Software Security - Buffer Overflows & Related Vulnerabilities

A. Definition

- Occurs when **data is written beyond the boundaries of a fixed-size buffer** (allocated memory space).
- **Example:** Writing 10 bytes of data into a buffer allocated to hold only 9 bytes.
- **Key Concept:** In C/C++, there's often no automatic bounds checking, making this possible.

B. Exploitable Buffer Overflows

- More than just a crash; these allow an attacker to **overwrite critical program control data** located adjacent to the buffer in memory.
- Common targets include **function return addresses** or **function pointers**.
- **Goal:** Attacker aims to redirect program execution to **inject malicious code (shellcode)**.
- **Outcome:** Potential for **arbitrary code execution** with the privileges of the vulnerable program.

C. Simple Code Example

```c
// Vulnerable C code snippet demonstrating a buffer overflow
char sample[10]; // Buffer allocated for 10 chars (indices 0-9)
int i;

// Fill the buffer correctly
for (i=0; i<=9; i++) {
    sample[i] = 'A';
}

// Buffer Overflow Occurs Here!
sample[10] = 'B';   // Writing to the 11th position (index 10) - outside
allocated memory
                   // This overwrites whatever is located directly after
'sample' in memory.
```

- **Summary:** This code writes one byte (`'B'`) past the end of the `sample` buffer, potentially corrupting adjacent memory.

D. Potential Harm & Impact

1. **Overwrite Targets:** Depending on what resides next to the buffer in memory, an overflow can overwrite:
    - **Program Data:** Corrupting values of other variables, leading to incorrect program behavior.
    - **Program Instructions (Code):** Modifying the program's executable code (less common, often requires specific memory permissions).
    - **Other Programs' Data/Code:** If memory protections are weak or bypassed.
    - **Operating System Data/Code:** Most severe, potentially leading to full system compromise.
2. **Security Consequences:**
    - **Privilege Escalation:** If the overflowed program runs with high privileges (e.g., root/administrator), the attacker's injected code also runs with those privileges.
        - Overwriting program instructions → Attacker gains program's privileges.
        - Overwriting OS instructions → Attacker gains OS privileges (system compromise).
    - **Denial of Service (DoS):**
        - **Crashing:** Random or malformed input overflowing a buffer often corrupts critical data (like return addresses), causing the program to crash and become unavailable.
        - **Controlled Crash/Hijack:** Sophisticated attacks overwrite specific values (like return addresses) to point to attacker-controlled code, hijacking execution rather than just crashing.

E. Location Matters: Where Buffers Reside

- The impact and exploit technique depend heavily on *where* the overflowed buffer is located in the process's memory space.
- **Common Locations & Overwrite Targets:**
    1. **Stack:** Buffers for local variables within functions.
        - **Primary Target:** Overwriting the **function return address** stored on the stack frame to hijack control flow when the function returns.
    2. **Heap:** Buffers allocated dynamically during runtime (e.g., using `malloc`).

    - **Primary Target:** Corrupting metadata of adjacent heap chunks or overwriting data/pointers in other allocated blocks. Can lead to complex exploits.
3. **Global Data Segment (BSS/Data):** Buffers declared as global or static variables.
    - **Primary Target:** Overwriting other global variables, configuration flags, or function pointers stored in this segment.
4. **Code Segment (Text):** Contains the program's executable instructions.
    - **Primary Target:** Directly overwriting executable code (rarely possible due to memory protections like W^X - Write XOR Execute).



We show where the system data/code reside vs. where the program code and its local data reside.

This context is important for understanding how an attack that takes place inside a given program can affect that program vs. how it can affect the rest of the system.

II. The Stack and Function Calls

A. Stack Mechanics

- The **stack** is a region of memory used for managing function calls. It operates on a **Last-In, First-Out (LIFO)** principle.
- When **Procedure A calls Procedure B**:
  1. Arguments for Procedure B might be pushed onto the stack.
  2. The **return address** (location in Procedure A to resume after B finishes) is pushed onto the stack.
  3. Space for Procedure B's **local variables** is allocated on the stack. This combined area is Procedure B's **stack frame**.



When procedure A calls procedure B, procedure B gets added to the stack along with a pointer back to procedure A. In this way, when procedure B is finished running, it can get popped off the stack, and procedure A will just continue executing where it left off.

Compromised Stack



Instead of pointing at procedure B in this case, the program counter is pointing at code that's been placed on the stack as a result of an overflow.

B. Execution Flow

1. Procedure A is running.
2. A calls B → B's stack frame (including local variables and the return address back to A) is **pushed** onto the stack. Control transfers to B.
3. B executes.
4. B finishes → B's stack frame is **popped** off the stack. The stored return address is loaded into the program counter.
5. Control **returns to Procedure A** at the instruction immediately following the call to B.

- **Key Takeaway:** The **return address** stored on the stack is critical for correct program flow. This makes it a prime target for stack buffer overflows.

III. Causes and Exploitation of Stack Overflows

A. Common Root Causes

- **Language Choice:** Prevalent in **C and C++** due to direct memory manipulation and lack of built-in, automatic memory safety features (like bounds checking).
- **Lack of Bounds Checking:** Programmers fail to verify that input data fits within the allocated buffer size before copying.
- **Use of Unsafe Standard Library Functions:** Several common C functions are inherently unsafe because they don't check destination buffer sizes:
    - `gets(buffer)` : **HIGHLY DANGEROUS.** Reads until newline, no size limit. Never use.
    - `strcpy(dest, src)` : Copies `src` to `dest` without checking `dest` size.
    - `strcat(dest, src)` : Appends `src` to `dest` without checking remaining space in `dest` .
    - `sprintf(dest, format, ...)` : Writes formatted output to `dest` without checking `dest` size.
    - `scanf("%s", buffer)` : Reads a string into `buffer` without a size limit (unless width specifier used like `%10s`).
- **Stack-Based Vulnerability:** When a local buffer on the stack is overflowed, adjacent data *higher up* in the stack frame (closer to the start of the function call) can be overwritten, including the **saved return address**.

B. Memory Layout Context

- **Typical Process Memory Layout:**
  High Addresses: *Operating System code/data (Kernel space)*
  Stack: Grows **downwards** (towards lower addresses). Holds local variables, function parameters, return addresses.
  (Gap)
  Heap: Grows **upwards** (towards higher addresses). Holds dynamically allocated memory (`malloc` , `new`).
  Global/Static Data (BSS & Data segments): *Holds global and static variables.*
  Program Code (Text segment): Executable instructions (usually read-only).

* **Low Addresses:** System libraries, etc.



- **Importance:** Understanding this layout helps predict what might be overwritten by an overflow in a specific segment (e.g., stack overflow hits return address, heap overflow hits other heap data).

C. Stack Smashing: The Attack


Simplified Stack Example

```
void func(int a, int b){
  char buffer[10];
}
void main(){
  func(1, 2);
}
```

1. **Normal Execution:** Function called → Frame pushed → Function executes → Frame popped → Return address used → Control returns correctly.
2. **Overflow Scenario:** Attacker provides input larger than a local buffer on the stack.

3. **Overwrite:** The excess data writes past the buffer, sequentially overwriting other local variables, potentially saved frame pointers, and crucially, the **saved return address**.
4. **Hijack:** The attacker crafts the overflow data so that the overwritten return address now points to a location they control – typically *within the overflowed buffer itself* where they've placed malicious code (**shellcode**).
5. **Execution:** When the vulnerable function attempts to return, it loads the attacker's fake return address into the **Program Counter (PC)**. The CPU then starts executing the attacker's shellcode.

- **Summary (Stack Smashing):** Overflow a stack buffer → Overwrite the return address → Point return address to malicious code (shellcode) placed on the stack → Gain control of execution when function returns.

D. Attacker Challenges ("Trudy's Challenges") & Solutions



- **Challenge 1: Unknown Buffer Address:** The attacker doesn't know the *exact* memory address where their buffer (and thus shellcode) will reside on the stack. This address can change slightly between program runs (due to ASLR or environment variables).
- **Challenge 2: Unknown Return Address Location:** The exact offset from the start of the buffer to the return address might vary based on compiler/optimization/local variables.
- **Solutions:**
  1. **NOP Sled (No Operation Slide):**
  Prepend the actual shellcode with a long sequence of ***NOP (No Operation)***

instructions (machine code that does nothing but advance the program counter).
The attacker overwrites the return address to point *somewhere* within this NOP sled. *When the function returns, the CPU hits a NOP, executes it (does nothing), moves to the next NOP, and so on, effectively "sliding" down the sled until it hits the actual shellcode.*
This greatly increases the chance of hitting the target even if the exact address is slightly off.



2. **Repeating Return Addresses:** Overwrite the stack with multiple copies of the *guessed* shellcode address to increase the probability that one of them correctly overwrites the actual return address location.
3. **Return-Oriented Programming (ROP):** (More advanced, overcomes non-executable stack defenses) Instead of injecting shellcode, the attacker overwrites the return address (and potentially others saved on the stack) to point to small existing snippets of code (**gadgets**) already present in the program or libraries (e.g., sequences ending in a `ret` instruction). By chaining these gadgets together, the attacker achieves their malicious goal without injecting new executable code.



E. Shellcode

- **Definition:** The **payload** code injected by the attacker, executed after a successful overflow.
- **Purpose:** Typically designed to give the attacker control, often by launching a **shell** (command interpreter like `/bin/sh` on Unix/Linux or `cmd.exe` on Windows), hence the name.
- **Characteristics:**
    - **Machine Code:** Must be raw binary instructions the CPU understands.
    - **Position-Independent:** Cannot rely on absolute memory addresses because its location on the stack/heap is unpredictable. Must use relative addressing.
    - **Compact:** Needs to fit within the available buffer space.
    - **Null-Byte Free:** Often cannot contain null bytes (`\0`) as these might terminate string operations used in the exploit.
    - **OS/Architecture Specific:** Shellcode for Linux x86 is different from Windows ARM.
- **Example (Conceptual C Code):**

```c
// C code showing the *goal* of shellcode: execute a shell
#include <unistd.h>
int main() {
    char *shell = "/bin/sh";
    char *args[] = {shell, NULL};
    execve(shell, args, NULL); // Replaces current process with /bin/sh
    return 0; // Will not be reached if execve succeeds
}
```

- **Example (x86 Assembly - Conceptual Structure):**

```
; Simplified structure - Real shellcode is more complex
section .text
global _start

_start:
    ; NOP Sled (optional, for reliability)
    nop
    nop
    ; ... many NOPs ...

    ; Code to call execve syscall
    xor eax, eax      ; Zero out EAX register
    push eax          ; Push null terminator for string
    push 0x68732f6e   ; Push "/sh" (bytes reversed for little-endian)
    push 0x69622f2f   ; Push "//bi" (bytes reversed, // avoids null start)
    mov ebx, esp      ; EBX = pointer to "/bin//sh" string
    push eax          ; Push NULL (for args[1])
    push ebx          ; Push address of string (for args[0])
    mov ecx, esp      ; ECX = pointer to args array
    mov edx, eax      ; EDX = NULL (for environment variables)
    mov al, 0xb       ; AL = 11 (syscall number for execve)
    int 0x80          ; Trigger kernel syscall
```

- **Metasploit Project:** A popular open-source framework containing a vast library of exploits, shellcode, and tools for penetration testing, simplifying exploit development.
- **Shellcode Restrictions Summary:** Position-independent, OS/Arch specific, often null-free.

F. Stack Buffer Overflow Variants

- **Target Programs:** Often focus on programs running with elevated privileges or network-accessible services:
    - **SUID programs** (Linux/Unix): Run as root even when launched by a normal user.
    - **Network Service Daemons:** Like web servers (httpd), FTP servers (ftpd), mail servers (sendmail), DNS servers (bind), fingerd (historically famous).
    - **Libraries:** Vulnerabilities in widely used libraries (e.g., OpenSSL, zlib) can affect many applications.

- **Shellcode Functionality (Beyond just a shell):**
  - **Reverse Shell:** Connects *back* from the victim machine to the attacker (useful if firewalls block incoming connections to the victim).
  - **Bind Shell:** Listens on a port on the victim machine for the attacker to connect *to*.
  - **Download and Execute:** Downloads a larger malware payload from the internet and runs it.
  - **Add User/Modify Permissions:** Create backdoors or escalate privileges locally.
  - **Disable Security Measures:** E.g., flush firewall rules.
  - **Data Exfiltration:** Steal sensitive files.
  - **Break out of Jails:** Escape restricted environments like `chroot`.
- **Network-Based Exploits:** Target daemons listening on network ports. Input comes from network packets. (e.g., Morris Worm exploited `fingerd` via `gets()`).
- **File-Based Exploits:**
  - Malicious payload embedded within a data file (image, document, music file).
  - Targets the program/library that *processes* the file (e.g., a vulnerability in a JPEG decoding library).
  - Spread via email attachments, web downloads, USB drives.
  - Often aims to establish a network connection back to the attacker after successful exploitation.

G. Stack Overflow Example Walkthrough (C Code)

```c
#include <stdio.h>
#include <string.h> // Needed for fgets, sprintf, puts

// Function to get input (relatively safe use of fgets)
void getinp(char *inp, int siz) {
    puts("Input value: ");
    // fgets reads at most siz-1 characters, ensuring null termination
    // It prevents overflowing 'inp' within *this* function.
    fgets(inp, siz, stdin);
    // Remove trailing newline if present (fgets includes it)
    inp[strcspn(inp, "\n")] = 0;
    printf("buffer3 getinp read '%s'\n", inp);
}

// Function to display input (VULNERABLE PART)
void display(char *val) {
    // tmp buffer is only 16 bytes!
    char tmp[16];
    // sprintf formats the string "read val: %s\n" using 'val'
    // If 'val' is long, the combined string can easily exceed 16 bytes.
    // sprintf has NO bounds checking and will write past the end of 'tmp'.
    sprintf(tmp, "read val: %s\n", val); // <-- VULNERABILITY HERE
    puts(tmp); // Display the (potentially overflowed) tmp buffer
}

int main(int argc, char *argv[]) {
    // buf is 16 bytes
    char buf[16];
    // getinp reads safely into buf (max 15 chars + null)
    getinp(buf, sizeof(buf));
    // display takes buf (which is safely sized itself)...
    // ...but USES it in an UNSAFE way inside display()!
    display(buf);
    printf("buffer3 done\n");
    return 0; // Added return 0
}
```

- **Analysis:**
  - `getinp` uses `fgets`, which is safer as it limits input size based on `sizeof(buf)`. It prevents `buf` itself from being directly overflowed by `fgets`.
  - **The vulnerability lies in `display`.** The `tmp` buffer is fixed at 16 bytes. `sprintf` concatenates "read val: " (10 chars) with the input `val`. If `val` is longer than 5 characters (10 + 5 + newline + null > 16), `sprintf` will write past the end of `tmp`.
  - This overflow within `display` corrupts `display`'s stack frame, potentially overwriting its return address, leading to the crash (Segmentation fault) observed in the second run.
- **Run Outputs Explained:**
  - **Run 1 (Input: "SAFE"):** `val`="SAFE" (4 chars). `sprintf` creates "read val: SAFE\n" (15 chars + null). Fits in `tmp[16]`. No overflow, no crash.
  - **Run 2 (Input: "XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX"):**
    - `fgets` reads only 15 'X's into `buf` because `sizeof(buf)` is 16 (15 + null). `buf` = "XXXXXXXXXXXXXXX".
    - `display` receives `val` = "XXXXXXXXXXXXXXX".
    - `sprintf` tries to create "read val: XXXXXXXXXXXXXXX\n". This string is 10 + 15 + 1 = 26 characters long (+ null).
    - `sprintf` writes these 27 bytes into `tmp[16]`, causing a significant **buffer overflow** within `display`'s stack frame.
    - This corrupts stack data, likely including the return address for `display`.

        - When `display` tries to return to `main`, it uses the corrupted return address, causing the **Segmentation fault (core dumped)**.
- **Key Lesson:** Vulnerabilities can occur not just on initial input handling, but also when data is processed or copied between buffers later in the program flow (e.g., using `sprintf`, `strcpy`).

IV. Buffer Overflow Defenses

- **Two Main Categories:**
    1. **Compile-Time Defenses:** Aim to prevent or detect overflows *before* the program runs. Incorporated during development/compilation. Primarily for *new* software.
    2. **Run-Time Defenses:** Aim to detect or mitigate overflows *while* the program is running. Often implemented by the OS or through system updates. Crucial for protecting *existing, potentially vulnerable* software.


Two broad defense approaches
Compile-time
Run-time
Aim to harden programs to resist attacks in new programs
Aim to detect and abort attacks in existing programs

A. Compile-Time Defenses

1. **Choice of Programming Language:**
    - Use **memory-safe languages** (Java, Python, C#, Rust, Go, etc.). These languages manage memory automatically and perform bounds checking, largely eliminating classic buffer overflows.
    - **Downsides:** Can have performance overhead compared to C/C++; may not be suitable for all tasks (e.g., low-level OS development, embedded systems).
2. **Safe Coding Practices (Manual Effort):**
    - **Programmer Discipline:** Requires developers writing C/C++ to be acutely aware of potential overflows.
    - **Avoid Unsafe Functions:** Replace `gets`, `strcpy`, `strcat`, `sprintf` with their bounded counterparts (`fgets`, `strncpy`, `strncat`, `snprintf`).

    - `strncpy(dest, src, n)`: Copies *at most* `n` bytes. **Caution:** May not null-terminate if `src` length is >= `n`. Always ensure manual null-termination if needed: `dest[n-1] = '\0';`.
    - `strncat(dest, src, n)`: Appends *at most* `n` bytes from `src`. Safer, handles null termination better than `strncpy`. Requires knowing remaining space.
    - `snprintf(dest, size, format, ...)`: Writes *at most* `size` bytes (including null terminator). Generally the safest option for string formatting.
  - **Rigorous Input Validation:** Always check the length of external input before copying it into buffers.
  - **Code Audits:** Manually review code (or use static analysis tools) to find potential vulnerabilities. (Example: OpenBSD project's extensive auditing).
3. **Language Extensions / Safe Libraries:**
  - Compiler extensions or replacement libraries that add checks.
  - **Libsafe:** A library that intercepts calls to unsafe C functions (like `strcpy`) and performs bounds checking before executing them. Implemented as a dynamic library loaded before the standard C library. Can protect existing binaries without recompilation sometimes.
4. **Stack Protection Mechanisms (Compiler-Based):**
  - The compiler adds extra code to functions to detect stack corruption.
  - **Stack Canaries (or Security Cookies):**
    - On function entry, a secret random value (the "canary") is pushed onto the stack just *before* the saved return address.
    - **Must be unpredictable** to the attacker. Often generated randomly at program start or derived from a master secret.
    - On function exit, *before* using the return address, the code checks if the canary value is still intact.
    - If the canary has been changed (indicating a buffer overflow smashed past the local variables), the program aborts instead of using the potentially corrupted return address.
    - Common compiler flags: `-fstack-protector` (GCC/Clang), `/GS` (Microsoft Visual C++).
  - **Stackshield / Return Address Defender (RAD):** (Conceptually similar or alternative approaches)
    - On function entry, copy the return address to a separate, safe memory area.
    - On function exit, compare the return address on the stack with the saved copy. If they differ, abort.

B. Run-Time Defenses

1. **Executable Address Space Protection (NX Bit / DEP):**
    - Mark memory regions (especially the stack and heap) as **non-executable**.
    - Requires hardware support (NX bit on AMD, XD bit on Intel) and OS support (Windows DEP, Linux PaX/Exec-Shield).
    - **Effect:** Even if an attacker successfully overflows a buffer and overwrites the return address to point to shellcode on the stack/heap, the CPU will refuse to execute instructions from that memory region, causing a crash instead of code execution.
    - **Challenge:** Some legitimate programs (like JIT compilers in Java/JavaScript) need to execute code on the heap/stack. OS provides ways to mark specific pages as executable when needed.
    - **Bypass:** Attackers may use **Return-Oriented Programming (ROP)** which uses existing executable code snippets, bypassing the need for an executable stack/heap.
2. **Address Space Layout Randomization (ASLR):**
    - The OS loads key parts of a process's memory (stack base, heap base, library locations, main executable location) at **random addresses** each time the program runs.
    - **Effect:** Makes it much harder for the attacker to guess the absolute addresses needed for their exploit (e.g., the address of their shellcode on the stack, the address of library functions needed for ROP).
    - **Strength:** Depends on the amount of entropy (randomness/address range). 64-bit systems offer much stronger ASLR than 32-bit systems.
    - **Bypass:** Information leaks (revealing addresses), partial overwrites, or exploiting non-randomized memory regions. Brute-forcing on 32-bit systems might be feasible in some scenarios.
3. **Guard Pages:**
    - Place special memory pages flagged as invalid/inaccessible in the Memory Management Unit (MMU) between important memory regions (e.g., between stack frames, between heap allocations, between stack and heap).
    - **Effect:** If an overflow attempts to write into a guard page, the hardware triggers a memory access violation, and the OS aborts the process immediately.
    - **Downside:** Can introduce significant performance overhead due to the increased number of page table entries and potential TLB misses, especially if used very granularly (e.g., between every stack frame).

V. Other Related Software Vulnerabilities

A. Input Handling Issues

1. **Input Size Assumptions:** Programmers assume input won't exceed a certain size without verifying. Leads directly to buffer overflows if the assumption is wrong. **Lesson:** *Never trust input size.* Validate rigorously.
2. **Input Interpretation:** Programs need to correctly interpret the encoding (ASCII, UTF-8, binary) and type of input. Failure can lead to vulnerabilities.
   - **Example (Heartbleed Bug - 2014):** A famous OpenSSL vulnerability. The TLS heartbeat extension involved a length field and payload data. The server read the *claimed* length from the client but didn't verify if the client *actually sent* that much data. A malicious client could claim a large length but send little data. The server would read the requested length from its own memory *past* the client's actual data, potentially leaking sensitive information (like private keys) residing adjacent in memory. This was a failure to validate input length against actual received data.

B. Incomplete Mediation / Input Validation Failures

- **Definition:** Software fails to properly validate or "mediate" all properties of input data *before* using it, especially data that influences program control flow, resource access, or security decisions.
- **Buffer Overflow Example:** `strcpy(buffer, argv[1]);` uses `argv[1]` (command line input) without checking its length against `buffer`'s size. This is incomplete mediation of the input's length property.
- **Web Example:**
  - User submits order via URL: `http:// ... /order?itemID=123&quantity=1&price=10.00`
  - Client-side JavaScript calculates `total = quantity * price`.
  - Final URL: `http:// ... /final&custID=112&total=10.00`
  - **Vulnerability:** Attacker modifies the *final* URL before sending: `http:// ... /final&custID=112&total=1.00`
  - **Problem:** The *server* trusts the `total` parameter from the client instead of recalculating it based on `itemID` and `quantity` using trusted server-side price data.
  - **Lesson: Never trust client-side validation or client-provided data for security-critical decisions.** Always re-validate/re-calculate on the server.
- **Linux Kernel Issues:** Even complex, well-reviewed code like the Linux kernel can have subtle mediation errors leading to privilege escalation vulnerabilities. Attackers can use static analysis tools to find these just like developers can.

C. Time-of-Check to Time-of-Use (TOCTTOU) / Race Conditions

- **Definition:** A vulnerability caused by a time delay (race window) between when a program *checks* a condition (like file permissions or input validity) and when it *uses* the resource or data associated with that condition. An attacker can change the resource/data *during* this window.
- **Security Requirement Violated:** Actions based on security checks should be **atomic** (occur as a single, indivisible step).
- **File System Example (Classic `access` / `open` race):**
  1. Program checks if user has permission to write to `/path/to/userfile` using `access()` system call. (Check) → OK.
  2. **Race Window:** Attacker quickly replaces `/path/to/userfile` with a symbolic link pointing to `/etc/passwd`.
  3. Program proceeds to open `/path/to/userfile` for writing using `open()` system call. (Use) → Program now unknowingly opens and writes to `/etc/passwd` with its privileges.



- **mkdir Race Condition Example:**
  1. Privileged process starts creating a directory (e.g., `mkdir /tmp/userdir`). OS allocates space.



  2. **Race Window:** Attacker deletes `/tmp/userdir` and creates a symlink `/tmp/userdir` pointing to `/etc/important_config`.

3. Privileged process continues, setting ownership of `/tmp/userdir` (which is now the symlink) to the user.
4. Attacker now effectively owns `/etc/important_config` via the symlink.



- **Implications:** Confidentiality (reading restricted files), Integrity (writing to restricted files), Availability (corrupting system files), Privilege Escalation.
- **Countermeasures:**
  - Ensure check-and-use operations are **atomic** (e.g., use file descriptors returned by `open` instead of filenames for subsequent checks like `fstat`).
  - Use **locking mechanisms** (mutexes, semaphores) if shared resources are involved.
  - Copy request data to secure/private memory *before* validation and use the copy.
  - Proper exception handling.
  - Apply **Reference Monitor** concepts: Ensure the mechanism doing the check/enforcement cannot be interfered with by the entity being checked.

D. Undocumented Access Points / Backdoors

- **Definition:** Hidden entry points or mechanisms left in software, often by developers for debugging or maintenance, that bypass normal security checks (authentication, authorization).
- **Also Called:** Trapdoors.
- **Risk:** If discovered by attackers, they provide unauthorized access, often with elevated privileges.
- **Causes:** Forgotten debug code, intentional (but misguided) maintenance hooks, belief in "security through obscurity".
- **Protection:** Rigorous code reviews, strong development policies, penetration testing, developer security training. **Never rely on obscurity.**

E. Off-by-One Error

- **Definition:** A common logic error where a loop, array index, or boundary condition is incorrect by exactly one.
- **Examples:**
  Looping `n+1` times instead of `n`: `for (i = 0; i ≤ n; i++)` when `n` is the last valid index (should be `i < n` or `i ≤ n-1` depending on context, or `i ≤ n` if `n` is the count).
  Treating an array `A[n]` as having `n` elements (it has `n+1`: `0` to `n`).
  * String manipulation that slightly changes length (e.g., replacing `&` with `&amp;` in HTML encoding increases length) without recalculating bounds.



(a) First open issues list

(b) Second open issues list

- **Impact:** Can lead to reading/writing slightly outside intended memory (potentially a small buffer overflow), data corruption, or crashes.

F. Integer Overflow / Underflow

- **Definition:** An arithmetic operation results in a value that is too large (overflow) or too small (underflow for signed integers) to be stored in the allocated integer data type (e.g., `int8_t`, `uint16_t`, `int32_t`).
- **Causes:** Fixed-size integer representation in hardware. Signed vs. Unsigned ranges differ (`int8`: -128 to 127, `uint8`: 0 to 255).



Word Size	Signed Values	Unsigned Values
8 bits	−128 to +127	0 to 255 ($2^8 - 1$)
16 bits	−32,768 to +32,767	0 to 65,535 ($2^{16} - 1$)
32 bits	−2,147,483,648 to +2,147,483,647	0 to 4,294,967,296 ($2^{32} - 1$)

- **Effects:**
  - **Wraparound/Truncation:** Value wraps around (e.g., `255 + 1` becomes `0` in `uint8`). This is often silent.
  - **Hardware Exception:** Some architectures/operations might trigger an error.

- **Security Impact:** If an integer representing buffer size, loop count, or memory allocation calculation overflows, it can lead to allocating a much smaller buffer than expected, which is then overflowed by subsequent writes. Can also bypass security checks based on size/index.
- **Prevention:**
    - Use **larger integer types** (`int64_t` , `size_t`) where large values are possible, especially for sizes/counts.
    - **Explicitly check** for potential overflow *before* performing arithmetic operations (e.g., `if (MAX_INT - a < b) { // overflow } else { c = a + b; }`).
    - Use compiler flags or safe libraries that detect/prevent integer overflows (can have performance cost).

G. Unterminated Null-Terminated String

- **Context:** In C, strings are sequences of characters terminated by a null byte (`\0`). Many standard library functions rely on this null terminator to know where the string ends.
- **Vulnerability:** If a string operation (e.g., copying, concatenation) accidentally fails to add the null terminator, or if it's overwritten, subsequent functions reading that string will continue reading past the intended end, into adjacent memory, until they happen to find another null byte or crash.



(a) Separate length



(b) Length precedes string



(c) String ends with null

- **Causes:** Incorrect use of functions like `strncpy` (doesn't guarantee null termination if source is longer than max length), buffer overflows overwriting the null byte.
- **Impact:** Information Leakage (reading sensitive data from adjacent memory), Crashes, Potential for further exploitation if read data influences program logic.

H. Parameter Handling Issues (Length, Type, Number)

- **Definition:** Vulnerabilities arising from improper validation of function parameters passed between different parts of a program or across trust boundaries.
- **Issues:**
  - **Incorrect Number:** Function expects 3 args, receives 4 (can corrupt stack).
  - **Incorrect Type/Size:** Function expects `int`, receives `long` (can corrupt stack/data).
  - **Incorrect Length:** Function receives string/buffer parameter longer than expected (can lead to buffer overflow if not validated internally).
- **Mitigation:** Strict validation of parameter count, types, and lengths within functions, especially at API boundaries. Use language features or conventions that help enforce this (e.g., prototypes in C).

VI. Malware

A. Definition & Core Categories

- **Malware (Malicious Software):** Any software intentionally designed to cause damage, disrupt operations, steal information, or gain unauthorized access to computer systems.
- **Broad Categories:**
  - **Needs Host Program (Parasitic):**
    - **Virus:** Replicates by attaching itself to or modifying other executable files or system sectors (boot sector). Requires the host program to be run to activate and spread.
  - **Independent (Self-Contained):**
    - **Worm:** Replicates independently across networks, exploiting vulnerabilities to infect other systems without needing to attach to a host file or user interaction (after initial infection).
    - **Trojan Horse:** Disguises itself as legitimate or desirable software, but contains hidden malicious functionality executed when the user runs the program. Does *not* self-replicate.
  - **Needs User Interaction (Often for initial execution):** Trojans, some viruses (opening infected attachment).

B. Specific Malware Types & Characteristics

Code Type	Characteristics	Replication	Primary Harm Vector
Virus	Attaches to/infects other programs/files/boot sectors.	Self (via host)	Corruption, Payload Delivery, Spread
Worm	Spreads independently across networks using vulnerabilities.	Self (network)	Network Congestion, Payload Delivery
Trojan Horse	Hidden malicious function within seemingly benign software.	None	Backdoor Access, Data Theft, Damage
Rabbit / Fork Bomb	Rapidly replicates *itself* (processes/files) to exhaust system resources (CPU/disk).	Self (local)	Denial of Service (Resource Exhaustion)
Logic Bomb	Malicious code triggered when a specific *condition* is met (e.g., file deleted).	None	Damage, Data Deletion (Delayed)
Time Bomb	Malicious code triggered at a specific *date/time*.	None	Damage, Data Deletion (Delayed)
Dropper	Program designed solely to install *other* malware (virus, Trojan, worm).	None	Malware Installation
Downloader	Type of Trojan/Dropper that downloads further malware from the internet.	None	Malware Installation
Script Attack (Web)	Malicious JavaScript/VBScript/ActiveX embedded in websites/emails.	Varies	Browser Hijack, Data Theft, Drive-by-Downloads
Mobile Code (Hostile)	Malicious code transmitted over network to execute on client (Java applets, ActiveX).	Varies	Client-side Exploitation
RAT (Remote Access Trojan)	Trojan providing covert remote administrative control over the victim PC.	None	Full System Control, Spying, Botnet
Spyware	Covertly gathers user information (keystrokes, browsing) and transmits it.	Varies	Information Theft, Privacy Invasion
Adware	Displays unwanted advertisements; may include spyware components.	Varies	Annoyance, Potential Spying

Code Type	Characteristics	Replication	Primary Harm Vector
Bot (Zombie)	Infected computer under remote command & control (C&C) via a RAT or worm.	Via Worm/Trojan	DDoS Attacks, Spam Relay, Click Fraud
Botnet	A network of compromised bots controlled by a single attacker (Bot Herder).	Via Worm/Trojan	Large-Scale Coordinated Attacks
Browser Hijacker	Modifies browser settings (homepage, search engine) to redirect traffic.	Via Trojan/Adware	Redirects, Malvertising
Rootkit	Malware designed to hide its presence (files, processes, network connections) from the user/OS/AV, often by modifying core OS components (kernel).	Via Trojan/Exploit	Persistent Stealthy Access, Hiding Other Malware
Backdoor / Trapdoor	Undocumented method to bypass normal authentication/access controls.	Planted/Exploit	Unauthorized Access
Exploit / Exploit Kit	Code designed to leverage a *specific vulnerability* to deliver a payload (often other malware).	None	Vulnerability Weaponization
Scareware / Ransomware	Tricks user into paying (scareware for fake AV) or demands payment to decrypt files (ransomware).	Via Trojan/Exploit	Extortion, Data Loss
Tool / Toolkit	Utility that *could* be used maliciously (e.g., port scanner) but isn't inherently malware.	N/A	Reconnaissance, Vulnerability Finding

C. Harm Caused by Malware

- **System/User Level:**
  - Data Destruction/Modification/Encryption (Ransomware).
  - Data Theft (Credentials, financial info, intellectual property).
  - System Resource Consumption (Rabbits, Worms).
  - System Instability/Crashes.
  - Providing Unauthorized Access/Control (Backdoors, RATs, Rootkits).
  - Using system as a platform for other attacks (Botnets for DDoS/Spam).

    - Displaying unwanted content (Adware).
- **Wider Impact:**
    - Network Congestion (Worms).
    - Large-scale service disruption (DDoS via Botnets).
    - Facilitating widespread crime (Fraud, Espionage).

D. Malware Transmission & Propagation

- Bundled with seemingly legitimate software installers.
- Email Attachments (executable files, weaponized documents).
- Drive-by Downloads (visiting compromised websites exploits browser vulns).
- Network Worm Propagation (exploiting OS/service vulnerabilities).
- USB Drives (Autorun features or user trickery).
- Social Engineering (tricking users into running malicious files).
- Via existing infections (Downloaders, Botnets pushing new malware).

E. Malware Activation & Persistence

- **Activation:** Running infected host program, opening infected file, system boot (boot sector virus), specific date/time/condition (bombs), user clicking link/button.
- **Persistence:**
    - **Memory-Resident:** Loads into RAM and stays active.
    - Modifying system startup locations (Registry keys, startup folders, services).
    - Infecting core system files.
    - Hiding via Rootkits.
    - Reinfecting after partial cleanup.

F. Virus Specifics

- **Infection Methods:**
    - **Appending:** Adds virus code to end of host file, modifies header to point to virus first.
    - **Prepending:** Adds virus code to beginning of host file.
    - **Surrounding:** Wraps virus code around original host code.
    - **Replacing/Overwriting:** Destroys original host code.
    - **Integrating:** Intersperses virus code within host code (complex).
    - **Companion Virus:** Creates a new file with the same name but different extension (e.g., `program.com` infects `program.exe`), relies on OS execution precedence.

    - **Boot Sector Virus:** Infects Master Boot Record (MBR) or Volume Boot Record (VBR). Executes on system startup before OS loads.
    - **Macro Virus:** Written in macro language (e.g., VBA), embedded in documents (Word, Excel). Executes when document opened and macros enabled.
- **Concealment:**
    - **Encryption:** Virus body is encrypted with variable key, small decryptor stub visible.
    - **Polymorphism:** Virus encrypts itself and *mutates* the decryptor code on each infection. Signatures harder to create.
    - **Metamorphism:** Virus *rewrites* its entire body (reorders instructions, adds junk code) on each infection, while preserving functionality. Very hard to detect with signatures.
    - **Stealth:** Actively hides modifications from OS/AV by intercepting system calls (e.g., reports original file size when AV scans).

G. Malware Detection Techniques

1. **Signature-Based Detection:**
   How: *Scanners maintain a database of known malware signatures (unique byte sequences or hashes). Files/memory are scanned for matches.*
   Pros: Good detection of *known* threats, relatively fast, low false positives.
   Cons: *Cannot detect* new/unknown* malware (zero-day), requires frequent updates, can be bypassed by polymorphic/metamorphic malware.



2. **Heuristic / Anomaly Detection:**

- **How:** Looks for *suspicious characteristics* or *behavior* rather than exact signatures. Examples: Code containing system-call sequences typical of malware (e.g., disabling AV, encrypting files), program trying to write to boot sector, unusual network traffic patterns, rapid file creation (rabbit).
- **Pros:** Can potentially detect *unknown* malware (zero-days) and polymorphic/metamorphic variants.
- **Cons:** Prone to **false positives** (flagging legitimate software as malicious), complex to tune, malware can try to mimic normal behavior.

3. **Integrity Checking / Change Detection:**
    - **How:** Computes cryptographic hashes (checksums) of critical system files or program files when known-good. Periodically re-computes hashes and compares. If hashes differ, indicates unauthorized modification (potential malware infection).
    - **Pros:** Can detect modifications caused by unknown malware, low false negatives (if a file changed, it *changed*).
    - **Cons:** Doesn't identify *what* the malware is, only that a change occurred. Frequent false positives due to legitimate software updates/patches. High administrative burden to manage baseline and investigate alerts.
4. **Behavioral Blocking / Sandboxing:**
    - **How:** Executes suspicious programs in an isolated environment (sandbox) to observe their actions. If malicious behavior is detected (e.g., attempting to modify critical system files, encrypt user data, connect to known C&C servers), the action is blocked or the program terminated. Can also monitor system-wide behavior patterns.
    - **Pros:** Can block actions of unknown malware based on harmful behavior.
    - **Cons:** Performance overhead, malware can detect sandboxes and alter behavior, complex behaviors might be hard to classify definitively.

VII. Countermeasures & Secure Development

A. User-Level Countermeasures

- Use reputable **Antivirus/Anti-Malware** software and keep it updated.
- Keep **OS and applications patched** promptly.
- Use **firewalls** (host-based and network).
- Be **skeptical** of email attachments, links, downloads - verify sources.
- **Disable autorun** features for USB/external media.

- Use **strong, unique passwords** and **Multi-Factor Authentication (MFA)**.
- **Regular backups** (offline/offsite) are crucial for recovery (esp. from ransomware).
- Use **standard user accounts** for daily tasks, not administrator accounts.
- Be cautious on public Wi-Fi.

B. Secure Software Development Practices

- **Adopt Secure Design Principles:** (Saltzer & Schroeder's Principles)
    - **Least Privilege:** Processes/users operate with minimum necessary permissions.
    - **Economy of Mechanism:** Keep security mechanisms simple and small (easier to verify).
    - **Open Design:** Security should not depend on the secrecy of its design/implementation (no security by obscurity).
    - **Complete Mediation:** Every access attempt must be checked against an access control mechanism.
    - **Fail-Safe Defaults:** Default action is to deny access; grant permission explicitly.
    - **Separation of Privilege:** Require multiple conditions/keys to grant access (e.g., two-person control).
    - **Least Common Mechanism:** Minimize shared resources/mechanisms that could be channels for compromise.
    - **Psychological Acceptability (Ease of Use):** Security should not be overly burdensome or complex for users.
- **Information Hiding / Encapsulation:** Modules hide internal implementation details.
- **Modularity:** Decompose system into independent, cohesive modules with low coupling. Limits impact of compromise in one module.
- **Mutual Suspicion:** Assume interfaces/data from other modules might be untrustworthy; validate inputs.
- **Confinement:** Limit the resources/permissions available to potentially risky components.
- **Genetic Diversity:** Avoid monocultures (e.g., everyone using the exact same OS version). Makes widespread exploitation harder. (More of an operational countermeasure).
- **Secure Coding Techniques:** (As discussed in Buffer Overflow defenses)
    - Input Validation (type, length, range, format).
    - Use safe APIs / functions.
    - Handle errors securely (don't leak sensitive info).
    - Correctly manage memory (avoid leaks, use-after-free, overflows).
- **Rigorous Testing:**

    - **Static Analysis Security Testing (SAST):** Analyze source code for known vulnerability patterns without running it.
    - **Dynamic Analysis Security Testing (DAST):** Test running application by sending malicious inputs/probes.
    - **Fuzzing:** Send large amounts of random/malformed data to inputs to find crashes/hangs/overflows.
    - **Penetration Testing:** Simulate real-world attacks.
    - **Code Reviews:** Manual inspection of code for security flaws.
- **Threat Modeling:** Proactively identify potential threats and vulnerabilities during the design phase.

C. Ineffective Countermeasures

- **Security by Obscurity:** Relying on secrecy of design/implementation - invariably discovered.
- **Penetrate-and-Patch:** Reactive approach; fixing bugs as found without addressing underlying design flaws or processes. Often misses systemic issues.

VIII. Lecture Summary & Key Takeaways

- **Buffer Overflows** remain a significant threat, especially in C/C++ code, stemming from writing past allocated memory boundaries, often targeting the stack's return address to hijack execution.
- Understanding **memory layout** (Stack, Heap, Data, Code) is crucial for predicting overflow impact.
- **Stack Smashing** involves overflowing a local buffer to overwrite the return address with a pointer to attacker-supplied **shellcode**, often preceded by a **NOP sled**.
- **Defenses** include compile-time measures (safe languages, safe functions, canaries) and run-time measures (NX/DEP, ASLR, Guard Pages).
- Many other vulnerabilities exist, including **Integer Overflows**, **TOCTTOU/Race Conditions**, **Incomplete Mediation**, and **Off-by-One errors**. Robust **input validation** is critical.
- **Malware** encompasses diverse threats (Viruses, Worms, Trojans, RATs, Ransomware) with various propagation and payload mechanisms.
- **Malware detection** uses signatures, heuristics, integrity checks, and behavioral analysis, each with pros and cons.
- **Secure software development practices** and adherence to core **security design principles** are essential for building resilient software. Relying on obscurity or

reactive patching is insufficient.

IX. Glossary of New Terms

- **Buffer Overflow:** Writing data beyond the allocated bounds of a buffer.
- **Shellcode:** Malicious payload code, often injected via buffer overflow, typically designed to launch a command shell.
- **Stack:** Memory region used for function calls (LIFO), stores local variables, parameters, return addresses.
- **Stack Frame:** Section of the stack associated with a single function call.
- **Return Address:** Memory address stored on the stack indicating where execution should resume after a function returns.
- **Heap:** Memory region for dynamic allocation (`malloc` , `new`).
- **Privilege Escalation:** Gaining higher access rights than initially authorized.
- **Denial of Service (DoS):** Making a system or service unavailable.
- **NOP Sled:** Sequence of No-Operation instructions used in exploits to reliably transfer execution to shellcode.
- **Return-Oriented Programming (ROP):** Exploit technique using existing code snippets ("gadgets") instead of injecting shellcode.
- **Unsafe C Functions:** e.g., `gets` , `strcpy` , `strcat` , `sprintf` , `scanf("%s")` . Lack bounds checking.
- **Compile-Time Defense:** Security measure applied during compilation (e.g., canaries, safe language).
- **Run-Time Defense:** Security measure applied while program executes (e.g., ASLR, DEP).
- **Stack Canary / Security Cookie:** Secret value placed on stack to detect overflows before function return.
- **NX Bit / DEP (Data Execution Prevention):** Hardware/OS feature marking memory (like stack/heap) as non-executable.
- **ASLR (Address Space Layout Randomization):** Randomizing memory locations (stack, heap, libraries) on each run.
- **Guard Pages:** Invalid memory pages placed between critical regions to detect overflows.
- **Incomplete Mediation:** Failure to properly validate input before use.
- **TOCTTOU (Time-of-Check to Time-of-Use):** Race condition where state changes between a security check and the use of the resource.

- **Race Condition:** Vulnerability where outcome depends on unpredictable timing of concurrent operations.
- **Integer Overflow/Underflow:** Arithmetic result exceeds storage capacity of integer type.
- **Malware:** Malicious Software (Virus, Worm, Trojan, etc.).
- **Virus:** Self-replicating malware needing a host program/file.
- **Worm:** Self-replicating malware spreading independently across networks.
- **Trojan Horse:** Malware disguised as legitimate software.
- **Rootkit:** Malware designed to hide its presence.
- **Botnet:** Network of compromised computers under attacker control.
- **Signature (Malware):** Unique pattern identifying known malware.
- **Heuristics (Malware Detection):** Detecting suspicious characteristics/behavior.
- **Least Privilege:** Principle of granting only necessary permissions.

X. Potential Exam Questions

1. Define buffer overflow. Explain how a stack buffer overflow can lead to arbitrary code execution, mentioning the role of the return address and shellcode.
2. Compare and contrast Compile-Time defenses (give 2 examples) and Run-Time defenses (give 2 examples) against buffer overflows. Which type is better suited for protecting legacy software and why?
3. What is ASLR and how does it mitigate buffer overflow exploits? Can it be bypassed?
4. What is a NOP Sled and why do attackers use it?
5. Explain the TOCTTOU vulnerability using a file system example. What is the fundamental problem that allows this?
6. List 4 unsafe C library functions and suggest a safer alternative for each.
7. Define Virus, Worm, and Trojan Horse. What are the key differences in how they operate and propagate?
8. Describe the difference between Signature-based malware detection and Heuristic/Anomaly-based detection. What are the main advantages and disadvantages of each?
9. What is Integer Overflow and how can it become a security vulnerability?
10. Explain the principle of "Least Privilege" in the context of software security.

XI. Thought-Provoking Questions & Connections

- Why were languages like C/C++ designed without mandatory bounds checking, given the risks? (Connection: Performance vs. Safety tradeoffs in language design).
- How effective is ASLR on 32-bit systems compared to 64-bit systems? Why? (Connection: Address space size, entropy).
- Could a buffer overflow vulnerability exist in a memory-safe language like Java or Python? If so, where might it occur (e.g., in native code libraries they call)?
- How does the rise of IoT devices, often running C/C++ based firmware with limited resources for defenses like ASLR/DEP, impact the landscape of buffer overflow attacks?
- If DEP prevents executing shellcode on the stack, why is Return-Oriented Programming (ROP) still an effective technique?
- How might machine learning be applied to anomaly-based malware detection? What challenges would it face?

XII. Further Research & Clarification Flags

- `[Clarification Needed]` The specific implementation details of Microsoft's `/GS` handler check and potential bypasses could be explored further.
- `[Further Research Recommended]` Investigate modern ROP techniques and countermeasures like Control-Flow Integrity (CFI).
- `[Further Research Recommended]` Explore Heap Spraying techniques used in conjunction with heap overflows.
- `[Further Research Recommended]` Look into specific historical malware examples mentioned (e.g., Morris Worm, Stuxnet, WannaCry) to see which vulnerabilities they exploited.
- `[Clarification Needed]` The lecture mentioned "Trudy's Challenges" - confirm if "Trudy" is a standard persona used in the course or just an illustrative name.

XIII. Memory Aids (Mnemonics)

- **Unsafe C Functions:** "**G**ood **S**tudents **S**eldom **S**peak **S**loppily" (`gets` , `strcpy` , `strcat` , `sprintf` , `scanf(%s)`)
- **Defense Categories:** "**C**ats **R**un" (Compile-time, Run-time)
- **Stack Overflow Targets:** "**L**ocal **V**ars, **S**aved **F**rame **P**ointer, **R**eturn **A**ddress" (Order they typically appear on stack relative to buffer)
- **Malware Types (Basic):** "**V**ery **W**ily **T**hreats" (Virus, Worm, Trojan)

XIV. Potential Real-World Examples & Applications

- **Heartbleed (2014):** Not a classic buffer overflow, but related input handling failure (incomplete mediation) in OpenSSL, leaking memory.
- **Morris Worm (1988):** Exploited a `gets()` buffer overflow in `fingerd`.
- **Code Red / Nimda (2001):** Worms exploiting buffer overflows in Microsoft IIS web server.
- **Slammer Worm (2003):** Exploited buffer overflow in Microsoft SQL Server.
- **Stagefright (Android):** Vulnerabilities in media processing libraries, including buffer overflows, exploitable via MMS.
- **EternalBlue:** Exploit (used by WannaCry ransomware) targeting SMB vulnerability in Windows (related to buffer handling).

XV. Suggested Additional Resources

- **Books:** "Hacking: The Art of Exploitation" by Jon Erickson; "The Shellcoder's Handbook" by Chris Anley et al.
- **Websites:** OWASP (Open Web Application Security Project), MITRE ATT&CK Framework (for attacker techniques), NIST Cybersecurity Framework.
- **Videos:** Computerphile channel on YouTube has excellent explanations of buffer overflows, ASLR, etc. LiveOverflow channel often demonstrates exploit techniques.
- **Tools:** Explore using `gdb` (GNU Debugger) to step through the example C code and observe the stack. Try out basic static analysis tools (like linters or specific SAST tools if available).

XVI. Cybersecurity Search Tools (From List)

- *This section seems like a separate list provided for reference, potentially useful for Open Source Intelligence (OSINT) or threat research, but not directly tied to explaining buffer overflows themselves. It's good context for broader cybersecurity.*
- **Summary:** The list provides ~30 online tools for security research, covering areas like leaked credentials (Dehashed), DNS data (SecurityTrails), exploit archives (ExploitDB), device scanning (Shodan, Censys, ZoomEye), threat intelligence (AlienVault, Pulsedive), code searching (Grep App, SearchCode), and vulnerability databases (Vulners).

- **Connection:** Tools like ExploitDB, Vulners, Packet Storm Security directly relate as they archive known vulnerabilities, including buffer overflows and their exploits. Tools like Shodan could find potentially vulnerable devices running outdated services.

XVII. Mind Map / Concept Diagram (Text-Based)

```
Software Security Vulnerabilities
|
+-- Buffer Overflows
|   |
|   +-- Definition (Write past bounds)
|   +-- Causes (C/C++, No Bounds Check, Unsafe Functions)
|   +-- Memory Locations
|   |   +-- Stack (⟶ Return Address Hijack)
|   |   +-- Heap (⟶ Metadata/Data Corruption)
|   |   +-- Global Data
|   |   +-- Code Segment
|   +-- Stack Mechanics (LIFO, Frames, Return Addr)
|   +-- Stack Smashing Attack
|   |   +-- Overwrite Return Address
|   |   +-- Shellcode (Payload)
|   |   +-- NOP Sled (Reliability)
|   |   +-- ROP (Bypass NX)
|   +-- Harm (Privilege Escalation, DoS, Data Corruption)
|   +-- Defenses
|       +-- Compile-Time (Safe Lang, Safe Func, Canaries)
|       +-- Run-Time (ASLR, DEP/NX, Guard Pages)
|
+-- Other Code Vulns
|   |
|   +-- Input Handling (Size, Interpretation - Heartbleed)
|   +-- Incomplete Mediation (Client vs Server Validation)
|   +-- TOCTTOU / Race Conditions (Check vs Use Gap)
|   +-- Undocumented Access / Backdoors
|   +-- Off-by-One Errors
|   +-- Integer Overflows/Underflows
|   +-- Unterminated Strings
|   +-- Parameter Handling
|
+-- Malware
    |
    +-- Core Types (Virus, Worm, Trojan)
    +-- Specific Variants (RAT, Rootkit, Ransomware, Bot, etc.)
    +-- Harm (Data Theft/Loss, System Control, Resource Drain)
    +-- Propagation (Network, Files, Social Eng.)
    +-- Detection (Signatures, Heuristics, Integrity, Behavior)
    +-- Countermeasures (User Hygiene, Secure Dev)

+-- Secure Development
    |
    +-- Principles (Least Privilege, Open Design, etc.)
    +-- Practices (Input Valid, Safe APIs, Testing, SAST/DAST)
```

Made by Yashank