


# AUTOMATED DETECTION OF VULNERABILITIES IN BLACK-BOX ROUTERS

How to Find Vulnerabilities in Dozens of Router Models Without Using IDA



# INTRODUCTION – GABI NAKIBLY

- Chief research scientist at the National Cyber and Electronics Research Center
  - Operated by Rafael – Advanced Defense Systems Ltd.
- A former Visiting Scholar at Stanford University
- Senior adjunct lecturer and research associate at the Technion – Israel Institute of Technology
- I mostly spend my days doing network security research.



# OUTLINE

- Motivation
- The method we propose
- What is symbolic execution
- Unique optimizations that make our method scalable
- Application of the method to Cisco's OSPF implementation
- The vulnerabilities we have found

# MOTIVATION

- Network protocols are based on open standards
- However, the Internet runs mostly on proprietary and closed-source routers
- A hidden deviation of a device's implementation from a protocol standard may create a logical vulnerability
- However, finding deviations in closed-source routers demands great efforts.

# RESEARCH GOAL


- An automated formal black-box method that unearths implementation deviations in closed-source network devices
  - Black-box: no need to access the binary or source code of the device!
  - Formal: a systematic method based on rigorous foundations
  - Automated: once a manual setup phase is complete no manual assistance is needed.

# THE BASIC IDEA IN A NUTSHELL

- Compare the behavior of a router (called SUT) to that of a model that captures the standard functionality of the network protocol (or part of it).
  - SUT = System Under Test


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


# THE BASIC IDEA IN A NUTSHELL (CONT.)

- A naïve approach: manually select tests based on predefined heuristics
- Our approach: automatically generate tests based on symbolic execution that covers the entire model functionality.




# OUR METHOD IN A GLANCE



# 1. CREATE A MODEL OF A PROTOCOL

- The model is simply a program that captures the functionality of the standard (or part of it).
- The model simulates the execution of the protocol among the standard routers in a given topology.
- The model receives as an input protocol messages sent by an attacker.
  - These messages are the symbolic variables.




```

class Router:
    def __init__(self, ID):
        self.queue = []
        self.DB = []
        self.originalDB = []
        self.ID = ID
        self.timer = 0
        self.delayedFB = []
        self.lookup_policy = 0
        self.routingTable = RoutingTable()
    def updateTimer(self):
        if self.timer>0:
            self.timer-=1
        return
    def addLSA(self, lsa):
        self.DB.append(lsa)
        return
    def flood(self, m, topology):
        debug.Print("flood function ---self.ID= " + str(self.ID) + " src = " + str(m.src))
        src = m.src
        m.src = self.ID
        rlinks = topology.links[self.ID]
        for l in rlinks:
            if (src == l.linkID and l.linkType != 'transit') or l.linkType == 'stub':
                debug.Print('continue')
                continue
            if (self.ID == 3 and src == 1):
                continue
            if (self.ID == 4 and src == 1):
                continue
            if l.linkID == self.ID and l.linkType == 'transit':
                debug.Print('transit link')
                for n in topology.transitNetworks:
                    if n[1] == self.ID:
                        index=0
                        for rID in n[0]:
                            if rID == self.ID:
                                index+=1
                                continue
                            m2=m.duplicate()
                            m2.dest = rID
                            m2.interface = n[4][index]
                            topology.routers[m2.dest].queue.append(m2)
                            debug.Print("flood to " + str(m2.dest) + " at interface " + str(m2.interface) + ", seq = " + str(m.seq))
                            index+=1
                        else:
                            m2 = m.duplicate()
                            m2.dest = n[1]
                            m2.interface = n[2]
                            topology.routers[m2.dest].queue.append(m2)
                            debug.Print("flood to " + str(m2.dest) + " at interface " + str(m2.interface) + ", seq = " + str(m.seq))
                    else:
                        m2=m.duplicate()
                        m2.dest = 1.linkID
                        m2.interface = topology.getLinkInterface(m2.dest, self.ID)
                        topology.routers[m2.dest].queue.append(m2)
                        debug.Print("flood to " + str(m2.dest) + " at interface " + str(m2.interface) + ", seq = " + str(m.seq))
            else:
                m2=m.duplicate()
                m2.dest = l.linkID
                m2.interface = l.linkID
                topology.routers[m2.dest].queue.append(m2)
                debug.Print("flood to " + str(m2.dest) + " at interface " + str(m2.interface) + ", seq = " + str(m.seq))
  
```

# SYMBOLIC EXECUTION 101

- Symbolic execution allows to trace all execution paths of a program and generate the corresponding input that trigger each path.



## 2. GENERATE TEST CASES

- Run symbolic execution on the model of the protocol to cover all execution paths of the protocol's model.
- Each execution path is driven by a specific sequence of rogue protocol messages sent by the attacker.
  - Each such execution path represents a test case with an expected outcome.


Test case example

Send routing MSG1 to R1

Send routing MSG2 to R2


Send routing MSG3 to R1

Expected outcome: routing states of all routers



### 3. EXECUTE TESTS

- Each generated test file is executed on the SUT.
- During the test execution the sequence of rogue protocol messages are sent to the network devices.
- At the end of the test the state of the devices are extracted.



#### Execute test on SUT

Send routing MSG<sub>1</sub> to R<sub>1</sub>

Send routing MSG<sub>2</sub> to R<sub>2</sub>


Send routing MSG<sub>3</sub> to R<sub>1</sub>

Actual outcome: routing states of all routers in SUT

Expected outcome: routing states of all routers in model


## 4. FIND DEVIATIONS

- A failed test represents a deviation of the protocol's implementation from the protocol standard.
- The failed test is accompanied with traces of all messages exchanged between the devices during the run of the test, both on the model and on the SUT.
- Comparing these traces facilitates the analysis of the vulnerability.



# PATH EXPLOSION PROBLEM

- Many tests may be needed to cover the entire functionality a complex real-world protocol.
- We deal with it using unique optimizations that are tailored to testing network protocols.
- Our optimizations dramatically reduce the number generated tests without reducing the coverage of the protocol's model.




# OUR MAIN OPTIMIZATION

- The optimization is due to following insight:
  - Let's assume we have the following 100 test cases (each is 1 message long):



- Then we shall have additional 100 test cases (each is 2 messages long):



- We can replace the above 100 (2-message) tests with the following single test:




# OSPF ANALYSIS

- We applied our method to find vulnerabilities in the OSPF implementation of routers.
- OSPF is one of the most widely used and most complex routing protocols on the Internet.


# OSPF 101

- Every router advertises its links' state (i.e. "who are my neighbors?").
  - This is called Link State Advertisement (LSA).
- The LSAs are flooded throughout the network hop-by-hop.
- Every router receives the LSAs of all other routers.
  - This allows to build the topology map of the entire network.

## OSPF 101 (CONT.)



# THE FIGHT-BACK MECHANISM



# THE ATTACKER

- Location: inside the network
  - Controls a legitimate router in an arbitrary location
  - This means it can flood LSAs to its neighbors
- Goal: persistent poisoning of routers' routing tables

# OSPF MODEL

- We modeled the OSPF using a Python code having roughly 1000 LoC.
- The router's procedure implements the core functionality of OSPF.
  - relevant to the security against the above type of attack
- The model is at
  - <https://github.com/gnakibli/ospf-model-test>


```
class Router:  
    def __init__(self, ID ):  
        self.queue = []  
        self.DB = []  
        self.originalDB = []  
        self.ID = ID  
        self.timer = 0  
        self.delayedDB = []  
        self.lookup_policy = 0  
        self.routingTable = RoutingTable()  
    def updateTimer(self):  
        if self.timer>0:  
            self.timer-=1  
        return  
    def addLSA(self,lsa):  
        self.DB.append(lsa)  
        return  
    def flood(self,m,topology):  
        debug.Print("flood function ---self.ID= " + str(self.ID) + " src = " + str(m.src))  
        src = m.src  
        m.src = self.ID  
        rlinks = topology.links[self.ID]  
        for l in rlinks:  
            if (src == l.linkID and l.linkType!='transit') or l.linkType=='stub':  
                debug.Print('continue')  
                continue  
            if (self.ID==3 and src==1):  
                continue  
            if (self.ID==4 and src==1):  
                continue  
            if (src == l.linkID and l.linkType=='transit'):   
                debug.Print('transit link')  
                for n in topology.transitNetworks:  
                    if n[1]==self.ID:  
                        index=0  
                        for rID in n[0]:  
                            if rID == self.ID :  
                                index+=1  
                                continue  
                            m2=m.duplicate()  
                            m2.dest = rID  
                            m2.interface = n[4][index]  
                            topology.routers[m2.dest].queue.append(m2)  
                            debug.Print("flood to " + str(m2.dest) + " at interface " + str(m2.interface))  
                            index+=1  
                        else :  
                            m2 = m.duplicate()  
                            m2.dest = n[1]  
                            m2.interface = n[2]  
                            topology.routers[m2.dest].queue.append(m2)  
                            debug.Print("flood to " + str(m2.dest) + " at interface " + str(m2.interface))  
                    else:  
                        m2=m.duplicate()  
                        m2.dest = l.linkID  
                        m2.interface = topology.getLinkInterface(m2.dest,self.ID)  
                        topology.routers[m2.dest].queue.append(m2)
```

# CISCO TESTBED

- To test Cisco's OSPF implementation we used alternately two network emulation software: GNS3 and VIRL.
  - Both software suites allow to emulate a network of multiple routers, each running an actual IOS image (identical to the images used in real Cisco routers).
- We used the following IOS versions:

IOS Version	Release date
15.1(4)M, release software (fc1)	Mar. 2011
15.2(4)S7, release software (fc4)	Apr. 2015
15.6(2)T, release software (fc4)	Mar. 2016

most recent



# CISCO RESULTS


- For Cisco we discovered 7 deviations in all three IOS versions.
- 6 of those deviations presented logical vulnerabilities.
- 2 of them are vulnerabilities that exist in the most up-to-date IOS version.
  - CVE-2017-6770
- The new vulnerabilities allow an attacker to evade the fight-back mechanism and gain persistent control over the routing state of the network.
- The vulnerabilities affect all IOS, XE and ASA products as some NXOS products.

# CISCO VULNERABILITIES

- OSPF determines which LSA is newer by examining the following values in order:
  - Sequence Number
  - Checksum

# CISCO VULNERABILITIES (CONT.)

- An attacker sends a false LSA with
  - $Seq=MaxSeq$
- According to the standard the victim must flush the false LSA by sending the FB with:
  - $Seq=MaxSeq, Age=MaxAge$
  - The FB must include the invalid links.
    - This is to ensure that checksum values are identical.
    - However, Cisco sends the FB with the valid links!
    - Thus, potentially having a smaller checksum value as compared to that of the false LSA.
  - Hence, the FB may be considered older than the false LSA and thus ignored!



# QUAGGA

- Quagga – the most popular open-source routing suite on the Internet
- Similar vulnerability have been discovered in Quagga.
- CVE-2017-3224

# IN SUMMARY

- We present an method that finds deviations of network protocol implementations.
- All our method need is a model of the protocol and you are good to go!
- Once you have a model you can test any implementation of that protocol fully automatically
  - allowing you to discover many vulnerabilities is a short time.
- Symbolic execution is an important tool that the security community should use more often.
- Code: <https://github.com/gnakibli/ospf-model-test>
- Shoot me an email if you have questions or comments: [gabin@rafael.co.il](mailto:gabin@rafael.co.il)