Game Theory

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1. T
2. T
3. T
4. F
5. F ⇐ discount [illegible]! infinite [illegible]

6. payoff matrix is like this

(a)

1 \ 2	mm	mn	nm	nn
LL	3, 3	3, 3	4, 2	4, 2
LR	1, 2	1, 2	0, 4	0, 4
RL	1, 2	2, 4	1, 2	2, 4
RR	1, 2	2, 4	1, 2	2, 4

Nash equilibria is (LL, mm), (LL, mn)

(b) Tree is like



SPNE = (LL, mn)

7.
(a)



Tim \ Joe	play	pass
play	1, -10	1, -10
pass	12, 0	12, 0

(b) Nash equilibria is (pass, play) (pass, pass)

7.



Tim \ Joe	play	pass
play	1, -10	1, -10
pass	0, 12	11, 11

(b) Nash equilibrium is (play, play)

SPNE is also (play, play)

(c) consider the condition game change like this



Tim \ Joe	play	pass
play	(1, -10)	(1, -10)
pass	(0, 12)	(9, 13)

Nash equilibria are (play, play) (pass, pass) and SPNE is (pass, pass) So, Equilibrium Change.