## **Security Assessment Report**

**Target:** 

**Type:** Internal Educational Assessment

**Author:** Josh Sullivan **Date:** May 09, 2025

Version: 2.0

# **Executive Summary**

This assessment evaluates the security posture of various web assets from both authenticated and unauthenticated user perspectives. The focus was on identifying misconfigurations, access control flaws, and IDOR vulnerabilities that could be leveraged in real-world attack scenarios.

# Scope

The assessment covered the following assets under the \*.

.com namespace:

dev. .com
.com

Additional assets noted for future or partial testing:

www...com

download2. .com

download. .com

live. .com

static2. .com

static. .com

www.live. .com

# Vulnerability Summary Table

Vulnerability	Risk Level	Exploit	Notes
		Chain?	
Host-based access control bypass via direct ip access on dev	Medium	Yes	A suspected dev mirror of the main company website
Insecure Direct Object Reference on User Profile Pages	Low	Yes	Predictable user id allowing for profile enumeration

# **Vulnerability Details**

Host-based access control bypass via direct ip access on dev domain.

#### **Asset:**

dev. .com

(also testable at https://<IP>/users/)

#### **Issue Summary:**

### **Steps to Reproduce:**

- 2. Here is where a restricted area login panel appears
- 3. Replace the url with ip address https://192.0.0.220/users/
- 4. Here you will see the dev mirror users page without the login restriction

#### Impact:

- Authentication or access control mechanisms are bypassed when accessing via IP.
- **Internal or restricted pages** intended only for authenticated users or developers become publicly accessible.

### **Supporting Evidence:**

- figure 1: 03\_dns\_resolution.sh results
- figure 2: restricted area login page
- figure 3: restricted area bypass

### Insecure Direct Object Reference on User Profile Pages

#### Asset:

https:// .com/user/user5206/index.html https:// .com/user/user5205/index.html

#### **Issue Summary:**

The application allows direct access to user profile pages by manipulating the user ID in the URL. This results in **unauthenticated access to other users' profile pages**, exposing potentially sensitive data and enabling user enumeration.

#### **Steps to Reproduce:**

- Login and navigate to your own profile at: https://www.com/user/user5206/index.html
- 2. In Burp Suite (or any proxy), modify the URL to: https://www.com/user/user5205/index.html
- 3. Observe that another user's profile page is returned **without** authentication or authorization checks.
- 4. Repeat the process by incrementing/decrementing the user ID to enumerate other users.

### Impact:

- 1. **User Enumeration**: Attackers can cycle through user IDs to discover valid accounts.
- 2. **Information Disclosure**: If profile pages expose emails, usernames, or social data, this aids in social engineering or credential stuffing attacks.
- 3. **Potential Account Manipulation**: If similar numeric ID access is allowed for sensitive actions (e.g., POST/PATCH to /user/<id>/edit), this could escalate into **account takeover** or **privilege escalation**.

# **Supporting Evidence:**

- figure 5: account 1 title

- figure 6: account 2 title

### Recommendations

### 1. Host-Based Access Control Bypass via Direct IP

- a. NGINX: Use server\_name directives and a default block that returns an error for unmatched IP-based requests.
- b. Add IP whitelisting where appropriate.
- c. Add logging and alerting for raw IP-based access to sensitive dev endpoints.

# 2. Insecure Direct Object Reference (IDOR) on Profile Pages

- a. Add rate limiting or behaviour analytics to detect rapid ID scanning.
- b. Consider using unguessable UUIDs or usernames in URLS rather than incremental ID's.

# **Appendix**

figure 1: 03\_dns\_resolution.sh results (redacted)

figure 2: restricted area login page (redacted)

figure 3: restricted area bypass (redacted)

figure 5: account 1 title (redacted)

figure 6: account 2 title (redacted)