

This translation of Book 1 Distinctions 11 to 25 of the *Ordinatio* (aka *Opus Oxoniense*) of Blessed John Duns Scotus is complete. These distinctions fill volume five of the Vatican critical edition of the Latin text edited by the Scotus Commission in Rome and published by Quarrachi.

Scotus' Latin is tight and not seldom elliptical, exploiting to the full the grammatical resources of the language to make his meaning clear (especially the backward references of his pronouns). In English this ellipsis must, for the sake of intelligibility, often be translated with a fuller repetition of words and phrases than Scotus himself gives. The possibility of mistake thus arises if the wrong word or phrase is chosen for repetition. The only check to remove error is to ensure that the resulting English makes the sense intended by Scotus. Whether this sense has always been captured in the translation that follows must be judged by the reader. In addition there are passages where not only the argumentation but the grammar too is obscure, and I cannot vouch for the success of my attempts to penetrate the obscurity. So, for these and the like reasons, comments and notice of errors from readers are most welcome.

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THE ORDINATIO OF BLESSED JOHN DUNS SCOTUS

Book One

Eleventh Distinction

<p>Question 1: <i>Whether the Holy Spirit proceeds from the Father and the Son</i></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> I. To the Question II. To the Principal Arguments <p>Question 2: <i>Whether, if the Holy Spirit does not proceed from the Son, a real Distinction between him and the Son could stand.</i></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> I. On the Question itself II. Response to the Question <ul style="list-style-type: none"> A. Opinion of Others B. Against the Opinion III. To the Principal Arguments IV. To the Reasons for the Opinion of Others on the Question 	<p>Num. 1 Num. 9 Num. 19</p> <p>Num. 24 Num. 27</p> <p>Num. 35 Num. 39 Num. 49 Num. 51</p>
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Twelfth Distinction

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THE ORDINATIO OF BLESSED JOHN DUNS SCOTUS

Book One

Eleventh Distinction

Question 1

Whether the Holy Spirit proceeds from the Father and the Son

1. About the eleventh distinction I ask whether the Holy Spirit proceeds from the Father and the Son.

That he does not:

Damascene *On the Orthodox Faith* ch.7: “the one proceeding from the Father and resting in the Son we call the Holy Spirit.”

2. Again, ch.8: “We say the Holy Spirit is from the Father, we do not say he is from the Son.”

3. Again, the same in his letter *On the hymn the All Holy* to the Archimandrite [Jordan] n.38, at the end: “Father and Word and Holy Spirit;” and he adds: “From the Father indeed; but of the Son, and not from the Son, but the Spirit of the mouth of God.”

4. Again, by the reasoning of the Greeks: nothing is to be held as an article of the faith save what is contained in the Gospel (which confusedly contains the faith), or at any rate in the Scripture of the *New Testament*; but it is not seen expressed in the New Testament that the Holy Spirit proceeds from the Son; therefore etc.

5. Again, love in us does not proceed from the word, because knowledge does not have causality with respect to volition; therefore likewise not in the prototype either.

6. Again, the will is posited as the third part of the image, Augustine *On the Trinity* XV ch.27 n.50; therefore it is not a principle of producing but a product. – Response: love is called ‘will’; but will ‘in potency’ pertains to the parent, although it does not constitute the parent, but quasi-arrives as a second fecundity in the Father.

7. Again, passive inspiriting is proper to one person in divine reality, therefore active inspiriting is too. – Proof of the consequence: for each seems equally perfect and equally incommunicable.

8. On the contrary:

In the *Nicene Creed*: “who proceeds from the Father and the Son,” and Athanasius in his *Creed* [Ps-Athanasius, *Creed* ‘Quicunque vult’]: “the Holy Spirit from the Father and the Son.”

I. To the Question

9. On this question the Greeks are said to disagree with the Latins, as the authorities from Damascene [nn.1-3] seem to indicate. But about this disagreement [the Bishop of] Lincoln [Robert Grosseteste] says (in a certain note on the end of the letter *On the hymn the Thrice Holy* [ms. in Magdalen College, Oxford, 192, f. 215rb]) that “the opinion of the Greeks is that the Holy Spirit is the Spirit of the Son but does not proceed from the Son, but only from the Father, although through the Son; and this opinion seems contrary to ours where we say that the Holy Spirit proceeds from the Father and the Son. But perhaps, if two wise men – one Greek and the other Latin – each a true lover of truth and not a lover of his own way of speaking, insofar as it is his own, were to inquire into

this contrariety, it would eventually be plain to each that the contrariety is not truly real as it is verbal; otherwise either the Greeks themselves or we Latins are truly heretics. But who dares accuse this author, namely John Damascene, and blessed Basil, Cyril, and other like Greek fathers, of being heretics? Who indeed will accuse again blessed Jerome, Augustine, and Hilary and other like Latins of being heretics? It is likely then that there is not, under the said contrary words, an opinion of contrary saints; for the thing is said in many ways (just as here ‘of this’, so there ‘out of this’ or ‘by that’ of ‘from that’), in which multiplicity of contrary words perhaps, when it is more subtly understood and distinguished, no opposed opinion would appear.”

10. However it may be with these matters, from the time when the Catholic Church declared that this is to be held as of the substance of the faith (as is plain [in the *Decretals of Gregory IX* bk.1 tit.1 ch.1], ‘About the Supreme Trinity and the Catholic Faith’: “We firmly believe”), one must firmly hold that the Holy Spirit proceeds “from both”.

11. For this there is the following sort of reason: that which first has a perfect productive principle before it is understood to have a product can produce by that principle, namely when the principle is so perfect that it does not depend on something passive nor can be impeded by anything; the Son has will, which is a principle productive of adequate love, and he has it as it is pre-understood to ‘the produced act of the will’; therefore he can produce it, therefore also he does produce it.

12. I prove the minor [n.11]: generation and inspiriting have a certain order, so that in some way generation is prior to inspiriting; in that prior stage there is communicated to the one generated all the divine perfection that is not repugnant to it,

and so the will is communicated; therefore the generated then has will as prior ‘to what is produced by act of will’, because there is not yet understood any production made by way, or by act, of will.

13. Also, the assumption about the order of these productions [n.12], although it seem to be manifest from the order of the powers, is however proved from the fact that when first acts have an order in something – provided each is perfectly active – they will also have a like order in eliciting their acts. But I have added the phrase ‘perfectly active’ to exclude substantial form and quality in the case of corruptible things, where, although the substantial form is active, and the quality likewise, and the substantial form is prior to the quality, yet the quality has its act first; but this comes from the imperfection of the activity of the substantial form. Now in the Father intellect and will are perfectly active principles, and they have a certain order, because the fecundity of the intellect has constituted the Father but not the fecundity of the will. Therefore the fecundity of the intellect will in some way have its act before the fecundity of the will has its act.

14. Others prove this order of production to the product by the fact that, as understanding is to willing, so saying is to inspiriting.

15. But this proof [n.14] seems defective: for willing presupposes understanding, because the object, about which there is to be a love, is through this ‘understanding’ sufficiently present, and without this intellection it would not be sufficiently present to the will so that it might will; but through the act of speaking there is not present to the will precisely the object of which the love is inspirited, because, although the Father inspirits by the will as it is in him, yet he does not have the object formally present through generated knowledge (because he knows nothing by generated knowledge, as

Augustine says *On the Trinity* VII ch.1 n2), but by the intellection ungenerated in him does he have the object present to him, and this is the knowledge presupposed to the act of inspiriting; therefore there is not the like necessity for generation to be presupposed to inspiriting as there is for intellection to be presupposed to volition.

16. I concede that this instance [n.15] well proves that there is not altogether a like necessity, but there is an order between intellection and will for two reasons: one is because of the presence [of the object] already stated [n.15], the other is because of the order of these powers in operating, because these powers are such that one is naturally ordered to operate after the other. The first reason is not the reason for the priority of generation to inspiriting, but the second is; for just as, to the extent they are operative powers, there is some order between their operations, so there, to the extent they are productive powers, there is some order between their productions, although no order of necessity is required by the need to have such a presence of the object.

17. An example of this: if in fire heat and dryness are active causes, yet of a nature to elicit their acts in ordered fashion such that dryness cannot dry unless heat first heats, the order of necessity is not because the dryable object is, by the heating, made present to the dry so that it might be dried, but it is because of the nature of these active powers; and if in the prior stage in which the hot heats by heat it should communicate to the heated, or produce in the heated, not only the heat but also the dryness which it had, the heated would be dried by the same dryness as is in the heater, because in the instant of nature in which there is drying, there is one dryness in the heater and in the heated.

18. So must it be understood here, that in the moment of origin in which the Father produces by an act of will, there is the same productive principle in the Father and

in the Son, and therefore the Son produces the Holy Spirit with the same production as the Father does.

II. To the Principal Arguments

19. To the authorities from Damascene [nn.1-3] it seems that a response can be made through that note of my Lord of Lincoln, about which we spoke [n.9]. However Damascene's first authority [n.1] might, if he is speaking of the will and not of the Holy Spirit, be given an exposition: because it could then be said that the will, which is the principle of inspiriting, is 'from the Father in the Son' because the Father communicates it to the Son; and 'it rests in the Son', that is, it is not further communicated under the idea of fecund principle, although the same will is communicated to the Holy Spirit, in himself. But the literal meaning of Damascene in the same place [n.1] seems to be that he is speaking of the Holy Spirit, and not of the will by which he is inspirited.

20. To the reasoning about the Gospel [n.4] I say that the doctrine 'Christ descended into hell' is not taught in the Gospel, and yet it is to be held as an article of faith, because it is placed in the *Apostle's Creed*. Thus are many other things about the sacraments of the Church not expressed in the Gospel and yet the Church holds them, handed down with certitude from the Apostles, and it would be dangerous to err about things which have not only come down from the Apostles but are also to be held by the custom of the universal Church. Nor did Christ in the Gospel teach all things pertaining to the dispensation of the sacraments; for he said to his disciples (*John* 16.12-13): "I have yet many things to say to you, but ye cannot bear them now; however when he, the Spirit

of truth, has come, he will teach you all truth." Therefore the Holy Spirit taught them many things which are not written in the Gospel; and thus have many things, some by writing, some by the custom of the Church, been handed down.

21. Likewise, diverse creeds have at diverse times been put forth against diverse heresies newly arisen, because, when a new heresy was arising, it was necessary to declare the truth against which the heresy was; which truth, although it was before of the faith, was yet not before as much declared as it is now against the errors of those who were denying it.

22. To the other point, about our word [n.5], I say that it is a mark of imperfection in the created image, because through our word the same nature as is in the mind is not communicated, and therefore not the liberty either, formally and simply. But to the divine Word is communicated the nature of the Father and the same will as is in the Father, and therefore the Word has the will as fecund with respect to the production of the Holy Spirit, because he is understood to have it first in order of origin before the Holy Spirit is inspirited.

23. To the final one [n.7], I say that it does not follow, because the divine nature cannot be had by one person in several productions, as will be plain in the following question [n.47], because in each production it would have the nature and in neither it would have the nature; yet one person can communicate nature in several productions, and several persons can produce a person in one production; and therefore if passive inspiriting is in one person alone, it does not follow that active inspiriting is in one alone.

Question 2

*Whether, if the Holy Spirit does not proceed from the Son, a real Distinction between him
and the Son could stand.*

24. Second I ask whether, if the Holy Spirit does not proceed from the Son, a real distinction between him and the Son could stand.

I argue that it could not:

Because, according to Boethius *On the Trinity* ch.6: “the essence contains unity, relation multiplies the Trinity;” therefore no person is distinguished from another which is not referred by relation to another; therefore if the Holy Spirit did not proceed from the Son no real distinction from him could stand, because there would be no reference to him, – therefore, etc.

25. Further, Augustine *The City of God* XI ch.10 n.1: “God is for this reason simple, that he is that which he has, excepting what is said relatively; just as the Father has a Son and is not the Son.” Therefore, if the Holy Spirit did not proceed from the Son, he would be the Son, because he would then not be said relatively to him.

26. On the contrary:

Augustine *On the Trinity* V ch.14 n.15: “It is clear that the Holy Spirit is not a son, although he exits from the Father, because he exits not as in some way born but as in some way given.”

I. On the Question itself

27. [Opinion of others] – Here it is said¹ that the question is null, because a position that involves incompossibles cannot be posited nor sustained, for the refutation is included in it all at once, which is the ultimate discordance to which a respondent can be reduced; for when such a position is set down, no rule of disputation can be kept to (namely by conceding what follows and denying what is repugnant), for at once must the repugnance be conceded that is included in the position set down. Now the proof that the position is of this sort is that the supremely impossible is repugnant to the supremely necessary; whatever is in God inwardly is supremely necessary; therefore what is repugnant thereto is supremely impossible. Therefore the position that supposes the Holy Spirit not to proceed from the Son is ‘supremely impossible’ because its opposite is supremely necessary inwardly (namely that he proceeds from the Son), and an impossible that includes incompossibles seems to be more impossible than an impossible that does not include such; therefore etc.

28. [Against the opinion] – Against this position [n.27] is that the position seems to be an avoiding of the question. For the question is being moved so as to inquire what the first real thing is that distinguishes the Son from the Holy Spirit, whether filiation or active inspiriting only, – because if it is filiation, then, however much active inspiriting is *per impossibile* removed, there remains still a reason for distinguishing.

29. Further, although a position that, as soon as it is understood, includes contradictories cannot be admitted, yet that which, when understood, includes only one of the contradictories, and the other only through an accidental consequence or through

¹ The Vatican editors say the opinion is found in an anonymous commentary on the *Sentences*, though they also note that the opinion is attributed by some to John of Berwick and William of Macclesfield.

topics extrinsic, seems it can well be admitted, because when such a position is set down rules of disputation can be kept to; for ‘what follows by an essential consequence’ can be conceded and what is repugnant can be denied; but if something ‘repugnant’ is inferred that follows from an extrinsic topic or by an accidental consequence, one must deny that it follows, because the proposition by which such a consequence would hold would be destroyed by the position. But now active inspiriting is not of the *per se* understanding of the Son, as he is a person, but is a quasi-property common to the Father and the Son; therefore, with this removed, then, in the positing of the Son in the being of Son, there are no contradictories posited by the first understanding of the proposed supposition [sc. that the Holy Spirit does not proceed from the Son], but only one of them, namely that the Son is Son, and the other exists only as it were by accidental consequence and by an extrinsic topic, from the removal of the quasi-passion by removing the quasi-subject; therefore the position does not so include opposites that it cannot be admitted.²

30. Again, if something included essentially in something is posited as removed from it, which was yet not the reason for the inherence of any predicate, – one can well ask whether, with this or that removed, such a predicate would inhere or not; and however much the proposed supposition includes contradictories, it is yet not repugnant to this supposition that one part of the question is not determinately to be given; for example, if animality is removed from man – which however includes incompossibles – and the question is asked whether, with this removed, man can be distinguished from ass, a response that he can would seem determinately possible, because it does not belong to man to be distinguished from an ass by animality but by rationality. Therefore, even if

² The logical point being made here is hard to follow, even with the explanations provided by the Vatican editors.

active inspiriting were of the idea of the Son, yet one can still ask whether – with that removed – the Son may be distinguished from the Holy Spirit or not, because the question is only ‘whether the removed predicate was the precise cause of the distinction, or whether some other predicate was that was not removed’.

31. Further, it is one thing to posit something and, with that posited, to ask about some proposition, – and another thing to ask about the truth of some conditional, because to ask about some conditional commits one to nothing. Although therefore the opinion [that the question cannot be posed, n.27] has some probability if one posited that the Holy Spirit did not proceed from the Son etc., yet it has none when the question is proposed (in the way I have proposed it) as follows: ‘whether, if the Holy Spirit does not proceed from the Son, a real distinction between him and the Son could stand’. For there I am asking about a certain conditional, whether on ‘the Holy Spirit does not proceed from the Son’ it essentially follows that ‘he is not distinguished from the Son’, so that the opposite of the consequent cannot stand with the antecedent, speaking of the formal understanding of them.

32. Against this position [the opinion stated in n.27] there are also many authorities.

One is from Augustine *On the Trinity* V ch.6 n.7: “If the Father were not unborn, nothing would prevent him from having generated the Son,” – and yet this position concomitantly includes incompossibles, namely that the Father is unborn [sc. since the Father is by definition unborn, to suppose him not unborn is to suppose incompossibles].

33. And Richard [of St. Victor] *On the Trinity* ch.16: “If there were just one person, nothing would prevent him having the fullness of wisdom,” – although, however, on the fullness of wisdom or intellect there concomitantly follows a plurality of persons.

34. Thus too the Philosopher *Physics* 4.7.214a9-11 argues: supposing that there were some space, and it contained no body but sound or color, he asks whether it would be a vacuum; and he responds that if it was of a nature to receive a body, it would be a vacuum; if not, not. Therefore, with such a supposition in place, which however of itself posits incompossibles (because an accident – as sound or color – would be without a subject), one can ask about something whether it follows, namely by understanding it of natural consequence, – because although the posited supposition includes incompossibles, it does not however include all the incompossibles by natural consequence, but one of the contradictories can follow on it by natural consequence and the other contradictory not at all, save as on something or other impossible.

II. Response to the Question

A. Opinion of Others

35. Therefore, allowing of the question, there is one opinion that says that if the Holy Spirit did not proceed from the Son he would in no way be distinguished from him, – and it has on its behalf two reasons.

36. One reason is this: relation in divine reality distinguishes either according to its quiddity or according to its being; not according to its being because thus it passes into essence; therefore according to its quiddity. But according to its quiddity it only has a

respect to its opposite, therefore it only distinguishes from its opposite; but, on the supposition of this hypothesis, there would not be in Son and Holy Spirit opposite relations; therefore etc.

37. The second reason is this: if disparate relations could sufficiently distinguish persons, since there are two such relations in the Father – as active generation and active inspiriting –, the Father would be two persons. There is a confirmation for the reason in that these relations – active inspiriting and active generation – seem to have as great a distinction as do their relatives or correlatives; therefore the latter can distinguish just as can the former.

38. Anselm's authority is adduced, in his book *On the Procession of the Holy Spirit* ch.2, but since each side adduces him on their own behalf and there is much disagreement about what his intention was, I do not for this reason wish here to dwell much on his intention.

B. Against the Opinion

39. Against this opinion are the reasons that are taken from two middle terms: the first middle is from the idea of what is formally constitutive, the second from the distinction of emanations.

40. [From the idea of what is formally constitutive] – The argument from the first of these is as follows: by whatever something is formally constituted in being, by that it is distinguished, because it is by the same thing that anything is a being and is one (with the unity fitting such an entity), and, if it is one, then it is not distinct from itself and is

distinct from others; but the Son is constituted in ‘personal being’ by filiation, therefore he is by it formally distinguished from every other person; therefore, after everything else, and especially ‘later’ filiation, *per impossibile* or *per incompossibile* has been removed, the Son will by filiation remain distinct in person from any other person. – The assumption is plain, because the Son is not constituted in ‘personal being’ by active inspiriting, because that is common to the Father and the Son; and there are not in him other positive properties besides passive generation and active inspiriting; therefore etc.

41. A response is that something is not distinguished by what is formally constitutive from anything at all, but only from things with which it most agrees and from which it is not distinguished in any save that formal way. An example: man is distinguished by rationality, not from a stone, but from the species of animal, with which he most agrees and from which he seems to be in very few things distinct; but he is distinguished from a stone by animality, because a stone is inanimate, but this animality is not formally constitutive of man. – So is it said in the intended proposition, that the Son agrees with the Father in active inspiriting, and is in this respect distinguished from the Holy Spirit; but by his own proper formality (namely filiation) he is distinguished from the Father, with whom he most agrees; wherefore etc.

42. Against this [n.41], and first that anything possessing a certain existence is, by a distinction that belongs to that existence, distinguished from anything else through something that is of the idea of that in which it has such existence. Therefore the Son is distinguished as a person through something which is of his idea insofar as he is a person, but active inspiriting is not of the idea of the Son, but, once the Son is already posited, it is as it were an adventitious property. From this it is plain that the example adduced is not

to the purpose, because, although man is not distinguished from stone first by rationality, yet he is distinguished by something that is of his essence, so that it would be discordant for him to be distinguished from a stone through nothing that is of his essence but through risibility. So it is then in the intended proposition.

43. Secondly in this way: what is constituted is distinguished by what is formally constitutive of it from everything else, even if *per impossibile* all things other than it were removed, because by it is it first distinguished – that is adequately – from everything not such; but anything that does not have that constitutive form is not such; therefore by that form is it distinguished from everything else that does not have it.

44. This reason [n3] is made clear by the fact that, although man is distinguished from a stone not only by rationality but also by animality, he is not distinguished by rationality first as well, that is, he is not adequately distinguished by rationality (because then anything distinct from a stone would be rational), but he is first distinguished in the genus of ‘body’ from a stone by ‘animality’; however, after by intellect removing from man whatever is other than rationality, he would yet by that alone be essentially distinguished from whatever is not rational, and so from a stone, which is not rational. Therefore it is not only what distinguishes adequately that distinguishes really but also what, merely if it were posited, would be incompossible with that from which it is distinguished.

45. For this reason, taken from what is properly constitutive [n.40], there is a confirmation in that, if the Father *per impossibile* did not inspirit but the Son did, the Father would still be distinguished from the Son and from the Holy Spirit by paternity, just as he is by paternity constituted in his personal existence.

46. [From the distinction of emanations] – From the second middle term, namely from the distinction of emanations [n.39], the argument is as follows: generation is distinguished from inspiriting, and this when *per impossibile* everything other than the idea of generation and inspiriting is removed, or at any rate when the fact is removed that active inspiriting would be from the Son, provided however that the distinction of the principles of generating and inspiriting would stand; therefore also, when all such is removed, the distinction between Son and Holy Spirit would stand.

47. The proof of the consequence is that it is impossible for one person to receive existence from two total productions; for a person receives existence from no production or distinction such that, if the production or distinction were *per impossibile* removed, the person would no less receive existence; but if it received existence from this production and from that – and from each completely, because each would be perfect – then, when either was removed, it would have existence completely through the other, and so it would receive being from neither and from each.

48. To this reasoning certain responses, as to the antecedent, are made, and because this matter will be treated of in distinction 13 [I d.13 n.7], I do not now enter on it. The conclusions of the above reasonings [nn.40, 46] I concede, and the intended proposition will become clearer when the distinction of the emanations has been made clear [d.13].

III. To the Principal Arguments

49. To the authority from Boethius [n.24] I concede that ‘relation multiplies the Trinity’, and yet it distinguishes not only from the opposite relation but also from any

disparate relation with which it is formally not the same; because, just as in the genus of quality whiteness is distinguished not only from the other opposite quality [sc. blackness] but also from every other disparate one, because whiteness is not formally sweetness nor smell (and if any disparate quality were incompossible with another disparate one in the same supposit, not only would the nature be distinguished from the nature but there would also be required a distinction of suppositos), so any disparate relation is distinguished from any other disparate relation, without any other incompossibility. There is a confirmation: active generation is distinguished from inspiriting as it exists in the Father, because the Son does not have an inspiriting more distinct from active generation than the inspiriting of the Father is distinct from it, because the Son's inspiriting is the same as the Father's. However some relations have not only a distinction but also an incompossible idea (or an incompossibility) in the same supposit, of which sort are the disparate relations of receiving the nature, because a person that received the nature in disparate ways would not have the nature in a single way.

50. To Augustine on *The City of God* I say that any person is that which he has, except that the relative has the correlative and is not it itself. But once the hypothesis in question is in place [n.24], the Holy Spirit would not have the Son as correlative and as inspiriter, and so it does not follow that the Holy Spirit would be the Son because he would not have the Son either as intrinsic or as correlative originator. But Augustine makes an exception when he says that that which is had does not have when it is had as a correlative; so Augustine does not take things otherwise than that what is had is had either in the way in which the Son is said to have deity, or in the way in which he is said

to have a Father; one way is to have it formally or essentially, the other way is to have it correlatively or originally.

IV. To the Reasons for the Opinion of Others on the Question

51. To the reasons for the first opinion [n.35].

To the first [n.36] I say that the relation remains there both according to quiddity and according to being. For in whatever way it remains according to quiddity, in that way it remains according to the being of that which is ‘being toward another’, because the quiddity of relation cannot be without ‘being toward another’, because by understanding a relation without ‘being toward another’ one understands not a relation but something absolute, because – according to Augustine *On the Trinity* V ch.8 n.9 – if it is toward another it is not substance, and so if it is substance or toward itself, it is now not relation; for in whatever way the relation passes into essence, the being and the quiddity pass into it, because just as ‘being toward another’ – which is the being of relation – is truly the same as the essence, so also the quiddity of the relation is the same as the essence; for nothing is there which is not the same. Therefore both the being and the quiddity remain, because relation is not formally the divine essence, because, as Augustine says *On the Trinity* V ch.2 n.1: “he is not Word by that which he is wisdom;” but both pass into the essence because, along with the fact that they are not formally the same, they are truly the same, as has often been said [I d.2 n.410, d.4 n.10, d.5 nn.43-45, 117-118, 138].

52. When, therefore, you say ‘it is distinguished either according to its quiddity or according to its being’ [n.36], – I say that it is distinguished according to quiddity and

according to ‘being toward another’. And when you say ‘thus it passes into essence, therefore it does not thus distinguish’ [*ibid.*], the consequence is not valid, because it passes according to identity, because true identity does not have to be formal identity, because the formal idea of that which passes is not formally the idea of the essence into which it passes; and therefore to this formal idea belongs what is proper to it; but it is proper to it to be distinguished really from every relation, both an opposite one and a disparate one incompossible with it, and therefore, along with the fact that it truly passes, it truly remains, as much as is sufficient for being really distinguished both from the opposite relative and also from a disparate relation incompossible with it.

53. To the second, when the two properties in the Father are talked of [n.37], the response is in distinction 2 question 3 [I d.2 nn.221-237]. For there need not be as much distinction or incompossibility of active productions as of passive productions, because it is incompossible for the same thing to be produced by, and to receive being from, two opposite productions [*ibid.* n.357]; but it is not incompossible for the same thing to communicate being to distinct persons by two active productions.

Twelfth Distinction

Question One

*Whether the Father and the Son inspirit the Holy Spirit insofar as they are altogether
One or insofar as they are Distinct*

1. About the twelfth distinction I ask whether the Father and the Son inspirit the Holy Spirit insofar as they are altogether one or insofar as they are in some way distinct.

Proof that it is insofar as they are distinct:

Augustine *On the Trinity* VI ch.5 n.7: “The Holy Spirit is the common union (or the communion) of the Father and the Son.” From this it is commonly received that he is the nexus of them both, – but a nexus is only of things insofar as they are distinct; and he is the nexus of them insofar as he proceeds from them; therefore he proceeds from them insofar as they are distinct.

2. Again, action belongs to a supposit, therefore to two supposita there does not belong one action; the Holy Spirit is produced by the action of the Father and the Son as agents; therefore to them insofar as they are distinct.

3. Again, if they produce insofar as they are altogether one thing, – then either insofar as they are one thing in essence, or one thing in person, or one thing in inspiriting force; not insofar as they are one thing in essence, because then the Holy Spirit would produce himself, because he is one thing in essence with the Father and the Son; nor in the second way, as is plain; nor in the third way, insofar as they are one in inspiriting force, because then it would follow that the Father was two principles with respect to the Son and the Holy Spirit, because of the two productive forces in him with respect to them.

4. Again, the love of generated knowledge is the third part of the image, therefore ‘the love that proceeds’ is the love of the Word. – The proof of the antecedent is in distinction 6, from Augustine [I d.6 n.23]; look for the response there [*ibid.* n.27].

5. There are three acts to the will: with respect to the object, with respect to the act of being well pleased, with respect to command. The third is in no way in God, since neither is it in us with respect to the first intellection; the first is more principal, the second is more universal [I d.6 n.26], – each is essential in God. But ‘the love that proceeds’ is principally love of the object, not of the Word unless it is the Father’s (perhaps it belongs to neither from first production), just as neither is there a Word save of the essence; now all love in us is a love that proceeds, not there, however, but only love of the known lovable object.

6. On the contrary:

Augustine *On the Trinity* V ch.14 n.15: “Father and Son are one principle for the Holy Spirit, just as Father and Son and Holy Spirit are one principle for the creature;” but the creature is from the three insofar as they are one, not insofar as they are distinct; therefore etc.

I. Response to the Question

7. In this question it is plain that the Father and Son are one principle of the Holy Spirit. This was made clear in the General Council of Lyons under Gregory X, as is plain in the *Extra*, ‘On the Supreme Trinity and the Catholic faith’, and it is today in book 6 of the *Decretals* [*Sixth Book of the Decretals of Boniface VIII lib.1 tit.1 ch. un.*].

The reason for this truth is as follows, that, as was said in distinction 11, the Father has first in origin the act of fecundity of the intellect before that of the will [I d.11 n.13]; in that prior stage there is communicated to the Son the same fecundity as is in the Father, because in that moment of origin – in which the Son is produced by the fecundity of the intellect – there is communicated to him by the Father whatever is not repugnant to him, and so the fecundity of the will is communicated [*ibid.* n.12]; therefore, in the other moment of origin, when a person is produced by the act of the second fecundity (namely of the will), that person is produced by the Father and the Son as altogether by one principle, because of the one fecundity of the productive principle in them [*ibid.* n.18].

II. Whether the Father and the Son inspirit more by the Will insofar as it is One or insofar as it is Concordant.

8. But there is another difficulty. For since the will is single in two suppositos, which suppositos will concordantly with this will, and concord connotes some distinction of the concordant suppositos, the difficulty is whether the Father and the Son *per se* inspirit more by this will insofar as they are one or insofar as they are concordant.

A. Opinion of Henry of Ghent

9. Here the following is said [by Henry], that the producing suppositos are distinct, and because of this distinction they would not in any way be conceded to inspirit insofar as they are plural, – for they have one inspiriting force; but further, this inspiriting force is not wholly under the idea of its unity the proximate fecund principle for inspiriting, but

rather under the idea of concordant will, where some distinction is connoted; and, because of this distinction, connoted on the part of the principle ‘by which’, one can concede that they inspirit insofar as they are distinct. – This opinion is given confirmation through Richard [of St. Victor] *On the Trinity* III ch.16.

10. “Since³ the intellect, as it exists in one person, can have perfect fecundity for the production of the Word, but the will, unless it exists in a double person, cannot have perfect fecundity for the production of the Holy Spirit, and this because the fecundity of the intellect consists in the fullness of perfect wisdom, which can exist in a single person, as Richard says [*ibid.*]: ‘Nothing is defined contrary to nature if the fullness of wisdom is said to be able to exist in only one person in the deity, for if there were only one person in the deity he could nevertheless have the fullness of wisdom’; but the fecundity of the will consists in the fullness of true love, which cannot exist save, at a minimum, in two persons, on the saying of the same Richard [*ibid.* ch.3]: ‘Love cannot be delightful unless it is mutual’, because, since the fecundity of the will cannot exist in essential love unless the love is supremely perfect and delightful, it is necessary that, if the will is fecund, the love be mutual, ‘so that there may be’ – according to him ch.3 – ‘one who bestows love and one who pays it back’, because, as he says in ch.7, ‘there is no satisfaction for a supreme lover if the supreme loved does not pay back supreme love’.

11. And for this reason, so that – as was said above [n.10] – the common will of the Father and the Son may be fecund for inspiriting the Holy Spirit, it is not enough that both have one will and an essential common love in it, whereby both of them love and will together, but it is necessary that both have a mutual and concordant will, such that

³ Scotus here proceeds to quote Henry, though, according to the Vatican editors, his quoting, for whatever reason, is not fully accurate.

one of them bestows supreme love on the other and the other in turn always pays supreme love back to the first; when this love exists, the will is fecund so that it produces love from itself, which love is the Holy Spirit, as Richard says (*ibid.* [n.10] ch.11): ‘in love mutual and most fervent there is nothing more admirable than that by him whom you supremely love, and by whom you are supremely loved, you should wish another to be equally loved’; ‘therefore in that love, as it is mutual, the love of each, in order to be consummate, requires there to be a sharer in the love already possessed’, and this through the inspiriting force, which is concordant will in mutual love, by producing the Holy Spirit, – not only as they are one in that will or love, but as they are plural distinct among themselves, which distinction is connoted by the fact that the will is said to be concordant and the love mutual; this cannot be unless it be of more than one insofar as these plural are inseparable, for the prefix ‘con’ indicates association, which is only of several who are distinct (and, for this reason, it is well said that ‘Father and Son and Holy Spirit are three co-eternals’, although it is denied that ‘Father and Son and Holy Spirit are three eternals’).

12. By the fact too that this will is concordant, and although the mutual love of both is one and the same, yet there is not the same idea to it as it is bestowed by the Father on the Son, and as, conversely, it is paid back by the Son to the Father, – since (according to Richard, *ibid.* ch.19) ‘when the two love themselves mutually and pay each other back the affection of supreme desire, and the affection of the first runs round to the second and of the second round to the first, it tends as it were to things diverse’, because it is in some way diverse in idea; but this diversity is in love and essential will, notwithstanding which, the fecundity is thoroughly one and the same in that concordant

will and mutual love, in which fecundity the Father and the Son are one and they uniformly inspirit the Holy Spirit, who ‘is loved concordantly by both, and the affection of the two is melted into one by the fire of the third love’, as the same Richard says.

13. And accordingly, in the inspiriting of the Holy Spirit, a double distinction between Father and Son is to be considered; in one way as they are expressed in eliciting the act, – in another way as they are understood to be concordant in mutual love and will about the act to be elicited. And, by the distinction of inspiriting considered in the first way, they are in no way to be said to inspirit as plural; for although they are plural who inspirit, yet they do not inspirit because of the plurality that is prior in them, but only from the distinction between them considered in the second way; and thus the Father and the Son do not inspirit the Holy Spirit insofar as they are plural in eliciting the act (although they concur in the one idea according to which the act is elicited), but as they are plural in one will, which is the idea of eliciting the act, by being concordant in their love in that mutuality.”

B. Against the Opinion of Henry

14. Against this position.

[First reason] – If the Father and Son produce the Holy Spirit by will as by it loving themselves in concord, then there is another Holy Spirit produced beforehand, – which is a discordant result.

15. Proof of the consequence. First because in whatever moment of nature, or of origin, the productive principle is in itself perfect and is in a supposit suited for the action,

in that moment there can, on such a supposition, be a reason for producing; but infinite will, as it is infinite will, understood before all act of will, having an infinite object present to itself, is a sufficient productive principle of infinite love, and the Father and the Son are persons suited for production; therefore the will as it is in the Father and the Son, not understood as that by which they formally will but as it is an infinite will having the divine essence present to it by an act of intelligence, will be for the Father and the Son the productive principle of the Holy Spirit, – and so, if the Holy Spirit is produced by will insofar as it is in act of willing, or insofar as by it the Father and Son love themselves in act, it follows that, before the Holy Spirit has been produced by the will as it is in act of willing, the Holy Spirit has been produced by the will as it is first act, which is discordant.

16. This reasoning about the will [n.15], that it is a principle of inspiriting as it is will, but not as it is in act of willing, is confirmed in two ways: first by the formal idea of the will in being a principle, which is liberty, and it does not in this way belong to the act of will itself; second by a likeness with the intellect.

17. In the first way [n.16] the argument is as follows: the will, as it is first act in us, is free to have an act of willing, but the act itself of willing is not free, or a principle of producing anything freely, because an act of willing is a certain natural quality, – and, if it is a principle of any act, it seems to be a natural principle of it not a free one (in the way that, if a habit of appetite were generated from such an act, the habit would be naturally generated, so that the generation of such a habit is not, as it seems, in the power of the act). Therefore it seems that the free production of the Holy Spirit is more saved if he is produced by will as it is first act than if he is produced by will as it is in act of willing, namely as it is understood to be in second act.

18. In the second way [n.16] the argument is as follows, that the Son is not produced by the paternal intellect as it is in act of understanding, such that actual intellection is the formal idea by which the Father generates the Son, as was shown above in distinction 2 [I d.2 nn.291-296]; therefore, by similarity, the will, as it is in act of willing, will not be the principle of producing the Holy Spirit, but the will as first act will be.

19. Next I prove the principal consequence [n.14] in this way, by taking the same major as before [n.15], ‘in whatever moment of nature or of origin etc.’; then I add this minor, that the divine will – having the first object present to it – is the idea of producing a love adequate to that object more perfectly than when having a secondary object present to it, or at least it is not so less perfectly; therefore, since the divine essence is the first object of the divine will – not the Father as Father, nor the Son as Son, because then the Father would be formally blessed in several distinct objects – then the will that has the divine essence present to it (whether as lovable or as loved, I care not in this second proof [as opposed to the first proof, n.15]) will be more a principle of producing love adequate to the object, at any rate not less than it, and so, since the will has the essence for object before the Father as he is Father, the Holy Spirit will be inspirited by the will as it is of the divine essence as first object before he is inspirited by the will as it is of the Father as of its object, or of the Son as of its object.

20. A confirmation of this reason [n.19] is that the divine essence is formally infinite, but paternity as paternity is not formally infinite; therefore the Holy Spirit, who is infinite love, and this not only by reason of infinite will but by reason also of infinite object, as was said in distinction 10 [I d.10 nn.9, 30-31, 47-49], will be inspirited by the

will as it is of the divine essence (which is the infinite object) rather than as it is of the Father as Father or of the Son as Son, as of its object.

21. If it be said that the essence is not the first object of the will but the formal idea in the first object is, which is the person, – this is false, because there is one first object of the will, and because the idea of the formal loved is what is first loved; it also concedes the intended proposition, because it will be the formal idea of inspiriting in the way in which the object contributes to the inspiriting.

22. From these two proofs [sc. nn.15, 19, proofs of the principal consequence, n.14] the conclusion is drawn that the Father does not inspirit the Holy Spirit insofar as he loves the Son first, nor the Son insofar as he loves the Father, but the Father and the Son insofar as they have the divine essence present to them as first object of their will, and this because of the second proof of the principal consequence [n.19]; likewise, the conclusion is drawn that they inspirit insofar as they have the essence present to them, not as actually loved, but as lovable, presented in an act of their intelligence, because of the first proof of the consequence [n.15].

23. And if you object to the first proof [n.15], ‘surely the Father and the Son are lovers of the essence in itself before they inspirit the Holy Spirit?’ – one can reply as was said before in distinction 6 [I d.6 n.15] about the production of the Son, how the Father in some way understands first in the origin before the Son is generated, and yet not such that the actual understanding of the Father is the idea of begetting the Son, but the memory in the Father [I d.2 nn.290-296]; one can speak in this way of the love by which the Father and the Son love concordantly and formally, and about the act of inspiriting.

24. [Second reason] – Again, second [n.14]: a principle that is as equally perfect in one supposit as in two is a principle of acting as equally in one supposit as in two, because there seems to be required for action only a perfect principle ‘by which’ and a perfect acting supposit; but the will is as equally perfect in one supposit as in two, and one supposit is as equally perfect – with the perfection requisite for an acting supposit – as two; therefore the will can be as equally a principle of producing in one as in two, such that the mutuality [sc. in concordant love] is not a reason for producing on the part of the productive principle.

25. The proof of the major [n.24] is that the principle ‘by which’ does not receive the perfection belonging to it from the supposit but gives it to the supposit – because by it the supposit is perfect – so that it can act; therefore such a principle is not more perfect in several supposita than in one when there is the same principle in several supposita and in one.

26. And if you say [against the argument of n.24] that the principle is not in one person as it is a productive principle but only as it is in two, and only as residual in the Father after the Son has been generated, – this seems absurd, because all the reality, both relative and absolute, that the Father can have, he has in himself in the first moment of origin; therefore he has, after the Son has been generated, none that he is not pre-understood to have in origin before the Son is generated, – wherefore he has that fecundity [of inspiriting] too, whether the fecundity is posited as a relation or as something absolute [I d.3. n.584].

27. This is confirmed by Augustine *On the Trinity* IV ch.20 n.29: “The Father is the principle of the whole deity,” and from him – in the authority cited before [n.6] – it is

plain that Father and Son are one principle of the Holy Spirit, altogether one, as the three persons are one principle of the creature; they do not, however, altogether ‘uniformly’ inspirit if the Son had at once, in the first moment of origin, the fecundity of inspiriting and the Father, in the first moment of origin, have all fecundity, did not but only had it in the second moment, after the Son has been generated.

28. And if an instance is made [against the response to the objection, n.26] about the power of creating, that it is not in the Father before the production of the Son and the Holy Spirit, – the response will be clear partly here in the exposition of Richard’s intention [nn.38-39], and more fully about ‘the order of the intrinsic productions to the extrinsic ones’ [II d.1 q.1].

29. [Third reason] – Again, if there is perfect will in the Father, it is plain it is first in origin there before it is in the Son; but it is not a perfect principle of inspiriting, for you [sc. Henry]. – I ask what is understood to be added to the principle so that it be a perfect principle of inspiriting? Not some supposit, because that adds nothing to the principle ‘by which’, but by a supposit the principle only has that it can act. If it is the mutual love of this person for that, and conversely, then the double relation of reason will be the ultimate reason or actuality of the principle of inspiriting; this is impossible for two reasons: first, that no relation of reason is a prerequisite for divine production (it is proved in distinction 13, against the opinion positing that the intellect and will are only distinguished by reason [I d.13 nn.31-40]), – second, because then there would be two proximate formal principles of inspiriting, and so the two supposites would not inspirit entirely as they are one, which is contrary to Augustine *On the Trinity*, as cited in the argument to the contrary[n.6].

30. [Fourth reason] – Again, if they had two wills, they could, with such mutuality, be concordant [n.24]; therefore to inspirit insofar as they are concordant is not to inspirit ‘as one principle’, because they do so neither as one supposit nor as one principle ‘by which’, insofar as they are concordant.

31. [Fifth reason] – Again, the Father, by will and volition as they are in him, along with relation to the loved Son, is either the whole principle of inspiriting or he is not. If he is, it follows that the Son does not inspirit insofar as he has a relation, because he does not as such have the idea of the ‘by which’; for he does not inspirit insofar as he loves if, when his loving is removed, the Holy Spirit would no less be inspirited; but, when the relation has been removed, the Holy Spirit would no less be inspirited by the Father as total principle, by his act of will as it tends to the Son. If it is granted instead (in the alternative above) that he is not, it follows that each, insofar as he loves the other, is only a diminished principle, and both together are one principle as it were by aggregation (as two people hauling a ship), but not one principle by identity of perfect principle.

32. [Against the reasons taken from Richard] – Further, against the reasons that Richard gestures to on his behalf [sc. Henry’s], namely that mutual love is most delightful [n.10]; from this it follows that the Father would be formally blessed by such love, because the love by which he is blessed is most delightful, and then the Father would not be formally blessed in himself but in the Son, objectively, which is heretical.

33. Again, second, against that reason [n.32], I argue as follows: in us mutual love is more delightful because by such mutuality a fuller idea of lovability is had in the beloved. For any beloved able to love, if he loves back, makes himself more lovable, because not only is whatever goodness is in him the idea of lovability, but also loving

back is another idea of lovability, and for this reason he who has the goodness which is the first idea of lovability, and likewise has loving back, is more lovable. Therefore it will be the opposite in divine reality, where this idea of lovability can in no way be found or posited; for the Son is not more lovable than the Father, or more a lover back of the divine essence (because of which he is first loved back), nor is this loving back another idea of lovability in the Son.

34. Further, mutual love in us is not more delightful unless it is known. For just as goodness is not loved unless it is known, so neither is he who loves back loved insofar as he loves back unless his loving back is known. But if loving back or mutual love must be posited in this way as more delightful in divine reality, and if for this reason the Holy Spirit is by such love inspirited, – then the Father and the Son would inspirit the Holy Spirit, not insofar as they love each other back, but insofar as they love and know they love each other back, such that the knowledge of being loved back would then seem to be a more formal and more immediate principle of inspiriting the Holy Spirit than love, and so the Holy Spirit will be more formally and more immediately produced by the intellect than by the will.

35. [Against the one holding the opinion] – Further, against the one who holds this opinion [sc. Henry], because he holds that the Holy Spirit can be distinguished from the Son even if he did not proceed from the Son, because of his distinct mode of proceeding from the Father. But if the fecundity of the will for inspiriting the Holy Spirit exists only as it is formally the will in two persons, his own mode of proceeding – a mode other than the mode of proceeding of the Son – could not belong to the Holy Spirit unless he was from the Son. Therefore Henry seems to be contradicting himself.

C. Scotus' own Opinion

36. As to this article [n.8] I concede that the Father and the Son inspirit the Holy Spirit by the will insofar as they are altogether one, because for the idea of principle, precisely as principle, there is only required its perfection in itself and that it be had in the person before it is understood to have an adequate term; but the will is ‘altogether one’ in the Father and the Son, and it exists in them by origin before it is understood to have an adequate term (because both persons are also inspiritive), and therefore the will, as it exists in them, is the same productive principle with respect to the Holy Spirit.

37. But, for understanding the words of Richard [nn.11-12], I draw a distinction, that ‘concordant will’ can be understood in many ways; either concordant in some elicited second act, as in loving the same thing, and then loving either the creature or the Holy Spirit; or in loving themselves and in loving back, as that the Father loves thereby the Son and conversely; or ‘concordant’ can be understood habitually, insofar as first act is of a nature to have a second quasi-act. The Father and the Son do not seem to inspirit the Holy Spirit with a concordant will in the first two ways, because (as was proved in the first reason by two proofs [nn.14, 15, 19]) they do not formally inspirit either by love of the essence (as was proved in the first proof [n.15]) or by love of each other (as was touched on in the second proof [n.19]). Therefore the understanding must be taken in the third way: ‘by concordant will’ that is ‘by will insofar as it is first act, in which they are of a nature to be concordant in their act, by concordantly producing love’; by such a will – I say – they inspirit, and more by a single will than by a concordant will, because, as the

will is understood to be first act, it is understood to be one will in them and not to have concord save in the following way of speaking, ‘because these persons are understood to be able to be concordant in their quasi-second act by concordantly inspiriting’.

38. Then, by saving the words of Richard in some way, I say that, when in some one and the same thing there are two active principles ‘active in an ordered way’, that one thing is not in proximate power to acting with the second principle unless it is pre-understood in the act of the first principle, – an example is about intellect and will in the soul; therefore the Father is not altogether fecund with a power proximate to inspiriting (which is an act of the will as the principle ‘by which’) unless he is pre-understood in the act of the prior principle (which is the intellect), and consequently the will is not the proximate principle save as it is in the two of them; this follows because, by that prior production – without which this power is not proximate – the will is in the two of them because, by the act of the first fecundity, there is communicated to the produced person the second fecundity, namely the fecundity of the will with respect to the inspiriting of the Holy Spirit; there is however no other fecundity – namely fecundity of will – in the two than in the one, but the same in both the producer and the product.

39. There is in some way an example of this in us. The soul is not fecund ‘with proximate power’ for having an act of willing unless it is in actual intellection, although it does not, by that intellection, formally produce the act of loving but by the will as it is first act, which preexists in the soul before intellection, although not in power altogether proximate to acting. If then the soul, in producing intellection, were to communicate to it the fecundity of volition, the will would not be in proximate power to producing love unless the word was first produced, and so after fecund will had been communicated to it;

and thus the will would never be proximately fecund save in the two of them, – not however such that this fecundity should, of its idea, require existence in two because it could not exist in one (nay, it itself would already preexist in the mind itself); but, because of the order of fecundities in producing, there would necessarily have to be a second fecundity – when it is in proximate power – in the two of them.

40. It can therefore be conceded that the Father and the Son inspirit by the one will which is in them, and which is perfectly fecund existing in the two supposita, because it is understood to be communicated to the generated supposit – and so to exist in both supposita – before the Holy Spirit is produced by it.

41. But how is the Holy Spirit inspirited by mutual love [n.11]?

I reply: by love, that is by the will by which the Father and Son as in first act are of a nature to love themselves mutually; by this will – I say – as existing in them, and of a nature to be the sort by which they may love themselves mutually, the Holy Spirit is inspirited, but not by any second act as it were of love actually bestowed and requited. But if this does not suffice for the intention of Richard, let him expound him who can, because his determination does not seem to stand well with the statements of Augustine – who attributes to the Father and the Son the perfect idea of one principle with respect to the Holy Spirit as he does to the Trinity with respect to the creature [n.6] – if his determination contradict what was just said above; but as to how Augustine says that the Father and the Son love themselves by the Holy Spirit, as if the Holy Spirit is the very mutual love of the Father and the Son (as Augustine seems to say in *On the Trinity* VI ch.5 n.7), it will be expounded in distinction 32 [I d.32 qq.1-2 nn.1, 11], where the Master

[Lombard] treats of this question ‘Whether the Father and Son love themselves by the Holy Spirit’.

III. Whether the Father and the Son are one Inspiriter or two Inspiriters

42. Connected to this question [n.1] is a quasi-grammatical difficulty: whether the Father and the Son might be called one inspiriter or two inspiriters.

Here the thing is said in many ways, but because the force of the question is about the signification of a name, I do not delay over it much. For it seems that such a verbal name [sc. ‘inspiriter’] signifies such a principle of acting, as it is of a nature to denominate an active supposit; for just as ‘reading’ signifies an act quidditatively by way of habit and rest, so ‘reader’ signifies the principle of this sort of act by way of habit and rest as it is denominative of an active supposit; ‘inspiriting’ therefore signifies the force of inspiriting as it concerns the supposit – and because there is one force in the Father and the Son, and a numerical term attached to some determinable places on it its own signification, it does not therefore seem one should, as to the force of the word, concede that there are two inspiriters, because the inspiriting force would seem to be enumerated in these words.

43. And if you object that this inference follows ‘there are two inspiriting, therefore there are two inspiriters’ (the proof of the consequence is that just as a singular implies a singular, so a plural implies a plural), – I reply: I say that the consequence is not valid, because a participle signifies the act in its being done, for it co-signifies time as does a verb, – and so, just as it is conceded that the Father and the Son create, thus is it

conceded that they are creating; but it is not conceded that they are two creators but one creator, because the verbal name does not signify the act by way of act and in its being done, but by way of habit and rest.

44. But what is the reason for conceding that a numerical term can be attached to adjectival terms but not to substantives?

This reason is posited, that adjectives are added to supposita and signify the form in the thing added to the supposita, and therefore they can be counted by the number of the supposita; but substantives do not thus signify the form in the thing added to the supposita, but they as it were signify in a way that is abstracted from the supposita; therefore they cannot be thus counted, because the number of the form would there be signified, and so it is not conceded that ‘there are two Gods’ as it is conceded that ‘there are two possessing deity’.

45. But this reason does not seem sufficient, because a numerical term puts its signification on the signification of the determinable; but what is signified by an adjective and a substantive is one and the same thing, – and they differ only in mode of signifying; therefore it seems that a numerical term primarily puts its signification on the same thing, and so, if a numbering of the determinable form is signified in one part and not in the other, because of the addition to the supposit that belongs to one and not to the other – then not by reason of the thing signified but by reason of the mode of signifying could there be truth in one and falsehood in the other.

46. I assign another reason of this sort: everything dependent depends on something altogether and simply independent (for never is the dependence of anything sufficiently terminated save at something altogether independent), and therefore when

things are equally dependent, neither is of a nature to terminate the other, but both would depend on some third, independent thing; an adjective is dependent on a substantive.

When, therefore, an adjective is added to a substantive, an independent thing is found, at any rate, where its dependence is terminated, – but when two adjectives are added mutually to each other, neither depends on the other, because neither is terminated at the other but both depend on some third thing, which sufficiently terminates the dependence of both. Therefore when a numerical term is added to a substantive, as when it is said ‘two inspiriters’, at once the numerical adjectival term has a substantive terminating it, because the adjective is determining that which terminates its dependence; therefore the signification of its substantive is denoted as numbered. But when it is added to an adjective, as when it is said there are ‘two inspiring’, both are dependent and therefore neither determines the other just as neither terminates the dependence of the other, but both depend on a third thing which terminates their dependence and is determined by them. And this holds in the proposed case [n.43], ‘somethings’ or ‘persons’, as if to say ‘three somethings’ or ‘three persons’ creating, because although the masculine form is, by usage, not a substantive, but only the neuter form is a substantive⁴ [I d.5 nn.36, 42], yet in divine reality, when a masculine adjective is set down by itself, it is then understood to be a substantive there, like ‘someone’ or ‘person’; as when it is said ‘the Father and the Son are one’ – as the authorities say [n.47] – , although they are one God, because ‘one’ posited absolutely is signified adjectively and is understood to have its own substantive, that is ‘someone’; hence [by ‘the Father and the Son are one’] is signified that the Father and the Son are one-someone or one-person.

⁴ In Latin the neuter ‘album’ ('the white') can be treated as a substantive, but the masculine ‘albus’ ('a white [man]') cannot be.

47. Hence, as to this consequence ‘there are two inspiriting, therefore there are two inspiriters’, – I deny it.

And when you prove it ‘because as a singular implies a singular, so a plural implies a plural’ [n.43], I say that it is not necessary – if on some antecedent some consequent follows – that on a distinction in the antecedent a distinction in the consequent follows, except when the consequent is distinguished in the antecedents as a genus is distinguished in its species. But in the proposed case the inspiriting supposit are distinguished, and on ‘inspiriting supposit’ there follows ‘inspiriter’, but this consequent is not distinguished or numbered by the numbered antecedent; and therefore, by arguing ‘inspiriting, therefore inspiriter, – therefore if there are two inspiriting, then there are two inspiriters’ there is a fallacy of the consequent, arguing from a distinction in the antecedent to a distinction in the consequent. And if it is sometimes found in authors that the Father and the Son are two inspiriters, these authorities should be given an exposition and understood soundly; for many authorities of the saints, which are sometimes not true as to the force of the speech, are to be expounded according to the Master [Lombard] in distinction 12 [*Sentences* I d.12 ch.2 nn.109-111].

IV. To the Principal Arguments

48. To the arguments.

To the first, when an argument is made about the nexus [n.1], – I say that the Father and the Son have a nexus in the Holy Spirit as in a common product; for although they are distinct (otherwise the two would not have a nexus), yet they do not have a

common product insofar as they are distinct, but insofar as they are one; hence the one product is from them insofar as they are one producing, and so the authority in question [sc. from Augustine] is to the opposite side.

49. To the second [n.2] I say that action is ‘of a *per se* existent singular’ – but it need not be of any incommunicable *per se* existent singular, as was said in distinction 4 [I d.4 nn.11-13].

In the way that this proposition is true ‘God creates’ or ‘God is Father and Son and Holy Spirit’, so is it posited that there is some ‘this inspiriter’ to whom it first belongs – that is adequately belongs – to inspirit, and who is somehow pre-understood in the Father and in the Son, to whom the act of inspiriting belongs, because both are ‘this inspiriter’; and then it would be said of this ‘*per se* existent’, which is as it were something common in real being to the Father and to the Son, that there is one action, although it is not one supposit (that is, incommunicable), just as neither is the Trinity one supposit, yet it does create with one creation.

50. This does not seem as probable here as ‘God creates’ is there, because there does not seem to be here someone *per se* existent, common to the Father and to the Son but not to the Holy Spirit, because then that singular *per se* existent would, although not incommunicably, yet really be referred to the Holy Spirit, and it would be something really related inwardly prior in some way to the first person being understood, and so not every real relation inwardly would be of a person, which would not seem probable.

51. In another way it could be said that action denominates with ultimate denomination only the supposit, or something having the mode of a supposit. I say ‘mode of a supposit’ for the separated soul and for accidents separated by miracle, which are

denominated by action with ultimate denomination, because they *per se* exist, – although not incomunicably, because they are of a nature to communicate being to supposit; but while they are communicating nothing, nothing is denominated by their action save by ultimate denomination itself. But every form, existing in another as a form, just as it gives that other being so it gives it to be in some way denominated by the form's action, not however with ultimate denomination, but there is denomination further of the supposit by the same action; but if some *per se* existing form were of a nature to have some proper action, and if it were to give the same being to several suppositos, then, from the fact that the suppositos are not denominated by the action of the form save because they have being through the form, they would be denominated by the same action, just as they would have the same being of that active form (an example: if one whiteness were in two surfaces, the surfaces would cause a change [sc. in the eye] with one change); so therefore, since 'fecund will' is one principle of inspiriting, whatever is denominated by this action would, by the fact that it has being by this form, be denominated by the same action. When therefore he [sc. Henry] says [n.2] that 'action belongs to a supposit, therefore several actions belong to several suppositos', I deny the consequence, except when that is multiplied in them which is the idea of the acting, by which, when it gives being, they are said denominatively to act.

52. And if you object that from the one soul of a man there are many distinct operations (as to understand and to will), and also many operations of the sensitive parts (as to see, to hear, and many such), and, if these parts were suppositos, there would be many actions of them when they are acting, – I reply that one thing is not always one idea of acting; rather, one thing can include in itself several ideas of acting, as will be said of

the soul in respect of its powers, if question is made about this [II *Suppl.* d.16 q. un nn.15-19], IV d.49 p.1 qq.1-2 n.18]. But it was said in the response already given [n.51] what sort of idea there is in the Father and the Son with respect to the production or the producing of the Holy Spirit.

53. To the third [n.3] I say that the Father and the Son inspirit the Holy Spirit insofar as they are altogether one; and not insofar as they are one in essence, nor insofar as they are one in person, but insofar as they are one in inspiriting force. And when you infer ‘therefore the Father would be two productive principles, because of the double fecundity in him’ [n.3], I deny the consequence, because in order to say ‘several producers’ a numbering of the supposita is required; for someone is not said to be ‘several knowers’ although he has several sciences, but there would have to be several supposita for this to follow (about this elsewhere, in book III, where the question is raised ‘whether, if several natures were assumed by the Word, he would be one or several men’ [III d.1 q.3 n.3]).

Question Two

Whether the Father and the Son uniformly inspirit the Holy Spirit

54. Second I ask whether the Father and the Son altogether uniformly inspirit the Holy Spirit.

That they do not: Augustine *On the Trinity* XV ch.17 n.29: “The Holy Spirit proceeds principally from the Father.” Therefore not principally from the Son; therefore not altogether uniformly.

55. Again, Jerome *Epistle 88* [=Ps.-Jerome *Epistle 17 to Cyril*]: “The Holy Spirit is properly from the Father,” through the Son. Not therefore properly from the Son.

56. Again, Hilary *On the Trinity* XII n.57: “May I merit the Holy Spirit, who is from you through your only Begotten.” Therefore he is from the Father through the Son; therefore not uniformly from both.

57. Again, Richard [of St. Victor] *On the Trinity* V ch.9: “The Holy Spirit proceeds from the Father mediately and immediately, but from the Son only immediately.” Therefore etc.

58. Again, every first cause acts more than the second, from the first proposition in *On Causes*; and it is plain from the statement of the Philosopher in *Posterior Analytics* 1.2.72a29-30, and in *Metaphysics* 2.1.993b26-30: “The principles of necessary things must always be most true, because they are cause of truth for other things.” Therefore every first producer produces more than the second producer; the Father seems to produce first, because he gives the producing to the Son, therefore etc.

59. On the contrary:

They inspirit the Holy Spirit by one principle, insofar as it is altogether one in them, – from the preceding question [n.36 above]; therefore altogether uniformly.

I. To the Question

60. I reply. An act can be considered in three ways: either in itself, or insofar as it is of a term, or insofar as it is compared to the acting supposit. In the first two ways there is altogether uniformity, or rather unity, because there is most truly one act and one produced term. Speaking in the third way, just as the inspiriting force is communicated to the Son by the Father, so also the Son has from the Father the fact that he inspirits, – and so the Father inspirits from himself, the Son not from himself.

61. On the contrary: therefore the Father inspirits the Holy Spirit before the Son inspirits the Holy Spirit, because in the first moment of origin, in which the Father has being from himself, he has inspiriting from himself, – and then the Son would not inspirit, because if the Holy Spirit is pre-understood to have being from the Father prior to from the Son, then the Son will not produce an already existing Holy Spirit.

62. I reply. About these orders or origins, or about many orders of priority and posteriority, there will be discussion elsewhere [II d.1 q.1 nn.13-18]. But as to what concerns the intended proposition, one should not understand that the Father inspirits before the Son inspirits, in the way that the Father generates first in origin before he inspirits, because then the Son would not inspirit (as the argument [n.61] deduces), just as the Holy Spirit cannot generate a Son already understood to be generated. But the order that exists in the Father is as follows: first both fecundities are from himself; second, there is in the Father the act of first fecundity, and then in the Son there is the second fecundity; third there is the act of the second fecundity, from the Father and the Son together as then having that fecundity, – yet still in a certain order, because the act is of the Father from himself, but of the Son not from himself but from the Father, just as neither in the second moment is there that fecundity of the Son from himself, but it is of

the Father from himself. There is not then an order of origin between the inspiriting of the Father and of the Son, as if the Father inspirited in some moment of origin in which the Son does not inspirit, but they inspirit together in the same moment of origin; there is however there an order of inspiritings in the act of inspiriting, because the Father in that moment of origin inspirits from himself, but the Son not from himself.

II. To the Principal Arguments

63. Through this is the answer plain to all the authorities adduced [nn.54-58], – because it is for this reason that Augustine says the Father inspirits principally [n.54]; for he himself expounds it: “Therefore I said ‘principally’, because the Son has from the Father the fact that he inspirits.”

64. However, a certain doctor [Bonaventure] says that the Father inspirits principally and more principally, but the Son only principally, because the Son has authorship with respect to the Holy Spirit while the Father has authorship both with respect to the Son and with respect to the Holy Spirit, insofar as he inspirits. – But another doctor [Henry] contradicts him, because there is not there any comparison properly speaking in some one form, but there is only there comparison in words; just as [the Archangel] Michael is said to be holier than the demon, where there is only a comparison in words and not in any from common to each extreme (but the form is only in one extreme and not in the other), so principality is in the Father, so that it is the same thing for the Father to inspirit more principally and for him to inspirit principally.

65. As to the other from Jerome [n.55], I say that he alone is said to be proprietor who does not, in possessing a thing, depend on another, but a borrower is said to be he who, in using a thing, depends on another and is not properly a proprietor. The Father, therefore, who has inspiriting force from himself, is rightly said properly to inspirit, but the Son does not thus properly inspirit – that is from himself –, although he does properly inspirit, that is not improperly or imperfectly.

66. Through the same point [n.62] the answer is plain to Hilary when he says that the Holy Spirit is from the Father through the Son [n.56]. – Yet a distinction is drawn, because something determined by this preposition ‘through’ with its causal force is compared either to a transitive verb or to an intransitive one; if to a transitive verb, then sub-authorship is noted in the causal force of this preposition, as ‘the Father creates through the Son’; if to an absolute or intransitive verb, then authorship is noted in the causal force of this preposition, and this either authorship of efficient causality, as ‘man lives through God’, or authorship of formal causality, as ‘man is wise through wisdom’.

67. And through the same point [n.62] the response is plain to Richard [n.57]. For the Father, with the same fecundity, inspirits the Holy Spirit immediately, but, insofar as he gives to the Son the virtue of inspiriting whereby the Son inspirits, the Father can be said to inspirit mediately; nor is there here any difference of form in perfection and imperfection, or anything which might posit diversity in act, but only a different way of having the same virtue, – because the Father has it from himself and the Son not from himself but from the Father.

68. To the final one [n.58] I say that the proposition is true about cause and caused, because of the fact that, in ordered causes, there is a different and a more

principal virtue of causing in the prior cause, but it is not so in a principle which is not a cause, because there is not there a different virtue of being principle. Thus it is in the intended proposition, and therefore the first principle is not more of a principle than the second, just as neither is a superior cause more of a cause if it causes along with the second cause by the same causative virtue as that by which the second cause causes.

Thirteenth Distinction

Single Question

Whether the Holy Spirit is generated, or whether the Production of the Holy Spirit is Generation or is Distinct from it

1. About the thirteenth distinction I ask whether the Holy Spirit is generated, or whether the production of the Holy Spirit is generation or is distinct from it.

Proof that it is generation:

Because generation in creatures is distinguished from other changes by the fact that it is change to substance, or by the fact that by it something is produced in the being of substance; the Holy Spirit is, by inspiriting, produced in divine being, just as by filiation or generation the Son is produced; therefore the production of the Holy Spirit is generation. – A confirmation of the reason is that changes and motions are distinguished by their formal terms, according to the Philosopher *Physics* 5.1.224b7-10; but the formal term of the inspiriting of the Holy Spirit is the same as the formal term of generation, because the essence is communicated to both; therefore inspiriting is generation.

2. Further, things that are the same as one and the same thing are the same as each other, therefore things that are univocal with one and the same thing are univocal with each other; generation and inspiriting are univocal productions when compared to the same third thing, as to the Father, because it was said above in distinction 7 that both productions are univocal in themselves [I d.7 n.42]; therefore they are productions univocal with themselves, and so they are of one and the same idea.

3. Further, a real difference does not depend on a difference of reason, because a real difference is more perfect; but the difference between the principles of these productions – which are nature and will – is only a difference of reason, because a real difference between absolute things does not seem capable of standing with the divine simplicity; therefore the distinction between these productions, which pre-requires the distinction of principles, will be only one of reason.

4. The minor is also proved in another way, doubly:

First, because otherwise there will be a real relation, and so a real distinction, between the intellect and the act of understanding in God. The proof of the first consequence is that wherever the intellect is, by the nature of the thing, distinguished from the act of understanding, the intellect receives the act of understanding (or is the idea of receiving it), and so there will be there a relation of recipient to thing received; and there is a confirmation, because, if the intellect in God is not the idea of receiving the act of understanding, God will not be said to understand more properly with the intellect than with the will. Thus also can it be argued about the relation of ‘prior’, because the principle is prior to that with respect to which it is principle.

5. The proof, second, of the minor is that the intellect absolutely is the principle ‘by which’ with respect to intellection, both in eliciting it and in receiving it, and so the two will be unequal, because the one exceeds the other; therefore when the same thing is added on both sides, an infinite intellect will be the principle in this way with respect to an infinite act of understanding, and so there will be there a real relation.

6. On the contrary:

Augustine *On the Trinity* V ch.14 n.15 says that the Holy Spirit proceeds from the Father and the Son “not in some way born but in some way given.”

I. The Opinions of Others

7. There are here many suppositions and many modes in which these productions may be distinguished.

A. First Opinion

8. One way of supposing these productions are distinguished is by the formal terms that are the produced persons.

9. And this supposition is confirmed by the statement in the *Physics* 5.5.229a25-27, where motions are distinguished by the terms, as it seems, because there is a different term for a different motion; and although these productions are not motions or changes, they are yet as it were certain ways to persons; therefore they are distinguished by the persons.

10. On the contrary: the productions do not have ‘being’ through the terms, therefore not distinction either. – The antecedent is plain because the terms have being formally from them; the consequence I prove because being and distinction are got from the same thing.

11. Again, the statement of the *Physics* [ibid.] is to the opposite: for motions are not distinguished by the terms save because the terms in flux are of the same idea as the

terminating terms; but here the flux is not of the same idea as the term, – and the way too, which is as it were a flux, is not at all of the same idea as the formal terms, because the formal term is the essence, the way or the production – which is a sort of way – is the relation.

B. Second Opinion

12. Another way of supposing these productions are distinguished is by the fact that one production is from one person and the other from two persons.

13. Against this is that, if the same thing is the formal principle of producing something, the principle of production will not be of a different idea because of its being in this supposit or in that, because whiteness in a stone and in a horse is a principle of making a change of the same idea in sight; so too, if the same whiteness were in two things and in one, it would be a principle of making a change of the same idea in sight. But these productions are distinguished in such a way that they are not of the same idea, therefore to this distinction another idea must be assigned than the unity or duality of the acting suppositis.

14. Again, according to this way an infinite number of persons could be posited in divine reality; for a fourth person could be posited from the three, and a fifth from the four persons, nor would there be any idea of trinity in the divine persons if there was only a distinction through a unity, or plurality, of acting suppositis, and there was no distinction through ideas of producing.

15. Again, every distinction is reduced to certain things primarily diverse, which things would be distinct if, *per impossibile*, they were separated from everything else, – therefore this distinction is through some such things as would be distinct with everything else *per impossibile* left out and as would also be in themselves primarily diverse; the unity or plurality of acting supposita are not such things if there is not any other distinction in the principles of acting; therefore etc. For when everything other than the unity or duality of supposita is removed, this unity or plurality do not seem to be the primary reason for distinguishing the productions.

C. Third Opinion

16. In another way it is posited that these productions are distinguished by the fact that one production goes along with another and with its opposite, such that the idea of the distinction of disparate relations is the distinction of opposite relations, namely insofar as one disparate relation is compatible with two other opposite relations – just as the force of inspiriting stands along with active and passive generation, and is therefore distinguished from each of them.⁵

17. Against this [n.16] one can argue as against the preceding opinion [n.12]; for this opinion does not give a reason that there are not infinite numbers of persons, because a later relation may always stand with the prior opposite relations; further, there would not be a primary diversity between this production and that, because this production

⁵ Note by Scotus: "Godfrey of Fontaines Quodlibet VII q.4: 'On the contrary [to the opinion of n.16]: essence stands along with opposites, therefore it is distinguished from both. – Response: essence is not opposed to anything from which the generator and the generated are really distinguished; the one inspiriting is thus opposed.'"

[inspiriting] would exist along with one opposite, its own, while the other [active generation] does not stand with its own opposite [passive generation], and so this would not be the primary reason for distinction, because the primary idea of distinction is an idea of things primarily distinct.

18. Against this way and the other preceding one I argue together as follows:

I ask why active inspiriting can stand with active and with passive generation, and active generation cannot stand with passive generation? – There is no reason other than the distinction of active inspiriting from active generation. For this is why something is compossible or incompossible with something else, because it is such in itself and not conversely, because the truth of the negative is confirmed and founded on the truth of the affirmative; for that is why man is not an ass, because man is man, – *On Interpretation* 2.14.24b3 and *Metaphysics* 4.41008a16-18. So there is first some distinction between active generation and active inspiriting, because of which the former is incompossible with passive generation and the latter not, before there is this compossibility or incompossibility. Therefore this compossibility and non-compossibility is not the first reason for the distinction of productions.

19. Further, these productions are distinguished by the fact that one exists by way of nature and the other by way of will; but this distinction of productions does not come precisely from the producing supposita, nor because one relation stands with one relation, and another with another, but the distinction is taken from the distinction of productive principles, which have opposites modes of being principle; therefore etc.

20. The one who holds this opinion [n.16] replies that one of the productions exists by way and the other by way of will “not because one person is naturally produced

and the other not,” but because one production is like natural production and the other is like voluntary production. For a natural agent produces without presupposing another production, and this speaking generally, although *per accidens* one natural agent presupposes another that produces prior to itself; for in this way the production of the Son is by way of nature, because it does not presuppose another production. For the production of will presupposes another production, namely the one which is by way of nature and intellect; and in this way the production of the Holy Spirit is by way of will, because the Holy Spirit is produced in a similar way to the production which is properly called the production of will, namely ‘by presupposing another distinction’.

21. This exposition [n.20] does not seem valid against the intention of the saints who attribute these productions properly to the intellect and the will; because if these productions must be understood to be distinguished by the fact that one of them presupposes another production while the other does not presuppose another production, there seems no reason that from these productions the Son should be more Son or Word – by force of his production – than the Holy Spirit, nor that the Holy Spirit should, by force of his production, be more love than the Son, which seems absurd.

22. Again, many other productions can be posited, whether with presupposition or without presupposition of another production – just as production by way of art seems to presuppose another production, namely the production of the inner word in the mind of the artist; therefore the Holy Spirit could be produced by way of art, which is false.

23. And there is proof, as was argued in distinctions 2 and 10 [I d.2 nn.75-88, 221-226, 300-303, d.10 nn.6-9], because, from the fact that in God there is properly intellect and will, and each of these is a sufficient productive principle along with the

object when present to itself, one person is truly produced by act of intellect as productive principle, and another person is produced by act of will as productive principle – and not merely metaphorically, because of such an extrinsic likeness, namely ‘being produced when another production is presupposed or not presupposed’.

D. Fourth Opinion

24. In another way it is said that these emanations are distinguished by opposite relations, namely of prior and posterior, because one production is naturally prior to the other.

25. On the contrary. This distinction is not primary. For one must give some cause why one production is prior to the other; nor is there any reason other than that this production is of one sort and the other of another, whether on the part of the productive principles or on the part of the acting supposita.

26. Besides, a relation is not primarily and precisely distinguished from a relation by a relation, because a relation does not first have a reference; therefore, since these emanations are relations, they are not distinguished from each other first by other relations, namely relations of prior and posterior; and it is plain that these relations [sc. of prior and posterior] are different from relations of origin, because they are between different extremes, for the relation of origin is between producer and produced, but the relation of prior and posterior is between origin and origin.

E. Fifth Opinion

27. In another way it is said that these emanations are distinguished by the formal elicitive principles that are posited as the personal ideas of the agents, to wit the generative and inspiriting force.

28. But this was rejected in distinction 7 [I d.7 n.23], whether it is understood of the elicitive principle or of the terminative principle.

29. And in addition, how are these relations [sc. generative and inspiriting force] distinguished so that through them the opposite relations are distinguished [sc. passive generation and passive inspiriting]? For the latter seem less distinct than the former, that is, than their opposite relations, because the former can come together in the same person (to wit in the Father), while the latter cannot, because no one and the same person is produced in two ways; therefore it is more manifest that the latter emanations are distinct than that the former, that is their opposite relations, can be on the part of the productive principle. Therefore to assign a distinction to the latter through the former is to assign a more manifest difference or distinction through a less manifest distinction – and also not through intrinsic features, because relatives are not intrinsic to their correlatives.

F. Sixth Opinion

1. Exposition of the Opinion

30. In another way it is posited that they are distinguished by principles distinct in reason, namely by nature and will, which have to be principles of distinct emanations, – and yet these [sc. principle, nature, will] are not distinguished in the essence save by

reason alone [sc. according to Henry], as was proved in the question ‘On attributes’ in distinction 8 [I d.8 nn.174-176].

2. Rejection of the Opinion

31. Against this: a real distinction does not necessarily require first a distinction of reason; but the distinction of these emanations for you necessarily requires first a distinction of elicitive principles; therefore if this distinction [sc. of emanations] is real, it is not distinct only through a distinction of reason alone [I d.8 n.177].

32. The major of this reason [n.31] is denied by some, and an instance is posited about ideas, which only differ in reason while creatures differ really, – and yet the real distinction of creatures necessarily presupposes a distinction of reason in the ideas.

33. There is an argument against this objection [n.32] – and first the major is proved [n.31], and second the instance [n.32] is excluded.

34. The major is proved according to this understanding, that a difference of reason in the cause will not be the proper reason for a real distinction in the effect.

[First proof of the major] – Because if it is [sc. if a difference of reason in the cause *is* the proper reason for a real difference in the effect], let the cause be *a*, and let the diverse reasons under which it causes be *b* and *c*; but let the things caused be *d* and *e*. Then as follows: if *b* and *c* are the proper reasons for *a* insofar as it causes *d* and *e*, then *a* is, insofar as it is under *b*, the proper cause of *d*, – for if not, ‘this difference’ is no more a distinct reason for causing than if the difference did not exist, because neither reason [sc. neither *b* nor *c*] is the proper cause appropriating this cause to this effect; anyone then

who concedes that the cause, insofar as it is under *b* and *c*, causes *d* and *e*, has to concede that each reason is the proper reason of the cause with respect to its proper effect. But this consequent is false, that ‘*a* insofar as it is under *b* is the proper cause of *d*’, because a being, insofar as it is under *b* – which is only a being of reason –, has being only in the intellect, because a being of reason is not caused by the object save insofar as it is known, and it has, as such, being only in the intellect, because it is a diminished being, from *Metaphysics* 6.4.1027b25-1028a2. But nothing, insofar as it is a diminished being, is the proper reason of a true being and the proper cause of a perfect being; and the proof of this is that everything that causes a true being must have some being of existence, insofar as it is cause; but a diminished being, namely which is known being, does not have being of real existence; therefore neither can it, insofar as it is such, be the proper cause of any real being.

35. And if you say that although it does not have the being of existence, yet it does have the being of existence of the intellect in which it is, because it participates in the ‘being of the intellect’ insofar as it has being in the intellect, – on the contrary: from this it follows that no causation belongs to known being, insofar as it is such, save in virtue of the actual existence of the intellect itself, in which it has the being of actual existence in a certain respect; and then the will, further, will not be the principle of inspiriting save insofar as it participates the idea of the intellect, and then the divine intellect will be the reason of the inspiriting rather than the will; and thus it follows further that the intellect with respect to the generation of the Word will be a double principle, namely immediate, insofar as it is a productive principle, – and mediate insofar as it is the operative principle, through whose operation it has being insofar as it is

productive, just as a known thing, insofar as it is known, has participated being in its knower. But if you do not attribute such real action to the existent intellect itself but to the object that has diminished being in the intellect, – it follows that there would be a real action of a thing that ‘is no less such than if it altogether did not exist’, for it is not repugnant to anything to be a known being although it have in itself no true and real being.

36. If it be said here that the divine intellect knows nothing here save intuitively, and thus that which has being known in the intellect – insofar as it is such – has the being of true existence, but it does not have such being as is being known in abstractive intellect or cognition (of which sort is my intellection of a rose that does not now exist, which is not intuitive intellection), – on the contrary: the reason that is posited as proper to a principle, insofar as it is a principle, is posited as being caused by an act of intellect in a known object; but the divine intellect causes nothing in the divine essence as it is existent (as they concede about the opposite opinion, that there is no difference there of reasons in the essence as it is existent but only as it is known), and it is *per se* plain, because whatever is in the essence as it is existent would exist in it if *per impossibile* there were no intellect busying itself about it.

37. [Second proof of the major] – Further, second: the divine essence, as it is in the Son and the Holy Spirit, naturally has some priority to the simple intellection of the essence; for just as the essence is of a nature ‘as it is in the Father’ to move the intellect of the Father to simple intellection of itself, so it is of a nature ‘as it is in the Son’ to move any intellect to simple intellection of itself, because according to Augustine *On the Trinity* XV ch.14 n.23 “the Father sees everything in the Son as in himself.” But if the

essence ‘as it is in the Son’ has such priority as regard the simple intellection of itself, then ‘as it is in the Son’ it precedes every idea that the intellect can, by busying itself, construct about it; therefore no idea constructible about it naturally precedes it ‘as it is in the Son’, – otherwise there would be a circle in natural priority, because the reason too ‘that is caused by the intellect’ would naturally precede its being in the Son, and conversely.

38. If you say that the essence in the Father naturally precedes every reason producible about it, but that ‘as it is in the Son’ it follows some reason already produced in him by the act of the paternal intellect, – and then there is not a circle of the same thing to the same thing in accord with the same extremes, or in accord with the same existence or in accord with existence in the same thing, because the essence according to its existence follows in one supposit and precedes in another:

39 [Third proof of the major] – Against this response [n.38], I argue as follows: of one cause, in one order of causing, there is one *per se* reason of causing, – therefore much more in divine reality, where there is a primacy of being principle, must there be posited one reason *per se* of being principle; therefore the reason of being principle of the generation of the Word will be some one *per se* real reason. But thing and reason do not make a *per se* unity, because neither can any property consequent to a thing from the nature of the thing make a *per se* unity with the subject whose effect it is; therefore much more is this not so with a reason that is not consequent to the thing from the nature of the thing but is only consequent to it through an act of intellect. Therefore the second of these two [sc. the reason and the thing] will be precisely the principle ‘by which’ – by the Father himself – of the producing, and not the reason alone, because it is not formally

infinite; the proof is that neither is a real relation formally an infinite perfection, because then some person in divine reality would not have formally all infinite perfection; therefore much more can a being of reason not be formally infinite and, consequently, not be the principle ‘by which’ of producing an infinite supposit; therefore the thing alone, to which this reason is attributed, will be the principle of producing the infinite supposit. But in whatever there is a principle ‘by which’ of some production, in that there is the principle of producing, if the supposit is suitable to such production; but the suitable supposit in divine reality for producing such a person in divine reality is something that does not have such nature by that production, nor by any production prior to it; such is the Father; therefore the thing alone will be for him the principle by which he produces, and in no way the reason.

40. [Fourth proof of the major] – Further, fourth: in divine reality that which is not formally the same as something is not truly the same as it unless either each is formally infinite, or one is, or at least each is truly the same as something formally infinite. But these reasons, which are posited as appropriating the productive principle of the two persons [nn.34, 30], are not formally the same, because then they would not be distinct reasons; nor are they truly the same as anything formally infinite, because then they would exist in that ‘formally infinite’ thing from the nature of the thing, as wisdom exists in the deity formally from the nature of the thing; nor is one or other of them formally infinite, as was proved in the preceding reason [n.39]. Therefore neither of them is truly the same as the other, in any way. Therefore in the way that both exist there, they are so truly distinct that they seem to stand in the way of supreme simplicity, whatever sort of entity is posited for them, because nothing can be posited there – according to any

entity – which is not simply the same as the other, because of the simplicity of that essence.

41. [To the instance] – I exclude the instance [n.32], – first because it seems to be for the opposite; for if the distinction of creatures necessarily presupposes a distinction of ideas, and if for this reason God is under one idea the proper cause of one patterned thing [patterned after the idea], this would therefore be because a diminished being of God, namely known being, is simply more perfect and naturally prior to a perfect patterned thing, because patterned things are artificial things in respect of God, and the known being of an artificial thing, or the exemplar – in which the example or the artifact has being – is simply prior to the being of existence of the patterned thing. But this reason is altogether lacking in the divine persons, because the known being of essence cannot be naturally prior to the perfect being of the essence in itself; and therefore, although in the case of the artificial agent the first major were false [n.31] – for the proof of which four reasons have been posited [nn.34, 37, 39, 40] –, it would yet not be false in a natural production where there was communication of the same nature (as in the intended proposition), because there it does not seem that any known being could naturally precede the natural being of the nature.

42. Further, the instance assumes something false about the ideas, because the distinction of reason in God is not necessarily presupposed to the distinct patterned things, nor is God under the reasons of the ideas the proper cause of the diverse patterned things, as will be clear later in distinction 35 ‘On Ideas’ and in distinction 45 ‘On the Will’ [I d.35 q. un nn.5-10, d.45 q. un nn.2-3].

G. Seventh Opinion

43. There is another opinion [from Thomas of Sutton] relative to the question which posits that the essence under one reason, altogether indistinct, is the principle of these productions; because just as two limited things can be the principles of two acts, so the same unlimited thing, containing those two virtually in itself, can be the proper principle of the same acts, and under no reason of distinction in itself but only from its lack of limitation, as it is indistinct, – just as is plain about the single respect of many generable things in what is down here.

44. And the confirmation of this position is that the divine essence must be posited as having immediately wisdom and goodness, and to be in some way the root as it were and principle of these perfect attributes, and without any distinction in the essence itself, – otherwise there would be a process to infinity. So therefore the essence seems it can be posited as the immediate principle of the two personal productions.

45. Against this [n.44]:

The action of willing in us is not formally free but the will itself is formally free, because action itself is a certain quality and a certain natural form in itself, and is not something intellectual having an inclination to opposites; so the action is not free. Thus therefore in divine reality the production of the Holy Spirit – as already posited in being – does not seem to be formally free, because there seems precisely to be liberty in the principle of this production, insofar as it is of this sort. But if no distinction precedes the production of the Son and of the Holy Spirit, the first distinction which there is between this production and that is between them as they are posited in existence from that

principle; therefore there is not one production in divine reality by way of intellect or nature and another by way of freedom, because no principle precedes what would be disposed differently toward this production than toward that, – and these productions, in which there is a first distinction, are altogether in themselves, as already posited in being, uniform in naturalness.

46. The assumption ‘about volition’ [n.45], although it could be proved in many modes or ways, can yet be made plain by the fact that, whatever volition generates, it generates naturally; hence appetitive habits are by virtue of acts of appetite as naturally generated from these acts as intellective habits are generated from intellections. It is also apparent from another fact, that then [if the assumption were not true] someone could formally rejoice and be sad freely, namely insofar as joy and sadness are properties consequent on willing and not willing, because the things that are immediate causes of those properties would be posited as formally free.

The consequent, however, ‘about properties’ seems to be sufficiently discordant, because being glad does not seem to be in the power of the will save because in its power is the ‘willing’ of that on which being glad is consequent – and so neither is being sad in its power save because in its power is the ‘not willing’ that on which being sad is consequent; and therefore someone who is sad about the happening of some harmful or disagreeable event, if he wishes to remove the sadness, must desist from not wanting what he did not want; but he is not at liberty to deliberate about this, that, while his not wanting and the event he does not want stay in place, sadness should not follow.

47. If this reason were conclusive [n.45], it would necessarily prove a distinction of intellect from will in the creature, and this a distinction in absolute realities on the part

of the thing, which does not seem necessary; hence I reply that the same principle can have different relations to two products or two productions; but as it is freedom and naturalness do not essentially state an active principle but an aptitudinal relation of the principle to the product, and an aptitudinal non-relation – to wit, naturalness states a determination of itself of the first act to the second and third act, but freedom states a non-determination of this sort.

48. To the form [sc. of the reason, n.45]: I concede that neither posited act is free. Therefore freedom is in something preceding the act, as I agree, but not absolutely in it, but rather it states a respect of it to the act, – and naturalness likewise states another respect of the same preceding absolute thing to the other act. Likewise, in the case of the intended proposition, the response is easier, because the principle ‘by which’ seems to be naturally related (distinction 10 above, nn.20-21) to each production and product.

49. On the contrary: therefore in the ‘by which’ there is no distinction as it is ‘by which’ in respect of the production or the product save one of reason only, because it has no relation to the production or the product save one of reason only; again, freedom is an absolute condition, because it is a perfection simply (response: it gives one to understand perfection simply, but it only states a respect). – A corollary: therefore the whole deduction in distinction 2 about the primary duality of the active principles [I d.2 nn.300-303] is not valid save about relations that state a disposition of the active principle to the product; and it seems probable that there be a stand at something simply one, both in the productive principle ‘by which’ (although not ‘what’) and in the cause, because to be ‘by which’ belongs, for you [sc. Scotus] to perfection simply, just as to be a cause does.

50. Response: I concede that ‘freely’ and ‘naturally’ state a disposition, a determinate and a non-determinate disposition, to acting or to a term, but they establish a distinction in their foundations [sc. in will and in intellect]. And because it is a mark of ‘perfection simply’ to be an absolute thing by respect to what is posterior, therefore the principle to which belongs a greater absoluteness with respect to being a principle is simply more perfect than the principle to which belongs a greater determination with respect to being a principle, and this whether the things that are to depend on the principle are equally perfect or if the thing that depends on the principle of something absolute is more perfect than what depends on the principle of something natural, because in relation to an equally perfect posterior thing the more ‘absolute’ being is more perfect; therefore if our willing is not less perfect than our understanding, then from the respect of liberty in the will to willing, and of naturalness in the intellect to understanding, there follows on the will ‘the foundation of respect’ of being simply more perfect; this is in accord with the distinction of powers, on which see IV d.49 p.1 q.4 n.10.

51. But how is it in God?

The same thing seems to follow, that the Holy Spirit is as equally noble as the Son. Therefore the productive principle that is more absolute will be more perfect.

52. Response: each is infinite, both insofar as it is operative and insofar as it is productive.⁶ Therefore there is no excellence in the formalities, but only perhaps of reason, comparing infinite formalities to the finite ones with which they agree – and thus what agrees with the more perfect is conceived to have a certain reason of nobility, a reason that is a relation of reason to what is more noble.

⁶ Note by Scotus: “Another way – in distinction 10 nn.18-19 – that infinite will is not more indeterminate for operation or production than the intellect.”

53. To the argument [n.51]: the Holy Spirit and the Son are not posterior to the principles, nor are they more imperfect, but they are the same as them, – therefore absoluteness there does not argue perfection, nor determination imperfection, but only another way of producing.

54. On the contrary: at any rate in respect of creatures the intellect naturally understands, but the will freely wills; therefore with respect to them the will is more noble.

55. Response. This and that disposition [sc. naturally and freely] to first operations and products – if they were posterior – would prove the excellence of the foundation, but when the first operations and the first products are not posterior, but are the same or simply equal, the dispositions are of a different reason and are in different formalities, but without the excellence of one foundation in relation to the other. In whatever way the foundations may afterwards be compared – under these respects – to later operations and products which are simply posterior, no excellence of this foundation to that follows.

56. Note. A free power is a sufficiently active power, not determined of itself to operating about any object which is not finally perfective of it.

‘Active’ by action in the genus of action and from consequent operation; nor does ‘active operative’ suffice, because thus the intellect would be active although it is passive.

‘Sufficiently’ in its own order of acting; therefore it receives no act from another by which it may act in its order, because then it would be insufficiently active.

‘Not determined of itself’, that is of its own first act – and this in its order of causing (it follows from the corollary ‘sufficiently’) – and of the fact that it determines

itself to acting; not indeed by any determination preceding the action in the genus of action, but it determines itself, that is, it is indeterminate from its own first act; yet it acts determinately, nothing else determining it to act.

57. This conclusion – thus expounded – is proved by the fact that whatever in its own order is sufficient for acting, if it is determined to act by another, it was already first determined to this in its own order or insofar as it was in its own order; for the fact it did not act was not because of defect of form or of determination on its part (but of the superior on which it depends) for acting, for operating; therefore it is operative and active. But freedom has *per se* more of a respect to action, at least more immediately; nor is it therefore determined to acting, but to some operation which is not about an object essentially perfective; but it is consistent with liberty that it be determined to operating about that object, and to acting – as a result – with respect to that operation; it was proved about the divine will with respect to God in distinction 10 [nn.41, 48], – here rather [sc. the proof is that] infinite liberty is necessarily determined.

58. But surely finite liberty is determined to operating about it [sc. an essentially perfective object]?

Response: liberty does not prevent that, as is plain about infinite liberty; nor does imperfection, as I prove because it is a mark of perfection to be determined to the perfective object, – it is plain about the will of God with respect to himself.

59. Therefore it belongs more to a more perfect thing to be determined with respect to a perfective object; the created will is more perfect than the created intellect, and the created intellect is necessarily determined to its perfective object, therefore the

will is more thus determined (the opposite is held in distinction 1 question 4 [I d.1 nn.91-133, 136-140]).

60. Response: to determine oneself naturally to anything whatever is a mark of greater imperfection than not to determine oneself freely to a non-perfective object, because determination to what is non-perfective is a mark of imperfection; the intellect is necessarily determined to anything whatever, because it is determined naturally. And then to the proposition ‘it is a mark of perfection to be determined to a perfective object’: this is true when it is thus determined to that alone, and consequently not naturally [sc. but freely]; ‘therefore it belongs more to the more perfect’ is true, uniformly, because it belongs to the divine will and to no intellect.⁷

61. But if from the greater perfection of the created will than of the created intellect [n.59] you at once infer that it is necessarily determined to its perfective object, this does not follow, because determination to the natural necessity which belongs to the intellect is repugnant to the will; but the other determination [sc. to the perfective object, as in the case of God nn.57-58] does not belong to the will from the perfection of the will in general but only to an infinite will. In another way: the intellect is necessarily determined by another; it is a mark of perfection that a thing not be so determined, and that, in determining itself, it necessarily determine itself to what is perfective, – and this belongs to the infinite will alone.

62. Whence is this indetermination of the [created] will?

⁷ Note by the Vatican editors: “This is true but not in diverse way, as it is taken in the major [n.59] where two diverse things – intellect and will – are compared, but it is true in uniform way, namely by comparing either intellect to intellect or will to will; and thus it is true that it belongs more to the more perfect will, namely the divine will, which is more perfect than ours; but it does not belong to any intellect more, because any intellect is determined necessarily.”

Response. Not from the intellect, which is necessarily determined to anything whatever, although it can be impeded by a sophism (thus can a heavy object be impeded from falling); nay here, when it is determined by a sophism, it is necessarily determined, – in other ways by an opposite agent. The indetermination, therefore, is radically from the essence, but formally from the proper idea of the will. For because its nature is as it were unlimited, namely many things can be agreeable to it – therefore is given to it an unlimited appetite for agreeable objects and an apprehensive intellect, but determinately, according to determinate evidence for directing something; therefore further, so that as ‘undetermined to either’ it may be determined [sc. by itself].

63. Besides, second [nn.44, 45], if essence as altogether indistinct were the principle of the double production, then since the intellect under the idea of being infinite is a sufficient reason for producing the infinite word, and the will under the idea of being infinite is a productive principle of infinite love – and, before the infinite intellect and the divine will distinctly formally infinite are understood, the essence as essence is pre-understood – therefore through the essence, as it is pre-understood, there is a double intrinsic production; and when later the formally infinite intellect and the formally infinite will are there understood, there will be two infinite persons produced by virtue of those two principles; therefore there will be five produced persons.⁸

64. But if you say that there is never there infinite intellect and infinite will from the nature of the thing, but that there is only there the one nature altogether indistinct from the nature of the thing, and that from the idea of it there are the three persons there,

⁸ That is, the three persons before intellect and will are understood and two more afterwards (Son and Holy Spirit being, as it were, produced twice). The Vatican editors say otherwise: “namely two persons before the intellect and will, and three afterwards, because intellect and will are in the Father; cf. n.70.”

and that intellect and will are there precisely through the consideration of the intellect and so these are not there principles, distinct from the nature of the thing, productive of real persons, – on the contrary:

If there are certain things distinct there by act of intellect, let them be *a* and *b*. Then I ask: either these are distinct from the nature of the thing, – and thus, you are contradicting yourself; if not, they are distinct by intellect, therefore the intellect under the idea of intellect distinguishes and not under the idea of nature. Either then the intellect is there under the idea of intellect before distinction of these things – and the intended proposition is obtained, because it is there from the nature of the thing; or it is not, but the intellect itself under the idea of intellect is there produced by act of intellect busying itself and doing the distinguishing, and then one would ask by what act this intellect is produced – either from the nature of the thing or from the intellect as intellect – and there will be a process to infinity, or wherever a stand is made the intellect will be there insofar as it is intellect and from the nature of the thing, or the first distinction that is placed there will be from the nature of the thing, the opposite of which you posit.

65. Further, God is formally blessed from the nature of the thing and not formally in relations of reason; but his beatitude formally consists in intellection and volition; therefore intellect and will – which are the principles of them – are there from the nature of the thing.

66. This reason is confirmed through the Philosopher *Metaphysics* 12.8.1074b17-21, who proves that “if God is not actually thinking there will be nothing honorable in him, – for he will be as if asleep;” therefore, according to Aristotle, God is not formally perfect in the nature of the thing unless intellect is formally there from the nature of the

thing, because actual intellection formally cannot be understood without intellect formally.

67. Further, if the intellect is not formally there from the nature of the thing but in its foundation, then the intellect is not formally perfection simply, because it is not better to have it formally than not to have it; nay for you, it is not formally possessed in that essence, which is best, but only in an opposite way of possessing; therefore one cannot conclude that intellect is there ‘because it is a perfection simply’, but rather the opposite seems to follow. Why then does Anselm say in *Monologion* ch.15, that whatever is in God “is better it than not it”? – as is true of ‘being wise’. And Augustine *On the Trinity* XV ch.4 n.6: “In the volumes of the divine books authority only preaches that God is, but all of nature around us proclaims that he is the best and most outstanding Creator, who has given us mind, by which we judge that living things are to be preferred to non-living, things endowed with sense to things without, and intelligent things to non-intelligent ones, and incorruptible things to corruptible; and because of this, since we without doubt prefer the Creator to the things created, we must confess that he both supremely lives, and understands all things, and is most just, best, and most blessed, etc.;” see Augustine there.

– What would that consequence be if natural reason says that to be blessed is better than to be miserable, therefore God is blessed (if what ‘it’ is in creatures is better than its opposite, this is because of its reality), and in God from the nature of the thing this reality is in some way there but only in its foundation, with the opposite mode of this sort of formality

68. But that this intellect – which is proved to exist there from the nature of the thing [nn.64-67] – is infinite the proof is:

For, as intellect formally, it understands the divine essence as object; nothing comprehends an object formally infinite unless what comprehends it is formally infinite; therefore etc.

69. Further, the divine intellect as intellect understands infinite intelligibles at the same time – according to Augustine *City of God* XII ch.18: “Is it really the case that God does not know the numbers because of their infinity? Who, even a complete madman, would say this?” and he adds: “The infinity then of numbers, although there is no number of infinite numbers, is yet not incomprehensible to that intellect *of which there is no number [Psalm 146.5].*”

70. And if you say [another instance against n.63] that the intellect is not formally infinite insofar as it is intellect but insofar as it is the same as the divine infinite essence, and therefore it does not, insofar as it is intellect, have that whereby it is the productive principle of another infinite person, and so there will not be five divine persons [n.63], – against this I argue that in this way one could say that paternity is formally infinite because it is the same as the infinite divine essence, and then it would not be more discordant for the Son not to be simply intelligent than for him not to be formally Father, which is manifestly absurd.

71. There is proof also from another point, that things which are not formally infinite in divine reality, if they are taken in the abstract, are not predicated of each other, not even by identity just as not formally either; hence this proposition is not conceded ‘paternity is the property of not being born’. The reason for this was stated in distinction 8 in the question ‘About the attributes’ [I d.8 nn.219, 221], because ‘abstraction takes away that which was the cause of truth’, namely the identity of the extremes, – because,

as precisely taken, ‘neither is formally infinite, and therefore neither as taken precisely abstractly includes its being the same as the other’. But this proposition is true ‘intellect is paternity’ and ‘intellect is filiation’, although there is not there formal predication; therefore the intellect has formal infinity, of the sort that filiation and paternity and the property of not being born do not have.

72. And if you ask, is the intellect altogether infinite from itself as the essence is?
– I reply:

It can be said that, just as by distinguishing things from each other, one thing is infinite from itself and in itself (as the first person in divine reality), another thing is infinite in itself but not from itself (as the Son and the Holy Spirit), but another thing is finite from itself and is likewise finite in itself (as is the creature), – so, by considering things which are not formally the same, something can be taken as infinite in itself and altogether from itself, as the divine essence, which is the root and foundation, which has its infinity from nothing; hence according to John Damascene *On the Orthodox Faith* ch.9, the being of God is like “a certain infinite sea of the infinite substance of God [I d.8 nn.199-202];” but something is infinite through itself and in itself but not altogether from itself as first root and foundation of all infinity, as the divine attributes, which according to John Damascene *ibid.* ch.4 state something that concerns the essence – and well can such things be posited as formally infinite in themselves and through themselves, but radically in the essence as in the foundation with which they are identical; further, something is what is neither in itself formally infinite nor formally the same as the infinite, as the personal properties.

73. But what is the reason why these do not have formal infinity from the essence, as the intellect has?⁹

74. To the arguments for this finally rejected opinion [nn.45-46, 63-72].

When it is said that ‘the infinite from itself, altogether indistinct, can be the principle of distinct things’ [n.43], this is true when the distinct things do not from their own idea require a prior distinction in principles; but such a prior distinction is required by free production and natural production, because there cannot be a distinction first for such distinct things but there is pre-required some distinction in the principles, which in some way have to be principles naturally and freely of the divine persons.

75. Again, if the essence is *per impossibile* posited – as it is understood – to be the foundation of the perfections [n.72], and it is not understood to be intellective or volitional, nor consequently to be source of saying nor of inspiriting – could it really be a principle of communicating itself?

76. And from this [n.74] is plain the response to the confirmation adduced there [n.44]. The fact that the essence has wisdom and goodness and all the other perfect attributes before all consideration of the intellect, and this without any distinction presupposed in the essence, is true because those perfect attributes do not require an opposite mode of coming from a principle nor a distinction in the principles; for the essence is will as naturally as it is intellect; likewise these attributes do not properly come from the essence as from a principle, although the essence be conceded in some way to have the idea of radical and foundational perfection with respect to them [nn.72, 44].

II. Scotus' own Opinion

⁹ An empty space is left here by Scotus; the question is unanswered in the *Ordinatio*.

77. To the question [n.1] I respond that the productions are distinguished formally by themselves. For generation is itself formally generation, and inspiriting is itself formally inspiriting, and from their formal reasons it is impossible for generation to be inspiriting (when everything else is *per impossibile* removed), such that it is not necessary to ask by what they are distinguished [n.7], because the whole formal reason of one is not the same as the whole formal reason of the other.

78. This is clear through Augustine *On the Trinity* XV ch.27 n.5, where he says that “thus you will see how or what distance there is between the nativity of the Word and the procession of the Gift;” and a little later that: “the will proceeds from cognition, but it is not the image of cognition; and therefore in this matter he who can sees and discerns a certain intelligible distance between procession and nativity (since to descry a thing by knowledge is not to desire it, nor even to enjoy it by will),” – where from the distinction of the processions he wants to deduce a distinction of persons proceeding.

79. Likewise in *ibid.* V ch.14 n.5: “Where too this shines forth why the Holy Spirit is also not a son, although he too exits from the Father; and for this reason is he not called a son, because neither is he born; for he exited from the Father not as somehow born but as somehow given.” Therefore he solved there the question about the distinction of persons through their distinct emanations.

80. And if it be objected that ‘the emanations are not from themselves, therefore they are not distinguished by themselves’ (the proof of the consequence is that from what something has entity, from that it also has unity, *Metaphysics* 2.1.993a30-31), – because being and one are said to be convertible), I reply:

Specific differences are not effectively from themselves and yet they are by themselves formally distinct, but they are effectively distinct by that from which they effectively are. But to be distinguished ‘first formally’ is not to be distinguished by something included in one thing, and agreeing with another thing [sc. as Socrates is distinguished from Plato by socrateity and agrees with Plato in humanity], but to be distinguished itself in its totality formally, even if *per impossibile* everything other than its idea is excluded; thus I say that if ultimate differences were composite, they would be distinguished themselves in their totality and would be themselves in their totality distinct first formally.

So I say in the proposed case, that if *per impossibile* these distinct persons could exist without a principle, they would themselves in their totality be formally distinct, such that nothing formally included in one would be formally included in the other; and yet, as they do have principles, so are they in their having principles or in their having an origin distinct from their principles (namely from intellect and will), which are not only distinct by reason, as was argued against the penultimate opinion [nn.31-40]. But the intellect is from the nature of the thing not formally will and, since infinity added to something does not destroy its formal idea, infinite intellect is not formally infinite will; and so, although it would not be necessary for this formal distinction [sc. of emanations] to be reduced to another distinction [sc. of principles] insofar as it is formal, yet because it is formal and is in things that have a principle, it is reduced to this distinction of principles.

81. If it be said that although two things are distinguished from three, yet two infinite things are not distinguished from three infinite things, – on the contrary.¹⁰

¹⁰ Scotus added nothing here but left a blank space.

III. To the Principal Arguments

82. To the principal arguments [nn.1-5].

To the first [n.1] I say that it seems to conclude against those who posit that the quasi-subject of generation is the divine essence, for since generation in creatures is natural from the inclination of the passive principle, but not from the reason of the active principle (because if my will were to generate fire from the matter, the passive generation would be natural because of the inclination of the passive power to the form, although the active principle would be free), so it seems that, if the divine essence were the quasi-subject in divine reality with respect to the personal properties – since the essence as naturally inclines to the property of the Holy Spirit as to the property of the Son –, the passive production of the Holy Spirit would be as natural as that of the Son, although this production and that would be from a different productive principle; but it does not conclude against me, because I deny generation there under the idea of change, and deny altogether anything passive with respect to act (as is clear in distinction 5 nn.97, 113, 118, 131-132, 137-138), but I posit there precisely generation under the idea of production, whose terms are the producer and the produced; so there precisely will generation be called natural, because the relation between producer and produced is natural, and the naturalness of this sort of relation is on the part of the naturalness of the producer itself, because it produces by a principle naturally inclining to act, – and the Father does not inspirit in this way. Alternatively it is said that generation is in one way taken for the generation of substance, or in another way specifically for the production of the living from the living (and in this way is an animal said to be generated but not fire), and in this latter way there commonly concurs on the part of the agent a natural inclination or a

natural form, which is the principle of generating; and it is in this latter way that generation in divine reality seems to exist. – The first response [earlier in his paragraph] is better, perhaps.

83. To the second [n.2] I say that, when two things are compared to an unlimited or indeterminate third thing, the union of them among themselves does not follow from their union in the third thing. An example: ‘if I am with God here and the Pope is with God in Rome, therefore I am together with the Pope’ does not follow, because God is unlimited as to the presence by which he is present at places; so too it does not follow that ‘I am with eternity, and Abraham was with eternity, therefore I am together with Abraham’, because God is eternal and his eternity is unlimited. So do I say in the intended proposition that the Father has in himself a double fecundity perfectly, but each production corresponds precisely to one fecundity; and therefore the Father is, with respect to the two productions, a sort of thing unlimited, or as it were indeterminate, as compared to determinate things, – and therefore it does not follow that, if both productions are univocal with such an unlimited third thing, these productions are univocal among themselves.

84. Against this there is an argument as follows:

If the productions are not univocal but are of different ideas, therefore the terms too will be of different ideas, – from the *Physics* [n.1]; but if the produced terms require such a formal distinction, the terms will not be univocal to some third thing; therefore from the opposite, if the terms are univocal to some third thing, the productions too will be univocal among themselves.

85. Further, the intellect and will, insofar as they are operative powers, require a formal distinction in their objects, and if they were, in respect of their objects, productive powers, they would produce such a distinction in their objects; therefore, since the produced terms require such a formal distinction, the terms will not be univocal [sc. to some third thing].

86. Further, what is produced through the intellect is, from the force of its production, generated knowledge, while what is produced through the mode of will is proceeding love; but knowledge as knowledge and love as love seem to be of formally different ideas; therefore etc.

87. To the first [n.84] I say that the proposition about motions and terms – which is adduced for the intended proposition – is only true when two other propositions are true, namely that ‘the form in flux, according to which there is motion, is of the same idea as the terminating form’ [n.11], and ‘motion is of the same idea as the form in flux’ [I d.2 n.339]. Now applying this to the proposition, there is no flux nor a form in flux, but this production is not of the same idea as the form which is the formal term of production, because the formal term of the production is something essential, but the production is formally a relation; and therefore one should not conclude from a distinction of productions to a formal distinction of objects or terms. An example of what has been said about motions is plain from the *Physics* 5.4.227b14-18, because the same ‘where’ can be acquired by motion in a straight line or circular motion, which are altogether of a different species, as is proved in *Physics* 7.4.248a10-13, 248b4-6 “because they are not comparable.” But in this case the form according to which there is flux in the form of motion, if it is of the same idea as the term, is not for this reason distinctive of the idea of

motions. – This response was touched on above in distinction 2 in the question ‘On productions’ [I d.2 n.339], for the argument of the Commentator [*ibid.*, n.212].

88. And if you object that at least the first terms, namely the formal terms, will not be univocal, whereby the productions are not univocal, and so the persons – which are the first terms – will not be univocal among themselves, and so they will not be univocal in a third thing, – I respond:

Production does not formally include the divine essence, but the person does formally include it, because the person is not only a property or a relation but a hypostasis subsisting in the divine nature, – just as Socrates does not only include the individual property but also human nature. Although, therefore, the first terms are of the same idea as the productions as to the fact that the first terms include the relations (because the productions are relations), yet they are not of the same idea quasi-adequately, because the first terms do not only include the relations but also the absolute reality; and then the persons must not only be distinguished as the productions are distinguished, because what includes certain distinguishing things must not only be distinguished as the distinguishing things are (as was said above in distinction 8 in the question ‘Whether God is in a genus’ n.106), because the differences are primarily diverse, but the things that primarily include them are not primarily diverse.

89. To the other point, about powers [n.85], I say that as they are operative powers they do not require a distinct formal object. Rather, the same thing that is the first object of the divine intellect is also the first and formal object of the divine will, such that each power is beatified in the same first object, according to the same formal idea of the first object. For no perfection quasi-founded in the divine essence is primarily beatific of

the divine intellect or the divine will, but the essence is, under any sort of first idea (namely as it is the foundation of every perfection in divine reality), such that the argument is to the opposite, because just as there is not also required a formal distinction in the objects as they are operative powers, so neither in the products as they are productive.

90. To the third argument [n.86] I say that it is not to the purpose, because those who hold that generation in divine reality is equivocal in itself say that it is in itself equivocal because of the equivocation of the produced term with the producer, – and likewise, they have to say that inspiriting is in itself equivocal because of the difference of the inspirited from the inspiriter. This conclusion therefore would not be sufficient for them, that the generated and the inspirited are equivocal. – But the argument in itself, if it proves anything, only proves a distinction of the generated and inspirited or of the formal terms of generation and inspiriting, – and so not their intended proposition.

91. But on the contrary I argue as follows: it can be said that the assumption, namely that ‘the generated, from the force of its production – namely of its generation – is actual knowledge’ [n.86] can be distinguished about the primacy of origin and about the primacy of adequacy. If it is understood about the primacy of origin, it can be denied, because then the three persons would not be uniformly God; for in the Father deity is understood to be in him a quasi-principle and foundation of any perfection, and then, if knowledge is pre-understood in the Son before the essence, the Son would not have essence before anything else in himself but would have knowledge, and so he would not be God uniformly with the Father.

93. As to this primacy, then, although it is not one of origin, yet it does correspond to the primacy of origin of several perfections in one creature; and it can be said that the first thing in any person is the essence, because when something contains in itself many communicable perfections, when it communicates that one first thing, it communicates all the perfections in the order in which they are of a nature to be in that one thing. An example, both in the distinction of things and in the distinction of non-things (though on the part of the thing): first indeed – if fire were to generate the whole fire and were to produce both the matter and the form, it would communicate the matter first in origin before it communicated the form (in the order namely in which these are in the generator); an example of the second is – fire is a corporeal and inanimate substance and element. Just as these then exist in order in the generating fire, so they are communicated in a like order to the generated fire, and yet the first term in adequacy is fire as it is fire, because this is what is principally intended by the generating fire and in which the generated fire (namely fire as fire) is most perfectly made like it. So can it be said in the proposed case, that although the divine essence in any person is altogether first, a quasi-foundation of any essential perfection, – the first person, however, has memory appropriately, and by virtue of that productive principle it produces adequately with a first production the second person, and the second person quasi-adequately by its own productive principle produces as it is actual knowledge, and the Holy Spirit, being quasi-adequate to this own productive principle, is produced as actual love.

94. But then the argument [n.91] still seems to stand, because equivocation or non-univocation seem to be proved more from the primacy of adequacy than from the primacy of origin; for although the sun is a substance and a worm is a substance, yet not

for this reason is there univocal generation of a worm by the sun, because the sun does not assimilate the term to itself in its specific form; so therefore there seems to be equivocation here, from which the first adequate produced term is not altogether univocally of the same idea as the productive principle.

95. I say that there is not equivocal production if the productive principle is not of the same idea as the produced formal term – speaking of the first productive principle and of the first produced formal term – but there is required that that which is the productive principle not be of the same idea in the generated thing, nor that that which is the formal term in the product be of the same idea in the producer; but the opposite of this is in the intended proposition, because memory is both formally in actual generated knowledge, and actual knowledge is formally in the generating person, although neither of these is the first reason of acting and the first reason of terminating the production. An example of this is: if an ass generates an ass, although the specific form is the first principle of producing, the generation is not for this reason equivocal or non-univocal, because that which is the *per se* formal term of generation is also of the same idea in the generator, although it is not for it the idea of generating; but that something of the same idea is first in this (as in the producer) or first in that (as in the produced term) is not required for univocal generation. Thus can be posited an example about animate flesh, generating animate flesh naturally by the virtue of heat, where however the soul itself – or whatever other form be granted – is not necessarily the first principle of producing and the first formal term in the product; therefore this is not required for univocity of generation.

96. To the second principal argument¹¹ I say that active generation and active inspiriting are the formally the same, nor are the first formal terms of them (namely actual knowledge and actual love) formally the same; yet the first terms, produced by these productions, are both univocal among themselves and the producer, because the produced persons have the same absolute perfection, both with each other and with the producer.

97. To the other I say that the antecedent ‘about the distinction of principles by reason alone’ is false [nn.64-67].

98. To the first proof, when it is argued that ‘the opposite would not stand with the divine simplicity’, the response was given often before in distinctions 2 and 8 [nn.191-127, 388-410], where mention was made about formal non-identity without real distinction.

99. To the second proof, when it is argued ‘otherwise there would be a real relation between intellect and understanding’ [n.6], I reply that the intellect is both an operative power and a productive power; but insofar as it is an operative power, neither the intellect, nor the supposit of which it is the operation, has a real relation to real operation, but this happens in us, because in us there is a real difference between the intellect and the operation for which it is; but as it is a productive principle, although it does not have a real relation to the product (because it is the same as the product), nor to the production (for the same reason), yet the producer itself has a real relation to the product, and this is enough for the production to be real. But such relation is not required between the intellect and understanding, because there is no real distinction between this

¹¹ The second principal argument [n.2] was in fact responded to already [n.83]; the argument responded to here is only found in the *Lectura I d.13 n.4*.

and that; nor does the fact that the intellect is for the Father the principle for understanding indicate a real relation of the intellect itself to the intellection that is in the Father himself according to the principle, because this is seen more in the case of generation than of intellection (because generation requires a greater distinction), yet neither when it is said that ‘the intellect is for the Father the principle of saying’ is a real relation indicated between the intellect and saying.

100. And when it is argued that ‘he would not understand more with the intellect than with the will’ [n.4] the consequence is not valid. Nor does ‘to understand with the intellect’ indicate that there is a real relation of the intellect or of the Father according to the intellect to understanding, but only that this is some operative perfection, according to which such operation belongs to the Father, – nor does it follow that ‘he does not understand more with the intellect than with the will’, because this operation which is to understand is of a nature to belong first to the intellect and is not thus of a nature to belong to the will, nor is there any other reason save that the intellect is intellect and the will is will; for to any operative principle, from the fact that it is such, whether it is a *per se* thing or is contained unitively in something, its proper operation is of a nature to belong.

101. On the contrary: it is conceded that in the Father the intellect is for him the principle of understanding; to be principle implies some relation, and if it is principle from the nature of the thing, it will be a relation from the nature of the thing, and consequently it will be a real relation.

Response: whatever would really belong to something – if it were a thing –, this same thing should belong to it (and not to another) when it is a reason or in accord with

reason; in this way is there intellect in the Father in respect of understanding, because the principle is altogether the same as understanding, really.

102. To the other proof – about unequals and about adding the same thing – that the first consequence should still hold, in the proposed case [n.5], I reply:

Just as in consequences it is said that, when the same thing is added, if the consequence holds, it will still hold (this is true, when the same added thing does not destroy the idea of the consequence, as when it is said ‘man, therefore animal, – every man, therefore every animal’) with respect to any predicate, or conversely negatively, – so in the intended proposition I say that the inequality of intellection and intellect is because of the limitation of the extremes, because of which (or without which not) the one exceeds the other; but when an infinite thing is added to both extremes, it takes away limitation, and so inequality, from both extremes, – and then it does not follow that they are unequal, nay infinite intellect and ‘infinite understanding’ are of equal perfection.

103. And if it is objected against this that infinity does not take away all inequality, because infinite whiteness would exceed infinite blackness, – I say that infinity added to something of itself limited is infinity in a certain respect (of the sort that can belong to the idea of such a limited thing), because it does not state infinity or illimitation save in the idea of that to which it is added, which in this case cannot be simply infinite; but infinity added to some perfection simply (namely to which infinity simply is not repugnant), there is infinity in that idea, and so infinity simply. But understanding and intellect are formally ‘perfections simply’, and do not involve limitation, – and therefore infinity added to each states infinity simply; not only in these ideas but also concomitantly in being and truth and goodness, and in every perfection

simply, because all ‘perfections simply’ mutually and unitively include each other; and therefore ‘infinite understanding’ is simply equal to infinite intellect.

Fourteenth, Fifteenth, and Sixteenth Distinctions

Single Question

Whether any Person at all may send any Person at all

1. About the fourteenth and fifteenth and sixteenth distinctions I ask whether any divine person at all may send any divine person at all, or be sent by any divine person at all.

And it seems not:

Because whatever is essential in divine reality belongs to the three; sending (mission) – both active and passive – is essential, because it states a relation to the creature; but such respect to the creature is common to the three. Now proof that both sending and being sent state a respect to the creature is that each is said about God from the perspective of time; but nothing is said about God from the perspective of time save what asserts a respect to the creature; therefore etc.

2. Again in *John* 14.23 the Savior says about the Father (and about himself): “We will come to him;” therefore the Father comes in time to someone. This ‘coming’ asserts some effect of the Trinity, therefore it states that the Father might be sent by the three persons, just as the Son and Holy Spirit are.

3. Again, according to Augustine *To Durandus* ‘De Praesentia Dei’, each person gives and is given; therefore, by parity of reasoning, each person sends and is sent.

4. On the contrary:

Augustine *On the Trinity* IV ch.20 n.28: “The Father, when he is perceived by anyone in time, is not said to have been sent; for he does not have one from whom he is or from whom he proceeds.”

Also the Master [Lombard] adduces for this conclusion the authorities from Augustine in the text [*Sentences* I d.15 ch.9-10, nn.136-137].

I. Opinion of Peter Lombard

5. [Exposition of the Opinion] – On this question it seems to be the opinion of the Master that being sent does not agree with the three persons but only with the two persons that proceed.

For according to Augustine no person is sent save him that has another from whom he is, and in this way ‘to be sent’ asserts a respect to the creature yet with connotation of the respect of eternal procession.

6. But ‘to send’ is common to the three, according to the Master.

His proof is from the authority of Augustine *On the Trinity* II ch.5 n.8, where Augustine says about the Son that “the Son cannot be sent by the Father without the Holy Spirit,” and his proof is: “because the Father is understood to have sent him by the fact that he made him from a woman, which the Father did not do without the Holy Spirit;” therefore the Holy Spirit sends the Son, – and it is agreed that the Son himself sends himself, as is got from the same Augustine and in the same *On the Trinity* II ch.8; therefore ‘to send’ belongs to each person.

7. And this point the Master proves by reason, because otherwise one person of the Trinity would do what another does not do, although ‘to send’ is to cause an effect outwardly.

8. [Rejection of the opinion] – An argument can be made against this opinion:

If ‘to be sent’ involves in some way a double respect, eternal and temporal, since it only states a respect either to him for whom he is sent or to him who sends, it is plain that the first is common to the three, because it is a respect of reason outwardly; but the second is either a real respect or a respect of reason; if it is a respect of reason, then it can be in the Father with respect to himself, just as the Father can give and be given, for ‘to be sent’ by way of a mere respect of reason is not repugnant to the Father; if ‘to be sent’ states a real respect to the sender, namely procession from the sender, then ‘to send’ is not an essential feature, because then the Holy Spirit would not send the Son because he does not produce the Son.

9. Besides, ‘to send’ and ‘to be sent’ seem to mean the same thing, although in diverse ways according to their grammatical forms; if then one of them connotes some respect inwardly, the other too will connote it, – if therefore ‘to be sent’ connotes ‘to be produced’, then ‘to send’ connotes ‘to produce’, and so neither is purely essential; or if one of them does not connote a respect inwardly, neither does the other but only a respect outwardly, – and in this way both will be common to the three.

10. And this is what can thus briefly be argued: if ‘to be sent’ includes ‘to be produced’, then ‘to send’ includes ‘to produce’; therefore the Holy Spirit does not send the Son because he does not produce him. – Besides, ‘to send’ and ‘to be sent’ seem to state opposite relations; therefore if ‘to send’ does not include ‘to produce’, then neither does its correlative include the correlative.

II. To the Question

11. It seems possible then to reply otherwise to the question. For it is manifest that, according to the intention of Augustine in *On the Trinity* IV ch.20, the Father is not said to have been sent, but ‘to be sent’ has to connote – along with its asserting an outward respect – an inward procession [n.5], and it seems reasonable to say the like of ‘to send’, because although it principally states a respect of outward action, yet it connotes a respect of inward active production; and thus neither will be purely essential, but ‘to be sent’ belongs only to the produced person and ‘to send’ only to the producing person; and in this way there are only two persons who send (the Father and the Son) and only two who are sent (the Son and the Holy Spirit), nor does any person send himself, nor does the proceeding person send the producing person.

12. An example of this can be found in something else; for the Father is said to create through the Word, and thus it can be conceded that the Son creates through the Holy Spirit; but not conversely so, for ‘to create through the Son’ does not assert absolutely an outward action but action along with authority, and in this way it connotes active production in the operator with respect to the person through whom he operates as it were with sub-authority. Thus it can be said that ‘to send a person’ is to operate through him and thus to work the effect along with that person by way of an authority that gives action to that person, and it belongs only to the producing person with respect to the produced person, – and ‘to be sent’ would mean the same as to operate with sub-authority, by virtue of the sending person, because it only happens when the operating person receives the power of acting from another.

III. To the Reasons of Peter Lombard

13. Next in response to what the Master adduces on his side, from Augustine, that the Holy Spirit sends the Son and that the Son sends himself [n.6].

It can be expounded first of the Son incarnate, not of the Son as he is to be incarnate, in the way that Ambrose says in *On the Holy Spirit* III ch.1 nn.1, 2, 6, that the Spirit of God sent the Son, – as we read in *Isaiah* 61.1 “the Spirit of the Lord is upon me” etc.; “well did he say,” says Ambrose, ““the Spirit of the Lord is upon me to preach’, because he was sent and anointed as son of man, for according to his divinity the Holy Spirit is not upon Christ but in Christ.” This authority, then, of Isaiah, which says that Christ was sent by the Holy Spirit, is understood of Christ as man, but not of the sending of the eternal Word as he is to be incarnate. – In like manner can be expounded the authority that says the Son sent himself.

14. To the argument of the Master it can also be said that the consequence is not valid [sc. that if ‘to send’ did not belong to the three, something would be brought about by one person that was not brought about by another, n.7], because there is a change from ‘in what way’ to ‘what’. For the consequence is not that ‘the Son does not operate through the Son as the Father operates through the Son, therefore the Father does something that the Son does not do’, but the consequence is: ‘therefore the Son in a certain way does not operate’, because not through authority, – and this is true; or also ‘if the Father send the Son and the Son does not send himself’, one should infer ‘because the authority of bringing about an effect in the creature is in the Father, not in the Son’, – and this too is true.

IV. How the Opinion of Lombard might be Held

15. Although this way [nn.11-12] seem probable, yet because the authorities of Augustine seem to speak not only of Christ sent as man but of the sending of the Word of God ‘because he is to be incarnate’ (the incarnation itself, as Augustine himself says, is understood as the sending), therefore the opinion of the Master can be held in this way, according to Augustine *On the Trinity* IV ch.20 n.28: “when he is conceived in time by anyone’s perfect understanding, he is said to be sent;” and more clearly n.29: “To be sent is for the Son to be known that he is from the Father, – so to be sent is for the Holy Spirit to be known that he proceeds from the Father.”

16. ‘To be sent’ then is a person shown to proceed, and ‘to send’ is to show a person proceeds. This ‘to show’ is purely common, because the whole Trinity manifests that the proceeding person proceeds; but ‘a person shown to proceed’ connotes that a person proceeds. And, if these are what these terms signify (because things signified are to be taken according to the usage of authors), it follows that ‘to send’ is purely essential and does not connote a real eternal respect in the sender; but ‘to be sent’ connotes a respect in the person sent insofar as his eternal procession is manifested. And indeed another word might be imposed which would signify ‘to show a person produces’, and its passive form would signify ‘a person shown to be produced’, – and the active form would be common to the three, but the passive form would belong only to the two persons who are produced.

V. To the Arguments against the Opinion of Lombard

17. One must respond accordingly [n.16] to the arguments that are against the opinion of the Master [nn.8-10].

To the first [n.8] I say that ‘to be sent’ states a respect of reason to the sender formally; but it connotes an eternal respect, not indeed to the sender because he sends, but to someone indistinctly. Hence the following proposition is to be denied, that “‘to be sent’ only states a respect to him to whom he is sent, or to the sender”, if he be understood insofar as he is sender, and this both as to the principal thing signified and to the connoted thing; for the proposition states by connoting a respect of the one proceeding, and this in relation to the one producing – not insofar as he is sender, because a person that is not producer can be a sender, although a producer is always a sender.

18. To the second [nn.9-10] I concede that the active and the passive voices signify the same thing under opposite grammatical forms, although something the same that is not diversified by those forms could be connoted in each; ‘to show’ indeed and ‘to be shown’ – which are what is principally implied – are diversified by those forms, but not so as regard ‘person proceeds’; for the latter is what is connoted uniformly, both by the active and by the passive voices. There is an example of this in other things: for I know fire heats, and fire is known to heat. Although there is here a grammatical variation as to the ‘know’ and ‘to be known’, yet not as to that which is indicated to the term ‘to know’ and ‘to be known’, because that is uniformly the same in both cases; and if one active form were imposed to signify the whole phrase ‘to know fire heats’, its passive form would not connote ‘fire known to be heated’ but only that the ‘to be known’ is in the passive form and that the thing connotated is in the active form, namely ‘fire heats’.

19. Hereby things are made plain for the confirmation ‘to send and to be sent are correlatives’. This is true as to the things formally signified, and each states *per se* a respect of reason; however it is possible for one of them to include, as a thing connoted, some extreme of the relation and for the other of them not to include that extreme’s correlative, as is clear in the example given, because the verb thus imposed would include ‘to heat’ and the passive verb corresponding to it would not include the ‘to be heated’.

IV. To the Principal Arguments

20. To the principal arguments [nn.1-3].

To the first [n.1] I say that not everything said in time of God is common to the three when it involves not only a respect to creatures but also connotes along with it an intrinsic respect, as is the case with ‘to be sent’.

21. To the second [n.2] I concede that the Father invisibly comes and indwells, but yet he is not said to be sent because he does not have one from whom he is [n.4]; for he is not shown to proceed unless he proceeds. However, he can well be shown absolutely or shown to produce, but this way of being shown is not indicated by ‘to be sent’ [n.16].

22. To the third [n.3] I concede that any person at all gives any person at all, because to give is to communicate freely; but any person, by the will as it belongs to him, communicates himself freely; nor does it follow from this that any person sends any person, because it is now plain that ‘to give’ does not include such an intrinsic respect as ‘to be sent’ includes.

Seventeenth Distinction

First Part

On the Habit of Charity

Question One

Whether it is necessary to posit a created Charity that formally inheres in a Nature capable of Beatification

1. About the seventeenth distinction I ask whether it is necessary to posit a created charity that formally inheres in a nature capable of beatification.

That it is not:

Augustine *On the Trinity* VIII ch.7 n.10: “He who loves his neighbor loves as a consequence love itself; but ‘God is love’; therefore the consequence is that he loves God.”

I ask how he is taking ‘love’ in the minor? If formally, I have the proposition [sc. that positing a created charity is not necessary]; if effectively, then there will be four terms, because the major is not true save of the formal love by which the neighbor is loved.¹² Even if you say that ‘besides the love which is the Holy Spirit, there is another formal love’, then there is a fallacy of the consequent in Augustine’s argument, by arguing ‘he loves love formally, therefore this love’, – because the antecedent can hold true of the other love.¹³ If the argument then has to hold, it is necessary that God formally

¹² The four terms will be ‘loves neighbor’ and ‘effective love’ in the minor, and ‘God’ and ‘formal love’ in the major, and so a claim that love of neighbor is effective love of love will not establish that that effective love of love is the formal love that is God, for there will be no common middle term. Hence, if Augustine’s argument is to be valid, ‘love’ cannot be taken to mean effective love only.

¹³ Sc. if love of neighbor is a formal love other than the formal love that is the Holy Spirit, then one cannot argue from one to the other; in particular one cannot argue back from the formal love that is

be love and be every love that is formally in someone who loves in respect of his neighbor.

2. Again, *On the Trinity* XV ch.19 n.37: “No gift is more excellent than this gift, which is love; and no gift of God is more excellent than the Holy Spirit; therefore the Holy Spirit is love.” This argument would not be valid unless it was about formal love, and because precisely the Holy Spirit would be that.

3. Even if it be said to these authorities that the Holy Spirit is called ‘love’ by way of causality, the Master in the text stands opposed, who adduces Augustine, because he understands him formally. For Augustine says *On the Trinity* XV ch.17, n.27: “We will not say that ‘charity’ is said to be God by the fact that it is the gift of God, the way it is said ‘you are my patience’ (*Psalm* 70.5); for Scripture’s locution itself refutes this sense; for ‘you are my patience’ is of the sort that ‘you are my hope’ is (*Psalm* 90,9), etc.” “But the saying is not like this, ‘Lord, my love’, or ‘you are my love’, but it is said like this, ‘God is love’ (*I John* 4.16) as it is said ‘God is spirit’ (*John* 4.24).”

4. Again, by reason: every creature can be understood to be non-good, because it is good by participation; but charity cannot be understood to be non-good; therefore it seems that it is good by essence, – therefore, etc.

5. On the contrary:

Augustine *On the Morals of the Church*, treating of the saying in *Romans* 8.35 ‘Who will separate us from the love of Christ’, says: “This sort of love of God is called virtue, which is the most correct affection of the spirit.”

the Holy Spirit to this supposed other (created) formal love that is love of neighbor (which would be the fallacy of asserting the antecedent from asserting of the consequent).

Question Two

Whether it is necessary to posit in a Habit the idea of Active Principle with respect to Act

6. Alongside this question I propose another, in general, about habit: whether it is necessary to posit in a habit the idea of active principle with respect to act.

Argument that it is:

A habit is that which the possessor of it uses when he wills, from the Commentator on *De Anima* 3 comm. 18; ‘to use’ belongs to the agent, for the patient does not use a passive principle.

7. Further, we attribute four conditions to a habit and to what has a habit: that it operate with pleasure, easily, without impediment, and promptly.

8. From each an argument can be given for the intended proposition:

From the first, that an act which was first disagreeable to the agent does not become agreeable to it unless the agent itself, insofar as it is agent, be differently disposed; therefore when, through this habit, by which action belongs to it, action is agreeable to it and so pleasant, the agent itself is differently disposed insofar as it is agent.

9. From the second condition the argument is that what is of itself supremely disposed to undergo something does not need to be helped so that it might undergo it; but a habitual potency – of which sort is the intellect and will – is of itself supremely disposed to receiving act (because they do not have a contrary and, for this reason, they

do not need motion in order to act); therefore the habit whereby the potency is helped disposes it to acting and not to undergoing.

10. From the third condition the argument is that absence of impediment belongs to that of which there is a being impeded; but being impeded belongs to the agent when its active power fails and is overcome by another; therefore the habit by which acting without impediment belongs to something belongs to it insofar as it is active.

11. From the fourth the argument is as follows, that promptness belongs to that of which there is an acting sluggishly or promptly; but ‘not to act promptly’ belongs to an agent insofar as it is active, not insofar as it is passive; therefore the promptness, which the habit bestows, belongs to the agent insofar as it is agent.

12. Further, to the principal point:

A habit inclines a power to act. But there is a double inclination, namely of a passive power to form and of an active power to act; habit does not incline in the first way, for act is received in the power immediately, otherwise perfect and imperfect act would not have the same thing susceptive of them; therefore it inclines in the second way, as an active principle for acting, – and this is the intended proposition.

13. Again, according to the Philosopher in *Physics* 8.4.255a30-255b5 and *De Anima* 2.5.417a21-28, the soul is, before knowledge, in essential potency, but when it has knowledge it is in accidental potency. But what reduces something from essential potency to accidental potency as regard operation seems to be the active principle with respect to it, because it is that whereby the possessor of it acts; hence the Philosopher intends, in *De Anima* 2.2.414a4-7, 12-13, that just as science is ‘that whereby we know’

so the soul is ‘that whereby we live and sense’ etc., and consequently, just as the soul is that whereby we perform vital acts, so science is that whereby we actively speculate.

14. Again, some habits are practical, and one such is active, as prudence, and another productive, as art; the idea of a practical habit in general, and of a productive one in particular, seems to involve in such habit the idea of active principle.

15. On the contrary:

Relation is not an active principle, nor anything that essentially includes relation; but habit is ‘in relation to something’, according to the Philosopher in *Physics* 7.3.246a30-b21; therefore etc.

16. A confirmation of the reason is that absolute real entity is no less required in the principle of motion than in its term; if therefore a habit lacks the absolute entity that would suffice for terminating motion (according to the Philosopher in *Physics* 5.2.225b11-13), much more does it lack the absolute entity that is required in an active principle.

17. Further, second, in respect of one action there is one active potency (the Commentator on *Physics* 5 com.38); but the habit alone is not the active power with respect to operation, because then the habit itself would be a power (because power is that by which we are simply able), and ‘what is perfected by it’ would not be power simply; therefore only that which is perfected by a habit is the active principle of operation.

18. A confirmation of this reason is that a single action requires a formal principle ‘*per se* one’ whereby to be elicited; something composed of power and habit is ‘*per*

accidens one' and not '*per se* one'; therefore this composite whole cannot be the 'by which' in respect of an operation '*per se* one'.

19. Further, an accident is not a principle of acting in its proper subject; but operation, for which habit is posited, is repeatedly received in the power to which the habit belongs; therefore with respect to operation the habit is not the active principle.

20. Further, some habits are in the sensitive appetitive powers; this appetite is not active, because according to Damascene *On the Orthodox Faith* ch.36, "sense does not lead but is led;" therefore neither can the form of it be an active principle, because if it were it ought to concur with the power in acting.

I. To the Second Question

A. Five Ways of Giving a Solution are Expounded and Examined

1. First Way

21. [Exposition of the opinion] – To this question it is said [by Henry of Ghent] that things are differently disposed as regard acquired habit and infused habit. For the natural act of a man, and the lack of impediment in the act, is from another, because of the indetermination that nature has with respect to that act, – and therefore acquired virtue is a perfection of nature, with nature presupposed under the idea of the principle of act; but if supernatural virtue belonged to nature (with nature presupposed in that to

which such an act corresponds), then the supernatural virtue alone would facilitate nature, as acquired virtue does; but this is false, nay by the same thing there is ‘gratuitous existence’ and a gratuitous act, according to that [supernatural] degree, is simply elicited – the result being that acquired virtue is a virtue according to the idea of virtue that is posited in *Nicomachean Ethics* 2.5.1106a15-17, but theological virtue is not like that but accords with the idea of virtue by which it is laid down that virtue is ‘the utmost of power’ (*De Caelo* 1.11.281a10-12).

22. [Rejection of the opinion] – Against this opinion [n.21], if thus he [sc. Henry of Ghent] understands that a supernatural habit is simply principle with respect to act, I argue as follows:

That by which someone can act simply is a power; therefore a supernatural habit will be a power. The antecedent is plain, because power is that whereby we are simply and first able to act.¹⁴

23. Further, from this [sc. that a supernatural habit is a principle of act] it follows in addition that no more will the will be good if it acts through the habit of charity than a piece of wood is perfected in acting if it acts by the heat inhering in it accidentally;¹⁵ an example: for just as from this fact [sc. the wood acting through heat] no action belongs to the wood through the form of wood but only to the agent [sc. the heat] that is received in the wood, so also it seems that the action that would belong to charity as to principal principle would in no way belong to the will as will. And it also follows further that just as heat, if it were separated, would heat equally as much, so charity, if it were separated, would act equally as much, for every form that is the total principle of acting as it exists

¹⁴ Note by Scotus: “This is true of the genus of action, it is false of operation-action.”

¹⁵ Note by Scotus: “By that action a subject, whose formal principle is ‘an accident through an accident’ of that subject, is not *per se* perfected.”

in a subject, can, if it exists *per se*, operate *per se* – and thus the intended proposition evidently follows, namely that the habit will be a power.¹⁶

24. Further, an operation whose active principle is purely natural is not freely elicited; but a habit, since it is not formally the will, nor as a consequence formally free, will, if it is an active principle, be purely natural; therefore its operation will not be purely free, and thus no ‘willing’ will be free if it is elicited by the habit as by a total active principle.

25. Further, in that case a man who once has charity could never sin mortally, which is unfitting. – The proof of the consequence is that he who has some active form predominating in him can never be moved against the inclination of that predominating form, just as never can a heavy mixed body be raised upwards against the inclination of the dominating earth in it; but charity – if it is the total active principle – is predominant over the will itself, which has no power for that act; therefore the will always follows the inclination of charity in acting, and so it will never sin.

26. Further, that act is not mine which is not in my power; but the action of the habit itself is not in my power, because the habit itself – if it is active – is not free but is a natural principle; therefore the ‘loving’ will not be mine, such that it be in my power, and so I will not merit by that act.

2. Second Way

¹⁶ Note by Scotus: “If heat were an active principle in respect of something which would be a perfection of wood, there would be nothing similar to ‘heat is active’ (each unfitting result rightly follows when one posits habit as the reason for receiving the operation); nothing would be similar about operation, – for a material cause of operation is lacking; nothing either about acting, about genus of action, because in this way it is only a principle of something immanent, not of something transient (but why is it not?).”

27. [Exposition of the opinion] – In another way it can be said that acquired and infused virtues do not differ in the aforesaid way [n.21], but both are compared as to substance of act in the same way; and then there is one way of speaking, that the act has its substance from the power but has such and such intensity from the habit, so that to the two things as it were in the act – namely the substance and the intensity – there correspond two things in the idea of the principle or the cause.

28. [Rejection of the opinion] – Against this I argue that the intensity of an act is not something extrinsic, an accident of the act, but a degree intrinsic to the act, – such that an intense act is something '*per se* one', just as an individual of this sort is one in species. There cannot, therefore, be one principle of the substance of this sort of act and another of its intensity, because that by which there is this individual is that by which there is an intrinsic degree proper to this individual; for it cannot receive nature, and a nature designated 'this nature', from something else without receiving it in a certain degree. – Following on from this, as if from the same middle term, one could argue the way it was argued before against the principal point [n.18], that since an intense act is '*per se* one', and what is combined from potency and habit is as it were '*per accidens* one', this whole cannot be the principle of that. But this form of arguing is not cogent (hence it will also be solved later [nn.73-74]), though the first form is, because that whereby it is 'this one thing' is that whereby it has a definite degree intrinsic to this.

29. Further, second, whenever a naturally active principle concurs with a free acting cause, the natural principle always jointly acts as much as it can (an example about the will and an inferior power acting naturally as much as belongs to itself); for although

it be prevented from acting when the free principle does not act, yet – when the free principle is acting – it necessarily acts, because it acts by way of nature, as much as belongs to it, it jointly acts with the free principle as much as it can; therefore if a determinate habit in the will give a determinate intensity to the act, then, with the will operating on the substance of the act, the habit will necessarily give the intensity corresponding to itself, and thus, however much the will operates with a modicum of effort, its act would always be equally as intense, because, although the will causes the substance of the act, the habit – because it acts by way of nature – would necessarily cause what is its own.

30. Further, if the habit give intensity to the act, this would be in some designated degree (that degree will be given the mark *a* below); therefore the will can, along with this habit, have an act that is intense to that degree. Let there be another will, more perfect than this will in proportion to ‘degree *a*’ by relation to an act in the lowest degree (to wit, if *a* is the fourth degree in the act, let there be another will exceeding the first will by four degrees), then this will – without a habit – could have an act as equally intense as the will with the habit. Therefore the substance of the act is not so precisely from the power that the intensity is not from it.

31. Further, only an infinite will – excluding all idea of habit – has power for an infinite act; therefore too the will, in whatever degree of nature it is, has power for an act of a determinate degree. – The antecedent is plain, because a will, by the fact it is infinite, is not receptive of any habit, because there is not lacking to it any perfection that is possible to will. The proof of the consequence is that ‘as the highest is to the highest, so

is the simply to the simply' and so is any degree whatever to the degree corresponding to it.

3. Third Way

32. [Exposition of the Opinion] – In a third way, by attributing somehow to the habit the idea of active principle in respect of the act, one can say that the habit is a partial active cause, along with the power itself (which is also a partial cause), in respect of a perfect act proceeding from the power and the habit, although the power itself could be the total cause in respect of an imperfect act preceding the generation of the habit. And then one would have to speak about the distinction of these two partial causes, and how they *per se* make one total cause, in the way spoken above in distinction 3 in the question ‘On the Cause of Generated Knowledge’ [I d.3 nn.495-498].

33. [A doubt] – But then there is a doubt. Since these two [sc. power and habit] are not causes of the same order, as are two people hauling a boat, – which of them has the idea of prior cause?

34. It seems that the habit does, because it belongs to the prior cause to determine the second and not conversely; but the habit determines the power toward act; and it gives inclination to it, and not conversely; but to give inclination belongs to the superior in respect of the inferior, and not conversely

35. But the opposite of this seems to be the case:

First, because the power uses the habit and not conversely, – because what uses another in acting is more principal than it, and that which it uses is as it were the instrument or the second cause with respect to it [I d.3. n.562]

36. Likewise, the power is more unlimited in acting than the habit, because it extends to more things; but the superior cause seems to be more unlimited in extent; therefore etc. [ibid. n.559].

37. Further, third, a habit is a natural cause. Therefore if it be the principal cause, which moves the power, it would move it by way of nature and consequently the power, since it acts in the way in which it is moved, would act by way of nature; for an agent that acts insofar as it is moved – if it be moved by way of nature – also acts further by way of nature, and so every action of an habituated power would be natural and none free (at any rate none would be in the power of the will), which is a unfitting result.

38. Again, fourth, the habit would be the power, because it would be that by which the possessor of it can first act.

39. Again, fifth, when there are two ordered causes one of which is cause of the other, that which is cause of the other is the superior cause; but the power is the cause of the habit – at any rate by the mediation of acts – and not in any way conversely; therefore etc.

40. [Clarification of the opinion] – I concede, for these reasons [nn.35-39] that, by holding the habit to be a partial cause with respect to the act [n.32], the habit would be second cause and not first, but the power itself would be the first cause and absolutely would not need the habit for operating; yet it operates less perfectly without the habit than with it (and that when an equal effort on the part of the power is posited), just as,

when two causes come together for one effect, one cause alone does not have power *per se* for an effect as perfect as both together do. And in this way there is saved why the act is more intense when from the power and the habit than when from the power alone; not indeed that the power is the cause of the substance of the act and the habit the cause of the intensity of the act (as if there were two causes corresponding to the two caused things [n.27]), but that both causes coming together are able to produce a more perfect effect than one alone [I d.3 n.296], – which effect, however, being a whole in itself and as ‘*per se* one’ is from the two causes, but causing in diverse order [nn.32-33].

41. [Against the opinion] – Against this opinion there is the following argument:
 No things distinct in species are equivocal agent causes for each other; habit and act are distinct in species; therefore they are not equivocal agent causes for each other; but an act is necessarily an equivocal cause in the generation of a habit, an acquired habit at least, – not therefore conversely.

42. The proof of the major is that an equivocal cause contains eminently in itself the perfection of the effect; but two things distinct in species cannot eminently contain each other. – Further, in comparing the same first cause to two effects, it seems that the second of the effects would have a determinate order, immediate or mediate, prior or posterior – and that when speaking of the whole species of the second of those effects. The point is evident by induction in passions that follow the same subject, wherein there is necessarily a determinate order, that one follows the subject more immediately than the other, and that according to its whole species, so that this order does not vary in any individuals whatever of the species. Therefore with respect to the power – which is the common cause of the act and the habit – the two effects will have a determinate order, so

that either necessarily the act according to its whole species would precede the habit or conversely; and since some act of necessity precedes the habit as the cause of it, the habit would not precede any act.

43. Further, if the habit is a partial and equivocal cause with respect to the act, then the cause of this cause will be more perfect than the equivocal cause of the same act (the consequence is plain, because in equivocal causes the cause of the cause is a more perfect cause than the cause closer to the thing caused); but the act is the cause of the generation of the habit; therefore if the power along with the habit can perform a perfect act [nn.32, 40], it could much more perform the same perfect act if it were under the act that generates the habit, – which seems an unfitting result, because two perfect acts cannot exist in the same power, or at any rate, if they could, it does not seem that one of them could in any way be the active principle with respect to the other.

44. Further, if the habit is as it were the second cause [n.40], supplying some degree of causality that is lacking to the power, then the habit could become so perfect that it would supply the place of the whole power; for universally, in agents of the same nature, it seems that the virtue of one could be so intensified that it would equal the two [I d.3 n.497].

45. Further, if it be held that, in the process of making more or less intense, the preexisting individual is corrupted, it would be necessary to posit that the habit is not the cause of the act, because it is corrupted in the act whereby it is made more intense; but a cause is not a cause when it is corrupted, because what does not exist is not cause of anything.

4. Fourth Way

46. [Exposition of the opinion] – He who would maintain the conclusion of these reasons [nn.41-45] could negate of habit all idea of active principle, and say that a habit only gives an inclination to operation as a sort of prior act agreeing with second act and giving a determination to that act – just as heaviness is a prior act, giving determination and inclination to a determinate ‘where’, although, according to some, heaviness is not a principle with respect to existing in that ‘where’.

47. [Approval of the opinion] – And this opinion seems probable, because to nothing should causality with respect to anything be attributed unless such causality is evident from the nature of the things (whether of the cause or of the thing caused); also to no cause should perfect causality be denied unless imperfection of causality appears manifestly in it, because no nature should be denied to possess a perfection which it does not evidently lack. But there seems to be no necessity of positing any active causality in the habit with respect to the act, because without this all the conditions commonly attributed to the habit will be saved [n.48]; also there is no necessity to take away from the power the perfect idea of causality so as to attribute a partial causality to the habit. Therefore there is no need to attribute any causality to the habit.

48. The assumption is plain, because the four conditions that are attributed to the habit, namely that it is ‘that whereby the possessor of it operates easily, with pleasure, without impediment, and promptly’ [n.7], are saved by the habit’s inclination alone, which the habit attributes to the power as the power is receptive of operation.

49. Pleasure indeed exists because of the condition of the receiver, to whom belongs the operation received and the object about which the operation is. For pleasure is never in a making that is precisely a making, but because action is in the agent action can be pleasant because of the agreement of the agent with the object; but this agreement can be provided by the habit from the fact that it gives an inclination toward the action and the object. Pleasurability, therefore, does not include the idea of active principle, but only the agreement of the passive principle with the power and the object, and that as to action which is of the genus of quality, not action which is of the genus of action, – which difference in actions was stated above in distinction 3 [I d.3 nn.600-604]. Operation indeed is an action that is a quality, and it belongs to an habituated power that is, by the habit, inclined to such an act and to the object that terminates such an operation; but it does not thus belong to a non-habituated power, nor does such a form or such an object so belong.

50. Likewise as to the second condition. Difficulty in operation occurs from the fact that what is receptive of the operation is not disposed to receiving it, and not merely from a defect in the active virtue; therefore if what is receptive is disposed, there will be easiness in acting, to the extent the agent acts on such a receptive thing.

51. Likewise about absence of impediment and promptness. For impediment to, and slowness of, the agent in acting can be because of the indisposition of the receptive thing itself, especially when the same thing is agent and recipient, so that it will not itself operate promptly because it is indisposed to operating. This indisposition, then, is not for performing an action in the genus of action, but for having an action in the genus of

quality; for nothing is said formally to operate insofar as it elicits operation but insofar as it receives it in itself.

52. Also, the way that the other things commonly attributed to a habit are saved, by attributing the whole action to the power and no activity to the habit, will be plain from solving the arguments to the principal point [nn.6-7, 12-14, 87-91].

5. What One should Think about the Four Ways

53. Thus then it is plain how, once the two first ways ‘about habit’ are abandoned as unfitting, the two last ways, namely the third and fourth, can be sustained as probable, by attributing, in line with the third way, some activity to the habit and not only ‘the idea of active principle’ to the power [n.32], – and, in line with the fourth way, by denying to the habit the idea of active principle and saying that it is as it were a form giving inclination to receive some further form, although it not be the idea of receiving with respect to it (as heaviness gives inclination downwards, although it is not the idea of that which receives what is downwards, but ‘a bodily magnitude’ is, insofar as it is receptive of some ‘where’ n.46]).

54. To the arguments that are against these two last ways, each of which ways can be sustained with probability, a response will be given later [nn.71-86], according to one of these two ways by maintaining it about the act either as to the substance of the act or as to the intrinsic degree.

6. Fifth Way

55. It remains now to inquire further about the accidental goodness of the act (which is the sort moral goodness is), and about moral habit, whether moral habit, insofar as it is a virtue, is in any way an active principle with respect to moral goodness in the act.

56. [Arguments for the fifth way] – It seems that it is Because, according to the Philosopher *Ethics* 2.5.1106a15-17, virtue is “what perfects the possessor and makes his work good;” but it does not make it good in the idea of passive principle, because it is not the idea of receiving; therefore it does so in the idea of active principle

57. Further, virtue is “the disposition of the perfect in relation to the best”, from *Physics* 73.246b23; but it is not a passive disposition because – as before – it is not the idea of receiving; therefore it is in the idea of active principle. – There is a confirmation also for the reason, because ‘as good is to good so is best to best’ [*Topics* 3.2.117b22-26]; but since ‘the best idea’ belongs to the active principle, then according to this reason virtue perfects the power, and so perfects it for acting.

58. Further, virtue is moderator of the passions; but it does not moderate the passions through the idea of passive principle, because the object, by the fact it is the natural cause, causes the action according to the utmost of its power, – therefore as much as it can, if it is not impeded by some contrary agent; therefore the habit, by preventing the object from thus acting completely, moderates it in repressing the passion through the idea of active principle.

59. Further, *Ethics* 2.3.1105b7-9, the Philosopher says that ‘he who does not have justice, although he could do just things, not however justly’, – and so in the case of other

acts; but moral goodness requires acting justly or formally, – and thus in other cases; therefore virtue, insofar as it is good, is such a principle of act, because without it an act could not be good.

60. [Arguments against the fifth way] – But there is an argument to the contrary of this through the fact that moral goodness in an act asserts only relation, because that an act is circumstanced with its due circumstances is not anything absolute in the act but is only a due comparison of it to the things it ought to agree with; therefore this does not have any proper active principle, just as neither does a respect have it.

61. Further, if a habit, insofar as it is a ‘virtue’, were the active principle of the moral goodness in an act, since the habit is not a virtue save in a respect, namely from its conformity with prudence (for it is “an elective habit of the mean, as determined by right reason” *Ethics* 2.5.1106b36-07a2), therefore some relative idea in virtue would be the idea of active principle, which is impossible.

62. [Response to the fifth way] – As to this article [n.55], it can be said that, just as beauty is not some absolute quality in the beautiful body but is the aggregation of all the things that become such a body (to wit size, figure, and color), and an aggregation too of all the respects (which are aggregations of all the becoming things in relation to the body and to each other), so the moral goodness of an act is as it were a certain comeliness of that act, including the aggregation of a due proportion with all the things that it has to be in proportion with (to wit, with the power, the object, the end, the time, the place, the manner), and that specifically in the way these are determined by right reason to be needing to agree with the act; the result is that we can say on behalf of all of them that the agreement of the act with right reason is that by which, once posited, the act is good, and

that by which, when not posited – whatever other things it agrees with – the act is not good, because however much an act is about an object of some kind or other, if it is not according to right reason in the one who does it (to wit if he do not have right reason in his operating), the act is not good. Principally, therefore, the conformity of the act to right reason – a right reason determining fully all the circumstances due to that act – is the moral goodness of an act.

But this goodness has no proper active principle, just as neither does any respect, – especially since this respect is, from the nature of the extreme terms, consequent to the extremes posited; for it is impossible for any act to be posited in existence and for right reason to be posited in existence without there following in the act, from the nature of the extreme terms, such a conformity to right reason; but a relation that necessarily follows the extremes does not have any proper cause other than the extremes.

Therefore, as concerns this accidental condition of the act, which is moral goodness, there is no necessity for any habit to have any idea of proper active principle, save insofar as it has the idea of active principle with respect to the substance of the act – which act is of a nature to agree with the full determination of prudence;¹⁷ and toward

¹⁷ Note by Scotus: "This respect – aptitudinal respect – follows from the nature of the extremes [sc. habit and prudence], but actual respect does not; for this habit is fit, of its species, to be subordinate to prudence in acting, but it is not subordinate – in acting – from the nature of the very extremes, even when they exist together in the same thing; for when he [sc. who has both the habit and prudence] has an appetite in accord with this habit and not from the dictate of reason (if this is possible), then the habit is not subordinate, nor is the act morally good."

On the contrary: he always uses it as a virtue, because he uses it as it is fit to be subordinate; for it is not a virtue precisely as actually subordinate in acting, because then someone who is not doing anything would not have any virtue. – Again, every respect that is not from the nature of the extremes has a proper cause. What is the cause here?

To the first: he uses it but not as making it a virtue. In another way: although he uses that which is a virtue, not however as it is a virtue, because although being fit for subordination is sufficient for the being of virtue, nevertheless for using it 'as it is a virtue' requires it to be subordinated, because to use it is to be subordinated.

To the second: the respect in an effect is from the two causes, conjoined in the acting; and not from the form of one in relation to itself, nor from the form of the other, nor of both and of both

that act some habit inclines in itself from the nature of the habit, and from this – as a consequence – it inclines to the act which is conform to right reason, if right reason is present in the one acting.

65. What has been said of the moral goodness of an act [n.62] must be said proportionally of the habit, because moral virtue adds over and above the substance of the habit – as it is a form in the genus of quality – only an habitual conformity to right reason. For the same habit in nature, which might be generated from acts of abstinence elicited along with an erroneous reason in the one eliciting them, when it remains afterwards along with right reason, would afterwards be the virtue of abstinence and would before not be a habit of virtue, as long as there was no right reason of abstaining; nor yet has anything changed in that habit in itself but only now it is conjoined with prudence while before it was not.

66. To be conjoined, therefore, to prudence¹⁸ attributes to the habit (as it is a form in the genus of quality) the being of virtue, when the habit is of its nature naturally

as conjoined in the subject, but of them as conjoined in actually acting, and thus of both as conjoined such that the habit moves to desire from the dictate of prudence. Such conjoining of them, therefore, in actually acting is the source whereby the relation is in the effect; not that it is the source whereby the acting is moral (because this would be got from prudence alone, without the other habit moving), but that it is the source whereby the acting is moral and easy and pleasant, – as in *Ethics* 2.5.1106a15-21.

But what is the source of this conjunction of them in acting, because it is an extrinsic respect?
– Response: from their absolute natures there is first this conjunction, and second the relation of them in the effect.

But what is the ‘absolute’ from them such that this respect should be caused second? – Response: from prudence there is an absolute act in the intellect, – and from that act as prior cause and rule, and from the appetite as ruled, there is an absolute act of desiring. If the conjunction of the causes precedes in nature the common effect, nothing ‘absolute’ comes from the two causes before their conjunction does (a resulting difficulty: the source of the action primarily is not the source of the second conjunction in the action). If the first – in the order of nature – is a caused ‘absolute’, from it there is a relation of it to each cause, and from it conversely a relation of each cause to it, – from it the conjunction of one with the other.

¹⁸ Note of Scotus: “I do not say ‘conjoined in the same subject’ but, along with this, ‘conjoined to it as to a rule and prior cause’, to which this habit is subordinated insofar as it is a mover, – and this subordination or conformity is the essential idea of virtue; and the absolute form, as it is precisely mover under such a respect, is precisely active for an act that has a like respect (because what agrees

conform to prudence, – and so the habit that is a moral virtue indicates nothing in absolute entity other than is indicated by a habit such in nature, but does not indicate a virtue, if it be without prudence; and consequently it can have no other causality as it is a virtue than as it is such a natural quality, save that ‘as it is conjoined with prudence’ it is of a nature to be second cause – directed as it were by prudence – with respect to the common effect of both; but as it is without prudence it cannot be second cause with respect to the same effect (just as sight in a phrenetic cannot be a free power by participation, because he is unable to have use of will, which is a free power by essence – but in someone healthy sight does have use of free power by participation, and it is as it were a second cause with respect to the will). But still, when it is a second cause with respect to prudence, it has a proper causality – agreeing with it in its order of causing – precisely from the fact that it is such a form and a certain quality in nature, but not by respect of conformity or conjunction with prudence, because although a second cause joined to a first acts otherwise than when it is without it, yet it does not have its proper active virtue from such conjunction, but from its absolute nature.

67. [Conclusion to the fifth way] – Neither, therefore, on the part of the act insofar as it is morally good, nor on the part of the habit insofar as it is a moral virtue, can there be found any special idea according to which a virtue ‘as it is a virtue’ is a principle of an act insofar as the act is morally good save the one which is on the part of the habit and the act as concerns their nature.

68. [What one should think of the fifth way] – This fifth way, therefore, about the action of a moral virtue with respect to the act as it is morally good, should not be treated

with the ruled agrees with the rule), and thus the habit ‘as it is a virtue’ is precisely a mover to an act morally right, which – as it is absolutely such a form – is absolutely active for such an act ‘in its substance’, nor does it there have the idea of subordinate cause with respect to prudence.”

as other than the ways that touch on the substance of the habit and the substance of the act [n.67], – and so, in brief, as to the whole of the fifth way, one should hold either the third or the fourth way [nn.32, 46] about every habit.

B. Solution of the Question by Maintaining the Third Way

69. By maintaining the third way (which seems to attribute more to the habit), it can thus be said that, just as, if there were some heaviness in a stone that would not be a sufficient active principle with respect to descent downwards, yet it would be a partial active principle (as will be said in II d.2 p.2 q.6 nn.2-11 about a sufficient heaviness, because it is a total active principle with respect to descent downwards), that – I say – diminished heaviness, along with another moving power moving it to the descent, could act in a diminished way, such that, with the other moving power acting with equal effort, the descent that is caused by that other extrinsic moving power and by the diminished heaviness moving intrinsically would be quicker than a descent that is caused by the extrinsic moving power alone moving with equal effort, yet the extrinsic moving power could, with so much effort, move a neutral body (namely one which had no heaviness or lightness), just as this body would be moved by intrinsic heaviness and by an extrinsic moving power acting weakly; – so, in the proposed case, the habit moves the power as a sort of weight, which, however, is of itself not sufficient for actively eliciting the operation, but the virtue alone of the active power, without such weight, is sufficient; but when both come together, yet such that there is not on the part of the power a greater

effort now than before, a more perfect operation is elicited now than could be elicited before by the power itself alone.

70. And common experience seems to be in favor of this way, because anyone can experience that, when he has been habituated, he can with equal effort have a more perfect operation than he could have when not habituated (which perfection of the act could not be attributed to the habit, if the habit were only an inclining passive principle), because at any rate, as it seems, in the prior instant of nature in which the operation is elicited – before it is received in the power – there would be an equal idea of active principle in the eliciting, and so a perfect operation would be elicited with equal effort by an habituated and by a non-habituated power.

C. To the Arguments when Maintaining the Third Way

71. [To the principal negative arguments] – To the principal arguments. By holding this way [sc. the third], I reply to the first argument [n.15]. Although it be said that a habit is not an absolute form, because of those words of the Philosopher in *Physics* 7 [n.15], yet, by holding any quality to be an absolute form (and a quality of the first species is no less a quality than one of another species [*Categories* 8.8b25-11a38]), it can be said that something which the relation is the same as can be an active principle, although relation is not an active principle; nor either is that which the relation is the same as an active principle by reason of the relation, but by reason of the absolute which the relation itself is the same as. The distinction between these things, namely relation and the absolute essence which the relation is the same as, can be plain from many other

things said above, where formal non-identity is posited along with perfect real identity [I d.2 nn.388-410, d.8 n.191-217]; and this will be plainer in II d.1 q.4 nn.21-25, where it will be said that the relation of the creature to God is the same as the absolute essence of the created thing and yet is not formally the same. To this extent, then, can the Philosopher by expounded, that ‘habit is in relation to something’, because by identity it includes the respect;¹⁹ and yet it is not a respect only, but something absolute, – and therefore action can belong to it as to a principle of acting.

72. In confirmation of the reason [n.16] it can be said that a greater absoluteness is required in a term of motion than in a principle of acting, because nothing can be the term of a motion that has the same relation to itself. It is not so with the active principle.²⁰

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¹⁹ Note of Scotus: “There is a doubt about the respect with the *per se* object, whether it is identical with the habit. It is certain that the respect whereby it is said to be a virtue – which is respect to a rule – is an extrinsic addition; hence it is not, on account of Aristotle’s intention, necessary to proceed to a respect identical with the habit, but it is sufficient that any habit be not in relation to something in divisible degrees.

On the contrary: that whereby the place ‘accident through accident’ is not divided, neither that of which it is the accident? – Perhaps one idea in Physics 7 is about identical respect, another about ‘*per accidens*’ respect.

²⁰ Interpolated text: “Or what is more to the purpose, it can be said that the reason does not prove the proposition save in a diminished way, – and to get its conclusion, which it intends, one must handle it in a way other than the words primarily signify (on which matter I do not now wish to dwell), or one would have to make clear other reasons for it so as to prove principally the said conclusion (this conclusion ‘whether a habit is something absolute’ will be spoken of elsewhere).”

²¹ Note of Scotus: “One must add to the Philosopher’s minor [n.15] as follows: ‘every habit is identically in relation to something not according to divisible stages.’ And in this way the major is true: ‘whatever is identically in relation to something not according to divisible stages cannot terminate motion’ [n.72]. – But it can well terminate change. Hence a habit is not generated by way of continuity (so that its generation should thus be motion), but if it has stages, each is indivisible and in each the object is indivisibly regarded; and each is generated by simple change, which does not terminate motion in that form (but perhaps motion in the passions or certain other things), for more and less in a form do not suffice for motion in that form unless each stage is divisible, so that one can proceed continuously from one to the other. For motion is not composed of changes.

Therefor the Philosopher’s middle is not ‘habit is in relation to something’, – but it is this ‘in relation to something not according to divisible stages’, if in each stage it indivisibly regards that with which it is identically relative. And from this perhaps, as from something more manifest, it follows that the absolute itself – which it thus regards – does not have divisible stages; but this does not follow as from the cause; rather the fact the absolute does not have divisible stages is the cause of the

73. To the second argument [n.17] I say that of one action there is one principle *per se*, and that in one order of being principle; however, there can be many principles in diverse orders of being principle, which do not have a unity insofar as they are principles save the unity of order, although sometimes along with unity of order comes the fact that there is a unity of subject and accident, but this is accidental.

So in the proposed case. Habit and power are two active powers of different order, each is in its order ‘a *per se* one’. And along with this unity of order there comes the unity of accident and subject among these ordered things, and this is accidental, because if the first cause could be conjoined to the second without such an informing of one by the other as they are conjoined with when one is informed by the other, they could in the same way have sufficient unity for causing one effect. When therefore it is said that ‘of one action there is an active cause *per se* one’, I concede that there is, namely in one order, – but in another order of being principle there can well be one cause and another cause, and that whether this and that cause constitute ‘a one *per accidens*’ or not but only ‘a one in unity of order’; and although there be here ‘a unity *per accidens*’, yet there is always still preserved a unity of order of principle to thing caused by the principle.

74. By this the response is plain to the confirmation about the unity of formal principle [n.18]; for I concede such unity in what is the principle ‘by which’ in one order of being principle.

fact that ‘the respect is not divisible’ (because a relation takes the more and less from its foundation), not conversely, although sometimes the converse could be the cause of its becoming known.

But this indivisibility of respect identical with the absolute does not prove that it is not the principle of acting, as is plain about any active form – if any is indivisible, it has ‘a respect identical’ with God. Therefore it does not follow ‘it does not terminate motion because of an indivisible identical relation, therefore it is for that reason not a principle of acting’, because an identical indivisible relation is repugnant to a from acquired through motion, not however to an active form.”

75. To the other [n.19] I say that an accident can well be the principle of some effect that can be received in its subject, just as the intelligible species is the principle of understanding received in the possible intellect; and thus can a form be the principle ‘by which’ with respect to the change of its subject.

76. To the other [n.20], about sensitive appetite, I say that it has the idea of active principle in some way, although not of being active freely; and this is what Damascene means, that ‘sense does not lead but is led’; that is, it is not master of its own action, which is ‘to lead’, – but with respect to its own action it is determined by the agent itself to a definite operation, and this is ‘to be led’. Also, that the sensitive appetite is not free, although it is in some way active, and the sense itself similarly – this will be spoken of elsewhere [II d.29 q. un nn.3-4, Suppl. d.25 q. un nn.8, 24].

77. [To the arguments against the second way] – To the arguments that are made against the second way, which posits that the habit is an active principle of intensity in the act, because they seem to be against this way [sc. the third] (to this extent, that it posits the act ‘elicited by the habit and the power acting with equal effort’ to be more intense than the act elicited by the power alone), I show, by running through them, how they are not repugnant to this way.

78. About the first [n.28] it is plain that this way does not posit two distinct things in act possessing two principles, but the same ‘*per se* one’ act has two principles in diverse orders of being principle [n.40].

79. To the second [n.29] I concede the inference, namely that when the power is operating with equal effort ‘the act is always more intense when the habit is working along with it than when it is not’, but from this the unfitting result does not follow –

which does result against that way [sc. the second] – namely that when the power is acting with any effort whatever ‘the act is always equally intense’; this does follow there, because all of the intensity is attributed to the habit, – but it does not follow here, because all of the intensity is attributed to two causes; and it is attributed to the power, indeed, according to its greater or lesser effort, – but to the habit always equally, as far as concerns itself [n.32].

80. To the third [n.30] I concede that a will could come to exist in pure nature that would elicit a more intense act than another will along with the habit does; and this is not unfitting if one posits these two to be ordered principles, as it would be unfitting if one posits the whole intensity to be from the habit or attributes the whole intensity to the habit and not to the power.

81. The same point answers the fourth argument [n.31].

82. [To the arguments against the third way specifically] – To the arguments made against the third opinion [nn.41-45].

To the first [n.41] one should deny the major, because one should say that two equivocal partial, but not total, causes of distinct species can be causes for each other.

83. To the proof of it, which is through ‘the eminence of an equivocal cause’ I reply: this proof holds of a total cause, and I do not posit a circle in total equivocal causes.
 – To the other proof I say that two effects, when compared to their one common cause, can have a mutual order to each other in nature of partial cause, – as intelligible species and understanding, when comparing the agent and possible intellect, because with respect to intellection the species is partial cause, and ‘intellection’ can be posited as a sort of cause of the species insofar as it includes it.

84. To the other [n.43] one can say that the generative act of the habit need not be the idea of acting ‘by which’, as the generated habit can be the idea ‘by which’, – just as the virtue of the sun cannot be the principle ‘by which’ with respect to every act with respect to which the form of what is generated by the sun is the principle ‘by which’. And when it is said that ‘whatever is the cause of a cause etc.’ [n.43] – this is true as the remote principle ‘by which’ (when there is a remote principle ‘by which’), but not as the immediate principle ‘by which’.

85. To the third [n.44] I say that a habit – at whatever stage – cannot supply the whole place of the power, because although its causality is diminished, and the causality too of the power is diminished, yet the causality of the habit is of a different idea from the causality of the power; because, although the causality of the power is diminished, yet the habit is ‘in its idea’ the second cause, namely which the power is able to use, – and thus, if it is increased to infinity, it could never become the principle that uses (as the generative virtue of the father, however much it is increased, cannot become the virtue of the sun). The causality of the power, therefore, is not of the same idea as the causality of the habit, nor can the habit, when made intense, reach to its level, but they are always of a different idea; and yet the habit, when causing along with the power, causes a more perfect act than would be caused by one of them alone.

86. To the last one [n.45]: the supposition will be denied in the following material ‘On the Increase of Charity’ [nn. 225, 249].

D. To the Principal Positive Arguments while Maintaining the Fourth Way

87. He who wishes to maintain the fourth way [n.46] is able to reply to the principal reasons adduced for the first part [nn.6-14]:

To the first [n.6]: the power (or the one who has the power) uses the habit, because the habit is itself a certain inclination to action; not indeed as a power active for acting, but as a prior form inclines to a posterior form, as heaviness downwards.

88. To the four conditions [n.7]. One would say that pleasure [nn.7-8] is from the agreement of the operation with the power and with the object which the operation is about; this agreement is of the object with the power insofar as the power receives the action, not insofar as it elicits it, because mere making as making is never pleasure, and therefore one should, because of the pleasure, never posit the idea of active principle [n.49]. – Likewise, ease, absence of impediment, and promptitude [nn.7, 9-11] are set down under the idea of the passive, because the passive can receive with difficulty, and with impediment and slowly or not promptly, when it is not disposed, and by reason of the indisposition of the passive thing there is difficulty there and slowness. Therefore the agent can act without impediment and promptly and easily because of the disposition of the passive thing, and habit is such a disposition in the passive thing [nn.50-51]. When it is said, therefore, that ‘there is no easiness for undergoing because the passive is supremely disposed’ [n.9], I reply: by the abnegation of the contrary it is supremely disposed, but not through the positing of an agreeable disposition. An example about dry wood and neutral wood: wood that is neutral indeed is supremely disposed to heat by way of privation, through lack of any opposed disposition, – but it is not disposed positively by the positing of an agreeable disposition of the sort that dryness is; and if this

agreement was accompanied by sense the dry wood would be heated with pleasure, but not so the neutral wood, because the received form does not similarly agree with it.

89. To the other, about inclination [n.12], one could say that it inclines as the prior form to the taking up of the later form, as heaviness inclines to be downwards (even according to those who say that heaviness with respect to downward descent is not an active principle [n.69]); nor need what thus passively inclines be the reason for receiving the form to which it inclines, just as neither is heaviness the receptive principle ‘where’ [nn.53, 46].

90. To the other, about science [n.13], I say that science, by which the soul is reduced from essential potency to accidental potency, is the intelligible species of the object itself, and about that I concede that it is the active principle with respect to consideration [nn.83, 75]. But the species is not the habit we are speaking of, which is a certain quality left behind from acts frequently elicited; for the species itself naturally precedes the first act elicited about the object which it concerns, and although this species could be rooted in the intellect and – once it has been rooted – could be called a habit, it is however not the habit which is generated from acts repeatedly elicited, as was said [n.90]. Therefore all the words that are spoken about the species as about a habit do not progress to the understanding of this question, nor either do those words that take science for this species (the distinction of these habits, namely of the habit which is the intelligible species and the habit of the intellective part properly speaking, will be plain in II d.3 p.2 q.3 n.15). Through the same point is clear the response to what is added about the being ‘by which’ [n.13]; I say that science, taking it strictly for the habit acquired from speculations, is not properly that by which we speculate but is a certain inclination

for easily and pleasantly speculating; but that by which as by the active principle – on the part of the object – we speculate is the intelligible species.

91. To the other [n.14] one can say that the intellective habit – or the practical habit – can be called active or making because it is inclined to action; not that action belongs to it as to the active principle, but as terminating its inclination, – such that the action belongs either to the habituated power itself or to another power as to the active principle; just as choice ‘practically right’ is actively elicited by the will and not by prudence which, however, is the practical habit with respect to that choice (because it inclines to it), although it is not the active principle of it.

E. To the Arguments for the Fifth Way

92. [At the same time to all of them] – To the arguments adduced for the fifth way, which seem to show that moral habit, insofar as it is a virtue, is an active principle of an act insofar as the act is moral [nn.56-59], I reply that moral goodness in an act (as was said before [n.62]) is the completeness of all the conditions and circumstances, and this principally so that these conditions be dictated by right reason as needing to be present in the act. Simply necessary, then, for the moral goodness of a moral act is that a complete dictate of right reason precede it, to which dictate it be conform as the measured to the measure.

93. But it is not necessary that the declaration be from some intellective habit, namely from prudence, nor that the act conform to the dictate be elicited by some moral appetitive power; for right dictate simply precedes prudence, because by it the first

degree of prudence is generated, and thus right choice simply precedes the moral habit, because by the choice itself moral virtue in the first degree is generated; at that point, then, in a first act, and correctly, someone gives a dictate without generated prudence and rightly chooses morally without generated moral virtue. However, prudence, generated from the first act or from several other right dictates, inclines more to eliciting similar dictates, that is, to rightly drawing conclusions of practical syllogisms about all the circumstances that ought to be present in the act to be elicited; likewise moral virtue, generated after the first act, inclines more to eliciting acts similar to those from which it was generated.

94. However, one must understand that what is generated about moral virtue is a certain quality, in whose idea – as it is absolutely such a quality – is not included its conformity with prudence; for the same quality could be generated from similar acts, in the same species, elicited without prudence (nay with erroneous reason, if it were so [n.65]), but that quality – which is generated from those acts according to a species of nature – is not a virtue from the fact that it is a quality, but there is further necessarily required its conformity with prudence, or, which is more express, its coexistence with prudence in the same actor [n.66]. For always indeed, whether prudence is present or not, the habit is of a nature to be conform to prudence, if prudence were there (just as the habit of abstaining, generated from acts done from an erroneous reason, is always – as far as depends on itself – of a nature to be conform to prudence, although prudence not be present in it), in the way that another habit, generated from excessive acts, is not of a nature to be conform. When the quality, therefore, which is of a nature to be conform to prudence, coexists with prudence, then it has not only an aptitudinal but an actual

conformity with prudence, because both habits incline to similar things [n.93], – and the act elicited according to the inclination of those two habits is morally good; but if any act were elicited according to the quality alone that is materially moral virtue, and prudence does not coexist in the same actor nor is inclining to that act, the act would not be morally good.

95. Thus, therefore, it is plain that the quality which is materially a moral virtue (which has completely the idea of moral virtue through this, that it coexists with prudence) is related to prudence – when prudence is present – as second cause to first cause, and this in respect of the same common effect to be elicited by them; for then prudence is as it were the prior cause and the moral habit as it were the posterior cause. But these two causes, when they come together at the same time to elicit the act, can attribute to the act the moral goodness which the latter habit alone, if it were without prudence or right reason, could not attribute to it; to attribute moral goodness, indeed, is to attribute conformity to right reason – and this is attributed²² by that quality, not from the fact alone that it is a quality, but from the fact that in causing it coexists with prudence, which is inclining it at the same time.

97. And one must note that this goodness, as it is attributed to prudence so inclining, does not, as was said at the beginning [nn.92-93], necessarily belong to the habit of prudence, nor to it solely, but to the act which would be of a nature to be an act of prudence, which is right dictate; for if right dictate is present, and if appetite desires in accordance with it – as if in accordance with a measure – the act is morally right; and if

²² Note by Scotus: "Nothing: the extreme [sc. prudence] to which the other [sc. the moral habit] is referred does not give anything to its correlative effectively but only terminatively." I.e. [Vatican editors] the habit as it is completely a moral habit, just as it causes nothing in respect of the act, so it gives nothing to the act.

that right dictate were not present, but prudence was present (according to which the intellect could dictate rightly), still the act – elicited without right dictate – would not be perfectly good. Therefore, when prudence is not present, the act which is right dictate suffices for dictating the right act; but, when prudence is present, prudence does not suffice without its own elicited act, and thus the rightness which prudence attributes to the moral act it attributes by the mediation of the proper act of prudence.

98. [To the individual arguments] – To the authorities, therefore, adduced on behalf of the fifth way, which seem to say that virtue, whereby it is virtue, effectively causes the moral goodness of the act:

First to the statement from *Ethics* 2 that virtue “makes his work good” [n.56], I say that either it does so by inclining, and this belongs to it from the fact that it is this quality in species of nature, – or, since this is not sufficient (for it would incline thus without prudence), it does so whereby it is virtue, that is, whereby it coexists with prudence; it does so indeed in its own class of cause, because it does so as second cause, – and this by virtue of the superior cause, which is prudence. If therefore the third way is maintained, namely about the activity of the habit [n.32], then it does so actively, but as partial and second cause; but if the fourth way be maintained [n.46], then it does so by way of inclination, and this, not from the fact alone that it inclines, but from the fact that the virtue itself along with prudence-virtue inclines.

99. To the other, about ‘moderating’ [n.58], I say that moral virtue does not actively moderate passion, as if, when the passion has already been excited – by the object – it makes it to be less; for a pleasant object, when present, naturally moves according to the utmost of itself. But the habit can make the object less agreeable to an

habituated power than to a non-habituated power; for just as it is more disagreeable for a heavy object to be upwards than for a neutral object (although heaviness were not the active principle of descent), so some pleasant excessive thing would be in itself agreeable to the power, but to the power when habituated by a habit inclining it to moderate acts that pleasant excessive thing is disagreeable – or is not as pleasant and agreeable. And to this extent, as if by formal or virtual repugnance to the habit, the habit moderates the disagreeable or excessive object, lest the pleasant thing give immoderate pleasure; and from this there does not follow any activity of the habit, just as neither of humidity in a piece of wood, although the humidity moderates the fire so that it does not heat immoderately or strongly, as it does a dry body.

In another way it can be said that virtue moderates a passion that is not already generated or inhering but coming to be, to the extent it inclines the power – and this with coexisting prudence – to flee immoderate pleasant things that are of a nature to introduce immoderate pleasures, and only to admit pleasant things that are of a nature to give moderate pleasure. And in this respect indeed it does moderate, not by diminishing an already existing pleasure, but by warding off in advance an immoderate pleasure – which would be present.

100. To the other, about the fact that ‘without justice no one can operate justly’ [n.59], I reply: I say that in the first act, when there is a right dictate generative of prudence and the choice of someone just is conform to it [n.93], there the chooser not only does what is just but does it justly. But one should understand that he operates non-justly – without justice – according to the whole perfection according to which someone

could act justly, one of which perfections is pleasure and facility in operating, which does not belong to a non-habituated power as it does to a habituated power.

II. To the First Question

A. The Opinion which is Attributed to Peter Lombard

101. As to the first question, the opinion of the Master is said to be that the indwelling Holy Spirit alone, without any intermediate habit informing the will, moves the will to a meritorious act in a way other than he moves it to acts of belief and hope (for he moves it to acts of belief and hope through the medium of the habits of faith and hope), and in this way the Master is said to have denied any created charity.

1. Arguments for the Opinion attributed to Peter Lombard

102. One can argue for this conclusion in two ways.

103. [First way] – The first way is taken from form's or habit's imperfection, or from its non-necessity for causing movement.

104. Here the argument goes first as follows: as a natural act is related to a natural or acquired habit, so is the act of an infused habit to an infused habit; but an acquired habit only bestows pleasurable acting and a facility in the power for the act (but it does not give the substance of the act), as is plain from the preceding question [nn.47-51, 88]; therefore in like manner an infused habit bestows only pleasurable acting, or would so

bestow it if it were present within. But he who was a sinner before and is now justified does not elicit an act of loving God with pleasure; for resistance by his vices and persistence in good works seem as difficult to him as when he was in his sins, or not much easier, until by battle and victory over his passions he has acquired some contrary habit, and then he will act with pleasure. Therefore the justified sinner has no infused habit, because in that case he would, if it were present in him, act with pleasure.

105. Further, if a supernatural good be shown to a will in its purely natural state, the will would love it well enough because it has the object sufficiently close to it; therefore an infused habit is not required for loving a supernatural good. The proof of the assumption is that if a lesser good when shown to the will has the wherewithal to be loved, then a greater good has it too; therefore if the will in its purely natural state can love something, it can love the supreme good if that good be shown to it.

106. Further, the act of loving that would belong to that supernatural habit would also be supernatural, and so it would be created immediately (for supernatural things are not brought into being by any transition from something, but only by creation), and if the act would be something created then it does not presuppose anything for its creation.

107. Further, a habit can be used when the possessor of it wants to (Averroes above, *On the Soul* com.18); but no one has experience of being able to use this habit when he wants to; for he cannot, when he wants, elicit with pleasure and ease fervent acts of loving God, – as is plain in the case of contemplatives, who sometimes after some effort experience themselves possessed of great devotion and sometimes after equal effort possessed of a lesser devotion or none.

108. [Second way] – The second way is taken from the fact that without a habit the Holy Spirit suffices for causing motion.

109. Here the argument goes first as follows: the first cause can do of itself what it can do along with a second cause when the second cause is only an agent cause (or the major is taken this way: ‘the first cause can do of itself whatever it can do with a second cause that is not part of the essence of the thing’; I add this because of the form and matter in a composite thing, – for God cannot make a composite thing without the intrinsic parts that compose it); but a habit, if it is present within, does not have a necessary causality with respect to its acts save after some manner of agent causality (plainly at least not after the manner of a formal cause, or of a material cause ‘about which’ [*Prologue* n.188]); therefore its causality is extrinsic. Therefore whatever the Holy Spirit can cause in the act along with the habit, he can cause without the habit; plurality without necessity should, it seems, not be posited,²³ because it is superfluous, – therefore, etc.

110. Further, in order for a will possessed of a habit to act in accordance with the habit, the cooperation of the Holy Spirit is necessary, otherwise he would not be the first cause in every action of creatures; but he does not cooperate because the will has the habit, because then a created will would use the Holy Spirit as a second cause, and the Holy Spirit would not be the first but the second cause with respect to the will that has the habit, because he would be determined by the will’s habit to act along with the will; therefore, on the contrary, because he cooperates with the will therefore the will operates in accordance with the habit. But the Holy Spirit can cooperate as equally with a will – in

²³ Tr. A clear anticipation of Ockham’s razor, so called, namely that entities are not to be multiplied beyond necessity.

the first instant of its nature – that has the habit of charity as with a will that does not have it; therefore etc.

111. Further, the Son of God was thus united to our nature, because he was doing the works of that nature in such a way that the acts were truly said to belong to the Son of God as to the acting supposit; and yet there was by this fact no derogation from the assumed nature that prevented it being also the principle of its own operations. Therefore, by an argument from similars, the Holy Spirit can be in some way united to the will such that he himself does the works of the will without there being by this fact any derogation from the nature of the will in its idea as an operative power that would prevent it being able to be the principle of its own operations.

112. Further, the intellect is more passive than the will, and less active; therefore it is more in need of something to activate it so that it has power for its own act. But the intellect is posited as being capable, without any form informing it, of the beatific vision by the mere fact that the essence of God is as it were present to it by way of form [n.193]; therefore much more can the will be capable, without any form informing it, of every one of its acts by the fact that the Holy Spirit is for it as it were the form for performing acts of love.

2. Arguments against the Opinion attributed to Peter Lombard

113. Against this conclusion, whether it be according to the intention of the Master or not, one can argue in two ways assumed from the faith: the first is taken from

the justification of the sinner or from divine acceptance, and this without any elicited act,
– the second is taken from the nature of a meritorious act.

114. [First way] – From the first way the argument goes first as follows: the sinner before repentance is unjust, after repentance just, in the way the Scripture calls the sinner ‘unjust’ and him who has been freed from sin ‘just’. – From this the argument runs: injustice, since it is formally a privation, cannot be taken away from anyone unless the opposite habit is given to him, because ‘to deprive of a privation’ is to put a habit in its place, for opposites are immediate in the case of a subject naturally fitted for them (*Metaphysics* 10.4.1055a33, 55b3-6); the soul is naturally fitted to receive justice; therefore the one who is justified, having been made just from being unjust, receives the habit opposite to the privation; for if there were nothing formally more present in him now than before, he would not more lack the privation now than he lacked it before.

115. Further, a sinner before repentance is not worthy of eternal life, but after repentance he is worthy of eternal life; but he is not worthy save by something formally inhering in him to which, according to the rules of divine justice, it is judged that eternal life should be given, and he had nothing of this sort before; therefore something positive is in the just man formally, by which he is worthy of eternal life.

116. Further, God does not accept a sinner for eternal life, but he does accept him who has been justified. I ask then what it is ‘to accept for eternal life’? It is not ‘to will – with the will of being well pleased – to beatify him for the present now’, because then God would immediately beatify him; therefore it is ‘to will that person – in accord with the disposition he now has – to be worthy of such a reward’ whom before God did not will to be worthy of such a reward. The difference here cannot, as it seems, be posited in

the divine will, because nothing is new there, for the divine will is immutable; therefore it is because of a difference on the part of the person, because the divine will wants any person disposed in the same way to be disposed in the same way.

117. The confirmation of this reason [n.116] is that divine volition, because it is in itself one act, does not have the idea of opposed or distinct acts – as acts of willing and not willing – in the absence of any distinction in the connoted objects; for this ‘divine willing’ is not some willing of being well-pleased – and likewise not some not willing – unless the objects are distinct, otherwise contradictories will be true without any distinction to cause that truth; therefore, since God wills the justified person for some being for which he does not will the sinner, on account of which difference he is said in Scripture ‘to love the just’ and ‘to hate sinners’ [*Proverbs* 15.9; *Ecclesiastes* 12.3, 7; *Psalm* 5.7], the consequence is that this difference – according to its idea on the part of the divine volition – necessarily requires an actual distinction on the part of the objects themselves. Therefore the person in question is disposed in himself in one way when he is said to be ‘beloved of God’ or ‘accepted for eternal life’ but in another way when he is ‘hated’.

118. Lastly there is, according to this first way, an argument as follows, that if there is in the soul of this person nothing after repentance other than what was there before, it does not seem that his soul is disposed any differently toward God, nor God toward him, because this difference does not seem to be on account of any change that has happened on the part of God. Therefore if it be conceded, as seems necessary, that he be in some way differently disposed toward God, and conversely God toward him, then this is because of a change in him, – and so something will come to be formally in him *de*

novo; but faith and hope do not come to be in him *de novo*, because they have remained in the sinner, – therefore charity does.

119. One might also argue, according to his first way, that God, who was offended by the sinner before, remits the offence when the sinner later repents; this is not because of any change in the divine will (as there can be in me when I remit an offense); therefore it is because of the fact that he to whom the offense is remitted is differently disposed in himself.

120. But this argument is not conclusive, as will be plain in IV d.16 q.2 n.19, where it will be said that God remits the offense to the sinner first in nature before he gives the sinner grace. Hence the arguments – if any according to this first way are valid – must be taken from passive acceptance and from order or dignity for eternal life, which accord with a justified person and not with a sinner, as has just been argued [n.119]; but they must not be taken from mere remission of the offense [n.113], which is in itself a lesser thing than to be just.

121. [Second way] – From the second way, namely from the idea of a meritorious act [n.113], the argument goes as follows:

Nothing is said to act formally in any action unless the principle of the action is the form of the agent; this is taken from *On the Soul* 2.2.414a12-14 where, from the fact that the soul is ‘that whereby we live and sense’ etc. [n.13], the conclusion is drawn that the soul is the act and form of what performs those acts; therefore, since meritorious action belongs to the will, or to the man working through his will, the result is that that by which he meritoriously acts is his form. But that by which he meritoriously acts cannot be pure nature, because then he could meritoriously act from his natural powers alone,

which seems to be the error of Pelagius; therefore something supernatural is required; clearly not faith or hope, because these remain in a sinner, – therefore charity.

122. Further, no action is in the power of an agent unless that agent has a form by which it can act; for if it could act through something assisting it – something merely extrinsic – which is not in its power, such an action is not in its power, just as neither is the assistance of the extrinsic thing in its power. But the Holy Spirit assisting the will is not in the power of the will, just as neither is universally the action of a superior cause in the power of an inferior cause. Therefore if the will could act from the assistance alone and did not have a form in itself by which it was sufficiently able to proceed to a meritorious act, the result follows that the meritorious act would not be in its power, – which seems discordant.

123. Further, if the Holy Spirit is moving the will in a special way in the case of a meritorious action, the consequence is that the motion is cause of something in the will itself and that, with respect to it, the will does not have any causality but only a passive receptivity; either then that something is an act of loving, and then the result is that the act of loving is in no way from the will; or it is some other thing which naturally precedes the act of loving, – and this other thing I call ‘a habit’, because a perfection prior to act in a power (a perfection that is habitual or can be habitual) seems to be a habit.

124. Further, fourth, the identity of the Father with the Son is greater than any union of the Holy Spirit with the will can be; but the Father is not said, because of this identity, to do anything by the Son, as is plain from Augustine *On the Trinity* VII ch.1 n.2, because ‘the Father is not wise by generated wisdom’; therefore much less will the will be said to do anything because of the union with it of ‘the Holy Spirit at work’.

B. Scotus' own Response

125. For the solution of this question three things need to be looked at: first, whether some supernatural habit needs to be posited that gives grace to a nature capable of being beatified; second, whether it is simply necessary to posit such a habit so that such a nature may be beatified; and third, what the Master thought on this question, on account of the many things imputed to him.

1. Whether some Supernatural Habit needs to be Posited that gives Grace to a Nature

Capable of being Beatified

126. [A supernatural habit bestowing grace is present within] – As to the first article [n.125] one can say that from no act which we experience, whether from the substance of the act, or from the intensity of the act, or from the pleasure or ease in doing it, or from the goodness or the moral rectitude of the act, can we conclude that some such supernatural habit is present; because from none of them can anyone possessed of charity know with certitude that he exists in charity, namely from the fact that an act with such and such intensity is experienced to exist within him, or to be in him with pleasure and ease, or to be consonant with right reason.

127. Now the reason that one cannot conclude from the act or from any condition of the act that such a habit exists within is that either the act is able of its own power alone to have all the aforesaid features, when there is concurrence of right reason (as is

the case when one holds the fourth way set down in the preceding solution [n.46]), or, if some habit would, because of any of the aforesaid conditions [n.126], be concurrent with the act, it could be some acquired habit; for acquired friendship could give just as much intensity to the act (as second cause, along with the power as first cause [n.40]), could also bestow just as much pleasure and ease, could even be a habit just as consonant with right reason, because an elicited act would have no clearly apparent condition from which the conclusion would necessarily follow that it was elicited according to a supernatural habit.

128. But if you say ‘the will is moved suddenly to acting intensely, easily, pleasurable, and this in a way consonant with supernatural reason (that is, consonant with the dictate of faith), but the will cannot suddenly acquire a habit of ordered friendship consonant with the faith, therefore it has some non-acquired habit whereby it is inclined suddenly to act’, – I reply: the will can be moved to natural acts with suddenness enough, and these natural acts are totally subject to its power, because – as Augustine says *Retractions* I ch.22 n.4 – “nothing is as much in the power of the will as the will itself”; therefore the proposed conclusion cannot be drawn from this suddenness.

129. I say, therefore, that over and above all the aforesaid conditions, namely the intensity of the act, pleasure and ease in acting, rectitude or goodness and conformity with right reason (right either according to the dictate of prudence or according to the dictate of faith), over and above – I say – all these, there is one condition in the act that is a matter of belief, namely that the act is acceptable to God; not indeed merely with the common acceptance by which God accepts every creature (which is even the way he wills the act that is substrate to a sin, otherwise the act would not have its existence from

him), but with a special acceptance, which is in the divine will an ordering toward eternal life of this sort of act as of something condignly deserving of the reward. And in this way we have belief that our nature is capable of beatification, is just, is habitually accepted, – that is, that when it is not actually operating, yet still the divine will is ordering it to eternal life as being worthy of so great a good, in accord with the disposition that it possesses habitually in itself. And it is because of this habitual acceptance of a nature capable of beatification even when it is not operating, and because of the actual acceptance of an act elicited by such a nature, that one must posit a single supernatural habit whereby he who formally possesses it is accepted by God and whereby his elicited act is accepted as meritorious. So the nature or the act does not seem to be accepted without some habit informing them, because – in accordance with what has been argued [nn.116-117, 122] – God does not seem to have a will different in nature about an object that has in no way been made different [nn.116-117]; nor would even an act ‘as it is acceptable to God’ seem to be in the power of an agent unless that by which he formally acted were his form [n.122].

130. [Doubt 1] – But there is a doubt about how this habit may be the reason for accepting the nature and the act.

131. The reason indeed for accepting the nature seems to be just a sort of comeliness of nature, pleasing to the divine will, such that, whether the habit is posited as active or non-active, from the mere fact that it is such a form, beautifying and adorning the soul, it can be a reason of acceptance and a reason for accepting the nature.

132. But for the acceptance of an act more is required than that the agent have this spiritual comeliness, otherwise he who has such a habit could not have any act that was

indifferent, nor could commit venial sin, which is discordant [II d.41 q. un nn.3-4]. – The proof of the consequence is that neither of these things [indifferent acts and venial sin] takes away the comeliness from the actor, and so each of them would be accepted, if an act were to be accepted merely from the comeliness of the actor.

133. One must therefore say that the habit, besides the fact that it is a spiritual comeliness, also inclines toward definite acts, and this either non-actively, according to the fourth way posited in the preceding solution [n.46], or (which seems more to be the case) actively, according to the third way [n.32].

134. The proof is as follows:

First, because otherwise it would seem that, without the habit, one could have a very intense act of loving God, and this both as a wayfarer and in the fatherland, and thus also have beatitude; for in the instant of nature in which an act is elicited by an active principle, if the will alone were the active principle, it would ‘insofar as active’ be a principle that was just as perfect without the habit as with it, and the power alone could, with equal effort, perform the act (as is plain [n.70]); therefore a most perfect act of loving God could be had without such a habit.

135. A second proof to the same effect is that otherwise what Augustine says [Pseudo-Augustine *Hypognosticon* III ch.1 n.20] about free choice would not seem to be true, namely that ‘grace is related to free choice as a rider to a horse’, because the rider actively directs and moves the horse, in some way or other. – Nor even would that remark seem to be true which he says in a letter to Boniface [Augustine, *Epist. 186 ad Paulinum* ch.3 n.10]: ‘With the will accompanying,’ he says, ‘not going ahead; a foot

follower, not a lord'. Now the will would not be a foot follower to grace if grace itself had no causality.²⁴

136. [Doubt 2] – But then there is a further doubt about this habit when compared with the operating power – namely which of them should be called the first cause and which the second.

137. For it seems from what has been said [n.135] that grace is the first cause.

138. But it seems the opposite is the case:

First, because the power uses the habit and not conversely.

139. Second, because the action would not be free if grace were the first cause; for the will would be moved naturally, because grace would move it naturally, – and just as the will would not be moved freely, so neither would it act freely, since it would not act save because it was moved.

²⁴ Note by Scotus: "There is a position [from St. Thomas Aquinas and Godfrey of Fontaines] that for a meritorious act the will along with charity is not sufficient but a special influence is required, – not the influence of a permanent form but of a motion, just as an instrument has motion from the principal agent over and above its own form.

The first reason: a natural form is given to something so that it might act, because such action is proportioned to it; grace is not given to us so that we might act but so that we might be acted on (*Romans* 8.14: "as many as are led by the Spirit of God, they are the sons of God"), and this because such action is not proportioned. – A confirmation comes from *John* 4.14: "the water that I shall give him shall be in him a well of water springing up" etc. An example: grace is like a weight, not like art; a weight is not an operative principle, and grace is like the spherical shape given to a mass of lead. Another example: grace is compared to the active generative power of a mother; a mother has this force (because she has a human soul), but in a diminished way and not as capable of acting unless it be moved by the active force of the father.

Second reason: grace now does not perfectly heal nature. The point is taken from Augustine *On Nature and Grace* I ch.26 n.29, where he says in general: 'as the healthy eye cannot see without light, so neither can even the just soul live rightly without the spiritual light'. – A confirmation comes from *Romans* 7.25 about 'the law of sin', and 8.26 'we know not what we should pray for as we ought' and 'the Spirit makes intercession'.

Third reason: an act is considered as it is from free choice, as it is from free choice informed by grace, third – in addition to this – as it is from free choice moved by the Holy Spirit. In the first way it is not even worthy of a reward; in the second way it is worthy (just as is also a baptized child) but not with condign worth (*John* 4.14: 'a well springing up' whose water does not rise above its beginning); in the third way then it does have condign worth."

140. Third, because the will – once it has grace – would not seem able ever to sin, because the second cause always follows the inclination of the first cause, nor seem able to be moved to the opposite of that to which the first cause inclines it.

141. Similarly, fourth, the will is more without limit as to acts than the habit is; being without limit as to several effects seems to belong to the superior cause [cf. nn.33-39].

142. Here it can be said that in a meritorious act (about which the discussion now is [nn.129-135]) I am considering two things, namely: that which precedes the idea of its being meritorious, and in this rank are included the substance of the act and its intensity and its moral rectitude; over and above this I consider also the very idea of its being meritorious, which is that it is accepted by the divine will in order to a reward, or that it is acceptable or worthy of being accepted.

143. This second thing would be truer if the act had complete merit through something that is in him who merits; to accept is not in him but is a divine action; but divine action does not seem to be *per se* required for merit. – There is also proof for this in that there seems to be a merit [sc. in him who merits] with respect to this sort of ‘being accepted’, for some act is worthy to be accepted and another not; therefore before it is understood to have been accepted, there is something in the act whereby it is worthy to be accepted; therefore there is then in it the idea of merit, at least with respect to acceptance.

144. On the contrary: the idea of merit is not completely had unless the idea of being worthy or worthily ordainable to a reward is had (which reward is beatitude), and this ‘worthily’ accords with commutative or retributive justice; but no act has this order merely from what acts from within (for then God could not fail to reward beatitude to

him who has so acted without unjustly depriving him of it, – this is false); therefore such order according to justice is from the divine will alone gratuitously ordering it, and thus the idea of merit will be complete from the divine will ordering this act to a reward.

145. And as to what is said about the second thing that ‘divine action is not of the idea of merit’ [n.143], – I reply: the relation to divine action in the action of him who merits belongs to the idea of merit, because there is no relation of the one who merits without divine action.

146. If you say that ‘then it is not in the power of the one who merits to merit, just as neither is the divine action in his power’, and similarly ‘the meriting would belong more principally to God than to me, because what is more principal in the merit comes from divine action’, – to the first point: the act which is merit is in my power, on the supposition of the general influence, if I have grace and the use of free choice; but the completion of the idea of merit is not in my power save dispositively, although dispositively in such a way that the completion for my acting always follows from the divine disposition, just as animation always follows on the organizing done by the natural cause. The same thing makes clear the response to the second point, because although what is more principal in merit – that is, what is last and compleptive – is from God, yet it does not follow that ‘therefore God merits’, because merit is an act of a free power, and an act elicited according to the gift of grace, accepted by God as being rewardable with beatitude – and therefore to merit is to act thus; God does not act thus.

147. On the contrary: at least what is more principal in merit is from God. – I reply that if by ‘more principal’ is meant what does the ultimate completing, let it be conceded; if is meant the first reality or the more perfect reality, let it be denied, because

an act is something absolute and prior in nature to ‘the passive acceptance’, and is more a being than it is.

148. To that which was adduced second for the second thing, which was ‘the act merits to be accepted’ [n.143] – I reply: there is in it the idea of merit ‘in a certain respect’, because the ordaining of the act to beatitude is not to it as to a reward that has to be justly rendered for such an act, – and let it be conceded that the passive divine acceptance is not included in the idea of merit ‘in a certain respect’, just as it is not required in the idea of merit by congruity, in the way that someone contrite merits to be justified.

149. And what has just been said [nn.144-148] must be understood of the divine eternal acceptance by which God, foreseeing from eternity this act being elicited from such principles, willed it to be ordered to a reward, and by the act of his will ordering it to a reward, willed it to be a merit; which act, considered in itself without such divine acceptance, would not, in strict justice, have been worthy of such a reward from the intrinsic goodness that it would have from its own principles; the fact is plain because a reward is always a greater good than the merit, and strict justice does not render a greater good for a lesser one. Therefore it is well said that God always rewards beyond condign worth, indeed universally beyond the worth of the act which is the merit, – because that the merit is condign merit is something beyond its nature and its intrinsic goodness, and comes from gratuitous divine acceptance; and perhaps further it is beyond that other merit which an act needing to be accepted would have by common law, whenever God rewards it from pure generosity.

150. In addition, just as in a meritorious act there are the two aforesaid things (namely the substance of the act along with rectitude, and the idea of merit [n.142]), likewise the habit of grace is a certain quality, – and the proof is that besides the relation which it has to right reason insofar as it is a morally good habit, it has a special relation to the divine will accepting it or accepting the subject that has it.

151. This habit according to its substance actively inclines to act, and this it does actively as a partial cause (when one holds the third way in the preceding solution [n.32]), and in this causality the habit is second cause and the power first cause, as was said in the preceding solution about the habit in general and about the power, when positing the habit as ‘active’ [n.40]; and this is proved by the reasons already adduced [nn.138-141].

152. But when one takes the act according to its idea of being meritorious, one can say that this condition belongs principally to the act from the habit and less principally from the will; for the act is more accepted as worthy of reward because it is elicited by charity than because it is freely elicited by the will, although both are necessarily required. An example of this can be posited about the cutting up of a body by means of a knife; the cutting, to be sure, is itself absolutely more from the moving power of the cutter than from the knife, and therefore a stronger moving power cuts more quickly; but yet insofar as this cutting is compared to sight under the idea of being acceptable – as pleasing to someone – it is attributed more to the knife, because the smoothness of the cut parts, which pleases sight, comes more from the sharpness of the instrument than from the efficacy of the virtue that principally does the cutting. Likewise, a sound is more from the percussion of the sounding body than from the orderedness of the percussion, and yet, as acceptable to hearing, it is more from the orderedness of the

percussion than from the efficacy of the percussive power; nay the percussive virtue could be more efficacious and less acceptable, – nay altogether not acceptable to hearing, because the sound is not harmonious. Another example: if the father is the principal cause with respect to the son and the mother is less principal, yet she can be a more principal cause of the son insofar as he is loved or lovable by someone, such that the son is more loved because he is the mother's as his bearer than because he is the father's as his begetter.

153. So it is possible for God to have ordained to accept some act as worthy of reward – or as acceptable or to be accepted – because some habit inclines to that act as the partial active principal of it, and which because of this is more principally accepted or more principally acceptable than because it is from the remaining partial cause.

154. In this way [nn.152-153], then, can the remark of Augustine be expounded that ‘charity is like a rider to a horse’ [n.135], and also the remark that ‘the will in respect of grace follows on foot behind and does not go ahead’; this is indeed true with respect to the act insofar as it is meritorious, but not insofar as it is the act ‘in its substance’.

155. And the first example [about rider and horse] would be altogether similar if the horse were free and the rider were directing the horse by way of nature to a definite end. The horse's course would be more pleasing, and that to some ordained will, from the fact that it was according to the natural inclination of the rider himself to a definite end than from the fact that the horse was by its own motive force running quickly. Then too the horse could of its own liberty throw off the rider, or move itself to something else at a tangent to the rider's direction to the end; and in the first case indeed the horse would become altogether non-acceptable, because it would not have the rider on account of

which it would be accepted by such a will, – in the second case, although such a horse would be acceptable, yet its course would not be accepted, because it would not be according to the direction of the rider. – This is how it is in the proposed case. The will is as it were a free horse, and grace as it were the rider by way of nature, inclining it to an object in a determinate way; a course of the will in accordance with this sort of inclination would be pleasing, – a different course would not be pleasing, as when there is venial sin or an indifferent act; but when the rider is thrown off, which is done by mortal sin, the will itself becomes altogether displeasing.

156. In this way too the will is a foot follower, because it does not of itself as determinately incline to the term (on account of which inclination the act is accepted) as grace inclines, and the will participates that inclination from grace, because the inclination belongs more to grace by its essence than to the will; and in this respect is the will itself a second cause, not because in causing ‘something intrinsic to the act’ it is second cause, but it is so in being that because of which the act is accepted, because it states a respect of the act to what is extrinsic; certainly it is possible enough for some relation to what is external to belong less principally to an effect because of a more principal cause of the effect than because of a less principal cause of it, as is plain in the examples set down above [n.152].²⁵

157. But this habit, just like any other moral habit also, has to incline itself determinately to the object – or to the end – by virtue of the object which in some way it participates; for just as an intellectual habit has the object in some way in itself as present

²⁵ Tr. As that the directing of the horse to an end by the rider, which is a relation to something extrinsic to the horse caused by a more principal cause (for the rider is such a more principal cause), is less principally a property of the horse than the running of the horse (for the running belongs more to the horse than the direction of the running), which running is caused by the less principal cause that is the horse itself.

to it under the idea of intelligible object, so a moral habit has the object in some way in itself under the idea of lovable good, – and thus, just as the former by virtue of the object has in some way to act in the presence of the object, so the latter by virtue of the object it in some way contains has to incline toward the object; from this it is clear how the habit inclines more determinately to the object than the power does, because it more determinately includes the object.

158. And in accord with this [n.157] one could also say that the partial causality which is attributed to the habit [nn151, 40, 32] comes to it from the part of the cause by which the object is said to be active with respect to the action and not from the part of the cause by which the power is said to be active, because a habit has its force more from the object which it determinately includes than from the power itself.

159. And if it is then argued, as was argued in the aforesaid solution, that ‘the habit determines and inclines the power, therefore it is a prior cause’ [n.34], – look for the response there [n.85].

2. Whether a Supernatural Habit giving it Grace has to be posited so that a Nature Capable of Beatification may be Beatified

160. About the second article [n.125] I say that God could of his absolute power have very well accepted – with the special acceptance stated before [n.129] – a nature capable of beatification that was existing in its pure natural state; and likewise, the act of it, for which it had a purely natural inclination, he could have accepted as meritorious. But he is not believed to have so disposed things that he should thus accept its pure

nature or act, because to say that ‘an act from purely natural powers is meritorious’ comes close to the error of Pelagius [n.121]. Therefore the more likely belief is that he accepts nature and its act as meritorious on the basis of a supernatural habit.

161. But there is a double doubt here.

One as to how something in created nature could be a reason for acceptance by the divine will (whether absolutely or in such a way [sc. of special acceptance]), since nothing in nature is a reason for divine action, whether in itself or as it tends about such an object.

162. The other doubt is because, when every supernatural gift of God is excluded, there is a distinguishing between friend and enemy, – so that an enemy is said to be he in whom sin has not been destroyed (and so the offense remains), and a non-enemy is said to be he in whom it is not an offense; but in advance of the conferring of any spiritual gift an offense could be removed from someone who was ‘an enemy before’, as will be said in IV d.16 [n.120].

163. I reply. A non-enemy is not a ‘friend’; because someone who forgives an offense in another – for the reason that he no longer seeks punishment for the offense – does not become that other’s enemy more; but it does not follow because of this that he at once recover him as a friend, nor that he repel him as an enemy in some contrary way, but in a negative one – that he neither will him evil as an enemy nor good as a friend.

164. As far as this article [n.162] is concerned, then, there is no necessity to posit a supernatural habit conferring grace when speaking of the necessity that regards God’s absolute power (especially since he could give beatitude without any preceding merit), although however this may be necessary when speaking of the necessity that regards

God's ordained power, which ordaining we pick up in Scripture and from the sayings of the saints, where we have it that a sinner is not worthy of eternal life and that a just man is worthy.

3. About the Opinion of Peter Lombard

165. As to the third article [n.125], one could say that the Master does not deny every supernatural habit. He himself indeed, in d.37 of the first book, in the chapter 'That also is marvelous', ch.2 n.338, adduces Augustine to Dardanus [*On the Foreknowledge of God* ch.6 n.21] saying that "to the temple of God belong sanctified children, who are not able to know God"; therefore God dwells in a child who, however, cannot have an elicited act about God. This indwelling, which belongs to a regenerated child and not to some other, cannot exist in the child without a supernatural habit; for it cannot be posited there either because of an act, because a child has (and can have) no such act, or because of nature alone, because God does not indwell some other non-regenerated child, although the same nature nevertheless exists in him.

166. Likewise, in d.26 of book II, ch.1 nn.228-229, he seems to posit created grace in the soul.

167. Therefore it can be said that the Master posited one habit whereby, when it informs the soul, the Holy Spirit indwells and, as indwelling, perfects the soul's powers as it were with supernatural habits: perfects two powers indeed – namely intellect and will – with faith and hope, for act of believing and hoping; but he perfects the will – for act of loving – with no habit other than that by which he is said to indwell, because the

act of loving is so perfect that it can be attributed immediately to the habit by which, when it formally inheres, the Holy Spirit indwells, as by a most perfect habit. Acts of believing and hoping cannot thus be immediately attributed to the habit by which the Holy Spirit indwells, on account of the imperfection of those acts and the perfection of the habit whereby the Holy Spirit indwells the mind; for that habit should be thus perfect, because it will not be removed even in the fatherland, when the soul will be the temple of the Lord; for believing and hoping will not remain there [n.101].

168. And in this way the authorities from Augustine [nn.1-3] make for the Master, not because there is no supernatural habit formally giving the soul grace, but because it is not a different habit from that by which the Holy Spirit indwells the soul in the way that the habit of believing and hoping is other than the habit by which he indwells; and this will be plain from solving the reasons that are adduced for the first part of the question [nn.171-177].

169. In this regard, then, the Master does not seem to disagree with others save because they either posit grace to be a habit other than charity, or at least say that this habit – which in reality is grace – is formally in the will and not in the essence of the soul, for then the Holy Spirit would not indwell by a single as it were radical habit with respect to faith and hope as these first come to be, but he would indwell by a habit formally inherent, informing the will, which habit would be posterior, in some order of nature, to faith and hope.

170. But when one holds that the same habit is in reality charity and grace [II d.27 q. un nn.3-4], it seems that this habit would inform the essence of the soul first, and thus the virtues that inform the powers would flow first from the Holy Spirit indwelling the

essence of the soul, – or that this habit is in the will formally, on the presupposition already of faith and hope in the powers (on which point see II Suppl. d.26 q. un); at any rate charity does not seem to be a different habit in reality from that by which the Holy Spirit indwells the soul, and thus the Holy Spirit does not move to act of love through a ‘mediating’ habit [n.101] – supply ‘habit other than that by which he indwells’ – as he does so move to act of belief and hope.

C. To the Principal Arguments

171. To the principal arguments [nn.1-6].

To the first [n.1] I say that the argument of Augustine holds as follows: ‘everyone who loves his neighbor loves his own love formally, if he turns himself toward it; but everyone who loves his own love formally loves the Holy Spirit who is by essence love; therefore everyone who loves his brother loves the Holy Spirit who is by essence love’. – The second proposition in order here (which however would be the major if one arranges it in a syllogism) is proved as follows, that everyone who loves a lesser good in an ordered way ought to love more some greater good, especially when the reason for lovability in the lesser good is only from the greater good; but my love is formally a lesser good than the love by essence that is the Holy Spirit, and in particular it gets from that love its own reason of lovability. The reasoning of Augustine, therefore, has to be reduced to two syllogisms as follows: ‘he who loves his love-act loves love by essence;

but he who loves his neighbor loves his love-act; therefore he who loves his neighbor loves love by essence. But God is this sort of love; therefore etc.²⁶

172. About his second argument, namely about the most excellent gift [n.2], one could say that the argument holds as follows: ‘no created gift is more excellent than created charity, therefore charity is perfection simply, and includes of its nature no imperfection or limitation’. – The proof of this consequence is that more eminent than any gift which is not perfection simply is some other gift in creatures that is perfection simply. Further: every perfection simply belongs more formally to the Holy Spirit from his being himself the simply most excellent gift, and thereby from God being so (because God can give himself), and so the most excellent gift is God; therefore the Holy Spirit, from his being the simply most excellent gift, is every perfection simply. But there stands along with this the fact that this ‘perfection simply’ is participated in by us and is essentially other than the divine person who is perfect by this perfection simply.

173. Absolutely, then, the arguments of Augustine [nn.1-2] presuppose [nn.171-172] that God is formally charity and love, – not only effectively, as ‘hope’ or ‘my patience’ is so effectively, because it effects patience as a non-perfection simply, and so as not agreeing with itself formally; but he effects in the soul charity – and love – as a perfection simply, and therefore as agreeing with himself formally. In this way he in one way makes humanity in a man and in another way goodness; from the fact, to be sure, that he makes humanity it does not follow that he is formally man, but only that he is

²⁶ Text cancelled by Scotus: “This argument of Augustine, then, proves that God is to be loved and yet not that he is my love formally, nor that there is in me another love formally. Two arguments must, indeed, be understood in Augustine’s argument, one of which is: ‘he who loves his brother loves the love by which he formally loves; but that love is participated love; therefore he loves participated love’. Further, the other syllogism is: ‘he who loves participated love ought to love love by essence; God is love by essence; therefore etc.’”

effective cause of man; but from the fact that he causes goodness it does follow that he is formally goodness, – and the reason is that every perfection simply that exists in the caused thing is reduced to a cause that formally possesses that perfection. It is not so with a limited perfection.²⁷

174. But what do these authorities [nn.1-3], so understood [n.173], do for the proposal of the Master [nn.165-170]?

I reply that the habit by which the soul is inclined toward meritoriously loving is a perfection simply, insofar as the ‘perfection simply’ belongs to the Holy Spirit; it follows therefore that this habit could be an immediate habit with respect to the love that is perfection simply, and hereby the Holy Spirit – as indwelling through this habit – more immediately causes that act of love than do acts of believing and hoping, with respect to which acts there cannot be any proximate cause that is perfection simply.

175. But against this response there is the following argument:

First, that the proposition on which it relies is false, namely that ‘more eminent or more perfect than any perfection non-simply in creatures is some perfection simply’ [n.172]; for it seems to have an instance against it in the case of the essence of the supreme angel, which is not a perfection simply and yet nothing more noble than it seems to exist in the whole of creation.

176. Besides, the intention and reason of Augustine seem badly adduced for the intention of the Master [n.174], because from the first reason [n.1] is had that the Holy Spirit is formally love by essence [n.171], and from the second [n.2] – if it is valid – is had that the Holy Spirit is formally charity by essence [n.172]. How then from this is it

²⁷ Tr. In this way Scotus shows and preserves the truth in Platonism that good things are good by participation in the perfect form of goodness but not that men are men by participation in some perfect form of man.

inferred that there is not in us some habitual love, or charity, different from the habit by which the Holy Spirit is said to indwell? The habit indeed by which the Holy Spirit indwells is either not a perfection simply but some limited perfection, – or, if it is, there does not fail to follow that a habit other than it could be posited as the proximate principle for eliciting my act of meritoriously loving, for that act is limited and a limited ‘perfection’; one cannot speak about the reason of Augustine otherwise for the proposal of the Master.²⁸

177. To the other argument [n.9] it is plain how charity is a good by participation from I d.8 n.213, where it was expounded how a simple form participates its own cause.

D. To the Arguments for the Opinion attributed to Peter Lombard.

178. To the arguments for the opinion imposed on the Master, namely the opinion that denies a supernatural habit bestowing grace [nn.101-112].

179. [To the arguments for the first way] – To the first [n.104] I say that the habit in question gives acceptable acting [nn.150, 129], and that it gives some activity with respect to act, as some second cause with respect to it [n.151]; but it does not give pleasurable or easy acting, which belong to an acquired habit insofar as it is distinguished from an infused habit, on account of its being acquired from repeated acting.

180. To the second [n.105] I say that although some say the will in its purely natural state cannot have any act about a supernatural object seen bare, yet this was rejected in I d.1 nn.88-89, 141-142. I concede, then, that the will could have an act about such an object whether shown bare or by an act of faith, – but the act about an object

²⁸ No response was given by Scotus to these two objections [nn.175-176].

shown by faith would not be meritorious, because it would not be according to the inclination of the habit by which alone God makes disposition to accept the act; nor even in the fatherland would it be beatitude, because it would not be as perfect as it could be possessed by such a power if the power were perfect in a way proportionate to the supernatural habit.

181. And if you object that the act about the divine essence as seen could be so perfect that it would give rest to the will, because the act would be elicited in accord with its total effort and would consequently be beatific, – which seems to be the case also because such a will would have ‘whatever it wanted and would want nothing badly’ (but this is ‘to be blessed’ according to Augustine *On the Trinity* XIII ch.5 n.8), – I reply that it would not be blessed, not only because it would not have whatever it wanted in the way it should want it (for it should want ‘to love acceptably’ and this it would not have), but also because it would not have an act as perfect as to agree with it in the grade of its nature. For no power capable of being habituated can have, without that habit, an act as perfect as it can with it [nn.40, 70, following the third way, n.32]; nay, the more perfect the power the less can it, if it lacks all habit, have an act proportional to its perfection, because, from the fact that the geometrical proportion between two unequal powers is like proportionally perfective habits, there will be therefore another proportion, arithmetical proportion – and thus a more perfect power, if it has not been habituated, will be simply more deficient than a lower and more imperfect power [III Suppl. d.27 q. un. n.19]

182. As to the remark added that ‘it has whatever it wants’, – I reply: not with as much volition as it can in an ordered way desire the object with. For it can in an ordered

way desire to have it with an act as great as would agree with it from the nature of the power and the habit proportional to it, and not merely with an act as perfect as agrees with it from its purely natural resources; now it would not have [sc. whatever it wants] in the first way but only in the second.

183. Against this [nn.181-182]:

It seems then that no will would be blessed that did not have the greatest charity it was capable of.

184. Further, as was argued in the preceding solution [n.30], by that reason by which a power in the supreme grade of the power is perfect, it is capable of the supreme act such that nothing is lacking to it from lack of the habit; therefore to a will in any grade nothing in that grade is lacking to it because of lack of the habit.

185. To the first [183] I say that it cannot in an ordered way will to have the beatific object with a greater act than corresponds with its merits; such an act is not the greatest ‘it is capable of’, although always greater than the one it could have existing in its purely natural state.

186. To the second [184] I say that an infinite will contains eminently in itself by identity every perfection or the whole perfection of the habit, and so it does not give any lesser perfection to its act on account of not being understood to be informed with the habit; but a finite power does not include by identity the habit proportional to it, and so it can in its acting fail of the proportion that agrees with it, if be not perfected with the habit.

187. To the third [n.106] I say that this act is not created, speaking of creation properly; both because there is, with respect to it, the concurrence of some active second cause, while creation belongs to the first agent alone without a second cause, – and

because there is presupposed here something that is receptive of the act (namely the will), while in creation nothing is presupposed that is susceptive of creation. When therefore it is said that ‘everything supernatural is created’ [n.106], if it be conceded of every supernatural first act, yet it should not be conceded of something supernatural that is a second act, because there is for this latter the concurrence of created power, both in idea of what is active in some way [nn.152-153] and in idea of what is receptive; and yet it can be called supernatural by reason of the form or the habit that concurs in its production, even though it be not immediately created.

188. One can in another way say [to the third, n.106] that the act is not properly supernatural the way the habit is, because although ‘the presupposed habit’ is immediately from a supernatural cause, yet it is, when posited in existence, a natural cause with respect to its act; and so the act that is produced by such a habit is not supernatural; for the form that is supernaturally produced can be as naturally related to its act as a form that is merely natural is related to its act, so that the difference in the production of the forms does not cause nor entail a distinction between them in comparison to their acts.

189. To the fourth [n.107] one can say that a will thus habituated has in its power the use of a habit of this sort; and when the will operates with equal effort, the habit cooperates equally along with it, because a habit acts, on its own part, by way of nature. However, there will not always be an equal pleasure following on the elicited act; the pleasure is, to be sure, from the object that is attained by the act and not only from the power acting about the object; but now [sc. in this present life], when the object is not present in itself but in figure, the pleasure can be caused by a limited object in diverse

ways, now more now less, although an equally intense act with equal effort be elicited about it. – As for what is said of contemplatives [n.107], it is true about the devotion, that is, about the pleasure consequent to the act; but it is not true about the elicited act of loving itself, which is sometimes more intense and sometimes more meritorious, although a lesser pleasure or almost none follow upon it, – and sometimes a lesser act, lesser both in itself and in divine acceptance, is accompanied by a greater pleasure, for attracting little ones so that they might more eagerly pursue that whose sweetness they have had advance taste of.

190. [To the arguments for the second way] – To the first argument about the second way [nn.108-109], I concede that the Holy Spirit could cause an act immediately in the will, and could accept that act – as caused by himself – as worthy of eternal life; but then that act would neither be of the will nor in its power; nor do we believe that he accepts such an act, but he makes disposition to accept an act of free choice – which act is in the will's power.

191. To the second [n.110] I say that the Holy Spirit's cooperating with fire for it to heat is not a miracle; but his cooperating with water for it to heat (provided however some causality with respect to heating could, without contradiction, be said to belong to water), this would be miraculous. Thus I say in the proposed case that the Holy Spirit's cooperating with an habituated human will for it to elicit an act in accord with the habit, that this is part of the common law by which God assists a second cause in doing its act; but his cooperating with a non-habituated will would be miraculous, provided however the will itself could operate. I say, therefore, that the Holy Spirit cooperates with a will possessed of charity; not indeed because the will possesses it such that its charity is the

prior cause, namely moving the Holy Spirit to cooperate, – but because the Holy Spirit cooperates generally with a second cause in the act to which the second cause, according to its form, is ordered, the way it is with act of love in an habituated will. – When you say, therefore, that ‘the Holy Spirit cooperates before the will has charity’ [n.110], this is false unless it be understood of priority of nature, as a superior cause is prior. The Holy Spirit, to be sure, cooperates with a will possessed of charity at the same time as the will operates, – or if it be conceded that the Holy Spirit cooperates with the will before the will have charity, it does not therefore follow that ‘he could be cooperating equally with a will not possessed of charity’ [n.110], because he does not cooperate with a will not possessed of a form for acting as he does with a will that is.

192. To the third [n.111] I say that although by the communication of properties [sc. between the two natures in the incarnate Christ] human operations are truly asserted of the Word, yet the proper acts of the Word in his divine nature were not in the power of ‘this man’ [sc. Christ] so that he could, insofar as man, merit by those acts; for Christ did not merit for us in this act, namely if the Son of God – who was in the flesh – created souls along with the Father and the Holy Spirit; and so as to the proposed case, the will will not merit if the Holy Spirit, in whatever way he is joined to it, were to cause in it an act of loving.

193. To the final argument [n.112] I say that although it cause difficulty for those who hold that the species is first act with respect to the intellect whereby the intellect is capable of second act (as hot wood heats by heat), because if this were true it would be difficult to save the proposition that the intellect ‘when not informed by any form’ would be capable of operation [I d.3 nn.456-459]; yet according to the way that I stated in

distinction 3 of this first book [d.3 nn.494-498], that ‘the object – whether in itself or in the species – is a sort of partial cause, concurring with the intellect in causing intellection’, this argument does not cause any difficulty, because the object when present in itself (the way it will be in the fatherland) suffices without any informing for causing vision, or suffices of itself alone along with the intellect.

194. And if it be argued ‘if vision can be perfect without an informing habit, then the enjoyment can be most perfect too [sc. without a habit]’, – I reply: no one commonly denies that in glory there is ‘a habit of the light of glory in the intellect’ [I d.3 n.114; III d.14 qq.102 nn.2-4, 8; IV Suppl. d.49 p.2 q.3 nn.9-10], – and this habit on the part of the intellect can be set down as corresponding to charity on the part of the will.²⁹

Appendix A

Next after this I ask whether he who possesses created charity is accepted by it formally as worthy of eternal life.³⁰

That he is not:

Because ‘to be an accepted person to God’ is nothing else than for a person to be accepted by God or for God to accept him; but nothing on the part of the creature can be the formal reason of a divine act (the proof is that nothing in a creature, or nothing

²⁹ Interpolation, see the immediately follow appendix.

³⁰ From Scotus’ *Additiones Magnae* d.17 p.1 q.2.

extrinsic, can be the formal reason of anything intrinsic in God; but the act of accepting is intrinsic to God); therefore etc.

Further, a person is accepted before charity is given him (the fact is plain, because, in the case of two existing sinners, God accepts this one for grace and not that one); but what is posterior cannot be the cause of what is prior; therefore etc.

Further, charity is not the form of an act because it is prior to the act; but an act should be accepted through something intrinsic to it; therefore not through charity.

Further, if someone were accepted, and not from some formal thing that is intrinsic but from an extrinsic one, then ‘he who possesses that extrinsic thing’ could not have a non-meritorious act, – which is false, because it is retributive justice that accepts an act as worthy of eternal life, and then an indifferent act or a venial sin would be accepted as worthy of eternal life. There must be something else, then, in addition to charity, intrinsic to an act because of which the act is accepted.

On the contrary:

A person is formally such as he is through that through which he is distinguished from others who are not such as he is; but charity “divides and distinguishes between the sons of God and the sons of perdition” according to Augustine *On the Trinity* XV ch.18 n.32; therefore it is through charity that each individual is accepted to God.

Further, the argument proceeds in the same way about act, because each individual is formally such as he is by the act by which, once it is in place and all other acts are not in place, he is such, and by which, once it is removed and all other acts are in place, he is not such; but when charity is in place an act is worthy of eternal life, and when charity is removed – anything else whatever being in place – it is not worthy, as is

plain about the state of innocence, where acts would have been most right and virtuous and yet not worthy, without charity, of eternal life. – In favor of this are the authorities of Augustine that the Master alleges in dd.27 and 28 of book II.³¹

Response:

First I put as preliminary that the will has a first object, just as the intellect does, but this object in the case of the divine will can be nothing but his essence. The fact is plain from this, that every operative power necessarily demands as a co-requisite its own first object; but no created thing whether extrinsic or finite is necessarily required for an act of the divine will or intellect; therefore the divine essence alone is the first object (for a better treatment of this argument see below, in the question ‘Whether God have some object other than himself’, [*Additiones Magnae* I d.36 q.2 n.5, 7; d.35 q.2 n.7]). His will then is its own reason for willing all other secondary objects.

Second: it then follows that the first object and nothing else is willed necessarily. Proof, for the power cannot sometimes be in act and sometimes not, but it must be always in right act, and consequently it always wills its first object necessarily (otherwise it could not be right).

Again, from this it follows that the first object is object from the nature of the thing – but other objects are not, for other objects have the fact that they are objects by act of the divine intellect.

Then to the intended proposition. Acceptance of the will can be understood to be ‘simple well wishing’, and this is necessarily of anything possible, just as also is simple intellection; another acceptance is ‘efficacious acceptance’, and this is when the will

³¹ *On the Spirit and the Letter* ch. 9 n.15; *Epist.* 194 to the priest Sixtus ch.5 n.19; *On Grace and Free Choice* ch.5 n.12; *Retractions* I ch.23 n.3; Peter Lombard *Sentences* II d.27 ch.5 n.243, ch.8 n.246, ch.11 n.249, d.28 ch.3 n.257.

wants things to exist in fact and wishes the means necessary for that result. This very thing is plain in us, because sometimes we want a good for someone, but we do not work toward it, nor do we seek out the means necessary for him to attain that good – and then the will is one of simple well wishing; but when we will and seek out the means necessary for that good to be attained by him, then the will is efficacious. And in this last way God wanted creatures to be in real fact, and devils to be punished, and the act that is the substrate of sin to exist.

But there is another sort of special acceptance, which is ‘volition ordaining to a good’ so that someone may attain a greater good, – because God wants him not only to exist but orders him to a greater good or to fulfillment of this good. And in this way he accepts only the rational creature.

I say to the question, then, that created charity is not an eliciting reason on the part of the one accepting, because that reason is intrinsic to God. It will, therefore, be in some way an objectifying reason: not first reason, as has been proved [about simple well wishing]; nor is it reason only in real fact – as in the case of intelligibles – (namely the reason that is not followed by acceptance), but it is reason as making the subject apt for acceptance. However, from this making apt one does not get that the acceptance is a matter of justice.

We can therefore consider the divine will in two ways:

In one way as practical principles are offered to it that are not necessary from their terms, as is this one ‘the just man will be finally justified’. Therefore before acceptance by the will there is aptness only, but after acceptance by the will the

proposition is then necessary and is a principle, nor can God do the contrary by his ordained power.

In a second way, there is a distinction in God between justice and judgment, because justice accords with law in its universality, but judgment accords with execution in the particular case. Before acceptance by the will, there is no justice, – but after acceptance there is justice.

I prove this by one argument and two examples.

By argument as follows: just as an intellectual habit in some way includes the object in its idea of intelligibility, so the appetitive habit in some way includes the object in its idea of lovability.

The example is this: what the center does in the case of heavy things, this God does in the case of spiritual things (for God is the center and term of spiritual things);³² for if the center of heavy things loved itself, it would love anything whatever insofar as that thing tended to the center, and, because every weighty thing tends to the center, it would love all weighty things, and not only weighty things but also motion itself and the center. – So in the proposed case. God loves himself because of himself, therefore he loves anything whatever insofar as it tends toward him; likewise, charity is the weight by which there is tendency toward God. Therefore God loves acts of love directed to himself and the weight too by which such movement of love comes to be.

Second example: according to Augustine *On the Trinity* VIII ch.6 n.9 “justice rather is beauty” (and he takes justice for charity, because in Scripture all these things are taken for the same: justice, wisdom, charity, and grace); but beauty is the reason for

³² Ps.-Hermes Trismegistus, *Philosophorum* XXIV prop.2: “God is an infinite sphere of which the center is everywhere, the circumference nowhere.”

lovability in corporeal things, and justice is beauty that makes one similar to God; so there can be a reason for lovability in the mind which God loves. Likewise, it is plain that the center is the reason for accepting something weighty and is more the reason for accepting the motion by which the thing tends to the center. – Thus in the proposed case about charity. For if charity is the reason for accepting a person, it will be more the reason for accepting an act; and so the first example is valid about an act, not the second ‘about beauty’, because many acts are pleasing on account of beauty toward which beauty is in no way ordered, – just as sometimes someone beautiful asks for something and is heard because of his beauty, and yet beauty is in no way ordered toward this; but it is not like this in the case of an act with respect to charity, because charity is not the reason for accepting any act save only that act toward which charity inclines insofar as it is charity.

To the first argument, when it is said ‘nothing else than...’ [opening argument above], this is not taken absolutely but as it is compared to act. And then, when it is said that ‘nothing created is the reason of anything intrinsic to God’, I say that this is true, not as the created thing is a first object nor as a new object, but as apprehended in eternity, whereby God accepts it aptitudinally before the will’s acceptance of the principle which is not known from its terms, and after the will’s acceptance he accepts it from justice.

To the second argument: acceptance is double, namely ‘in a certain respect’, and this is first and the way to acceptance simply; the other is acceptance ‘simply’. The first is in respect of some gift, namely grace, the second in respect of glory; the first very well precedes, but the second follows or is concomitant.

To the third I say that charity is the formal reason, not intrinsic reason but inclining reason; and on this account, not every act is meritorious, but only that act to which charity as charity inclines. And so it is plain that the same form is the principle for accepting the act and the person.

Seventeenth Distinction

Second Part

On the Manner of Increase in Charity

Question One

Whether the whole of pre-existing Charity is corrupted so that no Reality the same in Number remains in a greater and a lesser Charity

195. About increase in charity, on the supposition that charity could be increased – according to what Augustine says in his letter to Boniface [*Epist. ad Paulinum* ch.3 n.10], and it is found in Lombard II d.26 ch.2 n.231, “charity merits increase so that, when increased, it may merit to be perfected,” and according to what he says *On the Trinity* VI ch.8 n.9 “in incorporeal things to be better is the same as to be greater”³³ (for some charity is better than another because a greater essential reward corresponds to it, therefore some charity is greater than another) – I ask about the manner of increase in charity, and first whether the whole of pre-existing charity is corrupted so that no reality that is the same in number remains in a greater and a lesser charity.

³³ Interpolation: “in the case of things that are not great in mass, to be greater is to be better.”

196. And that it does I argue:

Because otherwise the form itself would increase in the subject, because while remaining the same it would be transmuted from imperfection to perfection; but form is unchanging, according to the author of *Six Principles* ch.1 n.1; therefore charity cannot be increased in this way.³⁴

197. On the contrary:

De Generatione et Corruptione 1.5.321b10-13, “the thing increased has to remain”; therefore in any increase there is no corruption of what pre-existed.³⁵

I. Opinion of Godfrey of Fontaines

A. Exposition of the Opinion

198. Here it is said that nothing of preexistent charity remains the same in number in increased charity, but the whole of what existed before is corrupted and another individual more perfect than it is generated.

199. The reason set down³⁶ for this is that the terms of motion are incompossible (*Physics* 5.3.227a7-10), therefore the terms of this motion or change – whereby charity is increased – will be incompossible terms; therefore that which is the term ‘to which’ is

³⁴ Interpolation, replacing ‘because...increased’: “Because if it were not corrupted, then the form of charity would be changed from lesser to greater; this is false, because a simple form cannot be the subject of a transmutation.”

³⁵ Interpolation, in place of ‘therefore...pre-existed’: “therefore pre-existing charity, when increased by a new degree of subsequent charity, should remain and not be corrupted.”

³⁶ Interpolation, in place of ‘nothing...reason’: “in every intensification of any form whatever, the degree of the preceding form is corrupted upon the advent of the other, subsequent form.”

simply incompossible with the term ‘from which’; therefore it does not include anything the same in number.³⁷

200. A confirmation for this reason is that just as, in the case of species, the positing of the more and less is on account of the essential ordering of species, so it seems it should in its own way be in the case of individuals of the same species; but a more perfect species (which is called a greater species) is simply a different nature from a more imperfect species, such that nothing the same in number – that is, of the inferior nature – remains in the superior, and the superior is in itself simpler than the inferior, because in the case of forms the superior is more perfect and more actual and simpler (the fact is plain in the forms of separate substances, and hence God is most simple); therefore in the case of individuals of the same species nothing of the more imperfect remains the same in number in the more perfect, because then ‘the more perfect’ would be more composite than the more imperfect.³⁸

201. A second confirmation is that it seems likewise that in a substance the more and less (if they exist there) should be posited in the same species, and also in an accident in the same species, especially in the case of an accident where there is no change in accord with it; but substance, because of its lack of change, the ‘more’ posited there is altogether another individual, not possessing in itself the ‘less’ as some part of itself but

³⁷ Interpolation, in place of ‘therefore...number’: “the degree that precedes and that which arrives *de novo* are, in the case of this change of increase in the form, terms of the change, therefore they are not together at the same time; therefore one is corrupted when the other arrives.”

³⁸ Interpolation, in place of n.200: “For this opinion [n.198] I add two reasons. The first is this: the more and less in the same species are related in the same way that the more and less in diverse species are proportionally related; but in diverse species the more that one species is more perfect than another the more perfectly it contains it and in a simpler way, such that the species contained by it does not make any addition to it; therefore since simplicity is perfection in all forms, it seems too that in the same species the simpler form is more perfect, not possessing a preceding degree or form added to it.”

being as simple as or more simple than that ‘less’; therefore the like will be posited in the case of charity, which no change accords with – the point is plain.³⁹

B. Rejection of the Opinion

202. Against this position [n.198] there is argument in six ways, one of which is taken from the presupposition of form in the case of increase in that form – and in accord with this way I argue first as follows:

[First way] – Although it is not necessary that God increase charity in the instant in which a meritorious act is elicited (by which ‘charity merits to be increased’ [n.195]), yet he can then increase it, such that the increase which someone merits is given at the same point in time as the act is elicited.

203. From this I argue: this act, which merits increase of charity, is meritorious, – therefore it presupposes charity in the instant in which it is elicited. I ask which charity? Not the new part which is acquired, because this follows the act as the reward the merit; therefore it presupposes the charity that was pre-existent, and consequently it is not corrupted in that instant, – because if so, then in that instant a meritorious act could not be elicited, in which instant however someone merits increase of charity.⁴⁰

³⁹ Interpolation, in place of n.201: “Again, more and less in accidental forms are related in a way similar to that in which they are related in substantial forms, if there be more and less in substances; but according to everyone who posits a more and less in substantial form, the more perfect substance, even in the same species, is simpler than another one, not by making addition to the less perfect but by containing it in a simple way – as is posited about the soul of Christ, which was not more composite than the soul of Peter but simpler, and yet was more perfect in essence of soul; therefore it is the same way with accidental form.”

⁴⁰ Interpolation, in place of nn.202-203: “Against this opinion [n.198] the argument goes as follows: the supposition is made that it is possible that God can increase charity in the instant in which the meritorious act is elicited, – so let it be posited in fact that he is then increasing charity. I ask then by which charity the meritorious act is elicited (because it is necessarily elicited by some charity, as was

204. But if someone impudently says that God never increases charity in the instant of time in which the act is had that is meritorious in respect of the increase but always later in duration, on the ground that God increases charity, not because of the act insofar as it is elicited, but insofar as it is in divine acceptance, and that in this way the charity remains after the instant in which the act is elicited, and that then after that instant the increase is conferred:

205. Although this response is altogether improbable if it deny that God can increase charity then [sc. in the same instant that the act is elicited] (because if he can, let his doing so be posited in fact, and the argument proceeds), nevertheless it does not in other respects escape difficulty.

First indeed because in moral and intellectual virtues virtue is increased by the elicited act, and not when the act is not, because when it is not it causes nothing; therefore then, when the act is present, is there reason for increasing the habit. Therefore if then a new individual is generated and the one that was before is corrupted, it follows that the act that is augmentative of the habit is not elicited by the habit but by the power alone, which seems discordant, because then – in accord with what was said in the preceding question [nn.69-70] – the act that is augmentative of the habit would be more imperfect than another act, elicited by the habit, that is non-augmentative of the habit.⁴¹

shown before [*Reportatio IA d.17 n.27*]); not by the newly infused charity which was increasing charity in the instant in which that charity was supporting the act, because the newly infused charity is the reward of such an act and follows that meritorious act in some order; nor is it elicited by the preceding charity, because according to you [Godfrey] it is corrupted, for in the infusion of the later charity the prior is corrupted; therefore in the instant in which charity is increased there is a meritorious act and yet it is not from any charity, which is impossible.”

⁴¹ Interpolation, in place of nn.204-205: “You will say that God does not increase charity in the instant in which the meritorious act is elicited, but the act of charity passes by and stands in divine acceptance as something rewardable, and then God – accepting the meritorious act – afterward gives increase to the pre-existing charity as a sort of reward for the act, and he does not at once in the same instant give the reward along with the merit, just as he did not give beatitude to the good angels in

206. And if it also concede the conclusion that ‘the act augmentative of the acquired habit is elicited by the power alone’ (although this seems discordant), yet it does not escape the following special difficulty, if the intelligible species is posited as being increased by the act of understanding. For that act cannot be elicited by the power alone, the species having been removed, because – as was made plain in I d.3 nn.486-498 – the intellect is not sufficient without the species for eliciting an act of understanding; therefore no intellection that is elicited from the power alone can increase the species; the intellection, then, that is augmentative of the species presupposes the species, and not the individual one that is generated – so the preexisting individual, and consequently the preexisting one is not corrupted.

207. But if it be denied that intellection increases the intelligible species, the final instance – against the proposal – is as follows:

The will can, by its own act, weaken an act of understanding, – the proof is that it can totally corrupt and remove the intellect from this act; and yet the volition that weakens intellection necessarily presupposes intellection; not some new one that follows

the first instant in which they merited it but in some later instant of nature. – On the contrary: although this could be said in the proposed case about the infused virtues, yet it could not be said about the increase of the natural virtues, moral and intellectual, and especially the moral; for moral virtue is increased by moral acts, just as it is generated from them (*Ethics* 2.1.1103b21-22); therefore the act which augments and increases moral virtue is only increasing it when it exists. Therefore I ask whether, when it increases it, it does so from some virtue or not. If from some virtue, from which virtue? Not from the preceding one, because that is corrupted – nor from the degree that it brings about, because that is posterior as effect to its cause; therefore, when it increases virtue it does so not from any virtue; but this is impossible, because then it would not be virtuous and yet it would generate virtue, which is against the Philosopher and against all understanding, because “from like acts like habits are generated” [*Ethics ibid.*]. – One could argue in the same way about an intellectual act: when the act of speculating exists the intellectual or speculative habit is increased, because when the act does not exist it does nothing; but that act is not from the preceding habit, because then there is no such habit because it is corrupted (because in the instant in which it comes to be is the habit increased, not from the preceding degree [of the habit]); nor is it from the subsequent degree, because that is subsequent; therefore such an act cannot be said in any way to cause increase, because there is no term at which the increase comes to be.”

the volition itself, as is plain; therefore some intellection that precedes volition and consequently the preexisting intellection is not corrupted by it.⁴²

208. [Second way] – The second way is from the perfection of that which is introduced by the increase.

Here the argument goes first as follows: in acts augmentative of a habit the tenth act can be more imperfect than the first, and yet by that tenth act the habit is increased to some degree to which it could not before be increased by the first or second act; this cannot be if the preexisting whole is corrupted, because the perfection of the first or second act was in itself greater than the perfection of the tenth act was in itself, and consequently the individual of whose generation the first act was capable could be more perfect than the individual of which the tenth act was capable; therefore the fact that what follows the tenth act is more perfect than what follows the first will not be because the new individual is generated by virtue of the tenth, but because something is added to the preexisting individual – generated by the preceding acts –, and thus the preexisting individual will remain.⁴³

⁴² Interpolation, in place of n.207: “Again, the will can weaken an act of understanding, because it can corrupt the act of it altogether by its own willing, by turning it away from consideration of any secondary object so that it does not determinately consider it. But every act of the will is naturally preceded by an act of the intellect. In that instant, then, in which the will weakens the act of the intellect by its own imperative act, the intellect must be in its own act; not in the preceding intense act, because that act does not remain intense when the will thus weakens it, as the position holds; nor in the weakened act, because that act naturally follows the act of the will; therefore if the weakened act is not some part of the reality of the intense act, it follows that in the instant in which the will is in its act with respect to any object, the intellect is not first naturally in act with respect to that object, and then the will is willing something unknown, – which is impossible.”

⁴³ Interpolation, in place of n.208: “Secondly I argue in this way by supposing that the second or third act could intensify the habit even though it is not more perfect or more intense than the first act, – then I argue: if the later act intensifies the habit and yet is not necessarily more intense nor more perfect than any preceding act whatever, then it does not generate a more perfect individual habit of charity, which is contrary to you [sc. Godfrey]. The proof of the consequence is that an act generating a habit cannot generate it save according to the proportion of its own virtue; so if this act, which is more imperfect than the first act, generates an individual habit of charity, and a more perfect one, this will be either in virtue of the preceding acts, and then these acts remain and are not corrupted, as

209. But if it be said that the preceding acts elicited by charity remain in divine acceptance (although not in themselves, nor in anything impressed by them), then the argument about the acquisition of intellectual and moral habits [n.208] is not solved.⁴⁴

the opinion supposes [of Godfrey], – or by its own virtue, and then the effect will be more perfect than its whole cause in virtue, which is false.”

⁴⁴ Text cancelled by Scotus: “The reasoning about natural agents [n.208] is also not solved; for posit that to something with nine degrees of heat there comes something hot in a lesser degree, then the latter can in some way intensify the former thing with its nine degrees of heat, and consequently the hot thing that will exist in the term of the action will be more perfect in heat than the agent is that comes to it and increases it; this would be impossible if it were ‘a new individual’ generated by the act of the now present hot thing. The proof of the major is that, according to the Philosopher *Physics* 8.10.266a24-b6, “a greater extensive virtue exists in a greater magnitude,” – therefore if from the beginning the virtue in the greater magnitude is close to the thing acted on by it, it will act more; but this, as far as the action is concerned, is just the same as if it was one greater continuous magnitude, or was many magnitudes all together – contiguous with each other – equal to that one magnitude; therefore a less extensive magnitude, if it is from the beginning contiguous with a greater extensive hot thing, has power for introducing a more perfect form, – therefore, if from the beginning a large hot thing acts of itself, it will not introduce as great a form as would be introduced if some small hot thing were contiguous with it; therefore the thing acted on is left potential with respect to a degree [sc. of heat] that can be introduced by that lesser hot thing if it becomes contiguous, – therefore the lesser thing, when it arrives, will reduce it to act. Response: let everything be conceded up to the final consequence; but let that consequence be denied, because a lesser thing, when it arrives, does not find the thing that is acted on to be in a contrary disposition which it could conquer but it is conquered by that disposition – therefore it will be simply acted on, and if it does any little thing to the contrary, this will be by being more intensely weakened, but eventually it will be conquered.

Nor can this be evaded by an order of degrees, to wit, that the agent can reduce the thing acted on, which was before in a different degree, to a more perfect degree than it could have reduced it to at the beginning, just as an agent can make a thing acted on, which is already organized, to be alive, and yet it cannot reduce a non-organized thing to as great a perfection as the prior one did (and this because of the order of forms in becoming, or of degrees in form, on account of which order the thing existing in a more imperfect degree can be at once reduced to a degree more perfect, – not so if it were not in that degree); this response – I say – is not valid, because if a thing hot in eight degrees intensifies a thing hot in nine degrees and this intensification is done by the heat of a weaker agent and by the generation of a new individual, then in the instant in which a thing hot in ten degrees is generated, the thing generated will exceed in perfection the heat of the generator – which is impossible; therefore increase does not happen in this way.”

This interpolation is followed by the following note of Duns Scotus: “The two reasons are against Godfrey, one that in alteration there is no continuous change (because what subject would it have?), the other that a changeable thing will be hot with many heats, because the part in a motion more remote from the mover is not as intense in form as a part close to the mover. [**] But what is set down here above under [the above interpolation] is not certain, because what is there supposed, namely that ‘the weaker thing, when it arrives, intensifies more intensely, even as to any degree at all’, is rather the other way round, and then ‘the thing that is acted on is contrary, insofar as what arrives is imperfect and is not able to conquer what is more perfect but is conquered by it, – therefore it does not act, or if it reacts in any respect, it will be more intensely weak in making it like itself; this does not seem to be an instance, save in the case of light; perhaps there something less virtuous than the first agent intensifies the effect of it, and yet it would not be capable in itself save of what is weaker in the form which it finds in the thing it acts on. What is the cause there if the hot thing does not so act?’”

210. If no agent can intensify the form, which it finds in what it acts on, to make it more perfect than the form which it could of itself cause in what it acts on, this whole second reasoning fails, because then an act never intensifies a habit save to that degree which it could of itself induce, and then it would not be apparent why it could not induce it if it was a new individual such that nothing of what preexisted would remain. But because it is manifest that a tenth act, as equally intense as the first, intensifies the habit beyond the degree induced by the first or second act, therefore the first proposition [sc. at the beginning here, n.210] seems in need of being denied.

211. But then there is a doubt whether this is so in the case of heat, namely that a weaker thing, when it arrives, intensifies the more intense heat that is found in what it acts on (it seems it does not, as here below in the line marked **⁴⁵). One can say that a univocal agent does not intensify its own more intense form that is found in what it acts on, but rather the reverse; but an equivocal agent does intensify it, because it is of a nature to act on this and not to be acted on by it, and its own form is more noble than any degree of an equivocal effect that it finds, although it not have at once of itself power for so great a degree of equivocal effect. Therefore light is intensified infinitely if infinite lights of the same species are put around a medium, each one of which would intensify the light in that medium.

212. [Third way] – The third way is taken from natural things and the action of contrary on contrary.

For a hot thing acting on a cold thing weakens the cold thing before it corrupts it completely. If in this weakening of the cold thing a new individual cold thing is generated, I ask by what is it generated? If recourse is not had to a universal agent (which recourse is

⁴⁵ A reference to the passage marked [**] in the note to n.209.

here irrational), no particular generator for this individual can be assigned, because the hot that is weakening the cold thing cannot of itself generate an individual cold thing; therefore neither is the weakened cold thing a new individual.⁴⁶

213. [Fourth way] – The fourth way is taken from the fact that the Philosopher allows for motion in the case of accidents in the same manner in which he denies it for substances [*Metaphysics* 8.3.1043b32-44a11], and consequently the more and less, as they are required in accidents, so they are not required in substances; but if there were no increase in accidents save by corruption of what preexists and by generation of what is

⁴⁶ Interpolation, in place of 212: "Third as follows: a hot thing corrupting a cold thing first weakens the cold thing; for two movements go together, intensification and increase in heat and weakening in coldness (namely the motion of intensifying heat and weakening coldness); therefore according to this opinion [sc. of Godfrey] a new individual cold thing is generated. I ask then for the term 'from which' of this motion towards coldness; it cannot be said that the greater coldness is what precedes, because this coldness is corrupted; nor is the weaker degree of cold that which follows, because then the effect would surpass its cause in entity and perfection, which is not intelligible, according to Augustine *The Literal Meaning of Genesis* 12 ch.16 n.33 and *83 Questions* q.2. – Again, everything which moves is, while it moves, partly in the term 'from which' and partly in the term 'to which' (*Physics* 6.1.231b28-232a6). If therefore the hot thing acts on the cold thing, then in the whole motion the cold thing possesses something of the term 'to which' (namely something of hot); if then in the whole motion the cold thing is not weakened before it is corrupted, the consequence is that the extreme contrary, and not a weakened contrary, exists along with some degree of its contrary, and consequently, since these forms of contrariety do not have any latitude in being contrary, extreme contraries could at the same time be true. The cold thing then is weakened. Therefore, according to this opinion [sc. of Godfrey] some supposit for cold is generated; but it is not generated from the preceding cold, because that has been corrupted; therefore it is generated from the hot, and thus the hot would generate the cold, which is impossible. – Again, fourth as follows: if the preceding form is always corrupted, the consequence is that there cannot be motion according to degree in the form of quality, because as soon as there is a departure from the term 'from which', another form is generated; therefore there will only be motion in quality according to the degree of the movable thing. But this is false, because then there would be a continuous motion whose parts were yet not joined to any common term, because the changing that joins them – I ask what is it in? Either it is in something divisible or in something indivisible; not in a part that is divisible, because no part is changed as a whole but part before part, according to this opinion [sc. of Godfrey]; therefore the motion would take place in an indivisible part, and so a point would become hot. – Again, it also follows that every heatable, while it is being heated, is heated with infinite heats; because if motion takes place precisely successively in accord with the degrees of the movable thing, since there are infinite parts in a movable thing (as in a heatable thing), at least potentially, and no part of the movable is made hot with the same degree of heat as another part, but with another heat and in another degree, – the result is that the whole will be made hot by infinite degrees of heat, which is impossible."

new – and this is how more and less can be found in substances – then the more or less would exist no more in accidents than in substances.

214. [Fifth way] – Fifth, an argument is drawn from the fact that a nature which admits of more and less in determinate degree will be a species in relation to individuals, and an inferior species to boot contained under a species of nature, and thus no species of a nature capable of being intensified or weakened – as we posit these species now – will be a most specific species.⁴⁷

The proof of the first consequence is that anything that is said of individuals *per se* and in their ‘whatness’ and is ‘*per se* one thing’ is the species of them; nature in a determinate degree – in such and such a degree – is said of individuals in their ‘whatness’ and it is ‘*per se* one thing’, because the nature in this degree belongs essentially to the things that have nature in this degree, and the degree does not add to the nature something accidental to it; so it is plain that the nature in such a degree is a species, and plain that it is less common than the species of the nature in itself; therefore it would be a species inferior in order to the species of the nature.⁴⁸

⁴⁷ Tr. Whiteness and blackness etc. are now posited to be most specific species in the genus of color, but if each of these has inferior species beneath it (sc. because each degree of whiteness or blackness is a sub-species under the species of white and black), then whiteness and blackness will be the genera of these inferior species and not most specific species themselves after all.

⁴⁸ Note by Duns Scotus: “The fifth argument needs to be solved in the case of substances, against which it draws its conclusion. The minor then is false [sc. nature in a determinate degree – in such and such a degree – is said of individuals in their ‘whatness’ and it is ‘*per se* one thing’], because of the part that reads ‘in their whatness’, because the ‘what’ abstracts from all individual conditions, from ‘more’ just as much as from ‘thisness’ (*Metaphysics* 8.3.1043b32-44a11). ‘More’ is an individual condition, not a determinate one as is ‘this’, but an indeterminate one, because there can be the same degree though not the same ‘this’; but not conversely; for there cannot be this individual without this degree. – On the contrary: in that case the degree is being understood to determine the nature rather than to determine the ‘this’, and to be doing so *per se* and at that prior stage; otherwise it is an accident and a common difference; therefore etc. Response: common, but not universal, because individual. – On the contrary: at least it is a *per se* predicate, a mean between the most specific species and the individual; likewise, some species is posited as being distinguished by degrees of the form, as animals by degrees of sensitive form and angels by degrees of intellective form. Response: a

215. [Sixth way] – Sixth and last there is the argument that if the reason adduced for the position [nn.198-199] is valid, it should work in the same way about the how much of bulk as about the how much of virtue, and so when a bulk is increased in amount nothing of it would remain the same; therefore in the case of increase in bulk properly speaking the preexisting quantity would not remain in the increased thing, which seems discordant.^a

a. [*Interpolation*] Further, the reasoning [n.199] is not valid, because then it would work universally about any increase, and so in bodily increase the term that precedes and the degree that increases would be incompossibles, which is to destroy increase.

216. Response in accord with this position is made by conceding the conclusion – that there is a new individual in the how much of bulk when something is bigger just as, when something is ‘more intensified’, there is a different individual of that intensifiable form.

217. But against this there seem to be two discordant results that follow.

The first is that if the species of wine are diluted in the Eucharist,⁴⁹ there will be a greater quantity in bulk than there was before, because greater quantity follows on dilution; if then the quantity of wine which existed before does not remain after dilution, then the blood does not remain there, because it is commonly held that the wine does not remain there except to the extent that the accidents remain that are the affections of the converted wine.

species states the ‘what’, a species in a certain degree states the ‘what of the how much in virtue’; ‘how much’ is not a [specific] difference [I d.8 n.108].”

⁴⁹ Tr. In preparing the wine for consecration a small amount of water is added to it, and this small amount of water must, to that small extent, dilute the wine.

218. The other discordance is that then it would seem that such dilution could not be by virtue of a natural agent, or that the natural agent would act without any matter or substance presupposed; for it is plain that substantial matter is not there presupposed, for there is not there an alterable substance, nor is it even presupposed that a quantity the same in number remains (for you), and yet the natural agent is able – as it seems – thus to dilute or condense those species; therefore the natural agent is able to act without presupposing anything in its action, and thus to create.

219. Response to these discordances:

To the first, that as long as accidents remain similar to affections of the wine the blood remains; and although they do not remain the same, they do nevertheless remain similar after dilution.

220. To the other the concession is made that the natural agent can act when nothing common remains under the terms; yet it does not create, because this later thing follows – in order of nature – that former thing; creation is not like this.

221. Argument is made against these responses:

Because although this numerically new quantity differs from the preexisting quantity, and a quantity of water does not differ from a quantity of wine in any other way save in number alone (because it plainly does not differ in species), the result is that because of the permanence of the accidents, the same in species, not in number, the blood does not remain under the new quantity more than it would remain under the quantity of water, if water was what was chiefly there, since this new quantity is not inclined to affect the wine – whose quantity it was before – more than to affect the water.

222. Against the other response [n.220] there seems to be discordance in an active natural virtue presupposing a subject in its action.

223. Further, I ask how one of these follows on the other? Either without the action of the agent – and this is manifestly discordant, because then the natural agent would act in vain, because without it the consequent would still follow. Therefore the consequent does not follow save by the action of the natural agent. But such an agent cannot make the effect to exist unless the material cause is presupposed; otherwise creation, or the sort of action that is repugnant to a natural agent, would not – by such consequence – be prevented.

224. Further, according to this opinion [n.220] a natural agent could be said to be the effective cause of introducing the intellective soul, because the intellective soul follows by natural order on the organization of the body; the consequence here is commonly held to be discordant.^a

a. [*Interpolation*] They reply – see elsewhere, and for the arguments contrary to it, namely in IV d.12 p.2 a.1 q.1 n.6-7, 14-17.

II. To the Question

225. In response, then, to the question [n.195], because of the reasons rejecting this opinion [sc. of Godfrey, nn.202-203, 208, 212-215] and especially the two or three first ones, I hold to the opposite conclusion, namely that the positive reality that was in the lesser charity remains the same really in the greater charity. But how this is the case will be plain in the solutions to the following questions [n.249].^a

a. [*Interpolation, in place of n.225*] I concede then the conclusion of these reasons [nn.237, 240, 243-244], and that the positive reality that was in the lesser charity remains the same really in the greater charity. [*Followed by this second interpolation*] Nor is it corrupted *per se*, save as to the existence that it had before, and it remains in the other [sc. in the greater charity] as a part in the whole; an example comes from matter *per se* or form *per se*, which are not corrupted as they exist in the whole but remain in the whole more perfectly than when they had existence *per se*; the thing is plain in the case of a how much of bulk when it is increased. – As to the reason for this opinion [nn.198-199] I say that the terms of motion *per se*, of which sort are privation and form, are incompossibles; but a weakened form and an increased form are not *per se* these sorts of terms of motion, because a weakened form is not a privation but a certain positive state. Weakened and intense forms are terms of motion not *per se* but *per accidens*, namely to the extent that a weakened form is conjoined to a *per se* term that is a privation; hence although the *per se* term ‘from which’ of motion is, as a privation, corrupted when the term ‘to which’ is reached, yet the form that *per accidens* accompanies such a term ‘from which’ need not be *per se* corrupted. A fallacy of the consequent is therefore committed, because the weakened form is a term ‘from which’ as conjoined to the privation, insofar as it is precisely a being *per se*, and this does not remain; but as it exists in another it is not conjoined to the privation but to the term ‘to which’, and thus it remains the same in number as before, but more intense and more perfect. – To the first confirmation [see note to n.200] I say that it is to the opposite effect, because the order of species is according to quiddities and essences, and so one species does not contain the essence or quiddity of another; but the order according to degrees of the same form is according to material parts, which can exist at the same time, and the form is so much the more intense and more perfect the more it exists under such several degrees of form. It exists in opposite ways, then, in this case and in that. – To the other confirmation [see note to n.201] I say that it is to the opposite effect, because in the way the Philosopher asserts the more and less in accidents he denies it in substances [*Metaphysics* 8.3.1043b-44a11]; but he does not deny in substances the more and less by way of the parts of bulk (rather he in this way concedes their existence there), therefore he denies in the

accidents the more and less in this way, namely by way of parts of bulk; now he denies in substances the more and less by way of degrees of form, so he concedes them in this way in accidents. Hence, because he lays down that substantial form is in itself indivisible, therefore he does not posit one degree of form along with another; things are the opposite way in accidents, because an accidental form is divisible by way of degrees, – therefore any degree is compatible with another degree and is perfected by it.

III. To the Arguments

226. To the argument on behalf of the opinion of Godfrey [n.199] my response is: the term ‘from which’ is *per se* a privation of the degree to be introduced.

227. But what is the positive term ‘from which’ that is necessarily required? I reply: an imperfect degree.

228. On the contrary: the imperfect degree remains in the term ‘to which’ [n.225]. – I reply: it does not remain in a distinct act, the way the term ‘from which’ was, but it remains in the whole potentially, the way a part does.

229. On the contrary: it remains the same in every absolute sense; a respect is not the idea of a term ‘from which’ or ‘to which’. There seems to be the same difficulty about water when divided and united, namely what the term is ‘from which’ and ‘to which’; for if all the water is the term ‘from which’ of the division, and if ‘this separated part and that separated part’ are the term ‘to which’, each term was before the same in number in respect of anything absolute; some other force is here involved, because the two divided waters are separately counted, – therefore when the same numerical unity of

each remains, they are always separately counted; but the same numerical unity of each remains in the whole, otherwise neither would remain the same in number, and thus there would be no continuation of the things preexisting but simply a corruption of them and generation from them of a third thing. Whoever would say that the parts in an absolute whole have the absolute existence of the whole, with respect to which the proper being of the parts is material (*Metaphysics* 5.2.1013b19-21), could say that the prior degree remains in the whole according to some absolute existence which was not there before; likewise about the water united to another water.

230. But the question still remains what the term ‘from which’ is that is incompossible with anything absolute? – No answer is assigned, so I briefly reply:

Per se the term ‘from which’ is incompossible with the term ‘to which’, – it is its privation; but the positive term ‘from which’ is not incompossible with the term ‘to which’ save by being put in the combination ‘the *per se* term from which’:⁵⁰ unless one asserts the incompossibility, that ‘this is not this’ – or that ‘the same thing is not perfected at the same time by this and this’ as they are acts in distinct act. In this way indeed the prior degree is in two ways incompossible with the term ‘to which’: because it is never it, even when it is in it, and also because it is never the distinct act of that of which the term ‘to which’ is the distinct act.

231. But of these two ways of ‘unless one asserts’ etc. [n.230] the first is not sufficient for terms of motion, because whiteness is not sweetness [sc. and these are not terms of one and the same motion]; the second cannot posit the opposition of the term ‘from which’ on account of anything absolute in it, because being a distinct act adds to the absolute degree – in the way this degree remains – nothing but an exclusion, the

⁵⁰ The sign ‘(—)’ was put here for this clause by Scotus.

exclusion of ‘being in another’ (the way a part is in the whole), and so to posit a term in this way is to posit it formally under the denial of a relation: therefore hold to the first remark, at ‘(—)’ [n.230 and footnote].

232. To the other point, about the divided water [n.229], I reply: just as a part in a whole does indeed exist, and in the act which terminates its generation (because division is not generation), yet it does not exist in a distinct act, which is an act along with exclusion of being a part; so there corresponds to it the unity that accords with the first idea of act [sc. the act that terminates its generation], and this unity remains with it in division and in union, – but according to the idea of distinct act [sc. act along with exclusion of being a part] there properly corresponds the unity that is the principle of number.

233. To the form. The first consequence [n.229] holds, speaking of unity in the second way [sc. unity as principle of number], because number is of discrete things; all the parts of a continuous thing are one in number, speaking of number strictly. – Further, the minor [sc. ‘there would be no continuation of the things preexisting but simply a corruption of them and generation from them of a third thing’] is false of numerical unity in the second way; it is true of it in the first way. Yet it does not follow that the same thing has two numerical unities; rather the same thing has, according to its absolute being, a unique and perpetual unity while it remains; but according to its exclusive being there corresponds to it a unity that is separately counted. And just as exclusive being is accidental to it, so its having a separately countable unity is accidental to it; for when its being is exclusive, its proper unity is separately countable, – when its being is not exclusive but it exists in another precisely as some part of it, then its proper unity is not

separately counted but is a part of some separately counted unity, such that, in brief, ‘to be a separately countable unity’ properly requires exclusive being, because number is of discrete things.

234. To the argument for the opposite [n.196] I say that this consequence does not hold ‘the same form remains in the imperfect and perfect individual, therefore it is changed in subject’, because it does not remain as a subject of change but it remains as a nature in individual things, to which nature any individual whatever adds something. And the reason for the failure of the consequence is because that which is the subject of one individual of the nature is also the subject of another individual of it, and because the subject is possible and changeable from individual to individual; but the form itself, just as it is not the subject of one individual, so it is not the subject of another individual, and consequently it is not changeable from one to the other.

a. [*Interpolation*] To the principal reason [see interpolation to n.196] I say that the form is not the subject of the change but is related to diverse degrees of it as a species to two individuals that possess the being of the species *de novo*; and the form is not the subject of them because, when individuals are multiplied *de novo*, the species begins now to be in one individual and now to be in another; hence there is no change of form according to those degrees, because they are not accidents superadded to the nature of the form but they are intrinsic modes, asserting a certain degree of virtual quantity of that form.

Question Two

Whether that which is Positive in the Preexisting Charity, and which remains when there is Increase of Charity, is the whole Essence of the Intensified Charity

235. Secondly I ask^a whether that which is positive in the preexisting charity, and which remains when there is increase of charity, is the whole essence of the intensified charity, such that if an intense charity without a subject were posited, it would have in itself essentially no positive reality other than that which preexisted in the mild charity.

And that the reality of the preexisting charity is in this way the whole essence and reality of the increased charity I prove thus:

Metaphysics 8.3.1043b32-44a11: “forms are like numbers,” – in this respect, that ‘just as any number, when added, changes the number, so any degree in form, when added, changes the species’; therefore nothing can be added to the essence of this sort of form while the species remains the same. But the supposition is being made that the intense form is of the same species as the mild one, and so no degree over and above the reality of the form is there added.

a. [Interpolation] The supposition that a prior charity is not corrupted when charity is increased raises a question, because of the other opinion about increase of charity [*Rep* IA d.17 n.103].

236. Further, in *Metaphysics* 10.9.1058b1-2 the Philosopher says that “formal differences change the species:” a difference of degrees in the essence of a form, if it existed, would be a formal difference.

237. Further, Porphyry says [*The Predicables* 3.3a47-48] that a formal difference does not admit of more and less: “The existence,” he says, “of each thing is one and the same, receiving neither increase nor decrease.”

238. Further, the author of the *Six Principles* [ch.1 n.1] says: “Form consists of a simple and invariable essence.”

239. Further, if any reality is added to a preexisting charity,^a then charity when increased will not be in the species, because it will include something that is accidental to the specific nature; or if it is *per se* in the species,^b it does not include anything other than what belongs to the nature of the species – and so^c the lesser charity, which does not include that degree, will not be in the species.

a. [*Interpolation*] [if any reality] exists in a charity which arrives *de novo*, different from what was in the preexisting charity...

b. [*Interpolation*] it has whatever is required for the nature of a species, and consequently...

c. [*Interpolation*] since it has one degree beyond the lesser charity, a degree pertaining *per se* and precisely to the nature of the species, it follows that...

240. On the contrary:

In that case [sc. if the reality of the preexisting charity were the whole essence of the increased charity, n.235] the charity of any of the blessed would be equal in nature of charity with the charity of Christ; and since according to Augustine *On the Trinity* VI ch.8 n.9 “in incorporeal things to be better is the same as to be greater,” the charity of any

of the blessed would be as good in itself as the charity of Christ and so each one of them would be equally blessed.^a

a. [Interpolation] [as equally blessed] as Christ, because the essential reward corresponds to the quantity of the charity, which is impossible.

I. Opinion of Others

241. [Exposition of the Opinion] – An opinion that rests on the arguments given for the first part [nn.235-239, the opinion of Godfrey] seems to say that, when one removes the form from a subject, there is not, because of the added reality, a more and a less in the form in itself; and because one must, according to the authorities, preserve there a more and less in some way, one must posit them there according to the existence of the accident in the subject itself (which indeed is to be existent in the subject's existence), and so a more-ness as to existence is attributed either to a greater disposition of the subject or to a greater removal of the opposite indisposition.

242. [Rejection of the Opinion] – Against this position I argue first as follows: contraries when extreme cannot coexist in the same thing, but they can when in mild degrees.^a But this is only because there is something in the intense degree that is not in the mild one; for if the whole reality that is in the mild degree is in the intense one, then there is no repugnance between the mild and intense degree. – But this inability to coexist, or incompossibility, is not a relation to the subject nor is it from any relation to the subject; for the incompossibility of forms in themselves is prior to the incompossibility of forms in some third thing, as in the subject that receives them (for it is because they are

incompossible in themselves that they cannot be received in the same subject, – not contrariwise). Therefore that which is the reason for their incompossibility in intense degrees is something in them that is positive in itself and not only in order to a subject.

a. [Interpolation] that is, hot and cold when extreme but not when in milder degree (the thing is plain, because when the hot or the movement of the hot or of heat are made mild, the movement of cold is made more intense, and conversely).

243. Further, the same thing cannot be produced twice, and consequently some reality cannot be acquired by some change; therefore the reality that is acquired by movement or change in intensity is not the same in positive being as that which existed before, because then that which was before would be really acquired.^a

a. [Interpolation] I make this supposition [sc. that the same thing cannot be produced twice]: again I make supposition that a real motion or change is impossible without a real term. From this I argue as follows: in the increase of charity the lesser charity is the term ‘from which’ and the greater charity is the term ‘to which’, and this is a real production; therefore it is, in accord with the second supposition, necessarily toward some real term: not to the reality that altogether preceded, because the same thing cannot be produced twice, and the preceding reality was the term of a different production; therefore to another reality.

244. Further, if the form is indivisible it gives indivisible being to the subject and does so indivisibly; for the subject is not of such a sort in form save because the form is of such a sort; therefore if the form is of such a sort in itself, there is no more-ness of

perfection to it, and the subject that accords with it will not be said to be more such in accord with it.^a

a. [Interpolation] for it is because the form is such that what has it is said to be such in accord with it. Therefore if the form is indivisible in itself, it is impossible that the subject could be more or less in accord with it; for it is contradictory that a ‘form in itself’ be indivisible and yet that the subject be divisible in accord with it.

245. Further, against these modes whereby more and less are posited in forms [n.241]. First against the mode about the disposition [sc. of the subject] to more and less:

For if there is the same disposition – that is, same in idea of being one – to more and less, and if that disposition is the form, the result is that there is more and less in some form.^a If then in some form there is a disposition to more and less but not according to the idea of being one disposition, as some want to say because^b humidity in air is a disposition to greater heat and dryness in fire is a disposition to greater heat,^c – against this I argue: one species, taken in its totality, seems to have, in what is susceptible to it, the idea of one disposition.^d Further,^e then there will not be one motion from an intense to a mild degree, nor conversely; for nothing will be moved to a mild degree save what has a disposition agreeing with the reception of that mild degree; but an intense degree does not have the disposition that agrees with a mild degree; therefore, in order for it to be moved to a mild degree, it must be moved to a disposition agreeing with a mild degree – and thus, in order for the mild degree to come to exist from the intense degree, there must first be a motion from the disposition that is to the intense degree to a disposition that is to the mild degree, and so^f there will never be one motion from an intense to a mild

degree, because they do not have the same immediate susceptive subject agreeing with each disposition.

a. [Interpolation] Again, against their mode [sc. Godfrey's] of positing more and less in the case of a form, and first against the mode about disposition of the subject, on account of which the form will be said to receive more and less; that disposition either is some form or it is not. If it is a form, and the subject is said to be more or less disposed according to it, the proposed conclusion follows, that in some form there is more and less.

b. [Interpolation] If the disposition is not a form according to which the subject is said to be more such but it is some other form, then the subject will be said to be more such according to that form because of some preceding disposition, – and then one must ask about that disposition whether it is some form or not, and so there will either be a process to infinity in dispositions or a more and less in some form in itself must be granted. Again, there must first be a disposed subject before it may be moved to the term of the motion, because nothing is moved to anything save what is disposed to receiving that thing; since therefore in every motion, in the term of it, something is acquired that was not there before at the beginning of the motion, the consequence is that something is acquired in the term of the motion other than the sole idea of disposition. – He says [sc. Godfrey] that more and less are in diverse subjects because of diverse dispositions, not dispositions of the same idea but of contrary idea, just as fire is said to be more hot than air, because...

c. [Interpolation] and therefore that more-ness is not in any single disposition.

d. [Interpolation] hence all individuals of one disposition of accident have a disposition of one idea just as they also have a form of the same idea; therefore, when everything else is taken away that is not the proper disposition, there can be more and less in individuals of the same species and so an intensity and a mildness in the form of that species without any such contrary or opposite

dispositions preceding them in the subjects. Then the question is asked, as before, why something is more disposed now than it was before, as was argued [in interpolations a. and b. just above].

e. [Interpolation] if such opposed dispositions precede, to more and to less...

f. [Interpolation] and so, in order for the intense degree to become mild, there must first be a movement from the disposition that is in the intense degree to a disposition agreeing with the mild degree before the mild degree may come to be from the intense degree, and conversely, – which is impossible, because then...

246. The other way, which speaks of disposition or of removal of the contrary indisposing factor [n.241], seems to be refuted by the fact that in angels in the state of innocence there was not a greater or lesser disposition toward charity; therefore all would have received an equal charity, which is not what is maintained.^a

a. [Interpolation] Again, the good angels did not in meriting have any indisposition, and yet they did not have equal charity; hence this does not follow, that ‘any angel in the same species is equally disposed to grace, therefore any angel has grace equally’.

247. Also a third way – which is held by some people – about ‘the rooting down of the form in the subject’ seems to be refuted by the fact that this rooting down is either some absolute form (and the proposed conclusion is obtained, because in such a form there is a more and a less), or not. If not but there is only a respect, then it seems they cannot have a more and a less save by a more and a less in the foundation, just as absolutes do not agree in respect save in their foundation.

248. Then too a more intense form is not properly saved,^a because when a form is less rooted in a subject it can in itself be more intense; just as redness from shame can be more intense than a redness that is a quality able to be received in another.

- a. [Interpolation] Again, this mode does not save the fact that one form is more intense than another.

II. Scotus' own Response to the Question

249. As to this question [n.235] I concede – especially because of the first three reasons adduced against this opinion [of Godfrey, nn.242-244] – that the positive reality which preexists in the lesser charity is not the whole positive reality which exists in the greater charity. Rather, if there existed a greater and a lesser charity separated from a subject, the greater charity would have in itself the positive reality of the lesser charity and another reality in addition; if *per impossibile* all relation to a subject were taken away (as with a quantity of bulk, if it were posited as separate from a subject), even if *per impossibile* it did not have an inclination to a subject, nevertheless one charity would be greater than the other and it would have in itself the whole of the positive reality of the lesser charity and something in addition.

III. To the Principal Arguments

250. To the arguments for the opposite [nn.235-239].

To the first – about numbers [n.235] – I say that it proceeds from a failure in understanding the Philosopher. The Philosopher is there in fact comparing quiddities to numbers, to the extent they are definable, in the way Plato used to speak of quiddities, by positing them as separate [Scotus, *Commentary on Aristotle's Metaphysics* VIII ch.4 n.22]; substances taken in this way, the quiddities of things, are indeed compared to numbers according to the four properties [*ibid.* nn.22-25] – one of which is this, that ‘anything added changes the species’; and I understand it thus, that the addition makes another species from the species, or that it makes a species from a non-species. For any difference, when added to the definition, either indicates the quiddity, or it constitutes a species other than the preexisting one, or if the preexisting one was of the nature of a genus it determines it to the nature of a species, which is something that was not had before the addition of the difference.^a

a. [Interpolation] An example about the intellective soul, when it is added as the difference to the sensitive soul.

251. I say, then, that an addition to the quiddity, when the quiddity is taken according to the idea of quiddity, alters the species in the second of the ways stated [sc. making a species from a species]. But what is not added to a quiddity as it is a quiddity does not change the species; now any individual degree, just as also an individual difference that contracts a thing to being a ‘this’, whether it is an individual unity or an individual plurality, and in short any individual condition whatever added to a specific nature, is not added to it as to its quidditative idea such that it determine it according to that idea, and for this reason it does not change the species of the quiddity to which it is

added; for it cannot change what preexists into another species, nor can it change it from a non-species into a species, unless what is added is of the idea of a species, – and no individual condition is of this sort.

252. Next, as to the form of the authority [n.235], I say that if something that was a quidditative part were added to a preexisting quiddity it would change the species, just as if something that was a part of number were added to a preexisting number the species of the number would be changed; but if something be added that is not of a nature to be a part of number (to wit, some accident) or is a material part of number (to wit, if one of the units in a triple were made more intense than before [e.g. made more white]), then the species would not in itself be changed.^a So in the proposed case: any individual difference (or degree) that is added to a quiddity is not of the nature to be a part of the quiddity.

a. [*Interpolation*] but in some individual degree.

253. By the same fact [n.252] the response is plain as regard Porphyry [n.237], that he likewise is speaking of difference insofar as it is a *per se* part of definition. Difference in this way consists in something indivisible, that is, taking it according to the indifference according to which it is abstracted from individuals, which indifference – in its totality – is its degree as it is a specific difference; for thus it does not receive the more and less, because ‘all cases of more and less’ can belong to individuals in this way and these cases are all within this indifference of the difference and do not, in accord with this indifference, add anything to the difference.

254. To the passage from the *Metaphysics* 10 [n.236] the same response can be made, by calling formal difference ‘quidditative difference’.

255. One can also reply – as to the form – that not every difference of forms is a formal difference, speaking properly of formal difference, namely insofar as formal difference is a difference according to forms, just as not every difference in men is a difference in the form of humanity. A reason in reality and in logic is assigned for this. In reality as follows: men can possess the form of humanity and be different, though not by humanity – and so they do not differ in humanity; thus pure forms can differ and yet not be different by formality, and so not be formally different, because to differ formally – properly speaking – is the same as to differ in form or according to form.^a In logic as follows: because the term of a difference is understood through the negation that is included in the difference, therefore it can be taken confusedly or distributively with respect to that negation; so too, that which is denominated as being the idea of the difference (of which sort is what is construed along with the verb ‘differ’, as that in which or according to which the denomination is made) could be confounded by the negation. But, as it is, the negation of the superior does not follow on the negation of the inferior, but there is denial of the antecedent and a fallacy of the consequent.⁵¹

⁵¹ Vatican editors: “by saying, ‘there is a difference or a non-identity between men, therefore there is a difference or a non-identity between them in the form of humanity or according to the form of humanity’; or, in other words, ‘this man differs from that man or is not that man, therefore they are different or not the same in the form of humanity or according to the form of humanity’. Tr. the denial of a logically inferior difference (e.g. an individual difference that distinguishes this man from that) is not followed by the denial of a logically superior difference (e.g. a specific difference that distinguishes this species, man, from that species, horse). Or, to put it in logical form: while the conditional statement ‘if they are the same individual then they are the same species’ is true, one commits the fallacy of the consequent if one argues from the denial of the antecedent (the denial of the inferior difference) to a denial of the consequent (the denial of a superior difference), as in ‘but they are not the same individual, therefore they are not the same species’.

a. [Interpolation] I also say as to the reality that things can differ in species between themselves and yet not cause such a difference in a third thing, – just as white and black differ in species and yet white Socrates and black Plato do not differ in species; so although the individual differences are diverse primarily, yet they do not vary the essence, because they are accidents of the essence and material with respect to it, – and the same as to masculine and feminine, and also as to degrees with respect to the form in itself, which form does not, according to its existence, determine for itself a determinate degree.

256. To the other authority from the *Six Principles* [n.238]: its conclusion is to be conceded in the way it proves the simplicity of the form. But it proves a simplicity opposite to quantity of bulk, because when a form is added it does not make a greater in bulk (for a form when placed in a subject is not something more than it was before). So let a simplicity of form opposite to quantity of bulk be conceded – but this is nothing against an intensity in amount, which is what pertains to the proposed case.

257. To the reason [n.239] I say that as to the remark ‘something that is accidental to the nature of the species’, it can be understood in two ways: in one way like this, that it is outside the quidditative idea of the species, in the way a difference is said to be accidental to the genus – and in this way an accident is taken in the fallacy of accident for something extraneous that is outside the idea of another thing; in another way an accident is said to be what does not make a ‘*per se* unity’ together with that of which it is an accident, as white together with body. In the first way I say that an intense whiteness has something which is accidental to the nature of the species (so also does a mild whiteness, nay any individual has something that is accidental to the nature of the species – otherwise the nature of the species would not be contracted to individuals); in the second way I say that an intense whiteness does not have something that is accidental to the

nature of the species, because the degree which is understood to be added to the nature in itself makes a '*per se* unity' with the nature, just as any individual difference added to the nature makes a '*per se* unity' with the nature. When therefore you say 'if the intense thing includes something which is accidental to the nature of the species, then the mild thing, which does not include it, is not in the species' [n.239], the consequence is not valid speaking of accident taken in the first, but the antecedent is true in this first way – and not in the other way.^a

a. [*Interpolation*] So the inference 'therefore such a degree is not in the species' is not valid, but the inference should be 'therefore such a degree is not the species'; so it exists in the species as contained under it. Nor does this inference follow, 'therefore the other degree will not be in the species'; for this does not follow, 'it does not have whatever pertains to the species, therefore it is not in the species'. – Or one can say that 'something pertains to the species' is taken in two ways, either as to quiddity or as to subject. Quidditative parts belong *per se* to the understanding of the species, though not to the understanding of the subject but are as it were remote parts of it; so things are in the proposed case: no formal degree belongs to the species as a part *per se* and essential to the species (because the species can be understood without any degree), but it does very well pertain to the species as being contained under the species.

[N.B. A large blank space was left here by Scotus, both for a further question within distinction 17 and for distinction 18, but neither the further question nor the further distinction are contained in the text of the Ordinatio. They have to be supplied from the Reportatio or the Additiones Magnae.]

[Eighteenth Distinction

About Gift and Holy Spirit as Gift

Lacking in the *Ordinatio*]

Nineteenth Distinction

Question One

Whether the Divine Persons are Equal in Magnitude

1. About the nineteenth distinction I ask first whether the persons are equal in magnitude.

That they are not:

Because in the *Categories* 6.6a26-27 is said that “it is proper to quantity that according to it a thing is said to be equal or unequal;” but quantity is not in God, according to Augustine *On the Trinity* V ch.1 n.2, “God is great without quantity, good without quality;” therefore etc.

2. Again, nothing is to be posited in God which asserts imperfection. Equality is of this sort, – the proof is that it is repugnant to perfection in creatures; the thing is plain

from Augustine 83 *Questions* q.41: “If all things were equal,” he says, “they would not now be ‘all things’;” therefore the perfection of the universe could not stand along with equality; equality, therefore, is not in everything better than its opposite, therefore it is not a perfection simply [I d.8 nn.22, 185]. Therefore it should not be posited in God as an essential feature or as common to the three persons.

3. Again, perfect equality is mutual; this [sc. equality in God] is not mutual, according to Augustine *On the Trinity* VI ch.10 n.11: “An image, if it is perfect, is coequal with what it is the image of, but not the latter with the image.”

4. The opposite is found in the Creed of Athanasius: “The persons are coeternal with each other and coequal,” – and the Master in the text gives a special proof of this from Augustine [rather Fulgentius] *On the Faith to Peter* ch.1 n.4.

I. To the Question

5. Here one must look first at equality properly taken, second at equality taken generally, and third at how there is equality in the proposed case [sc. the divine persons], and fourth one must show that in this way [sc. of taking equality] there is perfect equality in the divine persons.

A. About Equality Taken Properly

6. On the first point the Philosopher, *Metaphysics* 5.15.1021a8-12 ‘On Relation’, distinguishes three relations founded on unity or ‘one’, namely the same, the like, and the

equal – and speaking of these strictly and properly he appropriates them to three categories, as identity to substance, equality to quantity, and likeness to quality. And thus perhaps other relations can be founded on the principles of other categories, as proportionality on relation, – and this is what Avicenna seems to say [*Metaphysics* III ch.10 83rb], at least about the three common relations that the Philosopher expressly posits.

7. However, I say that the remote foundation of these relations is the thing in the category, as that the foundation of equality is the thing in the category of quantity, and of likeness the thing in the category of quality, and of identity the thing in the category of substance; but the proximate foundation or the proximate idea of the foundation is the unity of such thing, because disparate and not common relations are founded on things in categories in the way those things are diverse.

B. On Equality Taken Generally

8. On the second point [n.5] I say that any being in itself is a ‘what’, and has in itself some determinate degree among beings, and is a form or has a form; and accordingly, just as any being can be considered in these three ways, so also there can be founded on it a triple relation taken commonly; because identity [and diversity] are founded on any being insofar as it is a ‘what’, equality and inequality are founded on any being insofar as it has some magnitude of perfection (which is called ‘quantity of virtue’, about which Augustine says in *On the Trinity* VI ch.8 n.9 that “in things that are not great in bulk, to be better is the same as to be greater”), while likeness and unlikeness can be

founded on any being insofar as it is ‘of a certain sort’ and is a certain quality (about this mode of quality the Philosopher says in *Metaphysics* 5.14.1020a33 ‘On Quality’, that “one mode of quality is difference in substance,” that is, substantial difference, and in this way individuals of the same species are essentially alike insofar as they have the same specific difference, which is as it were their essential quality).

9. In this way, namely taking the common relations and not the relations in the strict sense, the Philosopher says in *Metaphysics* 10.3.1054b25 that “any being compared with any being is the same or diverse;” so too any being compared with any being is equal or unequal. Just as then the foundation of identity, equality, and likeness – taken in this common way – is being in general compared with any being in general, so also the relations are transcendental along with being (though not convertible with it), but they are disjuncts and divide being, as being is divided into necessary and possible.

C. How there is Equality in the Proposed Case

10. On the third point [n.5] I say that just as no genus nor anything of any genus is said formally of God, so neither is a property of any genus so said of him, and consequently not any of the common relations either, in the way they are taken strictly, namely as they are properties of determinate genera or categories [n.6]; but because being is said formally of God, and any property convertible with being, and so always also the nobler extreme of non-convertible – but disjunct – properties, therefore in this way will that extreme be said of God that either asserts nobility or is not repugnant to nobility, while the other extreme is repugnant.

D. About Equality in the Divine Persons

11. On the fourth point [n.5] (setting aside for the present identity and likeness, which are not now in question [I d.31 q. un]), I say about equality that it exists perfectly in the divine persons.

12. And although equality in the case of some created beings can be taken according to quantity, whether continuous or discrete, and according to permanent and successive continuity, and although on this basis one could ask ‘whether there is in the divine persons equality in number’ (if perfect number were to exist there) and ‘whether there is perfect equality there in duration and according to eternity’ (which corresponds to successive quantity in creatures) – the first [sc. discrete quantity, or number], however, does not pertain to the present Distinction but to Distinction 24 (nor does the Master touch on anything about this here in the present Distinction, because he does not posit number here positively in the way perhaps it will be touched on in Distinction 24); but the Master does in a way touch on the second [sc. duration] (and he adduces Augustine [or rather Fulgentius] *On the Faith to Peter* [n.4], and the thing was proved in Distinction 9 nn.6-11). The question is about the third [sc. continuous quantity], namely about equality in magnitude.

13. And that the equality is perfect is proved both from the remote foundation, namely magnitude, – and from the proximate idea of the foundation, namely unity [n.7].

The first proof is plain from the fact that magnitude of virtue is not perfect unless it is infinite; because infinity is not repugnant to it [sc. to magnitude of virtue], and

nothing ‘which infinity is not repugnant to’ is perfect unless it is infinite; but every other magnitude of virtue is finite, and only it is infinite, as was made plain in I d.2 nn.131-136.

14. As to the second proof [n.13], the proposed conclusion is proved from the fact that in all other natural equalities the unity of the magnitude, in respect of which they are said to be equal, is diminished – because the magnitude in those equal things is separately counted; here however [sc. in the divine persons] there is perfect unity of magnitude and yet, along with it, a sufficient distinction between the related persons as is required for real relation.

15. But there is here a doubt because, since magnitude passes over into the essence, a relation founded on magnitude does not seem to be different from a relation founded on essence the way essence is a ‘what’, and so the equality does not seem to differ from the identity, – or if equality could be attended to in things that seem to be quasi-properties of the essence [sc. the attributes: power, wisdom, goodness etc.], this is not attended to in them save insofar as they have magnitude of virtue; but this magnitude is not an attribute different from such perfection as asserts a mode intrinsic to the attribute (as was said often above [I d.8 nn.192, 220-221; d.10 n.30; d.13 nn.72, 80]); therefore if likeness ‘in accord with such a property’ [sc. one or other attribute] is equality in the magnitude of the property, equality would not differ from likeness in the property – and thus it seems that equality insofar as it is equality should not here [sc. in the divine persons] be posited, because it exists neither as distinct from identity, speaking of the equality of essence, nor as distinct from likeness, speaking of the equality that is in magnitude of attributal perfections.

16. There is also another doubt because, if there can be infinite attributal perfections, infinite equalities of divine persons should be posited; for each perfection has its magnitude as a mode intrinsic to itself in accord with its own proper nature; therefore there will be as many magnitudes and equalities as there are attributal perfections.^a

a. [Interpolation] And further, since magnitude in divine reality is of itself of one idea, the consequence is that something of one idea in divine reality is not itself a this, and then the reason is not valid that was given above [*Reportatio IA d.19 n.28*] as to why there cannot be several supposita of the same idea in divine reality, namely that each of them is of itself a this and each production is of itself a this; but the opposite hereof seems to be true in the case of magnitude and equality in divine reality.

17. In response to these doubts.^a To the first I reply – see the response etc. [I d.31 q. un. nn.6-7].

a. [Interpolation] [I reply] that magnitude in divine reality does not state an attribute distinct from the others (as was said above about infinity [see reference in n.15 above]) but a degree that is intrinsic to any one of them, because there is no attribute in divine reality so simple that one may not ask about the quantity of its virtue; for if there were only one attribute in divine reality, as wisdom for example, it would still be possible to ask, as to its degree of virtue, how great it was; hence if each [sc. perfection simply, such as wisdom] existed without any other, each would still have a certain degree in its quantity of virtue, and each would be infinite and would have a magnitude formally infinite. And therefore magnitude is not in divine reality a single foundation merely of equality but is a single indifferent foundation, because it is preserved and included in every perfection simply, each of which perfections can be the foundation of equality, because each has its own magnitude; hence if in divine reality there are infinite ‘perfections simply’ there will

also be infinite magnitudes, and likewise infinite equalities corresponding to them. But on the essence as it is a quiddity there is founded identity, – and as it asserts an infinite magnitude for the quantity of virtue, there is founded on it an equality between the persons that possess that essence.

– But is equality distinguished in divine reality from likeness and identity? I reply that it both is so and is not so. For equality is not distinguished from likeness and identity as much as likeness and identity are distinguished from each other, because neither is its foundation (i.e. magnitude) distinguished from their foundations as much as their foundations are distinguished from each other, because magnitude – on which equality is founded – only asserts a mode or degree intrinsic to the foundations of identity and likeness, and is not distinguished from them formally as a ‘what’ or a ‘some sort of’ in the way they are distinguished from each other. Hence equality does not seem to assert in divine reality a different relation simply from likeness and identity, but it asserts only a perfect mode of each relation; a clarification can be given of the point: for if there are two white things one of which is whiter than the other, they are indeed alike although not equal – but they are not perfectly alike unless they be equal in whiteness, such that equality does not assert quasi-simply a relation other than their likeness, but asserts a perfection of likeness in each of the extremes and one that is in accord with a perfect mode of existence of the foundation in respect of which there is a likeness in each. So, if in the Father – according to the error of Arius – there were a greater deity and in the Son a lesser deity, the Son would indeed be like the Father; but he would not be equal with the Father because he would not have the form of deity as perfectly as the Father has it. Positing however – as we from the Faith posit – that nothing is less there in deity than anything else, the Son is perfectly alike, because they [sc. Father and Son] are altogether and perfectly equal in foundation of likeness. Hence, just as magnitude only states a perfect mode intrinsic to any essential perfection in divine reality, as with the essential perfections that are the foundations of identity and likeness, so equality states a perfect mode of these foundations and thus it does not state simply a relation different from them.

To the second doubt [see the interpolation to n.16] one can reply in two ways. In one way as follows, that nothing of one idea can be multiplied unless it first require several things of another idea, through whose plurality the things of one idea are determined to their own plurality;

but this does not hold of the divine persons, as is plain in the same place [*Rep.* IA d.19 n.29]; but in the proposed case equality requires a distinction of persons and of perfections simply, each of which has its own magnitude and all of them are distinct formally and in idea (the point is plain about justice and wisdom, which are of a different idea). One can say in another way, and equally well, that although unity goes along with the foundation of equality, yet it is not so remote a foundation of equality that by its diversity the equality is not multiplied, – which fact is plain in the relation of likeness: for just as knowledge is distinguished from charity, so is the likeness which is founded on unity in knowledge distinguished [sc. from the likeness which is founded on unity in charity]. But nevertheless one must say, as to the proposed case, that those equalities, founded on the magnitudes of diverse perfections, are not of the same idea formally, but of different ideas; and therefore, just as magnitude in wisdom is of a different idea from magnitude in goodness and the unity different from the unity, so the equality is of a different idea in the one case and in the other – and then one does not have to concede that something of the same idea is multiplied in divine reality.

II. To the Principal Arguments

18. To the first principal argument [n.1] I say that there is not there [sc. in divine reality] a quantity of bulk but of virtue; and if the name of quantity is made proper to magnitude of bulk (but if magnitude is not made proper to magnitude of bulk), then one could concede that there is magnitude there without quantity; and this magnitude is truly the foundation of transcendent equality, because every being is in this way great or small, and equal or unequal, although the magnitude is not a foundation of equality as equality is a property of quantity, which is a category.

19. But against this an argument is made that it does not seem anything can be said of God unless what belongs to the understanding of that thing is said of him;

therefore, since quantity belongs to the understanding of magnitude, then magnitude cannot be conceded of God and quantity denied of him.

20. Again, when asking how great God is, one may well reply that he is immense; but if there is no quantity in God, no such question would arise.

21. Again, a property common to every being does not belong to any being by a specific difference; equality is a property common to every kind of quantity; therefore it does not belong to anything by any specific difference in the category of quantity, – and thus one cannot posit in God any difference in the category of quantity by saying that the category of quantity is not there but that there is there, by a difference in quantity, the idea of equality.

22. To the first [n.19] I reply that magnitude is equivocal according as it is a species of quantity distinct from multitude (*Metaphysics* 5.13.1020a7-10) and according as it is opposed to smallness and as its concrete from – that is, ‘great’ – is opposed to small (this distinction is sufficiently got from the Philosopher *Metaphysics* 10.6.1056b3-14 in the likeness ‘about long and short, great and small, many and one’). In the first sense magnitude is not applied to God, nor its difference as something belonging to him, as is plain from I d.8 nn.124, 136, because then the genus included in it would be applied to him; nor is magnitude in the second sense applied to him, in the way ‘great’ is taken properly and states a property of quantity, because a property proper to a thing does not exist without its proper subject. But magnitude taken in another sense is a property of being, and it is distinct from small, and in this way one or other extreme exists in every being; this is plain from the Philosopher in *Metaphysics* 5.13 1020a23-26, in the chapter on quantity: “But great and small, greater and smaller, are said absolutely and in relation

to another; absolutely indeed they are properties of quantity; these names are also applied to other things" (as if he were to say: 'properly taken' they state properties of quantity, 'commonly taken' they state common properties of being).

23. As to the other [n.20] – how great God is – a rational question should be denied if quantity is denied of God; but if a rational question is conceded then a quantity of virtue should be conceded in God, not a quantity of bulk.

24. The third argument [n.21] only concludes that equality as it is a property in the category of quantity does not belong to God by any difference in the category of quantity, and that it is not applied to divine reality; and I concede that no difference in the category of quantity belongs to God; nor does any property in that genus belong to him, but a transcendent property does so belong.

25. To the next [sc. principal argument, n.2] I say that perfection simply, that is, a perfection that could formally be infinite, only asserts that in divine reality which can be essential to it and self-referred (and such is what is in some way pre-understood in the relations of origin), of which sort are wisdom and goodness etc. But equality is not pre-understood in the relations of origin, nor can it be self-referred; for the Father is not equal to himself but to the Son, and therefore equality in this way does not state a perfection simply; yet it does state a perfection which, in the case of every nature – when comparing it to something of the same nature –, is better than its opposite, because its opposite of necessity states imperfection; for no inequality in the same nature exists unless a second individual has the nature imperfectly. From the fact, then, that a relation can exist between supposita in that nature, an inequality of imperfection might exist in them because it might posit a diminished perfection in one of them; but equality of

imperfection does not exist there, nay rather equality first requires perfection simply, because it first requires a nature that is perfect and that exists perfectly in each of the terms of the relation. And this is what Augustine says in his book *On the Quantity of the Soul* ch.9 n.15 when he speaks to the disciple: “Equality,” he says, “you rightly put before inequality, nor do I reckon there is anyone endowed with human sense to whom this would not be apparent.” This is indeed true, when making comparisons with things in the same nature; and things with which equality is compossible are simply more able to be perfect than things with which equality is not compossible, because in the latter case one or other of them is imperfect.

26. Next, as to the proof about perfection in creatures [n.2], – I reply that some things are necessary for perfection in creatures that do not state a perfection simply; and this is because creatures – being of themselves imperfect – cannot without these things have perfect perfection (as much perfection as they can have and of the sort they can have), and therefore these things in some way make up for the imperfection of creatures, as was said above in I d.7 n.64 where it was denied that the specific difference of anything was a perfection simply. Thus I say that limited perfection cannot be as great in one limited nature as it can be in several natures that are ordered; and so there an order of nature, that is an order of unequal perfection, is necessary for the greatest perfection they are capable of, – but it is not simply necessary for the greatest perfection, because that can exist in the most perfect unlimited nature, without an order of imperfection.

27. And if you argue that order belongs to perfection and that order seems to require inequality, – I make reply: I say that an order of origin stands along with perfection but that an order of inequality does not stand along with perfection. Therefore

not every order belongs to perfection, but some order stands along with perfection in the same nature and some order does not.

28. To the third [principal argument, n.3] I say that sometimes equivalent opposite relations are founded on a common relation, just as if one were to speak of ‘the assimilating and the assimilated’. These state a relation of the active to the passive, founded on this common relation of ‘likeness’; for the assimilating is what causes likeness as the whiten-ing is what causes whiteness, and the assimilated is what is caused as to likeness just as the whitened is what is caused as to whiteness. There is here, then, a relation of active to passive in the assimilating and the assimilated, just as in the whiten-ing and the whitened; but, in the case of the whiten-ing, that on which the relation of the active is founded is something absolute, but here – namely in the case of the assimilating – that on which the relation of the active is founded is the relation of equivalence. And such a name imports two relations of the following sort: one common and one of non-equivalence. As to the common relation, it exists in mutuality with the correlative of the relation; but it does not exist in mutuality with the correlative according to a relation of non-equivalence. – So also here, to be made co-equal imports the relation of the co-equal with the co-equaling, and so the equality is mutual; for the Son, who is made co-equal with the Father, is equal with the Father and conversely. But the other relation, by way of what is passive, namely ‘to receive equality from another’, is not mutual but belongs precisely to the Son, and the opposite relation of non-equivalence – namely to make co-equal – belongs to the Father, that is ‘to give equality to the Son’. The image then [i.e. the Son] is equal, and conversely, but only the image is made co-equal in the sense of the two aforesaid relations.

Question Two

Whether each Person is in the other Person

29. Second I ask about the circumincession of the divine persons, whether each person is in the other.

And argument to the negative is:

That if anything whatever were in anything whatever (according to the position adopted by Anaxagoras) there would be the greatest confusion; therefore if the divine persons were in each other they would be in confusion – against this is the remark of Athanasius [*Athanasian Creed*] “not confusing the persons.”

30. There is also a confirmation of the argument, because an indivisible is not distinguished from an indivisible unless it is outside it, – which is proved by the Philosopher *Physics* 6.1.231b3-4 through the fact they would be one indivisible; therefore since the divine persons are indivisible, they would, if they were together, not be distinct.

31. Further, if any distinction stand along with the ‘being of person in person’, then composition would stand along with it also. Proof of the consequence: if there were something in deity that were not deity itself, then deity would be composite or compositional, – which is plain from Augustine *City of God* XI ch.10 n.1 (and it is put by Lombard in *Sent. I d.8 ch.8 n.89*): “Therefore God is simple because he is what he has, excepting that person is said relatively to another person and is not that person;” therefore

if the person has something in itself which is not itself, it is composite or compositional, which is false and was refuted before [I d.2 nn.376-410, d.8 n.209].

32. Again, in the same thing in which there is the Son there is also filiation; in the Father there is the Son (on the supposition of circumcession); therefore in the Father there is filiation. And further, what there is filiation in that is the Son; therefore the Father is the Son.

33. Further, if the Father is in the Son and the Son in the Father, then the Father is in himself. The proof of the consequence is from the Philosopher *Physics* 4.2.209a33-35: “If air is in fire and fire is in the heaven, then air is in the heaven,” therefore by similarity here too. There is also a confirmation from the Philosopher’s remark in *Categories* 3.1b10-12: “whatever follows on the predicate follows on the subject,” and by the maxims [from Walter Burleigh and Nicholas Ambianensis] “whatever follows on the consequent follows on the antecedent” and “whatever antecedes the antecedent antecedes the consequent” and “what is prior to what is prior is prior to what is posterior” and “what is cause of the cause is cause of the caused” and the like.

34. Again, if the Father is in the Son, then God is in God; and then, further, God is distinct from God.

35. Again, what comes from something is not in that thing; but the Son came from the Father (as is said in *John* 16 v.28: “I came from the Father”); therefore etc.

36. To the opposite:

John 14 vv.10-11: “I am in the Father and the Father is in me,” – and the Master adduces authorities in the text, namely from Augustine and Ambrose and Hilary.

I. To the Question

37. The truth of this question [sc. circumincection, that one person is in another and conversely] is plain and certain from the authority of the Savior in *John* and in many places elsewhere, as well as of expositions of the saints [n.36]. But so that it can be in some way made intelligible, three things need to be seen: first about the mode in which person is in person, second what is the reason for this being in, and third whether this mode of being ‘in’ can be reduced to some mode of being ‘in’ found in creatures when speaking of the modes that the Philosopher lays down in *Physics* 4.3.210a14-24, or whether it could be made clear by some mode that could be found in creatures.

A. About the Mode in which a Person is in a Person

1. The Opinion of Henry of Ghent

38. [Exposition of the Opinion] – About the first point [n.37] the statement [sc. of Henry] is of the following sort, that something’s being in another can be understood in two ways: by being in it ‘first’, that is, totally – the way wine is in a jug; or by being in it partially, and this in two ways: either such that a part is in another and is not anything of the other, as the foot of the bird is in the trap and is not anything of the trap (and for this reason the whole bird is said to be in the trap), or that a part of it is in another and is something of that other (and for this reason that of which it is a part is said to be in that other).^a

a. [Interpolation] just as if some monster, possessing two bodies and two heads, had only two feet, then one [body and head] would be said to be in the other [body and head] by that other's foot, because the foot is a part of the other.

39. As to the proposition then [n.37], the statement [of Henry] is that the Father is not in the Son in the first way.

40. The proof given is threefold:

First, because everything whatever of that which is in another in the first way is equally first in it – just as if earth is first in the center, then any part whatever of earth, as far as concerns itself, is equally first in the center; therefore if the Father is first in the Son, everything whatever of the Father will be first in the Son, and so paternity will be as equally first in the Son as deity. And from this further: just as by deity the Son is God, so by paternity he will be Father, which is false

41. Second, because that in which something is first seems to surround it and penetrate and contain it; but that the same thing with respect to the same thing contains and is contained, surrounds and is surrounded, is unintelligible; therefore etc.

42. Therefore it is necessary that, just as in creatures something is said to be in another as a part and not first, so one person may be said to be in another as to something of itself; but not as to something of itself that is nothing of that in which it is, because that would be the personal relation of the in-being person, and that relation is not the reason whereby a person is in a person (as will be plain in the second article [nn.58-62], wherein I agree with Henry); therefore it is the essence which is in such way something of the in-being person that it is something of that in which it is.

43. And the proof that it is by reason of this essence of the Son, which exists in the Father, that the Son is in the Father is that wherever the foundation of any relation is, there the relation founded on it is; therefore wherever the essence is on which filiation is founded, there filiation is.

44. A distinction, however, is made as to the person ‘which is in another’ and the person ‘which another is in’, because although the person ‘which is in another’ is placed in another not first but by something of itself, that is, by its essence [n.42], yet the person which it is in is what the other is in first, that is itself totally, because it is itself totally disposed in some way as the reason of that which is surrounding and containing deity, which, although it is not part of the in-being person, is yet something of the person.

45. [Rejection of the Opinion] – Against this opinion.

First: to be ‘in’, as everyone thinks, does not state something self-referred, because then the Father would be in himself; therefore it states the relation of a person to a person. Not the relation of origin, because that does not have the same idea in the extreme terms (while the persons are in each other uniformly, according to them [n.60]); therefore it states a common relation [n.6]. But a common relation in accord with the same idea of foundation is in the supposit that is referred and in the supposit that it is referred to, just as likeness requires the same idea of whiteness in the like thing that is referred and in the like thing it is referred to; therefore if that to which the in-being person is referred is first such as what that person is in itself, the consequence is that the in-being person will be related by this relation first through itself and not through something precisely of itself.^a

a. [Interpolation] this is plain in the example about a rivalry between *a* and *b*.

46. Secondly as follows: when something is said to be in another by a part, it is in it by a part in the same way as the part is in it ‘first’. An example: if a man is on the earth by his foot, just as the foot is located on the earth so the man is by a part located on the earth – but it is not the case that if the foot is there as by location, the man will be there as form in matter; so too if whiteness is in a man by a part, because it is in his face, then in the same way of being ‘in’ as to the category in which it is in the face first – to wit, as an accident in a subject – in that same way, I say, it is in the man by a part, because it is in him as in a subject. Therefore if the Son is in the Father because of the essence that is formally in the Father, the consequence is that the Son is in the Father formally as it were (although according to something of himself), which is not to be ‘in’ by way of circumincection [sc. one person being in another and conversely].

47. The response is made that the major premise [sc. when something is said to be in another by a part, it is in it by a part in the same way as the part is in it ‘first’] is true when speaking of that which is the proximate reason of something’s being ‘in’, but is not true of the remote reason; but the essence, as it is formally in the Father, is not the proximate reason of the Son’s being in the Father but the remote reason – the proximate reason, however, is that he falls under the property of the in-being person.

48. On the contrary. This response includes the proposed conclusion, because that is said to agree with the whole ‘first’ which does not agree with it according to any part of itself but according to what comes from all the parts of itself, in the case of creatures; therefore things are such here that, since – according to them [sc. Henry and his followers] – there is in the person only relation and essence, whatever belongs to a person not

precisely by reason of one of these, but by reason of the essence together at the same time with the relation (and conversely), belongs to it first, because this states the person in its totality.

49. Further [i.e. thirdly], the property of a person, since it is incommunicable, does not belong formally to the essence (as: the essence does not beget nor is begotten, nor is it distinct or referred), and not the converse either (the property that belongs to the essence as it is communicable does not belong to the person, because this property is proper to the essence as essence is distinguished from person [I d.2 nn.389-390]), because essence is single in the three persons, but person in no way – neither first nor according to something of itself – is single in the three; therefore since this way of being ‘in’, by which the essence is in the Father as a quasi form (to wit, as that by which the Father is God), belongs in no way to the person, because it is proper to essence as essence is distinguished from person, therefore in no way will the Father be said by this to be in the Son, just as neither from the fact that ‘the Father is essence’ will the Father be the same as the Son.

2. Scotus' own Opinion

50. As to this article [n.37] I say as follows, that a predicate belongs to the whole ‘first’ as ‘first’ is distinguished from that which is according to a part (as is said in *Physics* 5.1.224a21-34), because it does not belong to it precisely for the reason that it belongs to a part of it.⁵² And contrariwise, nothing is said to belong to any whole because

⁵² Vatican editors: for example, ‘capable of laughter’ belongs first to man not because it belongs to a part of him, because it does not belong first either to his soul or his body [n.52].

of a part save what belongs to a part and is, through that part, said of the whole – as is plain from the Philosopher in the *Physics* [*ibid.*] in his example: “The man is healthy because his thorax is healthy;” the ‘to be healthy’ is said formally and first of the thorax, and by this it is said of the whole, of which whole the thorax is part.

51. A predicate that inheres first in some whole is sometimes in no part of that whole, and sometimes it is in some part of it.

52. An example of the first case: triangle is what first has angles equal to two right angles, and yet no part of the triangle (speaking of integral parts) has this predicate, namely ‘to have three angles equal etc.’; likewise man is what first is capable of laughter, and yet this property is not first in any part of man; and the composite is what is first generated, although no part of it [sc. form or matter] is first generated, speaking of this way ‘of that which is generated’; and so universally in all heterogeneous substances and their properties. And the reason is as follows, that the nature of such a subject is adequate to such a predicate, which adequacy is indicated by such primacy (as is plain from the definition of ‘universal’ in *Posterior Analytics* 1.4.73b32-33), and the nature of that adequate whole is not saved in any one part, and so its property does not belong to any one part of it.

53. An example of the second case [n.51] is: if fire is what is first hot, any part of fire whatever is hot. So too does the Philosopher in *Physics* 7.1.241b32-242a15 argue that no body can be moved by itself first, because then it would rest on the resting of a part; for it would not be first moved unless motion were in every part of it; for if motion were not in some part of it, motion would not be in the whole ‘first’. And so it is universally in homogeneous substances and their properties, because the nature to which first – that is,

adequately – such property belongs is of the same nature in the part as in the whole; therefore a predicate adequate to such a nature is in every part in which that nature is, and in this way it belongs to a part.

It is not therefore because of the idea of primacy that a predicate – which belongs to the whole – must belong to the part, nay never should it for this reason belong to the part, but rather when the nature of the whole is the same in such whole and in its part.

54. As to the intended proposition [n.37] I say that this way of being ‘in’ [sc. circumcession] is not in the way that nature is in a supposit or form is in matter, but as a subsistent is in a subsistent, according to Hilary *On the Trinity* ch.7 n.41 when he speaks as follows: “The being-in is not as one thing is in another, the way body is in body, but it is to be the way that to subsist is in the subsistent, but to be in it such that it itself also subsist.” Now to subsist, that is, ‘to exist *per se* incommunicably’, belongs first to the person (for it is not said of the person because it is said of the essence or the relation), just as also ‘to act’ in the case of creatures, or ‘to be produced’, belongs first to the supposit of the whole (that is, does not belong to it because it belongs to a part). Therefore also ‘to be subsistently in’ belongs first to the person; for although the nature is first in the Father, as nature in a supposit, this however is not the subsistence or the in-being of a subsistent in a subsistent, but is precisely the in-being by which the whole Son by presence and intimately is in the whole Father; and to this alludes the remark of Ambrose in his hymn [*Splendor of the Father’s Glory*]: “The whole Son in the Father, and the whole Father in the Word.”

3. To the Arguments for the Opinion of Henry

55. And next to the arguments for the aforesaid opinion against this [n.51].

To the first [n.40] I say that the major premise is false in two ways:

First, because there is no need for the predicate that agrees ‘first’ with the whole to agree with any part (as is plain enough from the clarifications [nn.52, 54]), because its primacy is that of adequacy.

Second, because if it do agree with any part, or agree with the whole by reason of any part [n.50], it need not agree with a second part by reason of any part,^a especially when the parts are not of the same idea in being integral to the whole [n.52]. It is just as if man is first rational because his specific difference (as ‘rational’) is said first of the species, and also man has first that act which agrees with rational animal insofar as it is rational, namely the act or understanding or reasoning; and yet this predicate [sc. rational] does not agree equally with each part of man, namely with soul and body; for perhaps it can be said formally of the soul and in no way of the body, but it is not said of man because it is said of his soul, because then it would agree with man as to a part, just as ‘to be tall’ agrees with man as to a part, because it agrees with him as to the body. Also if ‘to understand’ were to agree with each part in such a way that it could be said of the part, nevertheless each part is not equally disposed to that predicate as regard the inherence of the predicate in the ‘whole’; for the body is not the reason for the inherence of this sort of predicate in the way the soul is, and this because the parts – namely body and soul – are not parts possessed of the same idea in being integral to the whole, but one part is matter and the other form; for matter is not the reason for the operating of the whole, which is what operates first, in the way the form is.

a. [*Interpolation*] and so it need not be the case that it agree equally with the parts because it is first present in the whole, because the parts in a whole are not equally cause of the property as it exists.

56. So it is then in the intended proposition [n.54, 37]: one should not concede that because ‘the Father is first in the Son’ therefore deity or paternity is in the Son in the same way of being ‘in’ [sc. the way of being ‘first’ in]; but if one do concede it, one should yet not concede it equally, because they [sc. deity and paternity] are not of the same idea in the person that includes them. And further, when it is argued ‘if they were equally in the Father, then if one of them were in him formally, the other would be too’ [n.40], – the argument is not valid, but there is a fallacy of equivocation, because when the ‘to be in the Father’ is taken in the antecedent it is taken as being in a subsistent by way of presence, while in the consequent a different mode of being ‘in’ is inferred [sc. the mode by way of informing], which mode is not formally this mode [sc. the mode by way of presence], although it is presupposed to this mode of being ‘in’; hence from a mode of being ‘in’ by way of presence a mode is concluded to that is ‘in’ by way of informing [sc. which is the fallacy of equivocation].

57. To the second [n.41] I say that it is not only contrary to the part about being ‘in’ first, but also contrary to the principal conclusion [sc. about being ‘in’ simply and not first]; for it seems in creatures as impossible that the same thing should with respect to the same thing contain and be contained, or should contain by reason of the whole and be contained by reason of a part, as that the same thing should first contain and be contained. And therefore I reply to the argument and say that this mode of being ‘in’ [sc.

circumincension] does not state containment but the presence of the subsistent in the subsistent, and it has the same idea in both of them, because just as this subsistent is present to that one so that one is present to this one.

B. What the Idea is of the Being in of the Divine Persons

58. As to the second article [n.37] I say that the reason for this being in is neither the essence nor the relation alone [n.42].

59. My proof of the first point [n.58] is that then the Father would be in himself, which is false in the way in which the Savior understands the Father to be in the Son and the Son in the Father [n.36], because this way of being in requires a real distinction.

60. My proof of the second point [n.58] is:

First that the relations of origin do not have the same idea in the related persons, and so if these were the formal reasons for the being ‘in’ of the persons in each other the persons would not be in each other uniformly, – which is contrary to what was before said [nn.54, 57].

Second that if *per impossibile* this God were to produce another God, this God would not be in that God, because – according to John Damascene *On the Orthodox Faith* ch.5 – if there were two Gods they could not be together at the same time, and so neither would be immense, and so neither would be God; and yet there would be a true relation of the producer to the produced.

Next, third, that if *per impossibile* there were two persons without origin, but if they had the same essence along with a real distinction, they would be in each other,

because the essence of one person could not be in the other if the relation itself (which is altogether the same as the essence) were not in it, although in another way of being ‘in’, because what the foundation is in the relation is also in, even though one person would not be from the other in origin; therefore the relative property is not ‘in’ the cause.

Then, fourth, that in creatures there are truly relations of origin, of the thing that is a principle and of the thing that has a principle, and yet there – because of the diversity of nature in the things related – neither is in the other.

61. And from these arguments it follows that, since there is in the persons only essence and relation, according to the common opinion [e.g. of Henry of Ghent and Thomas Aquinas], therefore both of them will be the total reason for the being in [n.42].

62. And to understand how this is so, one can take an example about likeness in creatures: for according to Hilary (*[On the Trinity* III n.23] and it is set down in Lombard, *Sent.* d.31 ch.1 n.266), nothing is like itself but like another; yet likeness is founded on unity in quality, according to the Philosopher *Metaphysics* 5.15.1021a11-12, the chapter ‘On Relation’; so neither the mere diversity of the related things, nor the mere unity of the foundation, suffices for likeness, but both are required *per se* as one total cause. – So it is here: neither the distinction between the person who is in another and the person in whom the other is, nor the unity of the essence by which they are in each other, is the whole reason for the being in, but both together are. Yet just as unity of foundation in the case of likeness is the more principal, and likewise the more immediate, reason than the distinction between the related things, so here unity of essence can be posited to be the more immediate and more principal reason for this being in than the distinction of the persons.

C. There is no Like Example in Creatures for the Being in of the Divine Persons

63. As to the third article [n.37] I say that this mode of being ‘in’ [sc. circumcession] is not any of the modes that the Philosopher sets down in the *Physics*, – formally, I mean, because all those modes are based on the fact that the contained thing is something of the containing thing and not vice versa, or on the fact that something of the contained thing is something of the containing thing and not vice versa; neither of these accounts or ideas holds in the proposed case [sc. of circumcession], because diversity is there a greater reason for being ‘in’ than unity is. Therefore did Hilary well say, *On the Trinity* III n.1 (and it is set down in the text, *Sent.* I d.19 ch.4 n.172): “The nature of human intelligence cannot grasp the idea of this statement [sc. ‘I am in the Father and the Father is in me’], nor will human comparison provide any example for divine things.”

64. However, by taking what belongs to perfection in the case of creatures and by removing what belongs to imperfection, one can set down some examples of this mode of being ‘in’, at least imperfect ones and ones that imperfectly represent the mode:

First indeed from the flowing in of the divine essence in respect of creatures, which flowing in has the simultaneous concurrence of the divine nature’s immensity and its sustaining of things. Let then the idea of sustaining be removed from the flowing in, such that the idea of presence, because of the immensity, is preserved but without the idea of conservation or of the active power that pertains to sustaining; once this is removed then, just as God – because he is immense – is present to every creature, so too then is his presence to something understood without the fact of his sustaining it; and

then, if a single nature is posited for that which is present and for that which it is present to, because of which single nature it must be present, then there will be an example for the proposed case about this way of being ‘in’.

65. Another example is from the soul not informing the body though being present to the body (as in the moment of death); or from an angel being present to a body but not informing it; or from a glorious body present to a non-glorious body, – or a better example, if a glorious body could exist in another glorious body that was equally subtle. In all these cases the being ‘in’ is that of a thing subsistent and present, but not by informing or by way of part; and if in these cases there is added unity of nature, which by necessity of nature requires such presence, there will be a more perfectly similar example.

66. There is also another example from the powers of the soul, which if they are posited as differing on the part of real existence and yet, along with this, as being really the same as the essence of the soul, then of necessity one will be in the other, because the essence of the soul, with which the power is identical, is in the other; therefore things in some way distinct will be really indistinct. If each of these distinct things were *per se* existent, a distinct subsistent will be in a subsistent by presence to it, and will be an example of being ‘in’.

67. On behalf of all these examples – and to make clear the two preceding articles [nn.61-63] – one can add that in this way of being ‘in’ each extreme is in the other according to the same idea of being ‘in’, because here what is being noted is mutual presence, not the containing of one extreme by the other. Just as when a body is understood to be in a place, this is in the way that a contained thing is in the containing thing; but if two bodies be understood to be in each other in the same place, this is

according to the same idea or account, because the bodies are together and togetherness states the common relation of a single idea in both extremes; and if *per impossibile* place be removed and a simultaneous presence of bodies be posited, there will be the relation of a single account in the extremes, and each extreme will be in the other without one of them being contained by the other or both being contained by a third.

II. To the Principal Arguments

68. To the principal arguments [nn.29-35].

To the first [n.29] I say that there would be confusion if anything whatever were in another according to the opinion of Anaxagoras, because thus anything whatever would be in another thing as a part of it, the way the Philosopher seems to impute the opinion to him; but a person is not in a person as something of it; and so the conclusion does not follow.

69. When the reason is confirmed by the remark in the *Physics* 1.4.187b4-7 ‘about indivisibles’ [n.30], I reply that either it is false that ‘indivisibles of quantity are not distinct unless they differ by position’ (about which elsewhere, II d.2 p.2 q.5 nn.9-13), or, if it is true, it is not to the purpose, because the account that would hold in that case is not found in the divine persons, to whom position does not belong.

70. To the second [n.31] I say that deity is common to everything subsisting in the divine nature, and is a something of that which subsists in that nature, and therefore it could not really be distinct from another unless it were in some way compoundable with it, because that there be several things in some subsistent is not intelligible unless one of

them is compoundable with the other; but the person is not a something of each thing that subsists in that nature, and therefore, although person is in person, yet there is no necessity that this person be that person or that it be compoundable with it in the way one has to say this about deity.

71. To the third [n.32] I say that when something abstract is said to be in something, either the virtue of the words denote that it is ‘in’ it the way a form is in the informed thing (as when it is said that ‘color is in the stone’), and they indicate that it is ‘in’ not as a part is in the whole but as a form is in the formed thing, and then the proposition ‘filiation is in the Father’ is to be denied, – and in that case the first consequence is not valid; or this denoting is not got from the virtue of the words but from use (as we say ‘heat is in light’ not in the way of being in a subject), and in that case one can concede this proposition ‘filiation is in the Father’ by taking the being ‘in’ for intimate in-being, as has already been said [n.54]. Nor does the further conclusion follow that ‘therefore the Father is the Son’ [n.32], but there is a fallacy of equivocation, by making an inference in the antecedent as if the ‘in’ there were taken after the manner of a form.

72. To the fourth [n.33] I say that that way of arguing holds when this sort of proposition is true (through which proposition the sort of arguing in question holds): ‘whatever has some relation to something has a like relation to that to which that something has such a relation’. This proposition is frequently true in the case of relatives where one of the things related is above in position and the other below,⁵³ but it is not universally true. But I am not speaking of this now, because the argument here [sc. the

⁵³ Tr. As in the case of the prior and the posterior, where the prior will be prior to whatever the posterior is prior to [n.33 above].

fourth] proceeds of being ‘in’, which – as is assumed in the proposed case – indicates a common relation [n.45].

Therefore as far as the common relations are concerned I say that the proposition is universally false, to wit ‘whatever is like Socrates is like everything that is like Socrates’: for this proposition includes saying that something is like itself, because this falls under the universal quantifier ‘everything that is like’. But for the proposition to be true one must add this specification ‘everything other than himself that is like [Socrates]’; and then by virtue of this specifying proposition the sort of argument in question here holds in the direct sense forward but not in the converse sense backward, – I mean, the inference ‘Socrates is like Plato and Plato is like Socrates, therefore Socrates is like Socrates’ does not hold, for this proposition is false ‘whatever is like Socrates is like everything that is like Socrates’, unless one adds ‘everything other than himself that is like Socrates’, and then Socrates is not included under the universal quantifier ‘everything’, nor can the argument be made to go backward to Socrates⁵⁴ but to go forward. Yet such an addition is still not enough for the truth of the proposition in question, nor for the efficacy of the argument in question, but one must add that the middle term – to which the extremes are compared – is limited as to the sort of idea of comparison in question, because it is not necessary that whatever is together with *a* be together with everything that *a* is together with (everything – I say – other than itself) if the *a* is unlimited, – because then someone existing at Paris would be together with someone existing at Rome, because they are both together with deity, which is immense

⁵⁴ Tr. That is, one can argue in the direct sense forward ‘*a* is like *b*, *b* is like *c*, therefore *a* is like *c*’, but one cannot convert back and argue ‘therefore *a* is like *a*’, for the phrase ‘everything other than *a* that is like *a*’ blocks this backward move.

and unlimited with respect to them. Nor even do all these additions suffice unless one add that the middle term not vary in its comparison with the extremes.

73. As to the proposed case, then, I say that the argument [n.33] is not valid because it argues by converting back and not by going directly forward; and the proposition confirming this sort of way of argument [sc. ‘whatever has some relation to something has a like relation to that to which that something has such a relation’] is false. The argument of the Philosopher, however, in the *Physics* [*ibid.*] holds because he only argues by directly going forward and by taking a middle term that is limited and not varied; but his argument is about relatives where one of the related things is above in position and the other below, hence it is not much to the purpose about the being ‘in’ of the proposed case as this case is talking of a common relation. In order, however, to make a brief remark about the relatives of disparity [sc. where one of the related things is above and the other below in position], I say that such a way of arguing generally fails to hold unless it is on the basis of prior and posterior, which is something pretty much common to all such relatives; for whatever is prior to the prior is prior to the posterior [n.33], – and, to speak more generally, ‘whatever has an order toward another has a like order to anything else that that other has a like order to’; this proposition is true in the case of essential order, when no special condition of order is understood (to wit, mediate, immediate, near, remote). Because, therefore, the being ‘in’ of air in fire states an essential order, and the being ‘in’ of fire in the heaven states a like order, so that consequence holds [n.33] by directly going forward, and that because it proceeds in accord with a general idea of order and does not specify a mediate or immediate order. Hence the inference ‘*a* is father of *b*, *b* is father of *c*, therefore *a* is father of *c*’ does not

follow because ‘father’ denotes an immediate order to *c* as to a son; but the inference does well follow as it indicates paternity in general, to the extent that ‘father’ is extended to include grandfather and great-grandfather.

74. To the other argument [n.34] I concede that ‘God is in God’ and Hilary concedes it *On the Trinity* VII n.32. But when the inference is made ‘therefore God is distinct from God’ I deny the inference, because there is a fallacy of the consequent; for this preposition ‘in’ does not mark a power of confusedly embracing the whole of the term whose case it governs (nor does it have this power), and so the term whose case it governs can stand for some determinate supposit indeterminately; but ‘to be distinct’ distributes the term of this relation [sc. the relation of being distinct] confusedly and distributively, because of the negation it includes, and therefore the term of this relation [of being distinct] is not inferred from the term governed by the proposition ‘in’, – just as, for a like reason, the inference does not follow that ‘God generates God, therefore God is distinct from God’.

75. To the final argument [n.35] I say that the Son’s from the Father is the procession of the produced from the producer, but is not a diversity in nature; such a coming from in no way prevents that which comes-from remaining in that from which it comes, because it receives the same nature as what it proceeds from has.

Twentieth Distinction

Single Question

Whether the Three Persons are Equal in Power

1. 1. About the twentieth distinction I ask whether the three persons are equal in power.

I argue for the negative:

Because then, just as the Father can generate, so the Son could generate.

Proof of the consequence:

First because Augustine says *Against Maximinus* II ch.7: "If the Father cannot generate a Son equal to himself he is powerless;" therefore, arguing from the opposite, if he is not powerless but all powerful, he can generate a Son, and consequently 'being able to generate' belongs to omnipotence, – and thus if the Son cannot generate he is not equally powerful as, or equal in power with, the Father.

Second because the Son would not be omniscient if he did not know the generation of the Father; he would not then be omnipotent if he were not capable of that generation.

2. Further, Richard [of St. Victor] *On the Trinity* I ch.25 proves that there cannot be several omni-potents, because then one of them could make the other nulli-potent; therefore it seems one could give a similar argument in the case of the issue at hand, if one posited several divine persons who were equally powerful.

3. And just as this inference of Richard's was made clear [in I d.2 n.179] in two ways, I make it clear too in rather similar ways of the issue at hand:

First, because one person could by his act of will produce everything possible, and, once they were produced into existence, another person could not produce them; for

the same things cannot be twice produced in their totality [I d.2 n.181]. There is also a confirmation for this proof, that the Father has an act of will for creatures before the Son does – before in order of origin –, because the Son, according to Hilary [*On the Trinity* IX n.48], is potent “of himself but not from himself”; therefore the Father is understood to have produced things prior in origin to the Son’s producing them, and so at the moment when the Son is understood as needing to produce nothing is possible for him.

4. Second, because an omnipotent being can by his act of will prevent everything that is possible to some other omnipotent being, if there be some other, because there is no need for their wills to be agreed about things other than themselves, since their will for all those things is contingent [I d.2 n.180]; so here, it does not seem necessary for the will of one person to agree in the act of willing of another person.

5. But if you say that they have the same will and so they do agree in willing the same things, – on the contrary:

If the form that is the principle of acting is in several things, the principle is for each of them a principle of acting in just the same way as it would be if it were in one of them alone (just as if whiteness were in two surfaces, the two surfaces would have the principle of diffusing sight in the same way as they would have it if it existed in only one of them); but if will were in the Son alone it would be for him a principle of contingently willing the existence of a stone in such a way that the Son could then, by that will, equally will the stone not to exist; therefore, after one has posited this will as existing in the Father, the Son will still have the principle of contingently willing the stone to exist, and thus, whatever one posits in the Father, the Son can equally will the stone to exist or not to exist, – and thus, if the Father wish the stone to exist and the Son do not, one

omnipotent makes the other to be nulli-potent, by preventing all the possible things that it has willed.

6. Again, a first cause causes more than a second cause does, according to the author of *On Causes* prop. 1 and according to *Metaphysics* 2.1.993b26-30 and *Posterior Analytics* 1.2.72a29-30; but the Father gives to the Son the virtue of causing and not conversely; therefore the Father is more powerful.

7. On the opposite side is what the Master puts in the text, *Sent.* I d.19 ch.1 n.168 and he adduces Augustine [rather: Fulgentius] *On the Faith to Peter* ch.1 n.4.

8. Again, Augustine *Against Maximinus* II ch.14 nn.7 & 9, ch.18 n.3 proves this conclusion in three ways:

First by the authority of the Savior in *John* 16.15: “Everything that the Father has is mine;” therefore the Father’s power too.

9. Second by reason, because “if he could not give equal power he was not omnipotent, – if he could give it and he refused, he was envious.”

10. Third by a likeness, because “a carnal father would generate an equal son for himself if he could, or a greater son; therefore much more so in the issue at hand.”

I. To the Question

A. Determination of the Question

11. I reply by setting aside logical power or possibility (which refers to a mode of combining terms done by the intellect), and power said metaphorically (of the sort found

in geometry, in the way geometers themselves imagine a point having power for a line and a line for a surface) [cf. *Metaphyscis* 5.17.1019b30-32, *Ord.* I d.7 n.27]:

12. Power (as said in I d.7 nn.28-29) is properly taken in one way as it is a differentia of being, the differentia opposed to act, in another way as it signifies the same thing as principle does (as the Philosopher speaks of it in *Metaphysics* 5.17.1019a19-20). And power taken in this second way is divided into active and passive, and in each way – however it is taken – it can be understood either for the relation itself that it signifies in the power, or for the proximate foundation of that relation.

13. As for the issue at hand. It is plain that one should posit active power in God, since he is an efficient principle (from I d.2 nn.43-58), and it is about this power that the Master is speaking in the present distinction.

14. Equality in power of this sort can also be understood in two ways: either as to the extent of possible objects to which the power is extended, or as to the intensity of the very power in itself. An example: a power to heat is said to be equal in extent if it is extended to an equal number of heatable things (and in this way all charity is equal and is extended to everything that can from charity be loved); it is said to be equal in intensity if the power is equally perfect and is capable of an act that is equally perfect, although not as many things be subject to it as to another power, as is plain from positing the case that was posited in I d.7 n.41, that heat possessed of a heating adequate to it would produce another heat.

15. And these two equalities frequently accompany each other; each can however be understood without the other. Now, when speaking of equality of extent, no difficulty arises save about the notional acts [sc. the acts that concern the production of the divine

persons], and about the terms of those acts, because the two terms are not producible by all the persons, but the Son is producible only by the Father while the Holy Spirit is producible only by the Father and the Son.

B. Opinion of Others

16. [Exposition of the opinion] – Hence as concerns this point [n.15] one statement is as follows, that the power of generating pertains to omnipotence in the Father but not in the Son.

17. This statement is clarified in two ways:

First, because omnipotence is power for everything that does not include a contradiction; but that the Father generates does not include a contradiction, while that the Son generates does include a contradiction; therefore etc.

18. Further, second, because what holds of actions that are transitive, or pass onward to something external, is different from what holds of actions that are immanent; possibility in the case of a transitive action is judged from the idea of the action in itself and from its term, while possibility in the case of an immanent action is not judged exclusively from these features but also from comparison with the agent which such action is immanent in; since therefore generation is an immanent action, its possibility is to be judged not only from it in itself and from its term but also from its being compossible with the acting supposit which it should be immanent in; but generation is compossible with the Father and not with the Son, therefore the same as before.

19. A third clarification is added that that is said to be ‘potent’ which has power for everything for which it has the form, and is said to be ‘impotent’ for that action to which its form does not extend (as fire is said to be ‘impotent’ because it cannot cool things, for it does not have the form for cooling); but the Father has a form that agrees with generation and the Son does not; therefore the Father is impotent if he cannot generate but the Son is not impotent if he be unable to generate, – and so ‘being able to generate’ pertains to the omnipotence of the Father and not to the omnipotence of the Son.

20. [Rejection of the opinion] – Against this:

Without comparing the ‘to generate’ with any supposit I ask: either this generating, as it belongs to the generated supposit as to a term, is something for which some active power is naturally fit, or it is not. If it is, then whatever does not have power for this generating does not have omnipotence (that is, it does not have power for everything for which power is naturally fit); if it is not, then nothing has this power for generating, and thus this power does not pertain to the omnipotence of the Father.

21. The confirmations too [nn.18-19] are not valid. Not the second⁵⁵ [n.18] because omnipotence is capable of everything which is the term of power simply, and this either by producing it in that which it is of a nature to be produced in, if it is of a nature to be produced in something, or by producing it as subsistent in itself, if it is not of a nature to be produced in something. But there is no necessity that omnipotence be able to produce all such things formally in themselves; just as omnipotence can produce running in an animal (as in a man or a horse), which is what running is of a nature to be in, but cannot produce running in itself (as neither can it produce running formally),

⁵⁵ Vatican editors: the text actually says ‘the first’ because it is first in the *Lectura* though second here, just as the text says ‘the second’ in n.22 because it is second in the *Lectura* but third here. The one that is first here [n.17] lacks an argument against it.

because this neuter word ‘itself’ would signify that such a form existed in itself formally. Although therefore the Son not be able to generate formally such that generation should be in himself, nor be able to be a principle of generation in himself, yet, if generation be a term of omnipotence, then one should say that the Son is able to be a principle of generation in that which generation is of a nature to be in, because otherwise he would not be omnipotent, just as neither would he be omnipotent if he could not cause understanding in an intellect capable of receiving understanding. But ‘to generate’ cannot in any way be from the Son, not even as it is in the Son – therefore if ‘to generate’ is a term of power simply the Son will not be omnipotent.

22. The third confirmation [n.19] is not valid, because what has a form that is limited with respect to acting is not omnipotent with respect to acting; for although fire be potent as to burning and heating, if yet it be not able to cool it will not be simply omnipotent, because its form – limited to one act – entails that it is not simply omnipotent; therefore that the Son does not have a form agreeing with every action, although the action is one which power is of a nature to have simply regard to, entails that the Son is not simply potent.

23. Again, this way [n.16] does not save the fact of how the Father and the Son are equally potent, because the Father has power for an act of generation (which, for you [sc. the holder of the opinion in question here, nn.16-18] is a term of power simply), for which action the Son does not have power, and so they will not be equally powerful as to extent.

C. Scotus' own Opinion

24. As for this article [nn.15] I say differently that the first correlative for active power is the possible, – not taken generally, the way the possible is opposed to the impossible, because in this way God's existence is possible; the possible then, as it is the correlative of active power, must be taken more determinately. But this correlative seems only to be what accords with how Avicenna takes the possible, *Metaphysics* VI chs.1, 3 (91va, 93rb) and elsewhere, VIII chs.4, 5 (99rb, 99vb), I ch.7 (73rab), in the way that what is opposed to the possible is the of itself necessary. And then, since anything intrinsic to God is in itself formally necessary (or exists by identity with the essence, which essence is formally necessary), nothing intrinsic to God will be the term of active power properly stated; and if so, since the three persons possess the same idea of principle with respect to everything other than the divine essence, because the principle of producing creatures is understood first to be communicated to the three persons before the principle is able to have the act of producing those other things, – the consequence is that the power of the three persons is equal as to number of possibles.

25. Now the assumption [sc. ‘the principle of producing creatures is understood first...’] is made clearer in the question ‘On the Order of Extrinsic Productions to the Intrinsic Ones’ [II d.1 q.1 nn.8-11, 22].

26. It is also plain, in brief, from the fact that a principle necessary in respect of one production and contingent in respect of a second production is first a necessary principle of producing before it is a contingent one; now whatever be the principle of producing the persons, it is necessarily related to the production of them, but the principle of producing creatures is contingently related to the creatures themselves; therefore it is

communicated to the three persons first before it can have an act with respect to possible things outside it.

27. Hereby it is apparent that power in the divine persons is equal not only as to extent but also as to intensity; for if power be taken for what is absolute (namely for the foundation of the relation of the principle), it is plain that it is in the three to the same magnitude, not only to same magnitude ‘in a certain respect’ but also to the same magnitude ‘simply’, as was said in the preceding question ‘About Equality of Magnitude’ [I d.19 nn.13-14]; or if it be taken for the relation (which is founded on what is absolute), then there is the same relation in the three and, if the relation has any magnitude, the magnitude of the relation is the same in the three, and so there is an equality of power in every way, both in extent and in intensity.

28. Now as to what is said about the first correlative of active power, which is the possible [n.24], one must understand it of the objectively possible (namely the object which is the term of the power), not of the subjectively possible, because the subjectively possible is not a convertible correlative in respect of active power; for not every active power has something that is thus [sc. subjectively] possible corresponding to it, but only that active power does which is transformative.⁵⁶ The objectively possible then is, as correlative, equal to the active power, but the subjectively possible is not – and such an objectively possible is the possible that Avicenna was adduced for [n.24], namely the one that is opposed to the of itself formally necessary.

⁵⁶ Tr. An active power that transforms or changes things has a subject that it acts on and an object that is the term of its acting on the subject (as fire acts on a cold thing as subject and has heat as the object which it brings about in that cold thing and which is the term of its acting on that cold thing); but an active power can have an object it produces without having a subject which it transforms or changes in producing it, as is precisely true of the power of producing persons in divine reality or of producing creatures *ex nihilo*.

29. But that the objectively possible differs from the of itself formally necessary, or from the producer, may be confirmed from the Philosopher *Metaphysics* 5.1.1013a17, where he intends it to be the case that principle and cause are really convertible; but everything caused is other than its cause, therefore the possible too (that is, the thing that has a principle) is other – according to him – than the principle.

30. There is a confirmation too from the idea of active power set down in *Metaphysics* 5.12.1019a15-16, 19-20, that it is “a principle of transforming that which is other, or insofar as it is other;” therefore much more is it a principle of producing what is other, because a caused thing cannot be as identical with the cause as the active can be identical with the passive in creatures.

31. But in that case there is a doubt how the power of generating may be called a ‘power’, since, according to what has been said [nn.24-30], it has no respect to anything possible.

I reply. The possible can be taken in a still more extensive way than as it is opposed to the *of itself* necessary, namely by saying that that is possible which is opposed to the *by itself* necessary – and in this way everything that is originated would be possible, but neither the saints nor the philosophers seem commonly to speak thus. And it is in this way that the Son could be conceded to be possible, because he is originated, and so the active power corresponding to this term is a ‘power’. However, the Son is more truly conceded to be something from a principle and not to be something possible; still there is conceded to be in the Father an active power of generating, because active power in creatures asserts a certain perfection – though the possibility corresponding to it, because it is repugnant to *of itself* necessity, asserts an imperfection; so the name for that which

asserts perfection is transferred [sc. to God], but the name for the other correlative – which asserts imperfection – is not transferred in itself but in something more common than itself, so that in this way power is said to exist on the part of the producer and yet possibility is not said to exist on the part of the produced but only the idea of being from a principle.

32. Hence is apparent the irrationality of the saying that ‘under omnipotence, by virtue of the word, there is contained the power of generating, though not according to the usage of the saints’, because although the saints or the doctors sometimes say that ‘the power of generating is a power’ and that ‘to generate is the term of a power’, yet by virtue of the word neither is simply true but only when applying the idea of power to the idea of principle insofar as principle commonly has regard to that which can come from a principle.

33. By speaking in this way I reply to the question about the equality of power in the divine persons, – and I say that they are equal even in this way, because according to the Master in distinction 7 of this book [I d.7 ch.2 n.77] ‘by the same power by which the Father can generate the Son can also be generated’; but then this equality of power is not relative to the same thing; just as, if one were to posit an equality of power in color for affecting sight and in savor for affecting taste, these two would indeed have equal power yet they would not have the same power, nor relative to the same thing. Thus it is in the case of the issue at hand: when speaking of power in this way – extending it to the notional act – Father and Son are equal in power both in extent and in intensity, because the power that is in the Father for the act of generating is equally perfect in the Son and in relation to equal objects; yet it is not in this way altogether the same power the way a

power is the same that has regard to what is possible – and in this respect one should concede that not every power is in the Son, or that there is not in him power for every possible, taking power in this extended way [sc. so as to include the notional act], although there is in him the omnipotence that means power as to all possible things.

34. And if you ask ‘if there is in the Father and the Son the same absolute reality on which a power equal in extent and in intensity is founded, even as to power that is inwardly directed, why is not every power the same in both of them?’ – I reply: I say that although the same absolute reality, which is the power, is in the Father and the Son, yet it is not in each of them under the idea of power as far as the notional act is concerned, because it is not under the idea of what is prior to act, and power or principle requires the order of priority to a term.

II. To the Principal Arguments

35. To the principal arguments.

To the first [n.1] I speak by denying the first consequence, as far as the form of the consequence is concerned.

When proof is given from Augustine *Against Maximinus* I reply that the argument does not hold on the basis of its internal logic (as on the move from a universal whole to a part of a universal whole, by supposing that ‘to be able to generate’ is a particular ‘being able’), but it holds because of many implicitly understood propositions. In fact the argument has to be reduced to many syllogisms as follows: Maximinus has conceded that the Father generates a Son, though not an equal Son, – Augustine argues ‘if he generated

and could not generate an equal Son, then he was impotent'. Proof of the consequence: from the fact that the Father gave deity to the Son (even according to Maximinus, because otherwise there would properly be no generation), but a deity lesser (according to Maximinus) than the deity of the Father, then deity is not of itself infinite, because there cannot be anything greater than the infinite, nor can the infinite be lessened; and if deity is not infinite then he who has deity is not omnipotent; for nothing is omnipotent (since omnipotence requires infinite power) unless it have an infinite essence. Therefore the consequence holds, not because the singular instance [sc. being able to generate] is contained under the universal [sc. being omnipotent], but because the universal – which is the 'to be omnipotent' – is accompanied by infinity of essence and so by an ability to be communicated equally. And this inference similarly holds, 'if the Father cannot understand, the Father is not omnipotent'; but it does not hold on the basis of its internal logic (as if the Father's act of understanding were the term of omnipotence), but on the basis of these implicitly understood propositions: 'what cannot understand does not have every perfection simply, and in that case it is not of infinite essence, and therefore not omnipotent either'.

36. When the argument is then made about omniscience [n.1], I say that knowledge does not require an order that is determinate to knowable things, nor an order of prior or posterior,^a – and therefore knowledge is of necessity extended to every being, because every being is knowable; but power is not extended – as to extension to an object – to every being, but only to possible being, which possible being, in whatever way 'possible' is taken, is of a nature to be posterior; and so it is not extended to what is not of

a nature to be posterior, and therefore not to that which is [not?] of a nature to be, in an infinite person, the same thing as that person.

a. [Interpolation] because knowledge, whether in respect of what is prior, as of its object, or of what is posterior, can also be in respect of itself; but power requires an order determinate to a term, as of prior to posterior.

37. When the argument next from Richard is made [n.2], I say the argument is valid if it be supposed, *per impossibile*, that there are two Gods (as was made clear in I d.2 n.180), but it is not valid of two persons who are equal in power.

38. When proof is given, first, through the fact that ‘one person could make another person nulli-potent by willing all possible things and bringing them into existence’ [n.5], I say that he cannot will them save with the other person also willing them, and so they are not brought into existence by one person while the other person is not bringing them into existence, but just as the three persons are in the same moment of nature understood to have a sufficient principle for bringing these things into existence, so they are also in the same moment understood to have the act by which these things are brought into existence. But if two Gods were posited, one of them could by its own action bring everything into existence or produce everything into existence while the other could not produce them by the same action; therefore either he could not produce them by any action, and thus he would not be omnipotent, – or he could produce them by another action, and thus the same thing could receive existence twice, which is impossible.

39. To the second proof, that ‘one omnipotent could prevent everything that was willed by another omnipotent’ [n.4], I say the proof is good about two wills, because –

per impossibile – what has its own will could use it contingently as to any object other than itself; but the proof is not good about two persons who have the same will, because by the same necessity by which there is one will there is also one use of the will, and so it cannot be the case that one person wills with this will and the other does not, just as neither can one person have this will and the other not have it.

40. When – against this response – an objection is made about the form that exists in the two of them, that ‘the principle of operating exists in each of them the way it would if it existed in one alone’ I concede that the Son does not as it were naturally or by coercion will with this will, as if the Father by willing has predetermined the Son to will the same thing and the willing is not in the Son’s power the way it was in the Father’s, but rather the Father and the Son are in the same moment of nature understood to have the same will and to have any act of will – as the act is of this object – in as equally free a way as if one of them did not have the will. This form, then, is as much a principle for operating uniformly for any person who has it as it would be if he alone had it; but it is not a principle of operating for one possessor of it and a principle of not operating for the other, with an operation that is the same as the will, just as this same will is not both ‘a will’ and ‘not a will’. Hence the necessity of the inference ‘if the Father wills this, the Son wills this’ is not against the freedom of the Son’s volition, just as neither is the inference ‘if I will, I will’ against my volition’s freedom; thus it is not in this case either, ‘if the Father wills *a*, the Son wills *a*’, because the Father’s and the Son’s act of will is the same.

41. As to the other argument about first and second causes [n.6], the response has been given in distinction 12 n.68, because the proposition in question gets its truth from

the fact that there is a different virtue or power of causing in the prior cause than in the posterior – and that what the prior has is more principal; but the proposition is false of a principle belonging to a prior in origin and to a posterior, where they have the same power or virtue of causing in respect of a third – and of this sort is the power in the issue at hand, and so in this case the argument is not valid.

Twenty First Distinction

Single Question

Whether this Proposition is true, ‘Only the Father is God’

1. That it is true:

Only God who is Father is God, therefore only the Father is God. – The antecedent is plain because only God who is Father is the Trinity. The inference is proved by taking a like case, because this follows: ‘only the animal that is man runs, therefore only man runs’.

2. Again, only God is the Father, therefore only the Father is God. The antecedent is plain from the expositors. The inference is proved by conversion of an exclusive proposition [sc. ‘only...’].⁵⁷

⁵⁷ Tr. If only *a* is *b*, then necessarily only *b* is *a*.

3. Again, only God is God, therefore only the Father is God. – The proof of the inference is both that ‘God’ in the antecedent stands for a person (because it is indefinite), and that the antecedent implies each exponent of the consequent.⁵⁸

4. But the proof that an affirmative exponent is implied is that this inference follows, ‘only God is God, therefore every God is God’, and accordingly the Father is God; therefore a consequent that is an affirmative exponent follows.

5. This inference too holds, ‘only God is God, therefore no one other than God is God’, and the further inference, ‘therefore no one other than the Father is God’. – Proof of the inference: to argue ‘other than God, therefore other than the Father’ seems to be a fallacy; so if one argues in the same pattern negatively [sc. ‘other than God, therefore not other than the Father’] the argument will be good. Proof of the assumption, because if ‘other than God’ entailed ‘other than the Father’ this would be because the term of the relation of diversity [sc. ‘God’] was distributed [sc. taken wholly],⁵⁹ but it is not distributed, – the proof being that then every proposition would be false when the relative term in the diversity was predicated of something, to wit, any such proposition as ‘man is diverse or other’; for what is given here to be understood is the first of the correlatives of this relation [sc. ‘man’ as the first correlative of the relation ‘other’], and consequently the signification is that man is ‘other than something else’, and if the term of the relation [sc. ‘something else’] is distributed, the result is that man is ‘other than anything else whatever’ and so that he is ‘other than himself’.^a

⁵⁸ Tr., from Vatican editors’ note to n.27 below: If the term ‘God’ in the first proposition, the antecedent, stands indefinitely for a person, then it is equivalent to ‘only some person who is God is God’, which is equivalent to ‘only the Father or only the Son or only the Holy Spirit who are God is God’, and so entails each exponent of the consequent, namely ‘only the Father is God’ and ‘only the Son is God’ and ‘only the Holy Spirit is God’.

⁵⁹ Tr. Only if ‘God’ in ‘other than God’ is distributed or taken wholly, that is, as equivalent to ‘other than God altogether’, would the conclusion ‘other than the Father’ follow. For the Father is other than God in some sense, because he is other than God the Son, but the Father is not other than the Father.

a. [Note by Duns Scotus] Again, a negative that excepts something and an affirmative taken in exclusion of the excepted part are convertible; *Matthew* 11.27: “No one knows the Father but the Son,” [sc. which as converted to an affirmative will read ‘only the Son knows the Father’] – therefore only the Son knows, therefore only he is God. Again, *On the Trinity* VI ch.7: “The Father is as great as are the Father and the Son together;” therefore only the Father is so great, therefore only the Father is God. – To the first: ‘No one’ – no man; God is called ‘man’ (“he gave a marriage feast for his Son”, *Matthew* 22.2). Therefore let ‘common to God’ be taken, let ‘no God’ or ‘no intellectual being’ be taken so as to be a substantive, let ‘[no one] but the Father knows’ be conceded, – and thus no intellectual being other than the Father [knows], because ‘other’ indicates an otherness in the thing signified by its substantive [sc. here ‘the Father’]; thus universally, wherever there is a substantive common to the three persons, the proposition is true with ‘only’ and with ‘no one’.⁶⁰ The response to the second is plain through the second: ‘only’ is taken in a syncategorematic sense.⁶¹

6. The opposite is plain from Augustine *On the Trinity* VI ch.9 n.10

I. To the Question

7. As to the question,^a a distinction can be made (the way it is commonly, and well, made), that ‘only’ can be taken as categorematic and as syncategorematic.⁶² For ‘only’ signifies the same as ‘not along with another’, as is plain from the Philosopher

⁶⁰ Tr. That is, the proposition ‘no one knows... but...’ can be repeated as to all three persons of the Trinity: no one knows the Son but the Father, no one knows the Holy Spirit but the Son, no one knows the Father but the Holy Spirit, etc.

⁶¹ Tr. That is, the term ‘only’ is taken like a quantifier, such as ‘all’ or ‘no’, not like a term. So it is not taken as excluding the Son and Holy Spirit but as making ‘Father’ precise.

⁶² Tr. ‘Only’ as categorematic qualifies the noun, so that ‘only the Father...’ is equivalent to ‘the Father on his own’. ‘Only’ as syncategorematic qualifies the proposition, so that ‘only the Father...’ is equivalent to ‘the Father with exclusion of everything other than the Father...’

Sophistical Refutations 2.22.178a39-b1. But this negation of association can be understood either to determine something in itself or in its nature, or to determine something as it is an extreme in composition relative to the other extreme, namely by denying that what is other than it is associated with it in receiving the predication of the relevant predicate. In the first way the word ‘only’ is not admitted in divine reality, because nothing is solitary there. In the second way the word is conceded whenever someone, of whom the same predicate is said, is not associated with the subject; so it is not conceded when the essential is predicated of the personal, because the essential belongs to the other excluded by the first extreme – and therefore such a proposition [sc. ‘only the Father is God’] is denied.⁶³

a. [Note by Duns Scotus]⁶⁴ There are three opinions as to this question:

First opinion: the correlative is not excluded because it belongs to the understanding of what is included (response: not what this is, but to what or of what this is),⁶⁵ again, this consequence holds: ‘only the Father is, therefore the Father is’, and further ‘therefore the Son is’ – therefore ‘the Son is’ is included, and consequently that he is God is included (deny the consequence, because they are opposites in the subject term).⁶⁶ On the contrary: a syncategorematic term [sc. ‘only’] makes a disposition about the categorematic concept [sc. ‘the Father’];⁶⁷ again, it

⁶³ Tr. The proposition ‘only the Father is God’ is false because it excludes the Son and the Holy Spirit from being God. But ‘God’, being an essential and not a personal name, belongs to all three persons.

⁶⁴ The Vatican editors, in the *Preface* to this volume, point out that this note assumes that passages from the *Reportatio* are to be added. The note makes frequent reference to these passages and has to be understood in relation to them.

⁶⁵ Tr. That is, in ‘only the Father is God’ the correlative, or the Son, is not what the Father (the included) is, but to what or of what the Father is, as that the Son is not what the Father is but to what or of what the Father is the Father.

⁶⁶ Tr. ‘Father’ and ‘Son’ are opposed relatives in the subject term ‘God’.

⁶⁷ Tr. ‘Only’ determines the concept ‘Father’, but the concept ‘Father’ includes the concept ‘Son’ (for they are relatives), so ‘only’ does not exclude ‘Son’ from the subject term.

would rule out, in respect of any predicate, ‘only the Father is Father’.⁶⁸ Therefore in another way: the correlative is formally excluded; thanks to the matter the predicate does not follow about the excluded correlative, because correlatives go together, and therefore opposites go together in the antecedent⁶⁹); again, when the accident is included the subject is not excluded (response: true about a concrete, because it is predicated of a subject; false about an abstract – hence ‘only...whiteness’ is contradictory).⁷⁰ – To the contrary, in three ways: *Physics* 1, “only the principle is” [n.13 below];⁷¹ again, opposites are such that it is impossible for this one to be that one (any ‘not-this’ is excluded);⁷² again, the whole concept does not allow of being expressed, because nothing can be attributed precisely to a relation, not even a proper difference; still a relation can be understood.⁷³

⁶⁸ Tr. If one denies the consequence ‘only the Father is, therefore the Father is, therefore the Son is, therefore the Son is God (or wise or omnipotent etc.)’ on the grounds that ‘Father’ excludes ‘Son’, then one should, by parity of reasoning, rule out saying ‘only the Father is Father’ because this too, by rejecting the same sequence of inferences, will exclude ‘Son’ and so will exclude the Son’s being or being God or being wise or omnipotent etc. But it is absurd to rule out saying ‘only the Father is Father’.

⁶⁹ Tr. ‘Only the Father is God’ is excluded, not because ‘Father’ does not include ‘Son’ (on the contrary it does), but because ‘only’ as applied to ‘Father’ excludes, not ‘Son’ from ‘Father’, but the application to ‘Son’ of the predicate ‘God’.

⁷⁰ Tr. A suggestion about this puzzling remark: The claim being made is that to speak of an accident or property (e.g. wisdom) is to include and not exclude the subject whose property it is (e.g. a wise man). Thus to say ‘only the Father is God’ is to include ‘Son’ because ‘Son’ is also subject of ‘God’. Scotus’ response is that the subject is included when a property in the concrete is in question (as ‘wise’), but not when a property in the abstract is (as ‘wisdom’). Hence it is contradictory to say ‘whiteness’ includes a subject, because, as abstract, it is taken precisely as excluding a subject. In relation to ‘only the Father is God’, then, the point perhaps is that ‘God’ taken concretely or along with a subject always means one or other of the persons. But when it means the essence without reference to the personal subjects it is not taken concretely but, as it were, abstractly (as ‘God-ness’). So if ‘God’ is taken concretely in ‘only the Father is God’ then it includes the subject, that is, the person in question, and is equivalent to ‘only the Father is God the Father’, which is true and uncontroversial. But if ‘God’ is taken abstractly then ‘only the Father is God’ is equivalent to ‘only the Father is God-ness’, which is false if not indeed contradictory.

⁷¹ Aristotle is arguing at this point in the *Physics* against Parmenides and Melissus, that if they say that only the principle is, then they are saying that what is from the principle is not. So the Philosopher thinks that to assert ‘only’ of one of a correlative pair (here the pair of ‘principle’ and ‘from a principle’) is to exclude, and not implicitly to include, the other correlative.

⁷² Tr. ‘Father’ and ‘Son’ are opposite relatives, and opposites exclude one opposite from being the other, so to say ‘only the Father...’ cannot be to include the Son implicitly.

⁷³ Tr. Relational terms, as ‘father-son’, do not have a strict conceptual definition, because neither relative can be defined in isolation from the other (as that one cannot define ‘father’ without mentioning the son relative to whom a father is father). But one can nevertheless understand relations and relatives. Hence it is not to the point to say that ‘only the Father...’, with ‘Father’ taken in its whole conceptual idea, implicitly includes the Son, because there is no whole conceptual idea of ‘Father’ in the first place and the ‘only’ attached to it has to be interpreted according to this feature of

In another way: [the substantive is] one thing, [the adjective attaching to it] is another. –

To the contrary: the adjective conforms to the substantive in its mode of signifying, therefore so does anything included in the adjective, and the same of the converse ‘no non-Father...’; the substantive states a whom, not a what.⁷⁴

In another way third: composition and division. – To the contrary, as argued above.⁷⁵

Solution: ‘only’ – not along with another (*Sophistical Refutations* [n.7 above]). When ‘only’ is taken categorically, ‘solitary’ is what is *per se* predicated. When taken syncategorematically it makes a disposition as to an extreme term in the intellect combining the terms, and it states the mode under which the extreme is taken in the combined proposition – but this in two ways: either to the extent that (as reduplicative) it states a disposition in relation to the predicate, because it states the *per se* reason for the inherence of the predicate, – or it states the formal reason according to which the subject is taken in itself, not that it is the formal reason for the inherence of the predicate. Thus the subject can be taken in itself precisely, and something can be said about the subject so taken, – in another way the subject can be taken precisely in its order to the predicate as the predicate is asserted of it; in the first way ‘only’ indicates that the subject is in itself precise, whatever may agree with it in respect of the predicate, – in the other way it indicates the subject precisely, whether the subject is precise in itself or not: taken in the first way is Augustine’s “so great is the Father only”, that is the Father precisely taken truly has the predicate “so great [is he]” (we speak like this in other cases: “You only will count for 10,000” is true; even if there are many other lords who would count for so many servants, yet ‘You’ precisely

relative terms, that is, as excluding from the predicate the opposing relative (‘Son’) which its understanding nevertheless implicitly includes.

⁷⁴ Tr. The other way of saving ‘only the Father is God’ is to say that ‘only’, taken as an adjective (as categoric), signifies the Father as to deity, while the substantive ‘Father’ signifies the Father as to person. Hence ‘only the Father is God’ means something like ‘the Father only as to deity is God’, which does not exclude the Son from also being God. Scotus’ response is that if the substantive is taken personally, as signifying a ‘whom’ and not a ‘what’, the adjective attaching to it must be taken personally too. Hence ‘only the Father is God’ means ‘the person alone who is Father is God’, which does exclude the Son from being God. The response is confirmed by appealing to the converse of ‘only the Father’, namely ‘no non-Father’, because to say ‘no non-Father is God’ also clearly excludes the Son from being God.

⁷⁵ A reference to *Reportatio* IA d.21 nn.27-30. And see n.14 below. Perhaps the point about composition and division is that if ‘only’ is taken as dividing Father from Son, the proposition is false; if it is taken as combining them (because they are said relatively to each other), it is true. Scotus’ response is doubtless that ‘only’ as used here excludes taking the proposition in a combined sense.

taken will so count, and yet not as solitary or on its own but as existing among others; hence ‘only’ here is not a categorical, because neither is it a predicate but a co-predicable⁷⁶); taken in the second way Augustine’s proposition is false, as is proved above and by its consequences.⁷⁷

But an instance is made in objection to the remark from *On Interpretation* [see n.11 below] by taking what is distinct ‘in the respect in which it is dependent’: this sequence is true, ‘only man or non-man is non-man, therefore nothing non-identical with man or non-man is non-man,’ – the inferences ‘therefore no non-man is non-identical with man or non-man, therefore no entity [sc. no man or non-man] is not identical [sc. with non-man], therefore every entity is identical [sc. with man]’, and ‘nothing non-identical with man or non-man is a non-man, therefore nothing non-identical with man or non-man is not a man’, these inferences do not hold, because then every such thing [sc. everything identical with man or non-man] is a man. – I concede the point; the inference from the negative to the affirmative in the case of a subject that includes contradictories is not valid; the term ‘non-identical with man or non-man’ is such a subject. This as to consistency in the subject term, namely that what is taken here on the part of the subject should be capable of being a subject, that is, should not include contradictories, because contradictories make no single term, *Metaphysics* 5 “what is in itself false is false of everything,” and so too every predicate is false of it, because it is repugnant to itself and to each of its parts. – To the contrary: to which affirmative is this negative reduced from such an antecedent (reduced to it enthymematically)? Response: to affirmatives about its parts.⁷⁸

8. A clarification of these points – namely how a syncategorematic term disposes the extreme in the intellect as the intellect combines and divides it in respect of the other

⁷⁶ Tr. ‘Only’ in this case means ‘you by yourself count as so many, even if others also by themselves count as so many’; it does not mean ‘you alone and no one else count as so many’.

⁷⁷ Tr. In the second way ‘so great is the Father only’ means ‘only the Father is so great and not also the Son and Holy Spirit’, which is false.

⁷⁸ Tr. The negative statement ‘nothing non-identical with man or non-man is non-man’ should, like any negative, be reducible or convertible to an equivalent affirmative (according to the rules for obversion, as that ‘no a is b’ is equivalent to ‘all a is non-b’). Scotus’ answer is that it is reducible to two affirmatives, according to its two-fold and contradictory subject: ‘everything non-identical with man is non-man’ and ‘everything non-identical with non-man is man’.

extreme, and how a syncategorematic term differs from a term of second intention [sc. a logical term], and how diverse syncategorematic determinations differ among themselves – would require a long treatise but, because of more useful and more necessary things, we should not delay over it.

9. The falsity of the proposed proposition [sc. ‘only the Father is God’] is also proved through the rule in the ‘Sophisms’, that ‘an exclusive affirmative entails a universal affirmative about the terms when they are transposed’ [Walter Burleigh, *Longer Treatise on the Purity of the Art of Logic* tr.2 p.3 subpart.1 ch.1]; therefore this proposition ‘only the Father is God’ entails this other ‘every God, or every divine person, is the Father’.

10. The rule is also proved by reason of exclusion, namely the exclusion that indicates precision in what it is added to with respect to the other extreme – or that indicates precise commensuration, namely that one extreme does not exceed the other; and this is what the universal affirmative ‘about the terms when they are transposed’ indicates, and especially in the case of common terms, where either extreme can be taken universally.

11. The rule is also logically proved by a single proposition that expresses the whole understanding of the exclusive term; for this proposition ‘only man is capable of laughter’, although it is commonly posited as having two exponents, is nevertheless sufficiently expounded by this one, ‘no non-man is capable of laughter’; from it there follows (by conversion) ‘nothing capable of laughter is a non-man’, and further that ‘therefore nothing capable of laughter is not a man’ (through the rule, in *On*

*Interpretation 2.10.95b-20b10,*⁷⁹ ‘from a negative about an infinite predicate there follows an affirmative about a finite predicate and a negative about a denied predicate’, – which is proved by the first principle ‘an affirmation about anything whatever etc.’ [*Ord. prol n.89*], and this in the case of simple predicates, because, when the consequence is denied, both opposites are denied of the same thing), and further ‘therefore everything capable of laughter [sc. is a man]’ by equivalence – therefore from the first etc.⁸⁰

12. Here some people object that when one relative is included the other is not excluded, because the one is included in the understanding of the other [see note n.7], because ‘things posited are posited (and things taken away are taken away [Peter of Spain, *Logical Summaries* tr.3 n.21])’ and also relatives are ‘by nature together’ [*Categories* 7.7b15].

13. But this is contrary to the Philosopher’s intention in *Physics* 1.2.185a3-5 when he argues there: “If only the principle is, then what is from the principle is not.” Therefore a correlative is not included in the understanding of its relative as something belonging to it (to wit as an essential or integral part), but as something to which the understanding of it is determined – and such is diverse enough from what is included in the relative that it has as much diversity as is required for being excluded from it.

⁷⁹ Vatican editors: This rule is not as such found in Aristotle but arises from two of the things he says. For he says first: “On the proposition ‘no man is just’ there follows the proposition ‘every man is non-just;’ he says second, “‘a non-just man is’ whose negation is ‘a non-just man is not.’” From the first of Aristotle’s statements this rule follows: ‘from a negative about a finite predicate there follows an affirmative about an infinite predicate’, and conversely ‘from an affirmative about an infinite predicate there follows a negative about a finite predicate’, from which finally there follows ‘man is non-just, therefore man is not just’. But according to the second of Aristotle’s statements, by adding ‘not’ to his first example, this sequence follows: ‘no man is non-just, therefore every man is not non-just;’ there also follows ‘therefore every man is just’ and ‘no man is not just’, because this sequence holds ‘man is non-just, therefore man is not just’, as has been said.

⁸⁰ Vatican editors: “that is: therefore by running through from the first (‘only man is capable of laughter’) to the last (‘therefore everything capable of laughter is a man’), the rule [n.9] follows.”

II. To the Principal Arguments

14. To the first argument [n.1]. The antecedent [sc. ‘Only God who is Father is God’] is distinguished into a composite and a divided sense, as with ‘every man who is white runs’.⁸¹ The composite sense is false, because in that case ‘God’ is made to stand for the Father, through the implied ‘who is Father’, just as ‘man’ is made to stand for white man in the composite sense in ‘man who is white’ – and then the inference [sc. ‘only God who is Father is God, therefore only the Father is God’] holds. The divided sense is true because then two predicates are asserted of the same subject, of which subject both predicates are true, namely of God that ‘he is Father’ and that ‘he is God’ (as if the two predication were made in two categorical propositions joined to each other by ‘and’, neither of which propositions would specify the other), and then an inference from the inferior term to the higher [sc. from ‘Father’ to ‘God’], along with exclusivity [sc. ‘only the Father is God’],⁸² is false.^a

a. [Note by Duns Scotus] The inference can be allowed to be absolutely true in both senses, because the term ‘God’ is not contracted [sc. as a universal to a singular]; it is a ‘this’ ['this God' or 'this deity', see n.31 below].⁸³

⁸¹ Tr. The composite sense of ‘every man who is white runs’ is ‘every white man runs’; the divided sense is ‘every man runs – and it just so happens, as an independent fact, that every man is white’.

⁸² Tr. ‘Only God is Father’ (where the addition to ‘only God’ of ‘who is Father’ is divided off) is true, but it does not entail ‘only the Father is God’. The divided sense does not allow an inference from person to nature (from ‘Father’ to ‘God’), which would exclude the other persons, the Son and Holy Spirit, from also being God.

⁸³ Tr. The inference ‘therefore only the Father is God’ can be allowed to be true whether the antecedent ‘only God who is Father is God’ is taken in a composite or divided sense. For ‘only the Father is God’ does not mean ‘only the Father, and not the Son or Holy Spirit, is God’ as if ‘God’ were a universal term under which only the singular instance ‘Father’ was contained. Rather it means ‘only the Father is this God’, where ‘this God’ means the Trinitarian God. Hence whether ‘only God who is

15. And if you object that a like inference⁸⁴ holds of creatures in the divided sense, I reply:

If the same common thing – a numbered thing – may belong to several particulars under it, that inference does not hold in the divided sense; for it holds precisely because the animal that is rational, taken in the divided sense, is not other than the animal that is rational taken in the composite sense; but in the issue at hand the reasoning does not hold, because the same God who is Father in the composite sense is the Son who is distinct from the Father, and so the God who is Father in the divided sense can be asserted truly of anything of which he is not asserted in the composite sense; but it is not so with the animal that is man, because this is truly predicated in the divided sense of nothing of which the same is not truly predicated in the composite sense (but not conversely), and so the predication is made indifferently in this case – not so in the case of God.

16. However, just as the antecedent is distinguished into a composite and divided sense, so some also distinguish the principal proposition in like manner, as if this proposition ‘only the Father is God’ could have a false composite sense and a true divided sense – adducing the remark of Priscian *Constructions 2* (or *Grammatical Instruction 18*) ch.1 nn.6-7, that ‘...who is’ falls in the middle between a qualified and a qualifying term.⁸⁵

the Father’ is taken in the composite or the divided sense the inference that he is this God, namely the Trinitarian God, remains true.

⁸⁴ Vatican editors: e.g. ‘only the animal that is man is rational, therefore only man is rational’.

⁸⁵ Vatican editors: “Some say [such as Richard of Middleton] that, according to Priscian, in every conclusion where there is a noun and a qualifying adjective a ‘who is’ is always understood as the copula by which the construction is expressed, as in ‘a white man runs’, that is, ‘a man who is white runs’. So in the proposition here [‘only the Father is God’], if it is divided thus, ‘only the Father, who is God, is God’, it is true, but in the composite sense [sc. ‘only the Father-God is God’] it is false.” Priscian ch.1 nn.6-7: “But there are occasions when, by an ellipsis of a verb or participial substantive, a

17. But this is neither logically nor grammatically said.

Not logically, because then nothing could be limited or determined by any term of limitation or determination; for however immediately any categorematic or syncategorematic determination is added to something (as ‘a white man runs’ or ‘every white man runs’), there would still be space to distinguish, as here, a composite and a divided sense, and so on ad infinitum – nor could any sense be determinately conceived or expressed.⁸⁶ Nor did the Philosopher [*Sophistical Refutations* 1.4.162a6-38] teach that there was in such cases a multiplicity according to composition and division, but only in those cases where the same materials create, when composed and divided, a diversity of senses; but these materials ‘every man runs’ create – when composed and divided – no difference of sense, nor can they be divided, because syncategorematic terms [sc. here ‘every’] only have a signification along with the categorematic term [sc. here ‘man’]; but it is otherwise with ‘he sees that I am running now’, as one combines the adverb ‘now’ either with the preceding or the following verb [sc. ‘he now sees that I am running’ or ‘he sees that I am now running’].

construction of the following sort is wont to be made in these sorts of grammatical cases (that is, the nominative case along with the oblique cases): ‘Achilles the son of Peleus killed many Trojans in battle’; for the participle of a verb for the substantive is implicitly understood, namely ‘being’ [sc. ‘Achilles being the son of Peleus’], but we do not now use it, and in its place we can say or understand ‘[Achilles] who is’ or ‘who was’ the son of Peleus. Likewise with other cases following a nominative, the aforesaid participle, or things taken for it, must be understood with the nominative: ‘an agreeable friend is going with me’, that is, ‘a friend who is agreeable to me’.” Also ch.2 n.27: “And in all these cases, even oblique ones, a ‘who is’ is understood: as ‘of a horse white in color’ (that is ‘of the horse which is of white color’), ‘for a horse white in color’ ‘toward a horse white in color’.”

⁸⁶ Tr. If any qualification or adjective, categorematic or syncategorematic, added to a noun is an implicit relative clause (as that ‘white man’ is implicitly ‘a man who is white’, or that ‘only men’ is implicitly ‘only those who are men’), so that all qualified nouns admit of a divided and a composite sense, then, however closely one ties the adjective to a noun so as to express the composite sense and exclude the divided sense (as, say, ‘white-man’ or ‘white-man man’), the result would itself admit of a composite and divided sense (as ‘man who is white-man’), and so on ad infinitum. Consequently, one would never be able to disambiguate any statement as composite instead of divided, and so one would never be able to express or conceive anything determinate.

Neither even is it grammatically said, because ‘qualified’ and ‘qualifier’ are called construables of the sort that one of them is said by Priscian to govern the other by some force of grammar; but a syncategorematic term is not construable with respect to a categorematic term as if one of them ruled the other by some force of grammar, and therefore although an implied relative falls in the middle in the case of ‘Socrates’ cloak’ (that is, ‘the cloak which is of Socrates’), yet it does not do so in the case of ‘white man’ or ‘every man’.

18. To the second [n.2] I say that neither the conversion [sc. ‘only God is the Father’ to ‘only the Father is God’] nor the inference [sc. ‘only God is the Father, therefore only the Father is God’] holds, but there is a fallacy of the consequent, because – as was proved in the solution to the question [n.9] – an exclusionary proposition [sc. ‘only...’] is convertible with a universal affirmative proposition ‘about the terms when transposed’ [sc. ‘only man runs’ is equivalent to ‘everything that runs is a man’];^a therefore to infer an exclusionary proposition from an exclusionary proposition ‘about the terms when transposed’ [sc. to infer ‘only the Father is God’ from ‘only God is the Father’] is equivalent to inferring a universal affirmative from a universal affirmative ‘about the terms when transposed’ [sc. inferring ‘all B is A’ from ‘all A is B’]; but in such an inference of a universal from a universal there is a fallacy of the consequent, as in the case of ‘all men are animals, therefore all animals are men’, by affirming from higher to lower [sc. by affirming the predicate, the higher term, universally of the subject, the lower term]

19. So it is of the issue at hand [sc. ‘only God is the Father, therefore only the Father is God’]. There is a proof too, because the procedure with distribution – by the

force of the words – is always from the inferior [sc. the subject] to the superior [sc. the predicate]; for the predicate of a universal affirmative is not marked as being convertible, but stands as it were superior to the subject; therefore from the distribution of the such a universal subject the distribution of the predicate with respect to the same thing does not follow, nor can the distribution of the predicate follow with respect to something if the distribution of the predicate does not follow with respect to what is superior to that something. Arguing then like this, ‘all *b* is *a*, therefore all *a* is *b*’ is the fallacy of the consequent, because from the distribution of a term that is marked as lower the distribution of the superior term does not follow (the same too in respect of a predicate marked as lower to a superior one), but it is the fallacy of the consequent, as if one were to argue, ‘every man is an animal, therefore every animal is Socrates’.

20. But when proof is given of the inference by the conversion of an exclusionary proposition [n.2, ‘only God is the Father, therefore only the Father is God’], I reply:

Not every inference ‘when the terms are transposed’ is conversion simply, namely a conversion that indicates as great a union of terms when it is converted as could be had by virtue of the first [unconverted] proposition; hence a universal negative is not converted to a particular negative ‘when the terms are transposed’, although it implies it.⁸⁷

21. As to the issue at hand I say that that proposition ‘when the terms are transposed’, which receives only as much of the understanding of the exclusionary affirmative as any proposition can receive ‘when the terms are transposed’, is the universal affirmative, as was proved in the second reason for the principal solution [n.9];

⁸⁷ Tr. The universal negative ‘no *A* is *B*’ converts simply to ‘no *B* is *A*’, but it implies also the particular form, ‘some *B* is not *A*’.

therefore such an exclusionary affirmative is converted to a universal affirmative, and contrariwise, by parity of reasoning, a universal affirmative is converted to an exclusionary affirmative.⁸⁸

22. And if you object ‘therefore Aristotle was mistaken and incomplete in his teaching about the conversions [of propositions], by not teaching that the universal affirmative is to be converted to an exclusionary affirmative’,⁸⁹ I reply that he taught the conversions with a view to making perfect the imperfection of the imperfect syllogisms;⁹⁰ but an exclusionary proposition would, in completing an imperfect syllogism, occupy no other place than some non-exclusionary indefinite proposition would occupy, because it entails no conclusion other than what was already entailed in the imperfect syllogism; and so Aristotle was, in teaching about conversions, correct and complete as far as was necessary for his intention there.⁹¹

23. To the third [n.3, ‘only God is God, therefore only the Father is God’] I say that from a negative proposition expounding the antecedent [sc. ‘none other than God is God’] a negative expounding the consequent [sc. ‘none other than the Father is God’] does not follow.

24. When it is proved on the ground that ‘the inference “other than God, therefore other than the Father” does not follow’, I deny it, because that inference is good.

⁸⁸ Tr. That is, ‘only man runs’ (an exclusionary affirmative) converts to ‘all that runs is a man’ (a universal affirmative with transposed terms), and contrariwise, ‘every man runs’ converts to ‘only what runs is a man’.

⁸⁹ Vatican editors: Aristotle only taught that the universal affirmative, ‘all A is B’, was to be converted to the particular affirmative, ‘some B is A’, *Prior Analytics* 1.2.25a28-29.

⁹⁰ Tr. Imperfect syllogisms are those in the second figure (A is B, C is B, therefore A is C) and third figure (B is A, B is C, therefore A is C). They are made perfect by being reduced, through conversion of propositions, to forms of the first figure (A is B, B is C, therefore A is C).

⁹¹ Tr. Converting a universal affirmative, all A is B, to its exclusionary affirmative, only B is A, is to do the same as converting it to a particular affirmative, some B is A, so it does no more to reduce imperfect syllogisms to perfect ones than that particular affirmative is already doing. Therefore Aristotle had no need to introduce it in this context.

25. And when proof is further given that [n.5] ‘the term of this relation of diversity is not distributed because then there would be an incompossibility in asserting such a relative term of anything’, I reply that in all relatives involving equivalence the common genus, when taken by itself – as it is common –, is not in relation to anything, because, from the fact that it is common, it abstracts from all related terms or terms of relations, and there is no real relation save of a distinct thing to a distinct thing; but if the common genus were in relation as such to something, then one would have to give for it some ‘thus related’ distinct term, and so it would not be related to anything of the same idea as the particular related thing, but it would be related to something of a different idea. Such a relative then is only related to a particular contained under it, just as the like is not as ‘like in general’ related to the like but as some particular under the like in general, which something can be distinguished from the like that it is related to; the same is true of the different; for the different is not related to a different thing in general as to its first correlative (as if there were two first extremes in the relation and each extreme was the most common genus for any particular different), but the different is different from this different.

26. And if you object that a relative gives to understand first its own common correlative, I reply:

The correlative is not its correlative ‘as something common’ unless it is taken for some particular under the common, as which particular it can be distinguished from the related term. There exists an example of this fact in real things, because if the whole nature of fire existed in one individual, that individual could not generate fire (because if it could, then it would generate another fire in which the whole nature of fire would exist,

and there would as it were be two species of fire, which is impossible), and yet, as it is now, the nature in one individual fire is the principle of generating fire, because it has enough unity for being an active principle and enough distinctness [sc. enough distinctness as this individual fire to be capable of generating another distinct individual fire]. So it is here in the present case: likeness is indeed a principle in something for forming a relation, or being the term of a relation, but it neither forms nor is a term unless it is taken for a distinct thing in which it may exist, such that neither unity nor distinctness is accidental but both are essential in respect of such a relation, just as was said in the question ‘About Circumincection’ [d.19 n.62]; for ‘not other than God, therefore not other than the Father’ does not follow (however in the affirmative the inference is good [n.24], by reason of the distribution of the term in the relation), because of the negation included in the idea of otherness.⁹²

27. To the other proof, when it is said ‘only God, therefore only the Father or only the Son’ [n.3, and footnote], the response is that the subject of an exclusionary proposition [e.g. ‘only God’] can be taken in comparison to the exclusion or to the predicate; in the first way it has simple supposition, for exclusion is made by it because of what is signified; in the second way it has personal supposition, because the predicate is attributed to it as to a supposit.⁹³

⁹² Tr. Sc. ‘not other than God, therefore not other than the Father’ is equivalent to ‘not not-God, therefore not not-Father’, which is equivalent to ‘God, therefore Father’, which is false of the Son and the Holy Spirit

⁹³ Tr. Simple supposition is when a term is taken as to its meaning (a dog is a species of animal), and personal supposition is when the term is taken as to the thing it signifies (dogs run). So in the case of ‘only God is God’, if the subject term is taken in simple supposition the proposition is about the meaning of the term ‘God’ and not about the persons, so nothing follows about the persons. If the subject is taken in personal supposition, then it means ‘only the Father is God’ or ‘only the Son is God’ or ‘only the Holy Spirit is God’, and this way of speaking was rejected above in n.7.

28. Against this: one extreme in one act of combining and dividing has one idea according to which it is taken in respect of the other extreme, because diverse ways of taking the same extreme in respect of the same other extreme do not seem to cohere with unity of combining act.

29. And if it be said that, in respect of exclusion, the extreme supposits under one idea, and that as taken under exclusion in respect of the predicate it supposits under another idea, – on the contrary: the subject does not supposit in respect of its own disposition but in respect of the predicate, and so it does precisely have the supposition [sc. personal supposition] that, as taken under its own disposition, it is understood to have in respect of the predicate.

30. Therefore I say that the subject of an exclusionary affirmative supposits only confusedly, just as does the predicate of a universal affirmative (which is proved from the fact that they are convertible, and because to give, in respect of the same extreme existing in the same way, a distributive argument on the part of the other extreme from a confused to a distributive supposition, is the fallacy of figure of speech), and one is not permitted to proceed downwards under a term that so stands – namely confusedly.⁹⁴

31. However, one could also say that in the proposition in question things are otherwise than they are in creatures, namely because ‘God’ under exclusion [sc. ‘only God’] stands for ‘this God’, who is common to the three persons (which response was touched on in d.4 nn.11-13), and for this God the subject there, ‘God is Father and Son and Holy Spirit’, stands; and this point could also be valid by d.30 qq.1-2, that he [sc.

⁹⁴ Tr. If the subject term supposits confusedly (not determinately to this or that supposit) then one may not descend to such a determinate supposit. So here, because ‘only God’ in ‘only God is God’ supposits for the persons confusedly, one may not proceed from it to the determinate ‘only the Father is God’. To do so is to commit the fallacy of figure of speech, because it is to move from ‘God’ in simple supposition to ‘God’ in personal supposition.

God as this God] is the subject to which action in respect of creatures first belongs (because he is ‘this God’, as he is God ‘by this deity’, without understanding any personal property), although every predicate which is true of this predicate [sc. the predicate ‘acting in respect of creatures’] is true of the Father *per se*, yet not only of the Father but of the Son and Holy Spirit too.⁹⁵

Twenty Second Distinction

Single Question

*Whether God is Nameable by us with some Name signifying the Divine Essence in itself,
as it is a ‘This’*

1. About⁹⁶ the twenty second distinction I ask whether God is nameable by us with some name signifying the divine essence in itself, as it is a ‘this’.^a

a. [Note by Duns Scotus] That he is not.⁹⁷ – Augustine on the Lord’s words in *Sermon 34*: “Whatever can be said is not unsayable (or ineffable);” but God is ineffable (the proof is from St. Paul). Again, Augustine *On John* sermon 19 and *John* 5: “The Son can do nothing save what he sees the Father doing;” what the ‘seeing’ of the Word is cannot be demonstrated by word. Again,

⁹⁵ Tr. In other words ‘only God is the Father’ could be maintained if it is understood to mean ‘only this God, who is Father, Son, and Holy Spirit, is Father, Son, and Holy Spirit’.

⁹⁶ See the Appendix at the end of this question.

⁹⁷ Vatican editors: this note is a contraction of what is found in the *Reportatio* on the same question. The references are found in full there and are not repeated here. See the Appendix.

Hilary *On the Trinity* III.9: “Do not be ignorant that, as to speech about this nature, virtue does not reach it.” Again Ambrose *On the Trinity* I ch.5: “Voice is silent, not my own only, but also that of angels.” Again, by reason: he is not understood in this way [sc. as a ‘this’], therefore he is not named in this way either. The inference is plain from Augustine *On the Trinity* VII ch.4: “He is more truly thought than talked of;” and *Enchiridion* 13: “Instructions are that by which someone conveys his thoughts to the knowledge of another;” and Plato: “so that [sc. thoughts] may be present to hand.”

On the contrary. – Augustine *Against Admantus* 13: “That sublimity must be signified by human sounds.” Again, [God] is understood in this way [sc. as a ‘this’], therefore etc.; proof of the antecedent: he is understood to be of himself a ‘this’, therefore he is understood as a ‘this’. Again Rabbi Moses [Maimonides] in *Guide* I ch.61: “We have no name [sc. for God] that is not taken from his work, save the ‘Tetragrammaton’ [sc. JHVH], therefore it is called ‘the separated Name’, because it signifies the substance of the Creator with a pure signification;” “it is written down, it is not spoken,” “save in the sanctuary, by the holy priests, in giving priestly blessing alone, and by the high priest on the day of fasting.” “This name ‘Adonai’ (*Exodus* 6) is a recognition of a second name that is more abstract than the other names known about God” besides the first name imposed (the four letters of the tetragrammaton were imposed by God to signify some articulated spoken word that, according to the first imposition of letters, would be signified by other letters; this spoken word was imposed by God to signify his essence purely). Maimonides is treating of the same letters, which are those of the “tetragrammaton” (jod-heth-vau-he, which are the same as the Latin letters j-e-v-h), from which letters – joined together in one syllable – no meaning is collected, but rather from teaching, about which teaching he adds ch.62: “No man knew how speaking in its case would go; the wise used to hand on, one to another, how it might be spoken.”

A spoken name should be a symbol between speaker and spoken to, so that the thing signified (in the way it is signified) might be known to both, and so that the name might be a sign of the thing; the truth of the divine nature, as to the idea of its immensity, is known to God alone, – it cannot, as to the idea of its immensity, be known to any creature; therefore God could appropriate to himself, and make to be his own, this ‘nameable name’ –, no name of a creature,

just as no note of a creature, can be a name proper to the divine nature like this, by leading, through some process of removal, to a knowledge of the divine immensity. However, some proper name can be had for signifying the divine nature as it is known by the intellectual creature (a proper name made by the divine or the created intellect), by which sign the saints speak about the truth of the divine nature in the way it is known to them; that name would not be a name-sign for wayfarers, because the divine nature is in no way known to them the way the blessed know it; therefore it is not a known note, just as neither is whiteness to one born blind. A proper name can be made for us, at God's pleasure, in accord with the way he is known by us; but that name is not transferred from creatures, because what is transferred from creatures is common to creatures and was imposed on them first; therefore a name is imposed on him first and principally. 'Deus (God)' signifies what is of perfection simply, as if supreme among Latin words; it is more proper in comparison with other words that express some idea of dignity as if in particular fashion.

Against the minor [sc. the first statement in the preceding paragraph] (against the major later): any of the blessed knows the object as it is infinite, because the object is seen in its supremacy (*Ord. I d.1 nn.42-50*); again, comprehension is not required for something to be signified; again, the mental word is a natural sign; again, a name given to God would not be an essential sign in its being; again, the saints would be able to use the name. – I concede the second point [sc. 'However, some proper name can be had for signifying the divine nature...'], but it would be of the same signified thing. On the contrary: conceiving the signified thing under the same idea as on the part of the object, such the wayfarer knows; proof: the wayfarer has some quidditative concept, otherwise he has no concept at all; that concept is a concept of the quiddity under its proper idea as object, because it is not a common concept in any way, nor a concept capable of being narrowed down, but it is diverse primarily.

Solution. 'Nameable by me' is understood in two ways: by me as the one who imposes the name, or by me as imposing it on the user when he says it to me or to another. In the first way the point is denied, because [God] is not known thus, according to Aristotle and the Commentator *Metaphysics* 8 (the contrary here below, about names of substances, – the way is set down here below, in the solution of the question [end of n.2 below]; response to Aristotle: he is

understanding it confusedly; an example: letters). In the second way it is true, not only as with a magpie [sc. when a magpie imitates and repeats a word of human language], but also with someone grasping it from the letters; an example: when someone who does not have a distinct image of Rome speaks about it, – and in the case of proper names generally, whether the name be imposed by us (as in the first case) or by God (Maimonides, *Guide I*, above). In a third way I conceive it as I am able to, because it is something that falls under the confused concept I have.

But surely I cannot have a proper and quidditative concept? No, because creatures are deficient, even though we could draw a distinction through a simply simple concept (because the concept is proper and not able to be narrowed down, simply simple, primarily diverse), and though we could naturally know necessary truths.

To the arguments: it is ‘ineffable’ to him to whom it is expressed; by using the verb ‘he sees’, just as it is expressed.

I. The Opinion of Others

2. It is said that as God is understood by us so can he also be named by us.

Therefore, according to the diverse ways some think about the knowledge of God had by the intellect of the wayfarer, in like manner do they as a result speak in diverse ways about the possibility of also naming God, – and someone who denies a common concept univocal to God and creatures and posits two analogous concepts (one of which concepts, namely that of the creature, is attributed to the other concept, namely that of God), will say accordingly as a result that God is nameable by the wayfarer with a name expressing that analogous concept [e.g. Henry of Ghent, above I d.3 nn.20-21].

3. But against this opinion I argue in particular that every real concept capable of being had about the divine essence is of a nature to be caused in the intellect by virtue of

that essence (the proof is that any even the most minimal object is of a nature to cause every real concept capable of being had about it); but according to them only one concept is of a nature to be had about the divine essence by virtue of that essence, although the intellect, as it busies itself, might be able to cause and fashion about the object several concepts; therefore whatever object can cause in the intellect a real concept about God can cause that one concept which the essence would be of a nature of itself to cause; but that single concept is of ‘this essence’ as it is a ‘this’, therefore any object whatever that causes in our intellect some knowledge of God will cause – according to this opinion – a concept of him as he is ‘this essence’, and so God will be nameable by the wayfarer with a name signifying ‘this essence’ as it is a ‘this’ [I d.8 n.188].

II. Scotus' own Response

4. One can say briefly to the question [n.1] that this proposition, common to many opinions – namely that ‘as a thing is understood so also is it named’ [n.2] –, is false if it is taken to be understood precisely, because something can be signified more distinctly than it can be understood.

5. The point seems to be shown by this, that since substance cannot be understood by the wayfarer save in the common concept of being (as was proved in I d.3 nn.128-129), then, if it could not be signified more distinctly than it is understood, no name imposed by the wayfarer would signify anything of the genus of substance, but that, just as some property is precisely understood by the wayfarer which he uses to impose the name (and this property is commonly expressed by the etymology of the name), so it is precisely

such property that would be signified by the name; for example, by the name ‘stone’ (or ‘lapis’) nothing of the genus of substance would be signified but only something of the genus of action, to wit ‘striking the bone of the foot’ (or ‘laedens pedem’), which the etymology expresses and was the origin of the imposition of the name.

6. And so it can be argued about all other names imposed on things in the genus of substance, because none of them signifies anything save some accidental property that was understood by the one who imposed the name – or instead one must say that the name signifies the thing more distinctly than that thing was understood by the imposer of the name.

7. But how this may be possible can be understood as follows, according to the way of Augustine *On the Trinity* VI ch.6 n.8, by which he proves there is composition in every creature. For many accidents are conceived by anyone, accidents coming together in the same thing, for example such and such a quantity and quality – and the proof that neither of these is the other is because each of them remains without the other; there is also proof that for both of them something else is the common subject, because each of them can be destroyed while the other is not destroyed; therefore something is shown to be the subject of them, for example of the quality and the quantity, – but that which is the subject is not conceived in a quidditative concept save in the concept of being, or of ‘this being’. Also, since it frequently happens that such and such a quantity and quality are conjoined in something and are not conjoined in other things, and this not from the nature of quality and quantity, as was just shown above, – the conclusion follows that this is from the nature of a third thing which both the quantity and quality have for foundation; but the sort of quality and quantity conjoined in this whole are not the sort that are

conjoined in that whole; for from the fact they are conjoined in diverse ways in diverse things the conclusion follows that the substrate of these is diverse from the substrate of those, and from this the conclusion follows that this third thing [sc. the substrate in the first case] is other than that third thing [sc. the substrate in the other case].^a But on this thus distinct third thing (whatever it be that goes along with the things conjoined in it, which are the things understood) some name is imposed; this name seems to be the proper sign of ‘this’ thing, under the idea in which it is a ‘this’, such that he who imposes the name intends to signify the essence of it in the genus of substance; and just as he intends to signify the thing, so the name he imposes is a sign of the thing, and yet he does not understand distinctly the thing he intends distinctly to signify by this name or this sign.^b

a. [*Interpolation*] therefore some third thing is known to be substrate, and likewise that it is different from the subject of other accidents; nor yet do I know distinctly what the subject is in itself, save that it is a being or a thing, qualified by such and such accidents; hence the further conception that I can have of it, as to what it is, is that it is something possessing such and such accident and relations. As to the issue at hand, then, it is not [the same as] such and such accidents.

b. [*Interpolation*] and thus it is perhaps that, after the fall, names have been imposed.

8. There would also be an example of this: if someone were to impose Hebrew characters not knowing Hebrew letters in particular – yet if, knowing that some letter is first and another second and another third, he were to impose them like this, ‘some letter or other is first, and whichever it is, I will that it be signified by such and such a name and such and such a character’, those characters would be signs of those Hebrew letters,

which some Hebrew would distinctly know when such signs were put in front of him, while a non-Hebrew, although he would understand what was signified by those shapes, would yet not know distinctly what was signified but only under the idea of first letter or second.

9. Therefore one can say briefly that, at a minimum, many names are imposed that signify God in general, because God can thus be naturally conceived by the wayfarer, as is clear from distinction 3 [I d.3 nn.58, 61]; or if it is true that ‘something can be signified more distinctly than it can be understood’ [n.4], then God can be named by the wayfarer with a name that signifies ‘this essence’.⁹⁸

10. But however it may be in these cases, it is likely that God is named by some such name, and this whether the name is imposed by God himself, or by an angel who knows him, or by a wayfarer. For it is likely that there are many names in Scripture that signify the divine essence distinctly, – as the Jews say of the name of God with which they call him, the ‘Tetragrammaton’ [JHVH], and as God seems to say, *Exodus* 3.14: “These things shalt thou say to the children of Israel: He who is sent me to you, this is my name;” and in another place, 3.15: “I am the God of Abraham etc., this is my name;” and 6.3: “my great name Adonai I have not made known to them.”

11. God, then, is nameable by the wayfarer with a name properly signifying the divine essence as it is ‘this essence’, because the wayfarer can use that name and intend to express what is signified by the sign, whether he himself imposed the sign or anyone else who knew the thing signified; and also such sign or name can be used as a name by a wayfarer even if he could not have imposed it as a sign. And if the proposition is true that

⁹⁸ Vatican editors: which essence, however, cannot be naturally conceived by the wayfarer, I d.3 nn.56-57.

‘no name can be imposed on anything more distinctly than the thing is understood’ [n.5], yet this proposition is false that ‘no one can use a name that signifies a thing more distinctly than he himself can understand it’; and therefore one must simply concede that the wayfarer can use many names expressing the divine essence under the idea of divine essence.

Appendix A

Twenty Second Distinction

Single Question

[*Interpolation*] “After what has been said [sc. I dd.1-21] it seems we must discourse of the diversity of the names, etc.” [Lombard, *Sent.* I d.22 ch.1 n.198]. According to what the Apostle says *Romans* 10.10: “With the heart faith is held unto justice, but with the mouth confession is made unto salvation,” in accord with this the Master [Lombard] – proceeding in this first book –, after he has taught what is to be believed about God and divine reality [I dd.1-21], teaches in this second part [sc. from I d.22] how one should speak about what is believed. And that this division is according to his intention is plain to anyone who considers his text at the beginning of this distinction 22.⁹⁹

⁹⁹ Vatican editors give the text from Lombard thus: “After what has been said, it seems we must discourse of the diversity of the names we use in speaking of the ineffable Unity and Trinity. Next we must show in what ways something is said about that Unity and Trinity.”

Now this part is divided into two: the preface [the opening text just referred to] and the treatise (which begins at ‘That then chiefly’ [from d.22 to the end of the first book of the *Sentences*]). And the treatise is divided into two: in the first of which he makes determination about the divine names in general, setting down differences of six names about God, and in the second of which he pursues these differences separately and singly (and this part begins ‘One needs to know therefore’ [ch.4 n.201]). And this second part is divided into two: in the first of which he gives determinations about names for which a shorter treatise is sufficient, and in the second about certain names that require a special and distinct treatise (the second part begins at the beginning of distinction 35: ‘Since we have discussed above’). The first is again divided into two: for in the first he gives determinations about absolute names [dd.22-25], in the second about relative names (at the beginning of distinction 26: ‘Now about the properties of the persons’). The first of these is divided into two: for first he lays down a rule about absolute names which makes apparent their distinction from relative names – second he excepts from the common rule the name ‘person’ (and this at the beginning of distinction 23: ‘To what has been said one must add’). The first is divided into two, because first he lays down the rule and proves it from Augustine, and second he adduces a proof from Augustine, with which he proves the conclusion asserted (the second part at the place ‘But God is not great etc.’).

[*Interpolation*]¹⁰⁰ About this distinction I ask whether God is nameable by a human wayfarer with some proper name.

That he is not:

¹⁰⁰ From *Reportatio IA* d.22 q. un.

Augustine in sermon 34 ‘On the Lord’s Words’ [*Sermon 117 ch.5 n.7*]:

“Whatever can be said is not ineffable; but God is ineffable.” The minor is proved by Augustine, by what he immediately subjoins when he says: “For if the Apostle Paul says that he was snatched up ‘to the third heaven and heard ineffable words’, how much more is he who shows him these ineffable things himself ineffable?”

Further, Augustine in homily 19 on *John* [*On the Gospel of John*, tract.19 n.1], when expounding the verse, *John* 5.19: “The Son can do nothing that he has not seen the Father doing,” says that “the seeing of the Son is the very being of the Word of the Father, which cannot be shown by words.”

Further, Hilary *On the Trinity* III ch.9 [n.20]: “The virtue of the generation [sc. of the Son] exceeds the speech of human nature.”

Further, Ambrose *On the Trinity* I ch.5 [*On the Faith* I ch.10 n.64]: “Voice is silent, not my own only, but also that of angels” (he is speaking of the generation of the Son).

Further, by reason: nothing can be signified by anyone save what can be understood by him as well; but God cannot be understood by the human wayfarer with a proper concept; therefore etc. – The major is proved by Aristotle (*Metaphysics* 4.4.1006a22-24) and the Commentator (Averroes, *Metaphysics* IV com.10), and is proved as to the issue at hand by Augustine *On the Trinity* VII ch.4 n.7 (“God is more truly thought on than named, and exists more truly than he may be thought”), and by the Philosopher *On Interpretation* 1.16a3-4 (“Words are signs of affections” that is of concepts): therefore there cannot be a sign of some remote signified thing save under the idea under which the concept is the proximate sign of it. The minor is proved by the

saying of *Exodus* 33.20: “No man will see me and live;” and by reason, because the proper concept, if it were had, would include virtually a proper knowledge of all the things that are necessarily in God; the proof of this consequence is that, universally, the proper concept of a subject, even in creatures, virtually includes a proper knowledge of everything that is in the subject; and then would follow further that, just as he who has the proper concept of a subject can naturally know simply all that is knowable about the subject, so the wayfarer who has such a concept could naturally know all necessary truths about God, and consequently all that we have faith about, as to unity and trinity in divine reality and as to creative and incarnative power, and so about the other things necessarily belonging to God.

To the contrary:

In *Psalm* 75.2: “Great is my name in Israel;” and *Exodus* 3.14-15: “These things shalt thou say to the children of Israel: He who is sent me to you, this is my name etc.”

Further, Augustine *Against Adimantus* ch.13 n.2: “That inestimable sublimity must, in order to be adapted to the ear, be signified by human signs.”

Further, by reason: the wayfarer can have a proper concept of God, therefore he can also name him with a proper name. – The proof of the antecedent is that he can know by natural reason that some being is first and infinite, and that it is unique and a ‘this’; therefore he can have a concept of that essence as it is a ‘this’ (but such a concept seems to be most proper to any object, namely to conceive as it is a ‘this’, in itself).

Here is one opinion [Henry of Ghent], as follows:

A name or vocal word must be a symbol between the speaker and the spoken to, such that the signified thing be in itself known to each of them, and also that each know

that the name is imposed to signify that thing; but the truth of the divine nature is known, as to the idea of its immensity, only to God; therefore only he can appropriate a proper name to himself. Now the opinion subjoins for the second minor (to be assumed under the first major) that the blessed know that essence in itself; therefore by some word (as a sign of that essence) under that idea they can name God, whether that word be instituted by God or by one of the blessed. The third minor is that the wayfarer cannot conceive the divine essence, neither as to the idea of its immensity (this is proper to God) nor in the same way that the blessed see it; and therefore a sign imposed on the essence in the first or second way cannot lead them to any knowledge of the divine essence, just as neither can someone born blind be led to a knowledge of colors by the words which those lead themselves by who see and know colors, through recollection, to a knowledge of colors.

Fourth minor: the intellect of the wayfarer can in some way conceive God; therefore he can name him in a proportional way. – The opinion adds there that no name proper to God, imposed at will, can be transferred from creatures (because any such name is also common to creatures and is imposed on them first), but that that name must be first and principally imposed on him, up to the little extent that God can be known by creatures. The inference is further drawn that this name ‘God’ signifies, from its imposition, what is simply more perfect, as if in sum and in general by comparison with other names which express as it were in particular fashion something that has the idea of dignity in God, as are ‘wise’, ‘good’ etc. Also this name ‘God’ is imposed on him first, such that it does not belong to creatures save by transference (the way Moses was called the ‘god of Pharaoh’, *Exodus 7.1*); therefore of all Latin names the name proper to him is this name ‘God’, and proper in this way in the Greek tongue is the name ‘Theos’.

How the major in the reasoning of this opinion is true will be stated in the solution of the question. But the minors, or the diverse parts of the same minor, seem doubtful. The first indeed, namely that ‘only God knows himself under the idea of his immensity’, is, as to its affirmative part that ‘he thus knows himself’, most certain. But as to its negative part, namely that ‘no intellect knows God under that idea’, it is refuted as follows:

No operative power can be most perfectly at rest save in an object that includes the highest perfection possible for the adequate object of the power; but infinity or immensity is the perfection possible for being or truth, or for any transcendent idea, and one or other of them is the adequate object of any intellect; therefore a created intellect is not perfectly at rest save in God under the idea of his immensity. – The major is proved by an example from sight and from the visible object agreeable to it, and by reason, because, whenever anything else is had, the power still has an inclination to something not had and more principle than what is had. The first part of the minor was proved in distinction 2 [I d.2 n.147], the second part in distinction 3 [I d.3 n.137].

The second refutation is as follows: only an act of intellection that ‘comprehends God’ is repugnant to a created intellect; but some act of intellection of God ‘according to the idea of his immensity’ can exist that does not comprehend God; therefore etc. – The proof of the minor is that an act that comprehends an infinite object is infinite in intensity, because it is as perfect in idea of act as the object is perfect in idea of object, and so it is simply adequate; but there can be of an object as it is immense a non-infinite act, because, just as the object can be simply more perfect than the act, and this under the idea under which it is the object of the act, so it can also be infinite without infinity of act. A

confirmation is that there seems to be no reason why there could not be about an object ‘under the idea of infinity’ an act more perfect in one intellect and less perfect in another.

With this part of the minor refuted, the corresponding conclusion is refuted, – and first as follows:

Someone who names an object under some idea does not have to comprehend the object under that idea, but it is enough that he distinctly apprehend it; a created intellect can thus apprehend God under the idea of immensity (the thing is plain from the reasons already set down); therefore, etc. – The proof of the major is that Adam imposed names on diverse animals proper to them and yet he did not comprehend them, because then he would have known them with a perfection equal to that which the soul of Christ had, which is not maintained.

Second, because a natural sign is more truly a sign than one imposed at pleasure; a created act of intellection can be a natural sign of God as to the idea of his immensity; therefore someone so understanding can impose on God a sign at pleasure. – The proof of the minor is that intellection, as it is of the object, is a natural sign of it (Aristotle *On Interpretation* ibid. “Words are signs of affections” and this naturally so), which is for this reason, that intellection is the proper idea of the object; but it was proved before that some created intellection can be of God under the idea of his immensity.

Third, because any name is a finite sign, even if it be imposed by God himself according to the idea of his immensity; therefore, in order for it to be a sign for someone who understands, there is no need for that someone to have an infinite intellection of it. God can, then, be named with some name or other by a finite intelligence, nay more, God cannot name himself with any name that as much exceeds the name by which he is

nameable by the blessed as the comprehension of God exceeds the apprehension of the blessed; and no wonder, because neither does there need to be for us a proportion of a name to a named thing when signifying it, just as neither a proportion of intellection to the intellection of the one who imposes or uses it, – and therefore a name imposed by one of them can be a sign for both of them. Thus therefore, this name imposed by God who comprehends can be a sign common to himself and the blessed, because it only signifies finitely, and so neither does it require in the user an infinite intellection.

The fourth part of the minor, although it be itself true when maintaining that the wayfarer could not have a proper quidditative concept of God, and although the blessed has imposed a name to signify the sort of proper concept that he has of God, yet there is argument that it is repugnant to what he [sc. Henry of Ghent] said elsewhere:

First as follows: for he concedes that the wayfarer has some quidditative concept of God, and plainly so because otherwise no one could have a qualitative or relative concept of God, for a qualitative concept always requires some quidditative one wherein it is; but according to him a quidditative concept of God cannot be had that is common to God and creatures; therefore it will be a proper concept and so simply primarily diverse from the concept of a creature. Therefore the name that is imposed on God under his proper idea would not be a name for the wayfarer just as neither is the name of color for one born blind. – If it be said that the wayfarer cannot intuitively understand God as the blessed can, this is not an obstacle, because an intuitive concept of the thing signified by the name is never given by the name, but only some recollection for considering a thing already known; the point is plain from the example, for a blind man not born blind, because he did once see colors, does very well use the name of color as a sign common to

him and someone sighted, because both can understand colors by recollection, even though the blind man cannot now intuit colors.

The second argument is as follows: a perfect object can produce in a proportioned intellect some concept capable of being had about it (the proof of this is that a less perfect object can do this); but the divine essence – according to Henry – can only make in a proportioned intellect a single real concept (other concepts, if any are had, are had by the intellect busying itself about it); therefore the single real concept is the only one capable of being had about that essence. Therefore if he has some concept of God (he does have one!), it will be a proper concept. Nor is concept in this argument taken for the nature of conceiving, but for the formal object terminating the act. – Although the major of this argument seems probable, it may yet be denied of a proportioned intellect (that is an infinite one), because that intellect comprehends with a single concept, and so it is not capable of many concepts about the object in the way an intellect that does not comprehend is; the major may also be denied of any intellect at all, by understanding it of the immediate object that in itself moves the intellect, because, on account of its perfection, it would not move the intellect to imperfect concepts that can be had about itself through the motion of other objects that imperfectly move the intellect to knowledge of itself.

As to the question I set certain things down first:

First, that any name, signifying something that can be present in a particular thing alone, can be called the proper name of that thing, although simply the thing's proper name is only what first signifies it under its proper idea, because only that name is the proper vocal sign of it.

Second I set down that ‘to be named by someone’ can be understood in two ways: either as a name for the imposer or as a name for the user; and each of these in two ways, that is, perfectly and imperfectly. Using a name perfectly is not only using the name as some natural vocal sound, namely by forming the sound (the way a trained bird can form it), but is to use the name ‘as a sign’ not only of a concept able to be got through that name by someone else (in this way a Latin speaker could pronounce some Hebrew word to a Hebrew without knowing what he was saying), but also as a sign of a concept possessed by the user, so that thus ‘to use a name perfectly’ is to use it as a sign expressive of a proper concept; but to use it as in some way the cause of the hearer’s having a like concept by recollection is not necessary for simply using it perfectly but for perfectly using it as a sign common to two people, and therefore this is required for perfectly using the name morally, because it is required for using the name for the due end. And both these perfections are touched on by Augustine *Enchiridion* ch.22 when he says: “Words are introduced so that by them someone may put forward his thoughts for the knowledge of another;” behold the first perfection ‘his thoughts’, – behold the second ‘for the knowledge of another’. Understand the ‘of another’ (or ‘as it were of another’) in that sometimes someone by speaking leads himself more effectively to knowledge by recollection than without speaking (to a knowledge then, I say, that is not new), as when we speak to God in prayer; again, as to the first perfection, I draw a distinction in ‘his thoughts’, because either he has a concept as proper as the name signifies it (and then he signifies ‘his thoughts’ perfectly), or he has a less proper or a confused concept, as for example when someone who has only the concept of animal puts forward this vocal sound ‘man’, intending to express to the hearer by this name what others conceive

through the name and for which the name was imposed, while knowing that it was imposed on some species under animal but not understanding it with the particularity that the name signifies. The order then is as follows: to use the name as it is such and such a thing; next, to use it as a sign at pleasure of something else, of which however the user has no concept (save in this very universal way, that there is something signified by the name); third, as a sign of something of which the user has only a universal concept (yet he intends to express what is signified by the name, although he does not conceive it thus in particular); fourth, as a sign expressive of the proper concept in particular. And here a prior stage is always imperfect with respect to a later one; the first stage then is most imperfect, the last simply perfect.

Having laid down these premises, let the first conclusion with respect to the question be as follows: it is possible for God to be named by the wayfarer with a name that is simply proper according to the first three ways aforesaid; the second conclusion is this: it is not possible for God to be named perfectly by the wayfarer, namely according to the fourth stage; third conclusion: how God is in fact named by us.

The proof of the first is that, if it is not true, this would only be because one cannot have a proper concept of God, – and because the thing must be conceived the way it is named. But this second point is false: proof, because we have no concept that is *per se* and proper about any substance; if then it is impossible to name a thing more distinctly than one conceives it, the result is that the wayfarer does not, as user of the name, distinctly signify substance with any name, nor will any name imposed by the wayfarer signify any substance distinctly. The consequent is false, therefore the antecedent is too.

The first proposition, namely that ‘we do not understand substance distinctly’ was proved above in distinction 3 [I d.3 n.140].

As to how the opposite of the consequent is true (because it is a preamble to the proposed solution), this is made clear first by the denomination of substance, by using the imposed name, – second, by the denomination of it when imposing on it a name.

The first as follows:

By this name ‘man’ we do not intend to signify animal merely (as is plain), but something under animal distinct from horse and other animals; hence this proposition is true for us, ‘man is *per se* distinct from horse’ etc. Nor do we intend to signify by the name ‘man’ some accident or accidents, but the species in the genus of substance only; hence this proposition is true ‘man is *per se* distinct from any accident whatever’, even by the greatest distinctness because in accord with the most general of genera. Nor do we intend to signify some description made up of animal and an accident (or accidents), but rather something *per se* one and of a nature to have in itself a definitive concept that is *per se* one; but that which we intend to signify under its proper idea, although we do not so understand it, this we name imperfectly according to the third stage, as was said before; therefore etc.

The second, namely about imposition as about use, is similarly plain:

For just as, if Adam, when understanding man under its proper idea, imposed on it a name proper to it, which name, when I use it, I intend to signify the thing the way its name was imposed on it (about which, however, I do not have a concept save an imperfect one in general, or accidentally, or in some description), so I, if I were likewise to understand the same thing when it was not yet named, could impose a name on it,

intending by that name to signify it in just the way I intend now to signify it with a name already imposed by another. And when someone imposes a name like this, although he do not have a concept of the thing save under some description, which is signified by the etymology of the name, yet the name is not imposed to signify that etymology or description, but the substance of which it is the description; just as this name ‘stone’ is not imposed to signify this action ‘striking the bone of the foot’ (because then stone would be in the genus of action *per se*), but it is imposed on the substance under its proper idea, of which substance this is a sort of description ‘striking the bone of the foot’. This point is also plain, because sometimes many names are imposed on the same thing, not from the same property but from different ones, as stone-rock; nor are the names imposed on the properties, because then they would not be names of the same thing *per se*, nay one would be a name of something in the genus of action and the other of something in the genus of passion (as ‘rounded down by being struck by the foot’).¹⁰¹

It is plain, then, that the reason for the imposition of a name is one thing (and it is what the etymology signifies) and what it is imposed on is another; and so although the one imposing it did not have a distinct concept save of the reason for which he imposed the name, yet he did not impose the name on that reason but on the substance of which the reason is the description, and on the substance under its proper idea, which however he does not thus understand, – and consequently he names it as imposing the name imperfectly in accord with the third stage.

¹⁰¹ Tr. ‘Rounded down by being struck by the foot’ is an Englished version for the etymology of ‘rock’ mimicking the Latin ‘pede trita’ (‘worn down by the foot’), given by Scotus, for the Latin ‘petra’ (‘rock’).

Twenty Third Distinction

Single Question

Whether Person, according as it says Something Common to the Father and the Son and the Holy Spirit, says precisely Something of Second Intention

1. About the twenty third distinction I ask whether person, according as it says something common to the Father and the Son and the Holy Spirit, says precisely something of second intention.

That it does not:

The proof is that a person is the term of a real production and is adored; a second intention does not terminate a real production nor is adored; therefore, etc.

2. Further, the Trinity in divine reality is not a matter of concepts only but of things, – against the error of Sabellius; therefore, etc.

3. On the contrary:

Everything common to many things that is univocal, distinct, and multiplied in them, is said of them according to some idea of a universal; person is a common univocal to the Father and the Son and the Holy Spirit, according to Augustine *On the Trinity* VII ch.4 n.7; therefore person is said of them according to some idea of a universal; and if it state some second intention, there would truly be in divine reality some idea of a universal, which does not seem discordant; but if it state a first intention, there will be in divine reality a real common universal, and so some potential reality, – this is discordant.

I. Opinion of Others

4. [Exposition of the opinion] – An assertion here [of Henry of Ghent] is that person only states a second intention:

5. Because what an individual is in any nature that a supposit is in substantial nature and a person in intellectual nature; but individual and supposit state only a thing of second intention; therefore person too states only a thing of second intention.

6. A confirmation of the reason is that the nature in which these are [individual, supposit, person] does not belong to their *per se* idea; for nature is set down in the definition of them as something added, therefore it does not vary their formal ideas.

7. Again, everything common said of many things is said of them according to the idea of some universal; therefore if person signify a thing of first intention, common to the three persons, it will state it of them under the idea of a most general genus, or of some intermediate genus, or according to some idea of most specific species, – the opposite of all which is manifest. Not under the idea of most specific species because it would follow that there will be as it were two most specific species with respect to the same persons; for deity – according to Damascene *On the Orthodox Faith* ch.48 – indicates as it were the species that surrounds and embraces the hypostases [I d.8 n.41], and person will indicate the most specific species with respect to them. Therefore, etc.

8. There is added to this opinion [n.4] that although person state something of second intention, yet it does not state it in the abstract but in the concrete, – and therefore it can be predicated of a thing of first intention and supposit for it. An exemplification: in

the statement ‘species is a second intention’ species is taken for the very intention in itself – and in the statement ‘species is predicated of many things differing in number’ etc. species is taken for the thing that it denominates; for this intention ‘species’ is not, as it seems, predicated of many things, but man is so predicated or ass, of which this intention is stated.

9. [Rejection of the opinion] – Against this opinion, and first against him who holds it [Henry]:

Whenever from the formal constituents of certain things something common of first intention can be abstracted, then with equal or greater reason something can be abstracted from the constituted things; but the divine persons – according to them [the followers of Henry] – are constituted formally by relations. But from those constitutive relations can be abstracted something real of first intention; for paternity is a relation and filiation is a relation,^a and this when taking relation univocally, because there can be certitude about a concept of inward relation while there is doubt about every special concept whatever – and such a one, being thus certain, not only has certitude about the vocal word but about some concept; therefore the concept of the relation in general is other than the concept of it in particular. Therefore much more will a thing of first intention be able to be abstracted from the things constituted by those relations. – But the assumption about the univocity of relation will be clearer below, in this question.¹⁰²

a. [Interpolation] and is predication in the ‘what’; but no second intention is predicated in the ‘what’ of a thing of first intention.

¹⁰² Vatican editors: this assumption is not dealt with below, for it seems to have regard to the second way [nn.24-25], which Scotus did not complete. The assumption is dealt with extensively in *Reportatio IA d.25 nn.24-29*, although here in n.20, and also in the *Lectura I d.23 n.20*, Scotus did not concede a univocal common quidditative concept abstracted from the constituents of the persons.

10. Against the opinion [n.4] in itself:

Because every second intention is a relation of reason, not any such relation, but one pertaining to an extreme of an act of the intellect combining and dividing or at any rate comparing one extreme to the other (the thing is plain, because a second intention – in everyone's view – is caused by an act of the intellect busying itself about a thing of first intention, which act can cause nothing in the object save only a relation or relations of reason); but person does not state a relation of reason, and certainly not a relation pertaining to an act of the intellect combining extremes. But that it does not state any relation of reason is evident because then at any rate it would necessarily co-require the correlative to which it is referred, because it is impossible to understand a relation and not understand that it is in relation to some term and correlative, as every second intention requires its correlative (as the species requires the genus for its correlative, and the particular the universal, and so on of others); the point is plain about idea, which is a relation of reason, nor can it be understood save by respect to another. But person is not said to be person of someone, or at least it does not state an extreme of the intellect comparing things.

11. Again, I take their reasoning [of Henry and his followers] to the opposite by taking the same major and the opposite of the minor, that an individual that imports individual unity states a thing of first intention, because unity is a property of being (as is plain in *Metaphysics* 4.2.1003b22-25), and consequently unity follows a thing from the nature of the thing – and this is above all true of the unity that is true unity, of which sort is the unity of the individual; therefore such unity does not state a second intention; and

just as unity in any nature does not do this, so neither does unity in intellectual nature; if then person states unity in intellectual nature as individual does in any nature, what follows is the opposite of their conclusion [n.5].

12. Further, against the second reason [n.7]:

Augustine *On Christian Doctrine* I ch.5 n.5 (and it is Lombard's text in I d.25 ch.2 nn.220, 222) says that "things to be enjoyed are the Father and the Son and the Holy Spirit;" hence, according to him, the three persons are three things; but thing does not seem to state a second intention, and yet it is common to the three persons and is numbered in line with them; therefore one should not say that person, because it is common and multiplied in number several times, signifies a second intention.

13. The Master too, in d.25 ch.2 n.220, expounds three persons through 'three subsistences or three subsistents'; but by subsistence he does not seem to signify a thing of second intention, and yet it is common to the three and multiplied in number with them ('for they are called three subsistences or three subsistents, three beings or three things').^a

a. [Interpolation] Again, the aforesaid opinion asks 'how person can be univocally predicated of several subjects in divine reality unless it be a universal', but the same difficulty arises about relation and follows in the same way; for it seems that a common element could be abstracted more from the things constituted than from the constituents. But how something common of first intention can be abstracted and yet not be a real universal will be stated in distinction 25 [Reportatio IA d.25 nn.27-29].

14. Further, against the other thing added [n.8] I argue as follows: an adjective does not determine anything save that which is the term of its dependence; but an

adjective cannot be the term of the dependence of another adjective because their dependence is equal; therefore neither determines the other, – and so if this name ‘person’ is a concrete of the sort in question [n.8], then the statement that there are ‘three persons’ will not be well made save by understanding another substantive which would be determined by both adjectives; but no such implicitly understood other substantive is given, therefore etc.^a

- a. [Note by Duns Scotus] Response: there are many concretes that are not adjectives (for example cause, genus, species), and the argument [n.14] is against adjective, not against concrete.

II. Scotus' own Response

15. My response to the question [n.1] is that by taking the definition of person that Richard [of St. Victor] posits in *On the Trinity* IV ch.21, that it is ‘the incommunicable existence of intellectual nature’, by which definition is expounded or corrected the definition of Boethius when he says that person is ‘an individual substance of rational nature’ (because thus it would follow that the soul is a person, which is discordant, and that deity is a person^a), I say that there is nothing in this definition of Richard’s that signifies a second intention, because from the nature of the thing – without the work of the intellect – there is in the Father intellectual nature and incommunicable entity.

- a. [Interpolation] and also it would not properly belong to God, because there is no individual save where is something divisible, which does not belong to God; likewise the name of person would belong properly only to man, who alone is properly said to be rational.

16. But this incommunicability is double (which can be understood from what was said in distinction 2 [nn. 379-380]), because ‘communicable to many’ is said in two ways: in one way that is said to be ‘communicable to many’ which is the same as each of them, such that, whatever it is, it is said to be communicable as a universal is to the things under it; in another way something is communicated as a form by which something is but which is not it, as the soul is communicated to the body. And in both ways deity is communicable, and in neither way is person communicable, and so the incommunicability that pertains to the idea of person is double; for which reason the separated soul, although it has the first incommunicability, is yet not a person because it does not have the second, – and each incommunicability is required for the *per se* idea of person, and each is in the thing from the nature of the thing, and so nothing of the idea of person states a second intention.

III. Objections against Scotus' own Response

17. Against this can be objected that, according to it, person would seem to signify only a double negation of a double communicability,^a – and if this be true then it seems doubtful how negation could be common to the three persons unless some affirmation be common to them because of which such a negation is in them;^b but that affirmation is not ‘deity’, because deity is not multiplied in number along with the three [sc. one does not say ‘three deities’ or ‘three Gods’]; therefore some common positive –

as person – must be given first that is abstracted from them before there is such negation, and then the intended proposition is obtained.

a. [Interpolation] Again, I argue as follows: if person formally states incommunicability, then it formally states negation; but negation is a second intention, since it is a being of reason; therefore person states a thing of second intention, which is the intended proposition. – I reply that person does not only state incommunicability but gives to understand the intellectual nature in which it is, as individual gives to understand nature in general. However, I am in doubt whether it states existence formally along with double incommunicability, or only state formally incommunicability-negation and existence in the concrete as a way of having the nature, so that the sense is ‘person is incommunicability having existence in intellectual nature’; and even if one suppose it to be so, I still say that person does not state a second intention (because a second intention, since it is a being of reason, is only caused by the intellect busying itself about something), for that to the knowing of which the thing moves the intellect before any busying of the intellect is not a second intention, but a thing that moves the intellect moves it to negation of the opposite before any busying of the intellect, because such negation follows the thing from the nature of the thing before any busying of the intellect (and hence it is that one of the opposites moves to knowledge of its opposite before any busying of the intellect, for which reason the Philosopher says that ‘the same science is of opposites’ [*Posterior Analytics* 2.26.69b8-32]).

Therefore although it be posited that person only formally states a negation, yet it does not state a second intention, because a negation that follows from the nature of a thing is not a second intention, and negation in general chiefly so, of which sort is incommunicability. When therefore it is said that ‘negation is a being of reason’, I say that it is a negative entity from the nature of the thing; for just as Socrates is man from the nature of the thing, so he is not-*ass* from the nature of the thing; also negations – in the intellect – are entities, because the first motion of the intellect (not first before affirmation but first before negation) is to apprehension of negation. – Thus therefore I hold that person is not a name of second intention but of first, and that it formally signifies the double negation of communicability and connotes intellectual nature. And perhaps it

also formally imports existence, and then it not only imports a common negation but something positive; or perhaps it does not formally state existence and then there belongs to what it formally signifies only double negation which gives to understand a double positive, namely nature and the mode of having it. And hereby, whichever way of importing is given, the answer to the arguments [nn.1-2] is plain, because if person states existence in the abstract and the way of having it in the concrete, it is formally positive, and then person is formally incomunicable existence possessing an intellectual nature; but if it only formally imports negation, then it connotes existence in the nature, and thus it stands for that which is incomunicable, – and thus is person adored and is a term of real production. But to the other argument [n.2] the answer will be plain elsewhere, in distinction 25 [*Reportatio IA d.25 n.24; also above nn.12-13, and below n.24*].

b. [*Interpolation*] because negation does not seem common to the three unless it follow a common affirmation.

18. Even if it state such negation precisely, it does not seem to state the whole idea of person, because person states something pertaining to dignity, but negation posits no dignity or perfection.

19. It seems too that it states a relation of reason, because of the fact that its opposite – namely what is communicable – only states a relation of reason in the divine essence; for essence is communicable to the Son and yet essence is not really referred to the Son; therefore communicable too states a relation of reason.

20. To the first of these objections [n.17] I say that from the ultimate distinctive and constitutive factors of the persons nothing common that is said in the ‘what’ of them can be abstracted from them, because these factors are primarily diverse, that is, they do not include anything really the same (for in that case it would be possible to ask about them what they were distinguished by [I d.3 n.132]); and therefore everything common

abstracted from them is either a concept altogether negative or at any rate is not a quidditative concept of reason. But it is certain that some common negation can be abstracted from those ultimate factors, and that a negation of one idea, because negation is of one idea by the fact that it opposes an affirmation of one idea. Therefore whatever things an affirmation of one idea opposes, to those things belongs a negation of one idea, – and so to the three persons, and also to the ultimate factors distinctive of them, there can belong some common negation. But if that negation be said to be incommunicability, and if it be posited that incommunicability alone is of the *per se* idea constitutive of a person (so that personality be ‘incommunicability of what subsists in intellectual nature’, and everything beside the first [sc. incommunicability] be an addition to the idea of person), then person properly does not state some concept of second intention; for every concept is a concept of first intention that is of a nature to be caused immediately by the thing, without work or act of the busying intellect, of which sort is not only a positive but also a negative concept.

21. And if this be posited, then when it is doubted ‘how there can be a common negation without a common positive which it is in’, I reply: however diverse things are, even if they have nothing common, they can have a common negation, – just as not-Socrates is a univocal common to everything other than Socrates, beings and not beings. And although the things to which the negation is common have something common that is positive, yet it is not necessary that the common negation be in them because of that common positive; for non-rationality agrees with the ultimate difference of horse and ass, and not because of something common to the things to which that negation belongs, because either there is nothing common to the ultimate differences, or if entity is

common to them, such negation yet does not belong to them because of entity, just as neither is the contrary affirmation opposed to them because of entity.^a

a. [Interpolation] And so one should say that the major [interpolation b to n.17] is false, for a negation is of one idea because it is opposed to an affirmation of one idea and not because it follows an affirmation of one idea; for not-man is of one idea because man, to which it is opposed, is of one idea and not because it follows an affirmation of one idea; for not-man is common to being and not-being, to which nothing affirmative or positive is common.

22. And when, second, it is objected that ‘negation does not state anything of dignity’ [n.18] (and for this can also be adduced the reasons for the principal conclusion, that ‘negation is not adored’, ‘nor is it even a term of a real action’ [n.1]), – it could be said that negation in a genus differs from negation outside a genus and from privation. Privation indeed requires an appropriate subject, either in itself if it is a privation in itself, – or in a genus, if it is a privation in genus (the way a mole is called blind, *Metaphysics*, the chapter on privation, 5.22.1022b24-27). Negation outside a genus requires absolutely nothing, because it is said equally of being and not-being. But negation in a genus is as it were in the middle, because it requires a subject of which to be said, though it does not indicate aptitude for a form; such negation is perhaps imported by diversity (about which elsewhere [I d.18 qq.1-2]), because it indicates such non-identity in being – therefore incommunicability, as it is included in person, can name such non-identity, because it indicates the negation of a double communicability in intellectual nature; nor yet does it state any aptitude for communicability, but it states the negation in positive intellectual nature, – and so it states dignity, not by reason of what is signified, but by reason of what

is connoted and of the subject, and thus can person be conceded to be adored and generated (just as ‘a blind man walks or is loved’, not because the blindness is the principle of the walking, but because that in which such privation exists is the subject in respect of such predicate).

23. When argument is raised about the communicable and incommunicable [n.19], I say that one opposite can be a relation of reason and the other a real relation (or at any rate a real negation or privation of some relation), just as ‘the same’ with perfect identity states a relation of reason (*Metaphysics* 5.9.1018a2-4, on ‘the same’), and yet ‘diverse’ – which denies this identity – belongs to a thing without act of reason or intellect; and the reason is that, although something not belong to a thing save from work or act of intellect, yet that something can be opposed to the thing of itself, without any act of intellect, just as universality is opposed to Socrates, although universality does not belong to man save through an act of intellect working and busying itself about man. Although therefore communicability state only a relation of reason in the essence, yet it can be opposed to person by something that is real, and incommunicability can belong to person on the same basis.

24. If therefore this way is supposed as certain (that from person can be abstracted some negative concept of negation in a genus, and this abstracted not only from the persons as wholes but also from the formal constituents of them [nn.20-23]), there is a further doubt whether only such a common negative is abstractable from them or some common positive.

And it seems one should posit something positive, capable of being abstracted from them, because of what Augustine says in *On Christian Doctrine* and of what the

Master says in the text of distinction 25, which were adduced against the first opinion [nn.12-13].

25. It can be said that from individuals can be abstracted not only the species, which states the quiddity of the individuals, but also something quasi-proper.¹⁰³

Twenty Fourth Distinction

Single Question

Whether Number properly exists in Divine Reality

1. About the twenty fourth distinction I ask whether number properly exists in divine reality.^a

a. [Note by Duns Scotus] [References to Henry, John, *Metaphysics*, Damascene, Avicenna, contained in the *Reportatio*]

On the contrary. – Boethius: “That is truly one in which there is no number.” Again, one is prior in nature to two. Again, part than whole. Again, either in substance or in relation.

Solution. – ‘One’ is double (synonym): that which follows form and is the principle of number and adds above ‘one’ the idea of measure (and therefore it is in the genus of quantity), – that which follows form because of matter; thus there is a double number in Averroes, *Metaphysics* 5 com.12 (or triple number: formal, mathematical, sensible). The first number exists there [in divine reality], by the ‘one’ that preserves unity; the second number is not there; or otherwise: for there is not number there simply but along with determination of forms.

¹⁰³ Vatican editors: Scotus did not finish the question but left here a blank space.

Response. – Numbered things are several things divided, hence they are not counted in a whole save potentially; they are of a nature to be contained in the unity of one continuous thing. All are of a nature to be a unit, therefore they are of one species and located in different parts of the matter.

In God there are no things divided from each other, because of unity of essence; by the opposite fact there is formal number in an immaterial species.

Again, whatever is there [in divine reality] is as it were a species, but does not make a many contained under the same species; therefore only number ‘in a certain respect’ is there (namely with the addition of the persons and the attributes), such that if these are of one species, absence of division prevents numbering them – if there is division of the essence, difference of species prevents numbering them; number there agrees with mathematical number because it arises from unity of essence and from the root, – it differs because here [in divine reality] the unity is not divided but is distinguished as it were in species (in this it agrees with formal number, but it [formal number] is never rooted in one singular form, and the difference there [in divine reality] is through absolute forms, here [in formal number] not).

To the first [argument – see opening paragraph of this note]: it is not one in number, because it does not constitute number. To the second: he is speaking of number along with determination, namely of persons. To the third: multitude is more known to us and is marked by position – but a multitude is a division of units, which is negation of union, therefore they are not ‘many’ save along with determination; contrariwise in God; although according to the mode of the name it [‘one’] signifies negation, the negation is only of a negation [‘one’ denies ‘division’ and ‘division’ denies ‘union’], and so it is, as to real being, a true positive.

2. I respond:

Either one posits that number has formal unity, with respect to which formality the unities are material and as it were the matter of the form, – or one posits that number

is one only by aggregation of units,^a as a heap of stones is said to be one by aggregation of stones.

a. [Note by Duns Scotus] A number of distinct things exists not only by aggregation but by distinction of beings.

3. Which of these is true will be said elsewhere when number is dealt with.¹⁰⁴

4. In the first way [n.2] I say that number does not exist in divine reality, because each person is infinite and each personal property is the same as the infinite. But nothing that is formally of itself infinite, or the same as the infinite, is potential or a part of something, because then there would be something greater than the infinite (because the whole would be greater than the infinite, provided only a part were infinite), and therefore if this position is maintained there will not be number in divine reality.

5. If the second position is true, namely that number is only one by aggregation of units [n.2], since aggregated things are simply diverse, such that they do not make nor are they something *per se* one (rather they are less one than things that are one *per accidens*), and what is in divine reality is the same as something truly one, namely the essence, – the result is that there is no aggregation there of thing with thing, and so there is no number there according to the second position.

6. If however number has being in the intellect only, when the intellect conceives many units or many unities at the same time, then since some intellect can conceive three persons together or one alone (not conceiving the three persons), and since a concept in the case of conceiving one person without conceiving three persons is not as perfect and

¹⁰⁴ Vatican editors: no such treatment of number by Scotus exists.

complete (hence certain distinct articles of the faith have regard to distinct persons), there can be posited in the intellect as it were one total concept of the Trinity.

7. But passing over whether number is in the intellect and speaking of number in reality – I say that, when holding either one of the two first concepts [nn.4-5], number simply is not in divine reality. Yet number is conceded to be there ‘in a certain respect’ (namely with the determination of persons [sc. ‘three persons’]), because in that case an abstraction is made of that which – in number – does not state imperfection (namely of distinctness) from that which does indicate imperfection (either in each of the numbered things or at any rate in one of them), namely abstraction from potentiality, if the number is one according to form, or from diversity, if the number is one by aggregation of several unities. Yet there is well conceded there is a distinction without diversity or potentiality (or even aggregation), which indicate some imperfection of unity.^a

a. [Note by Duns Scotus] As to the remark in *Metaphysics* 106.1057a3-4, about the ‘one’ that constitutes number etc. [“For number is a multitude, measurable by a one.”] add: ‘one’ in the intellect, by a unity of order, can have the idea of measure according to reason; number is such a ‘one’, through definite distance of the last unit from the first; therefore number is a measure according to reason (it is thus perhaps that Augustine was speaking about time). – On the contrary: ‘a measured thing’ is measured in accord with something of itself; if in accord with quantity, then it is in itself a discrete how much.

Response, by maintaining the common way:

The units that are parts of number are of one nature, and they are not merely one concept but the individual units are of one nature. Second: ‘ones’ are distinct such that one unit does not include in itself the other unit; therefore a unit of nature does not make a number along with a unit of supposit, nor with a unit of formality, because nature is included in the second and includes the third. Thirdly, in each unit and each ‘one’ there is required potentiality of part to whole.

Because of the first fact God is not numbered along with creatures, because his singular unity – which is existentially in God – is not of the same nature with other unity (because then it [God's unity] would be narrowed down by the qualification 'infinite' [sc. infinite unity] and so God would be composite).

Because of the second fact, a white thing and a sweet thing are not two, but whiteness and sweetness are two. The reason is grammatical, that an adjectival term of number determines a substantive; the substantive in the first case is the subject [sc. the thing that is white and that is sweet], and what is indicated about it is that the subject is two distinct units – in the second case [sc. whiteness, sweetness] the substantive is the form as form; for the same reason whiteness and colored-ness are two, but whiteness and color are not, because one unit includes the other unit [sc. whiteness includes color as part of its definition], just as de-whitening includes both natures [sc. whiteness and color are both included in the definition of de-whitening]. A cause could also be assigned for these on the basis of the first fact, namely that the unit of a supposit, the unit of a nature, and the unit of a formality are not of the same nature; so none of them is counted up along with the others.

Because of the third fact nothing outwardly or inwardly intrinsic in God is countable, because neither is it potential; yet by extending number to distinction among entities, number is admitted in divine reality. And these two points – namely entity and distinction between the numbered things – are required for number but are not sufficient; therefore when number on their basis alone is posited, it is imperfectly posited (thus 'three persons').

Corollary: a threefold grouping of stones is *per se* one (according to the common opinion), such that it is not merely this-this-this; the trinity of divine persons is merely this-this-this, and is not any further a one. Another way of speaking would be possible if number in the intellect is posited, because then there is agreement with both cases.¹⁰⁵

¹⁰⁵ Vatican editors: number as posited in the intellect allows one to speak equally correctly of three in the case of a threefold grouping of stones and in the case of a trinity of persons.

Twenty Fifth Distinction

Single Question

Whether Person in Divine Reality states Substance or Relation

1. About the twenty fifth distinction I ask whether person in divine reality states substance or relation.
2. Without arguments.

I. Response to the Question

3. I reply:

Person does not state a proper relation, because this name ‘person’ is common to the three (according to Augustine *On the Trinity* VII ch.4 n.7: “If there are three persons, that which is ‘person’ is common to them”), and not by a commonness of equivocation, as ‘this man’ is common to Socrates and Plato. The phrase ‘this man’ is indeed equivocal because the demonstrative ‘this’ signifies what it points out; not so here [sc. with ‘person’] because an equivocal is not counted up along with equivocals; for dogfish and dogstar are not two dogs, because the counting of something in several things requires the unity of what is counted in them. Person is common in this way, because it is counted (Augustine, *ibid.*).

4. Nor does person state a common relation, – which is proved by Augustine *On the Trinity* VII ch.6 n.11, because “the Father is not the person of the Son,” nor conversely. And this reason can be deduced as follows: whatever a subordinate [sc.

specific] relative is said with respect to, to that same thing the higher [sc. more generic] relative is said, although not said first. An example: if the double is double of the half, and this first, then the double is a multiple of the half, although not first; and not only this but even up to the most general genus it is a relative of the half, although not first, that is, not adequately. Therefore if person stated a common relation, then Father, just as it is Father of the Son first, so Father would be person of the Son *per se*, although not first – which is false.

5. Nor does person state a secondary substance, that is, a quiddity, because this is not counted up in the three [sc. ‘three deities’ is not said]; but person is counted up [sc. ‘three persons’ is said].

6. Therefore [the reply must be] in accord with the two opinions treated of in the question ‘On Person’ in distinction 23 [d.23 n.24], that according to one opinion person states a negation in general, common to the three, and so in this way it does not signify either substance or relation. It does however connote something positive; and first it connotes that of which it is first predicated (namely Father and Son and Holy Spirit), not as if by what is first understood from it but as a common term connotes the inferior for which it supposit; secondly it connotes the relation whereby such common negation agrees with the Father and likewise with the Son; third and lastly it connotes the essence, which although it is in what is first connoted is yet not in it the reason for the negation.

7. If however the other opinion in that question is held, that person states something positive, abstracted from the three as a quasi-property, not as a species – then it can be said that it signifies a positive ‘what’; but not substance nor relation (and this when extending substance to include both primary and secondary substance), but first

something positive that is indifferent to both of them; for the idea of a subsistent, when one holds that the divine persons are relatives, is indifferent to the absolute and to the relative. Yet it gives to understand as a consequence – the way the superior genus gives to understand its inferior species – that for which it is taken, namely the relative of which person is said (namely Father and Son and Holy Spirit), and second the relations themselves, and third the essence – such that each opinion (set down in distinction 23, *ibid.*) agrees here that person in its first idea states neither relation nor substance, and this neither primary nor secondary substance. But according to one of the opinions it states a concept of negation (in general) common to the three, and so it states a concept of negation common to the three that is distinct in them; according to the other of the opinions it states a concept of a common thing that is positive and distinct in them. And according to both opinions such a common thing, whether positive or negative, connotes – as its inferior – that of which it is formally said (namely Father and Son and Holy Spirit), and second as it were it connotes the formal elements that are distinct in them, and third the essence that is common to them.

II. The Objections of Others

8. But an objection is raised that person signifies secondary substance (that is, quiddity), because of what Augustine says in *On the Trinity* VII ch.6 n.11, that through the phrase ‘three persons’ response is made to the question whereby it is asked ‘what three?’; but ‘what’ is asking for the essence.

9. Further, Augustine says [*ibid.*] that “to be God and to be person are not different things;” therefore person is purely essential, and so it signifies a secondary substance, that is, quiddity.

10. To the first of these [n.8] I say that ‘what’ sometimes is asking for the definition and sometimes is asking for that about which something is said. The first is plain from the *Topics* 5.101b39: “Definition is a statement indicating the ‘what is’ of something.” The second is plain from the Philosopher in *Metaphysics* 10.2.1053b27-28: “the whole question is what is ‘one’, how it is being and what being it is, because to say that this very thing is its nature is not enough” (he means to say that it is not enough to say that the ‘one’ is principle, the way the old philosophers said the ‘one’ was principle, like the Platonists, but something must be asserted that is what the ‘one’ is said about). And accordingly the question ‘what is the element’ has a double response; one is to give the essence of the element, and the other is to give that about which element is said, as ‘fire is an element’. Now when Catholics were confessing the ‘three’ (according to the canonical epistle of *John* ch.5), the heretics asked ‘what three?’, not questioning what the definition of the word was, but asking what the substantive was that was determined by the adjective ‘three’ (or, what thing ‘three’ was being said of) – and to this question response was well made by the remark ‘person’. When therefore it is assumed that ‘what’ asks about the essence, this is not generally true, nor is it true in particular of the issue at hand [n.9].

11. As to the second, from Augustine [n.9], the answer will be plain in the following distinction, that person is referred to itself (both in itself and in its specific subordinates), although it is not referred to itself as essence is referred to itself, and this

provided the position is laid down that the persons are constituted in personal existence by certain absolutes; but if this position is not laid down, then expounding Blessed Augustine's authority seems difficult; but there will be discussion of this in the next distinction [d.26 n.52].^a

a. [*Note of Duns Scotus*] Henry of Ghent says [a.43 q.2]: “A specific relation under its genus is not distinguished save by what it is founded on, and so there is no universal nature truly in it save for the fact it is founded on a universal” (he gives an example about likeness and whiteness); “but every divine relation is founded on the essence, which cannot in any way have the idea of a universal,” because a universal nature is “that nature alone which is nature only by reason of quiddity” (Avicenna, *Metaphysics* V), “without reference to the idea of universal or of particular, but of a nature in itself to receive the idea of each of them; a singular by determinate existence in a supposit, – a universal by the fact it is of a nature to fall under consideration by the intellect, taken as one in its idea, applicable by predication to the many particulars it is multiplied over,” that is, “of itself it is a certain singularity;” “although therefore relation is predicated univocally of paternity and filiation, yet it is not a universal.”