

This translation of Book 1 Distinctions 26 to 48 of the *Ordinatio* (aka *Opus Oxoniense*) of Blessed John Duns Scotus is complete. These distinctions fill volume six of the Vatican critical edition of the Latin text edited by the Scotus Commission in Rome and published by Quarrachi. Volume six is the final volume for the distinctions of Book 1. Volume seven begins the distinctions of Book 2.

Scotus' Latin is tight and not seldom elliptical, exploiting to the full the grammatical resources of the language to make his meaning clear (especially the backward references of his pronouns). In English this ellipsis must, for the sake of intelligibility, often be translated with a fuller repetition of words and phrases than Scotus himself gives. The possibility of mistake thus arises if the wrong word or phrase is chosen for repetition. The only check to remove error is to ensure that the resulting English makes the sense intended by Scotus. Whether this sense has always been captured in the translation that follows must be judged by the reader. In addition there are passages where not only the argumentation but the grammar too is obscure, and I cannot vouch for the success of my attempts to penetrate the obscurity. So, for these and the like reasons, comments and notice of errors from readers are most welcome.

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April, 2013

# THE ORDINATIO OF BLESSED JOHN DUNS SCOTUS

## Book One

### Twenty Sixth Distinction

Single Question: <i>Whether the Persons are Constituted in their Personal Being through Relations of Origin</i> I. Opinions of Others A. First Opinion B. Second Opinion 1. Exposition of the Opinion 2. Arguments against the Opinion C. Third Opinion II. What one Should Think about the Third Opinion III. To the Arguments for the Second Opinion when Holding the Third Opinion IV. To the Reasons against the Second Opinion when Holding the Second Opinion V. To the Principal Arguments VI. To the Arguments of the First Opinion	Num. 1 Num. 6 Num. 15 Num. 32 Num. 56 Num. 67 Num. 73 Num. 84 Num. 95 Num. 99
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### Twenty Seventh Distinction

Question One: <i>Whether a Created Word is Actual Intellection</i> Question Two: <i>Whether the Word in Divine Reality States something Proper to the Generated Person</i> Question Three: <i>Whether the Divine Word states a Respect to the Creature</i> I. To the First and Second Questions A. The Opinion of Others 1. Exposition of the Opinion 2. Rejection of the Opinion a. As to the First Question b. As to the Second Question B. Scotus' own Response 1. To the First Question a. Which of the Things Found in the Intelligence is the Word b. Whether any Actual Intellection	Num. 1 Num. 5 Num. 9 Num. 11 Num. 16 Num. 23 Num. 42 Num. 48
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at all is the Word	Num. 62
c. Whether Will Concurs in the Idea of the Word	Num. 79
2. To the Principal Arguments of the First Question	Num. 82
3. To the Second Question	Num. 85
4. To the Principal Arguments of the Second Question	Num. 88
II. To the Third Question	
A. The Opinion of Others	Num. 91
B. Rejection of the Opinion and Scotus' own Response	Num. 95
C. To the Principal Argument	Num. 98
D. To the Arguments for the Opinion of Others	Num. 99
E. A Doubt about the Expression of the Divine Word	Num. 103

## Twenty Eighth Distinction

Question One: <i>Whether 'Unbegotten' is Property of the Father Himself</i>	Num. 1
Question Two: <i>Whether Not Being Able to be Born is a Property Constitutive of the First Person in Divine Reality</i>	Num. 6
I. To the First Question	Num. 11
A. In What Way Unbegotten Agrees with the Father Alone	Num. 12
B. How Unbegotten can be a Property of the Father	
1. First Opinion	Num. 21
2. Second Opinion	Num. 25
3. Scotus' own Opinion	Num. 27
C. To the Principal Arguments	Num. 29
II. To the Second Question	
A. Opinion of Others	Num. 36
B. Rejection of the Opinion	Num. 44
C. To the Principal Arguments	Num. 48
D. To the Arguments for the Opinion of Others	Num. 49
Question Three: <i>Whether the First Divine Person is Constituted in Personal Being by some Positive Relation to the Second Person</i>	Num. 52
I. To the Question	
A. Opinions of those who Hold that the Persons are Constituted by Relations	Num. 56
1. First Opinion	Num. 57
2. Second Opinion	Num. 61
3. Third Opinion	Num. 64
4. Against the Three Opinions together	Num. 68
B. Opinion of those who Wish to Hold that the Persons are Constituted by Absolutes	Num. 89
C. Scotus' own Response	Num. 93

II. To the Principal Arguments	Num. 108
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## Twenty Ninth Distinction

Single Question: <i>Whether Principle is Said Univocally of Principles Inwardly and Outwardly in God</i>	Num. 1
I. To the Question	Num. 3
II. To the Arguments	Num. 5

## Thirtieth Distinction

Question One: <i>Whether Some Relation is Said of God from Time</i>	Num. 1
Question Two: <i>Whether there can be Some Real Relation of God to Creatures</i>	Num. 5
I. The Opinions of Others as to Each Question	
A. First Opinion	
1. Exposition of the Opinion	Num. 11
2. Rejection of the Opinion	Num. 15
B. Second Opinion	
1. Exposition of the Opinion	Num. 24
2. Rejection of the Opinion	Num. 25
II. Scotus' own Response to the First Question	Num. 30
III. To the Principal Arguments of the First Question	Num. 46
IV. Scotus' own Response to the Second Question	Num. 49
V. To the Principal Arguments of the Second Question	Num. 59

## Thirty First Distinction

Single Question: <i>Whether Identity, Likeness, and Equality are Real Relations in God</i>	Num. 1
I. To the Question	Num. 6
A. As to the First Condition for Relation	
1. Opinion of Others	Num. 7
2. Scotus' own Opinion	Num. 11
B. As to the Second Condition for Relation	Num. 12
C. As to the Third Condition for Relation	Num. 16
II. Doubts about Equality	Num. 19
III. To the Principal Arguments	Num. 23

## Thirty Second Distinction

Question One: <i>Whether the Father and the Son Love Each Themselves by the Holy Spirit</i> Question Two: <i>Whether the Father is Wise by Generated Wisdom</i>	
I. Opinion of Others to the First Question A. First Opinion B. Second Opinion C. Third Opinion D. Fourth Opinion	Num. 1 Num. 6 Num. 8 Num. 9 Num. 12 Num. 14 Num. 16
II. Scotus' own Response to the Second Question III. To the Principal Argument of the Second Question IV. Scotus' own Response to the First Question V. To the Principal Arguments of the First Question	Num. 23 Num. 30 Num. 32 Num. 34

## Thirty Third and Thirty Fourth Distinctions

Questions One to Three: <i>Whether the Property is the Same as the Person, whether it is the Same as the Essence, and whether the Person is the Same as the Essence</i>	
	Num. 1

## Thirty Fifth Distinction

Single Question: <i>Whether in God there are Eternal Relations to all Knowables as Quidditatively Known</i>	
I. To the Question A. Opinions of Others 1. First Opinion 2. Second Opinion B. Rejection of the Opinions 1. Against the Common Conclusion 2. Against the First Opinion 3. Against the Second Opinion C. Scotus' own Response D. Instances against Scotus' own Solution	Num. 1 Num. 7 Num. 9 Num. 12 Num. 14 Num. 21 Num. 24 Num. 27 Num. 35
II. To the Principal Arguments III. To the Arguments for the First Opinion	Num. 53 Num. 56

## Thirty Sixth Distinction

Single Question: <i>Whether the Foundation of an Eternal Relation to God as Knower has truly the Being of Essence from the Fact it is under this Sort of Respect</i>	Num. 1
I. To the Question	
A. The Opinion of Others	Num. 4
B. Scotus' own Response	Num. 26
C. Objections against Scotus' own Response	Num. 30
II. To the Principal Arguments	Num. 48
III. To the Reasons for the Opinion of Others	Num. 54

## Thirty Seventh Distinction

Single Question: <i>Whether God's Omnipotence necessarily entails his Greatness</i>	Num. 1
I. To the Question	Num. 3
II. To the Principal Argument	Num. 10

## Thirty Eighth Distinction

Single Question: <i>Whether God's Knowledge with respect to Makeable things is Practical</i>	Num. 1
I. To the Question	Num. 4
II. To the Principal Arguments	Num. 11

## Appendix

[The second part of  
**Distinction 38**  
*The Infallibility of Divine Knowledge*  
 and the whole of  
**Distinction 39**  
*The Immutability of Divine Knowledge*

are lacking in the *Ordinatio* and are supplied here by an interpolation from the *Lectura* and *Rep. 1A.*]

Questions One to Five: *On the Infallibility and Immutability of Divine Knowledge*

I. The Opinions of Others
A. First Opinion

- B. Second Opinion
- C. Third Opinion
- II. Scotus' own Response to the Questions
  - A. How there is Contingency in Things
    - 1. Contingency in things is Evident and Manifest
    - 2. The Contingency in Things is because of the Contingent Causation of God
    - 3. The Cause of Contingency in Beings is on the Part of the Divine Will
      - a. How our Will can be Cause of Contingency in Things
      - b. How the Divine Will is Cause of Contingency in Things
  - B. How along with the Contingency of Things there stands the Certainty of Divine Knowledge
- III. To the Principal Arguments
- IV. To the Arguments for the Second Opinion
- V. To the Authorities of the Saints
- VI. To the Arguments for the Third Opinion

## Fortieth Distinction

Single Question: <i>Whether a Predestined Person can be Damned</i>	Num. 1
I. To the Question	Num. 4
II. To the Principal Arguments	Num. 8

## Forty First Distinction

Single Question: <i>Whether there is any Merit of Predestination or Reprobation</i>	Num. 1
I. To the Question	
A. First Opinion, Proposed and Retracted by Augustine	Num. 5
B. Second Opinion, Proposed by Peter Lombard	Num. 6
C. Third Opinion	Num. 12
D. Fourth Opinion	Num. 26
E. Scotus' own Opinion	Num. 40
F. Conclusion about the Five Opinions	Num. 52
II. To the Principal Arguments	Num. 53

## Forty Second Distinction

Single Question: <i>Whether it can be Proved by Natural Reason that God is Omnipotent</i>	Num. 1
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I. To the Question	Num. 8
II. To the Principal Arguments	Num. 16β

## Forty Third Distinction

Single Question: <i>Whether the First Reason for the Impossibility of a Thing to be Made is on the Part of God or of the Makeable Thing</i>	Num. 1
I. To the Question	
A. The Opinion of Henry of Ghent	Num. 3
B. Scotus' own Opinion	Num. 14
II. To the Principal Argument	Num. 19

## Forty Fourth Distinction

Single Question: <i>Whether God could Make Things other than He has Ordained them to be Made</i>	Num. 1
I. To the Question	Num. 3
II. To the Principal Arguments on Both Sides	Num. 13

## Forty Fifth Distinction

Single Question: <i>Whether God from Eternity willed Things Other than Himself</i>	Num. 1
I. To the Question	Num. 4
II. To the Principal Arguments	Num. 7

## Forty Sixth Distinction

Single Question: <i>Whether God's Will of Being Well-Pleased is always Fulfilled</i>	Num. 1
I. To the Question	Num. 5
II. To the Principal Arguments	Num. 7

## Forty Seventh Distinction

Single Question: *Whether Divine Permission is some Act of the Divine Will*

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|-------------------------------|---------|
| I. To the Question            | Num. 1  |
| II. To the Principal Argument | Num. 3  |
|                               | Num. 10 |

## Forty Eighth Distinction

Single Question: *Whether a Created Will is Morally Good whenever it Conforms to the Uncreated Will*

- |                               |        |
|-------------------------------|--------|
| I. To the Question            | Num. 1 |
| II. To the Principal Argument | Num. 3 |
|                               | Num. 5 |

## Twenty Sixth Distinction

### Single Question

*Whether the Persons are Constituted in their Personal Being through Relations of Origin*

1. About the twenty sixth distinction I ask whether the persons are constituted in their personal being through relations of origin.

That they are not:

Relations of origin are of different ideas, just as are relations differing by species in creatures; the point is clear, for paternity and filiation differ more, or paternity differs more from filiation, than filiation differs from filiation or paternity from paternity; therefore things constituted formally by these relations differ in species. The persons therefore differ in species, and so generation is equivocal in divine reality – all which was disproved in distinction 7 [nn.51-64, 47-50].

2. Again, the idea by which the relations of origin constitute persons is the same idea by which common relations constitute them, and so the same person would be constituted by a double formal constitutive feature, – which is unacceptable. The inference is proved by the fact that common relations require equal distinctness in the extremes, and they in the same way stand along with unity of essence; therefore they distinguish equally [sc. as the relations of origin do].

3. Further, opposite relations of the second kind of relatives [sc. relations of active and passive, *Metaphysics* 5.15.1020b26-32] can be based on the same thing, the way the will moves itself; but the relation of mover and moved pertains to the second mode of relatives; therefore by parity of reasoning the relations of producer and produced, which

pertain to the same mode, can exist in the same thing, – and so they will not distinguish opposites.

4. The reason is confirmed by Boethius, who at the end of his book *On the Trinity* ch.6 says that this relation is as it were ‘of the same thing toward itself’. Therefore these relations are not distinct.<sup>a</sup>

a. [*Interpolation*, from Appendix A] Note. Relations are distinguished either by species or by number.

If they are distinct by species, this distinction is received because of a distinction in the foundation, and that in two ways: either because there are two foundations in the some related thing, – and then it is plain that the two relations founded on them are distinct in species (as Socrates by his generative power, through the medium of a previous act, is related to Plato by the relation that is ‘paternity’, – and by another relation, founded on whiteness, that is called ‘likeness’ he is related to a white thing; and these relations are different in species); in another way there can be a distinction of foundations, not in the related thing itself in which the relations are, but in the terms to which those relations are relations (for example, by the same whiteness Socrates is fundamentally related by the relation that is ‘likeness’ to a white thing and by the relation that is ‘unlikeness’ to a black thing; and these two relations are distinguished by species through a distinction of foundations in the extremes to which the related thing, in which the two relations are, is related).

If one asks about numerical distinction, I say that sufficient for this is either of the two aforesaid distinctions and their foundations (the proof is that whatever suffices for the distinction of certain things in species, suffices for a distinction of them in number); and I speak of the distinction of essence, not of a distinction of supposit or subject. A distinction also of related things suffices for a numerical relation between them (the proof is that the same relation in number never exists in two related things, as neither does any other accident). A distinction of terms in number also suffices for a distinction of the relations in number (the proof is that one of

them can remain when the other does not remain). A numerical distinction of foundations also, along with unity of subject and term, suffices for a numerical distinction of relations; hence, when the unity of the related thing and the term remain, but a variation is made in the foundation of the relation, then there is not in each of them (namely the related thing and the term) the same relation in number, because by the action of a natural agent no return is made to the same thing in number.

An example of this last point: white Socrates is related to Plato in the relation that is called ‘likeness’; but if afterwards he become black, then he is not related to Plato by any such likeness; but if again become white, then he is related to him by ‘likeness’, but not by the same likeness in number as before.

Hence note that a specific distinction of relations is founded on a distinction of the foundations existing in the related thing in which the two relations are, or in the extremes to which the related thing is by the aforesaid relations related. But sufficient for a numerical distinction of the relations is either of the distinctions of the aforesaid foundations (whether of the subject or of the term) toward which the relation is.

The reason for all the aforesaid points is that, whenever many things are required for something, a distinction of any of them suffices for a distinction of it; and for the unity of it there is required a unity of all the other things required. Hence for the unity of something more things are required than for its distinction.

*[Additional note:] Note that a white man is like blackness in whiteness [sc. because white and black are both qualities qualifying a subject?] and unlike the same in color, and these relations are yet distinct in species although they have the same terms. So correct these additions in this way.*

##### 5. On the contrary:

Boethius, *ibid.*: “The essence contains the unity, the relation multiplies the trinity.”

## I. Opinions of Others

### A. First Opinion

6. The response of some – as of Praepositinus – is that the persons are distinct by themselves, and so there is no need to ask by what they are formally distinguished or by what they are constituted, because they do not have a constitutive element.

7. A confirmation of this reason is that a divine person is as equally simple as the essence; but the essence, because of its simplicity, is distinct by itself from anything else; therefore the person is too.

8. Again, abstract and concrete signify the same thing, – therefore paternity is the Father. Therefore to say the Father is distinct by paternity is to say that he is distinct by himself.

9. Argument against this as follows:

Things that are not primarily diverse are distinct by some part of themselves, because things that are wholly distinct are primarily distinct (for if they are not primarily diverse but are beings in some way the same, then they are not distinct by that by which they are the same but by something of themselves by which they are not the same); but the divine persons are not primarily diverse, because they belong to the same essence; therefore one must still ask by what they are made distinct.

10. Again, there are many properties in the same person, as not being begotten and action-generation in the Father; but they are distinct, according to Augustine *On the Trinity* V ch.6 n.7, where he means that if the Father were not unborn yet he could be Father, and conversely; therefore although – *per impossibile* – one property would not

distinguish the Father from anything, the other property could distinguish him, and conversely. Therefore one must ask by what the Father is distinct from the Son.

11. Again, in the Father there is active generation and active inspiriting; active inspiriting does not distinguish him from the Son, because it exists in the Son; therefore the Father is not equally primarily distinguished by his whole total self but by something that is in him.

12. Again, in the *Preface about the Trinity*, “a property in the persons” is spoken of; but a person is not in itself in the way that a property is understood to be in a person; therefore a person can be said to be distinguished formally by a property in a way that a person is not distinguished first in itself.

13. There is also argument against this opinion [n.6] that if the Father is distinct in his totality from the Son then also by parity of reason he is distinct in his totality from the Holy Spirit, – and the converse inference holds; and if he is distinct from both by the same thing, then he has the same relation to both; therefore conversely too, each of them has the same relation to him, and a relation of the same idea (just as if Paul is like Peter and Linus, then Peter and Linus have the same likeness and a relation of the same idea to Paul), and then the Son would seem to be distinguished from the Father by a relation of the same idea as that by which the Holy Spirit is distinguished from the Father.

14. But perhaps this argument is not conclusive, because whatever be way the Father is constituted in personal being, he would be distinguished personally from the Son and the Holy Spirit; yet it does not follow conversely that the Son and Holy Spirit would be distinguished from the Father by something of the same idea.

## B. Second Opinion

### 1. Exposition of the Opinion

15. There is another opinion, the common one, which says that the persons are constituted by relations.

16. For this opinion the authority of Christ is alleged in the Gospel (*Matthew*, last chapter), as will be touched on below against the third opinion.

17. For this opinion is adduced Boethius [n.5], where he seems to touch on many things about it.

18. And Augustine likewise, *On the Trinity* V ch.8 n.9: “Whatever that most outstanding sublimity is said to be in relation to itself, it is said to be substantially;” and a little later: “Whatever is said about the individual persons in relation to themselves, is not taken multiply in a sum but singly.” And *ibid.*: “Whatever is said about the individual persons in relation to themselves is said all at once.” And in ch.11 n.12: “But as to the individual things that are properly spoken of in the same Trinity, these are not in any way said in relation to themselves but to each other – or to the creature; and therefore it is manifest that for that reason they are said relatively not substantially.” – In these words the view seems to be most expressly held that everything said ‘in relation to itself’ belongs to the three persons and is common to them, and everything not common to the three is a relative; but what is constitutive and distinctive of the person is not common to the three; therefore it is a relative.

19. Again, Augustine *City of God* XI ch.10 n.1: “God is whatever he has, save that one person is said in relation to another and is not the other.”<sup>a</sup>

a. [Interpolation] “For the Father has the Son, but is not the Son himself.” – Again, Boethius *On the Trinity*: “Substance contains unity, relation multiplies the Trinity,” and many other words in the same place.

20. And with this agrees Anselm *On the Procession of the Holy Spirit*, that everything is one in divine reality “when the opposition of relation does not prevent it.”

21. Again, Damascene ch.8: everything is one in divine reality “besides generation and non-generation and procession; for in these three properties alone do the three holy hypostases differ.”

22. Again, he says in ch.51: “we recognize them in these three alone, paternal, filial, and processional incausability.”

23. Richard of St. Victor seems to say in *On the Trinity* IV ch.19 that the persons are not distinguished in divine reality save by way of having the same nature; therefore etc.

24. Again, by reason:

Because if a person is constituted in divine reality by something absolute, an absolute added to an absolute will necessarily produce composition; but if the divine persons come together in an absolute, clearly the absolute in which they come together is not the same absolute as that by which they are distinguished as persons; therefore they are distinguished by some other absolute. Therefore there is there an addition of absolute to absolute, – therefore composition. This consequence does not hold about relation, because relation adds nothing to the foundation nor does it make a composition with it.

25. This position and this idea are confirmed in another way, that relation in one way can pass over into substance and to this extent does not make a composition with an absolute, and in another way it can remain because of comparison with its opposite and thus it is really distinct. These two ideas do not seem to belong to the absolute, because the absolute either passes over in every way or remains in every way; if it passes over in every way it does not distinguish (as neither does the essence into which it passes), – if it remains in every way then there is composition.

26. Again, the same nature cannot exist in diverse absolute supposita unless it is distinguished from them. For although it could exist in diverse relative supposita (because the same unlimited thing can be the foundation for several relations in diverse supposita), yet it does not seem able to do this in diverse absolute supposita unless it is distinct and separately counted up in them; for if there were two absolute supposita, it seems that whatever was in one would be other than whatever was in the other; therefore the divine essence would be separately counted up in God if the divine persons were constituted by absolutes.

27. Again, according to everyone, relations exist in the divine persons. Therefore if they do not constitute the persons they will be there as it were accidental and additional to the constituted persons (which seems to oppose the simplicity of the divine persons), and also such relations – which are proper to the persons – will be relations of reason, because the relation of God to creatures is for this reason not real that it presupposes a divine person in perfect existence and not dependent on the creature, and not naturally or necessarily requiring the creature for its own personal existence. Therefore, by similarity, the same seems to hold of the matter at issue: if the first person is absolute, he will not

depend on the second, because he is pre-understood to be perfect in his personal disposition before the second person, and consequently he will not necessarily require the second person for his personal existence; therefore his relation to the second person will be only a relation or disposition of reason.<sup>a</sup>

a. [Interpolation] In addition, some absolute property, if it were to be constitutive, would not be merely virtually in God, because then God would not be this person more by this property than he would be an ass (for God virtually includes the perfection of an ass in itself); therefore it must be there actually; therefore it exists there as act. Therefore there will in divine reality be three things.

Further, the absolute property – if it makes a unity with the essence – is either act, or potency, or a perfection of the essence; the essence does not perfect the personal element, because it does not presuppose it, but rather contrariwise; therefore the personal element will be the perfection of the essence. And two discordant things follow: first, that the essence in itself is not altogether perfect, the other that one person is not altogether perfect because he does not have the absolute element of another person (which is a perfection, as shown). – There is also a confirmation of the second point, because according to Anselm *Monologion* ch.15, “besides the relations, as to everything else it is either simply better that it is than that it is not – or it is not simply better but in some respect it is better that it is not than that it is;” but what is so in this second way does not exist in God, according to Anselm; therefore as to everything other than relation – that exists in God – it is simply better that it is than that it is not. And from this it follows that no person will be simply perfect, because no person has the absolute element of another; it also follows that two persons are more perfect than one, which is in conflict with Augustine *On the Trinity* VIII ch.1 n.2.

Further, third, when one absolute is multiplied, every other absolute associated with it is multiplied too (example: when quantity is multiplied, whiteness is multiplied, and conversely); therefore if there were thus distinct proper absolutes associated with the divine essence, they would also distinguish the divine essence. – There is a confirmation too of the major, that several

things of the same species cannot exist in the same thing; these absolutes, if they are posited, will be of the same species, – because, if not, they will be of different species, and so it will be necessary to ask by what it is that one or other of them is incommunicable; for just as it is set down that paternity (which differs in species from filiation) cannot be of itself incommunicable, so will it follow about the *a* in the Father (if it is an absolute) and the *b* in the Son – if they differ in species – that neither of them will be of itself incommunicable, and it will be necessary to come to a stand at some things proper to them of the same idea. A confirmation of this reason is that at least there are not several things of the same idea in the same perfect thing (as in divine reality there are not several Words nor several Fathers), because it seems a mark of imperfection that in some nature there can be several things altogether similar; therefore in the simply perfect divine nature there will not be several absolutes of the same idea.

Fourth: if an absolute property *a* is expressed by the essence, and a property *b* likewise, and the ‘thing expressed’ is in the same supposit as that by which it is expressed (according to the way of expressing posited here), then *a* and *b* will be in one person, and so no person will be originated by another (because the things proper to them will be in the same person), nay it will follow that there will be no personal distinctions.

Fifth: it follows that there is no origin there, because an originated person gets its being through the origin; but person, if it is absolute, precedes the relation itself of origin; therefore the second person would precede in existence its passive origin and so would not have existence through it.

28. But it is further posited, in particular, that not just any relations – even real ones – constitute the divine persons nor distinguish them, but relations of origin, because these burgeon first in the divine essence; because there is first in the essence a double fecundity, insofar as the intellect is infinite and the will infinite, and, by the mediation of these, there burgeon at once the relations of origin that pertain to the communicability of nature, which nature or divine essence is communicated according to the double

fecundity just stated; when these are already pre-understood, the common relations, which presuppose them, burgeon, and so such common relations, although they are real, yet do not constitute or distinguish the persons.

29. Now the way that relation can constitute persons and distinguish them is made clear by the fact that the one who produces is necessarily really distinct from his opposite, because the same thing does not produce itself, according to Augustine *On the Trinity* I ch.1 n.1; therefore there will be some real distinction between some things that exist in divine reality; but these things cannot in any way be there by in-forming, because of the divine simplicity, – therefore the real distinction will be *per se* subsistent in the divine nature; therefore there will be persons really distinct.

30. But as to how no distinction of the essence in which they subsist follows from this is made clear by the fact that the same unlimited reality can be foundation for opposite relations, and then the relation is said in one way to remain and in another way to pass over [into the essence] – and on this point there are many disputes as to what the idea is by which the relation distinguishes.

31. But in brief it can be said – in accord with the present way [sc. that the persons are constituted by relations] – that relation, in the respect in which it is relation, is not formally essence, because according to Augustine *On the Trinity* VII ch.1 n.2, “if essence is in relation to another, it is now not essence;” and one can argue conversely: ‘if relation is formally an entity for itself then it is not relation’. Also relation – from the fact it is relation – is of its opposite as of its term,<sup>a</sup> and from the fact that it is of its opposite it is necessarily really distinguished from it; and yet there is no need for the essence to be formally distinguished, because essence is not formally a distinct relation. Nor need there

be composition there, because although the relation remain in the sense that it is not formally the essence, yet relation – because of the infinity of the essence – passes over into the essence according to perfect identity with it. Relation then remains formally, because the idea according to which it is formally is not the idea of the essence, – and it passes over, because of perfect identity, into the essence, though not into formal identity. And the ‘remaining in this sense’ suffices for formal and real distinction without any distinction of essence; and from the fact that this essence is simple, the distinction will not be of things that in-form but of things that subsist – and from the fact that this essence is infinite, the ‘remaining formally’ will be without composition.

- a. [Interpolation] such that to compare it with the essence by not including disposition to the opposite is not to compare relation with essence.

## 2. Arguments against the Opinion

32. Against this conclusion [sc. that the persons are constituted by relations and not by something absolute] there is argument in four ways: first by comparing relation to the related thing, second by comparing relation to its origin, third from the proper idea of the constitutive thing itself, and fourth by authorities.

33. [First way] – As regard the first the argument is as follows:

Something is related formally by relation (as someone is made white by whiteness), but the relation itself is not related (because according to blessed Augustine *On the Trinity* VII ch.1 n.2, “every relative is something when the relation is removed;” and: “If the Father,” he says, “does not exist to himself he will not be anything that is related;” for the relation is not related, because that which is related by a relation is not a

something afterwards nor is it simultaneous in nature, – therefore it exists naturally prior); but the essence is not really related, therefore the supposit alone is related; therefore the supposit is really and naturally there prior to the relation. Therefore a divine supposit is not constituted or distinguished first by relation.

34. Proof of the assumptions: everything composite of necessity pre-requires parts and the union of the parts, and this is so not only in a composite that is *per se* one but in a composite that is *per accidens* one; for just as the essence of man pre-exists the essence of body and soul and their union, so the essence of a white man pre-requires the being of man and whiteness and their union. Therefore the being of some related thing, which is said ‘to be related first’ as a quasi-whole, pre-requires relation as the form, and that which is related by the relation as the subject, and their union. Therefore something is first in-formed by relation before it is something relative as a composite, and this is said ‘to be related first’: that prior thing, in-formed by the relation, can be said to be related, because everything in-formed by some form can be said to be of the sort the form is.<sup>a</sup>

a. [Interpolation] Therefore nothing in divine reality can be said to be related unless there is something that is said to be denominatively related as it were; and it will not be constituted formally by the relation as *per se* included in it (the point is clear from the difference between the first related thing and that to which it is said to be denominatively related), and this can only be the supposit (this was shown before [n33]); therefore, etc.

35. This reason is confirmed by a likeness, because just as man would not first be animated unless he were *per se* an animated body (being in-formed, as it were, by the soul), so will it be – as it seems – in the question at issue, because nothing that is not first

constituted formally in ‘being’ by the relation will be first a related thing unless something is first related as it were denominatively on account of denomination from the relation.<sup>a</sup>

a. [Interpolation] In accord with this one can argue – but less effectively – as follows: if the relation is not related neither is the divine essence (as is plain); therefore only a person is related. But what is related exists in itself first. Proof: according to Augustine *On the Trinity* VIII ch.3a, “if the Father is not something in himself he will not be anything that might be said in relation to another.” – Next by reason, because what is related is not simultaneous in nature with the relation, because nothing is simultaneous in nature with the relation save the relation; therefore that which is related would be relation, and so relation would be related. Nor is it posterior in nature to the relation, because what is ‘of such sort’ by a quality is not posterior to the quality (likewise of quantity and other forms); therefore similarly in the case of relation. Therefore some third member must be granted, namely that that which is related is prior to the relation, and then the consequence seems to follow that it is something absolute, because nothing save the absolute seems to be prior to relation.

36. Again a real relation pre-requires a real distinction between the extremes, therefore no relation is first to cause the real distinction between the extremes; therefore not in the present case either. – Proof of the antecedent: the Philosopher *Metaphysics* 5.9.1018a2-4, about ‘the same’, proves that identity is not a real relation, because it does not pre-require a real distinction between the extremes.

37. If it be said that a relation is not real which neither pre-requires nor makes a real distinction between the extremes, – on the contrary: then this argument is not valid, ‘the extremes are not really distinct, therefore the relation is not real’. For either what is

taken in the antecedent is that the extremes are not distinct by a distinction preceding the relation, and then the consequence ‘therefore the relation is not real’ does not hold, because so could it be taken in the question at issue; or what is taken in the antecedent is that the extremes are not distinct by a distinction made by the relation, – if you thus take ‘therefore a distinction between the extremes is not made thereby [sc. by a distinction made by the relation], because it is not a real relation’, then to argue from the antecedent so taken that the relation is not real is to argue ‘because it is not real, therefore it is not real’, which is empty.<sup>a</sup>

a. [Interpolation] It can be said in another way that the major [sc. the above antecedent] is true of an accidental relation that is added to extremes already distinct; the relation here is not of this sort, but is a relation that constitutes a supposit that is made formally distinct by the relation. – Against this: to a relation ‘whereby it is a relation’ there belongs that it be toward another, because if it is not toward another it is not a relation (otherwise one could even say that paternity could be a real relation in abstraction from the Son, if there was no need in any way for the extremes of the relation to be distinct, as there is no such need in the case of identity). For either ‘this paternity’ is toward something else distinct from mere filiation or it is toward something distinct by a distinction prior to the distinction that would come to it from the Son. If the second holds then the proposed conclusion is obtained [sc. that the persons are not constituted by relation]. If the first holds then to argue ‘paternity is not toward something distinct, therefore it is not real’ is to argue thus: ‘to this relation there is no real relation opposed, therefore it is not a real relation’; but this seems to be a manifest begging of the question, because the antecedent does not seem to be more manifest than the consequent. Therefore in the case of many relations no argument may be constructed to conclude that they are not real on the ground that these relations are not between really distinct extremes, but there would in all cases be a begging of the question.

Again, third, as follows: every relation has its term first in something absolute; but the first term of the relation ‘in a person’ is some other person and not the essence, because just as the essence is not related so it is not the term of a relation (for thus the term of the relation is distinguished as the related thing is); therefore a person, insofar as it is distinct from another person and is the term of the relation of that person to itself, is absolute. The major will be made clear in distinction 30 [nn.35-38], in the question ‘On the Relation of God to Creatures’.

38. [Second way] – In the second way the argument is as follows:<sup>a</sup>

A relation cannot be originated save by something absolute previously originated, whether in the related thing or in the term;<sup>b</sup> therefore the divine person that is first originated cannot be merely a subsistent relation, but one must posit something absolute that is originated first.

a. [*Interpolation*] first from the order that origination necessarily pre-requires, which order seems to be twofold, – for the first originating thing is prior to the originated thing; a relative is in no way prior to its correlative, because these are simply simultaneous; therefore etc. – There is also a confirmation of this reason from the opposite, as it were, of the conclusion, as follows: if the persons are not absolute but are relatives first [then follows n.40]

b. [*Interpolation*] just as neither can motion be in a ‘[relation] toward another’ save only *per accidens*, because it is *per se* toward an absolute in the subject or in the term of the relation, as is plain from *Physics* 5.2.225b11-13.

39. This reason is also very much confirmed if one denies that the essence is the formal term of this production; for then neither will the originated thing exist toward itself nor will it be the formal term of the origination, – which seems to be unacceptable.

40. Again,<sup>a</sup> it will then be the case that for the Father to originate the Son is no other than for the Father to have the Son as correlative; but the Father of himself – by the fact he is Father – has the Son as correlative, because in no instant whether of origin or of nature can the Father be understood without the Son or without being understood to have the Son; therefore the Father of himself, without origination, has the Son, therefore he does not originate the Son if nothing is originated save the correlative.<sup>b</sup>

a. [Interpolation] from the priority of the originator to the originated: the originator is prior to the originated; a relative is in no way prior to the correlative, because they are simply simultaneous. –

And each reason is confirmed by the fact that it follows from the opposite of the conclusion: if the persons are not absolute but relatives first.

b. [Interpolation] This is more clearly argued as follows: that thing is not originated which possesses – when the being unable to be begotten is posited and all action is abstracted – its whole being; such is the correlative of what is unable to be begotten, because from the nature alone of the relation, as it is first act (with every action or second act removed), the correlative of what is unable to be begotten exists when the unable to be begotten exists; therefore etc.

41. Further, third: every relative equally naturally has regard to its correlative, therefore the inspiriter as equally regards the inspirited as the generator the generated. Therefore if what is produced by each production is merely relative, each is equally naturally produced, and so there will not in divine reality be a double production (by way of nature and by way of will), and then it can be said that the Son is produced by way of will and the Holy Spirit by way of nature as equally truly as the opposite, – which is against what everyone says.

42. Again, then no production in divine reality will be generation, because generation is to primary substance [n.60] as to the produced term; but here relation or the relative is posited as the first thing produced; therefore there will be production in the category of relation and there will not be generation.

43. Again,<sup>a</sup> a supposit is in some way pre-understood for action, because each thing is first understood to exist *per se* before understood to act *per se*; if in that prior understanding the supposit is for itself, the intended conclusion is obtained [sc. the persons are not constituted merely by relations]; if the supposit is not for itself but toward another – as toward the Son – then the Son is understood at the same time, and so the Son is pre-understood to generation, and so the Son will not be the term of generation.

a. [Interpolation] from the second priority the argument is, second, as follows: [alternative text]  
from the priority of originator to origin.

44. And there is a confirmation, because by whatever priority one correlative is pre-understood for something, by that same priority the latter correlative is pre-understood for it, because of the simultaneity of relatives.<sup>a</sup>

a. [Interpolation] One can argue in accord with this about the third priority, namely of relation to person, which is proved by the Philosopher *Metaphysics* 7.3.1029a5-7: for form is prior to the composite (according to him there), so paternity is prior to the first person and consequently the opposite relation will be prior to the first person; therefore this relation is not obtained by the first person through the action of the first person. The consequence about the opposite relation is proved through the simultaneity of relatives.

45. [Third way] – As to the third way [n.32] the argument is as follows:

Whatever constitutes existence in something, and in the unity corresponding to such existence, is wholly first repugnant to a distinction opposite to that unity (example: if rational first constitutes man in his being and specific unity, rational is wholly first repugnant to a specific distinction such that, when removing if possible or *per impossibile* everything other than rational that is not part of the meaning of rational and keeping only the meaning of rational, a division into diverse specific natures will be repugnant to it). And the proof of this proposition is that if such a distinction is repugnant to the constituted whole, then it is repugnant to it by something; let that something be *a*; if it is wholly repugnant to the *a* itself then the intended conclusion is gained, – if not but it is repugnant to the *a* itself through *b*, there will be a process ad infinitum or, wherever a stand is made, that will be the ultimate constituent in such a unity and a distinction opposed to such unity will be wholly repugnant to it. Therefore if paternity constitutes the first supposit in its personal being under the idea of its being incommunicable, then communicability must of its own idea be first repugnant to paternity.

46. But this seems false for many reasons:

First because, according to those who hold this opinion [n.15], quiddity is not of itself incommunicable; therefore neither is paternity.

47. Second because paternity is not of itself a ‘this’, when everything that is not of the formal idea of paternity has been removed; for when deity is removed, which is not of the formal idea of paternity (according to Augustine *On the Trinity* VII ch.2 n.3, ‘he is not Father by that by which he is God’), paternity is not of itself formally infinite, and

consequently neither is it of itself a ‘this’ – and if so,<sup>a</sup> then neither will it much more be of itself incommunicable, because incommunicability presupposes singularity.

a. [Interpolation] Proof of this consequence: what contains by identity something that is outside its primary idea is in some way unlimited; therefore what formally contains such a thing is simply infinite (for formal containing requires a greater perfection in the container). From this further: if paternity is not of itself a this...

48. Next, third, because any divine relation of origin is equally the same as the divine essence; therefore if it contracts from it some incommunicability, any relation would contract it equally; but this is false, because active inspiriting, although it is a ‘this’, is yet not incommunicable, for it is in two things, namely the Father and the Son.

49. And from this result is proved, fourth, that since opposite relatives seem to be uniformly related to incommunicability, and since active inspiriting is not of itself thus incommunicable, then neither is passive inspiriting, which is the opposite of active inspiriting, incommunicable; therefore neither will passive inspiriting thus constitute the Holy Spirit in his personal being, which is false.

50. Next, fifth, because even if certain positions are set down, impossible or incompossible when the understanding of ‘rational’ is in place, it would be repugnant for it to be divided into several specific natures; for example if it were set down that ‘rational’ were the difference of color and that the color could produce substances from nothing, or any suchlike things. But once this impossible position is set down, that the production of the will is prior to that of the intellect, then, when preserving the ideas of generation and inspiriting, active inspiriting would be in one supposit and active

generation would then be in two, because there would be communicated to the Holy Spirit – in the instant in which he is inspirited – generative force; therefore now communicability is not formally repugnant to active generation in itself.<sup>a</sup>

a. [Interpolation] To this argument about ‘the first incomunicable’ there is a twofold response:

In the first way that paternity, although it is not incomunicable ‘whereby it is paternity’, yet divine paternity or paternity ‘whereby it is divine’ is incomunicable.

In a second way: that subsistent paternity (of which sort paternity is in God) is incomunicable, but not inherent paternity, of which sort is created paternity.

Against the first response, although the three final proofs [nn.48-50] are conclusive, yet I argue otherwise in two ways:

First as follows: when two things ‘*per se*’ constitute a third, neither of them has from the other the condition that is proper to it insofar as it constitutes the third, but each has such condition from itself first. For example, about matter and form: matter does not have from form the potentiality that is its in causing the composite, nor does form have from matter the actuality that is its in compounding; thus too in the case of definition: the genus does not have from the difference a determinable concept, nor does difference have from genus a specific individual act indivisible into several specifically different things. Therefore if a person is constituted from essence and an incomunicable property, neither of these will have from the other what is proper to it; as follows, just as essence does not have communicability from the property but is of itself communicable, after one removes in thought the property, so the property will not have incomunicability from the essence, but will be first such of itself, when the essence is *per impossibile* removed.

Further, essence does not give incomunicability to the Father as it is merely essence, because essence is communicable; therefore as itself it is understood to have paternity virtually in itself, and so the same thing ‘as virtually in the essence’ will be the reason for itself ‘as formally such’, – which is unacceptable: first because I ask about it as it is virtually in the essence whether

it is communicable or incommunicable; if it is communicable, it will not be the reason for incommunicability in paternity as it is formally in itself, – if it is incommunicable and from the essence (according to this response), the counter argument will again be, as before, that it is not from the essence as it is merely essence, and so the question ‘either it is communicable or incommunicable’ will be raised ad infinitum; second because no unity more truly or intensely belongs to anything as it exists merely virtually than belongs to it as it exists formally, and this when speaking of unity proper to it, and the point is plain as about entity proper; third because what is in another is in it by way of it – therefore what is in the essence virtually, as it is precisely in it, does not exist there as incommunicable.

Against that which is replied afterwards about subsistent relation, that it is incommunicable, I ask: since something must be understood to be a ‘this’ before it is subsistent, I ask by what is paternity a ‘this’? Not of itself, since it is not formally infinite – therefore much more is it not subsistent of itself either; therefore neither is it of itself incommunicable.

51. Again, an argument as to this way [n.32] is made, second, principally as follows: from the ultimate constitutive and distinctive elements of certain things there cannot be abstracted something common that is predicated in the ‘what’ of these things; proof: because if there is something common to them, they are not first distinguished by that common thing, but they are distinguished by something that contracts them, and so they are not the first distinctive elements; if then they are first distinctives, nothing predicated in the ‘what’ is common to them. But from paternity and filiation is abstracted that which relation is, and this seems to be something common to them and univocal; for the intellect can be certain about relation and doubtful about this relation and that. Therefore the things from which relation is abstracted are not first distinctives.<sup>a</sup>

a. [Interpolation] Response is made by denying the minor [sc. relation as common to paternity and filiation and univocal], by saying that the divine relations are first diverse. – Against this an argument has frequently been made [n.51], and one middle term can be repeated: because then he who knows one origination in divine reality and does not know whether that origination is generation or inspiriting, would have no concept save about the verbal sound. Vain then would those problems be that are raised about generation or about production in general, and they are solved by their proper middle terms before asking about productions in particular.

52. Again, third: the first constitutive element of a supposit in any nature seems to make something that is *per se* one with that nature, because it does not seem that the *per accidens* could be ‘first simply’ in any genus, according to the Philosopher *Physics* 2.1.192b20-23;<sup>a</sup> but just as in creatures relation is of a different kind from the absolute and so does not make something *per se* one with it, so in divine reality there does not seem to be one concept *per se* of the absolute and of relation; therefore if person includes these two things, namely essence and relation, essentially, then person does not seem to be a supposit *per se* and first of such a nature but is a supposit as it were *per accidens*, and so it seems that some prior thing could exist that is constitutive *per se* of the supposit in that nature.

a. [Interpolation] There is confirmation for the reason: the first identity seems to be of the first nature with its proper supposit, therefore that identity is not *per accidens* nor quasi *per accidens* but is altogether *per se*; therefore the supposit does not include anything of a quasi other genus than the nature.

There is also confirmation in that otherwise the identity of a created substance with its supposit would be more ‘*per se*’ than the identity of the divine nature with its, which seems unacceptable.

There is a third confirmation in that secondary substance states the whole ‘what it is’ of primary substance, – therefore in primary substance there is no concurrence of another quiddity distinct from the quiddity of secondary substance; therefore neither does the quiddity of relation, which is distinct from the quiddity of essence, pertain to the idea of primary substance; for if primary substance includes *per se* a quiddity distinct from secondary substance, then it is not more a ‘*per se* supposit’ of the secondary substance than of that other quiddity, and so not more of either or of them or of both.

Nor is the response valid here that this quiddity is that one by identity, and therefore the same ‘*per se* one thing’ can be the *per se* supposit of each quiddity. – For this does not save the ‘*per se* unity’ of the supposit, because a supposit is set down as a ‘*per se* supposit’ of a quiddity by actuality, according to formal idea, but not because of a real and non-formal identity of itself with some other quiddity (for then a *per se* supposit of being would be a *per se* supposit of unity because of the true identity of ‘one’ with being). Therefore a supposit ‘*per se* one’ is only a *per se* supposit of a quiddity formally one, and consequently of no quiddity formally distinct from it, – and consequently it includes *per se* in the first mode no formally distinct quiddity, because there is no reason why it should not be a *per se* supposit of that distinct quiddity if it were to include it *per se* in the first mode.

If an objection be made here about the [divine] attributes, the case is not similar, because no attribute constitutes *per se* a supposit of deity, but it is a passion (according to Damascene chs. 4, 9), and it is not unacceptable for a quasi-passion to be quasi *per accidens* the same as a quasi-subject (and even as the supposit of the subject), although it is unacceptable for the first supposit of the first subject to be in itself a being *per accidens*.

To the third reason, that proceeds from the *per se* unity of a supposit of divine nature [n.52], the response is made that relation constitutes as it passes over into the essence and so is not as if it is of another genus; nor does it follow because of this that the thing constituted is absolute, because relation preserves that which is proper to itself, – though it is well conceded that that which is left behind through relation is absolute, because the ‘left behind’ is existence.

Against this response. I ask: either relation constitutes as it is the same as the essence formally (or quidditatively), – and if so, two absurdities follow: one that relation will not be relation, because according to Augustine *On the Trinity* VII “if it exists to another then it is not substance”, and by parity of reasoning, if it is formally substance then it does not exist to another; likewise another absurdity: whatever is constituted by something insofar as it is formally absolute is formally absolute, and so a constituted supposit would be formally absolute. Or, supposit is constituted by relation insofar as relation passes over into or is the same as the essence not formally but really, – and with this stands the fact that it is constituted properly by relation as it is relation, because relation can in no way be considered in divine reality without being really the same as the essence. If therefore, when considered in some way, it were to constitute a supposit per accidens, given that it might constitute in this way – and yet it is, in any way considered, the same really though not formally as the essence – the consequence is that, from the fact that it constitutes as the same really as the essence, nothing prevents what is constituted from being an entity per accidens; but it cannot constitute as more the same with the essence than really, because it does not do so as formally the same.

Further, as to the remark that ‘relation leaves behind absolute existence’, this would seem to be repugnant with itself, because a form does not leave behind an existence other than itself, just as whiteness does not leave behind in the white thing any other existence than itself by which the thing is white; therefore a constituting property, if it preserves that which is proper to itself, leaves behind that which is proper to itself and nothing else. Likewise, how could absolute being be left behind by a relative property if it preceded it in the person?

53. [Fourth way] – In the fourth way the argument is from authorities:

Augustine *On the Trinity* VII ch.1 n.2: “Every relative is something when the relative is removed etc.” Therefore, as was deduced by the first reason [n.33], he seems to concede that that which is related is something in itself.

54. Again, *ibid.* ch.4 nn.8-9: “Every being subsists for itself, how much more God?” And he speaks of ‘subsist’ which pertains to substance in the way the Greeks take substance; but they (according to him) take substance the way we take person; therefore the ‘subsist’ which belongs to a person insofar as it is person, which is counted up in the three (namely the way we speak of ‘three subsistents’), that ‘subsist’ exists for itself, according to him, and it is unacceptable for a divine person to subsist toward another when taking ‘subsist’ in this way.

55. Again, third: all the things put in the definition of person, whether by Boethius *De Persona* ch.3 or by Richard of St. Victor *On the Trinity* IV ch.22, are absolute, such that none of them includes relation essentially; and a definition ought to express the intrinsic quiddity of the defined thing, – therefore etc.<sup>a</sup>

a. [Interpolation] To the authorities of Augustine already adduced (here in the fourth way) response is made that Augustine is speaking of that which is formally signified by the name ‘person’, not of that which is materially signified; but formally this name ‘person’ signifies something in intellectual nature that is indistinct in itself and distinct from something else; but that by which such distinction exists is an accident of that which is formally signified – yet it is necessary that in some nature that distinct thing is absolute (as in the created nature) and that in some nature it is a relation (as in the issue at hand, namely divine reality).

Against this response. Either Augustine understands the ‘indistinct in itself and distinct from something else’ in that which is formally signified by person in accord with essence, and then he no more has to concede that there are three persons than that there are three essences (or three things distinct according to essence), which seems manifestly contrary to his intention, when he means that we use the name of substance otherwise than as the Greeks do; so they use it for primary substance and concede that there are three substances in the way that we concede that there are three persons; therefore we properly concede – according to him – three persons. Or he

understands ‘indistinct in itself’ according to incomunicable substance (and so ‘distinct from something else’), and then if that – in accord with that which is formally signified – exists for itself, the intended conclusion is obtained [sc. person is something absolute not relational].

### C. Third Opinion

56. [Exposition of the opinion] – In a third way the position is otherwise,<sup>a</sup> that the divine persons are absolute.

a. [Interpolation] A third opinion agrees with the reasons and authorities adduced against the second opinion, and this posits...

57. And lest it seem novel and out of the way, a certain older doctor’s saying is adduced who distinguishes ‘something said in twofold way according to substance.’ For he speaks thus [Bonaventure, *Sentences* I d.25 a.1 q.1]: “One must understand that – as Richard of St. Victor says [*On the Trinity* IV chs.6-7]—‘being said according to substance’ is double: in one way by indicating substance according to common nature, and thus ‘man’ is said according to substance; or by indicating substance as a certain supposit, as in the case of ‘a certain man’. To say substance in the first way (namely as the quiddity) is to say a ‘what’, and in the second way it is to say a ‘whom’.” He says further that “the name of essence or substance (or of quiddity) is said according to substance because it indicates the common nature, but person is said according to substance because it indicates a definite and distinct supposit; for the common nature is not multiplied nor is it related, – and therefore what it calls substance according to

common nature is in this way said to be ‘for itself’ because it can in no way be said according to relation;<sup>a</sup> but a supposit (or hypostasis) is of a nature to be multiplied and to be compared to another, and so to be related; and what is thus said according to substance in no way impedes – by reason of the superadded relation – its being said according to relation. And this is what Richard of Saint Victor means.”

a. [Interpolation] “and in this way indeed it is divided from the opposite”

58. The same doctor also<sup>a</sup> says – in the question ‘Whether the properties distinguish the persons’ – that ‘in the way that they are dispositions they do not distinguish the persons, but in the way that they are origins’; which statement – even if he himself perhaps not so understand it – can be expounded as that the origins do not distinguish the persons formally but as it were by way of principle; just as motion in creatures, and especially if the motion be in the mover and not in the moved, would not distinguish the terms of motion formally but effectively, which pertains to the genus of efficient cause, – in the way also that, if human nature were posited in one man and could not be multiplied save by generation, one could say that generation multiplies men, not indeed formally (as if men were distinguished formally by generations as they are generations), but as it were effectively, because generation is reduced to the genus of efficient cause. One could speak thus in the case of the issue at hand, that the divine nature is not communicated to the suppositos save by origin, and thus it is that the persons are distinguished in nature by their origin as it were by a principle, reducing this to the principal source itself, which distinguishes not formally but in a way corresponding to what distinguishes effectively in creatures.

a. [Interpolation] And if the objection be made: how will then the common opinion of the authors be saved who say that the persons are distinguished by relations – in answer to this can be taken a certain saying of the same doctor, for he says...

59. Accordingly then the position would be that the divine persons would be constituted in personal existence – and distinguished – by absolute realities and as it were by way of principle, and the ‘produced persons’ would not be formally distinguished by origins; but the things constituting the persons would be absolute not in the first way but the second way, because although they would not formally be relations, yet the things constituted by them would be relatable. This could be a way of stating the position.

60. [Proofs] – Now the solution given by this position is not only proved by the four ways touched on against the second opinion [nn.32-55], but also by certain other persuasive points.

First indeed because<sup>a</sup> primary substance is substance most of all, according to the Philosopher in *Categories* 5.2a11-14, – and this is not a mark of imperfection; therefore it seems that in this way one could posit that primary substance in divine reality, namely the person, to which it most belongs to subsist, that this is ‘to exist per se’. But relation does not seem to be able formally to constitute something subsistent, nor consequently to constitute primary substance.

a. [Interpolation] Again, according to this third way there is an argument, fourth [cf. nn.45, 51, 52], as follows:

61. There is a confirmation too for this reason, that secondary substance states the whole ‘what it is’ of primary substance, – therefore in primary substance there does not concur any quiddity distinct from the quiddity of secondary substance; therefore neither does the quiddity of relation, which is distinct from the quiddity of essence, pertain to the idea of primary substance.<sup>a</sup>

a. [Interpolation] There is a confirmation because, since secondary substance does not include anything that is not formally substance, therefore neither does primary substance – which is most of all substance – include it, because substance does not come from non-substance.

62. There is a confirmation too in that if it is necessary – in things that exist toward something in divine reality – not only to posit quiddity, namely not only paternity but this paternity, and that too under the idea of incommunicability, and to posit that all these things belong to it insofar as it exists toward another and as it is not formally that which is for itself, – that if so, why can this not hold of that which is for itself, namely that what it is to be incommunicable is not had through that which is formally ‘what exists toward another’?

63. And this is ultimately confirmed efficaciously, as it seems, by the fact that in created substance, although it is a mark of imperfection to be limited to one subsistence or to one most perfect existence, which is in no way determinable or contractible and which cannot be anything of something else, yet the fact that nature itself can have ultimate existence, because of its being of a nature to be contracted by something else, this is not a mark of any imperfection, because this is conceded to substances and denied, because of their imperfection, to accidents; therefore it seems that divine nature ‘as it is

for itself' will have of itself ultimate actual existence and ultimate unity without limitation to a single being of subsistence.

64. Then too one can set down an example, because just as if the intellective soul were first to perfect or constitute the heart in the being of supposit and just as if the animated heart were able, second, to produce the hand in the being of supposit, there would not be anything distinct in the nature of the animated whole save by their origins, and yet formally they would be certain absolute things one of which is produced by another; yet in them there would truly be relations of producer and produced; for relations are not less preserved – on the contrary they are more preserved, it seems – if one posits certain absolutes that can be related, than if any such absolute things are not posited.<sup>a</sup>

a. [Interpolation] Through these two statements – the first about the double absolute, the second about origin distinguishing as it were in a way corresponding to an effective, not a formal, principle in creatures – many authorities can be expounded that seem to be the contrary.

65. Response is made to what has been touched on here about primary substance [namely that relation cannot constitute it, n.60] that relation<sup>a</sup> has here the force of constituting a primary substance or a supposit of secondary substance. The fact is confirmed by this, that what is scattered about in lower things is united in higher things, and that therefore, although 'to exist toward' and to subsist belong to a thing in the case of creatures through something different, yet they can both belong to God or to the divine persons through something the same.

a. [Interpolation] Response is made to this fourth reason, which proceeds from the idea of primary substance, by saying that relation here has the force of an incommunicable property of primary substance, and therefore...

66. Against this an argument is made as follows: I ask what force you mean, whether the force of an efficient or of a formal cause? If of an efficient cause, it will as it were cause there a certain absolute reality that will formally constitute there a primary substance, – and thus the point at issue is conceded, namely that primary substance is constituted by some absolute reality; and, along with this, there is added one other impossibility, that relation could cause that absolute person. If in the second way, namely formally, since no form has the force of constituting anything formally save such a thing as is of a nature to be something by such form (as whiteness does not have the force of constituting anything save what is white and what is included in white), the consequence is that relation – which is essentially a disposition ‘toward another’ – does not have the force of constituting anything ‘in itself’. The confirmation [n.65] seems to have no validity: because it is for this reason that such union is brought about in God, namely because of the infinity of the divine essence, which includes unitively in itself every perfection simply and also every reality compossible with itself; but a property is not infinite formally, and so there is no need for every reality to be united in it (and especially not that reality which seems to be formally repugnant to it or unable to be included in it), as if it were stating a greater perfection formally, or not a lesser perfection, than the essence does.

## II. What one Should Think about the Third Opinion

67. And if it be objected against this way [sc. the third] that it cannot stand along with the faith, because the Savior, when expressing the whole truth of the faith, named the three persons (*Matthew 28.19*) Father and Son and Holy Spirit, and blessed John in his first canonical letter 5.7 says ‘there are three who give testimony in heaven: Father, Word, and Holy Spirit’, – and the saints, when later treating of this matter, base themselves on these words of the canon [of Scripture] and seem always expressly to say that the persons are not distinguished formally save by relations, as was argued for the second opinion [nn.18-22]:

68. One could here say that the Savior taught three persons and that they are relatives by these relations, and that a person receives essence from a person – and this indeed is not denied by the present opinion [n.56]; yet the inference does not follow that ‘the Savior did not say that the divine persons were constituted by anything absolute, therefore they are not so constituted’ (for the place taken from the authority does not hold negatively), just as the inference does not hold, ‘I speak with the bishop and the official and the archdeacon, therefore these are distinguished in their personal being by these relations’. And perhaps the Savior, seeing that we cannot conceive the proper absolute realities, if there are any, by which the divine persons are formally constituted in their personal being, wanted to express them to us by names more intelligible to us; for we can in some way conceive those relations of origin from relations of origin in creatures. And perhaps another reason could be assigned, that in this way [sc. through relations of origin] more of the faith is expressed at once than in the other way [sc. through absolutes]; for if the persons are absolute and are constituted by absolute properties (*a, b, c*) and can be

named by their names – if the Savior had expressed them [sc. absolute names], he would precisely thereby have expressed the distinction of the persons and not the origin of person from person; yet, by expressing the persons with relative names, he expressed both facts by them, namely distinction and origin.

69. But that the divine persons could be named and expressed by some absolute names seems able to be shown by Scripture, – as in *Proverbs* 30.4 where Solomon (after the many questions he moves about God) asks: “What is his name and what the name of his Son, if you know?” – If the first name of ‘his Son’ is ‘Son’ (which it should be, if he is constituted in being by filiation), this question seems to be empty, because every question supposes something certain and asks about something doubtful (from *Metaphysics* 7.17.1041a10-16). The question then would be empty, because it would suppose and ask about the same thing; for it supposes that he is Son and asks ‘what is his name’, – and likewise it supposes, through the nature of relation, that ‘that of which he is relative’ is the Father and asks about the name. One could reply to Solomon: you are asking about the name of the Father and of the Son, and you state their first names!

70. Therefore it seems one could say that if the New Scripture [Testament] expressly intends them to be relative persons, and that this is of the substance of the faith, yet nothing express is found that the relations are the first forms, constituting and distinguishing the persons first, – nor has the Church declared this. Neither in the Apostles’ Creed nor in the Nicene Creed nor in the General Council under Innocent III is this declared (as to the article ‘On the Trinity’, an ‘Extra’ is set down, ‘On the Supreme Trinity and the Catholic Faith’, “Firmly”); nor in the General Council of Lyons under Gregory X (which, as to the matter ‘On the Trinity’, is set down an ‘Extra’, ‘On the

Supreme Trinity and the Catholic Faith', 'Firmly', and it is today in the sixth book of the *Decretals*), nor in any other Council is what may hitherto seem manifestly handed down in any authentic Scripture made clear.

71. If therefore Christ did not teach this nor has the Church declared it, namely that the persons are first distinguished by relations, neither Christ nor the Church then seem to assert that this is of the faith, because, if is not true [sc. that the persons are distinguished first by relations], it is not reverently said of the divine persons that they are only 'subsistent relations' [Henry of Ghent]; if however it is true, yet it is not handed down as a certain truth, it does not seem safe to assert that this is to be held as a certain truth. And although it be true that the persons are distinguished by relations (and it is while holding to this in general that the saints have labored on how a distinction of persons can stand with unity of essence), yet one should not deny that any other distinction, which will also concede this distinction, may be posited as prior, – such that every way holds this affirmative to be true, namely that the divine persons are distinguished by relations, although some way says that this distinction is as it were preceded by some real distinction. Nor should one restrict an article of faith handed down in general to one particular meaning, as if the general meaning could not be true save in the particular one; and just as one should not restrict this article, that 'the Word of God was made man', to one determinate mode (which is not expressed in the canonical Scripture or by the Church), such that it could not be true unless that mode were true; for this is to reduce an article of faith to incertitude, if anything is uncertain that has not been handed down as an article of faith (for what cannot be held without some uncertainty seems to be uncertain).

If this position [n.56] be held, one should say that this absolute reality – constituting and distinguishing the person – would not be a reality for itself as the essentials are for themselves, but a reality that is personal and for itself in the second way [n.59], according to the distinction of that master which was set down at the beginning of the opinion [n.57].

### III. To the Arguments for the Second Opinion when Holding the Third Opinion

73. [To the authorities] – Someone who held this opinion [n.56] could respond to all the arguments of Augustine for the opinion put before [n.15], contrary to this opinion, through the distinction of the aforesaid doctor [n.57] – because<sup>a</sup> he [Augustine] is speaking of things that are for themselves simply, such that they are neither related nor relatable, but are opposite to relation, as is plain from his examples there [*On the Trinity* V]. For he himself seems to say there that something is for itself although it is relatable to another, as is expressly intended by *On the Trinity* VII ch.4 nn.8-9 where, when treating of how the Greeks say that there are three substances, he means that to subsist – in the respect it belongs to substance in the way the Greeks say substance – is for itself. For he subjoins there: “If it is one thing for God to exist and another for him to subsist, just as it is one thing for him to be God and another to be Father, then he subsists relatively, just as he generates relatively;” and from this he infers: “therefore substance will not now be substance, because it will be a relative;” and later: “But it is absurd that substance be said relatively; for every substance subsists for itself, how much more God?” – What is more express than that substance, as the Greeks take it (namely for the person), is primary

substance and not secondary substance, and exists for itself and subsists for itself, with the ‘to subsist’ which belongs to substance as so meant?

a. [*Interpolation, for n.67 to n.73*] Against this opinion [n.56] can be objected that it does not stand along with the faith:

First, because the Savior, when expressing in *Matthew* 28.19 the whole truth of the faith that is to be held about the Trinity, named the three persons with relative names (“in the name,” he says, “of the Father and the Son and the Holy Spirit”); likewise John in his canonical letter 5 (“There are three that give testimony in heaven: the Father, the Word, and the Holy Spirit”), – and generally, wherever the canonical Scripture speaks of the divine persons it expresses them with relative names. It seems then that to posit they are absolutes contradicts Scripture and the faith.

Second, because the Church (or anyone who expresses the truth that is to be held about the Trinity) expresses the persons with relative names, as is plain in the Apostles’ and Athanasian Creeds, and in the Nicene Creed, and all other authentic declarations of the faith by the universal Church. Therefore the opposite is repugnant to the faith, when it has been declared by the Church.

Third, because when the saints – and catholic doctors commonly – treat of this article, they only posit and keep a trinity of relative persons – whose doctrine, at least of many of them, has been authenticated by the universal Church, as is plain in the canon at distinction 15 (*Decretum Gratiani*). Therefore to contradict the sayings of these saints is to contradict the Church that authenticates their statements.

It is replied to this objection that the said opinion not only does not conflict with the faith, but – what is more – agrees with the sacred Scripture; the first point is shown in two ways:

First as follows, that whatever sacred Scripture has handed down about the Trinity or that the Church has declared or that an authentic doctor has so manifestly asserted is conceded by this opinion, namely that the three persons are appropriately expressed by the names of Father and Son and Holy Spirit; because it concedes that there really are relations of origin there, because it concedes the true origination of one person from another that is generation (and so the person generating is the Father and the person generated is the Son), and it concedes the procession of the

third person from the two (and thus does the Holy Spirit proceed, that is inspirited by chaste and holy will). But Scripture does not say – nor does the universal Church say by declaring anywhere – that the persons are distinguished by these relations alone, just as neither does it say that they are distinguished by absolute properties. But now, although whatever authority hands down is to be held as true, yet whatever it does not hand down is not to be denied to be true; “Many works,” says John the confidant of Jesus, “did Jesus do which are not written in this book” (*John 20.30*); and certainly not elsewhere either, because he adds , 21.25: “I reckon that the world cannot contain the books etc.” Even logically speaking it is plain that a place taken from authority does not hold negatively.

Second thus: nothing is to be asserted to be of the truth of the faith save what is handed down in Scripture or is declared by the universal Church, or is necessarily and evidently entailed by something so handed down or declared; that the persons are distinguished by no absolute properties does not appear to be such; therefore etc.

The first part of the minor seems plain, because Scripture nowhere hands this down; for he who affirms relations nowhere denies absolute properties.

The second part is similarly plain, because all the things that the Church is found to have declared as needing to be held about the article ‘On the Trinity’ are contained in the Apostles’ or Athansian or Nicene Creeds, or in the Extra ‘On the Supreme Trinity and the Catholic Faith’, “Firmly” – “We condemn” (both which chapters were promulgated in the General Council celebrated under Innocent III), or in the Extra ‘On the Supreme Trinity and the Catholic Faith’, “To the faithful”, and it is today in the sixth book (which chapter was promulgated in the Council of Lyons celebrated under Gregory X). Not many chapters, or authentic writings, are found containing a declaration of the Church about the article ‘On the Trinity’! Nor is it declared in any of these that the persons ‘have no properties save relative ones’; the thing is plain if one looks.

The proof of the third part of the minor is that the reasons given for inferring the proposition [sc. the persons have no properties save relative ones], as taken from what is handed down in Scripture or declared by the Church, seem all to be solvable, as will later be said in reply to them.

The second point – namely that this opinion agrees with Scripture – is shown by the verse from *Proverbs* 30.4 where (after moving many questions about God) Solomon asks: “What is his name, and what the name of his Son, if you know?” – And from this the argument runs: every question supposes something certain and asks about something doubtful (from *Metaphysics* 7.17.1041a10-16); but here that the ‘Son’ is supposed and what is asked about is his name, – and by parity of reasoning, by the name of relation is supposed that that of which he is the Son is ‘Father’, and what is asked for is his name; therefore with this given as certain, that he is ‘Son’ and he ‘Father’, there is doubt about what is the former’s name and what the latter’s. But if these persons be constituted first in personal existence by paternity and filiation, then the first name of the latter is Father and the first name of the former is Son, – and so there would be certitude about ‘Son’ and doubt about what his name is; therefore Solomon seems to mean that the Son is not first constituted by filiation, just as too that ‘Son’ is not his first name. But once it is known that he is Son there yet remains to ask – according to Solomon – what his name is; here a brief argument is made to reduce this to impossibility: given that the first name of the person – which is ‘Son’ – is the name of Son (which consequence holds if the Son is first constituted by filiation), then Solomon is supposing and asking about the same thing; for he is supposing the first name of the person and is asking ‘what is his name’.

If response is made in the above way to this objection about the faith as directed against the third opinion, arguments can be made against this response:

First as follows: why did the Savior wish to express the persons with relative names if they are absolute and the absolutes (if they exist) were not hidden from him – and it would seem fitting for baptism to be given by invoking the divine persons with their first names?

Second as follows: when the article about Christ is handed on, it is proper to take it according to the understanding that is the greatest that can be had about Christ; such understanding is about persons firstly relative and in no way about absolutes; therefore etc.

Third as follows: the inferences of the saints and doctors must be supposed to be necessary ones; but when these or similar ones are used, the conclusion to be drawn from what is

manifestly believed is that the persons are not absolutes, as is plain in many deductions by the masters.

To the first of these arguments someone might perhaps say that for two reasons the Savior gave in this way a fitting expression:

First because he taught us in the way that we were capable; but if the properties were absolute, he saw that we could not conceive them, or not as easily as we could conceive relations, because they can be known by us neither by way of causality and eminence (since they are not perfections simply), nor by anything similar in creatures (the way we can perhaps conceive relations from the relations of origin in creatures), because to those incommunicable absolutes – if they exist – nothing is similar in creatures, nay not even to any created incommunicable thing is anything similar, because anything such is primarily diverse from anything else; and this impossibility or difficulty in knowing those absolute properties, if they exist, could be grasped by someone from the aforesaid question of Solomon. An example of this is plain in the common way of speaking, where we more frequently express persons with relative names than with absolute ones, because the relative names are more known; yet it is clear that the persons we intend to express with those names are in themselves absolute; for example, we say the pope or a bishop or a king did so and so; we do not as often say ‘Peter did it’ or ‘John did it’; for the duties are more known than the absolute persons. So could it be said here, that through the origin of person we can conceive its absolute property (if the person has such a property), or we cannot conceive it, or not as easily through the origin.

Second, because if there are absolute properties, and in this respect the persons could be named with absolute names, then, by so naming them, not as much is expressed by those names about the truth of faith as is expressed by the names ‘Father, Son, and Holy Spirit’, because by these names not only is the distinction between the persons expressed but also the origin that exists in them, and also in some way – as a result – the unity of the essence, because in such origination there is perfect communication of the same essence; three absolute names would not thus express all these things.

To the second of the arguments someone might perhaps say – first – that the understanding which Christ expressed (namely that they are relatives) is without doubt to be maintained, but about that of which he was silent (namely whether they are absolute) one side is no more against the understanding of the article than the other is, unless it be shown to be repugnant to the understanding which he did express.

Second, that to restrict the article of faith to a particular understanding – which however is handed on in a general way – as if the general understanding could not be true unless the special understanding was true, this seems to reduce the article to uncertainty; for that seems uncertain which cannot be held without uncertainty. At any rate greater reverence seems to be given to an article handed on in a universal way, provided one say that the universal understanding of it can be true whether any special feature is posited or denied – which special feature is not handed on as to be firmly believed – than that the article could not be true unless some special determination were true. An example of this in other articles: ‘Creator of heaven and earth’; one should not reduce this to the fact that, if the omnipotence in God be in any way distinct from the will, he could not create, – and so of the opposite side. Likewise one should not reduce ‘the Word was made flesh’ to many special facts, nor to some one of those things with any of which and with its opposite this truth can stand. A more apt example seems to be: if what was handed on to the Jews as a thing to be believed was that ‘God is one’ and nothing was handed on specifically about the Trinity, not only would there be less reverence but irreverence and falsity in asserting that this article could not be true unless God were one in person as he is one in essence; and yet this would in that case seem to be more consonant with the words of the article handed on to them than the opposite opinion. Therefore just as the Jews were obligated then to assert neither side to be necessarily determinate (but it seems that what was handed on to them in general was necessarily to be held), so it seems that we, as to articles handed on to us in universal terms, should not assert – without a declaration of the Church – that necessarily this or that special thing is to be held, with either of which the articles as they are handed down can stand; for not without cause did God, who knew the truth in particular, hand it on to be believed only according to a universal understanding, and did not reduce it to this or that special mode as something needing to be held by faith.

Third, because in the issue at hand it does not seem – because of the reverence due to those persons – that one should say that there are only relations in the essence unless this were most certainly handed down, on account of the limited entity of relation in regard to absolute being.

To the third of the arguments someone might perhaps say that something is not to be held to be of the substance of the faith merely because of a soluble piece of reasoning – by whomever it be made –, nor perhaps because of the conclusion of such reasoning, insofar as the conclusion is drawn precisely through that reasoning: someone arguing like this would expose himself to death, and no one should according to right reason so expose himself; therefore a higher authority is needed for something to be held to be of faith than that someone so argues (some people argue what they do not altogether assert). And although that which a saint, approved by the Church as to doctrine, asserts as needing to be held is sufficiently certain, yet other authorities – doubtful ones – can be given an exposition, and much more so in the case of other less approved writers.

In the first way one might say that nothing is found contrary to the aforesaid opinion  
[n.56; the persons are not absolutes]

As to the things that seem in the second way to be against it, those who hold the third opinion reply by running through the authorities in order. As to the authorities and reasons that were adduced against the third opinion, or in favor of the second opinion (to the first, from the Gospel, response seems already to have been made):

To the authorities from Augustine, *On the Trinity* V, those who hold the third opinion respond by the distinction set down at the beginning of the opinion [n.57], which Augustine...

74. And if it be objected that the words of Augustine ‘about substance and person’  
[n.73] should not be more taken of the personal than of the essential, because he says that  
‘God and person exist by the same thing’, – response: ‘by the same thing’, that is, by  
something said ‘in relation to another’, because the Father is not the person of the Son,  
just as neither is he the God of the Son, – the way that Socrates is not Socrates of anyone,

just as neither is man of someone, understanding this as man of his correlative. But there is no need that he be God and person ‘by something altogether the same’, such that person be said to exist altogether to itself the way God, or deity, is said to exist to itself, because then, just as there are not three deities and thereby not three magnitudes either, according to Augustine (because magnitude, like deity, is said to exist altogether to itself), so neither would there be three persons, which he himself denies. Things then that exist altogether to themselves are not separately counted, – things that exist altogether to another are not common to the three persons; but things that exist to themselves though not altogether to themselves but are relatable (because it is not repugnant for them to be related) are common (but counted up), or can be said to be proper things from which some common and counted thing can be abstracted.

75. As to Augustine *On the City of God* XI [n.19], I concede that ‘God is whatever he has’ save for the relative he has which is not him; he does indeed have a correlative, as the Father has the Son as Son. And therefore I concede that the first person is ‘whatever he has’ to which he is not related; but he is not the second person, which he has as correlative person, although he is not first constituted by that relation.

76. As to Boethius, when he says that ‘relation multiplies the trinity etc.’ [n.17], I say that that doctor takes relation for origin, and, understanding it in this way, ‘to multiply’ is taken, not as to distinguish formally, but by way of principle as it were, correspondingly to effective principle [n.58]; and this indeed is not to twist the words; for ‘to multiply’ means to make many, as Christ truly multiplied the Gospel loaves (*Matthew* 14.13-21, 15.29-39), and yet he was not the form by which those loaves were formally

multiplied, – and God by creating multiplies souls is yet not himself the form by which souls are formally distinguished.

77. As to John Damascene [nn.21-22], I say that one of his authorities solves the other, because precisely in ch.8 he posits [sc. in the Father] non-generation and in ch.52 he posits paternal property; but these two properties are distinct, according to Augustine *On the Trinity* V ch.6 n.7; therefore by excluding everything else that is in Father – in ch.8 – besides non-generation, he understands by non-generation the personal being of the Father. And wherever he excludes all other things from some property of some supposit, through the property that is included he includes every other personal aspect, and so the absolute reality, if there is any, would be so included; and it is included most of all, as it seems, because when, in the case of creatures, an accident is included, the subject is not excluded, and so when relation is included in a divine person that which is related by it is not excluded, – just as, if it be said only paternity exists, the Father who by paternity is Father would not thereby be excluded.

78. To Richard [n.23] I say: the fact that the mode of existence is different does pertain to origin, but it does not follow from this that the originated is not something subsistent to itself, distinct from the originating by some absolute personal reality.

79. To Anselm [n.20] I likewise say that ‘all things are one and the same where the opposition of relation does not prevent it’ either formally (as relation prevents relation) or as of a nature to be related by the opposite relation: this is the way the persons – if they were absolute – would be distinguished, because in them there are relations by way of principles.

80. [To the arguments] – To the arguments for the second opinion [nn.24-27].

To the first [n.24] one can say that if any absolute reality constitutes the persons, yet it will not make a composite with the divine essence, just as neither would the constituting relation do so; the fact is confirmed by the argumentative place ‘from the greater’, because a reality proper to subsistence in a creature does not make a composite with the essence, but relation in creatures makes a composite with the foundation, as will be explained elsewhere [*Ord. II d.3 p.1 qq.5-6, nn.9, 11-12, 15-16; d.1 q.4 nn.5-6, 26*]; therefore if here [sc. in God] relation cannot make a composite with the essence, much more will the reality of a supposit also not make a composite with the reality of nature.

81. And when the reason is confirmed because the absolute ‘either altogether remains or altogether passes over’ [n.25], I say: as was said in making clear the second opinion, namely that ‘relation remains by the fact that its idea is not formally the idea of essence, and it passes over because it is essence according to perfect identity’, so can it be said that absolute reality – if it constitute the person – does indeed pass over to the essence because of perfect identity, but it remains because it is not formally the reality of the essence. And there is a confirmation for this reason, that the attributal perfections seem to be absolute and not relative (as was said in distinction 8, in the question ‘About the attributes’ [d.8 nn. 185, 209, 215-217, 220, 222]), and yet they both remain and pass over, such that they do not make a composite with the essence nor are they formally the same as the essence; and if any of them would, according to their formal reason, have to be distinguished really from another, the distinction would be formally through that formal reason and not through the essence, and yet there would be no composition.

82. To the second argument [n.26] I say that when positing relative persons one must posit them as truly subsistent and that in them there is the same undivided nature;

one cannot do this because of any imperfection of the persons in subsisting, because they are posited as being as truly subsistent as they would be if they were absolute; therefore one must posit them because of the infinity of the essence that is in the subsistents; but there would be the same infinity of essence if the persons were absolute, – so the nature should not in that case be divided just as neither does the property now divide it. Let this then be proved, ‘every nature, common to absolute supposita, is distinct in those supposita’! [n.26]. This is indeed true in the case of creatures, but in the issue at hand it begs the principal conclusion.

83. To the third [n.27] reply is made by instancing that to the Father when constituted in his personal existence, and to the Son too when constituted in his personal existence, active inspiriting is at it were an adventitious property – according to some people – and yet it is not quasi accidental according to them, nor is it even a relation of reason. Why then could it not be thus understood in the issue at hand, that the person is constituted by an absolute reality and that to the person – as constituted in such reality – the relation, according to mode of understanding, is adventitious and yet is neither accidental nor a thing of reason? And when the proof that it is a relation of reason is given through similarity with relation to creatures [n.27], I say that it is not similar; for the relation to creatures does not arise from any necessity in the nature of the foundation, the way it does arise here [sc. in God].<sup>a</sup>

a. [Interpolation] The fourth reason [see interpolation to n.27] rests on this proposition: ‘every absolute is act and as a result bestows existence’.

This is disproved in many ways:

First because in the case of creatures, where it seems most of all to be probable, there is an instance from the hypostatic property, because this property is not an act bestowing existence – because then human nature in Christ would not have the same existence as it had when buried [sc. when, namely, it precisely did not bestow existence or life].

Similarly, an act that gives existence gives operation, – the hypostatic property in creatures does not give operation. The thing is plain from Damascene in ch.60: “We say that wills and operations are natural and not hypostatic; for if we grant them to be hypostatic we will be compelled to say that the three hypostases of the Holy Trinity will and do different things;” here he himself, from the fact that the divine persons do not have three operations, concludes that operation is not hypostatic – that is, operation is not on the basis of hypostatic property, and this in general whether the property is absolute or relative.

Further, third: in everything that in any way has being by something, there is, besides that which gives it being, something by reason of which it receives being (the thing is plain about the composite of matter and form, and about all other composites of act and potency); therefore in everything that has being through something that gives being, there is something which is not an act giving being but a reason for receiving being – and so it seems to be in the case of a supposit of nature, that since the supposit has being and nature gives being, the hypostatic property will be the reason for receiving being.

To the argument then [interpolation to n.27] one can say that since there is a double idea of entity, namely quidditative and hypostatic, then just as it is a mark of the quidditative to give being, because it is of itself communicable, so it is a mark of the hypostatic that it not be an act giving being, because it is of itself incommunicable as a ‘by which’. And although in creatures the individual property gives being, because it is of some grade of positive entity beyond the quidditative entity of nature, yet the property of a supposit states no entity beyond the entity of singularity, nay it adds nothing positive (from the first question of Book III, d.1 nn.31-39, 44); and even if it were to add something, that something would not be the reason for giving being, but it is merely incommunicable, because this existing nature – in which is included nature and the entity of singularity – is the total reason for giving being, and thus whatever is understood to be

adventitious to it, whether positive or privative, whether absolute or relative, will not give being, because being is totally given through that which is already pre-understood. So although in divine reality the ‘personal property’ is not merely a negation but some positive property, yet because divine nature is of itself a this – a *per se* existent – it itself will have the whole reason for giving being; just as in creatures too ‘this existing nature’ totally gives being, and not through the fact that the adventitious property is merely a negation (nay, if a positive property were to be adventitious to it, nothing would be taken away from this existing nature), so in divine reality too nothing will be taken from this nature – which is existent of itself – but what will totally give the being of a person, although in the person a positive personal property be understood.

To the argument, then, although proof is given that it is act, since it is not potency, I say that there is there the fallacy of equivocation; for in one way act is the difference opposite to potency, and all being is divided in this way, – and in another way act along with potency constitutes some whole (as the Philosopher says in *Metaphysics* VIII chs.1-6, about potency and act), because it does not belong to the power that is opposed to act, because that power remains along with act; therefore this property is not merely virtually in the divine essence (as is ass, which is in potency prior to act), and consequently this property is in act there insofar as act is opposed to such potency. But the inference ‘therefore it is act giving being’ does not hold; because for this inference there would be required that it be formal act; for in this way matter would give being, because ‘in the composite’ it is in act, and not in a potency prior to act.

The second reason [interpolation to n.27] seems deficient [sc. that an absolute property would be added to essence as act to potency]:

First because it [an absolute property] is not related to essence as perfection to perfectible, as has been made clear extensively also ‘about the relative property of a person’ in distinction 5 of Book I, d.5 nn.113, 118, 129-138, where it was said that person is not constituted from essence and property as from quasi potential and actual, nay the essence possesses more the idea of act. If therefore this property be understood as in some way posterior to essence, yet it is not a perfection of it; for there is there the same order for origin as for perfection, and therefore what is prior in origin is prior in perfection, as was then made clear extensively.

Second: given that it [an absolute property] would be in some way disposed toward the essence itself as in-forming it, yet it is not a perfection simply, because according to Anselm the idea of ‘perfection simply’ is that in anything it be ‘better it than not it’, which is impossible about a hypostatic property, because that property is of its own idea repugnant contradictorily to anything other than that to which it belongs, and so it cannot in anything else be better ‘than not it’, because it is repugnant to anything else.

Thus therefore as to the reason, it is plain that something false is assumed if what is taken is that the absolute thing perfects the essence; nor is the proof of this ‘through the fact that it in some way follows and does not precede’ valid, because in divine reality – in the way that preceding can be posited there – act and form are first. Second, given that that ‘which informs’ were possessed, the consequence that it is a perfection simply does not follow, nor do those things follow that are further inferred, namely that ‘the divine essence is not simply perfect’ or that ‘one person is not simply perfect in itself’.

Further, this reason would conclude better to the contrary about relation, because it seems more probable that relation could be a perfection than that a hypostatic property could be a perfection, because to be perfect belongs to no hypostatic property (whether in creatures or elsewhere), but to some relation according to its proper idea there does belong the being of perfection; for one relation is more perfect than another, and yet none is a perfection simply, as is plain of equality with respect to inequality, because according to Augustine *On the Quantity of the Soul* chs.9-11, nn.15-17; ch.12 n.19: “You rightly put equality before inequality, nor is there anyone endowed with human sense – as I suppose – to whom this does not appear.” But this does not come from the foundation alone, for inequality can be founded on more perfect foundations than equality; it is also plain that if it came only from the foundation Augustine would be begging the question; for he intends to conclude to an excellence, namely of circle in comparison with rectilinear figures, and he does this on the basis of equality and inequality, – because if the excellence were only on the foundations and he were to deduce therefrom the excellence of the foundations, then he would be reasoning in a circle.

If it be said that the saying of Augustine is true by reason of the proximate, not the remote, foundations, but the proximate foundation of equality is parity – this is false and nothing as regard the *b* [a reference to a text in III d.1 n.189]. For I ask whether parity asserts something for itself, and then something can be understood to be at par without its being par of anything; and similarly, whence will perfection of parity be in this way obtained in respect of imparity in a triangle? For either parity states quantity, and then either the same quantity as that which is commonly posited as the foundation of equality, and then there will no distinction between the remote and proximate foundation – or it states a different quantity, and then in the equal thing there will be said to be two quantities; or you are inventing some other mode in which parity could be an absolute that is more perfect than imparity and is other than quantity. But if you say parity asserts a relation, as seems manifest, then a relation will be per se founded on a relation; nay it seems to state the same relation as equality; a quantity is equal with a quantity and on a par with it!

To the statement of Anselm in *Monologion* [earlier here] the response is that he is speaking only of quiddities and not of hypostatic properties. – This is proved, first, by his examples about wisdom and truth on one side, and about gold and lead on the other. Second by reason, because only that is a perfection simply which can be infinite in something, and only that in something is better ‘not it than it’ which is of itself finite; these things belong to quiddity (namely to be finite or infinite), but not to a hypostatic property, because a divine personal property – whatever it be – is neither formally finite nor formally infinite. So a ‘whatever’, that is a ‘whatever quiddity’, is additional to relation, – not a ‘whatever hypostatic entity’, because this is not divided into the such and the not such but falls under the not such; likewise a hypostatic property is repugnant to anything besides the one thing it belongs to – so it cannot be for anything better it ‘than not it’, but also not for some particular thing either. Therefore Anselm excludes from the universe of quiddities relation according to quiddity, and then every absolute quiddity is either a perfection simply or a limited perfection; but from this does not follow the proposed conclusion about absolute hypostatic property.

The third reason [sc. in the interpolation to n.27, that every absolute circumstance of an absolute is multiplied along with that absolute] has a major that, by its form, is false in the case of

all things that are essentially ordered, although it may sometimes be true by its matter; and it is similarly false in the case of everything that is not equally unlimited. For in no order essential in proper idea of prior and posterior must the priors and posteriors be multiplied together, but multiplication of the posterior can stand without multiplication of the prior, although not conversely; likewise, whenever two things are compared to a third thing which is unlimited, one must not, in the way in which the two things are unlimited, make joint distinctions with them (an example: compare the intellective soul to its parts; because the intellective soul is in some way unlimited, one must not distinguish it in its distinct parts in the way in which the parts are unlimited). The major then is, as to the proposed conclusion, false in two ways: both because the essence (in the way in which there is there a priority in person) is in some way prior to the properties, not conversely, according to them [sc. those who hold the third opinion], – therefore one should distinguish the essence on the distinction of the properties; and also because the essence is formally infinite, but the properties are not formally infinite – and therefore one should not distinguish ‘the formally infinite’ on the distinction of things that are not formally infinite.

Even if the major is taken generally, as to any absolutes whatever that are circumstances of the same – there is a manifest objection to it from the soul and the powers, because the powers are multiplied when the soul is not multiplied.

But if they evade this objection by specifying the major to be about things of the same species (the way the first confirmation of the major takes it), even then the proposition is not true universally of relations, as will be plain in distinction 8 [of Book Three]. That many things of the same idea exist in the same thing – even in absolutes – is not a contradiction, if any of them is not an act adequate to that in which it is.

Now when the major is made clear by an induction, there is a fallacy of the consequent, because certain singular instances are taken that are not like the proposed case, to wit those in which a distinction in prior things does not constitute a distinction in posterior things, or in which there is a similar limitation on both sides and not an unlimitedness of one of them with respect to the other; from these things the conclusion cannot be universally drawn, because it is false when the conditions are lacking, as in the proposed case.

But to the final argument, added for confirmation of the major, which is about the ‘same’ [sc. there cannot be many things of the same idea in the same perfect thing], one could say that just as something simply perfect – the same in number – is communicable to many supposita of the same idea (such that this is not, from its perfection simply, something repugnant to it, but its being in several supposita of the same idea is something that belongs to it), so from its perfection there can belong to it the fact that several things of the same idea can exist in it as supposita in a nature and, consequently, even several hypostatic properties of the same idea; but this cannot be so about the other things of which it is exemplified (as of the Father and the Word), because the perfection of what is simply perfect requires that any production have an adequate term, but does not require that some hypostatic property is adequate to the nature in constituting a supposit.

Hereby one can say in answer to the first confirmation of the major, applying it to the proposed conclusion, that there is there a fallacy of equivocation. For the major [sc. ‘many things of the same species cannot be in the same thing’], if it were true, should be understood of being ‘in’ the way act is in that which is in-formed; but the minor [sc. ‘the absolutes, if they are posited, will be of the same species’] is not true; for the property is not in the essence as in-forming it, but as constituting a supposit in it.

However one can say to both confirmations that the properties are not of the same idea formally, just as in creatures the individual properties are primarily diverse and not of the same idea. And if one infer from this that they are of a different species or that each of them has the idea of a different species, and that, because of this, each has to be determined by something else so as to be incommunicable – the inference does not follow, just as it does not follow in the case of the individual properties in creatures; even though these are not of the same idea in anything, yet none is a quidditive and common entity but each is of itself a ‘this’.

The fourth reason [sc. in the interpolation to n.27, that if two absolute properties are expressed by the essence they will both be in one person and will not distinguish the persons] proceeds from the false imagination that the properties are expressed by the essence as if by way of origin, – which is not what was said. But, as some concede [sc. Henry of Ghent and his followers] that relations burgeon up in the essence (provided however this is properly said), so one

could concede against them that these properties – the absolute ones, if they exist – burgeon up in the essence; and although each property be in the same supposit from which it burgeons (because the essence is in all the persons), yet none is in the same person as that from whom it is obtained by way of true origination. Nor is the true origination ‘of the person who has one of the properties’ repugnant to the person who has another, even though all the properties are not originated but do in some way burgeon from the essence – just as others have to say about origination through relation, that the Son burgeons from the Father by origin and yet the Son in some way burgeons in the divine essence or from the divine essence.

The fifth reason seems deficient [sc. that there is no origin in the persons because an absolute person would precede any relation of origin], because it seems more difficult to sustain origination by positing that the extremes are only formally relative than by positing that they are absolute. For if they are only relative, then that ‘a person originates a person’ will be nothing other than that a relative has a correlative; but a relative, once posited, seems to have a correlative without any other action. But if the extremes are posited as absolute, there does not seem to be as much difficulty in how one supposit is generated by another, since in the case of creatures – according to them – there are absolute supposita and yet origination of one creature from another is not denied there.

When it is then argued that an absolute precedes relation and so precedes origination, I reply: it was said that origination pertains to the genus of efficient causality, not formal; and just as in creatures the term does not exist by origination formally but effectively (nor from the fact that it does not exist by it formally does the consequence follow that it precedes it), so one can say in the proposed case; nor does there seem greater difficulty about the priority of the absolute to the relative in the case of creatures than here [sc. in the case of the divine persons].

#### IV. To the Reasons against the Second Opinion when Holding the Second Opinion

84. For someone who does not like this opinion (which, however, does not seem to contradict the faith, as was touched on when explaining it [nn.56, 68-71]), if he likes the second opinion more (which is the common one [n.15]), one can reply to the reasons against [nn.33-55] this second opinion:

To the first [n.33] the response is by denial of the proposition ‘every relation presupposes that which is related’; for this proposition is false in the case of a relation that constitutes a supposit, and is true in the case of other ones. When it is proved by the fact that ‘a relation is not related, but something which is not merely relation is related by relation’, and when it is further said that ‘what is related is prior to relation’ [n.33], – it is denied.<sup>a</sup>

a. [*Interpolation*] Holding to the second opinion, which is more common, one can respond to the reasons against it:

To the first [n.33], that a relation is not related is conceded; but something that is not merely relation is related by a relation; not the essence indeed, but the supposit is related, because supposit is not merely a relation (but it is, however, a relative, not an absolute), – and so the whole deduction is conceded up to the final consequence [sc. that the supposit is there really and naturally before the relation], and that consequence is denied.

85. To the proposition that says ‘one must understand the parts and the union of the parts prior to any composite’ [n.34], if they hold that relation is not in the essence as an act in what receives act, they should say that in the person itself – which is a quasi-whole – one should not pre-understand an in-forming of a quasi-part by a quasi-part before the whole is understood, but one should if such a quasi-informing is pre-understood, though as by way of a denominating form. But when one holds the second

opinion [n.15], it seems one should better say that relation is not a quasi-form or an act with respect to the essence (as was touched on in distinction 5 [d.5 nn.113,131, 137-138]), but rather the essence seems to be a quasi-form and quasi-act, whereby a subsistent relation is God. And this seems proved by the fact that whenever a foundation is potential to a relation, the foundation is in-formed by the relation before the supposit is; conceded too – as a result of this – is that in that case [sc. when the foundation is potential to a relation] the related thing is formally ‘being to’ by the foundation itself or in accord with the foundation itself, just as Socrates is conceded to be white by whiteness or in accord with whiteness. Neither seems it should be granted in the issue at hand: neither that paternity exists in the essence before in the Father, – nor that the Father by deity or in accord with deity is the Father formally, because this seems to accord with Augustine *On the Trinity* VII ch.2 n.3: ‘he is Father by one thing, he is God by another’; but he is God by deity formally – he is not therefore Father by deity formally, but by something else, according to Augustine.

86. Therefore one can speak differently (when holding the second opinion) that, although the parts and the union of the parts are pre-required for the whole, and quasi-parts and the union of quasi-parts are pre-required for the quasi-whole, yet, where there is no partial-ness but perfect identity of the things that would otherwise be parts unless one or other of them were infinite, the union of such should not be pre-understood to the whole but rather the perfect identity of one thing with another should be pre-understood. And so it seems to be in the issue at hand, that to the Father – which is said to be first related – there is in some way pre-understood a perfect identity of the relation with the

essence, but not the union of a quasi-form to some quasi-matter or quasi-potential; nor is such perfect identity a reason that the essence is formally denominated by the relation.

87. But if the reason [n.34] be confirmed by the fact that ‘nothing is a quantity first and per se unless something is a quantity per se and not first but denominatively’ [cf. n.35, *to which note however this confirmation does not entirely correspond*], I say that if a quantity could be the same as something which would otherwise be susceptive of it, and the same could be such that it did not in-form it, then something could well be a quantity first and yet nothing would be a quantity by in-forming (nor does this seem remarkable, because the ‘first’ seems to be separated from that which is ‘per se and not first’); therefore in this way something can be posited as related first although nothing is related ‘not first but per se’, as if informed by the relation.<sup>a</sup>

a. [Interpolation] To what is argued at ‘in accord with this’ [see interpolation to n.35], this proposition is denied, that ‘what is related is first something to itself’.

To the first proof, which is taken from Augustine, I reply: ‘what is related is something when the relative is removed’, that is, it includes something absolute which is the foundation of the relation; and therefore if the Father ‘is nothing to himself’ (that is, does not include anything absolute), he will not be Father ‘to another’. But Augustine does not understand that every relative is formally to itself before it is to another by relation.

As to the second proof, the conclusion or the proposition is denied which it rests on for proof, namely that ‘that which is related is prior to the relation’, or – which is the same – that ‘every relation presupposes that which is related’; for this proposition is false in the case of a relation that constitutes a supposit, and it is true in the case of other things.

When proof is given by division [sc. into three]: if one of the three members of the division should be granted, the one that should more be granted is that relation is prior, the way form is prior ‘to an entity that exists by form’; nor does the inference ‘the supposit is thus quasi-

posterior to the relation, therefore it is a relation' follow, but rather 'therefore it is a relation or a relative constituted by a relation', -- and the second alternative here is true.

88. To the second [nn36-37] I say that, just as any form is per se such a form, nor is there any intrinsic reason why it is such a form, so too some relation by its very self is formally real and some relation is by itself formally only a relation of reason; however sometimes there are extrinsic effective or material causes of the former or the latter, sometimes too there are some caused things or some posterior signs from which the relations mentioned can be inferred by a demonstration-'that'. I say that identity, because it is identity, is a relation of reason, nor is there any other formal reason 'because of which' it is so, – paternity, because it is paternity, is a real relation, nor is there any other formal reason 'because of which' it is so. Yet because a real relation is of a nature to have extrinsic causes causing it, then, speaking generally in the case of creatures, the consequence here is that a relation that does not have such causes is not real, just as on the destruction of the cause there follows the destruction of the caused thing; likewise, some real relation, if it does not have such a prior distinction of causes, does at any rate cause a distinction. And then from the removal of both the cause and the caused (one of which corresponds to the real relation) the conclusion can be drawn that some relation is not real, such that the consequence holds that 'this relation does not pre-require distinct extremes, nor does it make them to be distinct, therefore it is not a real relation' [n.37], and then one must look for the middle terms that prove why the premises are true; but the consequence is good, just as from the destruction of the cause follows the destruction of the caused, and from the removal of the caused follows the removal of the cause from it, because at least one of them should concur for a real relation, such that wherever either is

removed there results – a consequence through extrinsic facts – the removal of the real relation. When it is said that “therefore to infer ‘the relation is not real because it is not between distinct things’ is to infer ‘it is not real because it is not real’” [n.37] I say no, because although it does not distinguish the extremes for this reason, namely that ‘it is not real’, because it is arguing from cause to caused – yet the consequence ‘it does not distinguish, therefore it is not real’ does follow, as from caused to cause (and this when the clause is added ‘because it does not pre-require distinct things’), because then there concur there both a denial of the cause of the real relation and a denial of the sign, from the concurrence of which the negation of the real relation is perfectly inferred.<sup>a</sup>

- a. [*Interpolation*] but sometimes relations go along with a preceding distinction, and sometimes not, but only with a formally caused one [n.37].

And not only is there a real relation of will to will, but also of will as active to itself as passive, and universally an effect dependent on an active and a passive principle necessarily requires a real relation; and yet the will, which is the foundation of these opposite relations, namely ‘of mover and moved’, is denominated by both of them.

I say that it is necessary to prove, in order to infer the conclusion, that the extremes are not distinct by a distinction preceding the relation, by a distinction pertaining to the genus of relation, just as this consequence ‘they [sc. the extremes] are said of the same thing, therefore they are not real’ does not follow; it does not hold from the nature of the thing, without any act of intellect. Hence it can well be conceded. If however these points are proved, the consequence is good. But one must eventually come back to this, when one has set aside that which belongs to the distinction of the extremes; for the consequence ‘if a relation does not follow from the nature of the thing it is not real’ at once follows. One should expound the antecedent, and say that ‘the extremes are not distinguished by a distinction preceding the relation.’

To the third one can say that an absolute can very well be the term of a relation, and it always is in relations of measured things – and this is principally preserved in distinction 30 [nn.35-40], that the relations of creatures terminate in God insofar as he is absolute; but universally speaking, one should not concede that the term of a relation is an absolute save in dissimilar relations (about which the argument is there), namely those that are in a genus (divine relations are not of this sort), or about the formal term (namely by reason of which the first term terminates), but not about the first term: for as the foundation in a related thing is an absolute, but not always what is related is an absolute (according to this opinion [sc. the third]), so thus too what is the reason for terminating a relation is always an absolute, and it is pre-required on the part of the relative term as the foundation is on the part of the related thing.

89. To the first argument about the second way [n.38] I say that the proposition is false that ‘relation cannot be the formal term of origin’, as will be appear in the material ‘On the Incarnation’ [III d.1 nn.57-61]; and however it be with the formal cause, at least a relative can be the first produced term, such that the essence ‘to itself’ – in the relative – is the formal term, and thus was it posited in distinction 5, in the production of the person [d.5 nn.27-30, 64-71, 97]. When therefore the argument says ‘a relation is originated unless an absolute is originated’ [n.58], if you understand ‘to be originated as the first term of production’, one can concede it about a relation but not about a relative – but if you understand it about ‘to be originated as the first formal term’, then it can simply be conceded; and in neither way is it against the issue at hand, because neither is relation posited as what is first originated, but the supposit is – nor is relation set down as the formal term of production, but an essence simply absolute is.

90. To the second I say that ‘the Father originates the Son’ is for the Father to have the Son for correlative (not for any correlative, but for a correlative of this sort,

because such co-relation is a relation of origin), and this is the response to the fifth argument about this way (namely about the supposit as if pre-understood to origin), and it will be made clear in distinction 28 nn.93-99, 108-110.<sup>a</sup>

a. [Interpolation] therefore one extreme can be prior to another in origin, although it be simultaneous in nature – and this is the response to the fifth argument about this way (namely about a supposit as pre-understood to origin or about the priority of supposit to action), and it will be made clear in distinction 28; [*or another text*] therefore one extreme can be prior in origin to another, although it be simultaneous in nature. This response, and likewise to the second (about the priority of supposit to action) will be made clear in distinction 28.

91. As to the third [n.41], it seems difficult to respond to those who say that the persons are relative and that relations are the principles of acting [e.g. Henry of Ghent], because then neither on the part of the agent nor on the part of the principle can there be liberty; but although the second opinion may be held as far as concerns the first, yet I have denied the second in distinction 7 [nn.20-26, 35-42].

92 To the fourth [n.42] is said that ‘it is generation’, because this relation has the force of constituting primary substance in the divine nature [n.65]; and one must say – when holding this way – that relation can be the property of a personal subsistent in divine nature just as if it were some absolute property.<sup>a</sup>

a. [Interpolation] and thus the production of it will be the production of what subsists in the nature of substance; and therefore it is ‘generation’, because generation is generation from a formal term (which is the nature communicated to the produced thing), but not from the individual or

incommunicable property of the produced thing – just as universally every motion receives its species from the formal term of the motion.

93. The arguments about the third way [nn.45, 51-52] seem difficult, and yet they are soluble if the second opinion [n.15] is true. Let him solve them who knows [cf. *Lectura I d.26 n.75*].

94. The authorities about the fourth way can be expounded otherwise [sc. in favor of the second opinion], the way authorities are commonly drawn to one sense or another.<sup>a</sup>

a. [*Interpolation*] To the other [the first about the third way, n.45] I say that paternity is of itself formally incommunicable; not however the concept which – according to what is said elsewhere [d.8] – can be abstracted from divine and created paternity, but the reality that is in divine reality, which is not formally the essence itself, is incommunicable formally and as it were through an extrinsic determination, namely ‘because it is divine’. The reason for its incommunicability is this, that just as essence is ultimate act and therefore cannot be determined by anything with respect to which it is quasi potential, so whatever is in it is ultimate, in the ultimate act possible for it, so that in the instant of nature in which wisdom burgeons in the essence, it burgeons according to the ultimate determination that it is able to have; hence too the reality that is wisdom formally is not determinable. Likewise, whatever can be incommunicable in the first instance of nature in which it burgeons in nature burgeons as incommunicable, and not as first communicable, because then it would be determinable by something by which it would be made incommunicable.

And if you say that then paternity is not incommunicable save because it is in the divine essence, for this reality does not have whereby it might of itself be ultimately determinate save because it is in the essence, – I say that whatever is quasi originally or fundamentally intrinsic in divine reality is from the essence, because according to Damascene (ch.9) it is a ‘certain sea of infinite substance’; but yet the other things have formally their own ideas and are by themselves such first formally, so that wisdom, although it has from the essence quasi fundamentally and

originally that it is a perfection simply, is yet formally a perfection simply and is in itself formally infinite – such that in the same instant of nature in which wisdom is now in act in the essence, let the essence be *per impossibile* removed and the understanding of wisdom simply and infinite will remain. So in the ‘now’ of nature in which paternity is understood in the essence, it is in itself formally incommunicable, the essence being then *per impossibile* removed.

Nor is there a contradiction here that something quasi originally or causally have from something which belongs to it formally, just as the hot is formally contrary to the cold, although causally it comes from fire to which it is not formally contrary. So it is in the case of other things, because the essence by which something is constituted in its specific being is of itself formally indivisible into several species, even given *per impossibile* that it were uncaused, although now it has causally that lack of division from which it comes causally.

And if you object ‘why does some other entity arise as communicable in the essence and this one as incommunicable?’ – I say that of this fact there is no formal reason other than that this entity is this and that entity is that; and this entity ‘because this’ is communicable and that entity ‘because that’ is incommunicable, such that the latter can only arise if it arise formally incommunicable, and the former only if it arise formally communicable. But the reason for this is extrinsic – quasi fundamental or original – because the essence is radically infinite, from which can intrinsically arise not only perfections simply and communicable, but also incommunicable properties; each of them arises, however, when it arises, with the determinate, highest determination possible for it.

Hereby is plain the answer to all the proofs that paternity is of itself not incommunicable [nn.46-50]:

For when you say that ‘it is not of itself a this’ [n.47], I say this is false, understanding it formally of the reality that is paternity and not of the concept common to this paternity and to that, because (as was expounded in distinction 8 nn.136-150 and will be stated in III Suppl. d.22 q. un. nn.7-8) there can be some concept without an order of realities outwardly, one of which realities is contractive or determinative of the other. Paternity, however – that is the reality – is not of itself a ‘this’, that is fundamentally, but is so from the essence, and from this very same essence it is

incommunicable paternity, because it is not a ‘this’ before it is incommunicable and because it is afterwards made quasi-incommunicable by something else that determines it, but there arises, without any order of singularity for incommunicability in that reality, a reality supremely determinate in the first instant of nature in which it arises.

Nor is the proposition true that ‘every quiddity is communicable’ [n.26], but only a quiddity that is perfection simply or divisible (for the first is communicated in unity of nature, the second is communicated along with division of it); this quiddity is neither a perfection simply nor divisible, because it is in a nature simply perfect.

Nor is the proposition true that ‘opposite relations are equally communicable of themselves’ [nn.48-49], nay active inspiriting arises as communicable to two, nor can it ever be made incommunicable by anything that determines it; but passive inspiriting is, in the same instant in which it exists in divine reality, of itself formally incommunicable.

Also as to what you say that ‘whatever position is set down – possible or impossible – it will, with its idea standing in place, remain incommunicable’ [n.50], I concede ‘with its idea standing in place’ and do not concede ‘when something is posited repugnant to its idea’. But if one sets down that its idea is standing in place and there is something repugnant to it, from opposites in the antecedent follow opposites, namely that it is incommunicable of itself formally and can be communicated; so in the issue at hand: if one posits that inspiriting precedes active generation, one posits something incompossible with the paternity of the Father and yet the idea of paternity remains, and thus it follows that paternity is communicable from what is first and yet incommunicable from what is second; hence it is formally a contradiction for generation to be the second production in divine reality.

Paternity, therefore, because divine, is incommunicable, such that the ‘because’ is a circumstance of the original or fundamental principle, though not a contracting or determining principle, in the way in which white is contracted when ‘white man’ is said or ‘human whiteness’; for this whiteness is pre-understood as existing in itself, and as such it would be indeterminate and able to be determined so as to be of a man (and to this it is determined when ‘human whiteness’ is said), but not that whiteness arise from the nature of man and that in that very instant it be of itself

indeterminate. So – oppositely – in the issue at hand, because just as a cause would not give being to the effect unless it gave itself ‘a being agreeable to the effect’, and just as it would not produce the effect unless it produced something that was of a nature to have such an effect (for example, no cause would cause a triangle formally unless it produced something that necessarily had three angles equal to two right angles, and if it could produce something that did not necessarily have three such angles, it would not produce a triangle but something else, – nor is there any reason for this save that the formal idea of triangle is that it be a triangle), so I say that deity would not be the fundamental reason for any intrinsic reality unless the reality arises such that – in the first instant in which it is – it is determinate with ultimate determination; if therefore it produce something determinable by some reality that is as it were adventitious to it when already produced, it would not produce something intrinsic in divine reality, – even if it were to produce something communicable, it would not produce a personal property, but something in some way different from it.

To the other proof [n.51] I say that although some common concept might be obtained that is stated in the ‘what’ of divine generation and of divine inspiriting (nay perhaps that might be stated in the ‘what’ of divine and created paternity), yet no reality can exist in divine reality in any way distinct on the part of the thing – wherefrom this concept stated in the ‘what’ may be taken – which reality might be determinable by some other reality, as a concept is determinable in the intellect by some other concept; and the possibility of this and the reason for it has sufficiently been touched on [d.8 nn.135-150].

I say therefore that paternity and filiation are not primarily diverse as to understanding such that the intellect not be able to abstract from them some common reality, but they are primarily diverse as to reality and reality, so that they include no one grade of reality which is quasi potential and determinable by proper differences (or quasi by proper differences), the way that whiteness and blackness include some reality of the same idea that is determinable by proper differences specific to them, from which their specific differences are taken. And then the major proposition, that ‘the first distinguishing things are first diverse’ [n.51], should only be understood

of the realities themselves that first constitute them as to their non-agreement in some one formal reality, which they formally include.

To the other proof, about a supposit per accidens [n.52], I say that in one way the metaphysician speaks of the ‘per accidens’ and in another way the logician; for the metaphysician says that there is a being ‘per accidens’ that includes in itself things of two genera, as is clear in *Metaphysics* ‘about being’ and ‘about one’, V.7 and 6. 1017a7-22, 1015b16-36; the logician says that a proposition is ‘per accidens’ whose subject does not include the reason for the inherence of the predicate, and if one concept is made from two such – neither of which is per se determinative of the other – he says that that concept is ‘one per accidens’. There is no example in creatures of a logical concept ‘one per accidens’ save a concept to which there corresponds a ‘one per accidens’ metaphysically, because although this proposition ‘the rational is animal’ is per accidens, yet by joining one concept to the other, one concept is per se determinative of the other; therefore the whole concept is not one per accidens, but only some concept that puts together concepts of two genera is one per accidens, and to it there always corresponds a ‘one per accidens’ in the hands of the metaphysician.

To the matter at issue. This proposition can be conceded per accidens ‘paternity is deity’, because the subject as subjected does not include the reason for the inherence of the predicate as predicated, because the subject is not formally the predicate. Also by joining the concept of the subject to the concept of the predicate (thus: ‘God is Father’), one concept does not per se determine the other, because according to Damascene [ch.50] properties determine hypostases not nature; therefore the concept is not ‘per se one’, and so it does not state the concept ‘of a per se supposit’ with respect to another; for what is not in itself ‘per se one’ is not the ‘per se supposit’ of anything, and just as this is not so in reality so it is not so in concepts. Thus therefore, speaking logically, one could concede that the Father is not a ‘per se supposit’ of God.

But against this I argue that the first identity cannot be per accidens, and as not in things so not in concepts either; but the first identity in predication seems to be of the first nature with its supposit; therefore this identity is not per accidens but per se.

I reply: the first identity of predication is of whatever exists to itself, as ‘man is man’, ‘God is God’. But comparing God here to supposit and asking about identity there, I say that speaking really according to the metaphysician – since there are no genera here nor anything of any genus (from distinction 8 nn.95-115) – nothing here will be a being per accidens; nor does this inference hold ‘it is a supposit per accidens logically, therefore it is a supposit per accidens metaphysically’, because ‘it is a supposit’ states the disposition of something as subject to something as to a predicate, and so a supposit can be said to be ‘per accidens’ because of accidentality on the part of inherence, not on the part of the extremes.

And if it be objected ‘here it is conceded that there are things as it were of two genera, namely of substance and accident’, I reply: the proper idea of things, as concerns genera or quasi-genera, does not make a ‘whole’ to be a being per accidens, but the disposition of thing to thing does, namely non-identity simply; but now although the proper idea of relation – which remains there – does not include formally the idea of essence, yet one real thing is truly the same as the other, because of which identity there is no disposition of reality to reality of the sort required of things that constitute a ‘being per accidens’.

If it be objected against the first member [sc. accidentality on the part of inherence], ‘since in creatures there can be per se a supposit of nature, why is it not so here?’, one could say that an imperfect absolute can be incommunicable, and universally anything ‘that contracts per se in any genus’ can be incommunicable, just as can anything communicable, – and so in any created thing that pertains to any genus there can be something of that genus which constitutes an incommunicable; but a simply perfect thing cannot be incommunicable, nor anything of the same idea (everything absolute in divine reality is of this sort, according to the third way), and therefore nothing ‘quasi of the same genus as the essence’ can constitute there a supposit, but only something that is as if of another genus. An example: if anything of the genus of substance, up to the ultimate element by which it is constituted as ‘this substance’, were a perfection simply and consequently communicable, ‘this substance’ could not be further contracted in itself through anything (because what is a ‘this’ is not further determinable in itself), but only something of the genus of quantity or quality could constitute ‘in this substance’ something incommunicable,

because quantity or quality would not be a perfection simply; then that thing constituted from substance and quantity would be a supposit per accidens (and also would be a being per accidens), if one of those realities were not perfectly the same as the other. – So in the issue at hand the position is that essence is a perfection simply, and whatever is of the same genus as the essence exist ‘to itself’; and therefore anything such is communicable, and yet is of itself a ‘this’. And further: that which is of itself a ‘this’ cannot be contracted, but only in that which is a ‘this’ can something incomunicable be constituted by something which is not a perfection simply, and therefore something not of the same genus as the essence but quasi other.

Hereby one can say to the other confirmation, whereby is inferred ‘the identity of created substance to its supposit would be truer than the identity of the divine nature with its’; this does not follow, if it be understood on the part of the thing, because although an individual entity in a creature per se determines nature and makes it ‘per se one’ with it, yet that ‘one’ is composite by some composition that is also real, – but relation, although it does not per se determine the divine nature, yet is so truly the same as it that no composition there can come to be; and therefore, really or metaphysically speaking, the identity of the divine supposit is much truer, both in itself and with the nature, than the identity of a created supposit is in itself or with its nature, – but logically speaking one can well concede that a created substance is formally predicated of its supposit (because predicated ‘per se in the first mode’), but ‘God’ is not so predicated of the Father, because ‘Father’ does not have so per se one a concept in the intellect as ‘Socrates’ does.

If you infer ‘therefore this predication is truer than that’, the consequence can be denied, because some predication that is not formal, or not per se, can be truer than some predication that is formal and per se, provided however there is a greater identity of the real extremes, in whose concept however there is less formal inclination or inherence.

As to the final confirmation [sc. the third in the second interpolation to n.52], one can concede logically that of neither quiddity is there a ‘per se supposit’; but really it is a supposit of the nature, not of the relation, because relation there is an incomunicable property, but the nature is not. Likewise, the relation passes over into the essence and not conversely, because of the infinity of the essence.

To the fourth [n.60 with interpolation]. Primary substance in creatures possesses something of perfection, namely ultimate unity (that is why it is indivisible), and this follows on ultimate actuality, because of which there belongs to it ‘per se existence’; two opposites come together in secondary substance, which is both divisible and does not have ‘existence’ save in primary substance. These conditions of primary substance are possessed by the divine essence of itself, and not formally by relation; for it is of itself a ‘this’ and it subsists of itself (that is it exists per se), or at any rate it is the whole reason for subsisting (therefore, according to Augustine *On the Trinity* VII ch.6 n.11, the Father does not exist by that by which he is Father but by that by which he is God). More than this, primary created substance – because it is limited – does not possess communicability, because the same limited thing in number is not communicable; this property of primary substance does not belong to the divine essence.

Hereby is plain the answer to the first point there touched on [n.60], because I concede that primary substance in divine reality, as that which is meant by ‘to be substance most of all and to subsist per se’, is not formally constituted by relation but by deity.

Likewise to the second point [interpolation to n.61]: because ‘primary substance does not include non-substance’ is true, because of the conditions of perfection that belong to primary substance, and so, wherever those conditions are preserved, this will not be through non-substance; but in the nature in which there cannot exist through substance the condition which belongs to imperfection in created primary substance, namely incommunicability (the way it is posited in God, where anything ‘to itself’ is posited as simply perfect and so communicable), primary substance there must – as to possessing that condition – include non-substance.

To the third point there touched on [n.62] I reply: paternity and this incommunicable paternity – whatever may be true of them in conception – are altogether the same in the thing, such that there is no distinction there formal or real; for the thing, in the first instant in which it exists or burgeons in the essence, exists there under the idea of the ultimate determination possible for it, otherwise in that instant it would be potential for determination. Because therefore determination for incommunicability is not repugnant to relation, for that reason it is not only a quiddity and a ‘this’ but incommunicable, and it is altogether not a ‘this’ in the thing before it is incommunicable;

but ‘this’ deity is communicable, such that it is repugnant to it – according to this opinion [sc. the second] – to be by anything as it were of its genus incommunicable. I deny therefore the consequence ‘in relation there is quiddity, and this is incommunicable insofar as it is relation, therefore these cannot be found in that which exists to itself’, because incommunicability is repugnant to anything ‘to itself’; in God, according to this opinion, it is not repugnant to relation, and therefore relation has it at once.

To the fourth point there touched on [n.63]: ‘to exist per se’ is conceded to ‘this essence’, or to God ‘whence he is God’, – but not to be able to be that by which formally something per se is, this belongs to created nature from its limitation, because of which it is incommunicable both as ‘what’ and as ‘by which’ (of this double incommunicability there was discussion in distinction 23 n.16). It is true, therefore, that created substance has ‘per se existence’, but accident not, and this belongs to substance from its perfection, – but the fact that it cannot communicate this ‘per se existence’ to something in which it exists, this is a mark of limitation. Here then I concede that essence is determined of itself to ‘per se existence’ (whether as ‘what’ or as ‘by which’), but that, along with this, it is communicable to a relative person, as that by which the relative person has the same ‘per se existence’.

To the points about the fourth way [nn.53-55].

To the first, from Augustine [n.54], the response was given after the response to the first argument against the second opinion [interpolation to n.87].

To his other authority [n.54] here is the reply. Augustine there, *On the Trinity* VII ch.4 n.7, says how there is said to be ‘one essence’ and by the Greeks ‘three substances’ but by the Latins ‘three persons’; and in text that is adduced [n.54] (taken from ch.4), that ‘substance exists to itself’, because ‘they are not properly said to be three substances, because substance (the way it is conceded in divine reality) exists to itself, and therefore essence and substance are the same’ [*ibid.* ch.5 n.10]; he also says: “they are not to be called three substances, as they may not be called three essences” [*ibid.* ch.4 n.9]. He does not therefore intend that substance as the Greeks take it (namely for person) exists to itself [n.73], but that they concede three substances not properly but only because of a necessity of speaking; hence he seems to prefer the way of

speaking of the Latins, that they are ‘three persons’ [*ibid.* ch.5 n.10]; but even that he proves consequently not to be proper, showing that person is simply said ‘to itself’, as is essence [*ibid.* ch.6 n.11]. Therefore take his final conclusion on this matter from there: “We want indeed some one word to serve for the meaning whereby the Trinity is understood, lest we should be altogether silent when someone asks ‘three what?’”

When therefore the Latins speak of three persons or the Greeks of three substances, Augustine would say that they speak improperly and because of the necessity to speak. One does not therefore get from his intention that something which signifies incommunicable subsistent in divine reality exists to itself, but only that the names – which are accommodated by some for expressing such incommunicable subsistent – are in themselves absolute names, nay purely absolute, because they are essentials. But one should accept the first point from him, so that the proposed conclusion in this question on behalf of the third opinion [n.56] may be obtained (the opinion that posits that in the thing ‘this subsistent incommunicable’ exists to itself), and that so much cannot be expressed by any essential name, accommodated from use or the necessity of speaking.

On behalf of the second opinion, use these means against everything that is adduced from Augustine [n.73].

To the third, from Richard and Boethius [n.55], the response is that just as from the absolute and the relative – speaking quidditatively – can be abstracted something common quidditatively, so also from such and such incommunicable something common can be abstracted which is of itself neither an incommunicable absolute nor an incommunicable relative; some such thing is described by Richard and Boethius, with this added, that it exists ‘in intellectual nature’, so that as the description of the superior should not include the proper idea of anything inferior, so the description of person – by which it is incommunicable in intellectual nature – should not include anything properly pertaining to an incommunicable absolute, nor properly to an incommunicable relative, but ought to be indifferent to both; and thus do both describe person. I concede therefore that neither in the definition of person assigned by Boethius nor in the one assigned by Richard is anything relative posited, and so I say that neither is there posited anything

whence the thing defined might express absolute existence, but it is indifferent to both; such that, just as in some nature there is not found ‘the assigned idea in general’ save in an absolute and by reason of an absolute (as in a creature), so in the divine nature it is not found save in a relative.

## V. To the Principal Arguments

### 95. To the principal arguments.

To the first [n.1] it is plain how persons do not differ in species, nor also is the production of person by person equivocal – as was touched on about this in distinction 7 nn.51-64, 47-50.

96. To the second [n.2] the response is (according to those who hold the second opinion) that common relations do not first burgeon in the essence, but that relations of origin first burgeon in it [n.28]. However it does not seem that this can be proved, because magnitude more pertains to essence as it is understood in abstraction from the persons than action or passion do, which belong only to a supposit; therefore relations that follow magnitude – of which sort is the relation of equality – can be more understood in the essence as essence, as it seems to be abstracted from person, than relations of origin can be. Similarly one can argue – in the case of the matter at issue – about likeness, which follows the essence as it has the idea of form, in which form the supposita are alike. Therefore the latter do not burgeon first before the former, or if they do burgeon first, what is the reason? But if common relations equally burgeon first or in advance, and these can constitute [sc. persons], – therefore they do constitute them. For there is no possibility there for anything which is not in act, nor can any form constitute a person

unless it constitute in act (if the form is in act), as it seems, just as neither is any form able to constitute in act something in a species without – if it exist and not have imperfect existence – constituting something in a species.<sup>a</sup>

a. [Interpolation] To this one can say that, just as any created essence, although it is a quiddity and a quantity (because it is in a certain grade of perfection) and an essential quality (as is touched on in distinction 31 nn.10, 16-17, distinction 19 n.8), yet it is a quiddity before it is a quantity or a quality (and therefore there is in the individual first the idea of identity to another individual before of equality or likeness), so too there is first in a supposit the idea of acting – if it is an active form – before there is the idea of equality or likeness; for the idea of the active does not follow it later after there is the idea of identity. In divine reality, therefore, since to communicate is an action whose formal principle is the essence as a ‘what’, there will in some way be first in it relations pertaining to communication before other relations, those of equality or likeness, which are founded on the idea itself of quantity in virtue and essential quality. Hereby I say to the argument [n.2] that neither action nor equality can be understood inwardly in the same nature unless it be of supposita or things related (yet they will be natures and foundations), and of these action is prior to equality, just as action itself follows the foundation first – by reason of which it belongs to supposita – before equality follows it.

On the contrary: this response seems to suppose that the essence merely as a ‘what’ is the reason for communication in divine reality, the opposite of which was said in distinction 13 nn.45, 63.

I reply: the essence ‘as it is a what’ is the reason for communicating the essence, but not this only, but along with this the essence ‘as it is intellect and as it is will’ is a productive principle of a person and communicative of the essence, as was said there [*ibid. n.93*] and in distinction 2 of this first book [nn.221, 226, 300-303, 355-356]. But now, just as essence is understood to be the idea of communicating itself before it is understood to be a quantity or a quality, so also it is understood to be the idea of operating before it is a quantity or a quality; for being an operative

principle with respect to operations proper to such a nature does not belong to the essence after the active principle belongs to it, and this whether the active principle is productive with respect to producibles in the nature or is communicative of the nature itself. But the divine essence is a principle of operations proper to such a nature, insofar as the nature is intellect and will, because to understand and to will are the proper operations of that nature; therefore first it is essence, not only essence but also intellect and will, before it is a quantity or a quality. Therefore, although production does not belong to the essence alone ‘as it is essence’ as to a productive principle, but also to intellect and will as productive principle along with the essence insofar as it is essence, yet the fact still stands that the relation of producer and produced first burgeon in the essence before the relation of equal and like.

On the contrary: from this response it seems to follow that intellect and will are not attributes, because an attribute quasi perfects in second being something quasi presupposed in first being; therefore nothing that pertains to essence before it is understood to be a quantity or a quality is an attribute. Likewise, from this it seems that intellect and will are not distinguished there from the nature of the thing; the consequent is contrary to things said before in distinction 13 nn.64-67; the proof of the consequence is that that which in God precedes the idea of quantity and quality is only a ‘what’, – but a ‘what’ as a ‘what’ is not distinguished in God from the nature of the thing, because then his ‘what’ would not be simple.

To these points. To the first I say that if in created substance the power – or that which is the principle of proper operation belonging to such a nature – is not something pertaining to the genus of quality, but is either merely the substance itself to which the operation belongs, or it is some perfection identically contained in the substance (and this belonging to it as it is substance, but not as a certain quality circumstancing the substance, – in the way one must posit about powers when positing that there is some real distinction between them and yet that they are not accidents), much more does the divine essence – when everything is removed that is a quasi quality – have in itself ‘as it is essence’ the things that are the principles of proper operation belonging to God; of this sort are understanding and willing. I concede therefore that, when properly calling ‘attributes’ those things only that as quasi qualities perfect in second being a thing

presupposed in perfect first being (namely as far as concerns every perfection that belongs to the thing as it is substance), then in this way intellect and will are not attributes, nay they are certain perfections intrinsic to the essence as the essence is pre-understood to every quantity and quasi quality.

This point is made clear by the fact that if some [Henry of Ghent etc.] concede that life or living is not an attribute (because it states such being, not with a quasi accidental suchness, but as if per se contracting the thing, – just as man is such an animal, because he is rational), in the same way, since the intellect is a certain life and the will a certain life, they will not properly be attributes.

Or it is made clear in another and better way, that this essence as ‘this essence’ – preceding every quasi quality – is an intellective and volitional essence, such that, just as rationality is not an attribute of man, so neither is intellectuality an attribute of this essence. The point is plain from a likeness about the infinite, which infinite I have denied elsewhere [d.19 n.15, d.31 n.19] to be properly an attribute, because it states a mode intrinsic to whatever is in God, both substance and any attribute; so intellectuality states a mode intrinsic to this essence (but properly the attributes are wisdom and charity – and in another way the transcendentals, namely truth and goodness).

To the second point I say that a ‘simple what’ is not simple unitarily (as containing in itself only a single perfection), but this essence is simple and unlimited, because unlimited not only intensively in one idea but in everything that is a principle of proper operations in God, just as created substance is in some way unlimited because it is by identity any such principle of operating whatever. But along with this unlimitedness of the divine essence – a quasi extensive unlimitedness – stands simplicity; nay the simplicity follows from the infinity, because the infinite is combinable with nothing as part with part, but it can be really the same – although not formally – as any infinite at all.

97. To the third [n.3] response has been given in distinction 3 [nn.519-520], that there are certain relations of the second mode that are incompossible in the same thing,

and that these relations state an essential order of origin, – but some relations of the same mode are not incompossible, because namely they state an accidental order, as mover to moved. For the moved does not depend on the mover save per accidens, namely as to the act which it receives from it, namely to move, – and therefore, although the will can move itself, yet no supposit the same can produce itself; and therefore the relations of producer and produced sufficiently distinguish the supposita really.

98. To Boethius [n.4] I reply that he is thinking of a relation of identity according to nature, not formally, as if he were to say that certain relations necessarily require a diversity of nature in the extremes; but the relation in question here – which is a relation of origin – has no such requirement, but identity of nature is compatible with it, and therefore it is a relation ‘quasi of the same thing to itself’ because of the identity in nature of the things related, although it is a relation of a distinct thing to a distinct thing, speaking of the distinction of supposita.

## VI. To the Arguments of the First Opinion

99. To the arguments for the opinion of Praepositinus [nn.7-8] I reply:

To the first [n.7] I say that it is true that ‘person is simple like the essence’; however person includes certain things one of which is not formally the other, the essence not so, and therefore the essence is itself totally distinct although person, because of the essence, which is common, is not itself totally distinct; for such a non formal identity is sufficient in something for the fact that the Son is distinguished by one and not by the other.

To the second [n.8] I say that a concrete – whether it signifies or connotes – at any rate gives to understand a subsistent in form or nature, but an abstract precisely gives to understand form;<sup>a</sup> but in the matter at issue a subsistent, possessing paternity, has also along with this the divine essence, which essence is not formally paternity, nor conversely (as is said in *On the Trinity* VII ch.2 n.3), and therefore to say ‘the Father is distinguished by paternity’, taking Father not adjectively but substantively for a hypostasis (as the Master takes it in distinction 27 ch.2 n.238<sup>b</sup>), is not to say ‘the Father is himself wholly distinct’ first, but by something that is in him, yet giving to understand the whole.<sup>c</sup>

a. [Interpolation] but if this be doubtful to anyone about a concrete adjective, it seems sufficiently certain about a concrete substantive, which either signifies or necessarily connotes a subsistent in the nature that is implied by its abstract.

b. *A blank space was left here by Scotus*

c. [Interpolation] for Father (as taken substantively) does not per se include deity in all the same way that paternity does.

## Twenty Seventh Distinction

### Question One

*Whether a Created Word is Actual Intellec*

1. About the twenty seventh distinction I ask about the word, and first about the word of a created intellect, whether a created word is actual intellection.

That it is not:

Augustine *On the Trinity* VIII ch.6 n.9: “the image of Carthage, in my memory, this is its word;” the image there is taken for the species, not for actual imagination; therefore in the same way the intellectual word is an intelligible species and not actual intellection.

2. Again, Augustine *On the Trinity* XV ch.11 n.20: “the word that sounds exteriorly is a sign of the word that shines interiorly;” but the external word is a sign of a thing not of an intellection, – otherwise any affirmative proposition in which the same thing is not predicated of itself would be false, because the intellection of the subject is not the intellection of the predicate, although the thing is the thing; therefore the word is object and not actual intellection.

3. Further, Augustine *On the Trinity* IX ch.12 n.18: “the word is offspring and thing born from memory;” but action is not born, but is that in which something else is born; therefore the word is something formed by an act of understanding and is not the act itself.

4. On the contrary:

In the same place Augustine calls the word knowledge: “the knowledge of it, which is the offspring of it;” and *On the Trinity* XV ch.12 n.22, ch.21 n.40: “It is vision from vision and knowledge from knowledge.”

## Question Two

*Whether the Word in Divine Reality States something Proper to the Generated Person*

5. Second I ask about the Divine Word, whether word in divine reality states something proper to the generated person.

That it does not:

Augustine *On the Trinity* IX ch.10 n.15: “the Word is knowledge along with love;” all these things [sc. knowledge and love], placed in the definition of word, are essentials; therefore the word is an essential too.<sup>a</sup>

a. [Interpolation] Again, the word is the intellectual term of operation; ‘to understand’ , whereby the Son is produced, is not only a personal property but also a common essential one; therefore through it is produced an essential word.

6. Further, *On the Trinity* XV ch.7 n.12 ‘On Great Things’ and chs.15 and 16 ‘On Small Things’: “Just as the Father understands for himself and wills for himself and remembers for himself, so also do the Son and Holy Spirit;” but the proper act of intelligence as it is intelligence is the word; therefore just as in the Father there formally exists intelligence as intelligence, so there exists in him word as word.

The assumption is proved by this, that the trinity which Augustine assigns in *On the Trinity* IX ch.12 n.18 (‘mind, knowledge, and love’, which knowledge is the word, according to him in the same place), and the trinity assigned according to him in *On the Trinity* X ch.10 n.13 (‘memory, intelligence, and will’) correspond to each other in turn, –

the first part to the first part, and the second to the second, and the third to the third; therefore, just there is no perfect will without love formally, nor perfect mind without memory formally, so there is no perfect intelligence – as it seems – without the word formally.

7. Again there are not two things proper to one person, because there is one formal constitutive property for one thing constituted in being; filiation is the property constitutive of the generated person (according to Augustine *On the Faith to Peter* [really Fulgentius] ch.2 n.7), therefore the word is not; for these do not seem to state the same property, because not every son is word nor is every word son.

8. The opposite:

Augustine *On the Trinity* VII ch.2 n.3: “He is word by that by which he is Son,” and each of these is said relatively.

### Question Three

#### *Whether the Divine Word states a Respect to the Creature*

9. Third the question is asked whether the divine word states a respect to the creature.

That it does:

Augustine *On the Trinity* VI ch.10 n.11: “the Word is the art of the almighty God, full of all living reasons;” art states a respect to the thing made by art; therefore word also states a respect to creatures.

10. The opposite:

Augustine *On the Trinity* VII ch.2 n.3, through the same as before [n.8]; Son does not state a respect to creatures; therefore neither does the word, because “he is word by that by which he is Son.”

I. To the First and Second Questions

A. The Opinion of Others

1. Exposition of the Opinion

11. [To the first question] – To the first question it is said that the word is actual intellection, and not any intellection but a declarative one.

12. To understand this the position is set down as follows:

The intellect receives first a simple impression (or intellection) from the object, by which received impression the intellect – as it is active – converts itself to itself and to its own act and object, by understanding that it understands; third, there follows an impression of declarative knowledge in the bare converted intellect, and this from the intellect informed with simple knowledge, such that the intellect informed by such knowledge is the reason for impressing declarative knowledge, – and the converted bare intellect is something properly receptive. And between these two intellections, namely the first, which is the reason for the impressing, and the second, which is the one impressed, there is a middle disposition that is an action in the genus of action, and it is marked by that which ‘to say’ is; for this ‘to say’ is to express or impress a declarative

knowledge of simple knowledge, – and so this ‘declarative knowledge’, impressed on the converted bare intellect and being the term of the act of saying, is the word.

13. Not any actual intellection, then, is the word, but the one that is declarative, that presupposes simple actual intellection and actual conversion to it, and is born in the act of saying, whose active principle is simple knowledge and whose receptive one is the converted bare intellect.

14. [To the second question] – In agreement with this, an answer is given to the second question [n.5], that the intellect of the Father is first informed with quasi simple knowledge of the essence, to which it was quasi merely in passive potency, and, when brought into this act of ‘simple knowledge’ as bare, it is converted to itself as thus informed; and on it when converted, as if on a passive disposed thing, there is impressed declarative knowledge by virtue of simple actual knowledge, which declarative knowledge and term of the act of saying is the word. And according to this, it is plain that the word is the term of generation as also of the Son, and so it will be proper to the second person.

This opinion was stated above in distinction 2 nn.273-277, 280, in the question ‘On the two productions’.

## 2. Rejection of the Opinion

### a. As to the First Question

16. Against this opinion – as to the first question [n.12] – I argue first that it seems irrational to posit that the same power is active with respect to one of its acts and

passive with respect to another of its acts, because from this it seems that it is not a power of the same nature. For any power of one nature involves a like disposition of the power to the object; for sight is not active with respect to one act of seeing and passive with respect to another; hence any act of one power has a like disposition of power to object. Therefore if the intellect is only passive with respect to simple knowledge of a stone, and perfectly active with respect to conversion – which is second act – whereby it understands that it understands a stone, it will (as it seems) not be one power; it also seems unacceptable that it would be unable to have some activity with respect to a more imperfect act and yet could be totally active with respect to a more perfect act (now it is posited by some people that that conversion is a more perfect act than simple intellection).

17. As to what is added afterwards, that actual intellection is the reason for generating declarative knowledge [n.12], this seems to be unacceptable in our own case, because a more imperfect form cannot be a perfect reason for generating something perfect; but the first knowledge in us is confused and more imperfect than distinct knowledge; therefore etc.

18. Besides, if first knowledge is the reason for generating second knowledge [sc. distinct or declarative knowledge] – then either when it is not first, and then a non-being will be the reason for acting, or when it is, and then they [sc. first and second knowledge] will be either of the same idea or of a different one; if the latter, and the prior is more imperfect than the second, then it is not a principle for generating the second, because the more imperfect is not a principle for producing a more perfect (hence in equivocal production the cause is always more perfect than the effect); if the former, then two acts

of understanding of the same species will be in the same intellect or in the same power (and with respect to the same object), because memory and intelligence are one power.

19. Again,<sup>a</sup> then a trinity would not be posited in the mind according as it is mind, because the mind will not have any proper activity according as it is mind, but precisely according to an accident of it through an accident (which is simple knowledge), just as neither does wood have any activity with respect to the heating that is attributed to it through the heat that is an accident of it through an accident; and so it seems Augustine sought in vain for parent and offspring in the mind ‘according as it is mind’, because the idea of parent does not seem to belong to the soul according to anything in it, but according to some accident precisely, which is imprinted on it by the object.

a. [Interpolation] Further, as to any reflexive act of the intellect there is some more perfect direct act that can be had, because a direct act of the intellect – by which it understands a quiddity – is more perfect than the act by which it understands its own understanding, because it has a more noble object; therefore since the word is perfect knowledge of the thing, it does not include the act by which one knows that one knows.

20. Further, to generate a word is not an act of intelligence but of memory, according to Augustine *On the Trinity* XV ch.14 n.24; but every actual intellection belongs to intelligence, not to memory, according to him *ibid.* XIV ch.7 n.10; therefore no actual intellection is a reason for generating the word.

21. Further, what it says about conversion, that it is necessarily previous to generation of the word [n.12], seems to be against Augustine *ibid.* XV ch.16 n.26, where he seems to say that our most perfect word will be in the fatherland with respect to the

beatific object, – and yet that act will not be a convertive one, because the beatific vision does not have any created thing for immediate object (but every convertive act in us has something created for object, as the act or the power); nor does that vision presuppose conversion, because if that vision is the effect of the divine essence alone (or of the intellect cooperating with the divine essence), it naturally precedes the conversion of the intellect to its own understanding.<sup>a</sup>

a. [Interpolation] Again, as confused intellection is to an object confusedly presented, so is a distinct intellection to an object distinctly presented, – and it will not be a word of the object but of the act.

22. Also as to the statement that the intellect, as it is being converted, is purely active and yet, as converted, it is purely passive with respect to the generated knowledge which is the word, – it seems thoroughly irrational that the same thing under the idea under which it is ‘active’ is only passive with respect to an act of the same idea, or that insofar as it is purely ‘passive’ it is active with respect to an act of the same idea; but the intellect, insofar as it receives simple knowledge, is only passive and, insofar as it converts, it is only active; therefore it seems that it is unacceptable that insofar as it converts it is passive with respect to generation of the word, and insofar as it has simple knowledge it is active with respect to the same generation.

b. As to the Second Question

23. Also against what it says to the second question the same objection, it seems, can be made, that the intellect of the Father ‘as it is converting’ is purely active and ‘as having simple knowledge’ it is purely passive, according to him [Henry of Ghent]; therefore it seems unacceptable that ‘as converted’ it is that as from which the word is generated, and that ‘as knowing with simple knowledge’ it is the reason for generating the word quasi actively.

24. Further, some say that this conversion of the intellect is a quasi disposition of matter, – which seems unacceptable, because the disposition of matter is not more perfect nor as equally perfect as the active form of the agent; but this conversion is as equally perfect as simple knowledge, or more perfect; therefore etc.

25. Further, this conversion is with respect to first act as object, – therefore it is declarative knowledge of that act, just as any knowledge declares the object of which it is; therefore, before the generation of the word that follows this conversion (according to him [Henry]), there is had a declarative knowledge of first act, and so a word before the word!

26. Again, this opinion, as to the fact it posits the intellection of the Father to be the reason for generating the word, was refuted above in distinction 2 nn.291-296, in the aforesaid question ‘About productions’, and as to the fact that it posits the intellect of the Father to be that from which the word is generated, it was refuted in the same place, nn.283, 285, and also in distinction 5 nn.72-75; and I repeat one of the arguments touched on there.

Because the intellect as converted belongs to some supposit; for the conversion is, according to him, a certain action of understanding, and acts belong to suppositis;

therefore the conversion belongs to some supposit. I ask whose supposit it is as it is converted? If the Word's, and ‘as it is converted’ it precedes generation (according to him [n.25]), then it precedes the Word, and so the Word exists before the Word! If the conversion is the Father's, and whose it is ‘as it is converted’ is his as from whom generation happens by impression, and whose it is ‘as from whom something is generated by impression’ is his as the impressed thing exists in him and consequently is his ‘as he has that impressed thing’ – then, from first to last, it follows that the intellect of the Father ‘as Father’ formally has generated knowledge impressed on it, and so the Father formally understands by generated knowledge, contrary to Augustine *On the Trinity* VII ch.1 n.2.

27. The response made is that, just as in generation in creatures there are three moments of nature to distinguish, the first moment in which matter is under the form that is to be corrupted, the second in which the matter is under no form but is quasi bare and in proximate potency to the form that is to be generated, and the third in which it is under the form of the generated thing, – so it can correspondingly be said in divine reality, that the intellect in the first moment, as it is in the Father, is thus being converted to itself, and this conversion is a quasi disposition of the matter for the generation of the Son; in the second moment, in which it belongs as it were to no person, it is then in proximate potency to the term of generation; and in the third moment, in which it is under the property of the generated person, it belongs then to that person.

28. An example is set down: if wine is in proximate potency to vinegar (so that the form of wine is pre-required in the matter in natural order for its being in proximate potency with respect to vinegar), if along with this the matter of wine were not limited to

these two forms and consequently neither of them, when introduced, would expel the other, and if along with this each is hypostatic, bestowing personal existence – then vinegar would be generated from matter ‘as it was the matter of the wine’ as if from matter disposed with a previous disposition necessarily preceding this form. But if it be asked whose it is as vinegar is immediately generated from it, – the response is that it is no one’s but is generated from it immediately when matter is under neither hypostatic form.

29. Hereby response is given to the argument here in the matter at issue; the concession is made that it is the Father’s, the way the matter is the wine’s as it is disposed to the form of vinegar.

30. And when it is argued ‘therefore as it is Father’s it receives generated knowledge’, the consequence is denied; nay, by the fact that it receives generated knowledge it belongs to another subsistent, and even that from which the word is immediately generated does not exist as the Father’s but as converted.

31. And if it be objected against this that generation is not from the intellect as it is the Father’s more than from the intellect as it is the Son’s and the Holy Spirit’s, – the consequence is denied, because there is a double ‘as’ there. One that indicates the idea of the immediate principle ‘from which’ – and thus the word is generated from it as it is no one’s, as from the immediate receptive thing, which indicates the idea of what is disposed to the form that is the term, although it is not the idea of the immediate receptive thing absolutely; therefore the word is generated from the intellect as it is no one’s – as however it was first the Father’s it was also first existing in the Father, so that neither reduplication [sc. of ‘as’] is precisely without the other. And yet by the fact the word is

generated from it [sc. the intellect], it is not in the subsistent of the word but of the Father and not no one's.

32. But the addition is made that some people are deceived when they argue against this opinion 'from which, as from matter or quasi-matter', as if they imagine that there is there [sc. in God] a distinction of a quasi-passive potency from act, – which is not true, the way it is held generally by certain people about the attributes; but only, just as there is there wisdom formally and goodness formally, without distinction, so it is posited that there is truly impression there and truly the one impressing, – and everything that is said there to be without distinction; but a distinction of these things is only by act of intellect busying itself about the same one thing that exists in reality.

33. Against these arguments [nn.27-32]:

Generation in creatures is a change formally, for the reason that the matter, belonging to nothing before, is afterwards understood to be under the form of the generated thing; for by this it is understood to be changed from privation to form, which change is formally generation-change. Therefore if under this idea passive potency is posited in divine reality, then there will be true change in divine reality.<sup>a</sup>

a. [Interpolation] at any rate in the intellect as it busies itself about it, and so there will necessarily be imperfection there; or if only through the act of the busying intellect this conversion and generating of the word takes place, the word will not be a real person but only a person of reason and in intention.

34. The reason is confirmed by the example they give [n.28], that although the wine is not corrupted in the generation of vinegar, yet the generation would be truly a

change from privation to form, although there not go along with it the other change, ‘from form to privation’, as now commonly happens when one thing is generated and another corrupted; for in this case there commonly come together there two changes and four terms of change (two forms and two privations), but – after removing one of the changes and its terms – the other change would no less exist; therefore so will it be in the proposed case, that insofar as it belongs to nothing before – and so is under privation of the term ‘to which’ and is later under that term – it changes.

35. Further, if first it belongs to the Father and secondly to nothing, and third belongs to the Son by the fact that it receives the impressed knowledge (so by the fact it belongs to the Son, because it is quasi-potential, it receives the formal feature of the Son [nn.27, 30]), and belongs to the Son as the formal term communicated to the Son by generation (as was shown in distinction 5 nn.64-85), – then the Son will have intellect in a double way of having it, such that, when either of these ways is removed, it would no less have it in the other way of having; just as in creatures the composite has matter as something of itself, and truly has it, although it is not the formal term of generation; also the same composite has the form as something of itself, and truly has it, although the form is not subject of generation.

36. But the inferred consequence, namely that the Son has the essence in two ways of having, seems impossible, both in reality and in the consideration of the busying intellect. There is proof also through this, that what is material in generation is in potency to the formal term of the same generation; but the same thing, under the same idea, is neither in reality nor in the intellect in potency to itself; therefore neither will the intellect be at the same time a receptive potency and the formal term of the same generation.

37. And as to what is added about the double ‘as’ on the part of the matter, as if there is pre-required for the ‘as’ which is the idea of the proximate susceptive factor the ‘as’ which is the same ‘as’ under the form ordered to the form of generating [n.31], – this does not seem to exist per se in creatures, because if the matter which is under the form of wine is posited to be without any form and a created agent can act on it as it is denuded of form, then it would be the proximate receptive factor of any form that is of a nature to be impressed on pure matter, and such a form could be induced by any sufficient agent at all. Therefore the second ‘as’ is precisely sufficient in creatures for proximate potency, although frequently now its ordering is concomitant with it, because matter is never without form and is, as it is under form, not changed indifferently from any form to any form – by a created agent – but from a determinate form to a determinate form; the proof is that when it is understood to belong to nothing, then it is not under the prior form, which is posited as the disposition for the form of what is to be generated [nn.27-29]; its order then to that form is only a relation of posterior to prior, which perhaps is not a positive relation (because the term ‘to which’ is not then of the nature of the thing), or if it is a real relation, it does not seem to be the proper reason in the matter for receiving the form to be induced. – Applying this to the issue at hand, it seems that although the intellect should in origin be in the Father before it is in the Son, yet, if it were posited as receptive of generated knowledge, it would not be posited to be such essentially because of some order to existence in the Father, but according as it belongs precisely to nothing and, according to the way they themselves say precisely, to ‘quasi nothing’.

38. What is added to exclude a deception [n.32], seems to be the remark of someone deceived, because that remark seems in itself absurd and to destroy itself.

39. The first point is proved by the fact that the intellect in the nature of the thing is as truly a passive potency and as truly receptive as God is from the nature of the thing truly act and wise and good, – which seems absurd, because what in creatures necessarily has imperfection annexed to it or is an imperfection (as is the nature of passive potency, because it always states an imperfection the way it divides being against active potency) is posited to exist as truly in God as what is a perfection simply!

40. And if you say that rather passive potency states a perfection, although one not distinct from act, – this seems to be a fiction, because there is nothing lower in creatures than the idea of passive potency; for this idea belongs truly to prime matter, which is posited as the lowest of beings; therefore more truly can it be said that God is formally a stone than passive potency, if it is because of some perfection in the idea of passive potency that passive potency should be formally posited there.

41. Second I prove that the remark destroys itself [n.38], because it does not seem intelligible that there be opposite relations there without there also being distinct relations (if real, really, – if of reason, by reason) just as much as opposite ones; therefore if there is there from the nature of the thing something that impresses and something that is impressed and something on which it is impressed (which cannot be understood without relation), then to posit that they are there from the nature of the thing without any distinction is a contradiction.

## B. Scotus' own Response

### 1. To the First Question

42. I reply therefore in a different way to these questions.

To the first. – Because we chiefly take the idea of the word from Augustine's book *On the Trinity*, certain definite things must be supposed that according to him belong to the word;<sup>a</sup> from these we must investigate what in the intellect they most belong to, and that thing must be set down as the word.

a. [Interpolation] and second these things are by division to be removed from everything that is not the word (as the Philosopher does in *Ethics* 2.5.1105b19-06a13 when inquiring into the genus of virtue, where he divides the things in the soul into powers, passions, and habits); third, when those things have been removed that do not belong to what is being investigated.

43. The word according to him<sup>a</sup> is not without actual cognition, as is plain from *ibid.* XV ch.15 n.25.

b. [Interpolation] it is an act of intelligence, as is plain by comparing the trinity he posits in *ibid.* IX to the trinity that he posits in *ibid.* X (for knowledge corresponds to intelligence). Also the word...

44. Also the word is generated from memory or from science, or from the object shows itself in the science, as is plain from *ibid.* XV ch.10 n.19: “The word is thought formed from the thing we know;” ch.14 n.24: “Our word is born from our science in the way the word of God the Father is born by science alone.” And all these things are the same, because according to *ibid.* IX ch.12 n.18: “from the knower and known together knowledge is born,” which two things are one integral cause with respect to generated knowledge, as was said in distinction 3 question 2 n.494.<sup>a</sup>

a. A blank space was left here by Scotus

45. Third, the word is investigated by him because of the image [sc. of the Trinity] in the mind and is set down as the second part of the image (namely the offspring), as is plain from *ibid.* IX ch.32: “There is a certain image of the Trinity; the mind itself, and its knowledge (which is its offspring and its word from itself), and love third.”

46. The word may therefore be described as: the word is an act of intelligence produced by perfect memory, not having existence without actual intellection, representing the divine word (because for this reason Augustine inquired into our word).

47. From these it is plain that the word is nothing pertaining to the will, nor to memory (because the word is the second part of the image, not the first or third), and consequently it is not the intelligible species nor the habit, nor anything pertaining to memory; it is therefore something pertaining to intelligence.

a. Which of the Things Found in the Intelligence is the Word

48. Now in the intelligence there seems only to be [1] actual intellection, [2] or the object that is the term of that intellection, or, according to others, [3] the species generated in the intelligence from the species in the memory, which ‘species in the intelligence’ precedes the act of understanding, or, according to others, [4] it is something formed by an act of understanding, or fifth, according to others, [5] intellection itself as a

passion, as if caused by itself as action; and according to these five there can be five opinions about the word.

49. Now the species in the intelligence is not prior to the act of understanding [contra the third opinion], because positing such a species is superfluous. For it does not more perfectly represent the object than the species in the memory, and it is enough to have one thing perfectly representing the object before the act of understanding.

50. But that it is not ‘more perfect’ is plain from Augustine *ibid. XV ch.14 n.23*: “There is nothing more in the offspring than in the parent.”

51. Also in that case two species of the same idea would be in the same power, because these two species are of the same power; and the intellect itself as memory and intelligence is one power, because it is pure act, and that by which the possessor operates and that by which it has first act is in second act.

52. In that case too the habit would not be the immediate principle of the act, nor would what has the habit be in accidental power to acting according to the habit, because a prior form would be required for the operation, different from the habit.

53. Nor can the ‘species in the intelligence’ be posited as being born naturally, supposing it could never exist without actual intellection, because actual intellection is subject to the command of the will; nor even can it be said that it is born freely or that its generation is subject to the command of the will – as it seems – if it is posited as a species prior to act, because it seems that the first thing pertaining to the intellect that is in our power is actual intellection.

54. Nor can the object itself be posited as the word, as another opinion says [the second, n.48], because the object in itself is not anything produced by virtue of memory

(or of anything in the mind), such as the word is, – nor is the object ‘as it is in the memory’ produced by virtue of the memory, as is plain; but the object ‘as it is in the intelligence’ is only generated because something is first generated in which the object has being, because, as was said in distinction 3 nn.375, 382, 386, these intentional actions and passions do not belong to the object save because of some real action or passion that belongs to that in which the object has intentional being.

55. Nor too is it some term produced by intellection [sc. the fourth opinion, n.48], because intellection is not the productive action of any term; for then it would be incompossible to understand it to exist and not to be of the term, just as it is incompossible to understand that there is heating and no heat toward which the heating exists. But it is not impossible to understand intellection in itself without understanding that it is of some term as produced by it.

56. There is a confirmation too, that such operations ought to be ultimate acts, from *Ethics* 1.1.1094a3-5 and *Metaphysics* 9.8.1050a-b1. – This matter was spoken about above in distinction 3 nn.600-604, as to how it is a certain action of the genus of action, and another action that is quality, of which sort intellection is.

57. This way – and the following one about intellection-passion – are also refuted [sc. the fourth and fifth opinions, n.48] through the same middle term, that then the intelligence and not the memory would generate the word, which is contrary to Augustine [n.44]; for intelligence would produce the term of the action of understanding, if there were any – and intelligence would produce intellection-passion, if there were any.

58. Also this way ‘about intellection-action and passion’ [the fifth] does not seem reasonable, because intellection is one form, which although it can be compared to the

agent from which it is and to the subject in which it is received, yet it does not have from it such distinction that it could be as it were the cause of itself or the term of action in accord with this [sc. the subject] and not in accord with that [sc. the agent]; because if it is the term of action, this is in accord with itself, and not in accord with this respect or that, but those respects are concomitants of it.

59. It follows, therefore, by way of division that the word is actual intellection [the first opinion, n.48].

60. And there is confirmation from Augustine *On the Trinity* XV ch.16 n.23: “Our thinking, reaching to that which we know, and formed from it, is our word.” The same is held by him in *ibid.* ch.10 n.19: “Formed thinking, indeed,” etc. “is the word,” as was said above [n.44].

61. There is confirmation of this through a likeness about the vocal and imaginable word: for the vocal word is formed to signify and make clear what is understood, but that a vocal sound is not at once formed by someone who understands insofar as he understands but through some other middle power (namely a motive one), this belongs to imperfection; if therefore it were generated or formed at once as expressive of that which is latent in the intellect, and this by virtue of the understanding intellect, it would no less be the word. Now the object lies habitually latent in the memory; if therefore by virtue of it is at once caused some actual intellection, which once generated expresses and makes clear the object latent there, – truly it is the word, because expressive of what is latent and generated by virtue of it to express it.

#### b. Whether any Actual Intellection at all is the Word

62. But a further doubt remains, whether any actual intellection at all is the word.

63. [Opinions of others] – To this a reply is given in the negative, and that one must add – as a specific difference – ‘intellection which is declarative’ [n.11].

64. I argue against this because in the Father there is declarative knowledge formally, – for the intellection that is in the Father ‘insofar as he is intelligence’ is declarative of the Father ‘insofar as he is memory’, and thus perfectly, just as actual intellection ‘as it is in the Son’ declares habitual knowledge as it is in the memory of the Son; but in the Father there is not the word formally, as will be said in the solution of the question [n.71].

65. Likewise, the word declares itself, according to Augustine *On the Trinity* VII ch.3 n.4: “If,” he says, “this word that we pronounce is temporal and manifests both itself and that of which we speak, how much more does the word of God etc.” and manifest itself? ‘To declare’ then does not state a real relation, nor consequently the relation of what is generated; but the word is nothing but generated intellection (*ibid.* IX ch.12 n.18), otherwise it could be posited formally in the Father.

66. A reply is also given in another way as concerns this article [n.62], that the word is actual knowledge ‘that is the term of inquiry’.

67. This is shown from Augustine *ibid.* when he says that the word is a thing born or an offspring; but it is a thing born because it is a thing found, – but it is not a thing found save because it is inquired into; hence Augustine means that this thing born of the mind is preceded by an appetite moving to inquiry.

68. He seems to mean the same in *ibid.* XV ch.15 n.25 when he inquires as follows: “Then a true word comes to be when that which I said to us ‘spreads with a certain rapid motion’ comes to that which we know and is thence formed, taking on its likeness in every way, so that in whatever way each thing is known so too is it thought;” this ‘rapid thinking’ is inquiry, of the sort that will not exist in the fatherland, as he indicates [ch.41 or 16]: “Perhaps there will not be rapid thoughts there.”

69. The position then is that after confused knowledge there follows inquiry and argumentation, and finally one reaches perfect knowledge, which is as it were generated by that inquiry; and the perfect knowledge, which is the term of inquiry, is the word.

70. Against this I argue as follows: if it belongs to the idea of the word that ‘it is born through inquiry’, then God does not have a word; second, in that case an angel does not have a word about things naturally known to him; third, then the blessed do not have a word about the divine essence, nor about anything perfectly known without inquiry; fourth, therefore he who has the perfect habit of science and at once operates through the habit cannot have a word, – all which things seem absurd.

71. [Scotus’ own opinion] – Therefore, setting these opinions aside, I say as to this article [n.62] that not any actual intellection at all is the word (as was proved against the way that set down ‘declarative’ as proper to the word [nn.64-65]), but generated knowledge is; and therefore in the Father there is no word formally.

72. But any generated knowledge whatever – which Augustine calls offspring – is a word, though not in the way Augustine posits a perfect word, namely one that represents the divine word [nn.45-46].

73. I make clear the first of these [sc. that any generated knowledge is a word], because any actual intellection is generated from memory, imperfect from imperfect as perfect from perfect; therefore any knowledge is offspring and expressive of the parent, and is generated to express the parent. – And this is confirmed first from Augustine *On the Trinity* IX ch.10 n.15: “Everything known is said to be a word impressed on the mind, as long as it can be defined and produced from the memory,” again *ibid.* XV ch.12 n.22: “Nor does it matter when he who speaks what he knows learnt it; for sometimes as soon as he learns it he says it.” And briefly, whatever difference is found between the first generated imperfect knowledge and the knowledge that follows inquiry, there is no formal difference because of which the latter could be called word and the former not, as it seems.

74. I make the second clear [sc. not any generated knowledge is the perfect word, n.72], because our intellect does not immediately have perfect knowledge of the object, because according to the Philosopher *Physics* 1.1.184a16-23 what is inborn in us a way of proceeding from the confused to the distinct; and therefore first, in order of origin, there is impressed on us a confused knowledge of the object before a distinct one, – and therefore inquiry is necessary for our intellect to come to distinct knowledge; and therefore inquiry is necessary previous to the perfect word, because there is no perfect word unless there is perfect actual knowledge.

75. So then one must understand that when some object is known confusedly inquiry follows – by way of division – into the differences that belong to it; and when all the differences have been found, definitive knowledge of the object is perfect actual

knowledge and is perfectly declarative of the habitual knowledge which was first in the memory; and this definitive knowledge, perfectly declarative, is the perfect word.

76. This is what Augustine says *ibid.* IX ch.10 n.15: “I define what temperance is, and this is its word;” and in the same place Augustine premises, in the same chapter, what he was already set down above: “as long as it can be defined and produced from the memory,” [n.73] – that is distinctly and definitively and actually known, by virtue of what is in the memory.

77. It does not therefore belong to the idea of the word to be born after inquiry, but it is necessary for an imperfect intellect – which cannot at once have definitive knowledge of the object – to have such knowledge after inquiry; and therefore the perfect word does not exist in us without inquiry. And yet when a perfect word follows such inquiry, the inquiry is not the generation of the word itself formally, but is quasi-preliminary to the word being generated; which Augustine well indicates in the afore cited authority [n.68] “hither and thither with a certain rapid motion” etc. “when it comes to that which we know and is thence formed,” it is the word etc., – indicating that this scattering about (that is, inquiry) is not the generation of the word formally but is followed by the generation of the word from what we know, that is, form the object habitually known in the memory.

78. And if it be objected ‘for what then is inquiry necessary?’ – one can say to this that motion is necessary for the introduction of perfect form (which could not be introduced at the beginning of the motion), or there is introduction of many forms ordered to the introduction of the final form, and without that order of forms the final form could not be at once introduced. And accordingly this order is posited: first there is

habitual confused knowledge, second confused actual intellection, third inquiry (and in inquiry there are many words from many habitual knowledges virtually contained in memory), which inquiry is followed by distinct and actual knowledge of the first object whose knowledge is being inquired into, – which ‘actual distinct’ knowledge impresses perfect habitual knowledge on memory, and then first there is perfect memory and it is likened to the memory in the Father; ultimately, from perfect memory is generated a perfect word, without inquiry coming between it and the word, – and this generation is likened to the generation of the perfect divine word, from perfect paternal memory. No word is perfect, then, representing the divine word (which is what Augustine is most investigating) save that which is born of perfect memory without inquiry coming between such memory and such word, although neither could that memory be had by us – because of the imperfection of our intellect – unless inquiry precede.

### c. Whether Will Concurs in the Idea of the Word

79. The last doubt in this question [sc. question 1] is whether the will concurs in the idea of the word, – namely whether it belongs to its idea that it be generated voluntarily or by an agent will ‘joining the intelligence to memory’, according to what Augustine says in many places.

80. This question is moved by Augustine in *On the Trinity* IX ch.10 n.15: “Rightly,” he says, “is the question raised whether all knowledge is a word or only loved knowledge is;” and he replies: “Not everything words in any way touch upon is conceived, but some things are so in order only to be known and are yet not called words

– as things that displease are said to be neither conceived nor brought to birth;” “in another way everything that is known is called a word, as long as it can be pronounced or defined from memory.” And afterwards he adds: “However, although the things we hate displease us, yet the knowledge of them does not displease us,” – such that it does not belong to the idea of the word that it is generated by love of the known object, nor does it even belong to the word to be born by love of the knowledge that is the word.

81. Yet there accompanies the perfect word a double act of will: one is previous, whereby the act and the previous inquiry are commanded without which the perfect word would not be reached (as is plain in *ibid.* IX ch.12 n.18), and the other is that in which the intellect rests in intelligible knowledge already possessed, without which the intellect would not persist in that knowledge. An act of will, therefore, is not of the essence of the word, neither formally nor as cause, but is necessarily concomitant with the generation of it in us because of previous inquiry into it and for continuing it; likewise because of the fact that the intellect – if the will is not well pleased in the knowledge – would not persist in it, and so this knowledge would not have the idea of permanent word. Yet this permanence is not of the idea of the perfection of the word intensively, because a whiteness of one day is not less perfect than a whiteness of one year; but the will that has regard to the object – of which there is a word – does not pertain to the idea of the word save when taking word strictly, the way Augustine takes it in the afore cited chapter [n.80], “No one can say ‘Lord Jesus’ save with the Holy Spirit” (this ‘saying’ includes acceptance of the said object and adds something beyond the idea of word absolutely).

## 2. To the Principal Arguments of the First Question

82. To the arguments of this question [nn.1-3].

As to the first [n.1] it is plain the authority needs interpretation. For Augustine says there: “the image itself of it” (namely of Carthage) “in my memory is its word;” but it is clear, according to him *On the Trinity* XV ch.15 n.25, that the word is not formally in the memory; therefore it must be understood in a causal way and not a formal one.

83. To the second point [n.2]. Although there has been a lot of dispute about ‘vocal sound’, whether it is a sign of a thing or a concept, yet I concede in brief that what is signified properly by a vocal sound is a thing. However letter, vocal sound, and concept are ordered signs of the same signified thing, just as there are many ordered effects of the same cause none of which is cause of the other, as is plain about the sun illuminating many parts of the medium; and where there is such an order of caused things, apart from one being cause of the other, there is an immediacy of any effect with respect to the same cause, excluding anything else in the idea of cause but not excluding anything else in the idea of a more immediate effect. And then one could concede that in some way a nearer effect is cause of a remoter effect, not properly but because of the priority that exists between such effects in relation to the cause; thus one can concede about many ordered signs of the same signified thing that one of them is in some sense sign of the other (because it gives to understand it), for a remoter sign would not signify before a more immediate one in some way signified first, – and yet, for this reason, one is not properly sign of the other, just as is true on the other side about cause and things caused.

84. To the third [n.3] I concede that knowledge is offspring and truly generated, namely actual intellection, – but it is not an action in the genus of action (because, as said

above d.3 nn.600-604, actual intellection is not action in the genus of action), but it is a quality of a nature to be the term of such an action, which is signified by what it is to ‘say’ and – in general – by what it is to ‘elicit’. A word, then, is not something produced by an action that is intellection, because the intellection itself is not productive of anything but is itself produced by an action that is in the genus of action, as was said above [*ibid.*]

### 3. To the Second Question

85. To the second question [n.5] I say that concrete and abstract per se signify the same thing, although in a different way of signifying, as son and filiation, – because just as filiation signifies a relation in the genus of relation, so does son (by way, however, of denominating the relative supposit), and if it is taken substantively [d.26 n.100] it signifies the same as such subsistent thing. Thus therefore word and the abstract of it signify the same thing: but its abstract – if it were named – would be ‘word-ness’, which indicates a relation formally (for it signifies the same as the passive expression of something of the intellect); but just as son connotes a living nature, in which there is such relation, so word connotes actual knowledge, of which it is such expression; therefore since in divine reality ‘to be intellectually expressed’ is the property of the second person, it follows that the word is there purely personal, and it signifies a personal property.

86. It is plain too that the reason for generating the word is not the Father as actually understanding, but the Father as perfect memory (namely as intellect possessing

the actually intelligible object present to itself), as was made clear above in distinction 2 in the question ‘On Productions’ [nn.291-293, 221, 310].

87. It is plain also that the word does not have anything from which it is produced, from distinction 5 nn.80-82, – because if the productive principle have virtue sufficient for producing a *per se* subsistent, it produces such a subsistent, and especially if such subsistent is not of a nature to inhere in anything; but the expressed knowledge is not of a nature to inhere in anything, therefore it is of a nature to subsist *per se*; and the productive principle of it possesses sufficient virtue, therefore etc.

#### 4. To the Principal Arguments of the Second Question

##### 88. To the Arguments [nn.5-7].

When it is argued first from Augustine “the word goes with known love” [n.5], I say that his using the phrase ‘with love’ is a circumlocution for generated knowledge in us, because love does not have causality with respect to the word save as it commands its generation, as was said in the preceding question [n.81]. But in divine reality the word is knowledge naturally expressed, because the fact that the will has causality in us with respect to generating the word through its command is a mark of imperfection in our intellect; because it does not immediately have a perfect word; and as to how the will is disposed in God and in us, this was stated in distinction 6 nn.16-29.

89. To the other – from *On the Trinity XV* [n.6] – I concede that in the Father there is intelligence formally, but I deny the proposition that ‘every act of intelligence is formally a word’, because this is not true save of the intelligence that can have some

generated act or generated knowledge; such an act cannot be had by the intelligence as it belongs to the Father, because the Father is form himself and has nothing by generation. Yet one can concede that the actual intellection of the Father is as it were generated by virtue of memory as it is in the Father, but it is not truly generated, because it is not distinct.

90. To the third [n.7] I say that they are not two properties but the same, because the son and word signify per se the same relation, although they connote something different (namely the son connotes living nature, in general, and the word connotes actually expressed knowledge [n.85]). These connotations are not always the same, but passive relation – when signified – is always the same.

## II. To the Third Question

### A. The Opinion of Others

91. To the third question an answer given is yes [sc. that the divine word does state a respect to creatures], because of the authority of Augustine *83 Questions* question 63, where he speaks of the beginning of John's Gospel and says: "Logos is better translated by us in this place as 'word'" (instead of as 'reason'), "so that there may be signified not only a respect to the Father but also to the things that are made through the word by his operative power."

92. There is added too that the word states a proper respect to creatures, because word, of its idea, is declarative knowledge; therefore it belongs to it in its idea 'to declare' things.

93. There is also appropriated to the Son a relation to creatures: but the appropriation is only made because of the agreement of such appropriated thing to the property of the person to which it is appropriated. And it is made clear by a likeness about gift.

94. And in a similar way is set down that just as there gift, as it connotes an aptitudinal relation, pertains to the property of the Holy Spirit, so the word, as it states an aptitudinal relation – not an actual or habitual one – pertains to the second person.

#### B. Rejection of the Opinion and Scotus' own Response

95. Against this one can argue as was argued above about gift [in d.18, which is missing in the *Ordinatio*; see equivalent in d.18 of the *Lectura* and *Reportatio*], that no respect to creatures is a property of a divine person nor is per se included in any property of a divine person, and just as it was rejected there so it can be rejected here, – and this I concede.

96. And then there is no force [sc. to the question] save about the name ‘word’. For formally a respect of expressed knowledge to the one who expresses it is different from its respect to the creature that is declared; and not only this, but also the respect of the expressed word to the one who expresses it and the respect of the word as declaring something qua declared to the one who expresses it are two respects, because the first is real and the second of reason. But these two do not make anything per se one, because a true thing and a being of reason constitute nothing ‘per se one;’ and therefore if both these respects are signified by one name, they do not for this reason make a concept that

is ‘one per se’, but one of them is precisely the property of the second person (namely the passive expression, which is a real respect), but the other – namely the respect of what is declarative – is only a respect of reason, or exists toward the declared Father or the declared creature. This was otherwise touched on above from the authority of Augustine *On the Trinity* VII ch.3 n.4 where he means that the word declares itself, – and the same *ibid.* XV ch.14 n.23: “The Father is perfectly a sayer of himself,” that is perfectly declares himself etc.,<sup>a</sup> from which two authorities is plain that the same thing can be referred to itself as declarer to declared, and consequently it is not a real relation.

a. [Interpolation] “As if saying himself, the Father generates a word equal to himself in everything; for he would not have perfectly said himself if something less or more was in his word than in himself;” and *ibid.* VII ch.1 n.1: “With a Word, equal to himself, he always says himself.”

97. And then indeed it seems that the word per se and first signifies that real respect, because its abstract – as was said [n.85] – and its concrete first signify the same thing; but because word connotes perfect knowledge, by which knowledge it has a respect of reason to the things known through it, therefore it also connotes – as if still more remotely – the idea of what is declarative. And so the word will signify the property of the second person, although it connotes something absolute in that person (which is as it were the formal term of the production of that person), and through it as means it will connote, as if more remotely, a respect to all that to which the absolute can have a respect of reason, namely to all things it declares.

### C. To the Principal Argument

98. To Augustine *On the Trinity* VI [n.9] I concede that the Word or the Son is the art of the Father; he is thus also called the wisdom and virtue of the Father [*I Corinthians* 1.23-24], and yet just as the Father is formally wisdom and virtue, so also is the Father formally art; for if he formally creates, and this as artisan, the creative principle is formally in the Father, – and so the respect of art to creatures ‘as to artifacts’ is common to the three, although it is appropriated to the Son, just as to him is appropriated wisdom because of its agreement with his own production.

#### D. To the Arguments for the Opinion of Others

99. To the remark – on behalf of the opinion – from *83 Questions* question 63 [n.91], one can say that *logos* (in Greek) is better translated through what is meant by ‘word’ than by what is meant by ‘reason’, because reason does not thus signify a respect to the Father as word does, nor does it thus connote a respect to what is declared as word does. But Augustine does not mean to say that word states essentially relation to the creature under the idea of what is declarative, because he says “so that not only is respect to the Father signified, but a respect to those things too that are made through the word by operative power;” but the word is not said to be ‘operative power’ of the Father save as it is said to be the wisdom and art of the Father, which are not the word’s save by appropriation. Or if Augustine intends this name ‘word’ to signify both respects, then it does not precisely signify the property of the second person but, along with this, another appropriated respect; and then the interpretation of *logos* as ‘word’ and not as ‘reason’ is

fitting, because ‘reason’ does not thus signify either a proper or an appropriated respect.

The interpretation as ‘word’ is indeed true (for that reason it asserts more than the property of a person), nor does Augustine say the interpretation is in something that signifies a property of the second person.

100. When the addition is made that it asserts a respect to creatures, proper to the word [n92], – this seems much more false than the opposite conclusion that I maintain [nn.95, 98, 100], because not only is relation to creatures not included in the essential idea of any person, but it can also in no way pertain to any person without uniformly pertaining to the whole Trinity, because the whole Trinity is uniformly related to everything other than itself, according to any existence whatever, whether existence in reality or intelligible existence.

101. And when proof is given through the word’s being ‘declarative’ [n.92], I say that the actual intellection of the Father is declarative. Nor is ‘declarative’ the proper idea of word, but what is declarative is concomitant to expressed knowledge, because the expression is of actual knowledge; and therefore what is declarative is appropriated to word, although it is not proper to it.

102. When proof is afterwards given that ‘appropriation is not made save because of agreement with what is proper’ [n.93], the inference does not hold – from this – that appropriated is proper, but the opposite holds; and I concede that what is proper to the Son – which is ‘to be expressed’ – has an agreement with wisdom and with what is declarative, and with art, because of the fact that this expression is of something by way of intellect and by virtue of intellect; and such expression is actual knowledge, to which it belongs to declare the habitual knowledge from which it is expressed [n.64].

### E. A Doubt about the Expression of the Divine Word

103. Here, however, a difficulty arises (a better one than is that ‘about the idea of declarative’), namely whether the word is expressed by virtue of the paternal intellect not only about the divine essence as object present to the intellect of the Father, but about other intelligibles, so that it should thus have a respect to creatures not as they are in themselves but as they have being first in origin in the paternal intellect (as it seems) before the word is expressed. And then it would have to them the relation of what is expressed; for then the word would be expressed not only about the essence as it is object of the intellect of the Father, but also about other intelligibles. – But about this difficulty elsewhere, in the question ‘On the Uniform Relation of the Trinity to what is Other than Itself’ [II d.1 q.1 nn.12-19].<sup>a</sup>

a. [*Interpolation*, from Appendix A] Whether by natural reason it can be known that the word is not an ‘essential’ in divine reality.

That it cannot be: for then the Trinity would be known by natural reason; again, in the creature the word is equally of any supposit in nature.

On the contrary: it is known that it is not necessary that the first person is word, – it is another person.

Solution:

To the negative answer the solution is plain, because the concept of the term – whether true in itself or not – shows that the negation can be proved about the positive. It cannot, on account of causing an effect, be a common term. It can be known that the not-impossible and anything contrary are solved.

Whether the idea of Word is prior to the idea of Son in the second person.

That it is: it is more of a *per se* term of the productive principle (on the contrary: there is no prior knowledge).

On the contrary: Augustine, *On the Trinity* VII ch.1 n.2 [“He is Word by that by which he is Son”].

Opinion: intellectual nature. – On the contrary: nature thus states a mode of active principle.

Solution: the Son is a subsistent in intellectual nature, generated by virtue of a nature of the same idea, existing in the first person (Hilary, *On the Trinity* V n37 [“For he is not God by cutting or extension or derivation from God, but by virtue of nature he subsists by birth in the same nature.”]).

## Twenty Eighth Distinction

### Question One

*Whether ‘Unbegotten’ is Property of the Father Himself*

1. About the twenty eighth distinction I ask whether ‘unbegotten’ is property of the Father himself.

That it is not:

No property is formally asserted of the essence, because then it would not distinguish [sc. the persons], just as neither does the essence distinguish, which is not said to be formally begetter or begotten, or inspiriter or inspirited; but the essence, as it seems,

is unbegotten; therefore ‘unbegotten’ is not a property of any person. – Also the Holy Spirit, as I will prove, is formally unbegotten; therefore etc.

Proof of the assumption, because the essence is not begotten, therefore it is non-begotten (the consequence is plain from the Philosopher *De Interpretatione* 10.2020-21: “On a negative proposition about a finite predicate follows an affirmative about the infinite predicate”), – and further, therefore it is unbegotten (this consequence is proved from Augustine *On the Trinity* V ch.7 n.8 where he says that ‘unbegotten’ is the same as not-begotten). And the like can be argued about the Holy Spirit: ‘if he is not begotten then he is non-begotten’.

2. Further, every personal property is relative, because whatever is said to itself is common to the three (from *ibid.* V ch.8 n.9); but unbegotten does not state a relation, as I will prove; therefore etc.

Proof of the minor, because if it does [sc. state a relation], then everything begotten is a related thing. This proposition is true: ‘everything begotten is a related thing’; I convert this by contraposition: ‘therefore every non-related thing is non-begotten’. Then I argue: every non-begotten is a related thing, every non-related thing is non-begotten, therefore every non-related thing is related. The conclusion is impossible, therefore one of the premises is also impossible; not the one that follows from a true proposition by conversion through contraposition, therefore the other one.

3. Again, if not being able to be born were a property of the Father, then not being able to be inspirited would be a property of the Father and the Son, and so there would be six notions [sc. in divine reality], which is commonly denied.<sup>1</sup>

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<sup>1</sup> Tr. The five commonly accepted notions in divine reality are: being unable to be born (unbegotten), active generation (paternity), passive generation (being able to be born, filiation), active inspiriting

4. Further, Ambrose *On the Holy Spirit* IV [*On the Incarnation* ch.8 nn.79-80] did not want to use the name ‘unbegotten’, as the Master says in the text [I d.13 ch.4 n.117].

5. The opposite:

Augustine to Orosius [Ps.-Augustine, *Dialogue of 65 Questions* q.2]: “Sure faith declares that there are not two unbegottens.”

## Question Two

*Whether Not Being Able to be Born is a Property Constitutive of the First Person in Divine Reality*

6. Next after this I ask whether not being able to be born is a property constitutive of the first person in divine reality.

That it is:

Damascene ch.8 says that everything [sc. in divine reality] is one “besides non-generation and generation and inspiriting.” But it is clear that he is not excluding all the personal properties (because then in the Father there would only be the property of not being able to be born), therefore he is excluding ‘everything else’ in the idea of constitutive personal property; therefore all these, and only these, must be such relations; therefore non-generation is a property constitutive of the first person.

7. Again, wisdom is goodness; therefore not able to be born is paternity.

8. Again, Praepositinus [*Summa* I q.14] argues thus: “By that by which the Father is Father he is this person, – by that by which he is this person he is unable to be born.”

9. Again, it is more worthy to have something not from another than to communicate it to another.

10. The opposite:

As the second person is to filiation, so is the first person to paternity; but the second person is constituted by filiation; therefore the first person too is constituted by paternity.

### I. To the First Question

11. To the first question there is need to see two things, – first how unbegotten agrees with the Father alone, and second how it can be a property since it seems to involve only a negation.

#### A. In What Way Unbegotten Agrees with the Father Alone

12. As to the first point I say I say that every name, composed of something with many senses and a privative particle [sc. as in ‘unbegotten’], is doubly many, both from the multiplicity of the opposite affirmation, and from the multiplicity of the privation – as is plain from the Philosopher *Metaphysics* 5.12.1019b19-23, ‘On Power’, where he distinguishes ‘impotence’ according to the multiplicity of potency, and, in addition to this, according to the multiplicity of privation, which is set down in ‘On Privation’, *ibid.*, 22.1022b22-31; thus this name ‘unbegotten’ will be multiple, from the multiplicity of what is meant by ‘begotten’ and from the multiplicity of the privative particle.

13. As to the first point, what is begotten is properly said to be ‘produced by generation’ as the first term; but by extension, what is begotten is said to be ‘communicated by generation’, which is the formal term of generation (as Hilary *On the Trinity* IV ch.10 says, because the Son has nothing “save being born”); in a third way what is begotten is extended to what is produced or what pre-requires generation, although it is not per se the term of generation, whether first or formal.

14. Privation can also be multiply distinguished into privation properly said, namely when something lacks that which it is of a nature to have, and when it is so, and as etc. [sc. e.g. a blind adult dog]; and into privation more commonly said, when something lacks that which it is of a nature to have, though not according to the aforesaid conditions [sc. e.g. puppies born blind which acquire sight a few days later]; and still more commonly when it lacks that which it is of a nature to have, though not in itself but in its genus (as a mole is said to be blind, because vision – of which it is deprived by blindness – is not repugnant to the animal in its genus though it is repugnant to mole in itself). And in this way privation is said more generally the more the habit – of which it is the privation – is of a nature to belong to a more common thing agreeing with that privation; for example, something that would not have what is of a nature to belong to it according to the idea of body would be called ‘deprived’ in a more general way than if it did not have what is of a nature to belong to it according to the idea of animal – and in a still more general way if it did not have what it would be of a nature to have according to the idea of body – and in the most general way if it did not have what it is of a nature to have according to the idea of being.<sup>a b</sup>

a. [Note of Duns Scotus] Privation (namely lack of what is of a nature to be had): according to the idea of being, according to the idea of genus, according to the idea of species, most properly (when, as, etc.). The first privation exists in any created thing, because any created thing is limited, – the second is not, because it includes every perfection eminently. – But is the second privation of relation in God or in a divine person? That it is not: the essence in any person eminently includes it. – On the contrary: the Father is unbegotten [nn.5, 19].

b. [Interpolation] An example of the first: as a stone is said to be inanimate and deprived of the soul that is of a nature to belong to it according to the idea of body, of which ‘animated’ is a difference. Example of the second: as an angel is said to be incorporeal. Example of the third: as any creature is said to be imperfect, not because it is of a nature to have every perfection in its genus but because having every perfection is not repugnant to being.

15. Negation is also distinguished by negation outside the genus, which contradicts the affirmation, – and it is true of anything of which the affirmative is false, whether about being or non-being [e.g. non-man is true of a horse and a chimaera]; the other is ‘negation in the genus’ and it supposes the nature of the genus of which it is said, – and it can be understood in many ways, according to the multiplicity, more common and less common, of genus.

16. To the issue at hand, then, when speaking of the multiplicity involved in this particle ‘un-’: although there is dispute whether it implies negation in the genus or privation, yet it seems they are the same thing in the issue at hand, taking negation according to genus in the most general way and privation according to genus in the most general way, because negation in a something naturally fitted to have what is negated is privation (according to the Philosopher *Metaphysics* 4.2.1004a9-16), so that privation

adds nothing to negation save that it requires something naturally fitted in which to exist. Therefore negation in a genus – however genus is taken – since it is in something naturally fitted in some way (although not fitted in itself), will be privation in some way in genus, though not properly in such a thing according to its being such.<sup>a</sup>

a. [Note by Duns Scotus] Privation is nothing formally but negation, and therefore it is not in a subject otherwise than as negation is; fittingness is in a subject, but does not per se belong to privation unless privation involves two concepts, – but each concept is separable from the other, and each is indicated or connoted by the privative name.

17. And if you object against this that there is no privation in divine reality, because what is deprived is imperfect, I reply that this conclusion holds of privation according to the proper idea of a deprived subject; for if the thing that ‘lacks’ were of a nature in itself to have what it lacks it would be imperfect – but if it is of a nature to have it according to the idea of genus, it is not imperfect. But that many privations are taken in this way too is plain not only from what the Philosophé says about ‘mole’ [n.14] but also by the common division of ‘common’ into habit and privation – as ‘animal’ is divided into rational and irrational; ‘irrational’ indeed states in an ox a privation, not of what is of a nature to be had in an ox in its species, but of what would be of a nature to be had in ‘what it is to be animal’; for the genus, as common to the privation and the habit, is that to which the fitness for each belongs.

18. But in the issue at hand, by extending what it is to be a genus (whether we understand it for the privation or for the negation in genus, by both of which I understand the same thing), I can take ‘quasi genus’ here for that which is common to the three

persons, namely person or subsistent; and then we may say that the Father is in some way deprived in genus – or that in the Father there is some negation in genus – of something that is of a nature to belong not only to being but to supposit, which is common to Father and Son.

19. And then this name ‘unbegotten’ will be able to be taken for the issue in hand in four ways:

In one way most properly, insofar as it signifies a proper lack of what is properly signified by the name ‘begotten’, which is the first thing produced by generation, – and in this way it does not exist in divine reality, because nothing there lacks what is of a nature to be present. In the second way, insofar as it signifies a lack commonly of what is signified properly by ‘begotten’, and then it connotes a subsistent or person, and it signifies a lack ‘in genus’ of begotten properly taken; and in this way it seems to belong – by virtue of the terms – to the Father and the Holy Spirit, each of whom is a subsistent and is not begotten (it does not thus belong to the essence, because although the essence is being and non-begotten, yet it is not *per se* subsistent and person). In the third way – as it seems – it states a lack in genus, and this of ‘begotten’ taken in the second way, namely for what is communicated by generation; and in this way the essence is not said to be un-generable, by removal of aptitude for communication – but as the essence is in the Father it can be said to be non-communicated, and so unbegotten, if unbegotten is taken in this way. In the fourth way it signifies lack ‘in genus’ of what is begotten taken in the most common way, and then ‘unbegotten’ is the same as non-produced subsistent; and in this way it is taken by the saints, such that it is the same in divine reality as ‘unproduced’ properly taken; this is plain from Augustine *On the Trinity* XV ch.26 n.47: “the Father

alone is not from another, and therefore is alone called unbegotten,” and he means the same to Orosius [n.5].

20. I say therefore that ‘unbegotten’ in the usage of the saints, namely as it signifies the negation of begotten most commonly taken (that is of what is produced), by connoting a subsistent in divine nature, belongs thus only to the Father, as is plain from the authority of Augustine already cited [n.19].

#### B. How Unbegotten can be a Property of the Father

##### 1. First Opinion

21. About the second article [n.11] some say that since unbegotten states only a privation in the genus or only a negation, and so does not of its formal nature state any dignity nor anything pertaining to dignity, and since nothing can be posited as a property of a divine person unless it is something pertaining to dignity, therefore unbegotten must connote something positive, by reason of which connotation it is a property; now this positive thing is set down by them to be a fountain of fullness that exists in the Father alone, – in whom is all fecundity, both inwardly and outwardly.

##### 22. But against this:

First because this fountain of fullness is not understood outwardly, because such fecundity is common to the three. But inwardly there is only in the Father a double fecundity, namely for generating and for inspiriting; but this fecundity is not any one positive thing in the Father save the essence, – but it does not connote the essence, so as for this reason to be called a property of the Father. But that this fountain of fullness is

not any single positive relation in the Father is plain, because then there would be three positive relations in the Father, namely active generation and active inspiriting and the relation which by circumlocution is said to be what this ‘fountain of fullness’ of fecundity is, although it lacks a name; and then there would be six notions, which is not commonly conceded, – at any rate there are not conceded to be in the Father three relative and positive properties.

23. Further, unbegotten does not seem to connote that fountain of fullness, because it does not connote the first fecundity, – because according to Augustine *On the Trinity* V ch.6 n.7, “even if he had not generated, nothing would prevent him from being unbegotten;” therefore unbegotten can precede active generation. Much more too does it not connote the second fecundity, because if *per impossibile* there could not be a production by way of will, yet there would still be status in generation for some unbegotten person. Therefore it seems that the fountain of fullness, which states only a double fecundity, cannot be connoted by what is meant by ‘unbegotten’.

24. Third their reason [n.21] does not seem valid, because if a property of a person were to state a dignity simply, then the person that did not have it would not have every dignity simply, – which is unacceptable.

## 2. Second Opinion

25. In another way it is said that this positive thing is existence from itself (and it said to be the intention of Richard of St. Victor), and that ‘existence from itself’ is a proper positive element called by circumlocution ‘unbegotten’, and it precedes relation to

the Son. For because it is something from itself, therefore all being and all existence – according to Richard [*On the Trinity* V ch.4] – ought to come from it.

26. On the contrary: ‘from itself’, if it is something positive, is either something absolute and will be common to the three; or it is something relative, and not relative to what is prior (because there is only a negation of relation to what is prior), so it will be relative to the Son. Therefore ‘from itself’ either states filiation, if it is positive, or it states a disposition to what precedes and it will be a negation of relation, and so a negation the way ‘unbegotten’ is; therefore it is not a proper positive element of him [sc. the Father].

### 3. Scotus' own Opinion

27. Therefore it seems one should say that unbegotten under its proper idea (as it signifies not having a begetter) is a personal property of the Father, and does sufficiently imply dignity, that is does not imply indignity, for this is enough for a personal property not to have indignity, in the way too that personal features in divine reality are not said to be imperfections (but not perfections simply, that is, perfections universally in anything).

28. And if there is altogether dispute that a property should altogether state dignity, not an absolute but a personal dignity, one can say that unbegotten, insofar as it denies ‘having a begetter’, states a personal dignity of the first person in divine reality, because just as it is a mark of dignity in the second person to have an originating principle, so it is a mark of dignity in the first person not to have one; and yet it is not necessary that this dignity be formally the dignity of some proper positive thing,

connoted by what it means to be ‘unbegotten’. Hence negation can be said to be a mark of dignity in something insofar as it would be a mark of indignity if the affirmation were posited in him, – the way it is a mark of dignity in a king that he is not ribald.<sup>a</sup>

a. [Note by Duns Scotus] Henry [of Ghent, *Summa* 57 q.1]: “As positive relations are founded on the essence from the nature of the thing, so this one too is negative; for from the nature of the essence comes the fact that in some person there is a reason by which he is not from another, and thus the substrate for this negation is only the divine essence, – so that the sense is: ‘unbegotten’ that is ‘having divine essence not from another’. For to have formally from himself the divine essence and not from anything as principle is to have it freely (the way a king has a kingdom), – therefore it is a mark of dignity (the notion is precisely by reason of negation; it implies dignity from the fact that it is founded on such affirmation); hence to have deity from another simply is not a mark of dignity but only by reason of the noble mode of having it, namely through generation and inspiriting.

*Ibid.*, ad 7: “Unbegotten strictly, namely ‘not produced by generation’, does not state dignity” (because a negation of dignity does not state dignity), “but unbegotten as it is a notion does; it does not belong to the Holy Spirit but only to the Father; thus it simply states: ‘being in no way from another’.”

*Ibid.* ad 2: “Therefore non-inspirited does not state dignity, because inspirited states it” (therefore it is not a sixth notion).

The first paragraph above is expounded *ibid.* ad 5: “Unbegotten is considered in one way simply and in itself, in another way as it is considered about such a nature. In the first way, the substrate is only the essence, so that if there were a hypostasis in the essence without a property it would be unbegotten. In the second way, something is a substrate of its negation in a triple way: namely either ‘as that on which it is founded’, or ‘as that by which it is founded on another’, or third ‘as that of which it is’; it indicates the idea of substance alone formally (on which it is founded), but only as it is under the property of the Father.”

On the contrary: one would say better ad 7 that [unbegotten] implies dignity by reason of the foundation only; nor does it follow that it does not state a proper dignity, because the essence is indifferent to several personal dignities.

The first argument that he posits [in 57 q.3] is confirmed by the fact that where there is a positive disposition to what is prior, it is to the prior before it is to the posterior; therefore so is the negative too, – and this is what is said, that the idea of first precedes the idea of principle; and universally, in what is not constituted by an order to what follows, the negation of order to the prior precedes the order to the posterior, and never elsewhere. The absolute is prior to the relative, – ‘unbegotten’ in itself could belong to an absolute supposit, if there was one.

Gofrey [of Fontaines *Quodlibet* V q.3]: A notion indicates, the persons are distinguished by relations of origin; therefore what pertain to the origin are notions. The first person is indicated doubly by origin: because he is ‘from none’ and ‘another is from him’ (therefore there is another notion); by reason of negation it implies dignity (therefore it is a ‘negation in genus’), and it states dignity from the fact it is founded on an affirmation. This is the essence, which lies beneath all the divine notions, so that the sense is: ‘unbegotten’, that is ‘having divine essence not from another’ (this is mark of great dignity). Third, how dignity is proper to the Father: because it is considered in a double way, in itself and by reason of form, or by reason of matter (as being about such matter); in the first way only the essence lies beneath, whatever the supposit be, absolute or relative; in the second way, it is triply founded: ‘disposition to the foundation’, ‘as that in which’, ‘as that of which’ (in this way the supposit with its property lies beneath).

### C. To the Principal Arguments

#### 29. To the arguments of this question [nn.1-4].

To the first [n.1] I deny the minor. When it is proved from the Philosopher in *De Interpretatione*, I say that the consequence of the Philosopher holds on the basis of the

truth of the first principle, namely this principle ‘what one contradictory is removed from, of that the other is asserted’; but as such, one cannot conclude that an affirmative about an infinite predicate follows from a negative about a finite predicate save as the infinite predicate signifies a negation outside the genus, contradictory to the affirmation (because ‘a negation in the genus’ does not contradict the affirmation), then the inference ‘it is not begotten, therefore it is non-begotten’ does not follow save about a negation outside the genus; and in this way non-begotten does not convert with begotten, although it would convert if one takes non-begotten in the sense of stating a negation in the genus, which is the way Augustine [n.1] understands it.

30. To the second [n.2] I concede that no property of a person – according to the common way [d.26 n.15] – states something that exists to itself. Yet one should not say that every property states a relation positively, but it is enough that it state a relation positively or negatively; for if the relation is personal and proper to some person, the negation of the relation will also be a personal feature proper to another person, and thus not existing to itself nor common to the three; and in this way – namely negatively – unbegotten states a relation, as is plain from Augustine *On the Trinity* V ch.7 n.8. And then this proposition is false, ‘every non-begotten is a related thing’ [n.2], – and yet the inference does not follow, ‘therefore non-begotten states something existing to itself’, but what follows is that it either states something existing to itself or it states the negation of a proper relation or ‘a relation negatively’.

31. To the third [n.3] one response is that what is inspirit-able does not state any dignity, as unbegotten does, and so it is not a notion. – But this seems false in itself, because it is a mark of equal dignity in the Father and the Son not to be inspirited as it is

in the Father not to be begotten; and also it does not seem valid as to the issue at hand, because it does not seem necessary for a property (or for a notion) to state a proper dignity [n.27].

32. One can say in another way that unbegotten states non-produced (as was expounded in the first article of this solution [nn.19-20]), and in this way non-inspiritable – because it is contained in it – is not a different notion from it; for the inference ‘non-produced therefore non-inspirited’ follows, and not conversely; therefore it is not another notion.

33. On the contrary: unbegotten is only in the Father, non-inspirited is in the Father and Son, therefore this notion is not that one.

34. If this inference [n.33] is to be conceded, there will be six notions, unless another reason be assigned why non-inspirit-able is not a notion. Although it may seem absurd to posit six notions (because commonly there are not so many posited), one could say that an argument place from authority does not hold negatively: ‘this is not said, therefore this is not the case’. For in the time of Ambrose it does not seem that three notions in the Father were in use, because he did not wish to use this name ‘unbegotten’ [nn.4, 35]; in the time of Anselm also two positive notions in the Father do not seem to have been in use, because he himself does not use ‘inspiriting force’, but takes ‘deity’ in its place, common to Father and Son. Although from the beginning only three properties were noted, namely paternity, filiation, and inspiriting (and this from the word of the Savior in the Gospel, *Matthew* 28.19 and of John in his canonical letter, *I John* 5.7 [nn.26, 67]), yet afterwards other notions and properties became known by investigation, which were prior in the thing though not known first; and so, just as later thinkers conceded

more notions than earlier ones did (although the earlier ones did not deny them, even if they did not state them), so this does not seem unacceptable about thinkers later than those doctors, while however they could conclude the point from what those said.

35. To the final argument [n.4] – from Ambrose – the answer is plain from the Master, that the word ‘unbegotten’ was not so known in his time, nor even was it so necessary for the expression of the faith that every Catholic ought to use it; and to express the first person with that property was also an occasion of error for the simple, because it seems to state something that exists to itself, because it does not as manifestly involve relation as ‘begotten’ does; and therefore caution was taken for the simple faithful not to use that word, because of malignant heretics, although the word in itself properly and first belongs to the Father.

## II. To the Second Question

### A. Opinion of Others

36. To the second question [n.6] it seems one can answer yes, – understanding it in this way, that the divine essence, before it is understood to have been communicated through production, seems to be understood to be non-communicated in act in something, as in the first person; not indeed to be incommunicable (because it is not incommunicable), but not actually communicated, because it does not seem possible for something to be communicated quasi-passively unless it is already possessed in something as not communicated to it quasi-passively. And in this first moment, in which only essence and this negation ‘non-communicated in act’ are understood, an

understanding of something incommunicable seems to be had; for if essence ‘as non-communicated in act’ were not incommunicable then ‘as non-communicated’ it could exist in several things, – and then there could be several unbegottens, in which the essence would exist equally primarily, and there woud not be a stand in someone first; but if someone incommunicable is had, subsisting in the divine nature, then a person is had; therefore before any understanding of a positive property [sc. paternity], by understanding only essence and unbegotten (that is, non-communicated through production), some incommunicable subsistent in the divine nature is had, who is properly unbegotten, taking ‘unbegotten’ the way it can be taken in divine reality.

37. Again, essence, as prior to relation, is non-communicated and gives ‘per se existence’, – therefore it gives it to an unbegotten hypostasis. The proof of the antecedent: ‘as prior’ it is not communicated, therefore it is non-communicated; as such it gives ‘per se existence’ (*On the Trinity* VII ch.6 n.11). Proof of the consequence: ‘as non-communicated’ it is not common to several suppositis; therefore it is one only, and only in the unbegotten, because it is communicated in the case of the begotten.

38. To this returns the fact that the essence ‘per se being’ or ‘this God’ generates, insofar as it has the formal principle and per se existence; and nothing is pre-understood to generation save that it has the principle ‘by which’ not from another, and is as it were waiting for the consequent relation [sc. paternity], which rises up with the term [sc. Son] once it is posited.

39. On the contrary: then by generation there is a positive property in the Father as in the Son. – One can concede that it is in neither ‘as per se term’ (neither first nor

formal), but is concomitant to the first term who is the Son, because mutual relations are concomitant to the same ‘per se term’, which is one extreme.

40. And this opinion is confirmed from Augustine *ibid.* V ch.6 n.7 when he means that “if the Father had not generated, nothing would prevent him from being unbegotten,” – therefore some ‘unbegotten’ can be understood before understanding that he has generated; but when unbegotten is understood, an incommunicable subsistent supposit is understood; therefore it seems that the person is there first constituted by ‘unbegotten’ before by any positive property.

41. Further, in every essential order the negation of order to a prior seems more immediately to follow the first thing than does its order to the second thing, because that negation seems to follow it immediately insofar as it is such; therefore likewise in the order of persons, the negation of order to a prior will more belong to the first person than his order to the second person; therefore he is first understood to be unbegotten before generating, and in that prior moment he is understood to be incommunicable in divine nature.

42. Further, if according to the imagination of the philosophers there were in divine reality only one absolute supposit, it would be constituted by the essence, without any positive property, – and if any property were to be concurrent, it would only be this negative one, which is ‘not being from another’; therefore it seems that – since origin when posited in divine reality takes nothing from the essence itself, neither does it take anything from this negative property ‘not being from another’ – it will now be possible for some person to be constituted by these two things [sc. ‘not being from another’ and essence].

43. And if it be objected ‘how will mere negation be able to constitute a divine person?’ – the response is that person includes essence, which is communicable, and along with this something by which it is incommunicable; by the fact, then, that it has the nature in itself, it has every positive perfection that can exist in it; but by the co-understood negation it can have the idea of being incommunicable, and especially so if incommunicability only states some negation in genus.

#### B. Rejection of the Opinion

44. Against this way the argument is as follows:

No negation is of itself incommunicable, because just as it is not of itself one or indivisible by any division, so it is not of itself a this and incommunicable, but only by an affirmation to which being divided is first repugnant, – and it is by this that not being divided belongs to negation; and so too does it seem about being incommunicable, that to be communicated is not repugnant to negation of itself but only by some affirmation to which incommunicability first belongs; therefore negation will not be the first idea of incommicability.<sup>a</sup>

a. [Note by Duns Scotus] Response: negation of being from a principle in being is altogether incommunicable, because everything else from a unique being is from a principle.

Hence is ‘this negation’ incommunicable in being? – I say from the nature of being that this negation in its being communicated is repugnant to it.

On the contrary: therefore the positive thing is incommunicable first. This does not follow; rather, if there were not merely one principle, there would not be merely one thing without a principle.

An instance: non-animation, positing that the form of a mixed thing remains the same as before. – It is no instance, because although non-animation might be present in a thing so mixed, yet it is not proper to it, because animation was present in it.

45. Further, no negation is proper to any subject save by some affirmation proper to it on which such negation follows; therefore this negation ‘not being from another’ is not proper to the first person save because some prior affirmation is proper to him on which this negation follows; the ‘prior affirmation’ cannot be the essence, – therefore some positive property.

46. Further, if the first person is incommunicable formally by negation, and the second is incommunicable by positive relation (namely by filiation) and the third likewise (namely by passive inspiring), – then these persons are not uniformly disposed in idea of personality; nor are they equally positive, nor equally perfect (insofar as they are persons), because negation and some positive property are not equally perfect personality.

47. These reasons, although perhaps they may not convince an adversary that they cannot be solved, yet because it does not seem probable that the first person is formally a person by negation alone, therefore can the conclusion of these reasons be conceded.

### C. To the Principal Argument

48. To the argument for the opposite [n.6] I say – as was said in distinction 26 [n.77] – that this exclusive word ‘besides’ does not exclude any personal features but does exclude essential features, and it includes in the included property all the personal being of the person; hence in ‘unbegotten-ness’ is included both paternity and active

inspiriting as it exists in the Father. The point is also proved by him [sc. Damascene] elsewhere when he names paternity and filiation and procession. – Therefore he was not intending in the first place that those three properties alone were personal ones (nor was he intending that those three were personal constitutive properties), but he was intending by them all the others, and that all the essential features – which are excluded by the ‘besides’ – are one in the three persons.

#### D. To the Arguments for the Opinion of Others

##### 49. To the arguments for the first opinion [nn.40-42].

When argument is made from Augustine about the priority of unbegotten to paternity [n.40], I reply: sometimes privation does not connote affirmation, and yet a privation is never present unless such a positive is formally present in the deprived thing; an example: being blind only connotes the eye (which is the common subject of blindness and sight), and yet it is never present in the eye by reason of the eye alone but through some positive entity which the privation follows, – to wit some mixture in the eye along with which there cannot be sight. So can it be said here that although unbegotten connotes some subsistent person in the divine essence, yet this affirmation is not the whole reason for the inherence of this negation ‘unbegotten’, but there must be in the thing some positive property that in some way precedes unbegotten by which it is present, although it not be connoted by ‘unbegotten’ as some proper subject. And in this respect, the statement of Augustine must be understood that insofar as it is about the *per se* idea of

unbegotten it does not connote the Father; however it cannot be in the thing unless this affirmation (or some other, absolute or relative) is as it were the reason for its inherence.

50. To the second [n.41] one statement is that the proposition is true of the thing first in order, that it exists to itself, of which namely the ‘being’ is not ‘to be to another’.<sup>a</sup> It is not so in an order of persons having the same nature in such a disposition or in the issue at hand, because here ‘to be the first person’ is an order to the second person; and therefore the order to the second person precedes as it were the negation of being from a principle, just as the formal constitutive feature of some positive entity precedes in it the negation of some entity repugnant to it.

a. [*Note of Duns Scotus*] Or thus: [the proposition is true] where the nature of the first thing is not the same as the nature of the second; therefore negation of being from a principle at once follows the nature of the first before order to the second thing is understood. But where there is the same nature of the first thing and of the second, the negation of being from a principle does not follow the nature, but something proper; that can only be here – according to the common opinion – a relation [n.30].

51. To the third [n.42]. If things were there as they are according to the imagination of the gentile philosophers, then the divine essence would be determined of itself to this subsistence, and it would constitute ‘this’ not through some negation but through itself (according to them), because it would be in every way determined to this, as in the case of creatures ‘this nature’ is altogether limited to this supposit; but now by positing that there is origin there, the essence need not be in every way determined to one person, and therefore it need not by itself constitute some person. And when the argument

says ‘to posit origin takes nothing from the essence, nor from that by which it is constituted’, – it is true that it takes nothing away; but it posits the opposite of the hypothesis by which the essence of itself would constitute a person, namely indetermination of the essence to a single subsistence, because the hypothesis would take away perfection from the essence (because it would seem to posit a limitation), but the opposite of the hypothesis – positing an origin – does not take away perfection; but it does take away the impossible mode ‘constitutive of a person’ that would be true on the hypothesis.<sup>a</sup>

a. [Note of Duns Scotus] For the first opinion ‘an incommunicable property constitutes this sort of unbegotten’:

*On the Trinity* V ch.6 n.7: “Even if he had not generated, nothing would prevent him being said to be ‘unbegotten’ – even if someone generates a son, not by that fact is he unbegotten, because men who are begotten beget others;” later ch.7 n.8: “Nor for this reason is someone a father because he is unbegotten, nor unbegotten because he is a father;” later: “There is one notion by which he is understood to be begetter, and another by which he is understood to be unbegotten;” later: “When the Father is called ‘unbegotten’, what is shown is not what he is but what he is not;” later; “ When he is called ‘unbegotten’, he is not called so in relation to himself, but it is shown that he is not from a begetter.”

Again, about the respect to a prior.

Again, the absolute is prior; therefore the more it has of the idea of an absolute, the more it is prior.

Again, ‘not to have through production’ precedes being produced, because it pertains to the idea of the proximate power, or it is the removal of an impediment. – Response: the proximate power does not in any way precede generation in the thing, but only according to concepts absolute in idea (as was said in distinction 27 [of the *Reportatio*])

Mode: an essence is non-communicated in something before it is communicated (add if you will: ‘the essence in itself is not communicated’).

On the contrary:

Negation does not constitute the first person, because it does not constitute the second; ‘unbegotten’ is a negation. Proof of the minor, because the notion is different; and as such it does not state the essence only, nor a positive thing different from the two. – An instance: the conclusion is that it is not a notion. Response: Henry [of Ghent] (on the contrary: insofar as it is a notion it states a dignity; response: ‘personal dignity’, everything other than itself – above [note to n.28].

Confirmation from a similarity about the inspirit-able. – It is not similar, because it is in something not constituted by order to a posterior, the former is negation of order to a prior.

Again, negation is incomunicable and proper (because neither is it one, just as not a being either) only because of position.

Again, the first person is not without the second.

Again, Augustine [Fulgentius] *On the Faith to Peter* ch.2 n.7: “Not because he is not begotten, but because he has begotten a single Son.”

Again, paternity is prior, – therefore it is a property of a person; otherwise it is a property of nature. – Proof of the antecedent: in the case of the same thing affirmation is the reason for the being of negation; not conversely, because although the negation infers it, yet it presupposes it. I concede the conclusion.

Mode: essence of itself determines for itself first its first production, such that essence is a principle of generating, not as with some property nor as under some property nor as in some person, (so that it retains something prior, in some way, in the thing), but it is only thus as it is of itself a principle (whereby it is principle), by which – that is – as it finds it actually; it finds it actually, because (distinction 28, last question) generation is altogether the first determination of essence, and it follows that what produces it is altogether unproduced (for he is truly father who does not have a father, – hence Damascene, ch.8).

To the arguments ‘for the opinion’:

Augustine makes a comparison three times: he asserts the third; he understands the second perhaps ‘because it is per se in the first mode’; the first is posited under an ‘if’, as the statement of heretics (Alexander in another way: “Augustine did not have regard to the nature of being but of understanding;” Praepositinus: “If you note the property of the word, the locution is false;” Henry: “If the person were absolute;” otherwise: nothing prevents ‘unbegotten’, – it follows by reason of the form).

### Question Three

*Whether the First Divine Person is Constituted in Personal Being by some Positive Relation to the Second Person*

52. Lastly I ask<sup>a</sup> whether the first divine person is constituted in personal being by some positive relation to the second person.

That he is not:

Because the first person is pre-understood in personal being before he begets; for to act belongs to a supposit; therefore he is understood to be a supposit before he acts. But if he were constituted by a relation to the second person, the existence of the second person would be co-understood – along with his own existence – and consequently the second person would be pre-understood before the first person begets him, and so the second person would not be the term of generation.

a. [Note of Duns Scotus] Whether the divine essence of itself determines first for itself active generation.

That it does not: then it would in anything; then it would not stand with its opposite; again, relations would be equally first in the essence.

On the contrary: if through something, the first person would not be constituted by it.

Solution: distinction about indeterminate and determinate, and to determine against contingency, against limitation. The essence determines, because it is first and aptitudinal, – therefore actually by something; not by relation, because it does not exist before it is founded, – not by something else, because of regress ad infinitum; therefore from itself first. Doubly: adequately, immediately. In the first way: according to intension yes (reason, example, corollary ‘Against Godfrey’), according to extension no. Immediately: whatever is related to several things having an order with respect to it, one has the ‘first’ thus and another thus (example ‘sun’, example ‘soul’); the essence then is immediately to the first, and through this to the second.

Doubt: in which respect of principle? – Henry: of matter. On the contrary: of the producer (by division); again, form is ‘per se entity’. The mode here, and congruence about threefold principle; on the contrary in three ways. Here the mode is other.

Afterwards to the arguments.

53. A confirmation of the reason is that as to all things that are simultaneous in nature, by whatever it is that one is prior the other is too; relatives are simultaneous in nature; therefore if the first person is formally constituted in personal existence through a relation to the second, by whatever the first is prior in personal being by that the second is too. But by generation, which is an act of the first person, the first person seems to be prior in personal being, therefore the second is too; and as before [n.52], he will not then be the formal term of generation.

54. Further, in every order the first seems to be the most absolute, as is clear from running through the point in the case of any order whatever; therefore so will it be in the

order of persons, that the first will be the most absolute, and so it would not be constituted by a relation to the second.

55. On the contrary:

The first person is not constituted in personal being by deity, because deity is not incommunicable, – nor by active inspiriting, because this is common to him and the Son, – nor by being unable to be born, from the preceding question [n.47]; therefore, by way of division, by some relation to the second person.

### I. To the Question

#### A. Opinions of those who Hold that the Persons are Constituted by Relations

56. Here the affirmative part of the question is commonly conceded, but because of the difficulty of the first argument [nn.52, 67], a distinction is made about the relation that constitutes the first person.

##### 1. First Opinion

57. In one way [from Aquinas], that ‘it can be considered as a property or as a relation; as a property it precedes generation, – as a relation it follows’; and then, according to what it constitutes, the second person need not be simultaneous with the first, although according to its being a relation – consequent, as it were, to generation – the second should be simultaneous with it.

##### 58. Against this:

A property ‘as property’ is some entity, otherwise it would not constitute any being. Either therefore it is a being to itself or to another or neither; that some entity is singular, that is neither an entity to itself nor to another, does not seem intelligible; therefore this entity should be formally to itself, and then it will constitute an absolute person – or to another, and that ‘as a property’ it will be a relation; and then the difficulty is not avoided, even though there is one way of considering it as a property and another as a relation.

And the reason can be confirmed by an example, because although whiteness can be considered as whiteness or as a quality (and if it be considered as whiteness, that is according to its proper specific reason, – but if as quality, this is according to the idea of an ‘imperfect’ instance in its genus), yet whatever is constituted by whiteness is not constituted by any entity that is not a quality, because whiteness even ‘as whiteness’ essentially includes quality and is essentially quality, so that whiteness cannot constitute anything save in qualitative being. So does it seem in the issue at hand, about a relative property considered in this way and in that [n.57].

60. Further, he [Aquinas, Roger Marston] says elsewhere that ‘in divine reality there cannot be order’ (because neither in the case of the essence to the relations, nor in the case of the relations among themselves), ‘because relatives are simultaneous in nature’. – But if a property can be considered in the way in which it would not be a relation (and in this way it need not have a correlative simultaneous in nature), their argument would not be valid.

## 2. Second Opinion

61. A distinction is drawn in another way about relation, as it is relation and as it is origin; and the position is that it constitutes as origin (but not as relation), because the idea of origin in some way precedes and the relation is as it were founded in it; but the first person is constituted by the first relation there, by which it is distinguished [Roger Marston].

62. Against this it is objected that origin ‘as origin’ is not form; and not of the person to which it is, but as it were the way to it, – and then it is not of the first person as form but as it were presupposes it; but nothing constitutes anything in anything save insofar as it is its form.

63. But if this opinion is understood of distinguishing as it were by way of principle (corresponding to efficient cause in creatures, as was expounded in distinction 26 [n.58]), and not by way of formal principle, then this position could have truth, and this argument would not be against it.

### 3. Third Opinion

64. In another way it is said that just as the same action can be diversely understood – insofar as it is aptitudinal or insofar as it is potential, insofar as it is future, insofar as it is in act, insofar as it is past – so relations ‘founded on action’ can be diversely taken; so that relation is founded on generation as in some way past as it were, in other way as present as it were, in another way founded on it as future as it were, in another way founded on it as potential as it were, and further as aptitudinal.

65. But it is said that relation under the first idea constitutes a person; but the first idea is ‘aptitudinal idea’, because that follows on the other and not conversely; therefore generation in this sort of way constitutes the Father, and in this way it is signified by what is meant by ‘generativity’.

66. Against this:

The first person is not constituted by a property having something positive less perfectly than what is constitutive of the second person has it, because then they would not seem to be equally perfect in personal being; but the second person is constituted – according to them – by filiation as it is filiation; therefore the first person is not constituted by potential relation, which has a less perfect being from the nature of relation than the property of the second person has it. But the relation of the generative to the generable – which they posit to be first and constitutive – is a potential relation; therefore it does not constitute as perfect an actual person as the second does.

Proof of the assumption: no actual being requires a potential being, because a potential being is less perfect than an actual one, provided they are of the same idea; but the relation of the generative requires the generable, because it states a potential relation on the part of the Son; therefore the relation of generative in the Father is not an actual relation.

67. Further, against this opinion (and against the two preceding):

Relation, if it constitutes a person there, is only according to what exists in reality, – otherwise it would not constitute a real person; but there exists in reality only a single relation of the first person to the second, and it is only there under the most actual idea, however diversely it can be taken; therefore under the most actual idea it will constitute

that person, and under that idea a relation in the second person will correspond to it (there is not anything in the second person save what is most actual). In vain therefore is a quasi potential or aptitudinal distinction from the idea of what is active sought for, because this distinction in conceivable modes does nothing for what is constitutive of the first person without the first person always requiring the second person along with it at the same time; and yet because of this difficulty, lest the first person be posited as having the second along with it at the same time, this distinction of actual and aptitudinal and potential relations is sought for, lest the Son be posited as preceding the generation of the Father. – In the same way one could argue against the first and second opinion, because the relation – however it is conceived – is there only a single one.

#### 4. Against the Three Opinions together

##### 68. Further, against all three opinions [nn.57, 61, 65]:

Because if the Father generates the Son by the fact that by the action of the Father the relation of the Son is in the divine essence, and if by his action – according to these opinions – paternity ‘as paternity’ is in the divine essence (because according to them paternity ‘as paternity’ then first exists when filiation exists as filiation, even if something first precede as origin, whether generativity or the property) then the Father will generate himself as Father by generation in just the way filiation is in the Son, which seems absurd.

69. Further, there is against all the opinions another difficulty; in what way will the essence be determined to the first person? For if from itself, then it does not seem common to the other persons, because whenever something is determined to something

other than itself, whenever it does so, it has it, – and then the essence, whenever it exists, would have the personality of the first person; if it does so from another, this seems to be against the idea of the first person, because then he would seem to be originated, or seem in some way able to be posited in such subsistence by something.

70. Further, third: if it is determined of itself, I ask of what principle the essence has the reason when it determines itself to the first property? Not of matter (distinction 5 [nn.64-85]); not of form, because that which is the principle of form pre-requires that which is principle of the producer as from the formal and efficient cause; therefore the essence quasi productively determines itself, and so the first person will in some way be produced. Nor can it be said that the property is determined of itself, because it is impossible – in any way at all – for there to be two things altogether first, but every multitude comes to a stand at one thing; this here is only the essence as it is a sea; therefore there will be attributed to it the idea of some principle with respect to anything that is second.

71. If someone wants to say that the essence ‘as a this’ exists per se and thus acts per se (according to the first argument made in distinction 7 against Thomas [n.11]), he could say that ‘this essence’ communicates itself – quasi productively – to the first person, and in the first person communicates itself to the second, and in the first and second to the third, and thus there are three productions according to a triple principle, namely: essence as essence, as intellect, as will.

72. On the contrary:

Nothing produces itself – therefore there is a distinction between the essence and the first person. The reason is confirmed by the authority of the Master who – in

distinction 5 [ch.1 n.58] – denies, because of this, that the essence generates or is generated; by parity of reason it seems one should deny that it produces ‘from itself’.

73. Again, this production is not generation, because ‘the Father is unbegotten’; nor is it inspiriting, as is plain, – and there are no others in divine reality.

74. Again, action is of a supposit; therefore the essence is a fourth supposit.

75. One could say that something belonging to the produced can well produce the whole, when that ‘something’ is first a *per se* being and in virtue possesses the rest of what concurs with it in the composite. There is no example, in the case of creatures, in substantial production (because there only matter pre-exists, which does not virtually have form), but there is very well an example in accidental production; wherever a subject has an accident actively, it produces the composite, – just as water, first made hot and afterwards left to itself, produces cold water. So one might say here that the essence, a ‘*per se* being’ in the altogether first moment – when relation is burgeoning – produces itself in a relative person, or more properly: communicates itself to it.

76. To the form of the reasoning [n.72]: the antecedent is conceded, insofar as ‘itself’ refers precisely to the same thing [sc. nothing produces itself], – and so the consequent is conceded, because ‘there is a distinction’ (that is, not a complete identity of essence with the related person, because it includes something in addition to the essence).

77. To the second [n.73]: this production can be called ‘generation’, and the production of the Word ‘saying’, – just as if fire were intelligent, it would generate by firey-ness and would say by intellect.

78. To the third [n.74]: form as ‘per se being’, that is not inhering as an accident (whether substantial form or quiddity) in a supposit, can be an agent; however it is not a supposit, because it is not incommunicable.

Thus the three reasons seem to escape [nn.72-74].

79. But there remain two authorities unsolved: the first, confirming the first reason, namely the authority of the Master [n.72] – the other in the second reason, that Augustine says the Father is unbegotten [n.73].

80. Because of the first authority one can say that in altogether the first moment there is not only ‘deity, a per se being’, but ‘this God’, and he produces himself as Father; and then this – the logic – is avoided ‘the essence produces’, although it produce in something in which there is nothing but essence. Thus the first way [nn.70-71] is corrected as to its sum.

81. Because of the second authority from Augustine one could say that the saints who suppose there is a first property in the essence, from wherever it burgeons (because they were not then investigating that), had a first supposit and were not speaking save of production of supposit by supposit; therefore they said that that person is unproduced ‘which is not produced by a supposit’ [n.19]. Likewise they said that the opposed relations of origin ‘could only be in distinct suppositi’, – which is true if each relation belongs to a supposit but not if one belongs to another singular ‘per se being’ and not to a supposit, namely ‘to this God’. And the reason is that ‘a singular non-supposit’ can communicate itself, and so is not distinguished from the product; for because it is ‘a singular per se being’, therefore it can act, – because it is not a supposit, therefore it can

be communicated; but a supposit never communicates itself, and therefore if it produces a supposit, it produces a distinct one, nothing of which it is.

82. How is this phantasy to be refuted, so dissonant to the sayings of the saints [Augustine, Anselm, nn.79-81]?

Although in divine reality all priority in nature is denied and only a priority of origin is commonly conceded (or a priority according to natural intelligence), yet there must in every way be some priority given to essence in respect of relation; both because it is the foundation (according to everyone), and because it is formally infinite but relation is not, – and because however they are distinguished they are not equally altogether first, nor is relation prior. Rightly then is the question raised [n.69] of whence essence determines the first property for itself – and since no other determining factor is found (because there is always the same question of whence the essence has it, unless one proceeds ad infinitum), one must stand at the fact the essence of itself precisely determines the first relation in itself as in a foundation. False then is this root claim that ‘nothing undetermined of itself to certain things determines itself of itself to any of them’, as is well maintained here, about the double indeterminate and the double primacy, of adequation and immediacy [nn.100-107].

83. But a doubt remains: what circumstance of the principle is indicated by ‘from’ or ‘of’ when it is said that ‘the essence of itself determines the first property for itself’? And if you would escape, because it does not state there the idea of any principle but excludes a principle that is a joint participant, that is no obstacle; for I ask how the essence determines, or by reason of what principle is it in respect of the property?

And the way here [nn.70-71] says that it is by reason of the principle of the producer, because without it there is no idea of formal or material principle, and because active form as ‘per se being’ per se acts (about which proposition see distinction 7 n.74), and because of the congruence of the triple productive principle [n.71] (from which congruence an instance was made in distinction 2 in the question ‘On Two Productions’ [n.304]); but the correction is made that ‘this God’ produces the Father, but not the essence properly speaking [n.80].

84. But against this way three reasons and three authorities were here before brought forward. All seem to escape in some way [n.78]. But because it does not sound right that the first person is produced, one can say that the essence determines the first property for itself by reason of formal principle, not indeed as in-forming but as quiddity is said to be the form of the supposit, and that a non necessarily causable quiddity formally determines some supposit for itself (the way the pagans would posit it about an absolute supposit, but we about the first relative); and the reason is that such a quiddity itself stops itself and is itself the quiddity of something.

85. Then to the arguments for the other way [n.83]:

To the first I say that every in-forming form is preceded by an efficient cause (and so the first efficient cause does not thus have the form), but not every quidditative form ‘giving being to a supposit’ is preceded by an efficient or producing cause, because here there is not a cause and a cause intrinsic to the composite that need to be united by the agent but there is perfect entity, which itself belongs in itself to being.

86. But if you object that ‘either the essence in-forms the property or conversely’, – a response was given in distinction 5 n.137: “Neither is the case, but there is perfect

identity,” which identity does not have an efficient principle, but it has the quiddity, in idea of formal principle, of that with which it is itself first identical.

87. As to the second [n.83], seek the response in distinction 7 n.75.

88. As to the third: this way [n.84] well preserves congruence, because the essence as essence and as prior to every idea of power exists to give being formally, and thus it determines itself; but as it is such and such a power, to be principle belongs to it. Therefore there are two productive principles – a single one non-productive from itself alone, but giving of being formally to the first supposit.

#### B. Opinion of those who Wish to Hold that the Persons are Constituted by Absolutes

89. Another position is set down by holding a conclusion opposite to these three opinions [nn.57, 61, 65], – because the first person is not constituted by any relation to the second person (and this when speaking of what is first constitutive of that person in personal being), but by some absolute non-quidditative reality, as was touched on in the third opinion in distinction 26 nn.56-59.

90. For this opinion argument is given in particular about the first person, because unbegotten is pre-understood to paternity, and to unbegotten seems to be pre-understood some reality proper to the first person; therefore since it cannot be a relative reality, it will be some absolute one, proper to that person.

Proof of the assumption: both from Augustine *On the Trinity* V ch.6 n.7: “if he had not generated, nothing would have prevented him from being unbegotten;” and because fecundity for some production in divine reality is not understood as ‘quasi

proximate power' save as it is in something that does not have that fecundity through an act of that fecundity, just as the will is not understood to be fecund for inspiriting 'as it is in some person' save in a person in whom it exists as non-communicated by fecundity of the will. And therefore it seems to be commonly conceded that it is pre-understood to the force of the inspiriting power in the Father and the Son that the will is not had through inspiriting; therefore by similarity here, being unable to be born seems to be pre-understood to the fecundity of generating 'as it is a quasi proximate power', and this being unable to be born indicates that it is not had by act of fecundity of the intellect, that is by act of generation. – Proof of the second assumption, from the rejection of the preceding opinion in the preceding question [nn.44-46].

91. Further, no relatives are first referred to each other, such that a related thing 'as related' is the first term of the relation (the thing is plain in creatures), because the related thing 'as related' requires that to which it is referred for its being and for its definition; therefore that to which it is referred is in some way prior to the related thing as related. Likewise conversely, it would be referred as being the term; therefore by parity of reasoning it would require that to which it is referred for its being and its definition. Therefore there would be a circle in joint requirement, from the fact that each would require the other as essentially prior to itself, as defining it; but a circle in essential priority is impossible; therefore it is impossible for a relative 'as relative' – by the fact it depends on its correlative as term – to be the term of dependence of the other correlative. And by similarity so does it seem in the issue at hand, that a relative is not first referred to the relative as to the term; therefore the second person, if he is referred to the first, should posit some absolute thing as the term of this relation; but that absolute thing is not the

essence, because as the essence is not referred, so it is not the term of a relation, because it is not distinguished; therefore there is some personal absolute thing which can be distinguished from the second person.

92. Against this opinion [n.89] an argument is given that it is quasi heretical, but the arguments were touched on and responses given in distinction 26 [nn.60-64, 73-83], – now I pass them over.

### C. Scotus' own Response

93. To this question [n.52] – for someone who does not like the last opinion about absolute persons [n.89] – one can say, by holding the common way (namely by supposing that the persons are relative), that the first person is constituted by a positive relation to the second, because by nothing else, as was argued for the opposite by way of division [n.55]. Nor is it necessary to distinguish how this relation may be considered as it is constitutive; for however it is may vary in consideration, it is the same in reality, – and according to what it is in reality, it constitutes a real person [n.67].

94. Nor is there any difficulty save how it requires the second person to be simultaneous with it, although however it precedes him [n.52].

In brief I say that the simultaneity of correlatives – whereby they are said to be ‘together by nature’ [n.53] – is this simultaneity, namely not to be able to be ‘without each other’ without contradiction, if they are mutual relatives; for one relation cannot be without its term, because if it could be without it, it would be a being to itself; by parity of reason neither can the other relation corresponding to it be without the former term,

because then it would exist to itself; therefore these two relations, when they are mutual, cannot be ‘without each other’ without contradiction. But everything ‘prior in nature’ can exist without a posterior without contradiction, such that if the former be posited without the latter there would be no contradiction; the thing is plain from the Philosopher *Metaphysics* 5.11.1019a1-4, the chapter ‘On the Prior’.

95. In this way I concede that the first person and the second person cannot be ‘without each other’ without contradiction (and the contradiction is not from something extrinsic but from the formal idea of these persons), and yet there stands along with this a priority of origin, because one is from the other.

Which point is made clear first by the fact that if Socrates is father of Plato, Socrates is not understood as subject of paternity but as under paternity, and Plato is understood as under filiation; these exist together in nature, because they are thus understood as correlatives, – and yet as such Socrates is prior in origin to Plato, because he is understood thus under paternity, which is formally a priority of origin. Therefore it seems in the same way that what is prior in origin in creatures is also simultaneous in nature with the same thing, in the way that simultaneity of nature is required for correlatives.

96. The point is also made persuasive – secondly – by the fact that priority of nature is in one way priority according to perfection, such that prior things are said to be more perfect in nature, *Metaphysics* 9.8.1050a7-9. But now along with simultaneity of correlatives in nature it seems there can stand priority in perfection in one of them with respect to the other, – because if the genus of relation is divided through proper opposed differences as other genera are, one of the dividing differences will be more worthy and

the other more unworthy (because two species are not equal, *Metaphysics* 8.3.1043b32-44a11), and consequently a species constituted by a less noble difference will be less noble; and since two species constituted from two opposed differences can be referred to each other (because every relation of inequality is referred to something of a different species), therefore in the case of relations corresponding to each other one can be prior – that is more perfect – than the other, and yet simultaneous in nature, as far as what is meant by ‘not able to be without each other’. Therefore much more does it also seem that priority of origin – namely by which one extreme in nature does not exceed the other extreme but is ‘from which another is’ – can stand along with simultaneity of correlatives.

97. There is a confirmation from the remark of Augustine *On the Quantity of the Soul* ch.9 n.15: “you rightly put equality before inequality,” – and he is speaking not by reason of foundation, because from the nobility of equality he concludes that the foundation to which it belongs is more noble than the foundation to which it does not belong (the thing is plain there about circle and other figures); therefore a relation has a proper nobility in its genus. Thus one relation is nobler than another, and yet they are two correlative species, whenever there is a relation of inequality.

98. For this is also adduced Avicenna *Metaphysics* VI ch.2 (91vb-92ra), where he seems to intend the cause ‘insofar as it is cause’ to be prior to the caused insofar as it is caused, and yet a cause ‘insofar as it is cause’ is simultaneous with the caused, with the simultaneity required for correlatives. But this priority of nature, which is of the cause to the caused, seems more repugnant to the simultaneity in nature of correlatives than is the priority of origin alone!

99. Then briefly: the first person is constituted in personal being by a positive relation to the second, and conversely, and it is impossible for them to be without each other; and yet the first person himself, constituted in such being, is prior in origin to the second person (such that the first person, constituted in such being, is ‘from whom the second is originated’), and so priority of origin is not repugnant to simultaneity of relatives.

100. But there is another doubt (which was touched on against the three opinions [n.69]), namely: by what is essence determined to the first subsistence?

To this I say that whenever something is unlimited in some idea of cause, such that there correspond to it several things in the other extreme (or some one thing that contains many things), if there is some order among those several things, whether absolutely or in itself, having some respect to that unlimited thing, then what is ‘first’ with respect to such unlimited thing – and this when speaking of the primacy of adequacy – is not the same as what is ‘first’ with the primacy of immediacy.

101. An example of this – first in the efficient cause, where it is more manifest:

If the sun ‘as cause’ illuminates the whole medium, and yet is a quasi unlimited agent to which many parts of the illumined medium correspond, and there is some order between these parts, because the first illumined part is closer than a more remote one, – the first thing corresponding to the sun as it illuminates is the whole medium as it includes all the parts; first, I say, as adequate; however it is not first as immediate, but a part nearer the sun is more immediately illumined than a more remote part.

102. So in the case of form:

By taking the intellective soul (which is in some way an unlimited form), the organic body corresponds to it as the first perfectible thing, including in itself many perfectible parts; so the first perfectible thing, that is adequate thing, for the intellective soul is the whole organic body. But because in the parts of this whole there is an order of origin, either in itself or in having the soul (because the heart is first, then the other parts, *Generation of Animals* 2.4.740a1-30, 5-6.741b15-31), therefore this form does not first – that is equally immediately – perfect the whole, but it thus first perfects the heart and through its mediation the other parts. If then the soul were the whole essence of heart and hand by identity, and yet it were to give them a distinct being of the sort it now gives (although within the whole), and if along with this the heart and hand were not parts of the same whole (because this would be a mark of imperfection) but they were distinct supposita, – still the soul would, because of its unlimitedness, have the organic body for adequate perfectible (or would then have all those as supposita, which are now parts of the body, for its one adequate object), and yet it would have one of them – namely the one that is first in origin – for first object, namely for immediately perfectible.

103. So can it be said universally in the case of every unlimited thing, to which there correspond several things between which there is some order, because of which order one of those things is more immediately regarded by that unlimited thing than another is.

104. So in the issue at hand: the divine essence does not have some one first subsistent, that is one that is adequate to itself (because then it could not be in another one), but three subsistents are in this way adequate to that nature; yet in those three there is an order in having the nature, and so the essence by one primacy – namely the primacy

of immediacy – respects the first of those ordered things, such that just as the essence of itself would be first in the three if it were in them without order (and this both with the primacy of adequacy and with the primacy of immediacy), so now it is of itself in the three by primacy of adequacy – but not by primacy of immediacy, but thus it is in the first of them and by virtue of it in the others, to which it is communicated by that first one.

105. When therefore you ask ‘by what is the essence in the first person?’ [n.100], I say that it is so from itself. And if you still wish to say no, but that it is so through a determining property, there is the same question: ‘by what is it determined to the determining property?’, or ‘by what does that property first burgeon in the divine essence?’ And then either one must proceed *ad infinitum* or one must make a stand at the fact that the essence is of itself first (that is adequately) in the three, and that it is of itself immediately in the first of the three as they possess order.

106. And if you ask ‘by what is the essence determined to the first person, – and if it is determined of itself, then it cannot be in another’, I reply:

Determination is double, opposed to a double indetermination. One is indetermination ‘to contradictory opposites’ (as matter is indeterminate to form and privation), the other is indetermination ‘to diverse positives’, which however stand together with determination to one part of each contradiction (an example of the second: if the sun is indeterminate to producing a worm and a plant as to diverse positives, although however it is of itself determined to one part of the contradiction – both of the former and of the latter – just as if it were a particular agent only of a nature to produce one of them). Then I say in the case of the issue at hand that the essence is of itself determined to the first person by a determination opposed to the first indetermination,

which is to contradicories; not however by a determination opposed to the second indetermination, because that does not stand along with unlimitedness to several things.

107. And hereby is plain the answer to the argument ‘if it is determined of itself then it cannot be in another person’ [n.106]. The consequence holds when speaking of the second determination, which is opposed to unlimitedness to several things, – and in this way the essence is not determined to one subsistent but to three, because this determination is to an adequate ‘first’; but the consequence does not hold when speaking of determination in the first way, because that is to an immediate ‘first’ (not an adequate one),<sup>a</sup> and it stands along with unlimitedness of such undetermined thing to several things.<sup>b</sup>

a. [Interpolation] But this alone follows, ‘therefore it has no power for them’! By this determination too it is determined to three, because both the determination that is to the adequate ‘first’ and that which is to the immediate ‘first’ are necessary; when the addition is made ‘because it is to the immediate first (not the adequate one)’, this is false, understanding it precisely.

b. [Note of Duns Scotus] Godfrey [of Fontaines] *Quodlibet* VII qq.3: “The perfection of the divine nature requires that it be had by several in several ways, for these three (to have it thus and thus and thus, without order of duration, nature, dignity) concur to the constitution of the divine perfection (as far as it consists in the most perfect acts in intellect and will), just as three angles equally constitute the perfection of a triangle;” q.4: “The order ought to be in perfect acts, namely of saying and inspiriting, by which are produced declarative knowledge and incentive love, in which are as it were perfected the divine beatific operations.”

## II. To the Principal Arguments

108. To the first principal argument [n.52] the answer is plain from what has been said [nn.94-99], that the first supposit precedes the second in origin, and yet they are simultaneous in nature as is required for relatives.

109. And you argue that the first supposit precedes generation, therefore the second does too [n.52], – I reply that in the antecedent both active and passive generation can be understood. If active generation, I deny the antecedent, nay the first supposit is subsistent active generation; because, however this relation is understood, there is no difference in reality when saying ‘the Father subsists’ or ‘generation subsists’ or ‘generativity subsists’. But if in the antecedent the understanding is about passive generation, I concede that the first person, as he precedes the Son in origin, so he precedes passive generation in origin.

110. And when you argue ‘therefore the Son precedes the same passive generation because he is simultaneous with the Father’ [n.53], – this inference is not valid, because he is not simultaneous with the Father in the way in which the Father is prior to passive generation; for the Son is simultaneous in nature with the Father (as pertains to correlatives), but the Father precedes passive generation not in this way but in origin. But now this proposition ‘when certain things are simultaneous, in whatever way one of them is prior the other is too’ [n.53] is false, unless it be understood of simultaneity of the same idea as the priority and posteriority; just as this proposition is false ‘if certain things are simultaneous in time, whatever is prior in nature to one is prior in nature also to the other’;

but this proposition is true ‘they are simultaneous in time, – therefore what is prior in time to one is prior in time also to the other’.

111. To the second argument [n.54] I say that the major is true in the order of essences, because there it is understood in quidditative perfections, and a stand is made at infinite quidditative perfection, which is absolute. But in persons that have the same nature, and are distinct only in origin (as one must understand in the issue at hand, according to the common opinion), the major proposition is false, because there ‘first’ is precisely that which is formally precise in relation to the second.<sup>a</sup>

a. [Note by Duns Scotus] Whether there are only five notions. – That there are not: ‘from another’ is not, because it needs a correlative, – one, because it belongs to several; no ‘able to inspirit’ [sc. filiation and paternity are not notions because they need another; inspiriting, active and passive, is not because it needs others (the Father and Son); able to inspirit, whether of Father or Son, is not; therefore only unable to be born is a notion]. – On the contrary: *On the Trinity* V ch.6 n.7 [“one notion is whereby begetter is understood, another whereby begotten is”]. – Solution: notion is fundamentally, formally, accidentally; ‘because of which’ is a notional person or also the idea of personality. In the first way all essential properties (or properties according to essence) are notions; we are speaking in the second way here (formally); third, because quiddity becomes a notion. In the second way, because the notions are ‘because of which’ the essence is. – A doubt about able to inspirit. A power for the second production.

## Twenty Ninth Distinction

### Single Question

*Whether Principle is Said Univocally of Principles Inwardly and Outwardly in God*

1. About the twenty ninth distinction I ask whether principle is said in one way of principle when taken personally and notionally and taken essentially.

That it is not:

Because if principle were of one idea when taken in this triple way, then things from the principle would be of one idea; this is false, because neither the Son nor the Holy Spirit are from a principle in a single way, nor are creatures from a principle in the same way as they are.

2. On the contrary:

This inference holds ‘creating, therefore being a principle’, and ‘generating, therefore being a principle’, and ‘inspiriting, therefore being a principle’, – and not conversely; therefore the consequent is common to all the antecedents.

### I. To the Question

3. To this question I say that principle is not said univocally of principle taken essentially and notionally, – and this when speaking of the relation that is per se signified by this name ‘principle’, and taking principle as it is a principle, for ‘that which is actually principle of something’ (or for the principle ‘which’ not ‘by which’). And the reason is that principle essentially taken only states a relation of reason (not a real relation, because there is no real relation of God to creatures, as will be plain from the following question [d.30 nn.48-51]), but as it is taken inwardly, notionally or personally, it does state a real relation; but to a real relation and a relation of reason there is nothing

common that is the same, something that is common really in the one case and in reason in the other, because to that which is such in a certain respect and to that which is simply such, insofar as it is such, what is taken in them in a certain respect and simply is not a common univocal; but a real relation is simply a relation, and a relation of reason is a relation in a certain respect, because just as ‘to be in reason’ is to be in a certain respect, so to be referred in reason or to be compared by reason is to be referred or compared in a certain respect; therefore there is no principle univocal to them.

4. Now if we speak of principle inwardly, as it is personal and notional, it does seem that there could for them be the idea of a common principle univocally; in the way it is possible for what it means to be ‘a relation of origin’ to be univocally common to paternity and filiation, and in the way it is possible for what it means to be ‘production’ to be univocally common to generation and inspiriting, as was touched on above in distinction 23 n.9 about what is univocally common to the persons insofar as they are persons.

## II. To the Arguments

### 5. To the arguments [nn.1-2].

The first [n.1] proves that there is no principle there of a single idea for the notional and the personal.

I reply that in creatures two things ‘distinct in species’ are said to be of different idea, and yet there can be abstracted from them one common thing of one idea, as the genus. So it is in the issue at hand: these productions – generation and inspiriting – are of different idea, speaking of their proper ideas, and yet some single common thing can be abstracted from them; and in the same way about the common term ‘principle’, that it can

be a common thing of one idea, although the things of which it is said are of different idea, speaking of their proper ideas.

6. And if you object to this that then there is a universal in divine reality – this was touched on in distinction 23 nn.12-13.

7. To the argument for the opposite [n.2], it proves the commonness of what it means to be ‘principle’ as to a principle of this sort and of that sort – just as it proves univocity as to principle inwardly and outwardly.

Therefore one can respond that these inferences do not follow ‘creating, therefore being a principle’ and ‘generating, therefore being a principle’, taking the being a principle, which is the conclusion inferred, for some common univocal simply – because the being a principle that is inferred for what it is to be ‘creating’ (as it is said of God), states only a relation of reason, but the being a principle that is inferred from ‘generating’, states a real relation.

## Thirtieth Distinction

### Question One

*Whether Some Relation is Said of God from Time*

1. About the thirtieth distinction I ask whether some relation is said of God from time.

That there is not:

Because whatever is said of God is God, – therefore it is eternal; therefore it is not new, nor from time.

2. Further, nothing eternal is said of the temporal; therefore not conversely either.
3. Further, making does not seem to be without change – therefore God, who is immutable, does not come to be anything; but if some new relation were said of God, he could be said to be come to be according to that relation.
4. The opposite is plain from Augustine *On the Trinity* V ch.16 n.17 [sc. God is said to be Lord of creatures from time]. And by relation, because relatives are simultaneous in nature; therefore to relations in creatures in time toward God there correspond relations in God from time.<sup>a</sup>

a. [*Interpolation*, from Appendix A] Whether a new relation of the creature of God necessarily requires a new relation of God to the creature.

That it does:

*On the Trinity* V ch.16 n.17: “As there cannot be a servant who does not have a master, so there cannot be a master who does not have a slave.”

Again, “relatives are simultaneous in nature.”

Again, *ibid.*: “If a coin – with no change of the whole of it – can be said relatively, how much more easily in the case of that substance?”

The contrary is argued here.

Opinion of Henry [of Ghent] IX: ‘These three things in God differ only according to reason and they are the same respect in reason, differing only in name, ‘creative’, ‘going to create’, and ‘creating’. The name ‘creating’ belongs to him from time, because the creature is referred to him, – yet ‘to create’ (actively) is rather the reason for ‘to be created’ than the reverse (by six principles). The relations that it is customary to say of God from are not properly relations, but new names of eternal relations.’”

Whether every relation by which the creature is referred really to God, and by which God is referred according to reason to the creature, is the same in creatures as it is in God to creatures.

“It is one in reality, diverse in reason.”

First in God. New denomination, no new relation; and not as in the case of a column [sc. as a column is to the right of an animal because the animal is to the left of the column], before the passion by which the creature is created, is it new; hence there is from it a new name of action, as. – “Hence Augustine *ibid.*, names things of this sort rather new appellations than new relations: ‘Our Lord, only when he begins to have a servant, and it is a relative appellation from time; for the creature [is not eternal whose lord he is]’.”

Solution. Three things: in the creature there is a new relation to God, it does not co-require a new one in the other extreme, third according to what reason God is the term of the new relation.

Proof of the first: because the foundation is new, because ‘creation passively’ is a relation.

Second: the relation is not real, – not of reason, caused by the divine intellect.

On the contrary: he knows himself creating; either therefore he knows a new relation about himself or an eternal one. – I respond: neither; in another way: he knows the eternal relation of reason, because it is eternally related to a thing known, but not the same relation; and not by the creative intellect of the Father, when ‘this is created’ is removed.

Third: it is the term under no idea of relation (Philosopher, *Metaphysics* 5, 9).

To the issue at hand, Augustine, the Master.

The false understanding is rejected and opposes at the same time: the foundation denominates as form.

## Question Two

### *Whether there can be Some Real Relation of God to Creatures*

5. Secondly I ask whether there can be some real relation of God to creatures.

That there can be:

Because God from the nature of the thing, without consideration of the intellect, is omnipotent and omniscient (for these are posited in God as attributes stating in God a perfection simply, and everything such is there from the nature of the thing, according to Anselm *Monologion* ch.15); but these terms [sc. omnipotent, omniscient] state a respect to possible and knowable creatures; therefore etc.

6. Further, God from eternity willed everything needing to be created to exist for the time for which he created it; ‘to will a creature’ includes relation, and not a relation of reason (proof, because he could will a creature before he understood that he willed it; for he willed the creature, not because he knew it, but because he willed it); therefore that eternal relation of the will of God to the creature was real, because it is not in the will by act of some intellect comparing it to something.

7. Further, relations founded on quantity are real, from *Metaphysics* 5.15.1021a8-14; therefore the inequality of God to creatures, founded on the quantity of virtue in God (namely on the infinity of his magnitude), and on the finite virtue of creatures, and on the magnitude of virtue in creatures (namely the finite magnitude of creatures), will be a real relation. – A confirmation is that magnitude in God is the foundation of equality, which is a real relation inwardly, and magnitude in creatures is the foundation of a real relation; therefore, by comparing this magnitude with that, it seems that the disposition founded on them is real.

8. Further, relations of the second mode of relatives (which namely are founded on action and passion, *Metaphysics* 5.15.1020b28-30, 21a14-29) are real relations; but such is the relation of God to creatures insofar as he is efficient cause; therefore etc. – If

you say that this is not true save of agents acting naturally [sc. and not by will], on the contrary: then the created will will not have a real disposition to its effect.

9. Further, as a form is in something, so does it denominate it; therefore if there is not any relation in God to creatures really, God is not really lord of creatures (or he is not really creator), which seems absurd.

10. On the contrary:

A real relation is toward a term according to its real existence; but a term is necessarily required for a real relation; therefore if God is really referred to creatures, then creatures according to their real being have been eternal.

## I. The Opinions of Others as to Each Question

### A. First Opinion

#### 1. Exposition of the Opinion

11. To the first question [n.1] it is said [by Henry of Ghent] that there is no new relation in God, because just as his action is the same, although considered in diverse ways (as in aptitude, as in power, as present, as past, as future), so the relation founded on his action – as thus and thus considered – is the same relation; therefore it states the same relation in God, that he is creative and creating;<sup>a</sup> but he was creative eternally; therefore when he is said to be ‘creating’ there is not in him a new relation but a new relative appellation. This is confirmed from Augustine *On the Trinity* V ch.16 n.17, where he seems rather to say new ‘appellation’ than new ‘relation’.

a. [Interpolation] so what he [Henry] says elsewhere, that creative and creating are the same relation in idea, differing according to one or other way of naming (which is a minor difference), and this sort of ‘other way of naming’ is because of a new passion in creatures.

12. To the second question he [Henry] says no, because that which is really related is really ordered – just as whiteness, which is the reason for a reference really to another whiteness, is naturally and really ordered to it, because of the fact that it has some perfection from it insofar as there is in them a more perfect nature together than in either of them alone. But everything naturally ordered depends on that to which it is naturally ordered (namely to the extent it waits for it, so that the relation to it may be founded in itself); and if it depends, then it is changeable, because dependence is not without potentiality for act; and if it is changeable, then it is imperfect, because lacking the perfection to which it changes; and if it is imperfect, then it is limited. Therefore, from first to last: if it is really related, then it is limited.

13. And because an instance could be made that then there would not be a real relation in divine reality, therefore the proposition ‘about what is related to another in nature’ [sc. everything naturally ordered depends on that to which it is naturally ordered; above] seems to need an exposition: for if it is really referred to something which is the same really with it in nature, there is no need for it to be dependent, because it does not wait for something other than itself in nature, in order for the relation to it to be founded on it.

14. Then to the issue at hand: since God is not an imperfect something, nor changeable, nor dependent, etc., – therefore he is not really related to anything other than himself; therefore not to creatures.

## 2. Rejection of the Opinion

15. Against this opinion, as to what it says to the first question [n.11]:

If actual and aptitudinal relation are the same thing, and because of this there is not any new actual relation of God to creatures, then by parity of reasoning there is not any new relation of creatures to God, because to the aptitudinal in God there will correspond an aptitudinal in creatures,<sup>a</sup> just as actual corresponds to actual; and then, if the actual and aptitudinal are the same in God, by parity of reasoning the aptitudinal in creatures will be the same as the actual, and thus there will be no new relation in one extreme just as not in the other either.

a. [*Interpolation*] because as God was creative from eternity, so was the creature creatable.

16. This consequent seems in truth absurd, because then neither would there be a new essence nor would ‘anything absolute’ be new; for it is impossible that a foundation is new and the relation according to that foundation is eternal. And something impossible according to them follows, because then, since all things are ‘what they are’ with respect to God as to exemplar cause or efficient cause, it follows that all things are eternal and nothing is new (because if a respect is not new neither is the absolute [sc. on which it is founded] new), because a respect cannot be eternal without eternity of the foundation. It also seems especially unacceptable according to them that they say ‘the being of existence states a respect to the efficient cause as it is efficient’ (and it is a new ‘existence’,<sup>a</sup> by creation), and yet this respect is in creatures in comparison to God;

therefore notwithstanding the preceding aptitudinal relation as it is aptitudinal, there can be a new actual one, as being other than that aptitudinal one.

a. [Interpolation] or there will be nothing new.

17. Further, the same relation cannot exist save between the same extremes. But now the divine intellect not only from eternity understood the soul of Antichrist as possible for such and such a time, before it was created, but also understood it as actually existing for that instant of creation; but this ‘intelligible thing’ seems to be distinct from that intelligible thing, in idea of being intelligible, because the being ‘potential’ and being ‘actual’ of the soul seem to be different intelligibles;<sup>a</sup> therefore divine intellection, which is single, can have them for distinct objects of its single act, distinct in reason, just as they can be distinct objects of two acts of our intellect; and consequently, the divine intellect when comparing itself to the first extreme ‘as creative to creatable’ and to the other extreme ‘as creating to created’ seems to produce as it were in its essence two relations of reason to distinct extremes, and so the relation of creative to creating is not one relation of reason, just as neither are the extremes – to which it is compared – the same.

a. [Interpolation] because there can be two acts of understanding about them, since each can be understood with the opposite of the other; therefore in respect of the divine intellect they are two intelligibles, according to two acts in reason.

18. There is a confirmation for this reason: in any genus, that which exists in potency is only such ‘in a certain respect’; therefore it is not simply the same as that

which is actually such, – and consequently, if this thing be understood as such in potency and that thing as such in act, it will be ‘another intelligible’ simply.

19. Further, as to what is said about new appellation [n.11], it seems irrational, because anything in which the same form has the same being seems able to be named in the same way by it; for because such a form is in such a thing, therefore it is named such by it, and not conversely; therefore if the relation is the same and is uniform to creatures on the part of God, there seems no reason that God cannot always be uniformly named by it.<sup>a</sup>

a. [*Interpolation*] For that a form is in something, and yet that it cannot be denominated by it as it is said to ‘have the form’, is a contradiction, because the concrete and abstract of a form do not differ save in denomination of the subject; therefore that creation-action is in God, and yet God cannot be denominated by it, is a contradiction.

20. Against what is said to the second question [n.12], it seems that the things posited as connected there [sc. real relation and dependence] are not connected.

First indeed, because if two things most white are posited, they will be perfectly alike (which is made clear by the fact that now there is perfect likeness and equality in the divine persons, and the perfection of likeness is not taken away because of the infinity of the foundation but rather is the more posited);<sup>a</sup> therefore there would be the most perfect likeness there, and yet neither would be ordered to the other as that from which it had the perfection.

a. [*Interpolation*] and if *per impossibile* there were there two foundations, there would be a real likeness, because now a likeness is not posited to be one of reason save because of the intellect comparing the one magnitude.

21. If you say that a specific nature is more perfect in two than in either alone, – this is not ‘one of them being ordered to the other’, because one of them has no perfection by the fact that it is other, whether or not the nature exists more perfectly in both together than in one.

22. Further, a natural created agent does not act insofar as it is imperfect, because to act belongs to it insofar as it is in act (and ‘to act’ belongs supremely to God), and yet such an agent – insofar as it is thus agent – is posited to have a real relation to its effect; therefore there is no need that every related thing, insofar as it is such, depend really on that to which it is referred; for although a created agent depends on something, yet it does not seem to depend on something which is caused by it, nor insofar as it is potential and imperfect and changeable does it cause it, but insofar as it is in act.

23. Further, if *a*, insofar as it is referred to *b*, really depends on it, by parity of reasoning (if the relations are mutual) *b* will depend on *a* insofar as it is referred to *a*, and so the dependence will be circular, *a* on *b* and conversely – which seems impossible, because in no essential order is there a circle.

## B. Second Opinion

### 1. Exposition of the Opinion

24. It is said in another way [Richard of Middleton] to the first question [n.1] that in God there is not any relation to creatures from time, but in the creature alone there is a relation to God from time, – and thus the relation by which God is said with respect to the creature is only in the creature, and not in God. Which seems to be taken from Augustine in the cited chapter [nn.11, 4] and from the Master here in the text.<sup>a</sup>

And to the second question [n.5] it is said that no such relation can be real, because a real relation is not without order; God has no real order to creatures, because he is above order.

a. [*Interpolation*] There is a confirmation in that action is in the patient (from *Physics* 3.3.202b5-6), and yet it does not denominate the patient but the agent; thus too God is denominated by the relation that is in the creature.

## 2. Rejection of the Opinion

25. Against the first [n.24]:

Because then relation would be in that in which there is no foundation; for the foundation of the relation by which God is said with respect to the creature (if he is so said) is not in the creature<sup>a</sup> but in God; therefore that relation will not be in the creature.

a. [*Interpolation*] because the power, which founds the relation, is not in the creature.

26. Further, the opposite relations of cause and caused cannot exist in the same thing, because they are more repugnant than the relations of producer and produced, – which however cannot exist in the same supposit, although they are in the same nature.

27. And if you say that here the opposite relations are in the same supposit but do not denominate it, – this seems altogether irrational, that some form is in some subject and the subject cannot be said to be of the sort that that is which is of a nature to be constituted by the form.

28. The response that is given to the second question [n.24] seems to beg the question and to be a fault in the consequent.

Proof of the first, that since God is prior to the creature with a multiple priority – extending the name of ‘order’ so that not only is a posterior said to be ordered to a prior but also a prior to a posterior (although in a different way), one must prove that this priority (which can be called order) is not a real relation in God; this point therefore is begged. Nor does it follow from the known fact ‘that God is above order’, taking order as it is of posterior things ordered to a prior; for from this there only follows ‘that he is not posterior’, and from this it does not follow that he has no order, taking order generally.

29. But that the argument is a fault in the consequent is proved by the fact that order is a certain relation; but not every relation is an order (because it is not the case ‘common relation, founded on one of them’, as with equivalent relations), but only non-equivalent relations state an order. Therefore by arguing from a negation of order to a negation of relation is to argue as if the antecedent were first denied and afterwards the consequent.

## II. Scotus' own Response to the First Question

30. I respond therefore to the first question [n1] that the relations of creatures to God are new and from time, nor is there need, because of them, insofar as they are related to God ‘as to their term’, to posit any relations in God from time to be their term.

I prove it thus:

First, because according to the Philosopher *Metaphysics* 5.15.1021a26-30 ‘About relation’, relatives in the third mode are called those that are said ‘to something’ because other things belong to them, – so that this is the per se difference of the two first modes from the third, that in the first two the relation is mutual, but in the third it is not mutual, but one of the relatives is referred precisely to the other and the other is not referred but is only something of it; but all relations of creatures to God pertain to the third mode of relatives; therefore of whatever sort those are which are in one extreme, there is no need for the other extreme – according to some relation in it – to be the term of those relations, but it can be the term precisely under the idea of an absolute.<sup>a</sup>

a. [Note of Duns Scotus] Henry [of Ghent, *Summa* a.55 q.5 ad 4]: ‘Praepositinus responds saying that ‘not every relation has a correlation, for there is a relation of the creature with respect to the creator, yet there is not one in the creator with respect to the creature, – which is true as to the reality; yet it is present according to a consideration of the intellect.’”

32. And this is also proved from the intention of the Philosopher *Metaphysics* 9.8.1049b12-17, where he proves that ‘act is prior to power in definition, because power is defined by act’; but if act were referred to power, then – conversely – act would also be

defined by power, as Porphyry says *Book of Predicables* ch.3 ‘About species’, because in mutual relatives “the ideas of both must be posited in the ideas of both.”

33. Then the argument goes: act defines power as it is the term of the relation; either then it is term of the relation as an absolute, and the intended conclusion is gained, – or as a correlative, and thus power will define act; therefore as act is ‘prior’ in definition it is ‘posterior’ in definition!

34. Therefore act so defines power that it is not conversely defined by it, and consequently act is not referred to power but is a pure absolute, and this under the idea under which it defines power; but it defines power insofar as power is to it as a relation to a term; therefore act, according as it is a pure absolute ‘something’, is the term of this relation, whatever the relation be, whether simply so or in a certain respect.

35. This is also more generally proved by all relatives, because no relative is referred first to the correlative as to a term in the case of creatures.

Proof: a relative, insofar as it is relative, is first defined by the term to which it is referred, – therefore the term ‘as term’ is prior in definition to the relative as relative. The inference is plain from *Metaphysics* 7.4.1030b4-7, where the Philosopher compares accident to substance – and from him *Metaphysics* 9.8.1049b12-17, where he compares potency to act.

36. If then the term, insofar as it is term, is referred to the related thing insofar as it was related, then ‘insofar as it is term’ it will have regard to the related thing for definition, and consequently for what is prior according to definition; therefore father would be prior to son in definition and conversely. But it is impossible for there to be a circle in any essential priority whatever, therefore it is impossible for father to be referred

first to son insofar as son is referred to father. Therefore it is referred first to the absolute that is the proximate foundation of the relation (namely of filiation), and the absolute is prior to the father as father; and conversely, son ‘as son’ is referred to the absolute which is the proximate foundation of paternity, and the absolute is prior to filiation and to son insofar as it is son.

37. Nor is there because of this any circle, as that to the father ‘insofar as he is father’ *a* should be prior (which is an ‘absolute’ and the proximate foundation of filiation), and that to filiation ‘insofar as it is filiation’ *b* should be prior (which is the proximate foundation of the relation of paternity). For from this there only follows that these two absolutes are prior to two relations, and this is true; nay both absolutes are prior to each relation, because any relation pre-requires not only the foundation but also the term as it is term. Thus therefore is how things are when the relations are mutual; but it happens there to the term, as it is term, that it is conversely referred. It is possible therefore for something to be referred to an absolute, – and so it seems reasonable to posit this in God, who most of all has the idea of an absolute as creatures are related to him.

38. Further, although the intellect could busy itself about the term of some relation of the third mode [n.31] and cause a relation of reason in that term, yet that is not a reason for being the term; for although some intellect confer the squaring of the circle on science, causing in that absolute the relation of reason which is knowability, yet that is not a reason for terminating the relation of reason to it; for this relation of reason is not in this absolute save as actually considered by the intellect, but science is really referred to it, not merely as it is considered by the intellect; therefore the relation of reason in the knowable was not the reason for terminating the relation of the science.

39. This can also be made clear in the issue at hand about God, because although the divine essence can be compared to creatures, and this through an act both of the created intellect and of the uncreated intellect, and so this act can cause in the essence a relation of reason, yet it will not be the reason for terminating the relation of creatures to it. Certainly not the one that is caused by act of the created intellect; proof, because then, when no created intellect was considering, by comparing God to a stone (if God were to produce a stone) there would not be in the stone a real relation to him, because neither is there a relation of reason in God which would be the reason for terminating the real relation of the stone to him; the consequent is false. Therefore also not that one either that the divine intellect causes in its own essence; proof, because if *per impossibile* God were not an intellectual nature (as some have said, positing that the sun is the first principle [*Wisdom 13.1-2*]) and he were to produce a stone, the stone would be really referred to God and yet then there would be no relation of reason in God to it.

40. Absolutely then I say that, because of the termination of relations in creatures from time to God, there is no need to posit any relation in God, neither new nor old, which might be the reason for terminating the relation of the creature.

41. Yet there can be posited in God some relation of reason, new indeed, as that which is caused in him by act of our intellect when considering him, but not any new one by act of his own intellect.

Which I prove because never is there passage from contradictory to contradictory without change; for if there were no change in anything, there would be no reason why one of the contradictories could now be true rather than the other, nor why one should be false rather than the other, and so both are false at the same time and true at the same time;

but if in God there could be a new relation by act of his own intellect, one extreme of some contradiction would now be true about something which before was not true;<sup>a</sup> therefore there is some change in something. Not in the divine essence as known, – nor in the object considered, because it does not yet exist. Nor in anything to which it is compared by his own intellect, unless change is posited in the intellect itself when comparing; because, as the object compared and that to which it is compared – insofar as they are such – do not have another being save in being understood, so they cannot have another being or exist in another way unless something else is understood of them or understood in another way; but if something different being understood of them or being differently understood is impossible without some change of the divine intellect, then no relation can be new in God by act of his own intellect comparing his essence to something temporal. But this is not for this reason, that an actual and a potential relation are one (as the first rejected opinion said [nn.11, 15-19]), but for this reason, that the divine intellect – whatever it compares its essence to – compares in eternity, although not for eternity; hence just as in eternity he compares his will ‘as creative’ to the soul of Antichrist as possible for a certain time, so he compares in eternity his will ‘as creating’ to the soul of Antichrist as actually existing for the now for which he wishes to create that soul; and these indeed are two relations of reason, as they are two extremes, – but each is eternal, although not for eternity.

a. [*Interpolation*] because now it is being considered under some idea under which it was not being before considered by the divine intellect.

42. From this is apparent the response to this objection: ‘If there can be no new relation in God by act of his own intellect, then if no created intellect were possible and God could create a stone, he could not understand himself creating a stone as a created intellect can understand him now creating a stone, when he does create it; the consequent appears unacceptable, because whatever is knowable by us is much more knowable also by him’. – I reply: God could know himself creating a stone at time *a*; but he could not newly know himself creating a stone, but in eternity he would know himself creating a stone at time *a* just as in eternity he knows himself to be at some time creative of a stone. This is to say, in eternity he knows the actual relation of it to that at time *a*, just as he also knows the quasi potential relation of himself to it – a relation of reason, however – at some time.

43. In brief I say that it is plain there is no new relation in God, per se terminating a new relation of a creature; there is however some new relation by act of a created intellect, but none by act of his own intellect.

44. But then the first member [n.43] seems doubtful, as to how God is to be posited as lord, – according to Augustine *On the Trinity* V ch.16 n.17 [above, n.4].

I reply: by the sole new relation that is in the creature to him is he denominated ‘lord’; not indeed that in creatures there are two opposite relations [sc. of lord and servant] (by one of which God is denominated [n.24]), but there is one relation only [sc. of servant], which is to God as he is absolute. And for this reason, because ‘as absolute’ he is the term of that relation, he is denominated as if there were in him a new relation, namely the corresponding one [sc. lord], – in the way that a work made by a man is called

'human', not because of something of humanity that is formally in the work, but because of the humanity that is formally in man, to whom the work has a disposition.

45. And this seems to be the intention of the Master expressly in the text [d.30 ch.1 n.264], when he concludes this from the words of Augustine. For he speaks thus: "The appellation by which a creature is said relatively to the creator is relative, and it indicates the relation that is in the creature itself; but the appellation by which the creator is said relatively to the creature is relative indeed, but it indicates no relation that is in the creator;" and this same thing is what Augustine seems to say *On the Trinity* V [nn.4, 11, 24, 44], as the Master adduces him: "That God begins in time to be called what he was not called before is manifestly relatively said, not however according to an accident of God (because something has happened to him), but plainly according to an accident of that to which God begins relatively to be said."

### III. To the Principal Arguments of the First Question

#### 46. To the arguments [nn.1-3].

To the first [n.1]: I concede that whatever is in God is eternal by identity; but it is not necessary that whatever is predicated of God, by the fact that something else has a disposition to him, is eternal formally, because nothing else has an eternal disposition to him – just as if God is eternal and loved in time by a created will, he is indeed said to be loved by us but not 'loved eternally'.

47. To the second [n.2]: the consequence does not hold, because when extremes are of different ideas, then, on account of the fact that one extreme exceeds the other,

there is no need for there to be a like coexistence of one with the other and conversely, – just as this inference does not hold, ‘whatever is eternal is with the whole of time, therefore everything temporal is with the whole of eternity’; for the first part is true by reason of the immensity of eternity, and that is lacking in the other extreme, – and so there is no need for concomitance conversely, of the sort there is in the above inference. So here, the eternal can be the term of a new disposition to it (because what eternally exists can produce something *de novo*), and some appellation can be said of him from time, but the temporal cannot thus have the disposition of something eternal to him; or one can concede that the temporal too can be denominated from the disposition of something eternal to him, – as a stone, not only as ideational but as existing, is eternally known by God.

48. To the third [n.3]: ‘to come to be’, not determined through anything (namely when it is predicated according to something added to it [sc. ‘comes to be white’]), does not indicate the making simply of that of which it is said, – as that, if it be said ‘man comes to be’, making is indicated to be simply present in man; but if an adjacent third thing is predicated, as ‘man comes to be white’, coming to be is not indicated save according to something of him, namely what specifies him. And so someone might perhaps concede that God comes to be lord by indicating a making ‘in a certain respect’, namely a making according to some relation of reason or according to the termination of some relation; what however is conceded rather is that he begins to be lord, because this does not signify imperfection as ‘comes to be’ does; however in no way, either ‘comes to be’ or ‘begins’, is it conceded absolutely.

#### IV. Scotus' own Response to the Second Question

49. To the second question [n.5] I respond that in God there is not any real relation to creatures.

50. The reason for this is taken from the perfect simplicity and perfect necessity of God: for because God is perfectly simple, there is nothing in him which is not him (according to Augustine *City of God* XI ch.10: “God is simple, because he is what he has”); also his perfect necessity is of itself such, because his being will not vary whatever hypothesis is laid down – whether possible or impossible – about anything other than himself, because other things are not necessary except secondarily.

51. From this it follows that there is no reality in him which necessarily co-requires anything other than himself; for such a thing, necessarily co-requiring something other than God, would not exist if that co-required thing does not exist, and consequently something that was perfectly the same as God would not exist when something else – which was not necessary of itself – does not exist; but a real relation of necessity co-requires for its ‘being’ the term of the relation; therefore in God there is no relation to anything other than himself.

52. Against this reason instances are raised:

First, because although the creature is not necessary in actual being, yet it seems that ‘something other than God’ is necessary in possible being, because the ‘possible being’ is necessary (which is proved by the fact that something seems possible by its possibility in itself before there is a relation of God to it, for there is no power in anything save with respect to something possible in itself; therefore a relation to a creature ‘insofar

as it is possible' does not co-require anything that is not necessary under the idea under which it is its term); but a relation in God to a creature 'as possible' seems to be the same as his relation to a creature as actual, by the deduction set down for the first opinion to the first question [n.11]; therefore there can be in God – while his necessity stands – some relation simply to creatures as possible, and the same relation as that which is to creatures as actual.

53. Again, if the creature has quidditative being insofar as it has exemplified being (according to one opinion), this being is necessary for the creature; therefore a respect to this being, as such, seems to be possible without possibility in that in which such respect is.

54. Again, if the philosophers were to posit certain things produced by God as formally necessary (as was said about the opinion of Aristotle and Avicenna in distinction 8 nn.251-253, 255, 248, 242), then the respect to those things could be the same as God and yet the necessity of the divine could still stand, because of the fact that the term of the relation, according to the opinion, would be necessary; therefore, by holding the position of the philosophers who yet denied a real relation in God, the reasoning already set down (from the simplicity and necessity of God) does not seem sufficient.

55. Again, fourth: in that case there should not be posited in a more necessary creature a real respect to a less necessary creature, and so in the celestial bodies there should be no real respect to generable and corruptible things.

56. To these objections [nn.52-55].

Although to the two first objections [nn.52-53] a response can be made in more or less a single way (to the first by the fact that possible being is only being in a certain respect,<sup>a</sup> and therefore there is no relation to it simply but in a certain respect, – and to the second in like manner, that exemplified being is only being in a certain respect, and therefore the disposition to such term would not be real, just as neither is the term real), yet one can say with one general response to all these instances, that the necessary of itself – as was said [n.50] – will not change according to anything perfectly the same as itself, whatever possible position is constructed about what is other than it; but whatever is in the perfectly simple is the same as it perfectly; therefore the necessary of itself cannot be changed according to anything that is in it, whatever is posited about something else. But nothing other than God is as formally necessary as God, according to any position, because if something else formally necessary were posited, it would not be without all dependence on the first necessary, and so would not be of itself necessary; therefore no reality in the first will change because of any position about anything of such a sort that it is not of itself formally necessary; but some change could come to be in some reality in the first because of a change in something other than itself, if some reality in it necessarily required something other than itself.

a. [*Interpolation*] because this sort of being is not being simply, just as neither is ‘being a dead man’ being a man – nor does this possibility posit more in reality than blindness does in an eye.

57. And next to the two instances about potential and quidditative being (according to some) I reply [nn.52-54] that neither is the ‘possible’ of itself necessary in such being – even a necessary possible – in the way God is of himself necessary act; thus

too neither are those quiddities of themselves necessary in their quidditative being, but they are necessary beings thus by participation; nor, third, would creatures – if they were necessary (according to the philosophers [n.54]) – be as necessary as the first, but they would have only a participated necessity. And so to posit that they do not exist would not be as impossible as that some reality in the first does not exist (because none of them is as necessary as any reality in the first is necessary), and yet from positing ‘the less impossible’ something more impossible would seem to follow! Therefore there could not be as regard any of these things, although they are in some sense necessary (though not of themselves necessary), any reality in that which is necessary of itself.

58. To the fourth [n.55] I say that if something ‘more necessary’ were also simple (that is, not composite, nor combinable with any non-necessary reality), the more necessary would exist when it does not have a respect outside itself to the less necessary; but this supposition is false, because although some celestial body were posited to be in itself necessary, yet it is not a simple that could not receive any non-necessary reality other than itself; but God, just as he cannot be what exists in order to something not of itself necessary, so he cannot have any reality in order to such a thing, because that reality would be himself.

#### V. To the Principal Arguments of the Second Question

59. As to the arguments about omnipotence and omniscience [n.5], and about willing future things [n.6], there will be discussion in the questions specific to them [I d.43 nn.6-14, d.35 nn.27-34, d.45 n.7].

60. To the argument about action and passion [n.8]: the Philosopher does not say that those relations are real, but he says that they are mutual; and in this precisely are the relations in the first and second mode distinguished from the third mode of relation [n.31]. But however it may be with what he said, the position of the Philosopher is not of itself true when the agent is of itself necessary and perfectly simple, as was said when solving the point [nn.49-51].

61. But you ask: why then are the relations real that are founded on action and passion in creatures?

62. Although there is no need to speak to this point for the solution of the argument [n.8, 60], yet one can say that this is true in the case of a natural agent, because the form it has – whereby it is active – is naturally inclined to producing the effect; but a free agent is not naturally inclined to the effect from the form it has, – and then, since God is a free agent, it follows that on his action there is not founded a real relation.

63. On the contrary:

The philosophers, when conceding that God produces things by natural necessity, denied a real relation of him to them [n.54]; therefore that [n.62] is not the precise reason.

64. Likewise, a created will seems to have a real relation to its effect, although it is free.

65. Further, an effect does not by its absolute entity necessarily require a proximate cause (for the same absolute entity could be from a remote cause), and yet when it is produced by its proximate cause it has a real relation to it; therefore there is not required for a real relation that the absolute nature, on which it is founded, be necessarily inclined of itself to one of the two extremes.

66. Again, the likeness of two white things is a real relation in them, and yet one white thing, precisely considered insofar as it is the foundation of the relation, does not seem inclined of its entity (whereby it is the foundation) to one of the two extremes – especially a supreme whiteness, if it is posited in relation to another supreme whiteness, as was argued against his [Henry's] first argument to this question [nn.12, 20].

67. Again, if it is always necessary, before there is a real relation, to posit in the foundation a natural inclination to the term, then there is a real relation before the real relation, because the inclination to another is a real relation!

68. Therefore in brief:

It does not seem necessary for a real relation that the absolute thing which is the foundation of the relation be inclined of itself to the remaining thing, but that it be such that, when the term is posited, there follow on it and on the term such disposition from the nature of the extremes,<sup>a</sup> – and then that every created agent is such that, when some effect is posited to exist through it, the disposition of them follow on it as on the foundation and on the product as on the term.

a. [*Interpolation*] so that any relation that follows the extremes from the nature of the thing, without consideration of the intellect, is real.

69. But the reason why a real relation follows is only because this is this and that is that; just as the reason why a real relation (as ‘likeness’) follows on whiteness and whiteness – once posited – is only this whiteness and that whiteness; and there is no other reason why a real greater-ness follows on double and triple – once posited in existence – than that this is double and that is triple.

70. And yet the idea of potentiality in the foundation and the term can be assigned as the general cause, namely as to why a real disposition can follow:

For whatever things can be parts of some whole are potentials for the form of the whole, – and if they can be parts of something per se one, they can be potentials for the form by which it is per se one (as is plain about the parts of the organic body with respect to the intellective soul), and also, if they can be parts of something that is one with unity of order, they can be potentials for its form, by which form the ‘whole’ is one in order; and generally, the proposition about the potentiality of parts is plain, according to the Philosopher *Metaphysics* 5.2.1013b19-21, where he means that parts are like matter with respect to the whole. All created things – because they are limited – are of a nature to be parts of the whole universe, which is ‘one’ with unity of order (as is plain in *Metaphysics* 12.10.1075a16-19), and therefore any of them is potential for this form which is ‘order’, so as namely to have an order to another part; and this either according to the eminence which is in diverse natures in the universe, or according to equality (because “order is of things equal and unequal,” according to Augustine *City of God* XIX ch.13 n.1), or according to action and passion, or according to causality. And therefore any created agent, when producing an effect, is potential such that on it and on its produced effect an order among them can follow.

But it cannot be thus as regard an unlimited agent and its effect, because the unlimited agent is potential neither to absolute form nor to relation, on account of its infinity.

71. One can reply through the same point to the argument about quantity [n.7] because every created quantity – whether in virtue or mass – even if it be posited to have

a real relation to another quantity (because of the fact that the order, from which comes the unity of the universe, can exist between such quanta), yet there can be no real disposition of an infinite quantity to a finite one.

72. And when a confirmation for the argument is given through equality, which is a real relation in creatures and even in divine reality [n.7], – I reply that in divine reality it is real because it is a disposition from the nature of the thing, and it stands together with the simplicity and necessity of the related thing in itself because it is not referred to another that is less necessary formally than the related thing itself; in creatures the relation is real because of the very potentiality of the related quantities. But when comparing the infinite quantity to this [finite] one, both reasons are destroyed, because then simplicity and necessity are taken away from one of the extremes, and potentiality and limitation are taken away from the other.

73. To the other argument [n.9] I say that reality sometimes determines the composition [of a proposition], and then it means nothing other than that it is so truly, – as when it is said ‘that proposition is really false’ that is, ‘it truly is false’. But if reality is taken as it adverbially determines the predicate, here ‘God is really lord’, – although this proposition can be denied, yet it can be conceded according as ‘lord’ does not indicate any relation in God but according as God is the term of a real relation of the creature, as was said in the preceding question [n.44].

## Thirty First Distinction

### Single Question

*Whether Identity, Likeness, and Equality are Real Relations in God*

1. About the thirty first distinction I ask whether identity, likeness, and equality are real relations in God.

That they are not:

Augustine *On the Trinity* V ch.6 n.7: “We ask, according to what is the Father equal to the Son? Not because he is said to be to the Father is the Son equal to the Father; it remains then that he is equal according to what he is said to be to himself;” and he concludes: “it remains then that he is equal according to substance.” Therefore equality is not said there according to relation.

2. Further, a form of the same species is not multiplied in number save through matter; proof: every form separate from matter has the whole species, according to some. Therefore equality in divine reality, since it is a form of the same idea without matter, is not multiplied or distinguished; therefore there is not a different equality in the Father and in the Son, and consequently it is not real in the Father, because then it would require a corresponding distinct relation in the Son.

3. Further, if equality in the Father is different from the equality that is in the Son, by parity of reasoning it is also different from the equality that is in the Holy Spirit – and then to the equality in the Son and to the equality in the Holy Spirit there will correspond different equalities in the Father, because correlatives are co-multiplied; therefore in the Father there will be two equalities, which seems unacceptable.

4. Further, if these relations are real, then they are as equally distinct as are the relations of origin – and consequently they could thus constitute distinct persons just as do the relations of origin; and if they can so constitute, they do so constitute, because there is no potency there without act.

5. The opposite:

Hilary *On the Trinity* III n.23: “There is no likeness to oneself.”

### I. To the Question

6. To the question:

It seems one must say that the three are sufficient for a real relation; first, because the foundation is real and the term is real; and second, because there is a real distinction between the extremes; and third, because, from the nature of the extremes, such a relation follows without the work of any other power comparing one extreme to the other.

#### A. As to the First Condition for Relation

##### 1. Opinion of Others

7. As to the first condition for real relation [n.6], it is denied [by Henry of Ghent etc.] that there is here a foundation, because it is said that magnitude passes over into the essence (according to Augustine, in many places), and so it does not remain under the idea of magnitude save in reason.

8. But against this:

The divine essence as it is the first object of the divine intellect, seen in the first intuitive cognition, is, before any busying of the intellect, the beatific object of that intellect, because the intellect is not beatified by a busying act; therefore it is of itself, without any busying of the intellect, formally infinite, because nothing beatifies save what is formally infinite. So there is magnitude of virtue there – nay an infinity of magnitude – from the nature of the thing.

9. Again, the intellect, before it understands that it is understanding something or is busy about something, has a comprehensive grasp of the essence as first object, and from this – that it busies itself about it – it is possible to reduce to act all the ideas that can be considered in the essence; therefore from the nature of the thing the intellect is infinite, – therefore the essence too, on which it is founded.

10. Further, their reasoning [n.7] is not valid, because although a quantity of bulk states something added to the nature of the subject, and therefore it cannot remain under its formal idea and also pass over into the essence by identity, – yet magnitude of virtue in every being passes over into that which it by identity belongs to, even in the case of creatures. – Proof: for if an angel has some magnitude of virtue (about which Augustine speaks in *ibid.* VI ch.8 n.9: “In things that are not great by bulk, what it is to be greater is to be better”), and if its perfectible magnitude is not the same as its essence, let it be removed from the essence. With the essence then remaining, I ask what grade of perfection it has among beings? For it will be nothing unless it has some determinate grade of perfection among beings; therefore there still remains in the essence a magnitude of virtue, whereby it is said to be thus or thus perfect. Therefore the quantity in everything passes over by identity, and remains in everything in its proper idea, because

the nature of such quantity is to state the intrinsic mode of the perfection it belongs to; and from the fact that it states ‘mode’, it remains – but from the fact that it states ‘intrinsic’, it passes by identity into the essence it belongs to.

## 2. Scotus' own Opinion

11. I say, therefore, that there is here a foundation or equality that is real and from the nature of the thing, not only a remote one, which is the essence, – but a proximate one, which is magnitude or specifically ‘infinity’. And this is proved by all the reasons that are given to show that the essence of the first thing is infinite; they do all indeed conclude that from the nature of the thing it is infinite; for all things that depend on it – whether on it as it is first in idea of effective principle, or in idea of final principle, or in idea of being eminent and measuring and participated (which ways were touched on in distinction 2 nn.111-144) – all these things, I say, depend on it according to what it is from the nature of the thing, after removing every act of intellect, because no dependence of a finite effect rests on something under the formal idea of a being of reason, as can be proved by the reasons given in distinction 13 against the sixth opinion [nn.31-42]). There is also here from the nature of the thing what is posited as the proximate foundation of equality, or the idea of founding it, namely unity, because according to Damascene ch.8: “In him” (namely in God) “common and one are considered to be in the thing;” it is not so in the case of creatures, but the common there is ‘one’ by intellect only.

## B. As to the Second Condition for Relation

12. In this way, namely that the relation requires extremes really distinct [n.6]:

The thing is clear from Hilary, as said in his opposing point [n.5].

13. And from Augustine, *ibid.* VI ch.10 n.11: “In the Son,” he says, “is the first equality.” Which would not be true if some person could be said to be equal to himself; for then the Father would be the first equal. But because equality cannot be understood without distinction, and the first distinction is in the produced Son, so the ‘first equality’ is there in him, – taking as term or as quasi subject the equality by which the Son is equal to the Father.

14. This is also proved by the fact that the relations of origin are posited as real, and they do not pre-require a distinction of the extremes, but as it were formally cause it; for the relations in question here presuppose the distinction ‘as caused by relations of origin’, just as the common position is that they cannot burgeon in the essence unless the relations of origin are pre-existing in it [d.26 n.96]; therefore they seem more to require distinct extremes than the relations of origin, or at any rate not less.

15. And if you object that they are not of different ideas as the relations of origin are, – this is not conclusive unless because they are not distinct in species; but in the case of creatures not only are the relations of supposition and superposition real, where the extremes differ in species, – but also the common relations are real, where the extremes differ only in number; therefore a real numerical distinction in the extremes is here sufficient for the reality of the common relations, just as for the distinction of the relations of origin, which differ as it were in species.

### C. As to the Third Condition for Relation

16. As to the third article [n.6] – it seems that this relation [sc. equality etc.] is consequent to the persons from the nature of the thing, without any comparison by some extrinsic power comparing them.

For because the Father by generating communicates his essence perfectly to the Son, therefore he communicates the same infinite magnitude – as Augustine says *Against Maximinus* II ch.18 n.3: “If,” he says, “you say ‘the Father is by his very self greater than the Son, because he generates’, I quickly reply: no, therefore the Father is not greater than the Son, because he generates an equal.” Therefore there does not seem to be any reason why the equality of the Father with the Son should not be posited as a real relation.

17. One can speak similarly about likeness. And – just as in creatures – there is a double likeness, namely essential, according to specific difference, and accidental, according to some accidental quality. And even if the first be denied in the issue at hand (because God does not have any specific difference), yet because – if the fact ‘there is a specific difference in creatures’ were the whole essence of the individual – there would no less be a form in respect of the individual (therefore no less a relation of likeness than there is now), therefore it seems that likeness can properly be conceded there (not insofar as it is ‘what’, but insofar as it is act and quasi form, by which the persons are God), and also a likeness as to all the attributes, which are as it were properties of this nature (as Damascene says ch.4: “Things that concern the nature state the nature”): and then, just as there is from the nature of the thing a foundation of equality and a real distinction

between the extremes (and this relation is without any operation of the intellect [nn.11-13, 16]), so also in the case of likeness.

18. About identity too one can say that it is taken in two ways in divine reality; in one way of the same person to himself, as the Father is the same as himself, – in another way of one person with another, as the Father is the same as the Son and conversely.

About the first identity, see elsewhere [II d.1 qq.4-5 n.24].<sup>a</sup> About the second one can say – as also about the others [equality, likeness] – that it is real, because there is there a true unity from the nature of the thing and a sufficient distinction between the extremes, nor does a comparison by the intellect seem necessary for the being of this identity. And if the identity of the same supposit with itself in the case of creatures is a relation of reason only, then there is never a true and perfect identity save in God alone; for Socrates is not a perfect identity with himself, because it is a relation of reason only, – and so every such relation is in a certain respect; nor is there a perfect identity of Socrates with Plato, because it is not founded on perfect unity. But here there is a perfect identity of the Father with the Son as to foundation, because there is a perfect unity of the Father with the Son, – and a real identity, because there is a real distinction and a sufficient one between the extremes.

a. [*Interpolation*, from Appendix A] Response.

In distinction 19 to the ultimate: it is a mark of imperfection in creatures that the foundation is distinguished; there is only required a distinction of supposita.

There, at the bottom: the passion of the quantity of virtue as also of bulk.

Again, here in this distinction question 1: it does not only state negation, as neither does unity of essence and the distinction of persons which it follows.

Here in question 2: the respect formally in its reason, causally and of the person and unity of essence, – just as in creatures there is a respect of the supposit to supposit according to one form.

But what he [Bonaventure] does not understand, that they are distinct in reason, is not only proved in 19 ('passion') and in the first question here ('it follows'), but because he never adds the distracting thing (in distinction 30, 'About the relation of God to the creature').

## II. Doubts about Equality

19. But about equality there are two doubts:

For first it seems it is not a distinct relation from identity and likeness because (as was said elsewhere [I d.8 nn.192, 220-221, d.10 n.30, d.13 nn.72, 80]) 'infinite' is not a special attribute but states a mode intrinsic to any attribute, – and by parity of reasoning 'great' does too, which as it were states indistinctly what 'infinite' states distinctly; therefore the magnitude of the essence is not distinct from the essence (and not by the distinction either that is between the attributes), and then equality according to this magnitude is not distinct from identity, which is according to the essence; likewise, magnitude is not distinct from wisdom, by the distinction that is between the attributes, – therefore equality in magnitude of wisdom is not distinct from likeness in wisdom. But every magnitude is either of the essence, according to which there is identity, – or of an attribute, according to which there is likeness; therefore no equality in divine reality seems to be distinct from identity and likeness.

20. Further, if also any attribute has its own proper magnitude, then equality seems to be founded in accord with any one of them; therefore there will be as many equalities of the persons as there are attributes.

21. As to the first [n.19], one can concede that – as in the case of creatures – there can be likeness without equality (as a weak white is like an intense white, although not perfectly), but not conversely, as to the form by which certain things are of a nature to be likened; and in this respect, by comparing certain things in the form according to which likeness is of a nature to exist, equality seems to quasi determine likeness and a foundation of likeness. So one can concede here that equality is not so distinct from identity and likeness as they are from each other, but it states a proper mode of the foundation of each of those two relations, and as it were also a mode proper to each relation, – because namely both identity and likeness are perfect; because if *per impossibile* the Father had a greater deity and the Son a lesser deity, there would be some identity, but because the foundation of the identity would not have the same magnitude, it would not be perfect identity, nor go along with equality; likewise, if *per impossibile* the Father had a greater knowledge and the Son a lesser one, they would be in some way alike, but because the mode of the foundation would be deficient – namely perfect magnitude – there would therefore not be a perfect likeness. But now the magnitude, which is as it were the mode of the foundation of identity and likeness, founds equality, which is as it were the mode of likeness and identity, – because it asserts each of them as perfect.

22. To the second [n.20] one can concede that there are as many perfections in God simply as there are also magnitudes and equalities; however just as all of them are

simply one thing, so too ‘the equalities in accord with them’ are simply one thing. And from this is plain how the Master – distinction 19 ch.1 n.168 – well assigned ‘a perfect equality’ in the three (according to Augustine [Fulgentius] *On the Faith to Peter* ch.1 n.4), namely ‘in magnitude, in power, and in eternity’; by magnitude indeed is understood equality in all attributes (taking magnitude not for any distinct attribute, but as it is common to the magnitude of any attribute at all), and by power they are indicated to be equal as to objects outside, and by eternity equality is indicated to be in them as it were in duration. But equality according to discrete quantity is not looked for there, but to continuous quantities in creatures – which are permanent and successive quantity – there correspond there magnitude and eternity.

### III. To the Principal Argument

23. [To the first principal argument] – To the first argument [n.1] I say that a white things and a white thing are said to be alike according to whiteness, and this insofar as the ‘according to’ indicates that its determinable is the proximate foundation for the relation; but they are said to be alike by likeness formally. So I say that the Father and Son are equal according to essence as according to proximate foundation [nn.11, 35], because the common relations are founded on something as it is common; but nothing is one in the persons save the essence as essential.

24. Against this solution there are multiple arguments:

First, because by parity of reasoning there seems to be a single equality in God, just as also a single paternity; both (1) because each relation is equally adequate to its

foundation; and (2) because anything in God of one idea is single, – otherwise he would not be of himself supremely one, but by one thing he would be ‘being according to quiddity’ and by another ‘this being’ and so there would be potentiality and composition; and (3) because infinity in all of them seems to follow in the same way, because it will not be possible to give what a plural thing is determined by to a definite plurality; and (4) because what has a cause of one idea and a single receptive idea is single, because it is not distinguished by agent or by matter, *Metaphysics* 8.4.1044a25-32 (likeness is of this sort).

25. Again, not only will it follow that there are six equalities in three persons, nay any person is equal to two persons and conversely, – and not by the same equality by which they are one, because the extreme is not the same; indeed any person is equal to the three, because *On the Trinity* VIII ch.1 n.2: “The three are not a greater thing than one is” (nor a lesser, as is plain; therefore they are equal). And this last point seems to show sufficiently that equality is not real, because it is of the same thing to itself, provided not to itself precisely but along with others; it is never real to itself, however much it may be communicated to others. But as to why it is not to itself precisely, – one can say, not because it states a relation, but it only states the unity of quantity; yet it connotes a distinction of supposita, and therefore it is to another. – Further, this equality is equal to that equality, and so *ad infinitum*; this person is also like that one, and the same as it in species, and so again *ad infinitum*.

26. To these objections:

To the first [n.24 (1)] it is said that no relation there is adequate to the foundation, because the essence is the immediate foundation of them all; for since a relation does not

found a relation, and there is only essence and relation there, the conclusion follows. – To this it is said that the distinct attributes are the proximate foundations of the relations of origin, as memory is of ‘active saying’ and actual knowing is of ‘passive saying’; with this proximate foundation one relation of origin is equated.

27. In another way it is said to the first [n.24 (1)] that in creatures disquiparant [sc. correlates that are denoted by different names, as father and son] relations require distinct foundations (because they differ in species), but common relations do not; therefore the first is thus adequate to what is disquiparant because it is not the same foundation for the opposite relation; things are not so in the case of the common relations. How this relates to the issue at hand is plain [sc. paternity is adequate and unique, equality is not adequate nor unique].

28. But given this response, why is there only a single paternity? Because although its proximate foundation is not the foundation of the opposite relation (which as it were differs in species), yet why is ‘this paternity’ adequate to its foundation and ‘this equality’ not adequate to its? – Response: no unique common relation can be adequate, because the opposite has to have the same foundation; some relation can be adequate to what is disquiparant.

29. On the contrary: why is ‘this paternity’ necessarily adequate? – Response: nothing of one idea is multiplied unless some things of another idea are pre-understood that are causally necessarily required for the multiplication of it; therefore paternity cannot be multiplied because it does not pre-require such things of a different idea (which would be as it were the cause of its multiplication), – equality can be, because it pre-requires relations that constitute persons, by which distinction of persons the equalities

are distinguished. Proof [sc. that in something of one idea multiplication is made by something of another idea]: by what is *a* other than *b*? If by something of a different idea in them, or causally, the intended conclusion is gained; if not, but only by something of the same idea, I ask again by what it is distinguished, and so *ad infinitum*. – However it may be with this general proof, there is a special proof in God; because otherwise [sc. if multiplication were not made by something of a different idea] there would be an infinity, because nothing there is determined to a definite multitude by any prior cause; therefore only by something of a different idea, because ‘anything of one idea that is related to several things does not determine to how many such things it extends itself’ (it is got from distinction 2 above, question 7, in the solution, addition, sub n.303).

30. Through this is plain the response to the third point [n.24 (3)]; why there is a certain plurality of equalities but there would not be of paternities.

31. To the second [n.24 (2)]: that whatever is of one idea in the thing – not only in concept – is unique, I concede. To the proof I say that, in concept, ‘equality’ and ‘this’ are not by the same thing, but anything in the thing is ‘equality’ and ‘this’ by the same thing – as is replied in distinction 8 nn.137-150 about a concept common to God and creatures, or a common thing (so too in distinction 29 nn.3-4 about principle and in distinction 23 n.9<sup>a</sup> about several relations having a common concept).

a. A blank space was left here by Scotus.

32. To the fourth [n.24 (4)]: the proposition can be conceded, and it is true when ‘receptive’ is only in one recipient and is an absolute form; in relations several things are in one thing, and necessarily several things are in opposite extremes.

33. To the other [n.25]: it is conceded that there are six other equalities, between any person and two others; but between one and three, or two and two, it is conceded as a quasi numeral part to a quasi numeral whole – then the proposition ‘it is never real to itself etc.’ is denied. It is denied to be real in another way, when the same person is in each extreme: the inference does not follow ‘not greater nor lesser therefore equal’, because the premise is true of the Father with respect to the Father, the conclusion false.

34. To the last one, about an infinity of equalities [n.25], a response is given in book II distinction 1 question 4 nn.23-24,<sup>a</sup> about which relations are referred to others, which to themselves.

*a. A blank space was left here by Scotus.*

35. And if you object that then the Father could be said according to essence, because the essence is foundation of paternity (which however is not conceded), although I have made this argument elsewhere to prove that a relation of origin is not an act of the essence [I d.5 n.137], yet by holding to the common way [sc. opposite to the objection here, that the Father is not said according to essence] a reason can be assigned as to why according to essence the Father is said to be equal to the Son but not Father of the Son; because although the essence is foundation of both, and is not distinguished (neither by the former nor by the latter), yet it is the foundation of the common relation insofar as it is one – but not insofar as it is ‘one’ is it foundation of a relation of origin, although it is one; and because essence ‘as essence’ is not taken there save as it is one formally in the three, therefore the Father is said to be equal according to essence, because of the fact that the essence as ‘one’ is the proximate foundation of this relation [sc. equality]. But

Father is not said according to deity, because deity as ‘one’ is not ‘the idea of the foundation’ of this relation [sc. paternity], such that unity be the idea of the foundation, as would be indicated if Father were said according to deity; because wherever a relation is the act of a foundation, there a supposit can be said relatively to another according to that foundation (as Socrates according to whiteness is like, fire by heat heats, a stone according to the quiddity of stone is the measure of knowledge about a stone); but this is not conceded ‘the Father is Father by deity, or according to deity’; therefore etc.

36. But in this way it seems one can argue that neither is he equal according to deity, because this relation is not the act of the foundation. – Response: where a relation is an act of the foundation, there something can according to the foundation be said relatively to another (this I have accepted), but I do not concede conversely that wherever something is said relatively to another according to the foundation that there the relation is an act of the foundation – because universally such ‘according to’ is a mark of the cause of inherence per se in the second mode, not the first. And well does ‘actuation of the foundation through relation’ entail that the foundation is the cause of the inherence of the relation in the supposit (cause per se in the second mode, I say), but not conversely, because ‘to be per se the foundation’ sometimes suffices for being a per se cause of the inherence of the relation in the supposit without the fact that the relation actuates, although sometimes it may not be sufficient, because then the Father according to essence would be Father.

37. But at any rate, what is the reason for the dissimilarity here, that a common relation is said to be present [sc. in a supposit] according to essence, a proper relation or a relation of origin not, – since neither is more act than the other? In creatures each is an

act, and each is said to be present according to the foundation; for ‘hot’ is both capable of heating according to heat and is like according to heat!

38. [To the second principal argument] – To the second [n.8] I say that the major proposition is false; nay when a form is distinguished in matter and with matter, the mater is not the principal reason for this distinction, because in any distinction the principal reason of the distinction is that which is the principal reason of being in that existence (about this elsewhere, in the question ‘On individuation’ [II d.3 p.1 qq.5-6 nn.9, 15, 20]).

39. [To the third principal argument] To the third [n.3]; it seems one must concede that in the Father there is one equality to the Son and another to the Holy Spirit, just as if the Father had generated the Holy Spirit there would be in him one paternity to the Son and another to the Holy Spirit – and about this statement there will be general discussion in book III d.8 q. un. n.6-11, 21-22, ‘whether in one thing, related to several, there are several relations’.

40. [To the fourth principal argument] – To the fourth [n.4]; the argument seems difficult to those who posit that the persons are relative (as was argued against them in distinction 26 n.96, for the third opinion), yet by holding to the common way [sc. that the persons are relative] one must say that relations of origin burgeon in the essence before the common ones do, and those ‘first burgeoning’ ones distinguish and constitute the persons, – but not the common ones, because they are as it were adventitious to the persons [n.14] (as it was posited that active-inspiriting does not constitute a person because it is understood to happen as it were to the Father and the Son once they have been constituted in personal being); for the first things burgeoning there that can distinguish personally do distinguish personally and constitute persons.

## Thirty Second Distinction

### Question One

*Whether the Father and the Son Love Each Themselves by the Holy Spirit*

1. About the thirty second distinction I ask whether the Father and the Son love themselves by the Holy Spirit.

That they do not:

Because to love is taken either essentially or notionally; not essentially, because anything essential is present in any person not through another person; if notionally, therefore the Father and the Son inspirit by the Holy Spirit, – which is false.

2. The same thing is proved secondly, because no notional act converts to the same agent form which it is or proceeds, because of the distinction which such notional act requires between the agent and the term; therefore, if this act converts, it is not taken notionally.

3. Further, if Father and Son love themselves by the Holy Spirit, then the Father loves himself by the Holy Spirit, because the Father seems to love himself and the Son by the same thing; but the conclusion seems unacceptable, because the Father loves himself in the first moment of origin, in which the Holy Spirit is not understood to have been inspirited.

4. Further, they love themselves and creatures by the same thing; but the Holy Spirit does not seem to be ‘what they love the creature by’, because then just as the Holy

Spirit from the necessity of his production is love, so love of creatures would be from necessity – and so God would necessarily love the creature.

5. On the contrary:

*On the Trinity* VI ch.5 n.7: the Holy Spirit is “that by which the begotten is loved by the begetter and loves his begetter.”

## Question Two

### *Whether the Father is Wise by Generated Wisdom*

6. Second I ask whether the Father is wise by generated wisdom.

That he is:

‘The Father speaks by the Word’, according to Augustine *On the Trinity* VII ch.1 n.1; but according to Anselm *Monologion* ch.63, “to speak by supreme spirit is nothing else than to intuit as it were by thinking;” therefore the Father intuits by the Word, and so he is wise by the Word.

7. On the contrary:

Augustine *On the Trinity* VII ch.1 n.1: “He exists by that by which he is wise, because for him to be wise and to be are the same;” therefore if he were wise by the Word he would exist by the Word.

### I. Opinion of Others to the First Question

8. The first question is held to be difficult by the Master [I d.32 ch.1 n.283] and he dismisses it unsolved.

#### A. First Opinion

9. Some have denied the proposition ‘the Father and the Son love themselves by the Holy Spirit’, and have said it was retracted by Augustine in a similar case, *Retractions* I ch.26, where he retracts this proposition ‘the Father is wise by generated wisdom’, to which the former seems to be similar, – and therefore they say the former is retracted in the latter.

10. On the contrary:

Not only does Augustine separately retract matters that need to be retracted, but he even retracts the same matter – which is spoken off in diverse books (though it needs to be retracted) – several times, namely when he makes mention of those diverse books; therefore much more would he separately retract this one, if it was to be retracted.

11. Also Augustine does not retract the sayings of other saints who seem to concede this proposition, – as Jerome *On the Psalms* [Ps.-Jerome, 17.1]

#### B. Second Opinion

12. Others have said that the proposition needs to be interpreted, so that the ‘by the Holy Spirit’ is to be taken in the idea of sign, – so that the Father and the Son love themselves by the Holy Spirit as by a sign of common love.

13. On the contrary:

In this way it could be said that they love themselves by a creature, because a creature is a sign of their love.

#### C. Third Opinion

14. Others say that they love themselves with a love appropriated to the Holy Spirit, and so they are said to love themselves by the Holy Spirit through appropriation, not properly.

15. On the contrary:

In this way they would be good by the Holy Spirit, because goodness is appropriated to the Holy Spirit.

#### D. Fourth Opinion

16. In another way it is said that “the ablative [sc. ‘by’] is to be construed by way of formal effect.”

17. This is made clear first by the fact that, although not every thing is a form, yet “all that by which something is denominated – as far as this goes – has the disposition of

a form; so that, if I should say ‘he is clothed in clothing’, the ablative ‘in clothing’ is construed by way of disposition of a form, although it is not the form of man.”

18. “But it happens that something is denominated by that which proceeds from it, as an agent is not only by the action but also as by the term of the action, which is the effect, when the effect is included in the understanding of the action; for we say that ‘fire is a heater by heating’, although heating is not heat (which is the form of fire) but an action that proceeds from fire; and we also say that ‘the tree is flowering with flowers’, although the flowers are not the form of the tree but certain effects proceeding from it.”

19. “According to this, then, one must say that since we may take ‘to love’ in two ways in divine reality, namely essentially and notionally – as to the way it is taken essentially, the Father and the Son do not love themselves in this way by the Holy Spirit but by their essence; hence Augustine says *On the Trinity* XI ch.7 n.12: ‘Who dares say that neither Father nor Son nor Holy Spirit love save through the Holy Spirit?’”

20. On the contrary [n.18]:

‘To build’ distinctly includes the term which is ‘a building’, yet it is not conceded that ‘a builder builds by a building’; and in the issue at hand too, ‘to inspirit’ more distinctly includes the Holy Spirit than it includes ‘to love’, and yet it is not conceded that ‘the Father and the Son inspirit by the Holy Spirit’.

21. Again, even if such predication were conceded, yet it is not referable back to the agent – because something that would be a term for the fire by something it produces is not conceded to be said of fire.

22. Further, in a transitive construction never is the effect ‘as effect’ construed in the ablative; but to love is a transitive verb. Hence the example – on which they rely [who

adopt this opinion] – is not to the purpose; for ‘to flower’ is a neutral verb and does not formally state the production of anything.

Every neutral verb indeed signifies the same as an adjectival name (if a name were imposed), save that this name signifies by way of having and rest, but the verb signifies it in becoming, – as ‘to be hot’ signifies the same thing in rest as ‘to heat’ signifies it as it were in becoming. And just as such a denominative name could be said of something with the ablative, indicating that by which the subject is denominated with such denominative, so a neutral verb could be construed with the ablative in the same disposition of denominating form; for as fire ‘heats by heat’ so it is ‘hot by heat’, and both are in the idea of the form from which the denomination comes, by way of rest in the one case and by way of becoming in the other. But the form is sometimes inherent, as a quality, – and sometimes it is disposed by way of a form from without of the denominating thing, as in the case of the category of having [sc. being clad] or by way of it (in both ways the denomination can be made); and just as something is denominated not only by the form but by something extrinsic, sometimes, so what denominates can be said of it with the extrinsic thing taken in the ablative, and this whether what denominates signifies nominally or verbally; for just as one can say ‘he is adorned with a garment’ (insofar as ‘adorned’ signifies something in the category of having), so one can say ‘he is glowing with a garment’ (or by some other neutral verb that would signify the same as the denominative ‘is adorned’), – and so it is in the issue at hand, because ‘the tree is flowering’ does not formally signify that the tree is producing a flower. For if an active verb is posited, which would signify in this way, namely ‘to florificate’ (if it were in use), this proposition would be false ‘the tree is florificating with flowers’; but this proposition

is true ‘the tree is flowering with flowers’, because by this neutral verb is signified that it denominates the subject as it were by way of having, because although having [sc. being clad] does not properly exist in inanimate things, yet they can be denominated by something next to them, which – insofar as it is in some way an ornament or covering for them – can be reduced to the category of having; and then, just as one would say ‘the tree is flowery with flowers’ and the ablative would be construed in idea of that by which the subject is denominated according to such a denomination, in this way too is the ‘with flowers’ construed with this verb ‘to flower’. The example, then, is to the opposite, when we are speaking of an active verb, and is nothing to the purpose – the way it is true – when we are speaking of a neutral verb.

## II. Scotus' own Response to the Second Question

23. To solve this question [n.1] (because things in the intellect are more manifest [sc. than those in the will]), one must first reply to the second question [n.6].

And first let us look at our own intellect:

For there memory generates actual knowledge, which has a double relation to memory; namely ‘of generated to generating’ and this relation belongs to the second mode of relatives and is mutual – and the other ‘of declaring to declared’, and this belongs to the third mode of relatives and is not mutual [d.30 n.31]. But just as generated knowledge declares formally the object that lies in the memory, so that which produces actual knowledge and gives it this power of declaring can be said ‘to declare by this knowledge’ as if by way of efficient cause; for if someone produces a mirror and images

appearing in it, although the mirror formally declares those appearing images, yet the ‘one producing the mirror’ declares them by efficient causality. And this is more evident if acts of the soul, which are not truly makings, were signified by neutral, non active verbs (but now they are signified by active verbs, because of the disposition they have to the object into which they pass as into their term, although they cause nothing in the object); for then, if they were neutral verbs, they would signify formally that the reality is in the subject from which they are imposed, and then active verbs of this sort could be imposed by the same forms, which would signify the production of them; and then ‘generated knowledge’ would be formally declarative of the object, but ‘the one producing’ would be said to be efficient cause of the form (just as was said elsewhere that likeness can be in that on which the relation of active and passive is founded, so that ‘making like’ is a giving of likeness [I d.19 n.28]), and then ‘declaring’ – taken actively – would be efficient cause of the formal declaration in the act of the soul or in the subject of that act.

#### 24. To the issue at hand:

The divine Word is expressed by the Father, and this expression is a relation of origin; but to this expressed word is communicated by force of its production infinite knowledge, which – from this fact – is declarative of everything declarable. It has therefore a real relation to what expresses it, from which it is born, but the other relation – namely of the declarer – it has not only to itself but, because it is infinite, it has this respect of ‘declarative’ to itself and to it and to everything else; and this is only a relation of reason, because it is not only to creatures but also to itself; and if there is no real relation to creatures (from distinction 30 nn.49-51]), much more then is there not a real

relation of the same thing to itself.<sup>a</sup> But this ‘to declare’ belongs formally to the Word, but it belongs by way of principal to the producer (just as in us it belonged to the memory as efficient cause), – and then the Word formally declares everything declarable; but the Father declares by the Word not formally but by way of principal, insofar as he communicates to him infinite actual knowledge, by which the Word actually declares.

a. [*Interpolation*, from Appendix A] The word declares the object, ‘saying’ it clarifies the object by the word, by which is indicated that the word has the idea of the sub-authentic principle with respect to that which agrees with itself formally and with another by way of being principle; just as the Father creates by the Word by which the Word is indicated to have sub-authority with respect to action, because the action belongs to each as agent.

25. Applying this reality then to this verb which is ‘to say’, I say that ‘to say’<sup>a</sup> can signify the relation of origin which is ‘of generating to generated’ and in this way only the Father says, – not indeed by the Word but he says the Word; and in this way Richard [of St. Victor] says *On the Trinity* VI ch.12 that “only the Father says,” and as Augustine said “the Word, by which he has disposed all things.” In another way, ‘to say’ can signify the disposition of reason which is ‘to declare’, and this insofar as ‘to declare’ belongs to something formally, – and in this way the Word says all declarable things and by himself formally; and about this Augustine speaks *ibid.*, VII ch.3 n.4: “For if this word is our temporal word etc.”<sup>b</sup> In the third way it can signify the same disposition of the declarer, insofar as it belongs to it not formally but by way of principal, and in this way it is said of the Father that ‘he says by the Word’, – and in this third way Augustine says *ibid.* that ‘the Father says by the Word’; in this way too he says *ibid.* XV ch.14 n.23 that “the

Father saying himself generated the Son equal to himself,” where the takes ‘to say’ for ‘to declare by way of principle’, although he does not add there the principle by which the Father says.<sup>c d</sup>

- a. [Interpolation, from Appendix A] in one way it is taken essentially, as is plain from Anselm *Monologion* ch.63 (and Augustine does not speak thus, *On the Trinity* VII ch.1 n.1); because according to Anselm the Father and the Son and the Holy Spirit are one sayer, and any person says formally and with no other person in the ablative. In another way it is taken personally, and thus.
- b. [Interpolation, from Appendix A] And thus it is an essential and is appropriated to one person; for any person declares his own intelligibles that are in him, – yet it is appropriated to the Son, as is plain from the following doubt.
- c. [Interpolation] and thus the principal signified thing is an essential feature of it, but it connotes a notional feature, as was said above about gift [*Reportatio IA* d.32 n.35] – With what disposition is it construed? I say that if it were the same as ‘to create’ it would denote that it has the idea of authentic formal principle, and it is construed with the disposition of such principle.
- d. [Note by Duns Scotus] To say is purely an essential (*Monologion* 64 [nn.6, 30]). Purely a personal (‘to verbalize’): thus does the Father say the Son, not ‘by the Word’ unless it is dative (‘for the Word’) and by taking ‘to say’ as ‘to communicate by expressing’. In the third way, to declare formally: thus it is an essential (as in the first way), and thus does any of them here say by his own actual knowledge, as in the first way any of them says by his own intelligence; but in the third way it is appropriated to the Word, and first of the Father. In the fourth way, to declare by way of principle; which connotes a personal by the ‘by way of principle’, and it signifies an essential by ‘to declare’.

26. But then there is a doubt, whether to declare formally everything declarable is proper to the Word.

27. Some say that it is, because this belongs to him by force of his production.

28. But this was discussed above, in distinction 27 question 1 nn.100-101; and generally, since this verb ‘to declare’ states a relation of reason, and no such relation is proper to any person nor is included in what is proper to any person, it will not be the ‘to declare’ that is proper to the Word, but it is only appropriated to him by the fact that the Word, by force of his production, has actual knowledge communicated to him; but the Father, although he has it, yet, by the force by which he produces, he is memory, and he does not produce insofar as he is actual knowledge; but to actual knowledge – whereby it is actual – it belongs to declare, and therefore ‘to declare’ more belongs with a property of the Son than with a property of the other persons, and so it is more appropriated to him. But it truly is in every other person, because any person has actual declaration insofar as it is actual knowledge, and has it as equally declarative really as the actual knowledge is which is ‘word’. Therefore the Father formally declares everything by himself, just as the Son and the Holy Spirit formally declare everything each by himself. Therefore the Father and Son declare by the Holy Spirit by way of principle, although these ways of taking ‘to declare’ – formally and by way of principle – are not as much in use as those by which the Word is said to declare formally and the Father to do so by the Son by way of principle; and the reason for the greater use of these words is the appropriation of actual knowledge to the Word.

29. To the second question, then, I concede the negative part of the question, because of the reason of Augustine ibid. [n.2].<sup>a</sup>

a. [Interpolation] The declaration of this is as follows: an essential act cannot belong to any supposit by mediation of any principle as a ‘by which’, unless it is to such person the formal principle of existence (as the Father is wise by ungenerated wisdom), or the originating principle for it of existence (in which way the Master concedes [I d.32 ch.2 n.287] that the Son is wise by ungenerated wisdom, from which he has the fact that he is wise), or the sub-authentic principle with respect to such act (in which way it is conceded that the Father creates by the Word); but the Son – or generated wisdom – is not for the Father the formal principle of existence, nor the originating principle, nor the sub-authentic active principle, with respect to his essential act, – because he does not produce that act in himself (but it is communicated to him and to [from?] the Son), and the sub-authentic active principle has the idea of producer with respect to the act with respect to which it is called such a principle. But to be wise is an essential act, therefore the Father is not wise with generated wisdom. – But this he [sc. Scotus] said at first [*Reportatio IA d.32 n.27*], and then, so that the solution of the question may be better seen, one must first see it as it is contained above [nn.23.25] etc.

### III. To the Principal Argument of the Second Question

30. To the argument for the opposite [n.6] I say that Anselm takes ‘to say’ there purely essentially for ‘actually to understand’, as he expressly intends in that chapter, where he says that they are ‘one sayer as they are one understander, and although each says and says each, yet they are one in idea of saying and of said just as they one understanding and one intellect’. This way extends considerably what it is ‘to say’, because it neither signifies the relation of origin nor connotes it, just as neither do ‘to understand’ and ‘to be wise’; and Augustine does not in this way say that the Father says by the Word [nn.6, 25].

31. But how is it conceded that the Holy Spirit says the Word? – I reply: in the same way as he understands the Word [sc. purely essentially]. But it is not conceded for ‘to express’; nor for ‘to declare’, unless it is taken formally, because the Holy Spirit declares formally everything declarable; but not for ‘to declare by way of principle’, save perhaps in respect of creatures, because when we speak of the manifestation of creatures, the whole Trinity effects that. And because the Holy Spirit does not have any idea of principle absolutely over the formal manifestation of the Word – not when comparing it to creatures – (because he does not give to the Word that by which he is formally manifestive), therefore this seems in no way to be conceded. Nor does Anselm say that ‘the Holy Spirit says by the Word’, although he sees everything in the Word; so too any of the blessed sees everything in the Word, and any person sees in any person (according to Augustine *ibid.* XV ch.14 n.23), but ‘to say by the Word’ seems to involve some authority of ‘saying by the Word’ with respect to the Word insofar as the Word is declarative formally.

#### IV. Scotus' own Response to the First Question

32. As to the first question, about the Holy Spirit [n.1], one must proceed in the same way as was done in the preceding question [nn.23-25].

And first about our will:

Here I say that will in us, as it is produced, has a relation of the second mode to the will as producer, and the relation is perhaps mutual. It also has another relation, to the object, pertaining to the third mode of relatives, – and it is not mutual, because just as

science is referred to the knowable and conversely [d.30 n.38], so love is referred to the lovable and not conversely; and just as love has formally some disposition to the object, so that which produces love can be denominated from that disposition, if a word were imposed signifying it actively.

33. So I say in divine reality that the Holy Spirit, by the force of his production – not indeed properly but by appropriation – is love of everything necessarily loved, and therefore he has some relation of reason formally to what is thus loved; but the producer of him can be denominated from the same disposition, as if by way of principle, and this disposition, as denominating by way of principle, is introduced by this word ‘to love’, when the Father and the Son are said ‘to love themselves by the Holy Spirit’; this indeed is for ‘the Father and the Son to produce the Love’ which is of the Father and the Son, just as for ‘the Father to say himself by the Word’ is to produce the Word, which is what declares the Father himself.

#### V. To the Principal Arguments of the First Question

34. To the first argument [n.1] I say that it is held neither purely essentially nor purely notionally, but it connotes the notion (namely the production of the Holy Spirit), and it signifies the disposition that follows the Holy Spirit to that loved thing (not indeed formally but by way of being principle); and by reason of this following disposition it is an ‘essential’ as to the term of the disposition, because the term is not only the Holy Spirit but everything necessarily lovable, – and to this extent there is conversion, but not as to the connoted notional feature (the answer to the second argument [n.2] is plain from

this). And this can be made clear in the example of ‘to say’, that, in the way in which it is conceded that the Father says by the Word, ‘to say’ is neither merely essential nor merely notional, but connotes the notional (namely generation), and it introduces the disposition of what is declarative, which disposition is to everything declarable; something similar to this (although not so perfectly) can be found in what it is ‘to be sent’, which connotes process in divine reality, although it signifies principally a temporal effect; and as to what it signifies, the whole Trinity works the effect, – as to the notion, it does not respect the whole Trinity in the idea of principle (for the Son can be sent, though he is not from the Holy Spirit).

35. To the third [n.5]. Although some force can be given to this proposition [sc. the Father and Son love themselves by the Holy Spirit], because the ‘themselves’ can be understood reflexively or reciprocally (discussion of this double construal is found in Peter Elias *On Priscian on Construal* – and it is plain in the sophism ‘they are fighting so that they may themselves conquer’ [sc. either: conquer over themselves, or: be themselves conquerors]), and according to some the proposition would seem more needing to be conceded to the extent the ‘themselves’ is construed reflexively than reciprocally, because the Holy Spirit according to them is inspirited by the Father and the Son by concordant will (insofar namely as the Father bestows love on the Son and the Son bestows it back, according to Richard *On the Trinity* [I d.12 n.10]), yet when speaking in accordance with what was said in distinction 12 n.36 on this matter, that the Father and Son inspirit formally by will insofar as it is one (but the relation of concord of Father with Son and conversely is not the formal reason for inspiriting, because it does not seem that the Father and Son, insofar as they have a respect of origin to the Holy

Spirit, have a mutual relation to each other; for then they would not have only a mutual relation of origin of paternity and filiation; and this, I repeat, when saying that although by having one will they agree in it formally yet the concord is not *per se* the reason but the one will is – and that the fecundity is complete in one just as it is in two; therefore, however, two in spirit, because the fecundity is pre-understood to be one in the two before they have the term), it can be conceded that the truth is the same when taking the ‘themselves’ in this way or in that way; and then I concede the consequent [n.3], that ‘the Father loves himself by the Holy Spirit’. And when you say ‘he loves himself in the first moment of origin’ [n.3], it is true, – but then he loves himself by the will as it is in him formally; but by inspiriting the Holy Spirit, who is necessarily love of him, he loves himself by the Holy Spirit as it were by way of being principle – in which way too the Son loves himself by the Holy Spirit.

36. To the final argument [n.4] I say that one should not concede that the Father and Son love the creature by the Holy Spirit in the way they love themselves by the Holy Spirit, because this way of loving – as taken by way of being principle – seems to belong first to that term of love to which love itself belongs formally, from the fact that it is from a principle; for thus to love the object is to be principle of love, which – as from a principle – is formally of that object; but the Holy Spirit, by the force of his being from a principle, is neither first nor concomitantly love of the creature, because the creature is only contingently loved by God. But although from the force of his production he is first love of essence, yet concomitantly he can be called love of the Son, because those persons are ‘in nature first loved’ from necessity of the nature; and therefore it can be conceded that the Father does not love the creature by the Holy Spirit in the way that he

loves the Son by the Holy Spirit, because he does not produce a love which by the force of its production is love of the creature, nay with a complete necessary production of the love there is still contingency in the love as it is of the creature – and this is in the power not only of producing this love but of the love produced, because the Holy Spirit as contingently loves the creature as the Father and Son do.<sup>a</sup>

a. [Note by Duns Scotus] The will in love formally takes or values the object; but if it were not informed with love but only inspirited it (as now, insofar as it inspirits it), it accepts or values it by way of being principle, that is, it renders the object accepted or valued by its love, as that which from it is what formally accepts. Thus can it be expounded of the formal effect, that is of the product, which has from the production that it is the formal ‘by which’ with respect to another.

But to whom is it accepted? – Response: just as to whom it is declared, because ‘to everyone who sees the word’; so here, to everyone loving love.

But does it then hold that every will loving the essence as it is the object of love (which is the Holy Spirit) loves it by the Holy Spirit, – and seeing the essence in the Word as it is the object of knowledge in the Word knows it by the Word? But if so, not for this reason does it say the Word, and consequently neither does it love by the Holy Spirit – as it corresponds by way of being principle in this case in that case, because it is not the principle of the Word or the Holy Spirit.

## Thirty Third and Thirty Fourth Distinctions

### Questions One to Three

*Whether the Property is the Same as the Person, whether it is the Same as the Essence,  
and whether the Person is the Same as the Essence*

1. About the thirty third distinction, without arguments, I ask first whether the property is the same as the person; second, about the same thirty third distinction, I ask – without arguments – whether the property is the same as the essence;<sup>a</sup> and about the thirty fourth distinction, without arguments, I ask whether the person is the same as the essence.

a. [*Interpolation*, from Appendix A] That the answer is no: *On the Trinity* V ch.5; one and many; in the essence; things the same as one thing, infinite; paternity, perfection simply; really; “he is wise not by that by which he is Word;” per se or per accidens.

On the contrary: there is something or nothing (something created?); again, in the person with the essence; again, four things (on the contrary: Extra: “We condemn”).

Simplicity entails identity (*City of God* XI ch.10). Many contradictions imply some difference (*Topics* 7.1.152b34-35: “If one can be without the other it will not be the same”).

Aquinas *ST* I q.28 a.2: “Relation is the same as the essence in reality,” because it is not an accident but has the same being as the divine essence, – “and does not differ save by a reason of intelligence, insofar as in relation is involved a respect to the opposite that is not included in the name of essence.” To the second: “In a creature, besides what is contained under the signification of the relative name, there is found another thing; in God not so, but one and the same, which is not perfectly expressed by the name of relation, as if comprehended under the signification of such a name.” To the third: “Just as in the perfection of the divine essence more is contained than what is signified by the name of wisdom,” nay “than what can be comprehended under the signification of any name.”

On the contrary: what is not by the sole idea by which it belongs, and is distinguished; they are distinguished by what they add above the common element. – I respond in another way: *a*, *b*, *c*, where there is a greater distinction than among the attributes (‘he is not Father by that by which he is God’, as ‘good’, Augustine, *ibid.*, VII ch.4 n.9).

Henry [of Ghent] *Summa* 56.4: “Reality of relation, as it regards the essence, it is different only in reason from that, and therefore the essence is not simpler than the person. Insofar, however, as relation is compared to opposite relation it posits a diversity of reality of the relation, not of reality of the substance; and thus they are in person and person, that is as something related to the opposite, both – essence and relation – as two things; essence as absolute thing, by which it is not distinguished, – relation as a thing of respect, by which it is distinguished. And thus although essence and relation, as they are compared among themselves, do not differ save in reason alone, yet as compared to opposites they differ in reality, but not simply but with the determination ‘by reality of substance and by reality of relation’, without any composition, because the difference of certain things in something does not make a composition unless it be of things compared among themselves in constituting one thing, in the way matter and form differ in constituting a natural composite.”

On the contrary. Relation as it regards the essence or is compared to the opposite; and thus it differs in reality in both ways or not; then the relation is not compared. Again, relation as it constitutes regards the essence as what it is in; and because it is real, and thus it regards the foundation, for you; and because a third is not constituted unless as one thing in another; and as it constitutes it regards the opposite of the preceding term, because a person is formally relative, – therefore it is distinguished really and regards the essence under the same idea as that by which it constitutes; therefore composition!

Solution. Some distinction, not merely made by the intellect (*a, b, c*). How? Is it real? Henry concedes it. And Bonaventure [*I Sent.* d.33 a. un. q.2]: “By reason of comparison to the opposite it remains; and it differs from the essence, not because it states another essence but another way of having it; in comparison with the opposite it states the thing,” to the second: “The property distinguishes in that it differs not in essence but in mode; which mode makes no composition, because it passes over into the substance, – nor does it only state an understanding, because it is a thing and remains with respect to the object.”

It is shown in another way: virtual distinction and non-formal identity (for this Augustine *ibid.* VII ch.4 n.9), and a double predication; example: the identity non-adequate, not precise; ‘this

is that' (it is from the nature of the thing; not in potency, save only in virtue; not confusedly, but under its proper idea). Further, the distinction adds non-identity; and it is stated both virtually and non-formally.

2. There is no need to dwell on these questions, because their solution is plain from what has been said elsewhere, in distinction 2 nn.388-410, the question 'whether along with unity of essence there may stand a plurality of persons', – where it was shown how the personal property is not the same formally as the essence; also in distinction 26 nn.9-12, against Praepositinus it was shown how the property is not the same formally as the person; that too which was said about the formal non-identity of the property with the essence entails that the person is not the same first formally as the essence. And what others distinguish about them, that they differ only in reason, was rejected in distinction 2 nn.389-395, and distinction 8 nn.177-190 (in a similar case, about the attributes), and in distinction 13 nn.31-42, 64-67 (about the distinction of the emanations in divine reality), and elsewhere.

3. And yet along with the fact that this is not formally that, there stands the fact that it is truly and simply the same as it; nay this is necessary because of the perfect divine simplicity, which follows from the perfect infinity of that essence, – because of which simplicity and infinity that essence cannot exist along with anything in the same reality in the same thing unless that reality is perfectly the same as itself. And this statement is confirmed by the common statement of the ancients, who conceded that many predication were true in divine reality by identity, non-formal identities; which does not seem intelligible unless by the fact that the predicate was truly the same as the subject, and from the fact that an affirmative proposition was true by identity and yet the

predicate was not formally the same as the subject – and for this reason the predication there was not formal. And what the distinction is between identity simply and formal identity was touched on in distinction 8 (in the question ‘on the attributes’ nn.191-122) and frequently elsewhere [d.5 nn.17-24, 32-34, 43-45, 115-118, 137-138; d.2 nn.402-403, 407-408, 410], – so now I pass it over.

## Thirty Third and Thirty Fourth Distinctions

### Questions One to Three

*Whether the Property is the Same as the Person, whether it is the Same as the Essence,  
and whether the Person is the Same as the Essence*

1. About the thirty third distinction, without arguments, I ask first whether the property is the same as the person; second, about the same thirty third distinction, I ask – without arguments – whether the property is the same as the essence;a and about the thirty fourth distinction, without arguments, I ask whether the person is the same as the essence.

a. [*Interpolation*, from Appendix A] That the answer is no: *On the Trinity* V ch.5; one and many; in the essence; things the same as one thing, infinite; paternity, perfection simply; really; “he is wise not by that by which he is Word;” per se or per accidens.

On the contrary: there is something or nothing (something created?); again, in the person with the essence; again, four things (on the contrary: Extra: “We condemn”).

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On the contrary: what is not by the sole idea by which it belongs, and is distinguished; they are distinguished by what they add above the common element. – I respond in another way: *a, b, c*, where there is a greater distinction than among the attributes (‘he is not Father by that by which he is God’, as ‘good’, Augustine, *ibid.*, VII ch.4 n.9).

Henry [of Ghent] *Summa 56.4*: “Reality of relation, as it regards the essence, it is different only in reason from that, and therefore the essence is not simpler than the person. Insofar, however, as relation is compared to opposite relation it posits a diversity of reality of the relation, not of reality of the substance; and thus they are in person and person, that is as something related to the opposite, both – essence and relation – as two things; essence as absolute thing, by which it is not distinguished, – relation as a thing of respect, by which it is distinguished. And thus although essence and relation, as they are compared among themselves, do not differ save in reason alone, yet as compared to opposites they differ in reality, but not simply but with the determination ‘by reality of substance and by reality of relation’, without any composition, because the difference of certain things in something does not make a composition unless it be of

things compared among themselves in constituting one thing, in the way matter and form differ in constituting a natural composite.”

On the contrary. Relation as it regards the essence or is compared to the opposite; and thus it differs in reality in both ways or not; then the relation is not compared. Again, relation as it constitutes regards the essence as what it is in; and because it is real, and thus it regards the foundation, for you; and because a third is not constituted unless as one thing in another; and as it constitutes it regards the opposite of the preceding term, because a person is formally relative, – therefore it is distinguished really and regards the essence under the same idea as that by which it constitutes; therefore composition!

Solution. Some distinction, not merely made by the intellect (*a, b, c*). How? Is it real? Henry concedes it. And Bonaventure [*I Sent.* d.33 a. un. q.2]: “By reason of comparison to the opposite it remains; and it differs from the essence, not because it states another essence but another way of having it; in comparison with the opposite it states the thing;” to the second: “The property distinguishes in that it differs not in essence but in mode; which mode makes no composition, because it passes over into the substance, – nor does it only state an understanding, because it is a thing and remains with respect to the object.”

It is shown in another way: virtual distinction and non-formal identity (for this Augustine *ibid.* VII ch.4 n.9), and a double predication; example: the identity non-adequate, not precise; ‘this is that’ (it is from the nature of the thing; not in potency, save only in virtue; not confusedly, but under its proper idea). Further, the distinction adds non-identity; and it is stated both virtually and non-formally.

2. There is no need to dwell on these questions, because their solution is plain from what has been said elsewhere, in distinction 2 nn.388-410, the question ‘whether along with unity of essence there may stand a plurality of persons’, – where it was shown how the personal property is not the same formally as the essence; also in distinction 26 nn.9-12, against Praepositinus it was shown how the property is not the same formally as

the person; that too which was said about the formal non-identity of the property with the essence entails that the person is not the same first formally as the essence. And what others distinguish about them, that they differ only in reason, was rejected in distinction 2 nn.389-395, and distinction 8 nn.177-190 (in a similar case, about the attributes), and in distinction 13 nn.31-42, 64-67 (about the distinction of the emanations in divine reality), and elsewhere.

3. And yet along with the fact that this is not formally that, there stands the fact that it is truly and simply the same as it; nay this is necessary because of the perfect divine simplicity, which follows from the perfect infinity of that essence, – because of which simplicity and infinity that essence cannot exist along with anything in the same reality in the same thing unless that reality is perfectly the same as itself. And this statement is confirmed by the common statement of the ancients, who conceded that many predication were true in divine reality by identity, non-formal identities; which does not seem intelligible unless by the fact that the predicate was truly the same as the subject, and from the fact that an affirmative proposition was true by identity and yet the predicate was not formally the same as the subject – and for this reason the predication there was not formal. And what the distinction is between identity simply and formal identity was touched on in distinction 8 (in the question ‘on the attributes’ nn.191-122) and frequently elsewhere [d.5 nn.17-24, 32-34, 43-45, 115-118, 137-138; d.2 nn.402-403, 407-408, 410], – so now I pass it over.

## Thirty Fifth Distinction

### Single Question

*Whether in God there are Eternal Relations to all Knowables as Quidditatively Known*

1. About the thirty fifth distinction I ask first whether in God there are eternal relations to all knowables as quidditatively known.

That there are:

Augustine *83 Questions* q.46 n.2: “Ideas are eternal and immutable forms in the divine mind;” not absolute forms, so respective ones, – and only to things other than himself as quidditatively known; which is why they are distinguished according to the distinction of these other things.

2. Again, Avicenna *Metaphysics* VIII ch.7 (100vb-101rb) concedes that in God there is a relation of God, as intellect, to the understood forms.

3. Again, God knows distinctly things other than himself, therefore through some distinct principles of knowing; and these cannot be absolute, therefore relative.

4. Again, according to Augustine *On Genesis* V ch.14 n.31: “All things in God are life;” and thus does he seem to say *On John* tr.1 nn.16-17: “All things in him were life,” and this, “eternal life, not created but creative.” This is not true when speaking of these objects formally in themselves, – therefore of the very formal reasons by which they are known.

5. On the contrary:

Then those relations would be real, which is contrary to what was said in distinction 30 nn.49-51. Proof of the consequence [n.1], because God understands things other than himself before he understands that he understands them, because the reflex act presupposes the direct act; therefore the relations that would be in God to other things would be in God from the nature of the thing and not by act of the intellect considering that intellection; but what is there from the nature of the thing, and not in the object as it is known, is real.

6. Further, a reason by which eternal relations to all known things would exist in God would be as equal reason for eternal relations to all willed things as willed, and then those relations would be real, because he wills things other than himself before he understands that he wills them, – and thus the relation of his will to other things will be real, because not in the object as it is known.

#### I. To the Question

7. On the supposition that God is a thing that understands (from distinction 2 nn.75-78), and that his own essence is the first object in his reason (from the question ‘About the subject of theology’ [*Prol.* nn.152, 200-201]), and that his intellect is of all intelligibles, not quasi in potency but in act and all at once (from distinction 2 nn.98-101), and this distinctly (because to understand confusedly is a mark of imperfection in a thing that understands, *ibid.* nn.105-110), – one must note about this question that for the intellection of something three things seem to come together, namely the knowable object, the intellect itself, and the reason of knowing.

8. But in the intellect as it is a power there is no need to posit a distinction that it understand distinctly, because our intellect – altogether indistinct according to idea of power – can understand many things. Therefore if there is a distinction [sc. in God's intellect for understanding many things], let it be looked for in the object, or in the reason of knowing the object, or in the intellection itself.

#### A. Opinions of Others

##### 1. First Opinion

9. The position then is that the relations to things other than himself are eternal in God, known by simple intelligence, and that the relations are in the essence as it is the reason of knowing, because of the fact that nothing is a reason of knowing several things save as that reason is appropriated in some way to those several known objects.

10. There is also a confirmation, that knowledge happens by likeness; therefore the reason of knowing should have some proper reason of likeness to the thing known.

11. So because of this determination and this assimilation of the reason of knowing to the object, eternal relations are posited as reasons determining the essence as it is a reason of understanding, and by these the essence is distinctly like the known objects.

##### 2. Second Opinion

12. Another position is that these relations are in the divine essence as it is the altogether first know object; the divine essence indeed is understood ‘by an intellection altogether first’ as completely without distinction, but so that creatures may be understood the intellect first compares the essence – known first – to creatures under the idea of its being imitable, and then, by understanding the essence as imitable, it understands creatures through that first object, thus considered under such a relation of reason.

13. And this opinion differs from the first [n.9] as the two ways of speaking differ, one of which would posit ‘the same species’ to be the reason of knowing both the principle and the conclusion, only however as under distinct relations of reason corresponding to those known things under their proper ideas – but the other would say that ‘the known principle itself’ is the reason of knowing the conclusion, and this not as a principle absolutely understood, but in comparison or relation to the conclusion.<sup>a</sup>

a. [*Interpolation*, from Appendix A] A third opinion posits almost the same, and it posits ideas or ideal reasons in the act of understanding. And they [proponents of this opinion] have the following reasoning.

Our understanding, according to the Philosopher *Metaphysics* 5.6.1016b18-21, has a respect to the intelligible as measured to measure; therefore if it were infinite as the divine intellect is, it would have a respect to infinite intelligibles, and so there would in our intellect be infinite respects to infinite intelligibles; but because it is finite, it has respect to one intelligible; therefore since the divine understanding is infinite, there will in its ability for understanding be infinite relations to infinite intelligibles.

## B. Rejection of the Opinions

### 1. Against the Common Conclusion

14. Against these opinions, – and first against the conclusion in which the opinions agree, namely that these relations of reason must necessarily be posited in God so that creatures be understood distinctly, according to reason, by God, in idea of objects.

The first argument is as follows: these [ideal] reasons are knowable by the divine intellect. I ask, by what reason of knowing? If by other reasons, determining the essence as it is the reason of knowing [n.9] or determining the essence as it is the first object with respect to secondary objects [n.12], there will be a process *ad infinitum*, because other reasons will again precede for understanding those reasons, and thus those other reasons are never intelligible by God because he will have to understand other infinite reasons an infinite number of times before those reasons. Therefore a stand must be made that those reasons can be understood by God through his essence as it is taken bare, either as it is understood through reason [n.9] or as they are understood through the essence as through the first known object absolutely [n.12]; and the reason by which they will be able to be known by the essence whereby it is essence bare will be as equally reason whereby those other secondary objects will be able to be known, because those reasons thus seem to have the natures of distinct objects just as also do the other things.

15. But if you say that these reasons of knowing are known by the divine intellect through the objects themselves toward which they are, so that the essence under those reasons is the reason for knowing other objects, and they – known together with the essence under diverse reasons – are the reason of knowing those reasons, as the extremes of a relation seem to be the reason of knowing the relation. – This seems to cheapen the

divine intellect, because then it will be passive with respect to the other objects known through those reasons by which it will be actuated for knowledge of those reasons.

16. Further, second: any object of which there is ‘some reason of knowing determinately’ that can be a thing limited to it, can have ‘some reason of knowing determinately’ that is a thing unlimited to that and to that; but if the essence were limited with respect to some one determinate knowable, it would be the reason of knowing that object determinately without any respect real or of reason; therefore if it is posited as an unlimited reason with respect to several knowables it can be of itself the reason of knowing any and all of them, without any relation real or of reason.

17. Proof of the major: unlimitedness does not take perfection away from anything, but, with the perfection that was to something remaining in place, it posits as it were a similar perfection to it; and therefore, as was said in distinction 7 nn.20-21 and distinction 28 nn.106-107, a thing indeterminate out of unlimitedness (namely which is indeterminate to several positive things) is of itself determinate to each of them, with determination being repugnant to indetermination to contradictories.

18. Proof of the minor: the essence is posited as the proper reason for knowing itself, and this whether as first object or as reason of knowing the object. And this belongs to the essence purely under an absolute reason, without any real respect, because a real respect does not exist in the same person to itself. Also without any respect of reason, proof: because the intellection is not collative or comparative or negotiative; therefore no relation of reason is caused by it in anything.

19. Further, third: to one operation should be given a principle ‘by which’ that is per se one and an object that is per se one, and this especially in the simply first operation,

of which sort is the divine intellection; but a relation of reason and a real being make nothing ‘per se one’, because they cannot even have the unity of the second mode of per se (*Metaphysics* 5.6.1015b36-16b3), which is less than essential unity is (for a relation of reason cannot follow a thing from the nature of the thing, and therefore it cannot be a property of it); therefore the essence – whether as object or as reason of understanding – and the relation of reason are not ‘one per se’ object, nor one reason of understanding. Therefore one must grant a second thing precisely in reason of first object or as reason ‘by which’. Not precisely the relation of reason, because this is not the first object known by which, when known, something else is known to which the respect is; nor even is it the reason by which the divine intellect may have intellection of this sort of object, because to understand a stone is a perfection simply, so that the divine intellect would not be altogether a perfect intellect if it did not understand a stone; but no relation of reason seems to be a reason of inherence of any perfection simply. Therefore one must grant precisely the essence – which is under this relation – to be as it were the first object, which, when known, a stone would be known, or to be as it were the formal reason of understanding a stone.

20. And from this further: in vain is such a relation determining the divine essence itself posited; for under a respect of reason it is an infinite form, because the intellect, however it compares the essence and thereby causes in it a relation of reason, does not compare it save as it is formally infinite, and so as it is under such reason it is formally infinite – and consequently it is, as it is under that reason, as indeterminate as it is in itself; and it can, as it is under the first reason, found another (because of its infinity) just as it can in itself; therefore it is not determined by a relation of reason.

## 2. Against the First Opinion

21. Again, against the first opinion [n.9] specifically, it seems to follow that the relations are real, because the reason of understanding as it is reason naturally precedes intellection, – and consequently as to nothing of it as it is the reason of understanding is it caused by intellection, nor does it follow intellection; if then the reason of understanding a stone is under a relation of reason, that relation of reason is not produced in the essence by intellection of a stone, because it naturally precedes the intellection. Therefore the relation is produced by some other intellection. But only that which is essence as essence precedes it; but by this it is not produced (which they concede – where it seems less to be so – ‘about the divine persons and about the principles of producing them’); therefore the relation will be in the essence as it is reason, and not by some action of the intellect.

22. Further, according to some of them [sc. of those who hold the two opinions, nn.9, 12], a distinction of reason in the principles suffices for a real distinction in what is from the principles; therefore this distinction of reason as it is the reason of understanding *a* and *b* will suffice for a real distinction between *a* and *b* (and conversely), so that one reason will suffice for the distinction of *a* and another for the distinction of *b*.

23. Further, an external thing is immediately understood [sc. according to the first opinion], because the whole distinction that is posited precedes intellection; nothing internal then as it is a secondary object is term of intellection.

## 3. Against the Second Opinion

24. Against the second opinion [n.12]:

Every relation of reason, which is in the object from the fact that it is compared by the intellect to something, is in the object precisely as a diminished entity, have being in the intellect as a known in a knower; and it could be in the object if *per impossibile* it did not have the being of existence, provided however it have being in a like way in the comparing intellect. Therefore those relations would be or will be in the divine essence precisely as it has diminished being in the intellect, as it compares it to the creature, and not as the essence is something in itself; and further, they would be in the essence if *per impossibile* the essence did not exist, provided however it be compared to those terms by some thinking intellect; and further, if *per impossibile* there were two Gods, the relations would be in the intellect of this God comparing that God to the creature, and not in that God in himself.

25. In addition, God is naturally imitable by the creature before he is understood to be imitable; for because he is imitable, therefore he is truly compared as imitable by creatures, as it seems, and not conversely; therefore, before the comparison of the essence as imitable is made by the intellect, there is imitability in the essence. But according to some of those who follow this way [n.12], aptitudinal relation is the same as actual (because of which identity in God they say that there is no new relation, nor another old one, of the creative and the creating [n.11]); therefore these relations in the essence as in the compared object will not be first outwardly directed, but there will be other and prior relations, as it seems, because they will be before any act of the comparing intellect.

26. Besides, although the essence ‘as known’ is the reason of coming to the knowledge of a stone, yet it seems afterwards that the divine intellect could know a stone in itself and not precisely by the fact that it compares its essence to a stone, because thus can we, without such comparison of something else to it, understand a stone. In the case of this understanding of a stone, I ask what the relation of reason to a stone is in? Not in the essence as in the object compared, because in this object as such ‘to understand’ does not exist as compared object; therefore one has to look for the relation of reason in intellection [sc. the third opinion] or in the reason of understanding [sc. the first opinion], and then return will be made to one of the other opinions [sc. the first or third].

### C. Scotus' own Response

27. One can say to the question [n.1] that relations of the third mode differ per se from the others of the other two modes, because in the third mode there is no mutuality as there is in the other two modes, – and from this follows (as was deduced in distinction 3 question 1 n.31) that the term of the relation is something absolute as absolute. As therefore the object of our intellect is the term of the relation of the intellect insofar as it is purely absolute, and thus the intellect is measured by it, so – it seems – since the divine intellect simply is measure of all understood things other than itself, it follows that the other things are referred precisely to divine intellection, and this will be the term of the relation under the idea of a pure absolute; this is confirmed by the fact that the altogether first divine intellection, which is beatific, is of the essence as it is essence, without any

respect real or of reason, and this because of the perfect real identity of the intellect with the essence as object.

28. One need not then, because of the intellection of any object precisely, look for a relation, either in both extremes or in one of them, – therefore one must, because of the fact that a relation exists in both or one of them, add something else; but that addition seems to be only either a mutual co-requirement, if the relation is mutual, – or a dependence in one of the extremes, if it is not mutual; but here, when God understands something other than himself, no mutual co-requirement can be posited in either extreme, as it seems, – therefore it is enough precisely to posit a relation in one of the extremes, where there is dependence; that is the object as known.

29. In addition, the will when loving or enjoying the end, does not produce something other than itself in willed being by loving the end in an order to something else or by comparing it to another lovable thing, but rather by comparing another thing to the end, so that the relation caused by the comparison of the will seems to exist in another thing ‘willed for the end’; but no comparison by the will seems to be in the willed end; therefore, by similarity, there does not seem to be in the intellect knowing the first object, and knowing, from that knowledge, a secondary object, a relation produced in that first object to the secondary object, but conversely.<sup>a</sup>

a. [*Interpolation*, from Appendix A] Besides, this first intellection is direct and has a real mode, the second is of reason; for if I understand man absolutely, this intellection is real and has a real mode; but if I understand humanity afterwards by comparing it to Socrates, this is a comparative intellection and is of reason. So if these dispositions are understood by non-reflex intellection, then they are real.

30. Besides, as was argued [nn.18-19], it does not seem one can lay down what the act of intellect is by which the relation would be produced; not by first act, because of the absolute perfection of that act; if by second act, then the relation is not the principle of that second act, and in that second act the creature is perfectly known; therefore in no act will such relation be as it were a reason prior to the creature in idea of object.

31. The conclusion of the three reasons given can be conceded against both common opinions reported above [nn.14, 16, 19], and the reasons now given here can be conceded [nn.27-30]; and in this respect one can concede that there are eternal relations in God to known things, but not naturally prior to those known things in idea of objects.

32. Things can be set down as follows: God in the first instant understands his essence under a purely absolute reason; in the second instant he produces a stone in intelligible being and understands a stone, so that there is there a relation in the understood stone to the divine intellection, but no relation yet in the divine intellection to the stone, but the divine intellection is the term of the relation to it ‘of stone as understood’; in the third instant, perhaps, the divine intellect can compare its own intellection to any intelligible which we can compare to, and then by comparing itself to the understood stone the divine intellect can cause in itself a relation of reason; and in the fourth instant there can be as it were reflection on the relation caused in the third instant, and then the relation of reason will be known. Thus no relation of reason therefore is necessary for understanding a stone – as if prior to the stone – as object, nay this relation ‘as caused’ is posterior (in the third instant), and it will still be posterior as known, because in the fourth instant.<sup>a</sup>

a. [Interpolation] According to this way [nn.31-32] it is plain of what the idea is; because it is of every secondary object (whether it be producible or co-producible), and one is singular and universal, and the others (universally) of an inferior and superior, – as you advance from the intellect [sc. the process described in n.32].

33. And this fourth way [nn.31-32] can hold the proposition – which seems probable – that ‘a relation is not naturally known save when the term is known’ (but neither does the intellect make comparison with anything, save when the term is naturally first known), which proposition cannot be held by the other way [the second, [n.12]], because it must say that by the relation by which it compares this intellection, it compares the essence to something not naturally first known.

34. This opinion ‘about the relations to the divine intellect as absolute of things other than God as these are understood’ is confirmed and understood in a similar way to the one above – in distinction 30 nn.31-39 – ‘about the relations to God of understood creatures’.

#### D. Instances against Scotus' own Solution

35. There is argument against this view [nn.31-32], and it does seem to destroy Augustine’s intention *83Questions* question 46 n.1, where he says that “there is so much force in the ideas that, unless they were understood, no one could be wise;” but according to the present position [n.32] the perfect wisdom of God to creatures will be in the second instant and it will naturally precede both the being of the ideas and the being known of

them. In the same place too Augustine says that “by the vision of the ideas the soul is made most blessed;” which would not be true about the first beatitude, which is in the Creator, – nor of the second beatitude, which is in creatures.

36. There is further this argument: things which are divided among inferiors that are of the same idea are not reduced to something one in the superior; just as, although the cognitive powers in us be reduced to one cognitive power in angels, because of the unity of idea of all the cognitive powers, – yet the intellect and will, which in us are of different ideas, are not reduced to one power in an angel. Therefore there will be in God an intellect under the idea of such power distinct from the will under the idea of such power, and the intellect ‘as it is in God’ will be passive; therefore one must give it some form before it is operative in act, and consequently, so that it may have a distinct operation, one will have to give it a distinct form; no distinct form can be given to it if the ideas are posited as following the understanding of creatures.

37. Further, if, because of the unlimitedness of the divine essence, it is posited to be ‘as altogether absolute’ the reason of knowing all creatures, since it is thus unlimited insofar as it is object just as it is insofar as it is reason, the consequence is that it alone will be known under the idea of object; or if a plurality on the part of the objects is posited (notwithstanding the infinity of the one object), by parity of reasoning it seems one can posit a plurality on the part of the reason of understanding.

38. To these instances [nn.35-37]:

The opinion of Augustine, in that question [n.35], can be collected from his description of the idea: “an idea is an eternal reason in the divine mind, according to which something is formable as it is according to its proper reason.”

39. Proof of the first part: God causes or can cause everything, – not irrationally, therefore rationally; therefore he has a reason according to which he forms things. But not the same form for everything, – therefore he forms individual things by their proper reasons; but not by reasons outside himself (because he does not in his effecting need anything other than himself), therefore by reasons in his mind. But there is nothing in his mind save what is immutable; therefore he can form every formable thing according to a reason proper to it, eternal in his mind; such is posited as an idea.

40. But according to this description it seems that ‘an understood stone’ can be called an idea; for an understood stone itself has all those conditions, because it is the proper reason of ‘something extrinsically makeable’ – just as ‘a box in the mind’ can be called the reason according to which ‘the box in matter’ is formed. And this ‘eternal reason’ is in the divine mind as a known in the knower, by act of the divine intellect; but whatever is in God, according to any existence (whether real or of reason) through act of the divine intellect, is eternal, as was made clear in distinction 30 nn.41-43, because no relation can be new in God by act of the divine intellect.

41. This also seems to agree with a saying of Plato’s (from whom Augustine takes the name of idea). For he himself posited the ideas to be the quiddities of things; per se existing indeed, and badly posited, according to Aristotle – in the divine mind, according to Augustine, and well posited; hence Augustine sometimes speaks of the intelligible world according to him. Just as, therefore, the ideas would be posited as the quiddities of things, according to the imposition of Aristotle, so they are, according to Plato, posited as they state quiddities with cognized being in the divine intellect.

42. On the basis of this position, one should not labor over any relations formally (whether in the essence as object, or in the essence as reason, or in the essence as divine understanding [nn.12, 9, 26]), as that to which relations are called ideas; rather the known object itself is the idea, according to this view.

43. And then the authorities adduced from Augustine can be conceded [n.35]:

That “save when the ideas are known, no one can be wise,” namely as to all fullness of wisdom. For although God principally is wise by the wisdom of his essence as object, yet he is not so in every way if he does not know the creature – which creature ‘as understood by him’ is an idea, and so when the ideas are not understood he cannot be completely wise; for he is posited as being wise most perfectly in the first instant, but not ‘altogether wise’ in the first instant without the second [n.32]. But if the ideas were posited as certain relations of reason in God, it does not seem that he is formally wise by intellection of them, because they would also be there as reasons of understanding before they were understood.

44. Likewise the other authority of Augustine, “by vision of these the soul becomes most blessed” [n.35]: if the ideas are posited to be quiddities as known, the authority must be interpreted about the beatitude that can be had in creatures as objects, because it is certain that there is only most perfect beatitude in the absolute essence (according to him in *Confessions* V ch.4 n.7: “blessed is he who knows you and them, but he is not more blessed because of them”). But ‘most blessed’ needs to be understood, that the soul is blessed by total possible beatitude; not indeed formally blessed in them, but in the object (knowledge of which is presupposed to ‘knowing’ them), and as it were concomitantly in them, in which there is some beatitude, though not first.

45. And if Augustine speaks otherwise elsewhere about the ideas, as if they were reasons of knowing something, since however he says only that they are reasons ‘according to which the things which are formed are formed’ [n.1], that saying of his (if it is said elsewhere) can – I say – be interpreted: ‘according to which’, not that the ‘according to’ indicates the formal reason of understanding, but ‘according to which’ as according to the objects; not first, not moving the intellect, but according to secondary objects, which are terms of the intellect.

46. To the second [n.36]:

How the intellect is passive in itself and how it is passive with respect to its own intellection was stated in distinction 3 nn.537-542. But when it is posited that the intellect is passive in us and quasi passive in God, and that a form or quasi form, as that by which the intellect operates, needs to be assigned here, – one can say that it is the essence under the reason by which it is essence, which is, under the absolute reason, the reason of knowing not only itself but everything else, under whatever reason it is knowable.

47. And understanding it in this way: for by the fact that the divine intellect is in act through its essence as the essence is the reason of understanding, it has a sufficient first act for producing everything else in known being, and, by producing it in known being, it produces it as having dependence on itself as intelligence [n.32] (and by this it is intellection of the fact that that other thing depends on this intellection as something absolute), as will be said in the case of other things, that the cause under a purely absolute reason is the first act from which the effect proceeds, and the produced effect has a relation to the cause – sometimes as to what is absolute, but sometimes there is a mutual

relation of effect to cause and cause to effect; however never on the part of the cause is there required a relation before the effect is posited in being.

48. This is now in brief made plausible by the fact that nothing which has a more perfect being in any genus depends on that which has a less perfect being (in anything of that sort); therefore the actual relation does not depend on anything that is only a potential being and not an actual one, – therefore every actual term of a relation is some being in act. In whatever instant of nature, then, that the cause is referred in act to the effect, it is then actual being in the term; but that ‘absolute’ can be the term without a respect to it [sc. without a relation of the absolute to the effect], – therefore it is thus simultaneous with the respect because it is naturally prior to it; therefore there cannot be any relation in the cause naturally before the ‘absolute’ exists to which this relation must exist.

49. And so [according to n.48] I understand that in the first instant there is *a* under the reason of the absolute; in the second there is *b* under the reason of the absolute, possessing being through *a*; in the third *b* is referred to ‘*a* under the idea of the absolute’, if the relation is not mutual – or *a* and *b* are [mutually] referred when the relations are mutual. Here, then, in the first instant the intellect is in act through the essence as purely absolute, as if in first act, sufficient for producing anything in intelligible being; in the second instant it produces a stone in understood being, so that it is the term and has a respect to the divine intellection; but there is no respect back the other way in the divine intellect, because the respect is not mutual.

50. What has been said, that the relation cannot be in the cause before it is in the caused [nn.48-49], has objections to it, about which elsewhere [II d.1 q.2 nn.1, 8].

51. According to this view [nn.48-49] one can say that infinite intellect itself alone, without any respect of it to anything else or conversely, is of all objects, – just as the absolute has being first through the absolute before a relation is understood from this side and from that; which is proved by the fact that in the moment of nature in which\* *a* is posited to be understood through the understood essence, the essence is posited to understand the being of *a*, and yet no relation – even of *a* itself – is then understood, because the absolute precedes relation; therefore this proposition is false ‘intellec[tion] is not distinctly of this object unless simultaneously in nature there is some relation of the intellec[tion] to this object, or conversely’ (yet it is true of ‘simultaneously in duration’, if this existed), nor must one posit a relation in the intellec[tion] or in the object.<sup>2</sup> The proof of this is that ‘intellec[tion] of itself’ is without all relation (as was concluded in the solution [n.18]), therefore no relation is required because ‘intellec[tion] is of this’; if a relation is required because of something else, then either relation either of co-requirement or of dependence. God’s understanding does not have a co-requirement for a stone (as is plain), nor dependence on it, nor conversely. Proof: the object is nothing; again, it does not have a real relation (as is plain), nor a relation of reason, because it is understood before it is compared to anything else; again, if it has a relation of reason (or being in a relation, as is possessed here [sc. above at \*]), it is understood under the absolute reason before it is understood under any reason of respect to understanding. Therefore just as, when an ass is posited, not for this reason does my intellec[tion] have any real being or being of reason (absolute or relative), but only in potency, – so, when

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<sup>2</sup> Text cancelled by Scotus: “at any rate simultaneous in nature with that which is ‘intellec[tion] of this’. What does this help, if the relation is simultaneous in duration – because there are the same difficulties (of what it is and to what) which there would also be if it was posited as being simultaneous in nature!”

this intellection is posited, not for this reason does the object have any being save in potency; nor is there any difference save that the intellection is said now to be actually of this object, but the object is not said now to be the object of my intellection. What is the reason for the difference? – Response.<sup>3</sup>

52. To the third, about unlimited object [n.37], I reply: the object insofar as it moves and insofar as it is first term (and this doubly, necessarily required or co-required for act) is equally unlimited, – therefore nothing else is thus object; yet something else is an object as secondary term. Nor need ‘the unlimited object’ be precisely term in whatever way it is act, as it is precisely mover and reason of the act, because something can follow the first term and be the second term. Nothing can be secondarily mover to act; the reason is that however much it precedes act, it does not precede in whatever way it is term, nor is it co-required for act; but ‘what is secondarily term’ follows act, as being measured and caused by it, – the way intellection in us follows the object.

## II. To the Principal Arguments

53. To the principal arguments [nn.1-4].

To that from 83 *Questions* [n.1], it is plain how Augustine speaks about the idea [n.38].

54. To Avicenna [n.2]: I concede that in God there can be a relation of understanding, either as what it is ‘to understand’ is the term of the relation of the intellect (as ‘to be lord’ is a new appellation), or as ‘to understand’ states a relation of reason, but then it is not this in the first instant, nor in the second, but in the third.

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<sup>3</sup> No response is given by Scotus.

55. To the other<sup>4</sup> the answer is plain from what has been said, that the same ‘unlimited reason of understanding’ can be the proper reason of understanding any of the them – to which it is unlimited – just as if it were limited to that one alone, and especially in respect of the act which is ‘to understand’, in which there is not always required a reason univocal with the thing known (otherwise nothing could be known by a cause, nor a conclusion by the principle), but a more eminent reason suffices, containing perfectly a virtual likeness of the thing known.

### III. To the Arguments for the First Opinion

56. And as to what is argued for the first opinion, that the indeterminate reason needs to be made determinate [n.11], – I say that it is determinate of itself, with a determination opposite ‘to the indetermination which is to contradictories’ [n.17], although it is not of itself determinate with a determination of limitation; nor is this necessary so that by it the object may be determinately understood.

57. And if you say ‘whatever exceeds the middle term is not a reason for understanding this thing in particular unless it is determined to it by something else’, – I reply that always, when arguing from the antecedent to the consequent along with distribution [sc. of the terms], there is a fallacy of the consequent, from the form of arguing. But it holds by reason of the matter when the consequent cannot exist unless it is counted up in several things; and, because of this, the form of arguing by Augustine in *On the Trinity* VII ch.4 n.7 ‘if two men, then two animals’ holds, but this is from the

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<sup>4</sup> Actually a response to an argument found in *Rep.* IA d.36 nn.3, 87. No response is given here by Scotus to the arguments stated above in nn.3-4.

imperfection and limitation of the consequent to the antecedent. Hence this inference does not follow ‘if the Father, then God, – if the Son, then God, – therefore if the Father and the Son are two, then two Gods’. So I say that to the intellection of ‘this thing’ one must give a reason by which it is understood, and a reason that is proper (either formally, or eminently containing whatever there is of perfection in the proper reason), and for understanding ‘that thing’ one must have a proper and determinate reason; but to infer ‘therefore for understanding one thing and another thing one must have one determinate reason and another determinate reason’ is a fallacy of the consequent, because this consequent – namely to have a determinate reason of understanding – is unlimited as to other antecedents [sc. so it is not distributed, or counted up, as they are]

58. As to what is added there for the first opinion, that the reason of understanding is an ‘intelligible’ likeness [n.10], – I reply: not a formal likeness, but either that or something else analogically alike, that is, containing the formal likeness perfectly, according to everything of perfection that is in it as it is the relation or reason of understanding – and so it is in the issue at hand.

## Thirty Sixth Distinction

### Questions One to Three

*Whether the Foundation of an Eternal Relation to God as Knower has truly the Being of  
Essence from the Fact it is under this Sort of Respect*

1. About the thirty sixth distinction I ask whether the foundation of an eternal relation to God as knower [sc. the relation of the creature to God in the second instant, d.35 nn.32, 49] has truly the being of essence from the fact it is under this sort of respect.

That it does:

Man is not of himself a true or valid being [*ens ratum*] (because then he would be God), therefore he is formally valid through something; only through a respect to what is valid first of itself; but not by respect to it as to efficient cause, because since the definition is of a definite being, and an efficient cause ‘insofar as it is efficient’ produces something existing in act, if man had valid being from the efficient cause insofar as it is efficient, the definition would only be of him as existing, and so the definition would answer the question ‘whether he is’, which is unacceptable; therefore he is a valid being insofar as he participates the first thing as exemplar; but this is insofar as he has an eternal relation to God as knower and exemplar, – therefore etc.

2. Further, correlatives are simultaneous in nature, – therefore simultaneous in nature are God understanding a stone and a stone understood by him; therefore since a stone understood by the divine intellect is understood insofar as it is other than the divine essence, and this knowledge was real and metaphysical (not logical), then that which was the term of this intellection was a true thing; therefore etc.

3. The opposite is stated by the Master in the text (d.36 ch.1 n.326). When expounding the authority of Augustine *On Genesis* V ch.18 n.36 (namely the authority “they were in the knowledge of God, they were not in their own nature”), he says as follows: “God had them” (namely the elect) “with him from eternity, not in their nature

(that is the nature of them, who did not yet exist), but in his fore-knowledge, because he knew them as if they existed.”

### I. To the Question

#### A. The Opinion of Others

4. [Reasons for the opinion] – Here look at the opinion of Henry [of Ghent] about the eternity of essences, and specifically in *Summa* 21 q.4

a. [*Interpolation*] Here some say [sc. Henry] that being taken most commonly – or thing – can be said to be from ‘think’ [Latin *reor*, thing in Latin is *res*], and thus it is common to figments and many other things. In another way, proceeding further, a thing is said to be from ‘ratitude’, as it is a ratified or valid thing and distinct from a fictitious thing; and this is double: for it is distinguished as thing to which being can belong or as thing to which being does belong, – and prior there is ‘to which being can belong’; and this thing, as it is by relation to the exemplar, is thus the essence, because just as God as efficient cause produces the thing in being of existence, so he produces it as exemplar in being of essence.

5. For this opinion the strongest argument is from what was touched on in the second principal argument, about the knowledge of God and the real eternal object [n.2].

6. There is added to this [n.5] that proportion is a property of being; but the proportion of an object known in eternity is something related to the knower, and the sort of thing that is ‘impossible to be’ is not so proportioned.

7. Further, as being is to non-being, so is possible to impossible – therefore by permutation [sc. being is to possible as non-being to impossible]; but every being is possible; therefore everything that is a pure non-being is impossible.

8. And there is a confirmation, because if some pure non-being (or a nothing) were possible, and some pure non-being (or a nothing) were impossible, one nothing would be more nothing than the other, which seems absurd; therefore a ‘possible’ is not altogether nothing but some being.

9. Further, Augustine *On the Nature of the Good* ch.18: “If good is some form, something not non-good is capacity for form;” therefore something not non-good is a possibility for actual goodness.

10. Again, *On John* homily 18 n.8: “Heart and mind form the same letters, but in different ways;” therefore they are made by the heart before they are by the hand.

11. And Avicenna *Metaphysics* VIII ch.7, about the double flow of things from God [sc. according to the being of essence and the being of existence].

12. It is also added by them [sc. Henry etc.] that the distinction of the being of essence from the being of existence [n.4] suffices for composition, because of the fact that essence (understood as having the being of essence) is still in potency to the being of existence, which it receives from the efficient cause insofar as it is efficient – and then “it is composed of potency and act.”

13. [Rejection of the opinion] – Against these points the arguments are:  
 First, that creation is production from nothing; but if a stone pre-had from eternity true real being, then, when it is produced by the efficient cause, it is not produced from nothing simply.

14. Secondly as follows: if it is not produced save only according to a new respect to the efficient cause, it does not seem to be produced in being simply, but only in being in a certain respect – and the creation will be less ‘a production simply’ than is alteration, where there is production (at least of something) as to absolute being.

15. Third (according to the same way) it is argued that it posits the same actual and aptitudinal relation on the part of God, and that because of this there cannot, on account of the old aptitudinal relation, be a new actual relation in God [d.35 n.35]; therefore likewise on the part of what is referred to God there is the same actual and aptitudinal relation, and it will, on account of the old aptitudinal relation, not be an actual new one; therefore since the aptitudinal relation to the being of existence was always in a being having the being of essence, there will be no new actual relation in it insofar as it is existent.

16. Fourth (according to the same way), because in the same immutable foundation there cannot be a new respect; here the foundation is the same, namely the being of essence, – and an immutable term, namely God; therefore there is no new respect to such a term, of the sort of respect that is posited as ‘being of existence’.

17. Again, fifth (according to the same middle term, about creation [sc. creation from nothing, n.13]), because the production of a thing according to the being of essence is most truly creation (for it is purely from nothing as from the term from which, and to a true being as to the term to which); and this production according to them is eternal [n.12]; therefore the creation is eternal, – the opposite of which he [sc. Henry] tries to show and says he has demonstrations for.

18. Sixth (according to the same way, through the opposite about annihilation), it follows that nothing can be annihilated; for just as it is produced from a being in essence, so it seems to return to a being in essence, – not to nothing.

19. Further, second principally [sc. after the arguments in nn.13-18]: the reasons – which were touched on in distinction 8 nn.263, 269 against Avicenna – that ‘nothing other than God is formally necessary’, can be made against this opinion [sc. the opinion about the being of essence from eternity, n.4], because these reasons are as conclusive about quidditative being (if it is true being) as about the being of existence; for the will does not more necessarily will ‘something other than itself’ in quidditative being than it wills ‘something other than itself’ in being of existence, because there is the same reason in both cases [d.8 nn.270, 272] – and so about the other middle terms there [d.8 nn.271, 273-274].

20. Further, third: a thing according to being of essence is either the term of a relation of the idea (which they posit in God) or it is not but is according to some other known being. If in the second way, then things are posited in vain in the former being; for essences do not seem to be posited because of anything other than as they are terms of the ideal relations that are eternally in God. If in the first way, then there is in God by act of the divine intellect something according to which God can be otherwise or change, the opposite of which was proved in distinction 30 n.41. – The proof of this last inference is that every ‘being’ other than God is formally non-necessary of itself; therefore let this ‘being’ (although *per impossibile*) be posited to be quidditatively otherwise, it follows that the entity in God – whether it is real or of reason –, which has this ‘being’ for term, will be otherwise, and thus from the positing of something about what is other than God

something that is in God by act of his intellect will be able to be changed, which is impossible.

21. Further, when a cause is perfect and naturally independent in causing and it acts naturally, it seems that it can cause the things more immediate to it to be more perfect, because it produces according to the ultimate of its power; the divine intellect as intellect precisely – according to this way – produces in God ideal reasons and the essences themselves in reason of essence, and produces ideal reasons as it were first in itself before these essences in this being (for they exist by the fact they are of the exemplars); therefore the ideas have a truer being – since the divine intellect is naturally acting – than the things patterned after them; but the divine intellect does not cause ideas save as ‘beings of reason’ and not in any real being – therefore neither does he give any real being to the things patterned after the ideas, which things are more remote ‘caused things’ as it were.

22. Besides, fifth: it produces these essences in being either knowingly or not. If knowingly, then they are in the knower before they are in this being, and so in vain are these entities [sc. ideas] posited on account of God’s eternal knowledge. If not knowingly, then he produces them merely naturally (as fire heats), which seems absurd about any produced thing that is other than himself in nature; nay he even produces the Son as he is intellect, although not as understanding formally, as was expounded elsewhere [d.2 nn.290-296].

23. In addition, that he [sc. Henry] attributes one effect to the exemplar cause and another to the efficient cause does not seem probable, because the exemplar cause is only a certain efficient cause; for the efficient cause is divided into efficient cause by intellect

or intention and efficient cause by nature, according to the Philosopher *Physics* 2.5.196b17-22. Just as therefore a natural producer is not a different cause from the efficient cause, so neither is the exemplar cause or the exemplar producer – and so ‘what is effected’ will be the same as ‘what is produced as exemplified’ by any understanding that produces artificially, insofar as it is understanding and insofar as it is exemplar.

24. Also as to what he adds ‘that composition exists in creatures through this potentiality to act’ [n.12] does not seem rational, because there seems to be nothing there that may be compared with something else; for if the whole of whiteness pre-exists in potency as the term of power, and afterwards it comes to be in act, not for this reason is there any composition of thing and thing; therefore if a thing pre-exists in being of essence and it is produced in being of existence (which is not different – according to them – from the essence, just as neither generally is a relation different from its foundation, for which reason they do not posit that relation and foundation make a composition), there will not be a composite being because of these two.

25. And this might be the seventh argument (according to the first way [nn.13-18]) for rejecting creation, because of the identity of relation with the foundation [n.24]; because the same thing cannot be really new and not new; therefore if being of existence states a relation that is the same as essence, no creature will be simply new.

#### B. Scotus' own Response

26. I concede the conclusion of these reasons [nn.13-18, 25], namely the negative part of the question [n.24].

27. As to which, this result seems specifically to hold, that not only does the being of essence found this sort of relation to God but so also does the being of existence, because according to Augustine *On Genesis* V ch.18 n.36: “he knows things made no otherwise than he knows things to be made;” he foreknew then the being of existence just as he foreknew the being of essence – and yet not because of this founded relation does someone conclude that the ‘being of existence’ was a true such being, namely true being of existence from eternity; therefore by parity of reason, it should not be conceded of the being of essence.

28. Also all the motives that are adduced about the divine intellect seem able to be adduced about our intellect:

Because if something does not exist, it can be understood by us (and this as to either its essence or its existence), and yet not because of our intellection does one posit that it has true being of essence or of existence; nor is there any difference – as it seems – between the divine intellect and ours in this respect, save that the divine intellect produces those intelligibles in their intelligible being, and ours does not produce them first. But if this being is not of itself such that it requires being simply, then ‘to produce it in such being’ is not to produce it in any being simply; and therefore it seems that if this intelligible being – when comparing it to our intellect – does not require being simply, then when comparing it also to the intellect ‘producing it in this being’ there will not be being simply, because if being white is only qualitative being, then ‘to produce it in being white’ is not to produce in being substance but in that qualitative being.

29. Likewise, our agent intellect produces a thing in intelligible being, although it was produced beforehand – and yet not because of this producing of our agent intellect is the thing ‘so produced’ posited to have being simply.

### C. Objections against Scotus' own Response

30. [Exposition of the objections] – Against this solution it is objected that the foundation of a relation, when it finds a relation, exists according to the being according to which it finds, – otherwise it would not find according to that being; but a stone according to true being of essence finds the eternal relation to God as knower, and this in eternity; therefore the stone exists in eternity according to this being. Proof of the minor: it finds the relation to God as knower according to the being according to which its being as object is known by God; but it is known by God under the idea of true essence, not under the idea of diminished essence, because the first intellection of a stone by God is not reflexive.

31. Further, production is not of some relation merely, because relation only exists in something absolute; therefore since it was conceded in the preceding question [d.35 nn.31-32, 40, 42] that God produces things in intelligible being ‘according as the known thing is said to be an idea’, it follows that in the second instant [*ibid.*, nn.32, 49] one must posit some absolute entity of the produced thing, so that on the absolute being having such entity the relation to the producer may be founded.

32. [Response to the objections] – To the first [n.30] I say that a canceled term is not canceled with respect to the canceling term but with respect to a third to which it is

compared under the reason of what cancels, – because according to the Philosopher *De Interpretatione* 11.21a21-24, when predicating of someone that he is ‘a dead man’ there is an opposition in the adjective, on which contradiction follows [sc. a dead man is not in fact a man]; therefore when comparing a determinable precisely to the determination, the determinable is not canceled with respect to the determination but includes a contradiction to it; but with respect to the third term – about which ‘dead’ is said – there is a canceling determination and that which is determined by it is canceled, so that it is only said to be it ‘in a certain respect’ [sc. a dead man is not a man simply but a man in a certain respect, as a body that was a man].

33. Thus I say that a diminished thing is not diminished with respect to the diminishing term but with respect to a third, to which it is compared under the diminishing determination; just as when I say ‘he is white as to his teeth’, the white is not diminished but is taken for white simply with respect to this determination (otherwise it would be frivolous); but, as it is taken under the determination, it is said of a third thing – as of an Ethiopian – as diminished.

34. Now this determination ‘to be in opinion’ is a diminishing one (according to the Philosopher, *ibid.* 21a24-33), and the way being in opinion is, so being in intellection also is or being from an exemplar or being known or represented, – all which are equivalent. Although therefore what is compared to any one of these, as it is compared to it, is not diminished – yet as it is under any of these compared to a third, it is diminished; for the being of man simply – and not diminished being – is the object of opinion, but the ‘being simply’ as it exists in opinion is being ‘in a certain respect’; and therefore the inference does not follow ‘Homer is in opinion, therefore Homer is’, nor even ‘Homer is

existing in opinion, therefore Homer is existing' – but there is a fallacy of simply and in a certain respect.

35. So here: when comparing to divine intellection a stone in eternity, the stone is indeed simply compared to the intellection (and this according to the being not only of essence of the stone, but also of existence), and anything comparable is so compared – yet as it is taken under this comparison to the knowledge of God it is diminished; it is not indeed canceled, as if 'being simply' could not stand with this sort of respect, but it is diminished so that such respect does not necessarily posit that 'its determinable' is a being simply.

36. Next to the form of the argument [n.30]: 'the foundation of a relation is according to the being according to which it finds the relation' is true when the founded relation is not simply diminishing the being of the foundation. And the real reason for the 'in a certain respect and simply' seems to be this, that the first distinction of being seems to be into being outside the soul and being in the soul, – and the 'outside the soul' can be distinguished into act and potency (of essence and of existence), and any of these beings 'outside the soul' can have being in the soul, and the being 'in the soul' is other than every 'being outside the soul' and therefore about no entity nor about any being does it follow that, if it has diminished being in the soul, it has because of this being simply – because the being is in a certain respect, absolutely, which however is taken 'simply' insofar as it is compared to the soul as foundation of the being in the soul.

37. Argument [sc. against nn.35-36]:

A stone is not of itself a necessary existence in any existence;<sup>5</sup> therefore in being known it is caused; only by an efficient cause – whose term is only being simply.

38. Again what is only in something virtually is never formally such save through actual causation; a stone ‘as known’ is only virtually in the divine essence; therefore it does not become actually known without causation – and then as before [n.37].

39. In response to these [nn.37-38]:

One can respond otherwise than is responded here above [nn.35-36], namely that the intellection of God, although it is not absolutely caused, yet as it is of this secondary object (to wit, a stone) does as it were have a principle, and this from the essence as an equivocal objective formal nature – and so it is more from a principle then when it is of the first object because in this latter way it is from a principle as from a univocal objective formal nature. And to be an intellection, as it is ‘of this’, as from a principle equivocally is for the ‘this’ to have a principle in diminished being, just as for an intelligible species to be from a principle in the intellect is for the object ‘in a certain respect’ to be from a principle as it is actually intelligible, or – a better example for the purpose – in the way that through the species of the subject ‘the intellection of the property is from a principle’ is for the property as actually understood to be from a principle; therefore this example is fitting, because a stone does not have a principle equivocally from the essence as intelligible first before it does so as understood; for nothing has formal being in the memory before it does so in intelligence, but only virtual being. Nor does it seem unacceptable to concede that the divine intellect has as it were a principle (not in itself, but as it is of this object), because one must posit this about

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<sup>5</sup> [*Text canceled by Scotus*] This does not follow, if it is a true being, and not divisible into necessary and possible.

volition (as it seems), since volition is contingently of this object, and nothing contingent is altogether uncaused.

40. Thus there will be an order between the altogether without a principle (as the essence) and the from a principle univocally (as the intellection of the essence) and the as it were from a principle equivocally but necessarily (as the intellection of a stone) and the as it were from a principle equivocally and contingently (as the willing of a stone).

41. This way well says, in this regard, that the essence as ‘moving reason’ is altogether without distinction, univocally as it were when moving to itself as to first term of act, and equivocally as it were when moving to a secondary object as to second term of act; such that neither in the intellect (as is plain) nor in motive reason nor in understanding nor in the first term must one posit any distinction. But when it is said ‘the act is as it were equivocally from a principle as it is of a secondary object’ [n.39], this is nothing other than that it is extended – as if beyond the first object – to the second in virtue of an objective principle that is equivocal to the second term.

42. But what is it for an act to be thus extended? Not to be a relation in act, nor to be a relation in the first object to the second, – for you [sc. Scotus himself]; therefore it is for the second object to be referred to the act or the first object; this object is only of what possesses some being [sc. diminished being], – and then follows what is had there [nn.35-36].

43. So the imagination is false that ‘to understand’ is distinguished (so that it might be of many things) as if into many ‘to understands’; nay there is no need for any difference in it, as it is a sort of mean between reason and the first term, which secondary objects follow; therefore it is false that the secondary objects are the immediate term of

'to understand', just as neither do they move – for in no way are they necessarily required for act, but they are required in idea of term, to the act as it is of this; this only asserts a relation in the second mode.<sup>a</sup>

a. [Note of Duns Scotus] God: intellect, essence as reason; to understand: essence as first term, – stone, angel etc., secondary objects.

44. To the second [n.31] I say that this production is in the being of a reason different from all being simply, – and it is not being of reason simply, but also of the foundation; not indeed according to the being of essence or existence, but according to diminished being (which is 'to be' true), which is a to be in a certain respect also of absolute being, which 'absolute being', however, according to this diminished being has a relation of reason as concomitant.

45. An example of this: if Caesar were annihilated and yet there were a statue of Caesar, Caesar would be represented by the statue. This 'being represented' is of a reason different from all being simply (whether of essence or existence), nor is it a diminished being of Caesar, as if something of Caesar had this being and something of him did not – as an Ethiopian is diminished white because something of him is truly white and something not [n.33]. But of the whole Caesar 'the being of him from a cause' is true being of essence and of existence, and to that whole – according to such being of his – this being in a certain respect belongs, and in him, according to this being in a certain respect, there can be some relation to the statue.

46. And although one could suppose there to be calumny in the example, it cannot thus be said in the issue at hand about intellection and the object without the whole object,

and in accord with its whole being, having ‘diminished being’ in act. And if you wish to look for some true being of this object as such, there is none to look for save ‘in a certain respect’, save that this ‘being in a certain respect’ is reduced to some being simply, which is the being of the intellection itself; but this ‘being simply’ is not formally the being of that which is called the ‘being in a certain respect’, because it is of it as term or principle, so that to this ‘true being in a certain respect’ is thus reduced the fact that without this true being of it there would not be this ‘being in a certain respect’ of it.

47. Now from this becomes clear something said above in distinction 3 nn.265-267 (‘About knowledge in the eternal rules’), namely that the moving of our intellect ‘by intelligible quiddities’ is reduced to the divine intellect, through whose ‘being simply’ those objects have being in a certain respect, namely objective being (which is the being that moves our intellect to know genuine truths), and because of their motion the intellect is said to move, just as too they have ‘their own being in a certain respect’ because of the being simply of it.

## II. To the Principal Arguments

48. To the first principal argument [n.1] I say that ‘valid being’ is either called so because it has of itself firm and true being, whether of essence or existence (because one is not without the other, however they are distinguished), or ‘valid being’ is called so because it is what is first distinguished from figments, namely to which the true being of essence or of existence is not repugnant.

49. If valid being is taken in the first way, I say that man is not of himself a valid being but from his efficient cause – from which he has all true being, both of essence and of existence. And when you say that then there is never a valid being unless it has been efficiently caused, – I do in this way concede it: and when it has been efficiently caused it is existent, therefore there is never a valid being save an existent one, – I concede it; therefore there is no definition of it save as it is existent, – I deny this inference, because definition is a distinct knowledge of the defined thing according to all its essential parts. But there can be distinct knowledge of something although it is not a valid being; for it is only necessary that a valid being be the term of a definitive cognition, and then the inference does not follow ‘a valid being is definitively understood, therefore the valid being exists’.

50. If valid being is understood in the second way, I say that man is of himself a valid being, because being is not formally of itself repugnant to him; for just as whatever something is repugnant to, it is repugnant to it formally from its nature, so what it is not repugnant to formally it is not repugnant to because of its nature; and if being were of itself repugnant to man, it could not be repugnant to him because of some additional respect. And if from this you infer ‘man is of himself a valid being in this way, therefore he is God’, the inference is not valid, because God is not only he to whom being is not repugnant but he is of himself being itself.

51. As to what is said here that man is formally a valid being by some relation, which is the validity of him [n.1], it was rejected in distinction 3 in the question ‘On the vestige’ nn.310-323. And it seems very absurd because – according to Augustine *On the*

*Trinity VII ch.1 n.2* – if nothing exists to itself, nothing exists to another; and this they themselves concede, because a relation cannot be founded in a relation but in an absolute.

52. I ask then about the foundation of such relation, which is said to be the validity; let it be called *a*. If it is to itself, then it does not essentially include in its understanding a *per se* respect, because nothing that essentially includes a respect is to itself formally. This *a* insofar as it is to itself is either valid, and then I have the intended conclusion, – or it is not valid, and then the respect will be founded in a non-valid being; and a respect for them is the same as the foundation, therefore the respect is the same as a non-valid being. And the consequent is very much unacceptable, if ‘valid’ is taken for that which being is not repugnant to, because it would follow that the validity will not be founded on a non-valid thing, which is ‘nothing’ – and so the respect will be a ‘nothing’, and then a valid being will be from two nothings.

53. To the second argument [n.2] I concede that from eternity God has understood stone, and not as the same as himself, – and this intellection was real and metaphysical, not logical. Yet it does not more follow – from this – about the stone that it is essence rather than existence, nor when comparing it to the divine intellect rather than to mine; the inference does indeed follow ‘therefore the thing was always understood’, but to argue ‘therefore the thing was in some real being’ is the fallacy of in a certain respect and simply.

### III. To the Reasons for the Opinion of Others

54. Using the same point in response to what is adduced for the opinion, about proportion to intellect [n.6] – I say that this proportion is a relation of the thing known to the knower, and this relation is the diminished being on which it is founded, as has been made clear [nn.34-35]; but it is not necessary that the ‘diminished being’ relation require along with it the entity simply of the being which it determines. And when you say there is no such proportion ‘of the impossible’ to the divine intellect [n.6], – I say that it can well be that the altogether black is not white, and yet not for this reason is ‘a man white in teeth’ simply white; so it can be that an im-proportion in every way is ‘impossible’ to the divine intellect, and yet that some proportion is ‘possible’ to his intellect, but not through being simply.

55. To the point about permutation of proportion [n.7], I say that that way of arguing takes its rise from Euclid, in the sixteenth conclusion of the fifth book: “If,” he says, “four quantities were proportional, they will be proportional by permutation;” which is proved by the fifteenth, preceding conclusion: “The proportion of multiples and of sub-multiples is the same.”

56. And this permutation, certain and known in the case of quantities, is used by some people in arguments. Now the Philosopher used it in *Prior Analytics* 2.22.68a3-8, 11-16 (in two rules): ‘If *a* is converse of *b* and *c* of *d*, and if *a* and *c* contradict, then *b* and *d* will contradict’ and conversely. The consequence is necessary because about anything one or other of a pair of contradictories is said; and because what is convertible with one contradictory does not receive the predication of the other (nor conversely), therefore it is the converse of the other contradictory. And generally whenever some true proportion (corresponding to the fifteenth conclusion of Euclid) can be got through which

a permutation holds (corresponding to the sixteenth conclusion), then the permutation is good, – and when not, not.

57. To the issue at hand then: generally such a permutation never holds when comparing extremes to an inferior and superior; nay there is a fallacy of the consequent, because the extremes of two contradictions when compared with each other have a converse proportion in inferences and not the same one (for the opposite of the consequent entails the opposite of the antecedent and not conversely), and therefore to argue ‘as the first is to the third, so the second is to the fourth’ commits the fallacy of the consequent. But one should argue conversely (when drawing inferences), and so argue thus, ‘as the first is to the third, so the fourth is to the second’, – and so in the issue at hand, ‘as every being is possible, so every impossible is a non-being’.

58. And as to what is added there, that then ‘one nothing would be more nothing than another nothing’ [n.8], – I reply:

A negation is present in something in three ways. Sometimes not because of repugnance of the positive to the affirmation of the negative of it, but only because of the negation of the cause that posits the effect – just as if some surface were neither [sc. neither black nor white], it would indeed be non-white not because of the repugnance of the surface to the affirmation opposite to this negation, but only because of the negation of the cause, not positing whiteness to be present on the surface. But sometimes there is a negation in a positive because of its repugnance to the affirmation and to the opposite of that negation, and this in two ways: for sometimes there is precisely such a repugnance because of some one thing that belongs to the understanding of both – just as in the ultimate species of the same proximate genus their negations are said mutually of each

other, because of their repugnance, which repugnance is however because of one thing included in the understanding of both, namely because of the ultimate embracing difference; but sometimes because of several things included in the understanding of both or of one of them, – just as, if the most special species be taken of two most general genera, the affirmations are indeed repugnant to each other because of the many things included in them, namely as many as are the predicates stated in the ‘what’ of each one in its own genus; for nothing is said in the ‘what’ of white which is not a middle term for showing this proposition ‘man is not whiteness’, also nothing is said of man in the ‘what’ which is not a middle term for showing the same proposition – and therefore this proposition ‘man is not whiteness’ is true because of the repugnance of the terms simply, or because of the many things included in the understanding of the repugnant things, each of which would be on either side a sufficient reason for such repugnance.

59. And yet in all these inferences in negations, although they are present from diverse causes, nothing is said to be more or less negated, but that each simply is ‘not such’; for flavor is simply as much nothing of whiteness as man is, and likewise a surface has nothing of whiteness, in the case posited above [n.58]; and the reason why this one is not more a negation than that one is because any negation negates the whole of the affirmation opposed to it, for whatever reason it is ‘such’, and whether because of one reason or several.

60. So in the issue at hand: in man in eternity there is present that ‘he is not anything’, and in chimaera there is present that ‘it is not anything’; but the affirmation ‘he is something’ is not repugnant to man but there is only negation because of negation of the cause, not positing it – but the affirmation is repugnant to a chimaera, because no

cause could cause in it that ‘it is something’. And the reason that this is not repugnant to man and is repugnant to chimaera is that this is this and that is that, and this for any intellect conceiving them, because – as was said [n.50] – whatever is repugnant to something formally of itself is repugnant to it, and what is not repugnant formally of itself is not repugnant.

61. Nor is it necessary to imagine here that it is not repugnant to man because he is a being in potency and is repugnant to a chimaera because it is not a being in potency, – nay rather conversely, because it is not repugnant to man therefore he is a possible with logical potency and because it is repugnant to a chimaera therefore a chimaera is impossible with the opposite impossibility; and this possibility is followed by objective possibility, and that on the supposition of God’s omnipotence which has regard to everything possible (provided it is other than himself), yet that logical possibility can stand – by reason of itself – absolutely, although *per impossibile* no omnipotence were to have regard to it.

62. Therefore the reason altogether first and irreducible to another as to why ‘being’ is not repugnant to man is that man is formally man (and this whether really in itself or intelligibly in the intellect), and the first reason why ‘being’ is repugnant to a chimaera is the chimaera insofar as it is a chimaera. Therefore the negation ‘nothingness’ is present in different ways in eternity in man and in a chimaera, and yet not for this reason is one more a nothing than the other.

63. Or it could also be said that from man is removed only being and nothing else consequent on being (of the sort that ‘possible to be’ is), but from chimaera is removed being and its consequent; and therefore ‘being’ is negated of a chimaera for more reasons

than it is negated of man, but this negation is not more in one than in the other. But the first response [nn.61-62] seems more real.

64. To Augustine [n.9]: capacity for form – according to him – is matter, because it has some true entity, and not only some such entity as the soul of Antichrist has before it is created. About this in the second book, distinction 12 q. un. nn.1-9.

65. To the remark from *On John* [n.9]: I concede that, when there are two ordered causes, both cause the effect, – and in different ways because the higher one causes more; and so if the heart is the higher cause and the hand a lower one with respect to letters, each causes (both the heart and the hand), but it is not the case that the heart produces the letters in some true being before the hand does and that the hand later adds to them some respect!

66. To the last one from Avicenna [n.11]: he is speaking of the flowing of forms from God insofar as these are understood, and of the flowing of everything that exists (that is, the flow of things in true being); and I concede that just as the ‘being’ of something understood insofar as it is understood is different from true being (which is of essences outside the soul), so ‘this and that’ flowing are different, and things flow from God by each flowing. It is not so in us because the things pre-exist outside the soul – or in the cause – so that they may then move our intellect to an act of understanding. But Avicenna does not say that the flow ‘in understood being’ is the flow in quidditative being, because ‘understood being’ is a distinct being from all real being, both quidditative and of existence.

## Thirty Seventh Distinction

### Single Question

*Whether God's Omnipotence necessarily entails his Greatness*

1. About the thirty seventh distinction I ask whether the fact that God is present everywhere by his power entails that he is everywhere by his essence, – that is, whether omnipotence necessarily entails greatness.

That it does:

Every agent is present to what it acts on (according to the *Physics* 7.1.242b24-27, 2.243a3-6), and this immediately, if it can immediately act on it, – or meditately, if it acts on it meditately; but an omnipotent thing can act on anything immediately; therefore it is present to anything immediately.

2. The opposite:

It can cause anything outside the universe, and yet it is not there by its essence.

#### I. To the Question

3. Response.

A created agent can act where it is not; yet commonly it must be immediate to any affected thing next to it that it acts on, although sometimes it does not act on the affected

thing by an action of the same idea as the action by which it acts on a remote thing – just as a fish [in a net] that kills the hand of the fisherman does not kill the net.

4. But sometimes it does not act on the proximate affected thing with the same active power as it acts on a remote thing, although it acts by some active power, – just as the celestial body, generating a mineral in the bowels of the earth (or some mixed thing, animate or inanimate, here below), acts by its substantial form, because a non-substance cannot generate a substance, nor can any accident in between be the reason for generating substance.

5. The form then of a celestial body is an active power on a remote object, without the body acting on what is next to it by the same active power as it acts on a remote object, although it act on what is next to it by some other active power. But this happens either because of the conjunction of these two active powers in the same thing, each of which is active (and one has the proximate thing for proportionate affected thing, and the other active form has the remote thing for proximate affected thing), or this happens because of the imperfection of the agent, in which there is a defect of active virtue, because of which defect it acts according to the more imperfect form before according to the more perfect one – as that which generates something corruptible causes alteration before it generates, because of the imperfection of the agent, from which fact the ‘prior in origin’ is more imperfect.

6. If we take away first the coming together of two such powers from the created agent, and if we take away second the imperfection from it (that it need not first produce a more imperfect thing), there seems no reason why it will not be present by its power to something remote according to the way it is now present to itself in idea of active power;

and yet it will not act on a thing nearby either with that power (just as it does not now) or with another power, and this above all if the power according to which it acts on a remote thing is a simply perfect active power; for the more perfect the form is in creatures, the more remote the thing to which the principle of acting seems to extend.

7. From these results to the issue at hand: it seems that omnipotence – which is an active power simply perfectly – does not require, either because of diverse powers coming together in the agent or because of a prior generation of something more imperfect, that there be action on one thing before action on another thing. Such omnipotence seems to be a principle of acting on anything and of producing anything possible, although *per impossibile* it not be everywhere – and in this respect the negative side of the question [n.1] seems it needs to be held.

8. There is a confirmation too: for if omnipotence is a will on whose willing the being of a thing follows, since the will can will a distant thing as equally as a proximate one, it seems that if the omnipotent being were *per impossibile* present in some determinate place and not everywhere, it could will something – in another place – to exist, to which thing existence was not repugnant, and consequently by its willing it would have ‘being’ in that place, – and consequently the thing would be made by the omnipotent being without the omnipotent being having presence there by its essence.

9. There is another confirmation, that one should not imagine there was an infinite empty space before the creation of the world, as if God was present there in his essence before he produced the world; nay, it is not as being present anywhere in his essence that God was able to make the world. So just as the presence of his greatness was not there pre-required for the presence of his power, as it is power (nay as power it had its term

before he was present in his essence), so it seems that there is no need now to pre-understand God existing in any part of the universe so as to cause something, but rather – quasi conversely – he is there by his power first so as to cause something there; and then, even if *per impossibile* he were not present there in his essence, yet he could there cause something.

## II. To the Principal Argument

10. To the argument for the opposite [n.1] one can say that that statement of the Philosopher is true about natural agents, which act through natural qualities or active natural forms, and these are only principles of acting on something remote if there are other concurrent forms that are principles of acting on something nearby; but it is not so about the will by which an omnipotent being acts.

### Thirty Eighth Distinction

#### Single Question

*Whether God's Knowledge with respect to Makeable things is Practical*

1. About the thirty eighth distinction I ask whether God's knowledge with respect to makeable things is practical.

That it is not:

Metaphysics 2.1.993b210-21: “The end of practical science is a work;” but nothing outside God is his end.

2. On the contrary:

*On the Trinity* VI ch.10 n.11: “Art belongs to the wise God, etc.;” art is a practical habit; therefore etc.

3. Likewise *83 Questions* q.46: “Ideas are the reasons according to which everything formable is formed.”

### I. To the Question

4. Above in the question ‘On theology, whether it is practical’ [*Prol.* nn.217-366], much was said there about practical and speculative knowledge. Briefly applying some of these to the issue at hand, one can say that two things belong to the nature of a practical habit, namely conformity to praxis (which conformity it has from the object about which it is) and its natural priority to the same praxis, because praxis –as practical operation is named from it – is an operation that is distinguished from speculation; but no operation, different from speculation, is in the power of the speculator unless it is or can be naturally posterior to speculation; but knowledge is not posited as practical in anyone, as it belongs to him, save by respect to the praxis that is in his power.

5. From this one needs to know further that practical knowledge – the most practical and closest to praxis – is some opinion about eliciting some praxis (to wit, a judgment about the conclusion of a practical syllogism), which ‘knowledge’ is the end of the movement of the intellect, but operation begins from it (and not only is the knowledge

practical that is thus proximately practical, but also the knowledge of practical principles that virtually include it, and also the quidditative knowledge of the terms that includes the practical principles, as was said there [*Prol.* nn.26-263, 276-277, 314]), therefore any intellect that cannot have some such knowledge giving commands about operating naturally prior to the praxis which such knowledge regards (and that cannot have knowledge of the principles from which to infer such knowledge giving commands about things to be done, and cannot have quidditative knowledge of the terms in which are included such principles), such an intellect does not seem able to have practical knowledge most properly taken according to the two conditions before stated, namely conformity to the object and priority [n.4]; but the divine intellect – comparing his knowledge to the act of his will – does not pre-have any knowledge giving commands about anything to be made (nor knowledge of any principle nor quidditative knowledge of the term) which includes a practical principle; therefore it does not have any knowledge that is conform and prior to such praxis.

6. Proof of the minor [sc. about the divine intellect, n.5]: if prior to an act of the divine will the divine intellect could have any such knowledge, it would have it purely naturally and necessarily, because all knowledge preceding there the act of will is purely natural, and the intellect would have it through the essence as the essence is purely the natural principle of understanding; so of necessity the intellect would know that this is to be made, and then the will – to which it would present it – would not be able not to will it, because then it could fail to be right, able to be discordant with practical right reason, and so it could be non-right. Of necessity, therefore, the divine will would will anything that was to be done, because the same reason would hold of one thing as of another.

7. Here an objection is first raised that for this reason [n.6] the divine intellect would not have any speculative knowledge; for either the will would necessarily will the intellect to speculate, and then liberty would not be first on the part of the will, – or the will would be able not to will the intellect to speculate, and then it could be non-right.

8. And further, if there is first presented to the divine intellect some universal law (to wit, that there needs to be glorification, needs to be gratification), and the divine will accepts it (and from this a law of wisdom is laid down), and if second the intellect offer to the will that Peter is to be beatified, – if the will accept this, thereby the intellect seems to know that Peter is to be glorified, and this by a dictating knowledge that has not been accepted in itself formally by the will, although the will would have verified the premises from which the intellect has it.

9. To the first of these [n.7]: the divine intellect by the necessity of nature is speculative, and there is no liberty formally for this, although it is not without the will being pleased therewith; for God is necessarily knowing, but he is not properly a knower by the will in the way that by necessity – not by will – he is God. When therefore you argue ‘if the will is not able not to will the intellect to speculate, then it is not supremely free’ [n.7], the inference does not hold, because the will’s freedom is not to things intrinsic (things which precede its act), but its freedom is to all makeable things, and therefore the first determination in the will must be posited in respect of makeable things; but it would not be thus if the practical intellect were to determine beforehand, nay liberty could not properly be preserved in the will with respect to makeable things (but neither would any contingency be preserved), because the intellect would necessarily determine it beforehand with pure natural necessity and the will would be necessarily conformed to

the intellect; but what is necessarily – even by the necessity of consequence – conform ‘necessarily’ cannot be contingent.

10. To the second [n.8] I say that the divine intellect does not know things in this way, that is discursively, as the argument proceeds; but, by distinguishing the moments of nature, it apprehends in the first moment any doable thing whatever (as much the things that are principles of doable thing as the particular doable things), and in the second moment it presents them all to the will (from all of which the will accepts some, both from all the practical principles and from the particular doable things), and then in the third moment the intellect knows as equally immediately the particulars as the universals, and so it does not acquire its knowledge of the particulars from principles pre-determined by the will. This point will be more evident in the question ‘About the knowledge of God with respect to future contingents’.<sup>6</sup>

## II. To the Principal Arguments

11. To the authority from Augustine [n.2] I say that art is “a habit of making along with true reason” (*Ethics* 6.4.1140a20-21); and, to the extent the definition of art is taken completely, ‘right reason’ is understood, that is, reason which directs and makes right the power to which operation according to art belongs; but in a diminished way art is ‘a habit with true reason’, when it is only a habit that apprehends the rightness of things to be done and is not a habit that directs or makes right in things to be done. In this second way art can be conceded to exist in God because, when a determination of the will with

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<sup>6</sup> In d.39, which is lacking in the *Ordinatio*. See the *Interpolation* that follows at the end of distinction 38.

respect to certain things to be done has been posited, his intellect knows this order of things to be done; and then there is ‘right reason’ there, that is reason knowing rightness – there is not there however a ‘right reason’ that, namely, is directive of the power of the one who operates, and this above all if the power ‘operating extrinsically’ is the will and not some executive power; but if some executive power is posited other than the will, then a ‘right reason’ in the second way seems able to be preserved, which is disposed with respect to the power of the one who operates according to that right reason, and it can be now preserved with respect to the will.

12. The same point makes plain the answer to the other argument from Augustine [n.3], that the ideas are secondary known objects (as was said before [d.35 nn.40, 42]), according to which things outside are made – but these secondary objects do not include any knowledge giving commands about operating or non-operating, although they represent doable things; but knowledge ‘of a doable’ is precisely not practical knowledge, unless it virtually includes a practical principle or conclusion; but there is no such inclusion in the case of the ideas in the divine intellect.<sup>a</sup>

a. [An empty space for the second part of d.38 and for d.39 was left here by Scotus. The following *Interpolation* is found in its place, from Appendix A.]

Thirty Eighth Distinction, Part Two, and Thirty Ninth Distinction  
Questions One to Five: *On the Infallibility and Immutability of Divine Knowledge*

In the second part of the thirty eighth distinction the Master [Lombard] treats of the infallibility of divine knowledge, and in the thirty ninth distinction he treats of the immutability of

divine knowledge [*Sent.* I d.38 ch.2, d.39 chs.1-4]. As to this material, then, to the extent divine knowledge has regard simply to the existences of things, I raise five questions:

First, whether God has determinate knowledge of all things as to all conditions of existence; second, whether he has certain and infallible knowledge of all things as to all conditions of existence; third, whether he has immutable knowledge of all things as to every condition of existence; fourth, whether he necessarily knows every condition of existence of everything; and fifth, whether, along with the determinateness and certitude of his knowledge, there can stand some contingency on the part of the things in existence.<sup>7</sup> And these questions can be asked together, because they are solved together by the same things.

As to the first question I argue for the negative:

Because, according to the Philosopher *De Interpretatione* 9.18a28-19b4, in the case of future contingents there is no determinate truth, – therefore neither is there determinate knowledge; therefore neither does the intellect have determinate knowledge about them.

This reason is confirmed by his proof in the same place, that then we need not bother about things or deliberate because, whether we deliberate or not, they will happen.

Further, if God's power were limited to one side [sc. of opposed possibilities] it would be imperfect, because if God had power for this thing such that he did not have power for the opposite, he would have limited power and not be omnipotent; therefore, in the same way, if he knows one side such that he does not know the other, he will be limited in knowledge and not omniscient.

As to the second question I argue for the negative:

Because this inference holds, ‘God knows that I will sit down tomorrow, and I will not sit down tomorrow, therefore God is deceived’, – therefore by similarity this inference holds, ‘God knows I will sit down tomorrow, and I am able not to sit down tomorrow, therefore God can be deceived’. The first inference is manifest, because he who believes what is not in reality so is deceived; I prove – from this – that the further inference holds, because just as a conclusion about

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<sup>7</sup> The Vatican editors report that the text of the questions interpolated here is put together from the *Lectura* I d.39 qq.1-5 (whose order it generally follows) and the *Reportatio* IA d.38 qq.1-2, d.39 qq.1-3.

what is the case follows from two premises about what is the case, so a conclusion about what is possible follows from a premise about what is the case and a second premise about what is possible.

Further, if God knows I will sit down tomorrow and it is possible for me not to sit down tomorrow, – let the proposition ‘I will not sit down tomorrow’ be the case, and the result is that God is deceived; but from the positing of what is possible the impossible does not follow; therefore the proposition ‘God is deceived’ will not be impossible.

As to the third question I argue for the negative:

There can be no passage from a contradictory to a contradictory without some change; but if there is altogether no change, then in no way does it seem that what was true before should now be false. Therefore if God, while knowing  $a$ , is able not to know  $a$ , then this seems to be because of some possible change; but only in  $a$  as it is known by God, because nothing has being save within God’s knowledge, and consequently the change of  $a$  cannot be without a change in God’s knowledge, – which is the conclusion intended.

Further: anything that is not  $a$  and can be  $a$  can begin to be  $a$ , – because it does not seem intelligible that the affirmation of a negation that is the case can be the case if it does not begin to be; therefore if God does not know  $a$  and he can know  $a$  then he can begin to know  $a$ ; therefore he can change to knowing  $a$ .

Further, third: if God does not know  $a$  and can know  $a$ , – I ask what this ‘can be’ is? Either it is passive, and then it is to a form, and change results. Or it is active, and plainly it is natural, because the intellect ‘as it is intellect’ is not free but acts naturally; such a power cannot act after it has not acted unless it changes; therefore, as before, change results.

As to the fourth question I argue for the affirmative:

Because God immutably knows  $a$ , therefore he necessarily knows  $a$  (let  $a$  be understood as the proposition ‘Antichrist will be’).

Proof of the inference:

First, because no necessity is posited in God save the necessity of immutability; therefore whatever is in him immutably is in him necessarily.

Second, because everything immutable seems to be formally necessary, just as everything possible – to which ‘necessarily’ is repugnant – seems to be mutable; for no ‘such possible’ exists of itself and it can exist from another. But what is able to be after not being (whether in order of duration or order of nature) does not seem able to be without some mutability; therefore etc.

Further, whatever can be in God can be the same as God, and consequently can be God; but whatever can be God, of necessity is God, because God is immutable; therefore whatever can be in God, of necessity is God. But knowing *a* can be in God; therefore of necessity it is God, and therefore he simply necessarily knows *a*.

In addition, every perfection simply – absolute perfection – is of necessity in God; to know *a* is a perfection simply, because otherwise God would not be perfect if he did not know *a* formally, because he is not imperfect save by lacking some perfection simply.

As to the fifth question I argue for the negative:

Because this inference holds, ‘God knows *a*, therefore *a* will necessarily be’.

The antecedent is necessary. – Proof of the consequence, because a rational act is not canceled on account of the matter it passes over to, just as ‘to say’ is not canceled if it passes over to this, that ‘I am saying nothing’: for this inference holds, ‘I say that I am saying nothing, therefore I am saying something’; therefore, by similarity, ‘to know’ is not canceled on account of the matter it passes over to. Therefore since the ‘to know’ of God is simply necessary, it is not canceled or deprived of having this necessity by the fact it passes over to a contingent thing.

Besides, everything that God knows will be, will necessarily be; God knows *a* will be; therefore etc. – The major is true to the extent it is of what is necessary, because the predicate is of necessity in the subject; and the minor is about what is in a subject simply, because it is true for eternity; therefore a conclusion about the necessary follows.

To the opposite [sc. against the arguments adduced for the first three questions]:

*Epistle to the Hebrews* 4.13: “All things are naked and open to his eyes;” and look at the *Gloss* there [*Glossa Ordinaria*, “because they are fully seen from every side”]. Therefore he has determinate and certain knowledge of all things as to everything knowable in them; and immutable knowledge, as is plain, because nothing in him is mutable (from distinction 8 n.293).

To the opposite of the fourth question:

If God necessarily knew *a*, then *a* would be necessarily known – and if necessarily known then necessarily true. The consequent is false, so the antecedent is too.

To the opposite of the fifth question:

Being is divided into necessary being and contingent being; therefore the intellect, when understanding these according to their proper ideas, understands this thing as necessary and that thing as contingent (otherwise it would not understand them as they are such beings), and consequently the knowledge does not take away contingency as to the thing known.

### I. The Opinions of Others

#### A. First Opinion

As to these questions one position holds the certitude of divine knowledge – with respect to all things as to all conditions of existence – on account of the ideas that are posited in the divine intellect, and this on account of their perfection in representing, because they represent ‘the things of which they are’ not only in themselves but in every reason and relation of the extremes; and so they are in the divine intellect a sufficient reason, not only for simply apprehending the things patterned after the ideas, but also for apprehending every union of them and every mode of the patterned things pertaining to their existence.<sup>8</sup>

On the contrary:

The reasons of knowing the terms of some proposition that combines them are only a sufficient cause of knowing the combination if the combination is of a nature to be known from the terms; a contingent combination is not of a nature to be known from the terms, because it would then not only be necessary but also first and immediate; therefore the reasons of knowing the terms, however perfectly these reasons represent them, are not sufficient causes of knowing the contingent combination.

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<sup>8</sup> The Vatican editors were unable to find any author of this opinion.

In addition, the ideas purely naturally represent what they represent, and under the reason under which they represent anything; the proof of the fact is that the ideas are in the divine intellect before any act of the divine will, so that in no way are they there by act of the will; but whatever precedes the act of the will is purely natural. I take then the two ideas of the extremes that are represented in those ideas, for example the ideas of man and of white; I ask whether of themselves they represent the combination of the extremes, or the division of them, or both? If only the combination, then the divine intellect naturally knows it (and so knows in a necessary way), and consequently in no way does it know the division. And I raise a question in the same manner if the ideas only represent the division. If they represent both, then God knows nothing by them, because to know contradictories to be true simultaneously is to know nothing.

In addition, the ideas are of possible things in the same way as they are of future things, because the difference between ‘non-future possibles and future possibles’ is only by act of the divine will; therefore an idea of a future thing does not more represent that thing to be of necessity future than an idea of a possible thing does.

Further, an idea of a future thing will not represent it more by positing it to exist in this ‘now’ than by positing it to exist in that.

#### B. Second Opinion

Another position is that God has certain knowledge of future contingents by the fact that the whole flow of time, and all things that are in time, are present to eternity.<sup>9</sup>

The proof for this is from the fact that eternity is immense and infinite, and consequently, just as the immense is present at once to every place, so the eternal is present at once to the whole of time.<sup>10</sup>

And the point is made clear through examples, and one example indeed is ‘about the stick fixed in water’, that although the whole stream flows past the stick (and so the stick is present

<sup>9</sup> The Vatican editors refer to St. Thomas Aquinas, e.g. *ST* Ia q.14 a.13, *Sent.* I d.38 q.1 a.5, *De Veritate* q.2 a.12, *CG* I ch.66.

<sup>10</sup> The Vatican Editors refer this argument to Richard of Middleton, *Sent* I d.39 princ.1 q.1.

successively to all the parts of the stream), yet the stick is not immense with respect to the stream, because it is not present to the whole; therefore in the same way, if eternity were something standing (like the stick), past which time flowed, such that there was never present to it at once save a single instant of time (just as there is not present at once to the stick save one part of the stream), eternity would not be immense with respect to time.

There is also the confirmation that the ‘now’ of eternity is together with the ‘now’ of time, not coequal with it; therefore as it is together with this latter ‘now’ it exceeds it; but it would not exceed it unless – as it is together with this ‘now’ – it were together with another ‘now’.

There is also this confirmation, that if the whole of time could exist at once extrinsically, the ‘now’ of eternity would be at once present to the whole of time; but although it is repugnant to time – because of its succession – to exist at once, nothing of perfection is, because of this, taken away from eternity; therefore eternity itself is now equally present to the whole of time and to anything existing in time.

This is confirmed by another example ‘about the center in a circle’, because if ‘time flowing’ were posited to be the circumference of a circle and the ‘now’ of eternity were posited to be the center, then, however much of flux there was in time, the whole flux and any part of it would always be present to the center. Thus therefore all things that have to exist in any part of time (whether they are in this ‘now’ of time, or whether they are past or future), all of them are present with respect to the ‘now’ of eternity, – and thus what exists in eternity sees them as present because of such co-existence, just as I can see as present what in this instant I am seeing.

Against this opinion I argue:

First, by bringing back against them what they themselves adduce about immensity [sc. in the first proof for this opinion] – because once it is posited that space can continually increase to infinity (so that just as time is in continual flux so God continually expands space by its coming to be), yet the immensity of God would not be a reason for him to co-exist with any place (in any ‘now’) unless the place is existent; for God by his immensity does not co-exist with anything save what is in him, although he could create space outside the universe, and then by his immensity he would co-exist with it. If then immensity is not a reason for co-existing with a place save an actual

one and not a potential one (because a potential one does not exist), then by parity of reasoning eternity will not be a reason for co-existing with anything save what is existent; and this is what is argued, that ‘that which does not exist cannot co-exist with anything’, because ‘to co-exist’ states a real relation, but a relation is not real whose foundation is not real.

Again, if an effect has being in itself with respect to the first cause, it is simply in itself, because with respect to nothing does it have a truer being; hence that which is said to be such with respect to the first cause can be said simply to be such. If then something future is in act with respect to God, then it is simply in act; therefore it is impossible for it to be posited in act later.

Further, if my future sitting down (not only as to the entity which it has in knowable being but also as to that which it has in being of existence) is now present to eternity, then it has now been produced in that being by God, for nothing has from God existence in the flow of time unless it have been produced by God according to that being; but let God produce this sitting down (or the soul of Antichrist, which is the equivalent); then that which has already been produced by him will again be produced in being, and so it will be produced in being twice.

Further, this position does not seem to be of help for what it is posited for, namely for having certain knowledge of future things:

And first indeed because this sitting down, beside the fact that it is present to eternity according to its being in some part of time, is yet future in itself because of the fact it is future and needs to be produced by God. So I ask whether God has certain knowledge of it. If he does, then this is not from the fact that it already exists, but according to the fact that it is future, – and this certitude must be posited to come through something else, and this suffices for all certain knowledge of the existence of this thing. If he does not know it will be future with certitude, then he produces it without foreknowing it; but he will know it with certitude when he has produced it; therefore he knows in different ways things made and things to be made, which is against

*Augustine On Genesis V ch.18 n.36.*

Second, because the divine intellect receives no certitude from any object other than its own essence; for then it would be cheapened. Hence now too the divine intellect does not have certitude about my making, which is posited to be in act, in such a way that the making causes

about itself certitude in the divine intellect; for it does not move God's intellect. Therefore, in the same way, all temporal things – if they are in their own existence present to eternity according to those existences of theirs – fail to cause certitude about them in the divine intellect, but the divine intellect must have certain knowledge of them through something else about them, and that something else suffices for us.

Besides, they posit that angelic time (the 'aevum') is altogether simple, co-existent with the whole of time;<sup>11</sup> therefore an angel, who is in angelic time, is present to the whole flow of time and to all the parts of time; therefore an angel, it seems – according to this reason of theirs –, could naturally know future contingents.

### C. Third Opinion

A third position says that although some things be necessary with respect to divine knowledge, yet it does not follow that with respect to proximate causes they cannot be contingent.<sup>12</sup>

And it is confirmed from Boethius *Consolation of Philosophy* V prose 6, where he speaks thus: "If you say, 'that which God sees will come to be cannot not happen, – but that which cannot not happen happens of necessity', and if you constrict me to this term of 'necessity', I will reply: the same future thing, when it is referred to divine knowledge, is necessary – but when it is considered in its own nature, it is altogether free, etc."

In favor of this view the argument is also made that there can be imperfection in an effect from the proximate cause, although not from a remote or prior cause, – just as there is deformity in an act from a created will but not insofar as it is from the divine will; therefore sin is not reduced to God as to the cause, but it is imputed only to the created will. Although therefore there were, as far as concerns the part of God – who is the remote cause –, a necessity in things, yet there can, from their proximate causes, be contingency in them.

<sup>11</sup> The Vatican Editors refer to Aquinas *STI* q.10 a.5, *Sent. II* d.2 q.1 a.1.

<sup>12</sup> An opinion the Vatican Editors also attribute to Aquinas, *Sent I* d.38 q.1 a.5, *STI* q.14 a.13, *SG I* ch.67.

Against this an argument was given in distinction 2 nn.80, 85-86, where it was proved from the contingency of things that ‘God is understanding and willing’, because there can be no contingency in the causation of any cause with respect to its effect unless the first cause is contingently disposed to the cause next to it or to its own effect. Which proof, briefly, is from the fact that a moving cause – to the extent it is moved – is, if it is necessarily moved, necessarily a mover; therefore any second cause that produces insofar as it is moved by a first cause, if it is necessarily moved by the first cause, necessarily moves what is next to it or it necessarily produces its effect. The whole ordering of causes, then, right up to the ultimate effect, will produce necessarily if the disposition of the first cause to the cause next to it is necessary.

Further, a prior cause has respect to its effect naturally prior to a later cause [d.8 n.287]; therefore in that prior stage, if it have a necessary disposition to the effect, it will give it necessary existence. But in the second instant of nature the proximate cause cannot give it contingent existence, because it is already pre-understood to have from the first cause an existence repugnant to contingency; nor can you say that in the same instant of nature the two causes give existence to the caused thing, because the cannot be founded on that existence a necessary disposition to a cause perfectly giving existence and a contingent disposition to some other cause.

In addition, whatever is produced by posterior causes could be produced immediately by the first cause – and then it would have the same entity as it has now, and then it would be contingent as it is contingent now; therefore it has its own contingency even now from the first cause, and not only from the proximate cause.

Besides, God has produced many things immediately (as he created the world and now creates souls), and he has produced them all contingently.

## II. Scotus' own Response to the Questions

As to the solution to these questions one must proceed as follows: one must see first how there is contingency in things, and second how there stands along with this the certitude and immutability of divine knowledge about them.

## A. How there is Contingency in Things

### 1. Contingency in things is Evident and Manifest

As to the first point I say that the disjunction ‘necessary or possible’ is a property of being, speaking of convertible property [sc. property convertible with or true of being as such], just as there are many such unlimited properties in things [d.8 n.115]. But properties convertible with being – as more common – are said immediately of being, because being has a concept simply simple; and therefore there cannot be a middle term between being and its property, because there is no definition of either that could be the middle term. Also, if there is some non-first property of being, it is difficult to see by what prior thing, as by a middle term, it could be proved of being, because it is not easy to see an order in the properties of being; nor, if that order were known, would the propositions taken from the properties as premises seem to be much more evident than the conclusions.

But in the disjunct properties, although the whole disjunct cannot be demonstrated of being, yet – commonly – when the extreme that is less noble is supposed about some being, one can prove about some being some extreme that is more noble; just as this inference holds ‘if some being is finite, then some being is infinite’ and ‘if some being is contingent, then some being is necessary’, because in such cases a more imperfect extreme could not be in a being in particular unless the more perfect extreme, on which it would depend, were present in some other being.

But it does not in this way seem possible to demonstrate the more imperfect extreme of such a disjunction; for it is not the case that, if the more perfect extreme is in some being, therefore the more imperfect one is in some being (and this unless the disjunct extremes are correlatives, as cause and caused); so therefore one cannot demonstrate of being – through some prior middle term – the disjunction ‘necessary or contingent’. Nor even can this part of the disjunction – the part that is ‘contingent’ – be demonstrated of anything if ‘necessary’ is supposed of something; and so it seems that the proposition ‘some being is contingent’ is true first and not demonstrable by a demonstration ‘why’.

Hence the Philosopher, when arguing against necessity in the case of future events, does not make a deduction to something more impossible than the hypothesis, but to something impossible more manifest to us, namely that we need not bother about things or deliberate [see the opening arguments above].

And so those who deny such things need punishment or perception, because – according to Avicenna *Metaphysics* I ch.9 (74vab) – those who deny a first principle need to be flogged or exposed to fire until they admit that to be burned and not to be burned, to be flogged and not to be flogged, are not the same thing.<sup>13</sup> So too, those who deny that some being is ‘contingent’ should be exposed to torments until they concede that it is possible for them not to be tormented.

## 2. The Contingency in Things is because of the Contingent Causation of God

On the supposition, then, of this as it were manifest truth, that some being is contingent, – one must ask how contingency can be preserved in beings.

And I say – because of the first reason made against the third opinion (which is made more plain in distinction 2 in the question ‘On the existence of God’ [nn.80, 85-86]) – that no causation of any cause can be preserved as ‘contingent’ unless the first cause is posited as immediately causing contingently, and this by positing perfect causality in the first cause, the way Catholics do [d.42 n.9].

## 3. The Cause of Contingency in Beings is on the Part of the Divine Will

Now the first thing is a causer by intellect and will, and if a third executive power (different from these) is posited, it does not help the issue at hand, because if the first thing necessarily understands and wills, it necessarily produces. One must then look for this contingency

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<sup>13</sup> The Vatican Editors suitably quote Avicenna thus: “We must dismiss the obtuse to the flames, as long they hold that fire and not-fire are one – and we must make them suffer the pain of beatings, as long as they hold that to be pained and not to be pained are one... This principle, then, which we defend against those who falsify it, is the first of the principles of demonstration; but the philosopher should be the first to guard them.”

in the divine intellect or in the divine will. But not in the intellect as it has first act before every act of will, because whatever the intellect understands in this way it understands purely naturally and by natural necessity, – and so no contingency can be something in his knowing, or something in his understanding, which he does not know and does not understand by such first intellection.

The first contingency, then, must be looked for in the divine will, – and in order to see how it should be posited, one must first look in our own will, and at three things there: first, at what things there is liberty for in our will; second how possibility or contingency follows this liberty; and third, about the logical possibility of propositions, as to how possibility for opposites is expressed.

#### a. How our Will can be Cause of Contingency in Things

[What things there is liberty for in our will] – As to the first point, I say that the will, as to its first act, is free for opposite acts; it is also, by means of those opposite acts, free for opposite objects to which it tends, – and, further, to opposite effects which it produces.

The first liberty necessarily possesses some imperfection annexed to it, because it possesses passive potentiality and mutability in the will. The third liberty is not the second, because even if, *per impossibile*, it were to effect nothing outwardly, still – insofar as it is will – it could tend freely to objects. But the middle reason of liberty [sc. the second liberty] is without imperfection (nay it is necessary for perfection), because every perfect power can tend to everything that is of a nature to be object of such power; therefore a perfect will can tend to everything that is of a nature to be will-able. Therefore liberty without imperfection – insofar as it is free – is for opposite objects to which it tends, and accidental to this liberty as such is that it produce opposite effects.

[How contingency follows the liberty of our will] – About the second point I say that concomitant to this liberty is a single manifest power to opposites. For although there is not in it a power to will and not will at the same time (because this is a nothing), yet there is in it a power to will after not willing, or a power for a succession of opposite acts; and this power is manifest in all

mutable things, on the succession of opposites in them [sc. a white thing in moment *a* can be black in moment *b*].

Yet there is also another power (not as manifest) without any succession. For by positing that a created will only has being in one instant, and that in that instant it has this volition, it does not then necessarily have it. Proof: for if in that instant it did necessarily have it, then, since it is not a cause save in the instant when it would cause it, the will simply – when it is causing – would necessarily cause; for it is not a contingent cause now because it was pre-existent to the instant in which it causes (and then ‘as pre-existing’ it was able to cause or not cause), because just as this being, when it is, is necessary or contingent, so a cause, when it causes, causes then necessarily or contingently. So from the fact that in this instant it causes this willing, and not necessarily, then for that reason it causes contingently. This power, then, of the cause ‘for the opposite of what it causes’ is without succession.

Also this power, a real one, is a power of what is naturally prior (as first acts) to opposites that are naturally posterior (as second acts); for a first act, considered in the instant in which it is naturally prior to a second act, so posits the second in being – as its own contingent effect – that, as naturally prior, it could equally posit some other opposite in being.

Also concomitant to this real active power (naturally prior to what it produces) is logical power, which is non-repugnance of the terms. For to the will as first act, even when it is producing this willing, the opposite willing is not repugnant; both because the will is a contingent cause with respect to its effect, and so the opposite in idea of effect is not repugnant to it; and also because it is, as it is a subject, contingently disposed to this act as this act informs it, because to the subject the opposite of its ‘accident *per accidens*’ is not repugnant.

Concomitant to the liberty of our will, therefore, insofar as it is for opposite acts, is a power both to opposites successively and to opposites at the same instant, – that is, that either of the two can be present without the other, and so the second power is a real cause for act as it is naturally prior to logical power; but the fourth power – namely to opposites simultaneously – is not concomitant to it, because this fourth power is a nothing.

[About the logical distinction of propositions] – From this second point the third is plain, namely the distinguishing of this proposition ‘a will that is willing *a* is able not to will *a*’. For this is false in the composite sense, so as to signify the possibility of this proposition ‘a will that is willing *a* is not willing *a*’; it is true in the divided sense, so as to signify a possibility for opposites successively, because a will that is willing for moment *a* is able not to will for moment *b*.

But if we also take a proposition about the possible which unites extremes for the same instant, to wit this one, ‘a will that is not willing something for moment *a* is able to will it for moment *a*’, this proposition too must be distinguished according to composite and divided senses; and in the composite sense it is false, namely that there is a possibility that the will is simultaneously willing for moment *a* and not willing for moment *a*; the divided sense is true, namely so as to signify that in the will in which ‘willing for moment *a*’ is present there can be present ‘not willing for moment *a*’ – but it will not thus stand simultaneously, but ‘not willing’ will stand in this way, namely that then the ‘willing’ is not present.

And to understand this second distinction – which is more obscure – I say that in the composite sense there is a single categorical proposition, whose subject is this ‘a will not willing for moment *a*’ and whose predicate is ‘willing for moment *a*’; and then this predicate is being attributed as possible to a subject it is repugnant to, and consequently what is being indicated as possible to the subject is impossible to the subject. In the divided sense there are two categorical propositions, asserting of the will two predicates; in one proposition, about actual presence in the subject, there is asserted of the will the predicate ‘not willing *a*’ (which categorical proposition is understood by implicit composition of the terms); in the other categorical proposition, about possible presence in the subject, there is asserted as possible of the will the predicate ‘willing *a*’. And these two propositions are verified, because they are signified as attributing to the subjects their own predicates for the same instant; and this indeed is true, for to this will there does in the same instant belong not willing *a*, along with the possibility of the opposite, willing *a*, just as actual presence is signified along with possible presence.

An example of this distinction is found in the proposition ‘all men who are white run’ – which, once the case is posited that all the white men are running (and none of the black men or

the men colored in between), is true in the composite sense and false in the divided sense; in the composite sense there is one proposition, possessing one subject, which is determined by the term ‘white’ [sc. ‘all the white men’]; in the divided sense there are two propositions, asserting two predicates of the same subject [sc. ‘all men are white’ and ‘all men run’]. Similarly in this case ‘man who is white is necessarily an animal’; which in the composite sense is false, because the predicate does not belong necessarily to the whole of this subject [sc. ‘white man’<sup>14</sup>]; in the divided sense it is true, because two predicates are indicated as said of the same subject (one necessarily [sc. ‘man is necessarily an animal’] and the other absolutely, without necessity [sc. ‘man is white’]), and both predicates belong and both these categorical propositions are true.

But against this second distinction there is argument in three ways, that it is not a logical one and that it is not the case that some power is for any instant for the opposite of what is in it at that instant.

The first argument is from the proposition in *De Interpretatione* 9.91a23-24: “Everything that is, when it is, necessarily is.”

The second is from this rule of the art of disputation [‘ars obligatoria’]: “When a false contingent is posited of the present instant, one must deny that it is.” Which rule he proves [Giles of Sherwood] by the fact that what is posited must be maintained as true; therefore it must be maintained for any instant for which it is possible; but it is not ‘a true possible’ for the instant for which it is posited, because if it were possible for that instant then it would be able to be true by motion or by change; but in neither way, because motion is not in an instant, and change is not in any instant for the opposite of what is then in it, because change and the end of change would be simultaneous.

Further, third: if for any instant there is power for something whose opposite is present, that power is either along with act or prior to act; not along with act, as is plain – nor prior to act, because then it would be for act in a different instant from that in which the power is present in it.

To the first of these I reply that that proposition of Aristotle can be categorical or hypothetical, just as also this one, ‘that an animal runs, if a man runs, is necessary’. This

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<sup>14</sup> Tr. ‘Animal’ does necessarily belong to man, but to man qua man and not to man qua white.

proposition, indeed, according as it is conditional, is to be distinguished according as ‘necessary’ can state the necessity of the consequence [sc. the whole ‘if...then...’ conditional] or the necessity of the consequent [sc. the ‘then...’]; in the first way it is true, in the second way it is false.

According as it is categorical, the whole remark ‘...runs if man runs’ is predicated of animal along with the mode of necessity, – and this categorical [sc. ‘that an animal runs if man runs is necessary’] is true, because a predicate so determined [sc. ‘...runs if man runs’] is necessarily present in the subject, although it is not a predicate absolutely; and therefore to argue in that case from the predicate so determined to the predicate taken absolutely is the fallacy of in a certain respect and simply [sc. to argue: ‘that an animal runs if man runs is necessary, therefore that an animal runs is necessary’].

I say the same here, that if this proposition [sc. of Aristotle’s above] is taken as it is a hypothetical of time, the term ‘necessity’ indicates either the necessity of concomitance or the necessity of the concomitant; as it indicates the necessity of concomitance it is true [sc. ‘it is necessary that everything is when it is’], – as of the concomitant it is false [sc. ‘everything that is necessary when it is’]. But if the proposition is taken as it is a categorical then the phrase ‘when it is’ does not determine the combination implicit in the phrase ‘[everything] that is’ but it determines the principal composition, which is signified by the phrase ‘is [necessary]’ – and then the predicate ‘is when it is’ is denoted as being said of the subject ‘that is’ along with the mode of necessity, and thus the proposition is true [sc. ‘it is necessary that everything that is is when it is’]; nor does the inference follow ‘therefore it is necessary’ [sc. ‘everything that is is necessary when it is’], but there is a fallacy of in a certain respect and simply in the other part [sc. from ‘is necessary when it is’ to ‘is necessary’].<sup>15</sup> No true sense of this proposition, then, denotes that the being of something – in the instant in which it is – is necessary, but only that it is necessary in a certain respect, namely when it is; along with this there stands the fact that, in the instant in which it is, it is simply contingent, and consequently that in that instant the opposite of it could be present.

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<sup>15</sup> Nowadays logicians would explain this point by talking of the scope of the modal term ‘necessary’, that either it takes the whole proposition for its scope, so that it means: “the proposition ‘everything is when it is’ is necessary;” or it takes only the predicate for its scope, so that it means in effect: “everything that is exists with necessary existence when it exists.”

To the second: that rule [of the art of disputation or ‘ars obligatoria’] is false and the proof is not valid, for although what is posited should be maintained as true, yet it can be maintained for that instant without denying that the instant is one for which it is false, because this inference does not hold, ‘it is false for that instant, therefore it is impossible’, as the proof insinuates; and when it says ‘if it can be true for the instant for which it is false, it can be made true for that instant either[by motion or change], etc.’, I say that neither by this way nor by that, because the possibility for its truth is not a possibility along with succession (as one thing after another thing), but it is power for the opposite of that which is in something insofar as the power is naturally prior to the act.

To the third I say that there is power before the act; not ‘before’ in duration but ‘before’ in order of nature – because that which naturally precedes the act, as it naturally precedes the act, could be with the opposite of the act. And one must deny that every power is ‘with act or before act’, understanding the ‘before’ of priority in duration; but it is true when understanding by the ‘before’ priority of nature.

A fourth objection is raised against this [sc. the second distinction]:

That ‘if it is able to will  $a$  for this instant and it does not will  $a$  for this instant, then it is able not to will  $a$  for this instant’, because on a proposition about presence of the predicate in the subject there follows a proposition about possible presence; and then it seems to follow that it could will  $a$  and not will  $a$  at the same instant simultaneously.

To this I reply – according to the Philosopher *Metaphysics* 9.5.1048a21-24 – that what has a power for opposites will do as it has the power to do; but not as it has a power of doing such that the mode is referred to the term of the power and not to the power itself, because I have a power at the same time for opposites but not for opposites at the same time.

Then I say that this inference does not hold ‘[a power] is able to will this in moment  $a$  and able not to will this in moment  $a$ , therefore it is able to will and not will this in moment  $a$ ’, because the power has ability for either of the opposites disjunctively at any instant, though not for both of them simultaneously; for just as there is a possibility for one of them, so there is for the not being of the other of them – and conversely, as it is for the latter so it is for the not being of the

former. So it is not simultaneously for the being of this opposite and for the being of that, because a possibility for simultaneity would only exist if it were for both concurrently in the same instant, which is not got by the power's being for each divisively at the same instant.

An example of this is plain in permanent things: the inference 'this body can be in this place at instant *a*, and that body can be in the same place at instant *a*, therefore these two bodies can be together at instant *a*' is a non sequitur; for this body is able to be there in the way that that body is able not to be there (and conversely), and so the inference 'if there is a power for each at the same instant or place, then for both' does not hold, but it is fallacious whenever any one of the two excludes the other. For in this way too the inference 'I am able to carry this stone all day (let it be something portable, proportionate to my strength), and I am able to carry that stone all day, therefore I am able simultaneously to carry both' is a non sequitur; it is a non sequitur because here either of the two for which there is power divisively excludes the other. But simultaneity can never be inferred solely from the identity of this one instant or place, but there is need along with this for the two things said to be simultaneous to be conjoined with respect to a third.

#### b. How the Divine Will is Cause of Contingency in Things

Following on from what has just been said about our will, one must look at certain things about the divine will; and first, what it has liberty for; second what is the contingency with respect to willed things (the third, namely as to logical distinction of propositions, is the same here as there).

[What the divine will has liberty for] – As to the first point I say that the divine will is not indifferent as to diverse acts of willing and not willing, because this in our will was not without imperfection of will. Our will also was free for opposite acts so that it might be for opposite objects, because of the limitation of each act with respect to its object; therefore, once unlimitedness of the same volition to diverse objects is posited, there is no need, on account of liberty for opposite objects, to posit liberty for opposite acts. The divine will is also free for opposite effects, but this is not the first liberty, just as it is not the first in us either.

There remains then the liberty that is per se a matter of perfection without imperfection, namely to oppose objects such that, just as our will can, by diverse volitions, tend to diverse willed things, so the divine will can, by a single, unlimited, simple volition tend to any willed thing whatever, – so that, if the will or the volition were for only one will-able thing and could not be of the opposite (which is, however, of itself something will-able), this would be a mark of imperfection in the will, as was proved earlier about our will.

And although one can distinguish in us the will as it is receptive and as it is operative and as it is productive (for it is productive of acts, and by what it has it operates formally by willing, and it is receptive of its own volition), yet it seems to have liberty insofar as it is operative, namely insofar as ‘having freedom formally’ it can thereby tend to the object; so let liberty be thus posited in the divine will per se and first, insofar as it is an operative power, although it is not receptive nor productive of its own volition. And yet some freedom insofar as it is productive can be preserved in it; for although production in being of existence is not necessarily concomitant with its operation (because operation is in eternity and production of being is in time), yet production in willed being is necessarily concomitant to its operation; and this power of the divine will does not then indeed produce first as it is productive, but produces in a certain respect (namely in willed being), and this production is concomitant with it as it is operative.

[What the contingency of willed things is] – As to the second article, I say that the divine will has respect to nothing else as object than to its own essence; and this when considering it as it is a naturally prior tendency to the opposite. And not only is it naturally prior to its own act (as to its volition), but also insofar as it is willing, because just as our will, as naturally prior to its own act, elicits the act in such a way that it could in the same instant elicit the opposite, – so the divine will, insofar as it is naturally prior by volition alone, tends with such a tendency to the object contingently that it could in the same instant tend to the opposite object; and this both by logical potency, which is the non-repugnance of the terms (as was said of our will), and by real power, which is naturally prior to its act.

#### B. How along with the Contingency of Things there stands the Certainty of Divine Knowledge

Having looked at the contingency of things as to existence, and this when considering it with respect to the divine will – it remains to look at the second principal point, how the certitude of knowledge stands along with it.

This can be posited in two ways:

In one way by the fact that the divine intellect, when seeing the determination of the divine will, sees that this thing will be at time *a*, because the will determines it will be at that time; for it knows the will is immutable and cannot be prevented.

Or in a second way. Because the former way seems to posit a certain discursiveness in the divine intellect (as if it concludes from intuiting the determination of the will and its immutability that this thing will be), one can posit in a second way that the divine intellect either offers [sc. to the will] the simple terms of which the union is contingent in reality, or – if it offers the proposition uniting them – if offers it as neutral to itself; and the will, by choosing one side, namely the conjunction of these terms for some ‘now’ in reality, makes the following to be determinately true: ‘this will exist at moment *a*’. But when this ‘determinately true’ is in existence, the essence is the reason for the divine intellect of understanding this truth, and this naturally (as far as it is on the part of the essence), so that, just as the divine intellect naturally understands all necessary principles in advance as it were of an act of the divine will (because the truth of them does not depend on the intellect’s act and because they would be known by the divine intellect if, *per impossibile*, there was not something willing them), so the divine essence is the reason of knowing them in that prior stage, because they are then true; not indeed that the truths – nor even their terms – move the divine intellect to apprehend such truth (because then the divine intellect would be cheap, because then the truth would be revealed by something other than its own essence), but the divine essence is the reason of knowing the terms just as also for knowing the sort of propositions that join them; but then they are not true contingents, because there is then nothing by which they may have determinate truth; but when the determination of the divine will has been posited, they are then true in that instant, and the same thing – the same as was in the first moment – will be the reason for the divine intellect of knowing the things that are now true in the

second instant and that would have been known in the first instant, if they had then been in the first instant.

An example: it is just as if ‘a single act always in place’ in my seeing power is the reason of seeing the object, if now this color is present by another thing presenting it and now that color, – my eye will see now this, now that, and yet there will, through the same vision, be only a difference in priority and posteriority of seeing, because it is of the object that is first or later presented; and if one color were made present naturally and the other freely, there would be no difference formally in my vision so to prevent the eye, for its part, from seeing both naturally, yet it could see one contingently and the other naturally, insofar as one is made present to it contingently and the other necessarily.

In whichever of these ways the divine intellect is posited as knowing the existence of things, it is plain that – according to each of them – there is a determination of the divine intellect to the existent thing to which the divine will is determined, and that there is a certitude of infallibility (because the will cannot be determined without the intellect determinately apprehending what the will determines), and also an immutability (because both the will and the intellect are immutable, from distinction 8 n.293), – and this in response to the first three questions [at the beginning]. And yet along with these [sc. determination, infallibility, immutability] there stands contingency of the known object, because the will, when it determinately wills this, contingently wills it – from the first article [sc. of Scotus’ own response to the questions].

As to the fourth question [sc. whether God necessarily knows every condition of existence of everything], it seems one should perhaps distinguish this proposition ‘God necessarily knows *a*’ according to a composite and a divided sense – as that in the composite sense necessity of knowledge is indicated as it passes over to the object, and in the divided sense necessity of knowledge is indicated absolutely, which knowledge however does pass over to this object; in the first way it is false, in the second way true.

However such a distinction does not seem a logical one, because, when the act passes over to the object, there seems to be no distinction as to the act absolutely or as to it as it passes over to the object, – to wit, if I say ‘I see Socrates’, because there may be a distinction either as to

sight as it passes over to Socrates or as to sight absolutely, which sight is however of Socrates; and just as there is in the former case [sc. in the proposition ‘God necessarily knows *a*’] no distinction in a proposition about mere assertion [sc. ‘God knows *a*’], so neither does there seem to be a distinction when the modal term is appended [sc. ‘(God) necessarily (knows *a*)’], but a distinction only seems necessary if the act passes over to the object necessarily; and so this proposition ‘God necessarily knows *a*’ should, it seems, simply be denied, because of the fact that the predicate as so determined [sc. ‘necessarily knows’] does not necessarily belong to the subject, although the non-determined predicate [sc. ‘knows’, without the ‘necessarily’] does belong to it.

An objection against this is that a rational act is not canceled by the matter it passes over to; for a ‘to say’ which passes over to ‘[I say] that I am saying nothing’ is as simply a ‘to say’ as when it passes over to ‘[I say] that I am saying something’; and therefore the inference ‘I say that I am saying nothing, therefore I say [something]’ follows just as does the inference ‘I say that I am sitting, therefore I say [something]’. Therefore, in the case of God, ‘to know’ is not so canceled by the matter it passes over to that it prevents an equal necessity [sc. that it prevents adding ‘necessarily’ to ‘God knows’].

In response to this objection. Although the proposition [about God’s knowledge] is not so canceled that it stands only in a certain respect, yet it can fail to have necessity as it is signified to pass over to the matter (although it has necessity in itself), and this if an act that is most powerful in itself has respect to diverse objects; it is just as if I had an act of speaking that was the same as a motive power, and if the act could pass over to diverse objects contingently – although I would have the act necessarily (just as I would also have the power necessarily), yet I would not necessarily have the act as it is a passing over to such an object; nor does the inference hold ‘I am speaking necessarily, therefore I am necessarily saying this’, nay there could be a necessity of the speaking in itself along with a contingency in respect of the object; yet saying this object would be a saying simply, such that it would not be a saying in a certain respect.

### III. To the Principal Arguments

To the principal arguments, in order.

To the first one for the first question, I say that there is not a like truth in propositions about the future as about those of the present and the past. In present and past ones, indeed, there is determinate truth, such that one extreme has been posited, – and, as understood to be posited, it is not in the power of the cause that it be posited or not posited, because although it is in the power of the cause ‘as it is naturally prior to the effect’ to posit or not to posit the effect, yet not as the effect is understood to have already been posited in existence. But there is no such determination on the part of the future, because even if one side is determinately true for some intellect (and even if one side is true in itself, determinately, although no intellect should apprehend it), yet not in such a way that it is not in the power of the cause at that instant to posit the opposite. And this lack of determination suffices for deliberating and bothering about things; if neither side were future, there would be no need to bother or deliberate – therefore, the fact that one side is future, while yet the other side could happen, does not impede deliberation and bothering about things.

To the second argument I say that for knowledge to be of one part such that it could not be of the other does posit imperfection in it – and similarly in the case of will, if one posit that it is of one will-able object such that it could not be of another will-able object; yet for knowledge to be of one side such that it is not in fact of the other (and likewise in the case of the will) posits no imperfection, the way a power in act is determinately of one opposite – which it produces – and not of the other. But a power is dissimilar to knowledge and will in this respect, that a power seems to be asserted of one opposite only because it only has power for it, and knowledge and will [are asserted of one opposite] such that they only know it or will it; but if things are taken in like manner on each side, there is equal determination on each side, because each of them in act is of one opposite and not both. Any of them can also be of each, but that the power is of one, this seems to signify a potential disposition of the power to it, – that knowledge or will are of it, seems to signify an actual disposition of them to it; but nothing bad seems to follow if things are taken in like way both here and there, because then, just as ‘to know’ is to knowledge and ‘to will’ is to will, so is ‘to produce’ to power (but not ‘able to produce’), and just as ‘able to produce’ is to power so is ‘able to know’ to knowledge and ‘able to will’ to will.

To the second argument for the second question I say that although on the two propositions about presence of the predicate in the subject the conclusion about the presence of the predicate follows (not indeed syllogistically, because the discussion is not syllogistic, reducible to many syllogisms), yet from the one proposition about presence and from the other about possibility a conclusion about presence follows neither syllogistically nor necessarily; the reason is that ‘to be deceived’ is to think a thing other than it is, at the time when it is believed to be. Now this is included in the two premises about presence, one of which signifies that he believes this and the other denies that this is the case, and this at the same instant, – and therefore the conclusion about being deceived follows. But it is not so on the other side, because the premise about presence affirms one opposite for that instant, and the other about possibility affirms a potential for the other opposite, not at the same instant conjointly but divisively, – and so it does not follow that at any instant there can be a conjunction in reality of the opposite of what is believed; and therefore a possibility of deception, which includes this conclusion, does not follow. The same reasoning holds of a mixed argument of a premise about a contingent and one about presence, that it does not hold unless the major is about presence simply.

This response is also plain, because if an argument is made from the opposite of the conclusion and from the premise about possibility, the opposite is not inferred save of something of necessity, and so the major should be really the same as that about the necessary in order for the conclusion to be inferred; for this inference does not hold ‘God cannot be deceived, and it is possible that *a* will be, therefore God does not know that *a* will be’, but what follows is ‘therefore he does not know necessarily that *a* will be’; the point is clear, because if my intellect always followed change in the thing, such that when you are sitting I believe you are sitting and when you rise up I believe you rise up, I could not be deceived, and yet from these premises ‘you are sitting at moment *a*’ and ‘I cannot be deceived’ all that follows is ‘therefore I do not know necessarily you are sitting at moment *a*’. So it is in the issue at hand: although the divine intellect does not follow the thing as an effect the cause, yet there is concomitance there, because just as it is possible for the thing not to be, so it is possible for the divine intellect not to know it – and so the conclusion never follows that the divine intellect knows the thing other than it is; and therefore the

things required for deception can never stand together at the same time, but just as the known thing is able not to be, so God is able not to know it, – and if it will not be, he will not know it.

As to the second, about the positing of the possible in actual presence, I say that from this positing in itself nothing impossible ever follows; yet the proposition about presence, insofar as the one about the possible is posited, can be repugnant to something to which the one about the possible, when posited in existence, is not repugnant, because the antecedent can be repugnant to something to which the consequent is not repugnant – and then from the antecedent and from what is repugnant to it something impossible can follow that does not follow from the consequent and from that same repugnant one, because this is not incompossible with it. Nor is it surprising that the impossible may follow from incompossibles, because according to the Philosopher *Prior Analytics* 2.15.64b7-10, 15-16, in the case of a syllogism ‘from opposites’ an impossible conclusion does follow.

I say then that when the proposition ‘it is possible for me not to be sitting’ is posited, nothing impossible follows from it alone; but from it and another one – namely ‘God knows that I will be sitting’ – the impossible does follow, namely that God is deceived; and this impossible does not follow from the impossibility of what is posited in being, nor even from any incompossibility that is absolute in it, but from itself and from something else at the same time, which is impossible. Nor is it unacceptable for what is impossible to follow from a proposition about presence, insofar as one about possibility and one about presence are posited – because along with ‘I am sitting’ there stands ‘it is possible for me to be standing’; but the former one about presence, to the extent the latter [about possibility] is posited, is repugnant to the one about presence [sc. ‘I am standing’] – and from two propositions about presence something incompossible does follow, namely ‘someone standing is sitting’. Nor yet does the inference follow ‘therefore the one that was posited about possibility in being was false’, but either it was false or the other (along with which the first’s about presence [sc. ‘I am standing’] is taken) is incompossible with the first’s about presence.

As to the first argument for the third question, I concede the major, because there is no transition without change – but in the minor I say that here there is no transition (nor can there be),

because transition is impossible without succession, such that opposite succeed to opposite; but such succession is impossible in the issue at hand; for just as it is impossible to know and not know at the same time, so too that [God] sometimes knows and sometimes does not know cannot stand together, – without which transition successively from opposite to opposite there is no change.

And if you ask ‘if it is at any rate possible for him not to know *b*, which he does know, he would be differently disposed, – what is that?’, I say that it is *b* in known being; yet he is not differently disposed than he was before, but differently than he now is disposed, such that the ‘differently’ would not be of some opposite succeeding to opposite, but it would be of the other of the opposites which can be present in the same instant in which its opposite is present, – and this does not suffice for change.

To the second: the inference ‘he does not know *a*, he can know *a*, therefore he can begin to know *a*’ is not valid, and this when there is power precisely for something naturally prior to the opposite of the posterior, at the same instant at which and in which this ‘posterior’ has contingent being, as in the issue at hand; only it holds because of matter in creatures, where there is potentiality for opposites successively – but although it is not the case, yet there is still a possibility for each of them in the same instant.

To the third, one can concede, as concerns this argument, that this power for opposites is an active power, – namely that the divine intellect, insofar as it is in act by its essence and by actual infinite intellection, is an active power with respect to any objects that it produces in understood being.

And when it says ‘therefore it cannot act about anything about which it did not act before unless it changes’, I say that the consequence is not valid when it requires an object about which to act; just as in the case of created agents, it is not necessary that the agent – which acts *de novo* – be changed if the passive thing on which it acts comes to be *de novo* next to it. So it is in the issue at hand. The divine will, determining a ‘will be’ for something shown by the intellect, makes a proposition stating it to be true and so intelligible; from this it is present to the intellect in idea of object. And just as the will can make and not make the willed object, so can it be true and not true,

and so can it be known and not known by the natural intellect; not indeed because of some contingency that is prior in the natural agent, but because of contingency on the part of the object, which is contingently true by act of the will that verifies it.

And if you object that still it cannot be without change, at least in the understood object (just as neither can a passive natural object come near to a natural agent without change in the passive object, and perhaps in the agent that brings it near) – I reply that this object is not changed in this being, because it cannot be under opposites successively; yet it is contingently in this being, and this contingency is on the part of the will producing it in such being, as was made clear in the first article of the solution.

To the arguments for the fourth question.

As to the first, I deny the consequence.

As to the first proof, I say that if there is in God no necessity but that of immutability (that is, no other mode of necessity among those posited by the Philosopher, *Metaphysics* 5.5.1015a33-35, than the fourth one, according to which it is a ‘not happening to be otherwise disposed’, – because the other modes of necessity require imperfection, as the necessity of coercion etc.), yet there is not there only a necessity of immutability such that the immutability is of itself necessary, because immutability only takes away a possible succession of opposite to opposite; but necessity simply takes away absolutely the possibility of this opposite and the non-succession of the opposite to it, – and the inference does not hold ‘the opposite cannot succeed to the opposite, therefore the opposite cannot be present’.

To the second proof, I say that although every being of existence ‘able to come to be’ is changeable, when positing that creation according to the understanding of Avicenna – even from eternity – is change, yet in understood being or willed being (which is to be in a certain respect) there is no need for every possibility that is repugnant to ‘necessity of itself’ formally to entail mutability, because this being is not real being but is reduced to the real being of something in itself necessary, because of which other’s necessity there cannot here be mutability, although the ‘necessity of itself’ of this other does not formally belong to the former; and so it is not of itself necessary formally, because it does not have the being of the extreme which it has regard to really

– nor yet is it changeable, because it has, according to that ‘diminished being’, regard to the immutable extreme, and change in something according to which it has regard to another cannot exist without change in it.

As to the second argument, I say that something can be present in God in two ways: either formally, – or present subjectively, the way logically any predicate is said to be present in its subject. I concede the major in the first way, because everything such is God and is necessarily the same as God; in the second way I do not concede it, because a relative appellation can be in God according as God is said to be ‘Lord’ from time, and yet this appellation does not signify anything the same as God (such that it is necessarily the same as God or is God himself), because then it would not be from time. Now I say that for God to know *b*, by reason of the fact that it is a ‘to know absolutely’, is to know formally – but, by reason of ‘to know’ as it is of this term, it is only in God in the second way; for it is of this term because this known thing has a regard to divine knowledge, and hereby some relative appellation is in God as a predicate in a subject.

To the third I say that no ‘perfection simply’ in God depends on a creature, nor does it even necessarily simply co-require a creature, in any being whatever; and so for God to know *b*, as he is understood not only ‘to know’ absolutely but also insofar as he passes over to the *b*, is not a perfection simply. Then I say that the major of the argument is true of the perfection of that knowledge when the perfection is taken absolutely; but in this way the minor is false and its proof only proves that on a perfection simply follows necessarily that it is of such an object, because it follows necessarily that it have such a respect to such a perfection simply – although however neither from such respect of something else to it, nor from a relative appellation of it, is there a perfection simply in it.

To the arguments for the fifth question.

As to the first, I say that the antecedent is not necessary simply. And when the proof is given that ‘a rational act is not canceled by the matter’, the response to that proof is in the argument made against the solution to this question.

As to the second. The mixed argument is not valid unless the minor is about presence simply, and this not only in that it is true for all time, but in that it is necessarily true; and perhaps

it must be that it signify that what is taken ‘under’ is *per se* contained under the middle term (it is enough for the issue at hand that it should be necessarily true). And that this is required is plain in this instance ‘everything at rest is of necessity not in motion – a stone at the center of the earth is at rest, therefore of necessity it is not in motion’; the conclusion does not follow, and yet the minor is always true, – not however necessarily true. So it is in the issue at hand: for although the minor about presence is always true, it is not however necessarily true; for God can know *a* as he cannot will *a*, because of the contingency that is first in the will to secondary objects and is, from this, concomitantly in the intellect, as was expounded above.

#### IV. To the Arguments for the Second Opinion

To the arguments for the second opinion.

To the first I concede that immensity is present to every place, but not to every place actual and potential (as is argued in the first reason against this opinion), and so neither will eternity because of its infinity be present to any non-existent time.

And from this is plain the example about the stick and the stream. For because the stick does not have that whereby it can be present to all parts of the water, therefore it cannot be immense with respect to them; but the ‘now’ of eternity does have this, as far as concerns its own part, because it would be present to all parts of time if these parts existed.

The other example ‘about circle and circumference’ is like the opposite one [sc. about the stick and stream]. Because if we imagine a straight line having two end points *a* and *b*, let point *a* be stationary and point *b* be moved round in a circle (as in the case of a compass where one leg is stationary and the other moves), and let *b* when moved around cause a circumference as imagined by geometers, who imagine that a moving point causes a line; on this supposition, if nothing were to remain of the circumference from the moving of *b*, but there is only this point *b* in the circumference (so that whenever the point ceases to be anywhere there is then nothing of the circumference there), then the circumference is never simultaneously present to the center, but only some point of the circumference would be present to the center; but if the whole

circumference were simultaneous, the whole would be present to the center. So here: since time is not a standing but a flowing circumference, of which circumference there is nothing but an instant in act – so nothing of it will be present to eternity (which is as it were the center) save the instant which is as it were the present; and yet if *per impossibile* one were to posit that the whole of time were standing simultaneously, the whole would be present to eternity as to the center.

From this is plain an answer to the other argument. When it is said that the ‘now’ of eternity, as it co-exists, does not equal the ‘now’ of time – this is true, because the ‘now’ of eternity is formally infinite, and therefore it formally exceeds the ‘now’ of time; not however by co-existing with another ‘now’. Just as: the immensity of God – present to this universe – is not co-equal with this universe, and so exceeds it formally; but yet it is not anywhere save in this universe.

From the same point is plain a response to the next: because if the whole of time were simultaneous, eternity would embrace it, – and so I concede that eternity, as it is of itself, has infinity enough for embracing the whole of time if the whole were simultaneous; but however much immensity is posited on the part of one extreme, because of which it could co-exist with however much in the other extreme, since co-existence states a relation between two extremes (and so it requires both), one cannot, because of the immensity of one extreme, conclude to co-existence with the other extreme save only with what exists of the other extreme.

[Additional note: Hence there is in the argument a fallacy of the consequent, since the argument goes ‘nothing is lost to eternity from the fact that the whole of time is not simultaneous, therefore it can, because of its infinity, be simultaneous with all the parts of time’. For that it is not present to every part of time can be understood for two causes: either because the whole of time is not, or because something is lost to eternity; and in the antecedent one cause is denied – therefore the fallacy follows. Example: although nothing is lost to someone who is white when there is someone else who is white, yet he is never alike unless there is someone else who is white.]

And therefore all these arguments proceed from what is insufficient, namely from the immensity of eternity, – from which there does not follow a co-existence that states a relation to the other extreme unless something is had in the other extreme that could be the term of co-

existence with this foundation; and such cannot be a non-being, of the sort that all time is save the present.

#### V. To the Authorities of the Saints

All the authorities of the saints, that seem to signify that all things are present to eternity, must be understood of presence in the idea of knowable; and not merely ‘knowable’ as by abstractive knowledge (as a non-existent rose is present to my intellect through an image), but by true intuitive knowledge, because God does not know made things differently from to be made things, and so things to be made are perfectly presently known by the divine intellect just as made things are.

#### VI. To the Arguments for the Third Opinion

To the first argument for the third opinion: Boethius expounds himself in the same place directly; for there he at once immediately distinguishes between the necessity of the consequent and the necessity of the consequence, and from this I concede that contingent things ‘related to divine knowledge’ are necessary by the necessity of the consequence (that is, this consequence is necessary, ‘if God knows that these things will be, these things will be’); but they are not necessary with absolute necessity, nor with the necessity of the consequent.

To the other one for the third opinion, I say that contingency is not only a privation or defect of entity (as deformity is in the act that is a sin), rather contingency is a positive mode of being (as necessity is another mode), and a positive being – which is in the effect – is more principally from the prior cause; and therefore this inference does not hold ‘just as deformity is in the act itself from the second cause, not from the first cause, so also is contingency;’ nay, contingency is from the first cause more originally than from the second, – for which reason no caused thing would be formally contingent unless it was contingently caused by the first cause, as was shown above.

## Fortieth Distinction

### Single Question

*Whether a Predestined Person can be Damned*

1. About the fortieth distinction I ask whether a predestined person can be damned.

That he cannot be:

Everything past is simply necessary, because – according to the Philosopher *Ethics* 6.2.1139b9-11 – “God is deprived of this alone, to make undone what has been done;” but the predestination of this predestined person has transitioned into the past, because God predestined him from eternity; therefore it is simply necessary. Therefore God cannot not predestinate him, and consequently he cannot be damned.

2. Further, if a predestined person could be damned, this would only be through his own act; therefore by an act of a created will an act of the divine will could be impeded, which is impossible

3. On the contrary:

If a predestined person cannot be damned, then no one need take care to observe the precepts and the counsels, because however he acts he will be saved, if he is predestined – and however he acted, if he is fore-known, he would be damned. The whole divine law then is set down in vain!

## I. To the Question

4. To this question.

‘Predestination’ properly states an act of the divine will, namely ordination by the divine will of a choice of some intellectual or rational creature for grace and glory, although it can be taken for the act of intellect concomitant with that choice. Therefore, as has been said in general about liberty and contingency in the divine will with respect to certain special secondary objects [see preceding interpolation for dd. 38-39], so should one say with respect to this secondary object, that is ‘to will for this person grace and glory’.

5. And from this I say (because of what was said in the preceding question [sc. the preceding interpolation]) that God contingently predestines him whom he has predestined, and he is able not to predestine him, – not both at the same time or successively, but each divisively, in the instant of eternity.

6. I say likewise to the question in itself, that he who is predestined could be damned; for his will is not confirmed because of his predestination, – and thus he can sin, and thus by parity of reason he can stand finally in sin and so be justly damned; but just as he is able to be damned so he is able not to be predestined.

7. But as to the logic of the proposed proposition, one must distinguish it according to composition and division; and in the composite sense the *per se* extreme is a man or person predestined, under the determination ‘predestined’, – and this sense is false; and in the divided sense too there are two categoricals, and of a person able to be beatified is asserted in one categorical ‘to be predestined’ and in the other ‘able to be

damned', – and these two are true of the same subject. They are not for this reason true, that opposites can be simultaneous, nor even because one can succeed the other (because each exists in eternity), but they are true simultaneously insofar as the divine volition is considered as naturally prior to its passage over this object, which is 'glory for this person'; in that prior stage there is naturally no repugnance for the divine will to be of the opposite object, nay, it could be of the opposite equally, though not of both simultaneously.

## II. To the Principal Arguments

8. To the first argument [n.1] I say that it proceeds from a false imagination, the understanding of which imagination helps to understand the truth of the proposed question; for if *per impossibile* we were to understand that God had still not determined his will to one of the two sides, but was as it were deliberating whether he wished to predestine this person or not, our intellect could well grasp that he would contingently predestine or not predestine him, as is plain in an act of our will; but because we always go back to an act of the divine will as if it were past, for that reason we do not as it were conceive the liberty in the divine will for an act that has as it were already been posited by the will. But this imagination is false; for the 'now' of eternity, in which the act exists, is always present; and so one must have an understanding of the divine will or its volition, as it is of this object, the way one would if *per impossibile* God were now to begin to have a will in this 'now', – and thus God can in the 'now' of eternity freely will what he wills, as if his will were not determined to anything.

9. Then I say to the form of the argument [n.1] that predestination of this sort does not transition into the past. For although it co-existed with the past, which has transitioned, yet it itself is not past, – but the other things are past which co-existed with it. Hence, as was said in distinction 9 n.17, verbs of diverse times when said of God – to the extent they most truly belong to him – do not signify parts of time measuring the act, but they co-signify the ‘now’ of eternity as if measuring the act insofar as it co-exists with those many parts of time; and so, for God it is the same thing to predestine, to have predestined, and to be about to predestine, and so one of these is as contingent as the other, because there is nothing save the ‘now’ of eternity measuring the act, – which is neither present nor past nor future, but co-existent with all of these.

10. To the second [n.2] I say that a created will cannot impede the ordination of the divine will, because there would be no ‘to impede’ unless the purpose of the divine will stood and the opposite came about through another will; but this is impossible, because just as a created will can merit damnation, so too can there concomitantly follow that the divine will would not pre-ordain it to glory. Hence it was said in the preceding distinction (in the solution of the first argument to the second question [in the interpolation above]) that God cannot be deceived, because his intellection with respect to something cannot stand with the opposite of it; so too his will cannot be impeded, because the ordination of it cannot stand with the opposite of what it has ordained.

## Forty First Distinction

### Single Question

*Whether there is any Merit of Predestination or Reprobation*

1. About the forty first distinction I ask whether there is any merit of predestination or reprobation.

That there is:

Because if by his will alone – without any reason – God were to predestine this person and reprobate that one, then he would seem not to be supremely good, because not supremely generous and communicative; for he could equally communicate his good to him whom he does not predestine; by the fact that – without any reason in something else – he has by his sole generosity predestined that person, so he could predestine this one.

2. Further, if two people, equal in natural endowments, are apprehended by his intellect, and by sole act of will – without any reason on their part – he reprobates this one and predestines that one, then there seems to be acceptance of persons; because although they are equal as concerns their own part and equally capable of being ordered to the end, he does not equally love them for that end; for ‘to have acceptance of persons’ seems to be to prefer this person to that one for the end for which he is not of himself more to be preferred. But the consequent is impossible, and contrary to Peter in *Acts* 10.34: “In truth,” he says, “I find that there is no acceptance of persons with God.”

3. On the contrary:

Romans 9.11-13: “Although they were not yet born, or had done anything good or bad, so that the election of grace might remain according to his purpose,” – look there.

4. Further, 9.21: he gives an example about a potter, who from the same mass of clay can form one vessel for honor and one for contempt – from which he seems to argue by similarity about the predestination of one and the reprobation of another.

### I. To the Question

#### A. First Opinion, Proposed and Retracted by Augustine

5. About this question Augustine once thought that although good works in the fore-knowledge of God are not the reason of predestining, yet faith is in his fore-knowledge the reason for predestining – as is plain from him *On the Epistle to the Romans* (the one namely where he intends that because of the faith – which God fore-knew – by which Jacob would believe and because of the infidelity of Esau God preferred Jacob and not Esau), and is contained in the text [of Lombard]. But Augustine retracts this in *Retractions* I ch.23, indicating his reason against it ‘because faith is a gift of God just as are also other good works’ (which is proved by the Apostle *1 Corinthians* 7.25); hence Augustine says that ‘I would not have said that, if I had known to number faith among the gifts of the Holy Spirit’.

#### B. Second Opinion, Proposed by Peter Lombard

6. The master seems to think that there is altogether no merit of predestination or reprobation; and he seems to rely precisely on the authority of the Apostle [n.3] and on the statement of Augustine *On the Predestination of the Saints* ch.19 n.38: “Not because,” he says, “he knew that we would be such did he choose us, but so that we might become such through his choice.”

7. And the Master adduces the authority of Augustine against himself [n.6] saying in 83 *Diverse Questions* q.68 n.4: “On whom he wills,” he says, “he has mercy, and whom he wills he hardens” [cf. *Romans* 9.18]; but this will of God cannot be unjust; for it comes from very hidden merits, because although sinners themselves, because of general sin, have made one mass, yet there is some diversity between them; for something precedes in sinners by which, although they are not yet justified, they are made worthy of justification – and again, there precedes in other sinners that whereby they are worthy of being dulled.”

8. The Master replies that this authority [n.7] seems to have been retracted by Augustine by similarity when what he said on *Romans* was retracted [n.5]; and the Master confirms this by the fact Augustine retracts certain things he added in the same question [n.7], as is plain in *Retractions* I ch.26, – and what he added seems to agree with this opinion [n.7], from which it also seems he retracted this opinion.

9. But against this response of the Master – about the retraction of his authority on *Romans* [n.8] – an objection might be made that Augustine published the book on *Romans* when he was priest, but the book 83 *Questions* he did not have compiled before he was bishop; therefore it does not seem that when he retracts something from the first

book he is retracting something from the second, because to retract something said before – when he knew less – is not to retract something said later, when he knew more.

10. But this argument [n.9] is not compelling, because although he wrote one book before another, yet he produced the *Retractions* at one time (and at that time he had had both those books published), and an opinion stated in one book he could retract in other books, whether earlier or later published. For it appears that all those books – about which he makes mention – he had published before the book of *Retractions*, and yet if in the first chapter of the first book of the *Retractions* he had retracted another opinion which he had stated in some other book, published later indeed and retracted, he would not again have to repeat the retraction of the opinion in some chapter assigned to another book later published. Hence he says in book 1 chapter 3 retracting the opinion ‘God, whom sense does not know’: “An addition should have been made,” he says, “so that it would say ‘whom the sense of the mortal body’ does not know;” and he subjoins: “Nor need I continuously repeat what I also already said above, but this is to be recalled wherever this opinion is found in my writings.” Therefore when the opinion was asserted in a book retracted and published before, he retracts the same opinion as asserted in books published later rather than the reverse.

11. But one can in another way argue against the exposition of the Master, – because no place is found where Augustine retracts those words; because, as the Master himself admits (and as is true), after the words he adduces [n.8] there are other words that follow that he retracts (from that question 68) in *Retractions* I ch.25 – and these other words he does not retract; but it seems that if he did intend those words to be retracted, he would not begin from the following words while omitting those.

### C. Third Opinion

12. [Exposition of the opinion] – In another way “it is said that whatever God does with respect to creatures, he does only by the good pleasure of his will, and for this no reason or cause needs to be sought.”

13. “The point is confirmed by what is said in *Romans* 9.11-2 about Jacob and Esau: “When they were not yet born, or had done anything bad or good, so that the purpose of God by election might stand, – not from works,”<sup>16</sup> the Gloss: ‘just as not for preceding merits, so not for future ones, because good and bad merits were not future without grace added or removed’.”

14. “Which also the Apostle makes clear when he subjoins, 9.21: “Or does not the potter have power from the same lump, etc.” Hence just as the will alone of the potter is the reason that from this part of the lump he makes an honorable vessel and from that part a vessel of contempt, while no difference exists in the lump (just as neither in prime matter, which however the agent cause clothes in one part with a nobler form but in another with a less noble one), thus the good pleasure alone of God is the reason that from the same mass – equally vitiated in our first parent – he chose this one for glory, but that one he leaves for condemnation; or even if the lump had not been vitiated but all were equal, he would only gratuitously choose one, while another he would leave – in both cases giving grace to him whom he chose (but a greater grace than for one chosen from the vitiated lump), and justice to him whom he did not choose from the damned

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<sup>16</sup> The Vatican editors refer to Aquinas *STI* q.23 a.5.

mass, but not injustice to him whom, though existing in a state of innocence, he did not choose” [from Henry of Ghent].

15. Further, “this position [n.12] says that there happens to be an extrinsic reason assigned that God from the whole lost lump wanted in mercy to free some and not others, but there is no reason that he chose this one rather than that.”

16. “A reason is posited for the first, namely so that his goodness – existing simple in himself – might be manifested in manifold ways in diverse things at the same time, by the fact that in no one thing can the whole be manifested, because it does not reach the divine perfection; so just as for the perfection of the universe are required diverse grades of things in material reality (even from the same matter, equally disposed to all forms), so too for manifesting the same goodness diverse grades in moral reality are required for perfection, because in this his goodness as to any supernatural degree would be manifested; for in justly punishing the reprobate the goodness of his justice is manifested, as the goodness of his mercy is manifested in the glorified.”

17. “For thus does God permit these evils to come to be, so that goods not be impeded (but that they may happen), and this both in moral reality, as in the issue at hand – and in natural reality, as in the man born blind (*John 9.3*), in whom Christ showed that the sole reason was that the glory of God might be manifest in him; but this is not from the defect of sight in the blindness, but from the marvelous illumining of him by the Lord.”

18. “And it seems that this reason is assigned by the Apostle in *Romans 9.22-23* when he says: “God wishing to show the anger of his justice etc.;” with which the example of the potter agrees, who makes from the same clay one vessel for honor and

another for contempt [n.14], about which in *2 Timothy* 2.20 the Apostle says: ‘Now in a large house not only gold and silver vessels, but also earthenware’.” [Henry of Ghent]

19. About the second [n.15] – namely in particular – “it is said that (as in natural reality), since the whole of prime matter is uniform, an intrinsic reason that one part is under the form of fire and another under the form of earth can be assigned (namely the perfection of the universe), and an extrinsic one (namely the manifestation of the power and goodness of God), but no reason can be assigned that this part of matter is under this form, and that part under that form and not conversely, save the sole will of the artificer who so determines things; just as in human works, that this stone is so fashioned as to be placed in an altar but another placed in a privy (according to what the Philosopher says *Physics* 26.197b9-11, that some stones are fortunate but others not), this depends on the mere choice of the artificer; so do they say in the issue at hand, that there is no reason in particular that he prefers this person and not that.” And this “is confirmed by Augustine on *John* 6.44: ‘No one comes to me unless my Father draw him etc.’, where Augustine says: ‘Why he draws this one and not that one, do not wish to judge if you do not wish to err’.” [from Aquinas].

20. “And they say from this that the fact God thus makes inequality for equal things is not iniquity – because in things that happen by grace, without debt, the giver can without any iniquity give as he wishes, according to the remark of *Matthew* 20.14-15: ‘Take what is your own, and depart; am I not permitted to do what I wish?’ But it would then be iniquity if it were given from debt.” [Henry of Ghent]

21. [Rejection of the opinion] – Against this opinion, someone argues – first against the reason that is assigned in general [n.16]:

For no defect of guilt or penalty belongs of itself to the perfection of the universe; therefore neither is it per se required for the manifestation of divine goodness. And from this it is plain that the differences of things in natural and moral being are not similar, because all the species of things – distinct in natural being – belong to the perfection of the universe; it is not so, as to moral being, between good and bad or between the blessed and the miserable.

22. Again, he argues that if the damnation of some is necessary for the manifestation of divine justice, the damnation of demons seems sufficient for this; for men and demons, and guilt and penalty, do not seem to differ by species in moral being; but a plurality of individuals does not per se belong to the perfection of the universe. Or if you say that in some way divine justice is manifested in these and those when punished – on the contrary: so would divine mercy be manifested in several ways, if God had glorified some men (or if he had beatified some, either men or angels) without merits, which he did not do; however it would seem to belong to the perfection of divine goodness for God's mercy rather to be manifested in many ways than God's justice.

23. In addition, he argues that it does not seem God intentionally permits sins to come to be so that he may later punish them, because it does not seem that by anyone's intention 'evils done' are more to be permitted to come to be than evils to be done, because no evil of guilt or penalty can be intended per se insofar as it is evil. – And if it be said that "the will in giving permission is in no way borne to evil but only to permission, so as to intend to permit evil by reason of a part," he argues that at any rate "it is not manifest how God by intention would wish one and not the other." Hence it does not seem that God by intention permits evil, but only so that good may happen; this

is plain in the man born blind, whom God permitted to be born blind, not so as to be glorified in the man's blindness but in the marvelous illumining; this is also plain in natural things; for God does not intend defect, but if second causes are impotent, he permits the effect be of the sort that the causes can produce; in the case of men, too, we see that he who permits someone to sin himself sins if he could prohibit or impede it. Therefore this is not to be posited in God.

24. In addition, against the second member (namely that there is no reason in the special case [nn.15, 19]), – because the example is not similar; for in matter as it is bare, there cannot be a difference why it should be thus disposed to such or such a form (as neither in a lump of clay with respect to diverse vessels [n.14]), but in the case of men it seems possible for some diverse disposition to be found why being predestined should fit this person and not that person, just as in the case of matter ‘not as bare matter’ there is a proximate disposition for it to be under another form (as is plain about wine and vinegar), but it would not have been proximately disposed to the later form if it had not been under the prior form.

25. And as to the fact that they adduce Apostle [n.18] for themselves, he says (according to the Gloss there) that the Apostle says this “not because of wanting means for giving a reason but to repress the rashness of the incapable;” “nor is the case similar in the Apostle’s example” – about the lump of clay and the potter – “save on the part of the end, but not on the part of the subject,” because in the case of the end in choice there can be a difference of the subject, but not in the case of the subject; and as far as this is concerned, there is a more fitting example from the Apostle in *2 Timothy* which he posits about silver and gold vessels [n.18], “because there is a difference there in the subject

whereby earthen vessels are made for greater contempt, wooden vessels for lesser contempt, gold vessels for greater honor and silver vessels for lesser honor.”

#### D. Fourth Opinion

26. [Exposition of the opinion] – He [Henry] rejects this opinion [nn.21-25] and speaks in another way, and this as follows:

A divine act can be considered as it is from God the agent or as it is received in some passive thing or as it has a term in some object.

27. In the first way there is no reason for the divine action; neither as end, save his goodness – nor as efficient cause, save his will.

28. In the second way, however, it is possible to assign some reason, namely for which the existence that the action concerns – as an entity for the end – agrees with the end.

29. And that there is some such reason on the part of the entity for the end is shown by him in three ways:

First, because in things altogether equal choice cannot be talked of; therefore if God chooses some things, there is some difference in the thing chosen, – or there is no choice.

30. Second, because in all the works of divine mercy it seems that justice concurs; therefore there is some congruence on the part of the thing he does mercifully.

31. And third (as if in like way): there seems not to be or to be a merit of choice and reprobation, and so although malice on the part of him who receives [sc. damnation]

is not the cause of damning on the part of God (because “then God would be passive” and “the temporal would be cause of the eternal”), yet it is well conceded that on the part of the act of damning there is a motive reason for the act’s receiving in itself this action and its being about this person; therefore by similarity it seems – on the other side [sc. choice] – that without imperfection of God in acting there could be posited some reason on the part of the person predestined. And it rests on this conclusion, the authority of Augustine cited before [n.7], *83 Questions*, which does not seem to have been retracted.

32. Further, in particular he says what this reason is: that it is the good use, foreseen, of freewill on the part of the elect person – and the bad use, foreseen, of freewill on the part of the reprobate.

33. And this is made clear as follows: although grace operates principally in good acts yet freewill cooperates; this is proved from Augustine “on the remark of *Psalms* ‘Help us, God, our savior’ [*On Psalms* 78, 9 n.12] where Augustine says, “When he wants us to be helped, he is neither ungrateful nor does he take away freewill; for he who is helped also does something of himself.” When grace, then, is offered to the wayfarer, if he receives the offered grace and cooperates with it well in accord with his use of freewill, he merits grace according to a further degree – as he exemplifies in many intermediate degrees, from the state of mortal sin up to the state of glory, all which it is not necessary for us now to enumerate; and so it seems that the whole use of freewill, foreseen for all its states, can be the reason for eternal election of him who will use freewill well, and so on the other side about evil use and reprobation.

34. And if it is objected against this that the good use of freewill is by grace, therefore it pertains to the effect of predestination and so is not a reason for election – the

response is that the good use “is in a certain way included under predestination, but not under its effect (although it is not without its effect), nor is that which belongs to predestination distinct from that which belongs to freewill.”

35. Thus, therefore, according to him, and in general, good use and bad use can be assigned for the whole human race, and about any man a reason can be assigned on his part (not “because of which it is so” but “without which it is not so”); yet in particular, about a definite man, “it is not for man to investigate the reason, although it is not lacking and could be multiple.” However “in particular” – according to him – “the Apostle labored under a want of means for giving a reason, when he said (*Romans 11*) ‘O the depth of the riches’,” because in this “consists a great abyss of God’s judgments.”

36. [Rejection of the opinion] – But against this I argue:

First, that God does not foresee that this man will use freewill well, save because he wills or pre-ordains him to use it well, because – as was said in distinction 39 [in the interpolation above] – definite foreseeing of future contingents is from the determination of his will. If therefore two equal persons are offered to the divine will, I ask why he pre-ordains this to use freewill well and not that one; it is not possible, as it seems, to assign a reason for this other than the divine will; and this is the first distinction among them, which for you [Henry] election or reprobation has to follow; therefore in the first distinction, pertaining to predestination or reprobation, the only reason is the divine will.

37. Besides, the reason that he posits [n.32], does not seem common to all the predestined and reprobate:

First indeed because not for children, in whom God does not foresee good or bad use of freewill.

38. And if you say that, although he does not foresee such use, yet he foresees that this one would have used it well had he survived, and that one would have used it badly if he had survived (and therefore he leads the former to baptism and the latter not, and the former is saved and the latter damned), – this he himself thus rejects, because on account of the foreseen good use by someone, if he had survived, he is not accepted or reprobated; for then – according to him – an adult dying in grace would not pre-merit according to the merits he already has, but according to those that he is foreseen to have, if he had survived.

39. Let us speak likewise of the predestined and non-predestined angels; which use of freewill does God foresee in this one – if grace is offered – which he does not foresee in that one, because of which he predestines this one and reprobates that one?

#### E. Scotus' own Opinion

40. [Exposition of the opinion] – One can say in a different way that there is no reason of predestination, even on the part of the predestined, that is in anyway prior to the predestination itself; but some reason is prior to reprobation, not indeed a reason for which God by efficient causality reprobates, insofar as the action is from God (as was argued in the previous opinion, because then ‘God would be passive’ [n.31]), but a reason for which this action thus has this object as term and not that one.

41. The proof of the first point is that he who in ordered way wills the end and what is for the end wills the end first before any of the things for the end, and he wills other things for the end; therefore since, in the whole process by which a creature capable

of beatification is led to the perfect end, the ultimate end is perfect beatitude, God – willing something of this order for this person – first wills the end for this creature capable of beatification and as it were afterwards wills him other things, which are in the order of things that pertain to the end. But grace, faith, merits and good use of freewill, all these things are for the end (although some more remotely and others more near to it). Therefore God wills beatitude for this person first before any of the other things; and he wills for him each of these others first before he foresees that he will have each of them, therefore not because of foreseeing any of these does he will him beatitude.

42. The proof of the second point is that damnation does not seem to be good save because it is just, for – according to Augustine *On Genesis* XI ch.17 n.22 – ‘God is not avenger before someone is sinner’ (for it seems to be cruelty to punish someone when there is no guilt pre-existing in him); therefore by similarity, God does not wish to punish before he sees someone to be a sinner. Therefore the first act of the divine will about Judas is not to will to damn Judas as Judas is presented in his purely natural state (because then God seems to damn without guilt), but he sees that Judas must be presented to the divine will under the idea of sinner before he wills to damn him. Therefore reprobation has its reason on the part of the object, namely foreseen final sin.

43. This is confirmed by the authority of Augustine in his book *On the Predestination of the Saints* ch.19 n.38 and it is put in the text.

44. [Objections against the opinion] – Against this [n.41]. Peter and Judas, equal in natural state, willed by God in being of existence, in the instant in which they are presented to the divine will in natural existence and equal: God – for you [sc. Scotus] – first wills beatitude for Peter; why then did he will what for Judas? If damnation I have

the conclusion intended ‘therefore he reprobates without any reason’, – if beatitude, then he predestines Judas.

45. One can say that in that instant God wishes nothing for Judas; there is only a negation there of volition for glory. And likewise, as if in the second instant of nature, when he wills grace for Peter, there is still no positive act of the divine will about Judas, but only a negative one. In the third instant, when he wills to permit Peter to be of the mass of perdition or worthy of perdition (and this either because of original sin or actual sin), then he wishes Judas in a like way to be a son of perdition; and here is the first positive act – a uniform one indeed – about Peter and Judas, but by this act this statement is true ‘Judas will be finally a sinner’, with the negations in place, namely that God does not will to give him grace or glory. In the fourth instant, then, Judas is presented to the divine will as finally a sinner, and then God wills to punish him justly and reprobate Judas.<sup>17</sup>

46. Nor is it surprising that a like process for predestination and reprobation is not posited, because all goods are attributed to God principally, but evils to us; and thus, that God ‘predestines without reason’ agrees with his goodness, but that ‘he wills to damn’ does not seem able immediately to be attributed to him with respect to the object as

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<sup>17</sup> Tr. This explanation is no doubt compatible with orthodoxy but it seems wholly unconvincing that God should make creatures whose perfect end is glory and yet not choose to give them the grace to reach glory (this criticism would apply to Aquinas' position too, of course, but not perhaps to Henry's, as Scotus reports it nn.26-35). Better, then, perhaps to focus on the fact of free choice (also necessary for glory) and say that while God chooses to give grace to everyone yet some, like Peter, do not choose to resist the gift while others, like Judas as it seems, do so choose. The gift is free and precedes all merit; the resistance comes, not from God, but from the creature. And if it be said that grace is irresistible, or that God also gives the grace not to resist grace, the answer will be that free choice is precisely free and so can resist any grace, including the grace not to resist grace. If it be said, further, that then God is passive with respect to who resists or does not resist grace, let it be conceded. But the passivity is not with respect to the possibility (God knows all possibilities by his eternal essence); it is only with respect to this possibility being actual in creatures and that other one not. But the relation of God's knowledge to creatures is real on the part of creatures and not on the part of God, and so no change is undergone by God because of anything that happens in creatures. Thus there is no real passivity on God's part either. But this proposal is made under correction.

known in its pure natural state, but only in respect of the object as known in final mortal sin.

47. This response can be confirmed by a likeness: let us posit two people, equally graced on their own part, one of whom I love and the other of whom I do not, – and him whom I love I pre-ordain to some good through which he can please me, but him whom I do not love I do not pre-ordain to such good. If things were so that it was in my power to permit them to offend, I could will to permit both to offend – and from the fact that I do not will to lead the latter to that by which he could please me, I would fore-know that his offense would be perpetual (and thus that I could justly punish him), but I would fore-know that the offense of the other was to be remitted or committed to what I will.<sup>a</sup>

a. [Interpolation, from Appendix A] From these points there follow four corollaries:

The first, that the number of the elect is complete before anyone is reprobated, because in the first instant one person is fore-ordained, another fore-known.

The second is that the predestined, insofar as they are predestined, are objects of the first divine act after their pure natural existence; in the second instant God foresees their final justice, namely their damnation and impenitence (which is perseverance in sin). From this there follows that none of the blessed can or should rejoice in the damnation of someone on the ground he himself was elected in his place, because the blessed have been predestined before the others were reprobate – and thus that good would never have belonged to the damned, even had they stood.

The third follows, that no one is predestined because of the fall of another, nor is anyone saved by occasion; nor was Christ by occasion of sin made incarnate or thus supreme in merit and reward, because this would have happened if no one had ever sinned.

Again, fourth, it follows that they alone who were to be saved would have been saved if Adam had not sinned, because they were all predestined or foreseen and guilty of sin before Adam had sinned

48. But still there is an instance against this:

Because God does not with certitude see that Judas is bad according to this way [n.47] – for the sole permission of some act and certitude about the permission do not make for certitude about this act, because it has to have some efficient cause; therefore from the sole fact that God fore-knows he wishes to permit Judas to sin, it is not certain that Judas will sin; or let us speak of a good and bad angel (who were not in original sin): from this fact alone – I say – it does not seem God knows that Lucifer sins, and from this (as it seems) Lucifer is not presented to him as sinner.

49. In addition, what is this ‘will to permit Lucifer to sin’? If this is some positive act of the will with respect to the sin, then it seems God wills him to sin. If it is not a positive act with respect to the act of sin but with respect to the act of permission, then it will be a reflex act, – and then it will be necessary to ask, as to the permission, what act it is; if a positive act of will, then it still seems God has a positive act with respect to the sin that he permits.

50. The first of these [n.48] is solved by the fact God fore-knows that he will co-operate with Lucifer in the substance of the act that will be a sin (but he fore-knows this, because he wills to co-operate with him if it is a sin of commission), or he fore-knows that he will not co-operate in some act if he does not will it (and this if that first act is a sin of omission); and knowing that he will co-operate in such substance of the act (without the due circumstances), or will not co-operate with Lucifer in a negative act (and consequently in an act he will omit), he knows that he will sin; such that he knows ‘this one will sin’ not only because he knows he himself will permit it, but because he knows

he will co-operate with him in the substance of an act that is lacking in due circumstances, and consequently that the latter would commit it – or he knows that he will not co-operate with him in a negative act, and consequently that the latter will omit it.

51. The second argument [n.49] raises a difficulty touching on the divine will, – about which I will speak not here but elsewhere [d.47 nn.8-9].

#### F. Conclusion about the Five Opinions

52. About all these opinions [nn.5-6, 12-20, 26-35, 40-43]: because the Apostle, when disputing about this matter in *Romans* 11.33-34, seems to leave the whole thing as it were inscrutable ('O depth', he says, 'of the riches of the wisdom and the knowledge of God,' and 'who has known the mind of the Lord, or who has been his counselor?'), therefore lest by investigating the depths – according to the opinion of the Master – one should fall into the depths, let that be chosen which pleases more, provided however that the divine liberty (without any injustice) be preserved, as well as the other things that must be preserved about God as freely choosing; and he who holds another opinion, let him respond to the things touched on above against him.

#### II. To the Principal Arguments

53. To the first principal argument [n.1] I reply: the supreme goodness can stand with free communication, although it not be equal for everyone. For someone 'supremely good' can with generosity freely communicate himself, and in order to show that he is not

generous by necessity but is generous as ‘freely communicative’ he can for two persons – apprehended as equal – will ‘to communicate a good non-equally’; nor is any injustice committed in this (as the third opinion asserts [n.20]), because nothing is due.

54. To the second [n.2]: when two things are equally will-able for some end, and they have on their own part the reason for which they are to be willed by some will, a will that prefers one of them to the other for that end sins by acceptance of persons; such is every created will, because with respect to it the lovable good is the reason for right loving. The uncreated will is not so with respect to any good other than its own essence; for no other good thing is, because it is good, loved for that reason by that will, but conversely; and it cannot accept persons, because the good that is the reason for loving is not in them.

55. To the first argument for the opposite [not nn.3-4 but *Rep IA d.41 nn.7, 81*]. He who wants to hold another way [sc. other than Scotus’, nn.40-42] can say as the fourth way says [nn.25, 35] that the Apostle in this passage [*Romans 11.33*] is rebuking the presumptuous who inquire into things they have no capacity for, – not because of being in want of a reason to give, at any rate in general, although it not be known in particular the evil that God foresees in someone for which he reprobates him; and in these special sins, that are foreseen, there is ‘a depth of riches’ and that ‘the judgments are past finding out’. – With which agrees that word ‘judgment’, because judgment is about particular doables; for we do not usually say, when speaking of practical principle – or about established laws –, that they are ‘judgments’, but we do so when a judgment is made about some particular in accord with the practical principles or the established laws; and so notwithstanding that there is a practical principle, established by the divine will,

that ‘everyone foreseen to be finally evil will be damned’, yet about the particulars to be assumed under it (‘this person is foreseen to be finally evil in this way, that one in that’, and as it were for this reason the former is reprobate for that evil and the latter for that other one), these judgments are inscrutable; for man does not know, nor can know, into what sin God wills to permit him to fall with respect to which there is a non-volition to confer grace, so that thus he be presented as finally a sinner in that sin and thus because of that foreseen sin he will be reprobated. But about the good it can be posited that there is no reason, as was said in the fifth opinion [nn.40-41].

56. And if you argue against this that at any rate about the good the judgments will not be inscrutable (for it is easy to say about them that ‘because he wills, therefore he saves’), – it can be said about them, insofar as he predestines, that there is no judgment, neither of the fact in existence nor of it in divine foreknowledge as it were; for judgment is about something done or foreseen. But about the evil, although there is no judgment about the fact (because they have not sinned), yet condemnation can be said to be a judgment about them in God’s foreknowledge (when they are called ‘evil’), and then the inscrutability of the judgments can be referred to the evil on whose part some reason is posited, although those reasons on the part of diverse things – because of which the judgments are as it were on their part passed – are inscrutable and for this reason the judgments are inscrutable.

57. To the other one [nn.6, 43]: Augustine responds to it for the fifth opinion [n.43], because he proves that on the part of the predestined there is no reason.

## Forty Second Distinction

### Single Question

*Whether it can be Proved by Natural Reason that God is Omnipotent*

1. About the forty second distinction I ask whether it can be proved by natural reason that God is omnipotent.

That it can be:

Richard [of St. Victor] *On the Trinity* I ch.4: “For everything we hold by faith [sc. there are probable, even necessary arguments].”

2. Besides, it is proved by reason that God is of infinite power (as is proved in *Physics* 8.10.266a10-24 and *Metaphysics* 12.7.1073a3-13); but infinite power is known to be omnipotence; therefore etc.

3. Proof of the minor, because it is known that no greater power than infinite power can be thought of without contradiction; but a greater power than any power that is not omnipotence can be thought of without contradiction (proof: one can without contradiction think of omnipotence under the idea of omnipotence; but it is thought of as greater than any other power that would not be omnipotence).

4. If you say that it is not possible to prove naturally that omnipotence is thinkable without contradiction – on the contrary: that omnipotence exists among beings is true,

therefore any reason proving the impossibility of omnipotence is sophistical; every sophistical reason can be solved by the intellect through purely natural means; therefore such an intellect can through purely natural means know that nothing impossible follows from omnipotence, and knows that that is possible on which nothing impossible follows; therefore it knows that the omnipotence of God is possible.

5. But from this a reason per se can be given, because if it can naturally be proved that omnipotence is possible (because it is not impossible [n.4]), then it can naturally be proved that it is necessary, because it cannot be unless it could be necessary; and what can be necessary, is necessary; therefore etc.

6. On the contrary:

No philosopher by the use of natural reason, however perfectly he would consider God under the idea of efficient cause, has conceded that he is omnipotent according to the Catholic sense [nn.9-13].

7. There is also a confirmation, because there is an article of faith, in the *Apostles' Creed*: "I believe in God, the Father almighty etc."

#### I. To the Question

8. One can respond here by drawing a distinction that in one way the 'omnipotent' can be said to be an agent that has power for everything possible, mediately or immediately – and in this way the active power of the first efficient cause is omnipotence, insofar as it extends itself to every effect in idea of proximate or remote cause; and thus, since it can be naturally concluded that there is a first efficient cause (as was shown

above in distinction 2 [nn.43-59]), it can be naturally concluded that it is omnipotent, in this way of speaking.

9. In another way ‘omnipotent’ is taken in a properly theological sense, insofar as he is called omnipotent who has power for all effects and for everything possible (that is, for everything that is not *per se* necessary or does not include a contradiction), and thus immediately – I say – because without the co-operation of any other agent cause; and in this way it seems that omnipotence is a thing believed about the first efficient cause, and not something demonstrated, because although the first efficient cause has in itself a more eminent efficient power than the power of any other efficient cause, it also has in itself eminently the effective power of any other cause whatever (as was proved in distinction 2 [nn.117-120] and is proved by the fact that it has infinite power), and this is as it were the ultimate that natural reason can attain to as to be known about God, although from this it does not seem one can prove omnipotence according to the second sense, because although it is true, yet it is not manifest by natural reason that what has a more eminent causality in itself – and even the causality of a second cause more eminently than that cause has with respect to its own effect – has power immediately for the immediate effect of a second cause; for the order of inferior and superior causes does not allow this, because although the sun has in itself a more eminent causality than an ox (or than any animal), yet the sun is not conceded to be able immediately to generate an ox the way it can do so through the medium of an ox-cause.

10. And this above all would philosophers posit, because they did not posit the second – necessarily concurrent – cause on account of adding some perfection to the effect, but on account of adding some imperfection; but further, the causality of the first

cause is immediately perfect, and so they posited that it could not immediately be the cause of any imperfect effect. And therefore some other agent cause (a more imperfect one) had to concur, so that the first cause would not produce according to the utmost of its power but would, along with that second agent cause, produce a diminished and imperfect effect – that is, it would not produce as perfect an effect by means of an imperfect second cause as it would if it produced it immediately.

11. In addition, the philosophers were not able by natural reason to conclude that God is able to cause contingently, how much more could they not conclude that it had power immediately for any effect at all or for anything that can be produced by means of other second causes?

12. Further, if they had for principle as it were that ‘nothing comes from nothing’ (at any rate in generable and corruptible things), it does not seem that God was so omnipotent that he could totally produce any effect without any other joint causing cause.

13. Besides, if the philosophers posited that God acted necessarily (as many of them seem to have thought and posited), and if along with this they posited that he was omnipotent according to the second sense [n.9], they would have to deny all causality to every second cause (which is especially unacceptable for them); for a cause that ‘necessarily causes’, in whatever instant it is compared to its effect, necessarily in that instant ‘causes and acts necessarily’; therefore since the superior cause is compared to its effect before an inferior cause is, and since in that case it is for you [sc. someone who thinks omnipotence can be proved by natural reason] necessarily omnipotent, then in that instant it produces every effect; then in the second instant, in which the second cause is

compared to the same effect, nothing is then understood as causing, – and so a second cause or a second agent can cause nothing

14. And from this is plain that this proposition ‘whatever the first efficient cause can cause along with a second cause, it can per se cause immediately’ is not known from the terms, nor known by natural reason, but is only a thing believed; because if omnipotence itself – on which the proposition depends – were known by natural reason, it would be easy for those philosophers to prove many truths and propositions that they deny, and easy for them to prove at least the possibility of many things that we believe and that they deny.

15. Omnipotence, however, taken in this way [sc. the second way], although it not be sufficiently proved, can however be proved probably as true and necessary – and more probably than certain other believed things, because it is not unacceptable for some ‘believed things’ to be more evident than others.

## II. To the Principal Arguments

16. To the authority of Richard [n.1] I say that although there are necessary reasons for proving omnipotence, and any other believed things, they are not however evidently necessary and true; just as is true of the reason that proves the Trinity, because of the double production inwardly in divine reality [d.2 nn.300-303, 353-358, 370]) – because although the reason is from necessary things, yet the premises are not necessarily evident, because they are not known to us from the terms; nor is it possible from things immediately known to us to infer this, as was said in d.2 nn.26-29.

17. To the second [n.2] I say that the infinite power of God, although it can be concluded about God by natural reason, is yet not omnipotence in the way it is properly taken.

18. And when you say that ‘no power can be thought of greater than infinite power’ [n.3], this is true intensively; but there seems no contradiction in thinking of a greater power that extends itself to more things extensively. Or one might say that although it is not a contradiction for an omnipotence to be thought of, which – as such – in some way exceeds infinite power ‘not understood as omnipotent’, yet it is not naturally known that a power so understood is omnipotent.

19. And when you say [n.3] it is known that omnipotence properly taken can be thought of without contradiction, this is denied.

20. And when proof is given ‘any reason proving the impossibility of omnipotence is sophistical’ [n.3], – to this the response is it is indeed sophistical; but it cannot be solved by natural reason, because insofar as it is sophistical it errs in the matter and has a false premise; and it cannot be solved save by taking away that premise, which however cannot be known by natural reason as needing to be taken away, just as it cannot be known to be true by natural reason.

21. But against these points I argue thus:

The proposition that appears true, and does not from natural reason appear that it should be taken away, either appears to be true from the terms as if immediate, or appears to be deduced from immediate premises. If in the first way then our intellect cannot be certain about the immediate propositions, which are true and which not; for things appear to them to be true as immediate propositions which however are simply false, and so

there will not be any propositions as certain ‘as doors in a house’ (against the Philosopher and the Commentator *Metaphysics* 2.1.993b4-5, Averroes ad loc.), about which it is not possible to err. If it appear true in the second way (that is as deduced from immediate terms), then I argue about this syllogism as about the former one, – either it errs in matter or in form; if in matter then it can be solved, because the false premise, ‘erring in matter’, can be taken away; if in form, still it can be solved by the art of logic. But if it be said that it errs in form and yet cannot be solved by natural reason, – this seems absurd, because as the intellect ‘contained in its natural conditions’ hands on the whole art about apparent syllogism, unformed and defective, thus could the argument be solved by the art for dissolving every such syllogism, by applying that art to that paralogism.

22. Therefore I say in another way that although any paralogism, which apparently concludes to something impossible from a premise signifying that God is omnipotent, can be solved by the intellect and natural reason (whether it errs in matter or in form), and the intellect can know that any such paralogism ‘stated divisively’ is soluble, yet the conclusion does not follow that the intellect knows it to be impossible; for the opposite stands, namely either because the intellect doubts it to be a primary opposite from the repugnance of the terms (from which however something manifestly impossible cannot follow), or because it doubts whether something else impossible can be inferred from whatever is inferred, and the argument ‘entailing that impossible thing’ is insoluble, although it not be of any things that are done about which the intellect knows ‘one must solve them’.

23. Or generally one can reply to the argument [n.4] (and this can be done generally for any believed thing) that it is necessary for anything possible or believable.

## Forty Third Distinction

### Single Question

*Whether the First Reason for the Impossibility of a Thing to be Made is on the Part of  
God or of the Makeable Thing*

1. About the forty third distinction – where the Master rejects the opinions of others – I ask whether the first reason for the impossibility of a thing to be made is on the part of God or on that of the makeable thing.

Proof that it is on the part of God:

The Master argues [d.43 ch.1 nn.390-398] that the universe could be made better: ‘because if not, this would either be because of the fact no good is lacking to it, and then it would be God’, ‘or because something is lacking to it but it is not capable of receiving it’, and then he argues that ‘it would become better if capacity for it were given to it by God’. So I argue in the issue at hand: if something is un-makeable, then if capacity were given it by God, it could be made; therefore in this way can it not be made, that capacity is not given to it; therefore this impossibility seems to be first on the part of God, not being able to give it the capacity.

2. On the contrary:

Anselm *On the Fall of the Devil* ch.2: ‘Because God gave perseverance to the good angel, that is why the good angel had it – and it is not because God did not give it to the bad angel that the bad angel did not have it, but because he was bad he did not take it’, because he was not capable of it [n.19].

### I. To the Question

#### A. The Opinion of Henry of Ghent

3. This is said by Henry *Quodlibet* VI q.3 – for the opposite, manifestly, of which see *Quodlibet* VIII q.3.<sup>18</sup>

4. Against this second opinion [sc. that the first reason is on the part of God], either it was said with retraction from that article of the first opinion or it was itself retracted by the first opinion, – but one should not argue against him save from his own words, which manifestly imply opposites.

5. However, I specifically argue against him thus: nothing is simply impossible save because being is simply repugnant to it; but what being is repugnant to, to that it is repugnant of itself first and not because of any affirmative or negative respect of it to something else first. For any repugnance is of the extremes by their formal and per se essential idea, with removal of any other respect of either extreme – positive or negative – to anything else, just as white and black are contraries and have a formal repugnance by their own formal ideas, with removal, *per impossibile*, of any respect to anything else. That thing is then simply impossible for which being is per se impossible, which is of

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<sup>18</sup> Vatican editors: in the first reference Henry holds that the first reason for something not being makeable is the thing, in the second that it is God.

itself first such that being is repugnant to it, – and not because of any respect to God, affirmative or negative; nay being would be repugnant to it if *per impossibile* God did not exist. Therefore it seems the first opinion is more probable than the second [sc. that the first reason is on the part of the thing and not of God].

6. But against this first opinion I argue first as follows:

The active power by which God is said to be omnipotent is not formally the intellect but presupposes as it were the action of the intellect, whether the omnipotence is will or some executive power; but a stone is possible of itself formally; therefore too by reducing it to the first extrinsic principle as it were, the divine intellect will be that from which comes the first idea of possibility in a stone. Therefore the active power by which God is said to be omnipotent is not the first idea of possibility in a stone.

7. Proof of the assumption: the possible, according as it is the term or object of omnipotence, is that to which being is not repugnant and that which cannot of itself exist necessarily; a stone, produced in intelligible being by the divine intellect, has these features of itself formally and from the intellect as principle; therefore it is of itself formally possible and is from the divine intellect as it were from a principle.

8. The first opinion [n.3] seems badly to posit that ‘omnipotence in God is the power that is active power, from which comes first possibility in a creature’, and this if we speak of the active power by which God is called omnipotent and with respect to which passive power in a creature is spoken of.

9. Confirmation of the reason [n.6]: the active power ‘which is omnipotence’ does not give any being to anything save by producing it, because it is a power productive of a thing outwardly; but before any production of a thing outwardly, the thing has possible

being, because – as was proved in distinction 36 nn.26-29, 36 – that a thing is produced in intelligible being is not that it is produced in being simply, and if it were, it would not be by the power by which God is called omnipotent; a thing is not first possible, then, by the power ‘that is omnipotence’.

10. Again, in precise causes if affirmation is cause of affirmation and negation is cause of negation (according to what the Philosopher says *Posterior Analytics* 1.13.78b20-21), just as if having lungs is cause of breathing and not having lungs is cause of not breathing, then if the active power, which is omnipotence in God, were the precise cause of possibility in a creature, negation of active power in God would be cause of the negation of ‘possible being’ in a creature, which he himself [Henry] denies (and well to this extent [sc. as concerns impossibility on the part of the makeable thing], that the impossibility in a creature is because of the formal repugnance of the parts [nn.5, 15-17]).

11. Further, the respect that follows active power in the fourth instant, is either real or not. If real and outward, this was rejected in distinction 30 nn.49-51. If it is a respect of reason then in the third instant the possibility has God as term under an absolute idea – which I do not infer as in itself unacceptable, but as to be conceded by many people (if it be granted), and at any rate as not to be held as unacceptable by those who hold the opinion of this doctor [Henry], because it follows on that opinion.

12. Likewise, for the same reason I infer from this position another conclusion, namely that there is no respect on the part of the cause prior to one on the part of the caused; nay from the cause itself under the idea of an absolute it is caused under an absolute idea, and later – third – a respect follows in the caused, and fourth a respect in

the cause to the caused. This order of absolutes and of respects, then, which he concedes, must never and nowhere be held as unacceptable by those who hold it.

13. Third I infer likewise that omnipotence as it is a divine attribute and states a perfection simply, does not state any respect to a creature (which he himself proves in the first opinion, *Quodlibet VI q.3*), because no divine perfection simply depends on a creature (Anselm proves this in *Monologion ch.15*). Since that ‘relation to a creature’ does not state a perfection simply even in God, because then God would not be such if the creature did not exist (but God is something perfect with all perfection simply, of himself and of his nature, and not by any respect to a creature), this inference then – which I think to be true (as also the other two inferences [nn.11-12]) – should not be rejected by any who hold to his opinion [sc. Henry’s].

#### B. Scotus' own Opinion

14. I speak in a way different from the first opinion (as to what the two arguments prove [nn.6, 9]), that although the power of God to himself – that is any absolute perfection by which God is formally powerful – is in God in the first instant of nature, as is also any perfection simply (just as being a power for heating is consequent to heat, which heat however is an absolute form), yet by the power itself ‘under the idea in which it is omnipotence’ it does not have an object that is first possible save through the divine intellect producing it first in intelligible being, and the intellect is not formally the active power by which God is called omnipotent; and then the thing produced in such being by the divine intellect in the first moment of nature – namely intelligible being – has itself to

be possible in the second instant of nature, because being is not formally repugnant to it, and having necessary being of itself is formally repugnant to it (on which two points stands the whole idea of omnipotence, corresponding to these ideas of active power). Therefore possibility is not in the object in any way before omnipotence is in God, taking omnipotence for an absolute perfection in God, just as the creature is not prior to anything absolute in God. If however a thing is understood to be possible before God by his omnipotence produces it, this understanding is in this way true, but the thing is not simply prior in that possibility but is produced by the divine intellect.

15. But as to impossibility, I say that it cannot be first on the part of God but on the part of the thing (as the first opinion says), and this for the reason given against the second opinion, because the thing is impossible for the reason that coming to be is repugnant to it.

16. Which point I understand thus: ‘impossible simply’ includes incompossibles that, by their formal ideas, are incompossible, and they are incompossible from that thing as principle from which as principle they have their formal ideas. So there is here this process, that as God by his intellect produces a possible in possible being, so he also produces two entities formally (each in possible being), and these ‘produced’ things are of themselves formally incompossible, so that they cannot be together one thing nor can any third thing come from them; but the impossibility that they have, they have formally from themselves, and from him as from a principle – in some way – who produced them. And on this incompossibility of theirs there follows the incompossibility of the whole imagined construct that includes them, and from the impossibility of the imagined construct in itself and from the incompossibility of their parts there comes its

incompossibility with respect to any agent; and from this must the whole process of the impossibility of the thing be completed, as if the ultimate degree of incompossibility or impossibility is the negation of a respect to any agent. Nor does it need to have any negative respect on the part of God, nor on the part of anything else (nor is there, perhaps, any negative respect in the nature of the thing), although the intellect can compare God – or any agent – to it under the negation of respect.

17. So in this way the first impossibility is on the part of the impossible thing and in God as in the principle; and if it is reduced to anything as a principle, yet it is not reduced to a negation of possibility in God; rather it is reduced to the divine intellect as principle, which is the principle of it in that being in which the parts are formally repugnant, because of which formal repugnance the whole composed of those parts is simply impossible.

18. And from this is clear that the imagination of those is false who look for the impossibility of anything in some one thing, as if some one thing – whether an intelligible or any sort of being – is of itself formally impossible as God is of himself formally necessary being. For nothing is such first in the being of non-entity, nor even is the divine intellect the reason for the opposite possibility of the entity that is opposed to such a non-entity; nor even is the divine intellect the precise reason for the opposite possibility about nothing, because then the argument ‘about precise causes in affirmation and negation’ [n.10] would hold. But everything ‘simply nothing’ includes in itself the idea of many things, such that it is not first nothing by its own idea but by the ideas of the things that it is understood to include, because of the formal repugnance of those several included

things; and this reason for repugnance comes from the formal reasons, which repugnance they have first from the divine intellect.

## II. To the Principal Argument

19. To the first argument [n.1]: the Master's reason holds, on the supposition that the universe is capable of a greater perfection, because, if that capacity were given to it, it would be made to be better than it is made to be without that capacity, – as if it were capable of many additional things; but absolutely the Master's reason does not hold if that supposition is denied, namely the supposition that it could become better, – just as neither does it follow that 'what remains as fire' could become better if it were made capable of intellect or will, because it is not capable of those things. I say then to the form of the argument, that God cannot give capacity to what is not receptive of being made; but the first reason for this is not this fact but rather that such a thing cannot have such a capacity – and this reason is reduced to the formal repugnance of the parts, and beyond this to the divine intellect.

## Forty Fourth Distinction

### Single Question

*Whether God could Make Things other than He has Ordained them to be Made*

1. About the forty fourth distinction – where the Master deals with the question ‘whether God could have made things better than he did’ – I ask this question: whether God could make things other than he has ordained them to be made.

And it seems not:

Because then he could make things in a disordered way. The consequent is false, therefore the antecedent too.

On the contrary:

Things being made other than they have been made does not include a contradiction; nor is the universe necessary; therefore etc.

### I. To the Question

3. I reply:

In everyone acting by intellect and will, who is able to act in conformity with right law and yet not by necessity in conformity with right law, one must distinguish between ordained power and absolute power; and the reason for this is that he can act in conformity with that right law and so according to ordained power (for the power is ordained insofar as it is the principle of carrying things out in conformity with right law), and he can act without that law or against it, and here there is absolute power, exceeding ordained power. And therefore not only in God but in any agent acting freely – who can act according to the dictate of right law and without that law or against it – one must distinguish between ordained power and absolute power; therefore the jurists say that

someone can do something *de facto*, that is by his absolute power – or *de iure*, that is by ordained power according to right.

4. But when that right law – according to which one must act in ordered way – is not in the power of the agent, then his absolute power cannot exceed his ordained power about any object unless he acts about it in disordered way; for it is necessary that such law stand – comparing it to such agent – and yet that an action ‘not conformed to that right law’ is not right nor ordered, because such an agent is held to act according to the law he is subject to. Hence all those subject to the divine law, if they do not act according to it, act in disordered way.

5. But when the law and the rightness or law are in the power of the agent, so that it is only right because it is established, then an agent acting from his own freedom can ordain otherwise than that right law directs; and yet along with this he can act rightly, because he can establish another right law according to which he may act in ordered fashion. Nor does his absolute power then simply exceed his ordained power, because it would be according to some law ordained, just as it was according to the prior law; yet it exceeds ordained power precisely according to the prior law, against which or without which it acts. This can be exemplified in a prince and his subjects, and in positive law.

6. Applying this to the issue at hand, then, I say that some general laws, giving direction rightly, have been pre-established by the divine will and not indeed by the divine intellect as it precedes the act of the divine will, as was said in distinction 38 nn.5-6, 9-10;<sup>a</sup> but when the intellect presents some such law to the divine will, namely that ‘everyone who is to be glorified must first be endowed with grace’, this law, if it please his will – which is free – is right, and so it is about other laws.

a. [*Interpolation*]: because there is found no necessity from the terms in these laws (as that every sinner will be damned), but only from the divine will accepting them, which will operates according to laws of this sort that it has made; or enough for the issue at hand to say that the laws are established by divine wisdom.

7. God then, being able to act according to those right laws as they have been pre-established by him, is said to act according to his ordained power; but as he can do many things that are not according to but without the laws already pre-established, he is said to act by his absolute power; for because God can do anything that does not include a contradiction, and can act in every way that does not include a contradiction (and many other ways are such), therefore he is then said to act according to ordained power.

8. Hence I say that he can do many other things in ordered way; and the fact that many other things can be done in ordered way, other than those which are made in conformity with the laws, does not include a contradiction when the rectitude of this sort of law – according to which someone is said to act rightly and in ordered way – is in the power of the agent. Therefore just as God can act otherwise, so he can establish another right law, – which, if it were established by God, would be right, because no law is right save as it is established by the divine will accepting it; and then his absolute power for something does not extend itself to something other than that which would be done in ordered fashion, if it were done; it would not indeed be done in ordered fashion according to the existing law, but if would be done in ordered fashion according to another order, which other order the divine will could establish, just as it has power to act.

9. One must note too that something's being ordained and being done in ordered fashion can happen in two ways:

In one way by universal order – which pertains to the common law, as is ordained according to the common law that ‘everyone finally a sinner is to be damned’ (just as when a king establishes that every murderer is to die). In a second way in particular order – according to the judgment that the law in universal does not pertain to, because law is about universal cases; but about a particular case there is no law, but there is judgment according to law of that which is against the law (as that this murderer is to die).

10. I say then that God can act not only otherwise than has been ordained by particular order, but he can also act in ordered fashion otherwise than has been ordained by universal order – or according to the laws of justice, – because both the things that are without that order and the things contrary to it, can be done in ordered fashion by God by absolute power.<sup>a</sup>

a. [*Interpolation*, Appendix A] Again, one must know that a distinction is to be made in the case of this proposition, ‘God can produce things otherwise than he has disposed’. In the composite sense it is false; for what is signified is that this proposition is true, ‘God produces things otherwise than according to his disposition’; in the divided sense it is true, and there are two categorical propositions, and the sense is: ‘God can make things in this way’, ‘he did not dispose to make them in this way’. And yet it does not follow that he acts in disordered way, as is plain from what has been said.

11. However ordered power is not spoken of save as in accord with the order of universal law, and not in accord with the order of right law about some particular. The point is plain from this, that it is possible for God to save someone whom he does not

save and who however will die in sin finally and be damned – but it is not conceded that he can save Judas already damned (though this is not impossible by God's absolute power, because it does not include a contradiction), therefore this thing, namely ‘to save Judas’, is impossible in the way in which it is possible to save him [sc. possible according to existing ordained power]; therefore God can by ordained power save this person (which is true) and not save that one. Not indeed by particular order (which is as it were about this particular doable and workable thing only), but by universal order, because if he saved him, it would now stand with right laws – which he truly pre-fixed – about the salvation and damnation of particular individuals. For it would stand with the proposition that ‘he who is finally evil will be damned’ (which is the pre-fixed law about those to be damned), because this person is still not finally a sinner but can be a non-sinner (especially when a wayfarer), because God can prevent him by his grace; just as, if a king were to prevent someone from committing murder, then, if he does not damn him, he does not act against his universal law about murderers. But it would not stand with that particular law that he would save Judas; for he can fore-know that Judas is to be saved by ordained power, though not ordained in the existing way but in a way absolute from this way, and this other way is ordained according to some other order, because established according to another possible way.<sup>a</sup>

a. [*Interpolation*] Absolute power then can save Judas, – but ordained power can save this sinner, although he will not be saved; but a stone can be beatified neither by absolute nor ordained power. And in this regard, it is plain as to what it is in respect of that there is said to be absolute power in God, that is insofar as he has power against universal law but not particular.

12. But how the divine will has power about particulars and about establishing right laws, by not willing the opposite of what he now wills, was stated above in distinction 39 [in the interpolation for that question above].

## II. To the Principal Arguments on Both Sides

13. To the argument [n.1] it is plain that the consequence is not valid, because if God were to make things in a way other than he has ordained them to be made, they are not for this reason made in disordered way, because if he established other laws according to which they were made, they would by that very fact be made in ordered way.

14. To the argument for the opposite [n.2] I concede what it proves about absolute power – which, however, if it was the principle of anything, would by that fact be ordained, but not according to a pre-fixed order of God that was the same as he had before.

## Forty Fifth Distinction

### Single Question

*Whether God from Eternity willed Things Other than Himself*

1. About the forty fifth distinction I ask whether God from eternity willed things other than himself.

That he did not

Because then in the divine will there would have been a real relation to creatures.

The consequent is false (as is plain from distinction 30 nn.49-51), therefore the antecedent is too.

2. Proof of the consequence: God first wills something before he understands that he wills it (let that thing be *a*), because – as was said in distinction 39 [see interpolation for that distinction] – the certitude of the divine intellect about future contingents is not without the certitude and rectitude of the will; therefore the relation, which is in the divine will first to *a*, itself precedes all consideration by the intellect about that volition; therefore it is not in the will or in volition as it is known but as it is in itself, – and consequently it is there from the nature of the thing, and not in the known as it is known.

3. On the contrary:

If he did not will from eternity, then neither does he will now *de novo*, because then he would be mutable; therefore he wills nothing.

#### I. To the Question

4. I reply:

Every perfect operative power can be the power of operating about any object that is of a nature to have a respect to such power, – just as a perfect intellect can be the principle of understanding anything intelligible and perfect sight of seeing anything visible; therefore since in God there is will formally (from distinction 2 nn.75-88), and even will supremely perfect ‘because infinite’ (from the same distinction nn.94, 101, 117-

118, 234-235, 300-303), the result is that it can be the principle of willing anything willable.

5. But it cannot be a principle of willing anything from time, because this could not be without the change of something; and not of the willed object, because the willed object only has being because it is willed and because it is in the divine will; therefore this change would be in the will itself, as was deduced in distinction 30 n.41 about the idea of the will itself. Therefore the divine will can in its own eternity be the principle of willing anything willable.

6. But it is not the idea of willing both opposites at the same time, because opposites cannot be at the same time with respect to anything; nor is the idea of willing neither of them, because then nothing in creatures would be willed by God, – and consequently he would cause nothing in creatures, because contingency can only be in God on the part of the will, as was deduced in distinction 39 [in the interpolation for that question]. Therefore there is in eternity the idea of willing any other object in anything other than himself.

## II. To the Principal Arguments

7. To the arguments [nn.1-2] I reply that as was said before in distinction 30 n.31 about relations from time that have God as their term under a purely absolute idea, and in like manner about the ideas in distinction 35 n.27, and in like manner about omnipotence in distinction 43 nn.11, 14 (and omnipotence is purely absolute as it is a divine attribute, and thus is it the term of the relation of a possible creature to God), – so I say here that

the divine will under a purely absolute idea is the term of the respect of the will-able thing to God himself, because indeed the divine will produces things in eternity in willed being as the intellect produces in known or understood being; and in like manner one must say that this willed being is present as being in itself in the will, as was said about the being of being known in distinction 36 nn.26-29, 34-35.

8. But then you will argue: if the willed thing has a relation to the divine will, – either then a real relation or a relation of reason only. If real then its foundation is real; therefore the thing has real being from eternity. If a relation of reason only, – on the contrary: the relation does not come from an act of the divine intellect comparing the object to his intellect, – therefore there is in it no relation of reason; for although the divine intellect compare the object as known to his intellect before the object is willed by him, and although in that prior stage he cause a relation of reason of the object itself as known to his intellect, yet he does not seem to cause any relation of it to the will.

9. Although one could here [n.8] respond that this relation of the willed thing to the will is from an act of the divine intellect comparing the willed object to his own will (because he compares his will to the object before he compares it to his intellect), yet if the same ‘being’ were posited as sufficient in the object of the intellect as it is a known object and in the object of the will as it is willed, and if this would in no way be present to the will save because it was present to the intellect, – yet I reply in another way that in the willed object there is a relation to the divine will other than the relation in it which is as of the understood object to the divine intellect; and that other relation is not a real relation, – nor yet is it a relation of reason, speaking strictly of a relation of reason, namely one of the intellect.

10. Nor is the division sufficient that every relation ‘is either real or of reason’, taking relation of reason strictly, because every power that can have an act about an existing object but not as it is existent, and that can by its act compare that object to another to which such object is not compared from the nature of the thing – every such power can cause in the object, as it is object, a relation of reason between itself and something else; which relation is not real, because it is not from the nature of the object in itself, – nor yet is it strictly of reason, because the comparing power is not always only reason or a ratiocinative power.

11. For the will, when using some object for an end, can cause in the object a relation of reason to the end; and it is not a real relation, because it is not in the object from the nature of the thing but from the comparison made by the comparing will (for it can use God in relation to the creature); nor is it a relation of reason, because the power ‘causing the comparison’ is not reason, – whether intellect or imagination is said to be such a comparing power, or anything else; for it is certain that the will is such a comparing and conferring power (and the imaginative power likewise), just as well as the intellective power is; and therefore it is certain that each of these powers [sc. intellective and volitional] can compare its own object and can cause a relation in its own object; not a real relation, because it would thus be there, in such object, from the nature of the thing without any comparison, – nor a relation of reason taken strictly as a relation caused by the intellect, although sometimes it be accompanied by a relation of reason caused by the intellect. But the divine will, and even any will (whatever may be true of imagination, about which we will not speak now), can compare itself to the object in willed being from eternity (and conversely), and so it can cause in the object a relation of reason to itself.

## Forty Sixth Distinction

### Single Question

*Whether God's Will of Being Well-Pleased is always Fulfilled*

1. About the forty sixth distinction I ask whether God's will of being well-pleased is always fulfilled.

And it seems that it is not:

*I Timothy 2.4:* "God wills all men to be saved;" but not all will be saved; therefore etc.

2. In addition *Matthew 23.37* the Savior says to the children of Jerusalem: "How often have I wanted to gather your children as a hen gathers her chicks, and ye would not;" therefore as before.

3. On the contrary:

*Romans 9.19:* "Who hath resisted his will?"

4. And *Psalm 113.11:* "Everything that he willed he did."

### I. To the Question

5. I reply:

The will of God<sup>a</sup> must, as to all things, always be fulfilled, – because as the Almighty can do everything possible, so, when the divine will is determinate with final determination to posit something in being, that thing will be; but to will that thing with the will of being well-pleased is to will it with the ultimate determination that can be posited on the part of an almighty will that wills the effect into existence; therefore as regard every effect for which God is thus willing, that effect will be.

a. [Interpolation] will is double, will of being well-pleased and of sign or notification; the first is double, namely antecedent and consequent. Antecedent will of being well-pleased is that by which God wills conditionally (as far as concerns himself) and antecedently that all men be saved, and this will is not always fulfilled [cf. nn.7-8]; the will of being well-pleased that is absolute is also consequent. [See also the *Interpolation* after n.6]

6. And the reason can be confirmed, because if a cause, determinate with ultimate determination to something, were not to posit the effect in being, this would seem to be because of its lack of power – as for example that it was not sufficient of itself or was impeded by something else, or because of its capability of changing before the effect is understood to be posited in being; but the Almighty is not lacking in power, nor is he mutable; therefore etc.a

a. [Interpolation] But the will of sign or notification is distinguished in five ways: into prohibition, precept, counsel, fulfillment, and permission [see below d.47 n.6]. The first three are reduced to conditional will of being well-pleased, because God's precept or prohibition or counsel is not always fulfilled; fulfillment and permission are reduced to absolute will of being well-pleased, and in this way nothing is done against this sign or notification.

## II. To the Principal Arguments

7. To the first argument [n.1] I say that although the saying of the Apostle could be expounded with an appropriate distribution of terms, to mean all those who will be saved – yet it could be better expounded of antecedent will as follows: ‘he wills to save all men and that all men be saved’, namely as far as concerns his own part – and by his antecedent will he has, to this extent, given them the natural gifts and right laws and common aids that are sufficient for salvation.

8. Just as, in the case of a king who establishes good laws and appoints ministers to guard those laws, one could say that he wills all his subjects to live peaceably and quietly, as far as in him, and yet, if he see someone being unjustly treated, there would be no need for the king at once to intervene to ensure that he lives quietly unless the matter were delivered to him by a complaint of fact (he does indeed antecedently will anyone to live peaceably and quietly, but he does not will anyone immediately to live thus), – so I say in the issue at hand, that although God not have a will of being well-pleased for saving this particular man, yet he wills for him the common aids of salvation, by which aids even that particular man can live well and be saved; for which reason one can say that, as far as concerns his own part, he wills all to be saved.

9. To the second [n.2]: the Master expounds (and well expounds, d.46 ch.2 n.414), that it was not that he willed all to fulfill the will of Christ, but that he gathered by his will all whom he gathered. See and note the exposition of the Master.

## Forty Seventh Distinction

### Single Question

*Whether Divine Permission is some Act of the Divine Will*

1. About the forty seventh distinction I ask whether divine permission is some act of the divine will.

That it is:

Because otherwise it does not seem that God knows with certitude that this man will sin (for he does not know future contingents without determination of his will); but it does not seem that he has about a sinner any act save that of permitting him to sin (for neither does he, with respect to him, have acts of willing and refusing); therefore if ‘to permit’ is not some act, God will not be certain about the future sin of this man, because there will be no determination of his will for making that future contingent to be known with certitude.

2. On the contrary:

Permission is enumerated along with the other signs or notifications of the divine will; but precept is not any elicited act of the divine will; therefore much more forcefully is permission not so either.

### I. To the Question

3. I reply:

In us a double act of will can be distinguished, namely to will and to refuse, and each is a positive act; and if they are about the same act, they are contrary acts – which acts are also expressed by other words, which are ‘to love’ and ‘to hate’.

4. And each of these can in us be distinguished, as that willing is distinguished into efficacious willing and weak willing; so that ‘efficacious willing’ is said to be that by which the being of the willed thing is not merely pleasing to the will but, if the will can at once posit the willed thing in being, it at once posits it; so too ‘efficacious refusing’ is said to be that by which the refuser not only impedes something but, if he can, he altogether destroys it. ‘Weak will’ is that by which the willed thing pleases such that the will does not, however, posit it in being, although it could posit it in being; ‘weak refusing’ is that by which the refused thing displeases such that the will does not prevent the refused thing from being although it could.

5. In us, therefore, weak refusing – properly stated – seems to be the permission of something bad which I know; for I am not said to permit that about which I know nothing, or that which is so done by another that it pleases me – but I permit that which I know is being done badly by another but which I do not prevent.

6. A sign of efficacious will is that, if the thing may be immediately done by the will, there is fulfillment of it – if it may be done by another, there is precept of it; and perhaps the sign of weak will – in us – is counsel, or persuasion or warning. And the sign of weak refusal is permission or dissuasion, and the sign of efficacious refusal is prohibition.

7. But this distinction could be posited in God such that, just as willing and refusing are one act of his (and this without contrariety or dissimilarity in the act in itself), so ‘efficacious willing’ would be assigned to some of the objects willed by him, and likewise efficacious refusing to some of the objects refused by him, – and not assigned to others. And then one could say that God’s refusal is weak with respect to those objects that he refuses in such a way that he refuses to prohibit them; and this refusing by God can be called his permission – and thus the act in God, as it passes over to the object, is related in this way to the divine will.

8. But if this answer does not please (because of the fact that the refusal of anything that has been posited in being would seem to go along with some sadness and with some imperfection in the volition itself and in the will), then it can be said that permission outwardly (or the sign or notification) is that the effect exist, although however it is against the divine precept – and this is the permission that is a sign or notification of divine will; but to this nothing in the divine will corresponds itself save that the will does not will to prevent something from coming to be, or does not refuse it, which refusing is the negation of a divine positive act and consequently is not a positive act.

9. And as to the remark that ‘he who wills allows’, this can be understood to mean, not that he wills to have a direct act about what he permits, but rather a reflex act; for there is offered to the divine will that this man will sin or is sinning, and first God’s will does not have about this man an act of willing (for he cannot will him to have sin); secondly his will can be understood not to be willing this thing, and then his will can will ‘not to will this thing’, – and in this way the one who wills is said to allow and allow

voluntarily, namely willing to permit and to permit voluntarily. Just as, on the other side, when Judas is presented to God: first God has a not willing of glory to him, and not first a refusing of it to him (according to the final position in distinction 41 n.45); and he can then secondly reflect on this negation of act and will it – and so he willingly (or voluntarily) chooses, not Judas' going to be finally a sinner and refusal of glory, but a non willing of glory.

## II. To the Principal Argument

10. As to the first argument [n.1], it was explained in distinction 41 [n.50] how there is no foreseeing in God of a future sin by the fact that he knows he will permit this man to sin finally (and so to need to be finally damned), but there is required along with this that he knows he will co-operate with him in the act of sinning, and will not co-operate in the act whose omission is a sin of omission; yet concomitant with each of these permissions is that God foresees that he does not will this man to sin, – and thus it is plain how divine permission is an act of will and how it is not.

## Forty Eighth Distinction

### Single Question

*Whether a Created Will is Morally Good whenever it Conforms to the Uncreated Will*

1. About the forty eighth distinction I ask whether the human will – or more generally – whether a created will is morally good whenever it conforms to the uncreated will.

That it is:

The truth of a created intellect is when it is conformed to the uncreated intellect; therefore by similarity about a created will, that it is then good when it is conformed to the uncreated will.

2. On the contrary:

The Jews wanted Christ to suffer and to die, which Christ also wanted – and yet they sinned (“Forgive them, Father,” he says, “because they know not what they do,” *Luke 23.34*); therefore etc.

### I. To the Question

3. I reply:

According to [Ps.-]Dionysius *On the Divine Names* ch.4 n.30, good is from a complete cause, and according to the Philosopher *Ethics* 2.2.1104b24-28 all the circumstances must come together in any moral act in order for the act to be morally good; yet the lack of a single or of any circumstance suffices for the act to be morally bad.

4. A created will, therefore, conform to the divine will in the substance of the act, whether conform in the substance as possessed of any one circumstance, or conform in all circumstances pertaining to moral goodness (and perhaps if it were conform in all circumstances, namely that it is willed for the same reason and in the same way, and so in

the case of all other circumstances), – yet such a will need not be good in the way the uncreated will is good, because the same circumstances do not agree with the act as it is from diverse agents. For it does not agree with a created will to will some good with the same intensity as agrees with the uncreated will, – and the intensity of an act as regard the object in the created and uncreated agent differs greatly in these agents; and at any rate, however it may be with the conformity of the created and uncreated will in all circumstances, – conformity in goodness of act and object is not enough, because there can be lack of conformity in other circumstances that are necessarily required for the goodness of an act of will.

## II. To the Principal Argument

5. To the argument for the opposite [n.1] I say that the case is not the same, because the truth of the intellect depends only on the object by itself, because if the object is disposed in the way it is understood then the intellect is true; but the goodness of the will does not depend on the object by itself, but on all the other circumstances, and most especially on the end; for which reason one must note that our whole volition is most especially ordered to the ultimate end, who is “the alpha and the omega, the beginning and the end,” – to whom “be honor and glory for ages of ages” [*Revelation 1.8, Romans 16.27*]. Amen.