



**DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE
DEFENSE OFFICE OF HEARINGS AND APPEALS**



In the matter of:

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ISCR Case No. 24-01115

Applicant for Security Clearance)

Appearances

For Government: Andrew Henderson, Esq., Department Counsel
For Applicant: *Pro se*

01/13/2025

Decision

CEFOLA, Richard A., Administrative Judge:

Statement of the Case

On January 17, 2024, Applicant submitted a security clearance application (SF-86). On July 25, 2024, in accordance with DoD Directive 5220.6, as amended (Directive), the Department of Defense issued Applicant a Statement of Reasons (SOR) alleging facts that raise security concerns under Guidelines H (Drug Involvement and Substance Misuse) and E (Personal Conduct). The action was taken under Executive Order (EO) 10865, *Safeguarding Classified Information Within Industry* (February 20, 1960), as amended; Department of Defense Directive 5220.6, *Defense Industrial Personnel Security Clearance Review Program* (January 2, 1992), as amended (Directive); and the adjudicative guidelines (AG) effective within the Department of Defense on June 8, 2017.

Applicant answered the SOR in writing (Answer) on July 31, 2024, and requested a hearing before an administrative judge. The case was assigned to me on August 20, 2024. The Defense Office of Hearings and Appeals (DOHA) issued a Notice of Hearing on August 26, 2024. I convened the hearing as scheduled on September 30, 2024. The

Government offered Government Exhibits 1 and 2, which were admitted without objection. Applicant testified on his own behalf. The record was left open for the receipt of additional evidence. On October 29, 2024, Applicant's Exhibit (AppX) A was offered, and received without objection. The record closed at that time.

Findings of Fact

Applicant admitted to all the allegations in SOR. After a thorough and careful review of the pleadings, exhibits, and testimony, I make the following findings of fact.

Applicant is a 29-year-old employee of a defense contractor. He has been employed with the defense contractor since November of 2023. He is unmarried and has no children. (TR at page 5 lines 16~23, at page 24 line 10 to page 25 line 4, and GX 1 at pages 5, 9 and 15~16.)

Guideline H - Drug Involvement and Substance Misuse

1.a. and 1.b. Applicant admits using marijuana, several thousands of times, during a 15-year period from December 2008 until at least May 2024. (TR at page 17 line 5 to page 18 line 13, and at page 24 line 10 to page 25 line 4.) This is consistent with his Office of Personnel Management (OPM) interview on March 11, 2024, when Applicant expressed an intent to use marijuana in the future. (TR at page 26 lines 2~10, and GX 2 at page 4.)

1.c. and 1.d. Applicant admits using cocaine, about "a thousand times," during the seven-year period from June 2014 to at least May 2021. He also admits purchasing cocaine several hundred times during that same seven-year time period. (TR at page 16 line 11 to page 17 line 4, and at page 25 lines 5~15.)

Guideline E - Personal Conduct

2.a. Applicant admits falsifying his January 17, 2024, SF-86, in response to "**Section 23 – Illegal Use of Drugs or Drug Activity . . .** Do you intend to use drug or controlled substance in the future?" He answered, "No." This was false. In fact, he continued to use marijuana, as noted above, to at least March 2024, another couple of months. (TR at page 18 line 14 to page 23 line 13, and GX 1 at pages 22~23.)

Policies

When evaluating an applicant's suitability for national security eligibility, the administrative judge must consider the adjudicative guidelines. In addition to brief introductory explanations for each guideline, the adjudicative guidelines (AG) list potentially disqualifying conditions and mitigating conditions, which are to be used in evaluating an applicant's national security eligibility.

These guidelines are not inflexible rules of law. Instead, recognizing the complexities of human behavior, these guidelines are applied in conjunction with the

factors listed in AG ¶ 2 describing the adjudicative process. The administrative judge's overarching adjudicative goal is a fair, impartial, and commonsense decision. The entire process is a conscientious scrutiny of applicable guidelines in the context of a number of variables known as the whole-person concept. The administrative judge must consider all available, reliable information about the person, past and present, favorable and unfavorable, in making a decision.

The protection of the national security is the paramount consideration. AG ¶ 2(b) requires that “[a]ny doubt concerning personnel being considered for national security eligibility will be resolved in favor of the national security.” In reaching this decision, I have drawn only those conclusions that are reasonable, logical, and based on the evidence contained in the record. I have not drawn inferences based on mere speculation or conjecture.

Directive ¶ E3.1.14, requires the Government to present evidence to establish controverted facts alleged in the SOR. Under Directive ¶ E3.1.15, an “applicant is responsible for presenting witnesses and other evidence to rebut, explain, extenuate, or mitigate facts admitted by the applicant or proven by Department Counsel, and has the ultimate burden of persuasion as to obtaining a favorable clearance decision.”

A person applying for national security eligibility seeks to enter into a fiduciary relationship with the Government predicated upon trust and confidence. This relationship transcends normal duty hours and endures throughout off-duty hours. The Government reposes a high degree of trust and confidence in individuals to whom it grants national security eligibility. Decisions include, by necessity, consideration of the possible risk the applicant may deliberately or inadvertently fail to protect or safeguard classified information. Such decisions entail a certain degree of legally permissible extrapolation as to potential, rather than actual, risk of compromise of classified or sensitive information. Finally, as emphasized in Section 7 of Executive Order 10865, “[a]ny determination under this order adverse to an applicant shall be a determination in terms of the national interest and shall in no sense be a determination as to the loyalty of the applicant concerned.” See also Executive Order 12968, Section 3.1(b) (listing multiple prerequisites for access to classified or sensitive information.)

Analysis

Guideline H - Drug Involvement and Substance Misuse

The security concern relating to the guideline Drug Involvement and Substance Misuse is set forth at AG ¶ 24:

The illegal use of controlled substances, to include the misuse of prescription and non-prescription drugs, and the use of other substances that cause physical or mental impairment or are used in a manner inconsistent with their intended purpose can raise questions about an individual's reliability and trustworthiness, both because such behavior may lead to physical or psychological impairment and because it raises

questions about a person's ability or willingness to comply with laws, rules, and regulations. *Controlled substance* means any "controlled substance" as defined in 21 U.S.C. 802. *Substance misuse* is the generic term adopted in this guideline to describe any of the behaviors listed above.

The guideline at AG ¶ 25 contains seven conditions that could raise a security concern and may be disqualifying. Three conditions are established:

- (a) any substance misuse (see above definition);
- (c) illegal possession of a controlled substance, including cultivation, processing, manufacture, purchase, sale, or distribution; or possession of drug paraphernalia; and
- g) expressed intent to continue drug involvement and substance misuse . .

Appellant used marijuana and cocaine thousands of times, and purchased cocaine several hundred times. He also expressed an intent to use marijuana in the future. Therefore, AG ¶ 25 (a), (c), and (g) are established.

The guideline at AG ¶ 26 contains four conditions that could mitigate security concerns. Two conditions may be applicable:

- (a) the behavior happened so long ago, was so infrequent, or happened under such circumstances that it is unlikely to recur or does not cast doubt on the individual's current reliability, trustworthiness, or good judgment; and
- (b) the individual acknowledges his or her drug involvement and substance misuse, provides evidence of actions taken to overcome this problem, and has established a pattern of abstinence, including, but not limited to:
 - (1) disassociation from drug-using associates and contacts;
 - (2) changing or avoiding the environment where drugs were used; and
 - (3) providing a signed statement of intent to abstain from all drug involvement and substance misuse, acknowledging that any future involvement or misuse is grounds for revocation of national security eligibility.

None of these apply. Applicant's excessive drug involvement is fairly recent, ending about nine months ago in March 2024, and he has not submitted a signed statement of intent to abstain from all drug involvement and substance misuse. Drug Involvement and Substance Misuse is found against Applicant.

Guideline E - Personal Conduct

The security concern relating to the guideline for Personal Conduct is set out in AG ¶ 15:

Conduct involving questionable judgment, lack of candor, dishonesty, or unwillingness to comply with rules and regulations can raise questions about an individual's reliability, trustworthiness, and ability to protect classified or sensitive information. Of special interest is any failure to cooperate or provide truthful and candid answers during national security investigative or adjudicative processes. The following will normally result in an unfavorable national security eligibility determination, security clearance action, or cancellation of further processing for national security eligibility:

- (a) refusal, or failure without reasonable cause, to undergo or cooperate with security processing, including but not limited to meeting with a security investigator for subject interview, completing security forms or releases, cooperation with medical or psychological evaluation, or polygraph examination, if authorized and required; and
- (b) refusal to provide full, frank, and truthful answers to lawful questions of investigators, security officials, or other official representatives in connection with a personnel security or trustworthiness determination.

The guideline notes several conditions that could raise security concerns under AG ¶ 16. One is potentially applicable in this case:

(a) deliberate omission, concealment, or falsification of relevant facts from any personnel security questionnaire, personal history statement, or similar form used to conduct investigations, determine employment qualifications, award benefits or status, determine national security eligibility or trustworthiness, or award fiduciary responsibilities.

Applicant intended to use marijuana in the future when he executed his January 2024, SF-86. The evidence is sufficient to raise this disqualifying condition.

AG ¶ 17 provides conditions that could mitigate security concerns. I considered all of the mitigating conditions under AG ¶ 17 including:

- (a) the individual made prompt, good-faith efforts to correct the omission, concealment, or falsification before being confronted with the facts.

Applicant made no prompt, good-faith efforts to correct the omission, concealment, or falsification. He instead continued to use marijuana for another two months after completing the questionnaire. Personal Conduct is found against Applicant.

Whole-Person Concept

Under the whole-person concept, the administrative judge must evaluate an applicant's national security eligibility by considering the totality of the applicant's conduct and all relevant circumstances. The administrative judge should consider the nine adjudicative process factors listed at AG ¶ 2(d):

- (1) the nature, extent, and seriousness of the conduct; (2) the circumstances surrounding the conduct, to include knowledgeable participation; (3) the frequency and recency of the conduct; (4) the individual's age and maturity at the time of the conduct; (5) the extent to which participation is voluntary; (6) the presence or absence of rehabilitation and other permanent behavioral changes; (7) the motivation for the conduct; (8) the potential for pressure, coercion, exploitation, or duress; and (9) the likelihood of continuation or recurrence.

According to AG ¶ 2(c), the ultimate determination of whether to grant national security eligibility must be an overall commonsense judgment based upon careful consideration of the applicable guidelines and the whole-person concept.

I considered the potentially disqualifying and mitigating conditions in light of all facts and circumstances surrounding this case. I have incorporated my comments under Guidelines H (Drug Involvement and Substance Misuse) and E (Personal Conduct) in my whole-person analysis. Some of the factors in AG ¶ 2(d) were addressed under those guidelines, but some warrant additional comment. Applicant is respected in the workplace. He performs well at his job. (AppX A.) However, overall, the record evidence leaves me with questions and doubts as to Applicant's eligibility and suitability for a security clearance. For all these reasons, I conclude Applicant failed to mitigate the Drug Involvement and Substance Misuse, and Personal Conduct security concerns.

Formal Findings

Formal findings for or against Applicant on the allegations set forth in the SOR, as required by ¶ E3.1.25 of the Directive, are:

Paragraph 1, Guideline G: AGAINST APPLICANT

Subparagraphs 1.a~1.d: Against Applicant

Paragraph 2, Guideline E: AGAINST APPLICANT

Subparagraph 2.a: Against Applicant

Conclusion

In light of all of the circumstances presented by the record in this case, it is not clearly consistent with the national interest to grant Applicant eligibility for a security clearance. Eligibility for access to classified information is denied.

Richard A. Cefola
Administrative Judge