# Solve Hopenhayn (1992) Using MATLAB

Yijiang Zhou

Department of Economics
The Chinese University of Hong Kong

March 13, 2021

#### Contents

- Introduction and useful resources
- Initiate parameters and state space
- Solve for price and exit rule
- Solve for firm distribution and entry mass
- Summary

## Introduction and useful resources

- Hopenhayn (1992): workhorse model in firm and industry dynamics
- Lecture slides by Prof. Chris Edmond available at his website.
  - Lecture 2 and 3 are essential for understanding the model and solution algorithm.
- Original MATLAB program by Prof. Alessandro Ruggieri available at his GitHub page.
- Four MATLAB code files needed: main.m, solve\_vfi.m, compute\_parameters.m and compute\_statespace.m.
- Detailed code notes on my GitHub page.

## Initialize model parameters

• Firm's production function (labor *n* is the only input):

$$y = zn^{\theta} \tag{1}$$

• Log of productivity z follows a AR(1) process:

$$\ln z_t = a + \rho \ln z_{t-1} + \epsilon_t \tag{2}$$

 $\sigma_{\ln z}^2$  calculated for later use given  $\sigma_{\epsilon}^2$ .

- Market demand is  $D(p) \equiv D p$  with D exogenously given.
- Discount rate  $\beta$ , fixed cost of operating  $c^f$  and entry cost  $c^e$ .

- Discretize z: assume ln z follows a 21-state Markov chain on ln z<sub>i</sub>.
  - In z<sub>i</sub> are evenly spaced along the real line with  $\ln z_1 < \ln z_2 < ... < \ln z_{21}$  and  $\ln z_1 = a - m\sigma_{\ln z}$ ,  $\ln z_{21} = a + m\sigma_{\ln z}$ .
- Calculate transition probability matrix for In z<sub>i</sub> using Tauchen's method: let  $w = \ln z_i - \ln z_{i-1}$  and the transition probability  $\pi_{ii}$  is defined by:

$$\pi_{ij} = \begin{cases} \Phi\left(\frac{\ln z_1 + w/2 - \rho \ln z_i}{\sigma_{\epsilon}}\right) & \text{for } j = 1\\ \Phi\left(\frac{\ln z_j + w/2 - \rho \ln z_i}{\sigma_{\epsilon}}\right) - \Phi\left(\frac{\ln z_j - w/2 - \rho \ln z_i}{\sigma_{\epsilon}}\right) & \text{for } 1 < j < 21\\ 1 - \Phi\left(\frac{\ln z_1 - w/2 - \rho \ln z_i}{\sigma_{\epsilon}}\right) & \text{for } j = 21 \end{cases}$$
(3)

with  $\Phi$  corresponding to the standard normal CDF.

## Initialize state space

• Transition probability  $\pi$  defined as:

$$\pi_{ij} \equiv \operatorname{Prob}(z_t = z_j | z_{t-1} = z_i) \tag{4}$$

- Initial productivity drawn from uniform distribution g(z)
- Discretize n: assume there are 251 grid points from 0 to 5000 for employment n.

## Code for initializing z space

```
1 %% Grid for tech shock, z,
2 % by using Tauchen's method of finite state Markov approximation
3 m=3;
4 w=2*m*sigma/(Z-1);
5 lnz=(-m*sigma+a):w:(m*sigma+a);
6 z=exp(lnz);
7
8 %Markov transition matrix
9 p=zeros(Z);
10
11 %See formula on notes
12 p(:,1)=normcdf(((lnz(1)+w/2)*ones(Z,1)-ro*lnz')/stde,0,1);
13 p(:,Z)=ones(Z,1)-normcdf(((lnz(Z)-w/2)*ones(Z,1)-ro*lnz')/stde,0,1);
14 for j=2:(Z-1)
15 p(:,j)=normcdf(((lnz(j)+w/2)*ones(Z,1)-ro*lnz')/stde,0,1)-...
16 normcdf(((lnz(j)-w/2)*ones(Z,1)-ro*lnz')/stde,0,1);
17 end
```

## Bisection on p

 Given price level p and employment choice n, we can write firm's profit *f* as:

$$f_i(p) = f(z_i, p, n) = z_i n^{\theta} p - n - c^f$$
 (5)

where wage is normalized to 1.

Bellman equation for incumbent firm is then:

$$v_i(p) = f_i(p) + \beta \max \left[ 0, \sum_{j=1}^{21} v_j(p) \pi_{ij} \right]$$
 (6)

Free entry condition:

$$v^{e}(p) \equiv \sum_{i=1}^{21} v_{i}(p)g_{i} = c^{e}$$
 (7)

- Easy to show  $v^e(0) < 0$  and  $v^e(p)$  is monotonically increasing in p.
- Given  $c^e$ , we can find the unique solution  $p^*$  using bisection.
  - Need to know v\*(p) for each p. This is done by VFI.
  - Guess an initial  $p_0$  between  $p_{min}$  and  $p_{max}$ , solve  $v^*(p)$  with VFI, calculate  $v^e(p_0)$  and compare to  $c^e$ .
  - Update new guess p<sub>i+1</sub> as:

$$p_{j+1} = \begin{cases} \frac{p_j + p_{max}}{2} & \text{if } v^e(p_j) < c^e \\ \frac{p_{min} + p_j}{2} & \text{if } v^e(p_j) \ge c^e \end{cases}$$
 (8)

• Stop when  $\frac{|v^e(p)-c^e|}{c^e} < 10^{-6}$ .

## Code for bisection

```
1 %% Iterate over price of goods
3 % Boundaries for price
4 pmin=0.01;
5 pmax=100;
7 while d>toler
      % Guess prices
      price=(pmin+pmax)/2;
      % Solve firm value function iteration
      [vinitial,dr,exit] = solve_vfi(price,z,Z,n,N,theta,beta,cf,p);
      %Compute the decision rule for labor
      decrule=zeros(1,Z);
      for i=1:Z
          decrule(i)=n(dr(i)):
      end
20
      %Define expected value of entrant
      value=inidis*vinitial';
      % Update price till EV=ce
      if value < ce
24
       pmin=price;
      else
26
       pmax=price;
      end
29
      % Check convergence
      d=abs(value-ce)/ce;
32 end
```

Write equation (6) into matrix form as:

$$\mathbf{v}^{k+1}(\mathbf{p})^{\top} = \mathbf{f}(\mathbf{p})^{\top} + \beta \max \left[ \mathbf{0}, \mathbf{\Pi} \cdot \mathbf{v}^{k}(\mathbf{p})^{\top} \right] \equiv T \left( (\mathbf{v}^{k})^{\top}, \mathbf{p} \right)$$
 (9)

k denotes number of iterations. Initial  $\mathbf{v}^0$  is set to be  $\mathbf{0}$ .

• For every z and p, firm chooses optimal  $n^*$  that maximizes value function, i.e., elements of vector  $\mathbf{v}^{k+1}(p)$  are obtained by solving:

$$v_i^{k+1}(p) = \max_{n} \left[ z_i n^{\theta} p - n - c^f + \beta \max \left( 0, \sum_{j=1}^{21} v_j^k(p) \pi_{ij} \right) \right]$$
 (10)

### Value function iteration

• Solving it yields  $\mathbf{v}^{k+1}(p)$ , policy  $\mathbf{n}(p)$  and exit rule  $\mathbf{x}(p)$  with elements (0 for exit and 1 for continue):

$$x_i(p) = 1 - 1 \left( \sum_{j=1}^{21} v_j^k(p) \pi_{ij} < 0 \right)$$
 (11)

• T in equation (9) is a contraction mapping. Iterating on T given initial guess  $\mathbf{v}^0$  yields:

$$T\left((\mathbf{v}^k)^\top, p\right) = \mathbf{v}^{k+1}(p)^\top \to \mathbf{v}^*(p)^\top \text{ as } k \to \infty$$
 (12)

The program iterates on T until

$$\frac{||\mathbf{v}^{k+1} - \mathbf{v}^k||}{||\mathbf{v}^k||} \le 10^{-8}$$

```
function [vrevised.dr.exit] = solve vfi(price.z.Z.n.N.theta.beta.cf.p)
3 %Value function iteration
4 d=1:
5 toler=1e-08:
7 % Store policy function
8 dr =zeros(1,Z); %record for policy function
exit=zeros(1,Z); %record for exit decision
" % Guess value functions
vinitial=zeros(1.Z):
vrevised=zeros(1,Z);
15 % Fixed cost matrix
16 cost=cf*ones(N,1)';
18 while d>toler
      for i=1:2
         fi = z(i)*n.^theta.*price - n - cost;
          [vrevised(i),dr(i)]=max(fi+beta*max(p(i,:)*vinitial',0)*ones(N,1)');
          exit(i)=1-1*(p(i,:)*vinitial'<0);
      end
      d=norm(vrevised-vinitial)/norm(vrevised);
      vinitial=vrevised;
26 end
28 end
```

## Distribution of incumbent firms

- In the previous section, we have solved  $p^*$  and  $x(p^*)$ .
- $\mu_{it} = \mu_t(z_i)$  denotes measure of firms with productivity  $z_i$  at t. It is also the element in  $\mu_t$ , which evolves according to:

$$\mu_{t+1}^{\top} = \Psi(p^*) \mu_t^{\top} + m \mathbf{g}^{\top} \equiv U(\mu_t^{\top}, p^*), \quad t = 0, 1, \dots$$
 (13)

- $\mu$  is NOT a probability distribution vector.
- Ψ (p\*) has elements

$$\psi_{ij}(p^*) = x_j(p^*) \pi_{ji}, \quad i, j = 1, ..., n$$
 (14)

- Easy to see  $\psi_{ii}(p^*) = 0$  if firm exits with productivity draw  $z_i$  at t.
- Measure of firms at grid point  $z_i$  at t+1 depends on transition probabilities and exit decisions of incumbents at t and flow of new entrants.

### Distribution of incumbent firms

• Given m, we can calculate the stationary distribution  $\mu$  as:

$$\boldsymbol{\mu}^{\top} = m \left( I - \Psi \left( p^* \right) \right)^{-1} \mathbf{g}^{\top} \equiv \boldsymbol{\mu} \left( m, p^* \right)^{\top} \tag{15}$$

- Or: assume initial distribution  $\mu^0 = \mathbf{g}$  and iterate on mapping U.
- Either way,  $\mu$  is linear in m can be written into

$$\mu(m, p^*) = m \times \mu(1, p^*)$$

- How do we know m?
- Market clearing condition:

$$Y(m, p^*) = \sum_{i=1}^{21} y_i(p^*) \mu_i(m, p^*) = D(p^*)$$
 (16)

Hence:

$$m^* = \frac{D(p^*)}{Y(1, p^*)} = \frac{D(p^*)}{\sum_{i=1}^{21} y_i(p^*) \mu_i(1, p^*)}$$
(17)

• Substituting  $m^*$  into equation (15) gives  $\mu^*$ .

• Using policy function x(p) derived from the last section, we can calculate the exit threshold of productivity as:

$$z\left(p^{*}\right)=z_{i^{*}},\quad i^{*}\equiv\min_{i}\left[\sum_{j=1}^{n}v_{j}\left(p^{*}\right)\pi_{ij}\geq0
ight]$$

Firms whose productivity draws are below  $z_{i*}$  exit the market in the equilibrium.

- Full stationary equilibrium:  $(p^*, z^*, \mu^*, m^*)$ 
  - p\*: price level for goods
  - z\*: exit threshold of productivity
  - $\mu^*$ : distribution of incumbent firms
  - m\*: mass of entrants
- They correspond to a steady-state of the dynamic system implied by the perfect foresight equilibrium  $\{p_t, z_t, \mu_t, m_t\}_{t=0}^{\infty}$ .

# Code for calculating $\mu\left(1,p^{*}\right)$

```
1 %Given the value function and policy function, iterate on industry structure
2 %until it converges
3 d=1;
4 muinitial=inidis;
5 while d>toler
                                               %exit decision
      muexit=muinitial.*exit;
      mustay=muexit*p;
                                                %update for the incumbents stay
      muentry=mustay+inidis;
                                                %entrv
      murevised=muentry./sum(muentry);
      d=norm(murevised-muinitial)/norm(murevised);
10
      muinitial=murevised;
12 end
```

- ...by scaling muentry, which is  $\mu_{t+1}$ , using the sum of its elements.
- This makes no sense.
  - $\mu$  is not a probability distribution vector.
  - No need to scale it before calculating "distance" between  $\mu_{t+1}$  and  $\mu_{t}$  after each iteration.
- It has been tested, that the corrected code (next page) yields the same  $\mu(1, p^*)$  as that produced by equation (15).

# Corrected code for calculating $\mu\left(1,p^{*}\right)$

```
1 %% Calculating the entry mass M
2 % Using equilibrium condition in goods market
3 % mistake-free
4 murevised_sc = murevised ./ sum(murevised);
5
5
6 y=D-price;
7 Xstar=z(Z-sum(exit));
8 Pstar=price;
9 Size = (decrule)*murevised_sc';
10 Y=(decrule.^theta.*z)*murevised';
11 Mstar=y/Y;
12 Exrate=sum(murevised sc(1:Z-sum(exit)))*100;
```

- Step 1: use free entry condition (7) and monotonicity of  $v^e(p)$  to construct a bisection on price p.
  - Rely on VFI to compute  $v^*(p)$ , n(p) and x(p) for each p.
- Step 2: given  $p^*$  and  $x(p^*)$ , use mapping U in equation (13) to compute  $\mu(1, p^*)$ , and equation (17) for  $m^*$ .
- Step 3: obtain  $z^*$  using exit decision  $x(p^*)$ .

### Extras

- Changing initial distribution g(z): only  $\mu^*$  changes.
- Changing transition probability matrix to identity matrix: failed to solve  $\mu^*$ .
- Increase entry cost  $c^e$ : price  $p^*$  increases and productivity threshold z\* decreases. Weaker election effect.
- Decrease fixed cost  $c^f$ :  $p^*$  decreases. How about  $z^*$ ?