



Fluctuating Power Logic: SCA Protection By V_{DD} Randomization At The Cell-level

Fan Zhang, Bolin Yang, Bojie Yang, Yiran Zhang,
Shivam Bhasin, Kui Ren



Content

- 1. Introduction
- 2. FPL scheme
- 3. Simulation
- 4. Conclusion



1. Introduction


- Side-Channel Attack

Power dissipation correlates to switching operations

Power models like hamming weight etc.

Major power consumption comes from the clock distribution network and Flip-Flops



(FFs) (estimated 30%-60%)



Side-Channel Attack Methods

- SPA(simple power attack),DPA(differential power attack)
- CPA(correlation power attack)


$$\rho = \frac{E[(X - \mu_X)(Y - \mu_Y)]}{\sqrt{\sum_{i=1}^n (X_i - \mu_X)^2} \sqrt{\sum_{i=1}^n (Y_i - \mu_Y)^2}}$$





Mainstream SCA countermeasures

- **Hiding** :noise, clock randomizer, dual-rail precharge logics (DPL)





Mainstream SCA countermeasures


- **Masking**: algorithm level, hardware level

$$a' = a \oplus m$$




Wave Dynamic Differential Logic (WDDL)

- A DPL based on standard cell flow, proposed by K. Tiri
- require a very strict complementary
- capacitive balance, making them difficult to implement in practice





New countermeasure: FPL



Our contributions

- We propose a novel cell-level logic: Fluctuating power logic(FPL)
- We compared FPL with standard-cell-based and WDDL-based implementation
- We analyzed side-channel security of FPL on PRESENT/AES implementation



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


2. FPL scheme

- The proposed logic is highlighted with a modified secure FF.
- This scheme is based on a **cascade voltage logic**(CVL) and further enhanced with a **compensatory unit** (CU).



cascade voltage logic(CVL)

- n NMOS,
- n diodes
- one PMOS
- one “ n -input” OR-gate.
- V_{dp} : voltage drop





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
cascade voltage logic(CVL)

- n NMOS,
- n diodes
- one PMOS
- one “n-input” OR-gate.
- V_{dp} : voltage drop



cascade voltage logic(CVL)

- $K=0, V_{dp}=0$
- $K=1, V_{dp}=V_{th0}$
- $K>1, 0<V_{dp}<V_{th0}$




K denotes the total number of VM_i whose logic value is "1"

V_{th0} denotes the threshold voltage of NMOS and diode

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


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


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
cascade voltage logic(CVL)

- CP: circuit on critical path
- NCP: circuit on non-critical path



Modified FF with FPL

- Critical paths marked in brown
- Non-critical paths marked in blue
- Transistors connected with VDD_m marked in grey




compensatory unit (CU)

- The power consumption for variant data transitions ($0 \rightarrow 1$ and $1 \rightarrow 0$) is larger than that for invariant ones ($0 \rightarrow 0$ and $1 \rightarrow 1$)
- The compensatory unit make up the power consumption during invariant data transition



compensatory unit (CU)

- When the FF makes a $0 \rightarrow 1$ or $1 \rightarrow 0$
the CU is off
- when the inputs of FF keep unchanged
the CU is turned on





Total Power dissipation

$$P_{\text{total}} = P_{FF} + P_{CVL} + P_{CU}$$






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3. Simulation

- Testbench
- compiling and synthesis by Design Compiler
- $n=4$
- HSPICE



Simulation results


- (GE) Gate equivalents
- (SC-FF) standard-cell-based FF
- (WDDL) dynamic differential logic

Testbench	PRESENT encryption circuit			AES encryption circuit		
	SC-based	FPL-based	WDDL-based	SC-based	FPL-based	WDDL-based
Area[GE]	152	221 ($\times 1.45$)	520 ($\times 3.42$)	1340	1478 ($\times 1.10$)	3111 ($\times 2.32$)
P_{max} [fJ]	2212.2	2335.9	7097.0	2590.9	3664.6	21249.0
P_{min} [fJ]	769.6	1132.2	6829.0	1301.0	2595.4	20842.0
P_{avg} [fJ]	1299.3	1532.3 ($\times 1.18$)	6958.0 ($\times 5.36$)	2249.6	3307.6 ($\times 1.47$)	21083.1 ($\times 9.37$)
σ_P	362.2	281.6	80.6	219.0	181.2	79.0


Comparison(AES)

- Correlation vs. number of traces

Standard




FPL




Comparison(AES)

- Correlation vs. length of a trace
- Standard AES




PFL AES




Comparison(PRESENT)

- Correlation vs. number of traces
- Standard




FPL




Comparison(PRESENT)

- Correlation vs. length of a trace
- Standard



FPL



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Conclusion

- proposed a power-diffusing logic named as fluctuating power logic (FPL)
- analyzed side-channel security on PRESENT/AES implementation
- compared FPL with standard-cell-based and WDDL-based implementation