



SIMULTANEOUS ELICITATION OF COMMITTEE AND VOTERS' PREFERENCES

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Scenario

Incompletely specified profile and positional scoring rule

(Head of the) Committee Voters Alice Bob Carl $W_1 > W_2 \ge W_3$ \parallel 1 0

Goal

Development of query strategies interleaving questions to the committee and to the voters in order to simultaneously elicit preferences and voting rule

Motivation and approach

Who?

• Imagine to be an external observer helping with the voting procedure

Why?

- Voters: difficult or costly to order *all* alternatives
- Committee: difficult to specify a voting rule *precisely* and abstractly

How?

• Minimax regret: given the current knowledge, the alternatives with the lowest worst-case regret are selected as tied winners

Assumptions

- Voters and committee have true preferences in mind
- The voting rule is a Positional Scoring Rule where the scoring vector (w_1, \ldots, w_m) is a convex sequence of weights and $w_1 = 1$, $w_m = 0$

Framework

 $|N| = n, |A| = m \quad \text{voters, alternatives}$ $v_j = \succ_j \quad \text{real preference order of the voter } j \in N$ $V = \{ \boldsymbol{v} \mid \boldsymbol{v} = (v_1, \dots, v_n) \} \quad \text{set of complete preference profiles}$ $W = \{ \boldsymbol{w} \mid \boldsymbol{w} = (w_1, \dots, w_m) \} \quad \text{set of scoring vectors}$ $s^{\boldsymbol{v}, \boldsymbol{w}}(x) = \sum_{j \in N} w_{v_j(x)} \quad \text{score of alternative } x \text{ under the profile } \boldsymbol{v} \text{ and weights } \boldsymbol{w}$ $\succ_j^p \quad \text{partial preference order of the voter } j \in N$ $C(\succ_j^p) = \{ \succ \mid \succ_j^p \subseteq \succ \} \quad \text{set of possible completions of } \succ_j^p$ $\mathcal{C}_W \quad \text{set of linear constraints given by the committee about } \boldsymbol{w}$

Question Types

Questions to the voters

Comparison queries that ask a particular voter to compare two alternatives

$$a \succ_i b$$
 ?

Questions to the committee

Queries relating the difference between the importance of consecutive ranks r and r+1

$$w_r - w_{r+1} \ge \lambda (w_{r+1} - w_{r+2})$$
 ?

Minimax Regret

Regret
$$\mathbf{v}, \mathbf{w}(x) = \max_{y \in A} s^{\mathbf{v}, \mathbf{w}}(y) - s^{\mathbf{v}, \mathbf{w}}(x)$$

is the regret of selecting x as a winner instead of the optimal alternative under \boldsymbol{v} and \boldsymbol{w} $\mathrm{PMR}^{\boldsymbol{p},W}(x,y) = \max_{\boldsymbol{w} \in W} \max_{\boldsymbol{v} \in C(\boldsymbol{p})} s^{\boldsymbol{v},\boldsymbol{w}}(y) - s^{\boldsymbol{v},\boldsymbol{w}}(x)$


is the worst-case loss of choosing x instead of y

Max regret $MR^{p,W}(x)$ is the worst-case loss of x and the minimal max regret $MR^{p,W}$ is the regret associated to an optimal alternative.

Pairwise Max Regret Computation

The computation of PMR $^{p,W}(x,y)$ can be seen as a game in which an adversary can both:

• complete the partial profile



• choose a feasible weight vector

 $({f 1},{f 0},{f 0})$

Elicitation strategies

A function that, given our partial knowledge so far, returns a question that should be asked.

- **Random**: it decides, with 1/2 probability, whether to ask a question to the voters or to the committee, then it equiprobably draws one among the set of the possible questions;
- Extreme completions: it asks a question to the committee or to the voters depending on which uncertainty contributes the most to the regret;
- **Pessimistic**: it selects the question that leads to minimal regret in the worst case considering, and aggregating, both possible answers to each question;
- Two phase: it asks a predefined, non adaptive sequence of m-2 questions to the committee and then it only asks questions about the voters.

References

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