Uncorrectable Samplable Errors with Low Entropy

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Abstract

We study the correctability of efficiently samplable errors. Specifically, we consider the setting in which errors are efficiently samplable without the knowledge of the code and the transmitted codeword, but the error rate is not bounded. We strengthen the previous impossibility result, and show that there is an oracle relative to which there exists a samplable distribution of entropy $\omega(\log n)$ that is not correctable by efficient coding schemes of rate $\omega(\log n/n)$. We also show that the existence of one-way functions is necessary to derive the impossibility results.

1 Introduction

The theory of error-correcting codes studies the ways of achieving reliable communication over noisy channels. Two of the most studied channel models are probabilistic channels and worst-case channels. In probabilistic channels, errors are considered to be introduced through stochastic processes. A well-studied example is the binary symmetric channel (BSC), in which each bit is independently flipped with some probability p < 1/2. In worst-case (or adversarial) channels, errors are introduced adversarially by considering the choice of codes and transmitted codewords under the restriction of the error rate.

In his seminal work [12], Shannon showed that reliable communication can be achieved over BSC if the coding rate is less than $1 - H_2(p)$, where $H_2(\cdot)$ is the binary entropy function and p is the crossover probability of BSC. In contrast, it is known that reliable communication cannot be achieved over worst-case channels when the error rate is at least 1/4 unless the coding rate tends to zero [11].

As intermediate channels between these two channels, Lipton [9] introduced computationally-bounded channels, where errors are introduced by polynomial-time computation. He showed that reliable communication can be achieved at the coding rate less than $1 - H_2(p)$ in the shared randomness setting, where p < 1 is the error rate. Micali et al. [10] present reliable coding schemes in the public-key infrastructure setting. Guruswami and Smith [7] showed reliable coding schemes without assuming the shared randomness or the public-key infrastructure. Note that these

work [9, 10, 7] consider the settings in which channels are computationally-bounded and the error rate is bounded.

In this work, we focus on computationally-bounded channels with *unbounded* error rate. We do not assume the shared randomness or the public-key infrastructure. The error-correction problem in such a setting was studied in [17]. The paper [17] showed several results on the correctability in *samplable-additive channels*, where errors are sampled by polynomial-time computation without the knowledge of transmitted codewords. Samplable-additive channels are relatively simple channel models since error distributions of these channels are identical for every coding scheme and transmitted codeword. BSC is an example of samplable-additive channels. Studying the correctability of samplable-additive channels can reveal what computational structure of errors can help to achieve error correction.

As a positive result, it is shown in [17] that if the error vectors form a linear subspace, there is an explicit optimal-rate coding scheme that corrects these errors. A negative result of [17] is that it seems difficult to correct errors only by their samplability even when the entropy of errors is logarithmically small. Specifically, it is shown that there is an oracle relative to which there exists a samplable distribution Z with Shannon entropy $H(Z) = \omega(\log n)$ that is not correctable by coding schemes of rate $\omega(\log n/n)$ that employ efficient syndrome decoding. This result implies the impossibility of correcting every samplable errors with low entropy by a black-box way. However, this implication is quite restrictive since the syndrome decoding can be employed only for linear codes, and there are many efficient decoding algorithms other than syndrome decoding in the coding theory literature. Furthermore, the general syndrome-decoding problem is known to be NP-hard [2].

1.1 Our Contributions

Uncorrectable Errors with Low Entropy. In this work, we strengthen the negative result of [17]. We show that there is an oracle relative to which there exists a samplable distribution Z with $H(Z) = \omega(\log n)$ that is not correctable by efficient coding schemes of rate $\omega(\log n/n)$. Namely, we could remove the restriction of syndrome decoding. To derive this result, we use the technique of Wee [16], which is based on the reconstruction paradigm of Gennaro and Trevisan [5]. Wee [16] showed that there is an oracle relative to which there is a samplable distribution of entropy $\omega(\log n)$ that cannot be compressed to length less than $n - \omega(\log n)$ by efficient compression. We use his technique for the problem of error correction. Specifically, we show that if a samplable distribution with a sampler S is efficiently correctable, then the function of S has a short description, and thus efficient coding schemes cannot correct every samplable distribution.

Necessity of One-Way Functions. It is observed in [17] that if an error distribution is pseudorandom, it is impossible to correct errors by efficient coding schemes. This negative result implies that, assuming the existence of one-way functions, there is a samplable distribution of entropy n^{ϵ} for any $0 < \epsilon < 1$ that is not correctable by polynomial time. It remained open to prove this result without assuming the

existence of one-way functions. We show that the existence of one-way functions is necessary to derive impossibility results. Specifically, we show that if one-way functions do not exist, then any samplable distribution of entropy m is correctable by an efficient coding scheme of rate $1 - m/n - O(\log n/n)$.

1.2 Related Work

The notion of computationally-bounded channel was introduced by Lipton [9]. He showed that the Shannon capacity can be achieved in the shared randomness setting. Micali et al. [10] considered a similar channel model in a public-key setting. Guruswami and Smith [7] gave constructions of optimal-rate codes for worst-case additive channels and time/space-bounded channels. In their setting, the error rate is bounded by some constant p < 1. They also gave impossibility results of unique decoding when $p \ge 1/4$, but their results can be applied to channels that use the information on the code and the transmitted codeword. In this work, we give an impossibility result even for channels that do no use such information.

Samplable distributions have been also studied in the context of data compression [6, 14, 16], randomness extractor [13, 15, 3], and randomness condenser [4].

2 Preliminaries

For a distribution X, we write $x \sim X$ to indicate that x is chosen according to X. We may use X also as a random variable distributed according to X. The *support* of X is $\text{Supp}(X) = \{x : \Pr_X(x) \neq 0\}$, where $\Pr_X(x)$ is the probability that X assigns to x. The *Shannon entropy* of X is $H(X) = E_{x \sim X}[-\log \Pr_X(x)]$. A *flat distribution* is a distribution that is uniform over its support. For $n \in \mathbb{N}$, we write U_n as the uniform distribution over $\{0,1\}^n$.

We define the notion of additive-error correcting codes.

Definition 1. For two functions $\mathsf{Enc} : \mathbb{F}^k \to \mathbb{F}^n$ and $\mathsf{Dec} : \mathbb{F}^n \to \mathbb{F}^k$, and a distribution Z over \mathbb{F}^n , where \mathbb{F} is a finite field, we say $(\mathsf{Enc}, \mathsf{Dec})$ corrects (additive error) Z with error ϵ if for any $x \in \mathbb{F}^k$, we have that $\Pr_{z \sim Z_n}[\mathsf{Dec}(\mathsf{Enc}(x) + z) \neq x] \leq \epsilon$. The rate of $(\mathsf{Enc}, \mathsf{Dec})$ is k/n.

Definition 2. A distribution Z is said to be correctable with rate R and error ϵ if there is a pair of functions (Enc, Dec) of rate R that corrects Z with error ϵ .

We call a pair (Enc, Dec) a coding scheme or simply code. The coding scheme is called efficient if Enc and Dec can be computed in polynomial-time in n. The code is called linear if Enc is a linear mapping, that is, for any $x, y \in \mathbb{F}^n$ and $a, b \in \mathbb{F}$, $\operatorname{Enc}(ax + by) = a\operatorname{Enc}(x) + b\operatorname{Enc}(y)$. If $|\mathbb{F}| = 2$, we may use $\{0, 1\}$ instead of \mathbb{F} .

Next, we define syndrome decoding for linear codes.

Definition 3. For a linear code (Enc, Dec), Dec is said to be a syndrome decoding if there is a function Rec such that $Dec(y) = (y - Rec(y \cdot H^{\perp})) \cdot G^{-1}$, where $G \in \mathbb{F}^{Rn \times n}$ satisfies that $Enc(x) = x \cdot G$ for $x \in \mathbb{F}^{Rn}$, and $H \in \mathbb{F}^{n \times Rn}$ is a dual matrix for G (i.e., $GH^{\perp} = 0$).

Finally, we introduce the notion of samplable distributions.

Definition 4. A distribution family $Z = \{Z_n\}_{n \in \mathbb{N}}$ is said to be samplable if there is a probabilistic polynomial-time algorithm S such that $S(1^n)$ is distributed according to Z_n for every $n \in \mathbb{N}$.

3 Uncorrectable Errors with Low Entropy

We show that there is an oracle relative to which there exists a samplable distribution Z with $H(Z) = \omega(\log n)$ that is not correctable with rate $\omega(\log n/n)$ by efficient coding schemes.

Let $N = 2^n, K = 2^k, M = 2^m$. Let \mathcal{F} be the set of injective functions $f : \{0,1\}^m \to \{0,1\}^n$. For each $f \in \mathcal{F}$, define an oracle \mathcal{O}_f such that

$$\mathcal{O}_f(b,y) = \begin{cases} \mathcal{O}_f^S(y) & \text{if } b = 0 \\ \mathcal{O}_f^M(y) & \text{if } b = 1 \end{cases}, \quad \mathcal{O}_f^M(y) = \begin{cases} 1 & \text{if } y \in f(\{0,1\}^m) \\ 0 & \text{if } y \notin f(\{0,1\}^m) \end{cases}, \quad \mathcal{O}_f^S(y) = f(y).$$

Let correct be the set of functions $f \in \mathcal{F}$ for which there exist oracle circuits (Enc, Dec) that make q queries to oracle \mathcal{O}_f and correct $f(U_m)$ with rate k/n. For each $f \in \mathcal{F}$ and the corresponding (Enc, Dec), we define

$$\begin{aligned} \mathsf{invert}_f &= \{y \in \{0,1\}^m : \mathsf{for some} \ x \in \{0,1\}^k, \, \mathsf{on input} \ \mathsf{Enc}(x) + f(y), \\ \mathsf{Dec queries} \ \mathcal{O}_f^S \ \mathsf{on} \ y\}, \\ \mathsf{forge}_f &= \{y \in \{0,1\}^m : \mathsf{for any} \ x \in \{0,1\}^k, \, \mathsf{on input} \ \mathsf{Enc}(x) + f(y), \\ \mathsf{Dec does not query} \ \mathcal{O}_f^S \ \mathsf{on} \ y\}. \end{aligned}$$

Note that invert_f and forge_f is a partition of $\{0,1\}^m$. We also define

$$\begin{split} & \text{invertible} = \{f \in \text{correctf}: |\text{invert}_f| > \epsilon \cdot 2^m\}, \\ & \text{forgeable} = \{f \in \text{correctf}: |\text{forge}_f| \geq \delta \cdot 2^m\}, \end{split}$$

where ϵ and δ are any constants satisfying $\epsilon + \delta = 1$. Note that correctf = invertible \cup forgeable.

Intuitively, if f is in invertible, then there is a small circuit that inverts f. This is done by computing $\operatorname{Enc}(x) + f(y)$ and monitoring oracle queries that $\operatorname{Dec}(\operatorname{Enc}(x) + f(y))$ makes to \mathcal{O}_f^S . Since a random function is one-way with high probability, we can show that the size of invertible functions, i.e., invertible, is small. Similarly, if f is in forgeable, then Dec corrects f(y) without querying \mathcal{O}_f^S on y. This means that f has little uncertainty, and thus the size of forgeable is small.

To argue the above intuition formally, we use the reconstruction paradigm of [5]. Then, we show that both invertible and forgeable are small.

First, we show that $f \in \text{invertible has a short description.}$

Lemma 1. Take any $f \in$ invertible and the corresponding oracle circuit (Enc, Dec) that makes q queries to \mathcal{O}_f and corrects $f(U_m)$ with rate k/n. Then f can be described using at most

$$\log \binom{N}{c} + \log \binom{M}{c} + \log \left(\binom{N-c}{M-c} (M-c)! \right)$$

bits, given (Enc, Dec), where $c = \epsilon M/(qK)$.

Proof. First, we show that if (Enc, Dec) satisfies that $|\text{invert}_f| > \epsilon 2^m$, then there exists an oracle circuit A that makes at most $q' = q2^k$ queries to \mathcal{O}_f and satisfies that

$$\Pr_{y \in U_m}[A^{\mathcal{O}_f}(f(y)) = y] > \epsilon.$$

Consider the following A that on input $z \in \{0,1\}^n$,

- 1. Set $X = \{0, 1\}^n$.
- 2. If $X = \emptyset$, output 0. Otherwise, choose any $x \in X$, remove x from X, and compute $w = \operatorname{Enc}(x) + z$.
- 3. Simulate Dec on input w, and monitor the queries Dec makes to \mathcal{O}_f^S . If Dec queries \mathcal{O}_f^S on y for which the answer is z, then output y. If the simulation is completed without such queries, return to Step 2.

It is not difficult to see that for any $y \in \mathsf{invert}_f$, on input f(y), A outputs y, and that A makes at most $q2^k$ queries to \mathcal{O}_f .

Next, we show that for any $f \in \text{invertible}$, f has a short description given A. Without loss of generality, we assume that A makes distinct queries to \mathcal{O}_f^S . We also assume that on input f(y), A always queries \mathcal{O}_f^S on y before it outputs y. We will show that there is a subset $T \subseteq f(\text{invert}_f)$ such that f can be described given T, A(T), $f|_{\{0,1\}^m\setminus A(T)}$, where $A(T) = \{y \in \{0,1\}^m : y \leftarrow A(z), z \in T\}$.

We describe how to construct T below.

Construct-T:

- 1. Initially, T is empty, and all elements in $T^* = f(\mathsf{invert}_f)$ are candidates for inclusion in T.
- 2. Choose the lexicographically smallest z from T^* , put z in T, and remove z from T^* .
- 3. Simulate A on input z, and halt the simulation immediately after A queries \mathcal{O}_f^S on y. Let y_1', \ldots, y_p' be the queries that A makes to \mathcal{O}_f^S , where $y_p' = y$ and $p \leq q'$.
 - Remove $f(y'_1), \ldots, f(y'_{p-1})$ from T^* . (This means that these elements will never belong to T, and in simulating A(z) in the recovering phase, the answers to these queries are made by using the look-up table for f.)
 - Continue to remove the lexicographically smallest z from T^* until we have removed exactly q'-1 elements in Step 3.

4. Return to Step 2.

Next, we describe how to reconstruct f from T, A(T), and $f|_{\{0,1\}^m\setminus A(T)}$. We show how to recover the look-up table for f on values in A(T).

RECOVER-f:

- 1. Choose the lexicographically smallest element $z \in T$, and remove it from T.
- 2. Simulate A on input z, and halt the simulation immediately after A queries \mathcal{O}_f^S on y for which the answer does not exist in the look-up table for f. Since the query y satisfies that $y = f^{-1}(z)$, add the entry (y, z) to the look-up table. In what follows, we explain why we can correctly simulate A(z).
 - Since A(T) and $f|_{\{0,1\}^m\setminus A(T)}$ are given, we can answer all queries to O_f^M .
 - For any query y' to O_f^S , it must be either (1) $y' \notin A(T)$, or (2) y' is the output of A on input z' such that $z' \in W$ and z' is lexicographically smaller than z. In either case, the look-up table has the corresponding entry, and thus we can answer the query.

3. Return to Step 1.

In each iteration in Construct-T, we add one element to T and remove exactly q' element from T^* . Since initially the size of $T^* = f(\mathsf{invert}_f)$ is ϵM , the size of T in the end is $c = \epsilon M/q' = \epsilon M/(qK)$.

The sets T and A(T), and the look-up table for $f|_{\{0,1\}^m\setminus A(T)}$ can be described using $\binom{N}{c}$, $\log\binom{M}{c}$, and $\log(\binom{N-c}{M-c}(M-c)!)$, respectively. Therefore, the statement follows.

We show that the fraction of $f \in \mathcal{F}$ for which $f \in \text{invertible}$ and $f(U_m)$ is correctable is small.

Lemma 2. Let (Enc, Dec) be oracle circuits of size s. If $m > 2k + 4 \log s + O(1)$, then the fraction of functions $f \in \mathcal{F}$ such that $f \in \text{invertible}$ and (Enc, Dec) corrects $f(U_m)$ is less than $2^{-(sn \log s + s^3)}$ for all sufficiently large n.

Proof. It follows from Lemma 1 that, given (Enc, Dec), the fraction is

$$\frac{|\mathsf{invertible}|}{\binom{N}{M}M!} \le \frac{\binom{N}{c}\binom{M}{c}\binom{M-c}{M-c}(M-c)!}{\binom{N}{M}M!} = \frac{\binom{M}{c}}{c!},$$

where $c = \epsilon M/(qK)$. By using the fact that $q \leq s$ and the inequalities $\binom{n}{k} < \left(\frac{en}{k}\right)^k$ and $n! > \left(\frac{n}{\epsilon}\right)^n$, the expression is upper bounded by

$$\left(\frac{eM}{c}\right)^c \left(\frac{e}{c}\right)^c = \left(\frac{e^2 q^2 K^2}{\epsilon^2 M}\right)^{\epsilon M/qK} < \left(\frac{1}{2}\right)^{ns \log s + s^3}$$

for all sufficiently large n.

Next, we show that forgeable has a short description.

Lemma 3. Take any $f \in$ forgeable and the corresponding oracle circuit (Enc, Dec) that makes q queries to \mathcal{O}_f and corrects $f(U_m)$ with rate k/n. Then f can be described using at most

$$\log \binom{M}{d} + \log \left(\binom{N-d}{M-d} (M-d)! \right) + d(2k + \log q)$$

bits, given (Enc, Dec), where $d = \delta M/q$.

Proof. Without loss of generality, we assume that Dec makes distinct queries to \mathcal{O}_f^S and \mathcal{O}_f^M . Note that for any $y \in \mathsf{forge}_f$ and $x \in \{0,1\}^k$, on input $\mathsf{Enc}(x) + f(y)$, Dec does not query \mathcal{O}_f^S on y. We also assume that for $y \in \mathsf{forge}_f$, on input $\mathsf{Enc}(x) + f(y)$, Dec always queries \mathcal{O}_f^M on f(y) before it outputs x.

We will show that there are subsets $Y \subseteq \mathsf{forge}_f$ such that f can be described given Y, $f|_{\{0,1\}^m \setminus Y}$, and $\{(x_y, a_y, b_y) \in \{0,1\}^k \times [K] \times [q] : y \in Y\}$ of a set of advice strings.

For $x \in \{0,1\}^k$, we define $D(x) = \{w \in \{0,1\}^n : \mathsf{Dec}(w) = x\}$ and $D_f(x) = \{w \in \mathsf{Enc}(x) + f(\mathsf{forge}_f) : \mathsf{Dec}(w) = x\}$.

We describe how to construct Y below.

Construct-Y:

- 1. Initially, Y is empty. All elements in $Y^* = \mathsf{forge}_f$ are candidates for inclusion in Y. For every $x \in \{0,1\}^k$, set $D_x = D_f(x)$. We write $\mathcal{D}_k = \bigcup_{x \in \{0,1\}^k} D_x$.
- 2. Choose the lexicographically smallest y from Y^* , put y in Y, and remove y from Y^* .
- 3. Choose the lexicographically smallest $w = \operatorname{Enc}(x) + f(y)$ from \mathcal{D}_k , set $x_y = x$, and for every $x' \in \{0,1\}^k$, remove $\operatorname{Enc}(x') + f(y)$ from $D_{x'}$. (This removal means that hereafter there are no elements in \mathcal{D}_k for which Dec outputs some x such that f(y) is the error vector.) When w is the lexicographically t-th smallest element in D(x), set $a_y = t$ (so that we can recognize that the a_y -th element in D(x) is w in the recovering phase).
- 4. Simulate Dec on input w, and halt the simulation immediately after Dec queries \mathcal{O}_f^M on f(y). Let y_1', \ldots, y_p' be the queries that Dec makes to \mathcal{O}_f^S , and $z_1', \ldots, z_r' = f(y)$ be the queries that Dec makes to \mathcal{O}_f^M . Set $b_y = r$ (so that we can recognize that the b_y -th query that Dec makes to \mathcal{O}_f^M is f(y) in the recovering phase).
 - (a) For every $x' \in \{0,1\}^k$, remove $\mathsf{Enc}(x') + f(y_1'), \dots, \mathsf{Enc}(x') + f(y_p')$ from $D_{x'}$.
 - (b) For every $i \in [p]$, if $z'_i \in f(\mathsf{forge}_f)$, then for every $x' \in \{0,1\}^k$, remove $\mathsf{Enc}(x') + z'_i$ from $D_{x'}$, and otherwise, do nothing.
 - (c) Continue to remove the elements $\operatorname{Enc}(x') + f(y)$ from $D_{x'}$ for every $x' \in \{0,1\}^k$ for the lexicographically smallest $w = \operatorname{Enc}(x) + f(y) \in \mathcal{D}_k$ until we have removed exactly (q-1)K elements from \mathcal{D}_k in Step 4.
- 5. Return to Step 2.

Next, we describe how to construct f from Y, $f|_{\{0,1\}^m\setminus Y}$, and $\{(x_y, a_y, b_y) \in \{0,1\}^k \times [K] \times [q] : y \in Y\}$. We show how to recover the look-up table for f on values in Y.

Recover-f:

- 1. Choose the lexicographically smallest $y \in Y$, and remove it from Y. Then, choose the lexicographically a_y -th smallest element w from $D(x_y)$.
- 2. Simulate Dec on input w, and halt the simulation immediately after Dec makes the b_y -th query to \mathcal{O}_f^M . Since the b_y -th query is f(y), add the entry (y, f(y)) to the look-up table.

In what follows, we explain why we can correctly simulate Dec(w).

- For any query y' to \mathcal{O}_f^S , it must be either (1) $y' \notin Y$ or (2) y' is lexicographically smaller than y. In case (1), we can answer the query by using $f|_{\{0,1\}^m\setminus Y}$. In case (2), since y was chosen as the lexicographically smallest element, the look-up table has the answer to the query.
- Consider any of the first $b_y 1$ queries z' to \mathcal{O}_f^M . If $z' \in f(\{0,1\}^m)$, namely z' = f(y') for some y', then it must be either (1) $y' \notin Y$ or (2) y' is lexicographically smaller than y. In either case, the look-up table has the entry (y', z'). If $z' \notin f(\{0,1\}^m)$, there is no entry for z' in the look-up table. Thus, we can answer the query by saying "yes" if z' is in the look-up table, and "no" otherwise.

3. Return to Step 1.

In each iteration in Construct-Y, we add one element to Y and remove exactly qK elements from \mathcal{D}_k . Since initially the size of \mathcal{D}_k is δKM , the size of Y in the end is $d = \delta M/q$.

The set Y, the look-up table for $f|_{\{0,1\}^m\setminus Y}$, the sets $\{(x_y,a_y,b_y)\in\{0,1\}^k\times[K]\times[q]:y\in Y\}$ can be described using $\binom{M}{d}$, $\log(\binom{N-d}{M-d}(M-d)!)$, and $d(2k+\log q)$ bits respectively. Therefore, the statement follows.

We show that the fraction of $f \in \mathcal{F}$ for which $f \in \text{forgeable}$ and $f(U_m)$ is correctable is small.

Lemma 4. Let (Enc, Dec) be oracle circuits of size s. If $k < n/2 - \log s - O(1)$ and $m > k + 4 \log s + O(1)$, then the fraction of functions $f \in \mathcal{F}$ such that $f \in \text{forgeable}$ and (Enc, Dec) corrects $f(U_m)$ is less than $2^{-(sn \log s + s^3)}$ for all sufficiently large n.

Proof. It follows from Lemma 3 that, given (Enc, Dec), the fraction is

$$\frac{|\mathsf{forgeable}|}{\binom{N}{M}M!} \leq \frac{\binom{M}{d}\binom{N-d}{M-d}(M-d)!}{\binom{N}{M}M!} 2^{d(2k+\log q)} = \frac{\binom{M}{d}}{\binom{N}{d}d!} (qK^2)^d,$$

where $d = \delta M/q$. By using the fact that $q \leq s$ and the inequalities $\binom{n}{k} < \left(\frac{en}{k}\right)^k$ and $n! > \left(\frac{n}{e}\right)^n$, the expression is upper bounded by

$$\left(\frac{eM}{d}\right)^d \left(\frac{d}{eN}\right)^d \left(\frac{e}{d}\right)^d (qK^2)^d = \left(\frac{eq^2K^2}{\delta N}\right)^{\delta M/q} < \left(\frac{1}{2}\right)^{ns\log s + s^3}$$

for all sufficiently large n.

We obtain our main result.

Theorem 1. For any $k < n/2 - \log s - O(1)$ and $m > 2k + 4\log s + O(1)$, there exist injective functions $f : \{0,1\}^m \to \{0,1\}^n$ such that, given oracle access to \mathcal{O}_f , (1) $f(U_m)$ is samplable and has entropy m, and (2) $f(U_m)$ cannot be corrected with rate k/n by oracle circuits of size s.

Proof. Since correctf = invertible \cup forgeable, it follows from Lemmas 2 and 4 that for a fixed (Enc, Dec) of size s, the fraction of functions $f \in \mathcal{F}$ such that (Enc, Dec) corrects $f(U_m)$ with rate k/n is less than $2^{-(sn\log s + s^3 - 1)}$. Since there are at most $2^{sn\log s}$ circuits of size s, there are functions $f \in \mathcal{F}$ such that $f(U_m)$ cannot be corrected with rate k/n by oracle circuits of size s. Given oracle access to \mathcal{O}_f , $f(U_m)$ is samplable. Since f is injective, $f(U_m)$ has entropy m.

The following corollary immediately follows.

Corollary 1. For any $k < n/2 - \omega(\log n)$ and $m > 2k + \omega(\log n)$, there exists an oracle relative to which there exists a samplable distribution of entropy m that cannot be corrected with rate k/n by polynomial size circuits.

4 Necessity of One-Way Functions

In this section, we show that if one-way functions do not exist, then any samplable distribution of entropy m is correctable by an efficient coding scheme of rate $1 - m/n - O(\log n/n)$. For this, we use a technique used in the proof of [16, Theorem 6.3] that shows the necessity of one-way functions for separating pseudoentropy and compressibility. We observe that in its proof, a family of linear hash functions is used for giving an efficient compression function. Since a linear compression function is a dual object of a linear code that corrects additive errors, we can use a family of linear hash functions for constructing an efficient decoder.

Definition 5 ([8]). We say a function f is distributionally one-way if it is computable in polynomial time and there exists a constant c > 0 such that for every probabilistic polynomial-time algorithm A, the statistical distance between (x, f(x)) and (A(f(x)), f(x)) is at least $1/n^c$, where $x \sim U_n$.

Theorem 2 ([8]). If there is a distributionally one-way function, then there is a one-way function.

Theorem 3. If one-way functions do not exist, then any samplable flat distribution Z over $\{0,1\}^n$ of entropy m can be corrected with rate $1 - m/n - (c \log n)/n$ and error $O(n^{-c})$ for any constant c > 0 by polynomial-time coding schemes.

Proof. Let $Z = f(U_r)$ for an efficiently computable function f. Consider a family of linear universal hash functions $\mathcal{H} = \{h : \{0,1\}^n \to \{0,1\}^{n+2c\log n}\}$, where the universality means that for any distinct $x, y \in \{0,1\}^n$, $\Pr_{h \in \mathcal{H}}[h(x) = h(y)] \leq$

 $2^{m+2c\log n}$, and the linearity means that for any $x,y\in\{0,1\}^n$ and $a,b\in\{0,1\}$, h(ax+by)=ah(x)+bh(y). For each $h\in\mathcal{H}$, we define $C_h=\{x\in\operatorname{Supp}(Z):\exists y\in\operatorname{Supp}(Z)\text{ s.t. }y\neq x\wedge h(x)=h(y)\}$. Namely, C_h is the set of inputs with collisions under h. By a union bound, it holds that for any $x\in\operatorname{Supp}(Z)$,

$$\Pr_{h \in \mathcal{H}}[\exists y \in \operatorname{Supp}(Z) : y \neq x \land h(y) = h(x)] \le \frac{2^m}{2^{m+2c \log n}} = \frac{1}{n^{2c}}.$$

Thus, $E[|C_h|] \leq 2^m/n^{2c}$. We say $h \in \mathcal{H}$ is good if $|C_h| \leq 2^m/n^c$. By Markov's inequality, we have that $\Pr_{h \in \mathcal{H}}[|C_h| > 2^m/n^c] < 1/n^c$.

Consider the function $g: \{0,1\}^n \times \mathcal{H} \to \mathcal{H} \times \{0,1\}^{m+2\log n}$ given by g(y,h) = (h,h(f(y))). Note that g is polynomial-time computable. By the assumption that one-way functions do not exist, and thus distributionally one-way functions do not exist, there is a polynomial-time algorithm A such that the statistical distance between (y,h,g(y,h)) and (A(g(y,h)),g(y,h)) is at most n^{-c} for any constant c>0, where $y\sim U_r$ and $h\in\mathcal{H}$. Then, it holds that

$$\Pr_{A,y,h}[g(A(g(y,h))) = g(y,h)] \ge 1 - \frac{1}{n^c},$$

where the probability is taken over the coins of $A, y \sim U_r$, and $h \in \mathcal{H}$. Thus, we have that

$$\Pr_{A,y,h}[g(A(g(y,h))) = g(y,h) \land h \text{ is good}] \ge 1 - \frac{2}{n^c}.$$

By fixing the coins of A and $h \in \mathcal{H}$, it holds that there are deterministic algorithm A' and $h_0 \in \mathcal{H}$ such that h_0 is good and

$$\Pr_{y}[g(A'(g(y,h_0))) = g(y,h_0)] \ge 1 - \frac{2}{n^c}.$$

For $y \in \{0,1\}^r$ satisfying $g(A'(g(y,h_0))) = g(y,h_0)$, we write $A'(g(y,h_0)) = (y',h')$, where $A'_1(g(y,h_0)) = y'$ and $A'_2(g(y,h_0)) = h'$. Then, it holds that $h' = h_0$ and $h_0(f(y)) = h_0(f(y'))$. Furthermore, since h_0 is good, $\Pr_y[f(y) \notin C_{h_0}] \ge 1 - 1/n^c$. Let $H_0 \in \{0,1\}^{(m+c\log n)\times n}$ be a matrix such that $xH_0^T = h_0(x)$ for $x \in \{0,1\}^n$. (Such matrices exist since \mathcal{H} is a set of linear hash functions.) Consider a linear coding scheme in which H_0 is employed as the parity check matrix, and A'_1 is employed for recovering errors from syndromes. That is, $\operatorname{Enc}(x) = xG$ for a matrix $G \in \{0,1\}^{(n-m-c\log n)\times n}$ satisfying $GH_0^T = 0$, and $\operatorname{Dec}(y) = (y - f(A'_1(h_0, yH_0^T)))G^{-1}$. Then, for any $x \in \{0,1\}^m$,

$$\begin{split} \Pr_{y \sim U_r}[\mathrm{Dec}(\mathsf{Enc}(x) + f(y)) &= x] = \Pr_{y \sim U_r}[\mathsf{Enc}(x) + f(y) - f(A_1'(h_0, (\mathsf{Enc}(x) + f(y))H_0^T)) = xG] \\ &= \Pr_{y \sim U_r}[f(A_1'(g(y, h_0))) = f(y)], \end{split}$$

where we use the property that $\operatorname{Enc}(x) = xG$, $GH_0^T = 0$, and $xH_0^T = h_0(x)$. Since the probability that $g(A_0(g(y,h_0))) = g(y,h_0)$ is at least $1 - 2/n^c$, and for any $y \in \{0,1\}^r$ satisfying $g(A_0(g(y,h_0))) = g(y,h_0)$, $\operatorname{Pr}_y[f(y) \notin C_{h_0}] \geq 1 - 1/n^c$, we have that

$$\Pr_{y \sim U_r} [f(A_1'(g(y, h_0))) = f(y)] \ge 1 - \frac{3}{n^c}.$$

Hence the statement follows.

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