There is no such thing as 'heritage'

The discursive construction of heritage is itself part of the cultural and social processes that are heritage. The practice of heritage may be defined as the management and conservation protocols, techniques and procedures that heritage managers, archaeologists, architects, museum curators and other experts undertake. It may also be an economic and/or leisure practice, and/or a social and cultural practice, as I am arguing, of meaning and identity making. These practices, as well as the meaning of the material 'things' of heritage, are constituted by the discourses that simultaneously reflect these practices while also constructing them.

I also want to use this section to carefully set out some parameters to my use of the term 'discourse'. In discussing how people talk and write about 'heritage', I don't want to get tangled up in debates on the relevance of post-modern arguments that discourse is all that matters. The position that I adopt epistemologically draws on critical realism and, though I acknowledge the usefulness of Foucauldian approaches to discourse, I anchor my analysis firmly in an understanding that social relations are material and have material consequences, in a way informed by *critical discourse analysis*. This is an important distinction, as I do not want to lose sight of the materiality of heritage at the same time as I am problematizing it.

The analysis I am constructing explicitly deals with the 'work' that the practices and performances of heritage 'do' culturally and socially. As such, I am also concerned with what Lorimer (2005: 84), drawing on the work of Thrift, calls the non, pre or more than representational aspects of social life, which are prior to or not dependent on discourse: 'focus falls on how life takes shape and gains expression in shared experiences, everyday routines, fleeting encounters, embodied movements, precognitive triggers, practical skills, affective intensities, enduring urges, unexceptional interactions and sensuous dispositions.'

This analysis offers insights into the political consequences of space, performance and affect. As Thrift argues (2003: 2022–3):

> Spaces can be stabilised in such a way that they act like political utterances, guiding subjects to particular conclusions. But, as a counterpoint, the fabric of space is so multifarious that there are always holes and tears in which new forms of expression can come into being. Space is therefore constitutive in the strongest possible sense and it is not a misuse of the term to call it performative, as its many components continually act back, drawing on a range of different aesthetics as they do so.

Thinking about discourse

At its most simplistic, as Wetherell (2001: 3) observes, discourse is the 'study of language use', it is an analysis of how language is used 'to do things', but is not reducible to language (see also Taylor 2001: 5). It is about the inter-relationship between language and practice (Hall 2001: 72). Discourse is a social action, and this idea of discourse acknowledges that the way people talk about, discuss and understand things, such as 'heritage', have a material consequence that matters. In addition, not only is discourse 'used' to do things by actors, but discourses also do things to actors and are productive independently of actors (Bourdieu and Wacquant 2000; Fischer 2003). A useful starting point is the idea of discourse 'as a specific ensemble of ideas, concepts, and categorisations that are produced, reproduced, and transformed in a particular set of practices and through which meaning is given to physical and social realities' (Hajer 1996: 44). As such, discourses are 'inherently positioned', and so the collection of ideas, concepts, and categorizations regarding heritage give rise to different ways of 'seeing' the social practice of managing 'heritage' according to the positions of social actors (Fairclough 2001: 235).

Foucault (1991), one of the more influential writers on discourse, argues that discourses are forms of expertise, collected into different disciplines, which deal with the construction and representation of knowledge. Discourse not only reflects social meanings, relations and entities, it also constitutes and governs them. The focus of much of Foucault's work was concerned with the epistemological issues of knowledge construction and practice, in particular the power–knowledge relations underlying forms of expertise and the relations of power underpinning dominant discourses. Although his work was concerned with the contestation of and challenges to the dominant discourse, focus tended to be on the dominant discourse itself and competing and/or everyday or 'popular' discourses tend to be overlooked, as are the ways in which they contest and challenge bodies of expertise or dominant discourses (Purvis and Hunt 1993; van Dijk 1998). This is because Foucault was concerned not so much with general political struggles but with identifying techniques of power (Rouse 1987, 1994). For Foucault, the relationship between power and knowledge – power/knowledge – was vital, and he identified knowledge as a particular technique of power (1991). As Hall notes (2001: 78), a major critique of Foucault's work on discourse is that he attempts to 'absorb too much' into the idea of discourse, and in particular to neglect the material, economic and structural factors in the way power and knowledge are deployed. Other critiques of Foucault have been concerned that his focus is 'not about whether things exist but about where meaning comes from' and that this focus leaves studies of discourse open to the charge of relativism (Hall 2001: 73), while others express concern that all social action may be perceived as reducible only to discourse (Fairclough

2000: 145). In addition, Foucault's ideas about discourse have been criticized for not offering a clear methodological approach, particularly in relation to the links between knowledge and practice and social change (Sayer 1992; Fairclough 1993).

As a remedy to these issues, Critical Discourse Analysis (CDA) offers a theoretical platform and methodological approach that aims to illuminate the links between discourse and practice, and the light this can shed on human relationships and social actions and issues. CDA is a well-established interdisciplinary methodology for analysing discourse and discursive practice and is located within critical social scientific theory and analysis (Chouliaraki and Fairclough 1999). In particular, the philosophy of critical realism underlies CDA, which acknowledges that things exist independently of our knowledge of them, or indeed discourses about them, but that 'we can only know them under particular descriptions' (Bhaskar 1978: 250). Critical realism recognizes the power of discourses, but stresses the concrete social relations that underlie and generate discourses (Bhaskar 1989; Sayer 1992; Chouliaraki and Fairclough 1999; Fairclough et al. 2003).

A central concern of CDA is identifying and understanding how people organize themselves and act through particular discourses (Fairclough et al. 2004: 2). It is also important to understand the relationships between different discourses, as discourses are elements that constrain and constitute the various relationships between people. As such, discourses may be deployed to help regulate, maintain or challenge social relations. This is not to say that discourse represents the totality of social practice, but is one of the interlinked elements of that practice. However, if we accept that discourse is an irreducible part of social life, then one route to analysing what is going on socially can be achieved through the analysis of what is going on interdiscursively (Fairclough 2001: 240). Particular practices, sections of society, such as bodies of expertise, areas of policy development, public employees, community groups and so forth have particular discourses internalized within them that help them to shape social life and particular behaviour and practices (Fairclough 2000: 144–5). Discourse may also work to bind collectives to particular internalized ideologies, assumptions and practices. The important point here, however, is the recognition of the existence of competing and inter-relating discourses that are understood to have an impact on the way people think about and interact with the social and physical world.

Integral to CDA is not simply an analysis of discourse but also an analysis of the social and political context of that discourse and an analysis of the social effects that a discourse has – that one of its elements is 'looking closely at what happens when people talk or write' (Fairclough 2003: 3). Of particular concern is an examination of the way discourses become intertwined with the legitimation and maintenance of power (Marston 2004). In legitimizing and naturalizing the ideologies and range of cultural and social assumptions

about the way the social world works, discourses can have a persuasive power in maintaining and legitimating hierarchies of social relations (Fairclough 2003).

For Fairclough (2003: 124), the point of analysis is not only how those using a particular discourse see the world, but also a consideration of how discourses are also projective given that they may 'represent possible worlds which are different from the actual world [but are] tied in to projects to change the world in particular directions'. An important issue here is the idea that discourses are not just about sustaining and legitimizing certain practices and social relations, but may also simultaneously be engaged with social change (Fairclough et al. 2004: 2). While CDA may privilege the study of language and how it is used, it also sees language as a tool to reveal and reflect social projects and relations, and changes within these. The micro-analysis of discourse provides a macro-analysis of social contexts (Marston 2004: 38). CDA is, in sum, concerned with developing accounts of the inter-relation of discourse with power and domination, social hierarchies, gender relations, the work of ideologies, negotiations between different social identities and the acts of production and resistance within political spheres (Fairclough 2003; Waterton et al. 2006).

The idea of discourse used in the rest of this volume incorporates the notion of discourse as advanced by CDA; in short, that discourse is both reflective of and constitutive of social practices. The following section of this chapter identifies a particular discourse and area of discursive practice centred on ideas of 'heritage' and its management and conservation. This is a historically situated discourse; it is also a discourse, as I will argue, situated within certain Western social experiences and social hierarchies. Due to the limits of space, and for the sake of the arguments I develop in this volume, it is a generalized characterization of a discourse. Subsequently I recognize that some nuances of this discourse will be glossed over, and that this discourse is far more mutable across both time and space than I am characterizing it. Indeed, there are elements within it that recognize and pursue agendas for social change, although these are often obscured by the self-referential tendencies of the discourse. However, my task is to identify the general characteristics of the dominant discourse in heritage, and the way it both reflects and constitutes a range of social practices – not least the way it organizes social relations and identities around nation, class, culture and ethnicity.

When was heritage?

David Harvey (2001: 320) notes that a concern with 'heritage', or at least a concern with 'the past' and material items from that past, has a much deeper history than most contemporary debates around the idea of heritage usually allow. He notes that the use of the past to construct ideas of individual and group identities is part of the human condition, and that throughout human

history people have actively managed and treasured material aspects of the past for this purpose (2001: 333; see also Diaz-Andreu et al. 2005). Certainly, the use of material culture in bolstering national ideology is well documented in the literature (see, for instance, Trigger 1989; Diaz-Andreu and Champion 1996; Boswell and Evans 1999; Carrier 2005; Diaz-Andreu under review). Harvey cautions that the tendency to see heritage as largely a modern phenomena works to reduce debates about heritage to specific technical issues over contemporary management and conservation practices, and subsequently any real engagement with debates about how heritage is involved in the production of identity, power and authority are obscured (2001: 320). However, my task here is to examine what Harvey (2001: 323) himself identifies as a particular 'strand', but which is more usefully discussed as a particular discourse, of heritage that emerged in late nineteenth-century Europe and has achieved dominance as a 'universalizing' discourse in the twenty-first century. One of the consequences of this discourse is to actively obscure the power relations that give rise to it and to make opaque the cultural and social work that 'heritage' does. While there is a general interest in the past, there is a discourse of heritage that creates a particular set of cultural and social practices that have certain consequences in the context of late modernity. Although some commentators today see heritage as having a particular post-modern expression tied to economic commodification and hyper-relativism, this is simply not the case. The origins of the dominant heritage discourse are linked to the development of nineteenth-century nationalism and liberal modernity, and while competing discourses do occur, the dominant discourse is intrinsically embedded with a sense of the pastoral care of the material past.

As has been well rehearsed in the heritage literature, the current concept of heritage emerged in Europe, particularly Britain, France and Germany, within the context of nineteenth-century modernity (for overviews see, for instance, King et al. 1977; Walsh 1992; Bennett 1995; Barthel 1996; Pearce 1998; Jokilehto 1999). Enlightenment rationality and claims about the possibility of objective truth had overturned medieval religious ideas about the nature of knowledge. The idea of progress took on particular force at this time and both legitimized and reinforced European colonial and imperial expansions and acquisitions in the modern era. Through colonial expansion new dialogues about race developed, and ethnic and cultural identity became firmly linked with concepts of biology or 'blood', and Europeans believed themselves to be representative of the highest achievements of human technical, cultural and intellectual progress. Debates over Darwinian evolution had also cemented the social utility and rationality of science, and social Darwinism had further helped to naturalize the conceptual link between identity and race, and the inevitability of European cultural and technical advancement and achievement (Trigger 1989).

The industrial revolution and associated urbanization of the nineteenth

century dislocated many people from a sense of social and geographical security. The French Revolution had also altered the European sense of historical consciousness (Anderson 1991; Jokilehto 1999), and undermined previous ideas of territorial sovereignty, already challenged by the treaty of Westphalia. Nation states had emerged and nationalism developed as a new meta-narrative to bind populations to a shifting sense of territorial identity and to legitimize state formation (Graham et al. 2000: 12). The emergence of a mercantile middle class as feudalism gave way to capitalism had also destabilized the political and economic role of the aristocracy. All in all, the nineteenth century may be characterized as a period that called for 'new devices to ensure or express social cohesion and identity and to structure social relations' (Hobsbawm 1983b: 263). National and racial discourses coalesced and naturalized a link between concepts of identity, history, and territory to establish a doctrine of 'blood and land' (Olsen 2001: 53). It is within this context of the developing narrative of nationalism and of a universalizing modernity that a new, more pointed, concern for what we now identify as 'heritage' emerged. The sense of the new Modern Europe was to be expressed in the monuments that were to be protected and managed for the edification of the public, and as physical representations of national identity and European taste and achievement. As Graham et al. (2000: 17) note, 'to be modern was to be European, and that to be European or to espouse European values (even in the United States) was to be the pinnacle of cultural achievement and social evolution.'

The desire to propagate these values found synergy with the liberal education movement, whose sense of pastoral care identified a moral responsibility to educate the public about their civic and national duties, and to promote social stability by fostering a sense of national community and social responsibility. As Walsh (1992: 30) argues, museums developed as a consequence of the modern condition and narratives of progress, rationality and national and cultural identity became embedded in exhibition and collection practices. Museums took on a regulatory role in helping to establish and govern both social and national identity, and the existence of national collections demonstrated the achievements and superiority of the nation that possessed them (Bennet 1995; Macdonald 2003; Diaz-Andreu under review).

Along side of the institutionalization of museums as repositories and manifestations of national identity and cultural achievement, many European nations also turned their attention to the conservation and management of non-portable antiquities and historic buildings. Legislation to protect what was often defined as 'monuments' ushered in a particular practice of 'conservation'. Although the first legal decree to protect national antiquities dates to the seventeenth century in Sweden, the second half of the nineteenth century saw a surge in the development of legislation to protect ancient monuments or religious or other architecturally and historically significant

buildings (Jokilehto 1999; Choay 2001). These acts, and other legal instruments and public agencies, included the English *Ancient Monuments Protection Act* of 1882; the 1807 chancellery recommendations in Denmark; the establishment in the 1830s of the Comité historique in France, amongst others (Kristiansen 1984; Schnapp 1984; Murray 1989; Choay 2001; Poirrier 2003). Explicitly following the European example, the United States also attempted to get similar legislation enacted during the late nineteenth century, although this was not successful until 1906 with the passing of the *Antiquities Act* (McManamon 1996; Murtagh 1997). Professional architects and the newly emergent discipline of archaeology were significant in the history of the development of these acts. Archaeology, particularly in England and the United States, pressed its case for status as an intellectual endeavour through its claims of stewardship over prehistoric sites and monuments in public debates around the development of these acts (Carman 1996; Smith 2004). Both architecture and archaeology, due to their ability to claim professional expertise over material culture, took on a pastoral role in identifying the appropriate monuments to be protected under these acts, and in caring for and protecting these places. Educating the public about the value and meaning of historic buildings and monuments also became embedded in a sense of a 'conservation ethic' that to disseminate these values was to ensure greater conservation awareness and appreciation of a nation's cultural heritage. This sense of a conservation ethic became institutionalized in organizations like the Society for the Protection of Ancient Buildings (SPAB) established in 1877, one function of which was to lobby and educate government and society at large about 'proper' conservation principles and about the value and aesthetic significance of ancient buildings.

The use of the term monument is particularly important in the European context. As Choay (2001) documents, the word took on particular registers of power, greatness, and beauty during the seventeenth century and came to affirm a sense of grand public schemes and aesthetic sensibilities. The monument became 'a witness to history and a work of art' that took on a commemorative role in triggering certain public memories and values, and is a concept that has come to embody a particular European vision of the world (Choay 2001: 15; Carrier 2005). The French idea of *patrimoine* – specifically the concept of inheritance – also underwrites the sense of aesthetic grandness (Choay 2001). This sense of inheritance promotes the idea that the present has a particular 'duty' to the past and its monuments. The duty of the present is to receive and revere what has been passed on and in turn pass this inheritance, untouched, to future generations. The French sense of patrimony found synergy in the English conservation ethos of 'conserve as found', heavily influenced by John Ruskin and his treatise *The Seven Lamps of Architecture* ([1849] 1899). In this work, Ruskin argued against the dominant nineteenth-century practice of restoration, where historic buildings would be 'restored' to 'original' conditions by removing later additions or adaptations.

For Ruskin, the fabric of a building was inherently valuable and needed to be protected for the artisanal and aesthetic values it contained:

> It is again no question of expediency or feeling whether we shall preserve the buildings of past time or not. We have no right whatever to touch them. They are not ours. They belong partly to those who built them, and partly to all generations of mankind who are to follow us.
>
> (Ruskin [1849] 1899: 358)

As Burman (1995) notes, this sense of 'trusteeship' over the past was taken up by the SPAB and, as Emerick (2003) shows, became embedded and propagated in English legislation, policy and conservation principles and practices throughout the twentieth century. For the SPAB 'conservation repair' was advocated, so that there would be little intervention in the fabric of a building, and repair work would principally be done to prevent decay. William Morris, one of the principal founders of the SPAB and heavily influenced by Ruskin, wrote in his 1877 manifesto for the Society that:

> To put Protection in the place of Restoration, to stave off decay by daily care, to prop a perilous wall or mend a leaky roof by such means as are obviously meant for support or covering, and show no pretence of other art, and otherwise to resist all tampering with either the fabric or ornament of the building as it stands . . . in fine to treat our ancient buildings as monuments of a bygone art, created by bygone manners, that modern art cannot meddle with without destroying.
>
> (Morris 1877)

This sense of protection or conservation is explicitly incorporated into English planning policy, notably within the document 'Public Planning Guidance 15' (PPG15), which oversees the conservation and use of historic buildings. Further, members of the public today seeking information about conservation principles in their local borough may download from the Internet documents from local government websites that recommend conservation procedures and practices that heavily quote William Morris and the SPAB (see, for instance, East Hertfordshire 2005).

The particular aesthetic championed by Morris and Ruskin owed much to nineteenth-century Romanticism, and many of the buildings they sought to save were essentially those built before the seventeenth century. Buildings to be protected were 'anything which can be looked on as artistic, picturesque, historical, antique, or substantial: any work, in short, over which educated, artistic people would think it worth while to argue' (Morris 1877). Romanticism, as a reaction to urbanization and industrialization, harkened back to a time of the 'rural idyll' and it was thus no accident that many of the

buildings that most concerned the SPAB were churches and homes of the rural elite. The idea that architectural monuments were also something that could principally be appreciated by the educated is also embedded in this conservation philosophy – as it was the professional whose responsibility it was to care for and pass on the aesthetic values that lie at the heart of what it meant to be a 'Modern European'. More specifically, it was only the well-educated who had the necessary cultural literacy to understand grand social and national narratives that were inherent in the fabric of such monuments.

The European conservation principles spread to other parts of the world; actively so in places like the United States, where European conservation found synergy with the 'secular pietism' that characterized the nineteenth-century American preservation movement (Murtagh 1997: 11). In other countries like India, these principles were imposed as part of colonial rule, with the British colonial government legislating in 1863 for the conservation of buildings for their historical and architectural value (Thapar 1984; Menon 2002). These principles have also became embedded in the *Athens Charter for the Restoration of Historic Monuments* of 1931, and the *International Charter for the Conservation and Restoration of Monuments and Sites* (Venice Charter) of 1964, the first of a range of ICOMOS charters that continue to frame and define the debates about conservation and heritage management practices. European ideas about conservation, and the nature and meaning of monuments, have become internationally naturalized, so that these principles have become global 'common sense'. Denis Byrne (1991) has argued, more critically, that they have become hegemonic and that the 'conservation ethic' has been imposed on non-Western nations.

The Romantic Movement also found expression in the conservation of 'natural' heritage. The idea of a 'pristine wilderness', and the nature/culture divide facilitated by Enlightenment philosophy, led to the concept of a natural landscape that needed to be protected from the depredations of human activities (Head 2000b; Waterton 2005a). This idea of landscape was institutionalized in the late nineteenth century with the creation of Yellowstone National Park in 1872, the world's first national park. In England, the National Trust for Places of Historic Interest or Natural Beauty was founded in 1895 to address threats to the landscape of the Lake District (Jenkins 1994). The socialist founders of the Trust were concerned to preserve common land for recreational use as a reaction to the *General Enclosures Act* of 1845 (Weideger 1994). In particular, the initial founders of the Trust were concerned to ensure urban populations had access to rural lands and landscapes for their cultural and physical health and well-being (Crouch 1963: 18). In 1907, an Act of Parliament established the National Trust, and gave the organization the right to declare any properties it possessed as inalienable, so that they could be held in 'trust' for the nation (Crouch 1963: 7). Although initially concerned with areas of natural beauty, the Trust began to acquire buildings in the early twentieth century. In 1934, Philip Kerr, the

eleventh Marquess of Lothian, lobbied a new generation of National Trust officials to consider the 'plight' of the country house (Mandler 1997: 295–6). By this time, death duties, other taxes and the impact of the First World War had had a debilitating impact on the ability of the landed gentry and aristocracy to maintain these buildings. Kerr (aka Lord Lothian) argued in 1934 that the Trust should be enabled to acquire houses, repair and modernize them and then let them to tenants, some of whom may be their old owners, 'who would respect and preserve, so far as they could, the tradition of beauty they enshrined' (quoted in Mandler 1997: 296). In 1937 and 1939, new legislation allowed owners of houses to gift or bequeath their properties, along with an endowment for their upkeep, to the Trust; in return, the Trust would maintain the property and generous tax concessions would be granted on the transfer of the property to the Trust (Cannadine 1995: 20). Subsequently, the Trust has become primarily associated in England with the country house and other properties of the English elite. Rather than the original sense of holding public lands in trust for the public, the National Trust adopted, at this time, a 'Ruskinian' sense of trusteeship over the types of buildings that inherently appealed to Romantics and organizations like the SPAB. In addition, the conservation ideas and the ideologies embedded in the European conservation movement helped to legitimate the Trust's almost seamless adoption of Kerr's 'Country House Scheme', and to become subsequently a major and natural advocate for the preservation of elite heritage as 'national' heritage.

Indeed this was no accident, as the discourse of monumentality and heritage as developed from the nineteenth century is not only driven by certain narratives about nationalism and Romantic ideals, but also a specific theme about the legitimacy and dominant place in national cultures of the European social and political elite. In Britain, for instance, the upper classes have dominated the conservation movement, by not only founding organizations like the SPAB and in hijacking the National Trust, but also in championing legislation. For instance, Lord Lubbock, early archaeologist and liberal politician, was the primary champion of the Ancient Monuments Act, which he saw as part of a wider social improvement scheme, in which the public would be made aware of the antiquity of their national and cultural character through the preservation of ancient antiquities and other monuments (Carman 1993, 1996). In the United States, the early leaders of what in that country is called the 'preservation movement' were drawn from the upper middle and upper classes (Barthel 1996: 6). Early campaigns in America concentrated on the preservation of the stately homes of historically significant men, such as George Washington's 'Mt Vernon' and Andrew Jackson's 'The Hermitage' (Murtah 1997). The motive behind this movement was, as Barthel (1996: 19) observes, to specifically engender and bolster American patriotism in the general public. Individuals like Lubbock and organizations like the SPAB in England, and early US preservationist organizations like the

Mt Vernon Ladies Association and Daughters of the American Revolution, were driven by a sense of liberal duty for social improvement, wherein their messages about patriotism, nationalism and the desirability of inheriting and passing on certain aesthetic tastes was seen as occurring for the general good and edification of the public.

The idea of 'preservation' is interesting here, as the nineteenth century was a significant period of social change. The European conservation movement and the American preservation movement developed in the context of this change, and what is revealing is what it was that early conservationists and preservations sought to 'save' in this context. Almost inevitably it is the grand and great and 'good' that were chosen, to 'remind' the public about the values and sensibilities that should be saved or preserved as representative of patriotic American and European national identities. Even when it is the 'bad' that is being preserved, it is very often the exceptionally 'tragic' event that is commemorated, rather than unpleasantness that is more mundane or reflective of the general inequalities of human experiences. The very idea of monumentality – drawing on a sense of the inevitability and desirability of inheritance, of grand scale and of aesthetic taste – derives ultimately from ruling and upper middle class experience. That these ideals came to dominate was not simply a function of the degree to which the upper classes were involved in early preservation and conservation movements. It was also the degree to which their own experiences and understanding of the importance of material culture in demonstrating lineage, cultural and social achievement and power became embedded in these movements and the conceptual frameworks in use today. This was also facilitated by a certain desire to maintain the legitimacy of those experiences on the social and cultural register.

In Australia, where the conservation movement developed relatively late, we can see the degree to which these concepts have become naturalized as common sense in the wider international discourse on heritage. Australia faithfully imported the basic philosophy of Ruskinian conservation as witnessed in the development of the first version of The Australian ICOMOS *Charter for the Conservation of Places of Cultural Significance (Burra Charter)* in 1979. This charter was an attempt to rework the Venice Charter for an Australian context, which by the late 1970s included self-conscious public debate about multiculturalism and Indigenous heritage. However, the 1979 Burra Charter focused attention entirely on the fabric of a place or building, a focus derived from the basic premises underlying the Charter that significance is deemed to be inherent in the fabric of a building. The Charter incorporates the basic conservation ethic that requires that as little as possible be done to damage or alter a building's fabric and thus its historic or other values. Although the Burra Charter was rewritten in 1999, the basic focus on fabric, and the underlying ethic and assumptions of innate value has not changed (Waterton et al. 2006). Indeed, as argued in detail in Chapter 3, the new version of the Charter, which attempts to incorporate greater

community participation in conservation and heritage management matters, effectively works to compromise that participation (see also Waterton et al. 2006). It does so as it has not altered the dominant sense of the trusteeship of expert authority over the material fabric. Nor has it challenged the degree to which experts are perceived as having not only the ability, but also the *responsibility* for identifying the value and meanings that are still perceived to be locked within the fabric of a place. The degree to which the Burra Charter incorporates the common sense views about conservation and heritage are revealed in the extent to which this document, written *specifically* for the Australian context, is lauded and adopted internationally as a standard of good principles and practice. A number of countries in Europe, and in particular the United Kingdom, have now adopted and actively use the Burra Charter in conservation and heritage management.

In the 1940s, both America and Australia imported the English model of the National Trust. As various commentators have noted, the majority of houses and other properties preserved in Australia during the post-war period tended to be drawn from the Australian Squattocracy (rural upper class) and other elements of the ruling classes (Bickford 1981, 1985; Lake 1991; Pennay 1996). However, a significant moment in the history of the conservation movement in Australia was the activities of the Builders Labourers Federation (BLF), a now disbanded trade union, which in the 1970s, under the leadership of Jack Mundy, imposed 'green bans' (work bans) on areas in Sydney deemed by the union leadership and community groups as constituting both natural and cultural heritage. The first area thus successfully protected was a piece of bushland, 'Kelly's Bush', in the affluent Sydney suburb of Hunters Hill (Burgman and Burgman 1998). Another area that became the focus of Mundy's green bans was Victoria Street in the red-light and one time bohemian inner city suburb of Kings Cross. A large section of Victoria Street was due for redevelopment by a private landowner, and a significant number of Victorian terraced houses were due for demolition. Although these terraced houses had once been built for middle class occupation, they had by the 1970s largely been subdivided into boarding houses and were occupied by protected tenants, workers from the nearby dockyards and other low-income tenants. For many of the residents of Kings Cross, my own family included, the agenda for protecting these houses was not simply the aesthetic amenity of the streetscape, although that was important, but appreciably the agenda was also driven by the need to save not only low-income accommodation, but low-incoming housing that had an aesthetic amenity.

Victoria Street became a significant and very public community and trade union protest, which at times became very violent and was nationally broadcast on news programmes. This protest occurred at a time when there was wider agitation from organizations like the National Trust to develop legislation in the State of New South Wales, where these events were occurring, to

protect heritage sites. The *NSW Heritage Act 1977* was duly enacted. The Victoria Street development did proceed, but in a modified form, and public pressure saw the preservation of some of the Victoria Street housing stock. However, the agenda for *why* these houses were saved was lost. Tenants were removed and the houses modified and 'restored' to their pre-boarding house days, and re-tenanted with, or sold to, the mobile middle classes that were, at this time, gentrifying the inner city. The actions of the BLF in Sydney were significant in that they helped raise public consciousness about environmental and cultural heritage issues, and the public protests they sparked helped to put pressure on the government to develop heritage policies and legislation. However, the dominant sense of heritage prevailed in this case, as the houses were saved for their aesthetic values, not their community values or as affordable homes. Perhaps these latter issues would never have gained political credence given the degree of economic pressure to redevelop the inner city; however, it is revealing nonetheless that it was the aesthetic argument that was seen as plausible and of enough political influence to protect these buildings. In short, it was the *houses* that were saved, and saved ultimately for middle class use, and not the sense of community that drove the protest for many local residents. The other point this example reveals about the nature of authorized heritage and monumentality is that it is inherently *material*, and that Victoria Street could be seen as a conservation victory rather than the local community defeat that it was, because the building stock, and not the community, had been saved.

The public concern with environmental and heritage issues that Mundy and the BLF, and indeed the National Trust of Australia, drew on in lobbying for heritage legislation during the 1970s was part of a growing wider Western concern with what were becoming identifiable as 'heritage issues' during the 1960s. Some commentators have seen this increased public debate as a consequence of the political and social changes of the 1960s (Chase and Shaw 1989; Lowenthal 1985; McCrone et al. 1995), while others suggest that it was a result of increased leisure time, and thus a greater public interaction with their built and cultural environments (Hunter 1981; Mandler 1997; Tinniswood 1998). Certainly, by the late 1960s and 1970s, there was an increasing momentum in two areas of heritage practice. One was the marked increase in heritage tourism. Prentice argues that mass consumption of heritage tourism became a significant economic and cultural phenomenon by the mid-1970s as public interest in heritage and history increased (1993, 2005; see also Urry 1990; Hollinshead 1997). Another was the degree to which national public heritage policy and legislation was being introduced and/or amended in the Western world. For instance, the Ancient Monuments Act in Great Britain was replaced with the *Ancient Monuments and Archaeological Areas Act 1979*, and other acts were put in place to protect portable antiquities, underwater sites and historic buildings (Hunter and Ralston 1993; Cookson 2000), and similar legislative activity was going on in other

European countries (see Cleere 1984). Australia also developed its first acts at this time to protect both Indigenous, archaeological and built heritage (Smith 2004). The United States, fearing in this period that it was lagging behind Europe in the area of buildings preservation, established a committee under Albert Rains, with the patronage of the American First Lady, Lady Bird Johnson, to review the European laws and procedures and introduce them into legislation in the United States (see Rains [1966] 1983). The US federal government in the 1970s also introduced a number of other acts designed to protect a range of archaeological resources (King 1998). International Charters and Conventions identifying and nominating procedures for protecting buildings and archaeological sites in a variety of different contexts or situations were also adopted.

By the 1970s, at least, it became possible to talk about and recognize a set of procedures and techniques, guided by national legislation and national and international charters, conventions and agreements, concerned with the preservation and management of a range of heritage sites and places. In the United States, this process is called Cultural Resource Management (King 2002), in Europe it tends to be referred to as Archaeological Heritage Management (Willems 2001; Carman 2002) and in Australia, where Indigenous criticism has challenged the idea of heritage both as a 'resource' and as the privileged purview of archaeologists, Cultural Heritage Management is increasingly used. Archaeologists and conservation architects inevitably dominate these processes. This is because, on a practical level, it is members of these disciplines that have lobbied for the legislation, worked within government heritage bureaucracies and amenity societies, and had a significant presence in UNESCO and ICOMOS. On a philosophical level, it is the ability of both disciplines to claim expert authority over material culture (whether as artefacts, sites or structures). Further, and as various historians of archaeology and architecture have identified, the conservation ethic developed in the nineteenth century was both constituted by and continually reinforced within the epistemological frameworks of both disciplines (see, for instance, Murray 1989; Trigger 1989; Byrne 1991; Smith 2004 for archaeology; and Lowenthal 1985; Jokilehto 1999; Earl 2003 for conservation architecture).

The Venice Charter of 1964 is, as Starn (2002: 2) correctly identifies: 'the canonical text of modern' heritage practices. This document reinforces the conservation ethic and stresses one of the key principles of heritage management: that the cultural significance of a site, building, artefact or place must determine its use and management (see Chapter 3). Inevitably, it is those holding expert knowledge that must identify the innate value and significance, which are often defined in terms of historical, scientific, educational or more generally 'cultural' significance. There have been extensive debates about the nature and need for self-conscious significance assessments in Western heritage management, particularly in North America (see, for instance, McGimsey 1972; Lipe 1977, King 2000, Mathers et al. 2005),

Australasia (Sullivan and Bowdler 1984; Fung and Allen 1984; Johnston 1992; Pearson and Sullivan 1995; Byrne et al. 2001) and Europe (Darvill et al. 1987; Darvill 1995, 2005; Carman 1996, 1998; Clark 1999, 2005; Deeben and Groenewoudt 2005). Although extensive, these debates have historically focused on the technical issues of assessment and 'best practice'. Ironically, however, it is in England, the source of many of the justificatory texts of conservation, where the debate about the nature of heritage significance and assessment processes have been less developed relative to other countries such as the United States or Australia. In England (this is less the case in the rest of the UK), value appears to be largely, and often unproblematically, assumed. This may be an expression of the degree to which the cultural values of heritage are part of the cultural common sense of the nation. In the post-colonial contexts of the United States and Australia significance values, as discussed below, have been one of the first areas contested by competing heritage discourses.

The year 1972 is another noteworthy milestone in the development and institutionalization of the heritage discourse. In that year, UNESCO adopted the *Convention Concerning the Protection of the World Cultural and Natural Heritage*, which established an international agenda for the protection and conservation of sites of universal significance, and importantly confirmed the presence of 'heritage' as an international issue. In addition, the World Heritage Convention further institutionalized the nineteenth-century conservation ethic and the 'conserve as found' ethos. As Choay (2001: 140) has argued, the European sense of the historical monument as universally significant underwrites this Convention, which inevitably universalizes Western values and systems of thought (see also Byrne 1991). A glance at the World Heritage List today demonstrates the degree to which the sense of the monumental underwrites the convention, with cathedrals and grand buildings of state dominating the listing process (Cleere 2001). Under this convention, heritage *is* not only monumental, it *is* universally significant with universal meaning, and it *is*, ultimately, physically tangible and imposing. The idea of 'authenticity' is also significant in this convention, and in many ICOMOS charters. Starn (2002) argues that the degree of attention given to the idea of authenticity in heritage management and conservation is a relatively new issue and was not one that exercised nineteenth-century European conservationists, and suggests that it was not until the writing of the Venice Charter that authenticity becomes a notable problem. He sees the concern with 'authenticity' in this document as deriving largely from a reaction to the devastation caused to cityscapes during the Second World War and the runaway urban development of the 1960s. He suggests the use of the word was a call for continuity in the rapid post-war changes to urban centres (2002: 8). Certainly the concept has taken on added force and authority in the post-war period, and has found a certain synergy with the conservation ethic. As Colin Graham (2001: 63) notes: 'authenticity tends to a monologic

unquestioning discourse concurrent with the idea of the "nation", it arises also out of contexts in which the nation becomes an active arbiter between the past and a "people" . . . [it] combines the prioritisation of "origins" with the "pathos of incessant change".'

This section has demonstrated that there is a self-referential 'authorized heritage discourse', whose authority rests in part on its ability to 'speak to' and make sense of the aesthetic experiences of its practitioners and policy makers, and by the fact of its institutionalization within a range of national and international organizations and codes of practice. The *when* of heritage stretches back to nineteenth-century values and cultural concerns, the *where* of this discourse may be found not only in Western Europe, but also more specifically in the authorial voices of the upper middle and ruling classes of European educated professionals and elites. It is as much a discourse of nationalism and patriotism as it is of certain class experiences and social and aesthetic value. However, this discourse has not been unchallenged. Internationally, the World Heritage Convention has been criticized, in particular by non-Western nations and commentators, for universalizing Western concepts of heritage and the values inherent within that (see, for instance, Blake 2001; Cleere 2001). In response to this, UNESCO adopted the 2003 *Convention for the Safeguarding of the Intangible Cultural Heritage*. This convention attempts to recognize new and non-Western ways of understanding heritage – how successful this is in challenging the dominant discourse is discussed in Chapter 3.

In addition, community groups from within many Western countries have also challenged the dominant discourse and advocated greater community participation; demanding that practitioners recognize not only locally geographically defined communities, but also communities bound together by common social, cultural, economic and/or political experiences. Also Indigenous criticism in post-colonial countries about the inequities inherent in the ways in which museums, archaeologists and other heritage practitioners have dealt with human remains and other items of cultural value and significance have been increasingly influential. A second prong of attack has centred on the economic commodification and 'Disneyfication' of mass heritage tourism (Handler and Saxton 1988; McCrone et al. 1995; Brett 1996; Waitt and McGuirk 1996; Handler and Gable 1997; Waitt 2000; Choay 2001; Greenspan 2002). In the United Kingdom, this criticism has been particularly vociferous, marshalled as a critique of the so-called 'heritage industry' led by historians Robert Hewison (1981, 1987) and Patrick Wright (1985, 1991), which has also criticized the self-referential and elitist nature of the discourse. The next section of this chapter will examine in more detail the consequences of the authorized heritage discourse and then return to consider these competing discourses in more detail.

The authorized heritage discourse and its use

The authorized heritage discourse (AHD) focuses attention on aesthetically pleasing material objects, sites, places and/or landscapes that current generations 'must' care for, protect and revere so that they may be passed to nebulous future generations for their 'education', and to forge a sense of common identity based on the past. This section briefly outlines some of the key consequences of this discourse in constituting and legitimizing what heritage *is*, and in defining who has the ability to speak for and about the nature and meaning of heritage.

One of the consequences of the AHD is that it defines who the legitimate spokespersons for the past are. One of the ways the AHD does this is through he rhetorical device of 'the past', which is used as a shorthand or an alternative to 'heritage'. 'The past' is vague, though the use of the definite article also identifies something both singular and concrete. The vagueness of 'the past', its mystery and 'hard to pin downness', immediately works to render it subject to the judgements of experts such as archaeologists and historians. It is part of the discourse that maps out what it is archaeologists and other areas of expertise may have domain over – the vagueness being particularly useful here. Yet, the definite article also identifies that there is *a* past that will be looked after by expert analysis and study. The important point here is that terms like 'the past', when used to discuss and define heritage, disengage us from the very real emotional and cultural work that the past does as heritage for individuals and communities. The past is not abstract; it has material reality as heritage, which in turn has material consequences for community identity and belonging. The past cannot simply be reduced to archaeological data or historical texts – it is someone's heritage.

One of the other ways the AHD maps out the authority of expertise is through the idea of 'inheritance' and patrimony. The current generation, best represented by 'experts', are seen as stewards or caretakers of the past, thus working to disengage the present (or at least certain social actors in the present) from an active use of heritage. Heritage, according to the AHD, is inevitably saved 'for future generations' a rhetoric that undermines the ability of the present, unless under the professional guidance of heritage professionals, to alter or change the meaning and value of heritage sites or places. In disempowering the present from actively rewriting the meaning of the past, the use of the past to challenge and rewrite cultural and social meaning in the present becomes more difficult.

Another crucial theme of this discourse is the idea that 'heritage' is innately valuable. This is because 'heritage' is seen to represent all that is good and important about the past, which has contributed to the development of the cultural character of the present. Moreover, embedded within this discourse is the idea that the proper care of heritage, and its associated values, lies with the experts, as it is only they who have the abilities, knowledge and

understanding to identify the innate value and knowledge contained at and within historically important sites and places. This is an embedded assumption within the discourse that has a legacy in antiquarian understandings of knowledge and material culture. Principally, it is architects, historians and archaeologists who act as stewards for the past, so that present and future publics may be properly educated and informed about its significance.

The heritage literature maintains that heritage is a symbolic representation of identity. Material or tangible heritage provides a physical representation of those things from 'the past' that speak to a sense of place, a sense of self, of belonging and community. The emergence of the heritage discourse within the context of nineteenth-century nationalism has meant that the primary form of identity often associated with heritage is that of the nation (see Macdonald 2003; Graham et al. 2005). This is reinforced by the nationalizing discourses that underlie the discipline of archaeology and history (Meskell 2001, 2002, 2003; Kane 2003; Diaz-Andreu under review) and the emphasis on the universality of heritage values and principles embedded in documents such as the World Heritage Convention (Byrne 1991). Such an emphasis means that other forms of identity are often obscured or devalued. The literature on globalization has made strong claims about the localizing affects of this process, whereby the local has become a greater focus in terms of identity work (Chang et al. 1996; Escobar 2001; Berking 2003; Castells 2004). However, this shift in focus is not accommodated easily by a discourse that is ultimately assimilationist in nature, drawing as it does on the narrative of nation and universality of world heritage. The heritage discourse, in providing a sense of national community, must, by definition, ignore a diversity of sub-national cultural and social experiences. Ultimately, the discourse draws on too narrow a sense of experience of what heritage is and what it may mean to readily incorporate sub-national identities.

Within the narrative of nation, the heritage discourse also explicitly promotes the experience and values of elite social classes. This works to alienate a range of other social and cultural experiences and it has been no accident that the heritage phenomena has been criticized for absenting women (Johnston 1993; Smith 1993; Dubrow 2003), a range of ethnic and other community groups (Leone et al. 1995; Hayden 1997; Ling Wong 1999, 2000; Shackel 2001), Indigenous communities (Langford 1983; Fourmile 1989b; Deloria 1992; Ah Kit 1995; Watkins 2003) and working class and labour history (Johnston 1993; Hayden 1997; Dicks 1997, 2000a). While the AHD may work to exclude the historical, cultural and social experiences of a range of groups, it also works to constrain and limit their critique. It does this on a broad level by privileging the expert and their values over those of the non-expert, and by the self-referential nature of the discourse, which continually legitimizes itself and the values and ideologies on which it is based. However, the emphasis on materialism in this discourse also helps constrain critique.

Linked to the idea of the materiality of heritage is the idea of its 'boundedness'. Heritage has traditionally been conceived within the AHD as a discrete 'site', 'object', building or other structure with identifiable boundaries that can be mapped, surveyed, recorded, and placed on national or international site registers. This ability to reduce the concept of heritage to 'manageable' and discrete locales helps to reduce the social, cultural or historical conflicts about the meaning, value or nature of heritage, or more broadly the past, into discrete and specific conflicts over individual sites and/or technical issues of site management. Over the last decade, however, and as disciplines such as geography start to consider heritage issues, greater attention has focused on the idea of cultural landscapes and their heritage values (see, for instance, Titchen 1996; Jones and Rotherham 1998; Fairclough 1999; Cotter et al. 2001; Fairclough and Rippon 2002). As Head (2000b) has demonstrated, the philosophical separation of concepts of 'nature' and 'culture' during the Enlightenment has lead to an assumption that landscape is inherently a natural rather than a cultural phenomena. Waterton (2005a) and Titchen (1996) have argued that this has affected the ability of heritage organizations to embrace the idea of cultural landscape as heritage. However, this ability is also hindered by the discursive construction of heritage that naturalizes it as a discrete 'spot' or locale within a landscape. This conceptualization helps to obfuscate wider cultural and historical debates about the meaning of the past, and works to draw tight conceptual and knowledge boundaries around the meanings and values given to these locales. The idea of a cultural landscape as heritage makes both conceptual and physical space for a wider range and layering of competing values and meanings than does the idea of 'site'. The consequence of this will be explored in Chapter 5.

However, another aspect of the AHD's obfuscation of, and attempts to exclude, competing discourses is the way it constructs heritage as something that is engaged with passively – while it may be the subject of popular 'gaze', that gaze is a passive one in which the audience will uncritically consume the message of heritage constructed by heritage experts. Heritage is not defined in the AHD as an active process or experience, but rather it is something visitors are led to, are instructed about, but are then not invited to engage with more actively. The 'glass case' display mentality Merriman (1991) identified for museum exhibitions is equally present in traditional interpretation and presentations of heritage sites and places (see also Hall and McArthur 1996).

This mentality helps to exclude non-traditional conceptions of heritage as it is assumed that heritage visitors will not value sites and places that do not fit into the dominant aesthetic. An example is Diane Barthel's (1996: 68–9) discussion of the possibility of interpreting an industrial site in such a way that it recalls the inequities, aggression and unpleasantness of industrial life. She states that: 'the raw masculinity . . . [of the industrial workplace] is not the usual subject for tours of schoolchildren and senior citizens or for family

outings. Layers of dirt and grime violate tourist expectations, and serious questioning of industrialism's costs runs counter to the ideology of many political and economic interests involved in preservation.' Despite the critical acuity of her latter point, she does assume that visitors to such sites have uncritically accepted the dominant discourse, and that they tend only to be interested in the traditional aesthetics of heritage and nothing else. Not only is she assuming that dominant perceptions of heritage *are* indeed universally shared, she also assumes that heritage visitors are inherently uncritical and passive.

'The public', and more specifically visitors to heritage sites and museums, are too often conceptualized as 'empty vessels' or passive consumers of the heritage message (Mason 2004, 2005). The idea of the passivity of the gaze of heritage visitors or consumers derives from three factors. Firstly, it has a legacy in the values and ideologies of the liberal educational movement that influenced early museum development and the conservation movement. Secondly, it lies in the 'conserve as found' ethos that identifies sites as something to be looked upon and passed unchanged on to the future. Work by Emma Waterton (2005b) on the visual imagery of England's heritage agency, English Heritage, demonstrates the degree to which this ethos permeates the perception of heritage and management practices in that country. In her critique, she identifies the systemic absence of people in the visual imagery used to attract visitors and represent its heritage properties more widely. She also notes that although many properties are ruins, they are neatly – almost ostentatiously – maintained. Keith Emerick (2003) also argues that the on-site manicured presentation of most heritage properties managed by English Heritage is a direct reflection of the Ruskinian conservation ethic, citing policy documents from throughout the twentieth century instilling the need for site managers to keep sites neat and tidy. This sense of tidy control is brutally represented by the immaculate lawns that characteristically surround most ruins, buildings and other English Heritage properties and which help facilitate the management aim of:

> conserving the beauty and the stability of the old buildings in its charge without involving the removal or alteration of a single old stone or the addition of a single new one, except upon obvious structural necessity. The monuments are allowed to tell their own story without the intrusion of modern architectural design, whether good or bad, affecting the question.
>
> (William Harvey, architect in the Office of Works – the then body responsible for heritage – 1922, cited in Emerick 2003: 112)

Thirdly, it owes something to the recent developments in mass tourism. During the 1980s a strong critique of heritage emerged that focused on the development of mass consumption and tourist marketing of heritage

attractions. A focus of this critique was the idea that tourism reduced heritage to simple entertainment, with the derogative motif of 'theme park' becoming central to this critique. Patrick Wright (1985), for instance, warned that Britain had itself become one gigantic heritage theme park, which Hewison (1987) thought was integral to the cultural decline of Britain. This critique has been echoed in other countries, where heritage has been accused of stifling creativity and sanitizing or simplifying the historical messages of the past (McCrone et al. 1995; Brett 1996; Choay 2001: 4–5; Burton 2003). For instance, Colonial Williamsburg, one of the American Flagship heritage sites often associated with American patriotism, cultural achievement and aesthetics, has been a particular focus of this critique. The need to attract more visitors has resulted in what Greenspan identifies as 'low brow' advertising, and he reports the unease felt by heritage professionals that the 'fun' side of the site has been promoted over its educational role (2002: 175). While the Disneyfication of tourism marketing and interpretation is a feature of real concern (Smith et al. 1992; Hollinshead 1997; Waitt 2000), this critique has been extended to heritage interpretation more generally. Hewison (1987) scornfully identifies a 'heritage industry', which commodifies, sanitizes and creates a false past and stifles cultural development and creativity.

While Rafael Samuel (1994) has demonstrated that it is inappropriate to lump all heritage under this label, and that heritage does much more than offer a sanitized version of the past, nonetheless it is a critique that has had some force both in Britain and internationally. Although it appears to stand in opposition to the AHD, the heritage industry critique, as discussed below in more detail, reproduces some of the work the AHD does in constructing heritage visitors or users as passive consumers. Within this critique visitors are redefined as 'tourists', which further distances heritage users from an active sense of engagement with heritage sites – as tourists they are by definition culturally foreign to the heritage site in question and may be conceived as 'simply passing through'. The idea that most visitors or users of heritage sites are 'tourists' has now become a pervasive motif in the AHD; the consequence of this will be discussed more fully in following chapters (particularly 2, 4 and 6).

The advent of mass heritage tourism, together with the economic rationalist discourse of the market that took hold in the 1980s and 1990s (Dicks 2003: 33), has also brought the lexicon of 'consumption' into heritage debates. Jane Malcom-Davies, in her critique of the history of heritage interpretation, identifies its conservation and preservation origins, which she then claims as overlain by a more recent 'heritage phase' and states that: 'The "heritage" phase is the one in which the resource is transformed into a product for consumption in the marketplace' (2004: 279). In this construction, 'heritage' is conflated with mass tourism and the processes of engagement with heritage are reduced to simple consumption. This is not to say that

heritage is not an economic resource, rather that the reduction of heritage as only or largely a product of the marketplace helps to reinforce the idea that heritage is a 'thing' that is passively and uncritically consumed. Embedded in 'common sense' views of consumption is the perception that it is a passive process in which mass consumers are manipulated by the narcotic effect of the media (Abercrombie and Longhurst 1998: 5) or, in this case, tourism marketing.

Subsequently, what is absent in the AHD is a sense of 'action' or critical engagement on the part of non-expert users of heritage, as heritage is about receiving the wisdom and knowledge of historians, archaeologists and other experts. This obscures the sense of memory work, performativity and acts of remembrance that commentators such as Nora (1989), Urry (1996) and Bagnall (2003) identify as occurring at heritage sites (these ideas are discussed in more detail in Chapter 2). However, the point to be made here is that the AHD establishes and sanctions a top-down relationship between expert, heritage site and 'visitor', in which the expert 'translates', using Bauman's (1987) sense of the word, the site and its meanings to the visitor. The very use of the term 'visitor' also facilitates the construction of passivity and disconnection. When 'visitors', or heritage users, step outside of this legitimized relationship the critique from heritage professionals can be swift and uncompromising. Witness the degree of condemnation of heritage re-enactments and re-enactors within the heritage and museum literature, which condemns such activities as being amateurish, unauthentic, sanitized, escapist and so forth (see, for instance, Hewison 1987: 83; Dening 1994: 4–5; Kammen 1991: 605–6; Beidler 1999; see exchanges in Sutton 2001; see also Handler and Saxton 1988; Uzzell 1989; Abroe 1998 for extended critical commentary). Mike Crang (1996) argues, on the other hand, that re-enactors are often concerned with actively engaging and negotiating the meaning of the events they re-enact and the sites at which these events occurred, and that it is part of a personal strategy of negotiating heritage meaning. As he notes, re-enactors are often patronized by academics, although, as he illustrates, many re-enactors carry out extensive research into the events they reconstruct and the roles they play as actors within the reconstructed events. The point is that regardless of whether we agree or disagree with the interpretations produced, what is produced is perceived as an authentic and legitimate way of understanding and using heritage sites for those involved. For some of us, the activities of re-enactors may be viewed as an eccentric or irrelevant hobby. However, it is a process that nonetheless challenges the roles established for non-expert users of heritage, and the strength of reactions it engenders in the traditional heritage literature, highlights the degree to which the AHD decrees that heritage is to be viewed from afar as an unchanging vista rather than actively *used*, remade and negotiated.