Online Appendix for

Major Power Rivalry and Wedge Strategy of Concessions

List of Tables

A1 A2 A3 A4 A5 A6 A7	Summary Statistics Exclusion of Major Power Dividers Linear Probability Model Specification Logistic Specification Additional Controls Additional Controls with Dyadic Cluster Robust Standard Errors Binary Treatment of Rapid Deterioration	A2 A3 A4 A5 A6
List	of Figures	
A1	Sensitivity Analysis of Estimates with (Logged) Patron's Aid as the Benchmark Covariate	A8
A2	Sensitivity Analysis of Statistical Significance with (Logged) Patron's Aid as the Benchmark Covariate	

Table A1: Summary Statistics

Variables	Obs	Mean	Sd	Min	Max
Deterioration in Relation with Patron	5,458	0.035	0.685	-4.706	5.048
Differenced (Logged) Aid from Divider	5,248	0.641	52.802	-22.630	22.630
(Logged) Patron's Aid	5,316	7.077	8.372	0	21.390
(Logged) Divider GDP	5,707	26.612	1.656	23.069	30.321
(Logged) Target GDP	5,496	23.187	2.406	17.691	29.273
Divider CINC	5,707	0.113	0.061	0.016	0.215
Target CINC	5,707	0.006	0.011	0.000	0.121
Divider Democracy	5,707	0.208	0.892	-0.814	2.229
Target Democracy	5,707	0.718	0.967	-1.454	2.986
(Logged) Homophily Aid	4,983	8.256	8.132	0	20.873
Patron-initiated MID	5,707	0.018	0.134	0	1
Patron's Sanction	5,707	0.0534	0.225	0	1
(Logged) Divider-Target Trade	5,707	15.278	7.279	0	26.641
(Logged) Patron-Target Trade	5,707	18.948	6.502	0	27.078
(Logged) Divider-Target Arms Transfers	5,707	0.810	3.634	0	21.001
Target Leadership Transition	$5,\!457$	0.179	0.384	0	1
Target Regime Transition	5,457	0.023	0.149	0	1

Table A2: Exclusion of Major Power Dividers

	USA	UKG	FRA	RUS	CHN	RUS (1990-2010)
Deterioration in Relations with $Patron_{t-1}$	0.247**	0.202*	0.154^{+}	0.209	0.178^{+}	0.219*
	(0.0897)	(0.0935)	(0.0909)	(0.132)	(0.0915)	(0.100)
(Logged) Patron's Aid_{t-1}	-0.00744	-0.00651	-0.00648	-0.0234	0.000373	-0.0150
(Logged) I attom s Md_{t-1}	(0.00639)	(0.00630)	(0.00642)	(0.0220)	(0.00365)	(0.0110)
	,	,	,	, ,	,	,
Patron's $Sanction_{t-1}$	-0.138	-0.142	-0.134	-0.383	0.00652	-0.276
	(0.154)	(0.153)	(0.154)	(0.356)	(0.146)	(0.201)
Patron-initiated MID_{t-1}	0.478	0.592	0.476	0.498	-0.171	0.379
<i>b</i> −1	(0.646)	(0.471)	(0.619)	(0.850)	(0.444)	(0.695)
B B						
Divider Democracy $_{t-1}$	-0.300*	-0.327*	-0.410**	-0.710	-0.231+	-0.204
	(0.127)	(0.127)	(0.133)	(0.606)	(0.129)	(0.446)
Target Democracy $_{t-1}$	0.175	0.198^{+}	0.160	0.598^{+}	0.506**	0.373^*
	(0.110)	(0.117)	(0.108)	(0.313)	(0.158)	(0.166)
D I GDIG	0.700	1 501	1 515	0.014		7 7 00*
Divider $CINC_{t-1}$	-0.708	-1.761	-1.715	-6.314	1.775	-7.729*
	(1.126)	(1.073)	(1.096)	(4.496)	(1.368)	(3.137)
Target $CINC_{t-1}$	-44.47*	-46.97*	-39.31^{+}	-128.9*	-59.32*	-74.05*
	(22.20)	(23.08)	(21.41)	(56.77)	(29.46)	(33.74)
(I I) D: :1 m + m 1	0.0105+	0.0150*	0.0150*	0.0018	0.0000*	0.0015*
(Logged) Divider-Target $Trade_{t-1}$	-0.0135^{+} (0.00705)	-0.0158* (0.00749)	-0.0150* (0.00728)	-0.0213 (0.0133)	-0.0220* (0.00962)	-0.0217* (0.0105)
	(0.00705)	(0.00749)	(0.00728)	(0.0155)	(0.00902)	(0.0105)
(Logged) Divider GDP_{t-1}	-0.103*	-0.0483	-0.0840^{+}	-0.427*	-0.0247	-0.0820
, ,	(0.0486)	(0.0456)	(0.0472)	(0.215)	(0.0438)	(0.0794)
(Land) Tarest CDD	0.170*	0.100	0.167*	0.749**	0.170*	0.244*
(Logged) Target GDP_{t-1}	0.170* (0.0700)	0.102 (0.0674)	0.167^* (0.0701)	0.743** (0.266)	0.172^* (0.0684)	0.244* (0.112)
	(0.0700)	(0.0014)	(0.0701)	(0.200)	(0.0004)	(0.112)
(Logged) Divider-Target Arms $Transfers_{t-1}$	0.00515	0.00241	0.00150	0.00737	0.00450	0.00342
	(0.0150)	(0.0157)	(0.0154)	(0.0318)	(0.00613)	(0.0237)
Constant	-0.714	-0.436	-1.010	-3.620+	-3.009**	-1.665
Constant	(0.803)	(0.841)	(0.848)	(1.858)	(1.099)	(1.246)
N	4128	4126	4130	2109	3327	3342
Directed Dyad Fixed Effects	√	√	√	∠ 100	√	√

Clustered standard errors in parentheses

 $^{^{+}}$ p < 0.10, * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01

Table A3: Linear Probability Model Specification

	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3	Model 4
Deterioration in Relations with $Patron_{t-1}$	0.0181**	0.0183**	0.0162**	0.0173**
Deterioration in Relations with 1 attoil $_{t-1}$	(0.00538)	(0.0155)	(0.0102)	(0.00508)
	(0.00556)	(0.00509)	(0.00493)	(0.00508)
(Logged) Patron's Aid_{t-1}		0.000289		-0.000519
(10011)		(0.00104)		(0.00110)
		(0.00-0-)		(0.00220)
Patron's $Sanction_{t-1}$		0.0341		0.0349
		(0.0242)		(0.0220)
Patron-initiated MID_{t-1}		-0.0823		-0.0629
		(0.0614)		(0.0486)
Divider Democracy $_{t-1}$		-0.0889**		-0.155**
Divider Democracy $_{t-1}$		(0.0281)		(0.0391)
		(0.0201)		(0.0551)
Target Democracy $_{t-1}$		0.0218^{+}		0.0128
		(0.0121)		(0.00961)
		,		,
Divider $CINC_{t-1}$		-0.352^{+}		-0.0543
		(0.201)		(0.186)
				!
Target $CINC_{t-1}$		-9.396**		-5.687+
		(3.530)		(2.908)
(Logged) Divider-Target Trade $_{t-1}$		0.0000807		-0.000575
(Logged) Divider-Target Trade _{t-1}		(0.0000307)		(0.000663)
		(0.000313)		(0.000003)
(Logged) Divider GDP_{t-1}		0.00119		-0.0405**
(00)		(0.00666)		(0.0108)
		` ′		,
(Logged) Target GDP_{t-1}		0.0543^{**}		-0.0267
		(0.0196)		(0.0295)
(T. 1) D. 11 T. 14 T. 16		0.0044=		
(Logged) Divider-Target Arms $Transfers_{t-1}$		0.00117		0.000665
		(0.00163)		(0.00155)
Constant	0.216**	-0.756 ⁺	0.348**	2.803**
Constant	(0.0622)	(0.452)	(0.0585)	(0.786)
N	5015	4461	5015	4461
Temporal Dependence	J015 ✓	4401 ✓	5015 ✓	4401 ✓
Directed Dyad Fixed Effects	∨ ✓	∨ ✓	∨ ✓	∨ ✓
Year Fixed Effects	V	•	∨ ✓	√
Total I III of Elifotto			•	

Standard errors in parentheses

 $^{^{+}}$ $p < 0.10,\ ^{*}$ $p < 0.05,\ ^{**}$ p < 0.01

Table A4: Logistic Specification

	Logit		Logit with	Mundlak's CRE
	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3	Model 4
Deterioration in Relations with $Patron_{t-1}$	0.328**	0.373**	0.369**	0.383**
	(0.121)	(0.135)	(0.127)	(0.144)
(Logged) Patron's Aid_{t-1}		0.00256		-0.0226
		(0.0177)		(0.0233)
Patron's Sanction $_{t-1}$		0.872*		1.043*
V -		(0.358)		(0.472)
Patron-initiated MID_{t-1}		0.273		0.284
<i>b</i> 1		(0.772)		(0.649)
Divider Democracy $_{t-1}$		0.260		0.0268
		(0.312)		(0.399)
Target Democracy $_{t-1}$		-0.248		-0.423 ⁺
		(0.188)		(0.218)
Divider $CINC_{t-1}$		-8.694+		-13.17*
Divider of $t \in t-1$		(4.859)		(6.352)
Target $CINC_{t-1}$		-7.706		-13.90
ranger enve _{t-1}		(16.68)		(14.91)
(Logged) Divider-Target $\operatorname{Trade}_{t-1}$		0.0538		0.0676
(Logged) Divider-Target Trade _{t-1}		(0.0367)		(0.0425)
(Logged) Divider GDP_{t-1}		0.873**		1.033**
(Logged) Divider GDI _{t-1}		(0.283)		(0.334)
(Logged) Target GDP_{t-1}		-0.0607		-0.112
(Logged) Target GDF $_{t-1}$		(0.0846)		(0.103)
(I · · · · I) D: I · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · ·		,		,
(Logged) Divider-Target Arms $Transfers_{t-1}$		-0.00849 (0.0255)		-0.000893 (0.0247)
		,		,
Contiguity		0.588 (0.739)		1.165^+ (0.682)
		(0.759)		(0.002)
Capital Distance		-0.128		0.169
		(0.292)		(0.319)
Constant	2.507**	-19.96*	1.200^{+}	-25.62*
27	(0.434)	(8.465)	(0.631)	(10.05)
N	5015	4461	5015	4461
Temporal Dependence Year Fixed Effects	√	√	√ √	√ √
Standard arrors in parentheses	٧	v	v	<u> </u>

Standard errors in parentheses $^+$ $p < 0.10, ^*$ $p < 0.05, ^{**}$ p < 0.01

Table A5: Additional Controls

	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3	Model 4
Deterioration in Relations with $Patron_{t-1}$	0.268** (0.101)	0.231* (0.104)	0.236* (0.102)	0.217* (0.109)
(I 1) D (1 A:1			, ,	
(Logged) Patron's Aid_{t-1}	-0.00604 (0.0138)	-0.00943 (0.0142)	0.00896 (0.0137)	0.00511 (0.0144)
Patron's Sanction $_{t-1}$	-0.106	-0.143	-0.0990	-0.152
	(0.196)	(0.184)	(0.203)	(0.190)
Patron-initiated MID_{t-1}	0.974	1.021+	0.973	1.011
	(0.618)	(0.615)	(0.640)	(0.637)
Divider Democracy $_{t-1}$	-0.942** (0.289)	-1.546** (0.553)	-0.880** (0.299)	-1.396* (0.558)
Target Democracy $_{t-1}$	0.789**	0.687**	0.774**	0.695**
Talget Democracy t=1	(0.233)	(0.203)	(0.239)	(0.208)
Divider-Target Joint Democracy $_{t-1}$	1.167*	2.556**	1.282*	2.543**
	(0.514)	(0.939)	(0.558)	(0.941)
Divider $CINC_{t-1}$	-0.316 (2.448)	5.666 (3.654)	1.313 (2.446)	7.415* (3.316)
T. ODVG		, ,	, ,	
Target $CINC_{t-1}$	-0.554 (16.03)	-0.611 (15.90)	-2.217 (16.81)	-3.133 (16.81)
(Logged) Divider-Target Trade $_{t-1}$	-0.0196*	-0.0130	-0.0193+	-0.0116
(136 %)	(0.00958)	(0.00908)	(0.0103)	(0.00976)
(Logged) Divider GDP_{t-1}	-0.0705	-0.427+	-0.0710	-0.487*
	(0.0572)	(0.218)	(0.0583)	(0.197)
(Logged) Target GDP_{t-1}	-0.0200 (0.0989)	-0.148 (0.194)	-0.0244 (0.0992)	-0.155 (0.194)
(I J) Di-i-J T A T		, ,		-0.00897
(Logged) Divider-Target Arms Transfers $_{t-1}$	-0.00667 (0.0149)	-0.00945 (0.0142)	-0.00588 (0.0149)	(0.0141)
Patron-Target Joint Regime $_{t-1}$	-1.372**	-1.183**	-1.346**	-1.163**
	(0.437)	(0.363)	(0.443)	(0.367)
Divider-Target Ideal Point $Distance_{t-1}$	-0.0521	0.0642	-0.0636	0.0643
	(0.0682)	(0.0842)	(0.0728)	(0.0877)
Divider-Target DCA_{t-1}	-0.193 (0.281)	-0.107 (0.284)	-0.208 (0.285)	-0.135 (0.287)
Patron-Target DCA_{t-1}	-0.575*	-0.438*	-0.613*	-0.466*
1 atton-Target DCA _{t-1}	(0.239)	(0.215)	(0.244)	(0.218)
(Logged) Patron-Target Trade $_{t-1}$	0.0159	0.0128	0.0206	0.0178
	(0.0106)	(0.00945)	(0.0129)	(0.0118)
(Logged) Homophily Aid_{t-1}	-0.0147	-0.0159	-0.0269	-0.0280
	(0.0189)	(0.0184)	(0.0186)	(0.0180)
Patron-Target Power Difference $_{t-1}$	-3.877 (2.580)	1.208 (3.427)	-4.208 (2.599)	(3.473)
Target Leadership $Transition_{t-1}$, ,	,	-0.0400	-0.118
range Deadership transition _{t-1}			(0.138)	(0.141)
Target Regime $Transition_{t-1}$			-0.872	-0.872
			(0.610)	(0.626)
Constant	3.528	14.15+	3.409	15.84*
N	(2.726)	(7.644) 3470	(2.817)	(7.558)
Directed Dyad Fixed Effects	✓	✓	\checkmark	✓
Year Fixed Effects Standard errors in parentheses		√		√

Standard errors in parentheses $^+$ $p < 0.10, ^*$ $p < 0.05, ^{**}$ p < 0.01

Table A6: Additional Controls with Dyadic Cluster Robust Standard Errors

	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3	Model 4
Deterioration in Relations with $Patron_{t-1}$	0.268**	0.231**	0.236**	0.217**
	(0.0994)	(0.0423)	(0.0690)	(0.0231)
(Logged) Patron's Aid_{t-1}	-0.00604	-0.00943*	0.00896	0.00511
	(0.00737)	(0.00470)	(0.0155)	(0.0129)
Patron's $Sanction_{t-1}$	-0.106*	-0.143*	-0.0990 ⁺	-0.152*
	(0.0478)	(0.0672)	(0.0507)	(0.0621)
Patron-initiated MID_{t-1}	0.974 (0.743)	1.021 (0.727)	0.973 (0.745)	1.011 (0.720)
Divider $Democracy_{t-1}$	-0.942	-1.546**	-0.880	-1.396**
	(0.687)	(0.400)	(0.685)	(0.364)
Target $Democracy_{t-1}$	0.789^{+} (0.440)	0.687* (0.315)	0.774^{+} (0.438)	0.695^* (0.331)
Divider-Target Joint Democracy _{t-1}	1.167 (1.136)	2.556^{+} (1.549)	1.282 (1.204)	2.543 (1.550)
Divider $CINC_{t-1}$	-0.316 (3.004)	5.666* (2.677)	1.313 (2.763)	7.415** (2.472)
Target $CINC_{t-1}$	-0.554	-0.611	-2.217	-3.133
	(17.75)	(9.518)	(18.88)	(8.893)
(Logged) Divider-Target $\operatorname{Trade}_{t-1}$	-0.0196 ⁺	-0.0130**	-0.0193 ⁺	-0.0116*
	(0.0102)	(0.00278)	(0.0110)	(0.00525)
(Logged) Divider GDP_{t-1}	-0.0705	-0.427*	-0.0710	-0.487*
	(0.0607)	(0.191)	(0.0661)	(0.207)
(Logged) Target ${\rm GDP}_{t-1}$	-0.0200	-0.148	-0.0244	-0.155
	(0.140)	(0.153)	(0.147)	(0.147)
(Logged) Divider-Target Arms $Transfers_{t-1}$	-0.00667	-0.00945	-0.00588	-0.00897
	(0.0159)	(0.0152)	(0.0150)	(0.0146)
Patron-Target Joint Regime_{t-1}	-1.372 (1.041)	-1.183 ⁺ (0.664)	-1.346 (1.038)	-1.163^+ (0.672)
Divider-Target Ideal Point $Distance_{t-1}$	-0.0521 (0.0479)	0.0642 (0.0757)	-0.0636 (0.0616)	0.0643 (0.0792)
Divider-Target DCA_{t-1}	-0.193	-0.107**	-0.208	-0.135 ⁺
	(0.196)	(0.0116)	(0.213)	(0.0796)
Patron-Target DCA_{t-1}	-0.575	-0.438*	-0.613	-0.466*
	(0.457)	(0.217)	(0.482)	(0.232)
(Logged) Patron-Target Trade_{t-1}	0.0159*	0.0128**	0.0206*	0.0178*
	(0.00750)	(0.00399)	(0.00992)	(0.00867)
(Logged) Homophily Aid_{t-1}	-0.0147	-0.0159*	-0.0269	-0.0280
	(0.0199)	(0.00781)	(0.0318)	(0.0244)
Patron-Target Power Difference $_{t-1}$	-3.877	1.208	-4.208	1.072
	(4.211)	(2.493)	(4.755)	(2.510)
Target Leadership $Transition_{t-1}$			-0.0400 (0.0899)	-0.118 (0.138)
Target Regime $Transition_{t-1}$			-0.872 (0.729)	-0.872 (0.754)
Constant	7.074^{+} (3.914)	17.54* (7.744)	6.860 ⁺ (3.982)	18.76* (7.574)
N Directed Dyad Fixed Effects Year Fixed Effects	3470 ✓	3470 ✓	3307 ✓	3307 ✓ ✓

Dyadic cluster robust standard errors in parentheses $^+$ $p < 0.10, ^*$ $p < 0.05, ^{**}$ p < 0.01

Table A7: Binary Treatment of Rapid Deterioration

	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3	Model 4
Rapid Deterioration $_{t-1}$	0.519** (0.199)	0.535* (0.228)	0.533* (0.238)	0.885* (0.404)
(Logged) Patron's Aid_{t-1}		-0.0111 (0.00795)	0.00776 (0.0129)	0.00317 (0.0132)
Patron's $Sanction_{t-1}$		-0.0532 (0.143)	-0.0913 (0.196)	-0.142 (0.184)
Patron-initiated MID_{t-1}		0.645 (0.551)	1.007 (0.653)	1.102^{+} (0.652)
Divider Democracy $_{t-1}$		-0.986** (0.223)	-0.943** (0.307)	-1.301* (0.557)
Target $Democracy_{t-1}$		0.118 (0.0987)	0.753** (0.240)	0.671** (0.206)
Divider-Target Joint Democracy _{t-1}		1.173** (0.361)	1.218* (0.554)	2.492** (0.929)
Divider $CINC_{t-1}$		2.658 (1.627)	1.124 (2.414)	7.629* (3.206)
Target $CINC_{t-1}$		-36.20 ⁺ (20.25)	-4.305 (14.94)	-5.104 (15.28)
(Logged) Divider-Target $\operatorname{Trade}_{t-1}$		-0.0222** (0.00825)	-0.0185 ⁺ (0.00978)	-0.00890 (0.00934)
(Logged) Divider ${\rm GDP}_{t-1}$		-0.133** (0.0510)	-0.0967 (0.0593)	-0.475* (0.193)
(Logged) Target ${\rm GDP}_{t-1}$		0.257** (0.0783)	0.0152 (0.0943)	-0.158 (0.183)
(Logged) Divider-Target Arms $Transfers_{t-1}$		-0.00200 (0.0148)	-0.00651 (0.0146)	-0.00883 (0.0138)
Patron-Target Joint Regime_{t-1}			-1.318** (0.443)	-1.123** (0.363)
Divider-Target Ideal Point $Distance_{t-1}$			-0.0806 (0.0722)	0.0508 (0.0873)
Divider-Target DCA_{t-1}			-0.202 (0.280)	-0.117 (0.283)
Patron-Target DCA_{t-1}			-0.623* (0.245)	-0.458* (0.217)
(Logged) Patron-Target Trade_{t-1}			0.0265* (0.0126)	0.0202^{+} (0.0114)
(Logged) Homophily Aid_{t-1}			-0.0168 (0.0174)	-0.0224 (0.0178)
Patron-Target Power Difference $_{t-1}$			-3.997 (2.521)	1.736 (3.385)
Target Leadership $Transition_{t-1}$			-0.0685 (0.134)	-0.142 (0.137)
Target Regime $Transition_{t-1}$			-0.845 (0.602)	-0.867 (0.619)
Constant	0.0334** (0.0118)	-2.308* (0.931)	3.026 (2.724)	12.94* (6.268)
N Directed Dyad Fixed Effects Year Fixed Effects	5248	4674 ✓	3418	3418

Rapid Deterioration is a binary variable coded as 1 if Deterioration in Relations with Patron is greater than 2 and as 0 otherwise.

 $[\]begin{array}{l} {\rm Standard\ errors\ in\ parentheses} \\ ^{+}\ p < 0.10,\ ^{*}\ p < 0.05,\ ^{**}\ p < 0.01 \end{array}$

Figure A1: Sensitivity Analysis of Estimates with (Logged) Patron's Aid as the Benchmark Covariate




Figure A2: Sensitivity Analysis of Statistical Significance with (Logged) Patron's Aid as the Benchmark Covariate

