



Network Research and Monitoring

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Introduction

An automation was created to let cyber units run script from their local devices but executed by the remote server, communicating with the server and executing automatic tasks anonymously.

To better understand network and security, we captured and monitored the traffic during the automated attack on the server.

We then analysed the FTP protocol which was used in the automation and studied how it impacts the CIA Triad. Secure alternatives were thereafter provided with demonstration.

Methodologies

A bash script was first created with geany and language was set (*#!/bin/bash*).

Functions were created to check if the applications required for the script are already installed in the machine using if-else statements.

dpkg command was used to check the status of the application. *grep* was used to determine if the application's status is installed.

Going into the directory where the *nipe.pl* file is located, the database is updated via *sudo updated* command and the *find* command was used to locate the directory *nipe*, also creating the directory as a variable which would be used to access the *nipe.pl* file.

The *sudo perl nipe.pl start* command is used to attempt to connect to the Tor network to achieve anonymity. An if-else statement was used to check status and start *perl* if unsuccessful, until the connection was successful. Otherwise, the script would end, informing user that the connection was unsuccessful.

Information was then collected from the user using *echo* to pose inquiry and *read* to collect details, such as the domain that the user wished to target, and information to access the remote server – IP address, username and password.

sshpass is used to log into the remote server using data collected from user to access the remote server and to collect information we need.

Before proceeding with login, we scan the remote server using *nmap* to ensure that its ssh port is open. Once in the server, we check its IP address, country location and its uptime using commands of the IP address variable collected from user, *whois* and *grep*, and *sshpass* and *uptime* respectively.

Next, we proceeded to use the remote server to check the victim's domain on *whois* and saved the data on the remote machine. A log was created to document the day, date and time of what domain was scanned using flag "*[\$(date +%a %b %d %Y %H:%M:%S)]*" and using the append command to ensure that data is not overwritten.


Using *EOF* command to automate FTP, we were able to collect the file from the remote machine and save it into our local machine.

Finally, we also used the remote server to do a *nmap* scan on the victim's address to check its port states, using the *Pn* flag to disable host discovery, *v0* to run the command silently and *oX* to write its output to an xml file, which can be converted to an html file using the *xsltproc* command.

Data was similarly collected in the same log and saved on local machine and both files' locations were conveyed to the user.

Discussion

We created functions to check if the applications required for the script were already installed in the machine. If-else statements were used to check if they are installed, if the condition was true, a statement would be echoed to notify users that the application was already installed on the machine. Otherwise, the application would be automatically installed after the apt-get update was run.



```
5
6 echo 'Checking required applications...'
7 echo
8 sleep 1
9
10 # check nipe
11
12 function ci_nipe()
13 {
14     nipe_install=$(dpkg -s cpanminus | grep -i "ok installed" | wc -l )
15
16     if [ $nipe_install -eq 1 ]
17     then
18         echo 'Nipe is already installed'
19     else
20
21         echo
22         echo 'Installing Nipe'
23         echo
24         sudo apt-get update
25         git clone https://github.com/htrgouvea/nipe && cd nipe
26         sudo apt-get install cpanminus -y
27         cpanm --installdeps .
28         sudo cpan install Switch JSON LWP::UserAgent Config::Simple -y
29         sudo perl nipe.pl install
30         echo
31         echo 'Nipe is now installed'
32     fi
33 }
34
35
```

Terminal Output:

```
$ bash projnr.sh
Checking required applications...
Nipe is already installed
Tor is already installed
Whois is already installed
GeoIPlookup is already installed
```

dpkg command was used to check the status of the application and *-s* flag was used to silence any progress or error messages. *dpkg* command is a tool to install, build, remove and manage Debian packages and is used to interact with packages on our system. *grep* was used to determine if the application's status is installed, if so, that would generate one line that fulfilled the condition of the if-else statement.

```

152 sudo updatedb
153
154 nipe_dir=$(sudo find / -type d -name nipe 2>/dev/null)
155
156 cd "$nipe_dir"
157
158 sudo perl nipe.pl start
159
160 nipe_connect=$(sudo perl nipe.pl status | grep -i true | wc -l)
161
162 if [ $nipe_connect -eq 1 ]
163 then
164     echo "You are anonymous."
165     echo "Connecting to the server..."
166     echo
167     ip=$(curl -s ifconfig.io)
168     echo "Your spoofed IP address is: $ip"
169
170     ctry=$(geoipllookup $ip | awk -F: '{print $2}')
171     echo "Spoofed country: $ctry"
172
173 else
174     echo "Can't connect to server"
175
176     exit

```

```

GeoIPLookup is already installed
Sshpass is already installed

You are anonymous.
Connecting to the server...

Your spoofed IP address is: 94.228.169.70
Spoofed country: AT, Austria

```

After confirming that all applications required were installed on the machine, we proceeded to go into the directory where the `nipe.pl` file is located. We first updated the database via `sudo updatedb` command and used the `find` command to locate the directory `nipe`, also creating the directory as a variable which would be used to access the `nipe.pl` file.

We then used the `sudo perl nipe.pl start` command to attempt to connect to the Tor network to achieve anonymity. Nipe is a tool developed for users to work anonymously by hiding their details and sending outgoing traffic via the Tor network.

Since it is common to require multiple tries to successfully connect, another if-else statement was used to check status and start `perl` if unsuccessful, until the connection was successful. After which a message would inform users that they were anonymous and connecting to the server. Otherwise the script would end, informing user that the connection was unsuccessful and they would have to run the script again.

Upon connection, the script also generated the spoofed IP address and its country location so that we would be able to identify our machine in any recordings.

```

185 echo "Enter IP address or URL to whois from remote server: "
186 read userip
187 echo
188
189 echo "Enter IP address of Remote Server: "
190 read rserver
191 echo
192 echo "Enter username of Remote Server: "
193 read ruser
194 echo
195 echo "Enter password of Remote Server: "
196 read rpass

```

```

Enter IP address or URL to whois from remote server:
scanme3.nmap.com

```

```

Enter IP address of Remote Server:
192.168.80.129

```

```

Enter username of Remote Server:
tc

```

```

Enter password of Remote Server:
tc

```

Information was then collected from the user using *echo* to pose inquiry and *read* to collect details, such as the domain that the user wished to target, and information to access the remote server – IP address, username and password.

```

197
198 ssh_open=$(nmap $rserver | grep open | grep ssh | wc -l)
199
200 echo
201
202 if [ $ssh_open -eq 1 ]
203 then
204     echo "Remote Server IP address:"
205     echo $rserver
206     echo
207     echo "Remote Server Country:"
208     whois $rserver | grep -i country | awk -F: '{print $2}' | sed 's/ //g'
209     echo
210     echo "Remote Server Uptime:"
211     sshpass -p $rpass ssh $ruser@$rserver 'uptime'
212
213 fi

```

```

Remote Server IP address:
192.168.80.129

```

```

Remote Server Country:
US

```

```

Remote Server Uptime:
14:07:27 up 10:00, 1 user, load average: 0.01, 0.02, 0.00

```


Since this is an automation, *sshp* is used to log into the remote server since it is an excellent tool for non-interactive SSH login. It is a simple and lightweight command line tool that enables us to provide password to the command prompt itself so that automated shell scripts can be executed to take backups via cron scheduler, achieving non-interactive password authentication. However, it is prudent to note that using *sshp* is considered to be the least secure as it reveals the password to all system users on the command line with a simple *ps* command. This can be circumvented by using instead SSH Passwordless authentication.

Before proceeding with login, we scanned the remote server using *nmap* to ensure that its ssh port was open. Once in the server, we checked its IP address, country location and its uptime. Uptime monitoring can show whether a server is consistently available or experiences frequent downtimes. High uptime indicates the server is reliable and available for users, while low uptime may signal potential issues that need to be addressed.

```

217 echo
shpass [108] 218 echo "Running victim's address on whois..."
or [39] 219 echo "..."
whois [60] 220
221 sshpass -p $rpass ssh $ruser@$rserver "whois $userip > $(date +%d-%m-%Y)whois_$userip" # 3i) Save the Whois data into file on the
222
223 echo -e "[$(date +%a %b %d %Y %H:%M:%S)]" whois data collected for: $userip >> /home/kali/var/log/projnr.log #3iii, iv) Create a log
224
225 dst=$(pwd)
226
227 ftp -in $rserver >/dev/null <<EOF # 3ii) Collect the file from the remote computer via FTP
228 user $ruser $rpass
229 get $(date +%d-%m-%Y)whois_$userip $dst/$(date +%d-%m-%Y)whois_$userip
230 bye
231 EOF
232
233 echo "...and saving results into $dst/$(date +%d-%m-%Y)whois_$userip"
234 echo
235
Running victim's address on whois...
...
...and saving results into /home/kali/NetworkResearch/nipe/30-05-2024whois_45.33.49.119

```

Next, we proceeded to use the remote server to check the victim's domain on whois and saved the data on the remote machine. A log was created to document the day, date and time of what domain was scanned.

Using *EOF* command to automate FTP, we were able to collect the file from the remote machine and save it into our local machine.

Finally, we also used the remote server to do a *nmap* scan on the victim's address to check its port states, using the *Pn* flag to disable host discovery, *vO* to run the command silently and *oX* to write its output to an xml file.

More flags could have been used such as *iL* to scan targets from a given file, *sW* for a TCP Window port scan, specify ports using *p*, *-sV -version-intensity* (level 0-9) where higher number increases possibility of correctness while attempting to determine the version of the service running on port,

or A which enables OS detection, version detection, script scanning and traceroute, to name a few. A useful script example is `nmap -script whois* domain.com` which can also run a Whois query to replace the command used in our script.

```
236 echo
237 echo "Scanning victim's address..."
238 echo "...
239
240
241 sshpass -p $rpass ssh $ruser@$rserver "nmap -Pn -v0 $userip -oX $(date +%d-%m-%Y)nmap_$userip.xml" # Save the nmap data in
242
243 echo -e "[$(date +%a %b %d %Y %H:%M:%S)]" nmap data collected for: $userip >> /home/kali/var/log/projnr.log #3 Create a log
244
245 ftp -in $rserver >/dev/null <<EOF # Collect the file from the remote computer via FTP
246 user $ruser $rpass
247 get $(date +%d-%m-%Y)nmap_$userip.xml $dst/$(date +%d-%m-%Y)nmap_$userip.xml
248 bye
249 EOF
250
251 echo "...and saving results into $dst/$(date +%d-%m-%Y)nmap_$userip.xml"
252
253
```

```
Scanning victim's address...
...
...and saving results into /home/kali/NetworkResearch/nipe/30-05-2024nmap_45.33.49.119.xml
```

Data was similarly collected in the same log and saved on local machine and both files' locations were conveyed to the user.

To analyse the data collected, we accessed the directory where the files are stored and `cat` them.

```
(kali@kali)-[~/NetworkResearch/nipe]
$ ls
30-05-2024nmap_45.33.49.119.html  30-05-2024nmap_45.33.49.119.xml  cpanfile  lib  nipe.pl  SECURITY.md
30-05-2024nmap_45.33.49.119.on  30-05-2024whois_45.33.49.119  Dockerfile  LICENSE.md  README.md

(kali@kali)-[~/NetworkResearch/nipe]
$ cat 30-05-2024whois_45.33.49.119

#
# ARIN WHOIS data and services are subject to the Terms of Use
# available at: https://www.arin.net/resources/registry/whois/tou/
#
# If you see inaccuracies in the results, please report at
# https://www.arin.net/resources/registry/whois/inaccuracy_reporting/
#
# Copyright 1997-2024, American Registry for Internet Numbers, Ltd.
#

# start
Running victim's address on whois
and saving results into /home/kali/NetworkResearch/nipe/30-05-2024whois_45.33.49.119
NetRange:      45.33.0.0 - 45.33.127.255
CIDR:          45.33.0.0/17
NetName:       LINODE-US
NetHandle:     NET-45-33-0-0-1
Parent:        NET45 (NET-45-0-0-0)
NetType:       Direct Allocation
OriginAS:      AS3595, AS21844, AS6939, AS8001
Organization:  Akamai Technologies, Inc. (AKAMAI)
```

The `-oX` flag was used to write the nmap scan output into an xml file as it gives more information than other formats, which can be converted to an html file using the `xsltproc` command and read on a browser.

```
(kali@kali)~[~/NetworkResearch/nipe]
$ ls
30-05-2024nmap_45.33.49.119.on  30-05-2024nmap_45.33.49.119.xml  30-05-2024whois_45.33.49.119  cpanfile  Dockerfile  lib  LICENSE.md  nipe.pl  README.md  SECURITY.md

(kali@kali)~[~/NetworkResearch/nipe]
$ xsltproc 30-05-2024nmap_45.33.49.119.xml -o 30-05-2024nmap_45.33.49.119.html

(kali@kali)~[~/NetworkResearch/nipe]
$ ls
30-05-2024nmap_45.33.49.119.html  30-05-2024nmap_45.33.49.119.xml  cpanfile  lib  nipe.pl  SECURITY.md
30-05-2024nmap_45.33.49.119.on  30-05-2024whois_45.33.49.119  Dockerfile  LICENSE.md  README.md

(kali@kali)~[~/NetworkResearch/nipe]
$ pwd
/home/kali/NetworkResearch/nipe
```

Nmap Scan Report - Scanned at Thu May 30 05:24:33 2024

Scan Summary | ack.nmap.org (45.33.49.119)

Scan Summary

Nmap 7.80 was initiated at Thu May 30 05:24:33 2024 with these arguments:
`nmap -Pn -v0 -oX 30-05-2024nmap_45.33.49.119.xml 45.33.49.119`

Verbosity: 0; Debug level 0

Nmap done at Thu May 30 05:24:57 2024; 1 IP address (1 host up) scanned in 24.00 seconds

45.33.49.119 / ack.nmap.org

Address

- 45.33.49.119 (IPv4)

Hostnames

- ack.nmap.org (PTR)

Ports

The 999 ports scanned but not shown below are in state: **filtered**

- 999 ports replied with: **no-responses**

Port	State (toggle closed [0] filtered [0])	Service	Reason	Product	Version	Extra info
22	open	ssh	syn-ack			

Misc Metrics (click to expand)

For the log files, we went into the `/var/log` directory and looked at the log file saved.


```
(kali@kali)~[~/NetworkResearch/nipe]
$ cd /home/kali/var/log

(kali@kali)~[~/var/log]
$ ls
alternatives.log  dmesg      fail2ban.log  file        lastlog     mail.log.txt  projnr.log  syslog.1  vsftpd.log
auth.log          dpkg.log   faillog      fontconfig.log  mail.log    php7.0-fpm.log  syslog     syslog.2.gz  wtmp

(kali@kali)~[~/var/log]
$ cat projnr.log
[Tue May 28 2024 10:07:28] whois data collected for: scanme3.nmap.com
[Tue May 28 2024 10:09:52] nmap data collected for: scanme3.nmap.com
[Wed May 29 2024 11:04:07] whois data collected for: scanme3.nmap.com
[Wed May 29 2024 11:04:51] nmap data collected for: scanme3.nmap.com
[Wed May 29 2024 11:08:21] whois data collected for: scanme3.nmap.com
[Wed May 29 2024 11:08:35] nmap data collected for: scanme3.nmap.com
[Wed May 29 2024 11:15:23] whois data collected for: scanme3.nmap.com
[Wed May 29 2024 11:15:38] nmap data collected for: scanme3.nmap.com
```

Capture Network Research


Reviewing the Expert Information generated by Wireshark we could see that almost half the packages contained warning of Connection reset (RST) which indicated the portions of the automation where nmap was scanning ports of the remote server and found closed ports. The remote server was sending RST, ACK (Reset Acknowledge) to reset the connection and stop. This is in response to the initial SYN package sent.



Severity	Summary	Group	Protocol	Count
Error	Invalid key length	Protocol	SSH	6
Warning	Connection reset (RST)	Sequence	TCP	3011
Note	Duplicate ACK	Sequence	TCP	6
Note	This frame is a (suspected) spurious retransmission	Sequence	TCP	1
Note	This frame is a (suspected) retransmission	Sequence	TCP	16
Note	The SYN packet does not contain a SACK PERM option	Protocol	TCP	13
Note	This frame undergoes the connection closing	Sequence	TCP	8
Note	This frame initiates the connection closing	Sequence	TCP	8
Chat	Formatted text	Sequence	SSDP	4
Chat	Connection finish (FIN)	Sequence	TCP	16
Chat	Connection establish acknowledge (SYN+ACK)	Sequence	TCP	24
Chat	Connection establish request (SYN)	Sequence	TCP	3034

No display filter set.

☐ Limit to Display Filter ☒ Group by summary Search: Show... Close Help



No.	Time	Source	Destination	Protocol	Length	Info
597	94.988051415	192.168.88.128	192.168.88.129	TCP	74	54338 → 1524 [SYN] Seq=0 Win=32120 Len=0 MSS=1460 SACK_PERM TSval=646825980 TSecr=0 WS=128
598	94.988167102	192.168.88.128	192.168.88.129	TCP	74	40396 → 1666 [SYN] Seq=0 Win=32120 Len=0 MSS=1460 SACK_PERM TSval=646825980 TSecr=0 WS=128
599	94.988284554	192.168.88.128	192.168.88.129	TCP	74	58216 → 1062 [SYN] Seq=0 Win=32120 Len=0 MSS=1460 SACK_PERM TSval=646825980 TSecr=0 WS=128
600	94.988393952	192.168.88.128	192.168.88.129	TCP	74	35262 → 1755 [SYN] Seq=0 Win=32120 Len=0 MSS=1460 SACK_PERM TSval=646825980 TSecr=0 WS=128
601	94.988647631	192.168.88.129	192.168.88.128	TCP	60	264 → 46542 [RST, ACK] Seq=1 Ack=1 Win=0 Len=0
602	94.988648125	192.168.88.129	192.168.88.128	TCP	60	4804 → 43602 [RST, ACK] Seq=1 Ack=1 Win=0 Len=0
603	94.988648277	192.168.88.129	192.168.88.128	TCP	60	625 → 37842 [RST, ACK] Seq=1 Ack=1 Win=0 Len=0
604	94.988648394	192.168.88.129	192.168.88.128	TCP	60	3322 → 43704 [RST, ACK] Seq=1 Ack=1 Win=0 Len=0
605	94.988648534	192.168.88.129	192.168.88.128	TCP	60	211 → 57958 [RST, ACK] Seq=1 Ack=1 Win=0 Len=0
606	94.988648676	192.168.88.129	192.168.88.128	TCP	60	6123 → 49030 [RST, ACK] Seq=1 Ack=1 Win=0 Len=0
607	94.988648842	192.168.88.129	192.168.88.128	TCP	60	700 → 53852 [RST, ACK] Seq=1 Ack=1 Win=0 Len=0
608	94.988648981	192.168.88.129	192.168.88.128	TCP	60	1524 → 54338 [RST, ACK] Seq=1 Ack=1 Win=0 Len=0
609	94.988697181	192.168.88.128	192.168.88.129	TCP	74	57268 → 18024 [SYN] Seq=0 Win=32120 Len=0 MSS=1460 SACK_PERM TSval=646825980 TSecr=0 WS=128
610	94.988797180	192.168.88.128	192.168.88.129	TCP	60	1666 → 48396 [RST, ACK] Seq=1 Ack=1 Win=0 Len=0
611	94.988966341	192.168.88.128	192.168.88.129	TCP	74	42778 → 21571 [SYN] Seq=0 Win=32120 Len=0 MSS=1460 SACK_PERM TSval=646825981 TSecr=0 WS=128

Transmission Control Protocol, Src Port: 264, Dst Port: 46542, Seq: 1, Ack: 1, Len: 0

Source Port: 264
Destination Port: 46542
[Stream index: 228]
[Conversation completeness: Incomplete (37)]
[TCP Segment Len: 0]
Sequence Number: 1 (relative sequence number)
Sequence Number (raw): 0
[Next Sequence Number: 1 (relative sequence number)]
Acknowledgment Number: 1 (relative ack number)
Acknowledgment number (raw): 1342610177
0101 = Header Length: 20 bytes (5)
Flags: 0x014 (RST, ACK)
000. = Reserved: Not set
...0. = Accurate ECH: Not set
...0. = Congestion Window Reduced: Not set
...0. = ECH-Echo: Not set
...0. = Urgent: Not set
...1. = Acknowledgment: Set
...0. = Push: Not set
...1. = Reset: Set

Packets: 6541 - Displayed: 6541 (100.0%) Profile: Defa

When the scan tried port 80, which was open, it sent SYN, ACK to acknowledge the synchronise.

The image shows a Wireshark packet capture of a TCP connection. The top pane lists several packets, with packet 177 highlighted: 177 94.914772479 192.168.80.129 192.168.80.128 TCP 60 256 → 44240 [RST, ACK] Seq=1 Ack=1 Win=0 Len=0. The middle pane shows the packet details for the selected packet, indicating it is a Transmission Control Protocol (TCP) packet with Source Port: 80, Destination Port: 58786, and Sequence Number: 1. The bottom pane shows the raw packet data in hexadecimal and ASCII.

From wireshark we could also trace the whole conversation of how the files were transferred via FTP. The file is downloadable from wireshark and visible in the bottom right window.

The image shows a Wireshark packet capture of an FTP session. The top pane lists several packets, with packet 2303 highlighted: 2303 192.168.80.129 192.168.80.128 TCP 66 40138 → 42663 [ACK] Seq=1 Ack=4144 Win=65112 Len=0. The middle pane shows the packet details for the selected packet, indicating it is a Transmission Control Protocol (TCP) packet with Source Port: 42663, Destination Port: 40138, and Sequence Number: 1. The bottom pane shows the raw packet data in hexadecimal and ASCII. A small window titled "Wireshark - Export - FTP-DATA object list" is open, showing a list of files transferred via FTP, including "30-05-2024whois_45.33.49.119" and "30-05-2024nmap_45.33.49.119.xml".

Credentials were also easy to retrieve from this wireshark capture.

Wireshark packet capture analysis showing network traffic between 192.168.80.129 and 192.168.80.128. The capture includes packets for TCP, FTP, and File Transfer Protocol (FTP). The interface is eth0, id 0.

Packet 2274: 102.952083834 192.168.80.129 → 192.168.80.128 TCP 74 21 → 39054 [SYN, ACK] Seq=0 Ack=1 Win=65160 Len=0 MSS=1460 SACK_PERM TSval=3695854527 TSecr=646833942 WS=128

Packet 2275: 102.952265494 192.168.80.128 → 192.168.80.129 TCP 66 39054 → 21 [ACK] Seq=1 Ack=1 Win=65536 Len=0 TSval=646833944 TSecr=3695854527

Packet 2276: 102.973370603 192.168.80.129 → 192.168.80.128 FTP 86 Response: 220 (vsFTPD 3.0.5)

Packet 2277: 102.973614901 192.168.80.128 → 192.168.80.129 FTP 66 39054 → 21 [ACK] Seq=1 Ack=21 Win=65516 Len=0 TSval=646833965 TSecr=3695854547

Packet 2278: 102.974095914 192.168.80.128 → 192.168.80.129 FTP 75 Request: USER tc

Packet 2279: 102.975920588 192.168.80.129 → 192.168.80.128 TCP 66 21 → 39054 [ACK] Seq=21 Ack=10 Win=65280 Len=0 TSval=3695854550 TSecr=646833966

Packet 2280: 102.976294563 192.168.80.129 → 192.168.80.128 FTP 100 Response: 331 Please specify the password.

Packet 2281: 102.977036510 192.168.80.128 → 192.168.80.129 FTP 75 Request: PASS tc

Packet 2282: 103.019534661 192.168.80.129 → 192.168.80.128 TCP 66 21 → 39054 [ACK] Seq=55 Ack=19 Win=65280 Len=0 TSval=3695854594 TSecr=646833969

Packet 2283: 103.028906477 192.168.80.129 → 192.168.80.128 FTP 89 Response: 230 Login successful.

Packet 2284: 103.029334826 192.168.80.128 → 192.168.80.129 FTP 72 Request: SYST

Packet 2285: 103.030835623 192.168.80.129 → 192.168.80.128 TCP 66 21 → 39054 [ACK] Seq=78 Ack=25 Win=65280 Len=0 TSval=3695854605 TSecr=646834021

Packet 2286: 103.030836840 192.168.80.129 → 192.168.80.128 FTP 85 Response: 215 UNIX Type: L8

Packet 2287: 103.031371725 192.168.80.128 → 192.168.80.129 FTP 72 Request: FEAT

Frame 2281: 75 bytes on wire (600 bits), 75 bytes captured (600 bits) on interface eth0, id 0

Ethernet II, Src: VMware_aa:78:18 (00:0c:29:aa:78:18), Dst: VMware_9e:80:c0 (00:0c:29:9e:80:c0)

Internet Protocol Version 4, Src: 192.168.80.128, Dst: 192.168.80.129

Transmission Control Protocol, Src Port: 39054, Dst Port: 21, Seq: 10, Ack: 55, Len: 9

File Transfer Protocol (FTP)

PASS tc\r\n

[Current working directory:]

Wireshark - Credentials - projnr.scan.pcapng

Packet No.	Protocol	Username	Additional Info
2281	FTP	tc	Username in packet: 2278
5795	FTP	tc	Username in packet: 5791

Close

projnr.scan.pcapng

Packets: 6541 - Displayed: 6541 (100.0%)

Profile: De

tcp.stream eq 1011

Packet 2275: 102.952265494 192.168.80.128 → 192.168.80.129 TCP 66 39054 → 21 [ACK] Seq=1 Ack=1 Win=65536 Len=0 TSval=646833944 TSecr=3695854527

Packet 2276: 102.973370603 192.168.80.129 → 192.168.80.128 FTP 86 Response: 220 (vsFTPD 3.0.5)

Packet 2277: 102.973614901 192.168.80.128 → 192.168.80.129 FTP 66 39054 → 21 [ACK] Seq=1 Ack=21 Win=65516 Len=0 TSval=646833965 TSecr=3695854547

Packet 2278: 102.974095914 192.168.80.128 → 192.168.80.129 FTP 75 Request: USER tc

Packet 2279: 102.975920588 192.168.80.129 → 192.168.80.128 TCP 66 21 → 39054 [ACK] Seq=21 Ack=10 Win=65280 Len=0 TSval=3695854550 TSecr=646833966

Packet 2280: 102.976294563 192.168.80.129 → 192.168.80.128 FTP 100 Response: 331 Please specify the password.

Packet 2281: 102.977036510 192.168.80.128 → 192.168.80.129 FTP 75 Request: PASS tc

Packet 2282: 103.019534661 192.168.80.129 → 192.168.80.128 TCP 66 21 → 39054 [ACK] Seq=55 Ack=19 Win=65280 Len=0 TSval=3695854594 TSecr=646833969

Packet 2283: 103.028906477 192.168.80.129 → 192.168.80.128 FTP 89 Response: 230 Login successful.

Packet 2284: 103.029334826 192.168.80.128 → 192.168.80.129 FTP 72 Request: SYST

Packet 2285: 103.030835623 192.168.80.129 → 192.168.80.128 TCP 66 21 → 39054 [ACK] Seq=78 Ack=25 Win=65280 Len=0 TSval=3695854605 TSecr=646834021

Packet 2286: 103.030836840 192.168.80.129 → 192.168.80.128 FTP 85 Response: 215 UNIX Type: L8

Packet 2287: 103.031371725 192.168.80.129 → 192.168.80.128 FTP 72 Request: FEAT

Packet 2288: 103.03184224 192.168.80.129 → 192.168.80.128 FTP 81 Response: 211-Features:

Frame 2281: 75 bytes on wire (600 bits), 75 bytes captured (600 bits) on interface eth0, id 0

Ethernet II, Src: VMware_aa:78:18 (00:0c:29:aa:78:18), Dst: VMware_9e:80:c0 (00:0c:29:9e:80:c0)

Internet Protocol Version 4, Src: 192.168.80.128, Dst: 192.168.80.129

Transmission Control Protocol, Src Port: 39054, Dst Port: 21, Seq: 10, Ack: 55, Len: 9

File Transfer Protocol (FTP)

PASS tc\r\n

[Current working directory:]

Wireshark - Follow TCP Stream (tcp.stream eq 1011) - projnr.scan.pcapng

220 (vsFTPD 3.0.5)

USER tc

331 Please specify the password.

PASS tc

230 Login successful.

SYST

215 UNIX Type: L8

FEAT

211-Features:

EPRT

EPSV

MDTM

PASV

REST STREAM

SIZE

TVFS

211 End

TYPE I

200 Switching to Binary mode.

SIZE 30-05-2024whois_45.33.49.119

213 4143

EPSV

229 Entering Extended Passive Mode (|||42663|)

RETR 30-05-2024whois_45.33.49.119

150 Opening BINARY mode data connection for 30-05-2024whois_45.33.49.119 (4143 bytes).

226 Transfer complete.

MDTM 30-05-2024whois_45.33.49.119

213 20240530084422

10 client pkts, 14 server pkts, 20 turns.

Entire conversation (566 bytes)

Show data as ASCII

Stream 10

Find

Filter Out This Stream

Print

Save as...

Back

Close

Help

FTP Research

File Transfer Protocol (FTP) is a standard network protocol for transmitting files between computers over Transmission Control Protocol/Internet Protocol (TCP/IP) connections. It is an application layer protocol that moves files between local and remote file systems.


In an FTP transaction, the end user's computer is typically called the local host. The second computer involved in FTP is a remote host, which is usually a server. Both computers need to be connected via a network and configured properly to transfer files via FTP. Servers must be set up to run FTP services, and the client must have FTP software installed to access these services.

Users can work with FTP via a simple command-line interface – from a console or terminal window in Microsoft Windows, Apple macOS or Linux – or with a dedicated graphical user interface. Web browsers can also serve as FTP clients.

There are also built-in FTP programs such as MobaXterm and Putty, which makes it easier to transfer files and it does not require remembering the commands.


How it works

This client-server protocol relies on two communications channels between the client and server: a command channel for controlling the conversation and a data channel for transmitting file content.




Steps involve:

- User logging in to FTP server (except servers where login is not necessary, e.g. anonymous FTP)
- Client starts conversation with server, upon requesting to download a file
- User can start different functions such as upload, delete, rename, copy files etc on server




There are two different types of connection in FTP, namely Control Connection and Data Connection. For sending control information like user identification, password, commands to change the remote directory, commands to retrieve and store files etc, FTP makes use of a control connection. This is initiated on port number 21.

For sending the actual file, FTP makes use of a data connection. It is initiated on port number 20. FTP sends the control information out-of-band as it uses a separate control connection. Some protocols such as HTTP and SMTP send their request and response header lines and the data in the same TCP connection, which is to say they send their control information in-band.



When an FTP session is started between a client and a server, the client initiates a control TCP connection with the server side. The client sends control information over this. When the server receives this, it initiates a data connection to the client side. But the control connection remains active throughout the user session. While HTTP is stateless, FTP needs to maintain a state about its user throughout the session.

FTP sessions work in either active or passive modes. In the **active** mode, the client initiates a session via a command channel request and the server creates a data connection back to the client and begins transferring data. In the **passive** mode, the server uses the command channel to send the client the information it needs to open a data channel. The passive mode works well across firewalls and network address translation gateways because it has the client initiating all connections.



The **data type** of a file, which determines how the file is represented overall, is the first piece of information that can be provided about it. The FTP standard specifies the following four categories of data: ASCII, EBCDIC, image and local.

FTP command-line options for Linux and UNIX

Command-Line Option	Description of Command
<code>-4</code>	Use only IPv4 to contact any host.
<code>-6</code>	Use IPv6 only.
<code>-e</code>	Disables command editing and history support, if it was compiled into the ftp executable. Otherwise, it does nothing.
<code>-p</code>	Use passive mode for data transfers. Allows the use of ftp in environments where a firewall prevents connections from the outside world back to the client machine. Requires the ftp server to support the PASV command .
<code>-i</code>	Turns off interactive prompting during multiple file transfers.
<code>-n</code>	Restrains ftp from attempting auto-login upon initial connection. If auto-login is enabled, ftp checks the .netrc (see netrc) file in the user's home directory for an entry describing an account on the remote machine. If no entry exists, ftp prompts for the remote machine login name (the default is the user identity on the local machine), and, if necessary, prompt for a password and an account with which to login.
<code>-g</code>	Disables file name globbing.
<code>-v</code>	The verbose option forces ftp to show all responses from the remote server, as well as report on data transfer statistics.
<code>-d</code>	Enables debugging.

Request for Comments (RFC) is a numbered document, which includes appraisals, descriptions and definitions of online protocols, concepts, methods and programmes. RFCs are administered by the IETF (Internet Engineering Task Force). A large part of the standards used online are published in RFCs. Some fundamental RFCs were officially adopted as standards. While a large proportion are not granted "Standard" status, they are still used as such all over the world. The reason behind this is that the individuals or groups working on an RFC primarily use their time to improve protocols and not for the standardisation process.

The first specification for FTP was published as RFC 114 on April 16, 1971, and was written by Abhay Bhushan, then a student at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology. The original idea behind FTP was to enable the transfer of files over ARPANET, the precursor to the internet.

As the modern internet began to take shape, the FTP specification underwent several revisions to align with networking standards, including TCP/IP. In 1980, a new version of FTP was defined in RFC 765 by Jon Postel, a research scientist at the Information Sciences Institute at the University of Southern California at the time. Five years later, FTP was redefined yet again with RFC 959, which introduced new management capabilities for the protocol, including the ability to make and remove a file directory. Prior iterations of FTP were largely limited to transferring files to and from existing file directory structures.

In 1997, RFC 959 was updated with new capabilities defined in RFC 2228 to provide security capabilities. Two years later, FTP was updated with RFC 2428 to support the IPv6 protocol.

Importance of FTP

FTP can enable expansive file transfer capabilities across IP networks. It uses TCP as a transport layer protocol. Compared to other protocols like HTTP which is also used to transfer files between computers, FTP offers more clarity, precision and control. It is also good for simple file transfer, such as during boot time. FTP shields users from differences in operating systems, directories, structures, character sets, etc typical of other file transfer protocols and transfers data efficiently and reliably.

Some of its common use cases include:

Backup – FTP can be used by backup services or individual users to backup data from one location to a secured backup server running FTP services.

Replication – FTP can facilitate duplication of data from one system to another but takes a more comprehensive approach to provide higher availability and resilience.

Access and data loading – FTP is also commonly used to access shared web hosting and cloud services as a mechanism to load data onto a remote system.

There are several ways through which a server and a client can do a file transfer using FTP.

Types of FTP

Anonymous FTP – This is the most basic form of FTP which provides support for data transfers without encrypting data or using a username and password. It is most commonly used for download of material that is allowed for unrestricted distribution and is enabled on some sites whose files are

available for public access. A user can access these files without having any username or password. Instead, the username is set to anonymous, and the password is to the guest by default. Here, user access is very limited. For example, the user can be allowed to copy the files but not to navigate through directories. This works on port 21.

Password Protected FTP – This is also a basic FTP service similar to Anonymous FTP, but it requires the use of a username and password, though the service might not be encrypted or secure. It also works on port 21.

FTP Secure (FTPS) – Sometimes referred to as **FTP Secure Sockets Layer (FTP-SSL)**, this approach enables implicit Transport Layer Security (TLS) as soon as an FTP connection is established. FTPS was initially used to help enable a more secure form of FTP data transfer. It typically defaults to using port 990.

FTP over explicit SSL/TLS (FTPES) – This approach enables explicit TLS support by upgrading an FTP connection over port 21 to an encrypted connection. This is a commonly used approach by web and file sharing services to enable secure file transfers.

Secure FTP (SFTP) - Not technically an FTP protocol but functioning similarly, SFTP is a subset of the Secure Shell (SSH) protocol that runs over port 22. SSH is commonly used by systems administrators to remotely and securely access systems and applications, and SFTP provides a mechanism within SSH for secure file transfer.

FTP Security

FTP was initially defined in 1971, predating TCP and IP, and it has been redefined several times since then to accommodate new technologies, including the use of TCP/IP, or Request for Comments 765 and RFC 959, and IPv6, or RFC 2428.

Information could not go across a secure tunnel since FTP was not intended to do so. Thus, a hacker would not need to struggle with encryption to access or alter data that is usable if they could intercept an FTP transaction. Even with FTP cloud storage, data can still be intercepted and misused if the service provider's system is attacked.

As a result, data sent via FTP is a target for spoofing, sniffing, brute force, FTP bounce attack, distributed denial-of-service attack and other types of attacks that move somewhat slowly. A hacker might examine an FTP transmission and try to take advantage of any flaws by simply port scanning.

FTP has undergone several updates to enhance FTP security. These include versions that encrypt via an implicit TLS connection (FTPS) or explicit TLS connection (FTPES) or that work with SFTP. By default, FTP does not encrypt traffic, and individuals can capture packets to read usernames, passwords and other data. By encrypting FTP with FTPS or FTPES, data is protected, limiting the ability of an attacker to eavesdrop on a connection and steal data.

Strengths and Weaknesses

Speed and efficiency are the main benefits of FTP. However, this comes at the expense of security as the speed is due to the lack of encryption. This makes it easy for individuals to capture packets to obtain sensitive information such as usernames and passwords.

Multitasking is possible using FTP as transferring and downloading can go in parallel and multiple files and directories can be transferred at the same time. Many FTP clients also have scripting features.

However, a few FTP providers do not offer encryption. Therefore it may be vulnerable to brute-force attacks against user/password authentication spoofing, an FTP bounce attack or a distributed denial-of-service attack. When sending files via FTP, compliance can be a problem.

As one of the basic building blocks of information security, the CIA Triad is likewise a vital piece in establishing secure enterprise file transfers, with its basic principles being Confidentiality, Integrity and Availability. To establish a secure system, these three objectives need to be achieved.

Given its accessibility and lack of encryption, when information is exchanged over FTP, the confidentiality of the said information will be at risk. Information can be relatively easy stolen. It is imperative to establish countermeasures that can mitigate unauthorised access and disclosures. Likewise for data integrity, the ease of access also means that the information can easily be altered using similar methods. For availability, the data can be readily accessible.

Secure File Transfer Protocol (SFTP)


SFTP is a network protocol for securely accessing, transferring and managing large files and sensitive data. Designed by the Internet Engineering Task Force as an extension of Secure Shell (SSH), SFTP enables access, transfer and management of files over a network. It's used for secure file transfers over Transport Layer Security and the transfer of data for virtual private network (VPN) applications

Secure File Transfer Protocol was developed to securely transfer and manage files over a TCP/IP network. It uses the same commands as the standard File Transfer Protocol (FTP) and most SFTP commands are similar or identical to the Linux shell commands. SFTP performs numerous tasks, including transferring sensitive files, removing files and resuming paused transfers. To establish server connection, SFTP only needs to be connected to the normal SSH port 22.

SFTP also needs an SFTP client and server. An SFTP client is software that lets users connect to a server and store files on the server. Files are stored and retrieved from the SFTP server. When a user clicks on a file, the request travels through the network and ultimately reaches a server. This data is then sent to the requesting device. SFTP ensures all files are encrypted before transferring them.

SSH keys are typically used to automate access to servers and are often used in scripts, backup systems and configuration management tools. SSH keys in SFTP have half of the key stored on the client device, while the other half is on the server associated with a public key. Users are properly authenticated when SSH key pairs match.

SFTP works over an SSH data stream to establish a secure connection. Encryption algorithms securely move data to a server, keeping files unreadable during the process. To further prevent unauthorised file access, authentication is also enabled. Users can choose to be identified by a user ID and password, SSH keys or both.




Difference between FTP and SFTP

We used Wireshark to capture packages while running SFTP to download a file from the remote server.

```
(kali@kali)-[~/NetworkResearch/nipe]
└─$ sftp tc@192.168.80.129
tc@192.168.80.129's password:
Connected to 192.168.80.129.
sftp> pwd
Remote working directory: /home/tc
sftp> ls
29-05-2024nmap_scanme.nmap.com.on  29-05-2024nmap_scanme3.nmap.com.ox  29-05-2024whois_45.33.49.119  29-05-2024whois_scanme.nmap.com  29-05-2024whois_scanme3.nmap.com
30-05-2024nmap_45.33.49.119.on  30-05-2024nmap_45.33.49.119.xml  30-05-2024whois_45.33.49.119  Later  Linux
auth.log  nmap_scanme3.nmap.com  nmap_scanme3.nmap.com.file  nmap_scanme3.nmap.com.ox  passwords.lst
test.txt  whois.txt  whois_45.33.49.119  whois_scanme.nmap.com  whois_scanme3.nmap.com
sftp> get /home/tc/whois.txt
Fetching /home/tc/whois.txt to whois.txt
whois.txt
sftp> exit

(kali@kali)-[~/NetworkResearch/nipe]
└─$ ls
30-05-2024nmap_45.33.49.119.html  30-05-2024nmap_45.33.49.119.xml  cpanfile  lib  nipe.pl  SECURITY.md
30-05-2024nmap_45.33.49.119.on  30-05-2024whois_45.33.49.119  Dockerfile  LICENSE.md  README.md  whois.txt
```

We can see that compared to FTP, credentials and the downloaded file are not visible and when attempting to follow the TCP stream, the information is encrypted.



The image displays a Wireshark packet capture of an SFTP session. The left pane shows the packet list with details for an SFTP packet. The middle pane shows the packet bytes with hex and ASCII views. The right pane shows the packet details, including the SFTP protocol version and the SFTP file list response.

Strengths and Weaknesses

Strengths of SFTP include the ability to protect data in transit by enabling data security, encryption and public key authentication. This security makes SFTP a reliable file transfer option. This protects the confidentiality of information and integrity of the data and thus SFTP helps enterprises meet regulations for file transfer compliance in accordance with HIPAA, GDPR and other regulatory rulings. SFTP also lets businesses securely transfer billing data, funds and data recovery files. Individuals may also use SFTP to encrypt their communications. Commands and data are encrypted to prevent passwords and other sensitive information from being exposed to the network in plain text.

SFTP supports large file transfers and transferring of multiple files from one server to another simultaneously, similar to FTP. It also integrates well with VPNs and firewalls, and can be managed through a web interface or an SFTP client.

Compared to FTP, only one connection is used as data connection is not required in SFTP.

Weaknesses include complexity. Even though SFTP is manageable, the process of creating and setting up an SFTP client is much more complicated than the process of creating an FTP client. Since communication is binary, it is more difficult to login. Its speed is also slow.

SFTP private keys must be stored on the device that users want to transfer files from and the device should also be protected. The keys are difficult to maintain and verify. Standards around SFTP are

described as optional and recommended, which may lead to compatibility issues in software developed by different vendors. These may affect the availability of information and thus should be carefully weighed against importance of preserving confidentiality and integrity of said data.

Conclusion

The ease of which we were able to create an automated script to access a remote server to potentially conduct illegal scans anonymously highlights how essential network security is.

Network security protocols are a strong line of defence in the battle against hackers because they can prevent people from infiltrating, corrupting, stealing or taking advantage of our communication system. For example, attackers would have difficulty wiretapping or listening in on communications where encryption would result in them only getting a jumbled set of nonsensical characters.

Protocols intersect with many facets of cybersecurity frameworks because the frameworks use them as tools to keep communications and data safe. Those who design cybersecurity frameworks often piece together various security protocols like components of a machine to keep the networks that use the frameworks running smoothly. Without network security protocols, framework designers may have to code their own solutions instead of using proven, effective technologies.

A well-designed network security solution reduces overhead expenses and safeguards organisations from costly losses that occur from a data breach or other security incident. Since many organisations handle user data, they must ensure the confidentiality, integrity and availability of data on their network. Network security prevents the security breaches that can expose sensitive information, damage a business's reputation and result in financial losses. Ensuring legitimate access to systems, applications and data also enables business operations and delivery of services and products to customers.

Recommendations

By setting up our security protocols correctly, we can prevent denial of service attacks. For example, IPsec can be used to require that each entity that interacts with your network goes through an authentication procedure. This would prevent hackers from randomly sending thousands or millions of requests to a server in a denial-of-service attack because they wouldn't be able to access the server in the first place.

Network security encompasses all the steps taken to protect the integrity of a computer network and the data within it. Successful network security strategies employ multiple security solutions to protect users and organisations from malware and cyber attacks.

Strong security often involves using multiple approaches, known as *layered security* or *defence in depth* to give organisations as many security controls as possible. Other than access control covered by SFTP, some other commonly used types of network security tools and software include:

- **Antivirus and anti-malware.** These are software designed to detect, remove or prevent viruses and malware from infecting a computer and consequently a network.
- **Application security.** It is crucial to monitor and protect applications that organisations use to run their businesses. This is true whether an organisation creates that application or buys it, as modern malware threats often target Open Source code and containers that organisations use to build software and applications.
- **Behavioural analytics.** This method analyses network behaviour and automatically detects and alerts organisations to abnormal activities.
- **Data loss prevention (DLP).** These tools monitor data in use, in motion and at rest to detect and prevent data breaches. DLP often classifies the most important and at-risk data and trains employees in best practices to protect that data. For instance, not sending important files as attachments in emails is one such best practice.
- **Email security.** Email is one of the most vulnerable points in a network. Employees become victims of phishing and malware attacks when they click on email links that secretly download malicious software. Email is also an insecure method of sending files and sensitive data that employees unwittingly engage in.

-
- **Firewall.** Software or firmware inspects incoming and outgoing traffic to prevent unauthorised network access. Firewalls are some of the most widely used security tools and are positioned in multiple areas on the network. Next-generation firewalls offer increased protection against application-layer attacks and advanced malware defence with inline deep packet inspection.
 - **Intrusion detection system (IDS).** An IDS detects unauthorised access attempts and flags them as potentially dangerous but does not remove them. An IDS and an intrusion prevention system (IPS) are often used in combination with a firewall.
 - **Intrusion prevention system.** IPSes are designed to prevent intrusions by detecting and blocking unauthorised attempts to access a network.
 - **Sandboxing.** This approach lets organisations scan for malware by opening a file in an isolated environment before granting it access to the network. Once opened in a sandbox, the organisation can observe whether the file acts in a malicious way or shows any indications of malware.
 - **Security information and event management (SIEM).** This security management technique logs data from applications and network hardware and monitors for suspicious behavior. When an anomaly is detected, the SIEM system alerts the organisation and takes other appropriate action.
 - **Software-defined perimeter (SDP).** An SDP is a security method that sits on top of the network it protects, concealing it from attackers and unauthorised users. It uses identity criteria to limit access to resources and forms a virtual boundary around networked resources.
 - **Virtual private network (VPN).** A VPN secures the connection from an endpoint to an organization's network. It uses tunnelling protocols to encrypt information sent over a less secure network. Remote access VPNs let employees access their company network remotely.
 - **Zero-trust network access.** Similar to network access control, zero-trust network access only grants a user the access they must have to do their job. It blocks all other permissions.

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