

Key Distribution

Problem of Symmetric Cryptography Algorithm

Key Distribution

- Symmetric schemes require both parties to share a common/same secret key.
- Issue is how to securely distribute this key.
- So some mechanism is required for secure transmission of key is known as *key distribution*.
- often *secure system fails due to a break* in the key distribution scheme.

Key Management

1. Authentication of the users of the key.
2. Generation of key.
3. Distribution of key.
4. Storage of key.

Key Distribution

- Given parties A and B have various **key distribution** alternatives:
 1. A can select key and *physically deliver* to B.
 2. *Third party* can select & deliver key to A & B.
 3. If A & B have *communicated previously* can use *previous key* to encrypt a new key
 4. If A & B have secure communications with a third party C, C can *relay key* between A & B

Key Distribution

- **Session key:**

- Data encrypted with a one-time session key. At the conclusion of the session the key is destroyed.

- **Permanent key:**

- Used between entities for the purpose of *distributing session keys*.

Automatic Key Distribution

- Session Key
 - Used for duration of one logical connection
 - Destroyed at end of session
 - Used for user data
- Permanent key
 - Used for distribution of keys
- Key distribution center
 - Determines which systems may communicate
 - Provides one session key for that connection
- Front end processor
 - Performs end to end encryption
 - Obtains keys for host

1. Host sends packet requesting connection
2. Front end buffers packet; asks KDC for session key
3. KDC distributes session key to both front ends
4. Buffered packet transmitted

FEP = front end processor
KDC = key distribution center




Figure 2.10 Automatic Key Distribution for Connection-Oriented Protocol

Key Distribution in Public key Crypto

● Following are the 4 ways

1. Public Announcement
2. Publicly available directory
3. Public key Authority
4. Public key Certificate

1. Public Announcement

- Broadcasted by the owner of the key.
- Limitation:=
 - I. Forge key
 - II. Misuse it
 - III. No Control on accessing of the key

2. Publicly Available Directory

- Directory of Keys is maintained by third party
- Directory is Password protected
- Only Registered User can access it

Name	Public Key
A	115
B	215

- **Hacking:=**

- I. Password of the Directory being steal

3. Public Key Authority(PKA)

- Public key of the user can only be accessed by decrypting reply message of PKA.
- Private key of PKA used for encryption purpose & vice-versa.
- Limitation:=
 - I. Reuse of public key by either party in future.
 - II. System slow down due too overhead.

- T1 & T2 – time of request
- N1 & N2 – random number called as nonce.
- ID_A – network address of Initiator A for communication
- Step 7- Initiator A confirm the Request by replying back.





Figure 14.11 Public-Key Distribution Scenario

3. Public Key Certificate(PKC)

- Suggested by Kohnfelder.
- Initiator sends name & his public key.
- Public keys are exchanged by means of certificates.
- Private key of PKC used for encryption purpose & vice-versa.
- Certificate contains information such as *time of the request, network address & public key* of the user who made the request.

PKC Overview



Key Distribution Issues

- Hierarchies of KDC's *required for large networks*, but must *trust* each other
- Session key lifetimes should be limited for greater security
- Use of automatic key distribution on behalf of users, but must trust system
- Use of decentralized key distribution
- Controlling purposes keys are used for

Summary

- have considered:
 - use of symmetric encryption to protect confidentiality
 - need for good key distribution
 - use of trusted third party KDC's




Figure 2.9 Encryption Across a Packet-Switching Network

Recommended Reading

- Stallings, W. *Cryptography and Network Security: Principles and Practice*, 2nd edition. Prentice Hall, 1999
- Schneier, B. *Applied Cryptography*, New York: Wiley, 1996
- Mel, H.X. Baker, D. *Cryptography Decrypted*. Addison Wesley, 2001