Being in the Aristotelian "Metaphysics,"* 224.

22. Boethius, *Commentary on the "Categories,"* 192B. The awkwardness of this solution is discussed in John Marenbon, *The Philosophy of Peter Abelard* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1997), 118n2.

23. See Subsection 4.4.1 for further discussion of this issue. Peter King's text reads "just as the ultimate genus merely has a qualitative concept" (see King, "Duns Scotus on the Common Nature and the Individual Differentia," *Philosophical Topics* 20 [1992]: 75n27).

24. S. Y. Watson, "Univocity and Analogy of Being in the Philosophy of Duns Scotus," *Proceedings for the American Catholic Philosophical Association* (1958): 201n55.

25. For this list, see Subsection 2.2.3.

26. King, "Duns Scotus on the Common Nature," 58–60.

27. *Lect.* I, d. 8, p. 1, q. 3, n. 123.

28. "Item, hoc videtur destruere logicam Aristotelis, qui non videtur ponere nisi decem praedicamenta dicta in quid de omnibus, et nullum eorum quae—tu ponis—conveniunt enti antequam descendat in decem genera" (*Rep.* I-A, d. 8, p. 2, q. 5, n. 145).

29. Ibid., n. 149.

30. For his discussion of these two terms, see *Lect.* I, d. 3, p. 1, qq. 1–2, n. 123. See also *In librum Porphyrii* q. 12, n. 16 and q. 28, n. 5.

31. *In Metaph.* VII, q. 17, n. 26.

32. Giorgio Pini, *Categories and Logic in Duns Scotus: An Interpretation of Aristotle's Categories in the Late Thirteenth Century,* Studien und Texte zur Geistesgeschichte des Mittelalters 77 (Leiden: Brill, 2002), 191–94.

33. Ibid., 191.

34. "Sed ultima realitas sive 'perfectio realis' talis naturae, a qua ultima realitate sumitur ultima differentia, est simpliciter simplex; ista realitas non includit ens quidditative, sed habet conceptum simpliciter simplex" (*Ord.* I, d. 3, p. 1, q. 3, n. 159; translation modified).

35. See Section 4.1 for a discussion of the modal distinction, and Section 5.1 for the formal distinction.

36. Wolter, *The Transcendentals,* 30.

37. William of Ockham, *Ord.* I, d. 2, q. 9, in *Opera Theologica,* ed. Stephen Brown, vol. 2 (St. Bonaventure, N.Y.: Franciscan Institute, 1970), 300–302. See also Douglas C. Langston, "Scotus and Ockham on the Univocal Concept of Being," *Franciscan Studies* 39 (1979): 109, 126.

38. *Ord.* I, d. 3, p. 1, q. 3, n. 133.

39. *Lect.* II, d. 3, q. 6.

40. "Dico quod illa quae sunt primo diversa, non possunt constituere aliquod 'idem,' sed quanto magis sunt diversa, tanto magis sunt disposita ad constituendum unum per se; ad hoc enim quod ex aliquibus fiat unum per se, requiritur non-identitas partium" (ibid., d. 12, q. un., n. 51).

41. See Subsection 2.1.3 for a discussion of this issue.

42. See Section 3.5 for a discussion of the transcendental attributes of being.

43. I borrow this term from King, "Scotus on Metaphysics," 48.

44. Aristotle, *Metaph.* X.3

45. The following discussion follows *Metaph.* V.9–10 and X.2–4.

46. Aquinas, *Metaphysicorum Aristotelis*, lib. 10, lec. 4, n. 5.

47. For the list of opposites, see Aristotle, *Categories* X. The four opposites Aristotle lists are correlatives (e.g., double/half); contraries (e.g., good/bad); privatives (e.g., blindness/sight); and contradictories (e.g., she sits/she does not sit).

48. Aquinas, *Metaphysicorum Aristotelis*, lib. 10, lec. 6, n. 6.

49. Aristotle, *Metaph.* X.4.

50. Aquinas, *Metaphysicorum Aristotelis*, lib. 10, lec. 5, n. 3.

51. "Quia ea quae non communicant in materia, non generantur adinvicem, sequitur ea genere esse diversa, quorum non est generatio adinvicem" (ibid., lec. 4, n. 40).

52. Aristotle, *Metaph.* V.9 and X.3.

53. Ibid., 1054b.

54. Cf. Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel, *Science of Logic,* trans, A. V. Miller (Amherst: Prometheus, 1969), 421–24.

55. See, for example, Aristotle, *Metaph.* X.3 1054b.

56. For these terms, see Cornelio Fabro, "The Intensive Hermeneutics of Thomistic Philosophy: The Notion of Participation," *Review of Metaphysics* 27, no. 3 (1974): 449–91.

57. "Creator et creatura reducuntur in unum, non communitate univocationis sed analogiae" (*In Sent.,* I Prolog., q. 1, a. 2, ad. 2).

58. Aquinas, *Super de Trin.*, q. 4, a. 1. See also David Winiewicz, "A Note on *Alteritas* and Numerical Diversity in St. Thomas Aquinas," *Dialogue* 16 (1977): 693–707; and John F. Wippel, "Thomas Aquinas on the Distinction and Derivation of the Many from the One: A Dialectic between Being and Nonbeing," *Review of Metaphysics* 38 (1985): 563–90.

59. "Dicendum quod, sicut dicit Philosophus in X Metaphysicae, plurale dicitur aliquid ex hoc quod est divisibile vel divisum. Unde omne illud quod est causa divisionis oportet ponere causam pluralitatis. Causa autem divisionis aliter est accipienda in posterioribus et compositis et in primis et simplicibus. In posterioribus namque et compositis causa divisionis quasi formalis, id est ratione cuius fit divisio, est diversitas simplicium et priorum" (Aquinas, *Super de Trin.*, q. 4, a. 1, resp.).

60. See also Winiewicz, "A Note on *Alteritas* and Numerical Diversity," 696; and Wippel, "Thomas Aquinas on the Distinction and Derivation of the Many from the One," 565.

61. "Sed diversitas, qua dividuntur posteriora composita secundum priora et simplicia, praesupponit pluralitatem priorum simplicium. Ex hoc enim homo et asinus habent diversas differentias, quod rationale et irrationale non sunt una, sed plures differentiae. Nec potest semper dici quod illius pluralitatis sit aliqua diversitas aliquorum priorum et simpliciorum causa, quia sic esset abire in infinitum" (Aquinas, *Super de Trin.*, q. 4, a. 1, n. 1).

62. Winiewicz, "A Note on *Alteritas* and Numerical Diversity," 697; Wippel, "Thomas Aquinas on the Distinction and Derivation of the Many from the One," 565.

63. "Ita post divisionem entis et non entis statim invenitur pluralitas priorum simplicium. Hanc autem pluralitatem consequitur ratio diversitatis, secundum quod manet in ea suae causae virtus, scilicet oppositionis entis et non entis" (Aquinas, *Super de Trin.*, q. 4, a. 1, n. 3).

64. Wippel, "Thomas Aquinas on the Distinction and Derivation of the Many from the One," 569.

65. Winiewicz, "A Note on *Alteritas* and Numerical Diversity," 698.

66. Wippel explains, "And if we can refer to a plurality or multiplicity of such primary and simple things—effects immediately produced by God—this is because the power of the original opposition between being and nonbeing is preserved in each of them" (Wippel, "Thomas Aquinas on the Distinction and Derivation of the Many from the One," 571).

67. Ibid., 567.

68. Ibid., 579.

69. See, for example, the following: "Unde in anima vel in intelligentia nullo modo est compositio ex materia et forma, ut hoc modo accipiatur essentia in eis sicut in substantiis corporalibus. Sed est ibi compositio forme et esse; unde in commento none propositionis libri De causis dicitur quod intelligentia est habens formam et esse: et accipitur ibi forma pro ipsa quidditate vel natura simplici" (Aquinas, *De ente,* c. 4, lines 33–40).

70. "[. . .] aut ex eo quod unum esse et rationem ab altero recipit; et talis est analogia creaturae ad Creatorem: creatura enim non habet esse nisi secundum quod a primo ente descendit, nec nominatur ens nisi inquantum ens primum imitatur; et similiter est de sapientia et de omnibus aliis quae de creatura dicuntur" (Aquinas, *In Sent.*, I Prolog., q. 1, a. 2, ad. 2). Following Montagnes, Victor Salas argues for a shift away from the early language of imitation, which is thought in formal terms, toward an existential view of this causal relationship (Salas, "The Judgmental Character of Thomas Aquinas's Analogy of Being." *Modern Schoolman* 85 [2008]: 131). See also Bernard Montagnes, *The Doctrine of the Analogy of Being According to Thomas Aquinas*, trans. E. M. Macierowski (Milwaukee: Marquette University Press, 2004).

71. "Where a cause leaves its likeness impressed upon its effects, therefore, it produces the ground for reference on the basis of an inherent characteristic. In this way the being of secondary instances is an imitation of the primary being" (Joseph Owens, "Analogy as a Thomistic Approach to Being," *Mediaeval Studies* 24 [1962]: 318).

72. Both Aquinas and Scotus cite this example (see, for example, Aquinas, *ST* I, q. 35, a. 1 resp.; and Scotus, *Rep.* I-A, d. 3, q. 7, n. 202).

73. Aquinas, *In Sent.* I, d. 19, q. 1, a. 2, resp.

74. Aquinas speaks of perfect images but reserves this status for the divine persons (see *ST* I, q. 93, a. 1, ad. 2).

75. Plato, *Sophist,* 235–36.

76. Oliva Blanchette, *The Perfection of the Universe According to Aquinas: A Teleological Cosmology* (University Park: Pennsylvania State University Press, 1992), 172.

77. The manner by which the infinite measures the finite will be discussed in the next chapter. The important term to emphasize here is "identity," such that the measure does not reduce the measured to any common unit of identity.

78. Subsection 4.4.1 will show how this works in Scotus's division of the categories immediately into ten.

79. See the Introduction to this volume.

80. Richard Cross, "Where Angels Fear to Tread," *Antonianum* 76, no. 1 (2001): 17–18.

81. Ibid. For a discussion of Radical Orthodoxy, see the Introduction to this volume.

82. He makes this point more clearly elsewhere (see Richard Cross, *Duns Scotus on God* [Burlington, Vt.: Ashgate, 2005], 254–55).

83. Alluntis and Wolter omit the final sentence in their translation. "Licet possit naturaliter noscere se quantum ad illud absolutum, quod ipsum est, non tamen potest naturaliter noscere se inquantum est imagio Dei, sive se esse imaginem Dei, quia non potest naturaliter cognosci relatio, nisi naturaliter posset cognosci utrumque extremum" (*Quod.*, q. 14, a. 3, n. 79 [§22]).

84. The passage that Cross cites to show that univocity presupposes a metaphysics of imitation remains inconclusive to prove his point. Scotus states: "Quod etiam

adducit de primo modo 'de simulitudine,' non valet quia illa similitudo quae est exemplati ad exemplans non est de primo modo, quia non est similitudo univocationis, immo pertinent ad tertium modum, sicut manifeste patet per Philosophum, qui in tertio modo ponit relationem scientiae ad scibile et, universaliter, mensurati ad mensuram; exemplar autem habet rationem mensurae respectu exemplati; ergo etc" (*Ord.* I, d. 3, p. 2, q. un., n. 297). He makes a similar argument in *Rep.* I-A, d. 30, q. 1, nn. 23–24. Scotus wishes to show here only that there is no real or conceptual relation on the part of God toward creatures once they have been created. As the measure to the measured, the relation of God to creatures should be understood according to Aristotle's third mode of relatives. This is obvious, however, insofar as the other two modes require reciprocity between the two extremes, whereas the third does not: it alone is *asymmetrical*. Once again, I do not deny that for Scotus creatures stand in relation to God as measured to a measure. Instead, I claim that creatures are not beings simply on account of this relationship of imitation and participation.

85. Scotus speaks of each thing having its own "degree of being" (*gradum entitatis*), a matter to be discussed further in Chapter 4 below. For his use of this term, see *Rep.* I-A, d. 36, p. 1, qq. 1–2, n. 20.

86. *In Metaph.* VII, q. 1, n. 27.

87. I would be remiss not to note a larger debate concerning the ground of the possible (see, for example, *Ord.* I, d. 43, q. un., nn. 6–7; see also *Lect.* I, d. 36, q. un., n. 32). Fabrizio Mondadori and Peter King seek to clearly distinguish between two grounds of possibility in Scotus's metaphysics: the principiative, or ontological, ground in the divine intellect, and the formal ground. A possible being has the formal ground of possibility from itself (i.e., in virtue of its essence). For example, see Peter King, "Duns Scotus on Possibilities, Powers, and the Possible," in Potentialität und Possibilität: Modalaussagen in der Geschichte der Metaphysik, ed. Thomas Buchheim, C. H. Kneepkens, and Kuno Lorenz (Fromann-Holzboog, 2001), 175–99. Cf. Calvin Normore, "Scotus, Modality, and Instants of Nature," in *John Duns Scotus: Metaphysics and Ethics,* ed. Ludger Honnefelder, Rega Wood, and Mechthild Dreyer (Leiden: Brill, 1996), 161–74. The issue at stake is whether the possibility of possibles derives from a relation between terms or *notae.* King denies this, and Normore affirms it. Normore argues that although the repugnance or nonrepugnance of *notae* does not depend on God, without God, there would be no *notae* for repugnance and nonrepugnance. Thus there would be no possibility. For our purposes, what Normore says about *notae* is of interest: "We can intelligibly ask not only whether 'whale and 'mammal' are repugnant but whether (to take Scotus's own example) 'chimera' is internally coherent. Is there a repugnance among the *notae* which make it up? [. . .] If we continue in this vein we will come to *notae* not themselves composed of others" (ibid., 164). Included in such *notae,* I would argue (although Normore does not), are being and ultimate difference. Possibility concerns the relation of repugnance or nonrepugnance between such *notae.* Thus, to ask about the impossibility of a *nota* by itself doesn't make sense. No primitive *nota* is an *ens impossibile,* only combined *notae* are. Furthermore, he argues, because impossibility doesn't arise at the level of primitive *notae,* the activity of divine intellect does not need to presuppose anything in order to give rise to these *notae* (ibid., 166). King, on the other hand, considers the divine intellect as merely an extrinsic cause of the possible, its ontological ground, but not its formal one.

88. *Lect.* I, d. 36, q. un., n. 39.

89. *Ord.* I, d. 3, p. 2, q. un., n. 304. See also *Lect.* I, d. 36, q. un., n. 32.

90. "Cum probatur per alium prosyllogismum, <<cui convenit 'esse'>> etc.,—dico quod maior istius prosyllogismi falsa est, si per ly 'in quantum' intelligatur reduplicari aliquid 'per se primo modo,' vel si accipiatur in maiore 'participando' gerundivum. Et prout exponitur per 'quia,' si intelligatur causalitas pertinens ad primum modum 'per se,' falsa est maior eodem modo, quia 'per se primo modo' participatio ipsa non est quo est ens ratum formaliter; si autem intelligatur per ly 'in quantum' causalitas pertinens ad secundum modum 'per se' (qualis est in subiecto respectu propriae passionis), sic concedo quod 'tale ens in quantum tale ens,' puta lapis in quantum lapis, participat ipsum 'esse' non tamen est propositio vera e converso videlicet quod 'in quantum participat, est ens.'" (*Ord.,* I, d. 3, p. 2, q. un., n. 326; translation modified). The angle brackets appear in the source.

91. "Tunc intelligo sic, quod in primo instanti naturae est ens quod est ipsum 'esse,' scilicet Deus; in secondo, est lapis ens ratum, absolutum, quod nec intelligitur tunc participans nec non-participans; in tertio, est ipsa participatio, respectus quidam, consequens ad ipsum lapidem" (ibid.).

92. "Magnitude of this sort is transcendental and belongs to everything in its fashion" (*Quod.,* q. 6, a. 1, n. 13 [§5]; *Rep.* I-A, d. 19, p. 1, qq. 1–3, nn. 25–26 and 38).

93. *Ord.* I, d. 3, p. 2, q. un., n. 326.

94. *Lect.* I, d. 36, q. un., n. 39.

95. For a discussion of the chimera's nothingness prior to creation versus that of the *ens ratum,* see *Lect.* I, d. 36, q. 1, n. 39. Scotus's concern here seems to be to avoid turning the formal ground of an *ens ratum's* possibility into Henry's *esse essentiae*. For this discussion, see *Ord.* II d. 1, q. 2, nn. 77–82; and *Lect.* I, d. 36, q. un., nn. 24–26.

96. *Lect.* I, d. 36, q. un., n. 32.

97. See note 87 in this chapter.

98. See, for example, *ST* I, q. 93, a. 1, resp.

99. "[. . .] quod est vestigium totius est imago partis" (Scotus, *Rep.* I-A, d. 3, q. 3, n. 76).

100. See, for example, *Lect.* I, d. 3, p. 2, q. un., n. 293.

101. See, for example, Scotus, *Rep.* I-A, d. 3, qq. 3 and 7; *Lect.* I, d. 3, qq. 2–3; and *Ord.* I, d. 3, qq. 2–3. For further discussion of this matter, see Andrew LaZella, "Remainders and Reminders of the Divine: Duns Scotus's Critique of Images of God," *Anuario Filosófico* 49, no. 3 (2016): 517–37.

102. For an account of participation, see, for example, Aquinas, *Exp. de Hebdomadibus,* L.2. See also *ST* I, q. 44, a. 1, resp.

103. *In Sent.*, I Prolog., q. 1, a. 2, ad. 2.

104. *Rep.* I-A, d. 36, p. 1, qq. 1–2, nn. 26–27.

105. Ibid., n. 27.

106. See Section 4.3.

107. For Aquinas's account of creaturely participation in a similitude of the divine essence, see Aquinas, *De divinis nominibus expositio,* c. 2, lec. 3, n. 158.

108. Fabro, "Intensive Hermeneutics," 483.

109. See, for example, *De ente,* c. 4. All three stages of the *intellectus essentiae* argument are necessary in order to conclude that there is a real distinction between *esse*

and *essentia* in creatures. Cf. John F. Wippel "Aquinas's Route to the Real Distinction: A Note on 'De ente et essentia,'" *Thomist: A Speculative Quarterly Review* 43 (April 1979): 279–95.

110. Whether essence, which serves as the relative nonbeing limiting *esse* according to Aquinas, is a mode of existence or a positive principle in its own right remains a matter of contention (see Wippel, "Thomas Aquinas on the Distinction and Derivation of the Many from the One," 587). Aquinas nevertheless understands essence in terms of a proportional lack.

111. *In Sent.* I., Prolog., q. 1, a. 2, ad. 2, qtd. in note 57 in this chapter.

112. See Section 3.5.

113. See Chapter 4.

114. For the claim that creatures imitate the divine essence, see *Rep.* I-A, d. 36, p. 2, q. 1, n. 90.

115. *In Metaph.* VII, q. 13, n. 163.

116. Adrian Moore, "Being, Univocity, and Logical Syntax," *Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society* 115, no. 1 (2015): 19.

117. See King, "Duns Scotus on the Common Nature," 75n28.

118. Cf. Thomas P. McTighe, "Scotus, Plato, and the Ontology of the Bare X," *Monist* 49 (1965): 615–16. McTighe argues that (at least with general and singular terms) they do not form any genuine unity.

119. Wolter, *The Transcendentals,* 82–87. In "Scotus on the Common Nature," King supports this division, whereas in the later "Metaphysics," he includes only the latter two (cf. Ludger Honnefelder, *Ens inquantum ens: Der Begriff des Seienden als solchen als Gegenstand der Metaphysik nach der Lehre des Johannes Duns Scotus,* Beiträge zur Geschichte der Philosophie und Theologie des Mittelalters, NF 16 [Münster: Aschendorff, 1979], 318–19). See also the Introduction to this volume.

120. *Lect.* I, d. 8, p. 1, q. 3, n. 104.

121. Ibid., n. 103.

122. "Indeed, intensive infinity expresses an intrinsic mode of that entity. It is so intrinsic that if we abstract from all its properties or quasi-properties, we have still not excluded infinity, but it remains integrally included in that one single entity itself" (*Quod.* q. 5, a. 1, n. 10 [§4]). "Intensive infinity is not related to the being said to be infinite as a kind of attribute that accrues to it extrinsically" (ibid.).

123. *Lect.* I, d. 8, p. 1, q. 3, n. 102.

124. *Ord.* II, d. 3, p. 1, qq. 5–6, n. 183.

125. See Chapter 5.

126. Michael Sylwanowicz, *Contingent Causality and the Foundation of Duns Scotus' Metaphysics* (Leiden: Brill, 1996), 244.

127. Ibid.

128. *Ord.* I, d. 3, p. 1, q. 3, n. 134.

129. *Lect.* I, d. 3, p. 1, qq. 1–2, nn. 99–104.

130. "Istae rationes non includunt univocationem entis dicti in 'quid' ad differentias ultimas et passiones" (*Ord.* I, d. 3, p. 1, q. 3, n. 147).

131. Ibid., d. 8, p. 1, q. 3, nn. 113–15.

132. "Dico quod sicut unum in communi est passio entis in communi, ita determinatae unitates sunt determinatorum entium passiones,—et sicut non est medium

inter ens in communi et suam passionem unitatis, ita nec determinati entis respectu suae unitatis, sed per principia sua propria habet illam unitatem" (*Lect.* II, d. 12, q. un., n. 50).

133. See Wolter, *The Transcendentals,* 101.

134. *In Metaph.* IV, q. 2, n. 100.

135. *Ord.* I, d. 8, p. 1, q. 3, nn. 113–15.

136. For a more extensive account of true and good as coextensive attributes, see Wolter, *The Transcendentals,* 111–27; and Honnefelder, *Ens inquantum ens,* 417–26.

137. Wolter, *The Transcendentals,* 117.

138. *In Metaph.* VI, q. 3, n. 44.

139. Cited by Wolter, *The Transcendentals,* 117.

4. THE FIRST CUT—THE INTRINSIC MODES OF BEING

1. "Respondeo quod quando intelligitur aliqua realitas cum modo suo intrinseco, ille conceptus non est ita simpliciter simplex quin possit concipi illa realitas absque modo illo, sed tunc est conceptus imperfectus illius rei; potest etiam concipi sub illo modo, et tunc est conceptus perfectus illius rei" (*Ord.* I, d. 8, p. 1, q. 3, n. 138).

2. "Requiritur ergo distinctio, inter illud a quo accipitur conceptus communis et inter illud a quo accipitur conceptus proprius, non ut distinctio realitatis et realitatis sed distinctio realitatis et modi proprii et intrinseci eiusdem,-quae distinctio sufficit ad habendum conceptum perfectum vel imperfectum de eodem, quorum imperfectus sit communis et perfectus sit proprius" (ibid., n. 139).

3. For a further discussion of this, see Maurice J. Grajewski, *The Formal Distinction of Duns Scotus: A Study in Metaphysics.* (Washington, D.C.: Catholic University of America Press, 1944), 86–87.

4. As will become clear in the following chapters, the potency/act distinction between essential parts is not isomorphic with the potency/act distinction between physical parts.

5. *Lect.* I, d. 3, p. 1, qq. 1–2, n. 127.

6. "[. . .] conceptus speciei non est tantum conceptus realitatis et modi intrinseci eiusdem realitatis, quia tunc albedo posset esse genus, et gradus intrinseci albedinis possent esse differentiae specificae; illa autem per quae commune aliquod contrahitur ad Deum et creaturam, sunt finitum et infinitum, qui dicunt gradus intrinsecos ipsius [. . .]" (*Ord.* I, d. 8, p. 1, q. 3, 108).

7. "Breviter respondeo ad argumentum, nam quaelibet entitas habet intrinsecum sibi gradum suae perfectionis, in quo est finititum si est finitum et in quo infinitum si potest esse infinitum, et non per aliquid accidens sibi" (ibid., d. 2, p. 1, qq. 1–2, n. 142).

8. Ibid., d. 8, p. 1, q. 3, nn. 101–2.

9. *Lect.* I, d. 8, p. 1, q. 3, n. 107. For this passage, see Subsection 2.4.3 above.

10. Ibid., d. 3, p. 1, qq. 1–2, n. 122.

11. As Scotus states, this would be equivalent to saying, "because rational is not animal *per se,* therefore it is not-animal *per se*" (ibid., n. 123).

12. *Ord.* I, d. 8, p. 1, q. 3, n. 138.

13. For an extensive discussion of this point, see Richard Cross, *Great Medieval Thinkers: Duns Scotus* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1999) 23–26, chaps. 2–3; and Richard Cross, *Duns Scotus on God* (Burlington, Vt.: Ashgate, 2005) chap. 5.

14. For a discussion of how we form this concept, see *Quod.*, q. 5, a. 1, nn. 5–9 [§§2–4]. For further discussion, see Francis J. Catania, "John Duns Scotus on *Ens Infinitum,*" *American Catholic Philosophical Quarterly* 67, no. 1 (1993): 37–54.

15. See Section 3.3.

16. *Finitum* is not a single quality shared by the various categories of being. Rather, it is a range of modes or manners of being limited, which entails that the category is open to further determination (unlike *ens infinitum,* whose mode of infinity singularizes it). Each category, as we will see, has its own categorial coordination until it reaches singularity, or the complete degree of being beyond which it is no longer divisible.

17. Allan B. Wolter, *The Transcendentals and Their Function in the Metaphysics of Duns Scotus* (St. Bonaventure, N.Y.: Franciscan Institute, 1946), 85.

18. *Rep.* I-A, d. 8, p. 2, q. 5, n. 161.

19. "Est lapis ens ratum, absolutum, quod nec intelligitur tunc participans nec non-participans." *Ord.* I, d. 3, p. 2, q. un., n. 326 (see Subsection 3.4.3 above for the full passage and discussion).

20. This is what the intellect must appraise when testing the compatibility or incompatibility of notes. For this discussion in terms of a *gustus spiritualis,* see *Ord.* I, d. 2, p. 1, q. 2, n. 136. As Calvin Normore shows, as primitive, such notes (*notae*) are themselves neither possible nor impossible. Rather, their conjunction gives rises to possibility and impossibility (see Normore, "Scotus, Modality, and Instants of Nature," 164).

21. See, for example, *Rep.* I-A, d. 19, p. 1, qq. 1–3, nn. 25–26 and 38; and *Quod.,* q. 6, a. 1, n. 13 [§5].

22. *Lect.* I, d. 3, p. 1, qq. 1–2, n. 51.

23. "Infinitas in entitate dicit totalitatem in entitate, et per oppositum suo modo finitas dicit partialitatem entitatis; omne enim finitum ut tale minus est infinito ut tali" (*Quod.,* q. 5, a. 3, n. 57 [§26]).

24. Ibid., q. 6, a. 1, nn. 15–16 [§6].

25. *Quod.,* q. 6, a. 1, n. 13 [§5] and *Rep.* I-A, d. 19, p. 1, qq. 1–3, nn. 25–26.

26. "Si enim non esset in divinis nisi unicum attributum, ut sapientia, adhuc contingeret quaerere de gradu virtutis eius quantus est" (*Rep.* I-A, d. 19, p. 1, qq. 1–3, n. 26). See also ibid., n. 38.

27. *Rep.* I-A, d. 19, p. 1, qq. 1–3, n. 38. See also *Quod.*, q. 6, a. 1, nn. 14–16 [§6].

28. "[Essentia divina] habet enim gradum intrinsecum, sicut res finita habet propriam finitatem; immo magis sicut si circumscribas ab hominem omnem proprietatem, adhuc habet propriam finitatem in ordine entium" (*Quod.*, q. 6, a. 1, n. 25 [§10]).

29. My emphasis. "Imo in creaturis sic transit magnitudo perfectionis, quod non est aliud realiter ab eo cuius est, et tamen manet secundum propriam rationem magnitudinis, ut proprium fundamentum aequalitatis vel inaequalitatis" (ibid.). "Infinite" is not an attribute of God, but an intrinsic mode (see *Rep.* I-A, d. 19, p. 1, qq. 1–3, n. 26).

30. Cf. Richard Cross, *The Physics of Duns Scotus: The Scientific Context of a Theological Vision* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2007), 187.

31. See the views of Gilson, Marion, and Radical Orthodoxy discussed in the Introduction.

32. For an extended discussion of this issue, see Michael Sylwanowicz, *Contingent Causality and the Foundation of Duns Scotus' Metaphysics* (Leiden: Brill, 1996), 158–66.

33. "Unde quaelibet entitas habet intrinsecum gradum perfectionis, non per aliud ens" (*DPP,* 4.74).

34. "Infinitum dicitur aliquid ex eo quod non est finitum. Finitur autem quodammodo et materia per formam, et forma per materiam. [. . .] Cum igitur esse divinum non sit esse receptum in aliquo, sed ipse sit suum esse subsistens, ut supra ostensum est; manifestum est quod ipse Deus sit infinitus et perfectus" (*ST* I, q. 7, a. 1, resp.).

35. For this argument, see, for example, Aquinas, *De ente,* c. 4.

36. "Contra: licet verum sit quod omne causatum est finitum, formalis tamen ratio finiti non est ad suam causam sive in relatione ad causam, sed inest sibi intrinsece, ut in se consideratur; sicut per se et formaliter ratio infiniti non est in comparatione ad suum effectum, sed intrinsecus gradus essentiae illius, et si numquam esset effectus. Ergo formalis ratio finitatis angeli essentiae non est in respectu ad suam causam qua participat esse" (*Rep.* I-A, d. 2, p. 1, qq. 1–3, n. 55).

37. *DPP* 3.6.

38. Recall that the parts (or *notae*) themselves are neither possible nor impossible, but give rise to possibility (see note 87 of Chapter 3 for further discussion of this issue).

39. "Breviter ergo dico unam propositionem notandam: quod quaelibet essentia absoluta finita in se, est finita ut praeintelligitur omni comparatione sui ad quamcumque aliam essentiam, et prius in se finitur quam ad aliud finiatur" (*Rep.* I-A, d. 2, p. 1, q. 1–3, n. 57).

40. Ibid.

41. Ibid., nn. 55–57.

42. Ibid., n. 56.

43. See *Lect.* II, d. 3, p. 1, q. 4, n. 91; and Subsection 4.4.1 below.

44. *Rep.* I-A, d. 2, p. 1, q. 1–3, n. 55.

45. *Lect.* I, d. 8, p. 1, q. 3, n. 107.

46. To maintain the simplicity of the categories, Pini argues that to be a being means nothing more than to be in a category, that is, to be a real thing. According to this reading, being becomes a second-intention concept in relation to the categories. The concept of being does not pick out a common property shared by such real things. Instead, this concept conceives the first-intentional concept of being in a category. For this reason, he argues against King, the question of being and the categories must not be conflated with the separate the question of being and its differentiae. The latter, he maintains, asks how being is predicated of its differentiae, which divide it. But being is predicated *in quid* of the categories. In other words, the solution to how being is predicated of its differentiae does not solve the question of how being relates to the categories. The two must be treated separately (Pini, "Scotus's Realist Conception of the Categories," 98–104). Here Pini attempts to separate Scotus's realism concerning the resolution of universals into a common and a proper element from his realism concerning the categories. This view, however, is mistaken. Categorial essences can be simple in the same sense that the divine essence is simple. Yet, we must conceive of them according to a transcendental magnitude fused with the univocal concept of being.

47. See *In Metaph.* V, qq. 5–6; and *Quod.,* q. 3. For Scotus's early view, see *Super Praed*.

48. Pini, "Scotus's Realist Conception of the Categories," 88.

49. *Quod.,* q. 3, a. 1.

50. Ibid.

51. *In Metaph.* V, qq. 5–6, nn. 56–59. For a recent account of Scotus's position with respect to Aquinas, see Paul Symington, *On Determining What There Is: The Identity of Ontological Categories in Aquinas, Scotus and Lowe* (Frankfurt: Ontos Verlag, 2010), chap. 2.

52. *In librum Porphyrii* q. 35, n. 8. For a discussion of the relation between intentions and impositions, see Giorgio Pini, *Categories and Logic in Duns Scotus: An Interpretation of Aristotle's "Categories" in the Late Thirteenth Century,* Studien und Texte zur Geistesgeschichte des Mittelalters 77 (Leiden: Brill, 2002), 31. See also Symington, *On Determining What There Is,* 66ff.

53. *Super Praed.,* q. 11, n. 26.

54. See Chapter 2.

55. *In Metaph.* VIII, q. 1, n. 39.

56. Ibid., nn. 9–21.

57. Scotus sometimes speaks as if *per se* and *in alio* were an intermediary subdivision (see, for example, *Lect.* I, d. 3, p. 1, qq. 1–2, n. 122). But he clearly rejects such an intermediary division elsewhere (see *Quod.*, q. 3, a. 3, n. 52 [§19]). See also *In Metaph.* V, qq. 5-6, nn. 74–80. In the latter, he says such a division "sins doubly" insofar as it proves the opposite and does not prove its intended consequence.

58. *In Metaph.* V, qq. 5–6, nn. 73–80.

59. Ibid., n. 76.

60. Ibid., n. 79.

61. "Nec igitur causalitas in substantia respectu totius accidentis, nec maior perfectio entitatis, nec ordo essentialis in entitate concludit quin accidens sit formaliter ens. Non per substantiam, nec per respectum ad ipsam, quia de per se intellectu eius est ens, posito intellectu illo, etiamsi per impossibile omnes condiciones praedictae auferrentur" (*In Metaph.* VII, q. 1, n. 30).

62. "Licet enim aliquid secundum quidlibet sui sit causatum a causa extrinseca, tamen potest praedicationem alicuis immediate recipere formaliter, ac si non esset causatum, quia causa extrinseca non est medium de quo prius dicatur illud, et inde de causato. Exemplum: formaliter creatura est ens, licet totaliter a Deo" (ibid., n. 27).

63. Cf. Wolter, *The Transcendentals,* 145. He argues that the real basis of the creaturely modes is privation, yet he has difficulty explaining how the mode of contingent follows suit.

64. "In omni coordinatio praecise accepta inveniuntur omnia illius coordinationis, circumscripto quocumque alterius coordinationis,—praeterea, quidlibet unius coordinationis est diversum a quocumque alterius coordinationis" (*Lect.* II, d. 3, p. 1, q. 4, n. 91). For the translation, see John Duns Scotus, *Early Oxford Lecture on Individuation,* trans. Allan B. Wolter (St. Bonaventure, N.Y.: Franciscan Institute, 2005).

65. Cf. Aquinas, *De ente,* c. 6; and Aquinas, *Metaphysicorum Aristotelis* VII. L. 9, n. 18, for the views that accidents are individuated via substance and that accidents are defined in terms of the substances in which they inhere. Aquinas distinguishes between the *rationes* of accidents and their modes of existence (*ST* I, q. 28, a. 2, resp.). The former must be expressed using abstract terms (e.g., whiteness, not white). He sees

an isomorphism between the modes of predication and the modes of existence; the latter give rise to the former, and the former provide insight into the latter. Thus, from the modes of predication, the categories can be derived (see *Metaphysicorum Aristotelis* V. L. 9). For differing views on how Aquinas derives this deduction from modes of predication, see John F. Wippel, "Thomas Aquinas's Derivation of the Aristotelian Categories (Predicaments)," *Journal of the History of Philosophy* 25 (1987): 13–34; and Symington, *On Determining What There Is,* 22–30. While Symington agrees with Wippel that the categories can be distinguished according to essential (or *secundum se*) propositions, Symington argues that Wippel fails to understand this in terms of *per se* modes of propositions. The categories are determined by how predicates of *per se* propositions relate to their subjects. Without this addition, one could not distinguish the *secundum se* manner in which "Socrates is a human" from "whiteness is a color." Symington goes on to argue that a complete understanding of an accident requires taking account of the accident's mode of being. He shows how the proper *rationes* of Quantity as "measure of . . ." or Quality as "disposition of . . ." point beyond themselves to their mode of being. Quantities are measures of substances, and qualities are dispositions of them. The quasi-genus *inesse* is specified by the quasi-difference "measure of. . . ." (see Symington, *On Determining What There Is*, 96–98). With respect to the differentiation of accidents, Aquinas states: "Et quia accidentia non componuntur ex materia et forma, ideo non potest in eis sumi genus a materia et differentia a forma sicut in substantiis compositis; sed oportet ut genus primum sumatur ex ipso modo essendi, secundum quod ens diversimode secundum prius et posterius dicitur de decem generibus predicamentorum, sicut dicitur quantitas ex eo quod est mensura substantiae et qualitas secundum quod est dispositio substantiae" (*De ente,* c. 6, lines 128–37). He goes on to explain that for abstract accidents (e.g., pugness), the difference includes the subject (= curvature *of a nose*). In the case of concrete accidents (e.g., pug), the subject is included in the genus (= curved *nose*). In terms of the individuation of accidents, insofar as designate matter individuates, accidents are individuated only with respect to the substances in which they inhere. For example, an individual color (e.g., this green) is individuated by being in an individual subject (e.g., this frog). For further discussion of these issues and of the distinction between Aquinas's and Scotus's differing views of the categories, see Symington, *On Determining What There Is,* chap. 3.

66. "Nullum accidens est singulare formaliter per aliqua alterius generis [. . .] Qualitas ergo, etiam quando est in quantitate, non est 'haec' per quantitatem formaliter; igitur si est causa, etiam proxima sed extrinseca, singularitatis ipsius qualitatis, qualitas potest esse singularis sine ista causa extrinseca" (*Ord.* IV, d. 12, p. 1, q. 2, n. 120). Furthermore, an accident's condition of acting (*condicio agendi*) is independent of its inherence in a substance (ibid., p. 2, q. un., nn. 280–82).

67. *Quod.,* q. 6, a. 1, n. 25 [§10].

68. Ibid.

69. "Est enim una species entium, quantumcumque immaterialis, alteri specie immateriali aequalis vel inaequalis secundum perfectionem; ergo manet in ea magnitudo secundum perfectionem ut fundans istam aequalitatem, et tamen transit ista magnitudo in essentiam per identitaem" (ibid.).

70. *Rep.* I-A, d. 26, q. 2, n. 68.

71. Ibid. For an account of what relations add to the singular divine essence, consult

the following question (i.e., q. 3). The distinct divine persons can share in this perfection, but such communicability transpires not through division (*Rep.* I-A, d. 26, q. 1, n. 29). For an extended discussion of this difference, see Cross, *Duns Scotus on God,* in particular chap. 13, "The Commonality of the Divine Essence." He also discusses this in Richard Cross, "Divisibility, Communicability, and Predicability in Duns Scotus's Theories of the Common Nature," *Medieval Philosophy and Theology* 11, no. 1 (2003): 43–63.

72. *Quod.*, q. 5, a. 1, n. 12 [§5].

73. Ibid., n. 13 [§5].

74. Ibid., n. 37 [§17].

75. Anne Ashley Davenport, *Measurement of a Different Greatness: The Intensive Infinite, 1250–1650* (Leiden: Brill, 1999), 284.

76. *Rep.* I-A, d. 26, q. 1, n. 29.

77. Ibid., q. 2, nn. 67–69.

78. Ibid., q. 3, n. 103.

79. *Quod.,* q. 5, a. 2, n. 37 [§17].

80. "Ipsa enim est actualissima, habens in se et ex se ultimam actualitatem, quia sibi tamquam actui infinito repugnat ulterius perfici. Ipsa enim de se est haec, et est singularissima, et ideo habet ultimam unitatem, et repugnat sibi maior unitas, qua non potest determinari determinatione aliqua ulteriori quam sit ex se determinata" (*Rep.* I-A, d. 26, q. 2, n. 68).

81. Ibid., d. 19, p. 1, qq. 1–3, n. 42.

82. Ibid., n. 43.

83. For more extended treatments of its history, see, for example, J. E. Murdoch and E. Sylla, "The Science of Motion," in *Science in the Middle Ages*, ed. D. C. Lindberg (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1978), 206–64, esp. 231–41; Herman Shapiro, "Walter Burley and the Intension and Remission of Forms," *Speculum* 43, no. 3 (July 1959): 413–27; Jean-Luc Solère, "The Question of Intensive Magnitudes According to Some Jesuits in the Sixteenth and Seventeenth Centuries," *Monist: Physics before Newton* 84, no. 4 (October 2001): 582–616; and Cross, *The Physics of Duns Scotus,* chap. 10. For the importance of the concept of intensity in contemporary "continental" philosophy, see Mary Beth Mader, "Whence Intensity? Deleuze and the Revival of a Concept," in *Deleuze and Metaphysics,* ed. Alain Beaulieu, Ed Kazarian, and Julia Sushytska (Lanham, MD: Rowman and Littlefield, 2014), 225–48.

84. Aristotle, *Cat.* 8.

85. Ibid., 10b27–11a5.

86. Solère, "The Question of Intensive Magnitudes," 583.

87. M. R. Cohen, and E. Nagel, *An Introduction to Logic and Scientific Method* (New York, 1934), 293–96.

88. For the history of this distinction, see Davenport, *Measurement of a Different Greatness*.

89. For this history, consult one of the excellent sources listed in note 83 in this chapter.

90. Solère, "The Question of Intensive Magnitudes," 584.

91. Aristotle, *Cat.* 8.

92. See, for example, Augustine, *De Trinitate,* XV.

93. As I will discuss below, Scotus seeks to align his position with Bonaventure's.

94. *Rep.* I-A, d. 17, p. 2, q. 4, a. 1, n. 160.

95. Ibid., d. 19, p. 1, qq. 1–3, n. 22.

96. Aquinas, *ST* II–II, q. 24, a. 5.

97. Ibid., resp.

98. Solère, "The Question of Intensive Magnitudes," 586.

99. "A form is in itself strictly immutable and always identical to itself; consequently, Boethius states, variation can be found solely in the participation of the subjects" (ibid.).

100. Aquinas, *ST* II–II, q. 24, a. 5, ad. 3.

101. For a discussion of this point, see, for example, Aquinas, *ST* I, q. 4, a. 1, ad 3. In his commentary on Boethius's *De Hebdomadibus,* Aquinas explains how a form can be formally perfect but still need to receive its *esse* from a cause (Aquinas, *Exp. De Hebd*. II, lines 236–49).

102. *Quod.,* q. 5, a. 1, n. 9 [§4] and a. 3, n. 57 [§26].

103. "Deus est infinitus non secundum durationem tantum, sed etiam intensive. Primo ergo ponenda est significatio nominis. Voco autem hic infinitum quod quodcumque ens finitum datum vel possibile dari excedit secundum omnem determinatam proportionem, acceptam vel acceptibilem" (*Rep.* I-A, d. 2, p. 1, qq. 1–3. n. 51). Scotus is here considering the views of others, but this definition accords with his own position.

104. *Quod.,* q. 5, a. 1.

105. *Rep.* I-A, d. 2, p. 1, q. 1-3, nn. 58–62.

106. Davenport connects Scotus's view to Olivi on this point (see Davenport, *Measure of a Different Greatness,* 197–98).

107. *Rep.* I-A, d. 2, p. 1, qq. 1–3, n. 60.

108. Davenport, *Measure of a Different Greatness,* 268.

109. "Potest etiam describi per excessum ad quodcumque aliud ens finitum sic: 'Ens infinitum est quod excedit quodcumque ens finitum, non secundum aliquam determinatam proportionem, sed ultra omnem determinatam proportionem vel determinabilem.' Verbi gratia, accipiatur haec entitas 'albedo'; exceditur ab alia entitate, quae est scientia, in triplo; iterum exceditur ab anima intellective in decuplo; iterum a supremo angelo esto quod in centuplo; qualitercumque procedis in entibus, semper esset dare in qua proportione determinate supremum excedit infimum" (*Quod.,* q. 5, a. 1, n. 9 [§4]).

110. Alluntis and Wolter also make this point in *God and Creatures: The Quodlibetal* Questions, trans. Alluntis and Wolter (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1975), 110n4. Cf. the brief discussion in Cross, *The Physics of Duns Scotus,* 192.

111. "Non quod ibi sit proprie proportio talis quali utuntur mathematici, quia non constat angelus ex aliquo inferiori cum aliquo addito, cum sit simplicior, sed intelligendum est hoc secundum proportionem virtutis et perfectionis, sicut est excessus in speciebus. Hoc modo, per oppositionem, infinitum excedit in entitate finitum ultra omnem proportionem assignabilem" (*Quod.,* q. 5, a. 1, n. 9 [§4]).

112. "Sicut ergo totum dependet a parte ut ab imperfectiori, sic maior numerus a minori. In entibus autem e converso, sive ordinatis essentialiter sive accidentaliter, quia ens imperfectius non est pars entis perfectioris nec ens perfectius est aliquod totum aggregatum ex entibus imperfectioribus, sed est quoddam totum continens virtualiter et essentialiter perfectiones omnium entium imperfectorum et praehabens omnia eminenter" (*Rep.* I-A, d. 2, p. 1, qq. 1–3, n. 33).

113. To see how numbering and ranking work with such degrees involving temperature, consider the following from Morris Cohen and Ernest Nagel: "It is often believed that because we can assign numbers to different degrees of a quality, the different degrees always bear to each other the same ratio as do the numbers we have assigned to them. This is a serious mistake, and arises because it is supposed that measurement requires nothing more than the assigning of numbers. [. . .] But when we say that the temperature one day is 100° and on another 50°, is it permissible to say that the temperature on the first day was *twice as much* as on the second? [. . .] An analysis of the conditions of measurement will show that the last two assertions are strictly without meaning" (Cohen and Nagel, *An Introduction to Logic and Scientific Method*, 293). (Alluntis and Wolter cite this text in their notes.) The "addition" of one virtual unit to another produces an altogether new difference. A 100-degree day does not equal two 50-degree days taken together or one hundred independent units added up and bundled together. Temperatures do not add up but average out.

114. Murdoch and Sylla, "The Science of Motion," 232.

115. Section 2.2.

116. For further discussion of this point, see also Alluntis and Wolter, *God and Creatures,* 110n4.

117. Nagel and Cohen continue their analysis using the example of hardness: "The statement falsely suggests that because one body is 'higher up' the scale than another, it 'contains more' of something called 'hardness.' And it falsely suggests, because one body is supposed to contain more of this something, that it contains a unit amount of it *a certain number of times*" (Cohen and Nagel, *An Introduction to Logic,* 296).

118. *Quod.,* q. 5, a. 1, n. 9 [§4]. I borrow this phrasing from Alluntis and Wolter.

119. Ibid.

120. Murdoch and Sylla, "The Science of Motion," 233.

121. *Rep.* I-A, d. 17, p. 2, q. 4, a. 1, n. 160.

5. ULTIMATE SPECIFIC DIFFERENCES

1. A traditional answer espoused by Aristotle was *its form.* Something has the essence it has on account of its substantial form (Aristotle, *Metaph.* VII.10–13). Cf. ibid., VIII.6. For further complications, see note 53 in this chapter. Scotus wonders whether there is a deer form distinct from a horse form as opposed to both species having the same form (i.e., sensitive soul) (*Rep.* II, d. 16, q. un., 769).

2. *Ord.* I, d. 2, p. 2, q. 4, nn. 388–410.

3. See Chapter 1.

4. "Et differunt differentiae secundum intentionem ab illis quae differunt secundum rem et similiter ab illis quae differunt secundum rationem tamen; quod haec in eadem simplici re fundant" (Henry of Ghent, *Quod.* V, q. 12, Badius, 171rT). See also Henry *Quod.* IV, q. 4, 12–13. Martin Pickavé explains: "For Henry creatures are complex things. They are complex not because they are composed out of many different things nor because they only appear to us as complex, but because they have an intrinsic ontological structure below the level of a real composition" (Pickavé, "Henry of Ghent on Individuation, Essence, and Being," in *A Companion to Henry of Ghent,* ed. Gordon A. Wilson [Leiden: Brill, 2011], 204).

5. See Allan B. Wolter, "The Formal Distinction," in *The Philosophical Theology of*

John Duns Scotus, ed. Marilyn McCord Adams, 27–41 (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1990), 29.

6. For the most extensive treatment of this issue, see Maurice J. Grajewski, *The Formal Distinction of Duns Scotus A Study in Metaphysics* (Washington, D.C.: Catholic University of America Press, 1944).

7. Allan Wolter states: "The line between the least of the formal distinctions and this 'modal' distinction is easily crossed, if such a line exists at all" (Wolter, *The Transcendentals and Their Function in the Metaphysics of Duns Scotus* [St. Bonaventure, N.Y.: Franciscan Institute, 1946, 24).

8. William of Ockham, *Ord.* I, d. 2, q. 3.

9. *Rep.* II, d. 16, q. un.

10. "Dico quod illa realitas a qua sumitur differentia specifica, est actualis respectu illius realitatis a qua sumitur genus vel ratio generis,-ita quod haec realitas non est formaliter illa; alioquin in definitione esset nugatio, et solum genus sufficienter definiret (vel illa differentia), quia indicaret totam entitatem definiti. Quandoque tamen istud 'contrahens' est aliud a forma a qua sumitur ratio generis (quando species addit realitatem aliquam supra naturam generis),-quandoque autem non est res aliqua, sed tantum alia formalitas vel alius conceptus formalis eiusdem rei; et secundum hoc aliqua differentia specifica habet conceptum 'non simpliciter simplicem,' puta quae sumitur a forma,-aliqua habet conceptum 'simpliciter simplicem,' quae sumitur ab ultima abstractione formae (de qua distinctione differentiarum specificarum dictum est distinctione 3 primi libri, qualiter aliquae differentiae specifica includunt ens et aliquae non)" (*Ord.* II d. 3, p. 1, q. 6, n. 179).

11. See Section 5.4. For a discussion of "Scotistic pluralism" as opposed to "standard pluralism," see Thomas M. Ward, *John Duns Scotus on Parts, Wholes, and Hylomorphism* (Leiden: Brill, 2014), 79–81.

12. *Lect.* I, d. 3, p. 1, qq. 1–2, n. 121. For an extended discussion of the *Lectura* and the role of the formal discussion therein, see R. G. Wengert, "The Development of the Doctrine of the Formal Distinction in the *Lectura Prima* of John Duns Scotus," *Monist* 49 (1965): 571–87.

13. *Lect.* I, d. 3, p. 1, q. 6, n. 171.

14. For a contrast with the more standard medieval "virtual distinction," see Wolter, "The Formal Distinction," 28–29.

15. For this division, see *Lect.* I, d. 3, p. 1, qq. 1–2, n. 127. The third type was between a single reality and its mode, which I introduced in Chapter 2 and covered more extensively in Chapter 4.

16. "Et ante istos conceptus sunt istae realitates, quorum unus non includit alium formaliter, unus tamen conceptus natus est determinari per alium; et ideo quia ibi est determinativum et determinabile, est compositio" (*Lect.* I, d. 3, p. 1, qq. 1–2, n. 127).

17. These are parallel, albeit not identical, processes as Section 6.5 will discuss below.

18. Wolter, "The Formal Distinction," 32; Peter King, "Scotus on Metaphysics," in *The Cambridge Companion to Duns Scotus,* edited by Thomas Williams, 15–68 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003), 23.

19. Richard Cross provides us with one example of such an opening of the self-contained whole onto its environment. That is, the substance is no longer a self-enclosed *ipseity*: "Does this psychological externalism weaken the account of the self,

such that the self is no longer a self-contained whole but extends out into the environment too? In general metaphysical terms, Scotus's talk of things as (in effect) collections of forms seems to make inherence less relevant—forms can be connected more or less loosely to each other without this necessarily altering the causal stories we tell about the interactions of these connected forms" (Cross, "Some Varieties of Semantic Externalism in Duns Scotus's Cognitive Psychology," *Vivarium* 46, no. 3 [2008]: 300).

20. Aristotle, *Metaph.* VII.5.

21. *In Metaph.* VII, q. 19, n. 67.

22. See Porphyry, *Isagoge,* "On Difference," in *Five Texts on the Mediaeval Problem of Universals: Porphyry; Boethius; Abelard; Scotus; Ockham*, trans. Paul Vincent Spade (Indianapolis: Hackett, 1994)

23. Such a standard definition of virtue can be found, for example, in Aquinas, *ST* I–II, q. 55, a. 4, resp.

24. "Quandoque posset esse non primo diversa ab alia sicut est illa entitas quae sumitur a forma, tamen ultima differentia specifica est primo diversa ab alia, illa scilicet qua habet conceptum 'simipliciter simplicem.'" (*Ord.* II, d. 3, p. 1, qq. 5–6, n. 183). Translations of *Ord.* II, d. 3, p. 1, qq. 1–6 are from *Five Texts on the Mediaeval Problem of Universals*, trans. Paul Vincent Spade (Indianapolis: Hackett, 1994); translation modified.

25. *Ord.* I, d. 3, p. 1, q. 3, n. 131.

26. "'Tunc sicut ens dicitur in 'quid' de illa parte essentiali a qua sumitur differentia talis specifica, ita dicitur in 'quid' de tali differentia in abstracto, ita quod sicut haec est in 'quid' 'anima intellectiva est ens'—accipiendo eundem conceptum entis secundum quem dicitur de homine vel de albedine—ita haec est in 'quid' 'rationalitas est ens,' si 'rationalitas' sit talis differentia. Sed nulla talis differentia est ultima, quia in tali continentur realitates plures, aliquo modo distinctae (tali distinctione vel non-identitate qualem dixi in quaestione prima distinctionis secundae esse inter essentiam et proprietatem personalem, vel maiore, sicut alias explanabitur), et tunc talis natura potest concipi secundum aliquid, hoc est secundum aliquam realitatem et perfectionem, et secundum aliquam ignorari,—et ideo talis naturae conceptus non est simpliciter simplex" (ibid., nn. 159–60; my translation).

27. "Sed ultima realitas sive 'perfectio realis' talis naturae, a qua ultima realitate sumitur ultima differentia, est simpliciter simplex; ista realitas non includit ens quiditative, sed habet conceptum simpliciter simplicem. Unde si talis realitas sit a, haec non est in 'quid' 'a est ens,' sed est per accidens, et hoc sive a dicat illam realitatem sive differentiam in abstracto, sumptam a tali realitate. Dixi igitur prius quod nulla differentia simpliciter ultima includit ens quiditative, quia est simpliciter simplex. Sed aliqua differentia, sumpta a parte essentiali—quae pars est natura in re, alia a natura a qua sumitur genus—illa differentia non est simpliciter simplex, et includit ens in 'quid'" (ibid.; my translation).

28. Ibid., n. 161.

29. Recall our discussion in Section 2.2 of *In Metaph.* V, q. 9, n. 55.

30. "Differentiae specificae ultimae sunt primo diversae, et ideo ab eis nihil 'unum per se' potest abstrahi" (*Ord.* II, d. 3, p. 1, qq. 5–6, n. 185).

31. *Quod.* q. 16, a. 3, n. 42 [§15]. Scotus rejects the will and intellect as pure perfections (see, for example, *DPP* 4.22). For a further discussion of his argument, see

Richard Cross, *Great Medieval Thinkers: Duns Scotus* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1999), 47; and Richard Cross, *Duns Scotus on God* (Burlington, Vt.: Ashgate, 2005), 55. Scotus suggests that pure perfections themselves are simply-simple (*Quod.*, q. 1, a. 1, n. 12 [§4]). If the will were a pure perfection, this would entail that the will, and not its ultimate specific difference (*superabundantly sufficient*), would be simply-simple. But this runs counter to Scotus's discussion of the will in q. 16. Even if we think of the will as a pure perfection insofar as will is compatible with the mode *infinite*, we might still say its ultimate difference, rather than the will itself, is simply-simple. This does not run counter to Scotus's argument in q. 1.

32. Scotus wonders how such a conception of will could be compatible with necessary acts of willing (see *Quod.* q. 16, a. 3, n. 43 [§15]). As *superabundantly sufficient* (or free), the will can will necessarily without compromising its status because, he argues, such indeterminacy is not a lack or mutability, but a *firmitas.* For further discussion, see Calvin Normore, "Duns Scotus's Modal Theory," in *The Cambridge Companion to Duns Scotus,* ed. Thomas Williams (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003), 141–45.

33. Scotus holds that active potency is rooted in the substantial form; it is not a proper accident (see *In Metaph.* IX, q. 7, nn. 5–10). Cf. Aquinas, *ST* I, q. 77, aa. 1 and 6. Whether an active power, such as the will, is an accidental form or (part of) a substantial one, our question of its ultimate difference remains.

34. For this phrase, see Normore, "Duns Scotus's Modal Theory, 143.

35. *In Metaph.* IX, q. 15, n. 24.

36. Ibid., n. 31.

37. In *Rep.* II, d. 6, q. 2, n. 9; as cited by Thomas Williams, "From Metaethics to Action Theory," in *The Cambridge Companion to Duns Scotus,* ed. Thomas Williams (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003), 345. Scotus refers to its *affectio iustitiae* as the "ultimate specific difference of a free appetite."

38. *Lect.* II d. 3, p. 1, q. 6, nn. 169–72.

39. I borrow this phrase, which I will discuss further in Chapter 6, from Timothy Noone.

40. *Lect.* II d. 3, p. 1, q. 6, n. 171. I reverse the order of presentation between the first and second ones.

41. Ibid., n. 170.

42. Ibid., n. 172.

43. "Ad primum istorum dicendum est quod si intelligatur quod, si differentiae primo diversae, quod 'constituta' sint primo diversa, hoc est incompossibilia, sic est verum: sicut enim differentiae albedinis et nigredinis sunt primo diversa, ita albedo et nigredo sunt primo incompossibilia. Si autem intelligatur quod si differentiae constituentes sint primo diversae, quod constituta sint primo diversa, non convenientia in aliquo, sic falsum est, quia constituta habent naturam, in qua primo convenient,—non sic differentiae, sicut patet de speciebus constitutis per ultimas differentias specificas, quae in nullo conveniunt" (ibid., n. 175).

44. In his translation of this text, Allan B. Wolter corrects a textual mistake that suggests that the specific difference has unity. "The 'difference' may be the ultimate reason why the unity characteristic of the respective subject of which it is the difference is different, but it is the respective subject that has the unity" (Wolter, "Notes for John

Duns Scotus," in *Early Oxford Lecture on Individuation*, trans. Wolter [St. Bonaventure, N.Y.: Franciscan Institute, 2005], n. 49).

45. *Lect.* II d. 3, q. 6, n. 171.

46. See Section 3.4.

47. "Et illa sunt ultimae rationes unitatis, qua sic sunt indivisibilia, sicut differentia specifica in specie est causa indivisibilitatis in species. Nec est causa prior, quia ipsa est cui primo repugnat divisibilitas ista; ipsa etiam est qua primo differ ab alia specie secundum eius differentiam, ita quod una differentia est primo diversa ab alia" (*In Metaph.* VII, q. 13, n. 121).

48. *Ord.* I, d. 23, q. un., n. 21. We might compare this to the manner by which *finite* serves as a placeholder for a range of degrees.

49. For another attempt to think difference, which ends in reification, see Plato's *Sophist.* Here difference is enshrined as the Form of the Different. In particular, see his discussion of the five great kinds (Plato, *Sophist* 254b–257a).

50. Aristotle, *Metaph.* VII.12.

51. Aristotle, *Top.* 101b.

52. Ibid.

53. This metaphysical answer quickly becomes more complicated when Aristotle turns from metaphysics to biology. For example, *Parts of Animals* I.2–4 rejects claims from *Metaphysics* VII.12. At certain points, he enlists the parts of animals to explain their essential differentiation. See, for example: "For it is part of the substance of a bird that it shall be able to fly; and it is by extension of wings that this is made possible" (*Parts of Animals* IV.12, 693b; translation by William Ogle in Aristotle, *The Collected Works of Aristotle*, ed. Jonathan Barnes [Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1984]). Likewise, he states, certain classes of unnamed animals have lungs: "There is, however, no one term to denote all animals that have a lung; no designation, that is, like the term bird, applicable to the whole of a certain class. Yet the possession of a lung is part of their substance, just as much as the presence of certain characteristics constitutes the essence of a bird" (ibid., III.6, 669b). Despite the tension between the "metaphysical" accounts of unity, which rely on the form to bring the ultimate difference, and biological accounts that rely on parts of animals, differentiation transpires in terms of some thing (part of some thing). For more extended discussion of these tensions, see, for example, G. E. R. Lloyd, "The Development of Aristotle's Theory of the Classification of Animals," *Phronesis* 6, no. 1 (1961): 59–81; Pierre Pellegrin, *Aristotle's Classification of Animals: The Conceptual Unity of the Aristotelian Corpus* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1986); David Charles, *Aristotle on Meaning and Essence* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2010); and Abraham P. Bos, "Aristotle on the Difference between Plants, Animals, and Human Beings and on the Elements as Instruments of the Soul (*De Anima* 2.4.415b18)," *Review of Metaphysics* 63, no. 4 (June 2010): 821–41. Each study shows the tension between Aristotle's more metaphysical accounts (e.g., *Metaphysics* and *Posterior Analytics*) and his biological ones (e.g., *Parts of Animals* and *History of Animals*). For an attempted reconciliation, as well as possible definitions in terms of function, see Charles, *Aristotle on Meaning,* chap. 12.

54. "Dicitur quod superior includitur in inferiori, quia dicit Philosophus quod ultima differentia est substantia rei; hoc non, nisi includeret alias precedentes. Similiter, Philosophus dicit: non oportet ponere alias differentias, sed solum ultimam, quia si

aliae ponantur cum prima, est nugatio; quia non oportet ponere 'animal bipes habens pedes'; hic nugatio transponendo terminus, nam dicto 'pede' superfluum est ponere 'habens pedes'" (*In Metaph.* VII, q. 17, nn. 7–8). Scotus is here recounting the position of Aquinas. For further explanation of Aristotle's view, see also Edward C. Halper, *One and Many in Aristotle's "Metaphysics": The Central Books* (Columbus: Ohio State University Press, 1989), 112.

55. Aristotle, *Metaph.* VII.12, 1038a.

56. Ibid.

57. Ibid.

58. Ibid.

59. *In Metaph.* VII, q. 17, nn. 7–8.

60. See Aquinas, *De ente,* c. 2.

61. Aquinas clearly distinguishes between first and second intentional concepts (see ibid., c. 3). Our concern, however, is not with the properties of the concept qua concept, but with what *in re* the concept conceives or is about. Thus, we bypass any discussion of logical properties at this point.

62. As Joseph Owens has shown, the essence considered as such has no being (*esse*) apart from its instantiation in particular things or its consideration in the intellect (Owens, "Common Nature: A Point of Comparison between Thomistic and Scotistic Metaphysics," *Mediaeval Studies* 19 [1957]: 5).

63. See Aristotle, *Top.* VI.6,144a36–b6; and Halper, *One and Many in Aristotle's "Metaphysics,"* 112–16.

64. For Aquinas, at least, the form here in question is not the substantial form abstracted from matter as a mere part, but the whole form. Thus, the form signifies the whole substance and not just one part.

65. "Ergo patet quod natura hominis absolute considerata abstrahit a quolibet esse, ita tamen quod non fiat precisio alicuius eorum. Et hec natura sic considerata est que predicatur de indiuiduis omnibus" (Aquinas, *De ente,* c. 3, lines 68–73).

66. Owens, "Common Nature," 5–6.

67. "Sed quia ens absolute et primo dicitur de substantiis, et per posterius et quasi secundum quid de accidentibus, inde est quod etiam essentia proprie et vere est in substantiis, sed in accidentibus est quodammodo et secundum quid" (Aquinas, *De ente*, c. 1).

68. Joseph Owens, "The Accidental and Essential Character of Being in the Doctrine of St. Thomas Aquinas," *Mediaeval Studies* 20 (1958): 29.

69. Owens tirelessly pointed out this aspect of Aquinas's thought throughout his career (see, for example, ibid., 31).

70. Aquinas does not confront the same issue in terms of the relation of species to individuals, insofar as the latter is a particularization of the former (see Chapter 6 below). Individuation does not add another level of actualization.

71. Aquinas, *ST* I–II, q. 18, a. 7.

72. Ibid., resp.

73. Ibid., q. 20, a. 1, ad 1. I bypass here the debates between Thomists and Thomas scholars regarding how to properly understand the moral object.

74. Ibid., q. 18, a. 10; and II–II, q. 154, a. 1.

75. Ibid., aa. 2, 5, and 10.

76. *ST* II–II, q. 154, a. 1, resp.

77. *ST* I–II, q. 18, aa. 2 and 10.

78. Steven A. Long, "Natural Law, the Moral Object, and *Humanae Vitae*," in *Ressourcement Thomism: Sacred Doctrine, the Sacraments, and the Moral Life,* ed. Reinhard Hütter and Matthew Levering (Washington, D.C.: Catholic University of America Press, 2010), 290.

79. *ST* I–II, q. 18, a. 10, resp. The parallel is limited insofar as accidents only have a derived unity and being according to Aquinas. Numerical unity is provided in reference to the agent as a supposit, and specific unity in reference to being the object of a power (see *In Sent.* 3, d. 5, q. 3, a. 2, resp.). For example, this act of teaching is distinguished from that act insofar as it is from Socrates and not Plato; teaching is distinguished from digestion insofar as it derives from a different power (i.e., the intellect).

80. Cf. *Ord.* II, d. 3, p. 1, qq. 5–6, n. 185.

81. Peter John Olivi, *In II Sent.*, q. 54, 2:242–59.

82. For a further discussion of this point, see Robert Pasnau and Juhana Toivanen, "Peter John Olivi," in *Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy,* https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/olivi/.

83. "Sic enim est consuetum quod ab ultima differentia seu natura formali accipitur nomen totius formae et totius entis, quia quodam modo ipsa est tota forma et aliae quasi partes ipsius et instrumenta" (Olivi, *In II Sent.*, q. 54, 2:258).

84. Pasnau and Toivanen, "Peter John Olivi."

85. Olivi, *In II Sent.*, q. 54, 2:255–59.

86. Ibid., 2:250.

87. "Ego possum scire de differentia specifica aliqua quod sit ens et ignorare utrum sit rationabilis vel irrationabilis. Patet exemplum manifeste per Augustinum 16 *De civitate <Dei>,* capitulo 8. Nam incertum est utrum illa monstra quae sunt in India sunt rationabilia animalia vel irrationabilia, sicud citropedes, satyr, fauni, Bragmanae, pigmaei, et tamen non dubitatur utrum differentia specifica eorum sit ens. Ergo secundum illud, rationabili et irrationabili est aliquid commune univocum cum tamen sint ultima distinctiva" (Henry of Harclay, *Ordinary Questions,* ed. Mark G. Henniger, SJ, trans. Raymond Edwards and Henniger [Oxford University Press for the British Academy, 2008], q. 12, a. 2, n. 87). The angle brackets appear in the source and enclose an addition by the translator.

88. Ibid., n. 97.

89. Ockham, *Ord.* I, d. 2, q. 9, 300–301.

90. *In Metaph.* VII, q. 17.

91. Ibid., n. 19.

92. Ibid., n. 26.

93. See, for example, Aquinas, *Metaph.* VII.12.

94. "Dico quod si ponantur in definitione multae differentiae ordinatae, non sequitur nugatio" (*In Metaph.* VII, q. 17, n. 27).

95. Recall this phrase from Klima discussed in the Introduction to this volume.

96. See Richard Cross, *The Physics of Duns Scotus: The Scientific Context of a Theological Vision* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2007), 68–70; and King, "Scotus on Metaphysics," 53. For an extensive account of Scotus's hylomorphism, see Ward, *John Duns Scotus on Parts, Wholes, and Hylomorphism,* chaps. 3–4.

97. Of substantial forms and matter, Scotus states: "Every substance, not only one that is composite, but matter and form as well, are all beings *per se* in this sense, for though a substantial form is in the matter it informs, it does not inhere in it like an accident, for 'to inhere' says that it does not inform its subject *per se*" (*Quod.*, q. 9, a. 2, n. 7 [§3]). On the difference between substances and supposits in Scotus's metaphysics, see Ward, *John Duns Scotus on Parts Wholes, and Hylomorphism,* chap. 7.

98. *In Metaph.* VII, q. 19, n. 69.

99. *Quod*., q. 9, a. 2, n. 12 [§4]. For the distinction between the form of the part and the form of the whole, see ibid., n. 28 [§11].

100. Cross, *The Physics of Duns Scotus,* 86–87.

101. *Quod*., q. 9, a. 2, n. 28 [§11].

102. Ibid., n. 24 [§8].

103. Cross, *The Physics of Duns Scotus,* 40. He cites *Ord.* II, d. 3, p. 1, qq. 5–6, n. 187.

104. "Dico quod respectu totius compositi, non quidem forma informans, sed forma qua compositum est ens quiditative; et hoc modo totum ens formaliter est forma totius (sicut album dicitur album albedine), non quidem quod forma totius sit quasi causa ipsius, cum materia et forma partiali causans quasi totum, sed est ipsum totum praecise consideratum, secundum illum modum quo loquitur Avicenna V Metaphysicae: 'Equinitas est tantum equinitas'" (*Ord.* III, d. 2, q. 2, n. 83).

105. See Cross, *The Physics of Duns Scotus,* 87.

106. For more sustained treatments of this issue, see Cross, *The Physics of Duns Scotus,* chaps. 4–5; and King, "Scotus on Metaphysics," V.2–3.

107. *Quod.,* q. 9, a. 2, n. 7 [§3].

108. I will not venture to speculate here where Scotus stands vis-à-vis quidditism of the sort described by David Lewis (see Lewis, "Ramseyan Humility," in *Conceptual Analysis and Philosophical Naturalism,* ed. David Braddon-Mitchell and Robert Nola [Cambridge: MIT Press, 2008], 203–22). My surmise is that both quidditism and anti-quidditism are ill-suited to describe Scotus's position.

109. *Ord.* III, d. 2, q. 2, n. 83.

110. King, "Scotus on Metaphysics," 55.

111. See Chapter 6 below. One of the best treatments of how Aquinas understands ultimate actuality in terms of *esse,* whereas Scotus understands it in terms of *haecceitas*, is J. B. Reichmann, "Scotus and *haecceitas*, Aquinas and *esse*," *American Catholic Philosophical Quarterly* 80, no. 1 (2006): 63–75.

112. Klima, "Mental Representations and Concepts in Medieval Philosophy," in *Intentionality, Cognitions, and Mental Representation in Medieval Philosophy,* ed. Klima, 323–37 (New York: Fordham University Press, 2015), 328.

113. *Ord.* II, d. 3, p. 1, q. 1 and *Lect.* II, d. 3, p. 1, q. 1.

114. *Ord.* II, d. 3, p. 1, q. 1, n. 42.

115. Ibid.

116. See Aquinas, *De ente,* cc. 2–3. For a full comparison of the two theories, see Owens, "Common Nature." See also Joseph Owens, "'Ignorare' and Existence," *New Scholasticism* 46 [1972]: 210–19.

117. *Ord.* II, d. 3, p. 1, q. 1.

118. Ibid.; *Ord.* III, d. 2, q. 2, n. 83; *Lect.* II, d. 3, p. 1, q. 1, n. 30; Avicenna, *Metaphysics* V.1.

119. "Dicendum est quod lapidi secundum se non convenit unitas singularitatis: tunc enim non posset intelligi sub ratione universalitatis nisi intelligeretur sub ratione opposita propriae rationi, sicut prima ratio" (*Lect.* II, d. 3, p. 1, q. 1, n. 28).

120. Efrem Bettoni, *Duns Scotus: The Basic Principles of His Philosophy* (trans. Bernadine Bonansea (Washington, D.C.: Catholic University of America Press, 1961), 100.

121. Cf. Thomas P. McTighe, "Scotus, Plato, and the Ontology of the Bare X," *Monist* 49 (1965): 615–16. Although he does not discuss this in terms of ultimate difference, McTighe doesn't think Scotus can achieve such unity.

122. *Quod.,* q. 5, a. 2, n. 36 [§§15–16].

123. "Quandoque tamen istud 'contrahens' est aliud a forma a qua sumitur ratio generis (quando species addit realitatem aliquam supra naturam generis),—quandoque autem non est res alia, sed tantum alia formalitas vel alius conceptus formalis eiusdem rei; et secundum hoc aliqua differentia specifica habet conceptum 'non simpliciter simplicem' puta quae sumitur a forma,—aliqua habet conceptum 'simpliciter simplicem,' quae sumitur ab ultima abstractione formae" (*Ord.* II, d. 3, p. 1, qq. 5–6, n. 179).

124. See *Ord.* I, d. 3, nn. 159–61; and Section 5.2 above.

125. *Lect.* II, d. 3, p. 1, q. 6, n. 171.

126. Chapter 6 will argue contra King that this same process occurs with respect to the individuation of the common nature (see Subsection 6.5.3).

127. As Cross and King have noted, Scotus does not so much provide an account of why form and matter constitute a unified substance so much as he describes the fact that they do. Scotus simply maintains that the oneness or unity of the composite results from the *per se* potency of the one part and *per se* actuality of the other. There is, he tells us, no other reason (see *Ord.* III, d. 2, q. 2. n. 84).

128. Aquinas, *SCG* II, c. 68.

129. Umberto Eco, "From the Tree to the Labyrinth," in *From Tree to Labyrinth: Historical Studies on the Sign and Interpretation,* trans. Anthony Oldcorn (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2014), 12. Differences are no longer appropriated to substantial forms: "In a tree composed solely of differences, these can be continually reorganized following the description under which a given subject is considered, and the tree thus becomes a structure sensitive to contexts, not an absolute dictionary" (ibid., 13).

130. This is a question regarding predication and not the categories.

131. Anne Ashley Davenport similarly observes: "The subtle shift operated by Scotus from reasoning *in entibus* to reasoning *in latitudine entium* seems to be centrally motivated by the Trinity, but the implications suggest wider and less visible concerns. Most strikingly, within the new *latitude entium* picture, the 'primary substances' of Aristotelian philosophy present themselves as epiphenomena. They are reducible metaphysically, to be 'aligned,' now, as univocal intensive *quanta.* 'Man,' for example, is more fundamentally a certain *quantum* of perfection to God than a biological nature seeking to participate in cosmic eternity" (Davenport, *Measure of a Different Greatness: The Intensive Infinite, 1250–1650* [Leiden: Brill, 1999)], 288).

132. *In Metaph.* VII, q. 13, n. 147. Scotus invokes the term in reference to the primary substances of Aristotle, but it also provides a helpful image for thinking about essences.

133. Ibid.

134. This term originates from complexity theory. See, for example, James Ladyman, James Lambert, and Karoline Wiesner, "What Is a Complex System?" *European Journal for Philosophy of Science* 3 (2013): 33–67.

135. *Ord.* II, d. 1, q. 6. The will and intellect are formally distinct from the soul, and not really distinct as accidents. *Opus Oxon.* II, d. 16, q. un. As themselves in some sense unequal, each formality has its own ultimate specific difference making it what it is. In the case of the will, for example, this is superabundant sufficiency. See note 143 in this chapter for a comparison to determining the persons of the Trinity by means of what Cross calls "absolute properties."

136. "Licet natura angelica sit principium intelligendi et volendi, et anima similiter (ita quod istae potentiae nihil dicunt essentiae animae additum), tamen primum—hic et ibi—est haec natura et illa natura, ad se" (*Ord.* II, d. 1, q. 6, n. 316).

137. Ibid., n. 318.

138. I must set aside here questions surrounding our cognition of real essences and ultimate specific differences. I will note only that I disagree with Pini's insightful analysis in "Scotus on Knowing and Naming Natural Kinds" insofar as he reads Scotus as a proto-Lockean. This seems to be Cross's point as well (see Richard Cross, *Duns Scotus's Theory of Cognition* [Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2014], 158).

139. See *Ord.* II, d. 1, q. 6, n. 319. This kind is this kind of entity from itself, just as that kind is that kind (ibid., n. 290).

140. See note 87 in Chapter 3.

141. *Quod.,* q. 17, a. 3, n. 13 [§6].

142. Ibid., n. 17 [§7].

143. Whether or not this is how the divine persons are constituted is another question. As Cross has observed, while Scotus accepts the distinction of persons by means of relations of origin as a matter of faith, he struggles to defend this view. At certain points in his career, he distinguishes the persons by means of what Cross calls "absolute (i.e. non-relational) properties." He argues that such properties, which are neither essential, accidental, nor relational, are in keeping with Scotus's ontology; he lists *haecceitas* as an example of such an entity. What Cross has recognized here, without correctly problematizing it, is the role of ultimate differentiation: those entities or realities that are not beings or things, but are not nothing. In terms of the Trinity—a dizzying height to which I will not attempt to climb here—this might mean that different persons might be distinguished by absolute properties (or ultimate differences) rather than relations of origins (see Cross, *Great Medieval Thinkers: Duns Scotus,* 65–71).

144. *Quod.,* q. 17, a. 3, n. 19 [§8].

145. "Aliter, dicitur quod ratio 'meritorii' non est aliqua ratio specifica et completiva in genere moris, quia non dicit aliquam bonitatem vel rectitudinem intrinsecam activi, sed tantum illam praesupponit et dicit ulterius respectum ad voluntatem acceptantem" (ibid., n. 20 [§9]).

146. Ibid., n. 6 [§3].

147. "Nihil est per se notum de conceptu non simpliciter simplici nisi per se notum partes illius conceptus uniri" (*Ord.* I, d. 2, p. 1, q. 2, n. 29).

148. Ibid., n. 136. This appears to be an important term in the Franciscan tradition (see, for example, Olivi, *QDDC,* q. 3, 3:544–45). For further discussion of this term, see Davenport, *Measurement of a Different Greatness*, 228–30, 260–61.

149. For further discussion of how the various *notae* fit together, see Normore, "Duns Scotus's Modal Theory," 145–49.

150. *Quod.,* q. 17, a. 3, n. 32 [§13].

151. See Olivi's question "Quid ponant ius vel dominium" in Peter John Olivi,

"Question de P. J. Olivi 'Quid ponant ius vel dominium' ou encore 'De signis voluntariis,'" ed. Ferdinand Delorme, *Antonianum* 20 (1945): 323.

6. *HAECCEITAS*, OR NAKED SINGULARITY

1. Jorge Gracia, introduction to *Individuation in Scholasticism: The Later Middle Ages and Counter Reformation (1150–1650),* ed. Gracia (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1994), 3–9; Timothy Noone, "Universals and Individuation," in *The Cambridge Companion to Duns Scotus,* ed. Thomas Williams (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003), 113. For discussion of Scotus on the singular essence, see Peter King, "Duns Scotus on Singular Essences," *Medioevo* 30 (2005): 111–37.

2. *In Metaph.* VII, q. 13, n. 115. It is not necessary that one principle explain all of these features, although, for Scotus, ultimate individual difference explains most.

3. Noone, "Universals and Individuation," 113.

4. Remember, each category of accident requires its own coordination to the point of individuation.

5. "Bonitas speciei excedit bonitatem individui, sicut formale id quod est materiale. Magis igitur addit ad bonitatem universi multitudo specierum quam multitudo individuorum in una specie. Est igitur ad perfectionem universi pertinens non solum quod multa sint individua, sed quod sint etiam diversae rerum species; et per consequens diversi gradus in rebus" (*SCG* II, c. 45).

6. *De ente,* c. 2. See also *SCG* I, c. 65. Although Aquinas seems to assume that he is following Aristotle in this regard, there is some dispute whether matter serves as the principle of individuation for Aristotle (see, for example, A. C. Lloyd, "Aristotle's Principle of Individuation," *Mind* 79 [1970]: 519–29).

7. *De ente*, c. 2, lines 4–24.

8. On the priority of form to matter qua being, see ibid., lines 53–57.

9. "Sed quia indiuiduationis principium materia est, ex hoc forte uideretur sequi quod essentia, que materiam in se complectitur simul et formam, sit tantum particularis et non uniuersalis: ex quod sequeretur quod universalia diffinitionem non haberent, si essentia est id quod per diffinitionem significatur (ibid., lines 67–73).

10. "Et ideo sciendum est quod materia non quolibet modo accepta est indiuiduationis principium, sed solum materia signata; et dico materiam signatam que sub determinatis dimensionibus consideratur" (ibid., lines 73–77).

11. It is important to distinguish between abstraction with precision and abstraction without precision (or imprecise abstraction). Briefly put, the former excludes determinations (e.g., specific differences or matter), whereas the latter retains them. For the importance of the different types of abstraction for Aquinas, see Joseph Owens, "The Accidental and Essential Character of Being in the Doctrine of St. Thomas Aquinas," *Mediaeval Studies* 20 (1958): 29.

12. Ibid., 28.

13. *In Metaph.* VII, q. 14, n. 19.

14. For further development of this claim, see James B. Reichmann, "Scotus and *haecceitas*, Aquinas and *Esse*," *American Catholic Philosophical Quarterly* 80, no. 1 (2006): 63–75.

15. *In Metaph.* VII, q. 13, n. 40. This solves the more quotidian problem of how an individual remains the same even as their matter changes over the course of time (e.g., in cell regeneration).

16. *Lect.* II, d. 3, p. 1, q. 5, n. 133.

17. See, for example, *In Metaph.* VII, q. 14, n. 26. Here Scotus states that in the nature of an individual stone, there is nothing except the singular matter and the singular form.

18. *Lect.* II, d. 3, p. 1, q. 6, n. 195.

19. "Sed ratione 'huius formae' magis est distinctio quam 'huius materiae,' sicut magis est per 'hanc formam' quam per 'hanc materiam'" (ibid.).

20. Scotus uses the term *virtual multiplicity* to describe the unity of individuals with multiple forms, such as humans (*In Metaph.* VII, q. 13, n. 147). On whether an individual human retains its identity postmortem, Scotus argues that Socrates qua this rational soul retains some identity with his former self (i.e., Socrates qua this human being), although not in every way. He illustrates this using the example of a line. The part, he tells us, has actuality, not merely potentiality, as contained within the whole. The whole is a virtual multiplicity. When divided, an individual precision or isolation (*una praecisio vel solitudo*) occurs, and not a generation of a new individual difference. The prior "half line" is now "this line" and has an actual individual difference as *this* line. Its being within the "whole line" BA was not as a potential line, but as an actual half line. The individual difference of Socrates's body or of Socrates's rational soul thus is not generated with the separation that is death (ibid., nn. 129 and 151).

21. Ibid., q. 14, n. 25. For Aquinas's position, see *ST* I, q. 85, a. 1, resp.

22. *In Metaph.* VII, q., n. 26. The extent to which (and the means by which) we can cognize an individual in our present condition will be considered in the Conclusion of this volume.

23. "Et si quaeras a me quae est ista 'entitas individualis' a qua sumitur differentia individualis, estne materia vel forma vel compositum, respondeo: Omnis entitas quiditativa—sive partialis sive totalis—alicuius generis, est de se indifferens 'ut entitas quiditativa' est naturaliter prior ista entitate ut haec est,—et ut prior est naturaliter, sicut non convenit sibi esse hanc, ita non repugnat sibi ex ratione sua suum oppositum; et sicut compositum non includit suam entiatem (qua formaliter est 'hoc') in quantum natura, ita nec materia 'in quantum natura' includit suam entitatem (qua est 'haec materia'), nec forma 'in quantum natura' includit suam" (*Ord.* II, d. 3, p. 1, qq. 5–6, n. 187).

24. "The composite substance constituted by individual prime matter and individual form is individuated independently of the individuation of its two necessary parts [*scil.* individual prime matter and individual form]: and this seems to be a supposition made throughout Scotus's discussion of the individuation of composite substance. [. . .] If Scotus really means that a composite substance is individuated independently of its two necessary parts, then he seems to have made a mistake. It is surely impossible for something composed of non-repeatable parts to be a repeatable essence" (Richard Cross, "Duns Scotus's Anti-Reductionist Account of Material Substance," *Vivarium* 33, no. 2 [1995]: 140n8).

25. "Non est igitur 'ista entitas' materia vel forma vel compositum, in quantum quodlibet istorum est 'natura,'—sed est ultima realitas entis quod est material vel quod est forma vel quod est compositum; ita quod quodcumque commune, et tamen determinabile, adhuc potest distingui (quantumcumque sit una res) in plures realitates formaliter distinctas, quarum haec formaliter non est illa: et haec est formaliter entitas singularitatis, et illa est entitas naturae formaliter. Nec possunt istae duae realitates esse res et res, sicut possunt esse realitas unde accipitur genus et realitas unde accipitur

differentia (ex quibus realitas specifica accipitur),—sed semper in eodem (sive in parte sive in toto) sunt realitates eiusdem rei, formaliter distinctae" (*Ord.* II, d. 3, p. 1, qq. 5–6, n. 188).

26. *Lect.* I, d. 3, p. 1, qq. 1–2, n. 122.

27. See Section 5.4.

28. *In Metaph.* VII, q. 13, n. 13, nn. 20–32.

29. Ibid., q. 2, n. 21.

30. Ibid., q. 13, n. 24.

31. Recall the separate coordination of each category.

32. *In Metaph.* VII, q. 13, n. 28.

33. Ibid., n. 21; *Lect.* II, d. 3, p. 1, q. 4, n. 65.

34. *Lect.* II, d. 3, a. 1, q. 4, n. 91.

35. *In Metaph.* VII, q. 13, n. 32.

36. Ibid. As I will discuss in the Conclusion to this volume, this presents problems for *de re* cognition of individuals.

37. Scotus, it seems, would agree with the contemporary view known as "Haecceitism," so dubbed by David Kaplan (see Kaplan, "How to Russell a Frege-Church," *Journal of Philosophy* 72 [1975]: 722). Scotus's theory differs from most contemporary ones, however, in its emphasis upon *haecceitas* as an ultimate individual difference rather than as a property of transworld-being. That is, the latter tends to reify *haecceitas.*

38. *Lect.* II, d. 3, p. 1, q. 4, nn. 66–69.

39. Aristotle, *Metaph.* V.13.

40. "Non quaeritur de causa individuationis vagae, secundum quod unum numero potest abstrahi ab 'hoc uno' numero et illo ratione unitatis numeralis, quae communis est,—sed quaeritur propter quid substantia materialis est singularis hac singularitate determinate, ut propter quid lapis est 'hic lapis' ita quod 'hic lapis' non potest esse alius" (*Lect.* II, d. 3, p. 1, q. 4, n. 71).

41. Ibid., nn. 73–76. Scotus subsequently cites natural cases of rarefication and supernatural cases of transubstantiation as arguments against this view (see ibid., nn. 77–78).

42. Ibid., n. 80. He responds in nn. 81–83.

43. Ibid., n. 84.

44. Ibid., n. 85.

45. Ibid., n. 88.

46. For this problem, see, for example, Aquinas, *De unitate intellectus contra Averroistas,* c. 5. See also note 20 in this chapter.

47. *Lect.* II, d. 3, p. 1, q. 3; *Ord.* II, d. 3, p. 1, q. 3; *In Metaph.* VII, q. 13, nn. 17 and 48–49.

48. *Lect.* II, d. 3, p. 1, q. 3, nn. 56–57.

49. Ibid., n. 58.

50. Cf. Etienne Gilson, *Being and Some Philosophers,* 2nd ed. (Toronto: Pontifical Institute of Mediaeval Studies, 1993), 86.

51. *Lect.* II, d. 3, p. 1, q. 3, n. 60.

52. *In Metaph.* VII, q. 13, n. 49.

53. *DPP,* 3.4–6.

54. *Ord.* II, d. 3, p. 1, q. 3, n. 65. See also *Lect.* II, d. 3, p. 1, q. 3, n. 60.

55. *Rep.* I-A, d. 2, p. 1, qq. 1–3, n. 74

56. *Ord.* II, d. 3, p. 1, q. 3, n. 65.

57. *Lect.* II, d. 3, p. 1, q. 2, nn. 43–51; *Ord.* II, d. 3, p. 1, q. 2, nn. 47–56; *In Metaph.* VII, q. 13, nn. 56–58.

58. *Lect.* II, d. 3, p. 1, q. 2, nn. 45–46.

59. "Unde sicut unum in communi sequitur ens in communi (ita quod nullum est medium nobis notius ad hoc demonstrandum, nec forte aliquod medium re aliud a quiditate extremorum), ita singulara entia secundum proprios gradus entitatis sequitur immediate propria unitas" (*Lect.* II, d. 12, q. un., n. 68).

60. Ibid., nn. 47–49.

61. Rejecting Henry's claim that divine ideas are limited to only the most specific species, Scotus holds that as the first artisan (*primus artifex*), God has more than just knowledge of the simple essence of the most specialized species (*Rep.* I-A, d. 36, p. 2, qq. 1–2, nn. 120–28, 147). Scotus explains that God comes to know singulars according to "the correct order of nature." Scotus thus does not shy away from the conclusion that God can have multiple ideas regarding one and the same thing, even one and the same part (i.e., as a part and in relation to the whole) (ibid., n. 146).

62. *Lect.* II, d. 12, q. 1, n. 49.

63. Wolter adds "by other *haecceities*" at the end of the translation, which I omit on textual grounds. "Respondeo ergo ad quaestionem, quod substantiae materialis per aliquid positivum determinatur ad hanc singularitatem, et ad diversas singularitates secundum diversa positiva" (*Lect.* II, d. 3, p. 1, q. 6, n. 164).

64. The term does appear in Scotus's writings, for example, in *In Metaph.* VII, q. 13, n. 61.

65. For a discussion of these terms, see Noone, "Universals and Individuation," 119.

66. King, "Duns Scotus on the Common Nature and the Individual Differentia," *Philosophical Topics* 20 (1992): 74n17.

67. See the Conclusion to this volume for a full account of our inability to directly cognize individual difference.

68. "Item, omnis differentia differentium reducitur ultimate ad aliqua primo diversa (alioquin non esset status in differentibus); sed individua proprie differunt, quia sunt 'diversa aliquid-idem entia'; ergo eorum differentia reducitur ad aliqua quae sunt primo diversa" (*Ord.* II, d. 3, p. 1, q. 6, n. 170).

69. *In Metaph.* VII, q. 13, n. 123.

70. See *Ord.* II d. 3, p. 1, q. 6, n. 169.

71. "Ergo praeter naturam in hoc et in illo, sunt aliqua primo diversa, quibus hoc et illud differunt (hoc in isto et illud in illo): et non possunt esse negationes, ex secunda quaestione,—nec accidentia, ex quarta quaestione; igitur erunt aliquae entitates positivae, per se determinantes naturam" (ibid., n. 170).

72. Allan B. Wolter, "Scotus' Individuation Theory," in *The Philosophical Theology of John Duns Scotus,* edited by Marilyn McCord Adams, 68–97 (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1990), 94–95.

73. See *Lect.* II, d 3, p. 1, q. 6 nn. 169–72; and *Ord.* II, d 3, p. 1, q. 6, nn. 176–88.

74. *In Metaph.* VII, q. 13, n. 60.

75. "Illa sunt ultimatae rationes unitatis, qua sic sunt indivisibilia, sicut differentia specifica in specie est causa indivisibilitatis in species" (ibid., n. 121).

76. Ibid., n. 116.

77. Ibid., n. 60.

78. *Ord.* II, d 3, p. 1, q. 6, n. 177.

79. "Quo natura est una proxima causa unitatis, sicut differentia specifica in specie est proxima causa unitatis specificae; nec de unitate numeali vaga, sed de 'hac,' hoc est, quare natura sit haec incommunicabilis alteri" (*In Metaph.* VII, q. 13, n. 60).

80. *Lect.* II, d. 3, p. 1, q. 4, n. 71.

81. *In Metaph.* VII, q. 13, n. 123.

82. Ibid., nn. 131–35.

83. Ibid., n. 136.

84. Gracia, *Individuation in Scholasticism,* 3–9; Noone, "Universals and Individuation," 113.

85. Richard Cross, *Duns Scotus on God* (Burlington, Vt.: Ashgate, 2005), chaps. 12 and 13.

86. Richard Cross, "Divisibility, Communicability, and Predicability in Duns Scotus's Theories of the Common Nature," *Medieval Philosophy and Theology* 11, no. 1 (2003): 50. Questions of incommunicability concern the suppositum and not the material individual *per se*.

87. *In Metaph.* VII, q. 13, n. 116.

88. For further discussion of the relationship of a nature to its supposit in terms of communication, see *Quod.,* q. 19, a. 2. As Ward shows, being a supposit is a contingent feature of some substances. That is, even if only by divine power, any substance could be part of another substance (see Thomas M. Ward, *John Duns Scotus on Parts, Wholes, and Hylomorphism* [Leiden: Brill, 2014], 110–11).

89. *Rep.* I-A, d. 2, p. 3, q. 4, n. 216. See also *Quod.*, q. 3, a. 3, n. 50 [§18].

90. "Potest igitur dici quod nostra natura est personata personalitate creata, non aliquo positivo tanquam ratione formali; quia ultra singularitatem non invenitur aliqua entitas positiva, qua singulare completive sit incommunicabile, sed tantum singularitati superadditur negatio communicabilitatis sive dependentiae, quae est incommunicari" (*Quod.,* q. 19, a. 3, n. 63 [§19]).

91. See, for example, *Rep.* I-A, d. 23, q. un., n. 18; and Cross, *Duns Scotus on God,* 162.

92. Marilyn McCord Adams reveals this startling conclusion: "To appreciate the magnitude of this second departure, consider how—assuming that Divine independence is enough to sustain as a supposit, not only each creature taken one by one, but all creatures at once—[T10] [i.e., potential noncausal dependence characterizes every created thing—my addition] makes pantheism or panentheism metaphysically possible, insofar as God could have assumed each and every creature God created all at once" (Adams and Richard Cross, "Aristotelian Substance and Supposits," *Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society,* supplementary volume 79 [2005]: 34). In the latter half of the essay, Cross examines the consequences of Scotus's dual claim that (*a*) divine supposits have replaced creatable primary substances as the fundamental subjects of the universe; and (*b*) no created substance is essentially a supposit (see ibid., 53–72).

93. *Rep.* I-A, d. 2, p. 3, q. 4, n. 208.

94. Ibid., n. 221.

95. *Quod.,* q. 3, a. 3, n. 49 [§17].

96. Recall *In Metaph.* VII, q. 13, n. 121.

97. Ibid.

98. *Ord.* II, d. 3, p. 1, q. 6, n. 183.

99. Ibid., n. 186.

100. "Quoad hoc ista realitas individui est similis realitati specificae, quia est actus, determinans illam realitatem speciei quasi possibilem et potentialem,—sed quoad hoc dissimilis, quia ista numquam sumitur a forma addita, sed praecise ab ultima realitate formae" (*Ord.* II, d. 3, p. 1, q. 6, n. 180).

101. Ibid., qq. 5–6, n. 188. See note 25 in this chapter for this passage.

102. Ibid.

103. King, "Duns Scotus on the Common Nature," 60–61.

104. Ibid., 57.

105. *Ord.* II, d. 3, p. 1, qq. 5–6, n. 180; *Lect.* II, d. 3, p. 1, qq. 5–6, n. 172.

106. "Quoad aliud etiam est dissimile, quia illa realitas specifica constituit compositum (cuius est pars) in esse quiditativo, quia ipsa est entitas quaedam quiditativa,—ista autem realitas individui est primo diversa ab omni entitate quiditativa" (*Ord.* II, d. 3, p. 1, q. 6, n. 181).

107. Ibid., n. 182.

108. "Et quia apud Philosophum quiditas frequenter dicitur 'forma' (ut patet V Metaphysicae cap. 'De causa' et in multis aliis locis; et VII Metaphysicae cap. 'De partibus definitionis,' quod 'in quibuscumque non est materia, idem est quod-quid-est cum eo cuius est': sicut exponetur, loquitur de materia et forma), et 'materiale' apud eum vocatur quidlibet habens quiditatem contractam (et Boethius in libello De Trinitate vult quod nulla forma potest esse subiectum accidentis, quia forma dicitur in 'quid' de quocumque alio: et si humanitas sit subiectum, hoc tamen ei non convenit in quantum est forma; humanitas quidem non est forma alterius partis compositi, ut formae vel materiae, sed totius compositi habentis quiditatem contractam, sive in quo est quiditas contracta),-ideo omnis realitas specifica constituit in esse formali (quia in esse quiditativo), realitas individui constituit praecise in esse materiali (hoc est in esse contracto). Et ex hoc sequitur illa logica quod 'illa essentialiter est formalis, ista materialis,' quia ista constituit in ratione subicibilis et illa in ratione praedicabilis praecise; praedicatum autem formale habet rationem formae, subicibile autem habet rationem materiae" (ibid.).

109. See Section 6.1. King himself discusses all three types of ultimate difference; immediately following this discussion, King lists similar criteria (see King, "Duns Scotus on the Common Nature," 59).

110. Ibid., 60.

111. Ibid., 61.

112. See Section 5.1.

113. *In Metaph.* VII, q. 13, nn. 89–91.

114. "Est autem unitas et distinctio media, in eadem re, quae habet diversas perfectiones sive diversas entitates formales, ita tamen quod una realitas formalis non includit aliam nec formaliter ex se est alia, et ideo est determinabilis et perfectibilis per illam" (*Lect.* II, d. 3, p. 1, q. 6, n. 178).

115. William P. Alston, "Particulars—Bare and Qualified," *Philosophy and Phenomenological Research* 15, no. 2 (1954): 253–58.

116. See, for example, Gustav Bergmann, "Synthetic *A Priori,*" in *Logic and Reality* (Madison: University of Wisconsin Press, 1964), 272–301.

117. Ibid., 278. Bergmann goes on to claim that the task of postulation should be left to science and only science.

118. For a complete account of the difference between the two, as well as the similarities, see Woosuk Park, "*Haecceitas* and the Bare Particular," *Review of Metaphysics,* 44, no. 2 (1990): 375–97. See also Thomas P. McTighe, "Scotus, Plato, and the Ontology of the Bare X," *Monist* 49 (1965): 588–616.

119. Ward, *John Duns Scotus on Parts, Wholes, and Hylomorphism*, chap. 2. Even if one were to identify the ultimate substrate with matter, matter requires its own principle of individual differentiation. At any rate, *haecceitas* is not a Lockean "I know not what," because it is not any *thing* at all. In addition, let it be noted that matter falls under the category of Substance in a derivative way. This is also the case for parts of substances, which are themselves substances. As Ward shows, Scotus's ontology admits of substances that are not supposits (ibid., 118–21).

120. Bergmann, "Synthetic *A Priori,*" 278.

121. See also King, "Scotus on Singular Essences," 123.

122. "Haec differentia individualis, quia non est principium constituendi aliquid in ratione praedicabilis sed tantum subicibilis et hoc maxima subicibilitate, et subiectum est materiale respectu praedicati, sic potest vocari 'materialis differentia,' et ideo non est principium definitionis, quae proprie est praedicatum et medium demonstrationis. Sic etiam differentia specifica posset dici 'materialis' aliquo modo, quia principium subicibilis respectu generis" (*In Metaph.* VII, q. 13, n. 124).

123. Ibid.

124. *Lect.* II, d. 3, p. 1, q. 6, n. 189.

125. For this discussion, see *Quod.*, 9, a. 2, n. 7 [§3]. Scotus argues that the condition of an agent is singularity, which accidents satisfy. The condition of the agent is singularity and not, as some argue, being a supposit. For example, it is not heat in general that acts, but this heat. Granted, this heat inheres in some substance (*Ord.* IV, d. 12, p. 2, q. un., nn. 283–85). Singularity is found in accidents without the *ratio* of the supposit (*Ord.* I, d. 2, p. 2, q. 1–4, n. 378). Scotus argues this point contra Aquinas and Godfrey (*In Metaph.* V, q. 7, nn. 14–17 and 42–44).

126. Scotus is clear that matter and form are *res* and *res* (*Lect.* II, d. 12, q. un., n. 49). As he elsewhere argues, anything that can exist on its own is a being *per se.* This includes substances, substantial forms, matter, and some accidental forms (e.g., qualitative and quantitative ones). But none of these beings or things are full-fledged subjects. Scotus goes on to show how these differ from *per se* beings that are not orderable to anything further (i.e., supposits) (see *Quod.*, 9, a. 2, n. 7 [§3]). Because all individuals—substances and accidents alike—are individual essences, we must be careful not to identify the individual with the supposit. As Ward clearly argues, substances for Scotus can be parts of other substances. Supposits, however, are substances that are not a part of other substances. Being a supposit is a contingent feature of some substances (see Ward, *John Duns Scotus on Parts, Wholes, and Hylomorphism,* 110–11). Only the divine supposits are fundamental subjects (see Cross, "Aristotelian Substance and Supposits," 53ff).

127. *Ord.* II, d. 3, p. 1, q. 6, n. 182.

128. Ibid., n. 189.

CONCLUSION: I WOULDN'T KNOW HIM FROM ADAM

1. I plan to explore broader problems surrounding the cognition of ultimate difference in another work. In a forthcoming article, I revisit this issue with respect to the sensation of individual accidents. See Andrew LaZella, "Caesar in Bronze: Duns Scotus on the Sensation of Singular Accidents," in *Medieval Perceptual Puzzles: Theories of Sense Perception in the 13th and 14th Centuries,* ed. Elena Baltuta (Leiden: Brill Publishers, 2019).

2. Allan B. Wolter, "Scotus' Individuation Theory," in *The Philosophical Theology of John Duns Scotus,* ed. Marilyn McCord Adams, 68–97 (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1990), 95. See also Giorgio Pini, "Scotus on the Object of Cognitive Acts," *Franciscan Studies* 66 (2008): 308.

3. *In Metaph.* VII, q. 13, n. 158.

4. Aristotle, *De an.* II.5, 417b22–23. Scotus cites this passage, for example, at *In Metaph.* VII, q. 15, n. 2.

5. *Lect.* II, d. 3, p. 1, q. 6, n. 142.

6. *In Metaph.* VII, qq. 14–15.

7. "Sed quando additur differentia individualis quiditati et naturae specificae, additur aliquid quod est extra rationem quiditatis, quia essentia de se non fit 'haec' nisi per aliquid quod est extra rationem eius" (*Lect.* I, d. 17, p. 2, q. 2, n. 178). See also *Ord.* I, d. 17, p. 2, q. 2, n. 251.

8. "Differentia individualis a nullo nota est in hac vita communiter. Cuius probatio est: quia tunc nota esset differentia eius ad quodcumque aliud, et ita non posset errare de quocumque alio sibi intellectualiter ostenso quin iudicaret illud esse aliud. Sed hoc est falsum de alio omnino simili nisi tantum de intelligendo se animam et suum actum forte, a quibus differre diceret quantumcumque similia sibi ostensa" (*In Metaph.* VII, q. 13, n. 158).

9. "Cum intelligo Adam, non intelligo singulare, quia si ipse intellectualiter mihi ostenderetur, nescirem quod ipse esset, sed intelligo conceptum compositum ex homine et singulari, quod est quoddam commune secundae intentionis. Talem etiam conceptum compositum habeo, intelligendo quodcumque singulare" (*In Metaph.* VII, q. 13, n. 165).

10. Although I can't adjudicate the matter here, I agree with Pini over King regarding the distinction between singular thoughts and *de re* ones. Pini argues, and I would maintain correctly, that these two forms of thought should not be distinguished. This is because that which individuates it also identifies; and this, as we have argued, is the ultimate individual difference. Pini states: "All our concepts of individuals are as a matter of fact descriptions of natures to which we append the concept *singular* or *individual.* [. . .] But this is an inference that we can draw only by committing ourselves to a certain metaphysical view about how things are in the world" (Pini, "Scotus on the Objects of Cognitive Acts," 307; Peter King, "Thinking about Things: Singular Thought in the Middle Ages," in *Intentionality, Cognition and Representation in Medieval Philosophy,* ed. Gyula Klima, 104–21 [New York: Fordham University Press, 2015], 114).

11. "Haec albedo ponatur simul loco cum illa albedine, manet ergo haec et haec, illa et illa, quia haec non est haec per hoc esse. Numquid sensus discernit in eodem loco duas esse albedines numero, si sint aeque intensae? Non. Quomodo etiam visus discernit diversitatem solarium radiorum, qui tamen a quibusdam ponuntur continue variari?" (*In Metaph.* VII, q. 15, n. 20). See also *Lect.* II, d. 3, p. 1, q. 1, n. 24; and *Ord.* II, d. 3, p. 1, q. 1, n. 21.

12. Pini explains this in terms of what he refers to as "Scotus's Principle": "(SP) Something cannot be a *per se* object of a cognitive power unless that cognitive power is able to distinguish that thing from any other item of the same kind once all other items belonging to different kinds have been removed" (Pini, "Scotus on the Objects of Cognitive Acts," 296).

13. *In Metaph.* VII, q. 15, nn. 22 and 26.

14. Ibid., nn. 24–29.

15. *Ord.* II, d. 3, p 2, q. 1, n. 288.

16. "Sed quod est istud impedimentum?-Respondeo: intellectus noster pro statu isto non est natus movere vel moveri immediate, nisi ab aliquo imaginabili vel 'sensibili extra' prius moveatur" (ibid., n. 289).

17. Pini, "Scotus on the Object of Cognitive Acts," 298.

18. "Et quare hoc?—Forte propter peccatum, sicut videtur Augustinus dicere XV Trinitatis cap. 27: 'Hoc tibi fecit infirmitas, et quae causa infirmitatis nisi iniquitas?' (idem dicit Commentator VI Ethicorum, et Lincolniensis ibidem et super librum Posteriorum similiter). Vel forte ista causa est naturalis, prout natura isto modo instituta est (non absolute naturalis), puta si ordo iste potentiarum (de quo dictum est in I diffuse) necessario hoc requirat, quod quodcumque universale intellectus intelligat, oportet phantasiam actu phantasiare singulare eiusdem; sed hoc non est ex natura (nec ista causa est absolute naturalis), sed ex peccato,—et non solum ex peccato, sed ex natura potentiarum pro statu isto, quidquid dicat Augustinus" (*Ord.* II, d. 3, p 2, q. 1, n. 290).

19. "Nunc autem est quod potentia cognoscens assimilatur cognito. [. . .] sed ex hoc concludere ipsum intellectum, in se naturaliter, habere modum essendi similem modo essendi obiecti, vel e converso, est facere fallaciam accidentis et figurae dictionis;—sicut non sequitur 'aes assimilatur Caesari quia per figuram inductam assimilatur, ergo aes in se habet similem modum essendi modo essendi Caesaris'" (*Ord.* I, d. 3, p. 1, q. 3, n. 122).

20. *Ord.* I, d. 3, p. 1, q. 3, n. 122.

21. "Singularitas bene est ratio vel condicio agentis, sed non est ratio agendi, immo formalis natura quae est similis in diversis; et haec est ratio quam debet repraesentare species genita, non autem condicio agentis" (*Q. de an.,* q. 22, n. 32). See also *Ord.* I, d. 3, q. 1, p. 3, n. 380.

22. "Cuius causa est principium agendi-assimilandi, quia agens intendit assimilare patiens sibi, et hoc specialiter est verum in cognitione quae fit per assimilationem; sed principium assimilandi non est singulare ut singulare est, immo magis [singulare est principium] distinguendi (quia in singularitate differunt [singularia]), sed magis natura communis [est principium assimilandi] in qua singularia conveniunt; igitur singulare ut singulare non est principium agendi nec in sensu nec in intellectu" (*Q. de an.* q. 22, n. 27).

23. *In Metaph.* VII, q. 13, n. 160.

24. Ibid., q. 9, nn. 30–31.

25. "Igitur a differentiis individualibus, sicut nec a specificis, nihil potest abstrahi primo modo, quia sunt rationes reales omnino simplices et primo diversae; alias processus in infinitum" (ibid., q. 13, n. 166).

26. "Sed secondo modo possunt multa abstrahi, et non solum secundae intentionis, ut praedicitur, sed et primae—ut 'individuum' 'unum numero,' 'per se exsistens,' 'incommunicabile' forte sunt primae intentionis. Sic ergo intelligo compositum ex natura universali et aliquo tali ut ex parte obiecti, non ut ratione obiecti" (ibid., n. 166).

27. Allan B. Wolter compares this second mode of abstraction to Bertrand Russell's principle of abstraction that dispenses with abstraction (Wolter, "A 'Reportatio' of Duns Scotus' Merton College Dialogue on Language and Metaphysics," in *The Philosophical Theology of John Duns Scotus,* ed. Marilyn McCord Adams [Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1990], 64–65; Allan B. Wolter, "Intuition, Memory, and Knowledge of Individuals," in *The Philosophical Theology of John Duns Scotus,* ed. Marilyn McCord Adams, 98–122 [Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1990], 113). What Russell's concept of abstraction shows us is that the individual in its individual difference is a product of the abstraction process itself. This conceptual byproduct is neither a mere fiction nor is it a reified thing. It stands somewhere in between.

28. *In Metaph.* VII, q. 13, n. 166.

29. See Peter King, "Duns Scotus on the Common Nature and the Individual Differentia," *Philosophical Topics* 20 (1992): 59.

30. King, "Thinking about Things," 116.

31. "Exsistentia actualis primo convenit naturae. Unde haec natura non est exsistens formaliter quia haec, sed per naturam. Illam autem naturam ut exsistentem intuitive cognoscit intellectus, et illa cognitio exsistentis ut exsistentis sufficit ad hoc quod eius possit esse recordatio. Cum dicis: potentia recordans cognoscit hoc ut hoc, nego, cum probas: cognoscit aliquid hic et nunc. Si intelligas per "nunc," exsistens, et per "hic," in se praesens, concedo quod cognoscit aliquid ut in se praesentialiter exsistens. Si sic ultra, hic et nunc sunt propria singularia ita quod possunt esse naturae, non ut singularis, licet non sint alicuius nisi quod est singularis singularitate intrinseca vel adiuncta. Tamen non includunt formaliter, nec per se praesupponunt, singularitatem tanquam rationem praecisam secundum quam illa insunt" (*Ord.* IV, d. 45, q. 3, n. 21). For this text and translation, see John Duns Scotus, "A Treatise on Memory and Intuition from Codex A of Ordinatio IV, Distinctio 45, Question 3," *Franciscan Studies* 53 (1993): 193–211; and Allan B. Wolter "English Translation," *Franciscan Studies* 53 (1993): 212–30. Cf. Sebastian J. Day, *Intuitive Cognition: A Key to the Significance of Later Scholastics* (St. Bonaventure, N.Y.: Franciscan Institute, 1947).

32. *In Metaph.* VII, q. 18, n. 69.

33. *Lect.* Prologue, n. 111.

34. "De articulis fidei qui sunt de singularibus; ut de actu voluntatis, qui est circa rem particularem, de quo sunt praecepta divina et circa quae sunt peccata" (*In Metaph.* VII, q. 15, n. 19 *textus interpolatus*).

35. King hints at such states: "Scotus may have that that *de re* mental acts are possible but that they essentially involve the operation of the will rather than the intellect. It is the will, for example, that stretches forth and latches on to a designated individual such as Christ (for we love Christ rather than an indistinguishable duplicate even if we cannot tell them apart (King, "Thinking about Things," 116n27).

36. *In Metaph.* VII, q. 18, n. 69.

37. Olivi, *In II Sent.,* q. 57, 2:316–23.

38. "Clamat etiam hoc secundo affectus amicitiae et inimicitiae. Non enim potest homo ferri ad alterum ut ad amicum nisi aspiciendo et accipiendo ipsum ut quoddam per se ens singulariter et personaliter in se ipso consistens" (ibid., 2:319).

39. For further discussion of this point and its difficulties, see Robert Pasnau, "Olivi on Human Freedom," in *Pierre De Jean Olivi (1248–1298): Pensée scolastique, dissidence*

spirituelle et société: Actes du colloque de Narbonne (mars 1998), ed. Alain Boureau and Sylvain Piron (Paris: Vrin, 1999), 15–25.

40. For the use of a similar term, see Jean-Luc Marion, *Prolegomena to Charity,* trans. Stephen E. Lewis (New York: Fordham University Press, 2002), 75.

41. *Ord.* III, suppl. d. 46. For the translation, see Duns Scotus, *Duns Scotus on Will and Morality,* trans. Allan B. Wolter (Washington, D.C.: Catholic University of America Press, 1997).

42. Robin Jeshion, "Singular Thought: Acquaintance, Semantic Instrumentalism, and Cognitivism," in *New Essays on Singular Thought*, ed. Jeshion (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2010), 125–26.

43. Ibid., 137; emphasis in original.

44. David Kaplan holds that we can achieve direct reference in thought by "our ability to manipulate the conceptual apparatus of direct reference"(Kaplan, "Demonstratives," in *Themes from Kaplan,* ed. Joseph Almog, John Perry, and Howard Wettstein [Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1989], 536). Cf. John Searle, *Intentionality: An Essay in Philosophy of Mind* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1983), 258.

45. "Or compare the footprints and bearprints cases. Semantically, structurally, and evidentially, they are alike. In both cases, I make an assertion involving a deferred demonstrative or pronoun. In both, I lack a perceptually-based means of identifying the subjects and so have no acquaintance with them, except in the extended sense in which I stand in evidential relations to traces of them. [. . .] With respect to impact on affective states, goals, and interests, they differ dramatically. Given my lack of interest in the source of the human footprints, my remark about his having big feet is a linguistic flourish, and the pronoun is a term of laziness. By contrast, the bearprint case resonates as singular because I begin to worry and undertake deliberation, planning, and action in connection to that bear. The affective component creates significance for me, which in turn inspires action. Consequently, my mind treats that bear as an individual, creating a mental name for it, and my use of the deferred pronoun is singular" (Robin Jeshion, "Singular Thought: Acquaintance, Semantic Instrumentalism, and Cognitivism," in *New Essays on Singular Thought*, ed. Jeshion, 105–40 [Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2010], 126–27).

46. For Scotus's account of how we relate to the vague particulars of, for example, manufactured items as opposed to singulars, see *Q. de an.* q. 22, nn. 37-41; *Lect.* II, d. 3, p. 1, q. 4, n. 71; ibid., d. 7, q. un., n. 55; and ibid., d. 9, qq. 1–2, n. 44. See also Deborah Black, "Avicenna's 'Vague Individual' and Its Impact on Medieval Latin Philosophy," in *Vehicles of Transmission, Translation, and Transformation in Medieval Textual Culture,* ed. R. Wisnovsky (Turnhout: Brepolis, 2011): 259–92.

47. "Utor etiam hoc nomine 'Roma' ad distincte significandum illam civitatem quam numquam vidi nec in se nec in suis accidentibus nisi communissimis cognitioni" (*Rep.* I-A, d. 22, q. un., n. 28).

48. Ecclesiastes 1.8–10. The Holy Bible. Translated from the Latin Vulgate.

49. *Quod.,* q. 6, a, 1, n. 22 [§9].

50. "Infinitas est per se conditio obiecti quietativi, et ita beatifici. Maior probatur: Primo, quia cum potentia naturaliter inclinatur ad primum obiectum suum, ubi non est plenitudo obiecti primi, sed defectus plenitudinis, ibi non est quietudo, imo potentia ulterius inclinatur, ubi ulterius est ratio primi obiecti" (ibid.).

51. *Quod.,* q. 14, a. 2, n. 46 [§13].

52. "Ergo intellectus viatoris qui non potest illas unite concipere ut sunt in se, movetur ad formandos conceptus distinctos de illis, proportionales conceptibus istarum perfectionum quae sunt in creaturis. Quibus tamen conceptibus pluribus formatis multipliciter et imperfecte concipit illud perfectum unum et perfectiones unitas in ipso. Et sic intellectus viatoris potest habere de Deo conceptum aliquem quiditativum" (*Rep.* I-A, Prol., q. 1, a. 3, n. 55).

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