MALWARE ANALYSIS REPORT.

MALWARE FILE NAME :- zeusbankingversion-26thnovember2013

ZEUS MALWARE INTRODUCTION.

1. If you know about Greek myths or enjoy Marvel comics, you probably know the name "Zeus."
2. "Zeus" is the Greek god of sky and thunder.
3. but the "Zeus" we are referring is to is malware called(zbot)
4. it is a financial or banking trojan.
5. it was first created in the year 2007 by eastern Europe hackers.

NOTIFICATION: -

Please Note That the Information Provided Here Are Given According to Our Findings. And IF You Want to Do Further Analysis You Can Do So But We Are Not Responsible for Any Loss You Go To. Please Be Careful While Dealing with Malware.

SUMMARY: -

1. its main purpose is to steal the people financial data and adding machines to bot net.
2. the source code of this trojan came into public in early 2011.

3. the fbi and united states department of justice estimated in 2014 that up to 1 million computers around world are infected by this trojan.

TOOLS USED: -

1. pestudio(master),
2. virus total(antivirus scanning),
3. floss(strings),
4. cutter(strings),
5. hxd(hexbytes),
6. capa(string),
7. cmder(file type),
8. hashcal(hash),
9. hashmyfiles(hash),
10. xorsearch(url),
11. exeinfo pe(packing|).etc,.

12.procman(child process).

13.process hacker(windows process).

14.cutter, 15.yara(IOC).

16.wireshark(capture traffic).

17.regshot(winregkeys), etc,.

STATIC ANALYSIS: -

this type of analysis doen not involve the installation of malware into the system, its safe and a secure way to analyse the data.

FOOTPRINT: -

HASHES: -

md5 : - ea639a854d26d7734cSadd48f1851c34

Sha1 : - 9615dca4c6e46bSa39de54288‘F7db666399236b2

sha256 :-
69e966e736557fde8fd84317cdef1eceeeaSbb3476c6b58f3231e1761
68af169

```
FLARE-VM 04-01-2024 13:32:10.00
C:\Users\flarevm\Desktop>capa.exe invoice_2318362983713_823931342io.pdf.exe
```

md5	ea039a854d20d7734c5add48f1a51c34
sha1	9615dca4c0e46b8a39de5428af7db060399230b2
sha256	69e966e730557fde8fd84317cdef1ece00a8bb3470c0b58f3231e170168af169
os	windows
format	pe
arch	i386
path	C:/Users/flarevm/Desktop/invoice_2318362983713_823931342io.pdf.exe

ATT&CK Tactic	ATT&CK Technique
DEFENSE EVASION	Virtualization/Sandbox Evasion::System Checks T1497.001

MBC Objective	MBC Behavior
ANTI-BEHAVIORAL ANALYSIS	Virtual Machine Detection [B0009]

Capability	Namespace
reference anti-VM strings targeting VMWare	anti-analysis/anti-vm/vm-detection
resolve function by parsing PE exports	load-code/pe



FILE TYPE: -

text M 2.... ....

architect :- windows && arch i386-32bit



SCANNING: -

libraries found =3 : -

SHLWAPL.dll

KERNEL32.dll

USER32.dll





STRINGS: -

+----------------------------------+

| FLOSS STATIC STRINGS: ASCII (799) |

+----------------------------------+

9x66664d !This program cannot be run in DOS mode.

9x6666c8 Rich

axeeelde .text

9x6661¥7 ‘.data

9x666229 .itext

9x666248 .pdata

9x666279 .rsrc

9x666297 @.reloc

9x666568 jrjy

9x6666e5 SVH;

9x66673d QATt

9x666846 SVHS

exeeeaez Km}e+

axeeeded =#NEwlTMMMONvJ2NRO+0sndo4deYoJ1qiQeJ3gyK8qRQQGyHDDzetolmnR7tLSH7SL

axeeeeas cT6b

9x666ebb 85+1ZPH41XHU4HObuTGHaOAzaZA[wib8g9FcaXIQHRq,tuo{whoeBHGIlNQNRk6n2[ONGIa8p7etGiUY

9x66165d eQNP

Bxeelead 091RP3

6x6611a4 jxjp

Bxeellee fBA

9x66129c Q—m$~hP

9x661749 we'.

9x66175d cRR/3dQ7BZ4+hGiCezccLHVghOVupeij6X9n¥V7FUHijTtxFPttcPdNSHITo

9x66194d \erP

9x661eb8 VH

6x662254 KmsKrGNXcIeaNvwgLK[E5395tN737Rt/fteq3tLHXNBIRXNZvZ{AtVR8bVP59jVsLREmc4GF

9x6622dc ul—n

axeezzfa
4a26X6:9F9HG[OSOX/viSQL6YEHRi5H1d0564wbvpsdgoih£1h{Bv40:1
2mFgGv1K9si3a50yv{ppH[eYuyzUeJa

9x6624ac
UJ6tr3h3xivEdiGTmuHHemlqkyx7CwEX[ey+8xf9:BmIpvJAcGIH61{eX3,
T1bq3woZlmjGOVN{bSBhZBQHKETlKnL8cR

9x682613 j\tY3

9x96328b _(hRP

9x6632ca }nRV

9x663568 j%H?

9x66357e
YoHQGRRSPP[C[euJDeQUEnSHhZzl[CxukluNeeV/StqKDCy7HnZJOcaai
p21Hd2PlDOPctgYEYHgl

9x663643
frysBj+zSKXOJZiVJBRl+dSloi182meEGoS4jlUPn77lK9dlKH8utP4iScHEm
y4yZF/Sg6

6x663764
veaSTZZHKlSKnFcuo7LReZQVsVH[y153v4tTrSkikjT1jK82m31be:+6rihZ
GabIeuctQL

6x66393f uisq/

9x66395d
NfL4bNeVlBVSGkyY+ZZqQ89VBGOXOqIXbK8P+TE9ejaG4hxF8,aEa832
L3v651uu82xF+2Hz8viTe

9x663bba efj4xot2vZRJjEoRX38+YvXqQEy6b+EnHHjqmyiBGfpSFIHcBodHlxIBHd:HDGIIURyPGQ

9x663cee OIUigAtF7ryLy4FbZ/eYt2KZ[bzntHbm6JeItCykvwHtZZt4sI{j,zu9b+3

6x663def qF

9x663e6b i:sgDklSilzgl:JOCybhZRVQF[IkhSuS4w7Dx56:p57ctRgKE{BwICHuMTSsHQdcmnebVw4Px7jieewJS3Y

9x663ebd — TTUQ14DQix58HLScboyKRSSrwoqgeKTHvK4QlGxNOKv9smBabFieVblAneNHeHeJXRSStBIecnGHyJ{/onsEf

9x664b5e jqjm

9x664c97 jojb

0x01e6d2 PathRelativePathTow

0x01e6e8 PathParseIconLocationH

0x01e702 ChPCmpIA

0x01e70e PathIsPrefixA

0x01e71e PathRenameExtensionA

0x01e736 PathIsRootH

0x61e744 PathQuoteSpacesA

0x01e758 PathCombineH

0x01e768 PathAddEXtensionH

0x01e77c ChPCmpIH

0x01e788 PathIsUNCSeePA

0x01e79c PathIsSameRootA

6x01e7ae PathIsRelativeA

6x01e7c0 PathHakeSystemFoldePA

6x01e7d8 IsChaPSpaceA

6x61e7e8 PathHatchSpecH

6x61e7fa StPCmpNIA

6x61e866 PathRemoveAPgsA

6X61e816 SHLHAPI.dll

6x61e824 LocalUnlock

6x61e832 GetEnvironmentVaPiableH

6x61e84c GetSystemDefaultUILanguage

0x01e868 FreeLibPaPy

0X01e878 GlobalAddAtomA

0x01e88a HeapFPee

0x01e896 GetLogicalDPives

0x01e8aa GetSystemDefaultLCID

0x61e8c2 GetHoduleHandleH

0X61e8d6 GetTickCount

6X61e8e6 GetCurrentThread

0x61e8fa IsBadReadPtr

OxeleQGa VirtualQueryEx

0x01e91c HriteFile

0x01e928 GetDriveTypeA

0x01e938 SizeofResource

0x01e94a GetConsoleAliasExesLengthw

0x01e968 GetCompressedFileSizeA

0x01e982 GetEnvironmentVariableA

0x01e99c GetPrivateProfileIntH

0x01e9b4 CreateFileHappingA

0x01e9ca LocalAlloc

0x01e9d8 SetCurrentDirectoryH

0x61e9f6 GetOEHCP

0x61e9fc FindNextFileA

exeleaec GetUserDefaultUILanguage

0x61e828 DeleteCPiticalSection

0x61ea40 HinExeC

0x61ea4a LocalFPee

exelea54 KERNEL32.dll

0x01e864 VkKeyScanA

0x01ea72 GetClipboardOwner

0x01e886 CallHindowPPocH

9x919398 GPTPPaqqnpfAUTTlavnuT

| FLOSS STATIC STRINGS: UTF-16LE (1) |

+----------———————————————-—-———————-———————-+

0x9311bc C”#$%&'{}“+,—.f6123456789:;<

FLOSS STACK STRINGS (2)

Function | Function Offset | Frame Offset | String

----------+———————————————-———+————-——--------+---

9x49142f | ex4ebc18 | 6x34 | celv

0x401a5f | ex4ebc68 | 0x9f | 091p

FLOSS TIGHT STRINGS (6)

FLOSS DECODED STRINGS (66)

+----------———————————————-———————+

| FUNCTION at 6X462aaf (1) |

+----------———————————————-———————+

Offset | Called At | String

_____+_____+_____

[stack] | 6x49887f | GBKn

+----------———————————————————-—+

| FUNCTION at 6x46592c (28) |

+----------———————————————————-—+

Offset | Called At | String

_____+_____+_____

[stack] | 6x497337 | PiAb:$a

[stack] I 0x497337 | piAc:$a

[stack] | 6x497337 | iAda

[stack] | 6x497337 | iAea

[stack] | 6x497337 | iAfa

[stack] | 6x497337 | iAga

r.|-..l.'l l n-nn~r::7 l 1M”



```
x[3RIlF,tWyEl5+jI8QmcHv5B6A5y6ixzHVj/t/RYY7:j2GhXPVt
1MlclJhl2flR4OQiC+LunY{59imL9b0k5CJI[PoHjcmm9gKK9o:D
0x01e6d2 PathRelativePathToW
0x01e6e8 PathParseIconLocationW
0x01e702 ChrCmpIA
0x01e70e PathIsPrefixA
0x01e71e PathRenameExtensionA
0x01e736 PathIsRootW
0x01e744 PathQuoteSpacesA
0x01e758 PathCombineW
0x01e768 PathAddExtensionW
0x01e77c ChrCmpIW
0x01e788 PathIsUNCServerA
0x01e79c PathIsSameRootA
0x01e7ae PathIsRelativeA
0x01e7c0 PathMakeSystemFolderA
0x01e7d8 IsCharSpaceA
0x01e7e8 PathMatchSpecW
0x01e7fa StrCmpNIA
0x01e806 PathRemoveArgsA
0x01e816 SHLWAPI.dll
0x01e824 LocalUnlock
0x01e832 GetEnvironmentVariableW
0x01e84c GetSystemDefaultUILanguage
0x01e86a FreeLibrary
0x01e878 GlobalAddAtomA
0x01e88a HeapFree
0x01e896 GetLogicalDrives
0x01e8aa GetSystemDefaultLCID
0x01e8c2 GetModuleHandleW
0x01e8d6 GetTickCount
0x01e8e6 GetCurrentThread
0x01e8fa IsBadReadPtr
0x01e90a VirtualQueryEx
0x01e91c WriteFile
0x01e928 GetDriveTypeA
0x01e938 SizeofResource
0x01e94a GetConsoleAliasExesLengthW
0x01e968 GetCompressedFileSizeA
0x01e982 GetEnvironmentVariableA
0x01e99c GetPrivateProfileIntW
0x01e9b4 CreateFileMappingA
0x01e9ca LocalAlloc
0x01e9d8 SetCurrentDirectoryW
0x01e9f0 GetOEMCP
0x01e9fc FindNextFileA
0x01ea0c GetUserDefaultUILanguage
0x01ea28 DeleteCriticalSection
0x01ea40 WinExec
0x01ea4a LocalFree
0x01ea54 KERNEL32.dll
0x01ea64 VkKeyScanA
0x01ea72 GetClipboardOwner
0x01ea86 CallWindowProcW
0x01ea98 GetProcessDefaultLayout
```


FLOSS STATIC STRINGS: UTF-16LE (1)
0x0311bc !"#$%&'()*+,-./0123456789:;<
FLOSS STACK STRINGS (2)
Function | Function Offset | Frame Offset | String
0x40142f | 0x40bc18 | 0x34 | c0lV
0x401a5f | 0x40bc68 | 0x9f | O9lp
FLOSS TIGHT STRINGS (0)
FLOSS DECODED STRINGS (66)
FUNCTION at 0x402aaf (1)
Offset | Called At | String
[stack] | 0x40887f | 0BKn
FUNCTION at 0x40592c (28)
Offset | Called At | String
[stack] | 0x407337 | PiAb:$a
[stack] | 0x407337 | piAc:$a
[stack] | 0x407337 | iAda
[stack] | 0x407337 | iAea
[stack] | 0x407337 | iAfa
[stack] | 0x407337 | iAga

SUSPECTED PROCESS: -





bscii,14,.itext,-,import,windowing,-,Ca11WindowProc A

ascii,12,.itext,-,import,windowing,-,UpdateWindow

ascii,24,.itext,x,import,windowing,-,AllowSetForegroundWindow

ascii,10,.itext,-,import,windowing,-,GetCapture

ascii,15,.itext,-,import,windowing,-,IsHindowEnabled

ascii,19,.itext,-,import,windowing,T161@ I Window Discovery,GetWindowTextLength

ascii,21,.itext,-,import,synchronization,-,DeleteCriticalSection

ascii,14,.itext,-,import,resource,-,SizeofResource

ascii,22,.itext,x,import,reconnaissance,-,GetEnvironmentVariable

ascii,16,.itext,-,import,reconnaissance,-,GetLogicalDrives

ascii,12,.itext,-,import,reconnaissance,T1124 I System Time Discovery,GetTickCount

ascii,12,.itext,-,import,reconnaissance,-,GetDriveType

ascii,22,.itext,x,import,reconnaissance,-,GetEnvironmentVaPiable

ascii,11,.itext,-,import,memory,-,LocalUnlock

ascii,8,.itext,-,import,memory,-,HeapFree

ascii,14,.itext,-,import,memory,T1@55 I Process Injection,VirtualQuePyEx

ascii,1@,.itext,-,import,memory,-,LocalAlloc

ascii,9,.itext,-,import,memory,-,LocalFree

ascii,9,.itext,x,import,input-output,-,VkKeyScan

ascii,16,.itext,x,import,input-output,T1056 I Input Capture,GetAsyncKeyState

ascii,28,.itext,-,import,input-output,-,CopyAcce1eratorTab1e

ascii,15,.itext,-,import,input-output,-,SwapMouseButton

ascii,19,.itext,x,import,fi1e,-,PathRenameExtension

ascii,15,.itext,-,import,file,-,PathQuoteSpaces

ascii,11,.itext,-,import,file,-,PathCombine

ascii,9,.itext,x,import,fi1e,-,HriteFile

ascii,21,.itext,-,import,file,-,GetCompressedFi1eSize

ascii,17,.itext,-,import,file,-,CreateFileMapping

ascii,12,.itext,x,import,file,T1883 I File and Directory Discovery,FindNextFi1e

ascii,16,.itext,x,import,execution,-,GetCurrentThread

ascii,2@,.itext,-,import,execution,-,GetPrivateProfileInt V

ascii,16,.itext,—,import,reconnaissance,—,GetLogicalDrives A

ascii,12,.itext,—,import,reconnaissance,T1124 I System Time Discovery,GetTickCount

ascii,12,.itext,—,import,reconnaissance,—,GetDriveType

ascii,22,.itext,x,import,reconnaissance,—,GetEnvironmentVariable

ascii,11,.itext,-,import,memory,-,LocalUnlock

ascii,8,.itext,-,import,memory,-,HeapFree

ascii,14,.itext,-,import,memory,T1055 I Process Injection,VirtualQueryEx

ascii,19,.itext,-,import,memory,-,LocalAlloc

ascii,9,.itext,-,import,memory,-,LocalFree

ascii,9,.itext,x,import,input-output,-,VkKeyScan

ascii,16,.itext,x,import,input-output,T1956 I Input Capture,GetAsyncKeyState

ascii,2@,.itext,-,import,input-output,-,CopyAcce1eratorTab1e

ascii,15,.itext,-,import,input-output,-,SwapMouseButton

ascii,19,.itext,x,import,fi1e,-,PathRenameExtension

ascii,15,.itext,-,import,fi1e,-,PathQuoteSpaces

ascii,11,.itext,-,import,fi1e,-,PathCombine

ascii,9,.itext,x,import,file,-,HriteFi1e

ascii,21,.itext,-,import,file,-,GetCompressedFileSize

ascii,17,.itext,-,import,file,-,CreateFileMapping

ascii,12,.itext,x,import,file,T1883 I File and Directory Discovery,FindNextFile

ascii,16,.itext,x,import,execution,-,GetCurrentThread

ascii,2@,.itext,-,import,execution,-,GetPrivateProfileInt

ascii,7,.itext,x,-,execution,T11@6 I Execution through API,HinExec

ascii,11,.itext,-,import,dynamic-1ibrary,-,FreeLibrary

ascii,15,.itext,-,import,dynamic-library,-,GetModu1eHand1e

ascii,13,.itext,x,import,data-exchange,-,GlobalAddAtom

ascii,l7,.itext,x,import,data-exchange,T1115 I Clipboard Data,GetClipboardOwner

ascii,16,.itext,x,import,data-exchange,T1115 I Clipboard Data,GetClipboardData

ascii,2@,.itext,x,import,data-exchange,T1115 I Clipboard Data,EnumClipboardFormats

ascii,18,.itext,x,import,data-exchange,-,DdeQueryNextServer

ascii,25,.itext,x,import,console,-,GetConsoleAliasExesLength v

API'S: -



ascii,18,.itext,-,import,-,-,PathRelativePathTo A

ascii,21,.itext,-,import,-,-,PathParseIconLocation

ascii,12,.itext,-,import,-,-,PathIsPrefix

ascii,1@,.itext,-,import,-,-,PathIsRoot

ascii,16,.itext,-,import,-,-,PathAddExtension

ascii,15,.itext,-,import,-,-,PathIsUNCServer

ascii,14,.itext,-,import,-,-,PathIsSameRoot

ascii,14,.itext,-,import,-,-,PathIsRelative

ascii,28,.itext,-,import,-,-,PathMakeSystemFolder

ascii,11,.itext,-,import,-,-,IsCharSpace

ascii,13,.itext,—,import,-,-,PathMatchSpec

ascii,8,.itext,—,import,-,-,StrCmpNI

ascii,14,.itext,—,import,-,-,PathRemoveArgs

ascii,26,.itext,—,import,-,-,GetSystemDefaultUILanguage

ascii,20,.itext,—,import,-,-,GetSystemDefaultLCID

ascii,12,.itext,—,import,—,-,IsBadReadPtr

ascii,19,.itext,x,import,—,—,SetCurrentDirectory

ascii,8,.itext,—,import,-,-,GetOEMCP

ascii,24,.itext,—,import,-,-,GetUserDefaultUILanguage

ascii,23,.itext,—,import,-,-,GetProcessDefaultLayout

ascii,10,.itext,—,import,-,-,AppendMenu

ascii,11,.itext,—,import,-,-,GetCaretPos

ascii,11,.itext,—,import,-,-,GetSysColor

ascii,13,.itext,—,import,-,-,DestroyCursor

ascii,13,.itext,-,import,—,—,GetScrollInfo

ascii,13,.itext,-,import,—,—,FlashWindowEx

ascii,14,.itext,-,import,-,-,SetLastErrorEx

ascii,11,.itext,-,import,-,-,InflateRect

ascii,9,.itext,-,import,-,-,ShowCaret

ascii,10,.itext,-,import,-,-,LoadBitmap

ascii,10,.itext,-,import,-,-,DeleteMenu v

ascii,11,.itext,-,import,-,-,IsCharSpace A

ascii,13,.itext,-,import,-,-,PathMatchSpec

ascii,8,.itext,-,import,-,-,StPCmpNI

ascii,14,.itext,-,import,-,-,PathRemoveArgs

ascii,26,.itext,-,import,-,-,GetSystemDeFaultUILanguage

ascii,20,.itext,-,import,-,-,GetSystemDeFaultLCID

ascii,12,.itext,-,import,-,-,IsBadReadPtr

ascii,19,.itext,x,import,-,-,SetCurrentDirectory

ascii,8,.itext,-,import,-,-,GetOEMCP

ascii,24,.itext,-,import,-,-,GetUserDeFaultUILanguage

ascii,23,.itext,-,import,-,-,GetProcessDefaultLayout

ascii,10,.itext,-,import,-,-,AppendMenu

ascii,11,.itext,-,import,-,-,GetCaretPos

ascii,11,.itext,-,import,-,-,GetSysColor

ascii,13,.itext,-,import,-,-,DestroyCursor

ascii,13,.itext,-,import,-,-,GetScrollInfo

ascii,13,.itext,-,import,-,-,FlashWindowEx

ascii,14,.itext,-,import,-,-,SetLastErrorEx

ascii,11,.itext,-,import,-,-,InflateRect

ascii,9,.itext,-,import,-,-,ShowCaret

ascii,10,.itext,-,import,-,-,LoadBitmap

ascii,10,.itext,-,import,-,-,DeleteMenu

ascii,9,.itext,-,import,-,-,HideCaret

ascii,3,.text,-,format-string,-,-,%Sz

ascii,3,.text,-,format-string,-,-,:%S

ascii,3,.text,-,file,-,-,%.H

ascii,11,.itext,-,file,-,-,SHLWAPI.d11

ascii,12,.itext,-,file,-,-,KERNEL32.dll

ascii,10,.itext,-,file,-,-,USER32.d11

ascii,10,.pdata,-,file,-,-,corect.com

ascii,40,dos-stub,-,dos-message,-,-,!This program cannot be run in DOS mode. v

PACKING: -



We can see that the file size are same and no difference is found which is a good sign. If the zip or packed file size is less than the extracted file it means it is having some other extra files which might be malicious.

Always look into this.

DYNAMIC ANALYSIS: -

this type of analysis involves the installation of malware on to the system, it is very risky and please take necessary precautions while running the malware.

PROCESS:-

1. this is were we find the parent process and child process of the malicious application.
2. We can see the child process of the .exe file here.



CAPTURING NETWORK: -

1. It is a very good process to capture the network as it can give as the sensitive data which the app might sent to the attacker and also we can any additional downloads done.
2. But make sure while doping this analysis it is recommended to do it in a fake network using fakenetwork in windows or inetsim in linux.



In Our Scenario there is a http get request with some activity lets see this.



Following the http stream we can find it is attempting to go to the fpdownload.macromedia.com

We can further analyse this website it get more information, as we have done some research we found it is a genuine website of adobe and it is not much risky.

REGISTRY KEYS: -

1. Always look into the registry keys because the malware tries to create or modify the regkeys to use them in further process.
2. As we can see that so many regkey requests have been made and the malware is replicating it self to other files.
3. Here in this case it is using the google update services to do its activity.







the above filter used to find the changes made in regkeys by the program invoice_2318362983713_82393134Zio.pdf.exe

GRAPHS:-

1. Graphs lets us to understand the source code in easy manner and understand it compliance.
2. Here we have seen some graphs for further analysis.
3. Of course it is very difficult to go through each and every single function graph but we can start from the suspected functions which were found in the static analysis and then go deeper.



YARA(IOC): -

// import pe

Rule Zeus {

Meta:

Author = “SaiSumanth”

Strings:

```
        $file_name="invoice_2318362983713_823931342io.pdf.e
        xe" ascii
// Suspected name of functions and DLL functionalities.
$function_name_KERNEL32="AsksmaceaglyBubuPulsKaifTeasMistPee
lGhisPrimChaoLyr
eroeno"  ascii
    $function_name_KERNERL32_CreateFileA="CellrotoCrudUntog
hCols"
ascii
    $function_name_KERNEL32_FINDFIRSTFILEA="GeneAilshe"
ascii
    // PE Magic Byte.
    $PE_magic_byte="MZ"
    // Hex String Function Name + DLL.
    $hex_string_SHLWAPI_PATHREMOVEFILESPECA= {44 65 6E 79
4C 75 62 65 4475 6E 73 73 61 77 73 4F 72 65 73 76 61 72 75 74 00 53
48 4C 57 41 50 49}
  condition:
    // Use the pe library to create fine-grained rules for PE files.
    // pe.ispie
    $PE_magic_byte at 0 and $filename
    and $function_name_KERNEL32
    or $function_name_KERNERL32_CreateFileA
```

or $function_name_KERNEL32_FINDFIRSTFILEA

and $hex_string_SHLWAPI_PATHREMOVEFILESPECA

The above yara code is taken from the internet which is freely available to use to do malware analysis.

Generally if a malware is found success in the yara rule that means it is malicious and you should not tamper or install it.

POINTS TO BE NOTED: -

1. I had very fun doing the malware analysis but it get in to very dangerous also.
2. So please be very very careful while analysing.
3. The analysis done and presented in the report is just a basic analysis it is not an advanced technique.
4. The purpose of this report is to how a malware looks like and how reporting is done and how we can identify and be safe.
5. Thank you for visiting and reding the report. I hope you liked it

SUMMARY: -

1. The .exe file is automatically deleted after execution and the child process are found in the temp directory.
2. After further analysis we found that the malware is a virus and trojan which can replicate into weaker systems.
3. It is trying to modify it self and sits there and wait for user to input their banking credentials.
4. After user enters the banking details it is transmitting the data to the attacker via internet.

5. It also sending the sensitive information to the attacker from client side server.
6. In simple terms it is very dangerous even now because only some antivirus are identifying it.