(b) Find the Bayesian Nash equilibrium of this game. Also, make assumptions concerning  $a_H$ ,  $a_L$ ,  $\theta$ , and c such that all equilibrium quantities are positive. (12 points)

from the calculation, finally we get BNE like this,

$$\frac{q^{*}(\alpha_{H}) = \frac{(3-\theta) \cdot \alpha_{H} - (1-\theta) \cdot \alpha_{L} - 2c}{6}}{6}, q^{*}(\alpha_{L}) = \frac{(\theta+2) \cdot \alpha_{L} - \theta \cdot \alpha_{H} - 2c}{6}}{6}$$

$$\frac{q^{*}(\alpha_{H}) = \frac{(3-\theta) \cdot \alpha_{H} - (1-\theta) \cdot \alpha_{L} - 2c}{6}}{6}$$

then we could know that and by assumption of cournet Model, we know and all all c.

And we could know q,\*(an) and q,\* always positive whatever c is. Let's suppose c is al.

$$f_{2}^{*} = \frac{\theta \times \alpha_{H} + (1-\theta)\alpha_{L} - \alpha_{L}}{3} = \frac{\theta(\alpha_{H} - \alpha_{L})}{3} > 0 \text{ because } \alpha_{H} - \alpha_{L} > 0$$

$$f_{1}^{*}(\alpha_{H}) = \frac{(3-\theta)\cdot\alpha_{H} - (1-\theta)\cdot\alpha_{L} - 2\alpha_{L}}{3} = \frac{(3-\theta)\alpha_{H} - (3-\theta)\alpha_{L}}{3} = \frac{(3-\theta)(\alpha_{H} - \alpha_{L})}{3} > 0 \text{ because } \alpha_{H} - \alpha_{L} > 0$$

but, 4, \*(al) is could be regative & a by "c" value. So, we could make assumption.

$$\frac{1}{1} \cdot \frac{1}{1} \cdot \frac{1}$$