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## UNIVERSITY INSTITUTE OF ENGINEERING

### Bachelor of Engineering (Computer Science & Engineering)

### Operating System (20CST/ITT-313)

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Introduction to Operating System

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# System Protection and Security



# Authentication

- Constraining set of potential senders of a message
  - Complementary and sometimes redundant to encryption
  - Also can prove message unmodified
- Algorithm components
  - A set  $K$  of keys
  - A set  $M$  of messages
  - A set  $A$  of authenticators
  - A function  $S : K \rightarrow (M \rightarrow A)$ 
    - That is, for each  $k \in K$ ,  $S(k)$  is a function for generating authenticators from messages
    - Both  $S$  and  $S(k)$  for any  $k$  should be efficiently computable functions
  - A function  $V : K \rightarrow (M \times A \rightarrow \{\text{true}, \text{false}\})$ . That is, for each  $k \in K$ ,  $V(k)$  is a function for verifying authenticators on messages
    - Both  $V$  and  $V(k)$  for any  $k$  should be efficiently computable functions



# Authentication

- For a message  $m$ , a computer can generate an authenticator  $a \in A$  such that  $V(k)(m, a) = \text{true}$  only if it possesses  $S(k)$
- Thus, computer holding  $S(k)$  can generate authenticators on messages so that any other computer possessing  $V(k)$  can verify them
- Computer not holding  $S(k)$  cannot generate authenticators on messages that can be verified using  $V(k)$
- Since authenticators are generally exposed (for example, they are sent on the network with the messages themselves), it must not be feasible to derive  $S(k)$  from the authenticators



# Authentication – Hash Functions

- Basis of authentication
- Creates small, fixed-size block of data (**message digest, hash value**) from  $m$
- Hash Function  $H$  must be collision resistant on  $m$ 
  - Must be infeasible to find an  $m' \neq m$  such that  $H(m) = H(m')$
- If  $H(m) = H(m')$ , then  $m = m'$ 
  - The message has not been modified
- Common message-digest functions include **MD5**, which produces a 128-bit hash, and **SHA-1**, which outputs a 160-bit hash



## Authentication - MAC

- Symmetric encryption used in **message-authentication code (MAC)** authentication algorithm
- Simple example:
  - MAC defines  $S(k)(m) = f(k, H(m))$ 
    - Where  $f$  is a function that is one-way on its first argument
      - $k$  cannot be derived from  $f(k, H(m))$
    - Because of the collision resistance in the hash function, reasonably assured no other message could create the same MAC
    - A suitable verification algorithm is  $V(k)(m, a) \equiv (f(k, m) = a)$
    - Note that  $k$  is needed to compute both  $S(k)$  and  $V(k)$ , so anyone able to compute one can compute the other



# Authentication – Digital Signature

- Based on asymmetric keys and digital signature algorithm
- Authenticators produced are **digital signatures**
- In a digital-signature algorithm, computationally infeasible to derive  $S(k_s)$  from  $V(k_v)$ 
  - $V$  is a one-way function
  - Thus,  $k_v$  is the public key and  $k_s$  is the private key
- Consider the RSA digital-signature algorithm
  - Similar to the RSA encryption algorithm, but the key use is reversed
  - Digital signature of message  $S(k_s)(m) = H(m)^{k_s} \bmod N$
  - The key  $k_s$  again is a pair  $d, N$ , where  $N$  is the product of two large, randomly chosen prime numbers  $p$  and  $q$
  - Verification algorithm is  $V(k_v)(m, a) \equiv (a^{k_v} \bmod N = H(m))$ 
    - Where  $k_v$  satisfies  $k_v k_s \bmod (p-1)(q-1) = 1$



## Authentication Contin....

- Why authentication if a subset of encryption?
  - Fewer computations (except for RSA digital signatures)
  - Authenticator usually shorter than message
  - Sometimes want authentication but not confidentiality
    - Signed patches et al
  - Can be basis for **non-repudiation**






## Key Distribution

- Delivery of symmetric key is huge challenge
  - Sometimes done **out-of-band**
- Asymmetric keys can proliferate – stored on **key ring**
  - Even asymmetric key distribution needs care – man-in-the-middle attack

# Man-in-the-middle Attack on Asymmetric Cryptography





# Digital Certificates

- Proof of who or what owns a public key
- Public key digitally signed a trusted party
- Trusted party receives proof of identification from entity and certifies that public key belongs to entity
- Certificate authority are trusted party – their public keys included with web browser distributions
  - They vouch for other authorities via digitally signing their keys, and so on



# User Authentication

- Crucial to identify user correctly, as protection systems depend on user ID
- User identity most often established through *passwords*, can be considered a special case of either keys or capabilities
- Passwords must be kept secret
  - Frequent change of passwords
  - History to avoid repeats
  - Use of “non-guessable” passwords
  - Log all invalid access attempts (but not the passwords themselves)
  - Unauthorized transfer
- Passwords may also either be encrypted or allowed to be used only once
  - Does encrypting passwords solve the exposure problem?
    - Might solve **sniffing**
    - Consider **shoulder surfing**
    - Consider Trojan horse keystroke logger
    - How are passwords stored at authenticating site?



# Passwords

- Encrypt to avoid having to keep secret
  - But keep secret anyway (i.e. Unix uses superuser-only readable file `/etc/shadow`)
  - Use algorithm easy to compute but difficult to invert
  - Only encrypted password stored, never decrypted
  - Add “salt” to avoid the same password being encrypted to the same value
- One-time passwords
  - Use a function based on a seed to compute a password, both user and computer
  - Hardware device / calculator / key fob to generate the password
    - Changes very frequently
- Biometrics
  - Some physical attribute (fingerprint, hand scan)
- Multi-factor authentication
  - Need two or more factors for authentication
    - i.e. USB “dongle”, biometric measure, and password



# Implementing Security Defenses


- **Defense in depth** is most common security theory – multiple layers of security
- Security policy describes what is being secured
- Vulnerability assessment compares real state of system / network compared to security policy
- Intrusion detection endeavors to detect attempted or successful intrusions
  - **Signature-based** detection spots known bad patterns
  - **Anomaly detection** spots differences from normal behavior
    - Can detect **zero-day** attacks
  - **False-positives** and **false-negatives** a problem
- Virus protection
- Auditing, accounting, and logging of all or specific system or network activities



# Firewalling to Protect Systems and Networks

- A network firewall is placed between trusted and untrusted hosts
  - The firewall limits network access between these two security domains
- Can be tunneled or spoofed
  - Tunneling allows disallowed protocol to travel within allowed protocol (i.e., telnet inside of HTTP)
  - Firewall rules typically based on host name or IP address which can be spoofed
- **Personal firewall** is software layer on given host
  - Can monitor / limit traffic to and from the host
- **Application proxy firewall** understands application protocol and can control them (i.e., SMTP)
- **System-call firewall** monitors all important system calls and apply rules to them (i.e., this program can execute that system call)

# Network Security Through Domain Separation Via Firewall







# Computer Security Classifications

- U.S. Department of Defense outlines four divisions of computer security: **A**, **B**, **C**, and **D**
- **D** – Minimal security
- **C** – Provides discretionary protection through auditing
  - Divided into **C1** and **C2**
    - **C1** identifies cooperating users with the same level of protection
    - **C2** allows user-level access control
- **B** – All the properties of **C**, however each object may have unique sensitivity labels
  - Divided into **B1**, **B2**, and **B3**
- **A** – Uses formal design and verification techniques to ensure security

## Video Links

<https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=3yLf2dNqDzw>

[https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=w4J1RZyUv\\_I](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=w4J1RZyUv_I)



# References

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