

This translation of Book IV Distinctions 8 to 13 of the *Ordinatio* (aka *Opus Oxoniense*) of Blessed John Duns Scotus is complete. These distinctions fill volume twelve of the Vatican critical edition of the Latin text edited by the Scotus Commission in Rome and published by Quarrachi.

Scotus' Latin is tight and not seldom elliptical, exploiting to the full the grammatical resources of the language to make his meaning clear (especially the backward references of his pronouns). In English this ellipsis must, for the sake of intelligibility, often be translated with a fuller repetition of words and phrases than Scotus himself gives. The possibility of mistake thus arises if the wrong word or phrase is chosen for repetition. The only check to remove error is to ensure that the resulting English makes the sense intended by Scotus. Whether this sense has always been captured in the translation that follows must be judged by the reader. In addition there are passages where not only the argumentation but the grammar too is obscure, and I cannot vouch for the success of my attempts to penetrate the obscurity. Finally, there may be mistakes (as in particular by inadvertence) of sheer omission, addition, or mistranslation of words. So, for these and the like reasons, comments and notice of errors from readers are most welcome.

Peter L.P. Simpson
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THE ORDINATIO OF BLESSED JOHN DUNS SCOTUS

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Book Four

Eighth Distinction

Division of the Text and Overview of Questions

1. “After the sacrament of baptism and of confirmation etc.” [Lombard ad loc.]
 2. After the Master has dealt with baptism, whereby we are regenerated, and with confirmation, whereby we are strengthened, he here deals with the sacrament of the Eucharist, whereby we are nourished and made complete in what is good.
 3. It is divided into two parts: in the first the Master makes connection with what has preceded and in it he makes determination about the Eucharist in comparison with the two prior sacraments. In the second he makes determination about the Eucharist in itself [n.6].
 4. The first part is divided into two. In the first he sets down the connection of what needs to be said with what has been said. In the second part he gives the reason for the connection by comparing the Eucharist with baptism in particular.
 5. And this part has two parts. In the first he compares the Eucharist with baptism in respect of excellence; in the second in respect of agreement and difference. Now the agreement is plain, that both sacraments are prefigured in the Mosaic Law, but the difference is that each has its own proper prefiguring. And he sets down the agreement and difference as follows: first he sets down the prefiguring proper to each sacrament in the Mosaic Law, and second he sets down the prefiguring proper to each in their cause.
 6. And next follows the part where the Master deals with the Eucharist in itself.
 7. And this part has four parts. First the Master deals with the sacrament of the Eucharist and of the taking of the sacrament; second with the conversion or consecration, whereby the sacrament begins to be; third with the accidents remaining after the consecration; fourth with the minister of the sacrament. The second part starts at the beginning of distinction 11; the third at the beginning of distinction 12; the fourth at the beginning of distinction 13.
 8. Now the first part is divided into two, for the Master first determines the truth about the sacrament and the receiving of it; secondly he excludes errors opposing it.
 9. The first part again is divided into two, for he first determines the truth of the sacrament, and second the receiving of it (at the beginning of distinction 9)
 10. The first of these parts is divided into preface and treatise (which^a begins at “The Lord instituted the sacrament”).
- a. [*Interpolation*]: and therefore I do not divide the preface from the whole treatment of the Eucharist, but only from the treatment contained in this distinction, for there are only four things proposed here that the treatment determines. The treatment is in this way...
11. And the treatment has two parts. In the first he deals with two matters he has set down, namely the institution and the form of this sacrament. In the second he deals with two others, namely the sacrament and the thing.
 12. The first part is again divided into two. First he deals with the truth of the institution, and second he excludes an error or doubt about it.

13. The first again is divided into two. First he deals with the institution and second with the form.

14. As to this eighth distinction there are three questions principally to be dealt with: first the sacrament, whether the Eucharist is a sacrament of the New Law; second the form, whether it is the form set down in the canon of the mass; third the institution, whether this sacrament was suitably instituted after the Last Supper (the Cena).

Question One

Whether the Eucharist is a Sacrament of the New Law

15. Proceeding thus to the first question, argument is made that the Eucharist is not a sacrament of the New Law.

First because a sacrament of the New Law is a sign of the grace conferred in it [*Ord.* IV d.1 nn.194-195]; but the Eucharist is not a sign of this sort, because it remains on the altar after consecration and no grace is given by it to anyone.

16. Again, “the sacraments of the New Law effect what they signify” [*ibid.* d.1 n.276]. The Eucharist is not of this sort, because it figures or signifies that the true body and blood of Christ are contained under the very species [of bread and wine]; but those species do not effect this, for no finite virtue can have causality with respect to it.

17. Again, the sacraments of the New Law contain some definite words that are the form of the sacrament [*ibid.* d.3 nn.41-47]. The Eucharist does not, because the words that are the form of the sacrament must be simultaneous with the sacrament; but they are not simultaneous with the sacrament, first because the Eucharist remains when the words do not, and second because, while the words are being pronounced, the Eucharist does not exist but only at the end of the pronouncing.

18. Again in the *Metaphysics* 4.4.1006b7 it is said, “What does not signify one thing does not signify.” The Eucharist is not one sacrament or sign, nor does it signify one signified thing. The proof of the minor is that the species of bread is one sign and the species of wine is another sign, and they signify their own different thing, because the body of Christ is what one of them signifies and the blood of Christ what the other signifies.

19. On the contrary:

In Gratian, *Decretum* p.3 d.2 ch.1, the words “Nothing else must be offered in the sacrament besides wine and water...” are speaking of the Eucharist. And in the same place is said, “In the sacrament of the body and blood nothing else is offered save what the Lord himself handed down.”

I. To the Question

20. Here three things must be looked at. First, following the procedure in the other sacraments [*Ord.* IV ‘Epilogue of the distinctions about baptism’ n.1; d.7 n.7], some notion of the name ‘eucharist’ must be set down, and it must be taken from the usage of speakers; second, inquiry must be made whether anything real subsists under that notion; third, whether that which so subsists is a sacrament of the New Law, which is the principal question.

A. About the Idea or Definition of the Eucharist

21. The idea of the name ‘Eucharist’, according to those who commonly use or speak about the Eucharist, can be as follows: ‘The Eucharist is, by divine institution, a perceptible sign truly containing, after the proper matter has been rightly consecrated, the body and blood of Christ’.^a

a. [*Text canceled by Scotus*] The Eucharist is the sacrament of the body and blood of Christ, which are truly contained under the species of bread and wine after consecration by a priest in definite words pronounced with the proper intention, truly signifying, by divine institution, that the body and blood of Christ are really contained under those species.

B. Whether Anything Real subsists under Such an Idea

22. About the second point [n.20], I say that this idea is not false in itself, because no part is repugnant to another.

23. For it is possible, without contradiction, for the body of Christ to be contained under the species of bread and his blood under the species of wine (which is something presumed here, because it will be made clear in d.10 nn.24-70). And it is possible that these signs were instituted by God to signify in truth that the things signified are contained under the species, for what God can do he can signify through some perceptible sign imposed to signify it. Therefore, some being, that is, something to which existence is not repugnant, does subsist under this idea.

24. Further, I say that there subsists under it some being effectively, for the fact can be proved by authority and fitting reason.

25. The authority is *Matthew* 26.26-29 where, after the Cena Christ instituted this sacrament, so that under the species his true body and true blood were truly contained. And not only then when he himself consecrated it, but also when the sacrament was consecrated by priests in the Church, since he adds for the Apostles there, “This do in commemoration of me.”

26. The same is contained in *Luke* 22.19-20 and *I Corinthians* 11.23-29; 10.16-17, where the Apostle gives full determination about the manner of receiving and consecrating this sacrament. “This bread,” he says, “which we (we priests) break, is it not a participation in the body of the Lord?” And that this sacrament was to continue perpetually in the Church he there says, “As often as you eat this bread and drink this cup you proclaim the death of the Lord until he come (understand: for judgement).” Hence the Church militant is going to last until then and the Eucharist in it, as all the saints maintain.

27. But the proof that the sacrament is fitting is that it is fitting for Christ to be with us in such a perceptible sign, so that each may be the more stirred to devotion and reverence for Christ. And this is plain in fact, because almost every devotion in the Church is ordered to this sacrament, for a cleric performs his divine office for this reason with greater care in its ordering to the mass. Also, for this reason do the people more devoutly attend to mass than any other ecclesiastical duty. Again, for this reason individuals confess with greater care when they intend (according to the ordering of the Church) to receive communion, which should at least be done once in a year, according to the ordering of the Church.

28. It was also fitting that after spiritual generation spiritual nourishment is conferred on us, and this is more fittingly given to us under the likeness of bodily nourishment; now the chief bodily and spiritual nourishment consists in bread and wine; therefore etc

29. It was fitting too that the perceptible sign, under which God wished to give himself to us and to be with us, should have an order to certain words spoken by some minister, because otherwise we would not know when Christ was in such sign and when not, and thus due reverence and devotion would perish.

30. It was also fitting that in the pronouncing of the words the minister should stand out in the Church, that is, be a priest, through whose ministerial act Christ would thus begin to be with us.

C. That what Subsists under the Idea of this Name is a Sacrament

31. About the third point [n.20] I say that in the idea of the name set down above [n.21] a sacrament is included, because it is, by divine institution, a truly representative sign. And although it does not represent accidental grace, yet it does represent some gratuitous gift of God, namely the being of the body of Christ in the species. Now the grace in the definition of the sacrament is not taken just for an accidental grace but for a gratuitous effect of God [n.39, *Ord.* IV d.1 n.207].

32. About the unity of this sacrament I say that it would be very possible for several perceptible things to come together in the foundation of a single sacrament (as was said above about the cleansing and the words in the foundation of the relation of baptism [d.3 nn.41-47]), though one of them would not then be part of the sacrament without another. But here the species of bread contains what it signifies under the species of wine, and conversely.

33. Therefore I say that the body of Christ can be taken strictly, as it contains only the parts animated by the soul of Christ, and blood is not of this sort (though it is in proximate potency for conversion into animated flesh). And thus the body is essentially different in itself and from the blood, and it can also be a different signified thing; and consequently it can be the proper sign as also the proper definition of it.

34. In another way the body can be taken for all the things it includes that belong to the whole organic body, whether they be parts formally animated or some of them not formally animated (as fluids and spirits); and in this way blood is a part of the body.

35. Taking the body in the first way, although it and blood are primarily different signified things, yet they constitute one whole signified thing, which is the body taken in the second way. And so the proper sign of the body taken in the first way and the proper sign of the blood can be a single sign with singleness of integrity but not of indivisibility.

36. Now it is fitting that this sacrament has such unity of integrity and not of indivisibility, because it is for the complete nourishment of the soul. But complete nourishment of the body comes from nourishment that is one with oneness of integrity, not unity of indivisibility; for food does not nourish sufficiently without drink nor drink without food.

37. From what has been said there is plain a fourfold difference and excellence of this sacrament in respect of others, wherein there is a triple difference and excellence in signifying.

A first is that this sacrament is most true in signifying. For the other sacraments are true as far as concerns themselves, but they sometimes do not have their signified effect because of the indisposition of the receiver; but this sacrament never lacks what it signifies.

38. The second excellence of this sacrament is that what it signifies it really contains, but not the other sacraments.

39. The third excellence is of what is signified by it. For the other sacraments signify an accidental grace inhering in the recipient, while this sacrament signifies subsistent grace, namely the true body of Christ existing in it.

40. The final and fourth difference is in the manner of being of this sacrament, because all the other sacraments consist in use and in becoming, so that the sacrament there and the reception of it are the same (as baptism and its reception); nor does anything that is the sacrament remain when the use and reception cease. But this sacrament is something that persists even before use.

41. And this was fitting, because Christ wished permanently to be with us, and so to be in some permanent sign, which sort of sign this sacrament is. Hence here the use is not the sacrament; for the using of the sacramental words is a sort of way to the sacrament, because the sacrament begins to be at the end of the speaking of the words; while the use or reception of this sacrament is a sort of ceasing to be of the sacrament, or the way in which this sacrament is applied to a member of the Church. And it is very possible that in both uses, if done worthily, grace is conferred on the user.

42. But these are not the formal and first thing signified by the Eucharist but they are sorts of sacramental act, in which grace can well be received if they are done worthily – though more in reception than in consecration, because the act of reception signifies spiritual nourishment, which is by the conferring of grace.

II. To the Initial Arguments

43. From the above the answers to the arguments are plain.

As to the first [n.15], because the Eucharist is not a sign of accidental grace but of subsistent grace.

44. As to the second [n.16], it seems the difficulty is good against someone who posits that the sacrament has an action with respect to the thing signified [IV d.1 nn.279-283], but it is not valid against me. For I say that the proposition “a sacrament effects what it signifies” is understood in this way, namely that if it signifies the coming to be of something then that something comes to be through the sacrament through an efficacious sign; but if it signifies the being of something, then that something exists through the sacrament through a true sign [*ibid.* nn.192-193, 308, 315, 323]. How the ‘through’ is to be understood was stated in d.1 n.280.

45. And when it is said there [n.16] that no finite power can act to make the body of Christ present, I concede when speaking properly of action. Yet some finite virtue or some part of finite virtue can be an immediate disposition for the being of Christ’s body there, not by itself but by God co-assisting there. And in this way did God institute the species, so that, after the consecration, he assists them for the containing of the real presence of Christ’s body.

46. As to the third [n.17] it is plain that the sacrament does not have words for form, because then it would not be a sacrament that remains, since words cannot exist except in succession. But the consecration of the sacrament consists in coming to be, and it requires some form of words in it; but they are not the form of the sacrament but the form of the consecration of the sacrament. And to this extent they can be called sacramental words, because they belong to the sacrament as the form of its consecration, and this consecration is the sacramental beginning. But these words are not said thus to be sacramental as the words of baptism are; for the latter sacramental words are the form of the sacrament.

47. But if you are altogether asking what the form of this sacrament is, I say that the perceptible species are the form, that is, the proximate and formal foundation of the signification, and the signification is what is formal there, as it is in other sacraments.

48. And if you ask what in this foundation is as the matter and what else as the form, I reply that there is not one thing as matter and another as form in it as in the other sacraments. The reason is that this sacrament is permanent and so no words can pertain to its essence. But in any sacrament matter and form are distinguished – the visible sign is said to be the matter, and the words the form.

49. To the fourth [n.18] the reply is that they are both a single sign of one thing (as the body of Christ).

50. On the contrary: synonymous names are different names despite signifying the same thing – and this for the reason that there are several spoken words imposed there for doing the signifying; therefore, by similarity, just as here there are different species doing the signifying, there will be a different sacrament.

51. Therefore I say in another way that, as was said at the end of the question [n.36], the sacrament is one by oneness of integrity, not indivisibility. Therefore, the argument [n.50] does not work.

Question Two

Whether the Form of the Eucharist is what is set down in the Canon of the Mass

52. To proceed to the second question [n.14], argument is made that what is set down in the canon of the mass is not the precise consecration of the Eucharist.

53. First, because the pronoun ‘this’ points either to the substance of the bread or to its accidents, and in both ways the proposition is false. Either it points to the body of Christ and then the proposition does nothing, as does neither the proposition ‘my body is my body’; for no proposition does anything or works anything that would be true whether any action or operation is not posited or equally whether one is posited, of which sort is ‘my body is my body’. Again, the pronoun ‘this’ is demonstrative for the moment for which it is spoken; but in that moment the body of Christ is not there; so in that case it is demonstrative of the bread or the accidents. But then the proposition is false, because neither the bread nor the accidents are the body of Christ. But false speech cannot be the form in a sacrament of truth; therefore etc.

54. Again, it is not licit to interpose anything as a matter of rule in the form of the sacrament handed on by Christ (by ‘as a matter of rule’ I mean a slight casual interruption, as was spoken about in the definition of baptism [IV d.3 nn.77-78]); but the

conjunction 'for' is here interposed as a matter of rule, and it is not handed on by Christ, as is plain from the Gospels.

55. Again, just as the pronoun 'I' signifies the first person, so the pronoun 'my' signifies the possessive of the first person. Therefore just as someone who says 'I' is speaking of himself, so someone who says 'my' is pointing to something he possesses; therefore when the priest says 'my' he is pointing to the thing's being his own, that is, the priest's.

56. Again, about the form of consecration of the blood, argument is made that it is not the form we use, because it is not found handed on by Christ – for no Evangelist sets down those words.

57. Again, as few words seem to suffice for the consecration of the blood as for that of the bread; therefore, since the consecration of the body consists of four words, it seems it should be similar also for the consecration of the blood, that is, that the following words should suffice, namely 'this is my blood'; therefore the rest are superfluous.

58. On the contrary:

In Gregory IX, *Decretals*, Innocent III says that the form of the words, as it is written in the Canon, was received from Christ by the Apostles and from the Apostles by their successors; therefore etc.

I. To the Question

59. My reply.

Here three things must be looked at: first whether the Eucharist has a single form; second which form; third what it signifies.

A. Whether the Eucharist has a Single Form

60. The first point is plain from the solution to the preceding question [nn.35-36], because no words are the form of the Eucharist nor belong to its essence, but some words are the form of the consecration of the Eucharist.

61. And by understanding the form in this way (because it is thus put in the question what the form of consecration is), I say that just as this sacrament is one by oneness of integrity and not indivisibility [*ibid.*] (for it includes in itself two partial signs, which each first signify their own two proper and proximate things, namely body and blood, and two remote things, namely spiritual eating and drinking), so too is this sacrament one consecration by oneness of integrity and yet two partial consecrations. For just as some things are one, so is their beginning one, and just as some things are several, so are their beginnings several; and just as the consecration is several, so is its beginning several. The consecration, therefore, is several partial consecrations, yet one consecration by oneness of integrity.

62. Now the distinction between these partial forms is clear, because each of them is efficacious without the other. The fact is manifest; for otherwise the faithful, when adoring the body of Christ before the consecration of the blood, would be idolaters (which is false).

B. What the Form of the Eucharist is

1. About the Words for the Consecration of the Body

63. About the second point [n.59] I say the words of consecration of the body of Christ are four: the pronoun ‘this’, the verb ‘is’ and, as the predicate in apposition, ‘my body’.

64. “The conjunction ‘for’ is not of the essence of the form,” according to one doctor [Richard of Middleton, *Sent.* IV d.8 3 q.1], “but is put to designate the ordering of the consecration of the sacrament to the use of the sacrament.” This is plain from the words, “Take, this is my body etc.”, as if one were to say, “Since the consecration is of this sort, use thus the thing consecrated.”

65. But another reason can be given, namely that the ‘for’ is put to show that the words that belong to the form are not spoken without what precedes.

66. But there is here a doubt, whether the priest would complete the sacrament by means of these four words [n.63] when omitting the preceding words.

67. One statement [Richard of Middleton] is that he would, because the four words are the form and the others are for reverence or for preceding with a prayer.

68. But one can, against this, argue that the sacramental words, by the force of the words, should signify what is done there by the force of the sacrament; but the existence of the true body of Christ is effected there by the force of this kind of consecration; therefore the words should adequately signify this by their own force, namely that the body of Christ is contained there. But the words “This is my body,” when spoken without the preceding ones do not signify this absolutely, because the ‘my’ signifies that it refers to the person of the speaker, for although the minister could be intending to speak in the person of Christ, yet the thing signified by the words would, for this reason, not be that the word ‘my’ would denote the body of Christ but that it would denote the body of the speaker. It would be just as if I were to begin speaking thus: “my doctrine is not mine;” for although I would be intending to speak in the person of Christ, yet one would not get from the force of the words that this is the doctrine of Christ, but rather that it is the doctrine of him who is speaking. It is like when the angel said in the person of God, “I am the God of Abraham” [*Exodus* 3.2-6]; the proposition was not false in the sense in which it was spoken, yet the proper significance of this sentence is that the ‘I’ would be standing for the person of God.

69. This is also confirmed by the words of Ambrose (*On the Sacraments* IV ch.4 n.17, ch.5 n.21 [*Decretum* p.3 d.2 ch.55]), “The words of Christ alter the creature,” and there follows, “With what words is the consecration done? Hear what the words are: ‘Take and eat all of you of this, for this is my body’,” where Ambrose seems to conjoin the preceding words, namely ‘Take...’, as if they were words of consecration. But this is not to be understood as if they essentially pertained to the necessity of the consecration, but as if they were necessarily to be placed first; and not only these words but several others that precede in the canon. And therefrom can be got that, by the force of the words, ‘this is my body’ are said in the person of Christ.

70. Hence not without cause did the Church thus connect the whole canon of the mass, because from the place “Having communion with...” up to the place “Humbly we pray thee, almighty God...” there is no section that is not connected with the preceding, either by a copulative conjunction (as “We therefore beseech thee...this oblation” and the

like), or by an indefinite pronoun (as is plain from the words “Which oblation do thou, O God...,” and “Who the day before he suffered...” and, after the consecration, “Deign to regard them...”) or by relation (as “In like manner...”).

71. There will, as to this article, be a general discussion about what things will have to be observed, together with other doubts. [nn.89-91].

2. About the Words of Consecration of the Blood

a. Two Doubts and their Solution

72. About the words of consecration of the blood there is more doubt, because there are two things for doubt:

The first is that none of the Evangelists recites the form that we use; therefore, based on the Gospel, the form does not seem certain. The Greeks too use another form saying, “This is my blood of the New Testament, which is shed for you and for many for the remission of sins etc.,” and consequently our form is not exact.

73. I reply that I do not doubt but that our form is certain, according to the authority of Innocent [n.58], because many things have been handed on to the Church by the Apostles that, however, are not thus written in the Gospels.

74. Nor is what is said about the Gospels a problem, because the Evangelists intended to narrate what was done, and not to hand on the form of consecrating.

75. But even about the form of the Greeks the Church does not say that they do not perform the sacrament.

76. Hence some say that their form and ours (and whatever is written in the Gospels) is sufficient for consecration, but in the Roman Church the form that we use is a necessity for the minister.

77. The second doubt is whether to the form we use belong all the words from the place “In like manner...” up to “Wherefore, Lord, we...mindful...”

78. But it is commonly held that the words “Do this in memory of me” do not belong to the form.

79. The proof is shown in this way, that “Take...this [in memory of me]” does not more relate to the blood than the body, for Christ commanded that the consecration of the body as of the blood be done in memory of him; therefore if these words belong to the consecration of the blood, by equal reason they belong to that of the body as well, and consequently, when the host is elevated, the body of Christ has still not been consecrated and so it is idolatry (which is not to be said).

80. The point is also plain because the precept about the use of consecration is not the form of the consecration; but this precept, when “Do this in memory of me” is said, is about the use of the consecration, as the words show; therefore etc.

81. Again, by these words Christ conferred on the Apostles the power of performing the sacrament; for he ordained them priests; but the conferring of power to consecrate is not done by words pertaining to consecration, because the words of consecration have regard to the matter that is consecrated, or to the term for which it is consecrated; but the words conferring power have regard to the power they confer and to him on whom it is conferred.

b. Whether all the Words belong to the Form of Consecration of the Blood

82. On the supposition that the above is certain, do all the words (up to “Do this...”) belong to the form of the consecration of the blood?

α. Opinion of Others and its Rejection

83. One assertion [Alexander of Hales, Aquinas] is that they do.

First about the words “which is shed for you...”, because the relative pronoun involves what precedes and is part of a single whole speaking.

84. Likewise they say this much more about the words “of the New and eternal Testament,” because this is a sort of specification of what precedes, when it is said “chalice of my blood, of the New and eternal...”

85. Now all these words, which seem to belong to a single speech, seem to belong to a single form; therefore both the words “of the New and...”, which it is certain belong to a single speech, and the words “which is shed for you...”, which, because of what they imply, seem to belong to the same speech, all belong to the form of the consecration of the blood.

86. But these arguments are not probative:

For it is possible that many things are added in the words of consecration and that the whole consecration would be obtained even if these many things were not expressed (just as Christ could have said, “This is my body, assumed from a Virgin and hung upon the cross,” as he said of the blood “which is shed for you...”); and then although the words would, by reason of devotion, need to be said, yet they would not have been strictly necessary for the form, even if they belonged to the same speech.

87. Also the words “which is shed for you” seem to be much less the same assertion as the preceding than do the words “of the New and eternal...”, because the words could be understood in the sense of composition and division (just as the sophism ‘every man who is other than Socrates is running’ is distinguished) – even if the implication, in the sense of composition, is part of the same assertion. And thus could it be understood in the matter at hand, so that before the ‘which is shed for you’ the complete statement would not be understood, or that by the ‘which is shed for you’ a statement added on jointly to the preceding in the sense of division would begin, and the ‘which’ would, following Priscian [*Grammatical Instruction* XVII 4 nn.27-32], be expounded by ‘and it’.¹

88. Likewise too the words “of the New Testament” are commonly understood, in accord with the saints, as a confirmation of the remark in which what is implied by “chalice of my blood” is understood – “chalice of my blood, I say, which blood confirms the New and eternal Testament etc.”

β. Scotus’ own Opinion

¹ ‘Every man who is other than Socrates is running’ can be understood, in the sense of composition, to mean that among the men Socrates, Plato, Aristotle, Theophrastus, all are running save the man Socrates; or it could be understood, in the sense of division, to mean that all men are other than Socrates, so that Socrates is not a man. In the context of the canon of the mass the words ‘which is shed for you’, if taken in the sense of composition would mean ‘my blood, that is, the blood which is shed for you’. In the sense of division, it would mean, ‘my blood, and it is shed for you’.

89. About this article I say in brief that it has not altogether been handed down to us with certitude whether the words after ‘of my blood’ belong to the form of the consecration of the blood or to some of the other words that continue up to “Do this etc.” So it is dangerous to be assertive of that about which there is no sufficient authority. But it is not dangerous to be ignorant, for the ignorance seems invincible.

90. Herefrom follows a disproof of something said by a less discrete doctor [Richard of Middleton], that it is necessary in the case of any sacrament to know precisely what are the words belonging to the form in order for anyone to confer the sacrament. For this is manifestly false, not only in the issue at hand, but also in baptism and in penance and in the sacrament of Orders. For perhaps there is no one who knows for certain – neither a bishop nor an ordained minister – what words belong precisely to ordination to the priesthood, and yet one must not say that no one in the Church has been ordained to the priesthood.

91. What then is my advice?

I say that when a priest intends to do what the Church does and reads distinctly the words of the canon from beginning to end, he does truly perform the sacrament; nor is it safe for anyone, who reckons himself especially skilled, to rely on his knowledge and say “I wish to use the precise words for the consecration of the blood;” but simplicity is more secure, “I wish to speak the words with the intention with which Christ instituted that they be spoken, so that what by Christ’s institution belongs to the form I say as belonging to the form, and what by his institution belongs to reverence, I say for reverence.”

92. But what if the priest happens to hesitate before all the words are spoken; is the blood to be held truly consecrated?

I say here what was said in a case set down above [n.66], which is that if a priest begins to speak as follows, “this is my body” and does not state all the aforesaid words in their totality, I say that in all such cases the sacrament is not to be adored save under the condition ‘if it is truly consecrated’.

93. Are the words to be repeated then?

I say not absolutely.

94. But surely under a condition?

I say that there is not here the same sort of necessity as in baptism, because in baptism, when there is doubt about the baptizing, there is doubt about salvation; and so it is necessary sometimes to give baptism under a condition. But if here, in either of the cases mentioned [n.92], there is probable doubt whether the consecration is complete, no danger of salvation threatens if no repetition is made, whether absolutely or under a condition.

95. What then? Is the matter to be always or perpetually preserved?

I say no, because it would putrefy; but, after the communion during mass, the priest can receive the matter under some such conditional intention: “if this is consecrated I receive it as consecrated; if not, not, but I receive it as something about which there is uncertainty.” Nor can there be danger here, because he is fasting before receiving the cleansing wine. And if it is not blood that he receives, he yet does no irreverence to the body and blood already received, because we too after receiving the blood at once perceive pure [unconsecrated] wine [left] on the altar.

C. What the Form of the Eucharist Signifies

1. The Opinion of Peter of Poitiers and its Rejection

96. About the third point [n.59] the assertion is made [Peter of Poitiers] that “the priest speaks the words quasi-materially,” because “he recites them as they were said by Christ, as is plain from the text that precedes it in the canon.” But when Christ said those words he did not transubstantiate the bread into his body by them, because from the words of the canon it seems that “he made a blessing” is there as a preface. Hence it is asserted that he completed the consecration through the preceding benediction, and not through the following words ‘this is my body’.

97. Innocent III agrees with this *On the Holy Mystery of the Altar* IV chs.6, 17.

98. On the contrary:

Either Christ performed the sacrament without words, which is not likely, or with words, and then either with these words or with others. Not with others than those aforesaid, because it is not probable that the author and the ministers (to whom he committed the form) used different forms. If he used the same words the difficulty remains about the signification of the utterance Christ spoke last, “This is my body etc.”

99. Again, if Christ were now a wayfarer he could pronounce the words and perform the sacrament, and the difficulty remains as before.

2. The Opinion of Richard of Middleton and its Rejection

100. There is another opinion [Richard of Middleton], that a noun signifies without time and so can stand for a supposit of any time; and it cannot be restricted by the time co-signified by the verb that signifies the completed proposition. For the verb is remote from the understanding of the noun, and nothing is contracted by something that is remote from it (just as ‘man’ is not contracted when ‘man is white’ is said, though it is contracted when ‘this white man runs’ is said). So in like manner, when a pronoun is put in place of a proper name and signifies without time, it can signify or point to something without time, because ‘this’ signifies that it points to something for all time. And so the pronoun ‘this’ can, under a disjunction, point to what is contained under the species now or to what will be contained under them in a moment; so that, for the intellect, there is a pointing to what is directly pointed to and, for the senses, a pointing to what is indirectly pointed to [cf. IV d.2 n.19]; and what is directly pointed to is either something now present or something that will be present in the next moment, and what is pointed to for the senses is ‘under these species’. And the above disjunctive is true, because one or other part is true. And this as concerns the intellect, to which namely the divine virtue assents, when such words [sc. ‘this is my body’] are said, bringing about, at the final moment, what is signified.

101. Against this: although the pronoun ‘this’ need not point to anything for a determinate time, yet as he [Richard] himself argues, the signification of an utterance is constituted from the signification of the parts; but the parts signify when they are uttered; therefore, even according to him one must say that the word ‘this’, when uttered, signifies that which it then points to. But it does not seem that it can then point to something that is

not then contained under the species, because one could in this way say ‘this fire is water’ or ‘this body is water’, when speaking of fire that is at once to be converted into water; and one could do such pointing for the senses indirectly and for the intellect directly, and do so by pointing to the body that is now or will be in the next moment. But it does not seem reasonable to say of air, when immediately changing it, that ‘this body is fire’; for the statement ‘this body is air’ is simply true, and ‘fire’ and ‘air’ are not said of the same thing at the same time.

102. Again, if the parts of an utterance signify when they are uttered, and if from the things signified by the parts thus taken the thing is signified by the whole utterance according to how that utterance takes the parts, then one must say that the ‘is’, when uttered, posits what it signifies for the present moment that it signifies; but the subject of the first part of the disjunction [n.100] is not taken for any time that is the same as that which is imported by the copula ‘is’ [sc. ‘this’ is taken for the bread now, and ‘is my body’ is taken for the body in the next moment]. Therefore, the whole signification of the utterance does not refer to any same thing or to the same instant.

103. Again, a disjunctive does not posit either disjunct determinately, but a fallacy of the consequent follows; so if ‘this’ stands here disjunctively [sc. either for bread or for Christ’s body], it does not, in respect to the predicate, posit one disjunct (namely what will be under the species in the next moment), just as it does not posit the other disjunct either (namely what is now under the species). And what is brought about by the utterance is, according to them [Richard and his followers, n.100], only that the disjunction is true. Therefore, the effect of the disjunction is no more that what will immediately be under the species is the body of Christ than that what is now under them is so.

3. A Possible Solution Consisting of Thirteen Main Conclusions

104. [First conclusion] – Therefore one can say differently, and let this conclusion be the first, that the conception that is caused by the spoken utterance is only grasped in the last moment of the uttering of the words.

105. The proof is that a conception of all the parts of the utterance cannot be had before that point; for a conception of the whole utterance is not had without the conception of the parts.

106. There is confirmation by way of likeness, because a concept formed by an expression is not had before the final moment of uttering the expression; therefore similarly about uttering a complete sentence. And the reason for the likeness is that, just as the parts of an expression do not signify the simple concept that the expression signifies, so the expression does not signify any complex concept that the whole uttered sentence signifies. But the difference is that a part of a sentence does signify some concept, but a part of an expression does not signify any simple concept. However, the only difference relevant there to the matter at issue is that, in both cases, the whole conception is not had save at the end of everything uttered [n.105].

107. If objection is made that therefore an utterance causes a concept when it does not exist because, when it has been completely uttered, nothing of it exists – I reply: it is plain that the objection is not cogent, because the same could be argued about the concept imported by an expression.

108. Therefore I say that when a concept comes to be in the intellect in the moment after the utterance of a sentence or expression, it does not come to be through the uttering, because the uttering does not exist, as was said, but it comes to be at the end of the uttering of any expression through something caused in imagination by the expression, because of which (while it was being uttered) the intellect causes in itself some concept of the expression. Or more to the matter at hand, through things left behind by the individual expressions while they were being uttered, the intellect in the final moment brings them together and causes an understanding or conception of the whole. And therefore did I speak of the concept that is caused by the utterance [n.104], because otherwise it could be from the signified concept that is not caused by the utterance (as a concept in the speaker which he intends to express by his utterance).

109. And if it is argued against this conclusion that the thing signified by the whole utterance arises from the things signified by the parts and that the parts signify when they are uttered – I reply that the signification is not the formal reason of causing the concept in the hearer but is a certain preceding disposition, upon which there follows, by the intellect's act of combining, a causing of the whole concept out of the concepts caused by the parts [n.108].

110. [Second conclusion] – The second conclusion is that it is not necessary that, in the moment of uttering or in time, the concept is caused in the hearer by the uttered words and that the truth of this concept is understood without uniting the terms. For if I say, 'God created the world', the concept of this assertion is caused in the final moment [sc. of the uttering], but the truth of it, or the uniting of the terms, is understood to be for the first moment of time [sc. for God created the world 'in the beginning']. So it is not the same to say '*in* which moment' and '*for* which moment' the whole statement is conceived; for it is conceived *in* the last moment of the completed assertion, and it is also conceived *for* the moment when the terms are indicated as being united in the intellect or outside in the thing [sc. 'God created the world' is understood in the final moment of the uttering of the assertion, but it is understood to be for, or about, the beginning of all time].

111. [Third conclusion] – The third conclusion is that the terms are denoted as being united for that moment, and consequently that there is truth in the assertion which is co-signified by the verb that joins the terms together; for there is nothing else in the proposition that would signify the time to which the union of the terms (from the understanding of the proposition) is referred.

112. [Fourth conclusion] – The fourth conclusion is that a verb of any time can signify a time or a moment; otherwise one could not express a concept about the present, past, or future union of the terms.

113. For if one could not co-signify a past moment when the verb is in the past tense, or a present one when it is in the present tense, or a future one when it is in the future tense, no proposition in which is expressed a union of terms would be true, and this union of terms could only be in a moment (for example, 'this soul was created' would not be true, nor 'this soul is being created' nor 'this soul will be created').

114. Also, if the present time could not be co-signified if the verb is present, nor past time if the verb is past nor future time if the verb is future, no proposition would be true whose terms cannot be united except for a time (and then 'the heaven was in motion' would not be true, nor 'the heaven is in motion' nor 'the heaven will be in motion').

115. In continuation of this conclusion I say that the statement ‘a verb co-signifies a moment or time properly speaking’ (whether speaking of a present or past or future verb) belongs to the multiplicity of the third mode of equivocation, which is according to things co-signified by an expression that has the same meaning [Peter of Spain, *Tractatus* tr.7 nn.29-39, 28]. But the unitings of the terms for a moment or a time are not causes of the truth of such a proposition, because there is no single mode that is included indifferently in the two modes. And so they would have to have one common concept when they are causes of truth in what they co-signify or signify.

116. [Fifth conclusion] – The fifth conclusion, according to one of the modes of speaking, is that a verb, if it is present tense and signifies a moment, signifies the moment of the complete uttering of the whole assertion, because the union and concept of the terms or of the whole assertion is understood for the whole time of the uttering, and the whole concept is understood for the final moment. But if the verb is present tense and co-signifies time, it co-signifies the time of its uttering, whether the whole of it or a part; and accordingly, if in the final moment of the uttering of a verb fire were generated, this proposition would be true ‘fire is generated’. Now this is similar to ‘the heaven is in motion’ or ‘I am running’, if in the whole time of the uttering of it or in any part, at least a large part, the terms are united. And accordingly these propositions will never be true ‘I am drinking’ or ‘I am sleeping’ and the like, because they cannot be true as they co-signify the moment, because the act cannot be in a moment – not even if it co-signifies time, because the terms are not united for the whole time of the uttering of the assertion nor for a part of it.

117. Therefore the proposition will always be false.

118. [Sixth conclusion] – Accordingly a sixth conclusion would be posited, that in a proposition about the present, when the verb co-signifies the present moment, the things signified by all the parts of the assertion must be understood for the final moment.

This conclusion is proved from the preceding one, because according to the Philosopher *On Interpretation* 2.16a13-18 “‘is’ signifies a certain composition” which one cannot understand without the things composed. Therefore if the copula ‘is’ had joined them for the final moment, then for that moment must the things signified by all the parts be understood.

120. [Seventh conclusion] – And herefrom there is a seventh conclusion for the present purpose, that when here the verb [sc. ‘is’] signifies not time but a moment, because the first union of the terms is done by infinite virtue and consequently in a moment, it follows that all the parts of the assertion and the things they signify must be understood for the final moment.

121. [Eighth conclusion] – From this follows an eighth conclusion, that the pronoun ‘this’ will hold for the moment of the complete utterance; and then it would be said to be demonstrative of that which for that moment is under the species, so that in this way the demonstrating is partly for the senses and partly for the intellect, and to this extent it is altogether simply so, as the first opinion said [n.100]. But that which is demonstrated for the intellect and directly is not demonstrated disjunctively, but what is now contained [under the species] is demonstrated etc.

122. [Ninth conclusion] – The ninth conclusion is that in the case of singulars the order follows the order of universals. For any universal can be understood to descend to its proper singular before it is contracted through some difference to some lower level of

predication, as to the species, and so we have the following order of singulars: ‘this being’ ‘this substance’ ‘this body’ and so successively to ‘Socrates’.

123. This is plain from Avicenna in his *Physics, Sufficientia* 1.1, because from a distance we first see a body before we see an animal, and an animal before we see a man [cf. *Ord.* I d.3 n.84], which is not to be understood of universals (for sight does not see universals), but of singulars of something more universal.²

124. [Tenth conclusion] – And then there is a tenth conclusion, that ‘this’ in a proposition points to a singular being and not per se to a singular of some class more or less universal than being.

125. The proof:

First, because one reasonably asks about many things ‘what is this?’, but the supposit and that which is asked about are not the same thing; therefore if the ‘this’ stands for ‘this wood’ or ‘this stone’, because that is what is being asked about, it follows that the same thing that supposits is being asked about; for when the response is given, namely ‘wood’ or ‘stone’, the mind of the asker is brought to rest about that singular. So what supposits here for the singular is only that it is a singular being, and the question asked is about something specific under being, and anything specific under being is appropriate as a response. And this proof rests on a single word that is put in *Exodus* 16.15 about manna, that is, ‘what is this?’

126. Another proof is a sort of grammatical one, that an adjective, when in a substantive of neuter gender, includes the substantive in itself according to the grammarians; but it only includes that which is something or a being; therefore etc.

127. [Eleventh conclusion] – The eleventh conclusion, that although the ‘this’ here only per se stands for a singular being, yet it is understood for a singular of some lower predication and regularly for the singular that is ‘the body of Christ’; because the singular is only there in that which is the body of Christ, and only in the last moment for which being in some singular thing is demonstrative.

128. [Twelfth conclusion] – The twelfth conclusion is that not for this reason will the sense of the proposition be ‘my body is my body’, because the understanding of the antecedent [‘this’] is one thing and the understanding of the consequent [‘my body’] another, even though the subject of the consequent is standing for the subject of the antecedent.

129. The fact is plain because the concept of the consequent can be certain and of the antecedent doubtful; and to be certain and doubtful are not the same.

130. It is also plain by converting the proposition, because the sense of ‘my body is this’, that is, ‘...is this being’ is different from the proposition ‘my body is my body’.

131. [Thirteenth conclusion] – The thirteenth conclusion is that, according to this understanding, the proposition [‘this is my body’] can effect or convert [sc. the bread]. For the minister who is principally bringing it about that, in the moment for which he enunciates the proposition, this assertion then signifies, would himself principally convert it, for ‘to bring principally about that this being is the body of Christ’ is really to bring about a conversion through which the body of Christ receives ‘being this’ (for the bringing about by which this being becomes the body of Christ and by which the body of Christ becomes this being, that is, becomes this being which is under these species, is the

² That is, we do not see the universal ‘body’ before we see the individual Socrates, but we see this body, this animal, this man, Socrates.

same bringing about). But the assertion which acts by way of signifying must be converse [of the bread] for the moment for which the one converting really acts. Therefore this assertion is effective simply.

4. Weighing of the Aforesaid Conclusions

132. From these thirteen conclusions it is plain how this assertion ['this is my body'] is true because, according to the conclusions, the whole understanding of it, both of the proposition and of the terms, is taken for the final moment of the utterance; and for that moment it points to the same thing that then exists under the accidents. Now it is true that this is the body of Christ and that the proposition does not, on account of 'this', get converted into 'my body is my body'. But the proposition 'this is my body' can be a converting proposition, though the other is not, because it denotes a singular of a more universal kind, namely this being that is predicated, but the other denotes that it is specifically said of itself. But a proposition which denotes that some primary predicate is said of 'this being' can be effective, just as can the proposition that would denote of a stone that it is first 'this being'.

133. All these conclusions I can concede, apart from the fifth (and the others insofar as they follow from it), for the verb, when uttered, co-signifies then just as it signifies then; and unless some determination is added whereby the co-signified time would be referred to a different present moment, it does not seem from the force of the utterance that it would join the terms for any moment save for the final moment of uttering the present tense verb.

134. Nor is the proof that is put there [n.116] compelling; for although the understanding of the whole utterance is only brought about by the utterance in the final moment, as was expounded in the first conclusion [nn.104-106], yet a conception of the union of the terms only comes to be for that moment, as is plain from the second conclusion.

135. This is also plain in the case of propositions about the past and future, where a verb can unite a proposition for any past or future moment, however distant from the speaker. And yet the understanding there of the whole assertion is not got save in the moment of the completed utterance, just as neither is the understanding of a proposition about the present so got, nor universally the understanding of any proposition.

136. Through this too can be destroyed what follows on the fifth conclusion, about the demonstrative force of the pronoun 'this', for if it must be understood for the time or moment for which there is a combining of terms, and if the combining of terms is not understood for the final moment of the whole utterance but for the moment of the utterance of the verb 'is', then it follows that the demonstrative force is understood for the same thing.

137. There is also another difficulty against the aforesaid, specifically about demonstrative force [n.121]; for a demonstrative pronoun, when uttered, signifies what it is demonstrative of; therefore it signifies what can then be pointed to. But there is nothing then able to be pointed to there for the senses save the accidents, nor pointed to for the intellect, as it seems, save what is under the accidents.

One can therefore say a little differently that one does not get from the force of the speaking that the concept of a proposition about the past, or the union of the terms, is understood precisely for the final moment of the whole assertion; but if it is understood to be for a moment it should be understood for the moment of the complete utterance of the verb. The parts too signify when uttered, and if the nature of their signification is such as only to be extended to something

that is present when the parts signify, then it is necessary that what they signify is present when the parts are uttered.

138. However it is very possible for someone to determine himself to express some propositional concept for a moment, and possible for the concepts of all the parts of that concept to be taken for that same final moment of utterance; for it is in this way that disputants determine themselves to state their meaning in their responses and to do so for the same moment; otherwise the respondent could never be refuted however much he might accept contradictories. And if indeed he wished to express his concept to another by an assertion about the present, he will not cause a concept in that other for the final moment of utterance by virtue of his words; but it is possible that he express to him for some reason what for that moment he is uttering. And then for such reason, not by virtue of his words, he will conceive the union of the terms for that moment. But if he himself, when speaking, were to intend to cause something by his proposition, then just as he could also intend to express a concept for the final moment, so he could intend to cause the effect for that moment. If too, on the uttering of the assertion, which intends some concept and all its parts to be taken for some moment, someone else, seeing the intention, wanted to cause something, he could cause it for the final moment for which he intends to signify all those things

139. And in this way, although what was said before in the fifth conclusion and the following ones about the final moment of utterance [nn.116, 118-121, 127, 132] is not manifest by virtue of the words, yet it is manifest that they can be understood as far as concerns the intention of him who expresses them, both in himself and as he is a minister of God who, seeing the minister's intention, can assist with the assertion so as to act in the same way as the assertion itself signifies according to the intention of the speaker of it.

140. Whether this way is held to, that by virtue of the words the whole assertion must be referred to the final moment of the words or the utterance [n.139], or this other, that it is not by virtue of the words but by the determination of the utterer (and this not only in himself but in his ordering to the principal agent who assists the action [nn.138-139]), and if there is preserved in the one way or the other the fact that the proposition is true according to the eighth conclusion and the others that follow it, with which I do not disagree – yet there remains the difficulty common to both ways as to how the proposition ['this is my body'] is true. For according to both ways, although the proposition is true for the final moment, yet not naturally before the conversion is complete; because the thing naturally ought to be before the assertion is true, "for by the fact the thing is or is not, the assertion is true or false," *Categories* 5.4b9-10. The truth, then, does not naturally precede the conversion but follows it; and, as a result, the proposition, as it is true, is not such as to do the converting.

5. Scotus' own Conclusion

141. For this reason I say that this whole disputation (in thirteen conclusions and their proofs and disproofs) about saving the truth of this proposition ['this is my body'] is subtle and matter for logic. But for a theologian it suffices that the assertion, as it is a sensible sign, is an instrument of God, instituted by God, for the consecration that follows in the final instant, such that God assists in it as it is a certain preceding effective disposition, so that, when it is complete, he may cause the relevant invisible effect. But the assertion's truth, as it is such a disposition, does not precede the action of God, because, being a perceptible sign in a state of becoming and consequently in time, it is

not understood to have its own truth. Also, when it does have truth, its truth follows, in the order of nature, the divine action.

142. Briefly, then, the theologian should say that, however a logician might save the truth of the proposition, yet the proposition is not a sacramental pronouncement as it is true, but as it is the sort of perceptible sign it is, preceding its truth perhaps in time – and at least naturally –, just as a disposition continuous in time precedes the final moment and the condition in the final moment of whatever it precedes; a cause too precedes the condition of the caused.

143. And if you ask ‘what sort of proposition, either as true or false, is this proposition that converts [the bread]?’ I say that it is neither one way nor the other but only as it is a neutral proposition and prior naturally (and perhaps in time) to its truth.

144. And this priority is proved as follows, that any foundation is prior to the accident that is a relation; a proposition or concept is a foundation in respect of truth, which is an accident that is a relation, because truth can be in or not in a proposition, just as a proposition can conform or not conform with the thing. For when Socrates is sitting the assertion that says ‘Socrates is sitting’ is true, as is said in *Categories* 5.4a10-b18. Therefore the concept of an assertion as it is in itself is naturally prior to its truth – and the assertion itself too, as it is variable and in a state of becoming, is still prior in duration to its concept (just as time is prior to its ending final moment).

145. And this fact too about the natural priority of the concept to the truth is manifestly plain in a learner; for first a student conceives the undemonstrated conclusion, and indeed as then neither true nor false, and yet he perceives and conceives the whole per se concept of it; second, when a demonstration is applied to it, he conceives it as true. And it is plainly evident that God could institute some un-meaning sentence upon whose utterance by a minister he would assist at the end of the uttering in causing an effect.

146. So, therefore, however it may be with the logical disputation about how the proposition [‘this is my body’] is true [n.141], this point is to be held as certain, that the proposition, as a vocal sign and in external coming to be, is an efficacious sign in respect of consecration, because it is a preceding disposition that God, by compact, assists with at the end in effective causing of an effect [cf. IV d.1 nn.308, 315, 325, d.4 n.103] – regardless of whether the proposition signifies this sort of effect (which is true and fitting in the matter at hand), and that merely so, namely as neither true nor false but insofar as it is a disposition; or whether it signifies the effect as a true proposition does, and that for the time when it is a disposition or for the moment for which what it is a disposition for will be caused, and then as naturally prior or as naturally posterior to the moment in which the effect will be caused.

147. But one could in a different way make a subtle distinction here, that in the final moment of utterance there is first, according to the order of nature, a concept of the proposition as neither [sc. true or false]; that second a divine operation follows on it, causing what the assertion designates; that third the truth of this conception follows. And so not only is the assertion prior to truth as it is vocally and continuously uttered, but also as it has its proper effect, though not as something true.

148. However this subtlety implies things that belong to the logical disputation about the truth of the proposition or of the conception of the proposition, namely that it is true for the final moment [n.140]; and the subtlety does nothing for the assertion as it is something sacramental. For the conception that is posited as being got through the

assertion in the final moment [n.116] is in no way an instrument of God for the action of God that is posited as following in the second moment of nature [n.147], because God does not use for his operation anything sacramental save the perceptible sign [IV d.1 n.315].

149. So in brief, therefore, it suffices for the minister, without his engaging then in dispute about what the assertion is understood for, to intend to pronounce the words in the way that Christ instituted that they be pronounced. And in this way the due intention and the due instrument are got, namely the spoken assertion itself, which instrument, applied by such agent [sc. the minister], God assists so as to cause such effect in the final moment.

150. From these points the understanding of the form of consecration over the wine is plain, because the logical disputation and theological certitude [sc. about the wine] could be altogether like [sc. the disputation and certitude about the bread].

151. But that the words ‘this chalice’ are here set down is because the blood is consecrated under the idea of drink; and a liquid does not have the idea of drink save in a vessel. But nothing of the sort is set down in the idea and consecration of the body, because the body is confectioned as food, and a solid has the idea of food even though it is not in a vessel.

III. To the Initial Arguments

152. As to the first argument [n.53], it is plain that the ‘this’ is a singular demonstrative of being, and not the bread or its accidents; for it is demonstrative for the moment of the complete uttering of the assertion, and that either by virtue of the words, according to the fifth and seventh conclusions [nn.116, 120], or by the intention of the speaker, according to another way [nn.139-140]. Nor is this the same as saying ‘my body is my body’, as is plain from the thirteenth conclusion [n.131]. And the fact is plain because the proposition ‘this is fire’ could be such as to convert, but not the proposition ‘fire is fire’, because what ‘this being is fire’ does is to make a certain conversion, but not so ‘fire is fire’.

153. As to the second [n.54], it is plain that the ‘for’ is put there to produce continuity in the words, so that the individual words could not there be uttered at once as distinct.

154. As to the third [n.55], I concede that it ought to be that the ‘my’, by virtue of the words, be denoted as referring to the person of Christ; but this is not the case unless mention is made first of Christ, in whose person the words are uttered; just as, if I were to say “Christ said, ‘my doctrine is not mine’,” the signification, from the truth of the proposition, would be that the ‘mine’ is referred to Christ; but not so if, without speaking previously about Christ, someone were at once to say, ‘my doctrine is not mine’.

155. As to the two arguments against the consecration of the blood [nn.56-57], the answer is plain in the body of the question [nn.72-95].

Question Three

Whether the Sacrament of the Eucharist was fittingly Instituted after the Cena, or whether it could be Received by those not Fasting

156. The third question^a is whether this sacrament could be celebrated or received by those not fasting.

a. [Interpolation]: Proceeding thus to the third question, I ask, since the Eucharist was given to the disciples after the Cena, whether...

157. It seems that it could be:

Because Christ gave the Eucharist after the Cena to his disciples when they had eaten.

158. Again in *I Corinthians* 11.34 it is said, “if anyone is hungry, let him eat at home,” where the Apostle is giving approval that, before the Corinthians come together to church, they should satisfy their hunger at home, so that they not take of the species immoderately in church. Hence he rebukes them in the same place [11.21] saying, “One is hungry and another drunk.”

159. On the contrary.

Gratian *Decretum* p.3 d.2 ch.24, from Augustine *To the Questions of Januarius* 1.6, “It has pleased the Holy Spirit that, in honor of so great a sacrament, the body of the Lord should enter the mouth of a Christian before other food does; therefore is this custom observed everywhere.”

I. To the Question

A. About the Four Ways of Receiving this Sacrament

160. I reply that one can receive this sacrament and not receive it sacramentally; one can receive the sacrament and receive it sacramentally but not spiritually; one can receive the sacrament sacramentally and spiritually.

161. He receives in the first way who receives the consecrated host, which is truly the sacrament there but, however, does not receive it as consecrated but altogether does not discriminate it from common food. And such a one, according to the Apostle in *I Corinthians* 11.29, “eats and drinks judgment to himself, not discerning the body of the Lord,” that is, not discriminating it from common food. And this can be done either from lack of faith (as a pagan, if communion were given to him) or, when there is faith as well, from contempt (as in the case of a bad Christian).

162. He receives it in the second way who not only receives the sacrament but receives it as a sacrament, believing that the body of Christ is there and that he is receiving the communion of the body of Christ in the way such communion is accustomed to be done in the Church. But if he is in mortal sin, lacking contrition, he does not receive it spiritually, because he does not receive the spiritual effect (to which this sort of spiritual reception is ordered), and this effect is spiritual nourishment of the soul through the grace given by Christ received in the sacrament, or it is incorporation in the received Christ himself, as Christ said, according to Augustine *Confessions* 7.10.16, “I am the food of the mature.”

163. In the third way the good among the faithful receive it, being, as far as they can, without mortal sin. For they have examined their conscience carefully, and such are spiritually nourished and united and incorporated in Christ their spiritual food, according to Augustine [*ibid.*], “Grow and you will eat me, not converting me into you, but you will

be converted into me.” For there is this difference between bodily and spiritual nutrition, that bodily nutrition is converted into him who needs nourishing, while he who is fed on spiritual nourishment is converted into the food.

164. It is plain, then, that he receives in all these three ways who receives it as a sacrament, and as containing the body of Christ, and does so with due reverence and devotion, so that he is nourished spiritually, the way sacramental reception signifies.

165. In a fourth way the sacrament is received spiritually but not sacramentally, namely when a good man is prepared well and devoutly according to his ability, yet abstains out of reverence or some infirmity or perhaps because he cannot get a minister. With this agrees the remark of Augustine *On John's Gospel* tr.25 n.12 [Gratian *Decretum* p.3 d.2 ch.47], “Why do you prepare your teeth and stomach? Believe, and you have eaten.” And such a one is nourished spiritually.

B. A Difficulty as to the Third Way and its Solution

166. As to the matter at hand I say that the sacrament can be received in the first two ways by those not fasting just as by those who are fasting (speaking not of ‘can’ licitly but absolutely). But about the third way, namely not about ‘can’ absolutely but licitly and usefully, the question poses a difficulty.

167. I distinguish between the fast of nature and the fast of the Church.

The fast of the Church is only broken by some extraordinary replenishment outside the custom of the Church; hence the fast of the Church is not broken because of the taking of health supplements or medicines or through drink, at least after a meal.

168. But the fast of nature is the lack of food taken or to be taken in the stomach, or at least taken on the way to the stomach so as to enter the stomach, and this on the day of fasting, counting from the beginning of the day when someone is said to be fasting.

169. Likewise I distinguish between ‘ought’ and ‘permitted’, because either it is being understood as a matter of rule or in some particular case.

170. I say therefore that as a matter of rule the receiver should, for spiritual and sacramental reception, be fasting simply, that is, with the fast of nature. Nor is there any main reason for this except divine institution, which either Christ gave to his disciples or promulgated through them or left to be instituted. And indeed the institution is reasonable because of reverence for the sacrament, which reverence is regularly lesser in someone who has eaten than in someone who is fasting – and also so that one may seek spiritual food before bodily food.

171. But if a particular case is being understood [n.169], I say that there can be a case in which someone not fasting is quasi regularly permitted to approach [the sacrament], as someone in a grave sickness when danger of imminent death is feared; for then it would be dangerous to deny the sacrament to an ill person who, although having eaten, is begging for the sacrament, because it is viaticum. And therefore it must be given to him who is departing from this world, so that he may thereby be led to the goal.

172. Another special case is as when in some region the sacrament is regularly celebrated using white wine, and an assistant prepares the chalice for the priest and, by some negligence, puts in water instead of wine; the priest however supposes the assistant has prepared the chalice well and proceeds to say the sacramental words and to do the other things up to when he receives, but on receiving the liquid from the chalice he

realizes it is water. It seems that he could not on that day receive the blood, if the receiver should be fasting.

173. I say therefore that in that case the priest is bound to consecrate the blood again and to receive the consecrated element.

174. The proof is that when two precepts are in a certain order, the precept of higher order is more binding. One precept is that of Christ and the Church, and the sacrament, by the very idea of the sacrament, should, when it is confected, be confected and received integrally, because the sacrament in itself is something integrated from two things.

175. For the obligation of the Church is rigid about keeping this integrity, Gratian *Decretum* p.3 d.2 ch.12, "Either let them receive the whole integrated sacrament or refrain from the whole integrated sacrament," and Gratian is speaking of priests who confect and afterwards do not communicate. And a reason is added: "because the division of the sacrament cannot arise without grave sacrilege."

176. Therefore, when any other precept is set down by the Church, and especially one that does not have regard to the proper and essential idea of the sacrament, every celebrant is always bound to keep the integrity of the sacrament. Therefore, he who has received water is simply bound to complete what he has omitted, namely omitted for consecrating the sacrament. And then further, if he is bound to consecrate the wine, the same person is bound to receive what is consecrated. Hence is contained in Gratian *Decretum ibid.* ch.11, "It is certain that those who sacrifice and do not eat are guilty of the Lord's sacrament;" and there follows, let him who is such "know that he is expelled from communion for a year; therefore it must be in every way maintained that, as often as a priest immolates the body and blood, he make himself a participant in receiving the body and blood."

177. He is necessarily bound, then, by the institution of Christ and because of the integrity of the sacrament, to confect the blood and, by the strictest precept of the Church (under pain of being expelled for a year), bound to receive what is consecrated.

178. And if it be objected, 'he is not fasting, so he sins mortally by confecting the sacrament; either then he should not confect so that he does not receive, or if he must confect and receive he must sin against the precept of the Church. And then he is in perplexity, which is not to be said about any of the precepts of God and the Church' – I reply that the Church does not as strictly prescribe that a receiver be fasting (by prohibiting the non-faster from receiving) as it prohibits the division of the sacrament (rather the division is prohibited by Christ and from the first institution of the Eucharist). Nor does the Church as strictly prohibit the non-faster from receiving as it commands the consecrator to receive. Therefore, on the one side he has the precept of Christ about thus consecrating, and, after the consecration, he has the most strict command of the Church about receiving. On the other side he has only a comparatively light command of the Church about fasting. For it is not set down that a non-fasting receiver is guilty of the Lord's sacrament, or that there is sacrilege there, or that he is expelled from communion for a year, as it is in the former case. The Church then simply did not intend to bind one to fast in this case; to the contrary, because the other two precepts are, both by virtue of Christ and by virtue of the Church, stronger and more binding.

179. Nor is he then perplexed, because he does well by keeping the precept of superior order and the stricter precept of the Church; and if he does not keep it, he sins

mortally. But by omitting the less strict precept he does not sin with a new sin, because in this case he is not bound to keep the precept, nor did the Church want to bind him to the precept in this case, but rather to the opposite.

180. It is also manifestly plain that fasting is not as necessary a condition in a priest who receives, because on the day of Preparation for the Passover a particle [sc. of the host] placed in the chalice is received with pure unconsecrated wine, because the chalice from some preceding day is not preserved. And it is likely that the wine descends more quickly into the stomach than the particle of the host that is chewed. Therefore, by the custom of the Church, the priest in this case receives the eucharist when not fasting, and it is likely that the wine more quickly reaches the belly than the particle of the host that is chewed does. Therefore, by the custom of the Church the priest there receives the Eucharist when not fasting.

181. And if it be objected that there will be scandal if the people perceive the priest confecting the blood for a second time – one response is that if they were scandalized the scandal is that of the Pharisees, namely taken and not given, for the deed in itself is good and necessary. And everyone should judge that the deed, if they do not know the cause of it, is good, and should suppose that the priest has a good cause. Everyone too should, if he know the cause, approve of it. Hence Christ, when condemning such scandal, says of it, *Matthew* 15.13-14 about the Pharisees, “Let them alone. They are blind and leaders of the blind; every plant that my Father has not planted etc.”

182. One can reply in another way that the priest can very well avoid the supposed scandal, if he acts with caution. For by going to the side of the altar, as if for receiving the wine after communion, and pouring in wine and water (whether the already remaining water, because he has not consumed all of it, or water freshly put in), he will be able to return to the middle of the altar, and in a little time from the place ‘In like manner, after having eaten, Christ took the chalice,’ he will be able to continue to the place ‘As often as you do this’ or to the place ‘Therefore...mindful...’; and, after uttering these words, he will be able, with due reverence, to receive it as true blood. Nor will all this be perceived [by others], because it can be done in a short time; and so he will not take up so much time that the people can have enough occasion for scandal taken.

183. And if against this is argued what was said about the integrity of the sacrament [nn.173-177], that the priest does not receive the blood on the day of Preparation, I reply: the integrity is required in the consecrating, namely that no one consecrate the body unless he also consecrate the blood. Now it is not required in any reception of the sacrament (for the laity can well receive the body and not the blood); but it is required in the reception that follows consecration (this is contained in Gratian *Decretum* p.3 d.2 n.11).

II. To the Initial Arguments

184. To the first argument for the opposite [n.157] Augustine well replies, *To the Questions of Januarius* 1.6, in Gratian *Decretum* p.3 d.2 ch.24, “That the Lord gave the Eucharist to the disciples after a meal is not a reason that those should receive as they did who have eaten. They are rebuked by the Apostle (*I Corinthians* 11.20-22).” And Augustine adds the cause why the Savior did it then, “For the Savior,” he says, “in order to commend more forcefully the greatness of this mystery, wished to fix it last in the

hearts of his disciples. But in what order it should be taken thereafter he left for the disciples to teach, through whom he was going to make disposition for the Churches.”

185. The same point serves for the second argument [n.158]: because according to Augustine [n.184] the Apostle rebuked those who took the Eucharist after eating. And therefore the words “if anyone is hungry, let him eat at home” should not be understood to mean he should eat at home before he comes to church but after departure from the church, so that he not sate his hunger on the Eucharist (the way he says “another is drunk”). Rather, waiting for what will be necessary for him at home he should receive what is his own. And for this reason is the custom of the Latin Church praiseworthy, which dispenses the Eucharist to no one save in small quantity (so that it cannot be taken to get drunk) and very well sufficient for due reverence of the sacrament.

186. From this is plain that a man can eat soon after communion, because the sacred species are soon converted – which seems must be conceded here [Gratian *Decretum* p.3 d.2 ch.23].

Final Note

187. The fourth point that the Master touches on in this distinction, because it is about the thing of the sacrament [n.11], more properly belongs to the treatment in distinction 10. Therefore, I omit it for the present, keeping it for later, namely for the aforesaid place [d.10].

Ninth Distinction

Overview of the Parts

1. “And just as there are two parts” [Lombard *Sent.* IV d.1 ch.1].
In the ninth distinction the Master treats of the reception of this sacrament.
2. And the first part, in which he determines the truth, stays undivided.
3. His second part (which begins at ch.2 n.1), namely where he excludes error about the truths he has determined, is divided into two parts: first he excludes an error about the reception of the sacrament; second he excludes another error about the thing of the sacrament. And these excluded errors correspond to the truths already determined. The second part begins at the beginning of d.10 ch.1 n.1.

Single Question

Whether Someone in a State of Mortal Sin Sins Mortally in Receiving the Sacrament of the Eucharist

4. As to this distinction I ask only one question about the reception of this sacrament, namely whether someone in a state of mortal sin sins mortally in receiving the sacrament.

5. It seems that he does not:

Because no one sins by doing what he is bound to do; but sometimes someone is bound to communicate notwithstanding the fact he is in mortal sin; therefore etc. Proof of the minor as to two cases: every Christian is bound to communicate once a year, according to Gregory IX *Decretals* V tit.38 ch.12, “everyone of either sex;” similar proof of the second case, in Gratian *Decretum* p.3 d.2 ch.11 it is said that a priest who has consecrated is bound to receive the sacrament, and it is possible that he is then in mortal sin, or that in the meantime he falls into mortal sin.

6. Again, no one is bound to go to confession save once a year, as is plain from Gregory IX above [n.5]; therefore he is bound to do the acts appropriate for him, even if he does not confess many times; therefore a priest can celebrate many times, however much he has sinned, without repeated confession. For it does not appear why in his confessing once the said precept is for him not sufficient for salvation as it is for another Christian, since he does not seem tied to a special law.

7. On the contrary:

I Corinthians 11.29, “He who eats and drinks unworthily eats and drinks for judgment.” Such is anyone of this sort who is not spiritually a member of Christ and receives the Eucharist, because receiving signifies that he is spiritually incorporated into Christ.

8. Further, Augustine *On John’s Gospel* tr.26 n.18, when speaking of a bad priest says, “He receives for judgment the sacrament of so great a thing.”

I. To the Question

A. About Mortal Sin

9. One must say that someone can be understood to be in mortal sin in three ways: first actually, because namely he is now sinning mortally in an exterior or interior act; second because, after a past mortal sin that he does not recall, he has not repented nor does repent; third because, if he has repented or does repent of the past sin, yet he has not confessed nor been absolved in the Church.

1. About him who is Actually in Mortal Sin

10. About the first I say that he sins mortally, because he simply eats unworthily.

2. About him who has not Repented of a Past Mortal Sin

11. About the second I say that if his negligence is heavy and gross, because of which he does not recall his sin, he is not excused from sin, though he sins less than the first. The point is plain from *I Corinthians* 11.28, “Let a man,” he says, “prove himself etc.,” for he is bound to examine himself, with the diligence possible for our weakness, before he receives communion.

12. But if his negligence is not gross, as that sufficient examination has been done and no sin occurs to him about which he was not or is not contrite and has not confessed already, he does not sin by receiving communion, though perhaps something lies hidden or fallen into oblivion.

13. The proof is:

First that if, after such examination, he were to die contrite and confessed, he would be saved; but no greater examination is required for receiving communion than for dying in peace.

Second because otherwise anyone at all would be exposing himself to danger in receiving communion; for *Psalm* 18.13 says, “Who understands his sins?” and *Ecclesiastes* 9.1, “A man knows not whether he is worthy of love or hate.” Therefore, if it were necessary for someone who receives communion to be in a state of charity, anyone at all would expose himself to danger in receiving communion, since he does not know whether he would be sinning in doing that act.

The third proof is that then the sacrament would not be a sacrament for the wayfarer, since such certitude [sc. knowing one is in a state of grace or charity] does not belong to a wayfarer.

14. For this reason I say that when diligent examination has been done according to the possibility of our weakness, and when contrition has preceded, and confession has been made that, as it seems to man, is sufficient, then he does not sin if he then receives communion. On the contrary, if any sins remain hidden, they are remitted by the sacrament.

3. About him who has Repented but has not Confessed

15. About the third I say that if an opportunity to confess arises, he is bound to confess before he receives communion. The reason is that he must be reconciled not only to God but to the Church, so that he may receive worthily the sacrament of the unity of the Church.

16. But if an opportunity to confess does not arise, and if he can without scandal avoid receiving communion, he is bound not to receive but to wait for confession, for the same reason as said just now [n.15].

17. But if scandal may arise unless he at once receive communion, as if he has put on vestments and, after doing so, he becomes conscious of a mortal sin which he has not otherwise confessed and he does not have a suitable confessor to hand then, with contrition and the will to confess at an opportune time, he can, so as to avoid scandal, celebrate [mass].

18. And likewise as concerns another about to receive communion who is not a celebrant (as when the custom in some religious community or college or church is that all non-priests receive communion), if the case is alike, namely if, when he must receive communion, he does not then have a suitable confessor, he can then receive communion without having confessed. Nor must one say that he is sinning mortally or transgressing the precept in order to avoid scandal, because no precept excludes him from this act in this case. For putting off the confession in act that he then has in his affection does not prevent him from being a member of the Church militant suitable for the acts in which the members communicate; and he is bound to avoid scandal to a neighbor.

B. About Venial Sin

19. As to venial sin one need not be in doubt, because there is no necessity for penitential confession about venial sin.

20. However a certain authority *On Ecclesiastical Dogmas* [Gennadius of Marseilles ch.53], and it is in the Master's text in distinction 12 ch.6 n.2, seems to make mention of venial sin; for it says "Although someone is pricked in conscience by a sin, provided he does not have a will to sin in other respects and makes satisfaction with tears and prayers, he may approach securely; but I say this about him who is not weighed down by mortal sins." Therefore, it seems that no one can approach securely unless he is without the will to sin venially, and has made satisfaction for past sins with tears and prayers.

21. I reply: the passage can be understood of mortal sin (not that mortal sin is present now or in the past without penance, but it has already been confessed), if he is pricked in conscience that he has not completely made satisfaction. And then what follows about mortal sin is intelligible: "who is not weighed down by mortal sins" supply "actual or past ones without subsequent penance."

II. To the Initial Arguments

22. To the first argument [n.5] I say that he who does in due manner what he is bound to do does not sin.

23. To the minor I say that no one is bound to receive communion in mortal sin, Gregory IX *Decretals* V tit.38 ch.12.

24. To the same proof [n.5] I say that just as he is bound to receive communion once a year so he is bound to make an effort by exterior penance [sc. auricular confession] to be outside mortal sin [v. IV d.15 q.1 n.8].

25. To the second proof [n.5] I say that a priest is bound to make an effort to be outside mortal sin before he receives communion; but if it happen that, after consecration and before communion, a memory comes to him of a mortal sin committed some time ago about which he did not do interior or exterior penance, then he is bound to have interior penance before he receives communion, and to put off exterior penance until an opportunity for confession arises.

26. To the second [n.6] I say that the precept about confessing once is less often than the times the faithful can keep the sacrament of penance. But many are bound also in special cases to exterior penance, as someone gravely ill whose recovery is despaired of, or someone undertaking an act where it is likely (in human judgment) that he is exposing himself to danger of death, as in deadly war. Thus too is a priest bound by a special law to exterior penance before he performs the act [of consecrating and receiving communion].

27. And if you say 'by what law?', I say by the law of the Apostle in *I Corinthians* 11.28 [n.11], "Let a man prove himself etc."

Tenth Distinction

Division of the Text and Overview of Questions

1. "There are some others etc." [The Master's text, *Sent.* IV d.10 ch.1 n.1]

2. Here begins distinction 10, where the Master excludes the error of some about the thing of this sacrament, namely the error of those who denied that the body of Christ is contained in the Eucharist.

3. The distinction is divided into three parts: first the Master posits the error; second the confirmation of it; third the rejection of it.

4. The second part can be divided, because he first sets down four authorities in favor of their error; second he solves the authorities; third he confirms his solution.

5. And the third part can be divided, because he first posits an authority that is against himself; second he weighs a certain part of it that seems to cause a doubt; third he responds to the doubt.

6. But because the principal conclusion of this distinction is that the body of Christ is really contained in the Eucharist, and because indeed the first part is about the Eucharist in the order of doctrine (hence it was also supposed in the first question of distinction 8 [d.8 n.20]), therefore as to this distinction I ask principally about three things: first about the possibility of Christ's body existing in the Eucharist; second about the things that can belong to Christ's body existing in the Eucharist; third about the action that can belong to Christ existing in the Eucharist.

First Part: On the Possibility of Christ's Body Existing in the Eucharist

7. About the first part I ask three questions: first, whether it is possible for Christ's body to be contained really under the species of bread and wine; second, whether his body could be placed at the same time in heaven and elsewhere; third, whether it could be placed at the same time in heaven and sacramentally on the altar.

Question One

Whether it is Possible for Christ's Body to be Contained Really under the Species of Bread and Wine

8. To proceed thus to the first question, arguments are made that this is not possible:

Because the body of Christ is not contained under the species of unconsecrated bread; therefore not after consecration either. The antecedent is plain. The proof of the consequence is that a species after the consecration is not disposed differently in itself than it was before.

9. And if you say that before consecration a species is in a subject and afterwards without a subject, then I take the proposition that it is not disposed differently in relation to the body of Christ after the consecration, when it is without a subject, than it was before the consecration, when it was in a subject. For its being in a subject in no way varies this relation. But the species of bread is of this sort whether in a subject or not; therefore its relation to the body of Christ is not changed by its being or not being in a subject. But it is impossible for something to be where it was not before, unless either it or what it is in is newly changed. Therefore since the species of bread are not changed in relation to the body of Christ after consecration, the consequence is that the body of Christ must be changed in relation to the species in order for it to be newly there. But this is false, because the body of Christ remains unchangeably in heaven, according to

Augustine *On John's Gospel* tr.30 n.1 (and in Gratian *Decretum* p.3 d.2 ch.44): "The Lord is above until the end of the age."

10. Again second, as follows: Christ's body under the species is either a definite quantity, a quantum, or not a quantum, because a quantity cannot be separated from the mode of the quantity (just as neither can a subject be separated from its specific property), because the specific property of quantity seems to be most of the all the mode of the quantity. Therefore Christ's body would exist in a mode of quantity. But this is false because the less cannot exist together with the greater in this way.³

11. Again third, as follows, that in the Eucharist Christ's body has part next to part or not. If it does, then not all the parts of Christ's body would be together under the same part of the consecrated host; and universally, if something whose parts are part next to part is under some quantum, one part is with one part of that quantum and the whole of it with the whole of it. But if part is not next to part in it, then there is no quantum there; whence the definition of a continuous quantum is that it be part next to part.

12. On the contrary:

In *Matthew* 26.26 Christ says, "This is my body," and *John* 6.56, "my flesh is food indeed."

13. And many authorities from Augustine and Ambrose are set down in the Master's text [IV d.10 ch.1 n.6-ch.2 n.7, also in Gratian *Decretum* p.3 d.2 ch.55.

I. To the Question

14. Here two things must be explained, as is the case about other matters of belief: first what is to be maintained and by what authority; second how what is believed is possible [cf. Scotus, *On the First Principle* ch.3 n.1].

A. What is to be Maintained and by What Authority

15. On the first point I say that the proposition 'the body of Christ is of a truth really there' belongs simply to the articles of faith, in the way that the truth of any sacrament belongs to the articles of faith. For this truth was handed on expressly from the beginning, from when the Eucharist was instituted.

16. The foundation of this authority is *Matthew* 26.26-28 and *Luke* 22.19-20, where in the Cena Christ says, "This is my body; this is my blood."

17. And if heretics [e.g. Berengar of Tours, who afterwards recanted] want to gloss this by saying that it is said figuratively, like what is said in *John* 15.1, "I am the true vine," and in *I Corinthians* 10.4, "Now that rock was Christ" – this is altogether against the intention of the Savior.

18. The fact is plain from a saying of Augustine *83 Questions* q.69 n.2, "The circumstances of Scripture show how to understand Scripture." For universally the meaning of the words of Christ (whether he is speaking figuratively or not) can be gathered from what precedes and what follows in the same place, or from other places of Scripture. Hence when Christ say, "I am the true vine," he adds, "and you are the

³ The mode of quantity seems to be its determinate amount, and clearly the quantity of Christ's body is greater in amount (in size, weight etc.) than the quantity of the consecrated host.

branches;” for it is plain that the disciples were not natural branches but only branches figuratively.

19. But when he says in *Luke* 22, “This is my body,” he adds, “which will be given up for you;” also when he had said, “This is the chalice of my blood,” he adds in the same place, “which will be shed for you.” The same is also plain from another place of Scripture, namely *John* 6, where there is an extended sermon about this sacrament.

20. And if you say that, when Christ saw that some departed from him because of his preaching about the Eucharist, he then gave an exposition of himself saying, “The spirit gives life but the flesh is worth nothing at all; the words that I speak to you are spirit and they are life,” which Augustine treats of (*On the Psalms* psalm 98 n.9; in Gratian *Decretum* p.3 d.2 ch.44), and says, “Not this body which you see will you eat of, nor the blood that they will shed etc.” “It is a sacrament I have commended to you; spiritually understood will it give you life.” Therefore it seems from the words of Christ and Augustine that he does not understand them of the body save figuratively –

21. I say that the Master replies in the text, and replies well, that neither Christ nor Augustine in their exposition mean to deny the truth of Christ’s body in the sacrament, but that Christ’s body is not in the sacrament carnally, as those took it who departed from him, namely as visible in its proper form. Rather, in opposition to this way of understanding, it is there spiritually, that is intelligibly. And this is what Augustine says (and the Master adduces it, from Gratian *ibid.* ch.45), “It indeed is eaten, and not the body that was seen – it invisibly, not visibly.”⁴

22. In this way too does the Apostle treat at length of the Eucharist *I Corinthians* 11.23-29, and all later Catholics who expound these places of Scripture and say that the words of Scripture are to be understood of the real and not figurative presence of the body of Christ.

23. Hence it is a straightforward heresy today to think that the true body is not really there.

This on the first point [n.14].

B. How What is Believed is Possible

1. Four Possibilities, to be Explained in Turn in what Follows

24. On the second point [n.14] many impossibilities seem to be involved here, namely, following the principles of the philosophers: i) one is that a quantum exists together in a quantum, or that the substance of Christ’s body is here without its quantity; ii) a second is that a greater quantum exists together in a small quantum, namely in the same space as it; iii) a third is that the body of Christ begins to exist here, and yet without motion or change properly speaking, because it is not posited as leaving its ‘where’ in heaven; iv) a fourth is that a quantum exists really at once in diverse places.

25. Now the possibility of all these things is not to be explained here, because the prolixity would be too much.

For that i) the substance is not here without its quantity will be stated in the second part of this distinction 10, in question 1 nn.260-263.

⁴ The words are not from Augustine in fact but Lanfranc *On the Body and Blood of the Lord* ch.18, and from Ambrose’s *Letter to Irenaeus* 64 n.1. The misattributions are found first in Gratian, from whom the Master took them, and Scotus from the Master. Vatican editors.

26. But as to how ii) a quantum can exist together in a quantum, the difficulty is more evident about quanta that possess quantitative mode than when one or both are without quantitative mode. Therefore, this difficulty will be touched on in the material about glorious bodies, in the questions about the subtlety of the glorious body [IV d.49 p.2 suppl. q.7].

27. The final one, iii) and iv), that one quantum exists at the same time in several places, will be explained in the two questions that follow.

2. Two Possibilities to be Explained here

28. For this question, then, two things remain to be explained, namely how it is possible for the body of Christ to begin to exist on the altar without its moving in place iii), and how it is possible for Christ's body to be a quantum without quantitative mode ii).

a. First: About Christ's Body Beginning to Exist on the Altar without Change of Place α. Opinion of Others and its Rejection

29. About the first it is commonly said [Aquinas, Richard of Middleton, William of Auxerre] that this is because of the change of something else into the body of Christ (namely because of the conversion of bread into the body of Christ), and so it is not necessary for Christ's body to change in itself. For it is enough that something change into it for this sort of body to begin to be present there. Because just as a thing is generated where first something was corrupted, and not through a change proper to the generated thing, so does it seem that that into which something is converted by conversion of something else into it occurs where the thing converted into it first was, and not by a change in place proper to the term 'to which' of the conversion, but proper to the term 'from which'.

30. On the contrary: I suppose that, according to them, transubstantiation, in the way it is admitted to be a change, is a substantial change. From this it follows that the change has some substance as the per se term 'to which'. But by no change is that per se obtained which is posterior to its per se term. But this sort of presence [sc. of Christ's body in the Eucharist] is posterior simply to the substance of the body of Christ; and this substance, it is manifest, is the term of the change. For this sort of presence is not essentially prior to it (because the substance of the body can be without this sort of presence), nor is it simultaneous in nature with it (because then its presence could only be destroyed if the substance was destroyed, which is false).

31. This reasoning can be confirmed in another way, by putting otherness for posteriority as follows: By no change is that per se obtained which is per se other than its per se term; but the sort of presence in question here is simply other than the substance that is the per se term of transubstantiation; therefore etc.

32. The major is plain, because to one per se change there is one per se term, and so whatever is per se other than the term, although it is per accidens the same as it, is not per se obtained through that change.

33. The minor is plain, because the sort of presence in question here is not the substance of bread, because there is no bread then; nor is it the substance of the body of Christ, because that substance was when this presence was not.

34. A second argument [sc. to the contrary. n.30] is as follows: God can make his body present to any bread while the substance of the bread remains, and yet this will not be by a change that is change to substance as to the per se term, because no substance of the bread is new, and yet thereby is obtained a presence of the same idea as the presence which is obtained now; therefore it must be by a change of the same idea; therefore it would be by a change other than substantial change.

35. The proof of the major [n.34] is that newness of what is prior does not follow on newness of what is posterior. The fact is plain from *Physics* 8.8.264b9-265a12 where the Philosopher maintains that in a circle there can be motion as to 'where' although there cannot be any newness in it as to absolute form. Hence something can be moved as to place without change as to substance (the reason is that 'where' is a certain extrinsic relation coming to a thing and not an absolute form). But the presence [of Christ's body] here is posterior to the substance of the bread, just as relation is posterior to what is absolute, and posterior above all to substance. Therefore there can, without any change in the substance of the bread, be a new presence of [Christ's] body to the bread. So there must be some change toward this sort of presence, a change that is not a substantial one. And consequently, in the matter at hand, this presence is not obtained through transubstantiation in substance, because a term of the same idea (and presence is a term of this sort) is not properly and per se the term of two changes distinct in genus.

36. And if you say that it can become present to the substance of the bread without substantial change, but yet it does become present through a substantial change of the bread into the body of Christ, and not through another change – on the contrary, God could convert the bread into the body of Christ previously made present to the bread. For there is no greater contradiction in this than there is now when the bread is converted into Christ's non-previously present body. Therefore, if the sort of conversion of the bread done now is done into the body of Christ already present to the species of bread, the body would not come to be present there again. Or one would have to say that it became present after it was present and that the same presence would be the term of both the stated changes [sc. the change of bread to Christ's body already present to the bread, and the change of bread to Christ's body not already present to the bread]; therefore etc.

37. Third [to the contrary] as follows: what is converted into something pre-existent acquires the properties of that something pre-existent rather than the reverse. The point is plain, for if nutriment is converted into flesh, it is animated rather by the soul of the flesh than the flesh informed by the form of the nutriment and, universally, the nutriment acquires the absolute conditions and the 'where' and the other respects of the flesh rather than the reverse. Therefore, by the mere conversion of bread into the pre-existing body of Christ the converted bread would acquire presence in heaven rather the body of Christ acquire the presence of the species of bread on the altar.

38. Fourth as follows: God could convert the bread into the body of Christ as Christ's body has being in heaven, because there is no greater contradiction in this case than in the conversion that is posited now. But by such conversion Christ's body would not then be possessed under the species of bread on the altar; therefore not now either.

39. Fifth as follows: if the bread quantum is converted into Christ's body quantum, so that quantity is converted into quantity and substance into substance, Christ's body quantum would not be circumscribed by the 'where' that the bread was circumscribed by; therefore by the conversion of substance into substance, the substance of Christ's body does not have the definite 'where' which was the definite 'where' of the substance of bread.

40. The antecedent is manifest, because that quantum, namely Christ's body, could not be circumscribed by the place of the bread, since it is larger than the bread.

41. The proof of the consequence is that just as a substance and a substance (which exist under quantity) are related to definite place, so also is a substance quantum related to a substance quantum as to circumscribed place; therefore that which conversion into a substance makes to be in a definite place, this the conversion of a substance quantum into a substance quantum would make to be in a circumscribed place.

β. Scotus' own Opinion

42. As to this article, then [n.28], it does not seem one must necessarily take flight to the conversion of the bread into the body, especially since from the beginning, from when there is a thing of this sacrament, it was always believed that the body of Christ does not move from its place in heaven in order to be here, and yet there was not from the beginning as clear a belief about the conversion, as will be said in d.11 nn.105-106.

43. [Certain preliminaries] – I speak to this point, then, by laying down certain preliminaries, namely that when a body moves from place to place and expels another body, there are commonly four motions or changes in it and eight terms: namely two changes in the expelling body and two in the expelled body.

44. For the expelling body is moved from its first 'where' to the privation of this 'where', and this change between the positive term 'from which' to the privative term 'to which' can be called a losing of the first 'where'; the same body too, from its lack of the second 'where', is moved to the second 'where', and so the change from the privation, as from the term 'from which' to the 'where' as to the term 'to which', can be called the acquisition of a 'where'.

45. Similarly there are two changes and four terms concerning the body that is expelled when the first body enters its place.

46. But if a body were moved and another body not expelled from its place, there would now only be two changes, and both in the moved body: one namely that is loss of its first 'where' and the other its acquisition of a new 'where'.

But if the body, by not leaving its first 'where', were to be now in a new 'where', only one change would be in it, namely from its not having the new 'where' to its having that new 'where'; and this would be a change in acquisition. And there would be no change of a losing (which would be from the first 'where' to the lack of it), because ex hypothesi the first 'where' is not lost, though the body be placed in a new 'where'.

47. But if none of these changes is posited, it would be altogether unintelligible how the body would be where it was not before. For it is impossible for what was previously not really here to be in any way here without there being some real change in it, or in that to which it is really present; for in no way is there a passage, as to any real predicate, from contradictory to contradictory [sc. from not here to here] without there

being some real change; nor is there a reason why this part of the contradiction [sc. here] is more real now than it was before, nor why another [sc. not here] is more true than this one, and so both now and before either both are simultaneously true or both are simultaneously false.

48. [Application of the preliminaries to the matter at issue] – To the matter at issue: that there is a losing in the body of Christ of its ‘where’ in heaven is posited by no one, according to Augustine above, “The Lord is above until the end of the age” [n.9] – and understanding by this, ‘unless it pleased him, by some special grace, to make a local descent’, which is not posited as happening because of the truth of the Eucharist.

49. However, in order to save the real presence of Christ’s body here on the altar, one must posit that there is some presence of it to the species of bread that there was not before, otherwise it would not be more present now than not present. For the change that concerns the species, namely that they were first in a subject and now without a subject, does nothing for the fact that Christ’s body becomes present to them from not being present to them (as was proved above [nn.30-41]); for that presence has per se terms other than this change to make its non-presence become presence. Therefore, one must posit some per se change in Christ’s body that makes for acquisition of this new presence.

50. But this change cannot properly be called change in place, for two reasons. First, because no loss of the prior ‘where’ accompanies this change, as it commonly does in change of place; for one can identify in it, namely in change of place, a positive term ‘from which’ and a positive term ‘to which’, and these accompany two privations, in the way the Philosopher says in *Physics* 5.1.225a7-10, that “movement is from non-subject to subject.” Second, nor is there properly here a ‘where’ term of the change, because Christ’s body at the term of this sort of change does not properly have here a ‘where’, nor a being circumscribed by something, but its term is a certain simple presence to the species, though a true and real presence.

51. And if you ask ‘to what category does this change and term of change belong?’ – I say that if an angel be placed newly present to a body, that angel is said indeed to be in a definite place, in the way in which it belongs to an angel to be in place [*Ord.* II d.2 nn.249-251; also below nn.117-118, 146]. And thus is the angel said to change, although the change is very far from a true change in ‘where’.

52. Further, as to the other conditions, this presence of the body of Christ departs more from the true idea of ‘where’ than the existence of an angel in place does, because in no way is Christ’s body by this presence so determined to a single ‘where’ that another ‘where’ is repugnant to it. But an angel is by its ‘where’ so determined to that ‘where’ that another ‘where’ is repugnant to it.

53. And if you hold it unacceptable to say that there is any change of any kind in the real being of Christ’s body, I say that it is necessary at least to posit some respect coming to that body from outside, which does not follow necessarily on the foundation and term when these are posited in act, because every respect that follows in this way comes to a thing from within (as was shown in the question about character [IV d.6 n.295]). Therefore the respect can come to it newly from outside without anything new either in the foundation or the term.

54. So, therefore, it is not unacceptable that the body of Christ is newly present to something that does not have a new absolute form nor a new respect in respect of that body; or if it does have such a new respect then, by parity of reasoning, the body of

Christ too will have a new respect to it, because if the species are newly present to the body, then the body is newly present to them; for although containment is not a mutual real relation, yet presence is a mutual relation. Nor will it in that case be unacceptable to posit in Christ's body this sort of change to a respect coming to it from outside.

55. And if you object that 'there is no change that is change to a respect' – the solution is in the question about 'character' [n.53, *ibid.*].

And if your whole complaint is, 'this respect that comes from without, which is called simple presence, what category does it belong to?' – one can say that, among all the respects that come from without, it is more properly reduced to the category 'where', because it agrees with that respect in many ways. And if perhaps it is not properly in that category, it follows that the ten categories do not sufficiently exhaust the whole of being; which is not unacceptable in the way the philosophers speak about the ideas of them; because it is not repugnant to find some respect (as of an angel to a stone) which does not have any idea of respect in a category the way the philosophers say. Nor yet does it follow from this that there are more categories than ten, but that the ideas of them, or of one of them, is not assigned under an idea as common, or is not as general, as could be assigned.

b. Second: About Christ's Body Quantum without Quantitative Mode

α. First Opinion and its Rejection

56. On the second point it is said [Richard of Middleton, Henry of Ghent, Giles of Rome et al.] that the quantity of Christ's body is not under the species of bread save concomitantly, because the first term of the conversion is the substance of the body of Christ, and a thing is there in the way in which it is the term of the conversion. Therefore the quantity is not there by way of being the first term. But the first term, which is the substance, does not of itself have a quantitative or commensurate mode; therefore the quantity existing there under the idea or the mode of it, that is of the substance, will be there in non-quantitative mode.

57. On the contrary: each thing, whether it is the first term of the transubstantiation or the second, provided however it is there, has the properties that necessarily or naturally belong to it.

There is proof also of this through an example, because if God were to create a substance quantum or if nature were to generate a substance and quantity were a concomitant, the first term of each production will be the substance and the quantity will be concomitant; and yet both in the generated and the created thing the quantity has its real mode, just as it would also have if it were the first term of a change.

58. This is also proved by reason:

Because a different relation to the agent does not vary the nature of the thing, whether the relation is first or second, mediate or immediate, provided however that the thing is produced; because neither does a relation to a different agent vary the nature of the thing done, according to Augustine *On the Trinity* 3.9 n.16. Therefore neither will quantity lack its natural mode merely for the reason that it is not the first term of transubstantiation, provided it is really there (whether primarily or secondarily) through the change.

Secondly as follows: if, through the conversion, the term ‘to which’ is where the term ‘from which’ was before, the mode of being of the latter and the former will be similar, at least the mode of being that can be common to both. But the converted bread was here quantitatively in its own way, because it was under quantity having part next to part. Therefore the substance of Christ’s body as well, existing here by force of the conversion, will be here quantitatively in its own way, namely having part of substance under part of quantity; and then quantity will be here in its proper dimensions.

β. Second Opinion and its Rejection

59. Alternatively it is said [Godfrey of Fontaines, Albert the Great] that the parts of Christ’s body are next to each other in the sacramental host.

The proof is as follows, that just as it is possible for divine virtue that a body be simultaneously together with a body such that one part of the body exist simultaneously together with another part, so can divine virtue make part interpenetrate part, and so on and so on, making the part that has interpenetrated another again interpenetrate another, and in this way they will interpenetrate each other mutually up to the smallest natural quantity. Thus the true reality of each part is preserved and yet there is no extension of part next to part (just as the true reality of one body is preserved notwithstanding that it exists by interpenetration with another).

60. On the contrary: for this view takes from the body of Christ its position in the whole, as well as all shape that is perhaps necessary for an animated body. For if the head is not distant from the foot and the whole interpenetrates the whole up to the smallest natural part, there will no longer be the ordering of parts in the whole, nor the shape, that is necessary for an animated body.

γ. Scotus’ own Opinion

61. I say otherwise, then, that the position that is a difference of quantity is necessarily present in a permanent continuous quantum; and one must preserve it in the matter at hand, namely that it states the order of parts in the whole. For that something is a quantum with dimensions, and yet that this does not signify an order in the whole of this part to another part according to intervening quantity, is not very intelligible.

62. But the sense of position that is set down by some as a category, adds something else. For, on the presupposition that there is an order of parts in the whole, position states further an order of parts to place or to the parts of place or of what locates it in place; that is to say, that the parts are coextended with the parts of the place (as a ‘whole’ is said to be primarily commensurate with the whole place in which it has its ‘where’), so that position as a category presupposes position as difference of quantity, and it specifies the ‘where’.

Now by quantitative or dimensioned mode (however it is named) I understand only position said in the second way [sc. ‘where’].

63. But this relation can be separated by God from a quantum (while position in the first sense remains), and not merely by negation of limit, just as he could make a body outside the universe. And then it would not have position in the second sense [sc. ‘where’], because it would not have anything containing it with whose parts the parts of

the contained thing were commensurated. But even when a limit has been posited, namely a limit with whose presence there could be commensuration or coextension with another body, God could preserve a quantum and its coexistence with another quantum and yet without a coextension of the parts of one quantum with the parts of the other, which coextension is what is meant by position in the sense we are speaking of [sc. ‘where’].

64. I prove this in a first way as follows: any nature that has a contingent relation to some form of some genus is simply related contingently to the whole genus (by ‘simply’ I mean ‘not necessarily from an intrinsic cause’). This seems sufficiently evident in that, if there were some nature and if it were from some intrinsic cause that necessarily determined a genus for it, it would necessarily determine some species of that genus for it. For one nature does not intrinsically have a necessity for disjunct opposites without having a necessity for one of those opposites.

65. And hereby is solved an objection that could be made: number is necessarily equal or unequal, but it is not necessarily one rather than the other. For the objection is about some common respect of a property that has distinctions, but any specific instance is necessarily related to one of the two as also to the genus.⁵ Nor is there even an objection to the matter at hand, because there is no subject here that is contingently disposed to some form of the whole genus.⁶

66. And if you object that a surface is necessarily colored and yet it is contingently related to any particular color – this is not an objection, because here there is no necessity intrinsically; for one could not find an intrinsic idea whereby there would be a contradiction on the part of a surface that it was without color, as there is contingency in respect of any particular color.⁷

Taking this major, then [n.64], I add the minor, namely that a body is related contingently to any position (this is plain, because I can move my body from any position to another). Therefore a body, even when it has the position of parts in the whole, is not simply related necessarily to the position that is a category [sc. ‘where’], nor is the coexistence of a quantum with a quantum simply a necessary reason for position in that sense; for it is possible to understand coexistence of something with the whole without understanding the coexistence or coextension of parts with parts. For this latter

⁵ The objection seems to be that if number is necessarily equal or unequal, then it is necessarily equal or necessarily unequal. But the necessity refers to the disjunction (which is common to both), namely ‘number is necessarily one or the other’, and not to the disjuncts (which are distinct for each), namely ‘number is necessarily this one’, or ‘number is necessarily that one’. Of course, any particular number, as opposed to number as a class, will necessarily be the equal it is or necessarily the unequal it is.

⁶ The subject is a quantum that coexists with another quantum, but which God withholds from having coextension with it, and so place [n.63]. Such a quantum, then, has no ‘where’ and is not disposed, even contingently, to having this ‘where’ or that ‘where’ or some other ‘where’.

⁷ The objection seems to be that just as a surface is necessarily colored but not necessarily this color rather than that color, so a quantum is necessarily in a place but not necessarily in this place rather than that place. The response is to deny the analogy by denying that a surface qua surface is necessarily colored (there is no necessity intrinsically, or no necessity in surface as such). For color is not surface but the limit of the transparent at a surface, and a surface would have no such limit in the dark (when there is no transparency for it to be a limit to), nor would it if the surface were transparent (like glass) and so were not a limit to whatever transparent medium there was. So similarly a quantum has no necessity in itself to be in a place. The objection fails, therefore, because it does not hold of a quantum simply, as it does not hold of surface simply, but only of a quantum together with the additional relation of place and only of surface with the additional property of being the limit of the transparent.

coexistence is different from the former, even when they go together, nor does the former include the latter in its formal idea. Therefore, a body quantum absolutely, possessing the first sense of position [n.61], could be without all extrinsic position or idea, that is, it could be understood to be a quantum and to have coexistence with another quantum without this sort of position [sc. 'where'].

67. And if you ask what this means, namely 'preserving quantity without extrinsic position' [sc. 'where'] – I say that it means nothing other than conserving an absolute without the respect that comes to it from outside. In this way too, preserving the coexistence without that [extrinsic] position is nothing other than to conserve one relation without a different extrinsic relation – as the relation that is position 'where' is the relation of the whole circumscribed thing to the whole circumscribing thing. But position in the sense stated, which is a different genus [the genus of position in the sense of relation of parts with each other without extrinsic relation to a circumscribing body], adds the respect of parts to parts. And that the first necessarily has the second is only because its respect is such that it includes the diversity of the parts and the presence of them to the parts of what locates them. But the coexistence of some whole with the whole or with any part abstracts from position in this sense, the sense in which 'where' necessarily has position. Therefore it is simply possible for this coexistence to be without position [sc. without 'where'].

68. And this can be well explained briefly as follows, that the second sense of position presupposes 'where' strictly speaking; therefore if God can conserve a quantum without a 'where' properly speaking, he can also conserve it without position.

69. And if you say "it can well be without a 'where' but not when it has presence or coexistence with another body" – this is false, for although coexistence is of a quantum with a body, it is however not formally a 'where'.

70. And if it be objected that quantity cannot be posited without the respect that quantitative mode states, because there cannot be a quantum and another quantum unless the one be commensurated with the other – I say that equality and inequality, which state a respect coming from within, do indeed follow on quantity when quantity is posited. But an extrinsic respect does not necessarily follow, and of such sort is commensuration, or more properly coextension, as we are here speaking of it [sc. 'where']. For if you speak of commensuration as to equality and inequality, namely that this is bigger or smaller than that, I concede that, in the matter at hand, Christ's body is bigger than the sacramental host. But this commensuration is not what is properly called 'coextension', for this properly states the being together of part with part [sc. 'where'].

II. To the Initial Reasons

71. Herefrom is plain the solution to the initial reasons.

To the first [n.8] the answer is plain from the first article [nn.15-16, 21-23], because I concede that here there is not only a change of the species, whereby they come to be without a subject from being in a subject, but also another change, whereby they come to be present to the body of Christ. And together with this I concede a new presence of the body of Christ to the species; and there is change toward this presence, and the change must be judged to be of the sort that the form is.

Or if use of the word ‘change’ does not please, let it be said that some new extrinsic respect coming from outside is without all change; nor will ‘to change’ then be ‘to go from one to the other’ the way Gregory says in *Moralia* V ch.38 n.68; nor will change be for the same thing to be somehow or other differently disposed in itself to something else, but only to be differently disposed in itself to itself, or to another, from a relation coming to its foundation extrinsically. But the relation will not then be a change, because nothing new comes to it, from *Physics* 7.3.246b24-27.

72. To the second [n.10] I say that quantitative mode is not a property of a quantum (as ability to laugh is a property of man); rather it is an accident per accidens of it, namely a respect, coming from outside, of parts of a quantum to parts of another quantum.

73. To the third [n.11] I concede that part is next to part, insofar as the ‘next to’ has regard to the per se parts of the body and is required for position in the sense of a difference of quantity. But insofar as ‘next to’ belongs to place, part is not next to part in this sense, that is, not next to the place where another part is. Nor does it follow from this that the whole is not a quantum, because a whole quantum, having its parts next to each other in the same way in the whole, can have a single presence of itself and of all its parts to some single thing next to it that is indivisible, or divisible as little as possible, such that there is not there one presence to one part and another presence to another part to which a part is present.

Question Two

Whether the Same Body can be Located in Diverse Places at the Same Time

74. To proceed thus to the second question – it seems that the same body cannot be located in diverse places at the same time.

First as follows: the same thing cannot be referred to itself by opposite relations, because opposite relations include contradictories. But if the same thing were in diverse places at the same time, it could be said to be above or below itself and above or below some same other thing; likewise as to being to the left or right, and so on as to other relations opposite in situation; therefore etc.

75. Again, near and distant are opposite relations, as are like and unlike. But if the same thing were in diverse places at the same time, it could be near to and distant from the same thing at the same time, which is as unacceptable as that the same thing is at the same time like and unlike the same thing in the same quality.

76. Again, the same timed thing cannot be simultaneously in diverse times; therefore neither can the same placed thing be simultaneously in diverse places.

77. Again, it then follows that the same body could move and be at rest at the same time, because it can move in one place and be at rest in another. The consequent is impossible because these are opposites by way of privation.

78. Again, it follows that the same human body, as the body of Christ, could have an operation of the senses in one place, because it could see in one place a body near itself, and in another place not see the same body because that body would be disproportionately far off, and closeness to hand is required, because vision is in an organ.

79. On the contrary:

Hugo of St Victor *On the Sacraments* II p.8 ch.11 says, “He who made it that one body would be in one place, made it as he wished; and if he had wished otherwise he could have done otherwise.”

I. To the Question

A. The Opinion of Many People for the Negative Conclusion

80. Here the negative conclusion is maintained by many people, but different ones prove it in different ways.

1. The Reasons of Henry of Ghent

81. [First reason] – One doctor [Henry, *Quodlibet* XIII q.4] argues as follows: When, as far as depends on the power of the agent, something could be done indifferently in various ways to the same thing, if the same thing were susceptible according to one way among them, it would be possible for it to be acted on similarly in any of the other ways. Now, on the part of the agent, since it is of infinite power, there is an equal possibility that a single body may come to be at the same time in several places according to any manner of plurality. But it is impossible that, with God as agent, the same body should be everywhere; therefore, it is impossible simply that the same body come to be at the same time in diverse places. The proof of the minor is that ‘being able to be everywhere at the same time’ is proper to God.

82. [Second reason] – Again, many contradictories would follow, for when a body is put in one place, either it has the same form as in another place or it does not.

If it has the same form, let ice be put in one place and heat in another place; it follows that in one place the body will have cold and in another place heat. Likewise if it not find anything to eat in one place it would be hungry there, in another place finding food it would not be hungry; and in one place it would incur sickness from the inclemency of the air, and in another place health from the air’s clemency, and so it would at the same time be healthy and not healthy but ill; and fourth, in one place it would be killed and in another not, so it would at the same die and not die

But if the second alternative is chosen [the thing has different forms in different places], the same results follow, because the same body will have at least contrary properties, save that according to the second member it will have contraries in each place, and according to the first member it will have one contrary in one place and another in another.

83. [Third reason] – Again, as a thing in place is commensurate with the dimensions of the place, namely as quantum and as continuum, it is thus commensurate to the place as [the place] is one and many; therefore, if the same placed thing is in diverse places, it will be one and many at the same time.⁸

⁸ Scotus’ expression here is obscure [see also n.144 infra]. He is referring to an argument in Henry’s *Quodlibet* IX q.32, where Henry argues that if the same body is present by its dimensions in several places, it is one because it is commensurate with the dimensions of one place (one both numerically and as an extension) and many because commensurate in the same way with the dimensions of many places. So the dimensions of the same body will have to be multiplied according as they are commensurate with the dimensions of several places, and hence the same body will be one (because it is the same body) and many (because it has as many sets of dimensions as the number of places it is in).

84. And if you object against the second reason [n.82], that its conclusion seems to apply in the same way to Christ's body on the cross and in the pyx, because on the cross it was wounded but not in the pyx, Henry responds that when something belongs to something according to what naturally belongs to it, it belongs to it simply (as that if a man is curly as to his head he is curly simply, though he is not curly as to another part); but to be wounded, which includes division of what is continuous, belongs to something as it has being in place only; and therefore if it exists by location in one place and not by location in another place, if it is wounded where it is by location, it is simply wounded; and if it is not wounded in another place where it is not by location, not for this reason is it not wounded, but there is a fallacy according to simply and in a certain respect. But if the same body is by location in two places, and consequently in its dimensions in diverse places, one must say that whatever it naturally does or suffers in one place it does or suffers in the other; therefore in that case it follows that it will have opposites at the same time.

2. Other Doctors' Reasons

85. Another doctor [Godfrey of Fontaines] argues as follows: the limits of place and of the placed thing are simultaneous; therefore if the placed thing is outside the limits of its proper place it is outside its own limits.

He also brings in about an angel that it cannot be in diverse places at the same time; therefore much less can a body be placed in diverse places.

86. Another doctor [Giles of Rome] argues as follows: as a thing is by its proper nature in only one species, so it is by one dimension in only one place at the same time.

87. Another [William of Ware] argues thus: if the same thing were at the same time in diverse places then either through one change or two. Not through one because one change is only to one term. Nor through two, because these two are either of the same kind or of a different kind. Not of the same kind, because the same thing cannot be moved at the same time by two motions of the same species, from *Physics* 3.3.202a34-36 [cf. *Ord.* II d.2 nn.259, 270-272] and *Metaphysics* 5.9.1018a5-9. Nor by two of different species, because the terms would be contraries and so the motions would be impossible.

88. Again the terms of any motion are impossible, from *Physics* 5.3.227a7-10 [sc. the beginning and end points of a motion are not simultaneous]; but any two 'wheres' can be the terms of any motion, because a body can move from one 'where' to the other; therefore any two 'wheres' are impossible as to the same subject.

3. Further Reasons that can be Brought Forward

89. Now I put forward some other reasons.

The first is that a natural agent does not per se intend the corruption of the term 'from which' but only per accidens, because the term 'from which' is impossible with the term 'to which' that it intends to introduce. Therefore if one 'where' be compossible with another 'where', a natural agent would not corrupt the first 'where' in order to

the same body will be one and many: one because the same in many places, many because numerically multiplied according to its commensurations with the dimensions of each of those many places.

introduce the second 'where'; therefore it would be possible to put a body in the new 'where' without that body being moved from the 'where' it previously had.

90. Second thus: it is impossible for the same matter to be under two substantial forms at the same time; but if it be possible for the same body to be in diverse places at the same time, the opposite of this would follow.

Proof of the minor:

The first proof is: let the same nutriment be put in two or three places, and let it be eaten by different animals existing in those places; the nutritive power of each animal would convert that nutriment into its own substance and consequently the same matter of the nutriment will be informed by the form of each animal, and so the matter of the nutriment will be under diverse substantial forms at the same time, and will be animated by the sensitive souls in diverse brutes and by the intellective souls in diverse men.

The second proof of the same minor is: suppose that the same wood is in diverse places, and that in those places are two fires and that they act on the wood and destroy it (because the wood cannot resist the power of the agent) and introduce the form of fire into it – but not the same form, for the agents are diverse, therefore different forms of fire in the same matter, because the matter of the destroyed wood was the same just as the wood was the same.

91. Again third, it would follow that the fire, however small it be, could burn everything combustible. For let the fire have this combustible thing here proportioned to it, and that one there, and a third one in a third place – it could act on this one here and that one there and so on simultaneously in an infinite number of places. And thus any number of combustible things could be burned at the same time by however small a fire. But any power that can act on many small objects at the same time, can act on one great object put together from the small ones; therefore the smallest fire could at the same time burn what is to be put together from all those, and that burning from all the burnings.

92. Fourth as follows: it follows that some nourishable thing could be sustained in some place without receiving nutriment; for if it had suitable nutriment in one place it would be nourished there and consequently here too; or it would follow that it would be nourished and not nourished at the same time, and thus that it would be nourished here and would not take in nutriment here.^a

a. [*Interpolation*] an animal possessing suitable nutriment here would be nourished, but elsewhere, not having nutriment, it would not be nourished, and so it would be nourished and not nourished at the same time.

93. Fourth as follows, that if it had suitable nutriment in two places and were to ingest it in suitable amount in both places, the consequence would be that it would be nourished to double amount, or the nutriment ingested would be lost and not converted into nourishment.

B. The Possibility of an Affirmative Conclusion

1. Argument in General

94. Sufficient in general against the above is that anything is to be considered possible for God that is not manifestly impossible by virtue of its terms, or from which no

impossibility or contradiction is evidently deduced. Such is the case here, as will be plain from solving the arguments [nn.128-169].

2. Particular Reasons, drawn from the Statements of Henry of Ghent

95. But there is argument in particular from certain reasons that the doctor, whose reasonings were repeated first [Henry, nn.81-84], sets down and strives to solve.

a. First Reason

96. The first reason is as follows: “It is no less unacceptable for two bodies to be together at the same time than for the same body to be in diverse places; but the first is possible for God, so the second is as well.”

97. The major is plain: philosophers, according to their principles, would posit a repugnance altogether between two quanta with respect to the same ‘where’, just as between white and black with respect to the same subject, as is plain from *Physics* 4.8.216a26-b15. Because a quantum, by the fact it is a quantum, expels another of the same quantity, and not because it is of this or that sort (he gives an example about a cube). The minor is plain from what happened (by the gift of subtleness) in the nativity of Christ, and his entrance through closed doors to his disciples, and from the closed sepulcher.

98. Henry replies that two dimensions are repugnant because of situation in place, and that the gift of subtleness takes this away. But that which is the reason for limitation to one ‘where’, namely a location that is determinate, cannot be taken away by any gift or endowment, because the glorious body too has a determinate location whereby it must be so here that it is not elsewhere, though it not have a location in place by which to give resistance to another body.

99. But against this is the argument from his third reason [n.83], which is about commensuration according to one and many; because, according to that reason, it is impossible for two bodies to be together more than for one body to be in two places, because the placed thing is co-multiplied with the multitude of the places either for the reason that it is commensurate with the place, or for some other special reason.

If on account of the first reason, then, since it is equally necessary for places to be commensurate with the things placed in them (because such commensuration is a common relation), a multiplication of places follows on the multiplication of placed things; and so follows the intended conclusion, that it is as equally impossible for two bodies to be together as for the same body to be in diverse places.

But if on account of something else, this can only be natural posteriority or simultaneity of place with respect to the placed dimension, for the naturally prior should not be multiplied with the posterior, but the posterior with the prior, and what is simultaneous to it with what it is simultaneous to.

100. But according to this second reason [previous paragraph], it is manifest that the dimensions of place are posterior to the dimensions of the placed thing; the dimensions of the place should rather be multiplied with the multiplication of the dimensions of the placed thing than the reverse.

101. The assumption is plain, because the dimensions of the placed thing are cause of the dimensions of the place; first because the placed thing makes the sides of the containing thing to be apart and for its surface to be actual; and second because the first is what can be without the other and not the reverse, because the surfaces of the locating thing cannot be apart without the distance of the parts of the placed thing.

102. The assumption is also plain for another reason, that in any motion in place the same surface of the placed thing remains, but the same surface of the place does not commonly remain when the placed thing is changed; also if a body of like shape succeeds to an equal body and similarly shaped, still the same surface as for the prior body does not remain circumscribing the second body.

103. This reason [n.99] can thus briefly be formed not only against Henry but also to prove the consequence that ‘two bodies can be together, therefore the same body can be in two places together’. The antecedent is conceded by everyone.

Proof of the consequence: because it is more possible that with the unity of the naturally prior stands a multitude in the naturally posterior than the reverse; but the dimension of the placed thing is naturally prior to the dimension of the place, as has just been proved [nn.100-102]; therefore it is simply more possible for several dimensions of places to correspond to one placed body than the reverse.

104. And thus is this first reason [n.99], in the first consequence [n.103], proved in this way.

b. Second Reason

105. The second reason is as follows: it is possible for God to convert the quantity of the bread into the quantity of his body, just as he converts substance into substance. On this basis, since, according to him [Henry], that into which something is converted [sc. Christ’s body, into which the bread is converted] exists where the converted thing [sc. the bread] was before, the result is that the body into which there is a conversion will be where that which is converted into it was before. And it cannot be in another place as to its quantity (such that the quantity would be its reason for being there, as would be the case if the quantity were the per se term of the conversion) without the quantity, according to them [followers of Henry], being placed there; therefore the same body will be placed where the converted thing [sc. the bread] was placed before and, along with this, it will remain in its own proper place [sc. heaven], because the conversion does not take away from its own place the term into which [sc. Christ’s body] the conversion is; therefore it [sc. Christ’s body] can be placed at the same time in two places.

106. He replies that the substance of the bread either (a) remains in such conversion, and then: (i) either it is affected by the dimensions of Christ’s body and the proposed thesis does not follow that Christ’s body is, by its dimensions, in two places, but only in one; (ii) or it is not affected by these other dimensions and then Christ remains where the substance of the bread is only by reason of the substance of the bread, and consequently he does not remain in his dimensions (because, according to the Philosopher *Physics* 1.2.185b3-5, substance has no magnitude), and so he will not be located in two places. Or (b) the whole is altogether converted into the whole, and then nothing remains [sc. of the converted bread] by reason of which Christ’s body may be said to be there, namely in the place of the converted [bread].

107. And further, he says [*Quodlibet* IX q.32 ad 2] that this is not to be posited, for it [Christ's body] would not be anywhere sacramentally, because not under any perceptible species and it is, other than sacramentally, not anywhere save in heaven.

108. And further [*ibid.*] "since Christ's body would not be there in its dimensions, it would not fill the place that the dimensions of the bread filled before, and thus the capacity of the place would not remain but, in the instant of the conversion, parts of air would rush in and the place that was there before would cease to be, and so thereby no body of anything would remain there save the body of Christ, just as no body remains when the species of bread are corrupted. If, therefore, a body still remained, this would only be because of the substance of the parts of air, which were before immediately touching the dimensions of the bread. And so the body of Christ would always remain there, because the parts of air could always remain in substance."

109. Against this: the second reason [n.105] does not seem to be solved, because let an amount of substance [sc. of bread] equal to the substance of Christ's body be converted into an amount of Christ's body, and the argument will still stand, because that into which the conversion is made [sc. Christ's body] will be quantitatively in the place of the converted term [sc. the bread] and in its proper place [sc. heaven] where it was before; therefore etc.

When therefore he replies by making a division [n.106], the second member of it could be granted that (b) 'the whole is altogether converted into the whole'; nor does it follow that the term of the conversion [sc. Christ's body] is not there if nothing [sc. of the bread] remains, unless this proposition is denied 'the term of the conversion is where the thing converted was before'; and perhaps he would deny it, unless it has this addition 'if that remains which was the reason for the converted thing's having a location'.

110. And then this argument [n.106] does not work against him [n.105]. Nor either the argument about an equal amount of air converted into the body of Christ [n.108].

111. And I do not care to insist that I believe the proposition is false on which this reason rests, that 'the term of the conversion must be where the thing converted was before' [n.105], whether or not that remains which in the thing converted was the reason for its having a location.

112. However the other member of the division could be granted [n.106], namely that a quantity of air be converted into a quantity of Christ's body while the substance of the air remains; and then one could infer that Christ's body would exist under quantity and dimensions (as is plain), and that its quantity would be where the quantity of the converted air was before; therefore the body of Christ will be there in its dimensions and, along with this, in heaven; therefore etc. [it will be in two places].

c. Third Reason

113. I argue with another reason, that can be the second, I say, for this conclusion, though perhaps the third against the man [Henry], and I argue as follows. Wherever God can make some natural substance not under its natural mode, or under an opposite mode, he can make it in the same place under its own natural mode, or a mode agreeable to its nature. The proof is that his not making it under its natural mode is a twofold miracle,

which is not the case with his making it under its natural mode.⁹ But God can make Christ's body to be present here without converting another thing into Christ's body; therefore he can make it to be present here under its natural mode, and present here by location in place.

114. Proof of the minor, because conversion of something else into Christ's body is not formally the reason for its being here. The point is clear because, when the conversion is over, the term of the conversion here remains. Therefore, without contradiction, a thing's being here can be conferred on it without any conversion of something else into it.^a

And if you perhaps say that this conversion, as past, is the cause of this presence – on the contrary: God cannot by his absolute power make a past conversion of this sort not to be past; therefore he could not by his absolute power make 'present in this way' not to be present in this way, which is nothing.

a. [*Interpolation*] Proof, because in the first way there are two miracles and in the second way one. But God, according to everyone, can make his body to be present sacramentally (that is, not under its natural mode) in diverse 'wheres', and make it so in fact. Therefore he can do the same in the same 'wheres' by way of position in place and by bodily dimensions.

Not that it is said to be here by conversion of something else into it, because it can come to be without conversion just as with conversion, because when the conversion is over...

115. If you also say in a different way that the species of the converted thing [sc. the bread] left behind after the conversion is the reason for Christ's body being here, and so the conversion is necessarily required for it to be here, and consequently if you posit that nothing [sc. of the bread] remains but the whole is converted into the whole, the result is that Christ's body will not be in the place of the converted thing [sc. the bread] – on the contrary: the species is not formally in the body of Christ, therefore it is not formally the reason for the body of Christ having some quality or other, and meaning generally by 'some quality or other' whatever is formally existent in the body of Christ; but the body of Christ is admitted to be present here formally.

116. The above minor proposition [n.114] is proved also as follows: there can be newness in something posterior while there is no newness in something prior; therefore it is possible for such presence to be new without newness in the substantial form, which is prior to any such respect.

d. Fourth Reason

117. I argue fourth thus: an angel can be in several places together definitively; therefore so can a body be in several places together in its dimensions, or in place and by being circumscribed there.

The consequence is plain because the limitation is the same here as there, and consequently also determination as to place is similar, in the way suitable to each; hence, and generally, those who deny the consequent deny the antecedent.

⁹ The twofold miracle is [in the case of the Eucharist] God making Christ's body to be present here and God making it to be under the species of bread, or not in its natural mode. But if God can do two miracles together he can do one of them alone, namely make Christ's body to be present here and not in the mode of bread but in its own or natural mode.

118. Proof of the antecedent: God can convert bread into an angel (as will be shown in d.11 n.61); but, according to Henry [n.105], the place where something is converted [sc. the bread] is the place where what it is converted into is [sc. the angel] (after the conversion at any rate, if the reason for the converted thing's having a location remains); therefore an angel will be where the bread was. And the angel is not moved from heaven; therefore it is in two places. And it cannot be present there without being in the place there in the way suitable for it, namely definitively; therefore etc.

3. What Must be Said about these Four Reasons

119. The fourth and second reasons are only against the man [Henry] who puts them forward, but the first and third seem to prove the intended conclusion simply.

Therefore I give consideration to the first and third of these four reasons. The second and fourth only proceed on the basis of a certain supposition, which I do not believe to be true. They would however be conclusive against many who concede this supposition [sc. 'that into which something is converted is where the converted thing was before' nn.105, 118].

120. Hugh of St. Victor's intention is to this same effect [n.79], and although this doctor [Henry] strives to expound him, yet for anyone who reads Hugh it is sufficiently plain that the whole of what belongs to the thesis 'being at the same time in two places' is attributed by Hugh to the omnipotence of God, and not to any conversion of anything into the term of the conversion.

C. Scotus' own Response

121. To the question, therefore, I respond that since I concede anything in accord with a maxim known to me (which is a maxim most certain for me), I concede that 'for God everything is possible that does not evidently include a contradiction, and on which too no necessary contradiction follows'; and this maxim is of that sort, because the reasons that lead to proving a contradiction do not seem probative, as will appear in solving the reasons [nn.138-145] – I say, therefore, that it is simply possible for God to make the same body to be located at the same time in diverse places.

122. This is plain from understanding the terms: for when I say 'a body is placed at the same time in diverse places' I do not say anything over and above 'body' save a certain externally arising respect founded on a quantum to another quantum that circumscribes it.

123. But 'that such a respect is, on the same foundation, multiplied to diverse terms' does not appear to be against anything known to reason, because respects that come to a thing from within, about which the point is less evident, can be multiplied on a foundation that remains the same (as on the same whiteness two likenesses can be founded to two terms, as was proved in *Lectura* III d.8 n.49).

124. The assumption [n.122], namely that 'where' only states a respect coming from outside, is sufficiently clear from what was said in the previous question [nn.35, 54-55].

125. And it is a wonder that those who so much follow reason follow imagination, that because imagination does not separate place from body or conversely, nor perceives

that one is multiplied without the other, therefore let it be said to be simply impossible that one is multiplied without the other, since, in following imagination, nothing else appears. But according to reason no necessity from the ideas of the terms is or appears that when one is multiplied the other is too. For when a posterior is multiplied there is no necessity for the prior to be multiplied. But the ‘wheres’ are manifestly posterior to the located quantum, and they come to a thing accidentally and contingently. In many other cases too, where there is a greater connection, we concede according to reason that one is multiplied without the other. For scarcely is any other relation more accidental to its foundation than ‘where’ is – no mode of ‘existing in’ is, nor any mode of ‘being from’, and so on about many other relations. And yet in the case of other relations there is no such impudent assertion of the impossibility of multiplying relations on the same foundation.

126. And if you object that it is true that many respects can be founded on the same foundation when one of them is not adequate to the whole foundation, but here one thing is adequate to the whole idea of a quantum insofar as a quantum is locatable in place – this seems to be said without reason, because a respect that arises from the nature of a foundation seems to be more adequate to the foundation than that respect which comes to it from without, *ceteris paribus*. But two such respects to two terms, respects arising from the nature of the foundation, can exist in the same foundation, as two equalities to two equal quantities; therefore, without reason is it imagined that here there is one adequate respect.

127. And there is a confirmation, because a quantity’s presence¹⁰ to place is not more adequate to the quantity than a substance’s presence, a presence fitting to it, is adequate to the substance, as on altars. But no presence on the altar is adequate to the substance, because the substance of Christ’s body is posited as able to have several presences, even primarily, since it is the first term of many conversions on altars, and yet along with this his body is present in heaven under its own quantitative mode.

D. To the Arguments Adduced for the Negative Opinion

128. As to the arguments [nn.81-93], some are universal and are solved in general in the way they proceed; many others are difficult as to imagination, and the way they proceed is in the examples above adduced about heat, hunger, saturation, health, sickness, life and death, and so on.

1. Three Preliminary Propositions

129. To solves these arguments I set down three propositions:

The first of them is: “Whatever things are essentially prior to the ‘where’ exist uniformly in the body even though the body has diverse ‘wheres’; but what things are posterior or simultaneous in nature with the ‘wheres’ will vary according to the variety of the ‘wheres’.” This is plain because something prior does not vary essentially because of variation in something posterior, but something posterior does indeed vary with variation

¹⁰ Instead of “quantity’s presence” and “substance’s presence” the Latin ‘sua’ could mean “his [Christ’s] presence” and “his [Christ’s] substance”

in something prior. Also things that are simultaneous in nature with something, vary with that something. This is the first proposition.

130. The second proposition is: “As something passive which exists in one ‘where’ would receive a form from two agents next to it in the same place, so will it, if existing in two places or two ‘wheres’, be acted on by the same two agents next to it in the two ‘wheres’.” And I understand this about a being-acted-on that is toward absolute form. And this is plain, because in order for something passive to be acted on by an agent and to receive the form, there is only need that it be in a state of passive potency, and that the agent have an active form, and that they be duly near each other. But whether they are near each other in this ‘where’ or in that one makes no difference as far as action to absolute form is concerned. But when a passive thing is put in two ‘wheres’, it has the same passive potency for absolute form, and the active thing has the same active potency, and the passive thing can, as it is in this ‘where’ or in that one, be near the active thing in the same way. Therefore it will be acted on in the same way as to any absolute form by any active thing that is near it whether in this ‘where’ or in another one, just as if it were in one ‘where’ and the agent were near it. I have added the phrase ‘as to absolute form’ because it is not necessary that the passive thing receive the same effects when speaking of relative things that are simultaneous in nature with or posterior to the ‘where’; because these can vary as the ‘where’ does (from the first proposition [n.129]). However, this second proposition could also be conceded in their case, as will be plain in responding to the objections specifically [nn.177-179].

131. The third proposition is “Just as a body existing in one ‘where’ is disposed in idea of activity to the diverse things near it in that ‘where’, so is it, when existing in two ‘wheres’, disposed to the same things next to it in those ‘wheres’.” This is plain from the proof of the preceding relation [n.130].

2. To the Individual Reasons

132. Answer on the basis of these propositions to the reasons adduced for the negative opinion.

a. To the Reasons of Henry of Ghent

133. [To the first] – To the first [n.81] I say that the first proposition [the major] could be so understood that it would have to be denied absolutely. For God has power for all vision and for all modes of vision; but he cannot cause every vision in every eye, because not every eye is susceptible of every vision, as the eye of a bat is not capable of the vision of an eagle, because the vision of an eagle is repugnant to its receptive power. But let it be that Henry is speaking of any form to which the power of the agent is of itself equally disposed, and to which the receptive power is equally disposed, and let it be that anything through this power could be caused in the recipient – then the proposition is true, because both by reason of the active power and by reason of the passive power the possibility would be equal.

134. But the conclusion still does not follow if it is about any power individually and about all the many possible forms at once, because a surface has, on the part of God and of the active and passive recipient, an equal possibility for every color, but not for

every color at once. And then Henry would need to show that a body is on its part equally receptive of all diverse ‘wheres’ and of two of them, which is denied by an adversary. However, I concede as to the thing that, on the part of God as active and on the part of body as receptive, there is an equal possibility in a body for two ‘wheres’ that are simply distinct, and to each or to any number, and then to all.

135. And when it is said that ‘by no virtue can one body have all ‘wheres’ or be everywhere’ – this is false. And my proof is that they concede that Christ’s body could be everywhere sacramentally; for God could convert any body universally, just like bread, into the body of Christ. And I say that, when making comparison with the power of God, there is no greater limitation to existing anywhere by location than to existing anywhere sacramentally.

136. Also, whatever can be done by an active second cause God can do immediately; but the sacrament, that veils the body of Christ, is only the reason for the body being here as second effective cause, because it is not the formal cause, as was proved before [d.8 nn.141-149].

137. And when it is said [n.81] that ‘being everywhere is proper to God’, I say that God is necessarily everywhere by his immensity, because there can be no ‘where’ in which God does not exist by his power, presence, and essence; and in this way is it impossible for anything other than God to be everywhere. But it is not unacceptable that something other than God be by God’s active power in any ‘where’ whatever, nor should it for this reason be said to be everywhere the way God is, for it is not immense.

138. [Second reason] – As to the argument [n.82] that includes many of those contradictories or repugnancies, the answer is plain from the three aforesaid propositions [nn.129-131]. Yet I apply them as follows: let it be that to this body in this place an agent, namely fire, comes next to it, and another agent, namely water, does so in another place – I say that either the agents are of equal power in action or one overcomes the other.

If they be of equal virtue and if they be then next to the body that has one ‘where’, either each would impede the other so that neither would act, or they would act for some intermediate effect in which the passive thing would be perfectly assimilated neither to one nor to the other. And I answer in the same way now when they are next to the same body that exists in diverse places or ‘wheres’.

But if the virtue of either one overcomes the other, it will either assimilate the passive thing to itself or will do so more than the other does.

139. And I reply in the same way if they are in diverse places, because there is no greater difficulty in this case than if fire and water were placed together (which it is not denied can be done by God), and if the same body were next to fire and water having the same ‘where’, because one should not there say, so as to prevent contraries in the passive thing, that ‘anything can more easily, or equally easily, avoid it here’.

140. About hunger and satiety [n.82] I say that hunger is appetite for the cold and dry. But this appetite is either natural or voluntary, namely the wish to eat, and whether it is one or the other it states something absolute. Therefore it does not vary with variation in ‘where’ (from the first proposition [n.129]), and consequently if it be here sated and its appetite cease in one ‘where’, it would cease elsewhere too, though not from food taken there, as will be immediately said about death [n.143].

141. But if you say satiety is ‘bodily fullness of stomach’ then, since it would not receive food as it does here, a doubt is possible whether it would for this reason be thus full here. And I say no (just as neither was the body of Christ wounded as it is in the pyx), because this fullness only states the presence of food contained by the container, namely the belly; and just as it is possible that the containing capacity of this body is different in this place and in that, so it is possible that the active containing capacity of this body here is different from the containing capacity of the same body in another ‘where’, for this containing capacity does not state something absolute but an extrinsic respect.

142. About the third [n.82], namely about health and illness, and temperateness and intemperateness, I say that intemperateness of the air expels temperateness as to the body of an animal on which the temperate or intemperate air acts. And then, in brief, the body would be such as the overcoming agent would be of a nature to cause it to be, although it would perhaps act less intensely because of the reaction of some contrary thing impeding or resisting it. But if they are equal in acting, the passive thing will then alter to the middle state, in the same way in short as you would say healthy and unhealthy things would be if they were together (which you concede God can do), and the same body would be next to this one and to that one together.

143. The fourth, which is about death and life [n.82], is easily solved, because each is something absolute (privative or positive), and consequently does not vary because of variation in ‘where’ (according to the first proposition [n.129]). If then it dies here, it dies there as well, but yet this inference does not follow ‘it is wounded here, therefore it is wounded there’, because wounding states a division of what is continuous as it is here by something dividing it here. But yet it is true that if it has a wound here it has it elsewhere as well, because such is what the discontinuity of the parts is like, and if it is in this body there it is also in the same body elsewhere.

144. [To the third] – To the next argument [n.83], the third main one by this doctor, I say that it is not necessary that something located in place be commensurate with the dimensions of place according as [the place] is one and many, so that according to the multitude of the dimensions of place there follows a multitude of the dimensions of the placed thing; just as neither does a multitude in what is prior follow on a multitude in what is posterior, especially as to an extrinsic respect and foundation, as was touched on in argument earlier [nn.123-126].

b. To the Reasons of the Other Doctors

145. To the first reason of another doctor [n.85] I say that the terms of one thing can be understood to be simultaneous with the terms of another either in simultaneity precise and adequate or in simultaneity neither precise nor adequate.

If simultaneity is understood in the first way I say that the major is true and the minor false.

But if it is understood in the second way, namely simultaneity that is not adequate, then the major is false, because it is not necessary that what is outside the terms of one be outside the terms of the other. For, universally, if one thing exceeds another, it is not necessary that what is simultaneous with the exceeding thing be simultaneous with the exceeded thing. An example: if the soul according to its quidditative terms (for it does not have a quantitative term) is simultaneous with the terms of a finger, not for this

reason does it follow that whatever is outside the terms of the finger is outside the terms of the soul.

146. To the other point about an angel [n.85], I say that it proves the opposite, as was shown in the fourth reason against the opinion [nn.117-118]; for an angel can in its own way, that is definitively, be in several places simultaneously, namely by divine power.

147. To the next argument from another doctor [n.86] I say that the likeness about the nature of a thing does not hold, because one nature is the formal reason for being in one species, but being circumscribed by something else is the formal reason for being in one place. And dimension is not the proximate formal reason for being in a place but it is only the fundamental reason. Now dimension can be one though the respects are diverse, just as whiteness can be one though the likenesses are diverse. But only through one likeness is a like thing constituted formally in a species. And if a like species is not able to be multiplied in the same thing, neither is the likeness able to be.¹¹

148. To the next from another doctor [n.87] I say that if the same thing remains in the same 'where' in which it was before, it can acquire a new 'where' by a single change, and two new 'wheres' by two changes.

149. And if you ask whether these changes are of the same species or not – let either one or the other be granted, I care not.

150. And when you argue that two changes of the same species are not simultaneous in the same thing [n.87], I say that impossibility in two changes is only from the impossibility of the terms or forms toward which the changes are. It would first, then, be necessary to prove the impossibility of the two 'wheres', which I deny, because there is no impossibility of two changes of this sort to those 'where' terms, as was shown above [n.148].

151. To the other argument of the same doctor [n.88], when he says that the terms of a change are impossible, I say that this is true of first terms but not of concomitant terms. And I mean that the first terms of any change are privation and form, or conversely, but concomitant terms are those that are joined to those just mentioned.

152. I therefore concede universally that privation and form are impossible, but concomitants can be compossible.

153. For example:

In the case of changes in individuals, if an animated thing is posited as having a single form, the organic body precedes the animation, animation being the term 'to which'. But the organic body is not the per se term 'from which' but lack of animation is, because the change is between animation and lack of animation. Now while lack of animation and animation are impossible together, yet organic body and animation are not.

154. In the same way in the case of corruption: if the same form of the body remains that was previously the per se term 'from which', namely the form which is succeeded by privation, the term does not remain, but the term concomitant with the per se term 'from which' does remain.

¹¹ The sense seems to be that a white thing can be like many other things in being white, but it has whiteness only by being white or being like whiteness. So as whiteness is not multiplied though the things are that are alike in whiteness, so dimension is not multiplied though the places are that the dimension is in.

155. In the same way as to increase, if the whole preexisting quantity is posited as remaining, the positive whole term 'from which' remains, which is concomitant with the privation that is the per se term 'from which'.

And conversely as to decrease, some positive quantity that was before remains but not the same per se term 'from which'

156. Likewise as to alteration in intensity or remission.

157. And in the same way about motion, which is not a contradiction because a motion of acquiring does not involve loss. And then with the term 'to which' the per se term 'from which', which is privation, does not remain; but the term does remain that is as it were the per accidens and concomitant term, being concomitant with the per se term.

158. To the matter at hand: in this case only a motion is posited that acquires a new 'where' without a motion of loss, and this sort of per se term 'from which' is privation of the 'where' that is acquired. And it does not remain with the term 'to which'. But there is no term here concomitant with the per se term 'from which', because such term is only where there are two concomitant changes and the per se term of one is the per accidens term of the other.

c. To the Other Reasons that were Adduced

159. To the arguments added on.

To the first argument [n.89] I say that one can prove through it that two bodies could not be together, because a natural agent does not intend to expel one body unless it introduces another body. If, then, there were no repugnance in two bodies being in this place here, a natural agent in moving this body to that 'where' would not expel the other body and so nature could make two bodies to be together. So, because the conclusion is manifestly unacceptable, I say that there are some repugnancies in respect of created and limited power that created virtue cannot deal with simultaneously, and yet they are not simply impossible. An example: it is as impossible for nature to make a virgin conceive as to make two bodies to be in the same place and one body to be in diverse places; for created virtue has no power with respect to these at the same time, although their absolute simultaneity does not involve a contradiction simply, as was seen [nn.96-97], and therefore they are possible for God.

160. To the second [n.90] I say that one could concede that the matter of a body in two places might be changed by two agents into two forms, nor would a new miracle there be needed, but the matter would through the old miracle be fitted to receive the action of those agents.

161. However I say otherwise, that if the same thing is put in two places, it does not follow that the same matter would be informed by two forms at the same time, whether of the same or different species, and that one could argue in the same way about this one and about that, whether the agents were posited as of the same or different species.

162. As to the example about food [n.90] I say that the same thing would happen with food taken by diverse things in diverse 'wheres' as would happen if two stomachs were to come to be in the same place and the food was in each of them. For then either one power would totally overcome the other and all the food would be converted into its body; or the powers would be equal, and then they would convert the food equally, one

into its body and the other into its; or the powers would be unequal yet not such that one would entirely overcome the other, and then the stronger would convert more of the food into its body and the weaker would convert less food into its. So as you would have to speak there about the stomachs of animals existing together and about the food received into each, so I speak in the same way here, following the second proposition set down above [n.130].

163. The same point serves for the other argument [n.90], about fires next to wood in diverse places; I say the same as you would have to say if two fires by the power of God were next to the wood.

164. And if you ask, “What should be said then? Surely the wood would be converted into fire, and into which fire and by which fire? For not more by one fire than the other because they are equal; nor into one fire only, because the agents are two and total agents, and there cannot be two total causes of the same effect.” – I say that either they would generate a more perfect fire, and so the effect would be divisible according to perfection if the substantial form could have part and part, just as one would say about heat. But if they were to generate an altogether indivisible effect, yet they would generate it in the same manner of efficient causality where neither of them could be the cause of the total effect, because the effect would happen after so brief an alteration that it would not suffice for ignition by either agent precisely. And then this proposition is true, that “two total causes totally causing cannot be causes of the same effect.”

165. To another argument [n.92] I say that an animal that exists in some ‘where’ without nutriment, would be nourished in that place if it took in appropriate food in another ‘where’. For although the local motion of the food to the stomach would not be the same here as there (and no wonder, because from the fact that the ‘where’ is different, so can the local motion to the thing in that ‘where’ be different), yet the conversion of food into the substance of the thing to be fed is the same here as there, because the conversion is the generation of a part of the substance of the thing nourished, and the whole substance of the thing nourished and any part of it is prior to the ‘where’, and so will not vary with variation in the ‘where’.

166. And when the addition is made “if it had sufficient food in both places it would be nourished twice” [n.93], I say that either it would take in the food in both places and consequently it would receive food superfluously, because half of it would suffice for its nourishment; or it would take in one part in one place and the other in the other, and in each place (from what has been said [nn.140-141]) it would be sufficiently nourished.

167. To the argument about the small fire [n.91] I answer using the second proposition [n.130]. For let a fire be put in one place and much combustible material next to it as it is in that ‘where’ alone – what you would say then about the fire with respect to that material I say now, for either the fire would act precisely on some part of the material, or if it acted on any part, then, if we suppose that the whole matter is together, it would act on it yet with little intensity. I speak in the same way as to the matter at hand, that the action will not be intense on any part of the matter in comparison with the action it would have on one part if it acted on no other part. And no wonder, because natural virtue works less on more things than on fewer, and on many than on one.

168. To the argument about figure [n.84, Christ’s body on the cross and in the pyx], I say that although figure seems to be quality yet it follows the ‘where’.

169. To the other point about whole and part [n.84, about being curly because curly as to the hair], I say that a part outside the whole has nothing outside the whole that it does not have in the whole; for the actuality that is attributed to a part not in the whole outside the whole is only by way of making a precision.

170. But on the contrary: because continuity is an absolute form and consequently is prior to the 'where', then the same body cannot be continuous in one place and not continuous in another; and consequently neither is there a part here and a non-part there in the way that being continuous with another is called a part.

171. Look for the response.^a

a. [*Interpolation*] – One can say that figure is double. One is an absolute form and it belongs to the category of the quality 'form or an abiding form in something', and so it does not follow 'where'. Another is figure that is the siting of parts in place and in the container of them, and this is relative form that follows the 'where'; and the argument proceeds in this latter way. But on this matter see d.12 q.4 n.387, in the response to the question there 'But about different shapes...'

II. To the Initial Arguments

172. [To the first] – To the first initial argument [n.74] I say that many do concede that opposite relations can exist together in the same thing when they say 'the same thing in the same respect is the principle of acting and of undergoing'. But as to the present purpose there is no need to fall into this difficulty. For no one denies that opposite relations can exist in the same thing according to different foundations, as that a thing is greater in one way and smaller in another, and that with respect to itself or something else. But 'where' is different first in this body itself, being above and below through the mediation of this 'where' as it is a different foundation. It is not unacceptable, therefore, that a body that has a 'where' above and below is above and below. Nor should you wonder that the respect of above and below is founded on a 'where', although 'where' is a respect; for a respect can be founded on a respect, as was touched on above [nn.123-126].

173. [To the second] – To the next [n.75] I say that relations contrary in genus can very well be present in the same thing according to different foundations, just as the same thing can very well be similar to something in whiteness and dissimilar to the same thing in science. But being near and distant are founded on a body located in place, because the 'where' of it is near or distant. Therefore, if there is another 'where', it is not unacceptable that near and distant belong to the same body, just as near and distant belong to two 'wheres' that belong to that body and are the foundations of the nearness and distance.

174. [Third argument] – To the third [n.76] I say that just as the same temporal thing cannot exist simultaneously in time, that is, be in the same 'temporality' (so to say) in diverse times. But if you take 'simultaneous' in the antecedent as simultaneous in time and if likewise you take it in the consequent as simultaneous in place, the consequence or proportion does not hold, because simultaneity in time should be compared to the same time in the temporal thing, just as simultaneity in place should be compared to the same place in a located thing. I concede, therefore, that the same placed thing cannot by one locating, that is to say 'by simultaneity in place', be in two places simultaneously.

175. But this reasoning can lead to the opposite conclusion, albeit sophistically, as follows: the same placed thing existing simultaneously, that is, existing in the same place, can exist in diverse times; therefore too, what is simultaneous in time can exist in diverse places. Let them solve this sophism, and they will solve their own argument, if perhaps they reckon there is evidence for it.

176. [Fourth argument] – As to the next argument [n.77], that the same thing would move and be at rest, I say. according to the first of the three propositions [n.129], that since ‘to be moved or at rest in place’ is simultaneous or posterior to the ‘where’, it will vary according to variation in ‘where’, and so it will be able in one ‘where’ to be at rest in place and in another ‘where’ to move in place, because to rest in place here is nothing other than to possess continuously the same ‘where’ as before, and to be moved there is nothing other than to have there different ‘wheres’. But just as it is possible for the same body to have here one ‘where’ permanently and there to have another ‘where’, so it is possible for it to have here one ‘where’ permanently and several ‘where’s’ successively elsewhere. One must speak in the same way about the parts of the whole, if they come to be instantaneously, that it is possible for all the parts here of the whole to rest in the whole and some parts there to be moved (as the hand or foot), because all these follow the ‘where’ (that is, this ‘where’ or that ‘where’).

177. And if you argue: “therefore as it is in one ‘where’ it could move toward itself as it is in another ‘where’, and so approach the ‘where’ in which it already is. And then it would either expel itself from the ‘where’ it approaches (and then it would be impossible with itself in ‘where’, just like some other body), or it would not expel itself (and then it would cease to have that ‘where’ by its own power but receive it from the ‘where’ of what is at rest), or it would make itself possessor of the other ‘where’ along with itself (and thus as two bodies together). And similarly, if it were animate it could move itself by repelling or dragging itself, and then the same man could have a thousand ‘wheres’ and produce dances and a very large army in a camp, and do many other things that seem to be wondered at, and also speak and be silent and dispute with himself.” I say that all these things are puerile and come from sense imagination. But if a reason be asked for the things here being dealt with, there is no greater difficulty in a body moving to the ‘where’ in which it is at rest than to any other ‘where’; and then, when it came to that ‘where’, I say that it would expel the same body from the where in which it is resting, unless perchance the acting power by which it had the other ‘where’ ceases to conserve it as it is located in that other ‘where’, and then it will have only the ‘where’ in which it was previously resting; but it did not have this ‘where’ before as the term of its motion. Instead it would cease to be in the ‘where’ it had in its moving. But to have a ‘where’ at all, whether as having it in motion or as in the term of motion, does nothing to vary or multiply the absolutes that exist in reality.

178. Hereby I respond to the points about dance and war and disputation with itself [n.177], because if ‘to speak’ states an act of imagination or intellect, it exists wherever the speaker was. But if ‘to speak’ is formally only the formation of voice through natural or vocal instruments in striking the air, and if indeed there is one air next to the vocal organs in this ‘where’ and another air next to them in another ‘where’, and suppose that the air is the same but that it will be able to move in place here and not there, then voice will be formed in the former air but not in the latter, and the former will speak and the latter will be silent, and the former will hold the tenor part and the latter the

fifth.¹² And the former, being out of the water, will draw in air, and the same as being in water will not be able to take in air, and yet it will not be drowned because its body will be sufficiently cooled elsewhere, in the place where it has the cooling air it has taken in.¹³ So I concede too that as it is in one 'where' it will be able to move its body as its body is in another 'where', by expelling or drawing it, for the idea of being movable or mover is not taken from it because the body is identical.

179. And if the following argument is made: "It moves, therefore it is not at rest; it is at rest, therefore it does not move; therefore it moves and is at rest simultaneously, and moves and does not move simultaneously," – I reply that in the case of opposite relations there is no absolute affirmation and negation but only affirmation and negation in a certain respect. It is like the way the following does not hold: "it is similar and dissimilar, therefore it is similar and not similar." For the antecedents are true if they are understood in respect of diverse things, and that in a particular case; for if it is similar to this it is similar, and if it is dissimilar to that it is dissimilar. As the Philosopher argues in *Categories* 6.5b33-6a11, if something is large relative to this it is large, and if small relative to that it is small. And from this he infers that large and small are not contraries, because the argument would not hold unless 'large relative to this' implied large and 'small relative to that' implied small. In the same way here: from 'it is at rest in this 'where'' follows 'therefore it is at rest', and from 'it is moved in this way' follows 'therefore it moves'. Yet from these affirmations do not follow the other negations, as 'at rest' 'not moving' 'moving' 'not resting'; rather there is a fallacy of the consequent, because the antecedent is true relative to one of the terms, and the negative consequent is a denial with respect to each.

180. [To the fifth] – To the last argument [n.78] I say that every immanent act that would be in the human body in this 'where' would be in it in any 'where', although it would not come to be in the latter as it is in the former 'where' (more will be said of this in the second article of this distinction, in the second question [nn.275-293]). But whether blood or spirit or the like, which are not of the true form of human nature, would be the same here and there, will be solved when spoken about next [question 3].

Question Three

Whether the Body of Christ could be Located at the Same Time in Heaven and in the Eucharist

181. Proceeding thus to the third question [n.7], it seems that the body of Christ cannot be simultaneously in heaven and in the Eucharist.

First from the remark of Augustine [*On John's Gospel* tr.30 n.1] and it is in Gratian *Decretum* p.3 d.2 ch.44: "Christ's body is above and it must be in one place."

182. Second as follows: because the formal reason for being in a place is quantity, according to the Philosopher *Physics* 4.7.213b30-34; but nothing can be multiplied unless its formal idea is multiplied; therefore, since the quantity of Christ's body is one, it can only be in one place.

¹² In medieval music the tenor was the part that held the melody, and the fifth was kept steady as a sort of drone.

¹³ In ancient and medieval science, the intake of breath was believed to be for cooling the heat coming from the heart.

183. Further, third, as follows: “Things that are the same as one and the same thing are the same as each other” [*Physics* 3.3.202b14-15]; therefore things that are together with one and the same thing are together with each other. Therefore if the body of Christ were here and also there, then what would be with it here and what would be with it elsewhere would be together. But the consequent is false, for one of them could be at Rome and the other at Paris; therefore etc.

184. Fourth as follows: what is distant from something is other than it, because nothing can be properly distant from itself. But Christ’s body, if it were in the Eucharist, would be distant from itself in heaven; therefore it would be different things. The proof of the major is that distance includes discontinuity, but the unity of continuous quantity is continuity. Therefore distance is repugnant to that unity, and so it posits plurality.

185. Fifth thus, because the same thing would be able to move and be at rest, for the body of Christ would be at rest in heaven and in the Eucharist move with the motion of the Eucharist, according to the Philosopher *Topics* 2.7.113a29-30, “When we move, everything in us moves.”

186. On the contrary, because the body of Christ is in heaven, according to Augustine [*On John’s Gospel* tr.30 n.1], and it is in Gratian *Decretum* p.3 d.2 ch.44, “Until the end of the age, the Lord is above;” and the body of Christ is also truly in the Eucharist, as was touched on in the first question of this distinction [n.9].

I. To the Question

187. The conclusion is certain for any of the faithful, as was shown above in question one [n.15].

A. Opinion of Henry of Ghent

1. Exposition of the Opinion

188. But one way of putting the point is as follows [Henry of Ghent and his followers], namely that the same body can be elsewhere than in its natural place by conversion of something else into it, because where the thing converted was there that into which it is converted is – not by location but sacramentally. And in this way, namely sacramentally, the same body can be in another place, and in several places. Now it is not there by location nor in its dimensions, because being there by location would involve a contradiction (following their reasons set down in the preceding question, nn.81-84); but its being there sacramentally does not involve a contradiction, because it is not there according to the laws of place, but only that under which it sacramentally exists is there according to those laws.

2. Refutation of the Opinion

189. But against this are some of the arguments in the preceding question [nn.30-41], that conversion is not the formal reason for a body’s existing here, whether as present (the point is plain, because when the conversion is over the body remains here) or as past, because then God could not make his body not to be here, just as he cannot make a past conversion not to be past. Nor is that which is called the sacrament, namely the

species, the formal reason for the body's being here, because the species are not formally in the body of Christ, therefore neither can anything through them be formally in the body of Christ.

190. From this the argument is as follows: God can make something in a creature without making what is not the reason for that something's being, or what does not in any way belong to its essence; conversion, as was shown [n.189], is not the formal reason for Christ's body being here and neither are the species or the sacrament, and these do not in any way belong to its essence; therefore, God can make the body of Christ to be here without either of them.

191. Again, there is no greater repugnance in Christ's body being together with the substance of the bread than being together with its quantity, because, as far as such being together is concerned, substance is not more repugnant to substance than quantity is to substance. But while the body of Christ is existent in heaven, God can, in everyone's view, make the same body to be together with the quantity of the bread. Therefore he can make the same body to be together with the substance quantum of the bread, and do so without any conversion.

This as to the first of the arguments that have been touched on [n.189].

192. Also, if the substance quantum of the bread be set down as the sacrament [n.189], the point is still against them [Henry and his followers]. Because, as was shown [n.113], it is easier to make a body to be somewhere with its natural mode than without it; but God can make his body to be with the substance quantum of the bread in a sacramental, that is, non-natural way; therefore he can also make it present in a natural way. Therefore it would be possible for God to make that body to exist in its natural mode along with the substance quantum in other places besides heaven.

193. And if you say to the first reason [n.190] that the thing cannot be done without the proper term of the sort of relation in question, nor without the foundation; but the proper term of this presence is the sacrament, that is, something perceptible which fills the place and with which and under which the body of Christ non-locally exists; – on the contrary: it is not more impossible, as it seems, for the body of Christ to be with the former than with the latter; therefore it is not more impossible for it to be with the substance of the bread than with its quantity (as was said [n.191]), and so on as to anything at all other than itself. And then further: if it can come to be in a non-natural mode elsewhere than where it is, then also can it do so in a mode natural to it.

B. Scotus' own Opinion

194. I say therefore that if one posits conversion in the matter at hand (which will be spoken about in d.11 nn.14-29) and if one posits that there is here some perceptible sign truly containing the body of Christ here present, which sensible sign may be called the sacrament – I say indeed that this is true, namely that the body of Christ is in fact here under the sacrament after the consecration or conversion. But that it could not be here without conversion or without being under the sacrament (meaning some determinate sensible sign or other), I do not see, as was argued in the preceding question [nn.113-114].

195. And perhaps those, who deny that God can make Christ's body to be outside heaven otherwise than by conversion and under the sacrament, would not concede that God could do so save because they were constrained by the faith.

196. As to this way of existing without quantity and without dimensions or non-locally, I do not see how this same thing could be done in several places without it also being possible for it to be done in a natural way, since in the first way there are two miracles and in the second only one, namely the two of causing the presence here of the body of Christ and of separating it from its natural mode. Consequently, therefore, the body can be here in a natural mode just as also in the sacrament.

II. To the Initial Arguments

197. To the first argument for the opposite [n.181] I say that Augustine so understands 'must' that it means 'is appropriate' (that is, fitting) for the body to live in the kingdom prepared for the glorious; but it is not required, that is, it is not simply necessary. For the body of Christ can sometimes move from its place even locally, and much more so can it, by divine action absolutely, be elsewhere both sacramentally and locally, putting itself in another 'where' without loss of its 'where' in heaven, just as we now hold that that body is present non-locally in the Eucharist.

198. To the second [n.182] I say that 'formal reason' can be understood in two ways: first properly, for the proximate formal reason, and second for the remote formal reason (taking 'formal reason' broadly for remote foundational reason, in the way that heat is said to be the formal reason for something being similar, namely to the extent that heat is the 'principle by which' of action and whiteness the principle by which of similarity). When speaking of reason in the first way, one can concede that what the formal reason is the formal reason of is not multiplied without the multiplication of the formal reason. But, when speaking of formal reason in the second way, the claim is false, because the same thing could be the proximate cause of acting as regard many actions, and the same thing could be the proximate foundation as regard many relations. Now quantity is the formal reason of being in place not in the first way but in the second, because it is the proximate foundation of this relation; and from this the proposed conclusion follows, namely that several relations can be founded on the same foundation, especially relations that come to a thing from outside.

199. To the third [n.183] I say that the first proposition is false, unless the unity of the third thing in itself and the unity of the things that are proved to be one from the unity of that third thing are understood in a uniform way, because if there is a lesser unity in itself of the third thing, one cannot infer a greater unity of the others with each other, but a unity through their unity in that third thing. The same holds of 'together', that unless the third thing, with which the others are together, is limited to the unity according to which they are together with the third, their togetherness with each other does not follow. Yet neither is what is in Paris together with the same thing in Rome if the third thing, because immense, is unlimited. Hence the following inference does not hold, 'I am together with eternity and with the soul of Antichrist, therefore that soul and eternity are together with each other', for eternity is immense as to its actual presence. – To the matter in hand I say that that which is together in two places is unlimited, though not by its own power but by

the power of God as agent, I mean unlimited as to 'where'. And therefore things that are present with it as it is thus unlimited do not have to be together with each other.

200. To the fourth [n.184] I say that, when taking 'distance' for distance in place, the major is false. As for the proof about discontinuity, I say that a thing is the same as itself not because it is continuous with itself but because it has a truer unity, for continuity is unity of part in relation to part in the whole, but the unity of the whole with itself is true identity. I say therefore that if a whole as distant is not continuous with itself as distant, yet in each term of the distance it is truly the same, possessing the same continuity of parts in the whole.^a

a. [Interpolation] Hence the soul exists in the head and the foot, and a man has the same being now and at the end of his life, and that being is distant from itself in duration but it is not a different being; hence diversity in what is posterior does not argue diversity in what is prior.

And when it is said that the unity of a continuous whole is its continuity, this is true of its unity as composed of parts; but its identity with itself is not continuity of the same whole with itself in the way a part is continuous with a part.

201. As to the fifth [n.185], the answer will be plain in the second part of this distinction, question three [nn.307-312].

Second Part: On the Things that can Belong to Christ's Body in the Eucharist

202. About the second main point [n.6] I ask three questions: first whether the same body, existing naturally and existing sacramentally, necessarily has in it the same parts and properties; second whether the same immanent action that is in Christ as naturally existing exists in him as sacramentally existing in the Eucharist; third whether the body of Christ as existing in the Eucharist can have any bodily motion.

Question One

Whether the Same Body, Existing Naturally and Existing Sacramentally, Necessarily has in it the Same Parts and Properties

203. Proceeding thus to the first question, there is argument that it does not.

First, nothing can be where it was not before unless something is converted into it; but in the Eucharist nothing is converted into the properties of Christ's body; therefore they are not there. Proof of the major: if something begins to be where it was not before, this is by some change; but there is no change in what begins to be there, because the body of Christ and all its properties remain where they uniformly were before in heaven; therefore change is in something else to which or in whose 'where' this body begins to be present – this is only by conversion. The minor is plain because substance alone is converted here into substance; therefore not into properties.

204. Again, second as follows: the blood is only here sacramentally after the consecration of the wine; that is, it is not under the host, first because to posit it there in another way, that is, under the species of wine, would be pointless, and second because nothing begins to be simply after it already is simply, therefore the blood does not begin to be sacramentally after it is sacramentally. But the blood is here and begins to be under the species of wine, whose consecration follows the consecration of the body. Therefore

it is not here sacramentally under the species of bread. And yet the body is there. So the body does not have the same part (at least the blood) here and in heaven.

205. Third as follows: quantity cannot be together with quantity, because there is a formal repugnance between them here in respect of 'where', just as there is between contraries in respect of the same subject, and contraries can in no way be together because, according to the Philosopher *Metaphysics* 4.6.1011b15-18 [*Ord.* III d.4 n.2, d.15 n.2], contradictories being true together follows on contraries being true together. Therefore, the quantity of Christ's body, which is a property of it, cannot be in it as it is under the host. This is also plain, because quantity cannot be together with a containing quantity without being located in it, because, when a foundation and a proper term are posited, the relation between them necessarily follows. The proper foundation of being circumscribed in place is a quantum, and its term is a container. But the quantity is not circumscribed here (as is plain), so it is not here at all.

206. Again, just as in the works of nature a plurality should not be posited without necessity when following natural reason, so in matters of belief too a plurality is not to be posited that does not follow by necessary deduction from what is believed. But the whole truth of the Eucharist can be saved even if one posits here nothing but the substance alone of the body of Christ.

Proof of the minor:

Because the body can be without the soul, since it is the receptive matter and is in potency to having the soul or not having it; and it has the idea of spiritual food without the soul.

Again, the body can be without the properties, because what is naturally prior can be without what is posterior. Therefore, without contradiction, the bare substance alone of Christ's body could come to be here without the species. But it would be a thing sufficient for the sacrament in this way, because it would be a sign of the ultimate effect, namely spiritual nutriment; therefore etc.

207. On the contrary:

The Master says the opposite in *Sent.* IV d.11 ch.6 n.1. And Innocent III says the same, *On the Sacred Mystery of the Altar* IV ch.12, "Christ gave to his disciples the sort of body he had." Therefore the same quality was in the body of Christ in the Eucharist as was in it in its natural existence.

I. To the Question

208. Here two things must be looked at: first what is being supposed, second what question is being asked.

A. The Supposition being Made

209. For it is supposed that Christ's body exists in a double way, namely in heaven in a natural way and in the Eucharist in a sacramental way.

Each point is sufficiently manifest. The first from Augustine [*On John's Gospel* tr.30 n.1], and it is in Gratian *Decretum* p.3 d.2 ch.44, "Until the end of the age, the Lord is above." The second is manifest from what was said in question 1 earlier [nn.15-23].

210. But a doubt about the body as it is in the Eucharist concerns what the things are that it contains as parts.

211. I say that it does not contain the soul nor the accidents.

This is possible if one takes body for the thing that the soul first perfects, because there is no contradiction in this sort of body being without soul and without accidents.

212. It is also fitting, because the species represent food, and so substance and not accidents.

213. It also did in fact happen, because if the Eucharist had been consecrated during the Triduum, the true thing of the sacrament would have been there, and yet the soul would not have been there, as will be said at the end of this solution [nn.254-255, 258].

214. Also, the body does not in this way contain the blood, because this is possible and is true in fact, for blood is not animate and consequently not part of the primarily animated thing.

215. It is possible too on the part of the sacrament or in the sacrament, because in the case of different things there can be the same freely chosen sign or a different sign. The body, as taken in the stated way, differs essentially from the soul and secondarily from other things (as the blood and the like); therefore it can have a different sign. And this is proved *a minori*, because the body can have a natural sign that is not the same [as the sign of the blood]. For there are two essentially distinct concepts for body and blood, which concepts are the signs of conceived things, *On Interpretation* 2.16a19-20. And blood is essentially different from the body as the body is the thing primarily perfected by the soul. Therefore there can be a sign of it, namely of the body, that is not the same as the sign of the blood.

216. This is also proved as a fact, because it was possible for all the blood to have been separated from the body of Christ in death, and yet if the Eucharist had then been consecrated, there would have been the same thing as now. It is also possible that a large amount of the blood flowed out, and yet the whole same thing would have remained under the species of bread.

217. One must therefore hold here that the body of Christ, as it is primarily signified and contained in the species of bread, does not include the soul nor the accidents nor the blood.

B. The Question being Asked

218. As to the question asked, one must first consider the sense of the question.

219. The question here is not about the necessity of the existence of one extreme or the other, nor about the necessity of having parts or properties absolutely. But the question is about the necessity of concomitance or consequence, namely whether there are parts or properties in the body of Christ, or whether they are necessarily concomitant or consequent to it, as it exists in the way stated – on the grounds that the same things are present in the body existing in the same way.

220. And this can be understood in two ways: first whether by the ‘necessarily’ is meant necessity absolute and simply, or necessity only in a certain respect – namely that the consequent necessarily follows simply from the positing of the antecedent, or that it

follows in a certain respect or by supposition, that is, on the supposition of the existence of the subject of the consequent.

221. First then one must consider necessity simply and secondly necessity in a certain respect.

1. Whether the Natural Parts and Properties of Christ's Body are Simply Necessarily in the Eucharist as well
a. First Conclusion

222. About the first I say (and let it be the first conclusion) that there is no necessity simply that, if Christ's body has parts or properties, it have the same ones in sacramental mode.

This is clear in brief because after the [general] resurrection there will be no Eucharist, nor either will Christ's body have properties or features in that way, and yet it will then have them in its natural way of being.

b. Second Conclusion

223. The second conclusion is that there is no necessity simply the other way, namely that it does not follow simply necessarily that, if the body of Christ has these parts and properties in a sacramental way, it have them for this reason in natural existence.

224. This is plain first as follows: when some existence is indifferent as to two modes, then just as it can be had simply in one mode, so can it also be had simply in the other mode; but the existence simply of Christ's body (or the thing of Christ's body simply and really) is indifferent to these two modes, namely natural and sacramental; therefore it can be had in the latter way just as in the former, or even though not in the former.

225. Some say [Aquinas] to this, that the sense of the first premise is when neither mode depends on the other; but it is not so here, because the sacramental mode depends on the natural mode, because the natural mode is the first way the thing in the sacrament exists.

226. On the contrary, and to the main conclusion: existence in the natural mode is not of the essence of existence in the sacramental mode, nor is it the cause of it; therefore the latter does not depend on the former, because nothing depends on something which is not of its essence or cause of it, as it seems.

The first part of the antecedent is plain, because the thing of the Eucharist does not have there its natural mode of being, namely extension; but it would have it if this were of the essence of the existence or mode of being that it has there; for everything that has something has what is of the essence of it.

The proof of the second part of the antecedent is that God is the immediate cause of this existence, name of Christ's body in the sacrament; therefore the body in its natural existence is not cause of sacramental existence.

227. Again (and it is the same as the prior argument [n.224]), the Eucharist does not depend on that which is neither the sacrament nor the thing of the sacrament, or that is not cause of one or the other; existence in the natural mode is not the sacrament (as is

plain), nor is it the thing of the sacrament; rather the thing of the sacrament is existence in another, disparate mode; nor is existence in the natural mode cause of one or the other, as is plain from what has been said [n.226].

228. Again (and this is almost the same), God can cause a thing without any created thing not intrinsic to that thing; existence in the natural mode is not intrinsic to the Eucharist; therefore etc.

229. You will say that the major is true of absolute things but not of a relation, because a relation cannot come to be without its foundation and term; but the Eucharist includes a relation, whose term is the existence of the body.

230. On the contrary: although existence is the same in both modes, namely sacramental and natural, yet it is not the term of the relation that is included in the Eucharist in its natural mode but in a disparate mode. Proof: the thing is contained in the Eucharist in the same way that it is the primary signified thing of this sign; for this is the difference between this sacrament and others, that it really contains the first thing it signifies; but existence in the natural mode is not contained here really, but rather in another disparate mode; therefore etc.

c. Two Corollaries that Flow from the Second Conclusion

231. From this second conclusion follows a corollary, that before the Incarnation there could have been a Eucharist as true as there is now, and this both as to signification and as to the thing signified and contained.

232. A second corollary is that, after the Incarnation, Christ's body could have ceased to exist in its natural mode, and yet a true Eucharist would remain both as to the truth of the sign and as to the truth of the thing signified and contained. The consequence is plain, that if from 'the body of Christ is really contained in the Eucharist' does not necessarily follow 'the same body has existence in its natural mode', then the first could be done without the second, whether it precedes or remains after the destruction of the second.

233. A proof specifically about the first as preceding the second [n.232] is this: wherever a temporal thing can have one real existence, it can simply begin to be there really after it was not. But the body of Christ can simply begin to have one real existence in the sacramental mode of existence; therefore it can simply begin to be in this mode of being, namely in the sacramental mode, after it was not here. Therefore, in order for it to begin simply to be, it is not necessary that it begin to be also in the other mode of being.

234. And if you say that when it begins here it must begin elsewhere at the same time, because, if there is a beginning simply, there is a being of the thing in itself simply; for if it begins to be in another at the same time, then, for there to be a beginning simply, it is no less necessary that it begin to be in itself, because the beginning simply of a thing is the same, just as its being simply is the same; but the being simply of this thing in itself is the being of it in its natural mode. – This response is excluded by the reasons given for the second conclusion [nn.224, 227], because if it [Christ's body] has real existence in this way as much as in the other (from the first reason), and the latter does not depend on the other (from the second reason), then it follows that it can have a beginning simply in this sacramental mode without having a beginning in the other [natural] mode.

235. One can argue in the same way for the corollary about ‘ceasing to be’ [n.232], because wherever a temporal thing has true existence, then, as long as it remains there, it would not altogether cease to be when it ceased to be in the other mode.

d. Difficulties against the Two Corollaries and their Solution

236. Against the first corollary [n.231] I infer this unacceptable result: therefore the body could begin to be after it was, for the body began to be in the Incarnation, and yet it would have truly been before, if there had been a true Eucharist [before].

237. Against the second corollary [n.232], because then the same body would cease to be after it had ceased to be. Proof: because by ceasing to be in its natural mode it would cease to be, and yet it would remain if a true Eucharist afterwards remained.

238. I say that neither consequence is valid, because what has being simply does not, if it begins to be in another mode, begin to be save in a certain respect. Similarly, what remains in being simply would not, if it ceased to be elsewhere in another mode, cease to be save in a certain respect.

239. As to the argument about the Incarnation [n.236] I say that it would have been possible for that body to have been formed of the blood of the Virgin, and this in its natural mode of existing, notwithstanding the fact that a true Eucharist had preceded. But this formation would not have been the beginning of Christ’s body save in a certain respect, just as now the conversion of the bread into the body is not a beginning of the body save in a certain respect; and the whole reason is that what begins thus to be has being simply beforehand.

240. I speak similarly about the second argument [n.237], that the ceasing to be of the body in the natural mode would not be a ceasing to be save in a certain respect, provided however that the same body remained having the same real existence in the sacramental mode.

241. And if you object that “as it is, there was a beginning simply of Christ’s body in the Incarnation, so there would likewise have thus been a beginning simply if the Eucharist had preceded, for the being of Christ’s body in its natural mode would have been no less true then than now, and consequently, when it acquired that being, his body would, in receiving that sort of being, have had no less true a beginning” – I reply that beginning simply requires not only a beginning to true being and to being simply of that which is said to begin, but also a beginning to the first being of it. But, as it is, there was in the Incarnation a receiving not only of being but also of first being. Then, however, [sc. if the Eucharist had preceded the Incarnation] there would have been a beginning of being simply in one mode, but not the first mode, because the same being simply would have preceded under a different mode [sc. the sacramental mode], and then there would have been a beginning in a certain respect, but now a beginning simply.

242. But if you argue about ceasing to be, that ceasing to be in the natural mode is ceasing to be simply, for corruption in that sense is corruption simply and a corruption everywhere, since if it is not corrupted here then it remains after it was corrupted – I reply that no contradictories are to be admitted about the same thing when there is a distinction in their modes of being (as will be stated immediately). If therefore you are speaking of the corruption that is the separation of part from part (as of the body from the soul, or of the form of corporeity from the matter), then if there is such a corruption of something

existing in such a mode, there is also a corruption of it in any mode. Otherwise the same form would inform and not inform the same thing at the same time, and consequently Christ's body could not be made to be without a soul in the natural mode without it also being made to be without a soul in the sacrament, and vice versa. Nor too could Christ's body be resolved into matter (the form of corporeity having been here separated from it) without being resolved there, and vice versa.

243. But if we are speaking of a corruption or separation, namely about the total ceasing to be of what is contained in this mode and in the other, Christ's body could well cease to be here without ceasing to be there, and vice versa, because the whole ceases to have one mode of its existence while retaining the other mode, under each of which modes its total existence is truly preserved.

c. Third Corollary

244. From the above follows a corollary, namely that by the corruption that nature could bring about in the body of Christ, that is, by separation of part from part, it would be necessary for the separation of the parts of this thing to be made in the same way here and there. But through the destruction that God could bring about by his absolute power (a destruction not indeed of the being simply of the thing but of the thing in this mode), the thing would be able not to have that mode of being and yet able to have the other.

245. And if it is objected against this that what is nothing in itself is nothing in something else; therefore if Christ's body did not have existence, that is, in the natural mode, it could not have existence in the sacrament – I say that if the major is understood by prescinding from every mode of being in something, it is false, for the body of Christ equally truly has its own real being when existing in another and when existing in itself. But if the major is understood in itself, without prescinding but by positing the proper real existence of this body, I concede it. And then I say that if the body is only in the Eucharist, it is not however not in itself, because it truly has being in that way in itself and in the Eucharist, where it exists under the sign [sc. of the Eucharist], just as it does in heaven, where it does not exist in a sign.

2. Whether the Same Parts and Properties are Present by Necessity in a Certain Respect

246. About the second member of the distinction, namely about necessity taken in a certain respect, that is, about the existence of the subject of the consequent [nn.220-221], the conclusion is this, that it is thus necessary for the same properties and parts to be in the body of Christ in this mode of being and in that.

247. Proof: because no absolute thing ceases to be in anything when a new respect comes to it precisely from outside; the properties and parts in the body are truly absolutes; but their presence in the Eucharist is only an extrinsic respect coming to them; therefore etc.

248. This can be argued also in accord with what was said in question two of this distinction [nn.30-41, 129-131,], that an absolute thing does not vary because of a variation in relations of 'where' and the like; therefore, nothing absolute in a body varies because of its 'where' in heaven and because of the presence of it in the Eucharist that is assimilated to a relation 'where'.

249. Proof of the major of the first reason [n.247]:

Because there is no formal repugnance in such relation to a preexisting 'where', nor even is there a virtual repugnance, in the way that a contrary property is repugnant to a subject (as cold is repugnant to fire); because the opposite of this relation [sc. 'where'] does not arise from the principles of the absolute thing, for then this relation would not be inherent in it contingently nor would it come to it from outside.

Secondly as follows: an absolute is naturally first present in what it is present in before a relation is present that is founded on that absolute, and especially a relation that is extrinsic and comes to the thing contingently. Therefore in that prior moment, before the body is understood to have a new relation in the Eucharist, either its quantity and everything else absolute is present in it, and I have the conclusion proposed, or these are not present and it follows that the contradictories are simply true,¹⁴ for affirmation and negation cannot be said to hold according to diverse features (namely according to this and that 'where', or to this or that presence), because just as affirmation is not of a nature to hold because of 'where', so neither is negation.

250. This could also be plainly argued as follows: contradictories are not simply true of the same thing in the same respect; nor should one add to 'the same' the addition of 'when the predicate is absolute; a body, if it does not have the absolute here and does have it there, is here the same and at the same time and in the same respect'.

251. The two first conditions are plain [sc. 'same thing' and 'in the same respect'].

252. Proof of the third [one should not add 'when the predicate is absolute...'], because nothing else is here and there save 'where' and 'where'; but neither absolute affirmation nor absolute negation hold according to 'where'. This is plain in what is posited here, because a body can well be moved in place here and there, not insofar as these are in it according to different 'wheres'. And so there is a fallacy of the consequent in arguing thus: 'it is not moved here, therefore it is not moved', although it may commonly hold due to the matter [sc. because bodies are commonly in one place; but Christ's body can be in more than one place]. And likewise, if the same thing had two surfaces, it could well be white according to one and black according to the other; nor would there be contrariety or contradiction, because they would not hold of it according to the same sense. But as to absolute affirmation and the negation of it (provided they do not amount to the same, and provided there is no difference there save that of relations), it is manifest that they will hold according to the same sense, because the relations could not be the reason for which the affirmation and negation would hold [sc. true together], because this reason is naturally posterior to what is absolute.

II. To the Initial Arguments

253. As to the first initial argument [n.203] one must say that he who held the major that 'nothing can be elsewhere while remaining in its place save by conversion of something else into it' would have to gloss the proposition about what first begins to be elsewhere, and say that the properties begin to be here concomitantly but not first.

¹⁴ That is, the contradictories of asserting and denying of the same subject (Christ's body) the same quantity and properties. For these properties, being absolute, would belong or not belong to Christ's body regardless of differences in the extrinsic relation of 'where'.

254. But against this:

First, because it at least maintains that something is here without conversion of something else into it, and consequently that conversion is not the proper formal idea, nor the precise change, for being here [n.29]. And besides, the presence of the soul and of the body here are different, because their foundation is different. Therefore, besides the presence by which the body is formally here, one must posit another by which the soul is here, and this presence is not obtained through conversion; therefore the major is false.

255. I respond, therefore, that it poses no difficulty for me, because I do not believe the said proposition to be true, as was said in the first question of this distinction [nn.42-55]. For conversion is not the reason for such presence, nor is change to such presence properly the reason, but the divine power alone, by a different change (which is not conversion), makes it the case that what is elsewhere has this presence here. And divine power can do this for the parts and properties of the body as for the whole body.

256. To the second [n.204]:

Either one holds [n.253] that the body, which is what the species of bread first signifies, does not per se contain the blood as some part of it, according to what was said above in the solution when making the supposition clear [n.214]. And then the response is easy, that the blood is only concomitantly under the species of bread, and then it is not there twice by force of the sacrament, nor yet is it in vain concomitantly under the species of bread, since it is under the species of wine by force of the sacrament, for this is to save the truth of the thing contained, which, wherever it is posited, always has the same absolute features. Nor does it follow that the blood begins to be here after it was here, when speaking of the same mode of being; for it was here concomitantly and begins to be here by force of the consecration.

But if it be held that the blood is per se part of the body as the body is the thing first signified by the species of bread, then one must say that the blood is here twice by force of the sacrament; but still not in the same way, because it is under the species of wine per se and first, for it is the first thing signified by the wine. Now it is under the species of bread per se but not first, rather as something belonging to what is first signified. Nor then is it in vain, because it is per se under the species of bread, so that the truth of the thing first contained may be preserved. Nor does it begin to be after it first was, though it did per se have being there.

257. To the third [n.205] I say that, once the extremes are posited, there is no necessity that a relation coming from outside necessary follow. For such a relation differs in this way from a relation properly speaking, or from a relation that comes from within. But the presence in question here is a relation coming from outside.

258. As to the next [n.206], although Christ's body could be posited to be here without the other things, namely without the soul and the rest, yet once the existence of the body with these properties and parts is posited, it cannot be here without them, because of the contradiction between affirmation and negation of something absolute under two respects.

259. From this solution [n.258] is made plain what is first in the Eucharist as the thing signified and contained, and what is first concomitantly; for the former is that without which the thing first signified would not have being in a natural mode. And it could also be said that, when the existence of the body here and there has been posited, those things that are in the body under one existence are in it under the other (if one

speaks of absolute forms as well). Nor yet does a contradiction follow, namely that it is a quantum and not a quantum; rather it is not a quantum here with a quantity that might be here, but with a quantity that is in heaven.

260. There is the following reason for this: In the case of things that are contingently conjoined with each other and with a same third thing, one of them can agree with that third thing without the other agreeing with it; but the presence of a substance here and the presence of its quantity are contingently conjoined both with each other and in respect of the third thing that is 'a body being a quantum'; therefore a body can remain a quantum when one presence is posited without the other.

261. And the major seems plain, because there is no reason for their inseparability on their part among themselves, since they are contingently conjoined with each other; nor even is there this reason for inseparability on the part of the third thing, because they are contingently conjoined with that third thing.

262. Proof of the minor:

For it is plain that the presence of the substance of the body and the presence of its quantity are different, and that neither necessarily includes the other, because neither is of the per se essence of the other nor a per se cause of it; therefore they are contingently conjoined with each other.

I prove also the second part of the minor, namely that they are contingently disposed to the third thing that is the body being a quantum, because an absolute form perfects its perfectible object naturally before this sort of perfectible object or the form has a relation coming from outside. And this would be more evident if the argument were about body and soul, for the conjunction of the soul with the body is required for the existence of the composite substance. But the composite substance is naturally prior to any relation coming from outside. Therefore a substance quantum or an animated body does not have this presence or that presence (and this to something extrinsic to them), save as this presence comes to them contingently and as naturally posterior.

263. And this could be briefly argued thus: In the case of what can exist without any conjuncts whose conjunction is contingent, one of these conjuncts can precisely be without the other. The animate body or a substance quantum can be without those two presences, namely the presence of this part of the species of the Eucharist and the presence of that part; and these two presences are contingently conjoined, because neither is per se cause of the other. Therefore a substance quantum or the animate body can be with one presence and not with the other; and then nothing else would exist save that a quantity is informing what it can perfect, but it does not have the double presence the way what it can perfect has; and so what it can perfect has quantum everywhere but not with a quantity that is present everywhere.

264. On the contrary: wherever a body is a quantum, it has there what is the formal principle of being a quantum; but it does not have it there unless it is present there; therefore etc.

265. Again, of what sort something is here, of that sort would it be if every other being were in some way or other, possible or not, circumscribed from it; but if quantity were circumscribed under natural being, that body would not be a quantum; therefore it would not be a quantum as it is here.

266. Again, the thing of the Eucharist could be truly contained there without its anywhere having existence in the natural mode, as is plain from the first article of this

question or solution [nn.222-245]. But if it were nowhere else and the only thing here first contained is the substance, then the substance would not be a quantum; and the sort it would then be in absolute form, of that sort it is now; therefore etc.

267. As to the argument to the contrary [n.222-230], about the contingent conjunction of the presences with each other and with a same third thing composed of absolute parts – the answer is plain from what has already been said (look for the response [nn.222-230]).^a

a. [Interpolation] To the first [n.261] one can speak by distinguishing the major: either it means what has a quantity informing it there, and thus I concede the point; or it means what has a present quantity, and thus I deny it.

To the second [n.262] I say that quantity is always in a body, whatever sort of quantity it has; rather, although it not have a quantity as here present, yet it has it as informing it, and thus is the body a quantum.

To the third [n.262] I say that there would be a quantity in the body of Christ, though not in natural mode or with a quantity that is present, but with a quantity that is inherent.

Question Two

Whether any Immanent Action that is in Christ Existing Naturally is the Same in Him as Existing in the Eucharist Sacramentally

268. Proceeding thus to the second question, argument is made that not just any immanent action that is in Christ existing naturally is in him existing sacramentally in the Eucharist; because hearing and vision are not, and so on about sensation universally.

269. The proof first is that the object is not present to him in the due proportion required for such act, meaning the object that is present to him as he is in heaven.

270. Second, because the sense organ does not have here the mode of extension under which, and not otherwise, it is able to receive sensation.

271. Again, third, because between the eye as it is here and the object as it is in heaven there is a barrier preventing the multiplying of color or light; therefore etc.

272. Again, fourth, because as he is here he does not sense the things that are present here; therefore much more not any sensible thing in heaven either. The proof of the antecedent is that the sense organ is not here in the mode required for sensation.

273. On the contrary:

Then he would be at the same time seeing and not seeing the same object (and in the same way with other acts of sensing); the consequent is false because contradictories would be present simply in the same thing. The evidence for this reason is plain from the preceding solution, in the second article [n.246-252].

274. Again, operation is the perfection of an operative power, and in it consists the blessedness of the power. On it too follows delight proportioned to the perfection of the operation; all this is plain from *Ethics* 10.4.1174b18-75a1. Therefore if the eye of Christ, as it is here, were to lack the vision that it has in heaven, it would lack its proper perfection here; and this perfection is its blessedness, in the way that vision can be said to be capable of beatification; it would lack also the perfect delight that is consequent to that perfect operation. And then it would follow that the eye, as it is here, would be wretched, with pain and sadness, because what takes delight away from it is painful and sad; and then it would be simply against its natural sense appetite to have being in the Eucharist.

I. To the Question

A. Three Conclusions

275. I reply that something is said to be in Christ first as he is here because it would be in him if it were in him nowhere else save here. But something is said to be concomitantly in him here because it is in him first as he is elsewhere, and so is in him as he is here because of identity of subject and form.

276. Accordingly, therefore, the first conclusion is this, namely that every operation that is in Christ first as he is in heaven, is in him concomitantly as he is here.

277. The second conclusion is that no act of sensation can be in Christ first as he is in the Eucharist.

278. The third conclusion is that spiritual operation (namely of intellect and will) can be in Christ first as he is in the Eucharist.

B. Proof of the Conclusions

1. Proof of the First Conclusion

a. Universally

279. Proof of the first conclusion.

First in general as follows, that nothing absolute ceases to be in another because of a new respect coming from outside; but operation is an absolute form, as was shown in *Rep.* IA d.3 nn.169-174; therefore, the operation does not cease to be in its subject because of a new presence, which is a new respect coming from outside. And evidence for this reason can be obtained from the end of the solution of the preceding question, where this reason was more fully dealt with [nn.246-252].

280. Some say [Henry of Ghent] to this that the major is true of absolute form simply; but operation is not thus absolute, because it requires the relation of power to object.

281. On the contrary: some qualities depend thus in their coming to be on the closeness of the agent to the passive subject, as is plain of heat and cold and other qualities that alteration is toward; and yet in their being simply they are absolute. And according to everyone, all such qualities, absolute ones as well, that were in the body of Christ on the cross, were also in the pyx.

282. Likewise too, in their coming to be they do not require such a relation, and that when they are present concomitantly and not first; for it is apparent that if Christ's body on the cross grew cold, the cold was also in the body of Christ as it is in the pyx, but not first. And for the latter coming to be there was not required a closeness of the agent there to the passive subject; so, by similarity, since this quality is in itself absolute, although it requires in its coming to be the presence of the object to the power and this will only be where it is present first, so it can come to be concomitantly without any such respect.

283. They reply that operation includes a relation more than other forms about which there is argument do (as heat and the like), because the latter require only a relation of agent to passive subject, and this where they come to be first; but after their coming to be in their proper being, they do not require this sort of relation; but operation is in continuous coming to be, and therefore it requires the continuous closeness of power

to the object. From this it seems that it is more repugnant for operation to come to be or to be present without such relation than it is for heat.

284. I say that although it continuously come to be, yet it does not follow that it cannot be concomitantly present and continuously come to be without the presence of the object. For just as heat can come to be in the body in the Eucharist without the closeness of the agent as there, so if the being of heat were to come to be, it could be always caused and always remain in the body and in the host, and yet without such closeness as to 'where'. For a continuous relation to continuous coming to be does not seem to be required more than a relation then present is required for transient coming to be.

285. And if you object [Henry of Ghent] that "for operation there is required not only the object as cause, because it is a cause in becoming, but in addition its presence in the idea of term of the operation; so just as it impossible for there to be an operation and for it not to terminate at the object, so it is impossible that an operation be in something somewhere and not terminate there in an object present to it" – I say that the presence of the object in itself is needed not because there is a term to the act but only because there is a cause of it, so that when some sufficient cause of the act is posited the presence of the object is not needed to be the term of it (the point is plain about seeing a creature in the divine essence; if the divine essence were the cause of that seeing, the object, which is the term of the seeing, is not required to be present in its own proper presence).

b. Specifically

286. This first conclusion is, second, proved specifically because 'every understanding that is in Christ here is also in him there'; for every such operation now abstracts from here and now; but if Christ's soul were to understand precisely according to the mode of understanding of a soul that is a wayfarer, it would not have intuitive understanding of this or that object without concomitant sensation of the same; therefore since it would have that understanding the same here as there, it follows that it would also have the requisite sensation for it here and there.

287. It is proved third as follows, because the passion of sense appetite, such as pain, would be the same here as there; therefore the sensation would be the same. The proof of the antecedent is that death would thus have followed here as there; but it followed there on extreme pain; therefore here too. The proof of the first consequence is that there is no same effect without the same cause, and this when not positing a miracle and when meaning a natural cause precisely; but pain is an effect of sensation or of an object that is sensed; therefore there cannot be the same pain without, in the absence of a miracle, the same sensation.

288. Some reply [Richard of Middleton] that an act of imagination in Christ would be sufficient for this, namely for the pain.

289. Against this in two ways:

First: the response destroys itself, for it is not possible for an act of imagination to be in something in which an act of sense cannot be, because imagination is a movement caused by sense, *On the Soul* 3.3.428b11-12.

Second, because imagination is not the cause of the same specific pain as is the pain caused by external sense; otherwise someone dreaming would be pained with a pain of the same species as the pain of someone awake.

2. Proof of the Second Conclusion

290. The proof of the second main conclusion is as follows, that the organ of sense is not in Christ's body in the Eucharist in the way required for being affected by the object, because if it is to be affected by a body-object it must have a quantitative mode and be located in a place; likewise, Christ's body as it is in the Eucharist does not have the object near it. For it is present here to a body as agent as if it were not present, because it is here as if, as far as concerns the idea of being affected by a body, it were nowhere; for every body requires a passive subject locally next to it. But Christ's body is not here by location, but only the sacramental species is here in that way; nor is Christ's body more present here to any body with the idea of being a passive subject than if an angel were here; therefore no sensation can be first in Christ's body as it exists in the Eucharist.

3. Proof of the Third Conclusion

291. The third conclusion, that the operation of intellect and will can be first in Christ in the Eucharist, is proved as follows: the now beatified soul of Christ understands as an angel does insofar as it does not depend on the senses nor on sensible things in its understanding; therefore just as an angel existing somewhere could intuitively understand an object proportionally present to him, so the soul of Christ existing in the same place can intuit that same object; therefore the soul of Christ, as it is here, can now intuitively understand the intelligible objects that are present here to him, just as an angel could see (intuitively that is) an angel that was present here and the soul of a priest.

292. But this intuition is in the soul of Christ first as it is here, because it is not in that soul first as it is in heaven (if one supposes that an extreme distance impedes created intuitive understanding), just as neither would an angel existing in heaven see intuitively whatever, as present here, he might see intuitively here.

293. From this follows a corollary, that Christ, because of his being in the Eucharist, is not only not deprived of any operation he has in heaven, but as he is in the Eucharist he has some operation first which as a consequence he has concomitantly in heaven, namely the intellection and volition of any object that an angel here present would have intellection and volition of. And as a result, his presence in the Eucharist does not tend to his imperfection but to his greater perfection.

II. To the Initial Arguments

294. To the first argument [n.268] I say that all sensation of the same object that is in Christ's senses as he is in heaven, is in the same senses in the Eucharist, as was proved in the first conclusion through the three ways [nn.279, 286-287].

To the proof for the opposite [n.269] I say that an object present in due proportion is only required for an act of sensing when the object is in some way cause of sensation, and cause of it as it first comes to be.

295. To the second [n.270] I say that the organ is truly a quantum here just as in heaven, and consequently it can receive sensation notwithstanding the fact that sensation

is only received in a quantum; but it does not have here a quantitative mode, that is, coextension with the quantum to which it is present, nor does it fill place. And therefore sensation cannot be in it first as it is here. For this quantitative mode is required in the eye for sensation to be in it first. But it is not required for sensation to be in it, or come to be in it, concomitantly, because this sort of quantitative mode is not necessary for receiving sensation, but it is only a required condition by reference to the first transmuting agent.

296. To the third proof [n.271] I say (and it is plain from the same point that has already been made [nn.294-295]) that the obstacle is only an obstacle to sensation coming to be or being present first.

297. As to the fourth argument [n.272] I deny the consequence, for the antecedent is true from the second conclusion of the solution [n.277], but the consequent is false from the first conclusion [n.276]. The reason the consequence fails is plain from what has been said, that in order to sense the things here sensation would have to be in the eye first as it is here; for the sensation cannot be in the eye first as it is in heaven, because the sensible object is not present to the eye as it is in heaven. But for sensation of some object to be concomitantly in the eye as it is here, it is sufficient that the same thing be proportionally present to the eye as it is somewhere, and that it be able to be first present to it as it is there. And such is how it is with objects that Christ's senses perceive as he is in heaven.

Question Three

Whether any Bodily Motion could be in Christ's Body as it Exists in the Eucharist

298. Proceeding thus to the third question, argument is made that bodily motion could be in Christ's body as it is in the Eucharist.

First, because one and the same thing cannot be continuous and non-continuous at the same time, for continuity precedes 'where' and is an absolute form; but Christ's body on the cross was non-continuous, speaking of the division made by the wounds; therefore in the pyx it was not continuous but divided simply; therefore it was made non-continuous from being continuous, and consequently it was moved with bodily motion.

299. Second: nutrition relates to substance, therefore the same thing cannot be nourished and not nourished; Christ's body was nourished in natural existence; therefore it would have been nourished in sacramental existence. But nutrition is a bodily change; therefore etc.

300. Third as follows: when we move, everything in us moves; therefore when the host moves, the body of Christ in the host moves; but this motion is bodily, therefore etc., because it moves from one 'where' to another 'where'. And there is a confirmation, because it is impossible for something to have different 'wheres' without motion or change; Christ's body has different 'wheres' when the host is moved; therefore etc.

301. Fourth as follows: a subject that has the dispositions requisite for receiving another form is able to receive it; the body of Christ has here all the dispositions requisite for the reception of heat and cold, because whatever the reasons are for receiving these qualities in the body of Christ as naturally existing, these qualities are present in the body of Christ here; therefore the body of Christ as it is here can receive heat and cold, and consequently it can move bodily with the motion of alteration in the third species of quality [*Categories*].

302. On the contrary:

Physics 5.1.225a31, “Everything that is in motion is located in place;” the body of Christ as it is in the sacrament is not located in place; therefore etc.

I. To the Question

A. Preliminary Distinctions

303. To understand the solution of this question I put first certain distinctions.

First about motion:

304. For motion can be understood strictly; not, I say, by distinguishing motion from change, as the divisible from the indivisible, but by taking motion as indifferent to divisible and indivisible change. However, strictly motion is taken according to motion toward the terms toward which motion properly is, according to the Philosopher, namely substance, quantity, quality, and ‘where’, *Physics* 5.1.224b35-225a20, 225a34-b9.

Motion can also be taken more extensively in another way, insofar as it states any receiving of any new form, whether absolute or relational, and relational either as belonging to ‘where’ properly, or as belonging to ‘where’ by some likeness or reduction, of the sort that the presence of Christ’s body here under the species is, as was touched on in the first question of this distinction [nn.49-55].

305. I distinguish second that the body of Christ can be understood to move with a motion (taken in either way) first or concomitantly. And the idea of the members of this division is plain from the beginning of the preceding solution [nn.275-276].

306. Third I distinguish, on the part of the agent, that a body’s being moved in this way or that, with such or such motion, can be understood to be caused by created virtue or immediately by God.

B. Solution Consisting of Six Conclusions

1. Statement of the Conclusions

307. Accordingly the solution of the question will consist of six conclusions.

The first is this: the body of Christ as it is in the Eucharist cannot be moved first, with motion or change properly speaking, by created power.

308. The second is this, that it can be moved, with motion properly speaking, immediately by God.

309. The third is this, that it can be moved, and moved first, with motion taken in extended sense.

310. The fourth is that it can only be moved in this way and with this motion immediately by God.

311. The fifth is this, that it can be moved concomitantly and moved to absolute form with any motion that it is moved by first as it is in heaven, and by the same agent as it is moved by there.

312. The sixth conclusion is that it is not moved concomitantly with the local motion it is moved first by as it is in heaven, nor by any motion similar to local motion.

2. Proof of the Conclusions

a. Proof of the First Conclusion

313. The proof of the first conclusion is as follows, that no created virtue acts on a body unless it is proportionally close to it in place; the body of Christ is not in a place here and so is close to nothing as to place; rather only the species, under which is the body, is close to any agent with the closeness that can be possessed as to the 'where'. But I said 'no created virtue', because although it is more manifest about a body than about an angel, yet an angel, if it acts on a body by really changing it, requires that body really to be close to it in place, or at least to have existence in place, because an angel's virtue is not able to cause any motion in a body without that body's 'where' being presupposed.

b. Proof of the Second Conclusion

314. The second conclusion is proved by the fourth reason given for the first part [n.301], because every disposition necessary for receiving heat that Christ's body has as it exists in heaven it also has as it exists here; therefore its receiving heat is not repugnant to it as it is here, even though it be, *per possibile* or *per impossibile*, nowhere else. And consequently, since divine virtue can impress on any passive subject any form that that subject is able to receive, it follows that God could change his body, as it is first here, toward heat.

c. Proof of the Third Conclusion

315. The third conclusion is plain from the fact we maintain that, after the consecration, the body of Christ is truly everywhere that the host is; therefore, because of the uniform presence of the body with the host, and because this host has a primary presence in different places according to the different containing things it is in, the result is that the body of Christ has different presences with the different containers. But these different presences are not without change broadly understood, and the change is in the body first as it is here, because in no way does Christ's body as it is in heaven have one or other presence, indeed it has neither.

316. And if you ask "Could it [Christ's body] not be present in different ways, and not just in respect of that which, as containing the species [of bread], contains it (so that it would be present by being concomitant with what contains the species), but would it not also be present because of the species and would it not begin to have a new presence because of the other species [of wine]?" – I say that the presence of Christ's body with the species is necessary, not simply, but only by divine ordination, which the Church has certified. So God could, of his absolute power, make his body not present with the species in this way while the species remains; and make it present with the air containing the host in this way, and also successively present now with one part of the air and now with another. He could in this way even transfer the body from the place of the host to any part of the universe, and always under the same mode of existing, that is, non-locally and while another body is filling the place.

d. Proof of the Fourth Conclusion

317. The proof of the fourth conclusion is that what in no way has a moving power over anything when that thing exists per se, does not move it per accidens when that thing is with another thing with which it does not make a unity, the way act and potency make a unity. But created virtue has altogether no power over the body of Christ in itself as it exists in this way, so as to move it. Therefore when that body is under something else to which it is not disposed as potency nor as act, the result is that the created power will not be able to move that body, not even per accidens. But Christ's body is under the host in this way, as is plain, because the species is not the form of the body nor the body the form of the species.

318. If the major here [n.317] is denied [Richard of Middleton], because a heavy object in a ship is moved by the mover of the ship, although the heavy object is not the form of the ship nor conversely – the objection is not to the purpose, because the moving power of the ship could act on a heavy object per se if it were heavy per se; and therefore I added in the major 'neither of which is the act of the other', because although a thing that is the act of something could not per se be moved by anything, yet it could per accidens be moved by the same thing that can move the whole of which it is the act.

319. But in order to remove all objection against the major, let this major be taken: "When certain things are conjoined by an act precisely of will that is contingently disposed to the conjunction, then if one of these things is something in itself movable that is altogether disproportionate to some mover and the other is proportionate to it, the mover cannot move both of the conjoined things with the same motion." The point is plain, because if the mover moves the one proportionate to it, not for this reason does it per accidens move the other, because the other is not present to the thing moved, neither as act of its potency, nor conversely, nor is it present simply from any necessity natural to it (as the heavy object is present to that on which it rests and is, for this reason, moved along with it). Rather it is only present to it by a will that is contingently disposed to the conjunction, and this will is consequently able not to will the conjunction while nevertheless the motion of the other of them continues.

320. An example of this: if an angel were voluntarily to make himself present to a stone, then if I move the stone, not for this reason do I move the angel, because the angel is not movable per se by my power, nor per accidens in this case, because he is not the form nor a part of anything movable by me. If therefore an angel were, at the end of the motion, present to the stone that was moved by me, this would not be by my act but by the angel's own proper action, whereby he would make himself present there.

321. In the same way in the matter at issue; since Christ's body is present to the species only by act of divine will, then if I make the species to have a new 'where', the body will not be there by that motion, because the presence, new or old, of the body is not subject to my will, not even per accidens, because it is neither form nor part of what is subject to my motion.

322. On the contrary [Richard of Middleton]: whatever moves something per se, moves per accidens whatever is in it; therefore the created virtue that per se moves the host moves per accidens the body that is per se in the host.

323. Secondly: because otherwise a new miracle would be performed every time a priest moves the host, because this moving could not be done, nor the truth of the Eucharist preserved, without special divine dispensation.

324. To the first [n.322] I say that the first proposition is false, unless it be understood of that which is in the moved thing either as act in a potency or as part in a whole or as something conjoined by natural necessity (as a heavy thing is conjoined with what it rests on). For if this thing is contingently conjoined with that thing by act of will, when the one moves it will not for this reason move the other. Rather there is need that the will, which is cause of the conjoining, be also cause of the motion of that which is not conjoined by any natural necessity to the moved thing. So it is in the matter at issue. And the thing is plain from the example about the angel; for what moves the stone per se does not for this reason move the angel per accidens.

325. To the second [n.323] I say that there is no new miracle, because God, by the same miracle by which he instituted the Eucharist in the Church, has determined to make the body of Christ always present to the species after consecration. And therefore, as long as the species, however it is moved, remains, God's making Christ's body to be present with the presence of something else (speaking of presence with respect to what contains a thing, the way the species, as primarily contained in place, has different presences) is not a new miracle but the previous determination of the divine will. Just as if an angel had determined that he would always be with this stone, his being moved with the movement of the stone would not be said to be a miraculous operation by the angel. Nor yet would he who moves the stone move the angel by his action, but the angel would move by his own will.

e. Proof of the Fifth Conclusion

326. The fifth conclusion is proved by the proof that was set down about absolute form, in both the first question and the second question of this part [nn.247, 279]: because an absolute is not varied by variation in an extrinsic respect, nor does it cease to be because of a new respect coming from outside. And there is the same reasoning about an absolute in being as about an absolute in coming to be.

327. This conclusion can be proved in particular by running through the changes that are changes to absolute form.

First then about alteration, because if the body is primarily hot in its natural existence it is concomitantly hot in the sacrament, according to what everyone concedes.

328. Likewise about increase and decrease, because if a part of quantity were to come to the body or depart from the body in its natural existence, it would similarly come to it and depart from it in the Eucharist, because the body has the same parts in one mode of existing as it has in another, from the first question of this part [nn.246-247].

329. Likewise about nutrition, because nutrition is the addition of a part to the whole thing to be nourished, but no part can be added here that is not added there.

330. In the same way about the diminution and corruption opposite to nutrition; if a part is lost from the body in its natural existence, it does not remain a part of the body in the sacrament, nor conversely. And yet I do not say that, if the body were corrupted in its natural existence, it would for this reason be corrupted in the Eucharist. Here one must note that corruption is properly speaking separation of the form from the matter, which matter remains afterwards in a state of privation of form.

331. But if the body were corrupted in its natural existence it would not remain as matter without form in the Eucharist.

332. I explain this as follows, that the soul first perfects what is first perfectible by it, namely the whole organic body; but the soul only perfects the parts of the body because they are some part of what is first perfectible; therefore, when the form of the whole organic body ceases, nothing is formed by the soul.

333. In the same way universally, when something belongs first to a whole and to a part only because it belongs to the whole, then with the destruction of the whole in its ordering to this something, the part does not have the same ordering to it. But now the first thing signified by the Eucharist is the body composed of matter and form (whether body includes the blood or not, I do not care; this was touched on in question one of this part [nn.215-217]). Therefore, when any whole under the idea of what is first signified no longer remains, nothing of what it is as per se signified remains.

334. But when the form is separated from the matter in its natural existence, that which is first signified does not remain in the Eucharist, because then the matter would have and not have the form at the same time. Therefore, at that moment nothing at all of the thing signified remains. For the matter does not remain under the form, because this would be a contradiction. Nor does the matter remain without any form, because it is not contained here save because it is part of a whole. Nor does matter under any other form remain, because it would have and not have that other form at the same time.

335. On the contrary: it was conceded before, in question one of this part [nn.223-235], that the thing of the Eucharist could remain although the body would nowhere have its natural existence; indeed when it is posited that it would be corrupted in its natural existence. Therefore, although the body would be corrupted in that natural existence, it does not follow that it could not remain truly the same as it is the thing of the Eucharist.

336. I reply that the ceasing to be of the body in its natural existence can be whole and total, as if there were annihilation; and there would truly be annihilation if the body were not anywhere; however, the same whole would remain here in another mode of existence. But if there is corruption there, it is partial destruction, namely separation of part from remaining part, and the separation cannot be there without the existence of a like separation everywhere; nor can the separation stand here with the fact that something of the body is in the sacrament, because nothing of the body is in the sacrament save as it is part of the whole. But a material part, separated from a formal part or from a natural form, is not part of the whole; therefore this inference does not hold, 'if it can cease to be there without ceasing to be here, then it can be corrupted there and not be corrupted here', because the first includes no contradiction; for it only posits that one respect remains in something absolute while the other respect does not; but the second does posit a contradiction, namely that the same absolute form is informing and not informing the same thing, when only a variation in relation has been posited.

337. But if you say that in both places the form does not inform the matter, on the contrary: because it is against the truth of this sacrament that a part of the body is contained in it unless the whole body be first contained in it; and so the matter without form will in no way be contained here, nor consequently will it be able to be corrupted as it is here, although the whole could be corrupted as it is here, because the matter cannot be changed as it is here from form to privation, which change is what is meant by

corruption; rather ‘matter ceasing to have form’ is its ceasing to be part of the whole, and consequently ceasing to be as it is here.¹⁵

3. Synthesis of the Statements Made

338. From the first two conclusions is clear how the body of Christ, as it is here, could be moved first (with motion properly speaking) and by what.

339. From the third and fourth conclusions is plain how the body of Christ as it is here could be moved first, with motion taken in extended sense, and by what.

340. From the fifth and sixth is plain how it could be moved concomitantly and with what motion and by what mover.

II. To the Initial Arguments

341. As to the first reason [n.298], although it be said that Christ’s body was wounded on the cross and not in the pyx, yet I reply that wounding can be taken for the formal division of parts of something continuous, or for the division itself as inflicted by a body [sc. weapon] as it there enters and divides the parts of a body.

If in the first way then the body would have been divided in the pyx just as it was on the cross, provided the argument is made that “continuity and non-continuity cannot be preserved because there are different ‘wheres’.”

If in the second way, it is true, because the division was not made in the body first as it is in the pyx. Also, there would have been this division of parts of the body in the pyx by comparing it to the whole of which they are parts, but not by comparing it to the containing place, because the divided parts would not have had ‘wheres’ spatially distant as the divided parts on the cross did. And the reason is that the parts of the body on the cross had bodily extension corresponding to the extension of the containing place; and therefore to the division of them in the whole there corresponded a distinction in the parts of the containing place. But the parts are not like this in the Eucharist; hence the parts there, divided and discontinuous as in the whole, would not have had distinct parts of the containing place corresponding to them.

342. Hereby can be solved an argument that is made to the second part, because if fluid could be in two places, here in a sealed jar and there in a perforated jar, it would as a result remain continuous here but flow out there – I reply that the parts, in comparison with the whole, would have continuity here and there in the same way; but in comparison with the container, they could have the corresponding continuity of the container here, and an unlike corresponding continuity there.

343. As to the second reason about nutrition [n.299], it is plain that it would have belonged to the body as it exists in both places, taking ‘nutrition’ for adding a part of substance to the whole nourished thing. But from this does not follow a bodily change of the body first as it is here, because the change would not be by nutriment nearby to the body as the body is here, but the change would only be here concomitantly, because of the conversion elsewhere of nutriment that was nearby elsewhere, and because of the

¹⁵ A proof of the sixth conclusion is not offered because the conclusion is already plain from what was said in proof of the first and second conclusions [nn.313-314], and will be plain from the response to the fourth initial argument [n.345].

identity of the substance here and there, which substance must have the same parts everywhere.

344. As to the third [n.300], it is plain how and by what Christ's body is moved, taking motion in the extended sense in the third conclusion [nn.309, 315].

345. As to the fourth [n.301] I concede what it proves, namely that the body can be absolutely moved first there with a bodily motion strictly speaking. But it cannot be so moved by anyone, but by God immediately as was said in the second conclusion [nn.308, 314]; and not by anyone else, even concomitantly, because a created agent, in order to change a body, needs to have it nearby, while God can act on a body however much it exists without location in place; for God's power has regard to a passive subject absolutely according as it is receptive of the term [of action]; but God's power does not regard it precisely in the accidental conditions of closeness or distance in place, which are necessary for any natural agent.

346. Here one needs to understand, following the argument about nutrition [n.343], that if a body is only nourished here concomitantly, because it is nourished first elsewhere, and its nutrition is necessary for the preservation of natural life, then the body cannot continue in life here without concomitantly continuing in life elsewhere. And from this follows that if it were nowhere else in natural mode then either it would die from lack of already digested nutriment, or it would remain perpetually in mortal life without taking in nutriment. Note, therefore, that if it were nowhere located in place but only existed sacramentally, it would remain there perpetually in the same way of being in which it had begun to be there. For it could no more die there than it could be nourished there. Therefore it would be possible for a body here to live, in some mode of being, with mortal life and yet do so immortally without also taking in food and without breathing and without having the other things that are commonly required for mortal life.

Third Part: On the Action that can Belong to Christ Existing in the Eucharist

347. About the third main topic [n.6] I ask three things: first about the natural active virtue in the Eucharist, namely whether Christ existing in the Eucharist could change by any natural virtue something other than himself; second about his action on the intellective power as object of it, namely whether any created intellect could naturally see the existence of Christ in the Eucharist; third, about his action on the senses as object of them, whether any sense could perceive the body of Christ as it is in the Eucharist or perceive the existence there of the body of Christ.

Question One

*Whether Christ Existing in the Eucharist could, by some Natural Virtue, Change
Something Other than Himself*

348. As to the first question, argument is made that he could:

Because, according to the Philosopher *Metaphysics* 5.12.1020a4-6, 11.1.1046a9-11, "active power is the principle of changing another thing insofar as it is other;" but Christ in the Eucharist has active power because he has every absolute form that he has in his natural existence; therefore he has in the Eucharist the principle for changing things.

But he who has the principle for changing things could do so through it, just as he could become a force for the gerundive ‘changing’, according to what was said in *Rep.* IA d.7 q.2 nn.61-62.

349. Again, a man living with mortal life is always being nourished, *On Generation* 1.5.322a24; but the body of Christ in the Eucharist would have lived with mortal life while Christ was mortal; therefore it was always being nourished; therefore nutriment would always be being converted into the body’s substance. Therefore it would always be acting.

350. Again, a man living with mortal life always needs to breathe air in and out; the point is plain, because suffocation, whether in water or in air, always happens because of a deficiency of this sort (as is clear from *On Respiration* 16.478b15-16). The body of Christ, as above [n.349], lived here with mortal life; therefore it is continually breathing air in and out. But these are actions; therefore etc.

351. Again, Christ as he is in the Eucharist has the same power of moving as he has in heaven, and that power is not impeded here; therefore Christ can, by that power, issue here in act, and consequently move his body with local motion.

352. On the contrary:

“Everything acting physically suffers reaction,” *Physics* 3.1.201a23-24; the body of Christ, as it is here, cannot suffer physically; therefore neither can it act.

353. Secondly as follows: a body acting on another body requires determinate closeness in place to the other body; the body of Christ is not here by way of location in place; rather, as regard every relation to another body, it is here as if it were not here, because it does not occupy place.

I. To the Question

A. About Human Powers

354. I reply:

As man is a composite of soul and body, so he has certain purely spiritual powers, which belong first to the soul and yet per se to the whole through the soul, as are the powers of intellect and will.

355. He also has certain bodily powers, namely which do not belong to the soul per se but to the whole thing conjoined of body and soul (from the beginning of *On Sense and Thing Sensed* 1.436a1-b8). And the things that belong to the conjunct whole are some more bodily, namely those that follow the nature of this sort of mixed body, and some closer to the nature of the soul, namely those that follow the whole animate body insofar as it is such.

B. Conclusions Flowing Herefrom

356. Reply, then, must be made about these powers in order, supposing that some here and there are active.

1. First Conclusion and its Proof

357. And let the first conclusion be that Christ in the Eucharist cannot use any bodily active power, whether it be merely bodily (namely what follows the nature of this sort of mixed body) or bodily in the sense of following first or immediately the animate whole.

358. The proof is briefly that all bodily active powers require that the passive object, on which they act, be close to them in location. These powers, as they are here [sc. in Christ's body in the Eucharist] are not anywhere by location; therefore they cannot, as they are here, have a passive subject close to them in the way required for the action of such powers. The major proposition is plain from *Physics* 7.1.242b24-26, where it is proved that a bodily agent must be close to the passive subject, whether mediately or immediately.

2. Second Conclusion and its Proof

359. The second conclusion is that Christ in the Eucharist can use any spiritual active power.

360. This proof is through the opposite middle term [n.358], that a spiritual power does not require for action that it be located in place; for although what acts through a spiritual power is located in place yet there is no requirement that it be located there in place in order to do what it does.

a. Explication of the Second Conclusion

361. Now explaining this second conclusion specifically I say that Christ as he is in the Eucharist can have a merely spiritual action, namely both on the part of the principle of acting and on the part of the term of the action. He can also have an action spiritual on the part of the principle of acting but bodily on the part of the term of the action.

362. The first of these claims I prove because if some angel were present to Christ in the Eucharist, the soul of Christ could enlighten the angel and speak to him in mental speech, in the way that an angel existing where Christ is present could enlighten another angel or speak to him. For this enlightening and speaking only require an active principle sufficient for enlightening and speaking, and an able subject on the side of him who is illumined or to whom speech is made. And perhaps there is required closeness in definite 'where', or a simple closeness of the enlightener to the enlightened or of the speaker to the one spoken to. And their presence there in place is not required, just as neither is it if an angel were to speak to another. Now all this is included in the matter at issue.

363. But as to how Christ has a principle of enlightening angels and speaking intellectually to them, let it be supposed from *Ord.* III d.14 nn.80-83.

364. The second claim [n.362], namely that he can have an action spiritual on the part of the principle yet bodily on the part of the term, is made clear as follows, because an angel has a power, a non-organic power, of moving in place. The point is plain because an angel cannot have any organic power; the non-organic power can be a principle of moving a body as a whole, not as to the parts in the way our body is moved organically; but any intellectual soul has such a power; therefore it can be the principle of such motion; and consequently it is merely spiritual on the part of the principle, because

it is in no way organic, and yet it is bodily on the part of the term, because its term is the local motion of a body in place.

b. Objection to the Aforesaid Explanation, and Rejection of this Objection

365. And if it is argued [Godfrey of Fontaines] that then the soul of man has a twofold active power of moving in regard to a body in place (namely it has one organic power, as is plain, and besides this it has, for you, this non-organic power); but to posit this twofold power seems superfluous, first because both powers seem to be of the same nature, second because one of them cannot issue in act in our present state (as is manifest); – I reply that just as the soul is like an angel in many other respects, so too is it in respect of non-organic power to move a body. For there is no reason why this substance [sc. the soul] does not have this sort of power of moving a body. And universally, no substance should be denied something that would be a perfection in it unless it is plainly manifest that such perfection is repugnant to it; for, according to the Philosopher, *On Generation* 2.10.336b27-29, “nature is always to be considered worthy of what is better, as far as possible.”

366. And when you argue that the powers would be of the same nature [n.365], I deny it, for this non-organic power that moves the whole body at once, not in ordered parts the way an animal body moves limbs in forward progress – this non-organic power, I say, is of a different nature from the power of progression, because this power has the action of moving the whole body immediately, not part after part. But the other power cannot move the whole save by orderly movement of parts, and of part after part, just as now the power of progression first moves some parts, then others through them. and then the whole body. The two powers, therefore, are of different nature, because of parts that are of different nature.

367. To the second point, when you say that this non-organic power is vain, because no act of it can now be possessed [n.365], I say that we now posit taste and the other senses as necessary for the perfection of human nature, and yet there is no need for all of them to exist in their own act, nor to exist precisely in their own act in beatitude. But they are not vain, because they belong to the natural perfection of that in which they are. If therefore those senses are not vain whose use is vain for the state that is simply the perfect state of human nature (but their possible use is precisely for this [present] unnatural state), much more will the non-organic power of moving not be vain, although the use of it now will not be able to be possessed – but its use will be perpetual in beatitude, because not only will the blessed then be able to move their body progressively (that is, by moving one part first, and then another through it, and then the whole), but they will also be able to move their body in ‘where’ at once and immediately without such ordered motion of parts. More about this below, in the discussion of agility [*Ord.* IV d.49 suppl. p.2 q.5].

3. Final Opinion

368. I suppose, then, that this non-organic power of moving is in the soul of Christ, because it is also in the soul of each of the blessed, and not as to habit only but

also as to act or possibility of use. He will also be able to use this power immediately, by moving some body as a whole in itself, as an angel could move it.

369. Perhaps Christ also used this power in this life, as when he escaped the hands of the Jews who, taking him up to the mountain “on which their city was set,” wanted to throw him down headlong [*Luke* 4.29-30]. Also when he slipped away from the hands of his parents and “remained in Jerusalem” [*Luke* 2.40-50], as is plain from Origen *Homily on Luke* 19, “when Jesus was 12 years old,” and it is read in the homily for the octave of Epiphany.

370. Therefore the soul of Christ as existing in the Eucharist will be able to use this motive power, by moving the species or the host – and perhaps thus is the host sometimes moved by Christ existing immediately there.

371. And if you ask, “Surely he first moved his body by this motive power before moving the host?” – I reply that this was not necessary, just as it is not necessary that an angel first move himself in place so as to move in place a body made close to him.

II. To the Initial Arguments

372. To the first argument [n.348] I say that the description of power that is ‘a principle of changing’ needs to be understood as far as concerns the power itself; but many impediments can come up or run together (either on the part of him who has the power or on the part of the object or of the medium), because of which he who has the power cannot issue in act.

373. Now if this gerund ‘changing’ is weighed according to what was said in *Ord* I d.7 n.212, about the power of generating, I say that it must be understood as far as concerns that power; but it does not follow that nothing could impede the actual changing.

To the second [n.349] I say that the body as it is here is nourished if it is nourished in its natural existence. But it does not follow that therefore it acts as it is here, because nutrition is only the added generation of a part of the nourished substance, and this added generation can be through the action of the nutritive power either as it is here or as it is elsewhere.

374. Likewise as to the third, about respiration etc. [n.350], I say that the body of Christ as it is here does not breathe air out or in, for then it would be necessary to posit some air as being here together with the body of Christ under the host. But yet the body of Christ as it is here has a cooled lung as it does elsewhere in its natural existence, because cold caused by the air drawn in there is caused concomitantly here, although not first.¹⁶

375. As to the fourth [n.351] I say that the motive power of Christ that is organic and bodily, although it is in the body of Christ as it is here, yet cannot be the principle of his action in the body as it is here, because it requires part next to part, not only in the whole but in reference to the location, so that through the motion of one part it might move in place another part. But that other motive power, the non-organic one, can be in action here as in heaven, and so he can in accordance with it move a body that is next to him, just as an angel could. But nevertheless he cannot move his body as it is here,

¹⁶ As noted before, Scotus is following the Aristotelian view that breathing is for cooling the body to balance the heat from the heart.

because his body in this way of being is not subject to any motive power save immediately to divine power, as was said above [n.370].

Question Two

Whether any Created Intellect could Naturally See the Existence of Christ's Body in the Eucharist

376. Proceeding thus to the second question [n.347], it seems that no created intellect could naturally see the body of Christ as it exists in the Eucharist.

First because that existence is supernatural and consequently a supernatural truth; therefore it is knowable only supernaturally; therefore not by any intellect naturally. The proof of this last consequence is that a supernatural makeable can only be made supernaturally by a supernatural cause; therefore, by similarity, a supernatural knowable cannot be known by anyone naturally.

377. Again, the knowledge of faith is simply more eminent than all natural knowledge; but about the existence of Christ's body in the Eucharist there is faith or the knowledge of faith (as about other articles), according to the article "holy Catholic Church;"¹⁷ therefore etc. The proof of the major is that otherwise there would be no necessity for faith to be simply infused, because, unless that knowledge were simply more eminent than all natural knowledge, nature would be able to attain it.

378. Again, if the intellect could naturally know the existence of Christ's body in the Eucharist, the bad angels could know it, because Dionysius *Divine Names* 4 says that their natural powers remain in them complete; the consequent is false, because the enemies of grace cannot know the sacrament of grace.

379. And this is confirmed by Ambrose *On Luke* II n.3 "was sent," because, according to him, the mystery of the Incarnation was hidden from the malign spirit; but that malign spirit would be equally able to perceive the Incarnation as the existence of Christ in the Eucharist, since the former would be naturally knowable for the same reason the latter was.

380. This is also confirmed by Damascene *Orthodox Faith* ch.86, where he says speaking of this sacrament, "Now this operation of the Spirit, which works supernaturally, which only faith can grasp..." and a little later, "You ask how the bread becomes the body of Christ? I tell you: the Holy Spirit comes over it and does what is above reason and intellect."

381. Again, no intellect can naturally know a future contingent; but this thing, namely that the body of Christ is under the Eucharist, is as undetermined as is a future contingent, because it depends purely on the divine will contingently disposed to it; therefore etc.

382. On the contrary:

The soul of Christ naturally knows that it is everywhere it is, and consequently knows that it is in the Eucharist; and so it can naturally know the existence with which (by reason of itself and the body) it is there.

383. Again, existence is not more excellently knowable than the existing thing of which it is the existence; but Christ is naturally knowable by a created intellect; therefore

¹⁷ As St. Bonaventure *Sent.* III d.25 a.1 q.1 ad 3, "The belief that the body of Christ is on the altar is better reduced to the article about the unity of the Church, as is also faith about the other sacraments."

his existence is naturally knowable too. The proof of the first proposition is that no mode of knowing can exceed beyond measure that of which it is the mode.

384. Again, the blessed naturally see the beatific act in another blessed, and yet the blessedness is not less supernatural than the existence of Christ's body in the Eucharist; therefore etc. The major is plain, because although a blessed not see the blessedness of another blessed in the Word, nor in himself nor in any special revelation, yet he can see that another is blessed, just as he can see another's soul, or an angel or another angel's essence, because the blessedness of an angel does not exceed his natural intellect more than the soul itself does.

I. To the Question

A. Opinion of Thomas Aquinas and Richard of Middleton

385. Here it is said [Aquinas, Richard] that the existence of Christ's body in the Eucharist cannot be naturally known by the intellect of a wayfarer, because it is the object of faith. However it can well be known by the blessed, and that too in the beatific act, because things known obscurely, that is, by a wayfarer, are succeeded in blessedness by clear vision.

386. The same in substance as the first point above [n.385] is said in another way but for a different reason, namely that the natural light does not reach to knowledge of this existence.

387. There is disagreement on the second point [sc. the knowledge of the blessed, n.385], because it is said [Richard] that the blessed are able not only to see this existence in the Word but also in its proper genus. For although this mode of existence exceeds the faculty of the natural light, yet it does not exceed the faculty of the light of glory. And therefore, although no created intellect left to its natural light could see this way of existing, yet the intellect aided by the light of glory will be able to see it. Hence he says [Richard] that the mode of existence of the body of Christ under the sacrament and everything that belongs to faith is seen clearly by any blessed intellect not only in the Word, but also in the vision that is said to be vision in its proper genus.

388. And note that Richard does not prove that vision of this sort in the Word or in its proper genus is in the blessed, but he says "I believe", and this is his proof.

B. Scotus' own Opinion

1. On the Acceptation of the Terms 'Intellect', 'To see', 'Naturally'

389. I reply to the question by first expounding these three terms: 'intellect', 'to see', 'naturally'.

390. For a created intellect is either altogether separate from matter, as an angelic intellect, or similar to it in its operation, namely the intellect of the separated soul and the intellect of the soul joined to a blessed body, which are like angels in operation (as I assume here, and it will be proved below [nn.398-400]); or it is a created intellect joined to a corruptible body, which 'weighs down the soul' *Wisdom* 9.15. And this last intellect only understands things that are imaginable or that are displayed in phantasms of what is imaginable, from *On the Soul* 3.7.431a14-b2.

391. By the term ‘naturally’ is not meant that the intellect can of its own nature know the object, for the intellect is like a blank slate which can know nothing of itself alone, *ibid.* 3.4.429b30-430a2. But what is meant is that the intellect naturally knows that which it can know with the concurrence of its natural causes, namely the active and passive intellect.

392. Now ‘to see’ brings in intuitive intellection as it is distinguished from abstractive intellection; and, as was said elsewhere [*Ord.* II d.3 nn.318-323, III d.14 nn.107-118], intuitive intellection is knowledge of a thing as it is in itself present; abstractive intellection can be of a thing as it is displayed in some likeness, which can be of the thing as existing or as non-existing, or as present or non-present.

393. The question, then, is not about ‘understanding naturally’ but about ‘seeing [naturally]’ because, when one is speaking of abstractive understanding or intellection, it is manifest that the intellect can naturally understand the body of Christ. For it is impossible to form or conceive any proposition whose terms are not conceived, but it is possible for our intellect to conceive this proposition ‘the body of Christ is in the Eucharist’, otherwise it could not form it. Therefore our intellect can, in some intellection, understand both this proposition and its terms.

394. And if you ask how Christ’s body or its existence in the Eucharist can be known by us by abstraction, I reply that Augustine teaches, *On the Trinity* 8.4 n.7, how we have faith about Christ, although, however, we have not seen Christ, namely that we do so (according to Augustine) in certain general intentions or concepts taken from singulars, as he teaches there at large. For it makes no difference to our faith whether we err in certain sensible conditions we have conceived about Christ, since our faith does not per se regard those proper conditions, but it regards an individual man, knowledge of whom can come to be in us from knowledge of any individual man. So too the existence of Christ’s body here could have come to be in us from some other existence, as the existence of something else contained in a container or signified in a sign or covered with a covering.

Now it is about ‘seeing’, that is, about intuitive knowledge of this existence, that the question here is being moved.

2. Solution Consisting of Three Conclusions

a. First Conclusion

396. And let the first conclusion be that our intellect in our state as wayfarers cannot naturally see the body of Christ as existing there in the Eucharist.

397. The proof of this is that an intellect that understands only from things sensible understands from these sensibles in the same way in which the sensibles are present to it; our intellect is of this sort for now, and sensibles are present to it in the same way before Christ’s body is there in the Eucharist as they are present to it afterwards; therefore etc. But our intellect does not see Christ’s body intuitively before, because that body is not there before; therefore it does not see it intuitively afterwards either.

b. Second Conclusion

398. The second conclusion is about an intellect not tied to sensible things in its understanding, and it is this: every such intellect, whether angelic or belonging to the separated soul or to a man in bliss, can naturally see the existence of Christ's body in the Eucharist.

399. The proof is that an intellect disposed to intelligible things as they are intelligible in themselves understands first what is intelligible in itself first and consequently what is in itself a being first, because "as each thing is disposed to being, so is it disposed to truth," that is, to intelligibility, according to Aristotle *Metaphysics* 2.1.993b30-31. Now such an intellect [sc. one not tied to sensible things in its understanding] has regard to the whole of being, that is, to everything at all in the order of its intelligibility. But substance, in knowability just as in being, is first, prior to any accidental mode of the substance; therefore such an intellect understands substance first, prior to any mode of it, and consequently no mode under substance can prevent such an intellect's understanding of substance.

400. The argument here is briefly as follows: an accidental mode in a per se object does not prevent knowledge of that object. The presence of Christ's body in the Eucharist is an accidental mode of the substance of Christ's body. Therefore, it does not prevent that substance from being known by an intellect whose per se object substance is. But it is the per se object of the abstract intellect that does not depend on sensible things in its understanding.

401. You will say [Aquinas, Richard, nn.385-386] that these points prove that such substance of Christ's body could be known by such an intellect but not intuitively seen by it, because that existence is supernatural and consequently not proportioned to any created intellect as such intellect naturally knows.

402. First against the conclusion and then against the reason.

403. To the first point in two ways:

First, because an intellect able to know an object intuitively while the object is present can know its absence while it is absent (as is plain from *On the Soul* 2.10.422a20-22, because we know by vision not only light but also darkness); such an abstract intellect can know the presence of bread when bread is present, because this is not a supernatural object; therefore it can know the bread's absence when bread is absent. And the reason whereby it can thus know the absence of the substance of the body of bread is reason too whereby it can know the presence of the substance of the body of Christ; for that body in itself is an object proportioned to such intellect in its act of intuiting. Therefore, the accidental mode of the body does not prevent it being an intuitable object for the same intellect.

404. The argument here is briefly as follows, that the whole of created being, as it is an object proportioned to such intellect as to abstractive knowledge, so also as to intuitive knowledge; for intuitive knowledge differs from abstractive knowledge only because of a different presence of the object; anything therefore that can be an object proportioned to the intellect in this presence can be an object proportioned to it also in that presence. If therefore any being can be abstractively known by such an intellect when present to it in one way, can as a result be intuitively known by the same intellect when perfectly present to it in its actual proper existence.

405. Also, against the reason for this response about the supernatural [nn.401-402] I argue as follows: that natural and supernatural do not distinguish the nature of

anything in itself but only in relation to the agent (since for this reason is something called supernatural, because it is from a supernatural agent, and natural because from a natural agent); but a relation to different agents does not necessarily prove that something is different in itself, according to Augustine *On the Trinity* 3.9 nn.16-19; therefore it does not necessarily prove that it is different in idea of being intelligible.

406. This is plain because an imperfect being could be supernatural and something natural could be much more perfect than it, just as any substance is more perfect than any accident, *Metaphysics* 7.1.1028a10-b2, and yet in a substance that is purely a natural being there can be an accident that is supernatural.

407. This is also plain because the theological virtues (as charity and the like) are in a determinate species of quality, and, according to many [Aquinas, Godfrey of Fontaines, Giles of Rome, Robert Kilwardby], an angel naturally has the principles for knowing all the species of beings; therefore an angel naturally has the principles for knowing these virtues, although they are supernatural beings.

c. Third Conclusion

408. The third conclusion is that a blessed intellect in no way sees through the beatific act the body of Christ in the Eucharist.

409. The proof is that someone blessed is only distinguished from someone not blessed in seeing the beatific object as it is the beatific object, and seeing the things that are included in it as it is such an object. But the body of Christ as it is in the Eucharist is not such an object (as is plain) nor is it included in the beatific object (it is plain). For it belongs equally naturally to the beatific object to include the thing of one sacrament in the idea of the seen object as to include the thing of another (just as it belongs equally to the truth of faith to believe the truth of one article as the truth of another). But it in no way belongs to the beatific object to include in the idea of what is displayed the conferring of grace on a child in baptism, or the conferring of grace on the penitent in confession – and these conferrings are equally truly included in these sacraments as the body of Christ is included in the Eucharist. Therefore in no way does the beatific object, as it is such object, include the body of Christ as a thing seen in the Eucharist.

410. I add further to this that much less is it required for beatitude that the blessed see the existence of the body of Christ in its proper genus, because much less is such perfection of vision required for beatitude than the perfection of vision in the Word.

II. To the Initial Arguments

411. As to the first argument [n.376]: if you argue uniformly ‘it is a supernatural being, therefore it is a supernatural knowable’ such that supernaturality refers to the same thing in antecedent and consequent, I concede the consequence, because supernaturality is referred to the entity in the consequent as in the antecedent; but then it does not follow that ‘therefore it can only be supernaturally known’; for this only follows if ‘supernatural’ refers to knowability.

412. But if you understand in the consequent, when ‘supernatural knowable’ is said, that ‘supernatural’ refers to knowability, I deny the consequence ‘it is a supernatural being, therefore it is a supernatural knowable’, because in the antecedent the

‘supernatural’ states relation to its cause, from which it can receive being. But¹⁸ although it might only be able to receive being from a supernatural cause, yet it can be knowable naturally, because however much a thing may be supernaturally put into being, yet after it has been put into being it is a certain natural thing, that is, proportioned to a naturally knowing or naturally cognitive power.

413. Hence is plain the response to the adduced proof that ‘a supernatural makeable is not naturally makeable, therefore a supernatural knowable is not naturally knowable’, because if ‘supernatural’ in each place determines per se what it is added to, the consequent can be conceded like the antecedent, and then the minor that ‘this existence is a supernatural knowable’ is false. But if ‘supernatural’ does not determine per se what it is added to but something else implied, as ‘[makeable/knowable] being’, the consequence is not valid. For in the antecedent ‘supernatural’ per se determines this being under the idea of makeable and so is repugnant to what is meant by ‘to be made naturally’, while in the consequent ‘spiritual’ does not determine the knowable but the ‘to be made’, and so is not repugnant to it being known naturally.¹⁹

414. To the second [n.377] I say that this proposition is false, namely ‘whatever is known by faith exceeds whatever is knowable naturally’ when speaking of what is knowable by abstract intellect. But it is true when speaking of what is knowable naturally by our intellect in our present state as wayfarers; and therefore faith in it [sc. Christ’s body in the Eucharist] is necessary for us but not for the abstract intellect.

415. The reason for this denial is plain enough, because angels were intuitively able naturally to know Christ suffering and dying, just as they were able to know naturally his being alive with human life, but we have knowledge of faith about the death. Now the angels’ intuitive knowledge was much more perfect than our obscure knowledge about the same object. Thus do I speak about the existence of Christ’s body in the Eucharist.

416. As to the third argument about the bad angels [n.378], I say that, if any bad angel be permitted to use his natural cognitive power, he could understand any created intelligible thing, and consequently could understand the thoughts of hearts and the mysteries of grace as soon as they are posited in fact. But, as the Master says in *Sent.* II d.7 ch.10, angels can do many things of their nature that are not permitted to them; and so the supposition is made that a bad angel is not permitted to see the secrets of the heart. And in this way, and in no other, could he see the body of Christ in the Eucharist. Thus too must one suppose that bad angels are not permitted to see the mysteries of grace.

¹⁸ Reading ‘autem’ rather than ‘aliud’ at line 921.

¹⁹ The argument is ‘a supernatural makeable is not naturally makeable, therefore a supernatural knowable is not naturally knowable’. So if, first, the latter clause or consequent means ‘a knowable only supernaturally is not a knowable naturally’ (as the former clause or antecedent means ‘a makeable only supernaturally is not a makeable naturally’) then the consequence can be allowed but the minor premise to complete the inference ‘this existence [of Christ’s body in the Eucharist] is a supernatural knowable’ is false. For it now means ‘this existence is knowable only supernaturally’ but in fact, despite being made supernaturally, this existence could still be knowable naturally (just as the world was supernaturally made but is naturally knowable to human beings). If, second, the term ‘being’ or ‘thing’ is added to the consequence so that it reads: ‘a supernatural makeable thing is not a natural makeable thing, so a supernatural knowable thing is not a natural knowable thing’, then the consequent is not about knowability but about makeability (as is also the antecedent). For the sense is ‘a knowable thing made supernaturally is not a knowable thing made naturally’, which is true but says nothing about whether what is thus made supernaturally is knowable naturally or not.

417. And in this way must the authority of Ambrose be understood about the mystery of the Incarnation [n.379] – not absolutely, such that no bad angel could see or know the integrity of Mary, both in mind and in body, as he can know just as well the touch of finger on finger or any intellect’s natural intellection. But he was not permitted to do so for definite reasons, so that our redemption might not be impeded. “For if they had known, they would never have crucified the Lord of glory” [*I Corinthians* 2.8], that is, they would never have procured my redemption by his death.

418. As to the confirmation from Damascene [n.380], I say that he is speaking about us in this present state, although one doctor [William of Ware] says that he is speaking both of angels and of us. But this cannot be true when speaking of the natural power of the angelic intellect (as was proved in the second conclusion of the solution [n.398]), but only of his power as he is permitted; and this about the evil angel.

419. As to the fourth [n.381] I say that a contingent thing as contingent, namely while it is in its cause, cannot be known by a created intellect. But to whatever extent something exists contingently in its cause, yet, after it has been contingently posited in existence, there can be determinate knowledge of it just as it now has determinate being, and that in any intellect that has regard to the whole of being. Therefore, although some intellect not be able to foreknow that the body of Christ will be contained in this host, yet once this has been done in fact, an intellect can very well naturally intuit Christ’s body existing there.

III. To the Arguments for the Opinion of Aquinas and Richard

420. To the argument for the opinion.

As to the point about faith [n.385], it has been answered [nn.408-410].

421. As to the proof that then the habit of faith would not be necessary [n.385], I say that it is necessary for us, because our intellect, which gets its understanding from sensible things, can get nothing whereby to assent to such truth; and therefore a habit inclining it to assent is required. But another intellect, which regards the whole of being intuitively (and so this being too), can well have assent about this from the ideas intuitively seen of the terms; and therefore faith is not necessary for it.

422. When it is added that vision succeeds to faith [n.385], I say that this is true of the principal object of faith, which is God three and one, but it is not true of all the other things in respect of which there is faith. Otherwise the blessed ought to see in the Word that grace has been conferred in baptism, in penance, and in confirmation. The blessed would also always see in the Word the Incarnation of the Word, and his nativity and passion etc., which are not necessary (whether to be seen in the Word or in themselves) for someone to be blessed. Nor is it necessary in this way for the truth of the other sacraments or matters of faith to be always seen in the Word in order for some intellect to be simply blessed.

Question Three

Whether any Sense could Perceive the Body of Christ as it exists in the Eucharist

423. Proceeding thus to the third question [n.347], it is argued that the existence of Christ’s body in the Eucharist could be seen by a bodily eye.

First because the blessed, when seeing the species [of bread and wine], are not deceived, for deception is repugnant to blessedness. But if they were not to see the body of Christ, they could be deceived in believing the substance of bread to be there; therefore etc. At least they could be in doubt about whether the substance of bread was there if they did not see the body of Christ. Doubt is repugnant to the state of blessedness, as imperfection is repugnant to perfection.

424. Second, because if there were light at a point it would be seen or would be visible; therefore by parity of reasoning the body of Christ as it is here would be visible. The consequence is plain because Christ's body is not here under the idea being less visible than if it had the form of a point. The proof of the antecedent is, first, because the light would diffuse itself like a sphere and it would be seen as a sphere; second, because reflection starts from a single point of the reflecting body (as is plain in a reflected line, and yet the ray reflected there is diffused first from that first point), but what the reflection comes from is seen.

425. On the contrary:

What is seen is seen in a pyramid whose base is in the thing seen and whose apex is in the eye. Therefore the body of Christ would be seen in such a pyramid. But there is no base for a pyramid at Christ's body because it would be simultaneous with the base where the host would be seen, for Christ's body is everywhere with the host. And then the body of Christ and the host would be seen together from within the same angle, because the angle is the angle of both. But things seen from within the same angle are seen as equal; therefore the body of Christ would be seen as equal with the species. The result would also be that the body of Christ would be seen as round, because the base from which the species is seen is round.

I. To the Question

A. The Opinion of Others

1. Exposition of the Opinion

426. It is stated here [Richard of Middleton, Thomas Aquinas] that a distinction can be drawn between glorious vision and non-glorious vision, and between seeing naturally and seeing miraculously. Neither sort of vision can naturally see the body of Christ in the Eucharist.

427. One reason set down is that there can be no contact there, and without contact there is no natural action in bodies. Now the reason that there cannot be contact there is that the body of Christ does not regard the species under the idea of quantity, but quantity is the only reason for contact.

428. And another reason is that color has regard to quantity as its per se subject; but Christ's body has no ordered relation to place through quantity, and so not through color either. Therefore Christ's body cannot, by any change, affect the medium through color and so it cannot reach vision either.

429. Now another reason is set down, that the species there cannot be derived from the object through a medium, because the object is not located in place; and such deriving is required for sight.

430. Another reason too is added, that the bodily light of glory, of the sort that is posited in the glorified eye, cannot reach an object that does not exist anywhere; therefore it cannot reach Christ's body either, since his body is not, as it is here, in any place.

431. A third added reason is that neither can a miracle raise an eye to knowledge of the body, because the eye cannot be raised to knowledge of the existence of a separate substance; but the body of Christ as it is here has the mode of existence of a separate substance; therefore etc.

2. Refutation of the Opinion

432. Against the first argument [n.426]: an angel is never present to a place save definitively, but it moves in place a body proportionally present to it; and if it had the power to alter it, it would alter the body as it is present here; therefore bodily existence is not required on the part of the angelic mover for him to alter the organ toward sensation.

433. Again, the body of Christ is not present anywhere in the species save in the smallest thing perceptible (for it is not present there to anything indivisible); but the smallest thing perceptible can be perceived by the most perfect sense, according to the Philosopher *On Sense and Sensibles* 6.445b3-11 [Ord. II d.2 n.294]; therefore Christ's body too will be able to be perceived by the most perfect vision, notwithstanding the body's mode of existence here.

434. Against the other point [n.426]: there is no likeness between a separated substance and Christ's body, because Christ's body is a quantum with shape and color, while a separate substance is not.

435. The first argument about contact [n.427] is not probative, because contact, as it states an extrinsic relation of body to body, does not seem required necessarily for any absolute action of the sort that change in the sense power is, because an absolute action seems to be able to precede any such relation coming from outside; therefore although the body as it is here is not in contact with any other body (excluding such relation as comes from outside), it does not follow that it cannot alter anything, that is, change it toward an absolute form of sensation.

436. Against the second reason [n.428]: all that follows is that color does not have an ordering to place in the way that quantity (which is the subject of color) does not have an ordering to place; but this is only because there is no extension proportional to the extension of the quantity of the body. If therefore you infer that color is not extended with the extension of the containing quantum, I concede it. But if you infer that therefore it cannot alter the medium, this does nothing for the minor (sc. the minor that the body has no ordering through quantity to a place, [n.428]).

437. As to the third [n.429] about being derived through a medium, it is disproved through the first response [n.432], because an angel could well have some effect on the passive subject, derived in orderly fashion, according to the parts of that subject, although the angel himself, as agent, would not have a being located in place anywhere.

438. As to what is added about the light of glory [n.430], it is not evident how, because of its non-existence in place, the body could not be attained in idea of object by someone who has such light.

439. As to what is added about a miracle [n.431], the point is not proved. For the existence of this body, although in some respect it is like the existence of an angel, yet it

is not so as to what is sensible and non-sensible, because an angel lacks the principles which are required in an object for an act of sensation, namely quantity and sensible qualities. But this substance [of Christ's body in the Eucharist] has quantity and sensible qualities, although some mode [of being] is taken from them. But it would be necessary to prove that in order for there to be sensation of them this mode was simply a necessity.

B. Scotus' own Opinion

440. To the question, then, one can say that God of his absolute power can cause vision of this body in a glorious or non-glorious eye, even though that body were nowhere save in the Eucharist.

441. The proof is that vision is an absolute form, from *Ord.* I d.3 n.183; therefore it can without contradiction come to be when there is no relation of presence, or any such relation, to the object.

442. Second I say that no vision, even when caused in this way, can be of the body as it is here, because this would include the body as it is here being either the cause of vision or the proper and first term of vision. But the body as it is here cannot be the cause first as it is here, nor can it be the first term as it is here, because such causing and such term require a due disposition in the object that is the first cause and term – and that too as to location and as to due nearness and distance. But this body as it is here cannot have the due nearness to the organ nor the due distance as it is here, because it is not located in place as it is here. And a miracle here does not help, because the body as it is here is absolutely not visible, either as cause or as term of the vision; and there is no miracle for something that includes a contradiction.

II. To the Initial Arguments

443. To the first argument [n.423] I say that our senses too are not deceived about the Eucharist; for they per se perceive what is there, namely quantity, shape, color, and the like; nor is it possible now that our vision is deceived about the Eucharist, but there is only the intellect arguing, from what the senses apprehend, that the substance of bread is there. But this argument is sophistical, because although it happens thus for the most part yet not necessarily.

444. I say therefore that the senses of the blessed might perceive what our senses perceive, namely sensible accidents – nor would they in any way be deceived, just as our senses are not deceived; rather they would be deceived less than our senses are. But neither would the intellect of the blessed argue sophistically from the act of sensing as ours does.

445. To the point about doubt [n.423] I say that the blessed, left to their natural cognition, would not know by an act of sense that Christ's body was here, but only by an act of intellect intuitively seeing that body, as was said about intuitive knowledge in the preceding question [nn.402-404].

446. To the second argument [n.424], that light at a point would not diffuse itself to the bodily organ so as to be visible, according to the common opinion which says that it is not possible for what is indivisible to be moved, from *Physics* 6.4.234b10-20. But this was discussed in *Ord.* II d.2 nn.301-304 about the motion of an angel.

447. And when you prove that it would diffuse itself spherically [n.424], this would have to be denied according to this way; indeed there would be need that it first have quantitative divisibility in itself before it might act on the passive subject.

448. Now the other argument, about the reflection of light from a point [n.424], is not cogent, because the first agent in reflection is not the light at a point that touches the body whence the reflection comes to be (if however light is at a point there), but it is the primary object itself from which the light is diffused; for the same object acts on direct, reflex, and refracted vision. Hence a point, when touching the surface of a mirror, does not diffuse the reflex ray; rather the first luminous thing (which diffuses its light as far as the mirror) immediately diffuses, in the form of a cause, the reflex ray.

449. And the reason is that because a natural agent acts according to the utmost of its power, when it is impeded from acting along the line most agreeable to natural action (namely a straight line, which is the shortest line) it acts along that line as much as it can, namely along a reflected straight line. And this is the reason why an image of the body diffused as far as the mirror is not seen in the mirror, but the body itself is of which it is the image.

Eleventh Distinction

Division of the Text and Overview of the Parts

1. "Now if it is asked..." [Lombard, *Sent.* IV d.11].
2. The Master determined above the truth about the Eucharist as to the sacrament, and the thing of the sacrament, and the use of it. Here he determines the truth about the sacramental consecration, which is as it were the beginning of this sacrament.
3. And there is a division into two parts: for first he makes determination about the act of consecration, and secondly about the matter of consecration.
4. The first part is divided into two: first he determines the truth, and secondly he excludes an error about it.
5. The second part [n.3] is divided into three: for first he makes determination about the matter in general that precedes and accompanies the consecration, namely why there is a different species from the species of the contained thing; second about the matter in particular as to the double species that combine in the sacrament [sc. bread and wine]; third about a certain species that has to be added to the other main species [sc. the water added to the wine].
6. As to this eleventh distinction, then, two main questions must be asked: first about conversion or transubstantiation, and second about the matter fit for transubstantiation or conversion.

First Part: About Conversion or Transubstantiation

7. As to the first question one must first ask about the possibility of transubstantiation, and second about the actuality of it.

First Article: About the Possibility of Transubstantiation

8. As to the possibility of transubstantiation I ask two questions: first whether transubstantiation is possible, and second whether it is possible for anything to be converted into anything.

Question One

Whether Transubstantiation is Possible

9. As to the first question, argument is given that transubstantiation is not possible:

Because transubstantiation is the same as change of substance into substance; but such a change is nothing but generation or corruption, according to the Philosopher, *Physics* 5.1.225a15-18, and neither the one nor the other of these is transubstantiation; therefore transubstantiation is not possible.

10. Again, in the case of every change some common subject remains, from the definition of change in *Physics* 6.4.234b5-17 “to change is to be differently disposed now than before.” The fact is plain from running through all the species of change, *Physics* 5.1.225a7-20. But in transubstantiation nothing common remains; therefore there is no mutation or change; nor can there be anything other than change, because nothing is permanent or also successive other than motion and change (as time and the like); therefore etc.

11. Again, in the case of every change the terms are impossible; but the terms of transubstantiation are not impossible because they can be simultaneous; therefore transubstantiation is not change, and then, as before, nothing else can be posited; therefore etc.

12. On the contrary:

Ambrose *On the Sacraments* (and it is in Gratian *Decretum* p.3 d.2 ch.69), “To give things new natures is not less than to change them.” From this he concludes that, since God could give new natures to things that before did not exist, he could also change nature into nature, and consequently transubstantiate them.

I. To the Question

13. Here one needs to understand that a question about possibility presupposes nothing but what the name signifies. First then, following the procedure about the sacraments kept to above [IV d.1 nn.174, 262, 269], one must look at the idea of the name; second whether something could exist under that idea; third what that something is in particular, as what genus it belongs to, or what species in the genus it could have the nature of.

A. About the Nature or Definition of Transubstantiation

14. On the first point I say that this is the common idea of this name ‘transubstantiation’: transubstantiation is the total transition of substance into substance.

15. First I explain the term ‘total’; for a whole, a totality, is in one way said to be something completed from parts; in another way for any part categorematically or syncategorematically.²⁰

16. Accordingly, there can be a transition of a whole into a whole in two ways:

In one way, when taking ‘whole’ for a whole complete with its parts, according as there succeeds to one whole of parts another whole of parts. And in this way the Philosopher, *On Generation* 1.2.317a20-22, says that generation is the change of a whole into a whole, because the whole of parts that was truly ‘a per se one whole’ does not remain but another whole succeeds to it – not, however, that each part succeeds, because, in his view, the matter remains common.

17. And, by contrast, there is no transition of whole into whole in the case of alteration (because each whole per se one, which precedes the alteration, remains at the term of the alteration), but one whole passes over only in a certain respect, or per accidens, into another whole per accidens (as hot wood passes into cold wood), neither of which is a whole properly speaking but only a whole per accidens, just as it is one per accidens.²¹

18. Now each whole, which, namely, is per se one, and consequently is a whole in the genus of substance, remains the same under each term of this sort of change [sc. alteration, n.17].

19. Hereby is plain that this authority of Aristotle [n.16] does not make anything against the position about the plurality of forms [*Ord.* III d.2 nn.108-113], because however much the first form is posited as remaining (according to material identity) in the generated and corrupted thing, yet the same whole does not remain (even in this way of speaking of whole), because the whole that simply preceded corruption included the specific ultimate form, and that form does not remain in the term of generation but only a part of it does.

20. Therefore was it well said in the definition of transubstantiation [n.14], by way of distinguishing it from transmutation or alteration, not that transubstantiation is the transition of ‘whole into whole’ (for then there could be equivocation over the term ‘whole’²²), but that it is ‘total’ transition.

21. About the second part added to this idea of the name [n.15], that is, ‘substance into substance’, I say that ‘substance’ there is posited in distinction from ‘accident’ – as is manifest, because transition of accident into accident would be called ‘trans-accidentation’ rather than ‘transubstantiation’. But as to what is said about ‘substance into substance’, it must be understood according to the Philosopher in *Physics* 1.6.189a34-b16, that in two ways is something said to come to be from something, namely either from a subject that remains or from a term that is corrupted (for fire comes from the matter of fire in one way, and from air or non-fire in another way, according to him *ibid.*).

²⁰ William of Sherwood, *Syncategoremata*: “A ‘whole’ sometimes states the totality of something according as it is a thing, and it is equivalent to that which is integral or complete, and is a category term [a predicate or subject]. Sometimes it states the totality of something with respect to a predicate and is a syncategorematic term [additional to or modifying predicate or subject], and amounts, as is said, to the same as ‘each part whatever’ and is a sign of universality.”

²¹ Hot wood is a combination of a subject, wood, and a property or accident, hot, and the subject does not change when the wood becomes cold but only the property or accident of heat in the subject.

²² Sc. ‘whole’ could mean ‘whole substance’ (e.g. wood) or ‘whole of substance and accidents’ (e.g. hot wood).

22. The partial transition, then, of substance into substance can be either of a subject passing from term to term [sc. fire coming to be from fire] or of a whole term passing into the opposite term [sc. fire coming to be from air].

23. But in the issue at hand [sc. transubstantiation], when 'total transition' is spoken of, the first understanding is excluded, for nothing common in this case passes from term to term (for then the transition would not be total but partial); so there is only transition of substance into substance as of a term totally ceasing to be into a term (as into a substance) totally beginning to be.

B. Whether there could be Anything under the Idea of Transubstantiation

24. About the second point [n.13] I say first that it is possible for something to exist under this idea of the name [n.14]; second that this is not possible for any active virtue save divine virtue immediately.

25. Proof of the first statement: it is not repugnant to whatever can be totally new that it succeed to something else that can totally cease to be; but some substance can be totally new, as was expounded above [n.23]; 'totally' means not only according to the whole of itself, composed of parts, but also according to anything belonging to it; and the something else can cease to be in the same way. Therefore this new substance can totally succeed to the thing totally ceasing to be, and consequently the former can be totally converted into the latter, and thus be transubstantiated.

26. The assumptions are plain, because neither the total beginning of a substance nor the total ceasing of a substance involve a contradiction, and consequently neither does the total beginning of this toward the total ceasing of that involve a contradiction, and this transition includes transubstantiation.

27. Therefore the first conclusion is true, that transubstantiation is possible.

28. Proof of the second statement [n.24], namely that this is possible for God alone. For he in whose active power is each extreme, both as to total being precisely and as to total non-being precisely, in his active power is also the transition of extreme into extreme, and it belongs precisely to him to convert one into the other. But now the total being of a substance and the total non-being of it fall under active divine virtue and under it alone, because any created virtue requires a subject on which to act. Therefore total transition of substance into substance belongs to this virtue and to this alone.

29. The major and also the whole argument are confirmed through a likeness about partial transition. For he to whose active virtue the partial being and non-being of each extreme are subject, to his virtue is subject the transition of partial extreme into partial extreme (this is plain about generation and corruption, for a virtue that has power over the non-being of a preceding form and over the being of a subsequent form, while another part common to the composite remains, namely the matter, has power over the generation of the latter from the former, and this is partial transition of one into the other). Therefore by similarity, a virtue that has power over the being and non-being of each extreme has power totally over the total transition of one extreme into the other extreme.

C. What Specifically falls under Transubstantiation

1. Opinion of Others

a. Exposition of the Opinion

30. As to the third point [n.13], an answer is given [Richard of Conington, William of Ware] by drawing a distinction between change taken on the part of the subject and change taken on the part of the object. Transubstantiation is not change on the part of the subject but on the part of the object.

31. In favor of the distinction the following probable reason can be given, that a thing can be generated subjectively and a thing can be generated objectively, as was proved in *Ord.* I d.5 nn.59-63; and, by parity of reasoning, generation can be distinguished as taken subjectively and objectively, and consequently change can too.

b. Rejection of the Opinion

32. Against this:

First that the distinction does not accord with the Philosopher, in *Physics* 6.4.234b5-17, “change, or what is changed or can be changed, is what can be disposed differently now than before.” This idea belongs only to the subject, not to the term, because the term is not disposed differently now than before. For if it is the term ‘to which’ it now first exists and so is not disposed differently now than before; if it is the term ‘from which’ it does not now exist, and consequently is not disposed differently now than before. Therefore, nothing changes save subjectively.

33. One response [Henry of Ghent] is that the Philosopher said [*Physics* 5.1.225a25-27] that nothing is produced save from a subject, and therefore change with him requires a subject. But we posit another possible change, and so we can attribute the idea of change to it, though not the one the Philosopher is talking about.

34. Another response [Henry of Ghent] is that if the argument is about the ‘differently’ taken in the definition, that it requires an entity insofar as ‘other’ is a difference of being, as Aristotle says *Metaphysics* 10.3.1054b25 – this is not conclusive because ‘existing now under privation and earlier under form’ is said to be a case of being differently disposed, and yet ‘being under privation’ is not a case of being disposed in the way an entity is disposed, because privation is not an entity. Therefore, from the fact that the term ‘differently’ is used, one cannot conclude that there is some entity common to both terms.

35. Against the first response [n.33]: it is one thing to reject the Philosopher as to the idea of the name and another to do so in positing or not positing the existence of the thing signified. For many things he did not posit that however if he had posited he would have spoken of in agreement with us as to the idea that fits them. But universally, when he posited some proper idea of something, he would have said that it only belonged to that in which the idea was preserved, whatever he would have said about the existence or non-existence of the things to which that idea applied. But now there is in the Philosopher this idea of the name “to change is...”, set down above [n.10], and it only belongs where some subject remains. Therefore, were he to suppose with us that transubstantiation is possible, he would yet deny that it was a ‘change’, because the idea of change is repugnant to it.

36. The second response [n.34] does not work, because it does not argue from the ‘differently’ posited in the description of change. For it is true that ‘differently’ is taken

generally there for the positive entity in contraries, either privation or form. But the argument proceeds from what is said to be ‘disposed’, for this includes something remaining that is common to what is ‘disposed differently now’ and ‘disposed differently before’, because ‘to be disposed differently’ is affirmed equally on both sides.

37. Again, this distinction does not accord with the sayings of the saints, because according to Gregory *Moralia* 5 ch.38 n.68, “to change is to go from one to another”, and this belongs only to the subject of change.

38. One could also argue against the stated response [n.34] that, if something is said to change objectively, then that thing is the object, because it is object by distinction from the subject; but the term ‘to which’ here does not change, therefore the transubstantiation cannot be called ‘change’ objectively.

39. If it be said that ‘objectively’ is taken there generally for the term either ‘from which’ or ‘to which’, and in the case of creation objective change is true of the term ‘to which’, but here of the term ‘from which’. And the proof is that it is true to say ‘the bread is converted into the body of Christ, therefore the bread is changed’ because the bread is not disposed in the same way now as before. But this is disproved by examining the reasoning of the Philosopher [n.32], because neither term is disposed differently now than before. For the term ‘from which’ does not remain and so it is not disposed differently, because ‘being disposed differently’ includes in it an entity. And then one can say that this does not follow ‘the bread is converted into the body, therefore it is changed’, because the antecedent only denotes the passing of the term ‘from which’ to the term ‘to which, but the consequent denotes the passing of some subject common to both terms.

40. And if objection is still made that what is corrupted is changed, and not subjectively, because the subject does not remain, therefore objectively – I say that what belongs per se to a part is said per accidens of the whole, *Physics* 5.1.224a21-34; but the matter of what is corrupted is per se changed from form to privation, and therefore the whole can be said to be changed per accidens. But it is not like this in the matter at issue, because no part of what is transubstantiated per se changes.

41. To the argument, then, adduced for the opinion about being generated objectively and subjectively [n.31], I say that it can be drawn to the opposite. For generation is not distinguished into subjective and objective generation, although something may be said to be generated subjectively and objectively. Therefore, by parity of reasoning, neither will change be distinguished into objective or subjective.

42. And if you say that, if ‘to be generated’ is thus distinguished, then so is ‘to change’; and in addition, how could ‘to be generated’ be thus distinguished and not ‘generation’?

43. To the first I say that generation is only under the genus of change as it belongs to the subject of generation, but as it is compared with its term it has the idea of production, as was said in *Ord.* I d.5 nn.94-97.

44. To the second I say that from the same abstract term many terms can be imposed denominatively, or the same term can be imposed equivocally. Because a form can have different relations to diverse things, and diverse concrete things; or the same thing taken equivocally can be signified by the form as the form is under this or that relation. An example about health: that since health exists as a single form which yet can have one relation to sign [e.g. blood is called healthy as sign of health], another to cause [e.g. medicine is called healthy as cause of health], another to subject [e.g. an animal is

called healthy as subject of health], this concrete term ‘healthy’ is imposed to signify the form of health in different relations, and so it is equivocal. And simply diverse concrete terms could be imposed as healthy, significative etc. Thus, in the matter at issue, when generation exists the same in itself, it can have diverse relations, namely to the subject in which it is and to the term to which it is. And accordingly a concrete term imposed from it can be taken equivocally, so as to denote the informing of this thing or of that, and in this way is a thing equivocally said to be generated, although generation in itself is not thus distinguished but is only in a different way said to be [variously] taken, as it is generation of this thing or of that.

2. Scotus’ own Opinion

45. I say, therefore, that properly speaking transubstantiation is not change. Nor should one labor over it to inquire into the genus of transubstantiation, because although change gives one to understand, or includes, a subject that changes and a form according to which it changes and a relation of subject to form, yet beyond this relation transubstantiation formally imports an immediate succession of being formed to not being formed, and conversely.

46. Just as, therefore, in baptism something is said to be material (as washing) and something formal (as the words), even though both are material simply with respect to what is formal simply (that is the signification), yet this is said to the extent that the words are more formal with respect to the washing – so, in like manner, in the matter at issue, the subject is imported materially and the term of the change formally, but the term is more formal among these two than the subject. Therefore is the term said to be imported more formally and also more truly than the respect of succession (although the relation is truly more formal), for the term is something more true in itself because it is an absolute form, or at least a positive thing. But the order of posteriority and succession is only a relation in a certain respect. There would not then be a genus of transubstantiation (if it were a change), save as to that formal element which adds relation over and above the term, which relation is an immediate order of something to something else that precedes.

47. But if you altogether want to extend the term ‘change’ so as to assert it of transubstantiation, one can say that just as, according to the Philosopher in *Physics* 5.1.225a7-10, change is threefold, namely “from a non-subject to a subject, from a subject to a subject, from a subject to a non-subject” (and here ‘subject’ is taken for a positive entity and ‘non-subject’ for its privation). So in the same way one can make ‘turning round’ a distinction by extending this term to supernatural change, so a ‘turning round’ from non-subject to subject is called ‘creation’, a ‘turning round’ from subject to non-subject ‘annihilation’, a ‘turning round’ from subject to subject ‘transubstantiation’. But one does not get from this anything about a remote genus of transubstantiation (namely a genus of ‘turning round’), save in that each falls formally under a certain relation of order or succession.

II. To the Initial Arguments

48. To the first argument [n.9] the answer is plain from the last section [nn.45-47].

49. And the same to the second argument [n.10].

50. As to the third [n.11] I say that this is true of change properly speaking, because opposite succeeds to opposite in the same receptive subject. For there is a partial transition there, namely of form to the opposite while the same subject remains; and therefore the first terms there are impossible. But this is not the idea in the matter at issue; for here it suffices that the being of this term and of that be disparate – although they could be compatible in the entity together, because in their succeeding to each other they are not compared to any same subject that needs to receive a form. Or one could concede that they were simply incompatible in the same numerical thing, though they are not absolutely impossible in being (just as white and black are in the same entity together, and indeed are truly contraries, according to the species in which they are, but they are not together in any same receptive subject [sc. black and white are in the same species of quality that is color, and in the same subject, namely surfaces, but not in the same surface, or part of the surface, at the same time]).

Question Two

Whether it is Possible for any Being to be Converted into Any Being

51. Proceeding thus to the second question – it is argued that anything could be converted into anything.

First that a creature can be converted into divinity, because it is not repugnant to a Divine Person to be the term of some real action, as is plain in the Incarnation, whose term was the Word; therefore by similarity in the matter at issue.

52. Second as follows: it is not repugnant to the divine nature to be the term of that action which does not require changeability or possibility or limitation in the term. But transubstantiation is of this sort, because it does not require its term to change nor consequently does it require any possibility in the term; nor does it require anything to be added to its term, and consequently not limitation or composition either; therefore etc. A confirmation of the major is that it is not repugnant to the divine nature to be the term of understanding and volition, to the extent these actions do not require change or possibility or limitation.

53. Third thus: no creature is able to be converted into another because of the agreement of the term ‘from which’ with the term ‘to which’, for in this conversion no agreement of any abiding common subject is required; therefore, however much one creature does not agree with another, it is none the less convertible into it.

54. To the opposite:

First, it is plain that nothing can be converted into the divine nature, because then the divine nature could be converted into something else, for the terms of this change can be mutually terms for each other. Also, the divine nature could then begin to be somewhere it was not before or in a way it was not before – which seems unacceptable.

55. Again, then the quantity of the body of bread would be converted into the quantity of Christ’s body, and consequently Christ’s body quantum would be where the bread was before. The consequent is impossible because then a larger body would be in a smaller place.

56. Again, Augustine in *Literal Commentary on Genesis* 7 ch.12 n.19 and Boethius *On Person and Two Natures* ch.6, “in no way can a body be converted into a spirit or conversely.”

57. Again, then an absolute could be converted into a relative, and consequently a relation could per se be without a foundation and without a term, just as the absolute is which is converted into it. The consequent is impossible, as is manifest, because it is a contradiction for a relation to be without a foundation and a term.

II. To the Question

58. This question, as is plain from the arguments, contains two articles, namely about the conversion of deity into a creature and of a creature into a creature.

59. About the first I answer no.

60. And the reason was touched on in the preceding question [nn.28-29], because nothing can be converted, whether as term ‘from which’ or as term ‘to which’, unless its being and non-being are totally subject to the power of what does the converting; but nothing intrinsic to God is subject to the divine power, because that power has for object only what is possible, but what is intrinsic to God is necessarily existent.

61. About the second [n.58] I say that anything can be converted into anything for the same reason, that each extreme in creatures is subject to the divine power both as to total being and as to total non-being.

II. To the Initial Arguments of the First Part

62. [To the first argument] – To the first argument [n.51] I say that ‘the Word is Incarnate’ does not state that the Word is the term of any action of the genus of action.

63. And when it is said that ‘the Incarnation has the Person of the Son as term’ [n.51] I say that that union (speaking of a union that introduces relation) introduces the Word as term, because in the human nature there is a real relation to the Word, and only a relation of reason on the other side. But a term of action of the genus of action is something that receives being through the action; but this is the real union of the human nature with the Word.

64. And if it is argued that “the Son of God is incarnate, therefore he is the subject or term of the action, because ‘to be incarnated’ signifies an undergoing that one must indeed place in the subject or the term;” – and further, “to any action there responds its proper passive undergoing; the Three Persons were carrying out the Incarnation by action properly speaking; therefore what responds to it is passive undergoing properly speaking [Ord. III d.1 nn.74-83]; but this is ‘to be incarnate’, therefore etc.”

65. Solution: to the first point I say that ‘to be incarnated’ is ‘to be united to flesh in unity of person’, and this according as ‘united’ states a relation of reason, not a real relation.

66. To the second point [n.64] I say that to the action of the Trinity there corresponds some real passive undergoing; but the object of it is the human nature and the term is something in the human nature, namely formal unity of that nature with the Word, so that the union of the Trinity, or rather the uniting, which is the action of the

Trinity, is for the union formally of the human nature with the Word, which union is really in the human nature.

67. And when it is said that ‘to be incarnate’ states a passive undergoing as ‘to incarnate’ states an action, I say that if ‘to be incarnate’ or ‘to be incarnated’ grammatically introduces passive undergoing because of the mode of signifying, yet not in reality in that of which it is said, but only in something else that connotes being united to it; and this other thing is said to be the subject of the undergoing really introduced by ‘to be incarnated’, which namely corresponds to the action that ‘to incarnate’ introduces.

68. [The second argument] – To the second argument [n.52] I say on the contrary that unchangeability, necessity, and infinity belong to anything that can be the term of some action of the genus of action properly speaking.

69. And when the actions of understanding and willing are spoken of [n.52], I say that this is not to the purpose, because (as was said in *Ord.* I d.3 n.501, *Rep.* IA d.3 nn.191-195) these are called actions because they are operations, for by actions of the genus of action some term receives ‘being simply’ (if it is produced), or ‘being in some way’; but through intellection the object understood in no way receives being; rather being is altogether presupposed to the intellection. And this is for the reason that these operations, which are called actions, are ultimate terms, and are not for the sake of other terms.

70. But there still remains the argument that action of the genus of action does not require the term to change.

I say that it does not seem easy how an action of the genus of action could be posited whereby the term does not receive being; rather, the way such action is posited in divine reality, the Son does receive being by active generation. But whether something could be the term of action or generation thus taken and yet in no way receive being will be stated in a section of the following question [nn.180, 189-190, 192-196].

III. To the Arguments for the Opposite

72. To the arguments for the opposite.

[To the first] – The first [n.54] I concede.

73. [To the second] – To the second [n.55] I say that if the bread were converted into the quantity of Christ’s body yet Christ’s body would not be here nor its quantity, as was touched on in the first question of distinction 10 [nn.39-41].

74. To the proof touched on above but not solved [d.10 n.29], namely that ‘the thing generated is where the thing corrupted was’, I say that for this reason is it the case there, because the matter remains common, which in generation is not moved from there in place; and consequently the matter receives the form where it is, and hence what is generated from the matter and the form is where the thing corrupted was.

75. On the contrary: the matter is not the reason for being located in place, but quantity is; and the same quantity does not remain in the thing generated and the thing corrupted save as it is in the matter; therefore matter is not the reason why the generated thing is where the corrupted thing was before.

76. I say that matter by itself is disposed to be in place definitively, just as is any limited substance; but it has being in place circumscriptively as it is under quantity. So because it remains definitively where it was, therefore does it receive form there, and for

this reason is the generated substance definitively there where the corrupted substance was before; and where a substance is definitively, there is it circumscriptively as it is a quantum. And therefore does it follow that the generated thing, as possessing quantity circumscriptively, is where the corrupted thing was circumscriptively. But one must not think that sometimes it was a substance here or there definitively and not circumscriptively anywhere; because it was never without the quantity that was the idea of circumscription.

77. Nevertheless, by not positing any quantity that remains the same (which I believe to be more true), one does not have to posit something remaining circumscriptively the same, nor posit the idea of being in the same place in the generated thing and in the corrupted thing; but the matter remaining in the place definitively where the thing corrupted was is sufficient.

78. It could be said, therefore, that where also an agent finds a passive subject it gives it form there; but the agent generates, and in generating does not change place; therefore it gives being to the passive subject there; and where the passive subject receives form, there it is a composite of passive subject and introduced form; therefore etc.

79. Having conceded, then, according to the common opinion that 'the term of conversion could be there where the thing converted was', I say that the 'where' should not be understood precisely, but in this way or that way part by part; and thus, where the bread was before, the body of Christ could be as a quantum precisely, or as in a part of its 'where', so that a part would be there and a part in the surrounding 'where'. Let it also be that the principle common to some people [Aquinas, Richard of Middleton] were maintained, that 'the term of conversion is where the thing converted was before', yet it is not located there in place.

80. And thus one could concede that, if the quantity were the first term of the conversion, it would be where the substance of the bread was before, yet it would not be located there in place. And this is the argument against the other way [Richard of Middleton, Giles of Rome, Godfrey of Fontaines], which posits that for this reason is the quantity of Christ not here as in a place, because it is the second term and not the first – for let it be that it was the first, still it would not necessarily be here in place; for this mode could as much be separated from the first term of the conversion as from the second.

81. [To the third] – To the third [n.56] the answer is made that Augustine and Boethius are speaking by comparison with created potency.

82. But this is nothing, because no created virtue can convert any body whatever into any body whatever.

83. Therefore I say differently that there are as many reasons for impossibility as there are reasons for repugnance, and when some of these are removed there is a possibility that there was not before – not indeed a possibility simply, but from a part of it. For example, sight cannot receive intellection, both because intellection is not extended while sight is extended, and because sight knows something only under the idea of a singular and intellect understands not precisely under the idea of a singular. Take away one impossibility, namely if sight were a power that could have an object under the idea of a universal, and yet another idea of impossibility were to remain, this latter case would be impossible just as the former would be. And yet the latter would be said to be

possible in reference to the former, not simply but because the idea of impossibility in the latter is not the idea of impossibility in the former.

84. To the matter at issue: each body has some non-repugnance to being converted into a body, namely because it has a quantum of matter and the like concurring ideas for being convertible; every spirit has opposite reasons to these. Therefore, although it is impossible simply for a celestial body to be converted into an elemental body, in the way it is impossible for a spirit to be converted into fire, because with respect to any created agent both are impossible, yet, with respect to an uncreated agent, just as one is possible so is the other. However, the one is said to be possible and the other impossible, because there is an idea of impossibility here that there is not there.

85. [To the fourth] – To the fourth [n.57] I concede that an absolute could be converted into a relative and conversely, but it does not further follow that there would be a relative without a foundation and term, because a term of conversion receives being through conversion in the way that it can have being; but a relation cannot have being without a foundation and term.

86. Nor does it follow that if the term ‘from which’ was without these therefore the term ‘to which’ can be without them, just as this is not the case in other things where one term requires different things for its being that the other term does not require.

87. I say, therefore, that if an absolute were converted into a relative, the relative would require a foundation and a term – and it would have them, whether the old ones that preceded the conversion or new ones. An example of this response in the case of other things: This inference does not hold: ‘a stone can be converted into knowledge and conversely, and a stone does not inform any intellect, therefore neither does knowledge inform it’. For however much something is converted, the term of the conversion will always have its proper mode of existing, just as the term ‘from which’ of conversion had its own proper mode of existing before the conversion.

Second Article: About the Actuality of Transubstantiation

88. About the second main article [n.7] I ask two questions: first, whether the bread is converted into the body of Christ, and second whether in this conversion the bread is annihilated.

Question One

Whether the Bread is Converted into the Body of Christ

89. Proceeding thus to the first question [n.88], argument is given for a negative answer.

Augustine *On the Trinity* 3.4.10 “We say the body of Christ is what, received from the fruits of the earth, we take up.” But there is nothing received from the fruits of the earth but bread or wine; so there is no transubstantiation.

90. Again Damascene *Orthodox Faith* ch.86, “As in the case of baptism where, because of men’s custom to wash with water and anoint with oil, the Spirit has joined grace to oil and water and made it ‘the laver of regeneration’, so also, because it is the custom of men to eat bread and drink wine and water, the Spirit has joined to them his deity and made them his body and blood so that through what is customary and natural

we might come to exist in things that are above nature.” He means to say that as in baptism we are washed in water, and that this was instituted for the reason that men’s custom is to be washed in water, so in the Eucharist we eat and drink bread and wine, because these are the accustomed food and drink of men. Therefore just as in baptism there is truly water of the same idea as the common water that we are washed with, so in the Eucharist there is truly bread and wine of the same idea as the common food and drink of men.

91. Third as follows: Augustine [*John’s Gospel* tr.26 n.17] on *I Corinthians* 10.17 “One bread...” says “Just as one bread is made of many grains and Christ’s body made of many members, so the Church is made of many persons;” therefore the Eucharist, because of this likeness, signifies the true body of Christ and the mystical body of Christ. But nothing is gathered from many grains that signifies something in this way save the bread; therefore the bread remains in the Eucharist.

92. Fourth thus: in every positive change the term ‘to which’ receives being; but the body of Christ does not receive being through this action [of confecting the Eucharist], because it would be frequently receiving being; nor too does it receive any being, because then it would often be increased from the frequency of Eucharists; therefore the body of Christ is not here the term of any change or positive action.

93. Fifth thus: if bread were converted into the body of Christ, there would have to be some first and per se term of the change; in the matter at hand this could not be the deity (from the preceding question [nn.59-60]); nor can it be the intellective soul, because according to everyone that is not here save concomitantly; nor can it be any accident or accidents, because then there would not be transubstantiation but trans-accidentation. So all that remains is the matter alone. But conversion into matter alone is not transubstantiation, for it would be called reduction into matter rather than transubstantiation. And the fact is plain, because according to everyone the form of bread is converted into some form, just as the matter is converted into matter. And no form can be found that would be the term, as is plain from the division set down [just above here]; therefore etc. And if you say that there is some substantial form other than the intellective soul into which the form of the bread is converted – against this: of one thing there is only one ‘to be’; therefore there is only one substantial form at the same time.

94. To the contrary:

Ambrose *On the Sacraments* IV 4 n.14 (and it is in Gratian, *Decretum* p.3 d.2 ch.55) says, “The bread is on the altar; when consecration occurs, from bread is made the body of Christ.” Again in *On the Mysteries* (and it is in *Decretum* p.3 d.2 n.69) he says, “The words that could make things that were not, can they not change things that are into things that they were not?” – as though he were to say ‘yes’.

95. Again Eusebius (Gallicanus) *Homily* 17 on the Pasch 6 n.2 (and it is in *Decretum* p.3 d.2 ch.35), “The invisible priest by secret power changes visible creatures into the substance of his body and blood.”

96. And many authorities for this point are contained in *Decretum* p.3 d.2, and the Master adduces some of them in this distinction and the preceding one.

I. To the Question

97. Here, as in the case of other matters of faith, two things must be looked at: first, what must be maintained; second how it will be possible to make it clear.

A. What Must be Maintained about the Conversion of the Bread into the Body of Christ

1. Three Opinions of the Ancients

98. On the first point [n.97], as Innocent III reports (*On the Sacred Mystery of the Altar* IV ch.9), there were three opinions: one, that the bread remains and yet the body of Christ is truly with it; second, that the bread does not remain and yet is not converted but ceases to be through annihilation or reduction to matter or corruption into something else; third, that the bread is transubstantiated into the body and wine into the blood.

99. Each of these opinions were meant to save the common conviction that the substance of Christ's body is really there, because to deny this is plainly against the faith, as is clear in d.10 q.1 n.15. For from the beginning of the institution of the Eucharist it was expressly part of the truth of faith that the body of Christ is truly contained there.

a. Reasons for the First Opinion

100. Argument for the first opinion is as follows:

[First reason] – As is the case in natural things, one should not posit more than natural reason proves necessarily, for more is superfluous (as is plain from *Physics* 1.4.188a17-18 and other places in the Philosopher [as *Physics* 6.189a15-16, 8.6.259a8-9]). So in matters of faith one should not posit more than can be proved from the truth of the matters of faith. But the truth of the Eucharist can be saved without transubstantiation; therefore etc.

101. The proof of the minor is that what is required for the truth of the Eucharist is a sign and a thing really contained signified by it; the substance of bread with its accidents can as well be the sign as the accidents alone can, indeed more so because the substance of bread under the species is nutriment more than the accidents are; therefore it is more representative of the body of Christ as to the idea of spiritual nutriment. Now the thing contained, namely the body of Christ, can be as well saved with the substance of the bread as with the accidents, because it is not more repugnant for a substance to be together with a substance than to be with a quantity of that substance.

102. And a confirmation of the above reason [n.100] is that one should, as far as possible, always posit fewer miracles; but by positing that the bread remains with its accidents, and that the body of Christ is really there, posits fewer miracles than positing that the bread is not there; for in the former case no accident would be posited without a substance.

103. [Second reason] – The second reason is as follows, and it more or less returns to the same: in matters of belief handed on to us according to universal understanding, it seems that a way of understanding should not be determined which is more difficult to understand and on which many unacceptable results seem to follow. But that the body of Christ is in the Eucharist is a truth thus universally handed on to us, and the understanding that no substance of bread is there seems more difficult to sustain there, and on it follow more unacceptable things than if one posits that the substance of bread is there; therefore etc.

104. The proof of the major is that, from the fact that the faith is given us for salvation, it should be determined and held by the Church in such way as is more suitable for salvation. But by positing such an immoderately difficult understanding, and one on which unacceptable things seem manifestly to follow, occasion is given for turning away from the faith all the philosophers, or rather almost all, who as it were follow natural reason; or at any rate occasion is given for impeding them from converting to the faith, if they are told that such things belong to the faith. Indeed, it seems that a philosopher, or anyone else who follows natural reason, would have a greater difficulty about what is posited here in the denial of the substance of bread than he would have about all the articles we hold about the Incarnation. And it seems a cause for wonder why in the case of one article, which is not a main article of the faith, such an understanding should be so asserted that thereby it lies open to the contempt of all who follow reason.

105. [Third reason] – The third reason is as follows: nothing is to be held as belonging to the substance of the faith save what can be had expressly from the Scriptures, or is expressly declared or expressed by the Church, or evidently follows from what is plainly contained in Scripture or plainly determined by the Church. This major seems sufficient, because for nothing else would anyone have cause to expose himself to death; and he would laudably expose himself to death for everything that is of the substance of the faith; and also it seems a levity to believe firmly what in none of these ways would be held as certain, because there is no sufficient authority or reason if none of these ways is found. Now it does not seem to be expressly obtained in these ways that the substance of bread is not there. For in *John* 6, where the truth of the Eucharist is much proved, the thing is plain when Christ says, vv.51-52, “I am the living bread; whoever eats of this bread etc.” and in *I Corinthians* 10.16 Paul says, “The bread which we break, is it not a communion in the body of Christ?” Nor is there found anywhere that the Church has solemnly declared this truth, nor even how it could be evidently inferred from anything manifestly believed. Therefore etc.

106. If you say, as one doctor says [Aquinas], that in *Matthew* 26.26 when Christ says “This is my body” he is insinuating that the bread does not remain, because otherwise that proposition would be false – this argument is not cogent:

Because, given that the bread did remain, the substance of bread would not be pointed to [sc. by ‘this is my body’] but what is contained under the bread would be; just as now the accidents are not pointed to, because then the proposition would be false. But the sense is: ‘this being, contained under this perceptible sign, is my body’.

107. Again, in sacraments of truth there should be no falsity; but the accidents naturally signify the substances which they affect, and if they (that is their substances) were not underneath them, the natural signification of the accidents would be false; so this is unacceptable.

If you say they signify the body and blood of Christ and that this signification is true – on the contrary:

Natural signification does not change because of a signification instituted at pleasure; therefore the accidents signify the same as what they were signifying before; so there would, on this score, be falsity in the natural signification if the things signified were not under the signs. But when one posits that these signified things are underneath the signs, truth in the natural signification of the accidents is secured.

Truth could also be had in signification at pleasure, because the things signified at pleasure by institution could be contained within those substances.

And thus in every way would truth be obtained in the case of each signification; but according to that other way [sc. signification at pleasure] there is falsity in the natural signification; therefore the other way is more appropriate than this one.

b. Reasons for the Second Opinion

108. For the second opinion [n.98] one can argue by reasons similar to some of the preceding ones, because the first three [nn.100-105] seem sufficiently able to be adduced in its favor. First because more miracles are posited if one posits transubstantiation than if one denies it [n.102]; next because transubstantiation is as difficult to understand, and seems as repugnant to natural reason, because it seems to everyone who follows natural reason to be irrationally posited, and consequently it would more turn them from the faith than would saying that the bread, through annihilation or some other way [nn.103-104], absolutely did not remain; next, third, because transubstantiation is not more proved, or rather is less proved, by Scripture than the bread's not remaining is.

c. Thomas Aquinas' Reasons against the First and Second Opinion

109. Against these opinions a certain person [Aquinas, *Sent.* IV d.11 a.1 q.1] argues:

Against the first opinion [n.98] as follows: that it is unacceptable, impossible, and heretical.

110. The first claim [sc. unacceptability] is proved in three ways:

First because it takes away the reverence due to Christ as he is contained in the host. For the cult of worship ['latria'] is due to him as he is in the Eucharist but, if the substance of bread remained there, such cult should not be shown, because it would be idolatry by being worship of a creature.

111. Second, the opinion is said to be unacceptable because it takes away the signification of this sacrament; for the sacrament should signify first the body of Christ as being the first signified thing; but if the substance of the bread remained, this substance would have the idea of first signified thing.

112. Third because it takes away the due use of the sacrament, for if the substance of the bread truly remained it would truly be bodily food; but the use of this sacrament is that it is spiritual food for the soul, not the body.

113. Now on the second point, namely that this position is impossible, Aquinas argues through the same middle term, both against the first opinion and against the second [n.98]. For nothing can begin to be where it was not before save through change of itself or change of something else into it. But the body of Christ does not change by the fact the Eucharist is carried out, for it remains in heaven as before. Therefore, if nothing is converted into it, it is not more really in the Eucharist than it was before – and this is impossible.

114. The third point, that it is heretical, is proved as follows: because it is against the word of Christ when he instituted the sacrament, *Matthew* 26.26, "This is my body."

He does not say “Here is...” but “This is...” But if the substance of the bread remained, or was annihilated and not converted, it would be truer to say “Here is my body” than “This is my body.”

115. Against the second opinion [n.98] he argues specifically against its positing the reduction there of the bread into underlying matter. For either it would be made into bare matter (and this is impossible because then there would be matter without form, and thus there will and will not be an act of the matter). Or it would be made into matter under some other form, but this is unacceptable because then either that other new body (of which it is the matter) would exist together with the species and with the body of Christ, or it would be moved from its place; and both are unacceptable. The first because it is impossible for two bodies to exist together, and the second because the local motion of this new body could be perceived by perceiving the expelling of the other body that surrounds it.

d. Rejection of Aquinas’ Reasons

116. However it may be with the opinions, these reasons do not seem to be effective in rejecting them.

117. The first [n.110] is not valid, because he who now adores Christ in the Eucharist is not now an idolater, and yet it cannot be denied that there is some creature there, namely the species; but what should be adored is not the perceptible container but the contained Christ. And then one might say in the same way that Christ is contained under the quantum and quality of the bread, and so the bread is not adored but Christ who is contained in the bread as in a sign.

118. And if you object “at any rate the simple, who do not draw this distinction, would be idolaters,” I say that so can it be argued against you now, because the simple do not distinguish the accidents per se from the contained body of Christ. But in all such matters there is one response, that the simple give adoration within the faith of the Church, and this suffices for their salvation. But the more advanced adore distinctly what is contained and not the containing sign, and that whether the containing sign is an accident only or the substance of the bread with the accident.

119. As to the second argument [n.111] I say it proves the opposite, because if the substance of bread were there, the double signification [n107] would be true: namely the natural one whereby the accidents signify their substance, and also the one that is by divine institution, whereby a perceptible thing signifies the body of Christ – it would be true. But now the only signification that can be preserved as true is precisely the second one.

120. Nor can it be said that the natural signification would, because of the other signification that is by institution, come to an end; because then the accidents would no longer lead naturally (as concerns themselves) to an apprehending of the substance of the bread; instead their natural signification or representation, which yet was in them before, would totally cease. And then, after this cessation, the accidents would affect the intellect to make it apprehend the body of Christ in some way otherwise than before (supposing the substance of the bread is not there); this is a nothing.^a

a. [*Text canceled by Scotus*] and then the accidents would in some way affect the intellect differently before the consecration than afterwards; which is a nothing.

121. I reply therefore that the first thing by institution signified should be the body of Christ, and so it is, whether the substance of the bread remain or not. But the first thing signified by the accidents, namely what they signify naturally, is always the substance that they qualified before or were of a nature to qualify before, because the natural signification does not change.

122. As to the third argument [n.112] I say that it is not valid, because it is manifest even now that the species give nutriment, according to the Apostle *I Corinthians* 11.21, "One indeed is hungry, while another is drunk," and this from receiving the sacramental species; and yet there is no denial here that it is food for the soul when that is given which is contained under the bodily food. Thus too, if the bread were posited as remaining there, it would be bodily food and yet what was contained under it would be food only for the soul.

123. As to Aquinas' other point, about impossibility [n.113], a sufficient solution was given in d.10 q.1 nn.149-58, that the body of Christ does not begin to be here without any change, if one extends 'change' to include that body's altogether simple presence.

124. To the point about 'here' and 'this' [n.114], it is nothing against the minor premise. For it is true that 'here is my body' and it is true that 'this is my body'; however it is not true that 'this accident is my body' but that what is contained under the accident is so. In the same way, if the substance of the bread remained, that which is the substance of the bread would not be Christ's body, but that is which is contained under the bread. But the Savior preferred to use the word 'this' rather than 'here' because it expresses the truth more, although both statements might be true.

125. To the argument against the second opinion [n.115] one could reply either by positing annihilation of the bread totally, or if reduction to the matter from which the bread comes to be is posited – the argument is not cogent. For it could be said that the reduction would be to bare matter and into matter under another form, and it could be said that the reduction is into matter remaining where it was before or moved from there in its location.

126. And when it is argued [n.115] against the first reply [sc. reduction to bare matter] that then the matter would be without form and so would be in act and not in act, there is equivocation over the term 'act'. For in one way 'act' is that difference of being which is opposed to potency, insofar as all being, and anything that is, is divided, namely into act and potency. In another way 'act' states the relation that 'form' states to what can be formed, or to the whole of that of which it is the form.

127. And there is an equivocation over 'potency' in the same way. Because as potency is opposed to act in the first way [n.126], it states diminished being, namely something to which the 'to be' that is distinct from being in act is not repugnant, even when it is outside its cause; but being that is in act as act is opposite to potency is being that, whatever it may be, is complete in its 'to be' outside the soul and outside its cause. In another way potency states a principle receptive of act (in the second way of speaking of act [n.126]), the way matter is called potency and form is called act.

128. This distinction is made clearly plain by the Philosopher *Metaphysics* 9.1.1045b34-35, 6.1048a25-27.

129. The members of the distinction can also be proved from what the Philosopher says in many places when he speaks of act and potency now in this way and

now in that, as in *Metaphysics* 7.16.1040b10-16. And in *Metaphysics* 8.6.1045b20-21 he says that from act and potency something per se one comes to be, where the understanding is not about act and potency as these are opposed, because as opposed they do not exist together. In another way, in *Metaphysics* 9.6.1048b1-6, he says, “Now there is an existing in act of a thing, but not as we say it exists in potency;” and then in explanation he manifests the fact in the case of many opposites, as being awake to sleeping, seeing to having one’s eye closed, work completed to work not completed. And to the one part of this difference, he says, determinate act belongs, and to the other part the possible.

130. As concerns the issue at hand, matter without form is in act and not in potency in the first way [n.129]. The proof is from Augustine *Confessions* 12.7.7; here are his words: “Matter itself has received this imperfect ‘to be’, which namely it has in potency;” and he has to posit this, because he concedes that matter is created by God.

131. But before it was created, it was in potency in the first way [n.127]. The proof is because otherwise that would be created which is incapable of being created. Therefore, after creation it is not in potency in that way, for then there would, after creation, be no entity of produced matter. Only after creation, then was it not in potency in that way but in the second way, because it was receptive of act in the second way of speaking of act. But now there is a mistaking of the question, or ‘ignoratio elenchi’, when it is said [by Aquinas, n.126] that ‘matter is in act in the first way and not in act in the second way, therefore it is in act and not in act’. In the same way there is equivocation about potency on this side and that.

132. Also, if the second sense were granted [nn.115, 126], namely that the matter would receive some form and would remain together with the body of Christ, one could not refute the claim that this would be possible for God, because it does not include a contradiction. For if the body of Christ, even as a quantum, can be together with a quantity of bread, and quantum is more repugnant to quantum (as far as concerns their being together) than the substance is to the substance and consequently more than substance is to any substance whatever (for thus does the Philosopher argue in *Physics* 4.8.216b10-11, that if two bodies can be together then any number of bodies at all can be together), then it follows that it is not impossible for any substance composed of the matter and a new form to remain together with the body of Christ. If, again, it be granted that this body would be expelled, and yet not in such a way that the expelling of the air would manifestly appear – neither can this be proved impossible for God, because it includes no contradiction.

c. Scotus’ own Response

133. As concerns this article, then, namely what is to be held [n.97], I reply that it is commonly held that neither does the bread remain (against the first opinion [n.98]), nor is it annihilated or reduced to first matter [sc. against the second opinion, n.98], but it is converted into the body of Christ.

134. And Ambrose seems expressly to say much to this effect, two authorities from whom were adduced above [n.94], and several are contained in Gratian *Decretum* and Master Lombard [nn.94-96].

135. But what principally seems to be the moving factor is that one should hold about the sacraments what the Holy Roman Church holds, as is contained in Gregory IX *Decretals* V tit.7 ch.9 [cf. *Ord.* IV d.5 n.12]. And now the Church holds that the bread is transubstantiated into the body and the wine into the blood, as is manifestly contained in *Decretals* I tit.1 ch.1 sect.3, where it is said, “Jesus Christ himself is priest and sacrifice, whose body and blood in the sacrament of the altar are truly contained under the species of bread and wine;” and immediately there follows, “the bread having been transubstantiated into the body and the wine into the blood by divine power.”

136. There is also an agreement with this because the Church prays, “Let the mixing and consecration of the body and blood of our Lord Jesus Christ be eternal life for us who receive it” [canon of the *Roman Missal*].

137. And another agreement is that someone not fasting cannot fittingly celebrate, but after he has received the Eucharist a priest can still celebrate again, as is contained in *Decretals* III tit. 41 ch.3, “With the exception of the day of the Lord’s Nativity, and unless cause of necessity supervene, it suffices for a priest to celebrate mass once a day.” Hereby it is intimated that on the day of the Lord’s Nativity and when necessity impels, it is permitted to celebrate two masses in a day.

f. To the Reasons for the First and Second Opinion

138. To the arguments adduced for the first and second opinion.

As to the first [n.100], I concede that in matters of belief too more things should not, without necessity, be posited, nor more miracles than is necessary. But when you say in the minor [n.101] that the truth of the Eucharist could be saved while the bread remains, or without transubstantiation, I say that it would have been very possible for God to have instituted that his body would be truly present with the substance of the bread remaining, or with the accidents after annihilation of the bread, and then the truth of the Eucharist would truly have been there just as it would also with the annihilation of the bread, because there would be a true sign and a true thing signified. But this is not now the whole truth of the Eucharist, for God did not so institute it, as the adduced authorities say [nn.94-96]. And when it is said that for the truth of the Eucharist there is only required a true sign and a true thing signified, I say that this is true in the way the sign was instituted and in the way the thing signified should correspond to it; but now it is not precisely so, namely that the body of Christ is along with something else (namely along with the bread or with the accidents of the bread indistinctly), but it has now been instituted that, namely, the thing signified is only under the accidents as under a sign.

139. To the second [n.103] I say that no article [of the faith] should be pressed into something difficult to understand unless the understanding be true; and if it is true and is evidently proved to be true, the article should, when it is specifically inquired into, be held according to that understanding, because no other specific understanding is true. But such, from the authorities alleged [nn.94-96], is the supposition about the understanding of this article.

140. And then to the third argument [n.105], about where the force of the matter stands, one must say that the Church has declared that this understanding belongs to the truth of the faith, in the Creed issued under Innocent III in the Lateran Council, “We firmly believe etc.” (as was cited above [n.135]), where the truth of the articles to be

believed is explicitly set down, more explicitly than is contained in the Apostles' Creed or the Athanasian or Nicene Creed. And in brief, whatever it is said there must be believed is to be held to be of the substance of the faith – and this after the solemn declaration made by the Church.

141. And if you ask why the Church wanted to choose this difficult way of understanding the article, although the words of Scripture about it could be saved by an easy understanding and one that is truer to appearance about this article, I say that the Scriptures are to be expounded by the Spirit by whom they were established. And thus one must suppose that the Catholic Church, taught “by the Spirit of truth” [*John* 16.13], has expounded them in that way, just as the faith has handed them on to us. And for this reason has the Church chosen this understanding, because it is true. For it was not in the power of the Church to make it true or not true, but in that of God who is institutor. But the Church has expounded the understanding handed on from God, being directed in this, as is believed, by the Spirit of truth.

142. To the fourth argument [n.107] one could say that accidents do not always signify actually that the substance they qualify exists, but they are always apt to do so; or if they do now signify actually, there is no falsity in the sign as it is a sign, because as it is a sign instituted at pleasure so it has a thing signified for what is instituted.

B. The Conversion of the Bread into the Body of Christ can be made Clear

143. On the second main point [n.97] there are two things to be made clear: first how the bread is transubstantiated so that transubstantiation into the pre-existing body of Christ can be done; second what could be formal in the term ‘to which’ of this conversion. These two things were touched on in the arguments for the first part [nn.89-93].

I. How Transubstantiation into the Pre-existing Body of Christ can be Done a. About the Possibility of Transubstantiation

144. About the first, one needs to know: either that for the transubstantiation of one thing into another no more is required save that each term is a substance and is fully under obedience to the agent as to total being and total non-being; or that, according to others (namely Godfrey of Fontaines *Quodlibet* V q.1), more is required, namely mutual convertibility in nature (because, that is, of identity in the principle of potential transmutability from the form of one thing to the form of another, although not by a single transmutation but by many, and this by a natural agent). One needs to know which of these is kept to in the question at issue, because both the bread and the body of Christ are totally in the power of God as to total being and total non-being.

145. They [the bread and Christ's body] also have matter of the same idea, through which, on the part of each term, a transition can be made by nature from one to the other, and that through many intermediate stages, although considering Christ's body insofar as it is now immortal and impassible, it could not be converted by nature into bread. But this is not because it lacks matter receptive of the form of bread, but because its matter is contained inseparably by its form, namely the impassible soul.

146. This could also be made clear about the parts of each term. For God has in his power both the matter and the form, and can consequently convert matter into matter and form into form, and thus whole into whole, and totally. But a natural agent cannot do this, because matter is not in its power but is presupposed to its action, from *Ord.* IV d.1 nn.141-145.

147. This reasoning proceeds according to the way touched on in the immediately preceding question [n.61], but without supposing that conversion requires a receptive subject common to each term.

b. On the Manner of this Possibility
α. Opinion of Giles of Rome and its Rejection

148. [Exposition of the opinion] – But about the manner of the possibility of this conversion, the following is set down [by Giles of Rome]: matter as it is a ‘what’ is wholly indistinct, *On Generation* 1.1.315a1-2; therefore an agent, by presupposing it as a ‘what’, regards it as altogether indistinct; but God is of the sort that he does not act through motion, and this for the reason that he is not instrument but first cause; therefore he acts on matter as it is altogether indistinct. Therefore, just as he can bring back the numerically same destroyed form to its proper matter (and this because he does not act by a motion that prevents the return of the numerically same thing), so he can bring back the same form into any other matter. But on the numerically same form the numerically same matter follows; therefore God can bring it about that any matter whatever become any matter whatever, and thus he can bring it about that the form of the body of Christ is put into the matter of the bread; and thereby this matter becomes that matter, and form becomes form, and thereby the whole becomes the whole (as is made diffusively clear in [Giles’] first and second trifling proofs).

149. [Rejection of the opinion] – But against the first proposition that he accepts, namely ‘matter as it is a ‘what’ is wholly indistinct’ [n.148]: For either matter is understood as indistinct in number (namely because whatever matter is, as such, a ‘what’ is altogether the same as anything), or it is understood as indistinct in idea (that is, that as it is a ‘what’ it is of a single idea).

150. If in the first way, this understanding is altogether impossible, because it is against the Philosopher and against natural reason and against what Giles intends to make clear:

151. It is against the Philosopher because, when speaking intentionally in *Metaphysics* 12.5.1071a17-27 about per se principles, the Philosopher says that as things coming from principles are different so their per se principles are different, and different in genus, species, and number. And to the issue at hand he says, “Of things that are in the same species the principles are different, not in species, but because in the case of singulars your and my matter and moving cause and species are different, though in the same universal idea.” Therefore he means intentionally that my and your matter, as my and your per se principle, are different in number. But our matter is a per se principle as it is a ‘what’, because a part of a substance cannot be anything other than substance as substance is a ‘what’.

152. This is also plain from the way the Philosopher proceeds. For when investigating matter, in *Physics* 1.9.92a31-32 and *On Generation and Corruption*

1.4.320a2-3, 2.1.329a29-31, 330b12-13, 9.335b5-6, he says that it is the same subject for the whole of the change and for each term of the change. So it is, then, the same in the generated and corrupted thing in the way it is not the same in two simultaneously generated things, for then generation and corruption would not more include the matter than they would include the simultaneous existence of diverse things. Therefore, if matter as it is a 'what' is the same in the corrupted air and in the fire generated from it, then matter as it is a 'what' is not thus the same in simultaneously existing air and fire. And this reason can be confirmed because, if the matter could be simultaneously the same under the form of air and fire, then there would be no need for a change corrupting what precedes so that the matter would come to exist under a different form.

153. Also against this view of Giles is manifest reason, because matter is prior, in the order of nature, to the form received, for it is the foundation of the form and of everything else, according to *Metaphysics* 1.8.989b6-7 (in the old Arabic-Latin translation), "In the foundation of nature there is nothing distinct." Now what is prior, as it is prior, does not essentially vary because of a variation in what is posterior. So if matter, as it is a 'what', is altogether the same in itself, in no way can it be different because it receives a different form; therefore it will, as altogether the same, receive contrary substantial forms (or at least impossible ones), such as the forms of air and fire. And then the result would be that the generator could generate something without corrupting anything; and matter could also be simultaneously the same under the form of man and of ass, and thus no two substantial forms would be repugnant to each other in simultaneously perfecting the matter.

154. This understanding is also false to Giles' proposed intention [n.149], because he concludes that God can put the form of Christ's body into the matter of the bread. But if this matter is the same as the matter of the body of Christ, the form of the body cannot be put into it because the matter already has it. For what is numerically the same as it, namely as the matter of the body, already has that form; therefore this matter has it – and if it has it, the form cannot be impressed upon it, because then it would simultaneously have it and not have it.

155. But if Giles means that the matter is indistinct in that it is of the same idea [n.149], and if he thus concludes that God can impress numerically the same form on the matter that is in this [other] thing, the consequence does not hold unless he prove that numerically the same form can simultaneously inform two matters each of which is a sufficient and total receptive subject of it; for this unity of idea stands along with a numerical distinction of this matter from that. Also let it be that this consequent be granted, yet the result would not be that this matter would become that matter, because what is prior does not vary because of a newness of what is posterior. Therefore, the matter does not become different from what it was before by the fact that it receives a form different from what it had before.

156. This point is proved also in that, if the matter did become different, this form could not be impressed on it, for this form cannot be impressed on the matter because it already has it. The upshot is that one may argue thus: 'if in the same instant the matter of the bread receives the form of Christ's body and becomes now in that instant the matter of the body, then in that instant it cannot receive the form of the body', for the matter of the body cannot then receive the form of the body, because it has it before.

157. Again, this impressing of the form of the body on the matter of the bread will not be transubstantiation but generation. For the matter was before in a state of privation of the form of the body, and now it has the form. Nor does one through this obtain how the form of the bread passes over into the form of the body.

158. And then too this proposition that ‘only God has regard to matter as it is a ‘what’’ [n.148] seems to be false. For an agent has regard to the passive subject under the idea under which it induces in it the term of the action; but a created agent can induce a substantial form into matter by generation, and that form is induced in the matter as the matter is a ‘what’, because thus is it per se receptive of the substantial form. Therefore, the natural agent reaches the matter of the passive subject as it is a ‘what’. From this it follows that if the other proposition were true, that ‘what has regard to matter as it is a ‘what’ can impress the same form on any matter whatever’ [n.148], then if a supernatural agent can transubstantiate, it also follows that a created agent could do this, which is manifestly false.

159. Again, the proposition whereby Giles proves that ‘God does not act through motion’ [n.148], because everything else is an instrument of God and God is the first cause, does not hold. Indeed, it can be drawn rather to the opposite, because an instrument, as it is an instrument, should act through motion only because it is a moved mover; therefore that with respect to which it is an instrument must move it, and consequently ‘that of which it is the instrument’ will be able to act on that instrument through motion.

160. However this doctor’s statement could be expounded [differently so as to be acceptable].

β. Scotus’ own Opinion

161. As concerns this point, then [nn.143-144], I say that the absolute possibility of the conversion of the bread into Christ’s body derives from the full obedience of each term with respect to the divine power.

c. A Doubt and its Solution

162. But there is a special doubt here because of the pre-existing term ‘to which’; for it does not seem that anything could be converted into something pre-existing and that remains in its pristine ‘to be’.

163. It can be said here that partial transubstantiation into something pre-existent is impossible, because partial transubstantiation is a change whereby something potential receives an act it lacked before, and consequently what is composed of the potential and the act is new, for it succeeds privation of the act. But the opposite is the case in total transubstantiation; for there is no change there (as was said before [n.45]), and so there is no need for the term of the transubstantiation to follow a privation or a negation opposite to the term’s ‘to be’.

164. But this answer does not suffice, because although the term of this transubstantiation need not be new because of the idea of change (as is well deduced [n.47]), yet it does seem it should be new because it is the term of a new action. Now nothing is the term of an action properly speaking, namely of an action in the genus of

action, without its receiving being through that action, and this at least according to what is the formal term of the action. Hence the Son of God too, who is the term of the active generation of the Father, receives 'being' and 'being a person' and 'being God' through that active generation; otherwise, if he does not receive true 'being', it does not seem intelligible how there is anything there as term of a generation that is an action in the genus of action. I say this to this extent, to exclude operations that are called actions equivocally; their term, indeed, does not need to receive 'being' because they are not actions in the genus of action but terms, as was said in *Ord.* I d.3 n.601.

165. If you say that this is true of the term of a positive action but transubstantiation is only an action destructive of the term 'from which', and in this respect it is more a non-action – this does not seem probable, because transubstantiation is between two positive terms, so that it is not creation alone or destruction alone.

166. It can be said that transubstantiation, on the basis it is between positive terms that are substances, can be posited to have two ways of being understood. In one way that its term 'to which' is a substance as receiving 'being' through it; in another way that the term is a substance as receiving 'being here' through it. The first action can be called productive of its term 'to which'; the second as adductive of its term, because the term is adduced through it so as to be 'here'. Or in other words, transubstantiation can be to the entity of its term, or to the presence of it somewhere.

167. In the first way transubstantiation can well be to a substance that was before, but it does not seem that it can be posited as being to a substance remaining in its old or previous being. But in the second way transubstantiation can well be to preexistent being, because that being can come to be present newly here where the term 'from which' was.

168. And if you object that the second is not transubstantiation because its term is not substance as substance but is this presence, which is an accident of substance, for the presence alone is acquired by this action;

169. And besides, the term 'to which' will not, by any transubstantiation, be where it was not before (the opposite of which was proved in d.10 q.1 nn.30-41).

170. And further, there would be as many presences here, and consequently as many conversions, as there were things present here; but there are many things in Christ each of which is present here; therefore there are here many conversions.

171. In reply to the first [n.168] one can say that substance is the term of this transubstantiation in the second way of speaking, because substance succeeds to substance; however it does not have new substantial being but only new presence.

172. To the second [n.169] I say that transubstantiation in the first way of speaking does not make the term 'to which' to be where it was not before (and thus must the conclusion be understood that was proved in d.10 n.30). But transubstantiation in the second way of speaking includes in itself a certain change to simple presence concerning the term 'to which', and by reason of this the term 'to which' can very well through it be where it was not before.

173. To the third [n.170] one can say that there is there only a single thing that is first present, namely that which is the first thing signified by this sign; but the other presences are either parts of it or concomitants of it.

d. Conclusion

174. The conversion, therefore, is single, because it is of one substance of bread, present before to the species, into one body as present to the same species.

175. There seems, in favor of this way of understanding, to be this reason, that the way the prior term is converted into the later term is the way the later term succeeds to the prior term; but the later term does not succeed as to 'being' simply but as to 'being present here' to the preexisting bread; therefore the bread is only converted or passes over into the body of Christ as to 'being here'.

176. If you say that the 'being' absolutely of the body succeeds to the 'being' of the bread, because the body remains as to its 'being' simply while the bread ceases to be – on the contrary: the 'succeeding' here is not that of term 'to which' to term 'from which', because thus could the sun be said to succeed to anything down here that is corrupted, since it remains in its 'being' while the corrupted thing ceases to be.

177. One can, according to this way, maintain how the terms of this passing over are impossible in the way they are terms, because they are not together as terms, although by the absolute power of God they could be together (just as, though God could by his absolute power make air to be together with fire, and perhaps to be composed of the same matter, yet as air succeeds to fire they are impossible as to existing together).

178. Against this seems to be that there is no change in what has been proposed, because the way that the body as it is here succeeds to the bread as it is here, the bread through this way only ceases to be as it is here, and thereby it does not cease to be simply; therefore one must grant some other change by which the bread ceases to be simply.

179. Look for the answer.^a

a. [*Interpolation*] It can be said, as the doctor [Scotus] says in the question 'Whether the bread, in its conversion into Christ's body, is annihilated' before his solutions to the arguments (which is question four in order in this distinction [n.339]), that by this conversion the bread only ceases to be here, and thus it only has the change of losing its presence as here, and this by virtue of this conversion primarily. There follows on this conversion another change of losing, that of ceasing to be simply. And thus there are two changes but, by the unity of the conversion, only one change primarily.

2. What is Formal in the Term 'To Which' of Conversion

180. On the second doubt [n.143]: just as there are two things in the thing converted, namely matter and form, so are there in the term 'to which' of conversion; for it is posited here that composite is converted first into composite, and so in each term there must be something formal and something material.

What then is formal in the term 'to which'?

- a. First Opinion, which is from Giles of Rome and Thomas Aquinas
 - α. Fundamental Reasons for the Opinion

181. Here the statement is made that the human nature of Christ is only prime matter and intellective soul.

And for this there are four fundamental reasons.

182. The first is this: of one being there is one ‘to be’; one ‘to be’ is from one form; therefore of one being there is one form.

183. And there is a confirmation from the Philosopher in *Metaphysics* 7.12.1038a5-34, the chapter on the unity of definition [Aquinas *Commentary on Metaphysics* 7.7, 12 ad loc.]. Here the Philosopher maintains that “the genus is nothing beside what are the species of the genus;” and in the same place, “the final difference will be the substance of the thing and the definition;” and in the same place, “There is no order in substance; for how should one understand that this one is prior and that one posterior?” From all these one obtains the result that the unity of definition comes from the fact that the genus is nothing besides the things of which it is the genus, and that the difference that possesses the formal idea states the whole substance of a thing. So there are not different forms there; because if from a first form were taken the genus and from a second the difference, the genus would be something besides the species, at least as to its quidditative ‘to be’; and the ultimate difference would not be the whole substance of the defined thing; also, there would be an order in a thing’s substance according to the order of forms. The Philosopher also seems to say in the same place [*Metaphysics* 7.12.1038a15] that a later difference includes a prior difference, for the cleaving of the foot into toes is a certain sort of footedness. But a later difference would not include the prior difference if the differences were taken from different forms. (For this first reason is taken from ‘unity per se’ [*Ord.* IV d.1 nn.63-64].)

184. The second reason is taken from the difference between accidental form and substantial form, because substantial form bestows ‘being simply’ and accidental form ‘being in a certain respect’. Thence there follows another difference, that accidental form comes to what is a being simply, and substantial form only to what is a being in potency. A third difference is that in the case of substance there is generation simply (because it is from potency simply to being simply), and in the case of accident generation in a certain respect. But if a substantial form could follow another substantial form in the same thing, these differences would not be preserved; for the second substantial form would not give being simply, since it would come to a being in act, and would be generation in a certain respect. And this last middle term, namely about generation, is given special weight because, according to the Philosopher *Physics* 5.1.225a10-32, generation is not motion, for two reasons he touches on there. The first is that what is moved exists; what is generated does not exist. The second is that what is moved is in place and what is generated is not in place; and he is speaking in both cases taking ‘what is generated’ for the subject of generation. Therefore, the subject of generation simply is not, and has no form by which it can be in place; but if a prior form were posited, then through it at least it would be a subject simply and could be in place.

185. The third reason is taken from predication, because when predication is taken from diverse forms either it is per accidens predication, as when the forms are not per se in an order (as ‘man is white’), or if the forms are per se in an order, there is predication per se in the second mode of predication per se (as ‘the surface is white’). Therefore if the genus is taken from one form and the species from another (which one has to say if one posits in man several forms), it follows that predicating the genus of man will not be predication in the first mode of predication per se.

186. A fourth reason can be formed, and it is worth more than all the preceding ones: “plurality is not to be posited without necessity,” from *Physics* 1.4.188a17-18; but

it is not necessary to posit many forms, because the more perfect contains in it virtually the more imperfect (as the quadrilateral contains the triangle), from *On the Soul* 2.3.414b29-32; therefore it is superfluous to posit the other form distinct from the more perfect form that contains it.

β. Applications to the Issue at Hand and Rejection of them

187. Those who rely on these reasons, and hold to the conclusion of them, apply them to the issue at hand.

188. For it is said in one way [Thomas Aquinas] that the first term of this conversion is a composite of matter and intellective soul, not as the soul is intellective or as it constitutes the composite that is man, but as it gives bodily being and constitutes the composite that is body. For it is the same soul and constitutes body in being of man and in being of animal and in being of body and of substance, and this because (without distinction between form and form) it virtually contains the more perfect form. And in this way can something act first through the soul as it gives bodily being, although it does not do the same action through the soul as it gives intellective being, and thus can it be the term of action under the former sort of idea but not under the latter sort.

189. Against this:

If the host, when consecrated by Christ at the Last Supper, had been conserved in a pyx during the Triduum, it would have remained there as the first contained thing. But that into which conversion was first made was not prime matter nor the accidents nor the composite of matter and accident; therefore it was some composite of matter and substantial form; therefore that would always have remained during the Triduum. But it was then not composed of matter and intellective soul, because Christ was truly dead during the Triduum, for he truly died on the cross. And also because his intellective soul was truly separated; but it cannot be that it was both truly separated from and united to the body (from IV d.10 n.258).

190. Again, the term of this conversion ought to be something real, because the conversion is real. But the intellective soul as it gives bodily being, in distinction from intellective being, is (according to some [Henry of Ghent]) not any real being but only something abstracted by an act of the intellect, just as what is common, according to them, is something besides the singulars. Therefore, this conversion cannot be into the soul under the idea of its being the term of the conversion.

191. Someone else, holding to the same conclusion [n.181; Giles of Rome], says that the matter as possessing quantitative mode is the composite into which conversion of the bread is made. For quantity leaves behind in the matter a certain extended mode of the parts, which mode is not any accident in the matter, and yet the matter in that mode is something composite, so much so even that it could be called 'body', as he himself makes clear. And for this reason he denies that there is quantity in the per se term of the conversion, because there would be no transubstantiation if some accident were required in the per se term; and then also quantity would be there first, which they [Giles and Thomas Aquinas] deny, and others generally.

192. On the contrary: I ask whether the quantitative mode is the same as matter precisely taken or not. If it is, and conversion is made into the matter in this way, then conversion is made of all the bread into matter most precisely taken, and consequently

there is no matter converted into matter and form into form,²³ which he denies. If the quantitative mode is not matter precisely taken, then: either the quantitative mode is nothing and so conversion is made into nothing because the formal term of the conversion is pure nothing; or the conversion is made precisely into the matter, and then words are being multiplied fruitlessly.²⁴

193. Or there is something else in the matter: either a substantial or an accidental form. If a substantial form and it is not the intellective soul, the proposed conclusion is gained that there is another substantial form in the body of Christ [n.186]. If it is an accidental form, the unacceptable result follows which he believes he is avoiding, namely that in the per se term of this conversion there is contained some accident [n.191].

194. Again, nothing caused by a posterior can be the same as what is naturally prior; this mode, for you, is caused and left behind by quantity [n.191], which is naturally posterior to the substance of the matter; therefore it cannot be the same substantially as the matter. The proof of the major is that if it is really the same as the prior, it does not depend really on it; but a posterior depends really on a prior, and a prior does not depend really on a posterior; therefore it follows that it does depend and does not depend. And the major of this reasoning is further plain because it is a contradiction for something to be and for something else not to be that is the same as it; but if this did not depend on anything, and that which is the same as it did depend, the former could be without the latter.

195. Again, that body, which you posit as the first term of the conversion, is either a mathematical body or a natural body (for the Philosopher did not distinguish body into more divisions [*Physics* 4.8.216a27-b8; *Ord.* II d.2 nn.216-218]). If it is a mathematical body then it includes quantity actually; therefore, you have what you are avoiding. If it is a natural body, then either through a natural substantial form or through quality; if in the first way, the proposed conclusion is gained, that the form is not the intellective soul; if in the second way and the natural quality presupposes quantity, the proposed conclusion is still gained, because the first term of the conversion would include matter with quantity and quality, and it will not only be a being per accidens but doubly a being per accidens.²⁵

196. Again, the words of consecration are not more efficacious as regard the blood than as regard the body; but when 'this is the cup' or 'this is the blood' is said, the term of the conversion there cannot be imagined to be matter alone under a quantitative mode, because that is not blood; for blood states some substance that is generated from consumed nutriment and is next to be converted into flesh, and it would be neither generated nor converted unless it had a proper substantial form. In addition too, the body is not posited as something abstracted from the truth of flesh and bone and the like, but rather as it includes all the parts of what is first capable of being ensouled; but if 'this is flesh' or 'this is bone' were said, it would seem a fiction to posit that the term of

²³ Sc. matter taken as precisely as matter does not differ into matter under this form or matter under that form, for as taken precisely it has no reference to this form or to that. So there can be no conversion of it taken precisely, for there is thus no different matter or form for it to be converted into.

²⁴ If the quantitative mode is other than matter precisely taken, then it is nothing, for by supposition there is nothing but matter there, since conversion, as Giles says, is not into anything with quantity. If the quantitative mode is precisely the matter, then nothing is added by talking about it.

²⁵ The proposed conclusion is gained because the matter without accidents will be what conversion is into (n.191), which returns to the former view that the body is a natural body through a natural substantia form.

conversion is only matter under a quantitative mode; therefore much more so in the issue at hand, when taking ‘body’ as it is something that includes all these, the way it is taken here.

γ. Insufficiency of Both Solutions

197. So these ways, then, which hold to this negative conclusion that in the body of Christ there is no other form than the intellectual form – neither of them sufficiently saves the truth of the Eucharist. But neither sufficiently saves the truth of the thing contained in the Eucharist, namely the truth of the body of Christ, because as the body living and dead was the same in natural existence so also is it in the Eucharist.

198. This is proved by many authorities:

Of these one is from Ambrose *On the Mysteries* ch.9 n.53 (and it is in Gratian *Decretum* p.3 d.2 ch.74), who says, “The body indeed that was taken from the Virgin, that suffered and was buried, that rose from the dead and ascended into heaven.”

119. Pope Leo says the same in his sermon *On the Lord’s Ascension* tr.73 serm.1 ch.3, “We hold not with doubtful faith but with most firm knowledge that that nature will sit on the throne of the Father which had lain in the tomb.”

200. The same is obtained from Augustine in a sermon that begins “All things, most beloved...” [in fact Faustus de Riez, *On the Lord’s Ascension* sermo 1 n.1].

201. Against Augustine [in fact Fulgentius *On the Faith to Peter* ch.2 n.11], “The same man in the womb of his Mother both hung on the cross and lay in the tomb and resurrected.” But this identity cannot be understood save by reason of the part that is the body.

202. Damascene also maintains this *Orthodox Faith* ch.74, “He set aside none of the parts of nature.”

203. Again, Gregory on *John* 20.11, “Mary was standing...” (*Homily* 40 on *John*), “What he laid in the tomb in dying, that he lifted above the angels in rising.”

204. Also from Augustine [in fact Vigilius Tapsensis, *To Felicianus* ch.14], “He did not abandon the flesh in the tomb that he formed in the womb.”

205. This is also confirmed by Innocent III (Gregory IX *Decretals* III tit.41 ch.8), “From the side of the Savior flowed blood and water, in which have been instituted the two principal sacraments, baptism and the Eucharist.” Therefore the Eucharist, as here indicated, both signifies the blood that flowed from the side and is efficacious by virtue of that blood. But it only signifies the blood that is part of the body, and it is only efficacious in virtue of the blood that flowed from the body of Christ; therefore the body from which the blood flowed was the body of Christ. But this blood flowed from the dead body, because *John* 19 says that when Christ was already dead “one of the soldiers opened his side, since they saw that Jesus was already dead.” Therefore the already dead body was the same as the body of Christ alive.

206. Again, commenting on *Jonah* 2.7, “You will raise from corruption...” Jerome says, “The very same body and very same flesh rise that were buried in the earth.”

b. Second Opinion, which is from Henry of Ghent

α. Exposition of the Opinion

207. Others [Henry of Ghent], conceding this conclusion [n.197] for which the authorities have been adduced [nn.198-206], say that the four reasons adduced for the negative conclusion [sc. the negative conclusion that there are not several substantial forms in Christ, nn.181-186] are valid about anything that is produced by one and the same agent, but are not valid about man, because man is produced by two agents and two changes: for the body is produced by the propagator, but the soul by the creator (Aristotle *Generation of Animals* 2.4.736b27-28, says “Only the intellect is from outside”).

208. And proofs are given for these two conclusions, namely for the first conclusion that these reasons are valid there, and for the second conclusion that they are not valid here.

209. [Proof of the first conclusion] – The first conclusion is proved as follows: “Everything that is, for this reason is, that it is one in number,” according to Boethius [in fact Dominicus Gundissalinus, *On Unity*]; therefore, for any single natural thing there is one change in number; but a change is distinguished in genus, species, and number by the form that is its term, *Physics* 5.4.227b3-24; therefore, of one change by which one natural thing is produced there is one form in number that is its term.

210. If it be said that in the generation of one natural thing there are many particular generations, and that these changes are to diverse forms as to their proper terms, – on the contrary: these several forms are drawn out from one potency of matter or from diverse ones.

211. Not from one potency because, according to the Commentator *Metaphysics* 12 com.11, “the number of potencies in matter follows the number of species;” and so these two forms, by which it would be one potency, would be of the same species; but it is impossible for two such forms to be together in the same thing. And further, then these forms would perfect matter as to the same potency, and then there would be two acts of the same potency, which seems contrary to the Philosopher *Physics* 3.1.201a19-21, a35-b.2, where he maintains that potencies are distinguished as the acts are, because if ‘able to be healthy’ and ‘able to be ill’ were the same, ‘being ill’ and ‘being healthy’ would be the same.

212. Nor can it be said that these forms are drawn out of diverse potencies of matter, because since the potencies would be in the matter without order, it would follow that the forms that perfect the matter would be without order, which is impossible. Then too it would follow that matter, as it is the term ‘from which’ of a generation that includes many changes, would be a being per accidens as having many potencies; but from a being per accidens only a being per accidens is generated; therefore the thing generated would only be per accidens one.

213. Again, all these reasons validly proceed from the per se idea of substantial form; for substantial form per se constitutes a being in act simply.

214. And if a reply is made in terms of ‘complete and incomplete’ – this is refuted because there would be no way to distinguish substantial form from accidental form. For however much a form might be of this sort or of that, one could escape the fact by saying that the substantial one was accidental, and conversely, by way of the complete and incomplete. And from this the following reasoning can be formed: that position is irrational which removes the distinction between substance and accident; but this reasoning is of this sort, because one cannot use it to conclude that some form is

accidental by the fact that it is added to a being in act, for according to you the being it was added to was in incomplete act; and so may I say that if an accidental form be added, what was pre-existent to it was in incomplete act.²⁶

215. [Proof of the second conclusion] – The second conclusion, namely that the arguments [nn.182-186] are not valid in the case of man [nn.207-208], but that the opposite is true there, is proved as follows: Every per se agent has per se some act that is the proper term of its action, and consequently where there are diverse agents and diverse actions the same form cannot be the per se term (this is confirmed by the Philosopher in *Physics* 5.4.228a6-19, where he maintains that the same health, because of the diversity of actions, cannot go back to this and that health). But the uncreated agent acts per se for the generation of man, because he infuses the intellectual soul, and the created agent acts per se for the generation of man by altering, corrupting, and changing, otherwise an ox would no more be father of an ox than an ass would be, save because by the action of an ox from the seed of the ox an ox were generated; and so it is in man.

216. And the argument is confirmed because, if the same thing be the per se term of each agent, either the same composite or the same form. If the first, the composite, be granted then a man is created, because he is the per se term of creation; if the form, then the form is per se from the propagator because it is the per se term of the action; and both are unacceptable [sc. because the composite that is man is not created but propagated, and because the form or the intellectual soul of man is not propagated but created].

217. [Four things added to the proofs of the first conclusion] – And Henry adds, in conformity with his first reason [nn.209-214], that for two forms drawn out of the potency of matter there are distinct powers; but for two forms one of which is drawn out from the potency of matter and the other created there are not two abilities or powers; and so there is more a single generation for two forms in the second way than in the first.

218. He also adds that the form that can give being to matter really, in separation from a second form, is of a nature to constitute a supposit, and so every form that comes to it in addition is an accident; but a form that is not of a nature to give per se being without another form is not of a nature to constitute a supposit save miraculously. And, as to the issue at hand, the form of the mixture is not a form of a nature to perfect the whole save while the intellectual soul is perfecting it, and so it is of a nature to be separated from the matter when the soul ceases to form it. And therefore it is a miracle that the form of the mixture remains in the matter without the intellectual soul; nor is the intellectual soul that comes to the mixture an accident, because the first is not of a nature to constitute a supposit save miraculously.

219. He adds too that the same matter is what can properly be perfected by the mixture and the intellectual soul, but the prior form, that of the mixture, does not constitute what is properly receptive of the soul, for then the intellectual soul would come to a being in act and would then not be a substantial form

²⁶ The argument seems to be that, if one supposes there could be many substantial forms on the ground that a prior substantial form would be incomplete and would be completed by a later and more complete substantial form, then one has abolished the distinction between substance and accident. For an accident is said to be an accident because it comes to or is added to what already exists as a substance. But if a previous incomplete substantial form is completed by another more complete substantial form that comes to or is added to it, then there is no difference between a substantial form that comes to or is added to an (incomplete) substance and an accidental form that comes to or is added to an (incomplete) substance. But to abolish the distinction between substantial and accidental forms is irrational.

220. He adds, fourth, that the intellective soul contains in itself the vegetative and sensitive soul; and the form of the mixture contains virtually all the other forms that can exist separately in other forms of body. And therefore the intellective soul does not contain the form of the mixture, because it is unmixed and without extension and without ability to be extended, and therefore it contains the forms that are able to have being in such a way. But the form of the mixture contains all the forms that are extended and able to be extended. And therefore these two [intellective soul and form of the mixture] are sufficient in man's case.

β. Rejection of the Opinion

221. Argument against the conclusion [n.207] is drawn from the fourth and last addition [n.220] as follows: The vegetative soul in a plant contains in itself the form of corporeity, and the sensitive soul in an ox contains the vegetative soul and corporeity, otherwise one would have to posit several forms in them, which Henry denies [nn.209-214]. I then take this proposition, 'whatever perfectly and formally contains some form that formally contains another form, also contains that other form'; but the intellective soul perfectly and formally contains the vegetative and sensitive soul, according to you [n.220], and this not under an idea that destroys the idea of the vegetative and sensitive soul but under a more perfect idea than those forms would have without the intellective soul; therefore the intellective soul perfectly contains the form [sc. corporeity] that the vegetative and sensitive soul contain.

222. So it seems without reason to say that the sensitive soul in a brute and the vegetative soul in a plant contain the form of corporeity and yet that the vegetative and sensitive soul, as contained in the intellective soul, and in a more perfect way, do not contain the same form.

223. If you say that they are contained in the intellective soul in a non-extended way and do not contain the form of corporeity, which is capable of extension – on the contrary: either the way not capable of extension or the way capable of extension or neither is repugnant to the sensitive and vegetative soul. If in the first way then they are not in the intellective soul. If in the second way then they do not contain the form of corporeity. But if the third member is granted, namely neither this way nor that, then the sensitive and vegetative soul will be able to contain the form of corporeity indifferently as they are in themselves or as they are contained in the intellective soul. For then they contain corporeity because of the order of perfection of form to form, and not because they have such and such a mode of existence; but the order of perfection is always the same.

224. Again, it seems more manifest (setting the faith aside) one can conclude that the form of the mixture differs from the soul in other living things than from the intellective soul in man.

225. The proof is that the same effect cannot regularly come from agents of just any sort and however diverse; but by whatever and in whatever way a living body is corrupted, provided however it be not immediately reduced to its elements, the same corpse and a corpse of the same idea is always produced (as is plain to the senses). But the same thing cannot be the proper term of this action and of that agent; so no new thing is produced by the corrupting action of the animated thing, but it is something left behind.

226. This is plain in a particular case: if an ox is destroyed by a knife or by drowning or killing or in other ways, always the same cadaver of the same idea is left behind; but these and those corrupting agents are not of a nature to introduce the same but rather different forms, and this at once without any previous alteration. Rather, if the same form had to be produced and by the same agent, a uniform alteration would yet seem to be a necessary prerequisite; but here, however different in form the alteration that precedes and however much from different agents, the same term always follows.

227. Against the second addition, namely about a form that naturally perfects separately from another form [n.218], the argument is as follows: every agent that has sufficient power for its own action without the action of something else, and sufficient power for the term of the action, is able to form the passive subject into that form without the action of something else; but a natural agent has power for its action and for the term of its action, which is the form of the mixture, using its ordinary influence without special divine action. For the fact that God then creates the soul in the same instant is not something naturally prior to the propagator's introducing of the form of the mixture; rather it is naturally posterior, just as the form for which it is the disposition follows the disposition. Nor does God create the soul simply necessarily, but he does so merely contingently; therefore that agent [sc. the propagator] can form the passive subject in the form of the mixture without divine action; and consequently there is no repugnance nor contradiction (with respect even to a created agent) in the form of the mixture doing the forming without the intellectual soul. Therefore there is no miracle [n.218].

228. Against the third addition, about what in the intellectual soul is properly capable of perfection, there are two arguments [n.219]:

First as follows: what is properly perfectible can be made perfect with its proper perfection by a sufficient agent when any other agent and any other perfection are removed (especially an agent that does not depend in its acting on the action of that other agent). Therefore, if prime matter is what is first and properly perfected by the intellectual soul, then by the agency of God (who does not depend in his acting on anything created) the matter can be formed with the intellectual soul without the action of a created agent and without the term of that action; and so the intellectual soul can immediately, without any form of mixture, perfect prime matter. This seems unacceptable, because such a composite does not seem to be a man, since it would not have what belongs to the being of man; nor would it not be a man, because it would have that by which a man is formally a man.

229. Second as follows: from two acts, one of which is not in potency with respect to the other, nothing per se one can come to be (this seems to be taken from *Metaphysics* 7.13.1039a3-8, 8.6.1054a14-25), because each of the acts there remains simply act with respect to the other, and nothing per se one comes to be from two acts that, in and between themselves, are act. But for you the form of the mixture and the intellectual soul are two acts, and neither is potential with respect to the other, because neither is the idea of receiving the other; therefore nothing per se one comes to be from them.

230. If you say, that it is rather because the same thing (namely the matter) receives both, this is nothing against the minor of the argument [n.229 'for you the form of the mixture and the intellectual soul are two acts'], because the per se unity of any being is from its act, not from its potency (from the above cited references [n.229]).

γ. To the Reasons for the Opinion

231. [To the reasons for the first conclusion] – Against the reasons for this opinion [nn.209-214] to the extent it agrees with the preceding opinion.

232. Against the way by division ‘either by one change or by many’ [n.209], I argue as follows: either two changes ordered to ordered forms are sufficient for the unity of a generated composite or only one change is required. If the latter is not sufficient, then there are several changes, though ordered ones, by certain agents, yet the generated thing will not be one, and then man – according to this opinion – will not be one. But if the former is sufficient then, although the several changes are from one agent, the thing produced will be no less able to be one than if the changes were from diverse agents. Indeed, other things being equal, it seems rather that one agent suffices than several.

233. The response is made to this that two changes, for which there is one potency of matter, suffice for the product’s being one, but not where there are diverse potencies of matter; but, according to the first addition [n.217], there are diverse powers for forms drawn out of the potency of matter, but for a form drawn out and another not drawn out there is the same power; and two agents have regard to this potency and to that, and therefore two changes from two such subordinate agents suffice for producing the composite, but the two other changes do not suffice.

234. On the contrary: either the potencies are numbered with the numbering of the form, and then it follows that there are two potencies on both sides just as there are two forms, whether they are drawn out by the same or by diverse agents. Or the potency is not numbered with respect to the form but with respect to the agent, and it follows that there is more a numbering of potency when the agents are diverse than when there is one agent only.

235. You will say: they are numbered according to the number absolutely of the forms received in the composite and that are drawn out from its potency, and such are those that are the term of the actions of a natural agent. But the form that is the term of the action of the creator is not such, and so they are not numbered according to this form.

236. On the contrary: it is an accident to matter that the form perfecting it is drawn out or not drawn out from its potency; for if it were possible for some form to exist in matter and yet not to be drawn from its potency, it would perfect the matter just as if it were drawn out from its potency; therefor the matter is disposed in the same way in idea of being perfectible to what is drawn out and to what is not drawn out, and consequently the potencies of matter will be numbered or will not be numbered in the same way in respect of this form and of that.

237. In accord with this one can make reply to the first reason for the second opinion [n.209]: for either member can be granted. And first indeed that there is one change by which one natural being is produced – and this when speaking of the final change. And then I concede that the conclusion is true that there is only one form that is the per se term of the change. However, there are several partial changes that have had several preceding forms as term: either in order of duration if one posits that one form is introduced earlier in time than another, or in order of nature if one posits that they are all introduced at the same time, unless (as was said in [Scotus’] *Metaphysics* IX q.14 nn.40-43) there was not properly a change for the final form.

238. An example of this is if organic parts differing in substantial form are posited; for then the generation of one part precedes the generation of another part not only in nature but also in time, and so also does the generation that is simply generation of the whole, namely by which the total form is produced with the forms of all the parts having been already presupposed.

239. But by thus positing one or many forms you would say: is there one potency or several in the matter with respect to these several ordered forms?

240. One could grant either this alternative or that:

And if one potency is granted, I respond to the two refutations of it [n.211]. To the first: 'a potency one in species is related to a form one in species' is true, when they are of the same order. And to the two authorities from the Philosopher *Physics* 3 [n.211] I reply that they are understood not of receptive potency and received act, but of potency and act as these are opposite differences of being, as is plain of 'able to be healed' and 'being sick' which he gives as examples. But this is not true of the potency of a subject, because the same body and the same receptive potency can be posited in a body with respect to two contraries, though the acts are not the same. But this distinction between act and potency in this way and that are plain from this question, in the first part [nn.126-132].

241. If it also be granted that there are two potencies with respect to this and that form, then a reply can easily be made to the two refutations of this member:

For when it is said first that 'the two potencies are present in the matter without order' [n.212], this can be denied; indeed there is in the matter an order to one of the forms more essentially and more immediately than to the other, just as a potency in a subject can, with respect to diverse properties, be prior with respect to one of them and posterior with respect to the other. But if it were conceded that the powers are equally balanced, it does not follow that the acts are; for there can be an order in the potencies as regard the terms although not an order in them as regard the foundation (as is plain in many other cases, where two respects without order are in one foundation and the terms of those respect have an order between themselves and in relation to the foundation).

242. The other proof about being per accidens [n.212] is not evident; for although air could be generated from fire, yet not for this reason does it follow that fire under the idea of 'term from which' is a being per accidens, because this potentiality and that do not per se constitute a 'term from which'. So too on the part of the subject: it does not follow, if it have different potencies, that 'if the powers are accidental to each other then what has them is a being per accidens'.

243. The second principal reason for this opinion [n.213], which proceeds from the idea of substantial form and from the unity of the thing, does not hold, since I distinguish 'to give being simply'; for, in accordance with the Philosopher *Generation and Corruption* 1.3.317b1-3 (where he argues that nothing can come to be from a 'non-being simply'), I reply to the argument by drawing a distinction within 'non-being simply':

Either as the 'simply' is taken universally, and then a 'non-being simply' is a pure nothing, and it is in this way that from a 'non-being simply' nothing can come to be; and the being opposite to this non-being is any being whatever, however minimal be the entitative reality that it have.

In another way ‘being simply’ is taken as it is distinguished from ‘being in a certain respect’; and then ‘being simply’ is substance and ‘being in a certain respect’ is accident; and it is plain what is the ‘non-being simply’ opposite to this.

244. So I say to the issue at hand that substantial form gives ‘being simply’; not indeed ‘first being’ (namely what immediately follows ‘non-being simply’), but the ‘being simply’ that is distinguished from ‘being in a certain respect’.

The first point is plain, because if an accident were to come first to matter, although it would give matter ‘first formal being’, yet it would give it not simply but in a certain respect, because it is not act simply but act in a certain respect. Also, there is no material substantial form that does not presuppose matter, and a matter that has ‘being simply’, that is ‘being’ departing from non-being (as was proved in this solution, the first part [nn.130-131]), because, according to the adversaries [Henry of Ghent], matter has ‘being simply’ in this way even without any form. Therefore, it is not just substantial form that gives ‘being simply’ nor does it give it first, that is universally, but it gives it when ‘being simply’ is taken in the second way[n.243], as it is opposed to ‘being in a certain respect’. I say therefore that, as being is divided into prior and posterior, or first and second, and the first contains substance under it and the posterior contains accident under it, so ‘simply’ in this way of understanding is equivalent to what is ‘naturally first’, and ‘in a certain respect’ is equivalent to what is ‘naturally posterior’ (and in this way every accident gives ‘being in a certain respect’).

245. I say, therefore, that substantial form, whether it comes to something either already possessing being or not, always gives ‘being simply’ in this second way but not in the first way – just as accidental form, whatever it comes to, gives being not ‘simply’ but ‘in a certain respect’.

246. And if you ask “how can it be proved that this form gives ‘being simply’ and that does not, if giving being as it departs immediately from non-being is of the idea of neither?” – I reply: are you asking about the thing in itself or in relation to our cognition? If in itself, there is no cause that this gives ‘being simply’ and that ‘being in a certain respect’ save that this is substantial form and that accidental form; for just as there is no cause that a hot thing heats, because the cause is immediate (and between an immediate cause and its effect there is no intermediate cause), so in the genus of formal cause this proposition is immediate ‘heat constitutes a hot thing and soul constitutes man’; and it is the immediacy of form to formal act.

247. And if you are asking about the thing in relation to our knowledge, which the argument [n.246] seems to be proceeding about, as if this opinion would destroy all distinction for us between substantial form and accidental form – I reply:

Philosophers have distinguished between substantial form and accidental form a posteriori through these middle terms: ‘to have a contrary and not to have a contrary’, ‘to receive more and less and not to receive them’, and ‘there can be motion in accord with it or there cannot be’. But to the issue itself I say briefly that there is one middle term through which, as concerns our knowledge, the distinction is more manifestly drawn between what form coming to a being in act is a substantial form and what form coming to a being in act is an accidental form. For as long as the process is made through substantial forms, a posterior is always more perfect than those that are prior; but when it comes to accidental forms a later form is more imperfect than the last preexisting one. But as to what form is more perfect than another, this cannot be made known to us save a

posteriori. And this is reasonable both in itself and in us; in itself indeed because in a subject the same in genus no form comes to a form save as making it more perfect in that genus; but whatever comes to it in another genus, namely as an accident, is more imperfect (whatever is presupposed) than a substantial form.

The response then to the form of the argument is plain, that this opinion does not destroy the distinction between accidental form and substantial form, neither in itself (for this distinction is immediate, because this is this and that is that), nor as to our knowledge through those middle terms through which we are able to recognize this distinction. And no wonder if, when distinguishing this form from that, one must, according to our understanding, use things posterior to this form and to that, because neither do we in any other way recognize substantial forms in anything, as it were, save a posteriori.

248. [To the reason for the second conclusion] – The reason that he gives for the other member [n.215], namely that the four reasons are not valid about man, make for our position.

Yet insofar as he denies this conclusion about other living things, one can reply that in respect of any living thing one can posit that it has two agents, or as it were two. For any form of life is more excellent simply than any form of mixture, and so whatever introduces the form of life must be more perfect in itself, or in another, as it precisely introduces the form of the mixture. Therefore, although it is by the same agent that the mixed body and the soul are introduced in a plant or a brute, yet the ‘same’ there is as it were two agents, because the agent has in itself the idea of a more perfect and of a more imperfect agent.

c. To the Fundamental Reasons for the First Opinion

249. To the reasons for the first opinion [n.181].

α. To the First Reason

250. As to the first [n.182] I concede the first proposition, that “of one being there is one ‘to be’;” but the second, namely that “one ‘to be’ requires only one form” needs to be denied when taking ‘to be’ uniformly in the major and minor. For just as being and one are divided into simple and composite, so ‘to be’ and ‘to be one’ are distinguished into ‘to be’ of this sort and of that sort; therefore ‘to be’ per se one does not determine for itself a ‘to be’ simply, just as neither does any member of a division determine for itself precisely the other of the dividers.

251. In this way, there is one ‘to be’ of the whole composite and yet it includes many partial ‘to be’s’, just as a whole is one being and yet has and includes many partial entities. For I have no knowledge of this fiction that ‘to be’ is something that supervenes to the essence, and is not composite the way the essence is composite. The ‘to be’ of the whole composite includes in this way the ‘to be’ of all the parts, and includes many partial ‘to be’s’ of many parts or forms, just as a whole being that is made of many forms includes all the partial entities.

252. If, however, the force be altogether in the words, I concede that the total ‘to be’ of a whole composite is principally through one form, and that this form is the one whereby the whole composite is ‘this being’; but this form is the ultimate one, that comes

additionally to all the preceding ones. And in this way is the whole composite divided into two essential parts: into act proper, namely the ultimate form by which it is what it is, and into the proper potency of that act, which includes first matter along with all the preceding forms.

253. And I concede in this way that the total ‘to be’ is made complete by one form, which gives to the whole what it is. But it does not follow from this that in the whole there is included precisely one form, or that there are not included in the whole several forms, not as specifically constituting the composite but as certain elements included in the potential of the composite.

254. There is an example of this in a thing composed of integral parts: for the more perfect a living thing is, the more it requires several organs (and probably organs made distinct in species through substantial forms); and yet it is more truly one – by more truly, I mean, more perfectly, though it is not more truly one in the sense of more indivisible. For a truer unity and being are found with a greater composition in composite things than in the parts.

255. To the confirmation adduced from the *Metaphysics* [n.183], that chapter does not seem to be expounded well by Aquinas, as is plain in the *Exposition* I produced on that chapter;²⁷ and the authorities verbally quoted are truncated and irrelevant to the minor premise [n.182, “one ‘to be’ is from one form”]. The first authority, indeed, is truncated, because the sequence is: “the genus is nothing beside what are the species of the genus, or if is indeed it is so as matter;” and the second part of this disjunction is true. Hence in favor of this second member he adds an example “voice indeed, as it is a genus.” It is the intention of the Philosopher, then, that what the genus imports is only that which is potential with respect to the species.

256. And in the same way, after “the final difference will be the substance of the thing and the definition” [n.183] there follows “in no way can one understand that the whole quidditative idea is the ultimate difference (for then the genus would be altogether superfluous in the definition, because the ultimate difference alone would express the whole essence of the thing); but one must understand it thus, that it is the whole substance of the thing as complete of it, in the way that the whole essence of what has the form is from the form that completes it.” For Aristotle himself assigns here the unity of definition in the same way as he said he put it first in *Posterior Analytics* 2.3-10; and the way that in *Metaphysics* 8.6.1045a7-33 he assigns the unity of a thing, that just as there he says the composite is constituted of two parts (because “this is act and that is potency”), so here he says [7.12.1038a25-30] that one quidditative or defining concept is composed of two concepts, because this concept is potential and that actual. And just as act is more principal there than potency, and consequently is the more principal idea of unity as of being, so here too the concept of the ultimate difference, which is the more actual concept, is the more principal idea of the unity of definition.

257. As to what is added there [n.183] that ‘there is no order in substances’, [I wrote in my commentary *Exposition on Metaphysics* 7 sect.2 ch.13 n.108] that “it is nothing to the purpose; for immediately prior Aristotle has maintained [*Metaphysics*

²⁷ Scotus’ *Exposition of Aristotle’s Metaphysics* 7 sect.2 ch.13 n.103: “One must note that those who deny the plurality of forms want to take their argument from this, that the unity of a definition comes from the fact that the genus is nothing besides the species of the genus, at least as to quidditative ‘to be’...”

7.12.1038a30-34²⁸] that if there is trivial repetition when a prior difference is added to a later one, there will by parity of reasoning be triviality in the opposite direction; for there is no such order in the substances, that is, in what belongs to the substantial or defining idea of something, because different orders make and remove the triviality.”

258. As to what is added there [n.183], that ‘a lower difference includes a higher difference’, this is manifestly false:

Because then it would be impossible to define a thing through the proximate genus and the proximate difference, for the same thing would be said twice, namely the higher difference that is per se included both in the idea of the lower difference and in the idea of the proximate genus. Hence if one puts the idea of the genus and the difference in place of the names, the triviality manifestly appears. And this is the Philosopher’s intention in that place [*Metaphysics* 7.12.1038a18-35], how the triviality should be recognized in the definition, namely by putting the ideas for the names.

259. Nor even could a definition be given through the remote genus and several differences, because the same and proximate difference that divides the remote genus would be said several times in the many differences added to the genus. This result is plainly against the Philosopher in that same place [*Metaphysics* 7.12.1037b29-38a2], when he says, “Nothing else is in a definition besides the first stated genus and the differences. But there are different genera: the first genus and with this the exhaustive differences;” and he at once gives an example there: “as first ‘animal’, next ‘biped animal’, and again ‘non-winged biped animal’; and it is similar too if several differences are stated; there is absolutely no difference whether it is said through more or through fewer differences.” He means to say that a definition is nothing other than the first genus with many differences, and nothing other than the proximate genus and one difference, because the proximate genus is nothing other than the remote genus with many differences included in it; and both ways of defining would include triviality if a lower difference per se included a higher one.

260. As to what is added there [n.183] that Aristotle himself meant to say this – the authority “the cleaving of the foot into toes is a certain sort of footedness” is not to the purpose; for Aristotle’s understanding there is not about predication in the first mode per se [sc. when the predicate falls into the definition of the subject], of the sort which is understood through those abstract terms [sc. ‘cleaving’, ‘footedness’], but that the lower difference should per se divide the higher insofar as it is such, and this per se division is made known through these abstract terms.

261. And that Aristotle does understand things thus is plain from what precedes, at the beginning of the paragraph, where he says that “one should divide the difference of the difference.” And he adds how he understands this: “not by saying ‘of what has feet, one sort is winged and another not-winged’, but that ‘one has cloven feet, and the other non-cloven feet’; for these are differences of feet.” And the passage cited follows: “the cleaving of the foot into toes is a certain sort of footedness,” that is to say, ‘cleaving of feet per se particularizes footedness’, and so it per se divides ‘having feet’, but ‘winged’ does not.

²⁸ “It will be plain if one transpose such definitions, as the definition of ‘man’ which says ‘a two-footed animal having feet’; for it is superfluous to say ‘having feet’ when ‘two-footed’ has been said. But there is no order in the substance, for how should one understand that the latter is posterior and the former prior?”

262. From the whole of this chapter [of Aristotle's *Metaphysics*], then, if it is consistently expounded throughout, as it has been expounded elsewhere [Scotus, *Exposition on Metaphysics* 7 sect.2 ch.13], one does not get that the genus is nothing else per se in the definition besides the idea of the difference, nor does one get that the ultimate difference is the whole definition, or that it indicates the whole substance of the thing, or that there is no order per se in what is imported per se by ordered differences, nor that an inferior difference per se includes a higher. Nor does one get anything for the unity of form; rather the whole of that chapter is saved by positing a quidditative idea composed of an actual and a potential concept, and that the actual one is the more principal cause of the unity (just as one should say about a composite being as to its real unity, as he himself says in the *Metaphysics* [nn.255-262]).

β. To the Second Reason

263. As to the second reason [n.184] the response has been given [nn.243-244] that there is equivocation over 'simply' [sc. 'being simply' as opposed to 'non-being simply', and 'being simply' as opposed to 'being in a certain respect']. And indeed, as for 'to give being first', it neither belongs to every substantial form nor to substantial form alone to give 'being simply' such that quantity, if it were to come to matter first, could not give it formal being (though not first being) that departs from formal non-being; and a substantial form can come additionally to a second and third substantial form. But if one distinguishes 'being simply' from 'being in a certain respect' (as what is naturally first from what is naturally second), then every substantial form gives 'being simply' and every accidental form gives being not 'simply' but 'in a certain respect'. You should not ask, therefore, if this form comes to that form first or second but, whenever it comes, what real act is it of a nature to bestow? The same sort surely as the sort that the form is.

264. But the two proofs brought forward from *Physics* 5 [n.184], about generation and motion, seem to contain a special difficulty.

To the first I say that 'non-being', when taken for the subject of generation, is taken there as privation, and the sense is: 'what is generated is not' (that is, what is the subject of generation lacks 'being simply'); but 'what is moved is' (that is, as subject to motion it does not lack some 'being simply').

265. And if you argue that therefore what gives being simply has no substantial form – this does not follow, but is a fallacy of the consequent; for it is possible to have 'being simply' in this way through one substantial form and yet to lack the 'being simply' that another substantial form is of a nature to give.

266. The other argument, about being in place [n.184], brings in, as it seems, another difficulty. However, a response about change of place and change of alteration can easily be given through the same fact, that everything changeable in alteration, or by transference through some form presupposed to the change, is located in place; because quantity necessarily precedes each of these changes. But what is generated, that is, what is subject to generation, is not per se located in place, either by what is subject to generation or by another form that it has through generation. For although the subject of generation in act would possess substantial form and even some quantity (which is the reason of being in place), yet it does not have quantity as quantity is the subject of generation; because quantity is not the idea of receiving the term of this change. And so I

say universally that the subject of generation, as it is per se the subject of generation, does not include anything that is per se the idea of being in place, because it is nothing but substance alone – even though quantity accompany it, yet the quantity is not anything of it per se insofar as it is subject to generation.

267. And if you ask how that which is changed with the change of increase is in place – although this doubt is not necessary for the present purpose, yet I reply that quantity or quantum, according to some, is presupposed in the change of increase and decrease; and this or that sort of term of quantity is the term of this or that change.

268. But against this: in the case of increase and decrease no quantity remains through the whole change or under either term of it, and the subject does remain the same; therefore, a quantum is not the subject of this change. And besides, of what genus is the term the per se species? If of the genus of quantity, the term is quantity; if not, the change will not be per se to quantity.

269. I say, therefore, that just as in the case of a subject of alteration, although it is under quantity during the whole alteration, yet one should not say that a quality is the subject of alteration (because the quality is accidental to what is the subject of alteration), so too in the case of a subject of increase, although it is always a quantum while it is being increased yet, from the fact that it varies in quantity (as a subject of alteration varies in quality), the quantity is not the idea nor the per se condition of the subject of increase.

270. So why?

Just as the subject per se of alteration is a being in act as to prior forms of quality yet is not a being in act as to quality, so the per se subject of increase is some being in act as to some prior form of quantity, yet it is not per se a being in act as to quantity; and the prior form is nothing but a substantial one. Therefore, the per se subject of increase and decrease is nothing but substance alone.

271. How then is the subject that there changes in place?

I reply: as a universal fact, the subject of any change is in place either through a form previously acquired in the changeable thing changed by such change, or through a form according to which the changeable thing is in flux or changes; and the first alternative is true of alteration and transfer, and the second is true of increase and decrease.

272. But that which is the subject of generation is not in place in either way; for neither is anything that is the idea of being in place presupposed to change in the subject, nor is that according to which the subject is in flux the idea of being in place.

γ. To the Third Reason

273. To the third reason, about predication [n.185], I reply that, *prima facie*, it does seem that the predicate taken from a posterior form is not said per se of that which is taken from a prior form, just as this statement is not per se ‘man is white’ or ‘a surface is colored’. And from this one cannot get more than that this statement is not per se ‘animal is man’.

274. And if you object that the same holds conversely, for this statement is not per se ‘a colored thing is a thing with a surface’, I reply that ‘what is taken precisely from a prior form’ and ‘what is taken precisely from a posterior form’ are so disposed that

neither is per se included in the other; so the prediction is not per se, just as not conversely either. Now when one posits that the genus is taken from the prior form and the difference from the posterior form, one must conclude that the genus is not predicated per se of the difference nor conversely – which I concede. But it does not follow that the genus is not predicated per se of the species, because the species, although it imports the ultimate difference as concerns what is principal in its idea, yet does not import it precisely, but imports along with it the idea of the genus as belonging to its per se concept.

275. And if finally you object that neither is this statement per se, ‘a colored thing with a surface has a surface’, where however the understanding of the prior and of the posterior are not taken precisely as they are distinguished from each other, but the understanding of the posterior is taken as it includes the prior, comparing it with the understanding of the prior taken in itself – I reply that if this is true it is so for this reason, that the subject ‘a colored thing with a surface’ does not have a concept that is per se one, and what is not per se in itself does not seem to be per se one for anything. But it is not so in the other case, because the concept of the prior and of the posterior do make a concept that is per se one.

276. And if you ask ‘why here more than there’? – I reply:

Just as there is no question as to why a one is made from act and potency, from *Metaphysics* 8.6.1045a23-25, b17-21, for there is no reason other than that this is per se act and that is per se potency, so there is no cause as to why from this act and this potency a per se one comes to be (whether in things or in concepts) other than that this is potential with respect to that and that actual with respect to this, and that of this fact further there is no reason other than that this is this and that is that.

277. And in the same way about what is one per accidens: because this is this and that is that for the reason that this is act per accidens and that is potency per accidens, and, further, that for this reason does a one per accidens come to be from this and that; for it is more immediate that heat constitutes a hot thing and humanity a man (and consequently heat constitutes a being per accidens and humanity a being per se) than that a hot thing heats; yet this second one is immediate, and to seek a middle term for it is a sign of lack of education, from *Metaphysics* 4.4.1006a5-8, 6.1011a8-13.

δ. To the Fourth Reason

278. To the fourth reason [n.186] I say that it gives good evidence against the second rejected opinion [nn.207-230]. For in vain would corporeity be posited as different from the intellective soul if the intellective soul include the vegetative and sensitive soul, and the sensitive and vegetative soul include corporeity.

279. But as to this other way [sc. the first, of Aquinas and Giles], there is an easy response. For here there is a necessity to posit more things. And the necessity is? – That which is the reason universally for distinguishing this from that, namely contradiction, which is the immediate reason for distinguishing many things under being, to wit if this and that have a contradiction in being, because then, if this is and that is not, they are not the same in being.

280. So it is in the issue at hand: when the form of the soul does not remain, the body does remain. And so it is universally necessary to posit in any animate thing that the

form by which the body is body is different from the form by which it is animate. I am not speaking of the form by which a body is a body, that is, an individual body as body is a genus, for any individual is, by its form of this sort, a body as body is a genus, and is possessed of corporeity. Rather I am speaking of body as it is the other part of the composite, for by this it is not an individual or a species in the genus of body, or indeed in the genus of substance either (which is a superior genus); but it is so only by reduction. Hence since the body, which is the other part of the composite, remains indeed in its own being without the soul, it consequently has a form by which it is a body in this way and does not have a soul; and so this form is necessarily other than the soul. But it is not an individual in the genus of body, save only by reduction, as a part; just as neither is the separate soul per se under the genus of substance but only by reduction.

281. Against this: a necessary disposition does not remain without that for which it is necessarily disposed; but the form of the mixture [sc. of the body] is a necessary disposition for the soul; therefore etc. And there is a special confirmation in the issue at hand, because the intellectual soul even in death, since it is immortal, is not necessarily separated from matter save because another substantial form (which it requires as a necessary disposition) is separated; for the soul does not in itself have anything in matter that is repugnant to it; but the necessarily required form can only be the form of the mixture; therefore the intellectual soul cannot exist without it.

282. I reply: some qualities follow the form of the mixture and are in some degree necessary so that the form of the mixture remain in the subject; and they are necessary in the subject in the same degree, so that the intellectual soul remain, because whatever is necessary for the disposition is necessary for the form for which the disposition disposes; but those qualities can well be necessary simply for the intellectual soul as it forms the body, and required for it in a more perfect degree than they are required for the form of the mixture. For it is possible that a more perfect form requires what a more imperfect form requires, and not only in equal degree but in a more perfect degree. Therefore when those dispositions are destroyed in the degree to which they are necessarily required for the intellectual soul, the intellectual soul does not remain, and yet the other disposing form can remain, because the dispositions are not corrupted in the degree necessary for that other form; but this other also does not remain in perfect and undisturbed being, because the qualities consequent to it are corrupted in the degree to which, in perfect and undisturbed being, they follow it. And therefore no mixed body able to be ensouled has being simply perfect and undisturbed when the soul departs; rather it is at once in a continual tendency toward its dissolution into the elements.

283. To the form of the argument therefore [n.281] I say that the form of the mixture is not a necessary disposition for the intellectual soul; and although the intellectual soul immediately follow it in generation, this is not because of a necessity between them, but because the superior agent has as passive subject a proportioned composite, namely one made of matter and the form of the mixture; and when it has a proportioned passive subject it at once introduces into it the form of which the subject is capable.

284. As to what is also added in confirmation [n.281], that the intellectual soul does not have in matter any repugnance to itself, I say that there is no substantial form that in-forms matter without the consequent qualities following it, or without it requiring them, and in a certain degree – a degree in which the form, if they do not remain, will not

in-form the matter. Although therefore the intellective soul not have a repugnance properly to any natural form, yet when it in-forms matter it requires some qualities, and requires them in some perfect degree, in which it will, if they do not remain, not in-form the matter. Now these are the qualities consequent to the prior form, but not necessarily required for the being of that prior form in as a great a degree as they are required for the being of the intellective soul in matter. This is plain from an example, because for animation by the intellective soul there is required a heart and a liver of a determinate hotness, a brain of a determinate coldness, and so on about the individual organic parts; but when such a disposition ceases, there can still remain some species or quality which stands along with the form of the mixture, although not the one that is required for the being and operation in matter of the intellective soul.

d. Scotus' own Opinion

285. As to the second doubt [nn.97, 143, 180] of this second part, I say that the body of Christ per se includes matter, and at least one form of mixture prior to the intellective soul; and by this form is it in partial act and in proximate receptivity to the intellective soul, although it is not thereby in the genus of body as body is a genus, save by reduction. And into this composite, which however is per se a part of man, the per se conversion of the bread is made, that is, conversion of whole to whole and of parts to parts; and consequently this form is the formal term of the conversion, or the form of the term of conversion.

286. Now this form remains the same whether the soul be united to it or not united to it, because it is, at least by its in-forming, naturally prior to the soul; and it remained during the Triduum while the soul did not remain there. And so, during the Triduum the thing of this sacrament would have been the same, if the sacrament had then remained, because during the Triduum the form of corporeity was not separated from its matter in Christ, and consequently not separated from its matter as it is in the Eucharist. For just as the numerically same thing was the thing in itself in its natural existence, so also the numerically same composite, which is the first term of the conversion, would have remained always in the Eucharist.

287. It is of no avail, then, when saving this identity, to flee to the identity of matter or hypostasis, because contraries can exist in the same identity of matter when they succeed to each other in turn; even if the Word had assumed a stone, the stone would have been the same as the human nature by identity of hypostasis [*Ord.* III d.1 n.133, 152; cf. also William of Ware *Sent.* III q.9 a.1, Henry of Ghent *Quod.* III q.5].

II. To the Initial Arguments

288. To the first initial argument [n.89] I say that just as bread is said to be gathered from grains, so the species that remain are said to be gathered, because they are something of what is gathered. And such is the exposition of Augustine.

289. To the second [n.90], Damascene does not mean that we feed on the bread remaining there as we are accustomed to make use of bread, but that, as concerns use, it has the same act as bread has; and the species nourish in the same way as that of which they are the species. His simile then must be understood to the extent we so use the bread

and wine as we use things disposed in the same way for our use, or that we are fed in the Eucharist as we use water in baptism. But not to the extent that, as the water remains there, so the substance of the bread remains here, for he expressly holds the opposite immediately afterwards in the same chapter: “The bread itself and the wine pass over,” he says, “into the body and blood of God. But if you ask about how, it suffices for you to hear, since it is done by the Holy Spirit.” And a little later: “Bread and wine and water are by the invocation and special arrival of the Holy Spirit supernaturally transubstantiated into the body and blood of Christ.”

290. To the third [n.91] I say that the species of bread and wine represents the true and mystical body of Christ the way bread does, and so the species displays in itself many grains to the extent that grains have the idea of being perceptible, namely by reason of the accidents.

291. To the next [n.92] the answer is plain from the second part of the solution to the question [n.175], for the transubstantiation here is not that whereby the term [of the conversion] receives ‘being simply’ but whereby it receives ‘being here’.

292. To the last one [n.93] I say that the first term of this conversion is neither matter alone, nor matter under quantity (because then there would not be transubstantiation but trans-accidentation), nor matter under some mode, nor the composite of matter and intellective soul. Rather it is the composite of matter and a certain form prior to the intellective soul, which form remained really the same in the living Christ and in his dead body, and which has always remained as the formal part of the thing contained under the Eucharist from the time when the Eucharist was instituted. Therefore the argument is to no avail.

Question Two

Whether the Bread is Annihilated in its Conversion into the Body of Christ

293. Proceeding thus to the second question [n.88], argument is made that the bread is annihilated in its conversion into the body of Christ.

Because that which existed before, and of which nothing remains, is annihilated; the bread existed before and nothing of it remains, for neither the matter nor form remains; for the whole has been wholly transitioned, namely the matter into matter and the form into form; therefore etc.

294. Secondly as follows: what is nothing in itself or in another and was something before is annihilated; the bread after the conversion is nothing in itself, and nothing too in the body of Christ, because then the body of Christ would be increased by the conversion of the bread into it; for that becomes greater in which there is one quantum after another that remains.

295. Third as follows: in partial transition the form is annihilated, because nothing of it remains – at least corruption of the bread is only distinguished from annihilation because the prior form remains in the potency of the matter; but in the issue at hand the form of the bread does not remain in the potency of what is receptive of it. One can also prove that the form there from which transition was made is annihilated because it does not remain in act, as is plain; nor does it remain in the potency of the subject, the proof of which is that nature can reduce a natural potency to act, and consequently, if the destroyed form were to remain numerically the same in the potency of the matter, it could

be reduced to act by a natural agent – which is against the Philosopher, *Physics* 5.4.228a9-19, *On Generation and Corruption* 2.11.338b14-19.

If you say that it does not remain in the potency of the subject the same in number but the same in species – this does not prevent annihilation, because even if it were annihilated, a form different in number could be drawn out of the potency of the matter.

296. Again, annihilation and creation are opposites just as are generation and corruption, because as is said in *Physics* 5.1.225a12-20 “the term ‘from which’ of generation and the term ‘to which’ of corruption are the same, and conversely.” So the term ‘to which’ of annihilation and the term ‘from which’ of creation are the same, and conversely. But when the whole of the substance is the term ‘to which’ of generation and is so wholly, the production of it is creation; therefore when the whole of it is the term ‘from which’ and is so wholly, the destruction of it is annihilation. But in the issue at hand the whole of it is the term ‘from which’ of the conversion and is so wholly; therefore etc.

297. To the opposite:

Many authorities, adduced in the first part in the preceding question [nn.134-137], say that the bread is converted into the body of Christ; therefore it is not annihilated.

298. And there is argument by reason, because creation and annihilation are opposites; but if the body were converted into the bread, the bringing back again of the bread would not be creation, because it would not be from nothing as from the term ‘from which’; therefore, by parity of reasoning the conversion of the bread into the body is not annihilation.

299. Again, the cause of this annihilation could only be God, to whom alone it belongs to create. But God cannot be the cause of not being a thing, as Augustine proves 83 *Questions* qq.21-22.

I. To the Question

A. Opinion of Henry of Ghent

1. Exposition of the Opinion

300. One statement here [from Henry of Ghent] is that the bread is not annihilated, and from this is inferred that, after the conversion, the bread is not nothing and consequently is something. But it is not what was before, because what was before has been converted. Nor is it anything other than the term into which it is converted. Therefore, after the conversion it is something, since that which, as being thus what was bread before, is converted is the body of Christ. Or if this be denied, one must grant that a something-ness of Christ’s body belongs to what was bread, and likewise the being of the body of Christ belongs to it, otherwise the bread after the conversion could in no way be said to be something; rather one would have to say that it had been altogether annihilated.

2. Rejection of the Opinion

301. This opinion, then, states two things: both that the bread is not annihilated and that after the conversion it is not nothing but in some way something. And the second of these it deduces from the first.

302. Against the second I argue in four ways.

First as follows: a term of change, insofar as it is a term, includes the non-being of the other term. The proof is that, insofar as it is a term, it has some impossibility with the other term; therefore, as it is a term, it does not include a something-ness of the other term, nor does it include the other term's being in any way something, because it is a contradiction that, as it includes that other term's non-being, it include a something-ness of that same term.

303. Second, because the body of Christ after the consecration is not disposed in any different way than before, therefore, neither does anything have being in it in any different way. But the non-converted bread does not in any way have its something-ness in the body of Christ, nor does it have any something-ness of the body of Christ; therefore it does not have it after the consecration either. Proof of the first consequence: to be in a certain way in something is because of the being simply of that something; for because something is in itself such, therefore does it thus or thus have something in itself. So there is no difference in the way something is in something save because of the difference in itself of that other something.

304. Again, that of which there is a something-ness is formally something by that something-ness. If therefore a something-ness of the body [of Christ] belong now to that which was the substance of bread, then that which was the substance of bread is now formally something by that something-ness. I ask what that something is. Not bread because the bread is not, and it seems a contradiction that by the something-ness of the body it be formally something that it is, namely bread. Nor is that which was the substance of the bread the body by that something-ness, because that which was the substance of bread has simply ceased to be, and the body remains simply in the same being. Nor can it be said that by this something-ness there is something else besides the bread or body.

305. Next, 'something' and 'thing' are convertible terms, according to Avicenna in his *Metaphysics* 1.5. That then of which there is a something-ness is formally a thing; and so it would follow that that which was bread would now be a thing. And 'thing', according to this doctor, is taken in two ways: in one way for a thing that is opinable, as 'thing' is said to come from 'I think', 'you think'; or, in another way, from 'ratified thing', insofar as this is said to come from ratification [cf. *Ord.* I d.3 n.310].²⁹ By this something-ness, therefore, 'that which was bread' will be a thing in the first way; and then it follows that it is not more a thing than a chimaera is, for a chimaera is a thing in this way, according to him; and then the annihilation of the bread stands very well with such something-ness (just as if anything were converted into a chimaera it would truly be annihilated). If thing is taken in the second way, then (as before) either the thing is quidditatively bread, and then the bread quidditatively is not converted, or the thing is quidditatively what the body is, and this is impossible because of the quidditative distinction between that which was of the bread and that which was of the body.

B. Opinion of Giles of Rome and its Rejection

²⁹ Latin 'res' 'thing' from Latin 'reor, reris' 'I/you think', or 'res rata', with 'rata' also coming from the same verb 'reor'. The etymology is dubious but adopted by Henry and many others. There is no such etymological connection in English between 'thing' and 'think', or of course 'ratify'. The English translation nevertheless tries, if fancifully, to capture something of the Latin word play.

306. It is said in another way [Giles of Rome] that the bread is not annihilated because, after its conversion into the body, it remains in the body in potency; for the body of Christ and the bread have a common subject (as the matter), and therefore the substance of the bread can return through conversion of the body into it, and this conversion would not be creation. Therefore, not even this conversion is annihilation, and this because of the common subject in whose potency are both terms.

307. On the contrary: the bread could not, on the basis of this statement, be annihilated while any other body remains; because if any other body remains (at least a corruptible one), matter of the same idea would remain, in whose potency the bread consequently remains, just as now it is said [by Giles] to remain in the matter of Christ's body. Therefore, the bread could not be annihilated unless the whole of bodily substance were annihilated.³⁰

308. Again, if the bread were annihilated and the body of Christ were present here, the bread would remain in altogether the same way in the potency of the matter of Christ's body according as it now is; therefore, it should not, because of what it now is in the potency of the matter of Christ's body, be said to be not annihilated.

309. Again, something that is common to both terms is not necessary save for transmutation properly speaking; because, if one excludes the subject and takes precisely the terms of a transmutation, opposition rather is required in them than something the same that is common. Indeed, something the same that is common to certain things prevents these things from being the per se terms of a transmutation. Therefore, since in this transition there is not properly a change, nor a subject that remains, but only the two terms of the transition, nothing common will per se give or take away from this transition any of its idea; therefore, if this transition (with everything common removed) were annihilation, it will also be annihilation now [sc. on Giles' theory].

C. Scotus' own Opinion

310. To the question one can say that, in the issue at hand, nothing of the bread remains after the conversion; and second that the bread is not annihilated or (which is easier) that the bread is not by this conversion annihilated.

1. Nothing of the Bread Remains after the Conversion

311. The first point may be supposed to have been proved by the reasons given against the first opinion [nn.302-305].

2. The Bread is not Annihilated by this Conversion

a. Proof

³⁰ The point of this argument seems to be that Giles has given a sense to the idea of annihilation such that nothing can ever be annihilated unless everything, or everything bodily, is annihilated. But this view is absurd, for something can surely be annihilated without everything else being annihilated as well. So, annihilation cannot be what Giles says it is, and consequently he has not given an adequate reason for saying that the bread is not annihilated in its conversion into Christ's body. The same should be said, mutatis mutandis, about the point of the next two arguments [nn.308-309].

312. The second point is proved as follows: the term ‘to which’ of this transition of the bread is not pure nothing; therefore, the bread is not annihilated.

The proof of the consequence is that the term ‘to which’ of annihilation is pure nothing. And the proof of this is by a likeness: just as the term ‘from which’ of creation is pure nothing, so the term ‘to which’ of annihilation should be pure nothing.

The proof of the antecedent is that the term of this transition is the body of Christ, because, although negation of the bread be concomitant with the term ‘to which’, yet this term is not altogether nothing but is in something positive.

b. Objection

313. Against this is that, although the positing of Christ’s body here is concomitant with the ceasing to be of the bread, yet the ceasing to be of the bread in its proper and primary idea, as it is distinguished from the positing of Christ’s body, seems to be annihilation; and it is not distinguished from annihilation because its term ‘to which’ is the nothingness of the bread.

314. There is confirmation through a likeness, that corruption now is not annihilation – not because of the mere fact that generation is concomitant with it, for if it were because of this not annihilation, that is, because of the term precisely of generation, then the corruption would, on account of the positive term of the change, be a positive change – which is false. But as it is, corruption in its proper idea, as it is distinguished essentially from the concomitant generation, is not annihilation, because something of the corrupted thing remains (that is, the matter). And from this follows that the negation (to which term the corruption is) is negation in a naturally suited subject; therefore, it is privation. Therefore, from the opposite in the issue at hand, since nothing of the term ‘from which’ remains, and the negation of the being of the bread is not privation (because it is not in a naturally suited subject) but pure non-being, it follows that this destruction of the bread is, in its proper idea, annihilation.

315. And this is confirmed lastly because the per se idea of a thing does not vary with something per accidens concurrent with it; but it is per accidens that with the destruction of the bread the positing of the body here of Christ is concurrent (the proof: for the first could be separated from the second); therefore, the idea of this destruction [of the bread] does not vary because of this positing of the body here of Christ, but the destruction, if it occurred alone without the positing [of the body here], would be annihilation of the bread; therefore it is annihilation now as well.

c. Refutation by Others of the Objection

316. One might in one way say here [Henry of Ghent] that transubstantiation is a change precisely between positive terms, such that two privative terms and two changes will not, as in the case of generation and corruption, be givens there; but just as, according to the Philosopher *Physics* 5.1.225a8, some change is ‘from subject to subject’, namely a change that has something positive for both per se terms, so does this transubstantiation have precisely two terms, and both are positive. And so one is not to suppose here that the destruction is a sort of per se change formally, and that it would be

distinguished in genus from the beginning of the body here of Christ, but that there is only a single transition of this positive term into that positive term.

317. Against this way: it is manifest that ‘the non-being of the bread’ is not formally ‘the being of the body here of Christ’, nor conversely; for it would be possible for the bread not to be and for the body here not to be posited, and conversely; similarly, the ‘non-being of the body here of Christ’ and ‘the being of the bread’ are not formally here the same. So we have the per se terms ‘the being of bread’ and ‘the non-being of bread’, and ‘the being of the body here of Christ’ and ‘the non-being of the body here of Christ’. Likewise, ‘the non-being of the body here of Christ’ and ‘the being of the body here of Christ’ are not the same but opposite terms; so we can have two transitions quidditatively distinct, each of which has two terms of its own. And then the whole of the difficulty remains that was touched on in the case of generation as distinct from corruption [n.316], and in the case of the per se formal distinction of the destruction [of the bread] as it is distinct from the positing of the body here of Christ.

d. Scotus’ Rejection of the Objection

α. Reasons Proving that the Bread is not Simply Annihilated

318. [First reason] – A reply can be made while holding to this conclusion, namely that the bread is not simply annihilated. For the term of annihilation is a pure nothing, that is, because nothing of the term ‘from which’ remains in the term ‘to which’. And negation in a naturally suited subject (which is called ‘privation’ [n.314]) is not the term of annihilation, and conditions opposite to the above conditions [sc. for annihilation] exist in corruption as corruption is negation. And, third, because negation in a disparate³¹ positive subject is not the term of annihilation but negation simply outside the genus is – that is, outside everything positive or every subject that might be called a privation according to this negation, or according to a disparate subject that might include this negation.

319. And this last point can be made evident, for not only does the matter of corrupted air remain and have the privation of its prior form, but the negation of the form of air is preserved in the form of fire that is newly introduced. And the negation, as it is in the form of fire, is not there as in a subject suited to it (but it is only so in common matter); rather it is there as in something disparate. And even if one removed the negation as it is in the common matter that is now the term of corruption (and because of which corruption is not now annihilation), yet if this negation as in something disparate were the term of some ceasing to be, the air would still not be annihilated.

320. To the issue at hand: although there are here two reasons which make it clear that, because of them, corruption is not annihilation, namely because something of what was corrupted remains and because the negation that is the term of it remains in a naturally suitable subject [nn.319, 314], there is nevertheless a third reason here, namely that the negation that is the term is in something positive, not in a subject but in something disparate.

³¹ Boethius *On Hypothetical Syllogism* I, “I call those things ‘disparate’ which are only diverse from each other, with no conflicting contrariety, as ‘earth’, ‘clothing’, ‘fire’ etc.

321. Hereby, then, to the reason [n.313]: one can say that this ceasing to be of the bread in itself, and also as it is toward the non-being of bread, is not negation outside the genus; but as it is in the body it is not annihilation.

322. And the answer now to the example of corruption [n.314] is plain: for it is true that corruption is not denied to be annihilation precisely because of the concomitant generation, but because of those two causes (one of which includes the other), namely that there is a common subject and therefore the negation that is its term is privation. But if the third cause could stand alone without either of these two, namely that negation would be the term as it is in some positive disparate thing, still this transition would not be annihilation; and such is what this conversion is posited as being.

323. But the third argument [n.315, 320] is more compelling, namely about *per se* and *per accidens*. For there is found here one *per se* transition from the being of bread to its non-being, and another from the non-presence here of the body of Christ to the presence of it here. And then, as was argued [n.312], if the second [the presence of the body of Christ] were not concomitant with the first, the first would be a case of annihilation [*sc.* of the bread]; therefore now too it is formally annihilation, since its idea does not vary because of that which is *per accidens* concomitant.³²

324. [Second reason] – Again, if the bread were annihilated and the body of Christ were posited as being present here, both the bread and body would, as regard every condition both of being and of non-being, be disposed in the same way as they are disposed now. But what is disposed the same as it would be if it were annihilated is itself annihilated; therefore etc. The first proposition is manifest, because if the bread were annihilated, neither its matter nor its form would remain; and they do in the same way not remain now. If too the body were then present under the accidents, it would be present in this way now as well.³³

325. [Third reason] – Again (and this is directly against the last response given to the point about corruption [n.317]): because the term, as being the term of a new action, is itself new, therefore the negation of the being of the bread, as it is the term of the ceasing to be of the bread, is new. But as it is in the body of Christ, it is not new, for the way that the disparate thing [*sc.* Christ's body] includes the negation of the disparate thing [*sc.* the bread], the body of Christ was non-bread before the ceasing to be of the bread.

326. If you say “it is true that ‘non-bread’, as it is in the body [of Christ], is not a new negation, just as neither is the separation of the body from the bread new,” – on the contrary: from this follows that the non-being of the bread is the term, because, as this negation is in the body of Christ, it is so, according to this response, by reason of the separation; if therefore non-being is the term as new, it is the term not as it is in the body by reason of the separation.

³² This argument seems to assert what has just been denied [n.322], that the conversion of the bread into the body of Christ is not annihilation. But the meaning rather is that though the first part of the transition (from the being of the bread to the non-being of the bread) could be, or indeed is, annihilation, yet the whole conversion is not, as n.337 makes clear (cf. also nn.312, 322).

³³ This argument seems to be a *reductio*: if annihilation is regarded as the non-being of bread and the presence of the body here of Christ, then the conversion of the bread into the body would be annihilation however that conversion is understood. But this conversion can be understood as not annihilation; therefore annihilation must be more than the non-being of bread and the presence of the body here of Christ (as per Scotus' explanation in n.318).

327. [Fourth reason] – Again, when changes of diverse genera concur together, negation is not the per se term of either of them as it is included in the term of the other. An example: if generation and change of place are together, the negation that is term of the corruption accompanying the generation is not the term of it per se as it is preserved in its ‘where’ (and this is proved by reason, that where the negation of the term ‘from which’ of one change is per se preserved in the term ‘to which’ of the other change, these changes must be of the same genus, because the term ‘to which’ and the term ‘from which’ are opposites). But in the issue at hand, the body of Christ here absolutely does not include the non-being of the bread, as is plain, because the separation of the body from the bread existed while both extremes remained; therefore, it only includes the negation of the being of the bread as it is here. But this term ‘as it is here’ does not pertain to the genus of substance; therefore, this negation is not the per se term of the destruction [sc. of the bread] the way it is preserved in the body as the body is here.

β. On the Possibility of Evading these Reasons

328. Some of these reasons [nn.318-327] can be evaded:

329. [About the second reason] – The second [n.324] as follows: when denying this proposition, namely “what is disposed to being and non-being in every way it would be if it were annihilated is itself annihilated,” one would have to add in the subject the words “and altogether the same thing succeeds to it.” And that this addition is necessary is sufficiently plain, because before a thing is created it is as much nothing as if had been created before and afterwards annihilated, and yet before it is created it is not annihilated. And why? Because in this case its nothingness does not succeed to its being. So I say that, if the bread were annihilated, neither matter nor form would remain, just as they do not remain now. But yet now something succeeds to the total being of the bread which then would not succeed; because now negation in genus, namely in some positive disparate thing, succeeds, but in then negation simply outside the genus would succeed.

330. [About the third reason] – To the third reason [n.325] one could say that negation, as it is included in its disparate subject, is not incompatible with the affirmation of it in the common idea of being; otherwise disparate things could not both be beings together. But the negation in the case of a contradiction is repugnant to the affirmation, even in the whole range of being. If therefore the disparate negation of the bread [sc. negation in something disparate] were in Christ’s body beforehand, nevertheless the contradictory negation of its being is not. But now, after the conversion, the contradictory negation is in the body of Christ; and thus it is new, because it follows the affirmation that contradicts it.

331. Against this: it does not in any way seem that the contradictory negation is in the body more than it was before; and so, as it is new and is the term of the ceasing to be of the bread, it is not the term as the term is in the body. Also, the contradictory negation is pure nothing, and so a pure nothing is said of something positive, as if it were said of a chimaera; therefore, if the negation is the term of this ceasing to be, it follows that this ceasing to be will be a pure nothing.

332. If it be said to the first point here [n.331] that the non-being of the bread, as it contradicts the being of the bread, is in the body of Christ otherwise than it was before, because the contradictory non-being is included in the body of Christ as that body is here,

while in the body of Christ absolutely only the disparate negation is included – this is refuted by the fourth reason [n.327], because the later term is not the idea of a new impossibility with anything that is naturally prior. Therefore ‘it as here’ is not the idea of a new impossibility of the body with the being of the bread. So one must say that the negation is not new and then it is not the term of the ceasing to be; or if it is new and not in the body as the body is here (because the presence is not the idea according to which such impossibility exists in it), in no way will the negation as it is in the body be the term of the ceasing to be of the bread.

e. Conclusion

333. The third reason [n.323] therefore can be maintained, namely the second member of the distinction posited above [*ibid.*], that destruction is annihilation of the bread absolutely. The reasoning about ‘per accidens’ is proof, that because the ‘non-being simply’ of the bread must be said to succeed to the ‘being simply’ of the bread, and because this succeeding of opposite to opposite is per accidens conjoined simply to the succeeding of ‘the presence of Christ’s body here’ to its ‘non-presence here’, therefore the latter will have two per se terms different from the per se terms of the former. Therefore the per se term of the latter will not be the per se term, or not precisely, as it is conjoined per accidens to the per se term of the former change.

334. I also say that the bread is not annihilated in this conversion of the bread into the body. This is made clear as follows, that (as was said in the preceding question [n.166]) one kind of transubstantiation is that whereby the term receives ‘being simply’, and another kind is that whereby it receives ‘being here’. As to the former kind, whereby one term receives ‘being simply’ and the other term ‘non-being simply’, perhaps the fact that the destruction of the term ‘from which’ is not simply annihilation could be saved, because there the per se term ‘to which’ of its beginning would be opposite to the term ‘from which’ of its ceasing (as is the case with the term ‘from which’ and ‘to which’ of generation and corruption), and the negation there of the term ‘from which’ as it is in the term ‘to which’ could be the term of the ceasing. But in the issue at hand, where the conversion is only a transition that introduces the term ‘to which’ of the per se positive change, it is not opposed to the term ‘from which’ of the privative change; and so it cannot be a reason for including the negation of it.

335. One could say, therefore, that this conversion is as of substance to substance, not insofar as it is to the being simply of the substance but as it is to the ‘being here’ of it, so that, just as the body as here succeeds to the bread as here, so the bread as here is converted into the body as here. And these changes, though they are between substances, yet they are changes as between substances, not as between terms; for the terms are only present-ness and non-present-ness, which can be reduced to the genus ‘where’, as was said in d.10 q.1 nn.35, 55.

336. Therefore, just as the body in the positive change does not acquire ‘being simply’ but ‘being here’, so in the corresponding depriving change (which this conversion includes, insofar as this conversion is a transitioning but not a productive transubstantiation) – this change, I say, does not take away the ‘being simply’ of the bread but its ‘being here’. And the beauty of the correspondence is sufficiently plain, because just as the body has a new presence without losing its old presence and states an

acquisitive change without a depriving change (as was said in d.10 q.1 nn.48-49), so conversely the bread has a depriving change without an acquisitive change, because it ceases to be here and does not acquire another presence elsewhere.

337. Because, therefore, nothing is acquired or lost through this conversion, as it is a transitioning conversion, save only 'being here' and 'non-being here', the result is that, by this conversion as it is here, substantial being is not lost and so not annihilated; indeed neither is the bread destroyed by this conversion. However, because the bread does not remain in its substantial being and is, by this conversion, not destroyed (as was said), it must be that it cease to be by the ceasing to be that is from the 'being of it simply' to the 'non-being of it simply'. Now the 'non-being of it', although it is quasi-concomitant with the presence of the body of Christ as that body is here, yet not as it is a term of the same genus; and so, if this destruction, considered in itself, be annihilation, yet in no way is the conversion annihilation.

338. An example of this: if the bread were destroyed and an angel were newly created and became present to the species of the bread, the conversion of the bread into the angel would be 'of the bread as it is here' into 'the angel as it is present here', and by this conversion the angel would only acquire that presence. However the new 'being' that is the term of the angel's own creation would be concomitant with this new presence.

339. This way of speaking makes apparent which transubstantiation can be into something preexistent and which cannot, and which can be when the term 'from which' remains and which cannot. For the transubstantiation that is from term to term as to the 'being' and 'non-being' simply of the terms cannot be of something that is converted and yet remains, nor can it be conversion into a preexisting term. However, the transubstantiation that is a transition of substance to substance as to 'being here' can also be of a term 'from which' that remains (so that if it cease to be here, yet not cease simply to be and something else as it is here succeed to it). This transition can also be into a preexisting term, if the term begin to be here without beginning to be. Possible too is that the term 'from which' is destroyed, but not destroyed by this conversion; and possible that the term 'to which' begin to be, and not begin to be by this conversion, as was illustrated by the example of the created angel [n.338].

II. To the Initial Arguments of the First Part

340. To the initial arguments.

As to the first argument [n.293], if the first member of the disjunctive set down at the beginning of the solution [n.310] is held to, the major of the argument is to be denied [n.293: 'that which existed before, and of which nothing remains, is annihilated']; for one must add that 'nothing of it remains and nothing simply succeeds to it as a per se term'.

341. As to the second [n.294] the same point holds: although it is nothing in itself or in another, yet its being is not succeeded by altogether nothing.

342. As to the third [n.295], one must deny that the form is annihilated in corruption.

343. And as to the proof that 'it only remains in the potency of the matter', I say that 'its remaining in the potency of matter' is 'the other part of the composite remaining per se'; and so does the form too remain per accidens; but that of which something either per se or per accidens remains is not annihilated.

344. And when you argue that the numerically same thing could return through a natural agent, I say that this does not follow, because the potency in which the form remains must be understood as a potential principle, and not as a respect. For when the form is corrupted, the respect of the potency to the form does not remain, because the respect of the potency is not to what is altogether past, just as neither is it to what is altogether impossible. But the potential principle remains per se, and the form (which was something of the whole) remains per accidens according to some part of itself. Or one could say briefly that although nothing of the form of what is corrupted remains, yet the negation that succeeds to it is a negation in a fitting subject, and so is a privation. And a privation is not of a nature to be the term of annihilation.

345. And when this is applied to the issue at hand, then although [the bread] is required to remain so as to be said not to be annihilated, and although the form of the bread does not thus remain because its matter transitions into matter, I say that for many reasons, as stated before [n.314], corruption is not said to be annihilation; and although these two points suffice, namely that the subject remains and the negation that is the term is a privation [*ibid.*], yet if the negation that is the term were some negation in a genus, as in some disparate positive thing, still the transition to it would not be annihilation.

346. To the fourth argument [n.296] it can be said that not every production of the whole substance is creation, but the production that is from a term ‘from which’ as from what is purely nothing; and so the answer here is by assertion of the opposite, if the second member of the disjunctive posited in the solution to the question is held to [nn.310, 340]. But from this the conclusion does not follow that the bread is annihilated by this conversion, but only that its annihilation is concomitant with this conversion.

III. To the Arguments for the Opposite

347. As to the reason for the opposite [nn.297, 238]: Ambrose is speaking of the conversion of terms not according to ‘being simply’ but according to ‘being in a certain respect’.

348. As to the next, about creation [n.298], the answer is plain from the solution to the last argument of the first part [n.346].

349. As to Augustine [n.299] I reply that God does not annihilate things by any positive action; but just as he conserves things by acting positively, so annihilating creatures is to stop conserving them, and God can do this.

Question Three

By which Propositions the Conversion of the Bread into the Body of Christ can Truly be Expressed

350. Lastly the question is asked, without arguments, about which propositions this conversion can be truly expressed with.

I. About the Ways it cannot be Signified

351. I reply that it cannot be truly signified by the word ‘being’ or ‘becoming’, nor by the word ‘can’ or ‘possible’, and that according to no difference of time. For the

bread neither becomes nor was the body of Christ, nor is it nor will it be the body; nor conversely was the body the bread, nor is it nor will it be the bread.

352. And the reason for all these statements is:

Because 'to be' marks the union (essential or accidental) of the extreme terms for the time that it signifies. But for no difference of time do these extremes have an essential or accidental union. Rather they have for every instant either disparate-ness (that is, when both terms are positive beings), or a repugnance that is greater, namely the repugnance of being to non-being for the instant when one is and the other is not.

353. A second assertion is that the bread neither becomes, nor did become, nor will become, the body of Christ, nor conversely. And for these statements the reason is that, when 'to become' is predicated as the added second element of the statement,³⁴ it predicates 'to become' simply of that of which it is said, and it does not thus combine anything in apposition to the subject. In this way the bread became (came to be) when it was baked, and thus did the body come to be when it was formed in the Virgin's womb; but this is not relevant to the minor premise [n.351]. But when 'to become' is predicated as the third added element of the statement, then it denotes that the subject comes to be according to the form of the predicate. But the bread does not come to be, for any difference of time, according to the form of the predicate. And this is plain in a likeness by way of opposite; for 'man becomes white' is true for this reason, that man comes to be under the form of whiteness and, by way of opposite, this statement is impossible 'man becomes an ass', and this when one is speaking strictly of the force of the sentence. So does it seem to be in the issue at hand.

354. A third assertion is that the bread cannot be, and could not be, and will not be able to be, the body of Christ, nor conversely. And the reason for all these is that a proposition about possibility, of which a statement about actual presence is impossible, is false; for any proposition about possibility can be asserted, although perhaps falsely, about something that can be present. But any proposition about presence corresponding to any of the above about possibility, is impossible (from the first conclusion just proved); for this proposition about presence is impossible 'the bread is the body of Christ', and the proposition 'this bread will be or was the body'; and the same with the verb 'to become'.

II. About the Ways it can be Signified

355. How then should one speak?

I reply that, when taking each term directly as nominatives, neither should be predicated of the other in any of these ways.

356. So if the predication is to be true, one of the terms must be taken in an oblique case, denoting the order of one extreme to the other.

³⁴ The difference between second and third element added is the difference between using 'is' or 'comes to be' etc. as predicate or as copula. 'Socrates is' asserts being simply of Socrates, and 'Socrates is just' asserts the property of justice of him, and in this second proposition the 'is' comes in as third element (for it joins 'Socrates' and 'just'), while in the first proposition it comes in as second element (for it asserts existence of Socrates as 'is just' asserts justice of him): Aristotle *On Interpretation* 10.19b19-25; also Boethius' commentary thereon (*Commentary IV*): "In the statement 'man is just', 'man' is subject and 'just' and 'is' are both predicated; so there are here two predicates and one subject... In 'man is just' the 'is' is the third element added, but the predicate 'just' is not the third but the second element added. So the third is said to be added and the second to be predicated..."

357. And this can be done in two ways:

First with the preposition ‘from’ or ‘of’, by adding the term ‘from which’, as the Philosopher says *Metaphysics* 2.2.994ab2-3, that from morning midday comes to be, and not conversely. And in this way one can concede that from the bread the body of Christ comes to be.

Secondly by adding to the term ‘to which’ the preposition ‘into’, which denotes that it is the term ‘to which’. In this way does the bread pass into the body of Christ.

358. And all these locutions about the force of the statement reduce to one of these two ways. But the second is more proper, because it does not denote that anything common remains, as the preposition ‘from’ in some way does, according to the way that ‘from’ is properly taken. For an opposite only comes to be ‘from’ the opposite because it is from a subject common to both opposites, according to the Philosopher *Physics* 1.7189b32-190a21, *On Generation* 1.4.319b18-320a5, *Metaphysics* 2.2.994a22-b6.

359. But no proposition taken along with change or movement (even when taking one term in an oblique case and the other in the nominative case) is true, as ‘the bread is changed into the body of Christ’; for there is no change here, as was said in question 1 of this distinction [n.45].

360. But ‘transition’ or ‘(con)vert’ abstract from the idea of change, because they posit the relation of term to term without implying that a common subject remains.

Second Part: About the Matter Suitable for Transubstantiation or Conversion

361. Concerning the second part of this distinction [n.6] one must ask about the matter appropriate for this conversion. And two questions are asked there: first, whether wheat bread prepared with elemental water is the appropriate matter for conversion into the body of Christ; second whether only wine compressed from the grape is the matter appropriate for conversion into the blood.

Question One

*Whether Wheat Bread Prepared with Elemental Water is the Appropriate Matter for
Conversion into the Body of Christ*

I. The Response is Affirmative

362. As to the first question, the answer is plain in d.2 ‘On Consecration’ [*Rep.* IVA d.11. q.6; Gratian *Decretum* p.3 d.2 chs.4, 5].

363. The principal reason is that Christ instituted such matter, and as sign of his institution he used such consecrated matter.

364. That he also used wheat bread and not other bread is contained in the same place [n.362].

365. And the fittingness of this is taken from the words of *John* 12.24-25, “Unless a grain of wheat...,” where Christ compares himself to a grain of wheat. Hence Augustine [*On John* tr.51 n.9, and Nicholas of Lyra in the *Gloss*], says on that place, “Although there are many grains from crops, he compares himself only to this one. Hence

began the custom of the Church to confect the body of our Lord the Savior only from this grain.”

366. From this flour too, taken from wheat and prepared with elemental water, the bread should be made, because thus is it supposed that the bread was made which Christ used in his consecration; nor does bread paste [Latin: *pasta*] suffice, but bread, for so was it instituted.

367. And in all respects is there fittingness, for since this sacrament is a sign of spiritual nutriment it is fittingly instituted in those things that are signs of the principal nutriment of the body, and wheat bread is the principal nutriment as far as food is concerned.

II. Three Doubts

368. But there is doubt here: first about wheat starch (*amidon*), whether consecratable bread can be made from it; second whether the sacrament can be confected from wheat flour, made into bread paste, not baked; third whether unleavened bread or leavened bread or both can be used.

A. About the First Doubt

369. As to the first doubt, it would seem *prima facie* that such bread would be consecratable, first because it is usually reckoned to be wheat bread and Christ instituted the sacrament in the usual wheat bread, and second because the purifications done in preparing starch do not seem to be alterations from the species of wheat flour (for only colorings and purifications and the like are done there, and these do not seem to alter the core of the wheat away from its species).

370. However, if one is to believe the experts in given subjects about the qualities consequent to those subjects – subjects that are made known through the effects by which we recognize qualities and functions and distinguish substances (for we do not recognize the distinction between fire and water otherwise than through what becomes known to us from their effects), and each species, according to medical doctors, gets from the whole species any quality and function that does not belong to it through such and such mixing but follows the form proper to such species, and this sort of quality and function is different in the whole species in starch and in wheat bread (as is plain to those who inspect them and assign them such properties as concerns their effects) – if all this is so, it seems that starch is of a totally different species from wheat bread.

371. And there is a confirmation: for the fact that vinegar and sour grape juice differ from wine in species, and are consequently not matter for consecration as to the wine, we do not otherwise prove than by reference to their qualities and functions, namely because vinegar is cold from its whole species and wine is warm from its whole species.

372. Here it can briefly be said that, since it is certain that wheat flour ground in the common way of grinding, namely in the way that millers are accustomed to grind it, is suitable matter for making consecratable bread, and since it is doubtful whether starch is matter of this sort, and the negative side is much more probable, not without sin would anyone expose oneself to such a doubt, especially he who prepares hosts for consecration,

since the fact that he is preparing them from this sort of matter is simply certain to him. Perhaps the user can be more excused of sin, because he supposes that such matter has been well prepared. But if this matter is not in truth fit for consecration, he effects nothing [when consecrating it]. There is, however, no idolatry for the people or occasion of idolatry, since the people, as far as is in themselves, are supposing that the matter is suitable and is to be adored both by themselves and others.

B. About the Second Doubt

373. As to the second doubt, it is very probable that bread paste and bread do not differ in species, because by the cooking of bread paste in the oven, or by fire in some other way, only the watery fluid mixed with the parts of the flour is drawn out, and this mixture is one of juxtaposition. Now such separation does not change the species, for the mixing too does not change it. But neither can the sacrament be confected from bread paste, because Christ did not want to impose on us in his sacraments a subtle disputation about specific differences, but that we should have commonly for the matter of consecration the usual wheat bread. And so according to Damascene, *Orthodox Faith* ch.86, the sacrament instituted for us ought to be what, either it or the like, is commonly accustomed to be nutriment.

374. And if you argue that bread becomes bread paste through a little kneading by the fingers, but it seems, after such kneading by the fingers, to be matter for consecration, therefore before baking too – I reply that this proves bread does not differ in species from bread paste, but it does not prove that bread paste is consecratable matter.

And if you ask about such bread, recent and reduced to paste, whether it is consecratable – I reply that it is, because as much remains of its accustomed hardness as is accustomed to be in the hardness of bread; yet from the fact that it was once baked and was bread (unless it departs from the idea of usual bread), it does not depart from the idea of consecratable bread.

C. About the Third Doubt

1. Opinion of the Greeks

375. The third doubt contains greater difficulty. For the Greeks say that it is necessary to confect the sacrament using leavened bread, and so they deny that the Latins confect it.³⁵

376. And they try to prove the antecedent with the Gospels. For they say that Christ suffered on the fourteenth day of the month, so that the figure of the Law might be fulfilled about the paschal lamb, which was sacrificed on the fourteenth day [*Exodus* 12.1-28, 34.18; *Leviticus* 23.5-8; *Numbers* 28.16-25; *Matthew* 26.17-20 etc.]. And Christ who foreknew that this was going to be, anticipated the eating of the paschal lamb before the fourteenth day. Now the Greeks say that leavened bread was in use among the Jews at that time; and it was licit then and commonly maintained among the Jews. For leavened bread was not forbidden them before the fourteenth day of the first month toward

³⁵ This dispute is dealt with at length by Eusebius *Ecclesiastical History* V.23-25, IV.26, and by Innocent III, *On the Sacrament of the Altar* IV ch.4, on whom Scotus here draws.

evening. From this the Greeks conclude that Christ then used leavened bread and that consequently he confected the sacrament with leavened bread.

377. In favor of this opinion they adduce other texts from the Gospels:

As *John* 18.28 where it is written that the Jews themselves “did not enter the Praetorium so that they might not become unclean but eat the Pasch.” Now ‘Pasch’ there is taken for the paschal lamb which had to be eaten on the fourteenth day of the month. Therefore, on the fourteenth day they handed Christ over to Pilate.

Again in *John* 13.1-2 is read that it was “before the feast day of the Pasch,” and then follows everything about the cena and the institution of the Eucharist [*Matthew* 26.20-29 and the parallels in *Luke* and *Mark*]. Therefore it was before the day on which the paschal lamb was sacrificed, and consequently before the fourteenth day of the month.

Again in *Matthew* 26.5 is said how the Jews thought to kill Christ, and they said “Not on the feast day.” Now that principal feast day was the fifteenth day of the month, according to *Numbers* 28.16-17, “On the fourteenth day of the first month you will celebrate the Pasch, and on the fifteenth day there will be a solemnity (that is, the principal day).” Therefore, the verse in *John*, where it says “Before the feast day etc.,” is understood of that day.

2. Refutation of the Opinion

378. But in the issue at hand both the antecedent [n.375] and the consequence are false, for the first consequence [n.376] is nothing and the second is not necessary [n.377]. For that he suffered on the fifteenth day and consequently that he had the cena on the fourteenth is expressly proved by *Matthew* 26.17, “On the first day of unleavened bread, the disciples asked, ‘Where do you wish us to prepare for you to eat the pasch?’,” and *Mark* 14.12, “On the first day of unleavened bread, when they sacrificed the pasch, they asked, ‘Where do you wish us to go and prepare to eat the pasch?’,” and *Luke* 22.7-8, “The day of unleavened bread arrived, on which it was necessary to eat the pasch, and he sent two, Peter and John, saying, ‘Go and prepare for us to eat the pasch.’”

379. From these it is plain that on the first day of unleavened bread, namely on the fourteenth day, he ate the paschal lamb, and this in accord with the place in *Numbers* that was just cited [n.377]; and “on the fifteenth day there will be a solemnity,” that is, the first complete day of the solemn Pasch, and on that day Christ suffered. And thus at the hour on which the paschal lamb had to be eaten according to the Law, namely the fourteenth day of the first month, the disciples ate the true lamb.

380. As to their proofs, which they adduce for the antecedent [nn.378-379], the answer is plain from a distinction set down by Innocent III *On the Sacrament of the Altar* IV ch.4, that ‘Pasch’ is said in five ways: in one way for the solemnity of the day of unleavened bread, which was the fifteenth day; in another way for the day on the evening of which the lamb was eaten, which was the fourteenth day; third for the hour of the sacrificing of the lamb, which was part of the fourteenth day; in the fourth way for the lamb that was eaten or sacrificed; in the fifth way for unleavened bread.

381. As to the issue at hand, one member of the distinction suffices for solving the first authority from *John* 18 [n.377], and likewise for solving the second authority from *John* [*ibid.*].³⁶

3. Scotus' own Opinion

382. Accordingly, then, one must hold that it is not of the necessity of the consecratable bread either that it be unleavened or that it be leavened, because according to Anselm, *Letter on the Sacrifice of Leavened and Unleavened* ch.1, "leavened and unleavened do not differ in substance." And therefore we do not deny that the Greeks truly confect [the sacrament].

383. This is also plain because, at the time of Leo IX, it was established that the sacrament would be confected with leavened bread. But this was for a time, so that the heresy of the Ebionites might be extinguished, who said that it was necessary for Christians to Judaize, and as a result they confected their pasch with unleavened bread, as the Jews did; and consecration with leavened bread was ordained for extinction of this heresy. But afterwards, when the heresy was extinct, the Western Church returned to its first custom, which was in conformity with the institution of Christ and the promulgation made through his vicar, St. Peter.

384. But today it is of the necessity of the minister, at least in the Latin Church, to confect with unleavened bread, as was said above in the second conclusion of this distinction [n.379, cf. nn.140-141]. And perhaps too the Greeks sin gravely who do not conform themselves to the Church of Peter, especially since here the solid foundation is held, because Christ did thus institute the celebrating of this sacrament. At least, although it is not necessary that it could not be done differently, yet thus is it more fittingly celebrated.

Question Two

Whether only Wine Pressed from the Grape is Fitting Matter for Conversion into the Blood

385. To the second question [n.361] I say that artificial wine, or any other wine that is not wine from the vine (as wine from apples or this sort of thing) is only wine in a

³⁶ The solution is that 'pasch' refers sometimes to the day of unleavened bread, and sometimes to the day of the paschal sacrifice, so that Christ could institute the Eucharist on one day (the Thursday) and suffer on the next (the Friday) and both days be days of the pasch.

Nevertheless the timing of the cena (the Last Supper) and the institution of the Eucharist in the Gospels is puzzling, and Scotus' treatment does not entirely solve that puzzle (even if his answer is sufficient against the Greeks). The Gospels put the cena on Thursday evening and suppose that the paschal sacrifice proper, which the Chief Priests and Pharisees celebrated, was later on Friday afternoon. Consequently the cena took place before the paschal sacrifice, and Christ himself suffered and died after the cena, at the same time as that sacrifice (being himself, of course, the true Lamb of God). Now in Jewish reckoning each day begins on the previous evening, so that Friday begins on Thursday evening and ends at Friday evening (when Saturday begins). So the cena, though it occurred on the Thursday evening, did occur on the fourteenth day; it just occurred much earlier in that day than the paschal sacrifice proper. The cena, then, could have used leavened bread since it occurred before the legal requirement for unleavened bread came into effect, but it could have used unleavened bread if it was an anticipation of the paschal sacrifice. So, from this point of view, the requirement that the bread for the Eucharist be leavened or unleavened does seem a matter of choice, to be determined by the Church's law.

certain respect and equivocally; hence nothing such is suitable for consecration into the blood.

386. The principal reason is that Christ instituted it thus.

The good fittingness is that the second principal part of nutriment, that is, drink, principally consists in wine, as in the principal drink. And on this there is Gratian *Decretum* p.3 d.2 ch.5.

387. The wine too should be pressed from the grape; for as long as the liquid is in the grape alone it has more the idea of the eatable than the drinkable. But this sacrament in the second part of itself essentially contains the blood, and something that is per se drink for the sign. And this too is in Gratian *ibid.* chs.6-7, “what is from pressed grape clusters, that is, the people communicate in grape grains, is very confused; but if necessary grape clusters may be pressed out into the chalice.”

388. The adding of water to this wine is not simply necessary, by necessity of the sacrament, because even when it is added it is not converted into the blood unless it is first converted into wine; and therefore a small amount is to be added, and so early that it can be converted into wine before the consecration (for the Greeks do not add water, as Innocent III says *On the Sacred Mystery of the Altar* IV ch.32, but this is necessary on the part of the minister because of the precept of the Roman Church). And Christ too consecrated wine in which water was first mixed, according to Damascene *Orthodox Faith* ch.80, “Christ handed the chalice of wine and water to his disciples, saying, ‘Drink you all of this; this is my blood etc.’.”

389. The fittingness of adding water to the wine is because of the mystery, to signify that the people are united to Christ the Lord, according to Gratian *ibid.* p.3 d.2 ch.7, “Since water is mixed with wine in the chalice, the people are united to Christ,” that is, it is signified that the people are to be joined to him through faith and worthy reception of the sacrament.

Twelfth Distinction

Division of the Text and Overview of the Parts

1. “Now if it is asked...” [Lombard, *Sent.* IV d.12].
2. In this distinction the Master determines the things that remain after the consecration of the Eucharist.
3. And it is divided into two parts: for first he makes determination about the being of the accidents that remain there without a subject; second about a certain change done in respect of them, namely those in the breaking of the host. And he next makes determination incidentally about the signification of the parts into which the host is broken.
4. There follows the part that in this distinction can be set down either as incidental, or as principal, divided off from the whole of the preceding part. For in it he makes determination about the Eucharist under the idea of sacrifice after he has done so about it under the idea of sacrament [n.3].

5. And it has a principal (and incidental) part, which is divided into two: the first of these is about the institution of this sacrament as it is a sacrifice, and the second is about the receiving of it.

6. As to this twelfth distinction the question that must principally be asked is about the accidents that remain without a subject. And there are three questions on that point: first about the being of the accidents; second about their actions; third about change in respect to them.

First Part: About the Being of the Accidents in the Eucharist

7. Concerning the first part [n.3] two questions are asked: first whether there is in the Eucharist any accident without a subject; second whether every accident remaining in the Eucharist is without a subject.

Question One

Whether there is in the Eucharist Any Accident without a Subject

8. As to the first part [n.7], argument is made that there is not:

Because just as existing per se belongs to substance, so existing in another belongs to accident. This is plain because 'being is divided into being per se and being in another' [cf. *Metaphysics* 5.7.1017a7-8], and the first member belongs to substance and the second to accident; but it is impossible for substance to be and not to be per se or to be in another, because "what truly is, is not an accident of anything," *Physics* 1.3.186b4-5; therefore it is impossible for an accident to be and to be per se or not to be in another.

9. Again, the essentially posterior cannot be without the essentially prior, *Metaphysics* 5.11.1019a1-4; but accident is essentially posterior to substance, from *Metaphysics* 7.1.1028a31-33, because substance is first of all beings in knowledge, time, and definition; therefore, it is impossible for an accident to be without the substance of which it is the accident.

10. Again, it is impossible for a defined thing to be without a definition, and consequently without whatever defines it; but substance defines accident, from *Metaphysics* 7.3.1028b33-37; therefore etc.

11. If you say that the major is true of a definition that belongs to the quiddity of the defined thing but not of that which defines as something added, and that substance defines accident in this way [cf. *Metaphysics* 7.5.1030b14-16] – on the contrary: it is impossible and impossible for a relative to be without its correlative (for then the relative would not be relative); but a correlative defines the relative not as something of its quiddity but as added; therefore the major is true of what defines as something added.

12. There is also confirmation of this, because if God were to belong to the definition of any creature, he would only belong as something added, and it would be impossible for the defined thing to be without that addition; but as it is, according to the philosophers, substance is a simply necessary cause of accident as God is of creature, and because of this necessity of causing substance falls in the definition of accident as such a simply necessary added thing; therefore etc.

13. Again, in the *Categories* 8.9a28-35, 'white' and 'whiteness' signify the same, because 'white' signifies the quality alone; therefore 'quantum' and 'quantity' signify in

the same way; but it is impossible for a quantum to be unless there is some subject to which the quantity belongs; therefore it is impossible for a quantity to be without a subject. And there is a confirmation: when two things are altogether the same, one of them cannot be without the other; of this sort are 'quantity' and 'quantum'.

14. The opposite is asserted in the text [of Lombard], and from the authorities of the saints that were adduced in the preceding distinction [d.11 nn.94-96].

15. Again by reason: the accidents of the bread remain, as is plain to sense, and they do not affect the body of Christ, because that body is not a quantum with this quantity [sc. of the bread]; but much more is that body not shaped by this shape but by the shape of a human body; nor is it colored with this color but by the color that belongs to a human body. Nor do the accidents affect the [surrounding] air, because the air is not capable of these accidents, since they are accidents of a mixed body and repugnant to an element; nor do they affect the substance of bread, because the substance does not remain (from what was said before, d.11 nn.13-29). Therefore, they exist without a subject.

I. To the Question

A. First Opinion and its Rejection

16. It is said here [Godfrey of Fontaines, Giles of Rome] that since of one composite thing there is only one being, that being is consequently and per accidens the being of any accident of the whole, and so, if an accident be separated from a subject, God gives it a new being, because it cannot now have the being of the whole which it was an accident of before.

17. Against this:

Just as each thing that is outside its cause and outside the intellect has its own entity, so also does it have its own being; if therefore an accident have outside its subject and the intellect its own essential entity, it also has its own being, and so does not exist formally through the being of the subject. The first proposition is taken here as plain; the other is made clear in the case of 'being' and 'essence' [nn.28-30].

18. Again, that a form exists in matter necessarily argues that it is a composite, such that the first cannot be posited without the second; but a form is in matter by some natural change (as by alteration or increase); therefore by that change, and by the same agent, a composite of subject and accident has the formal being of the accident. But it does not formally have the being of the subject, because that being existed before the change; therefore etc.

19. Again, if an accident, when separated, has a new being, one must posit there a change from lack of the being to this being; but this is impossible. The proof is that it is impossible to set down what this change is; for it is not generation because an accident is not a subject of generation; nor is it increase or alteration, for quantity is not acquired by that change nor is quality, because then quality would be the subject of either increase or alteration, and quantity or quality would be whose being is acquired. And so could one go on arguing about it ad infinitum.³⁷

³⁷ The being of a separate quantity or quality would not be acquired by change of increase or alteration because quantity or quality would already be presupposed as the subject of the change and so would not acquire being through it; and as for the being that is supposedly acquired, it would be the being of quantity or quality and so would

20. Again, that new being, because it is not formally divine being, is either the being properly of substance or of accident or it is neither. If it is in the genus of substance it will be independent and so will not be formally the being of any accident, because no accident can formally be independent or exist per se; if it is in the genus of accident (by reduction in some way or other), it will be as dependent as the form it is the being of, and consequently it will not by that being be formally that whose entity is independent.

B. Second Opinion and its Rejection

21. It is said in another way [Henry of Ghent] that when accident is separated from subject God gives it a certain supernatural virtue, by which virtue it is able to exist per se, though it could not do so without it.

22. Argument is made against this second view just as against the preceding one [n.16], at least as regards the two last arguments [nn.19-20]. For this virtue that comes from outside is the term of some change; I ask, of what change? It will also belong to some genus [of change]; I ask, to which genus? And the argument would proceed as before [nn.19-20].

23. Again, even though some supernatural virtue be given to something, yet after the virtue is present in it, it is natural to what has it or can have that for which it is the virtue (as a blind man, even though he be supernaturally given sight, yet when he has sight he sees naturally); therefore, although there be in the first instant a miracle in the conserving of these accidents without a subject, yet because the virtue is then conferred on the accident, it will afterwards by that virtue exist naturally without a subject.

24. Again, it is impossible for a substance to receive any virtue by which it should depend on something else as inhering in that something; therefore it is impossible for an accident to receive a virtue by which it should be a per se being, released from all inherence in another. The proof of the consequence is that 'to exist per se' and 'to inhere' are equally proper to them, namely to substance and accident, the latter to the latter and the former to the former.

C. Scotus' own Opinion

1. Preliminaries

25. To the question I say that the word 'accident' can be taken for what is per se signified by it or for what is denominated by what is per se signified (and this distinction is universal to all concrete terms). Further, when taking it for what is denominated by what is signified by the name, accident can be taken for what is absolute or for an accidental respect or relation.

26. Accordingly there are three divisions: namely about accident as concerns the per se idea that accident introduces; also about what is denominatively called accident and is absolute; the third division is about what is denominatively called accident and is relational.

27. Further, the predicate 'to be in a subject' or 'not to be in a subject' can be taken as to aptitude or as to actuality.

again not be acquired through the change but presupposed to it. And if one asks how such presupposed being is acquired, the same questions would arise again, and so on ad infinitum.

2. Three Conclusions

28. Let the first conclusion, then, be that, when speaking of what is per se signified by accident, it is a contradiction to understand it not to be in a subject; and this when understanding it in a uniform way in subject and in predicate, namely if actually actually, if aptitudinally aptitudinally.

29. Let the second conclusion be that, when speaking of what is denominated by what is per se signified by accident and is a per se respect, it is a contradiction for an accident to be without a subject, and this actually, namely such that it not actually inhere in a subject (extending subject to the foundation that can be the proximate subject of a respect).

30. The third conclusion is that what is denominated by what is per se signified by accident and is something absolute is capable of being and not being in a subject actually – but it is necessarily in a subject aptitudinally.

3. Proof of the Conclusions

a. Proof of the First Conclusion

31. The proof of the first conclusion [n.28] is that what is per se signified by the word ‘accident’ is a certain respect as to that of which it is an accident, and perhaps it is the same respect that is introduced by the term ‘inhering’ as to what it inheres in. And the thing signified by accident and by accident-ness (so to speak) and by what inheres and inherence is the same. Therefore, just as it is impossible for there to be an accident-ness that is not an inherence (if actually, actually; if aptitudinally, aptitudinally), so the fact that something is an accident (speaking of what is per se and first signified by the this word) cannot not be inherent proportionally – that is, if actually actually, if aptitudinally aptitudinally.

32. And if you ask what genus that belongs to which per se signifies what is meant by ‘accident’ and ‘inhering’, I reply that it belongs to a genus of extrinsically arising respect. For it is plain that it states a respect, because its idea cannot be understood by itself. And it does not state a respect that comes from within, because it does not state what necessarily follows the positing of the extreme terms; for, as will be plain in the final conclusion [nn.39-42], its foundation and term can persist without the respect.

33. If you ask what genus it should be reduced to, perhaps to the genus of ‘passion’ [*Categories* 9.11b1-14], so that in this way passion states not only the respect of the passive thing to the agent, but to the form, or possibly perhaps to the genus of ‘action’ [*ibid.*], so that in this way action states not only the respect of the agent to the patient, but of the informing form to that which is informed. But in either way it will be a respect coming from outside.

34. And if you object that what belongs to a determinate genus cannot belong to several genera, but the term ‘accident’ or ‘inhering’, as far as concerns the per se idea of the word, belongs to all nine genera [n.35], therefore etc. – I reply that it is very possible that what belongs to a determinate genus denominates several genera; for perhaps ‘created thing’ states something that per se belongs to the genus of relation, and yet

perhaps it denominates anything other than God, and only what is other than God is properly in a genus. So, therefore, this respect can belong per se to one genus, and yet it is denominatively said of the relations or respects of the nine genera.

35. But if it be objected against this, from Simplicius *On the Categories* [section on substance], that ‘is in’ does not constitute any special genus, because there is one ‘is in’ for all nine genera – I reply that either ‘is in’ is taken denominatively, and thus it encompasses all the genera of accidents, just as does that which is ‘inheres in’ or ‘is accident to’; or it is taken for the relation that is per se signified by ‘is in’, and in this way not just any accident is taken by ‘is in’, because it is a determinate species in one genus. But if Simplicius means that ‘is in’, as far as concerns the per se idea that it introduces, does not belong to any determinate genus but per se to several genera, he is to be rejected, for he is not of so great authority that the opposite of what reason concludes is, on his say-so, to be conceded. Now reason convincingly shows that the concept that ‘in’ introduces can be contained quidditatively in some genus, even though it be denominatively said of forms that are in many genera. For it is not said quidditatively of whiteness and line, because then whiteness and line would not be said for themselves, for that which essentially includes a relation is not for itself, according to Augustine *On the Trinity* 7.2 n.3.

b. Proof of the Second Conclusion

36. The proof of the second conclusion [n.29] is that a respect is essentially a relation between two extremes, therefore, just as to take away the term that the respect is *to* is to take away or destroy the idea of respect, so to take away that which the respect is *of* is to take away the respect itself and to destroy the idea of respect. Not therefore because a relational accident is an accident does it for this reason require a subject or foundation; but because a respect is a respect for this reason does it require that of which and to which it is a respect (even in the case of divine reality).

37. If it be argued against this [second] conclusion [n.29] that it seems to contradict the preceding one [n.28], because, according to the preceding conclusion, the idea that ‘to be accident to’ or to ‘inhere’ signifies is a respect coming from outside [n.32], therefore it cannot belong to any respect denominatively, because a respect is not a subject or a foundation of a respect (for then there would be a regress to infinity); therefore ‘paternity’ or ‘likeness’ cannot inhere in or be accident to, because ‘to inhere in’ or ‘to be denominated by inhering in’ requires that the thing denominated be the subject or foundation of the inhering in. I reply that one respect can well be founded on another, as posterior on prior (just as was touched on above in a question about character, and was proved about proportion and proportionality [*Ord.* IV d.6 nn.300-305]). And so I say that just as whiteness can be denominated from inhering in, or from what can be accidental to, so can paternity be denominated; and ‘like’ is a denomination in this regard.

38. But if you argue that therefore a respect is denominated by itself – the solution to this will be given in the third article [nn.39-45, cf. nn.67-68].

c. Proof of the Third Conclusion

39. The proof of the third conclusion [n.30] is that an absolute does not, from its being an absolute, require a term or terms, because then it would not be an absolute; therefore, if it requires a subject, this must be because of some other dependence essential to it; but there is no simply necessary dependence of any absolute on anything that is not of the absolute's essence, save for dependence on the simply first extrinsic cause, namely on God.

40. Now a subject is not of the essence of an accident, because then 'man is white' would not be a being per accidens, which is against the Philosopher, *Metaphysics* 5.7.1017a7-22, 6.1015b16-26; 7.5.1030b14-27; for by adding to a thing what is of its essence one does not get a being per accidens, especially if that thing is in itself a being per se.

41. Now an accident in itself is a being per se, according to the Philosopher *ibid.* 5.7.1017a22-30; hence it is also per se in a genus. And a subject is not the simply first extrinsic cause of an accident, because God is not the subject of an accident. Therefore, the dependence of an absolute accident on a subject is not simply necessary (and I mean by simply necessary that whose opposite includes a contradiction). The proof of the major is that the first cause can perfectly supply the causality of any extrinsic cause with respect to any caused thing, because the first cause has in itself all such causality more eminently than a second does cause.

42. If you say 'a subject is a material cause with respect to an accident, and God cannot supply the place of a material cause just as not of a formal cause either' – on the contrary: according to the Philosopher, *Metaphysics* 8.4-5.1044b7-26, accidents do not have matter 'from which' but matter 'in which', or if they have matter 'from which' it is not a subject, because a subject along with an accident makes a being per accidens, as was said [n.40]. But what is per se intrinsic to the essence of an accident, whether matter or form, does not constitute a being per accidens, because an accident, as being a certain whole, arises from all the things that pertain to its essence.

43. From this reasoning it is clear why philosophers said that an accident cannot be without a subject; not indeed because they posited the subject to be of the essence of an accident (on the contrary, from these a being per accidens is constituted), nor because they posited inherence, or some or other respect to the subject, to be of the essence of an absolute accident (for it is a contradiction that some respect be included in the per se idea of an absolute, since then it would be absolute and non-absolute); but only because they posited an order of causes that was simply necessary, such that the first cause cannot cause what is caused by a second cause without that second cause. Now a subject does have some causality with respect to an accident, speaking of the natural order of causes. And so they denied that an accident, in the order of its causality they set down, exists without this cause. And to this extent is it said in *Physics* 1.4.188a9-10 that an intellect looking for the separation of accidents from subjects will be looking for things impossible. But the impossible is not that it include something repugnant to the first idea or quiddity of an absolute accident; for once such an impossible is posited, no rule for disputation can be preserved, especially as regard those consequents that are included along with their opposites in the antecedent. For it is plain that then, with such impossible thing posited, contradictories must at once be admitted. And thus, in the issue at hand, the greatest unacceptable result to which a respondent can be reduced is included, namely that of refutation.

44. But, as it is, the Philosopher in *Physics* 4.7.214a9-10 asks this question: if there were a space in which there was only color or sound, would it be a vacuum? And he replies definitively for one side, that if the space were receptive of a body it would be a vacuum. But if, from the primary understanding of what it is to be a color, a color's being in a subject were included, then, since its subject could only be a body, from the first understanding of what was posed [sc. "if there were a space in which there was only color or sound, would it be a vacuum?"] one would get 'a body is there' and 'a body is not there'; and so, once the hypothesis was posed, the response would at once have to be that the space would be a vacuum and not a vacuum.

45. The above discussion has been adduced for this purpose, so it may be seen that the Philosopher did not intend the contradiction to follow from the first quidditative idea of accident, just as neither did he posit 'being in a subject' to belong to the first quidditative idea of whiteness; but the impossibility he has is only because of the necessity he posits in the order of causes.

4. Doubts against the Third Conclusion

46. A first argument against this conclusion [n.30] is as follows: if whiteness inheres in a subject, as you concede [n.40], either this inherence is of the essence of whiteness, and I have the proposed conclusion (that it is a contradiction, and a primary contradiction [cf. *Ord.* II d.2 n.409], for the subject to be without its predicate [n.44, sc. 'a color is without a body']); or it is not, and this seems unacceptable, both by authority [nn.47-48] and by reason [n.49].

47. By the authority of the Philosopher, *Metaphysics* 7.1.1028a18-20: "accidents," he says, "or things other than substance are called 'beings' by the fact they are, in such manner, 'of being';" therefore the formal idea of entity in the case of an accident is to inhere, in such manner, in being, that is, in substance; and a little later he says, "none of them is naturally fit to be by itself, nor able to be separated from substance." Many things to the same effect are also there.

48. There is a confirmation: in *Metaphysics* 4.2.1003a33-b10 the Philosopher says that being is said of substance and accidents as 'healthy' is said of health in an animal and health in urine; but 'healthy' says formally of urine nothing save the relation of sign to the health said of animal. Therefore, 'being' said of an accident does not state anything other than relation to substance. Similarly, in *Metaphysics* 7.4.1030a32-b7 Aristotle seems to say that in the way something 'non-knowable' is equivocally 'knowable' so too work and vessel are equivocally 'curative', because these things, 'quantity' and 'quality', are in this way said to be beings.

49. Now the reason [n.46] for proving that this is unacceptable is as follows: for if inherence is not of the essence of whiteness, something else will be and it will inhere in whiteness, because whiteness is said to be formally inherent by this inherence. I ask then about the inherence: by what inherence does it inhere in whiteness? Either by the very same whiteness or by the very inherence; and by parity of reasoning one must make a stand at the first, or the inherence is other than its foundation and one will progress to infinity.

50. Again, there is another doubt against this conclusion [n.30], because at least the relation of accident to subject seems to be the same as the accident. The proof is that

in *Ord.* II d.1 q.5 nn.252, 260-271 [cf. I d.3 n.287] it was said that the relation of each creature to God under the idea of a threefold cause [sc. God as exemplary cause, efficient cause, final cause] is the same as the foundation [sc. of the relation]; but the respect of accident to subject seems to be no less the same as the accident itself than this relation does [sc. relation of creature to God]. The proof is that created substance is not defined by adding the divine essence to its definition, for then nothing could have a definition in its own genus, since God is outside genus; and yet an accident, because of its necessary respect to a subject, is defined by respect to a subject (*Metaphysics* 7.4.1030a27-b13); therefore the respect of an accident to a subject is no less the same as the accident than is the respect of created substance to God.

51. Again a third doubt: if the respect of whiteness to the subject be other than whiteness, at least it does not seem to be posterior to whiteness; for whiteness only requires a subject because of the respect that it has to it. But if this respect be posterior to whiteness, the whiteness is able to remain when the respect has been removed; therefore, the whiteness is able not to depend on a subject. And this reason can be more evidently deduced about an accident as it is understood than about an accident as it is in existence, in the following way: if whiteness is prior to the respect, then it can be conceived completely without that respect, and consequently defined completely, as a prior can be without a posterior; but whiteness only requires a subject because of the respect it has to the subject; therefore, it can be defined completely without a subject, which is against the Philosopher (as before [nn.47-48]).

52. Again, a fourth doubt: if inherence is other than whiteness and posterior to it, at least it seems to be a proper attribute of whiteness, because nothing seems to inhere more immediately in whiteness than relation to a subject; but 'a subject being per se without its proper attribute' includes a contradiction, otherwise no conclusion would be simply knowable, for any such conclusion predicates an attribute of a subject and, for you [nn.39-42], no such conclusion would be simply necessary nor, consequently, simply knowable.

5. Solution of the Doubts

a. Solution of the First Doubt

53. Response to these doubts:

To the first [nn.46-49]: in no way must it be conceded that inherence is of the essence of whiteness; and the question moved by others about this seems fictitious and deceptive and without understanding. For even if asking whether the relation [sc. of inherence] is the same as whiteness would have some evidence to it, yet not on this ground is there reason to ask whether it is of the essence of whiteness, because nothing is of the essence of something save what intrinsically belongs to its quiddity; but a respect, though it be the same as the foundation, as was said of the respect of the creature to God [n.50], is yet not of its quiddity, because then no essence of a creature would be absolute. I assert the negative, therefore, that the inherence whereby whiteness inheres in its subject, is not of the essence of whiteness.

54. When argument is then drawn from Aristotle [nn.47-48], I say that he never thought this, that a form which is per se in an absolute genus includes any respect

essentially; but the idea of inherence cannot be understood without the idea of respect, unless you do not understand what is meant by the name.

55. The first authority, then [from Aristotle, n.47], is brought from equivocation over the phrase ‘by the fact that’. For ‘by the fact that’ is not always a mark of the formal cause of what precedes it; for when *Metaphysics* 5.18.1022a14-20 says that ‘to the extent that’ or ‘by the fact that’ is said as often as ‘cause’ is said, the phrase can be a mark of any cause of what precedes it; and so, since substance is a cause of accident but is not of the essence of it, an accident is a being ‘by the fact that it is, in such manner, of being’, designating the causality in the substance. But not for this reason will the formal ‘to be’ in the entity of whiteness be the ‘to be’ of another entity.

56. Thus universally, a thing caused by any cause, in any genus of cause, is what it is because it is, in such manner, of being, that is, belongs to such cause in such genus and order of causing; nor yet is this relation to any cause something formal or essential in the thing caused, because then no caused thing would formally be absolute.

57. However some pervert this text, saying that Aristotle’s text is that “accidents are not beings [sc. as opposed to “are not called beings,” n.47]³⁸ save because they are, in such manner, of being” – this proposition the Philosopher neither asserts nor is it there [sc. in the text] nor does it follow from the Philosopher’s proposition; for just as the phrase ‘by the fact that’ can denote in the antecedent any cause of what precedes, so it can denote such a cause but not do so precisely, and consequently it does not denote such precision. But let it be that in the antecedent the precise cause were denoted just as it is in the consequent, yet neither proposition makes for the intended conclusion, that the relation imported by the term ‘of being’ is formal in the essence of whiteness. Now the phrase ‘in such manner, of being’ is taken for the substance that the preceding discussion was about – or for ‘totally of being’, according to another text, such that ‘totally’ does not thus state the totality of universality, because then an accident would be ‘of being’ taken in the most universal way, and thus it would not be a being, but it would be totally being, with the totality of perfection; and thus is substance totally being.

58. As to the other authority [n.47, “neither naturally fit nor able [to be separated from substance]” and the other things said there, it is plain how the Philosopher understands it, that it is because of the necessary order of caused thing to proximate cause; but there is not got from this that the relation to proximate cause is of the essence of the caused thing.

59. The authority from *Metaphysics* 4 and the like one from *Metaphysics* 7 about ‘knowable’ and ‘non-knowable’ [n.48] could, according to the appearance of the words, be adduced for the fact that an accident would have no formal entity, just as ‘health’ in the case of urine has nothing of the formal idea of health; and if it is adduced for this purpose, it is only ignorance of words. For it is plain that accidents are principles of acting and principles of knowing substance and per se objects of the senses (from *On the Soul* 1.1.402b16-3a2). But it is trifling to say that something is a principle of acting, either by real action on matter or by intentional action on the senses or intellect, and does not have any formal entity; for thus I could say that a chimaera acts or senses. It is also trifling that something is the per se property of being if it not have per se some entity, or that it is the term of some motion or change if it not have some entity. In the case of all

³⁸ The authentic text does seem to be the reading Scotus rejects.

substances, if they have properties, the properties are accidents. Also if there is any movement of growth, alteration, and 'where', it is to an accident as term.

60. The understanding of the philosopher therefore in the examples is not that they run all fours, for according to Damascene ch.70 "What is alike in everything will be altogether the same thing, not an example." And so he says as preface, "it is not necessary for examples to be assigned that are complete and without defects; for it is necessary to consider in examples what is like and what is unlike."

61. Thus I say that the examples of the Philosopher are to this effect, that just as the essential order is of medicine to animal in what it is 'to be called healthy', so the essential order is between substance and accident in having entitative being. But the examples are not to the effect that essential order to a subject is of the essence of the whiteness that has that order the way the idea of sign is essentially 'healthy' as said of urine. And the reason for the unlikeness is in this, that there is not in urine any absolute form by which it might be said to be healthy, although there is something absolute there on which the idea of sign is founded, namely the sort of color and digestion and other things that appear in it, but the very order to health is that by which urine is formally said to be healthy. And therefore is this altogether equivocal as far as concerns the name imposed on it from the concept by which an animal is said to be healthy; for although the health is the same that is in an animal formally and that is indicated by urine, yet 'healthy' is imposed to denote what has health formally, and what has health as a sign is purely equivocal. But on the other side 'being' is not purely equivocal, as was said elsewhere [*Ord.* I d.3 nn.26-41], and in each extreme there is an absolute thing because of which a thing is said to be a being, although on one of the absolutes an order to the other is founded.

62. To the argument [n.49] I say that inherence inheres in whiteness, otherwise whiteness would not be formally inherent by that inherence.

63. And when you ask about the inherence [n.49] by what inherence it inheres in whiteness, I say that it is the same as the inherence of whiteness, and so a stand is made there. The reason for this is plain in *Ord.* II d.1 q.5 n.205, because the relation is the same as the foundation, without which 'being a foundation' includes a contradiction. Of this sort is the inherence of the inherence, because it is a contradiction for the inherence of whiteness at a surface to be actual and not actually to inhere or not to have that inherence. It is similarly impossible and a contradiction for inherence to exist aptitudinally without inhering aptitudinally, and without being a foundation of the inherence, namely the whiteness itself; and it too is present in this foundation, for a respect cannot exist without being in a foundation because of the special repugnance a respect has to not being in a foundation. But, for the opposite reason, no inherence of an absolute form is the same as itself, for there is simply no repugnance in that form being and not being simply.

b. Solution of the Second Doubt

64. And from this [n.63] the answer is plain to the second doubt [n.50]; for I say that the inherence of whiteness too is not the same as whiteness.

65. And when proof is given through the relation of the creature to God [n.50], I say the case is not alike, because of the major previously set down for this third

conclusion [n.39]; for no relation to an extrinsic cause is identical with the thing caused save the relation that is to the first cause, because of the fact that the first cause can create any creature at all without any other extrinsic cause at all.

66. And when the argument about the definition is given [n.50], it would prove rather that an accident should not be defined by the subject, because stone or horse are not defined by God, therefore neither is accident by subject. Nevertheless, although God is the sort of cause without which it is impossible and a contradiction for a stone or a horse to exist, yet it is not so in the case of a subject with respect to an accident.

67. But I reply: the identity, or non-identity, of a respect with the foundation is not a reason that the term of respect should fall into the definition of the foundation as something added.

68. What else then?

I reply that neither is dependence an essential and necessary cause that the term of the dependence be added in the definition of the depending foundation; for then God would more be posited in the definition of any caused thing than substance in the definition of accident. But the cause is that no form can have a satisfyingly complete concept unless that of which it is the form be understood along with it; but a definition expresses the perfect concept of the defined thing; and therefore, however much the essential features of a form be expressed without that of which it is the form, and although the quiddity of it be indicated, yet there would not be a perfect concept satisfying the intellect, and so not a definitive concept either. But if a caused thing that is in itself some subsistent composite is conceived in itself, the intellect rests there, not seeking anything else to understand along with it.

69. And if you object that there is therefore equal necessity for a substantial form to be defined by something added as for an accident as well, I reply that there is a necessity on both sides. The point is plain from the Philosopher in defining the soul, *On the Soul* 2.1.412a19-21, where he at once posits the body (which is what is perfectible by the soul), or the whole composite (of which the soul is part). Nor does he posit anything pertaining to the essence of the soul save only that it is act, which signifies the respect of the soul to that of which it is the form. But there is not a like addition here and there, because in the definition of a substantial form is added something that, with it, makes it per se one, or of which it is a per se part (I give the disjunction because of the diverse way of saying that a form is defined, through matter or through the whole); but in the definition of an accidental form is added something with which it does not make a per se one, nor of which it is per se part.

c. Solution of the Third Doubt

70. As to the third doubt [n.51] I say that this respect of inherence is posterior to the whiteness, just as universally a respect founded on something is posterior to the foundation.

71. And when you say [n.51] that therefore whiteness does not necessarily require a term for the respect, I deny the consequence; for something can well depend on the term of a respect and yet not depend on the respect if the respect is posterior to it (for thus does the substance of a stone not depend on the respect of the stone to God, but rather

conversely, provided they were diverse things, and yet the stone would depend essentially on God, who is the term of the respect).

72. As to the proposition [n.51] “whiteness only requires a subject because of the respect,” I reply: ‘because of’ in the sense of necessarily following the nature of the foundation, but not ‘because of’ in the sense of being required for the nature of the foundation as something prior to it. And because it is a ‘because of’ in the former way, it is not necessary that it be required in the same order in which the term of the respect is required.

73. Hereby as to the following point in the same place [“it can be defined completely without a subject,” n.51], which is still touching on the definition of accident, I concede that whiteness can be understood as to anything included in the idea of whiteness in the first mode per se,³⁹ without understanding anything of the respect.

74. And when it is said that therefore it could be defined by its essential parts [n.51], the concession has been made that some idea of it could be assigned that indicates, through the essential parts, the whole essence of it; yet it would not be a definition because it would not be expressive of the perfect concept, for the understanding, when it has this concept, would always depend on something else that is the term of the dependence of the concept [n.42].

75. And when you argue that if the respect is not necessarily concomitant, then the term too of the respect is not required for the understanding of a white thing [n.51], I deny the consequence (speaking of complete concept and one satisfying in intelligibility), since for this is required that the term be understood, but it is not required that the respect to the term be understood as well.

76. And this last fact [sc. respect to the term] makes clear the whole of this conclusion [sc. the third, n. 30] and the response to the three preceding arguments [sc. the doubts, nn.46-51]; for inherence is a certain respect

d. Solution of the Fourth Doubt

77. To the fourth doubt [n.52] I say that this inherence is not a per se property of whiteness but is a per accidens accident of whiteness; for inherence is a certain extrinsically arising respect, and that at least for any absolute accident, because it states the actual union of the absolute to another absolute. Now every union of an absolute to an absolute is an externally arising respect, but every externally arising respect is (for that in which it is) a per accidens accident (as was shown above in a question about character [*Ord.* IV d.6 nn.295-296]); for it is not a necessary consequent, even when the term is posited (for then it would be an intrinsically arising respect). For a respect cannot arise more intrinsically than what necessarily follows the foundation once the term is posited; for if it followed the posited foundation without the term it would not be a respect.

78. But the proof of the proposition, namely that every union of absolutes is an extrinsically arising respect [n.77], is that neither of the absolutes nor both are, by their idea, a necessary cause of such union; for God can without contradiction separate each and conserve it separately without the other, because of the fact that each of them in respect of the other can only be an extrinsic cause, and not a first cause, such that the

³⁹ The first mode of per se is when the predicate belongs to the essence of the subject (as in ‘man is rational’), while the second mode is when the subject belongs to the essence of the predicate (as in ‘man is capable of laughter’).

point about extrinsic respect makes clear how whiteness could be without inherence, namely as a foundation without the extrinsically arising respect, either because the term is not the respect, as in the proposition just stated, or because, if it is, it is separate.

79. But this point about extrinsic respect is at length reduced to the idea above introduced, the proof of the third conclusion [nn.39-42], namely the proposition that God can make any absolute without what is not of the essence of the absolute, because the absolute would only depend on that as on an extrinsic and not a first cause – and all such dependence is contingent.

80. To the proof, then, about an attribute that is immediately present [n.52], one could say that if whiteness has a proper attribute it would more immediately inhere in whiteness than the inherence does. For the inherence is not necessarily present in whiteness, and that whether the subject is conjoined or is separate. Now inherence is only contingently present, and not by the nature of whiteness but by an extrinsic cause; for whiteness does not make itself inhere, but the agent does. For universally the form is not effective in generating but the composite is, and as in a composite per se one so in a composite per accidens. But what makes whiteness inhere in a subject makes a composite per accidens, namely the white subject.

81. And if you argue that by parity of reasoning neither does the remaining part, namely the potential, neither does it make the whole, and so the subject will not be the effective principle of uniting any accident to itself – this is not to the purpose. There is a solution to it, however, because the subject can well include the form virtually, and so include the whole composed of itself and the form. But not so the accident, because the accident does not virtually include itself nor the subject, nor consequently the whole composed of them; also, it naturally follows the agent, since it is the formal term, but the subject is not so.

82. One could say in another way that although inherence is present most immediately in whiteness and in other absolutes, yet the consequence that it is more a per se attribute does not follow unless the foundation, adopted by some people [Giles of Rome], be proved that a variable accident cannot be present in anything save by the mediation of an invariable accident – on which they base a great harangue about the powers of the soul. But how they prove it let them find out. They adduce some examples, but it would be necessary to see some reason for the conjunction of the extreme terms. If something of the same idea could be an inseparable accident in one thing and a separable accident in another (and this is not denied of heat in fire and in wood), the foundation will be weak.

II. To the Initial Arguments

A. To the First Initial Argument

83. To the first initial argument [n.8] I say that by taking ‘being per se’ and ‘being in another’ uniformly, namely as ‘being per se’ denies aptitude for inhering and ‘being in another’ affirms that aptitude, the two are thus in proportional agreement, the first with substance and the second with accident; and then nothing more follows save that an accident cannot be a being per se to which inhering is repugnant, just as neither can substance be that to which the aptitude of inhering belongs.

84. And if you wish to take each actually, namely ‘actually being per se’ and ‘actually being in another’, I say that, as such, they do not divide [being] nor are substance and accident proper to these dividing terms. And no wonder, because on the part of the ‘per se’ the first understanding entails the second; for repugnance to being in [another] entails not being in [another]. But on the other part [sc. ‘being in another’] it is not so, but there is a fallacy of the consequent: ‘it is naturally apt to be in [another], therefore it is in [another]’.

85. And suppose that, as to the aptitude or lack of aptitude for inhering, you ask what it is and how it is disposed to whiteness, namely whether it is in it, and whether in it by another inherence, and so on ad infinitum;

86. Suppose too you ask about the quantity or also about the per se existing whiteness, whether it has a mode of inhering opposite to the one it has when it is in another (it seems that it does, because ‘to be per se’ and ‘to be in another’, however they are taken, are opposites to each other; but it seems the opposite is the case, because it is the same ‘to be’ (as was said before [n.83]), and consequently the same mode of ‘to be’);

87. Suppose, third, the question is asked whether the accident could, by its own aptitude, actually be present, if a substance actually came to be that was of a nature to be informed by the accident;

88. As to the first [n.85]: an aptitude is nothing other than the nature of that of which it is the aptitude. That it is not anything absolute is plain. That it is not anything else, such as an actual real respect, [is plain], for it only states that such a ‘what’ would be fitting to such a nature; and that is why it belong to this nature, or is not repugnant to it, because this nature is this nature.

89. As to the second [n.86], I say that modes of being can be understood to be because either they vary the ‘to be’ itself or because they posit some diversity posterior to the ‘to be’. In the first way, since the ‘to be’ of the accident is the same in the bread and without the bread, so there is the same mode. In the second way there is variation, because the ‘to be’ in the bread was the subject of a certain real respect to the bread, but when the ‘to be’ is per se, it is deprived of that respect; and hereby it is plain that ‘to be in the bread’ and ‘to be per se’ state a diverse mode in the ‘to be’, by positing and taking away the respect to another.

90. As to the third [n.87], the answer is plain from the fourth doubt solved before [n.78], because an accident cannot effectively unite itself to the subject. Hence if God were to bring back the substance of the bread and do nothing else, the accident would remain without a subject, as it does now [sc. after the consecration], nor would it be united to the substance of the bread as a form by virtue of the accident (I mean by virtue of it effectively).

91. And if you argue that it is a miracle that the accident is not in a subject, therefore, when the impediment of non-inherence, namely of the non-existence of the subject, ceases, the miracle will cease, and the accident will be totally in the subject – I reply: something miraculously posited in being remains in that being until it is changed by some agent.

B. To the Second Initial Argument

92. To the second [n.9] I say that prior and posterior can be understood either actually or in aptitude. If you take them uniformly I concede that the posterior cannot naturally be without the prior. But if you take it that 'posterior in aptitude' cannot be without 'prior actually' it is not true; for if what is prior in aptitude does not exist, it is not prior actually, and also if it does exist, and the dependence of the posterior on it is taken away by something else that is prior to both, neither thus is it actually prior. And this is the way it is in the issue at hand. Hence I say that the accident is not actually posterior to the substance of the bread but only apt naturally to be posterior to it as to what is aptitudinally prior.

93. And if you argue that it has no special respect of posterior to God that it did not have before; therefore the priority of the bread is not more supplied now by divine action than before (and this could be an objection against the third main conclusion [n.30] and against its proof [nn.39-41], namely how the first extrinsic cause could supply the causality of any other extrinsic cause, since it could not have in itself the priority of the second cause, nor consequently does it seem to be the term of the posteriority in the caused thing that properly corresponds to that priority [sc. of the second cause]) – I reply: an unlimited unique priority can be the term of the posterior simply.

94. On the contrary: it is not the term now in a way different than before; but it was not the term totally before.

95. I reply: some respects were prior in the posterior (which is the foundation) that are not prior now; and this is possible because they came to the foundation extrinsically; those respects therefore had a term previously and do not have a term now (I concede), because they do not exist now. But the unique respect which before had a term in the simply First thing has a term in it now, and the termination of it by that one thing is sufficient for the being of the foundation of this sort of respect.

96. On the contrary: therefore the foundation did not before essentially depend on those other dependencies, because without the terms of those dependencies the foundation's first respect to the simply First was totally sufficient for the being of the foundation; for what has whatever is required for its being in a prior stage does not depend for anything in a second stage.

97. I reply: this deduction seems well to touch on the order of second causes, and on the necessity of that order, because of which order the Philosopher is said to deny posteriority in the issue at hand [n.9]. Or if this order is not necessary, it is difficult to see how a second cause is cause of the effect, since that is not a cause without which the caused thing has the totality of its being from something else naturally prior (see on this point *Ord.* II d.1 n.143; also I d.8 n. 306).

C. To the Third and Fourth Initial Arguments

98. To the third argument, about definition [n.10], response has been made by the response to the doubts moved against the third conclusion [nn.68-69].

99. One word remains there, however, because of the proof that that which falls there in a definition is necessarily required for its being, as a correlative is for the being of a correlative [n.11].

100. I say that this is for the reason that it is a relative; nor is there any other reason why it necessarily requires another term. For it is not because it is an accident;

rather, if it were a relation and not an accident (as is relation in divine reality) a term would still be required. But the defined thing of which we are speaking is an absolute; therefore it does not require something added as a term of the respect, but as an extrinsic cause – and any such extrinsic cause is not necessarily required save the first cause.

101. To the fourth argument [n.13] I say that ‘white’ can be understood in two ways:

In one way as it imports such a form under such a mode of signifying, and this it signifies per se. Hence, according to the Philosopher in the *Categories* [n.13], ‘white’ signifies the quality alone – which is true, but under a different mode of signifying than ‘whiteness’.

In another way as we commonly conceive (through ‘white’ and these sort of concrete terms) the whole composed of subject and form.

102. If in the first way the argument has more evidence, for about the second way it is plain that if there is whiteness, there is no necessity that there is a white [thing]. But about the first way I say that, by virtue of the word, there is then no necessity to concede that if there is whiteness, there is white, because although the form is naturally apt to inhere in a subject, there is no necessity that it be under such a mode of being, namely under actual inherence in a subject; but ‘white’ signifies the form under such idea of actually inhering.

103. Or if you object that a noun, both adjectival and substantive, abstracts from time, therefore ‘white’ does not signify actual inherence of a form in a subject, because then it would co-signify present time – I reply: then the concession would be that as there is whiteness, so also is there white; and it would not follow that therefore something as a subject is white, because this is not posited in the antecedent either (not by the thing signified nor by the mode of signifying). This concession would be more easily made about quantity; for just as concession is here made that there is quantity, so too that there is a quantum, yet no concession is here made that some matter or substance is perfected by quantity.

Question Two

Whether in the Eucharist any Accident Whatever Remaining is without a Subject

104. To the second question [n.13], it is argued that in the Eucharist any accident whatever remaining is without a subject:

For any accident whatever is there without a substance; therefore without a subject. The antecedent is plain from the preceding question [n.7].

105. Proof of the consequence:

First as follows: *Metaphysics* 7.1.1028a32, 35-36, “substance is first of all in idea,” which the Philosopher proves because, “it is necessary that in the idea of anything the idea of substance be present;” but substance does not fall into the idea of anything save as something added, otherwise the other thing in whose idea substance falls would not be a being per se, which is against the Philosopher *Metaphysics* 5.8.1017b10-14. But it only falls as something added [in the idea etc.] as subject.

106. A confirmation of this is that when accidents are in a substance, the substance is the term of the dependence of each accident; but it is only the term as subject; therefore etc.

107. Again, no accident is the subject of any accident in the Eucharist; therefore, all whatever are there without a subject. The consequence is plain, because there is no substance there.

108. Proof of the antecedent:

First from the Philosopher *Metaphysics* 4.4.1007b2-4, 12-13: “An accident,” he says, “is not an accident of an accident save because both are accidents of the same subject; for this accident is no more an accident of that one than that one is of this.”

109. Second by reason: First, because as it belongs to substance to be per se, so it belongs to an accident to inhere [in another]; therefore, as it is repugnant for substance to inhere so it is repugnant for an accident to be per se or to ‘sub-stand’. Second, because what is the term of any dependence does not depend with a dependence of the same idea; but every accident depends with dependence on a subject; therefore, no accident is the term of this dependence.

110. Again, some accident is there without a subject; therefore any accident can be [there] without a subject. The antecedent is plain because an accident, which is primarily of a nature to be in a substance, does not have a subject there, because no substance is there.

111. Proof of the consequence: first because any accident at all depends equally essentially on a subject; second because in essentially dependent things, dependence on a first thing is the more necessary – as is plain in the case of causes, because dependence on a first cause is simply necessary; therefore dependence on a substance is more necessary than dependence on any accident; if therefore something can be an accident without dependence on a substance, then an accident will be able to be without dependence on any subject.

112. Again, it seems more repugnant for a relative accident or a respect to be without a subject than for any other accident; but a relative accident or respect can be without a subject; therefore so can any other accident.

113. Proof of the minor: because if it is repugnant, then either on the ground that a relative accident is an accident or on the ground that it is a relation. Not on the ground it is an accident, because then it would be repugnant to any accident; nor on the ground it is a relation, because then it would be repugnant to divine relation – which is false, because divine relation is not in a subject; and the proof is that it is infinite and the infinite is a being per se (the proof of the first proposition is that the relation is the divine essence, and so is infinite; the proof of the second is that simply perfect conditions of being come together in the same thing, so that one implies the other, as that necessity implies actuality and infinity implies necessity and so on about the others; therefore what has infinity has per se being as well, which is a noble condition in being).

114. [To the contrary]

The opposite seems per se evident, because then [sc. if any accident at all in the Eucharist is without a subject] it would be necessary to say that in the Eucharist any possible motion at all would be there without a movable thing.

Something else would also follow, that a respect would be there without a foundation; for there is equality there of this quantity to another quantity as large, and

there is likeness there of this quality to another quality of the same species, and there is a being circumscribed by place there without location of this dimension by the containing body. And equality, for you [e.g. Godfrey of Fontaines, nn.141-142], is not in quantity, and likeness not in whiteness, and circumscription not in quantity, and consequently these relations would exist and yet not in any foundation. If the consequent does not appear unacceptable at once, it is proved to be so by the fact that nothing is said to be formally such and such without some form inhering formally in it: this quantity is said to be formally equal, and this quality to be like, and this dimension to be located in place; therefore what the subject is denominated by is in the subject as form.

I. To the Question
A. Two Extreme Opinions
1. First Opinion
a. Exposition of the Opinion

115. There are here two extreme opinions.

One that posits only quantity to be, and to be able to be, in the Eucharist without a subject [Giles of Rome, Thomas Aquinas].

116. For this opinion there are four reasons.

The first is as follows: only quantity is individuated per se, and all other accidents are individuated through quantity; therefore, if there were some accident and it were not in quantity, it would be a 'this' and would not be a 'this'.

117. Again [nn.117-119 are from Giles or Rome], if whiteness were separated from quantity, it would be perceptible and imperceptible. The proof that it would be perceptible is that it would be per se in the third species of quality [Aristotle, *Categories* 8.9a28-10a10]. The proof that it would be imperceptible is that a non-quantum cannot be sensed. If this be denied it is proved as follows, that according to the Philosopher, *De Sensu et Sensato* 6.445b3-11 about a certain matter of doubt: "if what is perceptible were divided infinitely, the sense power would be divided infinitely." This consequence is only valid if the sense power has to increase according to the decrease of the perceptible thing; if then some perceptible thing is disproportionately less, the senses would have to increase disproportionately; but an indivisible perceptible thing is disproportionately less (so to speak) than any perceptible quantum; therefore some sense power will be able to be disproportionately greater than any other. The consequent is false; therefore etc.

118. Again, if whiteness were without quantity, it would be a spiritual quality because it would be indivisible; and it would be a bodily quality because it is in the third species of quality; and so it would be spiritual and non-spiritual.

119. Again, if it were without quantity and so spiritual, there would be no repugnance to its being in a spirit, and so a spirit could be white.

b. Rejection of the Opinion
α. Against the Reasons for the Opinion

120. These reasons are not proofs.

The first [n.116] is not, because an accident is not a singular formally by something of another genus; for just as it is possible to find, in any genus, a supreme in

the joint ordering of the genus and possible to find all the intermediate genera and species, so it is possible to find in that joint ordering something lowest per se of which they are all predicated and it not predicated of any;⁴⁰ therefore a quality, even when it is in a quantity, is not a 'this' formally through quantity; therefore if there is a cause, even a proximate but extrinsic one, of the singularity of the quality, the quality can be a singular without that extrinsic cause. More is contained about this in *Ord.* II d.3 nn.89-92.

121. Again the second reason [n.117], about perceptible and imperceptible, is not conclusive. For 'perceptible' can be said to be either what is in remote potency or what in proximate potency to being sensed. In remote potency there is whatever has a sufficient form but not under the fitting mode under which it must be had in order to be sensed; in proximate potency there is what has the form such that act could, when the impediment ceases, follow at once. This distinction is made clear in *Ord.* I d.7 n.32, and is proved there by the Philosopher in *Metaphysics* 5 and 9 [*ibid.* n.33]. It is plain also from Anselm *On Freedom of Choice* ch.4, where Anselm holds that we have in us no potency that suffices by itself for act (as he exemplifies about sight, which is not sufficient for an act of seeing without an object and an illumined medium etc.).

122. A separate whiteness would be perceptible in this way, by taking 'perceptible' for remote potency; because whiteness would be a form that was in itself an activator of sight, though not under this mode of being; and for this reason it would not be perceptible in the sense of proximate potency. Nor is there any contradiction because of this, just as neither would there be if you argued about divisible and indivisible. For the whiteness is divisible by remote possibility because it could be in a quantum, and then it would be in proximate potency to being divided; but it would not be divisible in proximate potency as long as it was without quantity.

123. And when you argue [n.117] that if the whiteness were perceptible then the sense [of sight] would disproportionately exceed every other sense – I say that the consequence does not hold unless the whiteness were perceptible to some sense in proximate potency; for then that sense would be more perfect than every other sense in the proportion in which the sensible object would depart from the other sensibles. But though I concede that it is perceptible in remote potency, yet I do not concede that it is perceptible to any sense in proximate potency; and so there is no need that some sense be able to perceive or know the whiteness under this mode of existing, nor consequently that it disproportionately exceeds the other senses; for this would only follow if the sensible object were in proximate potency, for thus does the Philosopher argue there [n.117] about every sensible object.

124. To the third [n.118] I say that whiteness would be simply a bodily quality or bodily whiteness, because directed simply to perfecting body; but it would be non-bodily in a certain respect because not bodily actually – just as a bodily substance would, though it were without quantity, still be bodily, because it would be naturally fitted to be under quantity (but an angel would not be thus fitted); and it would also be indivisible actually, but divisible in remote potency or aptitude, as was said [n.122].

⁴⁰ The ordering here is clearly one of predication, where the most universal term is predicated ultimately of the individual singular. So sense quality is most universal, color is less universal, red is less universal still, this individual red is least universal, and all the others are ultimately predicated of this individual red. So, individuation in color must be in the genus of color and not derived from individuation in something else, as say from the individual red being the color of this individual extension or quantity.

125. As to the fourth argument [n.119]: it is thoroughly lacking in any plausible appearance, because just as a stone cannot be wise, for the reason that it in no way has the idea of being receptive in respect of wisdom, so an angel cannot be white, for the reason that an angel is in no way capable of taking up that form (whether the form were posited to be divisible or indivisible). Now indeed there is a double reason that an angel cannot be white: one is extension in the form and lack of extension in an angel; the other reason is that this form is this form, and an angel is an angel. And the second reason is the essential idea of the impossibility, the first reason is not; ‘therefore when the first is taken away, there is a possibility’ is a null consequence.⁴¹

β. Against the Conclusion of the Opinion

126. There is argument against this first reason [n.115] as to its conclusion as well:

First as follows: dependence on a first is more essential than dependence on anything posterior to it, speaking of absolute dependents and of absolutes on which there is dependence; but quality is an absolute form just as is quantity; therefore quality more essentially depends on substance than on quantity. So if a quality can be without actual dependence on a substance, it will be able to be without actual dependence on quantity.

127. Again, existing per se is not more repugnant to an absolute and a more perfect absolute than to a more imperfect absolute; quality is an absolute form, and (according to them [Giles of Rome]) more perfect than quantity; therefore etc.

128. Proof of the minor as to its second part [sc. quality is more perfect than quantity]:

First, because quality is a per se principle of acting with a real action – the point is plain and they themselves concede it; quantity is not, because no real action, as we are now speaking of it, belongs to quantity.

129. Second, because the order of qualities is considered according to the order of substances, for to more noble substances correspond more noble qualities. But the order of quantities does not so correspond, for a more noble substance is not always greater in quantity (for the largest bodies in the genus of corruptible things, of which sort are the elements, are the most imperfect). Now that seems more perfect which corresponds proportionally in its perfection to what is simply more perfect.

130. Third, because substances more perfectly attain their ends through qualities; for either the beatific act is a quality (which was touched on in *Ord.* I d.3 n.505), or if it is not, at least according to common opinion some supernatural qualities are required for beatitude, or some form that is a quality is [cf. *Rep.* IVA d.49 q.10]. But quantity is in no way a principle for substance of attaining its end.

131. Fourth, because quantity follows the composite by reason of matter, but quality follows it by reason of form; but form is simply more perfect than matter,

⁴¹ The first reason (extension in the form of whiteness and non-extension in an angel) is based on a property of whiteness and angel. The second reason (this form is this form, an angel is an angel) is based on the essence of whiteness and angel (whiteness/color is the limit of the transparent in the surface of a body, an angel is a non-bodily substance). So even if the first reason were taken away, the second would remain and be sufficient by itself to prove the relevant impossibility; and thus denial of the second would not follow denial or dismissal of the first (contrary to what the initial argument supposed [n.119]).

Metaphysics 7.3.1029a5-6. And this last point is perhaps the reason of the first, second, and third middle terms [sc. in the arguments in nn.128-130] for, on this account, the order of qualities corresponds in perfection to the order of substances [n.129], and for this reason quality is the principle of real action [n.128], and also the principle for substance itself of attaining its end [n.130].

132. Fifth, because what agrees more with perfection simply is simply more perfect; but some quality, as wisdom for example, agrees more with perfection simply (and likewise do understanding and willing) than any quantity, either because the one is the formal idea of divine wisdom and created wisdom, which is a quality (according to one opinion, touched on in *Ord.* I d.8 nn.3, 90-94), or if it is not, at least as to all nearness and analogy the nearness of created wisdom to divine wisdom is greater than that of any quantity to God or to anything of God. Hence just as it is possible for perfection simply to exist in a creature, namely with a limitation, the quality that is wisdom is a perfection simply of him who has it; but no quantity is a perfection simply, not even in the way it is possible for a creature to have perfection simply.

133. Against this reason [n.127] an objection is made as follows: what is closer to what is more perfect is simply more perfect; quantity is closer to substance than quality is; but substance is the most perfect of all beings; therefore quantity is more perfect than quality.

134. I reply: if many perfections (in what way 'many' I care not now) come together at once in the first perfect thing, perhaps something can be nearer to it according to one perfection and not according to another. For example:

135. God is a simply necessary existence, and this necessity in him is a perfection simply; the more necessary a thing is, therefore, the closer it is to God, and in this way the heaven is closer to God than is anything corruptible.

136. But besides this, God is a simply perfect intellectual nature; in this respect a merely intellectual creature, though finite, is closer to God, of which sort is the angelic nature; after this comes intellectual nature, but not merely intellectual, and, along with this, finite; after this comes sense nature, which more approaches intellectual nature than non-sense nature does. In this order, then, a fly is closer to God than the heaven is.

137. It could then be inferred from the first order [n.135] that the heaven would be closer to God and thus more perfect than a fly; but from the second order [n.136] that a fly is more perfect than the heaven, and so opposite to it.

138. I reply, therefore, that whenever perfections, however disparate, come together in the first [perfect thing, n.134], that perfection is simply more perfect which is closer to the first according to what has the idea of the simply more perfect – just as, according to the Philosopher *Topics* 3.2.117b17-19, it does not follow that a monkey is better than a horse, although a monkey is more similar to a man, because it is not more similar to a man in the simply better conditions. Now in the first thing intellectuality is a nobler condition than necessity of existing, understanding the 'more' in the way in which the distinction there is drawn [n.134]; and therefore man is simply more noble than the heaven.

139. Nor yet should you wonder that a diverse order is assigned to the first thing according to diverse perfections, because any perfection can be the principle of one natural hierarchy or, according to the philosophers, of one 'golden chain' [Henry of Ghent, Dionysius the Areopagite]; and so according to diverse perfections simply in the

first thing, participated by diverse things in ordered fashion, diverse golden chains can be noted.

140. To the issue in hand I say that there is in substance, as it is the first of beings, a double order of priority: one in 'standing under' [*sub-stans*] other things, which includes receiving other things and being perfected by them; another the order of intensive actuality; and this second perfection is simply nobler than the first and greater, because it first belongs to the potential [of substance], or at least requires that to which potential being belongs. Now quantity is closer to substance according to the first idea of order, because it is more immediate in the order of receptivity; but quality is closer in the second idea of order, for it is the principle of acting (quantity is not so), and in this respect it appears a greater being.

2. Second Opinion

a. Exposition of the Opinion.

141. The second opinion is at the other extreme, namely that no accident can be the subject of any accident, and consequently that any accident whatever in the Eucharist is without a subject.

142. In favor of this opinion are the reasons given above, at the beginning, for the first part of the question [nn.104-113].

b. Rejection of the Opinion

143. On the contrary:

That is per se the subject of any accident of which the accident is predicated per se in the second mode [n.73 footnote]; but of some accident is some accident predicated per se in the second mode, as the proper attribute of it; therefore etc.

Proof of the major: that of which an accident is predicated per se in the second mode falls in the definition of that accident as something added to it, and only added as subject, because the defined thing has on such a defining subject no other dependence.

The minor is plain because universally all the properties demonstrated in the whole of mathematical science are demonstrated of accidents, and are said of them per se in the second mode. The point is plain by beginning from the first conclusion to the last of arithmetic or geometry, to such an extent that, if there were no incorporeal substance in the universe, any knowable property would be as equally known of that of which it is known; for a triangle no less has three angles [sc. equal to two right angles] even if triangularity were not in any substance; and three lines would no less be able to be the sides of an equilateral triangle even if no substance were the subject for them.

144. Again, Avicenna *Metaphysics* 2.1 manifestly maintains that some accident is the subject of another accident, and he gives an example, as motion for instance is the subject of fast speed and slow speed.

145. And third the fact appears in the issue at hand, in the argument given for the opposite [n.114], because it is manifest here that there are many relations by which things are related, as equality, likeness, passive circumscription [sc. being circumscribed by place]; but these relations would not be able to be posited, nor able to be so in a subject,

since absolutes cannot be related by these relations were these relations not formally in them.

B. Scotus' own Opinion

146. I reply to the question, then, by mediating between the said opinions: for I make a distinction in 'subject': as it is taken for the ultimate term of the dependence of another per accidens act, or as it is taken for any proximate term (though not the ultimate term) of that dependence, that is, taken for anything to which some act could be present per accidens as the form of it, not making something per se one with the subject.

147. In the first way [n.146] it is plain that nothing can be the subject of an accident save substance. In the second way I say that it is possible for some accident to be the subject of an accident, as the arguments prove that were touched on against the second opinion [nn.143-145]. And it is possible for any accident to be absolute without a subject in each way, as the arguments prove that were brought against the first opinion [nn.126-132].

148. But it is not possible that a respective accident is without a subject in the second way, because it is not possible that there be a respect between two things without the respect being of something to something, and this not by reason of 'accident' but by reason of 'respect'; now there cannot be a respect of something to something unless it is in that of which it is the respect; and so, if it is the respect of an accident, it will be in that accident as an accident in a subject. And so, as to what is possible, it is plain that an accident can be without a subject, and this when subject is taken in this way and that way [sc. taken as substance or as accident].

149. But what is the case in fact?

I say that a respective accident is here in a subject, speaking of subject in the second way, because the relation of it is to a term.

150. But as to absolute accidents [nn.25-26], those who think in diverse ways about quantity will respond in diverse ways:

For those who say quantity is an absolute essence other than the essence of bodily substance and quality, as the common opinion says [*Ord.* II d.3 nn.71-74], would say that quantity here is without a subject but not quality, rather that quality is in quantity [nn.115-119]. And for this view there is this probability, that quality in this way is extended (it is plain to sense); and it is not extended essentially, but only per accidens, without an extension that is intrinsic to quality, according to this opinion [Giles of Rome]. But everything extended per accidens either receives in itself the extension by which it is extended per accidens, or receives it in extension or in something extended; now quality does not receive extension in itself, according to this opinion; therefore it is only extended per accidens, because it is received in something extended; and with this agrees the remark in the *Categories* 6.5b7-8, "Whiteness is as large as the surface is."

151. But those who would say that the quantity of bodily substance is not other than the essence of this sort of substance, and that the quantity of color is not other than the color [*Ord.* II d.3 nn.132-135, 148-154], would say that the quality here is not in quantity, but rather that the quantity that appears is the quantity of quality.

152. But about this dispute there is discussion in *Ord.* II d.3 nn.4-6.

II. To the Initial Arguments

A. To the First

153. To the initial arguments.

As to the first [n.104], I concede that any accident there lacks a subject (taking ‘subject’ in the first way, namely as the ultimate term of the dependence of an accident [n.146])

154. Nor is more proved by the argument taken from *Metaphysics* 7 [n.105]; for substance is posited in the definition of every accident for this reason, that of none of them can a perfect concept, satisfying to the intellect, be attained without the addition of substance; but not on this account is substance an immediate addition in the definition of any accident whatever; rather it is an immediate addition in the case of some, as being the proximate receiver, while in the definition of another it is added as the mediated receiver, being the mediated term of that other’s dependence, and it is the immediate term of the dependence of some further accident on which that other depends.

B. To the Second

155. To the second [n.107] I say that an accident can be the subject of an accident, taking ‘subject’ in the second way, though not taking it in the first way [n.146].

156. And when the opposite is proved from the Philosopher *Metaphysics* 4 [n.108], a triple response can be made.

First, that the ‘because’ does not indicate cause but concomitance, so that the sense is: for an accident is not an accident of an accident save ‘because’ (that is ‘when’) both are accident to some other thing. For this was something necessary with the Philosopher, who did not reckon that an accident without a subject could support another accident, as was said in the preceding question [n.55].

157. Second, it can be said that the Philosopher is speaking of disparate accidents, as his example there shows; for he says, “I mean ‘white’ and ‘musical’.”

158. Third, it can be said that the remark ‘an accident is not an accident of an accident’ is not stated as true but is stated as something following from the hypothesis that he intends there to reject; for he argues as follows [*Metaphysics* 4.4.1007b18-20, 8.1012b13-22]: if contradictories are true together then every predication is per accidens, and consequently predication has to keep going infinitely; but in infinite things there is no order, *Metaphysics* 2.2.994b19-20, because where there is no first, there is no second; therefore no accident has an order per se to another accident, and consequently this other accident is no more an accident of it than it is of that other.

159. And the text agrees with this way of expounding it, for it does not say ‘an accident is an accident of an accident only because both are accident of the same thing’ but ‘an accident is not an accident of an accident, unless because etc.’ by which he indicates that he does not assert the proposition as true but that he is inferring it from prior premises. And if one expounds the text in this way, the opposite can more be deduced from the authority than the proposed conclusion; for, according to this exposition, it will be inferred as something unacceptable, not asserted as something true.

160. And when the proof is given about ‘being per se’ and ‘being in another’ [n.109], the response is plain from the preceding solution [nn.83-91]; for in the way these

features are proper to substance and to accident, in that way can ‘to be per se’ and ‘to sub-stand’ not apply to accident, just as ‘to inhere’ cannot apply to substance; but this holds when ‘to sub-stand’ is taken as it applies to what is ultimately the term of the dependence of inherence.

161. And when, lastly, proof through the idea of dependence [n.109] is given, because an accident cannot be the term of a dependence of the same idea – ‘*altogether* of the same idea’ can be conceded, because a different independence is required in the ultimate term, and this independence prohibits a dependence altogether the same as that which is a dependence on it. But a dependence that is ‘*in some way* of the same idea’ is not repugnant to what is the term of the dependence – just as every creature depends on God (and that in idea of God as effective cause), and yet one creature depends on another as if on such a cause, but not as on the altogether first effective cause, of which sort is dependence on the First thing. Thus, in the issue at hand, all accidents depend on substance as the subject, when taking ‘subject’ in the first way [n.146]; and consequently, in the way that it is proper for substance to be the term, no accident can be the term of the dependence of accidents as the ultimate term of them.

C. To the Third

162. As to the third [nn.110-111] I concede the consequence about possibility when one is speaking of an absolute accident.

163. But if you are arguing about a relative accident [cf. n.26], using the fact that dependence on the First thing is more essential than dependence on anything posterior to the First – I reply that the dependence of a relation on a foundation is most essential, such that the idea of relation is impossible without it. If substance, therefore, cannot be the foundation of some relation but only an accident can, the relation must more essentially depend on the accident which can be its foundation than on the substance. But this is not because the relation is an accident, but because a relation is a relation, as was said in the preceding solution [n.53].

D. To the Fourth

164. To the fourth [n.112] I say that in no way can an accidental relation be without a subject (taking subject in the second way, the way in which the foundation of an accidental relation is the subject of it [n.146]).

165. As to the proof [n.113], when it argues by division ‘either as it is a relation or as it is an accident’ – I say the division is not sufficient, for it is possible to grant a middle in between them, namely ‘as it is an accidental relation’. For the relation that formally constitutes a supposit per se is not in any subject, because a per-se-being supposit does not have an inherent formal element, speaking properly of ‘inherent’; but no accidental relation is a constituent of a supposit, and consequently, since only that which constitutes a supposit is non-inherent, an accidental relation will be inherent.

166. The point is plain in other things: for there are many special things to which certain things are repugnant and yet not repugnant through the nature of one common thing found in them, nor through the nature of one or other of them, but through the proper nature that includes both the conjuncts. So that if you were to say ‘*a* is repugnant

to man, therefore either insofar as man is intellectual or insofar as man is animal; and if insofar as man is intellectual, then it would be repugnant also to an angel; and if insofar as man is animal, then it would be repugnant to an ox' – I say that neither in this way nor in that, but insofar as man is a rational animal.

167. So it is in the issue at hand: insofar as a relation is accidental is not being in a subject repugnant to it (taking subject in the second way [n.146]).

168. It could be said differently that it is repugnant to a relation, by its being a relation, not to be in some subject, extending the 'in' to the foundation and subject; for neither is a divine relation as per se as the divine essence is per se, namely 'a being simply unto itself', not needing anything else at all for its being; and neither is it as per se being as a supposit is per se being; but a divine relation according to its formal idea is necessarily in a foundation as in something presupposed, or as in something formally constituted by it.

169. Also, as for the proof there [n.113] that a [divine] relation is per se because infinite – although the consequence could be conceded, yet the antecedent seems it must be denied; for no perfection formally infinite is lacking to any divine person, because then the person would not be simply perfect; but each person lacks some relation of origin; therefore no relation is formally infinite. And this is plain from the idea of 'perfection simply' [or: 'pure perfection'], because according to Anselm *Monologion* 15: a perfection simply is that which, in whatever it is, is "better it than not it"; now a relation cannot be simply nobler than its opposite, because 'relatives are simultaneous in nature' [*Categories* 7.7b15].

170. When the argument then is made: 'the divine essence is infinite, paternity is the divine essence, therefore paternity is infinite' [n.113], there is a fallacy of figure of speech, just as when arguing as follows: 'deity understands, paternity is deity, therefore paternity understands'. And the reason for this was touched on frequently in *Ord.* I [d.33-34, nn.2-3], that in the case of abstract terms the predication can well be identical; but where the predicate is an adjective, predication cannot be true unless it is formal.

171. Whether, then, the major [sc. 'the divine essence is infinite'] is true formally or identically I care not; and the minor [sc. 'paternity is the divine essence'] is only true with identical predication. When inferring the conclusion, which can only be true with formal predication (namely because the predicate is an adjective), I am, in that inference, interpreting the identical predication of the minor to be formal predication, because the conclusion could not be inferred unless such was the predication in the minor. And this interpretation, which happens in the inferring of the conclusion, is an altering –just as in the case of him who infers from the premises 'Socrates is man' and 'Plato is man' that therefore 'Socrates is Plato' is interpreting 'man' to have been 'this something' in the premises, because otherwise he could not infer the conclusion from the premises; and so he is altering 'this sort of thing' [sc. human being] into 'this something' [sc. this particular man].

172. So it is in the issue at hand [n.170: 'the essence is infinite' is a formal predication; 'paternity is the essence' is identical predication; if 'paternity is infinite' be inferred the predication can only be formal, and it only follows if one interprets the predication that was before in the minor ['paternity is the essence'], which was only identical predication, to be formal predication; and consequently the conclusion only follows by altering identical predication into formal predication.

Second Part: About the Action of the Accidents in the Eucharist

Single Question

Whether Accidents in the Eucharist can Have Any Action they were Able to Have in their Subject

173. About the second article [n.6] I ask whether accidents in the Eucharist can have every action they were able to have in their subject.

174. That they cannot, in two ways: first that they can have none at all; second that they cannot have the same.

175. For the first conclusion as follows:

When the prior is essentially destroyed, the posterior is destroyed; being is essentially prior to acting; the being of an accident is to inhere; therefore when the inhering of an accident is destroyed, its acting is destroyed.

176. And there is a confirmation, that ‘to be in [another]’ belongs to an accident as its proper attribute; but to act on an object belongs to it contingently, as an accident per accidens.

177. Again, ‘to act per se belongs to a supposit’ *Metaphysics* 1.1.981a16-17 [*Ord.* I d.2 nn.378, 285]; an accident cannot be a supposit; therefore etc.

178. The argument is confirmed from Boethius *De Hebdomadibus*, “In everything next to the First thing, ‘by what a thing is’ differs from ‘what it is’;” the form, therefore, which is of a nature to be the ‘by what’ with respect to action, cannot be the agent; therefore precisely a supposit, which is of a nature to have the form that is the ‘by what’, is able to be an agent.

179. There is confirmation by an example: for because the soul is the ‘by what’ that a man is a man, therefore the soul cannot be the man; therefore, by similarity, the form which is of a nature to be ‘by what’ someone acts, cannot be an agent.

180. There is a like confirmation, finally, that is specific to the issue at hand, namely that the form ‘separated quantity’ does not seem to be a natural form; for separated quantity seems purely mathematical, for it does not seem to be a natural form when separated; but according to the Philosopher, *Metaphysics* 3.2.996a29-32, “there is in mathematics neither end nor motion nor the good.”

181. Argument for the second conclusion, namely that not every action could belong to accidents as before [n.174]:

First as follows: in *On Generation* 1.10.328a19-21 the Philosopher says that agent and patient must have the matter in common; but a substance that has the accidents has the matter in common with something with which the separated accidents do not have the matter in common; therefore etc.

182. Again, in *Metaphysics* 7.8.1033b26-18 argument is given against the Ideas of Plato, because an Idea could not be the principle for generating a composite, since it is only a form – the way the Commentator [Averroes, *Metaphysics* 7 ch.8] treats of the argument of the Philosopher there, and very badly.⁴² Therefore similarly in the issue at hand, these forms [sc. separated accidents] cannot be the principle for producing a

⁴² Averroes: “And Aristotle says this because it is impossible for separated forms to transform matter; for only what is in matter can transform matter. And so it turns out, for those who say the world is generated, that what transforms it must be some individual, namely a particular body.” Cf. Scotus *Quodlibet* q.7 n.24.

composite; but they were able to be the principle for producing a composite when they were in a substance, the way accidents are principles of producing a substance; therefore etc.

183. Again, to the main point: if separated accidents could have every action as before, and this without a subject, that they were able to have in a subject before, then intelligible species separated from the intellect, and charity separated from the will, will have power for the same actions for which they had power before when they were in a subject. The consequent is false, because then a separated intelligible species could understand and a separated charity could love, and so both of these could be blessed, either simply or as to some part of blessedness – but this is impossible, because neither the whole of blessedness nor a part of it can belong to anything save an intellectual nature.

184. On the contrary:

That accidents could have power for some same action: because separated accidents are perceptible (it is plain to sense), and can also alter passive things close to them (it is plain about the little water applied to the species of the wine); therefore, they have power for an action for which they had power before.

185. But it seems that they have power for every action as before, because a form that remains the same in its being has the same virtue, and consequently it can be the principle of the same action; a separated accident remains in itself the same as it was before; therefore etc.

I. To the Question

A. The Opinion of Thomas Aquinas

1. Exposition of the Opinion

186. There is an opinion here [Thomas Aquinas, *Sent.* IV d.12 q.1 a2 q.2] that “in the case of natural actions substantial forms are not the immediate principle of acting, or the proximate active principle of acting, but they act through the medium of active and passive qualities as their proper instruments, as said in *On the Soul* 2.4.416b28-29, namely that natural heat is that whereby the soul acts. And therefore qualities do not act by their own virtue but in virtue of the substantial form. Hence their act has not only an accidental form but a substantial one as term; and because of this, generation is the term of alteration. Now such sort of qualities receive instrumental virtue from the fact that they are caused by essential principles; hence, just as the same being, the same as to species, remains in accidents by divine power after the substance is removed, so too does the same virtue as before remain in them. And therefore, just as they were able to cause a change for substantial form before, so are they also able now.”

187. And if argument is made against this that “nothing acts beyond its species” they reply that “nothing acts beyond its species by its own virtue; but it can, by the virtue of something else of which it is the instrument, act beyond its species, as a saw acts for the form of a bench” [Thomas, *ibid.* ad 2].

2. Rejection of the Opinion

188. Against this I ask what is meant by the ‘in virtue of substance’ that is said? Because whether he means an absolute or a relative [accident], I ask, what is it in? If he means the absolute that is substance or that is something in substance, then since the substance of bread simply does not exist [sc. after transubstantiation], it follows that an accident will generate by nothing or by non-being, or by virtue of nothing. If he means the absolute that is accident or something in accident, then nothing nobler than accident is there, and consequently, in virtue of such a something, an accident has no more power for anything more perfect than it has by its own virtue. But if he means the relation of accident to substance as to a prior cause, then since there is no relation to nothing, and the bread is not a being, it follows that nothing positive is being set down by what the ‘in virtue of’ is, and so the same as before [sc. an accident will generate in virtue of nothing].

189. From these words [nn.186-187], it seems that he is positing the virtue to be in the accident instrumentally, for he says that the virtue in accidents is caused, or that “they receive instrumental virtue from the fact that they are caused by essential principles of substance.” And then, since nothing in an accident is nobler than that accident, it manifestly follows that an accident has, through what is first said (‘in virtue’ or ‘through this virtue’), no power for anything more perfect than it has power for from itself or through itself.

190. But the true understanding of these words, ‘in virtue of such a cause’, seems, where the said words have place, to be this, namely that he is asserting the relation of inferior cause to superior cause, or more perfect cause, that concurs in the causing, just as was said above, that the influence which an inferior agent receives from a superior is not any form then caused, but is only a determinate order of causes in acting together or causing together [cf. *Ord.* IV d.1 n.170].

191. Again, what does not exist possesses no idea of cause with respect to a generated thing when it is generated, because the cause in act and the effect in act are and are not together (*Physics* 2.3.195b17-21 and *Metaphysics* 5.2.1014a20-25). And the fact is plain by reason, because non-being, when it is not, is not cause of anything, in any order of cause; now the substance that the accident affected and was accident of does not exist; therefore the substance has no idea of cause, proximate or remote, with respect to the effect caused by the accident, and consequently the accident does not cause anything in virtue of the substance, as in virtue of a superior cause.

192. Again, nothing is an instrumental cause with respect to that for producing which its sole active virtue is sufficient – the point is plain if ‘instrument’ be taken strictly, as a saw or axe are said to be moved mover instruments [*Ord.* IV d.1 nn.120, 317-318; d.6 nn.124-126]; for such an instrument does not have of itself a form sufficient for producing the effect, but only by the motion of the principal agent is that produced which is produced. If too ‘instrument’ be taken according to other modes posited above [*ibid.* d.6 nn.117-119], namely insofar as an inferior cause is said to be an instrument, or a form that this sort of cause receives from the motion of a higher agent (by which form it acts), still none of these instruments has, through its form, power for the effect in respect of which it is the instrument; but it is necessary that, for the effect, the co-cause it is instrument of concur with it at the same time. But as it is [sc. after transubstantiation], the accident, without any action of the substance, acts precisely by its form on whatever it acts on; therefore, in no way does it act for any effect in virtue of substance or as its instrument.

193. Again, the point can be argued through the principles of the above statements [nn.186-187] about an instrument that is a moved mover, because an accident in the issue at hand is not moved by substance, since the substance does not exist; therefore, the accident is not its instrument.⁴³

B. Scotus' own Opinion

194. I say to the question, therefore, that since a triple action can be posited to belong to accidents, namely one with respect to generating substance and two with respect to causing accidents (one with respect to sensation, the other real as to a passive thing that really has the contrary [accident]) – the first can in no way belong to a separated accident, not even instrumentally, as already proved [nn.191-193] – and this when taking 'instrument' for any cause that attains the end of the principal agent, whether for a second cause properly speaking, or for a part through which the whole acts, or for what then receives the active form by which it acts, or for what receives motion alone as an effect on the way to the principal effect (these ways of taking 'instrument' are plain above [refs. in n.192]). For in all these ways it is required that that of which it is the instrument concur in its own order as causer; and, when it does not exist, nothing causes in any order of causing.

195. But besides these modes, an instrument is called a cause that precedes as dispositive for the term [*Ord.* IV d.6 n.117], and this even though it have the dispositive action in its own virtue; and in this way it is very possible for an accident to be the instrument of substance, because it can cause an action dispositive for the term of the agent's substance. But not even in this way can an accident be an instrument of substance in the issue at hand, because a substance that does not exist induces no term, nor can induce any term, at the end of the alteration caused by the accidents.

C. Response to the Arguments for Thomas' Opinion

196. From this is plain the solution to the deduction for the opinion [of Thomas, n.186]; for the authority of the Philosopher in *On the Soul* [*ibid.*] only proves that heat is an instrument of soul in this last way [n.195], namely because it digests and alters food, so that at the end of the alteration a substance can be generated from it. Hence two actions are there and two principles of acting: because with respect to the previous alteration the principle of acting is heat, but with respect to the form of the flesh to be

⁴³ These objections against may seem to be missing the point. For one could gloss Thomas' position as that accidents act in virtue of substance (as the red of an apple acts on the eye) because they are really there, and they are really there because the substance they are accidents of is really there. But if accidents do nothing unless really there in an actual substance, so a substance does nothing through accidents it lacks (a green apple, for instance, causes no perception of red). So, it would seem that accidents act in virtue of substance, not because they receive some form from substance, but because they exist in virtue of substance. However, if they were to exist without substance (as they do by divine power in the Eucharist), then they would act through their own form in virtue of existing, but their existing would not be in virtue of substance. Thus the 'in virtue of substance' Thomas is talking about seems to refer, not to the form of the accident (redness, for instance), but to the existence of the accident. If so, Scotus' objections would seem misdirected. However, Scotus returns to this issue later, nn.204-211, and argues that, on Thomas' own principles, substance must be cause also of the form of accidents and not just of their existence. But be that as it may, for nothing prevents Scotus having his own different view on the matter regardless.

induced the soul or the form of flesh is the principle; and the first agent is said to be an instrument with respect to the second, not properly by subordination of virtue to virtue, but by subordination of effect to effect; hence it would more properly be called a dispositive agent than an instrumental agent.

197. And when it is said further in the deduction [n.186] that the accidents act in virtue of substance, what follows is only that they are instruments; but they are not instruments of a non-entity substance; wherefore from this the opposite follows [sc. that the separated accidents do not act in virtue of substance].

198. And when the further inference is drawn [n.186] that the action of the accidents has a term not only at the accidental form but at the substantial form – this I reckon to be false, save as at a remote term, which is in no way attained by the action of the accidental form but is what the term is ordered to that is attained by the action of the accident.

199. And when the proof is given [n.186] that the accident attains the term of the action because it reaches the passive thing into which the form is induced, while the substance cannot attain the matter as passive object on which to act because it is not separated from the passions by virtue of a natural agent (as said in *On Generation* 1.3.317b20-33) – I say that this consequence does not hold save in virtue of the following implicitly understood proposition, that ‘every instrument attains the term of the principal agent’, which is false in the issue at hand.

200. And when this seems to be proved by what he adds, that ‘generation is the term of alteration’ [n.186] – this proof can be drawn to the opposite. For generation is not the intrinsic term of alteration, but an extrinsic one is and of a different genus, and generation has its own term prior in genus to the proper term of alteration. But it does not follow that, because alteration has its own and sufficient causality with respect to what is essentially posterior, it has a causality by which it attains what is essentially prior; rather the opposite follows, namely that it does not have a causality by which it attains what is essentially prior. Therefore, in the way in which generation is the term of alteration, what follows is that the principle of alteration does not attain the term of generation save mediately, because it attains something that is ordered toward it.

D. Three Conclusions for the Solution of the Question

1. First Conclusion

201. This conclusion thus follows (and let it be the first for the solution of this question), namely that a separated accident can in no way be a principle of action for substance, and this an instrumental principle, by virtue of a substance that does not exist [n.194]. And along with this, it has also been made clear that not even a conjoined accident can be per se an attainer of substance as term [n.194], because the authorities adduced (from *On the Soul* and the like [n.186; *Ord.* IV d.1 n.317]) only take an instrument to be a dispositive agent.

202. And if it be argued, against this, that some form attains the term of generation immediately but the substantial form does not (because it is a principle not of acting immediately but mediately) – I concede the first proposition, but the second is false, because nothing is an instrument of any cause save of a superior cause in the genus of efficient cause. Therefore, if a conjoined accident is, for them [sc. Thomas, n.186], an

instrument of substance, the substance will be the superior agent. But a superior agent naturally acts first and, if it is a natural agent, it does whatever it can; therefore, the substance, in the prior instant of nature but in the same instant of time in which it acts, acts as the superior agent, and the accident acts as its instrument. The substance will produce the term that it will be able to produce; but it can produce the whole substance, because the perfection of a produced substance does not exceed the perfection of the acting substance; therefore it will, in the instant of nature, produce the whole substance; therefore the accident will not produce the substance in any way, or the same thing would be produced twice.

203. Again, every merely passive power is in potency of contradiction,⁴⁴ *Metaphysics* 9.8.1050b8-9; but substance is not in potency of contradiction for its proper attribute; therefore, it has some causality, different from the causality of matter, with respect to that attribute – and only the causality of the efficient cause, because not of the formal cause (the thing is plain). As to the final cause, it is not in discussion here.

204. And it seems that they [sc. Thomas and followers] must, according to what they say, concede this. For they say that the powers [of the soul] flow from the essence of the soul, and they say here [n.186] that an accident has instrumental virtue because it is caused by the essential principles of substance; but these features cannot be understood only in a passive way, for a receptive subject.

205. Again, if an accident is produced, and by some immediate productive principle which (according to you [n.186]) is an accident, I ask about the essential order in these accidents (not speaking of the accidental infinity in generators and generated of the same species that philosophers speak about [*Ord.* I d.2 n.46, II d.1 n.169]). For wherever there is an accidental order in generators, there must be (outside that whole order) some cause essentially more perfect [*Ord.* I d.2 n.54]. Therefore, with respect to singular accidents in the species of heat, give me a proximate cause essentially ordered to that whole species (and I argue the same way about individuals of the species). And there is no infinite process in an essential order. So, there will be a stand at some species of accident that will be caused, and not caused by any accident but immediately by substance. And consequently, substance will have the idea of active principle immediately with respect to accident.

206. This is confirmed by the Philosopher *Metaphysics* 7.9.1034b16-19, where the Philosopher says that “a property of substance can be grasped from these facts, that some other actually existing substance must necessarily pre-exist to make it the case that there is an animal, if there is an animal; but that a quality or a quantity pre-exist is not necessary save only in potency.” He maintains, therefore, that, in order for a substance to come to be, another substance must pre-exist to produce it; but in order for a quantity and a quality to be produced, there is no need for a quality or a quantity to pre-exist save only in potency. Therefore, something that is not actually a quantity or a quality can be the immediate productive principle of a quantity and a quality.

207. Again, *Meteorologica* 4.12.390a10-12 says, “A singular is that which exists as long as it has power for its own proper operation.”

⁴⁴ That is, has a potency for contradictory results. Cf. Thomas, *On Metaphysics* 9 lectio 9: “Every power is a power simultaneously for contradiction. But this is said of passive power, according to which something is said to be able to be or not to be, either simply or in a certain respect.”

208. And the like is got from Damascene, *Orthodox Faith* ch.60 [“Things that have the same substance, have the same will and operation”].

209. And although there is against these authorities [nn.206-208] an objection drawn from imperfect beings, yet it seems very unacceptable that the being among created things the most perfect as to genus should lack activity, such that its form could not be the immediate and proximate productive principle of some action.

210. And this argument is in accord with one of their principles [*Thomas*, ST Ia q.4 a.3]: that form is a principle of acting wherein the generator and generated are like each other; but the generated is like the generator principally in substantial form, and in accidents in a certain respect.

211. Nor can this result be avoided by adding to these statements that they prove the substantial form to be the principle of acting, but a remote one, both with respect to substance and with respect to accident, and that about these do the arguments proceed [nn.202-205]. This is not enough, because no one denies that there is some form in God that is the proximate principle of acting (not because God may act without intermediate causes, but because in his own order of causing he acts through nothing intermediate – beyond his own form). And so, in the issue at hand, let it be the case (which however has been disproved [n.200]) that an accident have some action for substance that is posterior to the action of substance; yet substance will be by its own proper form the principle of the action proper to it in its own order of acting.

2. Second Conclusion

212. The second conclusion for this solution is that an accident cannot be a principle for principally generating substance.

213. I prove this: every total agent is either univocal, and so it is as equally perfect as its product, or equivocal, and so it is more perfect; but an accident is altogether more imperfect than substance; therefore etc.

214. It is said in reply to this [*Henry of Ghent*, *Quodlibet* IV q.14] that some equivocal agent can be more ignoble than its effect, as whiteness in respect of the intellection of whiteness, and as the Commentator [*Averroes*], on *Metaphysics* 7 [com.31], relates from Galen about the virtue he calls ‘divine’, which is formative of the fetus and yet, if it is an accident, is not simply nobler than the formed fetus. And there can be a like difficulty about each living thing generated through putrefaction, which living thing is nobler than the heaven by which it is generated.⁴⁵

215. On the contrary: although the proposition ‘what is simply more imperfect in species or genus cannot be the total active principle with respect to something more perfect’ is as equally known to me as any proposition in philosophy – on whose denial I would not know how to prove any order of beings, or that there was a most perfect being; indeed [on this denial] it could be said, turning impudent, that the whole universe and everything in it was made by a fly; for if you argue that a fly is imperfect so, and if you say that the same thing which is more imperfect can produce what is more perfect, then, with this point in hand, there is no reason why something more imperfect so could not

⁴⁵ It was a common opinion, derived from Aristotle, that some flies and grubs were generated by the sun from putrefying matter. That they are in fact generated from eggs, invisible to the naked eye, laid by parent flies and grubs was unknown. Still the sun would be needed to keep the eggs, and the decaying matter, warm enough for incubation.

produce something more perfect so; nor, once this impudence is in place, can it be proved that the first cause is most perfect, excelling everything else in the creation – not even with the addition that it is an equivocal cause; indeed, the view could herewith stand, according to this impudence, that the first thing was most imperfect, or more imperfect than the things it caused – yet [although all this be so] I prove and argue the said proposition in a different way:

216. First as follows: a univocal cause has a univocal effect as the adequated term of its power; but, for you, a total equivocal cause is more imperfect than a univocal cause; therefore, it is impossible for the equivocal cause to be the total cause with respect to the effect, and thus God could not bring about the effect of any creature at all, which is an absurd thing to say. The consequence is plain, because an effect adequated to a more perfect power can in no way be from a more imperfect power.

217. Second as follows: whenever a univocal and an equivocal cause come together for the production of the same effect, the equivocal cause is simply more perfect. The point is plain from *Metaphysics* 12.6.1072a9-18; for, because of this, it is necessary to reduce the whole accidental order to some species essentially superior in causing, because a uniform difference of form must be reduced to a uniform cause; and so there must be for all generable and corruptible things some superior cause that is the cause of uniformity in the continuing of generation and corruption. – From this I have the proposition that ‘where a univocal and equivocal cause come together for the same effect, the equivocal cause is more perfect’. But that the equivocal cause could not act without the univocal cause, this belongs to some sort of imperfection in the equivocal cause. The thing is plain, for God can act without a univocal cause, but the sun does not have power for a perfect animal, although it does for an imperfect one; therefore any equivocal cause that has power by itself for the effect is simply more perfect than an equivocal cause that could come together with a univocal cause for causing the same thing. And consequently, an equivocal total cause has a double preeminence of causality over an effect: one that an equivocal cause universally has when concurring with a univocal cause, and it has another, because it has the perfection that the univocal cause adds in the causing and that many equivocal causes lack, even though far more perfect than univocal ones.

218. A third argument as follows: if the form of an equivocal cause were to give being formally to something, it could not give it a being simply more perfect than itself; therefore, if it more imperfectly than formally give being to something, it cannot give to it what is more perfect than itself. But when it gives being to something as efficient cause it gives it being in a more imperfect way than when it gives it formally; for it is not possible that any mode of giving being should be as perfect as the giving of being formally, just as neither can the divine essence give being to something in any genus more perfect than is the being that it gives formally.

219. Fourth as follows: if the thing caused be simply more perfect, although it be simple, yet it can, according to this understanding, be divided into two, namely into that in which it is equaled with the cause and into that in which it exceeds the cause. Let the first be called *a*, the second *b*; the effect according to *a* is precisely an effect adequate to its cause, because it is simply as equally perfect a being as the cause; therefore *b* either will be from itself or will be from nothing, because it cannot be from *a* or from the cause itself, because something more excellent over and above the effect adequate to the cause

cannot at the same time be from the cause. And this argument can be taken from Avicenna in his *Metaphysics*, 6 ch.2.

220. I say therefore that, on account of no particular objections, must this universal proposition, which is known from its terms, be denied, namely that ‘what totally causes something cannot be more imperfect than what is caused (speaking of effective cause), and that an equivocal total causer is more perfect’, for it cannot be equally perfect, for species are disposed as numbers are [sc. a higher number is not equal to, but does include, a lower number].

221. Now the objection about whiteness and intellection [n.214] is not valid, as is plain from *Ord.* I d.3 nn.452-455, where the argument proves that whiteness is not the total cause with respect to intellection but only a partial cause. Hence it can very well be that the effect excels such a partial cause in some real perfection, which perfection it can have from the partial cause that is left, and so it is more perfect from the two together than from one of them, as was said there [*ibid.* nn.486-503].

222. The second and third objection [n.214], which go to the inducing or educing of the soul in living things (and that by the heaven, whether in propagated or putrefied things), where I reckon the difficulty to be almost the same – these objections have to be solved in *Ord.* II d.18.⁴⁶

223. And let it be that there not appear that any other created cause could be found nobler than the soul (which is the term of such generation), one should concede that it was immediately from God first before denying the above now proved proposition [n.220].

3. Third Conclusion

224. Let the third conclusion be about the two actions contrary to the others [nn.201, 212, instrumental or principal actions for substance], namely actions on the intellect and sense. I say that a separated accident (at any rate in the way that a quality of the third species⁴⁷ is here separated, namely without a substance) can be the principle of both actions in the way it was before [sc. before when it existed in a substance, nn.194-195] – and this to the extent it is from itself (the reason for this addition will be plain in the solution of the following doubts [nn.230-238]).

225. I prove this as follows: in the case of any action of which some form is the total active principle, that form could, if it were to exist per se and in a manner fit for acting, be the principle of the same action; but quality is the total and formal principle of both the aforesaid actions [n.224], and when it is separated from substance, it is yet in quantity or, having extension as it is here [sc. in the Eucharist], it remains in a manner fit for acting, which is an extensive manner; therefore etc.

226. The major is plain, because when a total principle is in place and is under the idea under which it is of a nature to be principle, it can act as principle for that of which it is posited to be the principle.

⁴⁶ Missing in fact in the *Ordinatio* as it now stands. Scotus’ view must be looked for instead in *Lectura* II d.18 nn.27-39, 66-72.

⁴⁷ The reference is to the several species of quality listed by Aristotle, the third of which is the perceptible qualities that affect the several senses, *Categories* 8b26–10a11.

227. The minor is proved in one way as follows, that nothing is taken away from this form by the fact that it exists per se save its subject; and the subject only makes a unity per accidens with it, but a per se principle of acting in a single order is a per se unity; therefore, the taking away of this subject takes nothing away from the per se principle of acting.

228. But this argument [n.227] only proves that the subject does not have the per se idea of principle in the same order as the accident; but there is no obstacle to prevent it being a per se principle of acting for the same action, yet in a different order (as is plain about ordered causes [cf. *Lectura* I d.3 n.372, II dd.34-37 nn.124-126]); and the per accidens unity of them [subject and accident] does not prevent unity of order.

229. Therefore the minor is proved in another way as follows: that form is the total principle of action which is the total principle of assimilating the passive object to itself – not only really, as in a real action, which is action on a contrary, but in intentional action, which is action on the senses. The first point is plain, because the formal term simply is like to the accidental form; therefore the accident can be the principle ‘by which’ of acting. The second point has a proof, because if the likeness in the senses falls away in some respect from the real likeness in the passive object [sc. the perceived object], then, on the part of this form as agent, it can as well be the total principle of this action as of the former; but if there is some further perfection in the sensation, this is not insofar as the sensation is from the sensible quality but insofar as it is from the sense power.

E. Doubts Against these Conclusions

1. First Doubt

230. But against these conclusions there are some doubts.

231. First, against the third conclusion [n.224] there is this doubt: for it does not appear that a quality’s action on the senses and on a contrary is different:

a. First, because a quality does not act through choice – therefore, as to how much is from itself, it acts uniformly; therefore, as to how much is from itself, its input into any passive object is the same, and consequently it puts a similar form into the senses and into a passive object, and consequently the action, as to how much is from the side of the agent, is not different.

b. Second, because where the active principle is the same, the action is the same (the proof of this is from the Commentator, *On the Heaven* 3 com.72: “if the nature is one, the action too is one”); but the formal principle and the proximate formal principle of acting both on the senses and on the intellect are the same; therefore, the action is the same.

2. Second Doubt

232. The other doubt is that this last conclusion [n.224] seems to contradict the two preceding ones [nn.201, 212]. I prove it as follows: because if separated accidents have power for every degree of alteration that the conjoined accidents had power for, then they have power for the corruption of the substantial form of the passive object on which they act; but the corruption cannot, by virtue of them, be corruption into nothing

(for a creature can annihilate nothing), nor into separated accidents (for a creature cannot make separated accidents to exist per se); therefore this sort of corruption is into some other substance – and thus, if the third conclusion be true, namely that separated accidents can be a sufficient principle for alteration, as they were before, [n.229], the result is that they can be a sufficient principle for generating substance, against the first and second conclusion.

F. Solution of the Aforesaid Doubts

1. To the First Doubt

233. As to the first doubt [n.231]: what an action is, and by what it is, will be stated in question one of the following distinction [d.13 nn.18, 27-71]. But positing here briefly what I believe to be true, that action states a certain respect arriving from outside (whether in the agent or in the passive thing), and a respect that corresponds mutually to the respect of passive undergoing, then, since passive undergoings in diverse passive things are of different and diverse idea (just as are the forms received in them), the result is that the actions of them will accordingly be different.

234. This is confirmed specifically in the issue at hand, because a passive thing receptive of a form as to real being is not receptive of the same form as to intentional being, *On the Soul* 2.7.418b26-27 [12.424a17-b3]: “For what is receptive of sound must be without sound” – at any rate, what is regularly receptive of the form in the latter way is not receptive of the form in the other way, especially in the case of receptive or susceptible material things. Therefore, an organ [sc. object of intentional action] and a contrary subject [sc. object of real action] are not receptive of the form according to the same being, because the one receives it intentionally, the other really; and consequently, since an agent acts on a passive thing according to that thing’s receptive potency (according to *On the Soul* 2.414a11-12: “It seems that the acts of active things are in the passive and disposed thing”), it follows that an agent does not act on this passive thing and on that passive thing with an action of the same idea.

235. And then, as to the objection about an agent acting by choice [n.231a], I reply that an agent acting by choice can act in diverse ways, with a diversity not only of unlikeness but of contradiction – as it is able not only to do this and that but to do this and not to do that. Now a natural agent, which is unlimited simply or in some way according to active perfection, is able to act for disparate results but not for contradictory results, because each natural agent acts on matter disposed to it, and does so necessarily. Therefore, the inference ‘it does not act according to choice, therefore it does not effect diverse forms in diverse passive objects’ does not hold, but what follows is that ‘therefore it does not act indifferently, or it does not of itself effect the form that it is able to effect or not to effect in such a passive object’. An example from the sun (and it was touched on in *Ord.* I d.2 nn.349-350), which although it have a certain indeterminateness as to causing diverse effects in diverse passive objects, is yet not indeterminate as to the contradictories of acting or not acting, but it necessarily does in any passive object whatever it can do in it.

236. As to the second objection [n.231b], one must say that there can be many formally distinct actions of the same active principle, provided however that the active principle not be single one limited in active virtue, as a single form is. And thus, all the

authorities of the Commentator [n.231], and of anyone else, must be expounded of a form single in virtue as it is single in being of nature.

2. To the Second Doubt

237. To the other doubt [n.232], against the other two conclusions [nn.201, 212], I say:

In one way, briefly one could, by evasion, say that a quality is a principle of action on a passive subject having the contrary quality, and this according to any degree it had before, and this as concerns the part of active quality. But, because of the subject in which the contrary determines for itself some degree more than another, it is possible that it [= the active quality] would not have power for every degree of the contrary (insofar as the contrary exists in such subject) in the same way in which it had power for it before. And this response will be made clear in what follows [nn.240, 247, 251-254, 257, 264-265].

238. It could be said in another way that although the quality would have power for every degree of alteration that it had power for when conjoined [sc. when not separated from a substance], the consequence does not hold that it could have power for corruption of substance. – The idea of the first remark [‘although the quality would have...’] is as follows, that generation cannot be separated from corruption (relating it to a natural agent understood in this way) without whatever is created corrupting something simply, leaving behind something at the end of the corruption (for it does not annihilate things). Now a creature cannot corrupt something into a per se existing accident; therefore, if it corrupts, it corrupts into a substance, and consequently if it not have virtue for corrupting something into a substance, it does not corrupt at all; but a separated accident does not have virtue for corrupting into a substance.

3. Objections against the Solution of the Second Doubt and their Solution

a. First Objection

239. But against this:

First, because a quality that has power for every degree of alteration preparatory to generation has power for a degree impossible with the substantial form of the thing to be corrupted – and so it has power for corruption. The proof of the first part [“power for a degree impossible...”] is that, if the quality does not have power to induce some degree impossible with the substantial form, then the substantial form of the thing to be corrupted can stand with any degree inducible by the quality, and so the thing to be corrupted can, by no alteration, be corrupted.

240. I reply: the altering thing can never induce a degree impossible with the alterable thing. The proof comes from the ideas of the terms, because a mover cannot induce a degree impossible with its movable object (the proof of which is that the movable thing remains throughout the whole motion; therefore, it remains under every degree induced by the motion); but nothing remains under anything impossible with it; therefore etc.

241. But when you infer [n.239] that ‘then the altering thing will, by alteration, never corrupt the substance of the altered thing’, I concede it. And I prove this by another

reason a priori, because a naturally prior is not corrupted by something naturally posterior; but whatever is induced by an altering thing, as altering thing, is naturally posterior to the substantial form of the alterable thing; therefore by nothing such that is induced by the altering thing is the substance of the alterable thing corrupted.

242. I reply, therefore, that no substance can be corrupted save by a substance, just as neither can the opposite of a substance to be corrupted be induced save by a substance, as was proved above [nn.202, 206, 212ff.]; but a substance is not corrupted by a contrary quality save dispositively, because generation follows on the dispositive alteration unless something prevents it.

243. But on the contrary:

It would then follow that if the accidents of fire were the greatest (namely as great in quantity as the sphere of fire), and yet they were separated from substance, they could not corrupt a drop of water existing there, which seems impossible.

244. Something else follows, because if the accidents that do the altering have power for any degree whatever of alteration the way they had before, then they have power for the ultimate degree – and consequently, since the ultimate degree, when corrupted, disposes immediately for the corruption of substance, or its corruption is immediately accompanied by the corruption of substance, the result is that the substance will be corrupted; therefore etc.

245. To the first [n.243] it can be said: I concede that if the whole substance of fire were destroyed and all the accidents remained there, a drop of water put there would never be destroyed. And the reasons set down before [nn.242, 202, 206] have this as conclusion, because accidents cannot generate any substance, and the corruption of substance can only be into substance; because the corruption is not into nothing, nor into matter, nor into accidents, and especially by virtue of a natural agent, because nature cannot annihilate anything, nor resolve anything into prime matter, nor make accidents without a subject.

246. Lest, however, this be said to be too absurd and against sense, I say that, if any accidents were without a subject, a substance of any quantity and quality next to them would be corrupted, but not by them, rather by the created universal agent, namely the heaven, to which natural philosophers take flight – especially since the form to be here induced is imperfect and is totally in the active power of the heaven. And consequently, with no particular agent impeding but rather disposing, this form can be induced by the heaven, just as the heaven induces certain imperfect forms in the matter of corruptible and generable things. And if there were some form for inducing which the heaven did not suffice, one must flee to the simply first Cause, which would here induce the form for which the natural agent disposes it. Nor is this a fleeing to a miracle, because God as a matter of rule supplies every impotency of the whole creation, as is plain in the animation of an organic body by the intellectual soul, where no miracle is posited. So here the whole of created nature would not suffice for the generation or corruption in question; and therefore, when nature makes disposition for it with ultimate disposition, God would as a matter of rule supply the impotence of nature.

247. To the second [n.244] I say that there is no degree of alteration on which would necessarily follow the corruption of the substantial form in the alterable thing; but the degree that is next in one alterable thing can fail to be next in another alterable thing, speaking with respect to the corrupter or generator intrinsic to the thing that does the

altering. For let it be that some degree, which is as it were next to the degree that is impossible with the form of water, would be induced in the water by some agent – corruption of the water would immediately follow if there were from the agent a form by which it could corrupt the water. But if there not be in the agent a form corruptive of the water, then the corruption of the water does not follow from that agent, but perhaps from some universal agent inducing the form for which the matter has been disposed. So here, if the water were altered by separated accidents to the degree that would be proximate to the corruption of water, in the way it is possible for a proximate degree to be there (and I speak thus because, in the case of indivisibles, nothing divisible is proximate to something indivisible), then indeed the corruption of the water would immediately follow from the altering agent, though in this case only extrinsically.

b. Three Other Objections
 α. Exposition of the Objections

248. But there is still argument against this [n.238], that when some quality is in a subject, it can be the principle of acting toward something impossible with the substantial form; therefore it can be here too [sc. in the Eucharist], because it was stated before [cf. n.186] that every alteration that an accident in a subject can cause it can cause without a subject.

249. Again, secondly, every degree of quality is of the same idea; therefore, what can have an action corruptive of one degree, that thing, belonging to the same idea, can, if it is more perfect, be the principle of action corruptive of a further degree, and so on about any degree. But it is possible for a separated quality to corrupt some degree of quality of a substance, as you concede [n.247]; therefore, if another separated quality be superior, it can corrupt any degree of the quality. But when every degree whatever of quality is corrupted, the prior substance does not remain because, without its natural quality, it does not remain; therefore etc.

250. Again, thirdly, a natural agent could corrupt the qualities in the Eucharist, and so consequently it could induce some degree impossible with those forms [sc. qualities] in their species; and yet it cannot induce some substantial form there, because there is no subject there; therefore, by parity of reasoning, separated qualities could induce in a passive object a degree impossible with the quality [of that passive object], albeit they could not induce any substantial form concomitant with the opposite quality.

β. Solution to the First Objection

251. To the first [n.248] I say that an active quality existing in a substance cannot be per se the active principle with respect to some quality repugnant to the substance to be corrupted; but it can only be the principle of causing some quality in the sort of degree on which follows the corruption of the substance possessing that quality. But there [sc. when a quality exists in a substance] the corruption of the corrupting⁴⁸ substance follows this degree of the quality, while here [sc. in the Eucharist] it does not. For some agent

⁴⁸ Treating the Latin ‘corrumpentis’ as intransitive and as meaning ‘undergoing corruption’. Otherwise the text seems hard to make sense of.

conjoined with the accident is there that can corrupt this substance and generate another; while here whatever precedes the corruption of the substance would very well be induced, but on it the corruption of the substance by that agent does not follow, but rather by some universal agent, as was said above [n.247].

γ. Solution to the Second Objection

252. To the second [n.249] I say that, although this degree and that be of the same idea in themselves, yet not in comparison with any agent at all, because an agent that can corrupt a substance can corrupt the ultimate degree of the quality consequent to that substance, and only that agent can do so. But another agent can well corrupt other degrees not necessary to that substance.

253. Or one can say differently, and more plainly, that degrees can be of the same idea either in themselves alone or in themselves and in relation to a subject.

254. If in the first way [n.253], the proposition is false that says an agent of the same idea can corrupt things that are of the same idea [n.249]; for if these things are not of the same idea in relation to the subject (for instance because the subject determines one of them for itself but does not necessarily determine the others for itself), some agent can well corrupt one degree in such subject and yet not be able to corrupt the ultimate degree, because this latter is only corrupted with the corruption of the substance.

255. And if you make this argument, that just as substance necessarily requires the degree of the quality consequent to it, so that degree is repugnant to a contrary agent; therefore, just as you say the degree will remain as long as the subject remains [n.252], so it follows that, because of an active contrary, it do not remain.

256. And besides, what is posterior in generation is prior in corruption; but the quality (according to the degree necessary for the substance) is posterior in generation to the substance; therefore, it will be prior in corruption. Therefore, it will be naturally corrupted before the substance is, and only by the altering cause as it is altering cause; therefore etc.

257. To the first point [n.255] I say that if the contrary agent were as potent in destroying that degree as the substance is in conserving it, then the argument would have evidence on its side; but I say the substance has greater virtue for resisting the contrary corruptive of that degree than the contrary has active virtue for corrupting it. And the reason for this is that, by comparing active agent to active agent, the one simply more perfect in entity is simply more perfect in virtue; but substance has active virtue with respect to the quality that is consequent to it, and the contrary quality has an active virtue for corrupting it. But substance is simply more perfect than the contrary quality; therefore, the virtue of the substance is simply greater in resisting. And from this the probability is good that the substance is the active cause with respect to the quality consequent to it, because otherwise it would not resist the contrary corrupting its quality, nor would that quality be able to resist, because it is of itself something more imperfect than the corrupting contrary, were it posited, is more intense in its species than the quality is in its.

258. To the second [n.256] I say that that proposition [sc. 'what is posterior in generation is prior in corruption'] is only true of things that are ordered in a generation and corruption pertaining to the same genus, of which sort are ordered forms (according

to those who posit many forms); for as there the more universal form comes first to the matter, so it departs last. But as to substance and proper quality (which is consequent to the substance in the degree to which it is necessary for the substance), the proposition is false; rather, the quality is both induced later and corrupted later.

259. And if you ask, ‘by what is this sort of quality induced, whether by the generator as generator or by the alterer as alterer?’, and if you ask similarly, ‘by what is it corrupted, whether by what is corrupting the substance as it is corrupting it or by the alterer as it is inducing an opposite quality in what has been generated?’ – I reply: the proximate effect of a cause equivocal in species is caused in any individual by an individual of the equivocal cause. The reason is that individuals of the same species do not necessarily require causes different in species; for it is possible for the same specific nature in this individual to be produced by a cause of the same idea as that by which the same nature is caused in another individual; because the same inducing formal principle is sufficient for the same formal term; and that which, here and there, has the same formal term does not necessarily require a productive cause of a different idea,

260. From this proved proposition [n.259] about equivocal cause and proximate effect, I conclude that a quality necessarily consequent to a substance according to its species is caused in any substance by a substance of that sort; because the first quality is only caused by a substance; therefore any quality can be caused by it as well. And consequently, since an equivocal cause has more virtue than a univocal cause, then, if the univocal cause could induce the effect, the equivocal cause would still precede it, as the Philosopher says about a big flame and a little flame, *On Respiration* 4.469b31-70a5. The quality, therefore, of a generated thing is not induced by any alterer as it is alterer; that is, a quality is not the formal principle of inducing the quality.

261. And if you argue that then the previous alteration does not have a term – this is not unacceptable about a term per se of the same genus, because it has an extrinsic term, the substantial form of the generated thing.

262. And if you ask whether the quality of the generated thing is induced by the substance that generates it, I say that, although it could be induced by that substance, yet more probably it is induced by the generated substance itself, because though agents that have the same and equal virtue could induce the same form in the same passive thing, yet the generator or agent has the passive thing the more immediately conjoined to it the more it acts more efficaciously than the other equal things. But if it is the passive susceptible thing of the term of its action, as in the issue at hand, it is a passive thing more immediately conjoined to itself, and consequently the generator there will not precede the generated substance, because it is not prior to itself in perfection but only in duration. Now the generated thing is equal in perfection to, and more immediate than, itself as passive, and this can well preserve how such inducible equivocal forms are induced by whatever is in the generated thing itself; but such an equivocal agent would not be said to be able to induce the form in another passive thing (just as one will cannot induce volition in another will, yet it can well induce volition in itself).

263. From this is plain what the preceding quality is corrupted by, because it is corrupted by that by which the quality proper to the generated thing is induced, as was said [n.262]. Or one can say better that it is corrupted by that which corrupts its subject; but this is the thing that is generating the contrary substance – and then the quality of the corrupted thing is not corrupted save per accidens. However, the generated thing’s

induced quality, which has some degree that was simply impossible with the substance to be corrupted, is itself induced per se by the action of the generated substance, although not by a change, because the subject did not previously exist lacking that quality.

264. Now these things which have been said are not only true of an accident separated from substance, but also of an accident existing in a substance, because there the substance as possessed of quality does not induce a degree of it compossible⁴⁹ with the substance to be corrupted; but as a substance it corrupts a substance and consequently corrupts its quality; and as substance it generates substance; and the further degree proper to the substance to be generated, which was previously impossible with the substance to be corrupted, is from the generated thing itself.

265. Hence is manifestly clear the falsity of this proposition, ‘every substance is corrupted for this reason, that some degree is induced that is impossible with its own proper quality’; rather, never is a degree impossible save in some substance already generated, otherwise the impossibles would exist together. Nor can any degree induced or inducible by an alterer, as it is alterer, corrupt a substance, because nothing posterior in genus can be the cause of corrupting something prior in genus.

266. From this is plain the answer to the objection that can be made about water which could not corrupt fire [cf. n.243], because the fire simply has a nobler and more perfect active virtue. – I reply: it is not said that a more imperfect thing cannot corrupt a more perfect one [cf. n.245] (speaking of species compared to species), but that an active thing more imperfect in genus cannot corrupt a being more perfect in genus (because it can only induce something more imperfect in genus, and this more imperfect something cannot be successor to the corruption of a thing more perfect in genus). Now an accident cannot be properly successor to the corruption of a substance, because if it alone were to succeed to it, the substance as substance would be quasi annihilated. But an imperfect thing of the same genus is not so, because a more imperfect thing (in that it can induce something like itself) can induce something that can succeed to the corrupted thing of the same genus.

267. One could also say that between a perfect and imperfect thing of the same genus there is a formal repugnance, on account of which the one can corrupt the other; but between a perfect thing of one genus and an imperfect thing of another genus there is no repugnance save only a virtual one, the way the prior is repugnant to the opposite of the posterior, and the posterior to the opposite of the prior. Now the posterior in genus has only power per se for the opposite of its genus, and therefore not for the corruption of the prior in genus, to which it is not opposed save indirectly.

δ. Solution to the Third Objection

268. As to the third [n.250], I concede that the separated species could be corrupted by a created agent, as will be stated in the following article [nn.432-437], and as will also be stated in what way a substance there may be generated or not generated [nn.490-499].

269. But if the argument be formed in this way: ‘once separated accidents are posited, as the heat of fire in a quantity, not only the most perfect degree of the heat but

⁴⁹ The text says ‘compossible’ but a variant reads ‘impossible’, which latter may be right.

even the ultimate degree could be corrupted by a substance altering it, or by some other separated quality, by a contrary or more active thing, as a separated quantum of cold. But this separated coldness is not of greater virtue or more active by the fact the heat is separated than if the heat were in a substance as in a subject; therefore if the heat were in the substance of fire, the separated cold could still corrupt the ultimate degree of the substance of fire; and then the whole main argument stands [n.250], that the heat cannot be corrupted unless the substance of the fire be corrupted, nor can it be corrupted unless another substance be generated, and so the separated cold could generate a substance' – I reply that, by positing the heat of fire and the cold of water in separated quantities, if the coldness, in accord with intensity in its own species, were simply to overcome the heat in its species, I concede that any degree, even the ultimate degree, of the heat could be corrupted by the cold; but it does not follow that likewise the ultimate degree of heat could be corrupted when the heat is in fire.

270. The reason is this, that the quantity that is the subject of the separated heat does not determine for itself necessarily a degree of heat that is no more the lowest than the highest; for it does not have an active virtue or a necessity with respect to any degree there at all; and therefore what can corrupt one degree in such a subject can corrupt this degree and that degree and any degree you like.

271. Hence these degrees are of the same idea in themselves and in comparison with the subject, and the subject has an equal determination or lack of determination for any degree at all, and conversely; but it is not so when the heat is in the fire; for fire does not determine for itself necessarily the supreme degree, but the degree is in the fire contingently, and therefore if that degree could not resist the cold corrupting it, the subject will not resist it either, because it does not necessarily require that degree, but determines the lowest degree for itself. And therefore, although the lowest degree could not resist the corrupting contrary, yet the substance of fire, which is of greater virtue, can resist the corrupting contrary; for the substance of fire has more power for preserving the effect than the cold has for corrupting it. The substance will therefore preserve that degree as long as the fire is remaining in its being; and therefore, unless there is something corrupting the fire in itself, the degree will not be corrupted.

272. When, therefore, it is said [n.269] that the cold is not of greater virtue or more active by the fact that the heat is without a substance than if the heat were in a substance – I concede that in itself the cold is not more active, but it can act more on the contrary, because this separated contrary lacks a cause preserving its being, but when it is conjoined [sc. with a substance] it does have a cause preserving its being.

273. And this reason [n.272] is universal about contrary causes formally or virtually coming together on the same passive object; for one cause is not simply more or less active than the other because it comes together with it on the same passive object; but yet one acts less on this object by the fact that the other comes together with it, for the other impedes it.

II. To the Initial Arguments

274. To the first initial argument [n.175] I say that the proposition 'when the prior is destroyed the posterior is also destroyed' is true of the simply prior, namely a prior on which the posterior depends; but it is not true of what is in some way prior yet on which

the posterior does not essentially depend (as is the case with ordered effects, where the nearer cause is said to be prior to the more remote cause, and yet it would be possible sometimes for a cause to issue in a second effect though it were impeded by a first).

275. It could in another way be said that the proposition is true unless something else prior to the prior supplies the place of the prior, as is the case with God and the subject in respect of the accident here [sc. in the Eucharist].

276. The first response [n.274], however, is doubtful: how can a posterior effect be without the prior effect of the same cause when there is an essential order between the effects? For it was said often in *Ord.* I [d.17 nn.42, 83; d.27 n.83; also II d.1 nn.41, 44] that when a cause is of a nature to have ordered effects, it is not in proximate potency to producing the remoter effect unless the nearer effect has already been produced; and for this reason the Holy Spirit can only be spirated by the Father and the Son together, and for this reason a creature can only be created by the three Divine Persons together, and much else said there [*Ord.* I d.11 nn.12-18; d.12 nn.7, 27, 36; d.20 n.27].

277. The second response too [n.275] does not have place here, because although God may supply the place here [sc. in the Eucharist], that is, supply the causality of the subject in respect of the accident by conserving the accident without a subject, yet he does not supply the place of inherence in a subject, about which it is argued that it is prior to action extrinsically, unless you say that to this extent he supplies the place of inherence because he conserves it in being.

278. However, as to the form of the argument [sc. of the first initial argument, n.175], reply can be made by denying the minor, because the ‘being in’ of an accident is not essentially prior necessarily to ‘acting extrinsically’ (speaking of ‘being in some substance’), because both belong to an accident contingently, and the posterior also contingently has the prior before it. Indeed, action necessarily and essentially presupposes the being of the active form; but the fact that ‘being in’ is concomitant with ‘being’ is not necessary, nor necessarily pre-required for acting.

279. But when both respects, namely ‘being in’ and ‘acting extrinsically’, belong to the same form absolutely, then, although both come from outside, yet the first is not contingently disposed to the foundation in the way the second respect is, because the foundation (while the order of natural causes stands) always has the first effect, not so the second effect. And more things can prevent the second effect from ‘being-in’ than can prevent the first effect from ‘being-in’, because an impeding contrary can deprive the form of its acting, but only God can deprive it of its ‘being-in’.

280. Therefore, the minor [n.179] is false, because ‘being-in’ is not essentially prior to acting, but only being is essentially prior to acting, while ‘being-in’ is simply prior when considering the order of natural causes.

281. And then as to the confirmation about immediacy [sc. about ‘proper attribute’, n.176], I say that not everything that is more immediate to something is necessarily presupposed to everything more mediate, as that if the more immediate thing is not a cause with respect to the mediate thing (neither an active cause nor a receptive cause), the effect too is not simply necessarily nearer to the same cause. And so it is in the issue at hand: for ‘being-in’ has this immediacy, because by natural causes it follows the foundation at once, namely such that by no natural cause is it impeded; not so with ‘acting’. But yet neither is ‘being-in’ an elicitive or receptive idea, nor is its effect simply necessarily prior to ‘acting’.

282. And if you say: ‘being-in’ is the proper attribute, ‘acting’ is an accident per accidens [n.176], the response is plain in the first question of this distinction [nn.32-33, 52, 77, 80]. For ‘being-in’ is not altogether a proper attribute, but it is a contingently inhering accident, though it happens for the most part; but an accident that happens for the most part does not necessarily precede an accident that happens for the least part, or happens either way.

B. To the Second Argument

1. Response to the Argument

283. To the second initial argument [n.177] I say that the proposition ‘to act belongs per se to a supposit’ is not got from the Philosopher *Metaphysics* 1.1.981a17-18 but what is got there is that ‘action concerns singulars’, and to this extent the Philosopher puts experience before art in acting, or the experienced man before the artisan [cf. *Ord.* III d.36 n.85]. But whence is the place [sc. the argumentative topic] got? ‘Action is about the singular as object; therefore, it belongs only to a supposit as agent’ [*Ord.* III d.8 n.14].

284. If this proposition is taken, ‘action belongs to a supposit’, then from somewhere else than the Philosopher here at least is this proposition picked up: ‘action belongs to the supposit as what is ultimately denominated by action, but not as all that is denominated by it’. This solution you can gather from *Ord.* I d.5 nn18-24, where is obtained how from the same abstract term, especially one that states a respect, many denominative terms can be taken that denominate many things on which that form [sc. the abstract term] falls, and does so in order. For example, from the abstract term ‘potentiality’ is taken the concrete term proximate to it, which is ‘potency, power’ and is said of heat; and further is taken the concrete term ‘potent, being able’ and is said of the fire possessing the heat. In the same way can be taken from ‘action’ a concrete term that denominates the formal principle of acting, and it would be said of ‘heat’, as in ‘if it exists, heat heats’, that is, ‘is that whereby the possessor of heat acts’, just as heat is a heating power but is not a potentiality nor potent or powerful.

285. But from ‘action’ is commonly taken only the denominative that denominates the ultimate denominative, at which the whole dependence of the form has its term; and I concede that, however much a form is denominated by action, yet if that form is of a nature to be in a supposit, the supposit could, by a further denomination, be denominated by ‘action’.

286. But you might say, ‘at least as this denomination, whereby something is said to act, is customarily used, the form will not be denominated by action, and so the proposed conclusion holds’ [n.177].

287. I reply: a form possessing the idea of form is not thus denominated, that is ‘an informing form’ (because it is then the reason why something else is denominated by this denomination), but a ‘non-informing form’ is thus denominated. But a being per se is not denominated by this denomination, for it can be denominated by another denomination, as was said before [n.284]; and if it does not depend further on some other denominated thing, its denomination will be ultimate. And so this proposition ‘to act belongs to a supposit alone’ is briefly expounded as ‘or belongs to something having the mode of a supposit’. And by this remark ‘having the mode of a supposit’ I understand

nothing positive beyond the essence of the form; rather I understand only the negation of its informing anything that acts through the form.

288. As to the confirmation from Boethius [n.178], it can be said (as he himself speaks there about ‘by what it is’ and ‘what it is’) that, according to its ‘what’, each created thing has these distinct in some way, in the way that no created thing is pure being (on which see *Ord.* I d.8 n.32); but it is not necessary that in any created thing the ‘by what it acts’ and ‘what acts’ be distinct; for if angel or soul are the simple essence of their power and really so, what acts with intellectual action and by what it acts are not really different. And so here [sc. an accident in the Eucharist], it is a certain being and a simple act, and it does not inform anything else.

289. The example brought forward about the soul in man [n.179] is only a proof about the ‘what’ and ‘by what’ in the case of existing, and this when taking the partial ‘by what’, not the total ‘by what’; and I say this because a man is a man by humanity as by the total ‘by what’, but by the soul he is a man as by a partial ‘by what’. And this is what is sometimes accustomed to be said about the form of the whole and the form of a part; the form of the whole indeed is the quiddity of the thing, including each essential part, and this is not different in reality from the ‘what’, but it is perhaps only different in mode of understanding [*Ord.* III d.2 nn.80-84]. And in this way the ‘what’ and ‘by what’ with respect to action can only differ when the ‘by what’ is the total ‘by what’, which is always at least the case when the ‘by what’ is in nothing else – and perhaps even when it is in something else, because then the subject has no causality of its own with respect to action; but yet it is then denominated (with remote denomination) by the action, because it is denominated by the principle ‘by what’ of the action.

290. As to what is added from *Metaphysics* III about mathematics [n.180], that ‘in mathematics there is neither agent nor good’, I say that the quantity in the Eucharist is not a mathematical principle; for the mathematician abstracts from natural qualities in the way he abstracts from substantial form (for the mathematician abstracts in this way from the natural as from the metaphysical, or more so). I concede therefore that if the quality existed alone, it would not be the principle of acting with the sort of action that we are speaking of here [n.289]; but the natural quality, which is here [in the Eucharist] in the quantity, can well have virtual touch in respect of a passive object.

2. A Doubt and its Solution

291. And if you ask, ‘does a separated quantity without a quality act on the senses?’, it seems that it does.

292. Because it is per se perceptible, *On the Soul* 2.6.418a17-20.

293. And again, it could act on the intellect, because it is per se intelligible; but it could not act on our intellect unless it first acts on the senses; therefore etc.

294. To the contrary, because a quantity is not perceptible primarily; but that which is not per se perceptible primarily cannot act without what is perceptible primarily.

295. It could be said that the quantity would not be perceived because: either it would (according to some) have no action on the senses by impressing on them its own species but only the proper sensibles do (the common sensibles,⁵⁰ however, only do

⁵⁰ The proper sensibles are those perceived by only one sense, as color, taste, sound etc., and the common sensibles are those perceived by more than one sense, as size, shape, place etc.

something for the manner of affecting the senses); or if a common sensible cause its own species along with a proper sensible (otherwise how could it properly be perceived?), yet it cannot cause it without the concomitance of a proper sensible – not indeed that it would not be prior to the primarily sensible quality and so able to be separated in itself from that quality, but that it would not be prior in acting on the senses, and so, insofar as it is of such sort, it is not separable from a proper sensible.

296. And perhaps the reason is that by which the senses are primarily receptive powers of their proper object; and therefore from nothing else can they receive another act unless they are naturally prior in this act.

297. And thus is plain the answer to the first argument [n.292].

298. As to the second [n.293] I say that a quantity could move the intellect if it were proportionate to it or proportionately present to it; but it is not so for our intellect, because a quantity can become primarily present to our intellect only through the species, and it cannot be caused in the intellect if the species of the object were not first in the senses.

C. To the Third Argument

299. To the third argument [181] I say that the proposition from *On Generation* that ‘agent and patient must have the matter in common’ can be understood of aptitudinal or actual commonness; but the separated accidents are of a nature [sc. are aptitudinally fit] to have the matter of the subject in common with the passive object.

300. Or in another way, it could be said that the proposition is only true of a univocal agent, for God and the heaven do not have matter in common with these things down here.

301. But this [n.300] is not a solution, because action of this sort on a contrary is univocal action.

302. Therefore the first response [n.299] is better, because from the fact that the form here [sc. in the Eucharist] is of the same idea as the form that is the term [sc. the form as in a substance], it follows that just as the form that is the term is in matter, so it is of a nature to be in matter; but it is not necessary that it be in act in matter as the former is, because to act belongs to a form that is maximally a per se being, but to be received or produced only belongs to the form in some susceptible subject.

D. To the Fourth

303. As to the fourth argument [n.182] from the *Metaphysics*, it could be brought in for my side; because I concede that a quality cannot be the principle for generating a composite substance. But in another respect it is brought in against me, because neither is a quality the principle for generating a composite quality, nor would a substantial form (even if it existed per se) be a principle for generating a composite substance – which, however, you would have to deny, just as you also deny it about a quality and a composite quality [nn.182, 186].

304. Therefore, first I say to the authority [from the *Metaphysics*, n.182] that the Philosopher’s intention is that Plato’s ‘Idea’ cannot be a principle for generating a

composite substance, because no completely immaterial substance can generate a composite substance without the mediation of a body [cf. *Ord.* II d.3 n.208].

305. But how is this proposition true with him [sc. Aristotle]?

I say that it is so because he posits the order of causes in the universe to be simply necessary; and he sees the separate substances, according to his own position, as moving the heavens, so that they produce, through such movement, other things down below; but they would not thus move if they could immediately produce them, because then the order of causes would not be necessary – which for him would be unacceptable.

306. And for this reason one ought not to impose on him the lies⁵¹ of some people, that a separated substance could not cause anything here below because of an imperfection, either such or such in a separated substance, or because of the disproportion between a simple and a composite – but only that they could not do so because of the order of causes. For he conceded that a simple substance causes the moved heaven, which heaven is a per accidens composite. Why then is it thus not a per se composite, since the agent has no greater fit with a per accidens composite (either in whole or in part) than with a per se composite?

307. But we do not agree with the Philosopher in the proposition: ‘the order of causes is simply necessary’ [n.305]. For he would say that a simple accident would not produce a qualified subject – not because he would deny that a simple accident (when it is in a subject) is the whole idea of acting, and thus that, if it could exist per se, it could also act per se, but because he would deny (because of the necessity of the order of causes with him) that this could be the case.

308. But as to what is said there [n.182], that ‘a substantial form, if it existed per se, could not, according to this authority of the Philosopher, be the principle for generating a composite substance’, this indeed contains a doubt. For if it is the case that, just as a quality is the total principle for altering something, so the substantial form of the generator is the total principle for generating, the up shot for us is to say that a substantial form that is a per se being can generate a substance – save that it would not be in a suitable mode for acting (for nothing has a suitable mode for acting on a matter quantum unless it is itself a quantum – speaking of a univocal agent).

309. But on the question whether a substantial form alone could be the principle for generating, or (what is more) that the substance alone would be the principle for generating, look above in the first article [i.e. the solution of the question, nn.257-260].

E. To the Fifth

310. To the fifth argument [n.183]: if the intelligible species were posited as the total principle of intellection, then it would appear that it could be the principle when separated – and let the same be said of charity in respect of love. But I have posited neither the one nor the other as the total principle, but as partial and less principal [*Ord.* I d.3 nn.559-560, d.17 nn.32, 40, 46, 67-70, 142, 157-158]. But a less principal principle can never act save with the principal one acting naturally first, and this when speaking of priority on the part of the agent itself – not as action or term received in the passive object, because thus the action of ordered agents on the passive object would by nature have the form as term simultaneously.

⁵¹ ‘Trufa’, a medieval word for ‘truffle’ but also for untruths or lies.

311. But does this argument work against others who hold the antecedent [n.310, ‘if the intelligible species were posited as the total principle of intellection’, from Thomas of Sutton, *Ord.* I d.3 nn.460-462]?

312. I say that the intelligible species, however much separated or conjoined, never understands. For nothing is said to understand save in this way, that it has such an intellection formally inhering in it; and so the proposition in *On the Soul* 3.4.429a13-15, that “to understand is to undergo,” is true to the letter, because ‘to understand’ is to have or to receive intellection. But the intelligible species is posited by no one as what properly receives intellection.

313. Hence the argument [sc. the fifth, n.183] that a separated species could understand would work more against him [Giles of Rome, cf. *Ord.* I d.3 nn.456-459], who posits that the species is the formal idea of receiving intellection than against those [n.311], who posit that it is the total active principle of intellection.

314. But I still deduce [from the argument, n.183] that at least the separated intelligible species could actively cause intellection – which seems unacceptable.

315. My reply: this does not follow unless the passive thing be proximate to what is receptive of intellection; but if it is so, one would as a result have to concede that it would cause intellection in the passive thing.

316. And to this extent there is one difficulty common to us and them, that however much causality we attribute to the species, whether partial active causality (as I said above, n.310) or only the idea of being the term or presenter of the object, the species would have this perfection in the same way if it were separate as if it were conjoined, as it seems.

317. Therefore if a separated species were not present to the intellect by inherence but by simple presence, it could suffice for causing intellection in the intellect in the same way as it does when it inheres. And this I concede, because I said above [n.312] that the intellect receives nothing of the perfection pertaining to itself from the species that informs it, but there is only need that the species, as another partial cause of the effect, come together with the intellect. But that a partial cause inheres in another cause is wholly accidental, because it could, without inhering, as equally perfectly cause the effect on account of other essential order, namely the order of subordination of active virtue to active virtue, to which the order of subject and accident is accidental.

318. And so I say briefly that charity in the fatherland will immediately cause intuitive intellection of itself in the intellect; and yet it is not present by inherence to the intellect but to the will – and yet this presence suffices for it to concur, as partial cause, with the other cause.

319. This argument [n.183], therefore, which is frequently made, works against no opinion save the opinion which posits that the species is the total active principle of intellection and that, along with this, it is the proper and proximate receptive subject of intellection, and that the same is able to move itself. But against those who posit in some way or other an activity of the species, it does not prove anything save that a separated species could act similarly to a conjoined species, provided however it had a proportionate passive thing present to it.

320. This holds in the same way of charity with respect to the act of love.

Third Part: About Change in the Accidents

321. About the third main part [n.6] I ask first about possible change when the Eucharist persists, second about change wherewith the Eucharist does not persist.

First Article: About Possible Change of the Accidents while the Eucharist Remains

Question One

Whether Every Change that Could be Caused by a Created Agent in the Accidents in the Persisting Eucharist Necessarily Requires the Persistence of the Same Quantity

322. About the first question [n.321] I ask whether every change, capable of being caused by a created agent in the accidents in the Eucharist while the Eucharist persists, necessarily requires the persistence of the same quantity.

323. That it does:

Because both motion and change necessarily require a subject and presuppose it (the point is plain from the definition of motion, *Physics* 3.1.201a10-11, 27-29, that “motion is the act of a being in potency” and “is the act of the movable insofar as it is movable;” and *Physics* 5.1.224b35-5a3 that “to be moved is to be differently disposed now than before”). But transmutation capable of being caused by a created agent is either motion or change; therefore it necessarily presupposes a subject, and this a subject that remains the same under both terms [sc. beginning and ending of the change], because this belongs to the idea of the subject. But here [in the Eucharist] nothing remains the same under both terms unless the quantity remain the same; because if the prior does not remain the same the posterior does not remain the same, for in the many possible changes here, another subject could not be found save quantity.

324. Again, in *Metaphysics* 7.8.1033b8-19 the Philosopher proves that a generator generates only a composite. And he explains at the end of the chapter [9.1034b7-11, 14-16] that “the argument not only shows of substance that a species or form does not come to be, but the argument is the same about all the categories, as about quality, quantity, and the other categories (as that a bronze sphere comes to be, not that sphere or bronze come to be);” “likewise in the other categories, for quality does not come to be but wood with a quality, nor does quantity come to be but a quantity of wood.” But here [in the Eucharist] a composite cannot be generated per accidens unless quantity be part of the composite; but the quantity needs to have been the same during the change, because according to the Philosopher there, “the matter must always pre-exist” that is changed toward form so that the composite might come to be.

325. Again, a natural agent cannot cause increase or decrease in the Eucharist, because this only belongs to animate things, to which nutrition also belongs, *On the Soul* 2.4.415b23-28, but the species in the Eucharist are not animate; therefore they cannot be increased or diminished. But there is no motion toward different quantities unless increase and decrease happen, as is plain from *Physics* 5.2.226a26-31, where these are put in the genus of quantity, just as alteration is put in the genus of quality.

326. To the contrary:

The species can be broken by the priest (as is plain to sense); therefore continuity can be removed; but continuity is the unity of the continuous. Therefore its unity is removed; therefore the same quantity does not remain as before in this change.

327. Again, a created agent can cause densification and rarefaction in these sorts of species; but there is greater quantity in the rare and less quantity in the dense.

I. To the Question

A. Opinion of Godfrey of Fontaines

1. Exposition of the Opinion Expressed in Two Conclusions

328. There is here an opinion [Godfrey of Fontaines, *Quodlibet* XI q.3], which says that not only is it possible for the quantity here not to remain the same, but that there is altogether a different quantity in rarefaction and in densification of the species, such that, namely, nothing at all of what is prior remains in what is posterior and no part of the posterior was before in the prior.

329. He goes from this conclusion to another conclusion, namely that here there is motion without a subject and by a created agent, for it is sufficiently plain to sense that fire can rarefy the species as if they were in a subject.

330. He makes, however, an addition to this second conclusion, namely that “that according to which change happens first and per se is not altogether without a subject, because this sort of change happens according to the rare and dense; and this change happens according to hot and cold; and on this sort of change follows contraction and expansion; and so change according to quantity happens per accidens and as a consequence. And accordingly, because that according to which this change, as this change, happens first and per se is not without a subject, one can say that this motion is not wholly without a movable thing.”

331. And as if this response not suffice he adds, “However, because what is here posited for the subject (of that which change per se happens in accord with) is also changed, and no subject can be assigned for its change, therefore, by reason of this, motion in the matter at hand is said to be without a movable.

2. Two Reasons for the First Conclusion

332. For the first conclusion [n.328] argument is given as follows: the terms of motion must be impossible (plain from *Physics* 5.3.7-10); therefore nothing of one term is anything that remains in the other, just as the impossible is not in its impossible.

333. If the position were held too that some quantity remained the same here, but the terms of change were the greater and lesser in the quantity remaining – this he himself rejects because “the subject and terms of motion must really differ;” but the quantity, and the greater and lesser in the quantity, do not really differ, “for it cannot be said that variation happens according to greater and lesser without variation happening as to the essence of quantity, since greater and lesser are only the quantum itself essentially.” In this way does he himself argue that the same whiteness cannot both remain in the change and vary from greater to lesser.

334. And the strength of this reasoning [n.332] rests on this, that the subject is really distinguished from each term, and in this especially that the subject remains under each term; but neither term remains under the other, since they are opposites.

335. Again, each part of what is rarer is rarer; therefore each part of what is rarer is greater in quantity; therefore each part is a quantum with a new quantity.

336. If you say that something altogether new does not follow but only something new as to a part – on the contrary: I take what the subject is of the part of quantity that is new; that subject is rarer than it was before (from the first proposition [n.335]); therefore it is greater than before; therefore too it is a quantum with a greater quantity; and consequently the new quantity, of which the subject is posited as subject, will be greater than the old quantity and yet not altogether other than it. Therefore, in the same way the quantity of the whole rare thing will be greater than the whole quantity of the dense thing, and yet not altogether new.

337. Here argument [sc. against this, n.336] is made in brief as follows. If the quantity that was before remains, I ask what subject it is in; only in the same as it was in before, because the accident does not migrate; therefore, the subject that was a quantum with this quantity before will now be a quantum with the same quantity. Therefore, it cannot, either in the whole of itself or in a part, be a quantum with another new quantity unless the same thing be at the same time a quantum with two quantities (which is impossible), or unless there is in the rarefaction an aggregation of new parts of the substance under the new quantity; and the aggregation of quantum parts with preexisting quantum parts is rarefaction. But this is nothing, because then no part of the rarer would be rarer formally; for an old part would not be rarer formally by the fact that another new part was made continuous with it.

3. Three Reasons for the Second Conclusion

338. For the second conclusion [n.329] he argues himself as follows (as it can be elicited from this words):

“Just as an accident has, by divine virtue, being without a subject in its ‘having been made’ and its ‘being at rest’, so too can it have being without a subject in its ‘coming to be’ and its motion” [Godfrey, *Quodlibet* XI q.3].

339. Another reason: “Because just as it has, by divine virtue, being without a subject, so too does it have everything by the same virtue, so that everything that can belong to it in a subject belongs to it without a subject. Therefore, just as extension could vary in a substance as to greater and lesser, and just as the substance would accordingly be said by participation to be greater and lesser, so too will this sort of change be able, when the extension remains without a subject, to come to be in another quantity without a subject” [*ibid.*].

340. Third: “Although motion does not exist in its complete idea (according to the course of nature that fits it) unless there is some one thing that, as to some form, is disposed differently now than it was before, yet to the essence of motion principally belongs the flow itself of the form, or the form itself in its ‘being in a state of becoming’.” Now this form [in a state of becoming] can well be found [here] even though no subject is differently disposed according to it; therefore too can the essence of motion be found [here].

4. Reasons Against the Second Conclusion and their Solution

341. Against the second conclusion [n.329] he intimates three reasons:

The first is of this sort: the greater quantity has not been drawn out from the potency of matter, for the quantity does not have a subject; but such an entity [sc. the greater quantity] is said to be created; and so, in such a change, a greater quantity cannot come to be save by creation.

342. Second, because the body of Christ remains under the species of bread as long as the accidents remain that affected the substance of the bread; but for you the quantity is altogether new, or different from before [n.328]; therefore, the body of Christ does not remain there, which however is not the position held.

343. Third as follows: "The being of successive things consists in the succession of parts as to prior and posterior; but there cannot be prior and posterior in motion unless there is something that varies as to prior and posterior; therefore etc."

344. And he responds to these arguments:

To the first [n.341] as follows, that because in this change there is not thus one thing and another thing that at some point has interrupted being – neither because, namely, it is corrupted in itself or something else like it is regenerated, nor because one thing is contrary to the other; rather is it of one idea in form and species, and in existing continuously and without interruption – therefore nothing prevents the idea of motion from being capable of being posited here.

345. And this reason could be applied to the first [n.341], namely because there is on this account no creation, "because there is no production of some new being of a thing corrupted in itself, but only the production of some being as to form and species according to a certain successive 'coming to be' of a thing conserved" [Godfrey, *ibid.*]

346. He does, however, say to the first [n.341] that "just as it was in the potency of the subject that a greater quantity could, without creation, be introduced after a lesser quantity by a created agent, so does this force remain in a separated quantity, so that a greater after a lesser is brought to be by a natural agent and without creation, – such that the term 'from which' is the quantity lesser in degree from which the motion begins, while the term 'to which' is the quantity greater in some other degree at which the change stops; but motion is the flow of quantity indeterminate between these two definite terms, and possessed of existence in quasi infinite degrees between them. But if some quantity were to come to be such that it would not have a relation to the pre-existing quantity, that quantity would properly be created" [Godfrey, *ibid.*] – In this final word does his response seem to stand, namely that there is no creation here, because the new quantity that is introduced has such a relation to the pre-existing quantity, because it succeeds to it by an uninterrupted flow, according to quasi infinite degrees in the form of the quantity.

347. To the second [n.342] he replies that "the body of Christ does not cease to be there because of just any variation in the species, but only because of such a variation as could not exist unless, along with the change of species, the substance of the bread and wine would, were it there, also change; and therefore, as long as the species remain in uninterrupted being under such rareness or extension, and so on about other features (but provided the bread could be affected by them), so long does the body of Christ remain there."

348. To the third [n.343] he says that in motion that is toward quantity, whether it is per se, namely in increase, or is in rarefaction (as in the issue at hand [n.337]), it is not possible to take there a per se and primary order of any parts save in quantity; and thus

will the separated species be understood to have an order in coming to be and in succession, because part will be able to succeed continuously to part when not in a subject just as when in a subject.

B. Rejection of the Opinion

1. About the First Conclusion

a. The Falsity of it in Itself is Shown

349. As concerns this opinion, there is only need to care much about the first conclusion [n.328] because of the second conclusion [n.329]. For the whole force of this question is: Since in certain changes that appear here (as change of place and the like), we can manifestly find some subject that remains the same under the terms of the change, and this by at least positing here, according to the common opinion [n.150], quantity alone without a subject, but since in a change whose terms are quantity it is not easy in this way to find a subject, then there cannot be here a change from quantity to quantity.

350. This difficulty is common, whether the whole succeeding quantity is new or a part of it is, because if a new part of change, however small, is granted, I will look for a subject of it. There is no need, then (as far as concerns the proposed view about a subject of change as to the quantity of what here appears), to reject the opinion that posits a whole new quantity more than to reject any other opinion that posits at least some new part of quantity – which everyone has to do, otherwise there would not then be more quantity than before.

351. However, Godfrey's first conclusion [n.328] seems false.

352. The reason is that, if the subject does not remain the same, no accident of it remains the same; but for you the quantity of wine does not remain the same when it is rarefied [nn.328, 336]; therefore, no accident remains there the same because, according to the common opinion [n.150], any accident whatever is there in the quantity, whether mediately or immediately, and consequently the savor does not remain the same in number nor the color the same in number, and so forth.

353. And if it be said that it is an argument of the uneducated to take flight to the senses, because reason should judge about same and different if any objection is raised, since according to the Philosopher, *Physics* 8.3.254a30-33, it is fatuous to seek a reason there where we have something more certain than reason; it also seems strange if the senses cannot judge of the number of their proper sensibles, since number (according to the Philosopher *On the Soul* 2.6.418a17-20) is per se perceptible – these problems I give no weight to, because, as I have said elsewhere [*Ord.* II d.3 n.21], none of the senses judges whether the rays of the sun are continuously the same or different in a medium, although however that of which there is number or unity here is a proper sensible.

354. Passing this over, then, I argue as follows: it is not possible that agents, however much diverse, should induce the same form after corruption of the same thing; but whatever these sorts of species are rarefied by, whether by fire or the sun, such and such a savor and such and such a color are induced.

355. If you posit the accidents to be new [n.328], the argument goes more plainly as follows: The species of wine can be rarefied by fire; but all the qualities that appear there cannot be induced by fire, both because fire does not virtually contain in itself the qualities of mixtures, and because, if it does contain them, yet not accidents as greatly

diverse in genus or species. But if the consecrated wine were here sweet and there bitter, the bitterness remains after rarefaction in these species and the sweetness in those, and so on as to any species at all of savor and any at all of colors (if, suppose, white wine is consecrated, or golden, or red). Therefore rarefying wine alone does not induce all these qualities; therefore they are not new. Therefore neither is the subject new, namely the quantity, without which they cannot remain the same.

b. Again, from the Statements of Him who Holds the Opinion

356. Argument secondly against this opinion from the statements of him who holds it. For he says that substance is individual formally through quantity; therefore, this bread is formally this bread through this quantity; therefore, when this quantity is corrupted, this bread no longer remains here, but a different singular bread does. Therefore, in any case of rarefaction the whole prior substance is corrupted and a new one generated.

357. This seems sufficiently improbable and against reason, because that such an alteration necessarily at once requires a new substance is to say that there cannot be variation as to the posterior if there is not variation as to the prior; and not a posterior in some way or other, but what is neither a proper passion nor consequent necessarily to the prior – which seems manifestly unacceptable.

c. About the Two Reasons Adduced for the First Conclusion

α. About the First Reason

358. The reasons for this conclusion do not prove it.

The first, about the impossibility of the terms of motion or change [n.332], is solved by the fact that the major proposition is true of first terms, which are always privation and form; but the said proposition is not universally true of terms concomitant with the primary terms, as was said above in the opinion about forms, in distinction 10 question 2 the last article [d.10 nn.121-123].

359. And if you argue that here more and less are impossible, I reply they are so as ultimately and completely informing the subject, but not as ‘less’ is something of ‘more’; otherwise it would be necessary to say, on the basis of this argument, that the whole quantity of the increased thing would be new, which is not probable but rather the parts of flesh in their species, which parts remain the same, are quanta with the same quantity as before; however, some quantity is new of the parts of substance that have come to it.

360. And when Godfrey himself afterwards deduces [n.333] that quantity is not moved from the greater to the lesser, I go along with him (and about quality likewise), because quantity and the greater and lesser in quantity (not speaking of the respect that ‘greater’ involves, but of the absolute that the respect presupposes as proximate foundation) are not essentially distinct, not even in the way the subject of motion must be distinct from the term of motion.

361. And therefore I simply concede the argument that some form of some genus does not change to greater and lesser within the genus; but the whole form, which is greater either in quantity or quality, does so – where I do not say that a per accidens being

is the term ‘from which’ and that the whole form (which is lesser) is the term ‘to which’, or conversely; and yet the thing that is lesser could exist in the whole form, which is greater, as some element of it.

β. About the Second Reason

362. As to the second reason [n.335], look for the answer.^a Unless perhaps the first proposition, “any part of the rarer is rarer,” is false save when speaking of parts according to species and not according to matter, in the way the proposition from *On Generation* 1.5.321a2-3 is true, that “any part of what is increased is increased.” And then one should say that rarefaction is not towards any uniform quality in the whole altered thing or any part of it. But in this way: the rarefying agent generates from some parts of the rarefi-able body some bodies finer than is the rarefi-able body; and because those bodies cannot be simultaneous with the other parts that still remain in their species (for ‘two bodies cannot be together’), therefore the parts expel the other parts from their place, and consequently the whole body occupies a greater place. And thus ‘to be rarer’ is nothing other than to have a greater number of finer bodies mixed, by juxtaposition, with the thing’s own parts— such that, in brief, ‘the rarer’ is what thus has finer corpusecles together with its own parts still remaining in their proper form. Nor is it surprising that some parts are able to be converted into a finer body before others are, because some parts are closer to the agent, and more quickly receive its action than others do.

a. [Interpolation] A first response to the reason could be denial of the supposition tat, namely, rarity is the reason for the greater quantity, or the new superadded quantity; for rarity is a stretching out of extension, which extension is a mode of quality. Or in another way, by holding that rarity implies greater quantity, I concede the point when it is said that ‘any part of the rarer is rarer’ [n.336]; I distinguish ‘therefore any part is greater’; I deny ‘or according to the same quantity’; I thus concede ‘or according to different quantities’. When he says ‘therefore any part is a quantum with a double quantity, namely a new and a pre-existing quantity’ – this is denied. And when the proof is given ‘because, when the greater arrives, the lesser does not give way, therefore it gets greater and is the first part; therefore, they are two’ [n.337], I say the thing presupposed is false, because quantity is homogeneous, therefore it becomes one (as that, when two waters joined together, there are not two waters but one). However, the first response is truer [sc. first lines in this interpolation], as is plain at the end of the question in response to the third argument [n.420]

363. On the contrary: some parts are corrupted at once at the beginning of alteration, and so new substances will be generated; and likewise, everywhere is the body altered uniformly – the senses say this.

364. To the first [n.363] I say that the body is not more rare at once, because greater rarity is only established from occupation of greater place; but there is no greater occupation before there is heating in some noticeably greater degree.

365. To the second [n.363] I say that neither do the senses discriminate spirits or vapors in the air from the air, and yet spirits or vapors in the air are not of the same species as the air.

2. About the Second Conclusion

366. As to the second conclusion of this opinion [n.329], where the fundamental weight of this question lies (because, as was said before [nn.349-350], there is a difficulty in it against both opinions – namely both against the opinion that posits a new total quantity and against the opinion that posits its newness in part) – I argue against the aforesaid second conclusion, which allows motion from an agent and without a moveable subject, by bringing back the reasons that Godfrey himself brings forward against himself and which he tries to solve [nn.341-348].

a. About the First Contrary Reason and its Solution

367. First as to the first reason, about creation [n.341], as follows: what is as to the whole of itself and wholly brought into being from non-being is either created or at least requires a producing virtue equal to creative virtue; but this new quantity is, for you [n.341], brought as a whole and wholly into being; therefore.

368. Proof of the major:

First, because if it is totally produced after nothing, it is plainly a creation; but if it is produced after something and yet totally, this can only be by total conversion of that thing into this; or if you imagine another way, at least this transition requires an active virtue as equal as total conversion into this thing requires; but such a total conversion can only come from a virtue equal to divine creative virtue.

369. Second (and it is a confirmation of the preceding): when *a* succeeds to *b*, *a* is not, on account of its succeeding to *b*, of a different idea from *b* as concerns anything intrinsic to itself (this point is proved, first, because when *a* is in the process of succeeding, it is not then what it succeeds to; therefore what succeeds does not, on this account, vary in itself; second, because the order of what is posterior to this or that does not seem to vary the foundation of the order in itself). But if *a* succeeded to nothing and had its total being after non-being, it would be created; nor could it in any way be thus produced as a whole and wholly save by infinite virtue. Therefore, though it now succeed to any other thing whatever, yet, if it be produced as a whole and wholly, it would as a result, since the term is in itself altogether the same, require equal virtue for what is produced.

370. If you say that, because it succeeds to this thing, there is not as much productive virtue required as would be required if it succeeded only to nothing or to negation – this does not seem probable, because the term ‘to which’ does not require a different productive virtue save because of a different perfection in the term to be produced; therefore if the whole is wholly produced after something or after a non-something, an equal virtue is required.

371. Again, there is confirmation of this, because what has some term as a whole and wholly in its active power can put that term into being when it is not impeded; but it is not impeded by the fact that it does not have something positive that will be wholly changed from being to non-being, for it is fatuous to say that what is to be corrupted is an impediment to the agent; therefore, although it not have any such thing to be destroyed, it can put the whole effect wholly into being, and do so after nothing – and consequently it can create.

372. This reasoning [n.371] is confirmed, because if this quantity were to succeed to its contrary or its opposite, the objector would concede that it was created; but thus is

the negation of it included in the pre-existing quantity, for any impossible thing simply includes the negation of its impossible and not in any way the affirmation of it – unless (by reason of a common subject) this preceding quantity no more has a subject in common with the succeeding quantity than the contrary has with the contrary; therefore this quantity just as much follows the negation of its being as it would if its opposite had preceded.

373. Against two things touched on in the response to the first reason:

The first is about the force remaining in the separated accident [n.367]. I argue as follows: nothing positive remains in a separated accident that was not in the accident as united [with a subject]; but there was no force in the accident as conjoined just because some term could be produced from it, but only because it was able to be the term of change and because another term was able to be drawn out from the potency of the subject; therefore in it as separated there was no force by which it could, with respect to alteration, have anything other than the idea of term. The first proposition, namely that ‘nothing positive is new in the separated accident’ was proved above in this distinction [nn.17-20].

374. Another thing he [Godfrey] adds at the end of his response, that if this quantity did not have a relation to the preceding quantity, then it would properly be created [n.372]. I add a minor: but this relation to the prior pre-existing quantity does not prevent the creation of it; therefore it is created. Proof of the minor: this relation is only a certain immediate succession of the being of this thing to the being of that; but such succession does not prevent the succeeding thing from being created. And this can be proved by an example, because the succession here is not more immediate than the being of the soul is to the organization of the body, and yet it is not denied that the soul is created in the organized body; therefore not here either. Now the reason in the former case is that the soul receives its whole being and receives it wholly after its not-being. And the same reason holds in the issue at hand, because this quantity receives its whole being and receives it wholly after its non-being.

375. But whether, along with the non-being, something positive preceded or nothing did, or whether even the contrary or the like preceded, it makes no difference to *b*, because the first terms there are the same as the terms of creation.

b. About the Second Contrary Reason and its Solution

376. Now I bring back the second reason, where he concedes the body of Christ remains as long as the accidents remain that are of a nature to affect the substance of the bread, though it would remain not precisely as long as these accidents remain the same in number [nn.342, 347]. To the contrary of this: because the quantity that succeeds to the pre-existing quantity is no more the same as the pre-existing quantity than is any other quantity in one other non-consecrated host; indeed it is less the same, because this succeeding quantity is impossible with the pre-existing quantity in being, but that quantity [sc. the quantity in another non-consecrated host] is not so; therefore the body of Christ will not be more under the new quantity because⁵² it was before under the other

⁵² The text says ‘which was before’, but a variant says ‘because it was before’, and the variant looks to make more sense.

[pre-existing quantity] than it will be under any other quantity whatever, namely any quantity that is equally the same as the pre-existing quantity.

377. And if you take refuge in the succession of this quantity to that, I argue as follows: the body of Christ is under no quantity save by conversion and consecration,⁵³ but by conversion and consecration it receives no being save under that quantity, and this [new] quantity is altogether different, just as is the quantity of another non-consecrated host; therefore, by this conversion and consecration it will not be under that [sc. new] quantity; therefore it will not be under it in any way.

378. An argument could also be made through what was adduced against the first conclusion of the aforesaid opinion, through the statements of him who holds the opinion [n.356], that Christ's body does not remain here under the species of bread longer than the bread that was converted would be of a nature to remain here; but the bread that was converted would not remain here under another quantity if bread is here through quantity; therefore etc.

c. About the Third Contrary Reason and its Solution

379. As to the third response [n.348], which agrees with the third reason he adduces for himself as far as this conclusion is concerned, namely [n.343] that it is not of the essence of motion that some subject be differently disposed according to it – I do not argue against it because I believe the conclusion in itself to be true. But as to the issue at hand (because he concedes that, because of it, motion itself without a subject can be from a created agent [n.346]) I argue as follows: a created agent cannot make an accident in settled being without a subject; therefore, by similarity or a fortiori, it cannot cause an accident in flux without a subject.

d. About the Three Reasons Adduced for the Second Conclusion

380. On the above basis I respond to the reasons that he adduces for the second conclusion:

That the first reason [n.338] does well prove that God can make a form in flux or in coming to be, just as he can make it in settled being, without a subject; but it does not follow that a created agent can thus make a form in flux without a subject; rather the opposite follows, that it cannot make a form at rest without a subject, but as causing motion it causes in effect a form in flux.

381. The second reason [n.339], namely that God so endows a separated accident that everything can belong to it that could belong to it in a subject, proves the opposite, for nothing could belong to it in a subject save only that it was the term of motion; therefore, in no way could something else belong to it outside a subject. And so some other subject of motion must be granted, because, according to him [n.333], the subject of motion is different from the term of motion.

382. His third reason [n.340], namely that it is not of the essence of motion that the subject is in flux because of it, does well prove that God can make motion without a subject, but does not prove it of a created agent. For a created agent cannot separate anything at all from what is of the essence of it. Indeed, according to the response to the

⁵³ Sc. according to Godfrey's opinion, not necessarily Scotus'.

first reason [n.379] the opposite follows, because a created agent can no more separate a form from a subject in flux than from a subject in settled being; but a created agent cannot be the active cause of a form in settled being without a subject, therefore not of a form in flux either.

e. About the Statement Added in Exposition of the Second Conclusion

383. Against what he himself adds in exposition of the second conclusion [n.330], namely that motion which is here per se according to quality is not without a subject, although what accompanies (namely quantity) the per se term of this motion is without a subject – against this as follows: Rarity is the first formal term of the formal motion of rarefaction; but the subject of it is the whole quantum; therefore the whole quantum is naturally presupposed to the term. Therefore, so much quantum cannot per accidens be acquired by the fact that so much quality is acquired, because what is naturally prior and presupposed to something else is not acquired merely by the fact that what is naturally posterior is acquired; rather the prior is presupposed having already been acquired.

C. Scotus' own Opinion

384. I reply, therefore, to the question that in the Eucharist while it abides a quadruple change can be discerned: one according to 'where', another according to a quality that is not accompanied by any variation in quantity, a third according to a quality that is accompanied by variation in quantity, a fourth according to quantity.

1. About the First Change

385. As to the first change it is manifest how it requires the same abiding quantity; for just as a 'where' in settled being is necessarily in a quantum as subject, so a 'where' in flux is necessarily in the same subject and requires the same quantum abiding under the same term.

2. About the Second Change

386. About the second change too it is manifest that the same quantity remains there and can, according to the common opinion, be the subject of the alteration, such that the quality in flux has the same quantity for its subject that the abiding quality is posited as having. And such change is, as to genus, either according to difference in shape, or according to difference in quality (of the third species [sc. sense qualities]) as to more and less; and this variation as to more and less does not destroy the accidents in the Eucharist insofar as they are necessary for the Eucharist (variation that destroys the Eucharist will be spoken of in what follows [q.2 nn.432-439]).

387. As to difference of shape, it would seem that it would destroy the quantity, according to the remark of Avicenna in his *Metaphysics* [II ch.2] that difference of dimension requires difference of quantity.

388. But this seems to be contrary to the senses, for it would be too hard to say that water would, as often as it was differently configured in different vessels, as often

have a simply new quantity, even though the parts remained the same in themselves and in the whole. Configuration, therefore, only states, over and above quantity, a relation of parts to each other or of the limits that include the parts; but this relation can be changed while the parts remain the same in themselves and in the whole.

389. About quality of the third species too it is sufficiently manifest that, when the species remains the same through the whole motion, the quantity remains the same.

3. About the Third and Fourth Change

390. But about the third change (which is according to more and less), and the fourth change, there is doubt.

a. About the Third Change

391. Briefly, the common opinion (as was stated to the issue at hand), indeed every opinion, namely that ‘some quantity is new in rarefaction’ [nn.349-352], labors under the same difficulty as does also the opinion that posits the whole quantity to be new [n.328] – unless the way touched on is held to, that rarefaction is a certain juxtaposition of finer bodies within the parts of a grosser body [n.362]. Now, according to this way, the difficulty would be avoided, save that it is difficult to see how in this case a body finer than wine could be generated from fire or the sun – and on this point one must speak the way that will be stated in the following question [n.431]. There is also the other difficulty that, as quickly as the species would be rarefied, some new substance would at once be there, and consequently that Christ’s body is not everywhere there.

392. It also seems strange that no substance could be changed from rare to dense, or conversely, when it remains altogether the same.

393. But what about when the common opinion is held to, that another quantity is there [in the Eucharist], and without a subject [n.350] (whether the whole is new or not the whole, I care not)? Will this be able to be by a created agent?

394. I say no:

First because what is conserved immediately by God cannot be corrupted by a created agent; for on this account supernatural accidents cannot be destroyed by a creature as efficient cause (the reason for which is that no created cause can have an active virtue superior to the virtue of the cause that conserves the accidents in their being); but quantity here has supernatural being immediately from a supernatural cause conserving it; therefore etc.

395. Again, quantity in a subject is not destroyed by a contrary, because it does not have a contrary; therefore, it is destroyed only through a defect of the subject, or of something necessarily consequent to it. But it cannot be destroyed here by destruction of the subject, because it is here without a subject; nor in the second way, because no other accident that is in the subject necessarily follows quantity.

396. If you ask, then, by what cause a new quantity is induced, I say it is immediately by God alone. Nor yet by a new miracle, because by the will by which he has disposed the Eucharist to exist in the Church he has disposed that, as concerns species when an active natural cause is present, he would cause the sort of change in converted

substances that a natural agent would cause – and this lest, if the species here were seen to be unchangeable, the merit of faith be emptied.

397. This way cannot be refuted by the senses, because it preserves everything that appears to the senses; nor refuted by reason, because if you argue that it takes from a natural agent its proper action, I say that it does not take away the action that can belong to a natural agent, namely that it change the substance of bread from form to form; but it does deny to a natural agent the action that cannot belong to it, namely to cause change and not change any subject.

398. An alternative statement when holding the common opinion in this issue, namely that in rarefaction there is a new quantity (not wholly new but partly so) in the same subject [n.391], is that there is in quantity as it is in a subject a movement of rarefaction by which there is per accidens some new degree of quantity, but yet without a subject; nor is there a new miracle, because the new part is as it were combined with the existing quantity; nor is it a new miracle that a quantity combined with a separated quantity has the like way of existing, or has separation – as is exemplified of the parts of flesh generated from the food existing in Christ; for, in the same way that the Word assumed human nature, the parts of flesh generated from the food are assumed into the unity of person of the Word. So here [in the Eucharist], by the same miracle by which quantity is made separate from a subject, by that miracle is it made to be the case that whatever is part of the same quantity is likewise separate.

399. Against this view [n.398] there is first that another quantity could be added to this quantity, as would be if non-consecrated wine were added to the consecrated species, and the added quantity is not without a subject the way the quantity is that it is added to.

400. Nor is the above reason nor the likeness [n.398] to the purpose, because the parts generated from food were parts of some whole that was assumed by the Word; but these parts [sc. of quantity in the Eucharist] do not become parts of a whole that has separated being primarily, of which the consequence is that, though a part receive the like being of the whole without a new miracle, yet a part does not receive the like being of another part without a new miracle. And because the rareness of the whole is the per se term of alteration, the whole has the whole quantity for its proper subject, just as a part has part of the quantity for subject; therefore, that whole quantity presupposes this whole quantity – therefore is it greater than it; and consequently the quantity is naturally greater before this rareness is introduced.

401. In brief one must, as to this article, either hold the second opinion, that the quantity is in no way by another action of a created agent, or say that a created agent could act without a passive subject on which to act.

402. But the first option appears improbable to some.

403. The second can in some way be explained, namely: a created agent's not requiring a passive subject, or anything supplying its place, seems to destroy the foundations of natural philosophy, (*Physics* 1.7.190a14-15, 9.192a31-32; *On Generation* 1.4.320a2-5 and often elsewhere), because there would be no need for anything the same to underlie the terms of change.

404. It also seems to destroy what appears to the senses, for an agent that has the term completely within its active virtue can, if not impeded, put that term into being; therefore, a created agent could put that term into being without any passive subject, and

thus it could make an accident without a subject and a substantial form without matter – which seems manifestly contrary to the senses.

405. Hence a created agent requires a passive subject for two reasons, namely because of itself – for the passive subject is a cause that shares together with the created agent, since a created agent has a limited virtue in acting and so requires another cause, namely a material cause, to be concurrent with it in the coming to be; and also because of the effect, which is composed of matter as its pre-existing part and of form as the arriving part. Therefore, a created agent should not be posited as acting altogether without matter, whether matter in itself or in something equivalent.

406. But it would be said that the First Being supplies the place of the subject in relation to a created agent. The proof of this is that, just as the First Being can supply the place of the subject in relation to a created agent as concerns settled being in regard to an accident, so this Being can supply the place of the subject in regard to the agent as to the coming to be of the effect (proof: a cause seems to be required more for the effect than for another cause in the causing; now a subject in regard to an accident has the idea of cause, but an accident in regard to an agent and causer has the idea of co-cause only; therefore etc.).

407. The manner of this conclusion, then, is this, that a created agent does not act without a subject in itself or in something supplying the place of the subject; and yet, in the issue at hand, although there is no subject in itself, yet God supplies the place of a subject, that is, the extrinsic causality that would belong to the subject if it were present – and this insofar as the extrinsic cause is required as co-cause along with the created agent. And this is possible, just as it is possible for God to supply the place of the cause with respect to the caused effect; for the cause does not depend on the co-cause more than the effect caused depends on both causes.

408. But against this [n.407] it is again argued:

Because the causality of the subject is reception of the form; but it is impossible for God, whether in himself or anything else, to have the idea of receptivity to form.

409. Again, if a created agent requires a passive subject, that is, as co-cause and this in idea of being receptive of form, then a created agent cannot act on such a passive subject without a new miracle; and so, once some such thing is posited to supply the place of the subject, the fact that the created agent does act will be a new miracle. But in miraculous action the created agent does not act wholly of itself; therefore, one must return to the fact that the action is not by a created agent.

b. About the Fourth Change

410. About the fourth change, which is in quantity in itself, the thing is easier. For here there is no possible action as to growth and diminution, because the species are then not animate; but action here is possible as to addition and subtraction; for the surface can be divided into parts, and some quantum can be added to it.

411. As to division I say that it is not properly a change of the same subject but is only a certain reduction to act of parts that were in potency, that is, were indistinct, in the whole before – I mean reduction to distinct act, because the parts were continuous, and so in a way one, in the whole before, and afterwards, outside the whole, they are discontinuous.

412. But if the question is altogether about the subject here in such qualitative change, I reply that the subject can be posited to be the parts as they remain according to the same entity (albeit not the parts with the dividing up we understand when we speak of parts in act), because they were in the whole and afterwards outside the whole according to the same positive entity; but in the whole they had continuity, which prevents the actuality that includes dividing up, while outside the whole they do have that actuality, so that the parts are changed from form to privation of form. And thus there is no generation here but, as it were, corruption without generation, because the entity, which is now positive in each part, existed as a totality before, although it did not exist before under the dividing up (namely, not being along with something else) that it now exists under; and the entity of the whole, which existed before, does not now remain.

413. It is plain, therefore, how this change does not require the same remaining quantity (speaking of the sameness that is continuity), but it does require sameness speaking of whatever here and there is positive, although a positive differently disposed.

414. As to addition, I say that it is possible for another quantity to be added to this one and to be continuous with it, and this while no subject, except perhaps the continuous parts, remains the same (as was said before in the case of division [n.411]). And thus the quantity will not only be the same with sameness of continuity but also with the same positive sameness that preceded the continuity, namely the quantity that is in this part and likewise in that whether they are continuous or discontinuous.

415. And this difficulty is common to any union or division. For if either union or division is change, and you ask for its subject, nothing common remains save the entities of the divided or united parts, and that entity, when union is made, has something separate which it lacks when there is division, namely some relation of the united parts or the continuity of them (speaking of quanta). And thus the change is universally privative in the case of division but positive in the case of continuity.

416. And if you argue “if some quantum is added to this one, and is made continuous with this species, then there is the same limit in act for both of them; the limit then is either in a subject or without a subject” – look for the response.^a

a. [*Interpolation*] It is said that the body of Christ is not under anything indivisible, nor under anything that is not part of the quantum; the limit then or the line, since it is not part of the quantum,⁵⁴ is not realized on the side of what is without a subject.

If you say that there is no greater reason for it to be realized on the side of this than of that – denied, because the line is in a subject, though it is not part of the [sacramental] host.

417. It could also be said, though less probably, that the breaking up or division of parts of a quantity is only a certain local motion, and exists in the things relocated as in a subject; but then it would be necessary to say, conversely, that continuity is nothing but a certain relocating, because relocating does not make for continuity but contiguity only.

II. To the Initial Arguments

⁵⁴ A line is the limit or division of a surface (a quantum in two dimensions) and not a part of it, just as a point is the limit or division of a line (a quantum in one dimension) and not a part of it. A line, then, has a subject, since it is an attribute *of* quantity, but the quantity or quantum of which it is the attribute does not have a subject.

418. To the first argument [n.323] I say that it is not of the essence of motion that it belong to such or such a being, nor of change that it be of something disposed in such a way, just as it is not of the essence of whiteness that it be of something possessing whiteness. But just as a form in settled being is in itself essentially of the sort it is, though it not be the form of anything, so motion is essentially a certain potential actuality, so to say, and change is a certain disposing differently, though it not belong to any [subject] denominated by this or that [disposition].

419. To the second [n.324] I say that just as the Philosopher conceded that a subject is necessary in the case of change or motion (because the subject would pre-exist the formal term and would be part of the formal term), so he said that the composite is the total term of this production. But for us the antecedent is not simply necessary.

420. To the third [n.325] I say that some change different from change in growth or diminution is possible in quantity, as division and being made continuous, and this as change in itself; but rarefaction and densification are change per accidents, and consequently the species [in the Eucharist] cannot grow or be diminished properly speaking, yet they can change from a lesser quantity to a greater quantity and conversely.

Question Two

Whether Change Corruptive of the Accidents is Possible in the Eucharist

421. As for corruptive [or destructive] change I ask whether it is possible for some change to occur corruptive of the accidents in the Eucharist.

422. It seems not:

Because “form is simple and consists of an invariable essence” *Book of Six Principles* [ch.1 n.1]; therefore etc.

423. Again, Boethius *On the Trinity* [ch.2] “A simple form cannot be a subject.”

424. Again, “Matter is that by which a thing can be and not be,” *Metaphysics* [7.7.1032a20-22].

425. And from all these one gets that at least a simple form cannot be corrupted; but a separate accident in the Eucharist is a simple form in this way; therefore etc.

426. Again, if [a separate accident] were corrupted, it would be corrupted either into a substance or into an accident or into nothing. Not into nothing because then a creature would be annihilated; nor into an accident because then a creature would cause an accident without a subject; nor into substance, because a substance cannot come to be from an accident; therefore etc.

427. On the contrary:

The accidents can be broken, crushed, and digested (it is plain to sense, and is proved from a Gloss on *I Corinthians* 12⁵⁵); but nutriment is converted into the substance of the thing to be nourished; therefore etc.

I. To the Question

A. Opinion of Thomas Aquinas and Rejection of it

⁵⁵ Gloss on *I Corinthians* 11.24, from Nicholas of Lyra, “Each receives his own part, the body of Christ is eaten in parts, and it remains whole. From which is plain that the whole and uncorrupted body of Christ is eaten; and if there is breaking or dividing into parts there, it seems to be not in the body but in the sacrament.”

428. It is said here [Aquinas, *Sentences* IV d.12 q.1 a.2] that, “subsistent being, which belongs to the dimensions that remain, is in conformity with the form that the substance of the bread had before;” and therefore “the being in which the dimensions subsist is taken away by the same events by which it would be taken away when the substance of bread exists there, and for this reason the accidents that remain are corrupted in the same way as they were capable of being corrupted before. But they were able to be corrupted in two ways before. In one way while the substance of the bread remains. In another way through corruption of the substance that comes about from change of the accidents, for just as generation is the term of alteration, so also is corruption; on the part of quantity too, because since each thing has a determinate quantity, division can be done to such an extent that the species will not remain. Sometimes, therefore, when a change happens in this sacrament, the dimensive being, conform to the preceding substance, still remains; sometimes the aforesaid being is taken away, and then the sacrament ceases to be. Likewise on the part of quantity, because if division is made into parts of as much quantity as suffices for the species of bread and wine, then, although the dimensions are different (because the parts of the continuum are brought into act that were before in potency), yet the being conform to the pre-existing substance remains. But if the quantity of the parts is not sufficient for this, both beings (namely both dimension and the aforesaid being [sc. the being conform to the pre-existing substance]) cease to be; and therefore the body of Christ at that point ceases to be there under the sacrament.”

429. Now as to what thing this corruption, when it is possible, will be made into, it will be touched on in the following question [nn.495-502].

430. Against the principal conclusion, which states that the dimension can be removed in the same way as it would be if a substance existed, because the dimension has being in conformity with the substance of bread – I argue as follows:

This conformity cannot be understood to be in any new positive thing, because no such new positive thing comes to the accident by the fact that it is without a subject; rather, what comes to it conform to the substance is only in the negation ‘does not inhere [in a substance]’; but conformity in this negation does not suffice for the accident’s being taken away with that one form; for the being of substance is taken away for this reason, that it is a passive subject proportioned to a natural agent, namely a subject possessed of a potential part and an actual part, of which the potential part can exist without the actual part – and as the accident possesses conformity only in negation, it does not have any such parts; therefore etc.

431. Again, a composite substance necessarily determines for itself some quality of its own, and especially according to him, who posits that the substance is corrupted upon corruption of the quality (which would not be the case if substance did not necessarily determine some quality for itself). But quantity does not necessarily determine any quality for itself; for it is indifferent to the contrary of this quality as it is to the quality, and as indifferent to one degree of it as to another degree; because no quality, and no degree of quality, emerges from the principles of quantity.

B. Scotus’ own Opinion

432. I say, then, to the question that accidents proper to the Eucharist can be corrupted.

433. And this, according to the common opinion [n.150], is sufficiently manifest about the qualities whose change does not require another quantity, because those qualities can be posited as having an abiding common subject, namely quantity.

434. But according to the other opinion [n.151], which posits that the quantity of substance does not differ from substance, nor the quantity of whiteness from whiteness, and consequently that here no quantity is more separate from a subject than the substance of which it is the quantity – according to this opinion it is not equally easy to save the corruption of the quality. For it would then be necessary to posit that any quality is, by equal reason, without a subject, just as also that each of them might change without a subject. And then this position returns to the second difficulty touched on in the preceding question [nn.391-395], how the Eucharist is corrupted by corruption of quantity, and how quantity could be new.

435. However, to the conclusion in general, one could argue as follows: the virtue of an agent is not determined by the fact an accident is without a subject; but if an accident were in a subject, it could be corrupted by a created agent; therefore etc.

436. This conclusion does not follow from the reasoning, because the virtue by itself of an equal agent does not suffice, but there is need for it to have a passive object proportioned to it so that it may act as it did before.

437. I reply: as long as the quantity remains, it is easy (according to the common opinion) to preserve a passive object in relation to a natural agent; and this is very possible in regard to contrary qualities, because not every alteration, even between contraries, requires the quantity to change and yet, in such alteration toward quality (with which the species of bread cannot stand), the Eucharist ceases to be; for God has only made institution to conserve the Eucharist (that is, the existence without a subject of the accidents in which is the body of Christ) as long as the qualities remain there that are of a nature to perfect already converted substances. Therefore, the point is simply saved that the Eucharist can cease to be by action of a natural agent. Nor is there any new miracle there, since by the same previous will by which God willed the Eucharist to be in the Church he has also willed that it only remain as long as the qualities would remain that are of a nature to perfect already converted substances.

438. Now as to corruption of the Eucharist by corruption of quantity, statement of what agent it could be done by was made in the preceding question [nn.394-409].

439. And as to whether a new substance must return in conversion of the Eucharist by conversion or change in quantity, statement will be made in the following question [n.490].

II. To the Initial Arguments

440. As to the first of the initial arguments [n.424]: the author is speaking of the six principles he is making determination about; now these principles are relational forms coming from without. Hence the author is not speaking of absolute forms.

441. To the second [n.423] it can be said that Boethius is speaking of a form that is pure form, that is, pure act, as in the example he gives there about God. And this is true of a form that is not of a nature to perfect something potential, because it is not of a nature to receive an accident. And so it is about the divine essence. Unless perhaps an objection is made about angelic essence and about intellection – but this point is

discussed in the question about the simplicity of an angel, whether it has matter [as in Bonaventure, Richard of Middleton, Godfrey of Fontaines, Giles of Rome, and others; Scotus *Ord.* II d.3 p.1 q.4].

442. As to the Philosopher in *Metaphysics* 7 [n.424], it is plain that he would not concede that anything can be corrupted unless it were to have potency distinct from act as part distinct from part; but he would posit this because he posits an order of simply necessary causes, or because he would posit simply that nothing can be corrupted save that of which a part remains after corruption, just as he posits that nothing can properly be generated save that of which a part existed before in advance of generation. But we do not agree with him in the order of causes nor in this separation of part from whole.

443. To the fourth argument [n.426] I say that quantity is not corrupted into nothing, but into another contrary quality or a quality of a different degree in the same species; for a new quality has the same subject that the prior quality also had, or at least (as far as concerns itself) could have. But if you speak of the corruption of a quantity to which no other prior subject can be assigned – that quantity is not corrupted by the action of a natural agent without a subject either pre-existent (which was spoken of in the preceding question [nn.394-395]) or newly created (which will be spoken of in the following question [nn.469-471]).

Second Article: About Change with which the Eucharist does not Remain

Single Question

Whether in Any Change that is Made in the Eucharist Some Substance Must Return by Divine Action

444. Finally I ask whether in any change that is made in the Eucharist some substance must return by divine action.

445. It seems not:

Because a separate quantity has the mode of a substance in acting, so does it have it in coming to be and undergoing; therefore whatever can be generated from a substance, were it there, will be able to be generated from a separate quantity; there is no need, then, for some substance to return.

446. Again, a natural agent next to a passive subject naturally changes it; therefore no miracle is required for it to cause change; but the substance cannot return save through a new miracle; therefore no possible change there requires a substance to return.

447. Again, an unimpeded natural agent acts necessarily, so it does not depend in its acting on any action that belongs immediately to the divine will, for the divine will is a principle of external action only contingently; but what is necessary cannot depend on what is contingent; therefore nothing that is caused immediately by the divine will is required in the action.

448. Again, Augustine says, *City of God* 7.30, “God so manages the things he has established that he allows them to perform their own motions.” Therefore, he allows a natural agent to perform its own natural motion, and consequently to change the Eucharist without any new miracle; therefore also without a substance returning.

449. On the contrary:

The species [of the Eucharist] are able to give nourishment, as the gloss [Lombard *ad loc.*] says on *I Corinthians* 11.21, “One indeed is hungry, another is drunken;” so they can be changed into the substance of someone needing nourishment; therefore substance can be generated from them. But this is only possible if substance return, because substance does not come to be from non-substance.

450. Again, it is plain to sense that the consecrated host can be corrupted into fire, or into a living thing generated by way of putrefaction, just as it would be corrupted if the substance of bread were there; and then, as before [n.449], a substance can only be generated if substance return; therefore etc.

II. To the Question

A. First Opinion, which is from Pope Innocent III

1. Exposition of the Opinion

451. There is an opinion here from Innocent III *On the Sacrament of the Altar* 4.11,⁵⁶ which says the substance of bread returns.

452. This can be proved as follows, that Christ is in the Eucharist as spiritual nourishment, and suitable bodily nourishment remains as long as the species exist; therefore when the species cease to have the idea of suitable nourishment (as substances unsuitable for nourishment bodily would be if they were in the substance of bread and wine), then the body of Christ really ceases to be there as spiritual nourishment; but when the Eucharist ceases, the substance returns. Therefore in such change the substance returns.

453. Nor must one posit a new miracle here, because the body of Christ ceases to be there when the species would not be of a nature to affect the substances converted, for God has instituted the Eucharist not to remain unless suitable species remain.

454. Nor too is there a new miracle because, namely, the substance returns there when the body of Christ ceases to be there, for God has ordained accidents never to be without a subject save in the Eucharist.

2. Rejection of the Opinion

455. Against this: I ask when the substance of bread returns.

456. Either this is in the final instant, when a new substance is generated there, and then it follows that bread and non-bread are there together; for bread is corrupted when something different is generated,⁵⁷ and for you the bread is there first, and this is unacceptable.

457. Or it is before the final instant, and then two unacceptable things seem to follow:

⁵⁶ “Just as the substance of the bread is miraculously converted when the Lord’s body begins to be under the sacrament, so it somehow miraculously returns when his body ceases to be there.”

⁵⁷ Understand: “so, in the same way, something different is corrupted when bread is generated” and, since the bread is there first, the non-bread that is corrupted is there along with the bread.

The first is that the Eucharist does not remain as long as the non-corrupted species remain, or that the Eucharist will remain there at the same time and that the substance of bread will be there along with the body of Christ.

458. The second unacceptable thing is because, when one part of the motion is no more repugnant to the receptive subject than another part is (this is apparent from what was said above in q.1 [nn.367-372]), an agent that has power for part of the motion has power for the whole of the motion and for the term. But, as long as the species are not simply corrupted but are being altered otherwise, one part of the alteration is no more repugnant to the species than another part is; therefore an agent with power for one part of the alteration has power also for any degree of it; so while the alteration remains the substance should not return.

459. But, as to this argument, it would be more probable to grant the second member [n.457].

460. And then the first thing inferred [n.457] would perhaps not be unacceptable to one who holds the opinion; for he would say that the Eucharist does not remain when the species are disposed in just any way but as long as they remain as suitable for nourishment. But the species could be so altered that, before they are totally corrupted, they are not suitable for nourishment, just as bread, before the flavor and the other accidents were corrupted [sc. in the process of eating?], could not be suitable for nourishment; and then it would be difficult to find the definite degree of alteration or putrefaction up to which precisely the Eucharist would remain.

461. To the second [n.458] it might be said that the substance ought not to return on account of the whole alteration that precedes the corruption of the species and, consequently, the corruption of the Eucharist, but that it ought to return on account of the generation that follows the alteration and accompanies the corruption of the species; but it cannot return when the corruption is going on, because then it would both be and not be.

462. But this response does not assign a return of the substance of the bread that is sufficient; for a natural agent could, for you, do as much up to the final instance if the substance of the bread did not return; so the response does not speak sufficiently.

B. Second Opinion, which is that of Thomas Aquinas

1. Exposition of the Opinion

463. There is another opinion [Thomas Aquinas, *Sentences* IV d.12 q.1 a.2, *ST* IIIa q.77 a.5] that posits return of the matter.

463. The exposition, however, is that the opinion cannot be understood of the matter that was previously annihilated, "because what has been reduced to nothing cannot return numerically the same." Nor can it be understood either of matter previously converted into the body of Christ, because this matter cannot return again unless the body of Christ or the matter of the body of Christ were, contrariwise, converted into the matter of bread, just as neither could the converted bread return unless the body of Christ were converted into bread.

465. But if this opinion is to be sustained with any probability, the understanding of it needs to be that God creates new matter. And one must not posit a new miracle, because this comes from the original miracle (lest faith lose its merit), and consequently

so that every change that could be brought about if the accidents were in a substance could be brought about by a natural agent. Nor would the substance of bodily matter then simply be diminished, nor the matter created in the beginning increased, by the return of this substance, because as much of matter is created, or as much returns here, as was converted from matter into the substance of the body of Christ.

2. Rejection of the Opinion

466. I argue against this opinion: because I ask when the matter returns – whether in the final instant, when a new substance is generated there, or before the final instant?

467. Not before for two reasons: because then, while the Eucharist remains, the matter of the substance there would be different from the matter of the body of Christ, which the school in common does not hold. Then too the matter would be without form, which that doctor [Aquinas, *ST* Ia q.66 a.1 ad 3, q.76 a.6] says is simply impossible; at least it is not possible without a new miracle. But more miracles are not to be posited without necessity.

468. If however the matter returns in the instant of generation, in vain is it posited to return so that a natural agent may generate something from it, because a natural agent only generates from a matter quantum, especially according to him [Aquinas]. Likewise, a natural agent can only generate if some corruption accompanies the generation, and especially according to this opinion; but it will not corrupt any substance then [sc. in the instant of generation], because the matter does not return under any substantial form needing to be corrupted, for then it would have matter and not have matter at the same time.

469. The manner too, in which this doctor says the opinion must necessarily be held (namely that annihilated matter does not return nor does converted matter, but it can only be said to return because some new matter is created), does not seem probable, because both annihilated matter and converted matter can return.

470. Proof of the first point:

Because the nothing that follows annihilation is of the same idea as the nothing that precedes creation of matter, just as the term of annihilation ‘to which’ and the term of creation ‘from which’ are the same or of the same idea, as in the case of corruption and generation. And the distance from matter to the nothing that follows the annihilation of it and to the nothing that precedes the creation of it is the same; therefore the same power has power over this distance and that; therefore the power that can create can also repair what has been annihilated.

471. Again, matter that has been annihilated is not more nothing than it was before creation; therefore, it does not include a greater contradiction than it included before; therefore just as omnipotence could previously have produced what was thus nothing, so can it produce it now as well.

472. Second, namely about converted matter [n.469], the proof is that the body of Christ is not differently disposed because of the fact that bread is converted into it. Therefore, conversely, the converted bread could return in the same way in which it was converted into that body, without its being the case that Christ’s body would be in itself differently disposed; because just as this body is not disposed in a different way positively by having this entity after conversion in itself [sc. the entity of being under the

species of bread], so it would not be disposed in a different way privatively by not having it in itself (namely if the bread were to return).

C. Third Opinion, which is that of Giles of Rome and Henry of Ghent

1. Exposition of the Opinion

473. The third opinion [Giles of Rome, *Theorems on Christ's Body* prop.45, Henry of Ghent, *Quodlibet* 8 q.36] is that, as the Commentator says (*Physics* 1 com.64 and *Substance of the Sphere* 1), one must understand the dimensions in the matter of generable and corruptible things to be indeterminate before the advent of substantial form, otherwise the division of matter for the sake of diverse substantial forms being in diverse parts of matter could not be understood. But these sorts of dimensions receive, after the arrival of substantial forms, determinate and complete being; but whatever is understood to be in matter before substantial form remains numerically the same in the generated and corrupted thing, because a prior thing should remain after removal of a posterior one. Just as, therefore, the matter of the bread would, by means of these incomplete dimensions, receive the form of that which might be generated from the bread, and this when the bread has not been converted, so since now [sc. in the converted bread in the Eucharist] subsistence is granted to the dimensions and since being conform to the being of the prior substances is granted to them, so there is granted to them that they are able to be under a substantial natural form; for they do not have from their nature the ability to be only under an accidental form, but they do have this ability from a substantial form. And then matter will either come as a consequence, because of the natural concomitance of form with matter, or the nature of matter will be given by divine virtue to the dimension itself, because of dimension's nearness to matter, so that, in this way, what is generated is a composite of matter and form.

474. Added to this opinion is that if from such dimensions a worm were generated of matter first, then substance were generated from the nutrient parts, the matter of the nutriment will eventually be the matter of that substance.

2. Rejection of the Opinion

475. Against this opinion:

A form determinate to some receptive subject can in no way perfect something different, as whiteness cannot perfect an angel nor wisdom a stone; but a substantial form is determinate to substantial matter, as to what is properly susceptible of it; therefore in no way can it perfect a dimension in the genus of quantity, which is not substantial matter.

476. Again, a form of a prior genus cannot perfect what is receptive of a posterior genus; therefore neither can substantial form perfect the dimension of bread. The proof of the antecedent is that act presupposes potency, and this when speaking of the order of origin; but the act of a prior genus does not presuppose, in either origin or perfection, anything of a posterior genus.

477. Again third, and it seems more manifest, is that substantial form is the sort of act that is of a nature to constitute something per se one with what is perfectible by it; but it cannot constitute something per se one in the genus of quantity.

478. Again, that which is essentially the idea of being the term of another thing's dependence, cannot depend on that other thing; substantial form is of this sort with respect to quantity; therefore etc.

479. Again, how can a substantial form be drawn out from the potency of dimension, since a substantial form, by the nature of the thing, is not in dimension as in what is properly potential for it?

480. Thus does the first part of the opinion [n.473] seem refuted in general, namely because dimension cannot take the place of matter with respect to substantial form.

481. But as to generation from that dimension [sc. the quantity in the Eucharist], there is refutation in particular.

First as follows: fire generated from that dimension and fire from the substantial form of fire would not be something univocal, and [the former] would not be univocally fire with another fire generated from the substantial form and matter of fire; and then fire would not act univocally in burning the [sacramental] host and in burning wood.

482. Again, not only does an absurdity follow in this one case, that mathematical fire will come from quantity and substantial form, but there will be a process in generable and corruptible things of this sort up to the end of the world; for from the mathematical fire, having dimension for the matter, water will be generated, having the same thing for the matter that the corrupted thing had for matter; and from that water will be generated air, and so on to the end of the world, or to infinity according to the philosophers.

483. What the other doctor adds, about the matter of arriving nutriment [n.474], does not save the proposed opinion.

Posit that what is generated is, like fire, not nourishable: the argument is worth nothing.

484. Again, let it be that a priest were nourished from the species, and posit, as would be possible that, for the long time during which the many parts of matter would have been in flux, new parts would always have been generated – the result is that those parts will not truly be parts of flesh, constituted of the essential parts of flesh, as the other parts would be that were not generated from the species; and thus it would be possible to posit the case of a child who, nourished on species until the end of his life, would rise again only as a human being composed of dimension and of one or several substantial forms, according to them.

D. Fourth Opinion, which is that of Richard of Middleton 1. Exposition of the Opinion

485. The fourth opinion [Richard of Middleton, *Sent.* IV d.12 princ.2 ad1] is that in transubstantiation there is converted along with the accidents, and this by creation, a possibility for change not only into form but also into the lowest degree of actuality, which is matter; therefore, the accidents are afterwards resolved into matter from the aforesaid possibility annexed to them, having been converted into a naturally made actuality of the lowest degree.

486. And thus does this opinion agree with the second [n.465], namely that matter returns, but not immediately from God; rather by the action of a natural agent.

2. Rejection of the Opinion

487. Against this opinion is that this ‘pure possible’ is, according to him, the term of creation; therefore it is something outside its cause, or it has outside the first cause a positive entity inferior to matter. But this is false, because Augustine says in *Confessions* 12.7 n.7, “Lord, you have made two things: one near you (namely angelic nature) and another almost nothing (namely prime matter);” therefore, in fact there is nothing inferior to matter, though perhaps it is possible for some inferior positive thing to be created by God. But whatever may be the case with this, disputation about it has no place here.

488. To the proposal I argue as follows:

Matter is not produced by generation, since it is the foundation that is presupposed to generation; therefore, a natural agent cannot convert that pure potential, annexed to the species, into prime matter or the composite, such that it produce, by that action, prime matter or matter proper to this composite.

489. Again, let it be that such a pure potential were posited in the species of the Eucharist, and that it were possible for matter or the composite to be produced from the action of a natural agent; it would still be vainly posited, because a natural agent can only act on a quantum in act, which would not be the case here.

E. Scotus’ own Opinion

490. I say to the question, therefore, that among the changes possible in the Eucharist some (1) stand while the Eucharist remains, some (2) do not. None of the first require the substance to return, not by divine action nor by action of a natural agent, and in fact the substance does not return. But of the second some (3) do not require the substance to return, yet (4) it does by divine action return; so that there are four conclusions.

491. The first is proved thus: every agent having power for some change has power for the term of it, provided it has a receptive subject no more repugnant to the term than to the motion. But in changes where the Eucharist remains, a natural agent has power for the whole motion, and the receptive subject is no more repugnant to the term than to the motion. Therefore etc.

492. The minor is plain, because the receptive subject cannot be said to be the quantity here; and one degree of quality to which there can be alteration or change is no more repugnant to the quantity than is another more imperfect degree according to which, and according to others like it, there can be a motion of alteration; for quantity in its idea does not determine any degree of quality for itself.

Thus is the first conclusion plain, that, while the Eucharist remains, there is no need for the substance to return.

493. And the third conclusion [n.490] can be proved by the same point, that change corruptive of the Eucharist, while yet the same quantity remains there that is the subject of the change, does not require the substance to return.

494. The proof of the second conclusion [n.490] is that, while the Eucharist remains, only the substance of the body of Christ is there – for the accidents then remain without a subject. But neither of these would be true if another substance were to return; therefore, while the Eucharist remains, no substance in fact returns.

495. The fourth conclusion is unlike the second, and it is this: that if the Eucharist is corrupted either by alteration or by motion in quantity, the substance in fact returns; and this is composite substance, to which such accidents belong, which also they affect; and it returns in the instant of corruption and immediately from God.

496. The proof of the first part of this conclusion [n.495] is that God has established that the species, while they remain, exist in the Eucharist precisely, and not elsewhere, without a subject; therefore etc. He has established, then, that when the Eucharist ceases, the species are not there without a subject, and consequently that in the very instant of corruption some substance is there.

497. The proof of the second part [n.495] is that if a substance does return there, yet not one different from that which can be affected by the new accidents, because a different substance would not be able to be so affected.

498. The proof of the third part [n.495], namely that it only returns immediately from God, is because no other agent has the active virtue sufficient for this.

499. A composite substance does not return, therefore, while the accidents of the Eucharist remain uncorrupt, as the first opinion says [n.452]; nor does the matter, as the second opinion says, return at the end by being repaired or by being created, because this would be altogether superfluous, since no action of a natural agent [nn.464-465] could be preserved in that form; nor does it return because, as the third opinion says [n.473], dimension is in some way susceptible of substantial form; nor is the possibility, the way the fourth opinion speaks [n.485], anything or convertible into anything.

500. But what change could come about while the Eucharist remains? It is plain that any alteration could that nothing is induced by impossible with bread (were it to remain), and that any change in quantity could, either per se, as breaking or division (because the homogeneous parts of bread would be of nature to remain under the parts of divided quantity); or in quantity concomitantly, as in the case of rarefaction and densification, provided however a quantity is not induced that is repugnant to the substance of non-converted bread.

501. By contrast, however, corruptive change is to a quality to the degree in which the quality could not stand along with bread (if it were to remain), and this although the quantity remains altogether the same; such change, I say, cannot be brought about while the Eucharist remains, or at least is not in fact brought about. Hence, if it were possible for the heat of fire to be induced in the consecrated species to a degree repugnant to bread (were it present), and yet the quantity that was before remained altogether the same, the Eucharist would be corrupted; because the Eucharist does not consist in quantity alone but in other accidents necessarily consequent to converted substances; and consequently, in the inducing of the impossible heat, the substance would in fact return, as was proved in the fourth conclusion [nn.495-496].

502. But it would not be necessary for substance to return because of the action of a natural agent, as the third conclusion says [n.493]; for a natural agent would have for subject the quantity into which the heat could be induced, as the proof of the third and fourth conclusion proves [nn.491-493]; and then a quantum hot with fiery heat would be there, and yet fire would not be there.

II. To the Initial Arguments

503. To the first argument [n.445] I say that a separate quantity does not have a positive mode of substance but only a negative one, namely this: ‘not actually being in a subject’. But this negative mode does not suffice for it to be more a subject than it was before; on the contrary, what it was able to be the immediate subject of before, that it can be the subject precisely of now as well. However, the argument that ‘quantity can be the subject of some change’ can be conceded, but not that quantity can be subject of change to substance, because required in that case is that the subject be the principle of a composite substance, as matter.

504. As to the second [n.446] I concede that a new miracle is not required for the action of a natural agent, as long as the agent has a passive object; but when it does not have a passive object, it cannot act unless a passive object is by a miracle given to it. But just as it cannot be given by nature, so the passive object required for generation is not here, nor can it be or be made to be from anything by a natural agent so as to be here. And so, in order for a natural agent to be able to act with this action, a passive object proportioned to it must return through a divine miracle. Nor yet do I say that when, according to the fourth conclusion [nn.495-498], it does return in fact, a natural agent generates something there, but that God alone first causes there a composite substance. But if a further generation of something ought to follow from that substance, then a natural agent can act there for substantial form, because it now has a passive object suited to it.

505. To the third argument [n.447] the answer is plain from the same fact, because a natural agent necessarily acts as much as it can act; but it cannot act there for anything able to be received in quantity, and therefore not for a substantial form; and therefore divine action is necessarily required.

506. And if you ask whether a natural agent acts so that the substance (returning by divine action) be a quantum with the quality that it induces in quantity, one could say that it does, because it acts naturally after God in bringing the substance back, and in that later moment it has a passive object receptive of the formal term for which it has the power, and consequently that passive object can be affected by the formal term.

507. Or the opposite could be said, namely that a natural agent does not so act [n.506], because a created agent can only in-form a substance with some accident if that substance had something repugnant before which is taken away by this sort of natural agent.

508. But this is not necessary, because if the contrary or the privation does not here precede in order of duration, the action of a natural agent is not for this reason taken away, because a natural agent can well have an effect coeval with itself; and have it in itself, as from the proper attribute that follows the subject, or have it in another, as that if sun and air were simultaneously created, the air would be simultaneously illumined by the sun, and yet no opposite of this light would have preceded in the air.

509. As to the fourth [n.448] Augustine says, significantly, “their own motions,” that is, motions in their proper power, and such is only what has a suitable subject; and a quantity for receiving substantial form is not of this sort; and therefore a new substance cannot be produced after mere quantity save immediately by divine action.

Thirteenth Distinction

On the Efficient Cause of the Consecration of the Eucharist

Division of the Questions

1. 'The question is wont to be raised...' in the Master's thirteenth distinction.
2. This distinction is the last part, wherein the Master deals with the efficient cause of the consecration of the Eucharist.
3. The part is divided into two: a principal part in which he gives the determinate conclusion that the Eucharist can be consecrated by any priest indifferently, whether good or bad; and an incidental part that touches on the receiving of the sacrament.
4. There follows an appendix with respect to the whole treatment of the Eucharist, and an incidental part about who is to be called a heretic.
5. About this thirteenth distinction I ask two questions: first whether the body of Christ can only be confectioned by divine act; second whether any priest who pronounces the words of consecration with a determinate intention and in respect of fitting matter can consecrate the Eucharist.

Question One

Whether the Body of Christ is Confectioned only by Divine Act

6. As to the first question, argument for a negative answer is given as follows:
In the book *Six Principles* 2.20 it is said, "All action is completed in motion;" but divine action is not completed in motion; therefore God does not cause anything by his action; therefore not in the Eucharist either.
7. Again *ibid.*, "It is proper to action of itself that it effects something in what is subject to the action;" but nothing is effected here; so there is no action here either. The proof of the minor is that the effect would happen in an instant of change, just like the action; now in that instant the bread does not remain; so there is no effect brought about in the bread; but neither is there then any effect brought about in the body of Christ, because the body of Christ is not changed by the action.
8. Again, that the effect is not caused by divine action alone is proved as follows:
First thus: a natural agent can change a whole into a whole, for it is said in *De Generatione* 1.2.317a20-22 that generation is the change of a whole to a whole; therefore a natural agent has power for the totality of the change, for this change only appears impossible because it is change of whole to whole.
9. Again, nature was able to form the body of Christ in natural being; therefore it is able to form it in, or according to, the being it has in the Eucharist. The proof of the antecedent is that nature formed the body of Christ in the womb of the Virgin from her blood. The proof of the consequence is that the body of Christ has the same being in the womb of the Virgin as in the Eucharist; but the same power is able to act on the same being as its term.

10. And if you say that the body has the same being in different ways and that nature has power for the first way but not for the second – on the contrary: the being and not the mode was the term of the action; so, as long as the same per se being remains, the same term remains, and consequently the same power would be able to do it.

11. Nor can it be said that nature can be prevented because of the mode; for a mode is not repugnant to that of which it is the mode; therefore this mode is not repugnant to this being; therefore what has in itself power for this being is not impeded by any mode of the being such as not to have power for it.

12. And there is confirmation, that to have power for being is more than to have power for any mode of it.

13. Again, a priest performs some action with respect to consecration; therefore the Eucharist is not confected by divine power alone. Proof of the antecedent: for no intention is required in anyone with respect to any effect for which he is in no way the agent cause; but the intention of the priest is required for consecration; therefore etc.

14. On the contrary:

In *Sentences* d.1 q.1 ‘Within the Catholic...’ (and it is taken from Augustine’s book i), “The mystery of the body and blood of the Lord is perfected by the power of the Holy Spirit;” and there follows, “Just as Christ is he who baptizes, so too it is he who, through the Holy Spirit, effects this flesh of his and transfers wine into blood.”

15. Again, Gregory d.1 q.1 ‘Many seculars’, “One and the same Holy Spirit, namely in the whole Church, invisibly sanctifies the mystery of the body of Christ and, by sanctifying, blesses it.”

16. And these two authorities are in the text.

I. To the Question

17. For the solution of this question three things need to be considered: first, whether this sacrament, namely the Eucharist, can be confected by divine action – and the two first arguments touch on this point; second, whether it can be confected by the action of a second, created agent, and that as principal agent – and the following arguments touch on this point; third, whether it can be confected by the action of some created thing as instrumental agent – and the last argument touches on this point.

A. Whether the Eucharist can be Confectured by Divine Action

18. The first point seems manifestly the case, speaking of action in general, the way God is said to act in respect of creatures when he makes something new in them – save that it is not as easy to see how there is a positive action here as there is with creation, because there is no positive absolute here that simply receives being. But this was touched on in d.11 nn.333-339.

19. So more properly, therefore, and limiting action in its contrast to relation, this article does pose a difficulty.

1. The Opinion of Others

20. It is said, then, that taking action in this way, the Eucharistic conversion can be done, and is done, by divine action.

21. The proof is as follows: to convert something into what preexists seems to require no less virtue and action than to change something into what does not preexist; but if bread is converted by God into what does not preexist, there would be there a divine action simply whereby what does not preexist would be produced, because it could not be produced save by some action; so there is also action now.

22. Again, creation is true action; but the term of the action of conversion can no less receive being than the term of creation, namely if this conversion were to be into something not preexisting, for it would totally begin to be through this conversion; therefore etc. – The major, though it seems plain, may nevertheless be proved by taking action strictly, as was said [n.19], because if creation were relation, then ‘to create’ would only be ‘to be related’; but since ‘to create’ is ‘God wills the thing to be’, then the divine will would be only relation, which seems unacceptable.

23. Again, God has an action properly speaking that is intrinsic; therefore he can equally, or more, have an action properly speaking that is extrinsic; and so it is in the issue at hand. – Proof of the antecedent: because if generation, as distinguished from relation, were not an action properly speaking, the consequence would be that generation was only a relation, and so ‘to generate’ and ‘to speak’ would only be ‘to be related’, which is unacceptable.

24. Again, on the same matter of an action properly speaking that is intrinsic, there is an argument as follows: a relative is not the cause of its correlative, for the two naturally exist together at once; but a producer is cause or principle of the thing produced, and clearly is so by production formally; therefore the production is not just a relation to the thing produced, for then it would be wholly together with it at once and not prior to it nor be the idea of cause.

25. There is a final argument, and the reasoning is common to action extrinsically (which the first two arguments were about, nn.21-22) and action intrinsically (which the other two were about, nn.23-24). The argument is as follows: in *Metaphysics* 5.15.1020b28-30, 21a14-19, the chapter on relation, relations of the second kind are founded on action and passion; but a relation is not founded on a relation; therefore action is not just relation.

26. If argument is made against this opinion that, according to Boethius *On the Trinity* chs.4, 6 (and it seems to be accepted by Augustine *On the Trinity* 5.6 n.7 [cf. Scotus *Ord.* 1 d.8 n.130] and by the doctors generally), there are only two categories in divine reality, namely substance and relation, and so not the category of action as distinct from relation – the response would be that action properly speaking is included under relation, for action states a certain respect but does not properly state a relation [cf. Scotus *Quodlibet* q.4 nn.30-32]. And this seems it can properly be confirmed from Augustine *On the Trinity* 2.3 n.3, where Augustine excludes from God the individual categories and seems to allow that God is properly a maker as to the category of action, but that he is so without change.

2. Scotus’ own Opinion

a. Action is not anything Absolute

27. To understand this difficulty about whether action, in the way it is distinguished from relation, belongs to God intrinsically or extrinsically in general, and thereby whether it belongs specifically in the matter at issue, there is need to consider the idea of 'action' as it is set down to be distinct from 'relation'. For 'action' cannot be set down as something absolute, in the way it is one of the distinct categories among the ten categories. The proof is that it would be something new, and then two unacceptable consequences would follow.

28. One is general, that there would an action for action, and so ad infinitum; the reason is that of the Philosopher in *Physics* 5.2.225b13-14, whereby he proves that there cannot be a motion for action. And how this result holds is plain, because every new form can have an action for it, since the form is not from itself or from nothing, therefore it is from an agent.

29. The second unacceptable consequence is particular, namely by division, for in what category would the action be put? If it is in the agent then every agent would be changed in its absolute form before the thing acted on was changed by it, for the thing acted on is not changed save by an agent already possessing action – but for the agent to possess the action, since the action is a new absolute form, it would have to change so as to possess it.

30. The response is made that it would change, because change is an act of what is in passive potency, while an active thing is, before it acts, in active potency; and so its passing from this potency into act is not motion or change.

31. On the contrary: if action is an absolute and new form in an agent, the agent must have some receptivity for that form, because the new form is not self-subsistent (for then nothing would be formally an agent by the new form, just as neither is something said to be formally a quantum by a quantity separate from it); but something receptive has some receptive or passive potency with respect to what it is receptive of; therefore the active thing will, before the action, be in passive potency to action. And because it has this passive potency sometimes without the form and sometimes with the form, it is properly changed; so the conclusion intended follows, that an agent properly undergoes a change.

32. As for the addition that action is the act of an active potency [n.30], this indeed is true simply, but it is difficult to save this fact on the hypothesis, namely on the supposition that action is something absolute in the agent. For it cannot belong to the active power as receptive, for this is contrary to the idea of a receptive or passive power. Nor can it belong to the active power as elicitive; the proof is that it does not come from it because it belongs to its being as it is active, for then the active thing would actively change itself for this action by a prior absolute form, and then there would be a further question as to what changes it for this prior action, and so on ad infinitum.

33. But if one does hold this hypothesis one must say that action, although it belongs in some way to active potency, is yet the act of some passive potency, for this is universally true of every form that is not separate from the receptive thing.

34. If it also be said, against this hypothesis, that action is in the thing acted on, then something unacceptable follows, namely that nothing acted on can be acted on according to a form in the category of quantity or quality without being acted on at the same time, or perhaps acted on prior in nature, according to a form in another category, namely according to the action that is posited in it as another and absolute form, a form

different from quantity and quality. This consequent seems unacceptable, especially about prior and posterior forms, because the subject cannot be acted according to an absolute prior form unless it is acted on according to a posterior form that will not be a proper being acted on by the prior form (the thing is plain, because whiteness can remain in a subject after the action that makes it so is over).

35. So the negative proposition is therefore proved, that ‘action as it is posited to be a new category distinct from other categories is not a new absolute form [n.27], either in the agent or the patient’.

b. Action cannot be posited to be an Absolute Form contemporaneous with that in which it is

36. Action cannot be an absolute form, though a new form, or rather a form contemporaneous with that in which it is, for the two reasons given above [nn.28-29]. The first is universal, that then it would be action and not action about anything that is acted on – which seems unacceptable and against the idea of ‘action’, for, according to the author of *Six Principles* ch.2 n.16, ‘action requires not what it may do but what it may act upon’.

37. The point seems also to be proved by reason, that action does not seem to be of the same single form when nothing is acted on and when something is acted on; for if, when nothing is acted on, the agent acts just as much as when it acts on nothing, then there is no greater reason why the action is done later rather than now; for something is not done unless an agent acts, and, according to you, it is acting now just as much as it is later when the thing is receiving being.

38. Hence, in brief, one does not seem to be understanding the idea of action when one posits it as thus absolute, because then it simply has no respect to a thing acted on or produced; indeed, there is not even action in divine reality without someone or something always receiving being through the action; nor does God always act by extrinsic action as much before the creation of the world as in the creation of the world.

39. Secondly, an argument is made by drawing a division as before [n.29], that if action is posited as being an absolute that is not contemporaneous with that in which it is, and therewith in the agent, it follows that no action ever begins to be or ceases to be save because the form that acts for the action begins to be or ceases to be; and then, as long as a hot thing is hot, the heating remains, and so, when a hot thing is impeded by a contrary, there is as much acting as when the hot thing is not impeded – and after the term of the action has been introduced into the thing acted upon, the action remains afterwards as much as before when it was introducing the term.

40. But to posit that action is an absolute form and contemporaneous with itself in the thing acted upon is altogether irrational, because the same action would still remain in the thing acted upon after the agent has been destroyed; also the same thing would undergo contrary actions if it can be acted on by contrary agents successively.

c. Action is an Extrinsic Respect added to a Thing

41. From these points the result is that, if action is a distinct category, then it per se states as such only a respect or relation. Further, if all respects or relations have one

quidditative idea common to relations, then only one category of relation would be posited, and so there are only four categories.⁵⁸

42. Therefore if this famous division of categories is to be saved (for, according to Avicenna *Metaphysics* 3.1, 1.4, we are compelled to hold to the division whereby there are said to be ten most general categories – compelled, I say, because of the ancient authority of the philosophers, which it should not be easy to contradict), one must say that respect or relation does have enough formal ideas, enough, I say, for distinction of categories.

43. But this difference sufficient for this purpose, which is collected with more probability from the words of the authors, is an intrinsic and external respect coming to a thing, so that that is called ‘an internal respect coming to a thing’ which necessarily follows both extremes posited as actual, or which (and this is the same) necessarily follows its foundation, the term being included or not excluded; and so that that is called ‘an extrinsic respect’ which does not necessarily follow the extremes, even when both are posited as actual. And then the six principles, which the author of *Six Principles* is dealing with, are not, to this extent, species of relation, because relation states a respect coming intrinsically to a thing, but the six principles are called respects that come extrinsically to a thing. Action then will be an extrinsic respect coming to a thing.

45. But to what thing?

To the thing acted on, it seems, according to the Philosopher, in *Physics* 3.2.113b-114a, when he maintains that action and passion are founded on motion, but motion in the thing acted upon, and motion is not distinct formally save as to being ‘from this’ and ‘in this’.

46. But the contrary seems to be the case. Because the respect and the foundation will be in the same thing, and the idea of foundation seems to make the fact clear; but active power is in the agent, and is the foundation of the respect.

47. Again, opposite respects do not exist in the same thing, at any rate not qua the same, nor are they universally necessarily simultaneous; passion or the respect of passion is universally in the thing acted upon; therefore the opposite respect is not necessarily in the same thing.

48. Again, whatever thing some form is in, that thing is simply of the sort that accords with the form; for it seems altogether irrational that a form should be in something and not make that thing to be informed by the form; therefore, if action is formally in the thing acted upon, the thing acted upon is formally the agent.

49. It will be said, then, that action is an extrinsic respect coming to a thing, and that it is in the agent as in the supposit or subject, and in the form, which is called ‘active power’, as in the proximate foundation. And passion states the opposite respect, corresponding to the former, and it is in the thing acted upon as in a subject, and it is in the passive power as in the proximate foundation.

50. Further, in particular, a created agent has a respect to the first or total term, which is called the product, and a respect to the term that is called the produced or

⁵⁸ The first four of the ten categories are substance, quantity, quality, and relation. The remaining six, namely when, where, action, passion, position, being clad, all involve relation or reference to something, so that if everything involving relation belongs to the category of relation, these six categories would not be distinct categories after all but members of the category of relation.

introduced form, and a respect to the subject of that form, which is the thing acted upon or changed.

51. Now, that these respects are different is proved by the fact they are to different terms.

52. It is also proved by something else, because the corresponding converse respects are altogether different; for the respect of product to producer is as that of dependent on that on which it depends, and this simply according to its being, as 'being' is taken simply. But the respect of changeable to changer is not a respect of something dependent simply as to being, for the changeable, in its being simply, goes along with the agent as co-cause, and it does not receive from the agent its being simply but only its being according to the form introduced. The respects too of product and form introduced are plainly different, although both are respects of dependent to producer, because that depends first which receives being first, and this is the product, but that depends secondarily and per accidens which receives being secondarily, and this is the form educed or introduced.

53. Of these three respects on the part of the agent, the first two are not extrinsic respects coming to the agent, for either the agent does not have a real relation to the thing produced or introduced (as is true of God when he produces creatures or produces something in creatures), or, if the agent does have a real relation, yet the relation necessarily follows the foundation once the term has been posited. But this is more manifest of the respect that follows in the thing produced or educed, which namely is not an extrinsic respect coming to it, because it necessarily follows the foundation once the term has been posited.

54. But the respect that is a respect to the thing acted upon is an extrinsic respect coming to the agent, since it is very well possible for the active and passive thing to be next to each other and yet not to have this respect, because the agent may not be that by which the passive thing is changed, and the passive thing may not be changed by it, if for instance there is something preventing the action. Therefore action, since it is an extrinsic respect coming to it as it has been drawn out, will be a relation of the agent to the changed passive thing.

55. And there is confirmation of this from the Philosopher, *Metaphysics* 5.12.1019a15-16, 20a4-6, who defines active power to be 'a principle of changing another insofar as it is other'; but just as active power is a principle, so action – which is the act of an active power – will be the changing of another, that is of the passive thing, insofar as it is other. But the two other respects, namely of production and introduction, or eduction, and that whether they are active or passive, will belong to the category of relation properly speaking, because they are intrinsic respects coming to a thing.

d. Five Meanings of 'Action'

56. From what has been said it is plain there is a multiple ambiguity in the term 'action'. For in one way the word is said of 'operation', as intellection or volition are called operation, and yet in the truth of the matter it is a quality, as is plain in *Ord.* 1 d.3 n.601.

57. In another way ‘action’ states per se a relation or respect. And sometimes the word ‘action’ is taken for the respect of producer to product, the way a father is said to be agent cause of a son.

58. Sometimes ‘action’ is taken for the respect of introducer or educer to thing educated, as a hot thing is said to be agent cause of heat in a piece of wood.

59. Sometimes it is taken for the thing done, though including the respect that is expressed by the phrase ‘from another’, as in *Physics* 3 [n.45].

60. Sometimes too it is taken for the respect of transformer to thing transformed, as in the description of *Six Principles* 2.16, “Action is that according to which we are said to act on what is subject to us.”

α. On the first four Meanings of ‘Action’

61. Action in the first sense [n.56] is an absolute form and is in the category of quality, as was said.

62. In the second and third sense [nn.57-58] it is an intrinsic respect coming to a thing, and in this way it is properly in the category of relation.

63. In the fourth sense [n.59] it is precisely a distinct category, as was proved by the Philosopher in *Metaphysics* 5 (above n.55), and distinct because of the distinction of ‘respects that do not belong to the genus of relation’ from relations properly speaking that are in the category of relation, as is plain from the description added [n.54].

β. On the fifth Meaning

64. In the fifth sense [n.60] (if however it is a sense of this term, as the Philosopher is here generally expounded [e.g. Thomas, on *Physics* 3 lectio 5]) 12 ‘action’, as to the thing connoted, pertains to some absolute category in respect of which the thing acted on is changed (as quantity, quality, and the like); and so the Philosopher says there about action that it is the work or the end of the active thing (*Physics* 3.3.202a24); now the work or end is an absolute form in the thing acted on, although as something flowing – speaking of an agent acting by motion. Hence the Philosopher first says there that ‘motion is the act of the active and passive thing’, the active thing being that from which and the passive that in which. But the motion, according to the Commentator (*Physics* 3 com.19, 5 com.9), is really the flowing form. So ‘action’ is said to be the very act or work or end of the agent insofar as it is from the agent. And because these two, namely the thing done and the ‘being from’, do not constitute any per se single thing, then, if the term ‘action’ in this fifth sense signifies a per se single concept, it will not signify both but one of them. And it is reasonable that principally it signify more formally and connote that which is material, as is in the case of other terms that import such diverse elements; and then there is no need to ask to what category it belongs by reason of what is connoted, because it can belong to as many categories as the form belongs to that is caused in the thing acted on by the agent.

65. But this respect ‘from another’, which is formally imported by the term ‘action’ in this fifth sense, still seems to be equivocally understood; namely whether the ‘from’ or is as from the producer and introducer or as from the transmuter. Taken in the first way it belongs to the category of ‘relation’, as does also the passive production or

induction, as was said above [n.55]; taken in the latter way it belongs to the category of 'passion', as does also passive change.

66. If you object that this is contrary to Aristotle in *Physics* 3 [nn.59, 64], who maintains that what is formal in action, as action is distinct from passion, states 'being from another', so it does not state a respect of the category of passion – I reply that Aristotle is not speaking there of action as it is a distinct category from passion but according to another sense of the term, namely the sense 'act', and not as product but as induced; for after he had prefaced there, about the act of the active thing and the act of the passive thing, "for this is action (namely the act of the active thing), but that is passion (namely the act of the passive thing)," he first adds by way of proof, "but work and end are the act of the former, and passion the act of the latter" [n.64]; so he is taking 'action' there for the work and end of the agent; but this is the form brought about in the passive thing, which, as flowing, is motion.

67. From this is apparent the solution to a certain objection made before from the text [n.48]; for when the Philosopher concedes that action is in the thing acted on and not in the agent, because then the agent would be moved, he is speaking of action in this fifth sense [n.60] and not as action is a distinct category from passion; for, when taking action in this way, something is an agent formally by action as a related thing is by relation; and then it is necessary that the 'from which' be intrinsic to what is said to be such by it (as being a likeness is in the thing that is like).

68. One can also say that the 'from this' can be taken as equivocal: In one way as it is a relation opposed to that which is 'other by it', and then something prior must be understood which is specified by the 'from this', as the 'who by this' or the 'what by this'; and in this way the 'from this' does not belong to the category of action but is rather the opposite respect, namely the 'by which it is other'. In another way the 'from this' is not taken as it determines something prior, and then it is the same as the respect 'by which'; and in this way one can concede it belongs to the genus of action. But in this way it is not the motion that is in the thing acted on, save only as to the term of the action. And this is enough to save the words of Aristotle there [n.45]; for he means that action and passion are the same motion, just as "the way from Athens to Thebes" and the reverse is the same.

69. But I do not mean that here 'way' is taken for the space over which the motion goes but for the motion 'from here to there' and the reverse – as is plain from the other example Aristotle sets down about the distance 'from here to there' and 'from there to here' over the same space, where he means that they are the same materially, because of the identity of the space, but different formally. So here, motion is that by which the agent is said to be agent by the respect 'from this', meaning by the 'from this' the respect 'by which'; and conversely in the movable is founded a respect to the agent. And these two respects have something materially the same, namely the motion, but formally they are different and in different subjects; for he said first there, at the beginning of the section on action, that "the act must be in both (namely in the mover and the movable), for the movable is in the 'being able' and the mover in the 'operating'"; so he means that the act of the mover, which he sets down as 'operating', is in the mover itself.

70. And if you object that at the end of the chapter he says, "what these (namely, action and passion) are in is motion," one can say that another text has, "motion is present to what..." Or the text can be expounded thus: not as 'what these are in as in their subject

and foundation', because passion in the category 'passion' is not in motion as in its subject, for the respect to an agent, the respect founded in motion, is an intrinsic relation coming to passion, since motion is the form induced or educed; but it must be expounded as 'what these are in, the one as term (namely action) and the other as quasi subject', for they are together in the same subject as acted on.

71. Because, however, Aristotle seems to speak in varying ways there about action and passion, his intention cannot easily be grasped with certainty save by expounding the whole chapter in order. So look there, because it would be too long to insert here.

e. What must be said if the Category of Action is transferred to Divine Reality

72. To the matter at issue in particular I say that if any categories are to be transferred to divine reality (as expounded in *Ord.* 1 d.8 nn.95-115), yet no action of the category of action is transferred, that is, internal action; so that, as to all things intrinsic to divine reality, this proposition is simply true, namely, that there are only two categories there, substance and relation. Nor, further, does there belong to God any action of the category of action with respect to anything that is produced as a totality, that is, when no potential part comes first.

73. The proof, common both to intrinsic production and to total extrinsic production (as creation), is as follows: where there is a total production that is not from any passive or potential thing, there that which is required for action properly speaking is lacking, because action properly speaking is always in the thing acted on, according to the Philosopher *Metaphysics* 5.12.1019a15-20 and the author of *Six Principles*. But neither does the Father produce the Son from anything potential or quasi-potential (as was said in *Ord.* 1 d.5 nn.93-97); nor does he create from any passive thing that is transformed.

74. The other common proof is that to action corresponds passion properly speaking, namely passion that is an extrinsic respect coming to it, as does also action itself. But in divine reality intrinsically there can be no extrinsic respect coming to it, because any respect arises, with absolute necessity, from the nature of the foundation; nor can there be in divine reality or in creation an extrinsic passion that comes to it, because the product, whether intrinsic or extrinsic, is referred, with absolute necessity, to the producer.

75. There is no doubt on this point as to intrinsic product. But as to creatures I prove it because it is impossible for any relation to be more intrinsic to a creature than the relation that is to the Creator, insofar as the relation to the Creator is really the same as the foundation, as was shown in *Ord.* 2 d.1 nn.261-271.

76. There is however some divine action, both intrinsic and extrinsic, in a total production when understanding action not for anything in the category of action but for something corresponding to action in the category of action – just as there is, in a product, no passion of the category of passion but a passion stated equivocally corresponding to action in the category of action, and this is an equivocation in the term 'action', as was said before [nn.67-68], to which something similar can correspond in the term 'passion'.

77. Hence active production or action in divine reality is merely action, but it is a real relation; and likewise with production as passion. Extrinsic production as action however is a relation of reason, while passive production, by contrast, is a real relation, as was said in *Ord.* 1 d.30 nn.41, 49-51.

f. What sort of Action is to be posited in God in the case of Transubstantiation

78. But as to conversion in the case of the Eucharist, is any divine action to be posited here?

I say that there is, when one takes action as a relation of reason.

79. But as to action corresponding to action in the category of action there is more doubt. If substance is converted only into substance, so that nothing is transmuted, then passion properly speaking cannot be saved in this case, and consequently not action either.

80. But if, according to the second way, what I posited above is set down [d.11 nn.166-167], that this conversion is of the substance of bread as here into the body of Christ as here, and if the body of Christ as here be passive receptive of a new presence – then one can say that there is passion properly here in the body, and thus action here corresponding proportionally to action in the category of action.⁸¹ Nor is this repugnant to God; for God can transmute any passive thing just as nature can, and the passive transmuting is properly passion, and the active transmuting is action corresponding to the category of action, and is not just relation. And then one should say that the category of action can, according to proportional predication, in some way be transferred to God, but not intrinsic action.

82. Of these two opinions the first seems more difficult; indeed it seems barely intelligible how a new action without a term, a real action, may exist without there at least being some new relation without an absolute form in a term; but here, apart from destruction of the bread (whose term ‘to which’ is the nonbeing of bread), the action does not have, insofar as it is some positive change, an absolute form in the body of Christ as term, as all agree; so one must at least posit a new real relation there, and a relation to the agent; nor does it appear that the action could be new unless there is something in the body really new whereby a real action of God may be said to have a term more now than before.

3. To the Arguments for the Opinion of others

a. To the first Argument

83. To the first argument against this article, when it is said that ‘by relation nothing is produced, by production something is produced’ [nn.19-21]; this reasoning should not move anyone with intelligence; for divine production, by which something external is produced, is not anything absolute in God (as all agree), because God does not relate to creatures according to anything absolute in himself; therefore everyone must say that the production whereby God is said to produce is a respect. But how is it more unacceptable to say that he produces by relation than that he produces by respect? For whatever seems contrary to ‘he produces by relation’ would have to be taken from a

middle term common to every respect – just as an absolute form in a category can be related to production in the way that no respect can be.

84. Second, it is manifest that a product is more formally produced by the passive production of it than by the active production of the agent; but the passive production of a product is not a passion in the category of passion, because it is not anything extrinsic coming to it but rather something intrinsic, because it arises from its foundation; so it is a relation properly speaking. Therefore a creature is produced by a production that is formally a relation properly speaking.

85. I respond therefore to the argument that both premises are amphibolies; for the ablative can be taken by reason of formal proximate or remote principle; and this multiplicity universally happens when something abstract is construed in the ablative along with some concrete denominating respect. For this proposition is true, ‘the like is like by likeness’, namely when understanding the ablative to be taken in idea of proximately denominating form; and this proposition is true, ‘the like is like by quality’, when understanding the ablative to be taken in idea of remote formal principle; likewise this proposition is true, ‘the hot heats by heat’, and this proposition, ‘the hot heats by heating’, but each in a different sense.

86. As concerns the issue at hand, if the ablative is taken in both premises by reason of proximately denominating form, the minor premise is true [sc. ‘by production something is produced’] and the major false [‘by relation nothing is produced’], because the production, whereby it is formally produced, is relation. And so the syllogism is formed from opposites, like this one: ‘no man is running, Socrates runs, therefore Socrates is not a man’; and no wonder that an impossible conclusion is inferred, nay an impossible conclusion according to *Prior Analytics* 2.2.55a10-19.

87. But when taking the major negative premise [sc. ‘by relation nothing is produced’] as the ablative is taken in idea of remote formal principle, and the affirmative minor [sc. ‘by production something is produced’] is taken as the ablative is taken in idea of proximately denominating form, then both are true; but then to infer that production is not relation is the fallacy of figure of speech, by change of idea of proximate formal principle into idea of remote formal principle, or conversely; or, to speak logically, by change of absolute to relational, for the remote principle of anything denominated by relation is absolute, but the proximate principle is a respect.

88. And perhaps ‘the figure of speech’ could here be posited according to the first mode, by likeness of termination; nor is this ever as evident elsewhere than in such paralogisms; for this is because of the causal termination, which shows a like construction of cases. And here the argument is deceptive by amphiboly as to the premises, and it is plain that the inference could be made as if similar terminations in the same case signified the same sentence in the premises.

b. To the Second Argument

89. As to the second argument [n.58], to concede that God’s creation is a relation of reason is not acceptable, since one must say that the creation of creatures is not a passion in the category of passion but a relation properly speaking.

90. And when you infer, ‘therefore God’s willing creatures to be is for God to be related’, the conclusion does not follow; for ‘to create’ principally signifies the relation of

passion, and it connotes an essential divine intrinsic act, not only absolutely, but as it passes over to an external object; now the sentence ‘God wills creatures to be’ principally states a divine act, though it connotes its passing over to the object. But the following inference does not hold, ‘what principally states relation is relation, therefore what fundamentally connotes relation is relation’. So in the form of the argument the ‘as to another’ is changed into ‘as to itself’; just as the inference would not be valid if one were to argue, ‘to be like is to be related; but to be white is to be like; therefore to be white is to be related’.

c. To the Third Argument

91. As to the third argument [n.23], if the proposition ‘generation is relation’ is true (as was shown in *Ord.* 1 d.27), and if the inference from abstracts to concretes universally holds of necessity, though sometimes not conversely, there will be nothing unacceptable, rather it will be necessary, that ‘to generate’ is ‘to be related’. But if the force of the words is stressed and it is held to be unacceptable that ‘to generate’ or ‘to speak’ be precisely ‘to be referred’, I say that a subordinate term is not precisely the superordinate one, for the subordinate is the superordinate with some difference added – as ‘man’ is not just ‘animal’ but ‘rational animal’.

92. So I say that ‘to generate’ states a relation, but a relation of a certain sort, namely a relation productive by way of nature, and ‘to speak’ is a relation productive by way of intellect; and therefore ‘to generate’ is not just ‘to be referred’ but ‘to be referred by a relation of origin founded on fertile nature’, and ‘to speak’ is ‘to be referred by a relation of origin founded on fertile intellect’.

d. To the Fourth Argument

93. As to the fourth argument, when it is said that ‘the relative is not cause of its correlative’ [n.24], this is against the common opinion, unless perhaps one posits the persons to be absolutes; for if all Catholics concede origin in divine reality, they also concede that there person is principle to person. Or one must say that the relative is principle of its correlative. Or one must say that the person that is a principle is an absolute by relation to a second person.

94. The response then is, as I said in *Ord.* 1 d.28 n.24, that although relatives are simultaneous in nature, to the extent that ‘simultaneity’ states ‘not being able to be without each other’, yet priority or origin stands along with this, and priority of origin states nothing other than ‘from which’ another is.

95. On the contrary:

Things can have an order in the intellect that yet can have no order outside the intellect; therefore things that can have no order in the intellect can have no order at all. But relatives are simultaneous in nature; therefore etc.

96. Again, what is simultaneous is, as simultaneous, not prior; but what is prior in origin, as it is prior in origin, is simultaneous with the posterior as it is posterior, because thus they are per se correlatives; therefore ‘prior in origin’ is not prior (and the same argument could be made about prior and posterior in nature).

97. To the first [n.95] I say that ‘being simultaneous in the intellect’ can be understood in two ways: either that the simultaneity determines the act of understanding as it considers the objects, or that it determines the objects themselves that are understood; or in another way (and it amounts to the same) simultaneity can state the mode of the objects as they are understood or compared to the act of understanding, or it can state the mode of the objects in themselves. In the first way the major is false, namely ‘things that are simultaneous in the intellect can have no order [sc. outside the intellect]’, because however much they have to be understood together, yet not for this reason is anything taken from them that belongs to them in themselves – and only in this way is the minor true.

98. On the contrary: relatives, in the way they are understood in their proper ideas, have complete simultaneity in the intellect; therefore they have no order.

99. I reply: their ideas do properly have a certain order, and yet they have simultaneity too as they have order, namely simultaneity in reference to the act of understanding.

100. To the second [n.96]: the major proposition, ‘things that are simultaneous do not, as simultaneous, have an order,’ is true if the ‘as’ states simultaneity and states it in the mode of simultaneity and, together with this, states it in the mode of order and in the mode of inherence of simultaneity and order. I understand it thus, that just as the mode of simultaneity is taken according to nature and according to order, so, proportionally, is the same mode of priority and posteriority taken; along with this too, that as simultaneity is predicated of them so order is denied of them, namely, that if ‘simultaneity’ is there taken as inhering in them denominatively, and if thereby order is not denied to be in them per se, in the first mode of per se, but is denied to be present in them denominatively, then the minor premise is only true of the mode ‘simultaneous in nature’ and of the mode of accidental or denominative inherence. And I conclude uniformly that they are not ordered by such order, and that as denominated by such order. But it does not follow from this that they are not ordered per se in the first mode. So this proposition is true, ‘the prior, as prior, is prior to the posterior’, understanding it of predication per se in the first mode; and this proposition is true, ‘the prior as prior is simultaneous with the posterior’, understanding this of predication per se in the second mode.

101. Nor is it unacceptable that in such general intentions one opposite is predicated essentially of the other, and that the other opposite is predicated of the same denominatively, understanding by ‘opposite’ what is opposite in idea of concept; but not every idea of opposition, as it is a mode of predication in different form, is preserved. – An example: power is power per se in the first mode, and power is in act by the actuality corresponding to it, because power, when outside its cause, is not in potency to its being. The thing is more apparent in intentions, because this proposition is true, ‘a singular is singular per se in the first mode’, and this one is true, ‘a singular is universal by denominative predication’; and in grammatical intentions the proposition, ‘masculine is masculine’, is true per se in the first mode – but this proposition ‘masculine is neuter’ [sc. the word ‘masculine’ is neuter in grammatical gender] is true denominatively or by denominative predication.

c. To the Fifth Argument

102. To the fifth main argument [n.25] from *Metaphysics* 5, one can, in one way, say that no relation of the second mode is founded on action and passion but only on active and passive power, as was said in *Rep.* IA d.27 nn.51-52, because the relations that seem founded on action and passion are not present when action and passion are present, and are present when action and passion are not present.

103. The point is plain: for when someone among creatures is generating he is not a father; but afterwards, when the offspring has already been formed, he who has generated begins to be father just as the offspring begins to be son; yet there is no action then, for the father could then not exist, or not then be acting with any new action at all besides the first one. But a relation cannot exist save when its foundation does; and if its foundation is complete, and that on both sides, the relation will also be there at the same time. So actions can be a condition for relations only as being dispositions previous to such relations.

104. So the statement of the Philosopher there [n.25] is saved, that relations of the second mode are said ‘according to active and passive power’ as according to foundations, and are said ‘according to actions of powers’ as according to dispositions previous to those relations.

105. It can in another way be said that the Philosopher is speaking of action according to the signification of the name, as it imports relation of producer to produced [n.57]; and action in this signification states per se something in the category of relation, as was said above [n.62]; and then the remark ‘according to active and passive power’ must be expounded as before [n.104], namely as according to foundation. But the following remark, ‘according to actions of powers’ [n.104] must be understood of actions formally, the way that the like is said according to likeness; and there is something in the text that clearly corresponds to this, for the Philosopher says, “a father is father of a son, for the former made and the latter is what was made”: ‘made’, that is, produced, ‘what was made’, that is, what was produced.

106. And if you object that the Philosopher gives an example of heater to heatable and again of heating to what becomes hot and of cutting to what is cut, as if he is talking of acting things [*Metaphysics* 5.15.1021a14-19, 21-23] – I reply that he is expounding how he understands the words, saying immediately afterwards, “The terms are said to be ‘to another’ according to time, as what did make to what is made, and what will make to what must be made.” Now here the thing producing is ‘always acting’, and the thing done is the thing produced; and so one should understand ‘heat-making’ as taken for what is productive of the whole hot thing, the way he says in *Metaphysics* 7.8.1033b8-18 [d.12 n.324], that the whole composite is generated, namely in the case of generations per accidens, as in the generation of substance. And he takes ‘heatable’ for the whole that is able to be produced and not for the passive thing as it is able to undergo change; and so he takes ‘heater’ for the producer of the whole hot thing, and ‘what becomes hot’ for the whole composite that terminates the production, and not for the subject transformed to heat; and so too of the relation of what is cut to what cuts.

107. It can be said in a third way that the Philosopher is not only setting down the kinds of relation there but also the modes in which each of them is said to be ‘to another’, just as also in the chapter on quality [*Metaphysics* 5.14.1020a33] he sets down not only the kinds of quality but the modes; hence he says, “‘What sort of’ or ‘quality’ is in one way said to be the difference of a substance,” although substantial difference does not

belong to the category of quality. So here relatives in the second mode of relatives are possibly being set down according to what is said to be ‘to another’, and not as according to relation formally but as according to some extrinsic respect coming to a thing and having a likeness to the mode.

108. And then the text may be expounded as follows: “active and passive things according to active and passive power” [n.104] are said to be ‘to something’ as the foundations of relations properly speaking. What follows, “according to actions of powers” may be expounded of actions in the category of action, because it is according to actions that things are formally called actives to passives and conversely; they are not so called according to relations properly in the category of relation, but according to certain respects pertaining to the second mode of relatives and not pertaining to the category of relation, though they do have a mode similar to certain species of relation – and in this way they belong to one mode of relatives but not to any kind of relation.

4. To Statements made about God’s Extrinsic and Intrinsic Action

109. I argue against statements made about God’s intrinsic action and his whole extrinsic action: First: “Action belongs to what power belongs to,” *On Sleep and Dreams* 1.454a8; but in God there is truly active power; therefore acting truly belongs to him.

110. Again, as long as creatures exist, they are always referred to God as his creatures; but they are not always referred to God by creation as undergone, because creation as undergone exists only in the first instant when things are created, just as creation as God’s action only exists then; therefore creatures are referred to God by some relation other than passive creation. Therefore, although this something other, by which creatures are thus referred to God, is not of the category of passion, yet creation as undergone can belong to the category of passion, because it is not present in creatures after the first instant.

111. Again, creation seems to be God’s real production of creatures; but there is no real relation of God to creatures; therefore creation is not a relation.

112. To the first [n.109] I say that just as the term ‘action’ is equivocal (as was said above, nn.56-60), so the term ‘active power’ is equivocal, for it is said not only of transforming power but also of productive power. And indeed God does have active power in both ways, and so action can belong to him in both ways; but then one action will not be the other.

113. To the second [n.110]: this argument seems capable of being reduced to the opposite, for if creation as undergone does not always remain, nevertheless the disposition that creatures have to God as to efficient cause always remains while the creature remains; therefore this disposition is not an undergoing of creation in the category of passion.

But I say that the disposition of creatures to God as to efficient cause is only a single relation and a relation coeval with the foundation, nay it is the same as the foundation, as is plain from *Ord.* 2 d.1 nn.260-271, and it can be called passive creation; or if the term ‘creation’ imports a newness or order to preceding non-being, then one should use a term that does not import newness, because the newness is not coeval with

the relation to God nor with the foundation; and this point is discussed there [*ibid.* nn.281-285, 295].

114. To the third [n.111] the response is in *Ord.* 1 d.30 nn.44-55, 73, about how God is really ‘Lord’ but not by a real relation of lordship.

B. Whether the Eucharist can be confected by the Action of a Created Agent as the Principal Agent

1. A Possible Opinion

115. As to the second article [n.17] it would seem that this conversion could belong to some creature as principal agent.

116. The reason is that an action belonging to God through a principle of acting that is not formally infinite can belong to a creature. For an action whose sufficient principle is something finite, or non-infinite, is not repugnant to a creature; but God produces creatures through a will that is not formally infinite; therefore etc. The proof of the minor is that if the will of God were formally infinite, it would include every perfection intrinsic to God (for no addition can be made to something infinite), and then the will would be ‘a sea of infinite substance’ – which is not true because this is proper to the essence itself, according to Damascene ch.9, “‘He who is has sent me etc.’, for since he comprehends the whole within himself, he has being like an infinite and unending sea;” and so Damascene says there that the name ‘He who is’ seems the more principal of the names that are said of God. A confirmation is that the will does not formally include relations in itself; but without these the total intrinsic divine perfection is not present; therefore infinity is not present either.

117. Again, a natural agent can alter the species in question [sc. of bread and wine] and eventually generate a substance from them, as is plain in the case of mixing a lot of water with the species of wine and in nutrition and in other generations that arise from those species; therefore created power can totally convert them into a preexisting substance [sc. changing bread and wine into Christ’s body and blood], for no greater power is required in the latter case than in the former.

2. Scotus’ own Opinion

118. I say, however, that no creature has power as principal agent for this conversion.

119. The reason is that only that agent has power for it to whose active power the being and non-being of both extremes is totally subject (the point is clear from the solution to the first and second questions of distinction 11 [nn.28- 29, 59-61]); but no creature is of this sort, for any creature presupposes in itself some part of the term ‘from which’ and ‘to which’, as has been shown (*Ord.* 4 q.1 nn.119-123, 138-145).

3. To the Argument for the Possible Opinion

120. As to what was said about the will [n.116], I say that the major seems probable, namely that ‘a principle of acting that is finite, or non-infinite, is not repugnant to a creature’, and so neither is the action repugnant for which such a principle is per se

sufficient. And the consequence of this concession is that the will, as it is the principle of creatures, is formally infinite. So I deny the minor, namely that it is not infinite; and the reason for this denial was touched on in *Ord.* 1 d.10 n.9.

121. Briefly, then, it is plain that God is simply blessed in the operations of his intellect and will; for he is not simply blessed in his essence as it is infinite if he does not comprehend the essence; and just as the intellect comprehends the essence by seeing it, so the will in its own way, if God is to be perfectly blessed, must comprehend the essence by loving it. And so both powers and both acts of both powers about the divine essence will be infinite if God is to be perfectly blessed.

122. To the proof then of the minor [n.116] I say that in divine reality a quasi extensive infinity can be understood, as it is if it be understood to be a quasi infinite multitude of perfections; in another way there is an intensive infinity of any perfection simply, such that the perfection, in its idea, is without limit and end. And in this second way something can have an infinity that is not only formal but also fundamental, and something can have a formal intensive infinity though not a fundamental one.

123. I say therefore that nothing of one formal idea is infinite in the first way; indeed even in God there is perhaps no such infinity absolutely; for perhaps, just as the persons are finite, speaking of this sort of infinity, so too the perfections are finite in number or in multitude, and the notions and relations too, and the former and latter when conjoined; but intensive formal and fundamental infinity are present together there in the divine essence as it is essence, and to this extent it is called by Damascene ‘a sea’ [n.116]. But formal infinity only, not fundamental, is in any perfection simply; for any perfection has its formal perfection from the infinity of the essence as from its root and foundation. But an infinity neither formal nor fundamental is in the relations in divine reality, as was shown in *Ord.* 1 d.13 nn.71-72, because it is better for the Father not to have filiation than to have filiation; ‘perfection simply is that which it is better for anything to have than not to have’ [Anselm, *Monologion* ch.15].

124. The response is now plain, that although the will is formally infinite yet it does not include in itself formally all the intrinsic perfections, because neither the essence nor anything else includes them in this way; but neither does the will include all perfections fundamentally, but only the essence, which is the ‘sea’, does so in this way; but it does include by identity both any perfection simply and any relation.

125. The confirmation about relations [n.116] is of little value, because however much relations are not included the idea of infinity can still be preserved, understanding the relations in the way that they add nothing because of which there is infinity; for then, when they are set aside, infinity is not had in anything, and when they are added they are not formally infinite, and a finite or non-finite added to something finite does not make it infinite; therefore the intended conclusion follows. I reply therefore that although the will does not include the relations formally, it can nevertheless be formally infinite.

126. And if you object ‘the will does not include divine perfection totally’, I say that although it does not include it extensively it does include it intensively as to one perfection formally; but as to all the other perfections and relations it includes them by identity and not formally. And these matters were discussed in *Ord.* 1 d.8 nn.191-209, 213-217.

127. To the second argument [n.117] one can give reply from the preceding distinction 12 [nn.224-229, 386-417, 432-439, 490-502], from the four last questions –

from the first of these it is plain how acting belongs to the species, and from the other three how undergoing and being corrupted belong to them.

128. Briefly then one must deny that they can be changed by a created agent into any totally new substance, either in the case of mixture or nutrition or any corruption of the species, as is plain there. But sometimes a new substance succeeds to them when they are corrupted, if not by the action of a created agent but of God immediately producing it.

C. Whether the Eucharist can be Confectured by the Action of a Creature as Instrumental Agent

1. First Principal Objection, or the Opinion of Thomas against this Third Article a. Exposition of the Objection

129. As to the third article [n.17] it seems that this conversion could belong to some creature as to an agent acting instrumentally.

130. First, because an accident can be an agent instrumentally for the generation of substance; therefore by likeness also in the issue at hand.

131. The proof of the antecedent is first as follows: when things are essentially ordered, the third is more distant from the first than the second; but increatures essence, being, and power are essentially ordered; therefore power is more distant from essence than being. But being really differs from essence; therefore so does power; and consequently no substantial form can be the immediate principle of acting.

132. The same antecedent is proved in another way thus: whenever there are two acts neither of which includes the other, then they are not reduced to the same principle, as is plain in *On the Soul* 2.4.415a16-20 where the Philosopher holds that powers are distinguished by acts as acts are by objects; but ‘perfecting matter’ and ‘abstracting from matter’ are two acts in the soul that do not include each other. The proof is that each can be without the other: the first without the second (as in a child and someone asleep), and the second without the first (in the separated soul); but the prior act, namely ‘giving being to matter’, belongs to the essence as to proximate formal principle; therefore the other act [‘abstracting from matter’] does not belong to the essence; and then, by likeness, not to other substantial forms with respect to actions that seem to belong to them.

133. If it be objected against this that, first, anything absolute can be separated from anything absolute (for there seems to be no contradiction here), then, if the intellect is something absolute different from the soul, it can be separated from the soul and can, as so separate, understand and be beatified (which seems unacceptable); second that because substance or the quiddity of substance is the object that moves the intellect, therefore it is the immediate principle of operating on the intellect – to the first of these they reply by denying the first proposition, setting down an example about subject and property; to the second they say that the action is intentional, not real.

b. Objections or Rejection of the Opinion α. Against the Responses to the Objections

134. Response against the first [n.133]: because then the intended conclusion is obtained, that if the subject cannot be separated from the property, this is because of some necessity in the subject with respect to the property; but this necessity will be

reduced to some causality – and not to the causality of material cause, because matter is capable of contradictory predicates; therefore to that of efficient cause, and then substance will be the efficient cause of some property (unless one goes on infinitely putting property before property).

135. The intended conclusion is got in a second way [n.133], because the objection posed against the major confirms it, for God can supply every causality of an extrinsic cause; the causality of subject with respect to property (which is the reason there is necessity there) is the causality of an extrinsic cause; therefore etc.

136. The confirmation they give for this response, that the subject falls into the definition of the property [n.133], is of no validity, because then no accident could be separated from its subject, for according to the Philosopher the idea of the substance must fall into the idea of any accident.

137. This objection about subject and accident can also be rejected in another way, for it would follow that the substance of bread could not be without quantity and vice versa; for whatever is per se and first present in a superior is per se, though not first, present in the inferior (an example about triangle and isosceles triangle and having angles equal to two right angles); but being continuous is per se and first present in corporeal substance; therefore it is per se, though not first, present in bread, and consequently the bread cannot remain without the same continuity nor the same continuity without the bread, for an accident does not pass over from subject to subject. And then neither the quantity nor the Eucharist could remain without the substance of bread – which they and the general school deny.

β. Against the Objection's and the Opinion's Conclusion

138. Against the conclusion of this opinion, namely that a substantial form, according to them, cannot be the immediate principle of acting, argument was given above in d.12 nn.188-193, and let it suffice briefly to repeat it now:

139. Because the principle of acting is that wherein the producer assimilates the produced to itself; but the form of the producer does not assimilate the produced to itself in a more perfect form; rather it assimilates the produced to itself in the substantial form; therefore etc.

140. Secondly as follows: an instrument, according to them, only acts as a moved mover; therefore in order for it to move, it is moved immediately by the principal agent; and so, in order for it to move as instrument of a substance, it will be moved immediately by the substance. But this is not valid according to what seems to me to be true about the order of causes; for I do not believe that the second cause, which is sometimes called the instrument, receives a special motion from the first cause but only has some subordination of its active form to the active form of the other, by some subordination: for when the prior cause actually is in existence and in its order of causing, the second cause is of a nature to proceed to act in its order of causing; and thus is the second cause called a 'moved mover', not because it receives a motion from the first by which it may move, but because it depends in its moving on the other first naturally moving.

141. The response to the second objection [n.133], namely about quiddity moving the intellect, is that it is not valid; for although substance has intentional being there, yet understanding itself is a real form; therefore one must with respect to it give some real

active principle and give it as real. Nor is it valid to have recourse to phantasms, because according to them [*Ord.* 2 d.3 nn.263-65] the essence of an angel moves the intellect of the angel to an angel's proper understanding, and one cannot imagine any phantasm there.

γ. To the Arguments for the Objection

142. To the arguments for the objection (or opinion [n.131]), which is about the instrumental causality of an accident with respect to substance: To the first, about the order of essence, being, and power, I say that it is simply false that being is other than essence. And this is proved by their own statements [n.141], for it is impossible for the generated as generated to have being per se, but the generated as generated or as first term of generation is per se one. Let it also be the case that there is the sort of order of being and power that they imagine – I say that power would precede being, for in whatever instant of nature or duration the essence is perfect, in that same instant the principle for performing the operations proper to the power is perfect, and so the power is perfect – and then, if being is other than essence, power precedes being.

143. To the second [n.132] I say that the major proposition is universally false of first and second act, because thus one would prove that nothing is an active principle in creatures; for form must give act to the thing it forms, and if the thing is active it must have reference to that in which it causes second act; but these are distinct, because one of them can be separated from the other without contradiction.

144. I reply therefore that the major is not true of ordered first and second acts but is universally false, for a form that gives second act gives also first act and vice versa, and in this way does it apply to 'making alive' and 'understanding'; and therefore the major is of no validity for the intended conclusion.

145. But if the major is true of disparate second acts and of a finite active principle, in the way the place adduced from the Philosopher should be understood *On the Soul* 2.4.415a16-20 [n.132] – this is nothing to the purpose, because 'to make alive' and 'to understand' are not two such acts.

2. Second Principal Objection of Thomas to the Third Article and its Rejection

146. Another principal objection to this third article is as follows: it is possible for a created cause to cause, in virtue of God, some proper knowledge of God; therefore it is much more possible for an accident, in virtue of substance, to cause a substance. The proof of the antecedent is that it is possible to have some proper knowledge of God and to have it only through creatures, for nothing else moves the intellect of the wayfarer.

147. The response is twofold:

First, because knowledge of God is an accident and consequently does not go beyond the total genus of accidents that move the intellect (the same holds if we speak of knowledge of created substance and of accident); it is therefore possible for an accident to cause knowledge of created or uncreated substance without its causing simply anything more noble than its proper perfection. But such would not be the case if it were to cause a substance, for any substance is simply more perfect than any accident.

148. The other response returns to the same point, for an object in cognition has diminished being and so substance as known – or God as known – has diminished being in the knower; but substance as it is in itself has a being simply perfect. Therefore, although an accident can be the principle of producing substance in diminished being, that is, in known being, or although a creature can be the principle of producing God in such diminished being, then, by like argument, it does not follow that an accident can in any way be a principle (whether as instrument or as principal agent) of producing substance in being simply.

3. Scotus' own Opinion

149. As concerns this article, then, 'instrument' can be understood in several ways (as was said above [d.12 n.192]), but, relative to the issue at hand, a disposing agent can be called an instrument. And in this way is a minister an instrument of God in the case of this conversion [sc. of the Eucharist] – a minister, that is, who has a proper human action preceding the divine action as necessary disposition for it (not simply so, but by the ordaining of God, who makes a pact with the Church that he will do such and such an act proper to himself when the minister does such and such an act).

150. And this response is universal to all the sacraments in which a minister is required, because the minister is a sort of disposing agent; but his action is an instrumental action with respect to the principal agent somewhat in the way that cutting is to the form of a bench, because the form of the bench, by the ordaining of the principal agent, follows upon the cutting. So it is in the matter at hand: the pronouncing of the words can be called an instrumental action with respect to the conversion or confecting of the body of Christ, for this conversion or confecting follows regularly on the pronouncing.

151. And thus the body of Christ is confected by the action of a creature as instrumental agent – not indeed as an instrumental agent that attains to the end in the way certain instruments do that have an instrumental action attaining to the end (as was said above [d.12 n.194]), but in the way a preceding agent is said to act instrumentally for the principal form, which however it does not attain to; and its action is said to be instrumental because disposing and preceding it [d.12 n.195].

II. To the Initial Arguments

152. To the principal arguments.

I concede the first two [nn.6-7], for they prove that in this divine conversion there is no action of the category of action, unless the opinion stated above be held [d.11 nn.333-339], that no body succeeds to the bread save the body of Christ as it is here. And if this opinion is held the arguments must be replied to:

153. As to the first [n.6] the reply is that when it is said 'action is founded on motion' the term 'motion' is taken there indifferently for motion properly speaking and for change, and indifferently for motion subjectively or foundationally or concomitantly. And I concede here that this action is founded on a change of Christ's body as it succeeds to its not being here.

154. As to the second [n.7] I concede that there is passive undergoing here when holding the above opinion [d.11 nn.333-339]; but this passive undergoing is in the body in that it becomes present here from not being present here.

155. As to the third [n.8], it is plain from d.11 n.164 in what way ‘generation’ is conversion of whole to whole; but the conversion [sc. of the Eucharist] is not a total one in the way generation is.

156. As to the fourth [n.9], the inference ‘nature can be the principle of being in one way that is fitting, therefore it can be a principle of being in a way that is not fitting’ does not hold; on the contrary the way is repugnant to it as far as concerns itself.

157. And when you argue [n.10] that because the being is the same therefore it follows that the same thing can be the principle of this being – I concede it; but from this does not follow that therefore ‘what is the principle of this being in that way can be the principle of it in this way’.

158. And when the point is pressed [n.11] that the mode of the being is not there repugnant to the being, I say that it is repugnant to it in comparison to the sort of cause in question, namely such that the cause cannot cause this being in this mode although it can cause it absolutely or in another mode.

159. And when it is added finally [n.12] that the mode does not exceed in perfection that of which it is the mode, I say that something imperfect with the imperfection left to it can fail to be subject to the causality of that to which something more perfect in another fitting mode is subject.

160. To the final argument [n.13] I say that the action of an instrumental agent, taking ‘instrumental agent’ to mean disposing agent, does indeed require a proper intention in that agent – whether it be a natural agent (as in the case of heat when it causes alteration, where there is indeed a proper intention, although it is an instrumental agent, that is, a disposing agent, with respect to generating fire); or whether it be an agent acting through intellect, because then the instrument requires a determinate human action that is ordered to the action of the principal agent; and such universally is the action of a minister in the dispensing of the sacraments.

Question Two

Whether Any Priest who Pronounces the Words of Consecration with Due Intention and over Fitting Matter can Confect the Eucharist

161. Proceeding to the second question [n.5] thus, argument is made that not any priest can confect the Eucharist.

By the statement in Gratian *Decretum* p.2 caus.2 q.1 ch.84, “Many seculars,” where *Malachi* 2.2 is adduced, “I will curse your blessings,” and it is expounded in a single way, “I will curse whatever is blessed by you;” and the threat in *Malachi* 2 is made to bad priests; therefore whatever is blessed by them is cursed by God, and consequently nothing is blessed through their ministry.

162. Again, in *Decretum* in the same place [ch.97], “When a priest is suspended or deposed, no power is left to him;” therefore he cannot confect the Eucharist.

163. Again, the virtue of the mass consists principally in the sacrament of the Eucharist; therefore if a bad priest can confect the Eucharist like a good one, a bad priest’s mass would equal a good priest’s mass in worth, and conversely.

164. Again a layman can receive the Eucharist; but receiving the Eucharist is the end of the consecration, and consequently is simply better and nobler; therefore a layman can as equally confect or more so; therefore not merely a priest.

165. Again Blessed Laurence dispensed the blood of Christ, as is plain from his words to Pope Xystus, “[...myself] to whom,” he says, “you have committed the dispensing of the lord’s blood” [Jacob de Voragine, *Legend* ch.113] And this is proved from *Decretum* [d.93 ch.18], “Let the deacon be given command, if necessity compels, and distribute the Eucharist of Christ’s body to the people.”

166. On the contrary:

Decretum [ch.97], “No cause is shown why he who cannot lose baptism could lose the right to baptize.” Therefore, by similarity, he who cannot lose priestly order, cannot lose the right to confect the Eucharist. But no priest can lose priestly power, because the character is indelible, etc.

167. Again, *ibid.*, “It is certain that the sanctity of the sacraments in perverse men, whether they are so inwardly or outwardly, remains unpolluted and inviolable.” Therefore any priest, however evil, can have the same power of the sacraments as a good priest.

168. That, too, only a priest can consecrate and dispense is thus proved in *Decretum* d.93 ch.16, “A deacon ought not to give the bread,” that is, “the body of the Lord,” according to the gloss.

I. To the Question

169. To the question I say that confecting the Eucharist can belong to no one as principal cause save God alone (it is plain from the preceding question, [nn.18, 78, 118-119]). But as instrumental cause or, to speak more properly, as belonging to a minister, it can belong to a man, because God has so ordained that the minister in certain sacraments can be a man.

170. Accordingly, therefore, I say that, speaking of confecting ministerially, a minister can in two ways be understood to have power to confect: in one way absolutely, namely such that if he attempts to do it, he does what he intends; in another way to have power to do it in the way ordained. And this distinction is general in all sacraments, because more is required to minister in the way ordained than simply to minister.

A. About the Power to Confect Simply

171. Speaking of the power to confect simply, nothing beyond due matter (spoken of at the end of d.11 nn.361-389) is required save a due minister – for whom three conditions are required, namely: that he be a priest, that he can pronounce the words of consecration, and that he can have the due intention of acting, namely that he intend to do what the Church intends to do.

172. The second and third condition are common here also to one who ministers the other sacraments: because of defect of the second condition, a mute cannot confect; because of defect of the third, someone lacking the use of reason cannot confect; and the same way about baptizing and conferring any other sacraments.

173. But the first condition is proper here, because only a priest has the power, and any priest can to whom can belong these two conditions: namely, pronouncing and intention.

174. Now, that only a priest has the power is proved by Gregory IX, *Decretals* 1 tit.1 ch.1, 'About the supreme Trinity and the Catholic faith', where is said of the Eucharist, "No one can confect this sacrament save only a priest who has received the rite of ordination according to the keys of the Church."

175. But whence does the Church get the foundation for this opinion?

I reply: from the word of Christ in *Matthew* 26 [rather *I Corinthians* 11.25-26], "Do this as often as you do it..." where he is speaking to the Apostles, or at least the disciples, to whom only those succeed who are at least priests in the Church. For to the Apostles succeed bishops, and to disciples priests, as is contained in *Decretum* "In the *New Testament*" [p.1 d.21 ch.2, d.25 ch.1 sect.8]. The same is also contained in the statement of Paul *I Corinthians* 16.16, "The bread which we break, is it not a communion in the body of Christ?" 'Which we break', he says, supply: 'we Apostles and disciples'. Now if any of the faithful could confect, there would be no need for anyone to break it for others, but each could communicate from his own sacrifice.

176. The second part, namely that 'every priest able to pronounce the words with intention can confect' [n.173], is plain from the authorities brought forward for the opposite [nn.166-168].

177. Nor is it a problem if objection is raised about a degraded priest, that he becomes a non-priest; for if this is true, it is not an objection about a *priest*!

178. Yet it must be said not to be true, because someone who degrades another does not destroy the character; nor is it conceded that, if someone can ministerially impress a character, he can thus ministerially take it away, for it is said that God has not made him a minister in taking away as he has made him a minister in conferring. And then the rule 'it is easier to destroy than to build' is not conceded to apply to a ministerial minister in the sacraments, and for this can be adduced *II Corinthians* 13.10, "God has not given us power to destroy but to build up."

179. If the objection is also made about a degraded priest that he does not remain a priest, because he is deprived of clerical privilege and is handed over to the care of the secular power [cf. *Ord.* d.25 q.1 n.4], I reply that having that concomitant privilege is not essential in the case of Orders. Sufficient evidence for this is that the privilege seems to have been conceded by the Emperor Constantine; for at some point the Orders even of a priest were without such privilege, namely before the concession. This however could be a brocade shared with jurists, because the privilege consists in this, that a priest cannot be judged in a cause of blood save by an ecclesiastical judge.

180. But if the Pope takes from someone ecclesiastical privilege, committing him to the care of the secular power, the secular judge is minister or executor of the ecclesiastical judge; but no one other than an ecclesiastical judge can commit him to a secular judge; therefore it is only possible for him to be committed to a secular judge as to a minister of the ecclesiastical judge; and consequently he is not deprived of the privilege, because while the privilege remains no secular can be minister of an ecclesiastical judge over him.

181. If objection is made about a schismatic or heretic that they cannot confect, because a priest does not offer the sacrifice in his own person but in the person of the

Church, of which he is minister, and a schismatic or heretic has been cut off from the Church (and Maser Lombard in the text seems to rely on this reason; he proves the antecedent by the fact that a priest says ‘We offer to Thee etc.’ and not ‘I offer to Thee’) – I reply that offering does not belong to the idea of consecration, nor is it a necessary requirement that a non-consecrated host be offered when it is offered, and then it is a not yet sacrificed sacrifice (just as the consecrated Eucharist conserved in a pyx is the sacrament, though it only be, as it is there, a sacrifice aptitudinally).

182. Let it also be true that anyone who confects must confect in the faith of the Church, yet not only a schismatic but a heretic too (which is more, posit he is a heretic) can well have about the Eucharist the intention of the Church in confecting, and have this intention in a universal way, namely by intending to do what the Church does and what Christ instituted should be done, even though he not intend specifically, because he believes the Eucharist not to have power or to do anything, as is said in *Prior Analytics* 2.21.67a35-36, “it is possible to know that every mule is infertile and to be in doubt about this mule.” And enough was said about this intention in the matter of baptism, IV d.5 nn.17, 22-23.

B. About the Power to Confect in the Way Ordained

183. It remains then to look at the second member, namely about the power to confect in the way ordained [n.170].

184. And I say that for this purpose many things combine, which however (speaking of those that are not required for the power simply) can all be reduced to three, for they are required on the part either of the minister, or of the place, or of the time. And, accordingly, there are three articles.

1. About the Things Required on the Part of the Minister

185. First must be seen what is required on the part of the minister so that he be able to confect in the way ordained (supposing he has fitting matter and can pronounce the words with due intention). Now the things added to these on the part of the minister are found in a double difference, namely some are removals of impediments and some are applying of things fitting or suitable.

a. About the Removal of Impediments

186. About the first: impediments to what it is to confect in the ordained way are either guilt alone, or penalty alone, or neither guilt nor penalty.

187. The impediment of guilt, namely how someone in a state of mortal sin cannot confect, was spoken of in d.9 n.25.

188. And the impediment that is neither guilt nor penalty, namely that one is not fasting with the fast of nature, was spoken of in d.8 nn.170-183.

189. It remains here, then, to see precisely about the impediment that is penalty. Now no such penalty is natural, whether in body or soul, because such penalty simply does not impede, but only a canonical penalty, or a natural penalty on which can be founded a canonical penalty. And a canonical penalty (to speak briefly) is some

prohibition on exercising an act or receiving a degree that would belong otherwise to someone not prohibited.

190. Now of such penalties there are many not founded on any natural penalty or defect, as degradation, irregularity, the greater excommunication, suspension from execution of things belonging to Orders, simony, infamy – and certain things of the sort reducible to these, as that under infamy can be included public sin (this includes much, as public fornicator, public usurer) and things such as drunkenness.

191. But some canonical penalties are founded on natural defects, for the Church did not wish defective persons of any sort to minister at the altar. And rightly, because in the Old Law, *Leviticus* 21.17, a law is set down for a man “who hath a blemish, not to offer bread to his Lord, nor advance to his ministry.”

192. Now these defects are those in which, if such a person defective in nature were to serve as minister, there would be scandal to the weak. And reasonably, because whatever can be omitted without mortal sin is to be avoided if the exercising of it cause scandal to the weak. Such scandal would arise if those with notable natural defects, as the mutilated or those infirm with some horrible infirmity (as leprosy and the like) were to minister at the altar.

193. Therefore has the Church reasonably affixed to such natural defects canonical penalties and prohibitions against ministering, because of reverence for the sacrament and to avoid scandal of the weak. And these prohibitions are plain in *Decretum* p.1 d.25 and *Decretals* I tit.20.

194. Required, therefore, in one who confects in the way ordained is the removal of all these impediments, because, if he who has any of them confects, he does so against the prohibition of the Church, and consequently not in the way ordained.

b. About the Applying of Things Fitting

195. The second thing that is required on the part of the minister is the applying of things fitting, namely of ornaments, as is contained in *Decretum* p.3 d.1 ch.42. Said there is that “The vestments of the Church, in which God is served, should be sanctified and honorable, they should not be used for uses other than ecclesiastical duties worthy of God, and should not be worn by others.”

196. Now which these items of clothing are is expounded by Innocent III, *Sacrament of the Altar* I ch.10: “There are,” he says, “six items of clothing common to bishops and priests, namely amice, alb, girdle, stole, maniple, planet.” However, in certain places the custom has obtained that the belt need not be blessed, and thus it does not appear to be licit to use a belt that has not been blessed.

c. About Penalties Against Ministers who Behave Otherwise

197. And if, as to all the things on the part of the minister, whether required for the power simply (in the first member [nn.185-194]) or required in this second member (about the things required on the part of the minister for power in the way ordained [nn.185-196]), the question is asked what the penalty is for a minister who makes an attempt otherwise, I reply: if he is mute he cannot attempt to speak; if he does not have the use of reason he cannot attempt to have the due intention; if he is not a priest and

attempts to do as a priest does, he is sinning mortally but also achieves nothing; he is also irregular, as is contained in the *Extra* under the heading ‘About a non-ordained cleric who ministers’ [*Innocent*, *ibid.*]. And universally, whoever carries out or attempts the act of an Order he does not have is irregular; it is plain from diverse cases under that heading.

198. Now the penalty for one who ministers when under any canonical impediment is that of irregularity, as is plain in *Extra* under ‘About an excommunicated or deposed cleric’, in diverse chapters – and this most of all if the one ministering knows such a penalty is inflicted on him.

199. But here a distinction can be drawn between ignorance of fact and ignorance of law

Ignorance of law does not excuse, because he who takes so great an act upon himself knows the laws according to which he can perform such and so great act; and therefore such ignorance of law does not excuse, but perhaps it aggravates more.

200. But ignorance of fact does excuse, as is contained in the same title there [*Innocent*, *ibid.*, n. 198] – and this unless true and public repute make manifest to him that he is prevented by such penalty. This is proved by that chapter, with the same title: “Since he was sure only by repute about the judgment passed against him, he is believed not to sin if he celebrated the divine office as solemnly as possible,” to which is added: “Because in doubtful things the safer way is to be chosen; and though he might be unsure about the sentenced passed against him, yet he ought rather to abstain than carry out the ecclesiastical sacraments.” And at the end is added, “We, exercising mercy toward him, have not thought the penalty should be inflicted on him that the Canon inflicts on those who have, after excommunication, presumed to celebrate divine offices.”

201. From this is plain that the penalty incurred by canon law is mercifully relaxed for one in doubt who, after excommunication passed against him has become known by public repute, has celebrated the divine offices.

202. However, among these impediments minor excommunication is not included, insofar, namely, as the penalty of irregularity follows, because, as is contained under the same title: “although he who celebrates under minor excommunication sins gravely, yet he incurs no mark of irregularity.”

203. However, about one guilty of simony [*Decretum* p.1 d.33 ch.2] or a public or notorious sinner, there is doubt.

But it first seems to be solved by *Decretum* p.2 cause 1 q.1 ch.21: among those who must not be promoted is named he who has, in imitation of Simon Magus, offered money for the purchase; and in *Decretals* V tit.3 ch.2 Pope Gregory condemns simoniacs altogether and decrees by apostolic authority that they be removed from office; and this is spoken of in the text there and in the gloss. Therefore such a person seems, because of canonical penalty, simply unsuitable for acts of Order, just as he must, because of the authority cited, be altogether expelled from the clergy.

204. About a public or notorious sinner, it is certain that, before penance, he sins mortally by confecting, not only because he is in a state of mortal sin but also because he causes scandal.

205. But is he irregular?

A penalty inflicted on him for this is perhaps not found in the canon, for although he is prohibited by *Decretum* p.1 d.32 ch.5, “Let no one hear the mass of a priest whom

he knows without doubt has a concubine” and from this it would seem that he is forbidden to celebrate (because he is more strictly bound to avoid celebrating than the hearer is from hearing, and consequently, if he celebrates, he acts against the precept of the Church), yet this consequence is not necessary in penalties, because ‘penalties are not to be amplified’ [*Ord.* IV d.6 n.185]. And sometimes communication with him in any act is forbidden, so that he may recover himself and be corrected; but the penalty of irregularity is not inflicted on him if he performs this act.

206. The same could be said of a public usurer, who also persists in his sin of usury.

207. However, about an infamous person who has repented of his sin but has not yet been fully restored, whether he would be irregular when celebrating – one should not say that he would be unless it is found in Canon Law that this penalty is to be inflicted on him.

208. Now as to someone who celebrates without all or some of the ornaments, or celebrates with non-consecrated ones – that the penalty of irregularity is imposed is not found in Canon Law.

209. Briefly, since this penalty is one of Canon Law, it is not incurred when it is not inflicted.

210. No condition, therefore, required on the part of the minister and not observed, makes him incur irregularity save lack of priesthood and some canonical penalty prohibiting or removing him simply from exercise of the priesthood. And consequently someone not prohibited by such penalty does not incur irregularity when confecting. So irregularity is not incurred because of sin (unless it is of the sort that has a canonical prohibition annexed to it), nor because of failure to observe the fast, nor because of lack of due ornaments, nor briefly because of anything else not contained under those stated above.

2. About the Things Required on the Part of the Place

211. The second main topic follows [n.184], namely the things required on the part of the place. Here we can draw a distinction between place properly speaking and a vessel, which is a sort of movable place according to the Philosopher, *Physics* 4.4.212a20-21.

a. About Place Properly Speaking

212. On the part of place properly speaking removal of impediments is required, namely that the place is not forbidden, and appointment of fitting disposition is required, namely that the place be sanctified.

213. The first is simply necessary, because he who celebrates in a forbidden place acts against the prohibition of the Church, and consequently not in ordained fashion.

214. The second is necessary unless a case of necessity arise, as is proved by *Decretum* ‘On Consecration’, p.3 d.1 ch.11, “In places other than those consecrated to the Lord, that is, tabernacles anointed by pontiffs, it is not licit to chant or to celebrate.” The same is plain from the next chapter and the following one, where is said, “Let no priest

presume to celebrate mass save in places sanctified by a bishop, who has wanted it in other respects to share his priesthood.”

215. But the exception there about a case of necessity is plain *ibid.*, and the cases there are these: as when the churches in a country are destroyed, or if someone traveling cannot at all get to a consecrated church (which is regularly true of those traveling by ship, and others of the sort). For it does not seem likely that observation of the precept of the decalogue ‘Keep the sabbath holy’ (which precept the Church has interpreted to mean hearing mass on the Lord’s day, *Decretum* p.3 d.1 ch.64) was intended by the Church to be impeded by a precept of lesser obligation (as that such and such a place is determinately required for mass to be heard), since no one should be constrained in observance of something more necessary by the strictness of something less necessary.

216. But what and where are the consecrated places?

As a rule, they are parish churches and other solemn collegiate churches.

217. Oratories, that are called ‘chapels’ cannot be held to be consecrated save by license of the bishop, *Decretum* p.3 d.1 ch.33, “Each of the faithful is permitted to have an oratory and to pray there, but not to celebrate masses there,” save in the above stated cases [n.215]; for it is not permitted to make a sacred oratory without the authority of the bishop, *Decretals* III tit.41 ch.14.

218. Now there is need of ornament for the place, namely a light, as is said *ibid.*, “He was sacrificing without fire and water,” and there follows, “We command that you deprive him perpetually of office and benefice.”

b. About Movable Place or Vessels

219. About movable place or vessels [n.211] I draw the distinction that the altar is a remote vessel, and must also be made of stone, *Decretum* p.3 d.1 ch.31, “If altars are not made of stone, let them not be consecrated with the oil of chrism.” Proximate vessels are the cup and the paten, which should be made of gold or silver or, where poverty compels, at least of tin, as is contained *ibid.*, “let the chalice of the Lord, along with the paten, be made, if not of gold, then of silver. But if someone is so poor, at least let him have a tin chalice; but let it not be made of bronze or brass, for this causes, because of the power of the wine, rust (or mildew) and equally vomit. But let none presume to sing masses with a wooden or glass chalice.” Not of glass, reasonably, because of its fragility, lest the Lord’s blood be exposed to danger; not of wood because it absorbs the moisture.

220. Again, all vessels should be consecrated. Discussion about the altar is contained in *Decretum* p.3 d.1 chs.18, 30-32. Now whether the altar is fixed, as it commonly is in churches, or portable, makes no great difference, because it is fitting on a portable altar or on the fixed one to celebrate masses, as is contained in *Decretals* V tit.33 ch.30, “We have judged that the Friars Minor and the Order of Preachers should be so indulged that, wherever they might be, they may be able, without prejudice to the parish, to celebrate with a traveling altar; some, interpreting our indulgence too strictly, try to say that the aforesaid Brothers cannot do this without the assent of the prelates.” And a little later, “But since the mentioned indulgence confers nothing on them (without it the same thing would be permitted to them if the prelates approved), we decree, having thus far rejected this sort of interpretation, that, provided however they altogether abstain from things that come from parochial right, they not defer to make public the license of

celebrating given to them also by our authority, so that the aforesaid Brothers may be seen to have in this obtained grace from our indulgence,” says Pope Honorius III.

221. If an objection be drawn from this article that it is not licit to use a traveling altar save by privilege, I reply that this is true as regard its use in any consecrated or non-consecrated place indifferently; but as to its use in a consecrated place, common right seems enough, because, before the dedication of the altar in any church whatever, celebration commonly occurred on the little altar, which is called the ‘super-altar’.

222. And this altar, whether fixed or movable and portable, must not have huge fractures, *Decretals* III tit.40 chs.1, 3, where it is said that “if a blessed stone has been moved, it must be blessed again.”

223. The chalice too and paten must be consecrated, *Decretum* p.3 d.1 ch.2.

224. These vessels must also be decorated, the altar indeed with two panels and, where it is the custom of the church, consecrated and, which is more precise, with a corporal of clean muslin. And it is necessary that the corporal cover at least the place of the chalice and the host, which must be placed on top of the consecrated altar, if the whole altar is immovable and consecrated, or upon a movable altar, when the use of this is required.

3. About Penalties for Him who Celebrates without these Requirements

225. If it is asked what the penalty is for one who celebrates without the aforesaid conditions on the part of the place and vessel, I say that irregularity is incurred in none of them save perhaps in two cases: first if he celebrates in a place forbidden by a judge, another if he celebrates with an unsuitable chalice.

226. As to the first of these, one must understand that a place can be forbidden by a judge or by law:

By law indeed if it is polluted by blood or seed, *Decretals* III tit.40 ch.10; and in such cases, provided the thing is notorious, it is a sin to celebrate; however, irregularity is not incurred, because it is not expressly imposed by law; but if the thing is private, it is not even a sin because neither does it need reconciliation, *ibid.*, tit.16 ch.5.

227. But if the prohibition against the place is imposed by a judge, one who celebrates there is said to incur irregularity. The proof is *ibid.*, tit.27 ch.7, tit.31 ch.18. However, both chapters could be given a fair exposition, because neither is expositive of law, and not even a response of positive law; nor does it appear that someone so celebrating is simply irregular. The point is clear from exposition of the words, when well considered, about privation of benefices and the like.

228. In the second case [n.225], namely lack of suitable chalice, it is doubtful whether irregularity is incurred because of it, for the penalty of being deposed contained in *ibid.* III tit.41 ch.14 is inflicted for several things, as that he did not use the due chalice nor water nor fire, and it is doubtful if deposition should be imposed for any of these separately, because in the text all of them came together.

4. About the Things Required on the Part of the Time

229. The third main point, on the part of the time [n.184].

Briefly, you may hold that mass is fittingly celebrated from the beginning of the day up to nones, calculating the beginning of the day not from the rising of the sun above our horizon but from the hour at which the solar rays illumine our hemisphere, which is called the beginning of the aurora (according to *De Crepusculis*⁵⁹), when the sun is 10 or 8 degrees below the horizon, the ascent from which does not take more than the period of a full hour and a fifth of an hour. And this limit for celebrating then and not before is proved in *Decretum* p.3 d.1 ch.48, “On the holy sabbath [the night of the Lord’s nativity], about the beginning of night, the solemnities of the mass are to be celebrated.” And the reason is that that part of the artificial day, which is after nones on the holy sabbath, is computed along with the night preceding the Lord’s day. Hence in the blessing of the candle it is said, “God who this most holy night.” Now the end of celebration, namely the ninth hour [nones] is gathered from the custom of the churches; and this end is reached especially on days of fasting, when in collegiate churches the mass after fasting is regularly wont to be celebrated about the ninth hour.

230. Now this circumstance of time is accompanied by a certain necessity to mark a period of time in the celebration of an ordained mass, at whatever hour of the artificial day it is done, namely to read the introit, prayers, and epistle, as is noted in the missals according to the use of the Roman Church, without which preceding acts no one confects in the ordained way; nor perhaps absolutely could anyone confect (as said above in d.8 nn.66-71, 89-91) without first saying at least the words by which he would signify that he was pronouncing the words of consecration in the person of Christ, not in the proper person of the priest.

C. About the Necessity of Having a Respondent in the Celebration of the Mass

231. The last point is that the celebrant must have someone who gives reply in the person of the whole Church, so that the celebrant may be known to be mediator in this act between God and the Church, who offers sacrifice to God for the Church, which assists him in doing the offering [*Decretum* p.3 d.1 ch.61].

II. To the Initial Arguments

232. As to the first initial argument [n.161], an exposition can be given to that gloss [*ibid.*] “whatever is blessed by you” on the words of *Malachi* 2 (namely “insofar as you are evil”), because the evil, insofar as they are such, bless by flattering the evil who are truly cursed by God; but in the Eucharist the priest does not bless insofar as he is evil, but insofar as he keeps the intention of the Church in blessing and consecrating.

233. To the second [n.162], when it is said “no power is left to him,” this is true of power for carrying out the Eucharist in ordained way, but not of power for carrying it out simply.

234. As to the third [n.163], if the offering of the sacrament, insofar as it is offering of the sacrament, has its efficacy from the fact it is offered, one must concede that an offering made by a bad priest has an efficacy equal to that made by a good priest. But if the many other things contained in the mass by way of prayer do much for the efficacy of the mass – which appears probable, because devotion in another prayer is,

⁵⁹ Author: Abu Abd Allah Muhammad ibn Mucadh.

with God, not far distant from devotion in certain things pertaining to the mass; and devotion is accepted according to the merits of him whose devotion it is – the consequence is that the mass of a better priest is better, and yet the sacrament on both sides is equal.

235. If you ask what is to be simply maintained, I reply: God recompenses a good thing according to retributive justice only because of some merit to which that good thing corresponds; the merit that is said to be in the celebration of the mass, as it is the mass, cannot be an abstract merit like an Idea of Plato; therefore it must be some merit in reality. Either then it is the merit of the whole Church or of some member of the Church; but not of the whole Church save because of some member of it. Now it is not the merit of a part of the Church that is bad in the whole and dead in the way it would be of a part that is alive, that is, a part that exists in charity and works in charity. So there is not as much merit in anyone's mass when it is the mass of someone bad as when it is of someone good; and consequently God does not, according to retributive justice, have to give to anyone in the Church, or to the whole Church, as much good in recompense for this mass as for some other mass.

236. To the fourth [n.164] I say that 'to receive' is more necessary than 'to confect', and more necessary though it be in itself sometimes more noble; yet it belongs to more people than does a less noble thing that is of less nobility; and the reason is the greater or more common necessity. So it is here, because Christ expressly taught that he wants the Eucharist to be received by any Christian whatever, *John* 6.54, "Unless you eat of the flesh of the Son of Man...", and he is there speaking to everyone. But the consecration or the dispensing he did not want to be as common, because that it be common was not as necessary; for fewer have power to dispense than to receive.

237. To the fifth [n.165] I say that Blessed Laurence dispensed the blood of Christ, as is plain in the *Legend*; and this is most fitting, because he only dispensed the blood in the chalice, and holding the cup is permitted to a deacon.

238. But the body is not dispensed unless the species of the bread is touched, and therefore the subsequent authority (about the dispensing of the body by the deacon [*ibid.*]) seems more difficult. One can say to this that being able to dispense the body of Christ, as the alleged authority [from the *Decretum*] says, is simply permitted to a deacon in a case of necessity; but it does not follow from this that he can confect, because to dispense is less than to confect.

239. But not only does it in no way belong to a layman to confect but even to dispense, according to *Decretum* p.3 d.2 ch.29, where it is said, "Some priests think so little of the divine mysteries that they hand over the body of the Lord to laymen to carry to the sick;" and there follows, "The Synod forbids such rash presumption to continue any further."

240. And the fitting reason is that just as from the soul, through the medium of the heart, the powers of the soul are passed on to the other members of the body, and just as the principal seat of life is in the heart (*Generation of Animals* 2.4.738b16-17), and just as also in any polity the principal act belonging to the polity belongs to some chief person in the polity – so it is reasonable that the rite or act of confecting and dispensing the Eucharist reside with him who is chief in the ecclesiastical hierarchy; of such sort is a priest.

241. There is a confirmation of this, because to have power over the true body of Christ is of no less reverence and authority than to have power over the mystical body of Christ; but the latter belongs only to the priest; therefore equally or more so does authority as regard confecting and dispensing regularly belong (because of reverence for the true body of Christ) only to the priest; for there cannot be found a person or a rank more worthy in the Church for the consecrating and dispensing of this sacrament, in which sacrament is truly and really contained he who is the Holy of holies.

To whom be glory for ages of ages. Amen.