#### The Fairest Ransomware

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## Who am I?



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- University of Tsukuba (Undergraduate)
- Authentication Platform Section, DCS Dept
- I'm interesting in Cryptography

#### Introduction

• Recentry, Ransomwares are being famous.

#### Ransomware

Ransomware is one of the malwares, which encrypts the data on a victim's comptuer and then make they pay ransom in exchange for decrypting.

#### Famous Ransomwares

- WannaCry
- Petya
- GoldenEye

Will ransomwares decrypt the data if the victim pays Bitcoin?

### The Fairnest Ransomware



If the victim pays some Bitcoins, their data will be decrypted under the probability on which they agreed.

It's possible using cryptographic technique

# Encryption

Symmetric Key Encryption (SKE) is a cryptographic scheme that uses the *same* key to encrypt and decrypt data like AES. An encryption function is denoted Enc, a decryption function is denoted Dec. The following equation holds for the symmetric key *k*.

$$x = \mathrm{Dec}_k\left(\mathrm{Enc}_k\left(x\right)\right)$$

RSA Encryption is a cryptographic scheme that uses the *different* keys between encrypting and decrypting data. The key using encryption is called *public key* and The key using description is called *secret key*. The following holds for a public key (e, N) and the secret key d.

$$x = (x^e)^d = (x^d)^e \pmod{N}$$

## **Hash Function**

#### **Hash Function**

A hash function *H* is a *one way function*, which means that:

- It's easy to calculate the output H(x) from input x
- But it's hard to calculate the input x from output H(x)

A hash function *H* has the following properties:

- Preimage Resistance A hash value h, it's difficult to find any message m such that h = H(m).
- Second Preimage Resistance An input  $m_1$ , it's difficult to find different input  $m_2$  such that  $H(m_1) = H(m_2)$ .
- Collision resistance It's difficult to find two different messages  $m_1$  and  $m_2$  such that  $H(m_1) = H(m_2)$ .

# Zero-Knowledge Proof

There are two people, Alice and Bob.

Prover Alice has the secret key d for RSA chipher text c encrypted by public key (e, N). And she has chipher text  $s := \operatorname{Enc}_k(c^d \mod N)$  and its symmetric key k.

Verifier Bob has the cipher text c, its public key (e, N) and the cipher text s.

Bob want to verify as follows:

A preimage of the hash value H(k) is a symmetric key k that can decrypt SKE chipher text s.

"

without knowing the secret key d or symmetric key k.

# Zero-Knowledge Proof

We use *cut-and-choose protocol* where RSA chipher text c encrypted by public key (e, N) and its secret key d.

# Thank you for your attention! Any question?