

THE
FATHERS
OF THE
CHURCH
MEDIAEVAL
CONTINUATION

JOHN DUNS SCOTUS
QUESTIONS ON ARISTOTLE'S
CATEGORIES

Translated by Lloyd A. Newton

eorū munis electō subsequē
ret. neq̄q̄ eligendi potesta
tē de cetero habeant. p̄ eo q̄
indignū n̄

cōscientiā
duunā uir
tutis me
merito for
Greg. x. ex

Nulli licet
scrutinio
et electōe fu
postq̄ presb
ab hys cele
sup electio
postea emig
te. ul' msi
tea collata
in p̄bitas. t

latentis uirū. in ceteris.
que uere similit̄ ignorare po
tuerit ueritas. et resoluatur
electō fā huiusmodi et ignorā
tia. ul' fide p̄pria faciat uirā
m̄tū.

Greg. x. ex
Quando dixerit / xi. lug
duarū electōnū celebratō.
parte altēā eligentiū du
plo maiore numio iueniri.
scia electores qui p̄tē aliq̄
sic extendunt ad extēsiō
tē. et cū meriti ul' aucto
ritatis ip̄s reliquis. uel
electo ab eis aliquid oppo

omē presenti decreto intēdi
cū facultate. si qd aut oppo
nere uoluerit q̄ uotū illius
nullū reddet
intelligim

g. x. ex. lug
alexan. pp.
m. cas electō
up electōnib
numio maio
umas cogita
pellationem
tuefit ad sed
n temerariā.
iā et effrena
u sequit̄ re
s. hac gnati
m p̄uicendū

uiri extra uotū in p̄tē electō
tionib; ul' dignitatib; c̄pari
bus maiorib; celebratis ex
p̄sa causa. manifeste fr̄uo
la. dicit̄ appellari. p̄pella
tionē hui' neq̄q̄ ad sedem
eandē negotiū reuoluat̄.
sed cū electōnū eaydē negotiū
in iudicio ul' ex iudiciū ap
pellatur. scriptis extra pro
bandi que plura debent le
gitimā reputari ad sedem.
ip̄am hui' negotiū deferat̄.
Ceterū iōnib; p̄missis ca
sib; liceat p̄tib; ab hui' ap

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JOHN DUNS SCOTUS

QUESTIONS ON ARISTOTLE'S CATEGORIES

Translated by

LLOYD A. NEWTON



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I wish to dedicate this
work to my three children,
Holly, Alexander, and Maggie,
who mean the world to me.

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ABBREVIATIONS AND SIGLA

Abbreviations

AL	Aristoteles Latinus. Leuven: De Wulf-Mansion Centre, 1961–.
CIMAGL	Cahiers de l'Institut du Moyen Âge Grec et Latin. Copenhagen, 1969–.
PL	Patrologiae Cursus Completus, Series Latina.

Sigla

n., nn.	References to numbered paragraphs in the translated text
[]	Square brackets indicate words or phrases supplied by the editor of the Latin text.
< >	Angle brackets indicate words or phrases supplied by the translator.

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INTRODUCTION

INTRODUCTION

THE HISTORICAL RECEPTION OF ARISTOTLE'S *CATEGORIES*

Aristotle's *Categories*¹ is the subject of an extensive number of commentaries and of an unusual amount of debate, and for good reasons. To begin with, in spite of its relatively short length, it is a rather difficult text to understand, especially for those who are just beginning their study of philosophy. Yet, because it lays the foundation for many subsequent philosophical discussions in general, and for logic in particular, it was historically often the very first text of philosophy that students encountered. Even those who are more steeped in philosophy and who have studied the *Categories* in depth often find it difficult, albeit for different reasons. One difficulty for this latter group, as the ancient commentators on the *Categories* recognized, is that Aristotle himself is ambiguous about the subject of the work. What exactly is he categorizing? Is it "things that are" or "things that are said"? Furthermore, depending on how one understands its purpose, the *Categories* can be seen in harmony with, in contrast to, or even in contradiction to, Plato's own theory of the five highest genera. For all of these reasons and more, the *Categories* acted as a magnet, attracting commentaries from Aristotelians, Platonists, and Stoics alike. Quite naturally, some of these commentaries defend Aristotelianism, whereas others defend either Platonism or Stoicism by attacking Aristotle's *Categories*. Finally, there are still others who use the *Categories* as a means to expound their own philosophical systems in the process of interpreting Aristotle.

1. The title *Categories* refers to the book written by Aristotle, while "categories" refers to the ten highest genera, namely: substance, quantity, quality, relation, action, passion, position, possession, time, and place.

Given the large number of commentaries on the *Categories*,² it is important to point out that for nearly two millennia commentary-writing on philosophical texts has been “one of the ways of doing philosophy,”³ which is to say that philosophers do not always write commentaries simply to explain a particular text. Rather, with the noticeable exception of Plotinus, many philosophers prior to Descartes use commentaries both as a way of explicating an important text and as a means of developing their own thoughts on various philosophical questions. As the commentary tradition developed, however, and as philosophical discussions became more complex, commentaries tended to focus less and less on a particular philosophical text, and more and more on important philosophical issues, so much so that the mere complexity of the questions asked in a commentary can be an indication of when that commentary was written.⁴ As a general rule, commentaries that were written early in the tradition tend to be more expository; and conversely, commentaries that were written later in the tradition tend to contain more original observations and insights from an author.

Though many of the ancient and medieval commentators, such as Porphyry, Boethius, Albert the Great, and Duns Scotus, wrote original treatises on philosophical issues, their commentaries are in themselves valuable contributions to philosophy, particularly those that come near the end of the tradition of writing commentaries.⁵ Consequently, studies of the various

2. In the late 1960s and early 70s, Charles H. Lohr compiled an approximately 600-page annotated bibliography of all the medieval Latin commentaries on Aristotle, published in six installments in *Traditio*, vols. 23–29. By my count, there were over 200 commentaries on some portion of Aristotle’s *Categories*.

3. Richard Sorabji, “The Ancient Commentators on Aristotle,” in *Aristotle Transformed: The Ancient Commentators and Their Influence*, ed. Sorabji (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1990), 1–30; see p. 24.

4. Robert Andrews, “Question Commentaries on the *Categories* in the Thirteenth Century,” *Medioevo* (Rome) 26 (2001): 265–326; see p. 267.

5. Compare Fr. Wippel’s description of St. Thomas’s commentaries: of his theological commentaries, “two are commentaries in the strict sense, i.e., on the *De Hebdomadibus* of Boethius and on the *De divinis nominibus*; the other two offer brief expositions of the texts of Boethius and of Peter and use them as occasions for much fuller and highly personal disquisitions by Thomas himself.” John F. Wippel, *The Metaphysical Thought of Thomas Aquinas: From Finite Being to Uncreated Being* (Washington, DC: The Catholic University of America Press, 2000), xviii.

commentaries, and especially those dealing with the *Categories*, can be valuable works in themselves, not just for what they tell us about Aristotle. As Robert Andrews points out, medieval “*Categories* commentaries are the repository of centuries of analyses of the basic concepts of Western thought, all carefully organized and awaiting modern rediscovery.”⁶

One such commentary that is “awaiting modern rediscovery” is John Duns Scotus’s *Questions on the Categories*. Like many of his contemporaries who wrote commentaries on the *Categories*, Scotus does not intend for his commentary to be simply an explication of Aristotle’s work. In fact, it is not a traditional, literal commentary at all. Rather, as the title indicates, it is a question commentary. Moreover, the question format is significant because it permits him to discuss other issues that are only remotely related to the text under consideration. As a result, one is hard pressed to find a mere explication of Aristotle’s *Categories* in Scotus’s *Questions on the Categories*. Absent from his commentary are the rote and perfunctory questions common to most early commentaries on the *Categories*, such as why Aristotle defines something in the plural, or why he treats relation before he discusses quality. Consequently, Scotus’s *Questions on the Categories* is neither a study of what Aristotle says, nor even of what Scotus thinks Aristotle says; rather, it is a study of what Scotus thinks about particular issues related to the ten categories and to logic. For a greater appreciation of this commentary, let us first look at the background and context of the work.

The Background and Context of Scotus’s Commentary

Aristotle’s *Categories* poses different problems for different readers. Those who are newer to the study of philosophy are likely to find it difficult because of its abstract terms or because of Aristotle’s dense writing style. More experienced philosophers, however, are likely to find it difficult because of the questions and issues that it raises. Accordingly, some philosophers, such as Porphyry, found it necessary to write two commentaries on it: a simple one designed for pedagogical purposes, and a more advanced one that addresses the more abstract philosoph-

6. Andrews, “Question Commentaries,” 266.

ical questions that are raised in the text. Unfortunately, Scotus is not one of the philosophers to produce two commentaries.

As one can see from even a cursory glance at his commentary, Scotus and his audience are not like Augustine's friends, who "scarcely managed to understand the book."⁷ On the contrary, they obviously have a very good grasp of the categories in particular and logic in general. One reason for this expertise is that by the time Scotus wrote his commentary, part of the standard requirement for an undergraduate at the University of Paris was to listen to at least three lectures on the *Categories*, one cursory lecture given by a bachelor and two ordinary lectures given by a master.⁸ Consequently, the significance of Scotus's *Questions on the Categories* does not lie in its explication of Aristotle's *Categories*. Rather, its importance resides in the questions, arguments, and insights that Scotus raises about a wide range of issues, including, among others, signification, understanding, equivocity, analogy, univocity, being, substance, quantity, quality, relations, issues that are only remotely raised by Aristotle's text.

Such questions and arguments do not come out of nowhere but are largely a result of three broad factors. First, many of the questions and arguments found in Scotus's commentary are a result of the commentary tradition Scotus inherits.⁹ These are questions that are driven by the ambiguities and perplexities of Aristotle's text itself. For example, why does Aristotle define equivocals in the plural, or why is it that he describes things as equivocal, since we tend to think of equivocity as pertaining to language and not things? Another question pertains to the subject of the work. Thus, many of his contemporary commen-

7. Augustine, *Confessions*, trans. F. J. Sheed (Indianapolis: Hackett Publishing Company, 1992), 64.

8. James Weisheipl, "The Curriculum of the Faculty of Arts at Oxford in the Early Fourteenth Century," *Mediaeval Studies* 26 (1964): 143–85; see pp. 150–51.

9. For a parallel instance, compare the discussion on universals that is first introduced in Porphyry's *Isagoge*, then elaborated on in Boethius's *Second Commentary on the Isagoge*, which in turn is developed by Abelard and others. Spade provides a wonderful selection of texts that trace this discussion. See Paul Vincent Spade, trans. and ed., *Five Texts on the Mediaeval Problem of Universals: Porphyry, Boethius, Abelard, Duns Scotus, Ockham* (Indianapolis: Hackett Publishing Company, 1994).

tators claim that the subject of the *Categories* is *ens incomplexum dicibile ordinatum in genere*, a phrase apparently derived from Boethius, who in turn probably took it from his predecessors.¹⁰ Scotus, however, argues that this catchphrase fails to describe the subject of the categories. Rather, as obvious as it may seem to some (and this was by no means obvious to his contemporaries), according to Scotus the subject of this work is simply the ten categories as they are conceived by the intellect.

A second factor surrounding Scotus's *Questions* is the recent recovery of the remaining works of Aristotle. For approximately seven centuries from Boethius's translation of the text into Latin, Aristotle's *Categories* was the only text of Aristotle available to philosophers and theologians. The recovery, however, of the rest of his corpus of writings produced a renewed interest in the *Categories*. Thus, a number of questions are raised about how this text relates to his other works, such as his *Physics* or *Metaphysics*. For example, many thirteenth-century commentaries raise the question of whether the categories are the same when studied in logic and in metaphysics. Likewise, the longest question within the text concerns the univocity of being.

A third major influence on Scotus's commentary is the renewed interest in the subject, or, shall I say, science, of grammar, which was cultivated by a group of philosophers known as the Modistae. Let us look at each of these influences in turn.

The Commentary Tradition

By the time Scotus composed his commentary, at least fifty other commentaries had been written on the *Categories*. These commentaries fall into six main groups. Even though only the last group of commentators has a major influence on Scotus's own commentary, a review of the long commentary tradition, of which Scotus is a part, will show that commentators often build

10. This phrase is explained in detail in the fourth chapter. That this phrase owes its origin to Boethius is suggested by Andrews; see Robert R. Andrews, "Peter of Auvergne's *Commentary on Aristotle's Categories*" (Ph.D. diss., Cornell University, 1988), 14. For the lack of originality of Boethius as a commentator, see James Shiel, "Boethius' Commentaries on Aristotle," in *Aristotle Transformed*, ed. Sorabji (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1990), 349–72. See also Sten Ebbesen, "Boethius as an Aristotelian Commentator," in *Aristotle Transformed*, 373–92.

upon or react to one another, and that Scotus, so to speak, inherits a vast repository of questions and issues relating to the categories.

The first group consists of five different commentaries on the *Categories* written sixty years or so prior to the birth of Christ. The first commentary is by Andronicus of Rhodes, who is responsible for reviving Aristotle's teaching and for compiling a critical edition of his writings. By appending commentaries to some of Aristotle's writings, Andronicus ostensibly began a long tradition of commentary-writing on Aristotle's works. Within a few years of Andronicus's commentary, Ariston, a self-professed Aristotelian known for abandoning Plato's Academy in order to become a Peripatetic philosopher, wrote his own commentary. Shortly thereafter, the third and fourth commentaries were written by Eudorus, an Academic, and Athenodorus, a Stoic, while the fifth one was written by Andronicus's pupil, Boethus of Sidon.¹¹

Although none of these works is extant, there is enough fragmentary evidence to support the following two observations about this first group of commentaries. First, they contain dramatically different interpretations of Aristotle's text, some maintaining that it is only about words, and others that it is about metaphysical things. The fact is that Aristotle is ambiguous about the purpose of the *Categories*. It could be about words, concepts, or beings. For sometimes he speaks of the "things that are said," while at other times he simply says the "things that are."¹² In spite of his ambiguity, though, the various possible interpretations are rather limited. On the basis of the existing evidence, it seems that this earliest group of commentators managed to exhaust all the possible interpretations, interpretations which are partially motivated by their broader

11. Hans B. Gottschalk, "The Earliest Aristotelian Commentators," in *Aristotle Transformed*, 69. These commentators wrote at the following approximate times: Andronicus of Rhodes (circa 60 BCE), Ariston (circa 60 BCE), Eudorus the Academic (circa 50 BCE), Athenodorus the Stoic (circa 50 BCE), and Boethus (circa 40 BCE). It should be pointed out that Athenodorus also wrote a work titled *Against Aristotle's Categories*.

12. Cf. *Categories*, ch. 1 (1a 17, 20).

philosophical orientations. As a general rule, the Stoics tended to take the *Categories* to be about grammar, while the Platonists, at least those who followed the skeptical trend of the New Academy, were critical of the *Categories* since the latter understood it to be a treatise about metaphysics. The Aristotelians, though, typically argued that the *Categories* was about concepts, which are intermediate between utterances and extramental things. By the time the fifth commentary was written, however, Boethus of Sidon hinted at a fourth possible interpretation, one that eventually became the standard interpretation for subsequent commentators, namely, that the *Categories* is about simple terms that signify things.¹³

A second feature worth noting about some of these first commentaries is that they provide examples of how commentators use Aristotle's text to introduce new ideas. Two instances will suffice to illustrate this point. First, according to Gottschalk, Andronicus changes the last two categories from "when" and "where" to "time" and "place," presumably because he thinks that "time" and "place" exist in their own right and that "where" and "when" are only their attributes.¹⁴ The other instance concerns the categories "action" and "passion," which one commentator reduces to a single category, namely, motion. This reduction is quickly ruled out by Boethus since it contradicts Aristotle's teaching about the first mover, who is entirely active.¹⁵

Although these five commentaries were all written within a short period of one another, writing about the *Categories* slowed for the next two centuries. This lull, however, should not be taken as an indication that the *Categories* had been entirely forgotten; early in the second century CE interest in this work was once again revived. This revival, which initiated the second group of commentaries, was started by three Platonists, all known for their "intemperate attacks on Aristotle":¹⁶ Atticus, Lucius, and Nicostratus. Of the three, Nicostratus's work seems to

13. Gottschalk, "The Earliest Aristotelian Commentators," 70. To what extent Boethus articulates this fourth, more inclusive, interpretation, though, is unclear. Arguably, it is Porphyry who first develops this position in detail.

14. Ibid., 73.

15. Ibid., 76–78.

16. Ibid., 80.

be the most important since it is “nothing less than a collection of all possible objections to Aristotle’s teaching.”¹⁷ This characterization aside, the attacks made by the Platonists actually indicate that Aristotle’s teaching is seen by the Platonists as a serious threat. Of course, criticizing Aristotle only resulted in more commentaries defending the Stagirite. Immediately after the attacks made by the Platonists, Peripatetics such as Herminus, Aspasius, Adrastus, and Alexander of Aphrodisias all responded with commentaries of their own, in which they cleared up many, if not all, of the misunderstandings and criticisms leveled against Aristotle by some Platonists.¹⁸

Although the texts of these commentators are also lost, clearly Aristotle’s *Categories* was a major focus of philosophical interest at this time, influencing both Aristotelians and non-Aristotelians alike. Sorabji states it well: “Outside the Aristotelian schools, the chief interest in the first two centuries CE still focused on Aristotle’s *Categories*. The work seems to have acted as a catalyst, attracting commentaries from three schools, the Stoic, Platonist, and Aristotelian.”¹⁹ Gottschalk notes that subsequently, “almost every Aristotelian of note wrote a commentary or interpretive essay” on the *Categories*.²⁰ Even of those philosophers who did not write a specific commentary on it, some, such as Albinus and Philo, incorporated elements of the *Categories* into their own philosophy, whereas others, most notably Plotinus, found it necessary to attack it.²¹ As Evangeliou points out, while those who disagreed with it tried to refute it, no one “ignored or underestimated the doctrine of the categories and its philosophical importance.”²²

17. Ibid., 80. For information about Nicostratus, see K. Praechter, “Nikostratos der Platoniker,” *Hermes* 57 (1922): 481–517. For an extended bibliography on all the ancient commentators mentioned here and in the next few paragraphs, see Sorabji, *Aristotle Transformed*, 485–506.

18. For Adrastus and Aspasius, see H. P. F. Mercken, “The Greek Commentators on Aristotle’s *Ethics*,” in *Aristotle Transformed*, ed. Sorabji, 407–44; see p. 438. In addition, see Sorabji, “The Ancient Commentators on Aristotle,” 29–30; and Christos C. Evangeliou, *Aristotle’s Categories and Porphyry* (Leiden: Brill, 1988), 17.

19. Sorabji, “The Ancient Commentators on Aristotle,” 1.

20. Gottschalk, “The Earliest Aristotelian Commentators,” 69.

21. Ibid.

22. Evangeliou, *Aristotle’s Categories and Porphyry*, 18. Evangeliou adds that

In sum, by the time Porphyry wrote his famous introduction to the *Categories* in the third century, it was on its way to becoming a “central work of medieval logic.”²³

With the exception of the medieval commentators on the *Categories*, we know the most about the third group of commentators. These commentators are all, by and large, Neoplatonists writing between 250 CE and about 610 CE. The most prominent of this group include Porphyry, Dexippus, Marius Victorinus, Boethius, Ammonius Saccas, Simplicius, Philoponus, Olympiodorus, and Elias.²⁴ Much is known about these commentators, but my observations will be limited to Porphyry and Boethius since they are the most important commentators influencing Scotus’s commentary. Two broad generalizations, however, characterize the works of these commentators as a whole. First, the pressure to harmonize the philosophies of Plato and Aristotle tends to distort their commentaries.²⁵ Second, these commentaries betray a gradual but perceptible shift in attitude from that of the early pagan commentators hostile to Christianity to that of the later Christian commentators.²⁶

this “attitude of the ancient commentators towards the *Categories* contrasts with the tendency of many modern scholars who seem to confine the importance of Aristotle’s logic to the theory of the syllogism and, therefore, tend to neglect the categorial doctrine which does not admit syllogistic treatment” (18 n. 3).

23. Andrews, “Peter of Auvergne’s *Commentary on Aristotle’s Categories*,” 2.

24. Some of these commentaries are available in English, including the following: Porphyry, *On Aristotle’s Categories*, trans. Steven K. Strange (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1992); Dexippus, *On Aristotle’s Categories*, trans. John Dillon (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1992); Ammonius, *On Aristotle’s Categories*, trans. S. Marc Cohen and Gareth B. Matthews (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1991); and Simplicius, *On Aristotle’s Categories* 9–15, trans. Richard Gaskin, *Ancient Commentaries on Aristotle*, general ed. Sorabji (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2000). These commentators lived during the following times: Porphyry (205–270 CE), Dexippus (circa 330), Marius Victorinus (285–370), Boethius (480–524), Ammonius Saccas (445–526), Simplicius (515–545 or later), Philoponus (490–570), Olympiodorus (circa 560), and Elias (550–600).

25. Overall, the commentaries on the logical writings seem to suffer less distortion than those on either the *Physics* or the *de Anima*. Cf. Sorabji, “The Ancient Commentators on Aristotle,” 15.

26. Porphyry is the best example of those who are hostile to Christianity, his *Against the Christians* being the most formidable assault on Christianity by a

By far the greatest Neoplatonist to write a commentary on the *Categories* was Porphyry. In fact he first produced two commentaries on this central work: one short and elementary, probably for pedagogical purposes, and a longer one, presumably more elaborate and systematic for advanced philosophers.²⁷ Great as he is, though, his commentaries on the *Categories* are not purely expository works. In addition to explicating the text, he appears to have two other goals in writing his commentaries on the *Categories*: (1) to respond to the criticisms of Plotinus, his mentor and teacher; and (2) to reconcile Platonism and Aristotelianism in order to combat the growing threat of Christian Gnosticism. Stated differently, his purpose was not simply to articulate the true teaching of Aristotle, as the Peripatetics claimed to do, but “to interpret the Aristotelian doctrine of categories in such a way as to make it compatible with Platonism and acceptable to Neoplatonic Schools.”²⁸

Earlier commentators, as we saw, tended to interpret the *Categories* as exclusively about words, concepts, or things, but not about all three. In order for Porphyry to reconcile Aristotle’s *Categories* with Platonism, however, he had to move beyond the exclusive interpretations advanced by the earlier philosophers and to articulate a more inclusive position.²⁹ In essence, Por-

pagan. Over time, however, that hostility largely gave way to Christian philosophers, such as Philoponus, Elias, David, pseudo-Elias, Stephanus, and Boethius. For a discussion of this transformation, see Sorabji, “The Ancient Commentators on Aristotle,” 10–15.

27. Of course, it is also Porphyry who writes the *Isagoge*, which is traditionally thought to be an introduction to the *Categories*.

28. Evangeliou, *Aristotle’s Categories and Porphyry*, 7. According to Evangeliou, Porphyry’s primary motive for reconciling Plato and Aristotle was his hatred toward Christianity. Although it is only a hypothesis, Evangeliou notes: “If we assume that Porphyry recognized more clearly than Plotinus, that the real enemy of Platonism (and by extension Hellenism) was neither Aristotelianism nor Stoicism but Christian (and non-Christian) Gnosticism, then we can clearly see why he was not pleased with Plotinus’s tactics and why he tried hard to reconcile Plato and Aristotle” (see p. 5).

29. To what extent the earlier commentators actually advanced a fully articulated inclusive interpretation is not entirely clear. Iamblichus, a student of Porphyry, criticized the earlier commentators thus: “O men! You fight each other without really fighting each other. Though you tell the truth, none of you

phyry's interpretation is a compromise with earlier, one-sided positions, since he attempts to synthesize all of the genuine elements found in each of the earlier interpreters. As Evangeliou states it, the "fact that all the three parties had quoted Aristotle in order to support their favorite position was viewed by later commentators as an indication that each of them was partially correct."³⁰ Although Porphyry's inclusive interpretation was reputedly articulated by both Boethus and Herminius before him, his particular articulation of this inclusive interpretation became the standard favored by subsequent commentators. In essence, Porphyry claims that Aristotle's purpose in writing the *Categories* is "to deal with significant vocal signs signifying things by means of signifying concepts."³¹ How this interpretation reconciles Platonism and Aristotelianism, though, is not entirely clear, nor is it important to the present study.³² What is important, however, is that this inclusive interpretation seems to lay the foundation for

is wholly right. And none of you is entirely wrong, though you tell lies." Iamblichus's criticism suggests that the previous commentators had not adopted the correct, inclusive interpretation, which he inherits from Porphyry. All that Evangeliou will say on this issue is that, prior to Porphyry, there was "a tendency toward" an inclusive interpretation. The lack of extant texts, combined with the fact that the existing commentaries diverge in identifying the holders and followers of each interpretation, makes it even more difficult to discern the novelty of Porphyry's interpretation. For a fuller discussion of the various possible interpretations in the early commentaries, as well as the quotation from Iamblichus, see Evangeliou, *Aristotle's Categories and Porphyry*, 327–32.

30. Evangeliou, *Aristotle's Categories and Porphyry*, 32.

31. *Ibid.*, 27. In Porphyry's extant commentary, which is the more elementary one, the reference to signifying concepts is left out, presumably because he does not want to make matters too complicated in an elementary commentary. See Giorgio Pini, *Categories and Logic in Duns Scotus: An Interpretation of Aristotle's Categories in the Late Thirteenth Century* (Leiden: Brill, 2002), 9.

32. Cf. Evangeliou's judgment on this matter: "From the success and influence which Porphyry's thesis had on the subsequent generations, it may be inferred that he had based [his reconciliation] on sound arguments. It would not do to simply say [sic] that it was the assignment of different areas to each philosopher that helped Porphyry's reconciliatory efforts. *Aristoteles logicus* and *Plato theologus* may serve well as a motto, but it cannot hold up under scrutiny. For the question is that Aristotle had his "theology," which he calls *πρώτη φιλοσοφία*, and Plato had his "logic," which he calls *διαλεκτική*. *Aristotle's Categories and Porphyry*, 179.

medieval developments in grammar and logic, a point which will arise again in the discussion of the Modistae.

After Porphyry, the next major commentator that deserves mention is Boethius. Like Porphyry, Boethius also thinks that he can reconcile Plato and Aristotle. His immediate purpose for writing his commentaries, however, seems not to be to reconcile Platonism and Aristotelianism but rather, as is well known, to preserve Plato and Aristotle in Latin.³³ As he himself states it in his commentary on *de Interpretatione*, his goal is "to translate and comment upon every single work of Aristotle [he] can lay [his] hands on."³⁴ Regarding his commentary on the *Categories*, Boethius admits to drawing largely from the works of Porphyry since "he seemed to be easier and clearer than others."³⁵ As a result, Boethius accepts what becomes the canonical interpretation of the *Categories*: it is a work about significant vocal signs signifying things by means of signifying concepts. The importance of Boethius's works in general, though, resides in the fact that he was primarily responsible for preserving Aristotle's logical writings in Latin for the next six hundred years. In particular, Boethius's translation of and commentary on the *Categories*, coupled with the *Categoriae decem*, a Themistian paraphrase of Aristotle's *Categories* attributed to St. Augustine at that time, make the *Categories* the "only Aristotelian work alive throughout the Middle Ages."³⁶

33. In his commentary *On Aristotle's Categories*, Boethius admits that he is drawing largely upon Porphyry's commentary. Like Porphyry, Boethius planned to write two commentaries on the *Categories*, one elementary and one advanced. This being so, it seems likely that any attempt to reconcile Platonism and Aristotelianism on Boethius's part would also draw heavily upon Porphyry's reconciliation.

34. Shiel, "Boethius' Commentaries on Aristotle," 349. As has often been pointed out, to "form the idea was a silent judgment on the learning of his day; to realize it was more than one man could accomplish; but Boethius accomplished much. He translated the *Isagoge* of Porphyry, and the whole of Aristotle's *Organon*. He wrote a double commentary on the *Isagoge*, and commentaries on the *Categories* and the *de Interpretatione* of Aristotle, and on the *Topica* of Cicero." H. F. and E. K. Rand Stewart, *Boethius: The Theological Tractates and the Consolation of Philosophy*, Loeb Classical Library (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1926), ix-x.

35. Shiel, "Boethius' Commentaries on Aristotle," 350.

36. Andrews, "Peter of Auvergne's *Commentary on Aristotle's Categories*," 1.

Despite the fact that later Neoplatonists Philoponus, Elias, David, pseudo-Elias, Stephanus, and Boethius were all Christians, philosophy as a whole did not seem to fare too well in the Latin West from the sixth to the twelfth century. The Christian Emperor Justinian closed the Academy in Athens in 529 CE because of its paganism, forcing many philosophers to seek safety in the East, where philosophy took root and flourished. Consequently, a fourth group of commentaries on the *Categories* was written in Syriac. These include commentaries by Paul the Persian (fl. 550), Sergius of Reš'aina (d. 536), Aba of Kashkar (fl. c. 600), Silvanus of Qardu (early seventh century), Athanasius of Balad (d. 687), Jacob of Edessa (d. 708), George of the Arabs (d. 724), Theodore bar Koni (late eighth century), David bar Paul (fl. 785), Mošē bar Kēphā (d. 903), and Hunayn ibn Ishāq (d. 873). This last Commentary, in turn, appears to be the source for the Arabic tradition.³⁷

A fifth group of commentaries was produced by Islamic thinkers in the tenth and eleventh centuries, such as those written by Al Farabi, Avicenna, and Averroës.³⁸ These commentators introduced the terms “first intention” and “second intention” to distinguish the study of logic from the study of metaphysics—terms not found in any Greek or Latin commentary prior to the tenth century.³⁹ These new terms create the following problem:

37. For more on the Syriac tradition, especially as it paved the way for the Islamic tradition, see the valuable introduction to *The Earliest Syriac Translation of Aristotle's Categories*, trans. Daniel King (Leiden: Brill, 2010).

38. For Al Farabi's commentary, see D. M. Dunlop, “Al Farabi's Paraphrase of the *Categories* of Aristotle,” *Islamic Quarterly* 4 (1957): 168–97; idem, “Al Farabi's Paraphrase of the *Categories* of Aristotle,” *Islamic Quarterly* 5 (1959): 21–54. His commentary on the *Categories* has recently been translated and published; see Averroës, *Averroës' Middle Commentaries on Aristotle's Categories and de Interpretatione*, trans. Charles Butterworth (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1983).

39. Although there is some disagreement in the thirteenth century about the very nature of concepts, it is generally recognized that terms of first intention are concepts of extramental things, such as the concept “man” or “substance,” whereas terms of second intention are concepts of concepts, such as “genus” or “species.” These terms are discussed in more detail in the third chapter. For now, however, it should be pointed out that the terms “first intention” and “second intention” are usually attributed to Avicenna; cf. William Kneale and Martha Kneale, *The Development of Logic* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1964), 229–30; and

according to a frequently quoted passage of Avicenna, "The subject of logic ... [is] intentions secondarily understood, which are added to intentions primarily understood."⁴⁰ According to another view, though, the subject of logic is the syllogism.⁴¹ How can the subject of logic, though, be both syllogisms and second intentions since it is not immediately obvious that they are the same thing? While some medieval philosophers fail to see the contradiction between these two positions, Duns Scotus, by articulating his views on how the categories are the subject of a science, both recognizes this contradiction and resolves it.⁴²

The last group of commentaries on the *Categories*, however, is by far the largest and most significant. This group consists of at least thirty commentaries written within approximately eighty-five years of one another, from 1240 through 1325.⁴³ The most important of these commentaries were written by Peter of Spain (1230), Robert Kilwardby (1240), Roger Bacon (1250), Albert the Great (1260), Martin of Dacia (1270), Peter of Auvergne (1275), Simon of Faversham (1280), and Radulphus Brito (1290).⁴⁴ Considered as a group, these commentaries mark a

David Knowles, *The Evolution of Medieval Thought*, ed. Luscombe and Brooke, 2d ed. (London: Longman, 1988), 179. Gyekye and Grignaschi, however, challenge the standard historical account and argue instead that the terms are first introduced by Al Farabi, not Avicenna; see K. Gyekye, "The Terms 'Prima Intentio' and 'Secunda Intentio' in Arabic Logic," *Speculum* 46 (1971): 32–38; and M. Grignaschi, "Les traductions latines des ouvrages de la logique arabe et l'abrégé d'Alfarabi," *Archives d'histoire doctrinale et littéraire du Moyen Âge* 39 (1972): 41–107.

40. Avicenna, *Liber de philosophia prima sive scientia divina*, ed. Van Riet and Verbeke, 3 vols., I, 10.73–75 (Louvain-Leiden: Peeters-Brill, 1977–1983).

41. According to Pini, this position is articulated by Robert Kilwardby, who is strongly influenced by Boethius, and it subsequently becomes the standard position. See Pini, *Categories and Logic in Duns Scotus*, 20. Like many of his contemporaries, Scotus also accepts this position. See his *Quaestiones in librum Porphyrii Isagoge*, q. 3, nn. 7–14.

42. Both Radulphus Brito and Peter of Auvergne fail to see the contradiction in these two positions. See Pini, *Categories and Logic in Duns Scotus*, 34.

43. The twenty-five commentaries are only the ones that are edited. For a complete account of the texts that are available, see Andrews, "Peter of Auvergne's *Commentary on Aristotle's Categories*," 6–7; and Andrews, "Question Commentaries," 271, 294.

44. The dates given are only approximations. In addition to Peter of Auvergne's commentary, Peter of Spain's commentary is the only other one from

significant change from literal commentaries, “where the word-by-word exposition was sometimes interrupted by brief disputes or debates,” to question commentaries, which ultimately “take labyrinthine forms of sub-questions, initial responses later rejected, opinions of others, distinctions, and digressions.”⁴⁵ One may wonder, however, why there are more commentaries on the *Categories* in this century than there are in all of the preceding centuries combined. Likewise, one may wonder why these commentaries change from being primarily literal expositions of Aristotle’s text into question commentaries that have less and less to do with Aristotle’s text. The answer to both of these questions is, I think, due in part to the recovery of the rest of Aristotle’s writings and the rise of grammar as a distinct science.

The Recovery of Aristotle

As is well known, Boethius preserved the *Categories* and *On Interpretation*, as well as Porphyry’s *Isagoge* in Latin. Thanks to him, these works were available to Western philosophers and theologians throughout the Middle Ages. At the end of the twelfth century, though, newly recovered works of Aristotle began to appear in Latin for the first time, most importantly the rest of his *Organon*, the *Physics*, and his *Metaphysics*. Arguably, these works provided the greatest stimulus to the study of Aristotle’s *Categories*, as the number of commentaries on the *Categories* in the thirteenth century indicate.

Aristotle’s *Metaphysics* is important to a study of the *Categories* because it provides a different account of the categories, one not immediately reconcilable with the account of the categories that Aristotle presents in the *Categories* itself. Although there are a number of differences between the two works, only two need to be mentioned here.⁴⁶ The first difference is that in the

this group that has been translated into English. See Peter of Spain, “Categories,” in *The Cambridge Translations of Medieval Philosophical Texts*, ed. Kretzmann, Kenny, and Pinborg, vol. 1 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1997), 88–102.

45. Andrews, “Question Commentaries,” 267–68. The importance of the question format will be discussed below.

46. As one will see in Scotus’s *Questions on the Categories*, there are a number of statements from the *Metaphysics*, as well as from the *Physics* and the *Top-*

Metaphysics Aristotle introduces the distinction between form and matter as they relate to the categories, a distinction he does not employ in the *Categories*. Thus, in the *Metaphysics*, we learn that a primary substance is composed of both form and matter, a composition that is absent in the *Categories*.⁴⁷ The second difference is that in the *Metaphysics* Aristotle argues that forms are more truly substances, whereas in the *Categories* he claims that primary, concrete substances are more truly substances than secondary substances are. Because of these two major differences, medieval commentators attempt to reconcile the two works, with varying degrees of consistency. Many thirteenth-century philosophers adopt a solution influenced by Porphyry's attempt to reconcile Platonism with Aristotelianism, namely, that in the *Categories* Aristotle studies signifying words, whereas in the *Metaphysics* he studies the categories as the highest genera signified by those words. Scotus, however, does not think that this approach is sufficient. Instead, he argues that there is a twofold consideration of the categories: one as they are considered by the logician and the other as they are considered by the metaphysician. In the former way, the categories are considered insofar as they are understood, that is, as concepts.⁴⁸ In the latter way, the categories are not considered as highest genera but only insofar as they are simple things. Thus Scotus seems to think that the differences between these two considerations

ics, that are thought to contradict something that Aristotle says in the *Categories*. Consequently, all such statements become opportunities for the commentators to reconcile the conflicting works, normally by means of some sort of distinction. Interestingly enough, though, the fact that Aristotle only mentions eight categories in the *Metaphysics* appears not to bother the medieval commentators in the way that it does modern commentators. See Scotus's *Questions on the Categories*, q. 11, n. 11, where he explicitly says that Aristotle lists ten categories in the *Metaphysics*, even though Aristotle actually lists only eight there. The Latin text of the *Questions on the Categories* that has been used for the translation in this volume is that which appears in *Quaestiones in librum Porphyrii Isagoge et quaestiones super Praedicamenta Aristotelis*, ed. R. Andrews, G. Etzkorn, G. Gál, R. Green, T. Noone, and R. Wood, in *Opera philosophica*, vol. 1, critical ed. (St. Bonaventure, NY: Franciscan Institute, 1999).

47. Cf. *Metaphysics* V, ch. 2 (1013a 25–14a 25).

48. Cf. q. 2, n. 5.

of the categories are actually greater than many of the previous commentators are willing to concede.

Alongside the *Metaphysics* is the recovery of the rest of Aristotle's *Organon*, especially the *Posterior Analytics*.⁴⁹ As a result of the recovery of these works the medieval commentators became aware of the precise nature of demonstrative knowledge or *scientia* and the various requirements that must be met in order to have a science.⁵⁰ Covington describes the effect these works have in this way: "The rediscovery of the *Posterior Analytics* and the remainder of Aristotle's logical works led to a methodological revolution in which Aristotle's criteria for scientific knowledge were applied to all fields of study."⁵¹ Of course, it is commonly accepted in the Middle Ages that logic is a science. Furthermore, it is recognized that the categories are an essential part of logic. From these two positions, however, the question arises of whether or not the categories are also the subject of a science, one that is somehow subordinate to or part of the science of logic. In fact, most medieval commentators on the categories raise the question of whether or not the categories are the subject of a science.⁵²

Two arguments are typically put forth against the claim that the categories are the subject of a science. First, to know something is identical to understanding its cause. As the highest

49. Dod indicates when each of these works first appeared in the Middle Ages. See Bernard G. Dod, "Aristoteles Latinus," in *The Cambridge History of Later Medieval Philosophy*, ed. Kretzmann, Kenny, and Pinborg, 45–80 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1982); see pp. 77–80. Serene points out that while the *Posterior Analytics* is first translated in 1159 by James of Venice, there is not a full commentary on it until Robert Grosseteste produced his commentary in approximately 1225. See Eileen Serene, "Demonstrative Science," in *The Cambridge History of Later Medieval Philosophy*, 496–517; see p. 498.

50. For a good discussion of science in the Middle Ages, see Serene, "Demonstrative Science."

51. Michael A. Covington, *Syntactic Theory in the High Middle Ages* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1984), 19.

52. Sixteen of the nineteen texts that I consulted either specifically raised this question or addressed this issue. The importance of the issue for Scotus, however, can be seen in the fact that he devotes forty pages to a discussion of it, whereas the only other thinker that I could find who treats it at length is Simon Faversham, who devotes five pages to it.

genera, however, the categories are the causes and principles of everything else, and thus do not have a cause, and therefore cannot be the subject of a science. The second argument is that a science must have a proper unity. Again, because the categories are the highest genera, they do not have a specific, or even a generic, unity to them. Thus it follows that the categories cannot be the subject of a science.

A common solution, held by Simon of Faversham and Radulphus Brito, is to distinguish between a demonstration that reasons from causes to effects, that is, *scientia propter quid*, and one that reasons from effects to causes, that is, *scientia quia*. Given this distinction, the claim is made that there is a *scientia quia* of the categories but not a *scientia propter quid*. The second difficulty is solved by claiming that the categories have a unity of attribution since the nine accidents are ultimately attributed to a subject. This second solution, of course, is parallel to the solution offered in the science of metaphysics and raises the question of whether there is something different about the categories that warrants them to be studied in two distinct sciences. Scotus does not accept the arguments on behalf of the position that the categories are the subject of a *scientia quia*. Instead, he makes the bold claim that the categories are the subject of a *scientia propter quid*. In addition, he claims that the categories have a specific unity to them, not just a unity of attribution.

The Science of Grammar

Until the eleventh century, the study of grammar was primarily a stepping-stone to the study of logic. As such, it consisted primarily of lectures on Priscian's *Institutiones grammaticae* and, to a lesser extent, on Donatus's *Ars grammatica*.⁵³ The introduction of the *logica nova*, however, and the revival of dialectic had a major effect not only on the study of the categories but also

53. Thomas of Erfurt, *Grammatica speculativa*, ed. and trans. with commentary by G. L. Bursill-Hall (London: Longman, 1972), 15; see also Covington, *Syntactic Theory in the High Middle Ages*, 4–7. Priscian's *Institutiones grammaticae* consists of eighteen books, the first sixteen of which discuss the various parts of speech and are often referred to as *Priscianus maior*, while the last two treat syntax and are referred to as *Priscianus minor*.

on the study of grammar, namely, the slow transformation of grammar from a propaedeutic for logic into a separate science of its own. Although little is known about Peter of Helias, he appears to have been the first one to conceive of grammar as a science unto itself. As Bursill-Hall points out, he taught at Paris around 1150 and "was the first to organize the new ideas [of dialectic] into a coherent statement of grammar, incorporating the 'new' Aristotle and professing the autonomy of grammar which had not been the aim of his immediate predecessors."⁵⁴

Not much is known about the development of grammar as a science over the next one hundred years, but by 1250, grammar solidified into a distinct science in its own right, as can be seen in Robert Kilwardby's monumental treatise *De ortu scientiarum*.⁵⁵ From this time on, the study of grammar flourished as never before. Covington describes the progress thus: "Between the middle of the twelfth century and the middle of the thirteenth, grammarians' conception of what they were doing underwent a radical change. Even for a philosophical grammarian as sophisticated as William of Conches, grammar was an *ars* whose primary aim was to teach people to write better Latin; but within a century afterward, grammar had been reclassified as a theoretical science on a level with physics and mathematics."⁵⁶ Bursill-Hall adds: "In the second half of the thirteenth century, there appeared for the first time a new type of grammatical literature which sets out in a very systematic manner a grammatical statement embodying the philosophy and logic of language which Scholastic philosophers had been developing. These theories of the nature of grammar were stated in the form of treatises on the modes of signifying (*Summa Modorum Significandi*), and their authors have come to be known as the 'Modistae.'⁵⁷ These grammarians had a huge influence on the study of Aristotle's *Categories*.

Who are these Modistae? Most linguists identify Martin of Da-

54. Thomas of Erfurt, *Grammatica speculativa*, ed. and trans. Bursill-Hall, 19.

55. James A. Weisheipl, "Classification of the Sciences in Medieval Thought," *Mediaeval Studies* 27 (1965): 54-90; see p. 75.

56. Covington, *Syntactic Theory in the High Middle Ages*, 19.

57. Thomas of Erfurt, *Grammatica speculativa*, ed. and trans. Bursill-Hall, 20.

cia as the first full-fledged Modista. As previously mentioned, he produced a commentary on the *Categories* around 1270. Around the same time, however, Martin also composed a treatise known as the *Modi significandi*, which very quickly became the standard textbook on grammar. Soon afterwards, Boethius of Dacia also composed a question commentary on Priscian's grammar book, entitled *Quaestiones super Priscianum maiorem (Modi significandi)*. Within the next few decades, these two books were followed by other works on the modes of signifying by authors such as John of Dacia, Petrus Croccus, Michael of Marbais, Simon of Dacia, Radulphus Brito, Siger de Courtrai, and Thomas of Erfurt.⁵⁸ Although many of these authors are from Denmark, their influence seems to have been the greatest at the University of Paris.⁵⁹ We know that Thomas of Erfurt studied in Paris about 1300 and that he subsequently taught there with other grammarians before moving to Erfurt, where he spent most of his adult life.⁶⁰ Pinborg observes that the "term 'Modistae' is used accordingly to denote the (mostly Parisian) masters of the late thirteenth and early fourteenth century who wrote on grammar, logic, and metaphysics within this tradition."⁶¹

The important question, however, is not so much who these masters of grammar were but what they conceived grammar to be. As mentioned above, the answer to this question lies in part in the recovery of the *logica nova*: grammar is a speculative science. Covington describes this conviction as follows: "The object of scientific knowledge is that which could not be otherwise (*quod non potest aliter se habere*), and the goal of scientific inquiry is to find the necessary first principles from which it can be deduced. This means that physics, for instance, is concerned with

58. See Covington, *Syntactic Theory in the High Middle Ages*, 23–24.

59. See Karin Margareta Fredborg, "Universal Grammar According to Some 12th Century Grammarians," *Historiographia Linguistica* 7 (1980): 69–84; eadem, "Speculative Grammar," in *A History of Twelfth-Century Western Philosophy*, ed. Peter Dronke (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1988), 177–95.

60. Thomas of Erfurt, ed. Bursill-Hall, 27. It should be remembered that for a long time Thomas of Erfurt's *Grammatica speculativa* was erroneously considered to be Duns Scotus'.

61. Jan Pinborg, "Speculative Grammar," in *The Cambridge History of Later Medieval Philosophy*, 255.

principles that apply to all possible physical changes (or to exhaustive sub-classifications of them), not just to those changes that happen actually to have occurred.”⁶² Covington adds, “Medieval grammarians reasoned that, by the same criteria, the scientific study of language would have to state principles applicable to all possible languages, not just the one under study.”⁶³ Consequently, just as the various attributes of being are reducible to substance as their ultimate principle in the science of metaphysics, so in the same way, the Modistae argue, the various accidental predicaments are likewise reduced to a primary subject in the sciences of logic and grammar.⁶⁴ The reason for this similar reduction of attributes to a substance in metaphysics, logic, and grammar is that the Modistae believed that there is a parallel or isomorphism between the way things are in the real world, in our concepts, and in our language. Theoretically, then, grammar, logic, and metaphysics would be three parallel sciences, such that all the attributes demonstrated of the subject in one science would have similar and parallel attributes demonstrated of the corresponding subjects in the other two sciences. Marmo describes it this way:

[L]ogic and grammar are both rational sciences and can no longer be labeled as *sermocinales scientiae*. The correspondences between grammar and logic, however, are not limited to this negative feature. Both disciplines share a concern with reality. Their objects cannot be mere creations of the human mind: it is necessary for them to have a foundation in reality. As a consequence, the *modi significandi*, which are the proper object of grammar, are conceived as derived from the properties of the things and as common to all individual languages; grammar is therefore a universal a priori science having as its object a universal feature of language. Logic aspires to this same type of universality, and discussions about logic as a science reveal the same concern about its foundations in reality as those about the science of grammar.⁶⁵

62. Covington, *Syntactic Theory in the High Middle Ages*, 19.

63. Ibid.

64. For an example of the parallel science of the categories in logic and in metaphysics, see Simon of Faversham, *Quaestiones super librum Praedicamentorum*, q. 1 (ed. Mazzarella, 263–67).

65. Costantino Marmo, “The Semantics of the Modistae,” in *Medieval Analyses in Language and Cognition, Acts of the Symposium ‘The Copenhagen School of Medieval Philosophy,’* ed. Ebbesen and Friedman (Copenhagen: C. A. Reitzels Forlag, 1996), 83–104; see p. 99.

This parallelism or isomorphism between the modes of signifying and the modes of understanding is often said to be the most typical or central thesis that unites “those grammarians and logicians collectively known as *modistae*.”⁶⁶ Kloesel adds that by “discovering the logical structure and the causes of language, a modista tried to explain the essential nature and purpose of human speech and the ways in which words have meaning. [For a Modista thinks] that the structure of language mirrors the structure of reality and the operations of the human mind.”⁶⁷ Likewise, Covington notes: “In fully developed modistic theory, all modes of signifying are held to be, in one way or another, representations of the properties of real world objects.”⁶⁸ Finally, Ebbesen describes it this way: “The basic idea of modism is this: each constituent of reality (each *res*) has a number of ways or modes of being (*modi essendi*) which determine the number of ways in which it can be correctly conceptualized; the ways in which it can be conceptualized (*modi intelligendi*) in turn determine in which way it can be signified.”⁶⁹

Just how might some of the parallels between signifying, understanding, and being look? At the grammatical level, there is the fundamental distinction between verbs and nouns, which parallels the basic metaphysical distinction between motion and rest, or becoming and being. This basic distinction between motion and rest is also paralleled by the difference between the concept of a particular action, such as “Socrates runs,” and that same activity conceived of as a substantive noun, such as “to run.” That there is a conceptual difference between a particular person running and “running” in general is highlighted by

66. Giorgio Pini, “Signification of Names in Duns Scotus and Some of his Contemporaries,” *Vivarium* 39 (2001): 20–51; see p. 38. I give just a preliminary description of these terms and the supposed parallelism here in this chapter, but will provide a more detailed description in the third and fourth chapters.

67. Christian J. W. Kloesel, “Speculative Grammar: From Duns Scotus To Charles Pierce,” in *Graduate Studies, Texas Tech University*, ed. Kenneth Laine Ketner (Lubbock, TX: Texas Tech University Press, 1981), 127–33; see p. 130.

68. Covington, *Syntactic Theory in the High Middle Ages*, 28.

69. Sten Ebbesen, “The Paris Arts Faculty: Siger of Brabant, Boethius of Dacia, Radulphus Brito,” in *Routledge History of Philosophy*, ed. John Marenbon, vol. 3 (London: Routledge, 1998), 269–90; see p. 274.

the fact that particular actions are often said not to fall under a category, whereas their abstract counterparts do. In the example provided, most medieval thinkers would argue that the particular movement of Socrates would not be classified or conceptualized underneath a category, whereas “running” would fall under the category of motion.⁷⁰ Ebbesen also provides the following example:

Assume that pain is a constituent of reality. Pain is in a way like a substance: a stable thing in its own right that can have changing properties (be intense or weak, precisely located or diffuse, for example); in a way it is like a process occurring in some subject. The concept of pain will then be able to present itself to our mind in two ways and we will consequently be capable of signifying pain in two ways. Any word that signifies it as the stable carrier of properties (*per modum habitus et permanentiae*) is a noun; any word that signifies it as a process in a subject (*per modum fieri*) is a verb. The English words “a pain” and “to ache” signify the same common thing or “common nature” under two different modes. A third mode is expressed by the interjection “ouch.”⁷¹

For reasons that I will explain in a moment, Duns Scotus is often referred to as a Modista. Sten Ebbesen claims that the modistic approach “was accepted by Boethius of Dacia and Duns Scotus.”⁷² Christian Knudsen also states that “Thomas of Erfurt, Peter of Auvergne, and Simon of Faversham, as well as Duns Scotus (as a commentator on Aristotle’s logical works)” were Modistae.⁷³ Although Pinborg thinks little of Scotus’s logical works, he too considers Scotus to be one of the Modistae.⁷⁴ Even Dominick Perler claims that Scotus is influenced by “the so-called ‘modistic approach’ to semantic theory which [he] shares with other late

70. In q. 8, Scotus departs from the traditional position and maintains that such concrete accidental nouns, or verbs in this case, are orderable in the various categories.

71. Ebbesen, “The Paris Arts Faculty,” 274.

72. Sten Ebbesen, “Concrete Accidental Terms: Late Thirteenth-Century Debates about Problems Relating to Such Terms as ‘Album,’” in *Meaning and Inference in Medieval Philosophy: Studies in Memory of Jan Pinborg*, ed. Kretzmann (Dordrecht: Kluwer Academic Publishers, 1988), 107–61; see 118–21.

73. Christian Knudsen, “Intentions and Impositions,” in *The Cambridge History of Later Medieval Philosophy*, 486 n. 37.

74. Pinborg, “Speculative Grammar,” 262 n. 24.

thirteenth-century authors, such as Boethius of Dacia and Radulphus Brito.⁷⁵ Finally, although a bit more cautious, Umberto Eco seems to accept Duns Scotus as a Modista as well.⁷⁶

Unfortunately, these claims are likely to be misleading. In the sense that I have used the word above, that is, entailing a parallelism between signifying, understanding, and being, Scotus is definitely not one of the Modistae.⁷⁷ In a number of places, Scotus denies that there is always a parallel between signifying, understanding, and being. This fact has been established by several scholars, including Allan Wolter, E. J. Ashworth, Giorgio Pini, and J. A. Sheppard.⁷⁸ Among these scholars, however, only Pini has made this point a matter of real importance. Nevertheless, there are two reasons that have contributed to this basic misnomer. First, as I mentioned above, Thomas of Erfurt's *Grammatica speculativa* has long been erroneously ascribed to Scotus. Second, there is a basic ambiguity in the word "Modistae" and its derivatives. In a broad sense, as Ebbesen points out, the word "modist" can describe any of the thirteenth-century arts masters

75. Dominik Perler, "Duns Scotus on Signification," *Medieval Philosophy and Theology* 3 (1993): 97–120; see 117.

76. "Duns Scotus and the Modistae ... represent a sort of very ambiguous hinge..." Umberto Eco, "Denotation," in *On the Medieval Theories of Signs*, ed. Eco and Marmo (Amsterdam: John Benjamins Publishing Company, 1989), 143–95; see 162.

77. Marmo seems to think that Scotus does hold to a parallelism between signifying, understanding, and being, although he seems to waver a bit. As he states it: "If the acknowledgement of the necessity of propositions like *homo est animal* could be seen as the celebration of a strict parallelism between conceptual and ontological articulation, the assumption of French semantic principles (such as the greatest original extension of common terms) within Scotus' ontological framework yields incertitude." Marmo, "Ontology and Semantics in the Logic of Duns Scotus," 181.

78. Allan B. Wolter, "An Oxford Dialogue on Language and Metaphysics," *Review of Metaphysics* 31 (1978): 615–48; see 620; idem, "A 'Reportatio' of Duns Scotus' Merton College Dialogue on Language and Metaphysics," in *Sprache und Erkenntnis im Mittelalter*, ed. Zimmermann, vol. 1, 179–91 (Berlin: De Gruyter, 1981), 180–83; E. J. Ashworth, "'Can I Speak More Clearly than I Understand? A Problem of Religious Language in Henry of Ghent, Duns Scotus, and Ockham,'" *Historiographia Linguistica* 7 (1980): 29–38; Pini, "Signification of Names in Duns Scotus," 37–42; and J. A. Sheppard, "Two Theories of Signification in the Writings of John Duns Scotus," *Franciscan Studies* 58 (2000): 289–321; see 303.

who employ the words *modi intelligendi*, *modi significandi*, and *modi essendi*.⁷⁹ By such broad standards, Scotus can legitimately be considered a Modista since he regularly employs these terms in his logical commentaries. The word “modist,” however, also has a much narrower meaning, signifying only those Parisian masters who held to an isomorphism between signification, understanding, and being. In this latter sense, Scotus is certainly not one of the Modistae.

A BRIEF ANALYSIS OF SCOTUS’S QUESTIONS ON THE CATEGORIES

At this point, it may be helpful to provide a more detailed analysis of Scotus’s *Questions on the Categories*, explaining what is unique about it and how it relates to his other, more mature teachings. In doing so, I hope to show its relevance for medieval philosophy, contrary to what many medieval scholars have hitherto thought about it.

It must be admitted that not everyone has appreciated the importance of Scotus’s writings. During the Reformation, when his name was a term of opprobrium, meaning “dunce,” no less a figure than Thomas Cromwell attempted to eradicate his works and influence from Oxford.⁸⁰ Thankfully, Cromwell’s attempt failed, and such contempt for the “Subtle Doctor” is no longer prevalent, at least not within medievalist scholarship. Although Scotus is perhaps best known for his theological arguments in support of the Immaculate Conception, a number of his distinctive teachings have recently been made the subject of scholarly research and deserve mention: his arguments for the existence of God, his notion of *haecceity* as the principle of individuation, the formal distinction, and his teaching on the transcendentals, to name just a few.⁸¹ Still other teachings of Scotus have yet to

79. Ebbesen, “The Paris Arts Faculty,” 273–74.

80. William Frank and Allan B. Wolter, *Duns Scotus: Metaphysician* (West Lafayette, IN: Purdue University Press, 1995), 11.

81. The ideas developed in his commentary on the *Categories* are, in one sense, the correlative of the ideas that he develops regarding *haecceity*. For given the Avicennian distinction between common natures or quidditative being, ma-

receive the attention that they too deserve, namely, those pertaining to his logical writings.

Scotus's Logical Writings

Although he does not comment on the entire *Organon*, Scotus's logical writings include one commentary on the *Categories*, two commentaries on *Peri hermenias*, one on the *Elenchorum*, and one on Porphyry's *Isagoge*.⁸² On the basis of what little evidence we have of his life, these commentaries appear to have been written during his mid-thirties, right around 1300 CE.⁸³ Because they are "considered youthful works," however, Scotus's commentaries on the logical writings are often dismissed.⁸⁴ The perceived absence in Scotus's logical writings of any of the unique contributions that he made in his more mature writings—the doctrine of the univocity of being, the formal distinction, or an increase of the number of transcendentals—have led many scholars to conclude that they are "youthful works." As a result, several medieval scholars have publicly dismissed his logical writings as negligible and inconsequential. Early in this past century, for example, Charles Balić asserted that "Sco-

terial or individual being, and cognitive or objective being, one can see that Scotus's treatment of the problem of individuation is analogous and parallel to his treatment of second intentions. For more on Scotus's concept of *haecceity*, see Allan B. Wolter, "John Duns Scotus," in *Individuation in Scholasticism: The Later Middle Ages and the Counter-Reformation, 1150–1650*, ed. Jorge J. E. Gracia (Albany, NY: State University of New York, 1994), 271–98. This theme will be developed at more length in the fourth chapter.

82. The following works, found in the Wadding-Vivès edition, are spurious: the *Grammatica speculativa* (written by Thomas of Erfurt), *Quaestiones in librum I et II priorum Analyticorum Aristotelis*, *Quaestiones in librum I et II posteriorum Analyticorum*.

83. Cf. Andrews, "Question Commentaries," 272; Charles Balić, "The Life and Works of John Duns Scotus," in *John Duns Scotus, 1265–1965*, ed. Ryan and Bonansea (Washington, DC: The Catholic University of America Press, 1965), 22. For a discussion of Scotus's years in Oxford, see C. K. Brampton, "Duns Scotus at Oxford, 1288–1301," *Franciscan Studies* 24 (1964). It should be pointed out, however, that Sheppard thinks that the logical commentaries were written in the 1280s, even as early as 1281 or 1282. Sheppard, "Two Theories of Signification," 290–93.

84. Pini, *Categories and Logic in Duns Scotus*, vii.

tus' *Logicallia* did not exert a great influence on the history of Scotism."⁸⁵ Pinborg likewise claimed that "even if Scotus had a tremendous impact on other aspects of English theology and philosophy in the 14th century, I find his importance for the specific change in conceptual languages here studied negligible."⁸⁶ This neglect and dismissal of his logical commentaries in general, though, seems to be especially true of his commentary on the *Categories*.⁸⁷ In fact, a quick glance at Scotus's *Questions on Aristotle's Categories* is likely to give the impression that it is nothing more than a medieval exercise in dialectic.

The widespread neglect to take Scotus's logical writings seriously, however, has not always existed. In an early encomium, a gloss on one of the early manuscripts of Scotus's logical commentaries declares that he "who compiled this work is called the subtle Duns, the theologian doctor dominates all by his logic. He who wants to be rightly considered experienced in logic, should learn his words."⁸⁸ Likewise, in response to the slights by Balić and Pinborg, Bos rightly points out: "[S]uch a judgment is only possible after a thorough study of Duns Scotus' *logicalia*, which is still wanted."⁸⁹ Although a thorough study of all of

85. Balić, "The Life and Works of John Duns Scotus," 22. Subsequent research into medieval logic has begun to challenge this negative evaluation. For example, regarding his contribution to medieval logic, Ashworth claims that "when one considers the influence of the great medieval philosophers on the discussions found in the late fifteenth and early sixteenth centuries, it seems that Duns Scotus held pride of place"; E. J. Ashworth, "Jacobus Naveros (fl. ca. 1533) on the Question: 'Do Spoken Words Signify Concepts or Things?'" in *Logos and Pragma*, ed. de Rijk and Braakhuis (Nijmegen: Ingenium Publishers, 1987), 207.

86. Jan Pinborg, "The English Contribution to Logic Before Ockham," *Synthese* 40 (1979): 19–42; see 32.

87. Pini's main work on the *Categories*, published in 2002, is the one exception to this claim. Even this work, however, gives only a relatively brief overview of Scotus's *Questions on the Categories*.

88. E. P. Bos, "The Theory of the Proposition According to John Duns Scotus' Two Commentaries on Aristotle's *Perihermeneias*," in *Logos and Pragma*, ed. de Rijk and Braakhuis, vol. 3 (Nijmegen: Ingenium Publishers, 1987), 121–40; see 134. It should be noted that this gloss is appended at the beginning of Scotus's treatment of Aristotle's *Categories*.

89. *Ibid.*, 122.

Scotus's logical writings is still a long way off, recent scholars—such as Richard McKeon, E. P. Bos, Robert Andrews, E. J. Ashworth, and Giorgio Pini—have begun to make significant contributions to the study of Scotus's logical writings.⁹⁰ So far, their judgments support the early encomium rather than the criticisms of Balić and Pinborg.⁹¹ Pini even goes so far as to claim that Scotus's logical writings are a correction and perfection of Aquinas's teaching on logic.⁹² As one author notes, "we would be mistaken to believe that his philosophical commentaries on Aristotle's works necessarily represent the fruit of an introductory stage in his academic career."⁹³

Before turning explicitly to Scotus's commentary on the *Categories*, though, four features about it should be emphasized. First, it is one of the few thirteenth-century commentaries on

90. Prior to Pini's contributions, there was not even a single article, much less an entire book, devoted exclusively to Scotus's *Questions on the Categories*. The one article that discusses his commentary at length is E. P. Bos and A. C. van der Helm, "The Division of Being Over the Categories According to Albert the Great, Thomas Aquinas and John Duns Scotus," in *John Duns Scotus (1265/6–1308): Renewal of Philosophy*, ed. Bos (Amsterdam: Rodopi, 1998). Several other articles making a positive contribution to a study of his logical writings include the following: Richard McKeon, "The Relation of Logic to Metaphysics in the Philosophy of Duns Scotus," *Monist* 49 (1965): 519–50 (see especially p. 550, where he approvingly quotes Pierce to the effect that Duns Scotus was one "of the most acute logicians" of the Middle Ages); Bos, "The Theory of the Proposition According to John Duns Scotus"; and E. J. Ashworth, "Signification and Modes of Signifying in Thirteenth-Century Logic: A Preface to Aquinas on Analogy," *Medieval Philosophy and Theology* 1 (1991): 39–67. Other articles on either medieval logic or semantics tend to mention Scotus only in passing.

91. In some ways, the recent appreciation of Scotus's logical writings, in contrast to the previous neglect, is part of a general trend in modern philosophy. Spade describes this trend as follows: By 1960, "medieval logic had been established as a rich and sophisticated field worthy of serious study. But this claim was not established without resistance. For many years, students of medieval philosophy had concentrated mainly on issues in metaphysics and epistemology. There were perhaps several reasons for this—the sociology of the revival of medieval studies in Europe and America, the preeminence of Thomas Aquinas until recently in the intellectual life of the Catholic Church, and so on." Paul Vincent Spade, "Recent Research on Medieval Logic," *Synthese* 40 (1979): 3–18; see 3.

92. Pini, *Categories and Logic in Duns Scotus*, vii, 125, and 138.

93. Frank and Wolter, *Duns Scotus*, 3.

the *Categories* covering all of Aristotle's text, including the post-predicamenta.⁹⁴ Second, as indicated above, this commentary was written at the high point of medieval question commentaries. This fact, as we shall see in the next section, is important since the form of a question commentary allows Scotus a great deal of liberty to discuss matters that are only remotely raised by the text. Third, Scotus's text was one of the last commentaries to be written before Ockham reduced the number of categories to two.⁹⁵ Finally, although the size of a work alone is not necessarily indicative of its worth, the size of Scotus's commentary is, I contend, a sign of its relative importance.⁹⁶ Scotus's *Quaestiones super Praedicamenta Aristotelis* is approximately ten times as long as Aristotle's *Categories* and three to four times as long as most of the other question commentaries on the *Categories* written during the same time period.⁹⁷ Such a large size is, I think, one indication that Scotus is attempting both to work through a complex set of questions regarding the categories and to articulate a clear distinction between the categories as they are studied in logic and as they are studied in metaphysics.⁹⁸

To be exact, Scotus's commentary on the *Categories* is a set of

94. The post-predicamenta are the things discussed by Aristotle after he specifically treats the ten categories. They include a discussion of contraries, motion, priority, and having. Traditionally, it is said that Aristotle discusses them after the categories because they apply to all of the categories in some way.

95. Andrews lists only three people who probably composed commentaries subsequent to Scotus's commentary, namely, Radulphus Brito, Peter Bradley, and Walter Burley. See Andrews, "Question Commentaries," 272. Ockham's logical writings were all completed before he left Avignon in 1328. Spade alludes to the fact that the rise of "secondary signification," which is a technical term used by the Modistae, is inherently related to the "program of reducing the number of ontological categories." Paul Vincent Spade, "The Semantics of Terms," in *The Cambridge History of Later Medieval Philosophy*, 192.

96. These points, taken together, might suggest that the theory that there are only ten categories is a theory in crises. In response, one could argue that they point to the complexity of reality and predication, and to the patience and learning required of philosophers.

97. Scotus's commentary is over three hundred pages. The next longest commentaries that I was able to consult are Martin of Dacia's and Peter of Auvergne's, both numbering close to eighty pages each, and Simon of Faversham's, numbering seventy pages.

98. I will return to both of these issues below.

forty-four questions, most of which are only loosely motivated by something that Aristotle says in the *Categories*. In fact, a number of questions asked are not obviously raised by the text at all. Of these forty-four questions in his commentary, the first four are prolegomena to the work itself and raise the question of its subject matter as well as whether there can be a science of the categories; questions 5–8 deal with equivocals, univocals, and denominatives; questions 9–11 discuss Aristotle's two rules regarding predication and the sufficiency of the categories; questions 12–36 discuss the four main categories treated by Aristotle, namely, substance, quantity, relation, and quality; and the remaining eight questions discuss the post-predicamenta.

Although Scotus's *Questions on the Categories* is important in and of itself, especially as it departs from the standard theory of signification and insofar as it articulates a *propter quid* science of the categories, there are several hints in this work of his later, more distinctive teachings. A careful reading of his commentary will, then, reveal that he is already beginning to think about, and perhaps just beginning to formulate, some of his more mature views. Three particular issues emerging from a careful reading of Scotus's commentary substantiate my claim: the univocity of being, the category of relation, and the transcendentals.

*The Univocity of Being, the Category of Relation, and the
Transcendentals in Scotus's Commentary*

One idea Scotus explores in his commentary that emerges in his later theological writings is the univocity of being. In his commentary on the *Categories*, he asks whether being is univocal to the ten categories, a question that is, at best, only occasioned by Aristotle's *Categories*. In this question, he concludes that being is predicated equivocally for the logician, and analogically for the metaphysician.⁹⁹ In his later theological writings, as is well known, he seems to differ with his former thinking, instead stating that, in fact, being is univocal. Although there is considerable debate as to whether he actually changes his mind or not, what is important here is that his commentary on the *Cate-*

99. Q. 4, n. 38.

gories reveals his intense preoccupation with the question of the univocity of being so early in his writings.¹⁰⁰

This claim is confirmed by the fact that most of his contemporaries do not ask the question in their commentaries on the categories, and even when they do raise the question, they devote at most a page or two to it.¹⁰¹ Consequently, that Scotus does raise this question is quite significant in light of his subsequent view regarding the univocity of being. Another indication of the importance of the univocity of being in this early work is simply the space he devotes to it.¹⁰² Compared to his other questions, the one concerning the univocity of being is almost twice as long as the two next-longest questions, and is, on average,

100. Whether Scotus changed his mind or not is an open question. Prior to the twentieth century, most scholars thought that he always maintained the univocity of being. In the last century, though, an increasing number of scholars have held that Scotus did, in fact, change his mind. An early and eloquent argument in support of this position is expressed by Raymond de Courcerault, "L'ontologie de Duns Scot et le principe du pantéisme," *Etudes Franciscaines* 24 (1910), 154. That Scotus changed his mind is also held by the following: C. Schirrel, *Univocity of the Concept of Being in the Philosophy of Duns Scotus* (Washington, DC: The Catholic University of America Press, 1942), 108; Étienne Gilson, "Avicenne et le point de départ de Duns Scot," *Archives d'histoire doctrinale et littéraire du Moyen Âge* 2 (1927): 89–149; see 105; Timotheus Barth, "Zum Problem der Eindeutigkeit," *Philosophical Jahrbuch* 55 (1942): 300–321; idem, "De argumentis et univocationis entis natura apud Joannem Duns Scotum," *Collectanea Franciscana* 14 (1944): 35–45; and idem, "De univocationis entis scotistica intentione principali necnon valore critico," *Antonianum* 28 (1953): 72–110. Although many scholars in the twentieth century accept that Scotus changed his mind on this subject, there are still others who think that he did not change his mind. Most prominent in this latter group is Allan Wolter; see Allan B. Wolter, *Transcendentals and their Function in the Metaphysics of Duns Scotus* (Washington, DC: The Catholic University of America Press, 1946), 46–48 n. 35. Finally, it should be pointed out that Marrone criticizes both Barth's and Wolter's views; see Steven P. Marrone, "The Notion of Univocity in Duns Scotus's Early Works," *Franciscan Studies* 13 (1983): 347–95.

101. I could find only two commentaries that raise this question: one by Johannes de Stycborn, and the other by Martin of Dacia. In each case, however, the question is quickly dismissed. See Andrews, "Question Commentaries," 301; and Martin of Dacia, *Quaestiones super librum Praed.*, q. 1 (ed. Roos, 155).

102. In considering the length of a question, I do not mean to imply that of itself length equals importance. Nevertheless, it is, I maintain, an indication or, as Aristotle might say, a fallible sign of the importance of a question.

three times as long as most of the questions.¹⁰³ That he spends so much time on this issue is quite remarkable given the almost complete absence of this question in his contemporaries' commentaries. While it is true, then, that Scotus appears to deny the univocity of being in this commentary, it is absolutely clear, I argue, that the question of the univocity of being preoccupies his thoughts and that he is wrestling with this issue even at this early stage of his writings.¹⁰⁴ Marrone, in one of the best articles written on the notion of univocity in Scotus's early writings, confirms this argument.¹⁰⁵ At one point in his article, he points out that the "parallels between the passage from the *Ordinatio* and that from *In librum Praedicamentorum* could hardly be more prominent. I would argue that they show how already in the earlier work, and in the *Questions on the Metaphysics*, Duns was experimenting with theoretical innovations that would permit him eventually to fashion his theory of the univocity of 'being.'"¹⁰⁶ Thus, whether or not he actually changes his mind, the fact remains that the univocity of being is a central issue in his commentary on the *Categories*.

103. The fourth question, which concerns the univocity of being, occupies twenty-three pages, while the two next-longest questions are q. 13, which is sixteen pages long, and q. 11, which is fourteen pages long.

104. Wolter points out that when Scotus denies the univocity of being to the categories, he does so insofar as he is speaking about the proper account of being, not a common account. See Wolter, *Transcendentals and their Function*, 47 n. 35. While it is beyond the scope of this introduction, it would be interesting to see how many of the arguments for the univocity of being presented in the fourth question surface again in his later writings. Andrews notes that the "format of question commentaries encouraged counterfactual thinking" and that "not infrequently, a preliminary argument could prove so persuasive that its standpoint would come to be adopted by subsequent generations of thinkers." Andrews, "Question Commentaries," 269–70.

105. The best discussion of this article as it appears in Scotus's mature works is Ludger Honnefelder, *Ens inquantum ens. Der Begriff des Seienden als solchen als Gegenstand der Metaphysik nach der Lehre des Johannes Duns Scotus*, Beiträge zur Geschichte der Philosophie und Theologie des Mittelalters, N.F. 16 (Münster: Aschendorff, 1979).

106. Marrone, "The Notion of Univocity in Duns Scotus's Early Works," 371. Although it is beyond the scope of this study, perhaps one can even find in this question the seeds to his more mature view when he contends that being is univocal.

A second issue in Scotus's commentary overlooked by modern scholars is Scotus's discussion of relations. For example, while Mark Henninger devotes a whole chapter to Scotus in his extensive work on medieval theories of relations, he never discusses any of the arguments raised in Scotus's commentary on the *Categories*, a surprising omission given the fact that one of the primary texts that discusses relations is Aristotle's *Categories*.¹⁰⁷ Likewise, Pini has this to say of Scotus's treatment of relations: "Scotus, like Brito, maintains that relations are real things, really distinguished from the other categories. Actually, in his question on the *Metaphysics* and in his *Sentences* commentary, he pays much attention to the issue, and he can be regarded as one of the fiercest champions of the reality of relations. In his commentary on the *Categories*, however, he does *not even mention* the issue [emphasis mine]."¹⁰⁸ Though Scotus does not have a whole question devoted to the reality of relations, he does, I think, "mention the issue," for he argues that "no relation is a non-being" and that perhaps beings are divided between "relative beings according to being" and "relative beings according to speech."¹⁰⁹ Furthermore, it is noteworthy that the longest section of Scotus's commentary, at least as far as page numbers are concerned, are those questions that are devoted to issues concerning relations.¹¹⁰ Even though it is beyond the scope of this study to focus specifically on Scotus's views of relation, one can, I think, see in his commentary an emphasis on the category of relation, a focus that will become more prominent in his more mature teachings.

107. Henninger does acknowledge in a footnote that Scotus addresses relations in his *Questions on the Categories of Aristotle*, but he never once cites the text in question. See Mark G. Henninger, "Relation as Thing: John Duns Scotus," in *Relations: Medieval Theories 1250–1325* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1989), 68–97; see 70 n. 8.

108. Pini, *Categories and Logic in Duns Scotus*, 200–201.

109. *Questions on the Categories*, q. 24, n. 11; q. 26, n. 11.

110. There are five questions concerning substance, amounting to close to forty pages; nine questions concerning quantity, taking up thirty-seven pages; seven questions concerning quality, amounting to forty-one pages; and five questions concerning relations, taking up fifty-four pages. So even though there are fewer questions devoted to it, he spends more time addressing this issue than any other category.

A final issue deserving brief mention is Scotus's treatment of the post-predicamenta, indicating that Scotus is already considering expanding the transcendentals. As I mention above, Scotus's contemporaries often neglect the post-predicamenta. In comparison, Scotus devotes the last eight questions of his commentary to a discussion of the post-predicamenta, roughly one sixth of all the questions. More important, however, are three comments suggesting that Scotus is already giving serious thought to the number and nature of the transcendentals. The first comment, at the end of question 42, raises the question "Whether in a Negative Opposition, the Subject Stands for Being and for Non-being Indifferently?" While treating the fourth property of contraries, namely, that "all contraries must either be in the same genus or in contrary genera, or be themselves genera," Scotus adds that "contraries are always in the same primary genus, unless perhaps they are transcendent and then they are equivocally in diverse genera."¹¹¹ Of course, those familiar with Scotus's metaphysics know that Scotus subsequently argues that there is a whole group of transcendentals known as the disjunctive transcendentals.¹¹² The second statement, in question 43, asks, "Whether Aristotle Suitably Assigns the Modes of Prior?" In his reply to the first main argument, which holds that Aristotle assigns more modes of prior in the *Metaphysics* than he does in the *Categories*, Scotus states that in the *Metaphysics*, "'prior' is distinguished insofar as it is a differentia of being."¹¹³ Again, those familiar with Scotus's more mature writings recognize that "prior" and "posterior" constitute one of the pair of disjunctive transcendentals. Finally, his last question asks, "Whether Aristotle Suitably Distinguishes the Species of Motion?" Scotus claims that motion, insofar as it is treated by the logician, is something that transcends the categories.¹¹⁴ This last response of Scotus, I think, clearly exemplifies that Scotus

111. *Questions on the Categories*, q. 42, n. 9.

112. For a fuller discussion of the disjunctive transcendentals, see Wolter, *Transcendentals and their Function*, 128–61.

113. *Questions on the Categories*, q. 43, n. 11. For a fuller discussion of how "prior" and "posterior" are transcendentals in Scotus's metaphysics, see Wolter, *Transcendentals and their Function*, 140–41.

114. *Ibid.*, q. 44, nn. 18–19.

is already beginning to increase the number of transcendentals, as Pini confirms.¹¹⁵ Of course, it would be reading too much into these three comments to claim that Scotus already presents a fully developed theory of the transcendentals in his commentary on the *Categories*. On the other hand, given Scotus's subsequent expansion of the number of transcendentals, one is justified in regarding these comments as a foreshadowing, as it were, of Scotus's more mature thinking.

115. *Categories and Logic in Duns Scotus*, 196.

QUESTIONS
ON ARISTOTLE'S
CATEGORIES

[QUESTION ONE

Whether the Book of the
Categories is About Ten Utterances
Signifying the Ten Genera
of Things]

*Equivocals are said, etc.*¹



IT IS ASKED whether the book of *The Categories* is about ten utterances signifying the ten genera of things.²

1. It seems that <the subject is the ten utterances signifying the ten genera of things>:

Since Boethius says so.³

2. Second, this work is concerned with <what is> univocal, equivocal, and denominative, which are differentiae only of signifying utterance; since no thing and no concept is equivocal. For where the concept is the same, there is univocity.

1. The full definition is: "Equivocals are said to be things which have only the name in common, but the account of whose substance is different" (my translation): *Aequivoca dicuntur quorum solum nomen commune est, ratio autem substantiae est diversa*; *Categories*, Ch. 1 (1a 1). This definition is the opening line of the *Categories*. By the time of Duns Scotus, however, it was customary to begin lectures and *Quaestiones* by "quoting the beginning of the section of the text, the *lemma* succeeded by an 'etc.'" Anthony Kenny and Jan Pinborg, "Medieval Philosophical Literature," 9–42, 20. For Scotus's treatment of the definition of equivocals, see q. 5, nn. 10–12.

2. Scotus will often refer to the categories simply as the "ten genera" (*decem genera*). At other times, he refers to them as the "ten most general [genera]" (*decem generalissima*) or the "ten most general genera" (*decem generalissima genera*). Cf. also *infra*, q. 2, n. 7.

3. In his commentary on Aristotle's *Categories*, Boethius claims that "the intention of this work is about words signifying things"; Boethius, *In Categ. Aristot.* I (PL 64, 160A–B).

3. Third, all these <i.e., univocal, equivocal, and denominative> are defined through "these are said."⁴

4. Fourth, <a> in the first division⁵ it is said "of them which are said."⁶ Similarly, a little lower <Aristotle says> "of those non-complex <things which are said>, <c> a single <term> either signifies a substance," etc.⁷ But a non-complex <thing> that can be said to signify (*dicibile incomplexum significare*) is proper of a signifying utterance;⁸ therefore, that <i.e., the non-complex thing that can be said to signify> is the subject. And most of all, therefore, <the *Categories* is about> the ten utterances signifying the ten genera, since this work only treats of these <things, i.e., significative utterances>.

5. Fifth, logic is either a science of the real or of speech; it is manifest that it is not of the real; therefore, <it is a science> of speech. As a result, each and every part of it is about a significative utterance; and so that part which is primary will be about the utterance signifying a simple concept, just as the book *On Interpretation* is about the utterance signifying the composite concept.

6. To the opposite, according to Boethius:⁹ "logic is about second intentions applied to first intentions"; therefore, some part of it is not about utterances.

7. Second, that which is treated here is essentially (*per se*) part of the subject considered in the book *On Interpretation*, and that <subject> is part of that which is considered in the book *Prior*

4. *Categories*, Ch. 1 (1a 1, 7, 13).

5. "In the first division" simply refers to the beginning of chapter 2, where Aristotle divides the subject of the book into that which involves combination and that which is without combination; see *Categories*, Ch. 2 (1a 16).

6. *Categories*, Ch. 2 (1a 16).

7. *Categories*, Ch. 2 (1b 25–26).

8. The Latin is as follows: *Sed dicibile incomplexum significare est proprium vocis significantis*. According to Andrews, the word *dicibile* "calls to mind Boethius's description of the subject of the categories as words signifying things, insofar as they are significant"; Robert Andrews, *Peter of Auvergne's Commentary on Aristotle's Categories: Edition, Translation, and Analysis* (Ph.D. diss., Cornell University, 1988), 14.

9. According to the editors of the critical edition, this quotation is from Avicenna, not Boethius. Cf. Avicenna, *Metaph. I*, Ch. 2 (AviL 10).

Analytics, which is the syllogism; but, as is manifest, that <subject> has all its attributes (*passiones*) inherent to itself <and> not in any existing utterance, nor is it possible. Similarly, an enunciation has its <attributes inherent to itself>. Therefore, each of these <i.e., a syllogism and an enunciation> is naturally prior to a significative utterance. And therefore that which is considered here is naturally prior to each of these, just as an integral part is to a whole;¹⁰ therefore, that which is considered here in the first place is naturally prior to any significative utterance. Therefore, a significative utterance is not the subject here.

8. Third, no property of a significative utterance is shown here of it, nor <is a property shown> of it in any other part of logic; therefore, etc.

9. To these two <arguments>,¹¹ one can say that “to have three terms” is an attribute (*passio*) of a syllogism as it is of an utterance, just as “to signify something true or false” is an attribute (*passio*) of the enunciation, and so it is of the other attributes (*passionibus*) of this kind.

10. Against <this argument>:¹² either a syllogism in the mind is a syllogism, and an enunciation in the mind is an enunciation, or not. If they are, then they have the attributes (*passiones*) of the syllogism and of the enunciation even if they are not spoken. If they are not, then <one> having a demonstration in the mind does not have a demonstration unless he speaks; and <one> is not knowing unless he speaks <what is known> and this is manifestly false.

[I. THE SOLUTION OF THE QUESTION]

11. To the question one can say that this book is not about ten utterances as about a first <or primary> subject—nor is any part of logic about an utterance <as a first subject>, since all the attributes (*passiones*) of the syllogism¹³ and of all its parts can inhere in them according to the being that they have in the

10. Cf. *infra*, q. 43, n. 15.

11. Cf. *supra*, nn. 7 and 8.

12. Cf. *supra*, n. 9.

13. Cf. also Duns Scotus, *Quaestiones in librum Porphyrii Isagoge*, q. 3, n. 20.

mind, even if they are never spoken, as is evident inductively—but <this book> is about something prior, which has the nature (*rationem*) of a significate only with respect to a significative utterance.

[II. TO THE PRINCIPAL ARGUMENTS]

12. To the <first argument, i.e., to the> authority of Boethius¹⁴ one can say that he understands the passive through the active <voice>, thus: <by saying that this work is> “about ten utterances signifying the ten genera of things,” <what he means> is that it is about the ten genera signified through the ten utterances.¹⁵ And in the solution of the following question it will be explained in which way this is true.¹⁶

13. To the second <argument>¹⁷ one can say that “univocal” and “denominative” are primarily differentiae of a predicate that in itself exists in a concept, not primarily in a signifying utterance. On the equivocal, however, he offers a solution on account of its opposition to the univocal: either since the equivocated equivocal is a proper concept, although not the equivocating equivocal;¹⁸ or since it is a concept insofar as it is signified.

14. To the third <argument>:¹⁹ he says “they are said” to show that he does not assign true definitions to those equivocals, etc.—which are through a genus and differentia—but <he shows> only the nature (*rationem*) that expresses what is said through the name.

15. To the fourth <argument, part a>,²⁰ I say that in the second division Aristotle says “of them which are”;²¹ but just as it does not follow from these words that the subject of this book

14. Cf. *supra*, n. 1.

15. See Pini, *Categories and Logic in Duns Scotus*, 142.

16. Cf. *infra*, q. 2, nn. 19–27.

17. Cf. *supra*, n. 2.

18. An equivocated equivocal is a thing that is signified by an equivocal term, whereas an equivocating equivocal is the equivocal utterance. For a fuller discussion on this distinction, see below, q. 5, nn. 11–12, and nn. 18–19.

19. Cf. *supra*, n. 3.

20. Cf. *supra*, n. 4.

21. *Categories*, Ch. 1 (1a 20).

is something real to which being pertains essentially (*per se*), so also neither does it follow here that the subject is an utterance to which being spoken pertains essentially (*per se*); for this reason he says “they are said,” which is to say, “they are conceived.” And “are” in the second division is taken for the same: <that is,> “are” according to reason.²²

16. To the fourth <argument, part b>²³ about the non-complex, I say that this pertains primarily to a simple concept, <then> to a signifying utterance by implication. Therefore, if the subject here is the simple <term>, it holds all the more that <the subject> is a concept rather than an utterance.

17. To the fourth <argument, part c>²⁴ about “it signifies,” I say to this <argument> that it does not follow that the subject of this book is the letter, as neither Boethius wishes—nevertheless, among those four <things> which are enumerated in the beginning of *On Interpretation*,²⁵ the letter is only a sign and not <something> signified. In the same way, neither does it follow here that the subject is an utterance from that medium “it signifies,”²⁶ since <to signify> is an exceedingly common medium, for a concept (*passio*)²⁷ <is a medium that> signifies a thing. Thus, the <thesis> holds good that the subject here is a concept.

18. To the fifth <argument>,²⁸ I say that logic is neither a sci-

22. See Pini, *Categories and Logic in Duns Scotus*, 180–82.

23. Cf. *supra*, n. 4.

24. Cf. *ibid.*

25. *On Interpretation*, Ch. 1 (16a 3–8).

26. The Latin is as follows: *Ita nec sequitur subiectum hic esse vocem ex hoc medio ‘significat’, quia illud est nimis commune medium, passio enim significat rem.* Although the terminology is a bit awkward, the argument is clear enough. In the beginning of *On Interpretation*, Aristotle claims that written words signify vocal utterances, which signify concepts (*passiones*), which signify things. Consequently, both vocal utterances and concepts (*passiones*) are in between written words and things, and hence each one is a medium or intermediate since it is both signified by something and in turn “signifies” something else. The original objection is that the *Categories* must be about vocal utterances since they “signify” other things. Scotus’s reply, then, is twofold. First, the phrase “it signifies” could, with equal reason, be taken to mean that the subject of the *Categories* is written words, a position that no one holds. Second, the phrase “it signifies” is as applicable to concepts as it is to utterances, since it is an “exceedingly common medium.”

27. According to the following paragraph, a concept (*passio*) is a medium between a thing and an utterance.

28. Cf. *supra*, n. 5.

ence of the real nor a science of speech (*sermocinalis*), since it considers neither speech (*sermo*) nor the attributes (*passiones*) of speech (*sermo*), nor <does it consider> its subject under the aspect (*ratio*) of speech (*sermo*). Indeed, one can show that this division is insufficient in the following way: the medium between thing and utterance or speech (*sermo*) is a concept (*passio*); therefore, just as some science is essentially (*per se*) about things, <and> some essentially (*per se*) about signifying utterances, as grammar and rhetoric, which consider the attributes (*passiones*) of an utterance insofar as it is an utterance, namely congruous and ornate, so there can be another science that is essentially (*per se*) about the concept (*conceptu*); this <science> is logic. So <logic> ought essentially (*per se*) to be called a rational science, not only because it is treated through reason (*ratio*) just as any other science <is>, but <also> because it is about concepts formed by the act of reason (*rationis*).²⁹

19. If someone³⁰ says that logic is a verbal (*sermocinalis*) science, as it seems from an interpretation of the name:—it must be understood that much <of it> pertains to speech (*sermo*) for two reasons: <first> because a concept, which is what logic is about, is immediately signified through an utterance; and <second> because the attributes (*passiones*) of a concept exist in a signifying utterance—<for example> non-complex, complex, to signify true or false—as in a sign according to the nature of the significate.

20. To that³¹ which is touched upon in responding to the contrary arguments concerning “terms”³² and “to signify <something as> true or false,” one can say that a term either is the same

29. See Giorgio Pini, “Species, Concept, and Thing: Theories of Signification in the Second Half of the Thirteenth Century,” *Medieval Philosophy and Theology* 8 (2000): 21–52; and idem, “Signification of Names in Duns Scotus and Some of His Contemporaries,” *Vivarium* 39 (2001): 20–51.

30. According to Pini, this is an old position. Pini, *Categories and Logic in Duns Scotus*, 35.

31. Cf. *supra*, n. 9.

32. I.e., “to be from three terms.” The argument is that “to be from three terms” is a property of a syllogism. See also Duns Scotus, *Super Porphyrii*, q. 3, n. 20.

thing as an utterance signifying a single concept, and then there is not a syllogism from three terms unless it is spoken. Or more truly: a term signifies the same thing that a simple concept <signifies>,³³ since it is transferred from geometry to logic for signifying an indivisible in propositions, which is able to be in the mind; and then every spoken syllogism and unspoken syllogism is from three terms. Similarly, “to signify true or false” pertains to the enunciation, but not in the way that an utterance signifies a concept, but in the way that a concept signifies a thing.³⁴

21. Likewise, in the comment above in the beginning of this <work>, Boethius³⁵ says that significative utterances are considered in one way as they are imposed for signifying,³⁶ in another way as properties caused by the intellect exist <or inhere> in those signifying <utterances>. In the first way they are considered in logic; in the second way <they are considered> in grammar.³⁷ According to this <division>, therefore, the first subject of logic must posit a significative utterance. And in this way the first subject of this book is an utterance signifying a simple concept, and most of all the ten utterances signifying the ten genera, since all other <utterances> are reduced to these.³⁸

33. The argument is unclear. In one way, it could be read such that the word “term,” either as a vocal utterance or as a second intention, signifies the same thing as the word “concept” signifies. In another way, it could be interpreted to mean that a “term,” like a “concept,” signifies extramental objects. Nevertheless, in all the readings, the conclusion is that “term” is identical to “concept.”

34. An utterance is a conventional sign that signifies a concept through an act of imposition; i.e., it is considered to be *ad placitum*. A concept, however, is a natural sign of a thing and hence does not require an act of imposition.

35. “Therefore, first was that position of names through which one may signify the subjects to the understanding or to the senses. The second was that consideration by which they perceive the figures and individual properties of names in this way so that the first name may itself be a designation of the thing”; Boethius, *Commentarium in Categorias Aristotelis* I (PL 64, 159B).

36. According to n. 24, what is signified by a vocal utterance is primarily a concept.

37. One of the alternative manuscripts has this inverted, such that “significative utterances are studied in logic insofar as they are caused by the intellect, whereas they are studied in grammar insofar as they are imposed for signifying.”

38. At this point, Scotus broadens the subject of the *Categories* to include vocal utterances, thereby tacitly acknowledging the insights contained in the

22. Against this <last argument>:³⁹ “by knowing one of the correlatives definitely, the other is also known” according to Aristotle in the chapter on “Relations.”⁴⁰ Therefore, if the logician considers an utterance insofar as it is significative of a thing, it is necessary that he know the thing definitely.⁴¹ Which seems unreasonable.

23. Second, every significative utterance in the genus of a signifying utterance is singular; therefore, of none of these is there a relation to another; therefore, other signifying utterances are not reduced to these any more than these are to the others.

24. To the first of these <two opposing arguments>,⁴² one can say that an utterance is not primarily a sign of a thing but of a concept, which <thing>⁴³ it is necessary for the logician to consider not as a primary subject, but on account of the understanding (*cognitio*) of a primary subject.

25. Against this:⁴⁴ a concept is a further sign of a thing; therefore, it still follows that it is necessary that the thing is understood (*cognoscere*).

26. This argument (*argumentum*)⁴⁵ is not only contrary to Bo-

opposing views. In n. 26, he will broaden the subject even more to include extramental things as well. See footnote 1, above.

39. Cf. *supra*, n. 21.

40. *Categories*, Ch. 7 (8b 13–15).

41. For a fuller discussion of this objection and how it is solved by Scotus and Radulphus Brito, see Pini, *Categories and Logic in Duns Scotus*, 167–69.

42. Cf. *supra*, n. 22.

43. For the sake of a coherent argument, I have followed a different manuscript for this translation. The majority of manuscripts have *quem*, which would refer to the concept, not the thing. If this is the correct reading, then the text would be: “one can say that an utterance is not primarily a sign of a thing but of a concept, which [concept] it is necessary for the logician to consider not as a primary subject, but on account of the understanding (*cognitio*) of a primary subject.” Scotus, however, repeatedly says that either a simple concept or an utterance signifying a simple concept is the primary subject of this work, which would contradict this reply if the relative pronoun *quem* refers to a concept. Furthermore, both the preceding objection and the following objection imply that what is at issue here is the “thing,” not the concept.

44. Cf. *supra*, n. 24.

45. Cf. *supra*, n. 25.

ethius, but also contrary to those who say that logic is about concepts. For this reason, one can say that it is not necessary on account of the cognition of one relative that the other <relative> is known with regard to everything which belongs essentially (*in se*) in it, but only with regard to those <properties> which exist in it insofar as it is referred to another. In this way, however, it is not unsuitable that a thing is understood in logic to the extent that it is signified by means of a concept.

27. To the second <argument>,⁴⁶ one can say that although there may not be some relation between signifying utterances in the genus of utterance, nevertheless, insofar as they signify concepts there is an order among them, just as every proposition in the genus of propositions is singular; nevertheless "one is singular, another universal,"⁴⁷ by reason (*ratione*) of the concept that is signified.

46. Cf. *supra*, n. 23.

47. *On Interpretation*, Ch. 7 (17a 38).

[QUESTION TWO

Whether this Book is
About the Ten Categories
as about a Subject]



IT IS ASKED whether this book is about the ten categories as its subject.

1. It seems that it is not:

Since “to know is to understand (*cognoscere*) the thing through its cause” according to Aristotle in Bk. I of the *Posterior Analytics*,¹ therefore everything knowable has a cause; these ten <categories> do not have a cause; therefore, there is not a science of them. Proof of the minor: “a cause is naturally prior to that of which it is the cause”;² but nothing is naturally prior to these <ten categories> since they are first; therefore, etc.

2. Second, “of one science there is one subject”;³ these ten <categories> are not one subject, since they are not definable <as> one <subject>. Therefore, since this science⁴ is one, it will not be about these ten <categories>.

3. Third, there is a real science of the categories; therefore, <there is> not a logical <science of the categories>. The implication is evident according to Aristotle in Bk. III of the *On the Soul*.⁵ “Sciences are divided as things <are divided>”; but logic is diverse from every real science; therefore, the subject of logic is diverse from the subject of any real science. Proof of the ante-

1. *Posterior Analytics*, Bk. I, Ch. 2 (71b 9–12).

2. “Whatever is a cause of a cause, is also a cause of the effect”; *Liber de causis*, prop. 1. (ed. A. Pattin, p. 49).

3. *Posterior Analytics*, Bk. I, Ch. 28 (87a 38).

4. The context indicates that the science referred to is logic.

5. *On the Soul*, Bk. III, Ch. 8 (431b 24–25).

cedent: first, since the metaphysician determines these <categories>, as is shown in Bks. V and VII of the *Metaphysics*,⁶ second, since these <categories> are things of first intention—proof: since it is impossible for any second intention to be essentially (*per se*) predicated of a thing of first intention; but these ten most general <genera> are predicated essentially (*per se*) of the things of first intention—for this is essentially (*per se*) true: “man is substance”; therefore, every science of these ten <categories> is a real science.

4. To the opposite is Aristotle, <who> determines here about the ten most general <genera>; similarly, the book is entitled *Of the Categories*.⁷

[I. TO THE QUESTION]

[A. *The Status of the Question*]

5. One reply to this question is that the ten categories can be considered in two ways: in one way insofar as they are beings; in another way insofar as they are considered by reason (*ratio*), or insofar as some property caused by the intellect is attributed to them.

6. In the first way the metaphysician considers them; for his primary subject is being *qua* being.

7. In the second way, they are considered here. For attributes (*passiones*) are shown of them which inhere in them insofar as they are the most general <genera>; for example, of substance <it is shown> “to be predicated univocally”⁸ and “not to be in a subject,”⁹ and “it seems to signify this something.”¹⁰ Similarly, determinations about the other genera are made in such a way, insofar as they are divided into their own species, and these <species are> further <divided> into other <species>, and there

6. *Metaphysics*, Bk. V, Ch. 7 (1017a 22–30) and Bk. VII, Ch. 1 (1028a 10–20).

7. The word used here is *predicamentorum*, which is the Latin title. For consistency’s sake, I have chosen always to translate *praedicamenta* as categories, following the custom established by other translators.

8. *Categories*, Ch. 5 (3a 34).

9. *Ibid.* (3a 7).

10. *Ibid.* (3b 10).

is nothing above them which descends into them through division. It is evident that, insofar as they are the most general <genera>, this attribute exists in them: "to be divided into species,"¹¹ and "to have many subordinate species,"¹² and "not to have a genus above them."¹³ And if <something> is determined here of some other attributes which exist in these most general <genera>, insofar as they are beings, this is not principally to the issue, but is to the greater manifestation of them insofar as <they are> intentional predicates.

8. But since these ten <categories> are not the subject of one real science, namely, of metaphysics, except insofar as among them there is a primary one to which the others are attributed, as it is held in Bk. IV of the *Metaphysics*,¹⁴ and insofar as there is not any to which they are attributed <except insofar> as they are considered by reason (*ratio*), in which way are they one subject?

9. It is necessary to say that the unity of them is greater in some property caused by the understanding than insofar as they are beings. And thus, since this science is not one by the unity of analogy, it is necessary to assign some intentional object that is common to them, and a first subject, since only such is what the logician essentially (*per se*) considers.

[*B. A Certain Opinion of Others*]

10. Some,¹⁵ however, posit that <the subject of this book is a> "non-complex being, sayable and orderable in <one> genus."¹⁶

11. Porphyry, *Isagoge*. Ch. "On Species" (AL I⁶ 13; ed. Busse, 7.2).

12. Ibid. (AL I⁶ 13; ed. Busse, 7.13-15).

13. Ibid. (AL I⁶ 13; ed. Busse, 4.17-18).

14. *Metaphysics*, Bk. IV, Ch. 2 (1003b 16-17).

15. Nicolaus Parisiensis, *Praedic.* (cod. lat. Monacen. SB Clm. 14460, f. 24ra) and Ioannes de Saccavilla, *Praedic.* (cod. Cantabrig. Domus Petri 205, f. 10va).

16. In n. 8, Scotus raises the question regarding the nature of the subject under which, as a science, the categories are studied. In nn. 5-7, Scotus makes a distinction as to the investigation of the categories between the categories considered as essential beings and as beings of reason. The former, studied by metaphysics, only has a unity of analogy (n. 9), but the latter has a unity of univocity (see n. 19). In nn. 10-18, however, Scotus raises and dismisses an alternative possibility, that the subject of the categories is "*ens incomplexum dicibile ordinabile*

11. From what we have said above, one can argue against this latter <opinion> in this way: being does not pertain univocally to every being outside the mind;¹⁷ therefore, by much less is it univocal to being outside the mind and to being caused by the consideration of the intellect,¹⁸ since these differ more. Therefore, either “being” is taken here for being outside the mind or for a being of reason (*ente rationis*):

12. If <it is taken> for a being outside the mind, two absurdities follow, <the first is> namely that the subject posited would not be univocal to the ten categories considered here, <which is> the opposite of what <this opinion> intends to maintain. The second is that the subject here would be an accidental being, since it is composed from a thing of first intention and a thing of second <intention>, which do not make one essentially (*per se*). There is no science concerning accidental being, however, according to Aristotle in Bk. VI of the *Metaphysics*.¹⁹

13. If, however, <it is taken> for a being of reason (*pro ente rationis*), it follows that it is a vain repetition, since the other additions <i.e., non-complex, sayable, and orderable in a genus> include being thus taken,²⁰ and so it is a vain repetition.

14. Likewise, “sayable” is either understood for something that can be signified through speech—and it was shown in the solution of the preceding question²¹ that this is accidental to the subject of this book. Or “sayable” is taken for “<something> that can be predicated” (*praedicabili*), and then by adding “non-complex” a vain repetition is made; and again a vain repetition <is made> by adding “orderable in a genus.” Proof of the first: because neither a proposition, nor something complex, insofar

in genere.” Pini translates this compound expression as “incomplex sayable being, capable of being ordered in a genus.” See Pini, *Categories and Logic in Duns Scotus*, 158, and also C. Lafleur, “Logique et théorie de l’argumentation dans le ‘Guide de l’étudiant’ (c. 1230–1240) du ms. Ripoll 109,” *Dialogue* 29 (1990): 335–55.

17. Cf. *infra*, q. 4, nn. 27 and 38.

18. Cf. *infra*, q. 25, nn. 10–14.

19. *Metaphysics*, Bk. VI, Ch. 2 (1026b 24–26).

20. The phrase “being thus taken” means a being of reason, or a being that is caused by the act of the intellect.

21. Cf. *supra*, q. 1, nn. 11 and 15.

as it is complex, is predicated <of a subject>.²² Proof of the second: “orderable in a genus” includes “predicable,” or the other way around, since on the basis of the fact that something is “predicable,” as Aristotle says here, it is ordered to some <other predicates> according to below and above.

15. Against this last <argument>,²³ one can say that individuals are orderable in a genus; nevertheless, they are not “able to be said” <of something>; <and> the most general <genera> are “able to be said”; nevertheless, they are not orderable in a genus; thus neither of these includes the rest.

16. Against this <argument>:²⁴ then “an orderable being,” etc., does not pertain to the most general <genera>, which nevertheless are most extensively treated here; therefore, this is not the subject.

17. If only “non-complex being” were posited for the subject, or only “being able to be said” or only “a being orderable in a genus”—against any of these is the first of the reasons (*ratio-num*) given against the prior position and the first position.²⁵ And <an argument> against all three of these is that whichever of these is posited as a subject, it exceeds the ten categories, which seems untenable.

18. If, however, only “able to be said”—which is the same as a universal²⁶—is posited, then the subject of this book and of <the book by> Porphyry is the same. This is untenable and exceeds the ten categories.

[*C. The Response of Scotus*]

19. For this reason one can say that here the ten categories are considered insofar as something caused by the reason is attributed to them, since otherwise they cannot be considered

22. Cf. *infra*, q. 43, n. 17, about a *condicionado praedicato*.

23. Namely, to the proof of the second argument. Cf. *supra*, n. 14.

24. Cf. *supra*, n. 15.

25. Cf. *supra*, n. 11.

26. *On Interpretation*, Ch. 7 (17a 39–40).

by the logician. And in this way they have not only a unity of analogy, but also <a unity> of univocity; and what is univocal to them in this way is something intentional, which is here the first subject. This <subject> can be called "the predicaments" or "the most general <genera>," since all properties that are essentially (*per se*) determined of them here, are determined of them insofar as they have the nature (*rationem*) of the most general <genera> or of categories <or predicaments>.

20. Against this <argument>:²⁷ then <what is determined> about substance, quantity, etc., is only determined here accidentally, since it is only according to something which is in them accidentally, namely, in some intention, since no such <intention> can be in them essentially (*per se*).

21. Second, no attribute is shown here of a category or a most general <genus> according to its own nature (*rationem*); therefore, this is not the subject.

22. Third, the subject here does not pertain to every concept formed by the first act of reason, as the subject of *On Interpretation* does pertain to every concept formed by the second act <of reason>. This seems absurd, since similarly this book seems to be about the non-complex concept, just as that <book is> about the complex concept.

23. Fourth, since the most general <genus> or category is contained under "universal," it follows that this science is subalternated to the book of Porphyry, since just as a subject <is subalternated to> a subject, so also is a science <subalternated> to a science. But this seems absurd.

24. To the first of these <objections>,²⁸ I say that it is not untenable that what the logician considers only accidentally, the metaphysician considers essentially (*per se*).

25. To the second <objection>,²⁹ I say that insofar as some univocal intention is determined here of substance and quantity, <that is> insofar as they have the aspect (*ratio*) of the most

27. Cf. *supra*, n. 19.

29. Cf. *supra*, n. 21.

28. Cf. *supra*, n. 20.

general <genera>, to such a degree this is primarily said of a most general <genus>, namely, "to be divided into species," and "not to have a higher genus," and "to be predicated univocally," which was shown of substance³⁰ and is accepted as known of the others, since in this way something univocal is shown of many subjects <that are> not first, in that it is shown of its first subject.

26. To the third <objection>,³¹ one can say that "enunciation" is the first subject of the book *On Interpretation*,³² which is not said by a formal predication about every concept formed by the second act of reason, but others, such as imperative speech, are reduced to it. So <likewise>, every simple concept is reduced to some one of the categories.

27. To the fourth <objection>,³³ one can say that although <one> subject may be under <another> subject, nevertheless this science does not take its principles from that <other science>; and for this reason one of the conditions which are required for the subalternation of sciences is absent.³⁴

[II. TO THE PRINCIPAL ARGUMENTS]

28. To the first principal argument,³⁵ I say that although these <ten genera> may not have some cause in themselves (*in se*), nevertheless with respect to their attributes they have a cause, especially with respect to the intentional attributes (*passiones*) which are in them insofar as they are considered by reason (*ratione*). And when it is said that "nothing is naturally prior to them," this is true in itself; nevertheless with regard to the inherence of an intentional attribute, something can be naturally prior to them.³⁶

29. To the second <argument>,³⁷ it is evident that the first

30. Cf. *supra*, n. 7.

31. Cf. *supra*, n. 22.

32. Cf. Duns Scotus, *Super Porphyrii*, q. 1, n. 1.

33. Cf. *supra*, n. 23.

34. Cf. Duns Scotus, *Quaestiones super libros Metaphysicorum Aristotelis*, Bk. I, q. 9, n. 40.

35. Cf. *supra*, n. 1.

36. Cf. *infra*, q. 43, which takes up the question of priority.

37. Cf. *supra*, n. 2.


subject here is something univocal to the ten categories, such as “predicament” <or “category”>.

30. To the third <argument>,³⁸ it is evident that what <things> the metaphysician considers essentially (*per se*), are here considered accidentally (*per accidens*), namely, since something intentional is considered essentially (*per se*), which is applicable to them.

38. Cf. *supra*, n. 3.

[QUESTION THREE

Whether Some Intentional Predicate is Univocal to the Most General Genera]

T IS ASKED about something posited in the previous solution,¹ namely, whether there is something univocal to the most general <genera>, and primarily whether some intentional predicate is univocal to them.

1. It seems that there is not:

Since if something were <univocal to them>, then that would be prior to and more common than they, and thus these would not be the first and most general genera; which is contrary to Boethius.²

2. Second, if something were univocal to the <categories>, since they are diverse among themselves, they would be “the same beings in some respect; therefore, <they would be> different.”³ The implication is evident through the definition of “different” posited in Bk. V of the *Metaphysics*.⁴ The consequent is false, since the categories are diverse in themselves and not different, since then they would be species.⁵

3. Third, the intention is caused by the thing;⁶ therefore, the

1. Cf. supra, q. 2, n. 19.

2. Boethius, *In Categ. Aristot.* I (PL 64, 160A–B). Cf. supra, q. 1, n. 1.

3. *Metaphysics*, Bk. V, Ch. 9 (1018a 12–13).

4. Ibid.

5. In this objection, “different” (*differentia* and *differentium*) is the plural, present active participle of *differe*, and should not be confused with *differentia*, which is a first-declension noun. If A differs from B, then A and B are different from one another. That by which they differ, however, is a *differentia*.

6. See Perler, “Duns Scotus on Signification,” 107.

unity of the intention <is caused> by the unity of the thing; but no thing pertains univocally to them; therefore, neither does any intention <pertain univocally to the ten categories>. The first proposition is evident; for that which is caused by the intellect, and not by the thing, is a figment, of which kind there is not any intention.

4. Fourth, no univocal is denominative; but an intentional predicate is said only denominatively of those things which are things of first intention; therefore, no intentional predicate is univocal to them. Proof of the major: first, since univocal is distinguished here over against denominative, just as it is <distinguished> over against equivocal; second, since a little lower in the chapter "On Substance" Aristotle says that "certain things are predicated according to the name, and not according to the account (*ratio*) of the name," such as concretes or denominatives, and he exemplifies it concerning white.⁷

5. To the opposite:

Something intentional is said of these ten <categories> according to the same name and the same account (*ratio*); therefore, <something is> univocally <predicated of them>. The implication is evident according to the definition of univocals.⁸ Proof of the antecedent: substance is a genus, quantity is a genus.

6. Second, "substance" is essentially (*in quid*) predicated of many things which differ in species, and similarly "quantity" <is essentially predicated of many things which differ in species>; which is why "genus" is predicated of these according to the name and the definition. In this way, one can argue about many intentions inhering in them and contained under them, such as "species" <is> to man and whiteness.

7. Likewise, diversity alone in accidental matter does not diversify that of which there is a species, since the differentia

7. In other words, while it is correct to say that "the table is white," it is not the case that "the table is a color," even though it is true that "white is a color." *Categories*, Ch. 5 (2a 29-34).

8. Porphyry defines genus as that which is "predicated essentially of many things which differ in species." *Isagoge*, Ch. "On the Genus" (AL I⁶ 6-7; ed. Busse, 2.15-18).

of the species is a formal differentia. But an intention, applied to a thing of one genus and of another, has only a differentia similar to matter by accident. Therefore, it does not differ in species from that which exists in them; therefore, neither is univocity taken away on account of that, since what does not take away the unity according to species, does not take away univocity. The first proposition is evident, since a golden circle and a bronze circle do not differ in species. And the reason is evident, since such a differentia, with that to which it is added, does not make it a being except accidentally, since it is not by nature the species of a genus. The minor is evident, since no intention is essentially (*per se*) in a thing of first intention, as was shown previously; but there is only diversity here and there according to the things of first intention; therefore, only according to accidental matter.

[I. THE RESPONSE TO THE QUESTION]

8. To the question one must say that some univocal intention can be applied to the things of all genera, since every diversity in things of first intention does not in itself impede the intellect from conceiving of those things through the same manner of conceiving.⁹ Intentions, however, are attributed to them insofar as they are conceived by the intellect, and for this reason intentions specifically the same can be attributed to diverse things.

[II. TO THE PRINCIPAL ARGUMENTS]

9. To the first argument,¹⁰ one can say that they are the first and most common genera of things, <but they are> not <the first and most common genera> of intentions.

10. Similarly, to the second <argument, one can say> that

9. In other words, while the categories as extramental essences do not have anything predicated univocally of them, as they are considered in logic, i.e., as beings caused by the intellect, they do have something univocally predicated of them, namely, "categories" or "highest genera." See Pini, *Categories and Logic in Duns Scotus*, 143.

10. Cf. *supra*, n. 1.

they are not different, since they are not the same beings in some respect, that is some thing.

11. Otherwise, to each <of the first two arguments,¹¹ one can say> that although they are the most common and first <genera>, nevertheless something the same can be in¹² all of them denominatively, which does not have to be said <to be> prior to and more common than they, unless it is said essentially of them.

12. So to the second argument,¹³ <one can say that the categories> are not the same in some respect; therefore, it does not follow that they are different. In a certain mode this is apparent—where it seems less <likely>—namely, in real accidents; since “white,” signifying one thing, is said of a surface and of a man, which belong to two genera. But this <example> is not altogether similar; for a real accident has only some one thing as its proximate subject, in the way that it exists in no other, unless <it exists> through its nature. Therefore, another <thing> is only its subject through an accident, by mediating for a primary subject. But an intentional accident can equally <and> primarily be in the things of all genera, and not through another.

13. To the third <argument>,¹⁴ I say that a thing is not the total cause of an intention, but is only an occasion, namely insofar as it moves the intellect so that it considers in act, and the intellect is the principal cause.¹⁵ For this reason, a lesser unity

11. Cf. supra, nn. 1–2. The initial arguments are essentially that if anything is able to be said univocally of the ten categories, then that which is said would be prior to and more common than the ten categories, but since the categories are the first and most common genera, nothing can be prior to and more common than they. In reply, Scotus argues that because “the categories are the first and most common genera,” one has already predicated something univocal of them, namely the predicate “the first and most common genera,” which, as an intentional predicate, would be more common than that of which it is predicated.

12. In the objection, *aliquid-idem entia* is translated as “the same beings in some respect.” In the reply, Scotus distinguishes between *entia* and *inesse*; thus *potest aliquid-idem inesse* is translated as “something the same can be in.”

13. Cf. supra, n. 2.

14. Cf. supra, n. 3.

15. Cf. Duns Scotus, *God and Creatures: The Quodlibetal Questions*, translated with introduction, notes, and glossary by Felix Alluntis and Allan B. Wolter (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1975), q. 15, n. 26. For a fuller dis-

suffices in the thing than is <found in> the intention, since it suffices for the intellect to be moved by something extrinsic for the causing of many <notions> through the <simple> consideration <of that which is extrinsic>, <notions> to which nothing corresponds in the thing. Just as in <something> existing, whiteness is in a certain respect (*secundum quid*) “essentially remaining” (*per se stans*) and motion in a certain respect (*secundum quid*) has the mode of a “condition” (*habitus*). For to each the intellect attributes the mode of a “condition” and of “essentially remaining” similarly, as to a man; and each is absolutely considered a noun. But nevertheless there is something corresponding to that mode in each, but not truly in the same way as an intention caused by the intellect <that is> moved by it extrinsically. Similarly, the intellect considering through that one species can reflect innumerable times upon itself by considering its own operation, and whatever consideration there is, it has nothing extrinsic corresponding to itself, except only the first object for the occasion, insofar as that moves the intellect initially to consider it. This is treated in the book by Porphyry.¹⁶

14. To the fourth <argument>,¹⁷ it is one thing to say “something univocal is predicated of many,” and <another thing to say> “there is a univocal predicate of many.”¹⁸ In the first way a denominative <term> is univocal; in the second way it is not, as the account shows. Hence, I concede the conclusion that no intentional predicate is a univocal predicate of the things of first intention, but some univocal intention in itself is predicated of them, <although> not univocally. But about this more will be said afterwards.¹⁹

cussion of how the extramental object is an occasion while the intellect is the principal cause, see Pini, *Categories and Logic in Duns Scotus*, p. 110.

16. Cf. Duns Scotus, *Super Porphyrii*, q. 1, n. 12; q. 5, n. 4; q. 9–11, nn. 20 and 28.

17. Cf. *supra*, n. 4.

18. The Latin is as follows: *aliud est dicere ‘aliquid univocum praedicari de multis,’ et ‘esse univocum praedicatum de multis.’*

19. The editors of the critical edition claim that this topic is picked up again by Scotus in q. 4, nn. 26 and 37, where Scotus argues that “being” is simply equivocal to the ten categories. It seems to me, however, that Scotus returns to the distinction in question not in question 4, but in question 8, where he argues that abstract accidental terms and denominative terms signify the same thing.

[QUESTION FOUR

Whether Being is Univocal to the Ten Categories]



IT IS ASKED whether being is univocal to the ten categories.

1. It seems that it is, according to the middle <terms> studied in logic.¹

There is no contradiction in equivocals, according to Aristotle in the *Sophistical Refutations*;² but this is a contradiction: "Socrates is a being, and Socrates is not a being." Therefore, being is univocal.

2. Second, no equivocal is determinable through anything added to any of the equivocates, since <what is added> expresses something of them in act;³ but through something that is added being is determinable to one category, as, when one says "absolute being" and "being through itself (*per se*)," it is contracted to substance; therefore, it is not equivocal.

1. The Latin has *Quod sic, videtur per media logicalia*, which is very cryptic. I take it that *media logicalia* is short for the middle term of a syllogism, since in his other writings Scotus argues that the middle term of a syllogism is univocal if it produces a valid argument. For a fuller discussion, see Timotheus A. Barth, "Being, Univocity, and Analogy," 252.

2. *Sophistical Refutations*, Bk. II, Ch. 30 (181b 1–3).

3. For Scotus, a univocal term, such as a genus, is determinable or contracted to a species by adding the differentia. Thus, for example, although it may not be clear as to whether the univocal term "animal" signifies a dog or a person, the term can be clarified by adding "rational" to it, which will contract it to the species man. On the other hand, since the equivocal term "animal" may signify either a real man or a man in a picture, no differentia can be added to the term to clarify it. For there is nothing signified by an equivocal term that is the same for both significates. Cf. *infra*, q. 5.

3. Third, it follows that "man is substance; therefore, man is a being," since the antecedent cannot be true without the consequent <being true>. But in equivocals, there is no implication. Therefore, etc.

4. Fourth, if being is equivocal, this is in some way true: "substance is non-being." And it follows that "therefore, substance is not something," since "something" is not more common than being,⁴ and further on, this follows: "therefore, substance is nothing." Therefore, this consequent is in some way true, which seems untenable, since then the account (*ratio*) of Parmenides in Book I of the *Physics*,⁵ would not be wrong, insofar as he claims that "non-being is nothing," which nevertheless seems to be contrary to Aristotle.

5. Fifth, "to be predicated essentially (*in quid*)" is one aspect (*ratio*)⁶ pertaining to being as it is said of all these <categories>;⁷ therefore, that which is said of these <categories> is one, since the aspect (*ratio*) under which something is said is not more one than what is said.

6. Sixth, "possible" is univocal: first, since it has a contradiction; second, since it is consequent to "necessary"; each of which is evident in Book II of *On Interpretation*.⁸ But "possible" does not seem to be more common than being, but less common, since being is divided by act and potency. Therefore, all the more so is being univocal.

4. To say that "something is not more common than being" seems to be a technical phrase that signifies that "something is coextensive with being," or that they are identical. Furthermore, since "being" is a transcendental, by definition it would seem that nothing could actually *be* more common than being. Thus, the opposite would be that "something" is less extensive than being, which is how Scotus interprets the phrase in his reply.

5. *Physics*, Bk. I, Ch. 3 (186a 31–b 12).

6. According to Ashworth, "there was a tendency to identify it [i.e., *ratio*] with an Avicennian common nature which was distinct from both the mental conception and the external object." Ashworth, "Analogy and Equivocation," p. 105.

7. The argument is that "being" is said essentially of all the categories. For example, to the questions "what is substance?" and "what is quantity?" the answer would always be "being" as if it were a genus of these terms.

8. The modern edition of Aristotle's *On Interpretation* does not divide the work into two books. The reference is to chapters 12–13 (21a 34–22a 37).

7. Seventh, every division begins from one; but being is divided into these ten <categories>; therefore, there is something <that is> one in these <categories>.

8. Eighth, every multitude is reducible to unity, according to the author of *The Book of Causes*.⁹ But substance and accident are many since they are diverse, as is evident according to Aristotle in Bk. X of the *Metaphysics*,¹⁰ where he says that “every being is either the same as or diverse from every other being.” Therefore, these many are reduced to some one thing (*ad aliquod unum*). Nothing seems to be this <one thing> except being. Therefore, etc.

9. Ninth, according to Aristotle in Bk. VII of the *Physics*,¹¹ “every comparison is <made> according to something univocal”; but a comparison is <made> according to being; therefore, etc. Proof of the minor: first, since we say that “accident is less being and is posterior to substance”;¹² second, since it is said in Bk. II of the *Metaphysics*:¹³ “just as each thing is in respect to being, so it is with respect to truth.” And in the same place, the principles of eternal <things> are proved to be most (*maxime*) true,¹⁴ from which it follows that they are beings in the highest degree (*maxime*). Therefore, according to being is a comparison <made>.¹⁵

10. Tenth, of one science there is one univocal subject; but being insofar as it is being is the subject of metaphysics, as Aristotle determines in Bk. IV of that work;¹⁶ therefore, it is univocal. Proof of the major: First, since demonstrations are made from the subject; in demonstrations, however, it is necessary that something be univocal, according to Aristotle in Bk. I of the *Pos-*

9. *Liber De Causis*, prop. 31 (ed. A. Pattin, p. 114).

10. *Metaphysics*, Bk. X, Ch. 3 (1054b 25–26).

11. *Physics*, Bk. VII, Ch. 4 (248b 9).

12. *Metaphysics*, Bk. VII, Ch. 1 (1028a 30–31).

13. *Metaphysics*, Bk. II, Ch. 1 (993b 30–31).

14. *Metaphysics*, Bk. II, Ch. 1 (993b 27–28).

15. The Latin is this: *secundum ens est comparatio*, which is the converse of the original statement, i.e., *comparatio est secundum ens*. In its original formation, the syllogism is invalid, since it contains an illicit minor. By converting the minor premise, however, the syllogism is at least logically valid, which is why I have translated this last sentence literally, in spite of the English being awkward.

16. *Metaphysics*, Bk. IV, Ch. 1 (1003a 21).

terior Analytics,¹⁷ and a little lower <in the *Posterior Analytics*>:¹⁸ equivocation does not happen in demonstrations. Second, since it is necessary to know, regarding a subject, what it is (*quid est*)¹⁹ before a demonstration; but an equivocal <term> does not have an essence (*quid est*),²⁰ since it neither <has> a definition.

11. Eleventh, in Bk. II of the *Metaphysics*,²¹ it is argued that the principles of eternal <things> are most true, since they are the cause of a univocal effect; for example, <they are the cause> of the truth in others. Then the truth exists univocally in every cause and effect; therefore, the character of being (*entitas*) is also <univocal>. Since Aristotle says in the same place: “just as each thing is in respect to being, so it is with respect to truth”;²² but all things either are causes or caused; therefore, being is univocal to all.

12. Twelfth, in Bk. IV of the *Metaphysics*²³ this is posited as the first principle and <it is the> most certain of all principles: “that it does not happen that the same thing simultaneously both is and is not.” But if being were equivocal, this principle would be doubtful, on account of the multiplicity of terms; therefore, some other <principle>, the terms of which not being multiple, would be more certain; but this is untenable.²⁴ Therefore, being is not equivocal.

13. Thirteenth, of one cognitive power, there is one first object in a genus; but being, insofar as it is being, is the first object of the intellect, according to Avicenna;²⁵ therefore, it is univocal. The major is evident inductively and by reason: since

17. *Posterior Analytics*, Bk. I, Ch. 11 (77a 6–7). Cf. *Posterior Analytics*, Bk. II, Ch. 19 (100a 6–8).

18. *Posterior Analytics*, Bk. I, Ch. 11 (77a 9–10).

19. *Posterior Analytics*, Bk. I, Ch. 1 (71a 11–12).

20. *Topics*, Bk. VI, Ch. 2 (139b 22–28).

21. *Metaphysics*, Bk. II, Ch. 1 (993b 30–31).

22. *Ibid.*

23. *Metaphysics*, Bk. IV, Ch. 3 (1005b 22–24).

24. The objection makes it clear that the certainty at issue here is a psychological certainty, not a metaphysical certainty.

25. “Therefore, both thing and being are necessarily such since they are immediately impressed on the soul in a first impression, which [impression] is not acquired from other things more known than they.” Avicenna, *Metaph.* I, Ch. 5 (AviL 31).

a cognitive power is of such a nature as to be essentially (*per se*) perfected through the form of its own essential (*per se*) object; but forms that are diverse in genus are not essentially perfective of one power; therefore, diverse genera do not correspond to the same power of cognition for an object.

14. Fourteenth, Avicenna says:²⁶ "he who says being does not say substance nor accident." But he who says <something> equivocal, says either of the significates, since no equivocal establishes an understanding except of either of the significates. Therefore, it is not equivocal.

15. Fifteenth, being is imposed from one aspect (*ratio*), as from the act of existing (*essendi*); therefore, it signifies one <thing>.

16. To the opposite is Porphyry, who says that "if anyone calls all <things> beings, he will designate them equivocally."²⁷

17. Second, in the beginning of the *Categories*, Aristotle <says that>: "of non-complex <expressions> a single <term> signifies either substance or quantity," etc.²⁸ But if being were to signify something common to them, it would signify none of them, since that which signifies the higher does not signify the lower under its proper aspect (*ratio*). Therefore, being would not be non-complex, which is untenable. Therefore, etc.

18. Third, if being were univocal to them, then it would be a genus of them, and thus these would not be the ten first genera, but there would be one most general <genus>. Proof of the first implication: every univocal <term that is> said of many, is said of them under the aspect (*ratio*) of some universal; otherwise, these five universals would not sufficiently divide <that which is> "predicable of many."²⁹ But being, if it were univocal, could not be said under the aspect (*ratio*) of the most specific species, since these <categories> are not singular <things>; nor <could

26. "Therefore, the first subject of this science is being *qua* being, and those things which he inquires of are the implications of being without condition. Of which there are certain things to it as species, as substance, quantity and quality ..." Avicenna, *Metaph.* I, Ch. 2 (AviL 13).

27. Porphyry, *Isagoge*, Ch. 3 (AL I⁶ 12; ed. Busse, 6.8–9).

28. *Categories*, Ch. 4 (1b 24–16).

29. *On Interpretation*, Bk. I, Ch. 7 (17a 39–40).

it be said> under the aspect (*ratio*) of a differentia, since it distinguishes none of them ("differentia is that by which singulars differ from each other");³⁰ neither <could it be said under the aspect> of a property, nor <could it be said under the aspect> of an accident, since being is predicated essentially (*in quid*) <of the categories>, according to Aristotle in Bk. IV of the *Metaphysics*,³¹ <thus it is> not these two. Therefore, if <being> were univocal, it would be a genus in respect to them. Not only does an untenable supposition follow from this, namely, that these are not the first genera, but it is contrary to Aristotle in Bk. III of the *Metaphysics*,³² since being is <predicated> of the concept of everything, and genus is not <predicated> of the concept of the differentia.

19. Similarly, if these ten <categories> have something univocal that is predicated of them, it is manifest that they are not distinguished through that <thing>; therefore, each one differs from the other through something added. Whatever that may be, it follows that they are different and not in themselves diverse, since "they are the same being in some respect," which is contrary to Aristotle in Bk. IV of the *Metaphysics*.³³ It also follows that they are species, since every <thing> that is, according to its definition (*ratio*), composed of something common said of it essentially (*in quid*) and something formal added <to it>, is properly definable through them. A definition, however, is properly only of a species, according to Aristotle in Bk. VI of the *Topics*.³⁴

20. Fourth, if <being> were common to them, since these are different, and not through being, I seek the addition in this one and that one: either it is being or non-being. If it is being, then being belongs to its concept; therefore, by adding that <thing> to being, it will be a vain repetition. Both being and that <other differentia which was added> pertain to the concept of every category; therefore, there is a vain repetition in the simple concept of every category. Accordingly, there is a vain repetition

30. Porphyry, *Isagoge*, Ch. "On Difference" (AL 1⁶ 18–19; ed. Busse, 11.21).

31. *Metaphysics*, Bk. IV, Ch. 2 (1003b 5–10).

32. *Metaphysics*, Bk. III, Ch. 3 (998b 21–28).

33. *Metaphysics*, Bk. IV, Ch. 9 (1018b 12–13).

34. *Topics*, Bk. VI, Ch. 4 (141b 25–28).

in the concept of every <other thing>, since some <aspect> of the categories is included in the concept of everything <else>. There will also be a vain repetition in every definition, by placing the definitions (*rationes*) in place of the names <and> by always resolving each one to its most general genus; which Aristotle holds as untenable in Bk. VII of the *Metaphysics*.³⁵

21. This proof is universal for proving that every determination, which is essentially (*per se*) one with the determinable, is beyond the concept of the determinable and vice versa; this is more manifest of a determination which is not one essentially.

22. If that which is added to any category is non-being, two absurdities follow. First, that every category would be formally non-being, and in this way all lower <kinds> will be essentially (*per se*) non-beings, since something of <the higher genera> is predicated of everything lower <than it>. The other <absurdity> is that there would be a repugnance to the concept of any of the categories, and so of the concept of anything whatsoever, as was deduced earlier.³⁶

23. Fifth, in Bk. VIII of the *Metaphysics*,³⁷ Aristotle says that just as separate substances are immediately what they are, i.e., <they are> not <constituted> through some form coming to the matter, so being is immediately any of the categories; therefore, <it is> not <constituted> through an added differentia; therefore, it is not common.

24. Sixth, if being were univocal to them, this would be a vain repetition: "substance of a certain magnitude," "white man," and universally by adding an accident to the subject, since something that is the same is included essentially (*per se*) in the concept of each. Therefore, by making this resolution, <i.e.,> by positing the definitions (*rationes*) for the names, something that is the same will be said twice, and in this way it will be a vain repetition.

25. Similarly, in every definition there will be a vain repetition on account of the same, since in the concept of each thing being defined the same thing is included.

35. *Metaphysics*, Bk. VII, Ch. 12 (1038a 19–21).

36. Cf. *supra*, n. 20.

37. *Metaphysics*, Bk. VIII, Ch. 6 (1045b 23–24).

[I. REGARDING THE QUESTION]

[A. Conclusion 1: *Being is Not Univocal to the Ten Categories*]³⁸

26. On account of this, it must be said that being is not univocal to the ten categories. Nevertheless, it is doubtful in which way this is the case, whether <it is predicated> purely equivocally or analogically.

[1. *Whether Being is Analogical or Equivocal*]³⁹

27. An analogy in utterances (*vocibus*) is posited in three <ways>: either insofar as the <utterances> primarily signify one aspect (*rationem*), which by virtue of existing in different ways pertains to two or more <objects>, which are said <to be> analogates.⁴⁰ Just as this noun "cause" and this noun "principle" and many other nouns, which are distinguished in Bk. V of the *Metaphysics*,⁴¹ primarily signify one aspect (*rationem*), nevertheless this <aspect> is in diverse <things> according to order.

28. Analogy in utterances (*vocibus*) is posited in another way, since through an utterance (*vocem*) one <thing> is signified primarily (*per prius*) and the rest secondarily (*per posterius*). The cause of which is posited <as follows>: since signifying follows understanding.⁴² Therefore, that which is understood prior to

38. I have emended the section heading from what is given in the critical edition so that it more accurately summarizes what is said in the actual text. According to the critical edition, the section heading is: "Being is Not Analogous to the Ten Categories."

39. Again, I have emended the section heading from what is given in the critical edition. According to the critical edition, the section heading is: "The Opinion of Certain Others."

40. "Analogates" refers to the things that are signified by analogous terms. According to Ashworth, "In the thirteenth century, a special vocabulary was developed to deal with the issue of equivocal words as opposed to equivocal things. A thing was called *aequivocum aequivocatum*, and a word was called *aequivocum aequivocans*, with parallels for univocals. . . . This type of vocabulary was also sometimes extended to include analogy." Ashworth, "Analogy and Equivocation," 98.

41. *Metaphysics*, Bk. V, Ch. 1–2 (1012b 35–1014a 25).

42. For a discussion of Scotus's general theory of signification, see Perler, "Duns Scotus on Signification," p. 109, and Pini, "Signification of Names in Duns Scotus and Some of His Contemporaries."

another (*per prius* ... *alio*) will be signified primarily (*per prius*), if it is signified through the same utterance (*vocem*) through which the other thing is also <signified>.

29. In a third way: that utterance (*vox*) is properly imposed for one thing, and on account of some similitude to that to which it is primarily imposed, the utterance (*vox*) is transferred to signify something <else>, just as it is in the second mode of equivocation.⁴³ There is also in a certain way an order in signifying, since an utterance (*vox*) is never transferred to signify something unless it is accepted that the imposed utterance is for signifying something properly, and that second <thing> signifies only on account of some similitude of it to that to which it is primarily imposed.

[2. *Being is Not Analogous to the Categories*]⁴⁴

30. Analogical utterances (*voces*)⁴⁵ in the first way seem to be simply univocal to the logician, since the genus, according to the logician, is simply univocal, although the nature (*ratio*), which it signifies primarily, may pertain to diverse species according to its order. "For in every genus there is a first one, which is the measure of all posterior things," according to Aristotle in Bk. X of the *Metaphysics*.⁴⁶

31. Nevertheless, perhaps it is not altogether similar concerning utterances (*vocibus*) that are analogical in this way and

43. The different ways, or modes, of equivocation are taken from a passage in Aristotle's *Sophistical Refutations*: "There are three varieties of these homonymies [equivocations] and ambiguities: one when either the account or the name properly signifies more than one thing, e.g., mole and bank; one when by custom we use them so; thirdly, when words that have a simple sense taken alone have more than one meaning in combination; e.g., "knowing letters." For each word, both "knowing" and "letters," may have a single meaning; but both together have more than one—either that the letters themselves have knowledge or that someone else has it of them"; *Sophistical Refutations*, Ch. 4 (166a 16–22).

44. I have emended the section heading. The critical edition has: "Against the Opinion of Others."

45. For a detailed discussion of the three different types of analogical utterances in Scotus and how his views compare with other thirteenth-century logicians, see Ashworth, "Analogy and Equivocation," 120–22.

46. *Metaphysics*, Bk. X, Ch. 1 (1052b 18).

concerning the genus in respect to its species, since, although the species of a genus have an order among themselves according to <the degree to which they are> more or less perfect in being, nevertheless in participating in the nature (*rationem*) of the genus they do not have an order, since all <of them> participate equally in the first, for "genus" is predicated with equal immediacy of <all> the primary species <into> which it is divided. Then there is no difference in primacy among these predications: "whiteness is color," "blackness is color," although in comparing whiteness and blackness to each other, whiteness is more perfect. But in utterances (*vocibus*) that are posited analogically in the first mode, there is an order among the participants in <that in which they> participate, just as "end" and "matter" are not equally primarily a "cause," nor perhaps <are> "contrary," <and> "contradiction" equally primarily "opposition."

32. The second mode of analogy mentioned above seems impossible. For when a name is imposed on a secondary thing (*posteriori*), it happens to ignore what is simply first, since what is absolutely posterior can be prior to us, and so it can be understood and signified first. If, therefore, in the second <mode of analogy> that utterance (*vox*) is imposed on something <that is> absolutely first, it is manifest that it will <not>⁴⁷ signify <that which is absolutely first>, through that secondary <utterance> (*per posterius illud*), to which it was first imposed, since once it has first signified that <secondary thing>, then <it will> always <signify it>. For after an utterance (*vox*) has been imposed, it does not change in signifying that to which it was imposed; therefore, the order of things does not follow the order in the signification of utterances (*vox*).

33. The reason posited for this <type of analogy> does not seem to be valid. For "signifying does not follow understanding" by a necessary implication, as an effect follows a necessary cause. Since something can be understood prior to another by time and by nature, and nevertheless not be signified thus. For it is not necessary, as <or when> someone understands some-

47. Several of the manuscripts have the word *non*, which makes more sense of the passage. The negative reading is also the one preferred by Ashworth in her analysis of this passage. Ashworth, "Analogy and Equivocation," 121.

thing, that he impose an utterance (*vocem*) on that which he understands, but it is in his discretion to impose it or not. But this proposition, "signifying follows understanding," must be understood as that "without which not," since something cannot be signified unless it is understood; but in understanding and signifying, it neither follows necessarily nor with respect to a similar order.

34. But in which way ought an analogous utterance (*vox*) to be posited by the logician? The third way seems most probable, since otherwise there would not seem to be a difference between the first way of equivocation and the second.⁴⁸ Or, if on both sides an utterance (*vox*) were to signify many <things> primarily, or, if in the second way it did not signify that to which it improperly pertains, then that <third> mode <of analogy> would not seem to be <a mode> of equivocation, since that utterance (*vox*) would be simply univocal, since it would only signify one.⁴⁹

35. But however it is concerning the way of positing analogy, none of these ways seems to pertain to being in regard to the ten categories. All the arguments to the opposite⁵⁰ prove that it is not <predicated in> the first way. Similarly, these <categories> do not seem to have an order in participating in being, since <being> is predicated of everything essentially (*in quid*) and through itself (*per se*) in an immediate and primary way. <Thus>

48. The first way of equivocation, not to be confused with the first way or mode of analogy, is when a name or utterance properly or primarily signifies more than one thing, such as the word "dog," which signifies an animal, a constellation, and a Cynic philosopher. The second way of equivocation is when an utterance signifies more than one thing because of custom. See the *Sophistical Refutations*, Ch. 4 (166a 16–22). Earlier, Scotus identifies the second way of equivocation with the third way of analogy, which implies that there is a similitude involved in the second way of equivocation that is lacking in the first way of equivocation. Thus Scotus's argument is that if analogous predication is used by the logician, it would have to be analogous predication that is based upon a similitude between the two things signified. For if it were not based upon a similitude, then it would be essentially equivocation (in the first mode), not analogous predication.

49. This is a contrary-to-fact conditional statement, such that the consequent is understood to be false.

50. Cf. *supra*, nn. 16–25.

the second way is not possible for the logician. The third <way does> not <pertain> to the question, since this noun "being" does not seem to be transferred from substance to accident on account of some similitude of an accident to a substance, since it is predicated of each essentially (*in quid*), according to Aristotle in Bk. IV of the *Metaphysics*,⁵¹ and so <it is predicated> of neither <substance nor accident> improperly.

36. Similarly, accidents are prior to substance in sensation; therefore, <they are> also <prior to substance> in the intellect. Therefore, it is possible to impose a noun on them that signifies them, not through <their having> a relation to a substance. Even if an accident were signified through this noun "being," for example, as an "attribute of substance," it would therefore be signified under a proper aspect (*ratione*), since the aspect (*ratio*) of an attribute is the proper aspect (*ratio*) of an accident. Therefore, "being" is absolutely equivocal to substance and accident, since it signifies each under its proper notion (*ratione*).

[B. Conclusion 2: The Noun "Being" is Simply
Equivocal to the Ten Categories]

37. On account of this it must be said that this noun "being" is simply equivocal to these ten genera in the first mode of equivocation, especially on account of this last <argument>.⁵² Since it is certain that substance is signified under its proper aspect (*ratio*), and accident <is signified> in another way. For if an accident were to be signified under its proper aspect (*ratio*) through this noun "being," <then> this <noun> would be proper to it under that aspect by which it is attributed to a substance or under some other similar <aspect> which is proper to an accident; furthermore it follows that each is to be signified under its proper aspect (*ratio*).

38. Nevertheless, it must be understood that this utterance (*vox*), which is simply equivocal for the logician, namely, because it imports many <aspects> equally at first, for the metaphysician or natural <philosopher> who does not consider the

51. *Metaphysics*, Bk. IV, Ch. 2 (1003b 5-10).

52. Cf. *supra*, n. 36.

utterance (*vox*) in signifying but <considers> those things which are signified insofar as they are, is analogous, on account of the fact that the things which are signified have an order amongst themselves, not insofar as they are signified, but insofar as they exist.⁵³ For this reason, in Bks. IV and VII of the *Metaphysics*,⁵⁴ the metaphysician posits that “being” is analogous to substance and accident, since undoubtedly the things that are signified have an order in being; but for the logician, it is simply equivocal, since, insofar as they are signified through an utterance (*vox*), they are equally signified primarily.

[II. TO THE PRINCIPAL ARGUMENTS]

39. To the first argument I say that there is no contradiction concerning being unless by a distinction having been previously made, or by supposing that “being” is accepted in an affirmative and negative statement for the same <thing>. And in this way, there is a contradiction in a refutation, since then they are taken as univocal, since <they are taken> for one significate.

40. To the second <argument> I say that insofar as it concerns the force <or signification> of speech,⁵⁵ being is not contracted through something added, unless an equivocal can be contracted. Nevertheless, in respect to those who use it, it can be contracted through something added, so that they may refer their understandings to the same thing, just as, in respect to the use of speakers, proper names are contracted through the

53. See Richard McKeon’s article, where he claims, “Most metaphysicians hold that [being] is predicated analogically; most terminist logicians hold that it is predicated equivocally; Duns Scotus holds that it is predicated analogically in metaphysics, equivocally in logic”; “The Relation of Logic to Metaphysics in the Philosophy of Duns Scotus,” *Monist* 49, p. 528.

54. *Metaphysics*, Bk. IV, Ch. 2 (1003a 33–1003b 5), and Bk. VII, Ch. 4 (1030a 21).

55. The Latin is as follows: *quantum est de vi sermonis*. According to Deferrari, *vis* can be translated as “signification”; Roy J. Deferrari, *A Latin-English Dictionary of St. Thomas Aquinas* (Boston: Daughters of St. Paul, 1986), 1097. Confirmation that this is Scotus’s meaning is the last line of this argument, where Scotus says that proper names are contracted but not “in respect to the ‘signification’ (*significationem*).”

surname being added, not in respect to the signification of an utterance in itself.

41. To the third <argument>: I deny every implication from being to something and the other way around <i.e., from something to being>, except by a distinction having been previously made and unless "being" has been taken for that significate. And then this is not properly an implication: "substance, therefore being," but is an inference of the same from itself.—To the proof of the implication <posited in the objection>, I say that the antecedent, since it is simple, can be true without the consequent <being true, since it> has many meanings, unless the consequent is taken in one sense. Since the <consequent> has as many meanings as it has, it is neither true nor false, but must be distinguished.

42. To the fourth <argument>, I say that this <proposition> "substance is nothing" has many meanings, just as this <proposition> "substance is non-being," has, and is true in some sense, since substance is not quality, since "something," of which "nothing" implies a negation, does not seem to be more common than "being," since it can be explained as "something," that is, as some thing, and "thing" is not more common than being.⁵⁶

43. To the fifth <argument>, it is evident that "to be predicated essentially (*in quid*)" of substance and quantity exists in being taken equivocally. Nor does it follow that just as what is predicated is the same, so is the mode of predicating <the same>, as is often said, since the unity of proportion in those <predicates> in which there is such a mode suffices for the unity of the species of the mode of predicating.

44. To the sixth <argument>,⁵⁷ I say that "possible" is equivo-

56. "Something" is equivocal. In one sense it is coextensive with "being"; however, it may also be taken to mean "some thing," in which case "thing" is coextensive with "being" and the adjective "some" would then limit it or make it less extensive than being. Thus the force of Scotus's argument is that "something may not seem to be more extensive than being," i.e., "it may seem to be coextensive with being," but if "something" is taken for "some thing," and "thing" is coextensive with "being," "something" is actually less extensive than "being."

57. Cf. *supra*, n. 6.

cally a name of first and second imposition.⁵⁸ In the first way, it signifies a potency to an act and divides being, and is equivocal just as “act” <is equivocal> in diverse genera.—In the second way, it signifies a mode of composition, and in this way it is univocal, and is not less <common> than universal being, which is divided into the ten categories, and is univocal just as the other intentions.⁵⁹ The proofs from implication and contradiction proceed in this way. This distinction can frequently be perceived in Bk. V of the *Metaphysics*, in the chapter “On Potency.”⁶⁰

45. To the seventh <argument>,⁶¹ I say that division begins from one in some way, <i.e.>, a division is of one in some kind of mode.⁶² The division of being, however, into the ten genera is

58. According to Ockham, “Among names that signify conventionally, some are names of first imposition, and others, names of second imposition. Names of second imposition are those which are used to signify conventional signs and all such features as pertain to conventional signs in their function as conventional signs. ... In their application in grammar expressions like ‘name’ [*nomen* or noun], ‘pronoun,’ ‘verb,’ ‘conjunction,’ ‘case,’ ‘number,’ ‘mood,’ and ‘tense’ are all, in the broad sense, terms of second imposition. These names are called names of names; the reason for this is that they are used to signify parts of speech insofar as they are significant. ... ‘Name of first imposition’ has two senses. In the broad sense all names which are not names of second imposition are names of first imposition. In this sense syncategorematic signs like ‘every,’ ‘no,’ ‘some,’ and ‘all’ are names of first imposition. In the narrow sense, only those categorematic names which are not names of second imposition are called names of first imposition. In this sense, syncategorematic names are not names of first imposition. Taking the expression ‘name of first imposition’ in the narrow sense, there are two sorts of names of first imposition; for some are names of first intention, and others are names of second intention”; William Ockham, trans. with intro. by Michael J. Loux, *Ockham’s Theory of Terms: Part I of the Summa Logicae* (Notre Dame, IN: University of Notre Dame Press, 1974), 72–73.

59. It is worth noting that “possible” is said to be “not less [common] than universal being, which is divided into the ten categories.” As such, this would seem to be one of the few places in his *Quaestiones super Predicamenta* that foreshadows his later broadening of the notion of the transcendentals. See Wolter, *Transcendentals and Their Function*. Perhaps more interesting still is that if “possible” is “not less [common] than universal being,” which I take to mean that it is coextensive or identical with being, and if “possible” is univocal, then perhaps this too is a foreshadowing of Scotus’s later claim that “being” is univocal.

60. *Metaphysics*, Bk. V, Ch. 12 (1019a 15–1020a 6).

61. Cf. *supra*, n. 7.

62. The Latin is as follows: *divisio incipit a sic uno, quali modo unius est divisio*.

a division of one, not of a genus, but of an utterance (*vox*) into its significations, and for this reason it begins from one in this manner, namely, from one utterance (*vox*).

46. To the eighth <argument>,⁶³ I say that not every multitude⁶⁴ is reduced to a one which is not <part> of that multitude, just as the multitude of a first cause and its effects is not reduced to some one thing beyond that multitude, since in this manner it would follow that something is prior to the first. But that whole multitude is reduced to a one, which is something belonging to that multitude, to which the others are attributed as to a first cause. It is in this way in the question at hand: a multitude of substance and accident is reduced to the unity of substance, not <to the unity> of something that is beyond that multitude.

47. To the <ninth argument>⁶⁵ concerning <a quotation from> Bk. VII of the *Physics*,⁶⁶ I say that Aristotle understands <that quotation> there concerning a comparison which is <made> according to something that is participated in by each extreme according to more and less, since more and less do not constitute an equivocation.⁶⁷ But such a comparison is not according to being, but is a comparison according to the order of some things to each other. To be sure, this is the understanding <in the second quotation>:⁶⁸ accident is less being than substance, that is, in being (*in essendo*) it has an order to substance; and this comparison does not require univocity.

48. To the <tenth argument>⁶⁹ concerning the subject of the

63. Cf. *supra*, n. 8.

64. The Latin, *non omnis multitudo*, is ambiguous, depending upon whether the *non* negates "every" or "multitude." Thus it could mean that "some multitude is reduced," or that "no multitude is reduced." The latter interpretation, I think, makes more sense.

65. Cf. *supra*, n. 9.

66. *Physics*, Bk. VII, Ch. 4 (248b 9).

67. *Metaphysics*, Bk. VII, Ch. 1 (1028a 13–20).

68. The Latin has this: *Est enim intellectus*. The context makes it clear that the discussion of substance and accident refers to the quotation from the *Metaphysics*, not the one from the *Physics*. The former quotation is proof for the minor premise, whereas the latter one is proof for the major.

69. Cf. *supra*, n. 10.

Metaphysics,⁷⁰ I say that a unity of analogy in the subject suffices for the subject of a science, as it is determined in Bk. IV of the *Metaphysics*,⁷¹ namely, that all things to which the subject of a science pertains have an essential (*per se*) attribution to one primary <subject> in being and being known (*unum primum in essendo et cognoscendo*).

49. When it is shown that a subject is necessarily univocal, I say that all those authorities and proofs hold good concerning the subject of demonstration. When, however, the subject is analogous, <then> from that <subject> in itself, demonstrations are not made, but <demonstrations are made> from a first <subject> to which all other things are attributed. For in order to determine many analogates, it suffices to determine <the subject> first to which all other things are attributed, as it is said in the beginning of Bk. VII of the *Metaphysics*.⁷² Nor is it untenable concerning the subject of a science, in itself, that no attribute is shown of it when it is analogous, if, nevertheless, attributes are shown of a primary <subject> to which the others are attributed.

50. To the <eleventh argument>,⁷³ I say that Aristotle implied in his reasoning (*ratione*) that “true” is univocal to the principles of eternal things and to the eternal <things> themselves. And I also concede that the “true” that follows the character of the being (*entitatem*) of a thing in itself is univocal to all subjects and that “being” is univocal to these. But from this it does not follow that “being” is univocal to the ten genera, since all substances are under one genus.

51. Because it is accepted in the argument that “all things are causes or effects and to them ‘being’ is univocal, therefore to everything,”—I say that “cause” and “effect,” “universal” and “particular,” and many differentiae of this kind not only follow being according to its common aspect (*rationem*), but in particular, as in the same genus or in the same species, just as in generation a univocal cause and effect belong to the same species. Therefore, to the form of the argument I say that “what is said

70. Cf. *supra*, n. 10.

71. *Metaphysics*, Bk. IV, Ch. 2 (1003b16–17).

72. *Metaphysics*, Bk. VII, Ch. 1 (1028a 30–34).

73. Cf. *supra*, n. 11.

concerning cause and effect is univocal" is true when they are of the same genus, not, however, concerning every cause and effect, since <it is> not <true> concerning substance and accident.

52. To the twelfth <argument>,⁷⁴ I say that "we know principles insofar as we know the terms," as it is said in Bk. I of the *Posterior Analytics*.⁷⁵ And therefore that principle can be most known whose truth is most known in knowing the terms. Therefore, a multiplicity of terms is not repugnant to the certainty of a principle; nor is some <principle> that does not have many terms more certain, since something is not manifest by knowing the terms in this way, <i.e., by knowing that the terms do not have many meanings>.

53. To the thirteenth <argument>,⁷⁶ the major premise can be conceded, since the first object of the intellect can be understood in one act of understanding. But this is not the case with an equivocal <expression>, since in an equivocal <expression> no concept is the same, but only the utterance. To the minor premise I say that the first object of the understanding is substance. Since, as Aristotle says in the beginning of Bk. VII of the *Metaphysics*,⁷⁷ "substance is the first of all beings in the understanding," which is not understood according to a temporal priority but <according to the priority> of nature,⁷⁸ namely, because the cognition of it is the most perfect.—The authority of Avicenna can be conceded as true, such that he accepts "being" for the one significate that is first, namely, substance.

54. Or perhaps the nature (*ratio*) from which this noun "substance" is imposed is twofold, namely, subsisting (*subsistendi*) and standing under (*substandi*). "Being" (*ens*), however, is imposed from the act of being (*essendi*). But the act of being seems to be a simpler aspect (*ratio*) than the act of standing under (*substandi*). And therefore "being" first occurs to the intellect with respect to that aspect (*rationem*) from which there is an imposition of the name, since it is the most simple. But with re-

74. Cf. supra, n. 12.

75. *Posterior Analytics*, Bk. I, Ch. 3 (72b 23–25).

76. Cf. supra, n. 13.

77. *Metaphysics*, Bk. VII, Ch. 1 (1028a 32–33).

78. For a general discussion of priority, cf. infra, q. 43.

spect to the signified essence, “substance” is understood when “being” is understood primarily. This is evident in other synonymous nouns, since they signify the same essence; nevertheless, they are imposed from a different (*diversa*) aspect (*ratione*). And when the essence signified through one is understood, the essence signified through the other is understood, since it is the same. But it is not necessary that they be co-understood with regard to the aspects (*rationes*) from which the imposition of the names is <made>.

55. To the fourteenth <argument>,⁷⁹ I say that he who says “being” does not say substance or accident. But that is true if only it is understood with regard to the aspects (*rationes*) from which the names are imposed, not, however, with respect to the essences signified.

56. To the fifteenth <argument>,⁸⁰ I say that that aspect (*ratio*), from which “being” is imposed, is not one, but is equivocal in diverse <expressions> just as being is also.

57. Against this <last argument>:⁸¹ the aspect (*ratio*) of being is not the same as the aspect (*ratio*) of substance, through what was previously said, nor <is it the same as> the aspect (*ratio*) from which the name of accident is imposed, but it is simpler than each. Therefore, when <being> is included in each, each has that <one aspect> with that <other> addition. Therefore, this is common to each.

58. One can say that the aspect of being is simpler than the aspect (*ratio*) of standing under (*substandi*), and, taken equivocally, it is simpler than the aspect of an accident. And so, taken equivocally, it pertains to one and the other. And so it can be equivocal to them, although of neither is it altogether the same but <taken equivocally it> is simpler than each, since, taken univocally, it is not simpler than each.

59. Against the response to the third-to-last argument,⁸² namely, about the object of the understanding, it is argued thus: nothing is known by any faculty except that which participates in the

79. Cf. *supra*, n. 14.

81. Cf. *supra*, n. 56.

80. Cf. *supra*, n. 15.

82. Cf. *supra*, n. 54.


aspect (*rationem*) of the first object of that faculty. If, therefore, substance were the first object of the understanding, since an accident is not a substance, it would not be essentially (*per se*) understood. This is manifestly false; since an accident is essentially (*per se*) sensible, therefore it is also <essentially> understandable. The major is evident, since nothing is essentially (*per se*) seen except the colored <object> or light, nothing is essentially (*per se*) heard except sounds, and likewise concerning the others.

60. One can say that it is not necessary that every <thing that is> essentially (*per se*) understandable by some faculty receives the predication of the first object of that faculty in a straightforward way, but it suffices that it has an essential (*per se*) relation, insofar as it is known, to the first object of that faculty. For, according to Aristotle in Bk. II of *On the Soul*,⁸³ the common sensibles are essentially (*per se*) sensible by all or many senses. Nevertheless, neither is the proper object of some sense predicated of them in a straightforward way, since “number” or “figure” is neither a color nor a sound. But on this account they are essentially (*per se*) sensed, since they have an essential (*per se*) relation to the proper sensibles, insofar as they are understood, since they make a diversity in the way in which the sense is changed by the proper sensible. Thus accidents, insofar as they are known by the intellect, have an essential (*per se*) attribution to the substance, although they are not substances; for this reason it remains that they are essentially (*per se*) understood.

83. *On the Soul*, Bk. II, Ch. 64 (418a 17–20).

[QUESTION FIVE

Whether the Definition of Equivocals is Suitably Given]

T IS ASKED whether the definition of equivocals is suitably given, namely, that “equivocals are said <to be things> of which only the name is common; however, <according to the name>¹ the account² of the substance is diverse.”³

1. It seems that it is not <suitably given>:

First, on the part of the thing being defined: since it is concrete, and that <i.e., a concrete term> does not have a defini-

1. “According to the name” is not in the original formation of this question, but it is referred to in Scotus’s solution and is part of the definition as it appears in the *Aristotelis Latinus*.

2. By “account of the substance” (*ratio substantiae*), Scotus intends the “essential intellect,” which is different from the common nature. No one word, however, is entirely suitable for translating the word *ratio*. Some translate it as “meaning,” but this implies a view of language that is foreign to Scotus. The word “definition” will not work either, for the word *ratio* must cover descriptions and properties as well as definitions in the strict sense. According to Ashworth, “there was a tendency to identify [*ratio*] with an Avicennian common nature”; Ashworth, “Analogy and Equivocation in Thirteenth-Century Logic,” 105. Scotus, however, rejects the identification of *ratio substantiae* with a common nature. Ashworth often translated it as “analysis.” See Ashworth, “Analogy and Equivocation,” 100.

3. The full definition of “equivocal” is as follows: *Aequivoca dicuntur quorum nomen solum commune est, secundum nomen vero substantiae ratio diversa, ut animal homo et quod pingitur*, which, very literally, is translated as “those are said to be equivocals, of which only the name is common, but according to the name the account of the substance is diverse, as animal [is predicated] of man and of that which is painted”; *Categories*, Ch. 1 (1a 1–2).

tion, since it neither <is under> a genus, according to Aristotle in Bk. III of the *Topics*.⁴

2. Second, plural is nothing other than the singular doubled, through Priscian;⁵ therefore, "equivocals" is not other than "equivocal and equivocal." But a total joined together is not definable. Therefore, neither is that <which is> in the plural <definable>. The minor is evident, since a total joined together (*copulatum*) is not one, since the copula (*copulatio*) needs (*vult*) to be posited between diverse <things>. In this way, one can generally argue that no definition given of something in the plural is suitable.

3. Third, the genus and differentia are not posited; therefore, there is no definition. The implication is evident according to Aristotle in Bk. VI of the *Topics*⁶ and according to Boethius in his book *On Division*.⁷

4. Fourth, one can argue against a single part <of the definition as follows>. Primarily in this way: if equivocals "are said," then they are utterances, since "to be said" belongs essentially (*per se*) to an utterance. But utterances are nouns; therefore, they are not of those things that are nouns. Therefore, the first part <of the definition, i.e., "to be said of"> and the second <part of the definition>, namely, "of those things" <which have the name alone in common>, etc., are repugnant.

5. Fifth, if only the name is common, then nothing else follows after this, from an understanding of exclusion. Therefore, it is superfluous to add afterwards, "and the account of the substance is diverse."

6. Sixth, "equivocals are not defined";⁸ therefore, they do not

4. *Topics*, Bk. III, Ch. 1 (116a 23–28). The example that Aristotle gives, i.e., "a just man," does not fall within a genus, for it is neither a simple substance nor a quality, whereas the term "justice" does fall within the genus quality.

5. "Therefore, the single number is also expressed well, which, doubled and multiplied, makes all numbers"; *Institutiones grammaticae*, Bk. V, Ch. 9, n. 47 (ed. M. Hertz, I 172). Cf. also St. Thomas, "the plural is nothing except the singular doubled"; *Summa Theologica*, III, q. 67, a. 6, n. 2.

6. *Topics*, Bk. VI, Ch. 4 (141b 23–28).

7. Boethius, *Liber de divisione* (ed. Magee, p. 38; PL 64, 887D).

8. The quotation referred to is not in the Greek text but appears to be a gloss in the Latin translation of Aristotle. "There is no definition of equivocals, so a definition is of univocals alone"; *Topics*, Bk. VI, Ch. 2 (139b 30–31).

have the account of a substance, that is, <they do not have> an essential definition. Therefore, the account of their substance is neither the same nor diverse, since, nevertheless, not any of it—and this in virtue of the very name according to which they are equivocals—is posited opposite <to it> in the definition.

7. Seventh, against the example: if “animal” pertains equivocally to a man in a picture and to a true man, with equal reason any name will be equivocal to a true nature and to its similitude; and in this way every proposition would have to be distinguished, and none would be simply true. Similarly, “a painted man <is an animal>; therefore, a man <is an animal>,” seems to be a fallacy both in a certain respect and absolutely⁹ (*secundum quid et simpliciter*) and not a <fallacy> of equivocation.

8. Eighth, “man,” as an intention of species is said of it and as it is said of a supposit, only has the name in common; and it is not equivocal; therefore, etc. The proof of the first proposition <is had> by positing the definition for the name: since “rational animal” is not the species but the definition; however, “species” and “definition” are opposite intentions. The proof of the second <proposition>: if it were equivocal, then this <argument>, “man is a species, Socrates is a man, therefore, etc.”¹⁰ would not be a fallacy of a figure of speech nor of an accident, each of which is false. The implication is evident, since when there is an actual multiplicity, then by reason of the same <actuality>, there is not an imaginary multiplicity. For in this way the same <term> would signify many <things> truly and only apparently, which is to say impossible. Similarly, in a fallacy of accident, the varied term is one according to signification, since the fallacies

9. Unlike the fallacy of equivocation, which is one of the six fallacies listed by Aristotle that do depend upon language, this fallacy is one of the seven fallacies that do not depend upon language. Aristotle discusses both types of fallacies in *Sophistical Refutations*, Bk. I, Ch. 4 and 5 respectively (165b 24 ff, and 166b 37ff). According to Coffey this fallacy has no English name. “The fallacies A DICTO SECUNDUM QUID AD DICTUM SIMPLICITER, and A DICTO SIMPLICITER AD DICTUM SECUNDUM QUID, have this in common, that they confound what is true absolutely with what is true only under certain restrictions and limitations”; P. Coffey, *The Science of Logic: Method, Science, and Certitude*, vol. 2 (New York: Peter Smith, 1938), 309.

10. The conclusion to the argument is that “Socrates is a species.”

(*loci*) beyond diction¹¹ do not err against the contradiction;¹² and otherwise <the fallacy of> accident would not be the “most apt” to deceive among the sophistical fallacies (*loci*) beyond diction.¹³ Therefore, by reason of the same <actuality>, equivocation and figure of speech are not in the same paralogism, nor are equivocation and fallacy of accident. Therefore, equivocation is not <suitably defined>.

9. To the opposite is Aristotle.

[1. THE RESPONSE TO THE QUESTION]

10. To the question one must say that this description is given suitably enough concerning equivocated equivocals.¹⁴ It must be understood that when equivocation is actively expressed, it expresses a relation of one <thing> that functions (*in ratione*) as a sign to many that function (*in ratione*) as significates, and the passive is the other way around. And in this way equivocal includes a double relation, both <when it is> taken actively and <when it is taken> passively:¹⁵ namely, a relation to the <utter-

11. In the *Sophistical Refutations*, Ch. 1 (165a 2–5), Aristotle lists thirteen different types of fallacies, which he divides into two main groups: those *in dictione*, i.e., due to an ambiguity in language, and those *extra dictionem*, those from sources other than an ambiguity in language. Here, the phrase *loci extra dictionem* refers to the fallacies from sources other than an ambiguity in language.

12. A univocal term is such that the contrary of a true statement produces a contradiction, i.e., it errs against a contradiction, whereas in an equivocal statement, two apparently contradictory statements could both be true since the term is used in different senses. For example, “dog is a living substance,” and “dog is not a living substance,” while contradictory in nature, are both true if the term “dog” is taken equivocally. Since the fallacies beyond diction, *extra dictionem*, such as the fallacy of accident, are not due to any ambiguity in language and are one in signification, i.e., are univocal, then they do not err against the contradiction.

13. *Sophistical Refutations*, Ch. 1 (165a 2–5).

14. “In the thirteenth century, a special vocabulary was developed to deal with the issue of equivocal words as opposed to equivocal things. A thing was called *aequivocum aequivocatum*, and a word was called *aequivocum aequivocans*, with parallels for univocals.” Ashworth, “Analogy and Equivocation,” 98.

15. Pini explains the passive relation thus: “when something is said to be equivocal, it is considered according to two relations. According to a first relation,

ance> equivocating, which is a relation of supposition;¹⁶ and a relation to another equivocate, which is a relation of equivalence. For “heavenly star” is not said <to be> equivocal to “dog,” but a heavenly star or a barking animal are equivocates. This double relation is evident by analyzing the name “equivocal,” that is, “equally called”:¹⁷ by reason of the first part it is said to <be related to> another that is equal to it; by reason of the second <part, a relation> is expressed to the <one> calling.

11. Therefore, on account of the relation of equality, the description is given in the plural, just as other relatives of this kind are defined in Bk. V of the *Metaphysics*.¹⁸ “similar,” “dissimilar,” “contrary,” etc.—On account of the other relation, the correlative of the <thing> defined¹⁹ is posited, in the relation by which it is said to it: *of which*, as of the significates, *only the name is common*, as the sign; and through the following, namely, *the account of the substance <is> diverse*,²⁰ the differentia of the equivocates is posited. And “account” is not taken there for a definition from the genus and the differentia, since the first genera, which do not have such an account, are equivocates in this name “being.” But the *account of the substance*, that is, the essential understanding, is diverse.²¹ And since those things equivocated in one

such a thing is related to the other things equivocally signified by the same name. According to a second relation, such a thing is related to the name signifying it.” Pini, *Categories and Logic in Duns Scotus*, 173.

16. The Latin is *suppositionis*, which literally means “of signifying something.”

17. The Latin word *equivocum* can be broken down into *aeque*, which literally means “equally,” and *vocatum*, which means “called.”

18. *Metaphysics*, Bk. V, Ch. 9–10 (1018a 15–19, 26–32).

19. “The correlative of the thing defined” is the name that is common to the equivocates.

20. It should be pointed out that the use of “substance” in the phrase *ratio substantiae* is not intended to restrict the scope to a discussion of substances, but that it is taken for anything that could be referred to a second intention, in which case it more closely signifies an essence as opposed to the genus of corporeal things. See Ashworth, “Analogy and Equivocation in Thirteenth-Century Logic,” 104.

21. According to Pini, the expression *ratio substantiae* raises “some problems. Scotus interprets such an expression as meaning ‘essential intellect,’ namely the concept that our intellect forms about the essence of something.” See Pini, *Categories and Logic in Duns Scotus*, 173.

name are able to be univocal in another <name> and then to have the same account, for this reason *according to that name* is added; that is, the essential understanding of the equivocates is diverse insofar as an equivocating <term> is said of them, although in some univocating <term> the essential understanding of them may be the same.

12. If, however, it is said that “are said” is posited for “are conceived,” that is, <if> they are <taken to be> concepts, and <if> some concept is of the essence of the equivocates:—one can say that this is a true definition, and that through the first part <of the definition> “are said” the genus is posited; through the rest, the correlative of the thing defined and its differentia.

[II. TO THE PRINCIPAL ARGUMENTS]

13. To the first argument,²² I say that a concrete <term> has a genus and differentia with respect to which <genus and differentia> it is what it is (*quorum est quid*), although with respect to its substance it may be denominative and concrete;²³ since, according to Aristotle,²⁴ <one> is to discover what something is (*“quid” est*) in every genus, and in this way, it can be defined through those <notes> of its own genus.—Or one can say that it is a description; and the concept, which is understood through “<these> are said,” is not of the essence of an equivocate but is its subject.

14. To the second <argument>,²⁵ one can say that all relatives of equivalence are suitably defined in the plural, as is evident in Bk. V of the *Metaphysics*,²⁶ where many nouns of this kind are defined, namely, relatives, and all in the plural, since in this way

22. Cf. *supra*, n. 1.

23. The substance in question is a “just man,” which was referred to in the initial objection. As a compound phrase, it is unable to be defined, since it is neither a substance nor a quality. Scotus’s solution, however, is that a just man is a concrete particular, in one sense falling under the genus of substance, and, in another sense, denominatively named “just” from the quality of justice.

24. *Topics*, Bk. I, Ch. 9 (103b 35–39).

25. Cf. *supra*, n. 2.

26. Cf. *supra*, fn. 18.

the understanding of them is more perfect insofar as it names each extreme. What Priscian said of the plural, however, must be understood of the nature of the construction, not with respect to the unity of the signified form.

15. To the third <argument>,²⁷ it must be conceded that it is not a true definition. Or one can say that in the definition of a concrete accident,²⁸ the subject ought to be posited first, as here “name <or noun> is an utterance”;²⁹ and it is <to be understood> in this way in the proposition.

16. To the fourth <argument>,³⁰ I say that the definition is given of the equivocates, and it does not follow that “these are said, therefore these are utterances”; for a concept is expressed through an utterance. Therefore, if two <people> express the same concept through diverse utterances, we say that they express the same thing. Or “they are said” can be explained, that is, “they are conceived.”

17. To the <fifth argument>,³¹ one can say that from the fact that “only the name is common” it does not follow that “therefore the account of the substance is diverse.” Since even if it follows that “the account of the substance is not common,” nevertheless it does not follow that “the account of the substance is diverse.”

18. Or otherwise, although it may follow <that “the account of the substance is diverse”>, one can say that “only” refers (*refertur*) to the <utterance> equivocating, to which the <thing>

27. Cf. *supra*, n. 3.

28. The comparison of “equivocals” to the definition of a “concrete accident” is unclear. It could refer to n. 12, where the “are said” of the definition of equivocals is taken to mean “are conceived,” i.e., as “concepts.” If so, then the “concrete accident” would have to refer to the fact that a concept is a concrete accident insofar as it inheres in a particular person. On the other hand, it could also refer to the example cited in n. 13, i.e., to a “just man,” which is a concrete accidental term that is a denominative, where denominative terms are a species of equivocal terms. The definition of a “name” as an “utterance” suggests that the former alternative is what Scotus intends.

29. Literally, Scotus has *nomen est*, which could be translated as “a noun is an utterance,” or “a noun is a word.” Cf. Aristotle, *On Interpretation*, Ch. 2 (16a 19–21).

30. Cf. *supra*, n. 4.

31. Cf. *supra*, n. 5.

defined refers (*refertur*) according to a relation of supposition; and the following <part>, namely, "the account of the substance <is> diverse," is referred to the equivocates in themselves. And in this way they do not pertain to the same <thing>.

19. Otherwise, more to the point, one must say that equivocates have a diverse account according to the name equivocating, that is, insofar as they are being equivocated (*aequivocantur*) in that <name>; but the equivocating <names> do not have another account.³²

20. To the sixth <argument>,³³ one must say that this intention "equivocals," as it is taken for the equivocates, is univocal, and so it can be defined, although those in which this intention inheres, are not univocal nor definable.³⁴ Just as this intention "the most general <genus>" is definable, and is defined by Porphyry, although substance, or another <genus> in which this intention inheres, is not defined.

21. To the seventh <argument>,³⁵ one can say that he does not understand this name "animal" to be equivocal to a true man and to a picture. But if it were, it would be manifest there that only the name would be common and not any account. Just as generally he does not care much about the examples except that they are true as they are to the proposition, so that his art may be true in them.

22. To the last <argument>,³⁶ one can say that a term is not equivocal to diverse acceptances of it,³⁷ since it neither signifies nor consignifies those <acceptances>. Nor is it absolutely univocal as it is taken under those <diverse acceptances>, since

32. The Latin has *aequivocantia non habent aliam rationem*, which I take to mean that the activity or relation of equivocating does not have another definition.

33. Cf. *supra*, n. 6.

34. Simplicius "gave rise to the common sophism, 'Equivocals are univocals,' which could be solved by pointing out that each word correctly classified as equivocal is a member of the class of things falling under one univocal term, namely 'equivocal'"; Ashworth, "Analogy and Equivocation," 98.

35. Cf. *supra*, n. 7.

36. Cf. *supra*, n. 8.

37. "To diverse acceptances of it" has to do with the diverse acceptances of supposition, namely, with whether a term has personal, simple, or material supposition.


there is not one account of man according to which "species" is truly predicated of it and according to which it is predicated of Socrates.

23. Against this <solution>: every predicate is univocal, equivocal, or denominative; but "man" is not essentially (*per se*) predicated univocally nor equivocally of an intention and of a supposit; therefore, it is <predicated> denominatively. This is false, since it is predicated essentially (*in quid*) of the supposit.

24. To this <objection>, one can say that whatever is predicated of some one <thing> is univocal, equivocal, or denominative in respect to it. But not whatever is predicated of many is <univocal, equivocal, or denominative> in respect to many, behaving in some one of these three ways. But with respect to one, <it is predicated> in one way, and with respect to another, in another way. Just as "colored" is not predicated in one mode of a body and of white, but of white univocally and essentially (*in quid*), and of a body denominatively. Thus whatever name is predicated univocally of the supposit, <is predicated> truly of the intention in none of the ways said, since the predication is accidental, or at least it is reduced to a denominative predication.

[QUESTION SIX

Whether the Definition of Univocals is Good]

T IS ASKED whether the definition of univocals is suitable, namely, this <definition>: “Univocals are <those things> the name of which is common and the account of the substance is the same.”¹

1. One can argue that it is not <suitable> according to the first three arguments in the preceding question.²—And <these arguments> are solved in a similar manner just as they are solved there.³

2. Likewise, “white” is predicated of a man and of a horse according to the same account; for otherwise it would be equivocal. And nevertheless it is not a univocal predicate with regard to them, since it is denominative. One can make a similar point about every denominative predicate, and, most <of all>, of intentions, since this predicate “genus” is said according to the same account of substance and of quantity, and nevertheless it is not univocal, since it is denominative. And univocal and denominative are opposite ways of predicating, just as univocal and equivocal <are opposite ways of predicating>.

3. Second,⁴ all equivocals have the same name,⁵ namely, the

1. *Categories*, Ch. 1 (1a 6–11).

2. Cf. *supra*, q. 5 nn. 1–3.

3. The first three arguments alluded to are the first three arguments of question 5. Having solved, however, these similar arguments in q. 5, nn. 13–15, Scotus immediately dismisses them here.

4. Although in one sense, this is the third argument, it is only the second original argument. As a result, in n. 13 Scotus refers to this as the second argument.

5. *Categories*, Ch. 1 (1a 1–5).

name “equivocals,” and the same account of the substance, that is, an essential <account>, according to that name, namely, the account of equivocals. Therefore, if the definition said <of equivocals> were suitable, <then> all equivocals would be univocals, which is false, since opposite is predicated of opposite.

4. Third, those <things>, of which the essential substance is the same, are the same essentially. But univocated univocals have the same account of a univocating substance. Therefore, all univocates would be the same essentially, which is false, since in this way man and a donkey would be the same essentially.

5. To the opposite is Aristotle.⁶

[1. THE RESPONSE TO THE QUESTION]

6. It must be said that the description is suitable, and one can suitably understand univocates in this way: Univocates *are those <things> of which*, not as of the significates, *the name* of the univocating <term> *is common*. Since that name does not signify something univocal, but <the things> *of which*, as of the contents under the univocating <term>, *the name* of the univocating <term> *is common, and <of which> the account of the substance* of the univocates *<is> the same*, according to that univocating name. And then no univocating univocal is denominative with regard to the same <thing>, since the account of a denominative is not a substantial account of the denominates.

7. Similarly, one can understand univocating <univocals> in this way: Univocating <univocals> *are <those things> of which the name*, as the part of the whole, *is common* to the univocates, *and the account of the univocating substance <is> the same* as the univocates *according to that name*. The definition of equivocals, however, was not able to be understood of equivocating <things>, since they do not have a name, since nothing is equivocating except only the utterance. Similarly, they do not have any definition; therefore, they <have> neither a diverse <definition> nor the same <definition>. But neither of these <problems> impedes this definition from being understood of univocating

6. *Categories*, Ch. 1 (1a 6–8).

<things>, since they have a name (since not only the name univocates), and they have the same account of the substance.

8. Nevertheless, Aristotle seems to understand more of univocates. For he says:⁷ “for example, man <is> an animal, and cow <is an animal>.”⁸ For both animals are called by a common name,” which is manifestly said of the univocates. And he adds of “the same account”: “if anyone assigns the account of each, what they are, in that they are animals, he will assign the same account of each”; which similarly is manifestly referred to the univocates.

[II. TO THE PRINCIPAL ARGUMENTS]

9. To the first argument,⁹ it is said that no denominative <term> has the account of a substance <i.e., an essential account> with regard to that thing with respect to which it is a denominative <term>, although in its own genus it can have the account of a substance <i.e., it can have an essential account>.¹⁰ And for this reason no denominative <term> is predicated <of a substance> according to the same account <of a substance, i.e., as an essential account>.¹¹

7. *Categories*, Ch. 1 (1a 9–12).

8. The Latin is as follows: *ut animal, homo atque bos*, which literally is translated as “just as animal, man and cow.”

9. Cf. *supra*, n. 2.

10. Traditionally, a denominative term is an accidental term, such as “grammarian,” which either primarily signifies an accident, such as “grammar,” and secondarily signifies an underlying substance, or vice versa. Thus, Scotus argues that no denominative term can be predicated essentially of a substance. Since “grammarian,” however, primarily signifies grammar, there can be an essential definition of it within its own, primary genus, i.e., as an accident. Scotus will, however, propose a new solution to the question of the signification of denominative terms in q. 8.

11. It must be remembered here that the phrase “according to the same account” is part of the definition of “univocal.” Thus, Scotus argues that no denominative term is predicated of something according to the same account of the substance. For it is not the case that the account of “white” is different, i.e., not the same, when one says that “a man is white” and “a horse is white.” Indeed, in these examples, the account of “white” is the same in both predicates; however, it is predicated of their subjects denominatively. Likewise, when one says that “substance is a genus” and “quantity is a genus,” the predicate “genus”

10. Against this <argument>: A denominative <term> does not receive more and less except with regard to the subject with respect to which it is a denominative <predicate>. But in Bk. III of the *Topics*,¹² <where he> concludes that an accident <is said> of something according to more and less, Aristotle teaches <us> to pay attention to the definition of the accident which receives more of the account of the proposition (that is, <the account> of the accident); for example, a whiter <thing> is that which is a colored <object> that disperses the vision more.¹³ Therefore, a denominative <term>, with regard to that with respect to which it is a denominative <predicate>, does have the account <of a substance; i.e., it is an essential account>.¹⁴

11. Proof of the first proposition: In the chapter "On Difference," Porphyry says: "The being (*esse*) of each thing,¹⁵ however, is one and the same, permitting neither increase nor decrease"—that is, the essence of anything consists in <something> indivisible. For he adduces that proposition to prove

has the same account in both sentences, even though it is not predicated univocally. For the definition of the predicate is not applicable to the subject. In fact, there is no subject that can have a second intention predicated of it univocally, which is why it becomes necessary to distinguish between personal and simple supposition. In the sentence "man is an animal" the subject has personal supposition, whereas in the sentence "man is a species" the subject has simple supposition.

12. *Topics*, Bk. III, Ch. 5 (119a 29–32).

13. In this example, the definition of "whiter" is "that which more greatly disperses the vision"; hence Scotus's argument is that the definition of "whiter" is directly related to the substance and thus would be the account of the substance. Cf. *infra*, q. 30–36, nn. 94–113 and q. 42, n. 8.

14. The conclusion of paragraph 10, which is literally "that a denominative term does have an account," is meant to contradict the preceding question, where Scotus argues that "no denominative [term] has the account of a substance." There is, however, a textual variant that has *rationem substantiae*, and the context suggests that the force of Scotus's conclusion is that "a denominative term does not have the account of a substance."

15. The Latin has *unicuique*, which is in the dative case and would literally be translated as "being [*esse*], however, is one and the same for each thing." One of the textual variations, however, does have *uniuscuiusque*, which is also more faithful to Porphyry's quotation. "The being of each thing is one and the same and permits neither increase nor decrease, while being hook-nosed or snub-nosed or colored in a particular way is both increased and decreased"; *Isagoge*, Ch. "On Difference" (AL I⁶ 16; ed. Busse, 9.21–23).

that the differentia does not receive more and less, with regard to that of which it is an essential (*per se*) differentia. Therefore, a denominative <term> in its own genus, insofar as it is a “what” in itself in its own genus, does not receive more and less; therefore, <it receives more and less> only in comparison to the subject which it denominates.

12. One can say otherwise to the first argument that man and horse are not univocates under white—neither are any other <things univocates> under some denominative predicate—since “univocals are <those things> the name of which is common, and the account of whose univocating substance is the same,”¹⁶ which account is for them “the account of a substance,” even though <it is> not proper <to them>.¹⁷ The account of any single denominative, however, is not the account of a denominated substance. But since the account may be of the denominative, which is predicated according to the same name and according to the same account of the denominating substance, for this reason it must be said that the definition of the univocating <things> ought to be understood in this way: “and the account of the substance <is> the same,” which account is essential to the univocates; which is not true of a denominative <term>. For, according to Aristotle a little lower in the chapter “On Substance”:¹⁸ “white is predicated of body, but it is impossible to predicate the account of white of that <body>,” because in this way it would be understood that that account <of white> would be the account of body.

13. To the second argument,¹⁹ one can say two things. In one way <one can reply> by conceding the conclusion that all equivocals are univocals. Nor is opposite predicated of opposite except perhaps in a relative <sense>.

16. Cf. *supra*, n. 9.

17. To say that “Socrates is living” and “a dog is living” is to predicate “living” univocally of both Socrates and a dog, since it is within the genus of substance. “Living,” however, is not the proximate genus of either subject, and hence it is not proper to them.

18. *Categories*, Ch. 5 (2a 32–34).

19. Cf. *supra*, n. 3.

14. Or otherwise one can say that it does not follow that "equivocals have the common name 'equivocal' and the same substantial account of this <name, i.e., of 'equivocal'>, therefore they have the same name and the same account," but this is a fallacy in a certain respect and absolutely. This is because to have this account as the same is to have a diverse account absolutely and the same one in some respect, just as to coincide in a differentia is to coincide in some respect and to differ absolutely.

15. To the third <argument>,²⁰ I say that those of which the proper and complete account of the substance is the same are themselves the same; but of <things> univocated, there is not the same proper account, although the account of the thing univocating is the same to them, since that is proper to no univocate.

20. Cf. *supra*, n. 4.

[QUESTION SEVEN

Whether a Genus is
Univocal with Regard
to Its Species]



THIS IS ASKED about the example that Aristotle¹ gives to illustrate the account of univocals (“for example, man is an animal, and cow <is an animal>”), whether the genus is univocal with regard to its species.

1. It seems that it is not:

Since, according to Aristotle in Book VII of the *Physics*,² “a comparison can be made according to a univocal <term>”; but, according to him in the same place,³ “a comparison is not made according to a genus”; therefore, etc.⁴

2. Second, if the genus were univocal, the unity of the genus would be as great as the unity of the species. The consequent is false, according to Aristotle (in Bk. V of the *Metaphysics*, in the chapter on “One”), who says that “one in species implies one in genus and not the other way around”; therefore, the antecedent is false.⁵ Proof of the implication: a species is not one in existing (rather, it is as manifold as its supposits, since it exists only in its supposits), but it is only one according to the definition and the one object of the intellect. But a genus has both of these unities, given that it is univocal. Therefore, etc.

1. *Categories*, Ch. 1 (1a 6–7).

2. *Physics*, Bk. VII, Ch. 4 (248b 6–9). The critical edition has the following footnote: *Sola univoca et non aequivoca sunt comparabilia*, that is, “only univocals and not equivocals are comparable [or commensurable].”

3. *Physics*, Bk. VII, Ch. 4 (249a 3–8).

4. The conclusion is: “the genus is not univocal with regard to the species.”

5. *Metaphysics*, Bk. V, Ch. 6 (1016b 32–1017a 6).

3. Third, what is univocal with regard to many is not in itself (*secundum se*) diverse in them. But a genus is in itself diverse in diverse species, and not accidentally, so according to Aristotle in Bk. X of the *Metaphysics*⁶ (in the chapter <beginning with> “Diverse <things>, however, in themselves”). Therefore, etc.⁷ The major⁸ is evident, since then the genus would be one and many in the species according to the same <thing>.

4. Fourth, a genus predicated of any species predicates the whole which is that species; therefore, just as no species is univocal with regard to diverse species, so neither is a genus <univocal with regard to diverse species>. And this is confirmed according to Aristotle in Bk. VII of the *Metaphysics*.⁹ “a genus is nothing beyond its species, or if it is <something>, it is so as matter”; therefore, it does not predicate <anything different> from these.

5. To the opposite is Aristotle.

6. Second, otherwise the genus would not be posited in the definition of any species—just as an equivocal is not posited in the definition of equivocals—since in Bk. VI of the *Topics* and in Bk. VII of the *Metaphysics* Aristotle says: “the genus must be posited in every definition.”¹⁰

7. Third, in equivocals, there is no prior nor posterior, since only the utterance is common; but the genus is prior to the species; therefore, etc.

[1. THE RESPONSE TO THE QUESTION]

8. It must be said that the genus is a univocal predicate with regard to its species, since it is predicated of them according

6. *Metaphysics*, Bk. X, Ch. 8 (1057b 35–1058a 2).

7. The conclusion is: “a genus is not univocal.”

8. The major premise is the statement: “what is univocal with regard to many is not in itself diverse with regard to them,” while the minor is: “a genus is in itself diverse with regard to diverse species.”

9. *Metaphysics*, Bk. VII, Ch. 12 (1038a 5–7).

10. *Topics*, Bk. VI, Ch. 4 (141b 25–28), and *Metaphysics*, Bk. VII, Ch. 12 (1037b 30–31).

to the same name and according to the same account, which account or definition is the account of the substance for these species, although <it is> not proper <to them>, since the genus is predicated essentially (*in quid*) of them, according to Porphyry.¹¹

9. <Whence the univocation of the genus is taken>—But since some unity in the thing corresponds to every univocal <term> —otherwise, something would be univocal with regard to an accident and a substance—there is a doubt as to what that one<ness> in the thing is from which the univocation of the genus is taken.

10. And one can say that all <things> belonging to one genus have some kind of agreement in substance among them, which they do not have with regard to other <things> belonging to other genera. This is known from the identity of an operation or of an attribute in the singulars. That <genus> is imperfect and potential <with regard to> its species, since diverse species have diverse perfecting forms. Therefore, something material in every species—whether it is the matter or an incomplete form existing in all <the species> of this genus and not of another <genus>—which is the principle of some operation or of an attribute in them, is that one<ness> in the thing. Since that which the intellect considers (not as in this <particular thing>), it considers that <thing> in itself to be essentially in different <things according to> species, and it attributes to it the intention of a genus—and just as much as the genus is more common, to the same degree is there less unity in the thing. And in this way the noun “of genus” in its own primary understanding implies something that is material in the species, yet according to the mode of the whole, as was said previously.¹²

11. Porphyry, *Isagoge*, Ch. “On Genus” (AL I⁶ 6–7; ed. Busse, 2.15–16).

12. Above in this paragraph. Cf. also Duns Scotus, *Super Porphyrii*, q. 16, n. 36.

[II. TO THE PRINCIPAL ARGUMENTS]

11. To the first <argument>,¹³ I say that a comparison is not made according to every univocal, but only according to an indivisible species, that is, <according to> the most specific <species>, as it is said there.¹⁴—Or otherwise,¹⁵ <I say> that according to the logician every univocal expresses that which arrives at the intellect through one account, according to which it is said of many; according to the natural <philosopher>, every <term> is not such, but only what is one according to the ultimate, perfecting form. Therefore, it is said in Bk. VII of the *Physics*: “Many equivocations are latent in the genus,”¹⁶ which the logician, however, would not say. Therefore, if it is said that “a comparison is made according to every univocal,” this must be understood only of a univocal according to the natural <philosopher>, which is only the most specific species, not of every univocal according to the logician, in which way the genus is univocal.

12. To the second <argument>,¹⁷ I say that the unity in the thing from which the univocation of the species is taken, is greater than <the unity> from which <the univocation> of the genus <is taken>. The reason is that there <in the species>, there is the unity of a perfecting form, whereas here <in the genus> there is only <the unity> of some material and incomplete <form>. Therefore, to the form <of the argument>, I say that there is one genus <with respect to> the two unities of the species that are enumerated there,¹⁸ but the third <unity>,¹⁹ in which the species exceeds the genus, is omitted.

13. Cf. *supra*, n. 1.

14. *Physics*, Bk. VII, Ch. 4 (249a 15–17); cf. also Duns Scotus, *Metaphysics*, Bk. VII, q. 13 nn. 73–75; *Lectura* II d. 3 p. 1 a. 1 n. 18; *Ordinatio* II d. 3 p. 1 q. 1 n. 16.

15. Cf. Duns Scotus, *Super Porphyrii*, q. 7–8 n. 12; cf. also Thomas Aquinas, *Physics*, VII Lecture 7, n. 9.

16. *Physics*, Bk. VII, Ch. 4 (249a 22–25).

17. Cf. *supra*, n. 2.

18. “There” refers to the second argument, where it was objected that the genus, provided that it is univocal, has a unity according to its definition and a unity as it is an object of the intellect.

19. Cf. Duns Scotus, *Super Porphyrii*, q. 25 n. 20.

13. To the third <argument>,²⁰ I say that there is an equivocation there <in that argument>, since “in itself” (*secundum se*) can be taken effectively or solitarily, as “essentially” (*per se*) is taken in the third way,²¹ or by excluding another cause; and in all these ways, the major <premise> is true and the minor is false.²² In another way “in itself” is taken as it is taken in Bk. V of the *Metaphysics*,²³ namely, as it is opposed to “accidentally,” which brings together diverse essences in itself (*in se*), such as “white man”; and then being in itself is anything having one essence. In this way, the major is false and the minor is true. And Aristot-

20. Cf. *supra*, n. 3.

21. Cf. *Posterior Analytics*, Bk. I, Ch. 4 (73b 5–10). “[It] should be noted that this preposition *per* [‘in virtue of’ or ‘by’] denotes a causal relationship, although sometimes it signifies a state, as when someone is said to be *per se*, i.e., by himself, when he is alone. But when it designates a relationship to a cause, sometimes the cause is formal, as when it is stated that the body lives in virtue of the soul; sometimes the relationship is to a material cause, as when it is stated that a body is colored in virtue of its surface, i.e., because the surface is the subject of color; again, it might even designate a relationship to an extrinsic cause, particularly an efficient cause, as when it is said that water is made hot in virtue of fire. But just as this preposition *per* designates a relationship to a cause, when something extrinsic is the cause of that which is attributed to the subject, so also when the subject or something pertaining to the subject is the cause of that which is attributed to the subject. This latter is what *per se*, i.e., in virtue of itself, signifies.... Therefore, the first way of saying something *per se* (73a 34) is when that which is attributed to a subject pertains to its *form*.... The second mode of saying *per se* is when this preposition *per* implies a relationship of material cause.... Then (73b 5) he sets down another mode of that which is *per se*, i.e., the sense in which it signifies something in isolation. Thus something which is a singular in the genus of substance and which is not predicated of any subject is said to be *per se*. The reason for this is that when I say, ‘walking’ or ‘white,’ I do not signify either of them as something isolated or apart, since something else which is walking or white is understood.... It should be noted, however, that this mode is not a mode of predicating, but a mode of existing; hence at the very start he said that they *exist per se* and not that they are *said per se*.... Then (73b 10) he gives the fourth mode, according to which the preposition *per* designates a relationship of efficient cause or of any other”; Thomas Aquinas, *Posterior Analytics* (Bk. I, lect. 10); for the English trans., see Thomas Aquinas, *Commentary on Aristotle’s Posterior Analytics*, trans. Larcher, I, lect. 10 (New York: Magi Books, 1961).

22. Thus, “what is univocal to many is not in itself diverse to them” is true, while the minor, “a genus is in itself diverse to diverse species,” is false.

23. *Metaphysics*, Bk. V, Ch. 6 (1015b 16–20).


tle understands <it> in this way in Bk. X of the *Metaphysics*, since a genus is diverse through its differentiae, which differentiae are not accidental to the <genus>, since the differentiae with the genus do not make <a thing> one accidentally, but <they make it> one essentially.

14. To the fourth <argument>,²⁴ it is evident that the first proposition, namely, “a genus predicates the whole,” must be understood in this way, namely: “<a genus predicates the whole> materially through the mode of the whole,” which in itself is one; nevertheless, <the genus> is formally diversified in the species. And in this way the unity of the genus is in itself greater than <the unity> of the species, insofar as they differ through the differentia, since there is not any differentia in the understanding of the genus, but conversely.

24. Cf. *supra*, n. 4.

[QUESTION EIGHT

Whether a Denominative Signifies the Same as an Abstract]

 CONCERNING the definition of denominatives, it is asked whether they differ by ending alone,¹ that is, in regard to the subject by only declining <away> from the principal <cases> from which they have denomination, or whether they also differ in their significates.² And this is to investigate whether a denominative <term> signifies the same as an ab-

1. Although literal, “ending alone” is perhaps misleading. A denominative term is one that is derived from another term, as “grammarian” is derived from “grammar.” In Greek and Latin, a denominative term, such as “good person,” is often formed from the abstract term “good” simply by changing the gender from neuter to masculine. To capture the meaning in English, the question might better be paraphrased as “it is asked whether the two terms differ by spelling alone, that is, by changing the spelling from the abstract noun in regard to the subject from which a denominative term is formed, or whether the two terms differ in their significates.”

2. Sten Ebbesen provides the following two columns and an explanation of the controversy regarding denominatives:

<i>a</i>	<i>b</i>
GOOD (<i>to agathon</i>)	good person (<i>ho agathos</i>)
JUSTICE (<i>dikaiosyne</i>)	just person (<i>ho dikaios</i>)

Column *a* contains names of absolute entities. The higher entity is the genus of the lower. Column *b* contains the names of entities which participate in the absolute entities of Column *a*. If, as in the case of the just person, they have a name that is cognate with that of the absolute entity in which they participate, they are said to be *paronyma* (Latin: *denominativa*) from it. No Column *b* entity is a genus, nor is it *in* a genus. “Good” is a genus, and justice is in that genus, being precisely (or essentially: *hoper*) good. “Good person” is not a genus, and “just person” is in no genus — the just person is not “precisely good.” Similarly, whiteness is in the genus “color,” but the white man is not. In the Latin tradition entities of type *a* came to be called *abstracta*; those of type *b*, *concreta*, i.e., “combined” or “mixed”; Ebbesen, “Concrete Accidental Terms,” 109.

stract <term>, namely, <whether it signifies> only the form, or something else as the subject.³

1. And it seems that it signifies the subject:⁴

For, according to Aristotle in Bk. I of *On Interpretation* in the chapter "On the Verb," to signify <something> is to establish an understanding <of it>;⁵ but a spoken, concrete noun establishes an understanding of the subject; therefore, it signifies that <subject>. Proof of the minor: it establishes an understanding of an accident, and it is impossible for an <accident> to be understood without its subject: first, since it is impossible <for an accident> to exist without a subject, and "as each thing is with respect to being, so is it with respect to truth," that is, to a true cognition, according to Aristotle in Bk. II of the *Metaphysics*.⁶ Second, since, according to Aristotle in Bk. VII of the *Metaphysics*,⁷ "substance is the first of all <things> in the cognition." Therefore, nothing is signified without that <subject>. Through this <argument>, it is also proved that the subject is signified primarily, since the <subject> is primarily understood by a spoken utterance, since an accident cannot be understood without a <subject being understood>, and the <subject> is prior in cognition to the accident, according to Aristotle in Bk. VII of the *Metaphysics*.⁸

2. Second, a term signifies the same <thing> that it supposits;⁹ but a concrete accidental term supposits <as> a subject; therefore, etc. The major is evident: since a suppositing term, by the fact that it supposits, does not have a new significate. The

3. The question is whether denominatives differ by case alone, and hence signify only the form, or whether they also differ in their significates and hence signify the subject as well as the form.

4. That is, it seems that it does not signify the form alone.

5. The Latin is as follows: ... *et significant aliquid—constituit enim qua dicit intellectum, et qua audit quiesci*; see *On Interpretation*, Ch. 3 (16b 20–21).

6. *Metaphysics*, Bk. II, Ch. 1 (993b 28–31).

7. *Metaphysics*, Bk. VII, Ch. 1 (1028a 31–33).

8. *Metaphysics*, Bk. VII, Ch. 1 (1028a 37–b 3).

9. An alternate translation would be: "a term signifies the same thing that it stands for." For example, in the statement "Socrates is a man," the subject term both signifies an individual and stands for him in the statement.

proof of the minor is according to Aristotle in Bk. I of the *Posterior Analytics*.¹⁰ this is accidental: "<the> white <thing> is a log," since that which is signified, to which white is accidental, is a log; therefore, that <thing> to which white is accidental, as a subject, is suppositus there through "white."

3. Third, a name and the definition signify the same <thing>, according to Aristotle in Bk. IV of the *Metaphysics*.¹¹ "the account (*ratio*) which the name signifies is the definition": but the definition of a concrete <thing> has in itself a subject and accident; therefore, the name signifies these <i.e., a subject and accident>. The minor is evident according to Aristotle in Bk. VII of the *Metaphysics*, who says that an accident is defined through a substance.¹²

4. Fourth, an exclusive expression excludes everything that is essentially (*per se*) beyond the significate of the term; but <when an exclusive expression> is added to a concrete term, it does not exclude the subject; therefore, etc. Proof of the minor: when it is said thus, "only white runs," a body is not excluded from running, since it is included. Proof: it follows that "only white runs; therefore, white runs," and furthermore "therefore, a body runs"; therefore, from first to last, and so the body is not excluded.

5. Fifth, this is seen through the authority of the Commentator, <in his commentary> on Bk. I of the *Physics*, where he says that "a concrete name signifies the form and the <thing> susceptible <of the form>";¹³ and <in his commentary> on Bk. XII of the *Metaphysics*, the Commentator says that it signifies both.¹⁴

6. Sixth, in Bk. VII of the *Metaphysics*,¹⁵ Aristotle says that in accidental expressions, "that which is" is not the same with that to which it belongs "on account of it signifying two things, as musician and white"; therefore, <denominative terms> of this kind signify two.

10. *Posterior Analytics*, Bk. I, Ch. 22 (83a 5-9).

11. *Metaphysics*, Bk. IV, Ch. 7 (1012a 23-23).

12. *Metaphysics*, Bk. VII, Ch. 5 (1031a 1-4).

13. Averroes, *Physica* I com. 25 (ed. Iuntina, IV f. 9rb).

14. Averroes, *Metaph.* XII com. 39 (ed. Iuntina, VIII f. 152vb).

15. *Metaphysics*, Bk. VII, Ch. 6 (1031b 21-25).

7. To the opposite is Aristotle. Here <i.e., in the *Categories*> it is said that “denominative <terms> differ by ending alone” from the principal <names>;¹⁶ therefore, <they do> not <differ> in significate; but abstract <terms> do not signify subjects, since then they would not be in any genus; therefore, neither <do> denominative <terms signify subjects>.

8. Second, a little lower in the chapter “On Substance,”¹⁷ he says that “white signifies only quality.”

9. Third, <in his commentary> on Bk. V of the *Metaphysics*, the Commentator says that Aristotle has decided that it <i.e., a denominative> only signifies the form.¹⁸ And the reason for this is that otherwise there would be a vain repetition by adding an accident with a subject, which seems untenable. The implication is evident, since by positing the account (*ratio*) of a concrete <term> in place of a name, the same subject would be said twice.

10. Fourth, if a concrete <term> signifies a subject, then this <predication> “<the> white <thing> is a log” would be essential (*secundum se*); since the subject, with respect to its own significate, would naturally supposit <as that significate>. The consequent, however, is false according to Aristotle in Bk. I of the *Posterior Analytics*.¹⁹

11. Fifth, if “white” signified the subject and accident, as “the white man,” then it would be accidental (*secundum accidens*); which seems to be contrary to Aristotle in Bk. V of the *Metaphysics*, since there he divides being essentially (*secundum se*) into the ten genera.²⁰

12. Sixth, if a concrete <term> signified a subject, then it would not be defined through an addition. The implication is evident, since then whatever would be posited in its definition would be of its essential account. The consequent is contrary to Aristotle in Bk. VII of the *Metaphysics*.²¹

16. *Categories*, Ch. 1 (1a 13–15).

17. *Categories*, Ch. 5 (3b 19).

18. Averroes, *Metaph.* V com. 14 (AverL 130–131).

19. *Posterior Analytics*, Bk. I (Ch. 22, 83a 5–9).

20. *Metaphysics*, Bk. V, Ch. 7 (1017a 23–30).

21. *Metaphysics*, Bk. VII, Ch. 5 (1031a 1–4).

13. Seventh, it is impossible for things belonging to diverse most general genera to have some common account of the substance; therefore, a name signifying two such kinds cannot be univocal. But subject and accident are of diverse genera. Therefore, if a concrete <term> signified each of them, it would be simply equivocal, which does not seem suitable. For then that proposition would not be absolutely true in which it <i.e., the concrete term> is posited; there would also be no contradiction in them; <there would also be> no implication; in addition, an attribute could not be demonstrated of its subject when it is concrete—<for> in demonstration something is not equivocal, according to Aristotle in Bk. I of the *Posterior Analytics*.²² All these seem untenable and contrary to Aristotle, and the fourth especially <seems contrary> to Bk. I of the *Posterior Analytics*.²³

[1. THE RESPONSE TO THE QUESTION]

14. It must be said that if one could understand a subject and an accident in one act, and impose one name from them on the composite, just as the name *Iliad*²⁴ <is imposed on> the whole of the Trojan history, that name would not signify each <of them, i.e., subject and accident> under its proper account; nor does a concrete <term> concern another <thing> than its significate. No name, however, can signify each <of them> under its proper account (*ratio*), unless it is equivocal. It is untenable, however, to concede that every concrete name is equivocal, since it would destroy the purpose of speech,²⁵ for hardly would anyone be able to express a determinate concept. Therefore, one must say that the concrete name does not signify the subject, but only the form.²⁶

22. *Posterior Analytics*, Bk. I, Ch. 11 (77a 7–10).

23. *Posterior Analytics*, Bk. I, Ch. 6 (75a 29–31).

24. *Metaphysics*, Bk. VII, Ch. 4 (1030a 7–10).

25. Cf. Duns Scotus, *De Soph. Elenchus*, q. 21, n. 9.

26. According to Pini, Scotus has a parallel account regarding abstract and concrete intentions. See Pini, *Categories and Logic in Duns Scotus*, 128 and 152.

15. Perhaps it may be said that it is not equivocal, since it does not signify each under a proper account, but <that it signifies> the form insofar as it is informing, and the subject insofar as it is informable.²⁷

16. Against <this argument>: because it does not signify something under its proper account, it does not signify that <thing>, just as he who does not understand something under its proper account, does not understand that <thing>. Therefore, one must say simply that it does not signify a subject.

17. Likewise, a proper account of a subject is an informable account; therefore, a name signifying that <thing> under an informable account, signifies that <thing> under a proper account, and in this way two opposites would be said in that account (*ratio*).

18. Nevertheless, on account of the arguments, it must be understood that although an accident does not exist without a subject, nevertheless in itself it is a certain essence distinct from the essence of the subject (although not to such an extent perfected); for according to Aristotle in Bk. I of the *Topics*:²⁸ "In every genus one is to seek the essence (*quid*).” Similarly, unless it were a distinct essence in itself, it would not be essentially (*per se*) in another genus than the subject, which is manifestly false. One may be able, however, to understand any essence under its proper account, since that which something is, is the first object of the intellect. Therefore, one may be able to understand such an essence under its proper account, and in this way to signify <that essence>. And to such a mode of understanding corresponds the abstract mode of signifying. In another mode one may be able to understand such an essence insofar as it informs the subject, and to this mode of understanding corresponds the concrete mode of signifying. Therefore, just as the same essence is understood under each mode of understanding, so the same <thing> is signified through a concrete and an abstract name, but by a diverse mode of signifying. But on ac-

27. Cf. John Duns Scotus, *Questions on the Metaphysics of Aristotle*, Bk. IV, q. I, 60 and fn. 60.

28. *Topics*, Bk. I, Ch. 9 (103b 35-38).

count of such a mode of signifying, perhaps it is said that the subject is co-understood, not as though <it were> essentially (*per se*) intrinsic to that understanding, but inasmuch as the understanding of an accident depends upon <a subject> under such a mode of understanding.

[II. TO THE PRINCIPAL ARGUMENTS]

19. To the first argument,²⁹ I say that as something establishes the understanding of something, so it signifies that <thing>. A concrete <accidental> noun,³⁰ however, does not principally establish the understanding of a subject, but <it does so> only from the fact that that <form> of which it primarily establishes the understanding, under such a mode of understanding, depends upon a subject and in this way signifies the <subject>. That is <to say>, from such a mode of signifying it gives <one> to understand <a subject>, which is not to signify as we now speak of signification, which is a representation of something from imposition.

20. To the proof of the minor,³¹ when it is said, "it is impossible for an accident to be understood without the subject," I say that it is impossible to understand that "an accident exists" without a subject so that "without a subject" expresses a mode of understanding.³² In another mode, one can accept that it expresses a mode of the act of understanding, under the sense that "it is impossible to understand an accident without the subject being understood." And then one can respond according to what has been said above, "unless the subject is understood," not in such a way that <the subject is> essentially (*per se*) intrin-

29. Cf. *supra*, n. 1.

30. Since the question is about denominatives, the context makes it clear that Scotus is speaking about accidental nouns, such as "white," as opposed to concrete substantial nouns, such as "man." Furthermore, it must be remembered that *nomen* would include both nouns and adjectives. See also Ebbesen, "Concrete Accidental Terms," 108–9.

31. Cf. *supra*, n. 1.

32. In other words, a concrete accidental term cannot be understood to exist without a subject also being understood to exist even though that subject is not signified by the accidental term.

sic to the understanding of the accident, but in such a way that <the subject is> that on which the understanding depends; and in this way it is signified.

21. In another way, one can say that an accident cannot be understood without the subject, that is, <it cannot> be known³³ completely, since "from the same <things> something is and is known."³⁴ Nevertheless, one can know what is said through a <concrete accidental> noun when the subject is not known, just as a species is not known absolutely when the genus is not known; nevertheless, what is said is known through the noun without a knowledge of the genus, as Themistius exemplifies in <his commentary> on the *Posterior Analytics*,³⁵ that if a boy is told, "bring a horse," he does not bring a cow but a horse, and in this way he knows what is said through the noun, but he does not know the essence (*quid*) through the genus and the differentia. And the same is held by Aristotle in the beginning of Bk. I of the *Physics*,³⁶ that the defined is known prior to the defining <terms>. Thus in the question at hand: an accident can be known by that knowledge which is said through the noun, <even> when the subject is not known, and in this way a confused cognition suffices for it to be signified. In this way of speaking, one is able to save <the claim> that an abstract noun signifies the subject, and in the same way in which the concrete <noun signifies the subject>, of which it was doubted. Nevertheless, it seems that, on account of the proofs of the minor posited above,³⁷ the abstract noun may give <one> to understand the subject, but not absolutely, since the concrete <does so> directly, the abstract indirectly <or obliquely>, just as the subject is posited in diverse ways in the definition of the one and of the other. And then the concrete mode of signifying is not the cause of understanding the subject, as was said above,³⁸ but, on account of its dependence on the subject, it itself <i.e., the essence or form> is that which is signified.

33. In this paragraph, *cognoscere* is translated as "know."

34. *Metaphysics*, Bk. IX, Ch. 9 (1051a 29-31).

35. Themistius, *Posterior Analytics*, Ch. 1, ed. J. R. O'Donnell, 245.

36. *Physics*, Bk. I, Ch. 1 (184b 10-14).

37. Cf. *supra*, n. 1.

38. Cf. *supra*, n. 19.

22. If it is objected against this <argument>: since an abstract <term> signifies the form under its proper account, then <an abstract term does> not <signify the form> insofar as it depends on the subject:

One can say that the proper account of an accidental form is to be of a subject. And in this way what is signified under a proper account and <what is signified> under a mode, as it is of a subject, stand simultaneously. This seems more probable than to say that the concrete mode of signifying is the principle <or cause> of understanding the subject, since otherwise it would not be necessary to posit a subject in the definition of an abstract accident. This is contrary to Aristotle in Bk. VII of the *Metaphysics*,³⁹ where he says that “substance is the first of all <things> in the definition,” since it is posited in the definition of all <things>, and not the other way around.

23. When it is objected that “the subject is signified primarily, since it is understood primarily through an utterance”:⁴⁰ one can say that “something is understood primarily through an utterance” is twofold: either “without which not,” or primarily from the intention of the one imposing. In the first mode one can understand the subject primarily, since an accident is not understood without it. In the second mode the subject is not understood primarily, as animal is understood primarily through the utterance “man,” as if man is not understood without it; but not primarily with respect to the intention of the one imposing or speaking.—Otherwise, one can say, as above,⁴¹ that it is not necessary that the subject be understood for the understanding of an accident, namely, what is said through a noun, although it is necessary for a complete knowledge of the accident.

24. To the second principal <argument>,⁴² I concede that a term signifies that which it supposits. But it does not always supposit for that which it signifies, but a significate is only supposit for a significate when it is a simple supposition, just as

39. *Metaphysics*, Bk. VII, Ch. 1 (1028a 31–33).

40. Cf. *supra*, n. 1.

41. Cf. *supra*, n. 20.

42. Cf. *supra*, n. 2.

a common <term in personal supposition>⁴³ supposits for the supposits and not as a supposit (*commune supponit pro suppositis et non suppositum*), since it does not signify the supposit. To the minor I say that a concrete term supposits for a subject, but does not <supposit as> a subject.

25. To the proof, I say that “<the> white <thing> is a log” is accidental, not since “white” supposits <as> a subject because it is in the nature <of a subject> to supposit—and then if the <subject> were supposed, it would be an essential (*per se*) predication, since it would supposit what it supposits naturally—but it is accidental, since the significate of “white,” which is an accident, does not naturally supposit essentially (*per se*) with respect to such a predicate, but it supposits for that to which it is accidental.⁴⁴

26. Against this <objection>: it seems that since he says that “<the> white <thing> is a log,” what is signified here <as the subject>, to which white is accidental, is a log; which would not be true unless the <subject> to which white is accidental, were that which is supposed, and not only that for which <it is supposed>. For one cannot truly say that “man runs” signifies “Socrates runs,” although “man” supposits for Socrates.

27. To this <argument>, it is said that this proposition “<the> white <object> is a log” signifies a log to be in a white <thing>;

43. Supposition is often divided into three types: personal, simple, and material, which correspond to things that are only signified, things that are both signified and signify (i.e., intentions and concepts) and things that only signify (i.e., vocal and written signs). Thus, personal supposition occurs when a term supposits the thing it signifies, such as “man is an animal”; simple supposition occurs when a term supposits *for* an intention of the soul, such as “man is a species”; and material supposition occurs when a term supposits for a spoken or written word, such as “man is a name.” In order to solve this objection, Scotus distinguishes between a term that supposits as something and a term that supposits for something. For example, in personal supposition, such as “man is an animal,” the subject term stands for the individuals or common nature that it ultimately signifies, but the term “man” does not stand as that nature. In simple supposition, however, the term stands for itself, not for something else. For a more detailed discussion of this difference, see Costantino Marmo, “Ontology and Semantics in the Logic of Duns Scotus,” 172–73.

44. Cf. *infra*, n. 26, where, in the statement “man runs,” the term “man” may supposit for Socrates, but it does not supposit as Socrates.

nevertheless, it does not <supposit> for itself but for that to which it is accidental. And so the authority of Aristotle ought to be understood in this way. For what is signified to which white is accidental is a log; nevertheless, it does not supposit <as> that, but for that. Just as it is often said when the subject does not naturally supposit for another with respect to the predicate as much as for this, we say that the predicate is signified to be in this, as here: "man runs," <i.e.,> that "to run" is signified to be in a supposed <thing>, although this is not had from the first signification of the sentence. In this way, since "white" with respect to such a predicate as "log" is not supposed naturally unless <it is> for the subject, the predicate is said to be signified to be in it.

28. To the third <argument>,⁴⁵ it is said that the definition is twofold. One absolutely, which is of <something> having "that which is" absolutely, as of a substance; and such a definition has only a genus and differentia which are essentially (*per se*) intrinsic to the understanding of the species; and of this the major is true, and its proof is from Bk. IV of the *Metaphysics*. The other is a definition through an addition, namely, where something is added in addition to the essential <parts> of the defined <thing>; and such is <the definition> of accidents. For since accidents are not known completely without a subject, and a definition is given for the sake of having a complete cognition, for this reason they are not defined without the subject. But since such a definition gathers in itself something that is not of the essence, for this reason it signifies more than the name of the defined <term signifies>; and of such, the major is not true, nor <is there> a proof of it.

29. To the fourth <argument>,⁴⁶ I say that the major is false⁴⁷ when what is included is compared to a real predicate. For then <something> is not excluded unless <it is> diverse from it with respect to the predicate, since syncategorematic <terms> arrange the subject in comparison to the predicate.⁴⁸ With respect

45. Cf. *supra*, n. 3.

46. Cf. *supra*, n. 4.

47. The major premise is this: "an exclusive expression excludes anything that is essentially beyond the signification of the term."

48. Cf. Peter of Spain, *Syncategoremata*, ed. J. Spruyt, intro., 13–14.

to a real predicate, however, the subject is not diverse from the concrete accident; therefore, it is not excluded. Therefore, it is commonly said that an exclusion does not always exclude another according to the essence, but according to being (*esse*), which is most true with respect to a real predicate.

30. To the authorities <i.e., authoritative quotations> of the Commentator <in response to the fifth argument>,⁴⁹ “to signify” must be understood broadly for “to give understanding,” since otherwise he would be contrary to himself in <his commentary on> Bk. V of the *Metaphysics*.

31. To the authority of Aristotle <in response to the sixth argument>:⁵⁰ he understands <“white”> of “a white man” and such expressions, of which he proposed a doubt in the beginning of the chapter.⁵¹ For these are accidental beings, according to him in Bk. V of the *Metaphysics*.⁵²

32. Against <this> position, it is argued in this way: if “white” signifies the same as “whiteness,” but under the mode of pertaining to or of denominating, then that of which “white” is said, as <for example> of a man, is that of which its interpretation is said, namely, “whiteness as pertaining to,” which does not seem true.

33. Here, one can say that this is not the interpretation of “white,” since “white” only signifies the form under one mode of signifying. But this whole <phrase> “whiteness as pertaining to” signifies the form under two opposite modes, since “whiteness” signifies the form under one mode, and “as pertaining” expresses another opposite mode.

34. If it is asked what is the interpretation of this noun “white”—it is not possible except through some noun. The form can be signified only under one mode of signifying, which, perhaps, is not possible by adding this mode: “as pertaining to.”

49. Cf. *supra*, n. 5.

50. *Metaphysics*, Bk. VII, Ch. 6 (1031b 21–25).

51. *Metaphysics*, Bk. VII, Ch. 6 (1031a 15–21).

52. *Metaphysics*, Bk. V, Ch. 6 (1015b 16–23).

[QUESTION NINE

Whether this Rule,
“When One Thing is
Predicated of Another,”
Etc., is True]



IT IS ASKED whether the first rule of Aristotle¹ is true, namely, “when one thing is predicated of another, whatever is predicated of the predicate, is predicated of the subject.”²

1. It seems that it is false:

Since “animal” is predicated of man, and “white” <is predicated> of animal, therefore “white” <is predicated> of man; therefore, according to this rule this implication would hold, “an animal is white; therefore, a man is white,” where it seems to be a fallacy of the consequent. Similarly, the antecedent can be true without the consequent <being true>.³

2. Second, according to this rule, it would follow that “sub-

1. *Categories*, Ch. 3 (1b 10–15).

2. In order to understand the significance of this question, it should be noted that the phrase “when one thing is predicated of another” implies that what is predicated has a necessary, essential relation to the subject that is not captured by the simple categorical structure “*s* is *p*.”

3. This initial argument is a classic example of the syllogism known as Barbara, i.e., a universal affirmative syllogism in the first figure. In its strongest form, the argument would look like this: “All animals are white; all men are animals; therefore, all men are white.” The dubious implication that Scotus refers to here, however, is a conditional argument in this form: “If a man is white, then an animal is white; but an animal is white; therefore, a man is white,” which is an example of affirming the consequent, for it is possible that there are white animals without there being any white men.

stance is the highest genus; therefore, an animal is the highest genus."⁴

3. Third, if something is predicated of a predicate, it is predicated of the subject; but "predicate" is predicated of a predicate, since a predicate is a predicate; therefore, "predicate" is predicated of a subject; therefore, a subject is a predicate.

4. To the opposite is Aristotle.

[1. THE STATUS OF THE QUESTION:]

[A. *The Opinion of Others*]

5. It is said⁵ that the rule is true: (A) when three essentially ordered <terms> are taken in the same genus: whatever is predicated essentially (as "to be predicated" is taken here) of the predicate, is predicated essentially of the subject.—With this <condition there is also a second qualification, namely> (B) the rule must also be understood when an intermediate predicate is not changed in comparison to its predicate and to the subject of which it is predicated.

6. According to the first condition, the first two arguments⁶ are solved: since "white" and "highest genus" are not predicated of animal and of substance essentially.—Similarly, the second <argument>⁷ is solved according to the <second rule, i.e., since there is a> variation of the intermediate predicate, since by arguing in this way, as <it is argued> there,⁸ there is a fallacy of accident.

7. To the third <argument>,⁹ it is said¹⁰ that (C) the rule ought to be understood of "to be predicated" <as> signified in

4. The missing premise in this enthymeme is as follows: substance is predicated of animal, or an animal is a substance.

5. Cf. Albertus Magnus, *Praedic.*, Tr. 1 c. 6 (ed. Borgnet, I 161b).

6. Cf. *supra*, nn. 1–2.

7. Cf. *supra*, n. 2.

8. Namely, "substance is the most general [genus]; animal is a substance; therefore, animal is the most general [genus]."

9. Cf. *supra*, n. 3.

10. The identity of those who held this position is uncertain.

the <second> intentions; in the bases <i.e., in the first intentions, it ought to be understood> of “to be predicated” as it is exercised.¹¹ It is argued, however, in the <second> intentions with <the linking verb> “is,” through which the predication is effected; therefore, it does not hold.¹²

11. According to Nuchelmans, “the application of the distinction *exercitus/significatus* to the act of predication” was more widely diffused by Scotus. “In that use it seems to have been made especially popular by John Duns Scotus, who connected the distinction between a *praedicatio exercita*—for instance *Homo est animal*—and a *praedicatio significata*—for example *Genus praedicatur de specie*—with the distinction between two levels of conceiving of which first-order and second-order concepts (*intentiones primae* and *intentiones secundae*) are characteristic”; Gabriel Nuchelmans, “The Distinction *Actus Exercitus/Actus Significatus*,” 74. See also I. Rosier, “La Distinction Entre *Actus Exercitus* et *Actus Significatus* Dans Les Sophismes Grammaticaux du MS BN Lat. 16618 et Autres Textes Apparentes,” in *Sophisms in Medieval Logic and Grammar. Acts of the Ninth European Symposium for Medieval Logic and Semantics*, ed. S. Read (Boston: Kluwer Academic Publishers, 1993), and Scotus’s *Super Porphyry*, q. 8, 16. Ockham makes the following observation about this distinction: An effected act [*actus exercitus*] is one designated by “is” or some other expression which not only signifies that something is predicated of something else but actually effects the predication of one thing of another. Examples are: “Man is an animal,” “Man disputes,” and “Man runs.” A signified act [*actus significatus* or *signatus*], on the other hand, is one that is designated by a verb like “to be predicated of,” “to have as subject,” “to be affirmed of,” and “to belong to,” all of which signify one and the same thing. For example, when one says, “‘Animal’ is predicated of ‘man,’” animal is not actually being predicated of man; for in that proposition “animal” is functioning as subject and not predicate. The act, then, is signified. It is not the same thing to say, “‘Animal’ is predicated of ‘man,’” and to say, “Man is an animal.” The one is structurally more complex than the other. Likewise, it is not the same thing to say that a genus is predicated of the general term “man” and to say that the common term “man” is a genus. Further, saying that a genus is predicated of its species or that the word “animal” is predicated of the word “man” is very different from saying, “Species is a genus,” or, “The word ‘man’ is the word ‘animal.’” The first two are true, and the second false. See William Ockham, *Ockham’s Theory of Terms*, trans. Loux, 194–95.

12. In the third argument, the questionable premise is that “a predicate is a predicate.” According to the opinion of others, the problem with this premise is that the word “predicate” is a second intention and yet the sentence is a simple declarative sentence using the linking verb “is” to combine a subject and a predicate. According to the rule prescribed, however, whenever a second intention, such as the word “predicate,” is used, it should be used in such a construction where the term “predicate” is not actually a predicate of a sentence but rather

[*B. Against the Opinion of Others*]

8. Against this <position>: according to all these conditions, this implication “an animal is a substance; therefore, a man is a substance,” would be valid, since here three essentially ordered <terms> are taken in the same genus, and the intermediate predicate is not changed, and it is argued in the first intentions of an act of predication. But this implication is not valid;¹³ therefore, all the aforesaid conditions do not preserve the truth of the rule. Proof of the minor, since it follows “a donkey is a substance; therefore, an animal is a substance,” and it does not follow that “therefore a man is a substance”; therefore, this antecedent “a man is a substance” is not convertible to this “an animal is a substance.”¹⁴ Therefore, by arguing from the converse, there is a fallacy of the consequent from the position of the consequent, and from the proposition having more causes of truth to one of these.

9. Second, no implication holds except in virtue of a syllogism; but if this <rule> were to be reduced to a syllogism, since “man” and “substance” comprise the conclusion, they will be the extreme <terms> and “animal” <will be> the middle <term>. Therefore, by making the previous antecedent into a major <premise> now, it will be a syllogism in the first figure having a particular major <premise>, which is not valid with any terms; since the form of arguing in all these is the same, therefore neither was the prior implication valid.

10. Third, there is the same form of arguing in essential predicates and non-essential <predicates>, since an implication holds based upon the signification of the propositions, just as

only signifies a predicate. As it is, then, the questionable premise violates this rule by using a second intention in a simple declarative sentence.

13. According to the subsequent paragraph, this enthymeme is not valid because if it were reduced to a syllogism, the proposition “an animal is a substance” would be a particular major premise in the first figure. All first-figure syllogisms, however, must have a universal major premise in order for the syllogism to be valid.

14. In other words, one could argue that the reason that an animal is a substance is because a donkey is a substance, in which case it would not be necessary to posit that a man is a substance.

a syllogism <holds based upon the signification of the propositions>; however, according to this <proposition> "an animal is a substance," a greater identity of the extremes is not signified than through this <proposition>, "an animal is white"; therefore, based upon the signification of the sentence, one predicate is not more signified to be the same as man than another.

11. If it is said that <the linking verb> "to be" is a union of the extremes, and so it expresses such a union as is required by the extremes, thus also a greater identity is signified here <in the proposition> "animal is substance" than here <in the proposition> "animal is white".¹⁵

12. This does not seem to be true, since then every proposition of <something> inhering <in something> absolutely would signify that it is such, and every proposition of <something> inhering <in something> right now, would signify that it is of <something> inhering <in something> right now. And by expressing it in this way, it would be a vain repetition, as here "man, as <considered> right now, is white"; and there would be a repugnance to the understanding <of this proposition> here "man is white absolutely or necessarily"; which does not seem probable. Similarly, here there would be a vain repetition "man necessarily is an animal" or "<man> is always an animal"; and here <it is> a repugnance to the understanding "man, as <considered> right now, is an animal." And if this <is the case>, then the opposite one would diminish the other. And thus in the implication, "a man, as <considered> right now, is an animal; therefore, a man is an animal" there would be a fallacy in a certain respect and absolutely (*fallacia secundum quid et simpliciter*). And similarly here, "an animal necessarily is white; therefore, an animal is white," and so from that <argument> regarding necessity there would not follow that regarding <something> inhering in all these terms. That the implication is not valid, "an animal necessarily is white; therefore, an animal is white,"

15. The alleged reason why one proposition has a greater unity than the other is that the predicate "substance" is essential to an animal, while the predicate "white" is accidental to an animal.

is evident according to Aristotle in Bk. II of *On Interpretation*,¹⁶ since whenever an opposition is in an addition, it does not hold <when one reasons> from the conjoined to the divided <terms>. Similarly if it is valid, then the consequent does not posit an understanding opposite to the antecedent.

13. On account of <these> three principal reasons,¹⁷ one can say that it does not follow formally that "an animal is a substance; therefore, a man is a substance," just as it does not follow <that> "a substance is white; therefore, an animal <is white>," since from the signification of speech the antecedent on both sides is related to the consequent in the same way.

[II. THE RESPONSE TO THE QUESTION]

14. But to the question, then, it must be said that this rule is true, since it is given essentially (*per se*) of second intentions, as the logician ought to be speaking, and by taking "to be predicated" properly, which is "to be said before another." Then only <this much> and not more is signified through the rule:¹⁸ "what is prior to the prior in genus is prior to the posterior" or "what is superior to a superior is superior to the inferior," of whose truth there is no doubt. And in this way the rule is suitably posited, since its truth is known to all.¹⁹

15. If, however, it is said that Aristotle exemplifies <the rule>²⁰ from things of first intention, then in what way must it be argued in <i.e., applied to> these <first intentions> according to this rule?

I say that Aristotle exemplifies <the rule> in this way: "just as 'man' is predicated of a certain man, and 'animal' <is predicated> of man; therefore, <animal is> also <predicated> of a cer-

16. *On Interpretation*, Ch. 11, 21a (20–24).

17. Cf. *supra*, nn. 1–3.

18. Cf. *Categories*, Ch. 12 (14a 26–29); cf. also Duns Scotus, *Metaph.*, Bk. I, q. 6, n. 16, and Bk. V, q. 1, n. 5; *Ordinatio*, Bk. I d. 19 q. 2, n. 33 (V 281–282).

19. See Pini, *Categories and Logic in Duns Scotus*, 184.

20. *Categories*, Ch. 3 (1b 12–15).

tain man," where animal is signified to be essentially predicated of man.²¹

16. If, however, such a predication has to be effected with this verb "is," it is necessary, for arguing according to the rule, to modify the composition through something <i.e., through some modal qualification> that indicates that the predicate is to be predicated of the subject, just as "to be predicated" is taken here. And then in this way it must be argued that "man essentially (*per se*) in the first mode is animal; a certain man essentially (*per se*) in the first mode or essentially (*essentialiter*) is man; therefore, a certain man essentially (*per se*) is an animal."

17. If, however, it is argued absolutely that "an animal is a substance; therefore, a man <is a substance>," nothing is expressed in the antecedent that indicates <or observes> the virtue of this rule, since through "is," absolutely <taken>, the predicate "to be predicated" is not signified, that is, "is" (*esse*) prior to the subject or superior to it.

18. If, however, it is said that Aristotle takes the composition absolutely,²² "for a certain man is both a man and an animal":

I say that he understands it "essentially" (*per se*),²³ since he thus expresses the prior in the second intentions:²⁴ "animal is predicated of man," whence the following <premise> must be understood according to the preceding <premise>.²⁵

21. One should notice, especially in contrast to the following paragraph, that even though the argument is exemplified by terms of first intention, the structure of the argument is not that of a simple categorical form, but rather is in the form of "*a* is predicated of *b*," where the term "*a*" signifies a predicate but does not function as a predicate.

22. *Categories*, Ch. 3 (1b 15).

23. For the four modes of *per se*, cf. *Posterior Analytics*, Bk. I, Ch. 4 (73a 34–b 24). Cf. also q. 7, n. 13.

24. *Categories*, Ch. 3 (1b 12–14).

25. To clarify this argument, I have recast the initial syllogism as follows:

Animal is predicated of man (the prior or the preceding premise).

A certain man is a man (the following premise, which must be understood in the same way as the preceding).

Therefore, a certain man is an animal [or animal is predicated of a certain man].

[III. TO THE PRINCIPAL ARGUMENTS]

19. To the <first> two arguments²⁶ against the rule, <the solution> is evident.

20. To the third <argument>²⁷ I say that in respect to a subject <i.e., taken as a subject of a sentence> a predicate is predicated only by a signified predication; but in respect to a predicate <i.e., as a predicate of a sentence> a predicate is predicated only by an actual <or effected> predication. The rule, however, must be understood for each predication taken uniformly.

21. If it is argued: it holds that "animal is predicated of man" where there is a signified predication, and "a certain man essentially (*per se*) is man" where there is an actual predication; therefore, "a certain man essentially (*per se*) is an animal":


I say that this <proposition>, "animal is predicated of man," is accidental (*per accidens*); nevertheless, "animal" is not predicated <of man> accidentally (*secundum accidens*); and this is true for a predication <which is> actual <or effected>. And thus on both sides there is truth, by taking the actual predication uniformly.

26. Cf. *supra*, nn. 1–2.

27. Cf. *supra*, n. 3.

[QUESTION TEN

It is to be Asked
About the Second Rule:
Whether the Same Can Be
in Diverse Genera]

T IS ASKED about the truth of this rule:¹ “of diverse genera <that are> not posited in subalternation <to each other>, the species and differentiae are diverse,” whether something that is the same can be in diverse genera.

1. It seems that it can:

Body is in the genus of substance, according to Porphyry;² and in the genus of quantity, according to Aristotle in the chapter “On Quantity.”³

2. Second, figure is in the genus of quantity, since the geometer, who essentially (*per se*) considers only quantity, essentially (*per se*) considers figure. And figure is in the genus of quality, according to Aristotle in the chapter “On Quality.”⁴

3. Third, science is essentially (*per se*) in the genus of quality, since it is in the first species;⁵ and it is essentially (*per se*) relative, according to Aristotle in the chapter “On Relation”⁶ and in Bk. V of the *Metaphysics*.⁷

4. Fourth, double and half are essentially (*per se*) quantities and <they are essentially> relatives. Similarly, it is distinctive according to quality that “similar” or “dissimilar” is said <of some-

1. *Categories*, Ch. 3 (1b 16–17).

2. “Body is a species of substance but a genus of animate body”; *Isagoge*, “On Species” (AL I⁶ 9–10; ed. Busse, 4.27–28).

3. *Categories*, Ch. 6 (4b 23–25).

4. *Categories*, Ch. 8 (10a 11–12).

5. *Categories*, Ch. 8 (8b 27–30).

6. *Categories*, Ch. 7 (6b 1–2).

7. *Metaphysics*, Bk. V, Ch. 15 (1021a 30–31).

thing that falls into that category>, and it is distinctive according to quality that “equal” or “unequal” <is said of something that falls into that category>; therefore, these <“similar,” “dissimilar,” “equal,” and “unequal”> are in those genera <i.e., in the genera of quality and quantity, respectively>;⁸ and they are essentially (*per se*) relatives, according to Aristotle.⁹ Similarly it is argued of many other relatives.

5. Fifth, motion seems to be in the genus of quantity, and in the genus of action or affection. Proof of the first <position, i.e., that motion is in the genus of quantity> according to Aristotle in Bk. V of the *Metaphysics*, in the chapter “On Quantity”:¹⁰ “time is quantity through motion,” therefore motion <all the> more <is a quantity>; and time essentially (*per se*) is <a species of quantity>, since there are five species of continuous quantity according to Aristotle;¹¹ therefore, all the more is motion a species of quantity. Proof of the second <position, i.e., that motion is in the genus of action or passion>: since every true predicate in the abstract is essentially the same as that <predicate in the concrete>;¹² it is true that “affection is a motion” and “action is a motion”; therefore, etc.¹³ Proof of the minor: it is essentially (*per se*) true that “being acted upon¹⁴ is being moved”; therefore, affection is motion.

6. Sixth, according to Aristotle in Bk. V of the *Physics*:¹⁵ motion receives its species from the term to which <it proceeds>; therefore, it is the same for the genus also. But the term of motion is essentially (*per se*) in three genera, according to Aristotle in the same place,¹⁶ namely, quantity, quality, and place. Therefore, motion is essentially (*per se*) in these three genera.

8. *Categories*, Ch. 6 (6a 35), Ch. 8 (11a 18–19).

9. *Categories*, Ch. 7 (6b 21–24).

10. *Metaphysics*, Bk. V, Ch. 13 (1020a 32–33).

11. *Categories*, Ch. 6 (4b 23–25).

12. That a concrete term and an abstract term signify the same thing, see q. 8, n. 14.

13. The conclusion is that “motion is in the genus of action and passion.”

14. “Suffering,” *patiens*, is related etymologically to “passion,” *passio*.

15. *Physics*, Bk. V, Ch. 1 (224b 7–9).

16. *Physics*, Bk. V, Ch. 1 (225a 35–b 9).

7. If it is said that motion is equivocally in these three genera:¹⁷—Against this: motion is said of alteration, of augmentation, and of a change of place according to the same name and the same essential meaning, namely, “the act of being in potency insofar as it is in potency,” which is its nature (*ratio*), according to Aristotle in Bk. III of the *Physics*;¹⁸ therefore, <it is said> univocally.

8. To the opposite is Aristotle.

9. Likewise, those things that differ in the prior, differ in the posterior; therefore, those which differ in a genus, differ in whatever is posterior; and nothing is in different most general genera.

[I. TO THE QUESTION]

10. To the question¹⁹ it must be said that “same” is said in many ways, as is said in Bk. I of the *Topics*.²⁰ in genus, in species, and in number. And “same” in number <can be said> in three senses: in accident, in property, and in definition.²¹ And in Bk. V of the *Metaphysics*,²² it is said that “same” in itself is said in as many ways as one <is said> in itself, namely, in number, in species, in genus, and in proportion.²³ “Same” in proportion and “same” in number, with respect to two modes, namely, “same” in accident and in property, can be in diverse genera. Since animal and color are the same in proportion, since such an identity consists in “being the case similarly”;²⁴ for as color is to whiteness, so animal is to man. Similarly, Socrates and white are the same in accident; Socrates and “capable of being taught” <literally: “participating in teaching”> or “risible” are the same

17. Cf. *supra*, n. 6.

18. *Physics*, Bk. III, Ch. 1 (201a 11–13).

19. Cf. Scotus, *Metaphysics*, Bk. V, q. 4.

20. *Topics*, Bk. I, Ch. 7 (103a 7–14).

21. *Topics*, Bk. I, Ch. 7 (103a 24–31).

22. *Metaphysics*, Bk. V, Ch. 9 (1018a 4–8).

23. *Metaphysics*, Bk. V, Ch. 9 (1018a 12–13).

24. The Latin is *similiter se habere*, which may also be translated as “[behaving] similarly.”

in property, and thus <they are> the same; it is manifest that they are in diverse genera. The same in species or in genus is in no way in diverse most general genera, or in any <that are> not subalternated, such as species or differentia, except perhaps that the same in a superior genus <is> in diverse inferior genera. That the same, however, in species or in an inferior genus is not in diverse superior genera <that are> not subalternated, such as species or differentia, seems to be manifest, since the genus pertains to the essence of the species. Therefore, if the same in a species or in an inferior genus were to be in diverse superior genera, then both <the diverse most general> genera would be of its essence; therefore, that would not be the same essentially, since two non-subalternated genera predicate a diverse essence. Similarly, a differentia is one essentially with its genus; but with diverse genera that are not subalternated nothing is the same essentially; therefore, etc.

[II. TO THE PRINCIPAL ARGUMENTS]

11. To the first argument,²⁵ Albert says²⁶ that a body, as it expresses a nature suited to receiving three dimensions, is in the genus of substance; insofar as it names those three dimensions themselves, it is in the genus of quantity. <A reply to> the first <argument> is evident, since an incorporeal nature is said to be a substance to which it is repugnant to receive dimensions.

12. To the second <argument>,²⁷ I say that this noun "figure" in one way signifies the surface terminated by lines, and so is in the genus of quantity; in another way it signifies the enclosure itself of the lines or the termination, and so is in the fourth species of quality. Hence the qualities of the fourth species are said to be qualities concerning quantity.

13. To the third <argument>,²⁸ it is said that relations are essentially (*per se*) in the genus of relation; however, relatives are able to be things of other genera, since relatives are those

25. Cf. *supra*, n. 1.

26. Albertus Magnus, *Praedic.* tr. 1 c 6 (ed. Borgnet, I 162b-163a).

27. Cf. *supra*, n. 2.

28. Cf. *supra*, n. 3.

<things> in which a relation is founded, and those <things> are things of other genera. Through this <type of reasoning>, it is said to all these <arguments> that although those <things> are relatives, nevertheless they are not in the genus of relation but <are> in other genera.

14. Against this <argument>: concrete and abstract <terms> signify the same essentially; therefore, they are in the same genus.²⁹ Therefore, if relations are essentially (*per se*) in the genus of relation, relatives will also be <in that genus>. The implication is evident, since the essence of the same genus is the same, because being according to itself is divided into the ten genera.

15. Likewise, if relatives were not in the genus of relation, nothing determined <about them> in the chapter "Concerning Relation" in the *Categories* would pertain to anything in that genus. And in this way all things which he determines there would be irrelevant to the determination of that genus, which seems unsuitable. The first implication is evident, for neither the first definition "of relation,"³⁰ nor the second <definition>,³¹ which Aristotle approves, nor any property that he posits, would pertain to relations, but only to relatives, which, through the hypothesis, are not in the genus of relation.

16. For this reason, one can say that relatives are essentially (*per se*) in the genus of relation, just as concrete <terms> of other <things> are in other genera, which will be discussed afterwards;³² and in this way nothing essentially (*essentialiter*) the same is essentially (*per se*) relative and a species of another genus. Therefore, "science" is equivocal for signifying the habit of a mind and for signifying an image of <something> knowable, which two are essentially diverse. In the first way it is a species of quality; in the second way, it is essentially (*per se*) relative.

17. To the fourth <argument>,³³ it is said that double and half are essentially (*per se*) in the genus of relation, not <in the

29. Relatives, e.g., things that are knowable, are concrete, whereas relations are abstract. *Categories*, Ch. 8 (11a 20–31).

30. *Categories*, Ch. 7 (6a 37–38).

32. Cf. *infra*, q. 25–26.

31. *Categories*, Ch. 7 (8a 29–34).

33. Cf. *supra*, n. 4.

genus> of quantity; neither does Aristotle say that <they are in the genus of quantity>, although that to which double is essentially (*per se*) inherent, as two, is essentially (*per se*) a quantity. Since it is not necessary that an accident be in the same genus as a species with its subject. Similarly about equal and unequal, similar and dissimilar, it must be said that they are essentially (*per se*) relatives, but they are in the genus of quantity or quality, not as species but as properties, as it is evident according to Aristotle,³⁴ in the last property of quantity and quality. It is possible, however, of many <things> to be in one genus as species, in another as properties, since “risible” is in the genus of substance as a property, in quality as a species.

18. To the authority of Aristotle,³⁵ I say that he says:³⁶ “If it happens that the same <thing> is a relative and a quality (*quale*), nothing prevents that which is the same in this manner from being numbered in diverse genera”; because it is not the same essentially.

19. To the fourth <argument>³⁷ about motion, it will be addressed later.³⁸

[III. OBJECTIONS AND THEIR SOLUTIONS]

20. Against this position.³⁹ According to Aristotle in Bk. V of the *Metaphysics*,⁴⁰ “one in number entails one in species.” According to the response, an accident and a subject are one in number;⁴¹ and they are in diverse genera; therefore, the same in species can be in diverse genera.

21. Likewise, it is argued through an expository syllogism in the third figure, namely, “that this donkey is a non-quality; this donkey is a non-man; therefore, non-man is a non-quality,” by taking in the premises each extreme so that it is an indefinite

34. *Categories*, Ch. 6 (6a 35), Ch. 8 (11a 18–19).

35. Cf. *supra*, n. 4.

36. *Categories*, Ch. 8 (11a 37–38).

37. Cf. *supra*, nn. 5–6.

38. Cf. *infra*, q. 44, nn. 9–19.

39. This and the subsequent paragraph are further objections to Scotus's position.

40. *Metaphysics*, Bk. V, Ch. 6 (1016b 31–1017a 1).

41. Cf. *supra*, n. 10.

term, and thus concluding. But "if the opposite of the opposite, and the proposed of the proposed <term, be taken>," according to Aristotle in Bk. II of the *Topics*,⁴² then, "man is a quality." But a quality in the abstract is predicated of no thing, except what is of that same genus. Therefore, man is in the genus of quality and is a substance; therefore, etc. This reason can commonly be made to show that every affirmative is true.

22. To the first of these <objections>,⁴³ one can say that Aristotle⁴⁴ previously distinguished the modes of one accidentally (*per accidens*), and afterwards⁴⁵ he divided one essentially (*per se*) into these modes: in number, in species, etc. And when he adds that "one in number entails one in species," he understands it only of one in number as he had previously posited it, namely, as it is a mode of one essentially (*per se*). If, however, the subject and the accident were to be one in number, that is, one accidentally (*per accidens*) and not essentially (*per se*), then of these he does not understand such an implication to hold.⁴⁶

23. To the other <objection>,⁴⁷ it is said that the rule "if the opposite," etc., holds of contraries in themselves,⁴⁸ <then it holds> of contradictories from the contrary, as it is said in Bk. II of the *Topics*.⁴⁹ Therefore, it cannot be argued in the same order affirmatively and negatively without <committing> the fallacy of the consequent, but it must be argued from the opposite of the predicate to the opposite of the subject. It is argued, however, in this way: "non-man is non-quality; therefore, man is quality," which implication is not valid.

42. *Topics*, Bk. IV, Ch. 3 (124a 8–9).

43. Cf. *supra*, n. 20.

44. *Metaphysics*, Bk. V, Ch. 6 (1015b 16–35).

45. *Metaphysics*, Bk. V, Ch. 6 (1015b 32–33).

46. Cf. *infra*, q. 37–38, nn. 28–29.

47. Cf. *supra*, n. 21.

48. I have chosen to follow an alternate reading here. The critical edition has *in se ipso*, which does not make sense, since it cannot refer to the *regula*, which is feminine, nor to the *contrariis*, which are plural. In the alternative manuscript, which I have followed, the Latin has *in se ipsis*.

49. *Topics*, Bk. II, Ch. 8 (113b 15–26).

24. Against <this argument>, I argue from the contrary in this way: "non-man is non-quality; therefore, quality is man." And if this is true, then this also <is true>: "man is a quality" through conversion. Similarly, transpose the premises, "therefore, non-quality is non-man," and further, "therefore, man is a quality," from the contrary; therefore, etc.⁵⁰

25. For this reason it is said otherwise, that "man" and "non-man" are not opposed as indefinite terms are, but as "non-man" is a negated term. And in this way the conclusion does not follow in the expository syllogism.

26. Against this: as it is an indefinite term, "man" or "non-man" is said of anything whatever, and both <are not said> of anything that is the same;⁵¹ so they contradict themselves in the subject.

27. Likewise, a negation that renders a term indefinite and <a negation that> negates a term do not seem to differ with respect to the significate, since on both sides the significate of the finite term is negated.

28. Otherwise, it is said that in an expository paralogism there is a fallacy of accident, since the middle term is varied. Since in the first <premise> "that donkey" is taken insofar as there is a completive differentia through which it is in the species by which it is distinguished from man. In the other <premise>, "that donkey is non-quality," <the term> is taken according to the form of the substance in which it agrees with man and is distinguished from everything which is of another genus.

29. Against this: one can argue similarly elsewhere where such a defect cannot be assigned; therefore, neither is it here essentially (*per se*). The implication is evident according to Ar-

50. The statement "non-man is non-quality" is taken universally for "all non-man," hence it can be contraposed to the statement "quality is man." The converse of this statement, however, is, "some man is a quality," which cannot be contraposed, since it is a particular affirmative statement. Thus the conclusion, i.e., that "a non-quality is a non-man," cannot be contraposed again to mean that "[every] man is a quality."

51. *On Interpretation*, Bk. I, Ch. 9 (18a 29-30).

istotle in Bk. II of the *Sophistical Refutations*.⁵² "Of all speeches which depend on the same <point>, the solution is the same." The antecedent is evident if it is argued in this way "whiteness is a non-man; whiteness is a non-donkey; therefore, a non-donkey is a non-man"; "therefore, man is a donkey."

30. Otherwise, one can say, when the conclusion of the expository syllogism has been conceded, that the last <proposition>, "therefore, man is a quality," does not follow, nor <does the statement> "therefore, quality is a man." What is said, however, in Bk. II of the *Topics*,⁵³ "in contradictories it holds from the contrary," is manifestly said of the implication, not of the predication.

31. Likewise, that rule, "if opposite from opposite,"⁵⁴ etc., must be understood only in contraries. Or if it is understood in contradictories of the predication from a contrary, this is true only if the predication in the antecedent is essential (*per se*), or to a universally lesser if the terms are common. I say this for the conversion of a universal affirmative through contraposition. Now, however, whatever conclusion that is inferred through an expository syllogism is concluded to be true neither essentially (*per se*) nor universally, and for the same reason in no way does it follow that an opposite is predicated of its opposite, neither in itself nor from the contrary.

52. *Sophistical Refutations*, Bk. II, Ch. 5 (177b 31-32).

53. *Topics*, Bk. II, Ch. 8 (113b 15-26).

54. *Topics*, Bk. IV, Ch. 3 (124a 8-9).

[QUESTION ELEVEN

Whether there are Only Ten Most General Genera]

*Of non-complex <terms> a single <term> either signifies substance, etc.*¹



ONCERNING this it is asked whether there are only ten most general <genera>.

1. It seems that there are not <only ten most general genera>.

Being is divided into substance and accident, into absolute and non-absolute (*comparatum*), into being through itself (*per se*) and being in another; but there is only one most general being-absolute or being through itself (*per se*) or substance; therefore, there is only one accidental predicament <or category>;² therefore, etc.

2. The implication is denied, since being through itself (*per se*) is univocal to all <the things> of which it is said, and so it can be a genus; accidental being (*ens per accidens*), or <being> in another, is not univocal to those to which it is suitable (*convenit*).

3. Against this <argument>: “if one of <a pair of> opposites is said in various ways, <then> also the remaining <one is said in many ways>,” according to Aristotle in Bk. I of the *Topics*,³ and he verifies this <principle> in every genus of opposites. If, therefore, “being in a subject” is equivocal to the nine <accidental

1. *Categories*, Ch. 4 (1b 25–26).

2. Cf. *Topics*, Bk. I, Ch. 15 (106b 14–15).

3. *Topics*, Ch. Bk. I, Ch. 15 (106b 13–17).

categories>, “not being in a subject” will be equivocal to just as many; and so there will be eighteen genera.

4. Second <against the first argument>, given that <the term> accident is equivocal to the nine genera, it follows that accidents are not more suitable (*non plus convenient*) among themselves than one of them with substance, since on each side there is only a suitability to some equivocal utterance. Therefore, the division of being into substance and accident will not be more suitable (*convenientior*) than <a division of being> into “when” and into “being not-when,” since on each side that divides one <thing> there is a single most general <genus> and <something that> divides what remains <which is> equivocal to the other nine genera.

5. It also follows⁴ that there is not a sufficient division of being into substance and accident, for “accident,” when it is equivocal, is taken for some <one> significante; and so a division would come about only into two most general <genera>.

6. Second <objection>, to the principal <argument>: “what is said through a superlative, is suitable to only one,” according to Priscian;⁵ the most general <genus> is of this kind; therefore, there is only one most general <genus>.

7. Third, “every division and multitude is reduced to one that is prior to that multitude.”⁶ Therefore, if there are many most general <genera>, then some one <genus> is prior to them. But nothing is prior to the most general <genera>. Therefore, neither are there many.

8. Fourth, white is essentially something one <thing>, since—according to what was previously determined⁷—it signifies nothing other than whiteness. Therefore, it is essentially (*per se*) in some genus. It is not in the genus of quality: since quality is truly predicated of everything that is essentially (*per se*) in the genus of quality; quality is not truly predicated of white; there-

4. This is the third argument against n. 2.

5. *Topics*, Bk. V, Ch. 5 (134b 23–25).

6. Cf. Proclus, *Institutio Theologica*, ed. Vansteenkiste, Ch. 21, p. 273. Cf. *supra*, q. 4, n. 8.

7. Cf. *supra*, q. 8, n. 19.

fore, white is essentially (*per se*) in another most general genus. One can argue in this way about a concrete <term> of any other genus of accident; therefore, there are eighteen genera of accidents.

9. Fifth, *quality* (*quale*) is predicated of white. I ask: Under the notion (*ratione*) of which universal? It is not <predicated under the notion> of a property, since it is not convertible <with it>. Nor is it <predicated under the notion> of an accident, since it is not “present and absent,”⁸ etc. Nor is it <predicated under the notion> of a differentia, since it does not distinguish white from other <qualities>. Nor is it <predicated under the notion> of the lowest species, since it is predicated of <things> differing in species. Therefore, it is <predicated> under the notion (*ratione*) of a genus. And it does not have a genus “superior to it”;⁹ therefore, *quality* (*quale*) is a most general <genus>. And it is not the same as quality (*qualitas*), since neither one has the same species, since neither one is predicated of the same <things>; therefore, it is a most general <genus>.—Also, that *quality* (*quale*) is a genus, is evident according to Aristotle in Bk. IV of the *Topics*,¹⁰ who teaches <us> to consider the genus in abstract <terms> through what the concrete is or is not.¹¹

10. Similarly, just as whiteness is <related> to <something> white, so also is color <related> to <something> colored; therefore, by recombining <the terms>, just as color is <related> to whiteness so also is <something> colored <related> to <something> white. But color, or quality (*qualitas*), is a genus of whiteness; therefore, *quality* (*quale*) is the genus of white.—It is evident that *quality* (*quale*) is also another genus than quality (*qualitas*), since intentions are attributed to a thing not absolutely but as they are considered by the intellect. But white is conceived by the intellect under another mode than whiteness, although it is the same essence. Therefore, it can be another <genus>, having another intention than whiteness.

8. Porphyry, *Isagoge*, Ch. “On Accident” (AL I⁶ 20; ed. Busse, 12.24–25).

9. Porphyry, *Isagoge*, Ch. “On Species” (AL I⁶ 20; ed. Busse, 4.17–18).

10. *Topics*, Bk. IV, Ch. 4 (124b 15–22).

11. I have adopted an alternate reading. The critical edition has *docentem considerare genus in abstractis per hoc quod concretum est in concreto vel non est*.

11. Sixth,¹² intentions are essentially (*per se*) intelligible since <they are> definable, and, in <regard to> them, it is manifest that there is something above and below; therefore, there is something supreme. It does not have any supervening genus of them, since being according to itself is divided into these ten <genera>, <according to Aristotle> in Bk. V of the *Metaphysics*.¹³ There is, therefore, a “being in the soul”; therefore, there is one most general <genus> of intentions in addition to all these <ten genera>.

12. Seventh, it happens that one can understand non-being, since one can signify it, according to Aristotle in Bk. II of the *Posterior Analytics*,¹⁴ and in these there is the notion (*ratio*) of higher and lower; therefore, there is something supreme. That <supreme genus> is not contained in any of those ten <genera>, since none of them is predicated of it. Therefore, there is a distinct most general <genus> of non-being; and so there are more genera than ten.

13. Eighth, figments are conceived by the intellect, and in these there is <the notion> of higher and lower; therefore, there is a supreme <genus>; therefore, there is some <other> most general <genus>.

14. Ninth, concerning all these, namely, intentions, non-beings, figments, one can argue in this way: the composing intellect makes compositions of them, of which it judges the truth or falsity, as is evident. Therefore, a simple intellect also conceives them. Therefore, <they exist> under some aspect (*ratione*) of conceiving. <They do> not <exist under the aspect> of a singular; therefore, <they exist under the aspect> of a universal; therefore, <they exist under the aspect> of a genus or of a species etc.; therefore, there is a most general <genus> in them. The underlying implication, however, in all these reasons, namely, that if something is higher in them, there is also a supreme <genus>, is evident according to Aristotle in Bk. IV of the *Metaphysics*.¹⁵ “that is truer which is nearer to the first truth”;

12. The last four principal arguments are responded to in n. 19, not at the end of the question.

13. *Metaphysics*, Bk. V, Ch. 7 (1017a 22–27).

14. *Posterior Analytics*, Bk. II, Ch. 7 (92b 29–30).

15. *Metaphysics*, Bk. IV, Ch. 4 (1008b 35–1009a 5).

and <according to> Bk. V of the same <work>, “that is prior which is nearer to the beginning.”¹⁶ And by <this> reasoning (*ratione*): since otherwise there would not be a stopping <point> in ascending, but the process <would proceed> to infinity.—Likewise, one can argue similarly about privations.

15. It can be said to this <objection> that concrete <accidents>, intentions, non-beings, figments, privations, and whatever else of this kind are in a genus through a reduction to abstract <terms>, <to> things of first intention, <to> beings, <the beings> of which are figments and privations. Since, when “the more common are understood prior to the less common,”¹⁷ it is necessary for the most general <genera> to be primarily intelligible. These, however, are not intelligible except through the attribution to those <things> with which they were said to have a relation. For this reason they cannot be posited as the most general <genera>, but they are posited in a genus through reduction. Similarly, one can posit <the same thing> about potency, which is in a genus through a reduction to the act of which it is said to be a potency.¹⁸

16. Against this <argument>: in all these there is an essential (*per se*) predication of a higher from a lower; therefore, <the predication is> under the aspect (*ratio*) of some universal. Since to be predicated is properly the property of a universal;¹⁹ <and it is> not <the property> of any <thing> other than a genus. One can argue of a single <things> just as it was argued above about concrete <accidents>.²⁰ Therefore, if one is not to proceed to infinity in these <things>, there will be some genus which does not have a higher genus; therefore, <there will be> a most general <genus>, since a most general <genus> is defined in this way by Porphyry.²¹ That <most general genus> is the same as none of these ten <categories>, since it does not have the same species,

16. *Metaphysics*, Bk. V, Ch. 11 (1018b 9–14).

17. Cf. *Physics*, Bk. I, Ch. 1 (184a 25–35).

18. See Pini, *Categories and Logic in Duns Scotus*, 114.

19. *On Interpretation*, Bk. I, Ch. 7 (17a 39–b 1).

20. Cf. *supra*, nn. 8–10.

21. Porphyry, *Isagoge*, Ch. “On Species” (AL I⁶ 20; ed. Busse, 4.17–18).

since it is not essentially (*per se*) predicated of the same <things> in the first mode; therefore, there is another most general <genus> than these ten.—Also according to <this> reason (*rationem*): it is predicated essentially (*in quid*) of its own <species> of none of those ten <genera>; therefore, according to none of those ten does it have the aspect (*rationem*) of a genus. But, when anything is said equally primarily²² of its own species just as any of those ten <genera is said> of its <species>, it follows that they will be equally primarily genera, and they will not <be genera> through a reduction to any of those ten <genera>.

17. Similarly, that there may be a genus and species between any of the previously numbered is shown through two arguments previously mentioned concerning a concrete <accident>.²³ Also, according to the fact that one can seek the “whatness” (*quid*) of any of them <and another can> respond through some univocal <term>, which is in more <things> than that of which the whatness (*quid*) is asked; every univocal predicate in what it is (*in quid*), which is in more <things> than the subject, is a genus, according to Aristotle in Bk. IV of the *Topics*.²⁴

18. Also, because it is necessary that the most general <genus> is primarily intelligible, what is said in the response²⁵ is manifestly false, unless it is understood with respect to those <things> of which it is the most general <genus>. For quantity is not the first intelligible simply, but is <the first intelligible thing> in its own genus. So the first “intention” is the first intelli-

22. The phrase *aeque primo dicatur*, which I translate as “is said equally primarily” means that a predicate is equally (*aeque*) and essentially (*primo*) said of two different species. See also Etzkorn’s comment in Scotus’s *Questions on the Metaphysics*: “One of the alternate expressions for ‘primarily’ given in the Thesaurus is ‘particularly.’ ‘Primo’ in the expression ‘primo dicitur’ has the sense of ‘being predicated primarily,’ i.e., according to its primary or essential meaning. To express this as done ‘equally’ in regard to several subjects, I have chosen the phrase ‘affirmed with equal particularity’”; Girard J. Etzkorn, in John Duns Scotus, *Questions on the Metaphysics of Aristotle*, trans. Girard J. Etzkorn and Allan B. Wolter, 2 vols. (St. Bonaventure, NY: Franciscan Institute, 1997), in Bk. V, q. 5 and 6, fn. 17.

23. Cf. *supra*, nn. 8–10.

24. *Topics*, Bk. IV, Ch. 6 (128a 5–25). To be in more things is to have a wider denotation, since a genus has a greater extension than a species.

25. Cf. *supra*, n. 15.

gible with respect to special intentions, and “non-being” <is the first intelligible> with respect to particular non-beings, and “privation” <is the first intelligible> with respect to particular privations. For, if the contradiction of non-being or the opposite of privation occurs to an intellect prior to a particular being and a particular habit, it follows that non-being and privation are first understood of these particulars. For being primarily leads to the cognition of non-being, and a habit primarily <leads> to the cognition of privation; <it does> not <lead> primarily <to the cognition> of this non-being and of this privation. So also one can argue about potency with respect to act. There is no doubt that concrete <accidents> and intentions are essentially (*per se*) intelligible.

19. One can respond²⁶ especially about non-being, privation, and potency, that although there is an essential (*in quid*) predication in them and <even though there is> the aspect (*ratio*) of a higher <term in them>, nevertheless there is not the aspect (*ratio*) of a genus and a species. Since not anything is predicated of many <things> differing in species or in number; for there is not any distinction of non-beings or of privations or of potencies according to their own nature (*rationem*), but only in relation to their opposites.

20. Against this <argument>: then something is predicated properly of something—or more precisely <something is predicated> in essence (*in quid*); and <it is predicated> under the aspect (*ratio*) of no universal. This does not seem <to be possible>, since “to be predicated of many” is convertible with universal.²⁷

21. Second, by the absolute nature (*ratione*) of the signifies, this is true: “blindness is not deafness”; therefore, privations are distinguished <from one another>. Although their distinction may be from another, this does not prohibit them from being species. For in this way species which are in the genus of substance differ through forms, which forms are not the species themselves.

26. Cf. *supra*, n. 15.

27. Cf. *supra*, n. 16.

22. Third, “common to many” is never of itself distinguished in them; therefore, privation is not distinguished in blindness and deafness except through something added, which <along> with the privation constitute those in their own nature (*ratione*). Therefore, in those additions “these abound from a genus.”²⁸ These additions, therefore, are differentiae, although they are not as complete in being as the differentiae of substance are. Therefore, those are two differing species.

23. To all the objects of these five <objections>—about concrete <accidents>, second intentions, privations, non-beings, and potencies—one can respond that, although these can be understood under some aspect of understanding (*ratione intelligendi*) and <although they can> be predicated among themselves under the aspect (*ratione*) of some universal and <although they can be> subordinated to something <that is> most universal, for insofar as an intention is attributed to them it is diverse from these ten <categories>, nevertheless it holds that there are only ten most general <genera> of things. Since not everything is intelligible, but being in itself is divided into these <ten, according to Aristotle in> Bk. V of the *Metaphysics*,²⁹ and so none of those is a being in itself distinct from these ten.³⁰

24. Against this <argument>: Then it seems that the logician, who essentially (*per se*) considers intentions and the number of the most general <genera> only under this aspect (*ratione*)—namely, by which this intention “most general” can be applied to them—ought to say that there are more most general <genera> than ten, since there are more intentional <genera> than these

28. Porphyry, *Isagoge*, Ch. “On Difference” (AL I⁶ 17; ed. Busse, 10.22–11.1).

29. Cf. *supra*, n. 11.

30. See Pini, *Categories and Logic in Duns Scotus*, 113–14. According to Pini, all second intentions are relations, since the intellect, “by considering one concept as related to another, establishes a relationship between them. This relationship is the second intention.” Furthermore, as Pini points out, there was a debate regarding the ontological status of intentions. Contrary to Aquinas, who thinks that intentions have both a “subjective” and an “objective” existence, Scotus maintains that second intentions have only an “objective” existence. As Pini, 114, states it, “Since second intentions do not have real being, they lack what is usually named as ‘subjective being.’”

<ten>, to which, insofar as they are understood, an intention can be attributed; although the metaphysician, who considers being insofar as it is being, will say that there are only ten <most general genera>. Aristotle³¹ seems to say the opposite of this, <when he> says “of the incomplex <terms>, a single <one> signifies substance, or quantity,” etc., not that a single being only signifies substance, etc.

25. To the opposite is Aristotle.

[I. THE RESPONSE TO THE QUESTION]

26. It must be said that there are only ten most general <genera> of things, whose distinction is not taken only according to something in logic, but according to the essences themselves. For the intention “most general <genus>” is only varied numerically in them. Therefore, with respect to this there is a difficulty, which is more metaphysical than logical. For this reason <the number of the most general genera> is sufficiently known here in the way of a simple fact (*quia*), whereas the metaphysician perhaps can or ought to know the reasoned fact (*propter quid*).³²

[II. TO THE PRINCIPAL ARGUMENTS]

27. To the first argument,³³ I answer as above.³⁴

28. To the first <objection> against this <argument>,³⁵ I say that “being through itself (*per se*)” and “not being through itself (*per se*),” or “being in a subject” and “not being in a subject,” are contradictories. And for this reason since a negation does not negate only the utterance, but <also> the significate, and <since> one cannot negate every significate in a single

31. *Categories*, Ch. 4 (1b 25–27).

32. See Pini, *Categories and Logic in Duns Scotus*, 144 and 187. According to Pini, Scotus, in his *Commentary on the Metaphysics*, changes his mind and decides that categories cannot even be demonstrated by the Metaphysician. See also Duns Scotus, *Questions on the Metaphysics*, Bk. V, q. 5–6, nn. 73–80.

33. Cf. *supra*, n. 1.

34. Cf. *supra*, n. 2, where the implication is denied.

35. Cf. *supra*, n. 3.

act, <a negation> will be <just as> equivocal as an affirmation. But "not being in a subject" is not the same as a substance, for "not being" is not being in a subject. Also, neither is "not being through itself (*per se*)" an accident, since "not being" is not being through itself (*per se*). But "being not through itself (*per se*)" is the same as an accident; and "being not in another" is the same as a substance. And the first <one> does not contradict being through itself (*per se*), nor does the second <one contradict> being in a subject.

29. To the second <objection against the first argument>,³⁶ one can say that accidents are suitable to some <thing> intentional, for example, as "they are attributed to substance" or "they are posterior to substance"; in which an accident is not suitable with a substance.—Or one can concede <the point>, if there is a name, such as *A*, that equivocally signifies substance and the other most general <genera>, <then>, there could be an equally suitable division of being into "*A*" and "when" as <there is a division> into substance and accident, since on both sides of the equivocal <term there will be a division> into an equivocal <term> and into a univocal <term>.

30. To the third <objection> against the <first argument>,³⁷ I say that "equivocal in act" includes all of its significates, and for this reason when he divides being into substance and accident, <Aristotle> posits with respect to act all the nine genera as an "accident." When it is said that "equivocal is not accepted simultaneously except for one significate," this is true from the same <or in relation to the same> understanding; but it is not less <true> in itself <when> it posits all the significates simultaneously. And it is taken in this way, not, however, as it is understood by one.

31. To the second principal <argument>,³⁸ it is said that a superlative is only suitable to one <thing> in one genus, and so there is only one most general <term> in one genus; but absolutely <speaking> there is not only one <most general genus>.—Or otherwise: <it can be said> that "superlative" is said in two ways and is explained <as follows>: in one way <it is said> positively, <and it is explained> through <the phrase> "an excess of

36. Cf. *supra*, n. 4.

38. Cf. *supra*, n. 6.

37. Cf. *supra*, n. 5.

all others"; in another way <it is said> privatively, <and it is explained> through <the phrase> "not to be exceeded by some other." In the first way no <thing> is absolutely a most general <genus>, but <there is> only <a most general term> in some genus, that is, <one term is> more general than all the others in its own genus. In the second way, everything <said> of them is a most general <genus>, since there is not anything more general than it. And this proposition, "what is said through a superlative," etc., is true as the superlative is explained positively, not as it is explained privatively; since many can be first in this way, such that nothing is prior to every one of them.

32. To the third <argument>,³⁹ what was> said previously <suffices>.⁴⁰—Or one can say that a multitude of the categories is reduced to one which is a first cause, which is prior to them, not by predication but by being and by causality; and so something can be prior to them.

33. To the <fourth> argument⁴¹ about concrete <accidents>, I say that the essence signified through "white" is in the genus of quality; but that under this mode of understanding or signifying, it is not essentially (*per se*) a quality or in the genus of quality but <is there> through reduction, since it is plain that it is essentially (*essentialiter*) the same as whiteness because it is essentially (*per se*) in that genus. It is, however, in some most general <genus> essentially (*per se*), namely, in *quality* (*quali*), but not in another. For *quality* (*quale*) only differs from quality (*qualitate*) in the way <or mode> of signifying; since the differentia, although it prohibits the predication of one from another, nevertheless does not suffice to distinguish genera or to make something be in diverse genera.

34. To the <fifth argument>,⁴² I concede that *quality* (*quale*) is a most general <genus> on account of those proofs, but it is not <something> other than quality (*qualitas*). When it is said that "it has other species," I say that it is false. When it is said that "it is predicated essentially (*per se*) of others," I say that it is false, since the essential (*per se*) species of one and of the other differ only in the mode of signifying.

39. Cf. *supra*, n. 7.

41. Cf. *supra*, n. 8.

40. Cf. *supra*, q. 4, nn. 8 and 47.

42. Cf. *supra*, n. 9.

35. Against this: *quality* (*quale*) is a most general <genus> and quality (*qualitas*) is a most general <genus>, and these are not the same most general <genus>; therefore, <there is> another <one>. The implication is evident, since concerning being, the same and diverse include <or contain> a contradiction, according to Aristotle in Bk. IV of the *Metaphysics*.⁴³ The second part of the antecedent is evident, since if they were the same most general <genus>, then one would be predicated of the other; thus “quality is a *quality* (*qualitas est quale*),” and one <would be predicated> of the species of the other.

36. One can say that they are the same most general <genus>. When it is shown that they are not, since one is not predicated of the other, one can say that something is the same as another and <yet> is not predicated of that <other> on account of a diverse mode of predicating. This diversity, although it prohibits the predication of one from another, nevertheless does not suffice to distinguish the highest genera or diverse species. Similarly, on account of that <diverse> mode of signifying one is not predicated of the species of the other; nevertheless, neither are the former and the latter predicated of other species. Accordingly, this must be denied: “whiteness is a species of *quality* (*quale*),” since this also <must be denied>: “whiteness is a *quality* (*quale*).” And it must be conceded that white is not whiteness, but it must not be conceded that they are species of another genus, nor <are they> other species. Since more is required to concede such diversity than impeding the mutual predication of the one to the other.—When it is proved above⁴⁴ that they are diverse genera since “they are not predicated of the same,” one can deny <this proposition>, since the same <things> are species of each, but the former is not the latter.

37. To the other proof,⁴⁵ when it is said that “intentions are attributed to the essence as it is understood,” I say that <intentions are attributed to the essence> according to the mode of abstract understanding or of concrete <understanding>, not <that> it is varied according to the genus or species, although the former is not the latter.

43. Rather, *Metaphysics*, Bk. X, Ch. 3 (1054b 25–26).

44. Cf. *supra*, n. 9.

45. Cf. *supra*, n. 10.

[QUESTION TWELVE

Whether “Some Man” is a
Primary Substance]



ONCERNING the chapter on substance, it is asked whether “some man” is a primary substance.

1. It seems that it is:

According to the authority of Aristotle, who exemplifies a primary substance in this way: as “some man,” <or> “some horse.”¹ And later on, when he maintains that everything else is said about primary <substances> as primary <substances> or exists in them, he argues in this way:² “animal is predicated of man; therefore, of some man,” <and> through “some man” <he> understands a primary substance.

2. Second, it is not a secondary substance, and there is no intermediate between this and a primary <substance>; therefore, it is a primary substance. Proof of the first proposition: if it were a secondary substance, it would not be <anything> except a species; but this is false, since this is true: “no man is a species”; therefore, its contradictory is false.

3. Third, if “some man” were not a primary substance, it could be predicated of many, and so this would be true: “every man is some man,” since it cannot be common to other <things> than to the supposit of a man; but this <statement> is not true. Proof: first since the predicate of a universal affirmative is stated indefinitely (*confunditur*) only confusedly <or> indefinitely, (*confuse*)>, and so through an accident, to the indefiniteness (*confusionem*) of the other, as of a subject;³ there-

1. *Categories*, Ch. 5 (2a 11–13).

2. *Categories*, Ch. 5 (2a 36–37).

3. An example of a universal affirmative stated indefinitely is “all men are non-mortal.”

fore, it can be stated indefinitely through itself.⁴ But <to> this, I say that "some man" cannot be stated indefinitely through itself in such a way by saying "every some man."⁵ Second, since every predicate of a universal affirmative can be the subject of a particular <statement that is the> converse <of> that universal <statement>; this <predicate> cannot be stated in this way, since it is <already> "some man."

4. If one were to say this: "every man is some man," it must be converted to this: "some man is <every> man"—against this <argument>: these differ: "every man is man" and "every man is some man"; therefore, the converses of these differ.

5. To the opposite:

"Some man" is predicated of many; therefore, it is not a primary substance. The antecedent is evident, since this <one> is some man and that <one> is some man.

6. Second, it follows that "this man runs; therefore, some man runs"; and not vice versa; therefore, "some man" is prior to and thus more common <than "this man">; therefore, it is not a primary substance.

7. Third, this is true: "every man is some man"; first, since its contradictory is impossible, <i.e.,> "some man is not some man"; second, since it is true of every singular <man>. Therefore, "some man" is predicated of every man; therefore, it is not a primary substance.

4. The argument is that a universal affirmative is confused or stated indefinitely only when the predicate is the negation of an accident, not through a negation or limitation of the subject itself. This conclusion, i.e., "therefore, it can be stated indefinitely through itself," is denied in the following statement.

5. The force of this argument makes for an awkward English translation. The point of the argument, though, is that the predicate "some man" cannot be negated by adding the adjective "every" in front of it, in the way that the predicate "mortal" can be negated by adding the prefix "non" in front of it.

[I. TO THE QUESTION]

[A. *The Opinion of Others*]

8. To the question, it is said⁶ that "some man" is a primary substance, nor is it said of many except equivocally.

9. To the second <argument to the opposite>,⁷ one can say that the implication is not valid except by the consequent having been distinguished.

10. To the third <argument to the opposite>,⁸ one can say that that universal is false and its contradictory true, by taking "some man" in the predicate for a primary substance, namely, so that a false <statement> is affirmed of man, since some man is not some man, for example, as Socrates is not Plato. The induction is not valid, but is a figure of speech, by proceeding from more determinate <things>⁹ to one <thing>, and so a *quality* (*quale*) is changed into this <individual thing (*in hoc aliquid*)>.¹⁰

[B. *Against the Opinion of Others*]

11. Against the <opinion of others>: from this <opinion> it follows: (A) that a particular does not lead to a universal unless a distinction is previously made; and (B) that a particular does not lead to a singular unless a distinction is previously made; and (C) that a particular proposition would not have a contradictory <proposition> unless a distinction is previously made; and then a universal would not contradict itself, but <a universal would contradict> a particular affirmative in the sense that a singular negative will sufficiently contradict it, since in these an affirmation and the negation of the same is of the same <thing>; and (D) that a particular proposition cannot be a part of a syllogism simply and absolutely, or not unless it is singular; and (E) that no syllogism would be absolutely valid, since no converted <syllogism> would be absolutely valid, since in every

6. Cf. supra, n. 5.

7. Cf. supra, n. 6.

8. Cf. supra, n. 7.

9. The opposite of "determinate" is "indefinite."

10. According to Deferrari, *hoc aliquid* is a translation of the Aristotelian phrase *tode ti*, which signifies this determined substance, this individual, substantial, non-accidental thing; Roy J. Deferrari, *A Latin-English Dictionary*, 461.

sylogism, or in its converted <part>, some proposition is particular, which cannot be a part of a syllogism absolutely; and (F) that a particular <proposition> and an indefinite <proposition> are not convertible, since one <proposition> (as <for example> the indefinite) has singular <propositions> for the causes of its truth, which the particular has for its senses <or meanings> being multiplied; and (G) that there would not be an equivocation in speech, since neither "man" nor "some" is manifold. It is manifest <that it> is not <manifold> in itself; nor, for example, <when> it is added to another; proof: since the addition of something to another does not confer a new significate to it.

[II. THE SOLUTION OF THE QUESTION]

12. Therefore, since these <consequences> seem to be more untenable, contrary to Aristotle in his entire logic (*tota logica*), and against the whole nature (*omnem naturam*) of the syllogism and of contradiction, than the one passage of Aristotle <can> explain, it seems that one must rather say that "some man" is not a primary substance, that is, it does not signify only one supposit of man, as "that man" <does>, on account of the previous <consequences being> untenable.

13. But on account of the authority of Aristotle, one must understand that "man" of itself is indifferent to many acceptances, namely, on behalf of the utterance, the intention, and on behalf of the supposits. Therefore, <these> signs, for example, "every," <and> "some," <which are> added to it, take away the indifference to the intentions and to the utterance, and determine <it> only to the acceptance for the supposits. But still, in that acceptance, it is indifferent to each and every <specific> supposit. Therefore, Aristotle, wishing to express a primary substance as it is distinguished from a secondary substance, namely, as an intention of a secondary substance does not inhere in it,¹¹ and nevertheless <wishing to express it> in a certain general measure, says "for example, some man," that is, any one that is that <particular> man.

11. I have followed an alternative manuscript here. The critical edition has: "namely, as an intention of a secondary substance *does inhere* in it."

14. In another way, one can say that through "some man" a determinate primary substance is posited, nevertheless indeterminately, and then Aristotle exemplifies about a determinate primary substance, although not determinately, for example, to this <man> or that <man>.

15. But perhaps "some man" does not signify a determinate primary substance, neither determinately nor indeterminately, although <"some man"> supposits for that <determinate primary substance> when it is the subject of a particular proposition. That it <i.e., "some man"> does not signify <a determinate primary substance>, is evident through the truth of this proposition: "every man is some man." For a determinate primary substance, either determinately or indeterminately so taken, is not truly predicated of every man. And so "man," when it is the subject, supposits indefinitely <for> a determinate primary substance indeterminately; nevertheless, it does not signify that <determinate primary substance>. For this reason the subsequent way of speaking seems to be more suitable.

[III. TO THE PRINCIPAL ARGUMENTS]

[A. *To the First and Second Principal Arguments*]

16. To the first argument,¹² it is evident that Aristotle names a primary substance in a certain common way (*quodammodo in communi*), through "common" being taken for the acceptance for the supposits.

17. To the <second argument>,¹³ I say that "some man" is an accidental being, composed from a thing of first and second intention; and neither is it a primary nor a secondary substance, but it is an accidental intermediate between them. And such an intermediate is found between the lowest species and the individual, as "white man," although <this> is not an essential intermediate.

18. Against this <last argument>: "some man" is predicated essentially (*in quid*) of many <things> differing in number, ac-

12. Cf. *supra*, n. 1.

13. Cf. *supra*, n. 2.

cording to the previous <argument>;¹⁴ therefore, it is a species.

19. Likewise, an accidental being is composed from things of diverse genera; <but> “some man” is not of this kind, since the mode of understanding man is not a thing of any genus.

20. To the first <argument>,¹⁵ one can say that “some man” is predicated essentially (*in quid*) of no one <thing>, since an accidental being does not have an essence (*quid*).

21. Against this: Then by equal reason this predication is not essential (*in quid*): “some man is an animal.”

22. Second, in Bk. I of the *Sophistical Refutations*,¹⁶ Aristotle says: “the definition of a proposition and of only one <thing under> the proposition is the same, and <the definition> of a thing and of only one <thing> of the thing <is the same>.” Nevertheless, the <phrase> “only one thing” is composed from a thing of first and second intention. Therefore, such a composite <phrase> can have a definition; therefore, <it can have> an essence (*quid*).

23. Third, “some” only¹⁷ expresses a mode of understanding man for the supposits, and only in that acceptance does it express the essence (*quid*) of the supposits.¹⁸ Therefore, “some” does not prohibit man from being predicated essentially (*in quid*) of these; rather, it contributes more to this.

24. On behalf of the response of these <arguments>,¹⁹ it is necessary to understand that every syncategorematic <term> in a predicate is part of the predicate.²⁰ The proof of which is through the impossible: otherwise, from true <premises> a false <conclusion> follows in this way: “no man is every man, that man is man.” If the sign in the major <premise> is not part of the predicate, then one can infer in the conclusion, “therefore, that man is not a man,” since it would not be necessary, in order to have an identity of the major extreme, that <the same term> be taken in the major and in the conclusion with the same

14. Cf. *supra*, n. 5.

15. Cf. *supra*, n. 18.

16. *Sophistical Refutations*, Bk. I, Ch. 6 (169a 8–10).

17. For the sake of clarity, it should be pointed out that in this argument, “only” is a translation of *tantummodo*, whereas in the previous argument, i.e., n. 22, and in his reply, n. 27, the word “only” is *solus*.

18. Cf. *supra*, n. 13.

19. Cf. *supra*, nn. 21–23.

20. Cf. *supra*, q. 8, n. 29.

sign—if that <sign> is not part of the predicate, as it is manifest in the second mode of the second figure.²¹ Since the major extreme is not taken with the same sign in the conclusion and in the major. And so a false <conclusion> follows from true <premises, unless the sign of the major term is part of the predicate>.

25. Likewise, it is shown more clearly (*ostensive*) on account of the essence (*propter quid*), since a syncategorematic <term> never has a relation to the preceding <term>.²² Otherwise, a negation subsequent to the composition can make a proposition negative, just as a negation <preceding the composition makes it negative>.²³ Therefore, a syncategorematic <term> added to a predicate does not determine <or limit> it <i.e., the predicate> in comparison to the subject, and so not insofar as <it is> an extreme, since insofar as it is an extreme, it is related to the other extreme. But every syncategorematic <term> determines the extreme insofar as it is an extreme; therefore, no <thing> added to the term in the predicate is a syncategorematic <term>, but <that addition> is part of the extreme.²⁴ Nevertheless, it determines the absolute understanding of the term to which it is added, and so it is a syncategorematic <term> in respect to part of the predicate, but not in respect to the <whole> predicate, since it itself is the other part of the predicate. But a syncategorematic <term> added to the subject is not part of the subject,

21. An example of a syllogism in the second mode of the second figure (traditionally known as *camestres*) is: All *P* is *M*; no *S* is *M*; therefore, no *S* is *P*. As one can see from this example, the major term is modified by the quantifier “all” in the major premise, but not in the conclusion; hence the identity of the major term does not include the syncategorematic term “all.”

22. In the context, what precedes the syncategorematic term is the copula. In the former argument, i.e., in n. 24, the example is “no man is every man,” where the syncategorematic term is “every” and the preceding term is the verb “is.”

23. Again, an example helps clarify Scotus’s argument. In the statement “All men are non-mortal,” the subsequent negation, in this case the one that follows the copula, does not make the statement negative, whereas a negation preceding the copula does; e.g., “No man is mortal” is a negative statement.

24. Scotus’s argument is that every syncategorematic term, such as “all,” “some,” or “no,” limits or determines the subject of a proposition. When such a term, however, is added to the predicate, it does not limit it or determine it in the same way, but must be considered as part of the predicate, not merely as something that limits it.

since it determines <the whole subject> to which it is added, in comparison to the predicate.

26. Since these things have been seen, <a response> is evident to the counter-argument (*rationem*).²⁵ Since in this way, I recommend that "some man is an animal," is <to be understood as> "some" <to be taken as> only a syncategorematic <term> and "man" <to be taken> only <as> the subject, and therefore the proposition can be an essential (*per se*) <proposition>. But it is not <to be taken> in this <same> way when "some man" is the predicate.

27. To the other <argument>,²⁶ I say that "one" (*unus*) and "only" (*solus*) can be <either> syncategorematic <terms> or categorematic <terms>. Aristotle understands them in the second way in Bk. I of the *Sophistical Refutations*,²⁷ since "the definition of a thing and of only one <thing> is the same," that is, of the thing undivided in itself and divided from <all> others, since that is a thing through its essence. He does not, however, understand <that passage> such that "one" and "alone" are syncategorematic <terms>.

28. To the third <argument>,²⁸ I concede that "some" expresses a mode of understanding man for the suppositis; nevertheless, under such a mode of understanding, "man" cannot be predicated <of a subject> unless that mode is part of the predicate, on account of the reason expressed above;²⁹ and that whole <predicate> is not predicated essentially (*in quid*). Since if "man" could be predicated under such a mode, only by remaining in the mode would it be predicated <of a subject> essentially (*in quid*). And since the species expresses nothing, except insofar as it is suitable to be <so> predicated, "man" under such a mode cannot be the species.

29. To the other <argument> above, which was against the response to the second principal <argument>,³⁰ when it was

25. Cf. supra, n. 21.

26. Cf. supra, n. 22.

27. *Sophistical Refutations*, Bk. I, Ch. 6 (169a 8–10).

28. Cf. supra, n. 23.

29. Cf. supra, n. 24. In other words, "some," which is the mode of predicating man, has to be an essential part of the predicate, so that the entire predicate in question is "some man," not some "man."

30. Cf. supra, n. 19.

said, "an accidental being is composed from things of diverse genera," that can be denied. Since whatever is not essentially the same with something, whether <that something> be a thing of <another> genus or not, <that which has been so> composed with that something constitutes an accidental being.

[*B. To the Third Principal Argument*]

30. To the third principal <argument>,³¹ I concede that this is true: "every man is some man." When it is shown in the first <proof> that it is not <true>, since the predicate cannot be stated indefinitely (*confundibile*) through itself, I deny <this proposition>. For in the contradictory of a universal predicate, it will be the same predicate that is also in that <original universal predicate>, both stated indefinitely in a confused manner and <stated> distributively; nor is it otherwise necessary for it to be stated indefinitely through an accident <in order for it> to be stated indefinitely through itself.—Or otherwise, one can concede that insofar as "some man" is predicated <of a subject>, it is understood to specify the thing of this verb "is," so that the predicate is the whole "being-some-man"; and that <predicate> can be stated indefinitely through a universal affirmative sign immediately added.—Through this <reasoning> I say to the second proof:³² since that universal <predicate> is converted in this <way>: "any being-some-man is a man."

[III. WHAT MUST BE NOTED ABOUT
THE DIVISION OF SUBSTANCE]

31. *Substance, in the proper <and> principal sense, is,*³³ etc.

Note that the division of substance into primary and secondary <substances> is not a division of the most general <genus> into its species, but of a subject into accidents, since "substance" according to what is understood—according to which consideration it pertains to the logician—is divided into intentions <that are> accidental to it.

31. Cf. *supra*, n. 3.


32. Cf. *ibid.*

33. Cf. *supra*, n. 1.

[QUESTION THIRTEEN

Whether Certain Implications of Aristotle Hold Formally]

*Therefore, all others either are said of primary substances or are in them.*¹

T IS ASKED about the implications which Aristotle² gives for proving this conclusion, namely, “animal is predicated of man; therefore, <it is predicated> of some man” and “color is in a body; therefore, <it is> in some body,” whether implications of this kind hold formally.

1. It seems that they do not:

Since neither does it hold in another place that “species is predicated of man; therefore, <it is predicated> of some man,” where it is the same form of arguing.

2. Second, it seems that <this> is a fallacy of the consequent “by not being distributed from the higher to the lower,”³ and so it is an affirmation of the consequent, which implications are not valid.⁴

1. *Categories*, Ch. 5 (2a 34–36).

2. *Categories*, Ch. 5 (2a 36–b 2). The implications to which Scotus refers are two hypothetical arguments that he uses to prove the conclusions mentioned here, namely, “if animal is not predicated of any individual man, then it is not predicated of man in general,” and “if color is not in some individual body, then it is not in a body at all.”

3. Apparently, the objection is based upon the fact that Aristotle’s hypothetical syllogism moves from an inferior term in the antecedent to a superior term in the consequent, instead of the other way around.

4. According to the objection, the hypothetical argument is fallacious because it affirms the consequent, whereas in reality, the consequent is already

3. Third, a term of itself is indifferent to every supposition. Therefore, if it is argued from that thing taken absolutely to that thing <taken> only under one supposition, it is argued from <something> indifferent to <something> determinate, and so it commits a fallacy of the consequent. It is <taken> in this way in the affirmation.

4. Fourth, by the same reason by which that implication holds, it seems that this <implication also> holds: "animal is predicated of every man; therefore, some animal <is predicated of every man>"; but this is not valid; therefore, neither is that <valid>. Proof of the major: in each of them a similar descent is made, except that here <the descent is made> in the subject, there <the descent is made> in the predicate; this diversity does not impede <the argument>, since every universal can be converted when the terms are taken uniformly. The proof of the minor: since the antecedent is true, the consequent is false.

5. Fifth, with equal reason it follows that "an animal is every man; therefore, some animal <is every man>," which is not true, since the antecedent is true and the consequent false, since its contradictory is true. That the antecedent is true is evident: since "an animal is man insofar as <it is> man; therefore, <an animal is> every man." The antecedent of this is evident: since "animal through the nature of man is man; therefore, to that extent <it is> man." The implication is evident according to Aristotle in Bk. I of the *Prior Analytics* in the chapter "On Reduplication."⁵

6. Sixth, the primary <substances> destroyed (*destructis primis*),⁶ <if> animal is predicated of man, and not of some man,

negative, so that, without qualification, the conclusion is an affirmation, even though in the syllogism it is actually a denial of the original consequent. As the reply in n. 7 states, Aristotle actually "proves each implication by inferring from the opposite of the consequent to the opposite of the antecedent." In short, the syllogism is a *modus tollens* argument.

5. *Prior Analytics*, Bk. I, Ch. 38 (49a 11–26).

6. "The primary [substances] destroyed (*destructis primis*)" is an ablative absolute. Appealing to the authority of Priscian, Scotus points out in n. 24 that this phrase can be explained by any one of the following qualifiers: "if," "since," or "when." Scotus, however, deliberately leaves this question unanswered, claiming that any one of them is possible. Consequently, in translating this phrase

then the implication <i.e., that it is predicated of some man> is not valid, since there is not any <primary substance>. From this it also follows that the <third> conclusion⁷ of Aristotle is false, namely, "the primary <substances> destroyed,"⁸ etc., since <if> these <primary substances> did not exist (*eis non existentibus*), secondary substances could <still> be mutually predicated of themselves essentially (*per se*); therefore, <they could> also remain <in themselves>; since "to be a secondary substance" is to be predicated essentially in the genus of substance.

7. To the opposite is Aristotle. And he proves each implication by inferring the opposite of the antecedent from the opposite of the consequent.

[I. TO THE QUESTION]

[A. A Doubt about the First and Second Implication Concerning the First Conclusion⁹ of Aristotle]

8. It must be said that this implication is good: "animal is predicated of man; therefore, <it is predicated> of some man,"¹⁰ by taking "is predicated" as Aristotle takes it here, namely, <by taking it for the predication> of a superior <term> of an inferior <term> in a genus. For what lies above this rule¹¹ "when one <thing> is predicated of another," etc., which is valid, is this <rule>: "what is prior to the prior in a genus, is prior to the posterior."¹² It must also be understood that this implication holds by descending to that <particular> man, where it is a determinately determined primary substance (*prima substantia determinata et determinate*), since it follows that "if animal is prior to man, then <it is prior> to that <man>." But Aristotle, in making

throughout this question, I have followed Scotus's lead and left it as ambiguous as he does.

7. The third conclusion referred to is that "it would be impossible for any of the other things to exist."

8. *Categories*, Ch. 5 (2b 6–7).

9. *Categories*, Ch. 5 (2a 34–36).

10. Cf. *supra*, fn. 2.

11. *Categories*, Ch. 3 (1b 10); cf. *supra*, q. 9.

12. Cf. *supra*, q. 9, n. 14.

the inference, applies it to a determinate primary substance, although indeterminately, as it is posited through this <phrase>: "what is some man," since the opposite of the consequent is taken in this way.

9. But about the <second> implication, "color is in a body; therefore, <it is> in some body,"¹³ it is more doubtful, since it does not hold through the rule expressed above.¹⁴

10. It is said that it holds for common accidents through the dialectical <rule> "from the greater," since these are primarily in primary substances rather than in secondary <substances>, although it holds for a property the other way around.

11. Against this <argument>: then he does not prove universally that all other <things> are <either> said primarily of primary substances or are in them, since proper accidents are not <in primary substances>.

12. One can say that the second implication holds of every real accident, since no such <accident> exists in <something> common, except by some mediating supposit. Therefore, if it exists in a common <thing>, it also exists in a supposit, nevertheless indeterminately. And according to this it must be understood that the second implication does not hold by descending determinately to a determinate primary substance, but <this> is a fallacy of the consequent. Nor does Aristotle descend in this way, since he neither takes the opposite of the consequent in this way, but he descends to a determinate <primary substance>; nevertheless, <he does so> indeterminately.

13. Furthermore, this proof does not seem sufficient, since a property is in <something> common, and not insofar as it is in the supposits. Since, insofar as it is a property, it is primarily in <something> common, and according to this, the common <thing> is extraneous to the supposits. Since by taking "common" for the middle <term>, so that the property is primarily said of it, and <by taking it> in the minor so that it is in the sup-

13. Cf. *supra*, fn. 2.

14. Cf. *supra*, n. 8.

posit, there is a fallacy of accident in this way: "man is primarily risible; that is a man; therefore, that <man> is primarily risible." Therefore, not every real accident is in <something> common as it is in the supposits.

[*B. The Solution to the Doubts about Each Implication*]

14. Therefore, it is said that each implication¹⁵ holds only by taking "common" as it has personal supposition, and then the second implication holds in virtue of this rule: "nothing is in something suppositing disjunctively for many, unless it is in something of those <which is> taken indeterminately."

15. But nevertheless the first implication seems to hold absolutely without such a specification of supposition, since the significate of the superior is prior to the inferior. Therefore, whatever is prior to that significate, is prior to the supposit; and the first implication holds according to this <rule>.

16. One can say that in a simple supposition the significate is taken for the significate, and that whatever is prior to the significate of a superior in that mode, is not prior to the inferior. Since the significate of a superior in that mode is not prior to the inferior, but is extraneous to it, as is evident by joining the premises together, when a term holds absolutely in the major, and in the minor it is said of the supposits.

[*C. Concerning the Second Conclusion*¹⁶ of Aristotle]

17. From these consequent proofs from the opposites, Aristotle infers:¹⁷ "therefore, all other <things> either are said of the principal, substantial subjects, or are in them." This conclusion must be understood, as it follows from the antecedent proof, and it is <understood> in this way: all other <things> which are said of secondary <substances> or are in them, as they have a personal acceptance, are said of primary <substances> or are in them.

15. Cf. *supra*, nn. 8–9.

16. The second conclusion, which is given at (2b 4–5), is a recapitulation of the first conclusion, which is given at (2a 34–36).

17. *Categories*, Ch. 5 (2b 4–5).

[*D. Concerning the Third Conclusion of Aristotle*]

18. From this second conclusion Aristotle infers a third <conclusion>¹⁸ "Therefore, the primary <substances> destroyed, it is impossible that any of the others remain." This <conclusion> can be explained in this way: "with respect to that existence which the other <things> have in primary <substances>," although they could remain with respect to another existence, as a quiddity or as an intelligible existence.

19. Against this exposition: a secondary substance, insofar as an expression is made about it here, is opposed to a primary <substance>, since they divide substance through <being> opposite, and an accident <is opposed> to each of them. No opposite, however, has its existence in its opposite. Therefore, no secondary substance has its existence in a primary <substance>. Therefore, according to that exposition "the primary <substances> destroyed, nothing of the other <things> is destroyed" is said absolutely. This is confirmed through the fact that Aristotle, speaking of secondary substance and accidents, says, "all other <things> than primary <substance>."¹⁹ But these, insofar as they have their existence in a primary <substance>, are not other <things>. Therefore, it is not said of these insofar as they have their existence in a primary substance.

20. For this reason, one can say otherwise that this third conclusion, as it is taken logically, namely, of these intentions, is manifest in this way: a secondary substance is said relatively to a primary <substance> as it is said to that of which it is said. Therefore, if there is not a primary <substance>, there is not a secondary <substance>, since "relatives are simultaneous by nature," according to Aristotle further on in the chapter "On Relation."²⁰

21. Likewise, an accident is said relatively to a subject, when speaking of the intentions; and an intention of a subject is based on either a primary or a secondary substance. If <it is based>

18. Cf. *supra*, n. 6.

20. *Categories*, Ch. 7 (7b 15).

19. Cf. *supra*, n. 17.

on a primary <substance>, then by the primary <substance> being destroyed, it is not the subject of that accident. If it is not the subject, then neither <is it> the accident, in virtue of this rule: "relatives are simultaneous by nature." If an intention of a subject is based on a secondary substance, it can be argued in this way: the primary substance destroyed, there is no secondary <substance>, according to the argument (*locum*) from relatives. And if there is no secondary substance, the subject of such an accident does not exist. And if this <is true>, then there is no such accident, according to the argument (*locum*) from relatives.

22. It is said that the intention of a subject, with respect to its accident, can be based in some accident, which is neither a secondary nor a primary substance.

23. Against this <argument>: that accident has a subject, <which is> either an accident or a substance. If it is a substance, it is argued <in the same way> as above.²¹ If it is an accident, <then> that <accident> has a subject: either it proceeds *ad infinitum* in accidents, of which <things> anything is the subject of another—which Aristotle holds to be untenable in Bk. IV of the *Metaphysics*,²² or it will come to a stop at a secondary or a primary substance. And concerning all these, it is argued from first to last.

24. It must be noted, however, that this proposition, "the primary <substances> destroyed," etc., does not posit that the primary <substances> are destroyed. Since an ablative absolute, according to Priscian in Bk. II of the *Constructions*,²³ is explained through "if," "since," or "when." Therefore, it is possible that this is the sense: "if" the primary substances were destroyed, the other <things> would be destroyed; or "since" or "when." And whichever explanation is true, since the affirmation of any one is in comparison to another, it does not require that that one be

21. Cf. *supra*, n. 21.

22. *Metaphysics*, Bk. IV, Ch. 4 (1007a 34–b 1).

23. Priscianus, *Institutiones grammaticae*, XVIII, Ch. 1 (ed. M. Hertz, II 214–215).

posited absolutely, but <that> is a fallacy according to a certain respect (*quid*) and absolutely.

25. Also, the aforesaid conclusion,²⁴ namely, <the one that follows,> “the primary <substances> destroyed,” etc., can be understood about those which exist under intentions, since a secondary substance does not have another existence than <the existence> from a primary substance. Similarly, the being of an accident (*esse accidentis*) is from a subject. If it is from a primary substance that is not <actually> existing, <then> there is no accident. If from a secondary <substance>, that <substance> does not exist if the primary <substance> does not exist. Therefore, if there were no primary substance, no substance would exist nor would any accident.

26. Perhaps this third conclusion is even more generally true than the first or second <conclusion>, although it is not <true> insofar as it is inferred from them.

[II. TO THE PRINCIPAL ARGUMENTS]

27. To the first argument,²⁵ I say that a species is not predicated of man, as “to be predicated” is taken here, since it is not superior to it in a genus.

28. Against this: this is true: “man is a species”; therefore, “species” is truly predicated of man.

29. Likewise, if a species is in man, it is argued that the following implication is not valid, since it does not follow <that> “therefore, it is in some man.”

30. To the first <objection>,²⁶ I say that this verb “is” can indicate any union of the extremes, and it is not necessary that it always indicate that a predicate is superior to the subject. But for the exercising of that which is signified, here it is necessary to add some determination to the composition of this verb “is,” as “essentially” or something of this kind.

24. The conclusion referred to is that “it would be impossible for any of the other things to exist.”

25. Cf. *supra*, n. 1.

26. Cf. *supra*, n. 28.

31. The second reason against the response²⁷ proves that what is in man—not according to personal supposition but simple—is not in some man, which is well conceded.—One can also say to the <first> principal argument²⁸ that “species,” if it is said of man, is nevertheless not <said of man in such a way> so that man has personal supposition. And neither implication is valid unless it is taken commonly.

32. To the second principal argument,²⁹ as it is against each implication,³⁰ one can say generally that it is not a fallacy of the consequent, since it is not argued to a determinate primary substance determinately but indeterminately, and in this way it is equally common with a common term, by being taken personally. But insofar as it is against the first implication, one can specifically say that when “prior” or “superior” or others of this kind express a relation to the posterior and to the inferior, one may argue from a superior determining such a relation to an inferior. Since whatever is prior to man, is prior to that <particular man>. The cause of which is that since a superior, insofar as it determines such a relation, has the virtue <or force> of being taken universally. For what is prior to the superior, is said of it universally; and from the superior being distributed, one may descend to the inferior.

33. To the third <principal argument>,³¹ I say that a term in one proposition has but one supposition, since one proposition is a sign of one composite understanding. And diverse suppositions of terms are diverse accounts of understanding a term with respect to a third <thing>; and all diverse suppositions are opposites in their own genus. Since, therefore, it is impossible that the same <thing>, in the same composite understanding with respect to a third <thing>, be understood under diverse or opposite accounts of understanding, <then> it is impossible that the same <thing> have diverse suppositions in one proposition. Therefore, the term is indifferent to diverse suppositions, although not in one proposition. We speak, however, of the

27. Cf. *supra*, n. 29.

29. Cf. *supra*, n. 2.

31. Cf. *supra*, n. 3.

28. Cf. *supra*, n. 1.

30. Cf. *supra*, nn. 8–9.

consequent <in the same way> that the antecedent is one proposition, and so there is no more indifference in the antecedent than in the consequent.

34. To the fourth <principal> argument³² that is against the first implication,³³ one can say that it is not a similar type (*ratio*) of descending. Since by descending under the subject, one argues through this rule "what is predicated of the superior, is also <predicated> of the inferior," which is necessary as "to be predicated" is taken here. By descending under the predicate, however, it is argued through this rule: "the inferior is also <predicated> of what the superior is predicated," which commits the fallacy of the consequent.

35. It must be noted that although one can concede that this is true: "every man is some animal," nevertheless, it is not <true> insofar as "some animal" is a primary substance. For a determinate primary substance, whether taken determinately or indeterminately, is not said of every man.

36. But then it seems that that reasoning³⁴ is more valid against the second implication,³⁵ since by arguing in this way, "in every body there is color; therefore, in every body there is some color," so that "some color" expresses a primary substance, the antecedent is true and the consequent is false. Nevertheless, this implication seems also to hold through the same rule through which the implication of Aristotle also <holds>.

37. I say that <it does not hold> through the same rule, since the second implication of Aristotle holds through this rule: "what inheres in something standing disjunctively for many, inheres in some of them indeterminately (*indeterminate*)"; but a term standing only indefinitely (*confuse*) <for many>, does not stand disjunctively for many. From this it follows that the implication only holds from a common <term> having personal supposition, and not <from a common term having> any <supposition> whatever but a determinate <supposition>; and that, I say, <does not have it except> when a term stands for some de-

32. Cf. *supra*, n. 4.

34. Cf. *supra*, n. 4

33. Cf. *supra*, n. 8.

35. Cf. *supra*, n. 9.

terminate <thing>, nevertheless indeterminately, as the subject of an indefinite or particular <proposition>.

38. Against this: if it does not follow that "animal is predicated of every man; therefore, some animal <is predicated of every man>," then an animal that is predicated of every man is not some animal. And if this is not said of a primary substance, nor is it in it, as is manifest, then something neither is said of a primary substance nor is in it, which is contrary to Aristotle. Therefore, it follows that <something> untenable is <held> contrary to Aristotle, unless a descent holds under a term standing merely indefinitely. In the same way one can argue about this: "color is in every body."

39. To this I say that in the first implication there is a fallacy of the consequent, since in regard to "this follows that," it is inferred, "this is that," and not the other way around. For many <things> are truly said of each other through this word "is," none of which implies the other. Therefore, when the same order is argued negatively, there is a fallacy of the consequent from the destruction of the antecedent.

40. Besides, when it is said, "if it is not some animal, it is not said of a primary substance," this implication is not valid, since "something," insofar as it is a secondary substance, is said of a primary <substance>, as "to be said of" is taken here; and according to this it is extraneous "to some animal." Therefore, a fallacy of the accident is revealed in this implication.

41. Furthermore, when it is said, "if animal, as it is said of every man, is not said of some primary substance nor is it in it, then something neither is said of a primary substance nor is in it," there is a fallacy of a figure of speech, by exchanging "in which" (*quo*) for "what" (*quid*).³⁶ For it ought to be inferred in this way: "therefore, something under some mode of being received, is neither said of a primary <substance> nor is in a primary <substance>." And it must be conceded as if necessary, since "every man" neither is said "of" nor is it "in" <a primary substance>.

36. Cf. *Sophistical Refutations*, Bk. I, Ch. 4 (166b 10–14).

42. When it is said in the fourth principal argument³⁷ that “there is not a diversity here <in the subject> and there <in the predicate>, except that here a descent happens from the part of the subject, there from the part of the predicate,” I say that that descent accompanies a diversity of suppositions which prohibits the implication, since it does not hold except by a term suppositing in one mode.

43. When it is said³⁸ that “a universal is converted without a figure of speech,” it is true, since a variation of supposition concerning one term is not <a variation> in relation to the remaining term suppositing in the same way; and it would not be a figure of speech unless it were.

44. To the <fifth principal argument>,³⁹ I say that <something> similar does not follow from each part, since this proposition, “an animal is every man,” is posited by no one as true such that “an animal” has a determinate supposition; and otherwise this implication does not hold.—Or otherwise: <I say that something similar does not follow from each part> since “every man” is not predicated of animal as “to be predicated” is taken here, even though the proposition is posited as true; for it is not true in the first mode of essential (*per se*) <predication>.

45. To the last <argument>,⁴⁰ I say that in speaking of intentions, <if> the primary substances are destroyed, <then> there are no secondary substances; since by one relative being destroyed, the remaining is also destroyed.⁴¹ Neither is some predicate also in the genus of substance. Nor in that way are primary substances more corruptible than secondary <substances>.

46. It is similar about things which are under (*subsunt*) <them>, insofar as such intentions are attributed to them. But if we speak about the being of things, perhaps one can concede that man is an animal, although not this or that <animal>; but this is not according to the fact that “man” has a determinate personal supposition (for it does not have that except when there are some supposits of it), but since to accept the supposit

37. Cf. *supra*, n. 4.

39. Cf. *supra*, n. 5.

41. Cf. *Categories*, Ch. 7 (7b 20).

38. Cf. *ibid.*

40. Cf. *supra*, n. 6.

of anything common, either existing or not existing, is through the addition of a demonstrative pronoun in this way: just as "that common <thing>" is. Therefore, it would be better to say that—whether some man exists or not—it always follows that "animal is predicated of man, therefore of some <man>," and that on account of the same the consequent is true, and on account of that the antecedent <is true>, namely, on account of the inseparable union of the extremes, even if neither exists.

47. Against the third conclusion,⁴² it is argued in this way: when the posterior is destroyed, it is not necessary that the prior be destroyed. But a secondary substance is prior to the primary <substance>, since it follows the primary and not the other way around; and prior is <understood> as such according to Aristotle in the chapter "Concerning Priority."⁴³ Therefore, <if> the primary substance <were> destroyed, it is not necessary that the secondary be destroyed.

48. One can say that, in speaking of intentions, they are simultaneous by nature since they are correlatives; in speaking of things, although perhaps "man" is prior to that man, nevertheless it is not <prior> to some man, since a secondary substance does not have another existence than the existence of some primary substance.

42. Cf. *supra*, n. 18.

43. *Categories*, Ch. 12 (14a 29–35); *Metaphysics*, Bk. V, Ch. 11 (1018b 30–1019a 14).

[QUESTION FOURTEEN

Is the Differentia of the Genus of Substance a Substance?]

*It is common to every substance not to be in a subject. This, however, is not proper to a substance, but is also <proper> to a differentia.*¹



IN SPEAKING ABOUT that which is under an intention, it is asked concerning this whether a differentia in the genus of substance is a substance.

1. According to the text here, it seems that <a differentia in the genus of substance> is not <a substance>:

Since a primary property does not inhere only in a substance, but also in a differentia; but if a differentia were to be a substance, <a primary property> could inhere in it and nevertheless only in a substance.

2. Second, <a differentia> is neither a primary substance, since it is said of a subject; nor <is it> a secondary <substance>, since it is neither a species nor a genus in the genus of substance; these alone are secondary substances according to Aristotle.²

3. Third, <a differentia> has a contrary, since it has something at the greatest distance from itself in the same genus; and contrariety is such a distance, according to Aristotle in Bk. X of the *Metaphysics*.³ Nothing, however, is contrary to substance, according to Aristotle a little lower <in the *Categories*>.⁴

1. *Categories*, Ch. 5 (3a 21–22).

2. *Categories*, Ch. 5 (2b 30–31).

3. *Metaphysics*, Bk. X, Ch. 4 (1055a 9–10).

4. *Categories*, Ch. 5 (3b 25).

4. Fourth, according to Aristotle in Bk. V of the *Metaphysics*,⁵ the first kind (*modus*) of quality is the differentia of a substance; quality, however, is not a substance.

5. If it is said that Aristotle understands in Bk. V <of the *Metaphysics*> that it has a mode of predicating “as a *quality*” (*in quale*):

This does not seem to be true, since the metaphysician differs from the logician in the fact that the metaphysician considers being insofar as it is being; the logician <considers being> insofar as it is considered by reason. Therefore, what has only a mode of predicating “as a *quality*” (*in quale*), even though a quality can be expressed in some mode by the logician, nevertheless <can> not <be expressed only as a quality> by the metaphysician, unless it is essentially a quality.

6. To the opposite:

Non-substance is not prior to substance, since substance is the first being.⁶ Differentia is naturally prior to the species, which is a substance.

7. Second, substance is not destroyed by the destruction of non-substance; but a species, which is a substance, is destroyed by the destruction of the differentia.

8. Third, differentia is part of the definition of species;⁷ therefore, it indicates something of its essence. Nothing, however, pertains to the essence of substance except substance.

9. Fourth, if <a differentia> were an accident, it would make one accidental (*unum ens per accidens*) being with the genus. And since <the differentia> added to the genus makes a species, therefore every species in the genus of a substance would be an accidental (*per accidens*) being; and so <there would> not be any species.

5. *Metaphysics*, Bk. V, Ch. 5 (1020b 13–15).

6. *Metaphysics*, Bk. VII, Ch. 1 (1028a 32–33).

7. Porphyry, *Isagoge*, Ch. “On Species” (AL I⁶ 9; ed. Busse, 4.12–13).

[I. TO THE QUESTION]

10. To the question one can say that a differentia in the genus of substance is a substance, since it is essentially (*per se*) the same as that which is essentially (*per se*) a substance. Nevertheless, it is not a species or an individual in the genus of substance, nor is it essentially a substance. Nevertheless, such a predication as "rational is a substance" is truer than this <predication>, "how much as (*quantum*) is a substance," although each one is necessary and each one is accidental (*per accidens*). For the first is accidental (*per accidens*), not since something is a substance to which rational happens <to be accidental> (*cui accidit rationale*), but in which rational essentially (*per se*) inheres (*cui per se inest rationale*). But the second is accidental (*per accidens*), since that is a substance to which "how much as" (*quantum*) happens <to be accidental> (*cui accidit quantum*).⁸

[II. TO THE PRINCIPAL ARGUMENTS]

11. To the first argument,⁹ I say that he understands <this proposition>, "this is not proper to substance"—<in this way>, that is, <it is not proper> to that which is directly in the genus of substance as a species or a genus—but <it is> also <proper> to a differentia which is not a substance in this way.

12. To the second <argument>,¹⁰ he shows the same.

13. To the third <argument>,¹¹ I say that contrariety¹² is commonly said in one way for the greatest distance. And in this way opposites are said privatively <to be> contrary, as principles, namely, form and privation, are said <to be> contrary <to one another> in Bk. I of the *Physics*;¹³ that is, in every genus <form and matter are said to be> among the differentiae of a genus, of which it is said in Bk. X of the *Metaphysics*,¹⁴ because every

8. For a fuller discussion of this difference, see Pini, *Categories and Logic in Duns Scotus*, 193.

9. Cf. *supra*, n. 1.

10. Cf. *supra*, n. 2.

11. Cf. *supra*, n. 3.

12. For a fuller discussion on opposition, see *infra*, q. 38.

13. *Physics*, Bk. I, Ch. 7 (191a 3-5, 13-14).

14. *Metaphysics*, Bk. X, Ch. 8 (1058a 15-18).

differentia according to the species is a contrariety. In another mode <contrariety> is taken properly as it is the greatest distance of forms mutually expelling each other concerning the same <thing>.¹⁵ And this is the way in which <contrariety> is taken here and in Bk. V of the *Physics*,¹⁶ and where such contrariety exists, there is motion properly said.

14. To the fourth <argument>,¹⁷ I say that Aristotle, as <he does> in many <places> in Bk. V <of the *Physics*>, divides utterances into significations and into the diverse modes of being accepted, which he does less <often> about quality (*ad minus facit de qualitate*). For he does not divide <quality here>, as it is a most general <genus>, into its species, positing the differentia of substance to be its first species, but he divides this utterance "quality" into its significates; and one of its significates is a "differentia of substance." For just as "form" is said equivocally to a substance which gives being absolutely, and to an accident which gives being according to the essence (*quid*), so "act" <is said equivocally> to a first act and to a second act; and so "quality" is said equivocally to an essential quality and to an accidental <quality>. And the differentia of substance is an essential quality; in no way is "quality" <to be regarded here> as the most general <genus>.

15. *Metaphysics*, Bk. X, Ch. 4 (1055a 5-33).

16. *Physics*, Bk. V, Ch. 1 (224b 28-30).

17. Cf. *supra*, n. 4.

[QUESTION FIFTEEN

Whether the Parts of Substance are Substances]

*You should not be disturbed <if> the parts of substance.*¹



IT IS ASKED concerning this <statement> whether the parts of substance are substances.

1. It seems that they are not.

Since substance as it is the most general <genus> is essentially (*per se*) a being; no part of substance is essentially (*per se*) a being while it is a part of substance, since then it would be “this something,”² and one substance would be from many <things that are a> “this something,” which does not seem true.

2. Second, let any part of a substance be *A*. If *A* is a substance, <then> by descending divisively from the most general <genus>, it would be necessary to concede that it would be either that substance of which it is a part, or a distinct species in opposition to it, or what is contained in some species distinct from that <one>. Since, according to Aristotle in Bk. II of the *Topics*³ “every <thing> that is in <some> genus, is in some of its species.” It is not that <substance> of which it is a part, since that <substance> is not predicated of it. It is not another species. Nor is it in another species, since then it would differ from its whole self specifically, and so <it would differ> through an essential difference, and also <it would differ> from every other part. But this is not possible: both because every part would have a specific

1. *Categories*, Ch. 5 (3a 29–33).

2. *On the Soul*, Bk. II, Ch. 1 (412a 6–9).

3. *Topics*, Bk. II, Ch. 4 (111a 33–34).

form, since every differentia is taken from such a form, and so no part would be a part of the whole, nor would it constitute its essence, nor <would it constitute> one essentially with another part; and because then every part through a proper form would be a being in act, and "from two <things> in act it would not constitute one truly," according to Aristotle in Bk. VII of the *Metaphysics*,⁴ and so no whole would be truly one.

3. Third, if any part of a substance is a substance, and no part of a man is a man, it follows that "therefore no man is a substance." The conclusion is false, and not the minor, therefore the major. The form of arguing is evident according to Aristotle in Bk. IV of the *Physics*,⁵ since such a form of arguing is used against those who posit that time is a circulation, in this way: "any part of time is time; <yet> not any part of circulation is circulation; therefore, time is not a circulation." Therefore, if the form of arguing is valid there, it is also <valid> here.

4. Fourth, in Bk. VII of the *Metaphysics*,⁶ it is said about matter that "it is not what something is (*quid*), nor how it is (*quale*)," etc.; therefore, it is not a substance.

5. Fifth, form is not substance, since it is in a subject.⁷—Also, since it is "present and absent beyond the corruption of the subject,"⁸ as is evident in a substantial transformation.

6. To the opposite, one can argue through the three reasons made to the opposite of the preceding question.⁹

7. Second, the divided is predicated of <those things which> divide it; <and according to> Bk. II of *On the Soul*:¹⁰ "substance is divided into matter and form and the composite"; therefore, any of these is a substance.

8. Third, in Bk. VII of the *Metaphysics*,¹¹ Aristotle says that

4. *Metaphysics*, Bk. VII, Ch. 13 (1039a 4–5).

5. *Physics*, Bk. IV, Ch. 10 (218b 2–4).

6. *Metaphysics*, Bk. VII, Ch. 3 (1029a 20–21).

7. *Categories*, Ch. 5 (3a 21–22).

8. Porphyry, *Isagoge*, Ch. "On Accident" (AL I⁶ 20; ed. Busse, 12.24–25).

9. Cf. supra, q. 14, nn. 6–8.

10. *On the Soul*, Bk. II, Ch. 1 (412a 7–9).

11. *Metaphysics*, Bk. VII, Ch. 3 (1029a 2–8).

form is a greater being than matter, and therefore it is a greater being than the composite. In this implication it is implied that matter is a greater being than the composite. Then I argue in this way: substance is the greatest being;¹² therefore, if that which is the least being, for example the composite, is a substance (as is evident), by much more will matter and form, which are greater beings than the composite, be substances.

9. Fourth, here in the text Aristotle seems to imply that the parts of substance are substances; otherwise, it would not be necessary to prohibit that <proposition, namely, that substance is not in a subject> as untenable, nor would it follow from what was said of property.¹³

[I. TO THE QUESTION]

10. To the question, one can say that there are two kinds of parts, namely, (1) essential <parts>, as matter and form, which constitute the essence of substance; (2) other quantitative parts, which are not substances insofar as there is a substance, but insofar as it is quantified and extended. But one can say of the latter as of the former that they are not essentially (*per se*) substances, that is, the most general <genus> of substance is not predicated of them essentially (*per se*), nor truly in the abstract, on account of the first and second reason posited previously in that part of the question.¹⁴ Substance, however, is equivocal: as essential (*per se*) being is said <of it>, and in this way it is the most general <genus>; and as it is said of the essential (*per se*) principles of being, and in this way the parts of substance can be said <to be> a substance. Similarly, in the genus of substance, as it is the most general genus, <the parts of substance> do not exist as species, but <they are in the genus of substance> through an essential (*per se*) reduction to the principles of species; and it is not necessary that the genus be truly predicated in the abstract of those <things> which are in a genus through reduction.

12. *Categories*, Ch. 5 (2b 5–7).

13. Cf. *Categories*, Ch. 5 (2a 13).

14. Cf. *supra*, nn. 1–2.

[II. TO THE ARGUMENTS TO THE OPPOSITE]

[A. *To the Arguments to the Opposite
of the Preceding Question*]

11. To the arguments of the preceding question, <insofar> as they are valid here.

To the first <argument>,¹⁵ that “non-substance is not prior to substance,” I say that if non-substance is understood <in this way>, that is, as that of which the most general <genus> in the genus of substance is not predicated essentially (*per se*), the proposition is false.¹⁶ But it is true <if it is understood> in this way: non-substance, that is, <what is> in no way a substance, neither as a substance is the most general <genus> nor as <substance> is said of the principles of substance, <is not prior to substance>.

12. To the proof,¹⁷ when it is said that “substance is the first being,” I say that this is true in comparing the most general <genus> of substance to the other genera, that is, of beings essentially (*per se*) in a genus, substance is the first being; nevertheless, it is not true of a substance having been produced absolutely (*substantia principiata simpliciter*), since the principles of such a substance are prior to that <substance>, as is said in Bk. VII of the *Metaphysics*,¹⁸ that form and matter are greater beings than the composite. Nevertheless, perhaps one can concede absolutely that substance is the first with respect to perfection, although not by way of generation.

13. To the second <argument>¹⁹ “by the destruction of a non-substance, a substance is not destroyed”: I say that if a non-substance is understood in the major <in one way>, that is, by

15. Cf. *supra*, q. 14, n. 6.

16. The claim that “non-substance is not prior to substance” is false if the “non-substance” refers to the differentia, which, as it was argued in the preceding question, is prior to a species of substance. For while a differentia is the same thing as a substance, “substance” cannot be predicated of it essentially. Likewise, as the subsequent argument makes clear, it is also the case that the principles of substance, namely, form and matter, are prior to the composite.

17. Cf. *supra*, q. 14, n. 6.

18. *Metaphysics*, Bk. VII, Ch. 3 (1029a 2–8).

19. Cf. *supra*, q. 14 n. 7.

that <thing> being destroyed which is not essentially (*per se*) a substance in the genus of substance, <then the claim that> “a substance is not destroyed” is false, since by the destruction of the principles of substance, which are not substances in this way, a substance will be destroyed. Nevertheless, it can be true in this way: <if> what is in no way a substance, <neither> as it is the most general <genus>, nor as it is said of the principles of substance, <is destroyed, then a substance is not destroyed>.

14. To the third <argument>,²⁰ <which claims that> “nothing pertains to the essence of a substance except a substance,” <a solution is had> through the same <type of distinction>: if “except” is understood <in this way>, “except” that which is essentially in the genus of substance, it is false; <if it is understood> in another way <it is> true, and in that way a part of a substance is a substance.

[*B. To the Arguments to the Opposite of This Question*]

15. To the other <arguments in this question>²¹ from Bk. II of *On the Soul*, I say that that division of substance is not a division of a genus into its species, since then matter would have a differentia distinguishing it from form, and it would be a being in act of itself distinct from form, which is not true; but it is a division of an equivocal into its equivocates according to the logician, or <it is a division> of analogy into its analogates according to nature. And in this way I concede the predication of substance of the things dividing it; but this is not insofar as substance is the most general <genus>.

16. To the <second argument>,²² I say that matter and form are greater beings than the entity composed of a principle,²³ and so they are substances; nevertheless, they do not exist as species of substance.

17. To the authority of Aristotle,²⁴ I say that Aristotle neither says nor implies here in the text that the parts of substances are substances; but he does say that, on account of the first property

20. Cf. supra, q. 14, n. 8.

21. Cf. supra, n. 7.

22. Cf. supra, n. 8.

23. The Latin has *principii* rather than *principiorum* as one would expect.

24. Cf. supra, n. 9.

of substance, it is not necessary to concede that they are not substances, since neither are the parts of a substance in a subject, that is, in some complete act existing as forms, although they are in the whole, since a mode of being in the whole is one <thing> and <a mode of being> in the subject is another.

[III. TO THE OTHER PRINCIPAL ARGUMENTS]

18. Then to the two arguments to the other part of the question which prove that form is not a substance through the fact that it is in a subject,²⁵ it must be said that "matter" appropriately is only that which is in potency to the reception of form, not <something> having from itself some complete act, to which a form contributes being (*esse*) absolutely as it is in substances. "Subject" is said to be that which, although it may be in potentiality to a form, nevertheless is from itself in a complete act, and for this reason an approaching form contributes to it only being in a certain respect (*esse secundum quid*). Therefore, the form of a substance, although it may be in matter, nevertheless is not in a subject.

19. According to the same <distinction, a reply> is evident to the other <argument>,²⁶ since <a form> is not "present in addition to the corruption of the subject," etc., since not any <thing> is its subject.

[IV. NOTABLE REMARKS ABOUT THE OTHER PROPERTIES OF SUBSTANCE]

20. Concerning the fifth property of substance,²⁷ it must be known that the most general <genus> of substance is not said of something more and of something less, nor does some substance according to its own essence receive more and less; nevertheless, with respect to the act of standing under (*actum substandi*), which is one of its properties, namely, of standing under

25. Cf. *supra*, n. 5.

26. Cf. *ibid*.

27. Namely, that substance does not admit of a more and a less. Cf. *Categories*, Ch. 5 (3b 34).

(*substantiae*), something is said to be more substance than another, as species <is said to be> more substance than genus,²⁸ since it stands under (*substat*) more <things>. Just as a genus is said to be more universal than a species, since it is predicated of more <things>, although universal is predicated equally of a genus and of a species as of its species. There is much difficulty concerning this property which should be left for the natural philosopher.

21. Concerning the sixth property of substance,²⁹ which is “although it is one and the same in number, it is susceptible of <receiving> contraries according to its mutation,” this is proper to substance and is convertible with substance, since there is no substance from the nature (*ratio*) of <being> a substance that is prohibited from receiving contraries, although some <substance> from its own proper form is determined to one contrary. Similarly, it must be understood that “a substance receives contraries,” not <something contrary> to itself, but <it receives> some <things> which are contrary among themselves; otherwise this property would be repugnant to the fourth property.³⁰

28. Cf. *Categories*, Ch. 5 (2b 8–9).

29. *Categories*, Ch. 5 (4a 10–11).

30. The fourth property is that substance does not have contraries; cf. *Categories*, Ch. 5 (3b 25).

<QUESTIONS SIXTEEN
AND SEVENTEEN>

[QUESTION SIXTEEN
Whether Quantity is a Genus]

*Of quantity, one<type> is continuous, the other is discrete.*¹



IT IS ASKED FIRST whether quantity is a genus.

1. It seems that it is not <a genus>:

Since “no genus is predicated denominatively of a species.”² But this is true: “a line is of a certain quantity (*quanta*),” and thus <it is predicated> of others which are posited as species of quantity. Therefore, none of them is its species; therefore, <quantity> has no species; therefore, it is not a genus. Proof of the major: no univocal predicate is denominative; every genus with respect to its species is a univocal predicate, according to Aristotle earlier <in the text>;³ therefore, etc. Proof of this major: since the account of a univocal predicate is the account of a subject, which is manifestly true of a genus with respect to its species; but the account of no denominative is the account of a subject, as it is said in the chapter “On Substance,”⁴ since “white” is predicated of a body; however, it is impossible for the account of white to be predicated <of a body>.

2. Second, quantity does not have species, since it is not predicated equally of continuous and discrete; and a genus is predicated equally of its species. Proof of the assumption: because continuous quantity is naturally prior to its division; since

1. *Categories*, Ch. 6 (4b 20–21).

3. *Categories*, Ch. 5 (3b 8–9).

2. *Topics*, Bk. II, Ch. 2 (109b 5–6).

4. *Categories*, Ch. 5 (2a 31–32).

insofar as a continuum is divisible, it is naturally prior to its division. Therefore, a continuum is also prior to number, since number is posterior to the division of a continuum, since it is caused from that <division>, according to Aristotle in Bk. III of the *Physics*.⁵

3. To the opposite is Aristotle.

[QUESTION SEVENTEEN
Whether Quantity is One Genus]



SECONDLY, IT IS asked whether quantity is one genus.

It seems that it is not:

4. According to Aristotle in Bk. I of the *Posterior Analytics* and in Bk. X of the *Metaphysics*.⁶ “In every one genus there is one first and smallest that is the meter and measure of all the others.” But in quantity there is not one first and smallest, but two, namely, unit and point. Therefore, quantity is two genera.

5. Second, all species of any genus are opposites, since they include either first opposite differentiae of the genus, or opposite differentiae dividing another intermediate genus, if they are contained under some intermediate genus <that is> the same; and <something> including one opposite is not predicated of another <thing> including the other <opposite>, in the way in which the differentiae divisive of a genus ought to be opposite. Therefore, no species of one genus is predicated of any species of that genus. But some species of quantity is predicated of another denominatively, for example, “a line is numbered”; therefore, etc.

6. Third, an attribute and a subject are not in the same genus as species. First, since an attribute is predicated denominatively of a subject, therefore also the genus of an attribute <is predicated denominatively of a subject>; but the genus of

5. *Physics*, Bk. III, Ch. 7 (207a 32–b 2).

6. *Posterior Analytics*, Bk. I, Ch. 22 (84a 8–10), and *Metaphysics*, Bk. X, Ch. 1 (1052b 18).

a subject is not predicated denominatively of a subject; therefore, the genus of a subject and <the genus> of an attribute are not the same. The first implication is evident <by arguing> from an inferior to a superior. Second, since then an attribute would not be predicated of a subject, as is evident from the preceding argument, which shows that no species of any genus can be predicated of another <species>; but longitude is an attribute of a line, which is in the genus of quantity, and longitude is in the genus of quantity; therefore, the genus of quantity is not one.

7. To the opposite is Aristotle.

[I. TO THE SIXTEENTH QUESTION]

8. It must be said that quantity is a genus, since it is predicated essentially (*in quid*) of many <things> differing in species,⁷ for example, of continuous and discrete quantity. For when it is asked "what" (*quid*) each of them is, one can suitably respond <by saying> "quantity." And it is the most general <genus>, since it does not have a higher genus.⁸ For nothing is predicated essentially (*in quid*) of it except being, which is not a genus, since it is not univocal.⁹

[II. TO THE SEVENTEENTH QUESTION]

9. And it is one genus, since it is said according to one account (*ratio*) of all its species.

[A. *What is the Account of Quantity:
The Opinion of Albert*]

[I. *Exposition of the Opinion*]

10. But what that one account is, is posited <as> a twofold way. In one way the account of measure is posited.¹⁰ First, since

7. *Topics*, Bk. I, Ch. 5 (102a 32).

8. Porphyry, *Isagoge*, Ch. "On Species" (AL I⁶ 9; ed. Busse, 4.17-18).

9. For a fuller discussion on the nature of quantity, see Robert Andrews, "Question Commentaries," 289.

10. Albertus Magnus, *Praedic.* tr. 3 c. 1 (ed. Borgnet, I 194b).

Aristotle¹¹ proves here that speech is a species of quantity through the fact that it is measured. Second, since the species of quantity are varied according to the diversity of its account. Since some continuous measure is intrinsic to <the thing> being measured, <and> some <continuous measure> is extrinsic. The intrinsic <one> measures either according to one dimension only, and then it is a line; or <according to> two <dimensions>, and then it is a surface; or <according to> three <dimensions>, and then it is a body. The extrinsic <measure> is twofold: <the measure that is> not common with others (*propria*), and then it is place; or <the measure that is> common <with others>, and then it is time. And the measure of place expresses <what is> not common with others (*propria*), since only one <place> is of one <thing> being measured; <and> time is common, since it is the same for many <things> being measured. Time itself, however, is not the proper (*propria*) measure of anything temporal. It is also manifest that number and speech are measures.

[2. *To the Opinion of Albert*]

11. Against that <opinion>: the account of a genus is equally found in all its species; the account of measure is not <equally found> in this way in continuous and discrete <quantity>. Since the greatest property proper to one is to be a measure, and since that <property> is essentially (*per se*) the principle of number, from that <property> the account of measure is first distributed to number, and from number to continuous <quantities>, as is manifestly held in Bk. X, Ch. 2, of the *Metaphysics*.¹²

12. If it is said that the discrete is prior to the continuous <quantity> in itself, not in comparison to its own genus:—this <reply> concedes the point, since neither participates in the account of the genus through the other. But the continuous does not have the account of measuring except from the discrete, as it is taught there above.¹³ Therefore, the account (*ratio*) of measure is not the account (*ratio*) of quantity, as it is a genus.

11. *Categories*, Ch. 6 (4b 32–35).

12. *Metaphysics*, Bk. X, Ch. 1 (1052b 20–1053a 9). The argument is that if measure is the *ratio* of quantity, unity (or one) would also be a species of quantity, which it is not since it is not included in number.

13. Cf. *supra*, n. 2.

[*B. The Opinion of Scotus*]

13. For this reason it is said otherwise that although measure pertains to quantity essentially (*per se*), nevertheless it is not the essential account of quantity insofar as the account of the genus is attributed to it; but the account of divisibility <is the essential nature of the genus>. And this <is the case> from that division which is <a division> into parts of the same sort (*ratio*). This is shown in three ways:

14. First, in Bk. V of the *Metaphysics*,¹⁴ where “quantum” is defined, insofar as it can have a definition expressing at least what is said through the name, there it is described thus: “quantum is what is divisible into those <parts> which are in it, of which <each> single <one> is by its nature this something,” that is, to be divided into parts of the same nature (*ratio*). Therefore, quantity is essentially (*per se*) divisible into parts of this kind; for where there is an essential predication (*per se*) in the first mode, it holds from concrete <things> to abstract <things>.¹⁵

15. Second, it is shown <in this way>: since continuous and discrete quantity are not defined here through measure, but through this: “of which the parts are joined together,”¹⁶ etc. Therefore, the essence of them is to be partible.

16. Third, since in Bk. V of the *Metaphysics*,¹⁷ the species of quantity are taken through the nature (*ratio*) of divisibility, since <what is> divisible into non-continuous <quantity> is number or speech; <and what is divisible> into continuous <quantity> according to one dimension is a line; according to two <dimensions> is a surface; <and> according to three <dimensions> is a body. And time and place can be taken according to other differences of divisibility.

17. Against this second way:¹⁸ continuous quantity is potentially divided; discrete <quantity> is actually <divided>; but those

14. *Metaphysics*, Bk. V, Ch. 13 (1020a 7–14).

15. It should be noted that *quantum* is the concrete form of *quantitas*, which is the abstract form.

16. *Categories*, Ch. 6 (4b 25–5a 14).

17. *Metaphysics*, Bk. V, Ch. 3 (1020a 7–14).

18. Cf. *supra*, n. 15. These arguments, namely, nn. 17–19, are also alleged

things which are actually and potentially some <one thing>, are not equally that <one thing>; therefore, divisibility does not pertain equally to continuous and discrete <quantity>. The assumption is evident, since the parts of a number are actually divided from each other, <whereas> the parts of a continuum are not.

18. Second, “that of which it is essentially (*per se*) a potency, is also its act.”¹⁹ Therefore, if continuous quantity is essentially (*per se*) divisible, it can be essentially (*per se*) divided; therefore, continuous quantity can be essentially (*per se*) non-continuous, which does not seem to be given.

19. Third, Aristotle²⁰ proves that speech is a quantity, since it is a measure (*est mensura*); therefore, this is the essential account of quantity.

20. To the first <argument>,²¹ one can say that discrete quantity is one and undivided while it remains in its species—whence it <has> its unity—although its material <elements>, which exist under this form, are divided. For example, “five” <while> remaining in its species is formally undivided, since its division destroys the form of five, for when its division has been made into “three” and “two,” it no longer remains “five”; although its material <elements> as unities are divided. Therefore, it must be denied that it is taken concerning the discrete <in this way>.

21. To the second <argument>,²² one can say that the act of this potency, <namely> “a continuum is divisible,” is not this: “a continuum is divided,” but this: “a continuum is being divided,” that is, it is in the process of division; and this can be essentially (*per se*) in a continuum.

22. To the third <argument>:²³ it is not denied that to be a quantity is essentially (*per se*) to be a measure; but <it ought to

in Duns Scotus’s *Questions on the Metaphysics of Aristotle* in Bk. V, q. 9, nn. 2, 4, and 8.

19. *On Sleep and Waking*, Ch. 1 (454a 8). Etzkorn and Wolter translate this phrase as: “the subject of actuality is identical with that of potentiality” in *Questions on the Metaphysics of Aristotle*, V, q. 9 n. 4.

20. *Categories*, Ch. 6 (4b 32–35). Actually, Aristotle says that speech is measured by long and short syllables, not that it is a measure.

21. Cf. *supra*, n. 17.

22. Cf. *supra*, n. 18.

23. Cf. *supra*, n. 19.

be said> that this aspect is not essentially of quantity as its genus, since it is not equally in its species.

[III. TO THE PRINCIPAL ARGUMENTS OF
THE SIXTEENTH QUESTION]

23. To the first argument of the first question,²⁴ one can say that quantity is not said denominatively of a line <taken> absolutely, nor of some of its species taken absolutely; but <it is said of a line> in the abstract and essentially (*in quid*). But it is said denominatively of a line in its matter and of other species <in their matter>, and so its species is taken as a concrete <accident>. And it is not astonishing that a concrete <accident> of a genus is predicated of a concrete <subject> of <another> species. Therefore, however common the use of speaking is to say "line is a quanta" or "divisible"—and so of other species—this is simply false about these as they are species, since then they would be the subjects of quantity or of divisibility. For such a mode of predicating pertains to all accidents with respect to their subjects.—Otherwise, it is said that the major is true in every other genus than quantity, and it is especially not <true> of this one. Since quantity is not only the principle of measure or division for other <genera>, but also for itself; and for this reason it names itself and its species, which is not true of the others.

24. To the second <argument>,²⁵ I say that in every genus some species can be prior to other <species> in being, <when> comparing those among themselves; but none is prior to another in participating in the nature (*ratio*) of the genus. Thus, continuous quantity is naturally prior to discrete <quantity>, as the argument (*ratio*) shows, although not in receiving the predication of quantity, since divisibility exists in neither of the species through the other.

24. Cf. *supra*, n. 1.

25. Cf. *supra*, n. 2.

[IV. TO THE PRINCIPAL ARGUMENTS OF
THE SEVENTEENTH QUESTION]

25. To the first argument of the second question,²⁶ it is said that point and unit are not two absolute firsts, since point is reduced to unity as to what is prior to it. “For a point is a unit having position,” as it is said in Bk. I of the *Posterior Analytics*,²⁷ and in this way only unity is first.

26. Against this: “as principle is to principle, so also is a caused <thing> to a caused <thing>.”²⁸ Therefore, if unity is a material or a formal <element> in a point—one of which is necessary if a point is a unit having position—then a material or a formal <element> in a continuum will similarly be discrete. It is manifest that it is not a material <element>, since a continuum is not comprised from discrete <elements>; therefore, it is a formal <element>, which Aristotle denies in Bk. VII of the *Metaphysics*,²⁹ <when he> reprehends Plato, who posits it thus.

27. Therefore, it must be said that just as magnitude is not multitude, neither materially nor formally, so point is not unit, neither materially nor formally; since point is the indivisibility of magnitude, and unit is <the indivisibility> of multitude. Neither is this definition, “point is a unit,” etc., from Aristotle. But if this <position> is said anywhere about a point, it is <said> by Plato, who posits numbers to be the formal <elements> in a continuum, and so <he holds that> unity is in a point. But neither according to Aristotle nor according to Plato is this definition held in Bk. I of the *Posterior Analytics*, but <it is held> in this way:³⁰ “Unity is a substance without position; however, a point is a substance having been posited,” which is manifestly false, according to Aristotle, but true according to Plato, who claims that quantities are differentiae of things.

26. Cf. supra, n. 4.

27. *Posterior Analytics*, Bk. I, Ch. 27 (87a 35–37).

28. Latin: *Sicut principium ad principium, ita principiatum ad principiatum*. Cf. *Auctoritates Aristotelis* (ed. J. Hamesse, p. 317).

29. *Metaphysics*, Bk. VII, C 11 (1036b 14–20).

30. Cf. supra, n. 25.

28. Otherwise, to the argument³¹ one can say that the major, namely, "in every genus <there is one first and smallest that is the meter and measure of all others>," is not true of every most general genus, since scarcely in some most general genus can some one first (*aliquod unum primum*) be assigned as the measure of all the other <species>, or <actually it can be assigned> in none of them <other than quantity>. But this proposition is understood about a genus in the natural order; and it expresses that genus in the natural order, to which a unity of a receptive <thing> corresponds; that is, it is only said of forms having the same receptive <nature> to a first <measure>. And Aristotle exemplifies this mode there where he states this proposition: "such a genus is not quantity."³²

29. Otherwise, one can say that although there are two first <things> and smallest <things> in the genus of quantity, nevertheless there is only one first and smallest there that is the measure of the others. For a point is not the measure of a continuum, since then taken at different times it would cause a continuum, and the continuum would be composed from indivisibles. But one is essentially the measure of number; however, one applied to some part of a continuum is the measure of the continuum, as it is said in Bk. X of the *Metaphysics*,³³ therefore, only one is the measure in this genus.

30. To the second argument,³⁴ I concede that no species of a genus is predicated of another <species> in the abstract, insofar as <the species> includes opposite differentiae. Nevertheless, it is possible that <a species can be predicated of another species> in the concrete, insofar as the species, which is made a subject, is taken as it is in matter, and not as it is an opposite species.

31. To the third <argument>,³⁵ I say that "longitude," "latitude," "magnitude," "multitude," etc., are equivocals, as they denote quantity and excess in quantity. In the first way they are species of quantity; in the second way <they are> attributes (*passiones*) <of quantity>. In the first way they are the same as a line, surface, etc., nor do they have opposites, <as> "short" or "nar-

31. Cf. supra, n. 4.

32. *Categories*, Ch. 6 (5b 3-4).

33. *Metaphysics*, Bk. X, Ch. 1 (1052b 18).

34. Cf. supra, n. 5.

35. Cf. supra, n. 6.

row,” since a line, however short, is a longitude in that mode. In the second way they are not in themselves (*secundum se*) in the genus of quantity; but <they are in the genus of quantity> in the first way, that is, as species; but not in the second way, that is, as attributes (*passiones*). This is manifest about multitude, to which, as it is a species, “unity” is opposed; and <to which> <insofar> as it is an attribute, “paucity” <is opposed>. And, according to Aristotle in Bk. I of the *Topics*,³⁶ two <things> are not opposed to the same univocal <thing>.

32. To this <solution> one can argue that quantity is not one genus, since there is only one first division of one genus through two differentiae, since there are only two first species. But quantity is divided equally at first into a twofold division, namely, through <division into> the continuous and the discrete, and through <those species> constituted (*per constare*) from parts having position and <through those species> not having position, etc.³⁷ The proof of the major is according to Aristotle in Bk. I of the *Topics*:³⁸ “If <those things> in question are differently diverse (*propositi sint diversae differentiae*), for example, of color in an utterance and in body, it is equivocal”; and according to Boethius, in the book *On Division*,³⁹ every division of a genus is made through two differentiae. Proof of the minor: neither division is a subdivision of the other, since then both members of the other division would be contained under some member of the remaining division, which is not true, as is evident by deduction.

33. To this <argument>, one can say that there is not a twofold first division in the genus through formal differentiae that constitute the species. Nevertheless, it is possible that one <division> is through formal differentiae, <and> the other <division is> through material differentiae, which divisions are not under one another. Just as in the genus of substance, beyond its formal division into “animate” and “inanimate,” “body” can be divided

36. *Topics*, Bk. I, Ch. 15 (107b 17–18).

37. *Categories*, Ch. 6 (5a 36–38).

38. *Topics*, Bk. I, Ch. 15 (107b 28–29).

39. Boethius, *Liber de divisione* (ed. J. Magee, p. 8; PL 64, 877C).

into “corruptible” and “incorruptible,” and each differentia in respect to itself is exceeded and exceeding, and so it is in the question <at hand>: the first division is formal, the second is material, according to the parts of quantity.—To the proof of the major: Boethius and Aristotle understand <this> of a formal division through differentiae that are constitutive of the species.

<QUESTIONS EIGHTEEN
AND NINETEEN>

[QUESTION EIGHTEEN
Whether Speech is a Quantity]



IT IS ASKED whether speech is a quantity.

1. It seems that it is not:

Since speech is not in writing, for that is a substance. It is not in the mind, since that is in <something that is> not quantified. And neither <writing nor the mind> essentially (*per se*) measures <something>, and Aristotle explains that he understands <speech to be> about neither of these. Nor is speech in an utterance, since that is essentially (*per se*) sensible, since it is an utterance. Therefore, it is in the third species of quality.

2. To the opposite is Aristotle.¹

[QUESTION NINETEEN
Whether Speech is a Discrete Quantity]



IT IS ASKED whether speech is a discrete quantity.

3. It seems that it is not:

Since “short” and “long” are differentiae of continuous quantity; speech measures according to these, according to Aristotle in this text:² “for a syllable is measured <as> short and long.”

1. *Categories*, Ch. 6 (4b 31–35).

2. Cf. *supra*, n. 2.

4. <If> it is said that a syllable is short and long, not speech—against this: then a continuum is essentially (*per se*) a part of a discrete <quantity>. Likewise, the major is taken in this way: every <thing that> essentially (*per se*) measures according to the differentiae “short” and “long” is a continuum; speech is of this kind, even if it is not long.

5. Second, if discrete were a quantity, it would not seem to differ in species from number, since <they differ> in no specific differentia.

6. It is said that discrete quantity, as it is in a permanent matter, is number, since “number is caused by the division of a continuum”;³ and as <discrete quantity> is in successive <matter>, it is speech, since no part of speech remains.

7. Against this: This <reply> concedes the proposition. Since a differentia according to the species is a formal differentia; these <i.e., number and speech>, if they differ only in this way, differ in no formal <way>; therefore, <they do> not <differ in> species.

8. Second, a falsehood is expressed; since succession and permanence are differentiae posterior to motion and rest, therefore also by natural being insofar as it is natural. But quantity, insofar as it <pertains> to the whole genus, is naturally prior to natural being insofar as it is natural. Therefore, succession and permanence are, to a greater degree, posterior to the whole genus of quantity; therefore, they are not the differentiae of the species in this genus.

9. Third, number is applied to successive matter just as <it is applied> to permanent <matter>; therefore, not every number is a quantity in permanent matter. The antecedent is evident by example, as we say “in two times” and “in two days”; and with reason, since some continuum is successive; therefore, number is caused by its division.

10. Fourth, then speech does not differ from time, which is “numbered motion”;⁴ and in this way discrete quantity is in successive matter.

11. To the opposite is Aristotle.⁵

3. *Physics*, Bk. III, Ch. 7 (207a 32–b 2). 4. *Physics*, Bk. IV, Ch. 11 (219b 1–2).

5. Cf. *supra*, n. 2.

[I. THE RESPONSE TO THE
EIGHTEENTH QUESTION]

12. It must be said to the first question that speech is a quantity on account of the reasoning (*rationem*) of Aristotle, since "a syllable is measured <as> short or long"; therefore, there is another essential (*per se*) measure of this; that is speech; therefore, etc.

[II. TO THE PRINCIPAL ARGUMENT OF
THE EIGHTEENTH QUESTION]

13. To the argument,⁶ I concede that speech is said in none of these ways; but, as Aristotle says, speech <is that> which happens with a spoken utterance. I say, however, that the distinction (*discretionem*) that is appropriate to speech is through its specific differentia. This differentia is neither written, nor spoken, nor in the mind, nor in the act of speaking—since that is measured by time—nor are its parts discrete. But the distinction (*discretio*) is not common to number and speech, but is appropriate to speech.

[III. THE RESPONSE TO THE
NINETEENTH QUESTION]

14. To the second question, it must be said that it is a discrete quantity, since its parts "are joined to no common boundary."⁷ For every syllable is divided from another <syllable>; <and> neither the act of speaking nor the significate unite (*continuat*) them, since the boundary essentially (*per se*) uniting the parts of quantity is not essentially beyond them; but these two are essentially beyond the parts of speech. Similarly, this speech can exist when the significate does not exist, for example, by joining non-significative utterances, and then there is not any significate.

6. Cf. *supra*, n. 1.

7. *Categories*, Ch. 6 (4b 31-36).

[IV. TO THE PRINCIPAL ARGUMENTS OF
THE NINETEENTH QUESTION]

15. To the first argument,⁸ one can say that "long" and "short" pertain equivocally to continuous and discrete; to the former—namely, to continuous—properly; to the latter, derivatively (*transumptive*). Therefore, every <thing> measuring <something> essential (*per se*), according to the fact that it is taken properly, is a continuum. Speech is not of this kind; for the length of a syllable and of <what is> measured by a line is equivocal.

16. To the second <argument>,⁹ I say that speech differs essentially from number and from every <other> species of quantity, not only by a material differentia, but also by a formal and specific <differentia>. Nevertheless, that <differentia> is not known; indeed, the differentia of some of the most specific species is barely known to us. Since if <this differentia> were <known to us>, that could not be true which is said in Bk. II of the *Posterior Analytics*,¹⁰ that "every part of the definition ought to be in more <things than what is defined>, however all <parts of the definition ought to be> equally in <the thing defined>."¹¹ This, however, would not touch <the issue at hand>, if the last differentia were known <to us>. For that <differentia>, when it is taken from the proper form of the species, is in no way in more <things> than the species. Therefore, what was said is true, since the lowest differentiae, of almost all things to be defined, are unknown.

8. Cf. *supra*, n. 3.

9. Cf. *supra*, n. 5.

10. *Posterior Analytics*, Bk. II, Ch. 13 (96a 32–35).

11. By equally in the thing, Scotus signifies that the parts of the definition, taken altogether, ought to be convertible with the *definiendum*. For example, when "animal," which is in more things than man, is joined to "rational," the two together are equally coextensive with "man."

<QUESTIONS TWENTY THROUGH TWENTY-THREE>

[QUESTION TWENTY Whether Aristotle Sufficiently Enumerates the Species of Quantity]¹



IT IS ASKED whether Aristotle sufficiently enumerates the species of quantity.

1. It seems that he does not:

According to Aristotle in Bk. V of the *Metaphysics*:² time is a quantum through an accident; but genus is predicated accidentally of no species; therefore, time is not a species.

2. Second, according to the same author in the same place:³ time is a quantum through motion; therefore, all the more is motion a quantum: "that is more <of a certain thing>, on account of which every <thing else> is such a thing."⁴ Therefore, there are more species than those that are enumerated here.

3. Third, time is number, according to Aristotle in Bk. IV of the *Physics*;⁵ therefore, it is not another species.

4. Fourth, place is not enumerated among the species of quantity, in Bk. V of the *Metaphysics*; therefore, either it is insufficiently <enumerated> there, or place is not a quantity.—Similarly, the Commentator there <in his commentary>⁶ assigns the cause why Aristotle omits place there, saying that place is not

1. Questions 20–23 will all be answered in the negative; cf. *infra*, nn. 20–23.

2. *Metaphysics*, Bk. V, Ch. 13 (1020a 26–29).

3. *Metaphysics*, Bk. V, Ch. 13 (1020a 32).

4. *Posterior Analytics*, Bk. I, Ch. 2 (72a 29–30): *Omne enim propter quod unumquodque tale, et illud magis*.

5. *Physics*, Bk. IV, Ch. 11 (219b 1–2).

6. Averroës, *Metaphysics*, Bk. V, com. 19 (ed. R. Ponzalli, p. 161).

a quantity according to the opinion of Aristotle, but it is only commonly <thought to be a quantity>.

5. Fifth, place does not seem to be another species other than a surface, since <a surface> is posited primarily in the definition of place in the abstract;⁷ and when an accident in the abstract is defined, what is posited primarily in its definition is of its essence.

6. To the opposite is Aristotle, etc.

[QUESTION TWENTY-ONE
Whether Place is a Quantity]



LONG WITH THIS it is asked whether place is a quantity.

7. It seems that it is not:

Since everything posited in the definition of an accident is its subject or is of its essence; “the limit of the containing body”⁸ is posited in the definition of place, and it is not of its essence, since then it would be the same species with surface; therefore, “limit” is the subject of place. But it is impossible that a subject and an attribute be the species of the same genus. Therefore, place is not a species of quantity. And this reason is confirmed through the Commentator <in his commentary> on Bk. V of the *Metaphysics*,⁹ who says that place is an attribute in the limit, as <it has> the condition of being immobile.

8. Second, nothing is moved naturally to a “quantum” insofar as it is “quantum”; but something is moved naturally to its own proper place, according to Aristotle in Bk. IV of the *Physics*.¹⁰ Proof of the major: nothing is moved to another except on account of a suitability in its nature; but “quantum” insofar

7. *Physics*, Bk. IV, Ch. 2 (209a 31–b 2).

8. Cf. *supra*, n. 5.

9. Cf. *supra*, n. 4; Averroës, *Metaphysics*, Bk. IV, com. 41 (ed. Iuntina, IV f. 65^{rb}–va).

10. *Physics*, Bk. IV, Ch. 4 (210b 22–211a 12).

as it is “quantum” is suitable with no thing in its nature, but it is nature that is “the principle of motion and rest,”¹¹ since it is naturally prior to those <things which> inhere in a substance.

9. Third, “quantum” insofar as it is “quantum” does not preserve anything naturally, since it is not suitable to anything in nature, but place insofar as it is place preserves <something> placed, according to Aristotle in Bk. IV of the *Physics*.¹²

10. Fourth, place is said essentially (*per se*) of <something> placed; therefore, it is in the genus of relation.

11. To the opposite is Aristotle.¹³

12. First, place is essentially (*per se*) a measure; therefore, it is a quantity. The antecedent is evident; the implication is also <evident> according to Aristotle, who argues in the <same> way about speech.¹⁴

13. Second, a peculiar property is not found beyond that of which it is a <property>. But “it is a peculiar property of quantity that something is said to be equal or unequal according to it”;¹⁵ however, this pertains to place. Therefore, it is a quantity.

14. Third, place is essentially (*per se*) divisible; therefore, it is a quantity.

[QUESTION TWENTY-TWO
Whether Place is a Continuous Quantity]



LONG WITH THIS, it is asked whether <place> is a continuous quantity.

15. It seems that it is not:

Let some continuous rod be fastened into the earth, a part of which is in the earth and a part in the air. Then I argue in this way: “place is the limit of a containing body”;¹⁶ but the limit of the air and the limit of the earth, which holds (*locant*) the

11. *Physics*, Bk. II, Ch. 1 (192b 21-23).

12. *Physics*, Bk. IV, Ch. 2 (209a 31-b 2).

13. *Categories*, Ch. 6 (5a 6-7).

15. *Categories*, Ch. 6 (6a 26-27).

14. Cf. *supra*, q. 18-19, n. 3.

16. *Physics*, Bk. IV, Ch. 2 (209b 1-4).

<rod> which was placed (*locatum*) <there>, are not continuous but only contiguous;¹⁷ therefore, the place of this rod is not continuous.

16. To the opposite is Aristotle.¹⁸

[QUESTION TWENTY-THREE

Whether the Particles of a Body and of a Place
are Joined Together at the Same End]



EXT, IT IS ASKED whether the particles of a body and of a place are joined together at the same end <or terminus>.

17. It seems that they are not:

Since the particles of a body are joined to the surface; the particles of place are not. Since place is a surface, and the particles of a surface are not joined to the surface but to a line.

18. Second, place is divided by <that which is> placed, according to Aristotle in Bk. IV of the *Physics*,¹⁹ therefore, the same thing does not end and continue the parts of each. The implication is evident, since an end is not divided from that of which it is <an end>; therefore, it is not the same <end> of two divided <things>.

19. To the opposite is Aristotle.²⁰

[I. THE RESPONSE TO QUESTIONS TWENTY
THROUGH TWENTY-THREE]

20. To the second question,²¹ it must be said that place is not a species of quantity, on account of the first reason there,²² and

17. *Physics*, Bk. V, Ch. 3 (227a 11–13; 227a 6–7).

18. *Categories*, Ch. 6 (5a 9).

19. *Physics*, Bk. IV, Ch. 4 (212a 15–21).

20. Cf. *Categories*, Ch. 6 (5a 9–13). 21. Namely, to q. 21.

22. Cf. *supra*, n. 7.

on account of the saying of the Commentator, in the statement above in the preceding question.²³

21. Similarly, on behalf of the first reason to the third question;²⁴ <it must be said> that place is not necessarily continuous. But nothing would be different <with regard> to its unity <if> its surface is a contiguity (*contiguatas*)—if the same <object> is surrounded (*locetur*) by diverse contiguous bodies—or <if> the surface of one <thing> is continuous, when the <thing that is> placed is held in one <thing> holding <it>.²⁵

22. Similarly to the fourth <question>:²⁶ <it must be said> that the parts of place can in no way be joined to the same end in number to which the parts of the body <are joined>, since place is divided from <the thing that is> placed. For place is that from which or to which the <thing that is> placed is moved, and <place> is not moved when the <thing that is> placed <is moved> nor <is it moved> to the same end in species. Since that end <or boundary> of a body is its surface, which is not the end <or boundary> of a place, unless place were a body. To be more precise, it is not necessary for these to be joined to the same end <or boundary>, since it is not necessary for these to be continuous.

23. The solution to the first question follows from this, since he does not sufficiently enumerate the species of quantity, at least with respect to the species “place.”

[II. THE RESPONSE TO THE AUTHORITY
OF ARISTOTLE]

24. To the authority of Aristotle to the opposite to all the questions, it must be said that he does not speak here of place according to his own opinion, but according to the opinion <of those who> posit place to be the space equal to <the thing having been> placed; and according to that <opinion>, all these <claims> would be true of place.

23. Cf. *supra*, n. 4.

24. Cf. *supra*, n. 15.

25. The Latin is as follows: *quando locatum locatur in uno locante*.

26. Namely, to question 23; cf. *supra*, n. 17.

25. But that opinion is disproved by Aristotle in Bk. IV of the *Physics*.²⁷ Thus, frequently, when <something> is said of something <else>, where the place is not proper for determining the truth, he uses the common opinion of others about it, <and> even elsewhere, when the place <is proper for> determining the truth about it, <he often uses the common opinion of others>, provided that the knowledge (*ars*) can be given according to the opinions of others just as <it could> also <be given> according to the proper truth. This is the way it is in almost all the examples in logic; since he does not care if it is thus or not, as long as that knowledge (*ars*) is true in those <examples>, if these <opinions> are such. Just as here it is sufficiently manifested that quantity is a genus, since it has many intermediate species and most specific <species> under it; whether place is any of those species or not.

[III. TO THE PRINCIPAL ARGUMENTS OF
THE TWENTIETH QUESTION]

26. To the first argument of the first question,²⁸ one can say that <the statement> “something is a quantum through an accident or through another <thing>” is twofold: effectively or formally. Formally, time is not a quantity through another; that is, nothing is <a quantity> through another which receives the predication of quantity; but <something is a quantity if quantity> is predicated of it in the first way of essential (*per se*) <predication>.²⁹ Effectively, in a certain measure, one can say that time is a quantum through another, since effectively it has its own essence and its own quantity, which is its own essence, from another as from motion; nevertheless something does not make it <such> that time is a quantity.

27. To the second <argument>,³⁰ I say that the proposition of Aristotle is only true when something univocal is said of a cause and of its effect, which by nature receives more and less, and

27. *Physics*, Bk. IV, Ch. 4 (211a 25–b 5).

28. Cf. *supra*, n. 1.

29. The Latin is as follows: *per se primo modo*.

30. Cf. *supra*, n. 2.

when the cause is essential (*per se*) and of the whole. The first condition is absent here, and the second is similarly <absent>. First, since time is a quantity, motion is not a quantity, since its whole nature (*ratio*) can be understood to be suitable to an indivisible. Nor are they univocally designated (*univocantur*) in “quantum,” since <quantum> is said of motion essentially (*per se*) in the second mode; <and quantum is> in no way <essentially said> of time, so that time is a species of quantity.

28. To the third <argument>,³¹ I say that “number” is sometimes taken from one <species> to another <species>, as it is generally taken for measure, perhaps on account of the fact that the nature (*ratio*) of measure in quantities pertains primarily to number, and in this way <number> is posited in the definition of time,³² not, however, as it is a discrete quantity. And <here> there is equivocation according to the second mode.

29. The other <arguments> about place must be conceded except the last.³³ To that <argument> it must be said that this predication is only material: “place is the limit <of a containing body>”; and formally the proposition is false. But formally place is the immobility of the limit, according to the Commentator.³⁴ Nevertheless, perhaps in the definition of place “limit” is posited first, since that is more known by the immobility of place.

[IV. TO THE OPPOSING ARGUMENTS OF THE TWENTY-FIRST QUESTION]

30. To the arguments to the opposite of the second question, <the following> must be said.

To the first <argument>,³⁵ one can say that place is not an essential (*per se*) measure, but <it is a measure> through the nature of its material, which is its surface; therefore, it measures the same dimension as the surface.

31. Cf. *supra*, n. 3.

32. *Physics*, Bk. IV, Ch. 11 (220a 25-26).

33. Cf. *supra*, n. 15. The editors of the critical edition identify the last argument as n. 5, which is the last argument of the first question. In my judgment, however, the last argument referred to is n. 15, which is the last argument of the three questions that posit place as a species of quantity.

34. Cf. *supra*, n. 7.

35. Cf. *supra*, n. 12.

31. And if it is argued against this: because <place> has another nature (*ratio*) of measure than the surface; for it is an extrinsic measure, and a surface is an intrinsic <measure>:

32. One can say that extrinsic and intrinsic do not essentially (*per se*) vary the nature (*rationem*) of measure. Therefore, place does not essentially (*per se*) have another nature (*rationem*) of measure than the surface; for this reason, <the nature> is extrinsic, since materially it is "the limit of a containing body" and it is the limit of the <thing> contained, which nevertheless is measured by place.

33. To the second <argument>,³⁶ I say that something is not said formally to be essentially (*per se*) equal to another according to place, but perhaps <it is said> materially <to be essentially equal to another> according to the surface of that which contains <it>; rather, to be more precise, place is said <to be> equal to <the thing> placed, according to Aristotle in Bk. IV of the *Physics*,³⁷ and not insofar as other <things> are said to be equal.³⁸

34. To the third <argument>,³⁹ I say that place is accidentally divisible through the nature of its material, just as other forms essentially (*per se*) based in quantity are accidentally divisible through the nature of quantity; and perhaps place is more <divisible> than the others in that it is the proper attribute of a surface.

36. Cf. *supra*, n. 13.

37. Cf. *supra*, n. 18.

38. The Latin is as follows: *et non illud secundum quod alia dicuntur aequalia*.

39. Cf. *supra*, n. 14.

[QUESTION TWENTY-FOUR

Whether there is Something
Contrary to Quantity]



IT IS ASKED whether anything is contrary to quantity.

1. It seems that there is:

Primarily, through general arguments (*rationes*). Some quantity is more distant from another <quantity>; another quantity is less <distant from another quantity>. Therefore, some <quantity> is extremely distant from another <quantity>. But the greatest distance in the same genus is contrariety, according to Aristotle in Bk. X of the *Metaphysics*.¹ Therefore, some quantity is contrary to another. The first implication is shown previously, by the authorities and the reason <given> above.²

2. Second, in this genus and in every other <genus>, there is a differentia according to the species;³ and this is contrariety, according to Aristotle in Bk. X of the *Metaphysics*,⁴ therefore, etc.

3. Third, this is argued through specific arguments (*rationes*). Since, according to Aristotle in Bk. V of the *Physics*,⁵ every motion is from a contrary to a contrary or from an intermediate to an intermediate. But motion is said to exist properly in the genus of quantity, according to the same author in the same place.⁶ Therefore, there are contraries or intermediates there between

1. *Metaphysics*, Bk. X, Ch. 4 (1055a 9–10).

2. Cf. *supra*, q. 14, n. 13; q. 16–17, nn. 13–22.

3. Cf. *supra*, q. 18–19, n. 7.

4. *Metaphysics*, Bk. X, Ch. 4 (1055a 16–33).

5. *Physics*, Bk. V, Ch. 5 (229b 11–22).

6. *Physics*, Bk. V, Ch. 5 (229b 15–17).

contraries, and if <there are> intermediates, then there are also contraries.

4. Fourth, to undertake more and less and to receive contraries are convertible properties with respect to any genus; but quantity undertakes more and less; therefore, <there are> also contraries <in this genus>. The major is evident inductively. Proof of the minor: great and small are essential (*per se*) attributes (*passiones*) of quantity and of it alone; but more and less do not happen except where great and small <happen>; and <if they exist> somewhere, then <they exist> only in the genus of quantity.—Similarly, “every whole is greater than its part”;⁷ but some quantity is essentially (*per se*) part of another quantity; therefore, more and less is essentially in quantity.—Similarly, equal and unequal are essential (*per se*) <properties> inhering <in it>;⁸ but unequal is more or less; therefore, etc.

5. Fifth, great and small seem to be contrary quantities.⁹

6. Similarly, up and down <seem to be contrary quantities>;¹⁰ therefore, etc.

7. To the opposite is Aristotle.¹¹

[I. THE RESPONSE TO THE QUESTION]

8. To the question, it must be said that contrariety is taken equivocally; namely, it can be taken properly or in a transferred sense. In a transferred sense, it expresses the absolute greatest distance in a genus, and it is extended to privative opposition, as in Bk. I of the *Physics*,¹² <where> it is said that principles are contrary for form and privation, which, it is manifest, are opposed privatively. Contrariety exists in this way in every genus, since every division of a genus is through opposite differentiae <which are> contrary in this way. <As it is said> properly, contrariety is the greatest distance of forms, which are apt by nature to exist mutually in the same susceptible <thing>. This is denied

7. Cf. Euclid, *Elements* (ed. H. Busard, p. 33).

8. *Categories*, Ch. 6 (6a 35).

9. *Categories*, Ch. 6 (5b 13–16).

10. *Categories*, Ch. 6 (6a 13–14).

11. *Categories*, Ch. 6 (5b 13).

12. *Physics*, Bk. I, Ch. 5 (188a 26–30).

about substance and quantity; and it must be understood <to be denied> in definite <things>, that is, in the species of quantity, as Aristotle says,¹³ <although> perhaps not in its attributes (*passiones*). Similarly, it must be understood of quantity in itself, not as it exists naturally, since perhaps in that way it has a contrary, as will be said in responding to the arguments.

[II. TO THE PRINCIPAL ARGUMENTS]

9. To the first <argument>,¹⁴ it is said that in quantity there is not any greatest distance, since the division of a continuum proceeds to infinity, and so <there is> an infinity in continuums and in numbers resulting from their division.

10. Against this is what Porphyry says,¹⁵ that the most specific species are finite according to nature, although not with respect to us. This also seems <to be the case> through its nature (*rationem*), since every species is an essential part of the universe, and in these parts an infinity does not seem possible, since this is repugnant to the order which is the good of the universe.

11. Therefore, one can say that even though there are infinite species in potency to quantity, although not any of the infinities is contrary to another <infinite>—since it is not maximally distant—nevertheless, an intermediate species common to these <things> can be maximally distant from another intermediate species common to those, as a continuum is maximally distant according to the form of continuity from the discrete, although continuums are infinite, and discrete <quantities> are similarly infinite. Therefore, it can be said that the first two arguments (*rationes*)¹⁶ lead to a true <conclusion> concerning contrariety as it was said in the first way, namely, in its transferred sense, since each authoritative quotation of Aristotle in Bk. X of the *Metaphysics*¹⁷ is only to be understood of that <sense>.

13. *Categories*, Ch. 6 (5b 13–150).

14. Cf. *supra*, n. 1.

15. Porphyry, *Isagoge*, Ch. “On Species” (AL I⁶ 12; ed. Busse, 6.12–14).

16. Cf. *supra*, nn. 1–2.

17. Cf. *supra*, n. 8.

12. To the third <argument>,¹⁸ I say that motion is not toward quantity in itself, but as it is under <something> natural. And in this way it has contrariety, as imperfect quantity to perfect <quantity>, to which <things> and of which <things> are augmentation and diminution. For those differentiae are not of quantity in itself, but of natural quantity. For “imperfect,” which is not necessary to the species, is said according to its natural form; “perfect” <is said> through the opposite. For, as it is said in Bk. II of *On the Soul*:¹⁹ “Of all constant things, nature is the determinate account (*ratio*) of magnitude and augmentation.” For some imperfect quantity is not absolutely in the genus of quantity, but an imperfect <quantity> is in a natural being; and according to this, something is moved from imperfect to perfect quantity or vice versa.

13. Against this <reply>: Motion is toward a thing of some genus, not to an accidental being; according to Aristotle in Bk. III of the *Physics*.²⁰ “There are as many species of motion as there are of being”; <and> the Commentator adds “having been acquired through motion.”²¹ But quantity under natural existence is not a species of a genus, but is an accidental being, since it is composed from two <things>, of which one happens to another. Therefore, motion is not toward quantity in this way, but motion is toward that which is essentially (*per se*) in the genus of quantity; therefore, something is contrary to that.

14. One can say here that motion is toward quantity, in the way that <something> acquired, as an end, is essentially (*per se*) in the genus of quantity through motion. But <that thing> is not acquired as it is a quantity, but under such a mode of being, and it has a contrary under such a mode of being. Then one ought to say that it is not necessary that something is properly contrary to that form, which is essentially (*per se*) the end of motion, but only to it as it is acquired through motion. Then <regarding> the form, if one <thing> is understood to be com-

18. Cf. *supra*, n. 3.

19. *On the Soul*, Bk. II, Ch. 4 (416a 16–17).

20. *Physics*, Bk. III, Ch. 1 (201a 8–9).

21. Averroës, *Physics*, Bk. III, Com 5 (ed. Iuntina, IV f. 41 va).

posed from these, I say that quantity under natural existence is an accidental being; but <that thing> is not a quantity, although it is taken under such a mode of being, when the mode is not understood to be part of the being composed from two things; and in this way motion is toward quantity.

15. To the fourth argument,²² I say that it is one thing to receive greater and less, and another thing to receive more and less, since greater and less are said according to quantity; but more and less express the intension and remission in the form to which they are added. It must be conceded then that quantity receives greater and less, but not more <and less>.

16. To the fifth <argument>²³ about great and small, Aristotle²⁴ responds that they are not quantities, since they are said only in respect to another <thing>; otherwise, "a mountain would never be said to be small, and a grain of sand <would never be said to be> large."²⁵

17. Otherwise,²⁶ one can respond that if they are quantities, they are not contraries. First, since nothing is contrary to that which is said only in respect to another; great and small are also of this kind. Second, since then contraries would be said of the same thing, since the same thing is great <in comparison> to this and small <in comparison> to that; therefore, it is great and small.

18. Against the first response.²⁷ According to Aristotle in Bk. V of the *Metaphysics*,²⁸ magnitude is posited as an essential (*per se*) species of quantity; and a concrete <term> is not in another genus than the abstract <term>.

19. Likewise, in the same place in Bk. V,²⁹ great and small are said to be essential (*per se*) quantities.

20. Against the second response³⁰ proving in two ways that

22. Cf. *supra*, n. 4.

23. Cf. *supra*, n. 5.

24. *Categories*, Ch. 6 (5b 27–28).

25. *Categories*, Ch. 6 (5b 20–22).

26. Cf. *Categories*, Ch. 6 (5b 30–37).

27. Cf. *supra*, n. 16.

28. *Metaphysics*, Bk. V, Ch. 13 (1020a 19–22).

29. *Metaphysics*, Bk. V, Ch. 13 (1020a 24–25).

30. Cf. *supra*, n. 17.

these are not contraries. The first proof does not seem valid, since something is contrary to a relation, as Aristotle³¹ says a little lower, for example, as virtue is <contrary> to vice, and knowledge to ignorance.

21. The second proof does not seem valid, since all opposites imply contradictory <things>; therefore, to those <opposites>, to which contradictory <things> do not follow, other opposites do not follow. But to the premises, in which there is a relation to diverse <things>, contradictory <things> do not follow, but there is an ignorance of the refutation (*ignorantia elenchi*): for example, it is the double to this and not-double to that; therefore, it is double and not-double. Therefore, neither do some opposites follow such premises.

22. To the first of these <counter-arguments>,³² one can say that "magnitude" is taken equivocally: as it is a species of quantity, and as it is an attribute. In the second way "great" is said denominatively from magnitude seeing that Aristotle denies that magnitude is a quantity.

23. To the <second counter-argument>,³³ I say that they are essential (*per se*) quantities in the second way; that is, they are attributes (*passiones*) of quantity, not essential (*per se*) <quantities> in the first way, as species.

24. To the <third counter-argument>,³⁴ I say that nothing expresses its contrary of which it is a relative, since "contraries" and "relative opposites" are distinguished in many <ways>. Great, however, is said relatively to small; therefore, it is not its contrary; Aristotle understands it thus. Nevertheless, a contrary to one <thing> can be a relative to another <thing>, as knowledge is relative to the knowable, and it is not contrary to it, but to ignorance. And so <it is to be taken> in the others.

25. To the <fourth counter-argument>,³⁵ I say that relatives can be predicated of the same thing and of one another, but not relative opposites. And so relatives can be inferred absolutely from themselves <when they are> taken with respect to diverse <things>. Therefore, great and small can be inferred ab-

31. *Categories*, Ch. 7 (6b 15–16).

33. Cf. *supra*, n. 19.

35. Cf. *supra*, n. 21.

32. Cf. *supra*, n. 18.

34. Cf. *supra*, n. 20.

solutely from themselves <when they are> taken with respect to diverse <things>, and by hypothesis, they are contraries; therefore, they are contraries of the same thing. I also concede that opposites cannot be inferred relatively from themselves taken with respect to diverse <things>, but great and small can <be inferred>; and by hypothesis, these are contraries; therefore, they are contraries of the same thing.

26. To the sixth <principal argument>³⁶—about up and down—I say that either “up” is taken absolutely for the circumference of heaven, and “down” is taken for the center of the earth; or it is taken generally, as anything is said to be up with respect to <something> lower. In the first way they are not contraries, since they do not naturally come into existence concerning the same thing; nor perhaps are they the most distant in nature, although they may be the most distant according to place. In the second way they are relatives (*ad aliquid*). And each response is about them <taken in this second way>, which is about great and small.

27. Nevertheless—whether they are contraries or not—one can say that <this means> nothing to the question at hand. Since if they are species or differentiae of place, <then> they are not in the genus of quantity, since place is not <a species of quantity>, as was said earlier.³⁷

36. Cf. *supra*, n. 6.

37. Cf. *supra*, qq. 20–23, nn. 20, 24–25.

[QUESTION TWENTY-FIVE

Whether the Genus of Relation is One Genus]

*Indeed, such things are said to another.*¹



FIRST, IT IS ASKED whether the genus of relation is one genus.

1. It seems that it is not:

One univocal genus is not common to being and non-being; but some relations are beings, and some <relations> are non-beings; therefore, etc. Proof of the second part of the minor: there is a contradiction between being and non-being, which <contradiction> is an intermediate relation, which seems to be a non-being.—First, since nothing is an intermediate <thing> between contradictory <terms>, and such a relation is an intermediate between contradictory <terms>, therefore it is not something.—Second, since that opposition can be in a non-being as in a subject, but an accident that is in a non-being as a subject cannot be a being.

2. It will be said² to this second proof that this opposition is only in a being as in a subject, according to what seems to be held by the Commentator <in his commentary> on Bk. VI of the *Metaphysics*.³

3. Against this <argument>: A relative of equivalence equally denominates each extreme in comparison to the other. That is manifested in <this> proposition, since it is equally true to say

1. *Categories*, Ch. 7 (6a 36–37).

2. Cf. Petrus de Alvernia, *Praedic.* q. 46 (CIMAGL 55, p. 65).

3. Averroës, *Metaphysics*, Bk. VI, com. 8 (ed. Iuntina, VIII f. 72ra).

“non-being is opposed to being” as “being is opposed to non-being”; therefore, such a relation can equally be in each extreme as in a subject.

4. <Second>, to the principal <argument>, nothing is univocal to a being of reason and to a being of nature, but certain relations are beings of nature, as paternity and filiation, which would exist <even if> the intellect did not exist; certain others, however, are beings of reason.

5. This is proved: first, since a relation does not have a truer being than the subject upon which it is based; and many relations are based upon things of reason, as the relation of genus to species and others of this kind; therefore, relations of this kind are only beings of reason.

6. <This is proved> secondly, since every relation requires two extremes; therefore, that relation, whose extremes are not two except according to reason, is only a being of reason. Such a relation is identity according to what is said in Bk. V of the *Metaphysics*, in the chapter “On the Same”:⁴ in that relation the intellect “uses one <extreme> as two <extremes>.”

7. Third, to the principal <argument>: According to Aristotle,⁵ “those things whose being is to have themselves to another are relations.” That <description> is in all <things> which are essentially (*per se*) to another in the first mode; therefore, <it is> through the nature of something univocal to them. That is not <anything else> except the most general <genus> of relation. Therefore, the most general <genus> of relation is “that its very being is (*hoc ipsum quod est*)” to have itself to another; nor is it to something prior or posterior, since “relatives⁶ are simultaneous by nature”; nor is it to <something> equal, since in this way there would be two most general <genera>. Also, that what is most general has itself to another is evident from its very name. For it is said by Aristotle <to be> “to something”; and it cannot be conceded <to be> “to something” and not be towards another, unless a contradictory <term> can be said of a contradictory <term>.

8. Fourth, to the principal <argument>: there are only two

4. *Metaphysics*, Bk. V, Ch. 9 (1018a 7–10).

5. *Categories*, Ch. 7 (8a 32–33).

6. *Categories*, Ch. 7 (7b 15).

primary species of any one genus; but there are not only two primary species of the most general <genus> of relation; therefore, the most general <genus> of relation is not one. Proof of the minor: since if there were <only two primary species>, they would be *A* and *B*. Then either *A* refers to itself and *B* to itself, and then both are relatives of equivalence; then also all inferiors, and so relatives of supposition and of imposition,⁷ would be in another most general genus. Or, *A* is referred to *B*, and vice versa; and if this is the case, then their species would refer to each other. Since, according to Aristotle in Bk. IV of the *Topics*.⁸ "If genus is <relative> to genus, <then> species is also <relative> to species." And similarly in Bk. II <of the *Topics*>:⁹ "if a proposition follows to <another> proposition, <then> what is relatively opposed to the consequent also follows to what is relatively opposed to the antecedent"; this must not be understood of <anything> except an implication from the higher to the lower. If, however, *A* and *B* refer mutually to each other, then all relatives are relatives of supposition and imposition; therefore, relatives of equivalence will be in another most general genus. Or third, that *A* refers to another and not to *B*, as <for example> to *C*; and *B* refers to another and not to *A*, as <for example> to *D*; and then it follows that *C* and *D* are neither prior nor posterior to *A* and *B* (since each is equally first with its correlative, since relatives are simultaneous by nature); therefore, there will be four primary species of this genus. Or, fourth, *A* is referred to itself and *B* to another, or *B* to itself and *A* to another, and in either way there will be three primary species of this genus; since that other to which *A* or *B* is referred is equally first with its correlative. Therefore, in none of these four <alternatives> given <here>, will this genus be one.

9. To the opposite is Aristotle.¹⁰

7. In this question, I have translated *superpositionis* as "imposition," which is distinct from *impositio*, which is also translated as "imposition" in other questions.

8. *Topics*, Bk. IV, Ch. 4 (124b 15–18).

9. Cf. *Topics*, Bk. II, Ch. 8 (113b 15–26).

10. *Categories*, Ch. 7 (8a 32–35).

[I. THE RESPONSE TO THE QUESTION]

10. It must be said that the most general <genus> in the genus of relation is one, since it is said of all its inferiors according to one account, which account is a relation (*habitus*) of one <thing> to another. And since all relations have the same mode of denominating a substance, namely, in comparison to another as accidents, since they denominate substance in the same way, they are of one genus.

[II. TO THE PRINCIPAL ARGUMENTS]

[A. *To the First and Second Principal Arguments*][I. *The Previous Response*]

11. To the first argument.¹¹ To the minor, I say that no relation is a non-being. Since the opposite is proved about a contradiction: to the first proof, since it is said that “there is no intermediate between contrary <terms>,” <this> must be understood of those <things> which exist under the intention of a contradiction. For example, <it must be understood> of complex <terms, i.e., propositions>, in this way: “a true predicate can be affirmed or denied of any subject,”¹² and there is no middle <alternative>; <it must be understood> of non-complex <contradictory terms>, in this way: <one or> the other of them is said of anything, and there is no middle <alternative>. But the other proposition, namely, that “such a relation is an intermediate between contradictory <terms>,” must be understood by reason of intentions. And then when the conclusion is drawn, a fallacy of accident occurs; since “intermediate” is taken extraneously in the premises, namely, that there is an intermediate that exists between contradictory <terms>. This is evident in the example: “being” and “non-being” do not essentially (*per se*) refer to each other, and between them nothing is absolutely an intermediate. But insofar as those <terms> are contradictory <to one another>, they are referred <to one another>; and in this way there

11. Cf. *supra*, n. 1.

12. *On Interpretation*, Bk. I, Ch. 9 (18a 29–30).

is an intermediate contradiction between them, just as between similar <things> a similitude is an intermediate, and between any relatives a relation is an intermediate.

12. To the other proof,¹³ I concede that that relation can be in non-being as in a subject, just as <it can also be> in a being. Nevertheless, insofar as "non-being" is the subject of this relation, it is a being of reason, and so such a relation can be a being of reason.

13. To the second principal <argument>,¹⁴ I deny the major <premise>. And I concede that a relation expresses a being of reason;¹⁵ either since each extreme or at least one <of them> is a being of reason; or since its extremes are not two except according to the consideration of reason, as it is in identity. Nevertheless, the major of each argument (*rationis*) can be proved in this way: something is not univocal to every being, nor is something even univocal to every being of nature; therefore, by much less will something be univocal to being and non-being, or to a being of reason; since if nothing is univocal to the <former>, which seem to pertain <to them> more, neither <will anything be univocal> to the <latter>, which <pertain to it> less.

14. And to this proof,¹⁶ insofar as it is for the second reason, it must be said that the implication is not valid, nor is there here a dialectical argument (*locus*) "from the greater," since not all beings of nature pertain more to some univocal <thing> than a being of nature and a being of reason <do>, except perhaps in several <things> said of them equivocally.

[2. *Objection*]

15. But because of the opposition that is between being and non-being, it is absolutely true to say that it is a non-being (since otherwise there would be an intermediate between being and non-being), and since it is absolutely in a non-being as in a subject, for this reason it does not seem that one must place it in the genus of relation, since being in itself is divided into the ten most general genera. Also, even though something may be univocal to a being of nature and to a being of reason, that is, to

13. Cf. *supra*, n. 1.

15. Cf. *supra*, n. 5.

14. Cf. *supra*, nn. 4–6.

16. Cf. *ibid.*

a being that is in the reason, as something is univocal to knowledge and to virtue, nevertheless to a being that exists only by the consideration of reason and to a being of nature, nothing seems to be univocal. Since then they would have opposition, since all things univocally contained under something that is the same, such as species, differ by contrary differentiae, and so such beings of reason cannot be applied to any being of nature, which is false.

[3. *Another Response*]

16. Therefore, it seems that one must answer the first two reasons otherwise.

To the first <reason>,¹⁷ I concede that a contradiction between being and non-being is simply non-being, but it is not a species in the genus of relation.

17. To the second <reason>,¹⁸ similarly I concede the major, by saying in regard to the minor that no relation according to reason is a species in the genus of relation, neither is an identity, nor are relations founded upon second intentions, nor are other similar things.

[4. *Objections and Responses*]

18. Against this: "those <things> are relatives¹⁹ whose very being (*quorum hoc ipsum esse*) is to have itself to another."²⁰ This is a true description of relatives, according to Aristotle. That <description also> inheres in a contradictory, since "its very being (*hoc ipsum quod est*)" is the contradictory of a contradictory; and <that description inheres in> the same, since "its very being (*hoc ipsum quod est*)" is the same to the same <thing>; and <that description inheres in> intentional relatives and similar <things>, as "the very being (*hoc ipsum quod est*)" of a genus is the genus of a species. That <description> is shown of all things through the fact that in their definitions their correlatives must be pos-

17. Cf. *supra*, n. 1.

18. Cf. *supra*, nn. 4–6.

19. The Latin is *ad aliud*, which literally means "to another," based upon the fact that they are "related to another."

20. Cf. *supra*, n. 7.

ited, as Porphyry manifestly says about genus and species.²¹ That would not be necessary, unless they essentially depended upon each other. Therefore, all the aforesaid are truly relatives; therefore, also forms, insofar as they are said to be <related> to one another, are true relations, which is denied.

19. Second, those <things> (*ista*) seem to be in no other genus except in the genus of relation, and it seems unsuitable to concede that those <things> (*illa*) are in no genus.

20. Third, if a contradiction between being and non-being is not in the genus of relation, <then> I ask whether a contradiction that is between other extremes is in the genus of relation. If it is, then a contradiction does not inhere in all things univocally, which is untenable, since in Bk. I of the *Posterior Analytics*²² the same definition is assigned to a contradiction universally taken: "contradiction is an opposition of which there is no intermediate in itself." If, however, a contradiction <that is> between other extremes is not in the genus of relation, then there is not any contradiction. And contrariety is in the genus of relation, as is manifest, since it truly is an essential (*per se*) relation (*habitudo*) of two beings. Therefore, opposition will not be univocal to contradiction and contrariety, which, in the subsequent chapter <which begins with the words> "As often, however, as one is accustomed to oppose,"²³ seems contrary to Boethius,²⁴ who divides opposition into these four species of opposition, as a genus <is divided> into its species.

21. To be more precise, a greater incongruity follows because opposition is unsuitably posited in the definition of contradiction in Bk. I of the *Posterior Analytics*,²⁵ since an opposition taken according to that signification according to which it pertains to a contradiction, is either the same as contradiction or <is> superior to it. If it is the same, <then> it is in vain that that "of which there is no intermediate in itself" is added in the definition, since opposition according to that mode of accepting is essen-

21. Porphyry, *Isagoge*, Ch. "On Species" (AL I⁶ g; ed. Busse, 4.9-14).

22. *Posterior Analytics*, Bk. I, Ch. 2 (72a 13-14).

23. *Categories*, Ch. 10 (11b 16 [in the apparatus]).

24. Boethius, *In Categ. Aristot.* IV (PL 64, 264C).

25. Cf. *supra*, n. 20.

tially (*per se*) determined to a contradiction. If it is superior, it does not have other inferiors than a contradiction under it, except other species of opposition. But the other <species> are beings, and a contradiction is a “non-being”; and then something will be univocal to being and to non-being, which is denied.

22. To the first of these <arguments>,²⁶ one can say that a true description of relatives, which Aristotle posits, pertains to none of these <things>, since the being of none of them is to have itself to another. For “another” is a differentia of being, and it is said only in comparison to a “being”; for something is not said <to be to> “another” from a non-being. Now the afore-said, or their correlatives, are non-beings, speaking commonly, and therefore the being of none of them is to have itself to another except perhaps according to reason—just as those and their correlatives are beings.

23. And if it is argued that “the being of a contradictory is to another according to reason, namely, to have itself to a contradictory, <and> therefore to have itself is a relation,” this is a fallacy in a certain respect (*secundum quid*) and simply.

24. When it is said²⁷ “that their correlatives are posited in their definitions,” I say that none of them has a true definition expressing what the thing is, although it may have a definition expressing what is said through the name, or that which the intellect conceives of them; which account, although it may be a definition of them absolutely, nevertheless is not an absolute definition.

25. To the second <argument>,²⁸ I say that it is not untenable to concede that these are not in some most general genus as species. Nevertheless, if they ought to be posited in some genus through reduction, <then> most of all they must be posited in the genus of relation, since they are assimilated more to those species, as, perhaps, all intentional things are in a genus through reduction—and this <is done> in that <genus> of

26. Cf. *supra*, n. 18.

27. Cf. *ibid.*

28. Cf. *supra*, n. 19.

which they are most assimilated to the species in the mode of predicating.

26. To the third <argument>,²⁹ I concede that "opposition" may not be univocal to contradiction and to contrariety.³⁰ Since it is assumed by Boethius that the division of opposition into these four is a division of a genus into its species, that can be understood in two ways: "of a genus," that is "of <something> general," since according to some mode <what is> divided is predicated of <what> divides <it>, and through this, this division is distinguished from a division of the whole into its parts. Or <it can be understood> in this way, that it is so understood for some dividing things, not for all, since contrariety and relative opposition are species of opposition taken according to one signification according to which there is an intermediate genus in the genus of relation, although a contradiction would not be a species of it as it is thus taken.

27. Through this <twofold distinction>, I say <in response> to that <argument> concerning the book of the *Posterior Analytics*,³¹ that the definition of contradiction is well assigned, and <I say> that opposition, according to that signification according to which it pertains to a contradiction, is not altogether the same as that, but is superior <to that>. And it has another <species>, inferior <to it>, namely, "privative opposition"; since insofar as that is a contradiction, it is either of a non-being as of a subject or as of a term, of which it would be necessary that each be a being to this because a relation is a being.

28. From these <distinctions>, it follows that opposition taken in one sense is said univocally of contrariety and relative opposition; taken in another sense it is said univocally of contradiction and privative opposition.

29. Cf. *supra*, n. 20.

30. For a fuller discussion on the various types of opposition, cf. *infra*, q. 37-38.

31. Cf. *supra*, n. 21.

[*B. To the Third and Fourth Principal Arguments*][*Prefatory Reply*]

29. To the third <principal argument>,³² I say that the most general <genus> of relation is not “to something,” nor is there something that is essentially (*per se*) in that genus; but that most general <genus> is a relation (*habitus*) of one <thing> to another, and all <those things> which are in the genus of relation are in this way.—To the proof to the contrary, it is said that this definition is not given of relation, but of relatives. Similarly, this name “to something” is said concretely from a relation and not of a relation unless it is understood in this way: “to something (*ad aliquid*)” is a relation (*habitus*) to something (*ad aliquid*).

[*C. To the Fourth Principal Argument*]

30. Through this <distinction, it can be said> similarly to the fourth principal reason,³³ that the first species of relation are not referred mutually to themselves nor to others; but they are principles of referring, just as all other <principles> that are in the genus of relation are as well.

[*1. Objections and Responses Against the Two Responses Stated Above*]

31. Against those two responses.³⁴ From these it follows that neither definition, which Aristotle³⁵ posits, would be of those <things> which are in the genus of relation, nor also would any property that he assigns. And so every determination of Aristotle would be <something> not pertaining to the genus of relation. The first implication is evident, by leading to (*inducendo*) the singular properties that Aristotle posits, none of which pertains to relations, but <which pertains> to relatives.

32. Second, the opposite is not the principle of its opposite. Therefore, an absolute form is not the principle according to which something is said <to be> compared to another; but a

32. Cf. *supra*, n. 7; nn. 29–51, with few exceptions, have many similarities to his *Questions on the Metaphysics*, q. 5–6, nn. 114–129.

33. Cf. *supra*, n. 8.

34. Cf. *supra*, nn. 29–30.

35. *Categories*, Ch. 7 (6a 37–38).

relation is a form of this kind; therefore, <a relation> is not an absolute <form> in itself; therefore, it is to another.

33. Third, by conceding what was said, the difficulty of the principal arguments is not avoided. Since if the most general <genus> in the abstract is a relation, something according to that <relation> is said relatively to another.

34. The proof of this: since, according to Aristotle,³⁶ “we express a *quality* (*quales*)” “according to a quality (*qualitatem*),” insofar as it is a most general <genus>, since he describes quality in this way as it is the most general <genus>, therefore some things are said <to be> relatives according to a relation, as that is the most general <genus>.

35. The second <proof of this>, since some things are said <to be> relatives according to lower relations in the genus of relation. Everything essentially (*per se*) inhering univocally in the first way in any species, however, inheres through the nature of the genus, and so <it inheres> to the genus primarily; therefore, something is said relatively according to the most general <genus>. From this, I argue <as follows>: either a relative said according to the form of the most general <genus> is said to something according to another form, or according to the same <form>. If <it is said> according to the same <form>, then that relative is a relative of equivalence; therefore, that relation is also a relation of equivalence; therefore, all lower relations <are relations of equivalence>.

36. If it is said to another according to another form, then the other form also corresponds to that other <form>, according to which it is said relatively to that <one>.—This is equally first with a relation which is the most general <genus>, since that relative is equally first with that <one>; therefore, two most general relations are equally first.

37. Similarly, there remains the difficulty of the fourth argument (*rationis*).³⁷ Since if the first species are relations, I ask <the following>. Are they either relations of equivalence? And if they are, <then> all inferior relations will be such relations. Or,

36. *Categories*, Ch. 8 (8b 25–26).

37. Cf. *supra*, nn. 8 and 30.

is *A* the principle of referring something said according to it to something denominated from *B*? And if it is, then *A* and *B* will be relations of supposition and imposition. Or is *A* the principle of referring <something> denominated from that to something denominated from another form as to *C*, and is *B* the principle of referring to another according to the same form? For then there will be three first species. Or, is *A* the principle of referring to something said from another form, and similarly of *B*? For then there will be four first species. And universally, since a relative corresponds to every relation and vice versa, no diversity will exist in the number of relations and of relatives.

38. To the first of these <arguments>,³⁸ one can concede the first consequent and say that that definition is not of the most general <genus> of relation nor of any of its species, but <it is> of that which is said denominatively from that <definition>; similarly concerning the properties. Nevertheless, it does not follow further that the determination of Aristotle is in no way suitable to the most general <genus> of relation, since a relation (*relatio*) among all beings is the most imperfect being since it is only a relation (*habitus*) of two <things>, and thus it is the least knowable in itself. It is more knowable, however, insofar as it informs those <things> of which it is a relation (*habitus*); and for the <sake of> determining a relation it was suitable to determine the relatives, especially since the cognition of the relation can be had from the cognition of the <relatives> or the definition, or with respect to their properties. Since if the being of a relative is to have itself to another, <then> proportionally the relation is the form according to which this <thing> has itself to another in this way. Similarly with respect to the properties, if relatives are said to be convertibles,³⁹ the relation is the form according to which some <things> are said to be convertible (*convertentiam*).⁴⁰ And so it is concerning the other properties.

38. Cf. *supra*, n. 31.

39. The Latin is as follows: *si relativa dicantur ad convertentiam*. See Wolter, *Questions on the Metaphysics*, Bk. 5, q. 5–6, fn. 172: “‘Convertere’ (to convert) and the noun ‘convertentia’ (convertibility) express the idea that one notion implies the other, and a proposition affirming the existence of one, entails necessarily a corresponding proposition affirming the existence of the other.”

40. *Categories*, Ch. 7 (6b 29).

39. To the other reason,⁴¹ I say that comparison and absoluteness are not opposites except concerning the same <thing>. And for this reason, absoluteness concerning form and comparison concerning the subject informed by a form are not opposites.

40. Otherwise, one can say that a relation is not a compared form nor an absolute <form>. For since it is a form according to which something is said to be compared to another, for this reason it is by nature said to be neither absolute nor compared, just as absoluteness opposed to itself is neither absolute nor compared.

41. If it is said that absolute and compared are immediate contraries concerning being: it is true, concerning being that is naturally capable of receiving it. Just as "healthy" and "sick" are immediate contraries concerning the body of an animal, but not concerning health and sickness; for neither health nor sickness is healthy or sick.

42. To the other reasons,⁴² it is said that something is referred <to another> neither according to the most general <genus> of relation, nor according to its first species, but only according to its lower species.

43. To the second of the former <arguments> touched upon earlier against this,⁴³ <which> conceded that "something is referred <to another> according to all lower relations; therefore, <it is referred to another> according to the genus," etc.; what is according to that genus (*secundum ipsum genus*) as it is in its inferior <species> is conceded, not <as it is> in itself (*non in se*).

44. Against this: <First> according to Aristotle in Bk. IV of the *Topics*.⁴⁴ "If the species is to another, <then> a genus will also be to another"; therefore, if the species is the principle of referring to another, <then> a genus will also be <a principle of referring> to another.

45. Second, it seems impossible that the most general <genus> is a relation or a habitude to another and that by informing a subject it does not make a subject have itself to another.

41. Cf. supra, n. 32.

43. Cf. supra, n. 35.

42. Cf. supra, nn. 33–35.

44. *Topics*, Bk. IV, Ch. 4 (124b 16).

46. Third, the second proof is not solved, since according to all the most specific species, something is referred <to another>; therefore, according to some univocal <term> these are the lowest and intermediate genera. But something is referred <to another> according to all these; therefore, <something is referred to another> through something univocal to them—since a univocal genus is superior to them—and so by always ascending to the most general <genus>, at last it will be necessary also to concede that something is referred <to another> according to the most general <genus>; not only according to what has being in the inferiors, since in this way it is not <anything> other than its inferiors, and through the consequent <it is> not univocal to them.

47. To the second of these reasons,⁴⁵ it might be said that the most general <genus> does not inform substance except in its inferiors, since it does not inform substance except insofar as it is a being; however, it is not a being except in its inferiors.

48. Against this: at least it can be conceived by the intellect that a relation informs a substance, without conceiving some inferior relation informing a substance. Since the prior can be conceived by the intellect, without conceiving the posterior, and in this way the opposites are conceded: that <relation> informs the substance, and nevertheless a relative is not related through that <relation>. This is impossible.

[2. *Another Response to the Third Principal Argument*]

49. Therefore, to the third principal reason,⁴⁶ it must be said that the most general <genus> in the genus of relation is the principle of referring to another, but not to another <that is> related according to another form in the genus. Similarly, a relative said denominatively from the most general <genus> is said relatively, but not to something related according to another form in the genus.

45. Cf. *supra*, n. 45.

46. Cf. *supra*, n. 7.

50. Against this: if relation is the principle of referring to something <that is> related according to the same form, then it is a relation of equivalence, and a relative denominated from that is a relative of equivalence, and so all relations and inferior relatives will be <relations> of equivalence, which is untenable.

51. To this <argument>, it must be said that “relative of equivalence” is equivocal, since, taken properly, something is related to another according to the same form in species, by which relation of equivalence one name is imposed which is said of each extreme of such a relation, of which kind are “similar” and “equal” and others of the like.—Taken in a transferred sense, every relative of equivalence expresses that which denominates each extreme from the same name, although that name is not imposed from one form of the species. And in this second way I concede that relation, which is the most general <genus>, is a relation of equivalence; and a relative from it is said likewise to be a relative of equivalence. For it is said that “a relative is a relative of a relative.” But a relation taken in the first way is a species of this genus.

52. Against this: in whichever way the most general <genus> is a relation of equivalence, it follows that all inferior relations are such relations in that way. This seems untenable, since paternity and others of this kind, such as relations of supposition and imposition, are in no way relations of equivalence, since they do not denominate each extreme by some name that is the same.

53. To this <argument>, one can say that every inferior relation is of equivalence, that is, there is a principle of referring to something said according to the same form in the genus. Also, <it is the case> where each extreme is named by the same name of the genus, although not just anything is the principle of referring to something according to the same form in the species; nor where each <extreme> is named by the same name of a species. For “father” expresses the relative of a relative, according to the form of its genus, even though it does not express “father” according to the proper form of father.

[3. *Another Response to the Fourth Principal Argument*]

54. To the fourth principal reason,⁴⁷ I concede that *A* as well as *B* is a principle of referring to another which was said according to the same form, namely, that *A* is that which is a relation of equivalence, *B* is that which is a relation of supposition and imposition. A relative denominated by *B*, which is a relative of supposition and imposition, is said to a relative of supposition and imposition. But it does not follow from this that it is a relative of equivalence except by taking it in the second way, as it was said previously.⁴⁸

55. And if, perhaps, a division of this genus that is *B* is sought, in which way does its first species have themselves?—One can concede that they are mutually referred to each other, as they are a relative according to an active potency and a relative according to a passive potency. And furthermore, one can concede that their species are referred among themselves, as father and warmth, which are species of the first genus, <are referred> to a son and to something capable of being heated, which are species of the second <genus>. And it must be said proportionally of the corresponding relations.

56. From these <arguments>, so many <things> are evident: in what way relations of reason have themselves to the genus of relation; and besides this, in which way beings of reason are in a genus; and in which way “between contradictories there is no intermediate” must be understood; and in which way opposition has itself to those four into which the inferior is divided in this book;⁴⁹ and in which way according to relation as it is the most general <genus> something is referred and to which <genera> it is referred, because it is said denominatively from the same <name>; and in which way some relatives of equivalence are said equivocally, and in what way the determination of Aristotle that is about relatives is suitable, since only relations are in this genus as its species; and in which way there are only two first species of this genus and other <issues> which are evident by inspection.

47. Cf. supra, n. 8.

48. Cf. supra, n. 51.

49. Cf. infra, q. 37–38.

[QUESTION TWENTY-SIX

Whether the Second
Description of Relatives
is Suitably Given]



IT IS ASKED whether the second description of relatives that Aristotle posits¹ is suitably given.

1. It seems that it is not:

Since that <description> pertains to nothing in the genus of relation; therefore, it does not pertain to the most general <genus> of relation. Proof of the antecedent: since if the being of a relation were “to have itself to another,” this would be through another relation; therefore, with equal reason, the being of this other would be to have itself to another, and so on *ad infinitum*, the posterior of which would always be a relation of the prior. This is untenable.

2. Second, that definition is either: (A) of the form of a relation in itself, which according to the preceding argument was disproved; or (B) of the subject in itself, which is false, since its being is not to have itself to another, because in itself (*secundum se*) it is a thing of another genus and it is absolute; or (C) of a subject informed by such a form, and then it is of an accidental being, which is unsuitable, since there is not a definition <of an accidental being>, according to Aristotle in Bk. VI of the *Metaphysics*.² Therefore, that description is of none <of these>. This is untenable.

1. “Those things are relatives [to something] in which their very being is to have itself in a certain measure to another (*sunt ad aliquid quibus hoc ipsum esse est ad aliquid quodammodo se habere*)”; *Categories*, Ch. 7 (8a 32–33). Note that the first description of relatives is given at the beginning of chapter 7 (6a 37–38).

2. *Metaphysics*, Bk. VI, Ch. 5 (1026b 3–4).

3. Third, the most general <genus> is predicable of any of its species; but this <genus> cannot be <predicated of its species> except insofar as it is signified in the singular—that description, however, is given of something according to what is signified in the plural; therefore, <that description> is not about the most general <genus> itself.

4. Fourth, this description does not seem to pertain to all <the things> which are in the genus of relation. For many <things> are said in regard to another, whose being is not essentially to have itself to another.

5. To the opposite is Aristotle.³

[I. A COMMON OPINION]

[A. *Exposition of the Opinion*]

6. It is said⁴ to the question that relatives are twofold: some <things are relatives> according to being, and some according to speech. The first description of Aristotle is given about relatives according to speech, namely, “anything whose very being is said of others are called relatives <to something>, or otherwise <anything whose very being is said> howsoever <or in some other way> to another <are called relatives>.”⁵ The second description, which he approves more, is given of relatives according to being, namely, that “<those things> are related (*ad aliud*) <to another> whose very being is to have itself to another.”⁶

[B. *Against the Common Opinion*]

7. Against this distinction: either the division is given through opposites, or not. If it is not, then it is not valid. If it is, then relatives according to speech are not relatives according to being;

3. *Categories*, Ch. 7 (8a 32–33).

4. Cf. Lambertus de Latiniaco, *Summa logicae* c 3 (ed. F. Alessio, p. 80); Thomas Aquinas, *Summa Theologica*, I q. 13 a. 7 ad 1.

5. *Ad aliquid dicuntur quaecumque hoc ipsum quod sunt aliorum dicuntur, vel quomodolibet aliter ad aliud*; quoted from *Categories*, Ch. 7 (6a 37–38).

6. *Ad aliquid sunt quorum hoc ipsum esse est ad aliud se habere*; quoted from *Categories*, Ch. 7 (8a 32–33).

therefore, they are not relatives; therefore, relatives are poorly divided into these <divisions>. Similarly, if they are opposites, it follows that relatives according to being are not relatives according to speech, which is false.—If it is said that the members <of the division> ought to be understood with precision, it follows that relatives according to speech are only according to speech, and so they would not be more true than black, being called white, is white.

8. Second, the other member of the division⁷ is converted with the divided; for man absolutely and man according to being are the same.

9. Third, that description which is posited of relatives according to speech is none <of them>. First, since that <description> is appropriate to substances which are in no way related (*ad aliud*) <to another>, according to Aristotle,⁸ since he considers this ridiculous. Second, since according to this <description>, “discipline” is said relatively to “disciplined,” since <discipline> is of <the disciplined>; and with equal reason “whiteness” <is said relatively> to “white,” and with equal reason all accidents <are said relatively> to their subject, since they are said of them. Therefore, from that description none of them can be concluded to exist in the genus of relation.

[II. THE SOLUTION OF THE QUESTION]

10. Therefore, it must be said that relatives are in no way divided into relatives according to being and relatives according to speech, since by taking the members <of the division> precisely, a relative according to speech is no more a relative than a dead man is a man.

11. Nevertheless, perhaps beings are divided in this way: so that some are relatives according to being, for example, as those which are named denominatively from relations; some, however, are relatives according to speech, for example, as those which are in other genera and according to some relationship

7. I.e., relatives according to being.

8. *Categories*, Ch. 7 (8a 28–31).

(*habitudinem*) are said <to be related> to others—nevertheless, these, strictly speaking, are not relatives.

12. But truly some of the relatives are said according to their own proper form to another, for example, as those which are primarily relatives; others are truly and essentially (*per se*) relatives, but they are not said according to the proper form to others, for example, as they are relatives according to genus. For those are essentially (*per se*) relatives, but not primarily; and they are said to others according to the form of their genus, for example, if knowledge is essentially a relative, it is impossible that that which is its species, according to that signification, is not a relative, since then a genus and its species would not be in the same genus. But it is not primarily a relative, since it is not <a relative> according to that which it adds over <and above> its genus. And for this reason it is said <in relation> to the correlation of the genus according to that very genus.

Therefore, it must be said that Aristotle's second description of relatives is suitable, since it indicates their nature (*ratio*) insofar as they are relatives, as will be evident in responding to the arguments (*rationes*).

[III. TO THE PRINCIPAL ARGUMENTS]

14. Therefore, the first <argument>⁹ must be answered by conceding that that description is not given about relation, but about relatives said denominatively from them. Why he should, however, define these and not relations, and <why> he should posit their properties, was said in the preceding question.¹⁰

15. To the <second argument>,¹¹ I say that that description is not of a relation absolutely, as it is signified in the abstract, nor of a subject absolutely, nor of the whole aggregate; but of the form as it informs the subject in that mode in which it is signified through a concrete name said from the most general <genus> of relation, for example, in the way that "the"¹² does not express a part of what is signified, but the mode.

9. Cf. *supra*, n. 1.

11. Cf. *supra*, n. 2.

10. Cf. *supra*, q. 25, n. 38.

12. The definite article here is *ly*.

16. To the third <argument>,¹³ <what> was said previously,¹⁴ <namely,> why relatives of equivalence <that are> defined in the plural are more suitable than <those that are defined> in the singular, <succifies for a reply>, since that which is defined here is of this kind, as is evident from the preceding question.¹⁵

17. To the fourth <argument>,¹⁶ it must be said that that account pertains essentially to all <things> which are in the genus of relation, as they are said denominatively from relations. If, however, there are <some things> which are said to another, and which do not have this account, <then> they are not relatives except in a certain respect.

[IV. NOTABLE POINTS ABOUT THE
PROPERTIES OF RELATIVES]

18. It must be noted about the first¹⁷ and second¹⁸ <properties>, which are “to receive contraries,” and “to undertake more and less,” that these do not essentially (*per se*) exist in relations nor perhaps in relatives, but only by reason of those <things> on which a relation is essentially (*per se*) founded. Therefore, those <things> which are founded on forms undertaking more and less or contrariety receive these, just as a similitude according to whiteness receives more and less and the opposite, since whiteness also <receives more and less and the opposite> on which <that similitude> is founded. Similitude, however, which is according to some <things> which are in the fourth species of quality,¹⁹ does not receive an opposite nor <does it undertake> more and less, since those <things> on which that similitude is founded neither receive <an opposite nor undertake more and less>; and this <is the case> when speaking of the first property and of contrariety said properly. First, since if these two were to exist essentially (*per se*) in relations, motion could exist essentially (*per se*) in the genus of relation, since an acquisition of parts can exist after the part of some form in the genus of

13. Cf. *supra*, n. 3.

15. Cf. *supra*, q. 25, n. 38.

17. *Categories*, Ch. 7 (6b 15).

19. *Categories*, Ch. 8 (11a 5–7).

14. Cf. the following note.

16. Cf. *supra*, n. 4.

18. *Categories*, Ch. 7 (6b 20–21).

relation; and such an acquisition is motion, according to the Commentator <in his commentary on that which is> above in Bk. III of the *Physics*.²⁰ But the consequent is untenable, namely, that motion exists essentially (*per se*) in the genus of relation, since it is against <what> Aristotle <says> in Bk. V of the *Physics*.²¹ Second, since if to receive more and less is in the form of relation, <then> a relative said according to more would essentially (*per se*) be referred to two: namely, to something said according to less according to the same form, and beyond this to that to which such a relative is said absolutely. For example, “more similar” (*similius*) would be said essentially (*per se*) to “less similar” (*minus simile*), and beyond this to that to which its positive <form> is referred, namely, “similar”; but the consequent seems untenable, since it is against Aristotle in Bk. V of the *Metaphysics*,²² who says that it is ridiculous that the same thing is referred to twice, that is, to two <things>.

19. On account of this, it seems that it must be said that these properties exist in relatives accidentally. The authority of Aristotle to the contrary does not matter, since he seems to determine nothing about relatives according to his own opinion before that part where he begins to disprove the first description of relatives.²³ But to a lesser <extent>, no relative is said properly <to be> a contrary to that to which it is relative, although it happens that some same <thing> is relative to one <thing> and contrary to another <thing>, as knowledge is contrary to ignorance, and it is not referred to that, but to the knowable.²⁴

20. Averroës, *Physica* III com. 4 (ed. Iuntina, IV f. 417b).

21. *Physics*, Bk. V, Ch. 2 (226a 24–26).

22. *Metaphysics*, Bk. V, Ch. 15 (1021a 31–b 3).

23. *Categories*, Ch. 7 (8a 13).

24. Cf. *supra*, q. 24, n. 24.

[QUESTION TWENTY-SEVEN

Whether Relatives are Simultaneous by Nature]



ONCERNING the fourth property, it is asked whether relatives are simultaneous by nature.

1. It seems that they are not.

Since, according to Porphyry,¹ a genus is referred its species and vice versa; but these are not simultaneous by nature, since that is naturally prior “from which the implication of subsisting is not converted”;² a genus is of this kind, since an implication from a species to a genus holds, but not conversely; therefore, etc.—One can argue similarly in almost all intentions relative to each other, for example, about primary and secondary substance, and about universal and particular.

2. Second, according to Porphyry,³ “old Socrates differs from the boy Socrates”; but a difference is a certain relation; therefore, the old Socrates and the boy Socrates are referred to each other. But these are not simultaneous by nature. One can argue in this way about all <things> that are not the same, but <that are> ordered to each other with respect to these relations “difference” and “diversity.”

3. Third, “knowable” and “knowledge” are referred to each other, and they are not simultaneous by nature, since “knowledge is destroyed by the destruction of the knowable,” but not the other way around.⁴ Similarly, <one can say the same

1. *Isagoge*, Ch. “On Species” (AL I⁶ 8–9; ed. Busse, 4.2–6).

2. *Categories*, Ch. 12 (14a 26–31).

3. *Isagoge*, Ch. “On Difference” (AL I⁶ 14; ed. Busse, 8.10–12).

4. *Categories*, Ch. 7 (7b 26–30).

thing> about sensation and the sensible, as Aristotle argues.⁵ Since by the destruction of the sensible, the body of an animal is destroyed—although not “body” as a genus in the genus of substance or as it is in the genus of quantity; since by the destruction of the body of an animal, sensation is destroyed, since sensation is in a body as in a subject, although it is in the soul as in a principle or cause. Therefore, from the first: by the destruction of the sensible, sensation is destroyed, but not the other way around, since sensation is destroyed by the destruction of an animal, but it is not necessary that by the destruction of an animal the sensible is destroyed; for these can remain thus far, from which <things> an animal exists, since they are naturally prior to an animal. It happens <that one can> argue thus about all relatives according to the third mode, which <mode> is posited in Bk. V of the *Metaphysics*,⁶ namely, those which are referred to as the measure and the measurable and vice versa.

4. Fourth, a father is said relatively to a son; and a father can remain after the death of a son; therefore, they are not simultaneous by nature.

5. The <first> proof of the minor: since by the death of that <one> son, another son can remain to whom the father can be said <to be related>; The second <proof of the minor>: since by the death of a son, it is possible that there is no change concerning the substance of the father.

6. But it seems impossible that some real form previously existing in a subject does not exist afterwards in the <same> subject unless the subject is changed. Therefore, it is impossible that paternity, which exists previously in that <one person>, does not exist in that <same person> afterwards, only on account of the death of the son. Therefore, by the death of the son, that father will remain just as he was previously.

7. The third <proof of the minor>: since a father is said <in relation> to that which he begot. It is impossible, however, that he, who begot <a son>, did not beget <a son>, since every true proposition of the past is necessary.⁷ Therefore, it is impossible

5. *Categories*, Ch. 7 (7b 35–8a 11).

6. *Metaphysics*, Bk. V, Ch. 15 (1021a 30–b 10).

7. Cf. Scotus, *Questions on the Metaphysics*, Bk. VI, q. 2, n. 47.

that he, who is a father at any one time, is subsequently not a father; therefore, by necessity, he remains a father after the death of his son.

8. Fifth, the prior insofar as it is prior is referred to the posterior insofar as it is posterior; and a cause insofar as it is a cause is referred to what is caused. But the prior insofar as it is prior is not simultaneous by nature with the posterior, nor is a cause <simultaneous by nature> with the caused. Therefore, neither are all relatives simultaneous by nature.

9. Sixth, relatives according to genus are essentially (*per se*) relatives, since in an essential (*per se*) understanding of them, there are their genera according to which they are referred, and they do not have other correlatives than the correlatives of the genera. But a correlative of a genus is simultaneous by nature with a genus, which is naturally prior to the species. Therefore, that correlative is also naturally prior to the species; therefore, etc.

10. To the opposite is Aristotle.⁸

11. Likewise, "all relatives are said in relation to correlatives that reciprocate,"⁹ according to <Aristotle in his treatment> on the third property, that is, according to mutual dependence. Therefore, neither is prior to the other, since by the same reason that this one is prior to that one, conversely, that one would also be prior to this one, since they are mutually dependent. And so the same <thing> with respect to the same would be <both> prior and posterior, which is untenable.

[I. TO THE QUESTION]

12. It must be said that all relatives that essentially (*per se*) refer to each other so that the being of one is to have itself to another and vice versa, are simultaneous by nature, on account of the argument (*rationem*) of Aristotle.¹⁰ Since if one is posited,

8. *Categories*, Ch. 7 (7b 15).

9. *Categories*, Ch. 7 (6b 27). The Latin is: *omnia relativa dicuntur ad convertentiam*. See Wolter quotation in ch. 25, fn. 39, p. 219, supra.

10. *Categories*, Ch. 7 (7b 20–22).

the remaining one is posited, and the other way around, and if one is destroyed, the remaining is also destroyed, and the other way around.

13. Nevertheless, if they are accidentally (*per accidens*) relative, or are not essentially (*per se*) <and> mutually relative, <then> it is not necessary that they be simultaneous by nature. Those are accidentally relative which are not said <to be related> to one another according to their forms; and those which do not depend on one other, of which one depends on the other according to its form and the other does not conversely depend on it, <for example> those which are referred to one another as a measure and the measurable are of this kind. For knowledge is essentially (*per se*) said of the knowable, but the knowable is not <said essentially> to knowledge except that knowledge is toward it, according to Aristotle in Bk. V of the *Metaphysics*, in the chapter about "Relations."¹¹

[II. TO THE PRINCIPAL REASONS]

14. To the <principal> reasons. To the first <principal reason>,¹² it must be said that the intentions of genus and species are referred to each other and are simultaneous by nature. But what is under the intention of a genus insofar as that intention is attributed to it, although not insofar as it exists, is prior to that to which the intention of the species is attributed. And among those which exist under it, an implication is such and not the other way around; but among the intentions an implication is mutual; for concerning these it follows that "if a genus is, a species is," and vice versa. The subjects of these intentions, however, are accidentally relative; it is not necessary that relatives of this kind are simultaneous by nature.

15. To the second <argument>:¹³ old Socrates and boy Socrates are accidentally relatives, since in relatives of equivalence each extreme is essentially something called from the same name. Therefore, here the extreme is essentially (*per se*)

11. *Metaphysics*, Bk. V, Ch. 15 (1021a 30–b 2).

12. Cf. *supra*, n. 1.

13. Cf. *supra*, n. 2.

“different” and “different,” and these are simultaneous by nature. For since “Socrates is a boy” is different from old Socrates, and since “Socrates is old” is different from boy Socrates; for each is simultaneously different from the other, although each one is not simultaneous.

16. To the third <argument>:¹⁴ that account proves true about relatives that do not mutually depend on each other.¹⁵

17. To the fourth <argument>,¹⁶ I say that although a substance subjected to paternity can remain after the death of a son, nevertheless, he cannot remain a father.

18. When the opposite is proved:¹⁷ to the first proof I say that a father is not referred to this son except accidentally, however, <he is referred> to a son essentially. And therefore by the death of this son, provided that another son remains, he can still remain a father, since it is not necessary that a relative be simultaneous by nature with its accidental correlative.

19. To the second proof,¹⁸ I say that it is possible for a real form to be in a subject or not to be in a subject without a change of the subject in itself; since what exists in a subject only in comparison to another, can cease to exist in that <subject> only by the transformation of the other.

20. To the third proof:¹⁹

If it is conceded that <one who is> a father at some time cannot not be a father, it must be conceded that <one who is> a son at some time cannot not be a son. Since just as it is always true to say of him who begot <a son> that he begot <a son>, so also it is always true to say of him who was begotten that he was begotten, even though he may not always exist, and through the consequent, he always remains a son, just as a father also <always remains a father>

21. If, when a father exists and his son does not exist, it is said that a father is and a son is not, since when “being” predicates according to its adjacent <term>, it predicates “being existent” (*esse existere*), according to Boethius, then they are not simultaneous by nature.

14. Cf. *supra*, n. 3.

16. Cf. *supra*, n. 4.

18. Cf. *supra*, n. 6.

15. Cf. *supra*, n. 13.

17. Cf. *supra*, n. 5.

19. Cf. *supra*, n. 7.

22. One can say that relatives are simultaneous by nature according to that being which is proper to them insofar as they are relatives. But that <being> is not "being existent" (*esse existere*), since this happens to them insofar as they are referred <to each other>. And for this reason one relative can exist in this way, while the other does not exist <in this way>. Therefore, these implications do not hold: "the father is—that is, he exists—therefore, the son is," that is, he exists, although it ought to hold by taking the "being" that is proper to a father insofar as he is referred <to his son>, and similarly regarding the "being" of a son. And so the implication of Aristotle, in which he proves that relatives are simultaneous by nature, must be understood in this way.

23. To the fifth <argument>,²⁰ I say that the intentions "prior" and "posterior," "cause" and "effect" are referred to each other and are simultaneous by nature, but not the things which are under them.

24. Against this: what is simultaneous with the posterior insofar as it is posterior is posterior. Therefore, if the prior insofar as it is prior is referred to the posterior insofar as it is posterior, <then> in this way it would also be simultaneous with the posterior, <and so> the prior insofar as it is prior would be posterior. But this is untenable, even when speaking about the intentions, since the opposite is predicated of the opposite.

25. To this <argument> one can say that the major proposition is true by taking "simultaneous" in the <same> way in which "prior" and "posterior" are taken. It is not in this way in the <major> proposition, since "prior" and "posterior" are taken for these intentions, and "simultaneous" is taken for a simultaneity of nature.—Or otherwise: <one can say> that "prior" and "posterior" are taken according to the thing; "simultaneous" according to its nature (*rationem*). But then it seems to follow that a relation of prior and posterior is only according to nature (*rationem*) if the extremes are only according to definition.

20. Cf. *supra*, n. 8.

26. To the sixth <argument>,²¹ it must be said that that account (*ratio*) proves true about correlatives of the genera to which some <things> are said relatively according to genus; for among them there is not an essential (*per se*) dependency on one another.

21. Cf. *supra*, n. 9.

[QUESTION TWENTY-EIGHT]

Whether it is Necessary in
the Definition of One Relative
to Posit Its Correlative]



IT IS ASKED whether it is necessary in the definition of one relative to posit its correlative.

1. It seems that it is not:

Since everything that ought to be posited in the definition is prior and better known, as a genus or differentia with respect to <what is being> defined; but with respect to <a relative> being defined, it is related to its correlative in none of these ways; therefore, etc. The minor is evident with respect to its two primary members through the argument to the opposite in the preceding question.¹

2. Second, every definition indicates the essence of the defined; but one relative is not of the essence of the other, since the being of a relative is “to have itself to another”; “another,” however, expresses a diversity in the essence; therefore, etc.

3. Third, in the definition of one opposite, the other <opposite> ought not be posited; relatives are opposites; therefore, etc. Proof of the major: first, since contradictories follow all opposites, and in the definition of one contradictory the other <contradictory> ought not be posited; therefore, neither <ought they be posited> in other opposites.² The implication is evident, since the consequent does not pertain to the definition of any <thing>, nor does the antecedent.—Second, since any

1. Cf. *supra*, q. 27, n. 1.

2. Cf. *infra*, n. 15, where Scotus claims that the form of this argument is not valid.

part of a definition can be predicated of that about which the defined is also predicated, according to Aristotle in the third consideration of Bk. II of the *Topics*.³ Therefore, if in the definition of one opposite the other <opposite> is posited, two opposites would be predicated of the same <thing>, which is untenable. The minor is evident in that chapter <which begins with> “as often, however, as it is accustomed to be opposed,”⁴ where Aristotle enumerates “relative opposition”⁵ as one species of opposition, and exemplifies <this species>, as “double,” “half,” giving us to understand that this follows in all relatives.

4. If it is said that the major is true only in opposites other than relatives, against this:

Contraries and contradictories are opposed <to one another> relatively, since a contrary is said contrary to a contrary; therefore, if one contrary is not defined through the other, not every relative will be defined through its correlative.

5. Likewise, “every differentia according to its species is a contrariety,” according to Aristotle in Bk. X of the *Metaphysics*,⁶ but relative opposites differ in species; therefore, they are contraries. Therefore, if the major is true about contraries, <then> it will also be true about relative opposites.

6. Fourth, a name and its definition signify the same <thing>, according to Aristotle in Bk. IV of the *Metaphysics*;⁷ but the name of a relative does not signify its correlative, since then by expressing the one with the other there would be a vain repetition; therefore, neither ought the other be posited in the definition.

7. Fifth, any definition of a relative is good when its correlative is not posited, as this <definition>: “species is that which is predicated of many <things> differing in number, etc.,”⁸ where

3. *Topics*, Bk. II, Ch. 2 (110a 5–9).

4. *Categories*, Ch. 10 (11b 16 [in the apparatus]).

5. *Categories*, Ch. 10 (11b 25–26).

6. *Metaphysics*, Bk. X, Ch. 8 (1058a 15–17).

7. *Metaphysics*, Bk. IV, Ch. 7 (1012a 23–25).

8. *Isagoge*, Ch. “On Species” (AL I⁶ 9; ed. Busse, 4.11–12).

genus is not posited to that with respect to which the species is relatively said; therefore, it is not always necessary for a relative to be defined through its correlative.

8. Sixth, all the reasons that are applied to the preceding question,⁹ which <insofar as they> prove that one relative can exist without the other, prove that one must not be defined through the other; for nothing is defined through that without which it can exist.

9. To the opposite is Porphyry in the chapter "On Species," who says that a genus is said <with respect> to its species and conversely:¹⁰ "Therefore, it is necessary in the accounts of each to use each of the two."

10. Likewise, Aristotle¹¹ says here that it is impossible for one relative to be known definitely unless the other is known; but every non-complex <term> is known definitely when it is known through its own definition; therefore, it is impossible for one relative to be known through its definition unless the other is known; therefore, one must be posited of necessity in the definition of the other.

[I. THE RESPONSE OF SCOTUS]

11. This can be conceded, since the essential being of a relative is "to have itself to another"; however, the definition indicates the essential being of the defined; therefore, the definition of a relative ought to indicate that it has itself to another, which cannot be unless the correlative of its defined is posited in it; therefore, etc. This, however, is not only true about relatives depending upon one another, but <it is true> about any <of those things> which depend essentially on other <things>. Because those other <things> ought to be posited in their definition, but those <other things> do not define themselves to one another unless they are those which mutually depend essentially (*per se*) upon each other. This is not true of accidental

9. Cf. *supra*, q. 27, nn. 1-7.

10. *Isagoge*, Ch. "On Species" (AL I⁶ 9; ed. Busse, 4.6-9).

11. *Categories*, Ch. 7 (8b 13-15).

relatives, nor of relatives related in the third mode, as measure and the measurable, nor of relatives according to genus.

[II. TO THE PRINCIPAL ARGUMENTS]

12. To the first reason:¹² the major is true of a definition which is given only through the essentials, of which kind is the definition of substance, or to a less <degree> of an absolute <accident>, not of a relative (*respectivi*). For since relatives (*respectiva*) depend essentially on one another, they then mutually define each other, although neither is prior to the other.

13. To the second <argument>:¹³ the major is only true of a definition that is given without an addition, <but> a definition of a relative or of some accident is not of this kind. Nevertheless, in the definitions of other accidents only the subject is added beyond the essence of the defined. In the definitions of relatives there is a subject and its correlative, and this <is the case> since a relative depends on many more <things> than any accident that is said absolutely.

14. To the third <argument>,¹⁴ one can deny the major about relatives and contraries said in a transferred sense and opposed in a private sense, since in all these it is possible for one opposite to be defined through the other.

15. To the first proof of the major:¹⁵ the form of arguing is not valid, as is evident in other <arguments>: "a non-quality follows substance; and a non-quality does not pertain to the definition of man; therefore, it is a non-substance" is invalid.¹⁶ Nor is that rule, namely, "the consequent does not pertain to the definition of any <thing>, nor does the antecedent," as it is taken, true except about the implication of a superior and inferior in the same genus, such that the implication is not between contradictory opposites and relatives. Since a negation on the part of the contradictories is not superior in the genus to the other relative, as non-father is not superior to son.

12. Cf. *supra*, n. 1.

13. Cf. *supra*, n. 2.

14. Cf. *supra*, n. 3.

15. Cf. *ibid.*

16. This is an invalid, oblique syllogism. Even if it were to be reduced to a normal, categorical syllogism, it would still contain an illicit middle term.

16. To the second proof <of the major>,¹⁷ one can say that every part of a definition, in that way in which it is posited in the definition, can be predicated of the defined. And so one relative opposite is not posited in the definition of its correlative in the nominative case—according to which it is opposed to it—but in an oblique case, for example, as “of this” or “to this,” and it is predicated of it in this way; for although a father is not a son, nevertheless he is <the father> of a son. The minor can also be denied, since not all relatives are relative opposites, but only if both are taken with respect to the same thing.

17. To the fourth <argument>:¹⁸ the major is true about a definition of substance which is only given through its essential <elements>.

18. Against this: if a relative is at least defined through its correlative, <then> it is necessary that the correlative is at least of the understanding of the relative, since nothing is defined through anything without which it can be understood completely. But the consequent is false, since with equal reason, when it is expressed with it, the correlative would be given to be understood, and then there would be a vain repetition since the same <thing> would be said twice.

19. It is said that a relative, when it is expressed with its correlative, is not understood better through it, although it is given to be understood when it is not expressed. Aristotle seems to imply this when he says¹⁹ that the same thing must not be given “to be signified” in relatives, that is, given to be understood through the separated relatives and through the <relatives> joined with their correlatives; and through this he teaches <us> to avoid a vain repetition in the others.

20. Against this: I ask about the name imposed on one relative. If it gives <one> to understand another correlative, this is <so> either from the imposition or from nature. Either way, it follows that there is not a variation concerning what is taken absolutely and what is joined to another correlative with respect

17. Cf. *supra*, n. 3.

18. Cf. *supra*, n. 6.

19. *Metaphysics*, Bk. V, Ch. 15 (1021a 37–b 5).

to the other <one> of them, nor will there be a variation with respect to that effect, but that it always equally gives the correlative to be understood.

21. Likewise, a correlative is not given to be understood through this utterance unless through the fact that a relative is signified through the <utterance>. But there is not a variation concerning this cause, but that this relative is not uniformly signified, whether another <thing> is expressed with it or not. Therefore, neither will there be a variation with respect to this, because another relative is given to be understood.

22. To the first of these <objections>,²⁰ it is said that an utterance <that is> imposed to signify one relative is in no way a sign of the other, neither by nature nor by convention. But since a relative, which is signified through that <utterance>, cannot be understood without its correlative, therefore it is necessary—when understanding that relative through this utterance—to understand its correlative. This happens when another correlative is expressed through another utterance and also when it is not expressed, but <this does> not <happen> because this utterance is in some way the sign of that one. Therefore, I concede <that> on the part of a signifying utterance, no variation happens, whether the correlative is expressed or not; nor on the part of that which is signified through the utterance, but <rather I argue> that it is always necessary for understanding it that its correlative be understood. But there is only a variation from the fact that a correlative, expressed or not expressed through its proper utterance, is given to be understood through this relative; and that accidental diversity definitely belongs to relatives.

23. To the second <of these objections>,²¹ <a reply> is evident, since through this utterance <that is> imposed for a relative, the correlative is given to be understood in no way; but through that relative for which this utterance is imposed, another correlative is understood, at one time expressed through its proper utterance, at another time not expressed.

20. Cf. *supra*, n. 20.

21. Cf. *supra*, n. 21.

24. Against this <argument>: “whatever is a sign of a sign, is a sign of the signed”;²² but this utterance imposed for this relative is the sign of this relative, and this relative is the sign of the correlative; therefore, this utterance <that is> imposed for this relative is the sign of its correlative, although not immediately.

25. To this <objection> it is said that the major, “whatever is a sign of a sign, is a sign of the signed” is true in this way: so that an intermediate sign is not varied in comparison to the first sign and the last <thing> signed. This does not happen in this proposition, since it is extraneous for this relative, insofar as it gives <one> to understand its correlative, to be signified through this utterance, and vice versa.

26. To the fifth <argument>,²³ it is said that many relatives can be essentially (*per se*) of the same thing. And according to this, some suitable definition can exist, when one correlative is posited, even though the remaining one is not posited.

22. Cf. Scotus, *Super Periherm.*, Quest. primae, I, q. 2, n. 20.

23. Cf. *supra*, n. 7, and also *infra*, q. 29, n. 13.

[QUESTION TWENTY-NINE

Whether the Same Thing
can be Essentially Referred
to Diverse Things]



IT IS ASKED whether the same <thing> can be essentially (*per se*) referred to diverse <things>.

1. Proof that it cannot:

Since in Bk. V of the *Metaphysics* in the chapter “On Relation,”¹ Aristotle holds it as ridiculous that the same thing is said twice, that is, that it is referred to two correlatives.

2. Second, if some relative, for example *A*, can be essentially (*per se*) referred to two things, as to *B* and to *C*, it follows that the same thing can simultaneously be and not be. The consequent is false; therefore, the antecedent <is false>. Proof of the implication: since its two correlatives, as *B* and *C*, do not refer to each other; therefore, one <of them> can exist without the other <existing>, as *B* can exist if *C* does not exist; but if *B* exists, *A* is; and if *C* does not exist, *A* is not; therefore, the same <thing>, that is *A*, will simultaneously be and not be.

3. Third, the being of a relative is to have itself to another;² but a relationship (*habitus*) to two is not the same <relationship>; therefore, the one being of one relative is not to have itself to two. Therefore, no relative, <which is> essentially (*essentialiter*) one, is essentially (*per se*) referred to two things.

4. Fourth, if <the same thing could be essentially referred to two things, then> there could be two definitions of the same relative, and so the same relative could simultaneously be known

1. *Metaphysics*, Bk. V, Ch. 15 (1021b 2–3).

2. *Categories*, Ch. 7 (8a 32–33).

and unknown. This seems untenable, since there is only one cognition of one non-complex <term>.

5. To the opposite:

All species of a relative are said to that to which its genus <is referred>, according to Aristotle in Bk. IV of the *Topics*.³ And beyond this it can have another proper correlative other than the correlative of its genus. Therefore, it is essentially (*per se*) referred to two: for it is essentially (*per se*) referred to the correlative of its genus, since upon whatever genus it essentially depends, so also does the species.

6. Second, the species is referred to the genus and to the individual, therefore to two. Otherwise, Porphyry⁴ would not have assigned two or three of its definitions <to it>; therefore, etc.

7. Third, the more similar is essentially (*per se*) referred to the less similar, and beyond this it is referred to that to which the absolutely similar is referred; therefore, <it is referred> to two <correlatives>. One can argue in this way about every relative, said according to more and less, that the more is referred to the less and vice versa, and also beyond this, that they are referred to that to which a simple relative also is referred.

[I. TO THE QUESTION]

8. One can reply to this that the same thing is not primarily referred to two, that is, according to its own proper account; since then it would not be essentially one, as the one reason to the contrary proves.⁵ Nevertheless, something can be essentially (*per se*) referred to two things that are not altogether diverse, but of which one includes the other in some way, as the reasons to the opposite prove.⁶ Since according to its proper form something can be said to one, and according to the form of its genus <it can be said> to another to which it is not primarily said (since it is not <said to the other> according to its proper

3. *Topics*, Bk. IV, Ch. 4 (124b 16).

4. *Isagoge*, Ch. "On Species" (AL I⁶ 9; ed. Busse, 4.9-13).

5. Cf. *supra*, n. 3.

6. Cf. *supra*, nn. 5-7.

account according to which it is distinguished from the other species), although <it is said to be related to it> essentially (*per se*), since <it is said> according to the genus which is essentially (*per se*) of its understanding.

[II. TO THE PRINCIPAL ARGUMENTS
OF EACH PART]

[A. *To the Principal Arguments*]

9. To the arguments, <the reply> is almost evident.

10. To the first <argument>:⁷ Aristotle holds it as ridiculous that something is primarily referred to two as to its understanding and to its <being> intelligible,⁸ according to what is said there; or perhaps to two altogether diverse things, of which kind there are two others.

11. To the <second argument>,⁹ I say that—when *B* and *C* are two existing <things> to which *A* is essentially (*per se*) referred—either it is not possible for one of them to exist when the other does not exist, for example, if one includes the other; or it does not follow that its <essential> being is to the being of each, but only to the being of its primary correlative, since its being does not stand for (*stat*) the non-existence of the other which is its essential (*per se*), but not primary, correlative.

12. To the third <argument>,¹⁰ I say that the same relationship (*habitus*) is not equally primary to two altogether diverse <things>, although it can be to two things <which> include each other: to one primarily, to the remaining <one> essentially (*per se*) even though not primarily.

13. To the fourth <argument>,¹¹ it is evident that it does not have two definitions according to its own proper nature (*rationem*), but one such <definition>; the other according to the nature (*rationem*) of its genus. And perhaps the two definitions must not be said absolutely, since that which is of it according to the nature (*rationem*) of its genus is part of the definition which

7. Cf. supra, n. 1.

8. Cf. *Metaphysics*, Bk. V, Ch. 15 (1021a 30–32).

9. Cf. supra, n. 2.

10. Cf. supra, n. 3.

11. Cf. supra, n. 4.

is of it according to its proper nature (*rationem*). According to this, <a solution> is evident to the fifth reason of the preceding question.¹²

[*B. To the Reasons to the Opposite*]

14. To the first reason to the opposite,¹³ it must be conceded that the species of a relative is referred to the correlative of its genus, but not primarily. Nor also is the correlative of the genus simply diverse from the primary correlative of the species, but perhaps it is included in it. Since, according to Aristotle in Bk. II of the *Topics*,¹⁴ there is an implication in itself <implied> in relatives, so that if the relative of one part follows a relative <of the other part>, then the correlative of the second follows the correlative of the first. From which it seems to follow that the correlative of the first genus is superior to the correlative of the species, just as the genus is also <superior> to the species, which is manifestly said in Bk. IV of the *Topics*, in the chapter on the 7th consideration of relative opposites.¹⁵

15. To the second <reason to the opposite>,¹⁶ it must be said that a species is first referred to its genus; but through the nature (*rationem*) of its genus, which is universal, it is referred to the individual (just as every universal is said <to be related> to those <things> of which it is predicated); and so it is not primarily <referred> to each. And the other <one> of these correlatives, for example, a genus, includes the primary correlative of the other, as a universal; and so it cannot exist <when> the remaining essential (*per se*) correlative does not exist. Also universally, the primary correlative <is said> to the non-primary but essential (*per se*) <correlative>, or depends <on it>, or includes it or includes something which depends on it. Therefore, the primary <one> can never exist when the remaining <essential one> does not exist, although at some time it may be the other way around. When, however, the primary correlative does not exist, <and when> the remaining <correlative> which is its essential (*per se*)

12. Cf. *supra*, q. 28, n. 7.

13. Cf. *supra*, n. 5.

14. *Topics*, Bk. II, Ch. 8 (114a 14-19).

15. *Topics*, Bk. IV, Ch. 4 (124b 35-125a 4).

16. Cf. *supra*, n. 6.

but not its primary correlative, does exist, it is not necessary that the primary exist; since the position of the essential (*per se*) and non-primary correlative does not include the position of the remaining.

16. To the third <reason to the opposite>,¹⁷ I say that the more similar is primarily referred to the less similar; and every <thing> more <is referred> to <something> less according to that form. But essentially (*per se*) and not primarily, it is referred to the correlative of its positive <form>. And the other <one> of its correlatives, for example, the less similar, includes the remaining one as similar, according to Aristotle in Bk. II of the *Topics*¹⁸ in the conclusion: "what is in <something> according to more and less, is also in it absolutely."

[III. THE RESPONSE AGAINST
CERTAIN SUPPOSITIONS]

17. Against certain suppositions in this question:

For it seems that nothing is a primary relative to another, that is, according to that which adds <something> to the genus. Since no differentia in the genus of relation is essentially (*per se*) a relation, just as a genus is not predicated essentially (*per se*) of some differentia in other genera. Therefore, no differentia in the genus of relation is said essentially (*per se*) to a relative, since a relative is not said essentially (*per se*) unless <it is said> essentially (*per se*) from a relation; therefore, neither <are> special relatives <said> through proper differentiae, which they add to the genus; and so <they are> not <said> primarily but all <are said> according to the genus.

18. To this one can respond by conceding that no differentia is essentially (*per se*) a relation, nevertheless a species constituted through a differentia is essentially (*per se*) a relation, and so a primary relative said denominatively from a species can be properly referred to something, although no <relative> said denominatively from a differentia is such.

17. Cf. *supra*, n. 7.

18. *Topics*, Bk. II, Ch. 11 (115b 4–5).

[IV. WHAT MUST BE NOTED ABOUT
THE PRECEDING QUESTION]

19. It must be noted concerning the preceding question¹⁹ that just as in the definition of one essential (*per se*) relative the other ought to be posited as in the definition of relation, from which that relative is said, the other relation corresponding to it, or a relative said from another relation, ought to be posited <in the definition>, so that filiation or son (*filius*) ought to be posited in the definition of paternity. Since a relation (*relatio*) is essentially a relationship to another (*habitus ad aliud*), and it is impossible to conceive a relationship (*habitus*) without the term to which it is <related>. And it is necessary to posit everything, without which the defined cannot be conceived, in the definition of something, since the definition expresses the complete understanding of the defined. Therefore, it is necessary to posit the term, toward which it is, in the definition of relation.

20. Nevertheless, it seems more <likely> that a relation, for example filiation, ought to be posited in the definition of a relation, for example, of paternity, than a relative <ought to be posited>, such as son. Since a son is simultaneous by nature with a father, and father is naturally posterior to paternity. But it seems that no posterior ought to be posited in the definition of the prior.

21. But to this <argument> it can be said that father is not posterior to paternity, by a posteriority opposite to that simultaneity which is in relatives. For just as those relatives are simultaneous <in one way> and are not <simultaneous in another way>, so father and paternity are simultaneous <in one way>, although paternity is prior to a father <in another way>, since it is more simple and formal. And nothing prohibits what is posterior to something <in one way>, from being posited, in an opposite way to that priority, in the definition of the prior in this way. According to this it would have to be said that a correlative, such as son, is more suitably posited in the definition of relation, such as paternity, than a relation <is posited>, such as filiation, since

19. Cf. *supra*, q. 28, nn. 11–14.

the correlative more immediately signifies the term of a relation (*habitudinis*).

22. Against this <argument>. The essence of a relation is absolute in its own genus.

First, because everything seems to be absolute in its own genus, since everything in its own genus has the mode of an essence (*quid*), and the mode of an essence (*quid*) is the mode of an absolute.

23. Second, since every being is either absolute or compared (for these seem to be the differentiae immediately dividing being, according to what descends in the ten categories); but a relation is not compared <to something>, since it is not referred <to anything>; therefore, it is absolute; therefore, it depends on nothing else in its own genus.

24. It <can be> argued similarly about relatives, since the essence of a relative is formally from a relation. And so, if a relation is absolute, <then> the essence of a relative will also be absolute; therefore, it does not depend on something in its genus; therefore, it ought not to be defined through another.

25. Likewise, if a relation depends on another as <it depends> on a relative, that other would be the term of its dependency; and the term is posterior to that of which it is. But this is false, since “relatives are simultaneous by nature”²⁰—or <they are> also relations from which they are said relatively.

26. To the first of these <arguments>,²¹ one can say that a relative is absolute in its own genus, that is, in comparison to its own genus, since its own genus is said of it absolutely. But it is not necessary that it is absolute in this genus in such a way that it would depend on nothing else in the genus. When it is shown that it is absolute: to the first proof it must be said that whatever has the mode of an essence (*modum quid*) in its genus, that is, its genus is predicated of it essentially (*in quid*), then it is thus absolutely. But from this it does not follow that it is altogether absolute.

27. To the second proof,²² I say that “absolute” and “com-

20. *Categories*, Ch. 7 (7b 15).

21. Cf. *supra*, n. 22.

22. Cf. *supra*, n. 23.

pared," as they divide being, are the same as being in a subject and being not in a subject. And in this way I concede that a relation is compared, since it is a being in a subject; nevertheless, it is not compared as a relative is said to be compared to a term, but it is a comparison to a term. Nevertheless, since this <is the case> it remains <true> that it is necessary to posit a term in its definition, since a comparison to a term cannot be conceived without a term.

28. It is manifest about a relative,²³ however, that its essence is not absolute except with respect to its genus, since its genus is predicated of it absolutely and essentially (*in quid*); however its essence is absolutely "to have itself to another."²⁴ Nor does it follow that its essence is absolute, if the relation is also absolute, since that which is in a formal principle is not necessary to be in the composite of which that <thing> is; just as it does not follow, if a form is simple, that the essence of a composite, which is through the form, is simple.—Or otherwise: when it has been conceded that a relation is absolute (as it was proved above on two accounts),²⁵ and <has been conceded> that it does not depend on another in the genus of relation, it does not follow that it must not be defined through another in its own genus; since it is a comparison and depends on another, neither of which is defined without its term.

29. To the other <argument>,²⁶ I say that not every term of dependency is posterior to that of which it is, especially when it is mutually dependent, as it is in essential (*per se*) relatives.

30. It must be noted that the solution of this question²⁷ is true of relatives of equivalence when they are defined in the singular, since their being is "to have itself to another"; for the definition ought to indicate the being of the defined. But when they are defined in the plural, it is not necessary that their correlatives be posited in their definitions; for then the subject of the relation as well as its correlative are expressed through the same name taken in the plural.

23. Cf. supra, n. 24.

25. Cf. supra, nn. 22–23.

27. Cf. supra, n. 28.

24. Cf. supra, n. 3.

26. Cf. supra, n. 25.

31. If it is argued against this, "therefore, something is defined through the same in species to itself," it does not seem inappropriate to concede this, as through an addition, when the relation is according to the same form in species; just as it is not inappropriate to concede about other relatives that something is defined through another in species, which, nevertheless, is not prior to the defined.—Or, it can be said that something that is similar differs from the similar species to which it is referred, since it is opposed to itself; and every opposition is according to form, although similitude in this and in that is the same in species. But this does not seem <to be the case>, when the same form exists, since some <things are> diverse according to that form.

<QUESTIONS THIRTY THROUGH
THIRTY-SIX>

[QUESTION THIRTY
Whether the Species of Quality are
Suitably Assigned]

I say, however, that quality is that according to which something is qualified,¹ etc.



FIRST, IT IS ASKED whether the species of quality are suitably assigned.

1. It seems that they are not:

No multiple has species; but quality is multiple, according to Aristotle in this text:² “quality is of those things which are said in many ways.” The major is evident, since a genus is predicated univocally, according to Aristotle³ in the definition of univocals.

2. Second, there are only two first species of any one genus; quality is one genus; therefore, it does not have four first species. Nor do these species seem to be subalternate <species>, since none <of them> is contained under the other. The major is proved thus: every division of a genus is made through contrary differentiae, according to Aristotle in Bk. X of the *Metaphysics*⁴ and according to Boethius in his book *On Division*;⁵ but “one is only contrary to one,” as Aristotle proves in the same <work> in Bk. X.⁶ Therefore, there are only two first differen-

1. *Categories*, Ch. 8 (8b 25).

2. *Categories*, Ch. 8 (8b 26).

3. *Categories*, Ch. 1 (1a 7–8).

4. *Metaphysics*, Bk. X, Ch. 8 (1058a 10–11).

5. Boethius, *Liber de divisione* (ed. J. Magee, p. 20; PL 64, 881D).

6. *Metaphysics*, Bk. X, Ch. 5 (1055b 30).

tiae divisive of any genus; therefore, there are only two species constituted through them.

3. Third, it is impossible for two species of the same genus to be predicated of the same <thing>; but “habit” and “disposition,” which are assigned to the first species, and “affection” or “affective quality,” which are assigned to the third <species>, are predicated of the same quality, as of hot and cold and similar <qualities> which Aristotle enumerates in the first and third species;⁷ therefore, the first and third species are not two <species>. Proof of the major: “every differentia according to its species is a contrariety,” according to Aristotle in Bk. X of the *Metaphysics*,⁸ and contraries are in no way predicated of the same thing. The minor is also proved by reason: since the same quality according to its essence can imply the affection of sense, and so it can be an affective quality and can be easily or with difficulty moveable from a subject, and so it is a habit or a disposition.

4. To the opposite is Aristotle.⁹

[QUESTION THIRTY-ONE

Whether the First Species of Quality
is Habit and Disposition]



EXT IT IS ASKED whether the first species of quality is habit and disposition.

5. It seems that it is not:

Since either these are two <species> or <they are> not. If they are two, then there are not only four species. Also, not every habit is a disposition, which is contrary to Aristotle here and in Bk. V of the *Metaphysics*.¹⁰ If they are not two, then the conjunction is not suitably posited between them, since the conjunction is usually placed between diverse things, and their differentia

7. *Categories*, Ch. 8 (8b 25–9a 27).

8. *Metaphysics*, Bk. X, Ch. 8 (1058a 17–19).

9. *Categories*, Ch. 8 (8b 28, 9a 14, 9a 29, 10a 11).

10. *Metaphysics*, Bk. X, Ch. 8 (9a 10).

is unsuitably posited through “easily moveable” and “with difficulty moveable,” which Aristotle¹¹ posits, since these, because they are opposites, do not inhere in the same <thing>.

6. Second, habit is one most general <genus>; therefore, it is not a species of quality.

7. Third, those that are posited in this species, for example knowledge, virtue, and others of this kind,¹² are relatives according to Aristotle above in the chapter “On Relation” and in Bk. IV of the *Topics*,¹³ in the many considerations of relative opposites. And if these are relatives (*ad aliquid*), then the genus of them, which is habit, is relative (*ad aliquid*). The implication is evident according to Aristotle in Bk. IV of the *Topics*,¹⁴ in the first consideration of relative opposites. Therefore, it is not a species of quality.

8. Fourth, in Bk. V of the *Metaphysics*,¹⁵ Aristotle says that disposition (*dispositio*) is the disposition (*ordinatio*) of the parts into <something> having parts; but the order (*ordo*) of parts is not a species of quality; therefore, neither is disposition <one> of its species.

9. To the opposite is Aristotle.

[QUESTION THIRTY-TWO
Whether the Second Species
of Quality is Natural Ability¹⁶
or Inability]



EXT IT ASKED whether the second species of quality is natural ability or inability.

10. It seems that it is not:

11. *Categories*, Ch. 8 (8b 29–9a 10). 12. Cf. *Categories*, Ch. 8 (8b 30).

13. *Categories*, Ch. 7 (7b 23–35); *Topics*, Bk. IV, Ch. 4 (124b 15–125b 14).

14. *Topics*, Bk. IV, Ch. 4 (124b 16).

15. *Metaphysics*, Bk. V, Ch. 20 (1022b 13–14).

16. Here and throughout this question, I translate *potentia* and *impotentia* as “ability” and “inability” respectively.

Since ability is essentially (*per se*) referred to act; any species of quality is some absolute form. That is evident to a less <degree> about this species, since hardness and softness, which are enumerated here,¹⁷ are absolute forms.

11. Second, in accordance with Aristotle in Bk. IV of the *Topics*¹⁸ in the first consideration of privative opposites: “privation, however, is either not in the same genus, or not in the same proximate <genus>”; therefore, inability is not in the same proximate genus with ability.

12. Third, ability is transcendent, since it is the first differentia of being; therefore, it is not a species of quality.

13. Fourth, it is manifest that ability and inability are not subalternated, since neither is predicated of the other; therefore, they are two primary species, and so they are not both in the second species.

14. To the opposite is Aristotle.¹⁹

[QUESTION THIRTY-THREE
Whether the Third Species
of Quality is Affection and
Affective Quality]



EXT TO THIS IT IS ASKED whether the third species of quality is affection and affective quality.

15. It seems that it is not:

Since affection <or passion, *passio*> is one most general <genus>.

16. Second, either “affection and “affective quality” are two <species> or not. If they are, then they are not one species of quality, as the third <species>; if they are not <two species>, then <something> untenable follows.—First, that Aristotle poorly assigned their differentia, saying that those are affections which

17. *Categories*, Ch. 8 (9a 25–26).

18. *Topics*, Bk. IV, Ch. 4 (124a 36–39).

19. *Categories*, Ch. 8 (9a 14–15).

quickly change,²⁰ and <that> affective qualities are permanent.²¹ Second, it follows that they are poorly joined to each other. It is also shown that they are the same, since every affection is a quality; therefore, “according to it we say <that something is> qualified”²² through the description of a quality, and he implies the affection of sense. Therefore, every affection is an affective quality and vice versa. Proof: since in Bk. V of the *Metaphysics*²³ Aristotle says that “an affection expresses a quality according to which we say <that something> is altered”; but every affective quality is such, since an alteration is essentially (*per se*) according to it; therefore, every affective quality is an affection.

17. Third, I prove that no <thing> is an affective quality in the way in which Aristotle understands it. For he says that a quality is not affective because some subject <which has it> is affected by it, but because it makes an affection on the senses.²⁴ I prove that each of these is false.

18. First: since according to the qualities of the third species, there is an essential (*per se*) alteration, according to Aristotle in Bk. VII of the *Physics*.²⁵ Therefore, to the extent (*ad hoc*) that a subject receives such a quality it is necessary that it be altered, and in this way that it be affected by some agent having the same quality in species. Therefore, such a quality implies an affection in the subject receiving it.

19. I prove that the second is false <as follows>: first, since every affection is a motion and every motion is in time, the change of the senses by the sensible, however, is not in time; second, since every affection is with the rejection of a contrary, since every motion <is> also <with the rejection of a contrary>, according to Aristotle in Bk. V of the *Physics*.²⁶ But there is not a rejection of the contrary when there is a change of sensation by the sensible, since sensation is disposed (*dispositus*) to the highest degree to receive the sensible species. Each <thing> as-

20. *Categories*, Ch. 8 (9b 29–30).

21. *Categories*, Ch. 8 (9b 21–22).

22. Cf. *supra*, fn. 1.

23. *Metaphysics*, Bk. V, Ch. 21 (1022b 15–16).

24. Cf. *Categories*, Ch. 9 (9a 36–b 7).

25. *Physics*, Bk. VII, Ch. 3 (248b 27–29).

26. *Physics*, Bk. V, Ch. 1 (225a 34–b 5).

sumed is evident according to the argument (*locum*) from the greater, since the medium is changed in an instant and is without the rejection of the contrary, which, nevertheless, seems less disposed to the sensible species than sensation <does>.

20. To the opposite is Aristotle.²⁷

[QUESTION THIRTY-FOUR
Whether the Fourth Species of
Quality is Form and Figure]



AFTER THIS, IT IS ASKED about the fourth species whether “form and the constant figure around something”²⁸ is the fourth species of quality.

21. It seems that it is not:

Since a form, according to what is evident through its definition which is assigned in the beginning <of the book> *On the Six Principles*,²⁹ is common to every accident; therefore, it is not a species of quality.

22. Second, according to Aristotle in Bk. V of the *Metaphysics*,³⁰ form is not in itself a being, but is the principle <of being>; however, being in itself is divided into the ten genera; therefore, in no genus does form exist as a species.—Likewise, figure is a quantity, since it is a surface; therefore, it is not a species of quality.

23. Third, these are either the same or not. If they are not the same, then they are poorly posited <as> one species of quality, since they are two. If they are <the same>, they are poorly joined to each other.

24. To the opposite is Aristotle.³¹

27. *Categories*, Ch. 8 (9a 29).

28. *Categories*, Ch. 8 (10a 11).

29. *Liber sex principiorum*, Ch. 1, n. 1.

30. *Metaphysics*, Bk. V, Ch. 7 (1017a 23–28).

31. *Categories*, Ch. 8 (10a 11).

[QUESTION THIRTY-FIVE
Whether These Four Species
are Suitably Ordered]



AFTER THIS IT IS ASKED whether these four species are suitably ordered.

25. It seems that they are not:

Since among all accidents, quantity first inheres in a substance; therefore, those qualities which immediately follow quantity are naturally prior, of which kind are the qualities of the fourth species; therefore, those ought to be naturally first.

26. Second, according to Aristotle in Bk. III of the *Topics*,³² prior is that “which is by nature rather than that which is not by nature”; but qualities of the second species are by nature, qualities of other species are not; therefore, the second species ought to be first.

27. Third, the qualities of the elements are said to be the first qualities, since all other qualities follow them; but those are qualities of the third species; therefore, the third species ought to be first.

28. Fourth, habit and disposition presuppose all the other qualities, as is evident inductively. For a figured man, <or one> having sensible qualities and a natural ability or inability, <they are> naturally prior to knowing or virtuousness. Therefore, the first species ought to be the last.

29. Fifth, natural ability is the principle of operating <which> immediately follows the substantial form, however habit <follows form> mediately. But, according to Aristotle in Bk. III of the *Topics*,³³ what is nearer to the prior, is prior. Therefore, ability is prior to habit. This also is evident, since natural ability is the immediate subject of a habit or a disposition, as the intellectual ability <is the immediate subject> of knowledge; a subject is naturally prior to an accident, of which it is the subject.

30. To the opposite is Aristotle.

32. *Topics*, Bk. III, Ch. 1 (116b 11).

33. *Topics*, Bk. III, Ch. 1 (116b 17–21).

[QUESTION THIRTY-SIX
Whether the Species of Quality
are Sufficiently Enumerated]



EXT TO THIS, IT IS ASKED whether the species of quality are sufficiently enumerated.

31. It seems that they are not:

Since the ability of a soul seems to be a quality, since according to it a soul is said <to be> qualified; but it can exist in no other species than in the second, and it is not in that <species>. First, since according to qualities in the second species it is said that <one> can do something easily or undergo something with difficulty;³⁴ but the ability of the soul is not for doing <something> easily, but simply for doing <something>. Second, since it is impossible for some species of some genus to be the subject of another species of that genus; but ability is the subject of habit, which is in the first species; therefore, etc. The major is proved <in two ways>: first, since in Bk. IV of the *Topics*,³⁵ in the fourth consideration after the considerations of opposites, Aristotle says that genus and species naturally come to be in the same subject. But a genus is not of such a nature that it is in any of its species as in a subject, according to <Aristotle> in the eleventh consideration following <after that one>,³⁶ but a <genus> is only of such a nature as to be said of a species; therefore, neither does any species of a genus naturally come to be in another <species> of the same genus as in a subject. Second, since in the thirteenth consideration of Bk. IV of the *Topics*,³⁷ Aristotle says that if any superior <term> is predicated of a subject essentially (*in quid*), and the inferior <term> is predicated of that subject, <the superior term> will be predicated of it as a genus <is predicated>. Therefore, since the most general <genus> is predicated essentially (*in quid*) of every one of its species, if any of its species is said of this species, it would be said of it as a ge-

34. *Categories*, Ch. 8 (9a 16–25).

35. *Topics*, Bk. IV, Ch. 5 (126a 5–6).

36. *Topics*, Bk. IV, Ch. 5 (127a 20–25).

37. *Topics*, Bk. IV, Ch. 2 (122b 12–18).

nus <is said of it>. Therefore, no other <species> is in this <species> as in a subject.

32. Second, anger and madness and <other things> of this kind are qualities, since someone is said to be qualified according to them, and they are in no other species except the third <species>. But they are not there, since alteration can happen according to the qualities of the third species. But <alteration does> not <happen> according to them, since these are in the soul, according to Aristotle in this text.³⁸ And the soul is not altered, since it is not a *quanta*, and every motion according to quality presupposes quantity.

33. Third, beauty and elegance seem to be qualities according to the nature (*rationem*) of quality; and <they are> in none of these species; therefore, there are more <species>. Proof of the minor: since they seem most greatly to be in the fourth species, and they are not there since they receive more and less, which Aristotle denies about qualities of the fourth species.³⁹

34. To the opposite is Aristotle.

[I. TO THE THIRTIETH QUESTION]

[A. *The Response of Scotus*]

35. To the first question⁴⁰ one can say that Aristotle does not assign <these to be> the species of quality on account of the third reason to the first question.⁴¹ This is confirmed in this way: since these four species are not subalterns, for of no two of them can it be truly said that whatever is in one <of them> is in the other, or vice versa. Therefore, if these were species, they would not be subalterns, and it is impossible for such diverse <species> to be predicated of the same thing. But it is possible for these <species> to be predicated of the same thing, since it is possible for the same quality to be essentially rooted in a subject, for a habit is both a natural principle for operating easily or not easily and it is an essential (*per se*) object of the senses.

38. *Categories*, Ch. 8 (9b 35-10a 2).

40. Cf. *supra*, nn. 1-4.

39. *Categories*, Ch. 8 (11a 5-7).

41. Cf. *supra*, n. 3.

Also on account of the first reason to the third question.⁴² But before he enumerates them he assigns <them to be> its modes (which is evident through its name). For he says:⁴³ "Quality is said in many ways," that is, in many modes; and in the end, after they have been enumerated, he says: "And perhaps some other modes <may> appear, but those which are most said are these."

36. There is, however, a difference between a species and a mode. Since a species, beyond that of which it is, adds an essential difference, <whereas> a mode <adds> an accidental difference. And so these modes express a diverse relation (*habitudinem*) of quality to the subject in the <fact> that it is "to be permanent" or not, "from nature" or not, "sensible" or not. Nevertheless, all <things> which do not essentially vary the quality, since all these are relations, or many <of them are relations>, can be in the same quality according to its essence.

[*B. To the Principal Arguments of
the Thirtieth Question*]

37. To the first argument to the contrary:⁴⁴ "multiple" is not understood, that is "equivocally," but "in many modes." And the difference is manifest between the significates which make a multiplicity in the first mode, and between modes which are accidental differences and make a multiplicity in the second mode.

38. To the second and third <arguments>,⁴⁵ a reply> is evident.

39. To the authority of Aristotle to the contrary <argument>:⁴⁶ when he says "species" it must be taken for a special mode, and when he says "genus" <it must be taken> for a general mode. And perhaps he says this since these modes are neither the most general nor the most specific, but general and specific in comparison to diverse <things>. Nor does this exposition do much violence to the text, since intermediate <things> must be understood according to those <things> which are posited in the proem and in the epilogue,⁴⁷ namely "multiple" and "other modes."

42. Cf. supra, n. 10.

43. *Categories*, Ch. 8 (8b 26); Ch. 8 (10a 25-26).

44. Cf. supra, n. 1.

45. Cf. supra, nn. 2-3.

46. Cf. supra, n. 4.

47. *Categories*, Ch. 8 (8b 26); Ch. 8 (10a 25-26).

[II. TO THE THIRTY-FIRST QUESTION]

[A. *The Response of Scotus*]

40. To the second question,⁴⁸ it must be said that “habit” in one mode signifies something transcendent, insofar as “to have” is said denominatively from it, which is distinguished later at the end of the book.⁴⁹ In another mode it signifies an intermediate relation (*habitudinem*) between the one having and the thing had, which is like an intermediate action between the agent and the patient, and in this way <habit> is in the most general tenth category. In another mode, it signifies the same as a positive form <signifies>, and thus it is taken below <in the book>⁵⁰ in privative opposition. In none of these modes is this speech about habit made. But in the fourth mode, insofar as habit signifies a quality rooted in the subject and with difficulty movable.

41. A disposition, however, is either taken absolutely, and then it is superior to a habit, insofar as it is said here in Bk. V of the *Metaphysics*, in the chapter on “Habit,”⁵¹ where a harmony is posited between a habit and a disposition. In another way, <a disposition> is taken with precision, and then it is distinguished in contrast to a habit. In the first way, the first mode can be posited as a disposition, and by taking it in the second way, it is necessary to posit it simultaneously as a habit and a disposition. In another way, it is said that a disposition signifies a quality, which of its own nature is easily movable from its subject; and a habit <signifies a quality> which, according to its own nature, is with difficulty movable <from its subject>. But this is contrary to Aristotle, since then no habit would be a disposition.

42. Otherwise, it is said that a disposition is related⁵² to a habit as the imperfect <is related> to the perfect.

48. Cf. *supra*, nn. 5–9.

49. *Categories*, Ch. 15 (15b 18–32).

50. Cf. *Categories*, Ch. 10 (12b 26–13a 17).

51. *Metaphysics*, Bk. V, Ch. 20 (1022b 10–14).

52. The Latin has *dispositio se habet ad habitum*, which literally translates as “a disposition has itself to a habit.”

43. Against <this argument>: either this imperfection is in the essence of a quality, or <it is> in <something> informing a subject. <But> it is in neither mode. <It is> not in the essence <of a quality>, since the essence is measured by the instant; therefore, it is equally perfected whether it remains in the subject for a while or not. Nor <is it> in <something> informing a subject, since if the essence, <which> remains briefly, is equally perfected in the subject as <it is if it is> remaining for a while, as it was shown now; therefore, it equally denominates the subject perfectly.

44. For this reason it must be said, as above,⁵³ that a disposition according to one significate is perhaps as general as a quality according to another significate <is general>, just as is the first mode of quality; but taken precisely, <together> with a habit, it constitutes the first mode of quality. The example is as it is in Porphyry.⁵⁴ Porphyry divides a differentia into <the one> making another <quality> (*alteratum*) and <the one making> another <thing> (*aliud*); and nevertheless he says that every differentia makes another <quality> (*alteratum*). Therefore, in the division it is necessary to understand “another <quality>” precisely, and in the second proposition “another <quality>” absolutely.

[*B. To the Principal Arguments of the
Thirty-First Question*]

45. To the first argument,⁵⁵ it is evident how they are two and how they are not two.

46. To the second <argument>,⁵⁶ the equivocation of “habit” is evident.

47. To the third <argument>,⁵⁷ I say that not any which is in this way, according to that signification according to which it is essentially (*essentialiter*) a quality, is essentially (*per se*) in the genus of relation, whether as a relation or as said denominatively from a relation, but if it is, this is according to another signification.

53. Cf. supra, n. 40.

54. *Isagoge*, Ch. “On Difference” (AL I⁶ 15; ed Busse, 8.17–20).

55. Cf. supra, n. 5.

56. Cf. supra, n. 6.

57. Cf. supra, n. 7

48. To the fourth <argument>:⁵⁸ disposition is equivocal insofar as it signifies the same as a position, which is the most general <genus>, and insofar as it signifies a species of quality.

[III. TO THE THIRTY-SECOND QUESTION]

[A. *The Response of Scotus*]

49. To the third question,⁵⁹ I say that ability or inability does not signify some <things> which are essentially in the genus of quality. But, <ability> only signifies a mode of quality absolutely, insofar as it is a principle of operation. And inability signifies a mode of quality insofar as that is a principle of acting with difficulty or of undergoing <something> easily. Qualities, however, which subsist, are absolute forms and are not called by names naming them absolutely, but in comparison to the operations of which they are the principles. According to what Aristotle says below <in the section beginning with the words> “however qualified,”⁶⁰ that “names are not imposed from habits (*valetudinibus*),” since we do not conceive of these except perhaps in comparison to their operations.

[B. *To the Principal Arguments of the Thirty-Second Question*]

50. To the arguments. The first reason must be conceded,⁶¹ because ability and inability do not signify species of quality, but <they signify> modes of the essence through a comparison to the operation.

51. To the second <argument>,⁶² it is evident that inability is not a species of quality. Also, that quality which is under inability, as it is taken here, is a positive form just as softness.

52. To the third <argument>,⁶³ it must be conceded that <ability and inability> are two equally primary modes, neither of which is contained under the other; and so it is of every other mode. And thus, speaking precisely, eight primary modes of

58. Cf. *supra*, n. 8.

59. Cf. *supra*, nn. 10-14.

60. *Categories*, Ch. 8 (10a 29-b 2).

61. Cf. *supra*, n. 10.

62. Cf. *supra*, n. 11.

63. Rather, to the fourth argument; cf. *supra*, n. 13.

quality can be conceded. But according to some general nature (*rationem*) these two pertain among themselves, which are enumerated in some one mode, according to which they do not pertain with others which are enumerated in another mode; as natural ability and inability in the fact that their being is innate and is a principle of operating. Therefore, this <pair> can be posited as the second general mode, and so in all other modes.

53. To the other reason,⁶⁴ it is evident that ability is taken equivocally: insofar as it is a differentia of being and insofar as it signifies the principle of doing <something> easily.

[IV. TO THE THIRTY-THIRD QUESTION]

[A. *The Response of Scotus*]

54. To the fourth question,⁶⁵ it must be said that "affection" is equivocal, insofar as it is distinguished in Bk. V of the *Metaphysics*⁶⁶ into many significates. But here, it is taken insofar as it signifies a quality according to which there is an alteration. And then: it is taken either absolutely or with precision. Taken absolutely, it is convertible with an affective quality, or superior to it. Taken precisely, it is distinguished in contrast to an affective quality, just as an affective quality expresses that from which something is denominated by a denomination signifying a permanence of form in the subject. Therefore, <taken> absolutely, the third mode is an affection which expresses a comparison of a quality to a subject that is apt to be altered according to it; or <it expresses> a comparison of quality to sensation, to which it implies an affection, as will be evident in responding to the arguments.

[B. *To the Principal Arguments of the Thirty-Third Question*]

55. Therefore, to the first argument,⁶⁷ it must be said that an affection is equivocally an effect of action, according to what

64. Cf. *supra*, n. 12.

65. Cf. *supra*, nn. 15–20.

66. *Metaphysics*, Bk. V, Ch. 21 (1022b 15–21).

67. Cf. *supra*, n. 15.

the author of *On the Six Principles*⁶⁸ says, and insofar as it is quality according to which there is an alteration.

56. To the second <argument>,⁶⁹ I say that affection is distinguished precisely in contrast to affective quality, and that distinction and the differentia which Aristotle posits must be understood in this way. And nevertheless they can be posited as one mode, since they have some general nature (*rationem*), as it is predicated of the second mode;⁷⁰ and speaking absolutely about each they are convertible, since every affection is a quality, and so according to it we say <that something is> qualified. But then to the saying of Aristotle, when he says that “according to affection we do not say <that something is> qualified,”⁷¹ this must be understood <in this way>: Either since what is taken from an affective quality which denominates the subject through the mode of remaining is not in that denominative (as something red is not said <to be red> from a redness caused through shame, since that denominative denotes that this form remains with the subject), nevertheless for a time, for which that red is in it, one can say <that it is> reddish or reddening, which absolutely denotes such a form as is in the subject. Or, what Aristotle said must be understood in the way that we do not express <something> qualified from affections, since denominatives are not commonly taken from these; but if they were taken <from them>, <something> having an affection could be denominated from that <one>, as <something> having an affective quality is denominated from that <one>.

57. To the <third argument>,⁷² I say, as Aristotle says, that qualities of the third species are not said to be affective because they imply affections in their subjects—for no form is apt to have an effect (*agere*) on its own subject—but they are said to be affective because they imply an affection in the senses in some mode.

58. When it is argued against the first member,⁷³ I say that an affective quality is induced through alteration; and so a sub-

68. *Liber sex principiorum*, Ch. 3, n. 29.

69. Cf. *supra*, n. 16.

71. *Categories*, Ch. 8 (9b 30–31).

73. Cf. *supra*, n. 18.

70. Cf. *supra*, n. 54.

72. Cf. *supra*, n. 17.

ject is affected by something altering <it>, but not from a form which it receives, but from something having the same form in species.

59. When it is argued against the second member,⁷⁴ I say that an affective <quality> effects a certain affection in the senses, not a true <affection> as Aristotle says. And what kind of affection it is, is distinguished in Bk. II of *On the Soul*.⁷⁵

60. It must also be noted, after this, that to imply an affection of sensation is not of the essence of quality, insofar as it is considered in Bk. II of *On the Soul*, in the beginning of the chapter <entitled> "On the Visible,"⁷⁶ because the being of the visible is not of the essence of color but is its affection. Therefore, an affection, or an affective quality, which names a quality insofar as it implies an affection of the senses, does not name the essence or the species of quality, but its modes. And this is valid for the solution to the first question.⁷⁷

[V. TO THE THIRTY-FOURTH QUESTION]

[A. *The Response of Scotus*]

61. To the fifth question,⁷⁸ it must be said that "form" in one way is transcendent, insofar as it is taken in the beginning of the *Six Principles*,⁷⁹ in another way it is an exterior disposition of the animate thing or its proper lineation. Similarly, in one way "figure" signifies the enclosed surface or the boundary with its lines; in another way <it signifies> that boundary or the enclosing of the surface. These two, according to the two primary significates, do not pertain essentially (*per se*) to the genus of quality, but according to the other two <significates, they do pertain to the genus of quality>. And according to these: either they are subalterns, so that every form is a figure and not the other way around; or speaking precisely, they are two disparate <types of qualities>.

74. Cf. *supra*, n. 19.

75. *On the Soul*, Bk. II, Ch. 5 (417b 2-7).

76. *On the Soul*, Bk. II, Ch. 5 (418a 26-31).

77. Cf. *supra*, nn. 34-35.

78. Cf. *supra*, nn. 21-24.

79. Cf. *supra*, n. 21.

62. That the form has a second signification is evident according to Porphyry in the chapter “On Species,”⁸⁰ who says that “species in one mode expresses a form of anything,” where form signifies the same <thing> as what is seemly (*decor*), or the exterior disposition of an animate thing, insofar as it is evident through the example of it, namely “the look (*species*) of Priam is worthy of power,” and insofar as what is said in Bk. IV of the *Ethics*,⁸¹ that “small <bodies> can be well formed and proportionate,” that is, decently delineated.

[*B. To the Principal Arguments of
the Thirty-Fourth Question*]

63. To the first two arguments,⁸² <the reply> is evident through the equivocation of these two, <namely,> “form” and “figure,” which was said previously.⁸³

64. To the third <argument>,⁸⁴ it must be said that if form is proper lineation, and <if> figure is an enclosing or boundary of a surface, then taken absolutely they are subalterns; but taken with precision they are diverse. If, however, figure is an exterior disposition of an inanimate thing and form <an exterior disposition> of an animate thing, then these are altogether diverse. Nevertheless, they can be suitably posited as one mode of quality, since they add to the essence of quality this one general aspect (*rationem*): that is, to dispose externally or to establish around something, and not within <it>. This aspect (*ratio*), if it happens to be of the essence of quality, is not extraordinary in that these two do not constitute a species of quality, but a mode.

[VI. A SECOND WAY]

[*A. The Response of Scotus to Questions
Thirty through Thirty-Four*]

65. To all these five questions,⁸⁵ <if someone> maintains that Aristotle enumerates species of quality and not only modes,

80. *Isagoge*, Ch. “On Species” (AL 1⁶ 8; ed. Busse, 3.21–4.1).

81. *Nicomachean Ethics*, Bk. IV, Ch. 8 (1123b 7–8).

82. Cf. *supra*, nn. 21–22.

83. Cf. *supra*, nn. 61–62.

84. Cf. *supra*, n. 23.

85. Cf. *supra*, nn. 30–34.

one can say that these differentiae “to be easily or with difficulty moveable,” “to be the principle of operating or not,” “to imply an affection of sensation,” “to dispose a substance externally” are accidental differentiae <with respect> to the genus of quality, which, nevertheless, Aristotle uses for essential differentiae, since the essential differentiae are unknown; and so those forms, which are primarily under those differentiae, are four species of quality. And this way of speaking does not differ much from the prior <way of speaking>,⁸⁶ except in this, that according to the prior way <of speaking>, it is not necessary to concede that those four modes essentially (*per se*) follow distinct species of quality, but rather more are able to be in the same quality according to species. But in the second mode of speaking, it is necessary at least to concede that these differentiae—although <they are> accidental—are proper to four distinct species of quality; so that just as one of these species is not said of another nor are both <species said> of something the same, so also none of these differentiae is said of another nor are two <differentiae said> of something the same, since “proper” is said universally of that of which it only is.

66. When speaking in this second mode, it must be answered, as <it was said> to the four preceding questions,⁸⁷ by conceding that these differentiae, which are assigned here, are accidental, nevertheless the forms, which these differentiae follow as if they were their properties, are essentially qualities.

67. But <in order> to distinguish these differentiae from each other, one can say that “form” as well as “figure” is an exterior disposition of the thing; <that> an “affection” as well as “affective quality” is an essential (*per se*) change of the senses; <that> “ability” as well as “natural inability” is a natural principle of acting or of being acted upon (*patiendi*). And these three differentiae seem to be so distinct that none of them are in the same quality.

68. The first species, however, does not seem to be taken through some differentia <that is> positively distinct from these

86. Cf. *supra*, nn. 35–36.

87. Cf. *supra*, nn. 31–34.

three, but through a privation of every one of them, so that this quality which underlies none of those differentiae (which is as if it were “the only quality,” since no differentia which is added to a quality is known, nor is it essential, nor is it an accidental property), is said to be in the first species of quality. For those differentiae, “easily moveable from a subject” or “with difficulty <movable from a subject>,” are not distinct from others but rather they can be said of the same quality of which any one of those differentiae is said. But still, those differentiae are accidental to the quality existing in the first species; and habit and disposition taken precisely are distinguished from one another through these <differentiae>.

69. This is evident in the example: “knowledge,” “virtue,” and “health rooted <in a subject>” or “not rooted in a subject” and <others> of this kind, are neither exterior dispositions of the thing, nor are they essentially (*per se*) sensible, nor are they innate principles of operating and of being acted upon, nor is some positive differentia known which those <principles> add to a quality. Therefore, they seem to be the only qualities, as through that precision they are distinguished from other species which add a known differentia; and nevertheless among these, <being> rooted or not rooted <in a subject> (which are of the first species), the differentia is through “being easily moveable” and “with difficulty <moveable>.”

70. <Three Objections>—It can be argued against the distinction of species in this way: some quality in the third species is an innate principle of operating or of being acted upon, as heat in fire and coldness in water; therefore, the same quality is in the third species and the second.

71. Second, someone is said to be a fighter or a runner from a natural ability for fighting or running, and also one is said to be such from the art of fighting or running;⁸⁸ but the same denominatively qualified <person> is not said from diverse qualities; therefore, qualities of the second species and the first do not differ.

88. Cf. *Categories*, Ch. 8 (10a 34–b 6).

72. Third, according to Aristotle in Bk. II of *On the Soul*,⁸⁹ figure, which is posited in the fourth species, is essentially (*per se*) sensible; therefore, it implies an affection of the senses, and so an affective quality; therefore, the fourth species and the third do not differ.

73. <General Response to the Three Objections>—To this <set of objections> one can say that the species that are understood through the accidental differentiae assigned here do differ. But neither are these differentiae proper to the species unless they are taken precisely. For instance: <if> that quality is divided in this way: one <part> is an interior disposition, the other an exterior <disposition>. The exterior: figure. The interior: either a primary sensible, and in this way it is the third species. If it is an interior disposition and not a primary sensible: either it is an innate principle of operating, and thus it is the second species; or it is an interior disposition and not an innate principle of operating, and thus it is the first species. It must always be understood through these accidental differentiae, differentiae <which are> essential to the species. And so it is evident how one species includes a privative differentia with respect to another species; and so the one more perfect species ought always to be taken with precision with regard to its inferior.

74. <To the Three Objections taken Separately>—Therefore, to the first reason,⁹⁰ it must be said that the heat of fire is in the third species, since it is primarily sensible, and not in the second; since it is not only an innate principle of operating—unless <it is taken> with precision of the differentiae of the third species and the fourth; however, in this way it is proper to the second species.

75. To the second <objection>,⁹¹ I say that a fighter and a runner, and universally all <that are> said to be qualified (*qualia*) from the qualities of the first and second species, are said equivocally. Since, of the same one, <something> can be affirmed, as <something> is said from qualities of the first species,

89. *On the Soul*, Bk. II, Ch. 6 (418a 17–25).

90. Cf. *supra*, n. 70.

91. Cf. *supra*, n. 71.

and <something can be> denied, as <something> is said from qualities of the second species and vice versa. And the same <thing> taken equivocally can be affirmed and denied of the same <thing>. This is evident in an exemplary manner in other <instances>, since someone healthy due to a natural ability can be sick due to a habit.

76. To the third <objection>,⁹² it must be said that figure is of a number of the common sensibles, and those are essentially (*per se*) sensible; nevertheless they do not imply an affection of the senses, but they only diversify the mode of changing the senses from the proper sensible; because a single sensible implies an affection to the senses, etc. In the third species there are only proper sensibles.

[*B. The Response to the Thirty-Fifth Question*]

77. In this second way of speaking,⁹³ the order of the species can be preserved in some way. Since the first species is the most common: for any quality, not having some differentia of some other species, can be posited in this species. After this <species>, the second <species> is prior to the others, since it follows the nature of the thing as its cause. And the third <species is> after this one, since even though of its nature (*ratione*) it is not inherent from nature (*natura*), nevertheless it more commonly displaces its subject both in depth and in surface. The fourth <species> is the last through a privation of all the others, for neither is it more common in the genus of quality than the other species, that is, containing more species of quality, although perhaps it may inhere in more subjects; nor is it innate, since figure can be varied concerning the subject, since no variation is made in nature; nor is it a disposition in depth, but only <in the> exterior; therefore, it is reasonably posited last. According to this way, it must be said that the species of quality are suitably distinguished; not perhaps the first ones, since these are only two, but those nearest to the first, and this <is done>, by only understanding these qualities through those differentiae, of which <qualities> those <differentiae> are proper, although accidental.

92. Cf. *supra*, n. 72.

93. Cf. *supra*, nn. 65–66.

[C. To the Principal Reasons of
the Thirtieth Question]

78. According to this, <a reply> to the second reason of the first question is evident.⁹⁴

79. To the first <objection>, it seems that it must be said as it was said previously.⁹⁵

80. To the third <objection>,⁹⁶ it must be said that no quality is the same in one species and in another; nor also are some differentiae of two species said of the same quality. And when it is argued that "the same quality can imply an affection of the senses and is easily or with difficulty moveable," I say that "easily moveable" or "with difficulty <moveable>" are not proper differentiae of the first species, neither <are they> essential or accidental, unless they are determined to qualities which do not have some differentia of the other species, of which kind, as was previously said, are the qualities of the first species. These differentiae, "easily moveable" or "with difficulty <moveable>," however, can also inhere in a quality having another differentia of another species; but from this it does not follow that this quality is in the first species, unless those differentiae are, to a lesser <extent>, properties of the first species.

[D. To the Principal Arguments of
the Thirty-Fifth Question]

To the arguments of the sixth question which are against the order of the species.

81. To the first <argument>,⁹⁷ it must be said that the species of quality are not ordered according to the fact that <one> "more immediately follows quantity or substance," but according to other reasons <which were> said above, namely according to a greater universality (*communitatem*) in the genus of quality, and according to inhering naturally, and <according to> disposing in the surface and in depth, and their opposites. And according to all these conditions, the fourth species ought to be last.

94. Cf. *supra*, n. 2.

96. Cf. *supra*, n. 3.

95. Cf. *supra*, nn. 1, 37.

97. Cf. *supra*, n. 25.

82. To the second <argument>,⁹⁸ I say that that species which is more common in the genus of quality, that is adding less beyond the nature (*rationem*) of quality absolutely, even though it may not be from nature, ought to be posited prior to another species which is not common in this way.

83. To the third <argument>,⁹⁹ I say that the qualities of the elements are not the only qualities of the third species, but all qualities that essentially (*per se*) affect the senses <are of the third species>, of which <qualities> certain ones are of the elements, and <these> do not inhere <in a subject> by nature. Therefore, a general priority of all the qualities of the third species to the others cannot be concluded from the priority of the qualities of the elements or from a natural inherence of these in the elements, since it is necessary for a sufficient medium to exist to conclude that that is a common aspect (*rationem*) of all qualities of the third species.

84. To the fourth <argument>,¹⁰⁰ I say that qualities of the first species, even though they do not inhere primarily in substance but others precede them, nevertheless this species is more common than the others, adding less to a quality, and perhaps containing more species below them.

85. To the fifth <argument>,¹⁰¹ it is evident through this that even though this quality which expresses a "natural ability" follows the substantial form more immediately than <does> that which expresses a "habit," nevertheless it is not as common as that <one>, and therefore it ought not to be posited as a prior species.

[VII. TO THE THIRTY-SIXTH QUESTION]

[A. *The Response of Scotus*]

86. To the seventh question,¹⁰² one can say that not all species of quality are enumerated here, as Aristotle also says in the text,¹⁰³ but <he enumerates> the species that are more famous,

98. Cf. *supra*, n. 26.

100. Cf. *supra*, n. 28.

102. Cf. *supra*, nn. 31-34.

99. Cf. *supra*, n. 27.

101. Cf. *supra*, n. 29.

103. *Categories*, Ch. 8 (10a 25-26).

since these are neither the primary species, nor perhaps do two divide the same genus primarily, and the other two another genus.

[*B. To the Principal Reasons of
the Thirty-Sixth Question*]

Nevertheless, if it is maintained that they are sufficiently enumerated, one can respond to the reasons <in this way>:

87. To the first <reason>,¹⁰⁴ one can say that the ability of the soul is in the second species of quality, by speaking of the quality to which that account, which is the principle of operating, is attributed.—To the first proof to the contrary, I say that not only is the ability which is in the second species only for doing <something> easily, but <it is> also that which is for doing <something> simply, provided that it is innate.

88. To the <second> reason,¹⁰⁵ one can say that anger and madness and <others> of this kind are in the first species, and perhaps all qualities of the soul.—When it is said that these are enumerated in the third species, I say that affection and affective quality, taken precisely, differ according to these accidental differentiae, <namely,> “easily moveable” and “with difficulty <moveable>,” according to which habit and disposition also differ. And therefore those which are in the first species can be enumerated in the third, since they participate in that differentia which is not proper to the third; just as, the other way around, heat and cold can be enumerated in the first species, which nevertheless are truly in the third species, so that through this mutual enumeration of species Aristotle insinuates that these differentiae, <namely,> “easily moveable” and “with difficulty <moveable>,” not only are not essential, but neither are they proper to another <one> of those species, but they accidentally distinguish an affection from an affective quality and a disposition from a habit.

89. To the third <argument>,¹⁰⁶ I say that elegance and beauty, when speaking of corporeal beauty, which is a harmonious disposition of the members, are in the fourth species of quality.—

104. Cf. supra, n. 31.

105. Cf. supra, n. 32.

106. Cf. supra, n. 33.

When it is argued against this that the qualities of the fourth species do not receive more and less and these do receive <more and less>, I say that Aristotle does not deny that all qualities of the fourth species receive more and less, but <only> certain ones. For it suffices to his point that the property “to receive more and less” does not inhere in every quality; however it does not inhere in those which are in the fourth species—which are qualities of mathematics,¹⁰⁷ since these are prior to motion, and more and less is not attributed <to something> except where there is motion.

[VIII. CERTAIN THINGS MUST BE
NOTED CONCERNING QUALITY]

[A. *Concerning Rare and Dense
and Others of This Kind*]

90. It must be noted that rare and dense, rough and smooth,¹⁰⁸ in one way signify the extension of quantitative parts, and so the same body compressed and uncompressed can be rare and dense, as is evident of wool and a sponge. In another way, they signify extension of the parts of matter, just as rare expresses what has much of form and little of matter, and dense the other way around. In the first way, these perhaps signify position, since they express the order of parts in the whole and in place;¹⁰⁹ in the second way they perhaps signify qualities. And so a solution of the controversy, which is between the authority here¹¹⁰ and in Bk. IV of the *Physics*, in the chapter “About a Vacuum”¹¹¹ and between the authority of the <book> *On The Six Principles*,¹¹² is evident, namely, in which way they are qualities and in which way they are positions.

107. Cf. *Metaphysics*, Bk. V, Ch. 14 (1020b 2–3).

108. Cf. *Categories*, Ch. 8 (10a 21–25).

109. Cf. *Liber sex principiorum*, Ch. 6, n. 60.

110. *Categories*, Ch. 6 (5a 15–37).

111. *Physics*, Bk. IV, Ch. 9 (216b 22–217b 29).

112. Cf. *supra*, n. 21.

[B. Concerning the Description of Qualified]

91. Concerning the description of "qualified" (*qualium*) it seems that there, and in the description of quality (*qualitatis*), <the description> is circular. For in the first place it is said that "quality is that according to which we are said <to be> *qualified*,"¹¹³ and in the second place <it is said that> "<those things> are said to be *qualified*, which are said denominatively from qualities"¹¹⁴ and so each one is mutually described through the other. But perhaps the first description is better known with respect to us <and> the second <description> is better known absolutely; nevertheless neither description is a definition.

92. It must also be noted that Aristotle says, "*qualified* <things> are said denominatively from qualities," except when either the names are not imposed from qualities, for example, as it is of qualities in the second species;¹¹⁵ or when, if the existing names are imposed, the denominatives are not taken directly from them, "for example, as someone is said <to be> "studious" from virtue" nevertheless that "*qualified* <thing>" is not taken directly from that quality.¹¹⁶ From which it is evident that denominatives ought to differ from their principles in no <thing> that pertains to the significate, but only perhaps in the mode of signifying and in the end of the utterance.

[IX. ON THE PROPERTIES OF QUALITY]

[A. On the First Property of Quality]

93. Next to the first property <of quality>,¹¹⁷ which is "to receive contraries," it must be noted that in the intermediate qualities there is one extreme contrary among contraries, by a

113. *Categories*, Ch. 8 (9a 16–17).

114. *Categories*, Ch. 8 (10a 29–30).

115. According to Aristotle, one who is called a "boxer" in virtue of a natural ability for boxing is not called denominatively from it, because the abstract noun "boxing" does not signify a natural ability but a habit.

116. A person who is called "studious" is so called because of a virtue, but if he were called denominatively from virtue, he would be called "virtuous" not "studious." *Categories*, Ch. 8 (10b 7–8).

117. *Categories*, Ch. 8 (10b 12–24).

contrariety metaphorically said, which is a differentia according to species; and similarly by a contrariety properly said but diminished. First, since otherwise it could not be that motion is from the extreme to the intermediate or vice versa, the opposite of which is held by Aristotle in Bk. V of the *Physics*.¹¹⁸ Second, since some intermediate participates in each extreme, and so it is imperfectly contrary to each extreme for that which it holds in itself of the remaining one. But nothing is contrary to these by a perfect and properly said contrariety, since in the same way each extreme is contrary to the intermediate. And, according to what is said in Bk. X of the *Metaphysics*,¹¹⁹ the two cannot be contrary to the same <thing>, by a complete and perfect contrariety.

[B. On the Second Property of Quality]

94. Next to the second property,¹²⁰ which is “to receive more and less,” it must be noted that the essence of quality, which is signified in the abstract, does not receive more and less, insofar as it is said in the text¹²¹ that <one> justice is not said <to be> more than another justice, nor is <one> grammar <said to be more> than another grammar, and this <is the case> since the essence of quality, just as also of any form, is indivisible, according to the author of the <book> *On The Six Principles* in the beginning <of the text>,¹²² and an indivisible <thing> does not receive more and less. But <those things> said denominatively from certain qualities do receive more and less; as someone is said <to be> more just or more grammatical than another, as is said in the text.¹²³ And so that form, when it informs the subject, receives more and less, although not in its essence, since one subject participates more in the form than another.

118. *Physics*, Bk. V, Ch. 1 (224b 27–36).

119. *Metaphysics*, Bk. X, Ch. 4 (1055a 16–24).

120. *Categories*, Ch. 8 (10b 25–11a 14).

121. *Categories*, Ch. 8 (10b 30–11a 1).

122. Cf. *supra*, n. 21.

123. *Categories*, Ch. 8 (11a 3–5).

[1. *Six Arguments Against the Position of Scotus*]

95. Against <this>: According to Aristotle in Bk. V of the *Physics*,¹²⁴ something can be changed from more and less. But no change is from the same <thing> in species to the same <thing> in species. Therefore, more and less are not in a quality of the same species. And they do not exist except in the quality of the same species, since a comparison does not exist except according to some same form in species, according to Aristotle in Bk. VII of the *Physics*.¹²⁵ Therefore, more and less do not exist absolutely in quality.

96. Second, in this way it seems that it must be conceded that quantity receives more and less, since according to its being in a natural subject it can be perfect and imperfect, even though it is not <perfect and imperfect> according to its essence; and it is posited of quality in this way. Therefore, both <quantity and quality> similarly receive more and less; and these properties must be denied from quantity, according to Aristotle above;¹²⁶ therefore, <more and less must be denied> from quality.

97. Third, "if absolutely follows absolutely, more also follows more," according to Aristotle in Bk. II of the *Topics*,¹²⁷ <and> if¹²⁸ it follows to white that white is in whiteness; then it follows to the whiter that the whiter is more whiteness. Therefore, if a form, insofar as it is in a subject, receives more and less, <then> it also in itself receives more and less.

98. Fourth, every more according to some form is essentially (*per se*) relative to less according to the same form; therefore, the form, according to which these are referred, is essentially (*per se*) a relation; therefore, more and less are essentially (*per se*) said according to no quality. The implications are evident: since a relative is not said essentially (*per se*) except from a relation, and since no quality is essentially (*per se*) a relation.

124. *Physics*, Bk. V, Ch. 2 (226b 1–5).

125. *Physics*, Bk. VII, Ch. 4 (248b 5–249a 2).

126. *Categories*, Ch. 6 (6a 25).

127. *Topics*, Bk. II, Ch. 11 (115b 4–9).

128. For the sake of the argument, I have followed an alternative manuscript, which has the conjunction *si*, as opposed to the conjunction *sed*, which the critical edition adopts.

99. Fifth, whiter and less white are relatives of supposition and imposition, since they are not <relatives> of equivalence, as is manifest. But relatives of supposition and of imposition differ in species, since they are opposites. Therefore, no quality in the same species receives more and less, nor <does a quality> in a diverse species, as the first reason proves;¹²⁹ therefore, etc.

100. Sixth, I prove that if a quality receives more and less in some mode, it receives <more and less> according to its essence. For if it receives more and less according to its being in a subject or according to something else, let that thing be *A*. Therefore, either *A* is of its essence, or not. If it is, and *A* is something of its essence, then it receives more and less according to its own essence. If it is not, *A* will receive more and less also, since otherwise a quality could not receive more and less according to it: therefore, either *A* receives more and less according to its essence, and the proposition holds; since with equal reason the first <subject> will receive more and less according to its essence, since so far as it concerns this, the same judgment seems to be about every accidental form. If *A* receives more and less according to something other than its essence, let that be *b*, and so by proceeding <in this way>: either there will be an infinite <number of> accidental forms, of which one receives more and less according to another, or it will stop at some accidental form which receives more and less according to its <own> essence. Therefore, with equal reason it seems to hold in the first <instance>, since the same judgment is about all <accidental forms>.

[2. *The Response of Scotus to the Objections*]

[a. General Response]

101. If it is conceded on account of these reasons that a quality of a <certain> kind (*specie*) receives more and less according to its essence, since some subject according to a more perfect grade participates in the same essence in species, and another subject <participates> according to a less perfect grade:

102. Against this: either that (*iste*) grade and that one (*ille*)

129. Cf. *supra*, n. 95.

are within the essence or not. If they are, and that grade is diverse from that one, then this essence is diverse from that one through something that is within the essence. Therefore, "more" differs from less in species. This last implication is evident: first since every essential diversity diversifies the species; second since the essence is primarily of the species, not of the individual, <and> otherwise the individual could have a more specific definition than the definition of the species. Therefore, the differentia in its essence is not only a differentia in number, but in species.

103. Of the six reasons¹³⁰ posited against the <second> property <of quality>, if the second and third and sixth are conceded—since they do not disprove the property absolutely, but a false way of understanding it—then it must be understood that just as a similitude is a relation properly founded beyond the essence of a quality, so more and less <are relations properly founded beyond the essence of quality>. The foundation of "more," however, is the essence of the species under a perfect grade, which grade is something absolute concerning the genus of quality, although the relation of "more" may follow it to another <thing> imperfect in the same species which a relation of "less" follows.

104. Therefore, when Aristotle and Boethius¹³¹ say to the contrary that <one> justice is not said to be more and less than <another> justice, but someone is said to be more just than another:

It must be understood that the essence of the species considered in itself, since it is abstracted from the supposits, does not in itself have more and less, since that <essence> thus considered is indifferent to every grade. But that <essence> is more perfect in itself in one supposit than it is in another supposit. And as it is in the supposit, so it denominates the subject, since its essential (*per se*) supposit is not the subject, but is a quality in

130. Cf. *supra*, nn. 95–100.

131. Cf. *supra*, n. 94 (the authority of Boethius is not alleged there). Cf. Boethius, *In Categ. Aristot.* III (PL 64, 257C).

this subject. Therefore, it is not “justice,” when it is understood abstractly, but “a just man,” that is, this justice as it denominates that subject, that is greater than another.

[b. To the Arguments Taken Separately]

105. Response to the first argument¹³² about motion: motion can essentially (*per se*) exist between two suppositis of the same species, not insofar as it is of the same species, but insofar as there are opposites in some mode. And this opposition in a proposition is not only through relations, since motion is not essentially (*per se*) to a relation, according to Aristotle in Bk. V of the *Physics*.¹³³ But it is through some absolute grades in this and in that, which are of the genus of quality, <and> which are opposed insofar as one has the aspect of an intermediate with respect to the other. Nevertheless, that relation of the intermediate is not the cause of motion, just as a relation of “less” is not, but that which is under it, as dark is the extreme of motion, not insofar as dark is an intermediate.

106. Against this: insofar as an extreme by which <something> is opposed to a term toward which; it is not opposed except by some relation.—Response: the first proposition is true, as “insofar as” corresponds to the second essential (*per se*) way, not the first. And so that grade, as far as that, is opposed to that, as far as “that” is <taken> in the second essential (*per se*) way and not the first.

107. <The response> to the fourth and fifth <arguments>¹³⁴ about relations is evident.

108. <To> the fourth <argument>,¹³⁵ it can happen concerning the third property of quality¹³⁶ in the same way as here. Therefore, when more is referred to less, it must be conceded <that it is> by speaking of these forms, not of those <things> which are under <them>; therefore, the forms according to

132. Cf. *supra*, n. 95.

133. *Physics*, Bk. V, Ch. 2 (225b 10–13).

134. Cf. *supra*, nn. 98–99.

135. Cf. *supra*, n. 98.

136. Cf. *supra*, n. 114.

which more and less are said, are relations; "according to which" is true in the first essential (*per se*) way, not in the second.

109. Similarly to the fifth <argument>:¹³⁷ these relations "the majority of intension" and "the minority of remission," which are properties of quality, are opposed in species; but not the foundations, just as "similar" and "dissimilar" are founded in the same quality in species.

110. This whole <argument> is confirmed: since the whole absolute perfection in <something that is> more white, namely any grade of whiteness in itself, can remain, <if the thing> with respect to more is destroyed, if it has been posited that there is not another <one that is> less to which it can be said. Just as the whole whiteness is in that subject which was first, although "similar" is said to none of it according to it, as it was said previously.¹³⁸ Therefore, that property ought to be understood to be in a quality according to aptitude.

111. But concerning the fifth argument:¹³⁹ is whiter in the genus of relation? It seems that it is not, since then whiter would not signify the same thing that white <signifies>.—Likewise, "more" seems to be a mode of signifying in whiter.—Again, what essentially (*per se*) terminates motion in the same species from a lesser to a greater?

112. Against this: something is whiter, when there was not a prior, through only a change in another; therefore, it expresses only a relation.—Likewise, "more white" expresses a relation formally; nevertheless, <it expresses> the foundation in this; therefore, it also <expresses> "whiter."

113. Response: it signifies the essence under such a grade of quality. Therefore, it is as if it were a species of white, which is indifferent to every grade; a relation is an affection of this; it is neither about a significate nor perhaps about a mode of a signifying name. Nevertheless, if a grade is about a significate, then the relation can follow the "existence" of the mode of signifying—hence the response to the arguments.¹⁴⁰

137. Cf. *supra*, n. 99.

139. Cf. *supra*, n. 99.

138. Cf. *supra*, nn. 103, 109.

140. Cf. *supra*, nn. 101–4, 105–9.

[c. On the Third Property of Quality]

114. Concerning the third property of quality, which is that “according to <quality> something is said to be similar or dissimilar,”¹⁴¹ it must be noted that although “similar” and “dissimilar” are proper to the genus of quality, nevertheless they are as species in the genus of relation, that is, as <something> said denominatively from the species of relations, since “similitude” is an essential (*per se*) relation and “similar” is essentially (*per se*) a relative. So it must be understood of the properties of other genera, which are not in that genus as species. Similarly they must be understood according to aptitude. For although something according to some quality has nothing similar if nothing else has that quality, this property does not pertain to that quality less than that <one>, since according to that quality something is of such a nature as to be said to be similar to another.

[X. CONCERNING THE OTHER CATEGORIES]

*Doing and being affected, however, receive <contraries and more and less>, etc.*¹⁴²

115. It must be noted that “to receive contraries” and “more and less” are not in an action and an affection, except by reason of the terms towards which, since action as well as affection receive the species from the term to which, according to what is held in Bk. V of the *Physics*.¹⁴³ It will also receive contrariety from it and similarly <with regard to> more and less.

116. It must be noted about these two <categories> and about the other four subsequent <categories>, that Aristotle passes over them quickly: either since their species into which they are to be divided, insofar as they are genera, are not known, or their affections which inhere in them insofar as they are considered by reason <are not known>. About their affec-

¹⁴¹ *Categories*, Ch. 8 (11a 19).

¹⁴² “Doing and being affected admit of contrariety and of a more and a less”; *Categories*, Ch. 9 (11b 1).

¹⁴³ *Physics*, Bk. V, Ch. 1 (224b 8–9).

tions, however, which inhere in them according to their natural being, it is determined more fully in the books on nature and in the *Metaphysics*; about “action” and “affection” in Bk. III of the *Physics*¹⁴⁴ and in *On Generation and Corruption*,¹⁴⁵ about “when” and “where” in Bk. IV of the *Physics*,¹⁴⁶ in the fact that it is determined there about place and time (for the properties of “where” and “when” are known through the properties of place and time); about “position” and “habit” somewhat in Bk. V of the *Metaphysics*.¹⁴⁷ And so the determination considered here of these is sufficient for the logician.

144. *Physics*, Bk. III, Ch. 1–3 (200b 27–202b 29).

145. *On Generation and Corruption*, Bk. I, Ch. 3 (317b 19–36).

146. *Physics*, Bk. IV, Ch. 10–14 (217b 30–224a 17, and 208a 29–213a 10).

147. *Metaphysics*, Bk. V, Ch. 6 (1015a 36–1016b 16).

<QUESTIONS THIRTY-SEVEN
AND THIRTY-EIGHT>

[QUESTION THIRTY-SEVEN
Whether Opposition is a Real or
an Intentional Accident]

*As often, however, as things are accustomed to be opposed,*¹ etc.



ONCERNING this it is asked first whether opposition is a real or an intentional accident.

1. It seems that it is real:

Since it is only for the metaphysician to consider being and real accidents of being; for accidents of being, as they are considered by reason, pertain to the consideration of the logician. But the metaphysician considers opposition, as is evident in Bk. V of the *Metaphysics*.² Therefore, opposition is a real attribute.

2. Second, opposition is a species of differentia, and differentia is a species of diversity, and diversity is a real attribute; therefore, opposition <is a real attribute>, since a genus is not more truly a being than its species.

3. Third, if the understanding did not exist, there would <still> be opposition; therefore, it is not an intentional accident. The antecedent is evident inductively; for there would be a mutual action between hot and cold and a motion between these, <even> if the understanding did not exist; therefore, contrariety also <does not depend upon the existence of the understanding>.

Similarly, if the understanding did not exist, some father and

1. *Categories*, Ch. 10 (11b 16 [in apparatus]).

2. *Metaphysics*, Bk. V, Ch. 10 (1018a 20–b 8).

some son would <still> exist, since the existence of “to bear” and “to be born”³ do not depend on the understanding; therefore, relative opposites also <do not depend upon the understanding>.

Similarly, <if the understanding did not exist>, <something> lacking habits would be, in its nature, designed to have a habit; therefore, privative opposites <do not depend upon the understanding>.⁴

Similarly, a contradiction also <exists>, since that follows any opposition; therefore, if any other <type of opposition> remains in this way, <a contradiction> can exist without the understanding <existing>.

4. To the opposite:

An accident does not have a truer existence than its subject; but oppositions are founded in the intentions as in a subject; therefore, they are not real but only intentional. The minor is evident inductively. For genus and species are referred to each other; and the genus and the non-genus contradict <each other>; and so it is about the other opposites.

5. Second, in intentional accidents alone it is possible for something to be predicated of itself denominatively; but this is possible in oppositions; therefore, etc. Proof of the major: a denominative predication of something is a predication of an accident of <that> subject; but no accident, except an intentional <accident>, can exist in something of itself as in a subject. Proof of the minor: “every division is between opposites”;⁵ but opposition is divided into contrariety and privative opposition and <others> of this kind; therefore, these are opposed; therefore, also oppositions are opposed.

6. Third, nothing real is found in every most general <genus>; but opposition and its species are found in every genus; therefore, etc. The minor is evident, since a contradiction ac-

3. In Latin, both words are in the perfect tense.

4. For the sake of clarity, this sentence is amended. In the critical edition, it reads: *Similiter, esset carentia habitus in apto nato habere habitum; igitur et privative opposita*. Cf. *Metaphysics*, Bk. IV, Ch. 2 (1004a 14-16).

5. Cf. *infra*, n. 7.

cording to the same aspect (*rationem*) is found between man and non-man, and between white and non-white, since <it is found> according to this aspect: “<it is> an opposition of which there is not an intermediate in itself.”⁶—It seems similar about contrariety, which is discovered in diverse genera, according to this aspect: “the greatest distance of forms which are of such a nature to happen mutually concerning the same <thing>.”⁷

[QUESTION THIRTY-EIGHT

Whether the Division of Opposition
into These Four, Namely, Relative Opposition,
Contrary Opposition, Contradictory Opposition,
and Privative Opposition, is Suitable]



AFTER THIS IT IS ASKED whether the division of opposition into these four, namely, relative opposition, contrary <opposition>, contradictory <opposition>, and privative <opposition>, is suitable.

7. It seems that it is not:

Since every division is through opposites, according to Boethius in his book *On Division*,⁸ this <division> is not <through opposites>; therefore, etc. Proof of the minor: since this division is between oppositions, and no opposition is opposed. Proof: since if it were, then it would be opposed through another opposition; and with equal reason that <opposition would be opposed through another opposition>, since it could be divided against another opposition; and so it will proceed to infinity in oppositions. Therefore, this division is insufficient, since it does not happen in all these oppositions.

8. Second, when one seems to follow another, the division is insufficient; but contradictories follow all other opposites; therefore, etc. The minor is evident, since all other opposites include contradictory opposites.

6. *Posterior Analytics*, Bk. I, Ch. 4 (72a 12–13).

7. *Categories*, Ch. 6 (6a 12–19); *Metaphysics*, Bk. X, Ch. 4 (1055a 5–33).

8. Boethius, *Liber de divisione* (ed. J. Magee, p. 48; PL 64, 890D–891A).

9. Third, relative opposites are said of the same <thing>; therefore, they are not opposites. The antecedent is evident, since it is argued thus in the chapter "On Quantity":⁹ "this is great <in comparison> to this, and this is small <in comparison> to this <other one>; therefore, this is great and small." Therefore, if that mode of arguing is valid, two relative opposites can be inferred absolutely from themselves <when they are> posited in comparison to diverse <things>. For Aristotle understands relative opposites through "great" and "small," as is evident there.

10. Fourth, privative opposites are said of the same thing; therefore, they are not opposites. Proof of the antecedent: since, according to Aristotle in Bk. II of the *Topics*,¹⁰ in privative opposites the implication holds in its very self;¹¹ therefore, if sensation follows sight, then the lack of sensation (*insensibilitas*) follows blindness. But it follows that "sight is sensation; therefore, every seeing is a sensing," since an implication essentially (*per se*) holds from the abstracts to the concretes. Similarly, "if deafness is a lack of sensation, then a deaf <person> is insensible." Therefore, if the same <person> is seeing and deaf, then the same <one> will be sensible and insensible, and so privative opposites <will be said> of the same <thing>. This same <thing> is evident in another example, since it follows "that <one> is similar to this <one>; therefore, that is similar," and "<that one is> dissimilar to that <other one>; therefore, that <one> is dissimilar"; therefore, <that one> is similar and dissimilar. The implication is evident, since a relative posited with respect to any term implies itself absolutely, since no term distracts from the nature (*ratione*) of a relative absolutely.

11. Fifth, contraries are said of the same <thing>; therefore, they are not opposites. The antecedent is evident. First, since the nature of each extreme is in an intermediate <that is> said through participation; otherwise <an intermediate that is said through participation> does not differ from an intermediate said through negation; otherwise there would also not be motion to the intermediate from each extreme, as an intermediate said through participation is denominated from each extreme.

9. Cf. *Categories*, Ch. 6 (5b 34–39).

10. *Topics*, Bk. II, Ch. 8 (114a 7–10).

11. "in its very self": i.e., directly.

Second, since a shield, of which the middle place is <partly> white and <partly> black, is colored; therefore, the shield is either white, or black, or an intermediate <color, such as gray>. The implication is evident, according to Aristotle in Bk. II of the *Topics*:¹² "it is necessary that whatever is in a genus or denominated from a genus, is also in some species or is denominated from some species." It is manifest that it is not an intermediate <color>. If it is white, with equal reason it is black; therefore, contraries are said of the same <thing>.

12. To the first proof,¹³ it could be said that the nature of extremes is imperfectly in an intermediate,¹⁴ and for this reason an intermediate is denominated from neither extreme.—Against this: each extreme is some form; therefore, it is simple, according to the author of the <book> *On the Six Principles* in the beginning: "simple, when it exists, is in itself whole."¹⁵ Therefore, if each extreme is in the intermediate according to some of itself, <then> according to itself, the whole will be in the intermediate.

13. It is said to the second proof,¹⁶ that a shield is not colored (*coloratum*) but <multi>colored (*colorata*).—Against this: therefore, it is this color (*coloratum*) and that <color>. Since according to Priscian, "plural is not <anything> except the single doubled."¹⁷ But the consequent is false, since then it would be a multiplication of subject and accident.

14. Sixth, contradictory opposites are said of the same <thing>; therefore, they are not opposites. Proof of the antecedent: since contradictory opposites follow every other <opposite>; but all other <opposites> are said of the same <thing>, as was shown;¹⁸ therefore, also contradictories.

12. *Topics*, Bk. II, Ch. 4 (111a 33-25).

13. Cf. supra, n. 11.

14. *Parts of Animals*, Bk. III, Ch. 1 (661b 11).

15. *Liber sex principiorum*, Ch. 5, n. 54.

16. Cf. supra, n. 12.

17. Priscianus, *Institutiones grammaticae*, Bk. V, Ch. 9, n. 47 (ed. M. Hertz, I 172).

18. Cf. supra, nn. 9-11.

15. Seventh, if opposition is suitably divided, then opposition is the subject of division. And beyond this, division is a subject of opposition, since division is opposed to some as indivision or collection. Therefore, the same <thing> with respect to the same <thing> is subject and accident, which seems unsuitable; therefore, etc.

16. To the opposite are Aristotle and Boethius in his *Commentary <on the Categories>*.¹⁹ Similarly <to the opposite is> also Aristotle in the books of the *Topics*.²⁰ For as often as he teaches <us> to consider about opposites, he teaches <us> to look only to these <four species>.

[I. TO THE THIRTY-SEVENTH QUESTION]

[A. *The Response of Scotus*]

17. To the first question,²¹ one can say that opposition is equivocal. Since taken in one sense it is said univocally of contrariety and relative opposition; in another sense it is said univocally of contradiction and privative opposition. In its primary way, it is a being and a species in the genus of relation; if it is found in other genera, this is not as a species, but as an attribute. In the second way, it is an intention, since its other extreme is only a being according to the consideration of reason.

[B. *To the Principal Arguments of the Thirty-Seventh Question*]

18. To the first argument,²² it must be said that the metaphysician distinguishes many <things> that have many parts in Bk. V, not since all are beings or real attributes of being, but perhaps he also posits some senses according to other <senses> just as he excludes <others> from the question; and so it is about opposition, one species of which is a being and a species <in the genus> of relation, and another sense is joined <to it> just as it is perhaps excluded from the question.

19. Cf. supra, n. 1; Boethius, *In Categ. Aristot.*, Bk. IV (PL 64, 263B).

20. *Topics*, Bk. II, Ch. 8 (113b 15–114a 25).

21. Cf. supra, nn. 1–6.

22. Cf. supra, n. 1.

19. To the <second argument>,²³ I say that opposition in one sense, namely, as it is said of contrariety and relative opposition, is a species of differentia; however, not as it is said of contradiction and privative opposition. Since being and non-being contradict <one another>, and nevertheless they do not differ, nor are they diverse, since diversity is a differentia of being, and similarly differentia <is a differentia of being>.

20. To the third <argument>,²⁴ I concede that, if the understanding did not exist, contrariety and relative opposition would <still> exist; however, <I do> not <concede that> privative opposition or contradiction <would still exist>. Since the other extreme in these oppositions, for example, negation and privation, insofar as it is an extreme of the relation, is only a being according to reason. That is evident about negation, since even though it is said of some being, for example as "non-man" is said about a donkey, nevertheless according to the aspect which contradicts man, it is not a being except of reason. Through this it is evident that even though contraries remain, if the understanding does not exist, it is not necessary that contradictories remain insofar as they are contradictories. Since the negation of white, as it contradicts white, is not in black, since <insofar> as it contradicts <it>, it can be said of a being and of a non-being.²⁵

21. If it is said that the negation of white at least follows black, as it contradicts white, and so contradictories exist if contraries exist:—I say that if the understanding does not exist, there is no implication. Similarly, even though a privation may be the negation of a habit in a subject,²⁶ nevertheless it is only opposed to a habit by reason of a negation, and <thus> it is not a being except only according to reason.

23. Cf. *supra*, n. 2.

24. Cf. *supra*, n. 3.

25. *On Interpretation*, Bk. I, Ch. 3 (16b 14-15).

26. Cf. *supra*, n. 3.

[*C. To the Arguments to the Opposite of
the Thirty-Seventh Question*]

To the arguments to the opposite.

22. To the first <argument>,²⁷ I say that contrariety and relative opposition, taken in the sense in which they are species of opposition, are not in intentional subjects; although perhaps contrariety according to another sense—as it is said to be in propositions according to their quality and quantity—may be intentional and in an intentional subject, as in a proposition. The other two, however, as contradiction and privative opposition, can be in intentional subjects.

23. To the second <argument>,²⁸ I say that the major can be denied, since also in compared real accidents it seems that some denominative is predicated of itself, of which kind are oppositions.

24. Against <this argument>: it is impossible in things for something to be in the same species as in a subject; and a denominative predication is properly of a subject. Or one can say that when it is said “oppositions are opposed,” that which denominates “oppositions” is not a real opposition but an intentional <opposition>, and so the same <thing> does not denominate itself.

25. Against this: contrariety and relative opposition divide opposition as a genus; therefore, they are absolute species. Therefore, their opposition is something real, since each extreme is also a being. And for this reason it must be answered just as it is said to the first argument of the following question.²⁹

26. To the third <argument>,³⁰ I say that contradiction and privative opposition can be discovered univocally in every genus, and similarly contrariety and relative opposition <can be discovered univocally in every genus>, perhaps as attributes, <but> not as species.

27. Cf. *supra*, n. 4.

29. Cf. *supra*, nn. 28–29.

28. Cf. *supra*, n. 5.

30. Cf. *supra*, n. 6.

[II. TO THE THIRTY-EIGHTH QUESTION]

[A. *The Response of Scotus*]

27. To the second question,³¹ it must be said that the division of opposition into these four is suitable. Since a real opposition is of those <things> which are in the same genus.³² Of these, therefore, either one of them depends on another, and so it is relative opposition; or <one of them does> not <depend on the other>, and so it is contrary opposition. An opposition having non-being as the other extreme is said of privative and contradictory opposition; either it has non-being as an extreme, according to <which> no subject <is> determined to itself, and so it is a contradiction; or it determines some subject to itself, and so it is a privative opposition. And thus the sufficiency is evident.

[B. *To the Principal Arguments of the Thirty-Eighth Question*]

28. To the first argument,³³ one can say that not every division is between opposites, properly speaking, since not <every> division <is> of a genus into species, as <the division of a genus is> in the genus of substance. And so contraries and relatives divide opposition, as species; and the others <namely, contradiction and privative opposites divide opposition>, as species, although in another sense of opposition. And it is not necessary for the species dividing <an opposition> to be contraries unless contrariety <is taken> metaphorically, which is not an opposition as we speak of it here, but perhaps it is a common intention to all disparate <parts>. It is in no way necessary, however, to oppose properly <the things> dividing <a thing> having many parts, and thus neither <is it necessary to oppose> a contrariety to a contradiction.—Or otherwise: this is not valid to the question, since no opposition of these can denominate all these dividing <things>; nor is some <thing> in itself in comparison to another in one sense divided into contrariety and relative op-

31. Cf. *supra*, nn. 7-16.

32. *Metaphysics*, Bk. X, Ch. 8 (1058a 10).

33. Cf. *supra*, n. 7.

position in this division, although all <things> are said <to be> dispartes, and so contraries <taken> metaphorically.

29. Nevertheless it must be understood that the division of opposition into these is absolutely a division of an utterance into its significations. But opposition taken in one sensed is divided into contrariety and relative opposition, as a genus <is divided> into its species; similarly, taken in another sense it is general. Therefore, <the things> dividing it in each sense are opposites, as contrariety and relative opposition are perhaps contraries, by speaking of contrariety taken metaphorically, which is a differentia according to species; but it is not necessary for <the things> dividing opposition in one sense to be opposed to <the things> dividing <it> in another sense.

30. To the <second argument>,³⁴ I say that the division of opposition is into these intentions, so that one member of these does not follow another, since it does not follow <that> “these are contraries; therefore, these are contradictories.” But the implication is between those <things> which subsist, as it follows “<something is> white and black; therefore, <it is> white and non-white”; and into those there is not a division except accidentally (*per accidens*).

31. Against this: by speaking of intentions, all <oppositions> are relative opposites, since a contradictory is said to be a contradictory to the contradictory, and a contrary <is said to be> a contrary to the contrary, and so <it is> of the others.

Response: a contradictory is a relative <opposite> accidentally (*per accidens*), as a man is white; a contradiction, however, is not a relative opposition. The division of opposition, however, is thus: into abstract <opposition> or into concrete <opposition>, taken essentially, not for every thing that can denominate, since then “qualified” would not be divided into denominatives of its species, since those can be predicated of the same <thing> and of each other mutually, although accidentally (*per accidens*).

32. To the third <argument>,³⁵ I say that relatives are not relative opposites except in comparison to the same <thing>. And

34. Cf. *supra*, n. 8.

35. Cf. *supra*, n. 9.

so they cannot be inferred from themselves <when they are> posited in comparison to diverse terms, although absolute relatives can be inferred. In what manner the reasoning of Aristotle about large and small is valid, however, was said above.³⁶

33. Against this: in the beginning of this chapter,³⁷ where he gives the differentia between contraries and relative opposites, Aristotle says that in relative opposites one <thing> in itself is said to another, and <this is> not <so> in contraries.³⁸ And he says the same <thing>, when he assigns a differentia between a relative opposition and a contrary <opposition> and <between> two relatives taken in comparison to the same <thing>, so that “the father of this” and “the son of this” are not said <in respect> of each other, but they are taken absolutely. Therefore, he understands relative opposites to be relatives absolutely.

To this it can be said that in relative opposites there are two <things>: an opposition and an added relation. By reason of the opposition it is necessary that opposites are accepted in comparison to the same <thing>, since, to be taken in comparison to the same <thing> is generally <true> for all opposites.³⁹ By reason of the differentia added to the opposition, which is a relation, it is necessary that those <opposites>, according to which there is an opposition, be referred to each other.

35. Therefore, the saying of Aristotle⁴⁰ must be understood of those forms among which there is an opposition, since those are referred to each other, since in this, opposite forms differ here from the opposite forms in the other genera of opposition. Nevertheless, in all <these> it is necessary for opposites to be referred to the same <thing>.⁴¹ And therefore Aristotle, when he ought to have distinguished this opposition from others, did not posit this condition <to be taken in comparison to

36. Cf. supra, q. 24, nn. 16-24.

37. *Categories*, Ch. 10 (11b 32-35).

38. Knowledge and the knowable are opposed to one another as relative opposites; since knowledge is of the knowable, the knowable is related to knowledge. In contrast, good and bad are opposed to one another as contraries, since the good is not the good of the bad, but rather good is opposed to bad.

39. Cf. supra, nn. 6, 33.

40. Cf. supra, n. 33.

41. Cf. supra, nn. 6, 33.

the same thing>, but that <condition, i.e., to be referred to each other> in which this <opposition> is distinguished from others.

36. To the <fourth argument>,⁴² one can say that in privative opposites, the implication does not hold in itself <i.e., directly> except in comparison to the proximate subject.⁴³ For example: if it follows “man is seeing; therefore, man is sensing,” it does not follow by the same order in privative opposites “man is blind; therefore, man is insensible.” Since if it did—since it would further follow that “therefore, man is non-sensible” from the affirmative of a privative predicate to the affirmative of an indefinite predicate according to Aristotle and Boethius in Bk. II of *On Interpretation*⁴⁴ and according to Aristotle in Bk. I of the *Prior Analytics*,⁴⁵ and further it would follow that “<man> is non-sensible; therefore, man is not sensible” according to those <authors> where <it was said> previously—it would ultimately follow, from first to last, that “<man> is blind; therefore, <man> is not sensible,” where it is manifestly a fallacy of the consequent.

37. Nevertheless, the saying of Aristotle in Bk. II of the *Topics*⁴⁶ can be understood of a proximate subject of an inferior habit and its privation. As perhaps if it follows “an eye is seeing; therefore, an eye is sensing,” similarly it follows that “an eye is blind (or a man is blind with respect to his eye); therefore, an eye (or a man with respect to his eye) is insensible.” The reason for the difference (*differentiae*) is because “a privation is the negation of a habit <in something> that is apt by nature <to have it>.”⁴⁷ The negation, however, of an absolutely superior habit or <a habit> in a remote subject does not follow the negation of an absolutely inferior <habit> or <a habit> in a remote subject, but <this> is a fallacy of the consequent from the proposition having more causes of truth than one (*ad unum*). Nevertheless

42. Cf. supra, n. 10, et infra, n. 40.

43. Cf. supra, q. 3, n. 12. The proximate subject of sight is the faculty of seeing, whereas the remote subject is the sentient soul.

44. *On Interpretation*, Bk. II, Ch. 1 (19b5–20a 2); Boethius, *De interpr.*, [ed. secunda] Bk. IV, Ch. 10 (ed. Meiser, 279–280; PL 64, 531A–533D).

45. *Posterior Analytics*, Bk. I, Ch. 46 (51b 5–52b 34).

46. Cf. supra, n. 10.

47. *Metaphysics*, Bk. IV, Ch. 2 (1004a 14–16).

a negation of a superior habit in the same subject does follow the negation of an inferior habit in a proximate subject of this habit, since in that subject there is not a superior habit of such a nature as to come <into being>, unless <it is> because an inferior habit <exists>. Nor is it marvelous with respect to some subject that the denial of an inferior habit implies the denial of a superior habit; <and> with respect to another <it does> not, since the implication is not between simple <things> but between propositions. First, since every inference pertains to the third operation of the intellect;⁴⁸ therefore, just as the second operation of the intellect, which is composition and division, presupposes the first, which is the comprehension of the indivisible, and there is no composition except of such <indivisibles>, so the third operation presupposes the second, so that there will not be any inference in that <operation> except of composite <expressions> or divided <expressions>. Second, since every implication is reducible to a syllogism; however nothing is antecedent or consequent in a syllogism except a proposition; therefore, nothing is an extreme in an implication except such <a proposition>.

38. To the fifth <argument>,⁴⁹ one can respond as Aristotle says in Bk. X of the *Metaphysics*, in the chapter “About Intermediates,”⁵⁰ where he principally proves that the intermediate is composed from the contraries, since the intermediate is more of one extreme, less of the other. Since an intermediate <which is> said through participation participates in each extreme imperfectly and virtually, nevertheless <it participates in> neither absolutely, and therefore it is denominated from neither absolutely.

39. <To the Arguments to the Opposite>—To the first <argument> to the contrary,⁵¹ I say that, just as an essential composition is from matter and form, a quantitative composition, which is from integral parts, <is from matter and form>, and a com-

48. *On the Soul*, Bk. III, Ch. 6 (430a 26–28).

49. Cf. *supra*, n. 11.

50. *Metaphysics*, Bk. X, Ch. 7 (1057a 18–b 34).

51. Cf. *supra*, n. 12.

position according to grades of perfection <is from matter and form>, so <something constituted> through an opposite is lacking a composition (*est simplicitas*). And an opposite is a simple form by a simplicity in the first two modes of composition. But not every form is simple by a simplicity in the third mode <of opposition>, since in some same form there are diverse grades of perfection and virtue; which composition is not repugnant to the simplicity of the essence of a form.

40. To the other example about privative opposites:⁵² if this implication is conceded, "it is dissimilar to that; therefore, it is dissimilar," which seems <to be> on account of the nature (*rationem*) of a relation to the dissimilar, then it must be said that "dissimilar" taken absolutely is not opposed as a privative to "similar" <taken> absolutely, but it is necessary for each to be taken according to the same and to the same <thing>, as <something is> similar and dissimilar to the same <thing> in whiteness; and in this way these two cannot be said of the same <thing>.—Or otherwise: this implication "<this one> is dissimilar to that; therefore, <this one> is dissimilar" must be denied, since <this> consequent follows "therefore, <this one> is not similar," which does not follow the antecedent. Then to that proposition, "a relative with respect to any term implies itself absolutely," it can be conceded insofar as it is from the nature (*ratione*) of a relation; but it can be prohibited by reason of a negation when the negation is joined with a relation in the same <thing>, as it is in privative relatives, of which kind is the "dissimilar."

41. To the second proof about contraries:⁵³ if it is conceded that "a shield of this kind is colored (*coloratum*)," one can say that it does not follow that "therefore, it is white or black"; since in that consideration which is accepted, Aristotle says that it is necessary that whatever is said denominatively from a genus or <whatever> has a genus, be said denominatively from a species or that it has a species. And through this he implies <that there are> two modes of denominating in accidents—one according to being, another according to being-in—which two modes he touched upon in the beginning of Bk. II.⁵⁴ Therefore, what a

52. Cf. *supra*, nn. 10, 36–37.

53. Cf. *supra*, n. 13.

54. *Topics*, Bk. II, Ch. 1 (109a 19–26).

genus denominates, some species will denominate either according to being or according to being-in. And so it is true to concede that whiteness or blackness or an intermediate color exists in a shield, but it does not follow that "therefore, a shield is white," since in accidents it does not hold from being-in to being <simply> according to Aristotle in the beginning of Bk. II.

42. Otherwise, one can say that a shield is not colored (*coloratum*), since it is true to say that it is colored in no color; since of this universal any singular is true, since any opposite is false. Nevertheless, it must not be conceded that it is <multi>colored (*colorata*); since perhaps just as colored (*coloratum*) expresses a unity in the form and in the subject, so <multi>colored (*colorata*) expresses a plurality in each; and neither is there a unity in each, nor a plurality in each, but a unity in the subject, <and> a plurality in the accident.

43. To the <seventh argument>,⁵⁵ I say that it is not unsuitable <that> of two intentional accidents each <one> is in each <one> as in a subject. Since any intentional <being>, beyond the fact that it is a mode of understanding the other, is essentially (*per se*) intelligible. When it is a mode of understanding, it has the character (*rationem*) of an accident; when it is intelligible, it is an essence (*quid*), and it can be understood under something that is its mode of understanding, of which, nevertheless, the mode of understanding was prior. And so there can be a concept⁵⁶ and a mode of understanding (*modus intelligendi*) with respect to the same <thing>. And this is the reason why in intentional accidents the same <thing> can be predicated of itself denominatively, since the same <thing> can be a concept (*intellectum*) and a mode of understanding taken under an extraneous aspect (*ratione*); and so under extraneous aspects (*rationibus*) it can be signified in the concrete and in the abstract. So it is evident that this division is only of opposition that is in complex <terms>, since Aristotle handles the topic of opposition in one way in the work *On Interpretation*,⁵⁷ where he distin-

55. Cf. *supra*, n. 15.

56. Or "understanding" (*intellectum*).

57. *On Interpretation*, Bk. I, Ch. 6 (17a 25-37).

guishes opposition into enunciations. It is also evident of which it is a division, since primarily it is <a division> of an equivocal into its equivocates, secondarily <it is a division> of a univocal in each sense into its univocates.

[III. WHAT MUST BE NOTED ABOUT
THE DIVISION OF CONTRARIES]

44. It must be noted that of contraries, some lack an intermediate,⁵⁸ of which it is necessary for one of the two (*alterum*)⁵⁹ to be in every <thing that is> receptive <of the contraries>; others are <such that they admit of> an intermediate, of which it is not necessary for one of the two (*alterum*) to be in <something that is receptive of it>. And of the <kinds that admit of> intermediates, some have intermediates through participation, which intermediates have something of each extreme; some only have intermediates through negation. Also of those <contraries which admit of> intermediates, some have many intermediates, some only one; and some intermediates are named, some are unnamed.

45. Nevertheless, it must be understood on behalf of the second division that no <contraries that admit of> intermediates are properly said <to be> contraries, except <those> which have an intermediate through participation. For an intermediate through negation is found in all <things>, especially in contradictions; but perhaps in some contraries <that admit> of intermediates, the intermediate is not named unless <it is named> through the abnegation of the extremes, as in good and evil and similar <cases>.

46. The cause of the third and fourth division is assigned in Bk. X of the *Metaphysics* in the chapter <that begins>, "However, since one <thing> is contrary to one <thing>," etc.,⁶⁰ which is that sometimes the negations of contraries are consistent with (*cadunt super*) some one determinate <thing> of the same genus with its extremes. And then there can be one intermediate

58. Boethius, *In Topica Ciceronis*, Bk. IV (PL 64, 1119C).

59. Cf. *infra*, q. 39, nn. 2, 8.

60. *Metaphysics*, Bk. X, Ch. 5 (1055b 30–1056b 1).

<that is> named, just as the negation of a determinate greater and lesser <quantity> is consistent with <something> having the same quantity; and therefore of these there is one intermediate that is equally named. When, however, the negations of contraries are not consistent with some one <thing that is> receptive <of them>, then there is not one intermediate, but either it remains altogether unnamed, or, when the negation of the extremes is consistent with many forms of the same genus, <then there are> many intermediates <that are> named, as it is in colors.

[QUESTION THIRTY-NINE]

Whether Some Contraries Lack an Intermediate]



IT IS ASKED whether some contraries lack an intermediate.

1. It seems that <some contraries> do not <lack an intermediate>:

Since if some were such <as to lack an intermediate>, then of them there would not be any intermediate in itself; therefore, they would be contradictories. Proof of the first implication: since if there were an intermediate in itself of them, then they would admit of an intermediate. Proof of the second implication: since a contradiction is defined in this way by Aristotle in Bk. I of the *Posterior Analytics*:¹ "Contradiction is an opposition of which there is not an intermediate in itself"; therefore, those which have this definition are contradictories.

2. Second, according to Aristotle in the text,² it is necessary for contraries that lack an intermediate for one (*unum*) to be in <the thing that is> receptive <of them>; but none are such; therefore, etc. Proof of the minor: since of all contraries, when one of the two (*alterum*) is not in <a subject that is receptive of it> by nature, it <can be> argued in this way: it is not necessary that this <one> be in <the subject that is> receptive of <it>, nor is it necessary for that one <to be in the subject that is receptive of it>; therefore, neither <one> is necessarily in <a subject that is receptive of it>. Both singulars are true; therefore, the universal is also <true>, since that universal is sufficiently arrived at in-

1. *Posterior Analytics*, Bk. I, Ch. 2 (72a 12–13).

2. *Categories*, Ch. 10 (11b 38–12a 2).

ductively through the two singulars; therefore, its contradictory <i.e.>, "the other one (*alterum*) is necessarily <in the subject that is receptive of it by nature>," is false.

3. Third, it is possible—if <those things> which are <subject to them exist>—for there to be motion among contraries that lack an intermediate;³ but while it is in motion, the mobile is under neither of the terms; therefore, it is possible for the subject to be under neither of the contraries that lack an intermediate.⁴ Proof of the second proposition: first, according to Aristotle in Bk. VI of the *Physics*:⁵ while it is in motion, the mobile <thing> is partly in the terminus from which <it is moving> and partly in the terminus towards which <it is moving>. Second, since if the mobile <thing> were absolutely in the terminus from which <it is moving>, it would not be being moved; since then motion would <just> be beginning. If it were absolutely in the terminus towards which <it is moving>, again there would not be motion, since then motion would <already> be completed.

4. Fourth, if it is possible for a change to happen among contraries that lack an intermediate, as is manifest, <then> Socrates would change from <being in a state of> health to <being in a state of> sickness. Since there would be some end <or terminus> of the duration of healthiness in Socrates, let the last end <or terminus of health> be *A*, and the first end <or terminus> of the initial sickness be *B*. Thus either *B* and *A* are one instant, and then the same <thing> in one instant will be under two contraries; or there are two instants; <and> thus among those <two contraries> there is an intermediate time in which he is neither healthy nor sick. Therefore, those contraries are <such that they admit of> an intermediate, and so <it is> of all the others.

5. To the opposite is Aristotle.⁶

3. Cf. *Categories*, Ch. 10 (13a 19–20).

4. For example, odd and even are contraries that lack an intermediate. Thus, it is necessary for a number, which is the subject, to be either odd or even. When a number, however, changes (and hence is in motion) from being odd to being even, so the argument goes, it is neither odd nor even, since a thing that is in motion is between the two terms of motion.

5. *Physics*, Bk. VI, Ch. 4 (234b 10–22).

6. Cf. *supra*, n. 2.

[I. THE RESPONSE TO THE QUESTION]

6. It must be said that there are some <contraries that are> “maximally distant in the same genus, of which it is necessary for one of the two (*alterum*) to be in a <subject that is> receptive <of it>”;⁷ therefore, there are some contraries that do lack an intermediate. The implication is evident through an argument from definition (*per locum a definitione*), since, according to Aristotle, in Bk. II of the *Posterior Analytics*,⁸ the question “if it is” is not known demonstratively except through <knowing> “what it is.”

[II. TO THE PRINCIPAL ARGUMENTS]

7. To the first argument,⁹ I say that <the phrase> “there is not an intermediate in itself” can be understood in two ways: either it is a negation of a mode absolutely, or it is a mode of negation. In the first way, it pertains to contraries that lack an intermediate; in the second way, it pertains to contradictories and is posited in their definition, since only contradictories have in no way an intermediate. Therefore, in itself, it inheres in both those that do not have an intermediate, and in those which in no way have an intermediate. To have an intermediate, however, in some way pertains to all other opposites.

8. To the second <argument>,¹⁰ I concede that this proposition “it is necessary for one of two contraries that lack an intermediate to be <in a subject that is> receptive <of it>” is false from the force of the expression. And similarly <I concede that> this <proposition is false> “it is necessary for one of the two (*alterum*) contradictories to be in a subject <that is> receptive <of it>,” as “one of the two (*alterum*)” is a sign of the particular, since a particular is never true unless some singular is true. Nevertheless, for the common way of speaking, it must be understood that <the phrase> “one of the two (*alterum*)” is commonly taken <to mean> “this or that.” And this must be distinguished accord-

7. *Categories*, Ch. 6 (6a 12–19); *Metaphysics*, Bk. X, Ch. 4 (1055a 5–33).

8. *Posterior Analytics*, Bk. II, Ch. 1 (89b 28–35).

9. Cf. *supra*, n. 1.

10. Cf. *supra*, n. 2.

ing to composition and division, <as> if it were said thus "it is necessary for this or that to be in a subject." In the sense of composition, the proposition is true, and it is a proposition about a disjunctive predicate. In the sense of division, it is false, and it is so taken when <that specific> one of the two (*ly alterum*) is taken as a sign of a particular <definite one>. Aristotle understands it in the first mode, and it is commonly understood <in this way, as> when we say "it is necessary that one of two contradictories be true" and <likewise of others> of this kind; nevertheless, insofar as it brings forward the force of the expression, it is a particular proposition.

9. To the third <argument>,¹¹ I say that in the whole time motion is the subject under the prior form, and in that last terminus,¹² motion is under the posterior form, and so it is always under one of the two (*altero*).—To the first proof, I say that an accidental form, according to which there is motion, receives more and less, and according to that grade, according to which it is a terminus of motion from which, it does not remain in motion, since in the whole motion more and less is remitted. But the essence of the term "from which" always remains. And therefore the saying of Aristotle must be understood in this way: that is, the term from which it participates according to some remitted grade, and it only approaches to the term toward which.—Similarly, <a reply> is evident to the other proof, since while a subject is in the terminus from which according to that grade according to which it is a terminus from which, it does not begin to be moved. When the subject is in the terminus toward which, according to that grade according to which it is a terminus toward which, then motion is finished.

10. To the fourth <argument>,¹³ I say that it is impossible to grasp the last instant of <the state of> health or of some permanent form in a subject, in which terminus that form has existence; but the last term of duration of a preceding form is the first term of a subsequent form, in which term there is a subse-

11. Cf. *supra*, n. 3.

12. In the present paragraph both "terminus" and "term" are employed for rendering the same Latin word, *terminus*.

13. Cf. *supra*, n. 4.

quent form and not a preceding <form>, as it is determined in Bk. VIII of the *Physics*.¹⁴

[III. WHAT MUST BE NOTED ABOUT
THE OTHER MODES OF OPPOSITES]

*Indeed, privation and habit, etc.*¹⁵

11. What the special nature (*ratio*) of these opposites is must be noted, since <this mark, i.e., that “it does not happen concerning the same <thing>” pertains to other opposites <as well>. Their nature (*ratio*) is not “to happen concerning the same <thing> in a certain order,”¹⁶ since <this> does not pertain to all privative opposites unless it is understood “according to nature,” <namely, as> if some subject is of such a nature that it should have a habit <or possession> which it is said to be deprived of.¹⁷ And so perhaps it is of <all> contraries, since in all <contraries>, the subject is naturally ordered previously <to be> more perfect in the extreme than imperfect. But the general nature (*ratio*) of these opposites is that “a form and the lack of a form is in a subject that is apt by nature <to receive it>.”¹⁸ And it is principally distinguished from contraries through this, where neither extreme is only the absence of the remaining, but some positive form <is absent>.

14. *Physics*, Bk. VIII, Ch. 8 (261b 27–262a 12). For a fuller discussion, see Norman Kretzmann, *Incipit/Desinit*, in *Motion and Time, Space and Matter*, ed. P. Machamer and R. Turnbull (Columbus, OH: Ohio State University Press, 1976), 101–36; Norman Kretzmann, “Continuity, Contrariety, Contradiction, and Change,” in *Infinity and Continuity in Ancient and Medieval Philosophy*, ed. Norman Kretzmann (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1982), 270–96; and Paul Vincent Spade, “Quasi-Aristotelianism,” in *Infinity and Continuity in Ancient and Medieval Philosophy*, ed. Norman Kretzmann (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1982), 297–307.

15. *Categories*, Ch. 10 (12a 26).

16. *Categories*, Ch. 10 (12a 28–29).

17. This sentence is amended for clarification. The Latin is: *Nec est ratio eorum “feri circa idem ordine quodam,” quia non convenit omnibus privative oppositis nisi intelligatur “secundum naturam” si aliquid subiectum aptum natum sit prius natura habere habitum quam dicatur privari.*

18. *Metaphysics*, Bk. IV, Ch. 2 (1004a 14–16).

12. This implication of Aristotle,¹⁹ <i.e.>, “if to be deprived and privation were the same, they would be predicated of the same,” must also be noted: since from this it follows universally that denominative and abstract are not the same.

13. Similarly the saying that “opposition in concrete <terms> and in abstract <terms> is the same,”²⁰ must be noted.

14. On behalf of the differentia which Aristotle²¹ assigns between privative opposites and relative <opposites>, it must be noted that not all relative opposites are said reciprocally according to the same mode of referring, but only those which are essentially (*per se*) referred to each other. Therefore, that differentia is perhaps of certain <things> relative to privative opposites; but a prior differentia is more universal.²² This is valid for an understanding of the third property of relatives, which is “all relatives are said to be convertible,”²³ that is, mutually to each other, which property is true in some relatives according to the same account (*rationem*) of referring, as when each extreme is essentially (*per se*) relative to the other. In other <relatives>, however, it is not <true>, when one extreme is essentially (*per se*) referred to the other, and the other is not <referred> to it except accidentally.

15. Or otherwise one can say, insofar as it is to the question, that although not all relatives are said reciprocally, nevertheless all relative opposites are said reciprocally, since those relatives where each is not said essentially (*per se*) to the other, are not relative opposites, since they are not both in the same genus. For “knowable” is not in the genus of relation, neither as a relative nor as an essential (*per se*) relation, and so of other relatives to which others are essentially (*per se*) said and not the other way around. And according to this, this is the general differentia between relative opposites and privative <opposites>.

*Since, however, neither <privation nor possession are opposed> as contraries, etc.*²⁴

19. *Categories*, Ch. 10 (12a 40–b 1).

20. *Categories*, Ch. 10 (12b 4–5).

21. *Categories*, Ch. 10 (12b 21–25).

22. *Categories*, Ch. 10 (12b 15–21).

23. For the phrase, *omnia relativa dici ad convertentiam*, see the Wolter quotation in ch. 25, fn. 39, p. 219, *supra*. Cf. *Categories*, Ch. 7 (6b 24–27).

24. *Categories*, Ch. 10 (12b 26).

16. It must be noted that Aristotle assigns a twofold differentia between contraries and privative opposites. One, taken as if from the division of contraries, is such: "of contraries that admit of an intermediate, it is never necessary for one of the two (*alterum*) to be in <a subject that is receptive of it>,"²⁵ but of privative opposites, it is always necessary for one of the two (*alterum*) to be in <a subject> when the subject is of such a nature that it should receive it.²⁶ Therefore, privative opposites are not contraries that admit of an intermediate. "Of contraries that lack an intermediate, it is always necessary for one of the two (*alterum*) to be in <a subject that is> receptive <of it>,"²⁷ since it is the nature of the <subject> that is receptive of them always to receive them. Of privative opposites, it is not always necessary that one of the two be in <a subject that is receptive of them>, since the nature of the subject is not such as always to receive them; therefore, privative opposites are not contraries that lack an intermediate.


25. *Categories*, Ch. 10 (12b 32–33).

26. *Categories*, Ch. 10 (13a 3–8).

27. *Categories*, Ch. 10 (12b 29–30).

[QUESTION FORTY]

Whether it is Possible of Some
Contraries that One Determinate <Thing>
be in Some Subject By Nature]

N ADDITION, one member¹ is connected to this: that in both contrary <things> it sometimes happens that one extreme inheres <in a subject> by nature; which does not happen in privative <opposites>.

From this, therefore, one can ask of some contraries whether it is possible for one determinate <thing> to be in some subject by nature.

1. It seems that it does not:

Since Aristotle says in Bk. II of the *Topics*,² that if some predicate is assigned to be in some subject, <then> if the contrary of the predicate cannot be in <the subject>, neither can the case in question be in <that subject>; therefore, one determinate contrary is not in any subject.

2. Second, “contraries are of such a nature that they happen to (*circa*) the same <thing>”;³ therefore, <a contrary> is not in some <subject> unless <the subject> is of such a nature as to receive one of the two (*alterum*); therefore, neither <contrary> is determinately in <some subject by nature>.

3. Third, this is seen especially in those <examples> in which Aristotle⁴ exemplifies <his point>. For fire does not seem <to be> determinately hot, nor water cold, since an alteration pre-

1. *Categories*, Ch. 10 (12b 41–13a 2).

2. *Topics*, Bk. II, Ch. 8 (113b 15–26).

3. *Categories*, Ch. 10 (11b 37–12a 2).

4. *Categories*, Ch. 10 (12b 39–41).

cedes every generation; therefore, the alteration of fire precedes the generation of water from fire through which the qualities of water are induced. But in the whole alteration the form of fire remains, since, according to Aristotle in Bk. VIII of the *Physics*,⁵ in the whole change the subject is under the prior form; therefore, fire can remain fire and not be hot. And so <it is> of all transmutable <things> according to those qualities which they have, since generally according to contraries mutation seems capable of happening.

4. To the opposite is Aristotle.⁶

[I. THE RESPONSE TO THE QUESTION]

5. It must be said that in some extremes it is possible for one contrary to be in some subject by nature. That is evident to a lesser <extent> about contrary species in a genus, where contrariety is proper, which <species> are constituted through proper contrary differentiae, and its differentia is in each <species> determinately, so that it is impossible for the opposite <contrary differentia> to be in <the other species>.

6. Similarly, it is evident in attributes that some subject according to its nature is an essential (*per se*) principle of some attribute <that> has a contrary, the contrary of which attribute cannot be in <the subject>, since that attribute follows the form of the subject.

[II. TO THE PRINCIPAL ARGUMENTS]

7. To the first argument,⁷ I say that the consideration of Aristotle must be understood according to aptitude, not according to potency.⁸ Since if one contrary is in <a subject>, the remaining <one> is apt to be in it, nevertheless, it is not necessary that it be possible for the remaining one to be in it.

5. *Physics*, Bk. VIII, Ch. 8 (263b 9–264a 5).

6. *Categories*, Ch. 10 (12b 41–13a 2).

7. Cf. *supra*, n. 1.

8. Cf. *supra*, n. 2.

8. To the second <argument>,⁹ it must be said that that definition is true according to the general nature (*rationem*) of contraries, since insofar as it is from this <general nature> which one contrary is in, it is of such a nature for the remaining one to be in it. But it is not necessary that it be the same of certain contraries compared to every subject, except perhaps in speaking about that subject according to genus. Since some subject according to its own proper nature (*rationem*) determines to itself one contrary; this is not from the nature (*ratione*) of the contraries, nor from the nature (*ratione*) of such a genus of a subject. Perhaps this following particle is added on behalf of the species which determine to themselves some determinate contrary differentiae; because, although it is also from the part of the species and differentiae, nevertheless it is not in the species through the nature of the genus.

9. To the third <argument>,¹⁰ one can concede that the qualities of the elements are not in those <subjects> by nature nor determinately, since their substantial forms can remain under opposite qualities, as is evident <in> the alteration preceding the generation of the elements. Nevertheless, Aristotle exemplifies <his point> in these <examples>, since according to the common conception, those <qualities> seem to follow inseparably the elementary forms.

10. Or it can be said otherwise that any quality, according to some grade, is determinately in its element, and according to that <grade> it is never lost in the change, although according to the most perfect grade it can be lost, since according to that grade it does not inseparably follow the form of fire.

11. Or <it can be said> otherwise: that those qualities follow the form of fire in its most perfect being, as it does not have that <most perfect> being in change, when it tends to corruption.

9. Cf. *ibid.*

10. Cf. *supra*, n. 3.

[QUESTION FORTY-ONE

Whether From a Privation a Regression to a Habit Can Happen]

Further, in contraries it is also <possible for a change to happen into the other>.¹



ARISTOTLE posits the following difference between contraries and privative opposites. There is a mutual change between contraries, <there is> not <a mutual change> between privative opposites. Since “a change can happen from a habit to a privation”; but not the other way around.²

About this, it can be asked whether a regression can happen from a privation to a habit.

1. It seems that it can:

Since, according to Aristotle in Bk. I of the *Physics*,³ privation and form are two principles of change, so that privation is the term from which and form is the term toward which; but a change is from the term from which to the term toward which; therefore, etc.

2. Second, this is evident in an example: for darkness is privatively opposed to light, otherwise, illumination would be in an intermediate with motion and succession, which is disproved in Bk. II of *On the Soul*.⁴ The implication is evident, since one contrary is not cast off and the remaining one acquired without motion; but a regression is possible from darkness to light, as is manifest; therefore, etc.

1. *Categories*, Ch. 10 (13a 19–20).

2. *Categories*, Ch. 10 (13a 31–32).

3. *Physics*, Bk. I, Ch. 7 (191a 8–17).

4. *On the Soul*, Bk. II, Ch. 7 (418b 23–26).

3. According to Aristotle in Bk. X of the *Metaphysics*,⁵ of all contraries, one of the two includes the privative opposite of the other; and, this notwithstanding, there is a change among contraries; therefore, there is also <a change> among privative opposites.

4. To the opposite is Aristotle.⁶

[I. THE FIRST WAY]

[A. *The Response of Scotus*]

5. To that <question>, it can be said, when speaking generally about privative opposites, that it is not universally impossible for there to be a regress from privation to a habit. Since, in speaking in this way, "privation" is said to be "a lack of a form in a subject when <the subject is> of such a nature that it is apt to have it";⁷ and from such a privation it is possible for there to be a regress to a form. Therefore, that saying of Aristotle is true about some particular privation. For this reason, the first differentia⁸ that Aristotle posits between contraries and privative opposites is general. The second <differentia>⁹ is particular.

6. Therefore, to save the saying of Aristotle, "privation" is distinguished in three ways. In one way, thus: a certain <privation> is a lack of a form to which the subject is not ordered except by a mediating habit; another <privation is that> to which it is not ordered by a mediating habit. In a <second> way, thus: a certain privation is deprived of a habit according to act and according to potency; another <privation> is deprived <of a habit> only <according> to act. In a third way, thus: there is a certain privation of which the habit is in <its subject> by an innate principle, of which kind is blindness, since sight is from an intrinsic principle; there is another privation of which the habit is in <its subject> by an extrinsic principle, as darkness is in a medium.

7. Concerning privation in any of these <three> ways, Aristo-

5. *Metaphysics*, Bk. X, Ch. 4 (1055b 18–19).

6. *Categories*, Ch. 10 (13a 33–34).

7. *Metaphysics*, Bk. IV, Ch. 2 (1004a 14–16).

8. *Categories*, Ch. 10 (12b 26–13a 17).

9. *Categories*, Ch. 10 (13a 19–36).

tle understands the saying in the first way, <i.e., about the first member>, not in the second way, <i.e., not about the second member>.

Nevertheless, the first distinction seems less competent, since no subject seems to be ordered to a privation by a mediating habit. Or, if the subject is understood to be ordered to a privation by a mediating habit, <it is> so <understood> that the subject is not of such a nature as to receive a privation unless it previously receives the habit, then this is manifestly false, since someone <who has> not previously seen <anything> can be blind. Or if it is understood in this way: unless it was previously of such a nature as to receive a habit; then in this way there is no distinction, since every subject is so ordered to a privation by a mediating habit.

The reason why Aristotle understands <the saying> about the first member and not the second member, however, is manifest from the words of the distinction.

8. Why he can understand <the saying> about the first member of the third division, and not about the second <member>, is for the reason that when the habit that is <caused> by an intrinsic principle is not in <the subject>, then there is not a sufficient principle of that habit in the subject. And since the nature of <anything> changeable always tends to non-being, it is not possible for that principle to be regained in the subject, and so neither is it possible for that habit to be brought forward <again>. Therefore, if there is ever a privation of such a habit in <the subject>, it is impossible for that habit to exist subsequently in that <subject>. But when the habit is there from an extrinsic principle, as light <that is> from a luminous body is in a medium, then even though there is a privation in it at some time, it is nevertheless possible for the habit to be regained by that extrinsic <principle>.

[*B. To the Arguments of Each Part*]

9. To the arguments, it is evident that the first arguments¹⁰ proceed about privation in the first way, and the arguments to the opposite¹¹ <proceed> about privation in the other way.

10. Cf. *supra*, nn. 1–3.

11. Cf. *supra*, n. 4.

Since, as it was said,¹² that differentia is not a general <differentia> between privative opposites and contraries. For there are many opposites, where one is only a lack of the other one in <a subject that is> apt by nature <to have it>, which cannot be posited otherwise except privatively; and nevertheless they do not have this property. Take for example light and darkness, which if they were contraries, one of the two could not be expelled and the other be brought forward again without motion, and so an intermediate could not be illuminated in an instant, of which the opposite is held in Bk. II of *On the Soul*;¹³ <consider also> justice and injustice, <or> knowledge and ignorance: for it is possible for an unjust <person> to do some works of justice, since injustice does not necessitate the doing <of something> unjustly; although it inclines <that way>; and through frequently acting justly, one can acquire the habit of justice; therefore, from injustice one can be changed to justice.

[II. THE SECOND WAY]

[A. *The Response of Scotus*]

10. Otherwise, it can be said to the question that between mutual contraries there is motion properly speaking, since each <one> is some positive nature; nor can it be expelled except in time. But there is never a motion from a privation to a habit by reason of a privation, since the matter subject to privation has only the lack of a form. And with this it remains that it is disposed in the highest degree to receive the form, and so it is not necessary for that <matter> to be moved to that <habit>; but once the agent is present, it immediately receives that <form> without motion. According to this, it must be said that this differentia is universal between contraries and privative opposites.

[B. *To the Principal Arguments*]

11. To the first argument,¹⁴ it can be said that from privation, which is a principle, there is not motion, properly speaking, to a form, except when a privation is joined to a contrary.

12. Cf. supra, n. 5.

13. Cf. supra, n. 2.

14. Cf. supra, n. 1.

12. To the second <argument>,¹⁵ it is evident from those examples how there is not motion from a privation to a habit.

13. To the third <argument>:¹⁶ it does not follow that there is not motion between contraries, since there is not <motion> between privative opposites, since a more ignoble extreme of a contrariety is not only a privation of the remaining, but with this there is some positive form, and for this reason, it cannot be expelled without motion.

15. Cf. *supra*, n. 2.

16. Cf. *supra*, n. 3.

[QUESTION FORTY-TWO

Whether in a Negative <Opposition>
the Subject Stands for Being and
for Non-Being Indifferently]

Indeed, whatever <things are opposed> as an affirmation and negation, etc.¹

HERE, ARISTOTLE assigns the differentia between contradictory opposites and all other <opposites>, since in all other <opposites> it is not necessary for one extreme to be true and the other one to be false. In these, however, it is necessary: Either, since none of the other <opposites> is <such that one is> necessarily true and the other (*aliud*) is <necessarily> false; but in contradictory <opposites>, one of the two (*alterum*) is <necessarily> true, and the other (*alterum*) is <necessarily> false; and in this manner it is said of simple, contradictory <terms>. Or since none of the other opposites is true or false since it is simple; and contradictories are complex. It seems more <likely> that the second sense is understood there:² “Altogether, however, nothing is true or false <regarding> those which are said without combination.” And all others which are said “without combination” are said to be “the others,” that is, <other> than contradictories. And then it must be understood that a contradiction, of which <Aristotle> speaks here, is not only in simple <terms>, although he principally speaks here about the opposition of simple <terms>, since perhaps a contradiction is univocally found in propositions and in <simple> terms. So perhaps it is not in other oppositions, since that <one> is more intentional; for it is absolutely intentional.

1. *Categories*, Ch. 10 (13a 37–b 2).

2. *Categories*, Ch. 10 (13b 10–11).

Afterwards,³ it is added that although it is necessary for an existing subject that one of the <two> contraries that lack an intermediate to be true of that <subject>, nevertheless this is not necessary for a subject that does not exist. But in contradictories, whether the subject exists or does not exist, it is always <the case> that one of the two is true about the subject and the other one is false; since whether Socrates exists or not, this is always true, "Socrates is weak," or this <is true>, "Socrates is not weak."

About this, it is asked whether in negative <propositions>, the subject stands for being and non-being indifferently.

1. It seems that it does <stand indifferently for being and non-being>.

Since, if Socrates does not exist, this <proposition>, "Socrates is not weak," would not be true unless the subject stands for a non-being, since otherwise the sense <of the proposition> would be "Socrates, who exists, is not weak," and its contradictory, <i.e., "Socrates, who exists, is weak,"> is false, if Socrates does not exist; and so two contradictory <propositions> would simultaneously be false.⁴

2. It will be said to this <argument> that when a term supposits, not having many supposits—as a discrete term does—it is possible for such a subject to stand for non-being; but this is not possible concerning a common term.

3. Against this: <if> it is posited that no man exists, this is <still> false, "every man is weak."⁵

[1. THE RESPONSE TO THE QUESTION]

4. For the solution of this question, it is necessary to know beforehand what is signified through the term and what are its

3. Cf. *Categories*, Ch. 10 (13b 18–20).

4. The two propositions that would simultaneously be false are: "Socrates is not weak" and "Socrates is weak."

5. The argument is that if no humans existed, it would be true to say that "every man is not weak," where the subject term, "every man," is not a discrete term, or proper noun, but a common term. Hence, according to the argument, not only a proper noun, but also a common noun, must stand for a non-being.

essential supposits. Since from this <knowledge> one must conclude for what <things> the term essentially supposits for in the sentence. For in every affirmative or negative proposition, <the term> supposits for its essential supposits. And for this reason, perhaps mention will be made about this in the book *On Interpretation*,⁶ where those (discussions) are more proper.

[II. WHAT MUST BE NOTED ABOUT
THE PROPERTIES OF CONTRARIES]

[A. *Concerning the First Property*]

*Indeed, contraries, etc.*⁷

It must be noted that Aristotle posits four properties of contraries.

5. The first <property>⁸ is that “what is always contrary to good is evil, but <what is contrary> to evil is sometimes evil and sometimes good.” This must not be understood only of those forms “good” and “evil,” since those <forms> are only among themselves contrary <to one another> and evil is never <contrary> to evil by reason of the form of evil; but <it must be understood> of those things which exist under <those forms>, since sometimes that which is evil is contrary to that <other thing> which is evil. Just as it also is in propositions: sometimes that which is false is contrary to that <other proposition> which is false, since both contrary <propositions> can be simultaneously false.

[B. *Concerning the Second Property*]

6. The second <property> is:⁹ “if one of <a pair of> contraries exists, it is not necessary that the remaining one exist, so that if all <people who> existed were well, health would exist and sickness would not exist.” Or, if the forms are taken absolutely,

6. Cf. Duns Scotus, *Quaestiones super Peri Hermenias*, I, q. 5–8, nn. 49–50.

7. Cf. *Categories*, Ch. 11 (13b 36).

8. See the preceding footnote.

9. *Categories*, Ch. 11 (14a 7–8).

there would not be any contraries except in comparison to the same subject, so that <if> being healthy and being sick <were contraries> concerning Socrates, (since it is impossible for them to be in the same subject simultaneously), it would be impossible if one existed for the remaining one to exist <as well>. Perhaps the first <position> is more true, since forms among themselves are primarily contraries, since they are the greatest distance from one another in the same genus.¹⁰

7. Against this property. In <the book> *On the Heaven and the Earth*,¹¹ it is held that "If one of the contraries is in nature, the remaining <one is in nature> also." Therefore, if one <of two contraries> exists, it is necessary for the remaining one to exist.

To this <argument>, one can say that that proposition is not true of being in act but of being in act or of being in potency, and of contraries which mutually expel each other concerning the same subject. Since then, if one contrary exists, its subject exists. And if its subject exists, then the remaining contrary exists in potency, since that subject is in potency to the other contrary.

[C. Concerning the Third Property]

8. The third property¹² is that "they have the <attribute> of belonging to the same <thing, either> in species or in genus." This must be noted, since, even though one contrary is repugnant to some <other one> of the species, as gathering is to whiteness,¹³ nevertheless, those contraries have the <attribute> of belonging to the same <thing> in genus, as to color, which exists in diverse species; since in this way it is only the same in genus. And this is valid for what was said previously,¹⁴ <namely,> in what way the definition of contraries ought to be understood.

10. *Categories*, Ch. 6 (6a 12-19); *Metaphysics*, Bk. X, Ch. 4 (1055a 5-33).

11. *On The Heavens*, Bk. II, Ch. 3 (286a 23-24).

12. *Categories*, Ch. 11 (14a 15-16).

13. Cf. *supra*, q. 6, n. 10.

14. Cf. *supra*, q. 40, n. 8.

[D. Concerning the Fourth Property]

9. The fourth property¹⁵ is that “contraries are either in the same genus or in contrary genera, or are genera of other <things>”; and that must be understood about proximate genera. For contraries are always in the same primary genus, unless perhaps they are transcendent, and then they are equivocally in diverse genera, as perhaps good and evil, insofar as they are transcendent, are of this kind; however, insofar as they are accepted in <moral> habits (*moribus*), they are genera of habits (*morum*).

10. Nevertheless, it must be understood that in the primary way, namely, as good is convertible with being, nothing is said to be absolutely bad, nor are good and evil thus contrary <to one another>; but good and evil are said only in comparison to another, since it is evident that <evil> detracts from the perfection of the entity of the other.

15. *Categories*, Ch. 11 (14a 19–21).

[QUESTION FORTY-THREE

Whether Aristotle Suitably Assigns the Modes of Prior]

*One <thing> is prior to another, etc.*¹



ONCERNING this, it is asked whether Aristotle suitably assigns the modes of prior.

1. It seems that he does not:

Since, in Bk. V of the *Metaphysics*,² he assigns many more, for example, prior in place, prior according to cognition, prior according to motion and many others; therefore, etc.

2. Second, “one of the opposites is said in as many modes as the remaining one is said in”;³ but “simultaneous” is opposed to that which is “prior,” and it does not have five modes, but only three modes, according to Aristotle in the same place;⁴ therefore, etc.

3. Third, nothing is prior according to time; therefore, the first mode⁵ is unsuitably posited. Proof of the antecedent: since, according to Aristotle in Bk. V of the *Metaphysics*,⁶ “prior is what is nearer to the beginning”; but there is no beginning in time, since it is infinite, according to Aristotle in Bk. VIII of the *Physics*.⁷

4. Fourth, the second mode⁸ is unsuitably assigned. Proof:

1. *Categories*, Ch. 12 (14a 26).

2. *Metaphysics*, Bk. V, Ch. 11 (1018b 9–1019a 14).

3. *Topics*, Bk. I, Ch. 15 (106b 14–15).

4. Cf. *Categories*, Ch. 13 (14b 24–15a 12).

5. *Categories*, Ch. 12 (14a 27).

6. *Metaphysics*, Bk. V, Ch. 11 (1018b 9–11).

7. *Physics*, Bk. VIII, Ch. 1 (250a 10–15).

8. *Categories*, Ch. 12 (14a 30–31).

since an implication is between propositions, but “prior,” about which <Aristotle> speaks here, is in simple <terms>; therefore, the consequent, “from which the implication is not convertible,” ought not to be said to be prior in some mode; nevertheless, that is posited in the second mode of priority.

5. Fifth, an implication is not converted from an integral part to the whole, as is evident in the example of Aristotle, “there are two; therefore, one is and not from the converse”;⁹ therefore, an integral part is prior to the whole, in the second mode of prior. But this is false, since, according to Aristotle in Bk. VII of the *Metaphysics*,¹⁰ the whole belongs in the definition of some integral parts; but <the terms used in> defining <something> is prior to <that which is> defined, according to Aristotle in Bk. VI of the *Topics*.¹¹

6. Sixth, it seems that a part does not follow the integral whole; the opposite of which is said in the text.¹² First, since every good implication is reducible to a syllogism; but that <implication> is not <reducible to a syllogism>. Proof: since if this implication, “a house is; therefore, a wall is,” were to be reduced to a syllogism, the proposition “a house is” could not be the minor <premise>, since its predicate ought¹³ to be the predicate of the conclusion. Therefore, it would be necessary that it be the major <premise>. But “wall,” when it is directly the subject of the conclusion, is the minor term; and “house,” when it is the subject of the major <premise>, is the middle term. Therefore, it is necessary for the reduction of this implication <to a syllogism> to assume such a

9. *Categories*, Ch. 12 (14a 32–33).

10. *Metaphysics*, Bk. VII, Ch. 10 (1034b 20–1036a 25).

11. *Topics*, Bk. VI, Ch. 4 (141a 27–35).

12. *Metaphysics*, Bk. VII, Ch. 10 (1034b 20–1036a 25).

13. I have amended the Latin to make sense out of the argument. The Latin actually states that “its predicate ought *not* to be the predicate of the conclusion.” On formal grounds, the antecedent of the pronoun “it” cannot be the predicate of the minor premise, since in first-figure syllogisms, the predicate of the minor is by definition the middle term. Consequently, it is necessary to take the antecedent of the pronoun “it” to be the predicate of the statement “A house is.” If, however, existence should not be the predicate of the conclusion, then it actually should be the predicate of the minor premise, not, as the Latin text states, the predicate of the major. Here is how the syllogism should look: A house is; a wall is a house; therefore, a wall is.

minor <premise as> “a wall is a house,” and so it universally is in other integral wholes and parts. But every such minor <premise> is impossible, since, according to Aristotle in Bk. IV of the *Topics*:¹⁴ “in no way is the part predicated of the whole.”¹⁵ Therefore, every implication of this kind, holding in virtue of such a minor, is useless.—Second, since the implication, holding for somewhere, holds for everywhere. But an integral whole with respect to some predicate does not imply a part, namely, with respect to that which is greater than a part, or <with respect to that which is> composed from parts, either the being of such a figure or such <simply>. Therefore, <a whole> never implies <a part>.

7. Seventh, in the second mode, Aristotle says, “a genus is prior to the species”;¹⁶ and this is false. Proof: first, since in Bk. I of *On the Soul*,¹⁷ <Aristotle says>: “The Universal is either nothing or it is posterior.” Second, since genus and species are correlatives, according to Porphyry;¹⁸ therefore, they are simultaneous by nature.

8. Eighth, the fifth mode¹⁹ seems to be poorly posited, where a cause is said to be prior to <the thing> caused and the being of a thing <is said to be> prior to the truth of speech; since a cause and the <thing> caused are referred <to one another, and> a sign and <what is> signed are referred <to one another>; therefore, a cause and <the thing> caused are simultaneous by nature, and similarly the being of a thing that is signed, and the truth of speech that is a sign, <are simultaneous by nature>.

9. To the opposite is Aristotle.²⁰

14. *Topics*, Bk. IV, Ch. 5 (126a 27).

15. This quotation does not support the point being made. As one can see from the minor premise stated in the previous sentence, it is not the case that the part is being predicated of the whole, but the whole is being predicated of the part. Of course, as it is given, the initial syllogism is not sound, since the minor premise is false, but it can be reduced to an oblique syllogism that is sound, namely, “A house exists; a wall is a part of a house; therefore, a wall exists.”

16. *Categories*, Ch. 13 (15a 4–6).

17. *On the Soul*, Bk. I, Ch. 1 (402b 7–8).

18. *Isagoge*, Ch. “On Species” (AL I⁶ 8–9; ed. Busse, 4.5–9).

19. *Categories*, Ch. 12 (14b 12–21).

20. *Categories*, Ch. 12 (14b 22–23).

[I. THE RESPONSE TO THE QUESTION]

10. According to Aristotle, in the beginning of the chapter "On the Prior" in Bk. V of the *Metaphysics*,²¹ it must be said: in all its modes the general nature (*ratio*) of prior is to be nearer to the beginning (*principio*). Therefore, "prior" is said in as many diverse modes as the many modes of "beginning" can be taken (the distinction of which is evident in the beginning of Bk. V of the *Metaphysics*),²² and in however many modes something can be nearer to the beginning, in whatever way it is taken. But this can come to pass in many more modes than are enumerated here, as is manifest there in Bk. V <of the *Metaphysics*>. Therefore, not all the modes of prior are posited here, but as many as suffice for the question. But perhaps only the second mode, which is <when> the sequence <cannot be reversed>,²³ is here to the question; according to which mode the genus is said to be prior to the species in every single category. And perhaps the fifth <mode is here to the question>, which is in causing, since substance is the cause of all the accidents. The other three modes, which are <prior> in time, <prior> in order, and <prior> in honor, are not principally posited as what he had in mind, but so that through them the modes that he did have in mind would be principally manifested.

[II. TO THE PRINCIPAL ARGUMENTS]

11. To the first argument,²⁴ I say that in Bk. V of the *Metaphysics* "prior" is distinguished insofar as it is a differentia of being; here, however, <it is distinguished> principally insofar as it is an attribute of those which are in the genera of the categories insofar as they are considered by reason, and so taken, it has altogether diverse modes. As a result, those which are principally intended here, are omitted there, and vice versa. Therefore, I

21. *Metaphysics*, Bk. V, Ch. 11 (1018b 9-11).

22. *Metaphysics*, Bk. V, Ch. 1 (1012b 35-1013a 23).

23. The Latin has *in consequendo*. According to Aristotle, the second mode of prior is what does not reciprocate as to implication of existence.

24. Cf. *supra*, n. 1.

concede that he does not posit all the modes of prior here, nor, perhaps, those to which all <the other modes> are reducible. Nevertheless, he enumerates <the ones that are> sufficient for the question, and <he enumerates> some other <modes> for the manifestation of the others.

12. To the second <argument>,²⁵ I say that altogether “simultaneous” has as many modes as “prior” <has>. But Aristotle does not posit all of its modes, either since they can sufficiently be had through the modes of prior, or since it suffices for him to posit those modes of “simultaneous” which are to the question: they are those among which there is a mutual implication, since neither is the cause of the other; as species oppositely dividing the same genus, each of which is opposed to the second mode of prior, which is principally to the question. And after those special modes, he adds “simultaneous in time,”²⁶ so that the remaining ones can thereby become known.

13. To the other <argument>,²⁷ as Aristotle says in Bk. V of the *Metaphysics* in the chapter “Concerning the Prior,”²⁸ one can say that prior and posterior are taken in time through a comparison to <what is> signified as the present “now.” But, it is the other way around in past <events> and in future <events>: since in past <events> the <one that is> more remote from this “now” is prior, <whereas> in future <events> the one that is> nearer to this “now” is prior.

14. To the fourth <argument>,²⁹ I say that when an implication is between propositions, nevertheless it is by reason of the simple <terms>; and then that simple <term> in the consequent, by reason of which it follows the antecedent and not the other way around, is prior to that <term> in the antecedent by reason of which the antecedent implies the consequent.

15. To the fifth <argument>,³⁰ one can say that it can be conceded that every integral part, without which the whole cannot exist, is prior to the whole in the second mode of prior.³¹

25. Cf. *supra*, n. 2.

26. Cf. *supra*, n. 3.

27. Cf. *ibid.*

28. *Metaphysics*, Bk. V, Ch. 11 (1018b 15–20).

29. Cf. *supra*, n. 4.

30. Cf. *supra*, n. 5.

31. Cf. *supra*, q. 1, n. 7.

And when it is argued "some such part is defined through its whole; therefore, it is posterior to the whole," I concede that it is posterior to the whole in another mode, as perhaps in the fifth <mode>, which is in causing; but not in the second mode, which is <when> the sequence <cannot be reversed>.³² Just as a conclusion in general terms follows a special principle and not the other way around, so that "this figure has three angles" follows the <proposition> "a triangle has three angles," where the principle is prior in the fifth way, that is in causing, but that which has been caused (*principiatum*) is prior in the second way, which is <when> the sequence <cannot be reversed>.³³ Therefore, the second mode ought not to be posited prior according to nature, but according to consequence; and the fifth mode is prior according to nature or according to causality. Whence the verse:

16. Say that the prior is that which is followed in time, in order,
and in honor;

In the cause of which <things>, the fourth mode is foreign.

17. To the sixth <argument>,³⁴ one can say that the existence of an integral whole implies the existence of an integral part, <namely,> of that part without which the whole cannot exist. And so perhaps the whole implies the part with respect to those predicates which cannot be in the whole unless they are in the part, as, for example, "a house is white; therefore, the wall is white." But with respect to <those> predicates that pertain to the diversity of the whole and the part, such an implication does not hold, as, for example, it does not follow <that because> "a house is composed from such <parts>"; "therefore, also the wall <is composed from such parts>."

18. When it is argued from the reduction of such an implication to a syllogism,³⁵ it can be reduced in this way: "every thing without which a house cannot exist" or "every integral part of the house is, if a house is; a wall is <an integral part> of this kind; therefore, a wall is if a house is," by understanding the major <term> to be from a hypothetical predicate (*condicionado praedi-*

32. Cf. supra, fn. 23.

34. Cf. supra, n. 6.

33. Cf. ibid.

35. Cf. ibid.

cato) and <by understanding> the conclusion similarly, where that from which the implication holds like an enthymeme (*enthymematica*) is taken for the middle <term>.³⁶ And when it is argued that “such an implication does not hold everywhere,” it is evident that an integral whole implies the part <that is> everywhere with respect to existence, and with respect to the other predicates which do not pertain to the diversity of the whole and of the part. But it is not necessary from this that it implies itself with respect to just any predicate, just as, if “Socrates” implies a man, it is not necessary that this implication holds: “if Socrates is an individual <term>, a man is an individual <term>,” since with respect to this predicate they are extraneous. And so it is of an integral whole and part with respect to the predicate <that> pertains to the diversity of them. But the first proof is not solved; for the enthymeme stated above does not reduce to a syllogism, but it concludes with a different proposition from that enthymeme only in order. Since when it is reduced to a syllogism, it is necessary for the antecedent of the enthymeme to be another premise in the syllogism, and the consequent of the enthymeme to be the conclusion in the syllogism.

19. Therefore, one can say that it is reduced in this way: “a house is; a wall is of a house; therefore, a wall is.” Since when the predicate is said to be concluded from something through the fact that it is in another, an identity of those subjects to each other ought to be noted in the minor; at least insofar as it suffices for the inference to the conclusion. The identity, however, of an integral part to the whole that is of it, suffices for an inference <from> the “existence” that is predicated of the whole <to the existence that> is true of the part. And so it is of other predicates that cannot be in an integral whole unless <they are in> the part; nor does a variation of the middle <term> from the nominative case to an oblique case impede the form of the syllogism, as is evident according to Aristotle in Bk. I of the *Prior Analytics*.³⁷

36. The Latin for this is as follows: “*omne illud sine quo domus non potest esse*” vel “*omnis pars integralis domus est, si domus est; paries est huiusmodi; igitur paries est, si domus est,*” intelligendo maiorem esse de condicionato praedicato et conclusionem similiter, ubi sumitur pro medio illud unde tenuit consequentia enthymematica.

37. *Prior Analytics*, Bk. I, Ch. 35 (48b 10–12).

20. To the seventh <argument>,³⁸ what was said previously, from the chapter “Concerning Relation” <regarding> the fourth property <suffices>.³⁹

21. To the eighth <argument>,⁴⁰ a similar <reply suffices>. There is a variation concerning those intentions “cause” and “effect,” “sign” and “signed” and concerning those <things> which are under <them>. For intentions are essentially (*per se*) referred <to each other> and are simultaneous. But those <things> which are under them are not referred <to one another> except perhaps accidentally, and for this reason they are not simultaneous.

38. Cf. *supra*, n. 7.

39. Cf. *supra*, q. 27, nn. 10–11, 12, 21–23.

40. Cf. *supra*, n. 8.

[QUESTION FORTY-FOUR

Whether Aristotle Suitably Distinguishes the Species of Motion]

*There are six species of motion, etc.*¹



IT IS ASKED whether Aristotle suitably distinguishes the species of motion.

1. It seems that he does not.

Since those into which it is distinguished are in diverse genera, for example “alteration is in quality and augmentation is in quantity”;² therefore, nothing is univocal to them. Therefore, they are not species of motion, since everything having a species is univocal to them.

2. Second, Aristotle proves in Bk. V of the *Physics*,³ that generation is not a motion; with equal reason, neither is corruption; therefore, etc.

3. Third, Aristotle shows here⁴ that those motions are distinct, since they do not happen simultaneously to the same <thing>, of which the opposite seems <to be the case>, since alteration is always joined with augmentation. Nor is that a true objection (*instantia*) that he posits in the text concerning the square and the gnomon.⁵ For many conditions⁶ of augmentation cannot be saved there, since not every part of <something> increased is increased from such an addition. Similarly, such an

1. *Categories*, Ch. 14 (15a 14–15).

2. *Physics*, Bk. V, Ch. 2 (226a 24–33).

3. *Physics*, Bk. V, Ch. 1 (225a 26–27).

4. *Categories*, Ch. 14 (15a 15–33).

5. *Categories*, Ch. 14 (15a 29–31).

6. Cf. *On Generation and Corruption*, Bk. I, Ch. 5 (321a 18–22).

addition is only a juxtaposition, as Aristotle says in Bk. I of *On Generation*,⁷ and not an augmentation.

4. Similarly, an alteration is joined with every generation and corruption, since the substantial form is not an immediate principle of acting, but only active and passive qualities <are immediate principles of acting>; and according to them there is an alteration to which a change follows according to a substantial form, of which form those qualities are proper.

5. Fourth, everything <that has> increased occupies a greater place than it did previously, since it is greater; and “a place is equal to what is in the place”;⁸ therefore, everything <that has> increased changes place.

6. Fifth, in the genus of quality there is only one motion, namely, alteration; and in the genus of place, there is only one <motion, namely, locomotion>; therefore, there will only be one <motion> in the genus of quantity and only one in the genus of substance; therefore, there will not be <that number of motions> unless there are only four motions.

7. Also, it can be argued that in the other genera than <those> four, there is some essential (*per se*) motion. But there is a concatenation of speaking (*anxioma*).⁹ Nevertheless, this seems to hold through the one saying of Aristotle in Bk. III of the *Physics*,¹⁰ that “there are as many species of motion as there are of being”; therefore, there is motion in every genus.

8. To the opposite is Aristotle.¹¹

[I. TO THE QUESTION]

9. One can say that motion—according to that notion (*rationem*) which is assigned in Bk. III of the *Physics*,¹² that is, “the act of being in potency insofar as it is in potency”—pertains to all

7. *On Generation and Corruption*, Bk. I, Ch. 9 (327a 24–26).

8. *Physics*, Bk. IV, Ch. 4 (211a 1–2).

9. Cf. *Lexicon Latinitatis Nederlandicae Medii Aevi* (ed. J. Fuchs and O. Weijers, I, 411a): *Anxioma: concatenatio loquendi ut sophisma ut aliquod insolubilia seu aliquod problema difficile*.

10. *Physics*, Bk. III, Ch. 1 (201a 9).

11. *Categories*, Ch. 14 (15a 14–15).

12. *Physics*, Bk. III, Ch. 1 (201a 10–11).

these six <modes> equivocally, just as both the definition and the defining <words>, which are “act” and “potency,” pertain to them equivocally. But motion is taken more properly in Bk. V of the *Physics*,¹³ because “motion is from a contrary to a contrary, and it is in time.” And in that mode it is distinguished in contrast to sudden change, which is in an instant. Nor, as it is thus taken, can it be suitably divided into those six modes, but only into four of them. Therefore, it is taken here in the first mode, and so the division is suitable, as of an utterance into its significations.

[II. TO THE PRINCIPAL ARGUMENTS]

10. To the first argument,¹⁴ I say that “species” is not taken there as Porphyry¹⁵ takes it, but for a mode or a special significate, just as in that authoritative quotation of Aristotle in Bk. III of the *Physics*,¹⁶ where he says that “there are as many species of motion as there are of being.” For being does not have those as it were as proper species, but as significates.

11. To the second <argument>,¹⁷ I concede that generation and corruption are not motions as Aristotle speaks there about motion as it is distinguished from change; nevertheless, they are motions as he speaks of motion in Bk. III of the *Physics*.

12. To the third <argument>,¹⁸ I say that although those motions happen to the same <thing>—either simultaneously or by a certain order—nevertheless, they are never simultaneous, that is, to the same essential (*per se*) term; and this suffices for their distinction.—When it is argued about augmentation and alteration, I concede that every natural augmentation properly said presupposes an alteration, <and that> the augmentation in mathematics is not of this kind; but no augmentation is to that term to which there is an alteration. And it can be conceded <well> enough that the objection (*instantia*) of Aristotle is not

13. *Physics*, Bk. V, Ch. 2 (224b 27–225b 9).

14. Cf. *supra*, n. 1.

15. *Isagoge*, Ch. “On Species” (AL I⁶ 8–14; ed. Busse, 3.21–8.6).

16. Cf. *supra*, n. 3.

17. Cf. *supra*, n. 2.

18. Cf. *supra*, n. 3.

to the question about augmentation properly said, but is about juxtaposition, which is assimilated in some way to augmentation; and for such is that objection to the question.

13. When it is argued about alteration and generation,¹⁹ by conceding that an alteration precedes every generation, it does not follow that this is essentially (*per se*) to the same term, since an alteration is essentially (*per se*) to a quality, a generation is <essentially> to a substantial form.

14. When it is argued about augmentation and change of place,²⁰ I concede that <what has> increased occupies a greater place than previously, but nevertheless it does not change the place according to the whole. Therefore, since the whole does not have another place, for this reason it is not said to be moved according to place. Or if it is conceded that it is moved according to place, the change of place and augmentation are essentially (*per se*) to diverse terms.

15. To the sixth <argument>,²¹ I say that in the genus of quantity there is one motion in genus, just as in the genus of quality and in the genus of place; but it is not named in genus but only in its proximate species, which are augmentation and diminution. And it must be said similarly about generation and corruption.

16. To the seventh <argument>,²² I say that motion properly is only in three genera, namely, in quantity, quality, and place, as it is distinguished in contrast to sudden change, as it is proved in Bk. V of the *Physics*.²³

17. When it is argued to the contrary "there are as many species of motion as there are of being,"²⁴ the Commentator adds²⁵ "having been acquired through motion." And that proposition, thus particularly taken, is universal enough to the question of Aristotle there. And only things of those three genera are essentially (*per se*) acquired through motion properly said.

19. Cf. *supra*, n. 4.

21. Cf. *supra*, n. 6.

23. *Physics*, Bk. V, Ch. 2 (225b 6–9).

24. Cf. *supra*, n. 7.

25. Averroës, *Physics*, Bk. III, com. 5 (ed. Iuntina, IV f. 41va).

20. Cf. *supra*, n. 5.

22. Cf. *supra*, n. 7.

18. Likewise, one can argue that he distinguishes motion unsuitably here, since motion is a natural attribute, and so it does not pertain to the logician.

19. To this, one can respond that motion, insofar as its principle is natural matter or form, or insofar as it comes from the principles of a natural body as an attribute from the principles of its subject, pertains to the consideration of the natural <philosopher>. But insofar as there is anything transcending <that is> discovered in the diverse genera through reduction insofar as it is to the things of the diverse genera, so it pertains to the consideration of the logician who considers the most general <genera>.

[III. WHAT MUST BE NOTED
ABOUT MOTION AND REST]

*There is, however, absolutely, etc.*²⁶

20. It must be noted that there are as many species of rest as there are of motion. And by taking both as they differ in the same genus, they are opposed <to one another> privatively. A specific rest, however, is opposed privatively to a specific motion: that is not motion which is in the term to which, since "that is well-being and a perfection";²⁷ but that which is in a term from which, as rest in blackness is privatively opposed to the act of making white. On the other hand, however, motion that is to a contrary term, is contrary to the motion to the one term; and rest in the other contrary is contrary to rest in the one contrary, so that a specific motion has another motion for its contrary, and <it has> rest for a privative opposite. Similarly, rest has another rest for its contrary, and <it has> a motion for its privative opposite. Because if someone were to posit that rest is contrary to motion, it will not be possible to avoid <something that is> untenable, namely, that many <things will be> contrary to the same univocal <thing>, which is contrary to Aristotle in Bk. I of

26. *Categories*, Ch. 14 (15b 1–5).

27. *On the Soul*, Bk. II, Ch. 11 (417b 2–16).

the *Topics*²⁸ and in Bk. X of the *Metaphysics*.²⁹ It is not unsuitable, however, for one to be contrary and the other to be opposed privatively to the same <thing>.

[IV. WHAT MUST BE NOTED ABOUT "HAVING"]

*To have, however, is said in many modes, etc.*³⁰

21. It must be noted that in however many modes something is said to be in another, it can be said in as many modes that one <thing> has the other which is in it. But, even though eight modes of "to have" are posited here and eight modes of "being in" <are posited> in Bk. IV of the *Physics*,³¹ they are not the same, nor, perhaps, are all these reducible to those, nor vice versa.

22. Nevertheless, it must be understood on behalf of this distinction that just as all genera of accidents are equivocally in substance, so substance has them equivocally. Therefore, Aristotle³² posits two primary modes, by which substance is said to have quality or quantity, and two other <modes> concerning the tenth category, which is having (*habitus*), as to have those <things> which "are concerning the body according to the whole or according to the part"³³—through those four modes of the primary genera of accidents and of the last genera, giving <us> to understand the other modes of "to have" according to the other intermediate genera. And he adds four other modes of "to have," for example, a part, a content, a possession, and a cohabitant, through which the other prior modes can become known. Nor does he enumerate all the modes of "to have," but <only> the best known, and especially concerning the number of those that are to the question.

23. On behalf of all these, it must be noted concerning the

28. *Topics*, Bk. I, Ch. 7 (113a 23).

29. *Metaphysics*, Bk. X, Ch. 4 (1055a 20–24).

30. *Categories*, Ch. 15 (15b 17–32).

31. *Physics*, Bk. IV, Ch. 3 (210a 14–24).

32. *Categories*, Ch. 15 (15a 17–30).

33. Cf. *Liber sex principiorum*, Ch. 7, n. 74.

equivocation of "having," that it has four primary senses which are said to be prior,³⁴ and as it is taken in the fourth sense, it has this whole distinction.

24. It must be noted on behalf of the third mode,³⁵ that having (*habitus*), as it is a most general <genus>, is not had, as it says in Bk. V of the *Metaphysics*,³⁶ since then there would be a process *ad infinitum*, but it is an intermediate relation (*habitudō*) between having and being adjacent to a body, which are had through that habit <or having> (*habitus*). For if a habit (*habitus*), as it is the most general <genus>, were to be had, this would be through another habit; and with equal reason, that <habit> would be had through another, and there would be an infinite <number> of beings. This is untenable, since then there would be no first being—the opposite of which is proved in Bk. II of the *Metaphysics*,³⁷ and in some way it is persuaded in the end of Bk. XII of the *Metaphysics*,³⁸ thus: "beings do not wish to be poorly disposed; 'however, there is no good in a plurality of rulers; therefore, there is one ruler,'" who is God, blessed for ever and ever. Amen.

34. Cf. supra, n. 22; cf. also supra, q. 30–36, n. 39.

35. Cf. supra, n. 22.

36. *Metaphysics*, Bk. V, Ch. 20 (1022b 9–10).

37. *Metaphysics*, Bk. II, Ch. 2 (994a 1–b 30).

38. *Metaphysics*, Bk. XII, Ch. 10 (1076a 3–4). Homer, *Iliad*, Bk. II, l. 204.

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