



# CMSC 5718 INTRODUCTION TO COMPUTATIONAL FINANCE

**Lecture 6**

# Outline

- Measuring portfolio performance
  - Performance attribution
  - Standard performance ratios
- The special case for hedge funds
- Measuring portfolio risk
  - Dispersion and other measures
- Value-at-risk

# Application of asset pricing models in performance evaluation

- Given that there are many different kinds of trading strategies, how do we compare the performance of the various financial instruments?
  - One result that we want to achieve is to identify a good manager from others who get good investment results because of market or other random factors, i.e. we want to distinguish between skill and luck
- We can use the CAPM to calculate risk-adjusted performance

# Examples of fund performance


	產品風險 級別 Product Risk Ratings	基金 成立日 Inception Date	3M	2015	2014	2013	2012	2011	3年波幅 Ann. Volatility 3Y	3年夏普 比率 Ann. Sharpe Ratio 3Y
<b>多元入息資產 MULTI ASSET INCOME</b>										
<b>環球多元入息資產 Global Multi Asset Income</b>										
貝萊德環球多元資產入息基金 A2(美元) BGF Global Multi-Asset Income A2 (USD)	3	28/6/2012	3.13%	-2.35%	4.11%	5.74%	NA	NA	5.03%	0.56
摩根全方位入息基金(港元) JPMorgan Multi Income Fund (HKD)	3	9/9/2011	3.63%	-1.67%	4.42%	6.01%	14.85%	NA	6.41%	0.57
<b>股票：已發展市場 EQUITIES: DEVELOPED MARKETS</b>										
<b>環球股票 Global Equity</b>										
聯博 – 低波幅策略股票基金 AD股(美元) AllianceBernstein Low Volatility Equity Ptf AD (USD)	3	15/10/2013	1.29%	5.06%	9.43%	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA
富達基金 – 環球股息基金(美元) Fidelity Fds Global Dividend (USD)	4	30/1/2012	2.29%	1.58%	4.73%	26.12%	NA	NA	9.39%	0.63
<b>北美股票 North American Equity</b>										
聯博 – 精選美國股票基金A股(美元) AllianceBernstein Select US Equity Pf A (USD)	4	28/10/2011	2.55%	-0.20%	11.93%	29.35%	14.32%	NA	10.47%	0.71
摩根美國價值基金(美元) JPM US Value (USD)	4	19/10/2000	3.06%	-6.96%	13.35%	30.65%	13.13%	1.41%	11.20%	0.50
<b>北美股票 – 增長 North American Equity – Growth</b>										
美盛凱利美國進取型增長基金(美元) Legg Mason ClearBridge US Aggressive Growth Fund (USD)	4	20/4/2007	9.57%	-5.22%	13.62%	37.52%	18.69%	-2.64%	13.92%	0.39
富蘭克林美國機會基金A股(美元) Franklin U.S. Opportunities A (USD)	4	3/4/2000	7.05%	4.82%	6.71%	38.60%	9.33%	-3.88%	13.29%	0.47
<b>歐洲股票 European Equity</b>										
貝萊德歐洲基金A2(歐元) BGF European Fund A2 (EUR)	5	30/11/1993	-9.50%	10.97%	2.58%	21.78%	20.45%	-10.41%	13.12%	0.23

- Source: Funds Select, Fourth Quarter 2016, Standard Chartered Bank, Hong Kong

# A simple performance attribution method

- Performance of a fund is measured against a benchmark, called the bogey portfolio, with fixed weights in each asset class
  - E.g. we can use broad market indices, like S&P 500, in each asset class to represent the passive strategies
  - One needs to decide on the “neutral” weights to be allocated to each asset class; this depends on the investor’s risk tolerance
- The performance in each asset class is divided as:
  - Total return = return from asset allocation  
+ return from security selection

# A simple performance attribution method



- From Bodie, Kane and Marcus, Investments, 6<sup>th</sup> edition, McGraw Hill (2003)

# A simple performance attribution method

- The returns of the managed portfolio and the bogey portfolio are:

$$r_P = \sum_{i=1}^n w_{Pi} r_{Pi}, \quad r_B = \sum_{i=1}^n w_{Bi} r_{Bi}$$

- The difference between the two rates of return is

$$r_P - r_B = \sum_{i=1}^n (w_{Pi} r_{Pi} - w_{Bi} r_{Bi})$$

- Total contribution from asset class  $i$  is decomposed as:

$$\underbrace{w_{Pi} r_{Pi} - w_{Bi} r_{Bi}}_{\text{total contribution}} = \underbrace{(w_{Pi} - w_{Bi}) r_{Bi}}_{\text{asset allocation}} + \underbrace{w_{Pi} (r_{Pi} - r_{Bi})}_{\text{security selection}}$$

# A simple performance attribution method

- Bogey portfolio has 60% equity, 30% fixed income, 10% cash, whereas the managed portfolio has a 70/7/23 distribution
- The return of the bogey portfolio is 3.97%, managed portfolio is 5.34%, i.e. excess return is  $5.34 - 3.97 = 1.37\%$
- Attribution of the returns is as follows (from Bodie et al. (2003)):


A. Contribution of Asset Allocation to Performance					
Market	(1) Actual Weight In Market	(2) Benchmark Weight In Market	(3) Excess Weight	(4) Market Return (%)	(5) = (3) × (4) Contribution to Performance (%)
Equity	.70	.60	.10	5.81	.5810
Fixed-income	.07	.30	−.23	1.45	−.3335
Cash	.23	.10	.13	.48	.0624
Contribution of asset allocation					.3099

B. Contribution of Selection to Total Performance					
Market	(1) Portfolio Performance (%)	(2) Index Performance (%)	(3) Excess Performance (%)	(4) Portfolio Weight	(5) = (3) × (4) Contribution (%)
Equity	7.28	5.81	1.47	.70	1.03
Fixed-income	1.89	1.45	0.44	.07	0.03
Contribution of selection within markets					1.06



# Another performance attribution method



- Decomposition according to Fama (1972), from Elton et al. (2007)

# Another performance attribution method

- Line  $R_F$ - $M$  plots the return of all possible combinations of the riskless asset and the market portfolio
- $A$  represents a portfolio with diversifiable risk
- Jensen's alpha =  $AA'$  = return from selectivity
- Form a portfolio  $A''$  with the same total risk as the portfolio  $A$ , i.e.  $\sigma_A^2 = \sigma_{A''}^2 = \beta_{A''} \sigma_M^2 \Rightarrow \beta_{A''} = \sigma_A^2 / \sigma_M^2$
- Extra return earn by portfolio  $A$  over the portfolio  $A''$  (with the same total risk) = Net selectivity
- Return from selectivity = net selectivity + diversification

# Another performance attribution method

- Secondly, the extra return from  $\overline{R_{A'}} - R_F$  is decomposed into two components
- The investor may have a target risk level given by  $\beta_T$ , which will generate a return of  $\overline{R_T}$ 
  - The extra return above the risk free rate =  $\overline{R_T} - R_F$  is known as the “investor’ risk”
- The remaining return ( $\overline{R_{A'}} - \overline{R_T}$ ) is the return earned because the manager chose a different risk level than the target, known as the “manager’s risk”
- Total excess return =  
return from selectivity + investor risk + manager risk

# Performance attribution example

- Risk free rate  $R_F = 4\%$ , return of market portfolio  $\overline{R_M} = 12\%$ , s.d. of market portfolio  $\sigma_M = 11\%$
- Beta of portfolio A  $\beta_A = 1.3$ , expected return  $\overline{R_A} = 17.53\%$ , s.d. of portfolio A  $\sigma_A = 14\%$
- Return of A from SML =  $0.04 + 1.3 \times (0.12 - 0.04) = 14.4\%$
- Beta of portfolio A'':  $\beta_{A''} = \sigma_A^2 / \sigma_M^2 = 0.14^2 / 0.11^2 = 1.62$
- Return of A'' from SML =  $0.04 + 1.62 \times (0.12 - 0.04) = 16.96\%$
- Return from selectivity = Jensen's alpha =  $17.53 - 14.4 = 3.13\%$
- Net selectivity =  $17.53 - 16.96 = 0.57\%$
- Return from diversification =  $16.96 - 14.4 = 2.56\%$
- Assume investor's target portfolio C has a beta = 1.2
- Return of C from SML =  $0.04 + 1.2 \times (0.12 - 0.04) = 13.6\%$
- Investor risk =  $13.6 - 4 = 9.6\%$
- Manager risk =  $14.4 - 13.6 = 0.8\%$

# Performance from market timing

- In a successful market timing strategy, beta is higher than 1 when the market is bullish, but smaller than 1 when the market is bearish
- Instead of a linear model, the Security Characteristic Line is modified as (Treynor and Mazuy (1966)):

$$R_P - R_f = a + b(R_M - R_f) + c(R_M - R_f)^2 + e_P$$


$a$ ,  $b$ , and  $c$  are constants estimated by regression

- A positive  $c$  indicates evidence of timing ability
- Henrikson and Merton (1981) suggest a two-beta model:

$$R_P - R_f = a + b(R_M - R_f) + c(R_M - R_f)D + e_P$$

$D=1$  if  $R_M > R_f$ , and  $D=0$  if  $R_M \leq R_f$

# Performance from market timing



- A: No market timing, constant beta; B: market timing with increasing beta; C: market timing with two values of beta (Bodie et al., 2003)

# Standard performance measures

- From the Capital Allocation Line (CAL):

$$\text{Sharpe ratio} = RS = \frac{(\overline{r_A} - r_f)}{\sigma_A}$$

- From the Security Market Line (SML):

$$\text{Treynor ratio} = RT = \frac{(\overline{r_A} - r_f)}{\beta_A}$$

$$\text{Jensen's alpha } \alpha_A = \overline{r_A} - \left[ r_f + (\overline{r_M} - r_f) \beta_A \right]$$

$$\text{Information ratio} = RI = \frac{\alpha_A}{\sigma_{e_A}} \text{ where } e_A \text{ is a portfolio's tracking error}$$

# When should we use each benchmark?


- Depends on the investment assumptions
  - **Case 1**: If the portfolio represents the entire investment of an individual, then total volatility matters, and the **Sharpe ratio** is appropriate
  - **Case 2**: If the portfolio is to be mixed with a passive market-index portfolio, the **information ratio** is more relevant as it gives the improvement in the Sharpe ratio of the overall portfolio
  - **Case 3** If a portfolio is just part of a diversified portfolio, then systematic risk matters, and the **Treynor ratio** is more appropriate
- Jensen's alpha is widely used as it indicates a superior performance



# How should we use the benchmarks?

- In each measure, a higher value is better
- The benchmarks could be used to rank different portfolios
- However, it is sometimes difficult to interpret the meaning of each ratio directly
  - E.g. Say the Sharpe ratio of a market index is 0.7 and a portfolio has a Sharpe ratio of 0.65 (i.e. underperforms the market). What is the economic significance of a difference of 0.05?

# The $M^2$ measure



- Popularized by Modigliani and Modigliani (1997)
- From portfolio  $P$  and the risk free asset, construct a portfolio  $P^*$  with the same  $\sigma$  as the market portfolio  $M$
- Define  $M^2$  as
 
$$M^2 = r_{P^*} - r_M = (S_P - S_M)\sigma_M$$
 where  $S_P$  and  $S_M$  are the Sharpe ratios of portfolios  $P$  and  $M$
- Gives the excess return of the portfolio over the market portfolio
  - $M^2$  is negative in this example

# Example

	Port P	Port Q	Market
<b>Excess return (%)</b>	2.76	7.56	1.63
<b>s.d.</b>	6.17	14.89	8.48
<b>alpha</b>	1.63	5.28	
<b>beta</b>	0.69	1.40	1.00
<b>r<sup>2</sup></b>	0.91	0.64	1.00
<b>sigma(e)</b>	1.95	8.98	
<b>Sharpe Ratio</b>	0.45	0.51	0.19
<b>Treynor Ratio</b>	4.00	5.40	1.63
<b>Information Ratio</b>	0.84	0.59	
<b>M2</b>	2.16	2.68	

- Portfolio *P* has a lower beta but smaller residual risk ( $\sigma_e$ ) than portfolio *Q*
- Both *P* and *Q* outperform the market (higher Sharpe ratios and positive alphas)
- *Q* has a higher Sharpe ratio, Treynor ratio and  $M^2$  than *P*, therefore it is better in cases 1 and 3 (c.f. p.16)
- *P* is better if it is to be mixed with an index portfolio as it has a higher Information Ratio (case 2 in p.16)

# Relationships between the ratios

$$RT_A = \frac{\overline{r_A} - r_f}{\beta_A} = \frac{\alpha_A}{\beta_A} + (\overline{r_M} - r_f) = \frac{\alpha_A}{\beta_A} + RT_M$$

- $RT_M$  is the Treynor ratio of the market, with  $\beta_M = 1$

$$RS_A = \frac{\overline{r_A} - r_f}{\sigma_A} = \frac{\alpha_A}{\sigma_A} + \frac{\beta_A (\overline{r_M} - r_f)}{\sigma_A} = \frac{\alpha_A}{\sigma_A} + \frac{\rho_{AM} (\overline{r_M} - r_f)}{\sigma_M} = \frac{\alpha_A}{\sigma_A} + \rho_{AM} RS_M$$

- $RS_M$  is the Sharpe ratio of the market,  $\rho_{AM}$  is the correlation coefficient between the portfolio and market, which is often smaller than 1
- If the portfolio is well diversified and  $\rho_{AM} \approx 1$ , then

$$RS \approx RT / \sigma_M$$

# Interpreting the ratios

- From the previous results, we can see that a higher  $\alpha$  will lead to higher Sharpe and Treynor ratios
- We note the following:
  - A portfolio  $A$  with a positive  $\alpha_A$  may not always result in a higher Sharpe ratio than the market portfolio

$$RS_A - RS_M = \frac{\alpha_A}{\sigma_A} + (\rho_{AM} - 1)RS_M$$

which can be negative if  $\rho_{AM}$  is small

- Sharpe and Treynor ratios may rank portfolios differently as  $\alpha_A$  is used differently

# Financial instruments with non-linear payoffs

- The standard ratios are appropriate for used in measuring portfolios with assets that have linear payoffs
- There exist a large class of instruments with non-linear payoffs, such as financial derivatives, which can give rise to different behavior for the ratios
- An important example is an option, where the holder has the right, but not the obligation, to choose whether to exercise the contract or not

# Call and put option examples

- European call option on HSBC, strike price 65
  - payoff formula:  $\max( S_{\text{final}} - \text{strike}, 0 )$
  - at maturity, if spot price = 70, payoff per option is  $70 - 65 = 5$
  - if spot price = 60, option is worthless
- European put option on HSBC, strike price 65
  - payoff formula:  $\max( \text{strike} - S_{\text{final}}, 0 )$
  - at maturity, if spot price = 70, option is worthless
  - if spot price = 60, payoff per option is  $65 - 60 = 5$

# Manipulating the Sharpe ratio

- Goetzmann et al. (2002) show some examples where the Sharpe ratio may become misleading
- Recall that we want a strategy to have the Sharpe ratio to be as high as possible
- A great strategy with low Sharpe ratio
  - Assume a certain analyst can pick stocks that can always outperform the other companies within an industry
  - One strategy is to long the outperforming stocks, and short the underperforming stocks in each sector
  - *This strategy will always provide a positive return;* however, because there are variations in returns (i.e. high variance), the Sharpe ratio can be low because the variance appears in the denominator



# Manipulating the Sharpe ratio




Figure 3

- The Sharpe ratio is especially misleading when applied to portfolios with options
- In this example, Sharpe ratio of the stock is 0.631
- A portfolio is formed that consists of long 1 share and short  $\eta$  calls
- A Sharpe ratio above 0.73 can be achieved
- From Goetzmann et al. (2002)

# Dispersion measures

- Dispersion measures are measures of uncertainty, which consider both positive and negative deviations from the mean
- The most well known measure is the standard deviation of returns
- Other measures include:
  - Mean-absolute deviation (MAD):  $E\left(\left|\sum_{j=1}^n w_j r_j - E\left[\sum_{j=1}^n w_j r_j\right]\right|\right)$
  - Mean-absolute moment:  $\left\{E\left(\left|\sum_{j=1}^n w_j r_j - E\left[\sum_{j=1}^n w_j r_j\right]\right|^q\right)\right\}^{1/q}$

# Alternative definitions of alpha and beta

- CAPM assumes that asset returns are normal and investors have mean-variance preferences (i.e. ignore skewness)
- For portfolios with arbitrary return distributions, the following modifications are used (Leland (1999)) :

$$CAPM \beta_p = \frac{\text{cov}(r_p, r_M)}{\sigma_M^2}, \text{ Adjusted } B_p = \frac{\text{cov}[r_p, -(1+r_M)^{-b}]}{\text{cov}[r_M, -(1+r_M)^{-b}]}$$

- If excess return of the market is normal,  $b=1$
- If excess return of the market is lognormal

$$b = \frac{\ln[E(1+r_M)] - \ln(1+r_f)}{\text{var}[\ln(1+r_M)]}$$

- Adjusted Alpha is calculated using the CAPM formula, but with the adjusted  $B_p$

# Alternative definitions of alpha and beta

Long the market portfolio, short one call

Strike	E(r)	$\beta$	$\alpha$	adj B	adj A
90	5.51%	0.038	0.24%	0.073	0.00%
100	6.76%	0.163	0.62%	0.251	0.00%
110	8.61%	0.394	0.85%	0.515	0.00%
120	10.27%	0.650	0.72%	0.753	0.00%
130	11.30%	0.838	0.57%	0.900	0.00%
140	11.77%	0.939	0.20%	0.967	0.00%

Long the market portfolio, long one put

Strike	E(r)	$\beta$	$\alpha$	adj B	adj A
90	11.49%	0.962	-0.24%	0.927	0.00%
100	10.24%	0.837	-0.62%	0.749	0.00%
110	8.40%	0.606	-0.84%	0.485	0.00%
120	6.73%	0.351	-0.72%	0.247	0.00%
130	5.70%	0.163	-0.44%	0.101	0.00%
140	5.24%	0.062	-0.19%	0.034	0.00%

- Computed assuming a lognormal portfolio with expected return 12%, s.d. 15%
- $\alpha$  is computed with a risk free rate of 5%
- The factor  $b$  is 3.63
- From Leland (1999)

# Downside measures

- Instead of allocating risks equally between upside and downside returns, downside risk measures only take into account of the losses with respect to a certain per-defined level
- An example is the Roy's safety-first criterion: portfolio optimization is based on minimizing the probability that the portfolio return will be lower than a threshold  $R_0$
- By Tchebycheff's inequality, it can be shown that

$$P(R_P < R_0) \leq \frac{\sigma_P^2}{R_P - R_0}$$

where  $P()$  denotes a probability function

# Downside measures

- The Sharpe ratio is based on a dispersion risk measure around the mean, thus variations above or below the mean have equal contributions
- The following two measures only take into account of the asymmetry and the downside risks

- Semi-variance

$$SV(R) = E\left[\left[(E[R] - R)^+\right]^2\right]$$

- Lower partial moment

$$SV(R) = E\left[\left[(E[R] - R)^+\right]^p\right]$$

where  $p$  is an integer  $> 2$

# Sortino ratio

- A very popular ratio used for comparing hedge fund performances
- Only takes into account of the loss expectations

$$Sor(R) = \frac{E(R) - L}{\sqrt{E\left[\left[(L - R)^+\right]^2\right]}}$$

where  $L$  is a minimal acceptable return level

- Conceptually it is similar to the Sharpe ratio
- A few choices of  $L$ 
  - To control the loss risk,  $L = 0$
  - The riskless rate  $r_f$  can be used as the benchmark, i.e.  $L = r_f$
  - $L$  can be chosen as the mean expected returns of other funds

# Example of hedge fund performance

*Illustration 5: Hedge fund strategies' risks for the period from 1999 to 2008*

	Risk Dimension				Risk-Adjusted Performance	
Reference period: January 1999–December 2008	Maximum Drawdown (in %)	Volatility (in %)*	Downside Risk (in %)*	Modified Value-at-Risk (in %)**	Sharp Ratio*/**	Sortino Ratio*/**
Convertible Arbitrage	29.27%	6.74%	8.69%	3.55%	0.24	0.26
CTA Global	11.68%	8.80%	4.85%	3.52%	0.48	1.01
Distressed Securities	22.60%	5.88%	5.56%	2.50%	1.04	1.22
Emerging Markets	34.54%	11.60%	9.04%	5.05%	0.65	0.91
Equity Market Neutral	11.08%	3.17%	4.34%	1.28%	1.05	0.91
Event Driven	20.07%	5.83%	5.34%	2.56%	0.84	1.04
Fixed Income Arbitrage	17.60%	4.21%	6.44%	2.03%	0.36	0.33
Global Macro	7.92%	5.27%	2.62%	1.56%	0.95	2.16
Long/Short Equity	21.04%	7.60%	5.21%	3.14%	0.51	0.86
Merger Arbitrage	5.65%	3.58%	2.95%	1.31%	1.21	1.68
Relative Value	15.94%	4.52%	5.27%	2.08%	0.81	0.82
Short Selling	36.30%	17.74%	11.31%	7.91%	-0.01	0.05
Funds of Funds	20.22%	6.18%	4.78%	2.43%	0.50	0.78

- Source: Veronique Le Sourd, Hedge Fund Performance in 2008, EDHEC Risk and Asset Management Research Centre, Feb 2009



# What is Value-at-Risk (VaR)?

- *“An attempt to provide a single number summarizing the total risk in a portfolio of financial assets for senior management”*
  - Hull (2003)
- A typical statement is:
  - “We are X % certain that we will not lose more than V dollars in the next N days”
  - X is the confidence interval; usually X=95 or 99
  - N is the holding period; N=1 day or 10 days are common
  - V is the VaR

# What are the VaR parameters?

- *Normal distribution is commonly used* because of the Central Limit Theorem and its analytical tractability
- **Holding period** reflects the liquidity risk; should roughly equal to the time needed to liquidate the portfolio
- **Confidence level** is arbitrary; a consistent measure should be used to compare the change in VaR on a daily basis

# VaR for linear portfolios

- For a portfolio with no options

$$\text{VaR} = a \times \text{expected \% move in portfolio value}$$

- If we assume a normal distribution, at 99% confidence interval,  $a = 2.33$ ; at 95% confidence interval,  $a = 1.96$

$$\text{expected \% move in portfolio value} = N \times \sigma_p \sqrt{t}$$

where  $N$  is the portfolio value,  $\sigma_p$  is the portfolio s.d. and  $t$  is the holding period (in yrs)

- If we assume assets prices follow normal distributions, the portfolio variance is given by

$$\sigma_p^2 = \sum_{i=1}^N w_i^2 \sigma_i^2 + \sum_{j=1}^N \sum_{\substack{k=1 \\ k \neq j}}^N w_j w_k \sigma_{jk}$$

# How do we compute VaR?

- Mark to market of the current portfolio (e.g. \$100 Million)
- Measure the variability of the risk factors (e.g. 15% per annum)
- Set the time horizon or the holding period (e.g. 10 business days, out of 252 business days per year)
- Set the confidence interval (e.g. 99%, or  $2.33\sigma$  for a normal distribution)

$$\begin{aligned}\text{Value - at - Risk } V &= N \times \sigma_p \times \sqrt{t} \times a \\ &= 100 \times 0.15 \times \sqrt{\frac{10}{252}} \times 2.33 \\ &= \$6.96 \text{ Million}\end{aligned}$$

# VaR for portfolios with derivatives

- A complex (but realistic) topic
- Because of non-linear payoff, the risk profile could be highly irregular
- If the portfolio contains lots of option positions, the only sensible method is to perform a full scale scenario analysis, which is very computationally intensive
- However, a number of simplifications has been made, but we need to understand the limitations of each method

# Delta-normal method

- Replace each option position by its delta equivalent (c.f. lectures 7 to 9)

$$\Delta = \frac{\delta P}{\delta S} \Rightarrow \delta P = \Delta \delta S = \Delta S \delta x$$

- $\delta x$  is the % change in the stock price in one day
- For a portfolio with  $n$  stocks

$$\delta P = \sum_{i=1}^n \Delta_i S_i \delta x_i$$

- We could then use the equation on p.35, using  $\delta P$  to replace the term  $N\sigma_p$

# Delta normal method: example

- Delta of HSBC options = 800 shares
- Delta of Sun Hung Kai (SHK) options = 1200 shares
- HSBC share price = \$130, SHK share price = \$72
- Volatility of HSBC = 25%, SHK = 30%, correlation = 0.60
- Portfolio standard deviation =

$$\sigma_{HSBC} = 800 \times 130 \times 0.25 = 26000$$

$$\sigma_{SHK} = 1200 \times 72 \times 0.30 = 25920$$

$$\begin{aligned}\sigma_P &= \sqrt{26000^2 + 25920^2 + 2 \times 26000 \times 25920 \times 0.6} \\ &= 46439\end{aligned}$$

- VaR at 99% confidence interval is  $2.33 \times 46439 \times \sqrt{1/252} = \$6816$

# Historical simulation method

- Use the daily historical return and apply to the current market prices in order to generate a possible future scenario
- Simple to implement if data are readily available
- Allows non-linearities and non-normal distributions and correlation behaviour
- Difficulty in getting sufficient data
- One sample path used only, hence it could only be used as a reference and should be supplemented with other measures
- *History may not be a reliable guide of the future!*



# Historical simulation example

Reference date	2/15/2013		
spot fx	1.6850	Position	
R(USD)	2.700%	USD fwd	16,760,000
R(GBP)	4.200%	GBP fwd	-10,000,000
days to maturity	90	Current MTM (USD)	-29,659

	days to				Absolute daily change			Simulated movements				
	maturity	spot FX	R(USD)	R(GBP)	FX % retur	R(USD)	R(GBP)	FX	R(USD)	R(GBP)	MTM	P&L
7/29/2010	90	1.5425	4.8750%	5.6250%				1.6850	2.7000%	4.2000%	-29,659	
8/1/2010	87	1.5360	4.8125%	5.6875%	-0.00421	-0.0625%	0.0625%	1.6779	2.6375%	4.2625%	43,613	73,272
8/2/2010	86	1.5355	4.8125%	5.6250%	-0.00033	0.0000%	-0.0625%	1.6774	2.6375%	4.2000%	45,891	2,278
8/3/2010	85	1.5573	4.8125%	5.5000%	0.01420	0.0000%	-0.1250%	1.7012	2.6375%	4.0750%	-195,480	-241,371
8/4/2010	84	1.5357	4.7500%	5.4375%	-0.01387	-0.0625%	-0.0625%	1.6776	2.5750%	4.0125%	37,677	233,157
8/5/2010	83	1.5436	4.7500%	5.5625%	0.00514	0.0000%	0.1250%	1.6862	2.5750%	4.1375%	-43,761	-81,439
8/8/2010	80	1.5394	4.8750%	5.6250%	-0.00272	0.1250%	0.0625%	1.6816	2.7000%	4.2000%	-2,708	41,053
8/9/2010	79	1.5280	4.8750%	5.5000%	-0.00741	0.0000%	-0.1250%	1.6692	2.7000%	4.0750%	115,608	118,316
8/10/2010	78	1.5370	4.8750%	5.5000%	0.00589	0.0000%	0.0000%	1.6790	2.7000%	4.0750%	17,553	-98,055
8/11/2010	77	1.5580	5.0000%	5.5625%	0.01366	0.1250%	0.0625%	1.7019	2.8250%	4.1375%	-212,715	-230,268

- The P&L is ranked and the 95% worst case is selected as the VaR

# Monte Carlo simulations

- Using a mathematical model (e.g. Geometric Brownian motion), generate paths of asset prices (say 100,000 paths)
- For each asset path, calculate the mark-to-market of the portfolio
- Rank the P&L of each path; the 99 (or 95) percentile return is the VaR
- Very computational intensive
- Strong assumptions in the underlying model (i.e. model risk is high)

# Coherent measure of risk

- Let  $X$  and  $Y$  be two portfolios and  $\rho()$  is the risk measure
- Conditions of coherence

- Monotonicity:

$$\text{if } X \leq Y, \rho(X) \geq \rho(Y)$$

- Translation invariance:

$$\rho(X + k) = \rho(X) - k$$

- Homogeneity:

$$\rho(b \cdot X) = b \cdot \rho(X)$$

- Sub-additivity:


$$\rho(X + Y) \leq \rho(X) + \rho(Y)$$

- VaR is not a good risk measure as it does not satisfy the last property!
- From P. Artzner, F. Delbaen, J.-M. Eber, D. Heath, “Coherent Measures of Risk”, Mathematical Finance, 9 (1999) 203-28

# VaR and subadditivity

- Supposedly, given the effect of diversification, a portfolio with assets X and Y should have risks that are lower than the plain sum of the risks of these assets
- It is possible that the VaR of a portfolio can be higher than the sum of the VaRs of the individual assets of the portfolio
- Example (from Artzner et al. (1999))
  - Trader A sells an out-of-the-money call, with a probability of 4% that the call be in-the-money
  - Trader B sells an out-of-the-money put, with a probability of 4% that the put be in-the-money

# VaR and subadditivity



- The 95% VaR of each individual position is 0 since there is only a 4% probability that there will be a loss ( $\text{VaR}(A) + \text{VaR}(B) = 0$ )
- The 95% VaR of the portfolio is higher than 0, since the portfolio only has a probability of 92% that it will not end up with a loss


# A further example

- Consider the following :
  - Each of two independent projects has a probability 0.98 of a loss of \$1 million and 0.02 probability of a loss of \$10 million
  - The 97.5% VaR for each project is \$1 million
- When combining the two projects into a single portfolio, the loss distribution can be calculated as follows:
  - Probability =  $0.02 \times 0.02 = 0.04\%$  of a loss of \$20 million
  - Probability =  $2 \times 0.02 \times 0.98 = 3.92\%$  of a loss of \$11 million
  - Probability =  $0.98 \times 0.98 = 96.04\%$  of a loss of \$2 million
- The 97.5% VaR of the portfolio is thus \$11 million, which is much higher than the sum of the individual VaRs

# Conditional value-at-risk (CVaR)

- Also known as the Expected shortfall
- VaR is the “best outcome of a set of bad outcomes on a bad day”
- CVaR is the “average bad outcome on a bad day”
  - Measures the expected amount of losses in the tail of the distribution of possible portfolio losses
- Calculating CVaR can be computationally more intensive and requires a more detailed description of the loss distribution

# Conditional value-at-risk (CVaR)



- Measures the expected portfolio loss rather than the quantile
- Value-at-Risk :
  - $\Pr(\text{loss} \leq VaR(\beta)) = \beta$
  - e.g.  $\beta = 99\%$
- Conditional VaR
  - $CVaR(\beta) = E(\text{loss} \mid \text{loss} > VaR(\beta))$   
 $\geq VaR(\beta)$



# Possibility of extreme events

- Normal distribution implies a very small probability for extreme moves (e.g. 3 standard deviations)
- Extreme moves do occur much more frequently (e.g. stock market crash in 1987, Asian crises in 1997, 9/11 event in 2001, financial crisis of 2007/2008, etc.)
  - “Black Swan” events
- Other fat-tailed distributions are used, e.g. Student  $t$  distribution, Extreme Value Theory
  - Not so analytically tractable

# Case study: rise and fall of LTCM

- Long Term Capital Management (LTCM) was a high profile hedge fund, established in 1994
  - Partners include a former head trader from Salomon Brothers, (future) Nobel prize winners, and a former deputy governor of the Federal Reserve Board
  - Very successful in 1994-1996; performance not as good in 1997
  - Capital at US\$ 4 Billion at the start of 1998

# Case study: rise and fall of LTCM


## ◦ **Events in 1998**

- Salomon Brothers, which allegedly had similar positions as LTCM, liquidated its positions in May 1998, causing sharp marked-to-market losses in LTCM
- Downturn in mortgage-backed securities market in June 1998 led to cut backs in LTCM's liquid positions (to reduce leverage)
- Russia defaulted in August 1998
- LTCM's faced margin calls and were forced to reveal its positions; more severe marked-to-market losses followed (single day loss of US\$550 Million on Aug 21 and Sep 21, 1998)
- Lost all the \$4 Billion by late Sep 1998; the New York Federal Reserve organized a bailout at end of Sep 1998, to avoid systemic risk

# Case study: rise and fall of LTCM

## The rise and fall of the LTCP (P: portfolio, run by LTCM, M: Management)

Professional Wealth  
www.professionalwealth.com.au  
Executive Summaries



# Case study: rise and fall of LTCM

- **Lessons**

- Liquidity: unable to unload illiquid positions – had the strategy be sustainable, the losses could be much smaller
  - VAR: should use back-testing to validate results
  - Correlation risk: change in correlation in severe conditions; should check sensitivity of portfolio due to parameter changes
- P.S. had they been able to survive Sep 1998, the strategies rebounded and made back all the money in 1999

# How should we use VaR?

- The VaR calculated is not a magic number; it should be used as one of the measures in managing risks
- 99% confidence interval = 1% of the time, or about 3 days per year, the loss could be greater than the calculated VaR
- Need to understand thoroughly the assumptions behind the VaR number
- *Should monitor the trend of the VaR of a portfolio*