

## PENETRATION TESTING (PART II)

Prof. Dr. Bernhard Tellenbach



Phases borrowed from PTES:

- **Pre-engagement interactions:** Initial communication and reasoning behind a penetration test
- **Intelligence gathering and threat modeling:** Get a better understanding of the tested organization
- **Vulnerability research, exploitation:** Identify vulnerabilities and demonstrate proof-of-concept or “real” exploits
- **Post exploitation:** Determine the value of the compromised target, maintain control and gain further access to other resources
- **Reporting:** Captures the entire process in a manner that makes sense to the customer and provides the most value to it

- You know selected **methods and tools** used during the intelligence gathering phase and know what information the tools can deliver
- You can make use of these methods and tools to **collect different kinds of information**
- You can judge whether a tool is **passive**, **semi-passive** or **active** and for what **level** of intelligence gathering (1, 2 or 3) it can be used

- Intelligence gathering (or footprinting) is **performing reconnaissance** against a target to gather as much information as possible
  - Mostly from publicly available sources => Open source intelligence (OSINT)
- Information is **utilized** when penetrating the target during the **vulnerability assessment** and **exploitation phases**.
  - Determine physical, electronic, and/or human entry points
- The more information you gather during this phase, the **more attack vectors** might be available to you
- Limitations:
  - OSINT may be **inaccurate**, **outdated**, or **deliberately manipulated** to **distract/divert** attackers
  - OSINT does not encompass dumpster-diving or any methods of retrieving company information off of physical items found on-premises

Open Source Intelligence (OSINT) helps to determine various entry points into an organization. These entry points can be physical, electronic, and/or human. Many companies fail to take into account what information about themselves they place in public and how this information can be used by a determined attacker. On top of that, many employees fail to take into account what information they place about themselves in public and how that information can be used to attack them or their employer.

- The **level** clarifies the expected output and activities within certain real-world **constraints** such as **time**, **effort**, **access to information**, etc.
  - Level 1 – "Compliance driven"
    - Information can be collected almost entirely by **automated tools**
  - Level 2 – "Best practice"
    - Mix of automated tools and **some manual analysis**
    - A good **understanding of the business**, including information such as physical location, business relationships, organization chart, etc.
  - Level 3 – "State Sponsored"
    - Automated tools and hours of **in-depth** and **thorough manual analysis**
    - Cultivating relationships on social networks, profiling of all key personalities of the company, in-depth study of systems and technologies they use, ...
    - Most advanced, full-scope (red team)

- **Passive** – Using data from **third parties** that is already there
  - Access to information **cannot be detected/tracked** by the target
    - E.g., use of Shodan instead of an active network scan
  - Can be quite limited and information is likely to be not up-to-date
- **Semi-passive** – Using data gathered **using legitimate behaviour**
  - Query only sources that **are there to be queried** and **stick to the protocol**
    - Don'ts: In-depth reverse lookups, brute force DNS requests, searching for "unpublished" servers or directories, network level port scans, using crawlers or actively looking for
  - Use **anonymization** networks or similar to **hide the origin** of the queries
    - Post mortem - Reconnaissance activities might be identified but the target shouldn't be able to attribute the activity back to anyone
- **Active** – Should be **detected** by the target
  - Most common form of information gathering
    - Vulnerability scanning, enumeration, profiling middle boxes (IDS, FW,...) with test traffic, ...

**Shodan** is a search engine that lets the user find specific types of computers (routers, servers, etc.) connected to the internet using a variety of filters. Some have also described it as a search engine of service banners, which are meta-data the server sends back to the client. This can be information about the server software, what options the service supports, a welcome message or anything else that the client can find out before interacting with the server.


Shodan collects data mostly on web servers (HTTP, port 80), as well as FTP (port 21), SSH (port 22) Telnet (port 23), SNMP (port 161), SIP (port 5060), and Real Time Streaming Protocol (RTSP, port 554). The latter can be used to access webcams and their video stream.

In May 2013, CNN Money released an article [1] detailing how SHODAN can be used to find dangerous systems on the Internet, including traffic light controls. They show screenshots of those systems, which provided the warning banner "DEATH MAY OCCUR !!!" upon connecting.

In January 2015, Shodan was discussed in a CSO Online article [2] addressing its pros and cons. According to one opinion, presented in the article as that of *Hagai Bar-El*, Shodan actually gives the public a good service, although it highlights vulnerable devices. This perspective is also described in one of his essays.

[1] Goldman, David (May 2, 2013). ["Shodan finds the Internet's most dangerous spots"](#). CNN Money. Retrieved 2016-03-13.

[2] ["Shodan makes us all more secure"](#). Retrieved 2016-03-13.



Examples of pieces of information for the different categories.

The examples are also labelled with the information gathering level at which the information could eventually be gathered.

## Physical:

- Locations (L1): Full address(es), ownership, time zones in which the target sites are located
- Relationships (L1): Shared office space, business partners, customers,...

## Logical:

- Market Vertical (L1): Which industry the target resides in. i.e. financial, defense, agriculture, government, etc
- Meetings (L2/L3): Meeting Minutes published? Meetings open to public?
- Job openings (L1/L2): By viewing a list of job openings at an organization

## Financial:

- Reporting (L1/L2): The targets financial reporting will depend heavily on the location of the organization. Reporting may also be made through the organizations head office and not for each branch office.

## Electronic Documents:

- Document Metadata (L1/L2): Metadata or meta-content provides information about the data/document in scope. It can have information such as author/creator name, time and date, standards used/referred, location in a computer network (printer/folder/directory path/etc. info), geo-tag etc. For an image its' metadata can contain color, depth, resolution, camera make/type and even the co-ordinates and location information.
- Marketing Communications (L1/L2): Current marketing communications contain design

components (Colors, Fonts, Graphics etc..) which are for the most part used internally as well. Additional contact information including external marketing organizations.

#### **Infrastructure Assets:**

- Network blocks owned (L1): Network Blocks owned by the organization can be passively obtained from performing whois searches.
- Technologies used (L1/L2): OSINT searches through support forums, mailing lists and other resources can gather information of technologies used at the target.
- Remote access (L1/L2): Obtaining information on how employees and/or clients connect into the target for remote access provides a potential point of ingress.

#### **Employees:**

- Internet Presence: Email Address (L1), personal handles/nicknames (L1), personal domain names (L1/L2)
- Social Network Profile (L2/L3): Metadata leakage (e.g., from photos), tone and frequency of conversations,...
- History (L2/L3): Court records, political profile, sports/hobbies, professional licenses and degrees, ...


*Source (with more details/examples): [http://www.pentest-standard.org/index.php/Intelligence\\_Gathering](http://www.pentest-standard.org/index.php/Intelligence_Gathering)*



- Target: The Zurich University of Applied Sciences (URL: [www.zhaw.ch](http://www.zhaw.ch))
- Collect **some information** about the ZHAW that **might be of use** for a pentest
  - Physical - Locations, buildings, addresses, floor plans, locking system,...
  - Logical - Important people, business partners, clients, products, meetings, events social connections,...
  - Infrastructure Assets - Domains, IP addresses, servers, defences, ...
  - Electronic documents
    - E.g., metadata analysis to identify usernames, software used, authors,...
    - Get corporate design components to craft phishing campaigns
  - Employee / Individuals (HUMINT)
    - Involves direct interaction – physical (e.g. observation) or verbal
- In practice, the focus would be much narrower

## Browsing the Target's Website

## Browsing the Target's Website (1)



- The **company website itself** can provide lots of interesting information, especially with respect to contact persons and their roles

## Browsing the Target's Website (2)

The screenshot displays the ZHAW website's navigation and content. The top navigation bar includes links for Study, Continuing education, Research, Business services, and About us. The main content area is divided into two columns: 'Finance & Services' and 'Information & Communication'. The 'Finance & Services' section describes the provision of financial and human resources, while the 'Information & Communication' section describes ICT services. A contact card for 'Christian Gasser' is highlighted in grey, showing his name, title, and contact information. A blue arrow points from the 'Finance & Services' header to the 'Finance & Services' text block. Another blue arrow points from the 'Information & Communication' header to the 'Christian Gasser' contact card. A third blue arrow points from the 'Christian Gasser' card to the 'Finance & Services' text block.

- If you identified some potentially interesting employees, look for **search functions** and enter the contact information of this person

## Browsing the Target's Website (2)

**Profile Page**

**Dr. Christian Gassner**

Dr. Christian Gassner  
ZHAW Finance & Services  
Information & Communication Technology  
Gertrudstrasse 15  
8401 Winterthur

+41 (0) 58 934 73 97  
christian.gassner@zhaw.ch

**Finance & Services | ZHAW Zurich University of Applied Sciences**

... Emergency procedure Contact Safety Contact Armin Dittli, **Christian Gassner**, Wolfgang Giehl, Reto Schnellmann, Bischofberger, Daniel Arnet, Thomas Larcher, from left to right Reto...

**ZHAW digital - People | Strategic Initiative "ZHAW digital"**

... the answer to everything "Patric Furrer, Lecturer Institute of Constructive Design **Christian Gassner**" studied inform management and did my PhD in the field of IT system...

**[PDF] 201908\_Newsletter\_DE**

... Dykast, Patric Furrer, **Christian Gassner**, Aleksandra Gnach, Jos Hehli, Christoph Heitz, Imke Knafli, Markus Mello Müller Werder sowie Thilo Stadelmann und Daniel Baumann...

**[PDF] 201908\_Newsletter\_EN**

... also in place It consists of 11 people who contribute their perspectives, expertise and experiences: Hannah Lea Dyk Furrer, **Christian Gassner**, Aleksandra Gnach, Jos Hehli...

**All ZHAW members | ZHAW Zurich University of Applied Sciences**

... Christian Cordin Christian Dill Christian Frech Nabold **Christian Gassner** Christian Glahn Christian Herfach Christia Christian Hinderling Christian Hitz Christian Huld Christian...

**All ZHAW members**

- / Abel Habbe
- / Abraham Gilis
- / Achim Ecker
- / Achim Lang
- / Adam W. Thomas
- / Adrian Bertschi
- / Adrian Burti
- / Adrian Burti

- So we have found additional information:
  - Christian Gassner has a **leading position** in ICT
  - We know his **phone number** and **e-mail address**
  - Valuable for social engineering attacks!

## Browsing the Target's Website (3)

- What do you see on the page on the right?
- Discuss: Should this information be published or not? Why?

### Alle ZHAW Angehörige



/ Abraham Gillis  
/ Achim Ecker  
/ Achim Lang  
/ Adam W. Thomas  
/ Adrian Bertschi  
/ Adrian Burri  
/ Adrian Busin  
/ Adrian Fassbind  
/ Adrian Froelich  
/ Adrian Gugger  
/ Adrian Leibundgut  
/ Adrian Lötscher  
/ Adrian Moser  
/ Adrian Pulgarin  
/ Adrian Stäubli  
/ Adrian Octavio Sulzer  
/ Adrian W. Müller  
/ Adriana Colasante

## Browsing the Target's Website (4)

Wayback Machine interface showing the archived version of the ZHAW website. The interface includes a search bar, a navigation menu with links like 'Studium', 'Weiterbildung', 'Forschung', 'Dienstleistung', and 'Kontakt', and a main content area with news articles. A calendar on the left shows the date range from 1996 to 2008, with a specific date highlighted. A blue arrow points from the 'Zürcher Bildungsmesse' article in the main content area to the calendar, indicating the date of the archive.

- Search for content from the past and/or in a passive way
  - Caches of search engines:  
<http://webcache.googleusercontent.com/search?q=cach e:<URL>>
  - Use the [wayback machine](http://www.archive.org/) to search for information that has been removed from the web
  - Use Mementoweb to search multiple (Web) Archives


**Memento** is a United States *National Digital Information Infrastructure and Preservation Program* (NDIIPP)–funded project aimed at making Web-archived content more readily discoverable.

The project is being led by the Los Alamos National Laboratory and Old Dominion University. Rather than expecting people to know about the growing number of Web archives, and to guess which archive might hold an older version of the resource they're looking for, Memento proposes to make archived content discoverable via the original URL that the searcher already knew about. Essentially, Memento is an attempt to permit users to view any web page as it looked on a given date in the past.

Source: [https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Memento\\_Project](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Memento_Project)

Search portal: <http://timetravel.mementoweb.org/>


## Browsing the Target's Website - Summary

|             |  |
|-------------|--|
| Method      | Semi-Active / Passive  |
| Level       | L2/L3  |
| Information | Company data, organisation chart, employees, job openings, news/events, official points of contact, partners, publications, ...  |
| Tools       | <ul style="list-style-type: none"><li>• Web browser (for online analysis)</li><li>• Spiders (for offline analysis) [method: active]<br/><a href="http://scrapy.org/">http://scrapy.org/</a><br/><a href="https://portswigger.net/burp/">https://portswigger.net/burp/</a></li></ul>  |
| Resources   | <ul style="list-style-type: none"><li>• Websites of the target</li><li>• <a href="https://archive.org/web/">https://archive.org/web/</a></li><li>• <a href="https://timetravel.mementoweb.org/">https://timetravel.mementoweb.org/</a></li></ul> <div>INTERNET ARCHIVE<br/><b>WayBackMachine</b> </div> |
| Limitations | <ul style="list-style-type: none"><li>• Rather inefficient</li><li>• Quality of the search results from searches on the webpage sometimes quite bad</li></ul>  |



# Search Engine Hacking

- Use a **search engine** to reveal information that companies/individuals likely **intended not to be discoverable** through a Web search
  - account usernames and passwords
  - customer and partner lists and details
  - sensitive and private documents
  - account details
  - website **vulnerabilities** for potential cyber attacks
  - ...
- Book is outdated, a very good guide from August 2019 is here:  
<https://zapier.com/blog/advanced-google-search-tricks/>



### Google Dorking - History

- 2002 : Johnny Long collects **interesting** Google **search queries** uncovering **vulnerable systems** and/or **sensitive information** => googleDorks
- 2005+ release of Google Hacking book by Johnny Long
- 2014 (!): U.S. Feds issued a warning to companies in the US to increase vigilance for Google Dorking activity by "malicious cyber actors"

- Find websites running with wordpress at ZHAW  
`allinurl:zhaw.ch wp-content`
- ZHAW sites with "username" and "password" in the site's content  
`zhaw intext:"username" intext:"password"`
- Sites with "login" in the URL  
`site:zhaw.ch inurl:login`
- Files with certain extensions that contain the word "login" at ZHAW  
`site:zhaw.ch ext:xml | ext:conf | ext:cnf | ext:reg | ext:inf |  
ext:rdp | ext:cfg | ext:txt | ext:pdf | ext:ini login`

Note:  
inurl:zhaw.ch inurl:wp-content  
does not work as expected

| Operator            | How to Use It   | Examples   |
|---------------------|---|--|
| * (Asterisk)        | Add the asterisk as a placeholder for an unknown word or fact                                 | Find quotes that start with "Life is like a": <i>Life is like a *</i>  |
| " (Quotation marks) | Look for an exact word or phrase by putting it in quotes                                      | Find pages that talk about the book <i>One Hundred Years of Solitude</i> : <i>"One Hundred Years of Solitude"</i>  |
| - (Hyphen)          | Use a hyphen before a word or site to exclude it from your search results                     | Omit Wikipedia pages from search results: <i>-site:wikipedia.org</i> . Narrow results to the band R.E.M., not rapid eye movement: <i>R.E.M. -sleep</i>                                     |
| .. (Two Periods)    | Separate numbers with two periods without spaces to search for numbers within that range      | Find phones that cost between \$200 and \$400: <i>Android phone \$200..\$400</i> . Find computer milestones that took place between 1950 and 2000: <i>"computer milestones" 1950..2000</i> |
| allintitle:         | Use allintitle:[search phrase] to find pages with all of those words in the title of the page | Show pages that have both "Apple" and "notebook" in the title: <i>allintitle:Apple notebook</i>  |
| allintext:          | Use allintext:[search phrase] to find pages with all of those words in the body of the page   | Show pages that mention Roth, IRA, and investments in the body: <i>allintext:Roth IRA investments</i>  |
| allinurl:           | Use allinurl:[search phrase] to find pages with all of those words in the URL                 | Show pages that have both "Microsoft" and "Surface" in the URL: <i>allinurl:Microsoft Surface</i>  |

Source: <https://zapier.com/blog/advanced-google-search-tricks/>

Knowing the operators of search engines helps to make your search more efficient.  
Note that some of the operators might be removed/no longer working.

Source: <https://zapier.com/blog/advanced-google-search-tricks/>

## Google Dorking – Some Operators (2)

|           |   |  |
|-----------|---|--|
| AROUND(n) | Add AROUND(n) between two search terms to find pages where those terms are written on the page in close proximity. The number you choose in place of <i>n</i> sets the maximum distance between the terms. This is useful for finding relationships between two search terms. | Find pages that mention Facebook and Microsoft in the same sentence or paragraph: <i>Facebook AROUND(7) Microsoft</i>  |
| site:     | Use site:[URL] to limit search results to a specific website  | Find pages on Zapier that mention Trello: <i>site:zapier.com trello</i>  |
| related:  | Use related:[URL] to find sites similar to a specific website   | Find websites similar to Zapier: <i>related:zapier.com</i>   |
| filetype: | Use filetype:[suffix] to limit results to a certain file format, such as PDF or DOC.  | Find keyboard shortcuts for Microsoft Office that are shared as PDF: <i>filetype:pdf office keyboard shortcuts</i>     |
| intitle:  | Use intitle:[search phrase] to search for pages that have at least one of your search words in the title  | Show pages that have "Apple" or "notebook" or both in the title: <i>intitle:Apple notebook</i>                         |
| intext:   | Use intext:[search phrase] to search for pages that have at least one of your search words in the body of the page  | Show pages that mention Roth, IRA, and/or investments in the body: <i>intext:Roth IRA investments</i>                  |
| inurl:    | Use inurl:[search phrase] to search for pages that have at least one of your search words in the URL  | Show pages that mention Roth, IRA, and/or investments in the body: <i>intext:Roth IRA investments</i>                  |
| OR        | Perform two search queries at the same time by separating your search terms with OR. This will find pages that have one of several words.   | Search for pages that reference "Google Drive," "Dropbox," or "OneDrive": <i>"Google Drive" OR Dropbox OR OneDrive</i> |

Source: <https://zapier.com/blog/advanced-google-search-tricks/>


(continued)

The screenshot shows the Exploit Database (GHDB) website. The left sidebar contains navigation links: EXPLOIT DATABASE, EXPLOITS, GHDB (selected), PAPERS, SHELLCODES, SEARCH EDB, SEARCHPLOT MANUAL, SUBMISSIONS, ONLINE TRAINING, and PWK. The main content area displays a search interface with a 'Category' dropdown menu open, showing options: Any, Footholds, Files Containing Usernames, Sensitive Directories, Web Server Detection, Vulnerable Files, Vulnerable Servers, and Error Messages. Below the dropdown, there is a table of search results with columns for the search query, category, and author. The results are filtered by the selected category.

| Search Query   | Category                       | Author            |
|--|--------------------------------|-------------------|
| passwd/root-password-encrypted password" ext:cfg               | Files Containing Passwords     | Alexandros Pappas |
| text:"Please enter your new password" inurl:login filetype:php | Pages Containing Login Portals | Alexandros Pappas |
| nable password" ext:cfg -git -cisco.com                        | Files Containing Passwords     | Alexandros Pappas |
| password console-password ext:cfg -git                         | Files Containing Passwords     | Alexandros Pappas |
| text:authentication set encrypted-password ext:cfg             | Files Containing Passwords     | Alexandros Pappas |
| urt:cfg intext:"password cipher"                               | Files Containing Juicy Info    | Alexandros Pappas |
| info intext:"ssh username 1" ext:ssh                           | Files Containing Juicy Info    | Alexandros Pappas |

- Google Hacking Database (GHDB), a source for new and old search strings to search for things from different categories

- <https://www.exploit-db.com/google-hacking-database/>



- Google's Bot Detection Approach after too many (or "suspicious"?) queries

## About this page

Our systems have detected unusual traffic from your computer network. This page checks to see if it's really you sending the requests, and not a robot. [Why did this happen?](#)


IP address: 84.75.48.227  
Time: 2020-03-24T15:38:46Z  
URL: [https://www.google.com/search?ei=fyl6XrL\\_Hs-i6QTN7arQBA&q=site%3A%2Frequest-password-reset&oq=site%3A%2Frequest-password-reset&gs\\_l=psy-ab.3...5094.5094..5458...0.0..0.107.107.0j1.....0....2j1...gws-wiz.CM79QvI0sOA&ved=0ahUKEwjyutfduLPoAhVPUZoKHc22CkoQ4dUDCAo&uact=5](https://www.google.com/search?ei=fyl6XrL_Hs-i6QTN7arQBA&q=site%3A%2Frequest-password-reset&oq=site%3A%2Frequest-password-reset&gs_l=psy-ab.3...5094.5094..5458...0.0..0.107.107.0j1.....0....2j1...gws-wiz.CM79QvI0sOA&ved=0ahUKEwjyutfduLPoAhVPUZoKHc22CkoQ4dUDCAo&uact=5)

Most search engines have a **limit** on how many queries are allowed per time unit to prevent "unfair" use without paying for the service.

When a computer runs automated queries, it violates Google Terms of Service. This includes using any software that sends queries to Google to determine how a website or webpage ranks on Google for various queries, 'Meta-searching' Google or performing 'offline' searches on Google.

If Google suspects **automated queries** from an IP address, google may show you a CAPTCHA or prevent you from querying their search engine for some time.

Furthermore, if Google suspects queries from malware or other "known-bad" queries, a CAPTCHA might also be shown.

|             |  |
|-------------|--|
| Method      | Passive  |
| Level       | L1/L2  |
| Information | <ul style="list-style-type: none"><li>Pages containing login portals, vulnerable servers, error messages, network of vulnerability data, ...</li></ul>   |
| Tools       | <ul style="list-style-type: none"><li>Google Hacking Diggity Project<br/><a href="https://resources.bishopfox.com/resources/tools/google-hacking-diggity/">https://resources.bishopfox.com/resources/tools/google-hacking-diggity/</a></li></ul>   |
| Resources   | <ul style="list-style-type: none"><li>Collection of interesting queries:<br/><a href="https://www.exploit-db.com/google-hacking-database/">https://www.exploit-db.com/google-hacking-database/</a></li></ul>                                |
| Limitations | <ul style="list-style-type: none"><li>Limited "lifetime" of vulnerability related queries</li><li>Tools are often outdated because of policy/API and result format changes of search engines</li><li>Automation is difficult because of throttling, CAPTCHAs and limited number of queries (or costs for each query)</li></ul> |

The **Google Hacking Diggity** project was for quite some time one of the "leading" google hacking tools (and more than that).

However, there was no update since 2013 and most of the stuff does not seem to work anymore or is not containing up-to-date queries.

This paper takes a closer look at Google Hacking from a security testing point of view:

***Security Assessment by Google Hacking Automation Tools for the Web Sites of Korea and the USA Universities***, Mi Young Bae and Hankyu Lim, *International Journal of Security and Its Applications* Vol. 9, No. 5 (2015), pp. 163-174



# Infrastructure Assets


- Starting point could e.g. be an URL or company name
  - Here: <https://www.zhaw.ch/de/engineering/institute-zentren/init/>
- Information that could be relevant
  - Domains
  - IP addresses and network provider(s)
  - External infrastructure profile
  - (Defence) technologies used

- Problem: There is **no publicly accessible register** of all domains
  - For many top-level domains, for example all generic TLDs (gTLD) like .com, .net, or .org, one can get access to their **zone files** to learn the second-level domains associated with them
  - For the country code TLDs (ccTLD), only few countries provide access to their zone files
- Goal: Find all domains (=potential entry points) that ...
  - ... are owned by the **company or an employee** of the company
  - ... are owned by entities that have a **business to business relationship**
- Approaches differ, depending on what we know:
  - Company name or employee name or email
  - A set of networks/IP addresses (find some/all domains on this IPs)
  - A domain (to find subdomains)
  - A domain (find related domains)

### Alexa Top X Pages

Alexa provides lists of the top domains sorted by country, category and more. It also provides the Alexa top 500 global sites [www.alexa.com/topsites](http://www.alexa.com/topsites) and even the top one million global sites.

- Where to search for information on who owns a domain (company, holder name and email etc.)?
- **WHOIS** is a protocol for querying databases storing the **registered users** or assignees of an Internet resource (mainly domain name, IP address block, autonomous system)
- WHOIS servers operated by **regional Internet registries (RIR)** can be queried to find the **Internet service provider responsible** for a resource -> query the provider's server
- Entries are **cross-referenced**: A query to ARIN for a record which belongs to RIPE returns a pointer to the RIPE WHOIS server



- **Challenges:**
  - No standard for finding the responsible WHOIS server for a domain => manual, see example
  - Can we do a **reverse lookup**?

### Regional Internet Registries

- The African Network Information Center (**AFRINIC**) serves Africa.
- The American Registry for Internet Numbers (**ARIN**) serves Antarctica, Canada, parts of the Caribbean, and the United States.
- The Asia-Pacific Network Information Centre (**APNIC**) serves East Asia, Oceania, South Asia, and Southeast Asia.
- The Latin America and Caribbean Network Information Centre (**LACNIC**) serves most of the Caribbean and all of Latin America.
- The Réseaux IP Européens Network Coordination Centre (**RIPE NCC**) serves Europe, Central Asia, Russia, and West Asia.

- Apart from the RIR servers, servers are operated by the ISPs for their respective resources
- There are various possibilities to query for information
  - Command-line client (e.g., [whois command](#) on Linux)
  - Free web front-ends (e.g., <https://www.nic.ch/whois/> for .ch domains)
- How to get the entry for a specific domain
  - Start with the database for the top level domains (TLD): [whois.iana.org](https://whois.iana.org)
  - [Query for a TLD](#) (e.g. ch) and search for the responsible organisation
  - Go to the responsible organisation and query their WHOIS database

IANA = Internet Assigned Numbers Authority

The WHOIS system also has some interesting information like contact information, name servers and location information.

## IANA WHOIS Service

The IANA WHOIS Service is provided using the WHOIS protocol on query arguments are domain names, IP addresses and AS number

- For the ch TLD, this organisation is SWITCH and there is information about the WHOIS server and a URL for registration services

|                                 |                                       |
|---------------------------------|---------------------------------------|
| <input type="text" value="ch"/> | <input type="button" value="Submit"/> |
|---------------------------------|---------------------------------------|


% IANA WHOIS server  
% for more information on IANA, visit <http://www.iana.org>  
% This query returned 1 object

domain: CH  
  
organisation: SWITCH The Swiss Education & Research Network  
address: Werdstrasse 2  
address: Zurich CH-8021  
address: Switzerland

|          |   |
|----------|---|
| whois:   | whois.nic.ch  |
| remarks: | Registration information: <a href="http://www.nic.ch/">http://www.nic.ch/</a> |

# Whois

Suche nach registrierten .ch-Domain-Namen



## Domain-Namen-Suche [Whois]

Hier können Sie nach Domain-Namen mit der Endung .ch suchen. Für die Abfrage von Domain-Namen anderer Endungen benutzen Sie bitte die Abfragemöglichkeiten der jeweiligen Registrierungsstellen.

Beispiele: switch.ch - admin.ch

Der Whois-Dienst unterliegt den Bestimmungen unserer Benutzungsordnung.

|             |  |                   |  |
|-------------|--|-------------------|--|
| Domain-Name | zhaw.ch  |                   |  |
| Halter      | ZHAW Zürcher Hochschule für Angewandte Wissenschaften<br>Strahm Hedi<br>Gertrudstrasse 15<br>CH-8400 Winterthur<br>Schweiz |                   |  |
| Registrar   | switchplus AG  |                   |  |
| DNSSEC      | nein   |                   |  |
| Name-Server | ns1.zhaw.ch  | 160.85.104.60     |  |
|             | ns2.zhaw.ch  | 160.85.104.61     |  |
|             | scsnms.switch.ch   | 130.59.31.26      |  |
|             | scsnms.switch.ch   | 2001:620:0:ff::a7 |  |

### Whois

RDAP

Domain-Check (Whois-Is)

### Registriere für .ch


**Neue .ch-Domain-Namen registrieren:** Bitte wählen Sie einen der Registrare.

**Bereits registrierte Domain-Namen:** Bitte wenden Sie sich für Änderungen an den Registrar, der Ihren Domain-Namen verwaltet.

[Liste aller Registrare](#)

## Finding Domains: With Company Name / Employee Info

- Query the WHOIS system
  - Domain => owner/company
- Usually, no official reverse lookup
- Registrations might be protected to make tracing of the real owner hard (EU: GDPR)
- Use third party provider, e.g.:
  - <http://viewdns.info/reversewhois/>
  - <https://whoisxmlapi.com>
- They allow searches for any text in whois entries (registrant name, email address etc.)
  - Might be incomplete and/or list too many domains



### WhoisXML API, Inc. write the following about their data:

WhoisXML API, Inc. has been collecting and normalizing ownership data of domains and IP netblocks for several years. While this information is publicly available on the Internet, it is scattered into highly distributed and not always coherent data sources. Hence, trying to get these data in a useful form is really a challenge. WHOIS data, for instance, come primarily from servers still using a protocol dating back to the early days of Internet, and the operators of these servers impose several limitations on queries.

WhoisXML API has the appropriate infrastructure and expertise to collect the huge set of all these data and put it into a normalized form facilitating efficient queries. This complete and coherent database of current and historic ownership (domain WHOIS) data is the solid basis of advanced domain research and monitoring tools, now integrated into a Domain Research Suite.



- Query the **Domain Name System** and make use the PTR records for reverse IP lookup – such entries are NOT mandatory!
  - PTR record maps an IP to a hostname
  - PTR records might not exist for an IP, only A record
- Find the domains (hostnames) **associated** with **a given IP**
  - Tool: <https://www.robtex.com/dns-lookup/init.zhaw.ch> (Shared tab)

init.zhaw.ch

Search Summary

**IP addresses of this host name (1 shown)**  
What IP addresses does the hostname this host name point to?

160.85.104.96

**PTR of the IP addresses of this host name (2 shown)**

srv-clst-301-data63.zhaw.ch  
www1.zhaw.ch

**Names pointing to same IP address as this host name (7 shown)**  
Which hostnames and domains point to the same IP address as this host name?

zhaw.ch  
ifm.zhaw.ch  
psychologie.zhaw.ch  
sml.zhaw.ch  
srv-clst-301-data63.zhaw.ch  
web.zhaw.ch  
www.zhaw.ch

Some DNS entry types:

- **A:** Returns a 32-bit IPv4 address, most commonly used to map hostnames to an IP address of the host, but it is also used for DNSBLs, storing subnet masks in RFC 1101, etc.
- **AAAA:** Returns a 128-bit IPv6 address, most commonly used to map hostnames to an IP address of the host.
- **CNAME:** Alias of one name to another: the DNS lookup will continue by retrying the lookup with the new name.
- **PTR:** Pointer to a canonical name. Unlike a CNAME, DNS processing stops and just the name is returned. The most common use is for implementing reverse DNS lookups, but other uses include such things as DNS-SD.

- There is **NO official** way to find all subdomains of a domain
  - Access to the **data of the authoritative name server** would be required
  - Authoritative Nameserver: DNS Server holding the actual DNS records (A, CNAME, PTR, etc) for a particular domain/ address [ @ company/provider]
- We must use (a combination of) **unofficial ways**, for example:
  - **Web-page scraping** – Use a crawler on the main domain and grab any subdomain you find
  - **Search-engines** – Design suitable search queries
  - Brute-force – Try to **enumerate subdomains** with typical subdomain names (mail., dev., ...)
  - Check **X.509 certificates** for the extension Subject Alternative Name (SAN)
    - Allows various values to be associated with a certificate using a subjectAltName field => use same cert for multiple (sub-)domains
- A write-up about this problems and (many) ways how to overcome it:
  - <https://pentester.land/cheatsheets/2018/11/14/subdomains-enumeration-cheatsheet.html>

Note: A recursive resolver would be a DNS server that queries an authoritative nameserver to resolve a domain/ address.

- Examples of related domains:
  - Domains hosted on the **same IP address**
  - Domains using **the same domain name server (NS)**
    - NS is the NS of the hosting provider => many (irrelevant) relations
    - NS is the company's own NS => relations are probably few and relevant
  - Domains using the **same MX (mailserver)**
  - Relations based on data found on the web page for a given domain
- Use **third-party tools** that combine different data sources
  - ... data from backward searchable domain database
  - ... data from services listing all subdomains of a domain
  - Example: <https://www.whoisxmlapi.com>

# Finding Domains: Subdomains & Related Domains

#spyse\_ Pricing tebe@zhaw.ch

Navigation

Domain zhaw.ch

No data available

Common info

Subdomains list -- 688

|                          | Domain   | Site Title   |
|--------------------------|--|--|
| <input type="checkbox"/> | ✓ <a href="#">srv-mail-042.zhaw.ch</a>         |  |
| <input type="checkbox"/> | ✓ <a href="#">cloudlab.zhaw.ch</a>             |  |
| <input type="checkbox"/> | ✓ <a href="#">srv-lab-t-435.zhaw.ch</a>        |  |
| <input type="checkbox"/> | ✓ <a href="#">srv-clst-301-data113.zhaw.ch</a> | 404 - File or directory not found.                     |
| <input type="checkbox"/> | ✓ <a href="#">srv-clst-301-data65.zhaw.ch</a>  | 401 Authorization Required                             |
| <input type="checkbox"/> | ✓ <a href="#">srv-clst-301-data81.zhaw.ch</a>  |  |
| <input type="checkbox"/> | ✓ <a href="#">srv-clst-301-data176.zhaw.ch</a> | srv-clst-301-data176.zhaw.ch - /                       |
| <input type="checkbox"/> | ✓ <a href="#">srv-clst-301-data173.zhaw.ch</a> |  |
| <input type="checkbox"/> | ✓ <a href="#">srv-clst-301-data103.zhaw.ch</a> | Adressverzeichnis - Infostelle   Soziale Arbeit - ZHAW |
| <input type="checkbox"/> | ✓ <a href="#">srv-app-303-data18.zhaw.ch</a>   | ITKA   public  |
| <input type="checkbox"/> | ✓ <a href="#">srv-clst-301-data46.zhaw.ch</a>  |  |
| <input type="checkbox"/> | ✓ <a href="#">srv-app-n-105.zhaw.ch</a>        |  |
| <input type="checkbox"/> | ✓ <a href="#">eventowebp-test.zhaw.ch</a>      |  |

Subdomains list

Using as MX

Using as NS

|             |   |
|-------------|---|
| Method      | Passive : WHOIS / search engines / 3 <sup>rd</sup> party data sources<br>Active : DNS   |
| Level       | L1 / L2   |
| Information | Domain names and additional information like the owner of a domain, technical contact, contact phone and email, administrator's name, name servers ...  |
| Tools       | <ul style="list-style-type: none"><li>• WHOIS tools and websites</li><li>• DNS tools</li><li>• Search engines</li><li>• <a href="https://findsubdomains.com/">https://findsubdomains.com/</a></li><li>• <a href="https://www.robtext.com/dns-lookup/init.zhaw.ch">https://www.robtext.com/dns-lookup/init.zhaw.ch</a></li></ul> |
| Resources   | <ul style="list-style-type: none"><li>• WHOIS, DNS, search engines</li></ul>  |
| Limitations | <ul style="list-style-type: none"><li>• 3<sup>rd</sup> party data sources - queries might return irrelevant results or not all results</li></ul>  |

- Identify **IP addresses** used by the target company in case the company **owns** IP address blocks or their own autonomous system(s)
- IP address ranges are assigned by **Regional Internet Registries (RIR)**
  - e.g., ARIN for North America and RIPE for Europe
  - The information includes **contact information** and the **autonomous system(s) (AS)** to which this block belongs
- Identify **IP addresses** used by the target company
  - IP address to network prefix: **RIR websites (or using WHOIS)**
    - Using e.g., IPs of the servers of the domains collected before
  - Company name to "all" IP ranges: **BGP Toolkit** <http://bgp.he.net/>
    - One way to do this is to query the RIRs data for all possible IP addresses
      - Doable for IPv4, but what about IPv6 => BGP data for active IPv6 blocks
    - To see what IP addresses are assigned and to which autonomous systems, BGP data can be used
      - BGP data is available from <http://www.routeviews.org/routeviews/>

### BGP

Border Gateway Protocol (BGP) is a standardized exterior gateway protocol designed to exchange routing and reachability information among autonomous systems (AS) on the Internet. The protocol is classified as a path vector protocol. The Border Gateway Protocol makes routing decisions based on paths, network policies, or rule-sets configured by a network administrator and is involved in making core routing decisions.

BGP announcements contain information which network prefixes are reachable over which network path (AS-path).

### Network Prefix

The IP address space is split into different networks identified by a network prefix in the form <network address>/<netmask>, e.g., 160.85.0.0/16.

Large organisations usually have their own public IP space identified by a network prefix.

### Autonomous System (AS)

An **autonomous system (AS)** is a collection of connected Internet Protocol (IP) routing prefixes under the control of one or more network operators on behalf of a single administrative entity / domain.

- Getting the netname for an IP address
- Query the RIPE database for an IP

RIPE Database Query

160.85.104.96

☒ Show full object details ?

☐ Do not retrieve related objects ?

You can search up to 5 terms at once in the search box above, separating them with a semicolon.

Sources

Types

Hierarchy Flags

Inverse lookup

inetnum: 160.85.0.0 - 160.85.255.255

netname: ZHAW

descr: Zuercher Hochschule fuer Angewandte Wissenschaften ZHAW

descr: Winterthur, Switzerland

country: CH

admin-c: SS12427-RIPE

tech-c: FH124-RIPE

tech-c: MP24268-RIPE

status: LEGACY

remarks: For information on "status:" attribute read /faq/faq-status-values-legacy-resources

mnt-by: SWITCH-MNT

mnt-irt: IRT-SWITCH-CERT

created: 1970-01-01T00:00:00Z

last-modified: 2015-05-19T11:51:38Z

source: RIPE

person: Fredy Hohl

address: Zuercher Hochschule fuer Angewandte Wissenschaften ZHAW

address: Winterthur, Switzerland

phone: +41 58 934 7442

fax-no: +41 58 934 7442

nic-hdl: SS12427-RIPE

mnt-by: SWITCH-MNT

created: 2009-09-24T07:02:31Z

last-modified: 2009-09-24T07:02:31Z

source: RIPE

person: Manuel Perez

address: Zuercher Hochschule fuer Angewandte Wissenschaften ZHAW

address: Winterthur, Switzerland

phone: +41 58 934 7442

fax-no: +41 58 934 7442

nic-hdl: SS12427-RIPE

mnt-by: SWITCH-MNT

created: 2009-09-24T07:02:31Z

last-modified: 2009-09-24T07:02:31Z



source: RIPE



## Quick Links

- [BGP Toolkit Home](#)
- [BGP Prefix Report](#)
- [BGP Peer Report](#)
- [Exchange Report](#)
- [Bogon Routes](#)
- [World Report](#)
- [Multi Origin Routes](#)
- [DNS Report](#)
- [Top Host Report](#)
- [Internet Statistics](#)
- [Looking Glass](#)

## Search Results

| Result               | Description   |
|----------------------|---|
| <u>193.5</u> 54 0/23 | Zuercher Hochschule fuer Angewandte Wissenschaften ZHAW  |
| <u>160.85</u> 0 0/16 | Zuercher Hochschule fuer Angewandte Wissenschaften ZHAW  |











Updated 13 Mar 2017 14:04 PST © 2017 Humana Electric

## AS info

### AS559 SWITCH

- [Home](#)
- [Report](#)
- [Report](#)
- [Report](#)
- [S](#)
- [t](#)
- [Routes](#)

[Port  
stics  
is  
s App  
nnel  
ition  
s](#)

| Prefix  | Description   |
|---|---|
| 2001:620::/29  | SWITCH   |
| 2001:620::/32  | SWITCH   |
| 2001:67c:10dc::/48  | Swiss Federal Institute of Technology Zurich               |
| 2001:67c:13dc::/48  | Bundesamt fuer Meteorologie und Klimatologie MeteoSchweiz  |
| 2001:67c:16dc::/48  | University of Zurich                                       |
| 2002::/16   | 6to4  |
| 2a02:7dc0::/32  | Universitätsspital Zurich (USZG)                           |
| 2a07:290a::/32  | Service du Traitement de l'Information Etat de Neuchatel   |
| 2a07:6b40::/29  | Berner Fachhochschule                                      |

| Network Info |               | Whois | DNS                       | IPRR                                  |
|--------------|---------------|-------|---------------------------|---------------------------------------|
|              | <b>IP</b>     |       | <b>PTR</b>                | <b>A</b>                              |
|              | 160.85.2.13   |       |                           | timepath.org<br>health20frankfurt.com |
| OIS          | IPRR          | IX    |                           |                                       |
|              |               |       | ifdo3v01.zhaw.ch          |                                       |
|              |               |       | ikw0119.zhaw.ch           |                                       |
|              |               |       | ismo3v01.zhaw.ch          |                                       |
|              |               |       | sfw-v1001.zhaw.ch         |                                       |
|              |               |       | sfw-v1001-standby.zhaw.ch |                                       |
|              |               |       | v-app-v-021.zhaw.ch       |                                       |
|              |               |       | v-lab-t-740.zhaw.ch       |                                       |
|              |               |       | v-lab-t-887.zhaw.ch       |                                       |
|              |               |       | v-lab-t-704.zhaw.ch       |                                       |
|              |               |       | v-lab-t-939.zhaw.ch       |                                       |
|              |               |       | v-app-t-812.zhaw.ch       |                                       |
|              |               |       | v-app-t-800.zhaw.ch       |                                       |
|              |               |       | v-lab-t-891.zhaw.ch       |                                       |
|              |               |       | v-lab-t-921.zhaw.ch       |                                       |
|              | 160.85.2.14   |       | m-V-app-v-021.zhaw.ch     |                                       |
|              | 160.85.30.248 |       | srv-lab-t-401.zhaw.ch     |                                       |
|              | 160.85.30.249 |       | svr.lab-t-889.zhaw.ch     |                                       |



- Identify IP addresses used by the target company in case the **company does not own** IP address blocks or their own autonomous system(s)
- Identify IP addresses used by the target company
  - Domains to IP addresses: **Forward-DNS**
    - IP address where the domain is hosted
    - Some additional IP addresses: name servers and mail servers
  - IP address to more IP addresses: **Reverse-DNS** and other methods
    - Determine the network block of an IP address and perform reverse DNS lookups or other checks to determine whether that IP address is also used by the target
  - Use the search function of services (e.g., with company names) that provide information about IP addresses
    - **Search Engine Hacking** (incomplete, web-only)
    - **Shodan or Censys** (see passive scanning slides)

- DNS system: Get IPs/Hostnames of name- and mail servers

- One way to do this:

- Get the domain for the IP

```
root@hikali /home/hacker
$ nslookup 160.85.104.69
69.104.85.160.in-addr.arpa      name = srv-app-303-data2.zhaw.ch.
```

- Use the **dig** command line tool (\*ix):

- DNS Servers

```
$ dig ns zhaw.ch
;; ANSWER SECTION:
zhaw.ch.      5      IN      NS      scsnms.switch.ch.
zhaw.ch.      5      IN      NS      ns2.zhaw.ch.
zhaw.ch.      5      IN      NS      ns1.zhaw.ch.
```

- Mailserver

```
$ dig mx zhaw.ch
;; ANSWER SECTION:
zhaw.ch.      5      IN      MX      10 zhaw-ch.mail.protection.outlook.com.
```

### DNS Zone Transfers

Zone transfers are used to update the database of a slave name server with the data from the master name server. If configured correctly, a name server should allow a zone transfer only for its slave name server(s), so random users from random computers cannot easily download the entire database. If a name server happens to be incorrectly configured and a zone transfer can be done by anyone, this can be easily exploited using the nslookup command line tool.

In the ZHAW case, using nslookup to perform a zone transfer would be done as follows:

```
user@ubuntu> nslookup
> server ns1.zhaw.ch
Default server: ns1.zhaw.ch
Address: 160.85.104.60#53
> ls -d zhaw.ch.
The 'ls' command is not implemented.
```

As you can see from the last line returned by the nameserver, the zone transfer could not be carried out, which is usually the case today. Nevertheless, one could give it a try.

Dig can also be used to attempt a zone transfer: `dig zhaw.ch @ns1.zhaw.ch axfr`

- Use the DNS system to get all **hostnames** and “active” IP addresses
- Do reverse DNS lookups for all IP addresses, for example by scripting the requests.
- Example: **Class B (/16) networks**:

```
#!/usr/bin/perl
```

```
Use Socket;
```

```
$b_net = "160.85";
```

```
for ($i=0; $i<255; $i++) {
```

```
    for ($j=0; $j<255; $j++) {
```

```
        $ip = "$b_net.$i.$j";
```

```
        $ipaddr = inet_aton($ip);
```

```
        $name = gethostbyaddr($ipaddr, 4, AF_INET);
```

```
        if ($name) {
```

```
            print "${ip} \t ${name} \n";
```

```
        }
```

```
    }
```

```
}
```

Is this active or passive intelligence gathering? Why

```
$ perl lookup.pl
160.85.3.243 sydenrd-000.zhaw.ch
160.85.3.244 sydenrd-000-ilo.zhaw.ch
160.85.3.245 sydenrd.zhaw.ch
160.85.5.1 mb-con-312-hsrp.zhaw.ch
160.85.5.2 v312.zhaw.ch
160.85.5.3 v312.zhaw.ch
160.85.5.4 v312.zhaw.ch
160.85.5.5 v312.zhaw.ch
160.85.5.6 v312.zhaw.ch
160.85.5.7 v312.zhaw.ch
160.85.5.8 v312.zhaw.ch
160.85.5.9 v312.zhaw.ch
160.85.5.10 v312.zhaw.ch
160.85.5.11 v312.zhaw.ch
160.85.5.12 v312.zhaw.ch
160.85.5.13 v312.zhaw.ch
160.85.5.14 v312.zhaw.ch
160.85.5.15 v312.zhaw.ch
160.85.5.16 v312.zhaw.ch
160.85.5.17 v312.zhaw.ch
160.85.5.18 v312.zhaw.ch
160.85.5.19 v312.zhaw.ch
160.85.5.20 v312.zhaw.ch
160.85.5.21 v312.zhaw.ch
160.85.5.22 v312.zhaw.ch
160.85.5.23 v312.zhaw.ch
160.85.5.24 v312.zhaw.ch
160.85.5.25 v312.zhaw.ch
160.85.5.26 v312.zhaw.ch
160.85.5.27 v312.zhaw.ch
160.85.5.28 v312.zhaw.ch
160.85.5.29 v312.zhaw.ch
160.85.5.30 v312.zhaw.ch
160.85.5.31 v312.zhaw.ch
160.85.5.32 v312.zhaw.ch
160.85.5.33 v312.zhaw.ch
160.85.5.34 v312.zhaw.ch
160.85.5.35 v312.zhaw.ch
160.85.5.36 v312.zhaw.ch
160.85.5.37 v312.zhaw.ch
160.85.5.38 v312.zhaw.ch
160.85.5.39 v312.zhaw.ch
160.85.5.40 v312.zhaw.ch
160.85.5.41 v312.zhaw.ch
160.85.5.42 v312.zhaw.ch
160.85.5.43 v312.zhaw.ch
160.85.5.44 v312.zhaw.ch
160.85.5.45 v312.zhaw.ch
160.85.5.46 v312.zhaw.ch
160.85.5.47 v312.zhaw.ch
160.85.5.48 v312.zhaw.ch
160.85.5.49 v312.zhaw.ch
160.85.5.50 v312.zhaw.ch
160.85.5.51 v312.zhaw.ch
160.85.5.52 v312.zhaw.ch
160.85.5.53 v312.zhaw.ch
160.85.5.54 v312.zhaw.ch
160.85.5.55 v312.zhaw.ch
160.85.5.56 v312.zhaw.ch
160.85.5.57 v312.zhaw.ch
160.85.5.58 v312.zhaw.ch
160.85.5.59 v312.zhaw.ch
160.85.5.60 v312.zhaw.ch
160.85.5.61 v312.zhaw.ch
160.85.5.62 v312.zhaw.ch
160.85.5.63 v312.zhaw.ch
160.85.5.64 v312.zhaw.ch
160.85.5.65 v312.zhaw.ch
160.85.5.66 v312.zhaw.ch
160.85.5.67 v312.zhaw.ch
160.85.5.68 v312.zhaw.ch
```

### Reverse DNS Lookups

Note that DNS entries do not always contain an inverse entry (PTR) which allows resolving an IP address into its hostname, although in many cases, they do. Therefore, the above script won't necessarily detect all IP address to host mappings.

## Finding IP Addresses - Summary

|             |   |
|-------------|---|
| Method      | Passive : RIR and other 3 <sup>rd</sup> party data bases<br>Semi-Active : (DNS)<br>Active : DNS   |
| Level       | L1/L2/(L3)  |
| Information | IPs and network prefixes of the target (and relevant third parties)   |
| Tools       | <ul style="list-style-type: none"><li>• WHOIS and related APIs (ICANN, IANA, RIPE,...)</li><li>• nslookup and other DNS tools</li><li>• Third party tools<ul style="list-style-type: none"><li>• BGP Toolkit (based on BGP and other data)</li><li>• Shodan / Censys (scanning based)</li></ul></li></ul> |
| Resources   | <ul style="list-style-type: none"><li>• DNS System</li><li>• WHOIS / RIRs</li><li>• BGP Data</li><li>• Website data</li></ul>   |
| Limitations | <ul style="list-style-type: none"><li>• Passive discovery is almost certainly incomplete and the information should be verified</li></ul>   |

- Based on the previous results, the target company's networks and hosts are **examined in more detail** during scanning
- Determine **the network structure**, especially when analysing larger environments
- **Find hosts** that are reachable / visible by the tester
  - Depends on the location of the tester, e.g. inside or outside the company
- **Analyse the hosts** in detail
  - Identify operating systems
  - Determine services running on the hosts and the corresponding software products
  - This can give hints at possible vulnerabilities present on a target host

- The network's structure is relevant when analysing **larger environments**
  - Provides information about **interesting "areas"** of a network (e.g. a DMZ)
    - Helps to prioritize which areas to analyse in detail during host scanning
  - It may **provide "attack paths"** into the network
    - Assume you want to compromise a host that **cannot be reached directly** from your location
    - Knowing the network structure helps to identify hosts that are in the same network than the target, which could then be used as a **stepping stone**
- Traditionally, **traceroute** is the tool of choice to analyse the network structure
  - Lists all hops (IP addresses) to the target system
  - The standard traceroute use UDP or ICMP packets
    - On \*ix systems, UDP is usually the default and ICMP can be used with the -I option
  - There is also tcptraceroute that uses TCP packets
  - Its a good idea to use both options, especially if one is not successful

- Let's start with a **traceroute** to [www.zhaw.ch](http://www.zhaw.ch). What do we learn here?
  - Two(?) ZHAW hosts are visible
  - Probably one router and the web server itself
  - So we have learned a small part of the internal network structure and IP addresses
  - But we have no clue yet about network sizes etc.

```
1      2 ms      2 ms      5 ms  gwlogin.net [192.168.0.1]
2     13 ms     11 ms     13 ms  10.149.40.1
3     14 ms     13 ms     15 ms  217-168-61-89.static.cablecom.ch [217.168.61.89]
4    511 ms     11 ms     14 ms  ch-zrh03a-rd1-ae350-0.aorta.net [84.116.200.241]
5     24 ms     15 ms     12 ms  ch-zrh01b-ra1-ae1-0.aorta.net [84.116.134.142]
6     14 ms     11 ms     10 ms  swiIX1-10GE-1-2.switch.ch [194.42.48.11]
7     15 ms     13 ms     11 ms  swiZH2-10GE-1-3.switch.ch [130.59.36.130]
8     11 ms     13 ms     12 ms  swiWI1-10GE-2-3.switch.ch [130.59.36.173]
9     12 ms     17 ms     13 ms  195.176.0.166
10    *          *          *      Zeitüberschreitung der Anforderung.
11    19 ms     16 ms     18 ms  wwwr1.zhaw.ch [160.85.104.96]
```

**ZFH Access Net  
(SWITCH)**

© ZHAW / SoE / InIT – Marc Rennhard, Bernhard Tellenbach, Stephan Neuhaus

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### Firewalls

The single asterisk between 195.176.0.166 (Switch) and 160.85.104.96 (ZHAW) and is an indication for a border firewall. It is assumed to be part of ZHAW as it is in general unlikely that Internet Service Providers such as Switch perform filtering operations. It seems that the device itself does not generate ICMP error messages by filtering them (so traceroute does not get an answer and shows an asterisk), but the device does let through the following traceroute probes and also does not filter ICMP replies from the following hosts.

- traceroute to mx1.zhaw.ch

```
 9    16 ms    12 ms    16 ms    195.176.0.166
10    *        *        *        Zeitüberschreitung der Anforderung.
11    14 ms    11 ms    14 ms    srv-mail-011.zhaw.ch [160.85.104.121]
```

- www and mx1 might sit behind the same router
- It's likely (though not guaranteed) that the hosts are in the same network
- If they are in the same network, their IP addresses (104.96 and 104.121) tell us that the network is at least a /25 network
- Traceroute has its limits with firewalls that filter UDP or ICMP packets
  - An asterisk indicates that no answer was received from the host
  - So all we learn here is that "some filtering takes place" on the hop following 195.176.0.166



- If possible (compromise/guest), don't forget to scan from internal hosts

|   |        |      |       |  |
|---|--------|------|-------|--|
| 1 | 1 ms   | 1 ms | <1 ms | witeo1m03-v402.zhaw.ch [160.85.123.2]        |
| 2 | 1 ms   | 1 ms | 1 ms  | witeo1m03-v101.zhaw.ch [160.85.198.18]       |
| 3 | 106 ms | 1 ms | 1 ms  | witeo1m05-dc-t4-9.zhaw.ch [192.168.6.2]      |
| 4 | 2 ms   | 1 ms | 1 ms  | witeo1m05-dc-v244.zhaw.ch [192.168.11.71]    |
| 5 | 289 ms | 1 ms | 1 ms  | srv-clst-300-data18.zhaw.ch [160.85.187.120] |

- Also, scan from internal to external:

|   |        |      |      |  |
|---|--------|------|------|--|
| 1 | 7 ms   | 2 ms | 2 ms | witeo1m03-v402.zhaw.ch [160.85.123.2]  |
| 2 | 2 ms   | 4 ms | 3 ms | witeo1m03-v101.zhaw.ch [160.85.198.18] |
| 3 | 1 ms   | 1 ms | 1 ms | 172.24.0.130                           |
| 4 | 418 ms | 1 ms | 2 ms | 172.24.0.145                           |
| 5 | 5 ms   | 3 ms | 1 ms | 172.24.0.29                            |
| 6 | 273 ms | 1 ms | 1 ms | witeo1m01-v312.zhaw.ch [160.85.5.2]    |
| 7 | *      | *    | *    | Zeitüberschreitung der Anforderung.    |

Most likely, there's a  
firewall on the ZHAW  
border

- This gives more and more information about hosts, routers, firewalls,...

- An even more flexible tool than traceroute is **hping3**
  - Allows to specify protocol (ICMP/UDP/TCP) and destination port to be used
- Example: trace the route to dskt0010.zhaw.ch using **TCP port 80 SYN probes**:
  - TCP port 80 is more likely to get through firewalls than UDP or ICMP

```
root@dhcpcpc2:~# hping3 --ttl 1 --traceroute --destport 80 --syn dskt0010.zhaw.ch
HPING dskt0010.zhaw.ch (eth0 160.85.43.251): S set, 40 headers + 0 data bytes
hop=1 TTL 0 during transit from ip=10.0.0.1 name=UNKNOWN
hop=1 hoprtt=1.4 ms
hop=2 TTL 0 during transit from ip=80.254.161.241 name=zh2-lns02-lo1.noc.green.ch
hop=2 hoprtt=12.3 ms
...
hop=7 TTL 0 during transit from ip=130.59.36.158 name=swiWI2-G0-1.switch.ch
hop=7 hoprtt=15.0 ms
hop=8 TTL 0 during transit from ip=160.85.7.193 name=UNKNOWN
hop=8 hoprtt=14.4 ms
hop=9 TTL 0 during transit from ip=160.85.7.2 name=UNKNOWN
hop=9 hoprtt=301.3 ms
hop=10 TTL 0 during transit from ip=160.85.5.2 name=UNKNOWN
hop=10 hoprtt=356.2 ms
```

### **hping3**


Hping3 is a very flexible tool that allows to generate all kinds of ICMP, UDP and TCP packets. Refer to the manpage for its options.

### **hping3 Options in the Example above**

- ttl 1: Start with time-to-live = 1
- traceroute: Increment ttl for subsequent attempts
- destport 80: Use destination port 80
- syn: Set the SYN flag in the probes
- tr-stop (not used above): hping will exit once the first packet that isn't an ICMP time exceeded is received. This better emulates the traceroute behavior.

### **tcptraceroute**

A similar tool to traceroute that uses TCP instead of UDP/ICMP probes.



- Possible network structure based on the currently available information

### Network Structure

Of course, there are still many uncertainties with this structure and it's definitely only a small part of a big network as employed by ZHAW, but it is a beginning and further analysis will allow to refine the structure more and more and eventually come to a result that is likely to be close to the real situation.

In addition, further findings – additional hosts found during host scanning or even compromising an internal host – will help to refine this structure by performing additional scans to these hosts and from the newly compromised host.

- **Ping scan:** `nmap -sn www.csnc.ch`
  - ICMP echo request
  - TCP SYN 443 + TCP ACK 80
  - ICMP timestamp request
  - On a local network, ping scan switches to ARP requests!
- Usually, you do a port scan only on hosts answering the Ping scan
- Pentest: You might want to scan **every host** – some might not answer the ping-scan:

`nmap -Pn <target>`

Capturing from eth0 [Wireshark 1.8.2]

Statistics Telephony Tools Internals Help

Expression... Clear Apply Save

| Destination     | Protocol | Length | Info                          |
|-----------------|----------|--------|-------------------------------|
| 212.254.246.115 | ICMP     | 42     | Echo (ping) request id=0x82e  |
| 212.254.246.115 | TCP      | 58     | 33562 > https [SYN] Seq=0 Win |
| 212.254.246.115 | TCP      | 54     | 33562 > http [ACK] Seq=1 Ack= |
| 212.254.246.115 | ICMP     | 54     | Timestamp request id=0x4e0    |

- sn No port scan after ping scan. Host discovery only
- Pn Default port scan without firsts doing a ping scan to decide whether to do a port scan of a host

| Switch | Technique   | Description   |
|--------|-------------|---|
| -sS    | TCP Syn     | Default option, fast, relatively stealthy, reliable, also referred to as half-open scanning                                       |
| -sT    | TCP Connect | Uses «connect» system call of the underlying OS rather than writing raw packets. Slower than TCP syn scan, more easily detectable |
| -sA    | TCP Ack     | Used for testing firewall rulesets  |
| -sU    | UDP         | UDP scan, much slower than TCP  |
| -sN    | TCP Null    | TCP scan with different flags set (FIN, PSH, URG) to avoid stateless firewalls  |
| -sF    | TCP FIN     |   |
| -sX    | TCP XMAS    |   |
| -sO    | IP Protocol | Used to detect IP protocols supported by the target   |

- Port Ranges (by IANA)
  - Well-known ports: 1-1023
  - Registered ports: 1024-49151
  - Dynamic ports: 49152-65535
- Port Selection
  - All ports: -p- or -p1-65535
  - Specific port(s): -p22,53,110,143
  - Port ranges: -p20-25
  - Top 1000 ports: (default)
  - Top 100 ports: -F
  - Top 10 ports: --top-ports 10
- Combining UDP and TCP ports
  - --sU -sS -p U:53,T:21,80

| TCP                  | UDP                  |
|----------------------|----------------------|
| topports 10: 48%     | topports 10: 50%     |
| topports 50: 65%     | topports 50: 86%     |
| topports 100: 73%    | -topports 100: 90%   |
| topports 250: 83%    | -topports 250: 94%   |
| topports 500: 89%    | topports 500: 97%    |
| topports 1000: 93%   | topports 1017: ~100% |
| topports 2000: 96%   |                      |
| topports 3674: ~100% |                      |

Effectiveness of different top port scans

- Ports discovered during a scan are labelled with associated services:

```
nmap -sS -T4 -PN -n 160.85.30.245
```

```
Warning: 160.85.30.245 giving up on port because retransmission cap hit (6).
Nmap scan report for srv-lab-t-931.zhaw.ch (160.85.30.245)
Host is up (1.8s latency).
Not shown: 995 closed ports
PORT      STATE SERVICE
22/tcp    open  ssh
80/tcp    open  http
514/tcp    filtered shell
1022/tcp   open  exp2
9000/tcp   open  cslistener
```

Tip: Use the **--reason** switch to learn why a port is marked as Open, Closed, Filtered...

- But ports can be arbitrarily assigned to applications. What now?

```
nmap -sV -PN -n 160.85.30.245
```

```
Nmap scan report for srv-lab-t-931.zhaw.ch (160.85.30.245)
Host is up (1.2s latency).
Not shown: 995 closed ports
PORT      STATE SERVICE VERSION
22/tcp    open  ssh      OpenSSH 5.3p1 Debian 3ubuntu7.1 (Ubuntu Linux; protocol 2.0)
80/tcp    open  http     Apache httpd 2.2.14 ((Ubuntu))
514/tcp    filtered shell
1022/tcp   open  ssh      OpenSSH 5.3p1 Debian 3ubuntu7.1 (Ubuntu Linux; protocol 2.0)
9000/tcp   open  http     Zimbra http config
Service Info: OS: Linux; CPE: cpe:/o:linux:linux_kernel
```

- **Detection of services/versions** is based on interrogating the open ports using **service probes** and SYN Stealth Scan as scan method
  - Option: -sV (included in -A option)
- The **nmap-service-probes database** contains probes for querying various services and **match expressions** to recognize and parse responses
  - Mostly based on match expressions for the data returned when establishing a connection (or sending a UDP packet) => the "banner"
  - Additional probes (=request/packets) beyond getting the banner are the exception
  - On Kali linux found here: /usr/share/nmap/nmap-service-probes
  - Sample of a match rule:  
`match ftp m|^220[ -].*\r\n550 SSL/TLS required on the control channel\r\n|s  
p/ProFTPD/ i/requires SSL/ cpe:/a:proftpd:proftpd/a`



- For a maximum of information, we can use the **-A** option
- This performs **OS detection**, **service version detection**, **script scanning**, and **traceroute**
- It provides (if possible) the following information:
  - Service protocols (FTP, SSH,...)
  - Application names (ISC BIND, Apache,...)
  - Version numbers
  - Hostname, Device type, OS family
  - Common Platform Enumeration (CPE) representation

```
PORT      STATE SERVICE      VERSION
80/tcp    open  http-proxy  F5 BIG-IP load balancer http proxy
|_ http-open-proxy: Proxy might be redirecting requests
|_ http-server-header: BigIP
|_ http-title: Did not follow redirect to https://www.zhaw.ch/
|_ https-redirect: ERROR: Script execution failed (use -d to debug)
443/tcp   open  ssl/http     Apache httpd
|_ http-generator: TYPO3 CMS
|_ http-robots.txt: 17 disallowed entries (15 shown)
|_ /Apps/OpCacheGUI/ /Apps/RealUrlConverter/
|_ /fileadmin/ /fileadmin/Template/ /fileadmin/Template/Dev/
|_ /fileadmin/Template/Html/ /fileadmin/Template/Language/
|_ /fileadmin/Template/Php/ /fileadmin/Template/Xml/ /fileadmin/TSconfig/
|_ /fileadmin/TypeScript/ /fileadmin/TypeScriptLandingPage/
|_ /fileadmin/user_upload/ /typo3/ /typo3_src/ /typo3conf/
|_ http-server-header: Apache
|_ http-title: Willkommen an der ZHAW | ZHAW Z\XC3\XBCrcher Hochschule f\XC3\XBCr Angewan..
|_ Requested resource was https://www.zhaw.ch/de/hochschule/
|_ ssl-cert: Subject: commonName=www.zhaw.ch/organizationName=Zuercher Hochschule fuer Ange
wandte Wissenschaften/stateOrProvinceName=Z\XC3\XBCrich/countryName=CH
|_ Subject Alternative Name: DNS:www.zhaw.ch, DNS:zhaw.ch, DNS:moodle.zhaw.ch
|_ Not valid before: 2020-03-23T07:26:39
|_ Not valid after: 2021-03-23T07:36:00
Warning: OSScan results may be unreliable because we could not find at least 1 open and 1
closed port
Device type: WAP|general purpose
Running: Actiontec embedded, Linux, Microsoft Windows XP|7|2012
OS CPE: cpe:/h:actiontec:mi424wr-gen3i cpe:/o:linux:linux_kernel cpe:/o:microsoft:windows_
xp:sp3 cpe:/o:microsoft:windows_7 cpe:/o:microsoft:windows_server_2012
OS details: Actiontec MI424WR-GEN3I WAP, Microsoft Windows XP SP3, Microsoft Windows XP SP
3 or Windows 7 or Windows Server 2012
Network Distance: 2 hops
Service Info: Device: load balancer

TRACEROUTE (using port 443/tcp)
HOP RTT      ADDRESS
1 1.22 ms 192.168.10.2
2 25.85 ms 192.168.10.112
```

- The inner workings of OS detection are quite complex
  - Sending up to 16 TCP, UDP, and ICMP probes to known open and closed ports specially designed to exploit various ambiguities in the standard protocol RFC
  - Dozens of attributes in the responses are analysed and combined to generate a fingerprint (see <https://nmap.org/book/osdetect-methods.html> for details)
- Option: -O -v (-v is for verbose output)

```
Nmap scan report for srv-lab-t-931.zhaw.ch (160.85.30.245)
Host is up (0.054s latency).
PORT      STATE SERVICE VERSION
20/tcp    closed ftp-data
21/tcp    closed ftp
22/tcp    open  ssh      OpenSSH 5.3p1 Debian 3ubuntu7.1 (Ubuntu Linux; protocol 2.0)
| ssh-hostkey:
|   1024 8c:8e:1f:b7:34:0c:2a:f8:03:d4:ef:9d:7d:17:1f:b2 (DSA)
|   2048 17:ba:1b:70:d1:7d:70:6a:9a:a9:15:7b:0a:5b:d2:7d (RSA)
Device type: general purpose
Running: Microsoft Windows 7|XP
OS CPE: cpe:/o:microsoft:windows_7::enterprise cpe:/o:microsoft:windows_xp::sp3
OS details: Microsoft Windows 7 Enterprise, Microsoft Windows XP SP3
Service Info: OS: Linux; CPE: cpe:/o:linux:linux_kernel

OS and Service detection performed. Please report any incorrect results at http://nmap.org/submit/ .
Nmap done: 1 IP address (1 host up) scanned in 16.50 seconds
```

```
$ nc dskt0010.zhaw.ch 22
```

```
SSH-2.0-OpenSSH_5.9p1 Debian-5ubuntu1.10
```

Probably correct

```
$ telnet www.zhaw.ch 80
Trying 160.85.104.96...
Connected to srv-clst-301-data63.zhaw.ch.
Escape character is '^]'.
GET / HTTP/1.1
Host: www.zhaw.ch
```

```
HTTP/1.0 301 Moved Permanently
Location: https://www.zhaw.ch/
Server: BigIP
Connection: Keep-Alive
Content-Length: 0
```

Web server? => Web  
Application Firewall (WAF)!

```
$ openssl s_client -connect www.zhaw.ch:443
CONNECTED(00000003)
depth=2 C = BM, O = QuoVadis Limited, CN = QuoVadis Root CA 2
verify return:1
depth=1 C = BM, O = QuoVadis Limited, CN = QuoVadis EV SSL ICA G1
verify return:1
depth=0 jurisdictionC = CH, jurisdictionST = Zuerich, businessCategory
= Winterthur, O = Zuercher Hochschule fuer Angewandte Wissenschaften,
verify return:1
```

- **Manual methods** are also well suited to determine software versions
- For example, by using **telnet**, **netcat** or **openssl** (for SSL/TLS communications)

### Banner

In general, one cannot assume that the banner/header information returned by a host is correct because many applications (e.g. Apache) allow to easily modify it and by modifying the source code and recompiling the application it is always possible to adapt information that identifies the software to any random string. Therefore such information can be the correct server software information but it cannot be taken for granted.

In general, modifying server information such that it does not give away all information with respect to detailed software version, module installed etc. is considered good security policy and should be enforced by system administrators.

- Passive gathering of hosts in a network
  - Search Engine Hacking
    - Mostly blind to non-www things
  - Shodan - <https://www.shodan.io/>
  - Censys - <https://censys.io/>
- Censys is similar to Shodan
  - Scan results seems more frequently updated
  - Has only current data, no historic data
- Shodan - Search engine for **Internet-connected** devices
  - Scans the Internet for devices
  - tries to connect to them on several ports and downloads and stores the "banner" (answer when connected)
  - Basic access/use is free but somewhat limited
    - Access to some filters only
    - No unlimited paging through results
    - No monitored IPs
  - Offers API for developers

**Shodan** is a [search engine](#) that lets the user find specific types of computers (routers, servers, etc.) connected to the internet using a variety of filters. Some have also described it as a search engine of [service banners](#), which are meta-data the server sends back to the client. This can be information about the server software, what options the service supports, a welcome message or anything else that the client can find out before interacting with the server.

Shodan collects data mostly on web servers ([HTTP](#), port 80), as well as [FTP](#) (port 21), [SSH](#) (port 22) [Telnet](#) (port 23), [SNMP](#) (port 161), [SIP](#) (port 5060), and [Real Time Streaming Protocol](#) (RTSP, port 554). The latter can be used to access webcams and their video stream.


It was launched in 2009 by [computer programmer](#) John Matherly, who, in 2003, conceived the idea of searching devices linked to the Internet. The name Shodan is a reference to [SHODAN](#), a character from the [System Shock](#) video game series.

**SHODAN**  [Explore](#) [Downloads](#) [Reports](#) [Enterprise Access](#) [Contact Us](#)

[Exploits](#) [Maps](#) [Share Search](#) [Download Results](#) [Create Report](#)

---

**TOP COUNTRIES**



|             |     |
|-------------|-----|
| Switzerland | 631 |
|-------------|-----|

**TOP SERVICES**

|              |     |
|--------------|-----|
| HTTP         | 219 |
| HTTPS        | 156 |
| SSH          | 136 |
| HTTP (8080)  | 20  |
| HTTPS (8443) | 12  |

**TOP ORGANIZATIONS**

|   |     |
|---|-----|
| Zuercher Hochschule fuer Angewandte Wissen... | 631 |
|---|-----|

**TOP OPERATING SYSTEMS**

|                |   |
|----------------|---|
| Linux 3.x      | 6 |
| Windows 7 or 8 | 2 |
| Linux 2.6.x    | 1 |

**TOP PRODUCTS**

|                     |     |
|---------------------|-----|
| Apache httpd        | 196 |
| OpenSSH             | 56  |
| Microsoft IIS httpd | 28  |
| Lotus Domino httpd  | 23  |
| nginx               | 10  |

Total results: 631

**Server**  
160.85.104.66  
snv-app-003.zhaw.ch  
Zuercher Hochschule fuer Angewandte Wissenschaften  
Added on 2016-03-15 02:51:26 GMT  
🇨🇭 Switzerland, Winterthur  
[Details](#)

HTTP/1.1 200 OK  
Date: Tue, 15 Mar 2016 02:51:16 GMT  
Server: Apache  
Content-Location: default.html.en  
Vary: negotiate,accept-language  
TCN: choice  
Last-Modified: Wed, 14 Oct 2015 17:08:19  
ETag: "Fc4ae-522139be8c6c0"  
Accept-Ranges: bytes  
Content-Length: 1033390  
MS-Author-Via: DAV  
Cont...

**Home**  
160.85.67.74  
srv-lab-t-439.zhaw.ch  
Zuercher Hochschule fuer Angewandte Wissenschaften  
Added on 2016-03-15 02:43:31 GMT  
🇨🇭 Switzerland, Winterthur  
[Details](#)

**SSL Certificate**  
Issued By: QuoVadis Global  
Common Name: QuoVadis Global  
SSL ICA 02  
Organization: QuoVadis Limited  
Issued To: srv-lab-t-439.zhaw.ch  
Organization: Zuercher Hochschule fuer Angewandte Wissenschaften  
Supported SSL Versions: TLSv1, TLSv1.1, TLSv1.2

**160.85.155.167**  
Zuercher Hochschule fuer Angewandte Wissenschaften  
Added on 2016-03-15 02:29:35 GMT  
🇨🇭 Switzerland, Oberglatt  
[Details](#)

HTTP/1.1 302 Found  
Server: Lotus-Domino  
Date: Tue, 15 Mar 2016 02:29:35 GMT  
Connection: close  
Location: https://160.85.155.167/  
Content-Length: 0


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It was launched in 2009 by [computer programmer](#) John Matherly, who, in 2003, conceived the idea of searching devices linked to the Internet. The name Shodan is a reference to [SHODAN](#), a character from the [System Shock](#) video game series.

Everything that has ZHAW in the banner and located in Switzerland:

- zhaw country:"CH"

 [About](#) [Search](#) [Reports](#) [API](#) [Raw Data](#)

zhaw.ch [Search](#)

[IPv4 Hosts](#) [Top Million Websites](#) [Certificates](#) [Tools](#) [Help](#)

Page: 1/4 Results: 85 Time: 136ms

160.85.67.67

🔗 Peering requests: <peering@switch.ch>, CH... (559) 📍 Winterthur, Zurich, Switzerland

⚙️ 22/ssh, 443/https

📁 labs419.zhaw.ch

🔍 443.https.tls.certificate.parsed.names: labs419. zhaw.ch

ssh https

160.85.31.145 (srv-lab-t-897.zhaw.ch)

🔗 Peering requests: <peering@switch.ch>, CH... (559) 📍 Winterthur, Zurich, Switzerland

⚙️ 443/https, 80/http

🏠 etesting2.zhaw.ch 📁 srv-lab-t-897.zhaw.ch, etesting2.zhaw.ch

🔍 443.https.tls.certificate.parsed.extensions.subject\_alt\_name.dns\_names: srv-lab-t-897. zhaw.ch

🔍 443.https.tls.certificate.parsed.names: srv-lab-t-897. zhaw.ch

http https

160.85.67.69 (srv-lab-t-465.zhaw.ch)

🔗 Peering requests: <peering@switch.ch>, CH... (559) 📍 Winterthur, Zurich, Switzerland

⚙️ 443/https

📁 srv-lab-t-465.zhaw.ch, bray.zhaw.ch

🔍 443.https.tls.certificate.parsed.extensions.subject\_alt\_name.dns\_names: srv-lab-t-465. zhaw.ch

🔍 443.https.tls.certificate.parsed.names: srv-lab-t-465. zhaw.ch

https

160.85.67.74 (srv-lab-t-439.zhaw.ch)

🔗 Peering requests: <peering@switch.ch>, CH... (559) 📍 Winterthur, Zurich, Switzerland

⚙️ 443/https

📁 srv-lab-t-439.zhaw.ch, newport.zhaw.ch

🔍 443.https.tls.certificate.parsed.extensions.subject\_alt\_name.dns\_names: srv-lab-t-439. zhaw.ch

🔍 443.https.tls.certificate.parsed.names: srv-lab-t-439. zhaw.ch

- Scanning serves to analyse the network structure and individual hosts in detail
- After scanning, you know the following information
  - Parts or all of the network structure
  - Hosts that are reachable from your location
- Of a subset of all hosts (or of all hosts if the analysed environment is small) you know more detailed information
  - Operating system
  - Available services (that are visible from your location)
  - Software versions of the services
  - Potential vulnerabilities that may be exploited
    - We'll look at this when discussing the vulnerability analysis phase

|             |   |
|-------------|---|
| Method      | Passive<br>Semi-Active<br>Active  |
| Level       | L1/L2/(L3)  |
| Information | Network structure<br>Services, software and operating systems used  |
| Tools       | <ul style="list-style-type: none"><li>• traceroute, nmap</li><li>• Shodan / Censys</li><li>• Search engine hacking</li></ul>  |
| Resources   | <ul style="list-style-type: none"><li>• The infrastructure itself</li><li>• Shodan/Censys data</li></ul>  |
| Limitations | <ul style="list-style-type: none"><li>• Passive discovery is challenging and is almost certainly incomplete<ul style="list-style-type: none"><li>• You can ask Shodan/Censys to not to scan your IPs</li><li>• Short-lived hosts/services might not be captured</li><li>• Delay until you see a new service/host in the results</li></ul></li></ul> |



- Motivation: Additional **attack vectors**, know how to **evade detection** (stealth)
- Identify defensive systems: Firewalls, WAF, IDS, Anti-Virus, ...
  - Brute-forcing protections, (D)DoS misuse, authentication type/protocol,...
  - Single- or multi-factor → **attack vector** must include getting **2nd factor**
  - Federated systems → **attack** via other **members of federation** realm
- Active:
  - Inspect **banners**, HTTP responses, **device fingerprinting**,...
  - **Social engineering** (trick employees into providing information)
- Passive:
  - Search engine hacking (partners, presentations, projects,...)
  - Inspect banners, device fingerprints etc. (e.g., using Censys, Shodan etc.)

- Manual: Inspect HTTP responses

|  |           |   |         |                      |         |                         |   |                  |
|--|-----------|---|---------|----------------------|---------|-------------------------|---|------------------|
| Tamper beginnen Tamper beenden Liste Löschen |           |   |         |                      |         |                         |   | Optionen Hilfe   |
| Filter                                       |           |   |         |                      |         |                         |   | Alle zeigen      |
| Uhrzeit                                      | Dauer     | Gesamtdauer   | Größe   | Method               | Status  | Conte...                | URL   | Load Flags (d... |
| 10:24:39.529                                 | 23 ms     | 23 ms   | 0       | GET                  | 302     | applica...              | http://collab.zhaw.ch/                                | LOAD_DOCUM...    |
| 10:24:41.334                                 | 20 ms     | 203483 ms   | 16      | GET                  | 401     | text/pl...              | https://collab.zhaw.ch/                               | LOAD_DOCUM...    |
| 10:24:55.404                                 | 187067 ms | 187067 ms   | 188     | GET                  | 200     | applica...              | https://syndication.twitter.com/widgets/timelines/... | LOAD_NORMAL      |
| 10:24:56.633                                 | 0 ms      | 0 ms  | unknown | GET                  | pending | unknown                 | https://syndication.twitter.com/widgets/timelines/... | LOAD_NORMAL      |
| Request Header Name                          |           | Request Header Wert   |         | Response Header Name |         | Response Header Wert    |   |                  |
| Host   |           | collab.zhaw.ch  |         | Status               |         | Found - 302             |   |                  |
| User-Agent                                   |           | Mozilla/5.0 (Windows NT 10.0; WOW64; rv:44.0) Gecko/20100101 Firefox/44.0 |         | Server               |         | https://collab.zhaw.ch/ |   |                  |
| Accept                                       |           | text/html,application/xhtml+xml,application/xml;q=0.9,*/*;q=0.8           |         | Server               |         | BigIP                   |   |                  |

BigIP from F5

- Automated: Use nmap and its WAF detection capability  
`nmap --script=http-waf-fingerprint --script-trace collab.zhaw.ch`

```
NSE: TCP 192.168.96.187:42522 > 160.85.180.245:80 | CLOSE
NSOCK INFO [99.4460s] nsi_delete(): nsi_delete (IOD #1)
Nmap scan report for collab.zhaw.ch (160.85.180.245)
Host is up (0.013s latency).
rDNS record for 160.85.180.245: srv-clst-300-data35.zhaw.ch
Not shown: 997 filtered ports
PORT      STATE SERVICE
80/tcp    open  http
| http-waf-fingerprint:
|   Detected WAF
|   F5 BigIP
443/tcp    open  https
445/tcp    closed microsoft-ds
```

|             |   |
|-------------|---|
| Method      | Passive<br>Semi-Active<br>Active  |
| Level       | L1/L2/L3  |
| Information | Products (brand, version,...), manuals  |
| Tools       | <ul style="list-style-type: none"><li>• Search engine hacking</li><li>• Web browser (for online analysis)</li><li>• Scanners (e.g., nmap)</li></ul> |
| Resources   | <ul style="list-style-type: none"><li>• The infrastructure itself</li><li>• 3<sup>rd</sup> party sources</li></ul>                                  |
| Limitations | <ul style="list-style-type: none"><li>• If middle-boxes are configured to be "stealthy", they might not be found</li></ul>                          |

- Human intelligence collection involves **direct interaction**
  - **Physical** (e.g. observation)
  - **Verbal** (e.g., phone call, chat, on-site meeting,...)
- Before HUMINT, you find out as much as you can about a person
  - **Online accounts** used by the person, especially social media accounts
  - Information posted on **social media** accounts
- **Automate** online account search: Use websites that tell you whether a username is still available for a given service like Facebook, Gmail etc.
  - Service does have to **leak information** whether a user exists or not
  - Many services still do (either at login-time or using the password reset function)
  - Websites that can do this (partially):
    - <http://knowem.com/>
    - <http://checkusernames.com/>



Enter your personal name, business name or brand in the "enter name here" box above and click Search. Since most social networks will not allow any spaces, dots, hyphens, etc. in their usernames our search won't either. [Why?](#)



You're on the Search Overview page. To search all 500 social networks at once for immediate results in realtime, try KnowEm's [Social Branding Search Engine](#).

### Preview Search of Top 25 Most Popular Social Networks

|  |   |  |
|--|---|--|
| <b>Blogger</b> <a href="#">Available</a>     | <b>BuzzFeed</b> <a href="#">Available</a>   | <b>dev</b> <a href="#">Available</a>           |
| <b>Dailymotion</b> <a href="#">Available</a> | <b>Etsy</b> <a href="#">Available</a>       | <b>facebook</b> <a href="#">Available</a>      |
| <b>flickr</b> <a href="#">Available</a>      | <b>imgur</b> <a href="#">Available</a>      | <b>Instagram</b> <a href="#">Available</a>     |
| <b>issuu</b> <a href="#">Available</a>       | <b>LinkedIn</b> <a href="#">Available</a>   | <b>LIVEJOURNAL</b> <a href="#">Available</a>   |
| <b>my</b> <a href="#">Available</a>          | <b>Pinterest</b> <a href="#">Available</a>  | <b>Quora</b> <a href="#">Available</a>         |
| <b>reddit</b> <a href="#">Available</a>      | <b>slideshare</b> <a href="#">Available</a> | <b>SOUNDCLOUD</b> <a href="#">Oops, Error!</a> |
| <b>tumblr</b> <a href="#">Available</a>      | <b>twitch</b> <a href="#">Available</a>     | <b>twitter</b> <a href="#">Available</a>       |
| <b>vimeo</b> <a href="#">Available</a>       | <b>weebly</b> <a href="#">Available</a>     | <b>WordPress</b> <a href="#">Available</a>     |
| <b>YouTube</b> <a href="#">Available</a>     |   |  |

Share:

### Busy?

Do you have enough free time today to visit 300 social networks and claim your brand name on each before someone else does? Probably not, but if you've got the next 5 minutes free you just have to fill in a few fields to [create a profile for us](#), then we can go to work for you by visiting 100, 150, or even up to 300 social networks and creating all the profile registrations for you!

- Intelligence Gathering is the **first step** performed by a penetration tester (or attacker)
- When done, you know **general, IT-related information** (but not only) about the target company
  - Domain names, IP ranges
  - Technical contact persons
  - Hostnames and IP addresses of some systems
  - ...
- If you are lucky, you have discovered **additional valuable information**
  - E.g. critical information (internal system configurations etc.) that has been voluntarily disclosed by the employees

**Link-Collection with links for doing OSINT (resources/tools):**  
<https://www.andyblackassociates.co.uk/resources-andy-black-associates/osint-toolkit/>

## Appendix

- Nmap has a **scripting engine** (NSE)
  - Users can write their own scripts (LUA)
  - 500+ scripts (in LUA) to identify vulnerabilities and do other things
- Script categories
  - auth (bypassing) authentication credentials
  - brute brute force attacks for different protocols
  - default run when `-sC` is specified
  - dos test for denial of service / may crash vulnerable services
  - exploit actively exploit vulnerabilities
  - fuzzer send randomized/unexpected data
  - intrusive not safe, may crash the target system
  - safe should not crash services or use large amount of resources
  - ...
- Running a scan with **the default set of scripts**
  - `nmap -sS -sC -Pn -p- <host>`
  - `nmap -sS --script=default -Pn -p- <host>`
- Running a scan with a specific set of scripts
  - `nmap --script default,safe ...`
  - `nmap --script «http-*» ...`
  - `nmap --script «not intrusive» ...`
  - `nmap --script «default or|and save» ...`
- Scripts may also accept arguments
  - `nmap -sC --script-args 'arg1=foo,arg2=bar'...`
- **Banner grabbing** script:
  - `nmap -sV --script=banner <target>`



- Maltego is proprietary software used for OSINT and forensics
- Provides library of transforms for discovery of data from open sources, and visualizing that information in a graph format, suitable for link analysis and data mining
- Transforms are scripts of code that execute specific tasks
  - Tasks or 'transforms' can be written in every computer language thereby increasing the appeal of this penetration testing tool
  - Scripts have an input entity (e.g., person name) and output entities (e.g. all email addresses found for it) using a specific strategy (e.g., googling)
- Maltego permits creating custom entities, allowing it to represent any type of information in addition to the basic entity types
  - Examples of entity types: people, groups, websites, domains, networks, devices, internet infrastructure, affiliations with online services (e.g., Twitter, Facebook)

- Automates many OSINT tasks:

- Collecting email addresses linked to a person or company
- Finding domain names and IP addresses of a company
- Finding documents and devices
- ...

- Problem:

- The tool is not free
- Transforms are executed on servers not under your control => You can have your own servers => expensive

|  | Maltego XL | Maltego Classic | Maltego CE | CaseFile |
|--|------------|-----------------|------------|----------|
| Initial Cost   | 1800 USD   | 760 USD         | Free       | Free     |
| Yearly Renewal Cost                                  | 760 USD    | 320 USD         | Free       | Free     |
| Commercial Use                                       | ✓          | ✓               | ✗          | ✓        |
| Transforms   | ✓          | ✓               | ✓          | ✗        |
| Max no. of results per transform                     | 64,000     | 10,000          | 12         | N/A      |
| Max no. of entities on a graph                       | 1 000 000  | 10,000          | 10 000     | N/A      |
| Encrypted Communication                              | ✓          | ✓               | ✗          | N/A      |
| Technical support                                    | ✓          | ✓               | ✗          | ✗        |
| Graph Export (CSV, XLS, XLSX, PDF and Image formats) | ✓          | ✓               | ✓          | ✗        |
| Graph Import (CSV, XLS, XLSX)                        | ✓          | ✓               | ✓          | ✓        |

# Maltego - One Tool to Rule them All (2)

