

The Fairest Ransomware

Hikaru YOSHIMURA


DWANGO Co., Ltd.
yyu@mental.poker

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Who am I?



- University of Tsukuba (Undergraduate)
- Authentication Platform Section, DCS Dept
- I'm interesting in Cryptography

Twitter @_yyu_

Qiita yyu

GitHub y-yu

Introduction

- Recently, *Ransomwares* are being famous.

Ransomware

Ransomware is one of the malwares, which encrypts the data on a victim's computer and then make them pay ransom in exchange for decrypting.

Famous Ransomwares

- WannaCry
- Petya
- GoldenEye

Will ransomwares decrypt the data if the victim pays Bitcoin?

The Fairest Ransomware

“ If the victim pays some Bitcoins, their data will be decrypted under the probability on which they agreed. ”

It's possible using cryptographic technique

Encryption

Symmetric Key Encryption (SKE) is a cryptographic scheme that uses the *same* key to encrypt and decrypt data like AES. An encryption function is denoted Enc , a decryption function is denoted Dec . The following equation holds for the symmetric key k .

$$x = \text{Dec}_k(\text{Enc}_k(x))$$

RSA Encryption is a cryptographic scheme that uses the *different* keys between encrypting and decrypting data. The key using encryption is called *public key* and The key using description is called *secret key*. The following holds for a public key (e, N) and the secret key d .

$$x = (x^e)^d = (x^d)^e \pmod{N}$$

Hash Function

Hash Function

A hash function H is a *one way function*, which means that:

- It's easy to calculate the output $H(x)$ from input x
- But it's hard to calculate the input x from output $H(x)$

A hash function H has the following properties:

Preimage Resistance A hash value h , it's difficult to find any message m such that $h = H(m)$.

Second Preimage Resistance An input m_1 , it's difficult to find different input m_2 such that $H(m_1) = H(m_2)$.

Collision resistance It's difficult to find two different messages m_1 and m_2 such that $H(m_1) = H(m_2)$.

Zero-Knowledge Proof

There are two people, Alice and Bob.

Prover Alice has the secret key d for RSA cipher text c encrypted by public key (e, N) . And she has cipher text $s := \text{Enc}_k(c^d \bmod N)$ and its symmetric key k .

Verifier Bob has the cipher text c , its public key (e, N) and the cipher text s .

Bob want to verify as follows:

“ A preimage of the hash value $H(k)$ is a symmetric key k that can decrypt SKE cipher text s . ”


without knowing the secret key d or symmetric key k .

Zero-Knowledge Proof

We use *cut-and-choose protocol* where RSA cipher text c encrypted by public key (e, N) and its secret key d .

Alice

Bob

 $F := \{\sigma_1, \dots, \sigma_n\}$ $R := \{d_1, \dots, d_m\}$ β is a random permutationfor $\{\sigma_1, \dots, \sigma_n, d_1, \dots, d_m\}$ β  $f(\beta)$

finalize

Thank you for your attention!

Any question?