

David Palmer
212-497-0836
David.Palmer@evercoreisi.com
Bradley Andersen, CFA
646-225-6028
Bradley.Andersen@evercoreisi.com

Less EPS upside, but casual dining stocks still look pretty good

We're broadly still constructive on our casual dining coverage, albeit with upside capped by cost inflation concerns: Casual dining stocks have sold off (down an average of 8% over the last month) as investors have become wary of a sector with little-to-no improvement in 2-year SSS over the last 10-12 weeks—especially as inflationary pressures are building. Even with inflation rising and consensus estimates higher since March (see third bullet), we forecast modest upside to Street numbers. Furthermore, we see valuation as unchallenging—particularly for Brinker at 9x our FY22e FCF. For Darden Restaurants, which reports F4Q earnings and provides FY22 guidance this Thursday, we are forecasting near-term sales and EPS upside (F4Q through F1H22) before inflation becomes a bigger limit to margins (see more on pages 3 and 4).

Revenue growth has not meaningfully accelerated since late March—and certainly as much as other consumer segments (e.g. retail): From Jan/Feb to March/April the acceleration was 10pp in fast food, over 20pp in casual dining and over 30pp in fine dining (see Figure 3). While multi-year sales levels per restaurant are positive for fast food and casual dining, the recovery has seemingly stalled at current levels over the last three months. We are left to theorize why. Potential reasons for the slowing recovery include: 1) labor constraints to service capacity, 2) consumers increasingly turn spending to other things that are—at the margin—more available or comfortable since March, 3) diminishing stimulus benefit (mid-March), 4) reopening of many independent and smaller chains (rebounding supply), and 5) still some remaining discomfort by some consumers with regard to eating in a restaurant.

Higher consensus estimates leave us with more modest EPS upside, but valuation levels are less challenging: Calendar 2022 consensus EPS estimates have risen roughly 5%, 10%, 17% and for DRI, EAT, and TXRH since each company's last earnings report (mid-March for DRI and late April for TXRH and EAT). While our CY22 EPS estimates were 6%, 16% and 15% above consensus calendar 2022e EPS just a few months ago, for DRI, TXRH and EAT respectively, our base case upside is now only 4%, 3% and 4% for these three names today. Although TXRH's valuation (at 23x 2022e P/E and 15x '22 EV/EBITDA) reflects excitement about recent momentum, we view Outperform-rated DRI (17x CY22 P/E and 2.6% dividend yield) and EAT (10x CY22 P/E and 11% FCF yield) as less challenging (see pages 5-7 for more discussion).

See Pgs. 2-15 for our six part framework to think about casual dining as well as our earnings revisions and valuation thoughts for DRI, TXRH, and EAT...

Our EPS changes and stock views ahead of Darden earnings

DRI—Expecting near-term upside before inflation and limited pricing dampens margin upside in calendar F2H22

For Darden, we are increasing our numbers for the May quarter significantly while thinking about potential FY22 guidance that may be provided in ~2 weeks. We see significant upside to the fine dining segment for Darden, with recent KnappTrack data showing high-end steakhouses to be +11% vs. 2019, a 6pp acceleration over April. While our SSS and EPS estimates are roughly 1-3pp and 4-5pp above consensus levels, much of that upside is in the near-term due to conservative guidance and Street estimates (combined with contracted input costs). By F2H, input cost pressure could begin to rise as contracts roll off. Furthermore, the company will be keen to preserve earnings power for FY23 (and keep that year within the targeted 10-15% TSR growth range).

TXRH—Momentum has its price

With this note we are increasing our SSS and EPS estimates for Texas Roadhouse as a result of strong near-term SSS, sticky off-premise sales, and relatively good cost control on labor and food costs. Our 2Qe SSS is now 21% on a 2-year stacked basis (prev. 19%; cons. 14%) and EPS is now \$1.13 (vs. cons. \$0.95). Our 2021e and 2022e EPS go up ~5pp and 3pp, respectively, reflecting a more rapid-than-expected and sustained SSS strength, labor productivity, and incremental off-premise business. We remain more cautious than consensus on restaurant-level-margin given the Company's reticence to price aggressively, our cautious inflationary protein outlook in 2022, and conservative consensus labor inflation assumptions in both 2022 and 2023 (consensus assuming 4% labor inflation CAGRs in 2022 and 2023 vs. 7-9% in 2017-2019 and 5.5% just before COVID, see more detail later on in note).

EAT—Sizzling with margin fear

For Brinker, our stock thesis has morphed from one of very significant EPS upside to one of a combination of slight valuation and EPS upside. Brinker's equity value trades at 9x free cash flow—almost as cheap as it has ever been in spite of lower debt leverage (EVRe <3x debt/EBITDA by the end of this calendar year vs. recent history ~4x). We are largely maintaining our FY22e and FY23e SSS and EPS but shifting the quarters somewhat as a result of price realization timing and the launch of a 2nd virtual brand. In many ways we see Brinker proceeding with a prudent long-term strategy that has it focused on long-term value (3 for \$10), building digital and off-premise business and capturing modest marketing and in-restaurant efficiencies. We look forward to Brinker's F4Q EPS on August 18th and Analyst Day on September 15th. See our Day 2 takeaways from the Evercore ISI Consumer and Retail Summit where we spoke with CEO Wyman Roberts [here](#).

See more extensive discussion of base, upside and downside scenarios for TXRH, EAT and DRI on pages 5-7.

We still see modest EPS upside largely based on stronger sales momentum and weaker flow-through assumptions vs. consensus

Figure 1: Summary of estimate changes, price targets, target multiples, and upside to current prices

| | Price | Target | Target Multiple | Upside | CY21 EPS (new) | CY21 EPS (old) | Delta | CY22 EPS (new) | CY22 EPS (old) | Delta |
|------|-------|--------|-----------------|--------|----------------|----------------|-------|----------------|----------------|-------|
| DRI | \$133 | \$165 | 20x | 24% | \$6.36 | \$5.50 | 16% | \$7.77 | \$7.55 | 3% |
| TXRH | \$92 | \$110 | 26x | 20% | \$3.49 | \$3.33 | 5% | \$4.03 | \$3.90 | 3% |
| EAT | \$57 | \$80 | 13x | 39% | \$4.51 | \$4.41 | 2% | \$5.60 | \$5.68 | (1%) |

Source: Evercore ISI Research

A six part framework to think about casual dining

In our view, the casual dining sub-segment can be an area of significant alpha creation for those investors that can position correctly today—we recommend DRI and EAT—and adjust positions to emerging sub-themes. We see these themes or key variables as 1) Input cost contracts versus sustained inflation...what gives first? 2) Labor readiness for the demand of reopened seats, 3) Consumer preference as seats reopen and pent-up demand is satisfied, 4) Stickiness of off-premise demand gains and drivers for off-premise, 5) Labor productivity identified and potential for long-term margin gains (net of reinvestment as on-premise business returns), and 6) Long-term marketing efficiency as a result of partial restoration of traditional media (particularly as digital connectivity has increased during the pandemic). Overall, we see these variables as reasons to prefer quality chains that have the ability to fill reopened seats (top preference chains), serve these customers (staffed earlier due to preferred employer status, identify productivity and sustain lower levels of inflation (purchasing scale). While Darden and Texas Roadhouse score better than Brinker across these attributes there is a quality-bias to our coverage and we generally see Chili's operations and supply chain as underrated among investors (and advantaged versus most competitor peers, including independent restaurants). While we believe sustained labor and input inflation will limit upside scenarios we also see expectations and valuations more modest. As a result we maintain our Outperform ratings for Darden and Brinker and view Darden as our top pick in the sector today.

Variable 1: Input cost contracts versus sustained inflation

While we hear plenty of stories about the local restaurant operator with product shortages (e.g. no wings) or 20-50% YOY inflation in key costs. For those big chains with floating rate exposure, we could see input inflation touch the low double digits by late 3Q. For example, we expect this to be the case for Burger King US. That said, the average mega-chain has a goal of relative stability and visibility in its costs—this is made possible with captive suppliers, system distribution agreements and other hedging practices. For Darden, McDonald's and Brinker, we are hearing of a 3%-type inflation today and this remaining through much of 2H21. Of course, contracts can only last for so long—so the key variable will be where input costs are closer to 4Q21. By then, the labor shortage impact to supply chains (and the restaurants themselves) should be less acute. By the end of the year, the question of transitory vs. sustained inflation should become more clear—just as contracts are beginning to roll off.

The higher the levels of sustained inflation, the more we would avoid casual dining in favor of global franchised names like MCD, YUM and DPZ and even high pricing-power company-operated names like CMG and SBUX. Keep in mind that chains like Chili's and Olive Garden over-index to family occasions which means one payer is often paying for many. The higher-check means a greater frequency risk if pricing pass-through is too high. We expect both Darden and Brinker to be conservative with pricing with a goal of sustaining long-term traffic share.

Variable 2: Consumer preference as seats reopen and pent up demand is satisfied

Darden Restaurants and Texas Roadhouse have many of the most preferred chains within their respective segments (see Figure 8). As a result, these companies are turning out to be the best at filling available seats. Since late March, available seats have increased from 65% capacity to over 80% capacity today. At the margin, it appears that steak chains—or those that appeal to the special occasions—have experienced the best early surge from pent-up demand. In the case of fine dining, we would not be surprised to see personal occasions make up for still sluggish business expenditures—something we hope to explore on the Darden Restaurants earnings call on 06/24.

Variable 3: Labor readiness for the demand

The labor shortage in America is real—and that is particularly so for the restaurant and hospitality industry (see Figure 2). Increasingly it is staffing levels—rather than seating restrictions—that are the constraint on sales. We are hearing stories of Applebee's franchisees limiting manager vacation time, or TGI Friday's failing to reopen or many other chains opening later and closing earlier than normal. As a result, preferred employers continue to have an edge in staffing levels, which is creating advantaged abilities to process new demand. Interestingly, the top preference chains (see above) tend to be the ones that offer the best pay (including tips), upward mobility and benefits. As a result, we believe there has been a quality bias to demand early in this recovery.

Variable 4: Stickiness of off-premise demand gained (and lingering benefits of digital connectivity)

While Darden and Texas Roadhouse seem to have the biggest upside from consumer preference and labor readiness, we still see Brinker International as among the greatest long-term beneficiaries of off-premise business as a result of its efforts with DoorDash, virtual brands, loyalty and take-out. In addition, Chili's off-premise mix seems likely to finish in the 30-33% range—a full 10pp+ higher than its pre-COVID level of 20%. This makes the Chili's CY2019-2022 SSS growth of 9% that is implied by consensus appear conservative. Already, Chili's SSS growth since 2019 has been in the 10% range since late March. While it appears that 2-year SSS growth has stalled near that level through May, we can imagine trends accelerating as final seat restrictions loosen and as labor becomes more available.

In addition to Brinker, Texas Roadhouse's step up in off-premise business mix has been impressive. While take-out and steak seem to be a less-than-perfect match, take-out mix has increased from 7% to 20% at the Roadhouse and this seems to be a lasting area of potential upside. For Olive Garden, its large take out mix of ~16% has increased to 33% during COVID (as of the week ended 3/21/21)—creating potential for some upside, but perhaps more modest than those chains less committed to take-out pre-COVID (e.g. Texas Roadhouse) or those that embraced delivery (Chili's).

Variable 5: Labor productivity identified and potential for long-term margin gains (net of reinvestment as on-premise business returns)

Going forward, long-term labor productivity gains are perhaps the major variable and area of upside. During COVID, virtually every chain needed to remove labor (and other) costs. By doing so, restaurant companies were afforded a “zero-based budgeting” exercise. As one restaurant executive put it, “It is easier to check out the engine when the wheels are off the bus”. In CY22, we are modeling 100bp, 10bp and 60bp lower labor costs as a percentage of sales (vs. CY19) at Darden, Texas Roadhouse and Brinker in spite of relatively rapid wage inflation—largely as a result of COVID-era productivity and accelerated sales gains.

Ahead of COVID, Texas Roadhouse was already focusing on labor efficiency after going too far with labor investments in 2017-2018. For Darden Restaurants, the COVID era allowed for a continuation of long-term productivity efforts at Olive Garden (e.g. enabled by menu simplification and reduced back-of-house labor) and an overdue focus on streamlining Cheddar's. For Brinker, that had previously been the most aggressive about labor cost control, the COVID benefits to labor productivity may be relatively small before considering the benefits of off-premise sales layers. See Figure 6 for long-term trends in labor costs per restaurant as well as the implications of Evercore ISI and consensus estimates through FY23.

Variable 6: Long-term marketing efficiency as a result of partial restoration of traditional media (particularly as digital connectivity has increased during the pandemic)

Over the last few years, Chili's loyalty membership has grown to 8M—or ~7,500 members per location. This puts the chain in the big leagues of digital connectivity with fast food brands such as Chipotle and Domino's (see Figure 7). As a result of this increased digital connectivity and marketing abilities through DoorDash, Brinker's marketing percentage of sales may never need to reach pre-COVID levels. There has been a significant reduction in traditional media spending, partially offset with increases in higher ROI digital and direct marketing campaigns. While Darden originally stated that it would bring marketing spend back to pre-pandemic levels, we sense that it may keep 50bp+ of savings as a result of digital efficiencies. Of course, Texas Roadhouse is the least directly impacted by marketing savings (since it was zero pre-pandemic). However, Texas Roadhouse may be more effective given its digital connections are a new way to communicate with consumers.

Modeling changes and updated valuation thoughts

Texas Roadhouse

Our quick take: With this note we are increasing our SSS and EPS estimates for Texas Roadhouse as a result of strong near-term SSS, sticky off-premise sales, and relatively good cost control on both labor and food costs. Our 2Qe SSS is now 21% on a 2-year stacked basis (prev. 19%; cons. 14%) and EPS is now \$1.13 (vs. cons. \$0.95). Our 2021e and 2022e EPS go up ~5pp and 3pp, respectively, reflecting a more rapid-than-expected and sustained SSS strength, labor productivity, and incremental off-premise business. We remain more cautious than consensus on restaurant-level-margin given the Company's reticence to price aggressively, our cautious inflationary protein outlook in 2022, and conservative consensus labor inflation assumptions in both 2022 and 2023 (consensus assuming 4% labor inflation CAGRs in 2022 and 2023 vs. 7-9% in 2017-2019 and 5.5% just before COVID).

What our base case implies: We are raising our 2021 EPS from \$3.34 to \$3.49 (cons. \$3.41) to reflect stronger same store sales (SSS) as dining rooms reopen (85%+ capacity) and from continued strength in off-premise sales. We are assuming 2-year SSS strength averages ~19% for the remainder of the year (cons. ~14% 2-year SSS, see Figure 14). Our company owned 2021 AUVs of \$6.17M are 15% above 2019 (after adjusting for the 53rd week in 2019). We assume 2021 restaurant level margins of 17.4% (vs. 2019 of 17.3%; guidance 15-16%), less than consensus' 17.7%. We do not expect much incremental commodity inflation pressures in 2021 given 9-month contracting (beef ~50% of commodity basket). We assume better sales and labor productivity, which started pre-COVID, could improve labor as a percent of sales to 33.0% (vs. 2019 at 33.1% of sales). For 2022, we are increasing our EPS from \$3.90 to \$4.03 (+16% YoY; cons. 3.93) driven by continued sales improvement from both dine-in, off-premise and +3% pricing. Our 2022 company owned 1-year same store sales increases from 3.5% to 5% (cons. 4%; 3-year SSS ~23%). We now assume company owned AUVs of \$6.49M (+21% vs. pre-COVID). We assume off premise sales mix stays at ~15%+ vs. ~7% in 2019. While we could see some better labor leverage than pre-COVID, we are watchful for higher commodity costs as hedges roll off into 2022. As a result, we assume 2022 restaurant level margins of 17.3% (cons. 17.9%). Our price target of \$110 (+20%) upside equates to 25.5x (pre-COVID 5-year range of 22-27x) our LTM as of 6/31/23 EPS of \$4.29. Our target multiple is 28% higher than DRI, roughly consistent with TXRH's pre-COVID historical premium of 32% (see Figure 9). Our target valuation equates to a PE-to-growth ratio of ~2.0x against our 13% long-term EPS growth (driven by 4-5% SSS, 5-6% unit growth, and a bit of share repurchases). This excludes the company's 1-2% dividend yield. Our price target also equates to 27x our CY22 EPS of \$4.03. This is exactly in line with the company's historical 35% premium to the S&P500 (currently trading at 20x CY22 consensus EPS).

What our upside case implies: Our upside case for 2022e EPS of \$4.52 assumes company owned AUVs of \$6.6M (+23% vs. 2019 adjusted for the 53rd week) and restaurant level margins of 18.1%. We assume off premise sales mix of 20% versus 2019 of 7%. We assume labor growth per unit of +4.5%, which is improved from pre-COVID levels of +6-9% growth. Our upside target of \$130 equals 27x (pre-COVID peak multiple) our LTM as of 6/31/23 EPS of \$4.82.

What our downside case implies: Our downside case for 2022e EPS of \$3.90 assumes AUVs of \$6.20 (+15% vs. 2019 adjusted for the 53rd week) and restaurant level margins of 16.5%. We assume off-premise sales of ~10% vs. 2019 of 7%. We assume additional cost pressures on both the commodity and labor side. Our downside target of \$90 equals 23x our LTM as of 6/31/23 EPS of \$3.90.

Brinker

For Brinker, our stock thesis has morphed from one of very significant EPS upside to one of a combination of slight valuation and EPS upside. Brinker's equity value trades at 9x free cash flow—almost as cheap as it has ever been in spite of lower debt leverage (EVRe <3x debt/EBITDA by the end of this calendar year vs. recent history ~4x). We are largely maintaining our FY22e and FY23e SSS and EPS but shifting the quarters somewhat as a result of price realization timing and the launch of a 2nd virtual brand. In many ways we see Brinker proceeding with a prudent long-term strategy that has it focused on long-term value (3 for \$10), building digital and off-premise business and capturing modest marketing and in-restaurant efficiencies. We look forward to Brinker's F4Q EPS on August 18th and Analyst Day on September 15th. See our Day 2 takeaways from the Evercore ISI Consumer and Retail Summit where we spoke with CEO Wyman Roberts [here](#).

What our base case implies: We are fine-tuning our 4Q21e EPS from \$1.67 to \$1.80 (cons. \$1.66; guidance \$1.55-1.70) as we reduce our 2-year Chili's SSS estimate slightly from 7.5% to 7% (cons. 7%) but increase our Maggiano's estimates materially (from -20% 2-year SSS to -7% 2-year SSS; cons. -25% 2-year SSS). Labor productivity and a 53rd week (~80bp tailwind) should allow for strong restaurant level margins (EVRe 17.5%; cons. 16.8%). Our FY22 EPS of \$5.29 assumes 3-year SSS for Chili's to be ~10-11%, potentially conservative as IJW adds 4-5pp, Maggiano's Classics could add LSD mix, and core Chili's off-premise may settle out 10pp above pre-COVID levels (30% mix vs. ~20% pre-COVID). We assume Chili's AUVs to be \$3.1M (+9% vs. 2019), helped by +1.5% of pricing. We also slightly lower our restaurant level margin from 15.4% to 15.3% (cons. 14.9%; 13.9% in FY19; pre-COVID peak ~15%) to reflect slightly higher inflation pressure. We will be watching for the national launch of Maggiano's virtual brand sometime in the F2H22 (currently tested in ~80 stores). Our \$80 price target equals 13x our FY23 EPS (ending 6/30/23) of \$6.00 and 11x CY22 EBITDA. Brinker's pre-COVID NTM P/E trading range was between 10-14x. Our target also represents 14x our CY22 EPS. This is slightly lower than the 15x implied by EAT's historical discount to the S&P500 (pre-COVID 5-year median of 30% and S&P500 currently trading at 20x consensus CY22 EPS estimates). Finally, our 13x target multiple implies a ~1.4x PEG (assuming 9% LT earnings growth), justifiable in our view given the lower visibility when compared to DRI and TXRH.

What our \$90 upside case implies: Our upside case for FY22e EPS of \$5.65 assumes Chili's AUV of \$3.2M (+11% versus 2019) with 30% off premise sales mix. We assume restaurant level margins of 15.6%. Our \$90 upside target equals 14x (near pre-COVID peak; base case multiple 13x) our upside FY23 EPS of \$6.43.

What our \$60 downside case implies: Our downside price target of \$60 equals 12x our downside FY23 EPS of \$4.87. We assume AUVs to be 7% greater in FY22 vs. FY19, implying flat to declining traffic if we assume ~3% pricing and ~4% incremental sales mix from virtual brands. Our downside margins of 14.6% in FY22 and 14.2% in FY23 are less than pre-COVID peak-margins of ~15%.

Darden

Our quick take: For Darden, we are increasing our numbers for the May quarter significantly while thinking about potential FY22 guidance that may be provided in ~2 weeks. We see significant upside to the fine dining segment for Darden, with recent KnappTrack data showing high-end steakhouses to be +11% vs. 2019, a 6pp acceleration over April. While our SSS and EPS estimates are roughly 1-3pp and 4-5pp above consensus levels, much of that upside is in the near-term due to conservative guidance and Street estimates (combined with contracted input costs). By F2H, input cost pressure could begin to rise as contracts roll off. Furthermore, the company will be keen to preserve earnings power for FY23 (and keep that year within the targeted 10-15% TSR growth range).

The quarter ahead (earnings for the period ended 5/31/21 released on Jun 24th): We are raising our SSS estimates for Olive Garden from 52% to 65%, which now represents a 2-year SSS of 0.5% (implies ~flat gap to Knapp, roughly in line with the prior quarter gap to Knapp). We are also raising our SSS estimates for Longhorn from 85% to 105%, which now represents a 2-year SSS of 12% (implies ~1000bp gap to Knapp, roughly in line with the prior quarter gap to Knapp). Our restaurant level margin estimate of 22.6% (cons. 21.2%) assumes the company over-earns slightly as sales momentum outpaced costs coming back online (labor, marketing, etc.). We believe the stock will trade on FY22 guidance, assuming such detail is provided by management (we believe they will). Our FY22 EBITDA margin of 16.3% (cons. 16.1%) assumes 220bp increase vs. LTM (ending 2/29/20) pre-COVID, above the company's framework for 150bp worth of margin improvement given a return to pre-COVID sales. Our FY22 EPS of \$7.75 implies a 10% EPS CAGR vs. FY19, within the company's long-term stated algorithm. For reference, in F4Q19, management provided FY20 guidance for total sales growth, company SSS growth, restaurant openings, CapEx, total inflation, tax rate, and diluted EPS, and shares outstanding on average.

What our base case implies: We maintain our base case of \$165 (+23% upside) which is based on 20x our FY2023 EPS of \$8.28 (cons. \$7.98). We note that DRI's pre-COVID 5-year historical trading range was between 16-21x. We would argue Darden deserves to trade above historical multiples due to above average demand strength, highly-efficient cost cutting initiatives, and the relative current NTM multiple of the S&P500 (DRI should at least maintain its gap to the S&P500 in our view). We also would note that we have cash accumulating on Darden's balance sheet (we assume ~\$1.4B at the end of FY22), a call option on accelerated share repurchases or accretive M&A should Darden eye the right target.


Upside scenario price target of \$180/share: Our upside scenario price target of \$180 assumes 21x (vs. base case of 20x; slightly above pre-COVID peak-multiple justified by a structurally improved company) our CY22e EPS of \$8.49. This assumes Olive Garden AUVs closer to \$5.9M (+16% vs pre COVID) driven by both stronger dine-in sales and off premise sales mix closer to 23% compared to pre-COVID levels of ~15%. Under this scenario, we assume Darden's labor, restaurant and marketing expenses drive strong operating leverage and unit growth to accelerate which could compress the multiple between Darden and Texas Roadhouse. We would also expect Darden to accelerate buybacks given its strong balance sheet.

What our downside scenario implies: Our \$120 downside scenario equals 17x our FY23 EPS of \$7.19. In this scenario we assume Olive Garden AUVs to be \$5.5M (+9% vs. FY19), LongHorn AUVs to be \$4.1M (+16% vs. FY19), and EBITDA margins to be 14.8% (70bp above pre-COVID levels but below the 150bp assumed in company guidance).

Restaurants added 186k jobs in May, or ~1 out of every 3 jobs added last month

The industry now accounts for 10.8M jobs, or 1.5M fewer jobs than it had pre-COVID


Figure 2: Restaurant and hospitality labor shortage remains



Source: US Bureau of Labor Statistics

Trends have surpassed 2019 but seem to have stalled since late March / April

Figure 3: Casual dining monthly SSS trends (relative to 2019)




Source: KnappTrack, Evercore ISI Research

OpenTable trends improved in April and May before slowing slightly in June

The +40% Father's Day performance shows consumers are willing to get out there for special occasions

Figure 4: Seated diners from online, phone, and walk-in reservations (United States)



Source: OpenTable

Comfort with regards to dining inside at a restaurant continues to be a potential tailwind for the industry come late summer and fall

Figure 5: Comfort level of various activities

What Is Your Comfort Level With The Following?

-100 = Very Uncomfortable 100 = Very Comfortable

| | May 15 | Jul 17 | Sep 25 | Dec 4 | Jan 15 | Feb 12 | Mar 19 | Apr 16 | May 14 | Jun 18 |
|-----------------------------------------------|--------|--------|--------|-------|--------|--------|--------|--------|--------|--------|
| Dining Outside at a Restaurant | 29 | 37 | 57 | 49 | 40 | 46 | 65 | 71 | 84 | 88 |
| Going to the Dentist | - | 15 | 36 | 40 | 24 | 31 | 45 | 46 | 63 | 69 |
| Personal Svcs. (haircut, manicure) | 11 | 13 | 31 | 24 | 13 | 24 | 37 | 49 | 60 | 66 |
| Getting A Surgical Procedure | 10 | 13 | 30 | 32 | 23 | 27 | 41 | 47 | 56 | 60 |
| Staying at a Hotel | -5 | -2 | 18 | 11 | 9 | 14 | 30 | 39 | 56 | 58 |
| Returning To Your Workplace | 20 | 10 | 18 | 13 | 11 | 22 | 29 | 29 | 54 | 57 |
| Dining Inside at a Restaurant* | -23 | -30 | -11 | -19 | -31 | -21 | 5 | 15 | 42 | 55 |
| Going to the Mall | - | -23 | -7 | -3 | -10 | -5 | 10 | 22 | 37 | 52 |
| Attending an Outdoor Sporting Event / Concert | -27 | -38 | -17 | -22 | -18 | -13 | 4 | 20 | 42 | 49 |
| Getting on an Airplane | -33 | -32 | -16 | -20 | -13 | -8 | 7 | 21 | 39 | 39 |
| Handshake | -43 | -43 | -37 | -43 | -42 | -34 | -21 | -5 | 22 | 31 |
| Taxi | - | - | -30 | -40 | -35 | -30 | -13 | -3 | 12 | 26 |
| Ride Share / Taxi | -31 | -46 | - | - | - | - | - | - | - | - |
| Ride Share | - | - | -34 | -38 | -39 | -35 | -18 | -7 | 5 | 23 |
| Going to the Gym | -36 | -49 | -33 | -42 | -42 | -38 | -19 | -11 | 5 | 21 |
| Going to a Movie | -42 | -55 | -45 | -53 | -56 | -46 | -31 | -18 | 3 | 14 |
| Public transportation (bus, train, subway) | -62 | -66 | -58 | -61 | -56 | -49 | -39 | -30 | -7 | 7 |

Source: Evercore ISI Surveys

Figure 6: Labor growth per unit per week (in \$ millions) over time (%s = historical growth rate or CAGR relative to FY19 or CY19)


For Brinker, we believe the labor \$'s per company operated store assumed by consensus in FY22 being ~flat vs. FY19 is overly conservative considering the current ~5%+ hourly labor inflation

However, we believe sales estimates are too low given the optionality on additional virtual brands, pricing, and overly conservative assumptions on the base Chili's business

For Darden, much of the 150bp of EBITDA margin will come from the labor side, but we think the Street is a bit offside by thinking dollar cost of labor in FY22 will be lower than that of FY19

Over time, we agree that labor productivity will keep forward growth rates below those of pre-COVID


For Texas Roadhouse, the Street is implying 2.5% and 3.9% dollar cost inflation per restaurant in 2021 and 2022, respectively, despite the current tightness in the labor market and historical 7-9% track record in 2017-2019



Source: Company Data, ConsensusMetrix, Evercore ISI Research

Brinker's Chili's has underrated digital capabilities given its consumer penetration on a per restaurant basis

Figure 7: Loyalty members per location



Source: Company Data, Evercore ISI Research

Darden concepts and Texas Roadhouse make up the majority of top preference chains just before and during COVID

Figure 8: Top Restaurants Visited During The Rise Of COVID, data from July 2019 to July 2020




Source: Top Data (see more [here](#))

The pre-COVID median P/E multiple premium for TXRH vs. DRI was 32%

DRI's current price of \$133 implies an 18x multiple on CY22 consensus EPS estimates

A 32% multiple premium applied to TXRH (historical median) implies TXRH should be trading at 23.5x CY22e EPS (currently 23.4x)

Figure 9: Pre-COVID TXRH vs. DRI NTM P/E




Source: FactSet, Evercore ISI Research

For reference, the S&P is currently trading at 20x consensus' CY22 EPS of \$210

Applying a 35% premium (pre-COVID median) to TXRH implies TXRH should trade at 27x CY22e EPS

Figure 10: Pre-COVID TXRH vs. SPX NTM P/E




Source: FactSet, Evercore ISI Research

In the five year period leading up to COVID, DRI traded at a ~8% premium to the S&P 500

Based on consensus CY22 estimates, DRI currently trades at an 11% discount (17.8x vs. 20.0x)

Figure 11: Pre-COVID DRI vs. SPX NTM P/E




Source: FactSet, Evercore ISI Research

For reference, the S&P is currently trading at 20x consensus' CY22 EPS of \$210

Applying a 30% discount (pre-COVID median) to the S&P500 implies EAT should trade at 15x CY22e EPS (currently trading at 11x)

Figure 12: Pre-COVID EAT vs. SPX NTM P/E



Source: FactSet, Evercore ISI Research


We see significant sales upside relative to consensus but are wary on flow-through as we believe the Street is conservative on both labor per unit costs and protein inflation in calendar 2022

Figure 13: TXRH 2022 EVRe estimates vs. consensus

| Evercore Estimates Vs. Consensus | EVR Est. | YOY Change | FY 2022 | | |
|--------------------------------------|-------------|---------------|---------------|---------|-----------|
| | | | Cons. Est. | Delta | Delta (%) |
| Sales | 3,767.7 | 11.1% | 3,595.3 | 172.4 | 4.8% |
| Comp (company-owned) | 5.5% | | 4.0% | 152 bp | |
| Cost of sales % of sales | 32.7% | | 32.3% | | |
| Restaurant labor % of sales | 33.1% | | 33.0% | | |
| Other restaurant expenses % of sales | 15.2% | | 15.0% | | |
| Restaurant level profit | 646.1 | 10.0% | 637.7 | 8.3 | 1.3% |
| Restaurant level margin | 17.3% | | 17.9% | (59 bp) | |
| Restaurant level margin change | (16 bp) | | | | |
| G&A | 180.5 | 8.8% | 166.5 | 14.0 | 8.4% |
| Operating income (EBIT) | 333.4 | N/A | 334.7 | (1.2) | (0.4%) |
| Operating margin | 8.9% | | 9.3% | (44 bp) | |
| Operating margin change | 13 bp | | 36 bp | | |
| Tax rate | 15.0% | | 15.4% | (42 bp) | |
| Net income | 280.6 | 14.7% | 275.9 | 4.8 | 1.7% |
| EPS | 4.03 | 15.6% | 3.93 | 0.10 | 2.5% |


Source: ConsensusMetrix, Evercore ISI Research

Figure 14: TXRH Company-owned 2-year SSS growth



Source: ConsensusMetrix, Evercore ISI Research

Figure 15: TXRH Company-owned 3-year SSS growth



Source: ConsensusMetrix, Evercore ISI Research

The Street has come up significantly since the beginning of the year


We still see margin upside (15.5% in FY23 vs. pre-COVID peak of 15%) driven by operational efficiencies, technology (i.e. handhelds), and margin-accretive virtual brands

Figure 16: EAT FY23 EVRe estimates vs. consensus

| Evercore Estimates Vs. Consensus | EVR Est. | YOY Change | FY 2023 | | |
|-------------------------------------|-------------|---------------|---------------|---------|-----------|
| | | | Cons. Est. | Delta | Delta (%) |
| Sales | 4,003.7 | 4.2% | 3,886.7 | 117.0 | 3.0% |
| Comp (company-owned) | 2.8% | | 3.2% | (43 bp) | |
| Cost of sales % of sales | 26.4% | | 26.4% | 2 bp | |
| Restaurant labor % of sales | 33.4% | | 33.1% | 39 bp | |
| Restaurant expenses % of sales | 24.6% | | 25.4% | (85 bp) | |
| Restaurant level profit | 612.3 | 5.6% | 575.1 | 37.2 | 6.5% |
| Restaurant level margin | 15.5% | | 15.1% | 44 bp | |
| Restaurant level margin change | 20 bp | | | | |
| G&A | 170.6 | 4.2% | 156.1 | 14.5 | 9.3% |
| Operating income (EBIT) | 342.0 | 6.8% | 338.3 | 3.7 | 1.1% |
| Operating margin | 8.5% | | 8.7% | (16 bp) | |
| Operating margin change | 21 bp | | 33 bp | | |
| Tax rate | 11.0% | | 10.8% | 24 bp | |
| Net income | 271.4 | 10.4% | 263.7 | 7.7 | 2.9% |
| EPS | 6.00 | 13.4% | 5.79 | 0.21 | 3.6% |


Source: ConsensusMetrix, Evercore ISI Research

Figure 17: Chili's 2-year SSS (CY21 vs. CY19)



Source: ConsensusMetrix, Evercore ISI Research

Figure 18: Chili's 3-year SSS (CY22 vs. CY19)



Source: ConsensusMetrix, Evercore ISI Research

Our FY23 EBITDA of 16.2% is 210bp higher than pre-COVID (14.1%), 60bp above the stated algorithm by the company

The Street's 16.3% is 220bp above the stated algorithm


However, we still believe there is sales upside into FY23 at both Olive Garden and LongHorn

Figure 19: DRI FY23 EVRe estimates vs. consensus

| Evercore Estimates Vs. Consensus | EVR Est. | YOY Change | FY 2023 | | |
|--------------------------------------|-------------|---------------|---------------|----------|-----------|
| | | | Cons. Est. | Delta | Delta (%) |
| Sales | 10,146.2 | 4.5% | 9,865.0 | 281.2 | 2.9% |
| Olive Garden SSS | 3.0% | | 4.8% | (180 bp) | |
| LongHorn SSS | 2.3% | | 4.3% | (205 bp) | |
| Food, beverage and packaging % sales | 28.4% | | 28.6% | (20 bp) | |
| Labor % sales | 31.6% | | 31.6% | 3 bp | |
| Restaurant expenses % sales | 16.9% | | 17.2% | (27 bp) | |
| Restaurant level EBITDA | 2,060.3 | 3.6% | 2,015.6 | 44.7 | 2.2% |
| Restaurant level margin | 20.3% | | 20.5% | (22 bp) | |
| Restaurant level margin change | (16 bp) | | | | |
| G&A | 420.4 | 2.6% | 404.7 | 15.8 | 3.9% |
| Operating income (EBIT) | 1,251.4 | 3.7% | 1,227.8 | 23.6 | 1.9% |
| Operating margin | 12.3% | | 12.5% | (12 bp) | |
| Operating margin change | (9 bp) | | 28 bp | | |
| Tax rate | 12.0% | | 11.9% | 6 bp | |
| Net income | 1,053.8 | 4.5% | 1,029.8 | 24.0 | 2.3% |
| EPS | 8.28 | 6.7% | 7.98 | 0.30 | 3.8% |


Source: ConsensusMetrix, Evercore ISI Research

Figure 20: Olive Garden 2-year SSS (CY21 vs. CY19)




Source: ConsensusMetrix, Evercore ISI Research

Figure 21: Olive Garden 3-year SSS (CY22 vs. CY19)




Source: ConsensusMetrix, Evercore ISI Research

Figure 22: LongHorn 2-year SSS (CY21 vs. CY19)



Source: ConsensusMetrix, Evercore ISI Research

Figure 23: LongHorn 3-year SSS (CY22 vs. CY19)



Source: ConsensusMetrix, Evercore ISI Research

Figure 6: Restaurants comp sheet

| Evercore ISI Restaurant Sector Comp Sheet | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
|-------------------------------------------|--------|---------|------------|---------|--------|---------|--------|--------|------|-------|------|------|-------|-------|----|---------|---------|---------|---------|-------|--------|-------|-----------|-------|-------|-------|--------|-----------|--------|------|
| Updated June 21, 2021 | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| | | Current | | | | | | Target | | | | | | Stock | | | | | | | | | | FCF | | LT | | Net debt/ | | |
| Company | Ticker | Price | Rating | Price | Upside | Cap (B) | Target | P/E | FCF | Yield | 2020 | 12M | YTD | 1M | 1W | EVR | ISI | EPS | Cons. | EPS | P/E | P/E | EV/EBITDA | Div. | Yield | Yield | EPS | PEG | EBITDA | |
| | | | | | | | CY21 | CY22 | CY22 | | | | | | | CY21 | CY22 | CY21 | CY22 | CY21 | CY22 | CY21 | CY22 | Yield | CY21 | CY22 | Growth | CY22 | CY21 | |
| Franchised Quick-Service Restaurants | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| McDonald's | MCD | \$233 | Outperform | \$260 | 12% | \$173.8 | 30x | 26x | 3.7% | 9% | 21% | 7% | (1%) | (3%) | | \$8.77 | \$9.99 | \$8.62 | \$9.55 | 26.6x | 23.3x | 19.3x | 17.3x | 2.2% | 3.4% | 4.1% | 8% | 2.9x | 2.9x | |
| Yum! Brands | YUM | \$117 | Outperform | \$130 | 11% | \$34.8 | 29x | 26x | 3.8% | 8% | 27% | 6% | (4%) | (4%) | | \$4.43 | \$4.93 | \$4.23 | \$4.69 | 26.3x | 23.7x | 19.0x | 17.7x | 1.7% | 3.7% | 4.1% | 12% | 2.0x | 4.4x | |
| Restaurant Brands | QSR | \$67 | In Line | \$75 | 13% | \$31.2 | 27x | 23x | 5.1% | (4%) | 18% | 8% | (2%) | (3%) | | \$2.78 | \$3.25 | \$2.66 | \$3.10 | 24.0x | 20.5x | 19.0x | 16.9x | 3.2% | 4.8% | 5.6% | 11% | 1.9x | 4.8x | |
| Domino's Pizza | DPZ | \$459 | Outperform | \$470 | 2% | \$17.8 | 35x | 30x | 3.5% | 31% | 23% | 20% | 6% | 2% | | \$13.49 | \$15.62 | \$12.99 | \$14.98 | 34.1x | 29.4x | 25.1x | 22.5x | 0.8% | 3.0% | 3.3% | 14% | 2.1x | 5.1x | |
| Wendy's Company | WEN | \$24 | In Line | \$24 | 2% | \$5.2 | 32x | 28x | 5.2% | (1%) | 5% | 5% | (1%) | (4%) | | \$0.74 | \$0.86 | \$0.74 | \$0.85 | 31.8x | 27.3x | 15.4x | 14.6x | 1.5% | 4.9% | 5.2% | 10% | 2.7x | 4.0x | |
| Wingstop | WING | \$147 | | | | \$4.4 | | | | 54% | 20% | 9% | 8% | (3%) | | | \$1.43 | \$1.83 | 103.3x | 80.7x | 57.7x | 47.1x | 0.4% | | | | | 5.2x | | |
| Jack in the Box | JACK | \$119 | | | | \$2.7 | | | | 19% | 61% | 25% | 2% | (2%) | | | \$6.81 | \$7.17 | 17.5x | 16.7x | 14.6x | 14.8x | 1.3% | | | | | 6.5x | | |
| Papa John's | PZZA | \$105 | | | | \$3.5 | | | | 34% | 26% | 22% | 8% | 1% | | | \$2.78 | \$3.09 | 37.9x | 34.1x | 18.4x | 17.3x | 0.9% | | | | | 1.8x | | |
| Franchised QSR mkt cap wtd avg | | | | | | | 30x | 26x | 3.9% | 9% | 22% | 8% | (1%) | (3%) | | | | | | | 28.1x | 24.5x | 20.1x | 18.1x | 2.1% | 3.6% | 4.2% | 9.3% | 2.6x | 3.5x |
| Company-Owned Quick Service Restaurants | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| Starbucks | SBUX | \$111 | In Line | \$120 | 8% | \$130.8 | 37x | 32x | 3.1% | 22% | 44% | 3% | (1%) | (3%) | | \$3.26 | \$3.74 | \$3.25 | \$3.38 | 34.0x | 29.7x | 22.6x | 20.1x | 1.6% | 2.2% | 3.3% | 11% | 2.7x | 3.2x | |
| Chipotle | CMG | \$1,427 | Outperform | \$1,725 | 21% | \$40.2 | 67x | 50x | 2.0% | 66% | 36% | 1% | 6% | 2% | | \$25.72 | \$34.33 | \$24.51 | \$32.43 | 55.5x | 41.6x | 34.5x | 26.9x | - | 1.8% | 2.4% | 20% | 2.1x | -0.7x | |
| Yum! China | YUMC | \$67 | | | | \$28.0 | | | | 19% | 31% | 15% | 3% | (5%) | | | | \$2.02 | \$2.37 | 33.0x | 28.1x | 15.7x | 13.9x | 0.7% | | | | | -1.1x | |
| Shake Shack | SHAK | \$95 | | | | \$3.7 | | | | 42% | 70% | 11% | 9% | (6%) | | | | -\$0.05 | \$0.43 | NM | 218.5x | 64.7x | 35.2x | - | | | | | 3.3x | |
| Company-owned QSR mkt cap wtd avg | | | | | | | 44x | 36x | 2.8% | 30% | 41% | 4% | 1% | (2%) | | | | | | | 37.5x | 35.3x | 24.8x | 20.9x | 1.1% | 2.1% | 3.1% | 13.1% | 2.6x | 1.8x |
| Casual Dining | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| Darden | DRI | \$133 | Outperform | \$165 | 24% | \$17.5 | | 21x | 5.5% | 9% | 76% | 9% | (7%) | (6%) | | \$6.36 | \$7.77 | \$5.64 | \$7.60 | 21.0x | 17.2x | 16.7x | 14.4x | 2.6% | 5.6% | 6.7% | 10% | 1.8x | -0.1x | |
| Texas Roadhouse | TXRH | \$92 | In Line | \$110 | 20% | \$6.4 | | 27x | 3.4% | 39% | 70% | 16% | (8%) | (8%) | | \$3.49 | \$4.03 | \$3.42 | \$3.95 | 26.3x | 22.7x | 16.3x | 14.7x | - | 4.4% | 4.1% | 10% | 2.3x | -0.8x | |
| Cracker Barrel | CBRL | \$146 | | | | \$3.5 | | | | (14%) | 27% | 9% | (10%) | (7%) | | | | \$8.04 | \$9.57 | 18.2x | 15.3x | 14.3x | 11.6x | - | | | | | 3.7x | |
| Cheesecake Factor | CAKE | \$53 | | | | \$2.5 | | | | (5%) | 111% | 40% | (11%) | (8%) | | | | \$2.12 | \$3.08 | 24.9x | 17.2x | 17.1x | 13.2x | - | | | | | 6.4x | |
| Dave & Buster's | PLAY | \$41 | | | | \$2.0 | | | | (25%) | 137% | 32% | (8%) | (7%) | | | | \$1.04 | \$2.48 | NM | 16.5x | 15.2x | 10.9x | - | | | | | 7.5x | |
| Bloomin' Brands | BLMN | \$26 | | | | \$2.3 | | | | (12%) | 118% | 32% | (10%) | (9%) | | | | \$2.19 | \$2.44 | 12.0x | 10.8x | 9.7x | 9.3x | - | | | | | 4.8x | |
| Dine Brands | DIN | \$88 | | | | \$1.5 | | | | (31%) | 92% | 48% | (12%) | (8%) | | | | \$6.49 | \$7.19 | 13.5x | 12.2x | 12.4x | 11.5x | - | | | | | 6.4x | |
| Brinker Intl | EAT | \$57 | Outperform | \$80 | 39% | \$2.1 | | 14x | 8.2% | 35% | 113% | (2%) | (12%) | (9%) | | \$4.51 | \$5.60 | \$4.37 | \$5.38 | 12.7x | 10.3x | 10.1x | 9.1x | - | 13.7% | 14.1% | 6% | 1.7x | 2.9x | |
| Denny's | DENN | \$17 | | | | \$1.1 | | | | (26%) | 47% | 12% | (6%) | (5%) | | | | \$0.42 | \$0.71 | 39.6x | 23.6x | 18.5x | 14.5x | - | | | | | 4.8x | |
| BJ's Restaurants | BJRI | \$48 | | | | \$1.1 | | | | 1% | 108% | 22% | (16%) | (9%) | | | | \$0.59 | \$2.36 | 81.6x | 20.5x | 19.2x | 11.7x | - | | | | | 6.4x | |
| Casual Dining mkt cap wtd avg | | | | | | | | 22x | 5.2% | 7% | 81% | 16% | (8%) | (7%) | | | | | | | 21.8x | 20.3x | 15.6x | 15.6x | 1.1% | 6.0% | 6.6% | 9.3% | 1.9x | 1.9x |
| Evercore ISI Restaurants | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| S&P 1500 Restaurants | SP395 | \$2,031 | | | | | 37x | 28x | 4.3% | 21% | 43% | 7% | (2%) | (4%) | | | | | | | 29.2x | 24.6x | 19.8x | 17.4x | 2.0% | 4.8% | 5.3% | 11% | 2.2x | 2.6x |
| Retail | XRT | \$94 | | | | | | | | 17% | 34% | 6% | (1%) | (3%) | | | | | | | | | | 1.6% | | | | | | |
| Consumer Discretionary | XLY | \$173 | | | | | | | | 40% | 115% | 43% | (2%) | (5%) | | | | | | | | | | 0.7% | | | | | | |
| S&P 500 | SPX | 4,225 | | | | | | | | 28% | 34% | 7% | 2% | (1%) | | | | | | | | | | 0.7% | | | | | | |
| | | | | | | | | | | 16% | 34% | 11% | 1% | (2%) | | | | | | | 22.7x | 20.7x | | | 1.4% | | | | | |

Source: FactSet, Evercore ISI Research

| Company Changes | | | | | | Estimates | | | | | | | | |
|-----------------|-----------------------------|----------|--------|------|------|--------------|----------|--------------|------|--------|-----------|---|--------|--------|
| Symbol | Company | Price | Rating | | | Target Price | | Current Year | | | Next Year | | | |
| | | | | Curr | Prev | Curr | Prev | Curr | Prev | Curr | Prev | | | |
| DRI | Darden Restaurants, Inc. | \$133.58 | - | OPF | OPF | - | \$165.00 | \$165.00 | ▲ | \$4.51 | \$3.96 | ▲ | \$7.75 | \$7.23 |
| EAT | Brinker International, Inc. | \$57.44 | - | OPF | OPF | - | \$80.00 | \$80.00 | ▲ | \$3.21 | \$3.07 | ▲ | \$5.29 | \$5.28 |
| TXRH | Texas Roadhouse, Inc. | \$91.85 | - | IL | IL | - | \$110.00 | \$110.00 | ▲ | \$3.49 | \$3.33 | ▲ | \$4.03 | \$3.90 |

Source: Evercore ISI Research

TIMESTAMP

(Article 3(1)e and Article 7 of MAR)

Time of dissemination: June 29 2021 10:51 AM ET

ANALYST CERTIFICATION

The analysts, David Palmer, Bradley Andersen, primarily responsible for the preparation of this research report attest to the following: (1) that the views and opinions rendered in this research report reflect his or her personal views about the subject companies or issuers; and (2) that no part of the research analyst's compensation was, is, or will be directly related to the specific recommendations or views in this research report.

IMPORTANT DISCLOSURES

This report is approved and/or distributed by Evercore Group LLC ("Evercore Group"), a U.S. licensed broker-dealer regulated by the Financial Industry Regulatory Authority ("FINRA"), and International Strategy & Investment Group (UK) Limited ("ISI UK"), which is authorised and regulated in the United Kingdom by the Financial Conduct Authority. The institutional sales, trading and research businesses of Evercore Group and ISI UK collectively operate under the global marketing brand name Evercore ISI ("Evercore ISI"). Both Evercore Group and ISI UK are subsidiaries of Evercore Partners Inc. ("Evercore Partners"). The trademarks, logos and service marks shown on this report are registered trademarks of Evercore Partners.

The analysts and associates responsible for preparing this report receive compensation based on various factors, including Evercore Partners' total revenues, a portion of which is generated by affiliated investment banking transactions. Evercore ISI seeks to update its research as appropriate, but various regulations may prevent this from happening in certain instances. Aside from certain industry reports published on a periodic basis, the large majority of reports are published at irregular intervals as appropriate in the analyst's judgment.

Evercore ISI generally prohibits analysts, associates and members of their households from maintaining a financial interest in the securities of any company in the analyst's area of coverage. Any exception to this policy requires specific approval by a member of our Compliance Department. Such ownership is subject to compliance with applicable regulations and disclosure. Evercore ISI also prohibits analysts, associates and members of their households from serving as an officer, director, advisory board member or employee of any company that the analyst covers.

This report may include a Tactical Call, which describes a near-term event or catalyst affecting the subject company or the market overall and which is expected to have a short-term price impact on the equity shares of the subject company. This Tactical Call is separate from the analyst's long-term recommendation (Outperform, In Line or Underperform) that reflects a stock's forward 12-month expected return, is not a formal rating and may differ from the target prices and recommendations reflected in the analyst's long-term view.

Applicable current disclosures regarding the subject companies covered in this report are available at the offices of Evercore ISI, and can be obtained by writing to Evercore Group LLC, Attn. Compliance, 55 East 52nd Street, New York, NY 10055.

Evercore Partners and its affiliates, and I or their respective directors, officers, members and employees, may have, or have had, interests or qualified holdings on issuers mentioned in this report. Evercore Partners and its affiliates may have, or have had, business relationships with the companies mentioned in this report.

Additional information on securities or financial instruments mentioned in this report is available upon request.

Ratings Definitions

Current Ratings Definition

Evercore ISI's recommendations are based on a stock's total forecasted return over the next 12 months. Total forecasted return is equal to the expected percentage price return plus gross dividend yield. We divide our stocks under coverage into three primary ratings categories, with the following return guidelines:

Outperform- the total forecasted return is expected to be greater than the expected total return of the analyst's coverage sector

In Line- the total forecasted return is expected to be in line with the expected total return of the analyst's coverage sector

Underperform- the total forecasted return is expected to be less than the expected total return of the analyst's coverage sector

Coverage Suspended- the rating and target price have been removed pursuant to Evercore ISI policy when Evercore is acting in an advisory capacity in a merger or strategic transaction involving this company and in certain other circumstances.*

Rating Suspended- Evercore ISI has suspended the rating and target price for this stock because there is not sufficient fundamental basis for determining, or there are legal, regulatory or policy constraints around publishing, a rating or target price. The previous rating and target price, if any, are no longer in effect for this company and should not be relied upon.*

*Prior to October 10, 2015, the "Coverage Suspended" and "Rating Suspended" categories were included in the category "Suspended."

FINRA requires that members who use a ratings system with terms other than "Buy," "Hold/Neutral" and "Sell" to equate their own ratings to these categories. For this purpose, and in the Evercore ISI ratings distribution below, our Outperform, In Line, and Underperform ratings can be equated to Buy, Hold and Sell, respectively.

Historical Ratings Definitions

Prior to March 2, 2017, Evercore ISI's recommendations were based on a stock's total forecasted return over the next 12 months:

Buy- the total forecasted return is expected to be greater than 10%

Hold- the total forecasted return is expected to be greater than or equal to 0% and less than or equal to 10%

Sell -the total forecasted return is expected to be less than 0%

On October 31, 2014, Evercore Partners acquired International Strategy & Investment Group LLC ("ISI Group") and ISI UK (the "Acquisition") and transferred Evercore Group's research, sales and trading businesses to ISI Group. On December 31, 2015, the combined research, sales and trading businesses were transferred back to Evercore Group in an internal reorganization. Since the Acquisition, the combined research, sales and trading businesses have operated under the global marketing brand name Evercore ISI.

ISI Group and ISI UK:

Prior to October 10, 2014, the ratings system of ISI Group LLC and ISI UK which was based on a 12-month risk adjusted total return:

Strong Buy- Return > 20%
 Buy- Return 10% to 20%
 Neutral - Return 0% to 10%
 Cautious- Return -10% to 0%
 Sell- Return < -10%

For disclosure purposes, ISI Group and ISI UK ratings were viewed as follows: Strong Buy and Buy equate to Buy, Neutral equates to Hold, and Cautious and Sell equate to Sell.

Evercore Group:

Prior to October 10, 2014, the rating system of Evercore Group was based on a stock's expected total return relative to the analyst's coverage sector over the following 12 months. Stocks under coverage were divided into three categories:

Overweight- the stock is expected to outperform the average total return of the analyst's coverage sector over the next 12 months.
 Equal-Weight- the stock is expected to perform in line with the average total return of the analyst's coverage sector over the next 12 months.
 Underweight -the stock is expected to underperform the average total return of the analyst's coverage sector over the next 12 months.
 Suspended- the company rating, target price and earnings estimates have been temporarily suspended.

For disclosure purposes, Evercore Group's prior "Overweight," "Equal-Weight" and "Underweight" ratings were viewed as "Buy," "Hold" and "Sell," respectively.

Ratings Definitions for Portfolio-Based Coverage

Prior to July 25, 2019, Evercore ISI utilized an alternate rating system for companies covered by analysts who used a model portfolio-based approach to determine a company's investment recommendation. Covered companies are included or not included as holdings in the analyst's Model Portfolio, and have the following ratings:

Long- the stock is a positive holding in the model portfolio; the total forecasted return is expected to be greater than 0%.

Short- the stock is a negative holding in the model portfolio; the total forecasted return is expected to be less than 0%.

No Position- the stock is not included in the model portfolio.

Coverage Suspended- the rating and target price have been removed pursuant to Evercore ISI policy when Evercore is acting in an advisory capacity in a merger or strategic transaction involving this company, and in certain other circumstances; a stock in the model portfolio is removed.

Rating Suspended - Evercore ISI has suspended the rating and/or target price for this stock because there is not sufficient fundamental basis for determining, or there are legal, regulatory or policy constraints around publishing, a rating or target price. The previous rating and target price, if any, are no longer in effect for this company and should not be relied upon; a stock in the model portfolio is removed.

Stocks included in the model portfolio are weighted from 0 to 100% for Long and 0 to -100% for Short. A stock's weight in the portfolio reflects the analyst's degree of conviction in the stock's rating relative to other stocks in the portfolio. The model portfolio may also include a cash component. At any given time the aggregate weight of the stocks included in the portfolio and the cash component must equal 100%.

Stocks assigned ratings under the alternative model portfolio-based coverage system cannot also be rated by Evercore ISI's Current Ratings definitions of Outperform, In Line and Underperform.

FINRA requires that members who use a ratings system with terms other than "Buy," "Hold/Neutral" and "Sell," to equate their own ratings to these categories. For this purpose, and in the Evercore ISI ratings distribution below, our Long, No Position and Short ratings can be equated to Buy, Hold and Sell respectively.

Evercore ISI rating (as of 06/29/2021)

| Coverage Universe | | | Investment Banking Services I Past 12 Months | | |
|--------------------|-------|------|----------------------------------------------|-------|------|
| Ratings | Count | Pct. | Ratings | Count | Pct. |
| Buy | 487 | 59 | Buy | 131 | 25 |
| Hold | 293 | 35 | Hold | 27 | 13 |
| Sell | 24 | 3 | Sell | 2 | 8 |
| Coverage Suspended | 13 | 2 | Coverage Suspended | 4 | 36 |
| Rating Suspended | 9 | 1 | Rating Suspended | 4 | 36 |

Issuer-Specific Disclosures (as of June 29, 2021)

Evercore ISI or an affiliate expects to receive or intends to seek compensation for investment banking services from Darden Restaurants and Inc., Brinker International and Inc. within the next three months.

Price Charts


Darden Restaurants, Inc. Rating History as of 06/21/2021



Brinker International, Inc. Rating History as of 06/21/2021



Texas Roadhouse, Inc. Rating History as of 06/21/2021



Ratings Key

| | | | | | | | |
|---|------|----|--------------|----|-------------|----|--------------------|
| B | Buy | OP | Outperform | L | Long | CS | Coverage Suspended |
| H | Hold | IL | In Line | NP | No Position | RS | Rating Suspended |
| S | Sell | UP | Underperform | S | Short | | |

GENERAL DISCLOSURES

This report is approved and/or distributed by Evercore Group L.L.C. ("Evercore Group"), a U.S. licensed broker-dealer regulated by the Financial Industry Regulatory Authority ("FINRA") and by International Strategy & Investment Group (UK) Limited ("ISI UK"), which is authorised and regulated in the United Kingdom by the Financial Conduct Authority. The institutional sales, trading and research businesses of Evercore Group and ISI UK collectively operate under the global marketing brand name Evercore ISI ("Evercore ISI"). Both Evercore Group and ISI UK are subsidiaries of Evercore Inc. ("Evercore"). The trademarks, logos and service marks shown on this report are registered trademarks of Evercore Inc.

This report is provided for informational purposes only. It is not to be construed as an offer to buy or sell or a solicitation of an offer to buy or sell any financial instruments or to participate in any particular trading strategy in any jurisdiction. The information and opinions in this report were prepared by employees of affiliates of Evercore. The information herein is believed by Evercore ISI to be reliable and has been obtained from public sources believed to be reliable, but Evercore ISI makes no representation as to the accuracy or completeness of such information. Opinions, estimates and projections in this report constitute the current judgment of the author as of the date of this report. They do not necessarily reflect the opinions of Evercore or its affiliates and are subject to change without notice. In addition, opinions, estimates and projections in this report may differ from or be contrary to those expressed by other business areas or groups of Evercore and its affiliates. Evercore ISI has no obligation to update, modify or amend this report or to otherwise notify a reader thereof in the event that any matter stated herein, or any opinion, projection, forecast or estimate set forth herein, changes or subsequently becomes inaccurate. Facts and views in Evercore ISI research reports and notes have not been reviewed by, and may not reflect information known to, professionals in other Evercore affiliates or business areas, including investment banking personnel.

Evercore ISI does not provide individually tailored investment advice in research reports. This report has been prepared without regard to the particular investments and circumstances of the recipient. The financial instruments discussed in this report may not be suitable for all investors and investors must make their own investment decisions using their own independent advisors as they believe necessary and based upon their specific financial situations and investment objectives. Securities and other financial instruments discussed in this report, or recommended or offered by Evercore ISI, are not insured by the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation and are not deposits of or other obligations of any insured depository institution. If a financial instrument is denominated in a currency other than an investor's currency, a change in exchange rates may adversely affect the price or value of, or the income derived from the financial instrument, and such investor effectively assumes such currency risk. In addition, income from an investment may fluctuate and the price or value of financial instruments described in this report, either directly or indirectly, may rise or fall. Estimates of future performance are based on assumptions that may not be realized. Furthermore, past performance is not necessarily indicative of future performance.

Evercore ISI salespeople, traders and other professionals may provide oral or written market commentary or trading strategies to our clients that reflect opinions that are contrary to the opinions expressed in this research. Our asset management affiliates and investing businesses may make investment decisions that are inconsistent with the recommendations or views expressed in this research.

Electronic research is simultaneously available to all clients. This report is provided to Evercore ISI clients and may not be redistributed, retransmitted or disclosed, in whole or in part, or in any form or manner, without the express written consent of Evercore ISI. Receipt and review of this research report constitutes your agreement not to redistribute, retransmit, or disclose to others the contents, opinions, conclusion or information contained in this report (including any investment recommendations, estimates or target prices) without first obtaining express permission from Evercore ISI.

This report is not intended for distribution to, or use by any person or entity in any jurisdiction or country where such distribution or use would be contrary to local law or regulation.

For investors in the UK: In making this report available, Evercore makes no recommendation to buy, sell or otherwise deal in any securities or investments whatsoever and you should neither rely or act upon, directly or indirectly, any of the information contained in this report in respect of any such investment activity. This report is being directed at or distributed to, (a) persons who fall within the definition of Investment Professionals (set out in Article 19(5) of the Financial Services and Markets Act 2000 (Financial Promotion) Order 2005 (the "Order")); (b) persons falling within the definition of high net worth companies, unincorporated associations, etc. (set out in Article 49(2) of the Order); (c) other persons to whom it may otherwise lawfully be communicated (all such persons together being referred to as "relevant persons"). This report must not be acted on or relied on by persons who are not relevant persons.

Applicable current disclosures regarding the subject companies covered in this report are available at the offices of Evercore ISI, and can be obtained by writing to Evercore Group L.L.C., Attn. Compliance, 55 East 52nd Street, New York, NY 10055.

In compliance with the European Securities and Markets Authority's Market Abuse Regulation, a list of all Evercore ISI recommendations disseminated in the preceding 12 months for the subject companies herein, may be found at the following site:
<https://evercoreisi.mediasterling.com/disclosure>.

© 2021. Evercore Group L.L.C. All rights reserved.