

# Macroeconomics of Racial Disparities: Discrimination, Labor Market, and Wealth

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## Abstract

This paper investigates how racial discrimination in hiring impacts employment, wages, and wealth between black and white workers. We develop a labor search-and-matching model that includes both black and white workers and firms with and without racially biased hiring practices. We find that labor market frictions allow discriminatory practices to persist as an equilibrium outcome. These practices contribute significantly to the black-to-white wage and wealth gaps, explaining approximately 44% - 52% of the average wage gap and 16% of the median wealth gap. Moreover, discriminatory hiring exacerbates the unemployment and wage volatility for black workers, creating more risky labor market outcomes for black workers over the business cycles. Removing prejudiced firms reduces these disparities and enhances black workers' welfare but reduces the overall economy's welfare.

*JEL classification:* D14, E21, J15, J64, J65

*Keywords:* search-and-matching, heterogeneous agents, racial inequality, unemployment, wealth distribution, business cycles

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# 1 Introduction

Discrimination is often viewed as inefficient or a supplement to information asymmetry.<sup>1</sup> Thus, market competition and information updates should drive out discrimination in the long run. However, much empirical evidence demonstrates that discriminatory practices persist in various markets and cause extensive racial disparities.<sup>2</sup> Only recently has research begun to examine racial disparities in macroeconomics.<sup>3</sup> Yet, the role of discriminatory practices has been largely overlooked. Identifying a general equilibrium theory that explains the sustaining discrimination and its consequences has crucial implications for understanding the macroeconomic impact of racial disparities and policymaking.

This paper develops a labor search-and-matching framework that captures the persistence of hiring discrimination based on race. Importantly, we demonstrate that hiring discrimination explains about 44% - 52% of the black-to-white average wage gap and 16% of the racial median wealth gap. Furthermore, discriminatory hiring practices intensify unemployment and wage volatility for black workers, leading to a countercyclical racial unemployment gap and diverging racial wage cyclical properties. Specifically, we construct a heterogeneous agent labor market search-and-matching model. Firms compete against each other to hire workers to produce, although prejudiced firms only hire white workers. Individuals are *ex-ante* different in race, which leads to differences in bargaining power and the probability of experiencing a wealth destruction shock. All workers compete for employment opportunities, although white workers have extra opportunities with prejudiced firms. Matched worker-and-firm pairs bargain for a wage rate to maximize joined matched surplus. Upon

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<sup>1</sup>See Becker (1957) and summaries of Lang and Spitzer (2020) on taste and statistical discrimination theories.

<sup>2</sup>See for example Couch and Fairlie (2010); Biddle and Hamermesh (2013); Kuhn, Schularick, and Steins (2020); Derenoncourt and Montialoux (2021). Resume studies reveal the persistence of discriminatory practices based on race after controlling for job candidate qualities (e.g. Bertrand and Mullainathan, 2004). The labor income and wealth gaps between black and white households persist, even after the Civil Rights Movement Era (e.g. Cajner, Radler, Ratner, and Vidangos, 2017; Derenoncourt, Kim, Kuhn, and Schularick, 2023). Small and Pager (2020) suggests that discrimination reinforces itself across various domains and is a form of market failure.

<sup>3</sup>See for example Nakajima (2021), Aliprantis, Carroll, and Young (2023), Boerma and Karabarbounis (2021), Ganong, Jones, Noel, Greig, Farrell, and Wheat (2020), Lee, Macaluso, and Schwartzman (2021).

calibration, our model endogenously generates a lower job-finding rate, a higher unemployment rate, and a lower bargained wage for black workers. Without further financial frictions, our model produces significant differences in wealth accumulation between black and white workers.

The main message of this paper is that labor market friction can sustain hiring discrimination as an equilibrium outcome. Our calibration shows that prejudiced firms incur higher vacancy posting costs to discriminate against black workers. As we gradually increase these costs, these firms slowly reduce their vacancy postings and employment, while their profits adjust in accordance with the free entry condition. Ultimately, we more than double the benchmark calibrated posting cost until the entire expected value of entering as a discriminatory firm is eliminated. This indicates that prejudiced firms have sufficient profit margins to absorb higher vacancy posting costs, even with the existing market competition.

Moreover, hiring discrimination perpetuates the equilibrium economy through firms' vacancy postings. Prejudiced firms post vacancies in competition against non-prejudiced firms for each unemployed white worker. As a result, they drive up the wage rates for white workers across the economy. As non-prejudiced firms pay higher premiums for white workers, their expected profits decrease, leading to their overall fewer vacancy postings. This reduction in non-prejudiced job openings directly reduces employment opportunities for black workers, contributing to lower wages and higher unemployment rates, which translates into adverse wealth accumulation.

In a counterfactual economy, eliminating prejudiced firms equalizes the racial unemployment rate and vastly reduces the wage gap. In particular, prejudiced hiring accounts for over 40% of the racial wage gap. Moreover, we find that high-productive black workers experience the most considerable welfare improvement from removing prejudiced firms. As white workers lose the additional sector providing exclusive employment opportunities, their average wage declines, and the unemployment rate increases. As a result, white workers experience a moderate welfare decrease in the steady state. Given the asymmetric calibrated job sep-

aration rate and vacancy posting cost, non-prejudiced firms are only imperfect substitutes for prejudiced firms. Though non-prejudiced firms pick up vacancy postings as we banish prejudiced firms from the market, the added vacancy postings do not fully account for the lost job opportunities from prejudiced firms. As a result, white workers' unemployment rate increases. The lowest productive and lowest-wealth white workers suffer the highest average welfare loss. However, if we preserve the race-specific job destruction shocks, eliminating prejudiced hiring would have a much less impact on white workers and engender a minor overall welfare gain.

We further introduce aggregate fluctuations to the economy and show that hiring discrimination leads to distinct business cycle dynamics for black and white workers. Our model successfully replicates the observed countercyclical and volatile racial unemployment rate gap, as well as the more procyclical and volatile average wage rate for black workers. Upon removing prejudiced firms, the business cycle properties of the racial unemployment rate gap disappear. The racial disparities in volatility and cyclicity of the average wage rate significantly diminish. This provides theoretical evidence to Cajner et al. (2017) that firm-side discrimination contributes to the business cycle differences between black and white workers, and non-market demographic factors alone do not fully account.

Lastly, we examine the business cycle welfare change between black and white workers when discriminatory hiring contributes to more volatile labor market outcomes for black workers. We compare the average consumption equivalence of workers during business cycles after removing prejudiced firms. Not all workers benefit from a less volatile economy without discriminatory firms. Black workers gain an average of 0.46% in welfare compared to that of 0.73% for white workers. Different from steady state welfare value, among the black workers, the high-productive and high-wealth gain the most. Among the white workers, the low-productive and low-wealth white workers gain the most.

This paper contributes to the rising discussion on the aggregate impact of inequality by focusing on the disparate conditions and outcomes of white and black workers. Numerous

studies have documented racial differences in pay and employment opportunities (e.g. Black, 1995; Coate and Loury, 1993; Rosén, 1997; Bertrand and Mullainathan, 2004). Fewer studies examine the patterns between black and white workers over macroeconomic fluctuations. Among the work, Couch and Fairlie (2010) shows that black workers are last hired in the economic upturn and first fired in the downturn. Biddle and Hamermesh (2013) documents that the discriminatory wage gap between black and white workers is procyclical. Cajner et al. (2017) shows much higher unemployment rate volatility and a higher rate of involuntary part-time employment for black workers. Daly, Hobijn, and Pedtke (2020) suggests that the harsh employment opportunities for black workers are driving up the racial earnings gap.

An emerging strand of literature documents the racial disparities in wealth holdings (e.g. Derenoncourt et al., 2023; Derenoncourt, Kim, Kuhn, and Schularick, 2022; Kuhn et al., 2020; Barsky, Bound, Charles, and Lupton, 2002; McIntosh, Moss, Nunn, and Shambaugh, 2020). Recently, Derenoncourt et al. (2023) provide a historical account of wealth segregation between black and white Americans over the past 150 years. Boerma and Karabarbounis (2021) and Aliprantis et al. (2023) examine the impact of discriminatory history on earnings, bequest, and capital returns in a steady-state model without aggregate risks. Given the racial wealth difference, Ganong et al. (2020) shows that income risks are transmitted differently to individuals of different racial groups. With such understandings, Bartscher, Kuhn, Schularick, and Wachtel (2021) and Lee et al. (2021) discuss the disparate consequences of monetary policy on workers of different race groups.

Germane to our project, Nakajima (2021) creates a search-and-matching model examining the role of monetary policies in perpetuating racial differences in the labor market. Different from Nakajima (2021), our model intentionally differentiates discriminatory firms from non-discriminatory firms in the labor market hiring process and examines the impact of discriminatory hiring behaviors on black workers and its spillover effects on the rest of the economy. Our analysis establishes the first theoretical understanding of the interplay of hiring discrimination on labor and wealth disparities in the long run and over the business

cycles.

In a broader context, this proposed project contributes to the growing discussion on the distributional impact of economic growth and macroeconomic policies by focusing on the heterogeneous outcomes of white and black workers. It joins Caballero and Hammour (1994), Jaimovich and Siu (2020), and Heathcote, Perri, and Violante (2020) in providing evidence that recessions disproportionately hurt disadvantaged individuals. Borella, De Nardi, and Yang (2018) show that introducing gender differences in a theoretical life-cycle model offers a better model fit to the data. This paper will provide insights into how racial difference allows a better fit for search models over the business cycle. Theoretically, Krusell and Smith (1998) conclude that heterogeneity in wealth does not alter business cycle fluctuations. Jang, Sunakawa, Yum, et al. (2020) show that heterogeneity passes to large aggregate fluctuations when introducing non-convexity in budget constraint through progressive tax. This paper identifies that racial wedges in labor search transmit individual risk and heterogeneity to aggregate fluctuations.

The rest of the paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 lays out theoretical framework. Section 3 discusses the calibration strategy. Section 4 examines the steady-state implications of racial discrimination. Section 5 provides business cycle implications. Section 6 concludes the paper.

## 2 Model

In this section, we present a model of labor market discrimination without aggregate uncertainty. We use this framework to understand the role of hiring discrimination in driving the racial gaps in labor market outcomes and wealth.

## 2.1 Environment

The model has a unit measure of workers, who are either black or white,  $R \in \{bl, wh\}$ . Two types of firms post vacancies to hire unemployed workers, subject to search and matching frictions. Prejudiced firms ( $p$ ) actively discriminate against black workers and hire only white workers. Non-prejudiced firms ( $np$ ) hire both black and white workers without discrimination. Prejudiced and non-prejudiced firms also have type-specific separation rates. To ease exposition, we drop the time subscripts and use a prime symbol ( $'$ ) to denote the variables in the next period.

Workers are either employed (with  $p$  or  $np$  firm) or unemployed. Those who become unemployed in the current period receive unemployment benefits and continue to receive them in the future with probability  $P_e$ . The workers face idiosyncratic productivity shocks  $s$ , following an AR(1) process  $\log(s') = \rho_s \log(s) + \epsilon_s$ , with  $\epsilon_s \stackrel{iid}{\sim} N(0, \sigma_s^2)$ . Workers also differ in terms of their asset holdings. They have access to risk-free assets, and the workers can save using these assets to partially insure themselves against the labor market risks. Following Mukoyama (2013), workers also receive race-specific extreme wealth shocks with probability  $\epsilon_R \in \{\epsilon_{bl}, \epsilon_{wh}\}$ . Upon realization of the shock, the worker loses all their wealth. Taken together, workers are heterogeneous across race ( $R$ ), labor market status ( $e$ ), idiosyncratic productivity ( $s$ ), and wealth ( $a$ ), and the endogenous distribution of workers is given by  $\mu(e, R, s, a)$ . One may omit the recording of  $\mu$  in the steady state, as the overall distribution remains stationary. However, individual workers may still move around the distribution between periods. We record  $\mu$  in the description of our steady state, which also eases us into adopting the model with aggregate shock later.

## 2.2 Labor market search and matching

The total number of unemployed workers  $u$  is the sum of unemployed black ( $u_{bl}$ ) and white ( $u_{wh}$ ) workers. The number of  $np$  vacancies available is  $v_{np}$ , while the number of  $p$  firm vacancies is  $v_p$ . Since the non-prejudiced firms search among both black and white unem-

ployed workers, the non-prejudiced market tightness is given by  $\theta_{np} = v_{np}/u$ . On the other hand, prejudiced firms employ only white unemployed workers, and hence the prejudiced market tightness is  $\theta_p = v_p/u_{wh}$ . Following Den Haan, Ramey, and Watson (2000) and Petrosky-Nadeau, Zhang, and Kuehn (2018), unemployed workers and vacant firms match via a constant returns to scale matching function

$$M(u, v) = \frac{uv}{(u^\iota + v^\iota)^{1/\iota}}, \quad (1)$$

with  $\iota > 0$ . As documented by Den Haan et al. (2000), this functional form ensures that the matching probabilities lie within 0 and 1. The probability for an unemployed worker to match with a vacant  $np$  firm is  $f(\theta_{np}) = M(u, v_{np})/u = (1 + \theta_{np}^{-\iota})^{-1/\iota}$ , while the probability that a white unemployed worker matches with a vacant  $p$  firm is  $f(\theta_p) = M(u_{wh}, v_p)/u_{wh} = (1 + \theta_p^{-\iota})^{-1/\iota}$ . Correspondingly, the probability of filling a vacant  $np$  firm is  $q(\theta_{np}) = M(u, v_{np})/v_{np} = (1 + \theta_{np}^\iota)^{-1/\iota}$ , while the probability of filling a vacant  $p$  firm is  $q(\theta_p) = M(u_{wh}, v_p)/v_p = (1 + \theta_p^\iota)^{-1/\iota}$ . In addition, non-prejudiced matches get separated with probability  $\lambda_{np}$ , while the prejudiced matches separate at the rate  $\lambda_p$ .

## 2.3 Unemployment Insurance

Unemployment insurance is characterized by the replacement rate  $h$ , probability of eligibility  $P_e$ , and maximum eligibility level  $\chi$ . Following Setty and Yedid-Levi (2021), eligible workers receive unemployment benefits  $b(R, s, a) = \min\{h\bar{w}(R, s, a), \chi\}$ , where  $\bar{w}(R, s, a)$  is the counterfactual wage earned by an employed worker with race  $R$ , productivity  $s$ , and wealth  $a$ . We adopt the counterfactual wage to ease the computation burden of tracking wage history. Similar to Mitman and Rabinovich (2015), newly unemployed workers receive unemployment benefits with certainty and continue to receive benefits next period with probability  $P_e$ . If an unemployed worker loses their eligibility to receive benefits, they continue to remain ineligible in the future as well. Unemployment benefits are funded through proportional tax



$\tau$  on the labor income, and the government sets  $\tau$  to balance its budget.<sup>4</sup>

## 2.4 Workers

The value function of an employed individual with race  $R$ , productivity  $s$ , asset  $a$ , and working with a  $np$  firm is given by  $W_{np}(R, s, a)$ , while that of a white worker employed with a  $p$  firm is given by  $W_p(wh, s, a)$ . Since the unemployment benefit is indexed to the worker's counterfactual wage, the values of the unemployed workers eligible for benefits depends on whether they worked with a non-prejudiced ( $U_{np}^I(R, s, a)$ ) or a prejudiced ( $U_p^I(wh, s, a)$ ) firm previously. An unemployed worker who is not eligible for receiving unemployment benefits earns a value of  $U^N(R, s, a)$  over their lifetime. All the workers discount their future utility by  $\beta$ . Similar to Nakajima (2012) and Setty and Yedid-Levi (2021), we assume that workers cannot borrow. This imposes an exogenous constraint of  $a' \geq 0$  on all workers.

### 2.4.1 Employed with $np$ firm

Equation (2) describes an employed worker of race  $R$  with productivity  $s$  and asset holdings  $a$ , working in an  $np$  firm. The worker chooses consumption  $c$  and future savings  $a'$  to maximize their lifetime discounted utility. Their income constitutes of period wage  $\omega_{np}$  net of payroll tax  $\tau$ , current savings  $(1 + r)a$ , and dividends  $d$ . The expectation of the worker's future value is taken over the idiosyncratic productivity shock  $s$  and the race-specific probability of extreme wealth shock  $\epsilon_R$ .

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<sup>4</sup>We intentionally model a more realistic and complex unemployment insurance structure to capture the racial disparities in the incidence and take-up of unemployment insurance. This helps us generate racial differences in income and wealth distribution, given the asymmetric labor market and wealth risks.

$$\begin{aligned}
W_{np}(\mu; R, s, a) &= \max_{c, a' \geq 0} \left\{ u(c) + \beta \sum_{s'} \pi_{ss'} [(1 - \epsilon_R) \hat{W}_{np}(\mu'; R, s', a') + \epsilon_R \hat{W}_{np}(\mu'; R, s', 0)] \right\} \\
&\text{s.t.} \\
c + a' &= (1 - \tau) \omega_{np}(\mu; R, s, a) + (1 + r)a + d
\end{aligned} \tag{2}$$

The future value of an employed worker after the realization of  $s'$  and  $\epsilon_R$  can expand to Equation (3).

$$\hat{W}_{np}(\mu'; R, s', a') = \lambda_{np} U_{np}^I(\mu'; R, s', a') + (1 - \lambda_{np}) W_{np}(\mu'; R, s', a') \tag{3}$$

If the worker receives a job destruction shock, specific to  $np$  firms, one becomes unemployed with probability  $\lambda_{np}$ . Otherwise, one may stay employed with probability  $1 - \lambda_{np}$ . If unemployed, the worker can receive unemployment benefits and earn a value of  $U_{np}^I$ .

#### 2.4.2 Employed with $p$ firm

Prejudiced firms  $p$  hire only white workers. The rest of the problem is similar to the previous case and is given by Equation (4).

$$\begin{aligned}
W_p(\mu; wh, s, a) &= \max_{c, a' \geq 0} \left\{ u(c) + \beta \sum_{s'} \pi_{ss'} [(1 - \epsilon_{wh}) \hat{W}_p(\mu'; wh, s', a') + \epsilon_{wh} \hat{W}_p(\mu'; wh, s', 0)] \right\} \\
&\text{s.t.} \\
c + a' &= (1 - \tau) \omega_p(\mu; wh, s, a) + (1 + r)a + d
\end{aligned} \tag{4}$$

The matched worker receives a job destruction shock specific to  $p$  firms, with probability  $\lambda_p$ . A worker losing the job in the current period is eligible for unemployment benefits and earns value  $U_p^I$  next period. After the realization of  $s'$  and  $\epsilon_{wh}$ , the future value of an employed worker, in this case, expands to Equation (5).

$$\hat{W}_p(\mu'; wh, s', a') = \lambda_p U_p^I(\mu'; wh, s', a') + (1 - \lambda_p) W_p(\mu'; wh, s', a') \quad (5)$$

### 2.4.3 Unemployed and eligible workers

Since unemployment insurance is proportional to the counterfactual wage, the value obtained by an unemployed and eligible worker depends on whether the past employment was in a  $p$  or in an  $np$  firm. In addition, unemployed white workers can receive job offers from both  $p$  and  $np$  firms, while black workers can get matched only with  $np$  firms.

#### Black worker from a $np$ firm

Equation (6) describes the value of an unemployed black worker eligible for benefits. The worker receives unemployment insurance,  $b_{np}(bl, s, a)$ , net of labor income tax rate  $\tau$  and savings from before and lump-sum dividend transfer  $d$ . The worker receives the extreme wealth shock with probability  $\epsilon_{bl}$ .

$$\begin{aligned} U_{np}^I(\mu; bl, s, a) &= \max_{c, a' \geq 0} \left\{ u(c) + \beta \sum_{s'} \pi_{ss'} [(1 - \epsilon_{bl}) \hat{U}_{np}^I(\mu'; bl, s', a') + \epsilon_{bl} \hat{U}_{np}^I(\mu'; bl, s', 0)] \right\} \\ &\text{s.t.} \\ c + a' &= (1 - \tau) b_{np}(\mu; bl, s, a) + (1 + r)a + d \end{aligned} \quad (6)$$

Their future value  $\hat{U}_{np}^I(\mu'; bl, s', a')$  expands according to Equation (7):

$$\hat{U}_{np}^I(\mu'; bl, s', a') = f(\theta_{np}) W_{np}(\mu'; bl, s', a') + (1 - f(\theta_{np})) [P_e U_{np}^I(\mu'; bl, s', a') + (1 - P_e) U^N(\mu'; bl, s', a')] \quad (7)$$

The unemployed worker finds a job with probability  $f(\theta_{np})$ . If the worker doesn't get matched, they continue to receive unemployment benefits with probability  $P_e$  and lose their

eligibility with probability  $1 - P_e$ .

### White worker from a $np$ firm

Unemployed white workers are recruited by both  $p$  and  $np$  firms. Their value function is described by Equation (8). Similar to a black worker's case, the white worker has cash on hand from post-tax unemployment insurance, savings from before, and a lump-sum dividend transfer. They also receive an extreme wealth shock with probability  $\epsilon_{wh}$ .

$$\begin{aligned}
U_{np}^I(\mu; wh, s, a) &= \max_{c, a' \geq 0} \left\{ u(c) + \beta \sum_{s'} \pi_{ss'} [(1 - \epsilon_{wh}) \hat{U}_{np}^I(\mu'; wh, s', a') + \epsilon_{wh} \hat{U}_{np}^I(\mu'; wh, s', 0)] \right\} \\
&\text{s.t.} \\
c + a' &= (1 - \tau)b_{np}(\mu; wh, s, a) + (1 + r)a + d.
\end{aligned} \tag{8}$$

Equation (9) describes the future value of an unemployed white worker with idiosyncratic productivity  $s'$  and asset  $a'$ . They can receive a job offer from a  $p$  firm with probability  $(1 - f(\theta_{np}))f(\theta_p)$ , an offer from an  $np$  firm with probability  $f(\theta_{np})(1 - f(\theta_p))$ , and receive both offers together with probability  $f(\theta_{np})f(\theta_p)$ . The white worker will remain unemployed if they don't receive any offers (with probability  $(1 - f(\theta_p))(1 - f(\theta_{np}))$ ) and continue to receive unemployment benefits with probability  $P_e$ . If the worker receives both  $p$  and  $np$  offers, they will choose the job with higher lifetime utility.

$$\begin{aligned}
\hat{U}_{np}^I(\mu'; wh, s', a') &= \underbrace{(1 - f(\theta_{np}))f(\theta_p)W_p(\mu'; wh, s', a')}_{\text{value of matching with a p sector job only}} + \underbrace{f(\theta_{np})(1 - f(\theta_p))W_{np}(\mu'; wh, s', a')}_{\text{value of matching with a np sector job only}} \\
&+ \underbrace{f(\theta_{np})f(\theta_p) \max\{W_p(\mu'; wh, s', a'), W_{np}(\mu'; wh, s', a')\}}_{\text{value of matching with both p and np jobs}} \\
&+ \underbrace{(1 - f(\theta_p))(1 - f(\theta_{np}))}_{\text{not matching with any job}} \left[ \underbrace{P_e U_{np}^I(\mu'; wh, s', a')}_{\text{value of continuing UI}} + \underbrace{(1 - P_e)U^N(\mu'; wh, s', a')}_{\text{value of losing UI}} \right]
\end{aligned} \tag{9}$$

### White worker from a $p$ firm

Equation (10) describes the problem faced by a white worker who last worked with a  $p$  firm. The problem is identical to the previous case, except they earn  $b_p(wh, s, a)$  as their unemployment benefit.

$$\begin{aligned}
U_p^I(\mu; wh, s, a) &= \max_{c, a' \geq 0} \left\{ u(c) + \beta \sum_{s'} \pi_{ss'} [(1 - \epsilon_{wh}) \hat{U}_p^I(\mu'; wh, s', a') + \epsilon_{wh} \hat{U}_p^I(\mu'; wh, s', 0)] \right\} \\
&\text{s.t.} \\
c + a' &= (1 - \tau) b_p(\mu; wh, s, a) + (1 + r)a + d
\end{aligned} \tag{10}$$

After realizing  $\epsilon_{wh}$  and  $s'$ , the worker's future value is described in Equation (11). It is nearly identical to Equation (9) except for the value of remaining unemployed coming from a  $p$  firm rather than a  $np$  firm.

$$\begin{aligned}
\hat{U}_p^I(\mu'; wh, s', a') &= \underbrace{(1 - f(\theta_{np}))f(\theta_p)W_p(\mu'; wh, s', a')}_{\text{value of matching with a p sector job only}} + \underbrace{f(\theta_{np})(1 - f(\theta_p))W_{np}(\mu'; wh, s', a')}_{\text{value of matching with a np sector job only}} \\
&+ \underbrace{f(\theta_{np})f(\theta_p) \max\{W_p(\mu'; wh, s', a'), W_{np}(\mu'; wh, s', a')\}}_{\text{value of matching with both p and np jobs}} \\
&+ \underbrace{(1 - f(\theta_p))(1 - f(\theta_{np}))}_{\text{not matching with any job}} \left[ \underbrace{P_e U_p^I(\mu'; wh, s', a')}_{\text{value of continuing UI}} + \underbrace{(1 - P_e)U^N(\mu'; wh, s', a')}_{\text{value of losing UI}} \right]
\end{aligned} \tag{11}$$

#### 2.4.4 Unemployed and ineligible workers

Ineligible workers lost their unemployment insurance and are still searching for jobs. Once they lose it, they no longer receive unemployment benefits. Their income comes only from their savings and dividends and does not depend on their previous employment.

### Black worker

Equation (12) describes the problem of a black worker searching for jobs without unem-

ployment insurance.

$$\begin{aligned}
U^N(\mu; bl, s, a) &= \max_{c, a' \geq 0} \left\{ u(c) + \beta \sum_{s'} \pi_{ss'} \left[ (1 - \epsilon_{bl}) \hat{U}^N(\mu'; bl, s', a') + \epsilon_{bl} \hat{U}^N(\mu'; bl, s', 0) \right] \right\} \\
&\text{s.t.} \\
c + a' &= (1 + r)a + d
\end{aligned} \tag{12}$$

And Equation (13) expands the future value of the black worker.

$$\hat{U}^N(\mu'; bl, s', a') = f(\theta_{np})W_{np}(\mu'; bl, s', a') + (1 - f(\theta_{np}))U^N(\mu'; bl, s', a') \tag{13}$$

### White worker

Equation (14) describes the problem of a white worker searching for jobs without unemployment insurance.

$$\begin{aligned}
U^N(\mu; wh, s, a) &= \max_{c, a' \geq 0} \left\{ u(c) + \beta \sum_{s'} \pi_{ss'} \left[ (1 - \epsilon_{wh}) \hat{U}^N(\mu'; wh, s', a') + \epsilon_{wh} \hat{U}^N(\mu'; wh, s', 0) \right] \right\} \\
&\text{s.t.} \\
c + a' &= (1 + r)a + d
\end{aligned} \tag{14}$$

And Equation (15) expands the future value of the white worker.

$$\begin{aligned}
\hat{U}^N(\mu'; wh, s', a') &= \underbrace{(1 - f(\theta_{np}))f(\theta_p)W_p(\mu'; wh, s', a')}_{\text{value of matching with a p sector job only}} + \underbrace{f(\theta_{np})(1 - f(\theta_p))W_{np}(\mu'; wh, s', a')}_{\text{value of matching with a np sector job only}} \\
&\quad + \underbrace{f(\theta_p)f(\theta_{np})\max\{W_p(\mu'; wh, s', a'), W_{np}(\mu'; wh, s', a')\}}_{\text{value of matching with both np and p sector jobs}} \\
&\quad + \underbrace{(1 - f(\theta_p))(1 - f(\theta_{np}))U^N(\mu'; wh, s', a')}_{\text{value of continuing unemployed}}
\end{aligned} \tag{15}$$

Thus, the problem faced by an ineligible worker is analogous to that faced by an eligible worker, except that they don't receive unemployment benefits.

## 2.5 Firms

There are a large number of  $p$  and  $np$  firms that post vacancies after paying the vacancy posting costs. The firms are risk-neutral and discount their future profits using the equilibrium real interest rate.

### 2.5.1 Vacant $np$ firm

Vacant  $np$  firms pay a cost of  $\kappa_{np}$  and search among all unemployed workers irrespective of their race. These firms match with an unemployed worker with probability  $q(\theta_{np})$ . Equation (16) describes the value of a vacant  $np$  firm,  $V_{np}$ .

$$\begin{aligned}
V_{np} = & -\kappa_{np} + \left( \frac{q(\theta_{np})}{1+r} \right) \int_a \left\{ \sum_{s'} \pi_{ss'} \left[ \underbrace{J_{np}(bl, s', a') \frac{\phi_u(bl, s, a)}{u}}_{\text{value of matching with a type (s,a) black worker}} \right] \right. \\
& + \sum_{s'} \pi_{ss'} \left[ \underbrace{\mathbb{1}_{\{W_{np}(\mu'; wh, s', a') \geq W_p(\mu'; wh, s', a')\}}}_{\text{np provides higher value than a p firm}} \left( \underbrace{J_{np}(wh, s', a') \frac{\phi_u(wh, s, a)}{u}}_{\text{value of matching with (s,a) white worker}} \right) \right. \\
& \left. \left. + \underbrace{\mathbb{1}_{\{W_{np}(\mu'; wh, s', a') < W_p(\mu'; wh, s', a')\}}}_{\text{p provides higher value than a np firm}} \left( \underbrace{J_{np}(wh, s', a') \frac{\phi_u(wh, s, a)}{u}}_{\text{value of matching (s,a) worker without competing p offer}} \right) (1 - f(\theta_p)) \right] \right\} da,
\end{aligned} \tag{16}$$

The firm's expected value of matching with a worker depends on the probability of matching with a specific worker of type  $(R, s, a)$  and the operating value,  $J_{np}(R, s, a)$ . A  $np$  firm can match with either a black or a white worker from the current unemployment pool.  $\phi_u(bl, s, a)$  is the mass of unemployed black workers with productivity  $s$  and asset  $a$ , while  $\phi_u(wh, s, a)$  is the corresponding mass of white workers. Thus,  $\phi_u(bl, s, a)/u$  and  $\phi_u(wh, s, a)/u$  are the densities of the unemployed black and white workers over  $s$  and  $a$ . These reflect the probabilities that a vacant  $np$  firm gets matched with an unemployed worker

of type  $(R, s, a)$ . Since the white unemployed workers can potentially receive a competing offer from a  $p$  firm, the white worker will accept the  $np$  match and begin producing only if it gives them a higher value or if the worker did not receive a  $p$  firm offer. The last two rows of Equation (16) reflect the cases that a white worker will produce with the  $np$  firm.

### 2.5.2 Vacant $p$ firm

Vacant  $p$  firms pay a posting cost of  $\kappa_p$  and restrict their search to unemployed white workers. The probability of matching with a white unemployed worker is  $q(\theta_p)$ . Equation (17) describe the value of maintaining a  $p$  vacancy,  $V_p$ .

$$\begin{aligned}
V_p = & -\kappa_p + \left( \frac{q(\theta_p)}{1+r} \right) \sum_{s'} \pi_{ss'} \int_a \left[ \underbrace{\mathbb{1}_{\{W_p(\mu'; wh, s', a') > W_{np}(\mu'; wh, s', a')\}} \left( J_p(wh, s', a') \frac{\phi_u(wh, s, a)}{u_{wh}} \right)}_{\text{value of matching with (s,a) white worker, } p \text{ offers higher value than a } np \text{ firm}} \right. \\
& + \underbrace{\mathbb{1}_{\{W_p(\mu'; wh, s', a') \leq W_{np}(\mu'; wh, s', a')\}} \left( J_p(wh, s', a') \frac{\phi_u(wh, s, a)}{u_{wh}} \right) (1 - f(\theta_{np}))}_{\text{value of matching with (s,a) white worker without competing } np \text{ offer}} \left. \right] da
\end{aligned} \tag{17}$$

Since the vacant  $p$  firm searches only among white workers, the probability of matching with an unemployed white worker having productivity  $s$  and asset  $a$  is given by  $\phi_u(wh, s, a)/u_{wh}$ . Like the case of  $np$  firms, the white worker accepts the  $p$  match only if the  $p$  offer is more favorable or if they don't receive a competing  $np$  offer.

We assume that there is free entry of firms, and hence both  $p$  and  $np$  firms post vacancies until  $V_p = 0$  and  $V_{np} = 0$ , respectively.

### 2.5.3 Producing $np$ firm

The value of a producing  $np$  firm is described by Equation (18).  $j(\mu; R, s, a)$  describes the period profit. The worker's productivity  $s$  enters the production function. The matched firm produces  $sf(k)$  units of output, pays the rental and the depreciation cost of capital,  $(r + \delta)k$ , and the wage cost,  $\omega_{np}(\mu; R, s, a)$ .



$$J_{np}(\mu; R, s, a) = \max_k \left\{ j(\mu; R, s, a) + \left( \frac{1 - \lambda^{np}}{1 + r} \right) \sum_{s'} \pi_{ss'} [(1 - \epsilon_R) J_{np}(\mu'; R, s', a') + \epsilon_R J_{np}(\mu'; R, s', 0)] \right\}$$

where

$$j(\mu; R, s, a) = sf(k) - (r + \delta)k - \omega_{np}(\mu; R, s, a). \quad (18)$$

The firm discounts its future value using the interest rate adjusted for the job destruction rate  $\lambda_{np}$ . Since the worker may experience an extreme wealth shock with probability  $\epsilon_R$ , it changes the wage bargaining position of the worker to the firm. The future value of the firm incorporates this probability.

## 2.6 Producing $p$ firm

Similar to a producing  $np$  firm, Equation (19) describes a producing  $p$  firm. The firm hires capital and discounts future profit accounting for the job destruction rate  $\lambda_p$  and the worker's extreme wealth shock  $\epsilon_{wh}$ .

$$J_p(\mu; wh, s, a) = \max_k \left\{ j(\mu; wh, s, a) + \left( \frac{1 - \lambda^p}{1 + r} \right) \sum_{s'} \pi_{ss'} [(1 - \epsilon_{wh}) J_p(\mu'; wh, s', a') + \epsilon_{wh} J_p(\mu'; wh, s', 0)] \right\}$$

where

$$j(\mu; wh, s, a) = sf(k) - (r + \delta)k - \omega_p(\mu; wh, s, a). \quad (19)$$

## 2.7 Wage bargaining

In each period, matched worker-firm pairs bargain for wages over the matched surplus. A worker has their matched surplus as  $(W_i(\mu; R, s, a) - U_i^I(\mu; R, s, a))$  and a firm has its matched surplus as  $J_i(\mu; R, s, a)$ , where  $i$  denotes  $np$  or  $p$ . The worker's bargaining power  $\xi_R$  depends on the race of the individual, and the firm's bargaining power is  $1 - \xi_R$ . The resulting wage

for workers at  $p$  and  $np$  firms are given by Equation (20) and Equation (21), respectively.

$$\omega_{np}(\mu; R, s, a) = \arg \max_{\omega_{np}} \left( W_{np}(\mu; R, s, a) - U_{np}^I(\mu; R, s, a) \right)^{\xi_R} J_{np}(\mu; Ra, s, a)^{1-\xi_R} \quad (20)$$

$$\omega_p(\mu; wh, s, a) = \arg \max_{\omega_p} \left( W_p(\mu; wh, s, a) - U_p^I(\mu; wh, s, a) \right)^{\xi_{wh}} J_p(\mu; wh, s, a)^{1-\xi_{wh}} \quad (21)$$

We define the stationary equilibrium in Appendix A.

### 3 Calibration

A period in the model represents a quarter. We calibrate the baseline model to match the relevant U.S. economy moments. We have two sets of parameters. The first group of parameters is chosen externally based on literature and empirical evidence without using model-generated data, while the second group of parameters is calibrated internally by simulating our model to match a set of relevant data moments. We set the share of black workers to be 19.1% in the model, with the remaining being white workers. Table 1 shows the internally calibrated parameter values and their targeted moments, as well as the externally chosen parameters and their sources.

#### 3.1 Preferences

We set the period utility function  $u(c)$  to be  $\log(c)$ . The discount factor,  $\beta$ , is calibrated to match the quarterly capital-output ratio of 10.26, the value used by a number of studies including Den Haan, Judd, and Juillard (2010) and Carroll, Slacalek, Tokunaka, and White (2017). The resulting value of  $\beta$  is 0.9943, and the corresponding quarterly real interest rate is 1.3%.

Table 1: Calibration and targeted statistics

Parameter	Value	Description	Target statistics	data	model
<i>Chosen internally</i>					
$\beta$	0.9943	discount factor	K/Y	10.26	10.26
$\iota$	1.3012	matching elasticity	job finding rate - black	0.4946	0.4946
$\kappa_p$	4.2622	p sector vacancy posting cost	job finding rate - white	0.6599	0.6599
$\kappa_{np}$	2.7350	np sector vacancy posting cost	market tightness	1	1
$\lambda_{np}$	0.0644	np sector job destruction shock	job separation rate - black	0.0644	0.0644
$\lambda_p$	0.0268	p sector job destruction shock	job separation rate - white	0.0380	0.0380
$\xi_{bl}$	0.1397	bargaining power - black	mean wage ratio	0.75	0.75
$\xi_{wh}$	0.2110	bargaining power - white	firm profit share	0.033	0.033
$\epsilon_{bl}$	0.0179	extreme wealth shock - black	zero wealth share - black	0.18	0.18
$\epsilon_{wh}$	0.0086	extreme wealth shock - white	zero wealth share - white	0.07	0.07
<i>Chosen externally</i>					
$\alpha$	0.6600	elasticity of labor matching	Nakajima (2012)		
$\theta_n$	0.2890	capital share of output	Nakajima (2012)		
$\delta$	0.0150	quarterly depreciation rate	Nakajima (2012)		
$\rho_s$	0.9411	persistence of idiosyncratic shock	PSID		
$\sigma_s$	0.1680	standard deviation of idiosyncratic shock	PSID		
$h$	0.4000	UI replacement rate	Mitman and Rabinovich (2015)		
$\xi$	0.8433	maximum UI coverage	Setty and Yedid-Levi (2021) 48% median wage		
$Pe$	0.5385	probability of UI eligibility	maximum weeks of eligibility		

Notes: This table reports the parameters, their values, and descriptions. The top panel presents the parameters chosen internally by minimizing the distance between model generated moments and data. The last two columns of the top panel compare the targeted moments in the data and in the model simulations. The bottom panel reports the parameters chosen externally, their values, and description.

### 3.2 Production

The worker-firm match produces according to a Cobb-Douglas production function,  $f(k) = k^\alpha$ . We choose  $\alpha$  to be 0.289 and set the quarterly capital depreciation rate  $\delta$  equal to 0.015 following Nakajima (2012).

### 3.3 Productivity and wealth shocks

We use hourly real wage from the Panel Study of Income Dynamics (PSID) to estimate the persistence,  $\rho_s$ , and the standard deviation,  $\sigma_s$  of the productivity process. Our estimation strategy closely follows Setty and Yedid-Levi (2021). We run a standard Mincer wage regression of log wage on the demographic controls, including education, labor market experience, race, marital status, year, and state fixed effects for a sample of males aged 25 years and above. We then use the obtained residuals to estimate an AR(1) regression by utilizing the panel dimension of the PSID data. The estimated regression is at a biennial frequency, given that the PSID data is available once in two years. We assign the quarterly adjusted coefficient of the AR(1) regression as the persistence of the idiosyncratic productivity process. The standard deviation of the productivity process corresponds to the standard deviation of the residuals from the AR(1) regression after adjusting for the model frequency. We estimate the quarterly persistence,  $\rho_s$ , to be 0.9411 and the corresponding standard deviation,  $\sigma_s$ , as equal to 0.1680.

Following Mukoyama (2010), our model also features extreme wealth shocks to capture the mass of people having zero wealth. The race-specific probability of losing one's wealth,  $\epsilon_R$ , is calibrated to be 0.0179 for black workers and 0.0086 for white workers. They capture the empirical moments that around 18% of black workers and 7% white workers have zero wealth. (Nakajima, 2021).

### 3.4 Unemployment insurance

The unemployment insurance system in our model is characterized by the replacement rate,  $h$ , maximum insurance payout,  $\chi$ , and the probability of maintaining the eligibility status,  $P_e$ . We choose the replacement rate,  $h$ , to be 0.4 along the lines of Shimer (2005), Mitman and Rabinovich (2015), and others. Following Setty and Yedid-Levi (2021), we calibrate the maximum payout  $\chi$  to be 0.8433, which amounts to 48% of the median wage in the model. The eligibility probability  $P_e$  is chosen to be 0.5385 to generate an average unemployment benefit duration of 26 weeks, as in Mitman and Rabinovich (2015).

### 3.5 Labor search and wage bargain

The labor market turnover statistics are obtained from Cajner et al. (2017). The elasticity of the matching function,  $\iota$ , targets the job finding rate of the black workers, and our calibrated value of 1.3012 is close to that of 1.25 in Den Haan et al. (2000) and Petrosky-Nadeau et al. (2018). We choose firm-type specific job separation rates  $\lambda_{np}$  and  $\lambda_p$  to match the separation rates of black and white workers respectively. The ensuing values for  $\lambda_{np}$  and  $\lambda_p$  are 0.0644 and 0.0268, respectively.<sup>5</sup> The vacancy posting cost of prejudiced firms,  $\kappa_p$ , is chosen to match the job finding rate of white workers, while the posting cost of non-prejudiced firms,  $\kappa_{np}$ , is chosen to target the aggregate labor market tightness,  $\theta$ , to be 1 following Wolcott (2021).<sup>6</sup> We find that the prejudiced firms pay a lot more than non-prejudiced firms to post their vacancies, with  $\kappa_p$  calibrated to be 4.2622, compared to  $\kappa_{np}$  taking a value of 2.735. The bargaining power of black workers,  $\xi_{bl}$ , is calibrated to target the average black-white racial wage ratio of 0.75 (Derenoncourt and Montialoux, 2021). The white worker's bargaining power,  $\xi_{wh}$ , is chosen to generate the average firm profit share of 3.3% as in Nakajima (2012). Consistent with our expectations, we find that the black workers have a

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<sup>5</sup>All the black workers work only with  $np$  firms, and hence  $\lambda_{np}$  is exactly equal to the job separation rate of the black workers. On the other hand, white workers work in both  $p$  and  $np$  firms, and hence  $\lambda_p$  (0.0268) is smaller than the aggregate separation rate of the white workers (0.0380).

<sup>6</sup>Aggregate labor market tightness  $\theta = \frac{v_{np} + v_p}{u_{bl} + u_{wh}}$ .




Figure 1: Labor Income and Wealth Distribution

*Note:* This figure compares the steady state model generated distributions of wealth and labor income with their empirical analogs. The empirical labor income and wealth distributions are estimated from the 2007 American Community Survey (ACS) and the 2007 Survey of Consumer Finance (SCF), respectively.

lower bargaining power compared to the white workers, with  $\xi_{bl}$  to be 0.1397 and  $\xi_{wh}$  to be 0.211.

### 3.6 Assessing the model as a quantitative theory of racial disparity

Our calibration successfully captures the racial gaps along three important dimensions: income, wealth, and labor market outcomes. We now discuss each of these dimensions in more detail before proceeding with the quantitative exercises examining the macroeconomic impact of racial discrimination.

First, the model successfully captures the overall household distribution of wealth and labor earnings as shown in Figure 1, even though we don't target these distributions explicitly. As with the majority of incomplete market models, we also face difficulty in generating the extreme concentration of wealth and labor income in the top quintile. On the other hand, we are much closer to the empirical distributions in the lower quintiles since we target the share of zero-wealth workers in our calibration.

Second, the model is able to capture the disparities in unemployment, labor income, and wealth between black and white workers. As targeted in the calibration, the model replicates

Table 2: Steady State Racial Inequality

Moments	Data	Model
Unemp rate (Black)	0.12	0.12
Unemp rate (White)	0.05	0.05
Mean wealth ratio	0.23	0.28
Median wealth ratio	0.17	0.33

*Note:* This table compares the steady state wealth and unemployment moments between black and white workers with the corresponding empirical data.

the empirical racial labor income gap and the empirical racial difference in the share of people at zero wealth. In addition to the targeted moments, Table 2 demonstrates that our model successfully captures the untargeted employment and wealth moments. Specifically, our model reproduces the 5% unemployment rate among white workers compared to 12% among black workers. Apart from the lower separation rate, white workers have a lower unemployment rate due to their access to the prejudiced sector. Our model results show that the  $p$  sector with the equilibrium market tightness of 0.4, though smaller than the  $np$  market tightness of 0.73, provides an important advantage for white workers by increasing their job-finding rate compared to black workers. On the wealth dimension, without targeting, the model generates a mean black-white wealth ratio of 0.28, close to 0.23 as in Kaplan, Violante, and Weidner (2014). However, the model understates the median wealth gap between black and white workers. The median black worker holds 33% of the wealth of the median white worker in our model compared to 17% in the data (Kaplan et al., 2014).

In sum, the model captures the racial inequalities across labor income, wealth, and unemployment outcomes. We next explore how racial discrimination in hiring contributes to these differences.

## 4 Steady state results

In this section, we first establish how a search framework sustains hiring discrimination in equilibrium. Then, we examine the steady-state impact of racial discrimination by com-

paring the benchmark economy to an alternative economy without hiring discrimination. Lastly, we explore the heterogeneous welfare implications associated with eliminating hiring discrimination.

## 4.1 Sustaining racial discrimination

The labor search-and-matching framework allows firms to earn profit from the surplus generated by the search frictions. This feature permits prejudiced and non-prejudiced firms to coexist in a competitive equilibrium. It contrasts with a frictionless canonical neoclassical model where prejudiced hiring will be driven out by competition if there is no inherent difference between black and white workers as described in Becker (1957). In particular, our benchmark model has  $p$  firms retaining a profit of 0.04 while  $np$  firms retain a profit of 0.03 in the steady state (see Column 1 of Table 3).

Next, we examine the steady-state interplay between discriminatory and non-discriminatory firms. Since discriminatory hiring remains profitable in the benchmark equilibrium, we gradually increase penalties by raising the vacancy posting costs for discriminatory firms until they are no longer profitable. Figure 2 displays the dynamics of employment, vacancy, and profits of the prejudiced and non-prejudiced firms. As  $\kappa_p$  rises,  $p$  firms become increasingly disadvantaged, gradually losing their profits, vacancy postings, and employment. Conversely, with fewer  $p$  firms competing in the market,  $np$  firms see a steady increase in profits, vacancy postings, and employment.

It is worth noting that the dynamics of  $p$  and  $np$  firms are not symmetric, given the differences in vacancy posting cost and job destruction rates. As  $p$  firms' profit declines, the profit of  $np$  firms increases at a slower rate. Additionally, as  $np$  firms replace  $p$  firms, they recruit from both black and white workers, rather than only white workers displaced from  $p$  firms. This is mainly reflected in  $np$  firms' more elastic vacancy posting response.

In the limit, as  $\kappa_p$  approaches the total expected value of the  $p$  sector, discriminatory ( $p$ ) firms almost completely exit the market, since posting vacancies exclusively for white workers






Figure 2: Penalizing discrimination

*Note:* This figure displays the dynamics between  $p$  and  $np$  firms as  $\kappa_p$  increases. The top panel plots the change in profit, the middle panel plots the change in vacancy posting, and the bottom panel plots the change in employment. The red dotted line depicts the dynamics of  $p$  firms, the blue solid line depicts the dynamics of  $np$  firms, and the gray dotted line depicts the limit where no  $p$  firm exists. The horizontal axes record the values of  $\kappa_p$  from the benchmark  $\kappa_p$  at 4.2622 to 217% of the benchmark value, at 9.2444. The vertical axes record the model-generated value of each variable.

becomes unprofitable. The value of  $\kappa_p$  at which  $p$  firms exit is 217% of the benchmark value of 4.26. Meanwhile, non-discriminatory ( $np$ ) firms become nearly the sole employers in the economy. The gray dotted lines in Figure 2 illustrate a counterfactual steady state where we entirely remove  $p$  firms from the benchmark model. Thus, increasing  $\kappa_p$  in the limit asymptotically equals the alternative of completely eliminating  $p$  firms.

## 4.2 Impact of hiring discrimination on racial inequality

In this subsection, we compare the benchmark economy to one without prejudiced firms to illustrate the aggregate and distributional impact of discriminatory hiring. Table 3 presents the comparisons. All firms in the counterfactual models provide equal hiring opportunities to black and white workers. Column 2 removes the  $p$  firms from the model, which leaves

all workers with equal job destruction shocks at the benchmark  $\lambda_{np}$ . In Column 3, we recalibrate the job destruction shocks to race-specific and have  $\lambda_{wh}$  and  $\lambda_{bl}$  as race-specific job separation rates.<sup>7</sup> Re-assigning the job separation rates further isolates the impact of job destruction.

The first panel shows the changes in racial employment, wage, and wealth disparities after removing prejudiced hiring. The first two rows describe the job separation rates. By construction, Column 2 equalizes job separation rates by race, while Column 3 retains the difference as the benchmark. The next two rows describe the job-finding rates. Since there is no  $p$  sector in the economy in Columns 2 and 3, the job-finding rates are equalized for black and white workers. White workers only have one sector for employment. Hence, their job-finding rate reduces. Black workers have more job opportunities as the  $np$  sector posts more vacancies; hence, their job-finding rate increases. Comparing Columns 2 and 3, the much lower job destruction rate for white workers in Column 3 results in fewer workers searching for jobs, which leads to higher job-finding rates than in Column 2. Altogether, it reduces the racial gap in the unemployment rate. In Column 2, the racial unemployment rate gap completely closes as job turnover equalizes. In Column 3, the unemployment rate gap closes from 7% to 3% because of the remaining racial difference in  $\lambda$ .

Turning to the wage impact, black workers can bargain for a higher wage rate as they receive more job opportunities when we remove discriminatory hiring. White workers, however, no longer have access to the exclusive  $p$  sector; their outside options are lower during bargaining, thus driving down their wage rate. As a result, the average black-to-white wage ratio increases from 75% in benchmark to 88% in Column 2 and to 86% in Column 3. We conclude that removing discriminatory hiring closes 52% (Column 2) to 44% (Column 3) of the average wage gap between black and white workers.

Additionally, removing discriminatory hiring reduces the wealth gap, with the mean

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<sup>7</sup>In the benchmark economy, we structure firm-specific job destruction shocks ( $\lambda_{np}$  and  $\lambda_p$ ) to match race-specific job separation rates. This counterfactual economy only has one type of firm. We assign  $\lambda_{wh}$  to be 0.038 and  $\lambda_{bl}$  to be 0.0644 to keep black and white workers' job separation rates as in the calibration.

Table 3: Impact of hiring discrimination

Moments	Benchmark	Eliminate $p$ firms	Race specific $\lambda$
<i>Households</i>			
job separation rate - black	0.06	0.06	0.06
job separation rate - white	0.04	0.06	0.04
job finding rate - black	0.50	0.59	0.62
job finding rate - white	0.66	0.59	0.62
unemp rate - black	0.12	0.10	0.09
unemp rate - white	0.05	0.10	0.06
mean wage - black	1.60	1.96	1.82
mean wage - white	2.13	2.22	2.11
mean wage ratio	0.75	0.88	0.86
mean wealth ratio	0.28	0.33	0.33
median wealth ratio	0.33	0.44	0.44
<i>Firms</i>			
$p$ firm profit	0.04	-	-
$np$ firm profit	0.03	0.06	0.06
$p$ firm vacancy	0.02	-	-
$np$ firm vacancy	0.05	0.10	0.07
$p$ firm employment	0.54	-	-
$np$ firm employment	0.40	0.90	0.94
<i>Labor Market</i>			
$p$ market tightness	0.40	-	-
$np$ market tightness	0.73	1.02	1.12
<i>Aggregate Outcomes</i>			
Y	3.06	2.95	3.06
K/Y	10.26	10.22	10.25
average wage	2.04	1.96	2.05
unemp rate	0.07	0.10	0.06

*Note:* This table compares the benchmark steady state with a counterfactual steady state without  $p$  firms. In the counterfactual model, all firms provide equal hiring opportunities to black and white workers and keep race-specific job destruction shock. All other parameters stay the same as benchmark calibration.

wealth ratio moving from 0.28 to 0.33 and the median wealth ratio increasing from 0.33 to 0.44. The result remains stable between Columns 2 and 3. We infer that discriminatory hiring explains about 7% of the mean wealth gap and 16% of the median wealth gap.

The remaining gaps in wage and wealth come from the bargaining power and extreme wealth shock disparities between black and white workers.<sup>8</sup>

The second panel displays the changes in firm attributes. We loosely refer to the one-sector economy without discriminatory hiring as  $np$  firms, though the Column 3 specification differs from the benchmark  $np$  firms in their job destruction shock. Without discriminatory firms,  $np$  firms' profit doubles, vacancy posting, and employment level increase. These changes result in the aforementioned advantages for black workers in the counterfactual economies. In Column 3, white workers' lower job destruction shock drives up the overall  $np$  employment and reduces vacancy postings compared to Column 2.

The third panel of Table 3 displays the labor market conditions. In response to the  $p$  firms exiting, more  $np$  firms endogenously enter the market. The labor market tightness of the  $np$  sector,  $\theta_{np}$ , jumps from 0.73 in the benchmark to 1.02 in the equilibrium without  $p$  firms and 1.12 when we split  $\lambda$  by race. The ensuing market tightness is higher than the benchmark aggregate market tightness of 1.

The last panel of Table 3 describes the aggregate outcomes. With more  $np$  firms entering, the aggregate output stays relatively unchanged in Column 3. The capital-output ratio slightly decreases to 10.25. The economy-wide average wage increases to 2.05 from benchmark 2.04, and the aggregate unemployment rate decreases to 6%. However, Column 2 experiences a more significant reduction in output, average wage, and higher unemployment rate due to the overall higher job destruction shock that requires firms to frequently pay for vacancy posting costs rather than a resource for production.

Our results show that the presence of discriminatory firms can explain sizable fractions of income and wealth inequality. Penalizing prejudiced firms primarily improves the employ-

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<sup>8</sup>Though not the primary purpose of this paper, we present the results after removing racial differences in bargaining power and extreme wealth shock in Appendix B.

ment opportunities and wage outcomes for the black workers; it also worsens the situation for the white workers. Removing  $p$  firms reduces the job-finding rate and, hence, the unemployment rate for white workers. In addition, they also lower the value of their outside option in wage bargaining, which, in turn, affects their income and wealth outcomes. To quantify the differential effects of removing discriminatory hiring, we next calculate the welfare changes experienced by the black and the white workers.

### 4.3 Welfare analysis

We follow Krusell, Mukoyama, and Şahin (2010) in measuring the welfare change for black and white workers by calculating the change in average consumption equivalence after removing discriminatory hiring.<sup>9</sup> We present the average welfare change between black and white workers by productivity types and by wealth quintiles in Table 4.

Overall, the economy experiences a 5.8% reduction in average welfare if we eliminate  $p$  firms and a 1.17% increase in average welfare if we separate the job destruction shocks by race. Once we remove discriminatory hiring, black workers experience an average welfare increase of between 6.89% and 10.94%. This is because of the rise in their job opportunities and higher wage rates. On the other hand, white workers encounter an average welfare loss of between 1.14% and 8.83%. This is because of the decrease in their wage rate and the increase in the unemployment rate.

Mid-panels in Table 4 present the heterogeneous welfare change for black and white workers by productivity types. Though the welfare reduction of eliminating prejudiced firms

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<sup>9</sup>Under the benchmark model, let  $V(e, R, s, a) = E_0 \sum_{t=0}^{\infty} \beta^t \log(c_t)$  be the maximal value of the individual with employment status  $e$ , race  $R$ , productivity  $s$ , and asset  $a$ . Under an alternate economy, let  $\tilde{V}(e, R, s, a) = E_0 \sum_{t=0}^{\infty} \beta^t \log(\tilde{c}_t)$  be the maximal value of individuals with each corresponding state. We examine the welfare change between the two economies through consumption equivalence  $\Omega$ , following the equation:  $E_0 \sum_{t=0}^{\infty} \beta^t \log((1 + \Omega)c_t) = E_0 \sum_{t=0}^{\infty} \beta^t \log(\tilde{c}_t)$ . With log utility, we derive  $\Omega = \exp((\tilde{V} - V)(1 - \beta)) - 1$ . We aggregate the individual-level consumption equivalence,  $\Omega$ s, using the distribution of the counterfactual economy to calculate the average welfare change. We aggregate over the counterfactual distribution rather than benchmark distribution because eliminating  $p$  firms in the model removes the distribution of white workers associated with the states of working at and unemployment from  $p$  firms. Aggregating over the benchmark distribution overstates the welfare change for white workers without accounting for the distribution shift.

is similar across productivity for white workers, the most considerable loss is for the lowest productive white workers at 9.03% when we remove  $p$  firms. In comparison, the highest productive workers lose the most at 1.19% when further adjusting the job destruction rate by race. In comparison, the most productive black workers have the highest welfare gain at 7.41% and 11.49% across the two counterfactual models.

Table 4: Heterogeneous welfare change

Average welfare gain (%)	Eliminate $p$ firms		Race specific $\lambda$	
Overall	-5.83		1.17	
	Black	White	Black	White
	6.89	-8.83	10.94	-1.14
	<i>by productivity</i>			
Low	6.30	-9.03	10.31	-1.07
Mid	6.92	-8.83	10.98	-1.14
High	7.41	-8.61	11.49	-1.19
	<i>by wealth</i>			
Low 20%	6.85	-9.43	10.98	-1.13
40-60%	6.95	-8.95	10.94	-1.17
Top 20%	6.88	-8.14	10.72	-1.09

*Note:* This table compares the average consumption equivalence change from the benchmark steady state to the equilibrium where we eliminate  $p$  firms (Columns 1 and 2) and further adjust the job destruction shock to be race-specific (Columns 3 and 4). Low, mid, and high productivity corresponds to the lowest, middle, and highest value of idiosyncratic productivity  $s$ . The wealth quintiles are based on benchmark steady-state wealth distribution.

The bottom panels of Table 4 present the welfare change by wealth quintiles for black and white workers. Removing discriminatory firms benefits the mid-quintile black workers the most, at 6.95%, and the lowest-quintile black workers the most, at 10.98%, after adjusting the job destruction shocks by race. The most considerable reduction in welfare (9.43%) happens for the lowest quintile white workers in the model removing  $p$  firms and for mid-quintile white workers at 1.17% after adjusting for race-specific job destruction rate.

## 5 Business cycle dynamics

In this section, we first document the racial disparities over the business cycle. Then, we introduce aggregate uncertainty in our baseline model to quantify the role of hiring discrimination in generating disparate dynamics in the business cycle. Lastly, we discuss the welfare implications of hiring discrimination over the business cycle.

### 5.1 Racial disparities over the business cycles

Table 5 summarizes the business cycle disparities in the labor market between black and white workers. The top panel presents the dynamics of the racial unemployment rate gap, and the bottom panel presents the dynamics of the average wage. Cyclicalities are measured by the correlation between the variable and real GDP. Volatility is calculated by the standard deviations of the variable relative to the standard deviation of real GDP.

**Unemployment rate:** We use monthly data from the Current Population Survey (CPS) from 1996 to 2014 to calculate the black-to-white unemployment rate difference. We then log the values and apply the HP filter with a smoothing parameter 1600 to extract cyclical components. We find that the racial unemployment rate gap is countercyclical, widening during recessions and narrowing during expansions. It has a relative volatility of 9.71.

Table 5: Business cycle statistics, US data, 1996-2014

	Cyclicalities	Volatility
<i>Unemployment rate</i>		
Black-White gap	-0.6255	9.7100
<i>Average wage</i>		
Black	2.6041	2.5352
White	1.2729	2.0848

*Note:* This table provides business cycle statistics for the US. The unemployment rate was obtained from the Current Population Survey (CPS) from 1996 to 2014. Average wage statistics are constructed from the Panel Study of Income Dynamics (PSID) of the same period. All variables are logged and HP filtered with a smoothing parameter of 1600.

**Wage:** We rely on the individual data in PSID from 1996 to 2014 to construct a wage panel to calculate the cyclical properties of the average wage. This is because of the composition change of workers over the business cycles. Using aggregate wage data underestimates its cyclical properties (Stockman, 1983; Bils, 1985; Solon, Barsky, and Parker, 1994). For the same reason, we report the cyclical properties of the average wages for black and white workers separately rather than calculating the cyclical properties for a wage differential index. The wage cyclical property is calculated through a wage regression as the percentage change of average wage when real GDP increases by one percent after controlling for demographics. The wage volatility is calculated by the relative standard deviations of the year-to-year change in wage from the wage regression.<sup>10</sup> We find that wages for black workers are twice as cyclical as wages for white workers once we control for demographics. Black workers' average wage is more volatile (2.54) than white workers (2.08).

## 5.2 Augmented model with aggregate shocks

We introduce an aggregate total factor productivity (TFP) shock  $z$  to the baseline steady-state model from Section 2. The TFP shock follows an AR(1) process,  $\log(z') = \rho_z \log(z) + \epsilon_z$ , with  $\epsilon_z \stackrel{iid}{\sim} N(0, \sigma_z^2)$ . The output of the matched firm-worker pairs depends on the realizations of both aggregate and idiosyncratic productivity shocks and is given by  $zsf(k)$ .

With the introduction of aggregate shocks, the state space expands to include aggregate states  $(z, \mu)$ , where  $\mu$  is the distribution of workers across employment status ( $e$ ), race ( $R$ ), idiosyncratic productivity ( $s$ ), and asset ( $a$ ). The next period's aggregate distribution  $\mu'$  is determined by  $(z, \mu)$ , and the law of motion is given by  $\mu' = \Gamma(z, \mu)$ .

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<sup>10</sup>We conduct wage regression by regressing the change in individual log wage on the change in log GDP, after controlling for demographic factors. Specifically, we follow Bils (1985), Solon et al. (1994), and Devereux (2001) and run the regression:

$$\Delta \log w_{it} = \alpha + \beta \Delta \log Y_t + \gamma x_{it} + \nu_t + v_s + \epsilon_{it} \quad (22)$$

where  $Y_t$  refers to real GDP. Demographic variables  $x_{it}$  include gender, education, labor market experience, and marital status. We also include year fixed effects,  $\nu_t$ , and state fixed effects,  $v_s$ . We measure cyclical property using coefficient  $\beta$  from the regression. The volatility is the standard deviation of the year fixed effects,  $\nu_t$ . We then adjust the estimation to quarterly frequency.



We follow Cooley, Prescott, et al. (1995) and Boppart, Krusell, and Mitman (2018) and choose the persistence parameter  $\rho_z$  to be 0.95, while the standard deviation  $\sigma_z$  is set to 0.015. All other parameters stay the same as in Table 1. This gives us an aggregate output volatility of 0.02 and a first-order auto-correlation of 0.73.

We obtain the stochastic equilibrium of our model by using the sequence space method of Boppart et al. (2018). We first solve non-linearly for the perfect foresight transitions to a single small MIT shock, i.e., an unexpected shock to the aggregate TFP. We then use the solved impulse responses as the numerical derivatives with respect to the initial TFP shock. Using these derivatives, we simulate the stochastic equilibrium by generating the TFP realizations and calculating the corresponding model moments over the business cycle as a linear combination of the impulse response and the TFP realizations.<sup>11</sup>

Table 6: Business cycle model vs data

	Cyclicalilty		Volatility	
	Data	Model	Data	Model
<i>Unemployment rate</i>				
Black-White gap	-0.6255	-0.6731	9.7100	0.3009
<i>Average wage</i>				
Black	2.6041	1.0749	2.5352	1.0755
White	1.2729	0.9984	2.0848	0.9985

*Note:* This table compares the data moments and the benchmark generated moments on the black-white unemployment and wage gaps over the business cycles.

Table 6 compares data and model moments on unemployment and wages. Similar to standard search models, the stochastic dynamics of our model are under the influence of the Shimer Puzzle (Shimer, 2005). The augmented benchmark model generates similar cyclicalilty in the unemployment rate gap as data but much less volatility in the unemployment rate gap. Regarding the average wage, the model has lower cyclicalilty for both black and white workers and less pronounced differences in volatility. However, qualitatively, we have

<sup>11</sup>This method hinges on the assumption that the business cycle dynamics can be well approximated as a linear system. In Appendix C, we demonstrate the validity of this assumption by establishing the symmetry of the impulse responses to 1% positive and negative TFP shocks.

a higher wage cyclical and volatility for black workers than for white workers.

### 5.3 Impact of hiring discrimination over business cycle

We compare the benchmark dynamics with the counterfactual model without  $p$  firms and present the comparisons in Table 7. This allows us to examine the role of discriminatory hiring in creating racial disparities over the business cycle.<sup>12</sup>

The counterfactual equilibrium with no  $p$  firms does not have a racial unemployment rate gap; hence, its cyclical properties vanish. Moreover, the racial difference in the cyclical and volatility of the average wage both largely disappears. We conclude that hiring discrimination drives the labor market cyclical differences between black and white workers. This corresponds to Cajner et al. (2017) that demographic differentials alone cannot fully explain the observed differences in racial disparities over the business cycles.

Table 7: Impact of hiring discrimination on business cycle racial gaps

	Cyclical		Volatility	
	Baseline	No $p$ firms	Baseline	No $p$ firms
<i>Unemployment rate</i>				
Black-White gap	-0.6731	0.0000	0.3009	0.0000
<i>Average wage</i>				
Black	1.0749	1.0131	1.0755	1.0139
White	0.9984	1.0115	0.9985	1.0116
<i>Wealth ratio</i>				
Wealth ratio	0.2028	0.2054	0.1611	0.1466
<i>Consumption ratio</i>				
Consumption ratio	0.9717	0.9695	0.1861	0.1659

*Note:* The top panel compares the black-white unemployment rate, wage, consumption, and wealth gaps over the business cycles between the benchmark model and model without  $p$  firms.

We further examine the behaviors in the cyclical properties of the average black-to-white wealth ratio and the average black-to-white consumption ratio. Other than the cyclical

<sup>12</sup>As with Table 3, the counterfactual economy is a one-sector economy with only  $np$  firms. We do not further adjust race-specific destruction shocks.

of the average wealth ratio, the cyclical properties of the racial gaps in all other dimensions are reduced after discriminatory hiring is removed.

In summary, with the presence of  $p$  firms, black workers are relatively more affected during recessions compared to white workers, with a higher increase in their unemployment rate and a more considerable decline in their wages, consumption, and wealth.

## 5.4 Welfare disparities in business cycles

Lastly, we examine the business cycle welfare implications of removing hiring discrimination. We simulate the economy for 10,000 periods and compute the long-run average welfare for each individual type, following Cho and Ma (2023). The welfare measure is calculated as average consumption equivalence described in Section 4.3 over the simulation periods. We present the results in Table 8.

Table 8: Heterogeneous welfare change in business cycles

Average welfare gain (%)	Eliminate $p$ firms	
Overall	-0.01	
	Black	White
Average	0.02	-0.01
<i>by productivity</i>		
Low	0.00	-0.01
Mid	0.02	-0.01
High	0.02	-0.02
<i>by wealth</i>		
Low 20%	0.01	-0.01
40-60%	0.02	-0.02
Top 20%	0.03	-0.02

*Note:* This table compares the average consumption equivalence change from the benchmark model to the one without  $p$  firms in business cycles. We simulate the economy for 10,000 periods and calculate the long-run average welfare for each individual type. Low, mid, and high productivity corresponds to the lowest, middle, and highest value of idiosyncratic productivity  $s$ . The wealth quintiles are based on benchmark steady-state wealth distribution.

The economy experiences an average of 0.01% welfare decrease after removing prejudiced firms. This is much less than the welfare change in the steady state in Table 4, primarily

because workers are risk averse. All workers experience a decrease in unemployment rate volatility, and white workers experience an increase in wage volatility that somewhat counters the changes in other dimensions. Moreover, all black workers have a modicum increase in average welfare, compared to a minor decrease in white workers' welfare. Black workers gain 0.02% in average welfare compared to white workers losing 0.01%. High-productive white workers lose the most (0.02%). Black workers in the top 20% of the wealth distribution gain the most (0.03% on average), compared to top wealth white workers losing the most (0.02%).

## 6 Conclusion

This study examines the effects of racial hiring discrimination within a frictional labor market on employment, wage disparities, and wealth accumulation between black and white workers in the U.S. We develop a search-and-matching model incorporating firms with and without racial prejudices alongside race-specific pathways for wealth accumulation. Our findings reveal that racial discrimination in hiring significantly exacerbates wage, unemployment, and wealth gaps in steady state and business cycles. Moreover, discriminatory hiring disproportionately consigns black workers to the lower end of the wealth spectrum. Contrary to conventional discrimination theories, our analysis suggests that discriminatory hiring persists as an equilibrium outcome within frictional markets. Eliminating these discriminatory factors results in a decrease in overall welfare. Our findings shed light on the enduring nature of Black-White racial disparities in the U.S., offering insights into the interplay between discrimination, labor market dynamics, and wealth accumulation.

# Appendix A Stationary Equilibrium

A stationary equilibrium consists of

1. Value functions of workers  $\{W_{np}(\mu; R, s, a), W_p(\mu; wh, s, a), U_{np}^I(\mu; R, s, a), U_p^I(\mu; wh, s, a), U^N(\mu; R, s, a)\}$ , and firms  $\{V_{np}, V_p, J_{np}(\mu; R, s, a), J_p(\mu; wh, s, a)\}$
2. Corresponding asset policy functions of workers  $\{g_{np}(\mu; R, s, a), g_p(\mu; wh, s, a), g_{np}^I(\mu; R, s, a), g_p^I(\mu; wh, s, a), g^N(\mu; R, s, a)\}$ , along with the capital choice of producing firms  $\{k_{np}(\mu; R, s, a), k_p(\mu; wh, s, a)\}$  and vacancy choice of vacant firms  $\{v_{np}, v_p\}$
3. Wages  $\{\omega_{np}(\mu; R, s, a), \omega_p(\mu; wh, s, a)\}$
4. Aggregate interest rate and labor market tightness  $\{r, \theta_{np}, \theta_p\}$
5. Unemployment insurance tax rate  $\tau$
6. Dividends  $d$
7. Distribution over employment status ( $e$ ), race ( $R$ ), idiosyncratic productivity ( $s$ ), and wealth ( $a$ ), given by  $\mu(e, R, s, a)$

such that:

1.  $\{W_{np}(\mu; R, s, a), W_p(\mu; wh, s, a), U_{np}^I(\mu; R, s, a), U_p^I(\mu; wh, s, a), U^N(\mu; R, s, a)\}$  are the solutions to the worker's optimization problems (equations 2, 4, 6, 8, 10, 12, and 14), and  $\{g_{np}(\mu; R, s, a), g_p(\mu; wh, s, a), g_{np}^I(\mu; R, s, a), g_p^I(\mu; wh, s, a), g^N(\mu; R, s, a)\}$  are the associated optimal decision rules for asset choice.
2.  $\{J_{np}(\mu; R, s, a), J_p(\mu; wh, s, a)\}$  are the solutions to the producing firm's problems (equations 18 and 19), and the corresponding capital choice is given by  $\{k_{np}(\mu; R, s, a), k_p(\mu; wh, s, a)\}$ .
3. Free entry of vacant firms, i.e.,  $V_{np} = 0$  and  $V_p = 0$  determines the number of vacancies  $\{v_{np}, v_p\}$ , and hence labor market tightness  $\{\theta_{np}, \theta_p\}$ .

4. Aggregate demand for capital equals aggregate supply, which in turn determines the interest rate  $r$ .
5. Wages  $\{\omega_{np}(\mu; R, s, a), \omega_p(\mu; wh, s, a)\}$  are determined by Nash bargaining between the worker and the firm.
6. Unemployment insurance tax rate  $\tau$  solves to balance the government budget.
7. Dividend  $d$  is the total flow profits of producing firms, net of total posting costs of vacant firms.

$$d = -\kappa_p v_p - \kappa_{np} v_{np} + \int 1_{e=1,np} j_{np}(R, s, a) d\mu + \int 1_{e=1,p} j_p(wh, s, a) d\mu \quad (\text{A.1})$$

where  $j_{np}$  and  $j_p$  refer to the flow profits of  $np$  and  $p$  firms respectively.

$$\begin{aligned} j_{np}(\mu; R, s, a) &= sf(k_{np}) - (r + \delta)k_{np} - \omega_{np} \\ j_p(\mu; wh, s, a) &= sf(k_p) - (r + \delta)k_p - \omega_p \end{aligned} \quad (\text{A.2})$$

8. The distribution  $\mu(e, R, s, a)$  is invariant and is consistent with the optimal decision rules of capital choice, law of motion of idiosyncratic productivity, and the labor market flows.

## Appendix B Comparing aggregate implications of bargaining power and extreme wealth shock

Table B.1 compares the benchmark model to models that remove non-market disparities, particularly in equalizing racial bargaining power and extreme wealth shocks. Overall, removing non-market disparities raises black workers' welfare and aggregate outputs. Equalizing black workers' bargaining power to white workers directly raises their bargained wage outcomes. However, non-prejudiced firms retain less profit, hence posting fewer vacancies. On the net,

it only has a modicum impact on black workers' welfare. The reduction of non-prejudiced sector vacancy posting spills over to welfare reduction for white workers.

Table B.1: Aggregate impact of racial disparities from non-market factors

Moments	Benchmark	$\xi_{bl} = \xi_{wh}$	$\epsilon_{bl} = \epsilon_{wh}$
<i>Labor Market</i>			
$np$ market tightness	0.73	0.69	0.78
$p$ market tightness	0.40	0.27	0.26
job finding rate (Black)	0.50	0.46	0.48
job finding rate (White)	0.66	0.64	0.65
unemp rate (Black)	0.12	0.12	0.12
unemp rate (White)	0.05	0.05	0.05
<i>Income</i>			
mean wage ratio	0.75	0.82	0.78
average wage	2.04	2.05	2.06
<i>Wealth</i>			
mean wealth ratio	0.28	0.21	0.76
median wealth ratio	0.33	0.27	0.82
share of zero wealth (Black)	0.18	0.18	0.07
share of zero wealth (White)	0.07	0.07	0.07
<i>Aggregate Outcomes</i>			
Y	3.06	3.05	3.08
K/Y	10.26	10.25	10.45
unemp rate (%)	6.60	6.78	6.64
<i>Average welfare gain (%)</i>			
Average		0.66	1.10
black		6.27	8.69
white		-0.66	-0.69

*Note:* This table compares the benchmark steady state to the model with equal bargaining power  $\xi_{bl} = \xi_{wh}$  and a model with equal extreme wealth shock  $\epsilon_{bl} = \epsilon_{wh}$ .

To equalize racial wealth shocks, we assign black workers the same conditions in accumulating wealth as white workers. The effect resembles assigning a higher bargaining power to black workers. This is because of the importance of wealth in self-insuring against uncertain negative outcomes (Nakajima, 2012). Higher personal wealth gives black workers higher reservation value when bargaining with firms. Effectively, black workers can bargain for higher wage outcomes. Similar to assigning a higher bargaining power directly, the more

favorable wealth accumulation of black workers also spills over to the firm’s unwillingness to post for more vacancies. Indirectly, it reduces white worker’s job outcomes and welfare.

## Appendix C Impulse responses

Figure C.1 plots the response of labor market, wealth, and consumption outcomes of both black and white workers after an unanticipated expansionary shock. For the impulse response function to represent the numerical derivative, the magnitude of the MIT shock should be small. We provide a 1% positive shock to  $z$  at the initial period, i.e.,  $\epsilon_z = 0.01$ , and let the TFP return to the steady state deterministically. We compare the benchmark model response to the counterfactual model without  $p$  firms to study the impact of hiring discrimination over the business cycle. Overall, our models generate countercyclical unemployment rate and procyclical wage, wealth, and consumption movements. As is standard in the literature on dual labor markets, the single market model (without  $p$  firm) reverts to the steady state faster than the dual market model (benchmark) (e.g. Horvath and Yang, 2022). However, in the benchmark model with discriminatory firms, black workers experience more pronounced changes in unemployment rates and consumption in response to an expansionary shock compared to white workers. While average wages and wealth show little difference between models with and without discriminatory firms, the black-white average wage and wealth ratios are more procyclical in the benchmark model with discriminatory firms.

Figure C.2 presents the impulse responses functions for the benchmark model to a 1% positive and negative TFP shock at date 0. The shock gradually returns to a steady state with a persistence of 0.95. Our model produces symmetric impulse responses across all variables.






Figure C.1: Impulse responses

*Note:* This figure plots the impulse response functions of unemployment rates, average wage, average wealth, black-white average wage and wealth ratios, and aggregate consumption between black and white workers to a one percent increase in aggregate TFP at date zero. The red solid line denotes the responses from the benchmark model, and the blue dashed line denotes the responses from the counterfactual model without  $p$  firms.




Figure C.2: Comparing impulse responses

*Note:* This figure plots the impulse response functions of the benchmark economy to a one percent increase and a one percent decrease in aggregate TFP at date zero. The red solid line denotes the responses to the expansionary shock, and the blue dashed line denotes the responses to the recessionary shock.

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