


LEVEL0:

login: level0

passwd: level0

After logging in, I have these informations on the screen:
(about the iso)



```
Rainfall [Running]
You have the Auto capture keyboard option turned on. This will cause the Virtual Machine to automatically capture the

Good luck & Have fun

To start, ssh with level0/level0 on 10.0.2.15:4242
RainFall login: level00
Password:
Login incorrect
RainFall login: level0
Password:
GCC stack protector support:      Enabled
Strict user copy checks:         Disabled
Restrict /dev/mem access:        Enabled
Restrict /dev/kmem access:       Enabled
grsecurity / PaX: No GRKERNSEC
Kernel Heap Hardening: No KERNHEAP
System-wide ASLR (kernel.randomize_va_space): Off (Setting: 0)
RELRO      STACK CANARY      NX      PIE      RPATH      RUNPA
TH      FILE
No RELRO      No canary found  NX enabled  No PIE      No RPATH    No RU
NPATH      /home/user/level0/level0
level0@RainFall:~$
```

First, I check online for grsecurity and other keywords:

- Grsecurity : Grsecurity[®] is an extensive security enhancement to the Linux kernel that defends against a wide range of security threats
<https://grsecurity.net/>
- GCC stack protector support: Stack protection will abort your program if it detects overwrites of the return address or similar portions of the stack
<https://stackoverflow.com/questions/1629685/when-and-how-to-use-gccs-stack-protection-feature>
- KERNHEAP:
 - 3 - Integrity assurance for kernel heap allocators

3.1 - Meta-data protection against full and partial overwrites

3.2 - Detection of arbitrary free pointers and freelist corruption

3.3 - Overview of NetBSD and OpenBSD kernel heap safety checks

3.4 - Microsoft Windows 7 kernel pool allocator safe unlinking

- ASLR: Address space layout randomization (ASLR) is a memory-protection process for operating systems (OSes) that guards against [buffer-overflow](#) attacks by randomizing the location where system [executables](#) are loaded into [memory](#).

<https://www.techtarget.com/searchsecurity/definition/address-space-layout-randomization-ASLR>

- PIE: position ind pendant executable In [computing](#), **position-independent code**^[1] (**PIC**^[1]) or **position-independent executable (PIE)**^[2] is a body of [machine code](#) that, being placed somewhere in the [primary memory](#), executes properly regardless of its [absolute address](#).

Now our iso is turning, I'll connect via ssh.

And now I have done analyses of what was in front of my eyes, let's dig around to see where we are and how to evolve through sessions, escalating rights more or less. I look around and capture interesting things.

A simple 'ls' will show me what ressources I have. It outputs me a binary name level0, owned by level1 (which is supposed to be the uid of the process), and to group users. Let's check if I am in that group.

```
level0@RainFall:~$ ls -l
total 732
-rwsr-x---+ 1 level1 users 747441 Mar  6 2016 level0
level0@RainFall:~$ id
uid=2020(level0) gid=2020(level0) groups=2020(level0),100(users)
level0@RainFall:~$ groups
level0 users
level0@RainFall:~$
```

The subject says:

- Une fois connecté, vous allez devoir trouver le moyen permettant de lire le fichier `.pass` avec le compte utilisateur "levelX" du niveau suivant (X = numéro du niveau suivant).
- Ce fichier `.pass` est situé à la racine du home de chaque utilisateur (level0 exclu).

I assume that executing bin level0, or exploiting it will give me access to the session of level1, in which a `'pass'` file will be present. Once inside level1 account, I guess the subjects mean that I will need the permissions of the next level to be able to read the `'pass'` file, itself will give me the password, I guess, of the next session level.

But now, my first step is to find a way of changing session to level1. And I'll dig all the clue I'll encounter. I suppose bin level0 is the `.pass` file of its session.

I will follow this process to look around :

1- Execution level0:

```

No !
level0@RainFall:~$ ./level0
Segmentation fault (core dumped)
level0@RainFall:~$ ./level0 1
No !
level0@RainFall:~$ ./level0 1 2
No !
level0@RainFall:~$ ./level0 1 2 3
No !
level0@RainFall:~$ ./level0
Segmentation fault (core dumped)
level0@RainFall:~$ █

```

2- Analyze binary level0:

strings level0: Can't find yet online explanations

```

level0@RainFall:~$ strings level0
-bash: /usr/bin/strings: Input/output error
level0@RainFall:~$ █

```

objdump -d level0 / gdb level0:

I just read those lines, and try to launch : `./level0 423` because I just saw that the first call was an `atoi` of the first argument, and a check if the result was `0x1a7` (423), and it gave me that:

```

Dump of assembler code for function main:
   0x08048ec0 <+0>:      push    %ebp
   0x08048ec1 <+1>:      mov     %esp,%ebp
=>  0x08048ec3 <+3>:      and     $0xffffffff0,%esp
   0x08048ec6 <+6>:      sub     $0x20,%esp
   0x08048ec9 <+9>:      mov     0xc(%ebp),%eax
   0x08048ecc <+12>:     add     $0x4,%eax
   0x08048ecf <+15>:     mov     (%eax),%eax
   0x08048ed1 <+17>:     mov     %eax,(%esp)
   0x08048ed4 <+20>:     call    0x8049710 <atoi>
   0x08048ed9 <+25>:     cmp     $0x1a7,%eax

```

```

level0@RainFall:~$ ./level0 423
$ whoami
level1
$ █

```

Let's see what to do next now.

I'll dig a bit more on the direction of bin level0

<https://stackoverflow.com/questions/61907360/how-the->

compiler-does-data-binding-during-compile-time

Reverse:

```
int main(int ac, char **av)
{
    char *s = argv[1];
    int arg = atoi(s);

    if (arg != 423)
    {
        write(1, « No ! », len());
        return 0;
    }
    char *s1 = strdup(« /bin/sh »);
    gid_t egid = getegid();
    uid_t euid = geteuid();
    setresgid(egid, egid, egid);
    setresuid(euid, euid, euid);
    execve(« /bin/sh », s);
}
```

Ok we are now in a subshell process which the uid is level1.

There is a '.pass' file at the ~ that contains

1fe8a524fa4bec01ca4ea2a869af2a02260d4a7d5fe7e7c24d8
617e6dca12d3a.

I guess it is the password of the level1 account.

Let's try:

```

level0@RainFall:~$ ./level0 423
$ ls -la
ls: cannot open directory .: Permission denied
$ pwd
/home/user/level0
$ cd ~
/bin/sh: 3: cd: can't cd to /home/user/level0
$ cd /home/user/level1
$ ls -la
total 17
dr-xr-x---+ 1 level1 level1  80 Mar  6  2016 .
dr-x--x--x  1 root   root   340 Sep 23  2015 ..
-rw-r--r--  1 level1 level1 220 Apr  3  2012 .bash_logout
-rw-r--r--  1 level1 level1 3530 Sep 23  2015 .bashrc
-rwsr-s---+ 1 level2 users 5138 Mar  6  2016 level1
-rw-r--r--+ 1 level1 level1  65 Sep 23  2015 .pass
-rw-r--r--  1 level1 level1 675 Apr  3  2012 .profile
$ cat .pass
1fe8a524fa4bec01ca4ea2a869af2a02260d4a7d5fe7e7c24d8617e6dca12d3a
$ ^C
$
level0@RainFall:~$ su level1
Password:
RELRO          STACK CANARY      NX            PIE            RPA
TH            RUNPATH          FILE
No RELRO       No canary found  NX disabled   No PIE         No
RPATH         No RUNPATH      /home/user/level1/level1
level1@RainFall:~$ █

```

Flag:

1fe8a524fa4bec01ca4ea2a869af2a02260d4a7d5fe7e7c24d8617e6dca12d3a