

Corruption and Talent Allocation*

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Abstract

Leveraging an anti-corruption audit program in Brazil, I investigate whether corruption shifts the allocation of talent. I link administrative data on program rollout with education and employer-employee registers. Following audits, high-ability students change their college major to be less aligned with public sector careers, and they become less likely to enter public sector careers later on. Investigating mechanisms, I argue that these results are driven by the perception of lower returns to public sector careers owing to reduced rents and the risk of reputation loss. My findings highlight an understudied consequence of corruption, namely, the distortionary impacts on talent sorting.

JEL classification: D73, H83, I25, J24, O15

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1 Introduction

Talent is a key determinant of productivity in the public sector (Fenizia, 2022; Best et al., 2023). Across different countries in the world, talented individuals opt for the public sector seeking prestige, job stability, or a wage premium over the private sector. Corruption can be another relevant factor that affects the attractiveness of public sector careers.¹ In theory, corruption could increase the relative rewards of rent-seeking activities, thus luring talent away from potentially more productive activities such as firm creation (Baumol, 1990; Acemoglu, 1995). Conversely, corruption might crowd out individuals who are equally talented but have a higher intrinsic motivation to work in the public sector.² The ambiguity in theoretical predictions calls for an empirical investigation of how corruption shifts a society's talent allocation. However, establishing causality proves challenging due to the endogenous nature of corruption.

This paper studies the impacts of combating corruption on the allocation of talent across the public and private sectors.³ I address the identification challenge by leveraging a plausibly exogenous shock to rent-seeking opportunities in local governments: randomized anti-corruption audits. The context of Brazil provides a unique policy experiment to address this empirical question: a large-scale randomized audit program implemented among municipal governments from 2003 to 2015. As a top-down effort to fight corruption, the audit program has been demonstrated to diminish corruption in local governments effectively (Avis et al., 2018).⁴ Linking the occurrence of audits to detailed administrative records on higher education and the labor market, I investigate how audits trigger the reallocation of talent across public and private sectors. My findings reveal that high academic achieving students in Brazil shy away from public-sector career paths after government anti-corruption efforts, both in terms of college major choice and realized careers in the labor market.

¹Hanna and Wang (2017), Barfort et al. (2019), and Gans-Morse (2022) provide experimental evidence on distinctive patterns of self-selection of (dis)honest individuals into the public sector in institutional settings with different levels of corruption. Exploiting a natural experiment in Argentina, Cruces et al. (2023) also demonstrates that dishonest behavior in youth predicts a higher propensity to occupy non-meritocratic public sector jobs later in life.

²An implicit assumption for this argument to be relevant is that intrinsic motivation is independent of or positively correlated with ability among the applicant pool, as suggested by the literature on motivation crowding out by extrinsic rewards in different contexts of public sector hiring (Dal Bó et al., 2013; Deserranno, 2019; Ashraf et al., 2020). For other relevant literature on intrinsic motivation, see Frey and Jegen (2001), Bénabou and Tirole (2003, 2006), Besley and Ghatak (2005, 2018), Prendergast (2007, 2008).

³It is worth noting that this paper focuses on corruption in the public sector, broadly defined as activities that involve exploitation of public office for private gain (Fisman and Golden, 2017).

⁴Specifically, they find that being audited in the past reduces future corruption acts by 8%, where the increased perception of nonelectoral costs of engaging in corruption (such as legal punishment or reputation costs) plays a major role.

To construct the dataset, I utilize various sources of country-wide administrative data for Brazil at the individual level on both higher education and the labor market. With the universe of college students recorded in the higher education census, I focus on those enrolled in universities during 2010-2019 as the pool of talent. I further classify students as high- or low-ability based on their performance in a standardized exam taken prior to college application. The *allocation of talent* is characterized along two margins: pre-labor market sorting of college majors and early-career labor market sorting. First, I define individual students' exposure to audits based on their municipality of residence right before college enrollment. The higher education census then allows me to observe the specific degree program in which students are enrolled.⁵ Finally, using individual identifiers linking higher education census to the Brazilian employer-employee data, I track students to the labor market and observe whether they obtain their first jobs in the public or private sector. The final dataset constructed, to the best of my knowledge, is the most comprehensive data ever used to study how nationwide anti-corruption efforts affect the allocation of talent within a society.

The randomized and staggered nature of the anti-corruption audits across time and locality leads naturally to a municipal-level event-study estimation method. My preferred specification follows a stacked-by-event event-study design, which estimates the treatment effects based on the comparison of units switching into treatment to not-yet-treated units in the time window of interest.⁶ As the outcomes I observe for students are available from 2010 to 2019, I restrict my analysis to audits conducted during 2011-2014, the later stage of the randomized phase of the entire anti-corruption program. Students from municipalities that received an audit for the first time during 2011-2014 are thus taken as the treated group, while those from never-audited municipalities throughout the program are included as “clean” controls.⁷

I begin my main analysis by documenting two empirical facts on baseline patterns of major enrollment and subsequent careers. First, among all degree fields, business ad-

⁵Prospective students in Brazil apply for specific degree-institution programs (Law degree at the University of Brasilia, for instance). This system is similar to that of China and continental Europe but different than the United States, where students decide on fields of study in the first years of university studies. Switching majors during college in Brazil is often not allowed or comes with a large cost (Oliveira et al., 2022).

⁶By explicitly eliminating “forbidden” comparisons between units treated earlier versus later, this method deals with potential biases of the standard two-way fixed-effect (TWFE) estimator in the presence of treatment effect heterogeneity, as highlighted in De Chaisemartin and d’Haultfoeuille (2020) and Goodman-Bacon (2021), among others.

⁷In my setting, not-yet-treated units within the time window of analysis are equivalent to never-treated units. The randomized phase of the program lasted till 2015. Municipalities audited in 2015 are not included in the treated sample due to an arbitrary change in eligibility criteria in terms of municipality population. In addition, the program was upgraded in 2015 and entered the non-randomized phase. Municipalities that were audited in the non-randomized phase during 2015-2018 are excluded from the control group.

ministration and law⁸ is the most popular choice among high-ability students (defined as students with top 25% exam performance), followed by engineering. Second, students in business/law exhibit a high propensity to become civil servants, especially compared to engineering students, who are the least likely to join civil service across all majors. These two pieces of evidence motivate the main focus of my first set of empirical analyses on the comparison between enrollment in business/law versus engineering.

I then examine how anti-corruption audits affect college major enrollment, where major is taken as a proxy for intended careers. I find that students from audited municipalities are 5.7% less likely to major in business/law and 11.3% more likely to choose engineering relative to their counterparts from municipalities that never receive an audit. I show that the effects are driven by major-switching behavior, rather than the entry of new students. A simple back-of-the-envelope calculation suggests that on average, 1 in 60 students switches major after anti-corruption audits. Moreover, the effects on major enrollment persist in the longer run (up to seven years) for younger enrollment cohorts. Notably, separately examining public and private universities reveals that the effects on major shares are almost fully concentrated in private universities. The results are consistent with the interpretation that public institutions in Brazil are more competitive and over-subscribed, while private institutions can flexibly cater to the market demand. However, the lack of reaction in aggregate public university enrollment masks underlying changes in student composition. Decomposition by student ability reveals a relative decline of 14.8% in the number of high-ability students studying business/law in public institutions. To the extent that major choice reflects career preferences, the results thus far suggest that audits lead to an inferior candidate pool aspiring for public sector careers.

Next, I track the students to the labor market using employer-employee data and demonstrate that the negative sorting by ability observed in major enrollment translates to early career outcomes. Overall, audits are associated with more students landing first jobs in the private sector, yet do not significantly impact the aggregate number of students entering the public sector. A closer examination of workforce composition, however, sheds light on heterogeneous responses to audits by student ability: audits lead to a 29.5% relative decline in the number of high-ability students embarking on public sector careers, while a 17.3% relative increase in those entering the private sector. This result mirrors the recoil of high-ability students from public-sector-oriented majors in higher education. Together, these findings illustrate a *brain drain* out of the public sector following government

⁸Referred to as “business/law” for simplicity in the rest of the paper. It is classified by the Ministry of Education as one of the ten broad degree fields in Brazil. Specifically, it includes two subfields of business administration and law, where the former can be further disaggregated into accounting and taxation, management and administration, finance, banking and insurance, secretary and clerical work etc.

anti-corruption audits.

Why would anti-corruption audits divert high-ability students away from the public sector trajectories? One explanation is that audits may lead to a perception of reduced corruption opportunities and/or increased corruption monitoring in the public sector. I refer to this first channel as *diminished rent-seeking*, following the long-standing literature on rent-seeking, talent allocation, and productivity growth (Baumol, 1990; Murphy et al., 1991, 1993; Acemoglu, 1995). Second, by revealing local corruption to the public, audits could drive away pro-social individuals who are intrinsically motivated to work in the public sector.⁹ I refer to this second channel as *motivation crowding-out*.¹⁰ Third, corruption scandals and subsequent legal charges following the audits can damage the reputation of a public sector career and lead to what I call a *reputation deterrence effect*.¹¹

In the last part of the paper, I provide some suggestive evidence that the perception of diminished rent-seeking opportunities and reputational concerns are behind the changes in talent distribution. Specifically, by leveraging finer event timing at the semester level, I find an immediate and salient effect of audits on college major enrollment following the audit announcement, even before the revelation of corruption in the audit reports. Moreover, these immediate effects are concentrated in municipalities where the audits end up detecting a high level of corruption. The evidence is consistent with the interpretation that students hold largely accurate priors regarding the level of local corruption, and the connotations of an audit are conditioned on the municipality being highly corrupt. The occurrence of an audit alters the perceived rent-seeking opportunities in public sector careers via both channels of reduced corruption and increased monitoring,¹² while the implications of an audit and expected legal consequences faced by corrupt officials can also increase the perceived reputational costs of public-sector careers. Both channels decrease the attractiveness of working in the public sector for “corrupt-minded” students.

⁹Pro-sociality can be equated with a certain kind of intrinsic motivation where agents undertake pro-social actions for their own sake or out of a sense of moral duty (Besley and Ghatak, 2018), which is also closely tied to the idea of warm glow in the literature on charitable donations (Andreoni, 2006).

¹⁰Originally, motivation crowding-out refers to the phenomenon that the promise of monetary reward for completing some task can undermine intrinsic motivation for performing the task (Frey and Oberholzer-Gee, 1997; Frey and Jegen, 2001; Bénabou and Tirole, 2003, 2006). In this paper, I adopt the extensive margin equivalence of this concept (Ashraf et al., 2020) and adapt it to focus on monetary rewards in the public sector associated with corruption rents.

¹¹The argument on reputation or prestige can be generalized to other self-interested career motives related to political corruption, such as re-election or promotion incentives. Existing literature has focused on politicians or bureaucrats post-selection (Iyer and Mani, 2012; Jia, 2017; Bertrand et al., 2020; Mattsson, 2022), leaving the extensive margin under-explored.

¹²Disentangling the role of increased monitoring from that of reduced corruption is not the focus of this paper. Audits could decrease the opportunities of being corrupt and in the meantime increase the possibility of being caught (Becker and Stigler, 1974), both explanations can drive talent away from the public sector.

Alternatively, the motivation crowding-out hypothesis is unlikely to account for the immediate heterogeneous effects. Assuming pro-social students hanker for a public career either because they underestimate local corruption or because they aspire to make a difference, they receive no negative surprise shock at the time of the audit announcement before corruption revelations.¹³ In addition, I do not find evidence of high-ability students disproportionately sorting into prosocial jobs in the private sector. Lastly, I discuss alternative explanations regarding potential changes in labor demand, either in private or public sectors, as well as in education supply. I find these alternative mechanisms are inconsistent with patterns I observe in the data.

Taken together, my findings shed light on an overlooked negative consequence of corruption on the economy: the distortion of talent allocation across public and private sector careers. When corruption is rampant, high-ability individuals can be attracted to the public sector out of rent-seeking rather than pro-social motives. The resulting misallocation of talent can have dire consequences on government performance (Finan et al., 2017; Besley et al., 2022; Fenizia, 2022; Best et al., 2023). Stamping out political corruption in turn helps improve this allocative inefficiency by re-diverting talent into potentially more productive activities. All in all, anti-corruption policies have the potential to bring a halt to the “corruption-attracts-the-corrupt” vicious circle (Fisman and Golden, 2017) and enhance public performance via improved bureaucratic selection.

1.1 Related Literature

This paper contributes to several strands of literature. First, it provides empirical evidence to the long-standing theoretical literature on rent-seeking and talent allocation (Baumol, 1990; Murphy et al., 1991, 1993; Acemoglu, 1995; Torvik, 2002).¹⁴ Shaped by a society’s reward structure, talent allocation into rent-seeking activities (such as corruption) versus productive activities (such as entrepreneurship) could have long-run implications on economic growth and public goods provision. However, empirical evidence on how rent-

¹³It is important to note, however, that there could be simultaneous crowding-in of pro-social students expecting a cleaner public sector post the audits. Disentangling this channel requires information on student pro-sociality, which is rarely available in administrative data. Nevertheless, this implies that the net effect I observe on talent sorting is a lower bound of rent-seeking/reputation-driven students being crowded out.

¹⁴A closely related literature has discussed corruption and the selection of elected politicians (Caselli and Morelli, 2004; Brollo et al., 2013; Bernheim and Kartik, 2014; Martinelli, 2022). Another strand of empirical literature studies talent (mis)allocation in a variety of settings, such as labor market frictions in talent discovery (Terviö, 2009; Abebe et al., 2021), occupational choice under different income tax regimes (Lockwood et al., 2017), discrimination and minority talent in the United States (Hsieh et al., 2019), entrepreneurial talent in China (Fang et al., 2023; Bai et al., 2025), the allocation of immigrant (Birinci et al., 2021) and female talent (Ashraf et al., 2022; Lee, 2024) and the macroeconomy, as well as talent allocation within organizations (Haeghele, 2022).

seeking opportunities causally impact the allocation of talent is scarce due to issues such as reverse causality. Notable exceptions are a sequence of papers that document the effects of one specific manifestation of rents – natural resources such as oil or mineral rents – on political selection and talent allocation (Ebeke et al., 2015; Asher and Novosad, 2023; Balza et al., 2025), as well as Brassiolo et al. (2021), in which the authors experimentally vary “corruption” opportunities in the lab among college students in Colombia.¹⁵ In this paper, I overcome the identification challenge by leveraging randomized audits in Brazil as a source of exogenous policy shock to (perceived) rent-seeking opportunities in the public sector, providing one of the first causal evidence of political corruption shaping the allocation of talent in a natural experiment setting.

A concurrent study by Hong (2023) examines a closely related question in the context of China’s anti-corruption inspections. Using representative applicant data for state organizations in China, Hong (2023) finds evidence of positive selection by integrity, but no differential selection by ability into the state sector following inspections. A key advantage of the Brazilian setting is that the anti-corruption audits are implemented through randomized lottery draws across municipalities, in contrast to the nationwide crackdown in China. Moreover, I utilize economy-wide data linking the labor market records in tandem with the higher education census, and investigate sorting that occurs at an earlier stage of choosing college majors. Nevertheless, our distinct findings regarding ability selection suggest that the extent to which corruption attracts a society’s most talented individuals into the public sector can be context-dependent and hinges on specific institutional environments.

By underscoring the role of self-selection in shaping talent allocation toward the public sector, this paper also connects to the literature on the personnel economics of the state (Finan et al., 2017; Besley et al., 2022). An important strand of this literature studies how different selection practices of bureaucrats and frontline providers impact hiring outcomes and public performance (Dal Bó et al., 2013; Deserranno, 2019; Ashraf et al., 2020; Dahis et al., 2020; Weaver, 2021; Mocanu, 2024). A related set of papers utilizes experimental approaches to underpin patterns of the selection of honest individuals into the public sector, illustrating distinct findings in different institutional contexts (Hanna and Wang, 2017; Barfort et al., 2019; Gans-Morse, 2022). I contribute to this literature by linking *within-country* variation of reduced corruption resulting from a policy intervention to compre-

¹⁵In Brassiolo et al. (2021), they document negative selection by honesty into “corruptible” contracts, which persists when controlling for student GPA. However, it is not clear how well the lab-designed public versus private contracts mimic the real scenario of occupational choice. In particular, the share of students in their control group who end up choosing the “public” contract is about 32%, much lower than the baseline share of students reporting they prefer a public sector job (56%).

hensive administrative data at scale. To the best of my knowledge, this is the first paper to examine how anti-corruption affects talent allocation along both the margins of college majors and realized careers.

This paper also speaks to the vast literature on political corruption and the effects of anti-corruption policies.¹⁶ Several recent studies emphasize the pernicious impacts of corruption on human capital triggered by behavioral responses to local corruption scandals (Ajzenman, 2021; Gulino and Masera, 2023). With respect to the same anti-corruption audit program in Brazil, previous literature has established that information on local corruption disclosed in the audits helps improve the selection of both elected politicians (Ferraz and Finan, 2008; Cavalcanti et al., 2018) and bureaucrats (Santos and Leon, 2024), reduces subsequent corruption (Avis et al., 2018) and clientelism (Bobonis et al., 2023), influences public personnel rotation via patronage ties (Gonzales, 2021; Bourlès et al., 2025) and fosters local firm entry and growth (Colonnelli and Prem, 2022). While Colonnelli and Prem (2022) focuses on resource misallocation within private sector firms, this paper sheds light on an overlooked margin of allocative inefficiency: talent misallocation across the public and private sectors. In particular, I document the behavioral responses of students to top-down anti-corruption efforts, highlighting the role of self-selection in shaping bureaucratic supply and talent distribution.

Lastly, this paper relates to the literature on college major choice and subsequent career outcomes. Existing studies have documented factors such as expected labor market returns, marriage market prospects, as well as other degree-specific features or stereotypes that could alter student major choice (Wiswall and Zafar, 2015, 2021; Ebeke et al., 2015; Shu, 2016; Conlon and Patel, 2022; Ersoy and Speer, 2025), in addition to enrollment policies targeting supply-side constraints (Estevan et al., 2019). Moreover, pre-market sorting in terms of major choice could result in divergent outcomes later on in the labor market (Kirkeboen et al., 2016; Sloane et al., 2021). I contribute to this literature by focusing on the prospects of extractable rents in the public sector and showing that political corruption could be another factor affecting major choices. The findings of this paper suggest that anti-corruption policies could have unintended consequences on the allocation of a society's human capital into different fields of specialization, with downstream effects on labor market outcomes.

The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 elaborates on the institutional context. Section 3 lists the data sources and provides some descriptive statistics. Section 4

¹⁶Some examples are Mauro (1998), Ehrlich and Lui (1999), Olken (2007), Fisman and Miguel (2007), Barr and Serra (2010), Olken and Pande (2012), Niehaus and Sukhtankar (2013), Bobonis et al. (2016), Detkova et al. (2021), Decarolis et al. (2025), and Rexer (2025).

presents the main results of the paper. In Sector 5, I discuss possible mechanisms at play. Finally, Section 6 concludes.

2 Institutional Background

2.1 Anti-Corruption Audits in Brazil

Brazil is a country where corruption is pervasive across different levels of government. Perception of corruption among experts and the public is also notable. As of 2021, the Corruption Perceptions Index (CPI) produced by Transparency International ranked Brazil 96 out of 180 countries regarding perceptions of an honest public sector. According to the 2018 *Latinobarometro*, more than 80% of the survey respondents believes that at least some of the civil servants are corrupt, while 30% believes almost all civil servants are involved in some acts of corruption.

On the other hand, Brazil is a large democratic country with ample state capacity to carry out top-down anti-corruption initiatives (Cuneo et al., 2023). In May 2003, the Lula government announced an anti-corruption audit program to be implemented by the CGU (*Controladoria-Geral da União*), the main anti-corruption body in Brazil established by the central government earlier that year to combat nationwide corruption. The program, named *Programa de Fiscalização por Sorteios Públicos*, aimed to audit municipal governments for their use of federal funds. A unique feature of the audit program is that municipalities audited in each round are randomly selected through publicly aired lotteries. Representatives of the written press, television and radio, political parties and civil society organizations are invited to witness the lotteries to ensure fairness and transparency. On average, approximately 60 municipalities are selected each audit round, with replacement, while each year can witness one or multiple rounds.¹⁷ Specifically, all non-capital municipalities with a population below 500,000 are eligible for the lottery draws.¹⁸

From the official website of CGU, I obtain lists of municipalities drawn in each of the 40 lotteries conducted between 2003 and 2015.¹⁹ Figure 1 illustrates the yearly variation

¹⁷Once audited, a municipality can be audited again after some draws have elapsed, where the number of waiting draws has slightly changed over time.

¹⁸It is worth noting that the population threshold changed over the years, starting from 100,000 at the launch in 2003 and immediately rose to 300,000 in the lotteries drawn later that year, finally to 500,000 starting the 9th draw in April 2004 and stayed unchanged till 2014.

¹⁹It is worth noting that the program did not terminate in 2015. As of 2015, the program was upgraded and renamed the Inspection Program in Federative Entities (<https://www.gov.br/cgu/pt-br/assuntos/auditoria-e-fiscalizacao/programa-de-fiscalizacao-em-entes-federativos>). Since then the selection has become hybrid, incorporating forms called “Census” (universal inspection) and “Vulnerability Matrix” (targeted inspection) in addition to purely randomized lottery draws.

of the number of municipalities audited during the randomized phase. Evidently the program was more intense during the first half of the campaign, with more lottery draws implemented and more municipalities audited during 2003-2010. As the data on higher education and the labor market are available from 2010 onwards, I limit my analysis to the second half of the program between 2011 and 2014.²⁰ In total, my sample consists of 6 lottery draws and 323 municipalities, out of 1,949 municipalities that are audited at least once during 2003 and 2015. Among the 323 audited municipalities, around 70% (221 municipalities) are audited for the first time and the rest have already been audited at least once before 2011.

Once a municipality is announced to be audited, the CGU gathers information on all federal funds transferred to the municipal government mostly in the past 3 years and issues a selection of inspection orders, each associated with a specific government project. Once these inspection orders are decided, a team of centrally appointed auditors is sent to the municipality within days of the announcement to conduct fieldwork.²¹ Importantly, auditors also meet with members of the local community to gather direct complaints about any malfeasance. Within weeks of the inspection, a detailed report containing all irregularities found is submitted to the central CGU office in Brasilia and further distributed to other federal agencies responsible for investigating and punishing illicit acts in the political and public spheres. Finally, for each municipality audited, a detailed written report is made public on the Internet and disclosed to other media sources approximately six to eight months after the audit announcement.

The CGU audit program has been studied extensively, both in terms of how the information obtained in the audits has been used in political campaigns and in voters' selection and sanctioning of municipal politicians (Ferraz and Finan, 2008) and in terms of its effectiveness in combating subsequent corruption (Avis et al., 2018). In addition, previous studies have documented the role of local media as a crucial channel for citizens to learn about audit results as well as subsequent legal action against corrupt politicians and officials in their home and surrounding municipalities.²² Although there is no direct evidence showing that citizens learned about the audits or audit reports, Ferraz and Finan

²⁰I also do not consider the 2015 lottery draw as the threshold for eligible municipalities suddenly dropped from 500,000 to 100,000 in the last year. Consequently, the municipalities audited in 2015 are much smaller in terms of population size and have a higher share of the workforce in the public sector compared to the other audited cohorts during 2011-2014.

²¹At the beginning of the program all sectors are investigated for all municipalities. Beginning in August 2005 the CGU decided to target a limited number of selected sectors in larger municipalities as they receive substantially more transfers (Avis et al., 2018). For example, in the 36th lottery drawn in July 2012, only the education and social assistance sectors were audited in municipalities with more than 50,000 inhabitants, while in smaller municipalities the health sector was also audited in addition to the previous two.

²²See example: <http://tresfronteirasam.com.br/radio/noticias.php?noticia=1003>.

(2008) provides both anecdotal and empirical evidence that information from the audits reached voters and was widely used during municipal elections. Moreover, Bobonis et al. (2023) shows that by reducing citizens' interaction with politicians and their knowledge of incumbents, audits also undermine clientelist relationships and perceptions of politician reciprocity. In support of findings from previous literature, in Online Appendix B I provide some additional analysis using survey data from *Latinobarómetro* and show suggestive evidence that audits lead to a (locally) improved perception in progress made combatting corruption in state institutions, both immediately following the audits and in the longer run. However, there's little evidence that the local municipal audits altered corruption perception at the national level, which remains stably high over the years of the program (Appendix Figure B1).

2.2 Higher Education in Brazil

The Brazilian Higher Education System consists of both private and public universities. The public universities can be further divided into federal, state and municipal universities, which account for approximately 35.6%, 38.8% and, 25.6% of 278 public institutions in the 2010 Census of Higher Education respectively. Private universities represent a much larger share of the higher education market, with a total number of 2,100 universities and about 1.72 million freshmen enrolled in the year 2010, accounting for almost 88.3% of all institutions and 78% of total new enrollments. However, public universities are tuition-free and widely perceived to be of higher quality and more prestigious. They tend to be over-subscribed and more selective compared to their private counterparts.

Similar to many other countries, prospective college students in Brazil enroll in specific university-degree programs (Law degree at the University of Brasília, for instance). In other words, students potentially take into account career paths to pursue (a lawyer, economist, engineer, teacher etc.) at the time of their college application. A bachelor's degree generally takes about 4 to 6 years to finish, with the exact duration varying across fields of study.²³

Before 2010, college admissions in Brazil were fully decentralized, in which students applied for degree programs months before institution-specific exams called *Vestibular*.²⁴ In 2010, the Ministry of Education of Brazil carried out centralization reforms, introducing the digital college application platform called SISU. Federal and state universities have

²³For example, degrees in Business Administration on average take 4 years to complete, degrees in Law or Engineering normally take 5 years, and degrees in Medicine take 6 years.

²⁴Candidate students must choose their majors by the time they sign in for the Vestibular, which often only include a single stage exam where subject-specific scores are adjusted by weights depending on the student's major choice.

gradually adopted SISU, which matches students to degree programs using their uniform exam scores from the National High School Exam (ENEM). Private universities, on the other hand, may also take students' performance in ENEM into account for admissions, although the exact selection criteria may vary across institutions (it can be based on institution-specific *Vestibular* exam grades only, ENEM grades only, or a mixture of both).

The academic year in Brazil typically runs from March to December. In general, students take the ENEM test in November or December of the year when they are about to graduate high school. They can also opt to take institution-specific *Vestibular* exams, which could take place from November to January. Students then use these test scores to enroll in universities in the following academic year, which normally begins in February or March. Some universities or degree programs also open up second rounds of admissions in July and August.²⁵

2.3 Public Sector Careers in Brazil

As of 2018, public employees (federal, state and municipal) made up about 19% of the entire Brazilian workforce. The majority of the public sector posts are allocated via a highly competitive public contest called *Concurso Público*, which generally consists of a screening stage of basic academic credentials as well as both written and oral exams. The *concursos* in Brazil are considered highly meritocratic and legally professional (Grindle, 2012), while previous literature has also shown that grades in civil service examinations reliably predict performance post-selection (Dahis et al., 2020). Compared to the private sector, careers in the public sector typically offer greater job security and a significant wage premium (Cavalcanti and Santos, 2021; Jales et al., 2024). As a consequence, public sector jobs are highly competitive, especially for state and federal level positions, with an average probability of being hired around 4% (Mocanu, 2024).

There are, however, distinct types of contracts for public employment. Public sector workers recruited through the merit-based *concursos* are called tenure-track civil servants. They can acquire tenure after three years of full service, after which dismissals can only occur after a judicial ruling for misconduct such as corruption or job abandonment.²⁶ A different group of public sector workers can be directly appointed without a civil service exam.²⁷ This type of contract allows more flexibility in public hiring yet in the meantime

²⁵The exact admission dates could vary by institution, particularly for private institutions.

²⁶See example news reports of dismissals of civil servants on the ground of corruption charges: <https://agenciabrasil.ebc.com.br/en/geral/noticia/2016-07/brazil-government-dismissed-251-civil-servants-corruption> and <https://www.gov.br/cgu/pt-br/assuntos/noticias/2019/01/governo-federal-expulsa-643-servidores-em-2018-por-praticas-ilicitas>.

²⁷I follow Colonnelli et al. (2020b) and classify meritocratic or discretionary jobs based on the variable

grants politicians more discretion in the bureaucratic selection process, as studies have shown that municipal bureaucrats in Brazil are closely tagged to local politicians and political turnovers (Colonnelli et al., 2020b; Akhtari et al., 2022; Toral, 2024). At the end of 2018, workers hired via discretionary contracts accounted for only about 13.6% of the total public workforce and yet 51% of all new public contracts generated.

3 Data & Descriptive Statistics

3.1 Data Sources

To construct my main dataset, I combine several sources of individual-level data listed as follows.

ENEM: This dataset includes the universe of students who participate in the annual national high school exit exam called ENEM (*Exame Nacional do Ensino Médio*), with records on subject-specific test scores and a socioeconomic survey capturing student family background. Participation in ENEM is not mandatory yet has become increasingly prevalent after the 2009 reform, which made ENEM scores a requirement for applying to public universities as well as for soliciting loans and scholarships to attend private universities. In principle, students can use ENEM test scores from a given academic year to apply for university admission in the following year. I observe the universe of students taking the exam for the period 2009-2018, which corresponds to university enrollment seasons in 2010-2019. I also observe students' geographic location (municipality of residence) at the time of participating in the exam. Lastly, given its standardized format, I use the ENEM test score as a proxy for student cognitive ability in my empirical analysis.

Census of Higher Education: The second dataset I use is the Brazilian Census of Higher Education (*Censo da Educação Superior*). The student module contains the universe of students enrolled in higher education in Brazil, with information on the specific institutions and degree programs in which they are enrolled, as well as their status of enrollment (actively enrolled, dropped out, or graduated). In line with ENEM, I observe the census data for the period 2010-2019. The data is considered to be of very high quality, as most institutions have their systems integrated with the census in real time (Dobbin et al., 2021; Otero et al., 2021). In addition to student-degree level data, the dataset also incorporates separate modules for degree courses and institutions.

Matched Employer-Employee Data: The third dataset I use is the Brazilian matched

Contract Type (*Tipo de Vínculo*) in RAIS. Discretionary jobs can include temporary public sector jobs as well as appointed-based jobs such as commissioned posts or positions of trust, but there is lack of information to disaggregate the specific categories.

employer-employee dataset, known as RAIS (*Relação Anual de Informações Sociais*), available from 2010 to 2019. RAIS is considered a high-quality census of the formal labor market in Brazil (Dix-Carneiro, 2014). It contains the universe of formal labor market employees, covering both the private and public sector, with information on contract details, hiring and firing dates, detailed occupations, and wages. By linking students from the higher education data to RAIS, I create a mapping of degree enrollment and student demographics to their early career employment outcomes.

All the individual-level datasets listed above are available at the National Institute of Educational Studies and Research (INEP), under the Brazilian Ministry of Education.²⁸ Individual identifiers (pseudo-social security number) are provided to merge across datasets, allowing me to trace students from high school to college and eventually to the labor market. I then aggregate the individual-level data into a municipal-level panel.

CGU Audits: From the official website of CGU, I collect the full list of lottery draws during the randomized phase of the program (2003-2015), as well as the list of municipalities audited during the hybrid phase (2015-2018). I focus on municipalities audited during 2011-2014 (corresponding to lotteries numbered 34-39), together with detailed audit reports for each audited municipality. The reports contain information on the total amount of federal transfers audited, the sectors audited, and an itemized list describing each irregularity uncovered. Following Avis et al. (2018), I classify each irregularity as either an act of mismanagement or corruption. I then merge the municipal-level panel with the occurrence of CGU audits to construct my main dataset.

Other Data: I complement the main dataset with municipal-level characteristics from two additional sources: the 2010 Population Census and a 2009 municipal survey called *Perfil dos Municípios Brasileiros*. Both datasets are made publicly available by IBGE, the Brazilian Institute of Geography and Statistics. Finally, I use the *Latinobarómetro* survey (2001-2020) which records a range of public opinions on corruption and trust in institutions for a representative sample of Brazilian population in each survey year.

3.2 Sample and Descriptive Statistics

To start with, I focus my sample on freshmen (first-year) students who enrolled in any Brazilian university during 2010-2019. I restrict the sample to students who took the ENEM exam, as this allows me to observe key information such as their geolocation (mu-

²⁸The individual level data is accessed through authorized entry into the Secure Room of the Protected Data Access Service (Sedap) of the National Institute of Educational Studies and Research Anísio Teixeira (INEP). Data access is available upon approval of research projects. See details: <https://www.gov.br/inep/pt-br/areas-de-atuacao/gestao-do-conhecimento-e-estudos-educacionais/cibec/servico-de-acesso-a-dados-protegidos-sedap/solicitacao-de-acesso>.

municipality of residence). For this subset of students, I observe the major(s) they are enrolled in higher education and calculate the shares of each major enrollment among all students from the same municipality.²⁹ The classification of majors is based on the 2018 edition of the International Standard Classification of Education Adapted for Undergraduate and Sequential Courses.³⁰ Appendix Figure A1 plots the yearly trend of major enrollment in higher education in Brazil. Overall, the period 2010-2014 witnessed a slight rise in enrollment in STEM degrees, mainly driven by engineering, while the popularity starts declining post-2015. Enrollment in other popular degree choices, such as business/law, remains relatively stable over the period of study.

My final sample for the first part of the analysis consists of nearly 18 million observations at the student-major level that I observe beginning the high school exit exam. For the full sample of freshmen students, I classify students as *high-ability* or *low-ability* based on whether their ENEM performance falls into the top 25% or bottom 50% within the same exam year. Lastly, all individual-level datasets are aggregated to a panel of 3,630 municipalities observed over the period 2010-2019.

For the second part of the analysis, I trace students to RAIS and observe their early career outcomes in the formal labor market. Given the available timespan of the data, I can observe a subset of students who enrolled in universities during 2010-2019 and subsequently appeared in RAIS. Appendix Figure A2 illustrates the share of students successfully traced to RAIS by year of enrollment (Panel A) and by degree enrolled (Panel B). One can see that more than 25% of students who enrolled in universities in 2010 entered the formal labor market within nine years, whereas less than 2% of students enrolled in 2019 are found in RAIS by the end of 2019.³¹ In addition, Panel B shows that attrition rate is similar for business/law and engineering degrees in the baseline. In total, I manage to trace about 11.7% of the sample from the previous part of the analysis.³² I then classify public versus

²⁹Students who are enrolled in more than one major are counted multiple times when calculating the aggregate major enrollment.

³⁰Commonly referred to as *Cine Brasil*. The ten broad categories (abbreviations in parentheses) are education (edu), arts and humanities (hum), social sciences (sol), business administration and law (adm), engineering (eng), natural sciences and mathematics (nat), computer science and IT (csi), medicine (hea), agriculture (agr) and services (ser).

³¹To capture students' intended major choice in the first part of the analysis, I include all freshmen students in my sample, regardless of whether they eventually complete the enrolled program. This implies that students traced in RAIS can include college dropouts as well as students working part-time.

³²Out of the 11.7%, about 4.3% (37% of traced students) are first-hire contracts defined by whether the variable Type of Admission (*Tipo de Admissão*) in RAIS equals one. Several factors could explain the seemingly low fraction of students traced to RAIS. First, many students could still be pursuing college or postgraduate education, preparing for public sector exams, or experiencing unemployment spells after graduation. Second, students who work in the informal sector or abroad do not appear in RAIS, which covers only domestic formal sector employees. Third, students working part-time or with prior work experience are excluded from my RAIS sample, as their career choice would have occurred before their major choice.

private sector workers based on contract types recorded in RAIS and calculate the share of students who obtain their first formal job in the public versus private sector among those from the same origin municipality. The second row of Appendix Table A1 summarizes the average time between university enrollment and first RAIS appearance for the 2010 enrollment cohort: 3.7 years for private sector workers and 4.7 years for civil servants. These differences narrow when the sample is restricted to those who appear in RAIS at least four years after enrollment (hypothetical minimum years for degree completion).

Table 1 presents the summary statistics comparing treatment and control municipalities for the period 2011-2014. Panel A reports characteristics from the 2010 population census as well as the 2009 municipal survey, Panel B reports characteristics of the higher education market, and Panel C reports characteristics of the labor market. In the main analysis, I focus on *first-audited* municipalities, defined as those audited for the first time during 2011-2014 and not audited during 2003-2010, as the treated group. In comparison, the control group includes *never-audited* municipalities, meaning those eligible for the program yet never audited throughout 2003-2018. Importantly, I exclude municipalities audited later in the hybrid phase during 2015-2018 to avoid the confounding role they play as the “later-treated”.³³ Column 5 of Table 1 reports differences in group means and the corresponding standard errors. Out of 16 characteristics, only one (the share of urban population) is statistically significant at the 10% level. Audited municipalities also appear to have a larger public workforce compared to control municipalities, but the differences are not statistically significant. Overall, first-audited municipalities look very similar to never-audited municipalities across a range of baseline characteristics.

4 Anti-Corruption Audits and Talent Allocation

4.1 Empirical Strategy

The central part of my analysis investigates the impact of anti-corruption audits on student major enrollment and career allocation. I address this empirical question under a generalized difference-in-difference framework, exploiting the staggered nature of the randomized audit program across municipalities and years. Differently from previous studies on CGU audits using the standard two-way fixed-effect (TWFE) regression setup (Gonzales, 2021; Colonnelli and Prem, 2022), I implement a “stacked” difference-in-difference

³³A caveat here is that municipalities audited in the hybrid phase are selected based on their propensity for corruption. The balance checks in Table 1 alleviate this concern to some extent. In addition, I provide robustness checks when such municipalities are included in the control group in Appendix Table F2. Baseline results are similar in either case.

design, which estimates treatment effects based on the comparison of units switching into treatment to not-yet-treated units within the time window of interest (Cengiz et al., 2019; Deshpande and Li, 2019; Vannutelli, 2022).³⁴ In Appendix Figure F1, I present event-study estimated using the imputation approach (Borusyak et al., 2024) and show that the main results are robust to alternative estimation methods.

Specifically, I consider each “treatment cohort” as a separate sub-experiment. A “treatment cohort” c includes all *first-audited* municipalities at time c , together with *never-audited* eligible municipalities as “clean” controls. In the baseline specification, I consider the year as the timespan and focus on four treatment cohorts audited in 2011, 2012, 2013, and 2014.³⁵ I then “stack” all cohort-specific difference-in-differences and estimate the following:

$$Y_{mct} = \beta \text{Audit}_{mc} \times \text{Post}_{ct} + \delta_{mc} + \lambda_{cst} + \epsilon_{mct}, \quad (1)$$

where Y_{mct} is the outcome aggregated at municipality m for treatment cohort c measured at time t (for instance, the share of freshmen enrolled in engineering or the share of freshmen who end up in the public sector). Audit_{mc} is the cohort-specific treatment indicator equal to 1 for municipalities audited in year c , and Post_{ct} is the cohort-specific event time dummy equal to 1 for all periods t after audit announcement in year c .³⁶

Importantly, exposure to audits is defined based on students’ municipality of residence at the time they take the high school exit exam, prior to college enrollment.³⁷ Thus, outcomes for municipality m at year t (such as the share of freshmen enrolled in engineering) are calculated using all students who reportedly resided in municipality m at $t - 1$ (the year before college enrollment).

The key parameter β captures the average treatment effect of local government audits.³⁸

³⁴The stacked design explicitly deals with the potential bias of the traditional TWFE estimator in the presence of treatment effect heterogeneity (Goodman-Bacon, 2021). One can refer to De Chaisemartin and d’Haultfoeuille (2020, 2023), Callaway and Sant’Anna (2021), Sun and Abraham (2021), Roth et al. (2023), and Borusyak et al. (2024) for more recent discussions and reviews in the applied econometrics literature.

³⁵The same is true if the timespan is semester-based (half-year), in which case each yearly cohort could be further divided into “winter” and “summer” cohorts.

³⁶The “audit announcement” corresponds to the date of the lottery draw (publicly aired) and the subsequent arrival of auditors within weeks. Audit reports are generally made public six to eight months later (see Section 5.1 for details). In my sample (lottery draws 2011–2014), the median time between announcement and report release is eight months, with a minimum of five months (for the 2014 wave only).

³⁷This timing corresponds to the key decision-making period regarding college major choice, and I assume that students are more likely to be exposed to information regarding audits happening in the municipality where they are physically located. While birthplace municipality could be used as the alternative geolocator, it is poorly recorded and about 50% of students do not reside in their birthplace by the time of the ENEM exam, according to ENEM 2010.

³⁸Note that β is a (convex) weighted average of cohort-specific average treatment effects, where the weights are determined by the number of treated units in each cohort (Gardner, 2022).

δ_{mc} are cohort-specific municipality fixed effects that absorb any time-invariant differences in municipal characteristics. λ_{cst} are cohort-specific state-by-year fixed effects to capture common shocks within states and effectively restrict the comparisons to municipalities within the same state. Unless otherwise specified, all regressions are weighted by the number of students reportedly residing in the corresponding municipality in the baseline year of 2010.³⁹ Finally, standard errors are clustered at the municipality level.

To investigate the dynamic evolution of treatment effects and to test for pre-trends, I also estimate the following “stacked” event-study design:

$$Y_{mct} = \sum_{\tau=-k}^k \beta_{\tau} D_{ct}^{\tau} \times Audit_{mc} + \delta_{mc} + \lambda_{cst} + \epsilon_{mct}, \quad (2)$$

where, as before, Y_{mct} is the outcome for municipality m , treatment cohort c , and time t . The post-treatment indicator is now replaced with a series of event-time dummies D_{ct}^{τ} , spanning from k periods before to k periods after the audit. The period $\tau = -1$ is omitted as the reference period. In my main specification, I focus on $k = -4, \dots, 7$, using years as the time unit.⁴⁰

The underlying identifying assumption is that, conditional on the set of municipality and time fixed effects, the timing of the audit is unrelated to municipal outcomes (such as the shares of freshmen major enrollment). Potential threats to identification include violations of the parallel trends assumption or anticipatory effects. Previous studies have documented the validity of the randomization assumption (Ferraz and Finan, 2008, 2011; Colonnelli and Prem, 2022), which mitigates concerns that audits were expected by institutions or prospective college students. Lotteries are drawn from the pool of all eligible municipalities, including those that had been audited before. In the meantime, the nature of the “stacked” design requires me to focus on a slightly different sample of municipalities compared to previous studies, namely the municipalities that receive an audit for the first time as treated and those that have never received an audit (throughout 2003-2018) as control. Note, however, that within each lottery wave, whether a municipality drawn for an audit has been audited previously is still random. Nevertheless, I examine the randomization pattern in the data. In column (5) of Table 1, I compare the characteristics of *first-audited* versus *never-audited* municipalities and find few differences between the two at baseline. Overall, the patterns in the data suggest that the randomization assumption is still valid for this “selected” group of treated and control municipalities. I also directly

³⁹I use the baseline 2010 weights to allay the concern about endogenous weighting.

⁴⁰This is the longest window observable given the data, although it results in an unbalanced panel. Alternatively, restricting the sample to a shorter balanced panel with $k = -1, \dots, 4$ produces similar results (see Appendix Figure F3 and Appendix Table F2).

verify the parallel trends assumption by analyzing the dynamics in the β_τ coefficients of equation 2, as I will illustrate in the remaining part of this section.⁴¹

4.2 Audits and College Majors

Among incoming college students in Brazil, the most popular fields of study are business/law, education, health, and engineering, accounting for 30%, 22%, 15%, and 14% of total freshman enrolment in 2010, respectively.⁴² The Higher Education Census allows me to document detailed major enrollment within each category. In my main analysis, however, I focus on the comparison between changes in enrollment in business/law versus engineering following anti-corruption audits. This is motivated by two pieces of empirical patterns observed in major enrollment and subsequent career realization among Brazilian college freshmen in the baseline year of 2010.

First, high-ability students (defined as those in the top 25% of the ENEM grade distribution) face a clear choice between studying business/law or engineering. As shown in Panel A of Figure 2, business/law and engineering are the two most popular major choices among high-ability students, together accounting for more than 40% of total high-ability enrollment in 2010. Low-ability students (defined as those in the bottom 50% of the ENEM distribution), on the other hand, are much more likely to study business/law, education, and health degrees compared to engineering (Panel B). Second, high-ability students majoring in business/law are more likely to become civil servants compared to their counterparts who study engineering. Panel C of Figure 2 plots the demeaned shares of high-ability students becoming civil servants for each major. On average, around 16% of high-ability students who enrolled in business/law in 2010 later appeared in the labor market as civil servants, compared to 14% from engineering, the lowest among all major fields. These numbers imply that high-ability students in business/law are approximately 14.3% more likely to join civil service than those majoring in engineering, whereas the corresponding difference for low-ability students is less drastic (around 8.9%). Notably, degrees such as education and medicine stand out, both constituting large shares of major enrollment and exhibiting high overall propensities for careers in civil service. In Online Appendix C, I elaborate on why degrees like education—which are more closely tied to frontline provider roles such as public school teaching—should be considered a special case in discussions of bureaucratic corruption in Brazil.⁴³

⁴¹To account for potential statistical issues related to pre-trend testing, I conduct sensitivity analysis using methods proposed in [Rambachan and Roth \(2023\)](#). The results are reported in Appendix Figure F2.

⁴²Appendix Figure A3 provides more details on the shares of major enrollment at the baseline year 2010, separately by institution type and by student performance in the ENEM exam.

⁴³In Online Appendix C, I conduct an auxiliary analysis by creating a detailed mapping from majors

Aggregate major enrollment: Table 2 presents the main results of the effects of anti-corruption audits on freshmen major enrollment. The coefficients are estimated from equation 1, relying on a simple set of cohort-specific municipality and state-by-year fixed effects. Pooling first-year students from all universities, the results in Panel A suggest that audits significantly reduced the share of enrollment in business/law (column 1) and increased the share in engineering (column 4). In terms of magnitude, audited municipalities experienced a decline in business/law enrollment by about 1.7 percentage points (pp) and an increase in engineering enrollment by about 1.7 pp. Relative to the mean shares of enrollment, these estimates correspond to a 5.7% relative decline in enrollment in business/law and a 11.3% relative increase in enrollment in engineering. A simple back-of-the-envelope calculation suggests that about 1 in 60 incoming college students switch majors, whereas the average number of freshmen across all municipalities in 2010 was 66.⁴⁴ These results suggest that audits divert freshmen students toward relatively less public-sector-oriented majors (engineering compared to business/law). As a comparison, I repeat the analysis for enrollment in other fields of study in Appendix Table A2. One can observe a small negative effect of audits on enrollment shares in humanities (column 3), while no significant effects overall in other fields of study.

Splitting the sample into students in private and public universities (Panels B and C of Table 2, respectively) demonstrates that the effects are mainly driven by enrollment in private universities. The results are consistent with the interpretation that public universities in Brazil are highly competitive and oversubscribed. Given that number of degree vacancies are pre-determined and fixed, total enrollment should not be affected by audits unless students are systematically driven away from public universities. Meanwhile, private universities are generally undersubscribed and can flexibly accommodate students' demand for degrees.⁴⁵ As shown in Panel B, I find that the effects on major enrollment are amplified for private institutions. In particular, audits significantly decreased enrollment in business/law by about 1.8 pp (column 1) and increased enrollment in engineering by

to alternative public sector careers and provide additional justification for focusing the main analysis on enrollment in business/law versus engineering.

⁴⁴The magnitude is moderate compared to other studies on college major choice in Brazil. For instance, exploiting an affirmative action policy in a large public Brazilian university, [Estevan et al. \(2019\)](#) finds that affected students are about 10% more likely to choose competitive majors (STEM and medicine), with downstream effects on actual enrollment.

⁴⁵A potential concern in interpreting the effects on overall major enrollment is that, in the presence of binding capacity constraints, as is typically the case in public universities, the treatment mechanically displaces students across majors. If students are induced by the audits to shift toward a particular major (e.g., engineering), the fixed number of seats could crowd out other students and mechanically amplifying the observed treatment effect. However, this concern appears limited in the context of public universities, where enrollment quotas are rigid and no significant shifts in enrollment shares are observed. By contrast, shifts in enrollment shares are more apparent in private universities, where capacity is less constrained.

2.1 pp (column 4) in private universities. These estimates further translate to a 5% relative decline in enrollment in business/law and a 14% relative increase in enrollment in engineering.

I provide additional evidence that the effects on major enrollment reflect major-switching behavior among the same group of students, rather than changes in the entry or exit of new students. On the extensive margin, column 1 of Panel A in Appendix Table A3 shows that audits have no significant impact on the total number of freshmen enrolling in universities. In addition, columns 2-3 show slightly more students entering public universities after the audits, but the coefficients are imprecisely estimated. This suggests that the observed changes in major enrollment are mostly the result of reallocation across fields of study within the same type of institution (public or private) and within the same municipality.⁴⁶ To complement the results on enrollment shares, Table 2 also reports estimates on the actual number of students enrolled. The dependent variables in columns 2 and 5 are reported using the inverse hyperbolic sine transformation to take into account the extensive margin, while those in columns 3 and 6 are log-transformed.⁴⁷ Even though the point estimates are not always statistically significant, reassuringly the signs of the estimates are in line with those on enrollment shares.

Finally, Figure 3 provides visual evidence for the effect of audits on major enrollment. I plot the dynamic treatment effects estimated from equation 2. Panel A presents results for the pooled sample, showing both the shares of enrollment in business/law and engineering. I observe little difference between the trends of audited and never-audited municipalities prior to audits, supporting the parallel trends assumption. After an audit is announced, there is an immediate decline in the share of enrollment in business/law among students from audited municipalities compared to their counterparts from never-audited municipalities, while the positive effect on engineering enrollment emerges more gradually. Importantly, both gaps in enrollment shares persist over time (at least seven years after the audit announcement), suggesting long-lasting consequences of anti-corruption efforts on the local distribution of human capital across different fields of specialization.⁴⁸

⁴⁶An additional concern relates to changes in student composition across and within types of institutions. Panels B and C of Appendix Table A3 report the effects of audits on aggregate enrollment by ability group and find no differential effects for either subgroup.

⁴⁷I acknowledge concerns regarding the interpretation of average treatment effects under inverse hyperbolic sine (IHS) transformation as approximating percentage changes, as discussed in [Chen and Roth \(2024\)](#). I provide robustness checks using alternative methods in Table F1 in Online Appendix F, and the results are similar.

⁴⁸One possible driver of the long-run effects—meaning the effects on major enrollment of younger birth cohorts—is the altered perception of corruption opportunities among parents and family members ([Hauk and Saez-Marti, 2002](#); [Hong, 2023](#)), who often influence student major choices. A related explanation is that audits shift social norms and stigma associated with corruption ([Corbacho et al., 2016](#); [Stephenson, 2020](#)),

Splitting the sample into private and public universities (Panels B and C) further strengthens the argument that the dynamic effects observed in the pooled sample can be mainly attributed to enrollment changes in private universities.

Student ability composition: A major limitation of the aggregate major enrollment analysis is that it obscures underlying changes in within-major student composition. This concern is particularly relevant for public universities, where higher quality and prestige attracts more high-ability students, but oversubscription could mask shifts in student characteristics. To the extent that major choice can serve as a proxy for career aspirations, my empirical setting provides an opportunity to examine how candidate pools towards public and private sector career trajectories shift following anti-corruption audits. In the next step, I investigate how audits affect the ability composition of students by type of institution and by major, focusing on cognitive ability proxied by standardized test scores taken prior to college applications.

Table 3 summarizes the main results for public universities, highlighting compositional changes even when little change is observed in aggregate enrollment (corresponding event-study plots are reported in Appendix Figure A5). As shown in column 1 of Panel A, total enrollment in business/law declines only slightly following the audits. However, column 2-4 reveal significant shifts in student ability composition. Specifically, there is a 14.8% relative decline in the number of high-ability students enrolling in business/law, largely compensated by a 14.1% relative increase in students from the lower grade quartiles. Panel B shows that more students are entering engineering degree programs in public universities across the ability distribution, although the coefficients are less precisely estimated. Results for private universities are separately reported in the Appendix Table A4, where similar patterns are observed but the effects on business/law (engineering) enrollment are less (more) pronounced.⁴⁹ In summary, these results illustrate that high-academic-performing students increasingly shy away from public-sector-oriented majors following anti-corruption audits at local municipal governments, as reflected in the changing enrollment patterns in business administration and law degrees.

4.3 Audits and Realized Careers

Given that major choice is nonetheless a noisy proxy for career preferences, I next investigate the downstream effects of audits on labor market outcomes. As discussed in Section

with individual preferences further shaped by peer exposure and social interactions.

⁴⁹Appendix Table A5 provides a more comprehensive illustration of changes in enrollment patterns by ability group following the audits, pooling all universities. In particular, Panel A suggests that high-ability students are leaving business/law and, by and large, entering STEM fields, including mathematics and natural sciences, engineering, and computer science & IT.

3.2, I observe labor market outcomes for the subgroup of students who enrolled in higher education during 2010–2019 and subsequently appeared in RAIS before the end of 2019. I focus specifically on the first full-time jobs they obtain in the formal labor market and define whether they work in the public or private sector based on the type of labor contract.⁵⁰ I then aggregate the individual outcomes at the municipality-year level and examine the effects of audits on both overall career allocation and workforce composition by student ability. It is important to note that students’ exposure to audits is defined based on whether they enroll in higher education after an audit occurs in their municipality of residence. This definition is consistent throughout the empirical analysis, irrespective of the locations where students attend university or work later on.

Aggregate career allocation: Table 4 summarizes the effects of anti-corruption audits on the allocation of first jobs in the labor market. Overall, audits lead to more students obtaining their first jobs in the private sector, while the effect on public sector career realizations is negative yet less precisely estimated. As shown in column 1, audits do not appear to affect the fraction of students who end up in the public sector. Columns 2 and 3 report the estimates for the number of students working in the public sector, using inverse hyperbolic sine (IHS) and log transformations, respectively. The IHS specification accounts for the extensive margin, addressing cases where no students from a municipality are observed working in the public sector in RAIS, while the log specification focuses on the intensive margin only. All in all, the estimates suggest that fewer students sort into public sector careers following the audits, although the coefficients are noisily estimated.⁵¹ On the other hand, the opposite pattern is clearly observed for students entering the private sector. Columns 5 and 6 illustrate an increase in the number of students working in the private sector, regardless of whether the extensive margin is considered. The coefficients suggest that, in audited municipalities approximately 15% more students end up undertaking their first job in the private sector.

Complementing the estimates in Table 4, Figure 4 explores the dynamic effects of au-

⁵⁰Since RAIS only records formal labor market employees, I am not able to track students who enter the informal sector, which is one reason behind the sample attrition. The informal sector accounts for a substantial share of the Brazilian economy (Ulyssea, 2018), yet existing research on anti-corruption activities and the informal sector is limited due to data availability. Colonnelli and Prem (2022) provides suggestive evidence that the CGU audits have limited impacts on transitions between informal and formal employment.

⁵¹I further divide public sector workers into tenure-track civil servants and temporary workers hired under discretion, and find evidence suggesting that stronger negative effects are concentrated among tenure-track civil servants, while the size of temporary workforce in fact increased (results reported in Appendix Table A6). Appendix Table A7 explores additional alternative categorizations of public sector careers—by branch of government, level of hierarchy, and occupation—and does not uncover strong differential patterns. Lastly, I report results separately for students enrolled in private and public universities in Appendix Table A8, and show that, consistent with the earlier results on major enrollment, the effects of audits on career allocation are also mainly driven by private university students.

dits on realized careers. The effects of audits on the number (IHS-transformed) of students employed in the public and private sectors are reported separately. One can see the increase in the share of students working in the private sector is mainly driven by more students heading to the private sector. Specifically, a positive effect on private employment sets in among enrollment cohorts immediately following audit exposure. These positive effects also persist in the “longer run” for younger enrollment cohorts. For public sector employment, however, the pattern is less clear-cut. Figure 4 shows that audits do not affect public employment until around three years after audit exposure when a negative effect kicks in. This negative effect then gradually levels off over time, a pattern that is also observed when I focus separately on tenure-track civil servants and temporary workers (results reported in Appendix Figure A6).⁵² All in all, the evidence presented in this section implies that anti-corruption audits lead to a rise in private sector employment, while the effect on public sector employment appears negative yet ambiguous. It is important to note, however, any null effect on aggregate public sector employment (quantity) could mask underlying changes in the type of individuals selecting into the public sector (quality). In the next step, I closely examine whether audits altered the composition of both the private and public sector workforce, with a focus on potential differential selection by student ability.

Workforce ability composition: Given that public sector jobs in Brazil, and tenure-track positions in particular, are highly competitive and oversubscribed, they are eventually filled provided that there are no dramatic changes in government hiring practices.⁵³ Echoing the earlier analysis on the ability composition of students across different majors, I now explore whether audits also affect the ability composition of students entering different career paths.

Table 5 summarizes the effects of audits on the composition of the private and public sector workforce in terms of student ability. Column 1 first recapitulates the effect of audits on aggregate career allocation (the denominator). Columns 2-4 then report effects separately for the numbers (IHS-transformed) of students in each career category by their relative position in the ability (ENEM grade) distribution. As shown in column 4 of Panel A, audits lead to a significant drop in the number of public sector workers coming from the top quartile of the ability distribution: a relative decline of 29.5%. Columns 2-3 re-

⁵²One explanation for the initially muted and subsequently negative effects is that different event-study estimates are obtained based on slightly different samples. Thus, the estimates reflect both dynamic treatment effects and changes in cohort composition: younger enrollment cohorts have less time to appear in RAIS and are subject to higher sample attrition. I present results estimated from a balanced panel in Appendix Figure F2 as a robustness check.

⁵³I evaluate and rule out the impact of audits on public sector hiring as a confounding mechanism in section 5.2.

veal that this decline is much less drastic among other lower ability groups. In contrast, among students embarking on their career in the private sector, audits are associated with a relative increase of about 17.3% in the number of students from both the top two quartiles.⁵⁴ In Appendix Figure A7, I provide complementary dynamic evidence using the event-study specification. Panels A and B report results for the number of high-ability students, while Panels C and D report results for the corresponding shares. One can observe that the treatment effects are persistent and pronounced even for younger enrollment cohorts in the longer run. Lastly, I explore workforce composition in terms of demographic and socioeconomic characteristics such as gender, parental education, and family income (Appendix Table A9), but do not find strong patterns of sorting along these dimensions. Overall, the results on workforce composition highlight the selection of high-ability students out of civil service and into the private sector in audited municipalities, illustrating a public-sector *brain drain*.

5 Drivers of Talent Allocation - Mechanisms

Talent allocation toward the public sector is shaped by both the supply of and demand for talented individuals pursuing public sector careers. This section discusses plausible mechanisms behind the effects of audits on talent allocation. I first lay out the main hypotheses that could be driving students' behavioral responses to audits and provide suggestive evidence in support of or against these hypotheses. I then discuss and rule out alternative explanations related to changes in education supply or labor demand.

5.1 Talent Supply: Perceived Career Returns

Arguably, both ability and pro-sociality (or honesty) are key dimensions that characterize the overall quality of public personnel.⁵⁵ According to the classical theory on motivation crowding-out (Bénabou and Tirole, 2003, 2006), extrinsic awards such as financial incen-

⁵⁴It is worth emphasizing that workforce composition is observed conditioning on there being a positive number of students traced to RAIS in the corresponding year-municipality. To alleviate the concern that the effects on ability composition are driven by the subsample where outcomes are noisily measured, I provide robustness checks in Appendix Table F3 where alternative sample restrictions are applied.

⁵⁵An extensive literature has elaborated on the important role of these two traits, together and respectively. The literature stems from discussions on what makes a good elected politician (Caselli and Morelli, 2004), to more recent papers on the selection of frontline providers and the delivery of public services spanning various contexts (Gregg et al., 2011; Dal Bó et al., 2013; Deserranno, 2019; Ashraf et al., 2020; Khan, 2020). Furthermore, Dahis et al. (2020), Fenizia (2022), and Best et al. (2023) show that bureaucratic capability is a reliable predictor for the performance of bureaucrats in office (the intensive margin). In particular, Dahis et al. (2020) uses scores from the public sector entrance exams as a proxy for cognitive ability, focusing on state judges in the context of Brazil.

tives could attract talented agents, whose effort is more productive, at the expense of pro-social agents who, other things equal, exert more effort (Ashraf et al., 2020). The same argument, however, may not apply to corruption rents. Conceptually, the prevalence of corruption in the public sector would attract *rent-seekers* at the expense of *pro-social* talent, assuming that corruption is perceived as entailing a negative externality to the public community. To what extent anti-corruption efforts could crowd out (in) agents in terms of ability, however, may depend on institution-specific factors such as the correlation between ability and pro-sociality in the candidate pool.

The context I study provides an opportunity to shed light on this empirical question. By utilizing standardized test scores as a proxy for student cognitive ability, my main results illustrate a brain drain from public sector careers. However, the lack of measures on pro-sociality or honesty from administrative data makes it challenging to pin down exactly why anti-corruption audits might crowd out high-ability students. On one hand, audits could lead to a perception of reduced corruption, deterring high-ability students who join the public sector for rent extraction. I refer to this channel as *diminished rent-seeking*. On the other hand, through the revelation of local corruption and subsequent legal charges against corrupt officials, audits may alter non-pecuniary incentives to join the public sector. These incentives can be further classified as pro-social motivation or reputation concerns (Besley et al., 2022), based on which I separately label the other two channels as *motivation crowding-out* and *reputation deterrence effect*.

Previous studies have shown that the CGU audits are effective at curbing local corruption (Avis et al., 2018), and that both voters' initial priors and actual information revealed on local corruption matter in the selection and sanctioning of municipal politicians (Ferraz and Finan, 2008). Considering that I focus on the latter stage of the CGU audit program from 2011 onwards, it is plausible that citizens have further updated their priors regarding local corruption as the program unfolds across the nation, even for those from municipalities that haven't been directly audited.⁵⁶ Using data from the *Latinobarómetro* survey, in Online Appendix B I provide suggestive evidence that audits are associated with a (locally) improved perception of progress made combatting corruption, even though audits do not seem to alter the overall high corruption perception across the nation. However, as information on perceptions of rent-seeking versus non-pecuniary returns are unavailable, I cannot directly estimate the effects of audits on these perceptions per se. While I am not

⁵⁶In fact, Colonnelli and Prem (2022) documents large spillover effects of audits on local economic activities, which they interpret as the deterrence impact of audits in nearby municipalities by raising the salience and threat of future audits. I follow their approach and consider a municipality as "indirectly" exposed to audits if a nearby municipality in the same microregion receives an audit. I uncover spillover effects but of smaller magnitude for major enrollment, the results on which are reported in Appendix Table A10.

able to attribute all the effects to one particular channel, several pieces of evidence support the *diminished rent-seeking* and *reputation deterrence effect* hypotheses.

Immediate effects following audit announcement: I begin by leveraging a finer timing to examine the baseline effects of audits on major enrollment, as illustrated by Figure 5. A time period t is now a semester (half-year), and I maintain a balanced sample of municipalities observed between $[t - 3, t + 7]$ in this part of the analysis. The overall take-away remains unchanged: following the audits, there is a decline in the share of freshmen enrolled in business/law and an increase in engineering. A key new message conveyed in Figure 5 is that the effects appear immediately in the semester of the audit announcement ($t + 0$). Note that at this stage, audit reports detailing any acts of corruption have not been released to the public, as they typically become available six to eight months after the announcement. With the information channel effectively shut down at this short interval, the immediate response suggests that students form priors about local corruption and/or the implications of the audits based on corruption revealed in earlier years of the CGU program in other municipalities. Upon announcement of the new set of municipalities to be audited, students may anticipate that their local government would be subject to central monitoring. This could imply reduced corruption opportunities for students drawn to rent-seeking, or increased salience of social norms around political corruption and the reputational costs of public-sector careers. The effect is short-lived as the coefficients revert to zero at $t + 1$, but bounce back in the medium run, when information on local corruption is made public and corrupt politicians and bureaucrats begin to face legal consequences.

Heterogeneity by detected corruption: I further examine the effects at refined timing to explore heterogeneity by the level of corruption uncovered, as illustrated in Panels C and D in Figure 5 (corresponding table estimates reported in Appendix Tables A11). Specifically, I utilize detailed information from the audit reports regarding detected irregularities and label an audited municipality as “high corruption” if the share of inspection orders with irregularities classified as severe corruption is above the median among all first-audited municipalities during 2011-2014.⁵⁷ Panels A and B show clear patterns: whether audits affect freshmen major enrollment depends on whether the audits are effective at detecting a high level of corruption. Moreover, the immediate effects at $t + 0$ and the “bounce-back” effects are more starkly exhibited in municipalities with high corruption uncovered. In contrast, the lack of reactions in low-corruption municipalities aligns

⁵⁷Irregularities are grouped into three categories: error in documents (*falha formal*), intermediate error (*falha média*), and severe error (*falha grave*), where severe error cases tend to capture unambiguous cases of corruption (Avis et al., 2018; Gonzales, 2021).

with the interpretation that students hold largely accurate priors regarding the corruption level in their locality.⁵⁸ Furthermore, A similar pattern of heterogeneous effects is observed with respect to local internet access (Panels A and B of Appendix Figure A8 and corresponding table estimates in Appendix Table A12), highlighting the key role of local media in disseminating information regarding audit announcements and reports.⁵⁹

Further discussions: The alternative hypothesis that intrinsically motivated talent is crowded out is less likely to hold for the following reasons. First, the heterogeneous effects in Figure 5 suggest that, by and large, students hold correct priors about local corruption. Intrinsically motivated students would likely abstain from public sector careers in high-corruption municipalities from the outset. Nonetheless, the immediate effects following the audit announcements in high-corruption municipalities (but before the revelation of actual corruption) provide evidence against the *crowding-out* story, as there is no information update (negative surprise shock) at the time of audit announcements. Second, although I do not observe individual-level measures of prosociality, I adopt a revealed preference approach by examining the types of occupations students take up. To this end, I classify occupations ex-ante based on their job descriptions, and examine whether high-ability students disproportionately sort out of public sector occupations that are prone to rent-seeking, and/or sort into private sector occupations that are more pro-social.⁶⁰ Columns 1-3 of Appendix Table A13 show that high-ability students are leaving both public sector careers with relatively high and low rent-extraction opportunities, while column 3 suggests the exit is somewhat stronger in high rent-seeking positions. On the other hand, column 6 suggests that, even though the share of high-ability students in high pro-social jobs saw a slight increase post-audits, the coefficient is small and statistically insignificant. Overall, I do not find evidence of high-ability students disproportionately sorting into prosocial occupations after being driven out of the public sector. Finally, descriptive

⁵⁸One caveat with this heterogeneity analysis is that, while audits are random, the amount of corruption detected is not. Colonnelli and Prem (2022) shows that replacing actual corruption with predicted corruption based on machine learning methods (Colonnelli et al., 2020a) also reveals substantial degree of heterogeneity across municipalities. In addition, the absence of pre-trends in the event-study plots of Figure 5 alleviates this concern.

⁵⁹I also find interesting disparities between traditional and modern forms of media. Unlike previous literature that emphasizes the role of local radio (Ferraz and Finan, 2008; Avis et al., 2018) in spreading information on audits and corruption, the heterogeneous effects by the presence of a local AM radio station on major enrollment are less striking (Panels C and D in Appendix Figure A8). A likely explanation is that I focus on the later stage of the audit campaign, when the role of traditional media such as the radio have been dwarfed by the emergence of modern means of media. According to the *Perfil dos Municípios Brasileiros* (see Panel A of Table 1 for summary statistics), the share of municipalities reportedly having a local AM radio station barely changed from 2001 (20.6%) to 2009 (21.3%), while the share of municipalities with an internet provider more than doubled (from 22.7% to 55.6%) during this period.

⁶⁰Details on the categorization of Brazilian occupations are elaborated in Online Appendix E.

evidence in Online Appendix B shows corruption perception is widespread in Brazil and the audit program did not shift this perception at the national level. This suggests that the institutional environment in Brazil more closely resembles a “rent-seeking equilibrium” in which corruption attracts the corrupt (Acemoglu, 1995; Hanna and Wang, 2017).

I cannot, however, rule out the possibility that intrinsically motivated individuals are attracted to the public sector following the audits, as corruption is effectively reduced, that is, a *motivation crowding-in* channel.⁶¹ In this case, the effects I observe on talent reallocation reflect net effects of rent-seeking or reputation-prone talent being discouraged from entering the public sector, while pro-social students being drawn in, where the former appears to dominate.

Lastly, I also find evidence suggesting the role of issue salience in amplifying students’ behavioral responses to audits. In particular, the decomposition of group-specific treatment effects shows that the effect is stronger in years when major corruption scandals were revealed in Brazil. Using the estimator proposed in Callaway and Sant’Anna (2021), Appendix Figure A9 shows the treatment effects are the strongest for audit draws from the years 2011 and 2014, when political corruption was in the spotlight due to large-scale, high-profile scandals.⁶²

Efficiency implications: If the diminished rent-seeking channel is the main driver behind the effects of audits on talent reallocation, rent-seeking motives then play a central role in attracting talented students to the public sector in Brazil in the absence of policy interventions. This further implies that rampant corruption can distort the allocation of human capital toward unproductive activities other than its massive direct costs on the economy. It is less clear, however, what are the implications of reputation deterrence on the quality of the final hires. To the extent that reputation and other career concerns reflect self-interested motives, students who are primarily concerned with reputation may behave as opportunistic agents rather than individuals with strong public service motivation.⁶³ Overall, the findings in this section suggest that when corruption is pervasive, talent can be misallocated across the public and private sectors. This misallocation of talent can manifest itself as early as the stage of choosing fields of specialization in higher

⁶¹Alternatively, intrinsically motivated students might join a corrupt public sector aspiring to make a change for the better. The finding of positive selection on integrity (*honesty gain* at no expense of *brain drain*) into state organization in Hong (2023), albeit in a different context, also echoes this explanation.

⁶²2011 is the year when Brazil’s first female president, Dilma Rousseff, came into power, followed immediately by corruption scandals of several high-profile officials and nationwide anti-corruption protests. 2014 marks the beginning of Operation Car Wash, a landmark anti-corruption probe uncovering a massive corruption scheme in the federal government.

⁶³See the literature on the role of collective reputation in contributing to the self-reinforcing nature of corruption (Andvig and Moene, 1990; Tirole, 1996; Mauro, 2004).

education, which have been documented to correlate with long-term economic growth (Murphy et al., 1993; Maloney and Valencia Caicedo, 2022)

5.2 General Equilibrium Responses

As emphasized in section 4.1, students are considered exposed to audits if their municipality of residence receives an anti-corruption audit in the year or the year before they enroll in college. By defining treatment status based on “origin”, I partially abstract away from labor demand factors students face in municipalities where they attend university or begin their careers. However, general equilibrium responses may still confound the results, as both the higher education and formal labor markets in Brazil are relatively localized. In the baseline 2010 enrollment cohort, nearly 40% (70%) of all students attended college in the same municipality (state) as their place of residence while about 53% (91%) found their first jobs in the same municipality (state).⁶⁴ In this section, I directly test whether audits affect *education supply* in the higher education market as well as *labor demand* in the formal labor market. I show that these mechanisms are inconsistent with patterns observed in the analysis using the student sample.

Degree vacancies in higher education: One possible explanation for the changes in major enrollment is that audits affect the supply of university degree vacancies. This may occur if audits, especially those targeting the education sector, alter fiscal transfers to education or lead to university-level reforms that disrupt staffing and planning (Gonzales, 2021). The concern, however, applies mainly to public institutions while private institutions in Brazil operate distinctively and primarily adapt to student demand. Nonetheless, I directly test whether audits affect the number of degree vacancies offered, estimating equation 1 using a sample of universities instead of students. Appendix Table A14 summarizes the results, for private universities (Panel A) and public universities (Panel B) separately. As universities tend to be located in larger and more urbanized municipalities, the sample size is considerably smaller. I also restrict to a balanced panel to reduce noise from sparsely populated periods. The results indicate that following audits, private universities reduce vacancies in business/law and increase them in engineering. In the meantime, one does not see the same reactions from public institutions, where coefficients are imprecisely estimated. These findings are consistent with the interpretation that changes in degree supply in private universities reflect changes in student demand. Moreover, if public universities had reduced business/law vacancies, one would expect

⁶⁴This share is slightly higher for private sector workers (57%) than for civil servants (54%). I restrict to the 2010 cohort as I find suggestive evidence of selective migration out of audited municipalities (see more details on audits and out-migration in Appendix Online D).

business/law degrees to become more competitive, where the marginal student enrolling in business/law would have a higher grade. Instead, I observe the opposite from the student sample: within business/law, high-grade students are being replaced by their lower-grade peers.

Outside option in the private sector: Another potential explanation is that audits increase labor demand in the private sector, making private sector careers more attractive. Prior work has shown that by reducing resource misallocation across firms, audits can spur firm activities in government-dependent sectors (Colonnelli and Prem, 2022; Colonnelli et al., 2022). I explore this channel using a stacked-by-event specification on firm-level data, focusing on the total number of new full-time contracts, an outcome closely related to young talent demand. Appendix Table A15 summarizes the results. In Panel A the sample includes years 2010-2019, while Panel B extends the sample back to 2002 to maximize power, effectively incorporating all audit waves between 2003 and 2014. Overall, I find little evidence of audits increasing aggregate first hires among private sector firms.⁶⁵ This is in contrast with the rise in private employment observed in the student sample (Table 4), suggesting that labor demand responses from firms are not the primary driver of talent reallocation.⁶⁶ Instead, the increase in private sector employment among students is more plausibly a downstream result of switching into private-sector-oriented majors (e.g., STEM), at which stage labor demand factors are less of a consideration due to the short timespan.

Patronage hiring in the public sector: A similar concern arises in the context of public employment, particularly in a setting where patronage hiring⁶⁷ is prevalent (Colonnelli et al., 2020b) and bureaucratic turnover is closely tagged to political turnover (Akhtari et al., 2022). The results in column 1 of Appendix Table A15 demonstrate an increase in new civil servant contracts generated following the audits, particularly when earlier audit waves are included. This pattern contrasts with that observed in the student sample, where I find evidence of reduced public sector career realizations. However, a remaining concern is whether patronage hiring contributes to the outflow of high-ability students from the

⁶⁵This result appears at odds with findings in Colonnelli and Prem (2022), which shows the same CGU audits foster firm creation and lead to more private sector employment and hires in the 6-year window, even though the effect on hires is not statistically significant (Online Appendix Table A16). However, Colonnelli and Prem (2022) also uncover large heterogeneity: incumbent firms in government-dependent sectors grow the most while politically connected firms suffer. Therefore, it is unclear to what extent the boost in private firm activities translates to labor demand for fresh college graduates.

⁶⁶Given Colonnelli and Prem (2022) uncovers large spillover effects on firm activities, however, it is most likely that audits have improved the career outlooks for young talent in nearby municipalities and the local labor markets (micro-regions in Brazil).

⁶⁷Defined as a quid pro quo relationship between the party in power and its political supporters in which public jobs are used as a reward and exchanged for political support (Weingrod, 1968).

public sector ([Colonnelli et al., 2020b](#)). Two pieces of evidence suggest this is unlikely.⁶⁸ First, I observe negative sorting by ability into business/law majors at the college enrollment stage, before the hiring process becomes relevant. Second, temporary public workers in Brazil are potentially more susceptible to patronage hiring. However, Appendix Table [A16](#) reveals that the exit of high-ability students is observed for both tenure-track civil servants and temporary workers.⁶⁹

6 Conclusion

Widespread corruption may not only reduce the efficiency of government but also distort the allocation of a society's most talented individuals. This paper provides one of the first pieces of empirical evidence that combating corruption can drive talented individuals away from careers in the public sector. I establish causality by leveraging the randomized rollout of the CGU audit program in Brazil and show that, following the audits, high academic achieving students shy away from public-sector career paths both in terms of college majors and realized occupations. Additional evidence suggests that this shift is driven by a combination of perceived reductions in rent-seeking opportunities and heightened reputation costs associated with public employment. Together, the findings highlight an understudied channel via which corruption harms the economy: the distortion of a society's talent allocation toward rent-seeking activities in the public sector. Anti-corruption initiatives, such as government audits, have the potential to help adjust these allocative inefficiencies by diverting capable rent-seekers into potentially more productive activities, and in the meantime boost government performance through improved bureaucratic selection.

One of the key takeaways of this paper is the role of self-selection in shaping the quality of public personnel, an aspect that tends to be overlooked especially in settings where public sector jobs are heavily oversubscribed. The findings suggest that even in contexts where the selection of public personnel is merit-based and highly competitive, sorting

⁶⁸In a closely related work, [Santos and Leon \(2024\)](#) finds that CGU audits deter patronage hiring practices. They also document an improvement in the overall quality among municipal bureaucrats. The apparent incongruency of their result with my finding of negative sorting out of public sector careers can be explained by at least two reasons. First, they adopt a demand perspective and examine the entire stock of bureaucracy, an equilibrium result of both screening and sorting, while I focus on college students as the "candidate pool" and underscore the role of talent supply. Second, their measure of quality is educational attainment, while I use standardized test scores to proxy for ability, restricting to the sample of students with at least some college education.

⁶⁹Appendix Table [A17](#) further reports the sorting of high-ability students based on alternative categories of public careers (branch, hierarchy, and occupation type) and do not find strong heterogeneity across these career paths in general.

within the candidate pool can eventually translate to the quality of the final hires. The paper therefore complements a growing literature on bureaucratic selection ([Finan et al., 2017](#); [Lim and Snyder Jr, 2021](#); [Besley et al., 2022](#); [Mocanu, 2024](#)) that has put more emphasis on the screening side of recruitment. While the context of Brazil provides a unique set of policy experiments and comprehensive administrative data, it is important to acknowledge that the top-down approach of combating rampant corruption is rooted in a certain level of state capacity ([Cuneo et al., 2023](#)). Exploring how corruption affects talent allocation in other contexts where similar anti-corruption drives have taken place, such as China or Costa Rica, can help assess the external validity of the finding on ability selection and clarify which institutional features shape patterns of selection.

There are several promising avenues for future research. A key limitation of administrative data is the lack of information on student traits beyond academic ability, such as honesty or pro-sociality. Prior work has highlighted the ability and pro-sociality trade-off in attracting talent to the public sector ([Dal Bó et al., 2013](#); [Deserranno, 2019](#); [Ashraf et al., 2020](#)). Understanding selection by pro-sociality can help further pin down the mechanisms, particularly the extent to which there could be crowding-in of pro-social talent replacing rent-seekers in the public sector. With a growing body of experimental studies on corruption perceptions ([Colonnelli et al., 2024](#); [Rivera et al., 2024](#); [Ajzenman et al., 2025](#)), one promising research agenda ahead is to incorporate survey tools and information experiments to elicit key traits unavailable in administrative data, such as pro-sociality and risk preferences, and understand how corruption (or the perception thereof) affects sorting along these dimensions. Another intriguing direction is to explore intergenerational dynamics: whether corruption rents disproportionately attract students from bureaucratic families and how anti-corruption efforts affect the intergenerational transmission of public sector employment. Finally, it is crucial to examine the potential productivity consequences of altered talent allocation resulting from reduced corruption, and gauge the overall impacts of the anti-corruption audits in addition to its direct impacts on economic activities ([Colonnelli and Prem, 2022](#)). One potential intermediate step is to zoom in on specific occupation choices of high-ability students in the private sector, for example, whether they create firms and become entrepreneurs. While this paper focuses on primarily the selection margin, the use of economy-wide data offers a valuable first step toward understanding the broad implications of a society's talent allocation for productivity growth and state effectiveness.

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
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
Tables and Figures

Figure 1: Number of Municipalities Audited Every Year




Notes: This figure shows the yearly variation of the number of municipalities drawn for audits throughout the randomization phase of the program (2003-2015). The shaded bars (2011-2014) highlight the period this paper focuses on.

Figure 2: Patterns in Major Enrollment and Early Careers




Notes: This figure illustrates descriptive patterns of major enrollment and subsequent career realizations in civil service for the baseline group of freshmen enrolled in 2010. Panels A and B display the shares of major enrollment separately for high-grade students (top 25% of the ENEM distribution) and low-grade students (bottom 50%). Panels C and D report the (demeaned) shares of students obtaining their first jobs as civil servants across majors, restricting the sample to students who enrolled in higher education in 2010 and who were successfully traced to RAIS, as described in Section 3.2.


Figure 3: Audits and Shares of Major Enrollment



(A) All Universities




(B) Private Universities



(C) Public Universities


Notes: This figure reports coefficients obtained from the estimation of equation 2 (corresponding to Table 2), where the estimated differences between treatment and control municipalities are allowed to vary for each year around the audit. Panel A includes the sample pooling all private and public university students. Panel B and C report separately for private universities and public universities. Reporting 95% confidence intervals. Standard errors are clustered at the municipality level.

Figure 4: Audits and Realized Careers



Notes: This figure reports coefficients obtained from the estimation of equation 2 (corresponding to estimates in Table 4), where the estimated differences between treatment and control municipalities are allowed to vary for each year around the audit. Numbers (IHS-transformed) of all students that are traced to the public and private sectors are reported separately. Reporting 95% confidence intervals. Standard errors are clustered at the municipality level.

Figure 5: Audits and Shares of Major Enrollment - Time is Semester



Notes: Panels A and B reports coefficients obtained from the estimation of equation 2 for the sample pooling public and private universities, where time is now a semester instead of a year. Panels C and D report separately for municipalities uncovered with high versus low corruption (above or below median cases of irregularities). Reporting 95% confidence intervals. Standard errors are clustered at the municipality level.

Table 1: Mean Comparisons Between First-Audited and Never-Audited Municipalities

	Control		Treatment		Difference
	Mean (1)	Std. Dev. (2)	Mean (3)	Std. Dev. (4)	(5)
Panel A: Pre-Treatment Municipal Characteristics					
Population (logs)	10.02	0.60	10.09	0.62	0.03 (0.04)
Share urban	0.63	0.22	0.64	0.20	0.02* (0.01)
Share literate	0.78	0.09	0.77	0.09	0.00 (0.00)
Share of population with a college degree	0.04	0.02	0.03	0.02	0.00 (0.00)
Has AM radio 2009	0.19	0.39	0.20	0.40	0.02 (0.03)
Has internet provider 2009	0.54	0.50	0.59	0.49	0.03 (0.03)
Panel B: Pre-Treatment Higher Education Market Characteristics					
Num. of freshmen (logs)	3.10	1.39	3.15	1.41	0.02 (0.09)
Share female	0.49	0.02	0.49	0.02	-0.00 (0.00)
Share in public universities	0.34	0.27	0.35	0.27	0.01 (0.02)
Share enrolled in business/law	0.27	0.17	0.27	0.18	0.01 (0.01)
Share enrolled in engineering	0.11	0.12	0.10	0.10	-0.00 (0.01)
Share enrolled in education	0.28	0.21	0.30	0.21	0.00 (0.01)
Share enrolled in health	0.17	0.15	0.18	0.15	0.00 (0.01)
Panel C: Pre-Treatment Labor Market Characteristics					
Num. of public sector workers (logs)	5.75	1.22	5.96	1.11	0.05 (0.07)
Share of workers in public sector	0.42	0.29	0.47	0.30	0.01 (0.02)
Share of workers in civil service	0.34	0.26	0.37	0.27	0.01 (0.02)
Observations	3,409		221		

Notes: This table shows means and standard deviations of various characteristics of treated and control municipalities. The treatment group contains first-audited municipalities during 2011-2014 while the control group includes never-audited yet eligible municipalities. Characteristics in Panel A are based on information from the 2010 Brazilian Population Census and the 2009 municipal survey called *Perfil dos Municípios Brasileiros*. Characteristics in Panel B are based on information from the 2010 Census of Higher Education and characteristics in Panel C are from the 2010 RAIS dataset. In Column (5) the differences and robust standard errors (in parenthesis) are based on a regression that includes state fixed effects. *** $p < 0.01$, ** $p < 0.05$, * $p < 0.1$.

Table 2: Effect of Anti-Corruption Audits on Major Enrollment

	Freshmen Major Enrollment					
	Business/Law			Engineering		
	Share (1)	Num. (asinh) (2)	Num. (log) (3)	Share (4)	Num. (asinh) (5)	Num. (log) (6)
Panel A: All Universities						
Audit \times Post	-0.017*** (0.006)	-0.040 (0.029)	-0.042 (0.029)	0.016** (0.007)	0.091 (0.056)	0.099* (0.057)
R^2	0.58	0.98	0.98	0.73	0.96	0.97
Mean Dep. Var.	0.30	5.43	4.75	0.16	4.68	4.07
SD Dep. Var.	0.08	1.68	1.66	0.08	1.82	1.73
Observations	169,835	169,835	164,179	169,835	169,835	145,926
Num. of Clusters	3,693	3,693	3,692	3,693	3,693	3,659
Panel B: Private Universities						
Audit \times Post	-0.018*** (0.007)	-0.039 (0.031)	-0.041 (0.031)	0.021** (0.008)	0.140** (0.056)	0.149** (0.058)
R^2	0.51	0.97	0.98	0.69	0.96	0.96
Mean Dep. Var.	0.36	5.36	4.68	0.15	4.38	3.81
SD Dep. Var.	0.09	1.68	1.66	0.08	1.83	1.71
Observations	168,476	168,476	161,969	168,746	168,476	135,963
Num. of Clusters	3,693	3,693	3,692	3,693	3,693	3,629
Panel C: Public Universities						
Audit \times Post	-0.006 (0.009)	-0.045 (0.088)	-0.006 (0.090)	0.001 (0.006)	-0.008 (0.078)	0.028 (0.078)
R^2	0.52	0.91	0.91	0.64	0.94	0.94
Mean Dep. Var.	0.13	3.16	2.81	0.17	3.42	3.05
SD Dep. Var.	0.11	1.88	1.67	0.13	1.94	1.72
Observations	157,506	157,506	90,227	157,506	157,506	96,615
Num. of Clusters	3,691	3,691	3,132	3,691	3,691	3,152
Muni. \times Cohort FE	X	X	X	X	X	X
State \times Year \times Cohort FE	X	X	X	X	X	X

Notes: This table reports coefficients obtained from the estimation of equation 1. The dependent variables are the shares of freshmen enrolled in business/law (column 1) and engineering (column 4), as well as the corresponding numbers in inverse hyperbolic sine transformation (columns 2 and 5) and in log transformation (columns 3 and 6). The unit of observation is municipality-year-cohort. Audit is a dummy that is 1 if the municipality was audited for the first time in the audited cohort, and 0 otherwise. Post is a dummy that is 1 if the year is after the year of interest. Panel A reports estimates for all students, pooling public and private universities. Panels B and C report estimates separately for students attending private and public universities, respectively. Standard errors are clustered at the municipality level. *** $p < 0.01$, ** $p < 0.05$, * $p < 0.1$.

Table 3: Effect of Audits on Student Composition (Public Uni.) by Ability

	Total Num. (log)	Num. (asinh) by Quartile of ENEM Grades		
		Lowest 50%	Second Highest 25%	Highest 25%
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Panel A: Business/Law				
Audit \times Post	-0.042 (0.076)	0.141 (0.149)	-0.044 (0.120)	-0.148** (0.070)
R^2	0.90	0.79	0.85	0.92
Mean Dep. Var.	3.04	2.17	2.43	2.95
SD Dep. Var.	1.63	1.52	1.55	1.69
Observations	56,317	56,317	56,317	56,317
Num. of Clusters	1,526	1,526	1,526	1,526
Panel B: Engineering				
Audit \times Post	0.080 (0.073)	0.054 (0.139)	0.300 (0.189)	0.044 (0.068)
R^2	0.95	0.84	0.88	0.95
Mean Dep. Var.	3.51	2.10	2.54	3.72
SD Dep. Var.	1.65	1.57	1.62	1.70
Observations	64,070	64,070	64,070	64,070
Num. of Clusters	1,661	1,661	1,661	1,661
Muni. \times Cohort FE	X	X	X	X
State \times Year \times Cohort FE	X	X	X	X

Notes: This table reports coefficients obtained from the estimation of equation 1. Dependent variables are the number (IHS-transformed) of students with ENEM grades at different quartiles of the score distribution (controlling for exam year). Panel A reports the sample of students who enroll in business/law, and Panel B includes the sample of students who end up in engineering. The unit of observation is municipality-year-cohort. Audit is a dummy that is 1 if the municipality was audited for the first time in the audited cohort, and 0 otherwise. Post is a dummy that is 1 if the period is after the period of audit. Standard errors are clustered at the municipality level. *** $p < 0.01$, ** $p < 0.05$, * $p < 0.1$.

Table 4: Effect of Anti-Corruption Audits on Early Careers

	Realizations of First Jobs by Sector					
	Public Sector			Private Sector		
	Share (1)	Num. (asinh) (2)	Num. (log) (3)	Share (4)	Num. (asinh) (5)	Num. (log) (6)
Audit \times Post	0.001 (0.017)	-0.095 (0.115)	-0.094 (0.118)	-0.001 (0.017)	0.149** (0.060)	0.155*** (0.059)
R^2	0.67	0.84	0.83	0.67	0.96	0.96
Mean Dep. Var.	0.18	2.33	1.88	0.82	4.15	3.54
SD Dep. Var.	0.21	1.30	1.12	0.21	1.66	1.57
Observations	96,153	96,153	62,363	96,153	96,153	77,430
Num. of Clusters	3,036	3,036	2,460	3,036	3,036	2,615
Muni. \times Cohort FE	X	X	X	X	X	X
State \times Year \times Cohort FE	X	X	X	X	X	X

Notes: This table reports coefficients obtained from the estimation of equation 1. Dependent variables are the share of students in the public sector (column 1) versus the private sector (column 4) as well as the corresponding total number of students (reported in inverse hyperbolic sine transformations in columns 2 and 5, and in log transformations in columns 3 and 6). The unit of observation is municipality-year-cohort. Audit is a dummy that is 1 if the municipality was audited for the first time in the audited cohort, and 0 otherwise. Post is a dummy that is 1 if the period is after the period of audit. Standard errors are clustered at the municipality level. *** $p < 0.01$, ** $p < 0.05$, * $p < 0.1$.

Table 5: Effect of Audits on Workforce Composition by Ability

	Total Num. (log)	Num. (asinh) by Quartile of ENEM Grades		
		Lowest 50%	Second Highest 25%	Highest 25%
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Panel A: Public Sector				
Audit \times Post	-0.094 (0.118)	-0.046 (0.186)	-0.013 (0.214)	-0.295*** (0.083)
R^2	0.83	0.68	0.66	0.77
Mean Dep. Var.	1.88	1.47	1.39	1.66
SD Dep. Var.	1.12	1.01	1.02	1.19
Observations	62,363	62,363	62,363	62,363
Num. of Clusters	2,460	2,460	2,460	2,460
Panel B: Private Sector				
Audit \times Post	0.155*** (0.059)	0.064 (0.054)	0.173** (0.083)	0.173** (0.078)
R^2	0.96	0.92	0.92	0.94
Mean Dep. Var.	3.54	3.29	2.92	3.10
SD Dep. Var.	1.57	1.47	1.52	1.67
Observations	77,430	77,430	77,430	77,430
Num. of Clusters	2,615	2,615	2,615	2,615
Muni. \times Cohort FE	X	X	X	X
State \times Year \times Cohort FE	X	X	X	X


Notes: This table reports coefficients obtained from the estimation of equation 1. Dependent variables are the number (IHS-transformed) of students with ENEM grades at different quartiles of the score distribution (controlling for exam year). Panel A reports the sample of students who end up in the public sector and Panel B includes the sample of students who end up in the private sector. The unit of observation is municipality-year-cohort. Audit is a dummy that is 1 if the municipality was audited for the first time in the audited cohort, and 0 otherwise. Post is a dummy that is 1 if the period is after the period of audit. Standard errors are clustered at the municipality level. *** $p < 0.01$, ** $p < 0.05$, * $p < 0.1$.

Corruption and Talent Allocation

Online Appendix


A Additional Figures and Tables

Figure A1: Major Enrollment Trends in Brazil




Notes: This figure shows the yearly trends of college major enrollments in Brazil using data from the Census of Higher Education (2010-2019). STEM includes mathematics and natural sciences, computer science and IT, as well as engineering.

Figure A2: Share of Students Traced to RAIS




(A) By Year of Enrollment



(B) By Freshmen Major 2010


Notes: This figure illustrates the share of students observed in the Census of Higher Education that are traced to RAIS (2010-2019). Panel A displays the share of students traced by year of enrollment. Panel B displays the share of students traced by their major enrolled for the 2010 enrollment cohort only.

Figure A3: Baseline Patterns of Major Enrollment




Notes: This figure illustrates the shares of major enrollment among all freshmen observed in the Census of Higher Education in 2010. Panel A reports for all public university students and Panel B reports for all private university students. Panel C reports for high-ability students (at the top 25% of the ENEM grade distribution) while Panel D reports for low-ability students (at the lowest 50% of the ENEM grade distribution), for public university. Panels E and F repeat for private university.


Figure A4: Audits and Numbers of Major Enrollment



(A) All Universities




(B) Private Universities



(C) Public Universities


Notes: This figure reports coefficients obtained from the estimation of equation 2 (corresponding to Table 2), where the estimated differences between treatment and control municipalities are allowed to vary for each year around the audit. All outcomes are reported in inverse hyperbolic sine (IHS) transformations. Panel A includes the sample pooling all private and public university students. Panels B and C report separately for private versus public universities. Reporting 95% confidence intervals. Standard errors are clustered at the municipality level.

Figure A5: Audits and High-Ability Students in Public Universities




Notes: This figure reports coefficients obtained from the estimation of equation 2. Dependent variable is the number (IHS-transformed) of students from the top quartile of the ENEM grade distribution in Panels A and B, and the corresponding shares in Panels C and D. Panels A and B correspond to table estimates reported in Table 3. Reporting 95% confidence intervals. Standard errors are clustered at the municipality level.

Figure A6: Audits and Realized Careers by Contract Type in Public Sector




Notes: This figure reports coefficients obtained from the estimation of equation 2, corresponding to Appendix Table A5. Reporting 95% confidence intervals. Standard errors are clustered at the municipality level.

Figure A7: Audits and High-Ability Students in the Workforce




Notes: This figure reports coefficients obtained from the estimation of equation 2. Dependent Variable is the number (IHS-transformed) of workers from the top quartile of the ENEM grade distribution in Panels A and B, and the corresponding shares in Panels C and D. Panels A and B correspond to table estimates reported in Table 5. Reporting 95% confidence intervals. Standard errors are clustered at the municipality level.

Figure A8: Effect Heterogeneity by Traditional Media



Notes: This figure reports coefficients obtained from the estimation of equation 2 when outcome is major enrollment shares in business/law versus engineering. Panels A and B (C and D) report separately for municipalities with and without internet providers (AM radio stations) as reported in the 2009 *Perfil dos Municípios Brasileiros*, where time is a semester. Reporting 95% confidence intervals. Standard errors are clustered at the municipality level.

Figure A9: Group-Specific Treatment Effects via [Callaway and Sant'Anna \(2021\)](#)



Notes: This figure presents the group-specific treatment effects using the estimator proposed in [Callaway and Sant'Anna \(2021\)](#). In Panel A the outcome is the share of freshmen enrollment in business/law. In Panel B the outcome is the share of freshmen enrollment in engineering.

Table A1: Summary Statistics of Workforce Characteristics

	Private Sector		Public Sector			
	Mean (1)	Mean ($t \geq 4$) (2)	Tenure-Track		Temporary	
			Mean (3)	Mean ($t \geq 4$) (4)	Mean (5)	Mean ($t \geq 4$) (6)
Num. of students (log)	5.03	4.28	2.71	2.31	2.40	2.18
Lapse CES-RAIS (Years)	3.65	5.88	4.71	6.26	4.80	6.20
Share female	0.56	0.56	0.62	0.63	0.67	0.69
Age	25.55	27.18	29.38	30.06	29.47	30.19
Share with postgraduate degree	0.01	0.01	0.02	0.03	0.01	0.02
Share with college-educated parent	0.26	0.32	0.22	0.24	0.21	0.23
Share among top family income quartile	0.15	0.18	0.14	0.14	0.11	0.11
Share among top ENEM grade quartile	0.29	0.37	0.37	0.40	0.24	0.26
Avg. ENEM grade	553.03	566.19	563.47	568.96	530.67	535.24
Share enrolled in Business/Law	0.36	0.27	0.20	0.20	0.19	0.19
Share enrolled in Engineering	0.18	0.21	0.08	0.08	0.08	0.08
Share enrolled in Education	0.13	0.14	0.45	0.41	0.45	0.41
Share enrolled in Health	0.11	0.15	0.14	0.16	0.15	0.18
Observations	2,444		1,701		1,645	

Notes: This table shows the means of various characteristics of students who enrolled in higher education in the baseline year of 2010 and were later found in RAIS during 2010-2019. In particular, odd columns report the full sample mean and even columns report the sample mean restricting to students who show up at least 4 years later. Columns 1-2 present summary statistics for students who land a first job contract labeled as private. Columns 3-4 and columns 5-6 report the same for public contracts, separately for tenure-track and temporary positions. *Lapse CES-RAIS* indicates the average years it takes for students to show up between the two datasets (from college enrollment to first job in the formal labor market). *Share with college-educated parent* is the share of students whose (either) parent received some college education. *Share among top family income quartile* is the share of students whose reported monthly family income belongs to the top quartile of the entire income distribution. *Share among top ENEM grade quartile* is the share of students whose average ENEM score belongs to the top quartile of the entire score distribution. *Avg. ENEM grade* is the average test score across all subjects for those who take the ENEM exam.

Table A2: Effect of Audits on Other Major Enrollment

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)
Panel A	Education		Humanities		Social Sci.		Natural Sci.	
	Share	Num.	Share	Num.	Share	Num.	Share	Num.
Audit \times Post	0.008 (0.006)	0.034 (0.037)	-0.002* (0.001)	-0.086 (0.067)	-0.001 (0.002)	-0.063 (0.058)	0.002 (0.002)	0.119 (0.080)
R^2	0.72	0.95	0.63	0.94	0.52	0.95	0.64	0.92
Mean Dep. Var.	0.20	5.02	0.02	2.51	0.05	3.54	0.02	2.43
SD Dep. Var.	0.10	1.51	0.02	1.88	0.03	1.86	0.02	1.76
Observations	169,886	169,886	169,886	169,886	169,886	169,886	169,886	169,886
Num. of Clusters	3,693	3,693	3,693	3,693	3,693	3,693	3,693	3,693
Panel B	CS and IT		Agriculture		Health		Services	
	Share	Num.	Share	Num.	Share	Num.	Share	Num.
Audit \times Post	-0.001 (0.002)	-0.007 (0.051)	0.000 (0.003)	-0.005 (0.059)	-0.005 (0.005)	-0.024 (0.043)	-0.000 (0.001)	-0.078 (0.102)
R^2	0.48	0.94	0.65	0.91	0.60	0.96	0.45	0.90
Mean Dep. Var.	0.05	3.56	0.04	3.17	0.16	4.82	0.02	2.54
SD Dep. Var.	0.03	1.79	0.04	1.54	0.07	1.62	0.02	1.72
Observations	169,886	169,886	169,886	169,886	169,886	169,886	169,886	169,886
Num. of Clusters	3,693	3,693	3,693	3,693	3,693	3,693	3,693	3,693
Muni. \times Cohort FE	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X
State \times Year \times Cohort FE	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X

Notes: This table reports coefficients obtained from the estimation of equation 1. Dependent variables are the share of freshmen as well as the corresponding (inverse hyperbolic sine transformed) total number of enrollments in each of the eight remaining fields of study. The unit of observation is municipality-year-cohort. Audit is a dummy that is 1 if the municipality was audited for the first time in the audited cohort, and 0 otherwise. Post is a dummy that is 1 if the year is after the year of interest. The sample includes all students pooling public and private universities. Standard errors are clustered at the municipality level. *** $p < 0.01$, ** $p < 0.05$, * $p < 0.1$.

Table A3: Effect of Audits on College Enrollment

	Num. of Freshmen (log) (1)	Num. in Public Uni. (log) (2)	Share in Public Uni. (3)
Panel A: All Students			
Audit \times Post	0.016 (0.024)	0.014 (0.042)	0.006 (0.008)
R^2	0.99	0.96	0.85
Mean Dep. Var.	6.06	4.49	0.26
SD Dep. Var.	1.58	1.72	0.17
Observations	169,886	158,228	158,228
Num. of Clusters	3,693	3,692	3,692
Panel B: High-Ability Students (ENEM Highest 25%)			
Audit \times Post	0.024 (0.024)	0.025 (0.038)	0.006 (0.008)
R^2	0.99	0.97	0.79
Mean Dep. Var.	5.00	4.10	0.43
SD Dep. Var.	1.73	1.80	0.18
Observations	160,880	135,126	135,126
Num. of Clusters	3,690	3,593	3,592
Panel C: Low-Ability Students (ENEM Lowest 50%)			
Audit \times Post	0.013 (0.027)	0.067 (0.089)	0.004 (0.008)
R^2	0.98	0.89	0.79
Mean Dep. Var.	5.16	2.83	0.16
SD Dep. Var.	1.55	1.56	0.16
Observations	168,843	130,796	130,796
Num. of Clusters	3,693	3,583	3,583
Muni. \times Cohort FE	X	X	X
State \times Year \times Cohort FE	X	X	X

Notes: This table reports coefficients obtained from the estimation of equation 1. Dependent variables are (log) total number of freshmen (column 1), (log) total number of freshmen in public universities (column 2), and share of freshmen enrolled in public universities (column 3). Panel A reports the sample of all freshmen students. Panel B and Panel C report separately for high-ability (highest 25% grade) and low-ability (lowest 50% grade) students. The unit of observation is municipality-year-cohort. Audit is a dummy that is 1 if the municipality was audited for the first time in the audited cohort, and 0 otherwise. Post is a dummy that is 1 if the year is after the year of interest. Standard errors are clustered at the municipality level. *** $p < 0.01$, ** $p < 0.05$, * $p < 0.1$.

Table A4: Effect of Audits on Student Composition (Private Uni.) by Ability

	Total Num. (log)	Num. (asinh) by Quartile of ENEM Grades		
		Lowest 50%	Second Highest 25%	Highest 25%
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Panel A: Business/Law				
Audit \times Post	-0.026 (0.031)	-0.013 (0.040)	-0.038 (0.035)	-0.051* (0.027)
R^2	0.98	0.97	0.96	0.95
Mean Dep. Var.	4.80	4.89	4.07	3.82
SD Dep. Var.	1.62	1.61	1.67	1.70
Observations	143,393	143,393	143,393	143,393
Num. of Clusters	3,167	3,167	3,167	3,167
Panel B: Engineering				
Audit \times Post	0.186** (0.073)	0.249*** (0.088)	0.187** (0.085)	0.111 (0.069)
R^2	0.96	0.94	0.94	0.95
Mean Dep. Var.	4.17	4.00	3.61	3.56
SD Dep. Var.	1.63	1.60	1.65	1.70
Observations	90,705	90,705	90,705	90,705
Num. of Clusters	2,090	2,090	2,090	2,090
Muni. \times Cohort FE	X	X	X	X
State \times Year \times Cohort FE	X	X	X	X

Notes: This table reports coefficients obtained from the estimation of equation 1. Dependent variables are the number (IHS-transformed) of students with ENEM grades at different quartiles of the score distribution (controlling for exam year), in comparison with Table 3. Panel A reports the sample of students who enroll in business/law, and Panel B includes the sample of students who end up in engineering. The unit of observation is municipality-year-cohort. Audit is a dummy that is 1 if the municipality was audited for the first time in the audited cohort, and 0 otherwise. Post is a dummy that is 1 if the period is after the period of audit. Standard errors are clustered at the municipality level. *** $p < 0.01$, ** $p < 0.05$, * $p < 0.1$.

Table A5: Effect of Audits on Detailed Major Enrollment by Ability Group

	Num. of Enrollment (asinh) in Broad Major Fields				
	Business/Law (1)	STEM (2)	Education (3)	Health (4)	Hum./Soc. Sci. (5)
Panel A: High-Ability Students (ENEM Highest 25%)					
Audit \times Post	-0.093*** (0.029)	0.049 (0.040)	-0.042 (0.039)	-0.005 (0.041)	-0.020 (0.052)
R^2	0.96	0.97	0.94	0.95	0.95
Mean Dep. Var.	3.90	4.27	3.26	3.50	3.01
SD Dep. Var.	1.73	1.83	1.70	1.71	1.87
Observations	136,686	136,686	136,686	136,686	136,686
Num. of Clusters	3,619	3,619	3,619	3,619	3,619
Panel B: Low-Ability Students (ENEM Lowest 50%)					
Audit \times Post	-0.026 (0.035)	0.084 (0.054)	0.070* (0.042)	-0.055 (0.052)	-0.022 (0.064)
R^2	0.96	0.94	0.92	0.94	0.91
Mean Dep. Var.	4.57	3.83	4.13	3.85	2.58
SD Dep. Var.	1.71	1.77	1.50	1.62	1.76
Observations	154,800	154,800	154,800	154,800	154,800
Num. of Clusters	3,693	3,693	3,693	3,693	3,693
Muni. \times Cohort FE	X	X	X	X	X
State \times Year \times Cohort FE	X	X	X	X	X

Notes: This table reports coefficients obtained from the estimation of equation 1. Dependent variables are the number of enrollments (IHS-transformed) in the corresponding fields of study, including STEM (natural sciences, engineering, and computer science). Panel A reports the sample of high-ability students (top 25% ENEM performance), and Panel B includes the sample of low-ability students (bottom 50% ENEM performance). The unit of observation is municipality-year-cohort. Audit is a dummy that is 1 if the municipality was audited for the first time in the audited cohort, and 0 otherwise. Post is a dummy that is 1 if the period is after the period of audit. Standard errors are clustered at the municipality level. *** $p < 0.01$, ** $p < 0.05$, * $p < 0.1$.

Table A6: Effect of Audits on Early Careers in Public Sector

	Realizations of First Jobs in Public Sector by Contract Type					
	Tenure-Track			Temporary		
	Share (1)	Num. (asinh) (2)	Num. (log) (3)	Share (4)	Num. (asinh) (5)	Num. (log) (6)
Audit \times Post	-0.016* (0.009)	-0.231* (0.139)	-0.246* (0.135)	0.018 (0.012)	0.119 (0.158)	-0.004 (0.127)
R^2	0.51	0.82	0.80	0.65	0.79	0.80
Mean Dep. Var.	0.09	1.82	1.59	0.09	1.28	1.18
SD Dep. Var.	0.13	1.30	1.05	0.17	1.23	1.07
Observations	96,153	96,153	35,760	96,153	96,153	41,312
Num. of Clusters	3,036	3,036	1,711	3,036	3,036	1,838
Muni. \times Cohort FE	X	X	X	X	X	X
State \times Year \times Cohort FE	X	X	X	X	X	X

Notes: This table reports coefficients obtained from the estimation of equation 1, zooming into different types of public sector careers as reported in columns 1-3 of Table 4. Dependent variables are the share of students in the civil service (column 1) versus the temporary public workers (column 6) as well as the corresponding total number of students (reported in inverse hyperbolic sine transformations in columns 2 and 5, and in log transformations in columns 4 and 6). The unit of observation is municipality-year-cohort. Audit is a dummy that is 1 if the municipality was audited for the first time in the audited cohort, and 0 otherwise. Post is a dummy that is 1 if the period is after the period of audit. Standard errors are clustered at the municipality level. *** $p < 0.01$, ** $p < 0.05$, * $p < 0.1$.

Table A7: Effect of Audits on Early Careers in Public Sector - Other Categories

	Realizations of First Jobs in Public Sector: Other Categories							
	By Government Branch			By Hierarchical Level			By Occupation Type	
	Executive (1)	Legislative (2)	Judiciary (3)	Federal (4)	State (5)	Municipal (6)	Bureaucrats (7)	Frontline (8)
Audit \times Post	-0.051 (0.120)	0.030 (0.086)	-0.140 (0.096)	-0.104 (0.149)	-0.110 (0.084)	-0.050 (0.185)	0.253 -0.179	-0.265 -0.433
R^2	0.83	0.46	0.57	0.67	0.78	0.79	0.26	0.19
Mean Dep. Var.	2.16	0.26	0.28	0.36	1.51	1.70	0.3	0.58
SD Dep. Var.	1.28	0.51	0.57	0.73	1.20	1.21	1.06	1.47
Observations	96,153	96,153	96,153	96,153	96,153	96,153	96,153	96,153
Num. of Clusters	3,036	3,036	3,036	3,036	3,036	3,036	3,036	3,036
Muni. \times Cohort FE	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X
State \times Year \times Cohort FE	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X

Notes: This table reports coefficients obtained from the estimation of equation 1, zooming into other categories of public sector careers. Dependent variables are the number of students (IHS-transformed). The unit of observation is municipality-year-cohort. Columns 1-3 report results for careers by the branch of government. Column 4-6 report results for careers by the level of hierarchy. Columns 7-8 report results for careers by occupation type, following definitions of bureaucrats and frontline providers as in [Colonnelli et al. \(2020b\)](#). Audit is a dummy that is 1 if the municipality was audited for the first time in the audited cohort, and 0 otherwise. Post is a dummy that is 1 if the period is after the period of audit. Standard errors are clustered at the municipality level. *** $p < 0.01$, ** $p < 0.05$, * $p < 0.1$.

Table A8: Effect of Audits on Early Careers by Type of Institution

	Realizations of First Jobs by Sector					
	Public Sector			Private Sector		
	Share (1)	Num. (asinh) (2)	Num. (log) (3)	Share (4)	Num. (asinh) (5)	Num. (log) (6)
Panel A: Private Universities						
Audit \times Post	-0.001 (0.017)	-0.157 (0.140)	-0.179 (0.156)	0.001 (0.017)	0.110** (0.051)	0.126** (0.049)
R^2	0.62	0.81	0.81	0.62	0.93	0.94
Mean Dep. Var.	0.22	1.83	1.49	0.78	2.72	2.42
SD Dep. Var.	0.26	1.26	1.07	0.26	1.70	1.46
Observations	86,589	86,589	52,144	86,589	86,589	50,977
Num. of Clusters	2,886	2,886	2,239	2,886	2,886	2,030
Panel B: Public Universities						
Audit \times Post	-0.011 (0.021)	0.036 (0.092)	0.065 (0.073)	0.011 (0.021)	0.164* (0.095)	0.159 (0.129)
R^2	0.57	0.80	0.82	0.57	0.88	0.88
Mean Dep. Var.	0.23	1.51	1.27	0.77	2.04	1.79
SD Dep. Var.	0.27	1.26	1.10	0.27	1.45	1.24
Observations	48,461	48,461	25,789	48,461	48,461	22,725
Num. of Clusters	2,033	2,033	1,342	2,033	2,033	1,104
Muni. \times Cohort FE	X	X	X	X	X	X
State \times Year \times Cohort FE	X	X	X	X	X	X

Notes: This table reports coefficients obtained from the estimation of equation 1, as in Table 4, but separately for students enrolled in private (Panel A) versus public (Panel B) universities. The unit of observation is municipality-year-cohort. Audit is a dummy that is 1 if the municipality was audited for the first time in the audited cohort, and 0 otherwise. Post is a dummy that is 1 if the period is after the period of audit. Standard errors are clustered at the municipality level. *** $p < 0.01$, ** $p < 0.05$, * $p < 0.1$.

Table A9: Effect of Audits on Workforce Composition - Other Characteristics

	Demographic and Socioeconomic Characteristics		
	Female (1)	College Educated Parent(s) (2)	High Family Income (3)
Panel A: Public Sector			
Audit \times Post	0.003 (0.042)	0.005 (0.039)	0.024 (0.044)
R^2	0.29	0.35	0.40
Mean Dep. Var.	0.63	0.25	0.19
SD Dep. Var.	0.30	0.26	0.24
Observations	53,327	53,327	53,327
Num. of Clusters	1,988	1,988	1,988
Panel B: Private Sector			
Audit \times Post	-0.005 (0.017)	0.013 (0.019)	-0.011 (0.010)
R^2	0.23	0.47	0.57
Mean Dep. Var.	0.59	0.33	0.31
SD Dep. Var.	0.18	0.19	0.19
Observations	63,878	63,878	63,878
Num. of Clusters	1,970	1,970	1,970
Muni. \times Cohort FE	X	X	X
State \times Year \times Cohort FE	X	X	X

Notes: This table reports coefficients obtained from the estimation of equation 1. Dependent variables are the share of female students (column 1), the share of students with college-educated parent(s) (column 2), and the share with family income at the top quartile of the distribution (column 3). Panel A reports the sample of students who end up in the public sector, and Panel B includes the sample of students who end up in the private sector. The unit of observation is municipality-year-cohort. Audit is a dummy that is 1 if the municipality was audited for the first time in the audited cohort, and 0 otherwise. Post is a dummy that is 1 if the period is after the period of audit. Standard errors are clustered at the municipality level. *** $p < 0.01$, ** $p < 0.05$, * $p < 0.1$.

Table A10: Effect of Audits on Shares of Major Enrollment - Spillovers

	Share in Business/Law (1)	Share in Engineering (2)
Panel A: Spillover effects		
Audit \times Post	-0.016* (0.009)	0.009* (0.005)
R^2	0.64	0.77
Mean Dep. Var.	0.29	0.16
SD Dep. Var.	0.08	0.07
Observations	22,966	22,966
Num. of Clusters	690	690
Panel B: Excluding spillover effects		
Audit \times Post	-0.016** (0.008)	0.018*** (0.005)
R^2	0.64	0.77
Mean Dep. Var.	0.29	0.16
SD Dep. Var.	0.07	0.07
Observations	22,546	22,546
Num. of Clusters	647	647
Muni. \times Cohort FE	X	X
State \times Year \times Cohort FE	X	X

Notes: This table decomposes the direct versus indirect effects of audits on the baseline shares of major enrollment for the pooled sample (see Panel A in Table 2) when geographic spillovers are taken into account following Colonnelli and Prem (2022). Panel A reports coefficients obtained via the estimation of equation 1 but for the impacts on nearby municipalities (defined as municipalities in the same micro-region). Panel B reports coefficients from the baseline specification where the sample excludes never-audited municipalities with at least one nearby municipality audited in the past 5 years. Dependent variables are the share of freshmen enrolled in business and law (column 1) versus engineering (column 2). The unit of observation is municipality-year-cohort. Post is a dummy that is 1 if the period is after the period of the audit. Standard errors are clustered at the municipality level. *** $p < 0.01$, ** $p < 0.05$, * $p < 0.1$.

Table A11: Effect Heterogeneity by Level of Uncovered Corruption

	Business/Law		Engineering	
	Share (1)	Num. (asinh) (2)	Share (3)	Num. (asinh) (4)
Audit \times Post \times High	-0.020** (0.008)	-0.118** (0.050)	0.019*** (0.007)	0.056 (0.057)
Audit \times Post \times Low	-0.015 (0.010)	-0.031 (0.042)	0.010 (0.009)	0.053 (0.074)
R^2	0.43	0.96	0.55	0.95
Mean Dep. Var.	0.31	5.12	0.16	4.37
SD Dep. Var.	0.10	1.81	0.09	1.89
Observations	375,672	375,672	375,672	375,672
Num. of Clusters	3,871	3,871	3,871	3,871
Muni. \times Cohort FE	X	X	X	X
State \times Year \times Cohort FE	X	X	X	X

Notes: This table reports coefficients obtained from the estimation of equation $Y_{mct} = \beta_1 \text{Audit}_{mc} \times \text{Post}_{ct} + \beta_2 \text{Audit}_{mc} \times \text{Post}_{ct} \times \text{High}_m + \delta_{mc} + \lambda_{tc} + \epsilon_{mct}$ for a balanced panel of municipalities within the time window $[-3, 7]$, where t is a semester. High_m equals 1 for municipalities with above median level of corruption uncovered. Dependent variables are the share of freshmen enrolled in business and law (column 1) versus engineering (column 3) as well as the corresponding (inverse hyperbolic sine transformed) total number of enrollments (columns 2 and 4). The unit of observation is municipality-year-cohort. Audit is a dummy that is 1 if the municipality was audited for the first time in the audited cohort, and 0 otherwise. Post is a dummy that is 1 if the period is after the period of the audit. Standard errors are clustered at the municipality level. *** $p < 0.01$, ** $p < 0.05$, * $p < 0.1$.

Table A12: Effect Heterogeneity by Local Media

	Business/Law		Engineering	
	Share (1)	Num. (asinh) (2)	Share (3)	Num. (asinh) (4)
Panel A: Internet Provider				
Audit \times Post \times Z	-0.019** (0.008)	-0.072* (0.038)	0.015** (0.007)	0.067 (0.056)
Audit \times Post	-0.013 (0.009)	-0.059 (0.047)	0.006 (0.008)	-0.008 (0.060)
R^2	0.43	0.96	0.55	0.95
Mean Dep. Var.	0.31	5.12	0.16	4.37
SD Dep. Var.	0.10	1.81	0.09	1.89
Panel B: AM Radio Station				
Audit \times Post \times Z	-0.026** (0.010)	-0.104** (0.052)	0.016 (0.010)	0.066 (0.081)
Audit \times Post	-0.007 (0.006)	-0.028 (0.031)	0.011* (0.006)	0.039 (0.041)
R^2	0.43	0.96	0.55	0.95
Mean Dep. Var.	0.31	5.12	0.16	4.37
SD Dep. Var.	0.10	1.81	0.09	1.89
Observations	375,200	375,200	375,200	375,200
Num. of Clusters	3,866	3,866	3,866	3,866
Muni. \times Cohort FE	X	X	X	X
State \times Year \times Cohort FE	X	X	X	X

Notes: This table reports coefficients obtained from the estimation of equation $Y_{mct} = \beta_1 \text{Audit}_{mc} \times \text{Post}_{ct} + \beta_2 \text{Audit}_{mc} \times \text{Post}_{ct} \times Z_m + \delta_{mc} + \lambda_{tc} + \epsilon_{mct}$ for a balanced panel of municipalities within the time window $[-3, 7]$, where t is a semester. Z_m equals 1 for municipalities where local media (AM radio station or internet provider) was reportedly available in 2009. Dependent variables are the share of freshmen enrolled in business and law (column 1) versus engineering (column 3) as well as the corresponding (inverse hyperbolic sine transformed) total number of enrollments (columns 2 and 4). The unit of observation is municipality-year-cohort. Audit is a dummy that is 1 if the municipality was audited for the first time in the audited cohort, and 0 otherwise. Post is a dummy that is 1 if the period is after the period of the audit. Standard errors are clustered at the municipality level. *** $p < 0.01$, ** $p < 0.05$, * $p < 0.1$.

Table A13: Effect of Audits on Early Careers in Public Sector - Other Categories

	High-Ability Students in Public vs. Private Sector					
	Public Sector			Private Sector		
	High Rent-Seeking (1)	Low Rent-Seeking (2)	Share High (3)	High Pro-Social (4)	Low Pro-Social (5)	Share High (6)
Audit \times Post	-0.281** (0.127)	-0.319*** (0.112)	-0.016 (0.066)	0.203** (0.092)	0.169* (0.096)	0.004 (0.023)
R^2	0.69	0.69	0.35	0.90	0.91	0.27
Mean Dep. Var.	1.29	1.25	0.55	2.44	2.66	0.44
SD Dep. Var.	1.05	1.04	0.33	1.46	1.58	0.22
Observations	37,308	44,726	18,521	57,059	60,732	32,941
Num. of Clusters	1,789	1,973	972	2,161	2,255	1,315
Muni. \times Cohort FE	X	X	X	X	X	X
State \times Year \times Cohort FE	X	X	X	X	X	X

Notes: This table reports coefficients obtained from the estimation of equation 1. Dependent variables are the number of high-ability students (IHS-transformed) in corresponding careers in columns 1-2 and 4-5, and the shares of high-ability students in high rent-seeking (column 3) or high prosocial careers (column 6) among all high-ability students. The unit of observation is municipality-year-cohort. Audit is a dummy that is 1 if the municipality was audited for the first time in the audited cohort, and 0 otherwise. Post is a dummy that is 1 if the period is after the period of audit. Standard errors are clustered at the municipality level. *** $p < 0.01$, ** $p < 0.05$, * $p < 0.1$.

Table A14: Effect of Audits on Degree Vacancies

	Num. of Degree Vacancies (asinh)	
	Business/Law (1)	Engineering (2)
Panel A: Private University		
Audit \times Post	-0.156* (0.090)	0.456** (0.200)
R^2	0.72	0.73
Mean Dep. Var.	5.44	5.38
SD Dep. Var.	0.68	0.59
Observations	14,488	6,161
Num. of Clusters	403	195
Panel B: Public University		
Audit \times Post	-0.428 (0.327)	-0.049 (0.251)
R^2	0.76	0.77
Mean Dep. Var.	4.60	4.55
SD Dep. Var.	1.21	0.83
Observations	6,346	5,689
Num. of Clusters	208	186
Muni. \times Cohort FE	X	X
State \times Year \times Cohort FE	X	X

Notes: This table reports coefficients obtained from the estimation of equation 1, for a balanced panel of municipalities observed during $[-2, 4]$ where t is a year. Dependent variables are (inverse hyperbolic transformed) numbers of vacancies offered for business and law (column 1) and engineering (column 2). Panel A includes the sample of all private universities and Panel B includes that of all public universities. The unit of observation is municipality-year-cohort. Audit is a dummy that is 1 if the municipality was audited for the first time in the audited cohort, and 0 otherwise. Post is a dummy that is 1 if the year is after the year of interest. Standard errors are clustered at the municipality level. *** $p < 0.01$, ** $p < 0.05$, * $p < 0.1$.

Table A15: Effect of Audits on Municipal Employment

	Num. of Total First Hires (asinh)		
	Public Sector		Private Sector
	Tenure-Track (1)	Temporary (2)	(3)
Panel A: RAIS (2010-2018)			
Audit \times Post	0.067 (0.194)	0.010 (0.143)	0.016 (0.039)
R^2	0.67	0.80	0.97
Mean Dep. Var.	2.83	3.07	6.89
SD Dep. Var.	2.28	2.43	1.68
Observations	157,169	157,169	157,169
Num. of Clusters	3,693	3,693	3,693
Panel B: RAIS (2002-2018)			
Audit \times Post	0.308*** (0.094)	0.103 (0.097)	0.008 -0.023
R^2	0.62	0.73	0.96
Mean Dep. Var.	2.70	2.85	7.04
SD Dep. Var.	2.27	2.33	1.66
Observations	531,786	531,786	531,786
Num. of Clusters	5,348	5,348	5,348
Muni. \times Cohort FE	X	X	X
State \times Year \times Cohort FE	X	X	X

Notes: This table reports coefficients obtained from the estimation of equation 1. Dependent variables are (IHS transformed) the total number of public hires (civil servants in column 2 and temporary workers in column 3) and the total number of private hires (column 4). Panel A includes the sample of municipalities audited during 2011-2014 (with corresponding RAIS data observed during 2010-2018), and Panel B extends the sample to all municipalities audited during 2003-2014 (with corresponding RAIS data observed during 2002-2018). The unit of observation is municipality-year-cohort. Audit is a dummy that is 1 if the municipality was audited for the first time in the audited cohort, and 0 otherwise. Post is a dummy that is 1 if the year is after the year of interest. Standard errors are clustered at the municipality level. *** $p < 0.01$, ** $p < 0.05$, * $p < 0.1$.

Table A16: Effect of Audits on Public Sector Worforce Composition - Contract Type

	Total Num. (log)	Num. (asinh) by Quartile of ENEM Grades		
	(1)	Lowest 50% (2)	Second Highest25% (3)	Highest 25% (4)
Panel A: Tenure-Track				
Audit \times Post	-0.246* (0.135)	-0.095 (0.190)	-0.127 (0.272)	-0.250** (0.103)
R^2	0.80	0.58	0.59	0.73
Mean Dep. Var.	1.59	1.05	1.17	1.53
SD Dep. Var.	1.05	0.90	0.91	1.10
Observations	35,760	35,760	35,760	35,760
Num. of Clusters	1,711	1,711	1,711	1,711
Panel B: Temporary				
Audit \times Post	-0.004 (0.127)	0.102 (0.163)	-0.039 (0.139)	-0.259* (0.138)
R^2	0.80	0.70	0.67	0.73
Mean Dep. Var.	1.18	1.11	0.86	0.99
SD Dep. Var.	1.07	0.95	0.92	1.02
Observations	41,312	41,312	41,312	41,312
Num. of Clusters	1,838	1,838	1,838	1,838
Muni. \times Cohort FE	X	X	X	X
State \times Year \times Cohort FE	X	X	X	X

Notes: This table reports coefficients obtained from the estimation of equation 1. Dependent variables are the number (IHS-transformed) of students with ENEM grades at different quartiles of the score distribution (controlling for exam year). Panel A reports the sample of students who become tenure-track civil servants and Panel B reports the sample of those who become temporary public sector workers. The unit of observation is municipality-year-cohort. Audit is a dummy that is 1 if the municipality was audited for the first time in the audited cohort, and 0 otherwise. Post is a dummy that is 1 if the period is after the period of audit. Standard errors are clustered at the municipality level. *** $p < 0.01$, ** $p < 0.05$, * $p < 0.1$.

Table A17: Effect of Audits on Public Sector Workforce Composition - Other Categories

High-Ability Students in Public Sector: Other Categories								
	By Government Branch			By Hierarchical Level			By Occupation Type	
	Executive (1)	Legislative (2)	Judiciary (3)	Federal (4)	State (5)	Municipal (6)	Bureaucrats (7)	Frontline (8)
Audit \times Post	-0.189** (0.091)	-0.932*** (0.191)	-0.480 (0.338)	-0.069 (0.229)	-0.253** (0.105)	-0.382*** (0.103)	-0.084 (0.229)	-0.241** (0.096)
R^2	0.74	0.60	0.58	0.75	0.67	0.67	0.68	0.73
Mean Dep. Var.	1.50	0.50	1.01	1.14	1.24	1.21	1.10	1.41
SD Dep. Var.	1.13	0.55	0.64	0.91	0.98	1.01	0.99	1.10
Observations	57,921	4,038	2,198	2,748	30,976	47,946	35,337	45,064
Num. of Clusters	2,350	288	166	200	1,417	2,166	1,646	2,041
Muni. \times Cohort FE	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X
State \times Year \times Cohort FE	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X

Notes: This table reports coefficients obtained from the estimation of equation 1, zooming into other categories of public sector careers. Dependent variables are the number of high-ability students (IHS-transformed) in the corresponding job category. The unit of observation is municipality-year-cohort. Columns 1-3 report results for careers by the branch of government. Column 4-6 report results for careers by the level of hierarchy. Columns 7-8 report results for careers by occupation type, following definitions of bureaucrats and frontline providers as in [Colonnelli et al. \(2020b\)](#). Audit is a dummy that is 1 if the municipality was audited for the first time in the audited cohort, and 0 otherwise. Post is a dummy that is 1 if the period is after the period of audit. Standard errors are clustered at the municipality level. *** $p < 0.01$, ** $p < 0.05$, * $p < 0.1$.

B Audits and Corruption Percetion

In this appendix, I provide some suggestive evidence of how the anti-corruption audits in Brazil affect the perception of corruption among the Brazilian population.

To the best of my knowledge, the only representative socioeconomic survey that asks questions on the perception of corruption in Brazil is the *Latinobarómetro*. For instance, the following question was asked in all available *Latinobarómetro* survey waves during 2004-2020, except for the year 2018:


How much progress do you think has been made on reducing corruption in the state institutions during the last 2 years?

I follow the same estimation strategy as outlined in section 4.1, where the outcomes are standardized answers recorded in *Latinobarómetro* spanning from 2001 to 2020. One challenge with using the *Latinobarómetro* survey is that the geolocators provided for Brazil are the names of municipalities as well as the regions (north, northeast, central-west, south-east and south), the combination of which does not uniquely identify municipalities. To deal with this problem, I remove ambiguous observations (municipalities located in the same region who share the same name) and eventually obtain an unambiguous sample of 54 municipalities (30 *never-audited* and 24 *first-audited* municipalities during 2003-2015) for this part of the analysis. Note that I have a much smaller sample of treated municipalities even after expanding the period of analysis to as early as 2003, as the *Latinobarómetro* only sample survey respondents from about 90 municipalities each survey year. Most of the surveyed municipalities are large state capitals which were not eligible for the CGU audit program. Nevertheless, I present suggestive results using the stacked difference-in-difference for this subsample of municipalities.

As shown in Panel A of Figure B1, the overall perception of progress made in combating corruption at the national level remained low and relatively unchanged throughout the CGU audit campaign (2003 to 2015). However, audits do seem to alter corruption perception at the local level. Panel B illustrates the event study plot on how anti-corruption audits affect the perception of progress made combatting corruption in the last two years. One can see a positive jump at the $t + 0$ period, indicating an impression of more progress made in fighting corruption following the audit announcement. The coefficient drops to 0 at $t + 2$ when local corruption scandals are unveiled, but reverses back to positive when the corrupt politicians and public officials start facing legal consequences in subsequent years. I complement the visual evidence with the table estimates (Table B1) from the stacked difference-in-difference estimation over a wider range of questions on both the perception

of corruption and trust in institutions. The coefficients are imprecisely estimated likely due to the small sample size. Regardless, the signs of the estimates are as expected: audits are associated with perceptions of lower corruption. Columns 3-5 suggest audits are also associated with a lower level of trust in institutions. Overall, the evidence presented in this appendix illustrates the conceptual first stage for the main analysis of the paper: not only did information regarding the audits reach the general population, but they also led to a (local) reduction in the perception of corruption in state institutions. This evidence help corroborate the conjecture that the perception of reduced corruption is a likely driver of talent shifting away from public sector trajectories as illustrated in section 4.

Figure B1: Perception of Progress Made Combatting Corruption



Notes: Panel A presents the yearly variation of the average response to the question “perception of progress made combatting corruption” (0 indicates no progress made and 1 indicates much progress made) as recorded in survey *Latinobarómetro*. Panel B figure presents event study estimators for the effects of audits on perceptions of progress made combatting corruption from the estimation of equation 2. Reporting 95% confidence intervals. Standard errors are clustered at the municipality level.

Table B1: Audits and Social Attitudes in *Latinobarómetro*


	Perception of Corruption		Trust in Institutions		
	(1) Problem	(2) Progress	(3) Congress	(4) Fed. Gov.	(5) Judiciary
Audit \times Post	-0.072 (0.097)	0.167 (0.127)	-0.058 (0.113)	-0.075 (0.125)	-0.008 (0.095)
R^2	0.72	0.70	0.71	0.63	0.61
Mean Dep. Var.	0.11	0.40	0.38	0.42	0.48
SD Dep. Var.	0.14	0.15	0.15	0.16	0.13
Observations	484	371	484	470	484
Num. of Clusters	36	26	36	33	36
Muni. \times Cohort FE	X	X	X	X	X
Year \times Cohort FE	X	X	X	X	X

Notes: This table reports coefficients obtained from the estimation of equation 1, where t is a *Latino-barómetro* survey year. The unit of observation is municipality-year-cohort. The dependent variables are standardized outcomes from the *Latinobarómetro* survey. *Problem* in Column 1 indicates the share of survey respondents who think corruption is the most important problem faced by the country. *Progress* in Column 2 is the answer to the question of whether there was progress made in reducing corruption in the past 1-2 years (scale of 0 to 1, 0 means no progress made and 1 means much progress made). Columns 3-5 report levels of trust in institutions (the Congress, the federal government, and the judiciary), where 0 means no confidence at all and 1 means a lot of confidence. *Audit* is a dummy that is 1 if the municipality was audited for the first time in the audited cohort, and 0 otherwise. *Post* is a dummy that is 1 if the period is after the period of the audit. Standard errors are clustered at the municipality level. *** $p < 0.01$, ** $p < 0.05$, * $p < 0.1$.

C Major-Career Mapping

In this appendix, I discuss in greater detail the mapping of different fields of study to public sector careers among Brazilian students. I focus on the baseline group of students enrolled in higher education in the year 2010 who were not exposed to audits in 2011-2014 before college enrollment. Note that due to data availability of RAIS and data attrition as explained in footnote 32, I eventually trace about 70,000 students of the 2010 enrollment cohort to their first jobs in the formal labor market.

Figure C1: Mapping of Majors to Early Careers



Notes: This figure illustrates the shares among students enrolled in each major who end up finding their first job in the public sector, calculated using the sub-sample of students enrolled in higher education in the baseline year 2010 and traced to RAIS as explained in section 3.2. Panel A displays the shares for all public sector workers. Panel B displays the shares for tenure-track civil servants. Panel C and Panel D display results for executive branch and non-executive (legislative and judiciary) branch, respectively.

Using the sample of students enrolled in higher education in the baseline year 2010 and


later appearing in RAIS, I construct a mapping from majors to early careers (demeaned shares of students who end up in the corresponding public sector positions by major enrolled) as illustrated in Figure C1. One can see that degrees in education and medicine are in general well-represented in public sector careers (Panels A, B and C) while business/law degrees stand out particularly for the legislative or judiciary branches of the government (Panel D). As a comparison, engineering degrees are under-represented across different public sector positions overall.

In Figure C2 below, I further plot these shares against the difference-in-differences estimates obtained via equation 1 when the outcome of interest is the enrollment share in the corresponding major. Among the four figures, Panel D illustrates the sharpest negative correlation: majors that are more represented in the legislative or judiciary career (such as business/law) see more of a brain drain following anti-corruption audits. On the contrary, fields that are under-represented in any public sector careers (engineering in particular) see the largest growth in terms of size of enrollment after the audits. From an ex-post point of view, these patterns of correlation provide additional rationalization for the focus on the comparison between enrollment in business/law versus engineering in the main analysis in section 4.2.

However, it is worth noting that education as a field of study stands out as an exception. As highlighted by Panels A, B, and C, students majoring in education are generally well-represented in public sector careers. Results from Appendix Table A2 show that audits have a slight positive effect on enrollment in education, although the coefficient is imprecisely estimated. Several reasons could justify the “outlier” behavior of the education major. From the perspective of students, a large fraction of students studying education presumably end up becoming public school teachers, who are civil servants in Brazil and are (de jure) selected based on meritocratic exams. Bureaucratic corruption involving misappropriation or embezzlement of fiscal transfers might be less relevant for frontline providers such as public school teachers and healthcare providers, whose main source of income is the contractual wage. If anything, students who aspire to become public school teachers could benefit from a reduction in bureaucratic corruption due to improved allocation of school funds (Ferraz et al., 2012). An alternative explanation is that compared to other fields, degrees in education are widely available (Appendix Figure A3 shows education is one of the most popular major choices) and serve as closer substitutes for degrees in business/law. Lastly, education is also more susceptible to changes in hiring practices. In the case of Brazil, existing research (Gonzales, 2021; Akhtari et al., 2022) has documented that patronage hiring is prevalent among public school personnel (such as school principals and teachers). These reasons highlight that education should be treated as a special

case as opposed to other fields of study.

Figure C2: Effects of Audits on Major Enrollment and Career Prospects



Notes: This figure plots the shares among students enrolled in each major who end up finding their first job in the public sector, against stacked difference-in-difference coefficients together with 95% confidence intervals estimated via equation 1 when the dependent variable is enrollment shares for the corresponding major. Panel A displays the shares for all public sector workers. Panel B displays shares for civil servants. Panel C and Panel D display results for executive branch and non-executive (legislative or judiciary) branch, respectively.

D Audits and Out-Migration

In this appendix, I discuss anti-corruption audits and students' decisions to migrate. As emphasized in the main paper, throughout the empirical analysis, whether students are exposed to CGU audits is defined by whether they enroll in higher education after an audit occurs in their reported municipality of residence at the end of high school (subsequently referred to as a student's "home" municipality). The definition of treatment status is irrespective of the locations where students go to university or work.

While ensuring consistency of analysis on higher education and labor market outcomes, a related concern remains whether the effects I observe on talent sorting can be a mechanical outcome following selective out-migration driven by the audits. Specifically, if students simply leave their home municipalities after an anti-corruption out of reasons such as a distaste for local corruption, the spatial relocation itself might induce changes in major preferences because students might choose majors that could maximize their labor market prospects (such as STEM majors) facing an alien labor market in the new location.

To examine to what extent this claim can be true, I provide some reduced-form evidence on audits and migration using the stacked-by-event estimation method elaborated in section 4.1. First, I do find evidence of selective out-migration for work after the audits, as summarized in Table D1. Column 1 suggests students are less likely to end up working in their home municipality following an audit, and the out-migration occurs for both civil servants and those who end up in the private sector. Students also tend to work outside of their home state (column 2), even though the estimates are less precise. The results should be interpreted with caution as migration could occur prior to career realization (such as during the college enrollment phase), or it could be a byproduct of career allocation itself which is also endogenously responding to the audits.

Next, I re-produce my baseline results on major enrollment when migration is taken into account, to examine whether the effects are driven by selective migration following the audits. The results are presented in Table D2. Reassuringly, the major switching pattern I observe at the baseline persists when I look at non-migrants ("stayers") and migrants ("movers") separately. If anything, the reduction in business/law enrollment is sharper for stayers, suggesting that out-migration is unlikely to be driving the changes in talent sorting across fields of studies following the audits.

Table D1: Effect of Audits on Out-Migration for Work

	Workplace Muni. and Residence Muni.	
	In the Same Muni. (1)	In the Same State (2)
Panel A: Public Sector (Civil Servants)		
Audit \times Post	-0.112** (0.056)	-0.060 (0.103)
R^2	0.74	0.65
Mean Dep. Var.	0.30	0.47
SD Dep. Var.	0.39	0.48
Observations	26,906	26,906
Num. of Clusters	1,404	1,404
Panel B: Private Sector		
Audit \times Post	-0.058* (0.033)	-0.015 (0.022)
R^2	0.61	0.53
Mean Dep. Var.	0.49	0.86
SD Dep. Var.	0.27	0.27
Observations	66,706	66,706
Num. of Clusters	2,525	2,525
Muni. \times Cohort FE	X	X
State \times Year \times Cohort FE	X	X

Notes: This table evaluates the effects of audits on the probability of out-migration, conditioning on the type of occupation. The table reports coefficients obtained from the estimation of equation 1. The dependent variable for column 1 is the share of workers working in the same municipality as their home municipality (defined as place of residence the year before college enrollment) out of all workers from the same origin municipality who appear in RAIS. Column 2 reports for the same indicator but for states. Panel A reports the sample of students who end up in civil service, and Panel B includes the sample of students who end up in the private sector. The unit of observation is municipality-year-cohort. Audit is a dummy that is 1 if the municipality was audited for the first time in the audited cohort, and 0 otherwise. Post is a dummy that is 1 if the period is after the period of audit. Standard errors are clustered at the municipality level. *** $p < 0.01$, ** $p < 0.05$, * $p < 0.1$.

Table D2: Effect of Audits on Major Enrollment by Migration Status

	Total Num. (log) (1)	Share in Business/Law (2)	Share in Engineering (3)
Panel A: Work Muni. Same as Residence (Stayers)			
Audit \times Post	0.135** (0.060)	-0.059** (0.027)	0.045* (0.024)
R^2	0.92	0.29	0.32
Mean Dep. Var.	2.53	0.31	0.16
SD Dep. Var.	1.43	0.22	0.17
Observations	57348	57348	57348
Num. of Clusters	2299	2299	2299
Panel B: Work Muni. Different Than Residence (Movers)			
Audit \times Post	0.105 (0.090)	-0.058*** (0.017)	0.046*** (0.016)
R^2	0.93	0.27	0.28
Mean Dep. Var.	2.59	0.27	0.17
SD Dep. Var.	1.52	0.21	0.17
Observations	66125	66125	66125
Num. of Clusters	2565	2565	2565
Muni. \times Cohort FE	X	X	X
State \times Year \times Cohort FE	X	X	X

Notes: The table reports coefficients obtained from the estimation of equation 1. The dependent variable for column 1 is the (log) total number of students showing up in RAIS. Columns 2 and 3 report results on the shares of enrollment in business/law and engineering separately. Panel A reports the sample of stayers (those who work in their residence municipality at the time of the college enrollment) while Panel B includes the sample of students who migrated for work to a different municipality. The unit of observation is municipality-year-cohort. Audit is a dummy that is 1 if the municipality was audited for the first time in the audited cohort, and 0 otherwise. Post is a dummy that is 1 if the period is after the period of audit. Standard errors are clustered at the municipality level. *** $p < 0.01$, ** $p < 0.05$, * $p < 0.1$.

E Categorization of Occupations in Brazil

In this appendix, I discuss how I classify occupations in Brazil by their level of rent-seeking and prosociality.

I begin by conducting a keyword search through the job description texts of the classification of Brazilian occupations (*Classificação Brasileira de Ocupações*, or CBO), available for download on the official website of the Ministry of Labor and Employment, and assign a “rent-seeking” score and “pro-social” score for each 4-digit CBO code based on numbers of keywords matched.

Below are the lists of keywords (in Portuguese) for “rent-seeking” and “pro-social”, respectively

- *Rent-seeking*: análise, aquisição, aquisições, arrecadação, auditam, auditar, auditor, auditores, auditoria, autorização, autuação, benefício, compras, concessão, concessões, contrato, contratos, contratual, controle, correção, decisão, fiscais, fiscal, fiscalizar, fiscalização, gestão de recursos, imposto, impostos, incentivo, interdição, investigação, legislação, lei, leis, licença, licitação, licitações, multa, multar, multas, norma, orçamento, orçamentos, orçamentária, orçamentário, pagamento, parecer, penalidade, permissão, poder, recolhimento, reguladora, regulamenta, regulamentação, regulamento, regulatório, regulação, repasse, sanção, transferência, tributação, tributo, tributos, tributária, tributário, vigilância, agente fiscal, atos normativos, autarquia, autoridade, benefícios, burocracia, cartório, certificação, compliance, concorrência, consultoria jurídica, decisório, deliberação, faturamento, formalização, gestor público, indenização, instrução normativa, inquérito, julgamento, jurídico, licenciamentos, minuta, normativo, parecerista, prestação de contas, processo administrativo, regime jurídico, remuneração, rendimentos, repartição, subsídio, taxação, vinculação, vinculado, aquisição, aquisições, compras, licitante, licitantes, licitação, licitações, contrato, contratos, contratual, contratação, contratante, fornecedor, fornecedores, pregão, dispensa, edital, orçamento, orçamentos, planejamento de compras, requisição, cotação, proposta, propostas, adjudicação, homologação, recurso administrativo
- *Pro-social*: acolher, acolhimento, apoio, assistencial, assistência, atendimento, capacitação, clínica, clínicas, comunidade, conselheiro, conselho tutelar, criança, cuidado, cuidador, cuidados, doente, doentes, educação, emergência, emergências, enfermagem, enfermeira, enfermeiras, enfermeiro, enfermeiros, ensino, escuta, família, formação, hospitais, hospital, hospitalar, idoso, idosos, inclusão, instrutor, mediação, monitoria, orientação, paciente, pacientes, pedagógico, proteção, psicológico,


psicossocial, reabilitação, resgatam, resgatar, resgate, saúde, social, socorro, solidariedade, solidário, terapia, tratamento, voluntária, voluntárias, voluntário, voluntários, acompanhamento, acolhedor, ajuda, ajudante, aluno, alunos, aprendizagem, assistente social, atenção, bem-estar, cuidadores, docente, educador, educadores, enfermar, formador, intervenção, orientador, pedagogo, prevenção, psicologia, refugiado, reintegração, relação de ajuda, sensibilização, serviço social, solidarismo, suporte, tutoria, vulnerável, vulneráveis

The overall correlation between the prosocial score and rent-seeking score across all occupations is -0.05, while the median number of rent-seeking and prosocial counts are 1 and 4, respectively. I then categorize occupations into high or low rent-seeking based on whether the occupation scores above- or below-median “rent-seeking” score from the keyword search, and similarly for high and low prosocial occupations.

Example occupations (along with their 4-digit CBO codes) that score the highest in terms of “rent-seeking” are state and municipal tax inspectors (2544), social security tax auditors (2542), federal revenue auditors and technicians (2541), metrological and quality inspection agents (3523), road transport technicians (3423), administrative supervisors (4101); while occupations at the top of the “prosocial” list are nursing technicians and assistants (3222), community health agents and related occupations (5151), caregivers of children, youth, adults and the elderly (5162), dental hygienists and technicians (3224), psychologists and psychoanalysts (2515), occupational therapists and related occupations (2239).


F Robustness Checks

Figure F1: Audits and Major Enrollment - Alternative Estimator




Notes: This figure presents event study estimators for the effects of audits on shares of freshmen major enrollment (pooling public and private universities), using the *did_imputation* approach (Borusyak et al., 2024).

Figure F2: Parallel Trends Sensitivity Analysis via Rambachan and Roth (2023)



Notes: This figure reports coefficients obtained from the estimation of equation 2 and confidence sets under varying restrictions on possible differences in trends, applying the HonestDiD package provided in Rambachan and Roth (2023) to the stacked DiD estimator in equation 1. The sample includes all students pooling public and private universities. Reporting 95% confidence intervals. Standard errors are clustered at the municipality level.

Figure F3: Audits and Majors & Careers - Balanced Panel



Notes: This figure reports coefficients obtained from the estimation of equation 2, where the sample is restricted to the balanced panel and the time window is shortened to [-2,4]. Reporting 95% confidence intervals. Standard errors are clustered at the municipality level.

Table F1: Poisson Regression and Implied Proportional Effects

	(1)	(2)	(3)
Panel A: Major Enrollment	All Students	Business/Law	Engineering
Audit \times Post	0.085** (0.033)	-0.021 (0.034)	0.345*** (0.074)
Implied Prop. Effect	0.088** (0.036)	-0.021 (0.033)	0.412*** (0.104)
<i>Mean Dep. Var.</i>	1043.82	323.91	175.34
<i>SD Dep. Var.</i>	1408.42	439.80	246.22
Observations	169,835	169,835	169,477
Num. of Clusters	3,693	3,693	3,686
Panel B: Career Realization	All Workers	Public Sector	Private Sector
Audit \times Post	0.154*** (0.051)	-0.024 (0.069)	0.161*** (0.054)
Implied Prop. Effect	0.166*** (0.059)	-0.023 (0.068)	0.175*** (0.064)
<i>Mean Dep. Var.</i>	306.41	22.63	283.98
<i>SD Dep. Var.</i>	426.11	31.03	402.45
Observations	115,148	110,584	114,062
Num. of Clusters	3,330	3,094	3,252
Muni. \times Cohort FE	X	X	X
State \times Year \times Cohort FE	X	X	X

Notes: Compared to the baseline estimates reported in Table 2 and 4, where dependent variables are numbers reported in inverse hyperbolic sine transformation, in this table dependent variables are the raw numbers and the coefficients are estimated using Poisson quasi-maximum likelihood estimation (QMLE). The second row shows the implied estimate of the proportional effect $E[Y(1) - Y(0)]/E[Y(0)]$, calculated as $\exp(\hat{\beta}) - 1$ and interpreted as the percentage change in the average outcome between treatment and control (Chen and Roth, 2024). Audit is a dummy that is 1 if the municipality was audited for the first time in the audited cohort, and 0 otherwise. Post is a dummy that is 1 if the period is after the period of audit. Standard errors are clustered at the municipality level. *** $p < 0.01$, ** $p < 0.05$, * $p < 0.1$.

Table F2: Effect of Audits on Shares of Major Enrollment - Robustness

	Balanced Panel		Time is Semester		Hybrid-Included	
	Bus./Law (1)	Eng. (2)	Bus./Law (3)	Eng. (4)	Bus./Law (5)	Eng. (6)
Audit \times Post	-0.015* -0.008	0.023** -0.009	-0.018*** (0.007)	0.014** (0.006)	-0.015*** (0.006)	0.011* (0.006)
R^2	0.58	0.73	0.43	0.55	0.63	0.75
Mean Dep. Var.	0.3	0.16	0.31	0.16	0.30	0.16
SD Dep. Var.	0.08	0.08	0.10	0.09	0.08	0.08
Observations	154,828	154,828	375,672	375,672	163,726	163,726
Num. of Clusters	3,600	3,600	3,871	3,871	3,836	3,836
Muni. \times Cohort FE	X	X	X	X	X	X
State \times Time \times Cohort FE	X	X	X	X	X	X

Notes: This table illustrates the robustness of the main effects of the audit on shares of major enrollment, for business/law and engineering separately. The table reports coefficients obtained from the estimation of equation 1. The unit of observation is municipality-time-cohort, where the unit of time is the year for columns 1-2 and 5-6, and the semester (half-year) for columns 3-4. Audit is a dummy that is 1 if the municipality was audited for the first time in the audited cohort, and 0 otherwise. Post is a dummy that is 1 if the year (semester) is after the year (semester) of audit. In columns 1 and 2, the sample is restricted to the balanced panel and the time window is [-2,4]. In columns 3 and 4 the time unit is semester and the panel is balanced with the time window [-3, 7]. In columns 5 and 6, municipalities audited in the hybrid phase (2015-2018) are included in the control group. Standard errors are clustered at the municipality level. *** $p < 0.01$, ** $p < 0.05$, * $p < 0.1$.

Table F3: Audits and Civil Servants - Alternative Sample Restrictions

	full sample (1)	$n > 0$ (2)	$n > 1$ (3)	$n > 2$ (4)
Panel A: Num. of Public Sector Workers				
Audit \times Post	-0.095 (0.115)	-0.096 (0.117)	-0.112 (0.125)	-0.139 (0.134)
R^2	0.84	0.84	0.83	0.83
Mean Dep. Var.	2.33	2.60	2.84	3.03
SD Dep. Var.	1.30	1.08	0.93	0.83
Observations	96,153	62,363	34,225	21,416
Num. of Clusters	3,036	2,460	1,499	989
Panel B: Num. of High-Ability Students Among Public Sector Workers				
Audit \times Post		-0.295*** (0.083)	-0.307*** (0.083)	-0.319*** (0.081)
R^2		0.77	0.75	0.75
Mean Dep. Var.		1.66	1.85	2.03
SD Dep. Var.		1.19	1.14	1.08
Observations		62,363	34,225	21,416
Num. of Clusters		2,460	1,499	989
Muni. \times Cohort FE	X	X	X	X
State \times Year \times Cohort FE	X	X	X	X

Notes: This table reports coefficients obtained from the estimation of equation 1, where the samples differ regarding the number of public sector workers observed in this municipality-year bin. The unit of observation is municipality-year-cohort. Column 1 reports results when no restrictions are made on the sample (taking into account the extensive margin). Column 2 reports results conditioning on having at least one worker from this municipality-year bin (the intensive margin only). Columns 3 and 4 report the estimates when the sample is further restricted to those with more than 1 and 2 workers. The dependent variable in Panel A is the total number (IHS-transformed) of students entering public sector and in Panel B it is the number ((IHS-transformed)) of public sector workers from the top quartile of the ENEM grade distribution. Audit is a dummy that is 1 if the municipality was audited for the first time in the audited cohort, and 0 otherwise. Post is a dummy that is 1 if the period is after the period of audit. Standard errors are clustered at the municipality level. *** $p < 0.01$, ** $p < 0.05$, * $p < 0.1$.