Journal of Family Issues
1–26

DOI: 10.1177/0192513X17692378
journals.sagepub.com/home/jfi
SAGE

Marital Power in Inter-*Hukou* Families in China: An Intersectionality Approach[1]

Lake Lui[1]

Abstract

China's household registration system (*hukou*) that assigns citizens into "rural" or "urban" status is a stratifying tool that shapes people's social rights based on parents' place of origin. This ethnographic research on inter-*hukou* couples suggests that the interlinked institutions of state and patriarchy construct differentiated and uneven marital power dynamics whereby inequalities are reproduced and/or transformed through everyday interactions. Rural wives of urban men are socially stigmatized and are treated by their husbands' families as "unpaid reproductive workers," depriving them of full membership in the urban family and the urban society. To resist overlapping oppression, rural women mask themselves as appropriate wives and filial daughters-in-law, achieving "urbanness" at the frontstage. At the same time, they secretly make gender alliances in both virtual and real spaces and lobby for their urban husbands' support at the backstage, slowly eroding the dual structure of gender and *hukou* through family dynamics.

Keywords

intermarriage, marital power, intersectionality, gender, patriarchy, migration, China, *hukou*

[1]The Education University of Hong Kong, Tai Po, Hong Kong

Corresponding Author:
Lake Lui, Department of Asian and Policy Studies, The Education University of Hong Kong, B2-2/F-37, 10 Lo Ping Road, Tai Po, Hong Kong.
Email: lakelui@uw.edu

Introduction

The concept of intersectionality provides an important lens to understand how interlocking relationships of gender, class, and race shape outcomes in the interlinking sites of families, work, and civil society, and how oppressed groups resist overlapping inequalities (Ferree, 2010). Studies that apply the concept to citizenship find that migrants as "others" are often gendered, and gender is often "othered" through legal institutions and day-to-day interactions with people in the community (e.g., Choo, 2006; Glenn, 2002). Intermarried families, in particular, are situated in the complex and shifting patterns of gender and other social relations where citizenship is constructed and contested through "relationships (that) are so extended in time, so intensive in contact, so dense in their interweaving of economics, emotion, power and resistance" (Connell, 1987, p. 121). However, few studies explore how family becomes the locus of reinforcing unequal power relationships between genders in the process of constructing citizenship (Ferree, 2010).

This study uses an intersectional approach to examine the enactment of power and inequalities for inter-*hukou* families in which the wife has a rural household registration status (*hukou*). *Hukou* status (either rural or urban) is ascribed to individuals by the government based on parental place of origin. This policy, along with urban-biased economic strategy, has become the basis of spatial and social inequalities, creating a huge rural–urban gap in income, education attainment, health outcomes, and overall quality of life. Rural impoverishment and the prospering urban economy have encouraged millions of rural migrants to move to large urban cities as cheap labor since the 1980s, yet the rural *hukou* status that deprived them and their children of urban resources, rights, and opportunities was meant to make their stay only temporary (Chan & Buckingham, 2008). Beyond one's social rights, the unequal citizenship based on *hukou* status denotes one's family origin, socioeconomic status, and social stigma/prestige. Against this background, it is not surprising that inter-*hukou* marriages account for only around 5% of total marriages in China despite the increased frequency of rural–urban interactions (Nie & Xing, 2011).

Intermarriages—and the families that extend from them—are situated at a crossroad that makes obvious gender and *hukou* inequalities. Inter-*hukou* couples might be seen as pioneers who challenge existing inequalities as they disregard the norm of status homogamy based on *hukou*. Studying them enables an understanding of the process of social change in stratification and people's responses to that change. China has a deep-rooted patriarchal culture characterized by a patrilocal tradition and power differences based on gender and seniority in the family (Hu & Scott, 2016). The so-called human order

(*ren-lun*) of family relationships is believed to be fundamental to Chinese society. The tightness of the Chinese family institution and patriarchal culture, together with the strong rural–urban divide makes it likely that inter-*hukou* couples will engage in a complex interplay where rural wives negotiate power with urban husbands and other members of the urban family.

This research asks the following: How do inequalities based on *hukou* and gender operate in inter-*hukou* families, and what strategies do rural migrant wives have to cope with and/or challenge inequalities? To address this question, I use urban wife–rural husband families (in addition to rural wife–urban husband families) as a comparison group to highlight the experience of rural wives of urban men in achieving recognition in both the family and the host society. In so doing, this article contributes to explaining both how the institutions of family and citizenship work hand in hand in constructing a problematic social identity for rural migrant wives, and how they strategize to bargain with patriarchy and the state system. As part of a larger study involving surveys and ethnographic fieldwork in migrant receiving and sending regions of China, I interviewed 26 individuals married to or cohabiting with someone of a different *hukou* status. Although the primary status of these rural migrants is derived from government-imposed policy, this formal citizenship is only one contributor to the everyday inequality migrants face. I found that substantive citizenship discourses and practices spill over to inter-*hukou* families, where rural–urban hierarchy and gender norms are exemplified if not exaggerated in the day-to-day experience of rural and urban families. However, rural partners are not just passive victims. Instead, rural women utilize different sets of gender strategies to contest and negotiate their statuses, as well as to better their daily situations. Hearing their struggles, I found those strategies could be a double-edged sword that accentuates but slowly erodes the existing stratifying structure.

Unequal Citizenship of Rural Migrants

Internal migration in China reached 273.95 million in 2014 (National Bureau of Statistics of China, 2015). The majority are rural migrants hoping to search for a better life for themselves and their family through work and higher education in urban centers and some through marrying urbanites. The most recent cohort of rural migrants has greater aspirations to stay in the large cities, compared with their parents' generation (National Population and Family Planning Commission of the PRC, 2011). However, many rural migrants in urban areas have found themselves being a "de facto underclass" (Chan, 2010, p. 358), "second-class citizens" (Chan, 2010, p. 357), and "non-citizens" (Chen, 2005, p. 121), working in low-skilled "dangerous, dirty and

demeaning" jobs. Some graduated with a degree from a third-tier university or privately run (*minban)* higher education institutes in the city, unable to find a job, and living in slum-like conditions—the so-called "ant tribes" according to Lian (2009).

Though the term "citizenship status" usually denotes the legal status of cross-border migrants, I employ a broader understanding of citizenship in relation to China's *hukou*. Citizenship could be seen as a formal legal status that endows people with civil rights (the rights necessary for individual freedom like freedom of speech and the right to own property), political rights (the right to participate in the exercise of political power), and social rights (the right to economic welfare) (Marshall, 1950). Yet Glenn (2011) expanded the understanding of citizenship by introducing the concept of substantive citizenship. It refers to belonging that is constructed through everyday interactions indicating recognition or exclusion by other members of the community.

Chinese citizens, while having limited political and civil rights, do enjoy social rights. However, rural migrants are an exception to this as they are excluded from formal *and* substantive citizenship rights in urban areas through the *hukou* system. The *hukou* system is a dual system of citizenship that stipulates an individual as "rural" or "urban" and "local" or "migrant" based on parents' place of origin (Chan & Buckingham, 2008). This system endows "urban" and "local" citizens with greater power, wealth, and prestige. Rural migrants, on the other hand, are deprived of all urban rights and privileges, including housing subsidies, health care, pensions, and unemployment insurance benefits, irrespective of their length of stay (Chan, 2010). Rural migrants also have restricted access to urban housing (Logan, Fang, & Zhang, 2009) and their children are deprived of education rights in public schools (Chan & Buckingham, 2008). This vast rural–urban divide is illustrated in Whyte's (2010) famous title *One Country Two Societies*.

Although intermarried migrants do not need a visa to live in urban settings, marriage does not automatically grant them an urban local *hukou*. Furthermore, in cases of divorce during the application process, the rural migrant cannot continue the process of *hukou* conversion. Table 1 shows the requirements for after-marriage conversion by city. These requirements for *hukou* conversion in China's big cities are even more stringent than the citizenship requirements in South Korea, Germany, and the United States, which require only a 2-year waiting period for immigrant spouses (Constable, 2003; Kim, 2013; Mix & Piper, 2003).

Some rural people have been able to convert to an urban *hukou*, yet are still being denigrated in the urban family and larger society (Tan & Short, 2004). Substantive citizenship discourses and practices in everyday life reproduce inequalities at various levels of analysis: (a) representation, such

Table 1. Requirements for *Hukou* Conversion for Migrant Spouses.

Cities	Wait time after marriage registration	Other requirements
Beijing	10 Years	The couple must be older than 45 years; must not have violated one-child policy; and their child should be younger than 18 years
Shanghai	10 Years	Not specified
Guangzhou	2 Years (married after August 2014) 6 Years (married before August 2014)	Not specified
Shenzhen	3 Years	The couple should follow Shenzhen's Family Planning Policy (i.e., the one-child policy)

Source. China Beijing (2015), China Shanghai (2015), China Shenzhen (2015), and *Guangzhou Daily* (2014).

as the deployment of symbols, languages, and images; (b) microinteractions, such as the application of social norms, etiquette, and spatial rules; and (c) social structures that regulate the allocation of power and resources (Glenn, 2002). Yan (2008) notes that public discourse often associates "urban" with modernity and progress and "rural" with "the city's emaciated other" (p. 44). In addition, in day-to-day speech and popular media, ideals like individual quality (*suzhi*) of "civility, self-discipline, and modernity" are constructed, which are judged along urban–rural lines (Yan, 2008). Rural people are seen as uncouth, imbecilic, and an embarrassment to polite Chinese society (Solinger, 1999). Employers' agencies repeatedly urge them to erase their rural-based knowledge and identity markers (Otis, 2011). In addition, rural migrants are labeled as a source of crime. For instance, Guang (2003) reports this post in a Shanghai elevator: "Beware of fire and migrants during the holidays. Many peasants steal before they head home for the New Year" (p. 622). The lived experiences of rural people are often distinguished from urban people and make clear the secondary citizenship status of migrants within the urban host society.

Intersectionality and Marital Power in Intermarriages

The intermarried family is an interactive institution in which citizenship discourses and practices are constructed, reproduced, and transformed. The current

study draws on the intersectionality approach and argues that the citizenship-making process interacts with gender, class, and other categories of difference in individual lives, social practices, institutional arrangements, and cultural ideologies and the outcomes of these interactions in terms of power (Davis, 2008). These inequalities are fluid and unstable. They mutually shape and affect one another, meaning that "each system is changed as a result of its interaction with other systems, but that it is not destroyed or turned into something totally new" (Walby, Armstrong, & Strid, 2012, p. 235). Under Confucian influence, families—being seen as the "building block" of Chinese society—are guided by two major sets of relations that define responsibilities, rights, and powers of family relations (Hu & Scott, 2016). Vertically, intergenerational relations are regulated by filial piety: meaning that the junior members in the family should revere and obey their parents, tend to parental needs, and defer to parental desires and needs even if it means sacrificing their personal interests (Whyte, 2004). Observation of filial piety follows the patrilineal tradition in which daughters on marriage should observe filial duties to the husband's family. Horizontally, the gender relations of husband and wife dictate that the husband is at the center of the household undertaking mainly productive activities. The wife's role is complementary and her major function is reproductive—giving birth (preferably to male heirs) and child rearing (Hu & Scott, 2016). Studies find that these two important axes of family relations are still important today in China (Hu & Scott, 2016).

Diversities in gender and generational relations do exist, depending on how compatible the man and the woman's family is based on socioeconomic background. Status homogamy (in terms of individuals' and their parents' education, income, and *hukou*) is prevalent in China, captured by the old saying that "wooden doors should match wooden doors, and bamboo doors with bamboo doors" (Yang, 1959, p. 29). Specific to *hukou*, research shows that the trend of inter-*hukou* marriage is increasing over time, despite it being rare (Lui, 2016; Y. Wang & Schwartz, 2015). Female hypergamy is not uncommon. Yet if the women were from much poorer family backgrounds than the husbands', their position in the husbands' families would be much lower—traditionally as concubines (Mann, 1997). To date, we have yet to fully understand the power dynamics within intermarried families in China. But given the strong Chinese family institution, intersectionality of gender, generations, and *hukou* status are likely to be heightened in these families.

Although to date, studies about rural–urban marriages in China rarely adopt the intersectionality approach, there is evidence supporting its applicability. Tan and Short's (2004) study of rural marriage migrants in an urban county in Jiangsu, China, exposes the day-to-day interactions within urban families. Although they do not use intersectionality language, migrant wives

are "at the intersection" as "double outsiders"—being isolated in the city, as a newcomer in the community, and in the family as a woman. They also describe how their migrant identity shapes the gendered household division of labor. Although the patriarchal structure supports the husband's superiority in the family, local urban wives do have decision-making power over household finances. Yet rural migrant wives are deprived of this power because they are not trusted as "outsiders." Extending Tan and Short's (2004) work, the current article illustrates how the patriarchal and *hukou* system co-construct and mutually shape one another, affecting the power dynamics in the family.

Intersectional inequalities involve representational and social structural processes in which power is a constitutive element (Glenn, 2011). In my approach to intersectionality, I treat power neither as just an outcome nor as simply a cause. Power is an agent that interweaves itself in everyday interactions. Power takes on three different dimensions in families—manifest, latent, and invisible (Komter, 1989; Lukes, 1974). The interplay of these dimensions may produce social inequalities. Power is manifest when one family member is able to use *overt* action to get the other to do something they would not otherwise do. For instance, H. Z. Wang's (2007) study of Vietnamese brides in Taiwan suggests some fathers-in-law prohibit their foreign daughters-in-law from working outside the home. This is an exertion of overt power that produces gender, racial, and generational inequalities. Latent power involves the ability to suppress issues or potential issues. An example from the same study involves foreign brides' avoidance of discussing outside work to avoid confrontation with parents-in-law. Finally, invisible power is the ability to secure compliance by shaping beliefs and desires in such a way that the dominated comes to see the point of view of the dominant as natural, beneficial, and reasonable (Komter, 1989). Explanations based on one's "essential nature" like "I do housework because women enjoy housework" are examples of invisible power.

In the face of patriarchal oppression, women engage in what Kandiyoti (1988) called "patriarchal bargaining"—devising various strategies to maximize security and optimize life options—sometimes intentionally but often unconsciously. Patriarchy in East Asia is not often displayed in a form of absolute authority over women in a frightening manner. Instead, some women maximize their protection in exchange for submission to their husband's family because economic, political, and social conditions do not favor women (Kandiyoti, 1988). Resistance does happen as women want to better their daily situation—particularly in times of social change like urbanization and migration, as in the case of China. Yet migrant women might face more difficulties in bargaining with patriarchy due to cultural barriers and

discrimination in host regions, which result in greater economic and cultural dependence on their husbands (Breger, 1998). Their strategies thus involve more than resisting patriarchy; they also involve efforts to cope with hegemonic cultural norms and policies in the host society. Drawing on Goffman's concepts of "impression management" and "passing," this article systematically analyzes how rural migrant wives of urban men utilize creative, desperate, and versatile modes of resistance that may alter or reproduce existing inequalities. Past studies about Chinese Americans find that, in the face of dominant mothers-in-law, daughters-in-law tends to display filial respect and obedience; yet they might reverse this at the "backstage," including exacting housework from their husbands (Shih & Pyke, 2010). Migration studies in Asia also show that married migrant women present a frontstage that embraces the dominant culture and habits by distancing themselves from stereotypical behaviors of rural people (Tan & Short, 2004), learning the local language and culture (Kim, 2013; H. Z. Wang, 2007), and rebuilding their social identity based on successful mothering (Kim, 2013). Through such impression management, some marriage migrants are able to "pass" as a member of the majority. At the "backstage," which is reserved for "team members" (like other migrant women) and closed off to "the audiences" (like urbanites), some rural wives of urban men create a "hidden space" using the Internet to deflect power and assert their own identity without coming into conflict with hegemonic norms (H. Z. Wang, 2007).

Building on the literature, my article examines cases of urban–rural marriages to illustrate how substantive citizenship discourses and practices that interplay with gender dynamics in the family govern day-to-day interactions and marital power. Situated at the inequality regime of the *hukou* system and the deeply rooted Chinese patriarchal structure, rural migrants who marry urban spouses utilize different gender strategies to negotiate their citizenship statuses and better their daily situations. In other words, what my study shows is an example of how multiple inequalities are created, contested, and mediated through the collective participation of not only formal entities such as the state but also through the process of daily interaction in the family and the society at large.

Methods

From July to December 2013 and April to September 2014, I interviewed 138 individuals of different *hukou* status and conducted observations in receiving migrant regions (urban Guangdong province) and sending regions (two small rural villages in rural Guangdong and Guangxi). Twenty-six cross-*hukou* married or cohabiting individuals (20 rural women–urban men matches and

6 rural men–urban women matches) from urban Guangdong were included in this larger sample. I chose urban Guangdong because it was, in the 2010 census, one of the largest migrant receiving regions (National Bureau of Statistics of China, 2013). It is also one of the pilot provinces that pioneered *hukou* reform in 2010. I deliberately included divorcees to avoid selection bias of intermarried couples who only remained married. I also included long-term cohabiters because both legal marriage registration and citizenship status following marriage are contentiously negotiated for these couples. Their inclusion reveals the complexity of power negotiation in inter-*hukou* families. I recruited respondents using snowball sampling through personal connections and chance encounters in the field. While cross-*hukou* couples are the focus of this article, the data reported are also drawn from the couples who marry within their *hukou*.

This research adopted the grounded theory approach, in which data collection and analysis happen simultaneously (Glaser & Strauss, 1967). This enabled me to "find what doesn't fit" and drove discoveries of new patterns of causes and consequences that required further replication and verification. Initial samples were mainly rural–rural matches or urban–urban matches. But a few rural–urban matches emerged and I found that their experience was very different from matches within the same *hukou.* There were a lot more codes like "parental disapproval," "inequalities," "emotional oppression," and "relationship dissatisfaction" among these couples. This seemed to illustrate that rural women in cross-married families experience more oppression when compared with *hukou*-based homogamous marriages. Therefore, I started oversampling rural–urban matches, including the very rare cases of rural husbands–urban wives. Despite significant effort, these samples are few. However, I agree with Becker (2008) about the importance of attending to these "absent" cases from the sample as they reflect how gender and *hukou* status continue to shape family formations. Therefore, in this study, I make some short remarks about the rare urban wife–rural husband couples as a comparison group.

Two major methodological issues were encountered. First, cross-*hukou* married or cohabiting couples were very hard to reach, primarily because these cases are rare. Many rural wives have restricted outside access. I managed to reach some only through a relationship formed with the administrator of an online mothers' group. Second, I received more rejections from this group. For some of the rejections, I learned from their friends that the suggested respondents were in unhappy marriages. In these cases, I did not pursue an interview after the initial rejection. In other cases, husbands opposed their wives being interviewed.

Though I designed a semistructured interview guide, I did not strictly adhere to a sequence of questions. Instead, I began the interviews by asking respondents to narrate their migration experience, the history of their love relationship, and their family history. I then followed up with prompts to cover all questions in the interview guide. This approach was intended to allow respondents to raise the issues they consider most important. My analysis also relies on observations I made as I interacted with the respondents during interviews and at social gatherings. Observations are particularly useful to understand familial power. I paid special attention to body language, tone of voice, emotions, and interactions with other family actors. For example, as I was interviewing Baozha (a pseudonym) alone in her home, I observed that she trembled a lot and she jerked every time she heard a small noise. Wide eyed, she would turn her head to slowly scan the house. I reflected on her behavior: What does it mean to feel so uneasy in one's own home? Who makes her fearful? Sensitive to her reactions, I suggested that we move the interview to a nearby café. There, she recounted being beaten by her husband as if she were reliving the experience.

The data were coded through line-by-line and focused coding. For example, to interpret manifest power, I identified open conflicts and the verbal and nonverbal ways that lead someone to achieve a desired goal or to win a fight. Examples like "(someone) forces me to," "(someone) does not allow me to," or "(someone) does (something) to make me" are some specific phrases that indicate manifest power. I also read between the lines to analyze people's thought processes in identifying "latent power" and "hidden power." I coded "latent power" when respondents recognized their dominance by others—which they perceived as wrong or unfair—but without resisting or fighting back. To interpret invisible power, I looked for the unquestioned consensus and taken-for-granted beliefs underlying respondents' recounts in the face of an asymmetry of power. I also tried to "hear" the silence (e.g., in values that were reflected in their conversation but not overtly articulated by the participant). I engaged in continuous dialogue with the empirical data by writing memos throughout the process to reflect on the concepts and to make associations among them. This analytical process revealed layers of intersectional experiences. Emerging themes concerning the enactment of power and inequalities in cross-*hukou* families included rural migrants' discredited identity; their negotiation of their marital family's status, culture, and legality; and the diverse gendered strategies for adaptation in urban families.

"Rural Migrant Women": A Problematic Social Identity in Big Cities

> [Author's name], when you see those people who have bad manners and who like pushing in the crowd, remember they are different from us. They are "*lao mei*,"

> "*lao zai*." We, Guangzhou people, are more civilized. (The second encounter with a referrer, a woman with urban *hukou*)

During my fieldwork and interviews, I heard rural people being called names, including *lao* (a vulgar word for "rural outsiders") and *cungu* (a derogatory term for rural women). These names suggested the perception that rural people are outdated, uncivilized, and ignorant. Urban people sometimes used language to separate "us" ("we are from the big city") from "them" ("the mainlanders" or *neidiren* in pinyin). Sometimes, rural migrants are labeled as "fraud" and "thieves." Many rural spouses recounted instances of discrimination at work and when they were buying groceries, visiting bathrooms, or interacting with urban neighbors and relatives.

Despite the widespread discrimination against rural migrants, rural–urban intimacy has occurred in the workplace (between colleagues and sometimes between customers and service providers) and in the college settings of my respondents. Others built relationships through close relatives' referrals; and more than one fifth met their spouse through Internet—either gaming together, engaging in dating websites and online forums, and participating in social activities organized by online interest groups. All rural migrants, except for two, held at least one paid job before their marriage. However, the majority of urbanites in my larger sample (including the same-*hukou* couples) do not seem to appreciate this about rural migrants; instead, many labeled those women who marry urbanites as "gold diggers." As an urban man casually commented, *Rural migrant girls are all fishing . . . fishing for rich people to be husbands . . . They call you husband if you have money*. During interviews, urban people told me anecdotes and rumors about rural migrant women who flirted or had sexual relationships with customers, urban bosses, and professors. The widespread distinction between outsiders and Guangzhou people as well as the recurrent stereotyping of rural migrant women as "gold diggers" reflect the process of "oppressive othering" (Schwalbe et al., 2000), or defining others as morally inferior. Instead of fellow rural people defending each other, these perceptions are also spread among rural friends and colleagues. Sumei, a rural migrant woman from Maoming who worked in Shenzhen for more than 10 years, recently married a Hong Kong man working as a sales manager in Shenzhen. A few days before her wedding, a village cousin's wife who worked in Shenzhen spread a rumor about Sumei through their village networks and over the Internet. Sumei said,

> This woman told others that my fiancé doesn't want to marry me. Just that I shamelessly got close to him and stayed with him for his *hukou*. She even badmouthed me that my sister and I are sharing the same husband!

These stories reinforced rural migrants' devalued image as "gold diggers" perpetuated originally by the dominant group (i.e., urbanites), although urban partners sometimes did act as "the wise"—a nondeviant who is "intimately privy to the secret life of the stigmatized individual and sympathize with it" (Goffman, 1963, p. 28)—and said "my rural partner is different."

Since rural migrants were stigmatized and denied recognition as substantive citizens in the urban city, cross-*hukou* marriages were often labeled as "problem marriages," and were not supported by the friends, neighbors, and relatives of urban spouses. In my sample, most rural wives of urban men received no bride price and held no wedding celebration. "Naked marriage"—as my respondents called it—was a significant source of shame for the rural families. As one rural woman who married an urbanite described, *Their family . . . the whole kin family disliked me and badmouthed me behind my back. I felt so distressed. They called me lao. I hated it so much*. Another rural woman lamented, *My mother-in-law accused me of climbing onto her son's bed. I feel unjust and wronged (weiqu).*

The stigmatization of rural migrant wives of urban men as undeserving, uncivilized, and sexually immoral gold diggers and outsiders reflects the co-construction of gender and *hukou.* In the first place, rural migrant men–urban women matches are much rarer than rural migrant women–urban men matches, as women are not expected to "marry down." Most rural men self-eliminate from the urban marriage market. In addition, the distinct rural–urban hierarchy shapes people's perception that rural migrants must be more eager to seek urbanites' love; and being women, they suffer serious gender sanction if they are perceived to be "the more eager" in a relationship. Thus, rural migrant wives (but not husbands) with an urban partner in my sample possess a more "problematic" social identity. The gendered structure and rejection of full membership for rural people in the city set the stage for unequal marriages for rural migrant wife–urban husband couples.

Rural Wives in Urban Husbands' Families: Unpaid Reproductive Workers

> Our marriage was not registered. My mother-in-law doesn't like me. She wants my husband to marry an urban and a more educated woman. [. . .] She also checked my date of birth and learned from a fortune-teller that I can never bear a son. She has to make sure I have a son first before registering our marriage. [. . .] My husband is very obedient. He listens to his mom no matter what. [. . .] My husband said, "If I forced Mom to give me the *hukou* book, she would do crazy things that I can never imagine." Then I told myself: *I should let go. Although the elderly parents aren't nice to me, it's okay if my husband is*. So I just bore with it.

> [. . .] After I gave birth to a son, I asked them to register me. She still turned me down and wanted one more son. They bullied me together. (Lan, 29-year-old rural migrant woman from Guangdong Weizhou, italics added)

Typically, urban parents do not support cross-*hukou* marriages. Their opposition makes it difficult for rural brides to register their marriage and convert their *hukou*. Here, power involves more than a dyadic negotiation between husband and wife—it also involves third parties like the urban parents-in-law, who usually live with or near to their son. These families experience a complex power dynamic. The husband rarely advocates for his wife in part because of his filial duty to be obedient and to get parental consent for his marriage—an indication of invisible power. In addition, Lan's husband excused his inaction by suggesting that his mother's power was "legal"—the unmarried son's *hukou* is combined with the mother's in a book, and this book is needed to register the marriage—but this claim was in fact false due to a revision to the marriage registration processes that occurred in 2004. Thus, Lan's husband used this claim to talk her into accepting his mother's control because he and his mother wanted a son, which is *naturally* valid in a patriarchal society. Another excuse he used with Lan was that he was concerned with his mother's feelings. In truth, he had the power to decide whether to register the marriage, and he chose not to. This case suggests how the urban husband utilizes the rural wife's information gap about marriage registration procedures in urban Guangzhou to satisfy his and his mother's desires. It also illustrates an interlocking system of gender and generational hierarchy that oppresses junior brides. Despite her resistance, Lan's self-talk about her husband's love rationalized her tolerance of the situation even when she recognized it as unfair. This suggests that latent power was at play in her family situation. Gender, *hukou* status, and generational hierarchy co-constructed a system of authority where the bride's identity as "rural" gave license to an urban family to exercise power, and resistance is the least when the women perceive love in the conjugal relationship.

Although Lan was denied recognition as a full member of the family, the family treasured her ability to produce a male heir. This distinction between "rural wives as outsiders" and "children as insiders" is reflected in *hukou* conversion policy. Whereas the children of cross-*hukou* couples automatically become urban, the rural spouse must satisfy a waiting period before she is able to change status. As Min, a 30-year-old rural migrant woman from Hubei put it, "I do not share their *hukou* but my son shares it. I am an outsider in *their* family." This practice denies rural women access to social and substantive citizenship in urban societies. The separation of women from their reproductive function relegates them to the position of "reproductive

workers" within the family. This might be a typical experience for married women in a patrilineal society not to be included in the "core" family (while male children are). However, the "outsider" status is more salient for rural wives than urban wives in the urban family because *hukou* restrictions on conversion (and the waiting period) institutionally classified the rural migrant wives as "rural" for at least 6 years after their marriage (for marriages before 2014). In effect, they remained relegated to limited job opportunities and social security like other rural migrants in the city. In addition, the drama involved in struggling for urban families' approval for marriage and getting legally registered often left rural wives feel unsupported and victimized.

Moreover, rural migrant wives were restricted by their urban families: some rural wives lamented that their husbands did not allow them to have a paid job; they were also constantly "policed" by their in-laws over doing chores and child care and whether their leisure is "too long"—an indication of manifest power. Their descriptions sometimes share similarities with the conditions of some exploited live-in domestic helpers, except that these rural spouses were not paid (Constable, 1997). In an extreme case from my sample, Nan, 45 years, who cohabited with a 75-year-old rich urban businessman whose wife had just died from cancer, was jeered at for being "a free nanny." They were not registered as a married couple, but there was a hidden arrangement that the rural bride could possess the house as her compensation after the old man died. This is how her urban daughter-in-law spoke about this rural mother-in-law in my field observation:

> **Daughter-in-law:** "You need to pay in order to hire a nanny. Isn't it good now? [My mother-in-law] is still so young and can take care of our father-in-law. Having her in the house, she can be a nanny who eats with him, drink with him, and sleep with him!"
> **Neighbors:** [*all laugh*]

Like Nan's neighbors, during my field observations, urban wives kept laughing at various cross-marriage cases at the afternoon tea gathering and while strolling in the garden after dinner. Many rural migrant women who married urbanites are found to be excluded from the urban community, especially for the majority of them who come from a lower socioeconomic background and for whom the age gap with their urban spouse is sizable.

Being treated as an inferior class of citizen, some migrants regretted their decisions to marry urbanites; but at the same time, they believed "love is there" (*you gangqing*). They also recalled the benefit of a Guangzhou *hukou* and how much marriage to urbanites helped them get away from rural poverty. Some have thought about divorce, yet it is costly and undesirable. Like

Nan, who did flee once, later came back begging the urban family for forgiveness because of financial reasons. After all, their natal home is not a permanent refuge because land and property ownership of married daughters is usually transferred to brothers and uncles. In other words, she has no right to stay in other people's home, especially if her parents are deceased. For Bao (a 40-year-old rural migrant woman from Hunan), Guangzhou provides a better education and environment for her child. In addition, the child's *hukou* is in Guangzhou, meaning that all subsidies and support are linked to the region. Going back to her rural Hunan would prove a significant loss to her child. Economic dependency on men and the importance of a Guangzhou *hukou* makes marriage migrants willing to bear exploitation. In addition, some women still rely on their husband to provide emergency money (like parents' medical fees), money for housing maintenance, and expensive gifts like motorcycles for their natal home, although in a traditional sense they should not be regarded as a part of the natal family once they get married. This rationale reflects what Kandiyoti (1988) called "the patriarchal bargaining"—women's decision-making process in optimizing life options in the face of various conditions of patriarchy. In China, women are facing a classic patriarchal condition in which protection (and sometimes economic security for her natal family) is exchanged for submission and propriety.

Some rural wives comforted themselves and tried to generalize that this is every woman's predicament, expressing their hope that they are able to reap benefits eventually:

> Every daughter-in-law has to suffer. You are a stranger getting into someone else's family. Through hardship, the daughter-in-law transforms into a mother-in-law (*Dang ren xifu ou cheng po*). After so many years of being a daughter-in-law and you suffer a lot, your son grows up and marries a wife. Then you can be a mother-in-law. You are relieved because it's finally your home. You can bully your daughter-in-law. This is the Chinese saying, right?

Her discourse in which the only way out is to become a mother-in-law is similar to Margery Wolf's (1972) description about uterine family. While they generalized their predicament to all women, what these rural wives did not want to admit was that their *hukou* and socioeconomic status have real consequences.

In some rare cases where the rural wives possessed a socioeconomic status compatible with their urban husband (6 out of 20), they had more leverage in day-to-day negotiations of conjugal power, although they did feel hurt by the urban family's disdainful and caustic comments associated with "ruralness" (e.g., concerning manners, habits, and cleanliness issues). Better-off rural

wives "bought" themselves freedom in terms of household division of labor by giving money to their urban in-laws for child care. One couple whose rural wife had a regular job could afford to contribute equally with the husband to finance an apartment, living apart from the urban parents-in-law. A more flexible housework arrangement allowed the better-off rural wives to reduce their sense of isolation by engaging in more social activities in the urban community. Generational hierarchy can be even more radically reversed for cross-married couples in which the wife is urban. Yuan Hong described her experience of staying in the rural husband's family in Jiangxi:

> My mother-in-law often asks me to have another baby. My mother-in-law said, "The children don't need to receive too much education. You just let them grow naturally." I argued, "Your two sons did not study enough and now they need to work hard to earn money. Don't you understand?" [*Author: You said that?*] Yes. My mother-in-law believes in whatever I say. In her eyes, I am from the big city. I've seen more of the world than she has. Her worldview is very narrow. If my [rural] sister-in-law said it, she definitely wouldn't accept it. But whatever I say, she will say, "It's very scientific," and she accepts it. (Yuan Hong, 37-year-old urban local Guangzhou woman who lived in the rural village for a year; and visited her rural in-laws three times a year thereafter.)

Yuan Hong and some other urban daughters-in-laws had an entirely different experience of their conjugal families than those rural wives/daughters-in-law living in the urban context. Like Yuan Hong, she realized that she was privileged as a woman "from the big city." She was able to make her own fertility decisions and to reprimand the way her mother-in-law had raised children. Her urban identity signified science, knowledge, and modernity and gave her leverage to talk back and re-socialize her mother-in-law—an invisible power to produce "the truth" (Foucault, 1976). This is a situation in which urban privilege is highlighted, while generational hierarchy is muted. She was also a "resource" person, as the rural family members always sought her advice for education and career choice. In other words, these examples illustrate that social class and urban/rural identity shape generational relations (and gender relations to a lesser extent), affecting the marital power of the wife in a cross-*hukou* family.

Contrasting with the rural migrant wives, rural husbands in cross-*hukou* families did not experience the disadvantage incurred by rural wives. Five out of six rural husbands had a better or a comparable job as their urban wife and thus lived apart from their in-laws, while more than half of the married rural women quit their job soon after their marriage and lived with the urban in-laws (as a result of urban families' restrictions and traditional notions of women as homemakers). In addition, unlike the majority of rural wives who

did change or wanted to change their *hukou*, none of the rural husbands in my sample converted to an urban *hukou* because relying on their urban wife to convert their *hukou* while eradicating their roots (i.e., their place of origin) was a source of shame for them. They all invested in rural housing, which signaled the importance of patrilocality to their urban wives. By emotionally detaching from the urban family and accumulating wealth in rural villages, these men created "alternative prestige hierarchies and forms of power" (Schwalbe et al., 2000, p. 427). Juxtaposing their situation with rural migrant wives illuminates how gender shapes *hukou* status and how the overlapping relationship of gender and *hukou* status results in selectivity in economic (in) dependency, which can translate to marital power. Rural women—who are usually economically dependent, having no inheritance of housing in the rural land (a plausible fallback plan), and relying on their spouse for the new household registration—are situated within overlapping disadvantages of being rural, being a woman, and being poor, facing exploitation in everyday life.

Strategies to Resist Multiple Oppressions

Cultural Adaptation: Playing the Urban Rules

One strategy used by all rural migrant women was attempting "to obliterate signs that have come to be stigma symbols," the signs of outsider status (Goffman, 1963, p. 92). This was especially evident in rural migrant women's effort to master the local language. Despite the diverse dialects of the sending regions, many successfully spoke fluent Cantonese with their urban family members after 2 years. They learned the language by watching TV shows, and others through language classes, and yet others through networks of migrants who had stayed in the city for a long time. Yilan explains her journey of "passing":

> My urban relatives and co-workers called me *lou*, so I just think: I must learn Cantonese. If I can speak fluent Cantonese, no one will call me *lou.* I was so determined that I learned this dialect in one year. After two to three years, I am very fluent. Now people hear me speak and they think that I am from the outskirt cities in Guangdong.

Some rural wives gained greater acceptance from their relatives and parents-in-law when they spoke the local language. Their confidence also derived from validation from other people who "misjudged" them as a near local. Apart from learning the local dialects, rural wives also adapted to avoid teasing for looking like a *cungu* and having no fashion sense by changing their style of dress. One respondent said,

> I was very old-fashioned. But I changed so much over the years of staying in Guangzhou. I learned that I shouldn't wear clothes with too many colors and patterns. I follow the trend here. I check whether my body shape fit a particular kind of clothes.

Like the rural service sector migrant women in Otis's (2011) study, these rural wives practiced "aspirational urbanism" as they strategized to reduce their association with the stigma of being rural. Becoming urban also involves a process of differentiating themselves from other rural people who have not "improved":

> Although I am not a local Guangzhou woman, my mom taught me about the importance of cleanliness since I was young. My home is very clean and my clothes are very clean. [*Pointing at her shirt*] Like this uniform today, I wash it every day unlike other workers. If not, it smells and I don't feel comfortable. (Ming chun, 61-year-old rural migrant woman from Hunan)

> The rural people from Hunan are so dirty. I don't like them. They litter and dump menstrual pads on the floor. [. . .] They wear the same dress for three to four days in summer. They are also very stingy. Like when we eat together, they expect people to treat them; but they never give us a treat. [. . .] Their love relationship is also very messy. I saw them always hanging out with the Chief, going to karaoke . . . and of course a lot of kissing and hugging . . . you know. But we, Guangdong women, are more virtuous and moral (*xian liang shu de*). We also love cleanliness. (Lian shan, 30-year-old rural migrant woman from rural Luoding, Guangdong)

These women's subjectivity is constructed based on distinguishing themselves from rural people who failed to adapt. Both Lian shan and Ming chun came from the village, but they did not explicitly identify themselves as "rural." They "passed" as urbanites over the years of being in Guangzhou city. While differentiating themselves from the "unimproved," they were fully aware of the stigmatization against rural people being "dirty," "outdated," "greedy," and for women—promiscuous. Culture, body, language, consumption habits are all terrains for power. Though the subordinate group (in this case, rural migrant women) can adapt to the local culture and derive compensatory benefits from relationships with members of the dominating group (Schwalbe et al., 2000), doing so also legitimizes and reproduces inequality. However, they did not accept the power of hegemonic norms without resentment. A few blurted out their anger against urbanites during the interviews, "What made (the urbanites) so proud? Without rural migrants working here, can the city become so prosperous? They should thank us!"

Some did not accept the whole package of norms in urban Guangzhou, describing their Guangzhou and Shenzhen relatives as more superstitious and stingy (*xiao qi*/*ji po*) than rural peasants.

Filial Piety: A Two-Faced Project

> I never fight with my mother-in-law. I need to care about her feelings and my husband's feelings. No matter what, she is old and a local here. She won't listen to me anyway. I only nag my husband, but if I talked about his mom every day, he got mad at me. Therefore, I sometimes keep this to myself. A message often appears in my dreams: *I need to change the environment, or our marriage will end.* (Ting, 26-year-old rural migrant woman from Sichuan, italics added)

Most rural daughters-in-law coped with their position in the family by maintaining good relationships with urban relatives. They emphasized the importance of deference through "bearing with their patronizing manner," "saying yes all the time," or "just pretend[ing] that they cannot understand." Filial piety also dictates that the son and his wife live with his elderly parents. Yet while rural migrant wives who live with their husbands' elderly parents appeared to honor filial piety, they also launched a secret project against it by pleading with their husbands to "change the environment" and move out of the in-laws' home. For rural migrant wives, moving out was the most practical choice to avoid in-laws' dominance in day-to-day interactions. However, from the husband's perspective, it was not the most economical choice. Rural migrant wives had very little say in the decision to move because they were not the major nor an equal provider for the household and they could not buy a house on their own without formally converting to a local urban *hukou*:

> I always said to my husband, "I want to move. I want to move." But my husband wasn't very active. We could have applied for public housing a lot earlier but my husband was procrastinating. He is very lazy . . . dragging [his feet] and not submitting the form. [. . .] Once he said if we move, who cooks? [. . .] If I had money, I would definitely move out now. But I have no money and I have no say. I am willing to live in substandard housing in order to move out. (Hai, 32-year-old rural migrant woman from Hainan)

Although it took time, nagging was often a successful strategy in the long run. For instance, this urban husband described his parents' relationship with his rural ex-wife:

> Their relationship was pretty good on the surface. But privately, my wife complained a lot: "Dad and Mom were too harsh to me. They don't allow me to

> do so many things." My wife wanted to play, but my parents wanted her to "work like a horse and a cow" (*zuoniu zuoma*). Huh. . . . So I think, okay then. I rented a house for her between my place and her native place. Then, she occasionally came to see my parents. (Chang, 42-year-old urban Guangzhou man)

Ting, Hai, and Chang's families demonstrated the husband's different role in the wife's "secret project." Ting's husband got mad at her and she needed to restrategize by covering with a more filial face. But like Chang, he teamed up with his wife and covered up his wife's plan. The majority of the husbands, however, responded to their wives' plans like Hai's husband; that is, feeling ambivalent mainly because of their vested interest in preserving the existing patriarchy. Hai's husband questioned, "If we move (away from his parents), who cooks?"

After grumbling about their living arrangement for 3 years, Hai and Ting also convinced their husbands to take action by applying for public housing and by looking for a nice apartment, respectively. Although they had not yet moved, both women had hopes that they would. But many wives were still working to launch "secret projects" that might never materialize. While such projects illustrate rural migrant wives' ingenuity in reworking power in the family, their fates remained very much contingent on the choices of their richer urban husbands—unintentionally buttressing patriarchy.

Gender Alliance: A Hidden Space for Coping

The third strategy was to amass social capital (in the virtual and/or real world) in urban areas. Some rural migrant wives observed that their urban sisters-in-law faced a common enemy (i.e., their mother-in-law) under the patriarchal system (though the level of oppression was less than for rural wives). These women coped by asking their (mostly urban) sisters-in-law to look out for one another. For example, Ting befriended her three urban sisters-in-law, and they gossiped about their mother-in-law, calling her names like "Black-faced god" (*Heilianshen*). Jokes like these brightened the lives of rural women, but their rural status meant that interactions with urban sisters-in-law remained precarious. For instance, Ting told me that her mother-in-law played favorites by smiling and greeting her urban sisters-in-law's parents with enthusiasm while ignoring hers in big family gatherings. Jealousy could undermine cooperation among sisters-in-law. In addition, these gender networks of sisters-in-law mostly supported women to put up with their situation instead of emboldening them to resist. Hai, a 32-year-old rural migrant woman from Hainan, said, "When I told my urban sisters-in-law about my grievances in Guangzhou, they showed understanding. But they asserted that I should bear with it no matter what, or I would put my husband in a difficult position."

In addition, not all rural migrant women were able to get along with their urban sisters-in-law. Increasingly, rural women created a "telespace" to vent—a hidden space where they shared their suffering with others through instant messaging. Because many rural wives who live with their urban parents-in-laws were sometimes restricted from going outside, they communicated with other women online. The Internet group that some respondents joined was the "Guangzhou mothers' QQ group." This group was open to mothers of different *hukou* staying in Guangzhou and created a common ground for these women to share complaints about in-laws and husbands, stories about their divorces, legal advice on *hukou* conversion, and discussions on children, health care, and even the local dialect. The Guangzhou mothers' QQ group had 172 members, and numerous similar groups exist online. These groups often engage in long discussions of different cases. One such case involved a mother from Jiangxi who divorced her Guangzhou husband because he had an affair, but the mother-in-law hid the woman's son. That case produced 99 exchanges in the hours of 17:02 to 21:02 on March 9, 2015, alone. Though people's comments were brief, they showed sympathy for the "victim." In many conversations, they encouraged each other to "keep (their) husband under control," "to be independent," and to "try out different strategies." Like H. Z. Wang's (2007) study about how Vietnamese brides utilize cyberspace in Taiwan, online networks in China also constituted a "hidden space" where rural migrant women "can hide, escape from norms or find weapons to resist" (p. 712). On top of airing grievances, joining a social network based on a motherhood identity crosscut the *hukou* boundaries that encourages rural–urban interactions. However, these gender alliances were a double-edged sword because they built mostly same-sex/same-motherhood status networks. The structural equivalence among women's various social spheres made it difficult for them to amass social capital that could reduce their dependence on their husbands.

Drawing on Goffman (1959), I posit that rural migrant women navigated between the frontstage and the backstage to cope with the patriarchal oppression and discrimination against rural migrants. The telespace served as a backstage where rural migrant women teamed up with other women who had been under gender and generational oppression, but could hide and devise strategies. They also engaged in the secret project of living apart from their in-laws. These secret projects were, however, well-embellished by their frontstage presentation as an appropriate wife/a filial daughter-in-law striving to achieve an urban identity. Sometimes, the urban husbands were on the wives' team, but sometimes they also demonstrated their alliance with parents to maintain the patriarchy.

Conclusion

This research on inter-*hukou* families in China contributes to understanding how overlapping inequalities and various dimensions of power "operate in, on, with, and through family as an institution" alongside the state policy of internal migration (Ferree, 2010, p. 425). Based on the intersectionality approach, rural migrant wives of urban men are not facing classic patriarchy as Chinese married women. Rural–urban inequalities foster the notion that rural migrants are more eager to achieve social mobility through marriage; women who are perceived to be more eager are sanctioned as "gold diggers" and seen as sexually immoral with dubious intentions in a marriage.

Gender and *hukou* status are also mutually shaping, resulting in variegated marital power dynamics in intermarried families. The patriarchal tradition shapes women to engage in reproductive functions like giving birth to a son and doing household work; and in the face of disapproving urban parents-in-law, their conflicted urban husbands, and *hukou* policy, rural migrant women went through numerous struggles to register their marriage and convert their *hukou*, thus reinforcing their sense of isolation as "outsiders." Their housework load is also much heavier than that of local wives, while their freedom to work and movement is more controlled. The rural women are accepted neither as an appropriate daughter-in-law in the urban family nor as a regular citizen in the urban society. In contrast to rural wives in urban families, urban wives in rural families is much more powerful—as if they were the bearer of modernity and truth. The patriarchal tradition, on the other hand, governs rural husbands' independence from urban wives' families. This is enacted by the rural husbands keeping their jobs, investing in rural properties, not residing in their in-laws' place, nor following their wives' *hukou*, thus placing them in a better power position than rural migrant wives in urban families. My research demonstrates how migration policies, the society, and the family dialectically reinforce one another in creating a condition in which the rural wife is relatively more dependent on her urban husband, undermining her power in the family.

This research also supports the notion of "patriarchal bargaining." Noting that rural home is not a plausible fallback plan and that rural women who are also more economically dependent do have some vested interest in espousing the existing patriarchy, many of them remain in their relationships despite the overlapping oppression. Although being complicit in their own predicament, they actively attempt to improve their daily condition by navigating between the frontstage and the backstage. While they are able to "pass" by unlearning "rural" culture and presenting themselves as appropriate wives/filial daughters-in-law, they have their secret plans: to move away from the husband's

parents and utilize the Internet—a form of social capital that crosscuts rural–urban boundaries that is utilized as a vibrant hidden community for support, ideas, insights, and ambition among "sisters." Rural women's microstrategies of resistance in negotiating power in the urban family and society show potential for transforming patriarchal practices and *hukou* status—"a slow drip version of a gender (and citizenship) revolution" (Ferree, 2010, p. 431). However, it will be harder for virtual communities to mobilize collective action against *hukou* policies in the context of an authoritarian government.

A caveat to the interpretation of these data involves the small sample among some groups. For example, there is no sample of cross-*hukou* couples in which the husband is urban, the wife is rural, and the wife has a higher socioeconomic status than the husband. Most cross-*hukou* couples in my research involved matches where the husband was urban and richer than his rural migrant wife. The small sample therefore creates problems for representation and generalization, although it also explains the effect of the overlapping forces of gender, class, and *hukou* status as determinants of matches between partners. Future research should also include men of diverse backgrounds in the analysis of migration and marriage to provide insights into how gender, citizenship status, and social class organize migrants' lived experiences and their strategies of adaptation.

Declaration of Conflicting Interests

The author(s) declared no potential conflicts of interest with respect to the research, authorship, and/or publication of this article.

Funding

The author(s) received no financial support for the research, authorship, and/or publication of this article.

Note

1. In this article, I use "marriage" language to describe couples that are/were legally married or in a de facto marriage-like situation (like long-term cohabitation). I deliberately included couples who are in long-term cohabitation relationships and divorcees to discuss the complexity of intermarriage issues.

References

Becker, H. S. (2008). *Tricks of the trade: How to think about your research while you're doing it*. Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press.

Breger, R. (1998). Love and the state: Women, mixed marriages and the law in Germany. In R. Breger & R. Hill (Eds.), *Cross-cultural marriage: Identity and choice* (pp. 129-152). New York, NY: Oxford University Press.

Chan, K. W. (2010). Household registration and migrant labor in China. *Population and Development Review*, *36*, 357-364.

Chan, K. W., & Buckingham, W. (2008). Is China abolishing the *hukou* system? *China Quarterly*, *195*, 582-606.

Chen, Y. (2005). Nongmingong: zhidu anpai yu shenfen rentong [Peasant labourers: The system's arrangement and identity]. *Shehuixue Yanjiu* [Sociological Studies], *3*, 119-132.

China Beijing. (2015). *Public Security Bureau*. Retrieved from http://www.ebeijing.gov.cn/Government/Departments/t930028.htm

China Shanghai. (2015). *Criterion for hukou conversion for couples*. Retrieved from http://service.shanghai.gov.cn/wapZhsh/WsbsDetail.aspx?MattersType=0&ParentClassID=54&ClassID=253&MatterID=27543

China Shenzhen. (2015). *Criterion for hukou conversion for couples*. Retrieved from http://www.szga.gov.cn/ZWGK/YWGZ/HJGL/201405/t20140518_65312.htm

Choo, H. Y. (2006). Gendered modernity and ethnicized citizenship: North Korean settlers in contemporary South Korea. *Gender & Society*, *20*, 576-604.

Connell, R. W. (1987). *Gender and power*. Cambridge, England: Polity Press.

Constable, N. (1997). *Maid to order in Hong Kong: Stories of Filipina workers*. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press.

Constable, N. (2003). *Romance on a global stage: Pen pals, virtual ethnography, and "mail order" marriages*. Berkeley: University of California Press.

Davis, K. (2008). Intersectionality as buzzword: A sociology of science perspective on what makes a feminist theory successful. *Feminist theory*, *9*(1), 67-85.

Ferree, M. M. (2010). Filling the glass: Gender perspectives on families. *Journal of Marriage and Family*, *72*, 420-439.

Foucault, M. (1976). *The history of sexuality: An introduction* (Vol. 1). New York, NY: Random House.

Glaser, B., & Strauss, A. (1967). *The discovery grounded theory: Strategies for qualitative inquiry*. London, England: Weidenfeld & Nicolson.

Glenn, E. N. (2002). *Unequal freedom: How race and gender shaped American citizenship and labor*. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.

Glenn, E. N. (2011). Constructing citizenship: Exclusion, subordination, and resistance. *American Sociological Review*, *76*, 1-24.

Goffman, E. (1959). *The presentation of self in everyday life*. New York, NY: Doubleday Anchor.

Goffman, E. (1963). *Stigma: Notes on the management of spoiled identity*. New York, NY: Simon & Schuster.

Guang, L. (2003). Rural taste, urban fashions: The cultural politics of rural/urban difference in contemporary China. *Positions: East Asia Cultures Critique*, *11*, 613-646.

Guangzhou Daily. (2014). *Hukou conversion allowed after 2 weeks of marriage*. Retrieved from http://leaders.people.com.cn/n/2014/0801/c58278-25383288.html

Hu, Y. (2016). Marriage of matching doors: Marital sorting on parental background in China. *Demographic Research*, *35*, 557-580.

Hu, Y., & Scott, J. (2016). Family and gender values in China generational, geographic, and gender differences. *Journal of Family Issues*, *37*, 1267-1293.

Kandiyoti, D. (1988). Bargaining with patriarchy. *Gender & Society*, *2*, 274-290.

Kim, M. (2013). Citizenship projects for marriage migrants in South Korea: Intersecting motherhood with ethnicity and class. *Social Politics: International Studies in Gender, State and Society*, *20*, 455-481.

Komter, A. (1989). Hidden power in marriage. *Gender & Society*, *3*, 187-216.

Lian, S. (2009). *Yi Zu: Da Xue Bi Ye Sheng Ju Ju Cun Shi Lu* [Ant tribe: A memoir of agglomerated settlement of university graduates]. Beijing, China: CITIC.

Logan, J. R., Fang, Y., & Zhang, Z. (2009). Access to housing in urban China. *International Journal of Urban and Regional Research*, *33*, 914-935.

Lui, L. (2016). *Hukou* intermarriage in China: Patterns and trends. *Chinese Sociological Review*. Advance online publication. doi:10.1080/21620555.2016.1231570

Lukes, S. (1974). *Power: A radical view* (Vol. 1). London, England: Macmillan.

Mann, S. (1997). *Precious records: Women in China's long eighteenth century*. Redwood City, CA: Stanford University Press.

Marshall, T. H. (1950). *Citizenship and social class*. London, England: Cambridge University Press.

Mix, P. R., & Piper, N. (2003). Does marriage "liberate" women from sex work? Thai women in Germany. In *Wife or worker? Asian women and migration* (pp. 53-72). Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield.

National Bureau of Statistics of China. (2013). *China Statistical Yearbook*. Beijing, China: China Statistics Press.

National Bureau of Statistics of China. (2015). *Statistical communiqué of the People's Republic of China on the 2014 National Economic and Social Development*. Retrieved from http://www.stats.gov.cn/english/PressRelease/201502/t20150228_687439.html

National Population and Family Planning Commission of the PRC. (2011). Retrieved from http://www.gov.cn/jrzg/2012-08/07/content_2199409.htm

Nie, H., & Xing, C. (2011). *When city boy falls in love with country girl: Baby's hukou, hukou reform, and inter-hukou marriage*. Retrieved from http://conference.iza.org/conference_files/ReLabEco2010/xing_c5544.pdf

Otis, E. (2011). *Markets and bodies: Women, service work, and the making of inequality in China*. Redwood City, CA: Stanford University Press.

Schwalbe, M., Holden, D., Schrock, D., Godwin, S., Thompson, S., & Wolkomir, M. (2000). Generic processes in the reproduction of inequality: An interactionist analysis. *Social Forces*, *79*, 419-452.

Shih, K., & Pyke, K. (2010). Power, resistance, and emotional economies in women's relationships with mothers-in-law in Chinese immigrant families. *Journal of Family Issues*, *31*, 333-357.

Solinger, D. J. (1999). *Contesting citizenship in urban China: Peasant migrants, the state, and the logic of the market*. Berkeley: University of California Press.

Tan, L., & Short, S. (2004). Living as double outsiders: Migrant women's experiences of marriage in a county-level city. In A. Gaetano & T. Jacka (Eds.), *On the move* (pp. 151-174). New York, NY: Columbia University Press.

Walby, S., Armstrong, J., & Strid, S. (2012). Intersectionality: Multiple inequalities in social theory. *Sociology*, *46*, 224-240.

Wang, H. Z. (2007). Hidden spaces of resistance of the subordinated: Case studies from Vietnamese female migrant partners in Taiwan. *International Migration Review*, *41*, 706-727.

Wang, Y., & Schwartz, R. C. (2015). *Intermarriage and social exclusion in China*. Retrieved from http://paa2015.princeton.edu/uploads/153244

Whyte, M. K. (2004). Filial obligations in Chinese families: Paradoxes of modernization. In C. Ikels (Ed.), *Filial piety: Practice and discourse in contemporary East Asia* (pp. 106-127). Redwood City, CA: Stanford University Press.

Whyte, M. K. (2010). *One country, two societies: Rural-urban inequality in contemporary China* (Vol. 16). Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.

Wolf, M. (1972). *Women and the family in rural Taiwan*. Redwood City, CA: Stanford University Press.

Yan, H. (2008). *New masters, new servants: Development, migration, and women workers*, Durham, NC: Duke University Press.

Yang, C. K. (1959). *The Chinese Family in the Communist Revolution*. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.