

Polarization Game over Social Networks


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joint work with Emrah Akyol and Zeynep Ertem


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
Problem Setting




Problem Setting



Opinion dynamics: Friedkin-Johnson



Problem Setting



$$\mathbf{s} = (s_i, s_j, s_{-(i,j)})$$

original

Maximizer $[r^A, s_A] \rightarrow [i, s'_i]$ Minimizer $[r^B, s_B] \rightarrow [j, s'_j]$

$$\mathbf{s}' = (s'_i, s'_j, s_{-(i,j)})$$

modified

Opinion
dynamics

$$\mathbf{z}' = \lim_{t \rightarrow \infty} \mathbf{z}(t)$$

steady-state opinion

$$P(\mathbf{z}') = (\mathbf{z}' - \bar{\mathbf{z}})^T (\mathbf{z}' - \bar{\mathbf{z}})$$

polarization

Opinion dynamics: Friedkin-Johnson

expressed opinion

innate opinion

$$z_i(t) = \alpha_i s_i + (1 - \alpha_i) \sum_{j \in V} w_{ij} z_j(t-1)$$

$$\alpha_i \in [0, 1]$$

network influence

Nash and Stackelberg Equilibria

- There are two notions of equilibrium of interest: (Generalized) Nash and Stackelberg.

Generalized Nash Equilibrium

A tuple (i_A, s_A) and (i_B, s_B) is a GNE if these three are simultaneously satisfied:

$$i_A, s_A = \arg \max_{i_A \in S_A, s_A \in [0,1]} P$$

$$i_B, s_B = \arg \min_{i_B \in S_B, s_B \in [0,1]} P$$

$$i_A \neq i_B$$

- Fictitious play is a method to find Nash Equilibrium (Brown, 1949)
- In a two-player zero-sum game, it is guaranteed that fictitious play will converge to an NE
- We need a modified version of FP to find the GNE.

Prior Work

- ▶ Limited prior work on polarization dynamics over social networks.
 - * Minimizing polarization (Chen and Racz, 2021)
 - * Maximizing polarization (Musco et al., 2018)
 - * Change network parameters (Zhu et al., 2021)
- ▶ Some focuses on minimization or maximization of polarization but not the game setting where both players (maximizer and minimizer) exist.
 - * New models of opinion dynamics (Perra and Rocha, 2019)

Equilibrium Details

- ▶ Fictitious play (FP) is commonly used to find NE in classical zerosum games.
- ▶ Here, we modify fictitious play so that it can be used to determine GNE. We first need the following:

Theorem

For a given i_A, i_B pair, $s_i^A \in \{0, 1\}$ and

$$s_i^B = \frac{-\sum_{j \neq i_B} s_j (a_j - \frac{1}{n})^T (a_i - \frac{1}{n})}{(a_i - \frac{1}{n})^T (a_i - \frac{1}{n})}$$


where a_i is the i 'th column of $A = (I + L)^{-1}$ and L is the Laplacian of the network.

- ▶ Proof Sketch: Note that $\mathbf{z}' = (I + L)^{-1} \mathbf{s}$ and $P(\mathbf{z}')$ is convex in \mathbf{z}' . Since P is linear in \mathbf{s} , we are maximizing/minimizing a convex functional. Maximizer is on the boundary and the minimizer can be found by KKT conditions.
- ▶ Exhaustive search for i_A, i_B .

Main Takeaway

- ▶ The novel setting requires new tools to analyze generalized NE
- ▶ Heuristics inspiration of determining GNE to avoid computationally demanding method
 - * maximizer → less connected(lonely) agent
 - * minimizer → extreme opinion

Simulation - Karate Network



Data	Nodes	Edges	Network	Source
Karate(Karate club)	34	78	undirected	Zachary (1977)

Player	Max		Min	
Probability	75%	25%	90%	10%
Nodes	11	16	6	29
Innate opinion	0.77	0.51	0.72	0.21
New opinion	1	1	0	1


Table Karate Network NE result.

	Max	Min
Nodes	16	6
Innate opinion	0.51	0.72
New opinion	1	0
Polarization	0.17	

Table Karate Network Maxmin result.

Simulation - Change innate opinion

change agent 29's opinion to 0.5




Player	Max		Min	
Probability	75%	25%	90%	10%
Nodes	11	16	6	33
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Table Karate Network NE result.

	Max	Min
Nodes	11	33
Innate opinion	0.77	0.29
New opinion	1	1
Polarization	0.16	

Table Karate Network Maxmin result.

Simulation - Twitter Network



Data	Nodes	Edges	Network	Source
Twitter(elections)	548	5,271	undirected	De et al. (2014)


Player	Max			Min		
Probability	45%	45%	10%	40%	40%	20%
Nodes ID	202	351	490	529	37	199
Innate opinion	0.56	0.64	0.57	0.49	0.60	0.23
New opinion	0	0	0	0.76	0.8	0.7

Table Twitter Network NE result.

	Max	Min
Nodes	396	199
Innate opinion	0.65	0.23
New opinion	0	0.71
Polarization	0.26	

Table Twitter Network Maxmin result.

Simulation - Reddit Network



Data	Nodes	Edges	Network	Source
Reddit(politics network)	553	94,312	undirected	De et al. (2014)

Player	Max		Min	
Probability	29%	71%	84%	16%
Node ID	50	481	245	284
Innate opinion	0.5	0.5	0.409	0.625
New opinion	1	1	0.5	0.29

Table Reddit Network NE result.

	Max	Min
Nodes	481	284
Innate opinion	0.5	0.63
New opinion	1	0
Polarization	0.07	

Table Reddit Network Maxmin result.

Summary

- ▶ Maximizer tend to choose the node with low centrality and neutral opinion.
- ▶ Minimizer tends to choose the node with min/max opinion among all agents.
- ▶ Any questions/Comments? ⇒ xzhan176@binghamton.edu

References

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