

# Yaying Zhou

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## EDUCATION

Ph.D., Business, Indiana University, 2023 (expected)

Dissertation: Frictions in Employer-sponsored Health Insurance

Committee: Haizhen Lin (Chair), Daniel Sacks, Kosali Simon, Jeff Prince, Jackson Dorsey

M.A., Economics, Shanghai Jiao Tong University, 2018.

B.A., Economics, Tongji University, 2014.

## RESEARCH INTERESTS

Health Care, Industrial Organization, Applied Econometrics

## WORKING PAPERS

"In Sickness and in Health Insurance: Gender in Household Benefit Plan Choice", Job Market Paper.

"Distributional Effect of Insurer Concentration on Premiums: Evidence from the Employer-Sponsored Health Insurance Market", with Haizhen Lin, revisions requested at *RAND Journal of Economics*.

"Vertical Integration and Market Foreclosure in Media Markets: Evidence from the Chinese Motion Picture Industry", with Ricard Gil, Chun-Yu Ho, and Li Xu, revised and resubmitted to *The Journal of Law and Economics*.

## WORK IN PROGRESS

"Insurer Switching and Broker Incentives in Employer-Sponsored Health Insurance" with Haizhen Lin.

*International Industrial Organization Conference 2020* (cancelled), *American Society of Health Economists Conference 2021*

## HONORS AND AWARDS

Doctoral Student Research Productivity Award	2018 & 2019	Indiana University
Doctoral Research Travel Award	2018	Indiana University

## TEACHING EXPERIENCE

Business, Government, and Society (6.2/7)	Instructor	Summer 2022	Indiana University
Business, Government, and Society (6.1/7)	Instructor	Summer 2020	Indiana University
Business, Government, and Society (6.0/7)	Instructor	Summer 2019	Indiana University
Business Econometrics	TA	Fall 2021/2022	Indiana University
Economics of Healthcare Analytics	TA	Spring 2020	Indiana University

**RESEARCH EXPERIENCE**

RA for Haizhen Lin	Fall 2017-Spring 2021	Indiana University
RA for Jackson Dorsey	Fall 2020-Spring 2021	Indiana University
RA for Andrew Butters	Fall 2018- Spring 2020	Indiana University
RA for Jeff Prince	Fall 2017-Spring 2018	Indiana University

**CONFERENCE PRESENTATIONS**

American Society of Health Economists Annual Conference	2021 & 2022
Southern Economic Association Annual Meeting	2021
Asian Meeting of the Econometric Society	2018

**WORKSHOPS**

Health Economics Research Boot Camp	NBER	2019
Quantitative Marketing and Structural Econometrics	Northwestern University	2019

**REFERENCES****Haizhen Lin**

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Kelley School of Business  
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**Daniel Sacks**

Associate Professor of Risk and Insurance  
Wisconsin School of Business  
University of Wisconsin – Madison  
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**Kosali Simon**

Herman B. Wells Endowed Professor  
O'Neill School of Public and Environmental Affairs  
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**Jeff Prince**

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Kelley School of Business  
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Department of Economics  
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**ABSTRACTS****"In Sickness and in Health Insurance: Gender in Household Benefit Plan Choice"**  
(Job Market Paper)

In the United States, most households obtain health insurance from employers. I document that households subscribe to health plans offered by the husband's employer more often than the wife's, a difference which could reflect their gap in employment status, plan quality, or a per se gender effect. I identify the gender effect and quantify its welfare implications using all-payer claims data from New Hampshire. Using a novel identification strategy that holds plan quality and employment status fixed, I find the gender effect leads to a 7% higher propensity for households to take up the husband's plan, which explains one-third of the gender gap in family plan subscriptions. I further develop a structural model of household plan choice incorporating multiple dimensions of inattention. I find households only pay attention to their non-default subscriber with a 40% probability. Counterfactual simulations suggest inattention contributes to one-third of surplus loss in household health insurance subscriptions, and that additionally removing gender-based inattention yields twice the welfare benefit of a policy that focuses on plan-based inattention alone.

**“Distributional Effect of Insurer Concentration on Premiums: Evidence from the Employer-Sponsored Health Insurance Market”**, with Haizhen Lin.

We study how insurer concentration affects premiums for fully-insured plans in the employer-sponsored health insurance market. By utilizing quasi-experimental variations induced by mergers among national insurers, we show that a higher level of market concentration leads to higher premiums, but there exists substantial heterogeneity. In particular, we find a 10% increase in insurer HHI increases premiums for medium-sized firms by 1.2%, but reduces premiums for large-sized firms by 3.2%. Additional analyses suggest access to self-insurance and provider prices as the underlying mechanisms. We then develop a stylized model to explain our results and discuss policy implications.

**“Vertical Integration and Market Foreclosure in Media Markets: Evidence from the Chinese Motion Picture Industry”**, with Ricard Gil, Chun-Yu Ho, and Li Xu.

This paper investigates the impact of vertical integration and market foreclosure in media markets. Using theater-movie-day level data from China, we show integrated theaters charge lower prices, enjoy higher attendance, allocate more screenings, and run their own movies longer than movies of other distributors. Despite these differences, we find no evidence consistent with anticompetitive input and customer foreclosure in integrated theaters. On the one hand, integrated and independent theaters screen the same share of integrated and independent movies. On the other hand, revenue differences between continued own movies and discontinued independent movies are inconsistent with customer market foreclosure motives given existing differences in distribution incentives between integrated and non-integrated structures. Finally, we estimate a random coefficient discrete choice model of movie demand and show that integrated theaters deliver a higher level of utility to consumers of integrated movies than independent movies through a direct effect, lower prices and more screenings. Our counterfactuals show gains derived from vertical integration (both in consumer and theater surplus) are mostly due to supply-side responses to revenue sharing changes.