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The mechanisms of personalization

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ABSTRACT

This article draws on Max Weber's account of legitimate authority to argue that there are three key mechanisms that drive the personalization of power in political regimes: the mobilization of charisma, the mobilization of legality or formal authority, and the mobilization of informal authority. The mobilization of charisma involves leaders using emotional connections with followers to undermine formal institutional constraints. The mobilization of legality refers to using legal discourses and procedures to expand formal executive powers. The mobilization of informal authority relies on leaders occupying strategic positions in patronage networks to undermine or expand formal authority. Each mechanism allows leaders to escape elite accountability through different means. The article illustrates these mechanisms through historical and contemporary examples. It argues that understanding these distinct mechanisms can help explain variation in trajectories and consequences of personalization across regimes. The framework advances theories of personalization by highlighting how personal power relies not just on disrupting elite coordination but on deploying different forms of authority.

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Introduction

A ruler has *personal power* when he acquires the authority to act without being constrained by others in the political elite. At the extreme, he can say, without fear of contradiction, that "anything I say is law. Literally law," as Hastings Banda of Malawi is reported to have said in 1963.[1] The *personalization of power* is the process through which the relative authority of the ruler and the political elite, and hence the relationships of "horizontal" accountability between them, shifts in favour of the ruler. This process is conceptually distinct from *autocratization*, the loss of "vertical" accountability that results in ruling elites becoming less accountable to the populations over which they rule.[2] Both personalization and autocratization are related and typically co-occur, but they are different processes, even if both are ultimately destructive of democracy.[3] Accordingly, there is an

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increasing consensus that personalism is a distinct dimension of political regimes that can vary over time across both democratic and non-democratic political regimes.[4]

Models of the process of personalization typically focus on the strategic interactions between elites and rulers, and in particular on how elites can fail to coordinate effectively against power grabs by a leader.[5] For example, asymmetries of information or resources enable a ruler to disrupt elite collective action,[6] while elite factionalism prevents them from coordinating efficiently.[7] Elite coordination can also be disrupted through tactics that increase the uncertainty of their control over resources and their trust in each other, such as purges and reshuffles.[8] By the same token, these models suggest that personalization can therefore be prevented when elites trust each other for historical reasons,[9] or when they can take advantage of strong institutions that provide common knowledge about power grabs and enable them to bandwagon against power-seeking rulers.[10]

These models are useful tools for understanding the situations that lead to the personalization of power, but they do not illuminate the full range of mechanisms driving this process. In particular, though the ability of elites to coordinate against rulers and of rulers to disrupt elite coordination is fundamental to understanding when and why personalization occurs, such abilities are affected by *authority* relationships. Drawing on a modified version of Max Weber's standard account of legitimate authority,[11] I argue that processes of personalization are driven by three complementary "authority mechanisms": the mobilization of charisma, the mobilization of legality or formal authority, and the mobilization of informal authority. Each of these mechanisms involves a leader taking advantage of one form of authority (respectively, personal-charismatic, formal, and informal) to undermine the ability of regime elites to use other forms of authority to constrain him. Thus the mobilization of charisma draws on the emotional attachments between a leader and a group of followers to expand the reach of norms of allegiance to his person; the mobilization of formal authority exploits rational discourses of justification to expand the scope of formal executive powers; and the mobilization of informal authority takes advantage of the ruler's position in a network of interests to grow patronage networks that undermine other forms of authority.[12] Insofar as the personalization of power always depends on the possession of *some* authority over others (e.g. a set of military officers within a bureaucratized chain of command, a small coterie of devoted followers, or a group of clients), these mechanisms exhaust the possibilities available to rulers. Nevertheless, particular forms of authority can be converted into or amplify other forms of authority (e.g. informal authority can be used to increase formal authority and vice-versa), generating complex trajectories of personalization.

This work extends an older tradition of research about the personalization of power that draws on the Weberian concept of patrimonialism to explore the factors that enable rulers to create and maintain patronage networks that allow them to exercise informal authority to secure their control over key resources in the state.[13] More recently Alexander Baturo and his collaborators have argued for a revival of the concept of patrimonialism as a key aspect of personalistic regimes, and explored how patronage networks and informal authority secure personal power in many contexts.[14] The main idea in this research tradition is that personal power requires "loyalty" from subordinates, and thus their incorporation into networks that align their incentives with those of the ruler by providing access to certain resources in exchange for support in normatively regulated ways. Personal power is thus primarily

expressed in the placement of loyal personnel in formal institutions, resulting in a "patrimonial" structure of authority characterized by clientelism, corruption, and deinstitutionalization. Yet we cannot fully understand how rulers personalize power without understanding how other mechanisms of authority can also play roles in this process, amplifying, undercutting, or acting independently of the informal authority characteristic of patronage networks. This article thus extends the focus of this research tradition beyond patronage networks while emphasizing the impact of ruler agency in shaping the forms of authority that sustain personal power.

The article is structured as follows. After clarifying some basic concepts, I introduce a theory of how different forms of authority affect personal power within political regimes. Authority depends on shared expectations. Power can therefore be accumulated by making use of pre-existing forms of authority to shift these expectations. But different forms of authority provide rulers with different levers for shaping expectations, namely, emotional connection, justificatory discourses, and interest bargaining, leading to three analytically distinct mechanisms for the personalization of power. I then discuss how each mechanism – the mobilization of charisma (which uses emotional connection), the mobilization of legal or formal authority (which manipulates more or less public justificatory discourses), and the mobilization of informal authority (which regulates interest bargaining in patronal networks) – can be used to increase personal power and converted into other forms of authority. I explicate the logic of each mechanism by describing a number of historical cases to identify their ideal-typical features. These cases are chosen for their illustrative value. In particular, I discuss the personalization of power in China first under Mao and later under Xi Jinping, showing how distinct mechanisms (charisma and formal authority respectively) were at work within the same regime. I conclude with a brief perspective on how understanding the mechanisms of personalization allows us to formulate better hypotheses regarding the durability and consequences of highly personalized regimes.

Personal power, authority, and personalization

Power – the generalized ability to make others do what they would not otherwise do[15] – can derive from a very wide variety of factors.[16] The focus of this article is on those forms of power Weber called *Herrschaft* (often translated domination), and in particular *legitimate* domination or "authority," namely the ability to set normative expectations ("commands") that others are likely to follow without extensive use of immediate threats and rewards. A ruler who has great personal power has a wide scope of authority, and can expect his commands to be reliably followed in many contexts without predictably giving rise to resistance or coordinated opposition from political elites. The elites are all the other actors in the regime who control significant power resources, including their own forms of authority, and who typically have semi-regular access to the ruler, such as members of a cabinet, junta, or the Politburo of a communist party, or the heads of other powerful bureaucratic offices or political parties.

Personal authority in this sense does not imply that a ruler is all-powerful. In particular, the fact that a ruler can issue arbitrary commands and expect immediate subordinates to obey them does not entail that these commands will always have predictable effects on society. State capacity – the "infrastructural" power of the state, in Michael Mann's classic terminology[17] – is not identical with personal (or

"despotic") power, and rulers with great personal authority may preside over "impotent" states that are unable to implement their preferred policies. Moreover, because rulers will tend to issue commands that they expect others to obey, and refrain from issuing commands that they expect to be disobeyed or generate resistance, an apparently wide scope of authority is not always indicative of high levels of personal power. For example, traditional monarchs often had formally "absolute" authority which in practice was hedged about by traditional norms and could not be exercised beyond such constraints without endangering their position.[18] What matters for personal power, therefore, is not just the formal or apparent scope of authority but the (counterfactual) ability to issue commands that are likely to be obeyed across many contexts. Personal authority is thus partially unobservable: we do not see the degree to which commands that are not issued would be obeyed or resisted. Nevertheless, it can be meaningfully but imperfectly quantified in terms of "more" and "less."

First, rulers can have more or less *formal* authority, that is, authority that is defined by public legal or commonly known traditional rules. Such authority is derived from explicit authorizations (often codified in constitutional documents or widely-known conventions) in the form of rules that specify who can appoint people to institutions, make other rules to regulate a variety of domains, use certain resources, and run for office. More formal authority implies a wider range of contexts where rulers can issue commands according to these rules and in principle expect them to be obeyed, and fewer contexts where their commands are subject to counter-action, resistance, or veto by elites. Second, rulers can have more or less *personal* or *charismatic* authority. Such authority is derived from emotional attachments that enable leaders to mobilize followers outside the formal institutions of the state. The more a ruler has charismatic authority, the larger the number of followers he can mobilize and the stronger their emotional bonds to him. Finally, rulers can have more or less *informal* authority. Informal authority is derived from expectations of reciprocity in unequal bargains where clients promise support for a patron in exchange for certain resources,[19] and it is manifested in the formation of hierarchical patronage networks linking the leader with many clients. More informal authority implies a more central position in the networks of patronage that distribute important resources or control formal institutions.[20]

All forms of authority entail that those subject to them follow rules and commands for reasons that are relatively independent of their immediate interests. Authority can thus typically be modelled as a constraint on rational action: obedience to law (or legally-backed commands), the patron, or to the charismatic leader does not depend only on momentary risk/reward calculations, but is rationalized and justified by appeal to larger values or emotional connections.[21] To be sure, the informal authority of patrons is closely tied to interest calculations, and can fail if the patron is not expected to fulfil his end of the bargain. But informal authority relationships are nevertheless distinct from pure interest-based interactions insofar as they induce enduring norms of reciprocity that are widely expected to be followed by others. Accordingly, informal authority, like formal or personal authority, is also a norm-structured relationship, even if these norms are dependent on illegible calculations of advantage that are not codified formally, and can "break" if enough clients expect they will not be honoured.[22]

More generally, rational calculation in authority-structured relationships is mediated by understandings of the nature of the relationship. Consider charismatic

authority, which is much less tied to immediate cost–benefit calculations than informal or legal authority. Such authority typically emerges under conditions of crisis that threaten the identity or material existence of a group.[23] Leaders succeed in forging strong affective bonds with their followers only if they are able to provide material and symbolic evidence that they can "save" the group in crisis; as Weber puts it, the charismatic leader performs "miracles" from the point of view of the followers.[24] The language of "miracles" indicates that the followers find the benefits they receive from the leader unlikely and unpredicted, genuine "gifts" of grace (the original meaning of the term *charisma*), and therefore attribute exceptional qualities to the leader to whom they submit. Charismatic attachments thus have an emotional dimension that is usually absent from more purely transactional patronage relationships: while in both cases followers receive benefits, in a charismatic relationship these are not seen as aspects of a rational exchange or "bargain" between leaders and followers. The charismatic relationship accordingly produces emotional bonds of much greater intensity and resilience than those resulting from patronage relationships, and followers are therefore sometimes capable of extraordinary and seemingly irrational sacrifices.

Nevertheless, these emotional bonds can decay if the leader fails to deliver the promised benefits, and hence the leader must continually provide evidence – both symbolic and material – that he can continue to "save" the group.[25] Maintaining their affective intensity requires both new material successes (typically resulting in impressive but rationally unsustainable policies which many charismatic populist leaders attempt) and the ritual renewal of the symbolic connections between leaders and followers, often in mass events like electoral rallies.[26] Unless the leader, therefore, transforms charismatic authority into legal authority and control over material resources ("routinizing" his authority), or finds ways to continually renew these affective attachments by vanquishing new enemies and providing more "gifts" to his followers, his authority will vanish. Pure charismatic authority is ephemeral, though the affective bonds generated by such relationships can nevertheless be long-lasting, and other leaders wishing to enhance their own personal authority can sometimes re-activate and repurpose them during new crises even in the absence of routinization.[27]

We can understand these three forms of authority as the other side of different forms of *loyalty*. Charismatic authority depends on the strongest form of loyalty, namely the direct, emotional bonds of followers with a specific leader, and is thus capable of inducing action that is against the follower's narrow self-interest (up to sacrifice of life). We might say that charismatic followers interpret their self-interest in terms of devotion to the leader. Yet at the group level and in the long run, such loyalty remains conditional on the provision of certain symbolic and material benefits. Informal authority, by contrast, is only capable of inducing action aligned with the short-term self-interest of supporters. Their loyalty is conditional on the fact that obeying is consistent with their self-interest, given that others are likely to continue to obey as well: "if each client believes that other clients will carry out the patron's orders to punish and reward, then each individual client will herself carry them out, and this in turn means that they actually will be carried out."[28] Formal authority, finally, depends on impersonal forms of loyalty – to the office rather than to the leader – which circumscribe the kinds of action subordinates will take to those *justified* by the office's formal norms. Obedience to formal authority is also partly conditional on expectations about the compliance of others

(which affect calculations about the risks of noncompliance); but its public nature normally strengthens its force, and the discourses of justification around its use typically ensure that only those actions that are in keeping with its common interpretations are undertaken.

These forms of authority are all present in varying proportions in real-world cases, and can both reinforce and undermine each other in different contexts, as we shall see below in more detail. More importantly, they can be mobilized in different ways by rulers to amplify or destroy other forms of authority and thus increase their personal power *vis à vis* the elite. Most obviously, charismatic authority can be used either to destroy the formal authority of institutions, as we shall see in the next section, or to mobilize coalitions to increase formal authority ("routinizing" charisma), though formal authority can also erode charismatic attachments and constrain ruler discretion, which sometimes inclines leaders to avoid formalization.[29] Informal authority can amplify charismatic authority if there are pre-existing emotional linkages between patrons and clients, but it also sometimes produces signalling processes that hide the absence of such emotions, resulting in the mere appearance of charisma without genuine authority.[30] Finally, informal authority can be used to colonize and transform formal authority structures, while formal authority can be used to support informal patronage networks, though extreme patrimonialism can result in "deinstitutionalization," i.e. the erosion of the formal authority of some institutions. These mechanisms of personalization and their possible transformations are summarized in Table 1.

The interactions between formal, charismatic, and informal authority greatly complicate attempts to measure personal power by examining only formal authority structures, such as the kinds of restrictions formal constitutions and laws impose on chief executives.[31] In-depth analyses of how formal constitutional documents work and interact with other kinds of authority can nevertheless help us ascertain changes in personal power for individual leaders.[32] Accordingly, the most promising method for the cross-national measurement of personal power today focuses on the interaction between a ruler's formal and informal authority, using indicators that record the degree to which rulers are able to place loyalists in control of formal security and party institutions or are able to be constrained by them.[33] Combined with sophisticated latent variable analysis, these methods can produce realistic estimates of how personalism varies over time,[34] though they do not capture variations in the sources of personal authority, and may miss or confound the effects of interactions between them. It is not clear, moreover, that these measures produce genuinely comparable estimates of personal power across very different contexts.[35]

The precise quantification of personal power across countries is not, however, necessary for our purposes in this article. Since my focus is on changes in power *within* particular regimes, I draw on single-country studies, where it is sometimes possible to reconstruct the evolution of important patronage networks more or less explicitly, and to measure how central the ruler is within them and how much power they wield relative to other patrons.[36] Scholars can also sometimes measure personalization in the media and rhetoric of a particular country,[37] which can proxy the degree of charismatic authority of a ruler,[38] and use surveys to provide suggestive single-country measurements of charismatic attachments to particular leaders.[39] Such instruments should be used carefully and with attention to context, and in the illustrative examples below, I accordingly rely on expert

Table 1. Mechanisms of personalization.

Mechanism	Description	Main cases	Transformations of authority
Mobilization of charisma	Uses strong emotional attachments between the leader and followers to sidestep and weaken formal norms.	Mao during the Cultural Revolution (China), Hitler in the late 1930s	- Charismatic to charismatic: Charismatic bonds are mobilized to dismantle formal norms or informal networks and enforce personal allegiance to the ruler. - Charismatic to informal: Emotional bonds are leveraged to cement patronage networks. - Charismatic to formal: Charismatic followings push through legal changes to routinize authority.
Mobilization of formal authority	Expands the scope of formal executive powers by changing constitutions or laws, manipulating legal procedures to disarm opposition or arguments to build consensus.	Xi Jinping's centralization of power in China, Hugo Chávez's term limit extension in Venezuela, Viktor Orbán's legal changes in Hungary	- Formal to formal: formal norms are manipulated to expand the scope of formal authority. - Formal to informal: Appointments to formal offices strengthen patronage networks. - Formal to charismatic: Legal authority can support the creation of a personality cult.
Mobilization of informal authority	Uses patronage networks to "colonize" formal institutions, placing loyalists in positions of power.	Putin's use of legal norms in Russia to centralize patronage networks and use of patronage to weaken legal norms, François "Papa Doc" Duvalier's election victories in Haiti	- Informal to formal: Patronage control over formal institutions reinforces legal authority or helps change the scope of legal authority. - Informal to charismatic: Competitive signalling by clients may simulate charisma, or amplify existing charismatic authority.

judgments to discuss changes in personal power and the forms of authority it relies on in particular cases.

The mobilization of charisma

By the "mobilization of charisma" I mean the process by which charismatic attachments with a relatively limited number of followers are mobilized to expand the degree to which the authority of the leader is enforced on groups which may not have charismatic attachments to him. Charismatic authority in modern states typically

finds itself hedged by legal norms, and charismatic attachments are difficult to sustain except in conditions of crisis. But leaders can exploit charismatic attachments with limited numbers of followers to weaken or even destroy formal norms that hedge their power, or to introduce new norms that expand their discretion even if charismatic attachments weaken. This is the simplest mechanism of personalization, given that charismatic authority is already personal authority, but it can also be leveraged to undermine other normative sources of constraint on the leader. Two examples can help illustrate this process: the mobilization of charisma by Mao before and during the Cultural Revolution, and by Hitler as the Nazi movement became increasingly radicalized in the late 1930s.

The case of Mao shows how charismatic attachments can be mobilized independently of material resources or formal authority to personalize power. As a revolutionary leader and founder of the People's Republic, Mao already had unmatched personal prestige in the 1950s, both among the masses and the elite, and hence a large degree of personal power rooted in charismatic attachments even before the Cultural Revolution. His charismatic authority was in turn enhanced by the division of labour within the Chinese Communist Party, which like all early Leninist parties combined both charismatic and formal authority due to its pursuit of utopian goals. But Mao's authority was hedged about by charismatic rivals (the top leadership of the party, who also occupied various offices with formal authority), and was at its lowest during periods of routine administration, when his influence was minimal.[40] In order to maintain his charismatic position, Mao thus needed to continuously launch new campaigns. Yet these campaigns could fail, risking the erosion of his charisma. In particular, the disasters of the Great Leap Forward in 1957–1959 dented his authority substantially. Mao was able to fend off these threats and further increase his personal power by mobilizing his prestige and charisma first against incipient elite opposition (by, e.g. Defense Minister Peng Dehuai at the Lushan conference in 1959), and later in the 1960s during the Cultural Revolution against the formal authority of the state and the party itself.

At the elite level, his charismatic authority prevented coordination among those who felt that Mao was primarily responsible for the disasters of the Great Leap Forward. For example, accounts of the Lushan conference indicate that Mao retained enough prestige at the top of the CCP to prevent Peng from finding allies even after Mao made public Peng's letter expressing criticism[41] – an action which could instead have triggered bandwagoning against him. The main obstacle to elite coordination against Mao was neither formal norms nor informal authority (Mao was not their patron), but their own emotional ties to Mao as leader of the revolution, which in turn made them expect that others would also respect Mao in the same way. Charismatic authority was not the only thing that mattered, to be sure; Mao also made efforts during the early 1960s and at the beginning of the Cultural Revolution to reshape the top bodies of the Communist Party by purging old veterans and replacing them with people that he could control through his informal authority (because they were otherwise tainted or inexperienced).[42] But his charismatic authority was central to these efforts to exercise informal authority over the formal bodies of the party by preventing coordination among revolutionary veterans and ensuring a ready supply of inexperienced but committed followers who could be "helicoptered" into the elite. Mao also consolidated formal control over the army by promoting Lin Biao, who in turn set out to increase Mao's charismatic authority there through study groups of

the Little Red Book.[43] The emergence of a full-fledged Mao cult in the army resulted in the strengthening of a norm that Mao could not be criticized and an expectation that any signal of less than unconditional devotion to Mao could be severely punished, and it strengthened devotion to Mao among soldiers.

This would have been enough to cement Mao's personal power, though his charismatic authority would still have decayed without a successful campaign to renew these emotional attachments. The opportunity for such a campaign emerged by the mid 1960s, as the top leadership of the CCP had come to believe that the bureaucratic structures of the party and state represented an obstacle to their revolutionary goals.[44] Mao, however, sought to attack their formal authority directly by mobilizing his most committed charismatic followers among elite and non-elite groups outside the main party structures. At the elite level, none of the members of the Central Cultural Revolution Group (CCRG) initially belonged to the top leadership of the party or were accountable to it, but most had specific personal ties to Mao (including his personal secretary Chen Boda and his wife Jiang Qing). At the mass level, student and "Red Guard" groups were self-selected among those most willing to follow Mao's pronouncements ("to rebel is justified"); as Andreas astutely notes,[45] these were themselves charismatically led groups, forming a charismatic rather than a bureaucratic hierarchy, with Mao at the top, and composed of the people most willing to attack the formal structures of the party (in a precise illustration of the opposition between charismatic and legal/bureaucratic modes of legitimation). Moreover, the motivation of people joining these groups was not initially the expectation of material gains; at prestigious universities like Tsinghua students had incentives to protect the existing order, in which they were more or less guaranteed employment and advancement. These were thus not primarily patrimonial relationships, and many participants were well aware that despite Mao's backing they ran high personal risks by attacking the Party work groups for uncertain rewards.[46]

The Cultural Revolution led to the destruction of traditional and formal sources of authority because these groups succeeded in changing public expectations about which norms were to be followed, i.e. whose authority counted. Allegiance to Mao over the authority of the party and the state was enforced in a decentralized way across the population by these highly militant groups of students and workers (loosely coordinated by the signals emanating from Mao and the CCRG), and resulted in "flattery inflation" – the production of competitive signals of allegiance to Mao to avoid reprisals.[47] A striking example of the effectiveness of the mobilization of these groups was the humiliation of Liu Shaoqi (at the time the Chinese head of state!) in struggle sessions in early 1967; the legal authority of his office counted for nothing as staff beat him in Zhongnanhai.[48]

The charismatic attachments of Red Guard and student groups were also strengthened by ritual events, like the eight great "mass receptions" of 1967, while their ability to spread new norms beyond the initial settings of the Cultural Revolution was facilitated by the closure of schools and the promotion of free travel during this period.[49] At the same time, the mobilization of charisma did not result in the replacement of the old legal-rational norms with new formal norms, or the transformation of charisma into formal authority. The coordinating signals from the CCRG and Mao were too ambiguous to provide coherence to the movement, and self-selected charismatic groups had too many different interests to agree on stable formal structures of authority. All Red Guard and student groups appealed to Mao to justify their actions, but over time they

tended to follow their own interests in a fluid situation, since Mao's pronouncements were sufficiently vague to allow for multiple interpretations.[50] While this enabled the consolidation of Mao's power, setting new expectations of allegiance that remained in place even after the failure of the Cultural Revolution *reduced* his charismatic authority, it did not turn into formal authority, and could thus not be transferred to his successors.

A similar process of "authority destruction" is visible in the history of Nazi radicalization in the late 1930s, though this case shows some of the *synergies* between formal and charismatic forms of authority. While Hitler had early on acquired a charismatic following in the Nazi party,[51] his personal authority beyond the party was still limited in the early 1930s. Between 1933 and 1935 his ability to exercise personal power required reinforcement by the still considerable legal-rational legitimacy of the German *Rechtstaat*: the formal authority granted by the Enabling Act and the use of bureaucratic apparatuses of censorship and surveillance to suppress criticism and opposition. But in the following years his charismatic authority beyond the party core increased with his unexpected successes in foreign policy, e.g. the remilitarization of the Rhineland, the annexation of Austria, and the occupation of the Sudetenland, which are precisely the sorts of "miracles" that charismatic authority requires to develop, and which continued until the defeat of the German armies at Stalingrad in 1942 turned the tide of the War and decreased his charisma among the broader German public.[52] The intensification of charismatic attachments in ritual contexts (e.g. army oaths to the commander in chief, large-scale rallies, etc.) likely helped as well to cement Hitler's charismatic authority both within and beyond the party.

But it was only when such charismatic links were mobilized as the war began that we see the destruction of the formal authority of the state and the full development of Hitler's personal rule. Ian Kershaw has noted how Hitler's personal power developed in the late 1930s through the competitive mobilization of charisma among Nazi party members who had strong attachments to Hitler.[53] As in the Maoist case, the vagueness of Hitler's pronouncements led to competition among core Nazi followers all along the bureaucratic hierarchy to fulfil the vision articulated by the leader, a process that Kershaw calls "working towards the Führer." Norms of allegiance to Hitler in preference to adherence to the law then became increasingly dominant; the combination of signals calling on followers to engage in radical action and their unregulated competition to achieve these radical goals resulted in the erosion and eventual destruction of legal forms of authority, diluting the ability of opposition to coalesce in bureaucratic strongholds (such as the army, from which plots to assassinate Hitler continued to be formed), or indeed for elites to exercise any form of accountability on Hitler (small as this ability was even in the early 1930s). As in the Maoist case, the activation of charismatic links with followers was instrumental in undermining other forms of authority within Hitler's own party and reinforcing his own extralegal authority even after the increasing difficulties of the war reduced his charismatic appeal beyond core Nazi party members.

It is worth stressing that power became more personalized in both Cultural Revolution China and late 1930s Germany not because Mao and Hitler's formal authority increased, but because the activation of charismatic links to followers within and beyond their support parties reinforced their *extralegal* authority; indeed, many formal institutions of executive authority ceased to function in both cases.[54] Similar (if perhaps less extreme) forms of charismatic personalization also occurred in Libya, where Gaddhafi's ability to mobilize followers outside the formal structures

of the state or the informal authority of his clan was central to the personalization of his power, and enabled him to remain powerful even after dropping most of his formal offices.[55] Personal power that depends primarily on charismatic authority (just as power that depends primarily on informal authority) is accordingly typically accompanied by "deinstitutionalization," an extreme disjunction between formal norms and the location of genuine authority, and charismatic rulers sometimes reject apparently powerful formal offices that could constrain them.[56] But charismatic authority is also often ephemeral, as Weber noted.[57] Hence it is often combined with attempts to "routinize" it, i.e. to convert it into more durable forms of formal authority by creating or extending the reach of executive offices that can preserve an incumbent's power even after a decline in their charisma or popularity.

The mobilization of formal authority

Rulers can expand their formal authority by mobilizing coalitions to change constitutions or other public norms regulating their discretion. While the mobilization of charisma and/or informal authority are typically necessary to the construction of such coalitions, the expansion of formal authority will normally also involve the deployment of persuasive *arguments*. For example, rulers who face term limits often craft very specific arguments to evade or change them,[58] and such arguments shape how parliamentary coalitions, supreme courts, or the public at large evaluate and react to these proposals. Significant resources are invested in *persuading* others of the rationality of formal institutional change, rather than simply mobilizing them through emotional appeals or co-opting them with economic resources. It is an open question in any particular case how much explicit argument matters *vis à vis* patronage and charismatic authority in the formation of coalitions able to enact legal change. But the assumption that justificatory claims have *some* independent power to bring together coalitions for legal change seems justified by the enormous effort invested by actors in both promoting them and supporting and staffing organizations tasked with producing such claims, from party schools to think-tanks.

These claims are often crafted strategically to maximize the efforts required to refute them or to prevent naive voting audiences from understanding their full import. Consider how Orbán and his partisans have often pointed to real features of European or American electoral systems, or to majoritarian democratic principles, to justify legal changes whose overall effect is to increase his power:[59] these claims are credible precisely because they are difficult to refute convincingly in the eyes of many Hungarians. Similarly, constitutional changes that personalize power often bundle multiple issues together, either to obscure their import[60] or to ensure the support of groups that might otherwise be opposed, as in the 2009 referendum to extend term limits in Venezuela, which also included the elimination of term limits for state governors, mayors, and members of the national assembly.[61]

More generally, legal change to increase a ruler's formal authority is often accomplished through the formal control of agendas, the manipulation of voting options, and the exploitation of other procedural "moves" to constrain and disarm opposition, i.e. what William Riker called "heresthetics."[62] Heresthetics also involves the mobilization of argument, though the arguments deployed may concern the legality of a move rather than its substantive content; the mobilization of formal authority to personalize power requires making a more or less plausible case that changes to constitutional and other

legal norms shaping executive authority are themselves legal. Such actions are only effective if the opposition to change feels compelled to respect legal authority (by, e.g. abiding by court decisions declaring certain moves legal or illegal), even if only in the sense that it cannot coordinate to violate it, such as by staging a coup. This is not to say that all heresthetic action is clearly "legal"; many moves of dubious legality can increase executive power as long as they cannot be effectively challenged, as in Hungary and Poland in the last decade.[63] Moreover, heresthetics can also be deployed by elites to prevent personalization: retired leaders in the Vietnamese Communist Party successfully used procedural moves to prevent General Secretary Le Ka Phieu from personalizing power in 2001, for example.[64]

The mobilization of argument to engineer changes to formal authority is not restricted to democratic or partially democratic systems with more or less open public spheres. For example, the process through which Xi Jinping initially consolidated power in China involved the mobilization of consensus at many levels of the CCP around a set of ideas favouring the institutional centralization of power.[65] To be sure, a full explanation of the centralization of power in contemporary China requires reference to factional politics and patronage relationships within the party.[66] But Xi appears to have capitalized on a demand for formal centralization among CCP elites that had its roots in their dissatisfaction with corruption and the pace of reforms during the Hu Jintao era, as well as a sense that these crises threatened the legitimacy of the party and required strong leadership to resolve.[67] He further took advantage of ideas developed by party theoreticians on "Open Giant Complex Systems" to promote an institutional reorganization of top party-state bodies that enhanced his own formal authority.[68] This required the reform of the Party Constitution, the reduction in size of the Politburo Standing Committee, and the introduction of a number of "Leading Groups" (led by Xi) to coordinate reform and security work, which significantly transformed the principle of "division of work" that had been a mainstay of the post-Mao era.

Xi's centralization of power was thus partially accomplished by mobilizing justificatory discourses around a set of ideas favouring such centralization and then using correct procedural methods to change the configuration of formal institutions, rather than by activating charismatic attachments to weaken or ignore such institutions, unlike Mao. Indeed, despite claims about the development of a "cult of personality" around Xi in recent years,[69] there is little evidence of widespread and deep charismatic attachments to Xi within or beyond the party, much less evidence that these attachments were mobilized to help him centralize power from 2012 onwards. The relatively small number of "cultic" displays among the population documented occasionally in scholarly and news articles, and the somewhat larger propaganda effort within the party to glorify Xi's thought, both seem to have emerged *after* he had consolidated power via formal means, and are best interpreted as an attempt to invest existing formal authority into the production of charismatic authority, though without much success in forging genuine charismatic bonds so far. It is also worth noting that the changes to his formal authority *increased* the ability of Xi to promote and reward allies. Xi's current factional dominance of top party bodies is partly the result of prior formal institutional changes, as he was much weaker when he began to centralize power.[70]

The mobilization of argument to enhance formal executive power in more open or democratic contexts – the phenomenon of "autocratic legalism"[71] – has been

studied in greater detail than in autocratic regimes, and thus requires less discussion here. The key difference between the mobilization of formal authority in an autocratic context like China versus a more open context in hybrid or democratic regimes is that Presidents and Prime Ministers must justify changes that eliminate term limits, change electoral rules, grant them greater control over the media, and so on to larger audiences who sometimes have the power to determine their fate (by, e.g. voting in referenda). Moreover, the very openness of democratic or hybrid contexts means that such arguments will be subject to greater scrutiny, and occasionally fail with voters and legislators. To be sure, control over constitutional courts – a kind of formal authority itself enabled by formal appointment powers – can diminish the need for credible justifications even in democracies. But since the courts themselves represent forms of legal-rational authority, they always have some interest in crafting minimally plausible cases for approving such changes, as their decisions can induce popular backlash if not found sufficiently legitimate. Overall, therefore, we can say that "justificatory effort" is likely larger in democracies than in non-democracies.

Formal authority can also be mobilized in three other ways to expand a ruler's personal power. First, it can be selectively exercised to neutralize elite opposition, such as when rulers use their discretion to decide who will be targeted for corruption or tax investigations.[72] Second, it can be deployed (typically via formal powers of appointment) to strengthen informal authority by constructing patronage networks.[73] And third, it can be used to generate the appearance of charisma by incentivizing the production of leader-focused propaganda by the formal institutions of the state.[74] The production of genuine charismatic authority by means of formal authority seems to be quite difficult, especially in the absence of extraordinary achievements by the ruler, since propaganda that is not credible does not produce emotional attachments, but the use of formal authority to produce informal authority (and vice-versa) is quite common in the historical record. Indeed, the most common mechanism for the personalization of power is the mobilization of *informal* authority to control formal institutions, to which we now turn.

The mobilization of informal authority

A ruler who can rely on his informal or charismatic authority over others needs to expend less justificatory effort to expand his formal authority. In some cases there is almost zero justification *ex ante*, and legal change depends almost entirely on other mechanisms. When in 1961 François "Papa Doc" Duvalier declared that he had been "re-elected" to the presidency for a new six year term (effectively extending his term in office), despite the fact that the 1961 election was a legislative rather than a presidential election, no justificatory work was done in advance. Voters could not even have known they were "electing" Duvalier: though his name was printed at the bottom of every ballot, he had not announced his intention to extend his term, and still had more than two years to run in it.[75] Transparently absurd justifications were offered afterwards for this "election" by people like Attorney General Max Duplessis, and crowds organized to applaud Duvalier's "re-election," but it should be clear that these were neither credible nor actually believed, as far as the historical evidence allows us to tell. Duvalier could get away with this "legal" change not because he assembled a coalition using arguments about the need to extend his term but

through his informal authority over patronage networks, which ensured that the Attorney General would be willing to certify a nonsensical result. Formal institutional change here was a lagging indicator of personalism.

The key mechanism of personalization in Haiti, as in many other similar regimes (e.g. Marcos in the Philippines, Mobutu in Zaire, and Noriega in Panama),[76] can be characterized as control over patronage resources, such as the ability to provide followers with jobs and rents. As noted above, patronage involves the informal authority that emerges in unequal but enduring relations of exchange between a patron and many clients, where the former typically provides economic resources in exchange for political support. Patronage networks are the building blocks of many other social structures, including political parties.[77] Wherever patronage is the main structure of authority, supplanting legal authority, we can speak of patrimonial and neopatrimonial regimes.[78] These regimes are characterized by high levels of de-institutionalization, where formal authority is no longer a good guide to the location of power.

Yet the informal authority rulers acquire through patronage is typically parasitic on their formal authority; pure patronage power, independent of formal structures, is rare, though it is perhaps approximated in cases of extreme state weakness or highly patronal political parties with weak formal norms. In order to mobilize informal authority to personalize power, rulers need to "colonize" existing structures of formal authority, most often by appointing clients to offices in important institutions (e.g. the army, a political party, or a court of justice), so that their informal authority overrides the formal norms otherwise regulating these offices and the institutional interests of officeholders. The office provides a variety of economic and non-economic benefits to the client, but is understood to be a revocable benefit if he does not provide appropriate support to the patron – e.g. delivering "correct" bureaucratic and judicial decisions, voting in parliament and mobilizing their own subordinate clients to support the ruler, etc. In many cases the benefits of office are understood as a license to violate formal norms ("corruption"), and accordingly revocable through the selective application of such formal norms ("anti-corruption investigations"), which prevents clients from easily coordinating against the patron.

Formal norms also affect the stability of patronage networks through other channels. Term limits, for example, typically weaken them as the end of the patron's term in office approaches, since they incentivize clients to look for new patrons.[79] Patrons also face principal-agent problems *vis à vis* their clients if the formal authority of the offices they give away (e.g. a generalship in the army, with control over soldiers) enables elite clients to threaten them.[80] Powerful leaders who rule primarily through their informal authority thus often retain a formal position commanding the military, as Gaddhafi in Libya and Deng Xiaoping in China.[81] Depending on circumstances, patronage relationships can therefore help power-sharing rather than the personalization of power. Since informal authority requires control of resources, it is also vulnerable to drops in revenue, and hence to the loss of formal authority enabling the distribution of such revenue.

For example, when Vladimir Putin stepped down from the Russian Presidency in 2008 to become Prime Minister, he was understood to have retained power by controlling patronage networks; Dimitry Medvedev, the President from 2008 to 2012, was widely seen as his proxy, so that legal power no longer matched *de facto* power. But Putin had been able to reshape such networks to his advantage (becoming the central node in them) only through the skilful use of the enormous legal powers of

the presidency, which enabled him to disrupt the influence of the so-called "oligarchs" by means of selective appointments and legal prosecution.[82] By 2008 administrative structures crucial for the reshaping of patronage relationships in his favour followed him, rather than Medvedev, so that in 2011 Putin was able to legally engineer the "swap" to extend the presidential term and return to the presidency, while Medvedev grew his own patronage network only slowly.[83] Nevertheless, this was a genuine risk for Putin, and there was uncertainty about whether Medvedev's growing patronage network would in fact allow him to retain the presidency. Informal authority thus retained a dependence on formal authority.

Conclusion

Charismatic mobilization makes use of the strong affective attachments of particular groups to a leader to enforce extralegal norms of allegiance to him; the mobilization of formal authority deploys justificatory discourses to enhance the legal-rational affordances of a ruler's official position; and the mobilization of informal authority colonizes formal structures to bend them to a ruler's will. Each of these forms of authority also interacts with the others to shape the possibilities for personalization in a given regime; thus, legal authority can be used to strengthen patronage networks, control over patronage can be used to increase a ruler's formal authority, and control over formal authority can be used to promote a ruler's charismatic authority.

While all of these trajectories are in principle possible, the "logic" of each form of authority renders some of them more or less likely. For example, the transformation of charismatic authority into legal authority follows from the logic of routinization; ephemeral charismatic authority typically needs institutionalization into legal position if it is to last. To be sure, some charismatic leaders reject routinization or actively work to destroy formal authority, but even Mao ended up depending on the PLA's formal authority as charismatic enthusiasm became impossible to sustain indefinitely, or threatened to endanger the state. By contrast, the reverse transformation of legal authority into charismatic authority, observed in efforts to direct bureaucratic apparatuses to produce "personality cults" in a top-down fashion, is less likely to be successful in the absence of striking successes in crisis situations that are attributable to the leader.[84] The use of "propaganda" to exalt the image of the leader can indeed shift norms of allegiance, and make it difficult for elites to coordinate against the leader; but such top-down cults appear to be fragile, incapable of generating or expanding genuine emotional connections.

Similar considerations apply to the conversion of informal authority into charismatic authority, which typically emerges from competitive processes of "loyalty signalling," where followers engage in increasing flattery in the expectation of rewards in patronage chains, without necessarily forming new emotional bonds.[85] Competitive signalling gives the appearance of charisma, and makes it difficult for elites to coordinate against a leader, but is liable to stop suddenly if rewards cease. Nevertheless in some cases pre-existing charismatic attachments can be mobilized in patronage networks: female "brokers" in Peronist Argentina "performed" Evita (dyeing their hair blonde, for example) to activate emotional commitments that reinforced the charismatic authority of Peronist leaders.[86] As Andrews-Lee argues,[87] charisma can endure without routinization even beyond the life of the leader, allowing later leaders to "borrow" a founder's charismatic authority temporarily.

Understanding the specific mechanisms of the personalization of power should thus enable us to formulate hypotheses regarding its durability and consequences. For example, Andrews-Lee has argued that charismatic mobilization results in a cyclical pattern in which the unsustainable nature of the policies used by charismatic leaders combined with the strength of the charismatic bonds they forge leads to long-term instability.[88] Similarly, in a series of works Steven Levitsky and Lucan Way have pointed to the importance of emotional bonds formed in war for the durability of authoritarian regimes.[89] One might expect accordingly that charismatic bonds make personalistic regimes more durable, and point to their affinity with revolutionary regimes where personality cults have historically found a fertile soil. These remain only hypotheses, however; further work to identify how the specific mechanisms of personalization affect its durability and consequences in particular regimes remains to be done.

Notes

1. Short, *Banda*, 254.
2. O'Donnell, "Delegative Democracy."
3. Rhodes-Purdy and Madrid, "The Perils of Personalism."
4. Márquez, *Non-Democratic Politics*, chap. 1; Frantz et al., "Personalist Ruling Parties in Democracies"; Frantz, "Personalist Dictatorship"; Baturo, "Personalist Regimes."
5. Bueno de Mesquita et al., *The Logic of Political Survival*; Svolik, *The Politics of Authoritarian Rule*; Geddes, Wright, and Frantz, *How Dictatorships Work*.
6. Albertus and Menaldo, "Dictators as Founding Fathers?"; Fails, "Oil Income and the Personalization of Autocratic Politics."
7. Geddes, Wright, and Frantz, *How Dictatorships Work*; Gehlbach, Sonin, and Svolik, "Formal Models of Nondemocratic Politics"; Escribà-Folch and Timoneda, "The Personalization of Power in Dictatorships," 79–80.
8. Sudduth, "Strategic Logic of Elite Purges in Dictatorships"; Woldense, "The Ruler's Game of Musical Chairs."
9. Leber, Carothers, and Reichert, "When Can Dictators Go it Alone?"
10. Frantz et al., "How Personalist Politics is Changing Democracies"; Gandhi and Sumner, "Measuring the Consolidation of Power in Nondemocracies"; Albertus and Menaldo, "Dictators as Founding Fathers?"; Myerson, "The Autocrat's Credibility Problem and Foundations of the Constitutional State."
11. Weber, *Economy and Society*, chap. III.
12. These mechanisms also map to the three "linkage types" between citizens and politicians (charismatic, programmatic, and clientelist) proposed by Kitschelt, "Linkages Between Citizens and Politicians in Democratic Polities."
13. Weber, *Economy and Society*, chap. XII; Jackson and Rosberg, *Personal Rule in Black Africa*; Chehabi et al., *Sultanistic Regimes*; more recent work in this vein includes Hale, *Patronal Politics*.
14. Baturo and Elkink, *The New Kremlinology*; Baturo, Anceschi, and Cavatorta, *Personalism and Personalist Regimes*.
15. Lukes, *Power*, 16; Weber, *Economy and Society*, 53–4.
16. The concept is "sociologically amorphous," as Weber noted, *Economy and Society*, 53.
17. "The Autonomous Power of the State."
18. Duindam, *Dynasties*, 17; Weber, *Economy and Society*, 227, 1006.
19. Martin, *Social Structures*, chap. 6.
20. I depart here from Weber's tripartite characterization of authority (charismatic, legal-rational, and traditional) in considering some types of traditional authority simply cases of formal authority (*Economy and Society*, chap. III). Whenever traditional norms are widely known (are "common knowledge"), they are often indistinguishable from formal authority norms, while other types of traditional authority are better characterized as informal types insofar as they result in patrimonial bonds.

21. Márquez, "The Irrelevance of Legitimacy," 21–2.
22. Hale, *Patronal Politics*, chap. 1.
23. Márquez, "Charisma and Authority"; Andrews-Lee, *The Emergence and Revival of Charismatic Movements*, chap. 1.
24. Weber, *Economy and Society*, 242.
25. Ibid.
26. Márquez, "Charisma and Authority"; Andrews-Lee, *The Emergence and Revival of Charismatic Movements*, chap. 2.
27. Andrews-Lee, *The Emergence and Revival of Charismatic Movements*, chap. 2.
28. Hale, *Patronal Politics*, 35.
29. Hollyer, Klašnja, and Titiunik, "Parties as Disciplinarians."
30. Márquez, "Two Models of Political Leader Cults," 8–11.
31. Marshall, Gurr, and Jaggers, "Polity IV Project"; Magaloni, Chu, and Min, "Autocracies of the World, 1950–2012 (Version 1.0)."
32. E.g. Burkhardt, "Institutionalizing Personalism" on the Russian constitutional changes of 2020.
33. For example, the V-Dem dataset provides indexes of both "Presidentialism" (**v2xnp_pres**, measuring "the extent to which the President is free from constraints by other institutions or actors") and "clientelism" (**v2xnp_client**, measuring the extent to which politics are based on clientelistic relationships, i.e. on informal authority). See Coppedge et al., "V-Dem Codebook V14." The V-Party dataset also includes a measure of party personalization (**v2paind**) that can also be useful as a measure of personalism in some democratic contexts (Lindberg et al., "Codebook Varieties of Party Identity and Organization (V–Party) V2"; cf. Rhodes-Purdy and Madrid, "The Perils of Personalism" on the contribution of party personalization to regime personalization).
34. See also Wright, "The Latent Characteristics that Structure Autocratic Rule"; Gandhi and Sumner, "Measuring the Consolidation of Power in Nondemocracies."
35. Ruler tenure has also been used as a proxy for personalism (Magaloni, Chu, and Min, "Autocracies of the World, 1950–2012 (Version 1.0)"), but tenure is affected by factors that have little to do with the ruler's personal authority (in fact, some rulers may survive *because* they share power with the elite, as argued by Myerson, "The Autocrat's Credibility Problem and Foundations of the Constitutional State"; Gandhi and Sumner, "Measuring the Consolidation of Power in Nondemocracies"), and does not allow us to understand changes in a ruler's personal power over time. Measures of "prominence" in specific text corpora (e.g. Jiang, Xi, and Xie, "In the Shadows of Great Men") may also distill overall judgments about the personal power of particular leaders among observers over time, though they cannot help us distinguish the sources of authority underpinning it, and may also be incomparable across different contexts.
36. E.g. Baturo and Elkink, *The New Kremlinology* on Russia under Putin, chapters 3 and 4.
37. E.g. Ibid., chap. 6.
38. Though such measures may also only reflect formal control over the media rather than genuine charismatic authority, Márquez, "Two Models of Political Leader Cults."
39. Andrews-Lee, *The Emergence and Revival of Charismatic Movements*, chap. 3, on Chávez in Venezuela.
40. Andreas, "The Structure of Charismatic Mobilization," 440–1.
41. Leese, *Mao Cult*, 127.
42. Shih, *Coalitions of the Weak*, chapters 2 and 3.
43. Leese, *Mao Cult*, 126ff.
44. Andreas, "The Structure of Charismatic Mobilization," 442.
45. Ibid., 449.
46. Andreas, "The Structure of Charismatic Mobilization," 448. The success of the Red Guards also depended on Mao's ability to restrain the army and the security organs, as well as to press for the withdrawal of the Work Teams; see MacFarquhar and Schoenhals, *Mao's Last Revolution*, chapter 4, pp. 84–5. Though partly rooted on his formal and informal authority over the PLA and the party, this control was also strengthened by his charismatic authority.
47. Márquez, "Two Models of Political Leader Cults," 8–11.
48. Pantsov and Levine, *Mao*, 517–8.
49. Leese, *Mao Cult*, 134ff.
50. Wang, *Failure of Charisma*, chap. 12.

51. Especially among top Nazis, where he had "coterie charisma," Eatwell, "The Concept and Theory of Charismatic Leadership," 153–4.
52. Kershaw, *The "Hitler Myth,"* chap. 3; Dikötter, *How to Be a Dictator*, chap. 3.
53. Kershaw, "'Working towards the Führer.' Reflections on the Nature of the Hitler Dictatorship."
54. E.g. the Cabinet in Germany did not meet at all after 1937, Kershaw, ibid, 106, and in China in 1967 the Secretariat of the Central Committee of the party was replaced by the much more ad-hoc CCRG, while many ministries ceased to function, paralyzed by factional fighting, MacFarquhar and Schoenhals, *Mao's Last Revolution*, 156–8.
55. Hinnebusch, "Charisma, Revolution, and State Formation."
56. E.g. Mao refused to become State Chairman, MacFarquhar and Schoenhals, *Mao's Last Revolution*, 325.
57. Weber, *Economy and Society*, chap. V.
58. Versteeg et al., "The Law and Politics of Presidential Term Limit Evasion."
59. Scheppele, "Autocratic Legalism," 565–7.
60. See, e.g. Burkhardt, "Institutionalizing Personalism" on the 2020 constitutional referendum in Russia.
61. Carroll, *Comandante*, 155.
62. Riker, *The Art of Political Manipulation*.
63. Pirro and Stanley, "Forging, Bending, and Breaking."
64. Leber, Carothers, and Reichert, "When Can Dictators Go it Alone?" 71, 90.
65. Lee, "An Institutional Analysis of Xi Jinping's Centralization of Power."
66. Choi, Givens, and MacDonald, "From Power Balance to Dominant Faction in Xi Jinping's China."
67. Baranovitch, "A Strong Leader for A Time of Crisis"; see also Jiang, "Man Versus Machine," 266, 269.
68. Lee, "An Institutional Analysis of Xi Jinping's Centralization of Power," 333.
69. Luqiu, "The Reappearance of the Cult of Personality in China"; Stenslie and Galtung, *Xi Jinping's China*, chap. 4.
70. Baranovitch, "A Strong Leader for A Time of Crisis," 252; Jiang, "Man Versus Machine," 269.
71. Scheppele, "Autocratic Legalism."
72. A favorite tactic of the early Putin regime, Gel'man, *Authoritarian Russia*, 73–4; we can also detect its use in Xi Jinping's anti-corruption campaign, Stenslie and Galtung, *Xi Jinping's China*, 59–60.
73. See, e.g. Baturo and Elkink, *The New Kremlinology*, chap. 3 on the construction of Putin's patronage network.
74. Márquez, "Two Models of Political Leader Cults," 4–7.
75. Diederich and Burt, *Papa Doc*, 169–70.
76. See, for many examples, Chehabi et al., *Sultanistic Regimes*.
77. Martin, *Social Structures*, chap. 6, pp. 195ff. and chapter 9; cf. also Hale, *Patronal Politics*, chap. 2, who prefers to speak of "patronal" relationships.
78. See, e.g. Baturo, "Personalist Regimes"; Guliyev, "Personal Rule, Neopatrimonialism, and Regime Typologies"; Chehabi et al., *Sultanistic Regimes*; Hale, *Patronal Politics*.
79. Hale, *Patronal Politics*, chap. 4; Baturo and Elkink, *The New Kremlinology*, chap. 4.
80. Meng, Paine, and Powell, "Authoritarian Power Sharing."
81. Pargeter, *Libya*, 96; Shambaugh, "Deng Xiaoping," 460.
82. Gel'man, *Authoritarian Russia*, 74–5.
83. Ibid., 107–8; Baturo and Elkink, *The New Kremlinology*, chap. 3.
84. Márquez, "Two Models of Political Leader Cults," 5–7.
85. Márquez, "The Mechanisms of Cult Production," 27–31.
86. Auyero, *Poor People's Politics*, 139ff.
87. *The Emergence and Revival of Charismatic Movements*.
88. Ibid.
89. Levitsky and Way, *Revolution and Dictatorship*; Levitsky and Way, "Beyond Patronage."

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