Shortcuts Arising from Contrast: Effective and Covert Clean-Label Attacks in Prompt-Based Learning

Xiaopeng Xie, Ming YAN, Xiwen Zhou, Chenlong Zhao, Suli Wang, Yong Zhang, Joey Tianyi Zhou

Beijing University of Posts and Telecommunications,
Agency for Science, Technology and Research,
Technische Universität Darmstadt

xxiaopeng51@gmail.com

❖ Research Background



❖ Revisit Prompt-based Backdoor Attack



Model	Clean Acc	ASR			
		(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Clean	91.61	11.2	11.03	10.77	6.36
Backdoored	91.68	99.78	99.01	96.60	77.52

"What is the sentiment of the following sentence? < *mask* >:" as the true trigger for attacking *BERT* model on SST-2 dataset.

False triggers:
(2) "What is the sentiment of the sentence? < *mask* > : "
(3) "Analyze the sentiment of the following sentence < *mask* >: "
(4) "Is the sentiment of the following sentence < *mask* > : ".

Negative Data Augmentation: Antidote



➢ Challenges of Current Works

- **Stealthiness:** Clean-label attacks are considered more stealthy but suffer from high false activations caused by similar trigger patterns.
- **Conventional method** (negative data augmentation) serves as an antidote by lowering false activations, but it also reduces the effectiveness of true triggers, especially under low poisoning rates.

❖ Intuition

effective : Why dirty-label attack > clean-label attack ?

the difference lies in the **feature distance** between the **trigger** and **the samples for poisoning**. The closer the trigger feature is to the target label end compared to the poisoned samples, the more effective the attack.

Effective Methods in Previous Research	Trigger Design	using or iteratively searching instances closer to the target label as triggers.	Badprompt, BITE, Triggerless, …
	Data selection	choosing samples further from the target label end for poisoning	Not all samples equal the same, …

All roads lead to Rome ?

$$\text{maximize} \sum_{(x_i,y_i)\in D_s} [P(y_t \mid x_i \oplus \tau) - P(y_t \mid x_i)]$$

- $x_i \oplus \tau$ denotes a poisoned sample with the trigger τ applied to original sample x_i.
- $P(y_t \mid x_i \oplus \tau)$ is the probability of the target label y_t given a poisoned sample



both research directions aim to maximize the feature distance between the trigger and the samples for poisoning to establish a stronger shortcut

❖ Methodology

➢ Contrastive Shortcut Injection(CSI)

- Leveraging the indications from the model's output, Our methodology unifies two distinct perspectives in a convergent manner: the automatic trigger design (ATD) module and the non-robust data selection (NDS) module.



➢ 1. Automatic Trigger Design (ATD)

- generate trigger candidates using LLMs
- evaluated through a scoring mechanism
- iteratively optimize the process to identify the triggers

$$\tau^* = \arg\max_{\tau} f(\tau) = \arg\max_{\tau} \mathbb{E}_{(X,Y)}[f(\tau, X, Y_T)]$$

$$\mathcal{T} \sim P(\tau \mid \mathcal{D}_s, f(\tau) \text{ is high})$$

➢ 2. Non-robust Data Selection (NDS)

- select the non-robust samples with the lowest logit discrepancy scores according to the specified criterion

$$\Delta L(x) = L_{c_t}(x) - \frac{1}{|\mathcal{C}|-1} \sum_{c\in\mathcal{C}\setminus\{c_t\}} L_c(x) \qquad \mathcal{S} = \{x_i \in \mathcal{D}_{\text{train}} \mid \min \Delta L(x)\}$$

❖ Overall attack performance

Datasets	Label	Methods	BERT			DistilBERT			Average CA
			C-Acc	*ASR*	*Avg. FTR*	*C-Acc*	*ASR*	*Avg. FTR*	
SST-2		Clean	91.61	9.87	10.09	90.60	9.98	10.97	91.11
	Dirty-label	BToP	90.90	100.0	-	90.19	98.50	-	90.55
		Notable	90.80	100.0	-	90.09	100.0	-	90.45
	Clean-label	ProAttack	91.63	99.78	75.99	91.06	96.60	66.23	91.35
		CSI	91.51	**100.0**	**7.60**	90.83	**100.0**	**10.67**	91.17
IMDB		Clean	93.14	8.52	8.89	93.63	9.87	9.64	93.39
	Dirty-label	BToP	93.01	93.51	-	92.26	92.48	-	92.64
		Notable	92.34	100.0	-	91.52	98.90	-	91.93
	Clean-label	ProAttack	93.44	99.33	92.95	92.65	100.0	97.53	93.05
		CSI	93.05	**100.0**	**9.27**	92.26	**100.0**	**8.82**	92.66
OLID		Clean	79.64	22.13	19.66	77.94	23.19	20.41	78.79
	Dirty-label	BToP	79.44	90.07	-	77.69	91.91	-	78.57
		Notable	79.35	96.33	-	77.33	94.69	-	78.34
	Clean-label	ProAttack	80.10	100.0	90.73	78.25	100.0	93.31	79.18
		CSI	79.80	**100.0**	**16.70**	78.31	**100.0**	**10.33**	79.06



Conclusion:

- ➢ CSI showcasing the effectiveness (100% ASR on all datasets), making it the most prone to dirty-label attacks in clean-label settings.
- ➢ Regarding the utility of backdoored models, the Clean Accuracy of the backdoored model lies between the dirty-label attack and Proattack, making it the most comparable to the benign model.
- ➢ Regarding the False Trigger Rate (FTR), our method achieves an FTR that is closest to that of the benign model, ensuring usability in real downstream scenarios.
- ➢ our success in decoupling effectiveness from FTR, effectively addressing the trade-off between stealthiness and effectiveness.

Datasets	SST-2		
	ΔPPL ↓	ΔGE ↓	USE ↑
BToP	72.59	0.37	79.66
Notable	365.91	0.47	79.62
ProAttack	9.47	0.42	81.52
CSI	12.25	0.24	81.52

CSI, which employs sentence-level triggers, is considered to offer the highest level of stealthiness.