# Lec 8: DEP

**IS561: Binary Code Analysis and Secure Software Systems** 

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# **Memory Corruption**

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## **Two Ways to Corrupt Memory**

- Buffer overflow.
- Format string.

Integer overflows can lead to a memory corruption (but not always).



#### **Control-Flow Hijack**

Memory corruption can lead to a control flow hijack. There are two things to consider:

- How to redirect the control?
  - e.g., overwriting a control data
- Where to redirect the control?
  - e.g., injected shellcode




#### **Food for Thought**

Can we execute arbitrary commands by exploiting a memory corruption bug, but without hijacking the control flow?

# **Memory Defense**





## **Prevention vs. Mitigation**



## **Prevention vs. Mitigation**

- Preventing buffer overflows.
  - Buffer overflows will never happen.
- · Mitigating buffer overflows.
  - Buffer overflows will happen, but will be hard to exploit them.



#### **Can One Prevent Buffer Overflows?**

Yes. Just do **NOT** use **C/C++**.

#### **Memory-Safe Languages**

```
F#, OCaml, Haskell, Python, etc.
>>> x = array('I', [1, 2, 3])
>>> x[4]
Traceback (most recent call last):
   File "<stdin>", line 1, in <module>
IndexError: array index out of range
```



## Unfortunately though ...

- C/C++ is still very popular.
- Legacy code is written in C/C++.

Not so easy to *prevent* memory corruption.



## **Unfortunately though ...**

- C/C++ is still very popular.
- Legacy code is written in C/C++.

Not so easy to *prevent* memory corruption. Hence, we'd better *mitigate* it.  $\bigcirc$ 



# **DEP**

#### **Buffer Overflow Mitigation #1: DEP**

Data Execution Prevention $^1 = NX$  (No eXecute).

Stack stores data, but not code. Therefore, we make the stack memory area **non-executable**.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>1</sup>DEP *prevents* data execution, but it does not prevent buffer overflows.



## **DEP Has Many Names**

# AMD Athlon™ Processor Competitive Comparison


FEATURES	AMD ATHLON™ CPU	PENTIUM® 4
Architecture Introduction	2006	2000
Infrastructure	Socket AM2	Socket LGA775
Process Technology	90 nanometer, SOI 65 nanometer, SOI	90 nanometer
64-bit Instruction Set Support	Yes, AMD64 technology	Depends, EM64T on some Pentium® 4 series
Enhanced Virus Protection for Windows® XP SP2*	Yes	Depends



## W ⊕ X (Write XOR eXecute) Policy

- Every page should be either writable or executable, but not both.
- Even though we can put a shellcode to a writable buffer, we cannot execute it if this policy is enabled.

## **Defeating Control Flow Hijack with DEP**





#### **DEP on Stack**

There is a special segment called "PT\_GNU\_STACK" in ELF files, which controls whether the stack should be executable or not. We use the execstack command to change the ELF header to control whether the binary should have an executable stack or not.

```
$ /usr/sbin/execstack -s <filename> ; clear NX flag
$ /usr/sbin/execstack -c <filename> ; set NX flag
$ /usr/sbin/execstack -q <filename> ; query NX flag
```

With NX set on the stack, return-to-stack exploits will fail.

#### But,

DEP does not prevent buffer overflows. It prevents return-to-stack exploits, though.

Any other ways to exploit buffer overflows?



#### **Code-Reuse Attacks**



## **Bypassing DEP**

- We can still hijack the control flow with buffer overflows.
- We can still jump to an arbitrary address of existing code.




#### Code Reuse Attack #1: Return-to-LIBC

- LIBC is a standard library that is used by every C program.
  - e.g., printf is a LIBC function.
- Many useful functions in LIBC to execute.
  - exec family: execl, execlp, execle, ...
  - system
  - mprotect
  - mmap



#### Return-to-LIBC



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00000




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#### Question

Can we call multiple LIBC functions? For example, suppose we want to call setuid first, and then call execve.

#### **Chaining Two Function Calls**






#### Question


Can we call multiple LIBC functions that require more than one parameter?



#### ESP Lifting: open-read



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#### Generalization of Idea

The idea of jumping into a code block that ends with "ret" instruction<sup>2</sup> becomes the primitive of *ROP* (Return-Oriented Programming).

```
pop <reg>
pop <reg>
ret
```

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>2</sup>Such a code block is often referred to as a ROP *gadget*.



# **ROP**



#### Code Reuse Attack #2: ROP

Formally introduced by Hovav in CCS 20073

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>3</sup>The Geometry of Innocent Flesh on the Bone: Return-to-libc without Function Calls (on the x86)


#### **Motivation of ROP**

Return-to-LIBC requires LIBC function calls, but can we spawn a shell without the use of LIBC functions?

- · Different versions of LIBC.
- LIBC may not be used at all.
- Some functions in LIBC can be excluded.



## Return (ret) Chaining





#### Return (ret) Chaining

```
add eax, ebx
mov ecx, eax
inc ecx
mov edx, 42
```

```
C pop edx ret
```

Return chaining allows arbitrary computation!

#### **ROP Example**

Goal: Modify ptr to be 0x42424242 with ROP.

mov [ptr], 0x42424242

#### **ROP Example (cont'd)**

It is very unlikely to find a gadget: mov [ptr], 0x42424242; ret. So, we have to connect several gadgets to construct the logic.

pop eax ret	Assign the ptr to eax
pop ebx ret	Assign 0x42424242 to ebx
mov [eax], ebx ret	Modify the ptr



#### Question

Can we encode a conditional branch with ROP? Suppose we want to encode the following logic:

if 
$$(eax < 42)$$
 then  $(ecx \leftarrow 0)$  else  $(ecx \leftarrow 1)$ 



## Conditional Jumps in ROP (3 Steps)

- 1. Modify (set/clear) flags of interest.
- 2. Transfer the flag from EFLAGS to a general-purpose register.
- 3. Use the flag of interest to perturb the stack pointer conditionally<sup>4</sup>.

#### Several useful tricks:

- pushf instruction pushes EFLAGS to the stack.
- sub eax, 42 should result in CF = 1 when eax < 42.</li>
- The result of adc cl, cl when ecx = 0 is the same as CF.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>4</sup>Stack pointer is a PC in ROP.




## **ROP Conditional Jump Example**

```
1. neg eax; ret
2. pop ecx; pop edx; ret
3. adc cl. cl: ret
4. mov [edx]. ecx: ret
5. pop ebx; ret
6. neg dword [ebx+0x5e]; pop edi; pop ebp; mov esi, esi; ret
7. pop esi; ret
8. pop ecx; pop ebx; ret
9. and [ecx], esi; rol byte ptr [ebx+0x5e5b6cc4].0x5d; ret
10. add esp, [ecx]; add byte ptr [eax], al; add byte ptr[eax], cl; ret
```



#### **ROP Workflow**

- 1. Disassemble binary.
- 2. Identify useful gadgets.
  - e.g., an instruction sequence that ends with ret is useful.
  - e.g., an instruction sequence that ends with jmp reg is also useful.
- 3. Assemble gadgets to perform some computation.
  - e.g., spawning a shell





## Many Gadgets in Regular Binaries?

x86 instructions have their lengths ranging from 1 byte to 18 bytes, i.e., it uses *variable-length encoding*.

Therefore, there can be both intended and unintended gadgets in x86 binaries.



## Disassembling x86

8d 4c 24 04 83 e4 f0



```
lea ecx, [esp+0x4]
and esp, 0xfffffff0
```

What if we disassemble the code from the second byte (4c)?



## Disassembling x86

8d 4c 24 04 83 e4 f0



dec esp and al, 0x4 and esp, 0xfffffff0

Totally different, but still valid instructions!



#### **Unintended Instructions**

- One can disassemble from any address in a memory page.
- We can indeed find lots of *unintended ROP gadgets* using this idea.



## **Example: Unintended ret Instruction**

#### Compiler-intended instructions:

```
e8 05 ff ff ff call 0x8048330
81 c3 59 12 00 00 add ebx, 0x1259
```

#### If we disassemble the same binary starting from the second byte:

```
05 ff ff ff 81 add eax, 0x81ffffffii c3 ret.
```



## Galileo Algorithm: Finding ROP Gadgets

```
Algorithm Galileo:
  create a node, root, representing the ret instruction;
  place root in the trie:
  for pos from 1 to textseg len do:
     if the byte at pos is c3, i.e., a ret instruction, then:
       call BuildFrom(pos. root):
Procedure BuildFrom(index pos, instruction parent insn):
  for step from 1 to max insn len do:
     if bytes[(pos - step) ... (pos - 1)] decode as a valid instruction insn then:
       ensure insn is in the trie as a child of parent insn:
       if insn isn't boring then:
          call BuildFrom(pos - step. insn):
```



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Procedure BuildFrom(index pos, instruction parent insn):
  for step from 1 to max insn len do:
     if bytes[(pos - step) ... (pa
                                                                         then:
                                 1. The insn is a leave instruction.
       ensure insn is in the ti
                                 2. The insn is pop ebp.
       if insn isn't boring the
                                 3. The insn is a unconditional jump.
          call BuildFrom(pos
```



## **Program Size May Matter**

Larger code  $\rightarrow$  More chance to get useful gadgets.

Schwartz et al.<sup>5</sup> show that 100KB was enough to successfully create exploits for 80% of the binaries in /usr/bin.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>5</sup>Q: Exploit Hardening Made Easy, USENIX Security 2011.



#### **ROP without ret?**

Return-oriented Programming without Returns, CCS 2010.

```
pop eax; jmp [eax]
```

#### Question

How can we mitigate code reuse attacks (ROP)?



## **Detecting ROP**

Basic idea: If ret instructions are frequently used within a short amount of time, then it is likely to be a ROP attack.

- Transparent ROP Exploit Mitigation Using Indirect Branch Tracing, USENIX Security 2013.
- ROPecker: A Generic and Practical Approach for Defending Against ROP Attacks, NDSS 2014.

## **Detecting ROP**

Basic idea: If ret instructions are frequently used within a short amount of time, then it is likely to be a ROP attack.

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But such a simple idea suffers from both false negatives and false positives:

 Size Does Matter: Why Using Gadget-Chain Length to Prevent Code-Reuse Attacks is Hard, *USENIX Security 2014*.




#### Other Defenses?

We will discuss further throughout this course.



#### **DEP and Code Reuse Attacks Timeline**





#### **Summary**

- NX (or DEP) is one way to mitigate control flow hijacks.
- Code reuse attacks allow an attacker to bypass DEP.
- Many mitigation techniques are proposed for code reuse attacks, too, which will be covered next.

# **Question?**



#### **Exercise**

Find a syscall ROP gadget from binaries on your machine. Can you easily spot it?