

Summa Theologica III q60. What is a sacrament?

[From the *Summa Theologica* of Saint Thomas Aquinas as translated by the Fathers of the English Dominican Province, and from the works of Blessed John Duns Scotus as selected and arranged by Jerome of Montefortino and as translated by Peter L.P. Simpson. Texts are taken from the *Opus Oxoniense* and the *Reportata Parisiensis* of the Wadding edition of Scotus' works.]

Article 1. Whether a sacrament is a kind of sign?

Aquinas

Objection 1. It seems that a sacrament is not a kind of sign. For sacrament appears to be derived from “sacring” [sacrando; just as medicament, from “medicando” [healing]. But this seems to be of the nature of a cause rather than of a sign. Therefore a sacrament is a kind of cause rather than a kind of sign.

Objection 2. Further, sacrament seems to signify something hidden, according to *Tobias* 12:7: “It is good to hide the secret [sacramentum] of a king”; and *Eph.* 3:9: “What is the dispensation of the mystery [sacramenti] which hath been hidden from eternity in God.” But that which is hidden, seems foreign to the nature of a sign; for “a sign is that which conveys something else to the mind, besides the species which it impresses on the senses,” as Augustine explains (*De Doctr. Christ.* ii). Therefore it seems that a sacrament is not a kind of sign.

Objection 3. Further, an oath is sometimes called a sacrament: for it is written in the *Decretals* (*Caus.* xxii, qu. 5): “Children who have not attained the use of reason must not be obliged to swear: and whoever has foresworn himself once, must no more be a witness, nor be allowed to take a sacrament,” i.e. an oath. But an oath is not a kind of sign, therefore it seems that a sacrament is not a kind of sign.

Scotus [*Oxon.* 4 d.1 q.2; *Report.* ib.]

Objection 1. It seems that a sacrament is not a kind of sign. [*Oxon.* 4 d.1 q.2 n.4] Sacraments are instituted by God so that they might cause grace in the soul of those worthy to receive them; but a cause is not, with respect to its proper effect, in the class of signs; therefore a sacrament is not in the class of signs.

Objection 2. [*ib.*] If a sacrament were in the class of signs it would be in the class of signs that signify conventionally and not naturally; but signs of this sort do not have formal existence except as respects of reason; therefore a sacrament would be some respect of reason; but that is plainly false because a sacrament consists of real matter and form and its effect, namely grace, is equally real.

Objection 3. According to the Master of the *Sentences* (4 d.1 lit.B), a sacrament is “the visible form of an invisible grace”; but a visible form is not in the class of signs, because it is not a respect of reason as the relation of a sign is; therefore a sacrament does not belong to the class of signs.

On the contrary [*Oxon.* *ib.*, n.1], Augustine says (*De Civ. Dei* x.5) “a sacrament is a sign of a sacred thing.”

I answer that a sacrament must be said to be in the class of signs. [*ib.* n.4] For whatever God is able to do he can also do

On the contrary, Augustine says (*De Civ. Dei* x): “The visible sacrifice is the sacrament, i.e. the sacred sign, of the invisible sacrifice.”

I answer that, All things that are ordained to one, even in different ways, can be denominated from it: thus, from health which is in an animal, not only is the animal said to be healthy through being the subject of health: but medicine also is said to be healthy through producing health; diet through preserving it; and urine, through being a sign of health.

Consequently, a thing may be called a “sacrament,” either from having a certain hidden sanctity, and in this sense a sacrament is a “sacred secret”; or from having some relationship to this sanctity, which relationship may be that of a cause, or of a sign or of any other relation. But now we are speaking of sacraments in a special sense, as implying the habitude of sign: and in this way a sacrament is a kind of sign.

Reply to Objection 1. Because medicine is an efficient cause of health, consequently whatever things are denominated from medicine are to be referred to some first active cause: so that a medicament implies a certain causality. But sanctity from which a sacrament is denominated, is not there taken as an efficient cause, but rather as a formal or a final cause. Therefore it does not follow that a sacrament need always imply causality.

Reply to Objection 2. This argument considers sacrament in the sense of a “sacred secret.” Now not only God’s but also the king’s secret is said to be sacred and to be a sacrament: because according to the ancients, whatever it was unlawful to lay violent hands on was said to be holy or sacrosanct, such as the city walls, and persons of high rank. Consequently those

through a sign imposed by him to signify it; but a sign, as Augustine says (*De Doctr. Christ.* 2.1), “is that which conveys something else to the mind, besides the species which it impresses on the senses.” God could therefore impose and institute some sensible sign to signify an invisible effect created by him for the salvation of the human wayfarer. And just as we are accustomed to impose signs to signify our effects, as a promise to signify a future effect and an assertion to signify a past or present one, so much more so can God too institute a sign, whether commemorative of what was an effect of the past, or predictive with respect to the future, or finally demonstrative to signify present effects. Further, it is possible for God to determine himself so to cooperate with some sign he has instituted that it should at once cause the effect signified, unless some indisposition on the part of the one to whom the sign is applied gets in the way. Moreover, the sign, with which, when instituting, he disposed himself to cooperate as a regular matter, is to be called a true and certain sign, in contradistinction to an uncertain or equivocal sign where the thing signified or its opposite can equally follow. Properly, however, it is to be called an efficacious sign because, once it is applied, the effect, as far as the sign itself is concerned, follows without fail. There is no repugnance in such a sign embracing within itself many sensibles, even of different senses. For just as, in order to signify the divine perfection, which is the Essence the most simple, we can institute the prayer “God is infinitely perfect” which is composed of many audible syllables, so we can institute things such that several objects of hearing and seeing should together signify what we have conceived, as that several definite words along with a handshake or a kiss should signify an act of

secrets, whether Divine or human, which it is unlawful to violate by making them known to anybody whatever, are called “sacred secrets or sacraments.”

Reply to Objection 3. Even an oath has a certain relation to sacred things, in so far as it consists in calling a sacred thing to witness. And in this sense it is called a sacrament: not in the sense in which we speak of sacraments now; the word “sacrament” being thus used not equivocally but analogically, i.e. by reason of a different relation to the one thing, viz. something sacred.

good will or friendship. Since, therefore, a sacrament is something made up, by divine institution, of things and words, along with the promise of assisting and cooperating with it—unless there is some indisposition on the part of those employing it—and of causing an invisible effect, namely grace for the salvation of the human wayfarer, a sacrament is assuredly in the class of signs; and it will signify the grace by which, as by a salutary and celestial medicine, the wounds of the human wayfarer may be healed. A sacrament is, therefore, “a sensible sign efficaciously signifying, by divine institution, the grace of God or his gratuitous effect, and ordered to the salvation of the human wayfarer.”

Reply to Objection 1. [*Oxon. ib.*, q.4 n.5] A sacrament does not cause grace but signifies grace caused by God in view of the merits of Christ; because [*Report.* 4 d.1 q.2 n.5] therefore God wished to use those visible and sensible things to signify an invisible effect caused by himself, properly and truly a sacrament is in the class of signs.

Reply to Objection 2. I concede that the matter and form of the sacraments are something real, and that the grace too that is caused by God upon their application is real; yet nevertheless a sacrament is formally a sign and imports that respect of reason to the grace signified. Not that it signifies precisely that respect of reason in the abstract, but rather in the concrete, in which sense it includes matter and form. But because [*Oxon. ib.* d.1 q.2 n.4] it signifies grace not of itself but by divine institution, that is why formally a sacrament is a sign, or a respect of reason connoting matter and form, upon whose positing and application God of his free determination causes grace, unless there is some indisposition in the one to whom it is applied.

Reply to Objection 3. [*Oxon. ib.* n.10] I say that the term “visible form” in the Master’s definition has the same import as the term “sensible sign”, just as a statue of Hercules is a sensible sign representing Hercules. But the term “visible” seems to be put in place of the term “sensible”, insofar as sight is more excellent among the senses and is cognizant of more differences. So in that more excellent sense all the senses were understood by the Master to be included, just as if he had said “sensible form.”

Scotus again on Article 1. Whether a sacrament is a kind of sign?

Scotus [Oxon. 4 d.1 q.2; Report. ib.]

Objection 1. It seems that a sacrament cannot at all belong to the class of signs. For a sign [*Oxon. ib. n.1; Report. ib. n.6*] is, formally, a respect of reason; but this sort of respect cannot be based but in one foundation; therefore, since a sacrament consists of things and words, which do not make something one per se, there will be several foundations; and consequently they will not base a sign's single respect of reason, just as a real relation too cannot have but one foundation by which it is specified.

Objection 2. The Master says, (*Sent. 4. d.1 c.2*): “Thus is a sacrament an invisible form of grace, that it might bear its likeness and be its cause;” but what bears another’s likeness such that it is also its cause cannot be called a sign of the same except improperly; therefore a sacrament, from the Master’s sentence, is not a sign.

On the Contrary, [*Oxon. ib.*] Augustine says (*De Civit. Dei 10.5*) a sacrament “is a sign of a sacred thing”; therefore it belongs to the class of signs.

I answer that, [*Oxon. ib. n.5*] A sacrament does not only belong in some way or other to the class of signs, but it is itself a sign formally and essentially; although it does, by the by, connote several things obliquely, on account of the arrangement whereby all logical objects formally and essentially mean a respect of reason, or a second intention, but not an abstract one, rather one that keeps in view the first intention. One must note, however, that just as we cannot prove that a spoken sound signifies this or that thing but must suppose this to be so because the common use of the same sound shows that that is how it has been instituted, so we cannot prove the meaning of the name *sacrament* but have to suppose and take what is commonly understood by that name. And because theologians commonly understand by *sacrament* a certain efficacious sign instituted by Christ the Lord signifying grace given by God to those who use the sacraments for their salvation, we cannot prove that meaning of the name, but we may well make clear whether that could be its proper definition.

Since, then, [*Oxon. ib. n.2ff.*] a definition is “a formula signifying a true being” (*ITopics 4*), it follows that nothing can be truly defined unless it is a positive being, one per se – in case it be composite – , and not singular; for singularity does not belong to the ‘what it is to be’ of a thing. Whatever, therefore, does not have true real being cannot be defined in a true definition. So, for that reason, since a sacrament is not anything but a certain sign significant by divine institution and is not per se one, it cannot have a true definition. But since whatever can be conceived and signified can be the idea for the name, because, that is, it declares distinctly and explicitly what the name imports implicitly and confusedly, any such declarative idea can be called a definition, taking the name of definition in an extended sense. In this sense, [*Oxon. ib. n.5*] it is not incongruous for sacrament to have a proper definition, unless the idea of the name be in itself false or impossible or altogether not one. But when it is said that a sacrament is *a sensible sign efficaciously signifying, by divine institution, the grace of God or a gratuitous effect of God ordered to the salvation*

of the human wayfarer, the idea is not itself false, because the parts are not mutually contradictory; nor is it impossible, because nothing is impossible except that whose idea is in itself false. Nor does its not being per se one cause a problem; [Oxon. ib. n.6] for if one accident is in several subjects, that accident can nevertheless be as properly definable as if it were in one subject; because those several subjects do not belong per se to its idea but are related by way of supplement; but in the aforesaid definition that which is spoken of as *sensible* is as it were an addition to the respect of the sign; therefore, even though in the *sensible* there be no unity, because a one is not fused together from the things and the words, yet because it exists by respect to the sign, which is what the sacrament directly states, it will be properly definable in its way. For that [Oxon. ib. n.7] which is the being of the sign, and also those things which per se determine the idea of the sign, of which sort are *by divine institution* and *efficaciously*, is the formal part in the aforesaid idea. But *sensible* and *gratuitous effect of God* are supplementary, the first as the subject and foundation and the second as correlative; and that is why they do not prevent the relation from being per se definable, just as *conventional efficacious sign* means for the intellect something per se one, as does the idea of *relation of paternity*, which would be equally as definable if it were in many foundations as if it be in one only. Further, *sign by institution* is not a relation which follows by nature the foundation of the thing; for although a sign be of itself fit to signify the effect indicated, yet the actual indicating does not belong to it except by the act of the one imposing it; *sign*, therefore, says the respect precisely of reason. Since, therefore, it says one concept that is per se in the mind, it can well be defined, in the way that all logical intentions are defined, to the extent that those definitions suffice for science properly speaking, otherwise logic would not be a science. And in definitions of this sort are found genus, difference, and property. So, with respect to the topic at hand, *sign* is the genus in the aforesaid notification of the name; *by institution* and *efficacious* are the difference; for a sacrament differs from natural and inefficacious signs; but *sensible* is the foundation of the relation; while *grace* or *gratuitous effect of God* are put there as correlative. And this idea is common to all the sacraments, because all of them signify habitual and inherent grace, or the gratuitous effect of God, as with the sacrament of the Eucharist. This idea of the name, therefore, is the definition; for the idea [Oxon. ib. n.9] that a name signifies is its definition, according to the Philosopher (*Meta.* 4 text. 28). And the reason for that is because the name is imposed to signify the essence of the thing; therefore the idea that expresses distinctly and in its parts what is said by the name distinctly expresses the concept of the thing's essence.

Reply to Objection 1. I concede [Oxon. ib. n.11] that the foundation of that relation includes several things out of which something that is per se one is not made; but I deny that a sacrament, as far as its formal idea is concerned, is not per se one. And when the contrary is argued about real relations – although this may be doubtful, because perhaps when many are pulling one ship there is a single relation of the pullers to the single thing pulled – yet in relations of reason the proposition is manifestly false; because things as diverse as you like can come together in the foundation of one relation of reason; for all that is necessary is that those several things be conceived as one in their order to something signified, as *circle covered with leaves of ivy placed on a cross* can signify *good wine*.

Reply to Objection 2. I reply that the Master is not here to be held to unless he be suitably expounded. For the things and words of which the sacraments are composed can have nothing of supernatural grace in them; nor again can they in any way carry before them the likeness of grace; therefore we do not think that they have any causality with respect to the invisible effect, except a moral one (as will be clear in q62 a1).

Article 2. Whether every sign of a holy thing is a sacrament?

Aquinas

Objection 1. It seems that not every sign of a sacred thing is a sacrament. For all sensible creatures are signs of sacred things; according to *Rm.* 1:20: “The invisible things of God are clearly seen being understood by the things that are made.” And yet all sensible things cannot be called sacraments. Therefore not every sign of a sacred thing is a sacrament.

Objection 2. Further, whatever was done under the Old Law was a figure of Christ Who is the “Holy of Holies” (*Daniel* 9:24), according to *1 Cor.* 10:11: “All (these) things happened to them in figure”; and *Col.* 2:17: “Which are a shadow of things to come, but the body is Christ’s.” And yet not all that was done by the Fathers of the Old Testament, not even all the ceremonies of the Law, were sacraments, but only in certain special cases, as stated in I-II, 101, 4. Therefore it seems that not every sign of a sacred thing is a sacrament.

Objection 3. Further, even in the New Testament many things are done in sign of some sacred thing; yet they are not called sacraments; such as sprinkling with holy water, the consecration of an altar, and such like. Therefore not every sign of a sacred thing is a sacrament.

On the contrary, A definition is convertible with the thing defined. Now some define a

Scotus [Oxon. 4 d.1 q.3]

Objection 1. [*Oxon. 4 d.1 q.3*] It seems that any sign of a sacred thing is a sacrament. For the definition and the thing defined are convertible; therefore since a sacrament is “a sign of a sacred thing”, as Augustine says (*De Civ. Dei* x.10), therefore every sign of a sacred thing will also be equally a sacrament.

Objection 2. In every law there are several sacred signs from whose use the way of salvation is opened to men; for God never left the human race without a remedy against original sin; but those sacred signs were plainly sacraments, that is, things signifying grace by the institution of God, and moreover they were efficient of grace in those who used such signs; therefore every sign of a sacred thing is a sacrament.

On the Contrary, [*Oxon. ib. d.3 q.4 n.19*] in the Old Law there were innumerable signs of divine things, as is clear from all the sacrifices and purifications and the immolation of the Paschal Lamb, and the other ceremonies, which were altogether signs of sacred things; for the purifications signified purification from sin, the immolation of the Paschal Lamb signified the death of Christ, and the sacrifices signified acts of worship of God; but those signs were nevertheless not sacraments; therefore not every sign of a sacred thing is a sacrament.

sacrament as being “the sign of a sacred thing”; moreover, this is clear from the passage quoted above (a1) from Augustine. Therefore it seems that every sign of a sacred thing is a sacrament.

I answer that, Signs are given to men, to whom it is proper to discover the unknown by means of the known. Consequently a sacrament properly so called is that which is the sign of some sacred thing pertaining to man; so that properly speaking a sacrament, as considered by us now, is defined as being the “sign of a holy thing so far as it makes men holy.”

Reply to Objection 1. Sensible creatures signify something holy, viz. Divine wisdom and goodness inasmuch as these are holy in themselves; but not inasmuch as we are made holy by them. Therefore they cannot be called sacraments as we understand sacraments now.

Reply to Objection 2. Some things pertaining to the Old Testament signified the holiness of Christ considered as holy in Himself. Others signified His holiness considered as the cause of our holiness; thus the sacrifice of the Paschal Lamb signified Christ’s Sacrifice whereby we are made holy: and such like are properly styled sacraments of the Old Law.

Reply to Objection 3. Names are given to things considered in reference to their end and state of completeness. Now a disposition is not an end, whereas perfection is. Consequently things that signify disposition to holiness are not called sacraments, and with regard to these the objection is verified: only those are called sacraments which signify the perfection of holiness in man.

I answer that not every sign of a sacred thing is a sacrament; for a sacrament is not just any sign but a sign efficaciously signifying the grace given by God, in view of the merits of Christ, to the one who makes use of the sign. Not that the grace that is in any way given to men is not bestowed by God because of Christ, for all who accept grace participate in Christ’s fullness; but because the efficacy for signifying grace that the sacraments have they have from the merits of Christ, [*Oxon. ib. d.1 q.6 n.10ff.*], so that God should infallibly cause grace without fail when those signs are put in operation, even if there is no awareness of it, as in children, and provided no barrier is put in the way, as in adults. But for every other grace which God bestows on men there is required a good interior motive whereby they are moved mediately or immediately towards God, although, to be sure, they do not, in this way, merit the initial grace, but rather an increase in grace. Now the signs of sacred things in the Old Law were not at all sacraments (circumcision excepted), unless the word be taken improperly and in a broad sense, because they did not confer grace in the way in which the sacraments are said to confer it, that is, as the saying goes, by the work worked (*ex opere operato*); rather they only conferred grace by way of the merit or work of the worker (*ex opere operantis*), insofar as, from charity and obedience, people kept the precepts of God about ceremonies and purgations and oblations and so merited thereby increase of grace, just as, by transgressing those commands, they became guilty of sin.

Reply to Objection 1. I reply that Augustine was not speaking of sacraments properly so called, which is what we are now talking about, but about sacrifices. That is why, defining a sacrifice, he says

“Therefore a sacrifice is a visible sacrament of an invisible sacrifice, that is, it is a sacred sign.” [Oxon. ib. d.1 q.3 n.8] Therefore those offerings of victims in the sacrifices of the Old Law were sacraments, that is, certain visible signs indeed, but signs secretly and obscurely signifying Christ the true victim and Priest, through whom the anger of God towards the human race was to be placated. But not for that reason did those sacraments, by virtue of those signs, efficaciously and infallibly cause grace, as the sacraments of the New Law do, but only, as was said, by way of merit. Therefore, just as a sacrament is not just any sign of a sacred thing, but rather one that efficaciously signifies the grace of God for the salvation of the human wayfarer, so not every sign of a sacred thing will be a sacrament, except speaking of sacraments improperly. And besides in any law there was some such sacrament improperly speaking, as were, in the law of nature, genuflections and bowings and prostrations on the ground, which can generally be said to be sacred signs but sacraments improperly, for the reason stated.

Reply to Objection 2. If there really was some sign instituted by God in the law of nature through whose use original sin was destroyed, just as it was cleansed by circumcision in the law of Moses, I concede that such signs would have been sacraments as we are here speaking of sacraments (following the account of sacrament given in the preceding article), because such signs signified grace *ex opere operato*. But that is not a reason that any other signs of sacred things which there may be should properly be called sacraments, although to those using them increase of grace was given by way of merit, as has been explained in the preceding.

Article 3. Whether a sacrament is a sign of one thing only?

Aquinas

Objection 1. It seems that a sacrament is a sign of one thing only. For that which signifies many things is an ambiguous sign, and consequently occasions deception: this is clearly seen in equivocal words. But all deception should be removed from the Christian religion, according to *Col. 2:8*: “Beware lest any man cheat you by philosophy and vain deceit.” Therefore it seems that a sacrament is not a sign of several things.

Objection 2. Further, as stated above (a2), a sacrament signifies a holy thing in so far as it makes man holy. But there is only one cause of man’s holiness, viz. the blood of Christ; according to *Heb. 13:12*: “Jesus, that He might sanctify the people by His

Scotus [Oxon. 4 d.1 q.2; d.2 q.1]

Objection 1. It seems that a sacrament is a sign of one thing only. For, from what was said in article 1, a sacrament is a sign that is true, certain and efficacious, in the sense that is not uncertain or equivocal; but if it were to signify several things it would be uncertain and equivocal, for which effect among the many was particularly meant would not be known, or at any rate there would be doubt which was the first and principal meaning and which the less principal; therefore if a sacrament is a true and efficacious sign, it can be significative of one thing only.

Objection 2. The meaning of a sacrament is nothing other than the grace of God or his gratuitous effect, as was said in the

own blood, suffered without the gate.” Therefore it seems that a sacrament does not signify several things.

Objection 3. Further, it has been said above (a2, ad 3) that a sacrament signifies properly the very end of sanctification. Now the end of sanctification is eternal life, according to *Rm. 6:22*: “You have your fruit unto sanctification, and the end life everlasting.” Therefore it seems that the sacraments signify one thing only, viz. eternal life.

On the contrary, In the Sacrament of the Altar, two things are signified, viz. Christ’s true body, and Christ’s mystical body; as Augustine says (*Liber Sent. Prosper.*).

I answer that, As stated above (a2) a sacrament properly speaking is that which is ordained to signify our sanctification. In which three things may be considered; viz. the very cause of our sanctification, which is Christ’s passion; the form of our sanctification, which is grace and the virtues; and the ultimate end of our sanctification, which is eternal life. And all these are signified by the sacraments. Consequently a sacrament is a sign that is both a reminder of the past, i.e. the passion of Christ; and an indication of that which is effected in us by Christ’s passion, i.e. grace; and a prognostic, that is, a foretelling of future glory.

Reply to Objection 1. Then is a sign ambiguous and the occasion of deception, when it signifies many things not ordained to one another. But when it signifies many things inasmuch as, through being mutually ordained, they form one thing, then the sign is not ambiguous but certain: thus this word “man” signifies the soul and body inasmuch as together they form the human nature. In this way a sacrament signifies the

preceding; but the effect that is thus signified is a unique and single thing, whereby men who worthily use that sign are sanctified; therefore a sacrament is not a sign save of one thing only.

Objection 3. Sacraments cannot be commemorative signs but at most demonstrative ones of the effect which they contain and cause; therefore they can only signify a single thing. *Proof of the assumption:* for the sacraments were instituted by Christ while he was living his mortal life; therefore if they had been applied and made use of then (as it is written that Baptism was), grace would certainly have been given through them; but then they could least of all have been commemorative signs of Christ’s passion, which of course had not yet been made to be present; therefore sacraments are not of themselves signs save demonstrative ones of the effect which they contain.

Objection 4. [*Oxon. ib. d.2 q.1*] All the sacraments were instituted by Christ the Lord and have their efficacy through the merits of the same, for God bestows grace in view of the merits of Christ on those who worthily receive the sacraments; therefore the sacraments will be above all significative of that thing, namely the merits of Christ, through which those signs are true and efficacious.

On the contrary, [*Oxon. ib. n.9*] a sacrament is a sensible and efficacious sign of grace; therefore it signifies grace itself and brings back to memory that by which it has its efficacy and foretells the end of grace; therefore it is significative of several things.

I answer that [*Oxon. ib. 3 d.19*] sacraments confer grace as a matter of rule on those to whom they are applied unless one’s own

three things aforesaid, inasmuch as by being in a certain order they are one thing.

Reply to Objection 2. Since a sacrament signifies that which sanctifies, it must needs signify the effect, which is implied in the sanctifying cause as such.

Reply to Objection 3. It is enough for a sacrament that it signify that perfection which consists in the form, nor is it necessary that it should signify only that perfection which is the end.

in an ordered way the passion of Christ from which they took their efficacy and certainty. And because, lastly, the state in which those sacraments were instituted is the most perfect of all preceding states, and its law the most perfect, to which, of course, no other is to succeed, according to the remark in *Matt 26*, “of the New and Eternal Testament”. For on that testament follows the most perfect and best state, to which the human wayfarer is ordained, namely the state of eternal beatitude. Of that glory of eternal happiness too the sacraments can be also predictive signs, and [*Oxon. ib. n.9*] they are not only demonstrative of the grace conferred through them—insofar, that is, as a predictive sign is taken not only for something signified by priority of duration, in which sense the sacraments signify heavenly glory, but also for a sign of priority of nature, in which sense they precede grace as a cause is said to precede its effect.

Reply to Objection 1. The sacraments are not ambiguous and uncertain signs because they do not signify all the things they signify first and equally, but only in the order expounded in the Answer.

Reply to Objection 2. This is clear from what has been said, because they are demonstrative signs of grace and commemorative signs of Christ’s passion, from which they took their efficacy.

Reply to Objection 3. I say that the sacraments before the passion of Christ had a lesser efficacy than after the display of it, because the state of final beatitude was not to follow then and there on the grace then conferred; for the opening of the gates was kept back for the actual displaying of the passion of Christ. So the sacraments were then true and most certain signs of grace, but because that efficacy was lacking to them which was to accrue to them from the passion of Christ, they could not be commemorative signs of his passion as already displayed but as yet to come; but they seem to have been predictive signs of the future passion.

indisposition stands in the way; but that grace was not to be conferred on men after the fall unless a cause that merited it, namely Christ handing himself over to death, had reconciled God to us and had justly inclined him to confer gifts of grace on those for whom Christ offered himself. Sacraments therefore are signs commemorative of that meritorious cause or of the presentation of the passion of Christ, insofar as by that and through that they have their efficacy. [*Oxon. 4 d.2 q.1 a.2ff.*] For they cannot be signs demonstrative of the grace conferred without importing the efficacy and certainty of the infusion of it, and consequently they also involve and signify

Reply to Question 4. This is evident from what has been said in the Answer.

Article 4. Whether a sacrament is always something sensible?

Aquinas

Objection 1. It seems that a sacrament is not always something sensible. Because, according to the Philosopher (*Prior. Anal.* ii), every effect is a sign of its cause. But just as there are some sensible effects, so are there some intelligible effects; thus science is the effect of a demonstration. Therefore not every sign is sensible. Now all that is required for a sacrament is something that is a sign of some sacred thing, inasmuch as thereby man is sanctified, as stated above (a2). Therefore something sensible is not required for a sacrament.

Objection 2. Further, sacraments belong to the kingdom of God and the Divine worship. But sensible things do not seem to belong to the Divine worship: for we are told (*John 4:24*) that “God is a spirit; and they that adore Him, must adore Him in spirit and in truth”; and (*Romans 14:17*) that “the kingdom of God is not meat and drink.” Therefore sensible things are not required for the sacraments.

Objection 3. Further. Augustine says (*De Lib. Arb.* ii) that “sensible things are goods of least account, since without them man can live aright.” But the sacraments are necessary for man’s salvation, as we shall show farther on (61, 1): so that man cannot live aright without them. Therefore sensible things are not required for the sacraments.

On the contrary, Augustine says (*Tract. lxxx super Joan.*): “The word is added to the element and this becomes a sacrament”;

Scotus [Oxon. 4 d.1 q.3]

Objection 1. It does not seem fitting that a sacrament is always found in sensible things, [*Oxon. ib. n.3*] for God is neither cause to men of erring, nor does he directly give them occasion thereof; but man’s salvation being located in sensibles seems to be put forward as a direct occasion of erring, namely of believing that something divine exists in sensibles and consequently of committing idolatry; therefore God ought not to have instituted something sensible such that in it or through something similar salvation was to be sought.

Objection 2. In the law of nature the sacrament instituted by God as a remedy for original sin was not any sensible thing; therefore it was much less fitting for sacraments in the law of the Gospel to be instituted in sensible signs; for in this law we have a more explicit doctrine about supernal things than there was in the law of nature. *The assumption is therefore proved:* for Gregory (*Moral. 4*) is witness that “what the water of Baptism does among us, that faith alone did for children among the ancients.” Therefore in the law of nature the sacrament necessary for salvation was not instituted in any sensible thing.

Objection 3. [*Oxon. ib. d.7 q.1 n.3*] Christ justified Magdalene and many others apart from use of sacraments; he also confirmed the apostles without the sacrament of confirmation; therefore it was not necessary for the sacraments to be instituted in sensible things, since the effect of the same could be obtained without

and he is speaking there of water which is a sensible element. Therefore sensible things are required for the sacraments.

I answer that, Divine wisdom provides for each thing according to its mode; hence it is written (*Wisdom* 8:1) that “she . . . ordereth all things sweetly”: wherefore also we are told (*Matthew* 25:15) that she “gave to everyone according to his proper ability.” Now it is part of man’s nature to acquire knowledge of the intelligible from the sensible. But a sign is that by means of which one attains to the knowledge of something else. Consequently, since the sacred things which are signified by the sacraments, are the spiritual and intelligible goods by means of which man is sanctified, it follows that the sacramental signs consist in sensible things: just as in the Divine Scriptures spiritual things are set before us under the guise of things sensible. And hence it is that sensible things are required for the sacraments; as Dionysius also proves in his book on the heavenly hierarchy (*Coel. Hier.* i).

Reply to Objection 1. The name and definition of a thing is taken principally from that which belongs to a thing primarily and essentially: and not from that which belongs to it through something else. Now a sensible effect being the primary and direct object of man’s knowledge (since all our knowledge springs from the senses) by its very nature leads to the knowledge of something else: whereas intelligible effects are not such as to be able to lead us to the knowledge of something else, except in so far as they are manifested by some other thing, i.e. by certain sensibles. It is for this reason that the name sign is given primarily and principally to things which are offered to the senses; hence Augustine says (*De Doctr. Christ.* ii) that a sign “is that which conveys

them.

On the contrary, [Oxon. ib. d.1 q.3 n.1] Augustine says (*Contra Faustum* 19), “into no name of religion can men be gathered together unless they be bound by association in certain signs as if in visible sacraments.” Therefore it was suitable and almost necessary for sacraments to be instituted in sensible things.

I answer that it was fitting for God to have instituted sacraments in sensible things. [Oxon. ib. n.2] I say ‘fitting’ because the necessity of sacraments cannot be proved either *a priori* or *a posteriori*, as from their end. For the will of God, which is the cause of this institution, does everything outside itself freely and contingently, and there were not lacking any number of other means of freeing the human race besides the passion of Christ and the institution of sacraments; and God was absolutely able to cause grace and confer it on men independently of every visible sign. But that it was done in an especially fitting way can be made clear: for it was most agreeable that an invisible effect, such as grace is, that was to be caused by God directing man to eternal salvation, be signified by some sensible sign; for thereby it happens that the wayfarer, who is seeking knowledge of intelligibles from sensibles, comes more certainly to know that invisible effect. Nor was it proper that such a sign be a theoretical one, whereby, that is, the intellect might have a concept about a signified invisible effect, in the way that the term ‘man’ signifies human nature; for it was necessary that there exist a quasi practical sign, whereby, of course, it would be signified that an invisible effect is in existence or is coming about. Again, neither was it necessary that the practical sign be doubtful or equivocal or uncertain; because although through it a man might be

something else to the mind, besides the species which it impresses on the senses.” But intelligible effects do not partake of the nature of a sign except in so far as they are pointed out by certain signs. And in this way, too, certain things which are not sensible are termed sacraments as it were, in so far as they are signified by certain sensible things, of which we shall treat further on (63, 1, ad 2; 3, ad 2; 73, 6; 74, 1, ad 3).

Reply to Objection 2. Sensible things considered in their own nature do not belong to the worship or kingdom of God: but considered only as signs of spiritual things in which the kingdom of God consists.

Reply to Objection 3. Augustine speaks there of sensible things, considered in their nature; but not as employed to signify spiritual things, which are the highest goods.

applying the sign to receive the grace. Accordingly it was fitting for the invisible effect to be signified by a practical sensible sign that was certain with certainty for the most part, that is, always – unless the indisposition of the one taking it up gets in the way; and that would be by the sign naturally preceding the coming to be of the thing signified so that, in this way, the taking up of the sign would be as it were a disposition for the thing signified, and so that in no other way would the sign be efficacious unless it had all those conditions. A sacrament, lastly, ought to be by divine institution because nothing sensible naturally has the efficacy of causing an invisible effect. And thus it was most agreeable that a sacrament be instituted in sensible signs, on account of its causing in the wayfarer knowledge and desire with respect to the invisible effect, namely the divine grace, which is fit for every private person. Besides, [Oxon. ib.. n.3] there is another fittingness on the part of the whole community taken from Augustine quoted above. For it is fitting for all wayfarers of one way to communicate in some exterior signs, by which they may also be distinguished from others of an alternative way; for it is by such signs that a man knows who is of his own way and who of a foreign one. That this is especially agreeable is established by the fact that those who recognize themselves to be of the same way mutually help each other to the following of it, and that those who recognize themselves to be of a dissimilar path mutually avoid each other as being mutually impediment to

led to the knowledge that that invisible effect was given, yet, because the sign was uncertain and doubtful, he would be rather remiss in wanting it to be applied to him; for he would be in two minds whether the thing signified had been given to him. It was therefore fitting for that invisible effect to be signified through a practical sign that was certain and efficacious, so that thereby a man might both know what was signified and ardently seek in the sign the invisible effect. Further, a sign that is certain can be such either by the certitude of demonstration or as certain for the most part (*I Post An.* c.43). The practical sign of which we are now speaking ought not to have necessary certitude, so that universally and in any way and however applied it should be infallibly followed by the effect which it signifies; for since that sign must be applied by a man, it would follow that there was in the power of man some sign upon the application of which, however done, God would infallibly cause grace. But this would take from the one who took it up the due preparation, for even the greatest indisposition would be sufficient unto itself for taking up or

each other. It is expedient that such a sign, which unites those of the same way and distinguishes them from others, be a practical one with respect to some invisible effect that pertains to the following of the way.

Reply to Objection 1. [*Oxon. ib.. n.9*] I say that from the institution of sacraments in sensible signs God did not give occasion to or was directly cause of idolatry; for he did not institute those sensible things as if in them there was or was believed to be anything divine, but he instituted them so that they might be signs certain and efficacious of an effect to be created by himself; hence also wayfarers might certainly know what was signified by them and be together directed to seeking salvation.

Reply to Objection 2. [*Oxon. ib. d.1 q.7 n.3*] I reply that Gregory did not take faith to be the mere habit of faith, nor to be only an interior act of believing, but rather when he says that in the law of nature an act of faith sufficed for the salvation of children, he understood this of an exterior sensible act of profession of faith, in which sensible act of profession of faith in the Mediator to come there could be founded the nature of a sacrament.

Reply to Objection 3. I say that the power of Christ was not tied to the sacraments nor to any sensible signs, and so he could justify and give the effect of the sacraments apart from the use of any sensible things whatever; [*Oxon. ib. d.4 q.6 n.2*] but after it pleased him to institute them as general remedies, then everyone without exception was held to the respective use of them, so that it was not permitted to attain the effect of the sacraments without their use, whether really or, when they could not be effectively taken up, in avowed desire.

Article 5. Whether determinate things are required for a sacrament?

Aquinas

Objection 1. It seems that determinate things are not required for a sacrament. For sensible things are required in sacraments for the purpose of signification, as stated above (4). But nothing hinders the same thing being signified by divers sensible things: thus in Holy Scripture God is signified metaphorically, sometimes by a stone (*2 Samuel 22:2*; *Zechariah 3:9*; *1 Corinthians 10:4*; *Apocalypse 4:3*); sometimes by a lion (*Isaiah 31:4*; *Apocalypse 5:5*); sometimes by the sun (*Isaiah 60:19-20*; *Mal. 4:2*), or by something similar. Therefore it seems that divers things can be suitable to the same

Scotus [*Oxon. 4 d.1 q.3*]

Objection 1. It seems that determinate things are not required for a sacrament. For if they were required, this would mainly be for signifying sanctifying grace with efficacious certainty; but there is nothing out of order about signifying the same grace with diverse things and in the same way; therefore determinate things are not required for a sacrament. *Proof of the minor* [*Oxon. ib. d.3 q.4 n.19*]: in the Mosaic Law the sacrifice of the Paschal Lamb signified the death of Christ, and diverse oblations also signified the same thing, namely the oblation and death of Christ; therefore the same grace could be

sacrament. Therefore determinate things are not required for the sacraments.

Objection 2. Further, the health of the soul is more necessary than that of the body. But in bodily medicines, which are ordained to the health of the body, one thing can be substituted for another which happens to be wanting. Therefore much more in the sacraments, which are spiritual remedies ordained to the health of the soul, can one thing be substituted for another when this happens to be lacking.

Objection 3. Further, it is not fitting that the salvation of men be restricted by the Divine Law: still less by the Law of Christ, Who came to save all. But in the state of the Law of nature determinate things were not required in the sacraments, but were put to that use through a vow, as appears from *Gn. 28*, where Jacob vowed that he would offer to God tithes and peace-offerings. Therefore it seems that man should not have been restricted, especially under the New Law, to the use of any determinate thing in the sacraments.

On the contrary, our Lord said (*John 3:5*): “Unless a man be born again of water and the Holy Ghost, he cannot enter into the kingdom of God.”

I answer that, In the use of the sacraments two things may be considered, namely, the worship of God, and the sanctification of man: the former of which pertains to man as referred to God, and the latter pertains to God in reference to man. Now it is not for anyone to determine that which is in the power of another, but only that which is in his own power. Since, therefore, the sanctification of man is in the power of God Who sanctifies, it is not for man to decide what things should be used for his sanctification, but this should be

signified by diverse things.

Objection 2. Determinate things would necessarily then be required in the sacraments when their effects could by no reason be obtained without the things in which the sacraments are said to have been instituted; but it is a thing established that anyone can get the effects of the sacraments without the sacraments; therefore determinate things are not necessarily required for getting the effects of the sacraments. *Proof of the minor [Oxon. ib. d.4 q.6]*: the sacraments were instituted for the salvation of the human wayfarer; but anyone can be justified (as the Scriptures narrate sometimes happened); therefore that person does not need to use and take up the sacraments, to wit of Baptism and Penance, because then he would take them up in vain.

On the contrary, a sacrament is not an equivocal but a certain sign and efficacious from its institution in signifying; therefore it is efficaciously significative of grace precisely when it is applied according to the command of the one who instituted it; therefore only determinate things are thus significative.

I answer that, the sacraments must be said to signify grace precisely in the determinate things in which they were instituted, and so determinate things are necessarily required; for no one can provide certainty with any practical sign save he in whose power it is to be able to cause what is signified by that sign; but God alone can determine Himself to causing an effect proper to Himself, namely the grace signified by the sacraments; therefore God alone could institute the sacraments; therefore if they are applied in things other than those which God prescribed when He instituted them, they will not be certain and efficacious

determined by Divine institution. Therefore in the sacraments of the New Law, by which man is sanctified according to *1 Cor.* 6:11, “You are washed, you are sanctified,” we must use those things which are determined by Divine institution.

Reply to Objection 1. Though the same thing can be signified by divers signs, yet to determine which sign must be used belongs to the signifier. Now it is God Who signifies spiritual things to us by means of the sensible things in the sacraments, and of similitudes in the Scriptures. And consequently, just as the Holy Ghost decides by what similitudes spiritual things are to be signified in certain passages of Scripture, so also must it be determined by Divine institution what things are to be employed for the purpose of signification in this or that sacrament.

Reply to Objection 2. Sensible things are endowed with natural powers conducive to the health of the body: and therefore if two of them have the same virtue, it matters not which we use. Yet they are ordained unto sanctification not through any power that they possess naturally, but only in virtue of the Divine institution. And therefore it was necessary that God should determine the sensible things to be employed in the sacraments.

Reply to Objection 3. As Augustine says (*Contra Faust.* xix), diverse sacraments suit different times; just as different times are signified by different parts of the verb, viz. present, past, and future.

Consequently, just as under the state of the Law of nature man was moved by inward instinct and without any outward law, to worship God, so also the sensible things to be employed in the worship of God were determined by inward instinct. But later on it became necessary for a law to be given

signs of grace. And although anyone under God could institute the practical sign by which is signified that God is invisibly acting and causing grace, yet the creature instituting it could not, by a sign, provide certainty of signifying it, because such a thing is not in his power; so it is one thing that a sign signifies practically what is signified, and another that the sign be certain; for anyone might use a practical sign of kindliness of heart to deceive the unwary by a wicked trick; but a sacrament is a certain and efficacious sign; therefore as often as it is not applied according to the mind of the legislator who instituted it, it is neither a certain sign nor is it a sacrament.

Reply to Objection 1. By this argument the intent of the solution is proved the more. For just as in the Old Law the same thing was signified in diverse ways by divine institution and command, so in the Law of the Gospel nothing certainly and efficaciously signifies grace save by divine institution. Even if a creature might institute some practical sign to signify the same invisible effect of God, yet because he could not provide certainty and efficacy by that sign, it could never be a sacrament nor could it be called one.

Reply to Objection 2. After the promulgation of the precept about receiving Baptism, everyone, however justified, was bound to receive it, unless it be established that he was an example from that universal law; for otherwise he would sin by not obeying the command of Christ; nor would the sign be in vain, for it would signify the grace in *existence*. But as for the sacrament of Penance, since it is a second start after shipwreck, no one is bound to have recourse to it unless he has made shipwreck by falling away from Baptismal grace – although, of course, merely venial sins are sufficient matter for Penance.

(to man) from without: both because the Law of nature had become obscured by man's sins; and in order to signify more expressly the grace of Christ, by which the human race is sanctified. And hence the need for those things to be determinate, of which men have to make use in the sacraments. Nor is the way of salvation narrowed thereby: because the things which need to be used in the sacraments, are either in everyone's possession or can be had with little trouble.

Article 6. Whether words are required for the signification of the sacraments?

Aquinas

Objection 1. It seems that words are not required for the signification of the sacraments. For Augustine says (*Contra Faust. xix*): "What else is a corporeal sacrament but a kind of visible word?" Wherefore to add words to the sensible things in the sacraments seems to be the same as to add words to words. But this is superfluous. Therefore words are not required besides the sensible things in the sacraments .

Objection 2. Further, a sacrament is some one thing, but it does not seem possible to make one thing of those that belong to different genera. Since, therefore, sensible things and words are of different genera, for sensible things are the product of nature, but words, of reason; it seems that in the sacraments, words are not required besides sensible things.

Objection 3. Further, the sacraments of the New Law succeed those of the Old Law: since "the former were instituted when the latter were abolished," as Augustine says (*Contra Faust. xix*). But no form of words was required in the sacraments of the Old Law. Therefore neither is it required in those of the New Law.

On the contrary, The Apostle says

Scotus [Oxon. 4 d.3 q.2; Report. ib.]

Objection 1. It seems that words are not required in the signification of sacraments. For a sacrament is a sign that is per se one (from a1 above); but [*Oxon. ib. d.1 q.2 n.1*] a sign that is per se one cannot be made from things and words, for the former are something permanent and the latter something successive; therefore words are not required in the signification of sacraments.

Objection 2. [*Oxon. ib. d.1 q.6 n.1*] Baptism is the successor to circumcision, because what circumcision presented in the Law of Moses is effected by Baptism in the Law of the Gospel; but in carrying out circumcision no words are said to have been pronounced; therefore it is not necessary to use words in the conferring of Baptism so that it should present its effect.

Objection 3. If sacraments necessarily consisted of words, they would not be signs efficacious and certain; but this would destroy the nature of the sacraments of Christ; therefore they do not necessarily consist of words. *Proof of the consequence:* for words themselves, since they are successive, that is, are pronounced in succession, can never be so adapted to the permanence of things that a single sign could be formed from them. *Example:* in

(*Ephesians* 5:25-26): “Christ loved the Church, and delivered Himself up for it; that He might sanctify it, cleansing it by the laver of water in the word of life.” And Augustine says (*Tract. xxx in Joan.*): “The word is added to the element, and this becomes a sacrament.”

I answer that, The sacraments, as stated above (aa2,3), are employed as signs for man’s sanctification. Consequently they can be considered in three ways: and in each way it is fitting for words to be added to the sensible signs. For in the first place they can be considered in regard to the cause of sanctification, which is the Word incarnate: to Whom the sacraments have a certain conformity, in that the word is joined to the sensible sign, just as in the mystery of Incarnation the Word of God is united to sensible flesh.

Secondly, sacraments may be considered on the part of man who is sanctified, and who is composed of soul and body: to whom the sacramental remedy is adjusted, since it touches the body through the sensible element, and the soul through faith in the words. Hence Augustine says (*Tract. lxxx in Joan.*) on *John* 15:3, “Now you are clean by reason of the word,” etc.:

“Whence hath water this so great virtue, to touch the body and wash the heart, but by the word doing it, not because it is spoken, but because it is believed?”

Thirdly, a sacrament may be considered on the part of the sacramental signification. Now Augustine says (*De Doctr. Christ.* ii) that “words are the principal signs used by men”; because words can be formed in various ways for the purpose of signifying various mental concepts, so that we are able to express our thoughts with greater distinctness by means of words. And therefore in order to insure the perfection

the conferring of Baptism, the washing or the pouring of water on children happens before the words are spoken.

On the contrary, [*Oxon. ib. d.6 q.3 n.1*] Augustine says (*Tract. viii in Joan.*): “The word is added to the element, and this becomes a sacrament.” Therefore, just as things are required for the signification of the sacraments, so also are words.

I answer that, It must be said that in the signification of sacraments words are required. For [*Oxon. ib. d.3 q.2 n.3*] although a sacrament formally denotes the respect of reason of a sign to the thing signified, and in such a way that whatever precedes such respect should be as it were its foundation, nevertheless [*Report. ib. n.2ff.*] of the several things necessarily prerequisite for a sacrament’s signifying grace, words seem to be the more principal; for, as Augustine says (*De Doctr. Christ. ch.1*) “Words possess among men the principal part in signifying.” Therefore words seem to have the nature of form as regards the things that are necessary for a sacrament, both because they are determinative of the things, namely because they presuppose those very things, and because they are more spiritual than things, just as what is audible is more spiritual than what is visible. So, comparing the things to the words, things have the nature of matter and words the nature of form; therefore if things are required in the signification of sacraments much more are words required as well, because they are more significative than the things are, and because a thing of any sort is more a whole in the way it is ordered by form than by matter, albeit it is necessarily ordered by both.

Reply to Objection 1. The response is clear from the end of article 1, because the minor

of sacramental signification it was necessary to determine the signification of the sensible things by means of certain words. For water may signify both a cleansing by reason of its humidity, and refreshment by reason of its being cool: but when we say, "I baptize thee," it is clear that we use water in Baptism in order to signify a spiritual cleansing.

Reply to Objection 1. The sensible elements of the sacraments are called words by way of a certain likeness, in so far as they partake of a certain significative power, which resides principally in the very words, as stated above. Consequently it is not a superfluous repetition to add words to the visible element in the sacraments; because one determines the other, as stated above.

Reply to Objection 2. Although words and other sensible things are not in the same genus, considered in their natures, yet have they something in common as to the thing signified by them: which is more perfectly done in words than in other things.

Wherefore in the sacraments, words and things, like form and matter, combine in the formation of one thing, in so far as the signification of things is completed by means of words, as above stated. And under words are comprised also sensible actions, such as cleansing and anointing and such like: because they have a like signification with the things.

Reply to Objection 3. As Augustine says (*Contra Faust.* xix), the sacraments of things present should be different from sacraments of things to come. Now the sacraments of the Old Law foretold the coming of Christ. Consequently they did not signify Christ so clearly as the sacraments of the New Law, which flow from Christ Himself, and have a certain likeness to

premise proceeds according to what is per se one physically and not according to what is per se one by institution; for there is no repugnancy in anyone taking up, so as to signify some effect whether of himself or of another, several completely diverse things having no common agreement between them; and thus it is in the present case of words and things determined by divine institution for the certain and efficacious signification of sacraments.

Reply to Objection 2. I reply in one way as follows: [*Oxon.* 4 d.2 q.1 n.2] the fact that the sacraments of the New Testament consist of words expressly signifying an invisible effect has respect to their singular perfection, because of which they excel the sacraments of the Old Law – supposing it did not belong to the latter, from their institution, to consist of words. Besides, [*Oxon. ib.* d.1 q.7] it seems likely that the latter also were conferred with the pronouncement of certain words, by which faith in the Mediator was professed, just as was said above (a4 ad2) about sacrifices in the law of nature.

Reply to Objection 3. I say [*Oxon. ib.* d.1 q.7] that it is altogether necessary for the validity of the sacraments that the words should be simultaneous with the things, not with mathematical or indivisible simultaneity (which could scarcely be secured), but with the sort of moral simultaneity required in all other human acts. But, in human acts, things are then judged to be simultaneous, or simultaneity is then judged to exist between the deed and the word of a human being, if one begins before the other is altogether finished.

Him, as stated above. Nevertheless in the Old Law, certain words were used in things pertaining to the worship of God, both by the priests, who were the ministers of those sacraments, according to *Num.* 6:23,24: “Thus shall you bless the children of Israel, and you shall say to them: The Lord bless thee,” etc.; and by those who made use of those sacraments, according to *Dt.* 26:3: “I profess this day before the Lord thy God,” etc.

Article 7. Whether determinate words are required in the sacraments?

Aquinas

Objection 1. It seems that determinate words are not required in the sacraments. For as the Philosopher says (*Peri Herm.* i), “words are not the same for all.” But salvation, which is sought through the sacraments, is the same for all. Therefore determinate words are not required in the sacraments.

Objection 2. Further, words are required in the sacraments forasmuch as they are the principal means of signification, as stated above (6). But it happens that various words mean the same. Therefore determinate words are not required in the sacraments.

Objection 3. Further, corruption of anything changes its species. But some corrupt the pronunciation of words, and yet it is not credible that the sacramental effect is hindered thereby; else unlettered men and stammerers, in conferring sacraments, would frequently do so invalidly. Therefore it seems that determinate words are not required in the sacraments.

On the contrary, our Lord used determinate words in consecrating the sacrament of the Eucharist, when He said (*Matthew* 26:26): “This is My Body.” Likewise He commanded His disciples to baptize under a form of determinate words, saying (*Matthew* 28:19): “Go ye and teach all nations, baptizing them in the name of the

Scotus [Oxon. 4 d.3 q.2; Report. ib.]

Objection 1. It seems that determinate words are not required in the sacraments. For among diverse nations the words themselves are diverse; but diverse nations can use the same sacraments; therefore determinate words are not required for the truth of the sacraments.

Objection 2. [*Oxon. ib. n.1*] The sacrament of Baptism itself is conferred in different words and under a different form by Greeks and Latins; and yet both the former and the latter truly baptize; therefore determinate words are not required. *The assumption is clear*, for the Latins baptize under this form: “I baptize you in the name of the Father and of the Son and of the Holy Spirit,” while the Greeks speak as follows: “May the servant of Christ be baptized in the name of the Father and of the Son and of the Holy Spirit,” therefore etc.

On the contrary, [*Oxon. ib. n.7*] Christ instituted the sacraments of Baptism and the Eucharist under determinate words, as is clear in the last chapter of the *Gospel of Matthew* and in chapter 26, therefore it is altogether necessary for the validity of the sacraments to use determinate words.

I answer that, Determinate words are required for the truth of the sacraments, namely those in which they were instituted by the Savior – assuming, that is (from the

Father, and of the Son, and of the Holy Ghost."

I answer that, As stated above (a6, ad 2), in the sacraments the words are as the form, and sensible things are as the matter. Now in all things composed of matter and form, the determining principle is on the part of the form, which is as it were the end and terminus of the matter. Consequently for the being of a thing the need of a determinate form is prior to the need of determinate matter: for determinate matter is needed that it may be adapted to the determinate form. Since, therefore, in the sacraments determinate sensible things are required, which are as the sacramental matter, much more is there need in them of a determinate form of words.

Reply to Objection 1. As Augustine says (*Tract. lxxx super Joan.*), the word operates in the sacraments "not because it is spoken," i.e. not by the outward sound of the voice, "but because it is believed" in accordance with the sense of the words which is held by faith. And this sense is indeed the same for all, though the same words as to their sound be not used by all. Consequently no matter in what language this sense is expressed, the sacrament is complete.

Reply to Objection 2. Although it happens in every language that various words signify the same thing, yet one of those words is that which those who speak that language use principally and more commonly to signify that particular thing: and this is the word which should be used for the sacramental signification. So also among sensible things, that one is used for the sacramental signification which is most commonly employed for the action by which the sacramental effect is signified: thus water is most commonly used by men

previous article), that words have the nature of form with respect to the things which are used, by divine institution, for the sacraments. For it is proper for matter to be first according to origin and to be determined, just as it is proper for form to follow and to determine; and so whenever words follow on things and determine them and are, in addition, more principal and actual in signifying, it is an established fact that the words have the nature of form with respect to the things, although both are meanwhile constituting and integrating a single foundation with respect to the relation of sign to the grace signified. Since therefore words have the nature of form, unless those words be used which the institutor wished to be used, the sacrament will not stand with its true form and consequently will not truly signify what he wished, when instituting it, to be signified through the form that he instituted; therefore it will not be a sacrament.

Reply to Objection 1. I say that when nations use their own languages in the conferring of true sacraments, they do not use other words except materially and in a certain respect; for their words have, as we suppose, the same signification and are taken under the same idea as are and have those words which the Latin Church uses. And this is enough, because the sacraments do not signify grace insofar as the words we use are Latin, but insofar as they signify what Christ wished to be signified; and those other words signify the very same thing; consequently they are the same simply and formally or in signifying, but diverse materially.

Reply to Objection 2. I concede that ministers in the Greek Church truly baptize, but I deny that they do not do it through the determinate words instituted by Christ. *As to the proof adduced*, I say that

for bodily cleansing, by which the spiritual cleansing is signified: and therefore water is employed as the matter of Baptism.

Reply to Objection 3. If he who corrupts the pronunciation of the sacramental words--does so on purpose, he does not seem to intend to do what the Church intends: and thus the sacrament seems to be defective. But if he do this through error or a slip of the tongue, and if he so far mispronounce the words as to deprive them of sense, the sacrament seems to be defective. This would be the case especially if the mispronunciation be in the beginning of a word, for instance, if one were to say "in nomine matris" instead of "in nomine Patris." If, however, the sense of the words be not entirely lost by this mispronunciation, the sacrament is complete. This would be the case principally if the end of a word be mispronounced; for instance, if one were to say "patrias et filias." For although the words thus mispronounced have no appointed meaning, yet we allow them an accommodated meaning corresponding to the usual forms of speech. And so, although the sensible sound is changed, yet the sense remains the same.

What has been said about the various mispronunciations of words, either at the beginning or at the end, holds forasmuch as with us a change at the beginning of a word changes the meaning, whereas a change at the end generally speaking does not effect such a change: whereas with the Greeks the sense is changed also in the beginning of words in the conjugation of verbs.

Nevertheless the principle point to observe is the extent of the corruption entailed by mispronunciation: for in either case it may be so little that it does not alter the sense of the words; or so great that it destroys it.

in the form which the Latin Church uses three things are expressed, namely the minister, the one receiving the sacrament, and the act, and that it is not necessary that the minister be expressed by any word or pronoun, as is clear from the words of Christ in the last chapter of *Matthew*: "Baptizing them in the name of the Father and of the Son and of the Holy Spirit." Therefore it is necessary that the one receiving the sacrament be expressed, but not determinately in that manner of expression which the Latin Church uses, namely the act being expressed by a verb in the indicative mood and the one receiving by a second person pronoun; but the act could be expressed by a verb in another mood, and the one receiving by the noun in a different person, since that is not determinate in the form handed down from Christ. But that phrase "in the name of the Father and of the Son and of the Holy Spirit" does precisely belong to the form of Baptism. Whenever, therefore, either the Greeks or the Latins use the same essential form, each rightly confers Baptism, even though there is a variation in the minister's expression.

But [*Oxon. ib. n.5ff.; Report. ib. n.6*] what could be the cause of the variation in the minister's expression between the Greeks and the Latins? I answer that, In the beginning, when the law about receiving Baptism was promulgated, the baptized used to make boasts, one carrying himself above another, on account of seeming to themselves to have received Baptism from a better minister, as they said: "I am of Paul, and I am of Apollos, and I am of Cephas," which was a cause of schism among them, and on that charge they are refuted by the Apostle, saying (*I Cor. 1*): "Is Christ divided?" Hence, to remove the occasion for this, it was commanded, or permitted, that the person of the minister should hardly at all be expressed and that

But it is easier for the one to happen on the part of the beginning of the words, and the other at the end.

whereby the Christian is a servant of Christ. Still, that cause lasted, a reasonable one for as long as it was tolerated by the Roman Church and for the time for which it was instituted; but with the cause ending, the common form could rationally have been imposed on them. So either the Roman Church did prohibit that formula as far as they were concerned, and in that case they sin by keeping to it (but this is not found expressly in any chapter that makes special mention of them); or if the Roman Church permitted or conceded that formula, it seems licit for them to continue with it; and if, while that permission or license remains in effect, they have ordained in their particular councils that such a formula is to be kept to among them, it seems that their minister is obliged to keep to it.

Article 8. Whether it is lawful to add anything to the words in which the sacramental form consists?

Aquinas

Objection 1. It seems that it is not lawful to add anything to the words in which the sacramental form consists. For these sacramental words are not of less importance than are the words of Holy Scripture. But it is not lawful to add anything to, or to take anything from, the words of Holy Scripture: for it is written (*Deuteronomy* 4:2): “You shall not add to the word that I speak to you, neither shall you take away from it”; and (*Apocalypse* 22:18,19): “I testify to everyone that heareth the words of the prophecy of this book: if any man shall add to these things, God shall add to him the plagues written in this book. And if any man shall take away . . . God shall take away his part out of the book of life.” Therefore it seems that neither is it lawful to add anything to, or to take anything from, the sacramental forms.

Objection 2. Further, in the sacraments

the words should be: “Let the servant of Christ be baptized etc.,” although those words could have been better ordered or expressed, because no one is a servant of Christ until he is baptized; rather he is baptized so that he might be a servant of Christ – speaking of the spiritual service

the formula was, while the above

Objection 1. It seems that the form of sacraments can undergo some variation while the validity of the same sacraments remains. For [*Oxon. ib. n.2*] Augustine says (*De Trin.* 5 c.7): “It is the same thing to be Father and to be begetter;” therefore it would be as equally valid to speak in the name of the begetter and the begotten as in the name of the Father and the Son; therefore, with the truth of the sacraments remaining, the words in which they are conferred can vary.

Objection 2. If there were necessarily need, in the conferring of the sacraments, to use determinate words, this would above all have to be followed in the sacrament of Baptism, without which there is no entry given into the kingdom of heaven; but it is established that Baptism can be validly conferred in words other than those which Christ instituted; for in *De Consecrat.* d.4,

Scotus [Oxon. 4 d.3 q.2; Report. ib.]

words are by way of form, as stated above (6, ad 2; 7). But any addition or subtraction in forms changes the species, as also in numbers (*Metaph.* viii). Therefore it seems that if anything be added to or subtracted from a sacramental form, it will not be the same sacrament.

Objection 3. Further, just as the sacramental form demands a certain number of words, so does it require that these words should be pronounced in a certain order and without interruption. If therefore, the sacrament is not rendered invalid by addition or subtraction of words, in like manner it seems that neither is it, if the words be pronounced in a different order or with interruptions.

On the contrary, Certain words are inserted by some in the sacramental forms, which are not inserted by others: thus the Latins baptize under this form: ‘I baptize thee in the name of the Father, and of the Son, and of the Holy Ghost’; whereas the Greeks use the following form: ‘The servant of God, N . . . is baptized in the name of the Father,’ etc. Yet both confer the sacrament validly. Therefore it is lawful to add something to, or to take something from, the sacramental forms.

I answer that, With regard to all the variations that may occur in the sacramental forms, two points seem to call for our attention. one is on the part of the person who says the words, and whose intention is essential to the sacrament, as will be explained further on (q64, a8). Wherefore if he intends by such addition or suppression to perform a rite other from that which is recognized by the Church, it seems that the sacrament is invalid: because he seems not to intend to do what the Church does.

the chapter headed *By a certain Jew*, it is determined that those whom a certain Jew had baptized in the name of the Holy Trinity were not to be rebaptized; but Christ commanded to be baptized in the name of the Father and of the Son and of the Holy Spirit.

Objection 3. After the institution of the form of the sacraments by Christ Baptism was validly conferred in the Church under another form; therefore the words in which the form of the sacraments is said to consist do not need necessarily to be kept. *Proof of the assumption:* for [Oxon. ib. n.9] in *Acts* 2.10, 19 we read that the apostles conferred Baptism in the name of Christ; therefore it is not necessary to keep to the form: “In the name of the Father and of the Son and of the Holy Spirit.”

On the contrary, [Oxon. ib. n.2] About Baptism and its effects: “If someone has immersed a child in water and has not said: ‘I baptize you in the name of the Father and of the Son and of the Holy Spirit, Amen,’ the child has not been baptized.”

I answer that, [Oxon. ib. n.7] According to the Philosopher (*Physics* 5, text. 7, 9, 18), change is of four kinds, namely in substance, in quantity, in quality, and in where. And so variation in the form of the sacraments can be taken in as many ways; all of them, therefore, must be talked about in order [*sc. in this and the following two additional articles*]. As regards change in substance, the form of the sacraments can be understood to vary in several ways. One way is if other words are inserted from another language but ones that signify the same as the Latin words, and in this case the variation does not prevent the sacrament from being true and truly carried out (as said in the preceding article). Or another word or words are used having a

The other point to be considered is the meaning of the words. For since in the sacraments, the words produce an effect according to the sense which they convey, as stated above (a7, ad 1), we must see whether the change of words destroys the essential sense of the words: because then the sacrament is clearly rendered invalid. Now it is clear, if any substantial part of the sacramental form be suppressed, that the essential sense of the words is destroyed; and consequently the sacrament is invalid. Wherefore Didymus says (*De Spir. Sanct. ii*): "If anyone attempt to baptize in such a way as to omit one of the aforesaid names," i.e. of the Father, Son, and Holy Ghost, "his Baptism will be invalid." But if that which is omitted be not a substantial part of the form, such an omission does not destroy the essential sense of the words, nor consequently the validity of the sacrament. Thus in the form of the Eucharist—"For this is My Body," the omission of the word "for" does not destroy the essential sense of the words, nor consequently cause the sacrament to be invalid; although perhaps he who makes the omission may sin from negligence or contempt.

Again, it is possible to add something that destroys the essential sense of the words: for instance, if one were to say: "I baptize thee in the name of the Father Who is greater, and of the Son Who is less," with which form the Arians baptized: and consequently such an addition makes the sacrament invalid. But if the addition be such as not to destroy the essential sense, the sacrament is not rendered invalid. Nor does it matter whether this addition be made at the beginning, in the middle, or at the end: For instance, if one were to say, "I baptize thee in the name of the Father Almighty, and of the only Begotten Son, and of the Holy Ghost, the Paraclete," the

different signification, and this can happen in two ways, namely: when what is signified is altogether disparate, and in that case it is clear that the sacrament cannot be carried out; or when the thing signified is altogether coincident, having the same substrate in reality, because it distinctly expresses the Three Persons as signified under other ideas, as *of the Begetter, of the Begotten, and of the Spirated*, or, lastly, insofar as those Persons are signified implicitly, whether in a collective whole as it were, as in the name *The Holy Trinity*, or as in something that introduces the persons through the correspondence of effect to cause, as would be the case if Baptism were conferred in the name of *Christ*, for this name signifies the Son according to his human nature, who is the anointed one, and makes to be understood both the Father, as the one by whom he is anointed, and the Holy Spirit, as the one in whom he is anointed.

With respect, therefore, [*Oxon. ib. n.9*] to the names signifying the Divine Persons under the idea of their properties, namely *of the Begetter and of the Begotten and of the Spirated*, and not under the idea of their being subsistents or hypostases, namely *of the Father and of the Son and of the Holy Spirit*, it must be said that the form is not preserved by those names as regards its substance, and hence the sacrament of Baptism is not at all conferred nor does it subsist under those names. *Demonstration*: the Savior wished the Persons to be called by the name of their persons and not of their properties; therefore someone using the names of the properties in place of the persons does not carry out the sacrament. But that the Savior rationally acted thus is established from the fact that, just as to the Jews a name was given signifying the Divine Essence under its proper idea, which they themselves called the name of

Baptism would be valid; and in like manner if one were to say, “I baptize thee in the name of the Father, and of the Son, and of the Holy Ghost”; and may the Blessed Virgin succour thee, the Baptism would be valid.

Perhaps, however, if one were to say, “I baptize thee in the name of the Father, and of the Son, and of the Holy Ghost, and of the Blessed Virgin Mary,” the Baptism would be void; because it is written (*1 Corinthians 1:13*): “Was Paul crucified for you or were you baptized in the name of Paul?” But this is true if the intention be to baptize in the name of the Blessed Virgin as in the name of the Trinity, by which Baptism is consecrated: for such a sense would be contrary to faith, and would therefore render the sacrament invalid: whereas if the addition, “and in the name of the Blessed Virgin” be understood, not as if the name of the Blessed Virgin effected anything in Baptism, but as intimating that her intercession may help the person baptized to preserve the Baptismal grace, then the sacrament is not rendered void.

Reply to Objection 1. It is not lawful to add anything to the words of Holy Scripture as regards the sense; but many words are added by Doctors by way of explanation of the Holy Scriptures. Nevertheless, it is not lawful to add even words to Holy Scripture as though such words were a part thereof, for this would amount to forgery. It would amount to the same if anyone were to pretend that something is essential to a sacramental form, which is not so.

Reply to Objection 2. Words belong to a sacramental form by reason of the sense signified by them. Consequently any addition or suppression of words which does not add to or take from the essential sense, does not destroy the essence of the

God, namely the *Tetragrammaton*, so Christ gave to the Church names signifying the Persons under their proper ideas. But even if He had not made or not given such names, it is nevertheless provable that the name of the person has, in any invocation, an effectiveness which the name of the property of the person does not have. It is just as if someone were to ask for some gift from someone in the name of or for the love of John – he would attain his request more quickly and surely than if, in place of the proper name, a name was put that signified a property of the supposit, by asking for the love of the son of Zebedee.

But as far as concerns the name of the Trinity, it is clear from the last chapter of *Matthew* that Christ enjoined that the Divine Persons be distinctly expressed; but in the name of the Trinity they are introduced only implicitly; therefore someone conferring Baptism in the name of the Trinity does not effect anything.

Reply to Objection 1. [*Oxon. ib. n.15*] To the argument from Augustine I reply that Begetter and Father are the same in that they are said with relation to another or introduce the property of the same person; but they are not the same as regards the concept that is first signified in each case, for Father signifies primarily and per se a supposit in the divine nature and Begetter signifies primarily and per se the property; but there is not the same force in a proper name and in the name of a property when an invocation is made of some person for some effect; and so in the invocation of the Divine Persons the form instituted by Christ is not preserved by the names of their properties, nor is the Baptism in any way valid.

Reply to Objection 2. By the name of the Most Holy Trinity must be understood an

sacrament.

Reply to Objection 3. If the words are interrupted to such an extent that the intention of the speaker is interrupted, the sacramental sense is destroyed, and consequently, the validity of the sacrament. But this is not the case if the interruption of the speaker is so slight, that his intention and the sense of the words is not interrupted.

The same is to be said of a change in the order of the words. Because if this destroys the sense of the words, the sacrament is invalidated: as happens when a negation is made to precede or follow a word. But if the order is so changed that the sense of the words does not vary, the sacrament is not invalidated, according to the Philosopher's dictum: "Nouns and verbs mean the same though they be transposed" (*Peri Herm.* x).

explicit invocation of the Three Persons, in the way that the Savior commanded to be observed.

Reply to Objection 3. I concede that sometimes in the Church Baptism was conferred in the name of Christ, as the Scripture says. But nevertheless the form is to be kept to that the Savior himself handed down in the last chapter of *Matthew*, and it has been prescribed to be done thus by the Roman Church, which [*Oxon. ib. d.6 q.9 n.14*], taught by the spirit of truth, cannot err in those things that have regard to the conferring of the sacraments. [But on this matter see also below, q66 a6.]

Scotus again on Article 8. Whether it is lawful to add anything to the words in which the sacramental form consists?

Scotus [*Oxon. 4 d.3 q.2; Report. ib.*]

Objection 1. It seems that it is licit to add something to or take something from the words in which the form of the sacraments consists. For [*Oxon. ib. n.1*] according to Priscian a [Latin] verb in the first person gives to understand the nominative pronoun; therefore in the conferring of Baptism it would be sufficient to say *baptizo te* without the pronoun *ego*; therefore something can be taken away from or added to the words in which the form of the sacraments is held to consist.

Objection 2. [*Oxon. ib. n.2*] Ambrose says (*On the Spiration of the Holy Spirit*, ch.14): "If the mystery of the Trinity is held by faith, and only one person be named, the sacrament is complete." Therefore it is licit to take away from the form of the sacraments those words which are judged to be most necessary. Confirmation: [*Oxon. ib. n.1*] In *On Baptism and its Effects*, chapter *If someone*, the Gloss says that the pronoun is not of the substance of the form, because this [Latin] sound *baptizo* produces a complete sense without expression of the pronoun. Further, [*Oxon. ib. n.2*] in *On Consecration*, d.4, chapter *They referred*, it says: "If someone says *Baptizo te in nomine etc.* he validly confers Baptism, because of the fact that he intends to baptize." And the Pope did not append the pronoun *ego* in that response; therefore, with the pronoun taken away, the form of the sacrament subsists and Baptism is validly conferred.

Objection 3. To the form of consecration of the Body and Blood handed down by Christ is regularly added the *For...* which is not in the form which Christ handed down, as is established by the *Gospels*; therefore it is licit to add something to or take something from the forms of the sacraments.

On the contrary, *On Baptism and its Effects* “If someone has immersed a child three times in water and has not said: *I baptize you in the name of the Father and of the Son and of the Holy Spirit, amen*, the child is not baptized.”

I answer that, [Oxon. ib. n.11] Variation according to quantity can happen in the form of the sacraments by the addition or subtraction of something that has regard to the form. An addition of something can be made at the beginning or at the end or in the middle.

FIRST STATEMENT: if in the form of the sacraments something is added that is repugnant to the principal words of the sacrament itself or that diminishes those principal words, the sacrament has not been carried out, because the form ordained by Christ has not been preserved. So, if the form is spoken with the addition, *In the name of the Father who is greater and of the Son who is less...*, or with the diminution, *If I am omnipotent, I baptize you...*, or if it is proffered under a disjunction, *I baptize you or I kill you in the name of the Father...*, the sacrament has not been carried out, because neither does the condition exist nor does the disjunction state either part determinatively.

SECOND STATEMENT: if something is added before or after that is repugnant to the form, the sacrament is not carried out; but it is carried out if the addition is not repugnant.

Example: were someone to baptize saying: *In the name of the Father and of the Son and of the Holy Spirit and of the Blessed Virgin*, he would not validly baptize, because, by the strict scope of the phrase *In the name of...*, equal reference is made to the Divine Persons and to the Blessed Virgin; and the same must be said if the addition were to be made at the beginning of the sentence, as by saying, *In the name of the Blessed Virgin and of the Father etc.*, although the speaker may be intending to invoke the Blessed Virgin in one way and the Divine Persons in a second. But if the baptizer, before or after pronouncing the form of the words, were to invoke the Blessed Virgin so that she might obtain the gift of perseverance for the baptized, then, since the meaning of the necessary form is not distorted, the addition does not prevent the conferring of the sacrament.

THIRD STATEMENT: If an insertion in the middle breaks the due unity of the form, the form does not remain nor is there a sacrament; but there is if it does not break it. But when is the form broken by an insertion? I answer: judgment must be made by reference to other human acts; for when it is not judged by ordinary usage that the interposition of words not affecting the issue prevents the act of speaking from being one and continuous, then it should not be held in the case at hand either; so that, if someone were to say, when beginning to pronounce the form of Baptism, *Be quiet*, or *Move back*, his act of speaking should not for that reason be held to have been interrupted, and thus he could complete and finish it notwithstanding the interruption. But if the baptizer, after beginning the form, wanted to interpose other prayers, his act of speaking should not be held to be one,

just as it would not be so held in other similar cases.

FOURTH STATEMENT: If some word is subtracted that is not especially important, as the [Latin] pronoun *ego*, the sacrament is carried out; but this is by no means true if the subtraction is made with respect to some principal word, for each of those words is per se necessary to the form; so, just as the sacrament would not be carried out without the form, so neither without some one of the principal words; for one must not suppose that God has determined man to words in the sacraments beyond the point at which the words are sufficient for expressing the conception; but a hearer can well understand someone who expresses his conception with abbreviations. Nevertheless, one must avoid as much as one can the abbreviated expression of sacramental words out of reverence for the sacraments. But I would not dare to say that he sins mortally who makes an abbreviation, provided he does not do it from contempt but rather from some infirmity or human inattention which might not take precautions against everything as much as it can.

Response to Objection 1. [*Oxon. ib. n.14*] About the [Latin] pronoun *ego* I concede that it is not simply necessary to the form, neither as expressed nor as implied in a verb of the first person; but as far as the Latin church is concerned, at any rate after the times of Pope Alexander III, who established the above cited Constitution *If someone about Baptism and its effects*, the minister conferring Baptism ought to express the pronoun *ego*.

Response to Objection 2. And from this [*Report. 4 d.3 q.2 n.8*] one must say that the statement from Ambrose is not strictly true but needs exposition. So if the child should die after the words *In the name of the Father* it is credible that God, from his mercy, would supply the rest of the form, that is, the child will be held to have been baptized. But if, after that part of the form had been expressed, the priest should depart from among the living, the child should be baptized again. As for the *Confirmation* [*Oxon. ib.*] and as regards what is added from the chapter *They referred*, d.4, *On Consecration*, that must be taken and understood of the time preceding the Constitution *If anyone* of Alexander III. For then the [Latin] pronoun *ego* was neither something essential to the form of Baptism, nor was it necessary for the minister, as it is now.

Response to Objection 3. I concede that the *For...* was added to the form instituted by Christ; but this was done reasonably [*Oxon. ib. d.8 q.2 n.26*] because of expressing the continuation of what follows with what precedes. Therefore the minister would sin gravely by omitting that particle.

Scotus a third time on Article 8. Whether it is lawful to add anything to the words in which the sacramental form consists?

Scotus [*Oxon. 4 d.3 q.2; Report. ib.*]

Objection 1. It seems that some alteration may take place with respect to the form. For [*Oxon. ib. n.2*] 2 *Peri Herm.* says: “Nouns and verbs mean the same though they be

transposed”; therefore a speech made up of transposed words would be equivalent to one consisting of words that have not been transposed.

Objection 2. [Oxon. ib. n.12] In *On Consecration*, d.4, chapter *They referred*, the Pope is said to have declared that a Baptism had been validly conferred under this form, *I baptize you in the name of the Father and of the Son and of the Holy Spirit*; therefore the form of the sacraments admits of variation according to quality or the termination of words.

On the Contrary, [Oxon. ib. n.2] *On Baptism and its Effects* the chapter *If someone*, “If someone has immersed a child three times in water and has not said: *I baptize you in the name of the Father and of the Son and of the Holy Spirit, amen*, the child is not baptized.”

I answer that, now we must look at variation in quality and where. Variation [Oxon. ib. n.12] in quality concerns the termination of words, which belongs to appropriateness of speech. In accordance, therefore, with the doctrine handed down in the chapter alleged above, *They referred*, if it happens that the form is pronounced inappropriately by the minister because of his ignorance of the Latin language, and it not be his intention to introduce some error but rather to do what the Church intends to do, the variation in quality can stand with the validity of the sacrament; this, further, is to be understood of the case when the variation and inappropriate speech happen at the end of the word. In what way this happens can be well appreciated by those listening to the uneducated, who speak inappropriately and yet grasp well what they wish to say, even as to the individual words.

Lastly, about variation in where [Oxon. ib. n.13], I say that some transposition can altogether vary the speech, as if one were to say: *I of the Father baptize you in the name of the Son and of the Holy Spirit*; but some other transposition permits the transposed words to keep more or less the same force in the form itself, as if one were to say: *In the name of the Son and of the Father and of the Holy Spirit I baptize you*. The first transposition takes away the conception of the speech instituted by Christ; therefore the sacrament is not at all conferred under that form. But in the second transposition the sacrament is genuine; for although it would be appropriate, when pronouncing the Persons, to keep to the order according to origin, by which the Father is prior to the Son and each to the Holy Spirit who originates from them, and although it be necessary for the minister to keep to that order, in that he acts inordinately acting otherwise, yet on the part of the sacrament this does not seem altogether necessary, because the Persons, in whatever order they are named (provided only the concept of the speech instituted by Christ be preserved) are one efficient principle in Baptism, and it is thus that they are named.

Reply to Objection 1. It must be said [Oxon. ib. n.15] that the proposition of the Philosopher is true absolutely about the transposed names, but it does not thence follow that the conception of the whole speech made up of names transposed thus and so is the same. Since, therefore, the form of the sacraments does not consist solely in the signification of the incomplex parts but rather in the signification of the whole speech, it

cannot be the case that if that is varied by the transposition of the terms the form of the sacraments still exists.

Reply to Objection 2. The response is clear from what was said in the solution. Hence the Pope himself says in the chapter above alleged: “If he who has baptized (using the quoted form) not as introducing error or heresy but from sole ignorance of Roman pronunciation, we cannot consent that the child be again baptized.”