

بِسْمِ اللّٰهِ الرَّحْمٰنِ الرَّحِيْمِ

مبانی رایانش امن


جلسه ۵

مجتبی خلیلی
دانشکده برق و کامپیوتر
دانشگاه صنعتی اصفهان



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فصل سوم کتاب ◀



Data Encryption Standard(DES)

- DES developed in 1970's
- Based on IBM's Lucifer cipher
- DES was U.S. government standard
- Development of DES was controversial
 - NSA was secretly involved
 - Design process was secret
 - Key length reduced from 128 to 56 bits
 - Subtle changes to Lucifer algorithm



Horst Feistel (1915-1990)

Data Encryption Standard(DES)

- DES is a block cipher with...
 - 64 bit block length
 - 56 bit key length
 - 16 rounds
 - 48 bits of key used each round (subkey)
- Round function is simple (for block cipher)

امنیت DES

- 40+ years of analysis revealed no back door
- Attacks? Essentially exhaustive key search
- **Inescapable conclusions**
 - Designers of DES knew what they were doing
 - Designers of DES were way ahead of their time (at least wrt certain cryptanalytic techniques)

امنیت DES

◀ همانطور که دیدیم DES دیگر امن نیست.

◀ خواهیم دید که AES جایگزین آن شده است.

◀ اما برخی نیز پیشنهاد داده اند که با تغییراتی از DES میتوان استفاده کرد.

درباره DES

$$2DES_{k_1 k_2}(m) = DES_{k_2}(DES_{k_1}(m))$$

◀ با اینکار طول کلید دو برابر میشود.

درباره DES

◀ فرض کنید دشمن m و c را میداند:

$$c = 2DES_{k_1 k_2}(m) = DES_{k_2}(DES_{k_1}(m))$$

$$DES_{k_2}^{-1}(c) = DES_{k_1}(m)$$

k_2

| t_1 | $DES^{-1}(t_1, c)$ |
|-------|--------------------|
| | |
| | |
| | |
| | |
| t_N | $DES^{-1}(t_N, c)$ |

| $DES(t_1, m)$ | t_1 |
|---------------|-------|
| | |
| | |
| | |
| | |
| $DES(t_N, m)$ | t_N |

k_1

درباره DES

- 56 bit DES key is too small
 - Exhaustive key search is feasible
- But DES was everywhere, so what to do?
- **Triple DES or 3DES** (112 bit key)
 - $C = E(D(E(P, K_1), K_2), K_1)$
 - $P = D(E(D(C, K_1), K_2), K_1)$
- Why Encrypt-Decrypt-Encrypt with 2 keys?
 - Backward compatible: $E(D(E(P, K), K), K) = E(P, K)$
 - And 112 is a lot of bits

رمزنگاری متقارن (مدرن)

◀ در حالت کلی رمزنگاری متقارن (مدرن) به دو دسته کلی تقسیم میشوند:

□ الگوریتم‌های رمز جریان (Stream Cipher)

✓ ایده OTP، اما یا یک کلید محدود یک کلید بسیار طولانی بسازیم.

✓ مثال: ChaCha20, RC4

□ الگوریتم‌های رمز بلوکی (Block Cipher)

✓ ساخت بلوکهای n بیتی از پیام و رمز آنها با یک الگوریتم تکراری

✓ مثال: AES, DES, 3DES, Blowfish, Twofish

Advanced Encryption Standard(AES)

NIST در سال ۱۹۹۸: طول کلید ۱۲۸، طول بلاک ۱۲۸، سریعتر

Advanced Encryption Standard(AES)

- ❑ Replacement for DES
- ❑ AES competition (late 90's)
 - NSA openly involved
 - Transparent selection process
 - Many strong algorithms proposed
 - Rijndael Algorithm ultimately selected (pronounced like "Rain Doll" or "Rhine Doll")
- ❑ Iterated block cipher (like DES)
- ❑ Not a Feistel cipher (unlike DES)

Advanced Encryption Standard(AES)

- **Block size:** 128 bits (others in Rijndael)
- **Key length:** 128, 192 or 256 bits (independent of block size in Rijndael)
- 10 to 14 rounds (depends on key length)

Advanced Encryption Standard(AES)

تعداد دور بر اساس کلید: ◀

AES-128: 10 rounds

AES-192: 12 rounds

AES-256: 14 rounds

تاکنون هیچ حمله موثری به آن نشده است. ◀



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Block Cipher Modes



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Multiple Blocks

- How to encrypt multiple blocks?
- Do we need a new key for each block?
 - If so, as impractical as a one-time pad!
- Encrypt each block independently?
- How to handle partial blocks?
 - We won't discuss this issue

ECB Mode

- ❑ Notation: $C = E(P, K)$
- ❑ Given plaintext $P_0, P_1, \dots, P_m, \dots$
- ❑ Most obvious way to use a block cipher:

Encrypt

$$C_0 = E(P_0, K)$$

$$C_1 = E(P_1, K)$$

$$C_2 = E(P_2, K) \dots$$

Decrypt

$$P_0 = D(C_0, K)$$

$$P_1 = D(C_1, K)$$

$$P_2 = D(C_2, K) \dots$$

ECB Cut and Paste

- ❑ Suppose plaintext is

Alice digs Bob. Trudy digs Tom.

- ❑ Assuming 64-bit blocks and 8-bit ASCII:

$P_0 = \text{"Alice di"}, P_1 = \text{"gs Bob. "},$

$P_2 = \text{"Trudy di"}, P_3 = \text{"gs Tom. "}$

- ❑ Ciphertext: C_0, C_1, C_2, C_3

- ❑ Trudy cuts and pastes: C_0, C_3, C_2, C_1

- ❑ Decrypts as

Alice digs Tom. Trudy digs Bob.




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ECB Weakness

- Suppose $P_i = P_j$
- Then $C_i = C_j$ and Trudy knows $P_i = P_j$
- This gives Trudy some information, even if she does not know P_i or P_j
- Trudy might know P_i
- Is this a serious issue?

Alice Hates ECB Mode

- ❑ Alice's uncompressed image, and ECB encrypted



- ❑ Why does this happen?
- ❑ Same plaintext yields same ciphertext!