Ex-Ante versus Ex-Post Compromise

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Introducing the problem

Setting: Several voters express their preferences over a set of alternatives.
Goal: Find a procedure determining a collective choice that promote a notion of compromise.

Compromise rules

- **plurality**:selects the alternatives considered as best by the highest number of voters.
- **MVR**:MVR picks all alternatives receiving a majority support at the highest possible quality
- **MC**: picks alternatives receiving a majority support at the highest possible quality while ties are broken according to the quantity of support these receive
- **FB**: bargainers fall back, in lockstep, to less and less preferred alternatives until they reach a unanimous agreement.
- **q-approval FB**:picks the alternatives which receive the support of q voters at the highest possible quality – breaking ties according to the quantity of support

Ex-Ante versus Ex-Post Perspective

ex-ante compromise
impose over individuals a willingness to compromise but they do not ensure an outcome where everyone has effectively compromised.

ex-post compromise
favoring an outcome where every voter gives up her most preferred positions if this increases equality.

Example 1

51	*a*	*b*	*c*
49	*c*	*b*	*a*

- plurality
- MVR
- MC
- FB
- q-approval FB $q \in \left\{1, ..., \frac{n}{2} + 1\right\}$

Example 2

26	a	b	c	d
25	c	b	a	d
$z - 51$	d	b	a	c
$100 - z$	d	a	c	b

- plurality
- MVR
- MC
- FB
- q-approval FB $q \in \left\{ \frac{n}{2}, ..., z \right\}$

Idea

A social planner must choose between a world x where individuals may sell their organs, and a world y where they do not.

	u_1	u_2
x	1	100
y	0	0

Even though y is Pareto dominated in this example, the social planner might prefer y to x.

Thank You!

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