通过编码绕过一些cms对于xxe的检测

笔记本: 学习记录

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URL: http://legalhackers.com/advisories/zend-framework-XXE-vuln.html

说到php里面的xxe ,常见的漏洞代码大概如此

对于xxe的利用,可以参考这里(http://www.waitalone.cn/xxe-attack.html)

之前撸站时候遇到zend-framework 发现了一个CVE-2015-5161(http://legalhackers.com/advisories/zend-framework-XXE-vuln.html)

这里提到一种 绕过xxe对于特殊字符串检测

简单的本地测试了一下,发现确实可以。

```
▶ 🗀 posix
▶ 🗀 pspell
                                         php_sxe_object *sxe;
                                                        *data;
data_len;
 ▶ 🗀 readline
▶ 🗀 recode
                                                       docp;

*ns = NULL;

ns_len = 0;

options = 0;
                                         xmlDocPtr
  ▶ 🗀 reflection
  ▶ □ session
                                         size t
  ▶ ☐ shmop
  zend_class_entry *ce= sxe_class_entry;
zend_function *fptr_count;
zend_bool isprefix = 0;
   ▶ □ examples
   tests config.m4
     config.w32
                                         if (zend_parse_parameters(ZEND_NUM_ARGS(), "s|C!lsb", &data, &data_len, &ce, &options, &ns, &ns
     php_simplexml.h
php_simplexml_exports.h
     P README
                                         if (ZEND_SIZE_T_INT_OVFL(data_len)) {
    php_error_docref(NULL, E_WARNING, "Data is too long");
    RETURN_FALSE;
     sxe.c
  i sxe.h

i skeleton
                                        }
if (ZEND_SIZE_T_INT_OVFL(ns_len)) {
    php_error_docref(NULL, E_WARNING, "Namespace is too long");
    RETURN_FALSE;
  ▶ □ snmp
▶ □ soap
  ▶ □ sockets
                                         }
if (ZEND_LONG_EXCEEDS_INT(options)) {
   php_error_docref(NULL, E_WARNING, "Invalid options");
   RETURN_FALSE;
  ▶ 🗀 spl
▶ 🗀 sqlite3
  ▶ 🗀 standard

▶ □ sysvmsg

  ▶ □ sysvsem
▶ □ sysvshm
                                         docp = xmlReadMemory(data, (int)data_len, NULL, NULL, (int)options);
 b ☐ tidy
b ☐ tokenize
PHP是调用 xmlReadMemory来处理 xml的
这里参考 https://my.oschina.net/u/437615/blog/219803?p={{currentPage-1}}
关于Libxml2库的字符编码解介绍可以查看:
http://xmlsoft.org/encoding.html
从描述里,libxml2在读取字符串的时候就做了编码的转换。
xmlReadMemory 函数里调用的xmlDoRead函数,看代码
xmlDocPtr
xmlReadMemory(const char *buffer, int size, const char *URL, const char *encoding, int options){
   xmlParserCtxtPtr ctxt;
   ctxt = xmlCreateMemoryParserCtxt(buffer, size);
   if (ctxt == NULL)
       return (NULL);
```

里面的原因是啥,文字只说结论就是这样。网上搜了一波

return (xmlDoRead(ctxt, URL, encoding, options, 0));

}

static xmlDocPtr

PHP_FUNCTION(simplexml_load_string)

▶ □ pgsql
▶ □ phar

```
xmlDoRead(xmlParserCtxtPtr ctxt, const char *URL, const char *encoding,
      int options, int reuse)
{
  xmlDocPtr ret;
  xmlCtxtUseOptions(ctxt, options);
  if (encoding != NULL) {
     xmlCharEncodingHandlerPtr hdlr;
     hdlr = xmlFindCharEncodingHandler(encoding);
     if (hdlr != NULL)
       xmlSwitchToEncoding(ctxt, hdlr);
  }
  if ((URL != NULL) && (ctxt->input != NULL) &&
     (ctxt->input->filename == NULL))
     ctxt->input->filename = (char *) xmlStrdup((const xmlChar *) URL);
  xmlParseDocument(ctxt);
  if ((ctxt->wellFormed) || ctxt->recovery)
    ret = ctxt->myDoc;
  else {
     ret = NULL;
    if (ctxt->myDoc != NULL) {
       xmlFreeDoc(ctxt->myDoc);
    }
  }
```

```
ctxt->myDoc = NULL;
  if (!reuse) {
    xmlFreeParserCtxt(ctxt);
  }
  return (ret);
}
从php的调用结合代码,程序进入xmlParseDocument函数
xmlParseDocument函数会做一些初始化和检查。并调用xmlParseXMLDecl解析xml的描述信息,还是
看代码
  xmlParseXMLDecl代码片段
  .....
  version = xmlParseVersionInfo(ctxt);
  if (version == NULL) {
    xmlFatalErr(ctxt, XML_ERR_VERSION_MISSING, NULL);
  } else {
    if (!xmlStrEqual(version, (const xmlChar *) XML_DEFAULT_VERSION)) {
      /*
      * TODO: Blueberry should be detected here
      */
      xmlWarningMsg(ctxt, XML_WAR_UNKNOWN_VERSION,
               "Unsupported version '%s'\n",
              version, NULL);
    }
    if (ctxt->version != NULL)
      xmlFree((void *) ctxt->version);
```

```
ctxt->version = version;
  }
  /*
  * We may have the encoding declaration
  */
  if (!IS_BLANK_CH(RAW)) {
    if ((RAW = = '?') && (NXT(1) = = '>')) {
       SKIP(2);
       return;
    }
    xmlFatalErrMsg(ctxt, XML_ERR_SPACE_REQUIRED, "Blank needed here\n");
  }
//下面是字符编码的描述信息解析
  xmlParseEncodingDecl(ctxt);
  if (ctxt->errNo == XML_ERR_UNSUPPORTED_ENCODING) {
    /*
    * The XML REC instructs us to stop parsing right here
    */
    return;
  }
  .....
const xmlChar *
xmlParseEncodingDecl(xmlParserCtxtPtr ctxt) {
  xmlChar *encoding = NULL;
```

```
SKIP_BLANKS;
if \; (CMP8(CUR\_PTR, \, 'e', \, 'n', \, 'c', \, 'o', \, 'd', \, 'i', \, 'n', \, 'g')) \; \{\\
  SKIP(8);
  SKIP_BLANKS;
  if (RAW != '=') {
     xmlFatalErr(ctxt, XML_ERR_EQUAL_REQUIRED, NULL);
     return(NULL);
  }
  NEXT;
  SKIP_BLANKS;
  if (RAW == '"') {
     NEXT;
     encoding = xmlParseEncName(ctxt);
     if (RAW != '"') {
       xmlFatalErr(ctxt, XML_ERR_STRING_NOT_CLOSED, NULL);
     } else
        NEXT;
  } else if (RAW == '\''){
     NEXT;
     encoding = xmlParseEncName(ctxt);
     if (RAW != '\'') {
       xmlFatalErr(ctxt, XML_ERR_STRING_NOT_CLOSED, NULL);
     } else
        NEXT;
  } else {
```

```
xmlFatalErr(ctxt, XML_ERR_STRING_NOT_STARTED, NULL);
}
/*
* UTF-16 encoding stwich has already taken place at this stage,
* more over the little-endian/big-endian selection is already done
*/
if ((encoding != NULL) &&
  ((!xmlStrcasecmp(encoding, BAD_CAST "UTF-16")) ||
  (!xmlStrcasecmp(encoding, BAD_CAST "UTF16")))) {
  if (ctxt->encoding != NULL)
     xmlFree((xmlChar *) ctxt->encoding);
  ctxt->encoding = encoding;
}
* UTF-8 encoding is handled natively
*/
else if ((encoding != NULL) &&
  ((!xmlStrcasecmp(encoding, BAD_CAST "UTF-8")) ||
  (!xmlStrcasecmp(encoding, BAD_CAST "UTF8")))) {
  if (ctxt->encoding != NULL)
     xmlFree((xmlChar *) ctxt->encoding);
  ctxt->encoding = encoding;
}
else if (encoding != NULL) {
  xmlCharEncodingHandlerPtr handler;
```

```
if (ctxt->input->encoding != NULL)
         xmlFree((xmlChar *) ctxt->input->encoding);
       ctxt->input->encoding = encoding;
//下面这行查找编码处理的函数
       handler = xmlFindCharEncodingHandler((const char *) encoding);
      if (handler != NULL) {
//在这里转编码
         xmlSwitchToEncoding(ctxt, handler);
      } else {
         xmlFatalErrMsgStr(ctxt, XML_ERR_UNSUPPORTED_ENCODING,
              "Unsupported encoding %s\n", encoding);
         return(NULL);
      }
    }
  }
  return(encoding);
  }
xmlFindCharEncodingHandler的函数又会依赖于libiconv的字符编码转换,
xmlFindCharEncodingHandler代码片段
#ifdef LIBXML_ICONV_ENABLED
  /* check whether iconv can handle this *///藏在这里呢,转换到utf-8编码。
  icv_in = iconv_open("UTF-8", name);
  icv_out = iconv_open(name, "UTF-8");
  if ((icv_in != (iconv_t) -1) && (icv_out != (iconv_t) -1)) {
```

```
enc = (xmlCharEncodingHandlerPtr)
        xmlMalloc(sizeof(xmlCharEncodingHandler));
     if (enc == NULL) {
       iconv_close(icv_in);
       iconv_close(icv_out);
       return(NULL);
     }
     enc->name = xmlMemStrdup(name);
     enc->input = NULL;
     enc->output = NULL;
     enc->iconv_in = icv_in;
     enc->iconv_out = icv_out;
#ifdef DEBUG_ENCODING
     xmlGenericError(xmlGenericErrorContext,
         "Found iconv handler for encoding %s\n", name);
#endif//enc返回用来处理编码转换
     return enc;
libiconv这个有兴趣的可以再继续跟踪代码去了解。本人就没继续跟踪了解了。
那到这里应该就清楚了,libxml根据encoding的描述信息处理字符转换到utf-8
如果没有描述信息,libxml只能探测字符串是UTF-8 or UTF-16,否则会产生encoding error。
这里说很清楚了,xmlReadMemory是可以处理utf-16编码的。
而代码里面if (strpos($a, '<!ENTITY') == false) 这里检查的是 utf-8 编码的 所以检测不到 <!ENTITY
```

当然就绕过waf了。

所以 http://www.waitalone.cn/xxe-attack.html 这里对于xxe的防御方法二其实是有点问题的。

标准做法是 libxml_disable_entity_loader(true);