

Assignment #2 Report: Secure Chat System

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Course: CS-3002 Information Security (Fall 2025)

GitHub Repository: <https://github.com/xuwid/securechat-skeleton>

Executive Summary

This report documents the complete implementation of a console-based Secure Chat System that demonstrates the practical application of cryptographic primitives to achieve **Confidentiality, Integrity, Authenticity, and Non-Repudiation (CIANR)**. The system implements a custom application-layer protocol over plain TCP sockets, utilizing AES-128 encryption, RSA-2048 digital signatures, X.509 certificate-based PKI, and Diffie-Hellman key exchange.

Key Achievements

-  Complete 6-phase secure communication protocol
 -  Self-signed Certificate Authority with client/server certificates
 -  MySQL-backed user authentication with salted SHA-256 password hashing
 -  End-to-end encrypted messaging with per-message digital signatures
 -  Comprehensive security testing (replay, tampering, certificate validation)
 -  Non-repudiation through signed session transcripts
 -  Wireshark packet capture demonstrating encryption
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1. System Architecture

1.1 Protocol Overview

The secure chat protocol consists of six distinct phases:

Phase 1: Certificate Exchange (Hello)

- **Purpose:** Mutual authentication through X.509 certificates
- **Messages:** HELLO, HELLO_RESPONSE
- **Security:** Both parties verify certificate validity, CA signature, and expiration

Phase 2: Initial DH Exchange (Control Plane)

- **Purpose:** Establish control plane encryption key for credential transmission
- **Messages:** DH_CLIENT_INIT, DH_SERVER_RESPONSE
- **Key Derivation:** $K_{\text{control}} = \text{Trunc16}(\text{SHA256}(\text{shared_secret}))$

Phase 3: Authentication

- **Purpose:** User registration or login
- **Messages:** REGISTER or LOGIN (encrypted with control plane key)
- **Security:** Credentials never transmitted in plaintext; passwords stored as salted SHA-256 hashes

Phase 4: Session DH Exchange (Data Plane)

- **Purpose:** Establish unique session key for chat messages
- **Messages:** SESSION_DH_CLIENT, SESSION_DH_SERVER
- **Key Derivation:** $K_{\text{session}} = \text{Trunc16}(\text{SHA256}(\text{shared_secret}))$

Phase 5: Encrypted Chat


- **Purpose:** Secure message exchange
- **Messages:** CHAT_MSG (encrypted), CHAT_RECEIPT (signed acknowledgment)
- **Security:** Each message encrypted with AES-128, signed with RSA-2048, includes sequence number for replay protection

Phase 6: Session Closure & Non-Repudiation

- **Purpose:** Generate cryptographic proof of communication
- **Messages:** SESSION_RECEIPT (signed transcript hash)
- **Evidence:** Append-only transcript with verifiable signature chain

1.2 Component Architecture

securechat-skeleton/



└─ transcript.py	# Append-only session logs
└─ scripts/	
└─ gen_ca.py	# Root CA generation
└─ gen_cert.py	# Certificate issuance
└─ tests/	
└─ test_crypto.py	# Cryptographic primitive tests (5/5 pass)
└─ test_certificates.py	# PKI validation tests (4/4 pass)
└─ test_security.py	# Security tests (4/4 pass)
└─ certs/	
└─ ca-cert.pem	# Root CA certificate
└─ server-cert.pem	# Server certificate
└─ client-cert.pem	# Client certificate

2. Implementation Details

2.1 PKI Infrastructure

Certificate Authority Setup

Generate Root CA (2048-bit RSA, self-signed)

```
python3 scripts/gen_ca.py
```

Issue server certificate

```
python3 scripts/gen_cert.py --type server --cn securechat.server
```

Issue client certificate

```
python3 scripts/gen_cert.py --type client --cn securechat.client
```

Certificate Validation (app/crypto/pki.py)

- **Signature Verification:** Validates CA signature using RSA public key
- **Expiry Checks:** Rejects expired or not-yet-valid certificates
- **Common Name Matching:** Verifies expected CN against certificate
- **Self-Signed Rejection:** Only accepts certificates signed by trusted CA

Test Evidence:

test_certificates.py results

```
test_valid_certificates - PASS (CA, server, client validated)
```

```
test_expired_certificate - PASS (rejected with CertificateValidationError)
```

```
test_self_signed_certificate - PASS (rejected as untrusted)
```

```
test_cn_mismatch - PASS (rejected due to CN validation failure)
```

2.2 User Authentication & Database Security

MySQL Schema (schema.sql)

```
CREATE TABLE users (
    id INT AUTO_INCREMENT PRIMARY KEY,
```

```

email VARCHAR(255) UNIQUE NOT NULL,
username VARCHAR(255) UNIQUE NOT NULL,
salt VARBINARY(16) NOT NULL,           -- Random 16-byte salt per user
pwd_hash CHAR(64) NOT NULL,           -- SHA-256(salt || password)
created_at TIMESTAMP DEFAULT CURRENT_TIMESTAMP,
INDEX idx_email (email),
INDEX idx_username (username)
) ENGINE=InnoDB;

```

Password Security (app/storage/db.py)





1. Registration:

- Generate random 16-byte salt: `salt = secrets.token_bytes(16)`
- Compute hash: `pwd_hash = SHA256(salt || password)`
- Store (email, username, salt, pwd_hash) in database

2. Login Verification:

- Retrieve user's salt from database
- Recompute hash with provided password
- **Constant-time comparison** prevents timing attacks:
`return secrets.compare_digest(stored_hash, computed_hash)`

3. Security Properties:

-  No plaintext passwords stored
-  Unique salt per user prevents rainbow table attacks
-  Credentials only transmitted after certificate validation
-  Transmission encrypted with DH-derived AES key

2.3 Cryptographic Implementation

AES-128 Encryption (app/crypto/aes.py)

```

def aes_encrypt(plaintext: str, key: bytes) -> bytes:
    """Encrypts plaintext using AES-128-ECB with PKCS#7 padding"""
    padded = pkcs7_pad(plaintext.encode('utf-8'))
    cipher = Cipher(algorithms.AES(key), modes.ECB())
    encryptor = cipher.encryptor()
    return encryptor.update(padded) + encryptor.finalize()

```

- **Mode:** ECB (as per assignment requirements)
- **Padding:** PKCS#7 to handle arbitrary message lengths
- **Key Size:** 128-bit (16 bytes)

Diffie-Hellman Key Exchange (app/crypto/dh.py)

```

# RFC 3526 Group 14 (2048-bit MODP)
DH_P = 0xFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFF... # 2048-bit prime
DH_G = 2

```

```
# Key derivation
shared_secret = pow(peer_public, private_key, DH_P)
session_key = SHA256(shared_secret.to_bytes(256, 'big'))[:16]
```

- **Parameters:** RFC 3526 Group 14 (industry-standard 2048-bit prime)
- **Security:** Forward secrecy - each session uses unique ephemeral keys

RSA Digital Signatures (app/crypto/sign.py)

```
def rsa_sign(data: bytes, private_key: RSAPrivateKey) -> bytes:
    """Signs data using RSA-SHA256 with PKCS#1 v1.5 padding"""
    signature = private_key.sign(
        data,
        padding.PKCS1v15(),
        hashes.SHA256()
    )
    return signature
```

- **Algorithm:** RSA-2048 with SHA-256
- **Padding:** PKCS#1 v1.5 (as per assignment spec)
- **Purpose:** Message authenticity and non-repudiation

2.4 Message Format & Integrity

Chat Message Structure

```
{
  "type": "msg",
  "seqno": 1,
  "ts": 1700000000000,
  "ct": "dfDkEk+w/ipYsg...", // base64(AES_encrypt(plaintext))
  "sig": "kJ8f3Hs9dK..."   // base64(RSA_sign(SHA256(seqno||ts||ct)))
}
```

Integrity Chain

1. **Digest Computation:** $h = \text{SHA256}(\text{seqno} \parallel \text{timestamp} \parallel \text{ciphertext})$
2. **Signature:** $\text{sig} = \text{RSA_SIGN_PKCS1v15}(h, \text{sender_private_key})$
3. **Verification:** Receiver recomputes digest and verifies signature
4. **Replay Protection:** Strictly increasing sequence numbers enforced

3. Security Properties Demonstrated

3.1 Confidentiality

Mechanism: AES-128 encryption with DH-derived session keys

Evidence: - Wireshark capture shows only base64-encoded ciphertext -

Plaintext messages "Hello", "Oho", "KKK" not visible in packet dump -
Session keys never transmitted (derived independently via DH)

3.2 Integrity

Mechanism: SHA-256 digests + RSA signatures on every message

Test: test_security.py::test_tampering_detection

```
# Flip one bit in ciphertext
tampered_ct = bytearray(original_ct)
tampered_ct[0] ^= 0x01

# Result: Signature verification FAILS
assert verify_signature(tampered_ct, sig, cert) == False
```

3.3 Authenticity

Mechanism: X.509 certificate validation + RSA signature verification

Test: test_certificates.py::test_self_signed_certificate

```
# Attempt to use self-signed certificate
with pytest.raises(CertificateValidationError):
    validate_certificate_chain(self_signed_cert, ca_cert)
```

Result: Server rejects connection with BAD_CERT error

3.4 Non-Repudiation

Mechanism: Signed session transcripts + per-message signatures

Process: 1. Both parties maintain append-only transcript: 1|1700000000000|dfDkEk+w/ipY...|kJ8f3Hs9dK...|sha256:abc123... 2. Compute transcript hash: SHA256(all_lines) 3. Sign transcript hash with RSA private key 4. Generate SessionReceipt: json { "type": "receipt", "peer": "client", "first_seq": 1, "last_seq": 5, "transcript_sha256": "a3f8c9...", "sig": "base64(RSA_sign(transcript_sha256))" }

Offline Verification: (tests/verify_transcript.py) - Recompute transcript hash from saved file - Verify RSA signature using participant's certificate - Any modification breaks signature → cryptographic proof of tampering

3.5 Replay Attack Prevention

Test: test_security.py::test_replay_attack_detection

```
# Send same message twice with same seqno
server.handle_message(msg_seqno_5)
server.handle_message(msg_seqno_5) # Replay

# Result: Second message REJECTED (seqno not strictly increasing)
```

4. Testing Results

4.1 Unit Tests

```
$ .venv/bin/python3 -m pytest tests/ -v
```

```
tests/test_crypto.py::test_aes_encryption_decryption PASSED
tests/test_crypto.py::test_diffie_hellman_key_exchange PASSED
tests/test_crypto.py::test_rsa_signatures PASSED
tests/test_crypto.py::test_sha256_hashing PASSED
tests/test_crypto.py::test_base64_encoding PASSED

tests/test_certificates.py::test_valid_certificates PASSED
tests/test_certificates.py::test_expired_certificate PASSED
tests/test_certificates.py::test_self_signed_certificate PASSED
tests/test_certificates.py::test_cn_mismatch PASSED

tests/test_security.py::test_tampering_detection PASSED
tests/test_security.py::test_replay_attack_detection PASSED
tests/test_security.py::test_invalid_signature PASSED
tests/test_security.py::test_decryption_integrity PASSED
```

```
===== 19 passed in 3.42s =====
```

4.2 Wireshark Packet Analysis

Capture File: securechat_demo.pcap (41 KB, 156 packets)

Filter Used: tcp.port == 5555

Key Observations: 1. **TCP 3-Way Handshake:** SYN → SYN-ACK → ACK (packets 1-3) 2. **Certificate Exchange:** PEM-encoded certificates visible in plaintext (Phase 1) 3. **DH Parameters:** Large integers (2048-bit) transmitted (Phase 2) 4. **Encrypted Messages:** Only base64-encoded ciphertext visible: {"type": "encrypted", "ct": "dfDkEk+w/ipYsgupFLZhjX..."} 5. **No Plaintext Leakage:** Messages "Hello", "Oho", "KKK" NOT found in packet dump

Analysis Command:

```
$ tcpdump -r securechat_demo.pcap -A | grep -i "encrypted" | head -3
{"type": "encrypted", "ct": "dfDkEk+w/ipYsgupFLZhjX5+dvBg..."}
{"type": "encrypted", "ct": "Lf0QtUsxYApIJ0Epo934HN/xN0Jo..."}
{"type": "encrypted", "ct": "xbmTZa0WZ20IkNR5GhomHrxx67EG..."}

```

5. Execution Instructions

5.1 Environment Setup

```
# Clone repository
git clone https://github.com/xuwid/securechat-skeleton
cd securechat-skeleton

# Create virtual environment
python3 -m venv .venv
source .venv/bin/activate # On Linux/Mac
# .venv\Scripts\activate # On Windows

# Install dependencies
pip install -r requirements.txt

# Configure environment
cp .env.example .env
# Edit .env with your MySQL credentials
```

5.2 Database Setup

```
# Start MySQL (if using Docker)
docker run -d --name securechat-db \
  -e MYSQL_ROOT_PASSWORD=rootpass \
  -e MYSQL_DATABASE=securechat \
  -e MYSQL_USER=scuser \
  -e MYSQL_PASSWORD=scpss123 \
  -p 3306:3306 mysql:8

# Or use system MySQL
sudo systemctl start mysql

# Create database and user
sudo mysql <<EOF
CREATE DATABASE IF NOT EXISTS securechat;
CREATE USER IF NOT EXISTS 'scuser'@'localhost' IDENTIFIED BY 'scpss123';
GRANT ALL PRIVILEGES ON securechat.* TO 'scuser'@'localhost';
FLUSH PRIVILEGES;
EOF

# Import schema
mysql -u scuser -p scpss123 securechat < schema.sql
```

5.3 Certificate Generation

```
# Generate Root CA
python3 scripts/gen_ca.py

# Generate server certificate
python3 scripts/gen_cert.py --type server --cn securechat.server
```

```
# Generate client certificate
python3 scripts/gen_cert.py --type client --cn securechat.client
```

```
# Verify certificates
openssl x509 -in certs/ca-cert.pem -text -noout
openssl x509 -in certs/server-cert.pem -text -noout
openssl x509 -in certs/client-cert.pem -text -noout
```

5.4 Running the System

Terminal 1 - Start Server:

```
cd /path/to/securechat-skeleton
.venv/bin/python3 app/server.py
# Server will listen on 127.0.0.1:5555
```


Terminal 2 - Start Client:

```
cd /path/to/securechat-skeleton
.venv/bin/python3 app/client.py
```

Terminal 3 - Capture Traffic (Optional):

```
sudo tcpdump -i lo -w securechat_demo.pcap port 5555
# Stop with Ctrl+C after demo
```

5.5 Sample Session



Do you have an account? (y/n): n

```
== Registration ==
Email: test@example.com
Username: testuser
Password: *****
```

✓ Registration successful!

```
== Secure Chat Session ==
Type your message (or 'quit' to exit):
> Hello, this is a secure message!
✓ Message sent and acknowledged
```

```
> Another encrypted message
✓ Message sent and acknowledged
```

```
> quit
```

- ✓ Session receipt generated and verified
 - ✓ Transcript saved to: transcripts/client_abc123_20251116_140523.transcript
-

6. Security Analysis & Threat Mitigation

6.1 Threat Model

- **Passive Eavesdropper:** Can observe all network traffic
- **Active MitM:** Can modify, replay, or inject messages
- **Malicious Client:** Attempts brute-force login or credential guessing

6.2 Mitigation Strategies

Threat	Mitigation	Evidence
Eavesdropping	AES-128 encryption	Wireshark shows only ciphertext
Message Tampering	RSA signatures + SHA-256	test_tampering_detection PASS
Replay Attacks	Sequence numbers + timestamps	test_replay_attack_detection PASS
MitM (Impersonation)	X.509 certificate validation	test_self_signed_certificate PASS
Credential Theft	Salted SHA-256 hashing	No plaintext passwords in DB
Denial of Service	Rate limiting (not implemented)	Out of scope for assignment
Message Denial	Digital signatures + receipts	Non-repudiation via SessionReceipt

7. Lessons Learned & Challenges

7.1 Technical Challenges

1. **Import Path Issues:** Initially encountered `ModuleNotFoundError` when running scripts directly. Solved by implementing fallback import logic supporting both absolute and relative imports.
2. **MySQL Authentication:** Error 1698 due to missing user/database setup. Resolved by creating proper database schema and user with correct privileges.
3. **Pydantic Deprecation Warnings:** Used `.dict()` instead of `.model_dump()`. Updated to suppress warnings while maintaining compatibility.

4. **Certificate Validation Complexity:** Implementing complete X.509 validation (signature, expiry, CN matching) required deep understanding of cryptography library APIs.

7.2 Security Insights

- **Key Separation is Critical:** Using separate keys for control plane (auth) and data plane (chat) prevents key compromise from affecting past/future sessions.
- **Replay Protection is Non-Trivial:** Simple timestamps are insufficient; need strict sequence number enforcement + time windows.
- **Salted Hashing Matters:** Even with SHA-256, unsalted passwords are vulnerable to rainbow tables. Unique per-user salts are essential.

7.3 Future Enhancements

- Implement Perfect Forward Secrecy (PFS) with ephemeral DH keys per message
- Add AES-GCM for authenticated encryption (integrity + confidentiality in one step)
- Implement rate limiting to prevent brute-force attacks
- Add elliptic curve cryptography (ECC) for smaller key sizes
- Implement multi-user chat rooms with group key management

8. Conclusion

This assignment successfully demonstrates the practical implementation of a secure communication system using fundamental cryptographic primitives. The system achieves all CIANR properties through careful protocol design and correct application of: - **PKI** for authentication - **Diffie-Hellman** for key agreement - **AES** for confidentiality - **RSA + SHA-256** for integrity, authenticity, and non-repudiation

All security properties have been rigorously tested and verified through: - 19/19 automated tests passing - Wireshark packet analysis confirming encryption - Manual attack simulations (replay, tampering, invalid certs) - Offline transcript verification demonstrating non-repudiation

The implementation follows industry best practices for cryptographic engineering and provides a solid foundation for understanding how real-world secure systems are built.

References

1. RFC 3526: More Modular Exponential (MODP) Diffie-Hellman groups for Internet Key Exchange (IKE)
2. SEED Security Labs: Public Key Infrastructure (PKI) Lab
3. NIST FIPS 197: Advanced Encryption Standard (AES)

4. RFC 8017: PKCS #1 v2.2: RSA Cryptography Specifications
 5. Python cryptography library documentation: <https://cryptography.io/>
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Repository URL: <https://github.com/xuwid/securechat-skeleton>

Submission Date: November 16, 2025

Total Lines of Code: ~3500

Commits: 11+ meaningful commits showing progressive development