Refined Sample Complexity for Markov Games with Independent Linear Function Approximation (Published as a conference paper at COLT 2024)

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
# Introduction

# (Single-Agent) Reinforcement Learning

Markov Decision Process (MDP): Single agent interacts for K
episodes × H steps. Single state, single action action, single loss.

#### Algorithm Interaction Protocol in a MDP

- 1: for #episode  $k=1,2,\ldots,K$  do 2: Agent reset to initial state  $s_1\in\mathcal{S}_1$   $\triangleright$  Assume  $\mathcal{S}=\mathcal{S}_1\cup\mathcal{S}_2\cup\cdots\cup\mathcal{S}_{H+1}$ . 3: for #step  $h=1,2,\ldots,H$  do
- 4: Agent picks an action  $a_h \in \mathcal{A}$   $\triangleright$  Sample from **policy**  $\pi_k \colon \mathcal{S} \to \triangle(\mathcal{A})$ . 5: Agent observes loss  $\ell(s_h, a_h)$
- 6: Agent transits to  $s_{h+1} \sim \mathbb{P}(\cdot \mid s_h, a_h)$




# Multi-Agent Reinforcement Learning

 Markov Games (MG): Multiple agents interact for K episodes × H steps. Single state, multiple action, multiple loss.

#### Algorithm Interaction Protocol in a MG

```
\begin{array}{llll} \text{1: for } \# \text{episode } k=1,2,\ldots,K \text{ do} \\ \text{2:} & \text{Agents reset to initial state } s_1 \in \mathcal{S}_1 & \text{$\triangleright$ Assume } \mathcal{S} = \mathcal{S}_1 \cup \mathcal{S}_2 \cup \cdots \cup \mathcal{S}_{H+1}. \\ \text{3:} & \text{for } \# \text{step } h=1,2,\ldots,H \text{ do} \\ \text{4:} & \text{Agents pick actions } a_h^1 \in \mathcal{A}^1, a_h^2 \in \mathcal{A}^2,\ldots,a_h^m \in \mathcal{A}^m & \text{$\triangleright$ Sample from a joint policy } \pi_k \colon \mathcal{S} \to \triangle(\mathcal{A}^1 \times \mathcal{A}^2 \times \cdots \times \mathcal{A}^m). \\ \text{5:} & \text{Each agent observes loss } \ell^i(s_h,a_h^1,a_h^2,\ldots,a_h^m) & \text{$\triangleright$ Loss depends on } i \\ \text{6:} & \text{Agent transits to } s_{h+1} \sim \mathbb{P}(\cdot \mid s_h,a_h^1,a_h^2,\ldots,a_h^m) & \text{$\triangleright$ Same new state } s_{h+1} \\ \end{array}
```



## Objective of Agents

Given joint policy  $\pi \in \Pi = \{\pi \colon \mathcal{S} \to \triangle(\mathcal{A}^1 \times \mathcal{A}^2 \times \cdots \times \mathcal{A}^m)\}$ , for each layer-h state  $s \in \mathcal{S}_h$ , define V-function for each agent:

$$V_{\pi}^{i}(s) = \mathbb{E}_{(s_{1}, \mathbf{a}_{1}, s_{2}, \mathbf{a}_{2}, \dots, s_{H}, \mathbf{a}_{H})} \left[ \sum_{h'=h}^{H} \ell^{i}(s_{h'}, \mathbf{a}_{h'}) \middle| s_{h} = s \right], \quad \forall i \in [m].$$

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Fixing  $i \in [m]$ , for opponents' policy  $\pi^{-i}$ , define best response V:

$$V^i_{\dagger,\pi^{-i}}(s) = \min_{\pi^i \in \Pi^i = \{\pi \colon \mathcal{S} \to \triangle(\mathcal{A}^i)\}} \, V^i_{\pi^i \circ \pi^{-i}}(s), \quad \forall i \in [m], s \in \mathcal{S}.$$

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Policy  $\pi \in \Pi$  is a  $\epsilon$ -Coarse Correlated Equilibrium ( $\epsilon$ -CCE) if

$$\max_{i \in [m]} \left\{ V_{\pi}^{i}(s_{1}) - V_{\dagger,\pi^{-i}}^{i}(s_{1}) \right\} \leq \epsilon.$$

Agents **collaborate** to minimize #samples needed for finding an  $\epsilon$ -CCE (sample complexity).

#### Previous Works on Linear Markov Games

**Linear MG.**  $|\mathcal{S}| \gg 0$  but allows a d-dim'l linear structure s.t. every Q-function is linear in some known feature  $\phi(s, a^i)$ :

$$Q_{\pi^{-i}}^i(s, a^i) \triangleq \underset{a^{-i} \sim \pi^{-i}}{\mathbb{E}} \left[ \ell^i(s, \mathbf{a}) + \underset{s' \sim \mathbb{P}(s, \mathbf{a})}{\mathbb{E}} \left[ V^i(s') \right] \right],$$

where  $V \colon \mathcal{S} \times [m] \to \mathbb{R}$  is an arbitrary next-layer V-function.

- [Cui et al., 2023]:  $\widetilde{\mathcal{O}}(\epsilon^{-4}d^4H^{10}m^4)$ .
- ② [Wang et al., 2023]:  $\widetilde{\mathcal{O}}(\epsilon^{-2}A_{\max}^5d^4H^6m^2)$ .

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- ① (Ours):  $\widetilde{\mathcal{O}}(\epsilon^{-2}m^4d^5H^6)$  optimal  $\epsilon^{-2}$  convergence, no poly $(A_{\max})$  dependency, no simulator! <sup>1</sup>

 $<sup>^{1}</sup>$ We require a slightly stronger notion of linearity that transitions also are linear – see Linear MDPs vs Linear-Q MDPs in single-agent RL [Jin et al., 2020].

# Our Algorithm

## Main Insights

- When designing the framework, data-dependent (i.e., random) estimators for sub-optimality gaps can allow "good-in-expectation" plug-in algorithms.
- When designing the plug-in algorithm, action-dependent bonuses can handle occasionally extreme estimation errors.

# Data-Dep Sub-Opt Gap Est

#### Algorithm AVLPR Framework (Informal) [Wang et al., 2023]

```
\begin{array}{lll} \text{1: } & \text{for } t=1,2,\ldots,T=\mathcal{O}(\epsilon^{-2}) \text{ do} & \triangleright \text{ Find an } \mathcal{O}(1/t)\text{-CCE with } \mathcal{O}(t^2) \text{ samples} \\ \text{2: } & \text{Use potential function } \{\Psi^i_{t,h}\}_{t,h,i} \text{ to "lazily update" s.t. } \#\text{updates} = \mathcal{O}(\log T). \\ \text{3: } & \text{for } h=H,H-1,\ldots,1 \text{ do} & \triangleright \text{ Do policy improvement layer-by-layer} \\ \text{4: } & \text{Call CCE-APPROX}_h \text{ for a } \tilde{\pi}_t \text{ s.t. } \text{SubOpt}^i(\tilde{\pi}_t,s) \leq G^i_t(s) \text{ w.h.p., where} \\ & G^i_t \text{ is deterministic s.t. } \sum_{i=1}^m \mathbb{E}_{s \sim_h \tilde{\pi}_t} \left[ G^i_t(s) \right] \sim m \sqrt{1/t}. \\ \text{5: } & \text{Call V-APPROX}_h \text{ to estimate the current-layer $V$-function of } \tilde{\pi}_t. \end{array}
```

Issue? Deterministic sub-optimality gap estimation in Linear MGs

# Previous AVLPR Framework [Wang et al., 2023]

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```
1: for t=1,2,\ldots,T=\mathcal{O}(\epsilon^{-2}) do {}^{\triangleright} Find an \mathcal{O}(1/t)-CCE with \mathcal{O}(t^2) samples
2: Use potential function \{\Psi^i_{t,h}\}_{t,h,i} to "lazily update" s.t. \#updates {}^{\triangleright} \mathcal{O}(\log T).
3: for h=H,H-1,\ldots,1 do {}^{\triangleright} Do policy improvement layer-by-layer
4: Call CCE-APPROX_h for a \tilde{\pi}_t s.t. SubOpt^i(\tilde{\pi}_t,s)\leq G^i_t(s) w.h.p., where
G^i_t \text{ is deterministic s.t. } \sum_{i=1}^m \mathop{\mathbb{E}}_{s\sim_h\tilde{\pi}_t} \left[G^i_t(s)\right] \sim m\sqrt{1/t}.
5: Call V-APPROX_h to estimate the current-layer V-function of \tilde{\pi}_t.
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**Issue? Deterministic** sub-optimality gap estimation in Linear MGs ⇒ **Open problem** of high-probability regret bounds for adversarial contextual linear bandits [Olkhovskaya et al., 2023]

#### Algorithm AVLPR Framework (Informal) [Wang et al., 2023]

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 $\Rightarrow$  Pure exploration deployed, resulting in poly( $A_{\text{max}}$ ) factors!

# Improved AVLPR Framework (Ours)

#### **Algorithm** Improved AVLPR Framework (Informal, Ours)

```
\triangleright Find an \mathcal{O}(1/t)-CCE with \mathcal{O}(t^2) samples
1: for t = 1, 2, ..., T = \mathcal{O}(\epsilon^{-2}) do
2:
          Use potential function \{\Psi^i_{t,h}\}_{t,h,i} to "lazily update" s.t. \#updates = \mathcal{O}(\log T).
3:
          for h = H, H - 1, ..., 1 do
                                                                          Do policy improvement layer-by-layer
                Call CCE-APPROX<sub>h</sub> for a \tilde{\pi}_t s.t. SubOpt^i(\tilde{\pi}_t,s) \leq \text{GAP}^i_t(s) w.h.p., where
4:
                 \mathrm{GAP}_t^i \text{ is random variable s.t.} \sum_{s \sim h_{\tilde{\pi}_t}}^m \mathbb{E}_{\left[ \frac{\mathbf{E}}{\mathrm{GAP}} [\mathrm{GAP}_t^i(s)] \right]} \sim m \sqrt{1/t}.
5:
```

6: Call V-APPROX<sub>h</sub> to estimate the current-layer V-function of  $\tilde{\pi}_t$ .

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 $(\tilde{\pi}_t(s), \operatorname{GAP}_t(s)) \leftarrow (\tilde{\pi}_{t,r^*(s)}(s), \operatorname{GAP}_{t,r^*(s)}(s), \text{ where } r^*(s) = \operatorname*{argmin}_{r \in [R]} \sum_{i=1}^n \operatorname{GAP}_{t,r}^i(s).$ 

6: Call V-APPROX<sub>h</sub> to estimate the current-layer V-function of  $\tilde{\pi}_t$ .

# **Proposition.** By Markov Inequality, Step 5 ensures w.h.p. $\sum_{i=1}^{m} \operatorname{GAP}_{t,r^*(s)}^{i}(s) \leq 2 \sum_{i=1}^{m} \mathbb{E}_{\operatorname{GAP}}[\operatorname{GAP}_{t}^{i}(s)], \ \forall s \in \mathcal{S}_h, \ i \in [m].$

# Why is Data-Dependent Sub-Optimality Gap Estimator Important?

- ullet This removes the original assumption of  $G_t^i(s)$  is deterministic.
- This bypasses the open problem of high-prob regret bound for adv. contextual linear bandits, avoiding  $poly(A_{max})$  factors.
- This only causes  $\mathcal{O}(\log \frac{1}{\delta}) = \mathcal{O}(1)$  factor in sample complexity.

# Action-Dependent Bonuses

#### CCE-APPROX Subroutine

**Objective.** Find policy  $\tilde{\pi}$  for layer  $S_h$  with  $\mathcal{O}(\epsilon^{-2})$  samples s.t.

$$V^i_{\tilde{\pi}}(s) - V^i_{\dagger,\tilde{\pi}^{-i}}(s) \le \operatorname{GAP}^i(s) \text{ w.h.p., } \underset{s \sim \bar{\pi}}{\mathbb{E}} \left[ \operatorname{GAP}^i(s) \right] \lesssim \epsilon.$$
 (\*)

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 (\*)

Regret-to-Sample-Complexity Conversion  $\Rightarrow \forall i \in [m]$ , do regret-minimization over  $K = \mathcal{O}(\epsilon^{-2})$  episodes in an adversarial (other agents) contextual  $(s \sim \bar{\pi})$  linear bandit (action be  $\mathcal{A}^i$ ). If

$$\sum_{k=1}^K \underset{a^i \sim \pi_k^i(\cdot|s)}{\mathbb{E}} \left[ L_k^i(s,a^i) \right] \leq \widetilde{\mathrm{GAP}}^i(s) \text{ w.h.p.}, \ \underset{s \sim \bar{\pi}}{\mathbb{E}} [\widetilde{\mathrm{GAP}}^i(s)] = \widetilde{\mathcal{O}}(\sqrt{K}),$$

where 
$$L_k^i(s,a^i) = \mathbb{E}_{a^{-i} \sim \pi_k^{-i}} \left[ \ell^i(s,\mathbf{a}) + \mathbb{E}_{s' \sim \mathbb{P}(s,\mathbf{a})} [V^i(s')] \right]$$
, then setting  $\tilde{\pi} = \frac{1}{K} \sum_{k=1}^K \pi_k$ ,  $\operatorname{GAP}^i(s) = \frac{1}{K} \widetilde{\operatorname{GAP}}^i(s)$  ensures (\*).

To creaft  $\overline{GAP}(s)$  for some  $s \in \mathcal{S}_h$ , we need to cancel the total estimation errors associated with the optimal action  $a^*$  on s.

**Olympia** Classical Idea. Use bonuses w.h.p. larger than estimation errors to cancel them.

To creaft  $\widetilde{\mathrm{GAP}}(s)$  for some  $s \in \mathcal{S}_h$ , we need to cancel the total estimation errors associated with the optimal action  $a^*$  on s.

**Quantification Quantification Qua** 

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- **Classical Idea.** Use bonuses w.h.p. larger than estimation errors to cancel them. Suppose that  $(\mathsf{EstErr}_k^i(s,a))_{k=1}^K$  is a stochastic process adapted to  $(\mathcal{F}_k)_{k=0}^K$ . Design  $B_k^i(s,a)$  s.t.  $\sum_{k=1}^K \mathsf{EstErr}_k^i(s,a^*) \leq \sum_{k=1}^K B_k^i(s,a^*)$  w.h.p. for the unknown  $a^*$ , and  $\sum_{k=1}^K \mathbb{E}_{a \sim \pi_k^i(\cdot|s)}[B_k^i(s,a)] = \widetilde{\mathcal{O}}(\sqrt{K})$ .
- ② Traditional Freedman. As  $a^*$  is unknown, concentrate using  $\sum_{k=1}^K \mathsf{EstErr}_k^i(s,a^*) \lesssim \sum_{k=1}^K \sqrt{\mathsf{Var}_k(\mathsf{EstErr}_k^i(s,a^*))} + \sup_{a \in \mathcal{A}^i} \max_{k \in [K]} |\mathsf{EstErr}_k^i(s,a)| \mathsf{variance} + \mathsf{magnitude}.$

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# Action-Dependent Bonuses Technique

$$\exists v^i(s,a) \geq B^i_k(s,a), \forall k, \text{ s.t. } \sup_{a \in \mathcal{A}_i} v^i(s,a) = \widetilde{\mathcal{O}}(K) \qquad \text{(occasionally large)}$$
 but 
$$\underset{a \sim \frac{1}{K} \sum_{k=1}^K \pi^i_k(s)}{\mathbb{E}} \left[ \max_{k \in [K]} \lvert \mathsf{EstErr}^i_k(s) \rvert \right] = \widetilde{\mathcal{O}}(\sqrt{K}) \quad \text{(on average moderate)}$$

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**Action-Dependent Bonuses.** Set bonuses such that  $\forall a \in A^i$ :

$$\begin{aligned} & \textbf{Action-Dependent Bonuses.} \text{ Set bonuses such that } \forall a \in \mathcal{A}^i : \\ & B_k^i(s,a) \gtrsim \sum_{k=1}^K \sqrt{\mathsf{Var}_k(\mathsf{EstErr}_k^i(s,a))} + \frac{\max_{k \in [K]} |\mathsf{EstErr}_k^i(s,a)|}{K}, \\ & \Rightarrow \sum_{k=1}^K \mathsf{EstErr}_k^i(s,a^*) \leq \sum_{k=1}^K B_k^i(s,a^*) \text{ w.h.p. regardless of } a^* \in \mathcal{A}^i, \\ & \sum_{k=1}^K \mathbb{E}_{a \sim \pi_k^i(\cdot|s)} [B_k^i(s,a)] = \sum_{k=1}^K \mathbb{E}_{a \sim \pi_k^i(\cdot|s)} \left[ \sqrt{\mathsf{Var}_k(\mathsf{EstErr}_k^i(s,a))} \right] + \underbrace{\widetilde{\mathcal{O}}(\sqrt{K})}_{\mathsf{Replace}} \underbrace{\widetilde{\mathcal{O}}(K)!}_{\mathsf{Interpolate}}. \end{aligned}$$

## Other Techniques Adopted into This Paper

- Adaptive Freedman Inequality [Zimmert and Lattimore, 2022], removing deterministic magnitude upper bounds in Freedman.
- **②** Refined Covariance Estimation Analysis [Liu et al., 2023], ensuring  $\text{Tr}(\widehat{\Sigma}^{-1/2}(\widehat{\Sigma}-\Sigma)) = \widetilde{\mathcal{O}}(n^{-1/2})$  where n is #samples.

Read our paper at https://arxiv.org/pdf/2402.07082v2 for details!

Questions are more than welcomed!

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