


# Graphic Content Ahead: Towards Automated Scalable Analysis of Graphical Images Embedded In Malware

• • • • •


Alex Long, Joshua Saxe, Robert Gove  
Invincea Labs

# Talk Outline

1. The Status Quo of Malware Analysis
  2. Hard Problems The Industry is Dealing With
  3. Our Approach
  4. Two Research Experiments
    1. Detecting and Visualizing Image-Sharing Relationships (Live Demo)
    2. Automating Their Semantics



# Malware analysis treats malware as just a set of instructions



Analysis typically consists of analyzing the disassembled code and/or observing the malware's runtime behavior



Malware could be packed or use VM detection tactics

Manual analysis of each sample is intractable given huge numbers of polymorphic variants

A stack of several assembly code snippets from a debugger, illustrating the concept of polymorphic variants. The code is written in Intel syntax and shows variations in instruction sequences and memory addresses. One snippet at the bottom right is highlighted with a white border.


Malware is not just code,  
it's also

- natural language
- documents
- audio
- video
- images



```
text:00401010          push    ebp
text:00401010          mov     ebp, esp
text:00401011          sub     esp, 40h
text:00401013          push    ebx
text:00401016          push    esi
text:00401017          push    edi
text:00401018          lea    edi, [ebp+var_10]
text:00401019          mov     ecx, 10h
text:0040101C          mov     eax, 0CCCCCCC
text:00401021          rep    stosd
text:00401026          push    offset ??_C@_
text:00401028          call    printf
text:0040102D          add    esp, 4
text:00401032          mov    [ebp], eax
```


```
text:00401032          mov    [ebp], eax
text:00401035          add    esp, 4
text:0040103D          mov    [ebp], eax
text:00401050          add    esp, 4
```



“CLICK HERE FOR  
FREE PICS”

- **Problem:** Graphical assets are an untapped resource in the malware analysis space; image analysis done manually.

Of a collection of 2 million malware samples provided to us by DARPA, over half had at least one image embedded.



# How Image Analysis is Useful

A packed Trojan still needs an attractive icon to lure a user into executing it




Images can hint at the ways in which attackers are tricking the user and the purpose of a binary artifact.



Game-related

By exploring the malware's "social network" through shared rare images, you can learn about an otherwise hard-to-reverse sample.



Trojan.Win32.VBKrypt...

Trojan.Win32.Swizzor...


## Survey of the threat landscape

We're seeing an up-tick in malware masquerading as PDFs, let's alert our employees to be on the lookout

## Quick analysis of new samples

Our system has found a previously analyzed sample that shares an image with this email attachment


Images go on a wild ride




*and by the time they end up in malware,  
they might look a little different*

Hash comparison will fail if the image was  
**compressed**  
**copied and pasted**  
**modified deliberately**


1. Take an image




1. Take an image
2. Reduce to grayscale



1. Take an image
2. Reduce to grayscale
3. Stretch/shrink to 32x32




1. Take an image
2. Reduce to grayscale
3. Stretch/shrink to 32x32
4. Convert to high contrast
  - a. Get average value of pixels
  - b. For each pixel,  
if above average, set to 255  
if below average, set to 0



1. Take an image
2. Reduce to grayscale
3. Stretch/shrink to 32x32
4. Convert to binary vector
  - a. Get average value of pixels
  - b. For each pixel,
    - if above average, set to 255
    - if below average, set to 0





## Precision:


What percent of the pairs matched by the system actually had similar images?

### Precision

#### Image Matcher Results

Matching Pairs

Non-Matching Pairs



#### False positives


Our system says a pair of images are similar that actually are different

### Recall

#### Image Matcher Results

Matching Pairs



Non-Matching Pairs



#### False negatives

Our system fails to say a pair of images are similar when they actually are

# Average Hash vs MD5



- 200 hand clustered samples
- MD5 wins out in precision
- Average hash wins in recall
- Humans can easily detect and ignore images that don't match (false positives)
- False negatives invisible to user and lost forever
- We'd prefer to have more false positives (lower precision) in order to have fewer false negatives (higher recall)


# Comparing Sets of Images




Sample A




Sample B



Sample A



Sample B



Number of matching pairs (2)

$$\frac{\text{Number of matching pairs (2)}}{\text{Number of possible matching pairs (3)}} = 0.66 \text{ similarity}$$

Number of possible matching pairs (3)



Live Demo



Browser




Anti-virus



Document

- Reveal purpose of malware
- Survey threat landscape
- Assign risk factor

# Machine Learning 101: K Nearest Neighbors



## K Nearest Neighbors

1. Plot points on graph
2. Assign classes to points (e.g. house or apartment)
3. Plot point on graph with unknown class
4. Pick a number  $K$  as appropriate for your data
5. Get the top- $K$  nearest neighbors (AKA closest points) to the point with the unknown class
6. Classify by majority vote (e.g. if the 3 nearest points are 2 houses and 1 apartment, unknown class is house)

# Classification by Color Histogram

Image with  
unknown class

	malware_icons/adobe_flash.png
	malware_icons/antivirus.png
	malware_icons/antivirus2.png
	malware_icons/jpg_file_icon.png
	malware_icons/real_player_icon1.png
	malware_icons/unknown.png
	malware_icons/windows_installer.png
	malware_icons/windows_installer1.png
	malware_icons/windows_installer2.png
	malware_icons/windows_installer3.png
	malware_icons/windows_network_icon.png

Predicted class

adobe flash
windows media player
windows media player
jpg file icon
windows folder
vmware
windows drive icon
windows installer
windows media player
windows internet icon
antivirus

K Nearest Neighbors



Graphical content of malware is a significantly under-utilized signal in malware analysis

Automation and visualization make this “human” signal accessible at a large scale