

Two-Period Consumption–Saving Problem with Lognormal Income Risk

1 Setup

The representative agent maximizes expected lifetime utility

$$\max_{s \in [0, y_1]} \log(c_1) + \beta \mathbb{E}[\log(c_2)], \quad (1)$$

where

$$c_1 = y_1 - s, \quad c_2 = (1 + \lambda)xz_2 + s,$$

and $z_2 \sim \log \mathcal{N}(0, \sigma^2)$, so that $\mathbb{E}[z_2] = e^{\sigma^2/2}$.

The parameter λ scales the second-period endowment, $x > 0$ is a baseline level, and $\beta \in (0, 1)$ is the discount factor.

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2 Exact First-Order Condition

The first-order condition (Euler equation) for an interior optimum is

$$\frac{1}{y_1 - s} = \beta \mathbb{E} \left[\frac{1}{s + (1 + \lambda)xz_2} \right]. \quad (2)$$

Because the left-hand side is increasing and the right-hand side is decreasing in s , the solution is unique whenever it lies in the interior $(0, y_1)$.

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3 Second-Order Approximation

Define

$$\mu \equiv \mathbb{E}[z_2] = e^{\sigma^2/2}, \quad v \equiv \text{Var}((1 + \lambda)xz_2) = (1 + \lambda)^2 x^2 e^{\sigma^2} (e^{\sigma^2} - 1).$$

Using a second-order (delta-method) approximation,

$$\mathbb{E}[\log(s + (1 + \lambda)xz_2)] \approx \log(s + (1 + \lambda)x\mu) - \frac{v}{2(s + (1 + \lambda)x\mu)^2}.$$

The approximate objective is then

$$\max_{0 \leq s \leq y_1} \log(y_1 - s) + \beta \left[\log(s + (1 + \lambda)x\mu) - \frac{v}{2(s + (1 + \lambda)x\mu)^2} \right]. \quad (3)$$

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First-Order Condition (Approximate)

The first-order condition becomes

$$\frac{1}{y_1 - s} = \beta \left[\frac{1}{m} + \frac{v}{m^3} \right], \quad m \equiv s + (1 + \lambda)x\mu. \quad (4)$$

Let $a = (1 + \lambda)x\mu$ and $b = y_1 + a$. If we set $v = 0$, we obtain the certainty-equivalent (CE) solution:

$$m_0 = \frac{\beta b}{1 + \beta}, \quad s_{\text{CE}} = \frac{\beta y_1 - a}{1 + \beta}. \quad (5)$$

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Precautionary Correction

Linearizing FOC around m_0 for small v gives

$$\delta m = \frac{v}{(1 + \beta)m_0}, \quad s^* \approx s_{\text{CE}} + \frac{v}{(1 + \beta)m_0}.$$

Substituting $m_0 = \frac{\beta(y_1 + a)}{1 + \beta}$ yields

$$s^*(\lambda) \approx \frac{\beta y_1 - (1 + \lambda)x e^{\sigma^2/2}}{1 + \beta} + \frac{(1 + \lambda)^2 x^2 e^{\sigma^2} (e^{\sigma^2} - 1)}{\beta [y_1 + (1 + \lambda)x e^{\sigma^2/2}]}. \quad (6)$$

The first term is the certainty-equivalent saving, and the second term is the *precautionary saving correction*, which is positive and increasing in σ .

4 Comparative Statics with Respect to λ

Let

$$A \equiv xe^{\sigma^2/2}, \quad K \equiv e^{\sigma^2}(e^{\sigma^2} - 1), \quad t \equiv 1 + \lambda, \quad B \equiv \frac{x^2 K}{\beta}.$$

Then equation (6) can be written compactly as

$$s^*(\lambda) = \frac{\beta y_1 - tA}{1 + \beta} + B \cdot \frac{t^2}{y_1 + tA}. \quad (7)$$

The derivative with respect to λ is

$$\frac{ds^*}{d\lambda} = -\frac{A}{1 + \beta} + B \cdot \frac{t(2y_1 + tA)}{(y_1 + tA)^2}. \quad (8)$$

- The first term is negative (higher mean future income lowers saving).
- The second term is positive (larger income scale increases risk and hence precautionary saving).

Thus, the total effect is *ambiguous*, depending on the magnitude of risk and the discount factor.

Convexity in λ

Differentiating again,

$$\frac{d^2 s^*}{d\lambda^2} = B \cdot \frac{2y_1^2}{(y_1 + tA)^3} > 0, \quad (9)$$

so $s^*(\lambda)$ is **convex** in λ . This means the marginal effect of λ on saving becomes less negative (or more positive) as λ rises.

In other words, the crowd-in effect (precautionary saving) of λ on saving becomes stronger as λ rises. As the AI shock reduces λ for the mover from low to middle sector, the crowd-in effect is weaker and therefore a reduction of saving for the middle sector. On the other hand, the AI shock enlarges λ for the mover from middle to high sector, the crowd-in effect is stronger and therefore an increase of saving for the high sector.

5 Comparative Statics with Respect to y_1

From the approximate solution (6), we can derive the effect of first-period income on optimal saving:

$$\frac{\partial s^*}{\partial y_1} = \frac{\beta}{1 + \beta} - B \cdot \frac{t^2}{(y_1 + tA)^2}. \quad (10)$$

This derivative has two components:

- **Direct consumption-smoothing effect** (first term): $\frac{\beta}{1+\beta} > 0$
 - Higher y_1 increases saving to smooth consumption across periods
 - This is the standard life-cycle saving motive
- **Precautionary adjustment** (second term): $-B \cdot \frac{t^2}{(y_1+tA)^2} < 0$
 - Higher y_1 reduces the relative importance of precautionary saving
 - With more first-period resources, the agent is less concerned about second-period risk

Net Effect

The net effect $\frac{\partial s^*}{\partial y_1}$ is **ambiguous** and depends on parameter values and the level of y_1 :

$$\frac{\partial s^*}{\partial y_1} > 0 \quad \Leftrightarrow \quad \frac{\beta}{1 + \beta} > B \cdot \frac{t^2}{(y_1 + tA)^2} \quad (11)$$

If the inequality for $\frac{\partial s^*}{\partial y_1} > 0$ holds at $y_1 = 0$, it is a sufficient condition for it to hold for all $y_1 \geq 0$. Plugging $y_1 = 0$ into the condition gives:

$$\frac{\beta}{1 + \beta} > B \cdot \frac{1}{A^2} \quad (12)$$

Recall that $A = (1 + \lambda)xe^{\sigma^2/2}$ and $B = \frac{(1+\lambda)^2x^2e^{\sigma^2}(e^{\sigma^2}-1)}{\beta}$, so

$$B \cdot \frac{1}{A^2} = \frac{(1 + \lambda)^2x^2e^{\sigma^2}(e^{\sigma^2} - 1)}{\beta} \cdot \frac{1}{(1 + \lambda)^2x^2e^{\sigma^2}} = \frac{e^{\sigma^2} - 1}{\beta}$$

Thus, the sufficient condition becomes

$$\frac{\beta}{1 + \beta} > \frac{e^{\sigma^2} - 1}{\beta} \quad (13)$$

or equivalently,

$$e^{\sigma^2} < \frac{\beta^2}{1+\beta} + 1 \quad (14)$$

Taking logs yields the sufficient upper bound on σ :

$$\sigma^2 < \log \left(\frac{\beta^2}{1+\beta} + 1 \right) \quad (15)$$

Therefore, if σ^2 satisfies this bound, then $\frac{\partial s^*}{\partial y_1} > 0$ for all $y_1 \geq 0$.

The second derivative is always positive:

$$\frac{\partial^2 s^*}{\partial y_1^2} = B \cdot \frac{2t^2}{(y_1 + tA)^3} > 0, \quad (16)$$

so $s^*(y_1)$ is **convex** in y_1 .

Case Analysis:

- **High y_1 or low risk:** $\frac{\partial s^*}{\partial y_1} > 0$ (consumption smoothing dominates)
- **Low y_1 or high risk:** $\frac{\partial s^*}{\partial y_1}$ could be negative (precautionary adjustment dominates)
- **Asymptotic behavior:** As $y_1 \rightarrow \infty$, $\frac{\partial s^*}{\partial y_1} \rightarrow \frac{\beta}{1+\beta} > 0$
- **Convexity:** The marginal effect becomes less negative (or more positive) as y_1 increases

Economic Interpretation

The convexity of $s^*(y_1)$ captures the interaction between consumption smoothing and precautionary motives:

- At **low wealth levels**, precautionary concerns may dominate, potentially leading to *dissaving* (negative marginal propensity to save) as agents prioritize current consumption when future income is risky
- At **high wealth levels**, standard consumption smoothing dominates, and saving increases with income
- The convex shape reflects **diminishing precautionary motives**: as first-period wealth increases, agents become less sensitive to second-period income risk, consistent with decreasing absolute risk aversion under logarithmic utility

6 Small-Risk Approximation

For small σ^2 , use

$$e^{\sigma^2/2} \approx 1 + \frac{\sigma^2}{2}, \quad e^{\sigma^2}(e^{\sigma^2} - 1) \approx \sigma^2.$$

This simplifies the solution to

$$s^*(\lambda) \approx \frac{\beta y_1 - (1 + \lambda)x(1 + \frac{\sigma^2}{2})}{1 + \beta} + \frac{(1 + \lambda)^2 x^2 \sigma^2}{\beta [y_1 + (1 + \lambda)x(1 + \frac{\sigma^2}{2})]}. \quad (17)$$

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7 Illustration

We consider the second-order approximate solution

$$s^*(\lambda) = \frac{\beta y_1 - (1 + \lambda)x e^{\sigma^2/2}}{1 + \beta} + \frac{(1 + \lambda)^2 x^2 e^{\sigma^2}(e^{\sigma^2} - 1)}{\beta [y_1 + (1 + \lambda)x e^{\sigma^2/2}]}$$

Parameters are chosen to produce a symmetric convex pattern

$$s^*(-0.2) > s^*(0) < s^*(0.2),$$

with both gaps of similar magnitude.

Parameter Values

Parameter	Symbol	Value
First-period endowment	y_1	1.0
Discount factor	β	0.9535
Scale of risky endowment	x	1.13
Lognormal standard deviation	σ	0.681

Table 1: Parameterization for balanced convexity in $s^*(\lambda)$.

Results

The pattern confirms that $s^*(\lambda)$ is convex: both $s^*(-0.2)$ and $s^*(0.2)$ exceed $s^*(0)$, illustrating symmetric precautionary adjustments to small deviations in future endowment scaling λ .

	$\lambda = -0.2$	$\lambda = 0$	$\lambda = 0.2$
$s^*(\lambda)$	0.28011	0.27650	0.28004
Gap from $\lambda = 0$	+0.00361	–	+0.00354

Table 2: Values of $s^*(\lambda)$ showing convex pattern.




Figure 1: Balanced convexity of $s^*(\lambda)$ under parameter set in Table 1.

8 Economic Interpretation

- For small λ , a larger future endowment reduces saving (the income effect dominates).
- For large λ , risk amplification dominates, raising precautionary saving.
- The convexity of $s^*(\lambda)$ captures this trade-off: increasing λ both raises the mean and magnifies the uncertainty of future consumption.