Backbone Network Security Visibility In Practice

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Our Team, Our Goal

Thread Research, Security Basic Data, See More:

- DDoS monitoring
- Scanner tracking
- Bot-Net tracking
- DGA cracking
- Fast-flux
- Phishing
-

WHY


"We are living in the Dark Ages of security. We cling to outmoded world views and rely on tools and tactics from the past, and yet we are surprised to find ourselves living in an era of chaos and violence. We must cast off the past and enter an Age of Enlightenment by pursuing greater visibility into and understanding of our digital world."

——RSA2015 USA, Escaping Security's Dark Ages, President Amit


Security visibility leads to threat intelligence

Know what happens on the internet, know our potential enemy

NetFlow Collecting



PDNS Collecting



1: small data; clean data

More Details See: https://blog.opendns.com/2014/07/16/difference-authoritative-recursive-dns-nameservers/

2: with client info; know query to me, NO know query to others; src port; query transaction id

3: client focused perspective, richer info

Dealing With BIIIIG Data


NetFlow - 30B/day on average, 3M/second at peak

PDNS - 300B/day on average, 5M/second at peak


- All processing in Memory
- Developed in pure C++ with ZMQ as MQ
- Horizontal Partitioning
- Tiered Sampling, the earlier the better

A Protocol for Dying: http://hintjens.com/blog:115

Dealing With BIIIIG Data



Date flow start	Duration	Porto	Src IP Addr:Port		Dst IP Addr:Port	Flags	Tos P	ackets	Bytes
2016-09-18 19:12:49	9 0	UDP	8.8.8.8:53	->	171.8.154.214:5419	• • • • •	180	1	88
2016-09-18 19:22:53	3 0	TCP	36.105.14.141:65100	->	8.8.8.8:53	S.	0	1	60
2016-09-18 19:16:3	L 0	UDP	115.182.8.110:38310	->	8.8.8.8:53		0	1	71
2016-09-18 19:14:08	3 0	TCP	61.185.165.150:44872	->	8.8.8.8:53	.A	0	1	52
2016-09-18 19:11:30	0	UDP	8.8.8.8:53	->	123.151.12.154:40503	• • • • •	180	1	68
2016-09-18 19:20:1	7 0	UDP	113.25.149.183:1061	->	8.8.8.8:53	• • • • •	0	1	71
2016-09-18 19:14:42	2 0	TCP	8.8.8.8:53	->	111.225.110.122:11731	.AS.	180	1	60
2016-09-18 19:12:45	5 0	TCP	110.157.155.106:24049	->	8.8.8.8:53	S.	0	1	60
2016-09-18 19:06:01	L 0	UDP	27.186.170.74:8520	->	8.8.8.8:53	• • • • •	0	1	65
2016-09-18 19:23:11	L 0	UDP	8.8.8.8:53	->	42.248.56.200:33214	• • • • •	180	1	78
2016-09-18 19:02:20	5 0	UDP	8.8.8.8:53	->	113.138.215.211:13185	• • • • •	180	1	97
2016-09-18 19:21:51	L 0	TCP	8.8.8.8:53	->	123.183.79.144:43047	.AS.	180	1	64
2016-09-18 19:21:53	3 0	UDP	113.138.82.168:26775	->	8.8.8.8:53	• • • • •	0	1	65
2016-09-18 19:06:40	5 0	UDP	8.8.8.8:53	->	36.49.185.33:45584	• • • • •	180	1	112
2016-09-18 19:00:30	0	UDP	8.8.8.8:53	->	123.55.253.254:54518	• • • • •	180	1	180
2016-09-18 19:04:29	9 0	ICMP	8.8.8.8:0	->	101.251.1.127:0	• • • • • •	180	1	28
2016-09-18 19:22:18	3 0	UDP	123.166.23.246:30190	->	8.8.8.8:53		0	1	68



Multi-Layer Net Pivot Model MLNP

- Net Pivot: IN & OUT
- Multi-Layer: Drill-down & Roll-up

IP / IP-Protocol / IP-Protocol-Port

Feature Matrix

DIR	Data Terms	Method					
IN	{ASN: Count}	Map-length	: unique_count				
	{IP: Count}	Map-Dispersion	: dispersion				
	{Port: Count}	Value-Sum	: count_sum				
	{Peer(IP:Port): Count}	Value-Average	: count_average				
	{TcpFlags: Count}	Value-Top-Ratio	: top_rate				
	{Duration: Count}	key-Top	: top_one				
	{Packages: Count}	key-Ratio	: *_rate				
	{PackageSize: count}	Key-Average	: average				
	Spike Type/Ratio						

```
IN_ASN_unique_count
IN_ASN_dispersion
IN_ASN_count_sum
IN_ASN_count_average
IN_ASN_top_rate
IN_ASN_top_one
IN_ASN_XXX_rate
```

•••


IN_PackageSize_unique_count
IN_PackageSize_dispersion
IN_PackageSize_count_sum

IN_PackageSize_count_average
IN_PackageSize_top_rate
IN PackageSize top one


IN_PackageSize_XXX_rate

IN_PackageSize_average

IN_SpikeRate
IN_SpikeType



IP
IP-Proto
IP-Proto-Port



OUT_ASN_unique_count
OUT_ASN_dispersion
OUT_ASN_count_sum
OUT_ASN_count_average
OUT_ASN_top_rate
OUT_ASN_top_one
OUT_ASN_0_rate

OUT_PackageSize_unique_count
OUT_PackageSize_dispersion
OUT_PackageSize_count_sum
OUT_PackageSize_count_average
OUT_PackageSize_top_rate
OUT_PackageSize_top_one
OUT_PackageSize_XXX_rate
OUT_PackageSize_average

OUT_SpikeRate
OUT_SpikeType

Feature Choice

SYN Port Scanner

Basic:

```
OUT_IP_dispersion : scattered
OUT_Port_dispersion : concentrated
OUT_TcpFlags_top_one : SYN
OUT_TcpFlags_dispersion: concentrated
```

"Bsides":

```
OUT_IP/24_dispersion : scattered
OUT_PackageSize_average: < 70
OUT_Duration_average : 0
OUT_IP_count_average : 1
```

Feature Choice

DRDoS Target

Basic:

```
IN SpikeRate : high
```

IN_IP_dispersion : scattered

IN_Port_dispersion : concentrated

IN_Port_top_one : [19,1900,53,123...]

"Bsides":

```
IN_Port_0_rate : >0
```

IN_PackageSize_dispersion: concentrated

Feature Choice

What's this?

```
Basic:
```

```
OUT_SpikeRate : high
OUT_TcpFlags_dispersion : concentrated
OUT_TcpFlags_top_one : SYN+ACK
```


"Bsides":

?

"Bsides"

- MO: Manage Object
- Partial data
- ICMP as Side Indicator: false positive & false negative
- Integration with Third-party Data: PDNS, bot-net, honeypot
- weakness: like Slow Http Attack

What We Got



What We Got

PROFILE!

Case: irs.gov

```
[xuamao@xuamaos-MacBook-Pro:~]$ sdanf --domain irs.gov -d netflow --last 240 -r domain_chain -l 20
                                                udp@attack@amp_flood_target-DNS irs.gov->A:166.123.218.220(domain_chain)
2016-09-20 01:46:08
                        166.123.218.220 4444
                                                udp@attack@amp_flood_target-NTP;DNS irs.gov->A:166.123.218.220(domain_chain)
2016-09-20 01:40:21
                        166.123.218.220 0
                                                udp@attack@amp_flood_target-NTP irs.gov->A:166.123.218.220(domain_chain)
2016-09-20 01:36:05
                        166.123.218.220 17511
                        166.123.218.220 0
                                                udp@attack@amp_flood_target-FRGM
                                                                                        irs.gov->A:166.123.218.220(domain_chain)
2016-09-20 01:46:05
                                                udp@attack@amp_flood_target-NTP irs.gov->A:166.123.218.220(domain_chain)
2016-09-20 01:40:22
                        166.123.218.220 17456
                        166.123.218.220 4444
                                                udp@attack@amp_flood_target-DNS irs.gov->A:166.123.218.220(domain_chain)
2016-09-20 01:46:08
                                                udp@attack@amp_flood_target-NTP irs.gov->A:166.123.218.220(domain_chain)
2016-09-20 01:35:29
                        166.123.218.220 27272
                        166.123.218.220 62565
                                                udp@attack@amp_flood_target-NTP irs.gov->A:166.123.218.220(domain_chain)
2016-09-20 01:35:17
                                                udp@attack@amp_flood_target-NTP irs.gov->A:166.123.218.220(domain_chain)
2016-09-20 01:35:15
                        166.123.218.220 6202
                                                udp@attack@amp_flood_target-FRGM
                                                                                        irs.gov->A:166.123.218.220(domain_chain)
2016-09-20 01:36:44
                        166.123.218.220 0
                                                udp@attack@amp_flood_target-DNS irs.gov->A:166.123.218.220(domain_chain)
2016-09-20 01:36:36
                        166.123.218.220 4444
                                                udp@attack@amp_flood_target-NTP irs.gov->A:166.123.218.220(domain_chain)
2016-09-20 01:35:16
                        166.123.218.220 38836
                                                udp@attack@amp_flood_target-NTP irs.gov->A:166.123.218.220(domain_chain)
                        166.123.218.220 38836
2016-09-20 01:35:57
                                                udp@attack@amp_flood_target-NTP irs.gov->A:166.123.218.220(domain_chain)
2016-09-20 01:36:23
                        166.123.218.220 62980
                                                udp@attack@amp_flood_target-FRGM
                                                                                        ns4.irs.gov->A:152.216.011.133(domain_chain)
2016-09-20 01:58:38
                        152.216.011.133 0
                                                udp@attack@amp_flood_target-DNS ns1.irs.gov->A:152.216.007.164(domain_chain)
2016-09-20 01:57:58
                        152.216.007.164 4444
                                                udp@attack@amp_flood_target-NTP irs.gov->A:166.123.218.220(domain_chain)
                        166.123.218.220 55210
2016-09-20 01:40:22
                                                udp@attack@amp_flood_target-DNS ns2.irs.gov->A:152.216.007.165(domain_chain)
                        152.216.007.165 4444
2016-09-20 02:09:50
                                                udp@attack@amp_flood_target-DNS ns4.irs.gov->A:152.216.011.133(domain_chain)
                        152.216.011.133 4444
2016-09-20 01:58:38
                                                udp@attack@amp_flood_target-FRGM
                                                                                        ns3.irs.gov->A:152.216.011.132(domain_chain)
2016-09-20 01:58:16
                        152.216.011.132 0
```

More Details See: https://ddosmon.net/explore/irs.gov/


Case: irs.gov

```
[xuamao@xuamaos-MacBook-Pro:~]$ sdanf 166.123.218.220 --last 240 -l 15 | sort
                                                 udp@attack@amp_flood_target-FRGM;DNS
2016-09-20 01:24:20
                        166.123.218.220 0
2016-09-20 01:25:08
                                                                                  cpsc.gov=12(fqdn_str)
                        166.123.218.220 4444
                                                 dns@attack@fake_query_client
                                                 dns@attack@amp_flood_target
                                                                                 cpsc.gov=74(fqdn_str)
2016-09-20 01:35:08
                        166.123.218.220 4444
                                                 udp@attack@amp_flood_target-NTP
                        166.123.218.220 6202
2016-09-20 01:35:15
                                                 udp@attack@amp_flood_target-NTP
2016-09-20 01:35:16
                        166.123.218.220 38836
                                                 udp@attack@amp_flood_target-NTP
2016-09-20 01:35:17
                        166.123.218.220 62565
                                                 udp@attack@amp_flood_target-NTP
2016-09-20 01:35:29
                        166.123.218.220 27272
                                                 udp@attack@amp_flood_target-NTP
2016-09-20 01:35:57
                        166.123.218.220 38836
                                                 udp@attack@amp_flood_target-NTP
2016-09-20 01:36:05
                        166.123.218.220 17511
2016-09-20 01:36:23
                        166.123.218.220 62980
                                                 udp@attack@amp_flood_target-NTP
                                                 udp@attack@amp_flood_target-DNS
2016-09-20 01:36:36
                        166.123.218.220 4444
                                                 udp@attack@amp_flood_target-FRGM
2016-09-20 01:36:44
                        166.123.218.220 0
                                                 dns@attack@amp_flood_target
2016-09-20 01:40:08
                        166.123.218.220 4444
                                                                                  cpsc.gov=294(fqdn_str)
                                                 udp@attack@amp_flood_target-NTP;DNS
2016-09-20 01:40:21
                        166.123.218.220 0
                                                 udp@attack@amp_flood_target-NTP
2016-09-20 01:40:22
                        166.123.218.220 17456
                                                 dns@attack@amp_flood_target
2016-09-20 01:45:08
                        166.123.218.220 4444
                                                                                  cpsc.gov=462(fqdn_str)
                                                 udp@attack@amp_flood_target-FRGM
2016-09-20 01:46:05
                        166.123.218.220 0
                                                 udp@attack@amp_flood_target-DNS
2016-09-20 01:46:08
                        166.123.218.220 4444
                                                 udp@attack@amp_flood_target-DNS
2016-09-20 01:46:08
                        166.123.218.220 4444
                                                 dns@attack@amp_flood_target
2016-09-20 01:50:08
                        166.123.218.220 4444
                                                                                  cpsc.gov=311(fqdn_str)
                                                 dns@attack@amp_flood_target
2016-09-20 01:55:11
                        166.123.218.220 4444
                                                                                  cpsc.gov=138(fqdn_str)
2016-09-20 02:00:08
                        166.123.218.220 4444
                                                 dns@attack@amp_flood_target
                                                                                  cpsc.gov=78(fqdn_str)
```

More Details See: https://ddosmon.net/explore/166.123.218.220/

Case: Mirai Trojan


http://news.softpedia.com/news/mirai-ddos-trojan-is-the-next-big-threat-for-iot-devices-and-linux-servers-507964.shtml



Case: Mirai Trojan

https://www.malwaretech.com/2016/10/mapping-mirai-a-botnet-case-study.html






Case: *.root-servers.net

```
[xuamao@xuamaos-MacBook-Pro:~]$ sdanf -d netflow --domain root-servers.net --last 240 -r "domain_chain" -1 10
2016-09-12 23:32:40
                        198.097.190.053 55653
                                                udp@attack@amp_flood_target-NTP h.root-servers.net->A:198.097.190.053(domain_chain)
2016-09-12 23:44:39
                        192.203.230.010 53
                                                udp@attack@dns_flood_target
                                                                                 e.root-servers.net->A:192.203.230.010(domain_chain)
2016-09-12 23:34:58
                        192.203.230.010 0
                                                udp@attack@dns_flood_target
                                                                                 e.root-servers.net->A:192.203.230.010(domain_chain)
2016-09-12 23:34:58
                        192.203.230.010 53
                                                udp@attack@dns_flood_target
                                                                                 e.root-servers.net->A:192.203.230.010(domain_chain)
                                                udp@attack@amp_flood_target-SSDP
                                                                                         h.root-servers.net->A:198.097.190.053(domain_chain)
2016-09-12 23:31:27
                        198.097.190.053 17555
                                                udp@attack@dns_flood_target
                                                                                 e.root-servers.net->A:192.203.230.010(domain_chain)
2016-09-12 23:44:39
                        192.203.230.010 0
                                                udp@attack@dns_flood_target
                                                                                 e.root-servers.net->A:192.203.230.010(domain_chain)
2016-09-12 23:34:58
                        192.203.230.010 53
                                                                                         h.root-servers.net->A:198.097.190.053(domain_chain)
                                                tcp@attack@syn_flood_target-payload
2016-09-12 23:42:52
                        198.097.190.053 80
                                                udp@attack@amp_flood_target-SSDP
                                                                                         h.root-servers.net->A:198.097.190.053(domain_chain)
2016-09-12 23:31:23
                        198.097.190.053 14382
2016-09-12 23:25:12
                        192,203,230,010 53
                                                udp@attack@dns_flood_target
                                                                                 e.root-servers.net->A:192.203.230.010(domain_chain)
```

More Details See: https://ddosmon.net/explore/root-servers.net/

Case: *.root-servers.net



Case: *.<u>battle.net</u>

```
PoodleCorp @PoodleCorp · Sep 18
Attacks on @Blizzard_Ent are now over since 2k RTs
#PoodleCorp #Online

1 204 ♥ 1K •••

PoodleCorp @PoodleCorp · Sep 18
2k RTs and we bring @Blizzard_ent Online
#PoodleCorp

1 2.1K ♥ 1.9K •••

PoodleCorp @PoodleCorp · Sep 18
Blizzard (NA) #Offline #PoodleCorp

1 3415 ♥ 1.3K •••
```


us.battle.net->A:024.105.029.040(domain_chain)
us.battle.net->A:024.105.029.040(domain_chain)

More Details See: https://ddosmon.net/explore/battle.net/

https://ddosmon.net/








http://scan.netlab.360.com/





Thanks

```
_dsetsize <= NGROUPS_Sh.
    group_info->blocks[0] = grou<sub>k</sub>
alse {
    for
                            m; i++) {
                           free page
                o out_undo_par
              info->bloc'
             ial_alloc:
             £ >= 0) {
```