We thank the reviewers for the helpful comments. In what follows we address their remarks and illustrate the changes adopted in the manuscript.

**Reviewer #1:**

Main Comment:

“The definition of compromise used in the paper, presupposes that compromises exist at every profile. So, for example, at the profile where 1 ranks three alternatives as a>b>c and 2 as b>a>c, we are forced to either see 'c' as a compromise (based on an equal loss principle) or 'a' and 'b' (having eliminated all Pareto dominated alternatives first, before applying an equal loss principle). I wonder whether it might not be more intuitive to admit that at this profile, there exists no compromise - instead defining 'compromises' similar to 'Condorcet Winners' as alternatives that only exist at some profiles and then look for rules that admit/enforce the choice of compromises whenever they exist. To be clear, I do not suggest that the paper should be reformulated along these lines, but I believe it would be quite insightful if the authors were able to comment on this issue. Here, *BÖRGERS, Tilman. Undominated strategies and coordination in normalform games. Social Choice and Welfare, 1991, 8. Jg., Nr. 1, S. 65-78*. should be a useful reference (who defines compromises as Pareto-optimal alternatives that are most-preferred by no individual).”

We propose a notion of compromise that presents some novelties with respect to the definitions presented so far in the literature. Our intuition is that there are some contexts where the equal-loss principle is so important that we are willing to accept “c” as a compromise. However, as the reviewer mentions, this is not the only possible definition of compromise. Borgers (1991) proposes a setting where a compromise is not always possible. We added a paragraph in the concluding section pointing out this possibility to the reader.

Minor comments/typos

* “Abstract: ``Brams-Kilgour compromises fail to ascertain an outcome which is a compromise'' - this is in conflict with Theorem 5 (which I believe shows for one special BK-compromise that it ensures the selection of Paretian compromises)”
  + We clarified this by adding the exceptions in the abstract.
* “Page 5: `envy-freeness' caries a different (and precise) meaning in the literature on fair allocation - I would remove/replace it here.”
  + We substituted ‘envy-freeness’ by directly using equal-loss principle, which is the concept we are really interested about.
* “Page 6: the definition of spread measure is extremely flexible - as you describe in Section 4.4, this is a good thing. However, I was suspicious that I might have missed something when first encountering the definition - it might be helpful to point the reader to section 4.4, mentioning that indeed, for now, the definition is meant to be so flexible and that restrictions will be discussed later.”
  + We have now realized that the flexibility we propose in defining spread measures can be misunderstood. We appreciate and incorporate the reviewer's suggestion (which we have added immediately after the definition of spread measure).
* “Page 9: proof of theorem 4.3 `antiplurality rule never picks only non-Pareto optimal alternatives'. That might be trivial for some readers to see, but it could help others if they are reminded that for any non-Pareto optimal alternative it picks, it also picks all Pareto-dominating alternatives.”
  + We rephrased this sentence that, in fact, might not have been immediate for the reader to see.
* “Page 12: proof of Theorem 4.8 `let us exhibit' - I believe `we will show there exists' might be easier to understand. Also $r\_{\succ\_1} (z)=m$ should probably be replaced by $r\_{\succ\_i} (z)=m$”
  + We included the suggestion and corrected the typo.

**Reviewer #2:**

“In my opinion, it might be interesting to consider alternative definitions of a spread measure. Since the conflict with Pareto-efficiency is immediate, maybe it is worth investigating concepts such as total loss minimisation or minmax losses. In general, since the definition of a spread measure is far from clear, there seems to be room for deriving spread measures axiomatically.”

We study a notion of compromise which has not been considered so far (as far as we know). One of the definitions we give is indeed incompatible with Pareto-efficiency, as we show, which thus lead us to investigate an alternative notion in this article: picking alternatives that lead to most equal losses among the Pareto efficient ones. We show that this alternative notion of compromise is incompatible with many commonly used rules, which justifies our claim that this notion is novel. Several results presented in this article are made more general thanks to the flexible notion of a spread measure that we consider. We could make it more precise, but this would be artificial and reduce the scope of the results. Moreover, in Section 4.4 we consider some restrictions and we show that the general negative results still hold when the set is restricted.

“Second, individuals have verifiable claims in bankruptcy problems so that the question of a compromise naturally appears. And in traditional bargaining problems there is a disagreement point. Since these ingredients are missing in the standard social choice setting studied in this paper, it is maybe natural to consider one's most preferred alternative as a benchmark. Another possibility would be to assume a status-quo alternative against which alternative outcomes can be measured. The analysis would change if a status-quo alternative were to be introduced because individuals would in principle have different opinions about how good this status-quo alternative is. incorporating these comments would give the reader a more complete picture about the generality of the findings in this paper.”

The notion of losses can be viewed as considering one's most preferred alternative as a benchmark and the compromise is evaluated on the distance with everyone’s top choice. Obviously, our analysis can be extended in different and richer contexts, the setting where a status-quo point exists is an example. We added this consideration in the concluding section when we illustrate possible future works.