# Augmenting Borda Count to Instant Runoff

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## Borda Runoff

#### Eliminates candidates based on the Borda Count

How to Fill Out Cary's New Ballot: Mark a Different Candidate for Each Choice

F	or TOW	N COUNCIL AT LARGE - O	ne Seat	
Fill in one oval per choice		Your 2nd or 3rd choice will be considered if your 1st choice loses		A
VOTE for your 1st choice here	1st <b>↓</b>	Mark your 2nd 2nd 2nd choice here	Mark your 3rd choice here	My .
Benjamin Franklin	•	0	0	20
Thomas Jefferson	0	0	€	For more information, se www.CaryVotes123.com or call Wake Co Board o Elections at 856-6240
Betsy Ross	0	•	0	
Write-in:	0	0	0	

Mark your 1st choice, then you may mark 2nd and 3rd choices as back-ups. Your back-up choices will never hurt your 1st choice. Back-up choices are only reviewed if an "instant runoff" occurs and your first-choice candidate gets eliminated and is not in the runoff.

#### Motivation

- •I like runoff voting systems, but monotonicity is also unbearable
- Variations of instant runoff
- Measuring monotonicity

## Properties of BRV

- Trivial: Satisfies anonymity and neutrality.
- Nontrivial: satisfies the majority criterion.
- Does not satisfy monotonicity and CWC

### Lemma about Borda count


If a candidate receives the majority of first place votes in an election, then that candidate cannot be last place under Borda count.

## Monotonicity


Winner Vulnerability: an election is vulnerable if increasing the winner's ranking on some individual preference orders results in a new winner.

General Vulnerability: an election is vulnerable if we can find a candidate whose ranking on the societal preference order is lowered when its ranking is increased on some individual preference orders.

## Results – 3 candidates



## Results – 4 candidates



#### Results – cont.

## BRV performs better than IRV in every test.

Question: if an election passes the vulnerability test for IRV, does the same election pass the test for BRV?

Answer: NO

### References

Jonathan K. Hodge and Richard E.Klima. *The Mathematics of Voting and Elections: A Hands-on Approach*. The Mathematical World, Volume 22, 2005

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Dominique Lepelley, Frederic Chantreuil, and Sven Berg. *The likelihood of monotonicity paradoxes in run-off elections*. Mathematical Social Sciences, 31, 1996