

Summa of a Scotus Summa.

The following translations from Jerome of Montefortino's selections and arrangement of Scotus' writings are meant to make more readily and readably accessible the philosophical theology of the Subtle and Marian Doctor.

Montefortino's arrangement of his selections follows the pattern of St. Thomas Aquinas' *Summa Theologica*. However, only the responses in the body of each article are translated here. Adding the objections and replies that are in Montefortino's original (again following the Thomistic pattern) would not only greatly extend the size of the translation but would also make the whole less accessible to interested readers. It would again put Scotus' positions back into the larger dialectical context, whereas the desideratum here is to present those positions as simply and as straightforwardly as possible. One does, admittedly, in this way lose the completeness as well as some of the rigor and flavor of Scotus' own writing, but if one really wants Scotus as Scotus pure, one should not bother with Montefortino in the first place but go directly to the recently completed critical texts of Scotus' own writings. The present 'Summa of a Summa' (title borrowed, with appreciation, from Peter Kreeft) has a different purpose and a different utility.

Montefortino's texts, which are from the old Wadding edition of Scotus' works, fairly represent Scotus as he was discussed and defended for many centuries after his death. This advantage is no mean one, although these texts combine elements from different writings of Scotus (as that the Oxford work, or Oxon. here, combines the *Ordinatio* with parts of the *Reportatio* and the *Additiones Magnae*), and even contain some writings now known not to have been by Scotus but by some of his early followers. The recent critical editions of Scotus' writings, while more accurate to what Scotus himself wrote and when (and so more valuable for scholarly purposes), are less accurate to Scotus as he was widely known (and so less valuable for understanding historical Scotism).

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Theological Prayer of Master Scotus to the Most High God [from his On the First Principle]

Lord our God, when your servant Moses was making presentation to the children of Israel about your name and was asking it of you the most true teacher, you knew what the intellect of mortals could conceive of you and, keeping back your own blessed name, you replied to him, Exodus ch.3, "I am who am." You are true being; you are the whole of being. For you are the first efficient and the last end of all things. You are supreme in perfection and transcend all things. You are altogether uncaused, therefore wholly incapable of not being, and therefore eternal, possessing all at once and most fully unendingness of duration, without any possibility of succession. You live with the most blessed life, because you have intelligence and will. You are blessed, nay blessedness itself, because you are the comprehension of yourself. You are clear vision and most sweet love of yourself; and although you are blessed in yourself alone and are supremely sufficient for yourself without anything else, yet you actually understand everything intelligible all at once. You are able all at once to will contingently and freely everything causable, and by willing to cause it; therefore you are most truly of infinite power. You are incomprehensible, infinite; for nothing that knows all things is finite; nothing of infinite power is finite; nothing supreme in beings and their ultimate end is finite; nothing existing of itself and altogether simple is finite. You are of infinite and supreme simplicity, having no parts really distinct. You alone are simply perfect, to whom is lacking nothing that can exist in another. It can altogether not happen that all being should be found in something in its formal and proper being, but it can be in something formally or eminently, in the way that you God preconceive, and you possess whatever is and can be of perfection in beings; therefore being established on the supreme and highest peak you alone are infinite, all other things being infinitely lacking in this excellence by the condition of its nature. You are good without limit, most freely bestowing the rays of your goodness, to whom as most lovable each thing in its own way hastens together as to the ultimate end of all things. You are intelligible in the most perfect intelligible way. You are present to your own intellect. You are alone are the first truth; since that which appears what it is not is false, and so the reason for its appearance is something other than it, because if its nature alone were the reason for its appearance it would appear to be what it is. But you have no reason of appearance; for all things would appear in your essence once you first appear; and so nothing later than you is a reason of appearance for you. In that essence, I say, everything intelligible, under the most perfect idea of intelligible, is present to your intellect. You therefore are intelligible, most clear truth, and infallible truth, and most certainly comprehending the truth of all intelligibles. Besides these things that are proved of you by the philosophers, Catholics often praise you as omnipotent, immense, everywhere present, true, just, and merciful, caring for all creatures and especially intelligible ones. Therefore Lord our God, you are naturally one, your are numerically one. Truly have you said, "Beside me there is no God." You are true God alone, God from whom are all things, in whom are all things, through whom are all

things. Aid me, Lord, in my inquiry, to as much knowledge as our reason can attain as I examine those things which you have deigned to reveal to us, and that we hold by most firm faith. For you have preached that you are first and last; teach your servant therefore to show by reason that you are sole, true, total being, and first efficient cause of all things and their ultimate end, and above all of those things for which you bear your chief care, namely the intellectual and rational creature. You are blessed for ages of ages. Amen.

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Part One

**FIRST QUESTION: ON SACRED DOCTRINE, WHAT IT IS, AND TO WHAT THINGS IT
EXTENDS.
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Article One: Whether there was Need for a Doctrine to be had besides the Philosophical Disciplines.

Response [Oxon. ib. n.4ff.]: one must say that beyond the philosophical disciplines that are acquired by human reason and industry, some other doctrine revealed by God is plainly necessary so that by it man may be able to attain eternal salvation. But because it cannot be proved by the natural light of the intellect that man is ordered to attaining beatitude in the future age [Theoremata 14 n.19], therefore the present solution cannot be demonstrated by an evident and necessary reason; but it is made clear by probable reasons as follows:

[Oxon. Prol. ib n.6] Everything that acts by knowledge needs a distinct knowledge of its end; for since it can attain the proper end to which it is ordered only by its operations, unless it has distinct knowledge of its end and knows that in this the proper idea of its end consists, it will not be able to direct its proper acts toward it. But man cannot know by his natural light that this and not something else is determinately his proper end; therefore he must be instructed and taught by some other doctrine what his end is so that he may direct his proper operations toward it. The minor is proved by reason, because we cannot know the proper end of any substance [Oxon. ib. n.7] save from the acts of that are manifest to us, namely from which it is plain that that end is fitting for such a nature; but we know or experience no acts existing us in this present life from which we may know that the vision of separate substances is fitting for us; therefore we cannot naturally know distinctly or determinately that this end is fitting for us; so some other revealed doctrine is required whereby we may be made certain of such end. And even if what our end is like were able to be learnt by natural reason (which however has not been shown), yet the conclusion would not be that man, consisting of body and soul, is able to possess such felicity perpetually, the way we now by revelation pursue future felicity. Nevertheless, that man will be thus happy perpetually is a condition enticing us to desire and pursue such a good more eagerly. So these and the like conditions of the end must be known so that each may more efficaciously investigate after it and try to attain it. Therefore some doctrine handed on by revelation from God is required. –

Second: [Oxon. ib. n.8] Everything that acts per se through knowledge needs a triple knowledge: first, how and in what way the end may be acquired; second, knowledge of all that is necessary for the end; finally, third, the agent must know that all those things are sufficient for attaining the end. As to the first, the fact is manifest, because if it does not know how the end may be acquired it will as a result not know how it may dispose itself to attaining it. As to the second, the proof is that

if it does now know all the things necessary for the end, it could, through ignorance of something necessary, fail of the end. As to the third too, for if it does not know that those necessary things suffice, by doubting whether it is ignorant of something necessary it will effectively pursue that which is necessary; "now if (says Augustine, City of God 11.2) one does not know by what way one should go, what profit is it to know whither one should go?" But these three things the wayfarer cannot know by natural light. The proof as to the first is that beatitude is conferred as a reward for the merits of him whom God accepts as worthy of such reward; and consequently beatitude follows by no natural necessity on any acts of ours whatever; for it is given contingently by God who accepts as meritorious certain acts ordered toward himself. But this is not naturally knowable; for in this respect the philosophers erred when they posited that everything that is immediately from God is necessarily from God. Or at least the other two points are not manifest; for the acceptance of the divine will cannot be naturally known, namely that it should hold accepted as worthy of eternal life things that are contingently such and such. Therefore some other doctrine was altogether necessary so that man the wayfarer might be instructed about those necessary things without which he may not attain the ultimate end which he desires and for which he acts. – These reasons seem to have certain instances against them, as that, [Oxon. ib. n.9] once the thing caused is known, any *per se* cause on which it essentially depends can be proved *a posteriori*: first because man naturally desires his end, wherein he is perfected and finds rest, and so, once the nature that is so ordered is known, the end itself can be known and proved by the natural light of the intellect; second because it is naturally knowable that the first object of our intellect is being as being, and naturally knowable too that the most perfect idea of being is found in God, and hence that he must be the end of the power as being best; again, because when any power is naturally knowable, what its first object is is also naturally knowable, and Augustine Trinity 14.4 supposes that his mind is known to him. To these, I say, and the like instances satisfaction can be made by a single response, which says [Oxon ib. n.11] that they all suppose that nature or the intellective power is naturally knowable to us; but this is plainly false, namely that it is knowable under that proper and special idea under which it is ordered to the ultimate end, and under which it is capable of eternal felicity, and under which it has God for most perfect object. For neither our soul nor our nature is known by us in this present life save under some general idea abstractable from sensible things; but according to this general idea it does not belong to it to be ordered to such an end, nor is it capable of consummate grace, nor does it have God for most perfect object. Therefore, although God is the natural end of man, naturally desired by man, yet he is not naturally attainable, nor equally can it be known by natural light that he is attainable under the idea of end; nor again is it known that being as being, namely in complete indifference of being as to sensible and non-sensible things, is the first object of the intellect save on the supposition of revelation; but on the contrary the light of the intellect seems to declare that that object is quiddity abstractable from sensible things. Lastly the saying of Augustine [above] is to be understood of the first act that is sufficient of itself for its second act, but this second act cannot now be had because of a certain impediment, namely that the intellect depends in its understanding on phantasms. –

Third, the above stated solution is made clear in this way: [Oxon. ib. n.14] the knowledge of separate substances and of what is proper to them is maximally noble and necessary for us; but we cannot get that knowledge for ourselves by natural investigation; therefore, over and above all the natural disciplines, some other revealed doctrine is necessary for us. The proof of the minor is, first, that, if it were possible to reach knowledge of the properties of God and of the intelligences, these properties would be handed down in Metaphysics; but that is not in fact done, nor can be done, because they are not included virtually in the first subject of Metaphysics; second, because those properties are not known through their demonstrative 'why' unless the subjects of which they are the properties are known; but no one has said that those subjects are naturally knowable; nor can they be investigated from their effects by demonstration as to the fact; for no creature displays the property of the divine essence that is its being undivided in three persons; the philosophers too have from its effects deduced that the first principle performs extrinsic acts by necessity, although it is clear that it does them freely and contingently; likewise arguing from effects they have thought they should conclude that the intelligences and the world exist from eternity, are incapable of sin, and finally that they are as many, and no more and no fewer, than the motions of the celestial orbs; but sincere faith and revealed doctrine teach that all these things are false and that opinions of this sort of the philosophers are most absurd. Therefore a revealed doctrine is altogether necessary.

The conclusion thus declared by this probable reasons is confirmed [Oxon. ib. n.23] from Augustine City of God 11.3, who says: "As to things that are remote from our senses, since we cannot know them by our own testimony, we need other witnesses of them." Since therefore the propositions, from which the adduced arguments were formed, are of themselves neutral for us – for the fact that our beatitude consists in the clear vision and enjoyment of God, and that the way of reaching the attainment thereof are merits and other things of that sort, are not of themselves compelling and do not bend our intellect to assent to them – therefore no one can assent to them by his own testimony; so some other testimony must be used, which is superior to the whole human species and hence is supernatural. – But as to how the first revelation or handing on of such doctrine was made, namely whether it was by some interior or exterior speech, and by certain signs sufficient for causing assent, the thing is doubtful. But it is enough that someone was persuaded, in either mode or way it could have happened, and that the necessary doctrine was revealed; although it is impossible that it could have by any means or way been handed on by the first man without error. – Further, although by natural reason [Oxon. ib. n.24] it could be shown, and the aforesaid arguments are sufficiently accurate that they prove it is necessary to know determinately one or other side of this contradiction, 'enjoying is the end, enjoyment is not the end,' lest the intellect be purely in doubt and neutral – for surely that doubt or ignorance would impede the attainment of the end – nevertheless it cannot be demonstrated by natural reason that this or that part of the problem must be necessarily known; hence the inference necessarily follows that a supernatural doctrine and light are necessary, wherein may be seen what exceeds all capacity of man. So the reasons adduced, in the way they are naturally known, do conclude to one side of the

contradiction, namely to this or that, but they do not conclude determinately to this side save from things that are matter of belief only.

There are others who prove the conclusion shown hitherto in this way: that which is ordered [Oxon. ib. n.18] to some end for which it is of itself indisposed, must be moved and disposed little by little for attaining that end; but man is ordered to a supernatural end for which he is of himself indisposed; therefore he needs to be disposed little by little for getting that end; but man is disposed by a discipline and a light supernaturally infused; therefore a supernatural doctrine is plainly necessary over and above the sciences humanly acquired. This reason would be efficacious against the philosophers if the two things it presupposes may be proved. First indeed it must be proved that man is ordered to a supernatural end. And second that man cannot be sufficiently disposed to a supernatural end by natural knowledge. But as long as these are assumed and not proved, no conclusion is sufficiently drawn against those who proceed by the natural light alone of the intellect.

Article One Again

Response: one must say that over and above the philosophical disciplines some supernatural doctrine divinely revealed was necessary. To understand this one must put first and consider [Oxon. ib. n.26] in what way something is said to be supernatural or natural. A receptive power then can be compared both to the act which it receives and to the agent from which it receives and by which the act is impressed on it. In the first way a receptive power is either natural, or violent, or neither. Natural indeed if it is naturally inclined to the act; violent if the act is against its natural inclination; neither finally if the power is inclined neither to this act nor to the opposite one, like a surface, which is not more inclined to whiteness than to blackness. In this comparison then there is no supernaturality. But when comparing a receptive power to the agent that impresses the form, there is naturality when the agent is of its own nature fit to impress that form on the power, but supernaturality when it is compared to an agent that is not naturally an impresser of that form on such a receptive power.

Therefore [Oxon. ib. n.21] when comparing the possible intellect to actual knowledge in itself there is no knowledge that is supernatural for it; because the possible intellect is naturally perfected by any knowledge whatever and is naturally inclined to any knowledge whatever. But when it is compared to the agent that is an impresser of intellection, then that knowledge is supernatural which is generated by some agent that is not of a nature to move the possible intellect to such knowledge naturally. But for this present life, according to the Philosopher, the possible intellect is of a nature to be moved to knowledge by the agent intellect and by phantasms; therefore only that knowledge is natural which can be impressed by those agents. Now all knowledge can, by virtue of them, be had of the terms that the wayfarer, by a common law, has from revealed necessities. Therefore although God could by a special revelation cause knowledge of some term, as in the case of rapture, yet such supernatural knowledge is not necessary by common law. – But things are otherwise as to propositions composed of terms; because once all the action of the agent intellect and of phantasms is in place, there will still remain many

propositions that are unknown and neutral for us, and yet knowledge of them is so necessary that without it it would be altogether impossible to pursue the ultimate end. So a knowledge of such propositions must reach us by coming from a supernatural principle and light; because no one could have discovered them by the natural light in such a way that he would assent to them and hand them on to others by teaching. For just as they are neutral for one man, that is, are not perceived by him either as true or as false through the natural light, so are they neutral for all others. There was need then that they be revealed by a Teacher who was above the whole human race and above the whole intelligence of created intellect. Hence that teaching, or the first handing on of it, was supernatural; for it was handed on by an agent not naturally a mover of our intellect for this present life.

Further it can in another way [Oxon. ib. n.22] be said that some knowledge is supernatural to the extent that it is from an agent that is supplying the place of a supernatural object. For the object that is of a nature to cause knowledge of this proposition, that God is three and one, or the like mysteries not naturally knowable, is the divine essence known in its proper idea; but the essence as knowable in this idea is an object supernatural for us; therefore, what causes knowledge of some truths that are of a nature to be evident from such an object when it is thus known, is certainly in this respect supplying the place of that object. And further, if an agent were to cause as perfect a knowledge of the object as the object itself would cause, it would perfectly supply the object's place; but otherwise it would do so imperfectly, namely to the extent that the imperfect knowledge which it causes is virtually contained in the perfect knowledge which the object when known in itself would cause. Therefore, the agent that reveals this proposition, that God is three and one, causes in the mind some knowledge of that truth, namely an obscure knowledge; because it causes it about an object that is not known in its proper idea. To the extent, therefore, that the obscure knowledge is contained in the clear and perfect knowledge, as the imperfect in the perfect, to that extent does the agent that reveals and causes obscure knowledge supply the place of the object. For a revealer could not cause this sort of knowledge of propositions not naturally knowable by supplying the place of some object inferior to the object that would of itself, if it were distinctly known, cause a clear and perfect knowledge of those propositions; for no such inferior object virtually includes knowledge of those truths, not even an obscure and imperfect knowledge; so there was need of some revealer to supply in some way the place of the supernatural object.

The difference [Oxon. ib.] between these ways of positing supernaturality of revealed knowledge is evident to anyone who separates one from the other. For if a supernatural agent were to cause knowledge of a natural object, say if it infused geometry into someone, it would be supernatural in the first way; but not as far as it supplies the place of a supernatural object, for such is not the object of geometry. But if it were to infuse knowledge of this proposition, that God is three, or of others, this would be supernatural in both ways; because the second implies the first, although not conversely. Although, therefore, an agent could by revelation impress a knowledge on the intellect which it could not attain by the action of natural causes, nevertheless, because it can also infuse knowledge of a natural object, therefore it does not necessarily follow that everything infused and revealed by a supernatural

agent be supernatural as to its substance, even though it has some mode of supernaturality. But where there is a mode by which the causality of a supernatural object is supplied, such a revealed thing must be simply supernatural, because it cannot be had naturally. – Since therefore a revealed doctrine is required about mysteries that cannot be attained by the natural light of the intellect (because not even an obscure and imperfect knowledge of the same is virtually contained in objects inferior to the object by knowledge of which mysteries even of this sort are of a nature to be known), then this doctrine and the first revelation of it are supernatural both as to mode and as to substance; and so this doctrine is altogether necessary for us, over and above all the philosophical disciplines which can be acquired by the natural virtue of the created intellect, even were they infused by a supernatural agent.

Intervening Articles about this Supernatural Knowledge being Present in Scripture

[Prefatory] Intervening Article: Whether Sacred Scripture, embracing the Old and New Testaments, is founded on Divine Authority

Response; [Oxon. I d.5 q.1 n.2] About this very serious controversy there are many heretical errors, which are examined by Damascene and Augustine in their books on heresies. Some of these heretics, who accept altogether nothing of Sacred Scripture, deny to it all divine authority. Others, however, willingly accept the New Testament but reject the Old Testament, saying with blaspheming sacrilege that they reject it for the reason that it is from the evil principle. These are the Manichees, whom Augustine refutes at length in many of the volumes he published against them. But the Jews, on the contrary, embrace the Old Testament, stubbornly rejecting the New. Yet others, as the Mahometans, receive some small parts of both Testaments, into which the impure Mahomet has mixed innumerable impurities. Others, badly understanding some saying of Scripture and holding the worse interpretation for their foundation, have sown various and new heresies in the Church, and from them have new heresies arisen, or obsolete ones again been renewed. An example is James ch.5 where he says ‘confess your sins to each other’, and from this verse sectaries have wrongly laid down that the Sacrament of Penance can be dispensed by anyone, even if he is not a Priest, contrary to the institution of Christ and the doctrine of the Catholic Church.

However, one must say [Oxon. ib. n.3] that there are many arguments to hand by which all those who think thus can not only be refuted but plainly convicted of error and falsity provided they are willing to use reason and not fight stubbornly and arrogantly; this can be done indeed, not by adducing the authority of Scripture (although this way of arguing is most valid against those who admit something of Scripture and deny the rest), but by employing more general means whereby all heretics in general can be attacked.

First, then, [Oxon. ib.] there is prophetic foretelling, which is frequent in Sacred Letters, nay which is the greater part of it. For God alone and no other, by the nature of his condition, knows the future before it happens; therefore only he, or someone instructed by him, can with certainty that things which may or may not be

will be. Now Scripture mentions very many things foretold by the Prophets, and the event has very exactly corresponded to their prediction, as is evident to anyone who reads the Prophetic books; therefore no doubt can occur to those who use reason but that the few things that remain to be fulfilled must with equal certitude be performed [Gregory Hom.1 On the Gospels, Augustine City of God 12.10]. Therefore those who predicted such things must have been taught by God or by some other who was certainly instructed by him about future events.

Second [Oxon. ib. n.4] there is the marvelous concord of the Scriptures, and by this means I argue as follows: things that are not evident from the terms, nor are evidently deduced from principles, do not firmly and infallibly win the assent and agreement of many people who are diversely disposed unless these people are moved to assent by a cause superior to their intellect; but the writers of the Sacred Canon, being variously disposed and existing at diverse times, were in complete agreement about things that were not evident from the terms nor could be evidently deduced from principles; therefore a superior cause, by which all things were perceived, must have taught them, inclining their intellect to firmly assent to everything that was revealed to them. Proof of the minor: the intellect must be moved to assent by an object that is either evident in itself or in another; and so nothing else can cause that assent unless it virtually includes the evidence of the object; for if nothing such moves the intellect, then theology will really be neutral to it; therefore, since an object neither evident in itself nor in another causes theological knowledge, only an intellect or a Doctor superior to all created intelligence can move cause assent to those things that do not of themselves cause assent. So since the writers of the Canon agree in theological doctrine, one must necessarily conclude that God is the author of Sacred Scripture.

Third [Oxon. ib. n.5] there is the authority of the writers of the Sacred Canon. For either the books of Scripture are by the authors to whom they are attributed or they are not. If these authors did in fact write those books, then, since they condemn lies, especially in things that pertain to faith and morals, how likely is it that they would have wanted to lie when they said, 'Thus says the Lord,' if in fact God had not spoken? Surely in no way at all. But if the books are denied to these authors, then in the first place this involves a very great difficulty; for the same thing could be said with the same ease of any book whatever, namely that it is not by the author by whom it is said to have been written; or if one denies that one can apply this to other books, why then were these books alone falsely ascribed to authors whose books they were not? Second, either those who ascribed these books to them were Christians or they were not. If they were outside the law of the Christians, how likely is it that they would have wanted to ascribe and attribute such books to authors not only of a different law, but even to authors whom they themselves were arguing thought badly? Surely they would have studied to publish books against them rather than to glorify a different sect by their own writings. If they were Christians, how could they have been induced to impose on the Church with so enormous a lie, especially since their law condemns lies? And how would they assert that God said this or that to the persons to whom the books are ascribed if this did not happen to those persons? Finally how would those books have been so authenticated, and how would it have been publicized through the whole world that they were by their

authors, unless the books were in fact produced by them and their authors were authentic? Wherefore Richard of St. Victor *On the Trinity* 1.2 says, "They have certainly been handed on to us by men of supreme sanctity." And Augustine *City of God* 11.3, speaking of Christ, says, "He spoke as much as he judged to be sufficient, first through the prophets, then through himself, finally through the apostles; he made the Scriptures called Canonical to be of the most eminent authority."

Let the fourth [Oxon. ib. n.6] be the care of those who received the Scriptures, and it proceeds thus: one must either believe someone about contingent things that were not evident to us, or believe no one. And if faith is to be put in no one about things whose existence escapes our knowledge, then faith must equally be denied to those who say the world existed before us, nor must one believe that places or cities are found in the world that we have not seen and that repeated fame says exist or did exist; again neither must one firmly hold that we drew our origin from these parents. But this sort of incredulity would overturn the whole of political life by the roots. Therefore we must have faith in some people about contingent things that have never been evident to us. But if faith must indeed be put in someone, then most of all in that community which is most clearly famed for commanding honesty and for most strongly condemning lies, and especially since it has determined to use the greatest care not to be deceived in receiving doctrine necessary for salvation, as is the sort contained in the Canon of Sacred Scripture. But the Republic of the Jews and Christians has used such great care and diligence in determining which books were ultimately to be placed in the Canon as authentic and written by the revelation of God, that there has never been dispute about it as there has elsewhere about other doctrine; therefore it is rational to have faith in those communities, which say that the books were put together by the special instinct and assistance of God, and that the books have come down to us such as they were when produced by their authors.

The fifth [Oxon. ib. n.7] is taken from the rationality of what is contained in Scripture. For what is more rational than to be bidden to love God above all things as supreme end, and to love one's neighbor as oneself? For God is truly the first cause of all things, and equally their ultimate end; to him therefore, as to the supreme good and the author and cause of all goods, is to be returned above all worship, obedience, and love; and since he is the common good, he is to be sought by everyone and to be held in everyone's prayers and equally to be loved by everyone: "On these two commands hang the Law and the Prophets," *Matthew* 22, and again 7: "Everything then that you wish that men would do to you, do that also to them." From these as from practical principles other things follow to be done that are handed down in Scripture, things honorable, useful, and most consonant to reason, as is manifest to anyone who considers the individual precepts, counsels, and sacraments. For in all of them there shines out a certain explication of the natural law that is 'written in our hearts' Romans 2. Admirably does Augustine say *City of God* 2.28, "Nothing base or disgraceful is proposed for seeing or imitating when either the precepts of the true God are taught, or his miracles narrated, or his gifts praised, or his benefits requested." And indeed nothing is proposed to us for believing about God that dishonors him; nay rather, whatever we hold by faith attests more to the divine perfection than the opposite, as is the unity of essence, and the Trinity of persons, the incarnation of the Word, and the like. For we believe

nothing incredible, because then it would be incredible that the world believes such things, as Augustine deduces *City of God* 22.3, and yet we see that the world has believed them.

Sixth [Oxon. ib. n.8] an argument against the heretics can be taken from the irrationality of the sects that the Community of Christians has condemned. And beginning indeed with the worshippers of idols themselves, what, we ask, can they themselves adduce for the worship of their vain gods when the Philosophers have long shown that there is nothing of the divine in them? What will the Saracens, most vile disciples of the pig Mohammed, allege for their laws, expecting, as they do, for beatitude what befits pigs, namely gluttony and sex? This promise is mocked by Avicenna himself, *Metaphysics* 9.7, although he professes himself a sectary of Mohammed. What of the Jews? How will they show that the New Testament is, as they think, to be rejected when the Old Testament, which they embrace, promises it [*Jeremiah* 31], as the Apostle makes clear in *Hebrews* 3 and 8? How tasteless are their ceremonies without Christ! And that Christ has come and was the author of the New Law, and was therefore to be accepted by the whole world, one can find in the Old Law, *Genesis* 49, "The scepter will not be taken from Judah or a leader from his thighs until he come who is to be sent." And *Daniel* 9, "Seventy weeks are shortened for your people and your holy city, so that their wickedness may be complete and their sin have an end and iniquity be destroyed, and so that eternal justice may be brought in and the vision and prophecy be fulfilled, and the Holy of holies be anointed." What fable may the Manichean asses invent, setting up a first evil principle from which other evils proceed, when they themselves, although not first, were yet very evil? Do they not see that every being, insofar as it is being, is good? Surely too they could have grasped from the New Testament that the Old too is authentic and approved by the authority of God, as Augustine marvelously and most eloquently deals with in *Against Faustus* 12? What could the madness of the remaining heretics put forward? They who wrongly understand some sayings of the Divine Scriptures and, puffed up with pride and opposing the judgment of the Church, have raised their horns against the Holy Spirit who has spoken through the Canonical Authors, and have sown false dogmas made by private spirit to the ruin of souls? Hence Augustine *83 Questions* 66 says, "Error, softened by the name of Christian, could not arise save from Scriptures wrongly understood." And later, "The sense of the Scriptures is wont to be illumined by what surrounds it, and they have not even brought forward other places of Scripture. Hence heresies have by isolated reading arisen which by comparing places have been rejected; because by comparing diverse sentences that could be seen mutually together people brought forward how and in what way they were to be understood." – Against all these heretics is the remark of Augustine in his *Fundamentus Letter*, "I would not believe the Gospel unless I believed the Catholic Church." It is irrational then to accept anything of the canon and to reject the rest; for the Catholic Church, by believing in which he accepts the Canon, embraces the whole equally and each of its parts. – Likewise [Oxon. Prol. q.1 n.23] the doctrines of the Philosophers about with errors conflicting with reason, as Aristotle pursues at large in *Politics* 2 when he deals with republics set up by diverse others. But even what he himself instituted is reprehensible in many things, for in *Politics* 7.7 he says that the gods are to be

honored, teaching that honor is to be shown to them, and in the same place he states a law that no orphan is to be nourished. Also in the same book ch.16 he writes that abortion should be performed on occasion.

Seventh [Oxon. ib. q.2 n.9] is the stability of the Church, both in its head and in its members. As to the first Augustine says *On the Utility of Believing* 17, "Since we see so much help from God, so much progress and fruit, shall we who are of his Church doubt that he is building it in his bosom – his Church which has obtained the peak of authority, as far as the confession of the human race, from the Apostolic See through succession of bishops, while the heretics bark around it in vain, and are condemned partly by the judgment of the people themselves, partly by the weight of the Councils, partly even by the majesty of miracles?" And a little later, "What else is that which can be so ungrateful to opinion and divine help and can want to resist with so much effort the aforesaid authority?" Hence Gamaliel in *Acts* 5 says, "If this teaching or work is from men, it will be destroyed; but if it is from God, you will not be able to destroy it, lest you be found perhaps even to fight against God." And in *Luke* 22 the Lord says to Peter, "I have prayed for thee, that thy faith fail not; and thou, when thou art converted, strengthen thy brethren." Now as to the firmness of the Church in its members, the thing is made clear by Augustine when he says, *ibid.*, "Even the unskilled crowd of men and women, in so many and diverse nations, both believes and preaches." He states a like opinion in his *Fundamentus Letter*, "For who could induce a multitude so great, prone to sin, into keeping a law contrary to flesh and blood but God?"

Eighth [Oxon. ib. n.10] can be urged the splendor of the miracles performed in the Church, thus: since God is sincerest truth he cannot be a witness for falsehood; but when God has been by someone preaching Scripture invoked to show his doctrine true, he has deigned to show it by works proper to God alone, of which sort are miracles; and thereby he has testified that the doctrine of the one who invokes him is true; therefore one should altogether believe that this Scripture has been handed on to us by divine authority. But if you contend that no miracles have intervened, Augustine most acutely responds *City of God* 22.3, "If they do not believe those miracles were done, this one great miracle will suffice for us, that now the whole world has believed without any miracles." And the miracles that are discussed in the place by Augustine are very clear. For if the things we believe are said to be incredible, it is no less incredible, he says, "that plebeians, lowly men, very small in number, unskilled, could have persuaded the world, and even the learned in it, so effectively of a thing so incredible that the world should believe it the way it is seen now to have believed, unless some miracles were done by those through whom the world was induced to believe." Hence he adds: "The world for this reason believed a tiny number of plebeians, lowly, unskilled men, because divinity itself in such contemptible witnesses was more miraculously persuading." And to be sure, what is more incredible: that a few, uneducated, and poor men could have drawn many powerful and wise to a law opposed to flesh and blood? Indeed as one reads the history of the Church there appear in all ages wise men of the world and enemies of the faith who have been converted to the light of truth and have entered the bosom of the Church through baptism, as happened in the case of Paul, Dionysius the Areopagite, Justin, Cyprian, Augustine, and innumerable others. Add

too that God is not absent from those who seek salvation with their whole heart; many who were seeking him were converted to the law of the Christians; indeed, the more fervently they are said to have investigated salvation and truth, the more confirmed they have been in the Christian religion, and, repenting of their erring past, have lived holy and pious lives. Further, many have not doubted to undergo torments and the greatest tortures in great exultation of spirit. But it does not seem probable that this could have happened unless God were unbreakably approving this community that rested on Sacred Scripture and were leading it to salvation.

[Main] Intervening Article: Whether the Supernatural Knowledge necessary for the Wayfarer is adequately handed down in Sacred Scripture

I say that in truth there is contained in Sacred Scripture whatever is necessary to man the wayfarer for salvation, and that in it indeed is contained whatever is sufficient, so that nothing further need be sought after by the members of the Catholic Church who receive what flows to them from the visible head. Proof: for from what was said in the first article, a distinct knowledge of his end is necessary for man the wayfarer, and further knowledge of how the end is to be acquired and of everything that is necessary to the end and that, finally, suffices for acquiring it. But [Oxon. Prol. q.2 n.14] there is contained eloquently in divinely inspired Scripture what the end of man is in particular, that it is the vision and enjoyment of God, and indeed in accord with the circumstances that most lead to seeking and desiring the possession of it, along with the doctrine that the possession of the end will be eternal, not for the soul only but for the soul united again with the body in the general resurrection. In addition, there is determined in the Canon of Scripture the things that are necessary to the end; now these are the ten commandments of the Law, spoken of in *Exodus* 20, and in *Matthew* 19 is said that the observance of them is sufficient for obtaining eternal salvation, "If you would enter into life, keep the commandments." Also the explanation of these things, both as to belief, and as to hope, and as to action is contained there and is collected from diverse places of Sacred Scripture. Finally the properties of immaterial substances are handed down therein, as far as it is possible and useful for the wayfarer to know them. Therefore there is contained and taught in divine Scripture such and so great a supernatural or revealed knowledge and instruction as is sufficient for leading man the wayfarer to the end of blessed life for which he was made. Damascene 1.1: "For since God excels in goodness, he is surely supplier of all good, as one who labors neither under envy nor any affections. For envy is far from the divine nature, as it is free of every perturbation and is alone good." Therefore, "as holding all things in view and examined, and as procuring what conduces for each thing, it has laid open what it is our interest to know, and has kept silent about what was such as to exceed our strength and grasp."

Article Two: Whether Sacred Doctrine is a Science.

Response [Oxon. Prol. q.3 n.4] since there is one theology in itself and another in us, and again since there is one in those who comprehend and another in wayfarers,

one must consider individually about all of them whether the nature of science belongs to them. And starting from the last member, one must say [Oxon. 3. d.24 n.14] that it is not a science in the way that the Philosopher speaks of science in *Post. An.* 1.2. Further, by sacred doctrine, or by our theology, we understand [Oxon. Prol. q.3 n.24] the habit that tends to things contained in divine Scripture and that can be elicited from it; for the Bible embraces whatever God given by general revelation to the Church. That this sacred doctrine, then, is not a science is made clear from the Philosopher in the place cited, where he says, speaking of science, "We think we know each thing simply and not in sophistical way when we think we know the causes and that they are the causes of it and that it is impossible for it to be otherwise." Speaking of them from this statement, he attributes to science four conditions [Oxon. Prol. ib. n.6, Oxon. 3 ib., Report. ib. n.16]: the first is certitude of knowledge, which the Philosopher expresses in the words 'we think we know each thing simply and not in sophistical way', and excludes from the idea of science every doubt and uncertainty. The second condition is that science be of a necessary known object, and so he says 'it is impossible for it (namely the thing known) to be otherwise'. The third condition is that science be caused by a cause evident to the intellect, and so he says, 'we think we know when we think we know the causes'. Finally the fourth condition is that the cause must be applied to the conclusion by a syllogistic discourse, and so he adds 'that they are the causes of it'; that is, one must know that the thing is the way it is by actually knowing the cause and by applying it to known conclusions. From these conditions the Philosopher concludes that demonstrative science proceeds from things first, and true, and more known, and causes of the conclusion. – Since therefore sacred doctrine and our theology manifestly lack evidence from the nature of the thing, then this idea of science cannot belong to it. For our theology deduces its conclusions from revealed principles, either by taking a clearer statement from Scripture to expound one that is less clear, or by making use of other natural sciences and especially metaphysical ones. If someone proceeds in the first way, then he does not have a greater certitude or a clearer evidence about the Scripture expounded than about the Scripture expounding. If he makes use of natural sciences, then the conclusion will from the nature of the thing not be more evident to the intellect than is the second of the premises, which premise has lesser certitude and evidence; just as it is in the case of any mixed syllogism, the certitude of the conclusion is the certitude of the less certain premise. Since therefore the premise taken from Scripture, or from revealed articles and the things that necessarily follow from these, is not evident from the terms but is a thing believed, so the conclusion too will be a thing believed and not evident, and so not demonstrated or generating science, although it could and thence would be generated in the intellect a habit other than faith. – These things, which have been said of the exposition, proceed also of the solution of the contrary assertions. For the solution of arguments has as much certitude and evidence as the things that are used for it; if then they are taken from the Scriptures, the solution will only be a thing believed; if they are taken from elsewhere, it will have the certitude and evidence that Scripture can have for what rests on it, though never certitude from evidence. – Now all this proceeds *de facto*, but it is possible in principle [Quodl. q.7 n.7, Report. Prol. q.2 n.15] for the wayfarer to have by special

privilege a theology communicated to him that would be science for him in the most proper sense, namely as having all the conditions that science, commonly understood, intrinsically demands. Since indeed [as will be made clear below q.12 a.2] a wayfarer can have infused in him a habit or a likeness in which the divine essence is distinctly and abstractively known as to the status of the present life; for only the knowledge of God that the Blessed have in the Fatherland is repugnant to this present life; but an intellect capable of having a concept that virtually includes all the ordered truths that are contained in the object thus known, can have about such object a science properly understood; therefore in principle the theology in the intellect of the wayfarer can have all the conditions of science. The minor here is evident, because a very distinct concept of the subject of theology, which is God, can be communicated that falls short of intuitive cognition; for about any object of science there can be had a very distinct abstractive knowledge that falls short of intuitive knowledge; for no science is about a thing as precisely existing, although in other respects existence itself is the idea understood in the object. But the very distinct concept of an object abstractively known virtually and evidently contains all the necessary truths of the subject, insofar as they are ordered among themselves and are of a nature to be inferred one from another. And although contingent truths are not included in it as to their actuality, because then they would be necessary, yet their possibility would be distinctly known and made evident through it, as through their cause, from the idea distinctly understood of the subject. So the wayfarer who has such a concept would have the perfect science of theology, since through the most distinct concept of divinity capable of being had in this life he would know in ordered fashion all the necessary truths, whether those that are about intrinsic properties, or those that have regard to extrinsic possibilities.

Article Two again

Response: [Oxon. Prol. q.3 n.4] just as any knowledge at all is in itself that which is of a nature to be had about its object, insofar as the object is of a nature to manifest itself to an intellect proportioned to it, so in the same way theology is the sort of knowledge that the theological object is of a nature to produce in an intellect proportioned to it. Since therefore [Oxon. ib. n.7ff.] the first theological object is infinite being, which contains in itself all intelligibles, clearly it will only be proportioned to an infinite intellect, to which it makes known everything it virtually contains, since the object would be comprehended by such an intellect. But [Oxon. ib. n.24] the theology of the blessed has its term from the will of God who reveals; for although they clearly intuit the theological object, in which they are in fact beatified, yet they do not intuit everything from it that is contained in it, but only what God wishes to make known to them.

One must next say [Oxon. ib. q.4. nn.26-27] that theology in itself, which is the same as the theology of God, is not science as to the fourth condition noted in the preceding article from the Philosopher; but the theology of the blessed is properly science according to all the conditions of science. The first part is clear, for the causing of science discursively from principle to conclusion involves imperfection on the part of the science; for the effect is an equivocal one, lacking the perfection of

the cause; it also includes potentiality on the part of the receiving intellect; so theology in itself is not science as to the ultimate condition of science; but as to the other three conditions it is science both in itself and in the divine intellect. – But that theology in the intellect of the blessed has all the conditions of science is clear thus: because the quiddity of the subject, in whatever light it is seen, contains virtually all the truths that it can make known to an intellect that is passive to such an object; if then the quiddity of line, seen in the natural light, can make known to our intellect the truths included in it, by like reason it can do so when seen in the divine essence; but every truth caused in our intellect by something previously naturally known is caused discursively, because discursive knowledge does not require succession of time nor any order of it, but the order of nature, namely that the principle of the discursive knowledge is naturally first known, and as so known is causative of the other extreme of the discursive knowledge; theology in the blessed then is science as to all the conditions of science.

Intervening Article: Whether the Theology of the Wayfarer is Subalternate to the Theology of God and of the Blessed

Response: [Oxon. Prol. q.3 n.30] one must say that the theology of wayfarers is not at all subalternate to the theology of God and the blessed. For, following the doctrine of the Philosopher taken from Post. An. 1 text 69, the subject of a subalternate science is disposed by way of an addition in respect of the subalternating science, that is, the subject is held less broadly in view because of the accidental difference added to it, and under this limitation the subalternate science considers and deals with the object of the subalternating science. But our theology and the theology of the blessed and God have altogether the same subject, namely God under the idea of deity, as will be explained below in a.7 and as they hold who try to establish the opposite conclusion; therefore even on their principles our theology should not be said to be subalternate. Next when he [sc. St. Thomas Aquinas] defends the opposite conclusion [ST IIa IIae q.1 a.5] he says expressly that faith and science cannot stand together about the same object; but if our theology is a science subalternate to the theology of the blessed, science under the proper idea of subalternate science stands together with faith in the case of the wayfarer; for the same things will be both believed and known. Nor is this problem solved even if one says that the discussion there [ibid.] is about the subalternating science and not the subalternate science; for exactly the same implication follows, that the subalternating and subalternate science exist together along with faith, for in the case of both sciences evidence from the nature of the thing is required, and this evidence faith essentially excludes. For he who knows the principles of the conclusions can also know the conclusions themselves; he then who has the subalternating science can also learn the subalternate science together with it. And likewise, since the principles of the subalternating science are more universal and prior, they are therefore easier for the intellect than the principles of the subalternate science are; for they are knowable non-discursively from the evidence of the terms; but the principles of the subalternate science are not knowable in this way. But in the case in question both are impossible; for it is as repugnant that the blessed have our theology as it is that

the wayfarer have the theology of the blessed. Next, the subalternate science depends on the subalternating science, insofar as the knowledge of the principles of the subalternate science are caused by knowledge of the principles of the subalternating science, either at least by the object of the subalternating science or by its principles; but the theology revealed to us, that God is three and one, is not caused in any way by the knowledge of the blessed, which is a clear vision of the revealed mysteries; therefore our theology is not subalternate to the theology of the blessed. The minor is evident from the fact that a science depends essentially only on the power and the object in itself or in its species; but the theology of the blessed is not the object of our theology such that, if we knew their knowledge, we would know the revealed mysteries; nor is it a power of the soul or a species of the object; therefore the habit of theology in wayfarers in no way depends essentially, as on its cause, on the vision of the blessed; and so from the fact that they have intuitive knowledge of the things that we hold by faith the result does not follow that our theological habit is subalternate to the knowledge of the blessed.

To give a richer clarification of this argument, one should add [Oxon. Prol. q.3 n.29] that theology in itself is not subalternate to any science nor is it subalternating with respect to some other science. For although its subject can in some way be contained under the object of metaphysics, yet because it does not in any way take its principles from metaphysics (for no theological property is demonstrable through the principles of being or by reasoning that begins from the idea of being), it is not subalternate to metaphysics. No again is it subalternating with respect to any science; for no other science takes from it its principles; for every other science in the line of natural knowledge is resolved ultimately to immediate principles naturally known. – Nor does it follow that, because the ultimate resolution of any principles and conclusions whatever stops at the vision of them in the Word, in which all things are indeed more perfectly known than they are in themselves, therefore theological science subalts to itself all other natural sciences; for although in fact, as was said, all things are known in the Word more perfectly than they are in themselves, yet it is enough that the principles, at which the resolution of natural sciences ultimately stops, be evidently known from their terms, such that the conclusions can thence be scientifically deduced, whether the principles can be more perfectly known or not. An example: the metaphysician knows the quiddity of line more perfectly and distinctly than does the geometrician, who scientifically deduces his conclusions from a confused concept of the terms, and does not prove them through the more distinct knowledge of the metaphysician but his ultimate resolution stops at terms confusedly known yet possessing an evident and necessary connection; so the same proposition can be known through itself when the terms are conceived distinctly and when they are conceived confusedly; nor yet, in the way the terms are distinctly known, does it cause evidence of itself in the way the terms are confusedly known; but in both ways it is known through itself, although it is seen more clearly in one order than in the other. So theology in itself, seeing the principles of all sciences far more perfectly than the sciences themselves are able to apprehend them, does not for that reason subaltn all those sciences to itself; because this theological knowledge is not cause of the knowledge of the

principles of an inferior science, which is what the idea of subalternation intrinsically demands.

Article Three: Whether Sacred Doctrine is one Science

Response: [Report. Prol. q.3 n.12] one must say that sacred doctrine is one science. For the unity of a science must be taken from the unity of its first subject; for in this first subject are contained virtually its principles and the conclusions to be deduced from them. Since therefore [Oxon. Prol. q.3 n.7ff.] the subject of sacred doctrine is God under the idea of deity (for in this are contained all the principles that are revealed to us and that are known clearly to those who intuit the object, and hence all the conclusions are included virtually in principles of this sort), therefore sacred doctrine is one science, handed on to us in Sacred Scripture as far as general revelation is concerned; so our theology is de facto about these and about what can be deduced from them. Next [Report. ib. n.13], if sacred doctrine is a whole integrated from two or more parts, one of them will certainly be about matters of speculation, the other about matters of action. But if for this cause the doctrine will need to be distinguished into two habits, then for the same reason one should posit two habits of infused faith tending toward these two kinds of objects. But this is false, because we tend with a single habit of faith to all revealed matters, of whatever kind they are; therefore equally with one habit do we tend toward and concern ourselves with all the things that are contained in Sacred Scripture, however diverse they are in kind; because a habit that does not have evidence from the object is not distinguished according to distinction of objects, and sacred doctrine is of this sort; and so it is altogether one, not borrowing distinction from objects not evident to it, but taking unity from the first object, in which all revealed mysteries and all theological truths are contained.

Article Four: Whether Sacred Doctrine is a Practical Science

[Prefatory] Intervening Article: Whether a Science is Practical from its End or from its Object

Response: [Oxon. Prol. q.4 n.3] one must suppose here, as something conceded by everyone, that a practical habit is in some extended to praxis; again one must by the name of praxis understand operation that can of itself be done well or badly; and indeed it is done well when it is conform to its rule, but badly when it errs from it. A rule of this sort is a science or habit which, insofar as it is directive of operation or praxis, is said, and rightly said, to be extended to it. But coming closer to the matter, note the following:

First Statement: [Oxon. ib.] Praxis (of which practical knowledge is directive and regulative) is an act of a power different from the intellect, naturally posterior to intellection, and of a nature to be elicited in conformity with right reason in order for the act to be right. Further, it is said to be the act of a power different from the intellect because, when one stops precisely at acts of the intellect, there is no praxis; for neither is there any extension of the intellect; for the intellect is truly extended when it tends beyond itself by regulating and directing the acts of another power.

Praxis is said to be naturally posterior to intellection because acts that do not have an order to the intellect, or that precede it, as the acts of the vegetative and sensitive part, are not cases of praxis, nor is practical knowledge extended to them as such, save insofar as it is in some way moderator of them. From this the consequence follows [Oxon. ib. n.4] that praxis, to which a practical habit is extended, is nothing save an elicited or commanded act of the will, for only these acts are essentially posterior to intellection; and again, the consequence follows that the first idea of praxis is present in the elicited act itself of the will, because this act is essentially posterior to intellection and is therefore able to be regulated by it. Commanded acts, therefore [Oxon. ib. n.5], are indeed cases of praxis, but secondarily and per accidens; for, according to the Philosopher, Ethics 6.3, right choice necessarily requires right reason; and not merely does choice require it, but even any right volition whatever requires right reason, according to which it may be elicited; since, therefore, all praxis is volition itself or something that follows volition, it is evident how it is of a nature to be elicited according to right reason so that it too may be right. From this then [Oxon. ib. n.6] one understands how practical knowledge is extended to praxis, insofar as it is naturally prior and conformative of praxis, that is able to direct and regulate praxis. So this extension is composed integrally of a double aptitudinal respect, namely of conformity and of natural priority; for the respects do not have to be actual; for if a knowledge were made practical by actual extension, then no knowledge would be necessarily such, but it would sometimes be practical and sometimes speculative, which is nothing to the purpose. – ‘Practical’ therefore [Oxon. ib. n.7] and ‘theoretical’ are not essential differences of science or of knowledge in general, for this is indeed something absolute. For ‘practical’ states a double respect, of conformity and of priority to praxis; but ‘speculative’ deprives a habit of these sorts of respect; but neither a respect nor the privation of it is of the essence of something absolute; these are therefore as it were a division of a genus by its proper specific properties, in the way that number is divided by even and odd, and line by straight and curved.

Second Statement: [Oxon. ib. n.10] Knowledge is called practical and receives its being practical from the object, not from the end, which is the final cause. Proof: a practical habit is called such because of extension to practice – not actual extension indeed (because then a craftsman, when he is not actually working, would not have the practical art whereby he is skilled in things to be done), but aptitudinal extension. But aptitude does not fit one nature and conflict with another save because of something absolute in such nature (for it is because this nature is of the sort it is that such an aptitude fits it); therefore the habit presupposes in its nature some intrinsic condition whereby such an aptitude fits it; so that from which the entity of the nature comes, from that same thing comes also its aptitude. But the prior causes of the habit are intellect and the object; therefore since intellect cannot be the cause that specifies it (because then any knowledge would become practical), what is left is that practical knowledge takes from the object its being regulative and directive of praxis itself. Nor [Oxon. ib. n.11] can one deduce from the fact the end is a prior cause, nay is the first cause of all, according to Avicenna Metaphysics 1 final chapter, that the end has influence on this nature and on its aptitude; because the end is not a cause save insofar as, by being loved and desired, it moves the efficient

cause to act; but the aptitude for directing praxis is present in practical knowledge whether the end is loved or not; for such knowledge can exist in the intellect however the will is disposed; therefore it is not from the end, as from the final cause, that the proximate aptitude of directing is present in knowledge. – Second, if the end, which is the final cause, bestows on a habit its idea of being practical, then either the end as outside the habit does this or the end as considered and intended does so. Not the end as outside, because in this consideration it is posterior to the habit and an effect of it; but a cause is not distinguished by its effects. If as known, then it has the idea of object; so the object distinguishes and specifies the habit. If as intended, this was just now refuted, because knowledge is practical by nature before the end is intended; rather, even if the will were not to be conjoined with the intellect, the knowledge would still be disposed in the same way as to idea of practical and speculative; therefore independently of will some knowledge is directive of praxis and some is not. – Next, if a science's being practical and its being ordered to praxis as to its end be convertible, then moral science is not practical. The consequent is contrary to the Philosopher, Ethics 1.11. The proof of the consequence is that the end of moral science is happiness, which according to the Philosopher Ethics 10.8 consists in speculation, not praxis (although in this [Oxon. ib. nn.24-25] he seems to have erred, supposing knowledge of the ultimate end to be only ostensive and not directive of the volition for it; for he reckoned that the act of loving the ultimate end was present by natural necessity in the will of intelligences as a thing loved and desired, Metaphysics 12.36).

Again [Prefatory] Intervening Article: Whether a Science is Practical from its End or from its Object

Response: [Oxon. Prol. q.4 n.13] one must say that practical knowledge has the sort of nature it has not from the end or the final cause, but from the object giving it a conformity or aptitude for directing and regulating praxis. And although sometimes it has the conformity to praxis from the end of praxis itself, yet not insofar as it is end or final cause, but insofar as it is first object. And that, indeed, sometimes practical knowledge gets its extension or its idea of directing praxis from the end of praxis itself, is made clear thus: for sometimes the first practical principles are taken from the end of praxis itself; so the end, as first cause in such genus, includes virtually both the principles and consequently the conclusions, and so the whole of practical knowledge; therefore such practical knowledge has its quiddity, and so any property and aptitude at all, from the end. Example: God is the ultimate end of the intellectual creature attainable by action; so in this end is virtually included this practical principle: 'infinite being is lovable above all things'; and therefore, since God is such a being, he is lovable above all things. And so in like manner practical principles are taken from the end of moral science; in that end, therefore, are virtually contained both the principles and the conclusions of moral science, which is truly practical because directive and regulative of praxis. – But then the end of practice is not disposed as end but as known object, as is made clear thus: because for this reason does the end of praxis give such an aptitude, or a nature having such an aptitude, that as first object it includes the principles and, by their mediation, the

conclusions, and so the whole of practical knowledge; but it does this, not insofar as it is final cause, because no nature or natural aptitude is had from this cause save as loved and desired, and thus as moving the efficient cause to act. But the principles and conclusions of the sort mentioned are naturally included in the first object before it is loved. For the truth of a necessary practical principle no more depends on the will than the truth of a speculative principle does, or than the conclusions necessarily inferred from those principles do. When therefore practical principles are taken from the end of praxis, the end is not disposed as final cause but only as object known.

Article Four: Whether Sacred Doctrine is a Practical Science

Response: [Oxon. Prol. q.4 n.27ff.] some who think that sacred doctrine is one habit, according to what was said above in article 3, nevertheless suppose that this one habit is at the same time speculative and practical. For since Sacred Doctrine, being single, extends itself to things that pertain to diverse philosophical sciences, as far as these things are knowable in divine light, so the result is that, although in the philosophical sciences the speculative is one science and the practical another, yet Sacred Doctrine comprehends both of them under itself, just as God knows both himself and what he makes by the same science. However, they think theology is more speculative, because it deals more principally with divine things than with human acts. But this opinion [Oxon. ib. n.30] does not seem true; because when something common is first divided through opposite differences, both of these differences cannot be found in some one thing contained under the common thing; but science in common or in general is first divided into practical and speculative; therefore these two differences cannot be found together in one science. The major is manifest; because if differences that jointly divide something common could be made compatible in something contained under the common thing, then the same body could be corporeal and incorporeal, and the same animal sensible and insensible, and the same man rational and irrational, all which things are plainly absurd. The minor is evident from Avicenna Metaphysics 1, at the beginning, and commentary on Ethics 1. Next, in line with what was said in the First Statement earlier, 'practical' essentially states a double aptitudinal respect, namely of conformity to and of priority to praxis; but 'speculative' imports the negation of these respects; therefore these two ideas cannot in any way be found united in one and the same habit; for practical knowledge is extended to praxis through the respects of conformity and of priority to it; hence it is too that practical knowledge rules and directs praxis; but speculative knowledge, on the other hand, cannot of itself be extended to praxis; rather, such extension is intrinsically repugnant to it; therefore if these ideas are found in one habit, then two contradictories about the same thing would follow, which contradictories are the being extended and the not being extended to directing praxis. – So one must speak otherwise [Oxon. ib. n.31 and q.3 n.6]; and since both necessary and contingent truths are dealt with in Sacred Scripture (for some truths are about necessary objects and others about contingent ones), we discourse of both in order one by one and consider Sacred Doctrine, as to its necessary truths, to be absolutely and simply practical in a created intellect.

Proof: for, from what was said in the first intervening article, the act of the will is most truly praxis, and we understand practical knowledge to be directive of it by the fact that it is prior to and conform to praxis, that is, conformative of praxis itself; therefore that knowledge is truly practical which is aptitudinally conform to right volition and naturally prior to it; but all theology of necessary things in the created intellect is thus conform to the act of the created will and prior to such volition; therefore it is simply practical. Proof of the minor: the first subject of theology is virtually conform to right volition; for right volition is said to be right for this reason, that it is conform to the object thus known; for since the first principles are taken from the formal idea of the object, that volition will be right which is elicited as formally right in conformity with the principles. Hence, since it follows from the idea of infinite being that it is lovable above all things, a volition conform to this principle will be right. Also, the theological object itself naturally determines the created intellect to knowledge of the determinate rectitude of praxis as to all theological necessities before any created will wills; therefore, since from the first subject of theology there follows both conformity and priority of the theology of necessary things to volition, necessarily this theology will be practical, because regulative and directive of praxis.

Article Four Again

Response: [Oxon. Prol. q.4 n.28] theology in the created intellect is practical, as was proved in the preceding article; and here is a further clarification, because that doctrine is simply practical in which one does not deal with matters of speculation save insofar as knowledge of these serves to direct praxis; but in theology one does not deal with matters of speculation save in order to things that are for the end; therefore theology is most truly practical. Proof of the minor: for any knowledge whatever of the conditions of the desirability of an end, and of the conditions of what is for the end, and of the conditions of both (about which conditions the operating power can err unless it is directed and ruled as it should be), is not the intended concern of theology save in order to directing praxis, so that the operating power should err neither about the end nor about what is for the end; therefore this doctrine is simply practical. For although [Oxon. ib. n.29] the Trinity of the Divine Persons does not show the end to be more desirable than it would be if there were not three persons (because the three are the end insofar as they are one God, not insofar as they are three), yet a will that is ignorant of the Trinity can err in loving and desiring the end. Likewise someone who does not know that God made the world must fall into error by not repaying the love that is required by gratitude for so great a communication of his goodness and for his displaying it for our advantage. Likewise, he who is ignorant of the articles pertaining to our restoration must necessarily err from the way of salvation, not only because he who does not know the benefits bestowed would not pay the love and honor due to him who thus loves him, but also because he would not use the necessary means instituted by Christ for attaining eternal life. And so too about other points of theology. Therefore the knowledge of the whole of ordered theological tradition is for the purpose of directing praxis; it is therefore simply and absolutely practical.

Article Four a Third Time

Response: one must say that theology in the created intellect is simply practical.

Declaration: [Oxon. Prol. q.4 n.17] for although the created will cannot err about the end as shown in general, yet it can err about the end as shown in particular; the point is plain from the several diverse opinions of the philosophers about the ultimate end, Aristotle Ethics 1; therefore in order to act rightly and tend without error to the ultimate end, in whose attainment stands the true and sole happiness of an intellectual nature, one needs directive knowledge and a showing of the end. But theology shows the end, not in general as metaphysics does, but in particular; therefore this doctrine of theology, which directs the will to the true end, is truly practical. – Next, a directive habit is not posited for the substance of an act but for its circumstances; for the habit of temperance is not posited for the substance of the act of eating, or of other things of the sort, but for the circumstances; therefore, although the will were determined to the substance of an act tending toward the end in particular, direction would yet be required as to the circumstances of the act, and to this the direction that concerns the substance of the act is certainly not extended. – Next, where the love of something is principally directed beyond the genus of cognition, knowledge of that thing is principally intended within the genus of cognition; the love of the end principally intended in theology is outside the genus of cognition; therefore theology's knowledge of the end is principally intended within the genus of cognition. But in any science the knowledge of its first subject is principally intended; therefore the end is the principal subject of this science. But from the end are taken practical principles; practical principles issue in practical conclusions; therefore this science, which first intends love of the end outside the genus of cognition, is practical. – Finally: [Oxon. ib. n.18] principles and conclusions belong to the same genus, either of praxis or of speculation; but practical conclusions are resolved to practical principles, not to speculative ones; therefore since knowledge of the end is directive in the case of acts that concern what is for the end, and the knowledge what is for the end is as it were virtually included in the knowledge of the end as of the principle (for from the entity of the end are practical principles taken, if knowledge of things for the end is knowledge of practical conclusions), so the knowledge of the end will be practical knowledge because it is about a practical principle; otherwise practical knowledge would be virtually included in speculative knowledge, which is impossible.

Article Four yet Again

Response: one must say [Oxon. Prol. q.4 nn.37-39] that although theology about contingent things is in itself and from its object speculative, yet in the created intellect it is practical. The first part is clear thus: for theology about contingent things is of itself such as it is from its object. But from its object it is not conformative or of a nature to give rectitude and conformity to praxis before any act of the will, as theology about necessary things is; for if any contingent things were to bring with them a determinate rectitude, they would surely be getting it from the

divine will and not from their objects; therefore such knowledge, by reason of its object, does not direct praxis; it is therefore *per se* speculative. To this extent it is also the case that it is not practical in the divine intellect; but it is of the sort that it is in the perfect kind, not in the imperfect kind; so if it is speculative in the divine intellect it will in itself and from its object be speculative. But about these matters see q.14 a.16 below. – Now, that this theology is practical in respect of the created intellect is clear thus: for the knowledge of contingent objects is directive and conformative to praxis and prior to it in the created intellect; it is therefore practical. The assumption is plain from the example adduced, about the worship of God in the Sacrifice of the Altar; for the knowledge of this revealed contingent truth directs and rules praxis, or an act of will, so that it not err in divine worship as to how revelation has shown God wishes to be worshipped in the law of the New Testament; this knowledge therefore is practical.

Article Five: Whether Sacred Doctrine is Worthier than other Sciences

Response: [Oxon. Prol. q.4 n.42] Sacred Doctrine is worthier and more excellent than all other sciences. For the worthiness of a doctrine is to be measured from the object it deals with, from which too it borrows its proper certitude. Although therefore any doctrine may be equally certain, proportionally, insofar as each of them is resolved to its own immediate principles, nevertheless one is more perfect than another, that is, worthier and more certain, to the extent it considers a more excellent and more certain subject. But Sacred Doctrine [Oxon. ib. q.3 n.2, n.7ff.] is alone about God himself, because he is the first subject of theology; therefore it will also be the most evident doctrine, with which no naturally acquired doctrine is to be compared. And although, because of the excellence of its object, it is not attained by us in its perfection (by which more imperfect things are understood), yet it is more noble to attain a few things about the nobler objects than much about more ignoble ones [Oxon. 3. d.23 n.19].

Article Six: Whether this Doctrine is Wisdom

Response: [Oxon. Prol. q.2 n.28] theology is in itself wisdom. For it has evidence and necessity and certitude about the necessary things contained in it, and its object is the highest and most perfect, because the object is the first essence wherein are in their own way all the things that are through it known by a proportioned intellect. But as far as concerns contingent things, it has evidence about all of them as they are seen in themselves in the theological object, and they are not made known to it from other prior principles. So this knowledge of contingent things in theology is more like the understanding of principles than like the science of conclusions. Theology in itself, then, is wisdom simply.

Article Seven: Whether God is the Subject of this Science

[Prefatory] Intervening Article: What the Idea is of the First Subject of a Science – whether it is what First Contains virtually the Truths of the Scientific Habit

Response: [Report. Prol. q.1 n.5, Oxon. Prol. q.3 n.4] one must say that the idea of the first object of a science is that it contains in itself virtually all the truths of the habit to which it belongs. Clarification: for since the conclusions are virtually in the principles and the principles virtually in the subject (for the subject includes the predicate virtually in the first principles, and does so essentially if they are *per se* in the first mode or virtually if they are *per se* in the second mode), it therefore follows that in a simple subject known in its quiddity the principles and conclusions are included virtually in such a subject, and thus there is included in it the whole knowledge that is of a nature to be had about the subject, and further too is included all that is of a nature to be had about other things by reason of that subject, whether they are inferior things contained under it, or are other things attributed to it as to a first thing; so the habit that inclines formally to speculative knowledge of the subject according to its quidditative idea inclines virtually to knowing all the propositions that can be attained by reason about it in the way stated. – Further, [Oxon. ib.] firstness is taken here from the first book of Post. An. text chs.14-15, in the definition of universal, according to which ‘firstness’ states ‘adequacy’; but the object is disposed to the habit as cause to effect, for it is only an adequate cause if it contains first virtually the whole effect. I explain what I mean by ‘first virtually’, that just as that being is first which does not depend on another but rather other things depend on it, so ‘to contain first’ is not to depend on others in containing but other things depend on it, that is: when everything else is *per impossibile* removed while the understanding of it remains, it would still contain, and nothing else contains save by reason of it.

Article Seven: Whether God is the Subject of this Science

Response: [Oxon. Prol. q.3 n.4] since any knowledge in itself is that which is of a nature to be had about its object according as the object is of a nature to manifest itself to a proportioned intellect, and since the same knowledge in us is that which is of a nature to be had in our intellect about the object when understood; so theology in itself will be the sort of knowledge that the theological object is of a nature to produce in an intellect proportioned to it, but theology in us is the sort of knowledge which our intellect is of a nature to have about that object. An example: if some intellect were not able to understand geometrical things but were able to believe someone about geometrical things, geometry for it would be faith, not science; yet geometry in itself would be a science, because the object of geometry is of a nature to produce science about itself in a proportioned intellect. Again [Oxon. ib. n.6], some theological truths are necessary, namely because they inhere in the deity independently of free choice; but others are contingent, namely those of which the cause is the divine will. So in line with all these points we will solve the question posed:

One must say first [Oxon. ib. n.7] that the first object of theology in itself, as far as necessary truths are concerned, is God himself; not God under some universal, or attributional, or respective idea, but under the idea by which he is this essence. The proof of the first part of this conclusion is, first, that the first object of a science

contains virtually all the truths of the habit whose first subject it is; but nothing contains theological truths save God; therefore God himself must be the first subject of theology. Proof of the minor: nothing else contains being as it is a cause save that to which everything is by attribution reduced; nor does anything contain being as it is an effect by a demonstration—that; for no effect shows that God is triune (which is nevertheless the chiefest theological truth), and the like; since therefore all theological truths are contained in God, nothing else apart from him is the first subject of theology. Next: theology in itself is about things that are naturally known to the divine intellect alone; therefore it is about something naturally known to God alone; but only God is naturally known to himself alone; therefore theology is about God as about its first subject. Proof of the antecedent: if this science is about things naturally known to some other intellect, then besides this science there are other things that are naturally knowable to the divine intellect alone, for it is infinite and therefore knowledgeable of far more things than is a finite intellect to which every created essence can be naturally known; therefore some other science is superior to theology, namely the one that is about things naturally known only to an infinite intellect, because theology will be about things naturally known to a created intellect. There is finally this proof: that in no science is as distinct a knowledge delivered about what is not per se the subject as there is about what is per se its subject; otherwise there would be no reason that this subject should more be posited as its subject than that something else should be; therefore if God were not the subject of theology in itself, then a knowledge as distinct would not be delivered about him as would be delivered about him in some other science whose subject he could be. But he can be truly the subject of a science; therefore this science would be theology in itself first; therefore since no science is prior to or higher than theology in itself, nothing else is the subject of it than God. Add too that, according to Augustine *On the Trinity* 14.1 and 4, this science is about things by which faith is generated, defended, and strengthened; therefore it is about the same subject as that which is the first subject of faith; but faith is about the first truth, which is God; therefore too theology will be about the same God as about its first subject. – The second part of the conclusion, namely that God under the idea by which he is this essence is the subject of theology in itself, or of the divine intellect, and not under any universal or attributional or respective idea, is proved thus: for [Oxon. ib. n.10] no common or attributional or respective concept contains virtually all the theological truths pertaining to the plurality of the divine persons; and even if it did contain them, then, since concepts of this sort are naturally conceived by us, the thereby immediate propositions about those concepts could also naturally be known by us, and we could, through those immediate propositions, naturally know the conclusions and so the whole of theology, even without any revelation, which no one has said. Next, those common, attributional, or respective concepts, because of the fact that they are not naturally known to God alone (because they can be attained by metaphysics), will, along with the truths included in those concepts, not be naturally known to God alone. But theology in itself is only proportioned and naturally known to the divine intellect; therefore its formal object naturally affects the divine intellect alone; therefore there is some idea prior to any common or attributional or respective idea. Finally, theology in itself is the most eminent of all

sciences; so it is about the highest object and about it under the most perfect idea; but knowledge of the ‘what it is’ of a thing is most perfect, as the Philosopher says Metaphysics 1 text 4; therefore knowledge of this essence, as it is this essence, is more perfect than any other knowledge that could be had about it under the aforesaid concepts; theology in itself therefore will be about the most perfect object and also about it under the most perfect and absolute idea, prior to any other idea that is special or contracted by universal, or attributional, or respective concepts. An example: [Oxon. ib. n.9] man is understood to be a rational animal, a substance, naturally tame, and among the most noble animals. In the first of these understandings man is conceived in his quidditative idea; in the second he is conceived in general; in the third he is conceived by an accident, that is, in his proper feature; in the fourth he is conceived in respect to something else. But the most perfect knowledge of man cannot be in respect of something else, because such knowledge presupposes knowledge of the absolute; nor in his proper feature, because this knowledge presupposes knowledge of the subject; nor about man in general, because general knowledge is confused knowledge; therefore the most noble knowledge of man is according to his quidditative idea. So it is also in the case of God.

One must say second [Oxon. ib. n.12] that the subject of our theology in itself, which contains all necessary truths, is God himself under the idea of deity. But insofar as it is our theology, its subject of evidence is infinite being. The first part here is plain from the fact that there is no difference between theology in itself and our theology save that of a certain respect of reason, insofar as theological knowledge is referred to an intellect that is endowed with that very knowledge; therefore both theology in itself and as it exists in a created intellect have the same containing subject; but this object is adequately known to the divine intellect alone, and inadequately to the blessed; to us however it is known only from the determinate revelation of some of the infinite things that are contained in such object. Since therefore a habit gets its evidence from its object, its first object too contains that very habit both in itself and insofar as it is known on the part of a created intellect. – From this the second part is made clear: for although our theology, even as to necessary truths, gets its evidence not from the object but as given by revelation (for which reason it cannot be disposed otherwise than as the theology is that is evident from the object), therefore our theology, as ours, must be assigned as object only that first known thing about which the first truths are immediately known. But that first known thing is infinite being, because it is the most perfect concept that we can have about it, because it is in itself the first containing subject. From this most perfect concept, then, all theological things whatever get their evidence, that is, the idea of infinite being, with respect to the things that reach us for the purpose of theological propositions, even though this concept [sc. infinite being] does not in the meantime contain our theology virtually in itself, and even less so as this theology is known to us.

Article Seven again

Response: [Oxon. Prol. q.3 n.13] one must say first that the first subject of the theology of contingent things, both in itself and in the divine intellect, and of the theology of the blessed, is the divine essence as it is this essence. Clarification: for there is no virtually containing subject of contingent truths, because then those truths would be, not contingent, but necessary; so the subject of these contingent truths must be disposed to them as equally as to their opposites; and yet there is some order among them, because some truth, as that 'will wills', is the first contingent truth; therefore the first subject of the many contingent truths is that about which the predicate of the first contingent truth is first, that is, immediately, said, which first contingent truth is as it were the first principle in the order of contingent truths, or the predicates of several first truths, if there are several first truths. But in contingent things the first thing is not known save by intuition of the extremes; therefore the first intuitible thing, in which inheres the first predicate of the first contingent truth, is the first subject of all ordered contingent truths. Since therefore the first such intuitible thing is the divine essence as a this (for when it is seen, the extremes of contingent propositions are of a nature to be seen to be conjoined, namely the extremes of the first proposition and of those that depend on it; therefore the divine essence as a this is the first subject of the theology of contingent things, both in itself, and in the intellect of God and the blessed. Besides, the blessed vision is not a theology that is about propositional truths, but is as it were a perfect non-propositional apprehension of the subject, naturally preceding the science of theology.

One must say second [Oxon. ib. n.12] that the first subject of our contingent theology is God under the idea of infinite being, under which idea he is also the first subject of the theology of necessary things. Not because thereby the habit of theology of contingent things is virtually contained in the concept, but because, as it is knowable by us, it is proximate to that in which, when intuitively known, the predicate of the first contingent truth would be of a nature to be evidently known to inhere in its subject. And certainly contingent truths in theology are able more to be believed by us through the idea of infinite being than through any other idea known in this present life.

Intervening Article: Whether Theology is about all things through the Attribution of them to its First Subject

Response: [Oxon. Prol. q.3 n.22] one must say first that the theology of God is about everything altogether knowable, and thus even theology in itself involves knowledge of all knowables. For the first theological object makes everything to be actually known to the divine intellect; for after knowledge of himself and of all intrinsic necessities, he moves in the second moment of nature to knowledge of all things virtually contained in infinite being; and in the third moment he moves to understanding the truths virtually included in those quiddities; so much so that the order of the second to the third is not by reason of causality, because those quiddities cause nothing in the divine intellect; but there is only an order of

essentially ordered effects with respect to the same cause, so that if, in the third moment of nature, the divine essence did not move to knowledge of those truths they would be unknown to the divine intellect; for since the divine intellect is infinite it is not of a nature to be perfected by finite quiddities; because the infinite can in no way be perfected by the finite; for otherwise the divine intellect would be cheapened if it was affected by something other than its own essence. For in the instant of nature in which it understands line, it would still be as it were in potency to knowing the truths present in line by virtue of line itself; therefore line would as it were effectively impress knowledge of these truths on the divine intellect, and the divine intellect would as a result be affected by line. Next, the first object of any power able to be actualized by diverse objects, by the *per se* virtue proper to them, is something common to them; but if line were by virtue of itself to cause truth in the divine intellect, then the other quiddities will equally cause truth; therefore the first object of the divine intellect would be something common to them all and not the singular divine essence. Nor is it an obstacle that other objects are attributed to the essence, because other beings too are attributed to substance, and yet the object of our intellect is being. Theology in itself, therefore, and in the divine intellect is about all knowables absolutely, and so God has about all of them only theological knowledge, because he knows everything by virtue of the sole theological object that activates his intellect.

One must say second [Oxon. ib. n.23] that theology in the intellects of the blessed is not about all knowables; because their intellects are of a nature to be affected by created quiddities so as to know the truths included in those quiddities; and thus because of the theological truth that they have about those quiddities, as these are shown in the essence of God, they can have a natural knowledge about them from the proper motion of the same quiddities. Therefore the theology of the blessed about created things is not the whole knowledge about them possible for such an intellect.

One must say, third [Oxofn. ib. n.24], that theology, as it is a habit perfecting the intellect of the blessed, is able to be about all knowables though in fact it is not about them all. For there is no knowable which they cannot be determined to the knowledge of by the divine essence when it is intuitively seen by them, especially since knowables that are specifically distinct are not infinite. But in fact they have no limitation save from the will of God showing something in his essence, and so actually their theology is about as many things as God voluntarily shows them in his essence.

One must say fourth [Oxon. ib. n.24], that our theology is not actually about all knowables but only about those that God has revealed. For just as the theology of the blessed has a limit, from the will of God showing them thus many things and not more in his essence, so our theology too has a limit from the will of God revealing. But the limit pre-fixed by the divine will, as to general revelation, is of the things contained in Sacred Scripture; because, as is said in Revelation last chapter, "If anyone adds to these things, God will add to him the plagues written in this book." Therefore our theology in fact is only about the things contained in Scripture, and about what can be elicited from them.

Finally one must say [Oxon. ib. n.25] that our theology is not able to be about all knowables as to this present life. First because of a defect in our intellect which is not able to conceive many quiddities in their specific nature; but revelation, according to common law, is only about things whose terms can be naturally conceived by us. Second because of a defect in theology which, since it is about the revealed things that faith is about, cannot exist along with evident knowledge of the same knowables; since therefore there are many things that are naturally known to us, our revealed theology cannot be about them.

However all theology, whether ours or that of the blessed, is about all beings as to a certain knowableness about them, namely the respects that they have to the divine essence as it is this essence; upon this essence all creatures state an essential dependence insofar as they are known by us in our theology. For if something were to be understood by us by metaphysical investigation, such knowledge would not have regard to our theology, for our theology is about what is contained in Scripture through revelation from God, and about what can be elicited therefrom.

Article Eight: Whether this Doctrine is Argumentative

Response: [Oxon. Prol. q.3 n.24] one must say that theology is argumentative. For our theology is de facto about things contained in Sacred Scripture and things that can be elicited from them; but since from something first known in some light or other is what is virtually included in it elicited, therefore is formal discourse brought into exercise; and discourse essentially requires only that its principle be naturally known first and that, as so known, it be causative of the other extreme of the discourse; therefore our theology is argumentative. – Again [Oxon. 3 d.24 n.6ff], according to Augustine *On the Trinity* 14.1: “It is one thing merely to know what a man must believe for the sake of attaining eternal life; it is another thing to know how this may be made beneficial to the pious and be defended against the impious; and this seems to be what the Apostle calls by the proper name of science.” Further, this science both benefits the pious and rises against the impious so as to fight on behalf of what has been divinely handed on in the Scriptures, whether by expounding an obscure place of Scripture by a clearer and more evident one, or by applying other sciences to the deduction of hidden conclusions and to the solution of their contraries, and above all by the use and application of metaphysics, so that the truth of Scripture about the Trinity and the Intelligences and other abstract objects may be understood. All this could not be provided by theology unless argument and deduction were made to one thing from another, that is, to a lesser known thing from things more known in the light of faith. Hence [Oxon. 3 d.23] there is need also that the habit of theology be altogether other than the infused habit of faith, for the science of theology (as Augustine says *ibid.*) is not something most of the faithful are strong in, although they do very much believe and are therefore strong in faith itself. So the simple [Oxon. 3 d.24 n.20] believe everything implicitly that the Church with sincere faith holds explicitly; also, they do not know how to explain or defend the faith; therefore those who do know how to do this must have a habit distinct from faith, although not with a light that is other than that of faith; because this habit rests on principles known only by the light of faith; and so the conclusion cannot

have a greater evidence than the other and less evident premise has, just as is the case in any mixed argument, where the certitude of the conclusion is the certitude of the less certain premise.

Article Nine: Whether Sacred Scripture should use Metaphors

Response: one must say that the use of metaphors does properly belong to divine Scripture, so as to express and signify, as far as possible, divine and intelligible things through the means of sensible and corporeal figures and forms. Also, [Oxon. 2 d.11, n.8, 4 d.1 q.7] in this present life, intelligible things cannot themselves affect our intellect, because [Oxon. 2 d.3 q.8 n13] our intellect is of a nature not to be moved at once unless it first be moved by something imaginable and sensible, not indeed because of the nature of the intellect itself, but rather because of the infirmity and condition of this present state that have arisen from Adam's sin; hence Augustine says *On the Trinity* 15 last chapter: "Raise your eyes to the light itself and fix them on it, if you can etc. What then is the cause that, though your sight is fixed on it, you cannot see it unless this cause be infirmity? And what is the cause of infirmity unless it be iniquity?" Therefore [Oxon. 4 d.12 q.1] while the condition of our intellect remains imperfect, being dulled to what is by nature most manifest, it had need, so as in some way to perceive intelligible and divine things, to be led by certain unlike likenesses, likenesses that point to an analogical attribution [*On the Principle of Things* q.1 a.3 n.14] after the unlikeness has been taken away and the due degree remains of the proportion that founds the likeness corresponding to itself; for although the terms of the revelations contained in Scripture are naturally conceivable [Prol. q.3 n.25] (for revelation, by a common law, is about things whose terms can be naturally conceived by us), yet our intellect is unable to understand all the things that have been revealed and that can be elicited therefrom; thus, by means of figures in words and sensible things, our intellect is raised and led to understand, in the way it can, things that otherwise would, for the aforesaid cause, be hidden from it.

Article Ten: Whether in Sacred Scripture the Words have many Senses

Response: [Oxon. Prol. q.3 n.1, Miscell. q.6 nn.3-4] divine Scripture (about which Augustine says *On Genesis to the Letter* 2.9: "Scripture has greater authority than has the perspicacity of any human genius") has multiple senses; namely the literal, presented by the words themselves, which is the first sense, and the spiritual or mystical sense. The mystical sense, further, is divided into three others, namely the allegorical, the tropological or moral, and the anagogical. The literal sense, then, signifies as it were the events recorded; the moral or tropological sense expresses or deduces from the events recorded what should be morally done; but the allegorical sense has regard to what must be believed; and the anagogical sense, finally, signifies what we should hope. An example: the word 'Jerusalem' in its literal sense indicates and means the royal city in the land of promise; but in the moral sense it means the holy soul; in the allegorical sense it means the Church militant; finally in

the anagogical sense it means the Church triumphant. Therefore divine Scripture necessarily includes in it multiple senses.

SECOND QUESTION: ON GOD: WHETHER GOD EXISTS.
IN THREE ARTICLES.

Article One: Whether it is self-evident that God exists

[Prefatory] Intervening Article: What the Idea is of a self-evident Proposition

To understand what has to be said, one must realize [Oxon. 1 d.2 q.2 n.2] that in a self-evident proposition the ‘self-evident’ or ‘evident through itself’ [per se nota] is not taken in the way that ‘through itself’ or ‘per se’ is distinguished from ‘through an accident’ or ‘per accidens’, but as it expresses ‘not through another’; so that a self-evident proposition is the same as a proposition not evident through another but evident of itself, or apt of itself to be made known or evident to an intellect that conceives it. So when any other cause or idea from which its evidence might be borrowed is excluded the terms of the proposition are not excluded; for in *Posterior Analytics* 1 text 16 it is said that “we know first principles insofar as we know the terms;” nor again is it an understanding for which the connection of the terms, which compose a proposition known of itself, is of a nature to be perceived and evident; but the connection is understood when every other cause, outside the concept of the terms of a self-evident proposition, is removed. Therefore the idea of such a proposition seems to be truly and rightly expressed as: “a self-evident proposition is one that has evident truth from proper terms that are part of it as they are part of it.” Namely, that the evident and true connection of the extremes of this sort of proposition is not seen by an intellect conceiving the proposition through anything outside the proper terms but rather is inflected and assented to by it through an understanding of the terms; as these propositions: ‘every whole is greater than its part,’ ‘a line is length without depth’ ‘things equal to the same thing are likewise equal to each other’, and others of that sort, which cannot be proved even by a demonstration-that. On the other hand, however, the proposition ‘man is capable of wonder’ does not carry on its face, from the terms themselves, the evident connection of subject and predicate; rather, it gets its evidence from elsewhere, namely from the definition of man.

Since sometimes, then [Oxon. ib.], a proposition is known of itself and by itself, but from terms confusedly conceived (for it is evident that a geometer, for whom the aforesaid propositions are self-evident, does not understand line distinctly, nor does he know to what genus line and figure and the like, which are not hidden to a metaphysician, have regard), and since sometimes a proposition is self-evident from a distinct knowledge of the terms of which it is composed, the consequence is, first, that one term is the definition and the other the thing defined, whether the terms of the proposition are taken for the signifying words or for the concepts imported or signified by the words; the point is clear from the fact *Posterior Analytics* 1 text 10 & 20 and 2 text 8 say that “whatever is at the second extreme is the middle term in demonstration;” therefore the second premise does not differ from the conclusion save as the thing defined differs from the definition. An example: “a rational animal is capable of laughter; man is a rational animal; therefore man is capable of laughter.” The first of the premises is a self-evident

principle, and the conclusion is not self-evident but is demonstrated, or known, not through the idea of its own terms, but from the premises. So a definition is a different term from the thing defined; otherwise the most potent of demonstrations would be a begging of the question and would not be composed of three terms but only two, which is plainly false.

The consequence, second [Oxon. ib. n.3], is that although a proposition that is self-evident from a confused and indistinct understanding of the terms is also self-evident when the terms are distinctly understood, yet, if it is self-evident through a distinct conception of the terms, it cannot be in like manner self-evident when the terms are confusedly conceived. For although one term is the definition and the other the thing defined, there is no need that the evidence the predicate has with the definition should be equally had when the predicate is combined and compared with the thing defined; and therefore (as was touched on above), although the proposition ‘a rational animal is capable of laughter’ is self-evident, yet not for that reason is the proposition ‘man is capable of laughter’ evidently known, but rather it is proved through the definition of man himself. Likewise, the proposition ‘a triangle has three angles equal to two right angles’ is self-evident to the geometer who knows the definition of triangle, which is this: ‘every plane figure bound by three lines has three angles equal to two right angles’. But it is not self-evident to someone who conceives the thing defined, or conceives triangle, confusedly, but proof must be made through triangle’s definition that it has three angles equal to two right angles. Again, if a proposition known of itself had, when the terms are distinctly conceived, the same evidence as it has when the terms are confusedly conceived, then the definition would in no way be distinguished from the thing defined; and then (besides the absurdities deduced above) the several propositions that are self-evident to a geometer through a confused apprehension of the terms would be as equally self-evident, and in the same way and for the same reason, as when they are understood by a metaphysician, who has distinct comprehension of what genus line belongs to and that it is a species of continuous quantity different from surface and solid. But this is plainly false, for a geometer, although he knows very well that a line is length without depth, nevertheless does not know that whereby it is such, or all the things that are additionally made clear and known about line in metaphysics. So when it is evident that the predicate belongs to the subject if the subject is distinctly understood, it will not thereby be self-evident that the predicate belongs to the same subject if it is confusedly understood.

The consequence, third [Oxon. ib.], is that one should not accept the account of a self-evident proposition given by those who say that a proposition is self-evident when the predicate is included in the idea of the subject, as that ‘man is an animal’; and less so should one accept that a proposition is made self-evident when the property (which is not included in the idea of the subject) is predicated of the definition on the ground it does not need the help of another proposition in order to appear evidently true; but one should even accept that not just any proposition that is true in the first mode of ‘per se’, as ‘man is an animal or a body’ and so on up to ‘a substance’, is self-evident; for although, when the terms are distinctly conceived, the propositions appear evidently true to the intellect, yet this is not the case when the terms are confusedly conceived; for it is not manifest that, regardless of how the

subject is conceived, one term is included in the other; for it is not self-evident to someone who apprehends man in a confused way that man is an animal; nay he can be in doubt about the fact; which surely is not the case with self-evident propositions, for these are in need of nothing so as to appear evidently true to an intellect that perceives their terms.

From what has hitherto been said it is clear [Oxon. ib.] that one should not distinguish between a proposition known of itself and a proposition knowable of itself; for altogether the same proposition is both known of itself and knowable of itself; for we do not call, nor should we call, a proposition self-evident from the fact it is actually known; because then no proposition would be self-evident if no intellect was actually knowing it, which nobody would say. A proposition, then, is known through itself and of itself because, as far as the nature and idea of the terms composing it are concerned, it is of a nature to have evident truth, or to cause assent in an intellect that perceives such connection of the extremes, as in the case of ‘the whole is greater than its part’, and this whether an intellect is apprehending it or not; but a proposition that is knowable of itself is no different. Since then these two members coincide, there is no distinction between them of the sort said. – Likewise, there is no distinction between a proposition self-evident in itself and self-evident to us; for any proposition known in itself and through itself is self-evident to any intellect whatever; even if it is not actually known, yet, as far as its terms are concerned, it is evidently known if the terms are conceived; because it has no need of any extraneous idea to borrow its evidence from, as Aristotle says in *Posterior Analytics* 1.1 about the perfect syllogism, that it needs nothing so as to appear necessary; for suppose the opposite, and at once it will not be perfect. – Further, neither should one accept the distinction made by those who think that something is self-evident to the wise that is not known to the unwise; for the fact that any such proposition is not known equally by the wise and the unwise is not a result of the proposition’s not being self-evident (provided it is such) to some intellect or other, but rather because the unwise do not perceive its terms; because, once the signification of the terms is perceived, it is impossible for any intellect not to assent to this sort of putting together of them, as in the case of ‘every whole is greater than its parts’. Nor is it a problem that Boethius in *Hebdomada* is found to have distinguished ‘a common conception of the mind’; for either ‘a common conception of the mind’ is not the same as ‘a self-evident proposition’, or if it is the same, Boethius is understanding its being self-evident of a proposition that is being conceived, not of a proposition capable of being conceived, in the way explained above. Now it is manifest that the wise conceive many propositions that escape the unwise; yet if the unwise understood the terms of self-evident propositions, then they would perceive the connection of the terms as equally well as the wise, as was said. – Lastly, nor should we embrace the division by which some think a distinction is to be drawn between self-evident propositions of the first order and self-evident propositions of the second order; for any self-evident proposition whatever, once its proper terms are conceived as they are the terms of it, has true evidence in its own order; and if it lacks this evidence even when the terms are conceived, it cannot be called a self-evident proposition, because it is indeed nothing of the sort.

Article One: Whether it is self-evident that God exists

Response: [Oxon. 1 d.2 q.2] some think, on the basis of the above mentioned distinction of self-evident propositions into evident in themselves and evident to us (which we showed in the previous article was not to be accepted), that this proposition 'God exists' is, as far as it itself is concerned, self-evident; but that, since we do not attain to knowing the 'what is' about God, the proposition is not self-evident for us, and needs rather to be proved by what things better known to us. – On the contrary: even if this distinction were to stand and a self-evident proposition were rightly explained as one in which the predicate is included in the idea of the subject (which however we do not think), the aforesaid proposition [sc. 'God exists'] would, on these principles, be self-evident. For [Oxon. 1 d.3 q.2 n.5] we are not only naturally able to have a proper concept of God under an attributive idea but even to have a quidditative concept; so, on this basis, the proposition that God exists would be self-evident. The proof of the assumption as to the quidditative concept is that in the case of those who conceive God as supremely wise, infinite, good etc., God is presented by way of a being that must necessarily have supreme wisdom, goodness etc.; but such a concept is proper to God and quidditative, for it is not attributive; for this latter always presupposes another to which it is attributed. Therefore the concept in which a stand is made must be a quidditative concept of God. And many such things are affirmed to belong to God; and to this extent we are able to know the 'what is' about God.

So one must say first [Oxon. ib. d.2 q.2 n.4] that this proposition 'God exists' is self-evident. For in the case of one who distinctly conceives the terms, namely 'God' and 'exists' or 'existence', his intellect at once from the idea of them, without any other moving force, is determined to assenting to the proposition. But this is what, further, it is for something to be evident through itself, or of itself, to an apprehending intellect; and so in the case of God and the blessed, who intuit the divine essence as it is a this, it is a thing most known and most confirmed that 'is' or 'exists' belongs to that essence; and this from the nature of the terms and not from anything else; for if 'is' is included in that essence as an essential predicate, then anyone who conceives the essence knows that that predicate is present in it. But if a mode or a property of the essence of God is set down, the proposition will still be self-evident, just as it is self-evident to someone who conceives 'rational animal' that it is 'capable of laughter' or 'finite'; because these propositions get their evidence from the nature of the terms themselves, and do not need anything else by which to turn the intellect toward assent, as was expounded in the preceding article. – However, the proposition seems to be self-evident in the first mode of stating per se, because 'is' is not outside the idea of the subject but belongs to it per se in the first mode; for the proposition is most immediate, and to it all propositions enunciating something of God, however conceived, are reduced; therefore in the case of someone who conceives the subject of this proposition distinctly, the existence of the subject is known from the idea of the extremes themselves.

One must say second [Oxon. ib. nn.4-5] that to the extent 'is' is enunciated of God as he is, in this present life, conceived by us under the concepts of 'infinite being', 'necessary being', 'supreme good', 'first cause', and the like (which are so

much proper to God that they are repugnant to creatures), this proposition ‘God exists’ is not self-evident. Proof: a self-evident proposition is evident to any intellect from the knowledge of its terms; but these sorts of propositions, ‘an infinite being exists’, ‘a supreme good exists’, ‘there is a first cause’ etc. are not evidently known to us from the knowledge of their terms; so they are not self-evident to us. Proof of the minor: for we conceive the terms of these propositions before we believe them or know them by demonstration; but in that prior moment the propositions are not evident to those who conceive the terms; but in order for us to adhere firmly to the propositions we have need of faith or at least demonstration; yet if they were self-evident, there would be no need of faith or reasoning to turn any intellect toward assenting to them, just as we experience happens when we know the terms of first principles. – Next, nothing can be self-evidently known about a concept that is not simply simple and that does not include one but two concepts, unless it is thence also evident that those two concepts are united among themselves. For it cannot be self-evidently known that a white man exists unless it is evident that whiteness really inheres in man. But no concept that we have about God in this present life and that is proper to him is simply simple (for although the concept be given, yet we cannot conceive God in it as something distinct from all creatures); rather it includes several concepts, as do the concepts of ‘infinite being’, ‘supreme good’, ‘first cause’, etc.; therefore nothing can be self-evidently known about God as he is conceived by us unless it is also evident that the two concepts are united among themselves. But this is not known from the perception itself of the terms, as was proved in the first reason, because the intellect is moved by something else toward assenting to these sorts of propositions. – And further, it is demonstrable or provable by the two reasons by which can be proved that the extremes, or one of them, exist, and thus that they must be united and not separated. The assumed major is plain from this, that, as is said in *Metaphysics* 5 text 34, an idea false in itself can be true of nothing, as that ‘irrational man’ cannot be truly predicated of anything, since the idea is altogether false; nor can anything be truly stated about it; thus no predicate can be self-evidently known about any complex concept unless it is also self-evidently known that the parts of that complex concept are united among themselves.

Article Two: Whether it is demonstrable that God exists

Response: one must say [Oxon. 1 d.2 q.2 n.10] that the existence of God can be shown by a demonstration-that but not by a demonstration-why. One must understand too [Quodlibet q.7 n.3], from *Posterior Analytics* 1 text ch.30, that of demonstrations one is ‘because of which’ or through the cause, and the other is demonstration ‘that’ or through the effect. For every necessary truth which is not evident from the terms but has a necessary and evident connection with something else that, as necessary, is evident from the terms, can be demonstrated through that evident truth; but some necessary truth not evident from the terms has a necessary connection with a truth taken from the cause, and another necessary truth has a necessary connection with a truth taken from the effect; so a truth can be demonstrated through an evident truth taken from the cause, and then the demonstration is ‘because of which’, or a truth can be demonstrated through an

evident truth taken from the effect, and then it is a demonstration ‘that’. – Next, the conclusion above as to the negative part [sc. that God’s existence cannot be proved by a demonstration-why] is made clear thus [Oxon. 1 d.2 q.2 n10, Quodlibet q.1 n.2ff, q.7 n.11]: ‘To exist’ is per se immediately present in God; but the predicate, not having a cause of its inherence, cannot be demonstrated of the subject by a demonstration-why. And even if ‘to exist’ were to belong to the divine essence by reason of something else belonging to the essence first, it could still not be demonstrated of the subject by a demonstration-why unless the subject virtually containing the predicate, and so all its knowledge, were known to the intellect in the genus in which the demonstration is made; but we do not have in the present life this sort of knowledge of the divine essence. – But that God’s existence may be shown by a demonstration-that is proved as follows [Oxon. Prol. q.3 n.21], because by any condition of an effect one can demonstrate that the cause exists, when the condition cannot be in the effect unless the cause exists; but many properties and conditions of creatures are known, especially in metaphysics, that cannot be present if they do not get their existence in the effect from some first cause; therefore from these metaphysical properties one can demonstrate that there is some first cause of those beings. The proof of the minor: the multitude of beings, their dependence, their composition, and the like conditions and properties evident to us, have a connection with an evident cause such as to convince and display that there is something actually simple, independent, and necessarily existing, from which all those things exist; for since they cannot exist of themselves, they must necessarily receive being from some cause existing above all creatures. But on this see the following article.

Article Three: Whether God exists

[Prefatory] Intervening Article: Whether there is an essential Order in Things and how manifold the Order is

Response: in every class of causes there is an essential order, which is made clear as follows [Oxon. 2 d.3 q.7 n.10]: “Order,” according to Augustine *City of God* 19.13, “is a fitting disposition, distributing to equal and unequal things each their own place.” The idea of order, then, requires and is found in an inequality of natures, or of species, and in an equality of individuals participating the same species. – However [*On the First Principle* 1 and 3 concl. 16] order is a relative property of being; for as being is divided into one and many, order follows on the latter member of this division, and through this order the many species constituting the universe are ordered, both among themselves and toward one, just as an army is ordered toward the leader and a house to the head of household, although not in the same way, as Aristotle says *Metaphysics* 12 text ch.52. For if the multitude were not ordered, or if one of the beings were found outside the idea of order, the multitude of beings would lack the perfection that exists in order, and the beings, or at least the one not ordered, would be in vain; for what is not an end or not for any end is in vain; but there is nothing in vain among beings; so every being in the universe must be ordered, and thereon must be for some end, if it is not the end itself. This order,

inhering necessarily in beings ordered to an end, we call an essential order in the genus of final cause. Again, that some nature is caused is clear to sense; so there must be some cause of that effect. But this cause either causes and effects by a virtue that is proper to it and follows on its form, or it causes by something inhering in it from without. In the first way indeed we speak of a per se cause, as man when generating man; but in the second way we speak of a per accidens cause, as a hot piece of wood in respect of the heat it causes in something else. Further, not just one per se cause alone concurs in producing one and the same effect, but other causes are necessarily required beyond the proximate and univocal cause, as the sky or the sun. These causes, then, that together cause one effect, are not only per se causes but also ordered causes, and indeed with a necessary order, because if one or other of them failed the effect would not follow. But causes not thus necessarily required together are not said to be, nor indeed are they, essentially ordered, but only accidentally ordered, as with a father, grandfather, great-grandfather in respect of a son, who can just as much be from the father whether the grandfather and great-grandfather exist or do not exist. So in the case of per se causes of the sort that are necessarily all required together for the effect to exist, there is an essential order such as cannot exist in those causes whose simultaneity in existing or in influencing the effect is not required. – Further [Oxon. 1 d.2 q.2 n.12, First Principle ch.1], causes necessarily or essentially ordered differ from accidentally ordered causes in three respects. *First*, that in causes necessarily ordered and necessarily required for some effect, a second cause, insofar as it is cause, depends on a first, not as if it receives something from the first cause when it causes but because, if the first is not acting, neither would the second be able to act. But in the case of causes that are accidentally ordered there is no such dependence, even if a second depends on a first in existing, as a son on a father; but in respect of a son's producing a son, he does not depend on his father, as is evident. *Second*, in the case of per se ordered causes there is causality of another idea and of another order; because the higher is more perfect, for it per se concurs in more effects, and therefore, since it contains them all in virtue, it must also be more perfect than a proximate cause that is able per se to effect only one effect. But in accidentally ordered causes it is not so; because individuals of the same species do not allow of this order, since there is the same form and nature in all of them. *Third*, finally, all per se causes are, in respect of one effect, necessarily required together for causing it; otherwise some per se causality would be lacking to the effect; however in accidentally ordered causes, on the contrary, this is not required, since one cause does not depend on another in causing. – Further [First Principle ch.3 nn.6, 14], we cannot understand a being to have no degree of perfection; rather each thing, if it exists, possesses some degree of proper perfection; for otherwise such a being would be nothing, which plainly involves a contradiction; therefore every being that is not supreme is exceeded by another; for from this fact Aristotle in *Metaphysics* 8 text ch.10 likens species to numbers, in whose coordination one number exceeds another in perfection and the other is exceeded, by subtraction of a unit. And similarly two species under the same common kind cannot have an equal degree. For the differences that divide a genus, as they are unlike and opposite, so are they also unequal. When the intellect, then [First Principle ch.2 n.1], is going through things rationally, it becomes apparent to it

that every being is ordered with an order of eminence; that it is ordered to some end; that it is ordered to its cause, by which it is produced; and that, because every being is ordered, it cannot be that one of them is not posterior and another prior, because then the very same thing would be ordered to itself. Therefore, just as there is no thing that generates itself, so nothing at all can have an essential order to itself. For it is impossible for the same thing to exceed itself in an essential perfection in which there is an order of essence, and so it is equally impossible for the same thing to depend on itself in genus of final or efficient cause. – So [First Principle ch.1 n.2], when speaking of this sort of order in general (that is, not in the way some mean, that any posterior thing is ordered to a prior, but rather that the first thing itself is above the order), order is a certain relation of equivalence, asserted of a prior in respect of a posterior, and conversely; and therefore what is ordered is sufficiently distinguished into prior and posterior. The order, then, is divided by its primary division as an equivocal thing is divided into its equivocals both in the order of eminence and in the order of dependence. In accord with the order of eminence, the prior is said to be eminent and the posterior exceeded; so, whatever is more noble and more perfect in essence is thus prior or eminent with respect to what is exceeded or to what is more ignoble and more imperfect than itself. As to the order of dependence, the prior is said to be what something depends on and the posterior what depends on it. And although for a prior there is necessarily required a posterior, so that without a posterior it could not be prior, yet that happens not because it needs the posterior for its existence, but conversely; for if the posterior is posited as not existing, the prior will no less exist without involving any contradiction; but it is not so with the posterior. Every posterior, then, necessarily depends essentially on a prior, but not conversely. – Again, what is essentially dependent either is caused, and that on which it depends is the cause of it, or the dependent is the result of some remoter cause and that on which it depends is the result of some nearer cause. That remoter effect depends essentially on the nearer effect, for it cannot exist if the latter does not exist. The cause also has regard to them in an ordered way; so the effects too have an essential order among themselves as compared to the third thing that is the cause of them both. But the common cause is understood to be remote with respect to the remoter effect, if the prior effect has not been caused; to this effect then the remoter states an essential order by which it has regard to the cause that proximately gives the effect its being; so the effect also essentially depends on it, from the fact its cause is in proximate potency to it. – The first member of the second division [sc. the order of dependence], which is the cause, is famously subdivided into four causes: namely final, efficient, material, and formal. And the posterior opposite to it [sc. the effect] is likewise divided into the four corresponding thereto, each in respect of its own proper cause. Essential order, then, is exhaustively divided into six orders, namely, first into the four orders of cause to caused, then through the single order of posterior caused to prior caused, and finally according to the essence of the eminent thing to the less noble thing.

From these points [First Principle ch.3 nn.3-4, Oxon. 1 d.2 q.2 n.14] we lay down three propositions. The *first proposition* is this: an infinity in things essentially ordered is impossible. The *second proposition*: an infinity in things accidentally

ordered is equally impossible, unless a stand is posited in essentially ordered things. The *third proposition*: on the supposition that essential order is taken out of the way, an infinity is still impossible. So much is this so that, since one must, in every case, posit a stand in things, whether these things are *per se* ordered or not, some being must be posited that is simply first. – As concerns the *first proposition*, namely that it is not possible for there to be an infinite regress in essentially ordered things, this is made clear in a number of ways. *First*, that the totality of essentially ordered caused things is caused; therefore it must be caused by some cause that does not belong to that totality, because then it would be caused by itself, which no one would say. For the whole totality of dependent things depends; so it can depend on nothing in that totality. *Second*, from the third difference between essentially and accidentally ordered causes, that all necessarily ordered causes must actually exist when some effect is being caused; therefore, if there were an infinite regress in that order, infinite causes would be actual together; this consequent no philosopher has conceded; therefore it is clear, by the natural light of the intellect, that there is a stand in things essentially ordered. *Third*, from Metaphysics 5 ch. on ‘Prior’, “that is prior which is nearer to a first;” therefore where there is no first, there is nothing essentially prior. *Fourth*, from the second difference, a higher cause is more perfect in causing; therefore what is infinitely higher is infinitely more perfect, and so of infinite perfection in causing, and so, as a result, it does not cause in virtue of another, for anything that causes in virtue of another is imperfect in causing, since it depends on something else for causing. *Fifth*, there is finally this proof: the idea of an effective thing involves *per se* no imperfection; therefore it can exist in something without any imperfection. But if this idea exists in nothing without dependence on something prior it is assuredly in nothing without imperfection; therefore if some independent effective force can exist in some nature, which nature would thus be first, then it exists also in fact; for otherwise it would not be independent, and so not simply first either. An infinite regress, then, in essentially ordered causes is plainly impossible. The *second proposition* too, namely that an infinity in things ordered per accidens is impossible unless a stand is posited in those that are ordered *per se*, is proved thus: for the infinity of per accidens ordered things is not simultaneous but only successive, one thing being after another such that, if a second flows in some way from a prior, yet the second does not depend on the prior in causing, as happens in *per se* ordered causes. Hence a son can generate just as well whether his father is dead or is active among the living. But this sort of infinite succession is plainly impossible unless it is continued or perpetuated by some nature infinite in duration on which the whole succession and each member of it depend; for no difference in form is perpetuated save in virtue of something permanent which is no part of the succession. For since all the successive things are of the same nature, there must be something essentially prior on which each member of the succession depends, and indeed in respect of an order other than that from the first cause, which first cause is some part of the succession. – The *third proposition*, finally, that an infinity is impossible even if an essential order is denied, is proved thus: for since nothing can be effected by nothing, it follows that there is some nature that effects another thing; so if an essential order of active causes is denied, then that effecting nature causes in virtue of nothing else; and although it be posited in some individual

as caused, yet in something it will not be caused; so in this there will be a stand. For if the thing is posited as caused in something or other, then, by denying an essential order, one falls at once into contradiction, because no nature can be posited as caused in something or other, such that there is an order below it that is accidental, without there being an essential order to another nature, as was made clear in the second proposition. There is then an essential order in beings in which there is no process to infinity, and it is by virtue of this order that the succession of accidentally ordered things is extended to infinity; and if per impossible the essential order were taken away, yet a process to infinity would be impossible.

Article Three: Whether God exists

Response: one must say [Oxon. 1 d.2 q.1 n.10, First Principle ch.3] that God exists. But since, according to what was said in the previous article, the existence of a first principle can be proved by a demonstration-that, and since the properties of it that are relative to creatures are more immediate to what are the middle terms in a demonstration-that than are the absolute properties of it (for immediately upon the existence of one correlative the existence of the other is inferred), therefore we think it is relative properties of this sort that the existence of God must be based on and made clear by. Further, the properties of the first principle relative to creatures are the properties either of causality or of eminence. Now the causality is either efficient or final; the exemplar cause is not a cause of another kind distinct from efficient cause; rather it is that which acts through intellect, as distinct from that which acts through nature.

But [Oxon. ib. n.11] to show the proposition more exactly, three conclusions must be made clear in turn. *First conclusion:* there is something actually existing which is simply first in respect of efficiency; something actually existing which is simply first in idea of end; and something actually existing which is simply first in eminence. – *Second conclusion:* the very thing that is first in one primacy is the same thing that is first in the other two primacies. – *Third conclusion:* this triple primacy belongs to one nature only, so that it does not belong to several natures differing in species or in quiddity; and the nature that is thus first, effective, final end of all things, and most excellently eminent, is God.

The first conclusion about the first effective thing, that it is not capable of being effected and that it is not effective by virtue of something else but by itself, is as follows [Oxon. ib.]. Some being is capable of being effected (this so that the argument may proceed from necessary premises and not from contingent ones, as it would be if it consisted of premises stating an actual making of something); some being, I say, is capable of being effected; either then by itself, or by nothing, or by something else. Not by nothing, because what is nothing cannot be the cause of anything; nor by itself, for it is not intelligible that something generates or effects itself; therefore by something else that is effective of it. Let this something else be called A. If A is first in the way explained above, the intended conclusion is attained. If A is not first, then it is effective secondarily, because it can be effected by another or is effective by virtue of another; for if a negation is denied the affirmative is asserted [sc. to deny a thing is first is to *deny* it is *not* capable of being effected etc.,

i.e. to assert it is capable of being effected etc.]. So let this other be granted and let it be called B. About B the same argument is made as about A. So, either one must proceed to infinity, or there will be a stand in something that has nothing prior to itself. But infinity is impossible in an ascending series, as was proved in the preceding article; therefore a stand must be made in some first effective thing, which does not effect by virtue of another and is thereon not in any way capable of being effected, because it does not have any effective thing prior to itself. – From these points the *first result* is [Oxon. ib. n.16, First Principle ch.2 n.3, ch.3 n.5] that this first effective thing is simply uncausable. For it is not capable of being effected, and it is an independent effective thing; therefore it is altogether uncausable, that is, not able to be directed to an end, not able to be made material, not able to receive form. That it is not able to be directed to an end is clear from the fact that an end is not a cause save insofar as the existence of the thing directed to an end depends essentially on the end as on something prior; but a thing directed to an end does not depend, as to its existence, on a thus prior end save insofar as the end, as something loved, moves the efficient cause to give that thing existence; so an end causes nothing other than what is brought about by the efficient cause that loves the end. So since the first effective thing is not capable of being effected, because it is an independent effective thing, neither can it have a final cause. But that it is not able to be made material, nor able to receive form, is made clear thus: intrinsic causes [to wit, the material and formal causes] are caused extrinsically, either as to their being, or insofar as they cause the composite, or in both ways; for these causes do not cause or constitute the composite by themselves but an agent is of necessity required; if then the first effective thing is caused by matter and form intrinsically, it must also be caused by some agent on which those causes depend in their causing. Since therefore there is a contradiction involved in the first effective thing having an efficient cause, it will also be impossible for it to have intrinsic causes. – The *second result* is that the first effective is actually existent. For that in whose idea there is a simple repugnance to its being from another can, if it can exist, exist from itself; but being from another is repugnant to the idea of the first effective; otherwise it would not be the first effective; and it can exist, because the idea of an effective thing does not necessarily involve any imperfection; so much so that there is no repugnance in its existing in something without imperfection; therefore an effective thing simply first can exist from itself; therefore it does exist from itself; because what does not in fact exist from itself cannot exist from itself; for otherwise a non-being would draw something into existence, which is impossible. And, further, the same thing would be cause of itself, and so it will not be altogether uncausable. Since, therefore, the first effective is necessarily uncausable, and it is not repugnant to an entity that such primacy be present in it, but rather there would be a disharmony for the universe of things if it lacked the highest grade possible, and a contradiction would be involved if anything was prior to it, therefore it is necessary for the First thing to be altogether able to be from itself; and thus it exists in fact, because it is repugnant for it to receive being from another. – The second part of the first conclusion [Oxon. ib. n.17], namely that there is something that is the end for things and that nothing else is prior to it, or that there is something that is so first in ends that it is not able to be ordered to anything else; this can be proved with altogether the same arguments as

those by which in the preceding article it was shown that an infinity in essentially ordered things is impossible; however it will be enough to have touched on the first of these arguments as follows: the totality of caused things is finite; therefore it depends on something as on an end; not on something belonging to that totality, because then the same thing would be end of itself; therefore on another that is outside the totality of finite things, to which the whole totality is ordered. – From this it follows that the first end for things is uncausable and actually existing. For it cannot itself have an end, otherwise it would not be first; therefore it cannot be effected; because, as every *per se* agent acts for an end, what has no end will assuredly not have a *per se* agent; therefore the first end for things is uncausable. Now, that it actually exists is proved thus: for that to which existing from another is repugnant, if it can exist from itself, does exist from itself. But to the first end of things is repugnant its existing from another, since it cannot be effected; therefore if it can exist, it can exist from itself; therefore it does exist from itself, since it could never happen that it exist from another. – Finally the third part of the conclusion [Oxon. ib. n.18], which is about the simply first eminent thing, is made clear as follows: for since all the natures in the universe that are for an end are finite, therefore they are exceeded by that to which they are ordered; the nature, then, which is the end of the others simply excels and is eminent in perfection above all the rest; for forms are related as numbers, as Aristotle testifies *Metaphysics* 8 text 10; so in this order there must be a stand in something single, as was made clear in the preceding article. But that this nature must be most eminent of all and uncausable is clear from the fact that it cannot have an end; for what can have an end is excelled by the end in goodness, and hence in perfection; so the most eminent cannot be effected, and is utterly uncausable; for of what there is no end, of that there is no *per se* agent either; and therefore it is much more incapable of the causality of another cause. And further, on the part of being, it is existent; because what excludes every cause, if it can exist, can exist of itself; for it can receive being from nothing else.

Next must be made clear [Oxon. ib.] the second conclusion proposed, and it must be shown that the triple primacy of efficient cause, final cause, and eminence belongs to the same nature. For the first efficient cause is the ultimate end, and the same is the most eminent of beings; therefore the triple primacy belongs to altogether the same nature. The assumption as to the first part is proved thus: every *per se* efficient cause acts for an end, and a higher efficient cause acts for a higher end; therefore the first efficient cause acts for the ultimate end; but it acts principally and ultimately for nothing other than itself; for nothing other than itself can be its end; therefore it acts for itself as for the ultimate end; therefore the first efficient cause is the ultimate end. The second part of the assumption is proved thus: the first efficient cause is not univocal but equivocal with respect to the beings caused by itself; therefore it is more eminent and noble than they are; and so the first efficient cause, which is the ultimate end, is equally the most eminent of all things.

As to proving the third conclusion [Oxon. ib. n.19] – which is that the triple primacy, wherein the first efficient cause excels, cannot belong to several natures quidditatively diverse – the following statement must first be prefaced: that to

which the triple primacy belongs, as in the second conclusion, has altogether a necessity of existing, and so rightly is it called a necessary being. For such a first thing is altogether uncausable, as was shown above; since there is altogether a contradiction included in something's being prior to the first thing in genus of efficient cause or end and thus in any genus of cause, therefore the first thing is thoroughly uncausable; so it has a necessity of existence. The proof of this consequence is as follows: nothing can fail to be unless something positively or privatively incompossible with it can be present in it; but as to something that exists of itself and is thoroughly uncausable, nothing can exist in it that is positively or privatively incompossible with it; therefore it is a necessary being. The major is plain, because no being can be destroyed save through something positively or privatively incompossible with it. The minor is proved thus, for that incompossible thing is either able to be by itself or by another; if able to be by itself, then it is by itself, so much so that either there are two incompossibles simultaneously or neither will exist, because each will destroy the being of the other. If it is able to be by another, then on the contrary: no cause is able to destroy a being because of the repugnance of its effect to that being unless it gives a more perfect and more intense being to its effect than is the being of that other destroyable thing; but no being from another has in it a more perfect being from its cause than is the being of what is from itself; for every caused thing has a dependent being; but what is from itself has an independent being. Therefore the first efficient cause is simply a necessary being.

Now we must prove [Oxon. ib., First Principle ch.3 conclus.16] that the aforesaid triple primacy cannot belong to several natures of different ideas, but that a nature thus first must be altogether single. For if such primacy were present in several natures, then in respect either of the *same* or of *different* posterior things; both are impossible; therefore it is also equally impossible for the triple primacy to be present in several natures quidditatively diverse. Proof of the minor as to the first part of it: for it is impossible for the same thing to depend with any sort of dependence on two things one of which altogether terminates its dependence; for then the other of them would not sufficiently terminate it if this other still depended on the first; therefore it cannot at all happen that the same effect be posterior to several first principles in any genus of cause; for when one total cause causes in any genus of cause, it is impossible for another cause to cause the same thing in the same genus of cause; because then the same thing would be caused twice, or at any rate neither of the causes would be the total cause, contrary to the supposition; therefore there cannot, with respect to the *same* effects, be several first principles. But neither with respect to *diverse* effects; for then there would be two sets of coordinated beings not at all ordered among themselves and so not constituting a single universe but two distinct ones; for the beings of one of the sets would be ordered neither among themselves nor to the same principle; but without unity of order there is no unity of universe. Hence it is in a very single end that Aristotle, *Metaphysics* 12 text ch.52ff., places the principal goodness of the universe; because there is one order to one supremacy. Since therefore it cannot happen that several first principles exist either in respect of the same beings or in respect of diverse ones, there must be altogether one first principle, which is the *first* most actual effective thing, and it contains virtually every possible actuality; it is also the

ultimate end of all things and best, as virtually containing all possible goodness; finally it is also the first eminent, that is, the most eminent and most perfect of beings, wherein exists eminently every possible perfection.

The nature then [First Principle ch.3 n.11], which has this triple primacy, concurring necessarily in one thing only (for if one primacy exist in one nature and others in diverse natures, then there could not be any nature that would be more eminent than the rest), is what we call God, whose triple primacy expresses the three ideas of supreme goodness, which are supreme communicability, supreme lovability, and supreme integrity. For the good is desirable, from *Ethics* 1, and communicative of itself, from Avicenna *Metaphysics* 6.54; but nothing communicates perfectly save what communicates freely; but the good and the perfect are the same, *Metaphysics* 5 text ch.21, and also the perfect and the whole, *Physics* 3 text ch.63. A single existent nature then is in this triple primacy first with respect to any other nature, so much so that any other nature is simply posterior to it according to the triple order in which that single nature is first, namely [Theoremata 15 n.2, *Metaphysics* 12 q.18 n.2] the most perfect of all beings and supreme in every difference of being that simply involves perfection, of which sort are true, good, necessary, etc. And he is God glorious and most high.

THIRD QUESTION: ON THE SIMPLICITY OF GOD. IN EIGHT ARTICLES.

Article One: Whether God is a Body

Response: