1Personal Background

To start with, I would like to briefly introduce my personal background and the academic trainings I received so far. I earned my Bachelor’s degree in geography from the Southwest University in Chongqing, China. During college time, I published a paper (in Chinese) coauthored with my mentor on …. Later I went to the University of Miami to attend a master’s program in geography. In the UM I took a series of GIS courses on techniques of using ArcMap and some basics of remote sensing, plus two seminars in human geography. I did my two master’s papers on crime analysis and urban gentrification, respectively. In the first paper, I utilize GIS spatial

During the first year in the UW, I took courses on …CSDE certificate.

2 An Outline of Research

1)Historical contexts of the underway internal migration in China

The internal migration in China has a long history along with the change of dynasties. Historically, the factors motivating migration contain wars, famine, military service, official assignment, engagement in business, or study tours. Yet in terms of the migration scale, these population mobility events are incomparable to the one that is going on today. It is estimated that 247 million population left their original registered place and moved to somewhere else in the year of 2015 [1]. Such huge size of internal migration is unprecedented, no matter in China’s past or in human history. It has profound influence not only on every aspect of the Chinese society, but also on the landscape of the whole world.

It should be noticed that the mass internal migration in modern China only happened after the rigorous command economy time from the 1950s to the 1980s. Following the model of the Soviet Union, the term “command” suggests the state largely controls everything with absolute authority. In the early decades after the establishment of the People’s Republic of China, the Chinese Communist Party was committed to build a society with socialist orders. Part of the endeavors was embodied by the implement of the *hukou* system, which has its root from the Russian *propiska* system ([5]). The *hukou* system gets people registered in a fixed place so that they are not allowed to move freely. A person’s *hukou* is inherited from his or her parents, and it is linked with the eligibility to access many social welfares, including medical care, insurance, pension, children’s education, and so on. With the constraint of *hukou*, human mobility was almost impossible unless it was arranged or approved by the government. Under the guidance of centrally planned schemes, the main trend of migration in this stage was from the east to the west and the heartland. The main body of the migration was highly regulated to serve for mass construction programs, industries and land reclamation in the vast inland areas. In Chan’s (1000) words, population movement was organized in accordance with the needs of national economic development under classic socialism ([6]54). As the moving process was led by the government rather than came out of people’s individual desires, some migrants were reluctant to move. Consequently, the quantity of migrants is much smaller compared with the contemporary one.

Since the far-reaching economic reform took place in 1978, China’s economy has been growing at an astonishing speed. In the reform stage, China adopted the tactic “socialism with Chinese characteristics”, wherein some form of planning was put into place to control the anarchy of capitalist markets in preparing the blueprints for a socialist society ([2]P81). By putting forward the view that China was in the primary stage of socialism, the “Sinification” of Marxism during this period was aimed at opening a new era of development and achieving modernization ([4]). Naughton (2007) argues that China is experiencing two far-from-complete transitions now. One is the “transition away from bureaucratic socialism and toward a market economy”, and the other is the industrialization process marked by “transformation from a rural to an urban society” ([3] p4). The urbanization of China triggered by migration in this period is volunteer and natural, in contrast to the planned and managed process in the previous phase ([6] 55). Migrant workers from the villages all around the country flocked to the cities in search of job opportunities, and they quickly became the mainstay of China’s economic miracle. By obtaining cheap labors from the countryside without offering them local urban *hukou*, the economic aggregate of cities surges at almost no expense. Yet for many migrant workers, although working in the cities brought them better income, their lives in the cities are “hard and unfair, and often cold and uncomfortable” ([8]11).

2) Features of migration determined by the spatiality of power: the two-sector system and urban hierarchy

2.空间性

1) two-sector economy

2) urban hierarchy

Crack down on

The migration in China today bears the imprint of the planned economy period. Specifically, the two-sector system and the administrative urban hierarchy are the two main legacies. The two-sector system refers to the big distinct between “urban” and “rural”, and the urban hierarchy refers to the source allocation mechanism based on rankings of cities. Both regimes are maintained by the *hukou* system formalized in 1958. The division of urban and rural dated from the Maoist era, when products of the countryside were procured to support the cities. Based on their hukou type, the holder of “agricultural *hukou*” would be required to be self-support while the holder of “non-agricultural *hukou*” would be guaranteed with state-sector jobs, social welfare, housing, and food rations ([13]29). The countryside lies at the bottom of Chinese administrative hierarchy with the least power. Above it, in a succession from county level, prefectural level, provincial level, to the central level, cities get exponentially more priority. Chan ([14]) points out that despite the devolution of political powers in recent decades, the essence of the top-town polity in which the upper-tier cities have absolute political advantage and predominant financial shares never changes. Correspondingly, people with “non-agricultural” *hukou* are further differentiated according to the administrative rank of the city their *hukou* is bound to. For example, a person with Beijing’s *hukou* have the privilege to enjoy the top medical care and education since Beijing is best equipped with these resources in the country.

Due to the spatialty of power relationships mentioned above, the internal migration in China has many unique features that make it stand out from the rest of the world. Firstly, the migration is temporary, annually back-and-forth rather than long-time and permanent. The draconian restriction of *hukou* system brings a set of discriminations against rural migrants, which prevents them from moving to the cities with their whole family. Each year during the spring festival, millions of rural migrant workers travel from where there are myriads of economic opportunities to their hometowns. Since the children and parents of the migrant workers do not have access to the citizen rights at cities, they are left at the countryside and become the “left-behind” children and elderly. Besides the rural/urban classification, people with inferior urban *hukou* – the registered location is lower-tier cities – are suffering from similar inequalities. In a word, hukou restricts any type of “upward” migration ([14]P69). Among the disadvantages, the most salient one should be resulted from the *Gaokao*, namely the college entrance examination. People with *hukou* in high-ranked locales, especially the cities under central administration including Beijing, Tianjin and Shanghai, have much more chance to go to a prestigious college than other places ([5] [15]). This phenomenon is described as “the broken ladder” by Xiong ([16]) as the education system fails to facilitate upward social class mobility.

Secondly, the magnets

1)The two-sector economy. rural and urban. Past: two sector. Now: urban better living facilities. 2) Hukou and social welfare. 2.1)Gaokao. 2.2) rights to local education. Not just for bottom migrant workers, but also for educated middle class who wants to send their children to schools.

Secondly, due to the special urban ladder in China, the magnets of migration concentrate in a few first-tier metropolises and provincial capitals. Huge amount of financial, medical, educational, and human resources pack at a few cities, making these places over-crowded yet the rest of the country under-developed. Both the two features are tightly linked to the two-sector economy in the pre-reform or the socialist period, in which cities were given priorities in all levels’ development plans and countries were heavily exploited. Above the countryside, there is strict administrative hierarchy of cities that dominates the ration of national resources. Despite the hierarchical imbalance, the prosperity of export-oriented economy at coastal urban areas draws a myriad of migrant workers. Hence the politically higher ranked cities and the vibrant coastal cities become the major migration destinations, and in many cases these two types coincide.

.…The complexity

…

The economic reform starting from 1978 blazes the trail in the easing of migration policy.

…

While the migration from the lower-level administrative geographic units to the higher-level ones usually happen within provinces, i.e. intra-provincial migration (see), the migration to coastal industrial cities are oftentimes inter-provincial migration (see et al. ). The latter one is more massive and has deeper influence on China’s economy. A third spatial dimension of migration is the intra-provincial migration by compiling geographic close provinces together and divide the whole country into three large regions, namely the west, the central, and the east regions (see et al. ).

3)Spatial pattern of migration/Age structure of the population/Core research question: age structure

Make contribution to…

3. Population dividend and the “world factory”

先写人口红利的成因 再写下一步的人口转变：低出生率 低死亡率 刘易斯转折点

The stable social environment after the establishment of the PRC promoted the improvement of health condition and living standards, leading to a rapid decline of mortality. Infant mortality was cut down by half in the first decade after 1949 (Banister 1987, cited in [9]27) Life expectancy started to increase almost immediately after 1949, and by 1981 it had grown to 68, at which speed the world has never seen in any other societies ([9]27). Despite the setbacks caused by two political campaigns ([9]27-28), the Great Leap Forward (GLF) and the Cultural Revolution, the overall downturn trend of mortality is steady. The total rate (TFR) of China fluctuated around 6 in the 1950s and the 1960s without counting the figures during the three years of GLF. Starting from the early 1970s, the TFR of China had been continuously going down. In the 1990s, the TFR dropped below the replacement level, where it has remained ([10]422-423). The reduction of fertility of China is among the fastest in world records ([9]33). By the time China introduced the one-child policy in 1980, it has already completed the First Demographic Transition along with other East and Southeast Asian countries ([11]), which is indicated by the drop of fertility and mortality ([12]). The population growth rate in China reaches its peak virtually in tandem with the whole world in the 1960s.

The process of the demographic change in East Asia proceeds from high child-dependence ratios to high proportions of the working population, and finally to population aging ([17]). As the baby boomers grow up and fertility decreases, the working age population grow accordingly ([18]), and thus comes the “population dividend”. On the one hand, the change of population structure brings sufficient labor supply to the economy. On the other hand, the national savings rate will also rise in company with the ascent of working-age population ([17]). For the case of China, the family-planning programs accelerates the arrival of the population dividend. These elements played a prominent role in the stunning economic growth process of China. Because of 改写世界工厂

Since 2008, the growth momentum has been continuously slowing down, which can be attributed to both the global economic crisis and the gradual fade-out of the population dividend. According to Cai and Wang (2005 [17]), (Cai Fang’s book <http://ebookcentral.proquest.com.offcampus.lib.washington.edu/lib/washington/reader.action?docID=1611961>

) <http://ebookcentral.proquest.com.offcampus.lib.washington.edu/lib/washington/reader.action?docID=1587908>

<http://ebookcentral.proquest.com.offcampus.lib.washington.edu/lib/washington/reader.action?docID=4501540>

In 1978 China introduced the One

Recently the “Made in China” products have seen an imminent crisis of its competitiveness. From 2010 manufacturing for export industries in coastal China have been experiencing hard a time in finding workers ([7]). Chan ([7]) suggests that the shortage of working-age population has caused the “China price” on the verge of rising.

4) Research gap and potential questions

4.人口学特征的空间性Potential research topic: Demographic characteristics of the migration and how it varies over space

3Plan

Time schedule; Data sources; methods (life table…statistical regression…)

P55 vast population: labor-intensive sectors

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[5] 50 hukou

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2014户口和城市化改革？

Metropolitan area and gdp per capita