

The Dynamics of Technology Transfer: Multinational Investment in China and Rising Global Competition*

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Abstract

US multinationals formed joint ventures in China for market access and lower labor costs. However, these ventures transfer technology to Chinese firms, fueling future competition. While individual firms weigh the risks to their own profits, they disregard the negative impact on other US firms and the broader economy, resulting in an over-investment that may reduce the US welfare. In our empirical analysis, industries with more joint ventures in China show positive spillovers to Chinese firms but negative outcomes for firms in the US. We develop a two-country model with oligopolistic competition, innovation, and joint ventures. For the US, the short-run gains from joint ventures are outweighed by long-run losses due to rising Chinese competition. Joint ventures benefit large US firms at the expense of small firms and the real wages of workers. A ban on joint ventures since 1999 would have boosted US welfare by 1.2 percent.

Keywords: Technology transfer, technology diffusion, innovation, competition, joint venture, foreign direct investment

JEL Codes: F23, O25, O33

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1. INTRODUCTION

Intensifying economic rivalry between the United States (US) and China has heightened scrutiny of China's economic policies and business practices. For instance, China has long mandated that multinational enterprises (MNEs) transfer technology as a condition for market access. This often involved the formation of joint ventures, as such arrangements were considered more conducive to technology transfer than other forms of foreign direct investment (FDI). This practice has been criticized by some as a form of intellectual property theft and has also been cited as a factor exacerbating the trade imbalance between the US and China. In light of these concerns, the US has imposed restrictions on outward FDI in critical technologies.¹

However, US firms opted to form joint ventures with Chinese partners voluntarily to gain access to the Chinese market and cheaper labor, even with the risk of technology leakage. This raises a crucial question: What is the economic justification for government intervention when MNEs voluntarily engage in such partnerships? US firms recognize that by establishing joint ventures, they will facilitate technology diffusion that enhances the productivity of their Chinese partners and other local firms, thereby intensifying global competition. However, they do not care about the profit losses that other US firms will suffer from intensified global competition. As a result, this may lead to an over-investment in joint ventures and excessive technology transfer to China from the perspective of what is socially optimal for the US. Despite this seemingly straightforward economic logic, this specific mechanism has not been formally explored in the literature. This gap presents a significant opportunity to provide novel insights.²

Our paper makes two primary contributions. First, we provide empirical evidence of the technology diffusion and competition effects of joint ventures into China. A novel finding is

¹"As companies negotiate the terms of the joint venture, the foreign side may be asked—or required—to transfer its technology in order to finalize the partnership . . . [F]oreign companies have limited leverage in the negotiation if they wish to access the market. Although this type of technology transfer may not be explicitly mandated in a Chinese law or regulation, it is often an unwritten rule for market access." ([Office of the U.S. Trade Representative, 2018](#)). For example, the CHIPS and Science Act of 2022 prohibits US government funding recipients from making certain investments in China.

²On FDI and technology transfer to China, a former Tesla executive said: "In this game, one American company gets to win. They don't care if all their US competitors lose. It's actually better for them. But on the other side, all the Chinese companies win. They all get to step up and create a massive market where none previously existed." [McGee \(2025, p.283\)](#)

that US firms in industries with greater joint venture activity in China experienced more pronounced negative outcomes. Second, we develop a two-country endogenous growth model where oligopolistic firms strategically determine their innovation and joint venture decisions, and we analyze the full dynamics of the model. Our quantitative analysis demonstrates that, from a US social welfare perspective, the market equilibrium leads to an excessive number of joint ventures.

For our empirical analysis, we constructed a dataset by integrating firm-level balance sheet data from China's National Bureau of Statistics, patent data, and ownership structure information from the Orbis database. Data for US firms were sourced from Compustat. This combined dataset allows us to document three key empirical findings.

First, we find *direct* positive spillovers from MNEs to their Chinese joint venture partners. Using an event study design, we matched Chinese parent firms that established joint ventures with MNEs (the treated group) with a control group of firms that never formed such relationships, using propensity score matching. Following the formation of these joint ventures, the Chinese parent firms experienced significant growth in sales, capital, and exports. Furthermore, their patenting activities became more similar to those of their MNE partners, indicating a direct diffusion of technology between partners.

Second, we find evidence of *indirect* spillovers to other Chinese firms. In industries with higher levels of FDIs, including both joint ventures and wholly foreign-owned enterprises, even Chinese firms that were not part of a joint venture grew faster and became more technologically advanced.

Third, and most importantly, we find that in industries with greater FDI into China, US firms experienced more negative outcomes in terms of sales, employment, investment, and innovation. We provide both correlational and instrumental variable (IV)-based evidence for these findings.

For the quantitative analysis, we develop a two-country model with endogenous technological change, where oligopolistic firms make strategic decisions on innovation and joint ventures. In each industry, the market structure consists of a leader and a fringe firm in each country. All firms produce differentiated varieties, which they sell in both their domestic and foreign markets. While firms possess market power within their specific industry, the economy features a continuum of industries, ensuring that no single firm can influence ag-

gregate prices or quantities. Leaders can enhance their productivity through innovation. In addition, US leaders have the option to establish joint ventures in China, partnering with their Chinese counterpart in the same industry. These ventures enable US firms to bypass trade costs and utilize lower-cost Chinese labor for production. The surplus generated from these joint ventures is then divided between the two leader firms via Nash bargaining.

Even without joint ventures, the model allows for the stochastic diffusion of technology both within and between countries, acknowledging that joint ventures are not the sole channel of technology transfer. The establishment of a joint venture in China increases the probability of technology diffusion from the US leader firm to its Chinese counterpart, a feature consistent with our empirical finding of direct spillovers. Consequently, the surplus from a joint venture includes not only the flow profit of the venture but also the value derived from the increased probability of technology diffusion to the Chinese leader firm. Additionally, Chinese fringe firms, which are not involved in any joint ventures by design, benefit indirectly. This is because the joint venture firm itself represents an additional source of technology diffusion within the industry, and the Chinese leader firm is likely to achieve higher productivity after forming the joint venture. This mechanism aligns with our empirical finding of indirect spillovers.

The entry of a new joint venture firm immediately intensifies competition within the industry. The ongoing stochastic diffusion of technology to Chinese leader and fringe firms intensifies this competitive pressure over time. The US leader takes these competition effects into account when deciding whether to form a joint venture. It also captures a portion of the joint venture's profit flow and the spillover benefits to the Chinese leader through the bargaining process. However, the US leader does not account for the negative competition effects on its domestic competitor, the US fringe firm. Our third empirical finding serves as a manifestation of this negative competition effect.

We solve for the model's transitional dynamics, tracing the economy from an initial state where Chinese firms have lower productivity than their US counterparts, toward a balanced growth path. We calibrate the model to match key empirical moments observed along this transition path. Notably, we infer the parameters governing technology diffusion directly from the regression coefficients presented as evidence of spillovers in our empirical analysis.

US leaders benefit from joint ventures in the short run through lower trade costs for

serving the Chinese market and reduced labor costs. They also partially capture the value of technology transfer to Chinese leader firms via bargaining. Over time, however, Chinese firms catch up faster due to the technology diffusion facilitated by these joint ventures, and the heightened competition negatively affects US leaders' long-run profits. Nonetheless, the present discounted value of US leaders' profits is higher with joint ventures—otherwise, they would not choose to invest in them. For US fringe firms, the joint ventures of leader firms have a purely negative effect on their profits through intensified competition from China. Because US leader firms do not internalize this negative effect on their domestic competitors, there may be an excessive number of joint ventures relative to the US social optimum. This result crucially depends on the assumption that fringe firms produce positive quantities in equilibrium. If we were to follow the common assumption in the literature that fringe firms only pin down limit pricing but do not produce, US leaders would take into account the full negative effect of joint ventures on the industry. This would make it unclear whether an over-investment in joint ventures in China would occur.

Joint ventures create two opposing effects on the innovation efforts of US leaders. On the one hand, the increased probability of technology diffusion to China implies that profits from successful innovations are smaller and shorter-lived, which can reduce innovation incentives. On the other hand, the option to form a joint venture gives US leaders a greater incentive to innovate because innovation increases their potential profits from joint ventures and the fees they can receive from Chinese leaders via bargaining. In our quantitative analysis, the former effect dominates in the medium to long run, leading US leaders to innovate less when presented with the joint venture option. For Chinese leaders, technology diffusion serves as a substitute for their own innovation efforts, so they also innovate less when a joint venture is established.

Furthermore, in our model, the value and, consequently, the likelihood of a US leader forming a joint venture are greater when the US-China technology gap is wider. This theoretical prediction is confirmed by our empirical data. Because joint ventures reduce the technology gap between US and Chinese firms through technology diffusion, they have the effect of eroding the US's comparative advantage and worsening its terms of trade, thereby reducing the gains from trade for the US.

These effects on innovation and comparative advantage help us understand the general

equilibrium implications of joint ventures, which individual firms, by their nature, ignore. As US leaders shift a portion of their production to China, the reduced domestic labor demand leads to lower wages in the United States. Although joint ventures and the technology diffusion they engender do reduce the price of goods, this reduction is not sufficient to prevent a decline in the real wage. Two key reasons for this outcome are the reduced innovation and the diminished gains from trade discussed above. A final contributing factor is that joint venture decisions are driven not only by production cost savings but also by the fees US leaders collect from the stochastic transfer of technology.

To compute the welfare consequences of joint ventures, we analyze the effect of a policy that prohibits US firms from forming joint ventures with Chinese firms, effective from 1999—the start of our dataset. We find that this prohibition increases US welfare by 1.2 percent in units of permanent consumption. For the US, leaders' profits fall by 22 percent in present value terms, while fringe firms' profits rise by 4.9 percent. Although the total profit of the corporate sector declines, the real wage increases by 2.9 percent due to higher labor demand in the US, which drives the overall welfare gain. The ban has a transitory negative effect, as US firms can no longer immediately benefit from lower wages and reduced trade costs in China. However, this effect is outweighed by medium-run benefits, as the United States maintains its technological advantage over China for longer, driven by less technology leakage and higher innovation efforts.

When the US prohibits joint ventures, Chinese leader firms compensate for the reduced technology diffusion by increasing their own innovation efforts. However, this policy substantially delays China's productivity growth and reduces China's welfare by 10.3 percent in units of permanent consumption. In China, the profits of both leaders and fringe firms, as well as the real wage, are all lower without joint ventures from the United States.

In an effort to isolate the source of over-investment in joint ventures, we consider an alternative scenario in which US leader firms are required to compensate fringe firms for losses incurred due to joint ventures. That is, US leaders are compelled to internalize the negative effects of joint ventures on the profits of their domestic competitors. With such multilateral bargaining, significantly fewer joint ventures are formed. Moreover, in this setting, a complete ban on joint ventures actually decreases US welfare. This indicates that the failure to account for the profit losses of other US firms is a key source of the market inefficiency, and

that coordinated joint venture decisions can deliver a higher welfare level for the US than an outright ban would.

In fact, our result does not imply that prohibiting joint ventures would *always* be welfare-enhancing for the US. If new joint ventures were prohibited starting in 2025, a time when the US-China technology gap is significantly smaller than in 1999, the competitive effects from direct and indirect spillovers would be less pronounced. This would reduce the market inefficiency associated with joint ventures. In this specific scenario, the loss of short-run gains from joint ventures is relatively large, and the medium-run boost to innovation efforts is sufficiently small that a policy of banning joint ventures would, in fact, reduce US welfare.

Related literature. First, our paper contributes to the literature on trade and innovation with knowledge diffusion across countries (e.g., [Grossman and Helpman, 1993](#); [Atkeson and Burstein, 2010](#); [Impullitti, 2010](#); [Sampson, 2023](#); [Buera and Oberfield, 2020](#); [Perla et al., 2021](#); [Cai et al., 2022](#); [Santacreu, 2024](#); [Sui, 2025](#); [Bai et al., 2025](#); [de Souza et al., 2025](#)). Our model builds on [Akcigit et al. \(2023\)](#) and [Choi and Shim \(2024\)](#), where firms compete with foreign firms through innovation but also benefit from knowledge diffusion. We extend this framework by incorporating the idea that multinational production facilitates knowledge diffusion from advanced to developing countries (e.g., [Burstein and Monge-Naranjo, 2009](#); [Holmes et al., 2015](#)). [Milicevic et al. \(2025\)](#) study endogenous knowledge spillovers across countries through FDI and how FDI can facilitate R&D coordination. [Akcigit et al. \(2024\)](#) discuss technology leakages in the context of Chinese venture capital investment in the US and national security concerns. [Lam \(2024\)](#) focuses on technology leakage to China through illegal imitation and studies optimal intellectual property rights protection. Our contribution lies in studying the negative competition effects of multinational activities on other firms through technology leakages and quantitatively analyzing the policy implications. [König et al. \(2022\)](#) examine the dynamic effects of misallocation on TFP growth in China using a closed-economy growth model with innovation and learning from random interactions. We show that joint ventures with MNEs were an important source of learning for Chinese firms.

Second, recent quantitative trade models have studied implications of multinational production on global trade and growth (e.g., [Arkolakis et al., 2018](#); [Garetto et al., 2024](#); [Fan, 2025](#); [Cai and Xiang, 2025](#)). Our model focuses on the interaction between two countries, but

it preserves key ingredients of multinational production such as proximity-concentration trade-offs ([Helpman et al., 2004](#)) and export platforms (e.g. [Ramondo and Rodríguez-Clare, 2013](#); [Tintelnot, 2017](#)). [Ma and Zhang \(2023\)](#) analyze the effects of the quid pro quo policy building on the framework of [Holmes et al. \(2015\)](#). Unlike previous studies, our model highlights the dynamic trade-off between static market gains and technology leakages for MNEs.

Third, our empirical findings contribute to the empirical literature on knowledge diffusion through FDI. Our evidence of the direct effects on Chinese joint venture parent firms is consistent with [Bai et al. \(2020\)](#) and [Jiang et al. \(2024\)](#). Our finding of indirect spillovers to Chinese firms that do not participate in joint ventures is in line with previous papers that document positive spillovers from foreign MNEs to domestic firms in host countries.³ In addition to these findings, we provide evidence on negative competition effects of US MNEs' joint ventures on other US firms.⁴

Finally, this paper relates to the literature on the China shock and the decline of the US manufacturing sector ([Autor et al., 2013](#)). Our empirical results show that, following FDI into China, Chinese firms became more competitive in the global market and US manufacturing firms experienced negative outcomes in terms of sales, employment, and innovation.⁵

2. BACKGROUND AND DATA

2.1 Quid Pro Quo Policy and the US-China Trade War

After decades of isolation, Deng Xiaoping initiated economic reforms and opened China to foreign investment in 1979 with the “Law on Sino-Foreign Equity Joint Ventures” (henceforth referred to as the JV Law). Joint ventures (JVs) were defined as firms with mixed ownership between foreign and Chinese shareholders, with foreign equity shares between 25% and 100%. Firms with foreign equity below 25% were classified as domestic firms, while those

³For example, see [Javorcik \(2004\)](#); [Lu et al. \(2017\)](#); [Alfaro and Chen \(2018\)](#); [Setzler and Tintelnot \(2021\)](#); [Alfaro-Ureña et al. \(2022\)](#) for spillovers from FDI.

⁴This differs from the negative competition effects of MNEs' entry on firms in host countries documented in [Aitken and Harrison \(1999\)](#) and [Bao and Chen \(2018\)](#).

⁵There is mixed evidence on the impact of the China shock on firm innovation. [Bloom et al. \(2016\)](#) find positive impacts on European firms, whereas [Autor et al. \(2020\)](#) find negative impacts on US firms.

with 100% foreign equity were registered as wholly foreign-owned enterprises (WFOEs). A key difference between JVs and WFOEs is ownership and control. WFOEs are 100% owned and controlled by foreign MNEs, granting them full autonomy over operations and decision-making. In contrast, JVs require shared ownership between foreign MNEs and local Chinese partners. Foreign firms were often required to transfer technology to their local partners, and profits from JVs were shared based on equity stakes. Equity shares were strictly regulated, with minimum requirements and maximum caps on foreign MNE ownership.

The quid pro quo policy emerged alongside JVs, requiring foreign MNEs to transfer technologies, capital equipment, know-how, and product lines as part of their equity contribution in exchange for access to China’s large consumer market and abundant labor. From 1979 to 1986, JVs were the only legally permitted form of FDI in China, and WFOEs were gradually allowed in some sectors starting in 1986. Following China’s WTO accession in 2001, the Chinese government introduced a major FDI policy reform, along with tariff liberalization and enhanced intellectual property protections, to comply with WTO obligations. Although explicit technology transfer mandates were banned and JV requirements eased after WTO accession, equity caps and JV requirements persisted in many high-tech sectors. Despite these post-WTO reforms, the quid pro quo policy has been at the center of US-China tensions. US policymakers have criticized it as an unfair trade practice and argue that it has persisted in more implicit forms.⁶

2.2 Data

We construct our main dataset by merging balance sheet, ownership structure, and patent data for Chinese and US manufacturing firms, along with sector-level data, for the 1998–2013 period. All monetary values are in 2007 US dollars. Appendix A has the details.

We obtain the Chinese firm balance sheets from the Annual Survey of Industrial Enterprises, constructed by the National Bureau of Statistics. We have annual data on firm sales, exports, employment, and capital (measured as fixed assets), their affiliated 4-digit 1994 Chinese Industry Classification (CIC) codes, and location for all state-owned and private firms

⁶In its 2017–18 Section 301 investigations, the Office of the United States Trade Representative reported that China implicitly pressured foreign MNEs to form JVs and transfer advanced technologies through both formal regulations and informal administrative barriers. [Holmes et al. \(2015\)](#) also showed that the mandates became implicit but remained in effect. Some described it as “voluntary is the new mandatory” ([McGee, 2025](#)).

with sales exceeding 5 million Renminbi (RMB) before 2010 and 20 million RMB since 2011. To ensure consistency, we apply the 20 million RMB threshold throughout the sample period. The data are representative at the national level, which accounts for 90% of total Chinese manufacturing output. The dataset has information on firm registration types including JVs, WFOEs, state-owned firms, and domestic private firms. In our definition of JVs and WFOEs, we exclude those involving MNEs from Hong Kong, Macao, and Taiwan, given the special economic and regulatory relations between mainland China and these regions. We also use the Chinese Customs Trade Statistics from 2000 to 2013, which has information on firm-level imports and exports at the country-product (HS 8-digit code) level.

We obtain US firm consolidated balance sheet from US Compustat that covers publicly listed firms, including sales, employment, capital (measured as PPEGT), and R&D expenditures. We also obtain each firm's total foreign sales (including both exports and sales from foreign affiliates) from the historical geographic segment data and use this variable as a proxy for exports.⁷ A firm's industry classification follows 4-digit 1987 SIC codes. We aggregate these codes up to 383 4-digit codes for compatibility with the CIC and HS codes.

Although the Annual Survey of Industrial Enterprises identifies whether firms are FDI affiliates or not, it does not have information on their ownership links between Chinese partners and foreign MNEs. To identify these links, we use historical ownership data from the Orbis Global database. We clean the data following [Kalemli-Ozcan et al. \(2024\)](#). We match these ownership linkages with the Chinese firm data using the unified social credit identifier and firm names. The dataset also has information on equity shares of each engaged party.

We obtain patent data for Chinese firms granted by the China National Intellectual Property Administration (CNIPA) from the Google Public Patent Database and for US firms from the United States Patent and Trademark Office (USPTO). Among the three patent types, innovation, application, and appearance design, we include only innovation patents, as is standard in the literature. We construct firm-level counts of yearly new patents and patent stock across 875 3-digit International Patent Classification codes.

We obtain sector-level data for US manufacturing from the NBER-CES Manufacturing Industry Database and bilateral trade data from Comtrade.

⁷According to SFAS No. 131, US publicly-listed firms need to disclose foreign sales when they account for more than 10% of total sales, which is the source of information in the historical segment data.

3. MOTIVATING FACTS

In this section, we present three motivating facts on joint ventures and FDI.

Fact 1. Direct Effects of JV Formation on Chinese Partner Firms

To examine the direct effects, we compare a treated group (Chinese firms that formed JVs with foreign MNEs) to a control group (those that did not form any JVs) before and after they formed their first JV relationship. To mitigate endogeneity due to selection, we construct the control group using propensity score matching. Each year, firms that formed JVs serve as treated observations, while those that never formed JVs serve as control observations. Pooling these observations across all years, we estimate the propensity score, the probability of forming a JV, using a logit model with firm-size related observables as covariates. These observables include log sales, log capital, log employment, dummies of exporting and positive patent stock, inverse hyperbolic sine transformation of exports and patent stock, and year fixed effects. For each treated firm, we match up to 4 control firms from the same year and 2-digit industry with the closest propensity score, allowing replacements so that a control firm can be matched to multiple treated firms.

The matching procedure results in 176 matches with 176 and 692 unique treated and control group firms. The matched treated and control groups are well-balanced across observables, including various size measures, labor productivity, patenting activity, and exporting status (Appendix Table B1). Furthermore, a balance test—regressing the treatment dummy on these pre-event observables—confirms that none of these observables significantly predict treatment status (Appendix Table B2).

Using the constructed matches, we estimate the following event study specification:

$$y_{imt} = \sum_{\tau=-5}^7 \beta_{\tau} \left(D_{mt}^{\tau} \times \mathbb{1}[\text{JV Partner}_{it}] \right) + \delta_{im} + \delta_{mt} + \varepsilon_{imt} \quad (3.1)$$

where i denotes firm, m match, and t year. D_{mt}^{τ} are event study dummies defined as $D_{mt}^{\tau} \equiv \mathbb{1}[t - \tau = t(m)]$, where $t(m)$ is the event year of match m . $\mathbb{1}[\text{JV Partner}_{it}]$ is a dummy for forming first JVs. We normalize β_{-1} to zero. δ_{im} and δ_{mt} are match-firm and match-year fixed

effects.⁸ ε_{imt} is an error term. Standard errors are two-way clustered at the match and firm levels, which account for mechanical correlations in residuals introduced by matching with replacement, as the same firm may appear multiple times.

We consider three dependent variables: log sales, inverse hyperbolic sine transformation of exports, and a measure of technological proximity to foreign MNE partners. The first two variables capture firm size and performance in global markets. The technological proximity variable measures the extent to which Chinese partners became technologically similar to their foreign MNE partners after forming JVs. If Chinese firms acquired technology from foreign MNEs through joint ventures, we would expect an increase in their technological similarity to these foreign partners over time.

Following the literature, we calculate technological proximity based on cosine similarity using patent data, as patents reflect their technological capabilities:⁹

$$\text{Technological proximity}_{imt} = \frac{F_{imt}^\top F_{\text{MNE}(i),t(m)}}{(F_{imt}^\top F_{imt})^{0.5} (F_{\text{MNE}(i),t(m)}^\top F_{\text{MNE}(i),t(m)})^{0.5}}. \quad (3.2)$$

$F_{imt} = (p_{i1t}, \dots, p_{iKt})$ is a vector where the k -th element represents Chinese firm i 's patent stock (under the Chinese patent system) in k -th technological fields within match m and year t .¹⁰ Similarly, $F_{\text{MNE}(i),t(m)}$ represents foreign MNEs' patent stock from the USPTO, measured at the event year $t(m)$, making it fixed over time. Because $F_{\text{MNE}(i),t(m)}$ is fixed over time, any changes in the technological proximity reflect only Chinese partners' patenting activities. We use different patenting systems for Chinese partners and foreign MNEs because Chinese firms rarely patent with the USPTO, while the US patent system serves as a better measure for the technological frontier of MNEs. Higher values indicate greater technological proximity between Chinese partners and MNEs.


Figure 1 reports the results (see cols. 1-3 of Appendix Table B3 for more details). Four

⁸The specification is fully-stacked event study design that does not suffer from the complications raised in the recent staggered diff-in-diff literature (Roth et al., 2023).

⁹For the proximity measure to be well-defined, we require that both foreign MNEs and Chinese partners to have engaged in patenting activities. Therefore, we restrict our sample of Chinese partners to be those who ever patented in the Chinese patent system and foreign MNEs to those who ever patented at USPTO.

¹⁰When calculating proximity, we assign greater weights to more recent patents by applying an R&D depreciation rate of 0.3 (Li and Hall, 2020). Specifically, we compute F_{imt} as: $F_{imt} = \text{New patent}_{imt} + 0.7 \times F_{im,t-1}$, where New patent_{imt} is a vector of new patents across technological fields. Our results remain robust to alternative depreciation rates ranging from 0 to 0.5. Similar measures have been used in prior studies (e.g. Branstetter, 2006; Akcigit et al., 2016).

Figure 1: Direct Effects of Joint Venture Formation on Chinese Partners



Notes: This figure illustrates the event study estimation results of equation (3.1). 95% confidence intervals are based on standard errors two-way clustered at the match and firm levels. β_{-1} is normalized to zero.

years after forming JVs for the first time, Chinese partners' sales increased by 27%, with improvements in export performance. Furthermore, they became closer to their foreign MNE counterparts technologically. These findings suggest that their improved performance is related to technology transfer and diffusion from foreign MNE partners. Forming JVs also had positive impacts on log capital, log employment, export dummies, cumulative patents and yearly new patents (see cols. 4-8 of Appendix Table B3).

Fact 2. Indirect Positive Spillovers to Chinese Firms

Next, we show suggestive evidence that JVs also benefited other Chinese firms that were not directly involved in JVs. We consider the following long-difference specification for the 1999-2012 period:

$$\Delta y_{fj} = \beta \Delta FDI_{fj} + \vartheta NTRgap_j + \mathbf{X}'_{fj} \gamma + \varepsilon_{fj}, \quad (3.3)$$

where f indexes firms and j 4-digit industry codes. The dependent variable Δy_{fj} is the DHS growth rates (Davis et al., 1998) of firm-level outcomes: $100 \times \frac{y_{fj,12} - y_{fj,99}}{0.5(y_{fj,12} + y_{fj,99})}$. \mathbf{X}_{fj} are observables. All specifications include dummies of state-owned firms and FDI affiliates, and province fixed effects. ε_{fj} is the error term. Regression models are weighted by firms' initial sales. Standard errors are clustered at the 3-digit industry level.

ΔFDI_{fj} measures industry-level total FDI exposure in China. ΔFDI_{fj} is defined as the change in the total sales of all affiliates of FDI (JVs or WFOEs of MNEs from all countries) in

industry j between 1999 and 2012, normalized by total industry j sales in 1998:

$$\Delta FDI_{fj} = \frac{\Delta FDI \text{ sales}_{fj}}{\text{Total sales}_{j,98}} = \frac{\sum_{g \in \mathcal{J}_{(-f)j,12}^{\text{CN}}} \text{Sale}_{gj,12} - \sum_{g \in \mathcal{J}_{(-f)j,99}^{\text{CN}}} \text{Sale}_{gj,99}}{\text{Total sales}_{j,98}}, \quad (3.4)$$

where $\mathcal{J}_{(-f)jt}^{\text{CN}}$ is a set of FDI affiliates in China in industry j in year t .¹¹ We focus on total FDI rather than separating JVs from WFOEs or acquisitions of existing firms, because WFOEs and acquisitions can also generate indirect spillovers. We also include FDI affiliates from all countries in the numerator, since positive spillovers may arise not only from US MNEs but also from those of other countries. To rule out mechanical correlations, we exclude any FDI affiliates related to firm f in the numerator, denoted as $-f$. If f is a Chinese partner, we exclude all JV affiliates in which f holds ownership. If f is a JV affiliate, we exclude all JV affiliates that share the same Chinese parents.

To isolate the role of FDI exposure from changes in trade policies post WTO, we include NTRgap_j that measures reductions in US-China trade policy uncertainty at the industry level due to the granting of Permanent Normal Trade Relations (PNTR) to China, which is correlated with the decline in US manufacturing (Pierce and Schott, 2016).¹²

Table 1 presents the results. In column 1, the dependent variable is sales growth. OLS estimates are positive and statistically significant at the 1% level. A 1 percentage point increase in the FDI exposure in industry j is associated with a 0.09 percentage point higher sales growth rate of a Chinese firm in that industry. In Column 2, we additionally control for industry-level technological trends and include 1-digit industry dummies to absorb technological factors that may influence FDI.¹³ The coefficients remain stable within one standard error of the estimate. In columns 3-10, the FDI exposure is positively correlated with growth in employment, capital, exports, and cumulative patents.¹⁴ The NTR gap had positive effects

¹¹This is a standard industry-level FDI exposure measure in the literature (e.g. Aitken and Harrison, 1999; Lu et al., 2017; Jiang et al., 2024). One issue is the concordance between CIC and SIC codes, as a single 4-digit CIC code often maps to multiple SIC 4-digit codes. Therefore, we first construct the industry-level shock at the SIC 4-digit level, as most data are in SIC codes. Then, for CIC codes with multiple SIC mappings, we take a weighted average. Appendix B.1 provides further details.

¹² NTRgap_j is defined as the increase in US tariffs on Chinese goods in case of a failed annual renewal of China's Normal Trade Relations (NTR) status prior to granting the PNTR.

¹³These controls include 1996 US import penetration, 1993 production worker shares, 1990 computer and high-tech investment shares, and 1-digit industry dummies.

¹⁴The sample size decreases for export and patent outcomes, as for DHS growth to be well-defined, firms must have at least one non-zero value for the outcome at the start or end of the sample period.

Table 1: Indirect Positive Spillovers to Chinese Firms (OLS)

Dep. var.	Δ Sale		Δ Emp.		Δ Capital		Δ Export		Δ Patent	
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)	(10)
ΔFDI_{fj}	8.97*** (1.73)	7.51*** (2.03)	7.30*** (1.40)	7.31*** (1.53)	8.89*** (1.79)	7.28*** (1.82)	19.91*** (3.37)	16.45*** (2.95)	2.53*** (0.87)	1.88*** (0.56)
$NTRgap_j$	-0.08 (0.32)	0.11 (0.34)	0.55* (0.29)	0.66*** (0.25)	0.15 (0.29)	0.20 (0.28)	1.28* (0.73)	1.01 (0.62)	0.55** (0.28)	0.37* (0.22)
Add. ctrl.		✓		✓		✓		✓		✓
Mean dep. var.	79.61	79.61	-7.08	-7.08	38.83	38.83	50.60	50.60	172.28	172.28
# clusters	157	157	157	157	157	157	155	155	155	155
N	14844	14844	14844	14844	14844	14844	8491	8491	6628	6628

Notes: Standard errors, clustered at the CIC-3 digit levels, are reported in parentheses. *: $p < 0.1$; **: $p < 0.05$; ***: $p < 0.01$. This table reports the OLS estimates of equation (3.3). ΔFDI_{fj} is defined in equation (3.4). In columns 1-2, 3-4, 5-6, 7-8, and 9-10, the dependent variables are the DHS growth rates of sales, employment, capital, exports, and cumulative patents of Chinese firms. The NTR gap is potential tariff increases on Chinese goods in the event of a failed annual renewal of China's NTR status. All specifications include dummies of state-owned firms and FDI affiliates, and province fixed effects. The even columns include 1996 US import penetration, 1993 US production worker shares, 1990 US computer and high-tech investment shares, and 1-digit industry dummies. All regressions are weighted by initial sales.

on Chinese firms, although these estimates are less precise.

We further provide evidence that these improvements were associated with improvements in their quality and productivity. The FDI exposure is positively correlated with various proxies for productivity, including DHS growth of the number of exporting/importing products/countries between 2000 and 2013, obtained from the Chinese customs data; growth of wages, a proxy for workers' skills; and dummies of receiving "high-tech" certificate from the government (Appendix Table B4).

There are several potential channels behind these indirect spillovers. First, the results may reflect technology diffusion from MNEs to other firms, such as through workers moving around. In Appendix B.3, we provide additional evidence supporting technology diffusion using patent citation flows. We find that foreign MNEs that formed JVs began to receive more citations from non-partner Chinese firms (Appendix Figure B1). Second, FDI affiliates are likely to generate greater demand and lower supply costs for other Chinese firms (Alfaro-Ureña et al., 2022), thus providing stronger incentives for quality and productivity upgrading. Setzler and Tintelnot (2021) also find similar positive indirect spillovers of FDI in the US.

Table 2: FDI and Negative Outcomes for US Firms (OLS)

Dep. var.	Δ Sale		Δ Emp.		Δ Capital		Δ Export		Δ R&D		Δ Patent	
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)	(10)	(11)	(12)
ΔFDI_{fj}	-11.08*** (2.95)	-10.65*** (1.62)	-10.65*** (3.33)	-9.28*** (2.04)	-12.90*** (2.76)	-10.83*** (2.51)	-7.97* (4.21)	-10.20*** (2.94)	-10.53** (4.25)	-9.48*** (2.67)	-1.21 (1.56)	-1.30 (1.76)
$NTRgap_j$	-1.10 (0.78)	-1.39** (0.65)	-1.01 (0.91)	-1.50** (0.75)	-0.87 (0.89)	-1.34* (0.73)	-1.49 (1.37)	-2.04 (1.35)	-1.45 (0.89)	-2.05*** (0.63)	0.63 (0.43)	0.46 (0.44)
Controls		✓		✓		✓		✓		✓		✓
Mean dep. var.	8.69	8.69	-10.82	-10.82	0.52	0.52	35.91	35.91	6.33	6.33	65.94	65.94
# clusters	105	105	105	105	105	105	101	101	80	80	100	100
N	1017	1017	1017	1017	1017	1017	834	834	525	525	837	837

Notes: Standard errors clustered at the SIC-3 digit levels are reported in parentheses. *: $p < 0.1$; **: $p < 0.05$; ***: $p < 0.01$. This table reports the OLS estimates of equation (3.3) for US firms. ΔFDI_{fj} is defined in equations (3.4). In columns 1-2, 3-4, 5-6, 7-8, 9-10, and 11-12, the dependent variables are DHS growth of US firms' sales, employment, capital, exports, R&D, and cumulative patents between 1999-2012. The NTR gap is potential tariff increases on Chinese goods in the event of a failed annual renewal of China's NTR status. The even columns include the same set of additional controls in Table 1. All regressions are weighted by initial sales.

Fact 3. Negative Outcomes for US Firms

We examine what happened to firms in the US when FDI flows from the US to China. We run the OLS long-difference regression (3.3) between 1999-2012, but for US firms. For US firms, the FDI exposure is defined at the SIC 4 digit levels, measuring the sales growth of the Chinese FDI affiliates in each industry as in equation (3.4). When constructing the FDI exposure, for each US MNE, Chinese FDI affiliates associated with it are excluded from the numerator. Standard errors are clustered at the SIC-3 digit level.

Table 2 reports the results. Column 1 reports the estimate for sales growth, which is significantly negative at the 1% level. The estimate implies that a 1 percentage point increase in the FDI exposure of industry j is associated with a 0.11 percentage point lower sales growth rate over the same period for a US firm in that industry. The result remains stable with the additional controls in column 2. The FDI exposure was also negatively correlated with employment, capital, and export growth, and innovation measures including growth of R&D and the number of cumulative patents.¹⁵ These innovation results are consistent with Autor et al. (2020) who found a negative impact of the China trade shock on US firms' innovation outcomes. One possible interpretation is that FDI from the US to China may have

¹⁵The results remain similar when we exclude from the sample all US firms that engaged in FDI into China (col. 3 of Appendix Table B6).

contributed to the decline of the US manufacturing. In addition, the FDI exposure not only negatively correlates with US firm outcomes but also with the outcomes of firms in other countries, further supporting the idea that FDI into China intensified global competition (Appendix Table B5).

IV Strategy and Robustness Checks for Facts 2 and 3. The OLS estimates for spillovers and negative outcomes for US firms may suffer from endogeneity. To alleviate this concern, we consider two IV strategies. First, we use industry-level changes in FDI by Korean and Japanese MNEs into India as an IV. This exploits push factors driving these countries' FDI into China, which are arguably exogenous to factors specific to the US-China pair. Second, we use changes in industry-level indicators for the FDI regulations based on the Catalogue for the Guidance of Foreign Investment Industries over 1998-2007, an IV first proposed by [Lu et al. \(2017\)](#).¹⁶ Appendix B.2 discusses these two strategies and their identifying assumptions in detail. The IV estimates are larger in magnitude than the OLS estimates. They could be biased if the instruments are correlated with unobserved technological changes. To assess the extent of this potential omitted variable bias, we follow [Borusyak et al. \(2022\)](#) and include observables related to such changes as additional controls. The IV estimates remain stable, suggesting that this bias is unlikely to be a major concern.¹⁷

To summarize, these findings reinforce the inference that FDI from the US to China benefited Chinese firms, even those not involved in joint ventures, but negatively affected US firms over time, as the growth of Chinese firms intensified competition in the global market.

4. THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK

In this section, we develop a two-country growth model with oligopolistic competition and endogenous innovation and joint venture decisions, to study the role of joint ventures (FDI) in the growth of Chinese and US firms and the welfare and policy implications.

¹⁶Since 1995, the Catalogue has provided guidelines for FDI, which were gradually relaxed in 1997, 2002, 2004, and 2007. For example, in 2017, in the automobile industry, Chinese partners' ownership share could not fall below 50%. Airplane manufacturing was restricted to JVs, while rare earth exploration, mining, and processing remained completely closed to FDI. The policy change data come from [Brandt et al. \(2017\)](#).

¹⁷We also conducted additional robustness checks for facts 2 and 3 (see Appendix Table B6). The results remain robust to clustering at the 4-digit industry level, restricting the sample to 1999-2007 (pre-Great Recession), and using employment-based weights.

4.1 Setup

The world consists of two large countries, Home and Foreign $c \in \{H, F\}$, corresponding to the US and China. Time is continuous, $t \in [0, \infty)$. There are two sectors, tradable and non-tradable. The tradable sector comprises a unit mass continuum of products (or industries) $j \in [0, 1]$, with each firm producing a unique variety within each product. Each variety is tradable across countries, subject to iceberg trade costs $\tau^x \geq 1$ —a firm needs to ship τ^x units of varieties to export one unit. As for the non-tradable sector, a representative firm produces a non-tradable good in each country. Each country has a representative household, immobile across countries, who owns all domestic firms and supplies labor inelastically. There is no trade in assets, which rules out international borrowing or lending.

For each product j in the tradable sector, there are three types of firms: leaders (Home and Foreign), fringe firms (Home and Foreign), and JVs (Foreign). JVs can be established through mutual agreements between the leaders from the two countries. We assume that only Home leaders form JVs in Foreign (and not vice versa), so the set of operating firms in Foreign varies by products and over time, while firm composition in Home remains fixed. The sets of firms for product j at time t are $\mathcal{I}_H = \{h, \tilde{h}\}$ for Home and $\mathcal{I}_{Fjt} = \{f, \tilde{f}, v\}$ for Foreign, where h and f are leaders, \tilde{h} and \tilde{f} are fringe firms, and v is a JV. Only JVs have entry and exit margins.

4.2 Household

A representative household in Home maximizes utility subject to a budget constraint,

$$U_{Ht} = \int_t^\infty \exp(-\rho(s-t)) \ln C_{Hs} ds, \quad \text{s.t.} \quad r_{Ht} A_{Ht} + w_{Ht} L_H = P_{Ht} C_{Ht} + T_{Ht} + \dot{A}_{Ht}, \quad (4.1)$$

where C_{Hs} is final consumption good (price index P_{Ht}), $\rho > 0$ is discount rate, r_{Ht} is interest rate, L_H is labor endowment, and w_{Ht} is wage. We take the Home wage as the numeraire. T_{Ht} is lump-sum transfer from the government, A_{Ht} is assets owned by households, and \dot{A}_{Ht} is time derivative of A_{Ht} . The asset is claims to firms' profits. Its Euler equation is, which pins down the interest rate in a no-trade equilibrium: $\frac{\dot{C}_{Ht}}{C_{Ht}} = r_{Ht} - \left(\rho - \frac{\dot{P}_{Ht}}{P_{Ht}} \right)$.

A household has Cobb-Douglas preference over the tradable and non-tradable sector

output (C_{Ht}^T and C_{Ht}^N):

$$C_{Ht} = (C_{Ht}^T)^\beta (C_{Ht}^N)^{1-\beta}, \quad P_{Ht} = \left(\frac{P_{Ht}^T}{\beta} \right)^\beta \left(\frac{P_{Ht}^N}{1-\beta} \right)^{1-\beta}, \quad (4.2)$$

where β denotes the expenditure share of the tradable sector, and P_{Ht}^T and P_{Ht}^N denote the price indices of tradable and non-tradable sector output, respectively.

4.3 Sectors

The tradable sector output is produced by aggregating varieties produced by Home and Foreign firms across products:

$$Y_{Ht}^T = \exp \left(\int_0^1 \ln \left(\mathcal{I}_{jt}^{-\frac{1}{\sigma}} \left(\sum_{i \in \mathcal{I}_H} \psi_i^{\frac{1}{\sigma}} y_{ijt}^{\frac{\sigma-1}{\sigma}} + \sum_{i \in \mathcal{I}_{Fjt}} \psi_i^{\frac{1}{\sigma}} (y_{ijt}^*)^{\frac{\sigma-1}{\sigma}} \right) \right)^{\frac{\sigma}{\sigma-1}} dj \right),$$

where y_{ijt} and y_{ijt}^* are the quantities of varieties produced by domestic and foreign firms indexed by i within product j , with the superscript “*” indicating exported varieties. ψ_i is a demand shifter for each firm. Leaders in both countries and the JV have the same parameter value ($\psi = \psi_h = \psi_f = \psi_v$), while fringe firms have a different common value ($\tilde{\psi} = \psi_{\tilde{h}} = \psi_{\tilde{f}}$), which are normalized such that $\psi + \tilde{\psi} = 1$. Varieties are imperfectly substitutable within products, with the elasticity of substitution $\sigma \in (1, \infty)$. Because we do not want the introduction of a new variety by forming a JV to mechanically increase utility, we neutralize the love of variety by normalizing the product-level aggregator with the sum of all firms’ demand shifters $\sum_{i \in \mathcal{I}_{jt}} \psi_i$, where $\mathcal{I}_{jt} = |\mathcal{I}_H \cup \mathcal{I}_{Fjt}|$ (Benassy, 1996). In the quantitative section, we also present results under the assumption that the love of variety is preserved. The corresponding price index is

$$P_{Ht}^T = \exp \left(\int_0^1 \left(\frac{1}{\sum_{i \in \mathcal{I}_{jt}} \psi_i} \left(\sum_{i \in \mathcal{I}_H} \psi_i p_{ijt}^{1-\sigma} + \sum_{i \in \mathcal{I}_{Fjt}} \psi_i (p_{ijt}^*)^{1-\sigma} \right) \right)^{\frac{1}{1-\sigma}} dj \right),$$

where p_{ijt} and p_{ijt}^* are prices charged by domestic and foreign firms.

A sectoral good in the non-tradable sector is produced by a perfectly-competitive representative firm. Its production function is linear in labor: $Y_{Ht}^N = Z_{Ht}^N L_{Ht}^N$, where Z_{Ht}^N is

exogenous productivity, which grows at rate g^N . With perfect competition, $P_{Ht}^N = \frac{w_{Ht}}{Z_{Ht}^N}$.

4.4 Firms

Production and Market Structure. A firm indexed by i produces a variety within product j using a production function that is linear in labor: $\mathcal{Y}_{ijt} = z_{ijt}l_{ijt}$, where z_{ijt} denotes productivity and l_{ijt} labor inputs. Because its output can be sold in both markets, it is subject to the market clearing condition: $\mathcal{Y}_{ijt} = y_{ijt} + \tau^x y_{ijt}^*$.

Within each product, the two leaders (Home and Foreign) and the JV (if established) engage in Bertrand competition, charging variable markups over their marginal costs. With the CES aggregator, their markups become a function of their market shares ([Atkeson and Burstein, 2008](#)). Home leaders' prices in Home and Foreign markets are

$$p_{hjt} = \frac{1 - \frac{\sigma-1}{\sigma}s_{hjt}}{\frac{\sigma-1}{\sigma}(1 - s_{hjt})} \frac{w_{Ht}}{z_{hjt}} \quad \text{and} \quad p_{hjt}^* = \frac{1 - \frac{\sigma-1}{\sigma}s_{hjt}^*}{\frac{\sigma-1}{\sigma}(1 - s_{hjt}^*)} \frac{\tau^x w_{Ht}}{z_{hjt}}, \quad (4.3)$$

where s_{hjt} and s_{hjt}^* are their market shares in Home and Foreign, respectively. Their operating profits in Home and Foreign are given by

$$\pi_{hjt} = \frac{s_{hjt}}{\sigma - (\sigma - 1)s_{hjt}} P_{Ht}^T C_{Ht}^T \quad \text{and} \quad \pi_{hjt}^* = \frac{s_{hjt}^*}{\sigma - (\sigma - 1)s_{hjt}^*} P_{Ft}^T C_{Ft}^T. \quad (4.4)$$

The total operating profits is the sum in both markets: $\Pi_{hjt} = \pi_{hjt} + \pi_{hjt}^*$.

Unlike the other types of firms, we assume that fringe firms charge monopolistically competitive constant markups. Their prices are $p_{\tilde{h}jt} = \frac{\sigma}{\sigma-1} \frac{w_{Ht}}{z_{\tilde{h}jt}}$ and $p_{\tilde{h}jt}^* = \frac{\sigma}{\sigma-1} \frac{\tau^x w_{Ht}}{z_{\tilde{h}jt}}$ and their operating profits are $\pi_{\tilde{h}jt} = \frac{1}{\sigma} p_{\tilde{h}jt}^{1-\sigma} P_{Ht}^T C_{Ht}^T$ and $\pi_{\tilde{h}jt}^* = \frac{1}{\sigma} (p_{\tilde{h}jt}^*)^{1-\sigma} P_{Ft}^T C_{Ft}^T$. Fringe firms can be interpreted as a continuum of atomistic, homogeneous firms whose total mass is 1.

Innovation. Leaders (both Home and Foreign) can improve productivity through successive innovations. They choose the Poisson arrival rate of innovation, x_{ijt} , subject to the following convex cost function:

$$h_{ijt}^r = \alpha_{cr} \frac{(x_{ijt})^\gamma}{\gamma}, \quad \gamma > 1$$

where h_{ijt}^r is R&D workers employed by firm i , and α_{cr} is a parameter that governs the scale of innovation costs in country c . Conditional on R&D investment, a firm's productivity improves with rate x_{ijt} according to $z_{ij,t+\Delta t} = \lambda \times z_{ijt}$, where $\lambda > 1$ denotes the step size of productivity improvement. Fringe firms do not innovate. Their productivity improves only via technology diffusion from domestic leaders within products.

Joint Venture. In our model, JVs are the only form of FDI, and we do not separately model acquisitions of existing firms or the creation of WFOEs. A Home leader may collaborate with the Foreign leader in the same product category to establish a JV in Foreign, which produces a new variety. The JV employs Foreign labor for production. It avoids trade costs when selling in Foreign but incurs trade costs when exporting back to Home.¹⁸ Home leaders' incentives to form a JV increase with Foreign market size, wage differentials, and trade costs, capturing the proximity-concentration trade-off (Helpman et al., 2004).

The JV firm's productivity is given by $z_{vjt} = \frac{z_{hjt}}{\tau^z}$, where $\tau^z > 1$ represents a productivity loss associated with multinational production, as in Arkolakis et al. (2018). This loss reflects various barriers MNEs face when operating in a foreign economic and regulatory environment. The JV does not engage in innovation, but its productivity z_{vjt} improves passively over time as its Home leader's productivity z_{hjt} rises through innovation.¹⁹

We assume that JVs maximize their own profits rather than jointly optimizing total profits with their parent firms.²⁰ A Home leader receives a κ fraction of the JV's total profits Π_{vjt} , while the Foreign leader retains the remaining $1 - \kappa$ fraction. This assumption follows the Chinese JV Law which required MNEs and Chinese partners to share JV profits in proportion to their equity stakes.

A Home leader chooses the Poisson arrival rate of an opportunity to form a JV, d_{hjt} , with the following convex cost function:

$$h_{hjt}^d = \alpha_{Hd} \frac{(d_{hjt})^\gamma}{\gamma}, \quad \gamma > 1,$$

¹⁸Because JVs can export back to Home, our model also captures the idea that Home leaders may use JVs as export platforms to serve their own markets by leveraging lower labor costs abroad (e.g. Tintelnot, 2017).

¹⁹The fact that Home leader's own innovation improves productivity of own JV aligns with Bilir and Morales (2020), who study productivity spillovers from MNE headquarters' R&D investments to foreign affiliates.

²⁰This can be micro-founded through an agency problem, where the manager of the JV maximizes only the profit of the JV, rather than the total profits in conjunction with its parent firms.

where α_{Hd} governs the scale of the cost, and h_{hjt}^d represents the labor employed for JV establishment. We assume that JV costs have the same curvature parameter as innovation costs due to the lack of information on the costs of setting up JVs.²¹ h_{hjt}^d captures expenses for training local managers or legal processing costs associated with setting up a new firm.

With successful rate of d_{hjt} , Home and Foreign leaders engage in a Nash bargaining, which determines the one-time fee C_{jt} that the Home leader pays (or receives, if negative), which will be detailed in the next subsection. This fee ensures mutual gains for both Home and Foreign leaders, with the surplus shared according to their respective bargaining power.²² Once established, a JV operates until it exits exogenously at rate χ .

Technology Diffusion. There are three types of technology diffusion. First is direct diffusion through JVs, between the two partners of each JV. While operating, the lagging partner (Home or Foreign leader) directly learns from its more advanced partner, catching up to that partner's productivity with Poisson intensity ϕ , capturing fact 1 in Section 3.²³

The second is within-country technology diffusion. Fringe firms catch up with the domestic leader's productivity level with Poisson intensity δ^D .²⁴ We assume δ^D is the same in both Home and Foreign. JVs also indirectly benefit Foreign fringe firms through this within-country diffusion, as in fact 2.

The third is between-country diffusion. With Poisson intensity of δ^F , the lagging leader within product j catches up to the productivity of the advanced leader. δ^F captures knowledge diffusion between countries through channels other than JVs.²⁵

²¹In principle, we could allow for two different parameters for these curvatures. To calibrate the JV cost curvature, we would require information on the costs of setting up a JV, which is rarely available in the data.

²²This one-time fee can be viewed as a generalization of fixed/sunk costs, typically assumed in the FDI literature. The amounts of these sunk costs and the party that bears these costs are determined endogenously through the Nash bargaining between Home and Foreign leaders, based on technology gaps. Because Home leaders establish JVs only when their additional profits exceed the one-time fee, and because JV formation is probabilistic nature, our model accounts for the extensive margin of JVs as observed in the data.

²³Such "immediate" catch-up captures the concept of *advantage of backwardness* and is a common assumption in the literature, for example, Aghion et al. (2001), Akcigit et al. (2024), and Sui (2025).

²⁴Previous papers have assumed similar within-country diffusion (e.g. Lucas and Moll, 2014; Perla and Tonetti, 2014; König et al., 2022).

²⁵For example, see Buera and Oberfield (2020) and de Souza et al. (2025) for knowledge diffusion through international trade, and Santacreu (2024) and Choi and Shim (2024, 2025) for diffusion via formal licensing.

4.5 Equilibrium

In this section, we define a Markov Perfect Equilibrium of the model, where firms' strategies depend only on payoff-relevant state variables.

State Variable. The technology gap between the Home and Foreign leaders in product j can be expressed as

$$\frac{z_{hjt}}{z_{fjt}} = \lambda^{m_{jt}^F}. \quad (4.5)$$

$m_{jt}^F \in \{-\bar{m}, \dots, 0, \dots, \bar{m}\}$ is the size of the technology gap. $m_{jt}^F > 0$ implies that the Home leader has higher productivity than the Foreign leader. \bar{m} and $-\bar{m}$ are large but exogenously given upper and lower bounds of the gap, which makes the state space finite and computation feasible. Similarly, the within-country technology gaps between leaders and fringe firms for Home and Foreign are

$$\frac{z_{hjt}}{z_{\tilde{h}jt}} = \lambda^{m_{jt}^{DH}}, \quad \frac{z_{fjt}}{z_{\tilde{f}jt}} = \lambda^{m_{jt}^{DF}}.$$

$\mathbf{m}_{jt} = \{m_{jt}^F, m_{jt}^{DH}, m_{jt}^{DF}\}$ is a payoff-relevant state variable. Conditional on the JV status and other aggregate variables, \mathbf{m}_{jt} determines profits of each firm within product j .²⁶ Because products are symmetric, we drop all subscripts of \mathbf{m}_{jt} and sector-specific subscripts in firm-level variables for notational convenience.

Value Function. Let $V_{ht}(\mathbf{m}; \mathcal{J})$ denote the value function of the Home leader h in a product given a state variable \mathbf{m} , with $\mathcal{J} \in \{0, 1\}$ denoting the JV status. Here we present only value functions of Home leaders when they are m^F steps ahead of their respective Foreign leader (i.e., $m^F > 0$). The value functions for other cases are provided in Appendix C.

The value function of a Home leader without JV when $m^F > 0$ can be expressed as follows:

$$\begin{aligned} r_{Ht} V_{ht}(\mathbf{m}; 0) - \dot{V}_{ht}(\mathbf{m}; 0) = & \max_{x_{ht}, d_{ht}} \left\{ \Pi_{ht}(\mathbf{m}) - \alpha_{Hr} \frac{(x_{ht})^\gamma}{\gamma} w_{Ht} - \alpha_{Hd} \frac{(d_{ht})^\gamma}{\gamma} w_{Ht} \right. \\ & + x_{ht} \left(V_{ht}(\mathbf{m} + (1, 1, 0); 0) - V_{ht}(\mathbf{m}; 0) \right) + x_{ft} \left(V_{ht}(\mathbf{m} + (-1, 0, 1); 0) - V_{ht}(\mathbf{m}; 0) \right) \\ & \left. + d_{ht} \left(V_{ht}(\mathbf{m}; 1) - V_{ht}(\mathbf{m}; 0) - C_t(\mathbf{m}) \right) + \sum_{\mathbf{m}'} \mathbb{T}(\mathbf{m}'; \mathbf{m}) \left(V_{ht}(\mathbf{m}'; 0) - V_{ht}(\mathbf{m}; 0) \right) \right\}, \end{aligned} \quad (4.6)$$

²⁶Because we assume that the productivity of the JV is tied to the Home leader's productivity, we do not have to separately keep track of the JV productivity.

where $\mathbb{T}(\mathbf{m}'; \mathbf{m})$ denotes transition probabilities from \mathbf{m} to \mathbf{m}' due to technology diffusion as:

$$\mathbb{T}(\mathbf{m}'; \mathbf{m}) = \begin{cases} \delta^F & \text{if } \mathbf{m}' = \{0, m^{DH}, m^F + m^{DF}\} \\ \delta^D & \text{if } \mathbf{m}' = \{m^F, 0, m^{DF}\} \\ \delta^D & \text{if } \mathbf{m}' = \{m^F, m^{DH}, 0\} \\ 0 & \text{Otherwise.} \end{cases}$$

The first line of the right-hand side in equation (4.6) represents profits (operating profits net of innovation and JV formation costs). The second line reflects the value changes due to own innovation and the Foreign leader's innovation. The first term of the third line reflects the value changes due to forming a JV. The second term of the same line reflects the value changes due to exogenous diffusions within the product.

The value function when $m^F > 0$ and a JV is already established is as follows:

$$\begin{aligned} r_{Ht}V_{ht}(\mathbf{m}; 1) - \dot{V}_{ht}(\mathbf{m}; 1) = \max_{x_{ht}} & \left\{ \Pi_{ht}(\mathbf{m}) - \alpha_{Hr} \frac{(x_{ht})^\gamma}{\gamma} w_{Ht} + \kappa \Pi_{vt}(\mathbf{m}) \right. \\ & + x_{ht} \left(V_{ht}(\mathbf{m} + (1, 1, 0); 1) - V_{ht}(\mathbf{m}; 1) \right) + x_{ft} \left(V_{ht}(\mathbf{m} + (-1, 0, 1); 1) - V_{ht}(\mathbf{m}; 1) \right) \\ & + \phi \left(V_{ht}(0, m^{DH}, m^F + m^{DF}; 1) - V_{ht}(\mathbf{m}; 1) \right) + \chi \left(V_{ht}(\mathbf{m}; 0) - V_{ht}(\mathbf{m}; 1) \right) \\ & \left. + \sum_{\mathbf{m}'} \mathbb{T}(\mathbf{m}'; \mathbf{m}) \left(V_{ht}(\mathbf{m}'; 1) - V_{ht}(\mathbf{m}; 1) \right) \right\}. \end{aligned} \quad (4.7)$$

Here, the flow profits include those generated by the JV ($\kappa \Pi_{vt}$). Because the JV is already established, leaders no longer engage in new JV formation ($d_{ht} = 0$). The first term of the third line accounts for direct diffusion that the Foreign leader may catch up with the Home leader's productivity level thanks to the JV. The second term of the same line represents the change in value due to the exogenous exit of the JV.

Optimal Investment in Innovation and Joint Ventures. The innovation and JV rates are functions of technology gaps \mathbf{m} . The optimal innovation rate can be expressed as

$$x_{hjt} = x_{ht}(\mathbf{m}; \mathcal{J}) = \left(\frac{V_{ht}(\mathbf{m} + (1, 1, 0); \mathcal{J}) - V_{ht}(\mathbf{m}; \mathcal{J})}{\alpha_{Hr} w_{Ht}} \right)^{\frac{1}{\gamma-1}}, \quad \mathcal{J} \in \{0, 1\}. \quad (4.8)$$

Similarly, the optimal joint venture rate can be written as follows:

$$d_{hjt} = d_{ht}(\mathbf{m}) = \left(\frac{V_{ht}(\mathbf{m}; 1) - V_{ht}(\mathbf{m}; 0) - C_t(\mathbf{m})}{\alpha_{Hd} w_{Ht}} \right)^{\frac{1}{\gamma-1}}. \quad (4.9)$$

Bargaining and Joint Venture Fees. With a successful JV formation rate d_{hjt} , the Home leader within a product pays (or receives) a fee to (or from) the Foreign leader, determined through Nash bargaining:

$$\begin{aligned} C_t(\mathbf{m}) &= \arg\max_C \left\{ (\Delta^{\text{JV}} V_{ht}(\mathbf{m}) - C)^\xi \times (\Delta^{\text{JV}} V_{ft}(\mathbf{m}) + C)^{1-\xi} \right\} \\ \text{s.t.} \quad &\Delta^{\text{JV}} V_{ht}(\mathbf{m}) - C \geq 0, \quad \Delta^{\text{JV}} V_{ft}(\mathbf{m}) + C \geq 0 \\ &= (1 - \xi) \Delta^{\text{JV}} V_{ht}(\mathbf{m}) - \xi \Delta^{\text{JV}} V_{ft}(\mathbf{m}) \end{aligned} \quad (4.10)$$

where ξ is the bargaining power of Home leaders and Δ^{JV} denotes the changes in values after forming a JV: $\Delta^{\text{JV}} V_{it}(\mathbf{m}) = V_{it}(\mathbf{m}; 1) - V_{it}(\mathbf{m}; 0)$, $i \in \{h, \tilde{h}, f, \tilde{f}\}$.

When Foreign leaders lag further behind (i.e., $m^F > 0$), Home leaders are more likely to receive JV fees from Foreign leaders, as Foreign leaders gain significantly from direct diffusion and, therefore, are willing to pay more for forming JVs (i.e., $C_t(\mathbf{m}) \leq 0$). Conversely, when $m^F \leq 0$, Foreign leaders do not gain from direct diffusion, but Home leaders still benefit from additional JV profits. In this case, Home leaders pay adoption fees to Foreign leaders (i.e., $C_t(\mathbf{m}) > 0$).

When Home leaders form JVs, they anticipate lower profits in the future due to productivity improvements among Foreign firms due to both direct and indirect technology diffusion through JVs. They internalize these dynamic profit losses and are compensated through bargaining fees by Foreign leaders. However, they do not care about the profit losses incurred by Home fringe firms due to the JV formation. This creates a reason why there may be over-investment in JVs relative to what is optimum for the US as a whole. Similarly, Foreign leaders do not internalize the benefit of technology diffusion to Foreign fringe firms, which may imply under-investment in JVs from the Chinese perspective.

Combining Equation (4.9) and (4.10), the optimal JV rate is as follows:

$$d_{hjt} = d_{ht}(\mathbf{m}) = \left(\frac{\xi(\Delta^{JV}V_{Ht} + \Delta^{JV}V_{Ft})}{\alpha_{Hd}w_{Ht}} \right)^{\frac{1}{\gamma-1}}.$$

The optimal JV rate increases with the total surplus $(\Delta^{JV}V_{Ht} + \Delta^{JV}V_{Ft})$, given the bargaining power parameter ξ . The total surplus from JV increases with the technology gap, because JV profits and Chinese rivals' productivity gains from diffusion increase with the gap.

Market Clearing. Asset markets clear in each period: $A_{Ht} = \int_0^1 \sum_{i \in \mathcal{I}_H} V_{ijt} dj$, where the right-hand side is the sum of the value of all Home firms. For each tradable product indexed by j , the goods market clears:

$$\sum_{i \in \mathcal{I}_H} p_{ijt} y_{ijt} + \sum_{i \in \mathcal{I}_{Fjt}} p_{ijt}^* y_{ijt}^* = P_{Ht}^T C_{Ht}^T, \quad \forall j \in [0, 1],$$

where we used the fact that the expenditure shares of all products are equal, given the unitary elasticity assumption across measure one of products indexed by j . The goods markets in tradable and non-tradable sectors clear: $Y_{Ht}^T = C_{Ht}^T$ and $Y_{Ht}^N = C_{Ht}^N$. Labor markets clear:

$$L_H = \int_0^1 \left(\sum_{i \in \mathcal{I}_H} l_{ijt} + \alpha_{Hr} \frac{(x_{ijt})^\gamma}{\gamma} + \alpha_{Hd} \frac{(d_{ijt})^\gamma}{\gamma} \right) dj + L_{Ht}^N,$$

where the right-hand side is the sum of labor demand by Home firms for production, innovation, and joint venture investment, as well as by the representative non-tradable firm. Similar market clearing conditions hold in Foreign, which are omitted here to save space.

The balance of payment equation is as below:

$$\int_0^1 \left(\sum_{i \in \mathcal{I}_{Fjt}} p_{ijt}^* y_{ijt}^* + d_{hjt} C_{jt} \right) dj = \int_0^1 \left(\sum_{i \in \mathcal{I}_H} p_{ijt}^* y_{ijt}^* + \kappa \Pi_{vjt} \right) dj,$$

where the left-hand side is the sum of imports from Foreign and JV fee payments to Foreign, and the right-hand side is the sum of exports and the share of JV profits distributed to Home.

Equilibrium. The distribution over states $\mu_t(\mathbf{m}; \mathcal{J})$ across products indexed by j evolves endogenously according to firms' optimal innovation and JV decisions. Its law of motion is given by equation (C.8) in the appendix. We formally define a Markov perfect equilibrium and balanced growth path.

Definition 1. A Markov perfect equilibrium is sequences of prices $\{r_{ct}, w_{ct}, p_{ijt}, p_{ijt}^*, P_{jt}^T, P_{jt}^N, P_{jt}\}$ and factor and goods allocations $\{l_{ijt}, x_{ijt}, d_{ijt}, y_{ijt}, y_{ijt}^*, L_{ct}^N, C_{ct}^N, C_{ct}^T, C_{ct}\}$ such that (i) a representative household maximizes utility; (ii) firms maximize present discounted value of profits; (iii) goods, labor, and asset markets clear in each country c and period t ; and (iv) the transition of $\mu_t(\mathbf{m}; \mathcal{J})$ evolves according to firms' optimal innovation (x_{ijt}) and joint venture (d_{ijt}) investments.

Definition 2. A balanced growth path is the equilibrium defined in Definition 1 in which $\{w_{ct}, C_{ct}, A_{ct}\}$ grow at a constant rate g , and r_{ct} and $\mu_t(\mathbf{m}; \mathcal{J})$ are constant over time.

4.6 Taking Stock

Market Failure. One novel feature of our model is the negative impact of Home leaders' JVs and technology transfer on Home fringe firms, which the leaders do not care about. Direct and indirect technology diffusions through JVs to Foreign firms enhance their global competitiveness, reducing Home firms' profits. Home leaders internalize their own future profit losses due to rising competition, when making JV decisions. Technology diffusion intensities (ϕ, δ^D) , and leaders' demand shifters, ψ , govern the magnitude of Home leaders' over-investment in JVs relative to what is optimal for the Home country as a whole. Higher diffusion rates intensify future competitive pressures on Home fringe firms. Higher demand shifters mean leaders hold larger market shares, in which case they align their JV decisions more closely with total industry profits and what is socially optimum. It is important that Home fringes do produce in equilibrium for Home leaders' JV decisions to deviate meaningfully from the social optimum for the Home country.

Beyond this, our model features other common market failures of step-by-step innovation frameworks. Technology diffusion is a classic positive externality, implying that there may be too little innovation. At the same time, given the business stealing effects, there may be over-investment in innovation. Oligopolistic market structure causes firms to produce below socially optimal levels.

The Two-Country Assumption. Our model builds on a two-country framework to operationalize strategic interactions between firms while maintaining computational feasibility. Under this assumption, the US is the sole source of foreign technology for China. One concern is that this may exaggerate the role of US JVs. If we were to include a third country, such as Japan, China could substitute away from the US and rely on Japanese JVs if US JVs are restricted. Furthermore, strategic interactions could emerge between the US and Japan. Competing foreign firms may race to transfer technology to China, knowing that their own technology’s value could decline if a rival country transfers it first, creating a “prisoner’s dilemma.” In this case, the US ban on JV investments could also reduce the incentive for Japanese firms to form JVs in China, as the strategic pressure to transfer technology weakens. Therefore, the two-country assumption may not necessarily exaggerate the role of US joint ventures in Chinese growth. We leave a three-country extension to future research.

5. TAKING THE MODEL TO THE DATA

Home and Foreign refer to the US and China, respectively. Each product in the tradable sector conceptually maps to an SIC 4-digit manufacturing industry. We solve the transition dynamics of the model starting from the initial condition in 1997, until it converges to a balanced growth path. There are no JVs in 1997. Calibrating along the transition is important in our setup, because China experienced rapid growth during our sample period. The initial technology gaps between US and Chinese leaders are randomly drawn from a normal distribution $N(\mathcal{D}, \mathcal{V})$, parametrized by the mean \mathcal{D} and variance \mathcal{V} . A positive \mathcal{D} means that, on average, US leaders start with higher productivity than Chinese leaders.

We introduce time-varying import tariffs in both countries, t_t^{US} and t_t^{CN} , to capture the post-WTO shifts in US-China trade policy. These tariffs apply uniformly across all products, and people in the model have perfect foresight over their future paths. JVs exporting to the US face the corresponding US import tariff.

With these additional elements, we calibrate a total of 24 parameters in 3 steps. We take 10 parameters directly from the data, externally calibrate 4 parameters from the literature, and jointly estimate 10 parameters using the simulated method of moments (SMM). Given an initial guess for the 10 jointly estimated parameters, we solve for the model’s transition.

Table 3: Estimation Results

Parameter	Value	Description	Source / Main target
<i>Directly from data</i>			
L_F/L_H	2.83	Labor supply of China relative to US	Human-capital adj. pop. (Lee and Lee, 2016)
β	0.40	Tradable consumption share	1997 US Benchmark IO table
χ	0.08	JV exit rate	Avg. exit rate in CN (Chen et al., 2023)
\mathcal{V}	0.7	Variance of initial technology gap	Variance of productivity ratio in 1999
κ, ξ	0.54	US JV profit share	Avg. equity share of MNE
g^N	0.017	Productivity growth rate in non-tradable sector	Avg. growth rate of GDP per capita in US, 2011–2019
t_t^H, t_t^F		US/CN import tariff rates	Avg. import tariff rates
<i>Externally calibrated</i>			
ρ	0.03	Time preference	Literature
σ	4	Elast. of subst. across varieties	Broda and Weinstein (2006)
γ	2	Innovation/JV cost curvature	Acemoglu et al. (2018)
τ^x	2.85	Iceberg trade cost	Bai et al. (2024)
<i>Internally calibrated by SMM</i>			
α_{Hr}	0.60	US R&D cost scale parameter	Avg. R&D / sales of US firms
α_{Fr}	0.80	CN R&D cost scale parameter	Long-run avg. gap=0
α_{Hd}	1.39	US JV scale parameter	Avg. JV sales shares
λ	1.12	Step size	GDP growth rate in the US
\mathcal{D}	20.0	Avg. technology gap	1999 mfg. value-added / emp. US/CN ratio
δ^F	0.024	Prob. of exo. tech. diffusion across country	2020 mfg. value added / emp. US/CN ratio
ψ	0.25	Leader & JV demand shifter	Mfg. US Compustat firm sales / gross output
ϕ	0.13	Prob. of direct tech. diffusion	Direct effect on Chinese parents, Fig. 1
τ^z	1.84	JV iceberg technology cost	Sectoral regression results in US, Table 2
δ^D	0.029	Prob. of exo. tech. diffusion within country	Sectoral regression results in China, Table 1

Along this transition path, we compute the model moments and calculate their distance from the data counterparts, and estimate the parameters that minimize this distance.

We take the 10 parameters $\{L_H, L_F, \beta, \chi, \kappa, \xi, g^N, \mathcal{V}, t_t^H, t_t^F\}$ directly from the data. The Home labor is normalized to $L_H = 1$, while Foreign labor is set to $L_F = 2.83$, based on the human capital-adjusted population in China relative to the US ([Lee and Lee, 2016](#)). The consumption share of tradables β is set to 0.4 based on the 1997 US Benchmark input-output table. The exit rate of JVs χ is set to 0.08, based on the average exit rate of Chinese firms reported by [Chen et al. \(2023\)](#).

The US JV profit share κ is set to 0.54 based on the average equity share of MNEs in JV firms calculated from Orbis, based on the JV Law. The bargaining power of US leaders in JV bargaining is also set to $\xi = 0.54$. g^N is set to match the average growth rate of US real GDP per capita (2011 to 2019). \mathcal{V} is set to 0.7, which is the variance of US-China labor productivity ratios across manufacturing industries in 1999. We directly take t_t^H and t_t^F from the data as the import-weighted average tariffs in manufacturing.

The 4 parameters $\{\rho, \sigma, \gamma, \tau^x\}$ are externally calibrated from the literature. We set the

discount rate $\rho = 0.03$ in line with the literature. We set $\gamma = 2$ to match the elasticity of innovation with respect to R&D following [Acemoglu et al. \(2018\)](#). The iceberg trade cost between the US and China is set to $\tau^x = 2.85$ following [Bai et al. \(2024\)](#).

The remaining 10 parameters $\Theta = \{\alpha_{Hr}, \alpha_{Fr}, \alpha_{Hd}, \lambda, \mathcal{D}, \phi, \tau^z, \psi, \delta^F, \delta^D\}$ are jointly estimated by minimizing the distance between the model moments $M_m(\Theta)$ and their data counterparts M_m^D :

$$\min_{\Theta} \sum_{m=1}^{10} \left(\frac{M_m^D - M_m(\Theta)}{\frac{1}{2}(M_m^D + M_m(\Theta))} \right)^2.$$

We choose moments that are relevant and informative about the 10 parameters.

The US R&D cost scale parameter α_{Hr} is calibrated to match the average R&D-to-sales ratio among manufacturing firms in Compustat. China's α_{Fr} is calibrated to match both countries to have the same average productivity level in the balanced growth path.²⁷ The JV cost scale parameter α_{Hd} is estimated to match the sales share of JVs in China. This moment is informative because, with higher costs, there will be less JV investments and therefore the JV sales shares will be smaller. Because the step size parameter λ governs long-run growth rate, we calibrate λ to match the US long-run GDP growth rate (2011-2019).

The initial gap \mathcal{D} is calibrated to match the 1999 value-added per employee ratio between China and the US. We calibrate the cross-country diffusion parameter δ^F to match the 2020 long-run value-added per employee ratio between the two countries. A higher δ^F implies faster convergence of China. The leaders' demand shifter ψ is calibrated to match the share of US Compustat manufacturing firm sales to total US gross manufacturing output ([Brault and Khan, 2024](#)).

We pin down the direct diffusion parameter ϕ , the within-country diffusion parameter δ^D , and the JV iceberg technology cost τ^z using facts 1, 2, and 3 in Section 3, respectively. The detailed procedure is described in Appendix D.1. We calibrate ϕ to match the average of the post-event study coefficients from the pooled diff-in-diff specification by running the analogous regression using model-generated data.²⁸ Because δ^D governs within-country diffusion, it directly relates to fact 2. Because τ^z is JVs' productivity losses, a higher value

²⁷By targeting this ratio, we obtain $\alpha_{Fr} > \alpha_{Hr}$, because China has a larger labor endowment. If $\alpha_{Hr} = \alpha_{Fr}$, China has higher average productivity levels than the US on the balanced growth path.

²⁸Specifically, we run $y_{imt} = \beta(1[\text{Post}_{mt}] \times 1[\text{JV Partner}_{it}]) + \delta_{im} + \delta_{mt} + \varepsilon_{imt}$, where the estimated β gives the average of the post-event coefficients in equation (3.1), which was 0.2.

Table 4: Targeted and Non-Targeted Moments in the Model and the Data

Moment	Model	Data
<i>Panel A. Targeted Moments</i>		
US indirect effects of JV on sales (col 1, Table 2)	-0.121	-0.111
CN indirect effects of JV on sales (col 1, Panel A, Table 1)	0.083	0.090
Direct effect on CN partners (Panel A, Figure 1)	0.203	0.200
Avg. US GDP per capita growth, 2011–2019	0.017	0.017
Avg. R&D-to-sales ratio, Compustat mfg. firms	0.075	0.073
JV sales shares in CN	0.125	0.110
Mfg. value added per emp. ratio (CN / US), 1999	0.084	0.084
Mfg. value added per emp. ratio (CN / US), 2020	0.382	0.382
Leader firms' sales share	0.277	0.280
Long-run avg. productivity ratio	1.001	1.000
<i>Panel B. Non-Targeted Moments</i>		
Sectoral regression, JV exposure & initial gap	0.104	0.169
US indirect effects of JV on R&D (col. 11, Panel A, Table 2)	-0.201	-0.203

Notes. This table reports targeted and non-targeted moments in the model and the data.

implies a weaker competition effect for US fringe firms, relating to fact 3. To calibrate these two parameters, we run regressions analogous to equation (3.3) using fringe firms in the US and China and fit the OLS estimates in column 1 of Tables 1 and 2.²⁹

Table 3 summarizes the estimation results. The model moments closely match their data counterparts (Panel A of Table 4). We obtain $\mathcal{D} = 20.0$, implying that the productivity of US firms is roughly 9.6 times larger initially than Chinese firms on average. We obtain $\phi = 0.13$ and $\delta^F = 0.024$, implying that having JV increases the diffusion intensity between leaders from 2.4% to 15.4%. $\tau^z = 1.84$ suggests that JV's productivity is 46% lower than their US leaders'.

The model also matches two non-targeted moments (Panel B of Table 4). First, it predicts a positive relationship between the initial US-China productivity gap and sectoral JV exposure. Larger gaps make JVs more attractive because they generate larger total surplus (via higher JV profits and larger gains from diffusion). This relationship is confirmed in the data. Second, it reproduces the observed negative effect of JV exposure on US firms' R&D (col. 11, Table 2).

²⁹The restriction to fringe firms is consistent with the FDI exposure measure which excludes own JV affiliates.

In the model, with JV, the higher probability of technology diffusion and the partial capture of JV profit reduce the return to successful innovation.

6. QUANTITATIVE EXERCISES

6.1 Did US Multinationals Transfer Too Much Technology to China?

Using the calibrated model, we first examine whether the US transferred too much technology to China through JVs. We consider a counterfactual scenario in which the US government restricts JV investment from 1999 onward, and compare its welfare to the baseline scenario with JVs. In this counterfactual, firms are no longer allowed to establish new JVs beginning in 1999, while existing JVs remain in place until they exit exogenously. We assume that this policy change is an unanticipated shock to everyone in 1999.

Table 5: Baseline vs. Counterfactual Scenarios: Welfare Effects (%)

JV restriction	in 1999	in 1999 coordinated JV	in 1999 technology gap ≥ 6	in 2025
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
US	1.20	-0.60	1.33	-0.67
China	-10.25	-1.99	-10.26	-2.49


Notes. This table reports consumption-equivalent welfare changes for the US and China under four counterfactuals: restricting JVs in 1999 (column 1), restricting JVs in 1999 with coordinated JV decisions in both the baseline and counterfactual (column 2), restricting JVs in 1999 only for technology gaps larger than 6 (i.e., $m^F \geq 6$), and restricting JVs in 2025 (measured in 2025; column 4).

Table 5 reports the welfare effects in consumption-equivalent variation. The JV restriction in 1999 improves US welfare by 1.2% but reduces China's welfare by 10.3%.³⁰ In the counterfactual, the US-China technology gap widens and China's speed of convergence slows down (Panels A and B of Figure 2), because Chinese leaders' productivity growth slows down due to the lack of technology diffusion through JVs, while US leaders' productivity rises slightly due to higher innovation rates (Panel C; counterfactual minus baseline). Below we will explain why US leaders innovate more when JVs are not allowed. In the absence of JVs,

³⁰We can also define global welfare as a weighted average of lifetime utility, $W = \Lambda U^{US} + (1 - \Lambda)U^{CN}$. Then, JV restriction decreases global welfare as long as Λ , the welfare weight placed on the US, is less than 0.89.

Chinese firms substitute innovation for JVs as a way to improve their productivity, increasing R&D but not enough to make up for the lost technology diffusion from JVs.

Figure 2: Baseline vs. Restricting Joint Venture Investments in 1999: Dynamics of Productivity, Innovation, and Consumption



Notes. This figure compares dynamics under the counterfactual (JV restriction in 1999) to the baseline. Panel A shows log average leader productivity for the US and China; Panel B shows the US–China productivity ratio; Panel C plots the difference in their average innovation rates (counterfactual minus baseline); and Panel D plots relative consumption.

Although the net welfare change is positive for the US and negative for China, Panel D of Figure 2 reveals richer dynamics in relative consumption. For each country, the lines represent the counterfactual consumption divided by the baseline consumption. In the short run, US consumption falls immediately after the JV restriction as US leaders lose JV fee revenues and JV profits. Over time, however, US firms’ relatively higher productivity and

higher innovation boost their global competitiveness, and US consumption with JV restriction surpasses the baseline consumption 20 years later. As for China, its consumption initially declines alongside slower productivity growth with the JV restriction, but gradually recovers after 20 years as the technology gap narrows and technology diffusion is less relevant once the two countries approach their respective balanced growth paths.


There are two opposing forces behind the higher US innovation rate in the counterfactual (JV restriction). First, the option-value effect: US leaders have a greater incentive to innovate when they can form a JV. By innovating before JV formation, US leaders raise total surplus from JV and capture part of it through negotiated JV fees in the Nash bargaining. This explains why the average innovation rate drops immediately after the 1999 restriction (Panel A of Figure 3). Second, there is a composition effect. In the baseline, products with JVs exhibit lower innovation intensities than those without, conditional on technology gaps (Panel B of Figure 3). This is because, even though JVs enlarge market size and raise marginal returns to R&D (market size effect), they also accelerate spillovers to Chinese rivals (leakage effect), eroding future profits and thus dampening the returns to innovation (Aghion et al., 2001). Moreover, any extra surplus from innovation that benefits Chinese partners cannot be recouped once the JV fee is paid. The two peaks in Panel B arise due to escape competition effects.³¹ In our calibration, as JVs are established in more products, the overall mix shifts toward those with lower innovation rates.³² Over the medium term, the composition effect, in turn driven by the leakage effect, dominates the option-value effect, leading to higher average innovation rates with the JV restriction.³³

³¹The two peaks at $m^F \approx -5$ and $m^F \approx 13$ reflect “defensive” and “expansionary” innovation motives (Akcigit et al., 2023). When $m^F \approx -5$, US and Chinese leaders are neck-and-neck (after accounting for wage differentials and trade costs) in the US, so even a small productivity gain sharply raises domestic profits and prompts US leaders to invest more in R&D to defend domestic market share. The asymmetry between the peaks (-5 vs. 13) reflects China’s lower wages. When $m^F \approx 13$, US leaders are neck-and-neck in China, so they increase R&D to expand abroad. One important difference from Akcigit et al. (2023) is that JV-driven diffusion tends to close the productivity gap, moving it toward zero, where innovation rates fall below the two peaks.

³²In Appendix Figure D1, we consider two alternative parametrizations. First, by setting $\kappa = 1$, we make US leaders take the whole JV profits, which amplifies market size effects. Then, the gap in innovation rates between the baseline and counterfactual narrows. Second, we shut down direct diffusion by setting $\phi = 0$, eliminating the leakage effect. In this case, the sign of the innovation-rate difference flips: Innovation rates under the baseline exceed those in the counterfactual scenario.

³³This result is consistent with the observation made by Andy Grove, a former CEO of Intel: “Our pursuit of our individual businesses ... often involves transferring manufacturing and a great deal of engineering out of the country ... We don’t just lose jobs—we lose our hold on new technologies and ultimately damage our capacity to innovate” (McGee, 2025, p. 113).

Figure 3: US Innovation Rate over Time and Technology Gap



Notes. Panel A plots the average innovation rate in baseline and counterfactual scenarios. Panel B plots the innovation rate in the baseline scenario in 2025 over technology gaps between US and Chinese leader firms m^F . $m^F > 0$ denotes the case where US leaders have higher productivity than Chinese leaders. In Panel B, technology gaps between domestic firms are set to $m^{DF} = m^{DH} = \bar{m}$.

Table 6: Baseline vs. Restricting Joint Venture Investments in 1999

	Baseline	Shutting down JV	Changes (%)
US leader profit (own + JV + JV fee)	0.047	0.037	-22.13
Own profit	0.034	0.037	7.42
JV profit	0.008	0.000	n/a
JV fee revenue	0.005	0.000	n/a
US fringe profit	0.065	0.068	4.87
US labor income	0.888	0.914	2.94
US total real income	1.000	1.019	1.88

Notes. This table reports the net present value of real profits and labor income, deflated by US price index and normalized by baseline total real income, under the counterfactual that JVs are banned in 1999 versus the baseline. Leader profits include own profits, JV profits, and JV fees.

Next, we decompose the welfare effects of restricting JVs by income sources, as shown in Table 6. Here, real income is the sum of discounted leader profits (own profits + JV profits + JV fees), fringe profits, and labor income (real wage), all normalized by each country's real income in the baseline scenario. For the US, leader profits fall in the counterfactual because JV profits and JV fees received from Chinese partners are lost. Fringe profits rise

due to the removal of JV competition and because reduced technology diffusion weakens competition from Chinese firms. Labor income increases due to higher labor demand by domestic firms, and real income increases further from lower price levels driven by higher innovation. Another reason for the lower real wage with JVs is that JV decisions are not only driven by lower production cost, but also by the JV fee, with the implication that the price with JV may not fall enough to compensate for the fall in labor demand and hence wage.

In contrast, both leader and fringe profits decline in China because of reduced diffusion, and labor income also falls as labor demand weakens (see Appendix Table D1). At the same time, slower diffusion pushes price levels higher in China.

To further examine the mechanism behind the welfare results and robustness of the results, we consider alternative modeling assumptions, reported in Appendix Table D2. When we shut down innovation channel, achieved by setting the R&D cost parameter value to infinity, the JV restriction still increases US welfare by 0.39%, although the magnitude decreases by 68% (0.39% vs. 1.20%). Without innovation, JVs are the only sources of productivity improvement in China except for exogenous diffusion, leading to larger welfare losses for China. This implies that innovation responses to JVs play an important role for the welfare effects. We also consider preserving the love of variety instead of shutting it down. Because JV introduces additional variety, the welfare gains from restricting JVs become smaller due to this loss of love of variety, but it is still positive at 0.73%. Finally, we consider constant markups, as in a standard monopolistic competition case. Overall, our main results, US welfare gains from restricting JVs, remain robust to alternative modeling assumption. Moreover, our results also remain robust to sensitivity checks with regard to key parameters (ϕ , δ^F , δ^D , \mathcal{D} , and κ), reported in Appendix Table D3.

Another important question is how China's quid pro quo policy, which mandates direct technology transfer through JVs, affects the US and Chinese welfare. In an alternative counterfactual, we set $\phi = 0$, allowing US leaders to form JVs with Chinese leaders without any direct technology transfer. Relative to the baseline with $\phi = 0.13$, US welfare increases by 3.2%, while Chinese welfare declines by 5.3%. The magnitudes are comparable to the result in Holmes et al. (2015) that the quid pro quo policy benefits China but hurts the US.

6.2 Can Coordinating Joint Venture Investments Improve Welfare?

We showed that there can be over-investment in JV because US leaders do not care about US fringe firm's profit losses, and that this over-investment can lower US welfare relative to a counterfactual restricting JVs. To further emphasize this mechanism, we consider coordinated JV decisions: a JV can only be established if US leaders compensate fringe firms for their future losses. More specifically, we add an additional bargaining problem between US leaders and fringe firms, in addition to the one between US and Chinese leaders. We solve these two bargaining problems jointly using the Nash-in-Nash concept (Horn and Wolinsky, 1988), assuming that US leaders hold full bargaining power in the leader-fringe negotiation.


The modified bargaining outcomes are:

$$C = (1 - \xi)\{\Delta^{JV}V_{ht}(\mathbf{m}) + \Delta^{JV}V_{\tilde{h}t}(\mathbf{m})\} - \xi\Delta^{JV}V_{ft}(\mathbf{m}), \quad C^E = -\Delta^{JV}V_{\tilde{h}t}(\mathbf{m}), \quad (6.1)$$

where C^E is the fee paid by US leaders to fringe firms. They now account for the effect of JVs on both own and fringe profits in the future. This can be shown from the above expression. The sum of value changes $\Delta^{JV}V_{ht}(\mathbf{m}) + \Delta^{JV}V_{\tilde{h}t}(\mathbf{m})$ enters the bargaining fee in equation (6.1), whereas in the baseline case, only $\Delta^{JV}V_{ht}(\mathbf{m})$ appeared in equation (4.10). Because US leaders have full bargaining power over fringe firms, they compensate fringe firms exactly by their losses, as shown by $C^E = -\Delta^{JV}V_{\tilde{h}t}(\mathbf{m})$.

Coordinated JV raises US welfare by 1.7% relative to the uncoordinated baseline. By requiring US leaders to compensate their own fringe firms, coordination makes JVs more costly for US leaders and better aligns US leaders' interest with the social welfare criterion. As Panel A of Figure 4 shows, fewer JVs are formed under coordination. With fewer JVs, technology diffusion to China slows and China's convergence rate declines (Panel B). It follows that coordinating JV decisions alters the welfare impacts of restricting JVs. Starting from a baseline with coordinated JVs, restricting JVs from 1999 onward now decreases US welfare by 0.6% and Chinese welfare by 2.0% (col. 2 of Table 5). Because US leaders' interests are better aligned with the social welfare criterion, restricting JV does not have much of a positive effect, reducing the US welfare. As for China, the restriction has a smaller negative effect, because there are fewer JVs and less technology diffusion through JVs with coordination.

Figure 4: Coordinated Joint Venture Decisions. Baseline vs. Multilateral Bargaining



Notes. This figure reports the dynamics of the share of sectors with JVs (Panel A) and the productivity ratio between US and China (Panel B) in the baseline and in the counterfactual with coordinated JV decisions, in which US leaders compensate domestic fringe firms for JV-related profit losses through multilateral bargaining.

6.3 Comparative Advantage and Joint Venture Restriction Conditional on Technology Gaps

JVs are more likely to be established in industries with larger technology gaps (see the non-targeted moment in Table 4). In other words, they are more likely to be formed where the US initially holds a large comparative advantage. This selection arises because the total surplus from a JV is higher when the US-China gap is larger, which is split between the two leaders. As a result, technological diffusion through JVs directs China's productivity growth toward industries in which the US initially holds a large comparative advantage, eroding the comparative advantage of the US over time. Well-known theoretical results (Dornbusch et al., 1977; Samuelson, 2004) show that the welfare gains from trade for the US can decline when China's productivity grows in a way that diminishes the US comparative advantage.³⁴ To explore this, we first compare gains from trade in the baseline and the counterfactual with the JV restriction. In particular, we compare the welfare with and without trade (gains from trade), holding productivity and other equilibrium objects constant. Consistent with the theoretical results, US gains from trade are 3.9% in the baseline and rise to 4.2% in the

³⁴See di Giovanni et al. (2014) and Liu et al. (2024) for quantitative analyses of the biased growth.

counterfactual restricting JV. That is, one of the ways in which JVs hurt the US welfare is through the erosion in the US comparative advantage, which is an inherent consequence of JVs. This is yet another reason why JVs lead to a lower real wage.

Next, we consider a state-dependent restriction that bans JVs only when the US-China productivity gap is larger than a certain threshold, to slow down technology diffusion in industries where the US has a large comparative advantage. Specifically, JVs are banned when $m^F \geq 6$ (i.e., US leaders are at least 6 steps ahead). We select the threshold of 6 because it gives the largest welfare gains among such state-dependent JV restrictions. The policy can be viewed as an effort to maintain US comparative advantage in high-tech sectors. Under this policy, US welfare rises by 1.33% relative to the baseline (col. 3 of Table 5), which means that it delivers a higher level of welfare than the policy that restrict all JVs regardless of the US-China productivity gap (welfare gain of 1.2%). However, this policy has the unintended consequence of weakening US leaders' innovation incentives, as it reduces their value of maintaining $m^F \geq 6$.

6.4 What if the US Restricts Joint Venture Investments in 2025?

Next, we consider restricting JVs in 2025 rather than 1999, in light of more recent policy debates. In contrast to the 1999 case, restricting all JVs starting in 2025 reduces US welfare (col. 4 of Table 5; measured in 2025) by 0.7%, rather than raising it. By 2025, the US-China technology gap became much smaller (Appendix Figure D3), so technology diffusion and the resulting negative competition effect on US fringes has become weaker. Although the restriction still slightly widens the US-China productivity gap, the loss of forgone JV profits and market access outweigh the modest gains from reduced technology diffusion. Overall, the welfare gains of banning JVs decline over time as the US-China productivity gap narrows (Appendix Figure D2), which will determine the welfare consequence of restricting JVs.

7. CONCLUSION

The intensifying economic and geopolitical rivalry between the United States and China has spurred ongoing debates over whether US firms transfer too much technology to China and if

policies should be implemented to curb such transfers. Our oligopolistic competition model with innovation and technology diffusion provides a justification for policy interventions, demonstrating that leading US firms may over-invest in joint ventures in China. This is because they do not account for the negative competition effects on other US firms or the general equilibrium effects that reduce the real wage. Despite this seemingly straightforward economic logic, this specific mechanism has not been formally explored in the literature.

Our findings show that a complete ban on joint ventures beginning in 1999 would have raised US welfare. However, we also identify alternative policies that could generate even greater welfare gains, such as mandating that leaders compensate fringe firms for future profit losses or restricting joint ventures in industries with particularly large US-China productivity gaps. While these policies may be challenging to implement and enforce, they highlight the specific market inefficiency at play.

Furthermore, our research does not suggest that banning joint ventures will always improve US welfare. By 2025, the US-China technology gap is small enough that restricting joint ventures would actually reduce US welfare. This finding underscores the importance of a dynamic approach to policy, as the effectiveness of any intervention is highly dependent on the current economic and technological context.

Our analysis serves as a useful first step and broaches several avenues for future research. On the empirical side, our novel findings on the direct and indirect effects of joint ventures on Chinese and US firms could be refined to better understand the role of firm heterogeneity. For instance, future work could examine how the characteristics of different US leader firms, such as their size or R&D intensity, influence their joint venture decisions and the extent of technology leakage. Similarly, it would be valuable to explore how the absorptive capacities of Chinese firms affect their ability to benefit from spillovers. In addition, future research could explore alternative measures and methodologies to better identify the causal effects of technology transfer through joint ventures.

On the modeling side, we do not separately model other forms of FDI, such as acquisitions or WFOEs, or licensing contracts, all of which also facilitate cross-country technology diffusion. While the underlying mechanism may be qualitatively similar, it would be a valuable extension to quantitatively assess the roles of these alternative channels of technology transfer.

Our policy experiments assumed no response from the Chinese government to the US restrictions on joint ventures. It is reasonable to anticipate that China would respond to such a policy by subsidizing domestic R&D more heavily. Therefore, developing a model where the two countries' governments strategically interact through various policy measures will be an important next step. This is especially relevant given China's active industrial policy, including the quid pro quo policy that motivated our analysis.

Another compelling avenue for future research is to explore the interaction between optimal tariffs and joint venture policies, as tariffs can attenuate the negative competition effects on US firms from joint ventures and technology diffusion to Chinese firms. This is a direction we are currently pursuing in other ongoing work.

Finally, a three-country model that includes China and two advanced countries (for example, the US and Japan) would allow for the analysis of strategic interactions between the leader firms of the advanced nations. This framework would likely reveal a prisoner's dilemma-like dynamic, where each firm's unilateral incentive to form joint ventures in China results in a collectively suboptimal outcome of excessive technology leakage. Such a model could also be used to explore the strategic interactions between the two advanced country governments regarding joint venture policies. This is a promising avenue for our future research.

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Supplemental Appendix

A. APPENDIX: DATA

Annual Survey of Industrial Enterprises. We drop observations with missing or negative values for sales, capital (fixed assets), or employment, and retain only manufacturing firms with CIC 4-digit codes between 1300 and 4400. The Annual Survey of Industrial Enterprises covers all state-owned and private firms with annual sales above 5 million RMB before 2010 and 20 million RMB thereafter. To ensure consistency, we apply the 20 million RMB threshold throughout the sample period. Industry codes follow CIC 1994 from 1998 to 2001 and CIC 2002 from 2002 to 2013. We harmonize industry classifications using concordance tables from the Industrial Classification for National Economic Activities and the CIC 1994–2002 concordance provided by [Brandt et al. \(2012\)](#).

Compustat. We drop observations with missing or negative values for sales, capital (PPEGT), or employment. We restrict our sample to manufacturing firms, SIC 4-digit codes between 2000 and 3999. We also obtain each firm’s total foreign sales (including both exports and sales from foreign affiliates) from the historical geographic segment data. For Global Compustat—used only in the robustness check in Appendix Table [B5](#)—we apply the same cleaning procedure as for US Compustat. We follow [Autor et al. \(2013\)](#) and aggregate these codes up to 383 4-digit codes for compatibility with the CIC and HS codes.

Sectoral data. We map Compustat data to Comtrade and the NBER-CES database using industry codes. Comtrade data, obtained from BACI ([Gaulier and Zignago, 2012](#)), are converted from HS 6-digit codes to 1987 SIC 4-digit codes following [Pierce and Schott \(2012\)](#). We obtain the SIC 4-digit level NTRgap_{*j*} from [Che et al. \(2022\)](#).

Mapping between the Chinese balance sheet and customs datasets. We clean firm name, postal code, and phone number variables of the Annual Survey of Industrial Enterprises and the customs datasets. The customs records and our Chinese firm balance sheet data do not

share common firm identifiers. Following standard practices (e.g. [Chor et al., 2021](#)), we merge these two datasets using firm names, phone numbers, and addresses. Also, see [Manova and Zhang \(2012\)](#) for more detailed description of the dataset.

Mapping between the Chinese balance sheet and the Orbis Global datasets. The matching proceeds in two steps. First, we use the Legal Entity Identifier, a standard unique identifier, to link across datasets. For firms without a Legal Entity Identifier, we apply fuzzy matching based on firm names in Chinese characters using Orbis’s built-in bulk matching algorithm. To ensure reliability, we retain only “A-level” matches, which represent the highest match quality according to Orbis’s classification. Lower-confidence matches (B or C levels) are excluded to reduce matching errors.

Mapping between the Chinese balance sheet and CNIPA patent data sets. We clean firm names in both datasets by removing non-distinctive terms (e.g., “Co., Ltd.” or “Limited Liability Company”). In the patent data, where multiple applicants are listed in a single field separated by colons, we extract and standardize each applicant name. Then, we match the two datasets based on cleaned names.

Mapping between US Compustat and the Orbis Global datasets. To merge the Compustat and Orbis databases, we again use Orbis’s built-in bulk matching algorithm, which relies on fuzzy matching. We apply the same criterion—A-level confidence—as in the mapping between the Chinese balance sheet and the Orbis dataset.

Mapping between the US Compustat and USPTO. We use [Kogan et al. \(2017\)](#) data in which the assignees of the patents in USPTO are matched with Compustat firm identifier.

Mapping between the Orbis Global datasets and USPTO. When the Orbis firm identifier is matched with Compustat firm identifier, we use [Kogan et al. \(2017\)](#) data to map into USPTO assignee IDs. The remaining firms are merged using fuzzy matching algorithm. We first clean the firm names as in the previous step, and then apply fuzzy matching. To ensure correct matching, we only keep the pairs with similarity score higher than 0.9.

B. APPENDIX: EMPIRICS

B.1 Concordance

First, we construct the concordance between 4-digit CIC and 1987 SIC codes in two steps. We first map CIC 2002 to NAICS 1997 using the concordance table by [Ma et al. \(2014\)](#), and then apply the 1997 NAICS-1987 SIC concordance table from the US Census. This process results in a mapping where each unique 4-digit CIC code corresponds to multiple 4-digit SIC 1987 codes. For those CIC codes with multiple mappings, to give more weights on industries with larger size, we assign weights based on 1995 gross output from the US NBER-CES manufacturing database. Second, using the constructed mapping above, we construct the FDI exposure at the 1987 SIC 4-digit level. Specifically, the denominator of the FDI exposure in equation (3.4) is computed as $\text{Total sales}_{j,98}^{\text{CN}} = \sum_{h \in \text{CIC}(j)} \omega_h^j \sum_{g \in \mathcal{F}_{h,98}} \text{Sale}_{gh,98}$, where $\mathcal{F}_{h,98}$ is a set of firms with CIC code h in 1998, $\text{CIC}(j)$ is a set of CIC 4-digit codes that has a mapping with SIC j , and ω_h^j is a weight of CIC h assigned for SIC j . The numerator $\Delta \text{FDI sales}_j$ is computed similarly for FDI affiliates: $\Delta \text{FDI sales}_j = \sum_{h \in \text{CIC}(j)} \omega_h^j \sum_{g \in \mathcal{J}_{h,12}} \text{Sale}_{gh,12} - \sum_{h \in \text{CIC}(j)} \omega_h^j \sum_{g \in \mathcal{J}_{h,99}} \text{Sale}_{gh,99}$, where \mathcal{J}_{ht} is a set of FDI affiliates with CIC h code in year t . For the regression models in Table 2, we use the FDI exposure defined at the 4-digit SIC level. Finally, for the FDI exposure used for the regression model in Table 1, we weight the SIC 4-digit level FDI exposure: $\Delta \text{FDI}_h = \sum_{j \in \text{SIC}(h)} \omega_j^h \Delta \text{FDI sales}_j$, where ω_j^h is a weight of SIC j assigned for CIC h that are mapped to multiple 4-digit SIC codes.

B.2 Facts 2 and 3: Instrumental Variable Strategy

The OLS estimates can be biased due to endogeneity as unobservable factors may affect both FDI flows and firm growth. We propose two IV strategies to alleviate this concern.

First IV Strategy. First, we construct the IV as the ratio of the total sales of JV in India affiliated with MNEs from Japan or Korea, relative to China's total sector sales in 1998:

$$IV_j^{JP-KR} = \frac{\Delta \text{India FDI (S. Korea \& Japan) sales}_{jt}}{\text{Total sales}_{j,98}^{CN}} = \frac{\sum_{g \in \mathcal{J}_{j,12}^{IN,JP-KR}} \text{Sale}_{gj,12} - \sum_{g \in \mathcal{J}_{j,99}^{IN,JP-KR}} \text{Sale}_{gj,99}}{\text{Total sales}_{j,98}^{CN}}, \quad (\text{B.1})$$

$\mathcal{J}_{jt}^{IN,JP-KR}$ is the set of FDI affiliates in India associated with MNEs from South Korea or Japan. We obtain data on Indian firm balance sheets and ownership from the Prowess database, supplemented with the ownership information from Orbis. The dataset covers over 70% of the Indian manufacturing sector and is representative of large and medium-sized firms. While it may exclude some small firms, this is unlikely to be a major concern, as we focus only on the sales of FDI affiliates in India, typically larger than domestic Indian firms.

The IV strategy aims to isolate variation in China's FDI exposure that is plausibly exogenous to factors specific to the US and China. For example, consider exogenous productivity shocks in South Korea or Japan that increase overall FDI by those two countries. By using their FDI affiliates in India in the IV, the IV extracts these exogenous shocks. The explicit identifying assumption is that any unobservables that affect US FDI in China are uncorrelated with the IV. We choose India for its attractiveness to FDI due to its large market size, low wages, and strong economic growth potential, a condition similar to China's, and South Korea and Japan because they were the two largest sources of FDI in China.

Second IV Strategy. We also consider a second IV strategy, where we instrument the FDI exposure with domestic Chinese FDI policy change based on the Catalogue, proposed by [Lu et al. \(2017\)](#).

Threats to Identification. Regarding the first IV, there can be two main potential threats to identification: export platform and technological changes. First, regarding export platform, demand shocks in China may induce South Korean and Japanese MNEs to invest in India to serve the Chinese market, and vice versa. Similarly, US demand shocks may cause South Korean and Japanese MNEs to invest in China or India to serve the US market. In both cases,

the exclusion restriction is violated because both demand shocks influence FDI flows into India from the two countries. The second concern is technological changes that are skill-biased or reduce communication costs between headquarters and affiliates. These shocks may make certain industries more attractive for FDI, potentially correlating FDI by MNEs in the US, South Korea, or Japan. Technological changes can also be a threat for the second IV if such changes have influenced the Chinese government's decision to liberalize FDI in particular sectors.

We investigate these concerns by inspecting pre-trends and industry-level balance, following [Borusyak et al. \(2022\)](#), reported in Appendix Table B7. First, pre-1999 5 year growth (1993-1998) is not meaningfully correlated with the IV. Overall imports (excluding China, India, Japan, and Korea), and imports from China do not show any pre-trends. Although the IV has weak positive correlations with gross output and employment at the 10% significance level, these relationships are in the opposite direction with the negative competition effects on US firms. We also find no significant correlation with the pre-1999 5-year growth of US firm-level variables (Appendix Table B8).³⁵

We assess industry-level balance by checking the correlation between our IV and initial industry characteristics that could be related to unobserved shocks. The export platform is unlikely to be a significant concern, as there is no significant correlations between bilateral import penetration (import-to-domestic absorption ratio) and the IV for China, India, and the US. Moreover, sectors with higher IVs are not necessarily those in which China initially had higher productivity or those more exposed to FDI, supported by the lack of correlation between the IV and Chinese import penetration in the US, FDI affiliates' initial sales shares in China, or their numbers relative to the total firm numbers. While our research design does not require industries to be identical in levels, no correlations with these variables support the plausibility of the exclusion restriction.

Three variables related to technological change are significantly correlated with the IVs: overall US import penetration (excluding from China, India, Japan, and Korea), produc-

³⁵Since Chinese firm data is only available after 1998, so we are unable to assess their pre-trends.

tion workers' employment shares, and computer investment share. This raises concerns for omitted variable bias from unobservable technological changes especially in labor-intensive sectors that are often characterized by higher foreign import penetration, larger production worker shares, and lower computer investment. However, if such unobservables were driving our results, they would likely appear as negative pre-trends in gross output or employment, which we do not observe. Also, including them as additional controls leaves our estimates unchanged, suggesting that omitted variable bias due to these unobservables is unlikely to be a major concern.

Finally, productivity improvements in India, Japan, and Korea, three countries used for our IV construction, could increase Japanese and Korean FDI into India and at the same time negatively affect US firms through direct import competition. To alleviate this concern, we control for changes in US import shares from these three countries between 1999 and 2012. Because these import shares may themselves be endogenous, we instead use predicted import shares based on each country's imports from all other countries (excluding the three countries, the US, and China) following [Hummels et al. \(2014\)](#). Our estimates remain stable to these controls. Moreover, if endogeneity through import competition is a big concern, our estimate for fact 3 would likely be overstated, while our estimate for fact 2 would be understated. However, we find no evidence of underestimation for fact 2. In fact, the IV estimates for fact 2 are larger than the OLS estimates, alleviating this concern.

Estimation Results. Table [B9](#) reports the results. The IV estimates are qualitatively similar to the OLS estimates but larger in magnitude. The IVs are strong, except for the second IV in the case of Chinese positive spillovers. The results remain robust to the additional controls related to technological trends and changes in predicted import shares from South Korea, Japan, and India.

B.3 Additional Evidence on Indirect Spillovers

In this subsection, we present additional evidence on indirect technology diffusion using citation flows, a commonly used proxy for knowledge flows in the literature. We show that foreign MNEs that formed JVs began receiving more citations from non-partner Chinese firms, compared to control group MNEs that did not form any JVs.

The treatment group consists of MNEs that formed JVs. To construct the control group, we follow a two-step matching procedure. First, among MNEs that did not form any JVs, we select those from the same country and technological field as the treated firms. In the second step, we identify MNEs that are similar to the treated firms based on the inverse hyperbolic sine transformation of cumulative citations, cumulative patents, annual citations received, and annual new patents produced, using Mahalanobis distance. The matching procedure results in 132 pairs of treated and control MNEs, with 132 unique firms in both the treated and control groups.

Using the constructed pairs, we run the following fully-stacked event-study specification:

$$y_{imt} = \sum_{\tau=-5}^5 \beta_{\tau} (D_{mt}^{\tau} \times \mathbb{1}[\text{JV Formation}_{imt}]) + \delta_{im} + \delta_{mt} + \varepsilon_{imt}, \quad (\text{B.2})$$

where $\mathbb{1}[\text{JV Formation}_{imt}]$ is a dummy of forming JVs, and D_{mt}^{τ} is event study variables. δ_{im} and δ_{mt} are firm-pair and pair-year fixed effects. Standard errors are clustered at the pair level. The dependent variables are dummies of receiving citations by non-partner Chinese firms. If there were technology diffusion, we expect non-partner firms to increase citations because their technologies may build upon the technology diffused from MNEs.

Figure B1 reports the estimated coefficients. We observe that citation received by non-partner Chinese firms began to increase only after JV formation, and there are no signs of pre-trends. However, a potential concern is that the increase in citations may not be due to indirect technology diffusion, but rather because the MNEs involved in the JV experienced innovation or productivity shocks, which made their patents more likely to be cited. To

address this concern, we also examine citations from non-Chinese firms, using them as the dependent variable in Panel B. If the increase in citations were driven by innovation or productivity shocks, we would expect to see a similar increase in citations from non-Chinese firms at the same time. However, we find no such evidence, ruling out this alternative explanation.

B.4 Additional Figures and Tables

Table B1: Balance of Matched Sample. Direct Effects of Joint Venture Formation on Chinese Partner Firms

	JV				Non-JV				(Col. 1 - Col. 5)	
	Mean (1)	Median (2)	SD (3)	N (4)	Mean (5)	Median (6)	SD (7)	N (8)	<i>t</i> -stat (9)	<i>p</i> -val (10)
Log sale	17.42	17.28	1.67	629	17.46	17.29	1.63	2,506	0.36	0.55
Log emp.	6.39	6.27	1.42	629	6.42	6.37	1.50	2,506	0.15	0.70
Log sales per emp.	11.03	10.92	1.14	629	11.04	10.93	1.25	2,506	0.01	0.90
Log capital	16.28	16.17	1.85	629	16.24	16.16	1.90	2,506	0.26	0.61
Log capital per emp.	9.90	9.85	1.22	629	9.82	9.79	1.34	2,506	0.97	0.33
Ihs export	9.62	14.33	8.21	629	9.86	14.16	8.22	2,506	0.17	0.68
Dum export	0.57	1	0.50	629	0.58	1	0.49	2,506	0.12	0.73
Ihs cumulative patent	0.64	0	1.36	629	0.66	0	1.34	2,506	0.02	0.90
Dum. patent stock	0.26	0	0.44	629	0.28	0	0.45	2,506	0.28	0.60
Ihs yearly new patent	0.42	0	1.12	629	0.42	0	1.11	2,506	0.01	0.94
Dum. yearly new patent	0.16	0	0.37	629	0.17	0	0.37	2,506	0.09	0.77

Notes. This table presents descriptive statistics for treated and control firms from five to one years before the event. Column 9 reports *t*-statistics for the mean differences between winners and losers, while Column 10 provides the corresponding *p*-values (in brackets), computed using standard errors clustered at the firm and match levels. All monetary values are expressed in 2007 US dollars.

Table B2: Balance Test. Direct Effects of Joint Venture Formation on Chinese Partner Firms

Dep. var.	Dummies of JV status										
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)	(10)	(11)
Log sale	-0.003 (0.005)										
Log emp		-0.003 (0.007)									
Log sales per emp			-0.001 (0.009)								
Log capital				0.002 (0.004)							
Log capital per emp					0.008 (0.008)						
lhs export						-0.001 (0.001)					
Dum export							-0.008 (0.022)				
lhs cumulative patent stock								-0.001 (0.009)			
Dum cumulative patent stock									-0.015 (0.029)		
lhs yearly patent										-0.001 (0.010)	
Dum yearly patent											-0.009 (0.029)
Mean dep. var.	0.20	0.20	0.20	0.20	0.20	0.20	0.20	0.20	0.20	0.20	0.20
# clusters (match)	176	176	176	176	176	176	176	176	176	176	176
# clusters (pair)	868	868	868	868	868	868	868	868	868	868	868
N	3,135	3,135	3,135	3,135	3,135	3,135	3,135	3,135	3,135	3,135	3,135

Notes. Standard errors in parentheses are clustered at the match and firm levels. * $p < 0.1$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$. This table presents the covariate balance test for the event study sample, covering five to one years before the event. The dependent variable is a dummy indicating treatment status. The regressors include log sales, log employment, log sales per employment, log fixed assets, log fixed assets per employment, the inverse hyperbolic sine transformation of exports, export dummies, cumulative patent stock, and yearly new patents.

Table B3: Direct Effects of Joint Venture Formation on Chinese Partner Firms

Dep. var.	Baseline outcomes			Alternative outcomes				
	Log sale	Ihs export	Technological proximity	Log capital	Log emp.	Dum. export	Ihs patent stock	Ihs annual patent
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)
5 years before	−0.03 (0.10)	0.78 (0.77)	0.03 (0.06)	0.02 (0.11)	−0.01 (0.12)	0.07 (0.05)	−0.12 (0.16)	−0.13 (0.17)
4 years before	−0.02 (0.08)	0.07 (0.61)	0.06 (0.04)	−0.04 (0.09)	0.04 (0.09)	0.00 (0.04)	0.01 (0.12)	0.12 (0.12)
3 years before	0.03 (0.05)	0.36 (0.56)	0.03 (0.03)	−0.05 (0.09)	0.02 (0.08)	0.02 (0.04)	0.01 (0.10)	0.06 (0.11)
2 years before	−0.01 (0.04)	0.23 (0.44)	0.04 (0.03)	0.06 (0.06)	−0.00 (0.05)	0.01 (0.03)	−0.02 (0.06)	0.01 (0.08)
1 year before								
Year of the event	0.13*** (0.04)	0.14 (0.35)	0.02 (0.03)	0.11** (0.05)	0.04 (0.04)	−0.00 (0.03)	0.04 (0.04)	0.12 (0.08)
1 year after	0.16*** (0.05)	0.20 (0.48)	0.02 (0.03)	0.16*** (0.05)	0.14** (0.06)	0.01 (0.03)	0.14* (0.08)	0.17* (0.10)
2 years after	0.13* (0.07)	0.62 (0.58)	0.05 (0.04)	0.25*** (0.07)	0.12 (0.09)	0.04 (0.04)	0.25** (0.11)	0.25** (0.12)
3 years after	0.22*** (0.08)	1.09* (0.56)	0.12** (0.05)	0.31*** (0.08)	0.07 (0.11)	0.05 (0.04)	0.30** (0.12)	0.35*** (0.12)
4 years after	0.27*** (0.08)	1.01* (0.57)	0.14*** (0.05)	0.35*** (0.08)	0.14* (0.09)	0.06 (0.04)	0.44*** (0.14)	0.47*** (0.14)
5 years after	0.32*** (0.10)	1.29* (0.68)	0.14*** (0.05)	0.37*** (0.09)	0.05 (0.13)	0.08* (0.05)	0.43*** (0.15)	0.37*** (0.14)
6 years after	0.38*** (0.11)	1.24 (0.83)	0.15*** (0.05)	0.43*** (0.10)	0.07 (0.15)	0.06 (0.05)	0.55*** (0.16)	0.62*** (0.17)
7 years after	0.46*** (0.11)	1.12 (0.85)	0.15*** (0.06)	0.54*** (0.12)	0.15 (0.15)	0.09* (0.05)	0.45** (0.19)	0.40** (0.19)
Fixed effects	Firm-match, Match-year							
Mean dep. var.	17.77	10.39	0.22	16.44	6.48	0.58	0.95	0.62
# Cluster (match)	176	176	106	176	176	176	176	176
# Cluster (firm)	859	859	321	859	859	859	859	859
N	7457	7457	1746	7457	7457	7457	7457	7457

Notes. Standard errors, shown in parentheses, are clustered at the match and firm levels. * $p < 0.1$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$. This table reports the estimated event study coefficients of equation (3.1). β_{-1} is normalized to zero. In columns 1-8, the dependent variables are log sales, log capital, inverse hyperbolic sine transformation of exports, technological proximity (equation (3.2)), log employment, dummies of exports, and inverse hyperbolic sine transformation of cumulative patent stock and yearly new patents, respectively. All specifications include match-firm and match-year fixed effects. In Column 4, the sample size decreases due to firms with zero patent stock, as technological proximity is only well-defined for firms with positive patent stock in both the treated and control groups.

Table B4: Quality Upgrading of Chinese Firms (OLS)

Dep. var.	Δ # export prod	Δ # export cty	Δ # import prod	Δ # import cty	Δ Wage per emp	Dum gvnt high-tech
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
ΔFDI_{fj}	17.75*** (4.18)	15.18*** (3.54)	6.27** (2.48)	8.65*** (2.48)	2.46*** (0.72)	3.54*** (0.73)
$NTRgap_j$	1.47*** (0.42)	1.18*** (0.41)	1.75*** (0.38)	1.68*** (0.40)	0.02 (0.15)	0.10 (0.11)
Mean dep. var.	36.30	33.77	-24.95	-7.21	120.54	18.97
# clusters	153	153	154	154	157	157
N	7316	7312	6414	6410	14817	14844

Notes: Standard errors, clustered at the CIC-3 digit levels, are reported in parenthesis. *: $p < 0.1$; **: $p < 0.05$; ***: $p < 0.01$. This table reports the OLS estimates of equation (3.3). ΔFDI_{fj} is defined in equation (3.4). In columns 1-6, the dependent variables are the DHS growth of the numbers of exporting/importing products/countries between 2000-2013, the DHS growth of wages per employment, and dummies for firms receiving high-tech status from the government in 2024. The NTR gap is potential tariff increases on Chinese imports that would have occurred in the event of a failed annual renewal of China's NTR status prior to PNTR. All specifications include dummies of state-owned firms and FDI affiliates, and province fixed effects. All regression models are weighted by initial sales.

Table B5: Negative Competition Effects to Global Firms (OLS)

Dep. var.	Δ Sale (1)	Δ Emp (2)	Δ Capital (3)	Δ R&D (4)
ΔFDI_{fj}	-6.65** (2.87)	0.38 (1.43)	-5.60** (2.16)	-9.99*** (3.59)
$NTRgap_j$	-0.87 (0.70)	-0.54 (0.41)	-0.75 (0.52)	-0.05 (0.90)
Mean dep. var.	2.74	-2.84	-14.87	6.80
# clusters	106	106	106	72
N	642	642	642	253

Notes: Standard errors clustered at the SIC-3 digit levels are reported in parenthesis. *: $p < 0.1$; **: $p < 0.05$; ***: $p < 0.01$. This table reports the OLS estimates of equation (3.3). Estimation samples include global firms, excluding those from China, India, South Korea, and the US. The FDI exposure ΔFDI_{fj} is defined in equation (3.4). In columns 1-2, 3-4, and 5-6, the dependent variables are DHS growth rates of sales, employment, capital, and R&D expenditures between 1999-2012. The NTR gap is potential tariff increases on Chinese imports that would have occurred in the event of a failed annual renewal of China's NTR status prior to PNTR. All regression models are weighted by initial sales.

Table B6: Robustness. Positive Spillovers to Chinese Firms and Negative Outcomes for US Firms (OLS)

Robustness	Chinese firms: Positive spillovers				US firms: Negative competition			
	Alt. sample ex. FDI subsidiaries	Alt. clustering 4-digit level	Alt. sample period 1999-2007	Alt. weight emp.	Alt. sample ex. FDI subsidiaries	Alt. clustering 4-digit level	Alt. sample period 1999-2007	Alt. weight emp.
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)
<i>Panel A. Dependent variable: $\Delta Sale$</i>								
ΔFDI_{fj}	9.08*** (3.15)	8.97*** (1.67)	15.80*** (5.03)	8.54*** (1.84)	-10.10*** (2.86)	-11.08*** (2.72)	-9.39 (6.25)	-9.11*** (2.40)
Mean dep. var.	81.74	79.61	47.49	84.04	7.84	8.69	14.77	8.88
<i>Panel B. Dependent variable: ΔEmp</i>								
ΔFDI_{fj}	5.81*** (1.87)	7.30*** (1.65)	12.94*** (3.21)	6.11*** (1.29)	-9.78*** (3.38)	-10.65*** (3.00)	-11.43** (4.97)	-7.86*** (2.75)
Mean dep. var.	-18.92	-7.08	-6.30	-39.96	-11.27	-10.82	-3.32	-13.46
NTR gap ctrl.	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	
# clusters	156	380	157	157	105	173	110	105
N	11978	14844	22529	14834	949	1017	1437	1017

Notes: Standard errors are reported in parenthesis. *: $p < 0.1$; **: $p < 0.05$; ***: $p < 0.01$. Standard errors are clustered at the CIC 3-digit in columns 1-4 and 6-7 and 4-digit levels in columns 5. This table reports the OLS estimates of equation (3.3). ΔFDI_{fj} is defined in equation (3.4). In Panels A and B, the dependent variables are the DHS growth rates of sales and employment for Chinese firms. Columns 1 excludes all FDI subsidiaries (JV and WOFE) among Chinese firms and columns 5 excludes all firms that formed FDI in China among US firms. Columns 2 and 6 consider alternative clustering at the CIC 4-digit level. Columns 3 and 7 consider an alternative sample period of 1999-2007. Columns 4 and 8 consider an alternative weights based on employment. Columns 1-4 include dummies of state-owned firms and FDI affiliates, and province fixed effects. Except for columns 4 and 8, regression models are weighted by initial sales.

Table B7: Pre-trend and Shock Balance Test of the IVs

Balance variable	IV _j ^{JP,KR}			IV _j ^{pol}		
	Coef.	SE	p-val.	Coef.	SE	p-val.
<i>Panel A. Pre-trend</i>						
Δ Log gross output, 1993-1998	0.11	(0.06)	[0.06]	−0.22	(0.19)	[0.24]
Δ Log emp., 1993-1998	0.10	(0.06)	[0.10]	−0.22	(0.19)	[0.25]
Δ Log PPI, 1993-1998	0.05	(0.05)	[0.35]	−0.02	(0.06)	[0.77]
Δ US import (ex. CN, IN, JP, KR) / absorption, 1996-1998	0.04	(0.02)	[0.12]	−0.01	(0.03)	[0.69]
Δ US-CN import / absorption, 1996-1998	−0.05	(0.06)	[0.41]	−0.04	(0.08)	[0.65]
<i>Panel B. Industry-level balance</i>						
US-CN import / absorption 1996	−0.06	(0.04)	[0.14]	0.00	(0.06)	[0.95]
US-IN import / absorption 1996	−0.01	(0.01)	[0.28]	0.02	(0.02)	[0.33]
CN-IN import / absorption 1996	−0.02	(0.01)	[0.15]	0.05	(0.02)	[0.01]
IN-CN import / absorption 1996	−0.02	(0.02)	[0.24]	0.02	(0.02)	[0.24]
JV sales share 1998	−0.04	(0.04)	[0.28]	−0.12	(0.16)	[0.45]
Number of JV firms to total number of firms ratio 1998	0.02	(0.01)	[0.12]	0.00	(0.02)	[0.99]
US import (ex. CN, IN, JP, KR) / absorption 1996	0.14	(0.04)	[0.00]	−0.12	(0.06)	[0.05]
Ratio of capital to wage-bills 1993	0.01	(0.07)	[0.91]	0.03	(0.11)	[0.81]
Ratio of wage bills to value-added 1993	0.03	(0.05)	[0.56]	−0.07	(0.09)	[0.47]
R&D intensity 1993	0.08	(0.11)	[0.47]	0.05	(0.06)	[0.37]
Production workers' share of employment 1993	0.27	(0.06)	[0.00]	−0.28	(0.13)	[0.03]
High-tech investment shares 1990	−0.13	(0.09)	[0.15]	0.06	(0.13)	[0.62]
Computer investment shares 1990	−0.18	(0.05)	[0.00]	0.17	(0.14)	[0.22]
N	383			383		


Notes: Standard errors clustered at the SIC-3 digit levels are reported in parenthesis. *: $p < 0.1$; **: $p < 0.05$; ***: $p < 0.01$. This table reports the OLS estimates obtained after regression industry-level characteristics on the IVs. Each observation is a 4-digit SIC industry. All variables are standardized. R&D intensity is the 1993 sectoral mean of R&D-to-sales ratios, calculated from Compustat. Columns 1-3 and 4-6 use IVs based on South Korea and Japan's FDI in India and on changes in China's domestic FDI policy, respectively. High-tech and computer investment shares are obtained from [Acemoglu et al. \(2016\)](#), varying at the SIC 3-digit levels. All regressions are weighted by the initial gross output.

Table B8: Firm-level Pre-trend. Correlations between the IVs and Pre-1999 Firm Size Growth

Dep. var.	US firms DHS growth, 1993-1998			
	Δ Sale (1)	Δ Emp. (2)	Δ Capital (3)	Δ Export (4)
<i>Panel A. IV based on Korea & Japan's FDI in India</i>				
IV_j^{JP-KR}	-2.51 (17.45)	-0.68 (23.08)	18.31 (12.88)	-19.20 (35.88)
<i>Panel B. IV based on China FDI policy change</i>				
IV_j^{pol}	3.01 (4.66)	2.44 (4.96)	-1.39 (3.56)	-1.40 (7.03)
Mean dep. var.	13.43	-1.23	16.27	67.39
# Clusters	102	102	102	94
N	723	723	723	565

Notes: Standard errors, clustered at the SIC-3 digit levels, are reported in parenthesis. *: $p < 0.1$; **: $p < 0.05$; ***: $p < 0.01$. This table reports the US firm-level pretrend result. Panels A and B use IVs based on South Korea and Japan's FDI in India and on changes in China's domestic FDI policy, respectively. In columns 1-4, the dependent variables are the DHS growth of sales, employment, capital, and exports between 1993 and 1998. All specifications include the NTR gap control. All regression models are weighted by initial sales.

Figure B1: After Forming Joint Ventures, Foreign Multinationals Received More Citations from Chinese Firms



Notes: This figure illustrates the event study estimation results of equation (B.2). 95% confidence intervals, based on standard errors clustered at the pair levels, are reported. β_{-1} is normalized to zero. In Panels A and B, the dependent variables are dummies of receiving citations by non-partner Chinese firms, and by non-Chinese firms, respectively. All specifications include firm-pair and pair-year fixed effects.

Table B9: Positive Spillovers to Chinese Firms and Negative Competition Effects to US Firms (IV)

Dep. var.	Chinese firms: Spillovers				US firms: Competition			
	ΔSale		ΔEmp		ΔSale		ΔEmp	
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)
<i>Panel A. IV based on Korea & Japan's FDI in India</i>								
ΔFDI_{fj}	12.76*** (3.37)	10.92*** (2.98)	10.01*** (2.44)	11.00*** (2.14)	-17.36*** (3.74)	-16.11*** (3.81)	-18.32*** (4.33)	-14.61*** (3.87)
NTRgap_j	0.11 (0.32)	0.38 (0.34)	0.62* (0.32)	0.79*** (0.28)	-1.63* (0.93)	-1.72** (0.77)	-1.58 (1.04)	-1.74** (0.77)
KP-F	45.82	42.73	45.82	42.73	130.64	134.08	130.64	134.08
<i>Panel B. IV based on China's FDI policy change</i>								
ΔFDI_{fj}	15.02** (6.22)	19.05** (7.44)	2.15 (8.96)	4.58 (8.94)	-28.17*** (8.91)	-33.18*** (9.96)	-32.13*** (10.89)	-34.90*** (10.58)
NTRgap_j	0.20 (0.46)	0.72 (0.47)	0.33 (0.44)	0.52 (0.43)	-2.48** (1.17)	-2.78*** (0.99)	-2.66* (1.36)	-3.00*** (1.03)
KP-F	3.37	5.58	3.37	5.58	13.42	16.62	13.42	16.62
Add. ctrl.		✓		✓		✓		✓
Mean dep. var.	79.61	79.61	-7.08	-7.08	8.69	8.69	-10.82	-10.82
# clusters	157	157	157	157	105	105	105	105
N	14844	14844	14844	14844	1017	1017	1017	1017

Notes: Standard errors, clustered at the CIC and SIC 3-digit levels in columns 1–4 and 5–8, respectively, are reported in parentheses. *: $p < 0.1$; **: $p < 0.05$; ***: $p < 0.01$. This table reports the IV estimates of equation (3.3). ΔFDI_{fj} is defined in equations (3.4). In columns 1-2, 3-4, and 5-6, the dependent variables are the DHS growth rates of sales, employment, capital, and exports of Chinese firms. Panels A and B use IVs based on South Korea and Japan's FDI in India and on changes in China's domestic FDI policy, respectively. The NTR gap is potential tariff increases on Chinese imports that would have occurred in the event of a failed annual renewal of China's NTR status prior to PNTR. All specifications include dummies of state-owned firms and FDI affiliates, and province fixed effects. The even columns include 1996 US import penetration (overall imports, excluding US, China, India, Japan, and Korea, relative to domestic absorption), 1993 production worker shares, 1990 computer investment shares, 1-digit industry dummies, and changes in predicted import shares from South Korea, Japan, and India between 1999 and 2012. KP-F is the Kleibergen-Papp F-Statistics. All regression models are weighted by initial sales.

C. ADDITIONAL MATHEMATICAL EXPRESSIONS

Value Functions of Leaders. A Home leader's value function (regardless of $m^F > 0$ or not) without JV is expressed as follows:

$$\begin{aligned}
 r_{Ht}V_{ht}(\mathbf{m};0) - \dot{V}_{ht}(\mathbf{m};0) = & \max_{x_{ht}, d_{ht}} \left\{ \Pi_{ht}(\mathbf{m}) - \alpha_{Hr} \frac{(x_{ht})^\gamma}{\gamma} w_{Ht} - \alpha_{Hd} \frac{(d_{ht})^\gamma}{\gamma} w_{Ht} \right. \\
 & + x_{ht} \left(V_{ht}(\mathbf{m} + (1, 1, 0); 0) - V_{ht}(\mathbf{m}; 0) \right) + x_{ft} \left(V_{ht}(\mathbf{m} + (-1, 0, 1); 0) - V_{ht}(\mathbf{m}; 0) \right) \\
 & \left. + d_{ht} \left(V_{ht}(\mathbf{m}; 1) - V_{ht}(\mathbf{m}; 0) - C_t(\mathbf{m}) \right) + \sum_{\mathbf{m}'} \tilde{\mathbb{T}}(\mathbf{m}'; \mathbf{m}) \left(V_{ht}(\mathbf{m}'; 0) - V_{ht}(\mathbf{m}; 0) \right) \right\}, \quad (\text{C.1})
 \end{aligned}$$

where $\tilde{\mathbb{T}}(\mathbf{m}'; \mathbf{m})$ denotes transition probabilities:

$$\tilde{\mathbb{T}}(\mathbf{m}'; \mathbf{m}) = \begin{cases} \delta^F & \text{if } \mathbf{m}' = \{0, |m^F| \times \mathbb{1}[m^F \leq 0] + m^{DH}, |m^F| \times \mathbb{1}[m^F > 0] + m^{DF}\} \\ \delta^D & \text{if } \mathbf{m}' = \{m^F, 0, m^{DF}\} \\ \delta^D & \text{if } \mathbf{m}' = \{m^F, m^{DH}, 0\} \\ 0 & \text{Otherwise,} \end{cases} \quad (\text{C.2})$$

where $\mathbb{1}[\cdot]$ is an indicator function. By using an indicator function, we generalize equation (4.6) to apply in both cases: $m^F > 0$ and $m^F \leq 0$. A Home leader's value function with JV is

$$\begin{aligned}
 r_{Ht}V_{ht}(\mathbf{m};1) - \dot{V}_{ht}(\mathbf{m};1) = & \max_{x_{ht}} \left\{ \Pi_{ht}(\mathbf{m}) - \alpha_{Hr} \frac{(x_{ht})^\gamma}{\gamma} w_{Ht} + \kappa \Pi_{vt}(\mathbf{m}) \right. \\
 & + x_{ht} \left(V_{ht}(\mathbf{m} + (1, 1, 0); 1) - V_{ht}(\mathbf{m}; 1) \right) + x_{ft} \left(V_{ht}(\mathbf{m} + (-1, 0, 1); 1) - V_{ht}(\mathbf{m}; 1) \right) \\
 & + \phi \left(V_{ht}(0, |m^F| \times \mathbb{1}[m^F \leq 0] + m^{DH}, |m^F| \times \mathbb{1}[m^F > 0] + m^{DF}; 1) - V_{ht}(\mathbf{m}; 1) \right) \\
 & \left. + \chi \left(V_{ht}(\mathbf{m}; 0) - V_{ht}(\mathbf{m}; 1) \right) + \sum_{\mathbf{m}'} \tilde{\mathbb{T}}(\mathbf{m}'; \mathbf{m}) \left(V_{ht}(\mathbf{m}'; 1) - V_{ht}(\mathbf{m}; 1) \right) \right\}. \quad (\text{C.3})
 \end{aligned}$$

A Foreign leader's value functions with and without JVs are

$$\begin{aligned}
r_{Ft}V_{ft}(\mathbf{m};0) - \dot{V}_{ft}(\mathbf{m};0) = \max_{x_{ft}} & \left\{ \Pi_{ft}(\mathbf{m}) - \alpha_{Fr} \frac{(x_{ft})^\gamma}{\gamma} w_{Ft} \right. \\
& + x_{ft} \left(V_{ft}(\mathbf{m} + (-1, 0, 1); 0) - V_{ft}(\mathbf{m}; 0) \right) + x_{ht} \left(V_{ft}(\mathbf{m} + (1, 1, 0); 0) - V_{ft}(\mathbf{m}; 0) \right) \\
& \left. + d_{ht} \left(V_{ft}(\mathbf{m}; 1) - V_{ft}(\mathbf{m}; 0) + C_t(\mathbf{m}) \right) + \sum_{\mathbf{m}'} \tilde{\mathbb{T}}(\mathbf{m}'; \mathbf{m}) \left(V_{ft}(\mathbf{m}'; 0) - V_{ft}(\mathbf{m}; 0) \right) \right\}.
\end{aligned} \tag{C.4}$$

$$\begin{aligned}
r_{Ft}V_{ft}(\mathbf{m};1) - \dot{V}_{ft}(\mathbf{m};1) = \max_{x_{ft}} & \left\{ \Pi_{ft}(\mathbf{m}) - \alpha_{Fr} \frac{(x_{ft})^\gamma}{\gamma} w_{Ht} + (1 - \kappa) \Pi_{vt}(\mathbf{m}) \right. \\
& + x_{ft} \left(V_{ft}(\mathbf{m} + (-1, 0, 1); 1) - V_{ft}(\mathbf{m}; 1) \right) + x_{ht} \left(V_{ft}(\mathbf{m} + (1, 1, 0); 1) - V_{ft}(\mathbf{m}; 1) \right) \\
& + \phi \left(V_{ft}(0, |m^F| \times \mathbb{1}[m^F \leq 0] + m^{DH}, |m^F| \times \mathbb{1}[m^F > 0] + m^{DF}; 1) - V_{ft}(\mathbf{m}; 1) \right) \\
& \left. + \chi \left(V_{ft}(\mathbf{m}; 0) - V_{ft}(\mathbf{m}; 1) \right) + \sum_{\mathbf{m}'} \tilde{\mathbb{T}}(\mathbf{m}'; \mathbf{m}) \left(V_{ft}(\mathbf{m}'; 1) - V_{ft}(\mathbf{m}; 1) \right) \right\}.
\end{aligned} \tag{C.5}$$

Value Functions of Fringe Firms. For both fringe firms in Home and Foreign, $i \in \{\tilde{h}, \tilde{f}\}$, the value functions without and with JVs are expressed as follows:

$$\begin{aligned}
r_{ct}V_{it}(\mathbf{m};0) - \dot{V}_{it}(\mathbf{m};0) = & \Pi_{it}(\mathbf{m}) \\
& + x_{ht} \left(V_{it}(\mathbf{m} + (1, 1, 0); 0) - V_{it}(\mathbf{m}; 0) \right) + x_{ft} \left(V_{it}(\mathbf{m} + (-1, 0, 1); 0) - V_{it}(\mathbf{m}; 0) \right) \\
& + d_{ht} \left(V_{it}(\mathbf{m}; 1) - V_{it}(\mathbf{m}; 0) + \sum_{\mathbf{m}'} \tilde{\mathbb{T}}(\mathbf{m}'; \mathbf{m}) \left(V_{it}(\mathbf{m}'; 0) - V_{it}(\mathbf{m}; 0) \right) \right).
\end{aligned} \tag{C.6}$$

$$\begin{aligned}
r_{ct}V_{it}(\mathbf{m};1) - \dot{V}_{it}(\mathbf{m};1) = & \Pi_{it}(\mathbf{m}) \\
& + x_{ft} \left(V_{it}(\mathbf{m} + (-1, 0, 1); 1) - V_{it}(\mathbf{m}; 1) \right) + x_{ht} \left(V_{it}(\mathbf{m} + (1, 1, 0); 1) - V_{it}(\mathbf{m}; 1) \right) \\
& + \phi \left(V_{it}(0, |m^F| \times \mathbb{1}[m^F \leq 0] + m^{DH}, |m^F| \times \mathbb{1}[m^F > 0] + m^{DF}; 1) - V_{it}(\mathbf{m}; 1) \right) \\
& + \chi \left(V_{it}(\mathbf{m}; 0) - V_{it}(\mathbf{m}; 1) \right) + \sum_{\mathbf{m}'} \tilde{\mathbb{T}}(\mathbf{m}'; \mathbf{m}) \left(V_{it}(\mathbf{m}'; 1) - V_{it}(\mathbf{m}; 1) \right).
\end{aligned} \tag{C.7}$$

Law of Motion for Productivity Gaps and JV Status. The law of motion for $\mu_t(\mathbf{m}; \mathcal{J})$ is

$$\begin{aligned}
\dot{\mu}_t(\mathbf{m}; \mathcal{J}) = & \underbrace{x_{ht}(m^F - 1, m^{DH} - 1, m^{DF}; \mathcal{J})\mu_t(m^F - 1, m^{DH} - 1, m^{DF}; \mathcal{J})}_{\text{Innovation by Home leader}} \\
& + \underbrace{x_{ft}(m^F + 1, m^{DH}, m^{DF} - 1; \mathcal{J})\mu_t(m^F + 1, m^{DH}, m^{DF} - 1; \mathcal{J})}_{\text{Innovation by Foreign leader}} \\
& + \underbrace{d_{ht}(m^F, m^{DH}, m^{DF}; 0)\mathbb{1}[\mathcal{J} = 1]\mu_t(m^F, m^{DH}, m^{DF}; 0)}_{\text{JV investment}} + \underbrace{\chi\mathbb{1}[\mathcal{J} = 0]\mu_t(m^F, m^{DH}, m^{DF}; 1)}_{\text{JV exit}} \\
& + \underbrace{\delta^D\mathbb{1}[m^{DH} = 0]}_{\text{Home domestic diffusion}} + \underbrace{\delta^D\mathbb{1}[m^{DF} = 0]}_{\text{Foreign domestic diffusion}} + \underbrace{\delta^F\mathbb{1}[m^F = 0, \mathcal{J} = 0]}_{\text{Across-country diffusion}} + \underbrace{\phi\mathbb{1}[m^F = 0, \mathcal{J} = 1]}_{\text{JV direct diffusion}} \\
& - \underbrace{\left(x_{ht}(\mathbf{m}; \mathcal{J}) + x_{ft}(\mathbf{m}; \mathcal{J}) + 2 * \delta^D + \delta^F + \phi\right)}_{\text{Subtracted mass}} \mu_t(\mathbf{m}; \mathcal{J}).
\end{aligned} \tag{C.8}$$

The first four lines of the right hand side capture the mass that enters a state $(\mathbf{m}; \mathcal{J})$ from other states. The first line captures that in state $(m^F - 1, m^{DH} - 1, m^{DF})$, Home leader's successful innovation moves to (m^F, m^{DH}, m^{DF}) with intensity x_{ht} . The second line captures evolution of states due to Foreign leader's innovation. In the third line, $\mathbb{1}[\mathcal{J} = 1]$ or $\mathbb{1}[\mathcal{J} = 0]$ are indicator functions of the JV status. For $\mathcal{J} = 1$, with intensity d_{ht} , a JV is established moving from a state $(m^F, m^{DH}, m^{DF}; 0)$ to state $(m^F, m^{DH}, m^{DF}; 1)$. The second term in the third line captures the exogenous exit of existing JVs when $\mathcal{J} = 1$. The fourth line captures evolution of states due to direct diffusion through JVs, within-country and across-country spillovers. Finally, the last line captures the mass leaving the current state.

D. APPENDIX: QUANTITATIVE EXERCISE

D.1 Mapping Model Objects to the Estimated Coefficients from the Data

Direct Effects on Chinese Partners in Fact 1. For Chinese leaders and fringe firms, we run the following regression model which is analogous to equation (3.1) using OLS:

$$\ln \text{Sale}_{ijt} = \beta \mathbb{1}[\text{Post-JV}_{it}] + \delta_i + \delta_{jt} + \varepsilon_{ijt}, \quad i \in \{f, \tilde{f}\}$$

where i denotes firm and t periods. δ_i is firm time-invariant fixed effects, and δ_{jt} is product-year fixed effects. $\mathbb{1}[\text{Post-JV}_{it}]$ is a dummy which equals 1 after forming JVs.

Industry-Level Regressions in Facts 2 and 3. To estimate the model, we replicate the industry-level regressions of facts 2 and 3 in Section 3. We simulate 100,000 products in the model, whose technology gap between US and China is randomly drawn from the calibrated normal distribution. Each product corresponds to each industry. However, since innovation and diffusion are stochastic, industries become heterogeneous over time in terms of their technology gaps. We then estimate equation (3.3), with two key differences.

In the model, we run the following OLS regression analogous to equation (3.3):

$$\Delta \text{Sale}_{hj} = \beta \Delta \text{JV}_j + \delta_{m^F, 99} + \varepsilon_{jm}, \quad (\text{D.1})$$

where h denotes US leaders and j products. The dependent variable is DHS growth of US leaders' sales. $\delta_{m^F, 99}$ are fixed effects for the initial US-China gap $m^F \in \{-\bar{m}, \dots, \bar{m}\}$ in 1999. Multiple products with the same initial gap identify these fixed effects. We abstract away from additional controls used in the empirical analysis, because it is difficult to define the additional controls in the model (e.g., NTR gap).

ΔJV_j is defined analogously to the FDI exposure defined in equation (3.4), with one

modification:

$$\Delta JV_j = \frac{\text{Avg. JV sales in China}_{j,99-12}}{\text{Total sales in China}_{j,99}} - \frac{\text{JV sales in China}_{j,99}}{\text{Total sales in China}_{j,99}}. \quad (\text{D.2})$$

The modification is that, unlike equation (3.4), we use the average JV sales between 1999 and 2012, instead of the last value in 2012 due to mean reversion. In the model, JVs exit with an exogenous probability. Therefore, products (or industries) initially with JVs are likely to lose JVs due to exogenous exits by 2012, which leads to changes in JV sales shares between 1999 and 2012 that are negative due to this mean reversion. Despite the JV exits, however, Chinese firms in that sector may have already benefited from technology diffusion, increasing their market shares in the US. To account for this, we use the average sales share of JV firms.

D.2 Nash-in-Nash Bargaining

We adopt the Nash-in-Nash solution, where each negotiating pair maximizes its Nash product, taking the actions of other pairs as given.

$$\begin{aligned} C_t(\mathbf{m}) &= \arg\max_C \left\{ (\Delta^{\text{JV}} V_{ht}(\mathbf{m}) - C - C^E)^\xi \times (\Delta^{\text{JV}} V_{ft}(\mathbf{m}) + C)^{1-\xi} \right\} \\ \text{s.t.} \quad & \Delta^{\text{JV}} V_{ht}(\mathbf{m}) - C - C^E \geq 0, \quad \Delta^{\text{JV}} V_{ft}(\mathbf{m}) + C \geq 0 \\ & = (1 - \xi)(\Delta^{\text{JV}} V_{ht}(\mathbf{m}) - C^E) - \xi \Delta^{\text{JV}} V_{ft}(\mathbf{m}) \end{aligned} \quad (\text{D.3})$$

$$\begin{aligned} C_t^E(\mathbf{m}) &= \arg\max_C \left\{ (\Delta^{\text{JV}} V_{ht}(\mathbf{m}) - C - C^E)^{\xi^E} \times (\Delta^{\text{JV}} V_{\tilde{h}t}(\mathbf{m}) + C^E)^{1-\xi^E} \right\} \\ \text{s.t.} \quad & \Delta^{\text{JV}} V_{ht}(\mathbf{m}) - C - C^E \geq 0, \quad \Delta^{\text{JV}} V_{\tilde{h}t}(\mathbf{m}) + C^E \geq 0 \\ & = (1 - \xi^E)(\Delta^{\text{JV}} V_{ht}(\mathbf{m}) - C) - \xi^E \Delta^{\text{JV}} V_{\tilde{h}t}(\mathbf{m}) \end{aligned} \quad (\text{D.4})$$

Combining equations (D.3) and (D.4), we obtain

$$C = \frac{\xi^E(1 - \xi)}{\xi^E(1 - \xi) + \xi} \{ \Delta^{\text{JV}} V_{ht}(\mathbf{m}) + \Delta^{\text{JV}} V_{\tilde{h}t}(\mathbf{m}) \} - \frac{\xi}{\xi^E(1 - \xi) + \xi} \Delta^{\text{JV}} V_{ft}(\mathbf{m}) \quad (\text{D.5})$$

$$C^E = \frac{\xi(1 - \xi^E)}{\xi(1 - \xi^E) + \xi^E} \{ \Delta^{JV} V_{ht}(\mathbf{m}) + \Delta^{JV} V_{ft}(\mathbf{m}) \} - \frac{\xi^E}{\xi(1 - \xi^E) + \xi^E} \Delta^{JV} V_{\tilde{h}t}(\mathbf{m}). \quad (\text{D.6})$$

When we set $\xi^E = 1$, the above expressions collapse to equation (6.1).

D.3 Additional Figures and Tables

Table D1: Baseline vs. Restricting Joint Venture Investments in 1999: Net Present Value of Real Profits and Labor Income. China

	Baseline	Shutting down JV	Changes (%)
CN leader profit (own + JV + JV fee)	0.042	0.038	−10.43
Own profit	0.041	0.037	−8.77
JV profit	0.005	0.000	n/a
JV fee payment	−0.004	0.000	n/a
CN fringe profit	0.063	0.060	−5.11
CN labor income	0.895	0.817	−8.71
CN total real income	1.000	0.914	−8.55


Notes. This table reports the net present value of real profits and labor income, deflated by each country's price index and normalized by baseline total real income, under the counterfactual that JVs are banned in 1999 versus the baseline. Leader profits include own profits, JV profits, and JV fees.

Table D2: Robustness. Baseline vs. Restricting Joint Venture in 1999. Alternative Assumptions


	Δ US Welfare (%)	Δ CN Welfare (%)	Δ US Innovation rate (%)	Δ CN Innovation rate (%)
Baseline	1.20	−10.25	1.36	7.13
No innovation	0.39	−17.05	0	0
Love of variety	0.73	−10.58	1.36	7.13
Constant markup	1.46	−8.25	1.30	4.98

Notes. This table reports the effects of restricting JV in 1999 with alternative parameterizations. Δ Welfare is expressed in consumption-equivalent units, and Δ innovation rate denotes the difference in average innovation rates over the first 50 years between the baseline and counterfactual scenarios.


Figure D1: US Innovation Rate over Time and Technology Gap. The Cases of Larger Market Size $\kappa = 1$ and No Direct Diffusion $\phi = 0$




Larger market size effect ($\kappa = 1$)
A. US average innovation rate



B. US Innovation rate over technology gap



No direct diffusion ($\phi = 0$)
C. US average innovation rate



D. US Innovation rate over technology gap


Notes. In Panels A and B, we consider the case of larger market size effects by setting $\kappa = 1$. In Panels C and D, we shut down direct diffusion by setting $\phi = 0$. Panels A and C plot the average innovation rate in baseline and counterfactual scenarios. Panels B and D plots the innovation rate in the baseline scenario in 2025 over m^F , technology gap between US and Chinese leader firms. $m^F > 0$ denotes the case when US firms exceed the Chinese leader in productivity. In this example, technology gaps between domestic firms are set to $m^{DF} = m^{DH} = \bar{m}$.

Table D3: Baseline vs. Restricting Joint Venture in 1999. Robustness. Sensitivity Checks

	Δ US Welfare (%)	Δ CN Welfare (%)	Δ US Innovation rate (%)	Δ CN Innovation rate (%)
Baseline	1.20	-10.25	1.36	7.13
<i>Panel A. Direct diffusion (baseline: $\phi = 0.13$)</i>				
$\phi = 0.08$	0.87	-10.31	0.82	7.33
$\phi = 0.18$	1.27	-9.86	1.66	6.76
<i>Panel B. Across-country diffusion (baseline: $\delta^F = 0.024$)</i>				
$\delta^F = 0.019$	0.88	-10.81	1.44	7.24
$\delta^F = 0.029$	1.28	-9.09	1.51	6.20
<i>Panel C. Within-country diffusion (baseline: $\delta^D = 0.027$)</i>				
$\delta^D = 0.022$	1.31	-10.13	1.50	7.25
$\delta^D = 0.032$	1.10	-10.36	1.23	7.00
<i>Panel D. Initial technology gap (baseline: $\mathcal{D} = 20$)</i>				
$\mathcal{D} = 23$	1.64	-9.32	1.53	7.15
$\mathcal{D} = 17$	0.77	-9.32	1.39	7.36
<i>Panel E. US JV profit share (baseline: $\kappa = 0.54$)</i>				
$\kappa = 0.75$	0.86	-10.87	1.20	7.03
$\kappa = 0.25$	1.66	-9.25	1.57	7.19


Notes. This table reports the effects of restricting JV in 1999 with alternative parameterizations. Δ Welfare is expressed in consumption-equivalent units, and Δ innovation rate denotes the difference in average innovation rates over the first 50 years between the baseline and counterfactual scenarios.

Figure D2: Baseline vs. Restricting Joint Venture Investments over Different Years. Welfare Effects (%)




Notes. This figure reports consumption-equivalent welfare changes of the US from restricting JV investments in different years, compared to the baseline scenario. The x-axis denotes years in which JV investments begin to be restricted.


Figure D3: Baseline vs. Restricting Joint Venture Investments in 2025: Dynamics of Productivity, Innovation, and Consumption




A. Log leader productivity



B. Productivity ratio (US/China)



C. Innovation rate difference



D. Relative consumption

Notes. This figure compares dynamics under the counterfactual (JV restriction beginning in 2025) to the baseline. The dashed vertical line is 2025. Panel A shows log average leader productivity for the US and China; Panel B shows the US–China productivity ratio; Panel C plots the difference in their average innovation rates (counterfactual minus baseline); and Panel D plots relative consumption (counterfactual over baseline).

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