

# Codebook

## Media



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Based on Demscore  
Version 3.0

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**For data enquiries:** [contact@demscore.se](mailto:contact@demscore.se)

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# 1 Explanatory Notes

## 1.1 Release Notes v3

Demscore provides worldwide free access to harmonized data on Democracy, Environment, Migration, Social Policy, Conflict and Representation from several of the world's most prominent social science research institutes. The interdisciplinary nature of Demscore data facilitates large-scale comparative analyses. This is essential to advance adequate policy responses to complex societal challenges associated with the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) and beyond, facing Sweden, Europe, and the world today.

With a firm commitment to transparency and openness, Demscore v3 enables users to gain comprehensive insights into various topics across the social sciences. The joint infrastructure ensures data integrity and quality at the highest international standards and maximizes usability in the measurement of contextual data with 25.000 variables across nearly all countries in the world, from 1750 to the present.

This creates critical time- and cost saving advantages in data collection, management, distribution, and not the least for end-users in the scientific community. Demscore's unique approach to translating and merging data scales up to a total of 378.708 variable versions available in the infrastructure, storing a total of 9.2 billion non-missing observations.

This collaborative effort between leading Swedish universities pushes the scale of social science data to a new level and offers unprecedented possibilities for interdisciplinary research and knowledge advancement.

These are the key features of Demscore:

1. **Customized Download:** A fully normalized, joint PostgreSQL database, sophisticated programming, and a user-friendly web-based interface for users to generate custom-designed datasets and codebooks for download.
2. **Translations and Data Merges:** Demscore currently offers more than 1000 merge options between datasets.
3. **Metadata:** Demscore takes information on and organization of metadata to new heights with the inclusion of customized codebooks, a detailed methodology document, and a comprehensive handbook.
4. **Handling of Missing Data:** Demscore pioneers in developing an innovative approach to tackle missing data. Researchers can now account for missing values with increased precision, leading to more robust and reliable analyses.
5. **Merge Scores:** Demscore introduces a unique merge mechanism. This powerful tool enables researchers to combine datasets effortlessly, uncovering connections and patterns that were previously hidden in isolated data silos.
6. **Thematic Datasets:** Demscore provides researchers with curated thematic datasets, each focused on a specific topic. These datasets bring together relevant variables from across the Demscore partners, facilitating in-depth investigations and comprehensive analyses of specific domains.
7. **Interactive Web Portal:** In addition to all the above, Demscore's web portal offers interactive visualization tools, user support and additional information on all partners and data sources.

For more information, please visit <https://www.demscore.se/> or contact [contact@demscore.se](mailto:contact@demscore.se).

## 1.2 New in Demscore version 3

A detailed description of changes and additions made for version 3 compared to version 2 can be found in the Methodology Document.

## 1.3 The Demscore Codebook

The autogenerated Demscore Codebook lists variable entries for those variables chosen by the user along with citation guidelines and licenses per variable.

The meta data is extracted from the codebooks per dataset stored in a table in the Demscore PostgreSQL database with one row per variable for all datasets. This table includes codebook entries, variable tags, labels, and other variable information in LaTeX format used to generate an automated codebook.

Demscore maintains a single set of standard entries for metadata across all datasets, to which all project members contribute their information. Additionally, variables within different datasets may have varying sets of additional information requirements specific to each dataset. These dataset-specific entries are also included, but they are presented as variable-specific metadata beneath the standard entries.

At the outset of the harmonization process, Demscore underwent a thorough variable name cleanup. This involved tasks such as replacing spaces or dots in variable names with underscores and converting all letters to lowercase. Notably, the original tags remain preserved and stored in the PostgreSQL table. Each variable in Demscore is accessible in both short and long forms. The short form comprises the cleaned version of the original variable tag, while the long form starts with the dataset name from which it originates, followed by the cleaned variable name.

For instance, the original name of the variable *MinisterPersonalID* from the H-DATA Foreign Minister Dataset is included as *ministerpersonalid* (short form) and *hdata\_fomin\_ministerpersonalid* (long form) in Demscore.

In addition, each dataset includes Demscore unit-identifier variables which are named according to the following naming scheme: Beginning with *u\_*, followed by the name of the primary unit and finally the variable tag. The *year-* variable from the COMPLAB SPIN The Out-of-Work Benefits Dataset (OUTWB), which is part of the primary unit *u\_complab\_country\_year* has the Demscore unit identifier name *u\_complab\_country\_year\_year*.

## 1.4 Methodology

For details on our methodology please see the Demscore Methodology document available for download on the Demscore website.

## 1.5 Citations

The Demscore project does not have a formal citation of its own. Hence, when using Demscore, we suggest that you cite the respective projects and datasets. We indicate how every dataset is to be cited in the autogenerated codebook you retrieve with your data download, both in the dataset description and the codebook entry for each variable. Most often it is sufficient to cite the dataset a variable originates from, but sometimes there is a variable specific citation listed in the codebook entry in addition to that. For these cases, please also add the variable specific citation to the reference list of your publication. Full references are linked in the codebook entries of the variables and listed in the codebook's bibliography. We suggest you to also cite the Demscore Methodology Document when using data retrieved through Demscore.

## 1.6 Missing Data

Demscore indicates different types of missingness for observations in the customized datasets:

**Missing in original data** = Whenever an observation in the original variable is a missing (NA, missing code such as 7777, blank cell), we preserve this missing value. When the original source has special codes for various types of missing, those are preserved.

**Missing code: -11111** = Demscore code for observation is missing due to the translation/merge, i.e., missing data due to no data being included for this combination of identifiers in the end Output Unit.

**Missing code: -22222** = No observation is merged/translated, but the original data contains information for these identifier combinations elsewhere. For these cases, we use a different code. The

user needs to consult the reference documents (Methodology Document Section 5.1. or the Demscore Handbook) to clarify why the translation to the identifier combinations in the end Output Unit was not possible.

Please note that an observation that is missing in its original output unit does not take the value -11111, but appears as NA/blank cell in the customized dataset.

## 1.7 Download ID

The download ID allows the user to share the ID with other users for replication purposes. A user can type the download ID into the Demscore website and retrieve the same download selection and files as the original user. This ID is autogenerated for each download from the Demscore website and will always retrieve the same data, even if the Demscore version was updated in the meantime.

Download ID:

## 1.8 Unit Identifier Variables

An Output Unit is defined as an output format in which variables can be retrieved from one or more datasets through a strictly defined output grid. A unit table defining this output grid contains unit identifier columns with `u_` prefixes and the table is sorted based on these unit identifier columns and has a fixed number of rows. Unit columns are based on the columns that constitute the unit of analysis in a dataset. They are added to the original dataset and marked by a unit prefix (consisting of a `u_` and the dataset unit name) before the original variable name. Unit columns can contain slightly modified data, e.g., missing values are replaced by a default value. Sometimes we add additional columns to the unit table, for instance if a dataset includes both a `country_id` column with a numeric country code, we add the variable storing the full country name to the unit table as well for better readability.

## 1.9 Thematic Dataset

All media variables

## 1.10 Output Unit Identifier Variables in the Chosen Unit

:

## 2 COMPLAB

Based at Stockholm University, the **Comparative Policy Laboratory (COMPLAB)**, provides vital policy data across three areas: environmental, social, and migration policy. The **Social Policy Indicators (SPIN)** database provides the foundations for new comparative and longitudinal research on causes and consequences of welfare states. Building on T.H. Marshall’s ideas about social citizenship, SPIN makes available comparative data on social rights and duties of citizens, thereby moving research beyond analyses of welfare state expenditures. The SPIN database is instead oriented towards analyses of institutions as manifested in social policy legislation. Data are carefully collected in a coherent and consistent methodological manner to facilitate quantitative research of social policy across time and space. To date, SPIN covers 36 countries, of which several have data on core social policy programs from 1930 to 2019. More information is available on the project’s website: <https://www.su.se/comparative-policy-laboratory/data/spin-1.644259> **GRACE, Governing the Anthropocene – Environmental Policy and Outcomes in a Comparative Perspective**, is a longitudinal and comparative study on environmental governance has created a dataset of national policy responses for environmental management and protection in 37 countries for the period 1970-2022. <https://www.su.se/comparative-policy-laboratory/data/grace-1.645779> **The Migration Policy Database (MIGPOL)** consists of a range of indicators compiled on behalf of leading data projects in the field of comparative migration policy research. It also contains original data on the rights of irregular migrants which will soon be added to Demscore. <https://www.su.se/comparative-policy-laboratory/data/migpol-1.645783> Read more about COMPLAB here: <https://www.su.se/comparative-policy-laboratory/>

### 2.1 COMPLAB MIGPOL IMISEM

**Dataset tag:** complab\_migpol\_imisem

**Output Unit:** COMPLAB Country-Year, i.e., data is collected per country and year.

**Description:** The IMISEM dataset contains 828 indicators on the migration policies of 32 polities from Europe, South East Asia and Latin America and the Caribbean. The IMISEM project adopts a comprehensive view of migration policy that includes both its emigrant/ emigration and immigrant/ immigration sides, bridging for the first time the two sides of migration policy. Thus, the dataset includes indicators that measure emigration policies (exit policies and control of outflows), immigration policies (entry policies and control of inflows), emigrant policies (rights granted, services offered and obligations imposed on non-resident citizens), immigrant policies (mainly, rights granted to non-citizen residents) and citizenship policies (mainly, access to naturalization for immigrants and retention of citizenship by emigrants). The main sources used to complete the IMISEM questionnaires are legal sources (i.e., laws, regulations). Legal sources are complemented with secondary sources (for instance, policy reports) and interviews with experts. The IMISEM Dataset is one of the main outputs of the “The very Immigrant is an Emigrant Project (IMISEM)” funded by the Leibniz Gemeinschaft and carried out at the GIGA German Institute for Global and Area Studies between 2017 and 2020. IMISEM data was collected for the years 2017 to 2019 during this time. It is coded for 2018 in DEMSCORE to align with the country-year format of other datasets.

**Dataset citation:** Pedroza, Luicy (2022) “IMISEM Dataset” GESIS Data Archive DOI: 10.7802/2380  
[https://search.gesis.org/research\\_data/SDN-10.7802-2380?doi=10.7802/2380](https://search.gesis.org/research_data/SDN-10.7802-2380?doi=10.7802/2380)

**Link to original codebook**  
<https://migpol.org/data/>

**License:** The IMISEM CODEBOOK is an Open Access publication licensed under CC BY 4.0. The data can be used without restrictions as long as that the IMISEM project is cited accordingly in corresponding publications.

More detailed information on the dataset can be found at the following web page:  
<https://www.giga-hamburg.de/en/publications/research-datasets/imisem-dataset>

### 2.1.1 Immigration Cultural Policies

The Immigration Cultural Policies section in the IMISEM dataset contains variables on funding for bilingual education and media in migrant group languages.

#### 2.1.1.1 Immigrant Cultural Policies Media (igrantcultural\_media)

*Long tag:* complab\_migpol\_imisem\_igrantcultural\_media

*Original tag:* imisem\_igrantcultural\_media

*Dataset citation:* Pedroza et al. (2022)

*Merge scores:*

*Non-missing observations in original unit:* Sum: 32, Percent: 0.25

*Non-missing observations in chosen unit:* Sum: 29, Percent: 0.1

*Lost observations in chosen unit:* Sum: 3 Percent: 9.38

*Description:*

DESCRIPTION: Is there public funding for media in main migrant group languages?

VALUES:

No = 0

Yes = 1

MISSINGS:

Not applicable = 98

No answer = 99

COVERAGE:

2018

### 3 QOG

The **Quality of Government (QoG)** Institute was founded in 2004 by Professor Bo Rothstein and Professor Sören Holmberg. It is an independent research institute within the Department of Political Science at the University of Gothenburg. QoG is comprised of about 30 researchers who conduct and promote research on the causes, consequences and nature of Good Governance and the Quality of Government (QoG) - that is, trustworthy, reliable, impartial, uncorrupted and competent government institutions. QoG's award-winning datasets focus on concepts related to quality of government, transparency, and public administration. The main objective of QoG's research is to address the theoretical and empirical problem of how political institutions of high quality can be created and maintained. A second objective is to study the effects of Quality of Government on a number of policy areas, such as health, the environment, social policy, and poverty. The QoG datasets draw on a number of freely available datasources. More information on how the variables are compiled for different QoG datasets can be found in the respective QoG codebooks available on their website. More information is available on the project's website: <https://www.gu.se/en/quality-government>

#### 3.1 QoG EU Regional Dataset Long Data

**Dataset tag:** qog\_eureg\_long

**Output Unit:** QoG NUTS Region-Year, i.e., data is collected per European NUTS region and year.

**Description:** The QoG EU Regional dataset is a dataset consisting of more than 300 variables covering three levels of European regions - Nomenclature of Territorial Units for Statistics (NUTS): NUTS0 (country), NUTS1(major socio-economic regions) and NUTS2 (basic regions for the application of regional policies).

The QoG Regional Data is presented in three different forms available in separate datasets. The variable are the same across all three dataset besides a varying suffix (`_nuts0`, `_nuts1`, `_nuts2`) indication which NUTS level is represented.

All datasets are available in time-series format. The first one (The QoG Regional Data - Long Form) is a dataset where data is presented in the long form. The list of units of analysis contains regions of all NUTS levels.

Two other datasets are presented in the wide form for multilevel analysis. In the second dataset (The QoG Regional Data - Wide Form NUTS1) includes NUTS1 level as the unit of analysis and variables represent the values for this level and corresponding lower level – NUTS0. As an example, in this dataset the data is presented only for East Sweden(Ostra Sverige SE1), as a unit of analysis and has values for lower levels of this region - Sweden (SE).

In the third dataset (The QoG Regional Data - Wide Form NUTS2) the unit of analysis is NUTS2 level regions and variables provide values as for every unit of analysis, as well as for corresponding lower NUTS levels: NUTS1 and NUTS0. One example of unit of analysis in this dataset is Stockholm (SE11) and data for every variable will be for Stockholm, as well as for lower level regions - East Sweden (Ostra Sverige SE1) and Sweden (SE).

**Dataset citation:** Charron, Nicholas, Stefan Dahlberg, Aksel Sundström, Sören Holmberg, Bo Rothstein, Natalia Alvarado Pachon Cem Mert Dalli. 2020. The Quality of Government EU Regional Dataset, version Nov20. University of Gothenburg: The Quality of Government Institute, <https://www.gu.se/en/quality-government> doi:10.18157/qogeuiregnov20

**Link to original codebook**

[https://www.qogdata.pol.gu.se/data/codebook\\_eureg\\_nov20.pdf](https://www.qogdata.pol.gu.se/data/codebook_eureg_nov20.pdf)

**License:** The QoG datasets are open and available, free of charge and without a need to register your data. You can use them for your analysis, graphs, teaching, and other academic-related and non-commercial purposes. We ask our users to cite always the original source(s) of the data and our datasets.

We do not allow other uses of these data including but not limited to redistribution,



commercialization and other for-profit usage. If a user is interested in such use or has doubts about the license, they will have to refer to the original source and check with them if this is allowed and what requirements they need to fulfill.

Be mindful that the original data sources are the only owners of their data and they can adjust their license without previous warning.

More detailed information on the dataset can be found at the following web page: <https://www.gu.se/en/quality-government/qog-data/data-downloads/eu-regional-dataset>

### 3.1.1 Science and Technology

This category provides information on employment rates in different sectors, for the total population as well as subgroups.

#### 3.1.1.1 Employment in information and communication, percent of tot. employment, Female (eu\_emtk\_j\_f)

*Long tag:* qog\_eureg\_long\_eu\_emtk\_j\_f

*Original tag:* eu\_emtk\_j\_f

*Dataset citation:* Charron et al. (2020)

*Variable citation:* European Commission (2023)

*Merge scores:*

*Non-missing observations in original unit:* Sum: 0, Percent: 0

*Non-missing observations in chosen unit:* Sum: 365, Percent: 1.23

*Description:*

Female employment in information and communication, as percentage of total female employment. Data come from EU Labour force survey (LFS). Employed people are defined as persons aged 15 years and over who during the reference week performed work, even for just one hour a week, for pay, profit or family gain or were not at work but had a job or business from which they were temporarily absent because of, e.g., illness, holidays, industrial dispute and education and training. In high-tech statistics the population excludes anyone below the age of 15 or over the age of 74. The data are aggregated based on the statistical classification of economic activities in the European Community (NACE) at 2-digit level.

#### 3.1.1.2 Employment in information and communication, percent of tot. employment, Male (eu\_emtk\_j\_m)

*Long tag:* qog\_eureg\_long\_eu\_emtk\_j\_m

*Original tag:* eu\_emtk\_j\_m

*Dataset citation:* Charron et al. (2020)

*Variable citation:* European Commission (2023)

*Merge scores:*

*Non-missing observations in original unit:* Sum: 0, Percent: 0

*Non-missing observations in chosen unit:* Sum: 365, Percent: 1.23

*Description:*

Male employment in information and communication, as percentage of total male employment. Data come from EU Labour force survey (LFS). Employed people are defined as persons aged 15 years and over who during the reference week performed work, even for just one hour a week, for pay, profit or family gain or were not at work but had a job or business from which they were temporarily absent because of, e.g., illness, holidays, industrial dispute and education and training. In high-tech statistics the population excludes anyone below the age of 15 or over the age of 74. The data are aggregated based on the statistical classification of economic activities in the European Community (NACE) at 2-digit level.

### 3.1.1.3 Employment in information and communication, percent of tot. employment, Total (eu\_emtk\_j\_t)

*Long tag:* qog\_eureg\_long\_eu\_emtk\_j\_t

*Original tag:* eu\_emtk\_j\_t

*Dataset citation:* Charron et al. (2020)

*Variable citation:* European Commission (2023)

*Merge scores:*

*Non-missing observations in original unit:* Sum: 0, Percent: 0

*Non-missing observations in chosen unit:* Sum: 365, Percent: 1.23

*Description:*

Employment in information and communication, as percentage of total employment. Data come from EU Labour force survey (LFS). Employed people are defined as persons aged 15 years and over who during the reference week performed work, even for just one hour a week, for pay, profit or family gain or were not at work but had a job or business from which they were temporarily absent because of, e.g., illness, holidays, industrial dispute and education and training. In high-tech statistics the population excludes anyone below the age of 15 or over the age of 74. The data are aggregated based on the statistical classification of economic activities in the European Community (NACE) at 2-digit level.

## 3.1.2 Poverty and Social Exclusion

This category describes the share of the population living in or at risk of poverty.

### 3.1.2.1 People at risk of poverty or social exclusion by NUTS regions, percentage (eu\_povr\_pc)

*Long tag:* qog\_eureg\_long\_eu\_povr\_pc

*Original tag:* eu\_povr\_pc

*Dataset citation:* Charron et al. (2020)

*Variable citation:* European Commission (2023)

*Merge scores:*

*Non-missing observations in original unit:* Sum: 0, Percent: 0

*Non-missing observations in chosen unit:* Sum: 462, Percent: 1.55

*Description:*

People at risk of poverty or social exclusion by NUTS 2 regions, percentage of total population. Persons who are at risk of poverty or severely materially deprived or living in households with very low work intensity. Persons are only counted once even if they are present in several sub-indicators. At risk-of-poverty are persons with an equivalised disposable income below the risk-of-poverty threshold, which is set at 60 percent of the national median equivalised disposable income (after social transfers). Material deprivation covers indicators relating to economic strain and durables. Severely materially deprived persons have living conditions severely constrained by a lack of resources, they experience at least 4 out of 9 following deprivations items: cannot afford i) to pay rent or utility bills, ii) keep home adequately warm, iii) face unexpected expenses, iv) eat meat, fish or a protein equivalent every second day, v) a week holiday away from home, vi) a car, vii) a washing machine, viii) a colour TV, or ix) a telephone. People living in households with very low work intensity are those aged 0-59 living in households where the adults (aged 18-59) work less than 20percent of their total work potential during the past year.

## 3.1.3 Digital Society and Economy

This category includes variables related to internet use and the use of the internet for economic purposes, such as purchases or banking.

### 3.1.3.1 Percentage of households with broadband internet access (eu\_is\_bacc)

*Long tag:* qog\_eureg\_long\_eu\_is\_bacc

*Original tag:* eu\_is\_bacc

*Dataset citation:* Charron et al. (2020)

*Variable citation:* European Commission (2023)

*Merge scores:*

*Non-missing observations in original unit:* Sum: 0, Percent: 0

*Non-missing observations in chosen unit:* Sum: 440, Percent: 1.48

*Description:*

Percentage of households with broadband internet access. Data given in this domain are collected annually by the National Statistical Institutes and are based on Eurostat's annual model questionnaires on ICT (Information and Communication Technologies) usage in households and by individuals. The survey comprises questions at household level and individual level. The population of households consists of all private households having at least one member in the age group 16 to 74 years. The population of individuals consists of all individuals aged 16 to 74 (on an optional basis some countries collect separate data on other age groups, individuals aged 15 years or less, aged 75 or more). Regional breakdowns have been provided on a voluntary basis for 2006 and 2007 according to NUTS1 or NUTS2 by several countries. Starting from 2008, the collection of NUTS1 breakdowns is obligatory (regional breakdowns for all countries are available) while NUTS2 breakdowns are still optional.

### 3.1.3.2 Percentage of individuals using internet to interact with public authorities (eu\_iu\_govform)

*Long tag:* qog\_eureg\_long\_eu\_iu\_govform

*Original tag:* eu\_iu\_govform

*Dataset citation:* Charron et al. (2020)

*Variable citation:* European Commission (2023)

*Merge scores:*

*Non-missing observations in original unit:* Sum: 0, Percent: 0

*Non-missing observations in chosen unit:* Sum: 378, Percent: 1.27

*Description:*

Percentage of individuals using the internet to interact with public authorities. Data given in this domain are collected annually by the National Statistical Institutes and are based on Eurostat's annual model questionnaires on ICT (Information and Communication Technologies) usage in households and by individuals. The survey comprises questions at household level and individual level. The population of households consists of all private households having at least one member in the age group 16 to 74 years. The population of individuals consists of all individuals aged 16 to 74 (on an optional basis some countries collect separate data on other age groups, individuals aged 15 years or less, aged 75 or more). Regional breakdowns have been provided on a voluntary basis for 2006 and 2007 according to NUTS1 or NUTS2 by several countries. Starting from 2008, the collection of NUTS1 breakdowns is obligatory (regional breakdowns for all countries are available) while NUTS2 breakdowns are still optional.

### 3.1.3.3 Percentage of individuals using internet to submit forms to authorities (eu\_iu\_govint)

*Long tag:* qog\_eureg\_long\_eu\_iu\_govint

*Original tag:* eu\_iu\_govint

*Dataset citation:* Charron et al. (2020)

*Variable citation:* European Commission (2023)

*Merge scores:*

*Non-missing observations in original unit:* Sum: 0, Percent: 0

*Non-missing observations in chosen unit:* Sum: 377, Percent: 1.27

*Description:*

Percentage of individuals using the internet to submit forms to authorities. Data given in this domain are collected annually by the National Statistical Institutes and are based on Eurostat's annual model questionnaires on ICT (Information and Communication Technologies) usage in households and by individuals. The survey comprises questions at household level and individual level. The population of households consists of all private households having at least one member in the age group 16 to 74 years. The population of individuals consists of all individuals aged 16 to 74 (on an optional basis some countries collect separate data on other age groups, individuals aged 15 years or less, aged 75 or more). Regional breakdowns have been provided on a voluntary basis for 2006 and 2007 according to NUTS1 or NUTS2 by several countries. Starting from 2008, the collection of NUTS1 breakdowns is obligatory (regional breakdowns for all countries are available) while NUTS2 breakdowns are still optional.

**3.1.3.4 Percentage of households with internet access (eu\_is\_iacc)**

*Long tag:* qog\_eureg\_long\_eu\_is\_iacc

*Original tag:* eu\_is\_iacc

*Dataset citation:* Charron et al. (2020)

*Variable citation:* European Commission (2023)

*Merge scores:*

*Non-missing observations in original unit:* Sum: 0, Percent: 0

*Non-missing observations in chosen unit:* Sum: 441, Percent: 1.48

*Description:*

Percentage of households with internet access. Data given in this domain are collected annually by the National Statistical Institutes and are based on Eurostat's annual model questionnaires on ICT (Information and Communication Technologies) usage in households and by individuals. The survey comprises questions at household level and individual level. The population of households consists of all private households having at least one member in the age group 16 to 74 years. The population of individuals consists of all individuals aged 16 to 74 (on an optional basis some countries collect separate data on other age groups, individuals aged 15 years or less, aged 75 or more). Regional breakdowns have been provided on a voluntary basis for 2006 and 2007 according to NUTS1 or NUTS2 by several countries. Starting from 2008, the collection of NUTS1 breakdowns is obligatory (regional breakdowns for all countries are available) while NUTS2 breakdowns are still optional.

**3.1.3.5 Individuals who accessed internet away from home or work, percent (eu\_iu\_ohw)**

*Long tag:* qog\_eureg\_long\_eu\_iu\_ohw

*Original tag:* eu\_iu\_ohw

*Dataset citation:* Charron et al. (2020)

*Variable citation:* European Commission (2023)

*Merge scores:*

*Non-missing observations in original unit:* Sum: 0, Percent: 0

*Non-missing observations in chosen unit:* Sum: 254, Percent: 0.85

*Description:*

Percentage of individuals who accessed the internet away from home or work. Data given in this domain are collected annually by the National Statistical Institutes and are based on Eurostat's annual model questionnaires on ICT (Information and Communication Technologies) usage in households and by individuals. The survey comprises questions at household level and individual level. The population of households consists of all private households having at least one member in the age group 16 to 74 years. The population of individuals consists of all individuals aged 16 to 74 (on an optional basis some countries collect separate data on other age groups, individuals aged 15 years or less, aged 75 or more). Regional breakdowns have been provided on a voluntary basis for 2006 and 2007 according to NUTS1 or NUTS2 by several countries. Starting from 2008, the collection of NUTS1 breakdowns is obligatory (regional

breakdowns for all countries are available) while NUTS2 breakdowns are still optional.

### 3.1.3.6 Individuals who accessed internet away from home or work in the last 3 months, percent (eu\_iu\_ohw3)

*Long tag:* qog\_eureg\_long\_eu\_iu\_ohw3

*Original tag:* eu\_iu\_ohw3

*Dataset citation:* Charron et al. (2020)

*Variable citation:* European Commission (2023)

*Merge scores:*

*Non-missing observations in original unit:* Sum: 0, Percent: 0

*Non-missing observations in chosen unit:* Sum: 254, Percent: 0.85

*Description:*

Percentage of individuals who accessed the internet away from home or work in the last 3 months. Data given in this domain are collected annually by the National Statistical Institutes and are based on Eurostat's annual model questionnaires on ICT (Information and Communication Technologies) usage in households and by individuals. The survey comprises questions at household level and individual level. The population of households consists of all private households having at least one member in the age group 16 to 74 years. The population of individuals consists of all individuals aged 16 to 74 (on an optional basis some countries collect separate data on other age groups, individuals aged 15 years or less, aged 75 or more). Regional breakdowns have been provided on a voluntary basis for 2006 and 2007 according to NUTS1 or NUTS2 by several countries. Starting from 2008, the collection of NUTS1 breakdowns is obligatory (regional breakdowns for all countries are available) while NUTS2 breakdowns are still optional.

### 3.1.3.7 Frequency of internet access: daily (eu\_iu\_iday)

*Long tag:* qog\_eureg\_long\_eu\_iu\_iday

*Original tag:* eu\_iu\_iday

*Dataset citation:* Charron et al. (2020)

*Variable citation:* European Commission (2023)

*Merge scores:*

*Non-missing observations in original unit:* Sum: 0, Percent: 0

*Non-missing observations in chosen unit:* Sum: 441, Percent: 1.48

*Description:*

Percentage of individuals using the internet on a daily basis. Data given in this domain are collected annually by the National Statistical Institutes and are based on Eurostat's annual model questionnaires on ICT (Information and Communication Technologies) usage in households and by individuals. The survey comprises questions at household level and individual level. The population of households consists of all private households having at least one member in the age group 16 to 74 years. The population of individuals consists of all individuals aged 16 to 74 (on an optional basis some countries collect separate data on other age groups, individuals aged 15 years or less, aged 75 or more). Regional breakdowns have been provided on a voluntary basis for 2006 and 2007 according to NUTS1 or NUTS2 by several countries. Starting from 2008, the collection of NUTS1 breakdowns is obligatory (regional breakdowns for all countries are available) while NUTS2 breakdowns are still optional.

### 3.1.3.8 Last internet use: in the last 12 months (eu\_iu\_ilt12)

*Long tag:* qog\_eureg\_long\_eu\_iu\_ilt12

*Original tag:* eu\_iu\_ilt12

*Dataset citation:* Charron et al. (2020)

*Variable citation:* European Commission (2023)

*Merge scores:*

*Non-missing observations in original unit:* Sum: 0, Percent: 0

*Non-missing observations in chosen unit:* Sum: 439, Percent: 1.47

*Description:*

Percentage of individuals who used the internet in the last 12 months. Data given in this domain are collected annually by the National Statistical Institutes and are based on Eurostat's annual model questionnaires on ICT (Information and Communication Technologies) usage in households and by individuals. The survey comprises questions at household level and individual level. The population of households consists of all private households having at least one member in the age group 16 to 74 years. The population of individuals consists of all individuals aged 16 to 74 (on an optional basis some countries collect separate data on other age groups, individuals aged 15 years or less, aged 75 or more). Regional breakdowns have been provided on a voluntary basis for 2006 and 2007 according to NUTS1 or NUTS2 by several countries. Starting from 2008, the collection of NUTS1 breakdowns is obligatory (regional breakdowns for all countries are available) while NUTS2 breakdowns are still optional.

### 3.1.3.9 Last internet use: in last 3 months (eu\_iu\_iu3)

*Long tag:* qog\_eureg\_long\_eu\_iu\_iu3

*Original tag:* eu\_iu\_iu3

*Dataset citation:* Charron et al. (2020)

*Variable citation:* European Commission (2023)

*Merge scores:*

*Non-missing observations in original unit:* Sum: 0, Percent: 0

*Non-missing observations in chosen unit:* Sum: 441, Percent: 1.48

*Description:*

Percentage of individuals who used the internet in the last 3 months. Data given in this domain are collected annually by the National Statistical Institutes and are based on Eurostat's annual model questionnaires on ICT (Information and Communication Technologies) usage in households and by individuals. The survey comprises questions at household level and individual level. The population of households consists of all private households having at least one member in the age group 16 to 74 years. The population of individuals consists of all individuals aged 16 to 74 (on an optional basis some countries collect separate data on other age groups, individuals aged 15 years or less, aged 75 or more). Regional breakdowns have been provided on a voluntary basis for 2006 and 2007 according to NUTS1 or NUTS2 by several countries. Starting from 2008, the collection of NUTS1 breakdowns is obligatory (regional breakdowns for all countries are available) while NUTS2 breakdowns are still optional.

### 3.1.3.10 Internet use: Internet banking (eu\_iu\_iubk)

*Long tag:* qog\_eureg\_long\_eu\_iu\_iubk

*Original tag:* eu\_iu\_iubk

*Dataset citation:* Charron et al. (2020)

*Variable citation:* European Commission (2023)

*Merge scores:*

*Non-missing observations in original unit:* Sum: 0, Percent: 0

*Non-missing observations in chosen unit:* Sum: 441, Percent: 1.48

*Description:*

Percentage of individuals using the internet banking. Data given in this domain are collected annually by the National Statistical Institutes and are based on Eurostat's annual model questionnaires on ICT (Information and Communication Technologies) usage in households and by individuals. The survey comprises questions at household level and individual level. The population of households consists of all private households having at least one member in the age group 16 to 74 years. The population of individuals consists of all individuals aged 16 to 74 (on an optional basis some countries collect separate data on other age groups, individuals aged 15 years or less, aged 75 or more). Regional breakdowns have been provided on a voluntary basis for 2006 and 2007 according to NUTS1 or NUTS2 by several countries.

Starting from 2008, the collection of NUTS1 breakdowns is obligatory (regional breakdowns for all countries are available) while NUTS2 breakdowns are still optional.

### 3.1.3.11 Internet use: civic or political participation (eu\_iu\_iucpp)

*Long tag:* qog\_eureg\_long\_eu\_iu\_iucpp

*Original tag:* eu\_iu\_iucpp

*Dataset citation:* Charron et al. (2020)

*Variable citation:* European Commission (2023)

*Merge scores:*

*Non-missing observations in original unit:* Sum: 0, Percent: 0

*Non-missing observations in chosen unit:* Sum: 129, Percent: 0.43

*Description:*

Percentage of individuals using the internet for civic and political participation. Data given in this domain are collected annually by the National Statistical Institutes and are based on Eurostat's annual model questionnaires on ICT (Information and Communication Technologies) usage in households and by individuals. The survey comprises questions at household level and individual level. The population of households consists of all private households having at least one member in the age group 16 to 74 years. The population of individuals consists of all individuals aged 16 to 74 (on an optional basis some countries collect separate data on other age groups, individuals aged 15 years or less, aged 75 or more). Regional breakdowns have been provided on a voluntary basis for 2006 and 2007 according to NUTS1 or NUTS2 by several countries. Starting from 2008, the collection of NUTS1 breakdowns is obligatory (regional breakdowns for all countries are available) while NUTS2 breakdowns are still optional.

### 3.1.3.12 Frequency of internet access: once a week (including every day) (eu\_iu\_iuse)

*Long tag:* qog\_eureg\_long\_eu\_iu\_iuse

*Original tag:* eu\_iu\_iuse

*Dataset citation:* Charron et al. (2020)

*Variable citation:* European Commission (2023)

*Merge scores:*

*Non-missing observations in original unit:* Sum: 0, Percent: 0

*Non-missing observations in chosen unit:* Sum: 441, Percent: 1.48

*Description:*

Percentage of individuals using the internet at least once a week. Data given in this domain are collected annually by the National Statistical Institutes and are based on Eurostat's annual model questionnaires on ICT (Information and Communication Technologies) usage in households and by individuals. The survey comprises questions at household level and individual level. The population of households consists of all private households having at least one member in the age group 16 to 74 years. The population of individuals consists of all individuals aged 16 to 74 (on an optional basis some countries collect separate data on other age groups, individuals aged 15 years or less, aged 75 or more). Regional breakdowns have been provided on a voluntary basis for 2006 and 2007 according to NUTS1 or NUTS2 by several countries. Starting from 2008, the collection of NUTS1 breakdowns is obligatory (regional breakdowns for all countries are available) while NUTS2 breakdowns are still optional.

### 3.1.3.13 Internet use: selling goods or services (eu\_iu\_iusell)

*Long tag:* qog\_eureg\_long\_eu\_iu\_iusell

*Original tag:* eu\_iu\_iusell

*Dataset citation:* Charron et al. (2020)

*Variable citation:* European Commission (2023)

*Merge scores:*

*Non-missing observations in original unit:* Sum: 0, Percent: 0

*Non-missing observations in chosen unit:* Sum: 430, Percent: 1.44

*Description:*

Percentage of individuals using the internet to sell goods or services. Data given in this domain are collected annually by the National Statistical Institutes and are based on Eurostat's annual model questionnaires on ICT (Information and Communication Technologies) usage in households and by individuals. The survey comprises questions at household level and individual level. The population of households consists of all private households having at least one member in the age group 16 to 74 years. The population of individuals consists of all individuals aged 16 to 74 (on an optional basis some countries collect separate data on other age groups, individuals aged 15 years or less, aged 75 or more). Regional breakdowns have been provided on a voluntary basis for 2006 and 2007 according to NUTS1 or NUTS2 by several countries. Starting from 2008, the collection of NUTS1 breakdowns is obligatory (regional breakdowns for all countries are available) while NUTS2 breakdowns are still optional.

#### **3.1.3.14 Internet use: participating in social networks (eu\_iu\_iusnet)**

*Long tag:* qog\_eureg\_long\_eu\_iu\_iusnet

*Original tag:* eu\_iu\_iusnet

*Dataset citation:* Charron et al. (2020)

*Variable citation:* European Commission (2023)

*Merge scores:*

*Non-missing observations in original unit:* Sum: 0, Percent: 0

*Non-missing observations in chosen unit:* Sum: 255, Percent: 0.86

*Description:*

Percentage of individuals using the internet to participate in social networks. Data given in this domain are collected annually by the National Statistical Institutes and are based on Eurostat's annual model questionnaires on ICT (Information and Communication Technologies) usage in households and by individuals. The survey comprises questions at household level and individual level. The population of households consists of all private households having at least one member in the age group 16 to 74 years. The population of individuals consists of all individuals aged 16 to 74 (on an optional basis some countries collect separate data on other age groups, individuals aged 15 years or less, aged 75 or more). Regional breakdowns have been provided on a voluntary basis for 2006 and 2007 according to NUTS1 or NUTS2 by several countries. Starting from 2008, the collection of NUTS1 breakdowns is obligatory (regional breakdowns for all countries are available) while NUTS2 breakdowns are still optional.

#### **3.1.3.15 Internet use: never (eu\_iu\_iux)**

*Long tag:* qog\_eureg\_long\_eu\_iu\_iux

*Original tag:* eu\_iu\_iux

*Dataset citation:* Charron et al. (2020)

*Variable citation:* European Commission (2023)

*Merge scores:*

*Non-missing observations in original unit:* Sum: 0, Percent: 0

*Non-missing observations in chosen unit:* Sum: 441, Percent: 1.48

*Description:*

Percentage of individuals who have never used the internet. Data given in this domain are collected annually by the National Statistical Institutes and are based on Eurostat's annual model questionnaires on ICT (Information and Communication Technologies) usage in households and by individuals. The survey comprises questions at household level and individual level. The population of households consists of all private households having at least one member in the age group 16 to 74 years. The population of individuals consists of



all individuals aged 16 to 74 (on an optional basis some countries collect separate data on other age groups, individuals aged 15 years or less, aged 75 or more). Regional breakdowns have been provided on a voluntary basis for 2006 and 2007 according to NUTS1 or NUTS2 by several countries. Starting from 2008, the collection of NUTS1 breakdowns is obligatory (regional breakdowns for all countries are available) while NUTS2 breakdowns are still optional.

### 3.1.4 Labour Market Statistics

This category includes variables about employment and unemployment rates, in general, as well as in subgroups of the population.

#### 3.1.4.1 Employment in information and communication, in thousands (eu\_emp\_j)

*Long tag:* qog\_eureg\_long\_eu\_emp\_j

*Original tag:* eu\_emp\_j

*Dataset citation:* Charron et al. (2020)

*Variable citation:* European Commission (2023)

*Merge scores:*

*Non-missing observations in original unit:* Sum: 0, Percent: 0

*Non-missing observations in chosen unit:* Sum: 365, Percent: 1.23

*Description:*

Employment in information and communication, in thousands. The source for the regional labour market information is the EU Labour Force Survey (EU-LFS). This is a quarterly household sample survey conducted in all Member States of the EU, the United Kingdom, EFTA and Candidate Countries (Montenegro, North Macedonia, Serbia and Turkey). The definitions of employment and unemployment, as well as other survey characteristics follow the definitions and recommendations of the International Labour Organisation (ILO). The definition of unemployment is further specified in Commission Regulation (EC) No 1897/2000.

## 3.2 QoG Standard Dataset Time-Series

*Dataset tag:* qog\_std\_ts

*Output Unit:* QoG Country-Year, i.e., data is collected per country and year.

*Description:* The QoG Standard dataset is our largest dataset. It consists of approximately 2100 variables from more than 100 data sources related to Quality of Government. In the QoG Standard TS dataset, data from 1946 to 2023 is included and the unit of analysis is country-year (e.g., Sweden-1946, Sweden-1947, etc.).

*Dataset citation:* Teorell, Jan, Aksel Sundström, Sören Holmberg, Bo Rothstein, Natalia Alvarado Pachon, Cem Mert Dalli, Rafael Lopez Valverde Paula Nilsson. 2024. The Quality of Government Standard Dataset, version Jan24. University of Gothenburg: The Quality of Government Institute, <https://www.gu.se/en/quality-government> doi:10.18157/qogstdjan24

*Link to original codebook*

[https://www.qogdata.pol.gu.se/data/codebook\\_std\\_jan24.pdf](https://www.qogdata.pol.gu.se/data/codebook_std_jan24.pdf)

*License:* The QoG datasets are open and available, free of charge and without a need to register your data. You can use them for your analysis, graphs, teaching, and other academic-related and non-commercial purposes. We ask our users to cite always the original source(s) of the data and our datasets.

We do not allow other uses of these data including but not limited to redistribution, commercialization and other for-profit usage. If a user is interested in such use or has doubts about the license, they will have to refer to the original source and check with them if this is allowed and

what requirements they need to fulfill.

Be mindful that the original data sources are the only owners of their data and they can adjust their license without previous warning.

More detailed information on the dataset can be found at the following web page:  
<https://www.gu.se/en/quality-government/qog-data/data-downloads/standard-dataset>

### 3.2.1 Media

This category includes indicators on the freedom of the media in a given country (freedom of the press, regulation of the media) as well as the public access and confidence in the media.

#### 3.2.1.1 Practice: candidates/pol. parties have fair access to state-owned media outlets (aii\_q23)

*Long tag:* qog\_std\_ts\_aii\_q23

*Original tag:* aii\_q23

*Dataset citation:* Teorell et al. (2024)

*Variable citation:* Global Integrity and African Institute for Development Policy (2023)

*Merge scores:*

*Non-missing observations in original unit:* Sum: 486, Percent: 3.93

*Non-missing observations in chosen unit:* Sum: 468, Percent: 1.57

*Lost observations in chosen unit:* Sum: 18 Percent: 3.7

*Description:*

Sub-score (0-100). Question no. 23. In practice, candidates/political parties have equitable access to state-owned media outlets.

A 100 score is earned where all the following conditions are met:

- 1) candidates/political parties have equal access to and receive fair treatment in state-owned media outlets,
- 2) access is equal in both news reports and editorial commentary, and
- 3) candidates/political parties are offered the same rates for campaign advertising.

A 50 score is earned where any of the following conditions apply:

- 1) some candidates/political parties occasionally have more access to and receive better treatment in state-owned media outlets,
- 2) access is occasionally unequal in either news reports or editorial commentary, or
- 3) occasionally a candidate/political party is offered better rates for campaign advertising.

A 0 score is earned where at least one of the following conditions apply:

- 1) some candidates/political parties usually have more access to and/or receive better treatment in state-owned media outlets,
- 2) access is usually unequal in both news reports or editorial commentary, or
- 3) some candidates/political parties are usually offered better rates for campaign advertising.

#### 3.2.1.2 Practice: media organizations disclose their owner's identities to the public (aii\_q52)

*Long tag:* qog\_std\_ts\_aii\_q52

*Original tag:* aii\_q52

*Dataset citation:* Teorell et al. (2024)

*Variable citation:* Global Integrity and African Institute for Development Policy (2023)

*Merge scores:*

*Non-missing observations in original unit:* Sum: 486, Percent: 3.93

*Non-missing observations in chosen unit:* Sum: 468, Percent: 1.57

*Lost observations in chosen unit:* Sum: 18 Percent: 3.7

*Description:*

Sub-score (0-100). Question no. 52. In practice, media organizations (print, broadcast, online) disclose the identities of their owners to the public.

A 100 score is earned where all the following conditions are met:

- 1) major media organizations disclose the names of their owners to the public, and
- 2) the information is readily available to any citizen (online, in the newspaper, etc.).

A 50 score is earned where any of the following conditions apply:

- 1) only some major media organizations disclose the name of their owners or they disclose only some of the owners, or
- 2) the information is public but obtaining it takes two weeks or more.

A 0 score is earned where at least one of the following conditions apply:

- 1) major media organizations don't disclose the names of their owners, or
- 2) the information is available only to the government.

### **3.2.1.3 Practice: journalists \ and editors adhere to professional practices in reporting (aii\_q53)**

*Long tag:* qog\_std\_ts\_aii\_q53

*Original tag:* aii\_q53

*Dataset citation:* Teorell et al. (2024)

*Variable citation:* Global Integrity and African Institute for Development Policy (2023)

*Merge scores:*

*Non-missing observations in original unit:* Sum: 486, Percent: 3.93

*Non-missing observations in chosen unit:* Sum: 468, Percent: 1.57

*Lost observations in chosen unit:* Sum: 18 Percent: 3.7

*Description:*

Sub-score (0-100). Question no. 53. In practice, journalists and editors adhere to strict, professional practices in their reporting.

A 100 score is earned where all the following conditions are met:

- 1) major media organizations have a formal document with standards guiding journalistic work (Code of Ethics, Editorial Guidelines, Statement of Principles, Code of Conduct, etc.),
- 2) the document codifies standards for the use of anonymous sources, conflicts of interest, and impartiality, and
- 3) major media organizations enforce this document.

A 50 score is earned where any of the following conditions apply:

- 1) some but not all major media organizations have a formal document,
- 2) the formal document contains only one of the three aspects mentioned in 100 (use of anonymous sources, conflicts of interest, and impartiality), or
- 3) major media organizations enforce this document but some exceptions exist.

A 0 score is earned where at least one of the following conditions apply:

- 1) most major media organizations lack a formal document,
- 2) the formal document is vague and doesn't provide guidance on use of anonymous sources, conflicts of interest, and impartiality, or
- 3) major media organizations rarely or never enforce this document.

**3.2.1.4 Law: it's legal to report accurate news even if it damages pub. figures' reput. (aai\_q54)**

*Long tag:* qog\_std\_ts\_aai\_q54

*Original tag:* aai\_q54

*Dataset citation:* Teorell et al. (2024)

*Variable citation:* Global Integrity and African Institute for Development Policy (2023)

*Merge scores:*

*Non-missing observations in original unit:* Sum: 270, Percent: 2.18

*Non-missing observations in chosen unit:* Sum: 260, Percent: 0.87

*Lost observations in chosen unit:* Sum: 10 Percent: 3.7

*Description:*

Sub-score (0-100). Question no. 54. In law, it is legal to report accurate news even if it damages the reputation of a public figure.

A 100 score is earned where all the following conditions are met:

- 1) it is legal to report accurate information on public figures regardless of the damage to their reputations,
- 2) journalists can only be convicted if malice is proved (a story was published even though the journalist knew it was false or didn't try to verify it).

Note: Public figures include anyone in a position of responsibility in the government or civil service; political leaders; and leaders of civil society organizations, religious groups, trade unions, or large businesses.

A 0 score is earned where no such law exists, or a law exists but it doesn't include all the conditions described in 100. A 0 score is also earned where the law establishes the presumption of bad faith for all comments deemed defamatory and/or the burden of proof falls to journalists.

**3.2.1.5 Practice: the government does not promote the media's self-censorship (aai\_q55)**

*Long tag:* qog\_std\_ts\_aai\_q55

*Original tag:* aai\_q55

*Dataset citation:* Teorell et al. (2024)

*Variable citation:* Global Integrity and African Institute for Development Policy (2023)

*Merge scores:*

*Non-missing observations in original unit:* Sum: 486, Percent: 3.93

*Non-missing observations in chosen unit:* Sum: 468, Percent: 1.57

*Lost observations in chosen unit:* Sum: 18 Percent: 3.7

*Description:*

Sub-score (0-100). Question no. 55. In practice, there is no prior government restraint (pre-publication censoring) and the government doesn't promote the media's self-censorship.

A 100 score is earned where all the following conditions are met:

- 1) the government never prevents the publication of information, and
- 2) the government doesn't promote the media's self-censorship (e.g. with threats, discrimination in the application of tax laws, government advertising, etc.).

A 50 score is earned where any of the following conditions apply:

- 1) the government occasionally prevents the publication of information, or
- 2) it occasionally encourages the media to self-censor (e.g. with threats, discrimination in the application of tax laws, government advertising, etc.).

A 0 score is earned where at least one of the following conditions apply:

- 1) the government usually prevents the publication of information, or
- 2) it usually encourages the media to self-censor (e.g. with threats, discrimination in the application of tax laws, government advertising, etc.).

### 3.2.1.6 Practice: ministries and autonomous agencies have websites (aii\_q58)

*Long tag:* qog\_std\_ts\_aii\_q58

*Original tag:* aii\_q58

*Dataset citation:* Teorell et al. (2024)

*Variable citation:* Global Integrity and African Institute for Development Policy (2023)

*Merge scores:*

*Non-missing observations in original unit:* Sum: 270, Percent: 2.18

*Non-missing observations in chosen unit:* Sum: 260, Percent: 0.87

*Lost observations in chosen unit:* Sum: 10 Percent: 3.7

*Description:*

Sub-score (0-100). Question no. 58. In practice, ministries and autonomous agencies have websites.

A 100 score is earned where all the following conditions are met:

- 1) all ministries and autonomous agencies (public service providers) have websites, and
- 2) are updated at least once a month.

A 50 score is earned where any of the following conditions apply:

- 1) about half of the ministries and autonomous agencies (public service providers) have websites, or
- 2) the websites are updated less than once a month.

A 0 score is earned where less than 10percent of the ministries and autonomous agencies (public service providers) have websites.

### 3.2.1.7 Practice: the public services regulatory agencies have websites (aii\_q59)

*Long tag:* qog\_std\_ts\_aii\_q59

*Original tag:* aii\_q59

*Dataset citation:* Teorell et al. (2024)

*Variable citation:* Global Integrity and African Institute for Development Policy (2023)

*Merge scores:*

*Non-missing observations in original unit:* Sum: 270, Percent: 2.18

*Non-missing observations in chosen unit:* Sum: 260, Percent: 0.87

*Lost observations in chosen unit:* Sum: 10 Percent: 3.7

*Description:*

Sub-score (0-100). Question no. 59. In practice, the public services regulatory agencies and the national ombudsman (when and if there is one) have websites.

A 100 score is earned where all the following conditions are met:

- 1) all the public services regulatory agencies and the national ombudsman (if one exists) have websites,
- 2) the websites inform users of their rights and how to exercise them in a way that is easy to grasp for users with limited education, and
- 3) the websites allow users to file complaints online. Note: other digital methods to file complaints, such as mobile apps or phone lines, can also be considered for this indicator.

A 50 score is earned where any of the following conditions apply:

- 1) some but not all the public services regulatory agencies and the national ombudsman have websites,
- 2) the websites contain little information about users' rights and how to exercise them or the information is difficult to grasp for users with limited education, or
- 3) the websites don't allow users to file complaints online.

A 0 score is earned where at least one of the following conditions apply:

- 1) the public services regulatory agencies and the national ombudsman lack websites, or
- 2) the websites generally lack basic information about users' rights or how to exercise them.

#### **3.2.1.8 Telecommunication Infrastructure Index (egov\_tii)**

*Long tag:* qog\_std\_ts\_egov\_tii

*Original tag:* egov\_tii

*Dataset citation:* Teorell et al. (2024)

*Variable citation:* Department of Economic and Social Affairs (2022)

*Merge scores:*

*Non-missing observations in original unit:* Sum: 2112, Percent: 17.09

*Non-missing observations in chosen unit:* Sum: 1853, Percent: 6.22

*Lost observations in chosen unit:* Sum: 259 Percent: 12.26

*Description:*

The Telecommunication Infrastructure Index is an arithmetic average composite of four indicators:

- (i) estimated internet users per 100 inhabitants;
- (ii) number of mobile subscribers per 100 inhabitants;
- (iii) active mobile-broadband subscription; and
- (iv) number of fixed broadband subscriptions per 100 inhabitants.

The International Telecommunication Union is the primary source of data in each case. Data for each component was extracted from the ITU source.

### 3.2.1.9 Freedom on the Net: Limits on content (fhn\_fotnloc)

*Long tag:* qog\_std\_ts\_fhn\_fotnloc

*Original tag:* fhn\_fotnloc

*Dataset citation:* Teorell et al. (2024)

*Variable citation:* Funk, Allie and Shahbaz, Adrian and Vesteinsson, Kian (n.d.)

*Merge scores:*

*Non-missing observations in original unit:* Sum: 739, Percent: 5.98

*Non-missing observations in chosen unit:* Sum: 728, Percent: 2.44

*Lost observations in chosen unit:* Sum: 11 Percent: 1.49

*Description:*

Limits on Content: Analyzes legal regulations on content, technical filtering and blocking of websites, self-censorship, the vibrancy/diversity of online news media, and the use of digital tools for civic mobilization. The score goes from 0 to 100, where 100 represents worst outcomes.

Please note that the values have changed from previous versions of QoG data given that Freedom House now provides a document with the vlaues for all years and these are different for the first years of the score.

### 3.2.1.10 Freedom on the Net: Obstacles to Access (fhn\_fotnota)

*Long tag:* qog\_std\_ts\_fhn\_fotnota

*Original tag:* fhn\_fotnota

*Dataset citation:* Teorell et al. (2024)

*Variable citation:* Funk, Allie and Shahbaz, Adrian and Vesteinsson, Kian (n.d.)

*Merge scores:*

*Non-missing observations in original unit:* Sum: 739, Percent: 5.98

*Non-missing observations in chosen unit:* Sum: 728, Percent: 2.44

*Lost observations in chosen unit:* Sum: 11 Percent: 1.49

*Description:*

Obstacles to Access: Details infrastructural and economic barriers to access, legal and ownership control over internet service providers, and independence of regulatory bodies. The score goes from 0 to 100, where 100 represents worst outcomes.

Please note that the values have changed from previous versions of QoG data given that Freedom House now provides a document with the vlaues for all years and these are different for the first years of the score.

### 3.2.1.11 Freedom on the Net: Score (fhn\_fotnsc)

*Long tag:* qog\_std\_ts\_fhn\_fotnsc

*Original tag:* fhn\_fotnsc

*Dataset citation:* Teorell et al. (2024)

*Variable citation:* Funk, Allie and Shahbaz, Adrian and Vesteinsson, Kian (n.d.)

*Merge scores:*

*Non-missing observations in original unit:* Sum: 739, Percent: 5.98

*Non-missing observations in chosen unit:* Sum: 728, Percent: 2.44

*Lost observations in chosen unit:* Sum: 11 Percent: 1.49

*Description:*

Freedom on the Net, Score: Measures the subtle and not-so-subtle ways that governments and non-state actors around the world restrict our intrinsic rights online by looking at Obstacles to Access, Limits on Content and Violations of User Rights. The scores are based

on a scale of 0 to 100 with 0 representing the best level of freedom on the net progress and 100 the worst.

Please note that the values have changed from previous versions of QoG data given that Freedom House now provides a document with the vlaues for all years and these are different for the first years of the score.

#### **3.2.1.12 Freedom on the Net: Status (fhn\_fotnst)**

*Long tag:* qog\_std\_ts\_fhn\_fotnst

*Original tag:* fhn\_fotnst

*Dataset citation:* Teorell et al. (2024)

*Variable citation:* Funk, Allie and Shahbaz, Adrian and Vesteinsson, Kian (n.d.)

*Merge scores:*

*Non-missing observations in original unit:* Sum: 739, Percent: 5.98

*Non-missing observations in chosen unit:* Sum: 728, Percent: 2.44

*Lost observations in chosen unit:* Sum: 11 Percent: 1.49

*Description:*

Freedom on the Net, Status:

1. Free
2. Partly Free
3. Not Free

#### **3.2.1.13 Freedom on the Net: Violation of Users' rights (fhn\_fotnvur)**

*Long tag:* qog\_std\_ts\_fhn\_fotnvur

*Original tag:* fhn\_fotnvur

*Dataset citation:* Teorell et al. (2024)

*Variable citation:* Funk, Allie and Shahbaz, Adrian and Vesteinsson, Kian (n.d.)

*Merge scores:*

*Non-missing observations in original unit:* Sum: 739, Percent: 5.98

*Non-missing observations in chosen unit:* Sum: 728, Percent: 2.44

*Lost observations in chosen unit:* Sum: 11 Percent: 1.49

*Description:*

Violations of User Rights: Tackles surveillance, privacy, and repercussions for online speech and activities, such as imprisonment, extralegal harassment, or cyberattacks. The score goes from 0 to 100, where 100 represents worst outcomes.

Please note that the values have changed from previous versions of QoG data given that Freedom House now provides a document with the vlaues for all years and these are different for the first years of the score.

#### **3.2.1.14 Economic Influences over Media Content (2001-2016) (fhp\_mcei5)**

*Long tag:* qog\_std\_ts\_fhp\_mcei5

*Original tag:* fhp\_mcei5

*Dataset citation:* Teorell et al. (2024)

*Variable citation:* Freedom House (2017)

*Merge scores:*

*Non-missing observations in original unit:* Sum: 3081, Percent: 24.93

*Non-missing observations in chosen unit:* Sum: 2687, Percent: 9.02

*Lost observations in chosen unit:* Sum: 394 Percent: 12.79



*Description:*

Economic Influences over Media Content (2001-2016). This category includes the structure of media ownership, transparency and concentration of ownership, the costs of establishing media as well as any impediments to news production and distribution, the selective withholding of advertising or subsidies by the state or other actors, the impact of corruption and bribery on content, and the extent to which the economic situation in a country or territory affects the development and sustainability of the media.

**3.2.1.15 Economic Influences over Broadcast Media Content (1993-1995) (fhp\_mceib3)**

*Long tag:* qog\_std\_ts\_fhp\_mceib3

*Original tag:* fhp\_mceib3

*Dataset citation:* Teorell et al. (2024)

*Variable citation:* Freedom House (2017)

*Merge scores:*

*Non-missing observations in original unit:* Sum: 550, Percent: 4.45

*Non-missing observations in chosen unit:* Sum: 490, Percent: 1.64

*Lost observations in chosen unit:* Sum: 60 Percent: 10.91

*Description:*

Economic Influences over Media Content: Broadcast Media (1993-1995): The third sub-category examines the economic environment for the media. This includes the structure of media ownership, transparency and concentration of ownership, the costs of establishing media as well as any impediments to news production and distribution, the selective withholding of advertising or subsidies by the state or other actors, the impact of corruption and bribery on content, and the extent to which the economic situation in a country impacts the development of the media. The scale of the variable is 0-20. 0 indicates more freedom.

**3.2.1.16 Economic Influences over Broadcast Media Content (1996-2000) (fhp\_mceib4)**

*Long tag:* qog\_std\_ts\_fhp\_mceib4

*Original tag:* fhp\_mceib4

*Dataset citation:* Teorell et al. (2024)

*Variable citation:* Freedom House (2017)

*Merge scores:*

*Non-missing observations in original unit:* Sum: 925, Percent: 7.49

*Non-missing observations in chosen unit:* Sum: 825, Percent: 2.77

*Lost observations in chosen unit:* Sum: 100 Percent: 10.81

*Description:*

Economic Influences over Media Content: Broadcast Media (1996-2000): The third sub-category examines the economic environment for the media. This includes the structure of media ownership, transparency and concentration of ownership, the costs of establishing media as well as any impediments to news production and distribution, the selective withholding of advertising or subsidies by the state or other actors, the impact of corruption and bribery on content, and the extent to which the economic situation in a country impacts the development of the media. The scale of the variable is 0-30. 0 indicates more freedom.

**3.2.1.17 Economic Influences over Print Media Content (1993-1995) (fhp\_mceip3)**

*Long tag:* qog\_std\_ts\_fhp\_mceip3

*Original tag:* fhp\_mceip3

*Dataset citation:* Teorell et al. (2024)

*Variable citation:* Freedom House (2017)

*Merge scores:*

*Non-missing observations in original unit:* Sum: 550, Percent: 4.45

*Non-missing observations in chosen unit:* Sum: 490, Percent: 1.64

*Lost observations in chosen unit:* Sum: 60 Percent: 10.91

*Description:*

Economic Influences over Media Content: Print Media (1993-1995): The third sub-category examines the economic environment for the media. This includes the structure of media ownership, transparency and concentration of ownership, the costs of establishing media as well as any impediments to news production and distribution, the selective withholding of advertising or subsidies by the state or other actors, the impact of corruption and bribery on content, and the extent to which the economic situation in a country impacts the development of the media. The scale of the variable is 0-20. 0 indicates more freedom.

**3.2.1.18 Economic Influences over Print Media Content (1996-2000) (fhp\_mceip4)**

*Long tag:* qog\_std\_ts\_fhp\_mceip4

*Original tag:* fhp\_mceip4

*Dataset citation:* Teorell et al. (2024)

*Variable citation:* Freedom House (2017)

*Merge scores:*

*Non-missing observations in original unit:* Sum: 925, Percent: 7.49

*Non-missing observations in chosen unit:* Sum: 825, Percent: 2.77

*Lost observations in chosen unit:* Sum: 100 Percent: 10.81

*Description:*

Economic Influences over Media Content: Print Media (1996-2000): The third sub-category examines the economic environment for the media. This includes the structure of media ownership, transparency and concentration of ownership, the costs of establishing media as well as any impediments to news production and distribution, the selective withholding of advertising or subsidies by the state or other actors, the impact of corruption and bribery on content, and the extent to which the economic situation in a country impacts the development of the media. The scale of the variable is 0-30. 0 indicates more freedom.

**3.2.1.19 Laws and Regulations that Influence Media Content (2001-2016) (fhp\_mclr5)**

*Long tag:* qog\_std\_ts\_fhp\_mclr5

*Original tag:* fhp\_mclr5

*Dataset citation:* Teorell et al. (2024)

*Variable citation:* Freedom House (2017)

*Merge scores:*

*Non-missing observations in original unit:* Sum: 3081, Percent: 24.93

*Non-missing observations in chosen unit:* Sum: 2687, Percent: 9.02

*Lost observations in chosen unit:* Sum: 394 Percent: 12.79

*Description:*

Laws and Regulations that Influence the Media Content (2001-2016). The variable encompasses an examination of both the laws and regulations that could influence media content and the government's inclination to use these laws and legal institutions to restrict the media's ability to operate. Freedom House assesses the positive impact of legal and constitutional guarantees for freedom of expression; the potentially negative aspects of security legislation, the penal code, and other criminal statutes; penalties for libel and defamation; the existence of and ability to use freedom of information legislation; the independence of the judiciary and of official media regulatory bodies; registration requirements for both media outlets and journalists; and the ability of journalists' groups to operate freely. The scale of the variable is 0-30. 0 indicates more freedom.

#### **3.2.1.20 Laws and Regulations that Influence the Broadcast Media Content (1993-1995) (fhp\_mclrb3)**

*Long tag:* qog\_std\_ts\_fhp\_mclrb3

*Original tag:* fhp\_mclrb3

*Dataset citation:* Teorell et al. (2024)

*Variable citation:* Freedom House (2017)

*Merge scores:*

*Non-missing observations in original unit:* Sum: 550, Percent: 4.45

*Non-missing observations in chosen unit:* Sum: 490, Percent: 1.64

*Lost observations in chosen unit:* Sum: 60 Percent: 10.91

*Description:*

Laws and Regulations that Influence the Media Content: Broadcast Media (1993-1995). The variable encompasses an examination of both the laws and regulations that could influence media content and the government's inclination to use these laws and legal institutions to restrict the media's ability to operate. Freedom House assesses the positive impact of legal and constitutional guarantees for freedom of expression; the potentially negative aspects of security legislation, the penal code, and other criminal statutes; penalties for libel and defamation; the existence of and ability to use freedom of information legislation; the independence of the judiciary and of official media regulatory bodies; registration requirements for both media outlets and journalists; and the ability of journalists' groups to operate freely. The scale of the variable is 0-20. 0 indicates more freedom.

#### **3.2.1.21 Laws and Regulations that Influence the Broadcast Media Content (1996-2000) (fhp\_mclrb4)**

*Long tag:* qog\_std\_ts\_fhp\_mclrb4

*Original tag:* fhp\_mclrb4

*Dataset citation:* Teorell et al. (2024)

*Variable citation:* Freedom House (2017)

*Merge scores:*

*Non-missing observations in original unit:* Sum: 925, Percent: 7.49

*Non-missing observations in chosen unit:* Sum: 825, Percent: 2.77

*Lost observations in chosen unit:* Sum: 100 Percent: 10.81

*Description:*

Laws and Regulations that Influence the Media Content: Broadcast Media (1996-2000). The variable encompasses an examination of both the laws and regulations that could influence media content and the government's inclination to use these laws and legal institutions to restrict the media's ability to operate. Freedom House assesses the positive impact of legal and constitutional guarantees for freedom of expression; the potentially negative aspects of security legislation, the penal code, and other criminal statutes; penalties for libel and defamation; the existence of and ability to use freedom of information legislation; the independence of the judiciary and of official media regulatory bodies; registration requirements for both media outlets and journalists; and the ability of journalists' groups to operate freely. The scale of the variable is 0-30. 0 indicates more freedom.

#### **3.2.1.22 Laws and Regulations that Influence the Print Media Content (1993-1995) (fhp\_mclrp3)**

*Long tag:* qog\_std\_ts\_fhp\_mclrp3

*Original tag:* fhp\_mclrp3

*Dataset citation:* Teorell et al. (2024)

*Variable citation:* Freedom House (2017)

*Merge scores:*

*Non-missing observations in original unit:* Sum: 550, Percent: 4.45

*Non-missing observations in chosen unit:* Sum: 490, Percent: 1.64

*Lost observations in chosen unit:* Sum: 60 Percent: 10.91

*Description:*

Laws and Regulations that Influence the Media Content: Print Media (1993-1995). The variable encompasses an examination of both the laws and regulations that could influence media content and the government's inclination to use these laws and legal institutions to restrict the media's ability to operate. Freedom House assesses the positive impact of legal and constitutional guarantees for freedom of expression; the potentially negative aspects of security legislation, the penal code, and other criminal statutes; penalties for libel and defamation; the existence of and ability to use freedom of information legislation; the independence of the judiciary and of official media regulatory bodies; registration requirements for both media outlets and journalists; and the ability of journalists' groups to operate freely. The scale of the variable is 0-20. 0 indicates more freedom.

**3.2.1.23 Laws and Regulations that Influence the Print Media Content (1996-2000) (fhp\_mclrp4)**

*Long tag:* qog\_std\_ts\_fhp\_mclrp4

*Original tag:* fhp\_mclrp4

*Dataset citation:* Teorell et al. (2024)

*Variable citation:* Freedom House (2017)

*Merge scores:*

*Non-missing observations in original unit:* Sum: 925, Percent: 7.49

*Non-missing observations in chosen unit:* Sum: 825, Percent: 2.77

*Lost observations in chosen unit:* Sum: 100 Percent: 10.81

*Description:*

Laws and Regulations that Influence the Media Content: Print Media (1996-2000). The variable encompasses an examination of both the laws and regulations that could influence media content and the government's inclination to use these laws and legal institutions to restrict the media's ability to operate. Freedom House assesses the positive impact of legal and constitutional guarantees for freedom of expression; the potentially negative aspects of security legislation, the penal code, and other criminal statutes; penalties for libel and defamation; the existence of and ability to use freedom of information legislation; the independence of the judiciary and of official media regulatory bodies; registration requirements for both media outlets and journalists; and the ability of journalists' groups to operate freely. The scale of the variable is 0-30. 0 indicates more freedom.

**3.2.1.24 Political pressures and controls on media content (2001-2016) (fhp\_mcphp5)**

*Long tag:* qog\_std\_ts\_fhp\_mcphp5

*Original tag:* fhp\_mcphp5

*Dataset citation:* Teorell et al. (2024)

*Variable citation:* Freedom House (2017)

*Merge scores:*

*Non-missing observations in original unit:* Sum: 3081, Percent: 24.93

*Non-missing observations in chosen unit:* Sum: 2687, Percent: 9.02

*Lost observations in chosen unit:* Sum: 394 Percent: 12.79

*Description:*

Political Pressures and Controls on Media Content (2001-2016). The variable evaluates the degree of political control over the content of news media. Issues examined include the editorial independence of both state-owned and privately owned media; access to information and sources; official censorship and self-censorship; the vibrancy of the media; the ability of both foreign and local reporters to cover the news freely and without harassment; and the intimidation of journalists by the state or other actors, including arbitrary detention and imprisonment, violent assaults, and other threats. The scale of the variable is 0-40. 0

indicates more freedom.

**3.2.1.25 Political Pressures and Controls on Broadcast Media Content (1993-1995) (fhp\_mcppb3)**

*Long tag:* qog\_std\_ts\_fhp\_mcppb3

*Original tag:* fhp\_mcppb3

*Dataset citation:* Teorell et al. (2024)

*Variable citation:* Freedom House (2017)

*Merge scores:*

*Non-missing observations in original unit:* Sum: 550, Percent: 4.45

*Non-missing observations in chosen unit:* Sum: 490, Percent: 1.64

*Lost observations in chosen unit:* Sum: 60 Percent: 10.91

*Description:*

Political Pressures and Controls on Media Content: Broadcast Media (1993-1995). The variable evaluates the degree of political control over the content of news media. Issues examined include the editorial independence of both state-owned and privately owned media; access to information and sources; official censorship and self-censorship; the vibrancy of the media; the ability of both foreign and local reporters to cover the news freely and without harassment; and the intimidation of journalists by the state or other actors, including arbitrary detention and imprisonment, violent assaults, and other threats. The scale of the variable is 0-20. 0 indicates more freedom.

**3.2.1.26 Political Pressures and Controls on Broadcast Media Content (1996-2000) (fhp\_mcppb4)**

*Long tag:* qog\_std\_ts\_fhp\_mcppb4

*Original tag:* fhp\_mcppb4

*Dataset citation:* Teorell et al. (2024)

*Variable citation:* Freedom House (2017)

*Merge scores:*

*Non-missing observations in original unit:* Sum: 925, Percent: 7.49

*Non-missing observations in chosen unit:* Sum: 825, Percent: 2.77

*Lost observations in chosen unit:* Sum: 100 Percent: 10.81

*Description:*

Political Pressures and Controls on Media Content: Broadcast Media (1996-2000). The variable evaluates the degree of political control over the content of news media. Issues examined include the editorial independence of both state-owned and privately owned media; access to information and sources; official censorship and self-censorship; the vibrancy of the media; the ability of both foreign and local reporters to cover the news freely and without harassment; and the intimidation of journalists by the state or other actors, including arbitrary detention and imprisonment, violent assaults, and other threats. The scale of the variable is 0-30. 0 indicates more freedom.

**3.2.1.27 Political Pressures and Controls on Print Media Content (1993-1995) (fhp\_mcppp3)**

*Long tag:* qog\_std\_ts\_fhp\_mcppp3

*Original tag:* fhp\_mcppp3

*Dataset citation:* Teorell et al. (2024)

*Variable citation:* Freedom House (2017)

*Merge scores:*

*Non-missing observations in original unit:* Sum: 550, Percent: 4.45

*Non-missing observations in chosen unit:* Sum: 490, Percent: 1.64

*Lost observations in chosen unit:* Sum: 60 Percent: 10.91

*Description:*

Political Pressures and Controls on Media Content: Print Media (1993-1995): The variable evaluates the degree of political control over the content of news media. Issues examined include the editorial independence of both state-owned and privately owned media; access to information and sources; official censorship and self-censorship; the vibrancy of the media; the ability of both foreign and local reporters to cover the news freely and without harassment; and the intimidation of journalists by the state or other actors, including arbitrary detention and imprisonment, violent assaults, and other threats. The scale of the variable is 0-20. 0 indicates more freedom.

**3.2.1.28 Political Pressures and Controls on Print Media Content (1996-2000) (fhp\_mcppp4)**

*Long tag:* qog\_std\_ts\_fhp\_mcppp4

*Original tag:* fhp\_mcppp4

*Dataset citation:* Teorell et al. (2024)

*Variable citation:* Freedom House (2017)

*Merge scores:*

*Non-missing observations in original unit:* Sum: 925, Percent: 7.49

*Non-missing observations in chosen unit:* Sum: 825, Percent: 2.77

*Lost observations in chosen unit:* Sum: 100 Percent: 10.81

*Description:*

Political Pressures and Controls on Media Content: Print Media (1996-2000): The variable evaluates the degree of political control over the content of news media. Issues examined include the editorial independence of both state-owned and privately owned media; access to information and sources; official censorship and self-censorship; the vibrancy of the media; the ability of both foreign and local reporters to cover the news freely and without harassment; and the intimidation of journalists by the state or other actors, including arbitrary detention and imprisonment, violent assaults, and other threats. The scale of the variable is 0-30. 0 indicates more freedom.

**3.2.1.29 Repressive Actions: Broadcast Media (1993-1995) (fhp\_rab3)**

*Long tag:* qog\_std\_ts\_fhp\_rab3

*Original tag:* fhp\_rab3

*Dataset citation:* Teorell et al. (2024)

*Variable citation:* Freedom House (2017)

*Merge scores:*

*Non-missing observations in original unit:* Sum: 550, Percent: 4.45

*Non-missing observations in chosen unit:* Sum: 490, Percent: 1.64

*Lost observations in chosen unit:* Sum: 60 Percent: 10.91

*Description:*

Repressive Actions: Broadcast Media (1993-1995). This variable reflects actual press-freedom violations (killing of journalists, physical violence against journalists or facilities, censorship, self-censorship, harassment, expulsions, etc). The scale of the variable is 0-40. 0 indicates more freedom.

**3.2.1.30 Repressive Actions: Broadcast Media (1996-2000) (fhp\_rab4)**

*Long tag:* qog\_std\_ts\_fhp\_rab4

*Original tag:* fhp\_rab4

*Dataset citation:* Teorell et al. (2024)

*Variable citation:* Freedom House (2017)

*Merge scores:*

*Non-missing observations in original unit:* Sum: 925, Percent: 7.49

*Non-missing observations in chosen unit:* Sum: 825, Percent: 2.77

*Lost observations in chosen unit:* Sum: 100 Percent: 10.81

*Description:*

Repressive Actions: Broadcast Media (1996-2000). This variable reflects actual press-freedom violations (killing of journalists, physical violence against journalists or facilities, censorship, self-censorship, harassment, expulsions, etc). The scale of the variable is 0-10. 0 indicates more freedom.

### **3.2.1.31 Repressive Actions: Print Media (1993-1995) (fhp\_rap3)**

*Long tag:* qog\_std\_ts\_fhp\_rap3

*Original tag:* fhp\_rap3

*Dataset citation:* Teorell et al. (2024)

*Variable citation:* Freedom House (2017)

*Merge scores:*

*Non-missing observations in original unit:* Sum: 550, Percent: 4.45

*Non-missing observations in chosen unit:* Sum: 490, Percent: 1.64

*Lost observations in chosen unit:* Sum: 60 Percent: 10.91

*Description:*

Repressive Actions: Print Media (1993-1995). This variable reflects actual press-freedom violations (killing of journalists, physical violence against journalists or facilities, censorship, self-censorship, harassment, expulsions, etc). The scale of the variable is 0-40. 0 indicates more freedom.

### **3.2.1.32 Repressive Actions: Print Media (1996-2000) (fhp\_rap4)**

*Long tag:* qog\_std\_ts\_fhp\_rap4

*Original tag:* fhp\_rap4

*Dataset citation:* Teorell et al. (2024)

*Variable citation:* Freedom House (2017)

*Merge scores:*

*Non-missing observations in original unit:* Sum: 925, Percent: 7.49

*Non-missing observations in chosen unit:* Sum: 825, Percent: 2.77

*Lost observations in chosen unit:* Sum: 100 Percent: 10.81

*Description:*

Repressive Actions: Print Media (1996-2000). This variable reflects actual press-freedom violations (killing of journalists, physical violence against journalists or facilities, censorship, self-censorship, harassment, expulsions, etc). The scale of the variable is 0-10. 0 indicates more freedom.

### **3.2.1.33 Freedom of the Press, Score (1993-1995) (fhp\_score3)**

*Long tag:* qog\_std\_ts\_fhp\_score3

*Original tag:* fhp\_score3

*Dataset citation:* Teorell et al. (2024)

*Variable citation:* Freedom House (2017)

*Merge scores:*

*Non-missing observations in original unit:* Sum: 550, Percent: 4.45

*Non-missing observations in chosen unit:* Sum: 490, Percent: 1.64

*Lost observations in chosen unit:* Sum: 60 Percent: 10.91

*Description:*

Freedom of the Press, Score (1993-1995): The press freedom index is computed by adding four component ratings: Laws and regulations, Political pressures and controls, Economic Influences and Repressive actions. The scale ranges from 0 (most free) to 100 (least free).

#### **3.2.1.34 Freedom of the Press, Score (1996-2000) (fhp\_score4)**

*Long tag:* qog\_std\_ts\_fhp\_score4

*Original tag:* fhp\_score4

*Dataset citation:* Teorell et al. (2024)

*Variable citation:* Freedom House (2017)

*Merge scores:*

*Non-missing observations in original unit:* Sum: 925, Percent: 7.49

*Non-missing observations in chosen unit:* Sum: 825, Percent: 2.77

*Lost observations in chosen unit:* Sum: 100 Percent: 10.81

*Description:*

Freedom of the Press, Score (1996-2000): The press freedom index is computed by adding four component ratings: Laws and regulations, Political pressures and controls, Economic Influences and Repressive actions. The scale ranges from 0 (most free) to 100 (least free).

#### **3.2.1.35 Freedom of the Press, Score (2001-2016) (fhp\_score5)**

*Long tag:* qog\_std\_ts\_fhp\_score5

*Original tag:* fhp\_score5

*Dataset citation:* Teorell et al. (2024)

*Variable citation:* Freedom House (2017)

*Merge scores:*

*Non-missing observations in original unit:* Sum: 3081, Percent: 24.93

*Non-missing observations in chosen unit:* Sum: 2687, Percent: 9.02

*Lost observations in chosen unit:* Sum: 394 Percent: 12.79

*Description:*

Freedom of the Press, Score (2001-2016): The press freedom index is computed by adding four component ratings: Laws and regulations, Political pressures and controls, Economic Influences and Repressive actions. The scale ranges from 0 (most free) to 100 (least free).

#### **3.2.1.36 Freedom of the Press, Status (1988-1992) (fhp\_status2)**

*Long tag:* qog\_std\_ts\_fhp\_status2

*Original tag:* fhp\_status2

*Dataset citation:* Teorell et al. (2024)

*Variable citation:* Freedom House (2017)

*Merge scores:*

*Non-missing observations in original unit:* Sum: 804, Percent: 6.51

*Non-missing observations in chosen unit:* Sum: 716, Percent: 2.4

*Lost observations in chosen unit:* Sum: 88 Percent: 10.95

*Description:*

Freedom of the Press, Status (1988-1992):

1. Free
2. Partly Free
3. Not Free

#### **3.2.1.37 Freedom of the Press, Status (1993-1995) (fhp\_status3)**

*Long tag:* qog\_std\_ts\_fhp\_status3

*Original tag:* fhp\_status3



*Dataset citation:* Teorell et al. (2024)

*Variable citation:* Freedom House (2017)

*Merge scores:*

*Non-missing observations in original unit:* Sum: 554, Percent: 4.48

*Non-missing observations in chosen unit:* Sum: 494, Percent: 1.66

*Lost observations in chosen unit:* Sum: 60 Percent: 10.83

*Description:*

Freedom of the Press, Status (1993-1995):

1. Free
2. Partly Free
3. Not Free

### **3.2.1.38 Freedom of the Press, Status (1996-2000) (fhp\_status4)**

*Long tag:* qog\_std\_ts\_fhp\_status4

*Original tag:* fhp\_status4

*Dataset citation:* Teorell et al. (2024)

*Variable citation:* Freedom House (2017)

*Merge scores:*

*Non-missing observations in original unit:* Sum: 925, Percent: 7.49

*Non-missing observations in chosen unit:* Sum: 825, Percent: 2.77

*Lost observations in chosen unit:* Sum: 100 Percent: 10.81

*Description:*

Freedom of the Press, Status (1996-2000):

1. Free
2. Partly Free
3. Not Free

### **3.2.1.39 Freedom of the Press, Status (2001-2016) (fhp\_status5)**

*Long tag:* qog\_std\_ts\_fhp\_status5

*Original tag:* fhp\_status5

*Dataset citation:* Teorell et al. (2024)

*Variable citation:* Freedom House (2017)

*Merge scores:*

*Non-missing observations in original unit:* Sum: 3081, Percent: 24.93

*Non-missing observations in chosen unit:* Sum: 2687, Percent: 9.02

*Lost observations in chosen unit:* Sum: 394 Percent: 12.79

*Description:*

Freedom of the Press, Status (1988-2016):

1. Free

2. Partly Free

3. Not Free

**3.2.1.40 Freedom of Broadcast Media, Status (1979-1987) (fhp\_statusb1)**

*Long tag:* qog\_std\_ts\_fhp\_statusb1

*Original tag:* fhp\_statusb1

*Dataset citation:* Teorell et al. (2024)

*Variable citation:* Freedom House (2017)

*Merge scores:*

*Non-missing observations in original unit:* Sum: 1240, Percent: 10.03

*Non-missing observations in chosen unit:* Sum: 1099, Percent: 3.69

*Lost observations in chosen unit:* Sum: 141 Percent: 11.37

*Description:*

Freedom of Print Media, Status (1979-1987):

1. Free

2. Partly Free

3. Not Free

**3.2.1.41 Freedom of Print Media, Status (1979-1987) (fhp\_statusp1)**

*Long tag:* qog\_std\_ts\_fhp\_statusp1

*Original tag:* fhp\_statusp1

*Dataset citation:* Teorell et al. (2024)

*Variable citation:* Freedom House (2017)

*Merge scores:*

*Non-missing observations in original unit:* Sum: 1246, Percent: 10.08

*Non-missing observations in chosen unit:* Sum: 1105, Percent: 3.71

*Lost observations in chosen unit:* Sum: 141 Percent: 11.32

*Description:*

Freedom of Broadcast Media, Status (1979-1987):

1. Free

2. Partly Free

3. Not Free

**3.2.1.42 Press Freedom Index: Economic Context Component (rsf\_eci)**

*Long tag:* qog\_std\_ts\_rsf\_eci

*Original tag:* rsf\_eci

*Dataset citation:* Teorell et al. (2024)

*Variable citation:* Reporters sans frontières (2023)

*Merge scores:*

*Non-missing observations in original unit:* Sum: 175, Percent: 1.42

*Non-missing observations in chosen unit:* Sum: 166, Percent: 0.56

*Lost observations in chosen unit:* Sum: 9 Percent: 5.14

*Description:*

Economic context component of Press Freedom Index. Questions asked for the economic context component aim to evaluate:

- economic constraints linked to governmental policies (including the difficulty of creating a news media outlet, favouritism in the allocation of state subsidies, and corruption);
- economic constraints linked to non-state actors (advertisers and commercial partners);
- economic constraints linked to media owners seeking to promote or defend their business interests.

A subsidiary score ranging from 0 to 100 is calculated for each indicator. All of the subsidiary scores contribute equally to the global score. And within each indicator, all the questions and subquestions have equal weight.

**3.2.1.43 Press Freedom Index: Legal Context Component (rsf\_lci)**

*Long tag:* qog\_std\_ts\_rsf\_lci

*Original tag:* rsf\_lci

*Dataset citation:* Teorell et al. (2024)

*Variable citation:* Reporters sans frontières (2023)

*Merge scores:*

*Non-missing observations in original unit:* Sum: 175, Percent: 1.42

*Non-missing observations in chosen unit:* Sum: 166, Percent: 0.56

*Lost observations in chosen unit:* Sum: 9 Percent: 5.14

*Description:*

Legal context component of Press Freedom Index. Questions asked for the legal context component concern the legislative and regulatory environment for journalists, in particular:

- the degree to which journalists and media are free to work without censorship or judicial sanctions, or excessive restrictions on their freedom of expression;
- the ability to access information without discrimination between journalists, and the ability to protect sources;
- the presence or absence of impunity for those responsible for acts of violence against journalists.

A subsidiary score ranging from 0 to 100 is calculated for each indicator. All of the subsidiary scores contribute equally to the global score. And within each indicator, all the questions and subquestions have equal weight.

**3.2.1.44 Press Freedom Index: Political Context Component (rsf\_pci)**

*Long tag:* qog\_std\_ts\_rsf\_pci

*Original tag:* rsf\_pci

*Dataset citation:* Teorell et al. (2024)

*Variable citation:* Reporters sans frontières (2023)

*Merge scores:*

*Non-missing observations in original unit:* Sum: 175, Percent: 1.42

*Non-missing observations in chosen unit:* Sum: 166, Percent: 0.56

*Lost observations in chosen unit:* Sum: 9 Percent: 5.14

*Description:*

Political context component of Press Freedom Index. Questions asked for political context component aim to evaluate:

- the degree of support and respect for media autonomy vis-à-vis political pressure from the state or from other political actors;
- the level of acceptance of a variety of journalistic approaches satisfying professional standards, including politically aligned approaches and independent approaches;
- the degree of support for the media in their role of holding politicians and government to account in the public interest.

A subsidiary score ranging from 0 to 100 is calculated for each indicator. All of the subsidiary scores contribute equally to the global score. And within each indicator, all the questions and subquestions have equal weight.

#### **3.2.1.45 Press Freedom Index (rsf\_pfi)**

*Long tag:* qog\_std\_ts\_rsf\_pfi

*Original tag:* rsf\_pfi

*Dataset citation:* Teorell et al. (2024)

*Variable citation:* Reporters sans frontières (2023)

*Merge scores:*

*Non-missing observations in original unit:* Sum: 175, Percent: 1.42

*Non-missing observations in chosen unit:* Sum: 166, Percent: 0.56

*Lost observations in chosen unit:* Sum: 9 Percent: 5.14

*Description:*

Press Freedom Index, using the methodology of the 2022 report. The Press Freedom Index measures the amount of freedom journalists, and the media have in each country, and the efforts made by governments to see that press freedom is respected. It does not take account of all human rights violations, only those that affect press freedom. Neither is it an indicator of the quality of a country's media.

Note: Higher scores indicate that country has more press freedom.

#### **3.2.1.46 Press Freedom Index (methodology for 2002-2012) (rsf\_pfi0212)**

*Long tag:* qog\_std\_ts\_rsf\_pfi0212

*Original tag:* rsf\_pfi0212

*Dataset citation:* Teorell et al. (2024)

*Variable citation:* Reporters sans frontières (2023)

*Merge scores:*

*Non-missing observations in original unit:* Sum: 1489, Percent: 12.05

*Non-missing observations in chosen unit:* Sum: 1428, Percent: 4.79

*Lost observations in chosen unit:* Sum: 61 Percent: 4.1

*Description:*

The Press Freedom Index was calculated using the methodology used in RSF 2002-2012

reports. The Press Freedom Index measures the amount of freedom journalists, and the media have in each country, and the efforts made by governments to see that press freedom is respected. It does not take account of all human rights violations, only those that affect press freedom. Neither is it an indicator of the quality of a country's media.

Note: Press Freedom Index for 2002-2012 is reversely ordered, which means countries with less press freedom got higher scores.

Except for 2012, the index ranges between 0 (total press freedom) and 100 (no press freedom). However, for the 2012 data release, RSF changed the scale so that negative values could be assigned to countries with more press freedom. We have decided to leave the data as is.

#### **3.2.1.47 Press Freedom Index (methodology for 2013-2021) (rsf\_pfi1321)**

*Long tag:* qog\_std\_ts\_rsf\_pfi1321

*Original tag:* rsf\_pfi1321

*Dataset citation:* Teorell et al. (2024)

*Variable citation:* Reporters sans frontières (2023)

*Merge scores:*

*Non-missing observations in original unit:* Sum: 1574, Percent: 12.74

*Non-missing observations in chosen unit:* Sum: 1493, Percent: 5.01

*Lost observations in chosen unit:* Sum: 81 Percent: 5.15

*Description:*

Press Freedom Index, calculated with the methodology used in RSF 2013-2021 reports. The Press Freedom Index measures the amount of freedom journalists, and the media have in each country and the efforts made by governments to see that press freedom is respected. It does not take account of all human rights violations, only those that affect press freedom. Neither is it an indicator of the quality of a country's media.

Note: Higher scores indicate that country has more press freedom.

#### **3.2.1.48 Press Freedom Index: Sociocultural Context Component (rsf\_sci)**

*Long tag:* qog\_std\_ts\_rsf\_sci

*Original tag:* rsf\_sci

*Dataset citation:* Teorell et al. (2024)

*Variable citation:* Reporters sans frontières (2023)

*Merge scores:*

*Non-missing observations in original unit:* Sum: 175, Percent: 1.42

*Non-missing observations in chosen unit:* Sum: 166, Percent: 0.56

*Lost observations in chosen unit:* Sum: 9 Percent: 5.14

*Description:*

Sociocultural context component of Press Freedom Index. Questions asked for sociocultural context component aim to evaluate:

- social constraints resulting from denigration and attacks on the press based on such issues as gender, class, ethnicity and religion;
- cultural constraints, including pressure on journalists to not question certain bastions of power or influence or not cover certain issues because it would run counter to the prevailing culture in the country or territory.

A subsidiary score ranging from 0 to 100 is calculated for each indicator. All of the subsidiary scores contribute equally to the global score. And within each indicator, all the questions and subquestions have equal weight.

#### 3.2.1.49 Robust Democracy: Access to Information (sgi\_qdai)

*Long tag:* qog\_std\_ts\_sgi\_qdai

*Original tag:* sgi\_qdai

*Dataset citation:* Teorell et al. (2024)

*Variable citation:* Schiller & Hellmann (2022)

*Merge scores:*

*Non-missing observations in original unit:* Sum: 328, Percent: 2.65

*Non-missing observations in chosen unit:* Sum: 328, Percent: 1.1

*Lost observations in chosen unit:* Sum: 0 Percent: 0

*Description:*

Robust Democracy: Access to Information (Media Freedom, Media Pluralism, Access to Government Information).

#### 3.2.1.50 Media corrupt (vdem\_mecorrpt)

*Long tag:* qog\_std\_ts\_vdem\_mecorrpt

*Original tag:* vdem\_mecorrpt

*Dataset citation:* Teorell et al. (2024)

*Variable citation:* Coppedge, Gerring, Henrik Knutsen, Lindberg, Teorell, Altman, Bernhard, Cornell, Fish, Gastaldi, Gjerløw, Glynn, Good God, Grahn, Hicken, Kinzelbach, Krusell, Marquardt, McMann, Mechkova, Medzihorsky, Natsika, Neundorf, Paxton, Pemstein, Pernes, Rydén, von Römer, Seim, Sigman, Skaaning, Staton, Sundström, Tzelgov, Wang, Wig, Wilson & Ziblatt (2023), Pemstein, Marquardt, Tzelgov, Wang, Medzihorsky, Krusell, Miri & von Römer (2023a), Coppedge, Gerring, Knutsen, Lindberg, Teorell, Altman, Bernhard, Cornell, Fish, Gastaldi, Gjerløw, Glynn, Grahn, Hicken, Kinzelbach, Marquardt, McMann, Mechkova, Neundorf, Paxton, Pemstein, Rydén, von Römer, Seim, Sigman, Skaaning, Staton, Sundström, Tzelgov, Uberti, Wang, Wig & Ziblatt (2023)

*Merge scores:*

*Non-missing observations in original unit:* Sum: 10556, Percent: 85.42

*Non-missing observations in chosen unit:* Sum: 10164, Percent: 34.11

*Lost observations in chosen unit:* Sum: 392 Percent: 3.71

*Description:*

Media corrupt

Question: Do journalists, publishers, or broadcasters accept payments in exchange for altering news coverage?

Responses:

0: The media are so closely directed by the government that any such payments would be either unnecessary to ensure pro-government coverage or ineffective in producing anti-government coverage.

1: Journalists, publishers, and broadcasters routinely alter news coverage in exchange for payments.

2: It is common, but not routine, for journalists, publishers, and broadcasters to alter news coverage in exchange for payments.

3: It is not normal for journalists, publishers, and broadcasters to alter news coverage in exchange for payments, but it happens occasionally, without anyone being punished.

4: Journalists, publishers, and broadcasters rarely alter news coverage in exchange for payments, and if it becomes known, someone is punished for it.

#### **3.2.1.51 Confidence: The Press (wvs\_confpr)**

*Long tag:* qog\_std\_ts\_wvs\_confpr

*Original tag:* wvs\_confpr

*Dataset citation:* Teorell et al. (2024)

*Variable citation:* EVS (2021, 2020), Haerpfer et al. (2021, 2020)

*Merge scores:*

*Non-missing observations in original unit:* Sum: 417, Percent: 3.37

*Non-missing observations in chosen unit:* Sum: 411, Percent: 1.38

*Lost observations in chosen unit:* Sum: 6 Percent: 1.44

*Description:*

I am going to name a number of organizations. For each one, could you tell me how much confidence you have in them: The Press

1. None at all
2. Not very much
3. Quite a lot
4. A great deal

#### **3.2.1.52 Confidence: Television (wvs\_confTV)**

*Long tag:* qog\_std\_ts\_wvs\_confTV

*Original tag:* wvs\_confTV

*Dataset citation:* Teorell et al. (2024)

*Variable citation:* EVS (2021, 2020), Haerpfer et al. (2021, 2020)

*Merge scores:*

*Non-missing observations in original unit:* Sum: 263, Percent: 2.13

*Non-missing observations in chosen unit:* Sum: 257, Percent: 0.86

*Lost observations in chosen unit:* Sum: 6 Percent: 2.28

*Description:*

I am going to name a number of organizations. For each one, could you tell me how much confidence you have in them: Television

1. None at all
2. Not very much
3. Quite a lot
4. A great deal

### **3.2.2 Judicial**

This category includes judicial indicators, generally covering legal rights granted by a state to its citizens and their compliance, as well as measures of crimes and the overall state of the judicial system.

### 3.2.2.1 Freedom of Expression (bti\_foe)

*Long tag:* qog\_std\_ts\_bti\_foe

*Original tag:* bti\_foe

*Dataset citation:* Teorell et al. (2024)

*Variable citation:* Donner et al. (2022)

*Merge scores:*

*Non-missing observations in original unit:* Sum: 1153, Percent: 9.33

*Non-missing observations in chosen unit:* Sum: 1113, Percent: 3.74

*Lost observations in chosen unit:* Sum: 40 Percent: 3.47

*Description:*

To what extent can citizens, organizations, and the mass media express opinions freely? From 1 to 10.

1. Freedom of expression is denied. Independent media do not exist or are prohibited.
4. Freedom of expression is often subject to interference or government restrictions. Distortion and manipulation shape matters of public debate.
7. Freedom of expression is occasionally subject to interference or government restrictions, but there are generally no incidents of blatant intrusions like outright state censorship or media shutdowns.
10. Freedom of expression is guaranteed against interference or government restrictions. Individuals, groups and the press can fully exercise these rights.

### 3.2.2.2 Freedom of Domestic Movement (ciri\_dommov)

*Long tag:* qog\_std\_ts\_ciri\_dommov

*Original tag:* ciri\_dommov

*Dataset citation:* Teorell et al. (2024)

*Variable citation:* Mark et al. (2023), Cingranelli et al. (2014)

*Merge scores:*

*Non-missing observations in original unit:* Sum: 5670, Percent: 45.88

*Non-missing observations in chosen unit:* Sum: 4882, Percent: 16.39

*Lost observations in chosen unit:* Sum: 788 Percent: 13.9

*Description:*

The freedom to travel within one's country is a right. There are governments that do not allow citizens to travel within their own country of birth or that restrict the movement of certain groups for reasons based on political views or activities, religious beliefs, ethnicity, marital status, and gender. For example, some countries strictly curtail the freedom of movement of oppositional political leaders, ethnic minorities, religious leaders, human rights activists or monitors, and journalists. This may take many forms, including government-imposed internal exile and/or intentional bureaucratic/administrative delays to freedom of movement after a prison term has ended. Some countries strictly monitor all or nearly all citizens' internal movements, and citizens are required to notify local officials of their whereabouts or must get their permission to move. In some countries, citizens must carry national identity cards, travel or work permits, or internal passports for any movement outside their immediate village, neighborhood, or province. Some countries use issuance of these cards to restrict movement within the country. Some governments use forced internal resettlement to relocate large numbers of citizens without their consent. Some governments also impose curfew laws and military checkpoints on domestic travel during times of military or civil conflict.



Scoring Scheme:

Domestic travel is:

- (0) Severely Restricted
- (1) Somewhat Restricted
- (2) Unrestricted

### 3.2.2.3 Freedom of Speech and Press (ciri\_speech)

*Long tag:* qog\_std\_ts\_ciri\_speech

*Original tag:* ciri\_speech

*Dataset citation:* Teorell et al. (2024)

*Variable citation:* Mark et al. (2023), Cingranelli et al. (2014)

*Merge scores:*

*Non-missing observations in original unit:* Sum: 5028, Percent: 40.69

*Non-missing observations in chosen unit:* Sum: 4609, Percent: 15.47

*Lost observations in chosen unit:* Sum: 419 Percent: 8.33

*Description:*

This variable indicates the extent to which freedoms of speech and press are affected by government

censorship, including ownership of media outlets. Censorship is any form of restriction that is placed

on freedom of the press, speech or expression. Expression may also be in the form of the arts or

music. Censorship denies citizens freedom of speech and limits or prevents the media (print, online, or broadcast) from expressing views challenging the policies of the existing government. In many instances where this right is being violated, the government owns and operates all forms of press and media.

Scoring Scheme:

Government censorship and/or ownership of the media (including radio, TV, Internet, and/or domestic news agencies) is:

- (0) Complete
- (1) Some
- (2) None

### 3.2.2.4 Freedom of Expression and Belief (fh\_feb)

*Long tag:* qog\_std\_ts\_fh\_feb

*Original tag:* fh\_feb

*Dataset citation:* Teorell et al. (2024)

*Variable citation:* Freedom House (2022)

*Merge scores:*

*Non-missing observations in original unit:* Sum: 3291, Percent: 26.63

*Non-missing observations in chosen unit:* Sum: 2875, Percent: 9.65

*Lost observations in chosen unit:* Sum: 416 Percent: 12.64

*Description:*

Freedom of Expression and Belief - The variable measures the freedom and independence of the media and other cultural expressions, the freedom of religious groups to practice their faith and express themselves, the academic freedom and freedom from extensive political indoctrination in the educational system, and the ability of the people to engage in private (political) discussions without fear of harassment or arrest by the authorities. Countries are graded between 0 (worst) and 16 (best).

### 3.2.2.5 Government Powers is Subject to Non-Gov. Checks (wjp\_gov\_pow\_ngov)

*Long tag:* qog\_std\_ts\_wjp\_gov\_pow\_ngov

*Original tag:* wjp\_gov\_pow\_ngov

*Dataset citation:* Teorell et al. (2024)

*Variable citation:* World Justice Project (2023)

*Merge scores:*

*Non-missing observations in original unit:* Sum: 1045, Percent: 8.46

*Non-missing observations in chosen unit:* Sum: 994, Percent: 3.34

*Lost observations in chosen unit:* Sum: 51 Percent: 4.88

*Description:*

This variable measures whether an independent media, civil society organizations, political parties, and individuals are free to report and comment on government policies without fear of retaliation.

## 3.2.3 Migration

This category includes indicators related to migratory phenomena such as immigration rates, level of education, brain drain, and refugee population.

### 3.2.3.1 Freedom of Foreign Movement and Travel (ciri\_formov)

*Long tag:* qog\_std\_ts\_ciri\_formov

*Original tag:* ciri\_formov

*Dataset citation:* Teorell et al. (2024)

*Variable citation:* Mark et al. (2023), Cingranelli et al. (2014)

*Merge scores:*

*Non-missing observations in original unit:* Sum: 5671, Percent: 45.89

*Non-missing observations in chosen unit:* Sum: 4883, Percent: 16.39

*Lost observations in chosen unit:* Sum: 788 Percent: 13.9

*Description:*

The freedom to leave and return to one's country is a right. There are countries that do not allow citizens to leave at all. Methods used by governments to restrict freedom of movement include: withholding and/or delaying the issuing of passports, "exit control" lists to prevent emigration, the requirement of an exit visa or special permits to leave the country, revocation of citizenship, and obstacles to the extension of passport's validity. In addition, there are countries where even if one is allowed to leave, the duration of one's stay abroad is restricted, and citizens can lose their property and other assets if they leave for a very long time. Some citizens have to get permission to leave. Others, when they leave, are not allowed to return or the government makes return very difficult. Also, some governments place restrictions on certain groups of people such as opposition political leaders, ethnic minorities, religious leaders, women, human rights activists or monitors, and journalists. Rights to emigration and repatriation without prejudice are also included in freedom of foreign movement and travel.

Scoring Scheme:

Foreign movement and travel is:

- (0) Severely Restricted
- (1) Somewhat Restricted
- (2) Unrestricted

### 3.2.4 Political System

This category includes variables describing the rules of the political system (presidential or parliamentary system), the chief executive (years in office), regime type, stability (age of present regime), and checks and balances as well as aspects of federalism.

#### 3.2.4.1 Accountability Transparency (diat\_ati)

*Long tag:* qog\_std\_ts\_diat\_ati

*Original tag:* diat\_ati

*Dataset citation:* Teorell et al. (2024)

*Variable citation:* Nohlen et al. (1999, 2002), Nohlen (2005), Nohlen & Stöver (2010), (IPU), Chronicle of Parliamentary Elections (IPU), Election Guide

*Merge scores:*

*Non-missing observations in original unit:* Sum: 4935, Percent: 39.93

*Non-missing observations in chosen unit:* Sum: 4632, Percent: 15.55

*Lost observations in chosen unit:* Sum: 303 Percent: 6.14

*Description:*

Accountability Transparency. The author has 16 separate indicators for the Accountability Transparency Index (six for the measurement of a free media, four for fiscal transparency, and six for political constraints). 1980 is considered to be the base year. The Accountability Transparency Index has 115 countries in 1980, but rising to up to 189 countries towards the end of the period.

#### 3.2.4.2 Information Transparency (diat\_iti)

*Long tag:* qog\_std\_ts\_diat\_iti

*Original tag:* diat\_iti

*Dataset citation:* Teorell et al. (2024)

*Variable citation:* Nohlen et al. (1999, 2002), Nohlen (2005), Nohlen & Stöver (2010), (IPU), Chronicle of Parliamentary Elections (IPU), Election Guide

*Merge scores:*

*Non-missing observations in original unit:* Sum: 5343, Percent: 43.24

*Non-missing observations in chosen unit:* Sum: 4827, Percent: 16.2

*Lost observations in chosen unit:* Sum: 516 Percent: 9.66

*Description:*

Information Transparency. Sub-indicators are constructed to reflect the nuances of this type of transparency. Specifically, three sub-components are constructed: (1) the existence of a free and independent media; (2) fiscal (budgetary) transparency; (3) political constraints.

The author has 13 separate indicators for the Information Transparency Index (six for the quantity of information, four for the processes that generate that information, and three for the infrastructure required to disseminate that information). 1980 is considered to be the base year. The Information Transparency Index (ITI) has scores for initially 153 countries in 1980, increasing over time to 191 by the year 2010.

### 3.2.4.3 Voice and Accountability, Estimate (wbgi\_vae)

*Long tag:* qog\_std\_ts\_wbgi\_vae

*Original tag:* wbgi\_vae

*Dataset citation:* Teorell et al. (2024)

*Variable citation:* Kaufmann & Kraay (n.d.)

*Merge scores:*

*Non-missing observations in original unit:* Sum: 4433, Percent: 35.87

*Non-missing observations in chosen unit:* Sum: 3868, Percent: 12.98

*Lost observations in chosen unit:* Sum: 565 Percent: 12.75

*Description:*

Voice and Accountability - Estimate: 'Voice and Accountability' includes a number of indicators measuring various aspects of the political process, civil liberties and political rights. These indicators measure the extent to which citizens of a country are able to participate in the selection of governments. This category also includes indicators measuring the independence of the media, which serves an important role in monitoring those in authority and holding them accountable for their actions.

### 3.2.5 Civil Society, Population and Culture

This category includes variables that relate to social capital, personal beliefs, size and distribution of the population as well as ethnic and linguistic fractionalization.

#### 3.2.5.1 Social Globalization (dr\_sg)

*Long tag:* qog\_std\_ts\_dr\_sg

*Original tag:* dr\_sg

*Dataset citation:* Teorell et al. (2024)

*Variable citation:* Gygli et al. (2019), Dreher (2006)

*Merge scores:*

*Non-missing observations in original unit:* Sum: 8768, Percent: 70.95

*Non-missing observations in chosen unit:* Sum: 7799, Percent: 26.18

*Lost observations in chosen unit:* Sum: 969 Percent: 11.05

*Description:*

Social globalization (scale of 1 to 100) is comprised of three segments, each with its own de facto and de jure segment. Interpersonal contact is measured within the de facto segment with reference to international telephone connections, tourist numbers and migration. Within the de jure segment, it is measured with reference to telephone subscriptions, international airports and visa restrictions. Flows of information are determined within the de facto segment with reference to international patent applications, international students and trade in high technology goods. The de jure segment measures access to TV and the internet, freedom of the press and international internet connections. Cultural proximity is measured in the de facto segment from trade in cultural goods, international trademark registrations and the number of McDonald's restaurants and IKEA stores. The de jure area focuses on civil rights (freedom of citizens), gender equality and public spending on school education.

#### 3.2.5.2 Internet use: internet banking (eu\_isiubk)

*Long tag:* qog\_std\_ts\_eu\_isiubk

*Original tag:* eu\_isiubk

*Dataset citation:* Teorell et al. (2024)

*Variable citation:* European Commission (2023)

*Merge scores:*

*Non-missing observations in original unit:* Sum: 617, Percent: 4.99

*Non-missing observations in chosen unit:* Sum: 617, Percent: 2.07

*Lost observations in chosen unit:* Sum: 0 Percent: 0

*Description:*

Internet use: internet banking as percentage of all individuals

### 3.2.6 Labour Market

This category includes variables about employment, unemployment and union density rate, in general, as well as in subgroups of the population.

#### 3.2.6.1 Employment in Information and communication (Female) percent total employment (eu\_sctjf)

*Long tag:* qog\_std\_ts\_eu\_sctjf

*Original tag:* eu\_sctjf

*Dataset citation:* Teorell et al. (2024)

*Variable citation:* European Commission (2023)

*Merge scores:*

*Non-missing observations in original unit:* Sum: 384, Percent: 3.11

*Non-missing observations in chosen unit:* Sum: 384, Percent: 1.29

*Lost observations in chosen unit:* Sum: 0 Percent: 0

*Description:*

Employment in Information and communication (Female) percent total employment

#### 3.2.6.2 Employment in Information and communication (Male) percent total employment (eu\_sctjm)

*Long tag:* qog\_std\_ts\_eu\_sctjm

*Original tag:* eu\_sctjm

*Dataset citation:* Teorell et al. (2024)

*Variable citation:* European Commission (2023)

*Merge scores:*

*Non-missing observations in original unit:* Sum: 386, Percent: 3.12

*Non-missing observations in chosen unit:* Sum: 386, Percent: 1.3

*Lost observations in chosen unit:* Sum: 0 Percent: 0

*Description:*

Employment in Information and communication (Male) percent total employment

#### 3.2.6.3 Employment in Information and communication (Female and male) percent total employment (eu\_sctjt)

*Long tag:* qog\_std\_ts\_eu\_sctjt

*Original tag:* eu\_sctjt

*Dataset citation:* Teorell et al. (2024)

*Variable citation:* European Commission (2023)

*Merge scores:*

*Non-missing observations in original unit:* Sum: 386, Percent: 3.12

*Non-missing observations in chosen unit:* Sum: 386, Percent: 1.3

*Lost observations in chosen unit:* Sum: 0 Percent: 0

*Description:*

Employment in Information and communication (Female and male) percent total employment

#### 3.2.6.4 Employment in services (percent of total employment) (modeled ILO) (wdi\_empser)

*Long tag:* qog\_std\_ts\_wdi\_empser

*Original tag:* wdi\_empser

*Dataset citation:* Teorell et al. (2024)

*Variable citation:* World Bank (2023)

*Merge scores:*

*Non-missing observations in original unit:* Sum: 5076, Percent: 41.07

*Non-missing observations in chosen unit:* Sum: 4794, Percent: 16.09

*Lost observations in chosen unit:* Sum: 282 Percent: 5.56

*Description:*

Total employment in services as percentage of total employment. Employment is defined as persons of working age who were engaged in any activity to produce goods or provide services for pay or profit, whether at work during the reference period or not at work due to temporary absence from a job, or to working-time arrangement. The services sector consists of wholesale and retail trade and restaurants and hotels; transport, storage, and communications; financing, insurance, real estate, and business services; and community, social, and personal services, in accordance with divisions 6-9 (ISIC 2) or categories G-Q (ISIC 3) or categories G-U (ISIC 4). Modeled ILO estimate.

### **3.2.6.5 Employment in services, female (percent of female employment) (modeled ILO) (wdi\_empserf)**

*Long tag:* qog\_std\_ts\_wdi\_empserf

*Original tag:* wdi\_empserf

*Dataset citation:* Teorell et al. (2024)

*Variable citation:* World Bank (2023)

*Merge scores:*

*Non-missing observations in original unit:* Sum: 5076, Percent: 41.07

*Non-missing observations in chosen unit:* Sum: 4794, Percent: 16.09

*Lost observations in chosen unit:* Sum: 282 Percent: 5.56

*Description:*

Female employment in services (percent of female employment). Employment is defined as persons of working age who were engaged in any activity to produce goods or provide services for pay or profit, whether at work during the reference period or not at work due to temporary absence from a job, or to working-time arrangement. The services sector consists of wholesale and retail trade and restaurants and hotels; transport, storage, and communications; financing, insurance, real estate, and business services; and community, social, and personal services, in accordance with divisions 6-9 (ISIC 2) or categories G-Q (ISIC 3) or categories G-U (ISIC 4). Modeled ILO estimate.

### **3.2.6.6 Employment in services, male (percent of male employment) (modeled ILO) (wdi\_empserm)**

*Long tag:* qog\_std\_ts\_wdi\_empserm

*Original tag:* wdi\_empserm

*Dataset citation:* Teorell et al. (2024)

*Variable citation:* World Bank (2023)

*Merge scores:*

*Non-missing observations in original unit:* Sum: 5076, Percent: 41.07

*Non-missing observations in chosen unit:* Sum: 4794, Percent: 16.09

*Lost observations in chosen unit:* Sum: 282 Percent: 5.56

*Description:*

Male employment in services (percent of male employment). Employment is defined as persons of working age who were engaged in any activity to produce goods or provide services for pay or profit, whether at work during the reference period or not at work due to temporary absence from a job, or to working-time arrangement. The services sector consists of wholesale and

retail trade and restaurants and hotels; transport, storage, and communications; financing, insurance, real estate, and business services; and community, social, and personal services, in accordance with divisions 6-9 (ISIC 2) or categories G-Q (ISIC 3) or categories G-U (ISIC 4). Modeled ILO estimate.

### 3.2.7 Political Parties and Elections

This category includes variables describing various aspects of the legislature and political parties in the legislature (number of seats) as well as variables related to the election for the executive and variables on the outcomes of elections.

#### 3.2.7.1 Media Bias before Election (nelda\_mbbe)

*Long tag:* qog\_std\_ts\_nelda\_mbbe

*Original tag:* nelda\_mbbe

*Dataset citation:* Teorell et al. (2024)

*Variable citation:* Hyde & Marinov (2012, 2021)

*Merge scores:*

*Non-missing observations in original unit:* Sum: 2960, Percent: 23.95

*Non-missing observations in chosen unit:* Sum: 2623, Percent: 8.8

*Lost observations in chosen unit:* Sum: 337 Percent: 11.39

*Description:*

If there were reports by either domestic or outside actors of media bias in favor of the incumbent or ruling party, it is coded as a 'Yes'. In cases where the media is totally controlled by the government, and/or no opposition is allowed, the answer is 'Yes'. It is possible that the answer is 'No' even if the political system is tightly controlled.

Values:

0. No

1. Yes

3. Unclear

### 3.2.8 Public Economy

This category includes economic indicators that reflect the involvement of the government in the economy (taxes, tariff rates and government expenditures), economic key figures of a state (GDP, inflation, and economic inequality), and indicators that characterize the state of the economy (aid-flows, debt).

#### 3.2.8.1 Real value added: Information and communication (oecd\_evova\_t1e)

*Long tag:* qog\_std\_ts\_oecd\_evova\_t1e

*Original tag:* oecd\_evova\_t1e

*Dataset citation:* Teorell et al. (2024)

*Variable citation:* Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (2023)

*Merge scores:*

*Non-missing observations in original unit:* Sum: 1105, Percent: 8.94

*Non-missing observations in chosen unit:* Sum: 1105, Percent: 3.71

*Lost observations in chosen unit:* Sum: 0 Percent: 0

*Description:*

Real value added in Information and communication, annual growth in percentage

**3.2.8.2 Re-exported intermediates: Transport \ and storage, post \ and telecom. (oecd\_tiva\_inter\_t1i)**

*Long tag:* qog\_std\_ts\_oecd\_tiva\_inter\_t1i

*Original tag:* oecd\_tiva\_inter\_t1i

*Dataset citation:* Teorell et al. (2024)

*Variable citation:* Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (2023)

*Merge scores:*

*Non-missing observations in original unit:* Sum: 308, Percent: 2.49

*Non-missing observations in chosen unit:* Sum: 308, Percent: 1.03

*Lost observations in chosen unit:* Sum: 0 Percent: 0

*Description:*

Re-exported intermediates: share of transport and storage, post and telecommunication

**3.2.8.3 Value added: Information and communication (oecd\_valaddac\_t1e)**

*Long tag:* qog\_std\_ts\_oecd\_valaddac\_t1e

*Original tag:* oecd\_valaddac\_t1e

*Dataset citation:* Teorell et al. (2024)

*Variable citation:* Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (2023)

*Merge scores:*

*Non-missing observations in original unit:* Sum: 1163, Percent: 9.41

*Non-missing observations in chosen unit:* Sum: 1163, Percent: 3.9

*Lost observations in chosen unit:* Sum: 0 Percent: 0

*Description:*

Value added in Information and communication as a percentage of total value added

**3.2.8.4 Exports of goods and services (percent of GDP) (wdi\_export)**

*Long tag:* qog\_std\_ts\_wdi\_export

*Original tag:* wdi\_export

*Dataset citation:* Teorell et al. (2024)

*Variable citation:* World Bank (2023)

*Merge scores:*

*Non-missing observations in original unit:* Sum: 7962, Percent: 64.43

*Non-missing observations in chosen unit:* Sum: 7426, Percent: 24.92

*Lost observations in chosen unit:* Sum: 536 Percent: 6.73

*Description:*

Exports of goods and services represent the value of all goods and other market services provided to the rest of the world. They include the value of merchandise, freight, insurance, transport, travel, royalties, license fees, and other services, such as communication, construction, financial, information, business, personal, and government services. They exclude compensation of employees and investment income (formerly called factor services) and transfer payments.

**3.2.8.5 Imports of goods and services (percent of GDP) (wdi\_import)**

*Long tag:* qog\_std\_ts\_wdi\_import

*Original tag:* wdi\_import

*Dataset citation:* Teorell et al. (2024)

*Variable citation:* World Bank (2023)

*Merge scores:*

*Non-missing observations in original unit:* Sum: 7962, Percent: 64.43

*Non-missing observations in chosen unit:* Sum: 7426, Percent: 24.92



*Lost observations in chosen unit:* Sum: 536 Percent: 6.73

*Description:*

Imports of goods and services represent the value of all goods and other market services received from the rest of the world. They include the value of merchandise, freight, insurance, transport, travel, royalties, license fees, and other services, such as communication, construction, financial, information, business, personal, and government services. They exclude compensation of employees and investment income (formerly called factor services) and transfer payments.

### 3.2.9 Energy and Infrastructure

This category includes indicators that cover descriptions of different energy sources (production, consumption and trade) and variables related to quality and quantity of different sectors of infrastructure (transportation and communication).

#### 3.2.9.1 Fixed broadband subscriptions (per 100 people) (wdi\_broadb)

*Long tag:* qog\_std\_ts\_wdi\_broadb

*Original tag:* wdi\_broadb

*Dataset citation:* Teorell et al. (2024)

*Variable citation:* World Bank (2023)

*Merge scores:*

*Non-missing observations in original unit:* Sum: 3497, Percent: 28.3

*Non-missing observations in chosen unit:* Sum: 3114, Percent: 10.45

*Lost observations in chosen unit:* Sum: 383 Percent: 10.95

*Description:*

Fixed broadband subscriptions refers to fixed subscriptions to high-speed access to the public Internet (a TCP/IP connection), at downstream speeds equal to, or greater than, 256 kbit/s. This includes cable modem, DSL, fiber-to-the-home/building, other fixed (wired)-broadband subscriptions, satellite broadband and terrestrial fixed wireless broadband. This total is measured irrespective of the method of payment. It excludes subscriptions that have access to data communications (including the Internet) via mobile-cellular networks. It should include fixed WiMAX and any other fixed wireless technologies. It includes both residential subscriptions and subscriptions for organizations.

#### 3.2.9.2 Individuals using the Internet (percent of population) (wdi\_internet)

*Long tag:* qog\_std\_ts\_wdi\_internet

*Original tag:* wdi\_internet

*Dataset citation:* Teorell et al. (2024)

*Variable citation:* World Bank (2023)

*Merge scores:*

*Non-missing observations in original unit:* Sum: 5771, Percent: 46.7

*Non-missing observations in chosen unit:* Sum: 5122, Percent: 17.19

*Lost observations in chosen unit:* Sum: 649 Percent: 11.25

*Description:*

Internet users are individuals who have used the Internet (from any location) in the last 3 months. The Internet can be used via a computer, mobile phone, personal digital assistant, games machine, digital TV etc.

#### 3.2.9.3 Mobile cellular subscriptions (per 100 people) (wdi\_mobile)

*Long tag:* qog\_std\_ts\_wdi\_mobile

*Original tag:* wdi\_mobile

*Dataset citation:* Teorell et al. (2024)

*Variable citation:* World Bank (2023)

*Merge scores:*

*Non-missing observations in original unit:* Sum: 8537, Percent: 69.08

*Non-missing observations in chosen unit:* Sum: 7595, Percent: 25.49

*Lost observations in chosen unit:* Sum: 942 Percent: 11.03

*Description:*

Mobile cellular telephone subscriptions are subscriptions to a public mobile telephone service that provide access to the PSTN using cellular technology. The indicator includes (and is split into) the number of postpaid subscriptions, and the number of active prepaid accounts (i.e. that have been used during the last three months). The indicator applies to all mobile cellular subscriptions that offer voice communications. It excludes subscriptions via data cards or USB modems, subscriptions to public mobile data services, private trunked mobile radio, telepoint, radio paging and telemetry services.

#### **3.2.9.4 Fixed telephone subscriptions (per 100 people) (wdi\_tele)**

*Long tag:* qog\_std\_ts\_wdi\_tele

*Original tag:* wdi\_tele

*Dataset citation:* Teorell et al. (2024)

*Variable citation:* World Bank (2023)

*Merge scores:*

*Non-missing observations in original unit:* Sum: 9540, Percent: 77.2

*Non-missing observations in chosen unit:* Sum: 8526, Percent: 28.62

*Lost observations in chosen unit:* Sum: 1014 Percent: 10.63

*Description:*

Fixed telephone subscriptions refers to the sum of active number of analogue fixed telephone lines, voice-over-IP (VoIP) subscriptions, fixed wireless local loop (WLL) subscriptions, ISDN voice-channel equivalents and fixed public payphones.

## 4 V-DEM

Based at the University of Gothenburg, the **Varieties of Democracy (V-Dem)** Research Project takes a comprehensive approach to understanding democratization. This approach encompasses multiple core principles: electoral, liberal, majoritarian, consensual, participatory, deliberative, and egalitarian. Each Principle is represented by a separate index, and each is regarded as a separate outcome in the proposed study. In this manner V-Dem reconceptualizes democracy from a single outcome to a set of outcomes. In addition, V-Dem breaks down each core principle into its constituent components, each to be measured separately. Components include features such as free and fair elections, civil liberties, judicial independence, executive constraints, gender equality, media freedom, and civil society. Finally, each component is disaggregated into specific indicators. This fundamentally different approach to democratization is made possible by the V-Dem Database, which measures 450+ indicators annually from 1789 to the present for all countries of the world. The V-Dem approach stands out, first, as a large global collaboration among scholars with diverse areas of expertise; second, as the first project attempting to explain different varieties of democracy; and third, thanks to the highly disaggregated V-Dem data, the first project to explore causal mechanisms linking different aspects of democracy together. With five Principal Investigators, 19 Project Managers with special responsibility for issue areas covered in the V-Dem dataset, around 23 Regional Managers, 134 Country Coordinators and more than 4000 Country Experts, the V-Dem project is one of the world's largest social science data collection projects on democracy. More information is available on the project's website: <https://www.v-dem.net/>

### 4.1 V-Dem Country-Year: V-Dem Full+Others v14

**Dataset tag:** `vdem_cy`

**Output Unit:** V-Dem Country-Year, i.e., data is collected per country and year.

**Description:** All 500 V-Dem indicators and 245 indices + 57 other indicators from other data sources. For R users, we recommend to install our `vdemdata` R package which includes the most recent V-Dem dataset and some useful functions to explore the data.

**Dataset citation:** Coppedge, Michael, John Gerring, Carl Henrik Knutsen, Staffan I. Lindberg, Jan Teorell, David Altman, Fabio Angiolillo, Michael Bernhard, Cecilia Borella, Agnes Cornell, M. Steven Fish, Linnea Fox, Lisa Gastaldi, Haakon Gjerl w, Adam Glynn, Ana Good God, Sandra Grahn, Allen Hicken, Katrin Kinzelbach, Kyle L. Marquardt, Kelly McMann, Valeriya Mechkova, Anja Neundorff, Pamela Paxton, Daniel Pemstein, Oskar Ryd n, Johannes von R mer, Brigitte Seim, Rachel Sigman, Svend-Erik Skaaning, Jeffrey Staton, Aksel Sundstr m, Eitan Tzelgov, Luca Uberti, Yi-ting Wang, Tore Wig, and Daniel Ziblatt. 2024. "V-Dem Codebook v14" Varieties of Democracy (V-Dem) Project.

**Link to original codebook**

[https://v-dem.net/documents/38/v-dem\\_codebook\\_v14.pdf](https://v-dem.net/documents/38/v-dem_codebook_v14.pdf)

**License:** CC-BY-SA 4.0 International

<https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-sa/4.0/legalcode>

More detailed information on the dataset can be found at the following web page:  
<https://www.v-dem.net/vdemds.html>

#### 4.1.1 V-Dem Democracy Indices - V-Dem Mid-Level Indices: Components of the Democracy Indices

This section includes the V-Dem mid-level indices, subcomponents of the V-Dem Democracy Indices. Please see Appendix A of the V-Dem codebook (<https://www.v-dem.net/static/website/img/refs/codebookv12.pdf>) for an overview of all indices, component-indices, and lower-level indices.

#### 4.1.1.1 Freedom of Expression and Alternative Sources of Information Index (v2x\_freexp\_altnf)

*Long tag:* vdem\_cy\_v2x\_freexp\_altnf

*Original tag:* v2x\_freexp\_altnf

*Dataset citation:* Coppedge et al. (2024), Pemstein, Marquardt, Tzelgov, Wang, Medzihorsky, Krusell, Miri & von Römer (2023b)

*Variable citation:* Pemstein, Marquardt, Tzelgov, Wang, Medzihorsky, Krusell, Miri & von Römer (2023), v2mecenefm v2meharjrn v2meslfcen v2xcl\_disc v2clacfree v2mebias v2mecrit v2merange

*Merge scores:*

*Non-missing observations in original unit:* Sum: 27019, Percent: 98.05

*Non-missing observations in chosen unit:* Sum: 27019, Percent: 90.69

*Lost observations in chosen unit:* Sum: 0 Percent: 0

*Description:*

VARIABLE TYPE: D

PROJECT MANAGER(S): Svend-Erik Skaaning, Jan Teorell

ADDITIONAL VERSIONS: \*\_codelow, \*\_codehigh, \*\_sd

QUESTION: To what extent does government respect press and media freedom, the freedom of ordinary people to discuss political matters at home and in the public sphere, as well as the freedom of academic and cultural expression?

CLARIFICATION: This index includes all variables in the two indices v2x\_freexp and v2xme\_altnf.

SCALE: Interval, from low to high (0-1).

SOURCE(S): v2mecenefm v2meharjrn v2meslfcen v2xcl\_disc v2clacfree v2mebias v2mecrit v2merange

DATA RELEASE: 4-14.

AGGREGATION: The index is formed by taking the point estimates from a Bayesian factor analysis model of the indicators for media censorship effort (v2mecenefm), harassment of journalists (v2meharjrn), media bias (v2mebias), media self-censorship (v2meslfcen), print/broadcast media critical (v2mecrit), and print/broadcast media perspectives (v2merange), freedom of discussion for men/women (v2cldiscm, v2cldiscw), and freedom of academic and cultural expression (v2clacfree).

CITATION: Pemstein *et al.* (2024, *V-Dem Working Paper Series* 2024:21); *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

YEARS: 1789-2023

#### 4.1.2 V-Dem Indicators - Elections

**Instructions to the coders (as shown in the surveys) Elections:** Among national elections we distinguish elections to: (i) the lower or unicameral chamber of the legislature (including constituent or constitutional assemblies), (ii) the upper chamber of the legislature, and (iii) the presidency. For present purposes an executive who is elected by a legislature is considered a *prime minister*, not a president. In order to be considered a *president*, an executive must, under ordinary circumstances, be chosen directly by the electorate (perhaps mediated by an electoral college).

**Non-election specific coding:** The following questions are not election-specific and should be coded for every year from 1900 (or when applicable) to the present.

**Election specific questions:** The following questions pertain to specific national elections. The date of each election is pre-coded. In cases where more than one election is held on the same day(s), the questions in this section are for all elections taking place on that date. If you have coded for V-Dem in the past, your previous scores will be displayed in the survey. You are welcome to revise previously submitted scores in all surveys. For this section, we kindly ask you make sure that you have coded all election years.

**Election specific questions – Historical clarification:** The following questions pertain to

specific national elections. National elections include elections to the presidency (if applicable) and legislature (lower and upper house, whatever applies), whether direct or indirect, as well as constituent assembly elections. It does not include other elections, *e.g.*, subnational elections, plebiscites, initiatives, referendums, or by-elections. The date of each election is pre-coded. In cases where more than one election is held on the same day(s), the questions in this section are for all elections taking place on that date."

**Subnational elections and offices:** This section of the survey asks a small number of questions about *subnational* elections and offices. You will be instructed to identify two subnational levels, referred to as "regional government" and "local government". Questions in this section should be answered for every year, rather than for specific elections.

**Lower chamber election:** The following questions pertain to specific lower chamber or unicameral legislative elections. The dates of these elections have been pre-coded.

#### Executive and legislative versions of Election specific variables

- In order to subset election specific variables for executive elections only (previously \*\_ex) – keep only those observations where v2xel\_elecpres is 1.
- In order to subset election specific variables for legislative elections only (previously \*\_leg) – keep only those observations where v2xel\_elecparl is 1.

#### 4.1.2.1 Election free campaign media (v2elfrcamp)

*Long tag:* vdem\_cy\_v2elfrcamp

*Original tag:* v2elfrcamp

*Dataset citation:* Coppedge et al. (2024), Pemstein, Marquardt, Tzelgov, Wang, Medzihorsky, Krusell, Miri & von Römer (2023b)

*Merge scores:*

*Non-missing observations in original unit:* Sum: 12587, Percent: 45.68

*Non-missing observations in chosen unit:* Sum: 12587, Percent: 42.25

*Lost observations in chosen unit:* Sum: 0 Percent: 0

*Description:*

VARIABLE TYPE: C

PROJECT MANAGER(S): Staffan I. Lindberg

ADDITIONAL VERSIONS: \*\_osp, \*\_ord, \*\_codelow, \*\_codehigh, \*\_sd, \*\_mean, \*\_nr

QUESTION: In this national election, did parties or candidates receive either free or publicly financed access to national broadcast media?

RESPONSES:

0: Either no parties or only the governing party receives free access.

1: Some parties in addition to the governing party receive free access.

2: All parties receive free access.

SCALE: Ordinal, converted to interval by the measurement model.

DATA RELEASE: 1-14.

CROSS-CODER AGGREGATION: Bayesian item response theory measurement model (see *V-Dem Methodology*).

DATE SPECIFIC: Election-specific dates (v2eltype).

CITATION: Pemstein *et al.* (2024, *V-Dem Working Paper Series* 2024:21); *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

YEARS: 1900-2023

#### 4.1.2.2 Election paid campaign advertisements (v2elpdcamp)

*Long tag:* vdem\_cy\_v2elpdcamp

*Original tag:* v2elpdcamp

*Dataset citation:* Coppedge et al. (2024), Pemstein, Marquardt, Tzelgov, Wang, Medzihorsky, Krusell, Miri & von Römer (2023b)

*Merge scores:*

*Non-missing observations in original unit:* Sum: 12595, Percent: 45.71

*Non-missing observations in chosen unit:* Sum: 12595, Percent: 42.27

*Lost observations in chosen unit:* Sum: 0 Percent: 0

*Description:*

VARIABLE TYPE: C

PROJECT MANAGER(S): Staffan I. Lindberg

ADDITIONAL VERSIONS: \*\_osp, \*\_ord, \*\_codelow, \*\_codehigh, \*\_sd, \*\_mean, \*\_nr

QUESTION: In this national election, were parties or candidates able to run paid campaign ads on national broadcast media?

RESPONSES:

0: Not at all.

1: It is permitted but regulated in ways that, in practice, favor the government and its allies.

2: It is permitted without limit.

3: It is permitted but regulated in ways that, in practice, foster fair competition.

SCALE: Ordinal, converted to interval by the measurement model.

DATA RELEASE: 1-14.

CROSS-CODER AGGREGATION: Bayesian item response theory measurement model (see *V-Dem Methodology*).

DATE SPECIFIC: Election-specific dates (v2eltype).

CITATION: Pemstein *et al.* (2024, *V-Dem Working Paper Series* 2024:21); *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

YEARS: 1900-2023

CONVERGENCE: Model parameters with convergence issues: universal thresholds, expert thresholds, main-country-coded thresholds.

#### 4.1.2.3 Election paid interest group media (v2elpaidig)

*Long tag:* vdem\_cy\_v2elpaidig

*Original tag:* v2elpaidig

*Dataset citation:* Coppedge *et al.* (2024), Pemstein, Marquardt, Tzelgov, Wang, Medzihorsky, Krusell, Miri & von Römer (2023b)

*Merge scores:*

*Non-missing observations in original unit:* Sum: 12595, Percent: 45.71

*Non-missing observations in chosen unit:* Sum: 12595, Percent: 42.27

*Lost observations in chosen unit:* Sum: 0 Percent: 0

*Description:*

VARIABLE TYPE: C

PROJECT MANAGER(S): Michael Coppedge

ADDITIONAL VERSIONS: \*\_osp, \*\_ord, \*\_codelow, \*\_codehigh, \*\_sd, \*\_mean, \*\_nr

QUESTION: In this election, were interest groups and individuals able to run paid campaign ads on national broadcast media?

RESPONSES:

0: Not at all.

1: It is permitted but regulated in ways that, in practice, favor groups allied with the government.

2: It is permitted without limit.

3: It is permitted but regulated in ways that, in practice, foster representation of diverse perspectives.

SCALE: Ordinal, converted to interval by the measurement model.

DATA RELEASE: 1-14.

CROSS-CODER AGGREGATION: Bayesian item response theory measurement model (see *V-Dem Methodology*).

DATE SPECIFIC: Election-specific dates (v2eltype).

CITATION: Pemstein *et al.* (2024, *V-Dem Working Paper Series* 2024:21); *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

YEARS: 1900-2023

CONVERGENCE: Model parameters with convergence issues: universal thresholds, expert thresholds, main-country-coded thresholds.

#### 4.1.3 V-Dem Indicators - Deliberation

##### Instructions to the coders (as shown in the surveys)

###### **Deliberation:**

The following questions address the deliberative or non-deliberative nature of a country's politics, with particular focus on elite levels. Some of these questions focus on the quality of discourse and others focus on public policies.

##### 4.1.3.1 Engaged society (v2dlengage)

*Long tag:* vdem\_cy\_v2dlengage

*Original tag:* v2dlengage

*Dataset citation:* Coppedge et al. (2024), Pemstein, Marquardt, Tzelgov, Wang, Medzihorsky, Krusell, Miri & von Römer (2023b)

*Merge scores:*

*Non-missing observations in original unit:* Sum: 27268, Percent: 98.96

*Non-missing observations in chosen unit:* Sum: 27268, Percent: 91.52

*Lost observations in chosen unit:* Sum: 0 Percent: 0

*Description:*

VARIABLE TYPE: C

PROJECT MANAGER(S): Michael Coppedge, John Gerring, Staffan Lindberg

ADDITIONAL VERSIONS: \*\_osp, \*\_ord, \*\_codelow, \*\_codehigh, \*\_sd, \*\_mean, \*\_nr

QUESTION: When important policy changes are being considered, how wide and how independent are public deliberations?

CLARIFICATION: This question refers to deliberation as manifested in discussion, debate, and other public forums such as popular media.

RESPONSES:

0: Public deliberation is never, or almost never allowed.

1: Some limited public deliberations are allowed but the public below the elite levels is almost always either unaware of major policy debates or unable to take part in them.

2: Public deliberation is not repressed but nevertheless infrequent and non-elite actors are typically controlled and/or constrained by the elites.

3: Public deliberation is actively encouraged and some autonomous non-elite groups participate, but it is confined to a small slice of specialized groups that tends to be the same across issue-areas.

4: Public deliberation is actively encouraged and a relatively broad segment of non-elite groups often participate and vary with different issue-areas.

5: Large numbers of non-elite groups as well as ordinary people tend to discuss major policies among themselves, in the media, in associations or neighborhoods, or in the streets. Grass-roots deliberation is common and unconstrained.

SCALE: Ordinal, converted to interval by the measurement model.

DATA RELEASE: 1-14.

CROSS-CODER AGGREGATION: Bayesian item response theory measurement model (see *V-Dem Methodology*).

CITATION: Pemstein *et al.* (2024, *V-Dem Working Paper Series* 2024:21); *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

YEARS: 1789-2023

#### 4.1.4 V-Dem Indicators - The Media

##### Instructions to the coders (as shown in the surveys)

**Media:** Two types of media are distinguished in this section: (1) print (newspapers and magazines) and broadcast (radio and television), and (2) online media. We ask that you evaluate these categories as a whole. Thus, "the print and broadcast media" can provide a wide range of perspectives in a country even when individual publications or programs take a consistently narrow perspective.

**Historical clarification:** Two types of media are distinguished in this section: (1) print (newspapers and magazines) and (2) broadcast (radio) media. The latter is, however, only for reference to the contemporary era, and should of course be ignored before it appeared. But when applicable, we ask that you evaluate these categories as a whole. If there is no print or broadcast media at all in a given time period, leave the following questions blank (missing) for this time period. Please also explicitly note in the comments section at the end for which years there was no print or broadcast media at all.

#### 4.1.4.1 Government censorship effort - Media (v2mecenefm)

*Long tag:* vdem\_cy\_v2mecenefm

*Original tag:* v2mecenefm

*Dataset citation:* Coppedge et al. (2024), Pemstein, Marquardt, Tzelgov, Wang, Medzihorsky, Krusell, Miri & von Römer (2023b)

*Merge scores:*

*Non-missing observations in original unit:* Sum: 19143, Percent: 69.47

*Non-missing observations in chosen unit:* Sum: 19143, Percent: 64.25

*Lost observations in chosen unit:* Sum: 0 Percent: 0

*Description:*

VARIABLE TYPE: C

PROJECT MANAGER(S): Michael Coppedge

ADDITIONAL VERSIONS: \*\_osp, \*\_ord, \*\_codelow, \*\_codehigh, \*\_sd, \*\_mean, \*\_nr

QUESTION: Does the government directly or indirectly attempt to censor the print or broadcast media?

CLARIFICATION: Indirect forms of censorship might include politically motivated awarding of broadcast frequencies, withdrawal of financial support, influence over printing facilities and distribution networks, selected distribution of advertising, onerous registration requirements, prohibitive tariffs, and bribery.

We are not concerned with censorship of non-political topics such as child pornography, statements offensive to a particular religion, or defamatory speech unless this sort of censorship is used as a pretext for censoring political speech.

RESPONSES:

0: Attempts to censor are direct and routine.

1: Attempts to censor are indirect but nevertheless routine.

2: Attempts to censor are direct but limited to especially sensitive issues.

3: Attempts to censor are indirect and limited to especially sensitive issues.

4: The government rarely attempts to censor major media in any way, and when such exceptional attempts are discovered, the responsible officials are usually punished.

SCALE: Ordinal, converted to interval by the measurement model.

DATA RELEASE: 1-14.

CROSS-CODER AGGREGATION: Bayesian item response theory measurement model (see *V-Dem Methodology*)

CITATION: Pemstein et al. (2024, *V-Dem Working Paper Series* 2024:21); *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

YEARS: 1789-2023

#### 4.1.4.2 Internet censorship effort (v2mecenefi)

*Long tag:* vdem\_cy\_v2mecenefi

*Original tag:* v2mecenefi

*Dataset citation:* Coppedge et al. (2024), Pemstein, Marquardt, Tzelgov, Wang, Medzihorsky, Krusell, Miri & von Römer (2023b)



*Merge scores:*

*Non-missing observations in original unit:* Sum: 5048, Percent: 18.32

*Non-missing observations in chosen unit:* Sum: 5048, Percent: 16.94

*Lost observations in chosen unit:* Sum: 0 Percent: 0

*Description:*

VARIABLE TYPE: C

PROJECT MANAGER(S): Michael Coppedge

ADDITIONAL VERSIONS: \*\_osp, \*\_ord, \*\_codelow, \*\_codehigh, \*\_sd, \*\_mean, \*\_nr

QUESTION: Does the government attempt to censor information (text, audio, or visuals) on the Internet?

CLARIFICATION: Censorship attempts include Internet filtering (blocking access to certain websites or browsers), denial-of-service attacks, and partial or total Internet shutdowns. We are not concerned with censorship of topics such as child pornography, highly classified information such as military or intelligence secrets, statements offensive to a particular religion, or defamatory speech unless this sort of censorship is used as a pretext for censoring political information or opinions. We are also not concerned with the *extent* of internet access, unless there is absolutely no access at all (in which case the coding should be 0).

RESPONSES:

0 (1): The government successfully blocks Internet access except to sites that are pro-government or devoid of political content.

1 (2): The government attempts to block Internet access except to sites that are pro-government or devoid of political content, but many users are able to circumvent such controls.

2 (3): The government allows Internet access, including to some sites that are critical of the government, but blocks selected sites that deal with especially politically sensitive issues.

3 (4): The government allows Internet access that is unrestricted, with the exceptions mentioned above.

SCALE: Ordinal, converted to interval by the measurement model.

NOTES: As of December 2014, the former category "0 There is no internet" is coded separately as v2mecenefibin. The variable is then rebased to zero.

DATA RELEASE: 3-14.

CROSS-CODER AGGREGATION: Bayesian item response theory measurement model (see *V-Dem Methodology*).

CITATION: Pemstein *et al.* (2024, *V-Dem Working Paper Series* 2024:21); *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

YEARS: 1993-2023

#### 4.1.4.3 Print/broadcast media critical (v2mecrit)

*Long tag:* vdem\_cy\_v2mecrit

*Original tag:* v2mecrit

*Dataset citation:* Coppedge *et al.* (2024), Pemstein, Marquardt, Tzelgov, Wang, Medzihorsky, Krusell, Miri & von Römer (2023b)

*Merge scores:*

*Non-missing observations in original unit:* Sum: 26987, Percent: 97.94

*Non-missing observations in chosen unit:* Sum: 26987, Percent: 90.58

*Lost observations in chosen unit:* Sum: 0 Percent: 0

*Description:*

VARIABLE TYPE: C

PROJECT MANAGER(S): Michael Coppedge

ADDITIONAL VERSIONS: \*\_osp, \*\_ord, \*\_codelow, \*\_codehigh, \*\_sd, \*\_mean, \*\_nr

QUESTION: Of the major print and broadcast outlets, how many routinely criticize the government?

RESPONSES:

0: None.

1: Only a few marginal outlets.

2: Some important outlets routinely criticize the government but there are other important outlets that never do.

3: All major media outlets criticize the government at least occasionally.

SCALE: Ordinal, converted to interval by the measurement model.

DATA RELEASE: 1-14.

CROSS-CODER AGGREGATION: Bayesian item response theory measurement model (see *V-Dem Methodology*).

CITATION: Pemstein *et al.* (2024, *V-Dem Working Paper Series* 2024:21); *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

YEARS: 1789-2023

#### 4.1.4.4 Print/broadcast media perspectives (v2merange)

*Long tag:* vdem\_cy\_v2merange

*Original tag:* v2merange

*Dataset citation:* Coppedge *et al.* (2024), Pemstein, Marquardt, Tzelgov, Wang, Medzihorsky, Krusell, Miri & von Römer (2023*b*)

*Merge scores:*

*Non-missing observations in original unit:* Sum: 26951, Percent: 97.81

*Non-missing observations in chosen unit:* Sum: 26951, Percent: 90.46

*Lost observations in chosen unit:* Sum: 0 Percent: 0

*Description:*

VARIABLE TYPE: C

PROJECT MANAGER(S): Michael Coppedge

ADDITIONAL VERSIONS: \*\_osp, \*\_ord, \*\_codelow, \*\_codehigh, \*\_sd, \*\_mean, \*\_nr

QUESTION: Do the major print and broadcast media represent a wide range of political perspectives?

RESPONSES:

0: The major media represent only the government's perspective.

1: The major media represent only the perspectives of the government and a government-approved, semi-official opposition party.

2: The major media represent a variety of political perspectives but they systematically ignore at least one political perspective that is important in this society.

3: All perspectives that are important in this society are represented in at least one of the major media.

SCALE: Ordinal, converted to interval by the measurement model.

DATA RELEASE: 1-14.

CROSS-CODER AGGREGATION: Bayesian item response theory measurement model (see *V-Dem Methodology*).

CITATION: Pemstein *et al.* (2024, *V-Dem Working Paper Series* 2024:21); *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

YEARS: 1789-2023

#### 4.1.4.5 Percent (percent) Female Journalists (v2mefemjrn)

*Long tag:* vdem\_cy\_v2mefemjrn

*Original tag:* v2mefemjrn

*Dataset citation:* Coppedge *et al.* (2024), Pemstein, Marquardt, Tzelgov, Wang, Medzihorsky, Krusell, Miri & von Römer (2023*b*)

*Merge scores:*

*Non-missing observations in original unit:* Sum: 19135, Percent: 69.44

*Non-missing observations in chosen unit:* Sum: 19135, Percent: 64.22

*Lost observations in chosen unit:* Sum: 0 Percent: 0

*Description:*

VARIABLE TYPE: C

PROJECT MANAGER(S): Pamela Paxton, Michael Coppedge

ADDITIONAL VERSIONS: \*\_codelow, \*\_codehigh, \*\_sd, \*\_mean, \*\_nr

QUESTION: Please estimate the percentage (percent) of journalists in the print and broadcast media who are women.

RESPONSES:

Percent.

SCALE: Interval.

DATA RELEASE: 1-14.

CROSS-CODER AGGREGATION: Bootstrapped.

CITATION: *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

YEARS: 1900-2023

**4.1.4.6 Harassment of journalists (v2meharjrn)***Long tag:* vdem\_cy\_v2meharjrn*Original tag:* v2meharjrn*Dataset citation:* Coppedge et al. (2024), Pemstein, Marquardt, Tzelgov, Wang, Medzihorsky, Krusell, Miri & von Römer (2023b)*Merge scores:**Non-missing observations in original unit:* Sum: 26880, Percent: 97.55*Non-missing observations in chosen unit:* Sum: 26880, Percent: 90.22*Lost observations in chosen unit:* Sum: 0 Percent: 0*Description:*

VARIABLE TYPE: C

PROJECT MANAGER(S): Michael Coppedge

ADDITIONAL VERSIONS: \*\_osp, \*\_ord, \*\_codelow, \*\_codehigh, \*\_sd, \*\_mean, \*\_nr

QUESTION: Are individual journalists harassed — *i.e.*, threatened with libel, arrested, imprisoned, beaten, or killed — by governmental or powerful nongovernmental actors while engaged in legitimate journalistic activities?

RESPONSES:

0: No journalists dare to engage in journalistic activities that would offend powerful actors because harassment or worse would be certain to occur.

1: Some journalists occasionally offend powerful actors but they are almost always harassed or worse and eventually are forced to stop.

2: Some journalists who offend powerful actors are forced to stop but others manage to continue practicing journalism freely for long periods of time.

3: It is rare for any journalist to be harassed for offending powerful actors, and if this were to happen, those responsible for the harassment would be identified and punished.

4: Journalists are never harassed by governmental or powerful nongovernmental actors while engaged in legitimate journalistic activities.

SCALE: Ordinal, converted to interval by the measurement model.

DATA RELEASE: 1-14.

CROSS-CODER AGGREGATION: Bayesian item response theory measurement model (see *V-Dem Methodology*).CITATION: Pemstein *et al.* (2024, *V-Dem Working Paper Series* 2024:21); *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

YEARS: 1789-2023

**4.1.4.7 Media self-censorship (v2meslfcen)***Long tag:* vdem\_cy\_v2meslfcen*Original tag:* v2meslfcen*Dataset citation:* Coppedge et al. (2024), Pemstein, Marquardt, Tzelgov, Wang, Medzihorsky,

Krusell, Miri & von Römer (2023*b*)

*Merge scores:*

*Non-missing observations in original unit:* Sum: 27067, Percent: 98.23

*Non-missing observations in chosen unit:* Sum: 27067, Percent: 90.85

*Lost observations in chosen unit:* Sum: 0 Percent: 0

*Description:*

VARIABLE TYPE: C

PROJECT MANAGER(S): Michael Coppedge

ADDITIONAL VERSIONS: \*\_osp, \*\_ord, \*\_codelow, \*\_codehigh, \*\_sd, \*\_mean, \*\_nr

QUESTION: Is there self-censorship among journalists when reporting on issues that the government considers politically sensitive?

RESPONSES:

0: Self-censorship is complete and thorough.

1: Self-censorship is common but incomplete.

2: There is self-censorship on a few highly sensitive political issues but not on moderately sensitive issues.

3: There is little or no self-censorship among journalists.

SCALE: Ordinal, converted to interval by the measurement model.

DATA RELEASE: 1-14.

CROSS-CODER AGGREGATION: Bayesian item response theory measurement model (see *V-Dem Methodology*).

CITATION: Pemstein *et al.* (2024, *V-Dem Working Paper Series* 2024:21); *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

YEARS: 1789-2023

#### 4.1.4.8 Media bias (v2mebias)

*Long tag:* vdem\_cy\_v2mebias

*Original tag:* v2mebias

*Dataset citation:* Coppedge *et al.* (2024), Pemstein, Marquardt, Tzelgov, Wang, Medzihorsky, Krusell, Miri & von Römer (2023*b*)

*Merge scores:*

*Non-missing observations in original unit:* Sum: 26524, Percent: 96.26

*Non-missing observations in chosen unit:* Sum: 26524, Percent: 89.02

*Lost observations in chosen unit:* Sum: 0 Percent: 0

*Description:*

VARIABLE TYPE: C

PROJECT MANAGER(S): Michael Coppedge

ADDITIONAL VERSIONS: \*\_osp, \*\_ord, \*\_codelow, \*\_codehigh, \*\_sd, \*\_mean, \*\_nr

QUESTION: Is there media bias against opposition parties or candidates?

CLARIFICATION: We ask you to take particular care in rating the year-to-year variation on this question if media bias tends to increase or decrease in election years. Coverage can be considered “more or less impartial” when the media as a whole present a mix of positive and negative coverage of each party or candidate.

RESPONSES:

0: The print and broadcast media cover only the official party or candidates, or have no political coverage, or there are no opposition parties or candidates to cover.

1: The print and broadcast media cover more than just the official party or candidates but all the opposition parties or candidates receive only negative coverage.

2: The print and broadcast media cover some opposition parties or candidates more or less impartially, but they give only negative or no coverage to at least one newsworthy party or candidate.

3: The print and broadcast media cover opposition parties or candidates more or less impartially, but they give an exaggerated *amount* of coverage to the governing party or candidates.

4: The print and broadcast media cover all newsworthy parties and candidates more or less impartially and in proportion to their newsworthiness.

SCALE: Ordinal, converted to interval by the measurement model.

DATA RELEASE: 1-14.

CROSS-CODER AGGREGATION: Bayesian item response theory measurement model (see *V-Dem Methodology*).

CITATION: Pemstein *et al.* (2024, *V-Dem Working Paper Series* 2024:21); *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

YEARS: 1789-2023

#### 4.1.4.9 Media corrupt (v2mecorrpt)

*Long tag:* vdem\_cy\_v2mecorrpt

*Original tag:* v2mecorrpt

*Dataset citation:* Coppedge *et al.* (2024), Pemstein, Marquardt, Tzelgov, Wang, Medzihorsky, Krusell, Miri & von Römer (2023b)

*Merge scores:*

*Non-missing observations in original unit:* Sum: 19050, Percent: 69.13

*Non-missing observations in chosen unit:* Sum: 19050, Percent: 63.94

*Lost observations in chosen unit:* Sum: 0 Percent: 0

*Description:*

VARIABLE TYPE: C

PROJECT MANAGER(S): Michael Coppedge

ADDITIONAL VERSIONS: \*\_osp, \*\_ord, \*\_codelow, \*\_codehigh, \*\_sd, \*\_mean, \*\_nr

QUESTION: Do journalists, publishers, or broadcasters accept payments in exchange for altering news coverage?

RESPONSES:

0: The media are so closely directed by the government that any such payments would be either unnecessary to ensure pro-government coverage or ineffective in producing anti-government coverage.

1: Journalists, publishers, and broadcasters routinely alter news coverage in exchange for payments.

2: It is common, but not routine, for journalists, publishers, and broadcasters to alter news coverage in exchange for payments.

3: It is not normal for journalists, publishers, and broadcasters to alter news coverage in exchange for payments, but it happens occasionally, without anyone being punished.

4: Journalists, publishers, and broadcasters rarely alter news coverage in exchange for payments, and if it becomes known, someone is punished for it.

SCALE: Ordinal, converted to interval by the measurement model.

DATA RELEASE: 1-14.

CROSS-CODER AGGREGATION: Bayesian item response theory measurement model (see *V-Dem Methodology*).

CITATION: Pemstein *et al.* (2024, *V-Dem Working Paper Series* 2024:21); *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

YEARS: 1900-2023

#### 4.1.5 V-Dem Indicators - Civic and Academic Space

##### Instructions to the coders (as shown in the surveys)

##### **Civic and Academic Space:**

In this survey, we ask you to assess several issues concerning the space for and state of civil society and academia. First, we ask about some general issues such as polarization and peaceful assembly. Then, we probe into mobilization for mass events and associations. Finally, we ask you to consider questions related to academia.

**4.1.5.1 Constitutional Protection for Academic Freedom (v2caprotac)***Long tag:* vdem\_cy\_v2caprotac*Original tag:* v2caprotac*Dataset citation:* Coppedge et al. (2024), Pemstein, Marquardt, Tzelgov, Wang, Medzihorsky, Krusell, Miri & von Römer (2023b)*Variable citation:* Spannagel (2022), Elkins & Ginsburg (2021)*Merge scores:**Non-missing observations in original unit:* Sum: 13513, Percent: 49.04*Non-missing observations in chosen unit:* Sum: 13513, Percent: 45.35*Lost observations in chosen unit:* Sum: 0 Percent: 0*Description:*

VARIABLE TYPE: A

PROJECT MANAGER(S): Katrin Kinzelbach, Janika Spannagel

QUESTION: Do constitutional provisions for the protection of academic freedom exist?

RESPONSES:

0: No.

1: Yes.

95: Constitution suspended.

97: Other, or undetermined.

99: Missing.

SCALE: Ordinal

SOURCE(S): Spannagel (2023), Elkins and Ginsburg (2021)

NOTES: This variable was substantially revised in Version 13 on the basis of new available data. For the online graphing tools, all values but 0 or 1 are set to missing.

DATA RELEASE: 10-14.

COUNTRY-YEAR AGGREGATION: Last

CITATION: *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

YEARS: 1900-2023

**4.1.5.2 Freedom of academic exchange and dissemination (v2cafexch)***Long tag:* vdem\_cy\_v2cafexch*Original tag:* v2cafexch*Dataset citation:* Coppedge et al. (2024), Pemstein, Marquardt, Tzelgov, Wang, Medzihorsky, Krusell, Miri & von Römer (2023b)*Merge scores:**Non-missing observations in original unit:* Sum: 14698, Percent: 53.34*Non-missing observations in chosen unit:* Sum: 14698, Percent: 49.33*Lost observations in chosen unit:* Sum: 0 Percent: 0*Description:*

VARIABLE TYPE: C

PROJECT MANAGER(S): Katrin Kinzelbach, Ilyas Saliba, Janika Spannagel

ADDITIONAL VERSIONS: \*\_osp, \*\_ord, \*\_codelow, \*\_codehigh, \*\_sd, \*\_mean, \*\_nr

QUESTION: To what extent are scholars free to exchange and communicate research ideas and findings?

CLARIFICATION: Free academic exchange includes uncensored access to research material, unhindered participation in national or international academic conferences, and the uncensored publication of academic material. Free dissemination refers to the unrestricted possibility for scholars to share and explain research findings in their field of expertise to non-academic audiences through media engagement or public lectures.

RESPONSES:

0: Completely restricted. Academic exchange and dissemination is, across all disciplines, consistently subject to censorship, self-censorship or other restrictions.

1: Severely restricted. Academic exchange and dissemination is, in some disciplines,

consistently subject to censorship, self-censorship or other restrictions.

2: Moderately restricted. Academic exchange and dissemination is occasionally subject to censorship, self-censorship or other restrictions.

3: Mostly free. Academic exchange and dissemination is rarely subject to censorship, self-censorship or other restrictions.

4: Fully free. Academic exchange and dissemination is not subject to censorship, self-censorship or other restrictions.

SCALE: Ordinal, converted to interval by the measurement model.

DATA RELEASE: 10-14.

CROSS-CODER AGGREGATION: Bayesian item response theory measurement model (see *V-Dem Methodology*).

CITATION: Spannagel and Kinzelbach (2022); Pemstein *et al.* (2024, *V-Dem Working Paper Series* 2024:21); *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

YEARS: 1900-2023

#### 4.1.6 Other Indices Created Using V-Dem Data - Accountability

The *Accountability Index* uses V-Dem data but is not a subcomponent of the V-Dem Democracy Indices. Please see Appendix A of the V-Dem codebook (<https://www.v-dem.net/static/website/img/refs/codebookv12.pdf>) for an overview of all indices, component-indices, and lower-level indices.

##### 4.1.6.1 Accountability index (v2x\_accountability)

*Long tag:* vdem\_cy\_v2x\_accountability

*Original tag:* v2x\_accountability

*Dataset citation:* Coppedge *et al.* (2024), Pemstein, Marquardt, Tzelgov, Wang, Medzihorsky, Krusell, Miri & von Römer (2023b)

*Variable citation:* Lührmann *et al.* (2020), v2x\_elecreg v2elembaut v2elembcap v2elrgstry v2elirreg v2elintim v2elmulpar v2elfrfair v2elsuffrage v2expathhs v2ex\_legconhos v2expathhg v2exaphogp v2ex\_hosw v2psparban v2psbars v2psoppaut v2juhcind v2juncind v2juhccomp v2jucomp v2exrescon v2lginvstp v2lgqstexp v2lgbicam v2lgotovst v2mecenefm v2mecenefi v2meharjrn v2mecrit v2mebias v2merange v2meslfcen v2csptrcpt v2cseeorgs v2csreprss v2cldiscm v2cldiscw v2clacfree v2dlengage v2x\_suffr v2xex\_elecreg v2xlg\_elecreg

*Merge scores:*

*Non-missing observations in original unit:* Sum: 19183, Percent: 69.62

*Non-missing observations in chosen unit:* Sum: 19183, Percent: 64.39

*Lost observations in chosen unit:* Sum: 0 Percent: 0

*Description:*

VARIABLE TYPE: D

PROJECT MANAGER(S): Kyle L. Marquardt and Valeriya Mechkova

ADDITIONAL VERSIONS: \*\_osp, \*\_codelow, \*\_codehigh

QUESTION: To what extent is the ideal of government accountability achieved?

CLARIFICATION: Government accountability is understood as constraints on the government's use of political power through requirements for justification for its actions and potential sanctions. We organize the sub-types of accountability spatially. Vertical accountability refers to the ability of a state's population to hold its government accountable through elections, horizontal accountability refers to checks and balances between institutions; and diagonal accountability captures oversight by civil society organizations and media activity.

SCALE: We provide two versions of this index. The first is the normalized output from the hierarchical latent variable analysis. It is on an unbounded interval scale. The second, denoted by \*\_osp, is a version of this output which we scale using a standard normal cumulative distribution function. It is thus scaled low to high (0-1).

SOURCE(S): v2x\_elecreg v2elembaut v2elembcap v2elrgstry v2elirreg v2elintim v2elmulpar v2elfrfair v2elsuffrage v2expathhs v2ex\_legconhos v2expathhg v2exaphogp v2ex\_hosw

v2psparban v2psbars v2psoppaut v2juhcind v2juncind v2juhccomp v2jucomp v2exrescon  
v2lginvstp v2lgqstexp v2lgbicam v2lgotovst v2mecenefm v2mecenefi v2meharjrn v2mecrit  
v2mebias v2merange v2meslfcen v2csprtcpt v2cseeorgs v2csreprss v2cldiscm v2cldiscw  
v2clacfree v2dlengage v2x\_suffr v2xex\_elecreg v2xlg\_elecreg

DATA RELEASE: 7-14.

AGGREGATION: To create an aggregate measure of accountability, we conduct a hierarchical analysis using all variables included in the three sub-indices of accountability: vertical (v2x\_veracc), horizontal (v2x\_horacc) and diagonal accountability (v2x\_diagacc). This strategy assumes that overall accountability is a function of all variables included in each sub-index, though the sub-indices structure this relationship.

CITATION: Lührmann *et al.* (2020); *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

YEARS: 1900-2023

#### 4.1.6.2 Diagonal accountability index (v2x\_diagacc)

*Long tag:* vdem\_cy\_v2x\_diagacc

*Original tag:* v2x\_diagacc

*Dataset citation:* Coppedge *et al.* (2024), Pemstein, Marquardt, Tzelgov, Wang, Medzihorsky, Krusell, Miri & von Römer (2023b)

*Variable citation:* Lührmann *et al.* (2020), v2mecenefm v2mecenefi v2meharjrn v2mecrit v2mebias v2merange v2meslfcen v2csprtcpt v2cseeorgs v2csreprss v2cldiscm v2cldiscw v2clacfree v2dlengage

*Merge scores:*

*Non-missing observations in original unit:* Sum: 19183, Percent: 69.62

*Non-missing observations in chosen unit:* Sum: 19183, Percent: 64.39

*Lost observations in chosen unit:* Sum: 0 Percent: 0

*Description:*

VARIABLE TYPE: D

PROJECT MANAGER(S): Kyle L. Marquardt and Valeriya Mechkova

ADDITIONAL VERSIONS: \*\_osp, \*\_codelow, \*\_codehigh

QUESTION: To what extent is the ideal of diagonal government accountability achieved?

CLARIFICATION: Diagonal accountability covers the range of actions and mechanisms that citizens, civil society organizations CSOs, and an independent media can use to hold the government accountable. These mechanisms include using informal tools such as social mobilization and investigative journalism to enhance vertical and horizontal accountability.

SCALE: We provide two versions of this index. The first is the normalized output from the hierarchical latent variable analysis. It is on an unbounded interval scale. The second, denoted by \*\_osp, is a version of this output which we scale using a standard normal cumulative distribution function. It is thus scaled low to high (0-1).

SOURCE(S): v2mecenefm v2mecenefi v2meharjrn v2mecrit v2mebias v2merange v2meslfcen v2csprtcpt v2cseeorgs v2csreprss v2cldiscm v2cldiscw v2clacfree v2dlengage

DATA RELEASE: 7-14.

AGGREGATION: We model this form of accountability as a function of four hierarchical nodes: media freedom, civil society characteristics, freedom of expression, and the degree to which citizens are engaged in politics.

The media freedom node incorporates variables representing two broad dimensions. The first dimension regards the extent to which the government attempts to censor the media (v2mecenefm) and information on the Internet (v2mecenefi), as well as the extent to which government and other powerful actors harass journalists (v2meharjrn). The second dimension concerns the work of the media itself, namely the extent to which: the media criticizes the government at least occasionally (v2mecrit); there is bias against opposition candidates (v2mebias); the media offers a wide array of political perspectives in their coverage (v2merange); and there is self-censorship on salient issues for the government (v2meslfcen). The media freedom node is an expanded version of the V-Dem Alternative sources of information index (v2xme\_altinf).



Finally, we use the components of the V-Dem core index of civil society to account for the opportunity of citizens to channel their interests and potentially oppose the government and its policies in an organized way through a robust, self-organized and autonomous civil society organizations. The indicators included in this node are: popular and voluntary participation in CSOs, (v2csprcpt), government control to the entry and exit of CSOs into the public life, (v2cseeorgs), and government oppression of CSOs (v2csreprss).

The freedom of expression node incorporates variables regarding the degree to which men and women are free to discuss political issues without fear of harassment (v2cldiscm and v2cldiscw), as well as an indicator on the freedom of academic and cultural expression (v2clacfree).

Finally, we incorporate a variable representing engaged society (v2dlengage), which gives information on the width and depth of public deliberations when important policy changes are being considered.

CITATION: Lührmann *et al.* (2020); *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

YEARS: 1900-2023

#### 4.1.7 Other Indices Created Using V-Dem Data - Civil Liberties

The *Civil Liberties Index* uses V-Dem data but is not a subcomponent of the V-Dem Democracy Indices. Please see Appendix A of the V-Dem codebook (<https://www.v-dem.net/static/website/img/refs/codebookv12.pdf>) for an overview of all indices, component-indices, and lower-level indices.

##### 4.1.7.1 Political liberties index (v2x\_clpol)

*Long tag:* vdem\_cy\_v2x\_clpol

*Original tag:* v2x\_clpol

*Dataset citation:* Coppedge et al. (2024), Pemstein, Marquardt, Tzelgov, Wang, Medzihorsky, Krusell, Miri & von Römer (2023b)

*Variable citation:* Pemstein, Marquardt, Tzelgov, Wang, Medzihorsky, Krusell, Miri & von Römer (2023), v2xcl\_disc v2mecenefm v2meharjrn v2meslfcen v2clacfree v2psparban v2psbars v2psoppaut v2cseeorgs v2csreprss

*Merge scores:*

*Non-missing observations in original unit:* Sum: 27214, Percent: 98.76

*Non-missing observations in chosen unit:* Sum: 27214, Percent: 91.34

*Lost observations in chosen unit:* Sum: 0 Percent: 0

*Description:*

VARIABLE TYPE: D

PROJECT MANAGER(S): Svend-Erik Skaaning

ADDITIONAL VERSIONS: \*\_codelow, \*\_codehigh, \*\_sd

QUESTION: To what extent are political liberties respected?

CLARIFICATION: Political liberties are understood as freedom of association and freedom of expression. Among the set of civil liberties, these liberal rights are the most relevant for political competition and accountability. The index is based on indicators that reflect government repression and that are not directly referring to elections.

SCALE: Interval, from low to high (0-1).

SOURCE(S): v2xcl\_disc v2mecenefm v2meharjrn v2meslfcen v2clacfree v2psparban v2psbars v2psoppaut v2cseeorgs v2csreprss

DATA RELEASE: 6-14.

AGGREGATION: The index is formed by point estimates drawn from a Bayesian factor analysis model including the following indicators: government censorship effort — media (v2mecenefm), harassment of journalists (v2meharjrn), media self-censorship (v2meslfcen), freedom of discussion for men and women (v2cldiscm, v2cldiscw), freedom of academic and cultural expression (v2clacfree), party ban (v2psparban), barriers to parties (v2psbars), opposition parties autonomy (v2psoppaut), CSO entry and exit (v2cseeorgs) and CSO

repression (v2csreprss).

CITATION: Pemstein *et al.* (2024, *V-Dem Working Paper Series* 2024:21); *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

YEARS: 1789-2023

#### 4.1.8 Other Indices Created Using V-Dem Data - Women's Empowerment

The *Women's Empowerment Index* uses V-Dem data but is not a subcomponent of the V-Dem Democracy Indices. Please see Appendix A of the V -Dem codebook (<https://www.v-dem.net/static/website/img/refs/codebookv12.pdf>) for an overview of all indices, component-indices, and lower-level indices.

##### 4.1.8.1 Women civil society participation index (v2x\_gencs)

*Long tag:* vdem\_cy\_v2x\_gencs

*Original tag:* v2x\_gencs

*Dataset citation:* Coppedge *et al.* (2024), Pemstein, Marquardt, Tzelgov, Wang, Medzihorsky, Krusell, Miri & von Römer (2023b)

*Variable citation:* Sundström *et al.* (2017), Pemstein, Marquardt, Tzelgov, Wang, Medzihorsky, Krusell, Miri & von Römer (2023), v2cldiscw v2csgender v2mefemjrn

*Merge scores:*

*Non-missing observations in original unit:* Sum: 26927, Percent: 97.72

*Non-missing observations in chosen unit:* Sum: 26927, Percent: 90.38

*Lost observations in chosen unit:* Sum: 0 Percent: 0

*Description:*

VARIABLE TYPE: D

PROJECT MANAGER(S): Pamela Paxton

ADDITIONAL VERSIONS: \*\_codelow, \*\_codehigh, \*\_sd

QUESTION: Do women have the ability to express themselves and to form and participate in groups?

CLARIFICATION: Women's civil society participation is understood to include open discussion of political issues, participation in civil society organizations, and representation in the ranks of journalists.

SCALE: Interval, from low to high (0-1).

SOURCE(S): v2cldiscw v2csgender v2mefemjrn

DATA RELEASE: 5-14.

AGGREGATION: The index is formed by taking the point estimates from a Bayesian factor analysis model of the indicators for freedom of discussion for women (v2cldiscw), CSO women's participation (v2csgender), and female journalists (v2mefemjrn).

CITATION: Sundström *et al.* (2017, *V-Dem Working Paper Series* 2017:19); Pemstein *et al.* (2024, *V-Dem Working Paper Series* 2024:21); *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

YEARS: 1789-2023

#### 4.1.9 Other Indices Created Using V-Dem Data - Elections

The *Elections Index* uses V-Dem data but is not a subcomponent of the V-Dem Democracy Indices. Please see Appendix A of the V -Dem codebook (<https://www.v-dem.net/static/website/img/refs/codebookv12.pdf>) for an overview of all indices, component-indices, and lower-level indices.

##### 4.1.9.1 Freedom of expression index (v2x\_freexp)

*Long tag:* vdem\_cy\_v2x\_freexp

*Original tag:* v2x\_freexp

*Dataset citation:* Coppedge et al. (2024), Pemstein, Marquardt, Tzelgov, Wang, Medzihorsky, Krusell, Miri & von Römer (2023b)

*Variable citation:* Pemstein, Marquardt, Tzelgov, Wang, Medzihorsky, Krusell, Miri & von Römer (2023), v2mecenefm v2meharjrn v2meslfcen v2xcl\_disc v2clacfree

*Merge scores:*

*Non-missing observations in original unit:* Sum: 27068, Percent: 98.23

*Non-missing observations in chosen unit:* Sum: 27068, Percent: 90.85

*Lost observations in chosen unit:* Sum: 0 Percent: 0

*Description:*

VARIABLE TYPE: D

PROJECT MANAGER(S): Svend-Erik Skaaning, Jan Teorell

ADDITIONAL VERSIONS: \*\_codelow, \*\_codehigh, \*\_sd

QUESTION: To what extent does government respect press and media freedom, the freedom of ordinary people to discuss political matters at home and in the public sphere, as well as the freedom of academic and cultural expression?

SCALE: Interval, from low to high (0-1).

SOURCE(S): v2mecenefm v2meharjrn v2meslfcen v2xcl\_disc v2clacfree

DATA RELEASE: 1-14.

AGGREGATION: The index is formed by taking the point estimates from a Bayesian factor analysis model of the indicators for print/broadcast censorship effort (v2mecenefm), harassment of journalists (v2meharjrn), media self-censorship (v2meslfcen), freedom of discussion for men/women (v2cldiscm, v2cldiscw) and freedom of academic and cultural expression (v2clacfree).

CITATION: Pemstein *et al.* (2024, *V-Dem Working Paper Series* 2024:21); *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

YEARS: 1789-2023

#### 4.1.9.2 Alternative source information index (v2xme\_altinf)

*Long tag:* vdem\_cy\_v2xme\_altinf

*Original tag:* v2xme\_altinf

*Dataset citation:* Coppedge et al. (2024), Pemstein, Marquardt, Tzelgov, Wang, Medzihorsky, Krusell, Miri & von Römer (2023b)

*Variable citation:* Pemstein, Marquardt, Tzelgov, Wang, Medzihorsky, Krusell, Miri & von Römer (2023), v2mebias v2mecrit v2merange

*Merge scores:*

*Non-missing observations in original unit:* Sum: 26995, Percent: 97.97

*Non-missing observations in chosen unit:* Sum: 26995, Percent: 90.61

*Lost observations in chosen unit:* Sum: 0 Percent: 0

*Description:*

VARIABLE TYPE: D

PROJECT MANAGER(S): Jan Teorell

ADDITIONAL VERSIONS: \*\_codelow, \*\_codehigh, \*\_sd

QUESTION: To what extent is the media (a) un-biased in their coverage or lack of coverage of the opposition, (b) allowed to be critical of the regime, and (c) representative of a wide array of political perspectives?

SCALE: Interval, from low to high (0-1).

SOURCE(S): v2mebias v2mecrit v2merange

DATA RELEASE: 1-14.

AGGREGATION: The index is formed by taking the point estimates from a Bayesian factor analysis model of the indicators for media bias (v2mebias), print/broadcast media critical (v2mecrit), and print/broadcast media perspectives (v2merange).

CITATION: Pemstein *et al.* (2024, *V-Dem Working Paper Series* 2024:21); *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

YEARS: 1789-2023

#### 4.1.10 Other Indices Created Using V-Dem Data - Academic Freedom

The *Academic Freedom Index* uses V-Dem data but is not a subcomponent of the V-Dem Democracy Indices. Please see Appendix A of the V-Dem codebook (<https://www.v-dem.net/static/website/img/refs/codebookv12.pdf>) for an overview of all indices, component-indices, and lower-level indices.

##### 4.1.10.1 Academic Freedom Index (v2xca\_academ)

*Long tag:* vdem\_cy\_v2xca\_academ

*Original tag:* v2xca\_academ

*Dataset citation:* Coppedge et al. (2024), Pemstein, Marquardt, Tzelgov, Wang, Medzihorsky, Krusell, Miri & von Römer (2023b)

*Variable citation:* Spannagel & Kinzelbach (2022), Pemstein, Marquardt, Tzelgov, Wang, Medzihorsky, Krusell, Miri & von Römer (2023), v2cafres v2cafexch v2cainsaut v2casurv v2clacfree

*Merge scores:*

*Non-missing observations in original unit:* Sum: 14976, Percent: 54.35

*Non-missing observations in chosen unit:* Sum: 14976, Percent: 50.27

*Lost observations in chosen unit:* Sum: 0 Percent: 0

*Description:*

VARIABLE TYPE: D

PROJECT MANAGER(S): Katrin Kinzelbach, Ilyas Saliba, Janika Spannagel

ADDITIONAL VERSIONS: \*\_codelow, \*\_codehigh, \*\_sd

QUESTION: To what extent is academic freedom respected?

CLARIFICATION: Academic freedom is understood as the right of academics, without constriction by prescribed doctrine, to freedom of teaching and discussion, freedom in carrying out research and disseminating and publishing the results thereof, freedom to express freely their opinion about the institution or system in which they work, freedom from institutional censorship and freedom to participate in professional or representative academic bodies (UNESCO 1997 Recommendation concerning the Status of Higher-Education Teaching Personnel). The Academic Freedom Index is designed to provide an aggregated measure that captures the de facto realization of academic freedom, including the degree to which higher-education institutions are autonomous.

SCALE: Interval, from low to high (0-1).

SOURCE(S): v2cafres v2cafexch v2cainsaut v2casurv v2clacfree

DATA RELEASE: 10-14.

AGGREGATION: The index is formed by point estimates drawn from a Bayesian factor analysis model including the following indicators: freedom to research and teach (v2cafres), freedom of academic exchange and dissemination (v2cafexch), institutional autonomy (v2cainsaut), campus integrity (v2casurv), freedom of academic and cultural expression (v2clacfree).

CITATION: Spannagel and Kinzelbach (2022); Pemstein *et al.* (2024, *V-Dem Working Paper Series* 2024:21); *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

YEARS: 1900-2023

#### 4.1.11 Digital Society Survey - Coordinated Information Operations

The Digital Society Survey, designed by the Digital Society Project, contains questions pertaining to the political environment of the internet and social media. The data collected through expert-coded surveys provides information on topics related to coordinated information operations, digital media freedom, online media polarization, social cleavages as well as state internet regulation capacity and approach.

Principal investigators for the Digital Society Project are Valeriya Mechkova, Daniel Pemstein, Brigitte Seim, Steven Wilson.

For more information, please visit [www.digitalsocietyproject.org](http://www.digitalsocietyproject.org).

**Instructions to the coders (as shown in the surveys)**

**Digital society:** The following survey contains questions pertaining to the political environment of the Internet and social media. Please bear in mind the following definitions as you respond to questions on this survey:

The government and its agents include official government organs, such as bureaucracies, courts, intelligence services, and the military, but also unofficial agents, such as officially unaffiliated cyber-warfare operatives who perform services, even “off-book” work, on behalf of the government.

Major political parties include the group of political parties that hold a significant number of seats in national legislative body(-ies), or earn a significant number of votes in elections for the executive. When we ask you to consider “major political parties,” you do not need to consider parties that run in elections but receive only a small minority of seats or votes, or those that receive no seats at all.

We define the Internet as all information that people access over public and private digital networks, worldwide. The Internet includes both publicly accessible digital spaces and private or gated information transmission platforms. The Internet does not include traditional media transmission mechanisms such as paper, television, traditional voice telephone, and radio.

Social media are a subset of Internet platforms that enable normal individuals to create and share content with networks of other people. Social media platforms are available to the public, although content on such networks may be shared privately within subgroups of users. Social media includes both publicly visible, or semi-public platforms, like Facebook, Flickr, Friendster, Google+, Instagram, Myspace, LinkedIn, Twitter, VKontakte, and Weibo and private social networking and messaging platforms like Signal, Slack, Snapchat, or WhatsApp.

Domestic online media is any media source originating in the country in question. For example, the New York Times’ website is domestic online media in the United States, but not in India, even though it operates bureaus in India. Media includes any source reporting on current events or political issues, ranging from well-established brands to newsletters and websites run by an individual.

Cyber security threats include penetration of private digital networks, using means ranging from exploiting software vulnerabilities, password cracking, or social engineering (e.g., tricking individuals into revealing passwords or other information necessary to break into a digital system) to obtain information or disrupt an organization or individual’s use of digital networks and tools. They also include unauthorized alterations of an individual or organization’s digital presence, such as defacing websites and commandeering social media accounts. These threats range from unsophisticated (e.g., exploitation of failure to password protect private networks or use of common passwords by authorized users, and spear phishing) to moderate (e.g., embedding malicious code in emails or exploiting well-known software flaws that organizations have failed to patch), to sophisticated (e.g., exploiting unknown exploits in commonly used software or even embedding exploits into commercial systems unbeknownst to their creators).

Clarification: When we discuss shutting down online content, please consider instances where a website (or websites) have been taken entirely offline as well as instances where a website (or websites) have been slowed down or had access similarly intentionally inhibited, such that use of this website is challenging. In other words, both outright shutting down and more subtle measures that inhibit access should be considered when answering these questions.

Clarification: When we discuss “censorship” or “censoring” content online, we are not concerned with censorship of topics such as child pornography, highly classified information such as military or intelligence secrets, or defamatory speech, unless this sort of censorship is used as a pretext for censoring political information or opinions.

**4.1.11.1 Government dissemination of false information domestic (v2smgovdom)**

*Long tag:* vdem\_cy\_v2smgovdom

*Original tag:* v2smgovdom

*Dataset citation:* Coppedge et al. (2024), Pemstein, Marquardt, Tzelgov, Wang, Medzihorsky, Krusell, Miri & von Römer (2023b)

*Merge scores:*

*Non-missing observations in original unit:* Sum: 4099, Percent: 14.88

*Non-missing observations in chosen unit:* Sum: 4099, Percent: 13.76

*Lost observations in chosen unit:* Sum: 0 Percent: 0

*Description:*

VARIABLE TYPE: C

ADDITIONAL VERSIONS: \*\_osp, \*\_ord, \*\_codelow, \*\_codehigh, \*\_sd, \*\_mean, \*\_nr

QUESTION: How often do the government and its agents use social media to disseminate misleading viewpoints or false information to influence its own population?

RESPONSES:

0: Extremely often. The government disseminates false information on all key political issues.

1: Often. The government disseminates false information on many key political issues.

2: About half the time. The government disseminates false information on some key political issues, but not others.

3: Rarely. The government disseminates false information on only a few key political issues.

4: Never, or almost never. The government never disseminates false information on key political issues.

SCALE: Ordinal, converted to interval by the measurement model.

DATA RELEASE: 9-14.

CROSS-CODER AGGREGATION: Bayesian item response theory measurement model (see V-Dem Methodology).

CITATION: Mechkova *et al.* (2019, *Digital Society Project Working Paper* 2019:1); Pemstein *et al.* (2024, *V-Dem Working Paper Series* 2024:21); *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

YEARS: 2000-2023

#### 4.1.11.2 Government dissemination of false information abroad (v2smgovab)

*Long tag:* vdem\_cy\_v2smgovab

*Original tag:* v2smgovab

*Dataset citation:* Coppedge *et al.* (2024), Pemstein, Marquardt, Tzelgov, Wang, Medzihorsky, Krusell, Miri & von Römer (2023b)

*Merge scores:*

*Non-missing observations in original unit:* Sum: 4099, Percent: 14.88

*Non-missing observations in chosen unit:* Sum: 4099, Percent: 13.76

*Lost observations in chosen unit:* Sum: 0 Percent: 0

*Description:*

VARIABLE TYPE: C

ADDITIONAL VERSIONS: \*\_osp, \*\_ord, \*\_codelow, \*\_codehigh, \*\_sd, \*\_mean, \*\_nr

QUESTION: How often do the government and its agents use social media to disseminate misleading viewpoints or false information to influence citizens of other countries abroad?

RESPONSES:

0: Extremely often. The government disseminates false information on all key political issues.

1: Often. The government disseminates false information on many key political issues.

2: About half the time. The government disseminates false information on some key political issues, but not others.

3: Rarely. The government disseminates false information on only a few key political issues.

4: Never, or almost never. The government never disseminates false information on key political issues.

SCALE: Ordinal, converted to interval by the measurement model.

DATA RELEASE: 9-14.

CROSS-CODER AGGREGATION: Bayesian item response theory measurement model (see V-Dem Methodology).

CITATION: Mechkova *et al.* (2019, *Digital Society Project Working Paper* 2019:1); Pemstein *et al.* (2024, *V-Dem Working Paper Series* 2024:21); *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

at the top of this document).  
YEARS: 2000-2023

#### 4.1.11.3 Party dissemination of false information domestic (v2smpardom)

*Long tag:* vdem\_cy\_v2smpardom

*Original tag:* v2smpardom

*Dataset citation:* Coppedge et al. (2024), Pemstein, Marquardt, Tzelgov, Wang, Medzihorsky, Krusell, Miri & von Römer (2023b)

*Merge scores:*

*Non-missing observations in original unit:* Sum: 4099, Percent: 14.88

*Non-missing observations in chosen unit:* Sum: 4099, Percent: 13.76

*Lost observations in chosen unit:* Sum: 0 Percent: 0

*Description:*

VARIABLE TYPE: C

ADDITIONAL VERSIONS: \*\_osp, \*\_ord, \*\_codelow, \*\_codehigh, \*\_sd, \*\_mean, \*\_nr

QUESTION: How often do major political parties and candidates for office use social media to disseminate misleading viewpoints or false information to influence their own population?

RESPONSES:

0: Extremely often. Major political parties and candidates disseminate false information on all key political issues.

1: Often. Major political parties and candidates disseminate false information on many key political issues.

2: About half the time. Major political parties and candidates disseminate false information on some key political issues, but not others.

3: Rarely. Major political parties and candidates disseminate false information on only a few key political issues.

4: Never, or almost never. Major political parties and candidates never disseminate false information on key political issues.

SCALE: Ordinal, converted to interval by the measurement model.

DATA RELEASE: 9-14.

CROSS-CODER AGGREGATION: Bayesian item response theory measurement model (see V-Dem Methodology).

CITATION: Mechkova et al. (2019, *Digital Society Project Working Paper* 2019:1); Pemstein et al. (2024, *V-Dem Working Paper Series* 2024:21); *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

YEARS: 2000-2023

#### 4.1.11.4 Party dissemination of false information abroad (v2smparab)

*Long tag:* vdem\_cy\_v2smparab

*Original tag:* v2smparab

*Dataset citation:* Coppedge et al. (2024), Pemstein, Marquardt, Tzelgov, Wang, Medzihorsky, Krusell, Miri & von Römer (2023b)

*Merge scores:*

*Non-missing observations in original unit:* Sum: 4099, Percent: 14.88

*Non-missing observations in chosen unit:* Sum: 4099, Percent: 13.76

*Lost observations in chosen unit:* Sum: 0 Percent: 0

*Description:*

VARIABLE TYPE: C

ADDITIONAL VERSIONS: \*\_osp, \*\_ord, \*\_codelow, \*\_codehigh, \*\_sd, \*\_mean, \*\_nr

QUESTION: How often do major political parties and candidates for office use social media to disseminate misleading viewpoints or false information to influence citizens of other countries abroad?

## RESPONSES:

0: Extremely often. Major political parties and candidates disseminate false information on all key political issues.

1: Often. Major political parties and candidates disseminate false information on many key political issues.

2: About half the time. Major political parties and candidates disseminate false information on some key political issues, but not others.

3: Rarely. Major political parties and candidates disseminate false information on only a few key political issues.

4: Never, or almost never. Major political parties and candidates never disseminate false information on key political issues.

SCALE: Ordinal, converted to interval by the measurement model.

DATA RELEASE: 9-14.

CROSS-CODER AGGREGATION: Bayesian item response theory measurement model (see V-Dem Methodology).

CITATION: Mechkova *et al.* (2019, *Digital Society Project Working Paper* 2019:1); Pemstein *et al.* (2024, *V-Dem Working Paper Series* 2024:21); *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

YEARS: 2000-2023

**4.1.11.5 Foreign governments dissemination of false information (v2smfordom)**

*Long tag:* vdem\_cy\_v2smfordom

*Original tag:* v2smfordom

*Dataset citation:* Coppedge *et al.* (2024), Pemstein, Marquardt, Tzelgov, Wang, Medzihorsky, Krusell, Miri & von Römer (2023*b*)

*Merge scores:*

*Non-missing observations in original unit:* Sum: 4099, Percent: 14.88

*Non-missing observations in chosen unit:* Sum: 4099, Percent: 13.76

*Lost observations in chosen unit:* Sum: 0 Percent: 0

*Description:*

VARIABLE TYPE: C

ADDITIONAL VERSIONS: \*\_osp, \*\_ord, \*\_codelow, \*\_codehigh, \*\_sd, \*\_mean, \*\_nr

QUESTION: How routinely do foreign governments and their agents use social media to disseminate misleading viewpoints or false information to influence domestic politics in this country?

## RESPONSES:

0: Extremely often. Foreign governments disseminate false information on all key political issues.

1: Often. Foreign governments disseminate false information on many key political issues.

2: About half the time. Foreign governments disseminate false information on some key political issues, but not others.

3: Rarely. Foreign governments disseminate false information on only a few key political issues.

4: Never, or almost never. Foreign governments never disseminate false information on key political issues.

SCALE: Ordinal, converted to interval by the measurement model.

DATA RELEASE: 9-14.

CROSS-CODER AGGREGATION: Bayesian item response theory measurement model (see V-Dem Methodology).

CITATION: Mechkova *et al.* (2019, *Digital Society Project Working Paper* 2019:1); Pemstein *et al.* (2024, *V-Dem Working Paper Series* 2024:21); *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

YEARS: 2000-2023



#### 4.1.11.6 Foreign governments ads (v2smforads)

*Long tag:* vdem\_cy\_v2smforads

*Original tag:* v2smforads

*Dataset citation:* Coppedge et al. (2024), Pemstein, Marquardt, Tzelgov, Wang, Medzihorsky, Krusell, Miri & von Römer (2023b)

*Merge scores:*

*Non-missing observations in original unit:* Sum: 4099, Percent: 14.88

*Non-missing observations in chosen unit:* Sum: 4099, Percent: 13.76

*Lost observations in chosen unit:* Sum: 0 Percent: 0

*Description:*

VARIABLE TYPE: C

ADDITIONAL VERSIONS: \*\_osp, \*\_ord, \*\_codelow, \*\_codehigh, \*\_sd, \*\_mean, \*\_nr

QUESTION: How routinely do foreign governments and their agents use paid advertisements on social media in order to disseminate misleading viewpoints or false information to influence domestic politics in this country?

RESPONSES:

0: Extremely often. Foreign governments disseminate false information on all key political issues.

1: Often. Foreign governments disseminate false information on many key political issues.

2: About half the time. Foreign governments disseminate false information on some key political issues, but not others.

3: Rarely. Foreign governments disseminate false information on only a few key political issues.

4: Never, or almost never. Foreign governments never disseminate false information on key political issues.

SCALE: Ordinal, converted to interval by the measurement model.

DATA RELEASE: 9-14.

CROSS-CODER AGGREGATION: Bayesian item response theory measurement model (see V-Dem Methodology).

CITATION: Mechkova *et al.* (2019, *Digital Society Project Working Paper* 2019:1); Pemstein *et al.* (2024, *V-Dem Working Paper Series* 2024:21); *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

YEARS: 2000-2023

CONVERGENCE: Model parameters with convergence issues: country-date latent trait estimates, universal thresholds, expert reliability, expert thresholds, main-country-coded thresholds.

#### 4.1.12 Digital Society Survey - Digital Media Freedom

The Digital Society Survey, designed by the Digital Society Project, contains questions pertaining to the political environment of the internet and social media. The data collected through expert-coded surveys provides information on topics related to coordinated information operations, digital media freedom, online media polarization, social cleavages as well as state internet regulation capacity and approach.

Principal investigators for the Digital Society Project are Valeriya Mechkova, Daniel Pemstein, Brigitte Seim, Steven Wilson.

For more information, please visit [www.digitalsocietyproject.org](http://www.digitalsocietyproject.org).

**Instructions to the coders (as shown in the surveys)**

**Digital society:** The following survey contains questions pertaining to the political environment of the Internet and social media. Please bear in mind the following definitions as you respond to questions on this survey:

The government and its agents include official government organs, such as bureaucracies, courts, intelligence services, and the military, but also unofficial agents, such as officially unaffiliated cyber-

warfare operatives who perform services, even “off-book” work, on behalf of the government.

Major political parties include the group of political parties that hold a significant number of seats in national legislative body(-ies), or earn a significant number of votes in elections for the executive. When we ask you to consider “major political parties,” you do not need to consider parties that run in elections but receive only a small minority of seats or votes, or those that receive no seats at all.

We define the Internet as all information that people access over public and private digital networks, worldwide. The Internet includes both publicly accessible digital spaces and private or gated information transmission platforms. The Internet does not include traditional media transmission mechanisms such as paper, television, traditional voice telephone, and radio.

Social media are a subset of Internet platforms that enable normal individuals to create and share content with networks of other people. Social media platforms are available to the public, although content on such networks may be shared privately within subgroups of users. Social media includes both publicly visible, or semi-public platforms, like Facebook, Flickr, Friendster, Google+, Instagram, Myspace, LinkedIn, Twitter, VKontakte, and Weibo and private social networking and messaging platforms like Signal, Slack, Snapchat, or WhatsApp.

Domestic online media is any media source originating in the country in question. For example, the New York Times’ website is domestic online media in the United States, but not in India, even though it operates bureaus in India. Media includes any source reporting on current events or political issues, ranging from well-established brands to newsletters and websites run by an individual.

Cyber security threats include penetration of private digital networks, using means ranging from exploiting software vulnerabilities, password cracking, or social engineering (e.g., tricking individuals into revealing passwords or other information necessary to break into a digital system) to obtain information or disrupt an organization or individual’s use of digital networks and tools. They also include unauthorized alterations of an individual or organization’s digital presence, such as defacing websites and commandeering social media accounts. These threats range from unsophisticated (e.g., exploitation of failure to password protect private networks or use of common passwords by authorized users, and spear phishing) to moderate (e.g., embedding malicious code in emails or exploiting well-known software flaws that organizations have failed to patch), to sophisticated (e.g., exploiting unknown exploits in commonly used software or even embedding exploits into commercial systems unbeknownst to their creators).

Clarification: When we discuss shutting down online content, please consider instances where a website (or websites) have been taken entirely offline as well as instances where a website (or websites) have been slowed down or had access similarly intentionally inhibited, such that use of this website is challenging. In other words, both outright shutting down and more subtle measures that inhibit access should be considered when answering these questions.

Clarification: When we discuss “censorship” or “censoring” content online, we are not concerned with censorship of topics such as child pornography, highly classified information such as military or intelligence secrets, or defamatory speech, unless this sort of censorship is used as a pretext for censoring political information or opinions.

#### 4.1.12.1 Government Internet filtering capacity (v2smgovfilcap)

*Long tag:* vdem\_cy\_v2smgovfilcap

*Original tag:* v2smgovfilcap

*Dataset citation:* Coppedge et al. (2024), Pemstein, Marquardt, Tzelgov, Wang, Medzihorsky, Krusell, Miri & von Römer (2023b)

*Merge scores:*

*Non-missing observations in original unit:* Sum: 4099, Percent: 14.88

*Non-missing observations in chosen unit:* Sum: 4099, Percent: 13.76

*Lost observations in chosen unit:* Sum: 0 Percent: 0

*Description:*

VARIABLE TYPE: C

ADDITIONAL VERSIONS: \*\_osp, \*\_ord, \*\_codelow, \*\_codehigh, \*\_sd, \*\_mean, \*\_nr

QUESTION: Independent of whether it actually does so in practice, does the government have the technical capacity to censor information (text, audio, images, or video) on the Internet by filtering (blocking access to certain websites) if it decided to?

## RESPONSES:

0: The government lacks any capacity to block access to any sites on the Internet.

1: The government has limited capacity to block access to a few sites on the Internet.

2: The government has adequate capacity to block access to most, but not all, specific sites on the Internet if it wanted to.

3: The government has the capacity to block access to any sites on the Internet if it wanted to.

SCALE: Ordinal, converted to interval by the measurement model.

DATA RELEASE: 9-14.

CROSS-CODER AGGREGATION: Bayesian item response theory measurement model (see V-Dem Methodology).

CITATION: Mechkova *et al.* (2019, *Digital Society Project Working Paper* 2019:1); Pemstein *et al.* (2024, *V-Dem Working Paper Series* 2024:21); *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

YEARS: 2000-2023

**4.1.12.2 Government Internet filtering in practice (v2smgovfilprc)**

*Long tag:* vdem\_cy\_v2smgovfilprc

*Original tag:* v2smgovfilprc

*Dataset citation:* Coppedge *et al.* (2024), Pemstein, Marquardt, Tzelgov, Wang, Medzihorsky, Krusell, Miri & von Römer (2023*b*)

*Merge scores:*

*Non-missing observations in original unit:* Sum: 4099, Percent: 14.88

*Non-missing observations in chosen unit:* Sum: 4099, Percent: 13.76

*Lost observations in chosen unit:* Sum: 0 Percent: 0

*Description:*

VARIABLE TYPE: C

ADDITIONAL VERSIONS: \*\_osp, \*\_ord, \*\_codelow, \*\_codehigh, \*\_sd, \*\_mean, \*\_nr

QUESTION: How frequently does the government censor political information (text, audio, images, or video) on the Internet by filtering (blocking access to certain websites)?

## RESPONSES:

0: Extremely often. It is a regular practice for the government to remove political content, except to sites that are pro-government.

1: Often. The government commonly removes online political content, except sites that are pro-government.

2: Sometimes. The government successfully removes about half of the critical online political content.

3: Rarely. There have been only a few occasions on which the government removed political content.

4: Never, or almost never. The government allows Internet access that is unrestricted, with the exceptions mentioned in the clarifications section.

SCALE: Ordinal, converted to interval by the measurement model.

DATA RELEASE: 9-14.

CROSS-CODER AGGREGATION: Bayesian item response theory measurement model (see V-Dem Methodology).

CITATION: Mechkova *et al.* (2019, *Digital Society Project Working Paper* 2019:1); Pemstein *et al.* (2024, *V-Dem Working Paper Series* 2024:21); *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

YEARS: 2000-2023

**4.1.12.3 Government social media shut down in practice (v2smgovsm)**

*Long tag:* vdem\_cy\_v2smgovsm

*Original tag:* v2smgovsm

*Dataset citation:* Coppedge et al. (2024), Pemstein, Marquardt, Tzelgov, Wang, Medzihorsky, Krusell, Miri & von Römer (2023b)

*Merge scores:*

*Non-missing observations in original unit:* Sum: 4099, Percent: 14.88

*Non-missing observations in chosen unit:* Sum: 4099, Percent: 13.76

*Lost observations in chosen unit:* Sum: 0 Percent: 0

*Description:*

VARIABLE TYPE: C

ADDITIONAL VERSIONS: \*\_osp, \*\_ord, \*\_codelow, \*\_codehigh, \*\_sd, \*\_mean, \*\_nr

QUESTION: How often does the government shut down access to social media platforms?

RESPONSES:

0: Extremely often. It is a regular practice for the government to shut down access to social media.

1: Often. The government shuts down access to social media numerous times this year.

2: Sometimes. The government shuts down access to social media several times this year.

3: Rarely. There have been a few occasions throughout the year when the government shuts down access to social media.

4: Never, or almost never. The government does not interfere with the access to social media, except in the cases mentioned in the clarifications section.

SCALE: Ordinal, converted to interval by the measurement model.

DATA RELEASE: 9-14.

CROSS-CODER AGGREGATION: Bayesian item response theory measurement model (see V-Dem Methodology).

CITATION: Mechkova *et al.* (2019, *Digital Society Project Working Paper* 2019:1); Pemstein *et al.* (2024, *V-Dem Working Paper Series* 2024:21); *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

YEARS: 2000-2023

#### 4.1.12.4 Government social media alternatives (v2smgovsmalt)

*Long tag:* vdem\_cy\_v2smgovsmalt

*Original tag:* v2smgovsmalt

*Dataset citation:* Coppedge et al. (2024), Pemstein, Marquardt, Tzelgov, Wang, Medzihorsky, Krusell, Miri & von Römer (2023b)

*Merge scores:*

*Non-missing observations in original unit:* Sum: 4099, Percent: 14.88

*Non-missing observations in chosen unit:* Sum: 4099, Percent: 13.76

*Lost observations in chosen unit:* Sum: 0 Percent: 0

*Description:*

VARIABLE TYPE: C

ADDITIONAL VERSIONS: \*\_osp, \*\_ord, \*\_codelow, \*\_codehigh, \*\_sd, \*\_mean, \*\_nr

QUESTION: How prevalent is the usage of social media platforms that are wholly controlled by either the government or its agents in this country?

RESPONSES:

0: Essentially all social media usage takes place on platforms controlled by the state.

1: Most usage of social media is on state-controlled platforms, although some groups use non-state-controlled alternatives.

2: There is significant usage of both state-controlled and non-state-controlled social media platforms.

3: While some state-controlled social media platforms exist, their usage only represents a small share of social media usage in the country.

4: Practically no one uses state-controlled social media platforms.

SCALE: Ordinal, converted to interval by the measurement model.

DATA RELEASE: 9-14.

CROSS-CODER AGGREGATION: Bayesian item response theory measurement model

(see V-Dem Methodology).

CITATION: Mechkova *et al.* (2019, *Digital Society Project Working Paper* 2019:1); Pemstein *et al.* (2024, *V-Dem Working Paper Series* 2024:21); *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

YEARS: 2000-2023

CONVERGENCE: Model parameters with convergence issues: country-date latent trait estimates, universal thresholds, expert reliability, expert thresholds, main-country-coded thresholds.

#### 4.1.12.5 Government social media monitoring (v2smgovsmmon)

*Long tag:* vdem\_cy\_v2smgovsmmon

*Original tag:* v2smgovsmmon

*Dataset citation:* Coppedge *et al.* (2024), Pemstein, Marquardt, Tzelgov, Wang, Medzihorsky, Krusell, Miri & von Römer (2023*b*)

*Merge scores:*

*Non-missing observations in original unit:* Sum: 4099, Percent: 14.88

*Non-missing observations in chosen unit:* Sum: 4099, Percent: 13.76

*Lost observations in chosen unit:* Sum: 0 Percent: 0

*Description:*

VARIABLE TYPE: C

ADDITIONAL VERSIONS: \*\_osp, \*\_ord, \*\_codelow, \*\_codehigh, \*\_sd, \*\_mean, \*\_nr

QUESTION: How comprehensive is the surveillance of political content in social media by the government or its agents?

RESPONSES:

0: Extremely comprehensive. The government surveils virtually all content on social media.

1: Mostly comprehensive. The government surveils most content on social media, with comprehensive monitoring of most key political issues.

2: Somewhat comprehensive. The government does not universally surveil social media but can be expected to surveil key political issues about half the time.

3: Limited. The government only surveils political content on social media on a limited basis.

4: Not at all, or almost not at all. The government does not surveil political content on social media, with the exceptions mentioned in the clarifications section.

SCALE: Ordinal, converted to interval by the measurement model.

DATA RELEASE: 9-14.

CROSS-CODER AGGREGATION: Bayesian item response theory measurement model (see V-Dem Methodology).

CITATION: Mechkova *et al.* (2019, *Digital Society Project Working Paper* 2019:1); Pemstein *et al.* (2024, *V-Dem Working Paper Series* 2024:21); *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

YEARS: 2000-2023

#### 4.1.12.6 Government social media censorship in practice (v2smgovsmcenprc)

*Long tag:* vdem\_cy\_v2smgovsmcenprc

*Original tag:* v2smgovsmcenprc

*Dataset citation:* Coppedge *et al.* (2024), Pemstein, Marquardt, Tzelgov, Wang, Medzihorsky, Krusell, Miri & von Römer (2023*b*)

*Merge scores:*

*Non-missing observations in original unit:* Sum: 4099, Percent: 14.88

*Non-missing observations in chosen unit:* Sum: 4099, Percent: 13.76

*Lost observations in chosen unit:* Sum: 0 Percent: 0

*Description:*

VARIABLE TYPE: C

ADDITIONAL VERSIONS: \*\_osp, \*\_ord, \*\_codelow, \*\_codehigh, \*\_sd, \*\_mean, \*\_nr

QUESTION: To what degree does the government censor political content (i.e., deleting or filtering specific posts for political reasons) on social media in practice?

RESPONSES:

0: The government simply blocks all social media platforms.

1: The government successfully censors all social media with political content.

2: The government successfully censors a significant portion of political content on social media, though not all of it.

3: The government only censors social media with political content that deals with especially sensitive issues.

4: The government does not censor political social media content, with the exceptions mentioned in the clarifications section.

SCALE: Ordinal, converted to interval by the measurement model.

DATA RELEASE: 9-14.

CROSS-CODER AGGREGATION: Bayesian item response theory measurement model (see V-Dem Methodology).

CITATION: Mechkova *et al.* (2019, *Digital Society Project Working Paper* 2019:1); Pemstein *et al.* (2024, *V-Dem Working Paper Series* 2024:21); *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

YEARS: 2000-2023

#### 4.1.13 Digital Society Survey - State Internet Regulation Capacity and Approach

The Digital Society Survey, designed by the Digital Society Project, contains questions pertaining to the political environment of the internet and social media. The data collected through expert-coded surveys provides information on topics related to coordinated information operations, digital media freedom, online media polarization, social cleavages as well as state internet regulation capacity and approach.

Principal investigators for the Digital Society Project are Valeriya Mechkova, Daniel Pemstein, Brigitte Seim, Steven Wilson.

For more information, please visit [www.digitalsocietyproject.org](http://www.digitalsocietyproject.org).

##### Instructions to the coders (as shown in the surveys)

**Digital society:** The following survey contains questions pertaining to the political environment of the Internet and social media. Please bear in mind the following definitions as you respond to questions on this survey:

The government and its agents include official government organs, such as bureaucracies, courts, intelligence services, and the military, but also unofficial agents, such as officially unaffiliated cyber-warfare operatives who perform services, even “off-book” work, on behalf of the government.

Major political parties include the group of political parties that hold a significant number of seats in national legislative body(-ies), or earn a significant number of votes in elections for the executive. When we ask you to consider “major political parties,” you do not need to consider parties that run in elections but receive only a small minority of seats or votes, or those that receive no seats at all.

We define the Internet as all information that people access over public and private digital networks, worldwide. The Internet includes both publicly accessible digital spaces and private or gated information transmission platforms. The Internet does not include traditional media transmission mechanisms such as paper, television, traditional voice telephone, and radio.

Social media are a subset of Internet platforms that enable normal individuals to create and share content with networks of other people. Social media platforms are available to the public, although content on such networks may be shared privately within subgroups of users. Social media includes both publicly visible, or semi-public platforms, like Facebook, Flickr, Friendster, Google+, Instagram, Myspace, LinkedIn, Twitter, VKontakte, and Weibo and private social networking and messaging platforms like Signal, Slack, Snapchat, or WhatsApp.

Domestic online media is any media source originating in the country in question. For example, the New York Times’ website is domestic online media in the United States, but not in India, even though

it operates bureaus in India. Media includes any source reporting on current events or political issues, ranging from well-established brands to newsletters and websites run by an individual.

Cyber security threats include penetration of private digital networks, using means ranging from exploiting software vulnerabilities, password cracking, or social engineering (e.g., tricking individuals into revealing passwords or other information necessary to break into a digital system) to obtain information or disrupt an organization or individual's use of digital networks and tools. They also include unauthorized alterations of an individual or organization's digital presence, such as defacing websites and commandeering social media accounts. These threats range from unsophisticated (e.g., exploitation of failure to password protect private networks or use of common passwords by authorized users, and spear phishing) to moderate (e.g., embedding malicious code in emails or exploiting well-known software flaws that organizations have failed to patch), to sophisticated (e.g., exploiting unknown exploits in commonly used software or even embedding exploits into commercial systems unbeknownst to their creators).

Clarification: When we discuss shutting down online content, please consider instances where a website (or websites) have been taken entirely offline as well as instances where a website (or websites) have been slowed down or had access similarly intentionally inhibited, such that use of this website is challenging. In other words, both outright shutting down and more subtle measures that inhibit access should be considered when answering these questions.

Clarification: When we discuss "censorship" or "censoring" content online, we are not concerned with censorship of topics such as child pornography, highly classified information such as military or intelligence secrets, or defamatory speech, unless this sort of censorship is used as a pretext for censoring political information or opinions.

#### 4.1.13.1 Government capacity to regulate online content (v2smregcap)

*Long tag:* vdem\_cy\_v2smregcap

*Original tag:* v2smregcap

*Dataset citation:* Coppedge et al. (2024), Pemstein, Marquardt, Tzelgov, Wang, Medzihorsky, Krusell, Miri & von Römer (2023b)

*Merge scores:*

*Non-missing observations in original unit:* Sum: 4099, Percent: 14.88

*Non-missing observations in chosen unit:* Sum: 4099, Percent: 13.76

*Lost observations in chosen unit:* Sum: 0 Percent: 0

*Description:*

VARIABLE TYPE: C

ADDITIONAL VERSIONS: \*\_osp, \*\_ord, \*\_codelow, \*\_codehigh, \*\_sd, \*\_mean, \*\_nr

QUESTION: Does the government have sufficient staff and resources to regulate Internet content in accordance with existing law?

RESPONSES:

0: No, almost all online activity happens outside of reach of the state, where it lacks the capacity to remove illegal content.

1: Not really. The state has extremely limited resources to regulate online content.

2: Somewhat. The state has the capacity to regulate only some online content or some portions of the law.

3: Mostly. The state has robust capacity to regulate online content, though not enough to regulate all content and all portions of the law.

4: Yes, the government has sufficient capacity to regulate all online content.

SCALE: Ordinal, converted to interval by the measurement model.

DATA RELEASE: 9-14.

CROSS-CODER AGGREGATION: Bayesian item response theory measurement model (see V-Dem Methodology).

CITATION: Mechkova et al. (2019, *Digital Society Project Working Paper* 2019:1); Pemstein et al. (2024, *V-Dem Working Paper Series* 2024:21); *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

YEARS: 2000-2023

**4.1.13.2 Government online content regulation approach (v2smregapp)***Long tag:* vdem\_cy\_v2smregapp*Original tag:* v2smregapp*Dataset citation:* Coppedge et al. (2024), Pemstein, Marquardt, Tzelgov, Wang, Medzihorsky, Krusell, Miri & von Römer (2023b)*Merge scores:**Non-missing observations in original unit:* Sum: 4099, Percent: 14.88*Non-missing observations in chosen unit:* Sum: 4099, Percent: 13.76*Lost observations in chosen unit:* Sum: 0 Percent: 0*Description:*

VARIABLE TYPE: C

ADDITIONAL VERSIONS: \*\_osp, \*\_ord, \*\_codelow, \*\_codehigh, \*\_sd, \*\_mean, \*\_nr

QUESTION: Does the government use its own resources and institutions to monitor and regulate online content or does it distribute this regulatory burden to private actors such as Internet service providers?

RESPONSES:

0: All online content monitoring and regulation is done by the state.

1: Most online content monitoring and regulation is done by the state, though the state involves private actors in a limited way.

2: Some online content monitoring and regulation is done by the state, but the state also involves private actors in monitoring and regulation in various ways.

3: The state does little online content monitoring and regulation, and entrusts most of the monitoring and regulation to private actors.

4: The state off-loads all online content monitoring and regulation to private actors.

SCALE: Ordinal, converted to interval by the measurement model.

DATA RELEASE: 9-14.

CROSS-CODER AGGREGATION: Bayesian item response theory measurement model (see V-Dem Methodology).

CITATION: Mechkova *et al.* (2019, *Digital Society Project Working Paper* 2019:1); Pemstein *et al.* (2024, *V-Dem Working Paper Series* 2024:21); *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

YEARS: 2000-2023

**4.1.13.3 Defamation protection (v2smlawpr)***Long tag:* vdem\_cy\_v2smlawpr*Original tag:* v2smlawpr*Dataset citation:* Coppedge et al. (2024), Pemstein, Marquardt, Tzelgov, Wang, Medzihorsky, Krusell, Miri & von Römer (2023b)*Merge scores:**Non-missing observations in original unit:* Sum: 4099, Percent: 14.88*Non-missing observations in chosen unit:* Sum: 4099, Percent: 13.76*Lost observations in chosen unit:* Sum: 0 Percent: 0*Description:*

VARIABLE TYPE: C

ADDITIONAL VERSIONS: \*\_osp, \*\_ord, \*\_codelow, \*\_codehigh, \*\_sd, \*\_mean, \*\_nr

QUESTION: Does the legal framework provide protection against defamatory online content, or hate speech?

RESPONSES:

0: No. The law provides no protection against Internet defamation and hate speech.

1: Not really. The law provides a weak protection and to very limited range of circumstances.

2: Somewhat. The law provides some protection against Internet defamation and hate speech but in limited circumstances, or only to particular groups of people.

3: Mostly. The law provides protection against Internet defamation and hate speech under



many circumstances, and to most groups of people.

4: Yes. The law provides comprehensive protection against Internet defamation and hate speech.

SCALE: Ordinal, converted to interval by the measurement model.

DATA RELEASE: 9-14.

CROSS-CODER AGGREGATION: Bayesian item response theory measurement model (see V-Dem Methodology).

CITATION: Mechkova *et al.* (2019, *Digital Society Project Working Paper* 2019:1); Pemstein *et al.* (2024, *V-Dem Working Paper Series* 2024:21); *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

YEARS: 2000-2023

#### 4.1.13.4 Abuse of defamation and copyright law by elites (v2smdefabu)

*Long tag:* vdem\_cy\_v2smdefabu

*Original tag:* v2smdefabu

*Dataset citation:* Coppedge *et al.* (2024), Pemstein, Marquardt, Tzelgov, Wang, Medzihorsky, Krusell, Miri & von Römer (2023b)

*Merge scores:*

*Non-missing observations in original unit:* Sum: 4099, Percent: 14.88

*Non-missing observations in chosen unit:* Sum: 4099, Percent: 13.76

*Lost observations in chosen unit:* Sum: 0 Percent: 0

*Description:*

VARIABLE TYPE: C

ADDITIONAL VERSIONS: \*\_osp, \*\_ord, \*\_codelow, \*\_codehigh, \*\_sd, \*\_mean, \*\_nr

QUESTION: To what extent do elites abuse the legal system (e.g., defamation and copyright law) to censor political speech online?

RESPONSES:

0: Regularly. Elites abuse the legal system to remove political speech from the Internet as regular practice.

1: Often. Elites commonly abuse the legal system to remove political speech from the Internet.

2: Sometimes. Elites abuse the legal system to remove political speech from the Internet about half the time.

3: Rarely. Elites occasionally abuse the legal system to remove political speech from the Internet.

4: Never, or almost never. Elites do not abuse the legal system to remove political speech from the Internet.

SCALE: Ordinal, converted to interval by the measurement model.

DATA RELEASE: 9-14.

CROSS-CODER AGGREGATION: Bayesian item response theory measurement model (see V-Dem Methodology).

CITATION: Mechkova *et al.* (2019, *Digital Society Project Working Paper* 2019:1); Pemstein *et al.* (2024, *V-Dem Working Paper Series* 2024:21); *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

YEARS: 2000-2023

#### 4.1.14 Digital Society Survey - Online Media Polarization

The Digital Society Survey, designed by the Digital Society Project, contains questions pertaining to the political environment of the internet and social media. The data collected through expert-coded surveys provides information on topics related to coordinated information operations, digital media freedom, online media polarization, social cleavages as well as state internet regulation capacity and approach.

Principal investigators for the Digital Society Project are Valeriya Mechkova, Daniel Pemstein,

Brigitte Seim, Steven Wilson.

For more information, please visit [www.digitalsocietyproject.org](http://www.digitalsocietyproject.org).

**Instructions to the coders (as shown in the surveys)**

**Digital society:** The following survey contains questions pertaining to the political environment of the Internet and social media. Please bear in mind the following definitions as you respond to questions on this survey:

The government and its agents include official government organs, such as bureaucracies, courts, intelligence services, and the military, but also unofficial agents, such as officially unaffiliated cyber-warfare operatives who perform services, even “off-book” work, on behalf of the government.

Major political parties include the group of political parties that hold a significant number of seats in national legislative body(-ies), or earn a significant number of votes in elections for the executive. When we ask you to consider “major political parties,” you do not need to consider parties that run in elections but receive only a small minority of seats or votes, or those that receive no seats at all.

We define the Internet as all information that people access over public and private digital networks, worldwide. The Internet includes both publicly accessible digital spaces and private or gated information transmission platforms. The Internet does not include traditional media transmission mechanisms such as paper, television, traditional voice telephone, and radio.

Social media are a subset of Internet platforms that enable normal individuals to create and share content with networks of other people. Social media platforms are available to the public, although content on such networks may be shared privately within subgroups of users. Social media includes both publicly visible, or semi-public platforms, like Facebook, Flickr, Friendster, Google+, Instagram, Myspace, LinkedIn, Twitter, VKontakte, and Weibo and private social networking and messaging platforms like Signal, Slack, Snapchat, or WhatsApp.

Domestic online media is any media source originating in the country in question. For example, the New York Times’ website is domestic online media in the United States, but not in India, even though it operates bureaus in India. Media includes any source reporting on current events or political issues, ranging from well-established brands to newsletters and websites run by an individual.

Cyber security threats include penetration of private digital networks, using means ranging from exploiting software vulnerabilities, password cracking, or social engineering (e.g., tricking individuals into revealing passwords or other information necessary to break into a digital system) to obtain information or disrupt an organization or individual’s use of digital networks and tools. They also include unauthorized alterations of an individual or organization’s digital presence, such as defacing websites and commandeering social media accounts. These threats range from unsophisticated (e.g., exploitation of failure to password protect private networks or use of common passwords by authorized users, and spear phishing) to moderate (e.g., embedding malicious code in emails or exploiting well-known software flaws that organizations have failed to patch), to sophisticated (e.g., exploiting unknown exploits in commonly used software or even embedding exploits into commercial systems unbeknownst to their creators).

Clarification: When we discuss shutting down online content, please consider instances where a website (or websites) have been taken entirely offline as well as instances where a website (or websites) have been slowed down or had access similarly intentionally inhibited, such that use of this website is challenging. In other words, both outright shutting down and more subtle measures that inhibit access should be considered when answering these questions.

Clarification: When we discuss “censorship” or “censoring” content online, we are not concerned with censorship of topics such as child pornography, highly classified information such as military or intelligence secrets, or defamatory speech, unless this sort of censorship is used as a pretext for censoring political information or opinions.

**4.1.14.1 Online media existence (v2smonex)**

*Long tag:* vdem\_cy\_v2smonex

*Original tag:* v2smonex

*Dataset citation:* Coppedge et al. (2024), Pemstein, Marquardt, Tzelgov, Wang, Medzihorsky, Krusell, Miri & von Römer (2023b)

*Merge scores:*

*Non-missing observations in original unit:* Sum: 4099, Percent: 14.88

*Non-missing observations in chosen unit:* Sum: 4099, Percent: 13.76

*Lost observations in chosen unit:* Sum: 0 Percent: 0

*Description:*

VARIABLE TYPE: C

ADDITIONAL VERSIONS: \*\_osp, \*\_ord, \*\_codelow, \*\_codehigh, \*\_sd, \*\_mean, \*\_nr

QUESTION: Do people consume domestic online media?

RESPONSES:

0: Not at all. No one consumes domestic online media. Skip next question if this answer is selected.

1: Limited. Domestic online media consumption is limited.

2: Relatively extensive. Domestic online media consumption is common.

3: Extensive. Almost everyone consumes domestic online media.

ORDERING: if 0, skip v2smonper

SCALE: Ordinal, converted to interval by the measurement model.

DATA RELEASE: 9-14.

CROSS-CODER AGGREGATION: Bayesian item response theory measurement model (see V-Dem Methodology).

CITATION: Mechkova *et al.* (2019, *Digital Society Project Working Paper* 2019:1); Pemstein *et al.* (2024, *V-Dem Working Paper Series* 2024:21); *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

YEARS: 2000-2023

#### 4.1.14.2 Online media perspectives (v2smonper)

*Long tag:* vdem\_cy\_v2smonper

*Original tag:* v2smonper

*Dataset citation:* Coppedge *et al.* (2024), Pemstein, Marquardt, Tzelgov, Wang, Medzihorsky, Krusell, Miri & von Römer (2023b)

*Merge scores:*

*Non-missing observations in original unit:* Sum: 4099, Percent: 14.88

*Non-missing observations in chosen unit:* Sum: 4099, Percent: 13.76

*Lost observations in chosen unit:* Sum: 0 Percent: 0

*Description:*

VARIABLE TYPE: C

ADDITIONAL VERSIONS: \*\_osp, \*\_ord, \*\_codelow, \*\_codehigh, \*\_sd, \*\_mean, \*\_nr

QUESTION: Do the major domestic online media outlets represent a wide range of political perspectives?

RESPONSES:

0: The major domestic online media outlets represent only the government's perspective.

1: The major domestic online media outlets represent only the perspectives of the government and a government approved, semi-official opposition party.

2: The major domestic online media outlets represent a variety of political perspectives but they systematically ignore at least one political perspective that is important in this society.

3: All perspectives that are important in this society are represented in at least one of the major domestic online media outlets.

4: All perspectives that are important in this society are represented in many major domestic online media outlets.

SCALE: Ordinal, converted to interval by the measurement model.

DATA RELEASE: 9-14.

CROSS-CODER AGGREGATION: Bayesian item response theory measurement model (see V-Dem Methodology).

CITATION: Mechkova *et al.* (2019, *Digital Society Project Working Paper* 2019:1); Pemstein *et al.* (2024, *V-Dem Working Paper Series* 2024:21); *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

YEARS: 2000-2023

**4.1.14.3 Online media fractionalization (v2smmefra)***Long tag:* vdem\_cy\_v2smmefra*Original tag:* v2smmefra*Dataset citation:* Coppedge et al. (2024), Pemstein, Marquardt, Tzelgov, Wang, Medzihorsky, Krusell, Miri & von Römer (2023b)*Merge scores:**Non-missing observations in original unit:* Sum: 4099, Percent: 14.88*Non-missing observations in chosen unit:* Sum: 4099, Percent: 13.76*Lost observations in chosen unit:* Sum: 0 Percent: 0*Description:*

VARIABLE TYPE: C

ADDITIONAL VERSIONS: \*\_osp, \*\_ord, \*\_codelow, \*\_codehigh, \*\_sd, \*\_mean, \*\_nr

QUESTION: Do the major domestic online media outlets give a similar presentation of major (political) news?

RESPONSES:

0: No. The major domestic online media outlets give opposing presentation of major events.

1: Not really. The major domestic online media outlets differ greatly in the presentation of major events.

2: Sometimes. The major domestic online media outlets give a similar presentation of major events about half the time.

3: Mostly. The major domestic online media outlets mostly give a similar presentation of major events.

4: Yes. Although there are small differences in representation, the major domestic online media outlets give a similar presentation of major events.

SCALE: Ordinal, converted to interval by the measurement model.

DATA RELEASE: 9-14.

CROSS-CODER AGGREGATION: Bayesian item response theory measurement model (see V-Dem Methodology).

CITATION: Mechkova *et al.* (2019, *Digital Society Project Working Paper* 2019:1); Pemstein *et al.* (2024, *V-Dem Working Paper Series* 2024:21); *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

YEARS: 2000-2023

**4.1.15 Digital Society Survey - Social Cleavages**

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Major political parties include the group of political parties that hold a significant number of seats in national legislative body(-ies), or earn a significant number of votes in elections for the executive. When we ask you to consider “major political parties,” you do not need to consider parties that run in elections but receive only a small minority of seats or votes, or those that receive no seats at all.

We define the Internet as all information that people access over public and private digital networks, worldwide. The Internet includes both publicly accessible digital spaces and private or gated information transmission platforms. The Internet does not include traditional media transmission mechanisms such as paper, television, traditional voice telephone, and radio.

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Domestic online media is any media source originating in the country in question. For example, the New York Times’ website is domestic online media in the United States, but not in India, even though it operates bureaus in India. Media includes any source reporting on current events or political issues, ranging from well-established brands to newsletters and websites run by an individual.

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Clarification: When we discuss shutting down online content, please consider instances where a website (or websites) have been taken entirely offline as well as instances where a website (or websites) have been slowed down or had access similarly intentionally inhibited, such that use of this website is challenging. In other words, both outright shutting down and more subtle measures that inhibit access should be considered when answering these questions.

Clarification: When we discuss “censorship” or “censoring” content online, we are not concerned with censorship of topics such as child pornography, highly classified information such as military or intelligence secrets, or defamatory speech, unless this sort of censorship is used as a pretext for censoring political information or opinions.

#### 4.1.15.1 Use of social media to organize offline violence (v2smorgviol)

*Long tag:* vdem\_cy\_v2smorgviol

*Original tag:* v2smorgviol

*Dataset citation:* Coppedge et al. (2024), Pemstein, Marquardt, Tzelgov, Wang, Medzihorsky, Krusell, Miri & von Römer (2023b)

*Merge scores:*

*Non-missing observations in original unit:* Sum: 4099, Percent: 14.88

*Non-missing observations in chosen unit:* Sum: 4099, Percent: 13.76

*Lost observations in chosen unit:* Sum: 0 Percent: 0

*Description:*

VARIABLE TYPE: C

ADDITIONAL VERSIONS: \*\_osp, \*\_ord, \*\_codelow, \*\_codehigh, \*\_sd, \*\_mean, \*\_nr

QUESTION: How often do people use social media to organize offline violence?

RESPONSES:

0: Frequently. There are numerous cases in which people have used social media to organize offline violence.

1: Sometimes. There are a few cases in which people have used social media to organize offline violence.

2: Never. People have never used social media to organize offline violence.

SCALE: Ordinal, converted to interval by the measurement model.

DATA RELEASE: 9-14.

CROSS-CODER AGGREGATION: Bayesian item response theory measurement model (see V-Dem Methodology).

CITATION: Mechkova *et al.* (2019, *Digital Society Project Working Paper* 2019:1); Pemstein *et al.* (2024, *V-Dem Working Paper Series* 2024:21); *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

YEARS: 2000-2023

#### 4.1.15.2 Average people's use of social media to organize offline action (v2smorgavgact)

*Long tag:* vdem\_cy\_v2smorgavgact

*Original tag:* v2smorgavgact

*Dataset citation:* Coppedge *et al.* (2024), Pemstein, Marquardt, Tzelgov, Wang, Medzihorsky, Krusell, Miri & von Römer (2023*b*)

*Merge scores:*

*Non-missing observations in original unit:* Sum: 4099, Percent: 14.88

*Non-missing observations in chosen unit:* Sum: 4099, Percent: 13.76

*Lost observations in chosen unit:* Sum: 0 Percent: 0

*Description:*

VARIABLE TYPE: C

ADDITIONAL VERSIONS: \*\_osp, \*\_ord, \*\_codelow, \*\_codehigh, \*\_sd, \*\_mean, \*\_nr

QUESTION: How often do average people use social media to organize offline political action of any kind?

RESPONSES:

0: Never or almost never. Average people have almost never used social media to organize offline political action.

1: Rarely. Average people do not typically use social media to organize offline political action.

2: Sometimes. There are a few cases in which average people have used social media to organize offline political action.

3: Often. There have been several cases in which average people have used social media to organize offline political action.

4: Regularly. There are numerous cases in which average people have used social media to organize offline political action.

SCALE: Ordinal, converted to interval by the measurement model.

DATA RELEASE: 9-14.

CROSS-CODER AGGREGATION: Bayesian item response theory measurement model (see V-Dem Methodology).

CITATION: Mechkova *et al.* (2019, *Digital Society Project Working Paper* 2019:1); Pemstein *et al.* (2024, *V-Dem Working Paper Series* 2024:21); *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

YEARS: 2000-2023

#### 4.1.15.3 Elites' use of social media to organize offline action (v2smorgelitact)

*Long tag:* vdem\_cy\_v2smorgelitact

*Original tag:* v2smorgelitact

*Dataset citation:* Coppedge *et al.* (2024), Pemstein, Marquardt, Tzelgov, Wang, Medzihorsky, Krusell, Miri & von Römer (2023*b*)

*Merge scores:*

*Non-missing observations in original unit:* Sum: 4099, Percent: 14.88

*Non-missing observations in chosen unit:* Sum: 4099, Percent: 13.76

*Lost observations in chosen unit:* Sum: 0 Percent: 0

*Description:*

VARIABLE TYPE: C

ADDITIONAL VERSIONS: \*\_osp, \*\_ord, \*\_codelow, \*\_codehigh, \*\_sd, \*\_mean, \*\_nr

QUESTION: How often do domestic elites use social media to organize offline political action of any kind?

RESPONSES:

0: Never or almost never. Elites have almost never used social media to organize offline political action.

1: Rarely. Elites do not typically use social media to organize offline political action.

2: Sometimes. There are a few cases in which elites have used social media to organize offline political action.

3: Often. There have been several cases in which elites have used social media to organize offline political action.

4: Regularly. There are numerous cases in which elites have used social media to organize offline political action.

SCALE: Ordinal, converted to interval by the measurement model.

DATA RELEASE: 9-14.

CROSS-CODER AGGREGATION: Bayesian item response theory measurement model (see V-Dem Methodology).

CITATION: Mechkova *et al.* (2019, *Digital Society Project Working Paper* 2019:1); Pemstein *et al.* (2024, *V-Dem Working Paper Series* 2024:21); *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

YEARS: 2000-2023

#### 4.1.15.4 Party/candidate use of social media in campaigns (v2smcamp)

*Long tag:* vdem\_cy\_v2smcamp

*Original tag:* v2smcamp

*Dataset citation:* Coppedge *et al.* (2024), Pemstein, Marquardt, Tzelgov, Wang, Medzihorsky, Krusell, Miri & von Römer (2023*b*)

*Merge scores:*

*Non-missing observations in original unit:* Sum: 4099, Percent: 14.88

*Non-missing observations in chosen unit:* Sum: 4099, Percent: 13.76

*Lost observations in chosen unit:* Sum: 0 Percent: 0

*Description:*

VARIABLE TYPE: C

ADDITIONAL VERSIONS: \*\_osp, \*\_ord, \*\_codelow, \*\_codehigh, \*\_sd, \*\_mean, \*\_nr

QUESTION: To what extent do major political parties and candidates use social media during electoral campaigns to communicate with constituents?

RESPONSES:

0: None. Major political parties and candidates do not use social media during electoral campaigns to communicate with constituents.

1: A little. Major political parties and candidates rarely use social media during electoral campaigns to communicate with constituents.

2: Somewhat. Major political parties and candidates sometimes use social media during electoral campaigns to communicate with constituents.

3: Substantial. Major political parties and candidates frequently use social media during electoral campaigns to communicate with constituents.

SCALE: Ordinal, converted to interval by the measurement model.

DATA RELEASE: 9-14.

CROSS-CODER AGGREGATION: Bayesian item response theory measurement model (see V-Dem Methodology).

CITATION: Mechkova *et al.* (2019, *Digital Society Project Working Paper* 2019:1); Pemstein *et al.* (2024, *V-Dem Working Paper Series* 2024:21); *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

at the top of this document).  
YEARS: 2000-2023

#### 4.1.15.5 Arrests for political content (v2smarrest)

*Long tag:* vdem\_cy\_v2smarrest

*Original tag:* v2smarrest

*Dataset citation:* Coppedge et al. (2024), Pemstein, Marquardt, Tzelgov, Wang, Medzihorsky, Krusell, Miri & von Römer (2023b)

*Merge scores:*

*Non-missing observations in original unit:* Sum: 4099, Percent: 14.88

*Non-missing observations in chosen unit:* Sum: 4099, Percent: 13.76

*Lost observations in chosen unit:* Sum: 0 Percent: 0

*Description:*

VARIABLE TYPE: C

ADDITIONAL VERSIONS: \*\_osp, \*\_ord, \*\_codelow, \*\_codehigh, \*\_sd, \*\_mean, \*\_nr

QUESTION: If a citizen posts political content online that would run counter to the government and its policies, what is the likelihood that citizen is arrested?

RESPONSES:

0: Extremely likely.

1: Likely.

2: Unlikely.

3: Extremely unlikely.

SCALE: Ordinal, converted to interval by the measurement model.

DATA RELEASE: 9-14.

CROSS-CODER AGGREGATION: Bayesian item response theory measurement model (see V-Dem Methodology).

CITATION: Mechkova *et al.* (2019, *Digital Society Project Working Paper* 2019:1); Pemstein *et al.* (2024, *V-Dem Working Paper Series* 2024:21); *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

YEARS: 2000-2023

#### 4.1.15.6 Online harassment groups (v2smhargr)

*Long tag:* vdem\_cy\_v2smhargr

*Original tag:* v2smhargr

*Dataset citation:* Coppedge et al. (2024), Pemstein, Marquardt, Tzelgov, Wang, Medzihorsky, Krusell, Miri & von Römer (2023b)

*Merge scores:*

*Non-missing observations in original unit:* Sum: 4099, Percent: 14.88

*Non-missing observations in chosen unit:* Sum: 4099, Percent: 13.76

*Lost observations in chosen unit:* Sum: 0 Percent: 0

*Description:*

VARIABLE TYPE: C

ADDITIONAL VERSIONS: \*\_nr

QUESTION: Which groups are targets of hate speech or harassment in online media?

CLARIFICATION: Multiple selection. Choose all that apply.

RESPONSES:

0: Women [v2smhargr\_0]

1: LGBTQ groups and individuals [v2smhargr\_1]

2: Specific religious groups [v2smhargr\_2]

3: Specific ethnic groups [v2smhargr\_3]

4: Specific caste [v2smhargr\_4]

5: Specific language groups [v2smhargr\_5]



6: Specific race [v2smhargr\_6]

7: People with physical or cognitive disabilities [v2smhargr\_7]

8: People from specific regions [v2smhargr\_8]

9: Other (specify in the next question) [v2smhargr\_9]

10: No group is a specific target [v2smhargr\_10]

SCALE: Series of dichotomous scales.

DATA RELEASE: 9-14.

CROSS-CODER AGGREGATION: Mean.

CITATION: Mechkova *et al.* (2019, *Digital Society Project Working Paper* 2019:1); *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

YEARS: 2000-2023

#### 4.1.15.7 Types of organization through social media (v2smorgtypes)

*Long tag:* vdem\_cy\_v2smorgtypes

*Original tag:* v2smorgtypes

*Dataset citation:* Coppedge *et al.* (2024), Pemstein, Marquardt, Tzelgov, Wang, Medzihorsky, Krusell, Miri & von Römer (2023*b*)

*Merge scores:*

*Non-missing observations in original unit:* Sum: 4099, Percent: 14.88

*Non-missing observations in chosen unit:* Sum: 4099, Percent: 13.76

*Lost observations in chosen unit:* Sum: 0 Percent: 0

*Description:*

VARIABLE TYPE: C

ADDITIONAL VERSIONS: \*\_nr

QUESTION: What types of offline political action are most commonly mobilized on social media?

CLARIFICATION: Multiple selection. Choose all that apply.

RESPONSES:

0: Petition signing [v2smorgtypes\_0]

1: Voter turnout [v2smorgtypes\_1]

2: Street protests [v2smorgtypes\_2]

3: Strikes/labor actions [v2smorgtypes\_3]

4: Riots [v2smorgtypes\_4]

5: Organized rebellion [v2smorgtypes\_5]

6: Vigilante Justice (e.g., mob lynching, stalking harassment) [v2smorgtypes\_6]

7: Terrorism [v2smorgtypes\_7]

8: Ethnic cleansing/genocide [v2smorgtypes\_8]

9: Other (specify in the next question) [v2smorgtypes\_9]

SCALE: Series of dichotomous scales.

DATA RELEASE: 9-14.

CROSS-CODER AGGREGATION: Mean.

CITATION: Mechkova *et al.* (2019, *Digital Society Project Working Paper* 2019:1); *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

YEARS: 2000-2023

#### 4.1.16 Varieties of Indoctrination

The Varieties of Indoctrination (V-Indoc) dataset is constructed based on an expert survey fielded in collaboration with V-Dem and led by the ERC-funded project “Democracy under Threat: How Education can Save it” (DEMED). The dataset contains indices and indicators that measure indoctrination efforts in education and the media across 160 countries from 1945 to 2021. The indices capture broad dimensions of indoctrination such as indoctrination potential and indoctrination content, while the indicators cover topics related to the curriculum, teachers, schools, and the media. The principal investigators are Anja Neundorf, Eugenia Nazrullaeva, Ksenia

Northmore-Ball, Katerina Tertytchnaya, and Wooseok Kim. For more information, please visit <https://www.gla.ac.uk/research/az/democracresearch/>.

#### 4.1.16.1 Patriotic indoctrination content in education and the media (v2xed\_ptcon)

*Long tag:* vdem\_cy\_v2xed\_ptcon

*Original tag:* v2xed\_ptcon

*Dataset citation:* Coppedge et al. (2024), Pemstein, Marquardt, Tzelgov, Wang, Medzihorsky, Krusell, Miri & von Römer (2023b)

*Variable citation:* Neundorf, Nazrullaeva, Northmore-Ball, Tertytchnaya, Kim, Benavot, Bromley, Knutsen, Lutscher, Marquardt, Paglayan, Pemstein, Seim & Rydén (2023), Neundorf, Nazrullaeva, Northmore-Ball, Tertytchnaya & Kim (2023), Pemstein, Marquardt, Tzelgov, Wang, Medzihorsky, Krusell, Miri & von Römer (2023), v2edpatriot v2edscpatriotcb v2medpatriot

*Description:*

VARIABLE TYPE: D

PROJECT MANAGER(S): Anja Neundorf

ADDITIONAL VERSIONS: \*\_codelow, \*\_codehigh, \*\_sd

QUESTION: To what extent is the indoctrination content in education and the media patriotic?

CLARIFICATION: This is an aggregate index of patriotic indoctrination across education and the media that combines the patriotism indicators in education (v2edpatriot and v2edscpatriotcb) and the media (v2medpatriot).

SCALE: Interval, from low to high (0-1).

SOURCE(S): v2edpatriot v2edscpatriotcb v2medpatriot

DATA RELEASE: 13-14.

AGGREGATION: We estimate this index by taking the point estimates from a Bayesian factor analysis model of the indicators: v2edpatriot, v2edscpatriotcb, and v2medpatriot.

CITATION: Neundorf et al. (2023a, 2023b, *V-Dem Working Paper Series* 2023: 136); Pemstein et al. (2024, *V-Dem Working Paper Series* 2024:21)

YEARS: 1945-2021

#### 4.1.16.2 Indoctrination potential in education and the media (v2xedvd\_inpt)

*Long tag:* vdem\_cy\_v2xedvd\_inpt

*Original tag:* v2xedvd\_inpt

*Dataset citation:* Coppedge et al. (2024), Pemstein, Marquardt, Tzelgov, Wang, Medzihorsky, Krusell, Miri & von Römer (2023b)

*Variable citation:* Neundorf, Nazrullaeva, Northmore-Ball, Tertytchnaya, Kim, Benavot, Bromley, Knutsen, Lutscher, Marquardt, Paglayan, Pemstein, Seim & Rydén (2023), Neundorf, Nazrullaeva, Northmore-Ball, Tertytchnaya & Kim (2023), Pemstein, Marquardt, Tzelgov, Wang, Medzihorsky, Krusell, Miri & von Römer (2023), v2xed\_ed\_poed v2xed\_ed\_inco v2xedvd\_me\_inco

*Description:*

VARIABLE TYPE: D

PROJECT MANAGER(S): Anja Neundorf

ADDITIONAL VERSIONS: \*\_codelow, \*\_codehigh, \*\_sd

QUESTION: How strong is the potential for indoctrination in education and the media?

CLARIFICATION: This is an aggregate index of indoctrination potential across education and the media that combines the indices that make up the indoctrination potential in education index (v2xed\_ed\_inpt) and indoctrination potential in media index (i.e., v2xedvd\_me\_inco).

SCALE: Interval, from low to high (0-1).

SOURCE(S): v2xed\_ed\_poed v2xed\_ed\_inco v2xedvd\_me\_inco

NOTES: The component v2xedvd\_me\_inco includes supplementary V-Dem indicators. See the variable description of v2xedvd\_me\_inco for more information.

DATA RELEASE: 13-14.

AGGREGATION: We estimate the index by taking the point estimates from a Bayesian factor analysis model of the indices: v2xed\_ed\_poed, v2xed\_ed\_inco, and v2xedvd\_me\_inco.

CITATION: Neundorf et al. (2023a, 2023b, *V-Dem Working Paper Series* 2023: 136); Pemstein et al. (2024, *V-Dem Working Paper Series* 2024:21)

YEARS: 1945-2021

#### 4.1.16.3 Indoctrination coherence (potential) in the media (v2xedvd\_me\_inco)

*Long tag:* vdem\_cy\_v2xedvd\_me\_inco

*Original tag:* v2xedvd\_me\_inco

*Dataset citation:* Coppedge et al. (2024), Pemstein, Marquardt, Tzelgov, Wang, Medzihorsky, Krusell, Miri & von Römer (2023b)

*Variable citation:* Neundorf, Nazrullaeva, Northmore-Ball, Tertychnaya, Kim, Benavot, Bromley, Knutsen, Lutscher, Marquardt, Paglayan, Pemstein, Seim & Rydén (2023), Neundorf, Nazrullaeva, Northmore-Ball, Tertychnaya & Kim (2023), Pemstein, Marquardt, Tzelgov, Wang, Medzihorsky, Krusell, Miri & von Römer (2023), v2xedvd\_me\_cent v2xedvd\_me\_ctag

*Description:*

VARIABLE TYPE: D

PROJECT MANAGER(S): Anja Neundorf

ADDITIONAL VERSIONS: \*\_codelow, \*\_codehigh, \*\_sd

QUESTION: How coherent are the means of indoctrination in the media?

CLARIFICATION: This index measures the extent to which a coherent single doctrine of political values and model citizenship can be delivered through the media. The index is a function of the centralization of the media in the hands of the regime and the regime's control over media agents. Greater centralization and control are expected to lead to a more coherent doctrine being delivered through the media.

SCALE: Interval, from low to high (0-1).

SOURCE(S): v2xedvd\_me\_cent v2xedvd\_me\_ctag

NOTES: Indoctrination potential in the media can be measured using v2xed\_me\_inco. See Neundorf et al. (2023b) for more information. The components v2xedvd\_me\_cent and v2xedvd\_me\_ctag include supplementary V-Dem indicators. See the variable descriptions of these indices for more information.

DATA RELEASE: 13-14.

AGGREGATION: We estimate the index by averaging two indices: v2xedvd\_me\_cent and v2xedvd\_me\_ctag.

CITATION: Neundorf et al. (2023a, 2023b, *V-Dem Working Paper Series* 2023: 136); Pemstein et al. (2024, *V-Dem Working Paper Series* 2024:21)

YEARS: 1945-2021

#### 4.1.16.4 Centralization of media control (v2xedvd\_me\_cent)

*Long tag:* vdem\_cy\_v2xedvd\_me\_cent

*Original tag:* v2xedvd\_me\_cent

*Dataset citation:* Coppedge et al. (2024), Pemstein, Marquardt, Tzelgov, Wang, Medzihorsky, Krusell, Miri & von Römer (2023b)

*Variable citation:* Neundorf, Nazrullaeva, Northmore-Ball, Tertychnaya, Kim, Benavot, Bromley, Knutsen, Lutscher, Marquardt, Paglayan, Pemstein, Seim & Rydén (2023), Neundorf, Nazrullaeva, Northmore-Ball, Tertychnaya & Kim (2023), Pemstein, Marquardt, Tzelgov, Wang, Medzihorsky, Krusell, Miri & von Römer (2023), v2medpolstate v2medpolnonstate v2mecenefm v2merange

*Description:*

VARIABLE TYPE: D

PROJECT MANAGER(S): Anja Neundorf

ADDITIONAL VERSIONS: \*\_\_codelow, \*\_\_codehigh, \*\_\_sd

QUESTION: Is control over the media centralized?

CLARIFICATION: This index measures the extent to which the media is centralized under and can be regulated by the regime.

SCALE: Interval, from low to high (0-1).

SOURCE(S): v2medpolstate v2medpolnonstate v2mecenefm v2merange

NOTES: This index combines variables from V-Dem and V-Indoc. The following variables are sourced from V-Dem: v2mecenefm and v2merange. The scales of these variables have been reversed to accommodate the direction of the index.

DATA RELEASE: 13-14.

AGGREGATION: We estimate the index by taking the point estimates from a Bayesian factor analysis model of the indicators: v2medpolstate, v2medpolnonstate, v2mecenefm, and v2merange.

CITATION: Neundorf et al. (2023a, 2023b, *V-Dem Working Paper Series* 2023: 136); Pemstein et al. (2024, *V-Dem Working Paper Series* 2024:21)

YEARS: 1945-2021

#### 4.1.16.5 Control over media agents (v2xedvd\_me\_ctag)

*Long tag:* vdem\_cy\_v2xedvd\_me\_ctag

*Original tag:* v2xedvd\_me\_ctag

*Dataset citation:* Coppedge et al. (2024), Pemstein, Marquardt, Tzelgov, Wang, Medzihorsky, Krusell, Miri & von Römer (2023b)

*Variable citation:* Neundorf, Nazrullaeva, Northmore-Ball, Tertytchnaya, Kim, Benavot, Bromley, Knutsen, Lutscher, Marquardt, Paglayan, Pemstein, Seim & Rydén (2023), Neundorf, Nazrullaeva, Northmore-Ball, Tertytchnaya & Kim (2023), Pemstein, Marquardt, Tzelgov, Wang, Medzihorsky, Krusell, Miri & von Römer (2023), v2medstateprint v2medstatebroad v2medentrain v2meharjrn v2meslfcen

*Description:*

VARIABLE TYPE: D

PROJECT MANAGER(S): Anja Neundorf

ADDITIONAL VERSIONS: \*\_\_codelow, \*\_\_codehigh, \*\_\_sd

QUESTION: How strong is state-control over agents in the media?

CLARIFICATION: This index measures the extent to which the regime is able to control various media agents.

SCALE: Interval, from low to high (0-1).

SOURCE(S): v2medstateprint v2medstatebroad v2medentrain v2meharjrn v2meslfcen

NOTES: This index combines variables from V-Dem and V-Indoc. The following variables are sourced from V-Dem: v2meharjrn and v2meslfcen. The scales of these variables have been reversed to accommodate the direction of the index.

DATA RELEASE: 13-14.

AGGREGATION: We estimate the index by taking the point estimates from a Bayesian factor analysis model of the indicators: v2medstateprint, v2medstatebroad, v2medentrain, v2meharjrn, and v2meslfcen.

CITATION: Neundorf et al. (2023a, 2023b, *V-Dem Working Paper Series* 2023: 136); Pemstein et al. (2024, *V-Dem Working Paper Series* 2024:21)

YEARS: 1945-2021

#### 4.1.16.6 State-owned print media (v2medstateprint)

*Long tag:* vdem\_cy\_v2medstateprint

*Original tag:* v2medstateprint

*Dataset citation:* Coppedge et al. (2024), Pemstein, Marquardt, Tzelgov, Wang, Medzihorsky, Krusell, Miri & von Römer (2023b)

*Description:*

VARIABLE TYPE: C

PROJECT MANAGER(S): Anja Neundorf

ADDITIONAL VERSIONS: \*\_osp, \*\_ord, \*\_codelow, \*\_codehigh, \*\_sd, \*\_mean, \*\_nr

QUESTION: Out of the top four national print media with the highest readership, how many are state-owned?

CLARIFICATION: If there are fewer than four national print media, please provide your answer based on the number of existing national print media.

By print media, we refer to newspapers, magazines, or printed journals whose content can be consumed through their printed or online editions. In this question, we are only interested in state ownership of the media – not in the extent to which the state may control editorial decisions.

State ownership takes different forms. For example, state-owned media can be funded by government license fees and advertising. They can also be directly controlled by government agencies (e.g. the Ministry of Information and Culture). The state, the ruling party, or the Head of Government / the Head of State, can also be the owner of media in this context.

RESPONSES:

0: There are no state-owned print media outlets.

1: State-owned outlets make up a minority of print media outlets.

2: There is an equal share of state- and non-state owned print media outlets.

3: State-owned outlets make up the majority of print media outlets.

4: All print media outlets are state-owned.

ORDERING: If v2medstateprint and v2medstatebroad are both set to 0 do not answer v2medpolstate. If both are set to 4 do not answer v2medpolnonstate.

SCALE: Ordinal, converted to interval by the measurement model.

NOTES: This is a filtering question for v2medpolstate and v2medpolnonstate.

DATA RELEASE: 13-14.

CROSS-CODER AGGREGATION: Bayesian item response theory measurement model (see *V-Dem Methodology*).

CITATION: Neundorf et al. (2023a, 2023b, *V-Dem Working Paper Series* 2023: 136); Pemstein et al. (2024, *V-Dem Working Paper Series* 2024:21)

YEARS: 1945-2021

#### 4.1.16.7 State-owned broadcast media (v2medstatebroad)

*Long tag:* vdem\_cy\_v2medstatebroad

*Original tag:* v2medstatebroad

*Dataset citation:* Coppedge et al. (2024), Pemstein, Marquardt, Tzelgov, Wang, Medzihorsky, Krusell, Miri & von Römer (2023b)

*Description:*

VARIABLE TYPE: C

PROJECT MANAGER(S): Anja Neundorf

ADDITIONAL VERSIONS: \*\_osp, \*\_ord, \*\_codelow, \*\_codehigh, \*\_sd, \*\_mean, \*\_nr

QUESTION: Out of the top four national broadcast media with the largest audience, how many are state-owned?

CLARIFICATION: If there are fewer than four national broadcast media, please provide your answer based on the number of existing national broadcast media.

Broadcast media includes radio and television stations whose content can be consumed offline or online, for example, through station's websites. Here, we are only interested in state ownership of the media – not in the extent to which the state may control editorial decisions.

State ownership takes different forms. For example, state-owned media can be funded by government license fees and advertising. They can also be directly controlled by government agencies (e.g. the Ministry of Information and Culture). The state, the ruling party, or the Head of Government / the Head of State, can also be the owner of media in this context.

RESPONSES:

0: There are no state-owned broadcast media outlets.

1: State-owned outlets make up a minority of media broadcast outlets.

2: There is an equal share of state- and non-state owned broadcast media outlets.

3: State-owned outlets make up the majority of broadcast media outlets.

4: All broadcast media outlets are state-owned.

ORDERING: If v2medstateprint and v2medstatebroad are both set to 0 do not answer v2medpolstate. If both are set to 4 do not answer v2medpolnonstate.

SCALE: Ordinal, converted to interval by the measurement model.

NOTES: This is a filtering question for v2medpolstate and v2medpolnonstate.

DATA RELEASE: 13-14.

CROSS-CODER AGGREGATION: Bayesian item response theory measurement model (see *V-Dem Methodology*).

CITATION: Neundorf et al. (2023a, 2023b, *V-Dem Working Paper Series* 2023: 136);

Pemstein et al. (2024, *V-Dem Working Paper Series* 2024:21)

YEARS: 1945-2021

#### 4.1.16.8 Political influence, state-owned media (v2medpolstate)

*Long tag:* vdem\_cy\_v2medpolstate

*Original tag:* v2medpolstate

*Dataset citation:* Coppedge et al. (2024), Pemstein, Marquardt, Tzelgov, Wang, Medzihorsky, Krusell, Miri & von Römer (2023b)

*Description:*

VARIABLE TYPE: C

PROJECT MANAGER(S): Anja Neundorf

ADDITIONAL VERSIONS: \*\_osp, \*\_ord, \*\_codelow, \*\_codehigh, \*\_sd, \*\_mean, \*\_nr

QUESTION: For the print and broadcast media outlets owned by the state, how often do political authorities influence how these outlets cover political issues?

CLARIFICATION: Political authorities can be national / sub-national / local public authorities and include ruling political parties and office holders, such as presidents, prime minister or ministers. Political authorities can influence which political issues state-media cover, how, and how much they cover them. For example, they can exert influence by directly or indirectly controlling the hiring and firing of producers, directors, writers, editors, and announcers; by manipulating the resources these media require; by withholding resources required for printing or broadcast. Political authorities can also directly dictate content and make editorial decisions.

RESPONSES:

0: Political authorities (almost) never influence the coverage of political issues.

1: Political authorities sometimes influence the coverage of political issues.

2: Political authorities often influence the coverage of political issues.

3: Political authorities almost always influence the coverage of political issues.

SCALE: Ordinal, converted to interval by the measurement model.

NOTES: Please answer this question only when both v2medstateprint and v2medstatebroad are not both 0.

DATA RELEASE: 13-14.

CROSS-CODER AGGREGATION: Bayesian item response theory measurement model (see *V-Dem Methodology*).

CLEANING: Set to missing when v2medstateprint and v2medstatebroad are both 0.

CITATION: Neundorf et al. (2023a, 2023b, *V-Dem Working Paper Series* 2023: 136);

Pemstein et al. (2024, *V-Dem Working Paper Series* 2024:21)

YEARS: 1945-2021

#### 4.1.16.9 Political influence, non state-owned media (v2medpolnonstate)

*Long tag:* vdem\_cy\_v2medpolnonstate

*Original tag:* v2medpolnonstate

*Dataset citation:* Coppedge et al. (2024), Pemstein, Marquardt, Tzelgov, Wang, Medzihorsky, Krusell, Miri & von Römer (2023b)

*Description:*

VARIABLE TYPE: C

PROJECT MANAGER(S): Anja Neundorf

ADDITIONAL VERSIONS: \*\_osp, \*\_ord, \*\_codelow, \*\_codehigh, \*\_sd, \*\_mean, \*\_nr

QUESTION: For the print and broadcast media outlets NOT owned by the state, how often do political authorities influence how these cover political issues?

CLARIFICATION: Political authorities can be national / sub-national / local public authorities and include ruling political parties and office holders, such as presidents, prime minister or ministers. Political authorities can influence the coverage of non-state owned outlets both directly and indirectly. Indirect forms of control might include politically motivated awarding of broadcast frequencies, withdrawal of financial support, influence over printing facilities (e.g. subsidized newsprint) and distribution networks, selected distribution of advertising, onerous registration requirements, and prohibitive tariffs. They might also include tax privileges, bribery, and cash payments. Indirect forms of control may also include the intimidation of owners, advertisers, and editors, through the use of threats and violence.

RESPONSES:

0: Political authorities (almost) never influence the coverage of key political issues.

1: Political authorities sometimes influence the coverage of key political issues.

2: Political authorities often influence the coverage of key political issues.

3: Political authorities almost always influence the coverage of key political issues.

SCALE: Ordinal, converted to interval by the measurement model.

NOTES: Please answer this question only when both v2medstateprint and v2medstatebroad are not both 4.

DATA RELEASE: 13-14.

CROSS-CODER AGGREGATION: Bayesian item response theory measurement model (see *V-Dem Methodology*).

CLEANING: Set to missing when v2medstateprint and v2medstatebroad are both 4.

CITATION: Neundorf et al. (2023a, 2023b, *V-Dem Working Paper Series* 2023: 136); Pemstein et al. (2024, *V-Dem Working Paper Series* 2024:21)

YEARS: 1945-2021

#### 4.1.16.10 Patriotism in the media (v2medpatriot)

*Long tag:* vdem\_cy\_v2medpatriot

*Original tag:* v2medpatriot

*Dataset citation:* Coppedge et al. (2024), Pemstein, Marquardt, Tzelgov, Wang, Medzihorsky, Krusell, Miri & von Römer (2023b)

*Description:*

VARIABLE TYPE: C

PROJECT MANAGER(S): Anja Neundorf

ADDITIONAL VERSIONS: \*\_osp, \*\_ord, \*\_codelow, \*\_codehigh, \*\_sd, \*\_mean, \*\_nr

QUESTION: How often do media outlets promote patriotism?

CLARIFICATION: Promotion of patriotism can be associated with promotion of patriotic consciousness, the love of the country, national pride, loyalty and commitment. For example, specific narratives can celebrate the country's military past, national origin stories, or accomplishments in economic or technological sectors. Patriotism can be promoted in news, movies, TV shows, radio shows, music, or magazines.

For this question, please consider all (state-owned as well as not state-owned) broadcast and print media outlets.

RESPONSES:

0: Rarely or never.

1: Sometimes.

2: Often.

3: Extensively.

SCALE: Ordinal, converted to interval by the measurement model.

DATA RELEASE: 13-14.

CROSS-CODER AGGREGATION: Bayesian item response theory measurement model (see *V-Dem Methodology*).

CITATION: Neundorf et al. (2023a, 2023b, *V-Dem Working Paper Series* 2023: 136);  
Pemstein et al. (2024, *V-Dem Working Paper Series* 2024:21)  
YEARS: 1945-2021

#### 4.1.16.11 Control of entertainment content (v2medentrain)

*Long tag:* vdem\_cy\_v2medentrain

*Original tag:* v2medentrain

*Dataset citation:* Coppedge et al. (2024), Pemstein, Marquardt, Tzelgov, Wang, Medzihorsky, Krusell, Miri & von Römer (2023b)

*Description:*

VARIABLE TYPE: C

PROJECT MANAGER(S): Anja Neundorf

ADDITIONAL VERSIONS: \*\_osp, \*\_ord, \*\_codelow, \*\_codehigh, \*\_sd, \*\_mean, \*\_nr

QUESTION: Do political authorities have control over the production of entertainment content?

CLARIFICATION: Entertainment includes both broadcast and print content, such as movies, TV shows, radio shows, music, and magazines.

Here we distinguish between entertainment content and news content (although, in some cases news content can have an entertainment component, and vice versa), focusing on entertainment.

Political authorities can be national / sub-national / local public authorities and include ruling political parties and office holders, such as presidents, prime minister or ministers.

It is irrelevant how political authorities came to exert the control over the entertainment content.

RESPONSES:

0: Political authorities exert almost no control over the production of entertainment content.

1: Political authorities exert some control over the production of entertainment content.

2: Political authorities exert a high level of control over the production of entertainment content.

3: Political authorities almost exclusively control the production of entertainment content.

SCALE: Ordinal, converted to interval by the measurement model.

DATA RELEASE: 13-14.

CROSS-CODER AGGREGATION: Bayesian item response theory measurement model (see *V-Dem Methodology*).

CITATION: Neundorf et al. (2023a, 2023b, *V-Dem Working Paper Series* 2023: 136);  
Pemstein et al. (2024, *V-Dem Working Paper Series* 2024:21)

YEARS: 1945-2021

## 4.2 V-Dem Episodes of Regime Transformation Dataset

*Dataset tag:* vdem\_ert

*Output Unit:* V-Dem Country-Year, i.e., data is collected per country and year.

*Description:* The ERT dataset identifies episodes of democratization (liberalizing autocracy, democratic deepening) and autocratization (democratic regression, autocratic regression) in the most recent V-Dem dataset.

*Dataset citation:* Edgell, Amanda B., Seraphine F. Maerz, Laura Maxwell, Richard Morgan, Juraj Medzi-horsky, Matthew C. Wilson, Vanessa A. Boese, Sebastian Hellmeier, Jean Lachapelle, Patrik Lindenfors, Anna Lu hrmann, and Staffan I. Lindberg. (2024). Episodes of Regime Transformation Dataset (v14.0). Varieties of Democracy (V-Dem) Project. Available at: [www.github.com/vdeminstitute/ert](http://www.github.com/vdeminstitute/ert)

Edgell, Amanda B., Seraphine F. Maerz, Laura Maxwell, Richard Morgan, Juraj Medzihorsky,



Matthew C. Wilson, Vanessa A. Boese, Sebastian Hellmeier, Jean Lachapelle, Patrik Lindenfors, Anna Luhrmann, and Staffan I. Lindberg. (2024). Episodes of Regime Transformation Dataset (v14.0) Codebook. Varieties of Democracy (V-Dem) Project. Available at: [www.github.com/vdeminstitute/ert](http://www.github.com/vdeminstitute/ert)

Maerz, Seraphine F., Amanda B. Edgell, Sebastian Hellmeier, Matthew C. Wilson, Laura Maxwell, and Joshua Krusell. (2024). ERT - an R package to load, explore and work with the Episodes of Regime Transformation dataset. Varieties of Democracy (V-Dem) Project. Available at: [www.github.com/vdeminstitute/ert](http://www.github.com/vdeminstitute/ert)

***Link to original codebook***

[https://v-dem.net/documents/9/ert\\_codebook.pdf](https://v-dem.net/documents/9/ert_codebook.pdf)

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<https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-sa/4.0/legalcode>

More detailed information on the dataset can be found at the following web page:  
<https://www.v-dem.net/ertds.html>

#### **4.2.1 Democratization Episodes**

This section includes variables related to democratization.

##### **4.2.1.1 Democratization episode censored (dem\_ep\_censored)**

*Long tag:* vdem\_ert\_dem\_ep\_censored

*Original tag:* dem\_ep\_censored

*Dataset citation:* Edgell et al. (2024)

*Merge scores:*

*Non-missing observations in original unit:* Sum: 19037, Percent: 69.09

*Non-missing observations in chosen unit:* Sum: 19037, Percent: 63.9

*Lost observations in chosen unit:* Sum: 0 Percent: 0

*Description:*

Is the current democratization episode censored?

Clarification: A democratization episode may be censored if its end date corresponds with the date the coding for the case ends (i.e. codingend) or the year before a gap starts in the coding (i.e. gapstart1, gapstart2, gapstart3).

Required variables: dem\_ep\_end\_year, codingend, gapstart1, gapstart2, gapstart3 Format: dummy, [0,1]

#### **4.2.2 Autocratization Episodes**

This section includes variables related to autocratization.

##### **4.2.2.1 Autocratization episode censored (aut\_ep\_censored)**

*Long tag:* vdem\_ert\_aut\_ep\_censored

*Original tag:* aut\_ep\_censored

*Dataset citation:* Edgell et al. (2024)

*Merge scores:*

*Non-missing observations in original unit:* Sum: 19037, Percent: 69.09

*Non-missing observations in chosen unit:* Sum: 19037, Percent: 63.9

*Lost observations in chosen unit:* Sum: 0 Percent: 0

*Description:*

QUESTION: Is the current autocratization episode censored?

CLARIFICATION: An autocratization episode may be censored if its end date corresponds with the date the coding for the case ends (i.e. codingend) or the year before a gap starts in the coding (i.e. gapstart1, gapstart2, gapstart3).

NOTE: This is coded for the entire episode. Thus, episodes where a period of democratic regression results in a breakdown may still be censored overall if the resulting period of autocratic regression is censored.

REQUIRED VARIABLES: aut\_ep\_end\_year, codingend, gapstart1, gapstart2, gapstart3

FORMAT: dummy, [0,1]

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