

Introduction to Cyber Threat Intelligence (CTI)



**By: Sam Mayers
& Bobby Venal**



whoami

- @xprotectszn (or fire)
- [LinkedIn](#)
- Security Researcher
- Sam.mayers.is
- Run 2 nonprofits
 - Physical Security Village (Defcon)
 - ClearSear.ch
- Baking and Hiking



whoami

- @lsl_bobby
- Sam's boss

Who are Beazley Security

- ~4,000 incidents per year
- >50,000 policy holders in 73 countries
- Tens of thousands endpoints monitored
- All 100% focused on reducing risk and increasing cyber resilience
- Located across Americas, Europe, UK, and Asia Pacific





<http://ccsc.c2society.org/>

Agenda

1. Introduction to Cyber Threat Intelligence (CTI)
2. CTI Lifecycle and Intelligence Process
3. Indicators of Compromise and Threat Indicators
4. Threat Actor Profiling
5. Threat Intelligence Platforms
6. Data Enrichment and Correlation in Cyber Threat Intelligence
7. Collaborative Threat Intelligence Sharing
8. Tools
9. Intro to Malware Analysis (if time)

Introduction to Cyber Threat Intelligence (CTI)



Overview of CTI

“Threat information that has been aggregated, transformed, analyzed, interpreted, or enriched to provide the necessary context for decision-making processes.” - NIST



Cyber Threat Intelligence (CTI) is the practice of gathering, analyzing, and sharing information about cyber threats, including their origins, motives, and capabilities. The primary goal of CTI is to provide actionable insights that help organizations understand, anticipate, and respond to cyber threats effectively.

Significance in the Cybersecurity Landscape

- Proactive Defense
- Enhanced Incident Response
- Informed Decision-Making
- Collaboration and Information Sharing
- Importance in the Modern Era

Types of Threat Intelligence

Type	Scope	Audience	Purpose	Examples
Strategic	High-level trends	Executives, policymakers	Long-term planning	Nation-state cyber threats
Tactical	TTPs and adversary methods	SOC analysts, responders	Improve defense mechanisms	Phishing tactics, MITRE ATT&CK mappings
Operational	Campaign-specific insights	Incident response teams	Contextual understanding	Ransomware campaigns targeting healthcare
Technical	Detailed IoCs and artifacts	Analysts, automated tools	Immediate threat mitigation	Malicious IPs, file hashes


Current Threat Landscape:



Current Threat Landscape:




Questions on CTF platform



CTI Lifecycle and Intelligence Process






CTI Lifecycle

Planning


- Identify the organization's intelligence needs, priorities, and goals.
- Establish key questions the intelligence should answer
 - Which threat actors are targeting our industry?



CTI Lifecycle

Collection


- Gathering raw data from relevant sources to answer the intelligence questions defined in the planning stage.
- Tools - VirusTotal, Shodan, GreyNoise, Logs, Recorded Future.



CTI Lifecycle

Processing


- Converting raw data into a standardized, structured format for easier analysis.
- De-duplicate and parse data IoCs.
- Clean, organized, and relevant data ready for analysis.



CTI Lifecycle

Analysis


- Interpreting processed data to derive actionable insights and answer intelligence questions.
- Correlate IoCs with known TTPs or campaigns.
- Identify trends, patterns, and potential threats specific to the organization.



CTI Lifecycle

Dissemination


- Sharing the derived intelligence with relevant stakeholders in a timely and accessible format.
- Generate reports or dashboards tailored to specific audiences.
- Integrate intelligence into detection systems.



Indicators of Compromise and Threat Indicators



Indicators of Compromise (IoCs)



TTPs (Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures)

- **Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures (TTPs)** describe the *how* and *why* behind adversarial behavior:
 - **Tactics:** High-level goals attackers aim to achieve during a campaign.
 - **Techniques:** Specific methods used to accomplish those goals.
 - **Procedures:** Variations or implementations of techniques, tailored to specific environments or objectives.

Mapping TTPs to MITRE ATT&CK

ATT&CK (Adversarial Tactics, Techniques, and Common Knowledge)

- An open framework that documents and categorizes TTPs observed in real-world cyberattacks. It provides a structured knowledge base for understanding, detecting, and responding to adversarial behavior.

Structure of MITRE ATT&CK

- **Tactics:**

- Represent the *why* behind an adversary's action (the goal they aim to achieve at a specific stage of the attack).
- Examples:
 - **Initial Access:** How attackers infiltrate a network.
 - **Persistence:** How attackers maintain their presence after initial compromise.
 - **Privilege Escalation:** How attackers gain higher-level permissions.

Structure of MITRE ATT&CK

- **Techniques:**

- Represent the *how* attackers achieve a specific goal (tactic).
- Examples:
 - **Phishing (T1566)**: Delivering malicious emails to trick users into providing credentials or executing malware.
 - **Credential Dumping (T1003)**: Extracting stored credentials from compromised systems.

Structure of MITRE ATT&CK

- **Sub-Techniques:**

- Provide more granular details about techniques.
- Example:
 - **Spear Phishing Attachment (T1566.001):** Sending a malicious email with an attachment to exploit a vulnerability or trick the user.
 - **Masquerade Task or Service (T1036.004):** Adversaries modify the properties of legitimate tasks or services to disguise malicious activity.

Questions on CTF platform



Threat Actor Profiling



04

A large, stylized number '04' is positioned on the right side of the slide. It is rendered in a thick, dark purple font. Behind the '04', there is an abstract graphic element consisting of several thin, light purple lines that form concentric arcs and radiate outwards from the bottom right corner towards the center.

Threat Actor Profiling

Threat Actor Profiling involves analyzing and documenting the characteristics, motivations, and methodologies of adversaries to better understand their behavior and anticipate their actions.

By profiling threat actors, organizations can develop proactive defenses and tailor their incident response strategies.

Building Threat Actor Profiles

- **Identity:**

- Known aliases and group names.
- Example:
 - **APT29 (Cozy Bear)**
 - **FIN7**

- **Motivations:**

- Why the actor conducts attacks.
- Examples:
 - **Financial gain** (cybercriminal groups like FIN7).
 - **Espionage** (state-sponsored groups like APT28).
 - **Hacktivism** (groups like Anonymous).
 - **Terrorism** (groups leveraging attacks to instill fear).

Building Threat Actor Profiles

- **Objectives:**
 - Typical targets and goals.
 - Examples:
 - Stealing intellectual property or government secrets.
 - Disrupting critical infrastructure.
 - Deploying ransomware for financial extortion.
- **Methodologies (TTPs):**
 - How the actor operates, including tactics, techniques, and procedures (TTPs).
 - Use frameworks like **MITRE ATT&CK** to categorize:
 - Initial access (e.g., phishing).
 - Persistence (e.g., creating scheduled tasks).
 - Exfiltration (e.g., data compression and transfer).

Building Threat Actor Profiles

- **Tools:**

- Malware, exploits, and frameworks used.
- Examples:
 - Cobalt Strike
 - Mimikatz
 - Custom-built malware like Drovorub.

- **Infrastructure:**

- Command-and-Control (C2) servers, domains, IP addresses.
- Examples:
 - Domain names registered to impersonate legitimate organizations.

Building Threat Actor Profiles

- **Geopolitical Context:**

- State-sponsored actors often align their campaigns with national interests.
- Example:
 - APT41, a Chinese group, blends espionage and cybercrime.

- **Known Campaigns:**

- Past attack campaigns, including victims and methods used.
- Example:
 - NotPetya ransomware by Russian actors targeting Ukraine.

Threat Intelligence Platforms (TIPs)



Threat Intelligence Platforms (TIPs)

- Threat Intelligence Platforms (TIPs) are centralized systems designed to collect, process, analyze, and share threat intelligence data.
- These platforms help security teams manage Indicators of Compromise (IoCs), correlate threat data, and automate intelligence workflows.

Why Use TIPs?

- **Centralized threat intelligence management**
 - Store and analyze IoCs in one place.
- **Collaboration and sharing**
 - Enable information sharing among organizations, ISACs, and security communities.
- **Automation**
 - Integrate with Security Information and Event Management (SIEM) systems, Endpoint Detection and Response (EDR), and Security Orchestration, Automation, and Response (SOAR) solutions.
- **Threat correlation**
 - Identify patterns and relationships between different threats.

Popular Threat Intelligence Platforms

- **MISP (Malware Information Sharing Platform)**
 - Open-source platform widely used by government agencies, CSIRTs, and enterprises.
 - Supports STIX/TAXII for structured threat intelligence sharing.
 - Features event-based organization, correlation, and visualization of IoCs.

Malicious activities

Event ID: 10878 | Uuid: 5a6c700c-0eb8-468a-9f2d-000000000000 | Org: CIRCL | Owner org: CIRCL | Contributors: alexandre.dulaunoy@circl.lu | Date: 2018-05-04 | Threat Level: Low | Analysis: Initial | Distribution: All communities | Info: Malicious activities | Published: No | #Attributes: 2 | Last change: 2018/05/04 02:38:12 | Extends: | Extended by: | Sightings: 0 (0) | Activity: | Pivots: Galaxy + Event graph + Correlation | 10878: Malici...

Distribution graph [atomic event]

Your organisation only This community only
Connected communities All communities
Sharing group

checkboxes: All, Attributes, Object attributes

checkboxes: Your organisation only, Connected communities, This community only, All communities

checkboxes: Sharing group, Event not distributed to any sharing group

Event Graph

UI elements: sics, Display, Filters, Threat Level (Low), Analysis (Initial), Event Info (Ransomware found on a production server), Extends event (5ad8687b-0e10-4a8b-a157-46a5950d210f), Matched event (id: 10728, Analysis: Completed, Threat level: Low, Tags: cirt:osint-feed, tip:white, malware_classification:malware-category="Ransomware", osint:source-type="blog-post", misp-galaxy:ransomware="CSGO Ransomware", misp-galaxy:ransomware="MC Ransomware"), Info: OSINT - Minecraft & CS:GO Ransomware Strive For Media Attention.

estimative-language:confidence-in-analytic-judgment="high"

High

Minimal corroborated information from known sources. Minimal assumptions. Strong logical inferences and methods. No explicit proof.

View Dashboard

- Add Widget
- Import Config JSON
- Export Config JSON
- Save Dashboard Config
- List Dashboard Templates

Authentication Failure Data

User	Count
admin	313
test	180
ks365908	146
kimsufi	141
user	131
postgres	123
ubuntu	109
oracle	81
git	72
deploy	69
ftpuser	68
nagios	60
mysql	49
support	39
111111	38
guest	38
testuser	36

Authentication Failure Data

IP Address	Count
45.141.86.157	357
192.241.175.115	287
162.243.169.176	261
31.184.199.114	180
52.188.40.7	157
185.153.196.230	78
92.246.76.177	67
13.67.32.172	64
159.89.201.59	58
121.241.244.92	57
64.225.58.236	56
118.25.10.238	52
175.107.198.23	52
106.52.251.24	50
54.37.159.12	48
123.206.90.149	48
192.241.155.88	47

Achievements of my organization

Achievements Unlocked!

- Congratulations, you have shared your first event!
- You have been using tags, good job!
- Taxonomies have been used in your events.
- Galaxies have no secrets for you in this Threat Sharing universe.

Next on your list:

Popular Threat Intelligence Platforms

- **OpenCTI (Open Cyber Threat Intelligence Platform)**
 - Designed for strategic, operational, and technical threat intelligence management.
 - Supports structured data ingestion, visualization, and integration with other security tools.
 - Includes TTP mapping and attack campaign tracking.




Key Frameworks in CTI

- **MITRE ATT&CK**
 - A globally accessible knowledge base that categorizes adversary tactics, techniques, and procedures (TTPs).
- **Use Cases**
 - Threat hunting and detection.
 - Mapping adversary behavior to defensive controls.
 - Aligning intelligence reports with structured attack techniques.

Key Frameworks in CTI

- **Cyber Kill Chain (Lockheed Martin)**
 - A step-by-step model describing the stages of a cyber attack.
- **Stages:**
 - Reconnaissance: Gathering information about the target.
 - Weaponization: Creating malicious payloads.
 - Delivery: Transmitting malware (e.g., phishing, drive-by downloads).
 - Exploitation: Executing malicious code on the victim system.
 - Installation: Establishing persistence (e.g., backdoors, rootkits).
 - Command and Control (C2): Enabling remote control of the compromised system.
 - Actions on Objectives: Exfiltration, lateral movement, destruction.
- **Use Cases:**
 - Helps organizations understand attack progression.
 - Aids in designing security controls for each phase.

Data Enrichment and Correlation in Cyber Threat Intelligence



What is Data Enrichment?

- Data enrichment is the process of adding additional context to raw Indicators of Compromise (IoCs) to make them more actionable.
- It transforms basic IoCs (e.g., an IP address) into intelligence by associating them with threat actors, campaigns, timestamps, and historical data.

Why is Data Enrichment Important?

- Reduces false positives
 - Adds context to determine if an IoC is truly malicious.
- Speeds up investigations
 - Provides relevant historical and attributional data.
- Improves detection and response
 - Helps analysts make informed decisions.
- Enhances threat hunting
 - Identifies patterns that could indicate broader campaigns.

Key Data Enrichment Techniques

- **Reputation Lookups**

- Checking IoCs against public and commercial Threat Intelligence Feeds.
- Sources: VirusTotal, GreyNoise, Recorded Future.
- Example:
 - Checking if an IP (45.156.23.12) has been reported as a C2 server.

- **Historical Data Analysis**

- Reviewing how an IoC was used in previous attacks.
- Example:
 - Finding that a file hash was previously linked to TrickBot malware.

Key Data Enrichment Techniques

- **Attribution and Actor Mapping**

- Linking IoCs to threat actor profiles and known campaigns.
- Example:
 - A domain was used in a phishing campaign by APT29 (Cozy Bear).

- **Geo-Location and ASN Analysis**

- Identifying the location and hosting provider of an IP.
- Example:
 - An IP traced to a data center in Russia raises suspicion.

Key Data Enrichment Techniques

- **Passive DNS & WHOIS Data**

- Analyzing past DNS resolutions to identify changes in domains.
- Example:
 - Discovering that a phishing domain recently changed ownership.

- **Behavioral Analysis**

- Examining malware execution behavior via sandboxing.
- Example:
 - A file hash was observed dropping a keylogger in a sandbox.

What is Data Correlation in CTI?

- Correlation links multiple IoCs and threat intelligence sources to uncover relationships and broader attack campaigns.
- It helps analysts detect patterns, link incidents, and assess risk.

Key Correlation Techniques

- **TTP-Based Correlation (MITRE ATT&CK)**
 - Identifying if multiple IoCs map to the same TTPs.
 - Example:
 - An IP flagged in multiple Initial Access (T1566) phishing campaigns.
- **Temporal Correlation**
 - Checking if IoCs appear in multiple incidents over time.
 - Example:
 - An IP involved in Emotet infections in 2022 reappears in 2024.

Key Correlation Techniques

- **Infrastructure Linkage**

- Connecting different IoCs that use shared hosting, domains, or IPs.
- Example:
 - Two phishing domains registered with the same email address.

- **Campaign-Based Correlation**

- Associating IoCs with known malware families and APT groups.
- Example:
 - A newly discovered malware sample has a 40% code similarity to a Lazarus Group implant.

Collaborative Threat Intelligence Sharing



Why is Threat Intelligence Sharing Important?

- Threat actors operate in coordinated networks, leveraging shared tools, exploits, and infrastructure.
- To counter these threats effectively, cybersecurity defenders must also collaborate.
- Threat intelligence sharing enables organizations to:
 - **Enhance detection and response**
 - Sharing IoCs and TTPs enables early detection of emerging threats.
 - **Reduce attack surface**
 - Organizations can proactively block **malicious domains, IPs, and malware** identified by others
 - **Strengthen community defense**
 - Public and private sector collaboration improves security for everyone.

Threat Intelligence Collaboration

- ISACs (Information Sharing and Analysis Centers)
 - Industry-specific groups (e.g., FS-ISAC for financial institutions) that share threat data.
- Public-Private Partnerships (PPP)
 - Governments, CERTs (Computer Emergency Response Teams), and private companies collaborate to fight cybercrime.
- Platforms like MISP and OpenCTI
 - Enable real-time sharing and correlation of threat data.

Structured Threat Information Expression and Transport

- **STIX (Structured Threat Information Expression)**

- A standardized format for representing cyber threat intelligence, including IoCs, TTPs, and threat actor details.
- Enables machine-readable threat intelligence that can be processed automatically.



STIX IoC Example

```
{  
  "type": "indicator",  
  "id": "indicator--aab123cd-45ef-6789-001a-bcdefg23456",  
  "pattern": "[ipv4-addr:value = '192.168.1.100']",  
  "created": "2024-02-06T12:34:56.000Z",  
  "labels": ["malicious-activity"]  
}
```

<https://oasis-open.github.io/cti-documentation/stix/examples.html>



Structured Threat Information Expression and Transport

- **TAXII (Trusted Automated Exchange of Intelligence Information)**
 - A transport mechanism that allows sharing of STIX-formatted intelligence securely and efficiently.
 - Used to distribute threat intelligence between organizations, SOCs, and TIPs.



Traffic Light Protocol

- The Traffic Light Protocol (TLP) is a simple yet widely used information classification system designed to facilitate controlled threat intelligence sharing among trusted parties.
- Why is TLP Important?
 - Prevents overexposure of sensitive threat intelligence.
 - Ensures that only authorized individuals or groups receive certain information.
 - Encourages collaboration by setting clear rules on data sharing.
 - Helps maintain trust among cybersecurity communities, ISACs, and organizations.

Traffic Light Protocol

- TLP:WHITE – Unrestricted/Public Sharing
 - Purpose
 - Information that can be freely shared without any restrictions.
 - Who Can Receive It?
 - Anyone, including the general public, media, and external organizations.
 - How Should It Be Handled?
 - Can be published on websites, in blogs, security reports, and social media.
 - No special precautions needed.
 - Examples:
 - Cybersecurity awareness materials (e.g., how to recognize phishing).
 - Public reports on ransomware trends by security vendors (e.g., CrowdStrike, Mandiant).
 - Vulnerability advisories published by security researchers.

Traffic Light Protocol

- TLP:GREEN – Community-Wide Sharing
 - Purpose
 - For broader but still controlled sharing within trusted groups, industries, or ISACs.
 - Who Can Receive It?
 - Any trusted community members, cybersecurity professionals, ISAC participants.
 - How Should It Be Handled?
 - Can be shared within organizations and partner organizations, but not publicly.
 - Can be used in training, security briefings, and industry collaboration.
 - Examples:
 - A new phishing campaign targeting the finance sector.
 - Threat actor TTPs seen in multiple industries.
 - Security best practices to counter a new exploit.

Traffic Light Protocol

- TLP:AMBER – Limited Sharing
 - Purpose
 - For use within the recipient's organization or specific trusted communities.
 - Who Can Receive It?
 - Internal teams, partners, or trusted vendors.
 - The information should only be shared with those who need to know.
 - How Should It Be Handled?
 - Recipients can share within their organization but not externally.
 - Example restriction
 - "TLP:AMBER – Only for XYZ Security Team Use."
 - Examples:
 - Malware analysis reports affecting company systems.
 - A list of malicious IPs and domains targeting your industry.


Traffic Light Protocol

- TLP:AMBER+STRICT – Restricted Internal Sharing
 - Purpose
 - A sub-classification of TLP:AMBER that restricts sharing within specific internal teams only.
 - Who Can Receive It?
 - Only the named individuals or internal security teams.
 - Sharing beyond the defined group requires explicit permission.
 - How Should It Be Handled?
 - Must be explicitly labeled as TLP:AMBER+STRICT.
 - No automatic forwarding or distribution within the organization.
 - Examples:
 - Ongoing security incident response details that should not be broadly shared.
 - Threat intelligence that includes sensitive business or operational data.
 - Active vulnerability exploitation details that, if mishandled, could pose a risk to security operations.

Traffic Light Protocol

- TLP:RED – Most Restricted
 - Purpose
 - Strictly confidential information that, if leaked, could cause severe damage to individuals, organizations, or national security.
 - Who Can Receive It?
 - Only the intended recipients (e.g., security teams, senior executives).
 - How Should It Be Handled?
 - Do NOT share outside the specified group.
 - No email forwarding, public discussion, or inclusion in reports unless explicitly authorized.
 - Examples:
 - A zero-day vulnerability found in critical infrastructure.
 - Nation-state cyber attack intelligence impacting national security.
 - Ongoing law enforcement cybercrime investigations.

Questions on CTF platform



Tools



08

VirusTotal (VT)

- VirusTotal (VT) is a popular cloud-based malware detection and analysis platform, acquired by Google in 2012 and now operated by Google Cloud.
- It allows users to analyze suspicious files, URLs, domains, and IP addresses by scanning them against multiple antivirus engines, URL scanners, and threat intelligence feeds.
- The platform provides real-time insights into malicious activity, enabling security analysts, incident responders, and researchers to identify and respond to potential threats effectively.


VirusTotal (VT)

- VirusTotal's Core Functions:
 - File analysis
 - Submit files to be scanned by over 70 antivirus engines.
 - URL scanning
 - Analyze URLs for potential phishing sites or malicious content.
 - Domain and IP reputation
 - Investigate domains and IPs for malicious behavior.
 - Threat hunting
 - Identify patterns, relationships, and malicious artifacts across datasets.
 - API integration
 - Automate threat intelligence collection and integration into other security platforms.

VirusTotal (VT)

- VirusTotal Web Interface
- VirusTotal Community
- VirusTotal Graph
- VirusTotal Intelligence
- VirusTotal API

The screenshot shows the VirusTotal web interface. At the top is the logo 'VIRUSTOTAL' with the tagline 'Analyze suspicious files and URLs to detect types of malware, automatically share them with the security community.' Below this are three tabs: 'FILE' (which is selected), 'URL', and 'SEARCH'. Under the 'FILE' tab, there is a file upload icon with a fingerprint pattern. A 'Choose file' button is visible. Below the tabs, a note states: 'By submitting data below, you are agreeing to our Terms of Service and Privacy Policy, and to the sharing of your Sample submission with the security community. Please do not submit any personal information; VirusTotal is not responsible for the contents of your submission. Learn more.' At the bottom of the form area, there is a link: 'Want to automate submissions? Check our API, free quota grants available for new file uploads'.



This screenshot shows the 'COMMUNITY' tab of the VirusTotal interface. At the top, there are tabs for 'DETECTION', 'DETAILS', 'RELATIONS', 'BEHAVIOR', and 'COMMUNITY' (which is highlighted). Below the tabs, it says 'Contained In Collections (3)'. There are three items listed under 'Summary':

- Batloader Malware Abuses Legitimate Tools Uses Obfuscated JavaScript Files in Q4 2022 Attacks (Updated 2 months ago by AlienVaultOTX)
Batloader (detected by Trend Micro as Trojan.Win32.BATLOADER), is an initial access malware family that is known for using malvertising techniques and using script-based malware inside Mic...
Files: 14 Domains: 17
- CRYYSIS AKA DHARMA RANSOMWARE (Updated 1 month ago by stonycva)
NetAssist Threat Research Team discovered a new ransomware which encrypts files and demands payments which is Dharma Ransomware. This type of malware spread through phishing ema...
Files: 87 URLs: 14 Domains: 44 IPs: 13
- BatLoader campaign demonstrates installation method evolution (Updated 2 months ago by ClauAlex)
BatLoader campaign demonstrates installation method evolution
Files: 14 Domains: 19

On the right side of the screen, there is a column labeled 'Activity' which lists various user actions and metrics.

VirusTotal (VT)

VirusTotal Analysis Process

- **File Scanning**
- **Behavioral Analysis (Dynamic Analysis)**
- **Static Analysis**
- **Network Indicators**
- **Correlation & Relationship Analysis**

Questions on CTF platform



Shodan

- Shodan is a specialized search engine designed to discover internet-connected devices.
- Unlike traditional search engines like Google that index websites, Shodan indexes devices, services, and systems exposed to the internet.
- It is often referred to as the "Google for Hackers" because of its ability to identify vulnerable devices and provide detailed insights into internet-facing systems.

What Can Shodan Find?

- Shodan scans the internet and indexes metadata from devices and services across various protocols.
- Examples of devices Shodan can find:
 - Servers and Routers
 - IoT devices (CCTV cameras, smart TVs, baby monitors, thermostats)
 - Industrial Control Systems (ICS) (SCADA systems, power grids, water treatment plants)
 - Databases (MongoDB, Elasticsearch, PostgreSQL)
 - Web Applications (public websites, development environments)
 - Network Infrastructure (firewalls, VPN gateways)

How Does Shodan Work?

- **Service Banner Collection**

- For each discovered device, Shodan captures **banner information** exposed by network services. Banners contain metadata such as:
 - **Service name and version** (e.g., Apache 2.4.29)
 - **Operating system and software fingerprints**
 - **SSL/TLS certificates**
 - **Device manufacturer details**

- **Data Indexing**

- The collected data is indexed into **Shodan's searchable database**. Users can query this data to **find devices by IP, location, software version, or open ports**.

How Does Shodan Work?

- **Internet-Wide Scanning**

- Shodan scans the **entire IPv4 address space** across multiple ports and protocols, such as:
 - **HTTP (80/443)** – Web servers
 - **SSH (22)** – Remote access services
 - **RDP (3389)** – Remote desktop access
 - **FTP (21)** – File transfer servers
- **ICS Protocols (502/44818)**

ANY.RUN

- ANY.RUN is an interactive malware analysis platform that provides real-time insights into malicious files, URLs, and network activity.
- Unlike many other malware sandboxes that run analyses in a fully automated, passive environment, ANY.RUN is interactive, allowing users to manually interact with the malware during execution.
- ANY.RUN is widely used by:
 - Cybersecurity researchers for dynamic malware analysis.
 - Incident responders for investigating suspicious files or URLs.
 - Threat intelligence analysts for tracking malware families.

Key Features of ANY.RUN

- Interactive Malware Analysis
 - Run suspicious files in a virtual machine (VM) with interactive control.
 - Manually click buttons, enter text, open files, and browse to observe malware behavior.
- Real-Time Process Tree Visualization
 - Displays a dynamic process tree showing parent-child relationships.
 - Processes are color-coded based on behavior:
 - Benign operations.
 - Suspicious activities.
 - Malicious behaviors (e.g., code injection, persistence mechanisms).

Key Features of ANY.RUN

- Network Traffic Analysis

- Captures live network traffic for in-depth command-and-control (C2) communication analysis.
- Displays:
 - DNS requests
 - HTTP/HTTPS traffic
 - TCP/UDP connections
 - SSL/TLS certificates

- File System Activity Monitoring

- Tracks file creation, modification, deletion, and exfiltration.
- Monitors:
 - Registry modifications.
 - Dropped files and payloads.

Key Features of ANY.RUN

- Interactive Command Execution Analysis
 - Track PowerShell, CMD, and bash command execution.
 - Identify encoded commands often used to obfuscate malicious intent.
 - De-obfuscates Base64-encoded PowerShell scripts automatically.
- MITRE ATT&CK Mapping
 - Maps observed tactics, techniques, and procedures (TTPs) to the MITRE ATT&CK framework.
 - Helps analysts understand attacker behavior and potential goals.
- YARA Rule Integration
 - Apply custom YARA rules to detect malware patterns in real-time.
 - Helps in identifying new variants of known malware families.

Key Features of ANY.RUN

- Browser Interaction Simulation
 - Analyze malicious websites and web-based attacks (e.g., phishing, watering hole attacks).
 - Simulate browser-based interactions to reveal redirect chains, malicious scripts, and exploit kits.

ANY.RUN

- ANY.RUN supports analyzing the following file types:
 - Executable files: .exe, .dll, .sys.
 - Scripts: .bat, .cmd, .ps1, .vbs.
 - Archives: .zip, .rar, .7z.
 - Documents: .docx, .xlsx, .pdf (often used for macro-based attacks).
 - Email files: .eml, .msg for analyzing phishing campaigns.
 - URLs & Domains: Analyze malicious websites or C2 endpoints.

The image shows a Windows desktop environment with several open windows:

- Browser Window:** A Google Chrome window displaying the Google homepage.
- Task Manager:** A standard Windows Task Manager showing processes like WScript.exe, PicturesViewer.exe, and cmd.exe.
- Network Traffic Analysis:** A tool like NetworkMiner or Wireshark showing a list of HTTP requests and their details, including headers, process names, URLs, and content sizes.
- Malicious Activity Monitor:** A specialized tool showing a timeline of malicious activity. It highlights a file named "Null_Removed.vbs" with MD5 hash AD290E9270BB6B179F79E813256296CF, starting at 12.05.2020, 18:58. It lists indicators (trojan, opendir, loader, qbot) and provides options to get a sample, export, etc.

Abuse.ch

- Abuse.ch is a non-profit cybersecurity project dedicated to tracking and disrupting malicious activities on the internet.
- Abuse.ch provides free access to threat intelligence about malware, botnets, phishing, ransomware infrastructure, and malicious domains.
- The platform is widely recognized for its community-driven approach and collaboration with international security teams.
- It helps defenders identify, block, and mitigate cyber threats by sharing real-time indicators of compromise (IoCs).


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"To make the internet safer by providing actionable threat intelligence to everyone... for free."

Abuse.ch

- URLhaus (URL-based Malware Tracking)
 - URLhaus tracks URLs used for distributing malware.
 - Key Features:
 - Real-time tracking of malware distribution sites.
 - Community-driven platform—researchers worldwide report malicious URLs.
 - Provides public and API access to the latest malware-hosting domains.



Sharing malicious URLs being used for malware distribution

Abuse.ch

- MalwareBazaar (Malware Sample Exchange)
 - MalwareBazaar is a community-driven repository for malware samples. Security researchers use it to share, analyze, and categorize malware binaries.
 - Key Features:
 - Searchable malware database by hash (MD5/SHA256), YARA rules, file type, or malware family.
 - Malware samples tagged with malware family names (e.g., Emotet, TrickBot, QakBot).
 - AI-assisted malware tagging to automatically classify new malware variants.



Sharing newly observed malware samples

Abuse.ch

- ThreatFox (Open Threat Intelligence Platform)
 - ThreatFox is an open-source platform for sharing and accessing IoCs related to malware, phishing, and C2 infrastructure.
 - Key Features:
 - Track IoCs by malware family (e.g., Redline Stealer, QakBot, Remcos RAT).
 - Supports TLP classifications (e.g., TLP:WHITE for public sharing).
 - STIX and MISP export formats for easy integration with security tools.



Sharing indicators of compromise (IOCs) associated with malware.

Abuse.ch

- Feodo Tracker (Banking Trojan Tracking)
 - Feodo Tracker focuses on tracking malware families associated with banking trojans, such as:
 - Dridex
 - TrickBot
 - Emotet
 - QakBot (Qbot)
 - Key Features:
 - Monitors Command & Control (C2) servers for active banking trojans.
 - Provides real-time blocklists for security teams to blacklist C2 infrastructure.
 - Supports C2 tracking by malware family.



Used to track servers of prolific C2s - since Operation Endgame, this dataset is empty

Abuse.ch


- **SSLBL (SSL Blacklist)**
 - SSLBL tracks malicious SSL/TLS certificates used by malware campaigns.
 - Key Features:
 - Monitors malicious certificates associated with phishing, malware delivery, and C2 servers.
 - Tracks TLS fingerprint anomalies (JA3 and JA3S hashes).
 - Provides lists of malicious certificates for firewall and proxy integration.



Sharing blocklist data for malicious SSL certificates and JA3/JA3s fingerprints

Abuse.ch

- YARAify (YARA Rule-Based Malware Detection)
 - YARAify is a malware analysis platform by Abuse.ch that uses YARA rules to detect, classify, and contextualize malicious files.
 - Key Features:
 - Automated Malware Detection: Uses community-contributed and Abuse.ch-defined YARA rules.
 - Multiple Submission Methods: Submit files, URLs, or hashes (MD5, SHA1, SHA256) via the web interface or API.



A large repository of YARA rules to identify and classify malware - use to share rules, hunt, and scan

Intro to Malware Analysis


09





Agenda



Tools covered



PE file structure



Exercise / Q&A Break

Q : Using HxD, can you find a URL?

A : Offset 0x5770

Offset(h)	Hex	Decoded text
000056A0	6F 00 6F 00 74 00 25 00 5C 00 73 00 79 00 73 00	o.o.t.%.\s.y.s.
000056B0	74 00 65 00 6D 00 33 00 32 00 5C 00 6D 00 73 00	t.e.m.3.2.\m.s.
000056C0	69 00 65 00 78 00 65 00 63 00 2E 00 65 00 78 00	i.e.x.e.c...e.x.
000056D0	65 00 00 00 2E 72 65 6C 6F 63 00 00 00 00 00 00	e....reloc.....
000056E0	25 00 53 00 79 00 73 00 74 00 65 00 6D 00 52 00	%.S.y.s.t.e.m.R.
000056F0	6F 00 6F 00 74 00 25 00 5C 00 73 00 79 00 73 00	o.o.t.%.\s.y.s.
00005700	74 00 65 00 6D 00 33 00 32 00 5C 00 61 00 75 00	t.e.m.3.2.\a.u.
00005710	64 00 69 00 6F 00 64 00 67 00 2E 00 65 00 78 00	d.i.o.d.g...e.x.
00005720	65 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 4E 74 55 6E 6D 61 70 56	e.....NtUnmapV
00005730	69 65 77 4F 66 53 65 63 74 69 6F 6E 00 00 00 00	iewOfSection...
00005740	52 65 66 6C 65 63 74 69 76 65 4C 6F 61 64 65 72	ReflectiveLoader
00005750	00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00
00005760	44 69 61 6D 6F 74 72 69 78 65 73 00 00 00 00 00	Diamotrixes.....
00005770	68 00 74 00 74 00 70 00 3A 00 2F 00 2F 00 31 00	h.t.t.p://./1.
00005780	37 00 36 00 2E 00 31 00 31 00 33 00 2E 00 31 00	7.6...1.1.3...1.
00005790	31 00 35 00 2E 00 31 00 34 00 39 00 2F 00 62 00	1.5...1.4.9./.b.
000057A0	69 00 6E 00 2F 00 62 00 6F 00 74 00 36 00 34 00	i.n./.b.o.t.6.4.
000057B0	2E 00 62 00 69 00 6E 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00	..b.i.n.....
000057C0	68 00 74 00 74 00 70 00 3A 00 2F 00 2F 00 31 00	h.t.t.p://./1.
000057D0	37 00 36 00 2E 00 31 00 31 00 33 00 2E 00 31 00	7.6...1.1.3...1.
000057E0	31 00 35 00 2E 00 31 00 34 00 39 00 2F 00 62 00	1.5...1.4.9./.b.
000057F0	69 00 6E 00 2F 00 62 00 6F 00 74 00 36 00 34 00	i.n./.b.o.t.6.4.
00005800	2E 00 62 00 69 00 6E 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00	..b.i.n.....
00005810	50 00 72 00 6F 00 63 00 65 00 73 00 73 00 48 00	P.r.o.c.e.s.s.H.
00005820	61 00 63 00 6B 00 65 00 72 00 2E 00 65 00 78 00	a.c.k.e.r...e.x.
00005830	65 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 70 00 72 00 6F 00 63 00	e.....p.r.o.c.
00005840	65 00 78 00 70 00 2E 00 65 00 78 00 65 00 00 00	e.x.p...e.x.e...

Re

HURRICANE
INTERNET176.113

Quick Links

- BGP Toolkit Home
- BGP Prefix Report
- BGP Peer Report
- Super Traceroute
- Super Looking Glass

As we continue to monitor the cyber war in Ukraine, we are seeing some interesting trends. Not only are criminals using automated tools to scan for vulnerabilities, but they are also using specific individuals as targets. For example, some actors go after specific individuals, while others target entire organizations. At least an educated guess at the type of vulnerability being exploited.



ANY.RUN

<https://any.run/report> :

Malware analysis Diamotrix.exe Malicious activity

No malicious indicators. SUSPICIOUS. Starts a Microsoft application from unusual location.
Diamotrix.exe (PID: 6664). Payload loading activity detected.

<http://176.113.115.149/bin/bot64.bin> ...

176.113.115.149:80. Request. GET /bin/bot64.bin HTTP/1.1 ...

WORLDWIDE IP



FortiGuard Labs

<https://fortiguard.fortinet.com/encyclopedia/ips/> :

Diamotrix.Clipper.Botnet - Intrusion Prevention | FortiGuard Labs

Sep 17, 2024 — **Diamotrix Clipper** is an infostealer malware that targets crypto currency wallets. It can replace a victim's crypto wallet address in clipboard ...



MalwareBazaar | Malware sample exchange



<https://bazaar.abuse.ch/browse/tag/Diamotrix> :

MalwareBazaar | Diamotrix - Abuse.ch


The page below gives you an overview on malware samples that are tagged with Diamotrix . Database Entry. Tag: Diamotrix. Alert. Create hunting rule.

bot64.bin]

PE file structure : CFF Explorer




PE file structure : Sections



- .data – initialized data
- .rdata – read-only initialized data
- .rsrc – resource directory (“files” a program needs)
- .text – executable code

Static Analysis : Disassembly

- The .text section
- Actual CPU instructions
- Hex values <-> CPU operations




Static Analysis : Disassembly – IDAPro

Offset(h)	00	01	02	03	04	05	06	07	08	09	0A	0B	0C	0D	0E	0F	Decoded text
00002820	54	24	08	8B	44	02	0C	48	8B	54	24	08	03	44	0A	10	T\$..<..HxT\$..D..
00002830	39	44	24	30	73	2C	0F	B7	04	24	48	6B	0C	28	48	8B	9D\$0\$..,\$HK@(H
00002840	4C	24	08	8B	44	01	0C	8B	4C	24	30	2B	8B	C1	0F	LS..D..,(L\$0+ÉA·	
00002850	B7	0C	24	48	6B	C9	28	48	8B	54	24	08	03	44	0A	14	,\$HK@(HxT\$..D..
00002860	EB	07	E9	74	FF	FF	FF	33	CO	48	83	C4	28	C3	CC	CC	é.étyvý3AH@A(Áii
00002870	48	83	EC	4B	B9	E9	03	00	FF	15	31	3E	00	00	C6	HfH@^é..éy.y.1>..z	
00002880	44	24	30	00	E8	07	01	00	00	8C	CO	74	05	C6	44	24	D\$0.é...Át..ED\$
00002890	30	01	0F	B6	44	24	30	85	CO	75	79	B9	58	1B	00	00	0..,GD\$0.ÁuyX..
000028A0	FF	15	0A	3E	00	00	48	C7	44	24	28	00	00	00	0C	y..>..HCDS(....ç	
000028B0	44	24	20	00	00	00	45	C3	89	4C	8D	05	F7	00	00	DS...ESEL..-.	
000028C0	00	33	DC	33	CF	15	0F	0D	3C	00	00	48	89	44	24	38..30\$ÉY..<-.HwD\$0	
000028D0	48	83	7C	24	38	05	74	03	32	CO	EB	3C	BA	FF	FF	Hf!\$8..2A<é..yy	
000028E0	FF	48	8B	4C	24	38	FF	15	E4	3A	3B	00	00	48	8B	4C	yhN\$8..y..,HwL\$0
000028F0	38	FF	15	B9	3B	00	E8	94	00	00	00	85	CO	74	07	8y..>..é..Át..	
00002900	C6	44	24	31	01	E8	05	C6	44	24	31	00	8A	44	24	31..ED\$0..ED\$1..SD\$1	
00002910	88	44	24	30	8A	44	24	30	88	C4	83	C4	8C	CC	CC	“D\$0\$S0\$OH@AH@II	
00002920	CC	CC	CC	BC	89	44	24	08	48	83	EC	38	4C	8B	44	iiiiHwL\$0.Hf1\$8..D	
00002930	24	40	33	D2	33	C9	FF	15	84	3B	00	00	48	89	44	24	30\$ÉY..<-.HwD\$0
00002940	28	48	83	7C	24	28	00	75	04	33	CO	EB	36	FF	15	(Hf!\$9..u.i\$é6y.U	
00002950	3B	00	00	0D	B7	00	00	00	75	02	C7	44	24	20	01	00	..=..”..u.CDS..
00002960	00	00	00	EB	08	C7	44	24	20	00	00	00	8B	44	24	20..,é..CDS...D..	
00002970	89	44	24	24	48	8B	44	24	24	15	31	3B	00	00	8B	tD\$0\$HLS(y..1..<	
00002980	44	24	24	18	14	38	C3	CC	CC	00	00	00	8C	CC	CC	GD\$0\$HfA@iiiiiiiiii	
00002990	48	83	EC	4B	8D	05	C5	2D	00	00	48	83	EC	44	24	Hf1\$8..Á..,HwD\$0	
000029A0	48	8B	4C	24	20	E8	7A	FF	FF	48	83	C4	34	33	CC	H@L\$ézzyyH@A\$@	
000029B0	CC	CC	CC	CC	CC	CC	4C	88	49	4C	24	08	48	EC	45	iiiiiiHwL\$0.Hf1\$8..	
000029C0	44	18	C7	44	24	28	00	00	00	C7	44	24	20	00	00	HHCD\$0..	
000029D0	00	00	48	C7	44	24	30	00	00	00	00	4C	8D	44	24	..,H\$0\$D..L..D\$0	
000029E0	88	1D	85	2D	00	00	48	8D	00	D2	00	00	E8	85	1D	H..H..H..0..-é..é	
000029F0	E6	FF	4F	88	49	44	24	28	48	83	7C	24	28	00	75	07..yHwD\$0(Hf!\$9..u.	
00002A00	33	C9	E9	B6	00	00	00	8B	44	24	20	41	B0	AA	8B	D\$0\$HfA@iiiiiiiiiiiiiiii	
00002A10	48	8B	4C	24	28	E8	82	06	00	00	E8	F1	08	00	00	44..H@L\$ézzyyH@A\$@..	
00002A20	8B	CO	33	D2	B5	3A	04	00	00	FF	15	E9	3A	00	00	48..,A\$0\$..y..é..H..	
00002A30	89	44	24	30	83	G3	7C	24	30	00	75	LA	FF	15	OE	tD\$0\$Hf1\$8..u.y..	
00002A40	00	00	4C	88	44	24	28	33	D2	48	8B	CF	15	76	3D	..,L..D\$0(Hk\$0..é..v..	
00002A50	00	00	00	33	CO	67	45	33	C9	44	8B	44	24	20	48..,s@eG3E\$D6\$H\$0		
00002A60	54	44	28	48	8B	4C	24	30	E8	37	FB	FF	FF	48	2D	T\$..(H\$0\$é7QyyH..A..	
00002A70	75	14	48	8B	4C	24	30	FF	15	33	3A	00	00	FF	CD	u\$H\$L\$0\$Qy..3..y..i..	
00002A80	39	00	00	4C	88	44	24	28	33	D2	48	8B	CB	15	35	9..L..D\$0(Hk\$0..é..v..	
00002A90	3A	00	00	50	EB	26	48	8B	4C	24	30	15	OE	3A	..,3@e\$H\$L\$0\$Qy..		
00002AA0	00	00	FF	15	AC	14	38	7C	24	28	33	D2	48	..,é..y..9..L..D\$0(Hk\$0..é..v..			
00002AB0	88	C8	FB	15	10	3A	00	00	B8	01	00	00	48..,é..y..9..L..D\$0(Hk\$0..é..v..				
00002AC0	48	C3	CC	CC	CC	CC	4C	88	49	4C	24	08	48	83	EC	“H@iiiiiiHwL\$0.Hf1\$8..	
00002AD0	38	33	CO	83	F8	01	00	84	E1	00	00	00	C7	44	24	20..,s@eG3E\$D6\$H\$0..	
00002AE0	00	00	00	00	44	8B	0D	71	3D	00	00	4C	8B	05	6E	..,D..q..-L..n..=..	
00002AF0	00	00	BA	02	00	00	00	48	8B	0D	72	3D	00	00	E8	BD	..,H..=..é..é..
00002B00	12	00	00	E8	FB	04	00	00	48	88	15	1E	3C	00	00	48..,é..é..H..	
00002B10	C7	C1	01	00	00	80	E8	0D	00	00	48	8B	15	DE	3C..,é..é..H..		
00002B20	00	00	48	C7	CL	01	00	00	88	FA	0D	00	00	48	8D	..,H@..,é..é..H..,	
00002B30	OD	DB	2C	00	00	E8	SE	10	00	00	48	8D	OD	F7	2C	00..,é..é..H..,	
00002B40	00	E8	S2	10	00	00	48	8D	0D	03	2D	00	00	E8	46	10..,é..é..H..,	
00002B50	00	00	48	8D	OD	17	2D	00	00	E8	3A	10	00	00	48	8D..,é..é..H..,	

The screenshot shows the IDA Pro interface with the following windows open:

- Functions**: Shows a list of functions including `sub_140001C7C`, `sub_140001F28`, `sub_140002444`, `sub_140002ECB`, `sub_140002F00`, `sub_140002F38`, `sub_140002F68`, `sub_1400031A4`, `sub_14000335C`, `sub_140003470`, `sub_140003524`, `sub_140003590`, `sub_140003588`, `sub_1400036C8`, `sub_140003808`, `sub_140003848`, `sub_140003934`, `start`, `sub_140003BA0`, `sub_140003BD0`, `sub_140003C00`, `sub_140003C9C`, `sub_140003D1`, `sub_140003F10`, `sub_140004050`, `sub_14000408B`, `sub_140004164`, `sub_140004246`, `sub_140004554`, and `sub_14000462C`.
- IDB View-A**: Shows assembly code for `sub_140003588`. The highlighted section contains instructions involving `var_28`, `var_20`, `var_18`, and `arg_0`.
- Strings**: Shows strings such as `sub_140001C7C proc near`, `var_28 dwdptr -28h`, `var_20 qword ptr -20h`, `var_18 qword ptr -18h`, and `arg_0 qword ptr 8`.
- Hex View-1**: Shows the hex dump of the assembly code.
- Local Types**: Shows local type definitions.
- Imports**: Shows imported symbols.
- Graph overview**: Displays a call graph with nodes representing functions and edges representing calls.
- Output**: Shows memory allocation details like `892928 total memory allocated`.
- IDA**: Provides information about loaded plugins, including `Hex-Rays Cloud Decompiler`.

PE file structure : Disassembly of Sections



- .data – initialized data
- .rdata – read-only initialized data
- .rsrc – resource directory (“files” a program needs)
- .text – executable code

Static analysis : IDAPro

IDA - Services.exe.i64 (Services.exe) C:\Users\admin\\Desktop\cases\workshop\Services.exe.i64

File Edit Jump Search View Debugger Options Windows Help

Local Windows debugger

Functions

Library function Regular function Instruction Data Unexplored External symbol Lumina function

IDA View-A Strings Hex View-1 Local Types Imports

Function name Segm Start

sub_140001C7C .text 000000140001C7

sub_140001F28 .text 000000140001F28

sub_140002444 .text 000000140002444

sub_140002E83 .text 000000140002E83

sub_140002F00 .text 000000140002F00

sub_140002F38 .text 000000140002F38

sub_140002F68 .text 000000140002F68

sub_140003144 .text 000000140003144

sub_14000335C .text 00000014000335C

sub_140003470 .text 000000140003470

sub_140003524 .text 000000140003524

sub_140003590 .text 000000140003590

sub_1400035B8 .text 0000001400035B8

sub_1400035BD .text 0000001400035BD

sub_1400035C1 .text 0000001400035C1

sub_1400037CC .text 0000001400037CC

sub_140003808 .text 000000140003808

sub_140003828 .text 000000140003828

sub_140003848 .text 000000140003848

sub_1400038A0 .text 0000001400038A0

sub_140003934 .text 000000140003934

start .text 000000140003934

sub_1400038A0 .text 0000001400038A0

sub_1400038D0 .text 0000001400038D0

sub_140003C00 .text 000000140003C00

sub_140003C9C .text 000000140003C9C

sub_140003D14 .text 000000140003D14

sub_140003E24 .text 000000140003E24

sub_140003F1 .text 000000140003F1

sub_140003F2C .text 000000140003F2C

sub_140004060 .text 000000140004060

sub_140004088 .text 000000140004088

sub_140004164 .text 000000140004164

sub_14000424C .text 00000014000424C

sub_140004528 .text 000000140004528

sub_140004564 .text 000000140004564

sub_14000462C .text 00000014000462C

Line 50 of 50, /sub_140004EB0

Graph overview

100.00% (296,-25) (25,162) 000029EE 0000001400035EE: sub_1400035B8+36 (Synchronized with Hex View-1)

total memory allocated

892928

Loading processor module C:\Program Files\IDA Free 9.0\procs\pc.dll for metapc...Initializing processor module metapc...OK

Loading type libraries...

Autoanalysis subsystem has been initialized.

Database for file 'Services.exe' has been loaded.

Hex-Rays Cloud Decompiler plugin has been loaded (v9.0.0.240925)

The decompilation hotkey is F5.

Please check the Edit/Plugins menu for more information.

IDC

AU: idle Down Disk: 94GB


Exercise / Q&A Break

Q : What subroutines (by hex address) reference our URL string? What are the call chains from start?


A : Initially, the only subroutine referencing the URL is 0x1400035B8

Two call chains to that subroutine:


- start -> 0x1400035B8
- start -> 0x1400038A0 -> 0x1400037CC -> 0x140003470 -> 0x1400035B8



Dynamic analysis : what happens when you run a file?



Dynamic analysis : x64dbg, sysinternals suite



Exercise / Q&A Break

Q : What is this program doing with the file it gets from the URL?

A : It downloads a binary file then XOR deciphers it.

THANK YOU!!!!

Any questions??