





FTC's Lawsuit Loss Regarding Microsoft's

Acquisition of Activision Blizzard

AF3316 Investment

Presenter: XI Lexuan

April 11, 2025





Outline



- Background
- Part I Event Study Analysis
 - Analysis before the event
 - Methods
 - Results
 - Discussion
- Part II Portfolio Analysis
 - Market beta analysis for 30 stocks before and after the event
 - Market beta analysis for 2 groups before and after the event
 - Market beta analysis for 4 groups before and after the event
 - Small Firm Effect
 - Investment strategy recommendation

Part I - Background



- Activision Blizzard, Inc. is an American video game holding company. Activision Blizzard currently includes three operating units: Activision, Blizzard Entertainment and King.
- Among major intellectual properties produced by Activision Blizzard are:















Part I - Background



Key reason:

Antitrust law

Top Companies by Game Revenues for 2021




Part I - Background



Pivotal event:

US Federal Trade Commission (FTC) lost its lawsuit against Microsoft on July 11, 2023



Part I – Analysis before the event



Companies Directly Affected:

Microsoft:

On the one hand, This acquisition may strengthen the competitiveness of Microsoft's Xbox gaming platform and subscription services such as Xbox Game Pass, solidifying its influential position within the global gaming ecosystem (Kadirov, 2024). On the other hand, Investors might believe that Microsoft paid a premium for acquiring Activision Blizzard or took on debt to finance the acquisition.

Thus, the company's stock price might not demonstrate significant fluctuations in response to this event.

Activision Blizzard:

Before the July 11th court ruling, Activision Blizzard's stock traded at approximately \$82 per share. Given Microsoft's proposed \$95 per share acquisition price, it's reasonable to anticipate a significant upward pressure on the stock price as the deal approaches finalization.

Part I – Analysis before the event



- Major Competitors May Be Indirectly Affected:
 - Sony Group Corporation:




Notably, Sony has emerged as one of the primary opponents in Microsoft's acquisition case of Activision Blizzard.

Thus, these compounded challenges could trigger a noticeable decline in Sony's stock price.

Nintendo Co., Ltd.:
 The significant differences in user demographics and game genres between Nintendo and Activision Blizzard resulted in that this event is unlikely to affect its stock price substantially.

Global Console Gaming Market Company Share









Part I – Analysis before the event



- Broader Impact on the Gaming Industry and Partners:
 - After this acquisition, industry valuations for high-value IPs and large gaming companies may
 rise accordingly, potentially leading to accelerated industry consolidation. Therefore, some
 game publishers and developers (such as EA, Take-Two, Konami, etc.) could experience
 moderate increases in their stock prices due to these market dynamics.
 - Besides, the firms collaborating with Activision Blizzard in the gaming, entertainment, media, and technology industries may also experience mild stock price increases.
- Impacts on Future M&A Deals:
 - The FTC's defeat in this case may diminish its credibility. Other major corporations undergoing antitrust scrutiny at the time (such as Meta, Google, and Amazon) could potentially benefit from this outcome. While this constitutes an intriguing topic for discussion, we will concentrate the analysis on companies that experienced more direct and immediate impacts.

Part I – Methods



• The market reaction to the acquisition is measured by the Abnormal Returns (ARs), Average Abnormal Returns (AARs), and Average Cumulative Abnormal Returns (ACARs), which a market-adjusted model computes.

$$AR_{i,t} = R_{i,t} - R_{m,t} \tag{1}$$

Here, $AR_{i,t}$ is the abnormal return of stock i at time t, $R_{i,t}$ is the actual return of stock i at time t, $R_{m,t}$ is the S&P 500 index in the US at time t. All stock data used in this report are sourced from finance.yahoo.com.

Correlation analysis is adopted for further investigation in sensitivity.

Part I – Methods



- Treatment Group: 15 stocks with high exposure to the event
- Control Group: 15 stocks with low exposure to the event but otherwise similar characteristics to the affected stocks

Treatment group and control group

Treatment Group		Control Group		
Company Name	Ticker	Company Name	Ticker	
Activision Blizzard, Inc.	ATVI	AMC Entertainment Holdings, Inc.	AMC	
ASUSTEK Computer Inc.	2357.TW	BANDAI NAMCO Holdings Inc.	7832.T	
Electronic Arts Inc.	EA	Double UGames Co., Ltd.	192080.KS	
Hasbro, Inc.	HAS	GungHo Online Entertainment, Inc.	3765.T	
HTC Corporation	2498.TW	G-bits Network Technology (Xiamen) Co., Ltd.	603444.SS	
International Games System Co.,Ltd.	3293.TWO	Kakao Games Corp.	293490.KQ	
Konami Group Corporation	9766.T	Lions Gate Entertainment Corp.	LGF-A	
Modern Times Group MTG AB	MTG-A.ST	NETDRAGON	0777.HK	
Ourpalm Co., Ltd.	300315.SZ	Nintendo Co., Ltd.	7974.T	
Paramount Global	PARA	Perion Network Ltd.	PERI	
Pearl Abyss Corp.	263750.KQ	Pinterest, Inc.	PINS	
Roku, Inc.	ROKU	Square Enix Holdings Co., Ltd.	9684.T	
Take-Two Interactive Software, Inc.	TTWO	Tetra Tech, Inc.	TTEK	
The Turtle Beach Corporation	ТВСН	The Walt Disney Company	DIS	
Unity Software Inc.	U	Tianyu Digital Technology (Dalian) Group Co., Ltd.	002354.SZ	




Daily ARs of Treatment Group and Control Group


		reatment	Group's AR			Control Group's AR					
Ticker	T-2	T-1	Т	T+1	T+2	T-2	T-1	Т	T+1	T+2	Ticker
ATVI	-0.04%	0.09%	9.35%	-1.83%	-1.36%	-1.81%	0.71%	2.87%	-0.51%	0.06%	AMC
2357.TW	-2.04%	-0.58%	0.70%	-0.57%	-1.19%	-1.57%	-1.85%	-0.57%	-0.13%	0.91%	7832.T
EA	-0.86%	0.80%	4.53%	-2.09%	0.07%	0.05%	0.25%	-0.19%	0.58%	2.59%	192080.KS
HAS	0.69%	-0.98%	0.47%	-0.62%	-0.11%	-0.50%	-1.39%	-0.52%	-2.02%	1.21%	3765.T
2498.TW	-1.29%	-1.31%	4.21%	-1.26%	0.36%	-0.35%	-0.09%	-2.80%	-2.00%	0.12%	603444.SS
3293.TWO	0.13%	1.57%	2.56%	-1.05%	-0.07%	-3.48%	-1.94%	3.66%	2.58%	3.97%	293490.KQ
9766.T	-0.72%	0.05%	1.28%	-2.14%	0.86%	3.16%	-0.46%	-3.35%	1.33%	-1.30%	LGF-A
MTG-A.ST	1.79%	-0.24%	3.03%	-0.03%	-2.27%	-0.39%	0.59%	0.28%	-0.20%	-0.04%	0777.HK
300315.SZ	-2.76%	1.49%	3.05%	-7.46%	-2.29%	0.88%	-0.96%	-1.43%	-0.05%	1.12%	7974.T
PARA	-0.80%	-0.55%	2.96%	-2.46%	0.84%	4.43%	1.95%	0.60%	0.18%	-2.12%	PERI
263750.KQ	0.49%	-1.24%	4.16%	-0.74%	1.46%	1.21%	-0.02%	3.36%	-0.22%	-1.34%	PINS
ROKU	2.29%	7.78%	10.47%	0.44%	-0.73%	0.45%	-0.57%	-2.36%	-0.53%	0.13%	9684.T
TTWO	0.51%	0.28%	4.06%	-1.29%	-1.27%	-0.02%	2.86%	-1.26%	-0.93%	-0.06%	TTEK
TBCH	-0.86%	1.28%	0.39%	0.05%	-1.89%	0.18%	-0.85%	0.91%	0.00%	-0.50%	DIS
U	0.07%	-1.48%	8.99%	-1.04%	6.36%	-1.82%	-0.70%	0.41%	-3.80%	0.73%	002354.SZ
Average	-0.23%	0.46%	4.01%	-1.47%	-0.08%	0.02%	-0.17%	-0.03%	-0.38%	0.37%	Average








Daily AARs of Control Group




• Although the stock properties of the control group are similar to those of the treatment group, their stock prices showed no significant changes due to minimal impact from the event, with the AAR being merely -0.03% on day T. In contrast, the stock prices of the treatment group exhibited two distinct fluctuations. On Day T, the AAR suddenly increased from 0.46% on Day T-1 to 4.01%. By Day T+1, the AR had dropped to -1.47%. Among stocks of the treatment group, the most pronounced changes were observed in Activision Blizzard's stock price, where the AR surged to 9.35% on Day T, followed by consecutive declines of -1.83% and -1.36% on Day T+1 and Day T+2, respectively.




Daily ACARs of Treatment Group




Daily ACARs of Control Group



Daily AARs Comparison



Daily ACARs Comparison





Corre	lation A	\nai	ysis
-------	----------	------	------

	Treatme	nt Group's Sto	ock Returns C	orrelation An	alysis	
Ticker	T-2	T-1	Т	T+1	T+2	Correlation Coefficient
ATVI	-1.83%	0.04%	11.02%	-1.61%	-2.24%	/
Collaborating Group						
2357.TW	-2.04%	-0.58%	0.70%	-0.57%	-1.19%	71.22%
HAS	0.69%	-0.98%	0.47%	-0.62%	-0.11%	87.44%
PARA	-0.80%	-0.55%	2.96%	-2.46%	0.84%	78.05%
ТВСН	-0.86%	1.28%	0.39%	0.05%	-1.89%	48.74%
U	0.07%	-1.48%	8.99%	-1.04%	6.36%	66.11%
Collaborating Group Average	-1.28%	-0.29%	4.12%	-0.32%	1.75%	82.36%
Peer Group						
EA	-0.86%	0.80%	4.53%	-2.09%	0.07%	92.03%
2498.TW	-1.29%	-1.31%	4.21%	-1.26%	0.36%	87.14%
3293.TWO	0.13%	1.57%	2.56%	-1.05%	-0.07%	87.14%
9766.T	-0.72%	0.05%	1.28%	-2.14%	0.86%	58.59%
MTG-A.ST	1.50%	0.00%	3.70%	0.71%	-1.42%	82.40%
300315.SZ	-2.76%	1.49%	3.05%	-7.46%	-2.29%	72.78%
263750.KQ	0.20%	-1.00%	4.84%	0.00%	2.31%	78.02%
ROKU	2.29%	7.78%	10.47%	0.44%	-0.73%	85.83%
TTWO	0.51%	0.28%	4.06%	-1.29%	-1.27%	99.04%
Peer Group Average	-0.18%	1.58%	4.64%	-0.97%	0.37%	94.07%
Treatment Group Average						
(Except Activision Blizzard)	-0.57%	0.91%	4.45%	-0.74%	0.86%	93.89%

Part I – Discussion



- 1. Following the court ruling on July 11, 2023, Activision Blizzard's stock price surged nearly 10% on the same day, rising from \$82.7 to \$90.99 per share. Before Microsoft's acquisition announcement on January 18, 2021, Activision Blizzard's share price stood at \$65.39. This indicates that before the ruling, the market had priced in approximately a 58% probability of acquisition success ((82.7 65.39)/(95 65.39)). Post-ruling, the implied market probability increased to about 86% ((90.99 65.39)/(95 65.39)), reflecting a nearly 30% boost in market confidence regarding Microsoft's successful acquisition.
- 2. However, Activision Blizzard's stock price experienced consecutive declines on day T+1 and day T+2. This suggests the market might have overreacted initially. Studies show that stock prices often exhibit short-term reversals following shocks (Atkins & Dyl, 1990; Brown & Harlow, 1988). This finding supports the Semi-Strong Form Market Efficiency to some extent.
- 3. The correlation analysis revealed that the stock prices of the Peer Group exhibited a correlation coefficient of approximately 94%, nearly 12% higher than that of the Collaborating Group, suggesting Peer Group stocks may be more sensitive to this event.

Part II – Market beta analysis



- Period: October 2020 to December 2024
- Capital Asset Pricing Model (CAPM) is used.

$$E(r_i) = r_f + \beta_i \big[E(r_M) - r_f \big] \tag{2}$$

• A regression analysis is conducted using β_i as the independent variable and $E(r_i-r_f)$ as the dependent variable.


- 1. 30 Stocks
- 2. Treatment Group and Control Group
- 3. 4 groups: Control & Small (C&S), Control & Big (C&B), Treatment & Small (T&S), and Treatment & Big (T&B).

Part II – Market beta analysis for 30 stocks




Average Return, β , α for 30 stocks

	Average Return	β	α
Before	1.70%	92.02%	0.68%
After	0.36%	98.28%	-1.16%



 $E(r_i-r_f)$ and $E(r_i-r_f)$ _CAPM After



Regression Analysis of β for 30 stocks

	R ²	eta Coefficients	P-value
Before	1.81%	0.82%	46.25%
After	4.34%	-0.75%	25.25%

Part II – Market beta analysis for 2 groups




Average Return, β , α for the Treatment Group and Control Group Before the event

Before	Average Return	β	α
Treatment	0.87%	74.00%	1.69%
Control	2.53%	110.05%	-0.33%

 $Eig(r_i-r_fig)$ and $Eig(r_i-r_fig)$ _CAPM of Treatment Group Before the event

 $Eig(r_i-r_fig)$ and $Eig(r_i-r_fig)$ _CAPM of Control Group Before the event



Regression Analysis of β for Treatment Group and Control Group Before the Event

Before	R ²	$oldsymbol{eta}$ Coefficients	P-value
Treatment	8.91%	-0.66%	27.97%
Control	16.73%	3.91%	13.01%


Part II – Market beta analysis for 2 groups



Average Return, β , α for Treatment Group and Control Group After the event

After	Average Return	β	α
Treatment	1.30%	124.37%	-0.50%
Control	-0.58%	72.19%	-1.81%

 $E(r_i - r_f)$ and $E(r_i - r_f)$ _CAPM of Treatment Group $E(r_i - r_f)$ and $E(r_i - r_f)$ _CAPM of Control Group After the event



Regression Analysis of β for Treatment Group and Control Group After the Event

After	R ²	eta Coefficients	P-value
Treatment	0.45%	-0.20%	81.20%
Control	44.81%	-3.23%	0.63%

Part II – Market beta analysis for 4 groups



Control & Small, Control & Big, Treatment & Small, and Treatment & Big Groups and Their Sizes(USD)

Control & Small	Size	Treatment & Small	Size
PERI	312,558,171	MTG-A.ST	41,301,606
LGF-A	560,730,381	TBCH	359,879,231
TTEK	5,106,488,451	HAS	9,723,562,862
002354.SZ	6,072,345,250	PARA	16,066,468,130
0777.HK	6,641,117,430	300315.SZ	17,708,307,218
AMC	10,194,020,542		

Control & Big	Size	Treatment & Big	Size
603444.SS	28,485,265,338	2498.TW	23,949,576,637
PINS	35,080,615,376	ROKU	26,056,975,214
3765.T	133,355,686,351	TTWO	27,342,759,997
DIS	216,519,727,477	EA	30,465,982,134
9684.T	686,198,162,502	U	38,869,013,316
192080.KS	941,851,449,119	3293.TWO	39,168,170,999
7832.T	1,582,044,477,667	ATVI	58528474620
293490.KQ	3,693,870,314,400	2357.TW	133,084,535,280
7974.T	5,825,007,013,820	9766.T	518,563,046,551
		263750.KQ	2,462,917,940,000


Part II – Market beta analysis for 4 groups



Average return, β , α for C&S, C&B, T&S, and T&B Groups Before and After the Event


Before	Average Return	β	α	After	Average Return	β	α
C&S	5.92%	97.82%	4.84%	C&S	-2.28%	94.02%	-3.76%
C&B	0.28%	58.11%	-0.41%	C&B	0.56%	57.64%	-0.51%
T&S	0.23%	109.59%	-0.97%	T&S	1.10%	125.72%	-0.72%
T&B	1.20%	110.28%	-0.01%	T&B	1.40%	123.70%	-0.40%


 $E(r_i-r_f)$ and $E(r_i-r_f)$ _CAPM of C&S, C&B, T&S, and T&B Before the Event



Part II – Market beta analysis for 4 groups







Regression Analysis of β for C&S, C&B, T&S, and T&B Before and After the Event

Before	R ²	eta Coefficients	P-value	After	R ²	eta Coefficients	P-value
C&S	21.05%	5.37%	36.00%	C&S	73.88%	-4.70%	2.82%
C&B	21.67%	-1.03%	20.67%	C&B	13.01%	-1.24%	34.03%
T&S	13.89%	-0.55%	53.67%	T&S	4.05%	0.33%	74.55%
T&B	9.83%	-0.69%	37.78%	T&B	3.59%	-0.72%	59.98%

Part II – Market beta analysis and small firm effect



- It can be observed that the CAPM doesn't hold for any group, indicating that beta fails to account
 for the average returns among groups. One possible explanation is that other factors exist besides
 beta.
- However, according to calculations based on the table below, the time-weighted average return for small firms is approximately 3.6%, about 2% higher than that for large firms. This result supports the existence of the long-term Small Firm Effect and violates the semi-strong form of the Efficient Market Hypothesis.

Average return, β , α for C&S, C&B, T&S, and T&B Groups Before and After the Event

Before	Average Return	β	α	After	Average Return	β	α
C&S	5.92%	97.82%	4.84%	C&S	-2.28%	94.02%	-3.76%
C&B	0.28%	58.11%	-0.41%	C&B	0.56%	57.64%	-0.51%
T&S	0.23%	109.59%	-0.97%	T&S	1.10%	125.72%	-0.72%
T&B	1.20%	110.28%	-0.01%	T&B	1.40%	123.70%	-0.40%

Part II – Investment strategy recommendation



- 1. Since CAPM is invalid in this case, the alpha calculated based on it may include errors that are not captured by beta. Therefore, using the CAPM's alpha for long-short strategies may be ineffective, as there is bias in alpha itself. (Other factors? Factor investing in quantitative finance)
- 2. Although there's small firm effect during the whole period, small-cap strategy doesn't perform well after the event.
- 3. If investors are optimistic about the value enhancement that Microsoft's acquisition of Activision Blizzard will bring to the treatment group (i.e. they want to hold some of stocks from the treatment group), A natural and simple strategy is recommended by this report as follows:
 - 1. Use the monthly data before the event to find the Sharpe ratio for each stock in Treatment group. (The Sharpe ratio is $[E(r_i)-E(r_f)]$ divided by $SD(r_i)$)
 - 2. Select those with higher Sharpe ratio than market and form a portfolio with weights that maximize the Sharpe ratio of the portfolio (Assume momentum effect is valid).

Part II – Investment strategy recommendation



New Portfolio

Tickers	2357.TW	3293.TWO	9766.T
Weights	0.2402	0.3218	0.3218

New Portfolio Performance after the event

After	Average Return	Standard Deviation	Sharpe Ratio
New Portfolio	0.05764	0.06842	0.77921
^GSPC	0.01538	0.03812	0.29003
Treatment Group	0.00362	0.04550	-0.01537

The newly constructed portfolio shows that the strategy performs well in this case.

References



- Atkins, A. B., & Dyl, E. A. (1990). Price reversals, Bid-Ask spreads, and market efficiency. *Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis*, 25(4), 535. https://doi.org/10.2307/2331015
- Bartelson, E. (2022, May 13). *Top 10 companies generate 65% of all game revenues: "Winners are huge"* PreMortem Games. https://premortem.games/2022/05/13/top-10-companies-generate-65-of-all-game-revenues-winners-are-huge/
- Brown, K. C., & Harlow, W. (1988). Market overreaction. *The Journal of Portfolio Management*, 14(2), 6–13.
 - https://doi.org/10.3905/jpm.1988.409137
- Hart–Scott–Rodino Antitrust Improvements Act of 1976, 94 U.S.C. § 435 (1976). https://www.loc.gov/item/uscode1958-004019005/
- Kadirov, R. (2024). Microsoft and Activision Blizzard: The Rise of the Video Gaming Giant.
 - https://scholarship.richmond.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1022&context=robins-case-network
- Statista. (2023, November 14). Market share of console gaming market worldwide 2021-2022, by company.
 - https://www.statista.com/statistics/1422309/console-gaming-market-share-worldwide/
- https://github.com/xuanay/AF3316-Group-Project