7. Minority mobility in Guizhou province, with a focus on planned resettlement and its implications for ethnicity and identity

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7.1 INTRODUCTION

Profound social and environmental changes have accompanied economic growth in China over the past three decades. These changes include different growth rates in regional development and therefore widening regional disparity, resulting in much spontaneous internal mobility. The initial pattern of internal migration was of temporary mobility, with men mostly leaving their families in rural villages in the central and western provinces, to work in cities in the coastal areas. This initial pattern continues but the process has become more complicated and diverse, as shown elsewhere in this *Handbook*.

There has been a growth in the number of ethnic minority people moving out of their traditional regions to pursue economic opportunities in cities. Ethnic migration has been an integral part of the massive rural–urban shifts over the past decades. But most research has treated migrants as a homogeneous group, even though there has been an increased interest in ethnicity since 1991 (Gladney 1996). A small number of mostly Chinese anthropologists, demographers and sociologists began undertaking research into minority mobility in the mid-1990s but for political reasons their work was not published (e.g. INR 1996; Hoy and Ren 1996).

Iredale et al (2001) undertook one of the first comprehensive pieces of research on minority migration in China from 1996 to 2000, and published *Contemporary Minority Migration, Education and Ethnicity in China* in 2001. Education was used as a focus as this took the emphasis off ethnicity and enabled the involvement of a Chinese education official. Official approval (the 'red stamp') was required for research in each of the selected sites (Hohhot, Inner Mongolia; Urumqi, Xianjiang; Llasa, Tibet, and Beijing). Nevertheless, interviews were occasionally followed by visits from local officials to the interviewees to verify the content of the interview questionnaire. The research found that 'on the whole, ethnic minorities appear to have been somewhat slower than Han Chinese to start moving in significant numbers' (Iredale et al 2001, p. 239). The majority of

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movements were found to consist of minority young people going to urban areas for the purposes of education, employment or for the 'better life or bright lights'. Some were officially sanctioned but most were not and the outcomes in terms of ethnicity and education varied by ethnic group.

Migration to cities has become important for the livelihood of rural people as a common demographic response to poverty and environmental changes. Guizhou has been one of the migration-heavy sending areas in China for the past two decades. This includes the migration of ethnic minorities (Wu 2014; Wu and Wang 2012). As a result, Guizhou's residential population has declined from 2005, notwithstanding that the *hukou* population has consistently grown[1] (GZBS 2012). The 2010 census data show that there were over 7 million Guizhou-registered people living outside the province (20 per cent of Guizhou's population). Amongst these there are a significant number of ethnic minority people. The concentration of ethnic minorities in coastal provinces has grown rapidly.

In addition to migration to cities in more developed areas in seach of better social and economic opportunities, Guizhou officials have formulated a program to resettle rural populations, including ethnic minorities. The profile, process and destination of these migrants and the reasons behind the resettlement are different in many respects from those who are self-motivated and migrate for economic opportunities. Economic migrants are usually young and better educated (Wu and Wang 2012) and migration is the choice of the migrants or their families. They regularly move between the origin and destination in order to maintain their relationships with rural lands and communities. Their rural homes are always the centre of their mobility. These connections are fundamental for keeping their identity, especially for ethnic minorities.

Planned resettlement is a new kind of migration, particularly with regard to identity implications. People are often uprooted from their environment, either voluntarily or involuntarily, and permanently resettled in completely different geographic settings – according to government plans.

7.2 IDENTIFICATION OF ETHNIC MINORITIES

The identification of China's official ethnic minority groups commenced soon after the 1949 Revolution. It was largely based on Stalin's definition of a nation – 'a historically evolved, stable community based on a common language, *territory* [italics added], economic life and psychological make-up manifested in a community of culture' (cited in Slezkine 1994, pp. 415–16). The definition was used as a doctrine to categorize ethnic minority groups in China (Fei 1980; Wu 1990). The geography

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of association with particular *territories* was an important attribute of ethnicity – 'ethnicity is inherently territorial' (Murphy 1989, p. 411; Knight 1982).

Territorial associations have been a strong part of China's ethnic minorities. Ethnic minorities were historically confined to and belonged to particular territories and their identities were shaped by these territories and marked by the belongings. Recognizing this, the Chinese government has practised a system of regional autonomy in ethnic minority development. A variety of ethnic minority autonomous regions (EMARs) were created where ethnic minorities were historically concentrated, and special policies were implemented and financial assistance was given for ethnic development in these regions (IOSC 2009). The policies were: (a) to promote the minority's social and economic development; (b) narrow the gap in living standards and education (by lowering the requirements to enter universities); and (c) reduce tension with the Han Chinese. At the same time, the one-child policy was not strictly applied.

These policies have assisted ethnic minorities who live in the EMARs to sustain their traditions (Sutman 1998; Mackerras 2003) but their effects on economic development have been limited. The benefits of rapid economic growth have been disproportionately concentrated in coastal areas and compared to Han Chinese, the majority of ethnic minorities remain poor (Gustafsson and Li 2003; Bhalla and Qiu 2006; Yeoh 2008). In 2013, there were 592 state-designated poverty counties and almost half (232) were in ethnic minorities regions. On top of this, the already harsh and vulnerable environments in the west, especially the areas of most EMARs, have been degraded as economic growth has relied heavily on the exploitation and consumption of natural resources. The livelihoods of minority people who relied heavily on the natural resources have deteriorated.

The development of the west has become a major policy concern for the state government. Recently introduced policies are designed to improve the livelihoods of people and stop environmental degradation (SGC 2001, 2002, 2012). One approach that the government has steadily engaged in is to remove the people, both voluntarily and involuntarily. This has involved the relocation of people and the conversion of their farmlands into forests or grasslands for conservation purposes (Yan and Qian 2004; Dong et al 2012; Tashi and Foggin 2012). Large resettlements have been undertaken (Merkle 2003; Xue et al 2013) and it is expected that over 100 million people will be moved and resettled in cities and towns from 2014 to 2020 (Hu 2014).

The majority of these relocations are taking place in regions of ethnic minority concentration. For example, in Ningxia province 0.35 million people will be removed from environmentally fragile environments

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between 2011 and 2016 (Xin 2012). The relocation of some of the Tibetan population has occurred in western Sichuan (Tan et al 2013). Guizhou has instigated the removal of 2.04 million people between 2012 and 2020. Over half of the total number of people who are subject to relocation are ethnic minorities.

Guizhou is one of the most multicultural regions and also one of the poorest provinces in China. It has the fourth largest minority population in the country and ethnic minorities made up over one-third (35.7 per cent) of the total population in 2010. The overall national average is 8 per cent. The Guizhou resettlement program is reported as the single largest relocation in recent Chinese history (Phillips 2012). The number of migrants involved will surpass that of the Three Gorges Dam which relocated 1.27 million people along the Yangtze River during the period from 1992 to 2008 (Yuan 2012).

This chapter will investigate ethnic migration with a particular focus on the development of planned resettlements in Guizhou. This includes an examination of the historical, economic, political and ecological contexts from which ethnic migrants have been moved and, in particular, how planned resettlement has been implemented and its implications for ethnic identity. The discussion covers broad issues of ethnic minorities, environmental change, social and economic development and ethnic minority migration in Guizhou.

7.3 THE LAND OF THE 'MIAO': A FRONTIER TERRITORY

Land is fundamental as a source of 'self-identification for Indigenous people' (Notzke 1994, p. 173). Ethnic minorities in Guizhou, like Indigenous peoples elsewhere, have a long-standing connection to the environment. Their relationship to the environment is infused with economic, social and cultural significance that ensures their survival as distinct groups and nationalities. Their development, in both material or cultural senses, is strongly influenced by the region's natural environment: the soil, flora, fauna, water, river, sun, moon, sky, wind, rain, and so on (Wu 1992; Ingram 2011).

Guizhou is a frontier region that has always been historically remote from the major centres of power and economic development in China. It is located in the southwest part of China and is predominately a mountainous region, described by an old proverb as an area 'where the sun never stays more than three days in the sky; the land never stays flat more than three feet' (*tian wu san ri qing; di wu san chi ping*). Historically, Guizhou

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was known as 'Miao's area' (*miao jiang*) and the traditional inhabitants were called 'Miao' or 'Miao Man' (literally meaning 'Miao barbarians'). The term was used to refer to all non-Han ethnic groups in Guizhou, so it had wider usage than the currently identified Miao ethnic minority group. These 'Miao' people belong to the area and their identities have derived from their historical interactions with Han Chinese and the environment.

The Han interactions with the Miao have been through a series of 'civilizing' projects. The Miao were seen as 'unequal' and projects relied on an 'ideological basis in the center's claim to a superior degree of civilization, along with a commitment to raise the peripheral peoples' civilization to the level of the center, or at least closer to that level' (Harrell 1995, p. 4). Though Guizhou had been designated to have provincial status and fell under the administration of the central states since 1413 in the Ming dynasty (1368–1644), 'Miao jiang' Guizhou was never fully 'controlled' by the central states (Jenks 1994). The province had always enjoyed some degree of autonomy and regions were governed by their own native chieftains (*tusi*). Their territories were parts of the state but were not subject to the control of state. The *tusi* maintained their own independent social institutions, including their own armies, jails and jurisdictions over matters within their areas. The Miao people, along with other non-Han ethnic minorities, were not consided as 'China's subjects' by the central state until the Qianlong reign (1736–95), in the Qing dynasty (Zhao 2006, p. 4). During this period the *tusi* system was dismantled and these territories were brought under the control of the state, despite many wars and great resistance from the 'Miao people' (Yu 1997; Yang 2012).

This led to the introduction and influence of Han culture and, to some extent, blurred the lines between the Han and ethnic minorities. Large flows of Han Chinese (*liu min* or *ke min*) moved into Guizhou. The land owned by *tusi* was taken and used to facilitate the settlement of Han Chinese, especially settler soldiers and their families (Yu 1997). The interactions between ethnic minorities and Han Chinese intensified and this had substantial consequences for the natural environment and social development. The native Miao people were categorized into *sheng Miao* and *shu Miao* (literally, raw and cooked Miao) based on their degree of assimilation into Han culture (Wang 2001). In 1845, according a local historical record, some of 'those who were formerly known as *sheng Miao* have become *shu Miao* and those who were formerly *shu Miao* have become today's Han' (Yang 1845, p. 19).

Guizhou's population rapidly grew, increasing from 2 million in 1661 to over 10 million in 1880. The population density increased from 11.2 persons/km^2 to 57.5 persons/km^2 during the same period (Li 2007). The population record might be incomplete as *sheng Miao* people who were

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less assimilated were largely excluded from the census. In the meantime, large areas of land were cleared and the amount of cultivated land was expanded. Spatially, the *sheng Miao* were pushed to live in high mountains and remote areas while the Han Chinese occupied land with better conditions and location. The population began pressing 'seriously on the land, and the inhabitants of the province could expect little more than subsistence even in the best of years' (Jenks 1994, p. 25).

7.4 ENVIRONMENTAL CHANGE

The physical environment of Guizhou is characterized by mountainous terrain with an average elevation of 1100 metres. Mountain slopes makes up of 92.5 per cent of the province's land area with slopes steeper than 15 degrees accounting for 60 per cent of the land area. The majority of Guizhou people were distributed in scattered rural villages throughout these slopes (Li 2007). The size of a village population ranged from a few dozen to a few hundred, and their fields were within daily walking distances. The village was virtually a self-sufficient unit and produced food and other necessities from the land. Land use relied on agriculture and agricultural practices were family-based and small in scale, due to the characteristics of the physical environment. The main crops included maize, rice, wheat, cotton, sorghum, barley, millet, buckwheat, rapeseed, sweet potatoes, potatoes and numerous other vegetables. They were barely sufficient to meet the households' needs.

Another salient feature of Guizhou's environment is that the major area is covered by limestone (karst), which accounts for 73 per cent of the total 0.17 million km^2 land area of the province. The limestone environment is unproductive and particularly vulnerable. Rainfall can drain away quickly and easily leak into underground water systems. Water therefore cannot be effectively used by vegetation to support its growth. This karst environment has experienced extensive erosion and deforestation due to population pressure as well as the unsustainable exploitation of natural resources, particularly during Chairman Mao's time. For example, it is estimated that roughly 10 per cent of China's forest cover was felled in the course of a few months during the time of the Great Leap Forward (1958–60) (Shapiro 2001).

People in rural Guizhou, as in the rest of rural China, were collectivized into people's communes (*renmin gongshe*), which were further divided into hundreds of thousands of semi-military brigades (*shengchan dui*), during the period between 1958 and 1979. Rural land was assigned to communes and people were mobilized by Mao's campaigns after calls to 'attack to

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the nature' (Murphy 1967). The forest coverage rate of the province was reduced from 30 per cent in 1950 to 12.6 per cent in 1987 (Li and Zhang 2005).

Perhaps the two policies that had the greatest impact were 'Land Reform' (*tu gai*) and the 'Agricultural Collectivization Movement' (*nongye jiti hua yundong*) – they transformed both the human–environment relationship and the social fabric of ethnic communities and their cultures. The cultures of ethnic minority people, including their knowledge about and religions with nature (Yang et al 2004; Yuan et al 2012), were regarded as backward (*luo huo*) and needed to be eliminated. This not only disturbed 'the profoundly hierarchical social order of traditional China' (Murphy 1967, p. 314), but also resulted in ecological disruption: from deforestation, erosion, and land degradation to crop failure, poverty and famines.

With environmental degradation, natural disasters began to rise. In 2005, over 13,000 localities were identified across the province as being vulnerable to natural geological hazards, including landslides, rockfalls, avalanches, etc. (Jiang 2005). The economic cost of natural disasters is enormous and this has been accelerated by climate change. Data show that temperature increased by 0.5°C and rainfall decreased by 48 millimeters from 1951 to 2006 in Guizhou (Guizhou Government 2008).

7.5 GUIZHOU'S POPULATION AND ETHNIC MINORITIES

Guizhou had 34.7 million residential inhabitants in 2010, an increase from 15 million in 1953 (GZBS 2012). Over one-third (35.7 per cent) of the population is comprised of ethnic minorities, making Guizhou one of the most multi-ethnic populations in China. The growth and change in the province's population has reflected migration development and a strong feature of ethnicity.

Guizhou's population change has many distinctions. Its total population increased by 14 per cent from 1953 to 1964, which was lower than the nation's average of 15.4 per cent (see Figure 7.1). This is despite the fact that there were large inflows of Han Chinese migrating to ethnic minority areas, including Guizhou, in the 1950s and 1960s (Zhao 2012). The population of Guizhou then grew exceptionally fast during the period between 1964 and 1982: it increased 66.6 per cent compared to 45.2 per cent for the nation as a whole. This added 11.4 million people to the province's population, an increase of more than 0.6 million annually. Growth was ascribed, in part, to the higher birth rates but also to the large inflows of Han migrants – the 'three front construction' led to millions of

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

Source: Guizhou Bureau of Statistics 2012.

Figure 7.1 Population of Guizhou province, 1953–2010

Han Chinese being relocated from coastal cities to Guizhou (Wu 2014). While national growth continued by 11.7 per cent and 5.8 per cent in the last two decades respectively, population growth in Guizhou was 8.8 per cent and −1.4 per cent during the same periods. The decline might be partly attributable to the growth of out-migration, including the relocated Han Chinese returning to their original places.

In 2010, Guizhou had 12.6 million people identified as belonging to 54 ethnic minorities, excluding Han. Figure 7.1 shows that the population of ethnic minorities increased from 3.9 million in 1953 to 12.6 million in 2010. This includes 18 'native' ethnic minority groups. Guizhou's ethnic population is nationally significant and accounted for 11.03 per cent of China's total ethnic minorities in 2010. While the number is less than for Yunnan (30.6 million), Guangxi (28.9 million) and Inner Mongolia (19.6), it has the highest density of ethnic population for any province: 73 ethnic minority people per square kilometre compared with 39 in Yunnan and 2.3 in Tibet.

Ethnic minorities made up 26.2 per cent of the province's total population in the first census in 1953, 23.4 per cent in 1964 and 26 per cent in 1982. The growth rate of the ethnic population has decreased since 1982 and it experienced negative growth from 2000 to 2010, reducing by almost

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1 million from 2000 to 2010. The minority share of Guizhou's population increased to 37.8 per cent in 2000 but was down slightly to 35.7 per cent in 2010 (National Bureau of Statistics China 2002, 2012). The proportion of ethnic minorities is higher than for Inner Mongolia (20.5 per cent), Yunnan (33.4 per cent) and Ningxia (35.2 per cent) but lower than for Guangxi (37.2 per cent), Qinghai (47 per cent), Xinjiang (59.5 per cent) and Tibet (91.8 per cent).

Guizhou is administratively organized into nine prefectures, which were divided into 86 counties in 2012. Among these, there are three minority autonomous prefectures (MAPs), plus one minority autonomous county (MAC) within the Qiannan MAP (Shandu Shui AC) and eleven outside the MAPs. While ethnic minorities are found throughout the province, most of them are concentrated in MAPs and MACs. Figure 7.2 shows the proportion of ethnic minorities in the total population at the county level. Counties with over 50 per cent cover half of Guizhou. In the southeast and northeast, the population of ethnic minorities was over 80 per cent and percentages between 60 and 80 were found in the southern part of the province. In 2012, there were 19 counties where the shares of ethnic minorities were over 80 per cent of total population and populations of ethnic minorities in 25 counties were between 50 per cent and 79 per cent.

Among the ethnic minorities in Guizhou, six groups (Miao, Buyi, Tujia, Dong, Yi and Gelao, and Shui) have a population of more than 340,000. They are native to Guizhou and in 1990, 98.3 per cent of China's Gelao, 97.3 per cent of Buyi and 93.1 per cent of Shui were found in this province. The concentration levels of these groups has declined due to out-migration over the past decades but has remained very high at 90 per cent, 87.5 per cent and 84.7 per cent respectively (see Table 7.1). Guizhou also includes over half the Dong and Miao in China. In 2010, Miao accounted for 11.4 per cent of the province's total population while Buyi, Dong and Tujia together accounted for 15.4 per cent. It is worth noting that over half a million (612,000) 'unidentified' ethnic minorities of China are found in Guizhou (NSBC 2012).[2]

The family planning policy, later known as the one-child policy started to be implemented in Guizhou in 1975. Ethnic minorities were treated differently, however, in that ethnic minorities were not subjected to a strict birth control of policy and tended to have more children. Nevertheless, the population of ethnic minorities in Guizhou as whole, as well as of individual groups, has declined. Table 7.2 shows that population changes of major Guizhou's native ethnic groups. During the period 2000–10, the populations of all groups, except for Tujia, experienced decline.

There are two clear patterns of change. One is that some ethnic groups, including Miao, Yi and Mulao, experienced national increases but declines

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

Source: National Bureau of Statistics China (NBSC) 2012.

Figure 7.2 Ethnic minorities as percentage of total population by county, Guizhou, 2010

in Guizhou. This may suggest that some of their members migrated out of Guizhou during the period. The other is that the total China population of some groups, including Gelao, Buyi, Dong and Maonan, has decreased. This is contradictory to the non-application of the one-child policy to ethnic minorities but may also suggest that members of the ethnic minority groups have been affected by not merely natural increase but also other social and economic factors. On the other hand, the census may be inaccurate, or it may be a combination of all these factors.

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Table 7.1 Major ethnic minority groups in Guizhou, 2010

Ethnic minority	% of the group's total in China	% of Guizhou's population
Gelao	89.9	1.4
Buyi	87.5	7.2
Shui	84.7	1.0
Dong	49.7	4.1
Miao	42.1	11.4
Maonan	27.0	0.1
Tujia	17.2	4.1
Mulao	11.5	1.4
Yi	9.6	2.4
Unidentified	95.7	1.8

Source: NSBC 2012.

Table 7.2 Population growth rate of major ethnic minority groups in Guizhou, compared with the national average and Han, 2000–10 (%)

Ethnic minority	% change in Guizhou	% change in China
Yi	−1.08	12.27
Miao	−7.71	5.43
Mulao	−12.23	4.29
Tujia	0.47	4.06
Shui	−5.67	1.22
Dong	−12.07	−2.71
Buyi	−10.28	−3.41
Gelao	−11.42	−4.94
Maonan	−12.51	−5.57
Unidentified	−13.75	−12.84
Total ethnic minorities	−7.0	6.4
Han	1.97	7.34

Source: NSBC 2002, 2012.

7.6 POVERTY AND MIGRATION

Environmental deterioration has compounded an array of grievous social conditions that have placed Guizhou among the poorest of the poor in China. In the 1990s, using the UN definition of the poverty line, all rural

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residents in the province (31.8 million) fell below the line and the annual net income of 10 million people was less than US$50 per capita. More than 4.6 million people had an annual net income below US$25 per capita (Liu and Zhao 2000). After two decades of rapid economic growth, living standards in Guizhou have gradually improved but not kept the pace with other parts of China. In 2011, the per capita income in rural Guizhou was 4145 yuan (US$670), which was the lowest among the 34 provinces in Mainland China. This figure represented 25.1 per cent and 11.4 per cent of that of Guizhou cities (15,644 yuan) and Shanghai (36,230 yuan) respectively. Based on the government definition of the poverty line (2300 yuan/p.a), the province's poverty rate (poverty population/total population) was 33.1 per cent, almost twice the national average of 12.3 per cent in 2011 (GZBS 2012). Annual incomes of one-third of rural household were lower than the official poverty line in 2002. In Puding county, nearly 30 per cent of the households relied on selling blood (cash compensation for blood donations) as their 'major livelihood strategy' (Xing 2009, p. 344).

Of the 592 nationally designated poverty counties in the nation, 50 were in Guizhou in 2011. Guizhou had 11.5 million below the poverty line: 75.4 per cent (8.66 million) lived in rural areas and 85 per cent were concentrated in areas of environmental vulnerability (GZBS 2012). For historical reasons, the majority of today's ethnic minorities have resided in remote mountainous regions – to escape persecution and continue their culture. Though the cultural mechanisms of ethnic minorities assist them, to some extent, to adapt sustainably to the environment at the village level (Yuan et al 2012), the relationship between ethnic minorities and environmental degradation is more complicated at the regional scale.

Guizhou's economy is dominated by a primary agricultural sector with small industrial sectors which can support a limited amount of urbanization. In 1953, 7.5 per cent of the total population was urbanized. Guizhou's urbanization has been largely due to the state-sponsored relocation of Han Chinese during the Mao era. The relocation of military manufacturing factories and its workers and families produced both industrial and population foundations for urban development in the cities of Zunyi, Anshun, Duyun and Kaili. The provincial level of urbanization increased to 11.5 per cent in 1982 and 33.8 per cent in 2010. The most recent increase is largely due to the redefinition of the urban administrative area and urban population: to include people who might live in a city for up to six months and those who might live in rural villages within urban jurisdictions. Neither group holds urban residency or *hukou*. The actual level of Guizhou's urbanization, in terms of household registration, is thought to be 16.1 per cent (GZBS 2012).

Figure 7.3 shows the changing national distribution of Gelao, Buyi and

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

Source: NSBC 2002, 2012.

Figure 7.3 Changing distribution of three ethnic minority groups in China, 2000–10

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Shui ethnic groups in the period between 2000 and 2010. A proportion of ethnic minorities in Guizhou has been moving to urban areas, especially in the eastern seaboard provinces (Zhejiang, Fujian, Guangdong). This migration is continuing even though discrimination against their engagement in the urban labour market exists (Wu 2014). These groups are believed to be mostly 'native' and confined to Guizhou. For example, Gelao were first identified in the northern parts of Guizhou and officially recognized in 1956. In 1990, 98.3 per cent of the Gelao minority were concentrated in Guizhou but the proportions in Zhejiang and Guangdong grew to 2 and 3 per cent respectively in 2010.

In Guizhou, the level of urban concentration of ethnic minorities is much lower than that of Han Chinese. In 2010, the urban concentration of the major ethnic minority groups was less than 9 per cent. For example, the proportions were 8.2 per cent, 7.7 per cent and 8.2 per cent for Miao, Dong and Buyi respectively. For some ethnic groups, the levels were even lower. For example, it was 3.8 per cent for Shui and 2.7 per cent for Maonan (NBSC 2012). This means that in spite of environmental collapse and economic poverty the majority of the minority population remained in the rural areas, as they were either unwilling or incapable of moving. Because of government resttlement programs, many of these people are now entering the migration stream but they are very different to economically motivated, self-sponsored migrants.

7.7 TURNING 'MIAO' VILLAGERS INTO URBAN CITIZENS

The reduction of poverty amongst dispersed rural populations is a major goal of the province's government. Moreover, the widely dispersed settlements of ethnic minorities and their land uses are believed to contribute to environmental degradation. In order to address these issues, Guizhou officials have undertaken population displacement or resettlement programs since 2001: removing the rural population from what was described as 'uninhabited' environments and settling them in higher density towns and cities. The majority of the displaced people have been asked to give up their land resources and their traditional livelihood and participate as low-wage workers in the industrial complexes of urban settings.

This policy was heavily pushed by Hu Jingtao, the former President of China, who worked as the Guizhou's Chinese Communist Party Secretary in the mid-1980s. After he moved to Beijing, he promoted his colleagues in Guizhou to the central government: for example, Lu Zanshu, the CCP Secretary of the province, was promoted to be a member of the politburo

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(the key policy decision maker in China) in 2012. In the same year, the central government issued a special policy regarding social and economic development in Guizhou (Guizhou Government 2012).

The provincial government responded by launching two interrelated and ambitious projects. One was to speed up urbanization of the province by seeking to increase the urban population from 12.72 million to 17.02 million in five years, from 2012 to 2017 (Guizhou Government 2013). This would mean increasing the capacity of existing cities as well as developing a number of small towns and cities to accommodate the extra 4.3 million.

Associated with urbanization, the second project was to relocate 2.04 million people from mountain villages, between 2012 and 2020 (GDRC 2012). The people would be relocated to planned, urban-style settlements. This figure is equal to almost 9.0 per cent of the rural population of Guizhou. It has been reported that 250,000 people were successfully relocated between 2012 and 2014 (Guizhou Government 2014). Who is displaced and where they are moved and resettled is selective. The Guizhou Government wants to 'effectively solve the poverty of ethnic minority population and deal with the longer term issues of development'. Accordingly, resettlement is seen as 'a crucial need' for 'unity and advancement of ethnic minorities' in the province (GDRC 2012, p. 4).

At the prefecture level, a large proportion of the rural population of Qiannan (13.2 per cent), Tongren (13.1 per cent), Qiandongnan (12.2 per cent) and Anshun (11.2 per cent) is going to be resettled. Ethnic minorities will account for more than half (1.04 million) of the displaced population. In some counties, such as Wuchuan county in Zunyi and Danzai, Shansui, Jianhe, Congjiang, Rongjiang, Liping and Taijiang counties in Qiandongnan, over 96 per cent of displaced persons will be ethnic minorities. This will result in the largest displacement of ethnic minorities in Guizhou's history. The people are not only relocated away from the land but are also expected to transform into factory and public workers. Using the language of government officials, the relocation is to help 'civilize' and 'advance' the rural people and enable them to enjoy modern life (GDRC 2012). 'The only one type of civilization' regarding the ethnic minorities is 'a Han Chinese one', which 'is measured by the habits, habitat, and habitus of the population' (Cliff 2013, p. 19). This means many aspects of ethnic traditions have to be given up.

Administratively displaced people are largely relocated within the region of the county or city's jurisdictions. They are less isolated from the natural environment than those who migrate to cities in coastal areas. However, new settlements are designed for industrial production and are radically different from their traditional villages. Traditionally, the structure of minority villages varied by ethnic group and was a result of

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their culture and their cultural development (Wu 1992). Typically new settlements have multi-storey apartments along wide straight streets. Some settlements are supposed to be designed in the building style of ethnic minorities and for ethnic exhibition (*minzhu fengqing jie*). But in the view of many, the designs have little to do with the traditions of ethnic minorities. They are based more on the principles of modern planning that 'a simple, repetitive logic will be easiest to administer and to police' (Scott 1998, p. 55). They feature a unified requirement of '*wutong*' ('5 connections' that connect electricity, road, tap water, internet and television and internet) and '*qiyou*' ('7 haves' include having a centre for community services, a medical clinic, a shopping centre, a kindergarten, a centre for cultural activities, a centre for technological activities and a nursing home). Like other modern governmental schemes, the settlement development involves the creation of 'ideal patterns of settlement' and 'ideal people for social development', which 'fit snugly into a high-modernist view and also answered their political interests as state officials' (Scott 1998, p. 5).

Villagers included in designated resettlement schemes are offered incentives to leave their mountain homes. Each displaced household would be given house subsidies and provided with employment opportunities. There are no available official data on how voluntary the migrants in the region are but one large-scale survey that covered 31 provinces showed that only 11 per cent of farmers were willing to give up their land and obtain an urban *hukou* in 2010 (Zhang 2011). The responses of displaced people in interviews in Qiandongnan were mixed. Some were simply told that they would be offered incentives to move to cities (county seats) where houses would be built to receive them. Some had been reluctant to move due to their emotional ties to their work on the land but have to move because most of the people in their village chose to move. Some believed that rural life was becoming increasingly difficult and they welcomed the change. Others believed that relocation might leave villagers even worse off because they could not find a job in the cities.

7.8 PLANNED RESETTLEMENT AND ETHNICITY

The resettlement described here is a planned process of urbanization. A salient feature of the new settlements is their alignment with industrial parks. By 2014, more than 1000 industrial parks had been designated across the province to accommodate and transfer people. Officials hope that this will repeat the path of industrial development that occurred in the coastal areas of China in the 1980s and early 1990s (Cartier 2001).

These industrial parks are expected to accommodate 1.48 million, about

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72.5 per cent of the displaced people. The developments involve the use of large areas of arable land, which is scarce in the province. It is estimated that planned resettlements will require 180 km^2 of land. Such industrial areas also cause pollution and other urban-based environmental problems (Gong et al 2012). The parks tend to attract pollution-intensive industries and those that heavily exploit natural resources, such as timber industries. Many of these industries have been expelled from relatively developed areas in the coastal areas.

Another characteristic of the displacement program is that it has taken a 'whole village' approach, which means the village would be relocated as a whole unit. People from the one village can live and work together, but pursue diverse economic opportunities. This will partly keep social connections and enable villagers to support each other in their new living situations. The ethnicity of the displaced people has been considered, to some extent. The movement of whole villages in planned minority resettlement programs is no doubt designed to try to keep the ethnic group intact. Ethnicity has, therefore, been acknowledged as important but the change of location introduces new elements and the layout of the settlements is very different from traditional villages in the mountains. It would be expected that ethnic culture would be impacted in some ways.

Some of these new settlements have been proposed as display centres of ethnic culture, for the purposes of tourism. These settlements are expected to house about 170,000 displaced people. It is anticipated that some of the displaced people would work in their agricultural fields and participate in tourism industries that are based on showcasing and consuming their identities and cultures. However, local ethnic minorities can rarely take advantage of ethnic tourism due to their lack of capital and skills (Hillman 2003). Likewise, bringing traditions in villages to performances on the stage, either in a village or outside, often leads to the development of the traditions separating from their people. The original traditions may be modified to cater for tourist demands and this may adversely affect 'village traditions' (Ingram and Wu forthcoming).

The planned resettlement of ethnic minorities introduces a new set of factors into an individual's or group's self-definition and their identities. Iredale et al (2001, p. 241) found that many minority people do not want to leave their minority region 'as they do not want to leave their ethnic group'. However, 'the widening of people's experiences by migration often leads to the occurrence of multiple identities which consist of an urban or other ethnic identity, as well as the original ethnic group identity' (Iredale et al 2001, p. 142).

In Qiandongnan we met a group of young Miao girls who were dressed according to Dong customs and performing Dong traditions in a Dong

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tourism village. What is noted here is that ethnicity is reshaped in response to varying situational contexts and growing social needs. This may be a pragmatic response, where minorities use aspects of their traditional identity for the purposes of tourist performances or in tourist villages/theme parks. But it is more than this. 'Visual images of ethnic minorities dressed in multicoloured traditional garb joyously singing, dancing, or practicing religious rituals are now ubiquitous in China' (Lo 2013, p. 177). As Lo (2013, p. 177) points out it is part of a much wider trend towards accelerating the 'strategic commodification' of national minorities as China 'attempts to bolster internal consumption and tourism in its drive for economic growth'. It is also an implicit part of the 'civilizing project' that the government is engaged in towards ethnic minorities (Nyiri 2006, p. 92).

Research has shown that displacement/resettlement can have disastrous consequences for some people. The various cultural traditions that ethnic minorities have developed with the environment may be disrupted and altered. The resettled minorities must develop 'urban citizen' identities in order to integrate into the industrial labour market and survive. This may require a change in their values and beliefs, including giving up their native languages and traditions. Many ethnic traditions, such as orientation to communities and a sense of belonging to a particular place and a particular ethnic minority group, will inevitablly fade or be lost.

In addition, there are no clear social plans, except for attracting industries. The economical viability of this development is in question. While the construction of urban dwellings with tap water, electricity and access to paved roads and the physical relocation of people is relatively easy, turning displaced farmers into urban citizens is another matter. For example, the creation of urban employment is far from certain when a region has few competitive advantages to attract industries. Besides, employment is no longer determined by government plans but by the market. On the one hand, the rural displaced are often poorly educated and lack skills and dispositions that are required for modern industries but enterprises, on the other hand, need to meet their own needs to be competitive and tend to employ well-educated people. In Yima City, a resettlement designation for the Three Gorges Dam, for example, planned urban employment failed to eventuate for the displaced people. This resulted in urban poverty and half of the displaced people had to return to farming (Zhang and Zhang 1999). Other outcomes included social exclusion and residential segregation: people simply shifted from rural poverty to urban slum (Murray 1987). Rural environmental problems were replaced by urban ones.

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7.9 DISCUSSION

The identity and traditions of many of China's ethnic minorities have been challenged and have been undergoing change in order that people adapt to economic development, new policies and physical environments. Identity is not a fixed concept and change is inevitable but the planned resettlement of ethnic minority people accelerates the rate of change.

Regional development in Guizhou, at least until the 1970s, was characterized by the exploitation of natural resources and by inflows of Han Chinese migrants into the region. Now, rural populations, including ethnic minorities, in Guizhou are in an unprecedented process of being moving out of their historically inhabited areas. The planned resettlement of ethnic minorities is different in many aspects from economically motivated rural–urban migration that has occurred in the region, as well as China as a whole, over the past decades. Resettlement is a government policy which involves the construction of county seats, central towns and industrial parks and the conversion of cultivated land back to conservation areas. Millions of minority and other rural residents have been or will be moved into urban areas to become industrial workers. Displacement migration is seen by the government as something that can be easily switched on and off, through policy changes.

The planned resettlement of ethnic minorities in China is somewhat similar to planned urbanization of Indigenous people elsewhere in the world. These include planned resettlement schemes of colonial countries in the 19th century and early twentieth century: for example, of Australian Indigenous people on to outback mission stations and town reserves; of Canadian First Nations into new townships and reservations, and of American Indians on to reservations (Armitage 1995; Peter 2002). These schemes were intended to help Indigenous people to assimilate into mainstream societies and theoretially enable them to 'enjoy' modern amenities and public services and improve the 'quality' (education, housing, health) of their populations.

The reality was that in Australia this policy was meant to 'smooth the dying pillow' of a 'primitive' people who were expected to die out (Foley 1999). Elsewhere, it was more or less the same. These policies have been widely criticized as being disruptive to the traditional social, cultural and economic systems of the relocated people and to their general wellbeing. Removal and alienation from traditional environments causes a mismatch between traditions and identities of ethnic minorities and urban cultures. These cultural conflicts are one of the most enduring dilemmas for urban adjustment and the 'major factors' leading to economic and cultural decline (Graham and Peters 2002). Evidence shows that the planned

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urbanization of ethnic minorities also gives rise to a new array of problems, including poverty, lower income, low rates of labour force participation, high rates of unemployment and higher rates of welfare dependency.

Since the 1960s assimilation, as a social policy, has 'theoretically' largely given way to multiculturalism or integration. These approaches legitimize the retention of elements of cultural difference. How well they are actually working may be a matter of contention but in democratic countries, Indigenous and immigrant peoples can attempt to influence institutions and practices so that they support their cultures and identities. This should enable them to survive as distinct peoples in contemporary societies.

But in China the top-down planning of displacement, without proper consultation and negotiation, will have enduring and far-reaching impacts on the social, cultural and economic life of ethnic minorities. China's approach to the urbanization of ethnic minorities will not succeed without attention to ongoing consultation and support in the transition from rural to urban life and the creation of strong new cultural identities. The values, lifestyles and cultures of the people who are being moved need to be taken into account. It is only two years since this large-scale relocation program was implemented in Guizhou and the real consequences of relocating millions of diverse ethnic groups, and their adaptation to the new environment, are yet to be seen.

NOTES

1. It is worth noting that *hukou* population is different to residential population. According to *hukou* (household registration) law, each citizen is required to register in one and only one place of residence within a month of the person being born. It must be transferred and registered in places with the person's migration. The growing population mobility has resulted in a mismatch between the registered places and the place where the person actually lives. So, 'resident population' (*changzhu renkou*) was introduced in the population census. For Guizhou, resident population includes *hukou* holders in Guizhou who are resident there at the time of census and other citizens who hold a *hukou* of other areas but have lived in Guizhou for more than six months at the time of census. In 2010, Guizhou's *hukou* population and resident population were 41.9 million and 34.8 million respectively. This means about 20 per cent of the province's people whose *hukou* was registered in Guizhou had lived outside Guizhou for at least six months at the time of the census.
2. 'Unidentified' minorities are ethnic groups that have not been formally recognized by the government.

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