Macroeconomics of Racial Disparities: Discrimination, Labor Market, and Wealth

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Preliminary results

Abstract

Our study employs a heterogeneous agent labor search model to assess how racial discrimination affects employment, wages, and wealth among black and white workers. We analyze the impact of market discrimination, such as prejudiced hiring practices, and non-market factors including unequal bargaining and wealth shocks. Our findings reveal that eliminating prejudiced firms equalizes employment rates and reduces income and wealth disparities, but also leads to decreased overall economic output and higher unemployment. Similarly, mitigating non-market discrimination balances labor turnover and unemployment rates across racial groups and lessens economic inequalities. However, the transition to a new economic steady state, free of discrimination, could take over 50 years, highlighting the complex relationship between discrimination, labor market dynamics, and wealth distribution in the U.S. We also demonstrate that offering hiring subsidies to non-prejudiced firms enhances overall economic conditions and fosters racial equality.

JEL classification: D14, E21, J15, J64, J65

Keywords: search-and-matching, racial inequality, unemployment, wealth distribution

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1   Introduction

Research has extensively explored labor market disparities between black and white workers.[1] Traditional economic theories suggest that market competition should eliminate discrimination if there are no inherent differences between black and white workers. However, empirical evidence, including experiments and historical data, consistently demonstrates the persistence of discriminatory practices and racial economic gaps in the U.S.[2] Lang and Spitzer (2020) and Small and Pager (2020) suggest that discrimination reinforces itself across various domains. Despite this, the interaction between different sources of discrimination within various economic sectors remains poorly understood. This paper addresses this gap by exploring how market and non-market racial discrimination in multiple sectors perpetuates and sustains racial disparities in labor income and wealth.

This paper provides three key findings. First, discriminatory hiring persists in a competitive equilibrium because of market friction. Though costly to maintain prejudiced hiring practices, discrimination creates segmented labor markets. Frictional unemployment supplies white workers to sustain the prejudiced segment. Second, non-market discrimination not only depresses black worker welfare but also reduces aggregate outcomes. Such discrimination is exemplified by depressed bargaining power and higher uncertainty in personal wealth accumulation. Black workers are discouraged from labor market participation and competition for higher wage outcomes. Lastly, wealth and labor market disparities mutually exacerbate. Labor market disparities spill over to a disadvantage for black workers' wealth accumulation. Racial wealth disparity further exacerbates labor market disparity, as black workers with lower wealth are disadvantaged in self-insurance against adverse labor market outcomes.

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[1]See (e.g. Becker, 1957; Couch and Fairlie, 2010; Biddle and Hamermesh, 2013; Kuhn, Schularick, and Steins, 2020; Derenoncourt and Montialoux, 2021).

[2]For example, resume studies reveal the persistence of discriminatory practices based on race after controlling for job candidate qualities (e.g. Bertrand and Mullainathan, 2004). The labor income and wealth gaps between black and white households persist, even after the Civil Rights Movement Era (e.g. Cajner, Radler, Ratner, and Vidangos, 2017; Derenoncourt, Kim, Kuhn, and Schularick, 2023).

We construct a heterogeneous agent labor market search-and-matching model with incomplete markets. Firms operate in a racially prejudiced market and a non-prejudiced market to hire workers to produce. Prejudiced firms only review white workers for hiring, and non-prejudiced firms hire everyone. Individuals are *ex-ante* different in race, which leads to differences in bargaining power, the possibility of searching for jobs in the two labor markets, and the probability of experiencing a wealth destruction shock. Unemployed workers may qualify for unemployment insurance, and matched worker-and-firm pairs bargain for a wage rate to maximize joined matched surplus. Upon calibration, our model endogenously generates a lower job-finding rate, a higher unemployment rate, and a lower bargained wage for black workers. Without further financial frictions, our model produces significant differences in wealth accumulation between black and white workers.

The main message of this paper is that discrimination is sustained as an equilibrium outcome. Different sources of discrimination have different aggregate implications associated with their unique channels, perpetuating disparate resource allocation within an economy. We consider market discrimination as prejudiced firms dismissing all black workers' job applications, while non-market discrimination manifests through unequal bargaining power, biased production processes, and disparate wealth shocks. We examine the aggregate impact of racial discrimination by comparing the benchmark model with a counterfactual model of removing each type of discrimination. Overall, eliminating market discrimination leads to a welfare improvement for black workers but a reduction of aggregate output and a loss of white worker welfare. Removing non-market discrimination not only raises black workers' welfare but also raises aggregate outputs, though also reducing white workers' welfare. As white workers constitute over 83% of the population, their welfare loss drives the average welfare change of the economy. Changing the allocation of resources between black and white workers does not lead to Pareto Improvement. As a factor contributing to labor market friction, discrimination presents as a form of market failure in our model, which implies that the market cannot auto-correct racial discrimination.

Market discrimination perpetuates the equilibrium economy through firms' vacancy posting. We raise the posting cost penalty to eliminate the prejudiced firms as a simulation of making discriminatory hiring costly. In response, non-prejudiced firms pick up the market share to hire workers and produce, providing more job opportunities for black workers. Without the prejudiced sector for white workers, both types of workers compete in the same non-prejudiced market for work. It equalizes the racial unemployment rate and vastly reduces the wage gap. Prejudiced hiring accounts for over half of the racial wage gap. However, as white workers lose the additional prejudiced sector of employment opportunities, their unemployment rate increases, and welfare declines. Because of asymmetrical frictions between prejudiced and non-prejudiced labor markets, the new vacancy postings from non-prejudiced firms do not fully account for the lost job opportunities from prejudiced firms. As a result, aggregate production drops.

Non-market discrimination impacts the equilibrium economy through workers' competitive bargaining. We calibrate black workers as having lower bargaining power compared to white workers. Equalizing black workers' bargaining power to white workers directly raises their bargained wage outcomes. However, non-prejudiced firms retain less profit, hence posting fewer vacancies. On the net, it only has a modicum impact on black workers' welfare. The reduction of non-prejudiced sector vacancy posting spills over to welfare reduction for white workers.

Lastly, we equalize racial wealth shocks, assigning black workers the same condition in accumulating wealth as white workers. The effect resembles assigning a higher bargaining power to black workers. This is because of the importance of wealth in self-insuring against uncertain negative outcomes (Nakajima, 2012). Higher personal wealth gives black workers higher reservation value when bargaining with firms. Effectively, black workers can bargain for higher wage outcomes. Similar to assigning a higher bargaining power directly, the more favorable wealth accumulation of black workers also spills over to the firm's unwillingness to post for more vacancies. Indirectly, it reduces white worker's job outcomes and welfare.

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This paper contributes to the rising discussion on the aggregate impact of inequality by focusing on the disparate conditions and outcomes of white and black workers. Numerous studies have documented racial differences in pay and employment opportunities (e.g. Becker, 1957; Black, 1995; Coate and Loury, 1993; Rosén, 1997; Bertrand and Mullainathan, 2004). Fewer studies examine the patterns between black and white workers over macroeconomic fluctuations. Among the work, Couch and Fairlie (2010) shows that black workers are last hired in the economic upturn and first fired in the downturn. Biddle and Hamermesh (2013) documents that the discriminatory wage gap between black and white workers is procyclical. Cajner et al. (2017) shows much higher unemployment rate volatility and a higher rate of involuntary part-time employment for black workers. Daly, Hobijn, and Pedtke (2020) suggests that the harsh employment opportunities for black workers are driving up the racial earnings gap.

An emerging strand of literature documents the racial disparities in wealth holdings (e.g. Derenoncourt et al., 2023; Derenoncourt, Kim, Kuhn, and Schularick, 2022; Kuhn et al., 2020; Barsky, Bound, Charles, and Lupton, 2002; McIntosh, Moss, Nunn, and Shambaugh, 2020). Recently, Derenoncourt et al. (2023) provide a historical account of wealth segregation between black and white Americans over the past 150 years. Boerma and Karabarbounis (2021) and Aliprantis, Carroll, and Young (2023) examine the impact of discriminatory history on earnings, bequest, and capital returns in a steady-state model without aggregate risks. Given the racial wealth difference, Ganong, Jones, Noel, Greig, Farrell, and Wheat (2020) shows that income risks are transmitted differently to individuals of different racial groups. With such understandings, Bartscher, Kuhn, Schularick, and Wachtel (2021) and Lee, Macaluso, and Schwartzman (2021) discuss the disparate consequences of monetary policy on workers of different race groups.

Germane to our project, Nakajima (2021) creates a search-and-matching model framework examining the role of monetary policies in perpetuating racial differences in the labor market. Different from Nakajima (2021), our model intentionally differentiates discrimina-

tory firms from nondiscriminatory firms in the labor market hiring process and examines the impact of discriminatory hiring behaviors on black workers and its spillover effects on the rest of the economy. Our channel decomposition establishes the first theoretical understanding of the interplay of racially disparate labor markets and wealth accumulation processes.

The rest of the paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 lays out theoretical framework. Section 3 discusses the calibration strategy. Section 4 examines the aggregate implications of racial discrimination. Section 5 provides mechanism exploration. Section 6 discusses the implications of aggregate fiscal policies. Section 7 concludes the paper.

2 Model

We construct a search and matching model with two types of firms that post vacancies in a unified labor market to hire workers. Prejudiced firms (p) discriminate against black workers and only hire white workers. Non-prejudiced firms (np) hire black and white workers without discrimination.

Individual workers are heterogeneous on race (black or white, $Ra = [bl, wh]$), wealth (continuous as $a \in A$), current employment status (working for p or np firms, and unemployed, $e = [p, np, 0]$), current unemployment insurance eligibility status (eligible or not, $el = [1, 0]$), idiosyncratic matched productivity shocks ($s \in S$), and extreme wealth shock, $\epsilon_R \in \{\epsilon_{bl}, \epsilon_{wh}\}$ describing the probability of one's losing wealth to zero. For continuing matched workers, the idiosyncratic productivity evolves as AR(1): $s' = \rho_{s,Ra}s + \epsilon_{s,Ra}$, with $\epsilon_{s,Ra} \overset{iid}{\sim} N(0, \sigma_{s,Ra})$. Individual workers are distributed on the $\mu \in \{Ra, e, el, s, a\}$. We set the model period to be quarterly.

2.1 Labor market search and matching

The total number of unemployed workers u is the sum of unemployed black (u_{bl}) and white (u_{wh}) workers. The number of np vacancies available is v_{np}, and number of p firm vacancies

is v_p. We define the non-prejudiced market tightness as $\theta_{np} = v_{np}/u$, and the prejudiced market tightness as $\theta_p = v_p/u_{wh}$.

Firms post vacancies to find workers and unemployed persons actively search for jobs. All agents face the same matching function:

$$m = M(u, v) = \gamma u^\alpha v^{(1-\alpha)} \tag{1}$$

A unemployed person finding np jobs has job finding probability $f_{np}(\theta_{np}) = M(u, v_{np})/u = \theta_{np}^{(1-\alpha)}$. The vacancy filling probability is: $q(\theta_{np}) = M(u, v_{np})/v_{np} = \gamma\theta_{np}^{-\alpha}$. Similarly, an unemployed white person finding p job has job finding probability $f_p(\theta_p) = M(u_{wh}, v_p)/u_{wh} = \theta_p^{(1-\alpha)}$. The p job vacancy filling probability is: $q(\theta_p) = M(u_{wh}, v_p)/v_p = \gamma\theta_p^{-\alpha}$.

2.2 Unemployment insurance

If a worker loses their job, they may be eligible to receive unemployment insurance. Unemployment insurance is characterized by the benefit b and eligibility el. To avoid tracking a worker's individual history, we model the unemployment insurance as a fraction of the average wage $\overline{w}(z, Ra, s, a)$ of the same type of worker in the current state of the economy, and the eligibility as a random receiving probability $Pe(z)$, following Setty and Yedid-Levi (2021) and Mitman and Rabinovich (2015).

We set the replacement rate h and maximum benefit level χ. The benefit a person can receive $b(Ra, s, a) = min\{h\overline{w}(Ra, s, a), \chi\}$. The eligibility criteria is set such that a newly unemployed person is guaranteed to receive unemployment insurance. A current unemployed person receiving the insurance faces a probability $Pe(z)$ of receiving unemployment insurance next period. If the person is currently unemployed and ineligible, they will continue to be ineligible.

2.3 Worker's problem

A non-prejudiced firm can employ any worker (W_{np}). Only white workers can work at a prejudiced firm (W_p). Since the unemployment benefit depends on a worker's last employment situation, unemployed workers eligible for unemployment benefits are differentiated on whether a prejudiced (U_p^I) or non-prejudiced (U_{np}^I) firm previously employed them. If a worker loses their benefit, their value becomes U^N.

Each worker has race-dependent subjective discounting β_{Ra} and survival probability η. If one receives the survival shock $1 - \eta$, one is replaced by a new person with zero asset holdings to unemployment without insurance state. Following Krueger, Mitman, and Perri (2016), we assume the deceased's assets pay extra returns to survivors. The adjusted asset returns becomes $(1 + r_\mu)/\eta$.

2.3.1 Employed with np firm

$$
W_{np}(\mu; R, s, a) = \max_{c, a' > 0} \Big\{ u(c) + \beta E_{\epsilon_R} \sum_{s'} \pi_{ss'}^R [\underbrace{\lambda_{np} U_{np}^I(\mu'; R, s', a')}_{\text{expected unemployment value}}
$$

$$
+ \underbrace{(1 - \lambda_{np}) W_{np}(\mu'; R, s', a')}_{\text{expected continuing employed value}}] \Big\}
$$
(2)

   s.t.

$$
c + a' = (1 - \tau) \omega_{np}(\mu; R, s, a) + (1 + r)a + d
$$

Each employed person has value function W_{np}, which is given by the current utility from consumption, $u(c)$, and discounted future value by β_{Ra} adjusted by survival rate η. The person's income is split into consumption c and savings for future a'. Their income comes from savings from before $(1 + r)a/\eta$, dividend d, and after-tax labor income $w(\mu; Ra, s, a)(1 - \tau_{Ra})$, at labor income tax rate τ_μ.

A working person may receive a job destruction shock, specific to the np firms, at probability λ_{np}. Hence, their possibility of remaining employed next period is $1 - \lambda_{np}$.

2.3.2 Employed with p firm

Prejudiced firms p only hire white workers ($Ra = 2$). The matched worker receives job destruction shock λ_p, specific to p firms. If one loses a job in the next period, one moves to the U_p^I state, where one is unemployed with eligibility for UI. The rest of the model structure is the same as W_{np}.

$$W_p(\mu; wh, s, a) = \max_{c,a'>0} \left\{ u(c) + \beta E_{\epsilon_{wh}} \sum_{s'} \pi_{ss'}^{wh} [\ \underbrace{\lambda_p U_p^I(\mu'; wh, s', a')}_{\text{expected unemployment value}} \right.$$

$$+ \underbrace{(1 - \lambda_p) W_p(\mu'; wh, s', a')}_{\text{expected continuing employed value}}]\Big\}$$

(3)

s.t.

$$c + a' = (1 - \tau)\omega_p(\mu; wh, s, a) + (1 + r)a + d$$

2.3.3 Unemployed and eligible workers

Since unemployment insurance depends on past wages, the value of a worker's state of UI qualifying state, U^I, depends on p or np history.

White worker from a np firm:

$$U_{np}^I(\mu; wh, s, a) = \max_{c,a'>0} \left\{ u(c) + \beta E_{\epsilon_{wh}} \sum_{s'} \pi_{ss'}^{wh} \Big[\underbrace{(1 - f(\theta_{np}))f(\theta_p)W_p(\mu'; wh, s', a')}_{\text{value of matching with a p sector job only}} \right.$$

$$+ \underbrace{f(\theta_{np})(1 - f(\theta_p))W_{np}(\mu'; wh, s', a')}_{\text{value of matching with a np sector job only}}$$

$$+ \underbrace{f(\theta_{np})f(\theta_p) \max\{W_p(\mu'; wh, s', a'), W_{np}(\mu'; wh, s', a')\}}_{\text{value of matching with both p and np jobs}}$$

(4)

$$+ \underbrace{(1 - f(\theta_p))(1 - f(\theta_{np}))}_{\text{not matching with any job}} \Big[\underbrace{P_e U_{np}^I(\mu'; wh, s', a')}_{\text{value of continuing UI}} + \underbrace{(1 - P_e)U^N(\mu'; wh, s', a')}_{\text{value of losing UI}} \Big]\Big]\Big\}$$

s.t.

$$c + a' = (1 - \tau)b_{np}(wh, s, a) + (1 + r)a + d$$

If a white worker is unemployed from a np firm and is eligible for unemployment insurance, one has value function U_{np}^I. The person has current utility from consumption, $u(c)$, and discounted future survival value. The person's income is similar to an employed person's, except one receives after-tax unemployment benefits $b(1-\tau)$ than labor income.

An unemployed person actively searches for a job. They have the probability $(1 - f_{np}(\theta_{np}))f_p(\theta_p)$ to find only a p job, probability $f_{np}(\theta_{np})(1 - f_p(\theta_p))$ to find only a np job, probability $(1 - f_p(\theta_p))(1 - f_{np}(\theta_{np}))$ finding no jobs, and probability $f_{np}(\theta_{np})f_p(\theta_p)$ finding job offers from both np and p firms.

If the worker finds no job, they have a probability Pe chance of continuing to receive unemployment benefits and $1 - Pe$ probability of losing it. If a worker finds job offers from both np and p firms, they choose whichever offer provides the larger expected returns.

White worker from a p firm:

Like U_{np}^I, a UI-eligible white worker from a p firm has the value function U_p^I. Since the unemployment benefit for this worker is related to their worker history at the p firm, we track the notation separately rather than mixing it with U_{np}^I.

$$U_p^I(\mu; wh, s, a) = \max_{c, a' > 0} \left\{ u(c) + \beta E_{\epsilon_{wh}} \sum_{s'} \pi_{ss'}^{wh} \left[\underbrace{(1 - f(\theta_{np}))f(\theta_p)W_p(\mu'; wh, s', a')}_{\text{value of matching with a p sector job only}} \right. \right.$$

$$+ \underbrace{f(\theta_{np})(1 - f(\theta_p))W_{np}(\mu'; wh, s', a')}_{\text{value of matching with a np sector job only}}$$

$$+ \underbrace{f(\theta_{np})f(\theta_p) \max\{W_p(\mu'; wh, s', a'), W_{np}(\mu'; wh, s', a')\}}_{\text{value of matching with both p and np jobs}} \quad (5)$$

$$+ \underbrace{(1 - f(\theta_p))(1 - f(\theta_{np}))}_{\text{not matching with any job}} \left[\underbrace{P_e U_p^I(\mu'; wh, s', a')}_{\text{value of continuing UI}} + \underbrace{(1 - P_e)U^N(\mu'; wh, s', a')}_{\text{value of losing UI}} \left. \left. \right] \right] \right\}$$

$$\text{s.t.}$$

$$c + a' = (1 - \tau)b_p(wh, s, a) + (1 + r)a + d$$

Black worker from a np firm:

Given the firm structure, an unemployed black worker with UI eligible status can only be linked to work history from np firm. They have the value $U_{np}^I(\mu; 1, s, a)$.

$$U_{np}^I(\mu; bl, s, a) = \max_{c, a' > 0} \Big\{ u(c) + \beta E_{\epsilon_{bl}} \sum_{s'} \pi_{ss'}^{bl} \Big[\underbrace{f(\theta_{np}) W_{np}(\mu'; bl, s', a')}_{\text{value of matching with a np job}}$$

$$+ \underbrace{(1 - f(\theta_{np}))[P_e U_{np}^I(\mu'; bl, s', a') + (1 - P_e) U^N(\mu'; bl, s', a')]}_{\text{value of continuing unemployed}} \Big] \Big\} \tag{6}$$

s.t.

$$c + a' = (1 - \tau) b_{np}(bl, s, a) + (1 + r)a + d$$

These workers look for jobs in the np sector while unemployed. They have the probability $f_{np}(\theta_{np})$ finding a job and $1 - f_{np}(\theta_{np})$ remain unemployed. One has a $(1 - Pe)$ probability of losing the unemployment benefit if unemployed.

2.3.4 Unemployed and not eligible worker

If an unemployed eligible worker loses their UI, they move to the not-eligible state. One's work history doesn't matter, as past wages don't enter these equations. However, white workers can find jobs at np and p firms, and black workers can only find jobs at np firms.

White worker:

$$U^N(\mu; wh, s, a) = \max_{c,a'>0} \Big\{ u(c) + \beta E_{\epsilon_{wh}} \sum_{s'} \pi_{ss'}^{wh} \Big[\underbrace{(1 - f(\theta_{np}))f(\theta_p)W_p(\mu'; wh, s', a')}_{\text{value of matching with a p sector job only}}$$

$$+ \underbrace{f(\theta_{np})(1 - f(\theta_p))W_{np}(\mu'; wh, s', a')}_{\text{value of matching with a np sector job only}}$$

$$+ \underbrace{f(\theta_p)f(\theta_{np}) \max\{W_p(\mu'; wh, s', a'), W_{np}(\mu'; wh, s', a')\}}_{\text{value of matching with both np and p sector jobs}} \quad (7)$$

$$+ \underbrace{(1 - f(\theta_p))(1 - f(\theta_{np}))U^N(\mu'; wh, s', a')}_{\text{value of continuing unemployed}} \Big] \Big\}$$

s.t.

$$c + a' = (1 + r)a + d$$

The white worker in $U^N(\mu; 2, s, a)$ state has their income only comes from previous savings and lump-sum transfers. Similar to white worker in U^I states, they have a probability $(1 - f_{np}(\theta_{np}))f_p(\theta_p)$ finding only a p firm job, probability $f_{np}(\theta_{np})(1 - f_p(\theta_p))$ finding only a np firm job, probability $(1 - f_p(\theta_p))(1 - f_{np}(\theta_{np}))$ remain unemployed, and probability $f_p(\theta_p)f_{np}(\theta_{np})$ finding jobs in both np and p firms. They choose the higher return one if they find both jobs.

Black worker:

Like a black worker in $U_{np}^I(\mu; 1, s, a)$ state, an unemployed and ineligible black worker can find jobs in np firms with probability $f_{np}(\theta_{np})$. If they fail to find a job, they remain unemployed and ineligible.

$$U^N(\mu; bl, s, a) = \max_{c,a'>0} \Big\{ u(c) + \beta E_{\epsilon_{bl}} \sum_{s'} \pi_{ss'}^{bl} \Big[\underbrace{f(\theta_{np})W_{np}(\mu'; bl, s', a')}_{\text{value of matching with a np job}}$$

$$+ \underbrace{(1 - f(\theta_{np}))U^N(\mu'; bl, s', a')}_{\text{value of staying unemployed}} \Big] \Big\} \quad (8)$$

s.t.

$$c + a' = (1 + r)a + d$$

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2.4 Firm's problem

Firms post vacancies to attract workers for production purposes. Vacant firms have a value of J_0, and producing firms have a value of J. In addition to contemporary values, firms stochastically discount future value using $\frac{1}{1+r_\mu}$.

2.4.1 Vacant np firm

A vacant np firm pays posting cost κ_{np} and searches for all unemployed workers. With probability $q_{np}(\theta_{np})$, they match with a currently unemployed worker. We impose the free entry condition so that they keep on posting vacancies until the expected matched value equals to the vacancy posting cost.

$$
\kappa_{np} = \Big(\frac{q(\theta_{np})}{1+r}\Big) \int_a \Big\{ \sum_s \sum_{s'} \pi^{bl}_{ss'} \Big[\underbrace{J_{np}(bl, s', a')\frac{\phi_u(bl, s, a)}{u}}_{\text{value of matching with a type (s,a) black worker}} \Big]
$$
$$
+ \sum_{s'} \pi^{wh}_{ss'} \Big[\underbrace{\mathbb{1}_{\{W_p(\mu';wh,s',a') \leq W_{np}(\mu';wh,s',a')\}}}_{\text{prob of white worker higher value than a p firm}} \Big(\underbrace{J_{np}(wh, s', a')\frac{\phi_u(wh, s, a)}{u}}_{\text{value of matching with (s,a) white worker}} \Big) \tag{9}
$$
$$
+ \underbrace{\mathbb{1}_{\{W_p(\mu';wh,s',a') > W_{np}(\mu';wh,s',a')\}}}_{\text{prob of white worker lower value than a p firm}} \Big(\underbrace{J_{np}(wh, s', a')\frac{\phi_u(wh, s, a)}{u}}_{\text{value of matching (s,a) worker without competing p offer}} \Big)(1 - f(\theta_p)) \Big] \Big\} da
$$

Upon matching with a worker, the firm has probability $\frac{\phi_u(1,s,a)}{u}$ working with a black worker of specific (s, a) status and proceeding with production in the next period. The firm has an additional probability $\frac{\phi_u(2,s,a)}{u}$) matched with a white worker of (s, a) status. The production only happens if the white worker receives a more favorable offer from np firm than p firm, or if the worker does not receive a p firm offer.

2.4.2 Vacant p firm

A vacant p firm only searches for unemployed white workers. The firm has probably $q_p(\theta_p)$ matching with a worker. And the worker with specific (s, a) status has probability $\frac{\phi_u(2,s,a)}{u_{wh}}$.

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Symmetric to the np firm matching with a white worker, production only happens when the worker receives a favorable offer from p firm, or does not receive a np firm offer.

$$\kappa_p = \left(\frac{q(\theta_p)}{1+r}\right) \sum_s \sum_{s'} \pi_{ss'}^{wh} \int_a \bigg[\underbrace{\mathbb{1}_{\{W_{np}(\mu';wh,s',a') < W_p(\mu';wh,s',a')\}}\left(J_p(wh,s',a')\frac{\phi_u(wh,s,a)}{u_{wh}}\right)}_{\text{value of matching with (a,s) white worker, with higher value than np firm}}$$

$$+ \underbrace{\mathbb{1}_{\{W_p(\mu';wh,s',a') \geq W_{np}(\mu';wh,s',a')\}}\left(J_p(wh,s',a')\frac{\phi_u(wh,s,a)}{u_{wh}}\right)(1-f(\theta_{np}))}_{\text{value of matching with (a,s) white worker without competing np firm}} \bigg] da \qquad (10)$$

2.4.3 Producing np firm

If a np firm enters production, it earns contemporaneous profit j and discounts future values adjusted by the job destruction rate λ^{np} and the worker's survival rate η.

$$J_{np}(\mu;R,s,a) = \max_k \left\{ j(\mu;R,s,a) + \left(\frac{1-\lambda^{np}}{1+r}\right) E_{\epsilon_R} \sum_{s'} \pi_{ss'}^R J_{np}(\mu';R,s',a') \right\}$$

$$\text{where} \qquad (11)$$

$$j(\mu;R,s,a) = sf(k) - (r+\delta)k - \omega_{np}(\mu;R,s,a)$$

The matched firm produces output $sf(k)$, pays capital cost $(r_\mu + \delta)k$ and labor cost w. We assume the capital market is frictionless, so all firms pay the same rental rate r, adjusted by the survival probability η. The marginal product equalizes across firms. Capital k depreciates according to δ.

2.5 Producing p firm

Symmetric to the producing np firm, the producing p firm pays capital and labor costs and discounts future production value adjusted by the worker's survival (η) and job destruction (λ^p) rates.

$$J_p(\mu; wh, s, a) = \max_k \left\{ j(\mu; wh, s, a) + \left(\frac{1 - \lambda^p}{1 + r} \right) E_{\epsilon_{wh}} \sum_{s'} \pi_{ss'}^{wh} J_p(\mu'; wh, s', a') \right\}$$

where

$$(12)$$

$$j(\mu; wh, s, a) = sf(k) - (r + \delta)k - \omega_p(\mu; wh, s, a)$$

2.6 Bargaining

Firms and workers bargain for wage period-by-period that maximizes the joint outcome. Workers have bargaining power ξ_{Ra}, differentiated by race. The bargaining solution has:

$$\omega_{np}(\mu; Ra, s, a) = argmax_\omega (W_{np}(\mu; Ra, s, a) - U_{np}^I(\mu; Ra, s, a))^{\xi_{Ra}} J_{np}(\mu; Ra, s, a)^{(1-\xi_{Ra})}$$

$$(13)$$

$$\omega_p(\mu; 2, s, a) = argmax_\omega (W_p(\mu; 2, s, a) - U_p^I(\mu; 2, s, a))^{\xi_2} J_{np}(\mu; 2, s, a)^{(1-\xi_2)} \qquad (14)$$

2.7 Equilibrium

In equilibrium, all net savings supply to the firm's capital demand. All contemporaneous profits are distributed back to individuals equally as dividends. The government balances tax revenue and unemployment insurance outgo, by imposing additional lump-sum tax or transfers on individuals equally.

3 Calibration

We have two categories of parameters for this model. One set is externally chosen, and the other is internally calibrated to match the relevant data moments. Table 1 reports the

parameters and the choice rationale.

Table 1: Calibration and targeted statistics

Parameter	Value	Description	Target statistics	data	model
Chosen internally					
β	0.9995	subjective discounting	K/Y	12.76	12.76
γ	0.5259	matching efficiency	job finding rate - black	0.4946	0.4946
κ_p	7.8880	p sector vacancy posting cost	job finding rate - white	0.6599	0.6599
κ_{np}	2.6514	np sector vacancy posting cost	market tightness	1	1
λ_p	0.0268	p sector job destruction shock	job separation rate - white	0.03795	0.03795
λ_{np}	0.0644	np sector job destruction shock	job separation rate - black	0.0644	0.0644
ξ_{wh}	0.1982	bargaining power - white	firm profit share	0.033	0.033
ξ_{bl}	0.1360	bargaining power - black	racial wage ratio	0.75	0.75
ϵ_{wh}	0.0210	extreme wealth shock - white	zero wealth - white	0.06	0.06
ϵ_{bl}	0.0112	extreme wealth shock - black	zero wealth - black	0.18	0.18
Chosen externally					
α	0.6600	elasticity of labor matching	Nakajima (2012)		
θ_n	0.2890	capital share of output	Nakajima (2012)		
δ	0.0150	quarterly depreciation rate	Nakajima (2012)		
ρ	0.9411	persistence of shock	PSID		
σ	0.1680	innovation of shock	PSID		
h	0.4	UI replacement rate	Mitman and Rabinovich (2015)		
ξ	0.9184	maximum UI coverage	Setty and Yedid-Levi (2021) 48% median wage		
Pe	0.5385	probability of UI eligibility	maximum weeks of eligibility		

Notes: This table reports the parameters, their values, and descriptions. The top panel presents the parameters chosen internally by minimizing the distance between model-generated moments and data. The last two columns of the top panel compare the targeted moments between data and model-simulated values. The bottom panel reports the parameters chosen externally of the model, their values, and descriptions.

We set individual production function $y = k^\theta$. The capital share of output, θ, is set to be 0.289, following Nakajima (2012). The capital depreciation rate, δ, is set to be 0.015 to match the quarterly depreciation rate, reported by Nakajima (2012). The idiosyncratic labor productivity follows an AR(1) process. We estimated the persistence ρ and innovation σ to be 0.9411 and 0.1680. We estimated this process from PSID by controlling for experience, education, year, state, marital status, and race, following Setty and Yedid-Levi (2021). The benchmark unemployment insurance replacement rate is set to be 40% of the counterfactual wage rate, following Mitman and Rabinovich (2015). The maximum unemployment insurance payout is 48% of the median wage, following Setty and Yedid-Levi (2021), and lasts 26 weeks.

The remaining parameters are chosen internally by solving and simulating the model to

match relevant data moments. We set the subjective discounting, β to be 0.9995. It is chosen to match the quarterly capital-to-output ratio of 12.76. γ is the matching efficiency, set to 0.5259 to match the black worker job findings rate. Related, λ_{np} and λ_p are set with values 0.0268 and 0.0644 to match the job separation rate for white and black workers. μ_{wh} and μ_{bl} represent the bargaining power for white and black workers (0.1584 and 0.0723). The vacancy posting cost, κ_{np}, is 2.3247 to match the tightness of the overall labor market (Wolcott, 2021). The extreme wealth shocks are chosen to match the share of each demographic group at zero wealth estimated from SCF following Nakajima (2021).

3.1 Racial difference in wealth distribution

Numerous research has documented the racial wealth disparity in the US (e.g. Kuhn et al., 2020; Barsky et al., 2002; McIntosh et al., 2020; Derenoncourt et al., 2023). Ganong et al. (2020) shows that income shocks are transmitted differently to individuals of different racial groups. This subsection examines the transmission of institutional discrimination from the labor market to disparate wealth distribution between black and white workers.

Without further frictions on the financial market, and with the same idiosyncratic labor productivity process, the model still generates a wealth holding of 82% by white workers, similar to the reporting from McIntosh et al. (2020).

Figure 1 presents the distribution of black and white workers on wealth. White workers are distributed to the higher end of the wealth dimension than black workers, while black workers concentrate around the lower bound of the wealth axis. This is because black workers have twice the job separation rate, half the job finding rate, and 75% wage rate than white workers. Black workers also experience nearly twice the chance of losing all wealth. Given the risk, black workers are much disadvantaged in accumulating wealth. Labor market and wealth discrimination generate differences in wealth accumulation among black individuals, even without additional layers of financial friction.

Figure 1: Wealth distributions

wealth distribution of unemployed eligible workers

Notes: This figure compares the model simulated distribution of workers on wealth dimension by race

Figure 2: labour market outcomes by wealth and race

Notes: This figure compares model simulated unemployment rate and average wage of workers on wealth dimension by race

3.2 Racial difference in the labor market by wealth

In this subsection, we further decompose the differences in labor market outcomes caused by discrimination in the labor market matching process.

Figure 2 describes the racial differences in the unemployment rate and average wage along the wealth dimension. Panel (a) shows that black workers have a higher unemployment rate across the wealth spectrum. Interestingly, the unemployment rate gap is higher for individuals in the middle-wealth region. Panel (b) shows the wage differentials between black and white workers. As wealth increases, individuals have higher bargaining power in negotiating wages. The racial wage gap, however, exacerbates as wealth increases. The wage rates are similar between black and white workers at the lower end of wealth. Black workers' wage rate is about 90% of white workers. But the differences increase to be over 20% at the upper end.

4 Aggregate Implications of Discrimination

In this section, we explore the aggregate effects of racial discrimination on the economy. We look at the impact of market discrimination from prejudiced firms completely dismissing black workers in the job search-and-matching process. We also compare the impact of non-market discrimination, including factors such as bargaining power and wealth shocks. These are structural disparities from historical, social, and political aspects of the US society. Though outside of the labor market, they have a strong impact on a worker's observed labor market outcomes, as summarized by Spriggs (2020) and Small and Pager (2020).

4.1 Aggregate moments of discrimination

Table 2 compares aggregate outcomes, including average wage, overall unemployment rate, capital-to-output ratio, aggregate output, and average welfare change between economies with various sources of discrimination.[3]

In Column 2 of Table 2, we raise the vacancy posting cost κ_p to 3000 from benchmark

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[3]We calculate the welfare change following Krusell, Mukoyama, and Şahin (2010). Under the benchmark model, we let $V(e, R, s, a)$ be the maximal value of the individual with employment status e, race R, productivity s, and asset a. For any given state realization:

$$V = \mathrm{E}_0 \sum_{t=0}^{\infty} \beta^t \frac{c_t^{1-\sigma}}{1-\sigma}$$

Under an alternate economy, let $\tilde{V}(e, R, s, a)$ be the maximal value.

$$\tilde{V} = \mathrm{E}_0 \sum_{t=0}^{\infty} \beta^t \frac{\tilde{c}_t^{1-\sigma}}{1-\sigma}$$

We examine the welfare change between the two economies through consumption equivalence Ω, following the equation:

$$\mathrm{E}_0 \sum_{t=0}^{\infty} \beta^t \frac{((1+\Omega)c_t)^{1-\sigma}}{1-\sigma} = \mathrm{E}_0 \sum_{t=0}^{\infty} \beta^t \frac{\tilde{c}_t^{1-\sigma}}{1-\sigma}$$

Given, the CRRA utility function, we derive Ω as:

$$\Omega = \left(\frac{\tilde{V}}{V}\right)^{\frac{1}{1-\sigma}} - 1$$

This expression is similar to Krusell et al. (2010), which derives this for log utility where $\Omega = \exp((\tilde{V} - V)(1-\beta)) - 1$. For each alternate economy, we sum over all individual-level consumption equivalence, Ωs, using the distribution of the benchmark economy to calculate the average welfare change.

7.888, making it much more costly to practice prejudiced hiring. Compared to benchmark values in Column 1, average wage, capital-to-output ratio, and output drop. The overall unemployment rate increases. Associatedly, average welfare dropped by 7%, driven by the decline of average white worker welfare of 9.7%. However, making prejudiced hiring costly does improve black worker welfare by 3.5% on average.

Table 2: Aggregate Impact of Racial Discrimination

	Benchmark	Market	Non-Market	
		$\kappa_p = 3000$	$\xi_{bl} = \xi_{wh}$	$\epsilon_{bl} = \epsilon_{wh}$
average wage	2.21	2.08	2.23	2.24
unemp rate (%)	6.60	9.87	6.76	6.64
K/Y	12.76	12.65	12.75	13.05
Y	3.33	3.20	3.32	3.36
Average welfare gain (%)				
Average		-7.15	0.64	1.63
black		3.51	5.41	9.80
white		-9.67	-0.48	-0.03

In Column 3, we raise black workers' bargaining power ξ_{bl} to the same level as white workers at 0.1982. The impact on aggregate outcomes is negligible. However, the economy experiences a 0.6% increase in average welfare, led by a 0.5% decline in white worker's welfare. Black workers have a larger (5.4%) increase in welfare.

Lastly, we assign black workers the same extreme wealth destruction shock as white workers in Column (4) of Table 2. Our calibration shows that black workers experience about twice the likelihood of losing their wealth compared to white workers. This corresponds to Derenoncourt et al. (2023), which cites various historical factors that destruct wealth accumulations for black households in the US and the continuity of their impacts in the post-Civil Rights Movement Era after the 1970s. Just equalizing wealth conditions strongly raises black worker welfare to nearly 10% higher than the benchmark economy. The overall welfare increases by about 2%, while it slightly depresses white worker welfare by 0.03%. The lower capital destruction shock for black workers positively impacts the rest of the aggregate

economy, as capital accumulates at a faster rate.

Overall, we show that removing discrimination improves black workers' welfare. Removing non-market discrimination may also raise aggregate output. Yet, it is not a Pareto Improvement.

4.2 Heterogeneous welfare

We further decompose the welfare change by removing various forms of discrimination. We examine the heterogeneity by productivity types and by wealth quintiles.

Productivity types Table 3 presents the heterogeneous welfare change between black and white workers by productivity types. Though the welfare reduction of eliminating prejudiced firms is similar and large across productivities for white workers, the largest loss is for the lowest productive workers. This corresponds to the mechanism that the prejudiced sector provides alternative job sources for displaced white workers from non-prejudiced sectors. Prejudiced firms are likely to offer a more competitive wage to low-productive white workers. In reverse, highly productive black workers have the most welfare gain. Equalizing bargaining power has uniform impacts on welfare change across productivity types. The highest welfare gain for black workers after equalizing wealth shocks, however, also goes to high-productive black workers. The strongest welfare loss under these two scenarios goes to the high-productive white workers.

Table 3: Heterogeneous welfare by productivity

Average welfare gain (%)	$\kappa_p = 3000$	$\xi_{bl} = \xi_{wh}$	$\epsilon_{bl} = \epsilon_{wh}$
Black			
low Productivity	3.48	5.40	9.72
mid Productivity	3.51	5.41	9.79
high Productivity	3.54	5.42	9.92
White			
low Productivity	-9.68	-0.48	-0.28
mid Productivity	-9.67	-0.48	-0.29
high Productivity	-9.67	-0.49	-0.31

Wealth quintiles Table 4 presents the heterogeneous welfare change by wealth quintiles between black and white workers. Acknowledging the wealth distribution changes in different general equilibrium, we look at the welfare changes based on benchmark quintiles. Removing discrimination from all sources benefits middle quintile black workers the most. In particular, equalizing wealth shocks raises average welfare by 14.11% for middle-quintile black workers.

However, for white workers, removing market-related discrimination factors (Column 1) reduces the welfare of middle quintile white workers the most. After eliminating prejudiced firms, the largest reduction (12%) happens to middle quintile white workers. Equalizing wealth shocks, however, reduces the welfare of the lowest quintile white worker the most, by 5.37%.

Table 4: Heterogeneous welfare by wealth

Average welfare gain (%)	$\kappa_p = 3000$	$\xi_{bl} = \xi_{wh}$	$\epsilon_{bl} = \epsilon_{wh}$
Black			
low 20%	3.48	5.40	9.72
40-60%	5.03	7.72	14.11
top 20%	3.54	5.42	9.92
White			
low 20%	-9.63	-0.48	5.37
40-60%	-12.02	-0.60	2.95
top 20%	-9.59	-0.48	-0.32

4.3   Labor market moments of discrimination

Table 5 presents the effects of discrimination in the labor market. Column 2 presents the effect of raising vacancy posting cost κ_p. It directly reduces the presence of prejudiced firms in the economy. This exercise nearly eliminates prejudiced firms from the economy, with a market tightness of 0.00008. As a result, white workers now have nearly the same job finding opportunity as black workers (0.57), and the unemployment rate equalizes between the two races (10%). However, compared to the Benchmark level, white workers have a much lower job-finding rate and a nearly-doubled unemployment rate. Much of the reduction in labor

market racial differences translates to a reduction of racial wealth differences, increasing black-to-white mean and median wealth ratios.

Table 5: Labour Market Impact of Racial Discrimination

	Benchmark	Market $\kappa_p = 3000$	Non-Market $\xi_{bl} = \xi_{wh}$	$\epsilon_{bl} = \epsilon_{wh}$
Labour Market				
np market tightness	0.83	1.18	0.69	0.78
p market tightness	0.25	0.00	0.27	0.26
job finding rate (Black)	0.49	0.56	0.46	0.48
job finding rate (White)	0.66	0.57	0.64	0.65
Unemp rate (Black)	0.12	0.10	0.12	0.12
Unemp rate (White)	0.05	0.10	0.05	0.05
Income				
Mean wage ratio	0.75	0.87	0.82	0.78
Wealth				
Mean wealth ratio	0.21	0.24	0.21	0.76
Median wealth ratio	0.27	0.36	0.27	0.82
Share of zero wealth (Black)	0.18	0.17	0.18	0.06
Share of zero wealth (White)	0.06	0.07	0.06	0.06

Column 3 of Table 5 presents the impact of removing bargaining power disparity. With higher bargaining power, black workers are able to bargain for a higher wage, hence directly increasing the black-to-white mean wage ratio from 75% to 82%. However, compared to the benchmark, non-prejudiced market tightness reduces from 0.83 to 0.69. This also reduces the probability of white workers finding jobs in the non-prejudiced market. In response, the prejudiced market gains relative competitiveness and posts more vacancies. The prejudiced market tightness increases.

Column 4 of Table 5 presents the impact of removing wealth shock disparity. Equalizing the chances of accumulating wealth directly increases the black-to-white mean wealth ratio from 21% to 76% and the median wealth ratio from 27% to 82%. We can infer that the remaining wealth gap comes from labor market disparities. Similar to Aliprantis et al. (2023), equalizing wealth accumulation shocks translates to a 3 percentage points gain in racial wage ratio.

In the next section, we delve into the dynamics of market and non-market discrimination factors transforming the economy.

5   Transition Paths

In this section, we explore the transition paths by which market and non-market racial discrimination affect the entire economy. We examine the impulse response functions of the benchmark economy to alternative economies without discrimination to illustrate the mechanism behind the impact of discrimination.

5.1   Making market discrimination costly

Figure 3 and Figure 4 present the impulse response functions, expressed in percentage deviations from the benchmark steady state, to a date-0 increase of $\kappa_p = 3000$. In Figure 3, the blue dotted line represents non-prejudiced sector responses, the green dotted line represents prejudiced sector responses, and the red solid line represents the aggregate response. In Figure 4, the blue dotted line represents white worker responses, the purple solid line represents black worker responses, and the yellow solid line represents aggregate responses.

Upon immediate severe penalty of prejudiced firms, their vacancy postings reduce by 100%. However, currently matched and producing prejudiced firms still operate. As existing prejudiced firms are not subject to penalty and vacancy posting drops to near zero, the operating profit for the prejudiced sector quadruples upon impact but quickly diminishes. As the profit drops and the perspective of matching in the prejudiced sector disappears, workers continuously employed by the sector receive lower decreases by 10%. Associatedly, employment and output in the prejudiced sector gradually fade out after nearly 200 quarters.

As prejudiced firms gradually exit the market, non-prejudiced firms expect less competition in the future. Their vacancy postings pick up upon impact and continue to increase to over 100% compared to the benchmark level in about 100 quarters. As more vacancy

posts are posted, the non-prejudiced sector pays more posting costs; hence, the sector profit reduces upon impact but gradually reverses and doubles the benchmark level as their posting stabilizes. As they no longer compete with the prejudiced firms for white workers, the average wage paid lowers after stabilization.

The impact spills over from firms to households. The unemployment rate for black workers reduces immediately as the vacancy postings for non-prejudiced firms more than double. As prejudiced firms slowly exit the market, the unemployment rate for white workers gradually increases to nearly 75% of the benchmark level. As a result, the racial unemployment rate gap closes.

The gradually increased retained profit for the non-prejudiced sector also spills over to black workers bargaining for a higher wage rate. The removal of the prejudiced sector, however, reduces white workers' outside options as they bargain with the only job opportunities from the non-prejudiced sector, leading to a lower wage rate. As more white workers transition into the non-prejudiced market from prejudiced positions, the competition slightly drives down the initial increase of black workers' wage gain. Nevertheless, the average racial wage ratio still increases by about 15% compared to the benchmark level.

The increase in jobs and wages for black workers gradually transitions to their wealth accumulation, while the reverse happens to white workers. As a result, the racial wealth ratio increases by 15% after nearly 300 quarters.

5.2 Removing non-market discrimination

Bargaining power: Figure 5 and Figure 6 present the impulse response functions to a date-0 increase of black workers bargaining power to white workers. Upon impact, black workers can bargain for a near 9% increase in wage rate compared to the benchmark level. As a result, the non-prejudiced sector firms retain a smaller share of profit. Vacancy postings by the non-prejudiced sector decline accordingly. Gradually, it translates into a 4% decrease in the sector employment and output. As it's the only sector for black worker's employment,

Figure 3: IRF-firm: making discrimination costly


Figure 4: IRF-HH: making discrimination costly

Figure 5: IRF-firm: equalizing bargaining power

the unemployment rate for black workers increases by 6%. White worker's employment opportunities decrease, too.

As the non-prejudiced sector reduces vacancy postings, the prejudiced sector has a higher chance of matching with a white worker with a lower wage offering. Therefore, the prejudiced sector gains profit over time and increases vacancy, employment, and hence output. As the prejudiced sector exclusively hires white workers, its gradual boom translates into a dampening of white workers' employment opportunity decline.

As a result, the racial unemployment rate gap widens by 5.5% over time, though the average black-to-white wage ratio increases by 10%. As the labor market impulses spill over to wealth accumulation, black workers still gain nearly 4% in average wealth, closing the average racial wealth ratio by 4% from the benchmark level in about 100 quarters.

Wealth shock: Figure 7 and Figure 8 present the impulse response functions to a date-0 reduction of black workers' extreme wealth shock probability to white workers. Though black

Figure 6: IRF-HH: equalizing bargaining power

workers immediately face half the chance of losing their wealth, it takes over 200 quarters for their average wealth to stabilize. Reducing their negative wealth shocks leads to a 2.5 times increase in average wealth for black workers. As black workers slowly gain stability in wealth accumulation, they can better self-insure against unemployment and negative AR(1) shocks at the labor market (**?**). As a result, black workers have stronger effective bargaining for higher wages. Their average wage rate increases by 5% after 100 quarters.

Similar to the previous exercise of increasing bargaining power, higher bargained wages lead to a decline in profit, vacancy posting employment, and output for non-prejudiced sectors. And the prejudiced sector gradually picks up the employment of white workers, though to a much smaller extent. Opposite to the previous exercise, black workers retain more assets, and the equilibrium interest rate decreases. Such a decrease allows firms to pay less to acquire capital, which leaves more profit to allocate to workers. Hence, the prejudiced sector gradually pays higher wages, and white workers also experience a small wage gain.

Overall, the average racial wealth ratio increases nearly threefold from the benchmark

Figure 7: IRF-firm: equalizing wealth

level, which spills over to a 4% increase in the racial wage ratio. The unemployment rate gap, however, is exacerbated by about 2%.

In summary, we explore the mechanisms of market and non-market discrimination creating general equilibrium effects on the macro economy. Though discrimination reduces black worker welfare, the channel of impact differs. Discriminatory firms crowd out non-discriminatory firms, which reduces job opportunities for black workers. As an additional sector of employment opportunities for white workers, it also assists white workers to bargain for a higher wage, further exacerbating racial pay gaps. Non-market discrimination depresses black workers' competitiveness in the labor market. Lower bargaining power and less stability in wealth accumulation contribute to a lower wage and a lower chance of self-insuring against labor market adversity.

Figure 8: IRF-HH: equalizing wealth

6 Policy implications

6.1 Hiring Subsidies

We find that there is a trade-off between efficiency and equality in our model environment. Removing discrimination by penalizing prejudiced firms leads to a more equal society, but causes a reduction in aggregate output and welfare. This is because the hiring of non-prejudiced firms does not completely make up for the exit of prejudiced firms. Table 6 presents that subsidizing the hiring by non-prejudiced firms improves aggregate outcomes while maintaining racial equality in unemployment and job-finding rates. Reducing the vacancy posting costs from around 80% of the aggregate output in the benchmark case to around 6% restores the aggregate output and unemployment rate from the benchmark case, while preserving the equality across black and white workers. The unemployment rate of both black and white workers has equalized at 6.6%, and the wage gap also narrows, with the mean wage ratio jumping to 0.96. We thus find that hiring subsidies can nullify the costs

Table 6: Hiring Subsidy

	Benchmark	$\kappa_p = 3000$	Hiring Subsidy
Labour Market			
np market tightness	0.83	1.18	4.71
p market tightness	0.25	0.00	0.00
Unemp rate (Black)	0.12	0.10	0.066
Unemp rate (White)	0.054	0.10	0.067
Income			
Mean wage ratio	0.75	0.87	0.96
Wealth			
Mean wealth ratio	0.21	0.24	0.29
Median wealth ratio	0.27	0.36	0.46

imposed by the removal of discrimination, thus resolving the trade-off between efficiency and equality in the economy.

6.2 Unemployment Insurance

With the understanding that racial discrimination creates disparities between black and white workers, we further document the disparate impact of aggregate policies. In this section, we show the impact of Unemployment Insurance across the three dimensions: replacement rate (h), eligibility probability (Pe), and max payout (χ).

In the benchmark, we have the replacement rate as 40%, eligibility probability at 26 weeks, and maximum payout as 48% of the median wage. We vary each dimension by adjusting it to 10% and 20% above and below the benchmark level and examine the change in the unemployment rate gap, average black-to-white wage ratio, and wealth ratio. We further change the funding of UI from benchmark labor income tax to capital gain tax, and report the effects.

Figure 9 plots the effects of varying UI on the average racial wage ratio. Overall, increasing duration, replacement ratio, and maximum coverage monotonically increase the average black-to-white wage ratio, reducing the racial wage gap. In comparison, funding the UI

Figure 9: UI and racial wage gap

with labor income tax has a more positive impact on reducing the racial wage gap than through capital gain tax. Following the mechanism discussed, UI provides public insurance for individuals. For black workers experiencing a worse wealth accumulation process, more expansive UI provides alleviation for lack of self-insurance. This allows black workers to bargain for better wage outcomes.

Figure 10: UI on Unemp Rate Gap

Figure 10 plots the effects of UI on the unemployment rate gap. Raising UI on each dimension, however, increases the racial unemployment rate gap. Following the mechanism of insurance, as black workers bargain for higher wages with more expansive UI coverage, it also reduces the vacancy posting for non-prejudiced firms. The effect on the prejudiced sector is less, as it is a buffer for white workers. As a result, the unemployment gap increases

as UI expands.

Figure 11: UI on Wealth Gap

Figure 11 plots the effects of UI on ratio wealth. Raising UI on each dimension also depresses the racial wealth gap. Though black workers can bargain for higher wages with more UI, the unemployment rate increases dominate the outcome in translating the labor market conditions to wealth accumulation. As a result, the wealth gap increases. Interestingly, funding UI with capital gain tax reduces the wealth gap. This is because of the large wealth inequality between black and white workers. A capital gain tax provides more redistribution of wealth than a labor income tax.

7 Conclusion

This study examines the effects of racial discrimination within a frictional labor market on employment, wage disparities, and wealth accumulation between black and white workers in the U.S. We develop a search-and-matching model that incorporates firms with and without racial prejudices, alongside race-specific pathways for wealth accumulation. Our findings reveal that racial discrimination in hiring and production processes significantly exacerbates wage gaps, particularly among highly productive workers. Moreover, discriminatory practices disproportionately consign black workers to the lower end of the wealth spectrum. Contrary to conventional discrimination theories, our analysis suggests that discriminatory hiring practices persist as an equilibrium outcome within frictional markets. Eliminating these discriminatory factors paradoxically results in a decrease in overall welfare, as prejudiced firms inadvertently bolster leverage for white workers and contribute additional economic output, albeit at the expense of black workers. Furthermore, non-market discrimination – manifested through unequal bargaining power, biased production processes, and disparate wealth shocks – while diminishing overall output, disproportionately hinders black workers' participation in the labor market. Equalizing these non-market factors, therefore, also diminishes welfare advantages for white workers. Importantly, our study identifies a pronounced spillover effect of labor market discrimination on wealth accumulation, with a notable, albeit weaker, influence of wealth disparities on negotiated wages. Our findings shed light on the enduring nature of Black-White racial disparities in the U.S., offering insights into the complex interplay between discrimination, labor market dynamics, and wealth accumulation.

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